



Encyclopedia of
Modern Asia



volume





Encyclopedia of
Modern Asia



Encyclopedia of
Modern Asia

Volume 1
Abacus to China

A Berkshire Reference Work
David Levinson • Karen Christensen, Editors



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David Levinson and Karen Christensen, Editors

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Preface

The *Encyclopedia of Modern Asia* is an unprecedented effort at global understanding. With a readership of students and nonspecialists in mind, a team of more than eight hundred scholars and other experts from around the world has compiled this six-volume, 2.2-million-word publication. In it, we explore economics, religion, technology, politics, education, the family, the arts, environmental issues, international relations, scientific advances, and other vital aspects of the Asian experience that will shape the twenty-first century. The Encyclopedia explains the relationship of Asia to the rest of the world through its extensive coverage of the historical exchange of ideas and inventions. Most important, it provides a variety of perspectives on issues and events, and encompasses the past and the present of Asia in an authoritative and fully cross-disciplinary work.

To provide the comprehensive view needed by students and scholars in our global age, the Encyclopedia takes the broad and dynamic view of Asian history and culture that does not make false assumptions about Asian unity or uniformity, but allows us to look for continuity and diversity, change and variation, across and beyond this vast territory.

The Encyclopedia contains over 2,600 entries, which range from 200 to 4,000 words. The text is supplemented by 1,300 illustrations, tables, and sidebars of mainly primary-source materials; 90 maps; topical and regional outlines; and an extensive index. Articles have been written by experts from more than a dozen scholarly disciplines, from fields including banking, economic development, law, and human rights, and from more than sixty nations.

Our goal when we began this project with Charles Scribner's Sons in 1998 was to make the *Encyclopedia of Modern Asia* the standard reference work on Asia. Much has happened in Asia since then—the Asian economic crisis of 1997–1998 (the effects of which remain), the September 11th terrorist attack on the United States in 2001 and subsequent invasion of Afghanistan and war on terrorism, and increased fighting in the Middle East—to name just a few.

After September 11, 2001, people were fascinated by the fact that three years earlier we came up with the idea for this project, complete with coverage of the Central Asian republics, the Taliban, and many articles on Islam. "Were you smart or lucky?" someone asked. Our small publishing company's mission is to focus on the "global

experience and contemporary issues." Our first publication after September 11 was the *Encyclopedia of Fundamentalism*, followed by the *Encyclopedia of Crime and Punishment*, and now the *Encyclopedia of Modern Asia*.

Four years ago we had no idea that terrible, dramatic events would have Americans riveted by information on the religion and culture of Islam, or that bookstores would be selling Afghanistan maps by their cash registers. We did know that Asia was important and not well understood. We found its diversity and complexity absorbing. It's been thrilling to work with Asia scholars all over the world, even though we've dealt with threats that e-mail service in Turkmenistan would be stopped by the government, contributors' worries about political repercussions, and a variety of linguistic and cultural barriers.

As new political and economic conflicts—and opportunities—develop worldwide, and international trade barriers come down, and as there is an increasing migration and exchange of people and ideas, the *Encyclopedia of Modern Asia* will be a vital source of reliable and accessible information on the events, ideas, and issues that are shaping our future. The readership we have in mind is not just scholars and students but also journalists, businesspeople, governmental officials, and tourists.

Our essential purpose has been, since the first time we discussed this ambitious and sometimes nearly overwhelming project, to provide readers with information and knowledge about modern Asia from an Asian perspective. This immediately raises several questions about what readers will find in the *Encyclopedia of Modern Asia*. What is information? What is knowledge? What is Asia? What is modern Asia? What is an Asian perspective?

What Are Information and Knowledge?

In the age of rapid information availability via the Internet, understanding and appreciating the distinction between information and knowledge is crucial to making our way in the global community. Information and knowledge are both valuable, but they are not the same thing, and in the end only knowledge will enable the citizens of the twenty-first century to work together to create a better world.

By information we mean facts—dates, places, people, events, statistics—about who, what, where, and when. In the Encyclopedia you will find tens of thousands of facts, as our goal is always to provide information about the who, what, where, and when of modern Asia. Some of these facts stand alone, others paint a broad picture when combined with other facts, and still others provide context for deeper analysis and discussion.

By knowledge we mean information that has been organized, combined, studied, analyzed, and synthesized to answer questions about how and why. Here, you will find much knowledge, primarily in the form of articles by hundreds of international experts. These articles provide comprehensive, up-to-date, and authoritative discussions of the key elements of the history and culture of modern Asia.

What Is Asia?

By Asia we mean the thirty-three nations that comprise the subregions of East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, and West-Southwest Asia. Geographically, these nations range from Japan in the east to Turkey in the west and from Kazakhstan in the north to Indonesia in the south. Temporally, Asia includes nations and civilizations that are several thousand years old, such as China, Japan, and Iran (ancient Persia); nations that came into being as nation-states only in the twentieth century, such as Turkey and Singapore, and one nation—East Timor—that is brand new.

The use of the label Asia in this work is not meant to imply that there is one Asia nor to mask the significant variations that exist both across the region and between and even within nations. In fact, quite the opposite is the case. The Encyclopedia emphasizes diversity, with attention given to each region and each nation.

One cannot exaggerate just how diverse Asia is in language, religion, economy, form of government, history, and culture. It is more diverse and has less political and economic unity than any other region in the world today. There is no single historical or modern feature that defines or unites all of Asia.

In Asia, there is no religion like Christianity, which has long provided unity across Europe and the New World. Islam is the most widespread religion in the region, but is a minority religion in several large nations such as Japan, India, China, and the Philippines, and the majority of people in Asia are not Muslims. Buddhism is the major religion in East and mainland Southeast Asia but is no longer prominent in Central Asia and never was in West Asia. Western colonialism also did not produce regional unity as it has in parts of Africa. Asia was never colonized by one nation, although British influence was the broadest and in places the deepest. China has had much influence in East and northern Southeast Asia, but little in Central and West Asia. Asian colonization by the Mongols moving south and west, Hindu Indians moving east, and the Chinese moving south and east has had subregional rather than regional influence.

Every form of government has been found, and many still can be found, across Asia—theocracies, monarchies, constitutional monarchies, stable democracies, emerging democracies, communist states, and military dictatorships. Although Asian nations are members of the United Nations, there is no pan-regional body that is the equivalent of NATO, the European Union, the Organization of American States, or the Organization of African Unity. In fact, it is subregional associations like NATO for Turkey, ASEAN for Southeast Asian nations, and CIS for Central Asian nations which are especially important today.

The economy is also diverse, often within nations and across the region. In much of southern Asia and the east, wet-rice agriculture and village and family life based on it have been a powerful unifying force. But elsewhere, in rural areas, we find other primary subsistence methods including nomadic pastoralism, the farming of wheat and barley, horticulture, hunting, and fishing. In modern times, Asian nations have experienced very different patterns of economic development, with some relying on a single resource, such as oil, natural gas, or timber. Others rely on industrialized farming, while still others rely on manufacturing and others on a service-based economy. Asia houses the poorest nation in the world (Afghanistan), the second-leading economy (Japan), and the fastest-growing economy (China). Within nations, there is much difference in wealth between rural and urban areas and also in many nations with an emerging and increasingly influential middle class.

Culturally and linguistically, the region is again the most complex in the world. As the dozens of articles on languages show, there are thousands of languages spoken across Asia and within several nations (for example, India, China, Indonesia) people speak many different languages. Asia is also home to at least a thousand different cultural groups, some of whom have never been studied closely. India and Indonesia have several hundred each, China has at least fifty-five, and even ethnically homogeneous nations such as Japan and Iran have visible ethnic minorities.

The nations of Asia also vary in the amount of freedom of expression they afford their citizens. Some nations—Iran, Iraq, China, Vietnam—are considered to be quite restrictive in this regard. This had important implications, as it limited the number of experts from these nations who would agree to write for the project. Several

authors made it clear that their contributions were for scholarly purposes only, and one asked that his article be published without attribution.

Perhaps the one factor common to all of Asia in 2002 is contact with the West and reactions to Westernization. The different regions of Asia feel the effects of Westernization differently and respond to it differently, but it is an issue all of Asia faces. And, to a significant degree, how it is dealt with will have much to do with the nature of Asia in the twenty-first century.

It must be noted that there are several nations and regions not covered here in detail that some experts might classify as belonging in Asia: the Caucasus or Caucasia, Siberia, and Australia. Caucasia and Siberia are covered in several articles, but not in the same detail as other regions, mainly because most experts agree that from a cultural and political perspective they are better classified as being in Europe. Australia, too, though it now has close ties to several Asian nations and a growing Asian population, is politically, linguistically, and culturally European. Thus, it is not covered in detail although its relations with Asian nations are well covered. Also not covered in detail are several West Asian nations—Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel and the nations of the Arabian peninsula—which are geographically part of Asia. They are not covered in detail for both conceptual and practical reasons. Conceptually, they form much of a separate region known as the Middle East, a region defined by Arab culture and Islam. The three nations of the Middle East covered here—Turkey, Iran, and Iraq—are part of what used to be called the Near East and in several ways are tied to Asia to the east. And from a practical standpoint, we realized early on that six volumes is still very little space to cover all of Asia and so we restricted breadth of coverage so as not to compromise depth of coverage.

One factor in choosing not to include the other Middle Eastern nations was the point made by expert advisers that we would also have to cover North Africa, which is culturally and politically part of the Middle East. A second consideration was the availability of reference material on these nations. In 1996 Macmillan published its four-volume *Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East*, which provides excellent coverage of these nations.

Because we take a dynamic, international relations perspective, the Encyclopedia also covers many nations outside Asia. For example, the many articles about relations between Asian nations and the United States and about Asian nations and Europe or European nations, tell us much about the United States and Europe today. Similarly, the many articles on economics and commerce emphasize both the international and regional dimensions, a significant consideration in this time of rapid globalization.

What Is Modern Asia?

Now that we have defined Asia, what do we mean by modern Asia? Not surprisingly, there is no single date that marks the transition to modern—if such a date actually exists at all—that applies to all nations. Early on in the project, the year 1850 was suggested by historians as a reasonable date, but we do not apply it systematically across Asia. From a temporal point of view, we have focused on Asia in the twentieth century and on those earlier events that have continuing impact today. Because Asian nations have rich and deep histories and much cultural continuity over time, many articles cover people, places, events, developments, trends, and ideas of the past.

Our conceptualization of modern Asia is dynamic and interactional and stresses those points in recent Asian history when Asian nations became more open to contact with other nations both in the region and beyond. This, of course, varies widely from nation to nation, and in fact some nations, such as Iran and Afghani-

stan, have in recent times moved to restrict contact with the outside world. Nonetheless, this emphasis on interactions and relationships is an important defining feature of our meaning of "modern" and also a defining and unique focus of this work. It is the reason that there are over one hundred articles on relationships between nations (such as China—India Relations and Japan—United States Relations), dozens of articles on trade, articles on environmental issues across the continent, surveys of human rights, and articles on the media, tourism, and Asian communities outside Asia.

Conceptually, this encyclopedia takes a modern world systems view of Asia, with Asian nations and the institutions in them seen as increasingly significant participants in regional and international economic, political, and cultural networks. This approach allows us to extensively cover topics ignored or given less attention in earlier reference works on Asia: contemporary political and business dynasties, international business networks, economic development, the changing roles of women, human rights, migration, regional and subregional alliances, and ethnic relations.

What Is an Asian Perspective?

When we first began discussing this project with scholars, several told us that they were concerned that other works took a Western perspective and they wanted this work to be different—to describe and explain Asia as Asians see and experience it. We knew that this was what we wanted to do: provide a fresh view of a vital part of the world, a view that would enable students to travel, intellectually and imaginatively, to the heart of Asia.

Our determination to provide an Asian perspective—in addition to explaining the Western perspective—influenced the project's development on a practical level. First, we included many articles on topics that do not translate neatly into English. This is why there are several dozen articles with Asian terms as their titles, such as *chaebol*, *juche*, *bedaya*, and *kyoiku mama*.

Second, it meant that we had to cover the diversity of Asia. We did this in several ways, by, for example, including separate articles on the same phenomenon in different places or forms. The dozens of articles on Islam, Buddhism, and Christianity across Asia reflect this diversity. We also included general survey articles on several topics—history, politics, economy, human rights, women, marriage and family, education—for each nation or subregion. These articles highlight both similarities and differences and make cross-nation and -region comparisons easy and quick. By including hundreds of articles on specific topics such as puppetry, sumo, haiku, and batik, we are able to highlight unique cultural, political, and economic features of all the nations. Finally, we ensured diversity by recruiting an international team of editors and authors—nearly nine hundred in all from more than sixty nations.

All of the above decisions were "field-tested" in April 2001 by we two editors and our two children, aged twelve and fifteen, on a month-long trip to Japan, China, and Kazakhstan. Through contacts made during the project, we knew people in all three nations and through their hospitality we were able to sample life in these nations in a way not possible for many travelers.

Our trip began during the week in 2001 when the United States and China were acrimoniously negotiating over a grounded U.S. spy plane and its twenty-four-member crew. It was soon after the sinking of the Ehime Maru, a Japanese fishing boat, by a U.S. nuclear submarine. As we drove to the airport, it occurred to us that the destination we were on best terms with was Kazakhstan.

In Beijing we had meetings with contributors to the encyclopedia, executives at an Internet company, and an editor at the *People's Daily*, which is based in grounds

guarded by soldiers. We spoke to the Rotary Club in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Our final few days were spent in Kyoto, Japan, in the tranquil setting of Amherst House, on the Doshisha University campus. "I might want to be an expat," said our daughter Rachel reflectively.

We managed without tour guides and were the only westerners on most of our flights (some of which were delayed—we were glad we brought a spare suitcase of paperback books). We still talk about the day we got a taxi to take us to Heaven Lake, in the mountains north of Urumqi in the far west of China. Negotiation with the driver centered around a tiny map in my guidebook and my memory of the Chinese name for the mountains. He and the hotel doorman seemed to know where we wanted to go, but as we left the doorman waved and said politely, "Hoping to see you again some day."

In China and Japan we sampled the traditional and the modern, although the modern was far more ubiquitous in Japan. The mix of old and new is perhaps most striking in Beijing where broad shopping streets lined with modern department stores and shops are just around the corner from traditional courtyards (*butong*) fronted by tiny food stalls with dirt floors. It is also apparent in comparing rural and urban life and life in the rapidly developing Beijing region and in the less-developed Xinjiang province in the far west. In Kyoto, Japan, the old and new is more neatly structured with steel and glass office complexes standing alongside ancient Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples. In Kazakhstan we witnessed the issues involved in making the transition from a state to a private economy with dramatic inequalities of wealth, deteriorating public services, and a grab-it-while-you-can attitude. We also learned of the work of Western medical missionaries trying to fill a health care gap so wide that the rural poor often die from serious, but treatable, illnesses.

In all three nations we were continually aware of the Western and especially, the American, presence, and often had to consciously act so as to avoid it. In Almaty, Kazakhstan, there is the TexasKazakh Bank, an "Outback" steakhouse, and three luxurious and brand new hotels serving the international business community. In Beijing, major street signs are in English and Chinese and throughout the nation much is done to make travel easy for tourists. In China we talked with several young men who spoke a bit of English and were eager to learn more. One of these young men guided an English couple and us through the intricacies of changing money at a bank in return for the opportunity to speak English for an hour. And in Kyoto, it was hard not to feel that one was in a smaller, neater, more polite United States.

By talking to people in all three nations we also learned the deep mistrust that pervades much of foreign relations in Asia. Some Japanese seem to view the Chinese as backward and uncultured, and also as a threat to Japanese economic dominance in East Asia. The Chinese have yet to forget their treatment at the hands of the Japanese before and during World War II. And, the Kazakhs worry at any moment the Chinese will invade to obtain Kazakhstan's mineral riches.

At the same time, there are friendly exchanges among the nations. We saw many Japanese tourists in China and Chinese students in Japan. And the planes from Urumqi, China, to Almaty, Kazakhstan, were filled with Russian Kazakhs on shopping trips to China, where goods are much cheaper.

The contradictions and complexities we experienced gave us new enthusiasm for the coverage we were providing in the Encyclopedia of Modern Asia and a fresh appreciation for the challenges faced by scholars trying to explain in clear, accessible English the sheer variety, volatility, and vitality of the Asia of the twenty-first century.

Content and Types of Articles

The *Encyclopedia of Modern Asia* provides coverage of the following general topics:

Arts, Literature, and Recreation
 Clothing
 Cuisine
 Economics, Commerce, and Transportation
 Education
 Ethnicity
 Geography and the Natural World
 Government, Politics, and Law
 History and Profile
 Human Rights
 International Relations
 Language and Communication
 Marriage and Family
 Media
 People, Cultures, and Society
 Provinces and Cities
 Regional and International Relations
 Religion and Philosophy
 Science, Technology, and Health
 Significant People

For all of these topics there are both long and short articles, articles that focus on unique elements of a single nation or region, and general articles that allow comparisons across nations and regions. There are also several dozen pan-Asia articles, such as those on environmental issues, on organizations (United Nations, IMF) whose actions affect all of Asia, on events that impacted the entire continent (such as World War II), on relations between Asia and other parts of the world, and on pan-Asian trends concerning issues such as fertility and AIDS. In order to facilitate both understanding of each nation and comparisons across nations, we have included a standard list of articles for each nation or each region. For each nation or each subregion you will find articles on the political system, economic system, history, education system, human rights, cuisine, clothing, literature, arts, music, religion, marriage and family, international relations, marriage and family, media, women, and Westernization.

Additional Content

The Encyclopedia is enriched by maps, photos, and sidebars, which provide information not included in the articles themselves.

The maps are meant to help the reader locate places mentioned in the entries. There are a general map of Asia and maps of each region in the front matter of each volume. Each nation—profile article (such as Bangladesh—Profile) includes a political map of the nation showing cities, natural features, and provinces as required. Other

maps show the location of particular places, such as major rivers or lakes and accompany the entries on those topics.

The photographs provide images of places, peoples, events mentioned in the text, and examples of important features of Asian life. They are meant to provide readers with another form of information about Asia and were carefully selected from the vast Corbis collection and from the private collection of Stephen G. Donaldson, who spent eighteen months photographing Asia from 1996 to 1998.

The sidebars are an especially important part of the Encyclopedia. The content in the sidebars is meant to supplement the articles and provide readers with additional resources on Asia. The sidebars are of ten different types:

1. Extracts of text from historical documents, such as agreements, treaties, and conventions that provide readers with primary source documentation for significant events in the history, politics, and international relations of Asian nations.
2. Extracts of text from ethnography that provide readers with first-hand accounts of daily life and the cultures and customs of Asian peoples.
3. Extracts from the literature, poetry, drama, and religious texts of Asia that allow readers to experience the broad and deep literary traditions of Asia.
4. Recipes for dishes for all major Asian cuisines that enable readers to enjoy the riches and variety of Asian life by cooking Asian dishes themselves.
5. Up-to-date statistical profiles of each nation that provide readers with a snapshot of the nation and allow easy comparisons across nations.
6. The preambles to national constitutions, which accompany the Nation—Political System articles. These allow readers to experience the philosophy that forms the ideological basis for the nation.
7. Timelines that trace the history of nations and major eras and historical periods and that allow readers to quickly place events in their historical context.
8. Accounts by early travelers and settlers (mainly European) of life in Asia that provide readers with insights into how and why the European or Western image of Asia developed as it did.
9. Notations for the approximately one hundred places described in the encyclopedia that are designated by the United Nations as World Heritage Sites. These notations assist tourists in selecting sites to visit and in learning more about them.
10. Text written for the encyclopedia that highlights especially significant or interesting facts or that provides additional information.

Using the *Encyclopedia of Modern Asia*

The Encyclopedia is a complex work, and to help readers make most effective use of it, we have provided several user aids. Perhaps most important are the comprehensive index in Volume 6 and the Reader's Guide at the front of each volume. The index helps readers find articles on related topics across the encyclopedia, while the Reader's Guide helps readers find articles on related topics for each nation and region. In addition, there are more than one-hundred blind entries that direct readers to relevant articles as well as cross-references at the end of many articles.

We have also tried to help readers in the manner in which we have organized the articles. The basic organization is A to Z from Volume 1 through Volume 6. Within this structure we have tried to group related articles together. For example, all basic survey articles on each nation are found under the nation's name (for example, Pakistan—Profile, Pakistan—Economic System, Pakistan—Political System, and so forth). Also all major articles on a topic are placed together (for example, Islam—Myanmar, Islam—South Asia; Islam—Southeast Asia, and so forth).

Finally, we have considered the needs of readers in the editorial and style decisions we made. Most importantly, we have made considerable effort to standardize spelling of places and names despite the considerable diversity of such spellings in the literature. Nonetheless, standardization is not complete as some contributors insisted that particular spellings be used. Also of much importance was our decision after much discussion and consultation with experts to not include diacritics except for the ayn and hamza used in Arabic, Persian, and related languages. (Our language articles are exceptions to this rule, as to express linguistic points it is often absolutely essential to use diacritics.) Our decision was based in part on the needs of general users who, we learned, are intimidated by diacritics which they do not understand. Our hope is that by letting general readers experience the richness of the Asian experience without the barrier of diacritics, we may draw people to further study—at which point they will be able to learn the complexities of the many often conflicting methods of representing Asian languages in English.

Another issue was how to order the names of people covered or mentioned in the Encyclopedia. Our first principle in listing people was to list them by the significant identifying portion of their name. For most nationalities and ethnic groups, this is the family name. Because European and American family names come after the personal name, this means that European and American people are listed in the traditional inverted fashion familiar to users of catalogues and reference materials (for example, John Smith becomes Smith, John). Because Chinese, Japanese, and Korean family names come before the personal name, on the other hand, most entries for Chinese, Japanese, or Korean figures are listed in their traditional order, with no comma, as no inversion has occurred (so Mao Zedong is listed as Mao Zedong, not Mao, Zedong). In Thailand it is customary to identify people by their personal name rather than their family name, therefore Thai figures can be found under their personal name, with their family name coming second and no intervening comma.

In the case of certain very well-known figures, however, a second principle came into play; namely, that we wanted to list people in the way that most readers would think to search for them. In some cases this second principle has led to deviations from the first principle. In all cases where there is ambiguity about a name or multiple well-known spellings of a name (for instance, Genghis Khan versus Chinggis Khan), we have included blind entries to direct the reader to our listing of the figure in question.

Final Thoughts

Massive as this publication is, it is by no means the last word on Asia. We have felt constrained by space limitations as we learned more about the intricacies of regional relations in Asia and beyond and about the ever-present links between the past and the present and the future. In addition, as more nations, such as those in Central Asia, open up to more outside study, our knowledge of Asia will grow and change. For example, more and more Central Asian scholars are studying their nations, and their work is replacing that of previous generations of Russian scholars.

Although this is a work produced by scholars and experts, it is intended for a broad audience. We hope that journalists, tourists, government officials, writers, teachers, and the general reading public will find something of interest and use. We welcome suggestions and corrections, and further information about modern Asia. Please write to us at asiainfo@berkshirepublishing.com.

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Acknowledgments



The purpose of this section is to explain the division of labor for the project and to publicly acknowledge and thank the many people who contributed to the project.

The *Encyclopedia of Modern Asia* took nearly four years to organize and produce and involved the efforts of more than eight hundred people around the world. The first acknowledgment must go to editor Karen Christensen, CEO of Berkshire Publishing Group, who conceived the idea of a general encyclopedia on modern Asia and has served as a steadying influence and the project's senior diplomat throughout its development. Her childhood passion for everything Japanese led to her trying to persuade her Minnesotan father to move the family to Japan instead of the Silicon Valley in 1968, so the encyclopedia has become the culmination of lifelong interest.

I served as senior project director and took primary responsibility for shaping the scope of the work, creating consistency across countries and regions, stepping in to deal with certain articles, reviewing articles as necessary, and managing the sidebar, photo, and map research. As a cultural anthropologist and editor, I welcomed the opportunity to work again with some of the contributors to the *Encyclopedia of World Cultures* and *Encyclopedia of Cultural Anthropology*, as well as with scholars from a wide variety of fields.

In the early discussion stages of the project, several people were especially helpful, not all of whom became involved with or remained with the project. They are Virginia Aksan (McMaster University), Doris G. Borgen (University of Massachusetts, Amherst), Thomas Headland (Summer Institute of Linguistics), Paul Hockings (University of Illinois, Chicago), Jennifer Jay (University of Alberta), Anatoly Khazanov (University of Wisconsin), Uli Schamiloglu (University of Wisconsin), Caroline Herrick (editor of *Persimmon: Asian Literature, Arts, and Culture*), Jonathan Benthall (Royal Anthropological Institute, London), the late Douglas Pike (Texas Tech University), and William McNeill (Emeritus, University of Chicago).

The editors and associate editors played a major role in selecting topics for coverage, recommending contributors, and reviewing articles. Editors are Virginia Aksan (McMaster University), Edward Beauchamp (University of Hawaii, Honolulu), Anthony and Rebecca Bichel (Central Michigan University and Pennsylvania State University), Linsun Cheng (University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth), Gerald Fry (University of Minnesota), Bruce Fulton (University of British Columbia), Paul Hockings (University of Illinois, Chicago), and Robert LaPorte, Jr. (Pennsylvania State

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The work on the Encyclopedia is perhaps best described as evolutionary, with the list of articles and contributors not completely finalized until the last few months of the project. At various stages, several experts provided timely and very helpful assistance in recommending changes to the article list and suggesting contributors: David Buck (University of Wisconsin), Marta Simidchieva (York University), Thomas Dolan (Columbus State University), Vincent Kelly Pollard (University of Hawaii, Manoa), Kevin Alan Brook, Paul Kratoska (National University of Singapore), and Kirk Denton (Ohio State University).

We also want to acknowledge and thank publicly our hosts in Asia who opened many doors that would not otherwise been available to us: Dr. Marty Barrett and the Rotary Club in Almaty, Wu Shao Ping and Dr. Chen Bao-xing in Beijing, and Fusako and Hideo Higuchi in Japan.

The Encyclopedia was developed and managed from our offices in Great Barrington, Massachusetts, a small New England town with a population of 7,700, only a few miles from Stockbridge where Norman Rockwell painted some of the most well-known images of an idealized American way of life. The languages spoken by staffers over the course of the project include Korean, Turkish, Japanese, Persian, Hindi, and Mandarin.

Junhee (June) Kim, Project Editor, managed the project and deserves unbounded praise for so smoothly coordinating the work of some eight hundred editors, authors, and copy editors and managing the flow of more than twenty-six hundred manuscripts. For her, dealing with hundreds of e-mails a day was routine. June was born in Korea, moved to Thailand at age six with her family, then to Turkey for high school and to the United States for college—experiences that left her uniquely qualified to carry out the responsibilities of Project Editor.

Senior Editor Francesca Forrest did an incredible job managing the enormously complex editorial side of the project. With many years specializing in editing resources on Asia and several years' residence in Japan, she was just the right person to develop the editorial guidelines and manage the copyediting and fact-checking processes. The consistency one sees across articles—and the sensible editorial decisions behind this consistency—is largely due to her efforts. She was ably aided by Associate Editor Marcy Ross who also smoothly handled a good bit of the fact-checking and updating of the articles.

Debbie Dillon and Trevor Young deserve special mention for so cheerfully meeting our programming needs to provide the complex database system needed to manage the project. Other members of the Berkshire staff who cheerfully pitched in when needed were Ben Manning, Shana Stalker, Robin O'Sullivan, Poyan Lofti, George Woodward, and Liz Eno. Interns Shannon Bell and James McGirk relieved us of many of the clerical tasks; James also gathered information for a number of the sidebars. We also want to thank Paul Exner at Exner Productions for producing the maps

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At Scribners, we want to thank Karen Day for signing the project four years ago and Frank Menchaca and Tim DeWerff for their strong support. John Fitzpatrick and Sarah Feehan made coordination and delivery of the manuscript smooth and easy, and their timely responses to our questions helped move the project along.

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David Levinson
Berkshire Publishing Group
Great Barrington, Massachusetts

Survey of Asia's Regions and Nations



The *Encyclopedia of Modern Asia* covers thirty-three nations in depth and also the Caucasus and Siberia. We have divided Asia into five major subregions and assigned the thirty-three nations to each.

West and Southwest Asia

The West Asian nations covered in detail here are Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. Afghanistan and Pakistan form Southwest Asia, although in some classifications they are placed in Central and South Asia, respectively. Afghanistan, on the crossroads of civilizations for thousands of years, is especially difficult to classify and displays features typical of Central, West, and South Asia.

Despite diversity in language (Persian in Iran, Arabic in Iraq, Turkish in Turkey) form of government (theocracy in Iran, dictatorship in Iraq, and unstable democracy in Turkey) and international ties (Iran to the Islamic world, Iraq to the Arab Middle East, Turkey to the West), there are several sources of unity across West Asia. Perhaps the oldest is geographical location as the site of transportation routes between Europe and Central, East, and South Asia. Since ancient times, people, goods, wealth, and ideas have flowed across the region. In 2002 the flow of oil was most important, from the wells of Iran and Iraq through the pipelines of Turkey. Another source of unity is Sunni Islam, a major feature of life since the seventh century, although Iran is mainly the minority Shi'a tradition and there have long been Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian, and Baha'i minorities in the region. Diversity is also evident in the fact that Turkey is a "secular" state while Iran is a theocracy, and in the conflict between fundamentalist and mainstream Islam in all the nations.

Another important common thread is the shared historical experience of being part of the Ottoman Empire and having to cope with British and Russian designs on their territory and, more recently, American influence. And, in the twentieth century, all three nations have sought to deal with the Kurdish minority and its demands for a Kurdish state to be established on land taken from all three nations.

Unity across Afghanistan and Pakistan is created by adherence to Sunni Islam (although there is a Shi'ite minority in Afghanistan) and the prominence of the Pash-tun ethnic group in each nation. Both nations also experienced British colonialism, although the long-term British influence is more notable in Pakistan, which had been

tied to India under British rule. West Asia is the only region in the world never colonized by Britain, although some experts argue that it did experience significant British cultural influence. In all nations resistance to external control—British, Russian, or United States—is another common historical experience.

Across the region (although less so in Afghanistan) is the stark contrast between the traditional culture and the modernity of liberation from imperial rule, still not complete across the region. This contrast is apparent in clothing styles, manners, architecture, recreation, marriage practices, and many elements of daily life.

In 2002 all the nations faced a water crisis of both too little water and water pollution. They all also faced issues of economic and social development, including reducing external debt, controlling inflation, reducing unemployment, improving education and health care, and continually reacting to the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, which exacerbates many of these problems. The governments also faced the difficult task of solving these problems while resisting Americanization and also while controlling internal political unrest. Political unrest is often tied to efforts at creating democratic governments and the persistence of elite collaboration with tyrannical governments.

Central Asia

Central Asia is known by many names, including Eurasia, Middle Asia, and Inner Asia. At its core, the region is composed of five states that became independent nations following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Scholars sometimes include Afghanistan, Mongolia and the Xinjiang province of China within the label Central Asia. For this project, Central Asia is restricted to the five former Soviet countries, while Afghanistan is classified in Southwest Asia, and Mongolia and Xinjiang as part of East Asia. These states have a shared landmass of 1.5 million square miles, about one-half the size of the United States.

The region's unity comes from a shared history and religion. Central Asia saw two cultural and economic traditions blossom and intermix along the famed Silk Road: nomadic and sedentary. Nomadic herdsman, organized into kinship groupings of clans, lived beside sedentary farmers and oasis city dwellers. Four of the countries share Turkic roots, while the Tajiks are of Indo-European descent, linguistically related to the Iranians. While still recognizable today, this shared heritage has developed into distinct ethnic communities.

The peoples of Central Asia have seen centuries of invasion, notably the legendary Mongol leader Genghis Khan in the thirteenth century, the Russians in the nineteenth and the Soviets in the twentieth century. For better or worse, each invader left behind markers of their presence: the Arabs introduced Islam in the seventh century. Today Islam is the predominant religion in the region, and most Central Asians are Sunni Muslims. The Russians brought the mixed legacy of modernism, including an educated populace, alarming infant mortality rates, strong economic and political participation by women, high agricultural development, and environmental disasters such as the shrinking of the Aral Sea. It was under Russian colonialism that distinct ethno-national boundaries were created to divide the people of the region. These divisions largely shape the contemporary Central Asian landscape.

Today the five Central Asian nations face similar challenges: building robust economies, developing stable, democratic governments, and integrating themselves into the regional and international communities as independent states. They come to these challenges with varied resources: Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have rich oil reserves; several countries have extensive mineral deposits; and the Fergana Valley is but one example of the region's rich agricultural regions.

Finally, the tragic events of September 11, 2001, cast world attention on Afghanistan's neighbors in Central Asia. The "war on terrorism" forged new alliances and offered a mix of political pressure and economic support for the nations' leaders to suppress their countries' internal fundamentalist Muslim movements.

Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia is conventionally defined as that subregion of Asia consisting of the eleven nation-states of Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Myanmar is sometimes alternatively classified as part of South Asia and Vietnam as in East Asia. The region may be subdivided into Mainland Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam) and Insular Southeast Asia (Brunei, East Timor, Indonesia, Philippines, and Singapore). Malaysia is the one nation in the region that is located both on the mainland and islands, though ethnically it is more linked to the island nations of Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines.

Perhaps the key defining features for the region and those that are most widespread are the tropical monsoon climate, rich natural resources, and a way of life in rural areas based on cooperative wet-rice agriculture that goes back several thousand years. In the past unity was also created in various places by major civilizations, including those of Funan, Angkor, Pagan, Sukhothai, Majapahit, Srivijaya, Champa, Ayutthaya, and Melaka. Monarchies continue to be significant in several nation—Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand—today. Subregional unity has also been created since ancient times by the continued use of written languages, including Vietnamese, Thai, Lao, Khmer and the rich literary traditions associated with those languages.

The region can also be defined as being located between China and India and has been influenced by both, with Indian influence generally broader, deeper, and longer lasting, especially on the mainland, except for Vietnam and Singapore, where influences from China have been more important. Islamic influence is also present in all eleven of the Southeast Asian nations. Culturally, Southeast Asia is notable for the central importance of the family, religion (mainly Buddhism and Islam), and aesthetics in daily life and national consciousness.

In the post–World War II Cold War era, there was a lack of regional unity. Some nations, such as Indonesia under Sukarno, were leaders of the nonaligned nations. Countries such as Thailand and the Philippines joined the U.S. side in the Cold War by being part of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). A move toward greater unity was achieved with the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, with the founding members being Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Subsequently other Southeast Asian nations joined ASEAN (Brunei, 1984; Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam 1997; Cambodia 1999). As of 2002, communism was still the system in Laos and Vietnam and capitalism in Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, the Philippines Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Political, economic, and cultural cooperation is fostered by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), with headquarters in Jakarta, Indonesia. Economically, all the nations have attempted to move, although at different speeds and with different results, from a reliance on agriculture to an industrial or service-based economy. All nations also suffered in the Asian economic crisis beginning in July 1997.

Alongside these sources of similarity or unity that allow us to speak of Southeast Asia as a region is also considerable diversity. In the past religion, ethnicity, and diverse colonial experience (British, Dutch, French, American) were major sources of diversity. Today, the three major sources of diversity are religion, form of government, and level of economic development. Three nations (Indonesia, Malaysia,

Brunei) are predominately Islamic, five are mainly Buddhist (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar), two are mainly Christian (Philippines and East Timor), and Singapore is religiously heterogeneous. In addition, there is religious diversity within nations, as all these nations have sizeable and visible religious minorities and indigenous religions, in both traditional and syncretic forms, also remain important.

In terms of government, there is considerable variation: communism in Vietnam and Laos; state socialism in Myanmar; absolute monarchy in Brunei; evolving democracy in the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, and Indonesia; and authoritarian democracy in Malaysia and Singapore. The economic variation that exists among the nations and also across regions within nations is reflected in different levels of urbanization and economic development, with Singapore and Malaysia at one end of the spectrum and Laos and Cambodia at the other. Myanmar is economically underdeveloped, although it is urbanized, while Brunei is one of the wealthiest nations in the world but not very urbanized.

In 2002, Southeast Asia faced major environmental, political, economic, and health issues. All Southeast Asian nations suffer from serious environmental degradation, including water pollution, soil erosion, air pollution in and around cities, traffic congestion, and species extinctions. To a significant extent all these problems are the result of rapid industrial expansion and overexploitation of natural resources for international trade. The economic crisis has hampered efforts to address these issues and has threatened the economies of some nations, making them more dependent on international loans and assistance from nations such as Japan, Australia, and China. The persisting economic disparities between the rich and the poor are actually exacerbated by rapid economic growth. Related to poverty is the AIDS epidemic, which is especially serious in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Thailand and becoming more serious in Vietnam; in all these nations it associated with the commercial sex industry.

Politically, many Southeast Asian nations faced one or more threats to their stability. Political corruption, lack of transparency, and weak civic institutions are a problem to varying degrees in all the nations but are most severe in Indonesia, which faces threats to its sovereignty. Cambodia and Thailand face problems involving monarch succession, and several nations have had difficulty finding effective leaders. Myanmar's authoritarian rulers face a continual threat from the political opposition and from ethnic and religious separatists.

In addition, several nations faced continuing religious or ethnic-based conflicts that disrupt political stability and economic growth in some provinces. The major conflicts involve Muslim separatists in the southern Philippines, Muslims and Christians in some Indonesian islands and Aceh separatists in northern Sumatra, and Muslims and the Karen and other ethnic groups against the Burman government in Myanmar. Since the economic crisis of 1997, ethnic and religion-based conflict has intensified, as wealthier ethnic or religious minorities have increasingly been attacked by members of the dominant ethnic group. A related issue is the cultural and political future of indigenous peoples, including the so-called hill tribes of the mainland and horticulturalists and former hunter-gatherers of the islands.

In looking to the future, among the region's positive features are the following. First, there is Southeast Asia's strategic location between India and China, between Japan and Europe, and between Europe and Oceania. It stands in close proximity to the world's two most populous countries, China and India. Singapore, the centrally located port in Southeast Asia, is one of two major gateways to the dynamic Pacific Basin (the other is the Panama Canal). Second, there is the region's huge population and related economic market, with a total population approaching that of one half of China's. Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous nation. Third, there is enor-

mous tourist potential in sites and recreational locales such as Angkor Wat, Bali, Borobudur, Phuket, and Ha Long Bay. Fourth, there is the region's notable eclecticism in borrowing from the outside and resiliency in transcending tragedies such as experienced by Cambodia and Vietnam. Fifth, there is the region's significant economic potential: Southeast Asia may well have the world's highest-quality labor force relative to cost. And, sixth, there is the region's openness to new technologies and ideas, an important feature in the modern global community.

South Asia

South Asia is the easiest region to demarcate, as it is bounded by the Hindu Kush and Himalayan ranges to the north and the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea to the south. It contains the nation-states of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka and the more distant island nations of the Maldives and Mauritius. Myanmar and Pakistan, which are considered part of South Asia in some schemes, are here classified in Southeast Asia and Southwest Asia, respectively.

While the region is diverse economically, culturally, linguistically, and religiously, there is unity that, in some form, has existed for several thousand years. One source of unity is the historical influence of two major civilizations (Indus and Dravidian) and three major religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam). Regionally, Sikhism and Jainism have been of great importance. There is also considerable economic unity, as the majority of people continue to live by farming, with rice and especially wet-rice the primary crop. In addition, three-quarters of the people continue to live in rural, agricultural villages, although this has now become an important source of diversity, with clear distinctions between urban and rural life. A third source of unity is the caste system, which continues to define life for most people in the three mainland nations. Another source of unity is the nature and structure of society, which was heavily influenced by the several centuries of British rule. A final source of political unity in the twentieth century—although sometimes weakened by ethnic and religious differences—has been nationalism in each nation.

South Asia is diverse linguistically, ethnically, religiously, and economically. This diversity is most obvious in India, but exists in various forms in other nations, except for the isolated Maldives, which is the home of one ethnic group, the Divehi, who are Muslims and who have an economy based largely on tourism and fishing.

The dozens of languages of South Asia fall into four major families: Indo-European, Austroasiatic, Dravidian, and Tibeto-Burman and several cannot be classified at all. Because of its linguistic diversity, India is divided into "linguistic" states with Hindi and English serving as the national languages.

Hinduism is the dominant religion in South Asia, but India is the home also to Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism. India also has over 120 million Muslims and the world's largest Zoroastrian population (known in India as Parsis) and Bangladesh is a predominately Muslim nation. India also has about twenty-five million Christians and until recently India had several small but thriving Jewish communities. Nepal is mainly Hindu with a Buddhist minority, and Bhutan the reverse. Sri Lanka is mainly Theravada Buddhist with Hindu, Muslim, and Christian minorities. Mauritius, which has no indigenous population, is about 50 percent Hindu, with a large Christian and smaller Muslim and Buddhist minorities.

Linguistic and religious diversity is more than matched by social diversity. One classification suggests that the sociocultural groups of South Asia can be divided into four general and several subcategories: (1) castes (Hindu and Muslim); (2) modern urban classes (including laborers, non-Hindus, and the Westernized elite); (3) hill tribes of at least six types; and (4) peripatetics.

Economically, there are major distinctions between the rural poor and the urban middle class and elite, and also between the urban poor and urban middle class and elite. There are also significant wealth distinctions based on caste and gender, and a sizeable and wealthy Indian diaspora. There is political diversity as well, with India and Sri Lanka being democracies, Bangladesh shifting back and forth between Islamic democracy and military rule, the Maldives being an Islamic state, and Nepal and Bhutan being constitutional monarchies.

In 2002, South Asia faced several categories of issues. Among the most serious are the ongoing ethnic and religious conflicts between Muslims and Hindus in India, the conflict between the nations of Pakistan and India; the ethnic conflict between the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils in Sri Lanka; and the conflict between the Nepalese and Bhutanese in both nations. There are also various ethnic separatist movements in the region, as involving some Sikhs in India. The most threatening to order in the region and beyond is the conflict between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir region, as both have nuclear weapons and armies gathered at their respective borders.

A second serious issue is the host of related environmental problems, including pollution; limited water resources; overexploitation of natural resources; destruction and death caused by typhoons, flooding, and earthquakes; famine (less of a problem today), and epidemics of tropical and other diseases. The Maldives faces the unique problem of disappearing into the sea as global warming melts glaciers and raises the sea level. Coastal regions of Bangladesh could also suffer from this.

There are pressing social, economic, and political issues as well. Socially, there are wide and growing gaps between the rich and middle classes and the poor, who are disproportionately women and children and rural. Tribal peoples and untouchables still do not enjoy full civil rights, and women are often discriminated against, although India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh have all had women prime ministers. Economically, all the nations continue to wrestle with the issues involved in transforming themselves from mainly rural, agricultural nations to ones with strong industrial and service sectors. Politically, all still also struggle with the task of establishing strong, central governments that can control ethnic, religious, and region variation and provide services to the entire population. Despite these difficulties, there are also positive developments. India continues to benefit from the inflow of wealth earned by Indians outside India and is emerging as a major technological center. And, in Sri Lanka, an early 2002 cease-fire has led to the prospect of a series of peace negotiations in the near future.

East Asia

East Asia is defined here as the nations of Japan, South Korea, North Korea, China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. It should be noted that Taiwan is part of China although the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) differ over whether it is a province or not. The inclusion of China in East Asia is not entirely geographically and culturally valid, as parts of southern China could be classified as Southeast Asian from a geographical and cultural standpoint, while western China could be classified as Central Asian. However, there is a long tradition of classifying China as part of East Asia, and that is the approach taken here. Likewise, Mongolia is sometimes classified in Central Asia. As noted above, Siberia can be considered as forming North and Northeast Asia.

Economic, political, ideological, and social similarity across China, Korea (North and South), and Japan is the result of several thousand years of Chinese influence (at times strong, at other times weak), which has created considerable similarity on a base of pre-existing Japanese and Korean cultures and civilizations. China's influence was

greatest before the modern period and Chinese culture thus in some ways forms the core of East Asian culture and society. At the same time, it must be stressed that Chinese cultural elements merged with existing and new Korean and Japanese ones in ways that produced the unique Japanese and Korean cultures and civilizations, which deserve consideration in their own right.

Among the major cultural elements brought from China were Buddhism and Confucianism, the written language, government bureaucracy, various techniques of rice agriculture, and a patrilineal kinship system based on male dominance and male control of family resources. All of these were shaped over the centuries to fit with existing or developing forms in Korea and Japan. For example, Buddhism coexists with Shinto in Japan. In Korea, it coexists with the indigenous shamanistic religion. In China and Korea traditional folk religion remains strong, while Japan has been the home to dozens of new indigenous religions over the past 150 years.

Diversity in the region has been largely a product of continuing efforts by the Japanese and Koreans to resist Chinese influence and develop and stress Japanese and Korean culture and civilization. In the twentieth century diversity was mainly political and economic. Japanese invasions and conquests of parts of China and all of Korea beginning in the late nineteenth century led to hostile relations that had not been completely overcome in 2002.

In the post-World War II era and after, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea have been closely allied with the United States and the West; they have all developed powerful industrial and postindustrial economies. During the same period, China became a Communist state; significant ties to the West and economic development did not begin until the late 1980s. North Korea is also a Communist state; it lags behind the other nations in economic development and in recent years has not been able to produce enough food to feed its population. In 2002 China was the emerging economic power in the region, while Taiwan and South Korea held on and Japan showed signs of serious and long-term economic decline, although it remained the second-largest (after the United States) economy in the world. Mongolia, freed from Soviet rule, is attempting to build its economy following a capitalist model.

Politically, China remains a Communist state despite significant moves toward market capitalism, North Korea is a Communist dictatorship, Japan a democracy, and South Korea and Taiwan in 1990s seem to have become relatively stable democracies following periods of authoritarian rule. Significant contact among the nations is mainly economic, as efforts at forging closer political ties remain stalled over past grievances. For example, in 2001, people in China and South Korea protested publicly about a new Japanese high school history textbook that they believed did not fully describe Japanese atrocities committed toward Chinese and Koreans before and during World War II. Japan has refused to revise the textbook. Similarly, tension remains between Mongolia and China over Mongolian fears about Chinese designs on Mongolian territory. Inner Mongolia is a province of China.

Major issues with regional and broader implications are the reunification of Taiwan and China and North and South Korea, and threat of war should reunification efforts go awry. Other major regional issues include environmental pollution, including air pollution from China that spreads east, and pollution of the Yellow Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea. A third issue is economic development and stability, and the role of each nation, and the region as a unit, in the growing global economy. A final major issue is the emergence of China as a major world political, economic, and military power at the expense of Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, and the consequences for regional political relations and stability.

Overview


As the above survey indicates, Asia is a varied and dynamic construct. To some extent the notion of Asia, as well as regions within Asia, are artificial constructs imposed by outside observers to provide some structure to a place and subject matter that might otherwise be incomprehensible. The nations of Asia have rich and deep pasts that continue to inform and shape the present—and that play a significant role in relations with other nations and regions. The nations of Asia also face considerable issues—some unique to the region, others shared by nations around the world—as well as enormous potential for future growth and development. We expect that the next edition of this encyclopedia will portray a very different Asia than does this one, but still an Asia that is in many ways in harmony with its pasts.

David Levinson (with contributions from Virginia Aksan, Edward Beauchamp, Anthony and Rebecca Bichel, Linsun Cheng, Gerald Fry, Bruce Fulton, and Paul Hockings)


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ABACUS A manual computing device used in ancient China, the abacus (*suan pan*, or "counting plate") was probably invented there in ancient times. The word "abacus" has its roots in the Phoenician term for a flat surface, and its Greek and Roman forms used flat surfaces with grooves for beads.

The Chinese abacus has a frame of thirteen wires holding seven beads on each wire; a horizontal divider separates the top two beads from the bottom five, sometimes referred to as the "heaven" and the "earth" beads, respectively. Chinese sources show wide use of the device by 190 CE, popularization during the Song dynasty (960–1279), and printed instructions appearing in the 1300s during the Yuan (1279–1368). By the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), the Chinese abacus had taken on its modern form and had become an integral part of business and financial accounting. This basic counting machine spread by the 1600s to Japan and then to eastern Russia, with small modifications in the number of beads above and below the divider.

In China, the abacus replaced paper-and-pencil mathematical calculations; the beads served as markers representing quantity, and the beads' position on the vertical wires represented value. A skilled user of an abacus performed addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division quickly and easily, with the additional advantage of requiring no electricity to produce a readout that cannot be lost or erased without being manually changed. Because of the traditional Chinese use of 16 as an important standard weight, the Chinese abacus is particularly useful for calculations using a base number system of 2 and 16.

Among storekeepers and small businesses in China, an abacus remained a standard piece of office equip-

ment until the 1980s. Even today, shopkeepers in Russia sometimes use abaci to calculate customers' purchases. A good-quality abacus is generally about two feet wide by one foot tall and made of sturdy brass with hardwood beads.

Margaret Sankey

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ABADAN (1997 est. pop. 308,000). The Iranian city of Abadan is located in the southeast corner of the country along the east bank of the Shatt al Arab River, 55 kilometers from the Persian Gulf. Its population is mainly Persian, though with a considerable Arab minority. According to popular belief the city was founded by a mystic named 'Abbad in the eighth or ninth century CE. Its proximity to the port of Basra allowed it to develop quickly into a prosperous town, but it was reduced to an impoverished village after the Mongol conquests of the thirteenth century. The establishment of the Safavid dynasty in 1501 promised to bring stability but the Ottoman conquest of Iraq in 1534 and the ensuing Ottoman-Safavid conflict prevented any renewed prosperity. It was not until 1847 that the Ottomans finally recognized Persian sovereignty over Abadan. In 1909, following the discovery



The Abadan Refinery burns following an attack at the start of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. (FRANCOISE DE MULDER/CORBIS)

of oil in the area, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company chose Abadan as its main refinery site. By 1956 Abadan had become one of Iran's major cities, boasting the world's largest oil refinery and a busy maritime port. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) the city, along with its industrial infrastructure, was completely destroyed. Reconstruction started immediately after the war and some oil exports have resumed.

Thabit Abdullah

ABANGAN *Abangan* (Javanese "red") is a term popularized by the anthropologist Clifford Geertz (b. 1926) to describe the rural Javanese Muslims whose Islam is blended syncretistically with older animist and Hindu-Buddhist beliefs. The term has entered Indonesian usage and is now considered pejorative, implying laxness in belief. The complex of beliefs that Geertz described are now more commonly called Kejawen ("Javanism"). *Abangan* belief centers on spirits, magic, and the ceremonial feast or *slametan*. Most spirits are malicious beings who intervene in human affairs on their own initiative, whereas magic involves the direct control of supernatural forces by a sorcerer or *dukun*. The skills of a *dukun* include treating disease, preventing accidents or injury, controlling natural phenomena, and both casting and lifting spells. The *slametan* is a feast offered to the immediate (male) community and accompanied by incense and prayer to mark a special occasion, to placate the spirits, and to confer on participants and their families a state of being *slamet*, or healthy and calm. Geertz distinguished

abangan beliefs from the similarly syncretistic Javanese aristocratic *priyayi* tradition, but most observers now use the term *priyayi* to indicate aristocratic status and culture in general and regard it as part of the broader *abangan* or Kejawen category.

The *abangan* stand in contrast to the *santri*, considered more pious Muslims, and both are referred to as *aliran* (streams) in Javanese society. They became one of the bases for political organization after Indonesian independence, the Partai Nasional Indonesia initially having a strong *abangan* base. During the 1950s, the Partai Komunis Indonesia won increasing *abangan* support, because the party espoused the interests of the rural poor. Many *abangan* were therefore among the victims of the anti-Communist massacres of 1965–1966, in which perhaps half a million people died. Ironically, however, President Suharto (b. 1921, reigned 1967–1998) was *abangan* in upbringing and strongly supported *abangan* beliefs in his early years in office. *Abangan* belief was the responsibility of the powerful Department of Education and Culture and in the early 1980s came close to receiving recognition as "belief" distinct from "religion."

Since 1950, the Indonesian state had provided massive support for religion by constructing places of worship, maintaining Islamic universities, and paying the salaries of religious officials. The Department of Religion was generally dominated by orthodox Muslims who regarded *abangan* belief as heterodox and lax and therefore ensured that no funds went to *abangan* purposes. A passage in the Indonesian constitution, which refers to religion and belief as if they were sep-

arate phenomena, however, gave the government a legal basis for regarding belief as part of culture and therefore for supporting it through the Department of Education and Culture, in which *abangan* Javanese tended to be more influential. Nevertheless, from the late 1980s, official support for *abangan* practice weakened as Suharto's New Order began to cultivate orthodox Islam.

Traditionally, *abangan* belief was not at all organized, but from the late colonial period formal organizations began to emerge, generally centered on mystical practice (*kebatinan*, "innerness"). The largest of these, including Pangestu and Subud, also have a following outside Java.

Robert Cribb

See also: **Islam-Indonesia**

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ABDALRAUF FITRAT (1886–1938), Bukharan writer, educator, social activist. Abdalrauf Fitrat was born in 1886 in the emirate of Bukhara to a merchant family, and little is known of his early years. As a young student he attended the Mir-I Arab *madrasah* (Islamic school) until 1909, when he received a scholarship to continue his education in Constantinople. He spent five years there and traveled broadly throughout the Ottoman empire, Iran, and Xinjiang, China. In 1911, he published his well-known and popular *Bayanat-I sayyah-I hindi* (Tales of an Indian Traveler) in Persian. It was published in Samarqand in Russian in 1914. The novel denounces Bukhara's poverty-ridden conditions and the corrupt practices of many Islamic clerics and teachers. It challenges the emirate's social order, which was a common theme in his professional and social activities. In 1917, Fitrat was elected secretary of the *jadidist*- (new method) influenced Young Bukharan Party, which seized power in Bukhara during the Russian Civil War. Following the Bolshevik victory, he became the minister for education in the newly established Soviet republic. He is credited with revising the educational system and helping to establish a European-style university in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. In 1923, he was removed from office after being accused

of bourgeois nationalism. He was arrested in 1938 and executed during the Stalinist party purges.

Steven Sabol


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ABDUL RAZAK (1922–1976), Second prime minister of Malaysia. Abdul Razak bin Dato' Hussein, second prime minister of Malaysia (1970–1976), effected major policy changes with long-term implications for the multiethnic population and the nation. Born on 11 March 1922 in Pekan, Pahang, he was educated at the Malay College, Kuala Kangsar, and Raffles College, Singapore. During the Japanese occupation (1941–1945), he joined the Anti-Japanese Malay Resistance Movement (Wataniah). On a scholarship, he read law at Lincoln's Inn, England, and was called to the bar in 1950. He married Hajah Rahah on 4 September 1952 in Johor.

Abdul Razak believed that poverty and socioeconomic imbalances among Malaysia's multiethnic population could be alleviated through rural development and education. He was instrumental in establishing such agencies as the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA), Malayan Industrial Development Finance (MIDF), and Council of Indigenous People's Trust (Majlis Amanah Rakyat, MARA). In 1956 he chaired a committee whose recommendations (Razak Report) formed the basis of Malaysia's education policy. During his premiership, he reshaped Malaysia's socioeconomic landscape through the New Economic Policy (NEP) aimed at eradicating poverty and restructuring society by focusing on rural development and education.

He played a pivotal role in reestablishing public order and the resumption of parliamentary rule (1971) in the aftermath of the 13 May 1969 racial troubles. He expanded the Alliance Party to form a larger coalition, the National Front (Barisan Nasional). During the mid-1970s, he faced a resurgence of Communist activities on the peninsula and secessionist tendencies in Sabah.



Prime Minister Abdul Razak in Kuala Lumpur in 1968. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

Abdul Razak was closely involved in the formation of Malaysia (1963) and in the reconciliation with Indonesia following Konfrantasi (the Confrontation, 1966). He argued for regional economic cooperation that subsequently led to the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. He proposed the concept for a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia (adopted in 1971) and advocated a nonaligned stance for Malaysia and established relations with socialist countries.

Ooi Keat Gin


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ABDULLAH, MUHAMMAD (1905–1982), Kashmiri nationalist leader and statesman. Born in Soura, Srinagar District, Kashmir, in a family of shawl merchants, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah was educated in Lahore and Aligarh and earned a Master's degree in physics in 1930. He became a central figure in Kashmiri politics, even though for much of his political life he was in prison or under house arrest in Ootacamund, in south India. In 1931 he was arrested for the first time for his role in the Indian independence movement.

After the 15 August 1947 partition establishing the separate states of India and Pakistan, the Hindu maharaja of Kashmir wanted his kingdom to remain autonomous of both nations, but on 20 October 1947 Pakistani militia, with government backing, occupied a western sector of Kashmir that has been known ever since as Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir). In response, the maharaja urgently requested support from India, acting on the advice of Sheikh Abdullah.



Sheik Muhammad Abdullah in Kashmir, c. 1950. (BRADLEY SMITH/CORBIS)

The maharaja executed the Instrument of Accession to the Indian Union, and thereupon, India rushed airborne troops to secure Srinagar, Kashmir's capital. Sheikh Abdullah was a signatory to the Indian constitution and never advocated the secession of Kashmir to Pakistan. In January 1948 the U.N. Security Council, convened at the request of India, imposed a cease-fire in the region. Thus, Kashmir became a pawn in regional power politics. Soon Abdullah was leading a struggle to oust the maharaja of Kashmir who, unlike the majority of Kashmiris, was not a Muslim. But in 1953, he was dismissed as prime minister because of Pandit Nehru's suspicion that Abdullah wanted independence for Kashmir. He was kept under house arrest in India, but was finally released in 1964. Abdullah, called the Lion of Kashmir by Muslims and others, became chief minister of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1975 and held that position until his death.

Paul Hockings

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ABDULLAH QUAISI (1894–1938), Master of Uzbek literature. Abdullah Quaisi produced many of the first modern indigenous plays, stories, and novels of Central Asia and had a major role in establishing the genre of the novel in modern Uzbek literature. His works, published between 1913 and 1923, reflect the changing circumstances of Uzbek life under the late czarist and early Soviet regimes.

Initially attracted to the Turan society (a chauvinistic idea of a superpolitical unity of the Turkic language-speaking nations) as a reformer, he later became involved in promoting the revolutionary cause of the Bolsheviks, as reflected in his story *Atam va Bolshevik* (My Father and the Bolshevik, 1922). Quaisi came to prominence with the publication of *Otgan Kunlar* (Past Days, 1923), credited as the first Uzbek historical novel, as a nationalist work, and as an attack on traditional Uzbek attitudes. His second novel, *Mehradban Chayan* (The Scorpion from the Mihrab), also received acclaim. Quaisi died in Stalin's purges of the 1930s, but gained posthumous recognition in 1956, and since Uzbek independence he has been recognized as a martyred nationalist.

Leonard A. Stone

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ABE ISO (1865–1949), Father of Japanese socialism. A native of Fukuoka Prefecture and graduate of Japan's first important Christian university, Doshisha, Abe Iso spent his career advocating pacifism, Christianity, and labor rights. Following an early stint as a minister and a time of study at Hartford School of Theology in Connecticut, Abe joined the Waseda University faculty in 1899, a post he would hold for most of his remaining life.

A moderate socialist, Abe helped launch Japan's most important socialist parties and organizations. In 1901, he was a creator of Japan's first socialist party, the short-lived Socialist Democrats; in later years, he helped found the Socialist People's Party (1928), the Socialist Masses Party (1932), and the Nationalist Labor Party (1940). He was elected to the Diet in 1928 and continued to win in successive elections, until he resigned in 1940, in opposition to Japan's growing militarism.

Though lacking a brilliant personality (he called himself a "utility man," drawing on the language of baseball, which he loved passionately), Abe was admired by supporters for the dogged consistency of his ideals and damned by more radical leftists as too moderate and pragmatic. His insistent antimilitarist stance made him a target of the right wing, and in 1938, he was nearly assassinated. After World War II, he served as an advisor to the Japan Socialist Party.

James L. Huffman

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ABKHAZIA A semiautonomous republic in northwestern Georgia, Abkhazia borders Russia to the north, along a ridge of peaks in the Caucasus Mountains; the northeastern coast of the Black Sea defines its southern boundary. With some river valleys and a few lakes breaking the terrain, its steep northern slopes run from glaciers to pastures, to mixed forests,

and eventually to a long, narrow strip of fertile coastland. Because Abkhazia has a subtropical climate along its coastal slopes and lowlands, its farms have long been known for their abundant yields of tea, citrus fruit, tobacco, grapes, and other crops. The capital is the port of Sukhum, erected on the grounds of a former Greek colony.

The Abkhaz region has been the site of human settlement since prehistoric times. Some of the first recorded histories of the region involve the Colchis state of the first millennium BCE; Greece conquered it in approximately 100 BCE. In later periods, both the Romans and Byzantines supported trading posts and garrisons in Abkhazia in order to maintain control over the Black Sea. The first Abkhaz kingdom was established in the eighth century CE; a later manifestation of this state merged with a Georgian kingdom in the eleventh century. The region fell to Mongol-Turkic invasions in the thirteenth century, and the Ottoman Turks claimed Abkhazia in the sixteenth century. The Russians seized it in the early nineteenth century. With the rise of the Soviet Union, and throughout most of the Soviet period, Abkhazia was designated an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the republic of Georgia. The consolidation of Russian—and later Soviet and Georgian—control over the region led to the migration of ethnic Abkhazians, mostly to Turkey. Soviet restrictions on Abkhaz ethnolinguistic expression and institutions were particularly severe under Stalin and the Communist Party.

Ethnic Abkhaz—often referring to themselves as Apsua, or variations thereof—are generally regarded as descendents of those peoples who had entered the region by the first century CE. Images of traditional Abkhazians depict a people with great longevity who are associated with cattle husbandry along the slopes and agriculture in the lowlands. About half are Orthodox Christians; Sunni Muslims comprise the other half. The Abkhaz language is part of the Northwest group of Caucasian languages and, despite periods of severe suppression under the Soviets, maintains both written and literary traditions. According to the 1990 census, Abkhazia had a population of almost 550,000; of these fewer than 20 percent were ethnic Abkhaz. The majority were Georgian—almost 50 percent—with Armenians, Russians and Ukrainians, and some smaller groups constituting the remaining 30 percent. In the mid-1990s, however, large numbers of non-Abkhaz peoples left amid armed conflict.

Despite their minority status, Abkhazians were particularly active in promoting their ethnolinguistic and political rights in the later years of the Soviet Union,

and since its collapse. In 1978, the Abkhazians proposed a petition for secession, and in 1990 the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet declared independence—envisioning a federation with Georgia rather than a subordinate state in a larger Georgian republic. In 1992, military conflicts between the Abkhaz and Georgia ensued. Since 1994, a relative peace has been imposed by Russia, according to terms that critics view as favoring Russia, Georgia, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However, having been forced to accept peace under the threat of Russian force and trade sanctions imposed by the CIS, the resolution to the problem of Abkhaz autonomy and sovereignty are far from resolved.

Kyle T. Evered

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ABORIGINAL PEOPLES—TAIWAN

The aboriginal people of Taiwan are the island's non-Chinese indigenous inhabitants. Their cultures and languages are Austronesian and include the oldest languages of the Austronesian family. Archaeological evidence suggests that their ancestors came from the Asian mainland at least 6,000 years ago and then became the source of the migrations south into the Pacific and insular Southeast Asia. It appears that later migration northward from the Philippines brought new groups back to southern Taiwan. The twenty-two aboriginal languages and cultures in Taiwan, of which ten are still living, are a major anthropological source for research into Austronesian origins.

History

Aboriginal peoples were the only inhabitants of Taiwan until 1624, when the Dutch established a colony and Chinese migration began. Today, the remaining ten aboriginal "tribes" number some 400,000 people, or 1.8 percent of Taiwan's population. By the early twentieth century, almost all the plains aborigines (Pingpuzu) were sinicized and had intermarried into Chinese settler society. While there is a Pingpu ethnic revival today, their real descendents are the Hokkien-speaking Taiwanese, most of whom have Pingpu as well as Chinese ancestors. The ten groups

inhabiting the mountains and eastern coast survived in part because of geograph, and in part because they were feared as "savages" and headhunters. Aboriginal people were called Mountain People (Shandiren, Shanbao) until the "Return our Name" movement resulted in the official adoption of the term "Taiwan Aboriginal People" (Yuanzhuminzu) in 1994.

Relations between the settler society and mountain aborigines were shaped by trade and a Chinese defensive line along the mountain fringe until the 1860s, when export demand for tea and camphor led the settlers to push into the mountains, especially in northern Taiwan. Aboriginal resistance and settler reprisals characterized a generation of sporadic warfare in the north, which ended only with the imposition after 1895 of a strong defense line by the new Japanese rulers of Taiwan. They separated mountain aboriginal areas from the rest of Taiwan, forbidding Chinese settlement and any non-Japanese cultural influence on them. Ultimately, this colonial control strategy contributed to the preservation of aboriginal territory and culture. The imposition of harsh Japanese police administration was resisted most strongly by the Tayal tribe. It took a five-year military campaign (1910–1914) in which thousands of lives were lost before the Tayal were conquered. In 1930 there was a final uprising, the Wushe Incident, in central Taiwan. The Japanese moved villages out of the deep mountains, introduced rice agriculture and cash economy, and educated a generation of aboriginal elite, while destroying much traditional aboriginal social structure. Aboriginal culture today is deeply marked by Japanese custom and language.

Importance of Churches in Modern Period

After 1945, the Republic of Taiwan (under the Chinese Nationalists) continued most Japanese policies, but the government opened the mountains to Chinese settlement and Christian evangelism. Policies of agricultural development, enforcement of Mandarin Chinese education, suppression of aboriginal languages, and politicized sinicization in the 1950s were aimed at assimilating the aboriginal people. Attempts by some among the aboriginal elite to oppose these policies were quickly crushed, notably with the execution of several leaders of the "Formosan National Salvation Alliance" in 1954. Most local leaders joined the Guomindang Nationalist Party (GMD) and learned how to win elections in the thirty Mountain Townships, low-level units of self-government that serve as conduits for patronage and corruption. Much aboriginal reserve land, held in trust since Japanese days by the state for aboriginal users, fell into Chinese hands. Aboriginal so-

ciety became tormented by poverty, alcoholism, suicide, and family breakdown. The aboriginal people became sources of cheap labor in construction, mining, factories, and fishing. These problems persist despite improvements in the aboriginal people's situation.

The churches became the basis of aboriginal cultural persistence and ethnic revival. Presbyterian and Catholic evangelism resulted in about 70 percent of the aboriginal people becoming Christian by 1960. Christianity is often seen in Taiwan as a mark of aboriginal identity. Especially among Presbyterians, leadership by aboriginal clergy, use of aboriginal language in worship, and inclusion of traditional forms of social cooperation in church organization meant that the churches became the only autonomous aboriginal people's organizations outside state control that affirmed and perpetuated aboriginal identity.

From the mid-1970s on, a charismatic movement revitalized the aboriginal Presbyterian churches, and human-rights ideas combined with biblical images of the chosen people and the promised land, bringing elements of aboriginal nationalism into everyday religious practice. Politically, most aboriginal politicians remained loyal members of the Guomindang. In the early 1980s, widespread opposition to authoritarian GMD rule began to gather strength in Taiwan. A few educated youths began to challenge GMD control of the aboriginal people and in 1984 founded the Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines (ATA), with support from the Presbyterian Church. Aboriginal churches were already engaged in a campaign to gain land rights from the state, and, with the ATA, began to be overtly critical of state policies. In 1987 several highly publicized local protests ensued over land issues, in which Presbyterian clergy played leading roles. In 1988 these coalesced into the "Return our Land" movement and a mass aboriginal demonstration in Taipei on 25 August 1988.

Aboriginal Rights Movements and Contemporary Policies

The Return our Land movement resulted in only about 13,000 hectares of land being released, but it raised the profile of aboriginal issues in the media and among Taiwan's political elite. Aboriginal politicians, formerly GMD party hacks, sought to outdo one another in fighting for long-denied rights. Native language and self-government became popular social causes. These were enshrined in constitutional revisions between 1992 and 1997:

The State affirms cultural pluralism and shall actively preserve and foster the development of aboriginal languages and culture.

The state shall, in accordance with the will of the ethnic groups, safeguard the status and political participation of the aborigines. The state shall also guarantee and provide assistance and encouragement for aboriginal education, culture, medical care, economic activity, land and social welfare, measures for which . . . shall be established by law.

(Republic of China Constitution, Additional Article 10)

A cabinet-level Council of Aboriginal Affairs was established in 1996, but it has no administrative authority. Nonetheless, the large funding and policy consultation role it has been given has contributed to an aboriginal renaissance as well as to the development of many local and national nongovernmental initiatives. In the 1990s aboriginal peoples became key symbols of the new multicultural Taiwan, symbolized by the major role they played in the inauguration of President Chen Shuibian (b. 1950) in May 2000. Chen appointed one of the leaders of the aboriginal rights movement, a Presbyterian minister, to head the Council of Aboriginal Affairs and made classes in native languages part of the regular school curriculum. If proposals to establish aboriginal autonomous areas are realized, Taiwan's aboriginal peoples will not only be the most economically and socially advantaged in Asia (notwithstanding many continuing social problems), but will also be a political model for transition from the ethnic margins to the political center.

Michael Stainton

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ABU BAKAR (1843?–1895), sultan of Johor. Regarded as the father of modern Johor, Abu Bakar (reigned 1862–1895) presided over the emergence of a fairly prosperous bureaucratic state in Malay with a vibrant commercial agricultural sector. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Johor was the only independent peninsular Malay state; all the others were dominated by foreign powers, including the British. Abu Bakar cultivated close ties with the British. Through his influence, the British were able to impose indirect rule on the Sri Menanti Confederacy (present-day Negeri Sembilan, a state in the Federation of Malaysia) and Pahang (also a state in the Federation of Malaysia) in the late 1880s. The British sanctioned his annexation of Muar, a Malay principality nominally under the kingdom of Johor, following the death of Sultan Ali Iskandar Shah of Muar (reigned 1855–1877).

Abu Bakar outmaneuvered the governor of the Straits Settlements, Sir Frederick Weld (governed 1880–1887), by signing a treaty in 1885 with Britain, bypassing Weld and the British Colonial Office. Thereby Abu Bakar was recognized as sultan and an independent ruler. He established the Johor Advisory Board, a quasi-diplomatic representation, in London.

Abu Bakar promulgated a written constitution in 1894, a code of laws, and a bureaucratic form of administration. Roads, schools, and hospitals were built. Europeans were engaged as legal and technical advisers to the government. The economy was developed in partnership with Chinese and European entrepreneurs and financiers. Having led an extravagant lifestyle with expensive Anglophile tastes and habits, he died in 1895, bequeathing to his son and successor Ibrahim his kingdom, an empty royal purse, and a hefty debt.

Ooi Keat Gin

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ABU, MOUNT Mount Abu (1,722 meters) forms an isolated spur of the Aravalli Range, in southern

Rajasthan State of northwest India. It rises like a precipitous granite island from the surrounding plains. The mountain is sacred to the Jains who call the place Dilwara; several of its peaks are covered with a multitude of architecturally superb Jain temples dating from the eleventh through thirteenth centuries as well as other shrines and tombs. The structures are the best examples of Jain religious architecture and stand out because they are built of white marble. To the Jains, Dilwara is an important pilgrimage destination. A fort five kilometers from Dilwara served as headquarters of the local Paramara chiefs (ninth to eleventh centuries), and contains two Jain temples of the same period.

Among the most important temples on Mount Abu are one built during 1197–1247 and remarkable for the delicacy of its marble carvings; and another, built circa 1032 CE, is one of the oldest known Jain buildings and is devoted to the god Parsvanath.

There is also a hill-station or sanitarium on the mountain, at about 1,200 meters elevation. Called Mount Abu (1991 population 15,547), it was originally constructed for the convenience of Europeans seeking to escape the hot summer weather. The temperature ranges from 70 to 90° F, never hotter; annual rainfall is about 68 inches. The town has a church, club, hospital, a small artificial lake, and a school originally built for the children of British soldiers, as well as scenic roadways and bridle paths.

Paul Hockings

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ACADEMIA SINICA Academia Sinica, founded in Nanjing in 1928, is the most prominent academic institution in the Republic of China (ROC). Although it is affiliated directly to the ROC Presidential Office, Academia Sinica, which is located in Taipei, enjoys independence and autonomy in formulating its own research agenda. Its major tasks are to conduct academic research in sciences, humanities, and social sciences, as well as to provide guidance, coordination, and incentives to raising academic standards in Taiwan. An international graduate school to train future scholars is currently under preparation; it will recruit five to ten graduate students every year from 2002 for each of its eleven Ph.D. programs.

Academia Sinica has made tremendous progress in recent years. An increasing number of research papers written by its faculty, which numbered 1,150 in 2001, are appearing in well-known international journals. Some journals, published by Academia Sinica itself, such as *Zoological Studies* and *Statistical Sinica*, have received international recognition. Academia Sinica plays a major role in the field of Chinese studies. For example, the archaeological findings by researchers at the Institute of History and Philology have, in combination with written documents, led to a virtual rewriting of ancient Chinese history, pushing back the span of Chinese history by many centuries.

The current president of Academia Sinica is Dr. Yuan-tseh Lee, a 1986 Nobel laureate in chemistry. The convocation currently consists of 199 members (academicians), which includes five ethnic Chinese Nobel laureates.

Chang Jui-te

ACEH REBELLION (1873–1903). Despite the Dutch arrival in Indonesia in the seventeenth century, expansion into Aceh did not occur until the end of the nineteenth century. The people of Aceh fiercely resisted Dutch encroachment on their territory in northern Sumatra. While Aceh's independence was guaranteed by the 1824 Anglo-Dutch Treaty of London, in 1858 the Dutch gained access to east coast ports in an agreement with the sultan of Siak. The sultan of Aceh saw this as a threat and sought to forge alliances with external powers, particularly Turkey. In turn the Dutch and the British forged an alliance under a treaty in 1871, which allowed the Netherlands to launch their 1873 invasion. After a disastrous initial foray in 1873, the Dutch eventually captured the sultan's palace in Banda Aceh in 1874, but this failed to end resistance. Traditional village rulers organized a sustained rebellion in which a purist strain of Islam, notable among Acehnese, was used as a rallying point to oppose the Dutch *kafir* ("nonbelievers"). The destruction of the Aceh sultanate saw Islamic leaders assume control of the resistance, the most prominent of whom was Teungku Cik di Tiro (1836–1891). The Dutch were able to break the resistance through the use of local sympathizers, and troops from cooperative Indonesian ethnic groups. The fighting, which lasted until around 1903, proved costly to the Netherlands. But resistance continued throughout Dutch rule in what was the most troublesome part of Indonesia, even after the official end of the conflict. This resistance continued into the establishment of the



An Indonesian woman protests the government repression of the Aceh rebellion outside the United Nations office in Jakarta on 7 August 2001. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

Republic of Indonesia, when guerrilla elements continued to push their demands for independence.

Anthony L. Smith

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ACEHNESE Four million people live in Aceh (pronounced ah-chay) in northwestern Sumatra, Indonesia, and consider themselves distinct from other peoples of Indonesia. Ninety percent of them are ethnically Acehnese and live in the lowlands, while the minority Gajo live in the highlands..

In 500 CE, the Acehnese were Buddhist, but when Marco Polo visited in the thirteenth century they had

already converted to Islam. The 1824 Anglo-Dutch agreement placed them under the Dutch sphere of influence, but they resisted and were never completely subjugated. Consequently, many Acehnese reject Indonesia's claim to sovereignty over the territory.

Given the status of an autonomous Indonesian province in 1949, Aceh's amalgamation with North Sumatra province in 1950 provoked a brief rebellion in 1953. In 1956, Aceh was made a special province, administratively equal with other provinces, to quiet discontent, though this action implied reneging on the promise of autonomy.

Aceh's natural gas, petroleum, and other natural resources exploited by foreign and Indonesian companies appear not to benefit the Acehnese, who are poorer than residents of resource-poor Java, where the Indonesian government is centered. Awareness of economic exploitation feeds support for independence among the Acehnese, who are such devout Muslims that they want the Islamic legal code applied in the province.

In the late 1970s, when support for the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was centered in only one district, Indonesia tried to suppress dissent, and some Acehnese were deported. Resistance subsided until 1989, when some Libyan-trained guerrillas returned to Aceh and began attacking Indonesian soldiers and non-Acehnese migrants, provoking military overreaction. From 1990 to 1998, Indonesian counterinsurgency operations virtually placed the province under martial law.

After Suharto (b. 1921) resigned as Indonesian president in 1998, many Acehnese returned from Malaysia and some from Libya. Partial withdrawal of the military was ordered, but troops were stoned as they paraded during a 31 August ceremony marking the withdrawal, provoking brutal military retaliation.

In January 1999, an Aceh student congress proposed a referendum on independence. Abdurrahman Wahid (b. 1940), elected Indonesian president in October 1999, at first indicated approval. When the Indonesian government later declared opposition to a referendum, GAM organized support and attacked symbols of Indonesian authority. Security forces, ordered to arrest ringleaders, instead perpetrated widespread atrocities, prompting moderate Acehnese to support independence. The outcome of the struggle remains uncertain.

Michael Haas

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ACUPUNCTURE Acupuncture is an ancient treatment technique still routinely used in traditional Chinese medicine and also in Western medicine. The *Huangdi Nei Jing* (Canon of Medicine), compiled between 475 BCE and 23 CE, is the earliest extant medical book in which acupuncture is described. One of its components, *Ling Shu* (Canon of Acupuncture), describes nine instruments, some of which are still in use. Techniques for making bamboo needles and for casting bronze needles developed during the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE). During the Song dynasty (960–1267 CE), the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1126–1234 CE), and the Yuan dynasty (1267–1368 CE), acupuncture developed widely in China. However, during the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) the practice was banned from general use by decree because it was perceived as suitable for application to the emperor. Although banned, acupuncture continued to flourish in local use. Although acupuncture had been popular among the Chinese-American community for over one hundred years, non-Chinese Americans became more aware of acupuncture after President Richard Nixon's 1972 visit to China.

An understanding of the healing art of acupuncture requires familiarity with the concepts of channels and collaterals. In Chinese medicine, channels are the main trunks running lengthwise through the body, and collaterals are their connecting branches. Together they connect the superficial, interior, upper, and lower portions of the human body. *Qi* (life energy) flows through the channels. The twelve regular channels include the three yin channels of each hand and foot and the three yang channels of each hand and foot. Yin and yang are the two basic, complementary principles of which all phenomena partake: wetness, introversion, and coldness are yin characteristics, for example, and dryness, extroversion, and heat are yang characteristics. The eight extra channels are the *du* channel, the *ren* channel, the *chong* channel, the *dai* channel, the *yinqiao* channel, the *yangqiao* channel, the *yinwei* channel, and the *yangwei* channel.

The acupuncture points or acupoints are distributed along the channels and collaterals. The 361 channel points and 231 common points are named in Chinese and also are named using the Roman alphabetical and Western numerical system. For example, the often-used acupoint *zusanli*, which is along the channel connecting the stomach to the foot, is internationally named "S-36." Acupuncture needles are in-



A woman receives acupuncture treatment from a Chinese physician at a hospital in Beijing in 1989. (DAVID & PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS)

serted at the points, and their stimulation releases blocked *qi*, which in turn leads to healing.

In China acupuncture is used to treat diseases in nearly every branch of medicine, whether it is cardiology or dentistry, infectious diseases, or obstetrics. Responding to research, acupuncture techniques have embraced such new technologies as laser and electrical stimulation. In Chinese hospitals that provide acupuncture services, the acupuncture section is always called the department of acupuncture and moxibustion (moxibustion is the burning of medicinal substances, usually herbs, on the acupoints for therapeutic effect). Although the predominant treatment in the department is acupuncture, moxibustion plays an important role. Even as Western medicine becomes more common in China in the twenty-first century, acupuncture continues to be used, especially in hospitals that rely on traditional medicine and also those that combine traditional and Western approaches.

Bao-xing Chen and Garé Lecompte

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ADALET PARTISI The Adalet Partisi, or Justice Party (JP; 1961–1980), was a political party founded in 1961 in Turkey by the lower echelons of the Democrat Parti (Democrat Party [DP]). The DP had been dissolved by the military junta that staged the 1960 coup. The JP's first leader, Ragip Gumuspala (1897–1964), was chief of the General Staff and was among the 5,000 officers involuntarily retired by the junta to rejuvenate the armed forces in August 1960 (the "Eminsu" case). In 1964, following the death of Gumuspala, Suleyman Demirel (1924–) was elected the second leader of the party and occupied this position until the 1980 military junta banned the party.

The JP's ideology accorded the private sector an important role in economic development and emphasized social justice, rapid economic development, and religious tolerance. The party represented the newly emerging political elite made up of industrialists, small entrepreneurs, artisans, merchants, and professionals who had not been given enough representation by the central organization of the old DP.

The JP was not a uniform body. The party's caucus included, in addition to liberal elements, religious groups, extreme rightists, and devout supporters of the former DP. The mixed composition led to two major splits. The first ended with the dismissal of the nationalist-fundamentalist group from the party in 1967. The second came in December 1970, when seventy-two members of parliament and senators resigned from the party and founded the Demokratik Parti (Democratic Party).

The party's adoption of an import-substitution policy accelerated the expansion of a capitalist economy at the expense of small merchants and artisans, who withdrew support and moved toward small right-wing parties promising a more nationalist economy. Slowing economic growth, inflation, and labor-related conflicts cooled relations between the party and the

private sector. The party's relationship with the military and bureaucrats, on the other hand, was always troublesome.

The JP was in government for half of its twenty years of existence, serving as a coalition partner (November 1961–June 1962, February–October 1965, March 1975–June 1977 [I. Nationalist Front], July 1977–January 1978 [II. Nationalist Front]), as the majority government (October 1965–October 1969, November 1969–February 1970, March 1970–March 1971), and as a minority government (October 1979–September 1980). After the 1980 military intervention, it was dissolved, and its leaders were banned from political activities.

Ayla H. Kilic

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ADANA (2000 est. pop. 1.1 million). The fifth-largest city of Turkey, Adana is located at the confluence of the Seyhan and Ceyhan Rivers in the rich agricultural plain of Cukurova in southeastern Anatolia. Adana has changed hands often. In 1516 the Ottoman sultan Selim I (1468–1520) took possession of the city during his campaign against the Mamluks. The Ottomans left the administration of this newly conquered territory to local vassals for some years, but in 1608 the territory became a province of the Ottoman empire. In 1833 Adana was ceded in the Treaty of Kutahya to Muhammad Ali Pasha (or Mehmet Ali Pasa, 1769–1849), a rebel Ottoman officer who had succeeded in creating a more or less independent dynasty in Egypt.

The Ottoman empire recovered Adana with the London Convention of 1840, and the city again became a provincial capital in 1867. The city's importance as an agricultural trading center dramatically increased during the American Civil War (1861–1865), when Adana benefited from the sudden shortage of cotton on the international market. As a measure of this increasing importance, a railroad connecting Adana to the Mediterranean port of Mersin was built in 1886, and this line was later included in the Baghdad Railway.

In 1909, Adana was the site of a short-lived Armenian uprising that was brutally suppressed. The French occupied the city in 1919, following the 1918 defeat of the Ottoman empire in World War I. Unwilling to invest the men and moneys necessary to

maintain this occupation, however, France ceded the territory to the Turkish Nationalist forces in 1922 at the Treaty of Ankara.

Adana maintains its importance as an agricultural center, and cotton continues to be a significant local crop. Other important crops include oranges, lemons, rice, and sesame. During the Turkish Republic, agriculturally related industries such as textile and vegetable oil production also assumed increasing importance. Adana is home to Cukurova University, founded in 1973. Yasar Kemal (b. 1922), arguably the most famous author of Republican Turkey, was born here and based many of his works on the Turkish and Kurdish folktales of the surrounding countryside.

Howard Eissenstat

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ADAT *Adat* refers to the wide range of local customary regimes characterizing the diversity of ethnic groupings and local communities across the Malay-Indonesian archipelago. Various translated as "custom," "tradition," "practice," and "rule," the concept conveys a sense of the local order of things—bequeathed and validated by ancestors, maintained and adapted by their descendants. *Adat* typically orders property rights, marriage and inheritance practices, resource access, and local governance. Transgressions of *adat* prescriptions or prohibitions may result in social or supernatural retribution; hence the regulatory aspect of *adat* goes beyond tradition or convention and invokes a legal dimension. But *adat* has broader connotations than Western concepts of either custom or law convey: it also implicates propriety and commonality and appeals to particular moral styles and models of social consensus. *Adat* relationships typically encompass social behavior, ritual responsibilities, reciprocal relations, and collective obligations, as well as other duties and privileges of membership in a community or kinship group. Critically important are the ancestral and communal sanctions that make law and custom living religious and social practices.

Of Arabic derivation, the term *adat* entered Malay, the trading language of the region, and came to encompass numerous analogous concepts in indigenous languages: *dresta* (ancient custom) in Balinese, *ada nto-tua* (the customs of the elders) among Kaili speakers in Sulawesi, and *adat perpatih* (matrilineal customary law) for the Minangkabau peoples of Sumatra (In-

donesia) and Negeri Sembilan (Malaysia), for example. The long history of contact with external religious and legal systems—Indic since the fourth century, Islamic since the fourteenth century, and European since the sixteenth century—through trade and colonization resulted in a fusion of *adat* with compatible aspects of these imported traditions. But as the Dutch *adat* scholar Cornelis Van Vollenhoven (1874–1933) argued, it is the indigenous system that prevails in the popular legal consciousness.

While in no sense representing a homogeneous set of principles, the concept of *adat* nevertheless evokes the disparate meanings and significant identities associated with "the local" across Indonesia. Stretching from very specific ethnic, community, or kin group referents—for example, *adat* Minangkabau (an ethnic group), or *adat* Desa Tenganan (a particular village)—to a broad, generic notion of a pan-Malay-Indonesian cultural substratum that predated and fused with the religious traditions of Hinduism and Islam, the notion of *adat* is fundamentally concerned with the reciprocal rights of individuals and their responsibilities to their community and the ancestors that ensure the community's collective well-being.

The Leiden Adatrecht School

Adat law became a major discipline of Dutch colonial legal studies. Building on the earlier writings of G. A. Wilken, William Marsden, and Stamford Raffles, the Adatrecht (literally "*Adat* Law") School was pioneered by Cornelis Van Vollenhoven after his 1901 appointment to the professorship of Constitutional Law and Administration at the University of Leiden.

Van Vollenhoven understood *adat* to be founded on more or less autonomous "jural communities" organized along kinship or territorial lines. But *adat* authority could also be vested in voluntary associations that might be subsets of communities at one end of the spectrum or, at the other end, claimed by hierarchically structured principalities that incorporated *adat* communities or kin groups, which retained various degrees of autonomy.

Van Vollenhoven argued that it was inappropriate to divorce legal institutions from other elements of popular culture. The embeddedness of *adat* in local institutions and beliefs made it impossible to draw a clear distinction between *adat* as either custom or law. Rules or customs that might otherwise be regarded merely as etiquette represent a sensibility to community harmony and ancestral obligation that integrates social, religious, and legal dimensions of everyday life. One codification of customary law, the Ninety-Nine Laws

of Perak (translated in Hooker 1978), for example, includes sections on abusive language, ceremonial bathing, payments to the caretaker of village spirits, and the keeping of elephants.

Customary sanctions may be applied because of the failure to perform communal obligations or carry out village cleansing rituals, the omission of compulsory contributions to a feast, the felling of trees without permission, or the transgression of rules on prohibited marriages. Sanctions might require formal expulsion from the *adat* community, or they remain implicit in common understandings that the failure to observe proper social relationships, conduct rituals, or reciprocate appropriately would bring ancestral disfavor and misfortune. Van Vollenhoven and his students recognized these culturally defined norms and rules that regulate everyday life as legitimate forms of law, which exist alongside codified regulations imposed by formal institutions of authority.

The Dutch authorities published volumes of *adat* law documents as part of their colonizing project. These *Adatrechtbundels* (*Adat Law Collections*), including inventories of local *adat* practices, codifications of rules and penalties, and records of disputes and court cases, were collected annually from different parts of the archipelago between 1911 and 1955. For the Leiden School, these voluminous materials demonstrated the importance of indigenous customary law and the potential for codifying it. The highly localized and heterogeneous sources for interpreting *adat*, however, make generalization difficult.

Adat may apply primarily to groups organized by kinship or to a territorial community in which kinship is not important. It may privilege inheritance through male (as among the Balinese and Batak) or female lines (as among the Minangkabau), or it may stipulate equal inheritance from both parents, as in the most prevalent bilateral kinship arrangement in Southeast Asia.

Insofar as the diversity of *adat* regimes can be said to share underlying patterns or principles, a pragmatic tolerance for—or at least a recognition of—local variation is perhaps foremost among them. Different beliefs, prohibitions, obligations, prerogatives, ritual practices, and clothing and housing styles may be prescribed or justified as local *adat*. Certain aspects of *adat* practice may be privileged as central to group identity—for instance, matrilineal descent among the Minangkabau, ritual service obligation (*ayaban*) among the Balinese, or the *runggun* decision-making forum among the Karo Batak—in a certain period, locale, or context and remain without emphasis in another. As the Balinese adage *Desa kala patra* (according to "place,

time, and circumstance") indicates, *adat* is open to situational interpretation and revision.

Van Vollenhoven likened variation in local *adat* to dialects of a common language, in which an underlying grammar could be revealed by scholarly analysis. The studies carried out by the Leiden School assert that common underlying features could be identified beneath the surface diversity. *Adat* stresses local autonomy, recognizing and legitimizing variation from one social group to the other, and exhibits flexibility over time. *Adat* is geared toward maintaining harmonious relations; because local constructions of *adat* are acutely attuned to reciprocal relations in pursuit of social consonance, balance and equivalence have great resonance in its rhetorical and ritual expression. Nevertheless, in most of the cultures of the archipelago, *adat* also accommodates hierarchic social structures that grant degrees of precedence and prerogative to founding ancestors or aristocratic lineages. Communal interest theoretically takes priority over individual interest; consequently the *adat* ethos is geared toward consensual deliberation and mutual aid. Local *adat* is more often than not uncodified, taking its social force from the collective memory and ancestral bonds of community members, as interpreted through the wisdom and spiritual powers of *adat* specialists. *Adat* authority tends to be diffuse, vested variously in corporate membership, village elders, and rulers, but it is subject to the intervention of supernatural forces—auspicious or ominous events signifying the favor or dissatisfaction of ancestors and local guardian spirits. The power and knowledge of the spirit domain are often exercised by inspired or charismatic practitioners operating outside formal lines of authority.

Controversies: Of Rights and Identities

Most of the controversies surrounding *adat* in academic literature, political circles, and popular debates among the regional cultures of Indonesia center on its relevance to modernity, its relationship to orthodox religions, and its implications for property, status, and gender.

Gender, Religion, and Modernity Conflicts and accommodations among *adat*, capitalist modernity, and Islamic revival movements have been of special interest to scholars of gender and religion. *Adat* typically recognizes women's right to initiate divorce and, in the predominantly bilateral kinship systems of the archipelago, to equal inheritance rights and an equal share in property acquired during marriage.

Matrilineal customary law (*adat perpatih*) among the Minangkabau people of West Sumatra in Indonesia

and Negeri Sembilan in West Malaysia has received considerable attention because of the long-standing accommodation of Islam to women's customary inheritance rights. Under matrilineal *adat*, ancestral property passes through the female line, whereas Islamic law formally gives women the right to a one-third share of family property, compared to two-thirds for male descendants. The difference between Minangkabau *adat* and Islamic law was traditionally resolved through a distinction between ancestral property (*harta pusako*), transmitted from mothers to daughters, and individually acquired property (*harta pencarian*), which may be disposed of according to the wishes of the owner.

Although the Minangkabau generally regard Islam and *adat* as mutually reinforcing aspects of their identity, modernist political movements in West Sumatra challenged *adat*-based relations, particularly women's property rights under *adat*, without substantively altering *adat* inheritance practice. In Malaya, during what became known as the *Adat* crisis of 1951, when a branch of the United Malay National Organization mooted a proposal to abolish matrilineal inheritance in Negeri Sembilan, women mounted a successful campaign threatening proponents with divorce.

Individually acquired property still tends to be converted over generations to ancestral property. The continuity of this practice, despite the individualization and commercialization of property and other aspects of social life, attests to the resilience of Minangkabau *adat* and the continued significance of the cultural identities and social ties it underpins. Nevertheless, wider social change through urbanization, industrialization, and the commercialization of agriculture (which accompanied the green-revolution intensification of rice production) has altered the complex constellation of social relations and cultural beliefs that connected land, ancestors, and female mediation in ritual and family affairs. These forces have tended to marginalize the cultural values and social relations of these once predominantly agrarian societies, with consequences for the position of women.

While the *adat* arrangements of the predominantly bilateral or matrilineal cultures of the archipelago support relatively egalitarian gender relations, for women in patrilineal systems, such as the Balinese and Batak, the opposite is true. For example, Bali Hindu authorities obtained exemption from divorce and inheritance provisions of the 1974 Marriage Law that stipulate equal division of property on the grounds of patrilineal *adat*. Nevertheless, anthropologists find underlying bilateral principles across the cultures of Southeast Asia that moderate formally lineal practices.

Property Rights and Modernity Since the colonial period, the question of official recognition of *adat* property rights has been among the most vexing of political and economic issues. With respect to land and resources, *adat* is tied to concepts of territoriality and community rights of allocation, generally referred to as *bak ulayat* ("territorial right"). These include communal access or customarily allocated rights to residential lands, cultivated fields, uncultivated forests, and grazing and fallow areas.

The religious, social, and economic dimensions of *adat* make property rights and resource access more complex than individual private-property rights under Western law. Since the individual's rights to land and resources are in varying degrees defined and validated by community or group membership, it is impossible to draw clear distinctions between private and common property. Migration or expulsion from the community could mean the loss of rights to corporately held land. In Bali, for example, some of the oldest communities retain strict regulations on land alienation. Tenganan village does not permit the purchase or sale of village land, most of which is communally owned, and serious transgressions of *adat* rules, or marriage to someone from outside the village, result in loss of rights to communal property.

Under *adat* regulations, outside groups require permission and usually pay "recognition fees" for resource access rights to *adat* community territory. Smaller-scale payments may also be required of members themselves in acknowledgment of overarching group rights. *Adat* typically limits individual property rights to land that can be effectively worked by member households. Communities, custodians, or individual holders of *adat* land traditionally have ritual obligations to ancestors and guardian spirits that validate their property rights.

With cultural, social, and economic links so intimately connected, *adat* land has been widely regarded as inalienable from the community or descent group. This aspect of *adat* has not sat comfortably with national land laws, which in both Malaysia and Indonesia give great weight to forms of private-property rights inherited from the Western legal tradition. Land not officially registered under formal law was subject to appropriation by the state.

The Dutch colonial Domain Declaration arrogated to the state all land for which legally recognized property rights could not be proved. This principle became the subject of scholarly controversy between the Leiden School, which sought to defend *adat* rights as legal rights to land, and the competing School of Law and

Administration at Utrecht. The latter refused *adat* the status of law, arguing that *adat*-based rights were an impediment to modernization and development. The premise of the Domain Declaration was later incorporated into the Indonesian constitution and subsequent national land and resource laws, marginalizing the token acknowledgments of *adat* in the same legislation.

In practice, local claims to uncultivated areas under *hak ulayat* were disregarded or granted only residual recognition under colonial and postcolonial regimes. Land and resource rights asserted under *adat* were overridden by the state whenever they competed with alternative land uses. Widespread expropriation of *adat* domains for industry, resettlement, and other development projects set the stage for later, sometimes violent struggles over land, resources, and cultural rights.

Myths and Reformations

For its critics, the *adat* law project of the Leiden School was an idealist construction, which exaggerated the internal coherence and underlying commonality of *adat* regimes. Joel Kahn (1993) and Peter Burns (1989) critiqued the neotraditional romanticism of Dutch scholars and administrators who sought a pristine indigenous legal archetype. Clifford Geertz argued that the Dutch *adat* law framework reified a living, culturally defined legal sensibility, misrepresenting "an indigenous sense of what justice is, social consonance, in terms of an imported one of what order is, a *Rechtsstaat* [state law]" (Geertz 1983: 209).

Debate among contemporary scholars continues to reflect the earlier conflict between the Leiden and Utrecht schools, the former supporting the practical and ethical grounds for the recognition of *adat* as law and the case for legal pluralism, the latter regarding it as an artificial and inappropriate application of the concept of law, which hindered the development of a modern codified legal system. Parallel positions idealizing and contesting the character and role of *adat* regimes continue among indigenous writers confronting questions of equality, sustainability, nationalism, and modernity. As environmental concerns became linked to indigenous-rights issues, *adat* regulation of natural resources has become the focus of similar debate.

Controversies about the place of *adat* in the lives of the peoples of the archipelago and its legal viability in Malaysia and Indonesia have not abated. Indeed, the localization processes accompanying globalization place *adat* at the center of much of the discourse associated with issues of indigenous rights, local management of resources, and decentralized governance. In Indonesia,

the reform movement that ended the Suharto regime in 1998 spawned an alliance of *adat* communities supported by nongovernmental organizations and aimed at reasserting the rights of local indigenous minorities. The Alliance of *Adat* Communities of the Archipelago was formed in 1999 to press for revision of land, resource, and governance legislation and to gain full recognition of *adat* institutions, property, and cultural rights. Regional-autonomy policies have been developed in response to self-determination demands and to the interethnic conflicts partly generated by decades of marginalization of *adat* regimes under the auspices of government development policies.

While debate over the contemporary relevance of *adat* continues in scholarly and policy-making circles, evidence of the continuity of *adat* practices reveals an inner dynamic of meanings and values that demand recognition. These meanings and values take new forms as local regimes become linked to global movements focused on the rights of indigenous minorities. The politicization of *adat* has led to more crystallized and sometimes more rigidly defined conceptions of *adat*, reformed and reconstituted as a focus of political demands. As Maila Stivens (1996) says of matriliney in Negeri Sembilan, *adat*, for significant numbers among the populations of Malaysia and Indonesia, is no "traditional relic." Across the Malay-Indonesian archipelago, *adat* remains a vital force, a sometimes diffuse, sometimes explicit sociolegal sensibility, and a ground for contestation and for defining common identity and interest.

Carol Warren


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AEGEAN SEA The Aegean Sea is located between the coasts of Greece and Turkey and the islands of Crete and Rhodes. It covers an area of 210 square kilometers; its maximum depth is 3,543 meters, found to the east of Crete. More than two thousand islands of varying sizes, most of which belong to Greece, are scattered throughout the Aegean. Some, such as Lesbos, Chios, Rhodes, and Crete, are of substantial size and sustain significant populations. Many islands and islets, however, are too small and barren to sustain human habitation.

The prevailing winds in the Aegean Sea are northerly, dry, and relatively cold. During the mild winter season, these alternate with milder northwesterly winds. As with much of the Mediterranean, the Aegean is considered to be poor in resources. The flow of colder and less saline water from the Black Sea



Sailboats in the harbor of Bodrum, Turkey, on the Aegean Sea. (NIK WHEELER/CORBIS)

through the Turkish straits (the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles) and the Sea of Marmara tends to cool the water temperatures and reduce the high salinity of the Aegean Sea. This flow of water and the fish that migrate from the Black Sea through the Turkish straits have had a positive effect on the fish resources of the Aegean. On the other hand, the Aegean has been adversely affected by the increasing levels of pollution in the Black Sea as well as in other adjoining seas. In the Aegean, illegal dumping of waste materials by both Greek and Turkish industries has contributed to the pollution, with harmful effects on marine resources.

Increased shipping from ports in the Black Sea and the prospect of considerably higher tanker traffic carrying Caspian and Central Asian oil through the Aegean have generated fears in Greece and Turkey, as well as among environmentalists, of still more acute threats to the ecosystem and cleanliness of the Aegean.

Modest deposits of petroleum have been discovered and exploited off the coast of the island of Thassos,

and some experts have predicted more extensive discoveries elsewhere in the Aegean. However, disputes between Greece and Turkey over the limits of territorial seas and sovereign rights over the continental shelf have prevented explorations for oil and gas in much of the sea that remains outside the six-mile territorial seas that both countries maintain in the Aegean. The settlement of disputed maritime issues related to the continental shelf and territorial sea entitlement of the two neighbors will open the door to greater exploration activity for oil and gas in the Aegean. No less important, improved relations between Greece and Turkey will yield greater cooperation to help resolve the increasingly serious threats to the environment of the Aegean.

Tozun Babcheli

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AFGHAN HOUND The Afghan hound is a tall, slender hunting dog (*Canis familiaris*) with long, strong legs, a heavy, silky coat (although there are short-haired varieties of Afghans), and typically long ears. An adult stands about 70 centimeters at shoulders and weighs about 27 kilograms. Belonging to the hound group, Afghan hounds are supposedly related to greyhounds.

Afghan hounds originated in the Middle East and were used for hunting in mountainous regions of northern Afghanistan. Some have suggested that the breed was known in ancient Egypt as early as the third millennium BCE; the Egyptians certainly had some sort of hound at an early date. Afghans came to England with British soldiers who brought them back from the Indo-Afghanistan area in the late nineteenth century; the breed reached the United States in the early 1930s.

The Afghan dog's agility in covering difficult terrain made it a suitable companion for mountain-dwelling hunters mounted on horseback. An Afghan's long legs allow it to move with great speed in a characteristic, racehorse-like gallop. Like all sight hounds, such as the Borzoi or Russian wolfhound, the whippet, and the greyhound, the Afghan courses by sight rather than by smell; thus its swiftness lets it keep pace with and run down fast-moving game, and its agility enables it to follow its prey's evasive actions. Today Afghans are primarily companion dogs and show dogs

rather than hunters, esteemed for their stylish lines and beautiful, tireless movement in all Western countries, where Afghan puppies command a high price.

Paul Hockings

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AFGHANI, JAMAL AD-DIN (1838/39–1896/97), Islamic theorist and activist. Jamal ad-din al-Afghani (the "al" is often dropped) was a controversial and significant influence in the Islamic world during the last half of the nineteenth century. His influence continues through his writings, which stress anti-imperialism, nationalism, and Pan-Islamism.

Although he claimed that he was born in Afghanistan, several documents indicate that he was actually born in Iran and raised as a Shi'ite Muslim. His assertion of Afghan and Sunni Islam birth was probably made to avoid discrimination by, and lower status among, Sunni Muslims, who constitute about 90 percent of the world's Muslims. Evidence suggests that he received early education in Iran and higher education at Shi'ite shrine cities in Iraq. His papers indicate that he studied with great interest the innovative school of Shi'a Islam called Shaikhi, which was founded on the writings of Shaikh Ahmad al-Asa'i (1752–1826). He then settled in India where he apparently developed his lifelong hatred of the British and their colonial system. From India he traveled to Mecca and eventually arrived in Afghanistan via Iran.

In Afghanistan, he served as a counsel to the emir until his anti-British opinions cost him his position and led to his expulsion when a pro-British emir came to power in 1868. He eventually settled in Istanbul and became active in educational circles. In a series of controversial university lectures, he argued that philosophy and prophecies were crafts, skills that could be developed and learned. This view was seen as heretical by the religious authorities and led to his expulsion from Istanbul. He lived and taught in Cairo until 1879, where he encouraged his followers to replace the Egyptian leader Isma'il with his candidate, Tawfiq. Tawfiq did come to power, but only with British and French support, and Jamal ad-din Afghani's anti-British rhetoric again led to his expulsion. He moved back to India and settled in the Muslim state of Hyderabad, where he wrote his most influential work on nationalism, *The Refutation of the Materialists*. In 1883 he moved to Paris, where he was joined by a disciple

from Cairo, Muhammad Abduh. Together they put out a free Muslim newspaper, *Al-Urwa Al-Wuthqa* (The Firmest Bond), which took strong Pan-Islamist and anti-British positions. It was short-lived but very influential.

After the closing of the newspaper, Jamal ad-din Afghani was on the move again. In Britain he was involved in a plot to end British influence in Egypt; in Iran and Russia he tried to no avail to start a war between Russia and Britain. In Iran he spoke out against the shah's economic concessions to Europe, which caused him to be exiled to Iraq. On an invitation from the Ottoman sultan, he moved to Istanbul, where he was eventually banned from lecturing and publishing. It is believed that he encouraged one of his disciples to assassinate the shah of Iran, Naser al-Din Shah. He died of cancer in 1897, although a rumor persists that the sultan had him poisoned.

Houman A. Sadri

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AFGHANISTAN PROFILE (2001 est. pop. 26.8 million). Afghanistan (Land of the Afghans), formerly the Republic of Afghanistan (called *Jomhuri-ye Afghanistan* in Dari Persian, *Da Afghanistan Jamhawriyat* in Pashto), has undergone dramatic sociopolitical changes during the past 150 years and particularly since 1989. As a crossroads of Eurasian commerce for nearly four millennia, it has been a conduit for invaders from east and west and a recipient of major religious ideologies, including Buddhism and Islam. Hence, Afghanistan is ethnically and linguistically diverse, a mosaic of cultures and languages, especially in the north. In 2001, the self-proclaimed Taliban government, which at one time controlled 90 percent of the nation, referred to the country as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, whereas the Northern Alliance, the umbrella grouping of anti-Taliban forces, fought for the Islamic State of Afghanistan (*Dowlat-e Eslami-ye Afghanistan* in Dari Persian).

Location, Geography, and Ecology

Afghanistan is a landlocked Central Asian nation bounded on the north by three former Soviet republics—now members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan)—on the northeast by the People's Republic of China, on the east and south by Pakistan, and on the west by Iran. Afghanistan's current boundaries were established during the late nineteenth century in the context of the "Great Game," a rivalry between the British then occupying India on the Asian subcontinent



After more than twenty years of war and civil disorder, much of Afghanistan in 2002 is in ruins. These damaged buildings line a main street in the capital city of Kabul. (BACI/CORBIS)



AFGHANISTAN

Country name: Islamic State of Afghanistan, Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
Area: 647,500 sq km
Population: 26,813,057 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 3.48% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 41.42 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 17.72 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: 11.11 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio—total population: 1.06 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 147.02 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population: 46.24 years, male: 46.97 years, female: 45.47 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Sunni Islam, Shi'a Islam
Major languages: Pashtu, Dari, Turkic languages
Literacy—total population: 31.5%, male: 47.2%, female: 15% (1999 est.)
Government type: no functioning central government, administered by factions
Capital: Kabul
Administrative divisions: 32 provinces
Independence: 19 August 1919 (from U.K. control over Afghan foreign affairs)
National holiday: Independence Day, 19 August (1919)
Suffrage: no information
GDP—real growth rate: no information
GDP—per capita (purchasing power parity): \$800 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: no information
Exports: \$80 million (1996 est.)
Imports: \$150 million (1996 est.)
Currency: afghani (AFA)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Factbook* 2001. Retrieved 18 October 2001 from: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.
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and the Russians in Central Asia; Afghanistan was called the "Northwest Frontier" by the British. The borders of Afghanistan with its six neighbors cover 6,529 kilometers.

The nation covers 647,500 square kilometers—approximately the size of Texas or the United Kingdom—and has a shape similar to a clenched right fist with the thumb extended to the northeast, the narrow Wakhan Corridor leading to China. Major physical features include the Amu Dar'ya (the ancient Oxus) River, forming much of the northern international border; the steppes, the Turkistan Plains in the north;

a mountainous center and northeast dominated by the Hindu Kush mountain range (the western extension of the Himalayas) and the Pamirs; the Sistan Basin with plains in the southwest, through which flows the Helmand River; and deserts (Dasht-i Margo) to the far west and south (Rigestan). Except for the Amu Dar'ya, which flows westward into the Caspian Sea, and the Kabul River, which flows eastward and joins the Indus, the other rivers end in inland seas, swamps, or salt flats.

The northern plains are a major agricultural region, accounting for 80 percent of the grain crops;



the southwestern plateau is a desert and semidesert except for the irrigation agriculture associated with the Helmand River; the central highlands are dominated by the Hindu Kush, which is traversed by only a few high mountain passes. Nearly half of the total land area lies above 2,000 meters; thus, much of Afghanistan has a subarctic mountain climate with dry, cold winters and short, cool summers, whereas the semiarid steppe lowlands have cold winters and hot summers, and the southwest has a hot, arid, desert climate. Annual precipitation varies from 75 millimeters in the desert to 1,280 millimeters in the Hindu Kush. The elevation extremes are on the Amu Dar'ya (258 meters) and at Noeshak (7,485 meters). Climate, flora, and fauna vary with elevation, and temperatures range greatly. Agricultural products include wheat, rice, fruits, nuts, and vegetables, although only 12 percent of the land is arable, whereas 46 percent consists of permanent pastures, 37 percent deserts, and only 3 percent forests. A four-year drought (1998–2001) has decimated the agricultural lands and pastures.

Many species of the indigenous animal population are endangered due to heavy exploitation and the ravages of twenty-three years of international (Soviet-Afghan) and civil wars.

Sociopolitical Characteristics

Administratively, the nation has thirty-two *velayat* (provinces): Badakhshan, Badghis, Baghlan, Balkh, Bamian, Farah, Faryab, Ghazni, Ghowr, Helmand, Herat, Jowzjan, Kabul, Kandahar, Kapisa, Khowst, Konar, Kunduz, Laghman, Lowhar, Nangarhar, Nimruz, Nuristan, Oruzgan, Paktia, Paktika, Parwan, Samangan, Sar-e Pol, Takhar, Vardak, and Zabol (Zabol). The two newest are Khowst and Nuristan. There has never been an official, comprehensive census, but the population in 1998 was estimated by the United Nations at 21.5 million, including 2.5 million nomads, whereas the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 2001 projected 26.8 million, including 3.2 million refugees in Pakistan, 1.9 million in Iran, 300,000 in Turkmenistan,



AFGHAN NATIONAL CHARACTER

While extreme and stereotypical, this 1908 profile of the Afghan, nonetheless, does provide some insight into the nature of relations in Afghanistan, and the difficulties faced by any government in creating national unity—a key task in 2002.

As a race the Afghans are handsome and athletic, often with a fair complexion, the features highly aquiline. Their step is full of resolution, their bearing proud and apt to be rough. Inured to bloodshed from childhood, they are familiar with death, audacious in attack, but easily discouraged by failure. They are treacherous and passionate in revenge, which they will satisfy in the most cruel manner, even at a cost of their own lives. Nowhere is crime committed on such trifling grounds, in spite of the severe manner in which crimes are punished when brought home to offenders. The women have handsome features of a Jewish cast, fair complexions, sometimes rosy, especially in early life, though usually sallow. They are rigidly secluded; but in spite of this, and of the fact that adultery is almost invariably punished by death, intrigue is frequent. "The pride of Afghans," says Bellew, "is a marked feature of their natural character. They eternally boast of their descent and prowess in arms and their independence. They despise all other races; and even among themselves, each man considers himself equal to, if not better than his neighbour." They enjoy a character for liberal hospitality; guest and strangers are fed free of charge in the village guest houses; and by the law of honor known as *nanawatai*, the Afghan is expected, at the sacrifice of his own life and property if necessary, to shelter and protect anyone, even an enemy, who in extremity may seek an asylum under his roof. This protection, however, only extends to the limits of the premises; and once beyond this, the host may be the first to injure his late protégé. *Badal*, or retaliation, must be exacted for the slightest personal injury or insult, or for damage to property. Where the avenger takes the life of his victim in retaliation for the murder of one of his relatives, the act is termed *kisas*.

Source: Imperial Gazetteer of India: Afghanistan and Nepal. (1908) Calcutta, India: Superintendent of Government Printing, 26–27.

Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, and 150,000 residing elsewhere. The largest city is the capital, Kabul (Kabul *velayat*), with 1.4 million inhabitants, located in the eastcentral region; next are Kandahar (Kandahar *velayat*), with 225,500, located in the southwest; Mazar-i Sharif (Balkh *velayat*), with 185,000, located in the northcentral region; Herat (Herat *velayat*), with 175,000, located in the upper northwest; and Jalalabad (Nangarhar *velayat*), with 120,000, located east of Kabul.

U.N. data list the major ethnic groups as Pashtuns (54 percent of the population), Tajiks (concentrated in the north, 27 percent), Uzbeks (8 percent), and Hazara (7 percent). Others include Kyrgyz, Arabs, Baluchis, Turkmen, Nuristani, Chahar Aimak, Brahui, Sikhs, and Jews. CIA data list Pashtuns (38 percent), Tajiks (25 percent), Hazara (19 percent), and Uzbeks (6 percent). The Pashtun tribes, both sedentary farmers and nomadic pastoralists, inhabit principally the

southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan. Tajik farmers and village craftspeople live in Kabul and Badakhshan *velayat* to the northeast and in Herat to the far west.

Languages

The official languages of Afghanistan include Pashto (more precisely, Southern Pashto) and the Dari dialect of Persian (Eastern Farsi or Dari). The 2001 CIA data list Pashto (35 percent); Afghan Persian or Dari (50 percent); Turkic languages, primarily Turkmen and Uzbek (11 percent); and thirty minor languages. Summer Institute of Linguistics data in 1996 listed the number of languages at forty-seven, then all "living" (spoken) languages. Many individuals, especially men, are bilingual and trilingual, although the effects of warfare have undoubtedly altered the numbers of multilingual males. Thirty of the forty-seven languages are indigenous to Afghanistan; five derive from Pakistan and four from Tajikistan.

Approximately 85 percent of the population are Sunni Muslim (Hanafi school), and 14 percent are Shi'ite (primarily in the north), with the remainder Ismaili Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, and others. By 2001, the Sikh population of Afghanistan was estimated at about five thousand, and the number of Jews had shrunk from forty thousand in 1989 to fewer than seven hundred.

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AFGHANISTAN—ECONOMIC SYSTEM

As of 2002, Afghanistan does not have a viable economic system. The traditional economy, which was based mainly on subsistence agriculture and animal husbandry and which usually provided enough food for the Afghan population plus a surplus for trade, was essentially destroyed beginning in 1979 with the Soviet invasion and war, which lasted until 1989. The economy suffered further during the civil unrest of the first half of the 1990s and then recovered in some regions during Taliban rule from 1995 to 2001. The U.S.-led invasion of 2001–2002 damaged much of what was left of the economy and infrastructure, and the World Bank concluded that Afghanistan had become the poorest nation in the world. The situation was made worse by a drought that began in 1999 and limited crop production and livestock herding. It is also important to note that statistics regarding the Afghanistan economy for the last twenty or so years are untrustworthy.

The year 2002 marked the beginning of a large-scale international effort to rebuild the Afghanistan economy and infrastructure through billions of dollars of financial, material, and managerial support. The first major event was the Tokyo Conference on 21–22 January, convened to address the problems of Afghanistan's devastated economy.

Afghanistan has a relatively small (estimated at 18–20 million) rural population, most of whom live in small villages. The traditional economy is in accord with this population pattern and is based on a mix of farming (wheat, barley, corn, and fruits are the main crops) and herding (mainly sheep and goats and also cattle, camels, donkeys, and horses). Farming and herding are limited by the rough terrain and dry climate, and agriculture typically requires irrigation.



The Afghanistan economy is based primarily on subsistence agriculture. Here, a farmer plows a field with a team of oxen. (CAROLINE PENN/CORBIS)

Farming and herding are done mainly to support the family, but in good years prior to 1979 a surplus was sometimes produced and exported. These major subsistence activities are supported by village-level weaving, blacksmithing, and goldsmithing and cottage industries such as carpet weaving. Prior to 1979, other economic activities included a small manufacturing sector (cement, carpets, textiles) and foreign aid, which supported government programs and the development of a technology and communication infrastructure that mainly served the cities. From 1979 on, millions of Afghans fled to Pakistan and other nations, and remittances they sent to relatives back home provided another source of revenue.

The ten-year war with the Soviets destroyed many roads and irrigation systems and government programs and services, rendered land useless because of land mines, and caused several million to flee. The civil war following the Soviet withdrawal caused additional damage, and it was not until the Taliban took control and eventually ruled 90 percent of the nation that the economy began to recover. Especially in the south and east, farming and herding improved to a limited extent, trade with Pakistan increased, and natural resources such as timber, precious stones, and marble and granite were harvested and traded. Opium farming also expanded rapidly, and Afghanistan became the largest supplier of illicit opium until the Taliban banned opium production in July 2000. Opium production continued, however, in the north, where it

was an important source of income for the Northern Alliance, the major rival of the Taliban. The drought that began in 1999 and continued into 2002 undid the agricultural and herding gains and made a significant portion of the population dependent on international aid for food, shelter, and health care.

In 2002, as the international community plans for the development of the Afghan economy, it faces a challenging task. Among the major obstacles are the absence of political stability; weak or nonfunctioning economic institutions such as banks, a state treasury, and civil-service system; corruption in the distribution of international aid; an environment unsuited to farming in many regions; few passable roads; no railroad; and no access to the sea. On the positive side are a long tradition of self-sufficiency, natural gas and oil resources, and the sizable international effort.

David Levinson

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AFGHANISTAN—HISTORY Archaeologically, Afghanistan's prehistory dates to fifty thousand

years ago and includes Middle and Upper Paleolithic sites (particularly in the northern foothills of the Hindu Kush) and abundant Bronze and Iron Age sites in the north, south, and east. Modern Afghanistan, located at the crossroads of Central, West, and South Asia, incorporates partially or wholly the ancient regions of Aria, Bactria, Sogdiana, Arachosia, and Drangiana—part of the Achaemenid empire (559–330 BCE) and more recently the empire of Alexander of Macedon and his Hellenic successors (c. 330 BCE–150 CE). The territory was also a part of the Parthian, Yueh-chih/Tokharian, Saka, and Kushana polities and the Sasanid empire (c. 224/228–651 CE) and was incorporated into the lands conquered by the Arab Muslims about 700 CE. Portions of Afghanistan remained under the Abbasid caliphate into the ninth century and then under the temporary control of a series of polities: the Samanids, Kerts, Ghaznavids, Ghurids, Mongols, and the Timurids and successor states.

In the sixteenth century, the Mughal empire of India and the Safavids (Persians) were political rivals with Afghanistan as a frontier until the emergence of the native Afghan Durrani dynasty. This dynasty began rule in 1747 and continued nominally under Pashtun Abdali ethnic-group rulers until the Communist coup in 1978. Afshar Persian sociopolitical influence began in the 1720s and remained into the nineteenth century, when Afghanistan was thrust into the geopolitical arena of Britain versus Russia (initially through the British East India Company) in the Great Game. Three Anglo-Afghan wars (1838–1842, 1878–1879, and 1919) served to help establish Afghan independence in the twentieth century under a succession of rulers: Abdur Rahman Khan (1880–1901), Habibullah (1901–1919), King Amanullah (1919–1929), Muhammad Nadir Shah (1929–1933), and Muhammad Zahir Shah (1933–1973), with a republic being established by Muhammad Daoud (1973–1978).

The 1978 leftist coup led to a Soviet military presence until 1989, when the Afghan Islamic resistance movement (with U.S. and Pakistani aid) caused the Soviets to abandon the conflict and withdraw 100,000 troops. The mujahideen (Afghan guerrillas who fought against the Soviets) were composed of many ethnic Afghans and foreign warriors from throughout the Islamic world (particularly Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Pakistan), who began to fall out with one another, precipitating internecine rebellions and attacks on Kabul. Beginning in 1990, a violent civil conflict raged. On one side was the Pashtun fundamentalist Taliban militia, with seventy thousand soldiers, politically led by Mullah Muhammad Omar since 1993,

who had supported the international terrorist Osama bin Laden since 1995. On the other side was the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. The fragile Northern Alliance, whose fifteen thousand soldiers had been led by the charismatic Ahmad Shah Masood (an ethnic Tajik who assembled Tajik, Uzbek, and Shi'ite Muslim Hazara support), survived Masood's assassination in September 2001. The war precipitated a critical refugee problem—perhaps one-third of Afghan inhabitants had been displaced by the autumn of 2001—as the Taliban, who had once controlled 90 percent of the nation, faced a reinvigorated Northern Alliance aided by Western powers seeking to bring bin Laden to justice for the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The drought, a decimated sociopolitical infrastructure, the destruction of cultural patrimony (library and museum collections and archaeological treasures, such as the Buddhas of Bamian), and health and human rights issues (particularly concerning women and minority groups) exacerbated the military and political scene.

Charles C. Kolb

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AFGHANISTAN—HUMAN RIGHTS The chaos of over two decades of warfare has left Afghanistan without an infrastructure of any kind and without human rights. Human rights suffered especially after 1996, when the Taliban, a group of Islamic fundamentalists, captured Kabul and resolved to make Afghanistan accord with their vision of a pure Islamic state. The most flagrant departures from international standards of human rights were in the Taliban's treatment of women and the severity with which the Taliban punished crimes.



WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN

Women's rights were a major human rights issue in Afghanistan during the years of Taliban rule. The following text is from a flyer produced by the Afghanistan Is Everywhere movement for the 8 March 2002 International Women's Day.

In Afghanistan women risked their lives to attain basic human rights. Many women's organizations worked publicly and privately, secretly educating thousands of girls and securing healthcare under the brutal Taliban regime. They developed educational opportunities, conducted courses and vocational training, and opened hospitals for refugee Afghan women and children. The female spirit was strong and fearless during these horrific times.

The Taliban's Treatment of Women

After consolidating power, one of the first things that the Taliban saw to was the removal of women from all social and public life. Thus, women and girls were not allowed to work outside the home or even to venture out unless in the company of a close male relative and they were prohibited from attending schools or universities. All women were forced to wear the *burka*, an all-enveloping garment that completely hides the body, with a mesh in front of the eyes to allow for seeing and breathing. Male doctors could not examine female patients and female doctors could not practice, which meant that women were essentially denied access to modern health care. Proscriptions for women reached absurd levels, with women and girls being forbidden to wear white socks or shoes that made any noise when they walked. In short, women had to become invisible, and were virtually under house arrest.

The punishments meted out on women for transgressing these laws were severe and harsh. A large number of women were stoned to death for walking with a man who was not a husband. Thousands of women were beaten for not wearing proper clothing. Many women were publicly executed for alleged sexual improprieties. A large percentage of Afghanistan's female population is war widows; these women were forced to beg in order to subsist, since all work was

denied them. Women were shot at or beaten if they ventured out of the house alone.

Before the Taliban took control, women in Afghanistan were a very progressive group. In Kabul, prior to 1996, 60 percent of the teachers and 50 percent of the students at Kabul University were women; 70 percent of the schoolteachers, 50 percent of the government workers, and 40 percent of the doctors were women. Thus, the Taliban suddenly disenfranchised a large segment of the workforce and the intelligentsia.

The Taliban's Treatment of Men

Men were also subjected to brutal treatment. Every male was forced to grow a beard, wear a turban, and never show his arms or his legs. Flouting these laws meant public flogging or even summary execution. Most males of fifteen years and older were forced to join the Taliban army; those who refused were shot, along with their families; there were reports of entire villages being murdered in this fashion.

Punishment of Crimes

Severe punishment was meted out to those whom the Taliban saw as hindering their progress toward a perfect Islamic state. Thus, those convicted of stealing (most of these people stole food) had their right hands cut off; these events were held at the Kabul soccer stadium, and drew huge crowds. This stadium was also used for public executions. The relatives of victims publicly executed convicted killers; the method of dispatching the criminal was by cutting of the throat. Those convicted of homosexuality were placed against a brick wall, which was then knocked down by a tank; after thirty minutes, the rubble was cleared; those that could be pulled out alive were exonerated. For adultery, men were given a hundred lashes in a public place, while women were stoned to death.

Human-Rights Problems in the Post-Taliban Era

With the toppling of the Taliban in 2001, a new set of human-rights problems emerged. Women still do not have free access to health, education, and personal safety; lifting of the veil has not bettered their lot. Post-Taliban Kabul has seen an influx of orphans, who have flocked to the capital in search of food, clothing, and some form of security. In the Taliban era, street children in Kabul were estimated at 25,000; currently, there are over 70,000, and this figure is increasing daily, since people keep flocking to the capital, all of them driven from their villages by extreme poverty and drought. In fact, many parents

abandon their children at the city's two orphanages in the hope that these fledgling institutions will be better able to look after their children, which sadly is not the case. As well, female street children are routinely beaten and abused, because the larger society cannot accept a female wandering on her own.

Adding to this catalog of human misery are two additional factors: ethnic turmoil and avaricious warlords. Afghanistan is a land of many people. The largest and most powerful group is the Pashtuns, who populate the southern portions of the country. The Taliban were ethnically Pashtun, and they systematically sought to destroy their traditional enemies, such as the Persian-speaking Tajiks. The Taliban undertook an ethnic cleansing of sorts, and there is much evidence of mass murder, especially in the Shomali Valley, in the north of the country, which is the traditional Tajik homeland. The transitional government of Hamid Karzai has said that it will establish a tribunal to try individuals for war crimes and create a system of compensation for the victims. However, such a procedure will take many long years, and the transitional government will be gone before the tribunal can be securely established.

Warlords too have become a severe handicap for the country, in that they often hamper the movement of relief supplies from one area to the next. This is an acute problem when food and medical supplies need to be delivered to remote villages. It is often the case that entire truckloads of aid material simply disappear. The food and supplies given in aid by foreign countries is often stolen by these warlords and sold at a profit on the black market. Thus, the general population is still suffering because of widespread theft by those in power.

Extreme poverty and hunger still rule Afghanistan. Life expectancy is forty-six; one out of four children dies before reaching the age of five; almost 80 percent of the population is illiterate; and all rural areas (a large portion of the country) have no access to health care, safe drinking water, or electricity. A large percentage of the farmland has been sowed with land mines, so farmers are afraid to venture out into their fields. As well, years of drought have turned farming villages into dried, deserted ruins; urban warfare has destroyed factories, dams, and roads; there are no banks, no commercial infrastructure, and therefore no foreign investment. The only viable cash crop available to many farmers is the poppy, which is cultivated for opium. The land is still unstable and there are continued fears that powerful warlords, military commanders, or Muslim extremists may topple the pre-

sent government. In such an atmosphere, human rights are of little concern in Afghanistan. The situation will only change when a measure of stability is established in the land.

Nirmal Dass

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AFGHANISTAN-POLITICAL SYSTEM

The political history of Afghanistan has been a continuous competition for power and privilege between central and local leaders, with central leaders using a carrot, stick, or combination thereof in attempts to gain control of the rebellious provinces.

Monarchic and Local Institutions

Afghanistan has been a monarchy throughout most its history, from 1747 to the 1973 coup. The kings, who have almost exclusively been of Pashtun origin, traditionally based their rule on fragile tribal confederations and were heavily dependent on cultivating the goodwill of their supporters. Abdur Rahman Khan (reigned 1880–1901) was the first ruler to address this vulnerability actively, by building an independent military and establishing strong administrative and judicial control throughout the country. Centrally this system had no cabinet, only an auditing department with a mandate to control the bureaucracy and expand the tax base. Because the tax base was not expanded, Abdur Rahman Khan's regime depended on subsidies from the British, who controlled neighboring India. With the Russians to its immediate north, Afghanistan's current borders were established in the 1890s to make the country a buffer between the British and Russian empires. At the local level the regime used a system of middlemen appointed by their communities and recognized by the state; they



THE PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, 1990

Adopted 28–29 May 1990

In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful

The prideful history of our beloved homeland, Afghanistan, is enriched, with the heroic struggle of our brave people for independence, national unity, democracy and social progress. At the present stage the state of the republic of Afghanistan is actively carrying on the policy of national reconciliation relying on the support of national, political and patriotic forces.

Therefore, keeping in mind the historic changes that have taken shape in our homeland and in our contemporary world, adhering to the principles of the sacred religion of Islam, abiding by the accepted afghan traditions and rituals, relying upon the realities of the country's history and culture, respecting the valuable heritages of the constitutionalist movement and in conformity with the charter of the United Nations and the universal declaration of human rights, and for the purpose of: preserving the independence, defending the territorial integrity and strengthening the national sovereignty; achieving countrywide peace and deepening national unity; securing justice and democracy; socioeconomic reconstruction and balanced growth and enhancing the people's living standards; promoting the role and prestige of the count[r]y in the international arena; creating favourable conditions for determining the legal status of permanent neutrality of Afghanistan and its demilitarization; we, the representatives of the people of Afghanistan to the *loya jirga*, of twenty eight and twenty ninth of May, one thousand nine hundred and ninety amended as follows the constitution ratified by the *loya jirga* of November thirty, one thousand nine hundred and eighty seven which comprised thirteen chapters and one hundred and forty nine articles.

Source: Afghan-web.com. Retrieved 8 March 2002, from: <http://www.afghan-web.com/history/const/const1990.html>.

are called *arbab* and sometimes *malik* (both mean "village headman" in both Pashtu and Dari languages). The *arbab* represented the state vis-à-vis his community and vice versa, and had considerable freedom of maneuver in relation to both.

Constitutions and Government Reforms

The country got its first constitution in 1922, under King Amanullah (reigned 1919–1929). It provided for a council of state, including both elected and appointed officials, and a president who was also to be a member

of the council. There was no parliament, but there was a formalized role for the traditional *loya jirga*, a council of local leaders, convened to approve major reforms.

Habibullah (reigned 1901–1919) had previously established the first educational institutions, and Amanullah went on to institute an extensive network of primary schools in the 1920s. The basic philosophy of government, inspired by developments in the West, was that modernization had to be spearheaded by the elite and that education was the principal instrument. The results were an educated class, largely based in the

capital Kabul, whose fortune was wholly tied to the state and a deepening split between state and society.


Nader Shah (reigned 1929–1933) introduced a new political arrangement with a bicameral system: an elected council and a council of notables. Practically, parliaments remained the loyal backers of their government until 1964, when Zahir Shah (b. 1914, reigned 1933–1973) initiated his experiments in "new democracy" and promulgated a new constitution, which suggested new political freedoms including a free press and the right to form political parties. The king never signed the bill on political parties into law. Nonetheless, a range of political parties emerged, rooted in the city-based educated strata.

Zahir Shah was overthrown in 1973 by Daud Khan, who established a republic and ruled by revolutionary council until 1977, when he created a constitution that legitimized his presidency. Daud was removed by the Communist coup in April 1978.

The Era of Civil War

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a relatively marginal group on the eve of the coup, set out to implement dramatic reforms. The *arbabs* were thought to constitute a feudal class that had to be removed. PDPA failed both to realize that it did not have the resources to establish an alternative system at the local level, and that the existing intermediaries often enjoyed strong support in their communities. Therefore spontaneous resistance emerged throughout Afghanistan as the PDPA moved to implement its reforms, often with violent means. During the rule of the Communists (1978–1992), Afghanistan was plagued by civil war, internationalized by the direct involvement of the Soviet Union. In this period, there was no significant move toward a representative political system, although the "reconciliation policy" from 1986 onward implied certain moves to accommodate larger groups of the population.

In the same period various political arrangements developed in regions of the country not controlled by the government. At the local level the *arbabs* either developed into military figures or were replaced by religious figures or by young Islamic radicals, who not only enjoyed religious legitimacy, but were also preferred by Pakistan, which effectively controlled the distribution of external support to the resistance. Like the traditional *arbabs*, the resistance leaders maintained a delicate balance between their local supporters and the political parties, the latter being their primary source of money and arms.



Hamid Karzai, who was appointed interim leader of Afghanistan on 5 December 2001. (AFP/CORBIS)

Soon after the Soviet invasion (December 1979), Pakistan had selected seven parties that were to represent Afghan resistance, also known as the *mujahedin* (Islamic freedom fighters). All had a foundation in either radical or traditional Islam. Local resistance leaders depended on relations with the resistance parties for survival. Several *mujahedin* parties established close links to radical Islamic groups outside the country, and from the early 1980s, young men from other Muslim nations came to Afghanistan for military training and combat exercise. One of several key persons was Osama bin Laden, who apart from taking part in combat served as an intermediary for both money and new recruits.

In many cases, councils (Arabic, *shura*, or Pashtu, *jirga*) were established both at the community level and at higher levels, largely to coordinate the military effort and at times also to deal with the welfare of the population. The *shura* institution took on new functions throughout the civil war. The *shuras* were increasingly seen by foreign aid agencies as representatives of the local communities; they also maintained an important coordinating role at various levels within the *mujahedin* during the war and after these parties took control in Kabul in 1992. The resistance parties established various governments, in exile as well as in post-1992 Kabul, none of which really functioned. To



AFGHANISTAN'S INTERIM GOVERNMENT

As of March 2002, the key figures in Afghanistan's government are:

Hamid Karzai, Chairman—A Pashtun and former deputy defense minister and leader of the resistance to the Taliban in the south.

Yunas Qanooni, Interior Minister—A Tajik and close ally of assassinated Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud.

Muhammad Fahim, Defense Minister—A Tajik and former aide to assassinated Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud.

Abdullah Abdullah, Foreign Minister—A Tajik and Pashtun ophthalmologist and public spokesman for the Northern Alliance.

Other leading figures without official positions in the new government are Abdul Rashid Dostrum, the Uzbek leader in the north; Ismail Khan, the Tajik leader in the west, Hajji Abdul Qadir, the Pashtun governor of the Jalalabad region; and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the Pashtun leader of a fundamentalist faction.

Source: The New York Times
(24 December 2001), B4.

establish a representative government, some parties suggested mechanisms ranging from elections to *loya jirga*, while others argued against any such mechanism.

The Taliban Era

The *mujabedin* government, in power in Kabul from 1992 to 1996, was divided by war between its constituent parties. Key players in the government were of Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara origin, whereas there was scant representation of the Pashtun, the largest ethnic group. From 1994, the Taliban ("religious students") movement emerged as a new political actor, rooted in traditional religious networks that had been greatly expanded in both Afghanistan and Pakistan throughout the war of the 1980s, recruiting mainly among the Pashtuns. Many of the leaders had a *mujabedin* background; otherwise, the recruits were largely men who had grown up during the war. Public disappointment with the existing government and large-scale support from Pakistan were key factors in the Taliban's success. After the capture of Kabul in 1996, the Taliban instituted its own inflexible interpretation of *shari'a* (Islamic law), and ten-

sions with the international community intensified. Gradually, the Taliban government built relations with Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organization, as well as with armed opposition movements in places such as Chechnya, China, and Uzbekistan.

The movement gradually reestablished an administrative system modeled on prewar arrangements. At the village level, the role of the *arbab* was revitalized at the cost of the *shura*. Also the village mullahs related to the Taliban regime, which was strongly integrated with the religious networks. Hence, the Taliban were often well informed about local events and became adept at tax collection. At the central level, the Taliban administration gradually evolved from being broadly consultative to being increasingly dominated by a small group of men, and ultimately by one individual, Mullah Mohammad Omar. By 1996, the Taliban made it clear that it considered itself representative of all groups in the country, that Mullah Omar constituted the ultimate authority, and that the concept of general elections was against Islam and thus to be rejected.

The Collapse of the Taliban

Upon linking Osama bin Laden to the attack on the U.S. Pentagon and the World Trade Center towers in New York City on 11 September 2001, the United States repeated its demand for the government to hand over bin Laden unconditionally, which the Taliban refused. The United States launched attacks on the Taliban in collaboration with groups from the *mujabedin*, still internationally acknowledged as Afghanistan's legitimate government. The Taliban regime fell in December 2001, and representatives of different opposition groups met in Bonn to establish a transition plan. The Bonn agreement resulted in an Interim Authority with a six-month mandate, within which a *loya jirga*, for the first time in history, is to appoint a new government.

Kristian Berg Harpviken

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AFRICA-ASIA RELATIONS Africa is the world's second largest continent (after Asia); it includes a continental mass of 29.94 million square kilometers and the great oceanic island of Madagascar, which covers a further 594,180 square kilometers in the western Indian Ocean. Africa is attached to Asia by a thin strip of land forming the western border of the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt. This corridor is only 130 kilometers in width, and is marked today by the Suez Canal. The Cape of Good Hope lies some eight thousand kilometers to the south of it.

Prehistory

The importance of Africa for Asian prehistory cannot be exaggerated, for it was from this continent that early hominids spread northwards and eastwards to populate the Asian continent some 1 million years ago. By approximately 600,000 BCE hominids were living in the caves of Zhoukoudian, just outside the modern city of Beijing. These hominids were of the species *Homo erectus* ("Peking Man"). They used irregularly shaped stone tools, but also had control of fire. Until about ten thousand years ago, they and their descendants across Asia were without exception hunters and gatherers. By about 120,000 years BCE a transitional form of *Homo sapiens* was living at Ngandong, in Java, however, and by approximately 30,000 years BCE the inhabitants of the same Zhoukoudian cave were *Homo sapiens*.

The earliest hominids, and the earliest toolmakers, all evolved in Africa. The continent is thus the cradle of humanity. It was only the extremely slow spread of culture-bearers across Asia that ensured that, being totally cut off from their most ancient roots, they would evolve distinctively Asian cultures over time.

The earliest fully modern humans, *Homo sapiens*, evolved in Africa, most anthropologists believe, and may be represented by fossil material at Klasies River mouth, on the south coast of South Africa. Its caves and rock shelters were occupied intermittently from about 125,000 to 70,000 BCE. In due course the species spread throughout Asia and Europe too.

Early Civilization

One of the world's earliest and greatest high civilizations, a political state, arose on the African continent: this was Egypt. Only Mesopotamia had an earlier claim to the title of a civilization. Although some recent African historians object to characterizing it as such, Egypt was essentially a Near Eastern civilization. Undoubtedly the main influence on the people of the Nile Valley, which led to the development of this civilization in the fourth millennium BCE, was not the for-

aging cultures of East or Central Africa but urbanized Mesopotamia and the Levant. Nubia, lying just to the south of Egypt, was a source only of gold, wood, and slaves. Wheat and barley, introduced from the Near East, were being grown in the Faiyum (near Cairo) by 5000 BCE. Cattle, domesticated over two thousand years earlier in the Near East, also began to be herded around this time. In this early period, too, cotton spread from India to Egypt, while finger millet spread from the Ethiopian region to India. A state arose in Egypt by about 3100 BCE, but it had derived its basic ideas about divine kingship, bureaucracy, and urban organization from the city-states of Mesopotamia (from about 3500 BCE there). Nonetheless, one should not exaggerate the debt of the ancient Egyptians to their Near Eastern neighbors, for they did develop their own written script, one that was in no way borrowed from contemporary Mesopotamian scripts. In art and architecture, too, the Egyptians quickly developed a distinctive national style that had nothing to do with Near Eastern prototypes. Around 2650 BCE Egypt became the first country in the world to raise monumental pyramids to commemorate their dead rulers.

Iron Age

Egypt had begun a long, slow decline by the time Solomon was ruling in Jerusalem in the mid-tenth century BCE, and it never recovered its early grandeur. Although the ancient religion, language, and writing continued in use until the Roman period, the great civilizations of the world were now to be found in Greece and Asia: in Persia, Assyria, China, and Mauryan India.

Meanwhile in the rest of Africa south of the Sahara things were much as they had been before, the desert conditions having isolated them from influences of other civilizations. Eventually an Iron Age succeeded the Late Stone Age, and with none of the intervening phases of Mesolithic, Neolithic, and Bronze Age that had preceded the Iron Age elsewhere in the Old World. Shortly after 2000 BCE the Hittites of Anatolia began the dangerous process of smelting iron, and long kept it a state secret. Eventually it reached Egypt, but the first evidence of iron smelting in sub-Saharan Africa dates to about 480 BCE (at Taruga, Nigeria).

Religions

The interaction between Asia and Africa has been a religious as well as a mercantile and military one. Neither Hinduism nor Buddhism, two of the great Asian religions, reached Southern Africa until very recent times, but other faiths had a much earlier impact. Judaism came to the cities of North Africa some two



CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE FROM SOUTH AFRICA TO INDIA

Mohandas Gandhi's campaign for Indian independence from Great Britain actually began in South Africa, where he organized civil disobedience protests to end discrimination against Indians in South Africa. The following extract describes his first civil disobedience campaign in South Africa from 1906 to 1914, which helped reduce discrimination and served as a model for his subsequent campaigns in India.

The first mass *Satyagraha* [civil disobedience movement] and the most important, in historical perspective was launched by Gandhiji [Mohandas Gandhi] in South Africa in 1906, to fight the organized discrimination of the South African Whites against Indians who had settled there. Refusal to register, to give finger-prints and to receive permits which Gandhiji claimed would stigmatize the Indian community in South Africa as criminal was followed by wholesale arrests. In January, 1908, General Smuts promised to repeal the Ordinance and validate registration if the Indians would register voluntarily. An agreement was reached, and Gandhiji and others were released from jail. But when General Smuts did not carry out his agreement, when the ordinance was not repealed, and when new legislation was introduced barring all further Indian immigration, the resumption of the struggle became inevitable.

On September 16, 1908, two thousand registration certificates were burned in Johannesburg on a public bonfire. The fight was on. Fines, imprisonments, floggings and firing were followed in 1913 by a High Court Judgment invalidating all Indian marriages as not in accordance with the local law. The agitation finally culminated in the classic invasion of the Transvaal on the morning of November 6, 1913. The position of the Union Government became intolerable, and by the end of July, 1914, the Indian Relief Bill was passed, repealing the three pound poll tax, validating Hindu and Muslim [acceptance of] the domicile certificate as conclusive evidence of citizenship. An eight-year struggle, unique in the history of world, ended with justice. It provided the experience and techniques for Gandhiji's subsequent campaigns in India.

Source: R. R. Satyagraha Diwakar. (1948) *The Power of Truth*. Hinsdale, IL: Henry Regnery Co., 71–72.

thousand years ago, and Christianity reached Egypt during the first century CE, soon spreading to Ethiopia. Islam spread westward along the Mediterranean coast as far as Rabat, and then south to such sub-Saharan cities as Tombouctou (Timbuktu) and Gao in present-day Mali. A second route for the spreading new faith was down the East African coast

as far as Kilwa (in present-day Tanzania). But there is at least a possibility that Africa also influenced Asian religions, and in very ancient times. The most influential monotheisms—Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Sikhism, Zoroastrianism, and Bahá'ism—all originated in Asia, yet the world's oldest monotheism was African. This was the Atenism of the Pharaoh Akhenaten

(Amenhotep IV, reigned 1379–1362 BCE), which seemingly disappeared in Egypt after his death. This however was the period when the Hebrews were captive in Egypt, thus raising the distinct possibility that the severe monotheism of Moses (whose very name, Ahmose, is Egyptian) had grown out of the Atenism of the preceding century.

Ancient Voyagers

From the first millennium BCE the Arabian Sea became a Phoenician lake. King Solomon's famed temple on the Mount in Jerusalem was built with a large number of imported materials, including some from South India and some from Nubia. The latter land was the source of wood and gold, but an even longer sea journey brought sandalwood for the temple columns, huge amounts of gold, ivory, peacocks, monkeys, silver, ebony, precious stones, and harps from South India. (In the Hebrew Bible we find that these items all have Dravidian, not Semitic, names: the harp, for example, is *kinnor* in Hebrew, from Tamil *kinnari*.)

The source for these materials was Ernad Taluk in Malabar and its immediate hinterland, an area anciently known as Abita ("cowherd place"), which was rendered as Ophir in the Bible. In later centuries, seafarers on the Egyptian coast or based near Aden (Dedenites in the Old Testament) spread out across the western part of the Indian Ocean, probably discovering how to make use of the monsoon winds in different seasons, and traded regularly with western India; but they also pushed further and further down the east coast of Africa. Numerous Dravidian place-names in the interior of southern Africa suggest these ancient mariners penetrated far inland in search of slaves and raw materials—going, for example, to the copper mines of Zimbabwe.

Eventually, some two thousand years ago, the island of Madagascar acquired a human population, not from the neighboring African coast nor yet from the wandering Phoenician traders, but from a far more distant and unlikely source: Sumatra. It is a well-documented fact that Malagasy is the only African language in the Austronesian language family. Language affiliation is a sure sign of cultural affiliation, and in this case helps to identify with some precision the original homeland of the Malagasy people. Theirs does not appear to have been an intentional voyage of exploration, like Vasco da Gama's (c. 1460–1524), but rather an accident that had been waiting to happen. The prevailing winds and currents at a certain time of the year flow and blow westward right across the Indian Ocean toward the great island. Occasionally Indonesian fishermen lost their sails and, unable to return to port,

were blown off course until, with good fortune, they made a landfall in Madagascar, bringing bananas, rice, taro, and poultry with them.

Archaeological research shows that the first Indonesian occupants were there by about the first century CE. A return to Indonesia was out of the question, but the land of Madagascar was rich, and settled farming proved to be easy. Malagasy myth actually refers to the Indian city of Mangalore, no doubt a stopover port for some of the hapless migrants. A few Indian place-names are found in Madagascar, definitely predating colonial times (such as Mahajanga, from the Marathi *maha + jangal*, "great forest"); so we must presume that occasionally Indian fishermen suffered the same fate when the northeasterly monsoon was blowing.

By the eighth century CE a new force was sweeping down the east coast of Africa and into Madagascar too: this was seaborne Islam. The successors of the ancient Phoenician merchant-sailors were now Arabs, usually Muslims. Their influence even reached as far as Mozambique, and inland to Zimbabwe. The great city of Kilwa was a Muslim city, with mosques and slave quarters, on the African coast opposite the northern tip of Madagascar. Persian, Indian, and even Chinese trade goods have been found yet further south, on the Limpopo River, which borders South Africa. Chinese and Islamic pottery were the luxury goods these traders brought; but their commonest "gift" in these nonmonetary economies was beads, which found their way deep into Africa. In return, gold, copper, ivory, and slaves were brought out. One even reads of a gift of African pygmies and a zebra to a Chinese emperor. Equally surprising, medieval India began to import ivory from Africa, because of the ritual requirement that every Hindu widow break her ivory bangles during her husband's funeral. The Indian supply was consequently becoming too diminished. From the eleventh century Kilwa became the most important East African port, and its Shirazi dynasty (of Persian origin) began to mint the first coins in sub-Saharan Africa.

The gold and copper mines of Zimbabwe were already well known to Indian mining entrepreneurs in this period, six centuries before the first European explorer set foot in the area. (It was the time of the Chola, Hoysala, and Vijayanagar empires in southern India.) Although there is no historical documentation of this phase of Indian overseas expansion, the archaeological evidence of ancient mines is there for anyone to see, and the place-name evidence is quite compelling. Well over a hundred Dravidian place-names can be identified in southern Africa.



CREATING ASIA-AFRICA UNITY

In April, 1955, delegates from 29 Asian and African nations meet at Bandung, Indonesia, to discuss common concerns and the role of developing nations in the post-World War II Cold War world. The following extract is their agreement on economic cooperation.

1. The Asian-African Conference recognized the urgency of promoting economic development in the Asian-African region. There was general desire for economic cooperation among the participating countries on the basis of mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty. The proposals with regard to the economic cooperation within the participating countries do not preclude either the desirability or the need for cooperation with countries outside the region, including the investment of foreign capital. It was further recognized that the assistance being received by certain participating countries from outside the region, through international or under bilateral agreements, had made a valuable contribution to the implementation of their development programmes.

Source: George M. Kahin. (1955) *The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April, 1955*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 76.

The Colonial Phase

After a thousand years of Islamic influence, Africa was colonized, mainly during the nineteenth century, by a variety of Western European powers: the Dutch in South Africa, the Portuguese and Belgians in Central Africa, the French in North and West Africa and Madagascar, the Germans in East Africa, the Spanish in the Western Sahara, the Italians in North and East Africa, and the British in West Africa and a broad swath of lands running from Egypt more or less continuously to South Africa. In a sense they were the successor occupiers to the Asian miners, traders, and slave dealers who had come there some six centuries before them, sometimes even reopening the same old mines. They established colonial states, usually with unrealistic straight-line boundaries, and governed through an elite European civil service. They established roads, railroads, cities, schools, and industries, often built with indentured Indian labor. But when most of them left the continent in the 1950s and 1960s, they also left behind a tradition of racism and attitudes of European cultural superiority that lived on in South Africa.

While the number of Europeans in any African country was always a tiny percentage of the total pop-

ulation, the British had an unexpected demographic impact on the continent by importing indentured labor from South Asia. During the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth, thousands of Indians were brought to South and East Africa to work on building railroads (especially the Uganda railway, which opened up the interior), on harbors and other modern installations, or to labor in the mines, factories, and plantations. In Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya these were mainly Gujarati and Kachchi speakers, though some were Punjabi Sikhs. Parsis were sometimes brought in from Bombay as supervisors and clerks on these projects. Lawyers such as M. K. Gandhi (1869–1948) appeared to champion Indian interests, and many Gujarati traders also arrived from that same port to open small businesses in the African countries, often in competition with Lebanese. In South Africa too laborers were brought in from the ports of Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta, which caused them to be labeled respectively Bombayis, Madrasis, and Bengalis, regardless of their actual place of origin. The three categories tended to form endogamous, caste-like communities.

After independence came to some East African countries such as Somalia, Communist Chinese or Ko-

rean labor gangs could be seen helping to develop the local infrastructure, notably by building new railroad tracks. Recently, however, an intractable economic decline in numerous regions of East Africa has induced the local Indian traders and professional families to leave for other continents. The English-speaking countries, mainly Canada, Australia, the United States, and Britain, with their stable economies and good schools, have been the prime targets for these economic refugees, although some have returned to India or Pakistan. In South Africa the many middle-class Indians have retained their position; whereas in East Africa most have not been so fortunate.

In the Uganda census of 1969 "Asians" (primarily from South Asia) numbered about seventy thousand. Though many of them were born in Uganda, they were officially considered foreigners. In that same year the government of Milton Obote threatened to nationalize many industries, causing the wealthy Asians to export their assets and then move elsewhere. Then in 1972 President Idi Amin deported nearly seventy thousand Asians, leaving only a tiny minority behind. A decade later a few returned to claim their expropriated property, including factories and estates. By the end of the century only about ten thousand Asians were to be found in Uganda, and fewer still in other East African countries. Universally they have seen better opportunities for their families overseas.

Paul Hockings

See also: **Bandung Conference; Japan-Africa Relations**

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AFRIDI Through the centuries the Afridis, a Pakistani ethnic group among the Pashtun people inhabiting parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan, battled various powers. Afridi territory extends from the eastern Safid range to northern Pakistan, including the Khyber Pass.

In the eighteenth century the Afridis fought with the army of the Afghan ruler Ahmad Shah Durrani and later offered sanctuary to his grandson, Shah Shoja (reigned 1803–1809). From 1839 to 1842 the Afridis clashed with the British during the first Anglo-Afghan War, when they joined the resistance to General George Pollock's march on Kabul. After the British had annexed the Punjab in 1849, further clashes occurred because of British efforts to keep the Khyber Pass open.

The Afridis eventually joined the Red Shirt Movement, which sought independence from the British. When Pakistan achieved independence, the northwest province of Afridi territory was included in its borders. This led to a new movement for a Pashtun state uniting all Afridi lands, including those in Afghanistan.

The ethnic communities in Pakistan and Afghanistan were underrepresented in their respective governments until 1997, when Pakistan's president Farooq Leghari lifted voting restrictions to allow them all to vote. Previously, only eight ethnic people had represented more than four million in the National Assembly.

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AFYON (2000 est. pop.124,000). Located in western-central Turkey, Afyon has depended on agriculture since the Hittite era (1900–1300 BCE). Like most of Anatolia, Afyon survived centuries of invading or occupying civilizations and rulers right up to the Ottoman demise in the mid-twentieth century. A large proportion of the economy depended on feeding armies. The city's chief enterprises are still farm- or rural-based.

Poppies are an important crop. A local, state-run alkaloid factory refines poppy straw into opiates, supplying close to one-third of pharmaceutical opium to

world markets. The city is also famous for a rich, clotted cream produced as a regional specialty.

Twenty-first-century Afyon is a conservative city with many devout Muslims. The towering black citadel that overlooks the town is believed to have been a refuge for Byzantines during the first few centuries CE. The Greek invading army occupied Afyon, but were driven out in 1921 by Mustafa Kermal (1881–1938; later known as Atatürk, "Father of Turkey"), the future founder of modern Turkey. The rout of the Greeks at Afyon made possible the goal of an independent Turkish state.

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AFZAL KHAN (d. 1659), Bijapur general. Afzal Khan was a brilliant seventeenth-century general in Bijapur (in the Indian state of Maharashtra). Afzal was sent by the sultan of Bijapur with an army of ten thousand men in 1659 to suppress the rising Maratha warlord Shivaji, who had conquered Bijapur lands in the Konkan and neighboring areas between 1646 and

1655. Within two weeks, Afzal had reached Wai, driving all resistance aside; but meanwhile Shivaji was safely within the fort of Pratapgarrh. As Afzal could not tempt him forth, he engaged in negotiations with Shivaji, calling for a conference between the two leaders. Shivaji went to this ostensibly unarmed but, fearing treachery from the Muslim general, he carried arms hidden on him. As the two men embraced, the stalwart general tried to throttle Shivaji; but Shivaji immediately killed Afzal by ripping his stomach open with the metal "tiger's claws" (*baghnakh*) Shivaji was carrying. The Marathas went on to defeat the Bijapur forces in battle, and this ended Bijapur's hostilities.

Paul Hockings

AGARTALA (2002 pop. 193,000). Since 1850 the capital of tiny Tripura state in northeastern India, picturesque Agartala lies near the Bangladesh border on the Haroa River in an intensively cultivated plain. It is dominated by the Ujjayanta Palace. Built by Maharaja Radha Krishna Kishore Manikya Bahadur in 1901 in a mixed European-Mughal style, the gleaming white palace now houses the state legislative assembly. Its grounds extend over seventy acres of parkland, including formal gardens, artificial lakes, and the Umaneshwar and Jagannath Temples, both in a striking yellow-orange hue. Nearby are the Gedu Mian



A family wades through flood waters near Agartala in September 2001. (AFP/CORBIS)

Mosque, encrusted with an unusual mosaic of broken crockery pieces, and the Buddhist Venuban Vihar.

The city features the State Museum, a tribal museum, busy bazaars, and colleges affiliated with the University of Calcutta. The principal languages are Bengali, Kokbarak, and Manipuri; English is not widely spoken. The population is largely Bengali but includes members of the nineteen "scheduled" tribes. (Such scheduled tribes have special protections under the Indian Constitution.) These people, with a rich and varied culture, belong mainly to the Tripuris, Reang, Chakma, Halam, and Usai communities and live in elevated houses of bamboo called *tong*. Old Agartala, the former capital, is five kilometers to the east. The Temple of Fourteen Deities there draws thousands of Hindu devotees each July for Kharchi Puja, a festival celebrating worship of the earth.

C. Roger Davis

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AGING POPULATION JAPAN Perhaps the most significant challenge facing Japan over the coming decades is its aging population. By the middle of the twenty-first century, Japan will have the most aged society in the world, with approximately one in three Japanese being 65 years of age or more. The population by then will have shrunk to about 100 million. As early as 2010, more than 21 percent of the Japanese population will be aged 65 years or more (compared with, for example, 13 percent in the United States), an increase of 6 percent since 1998. By 2025, Japan is projected to have the highest average age in the world. This has been the result of several factors, the first being the rapid rise in birthrates following the end of World War II until 1947. The second factor is the falling birthrate, which dropped steeply through the 1950s, stabilizing around 1960 and declining slowly thereafter. At present, the birthrate is less than 1.4 children per Japanese woman (of childbearing age), while replacement is about 2.1. The birthrate is expected to fall to about 1.1 by 2020. The third factor is the longevity of the Japanese, who live longer than anyone else in the world—approximately 77 years for men and 84 for women. Japan has a massive change looming that will affect virtually every aspect of its social, political, and economic organization. Some have called the problem Japan's "demographic time bomb."

The Cost of Caring for Elderly People

In the coming decades, one of Japan's major difficulties will be to deal with the costs of supporting an aging population. Funding of basic pensions is the most immediate problem, and pressure will increase steadily. By 2020, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development has estimated, the cost of providing pensions will amount to 14 percent of Japan's gross domestic product (GDP), about three times that of the United States. At present, Japan spends only about 7 percent of GDP on pensions, and the Japanese government has recently introduced nursing-care insurance to commit the population to support of the aged. Fundamentally, such schemes are designed to make people responsible for their own financial security in old age rather than dependent on state support. At the same time, it is clear that the Japanese government will have to play a more significant role, and the so-called Golden Plan of 1989 and the 1994 New Golden Plan are examples of the state's attempt to play a role in the provision of pensions for the elderly. The overriding concern of these new measures is to avoid a financial crisis in the coming decades.

Other costs will also rise. Outlays for medical care will go up given that, with people living longer, elderly people will need more intensive medical care and over a longer time. In 1993, the number of Japanese over the age of 80 was only 3 million, but this is expected to jump to 9.5 million by 2025.

A related problem is providing adequate housing for the elderly. Most Japanese are urbanites, and there is a concentration of population in the Tokyo-Nagoya-Osaka belt. Indeed, today more than 20 percent of Japanese over the age of 60 are living alone in Tokyo, while approximately 78 percent of this age group is classified as urban. To a significant extent, this is a result of postwar industrialization and rural-urban migration, so that there is some conflict between earlier, rural-based values and the reality of contemporary high-density living. Housing pressures are a well-known phenomenon, and one of the limitations for extended family support is simply the lack of space, specifically affordable space, in the urban areas (where most elderly Japanese live, in spite of a disproportionate number of elderly in rural areas). There is additional pressure on the state to provide specialized facilities for the care of the elderly, alternative home-care models, special nursing homes, facilities for physically disabled persons, and so on. Given the pressures of modern urban living, men are often too preoccupied with work commitments and the required commuting to have time to look after elderly parents; if care is undertaken at home, the burden falls on women.

Labor Shortages

A fundamental problem in Japan is that there are fewer and fewer younger people to support the elderly. At present there are about 5 people working per retiree, but this will be reduced to about 2.5 workers by 2010, according to Japanese government projections. According to a different temporal comparison, in 1980 there were 12 people contributing to employee pension funds for every one pensioner, while the ratio by 2025 will be 2:1. That is, the number of people aged 65 or over per 100 people aged 20 to 64 in 2010 will be 37 and in 2025, 49. In short, the working population in Japan will peak in 2005 and thereafter decline, producing a substantial labor shortage.

This labor shortage means that labor costs will rise, and Japan will become less competitive as the cost of production increases; this process has already been underway for some time, and the situation is getting worse. Higher costs also mean that there is pressure to increase taxes, and the Ministry of Health and Welfare projects the social security tax to rise from 14.5 percent in 1994 to 34.8 percent in 2025. These factors, taken together, will drive more and more industry offshore, to lower-wage countries, especially those in Asia. Also, as more funding goes into this sector, there will be less available for investment in the economy; with fewer people working, there will be less savings available for investment. Ultimately this means a reduction in Japan's external trade surplus, which will have a profound effect on the global economy.

Alternative Sources of Labor

One response of Japan's policy makers has been to keep older Japanese working longer. It may be that the retirement age will simply be steadily increased, with older Japanese being asked to work to, say, the age of 70. Already the age of eligibility for the national pension is going up, from 60 years to 65 by 2013 (though the Employees Pension Insurance scheme still allows benefits from age 60). At the same time, there is a well-established (at least in the postwar period) tradition in Japan of having people continue to work after retirement in a company affiliated with their main place of employment. In 1993, for example, the proportion of Japanese who remained economically active after the age of 65 was 24.9 percent, as opposed to 6.6 percent in Sweden and 12.2 percent in Singapore.

If one assumes, however, that the number of Japanese workers will decline (and this will happen eventually as a substantial portion of the workforce enters very old age), the question of labor shortages arises. A common policy option in the West is to encourage

immigration. The problem in Japan's case is that it is not an immigrant country but, on the contrary, has had a tendency to be exclusionist. Only about 2 percent of Japan's population are migrants. So much of Japanese culture has revolved around being isolationist and resistant to having large numbers of foreigners in the land that people often find it difficult to interact with those from different cultural backgrounds. One compromise has been to facilitate the entry of Brazilians of Japanese descent, and there are now about 270,000 of them in Japan. However, many more migrants are required. The U.N. estimates a need for as many as 600,000 immigrants per year on a continuing basis to sustain the country's economic growth. If such a recommendation is followed (and there is overwhelming resistance to it in Japan), it would put pressure on the Japanese government to treat immigrants more equitably. The Japanese government may compromise further on this issue and allow more foreigners into the country on temporary work permits.

A third option in dealing with an aging population is to change the way in which Japanese women are treated in the workplace. To date, their labor is not utilized effectively. Many are well educated but not supported by society or the state to the point that they can rise to the level of their abilities. The aging population, however, will force changes in the area of women's employment. The demand for labor will provide women with a greater range of employment opportunities. Also, the present trend toward career interruptions for the purpose of raising children will have to change as labor becomes scarce. One indication that the Japanese government is taking this issue seriously is the 1999 modification of the 1986 Equal Employment Opportunity Law, which removed many of the barriers to female employment in Japan.

Impact on Global Trade and Investment

With the growth in the global economy, particularly the high level of interconnectedness between the major economies, events in one country are quickly felt in others. This is particularly the case with Japan. Despite its continuing recession, Japan is the second-largest economy in the world and enjoys one of the world's largest per capita incomes. Its products are used in virtually every country in the world, and brands such as Sony, Panasonic, and Mitsubishi are household names. Japanese companies also are increasingly manufacturing their products in other countries, either to avoid protective tariffs, penetrate local markets, or enjoy the benefits of low-cost labor. Japanese investors are also heavily involved in other

countries, especially the United States. In spite of Japan's economic slowdown through the 1990s, it remains crucial to global trade, manufacturing, and investment. Therefore, substantial socioeconomic change in Japan will have profound effects, directly and indirectly, and both positively and negatively, on the rest of the world.

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AGNO RIVER The Agno River is one of the main rivers in Luzon Province, Philippines. It is almost 150 kilometers long, originating at Binga Lake in Benguet Province, running down its deep valleys, and turning westward in the lowlands of Pangasinan Province before draining into the Lingayen Gulf.

The Ibaloi people of Benguet regard the river as sacred because it gives life. But its "life-giving" properties extend beyond Benguet because it also irrigates the lowlands of Pangasinan, which are part of the "rice bowl" of the Philippines. With its connection to Binga Lake, the Agno River is harnessed to power hydroelectric plants of the Binga and Ambuklao Dams, providing electricity to the Cagayan Valley region.

Another dam, the San Roque, is under construction along the Agno River. This project has been met with stiff resistance by the people of Benguet because the dam will inundate towns and threaten the environment.

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AGRA (2001 est. pop. 1.3 million). Agra, located in the state of Uttar Pradesh in northwest India, is renowned for its ancient architecture. The city developed by virtue of its location on major trade routes and waterways.

The first settlement is thought to have been established here in 2 BCE. The sultan of Delhi settled in Agra in 1492, making it his capital, renovating its ancient fort, and ruling the city until the Mughal dynasty came to power in 1526. The Mughals then made Agra the seat of their empire's government for a time and constructed the great Friday mosques (built specially for Friday worship) during their reigns

The city's most famous landmark is the Taj Mahal (built c. 1632–1652), the white marble mausoleum



AGRA FORT-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Designated a World Heritage Site in 1983, Agra Fort is a huge brick red seventeenth-century Mughal fortress that protects the Mughal imperial city of Agra within its 2.5 kilometers of walls. A stone's throw away from the Taj Mahal, Agra Fort contains many Mughal architectural masterpieces.



Sikandra, the tomb of Emperor Akbar in Agra. (WILDCOUNTRY/CORBIS)

commissioned by Shah Jahan for his wife Mumtaz Mahal considered a masterpiece of that period's architecture. Legend says that Shah Jahan maimed and blinded the architect to prevent him from ever constructing a building of similar beauty. Unfortunately the Taj Mahal and other monuments in Agra are threatened by the modern city's pollution.

The first European visitors compared Agra to London and Paris. After the British annexed Agra in 1803, the city became the headquarters for the presidency in the northwest provinces.

Modern Agra is composed of the ancient city and the nineteenth-century British cantonment. Today Agra is a center for commerce, higher education, and tourism. Despite its modernity, traditional crafts such as marble carving, stone setting, and carpet manufacture are still practiced.

Linda Dailey Paulson

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AGRICULTURAL COLLECTIVIZATION CHINA

Private land ownership and the one-family farm were the basis of Chinese agriculture for more than two thousand years before the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Until the early 1950s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) claimed that it would first improve, rather than eliminate, the system of private family farms. The land reform of the CCP during the 1940s and early 1950s won great support of the majority of Chinese peasants because it actually allowed more peasants to

own their own lands and thus to create their own family farms. However, CCP leaders, particularly Mao Zedong (1893–1976), shared Marxists' goal of eventually eliminating private ownership of land and achieving socialist collectivization. As early as 1943, Mao had proclaimed that agricultural collectivization would be the only way for Chinese peasants to escape poverty and would be the CCP's long-range goal. Before land reform was completely accomplished, the CCP was prepared to begin the gradual introduction of agricultural collectivization.

China's agricultural collectivization was carried out in three stages. The first stage was to promote mutual aid teams (MATs). MATs were small scale, usually with five or six households joining to work cooperatively during busy times (such as sowing and harvesting). Each family retained ownership of its own land, and the crops grown on that land basically belonged to that family. The move toward MATs was relatively successful. By 1952, 40 percent of China's rural households joined a mutual aid team.

During the same period, a small number of peasants were starting to move to the next stage of collectivization: the "lower" or "semisocialist" agricultural producers' cooperative (APC). An APC usually encompassed a small village or section of a village (twenty to forty households on average). Members of the APC pooled their lands and large agricultural tools and draft animals and worked the land together. A management committee kept records, usually measuring in daily "work points," of the amount of labor done by each family. At the end of a year, the crop and other income (after taxes had been paid and reserve funds had been subtracted) would be divided among the members of the APC according to the accumulated work points of each family and the land and tools they had contributed. Fifteen thousand APCs were established when the CCP began to encourage peasants to replace MATs with APCs at the end of 1953.

From APCs to Full Collectivization

The third stage was the fully socialist collectives, or "higher" APCs. Most higher APCs contained 150 to 200 households. Unlike in the semisocialist APC, in which an individual family still retained nominal ownership of its lands and derived its income partially from these lands, the lands now were legally the property of the APC. The amounts of land and capital contributed by each family were no longer taken into account in determining how much each family would receive at the end of a year. The APC would distribute crops solely on the basis of each

family's labor contributions: to each according to his deeds.

Originally, China's agricultural collectivization was planned quite cautiously. The CCP leaders who were in charge of this work knew that this transformation would have to be managed carefully to avoid the bloodshed and catastrophic results that had accompanied the rapid collectivization initiated by Joseph Stalin (1879–1953) in the Soviet Union. The CCP Central Committee predicted that the transition to socialist collectivization would be accomplished in fifteen years from 1953. The committee disbanded tens of thousands of APCs in 1953 and 1955 on the grounds that these APCs were premature and were organized against peasants' own will.

However, Mao was unsatisfied with the cautious approach to collectivization. According to Mao, China would suffer both economic and social problems unless the transition to collectivization speeded up. Mao believed that a socialist system of agriculture would bolster agricultural productivity, stimulate rural markets for industrial products, and divert sufficient workers and funds to accelerate China's industrialization. In the meantime, a fully socialist agriculture system would end the division between the haves and have-nots in China's countryside.

Despite the opposition of many key figures within the CCP and many peasants, Mao's view prevailed finally. The CCP launched a drive to organize more higher APCs in the autumn of 1955. After it started, the campaign moved much faster than even Mao had initially proposed. Provincial and lower-level cadres implemented the collectivization drive with such enthusiasm that China's agricultural socialization was completed in less than a year. In 1954, there were 114,000 APCs nationwide, 200 of them higher APCs. By 1956, 120 million agricultural households, or 96.3 percent of China's rural families, were organized in 750,000 collectives, of which 88 percent were the fully socialist higher APCs.

Endorsed by Mao, "people's communes" were organized in the countryside in 1958 on the basis of higher APCs. Each commune amalgamated dozens of higher APCs and had twenty-five thousand people on average. By the end of 1958, there were twenty-six thousand communes, in which 98 percent of China's rural population lived. The commune became a new organizational form for the countryside, combining political, administrative, and military functions in one organization. Economically, however, the principal internal unit in each commune was the production brigade, which often corresponded to a higher APC.

Results of Collectivization

Agricultural collectivization had profound influence in China. It gave the CCP greater power to exert its authority over Chinese peasants and to more effectively extract a large portion of agricultural income from the countryside to fund China's industrialization. In the meantime, collectivization was pushed too soon and too hard after 1955, resulting in inefficiencies in agricultural productivity, dissatisfaction among peasants, and mismanagement in China's rural areas. Peasants were deprived of their land and other private property and lost the incentive to work harder. China's agricultural productivity stagnated until 1979, when Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) launched economic reform. With the dismemberment of the people's communes in 1982, China's agricultural collectivization collapsed. Family farms again became the basis of Chinese agriculture; more than 97 percent of peasants ran their own farms under the household responsibility system (which turned responsibility for production back over to individual households) by 1983.

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See also: **Household Responsibility System—China**

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AGRICULTURE—CENTRAL ASIA The five Central Asian republics (CARs: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan) were prime suppliers of agricultural products, metals, and minerals to population centers in the Soviet Union. After independence in 1991, farm production fell during the efforts to restructure the inefficient and highly subsidized agricultural sector.

Monoculture Farming

Before independence the CARs provided the Soviet Union with 90 percent of its cotton needs, 15 percent of its vegetable oils, nearly 50 percent of its rice, and 35 percent of its fruits and vegetables. In turn the CARs imported grain, meat, dairy products, and sugar from the Soviet Union. Then and now the CARs depend on their agriculture sectors, which are prime employers and contributors to economic growth. (See Table 1.)

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, farm production and overall economic growth in Central Asia have dropped precipitously. (See Table 2.) This terrible economic performance has increased the level of poverty in the CARs, and the productivity of labor in farming has declined.

In the context of the Soviet Union, the CARs were never meant to be integrated, stand-alone economies. Rather, they were set up to be primary product producers for the more industrialized republics. Farm economies in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan specialized in cotton; Kyrgyzstan specialized in wool and mutton; Kazakhstan in grain.

Second-stage processing for these raw materials was discouraged in Central Asia, so that the CARs did not benefit from the jobs and economic activity that processing, milling, and manufacturing would have afforded. Links with non-USSR markets were discouraged or prohibited. The structural dependence that developed between the "center" and "periphery" of the Soviet Union was broken with its dissolution. When the USSR collapsed, the economy of the Russian Federation also plunged, greatly debilitating the markets it once offered to the CARs.

Other Economic Problems in Agriculture

Soviet planners, in an effort to expand production, brought land that was marginal for agriculture into

cultivation and employed excessive chemical inputs to maximize production. With the exception of Kyrgyzstan, which exports water, the CARs suffer from severe droughts and a shortage of irrigation. Existing irrigation systems have fallen into disrepair during the years of independence. The issue of water is also a problem for ecological reasons. Monocrop farming has ravaged natural resources, as evidenced by the despoliation of the Aral Sea. As rivers that drained into the Aral were diverted to provide irrigation water for cotton, new deserts were created, and much of the Aral Sea dried up. Now the wind blows salt and pesticide residue across an increasingly barren landscape.

Another factor accounting for the decline in production in the CARs is the withdrawal of agricultural subsidies. During the time of the Soviet Union and especially in the Gorbachev era (1985–1991), the CARs benefited from the All-Union budget transfers that provided investment resources for agriculture and other sectors of the economy. Physical inputs were also subsidized. These transfers tended to hide inefficiencies in agriculture while increasing production.

When exposed to the world markets, the agricultural products grown in the CARs suffered from substantial price fluctuations. Cotton prices were relatively high early in the 1990s but fell substantially later in the decade. At the same time imported inputs (like fertilizers and seeds) rose in price, imperiling the profitability of the agricultural sector and causing a cost-price squeeze.

Although some of the CARs' agricultural trade is still with other countries of the former Soviet Union for historical or physical reasons, that trade is declining. Other economically challenged former Soviet states may delay paying hard currency or may want to barter instead, while the CARs need hard currency to purchase inputs. By 1996 fifty percent of the total trade of the CARs was with countries that had not been part

TABLE 1

Central Asia's dependence on the agricultural sector for contributions to GDP and employment in 1999		
	Percent of GDP in agricultural sector	Percent of total labor force in agricultural sector
Kazakhstan	10	23
Uzbekistan	31	44
Kyrgyzstan	44	42
Tajikistan	25	52
Turkmenistan	25	44

SOURCES: Data for this table from World Bank (2000: Table 12) and Turner (1999, 2000, 2001).

TABLE 2

Percentage of economic growth and growth of agriculture sector, annual data for 1990–1999		
	GDP	Value added by agriculture
Kazakhstan	-5.9	-12.2
Uzbekistan	-2.0	-1.0
Kyrgyzstan	-7.4	-1.5
Tajikistan	-9.8	-12.2
Turkmenistan	-3.5	No data

SOURCE: World Bank (2000: Table 11).



During Russian and Soviet rule, cotton became the primary agricultural product in Central Asia. Here, a woman picks cotton in Muynak in 1989. (DAVID & PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS)

of the former Soviet Union. The CARs need new markets, and as physical links with southern and eastern neighbors are developed and access to the Mediterranean Sea and to Indian and Pacific Ocean ports increases, trade with other former Soviet states can be expected to decline further.

In an effort to cultivate new markets, the CARs turned south to Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran, which had formed the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 1985. Central Asian countries were admitted to ECO in 1992, along with Afghanistan and Azerbaijan. These additions gave the ECO cultural cohesion as it included all of the non-Arab Islamic countries of West Asia and Central Asia. While the ECO has not significantly increased the CARs' trade, it has provided a forum for discussion of regional trade disagreements and a forum for future peaceful settlement of conflicts. Similarity in resource endowments and overlapping commodity composition limit trade options between the three original ECO members and the CARs. For example, cotton, an important CARs export, is also important to both Turkey and Pakistan.

The CARs are aiming to build more diversity into their economies. For example, to substitute for imported grain, Tajikistan reduced its cotton acreage by 25 percent between 1990 and 1996 and planted wheat. Tajikistan's efforts to develop were impaired by civil war. While a peace agreement has been signed, there is still unrest in the country.

Restructuring Agriculture

The CARs are struggling to reform the archaic system of farm possession and management through privatization or land reform. Farming in the Soviet Union

took place on state land or state farms (*sovkhoby*) and collective farms (*kolkhozy*). Theoretically state farms were "factories in the field," paying a wage to workers, whereas capital and land belonged to the state. Any profit at the end of the year entered the government's coffers.

On the collective farms, also called cooperatives, buildings and machinery belonged to a group of worker members. Theoretically a profit at the end of the year was divided among the members according to some predefined plan. But since so many state and collective farms showed a loss as the Soviet Union came to an end, wages were often paid to collective farm members, but there were infrequent profits to divide.

Although there are some country differences, the state and collective farms of the Soviet Union shared some common characteristics:

1. The farms were large in average number of workers. A farm with 1,500 irrigated hectares and 1,500 workers was not unusual.
2. Laborers on these farms accomplished work communally. A farm's labor force was divided into brigades of, say, a dozen people, with the brigade leader responsible to the chairperson of the *kolkhoz* or the director of the *sovkhob*. One brigade might be responsible for 200 hectares of cotton on the farm, tending it from planting to harvest.
3. Each farm received state orders each year stipulating the production targets and the price to be paid for each commercial commodity. If the farm exceeded its targets, the extra amount could be sold through non-governmental channels for, presumably, a higher price.
4. The properties received from the state the inputs and credit deemed necessary to fulfill the production targets, automatically and often at a subsidized price.
5. The personnel on the farms were chastised in various ways if targets were not met, but bankrupt farms continued to be given subsidies and did not go "out of business."
6. The state and collective farms provided medical and other social and educational services to their members and workers.
7. The farming system, while dominated by large farms, provided workers' and members' families with small auxiliary parcels of about a quarter of a hectare each. On these small parcels farm families grew vegetables

or fruits for their own consumption, occasionally selling some of this produce. Some of these plots were very productive, and if the worker-members remained on good terms with the large farm's administrators, they were sometimes given inputs.

Many of these large centrally directed farms became a serious financial burden for the state well before independence. Subsidies were generous, production targets were infrequently met, productivity was low, incentives to work to capacity did not exist, and expenses for social infrastructure were high.

After independence the CARs enacted land reforms in an effort to reinvigorate agriculture. But such profound changes require years to institute completely. Land reforms included reorganizing the farms to make them smaller, placing them in the hands of former members and workers, and semiprivatizing them. International authorities argued that family farms would be the best alternative to state and collective farms, whereas local specialists believed that there were economies of scale that would be destroyed in the conversion to family farms. Some felt that land should be turned over to the owners so they could buy, sell, and inherit land; eventually, it was thought, the market would dictate its efficient allocation. Others argued that complete privatization would result in a concentration of land, and they wanted the land to remain state property while giving long-term leases to former members and workers.

Group Farming Still Prevails

Some members and workers opted for private individual farms, but most decided on some variant of cooperative farming with related families or with families who had worked together for a long time under the old system. Joint-stock companies gave negotiable paper shares to members or to production cooperatives or other associative organizational forms. With the exception of the private individual farm (sometimes called a *dekhan* farm) the other farm organizations were not a great deal different from the old *sovkhos* or *kolkhos*, though they were usually smaller in acreage and membership. The auxiliary parcels were often granted to those who held them before independence.

There were sound reasons that associative organizations were preferred to family farms. Workers and members were used to this team effort. Group farming meant that farming risk was minimized, and an eight-hour day could usually be observed. Most of those who

worked in the former system considered themselves to be laborers and not farmers; they felt that they simply did not have the management and financial experience that farmers needed. Furthermore the machinery from the old state or collective farm could be used if it was in good repair (although much was not), and it was impractical to use this heavy equipment on small farms. The barns and other outbuildings were large and all but useless for family farms. Moreover to obtain inputs a special relationship with a neighboring large farm had to be established; there was no system enabling individual farmers to buy fertilizer, seeds, and farm chemicals or even to obtain credit.

Those who criticize the associative structure of reorganization feel that the old authoritative structure is simply duplicated in the new system. Often the old presidents or directors of the collective or state farms became administrative heads of the new entities. Nor is the incentive issue solved. There is the continuing problem of so-called free riders. With group rather than individual effort, it is easier to slack off and let someone else do the hard work. Also it is difficult for members to change their minds about the structure they prefer. For instance in most of the associative forms it is difficult to break away and become a family farmer once one has opted for an associative choice. Few mechanisms exist for selling one's shares unless one goes through an authority figure, who is usually anxious that members not leave the organization. The right to sell shares may exist, but it is usually difficult to exercise this right.

Land reform is further along in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan than in the other CARs. In Kazakhstan, however, only 4 to 5 percent of agricultural production comes from private individual farms; in Kyrgyzstan half of the farmland in the country was transferred to private individual farmers on the basis of 99-year leases, and these farms provide about half of the country's agricultural produce. If the goal of the CARs is to reorganize into a system of private individual farms (and it is not completely clear that this is the case), it has a long distance to travel.

Future Implications

The CARs face a myriad of problems in reshaping their agriculture sectors. These countries have shown large drops in gross domestic product and agricultural-sector growth since independence. To get agriculture moving, the CARs must develop reliable sources of credit and inputs, find new markets, diversify their farm economies, fix their irrigation systems and create new ones, let market prices pre-

vail, and develop institutional forms conducive to agricultural development.

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See also: **Aral Sea**

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AGRICULTURE—CHINA Today Chinese agriculture sustains 22 percent of the world's popula-

tion, with less than 8 percent of the world's arable land. The pattern of intensive agriculture varies in accordance with regional differences in environmental conditions: double or even triple cropping in the southern coastal regions; double cropping with a summer rice crop in the Chang (Yangtze) River basin of central and eastern China; winter wheat–summer crop cycles on the North China plains; single-crop, spring-grown cereals in the Northeast.

Chinese Agriculture in the Early Twentieth Century

Historically China has long been plagued by an unfavorable human-to-land ratio. As economic conditions worsened in the countryside by the early twentieth century, some observers argued that poor peasants were exploited by parasitic landowners through exorbitant rents, and their plight was exacerbated by usurious interest rates, high taxes, and recurrent warfare and natural disasters. Therefore, only a radical restructuring of rural society and redistribution of wealth could alleviate endemic poverty. Others contended that technological backwardness was the root of impoverishment. In this case, the introduction of modern farming techniques and inputs and the availability of low-cost credit were the proper prescriptions.

The Communist Policy of Land Reform

Whatever the correct diagnosis of China's agricultural ills, the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war of 1946–1949 succeeded in large part because the Communists used a land-reform campaign to mobilize the impoverished and discontented peasants by appealing to their hunger for land. The land reform started in Communist-occupied areas of China in the late 1920s. It was temporarily suspended after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) formed an alliance with the Nationalist government to oppose the Japanese invasion of China in 1936. After Japan surrendered in 1945, the CCP resumed the land-reform campaign to win the support of peasants during the period of civil war. When the People's Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949, land reform spread throughout the country.

Agricultural Policies between 1950 and 1958

In this bloody land-reform campaign (1950–1953), the CCP destroyed the wealth and power base of the rural elite, redistributed land among the peasant class on an egalitarian basis, and elevated local leaders from the poor peasant stratum. Between the land-reform



MOUNT QINCHENG-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

The birthplace of Taoism and home to dozens of ancient temples, Mount Qincheng was designated a World Heritage site in 2000. Mount Qincheng is also home to the Dujiangyan Irrigation System, an engineering project that continues to irrigate the Chengdu plains after more than two thousand years of operation.

campaign and the beginning of economic reform in 1978, agricultural policies were based primarily on centralized planning and collectivization of agriculture, despite various changes in direction. In fall 1953, the government introduced compulsory procurement of farm products, whereby peasants were obligated to sell fixed quotas of their produce (including grain, cotton, and edible oils) to the state at government-set prices. Private markets were increasingly restricted.

Agriculture supported the state's focus on heavy industrial development by providing cheap food and by earning foreign exchange to import capital goods. To raise agricultural production without diverting resources from industry, the government adopted a strategy that involved the mass mobilization of rural labor to work on labor-intensive infrastructure projects (including irrigation, flood control, and land reclamation) and by raising agricultural productivity through more intensive application of traditional methods and inputs (for example, closer planting, more careful weeding, and more use of organic fertilizers). Collectivization was seen as the institutional means to implement that strategy.

To make the transition from a small-holder rural economy at the completion of land reform to a collectivized system, the Communists first promoted the creation of mutual-aid teams composed of five to fifteen households that exchanged labor and shared the use of tools and draft animals rented from owner-participants. Next the mutual-aid teams were consolidated into primary agricultural-producer cooperatives of approximately twenty to twenty-five households, which pooled land resources and paid participants according to the amount of labor, land, and tools contributed. The third stage in socialist development was the creation of advanced agricultural-producer cooperatives made up of 150 to 200 households and combining the principles of collective farming and

payment according to labor only. Most peasants had joined advanced cooperatives by the end of 1956.

The Great Leap Forward and Its Aftermath

Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward (1958–1960) was intended to catapult China into the front ranks of industrial nations, making China a Communist paradise in a short time. Some 740,000 advanced cooperatives were consolidated into 26,500 communes, self-sufficient communities averaging five thousand households each, which merged the functions of agriculture, industry, and trade and assumed responsibilities for administration, education, and defense. The production brigade, equivalent to one or more natural villages, constituted a middle tier in the commune structure. In turn, a brigade was composed of a number of production teams, each composed of tens of families drawn from one neighborhood.

Communal kitchens, mess halls, and nurseries both promoted collective living and released labor that was mobilized in large teams in massive water-conservancy and irrigation projects intended to raise agricultural productivity dramatically. In place of economic incentives, ideological exhortations inspired the people to work hard for the common good. Reports of bountiful harvests prompted the partial implementation of the Communist principle, to each according to his needs. Net income was distributed primarily on a per capita basis and only partially on the basis of individual labor contributions.

This utopian movement ended in disaster. Local cadres claimed fantastic productivity gains, leading higher authorities to harbor unrealistic expectations and to make escalating grain-procurement demands on peasants. Peasants, in turn, were left with little or nothing to eat and were physically exhausted by the relentless labor demand. Construction and industrial projects diverted rural labor needed for grain harvesting. Programs to promote rural industrialization, based on the transformation of local materials, most notably backyard furnaces to make steel out of iron reclaimed from utensils and tools, wasted resources but manufactured few usable products. Difficulties were further compounded by bad weather and the withdrawal of Soviet aid. Some 30 million people perished in the resultant famine from 1959 to 1961.

The original communes were reorganized into smaller and more manageable units with the tripling of their numbers to 74,000 in 1961 and 1962, and the small production team was reestablished as the basic unit of planning and accounting. Rural markets and

the right to cultivate small private plots were restored. Improved economic incentives paved the way for recovery of grain production by 1963.

Mao's Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976

Mao, disturbed by the reforms of the early 1960s, which he considered steps toward the restoration of capitalism, launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966. In the ten years of turmoil that ensued, not only was Chinese society violently traumatized by political persecutions and internal disorder, but agriculture suffered from the discontinuation of technical development; discouragement or even elimination of private plots, sideline activities, and rural markets; and primacy of political criteria over technical or economic considerations in economic policy making and in determination of individual earnings.

Despite the disruptions of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, China's total grain output increased at an average annual growth of 3.5 percent, or from 113.2 million metric tons to 304.8 million metric tons between 1949 and 1978. Agriculture was the primary foreign-exchange earner, accounting for more than 60 percent. Much new land was opened in the Northeast, extensive flood control and irrigation systems were constructed, and a number of improved crop varieties (including dwarf and semidwarf fertilizer-responsive varieties of rice and cold-tolerant, quick-maturing wheats) were developed and propagated. However, reflecting state policies that squeezed agriculture to promote industrial development, even as real per capita income increased almost threefold from 1952 to 1978, per capita peasant income stagnated. Agriculture grew at an average annual rate of 1.9 percent, compared with 10.8 percent for industry and 6.0 percent for total national income.

Agricultural Policies of Deng Xiaoping from 1978 to the Mid-1980s

After Deng Xiaoping became the leader of China in 1978, the government focused on the Four Modernizations: industry, agriculture, national defense, and science and technology. The state sought to stimulate agricultural production by reintroducing private economic incentives into peasant production decisions in the early 1980s: Crop- and animal-purchase prices were raised, and, most important, collective farming was replaced by household-based farming.

The latter was achieved largely through the household-responsibility system, which was originally an unauthorized local initiative by some poor rural communities in the late 1970s and sanctioned by the state

only in 1981 as it proved successful in raising peasant incomes. Each household contracted with the state for the management of a fixed amount of land for from one to three years, thereby assuming responsibility to pay certain specified quotas and taxes to the state or collective, but also gaining the right to make its own economic decisions on such matters as the allocation of production inputs or the disposal of any surplus output. By the end of 1983, more than fifty thousand communes were dismantled as 200 million farm families joined the household-responsibility system. In 1984, the duration of contracts was extended to fifteen or more years, and in 1993, it was extended an additional thirty years. The government also gave permission to farm households to exchange and employ labor in 1983 and to sublease land to other households in 1984.

Agriculture from the Mid-1980s to the Present

From the mid-1980s, rural reform was gradually extended from production to liberalization of marketing, distribution, and trade of farm products, first for fruits and vegetables, then fishery products, livestock products, and oilseeds. Wholesale markets were legalized, free-market trade permitted, and the number of items covered by procurement quotas reduced by the government. Private marketing enterprises, which bought from traders in local markets or directly from farmers, multiplied. Even the marketing of the most heavily regulated products has been partially liberalized since the mid-1980s: The government reduced quotas for grain purchased at state-set prices, while purchasing additional quantities above the quota at negotiated prices and allowing peasants to sell the remainder in the open market at higher prices.

With the dissolution of the communes, the government permitted townships to take over their administrative functions and property, while villages appropriated the functions and property of the production brigades. Many townships and villages formed collective industrial and commercial enterprises (TVEs) providing a variety of goods and services. Private enterprises also grew rapidly. Rural industries helped to absorb surplus labor and boost household income. By 1987, the gross product of rural industry had surpassed that of all agricultural production. Between 1978 and 1993, the number of TVEs expanded from 1.5 million to 20.8 million, with their output at the annual rate of 21 percent and employment at 12 percent, thereby creating nearly 80 million jobs.

The expansion of food supplies has exceeded the growth of domestic demand. Between 1991 and 1999, yield for wheat increased from 3.2 to 3.9 metric tons



COOPERATIVES IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The formation of agricultural cooperatives was major change effected by the new communist government in China in the 1950s. The following text setting forth government policy states the general principles for collectives and also membership criteria.

Model Regulations for Advanced Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives

(Adopted on June 30th, 1956 by the First National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China at its third session)

General Principles

Article 1. An agricultural producers' cooperative (the term as used in this document means the agricultural producers' cooperative of advanced type) is a socialist, collective economic organization formed on a voluntary and mutually beneficial basis, with the guidance and help of the Communist Party and the People's Government.

Article 2. The agricultural producers' cooperative, in accordance with socialist principles, converts the chief means of production owned privately by its members into the collective property of the cooperative. The members are organized for collective work, and the cooperative applies the principle of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work," giving equal pay for equal work, irrespective of sex or age."

Membership

Article 7. All working peasants who have reached the age of 16 and other working people able to take part in the work of the cooperative may be admitted as members. Applications for membership must be voluntary and approved by a general meeting of members' delegates.

The cooperative shall make every effort to take in as members the dependents of revolutionary martyrs, of soldiers and government workers, and disabled as well as demobilized servicemen (including the military personnel who came over from the Kuomintang armed forces and those who accepted the peaceful liberation of the regions under their control but who have since been demobilized and returned to the countryside). The aged, the weak, the orphaned, the widowed and the disabled should also be admitted as members. New settlers should also be drawn into the cooperative.

Source: W. R. Geddes. (1963). *Peasant Life in Communist China: Monograph #6*. Ithaca, New York: Society for Applied Anthropology, 56.

per hectare, yield for rice from 5.6 to 6.3, yield for corn from 4.6 to 4.9, while yields for sorghum and millet remained steady at 3.5 and 1.6, respectively. Between 1979 and 1984, total grain output expanded by 4.9 percent per annum to reach the level of 407.3 million metric tons. Growth was much more modest from 1985 to 2000 at 1.3 percent per annum. Between 1978 and 2000, rice production rose from 136.9 to 187.9 million metric tons (with a high of 200.7 in 1997), wheat production from 53.8 to 99.6 (with a high of 113.9 in 1999), and corn production from 56.0 to 106.0 (with a high of 133.0 in 1998).

The quality and varieties of food have significantly improved as consumer demand for better quality food increased with rising incomes. Between 1983 and 1999, urban per capita consumption of poultry meat rose from 2.6 to 4.9 kilograms, while consumption of seafood grew from 8.1 to 10.3 kilograms; corresponding figures for rural residents were 0.8 to 2.5 kilograms and 1.6 to 3.8 kilograms, respectively. To meet expanding domestic and foreign demand, China's animal output increased even more rapidly than grain production in the 1990s: from 25.1 to 47.6 million metric tons for red meat and 4.0 to 11.2 million metric tons for poultry. Aquatic production more than tripled in that decade, reaching 39.0 million metric tons in 1998.

Between 1978 and 1991, cotton production grew about two and one-half times, from 2.2 to 5.7 million metric tons, but hovered around 4.5 million metric tons thereafter. Production of oilseeds, on the other hand, continually expanded throughout the reform period, from 5.2 in 1978 to 16.4 in 1991 to 26.0 million metric tons in 1999.

China has become a significant participant in the global market for agricultural commodities. It exported as much as 10 percent of the world's traded corn while importing as much as 17 percent of the world's traded wheat, 25 percent of fertilizer, and 28 percent of soybean oil. Leading agricultural exports in 2000 were cotton yarn and fabric (\$3.73 billion), fish and seafood (\$2.27 billion), prepared meat and fish (\$1.88 billion), and cereals (\$1.64 billion). Oilseeds and miscellaneous grains (\$3.07 billion), hides and skins (\$2.95 billion), and cotton yarn and fabric (\$2.79 billion) headed the list of major agricultural imports.

The expansion of economic opportunities from improved incentives and particularly from rural industries has contributed significantly to the rise in rural income. Per capita annual net income of rural households in yuan rose from 133.6 in 1978 to 397.6 in 1985 to 686.3

in 1990 to 2162 in 1998. More than 210 million peasants were raised from extreme poverty, though 50 million still remained in that state as of 1997.

Despite the fundamental shift from collective socialism to an increasingly market-oriented and privatized economy since 1978, self-sufficiency in food as a matter of national security and the provision of stable and cheap grain supplies for urban residents remained constant concerns in Communist economic policy.

Alarmists in 1994 even voiced the fear that China might be unable in the future to produce enough food grain for an increasing population and enough feed grain for a rapidly growing livestock industry, thereby driving up international grain prices and leading to starvation in poor countries that will be unable to compete with China to import grain. Such scenarios have been taken by the Chinese government as an attack on its ability to provide for the needs of the people. Moreover, questions were raised by Chinese officials concerning the reliability of foreign food-grain suppliers. Such considerations reinforced the long-standing policy of food sufficiency.

The marketing of most agricultural commodities has become commercialized and marketized. Since 1999, even cotton procurement and prices are no longer mandated by the state; a cotton exchange was established, and the state's purchase monopoly over cotton was ended. Grain remains the sole agricultural product whose marketing is still largely controlled by the state. Under the governor's responsibility system, or grain-bag policy, introduced in 1995, responsibility for stabilizing grain supplies and prices was shifted to provincial leaders. In a major reform initiative in 1998, quota procurement grain prices were to be determined by the prevailing market price. But mounting deficits prompted the state to reclaim monopoly control over grain distribution and to permit private grain dealers to sell only grain purchased from government grain-marketing enterprises. Limited private grain marketing was allowed again only in 2000.

This emphasis on food security has resulted in devoting unnecessarily large efforts to the cultivation of relatively low-value basic crops, including grain and cotton, and has prevented peasants from increasing their production of high value-added agricultural commodities.

The land market itself has been incompletely reformed. Ownership of land has remained with the collective, and peasants have remained concerned about the long-term stability of land tenure. Consequently they have been reluctant to invest for the long term.

Agriculture's share of gross domestic product and trade has fallen from about 30 percent in 1980 to about 20 percent and 10 percent, respectively, by 1997. By the 1990s, rural industry suffered from a declining capacity to create additional employment. Income gaps between cities and rural areas had been closing between 1978 and 1985, after which they grew again until the mid-1990s, when per capita income for urban residents remained at around two and one-half times that for rural residents, about the same as in 1978.

Future Prospects for Chinese Agriculture

Further expansion of agricultural production faces a number of constraints. Official data indicate a loss of arable land since 1978: from 99 to 95 million hectares. While other independent estimates based on Landsat (satellite photography) data have yielded much higher figures for China's land under cultivation, ranging from 125 to 140 million hectares, there is little doubt that much arable land has been damaged by soil erosion, desertification, salinization, and alkalization. The 80,000 dams built since the 1950s have, ironically, contributed to the problem. Intended to control flooding, improve irrigation, raise farm yields, and free peasants to engage in industrial labor, many dams caused the waterlogging of upstream farmland; others became clogged with silt and caused severe flooding; and thousands of dams collapsed.

Aside from environmental problems, an unknown quantity of land has been left uncultivated or undercultivated by farmers who grew one crop for subsistence needs while household members worked in local industrial enterprises. In other cases, farmers wanting to keep their claims to the land as security leased their land-use rights to households not engaged in rural enterprises; the latter were typically too poor in resources to make good use of the land. In many households, married women, in addition to housekeeping and child rearing, were forced to assume responsibility for tilling the fields while their men worked outside agriculture or even remained idle and spent their time gambling.

By 1997 administrative responsibilities for rural areas were shared by 2,100 counties and county-level cities, 44,700 townships and towns, and 740,000 village residents' committees. Increasingly, local governments have devoted more of their budgets to the salaries of the rapidly growing numbers of officials, to the detriment of social services (including health and education) and agricultural investment. In recent years many local governments have levied a plethora of special taxes on farmers; these eat up 20 percent or more of rural household income. They have often issued

IOUs in lieu of payments for grain procurements. Ensuing peasant anger has erupted in a number of protests and demonstrations.

Government policy makers have become increasingly concerned about raising farm incomes since the early 1990s, and they have introduced a number of policy innovations to address these problems. One innovation attempted to introduce economies of scale by concentrating farm management on a large scale in certain regions. In another innovation, user rights for the development of certain types of wastelands were extended for longer periods, along with inheritance, transfer, leasing, and mortgage rights. Premier Zhu Rongji (b. 1928) proposed for the ninth Five-Year Plan (2001–2005) the promotion of downstream efficiency of agriculture, or the processing of produce after it leaves the farm, with the idea that added value would boost the incomes of farmers.

Further challenges to Chinese agriculture come with China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. China is obligated to lower tariffs on agricultural imports from an average of 22 to 15 percent and to end government grain quotas and food-distribution monopolies. The resultant flood of food imports may throw out of work 13 million farmers, mainly producers of wheat, corn, rice, and cotton. On the other hand, fruit, vegetable, and meat producers will gain more open access to overseas markets and add 2 million jobs. As of 2001 some 330 million people or 70 percent of the rural labor force still worked in agriculture.

Chinese agriculture in the twenty-first century faces the prospect of considerable restructuring to deal with environmental degradation, peasant discontent, and problems and opportunities stemming from greater economic globalization.

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AGRICULTURE—SOUTH ASIA The patterns of South Asian agriculture are discernible as far back as the Indus Valley civilization (c. 2300–1750 BCE). Traditional agricultural systems include shifting cultivation and settled cultivation. Shifting agriculture is substantially the same worldwide. Settled agriculture, however, separates into New World and Old World patterns.

Shifting agriculture is still practiced in certain mountainous areas in Assam, India, which receive large amounts of rain; in the adjacent hilly areas of eastern Bangladesh bordering Burma; in the Western Ghats in Karnataka, India; and in some remote parts of Madhya Pradesh and Orissa, India. In this system farmers clear a patch of bamboo jungle using slash and burn techniques, then sow a mixture of crops in the ashes. The crops include indigenous upland rice, maize, millet, cotton, vegetables, and bananas.

Whereas shifting cultivation brings the crops to the accumulated biochemical energy, settled cultivation requires that energy be brought to the crops. In South Asia, as was the case in the Old World in general, farm animals play an essential part in this process. In addition to supplying draft power and useful products in their own right, farm animals serve as energy gatherers when they browse beyond the cultivated fields and bring back the material they collect in the form of manure. In addition they act as energy recyclers when they consume what would otherwise be agricultural waste. South Asian farmers apply this general strategy with a mixture of crops, animals, and institutional traditions closely adapted to the area's physiography and climate.

Physiography

South Asia is divided into three major zones. Proceeding from north to south, they are a great arch of mountains on the edge of the Asian continental plate; the subduction zone between the Asian and South Asian plates, which is filled by the alluvium of the Indo-Gangetic Plain; and the old continental mass of peninsular India with its highest elevations on its western side running down to its southern tip, the Western Ghats.

Climate

The South Asian landforms interact with the prevailing winds to produce the distinctive pattern of a monsoon climate. The climate dictates cropping seasons and often sharp cropping gradients over small ge-



Farmers in the Tamil Nadu region of South India work in a rice field. (ARVIND GARG/CORBIS)

ographical distances, which in turn shape intervillage and interregional trade.

The climate involves a regular succession of wet and dry periods. The South Asian new year, beginning in mid-April, marks the onset of a hot, dry season during which the preceding winter's crops are harvested. From June through July, the summer monsoon season begins, as moisture-bearing winds proceed across the region from the southwest. Another hot, dry season begins in late September, when the summer's crops are harvested, followed by the development and retreat of winter and the northeast monsoon. In April the cycle starts again.

Local patterns of rainfall depend on an area's exposure to the prevailing winds and its proximity to the sea. In areas with a dominant southwest exposure, the summer rainy season is the heaviest. Where the exposure is north and east, as on the east side of the Western Ghats in southern India, the summer is the dry season, and the main rainy season is October through January. Where exposure is more balanced, both seasons provide useful rain, and in areas with no strong exposure at all, as in the Indus Valley from Lahore eastward, one finds a desert climate.

Cropping

After climate and soil, the most immediate constraint on cropping is the need to produce fodder. Since fodder has a low cash value, farmers rarely grow more than they need and therefore have little to sell to those who might not grow enough. The human diet imposes less of a constraint because farmers produce more food than fodder for sale. The South Asian diet usually involves two main meals a day, each consisting of one grain accompanied by one or at most two vegetables or pulses prepared as a soup or stew with



AGRICULTURE-SOUTH ASIA

This extract of a government report in India shows how village farmers combine traditional and modern farming methods.

Villagers keep seeds for the next harvest. Poor families borrow seeds from the better off farmers and return these to them after the harvest. It is very rare that a farmer goes to a *bania* for borrowing seeds because *bania* charges high rate of interest.

Villagers cared little about improved seeds in the past. Now they are gradually developing interest for such seeds. Improved seeds of wheat and better sugarcane are becoming popular among farmers. Wheat seeds are given to villagers on return basis. The Gram Sewak gives villagers certain quantity of wheat seed for sowing and takes back the same quantity out of the produce of improved seed. This is given to another villager on the same terms and conditions. The sugarcane seed has been distributed against cash payment. Most people prefer their own seeds. If improved types of seeds are provided at cheaper rates, these could be more popular.

Cowdung is the common manure that the farmers use. This is used after mixing with dry and rotten leaves. In the earlier days, compost pits for depositing cow-dung were not common and the manure was directly transferred to the fields or dumped in front of the houses. But now things are changing a little. Pits are dug for storing cowdung in the fields. In these, compost is prepared. Manure is carried to the fields in baskets or *kiltas*.

Chemical fertilizers are also being used. A depot has been opened in the village and Nirmal Das, a local shopkeeper, sells these. There are a few farmers who use these manures. One theory put forward by them is that chemical fertilizers harden the soil which means more labour while ploughing the fields for the next sowing. Rates for the fertilizer are nominal.

Source: R. C. Pal Singh. (1961) *Himachal Pradesh: A Village Survey of Moginand (Naban Tehsil, Sirmur District)*. Census of India 1961, vol. 20, part 4, no. 8, 33–34.

onions, chilies, and local spices. Tea, introduced into India in 1839, is the most common beverage after water and is usually served with substantial amounts of milk and brown sugar. Sugarcane is both an important cash crop and an important food. Since it mainly is consumed in unrefined forms, it is higher than any other foods in available energy and iron. Pickles made of unripe fruits and chilies preserved in oil are common accompaniments to a meal.

In each season, farmers plant approximately three to six crops along with a small kitchen garden. Each

array must provide vegetables for consumption in the current season, at least one grain or pulse to store for the next season, fresh fodder for consumption in the current season, and fodder for storage for future use. If possible, farmers plant more than one crop for each purpose (1) to reduce the risk of a total failure in any one category, (2) to level out labor requirements and thereby maximize the utilization of family labor, (3) to provide a better mixture of desirable qualities, (4) to balance more desirable crops with those that are more reliable or cheaper to produce, and (5) to provide better crop rotations.

The most abundantly produced grains are rice, several kinds of millet, wheat, and barley. Millet is the most widely planted grain. Rice is the preferred grain in the south and the east, and wheat is preferred in the north. The most popular pulses are chickpeas, lentils, pigeon peas, beans, and mash. Common vegetables are squashes, greens, onions, garlic, and chilies. Oilseeds and milk provide dietary fats except along the coasts and in Bangladesh, where fish largely replace pulses. South Asians eat meat, primarily goat and sometimes chicken, only occasionally.

Multicropping commonly involves both irrigated and rain-fed land. Most villages own both types of land, and farmers try to have plots in each area. Wheat and rice are usually irrigated, millets and barley are rain-fed. Likewise the other major crop categories include varieties that produce better on irrigation as well as some that can survive drought.

Animals

The animal complex includes eleven principal species. These stand in the same functional relation to each other across the region despite local preferences regarding varieties. The eleven species are single-humped Indian camel or dromedary, humped oxen or zebu (*Bos indicus*), buffalo, goat, sheep, horse, ass, mule, pig, dog, and cat. Some families also keep chickens and ducks.

Camels, oxen, and buffalo are the most important animals to farmers. Horses, asses, and mules generally are owned by artisans, who use them to carry heavy goods in packs. Dogs, which live in village packs rather than in individual households, hunt rats and similar pests in the fields. Cats are rare but are treated similarly to dogs.

Camels are prominent on the northwestern Indo-Gangetic Plain. In desert areas along the border of India and Pakistan, nomadic pastoralists still raise camels to sell in the surrounding farming communities. Important for their hair, hides, milk, and for use as beasts of burden in the desert climate, camels are particularly favored for operating Persian wheels (a Persian wheel is a mechanism for lifting water from a well by means of a chain of pots or buckets, operated by animal power).

The main draft animal is the bullock, a castrated male *Bos indicus*. Bullocks vary greatly in size according to the terrain and the food supply. The largest bullocks, raised in the semidesert plains of Haryana, India, between the Ganges and Indus drainages, reach nearly two meters at the shoulders. In the mountains, where fields are small and slopes are steep, bullocks are less

than waist high. In other areas, like Bangladesh and Tamil Nadu, India, where holdings are small and fodder is scarce and poor, bullocks reach a size between those extremes. The females of *Bos indicus*, the stereotypical Indian sacred cows, are usually kept only in sufficient numbers to provide the needed bullocks.

The buffalo, originally domesticated in Sind, Pakistan, from the wild river buffalo, is the primary milk-giving animal. Buffalo milk has about twice the butterfat content of cows' milk, and the lactation period is about nine months in contrast with six months in cows. However, in hot weather buffalo need access to water to bathe once or twice a day. Male buffalo are rare in hot, dry areas, but in wetter areas they are sometimes kept for plowing or water lifting. Like *Bos indicus* they vary in size. The largest varieties live on the plains, where moisture and fodder are abundant; the smallest varieties live in the mountains; and the mid-sized varieties live where fodder is scarce. Several Indian states have developed artificial insemination programs to improve the quality of the buffalo herd.

Both farmers and the landless keep goats, which provide milk and the most widely accepted meat. Goats of the region also give cashmere wool. Most sheep are kept for wool by specialized herders.

Because fodder shortages are endemic, animals are usually fed individually and according to need. Working animals, those plowing or lactating, are fed more than animals that are not working.

The common Western pig (*Sus scrofa*) was originally domesticated in India and eastern Turkistan. In villages, pigs normally are kept by those people who sweep out the barns and streets, and the pigs eat what they find. Pigs produce bristles, meat, and leather. Although the meat frequently is infected with parasites, it is sold at a low price in markets and is consumed by the poor. The British established sanitary piggeries, which have persisted long after British rule, to raise local varieties for urban markets.

Organization of South Asian Agriculture

South Asian agriculture is peasant agriculture organized and carried out by independent households with smallholdings, generally between 0.2 and 4.0 hectares. Although kings and great landlords have been prominent in South Asian history and large landlords persist in Pakistan and a few Indian states, they exercise little or no managerial control, simply drawing a share of the production.

Within the Household The division of labor within the household is based on sex and generation. In



AGRICULTURE AND AGRARIAN REFORM

Since independence India has been a mainly rural and agricultural society and the government has been concerned with making farming more efficient and productive. The resolution below from the April 1950 Indian National Congress Economic Planning Conference sets forth five measures to improve agriculture.

India's economic and social progress will in large measure be conditioned by the extent to which her land and water resources are developed. On the efficiency of the country's agricultural production will depend not only the satisfaction of the basic need of an adequate balanced diet for its growing population but also the supply of raw materials for some of her major industries.

The immediate object in agriculture that the country has set before itself is self-sufficiency in food to be attained by the end of 1951 as well as in cotton and jute; and concerted measures to this end are already under way. These consist of reclamation of land, offerings of incentives and assistance for the diversion of land from other crops to the cultivation of cotton and jute and improving the yield and quality of agricultural products. What is needed for the purposes of the immediate programme is an intensification of some of these measures as well as the creation of conditions conducive to better farming. Increased efficiency of agriculture postulates more than improvement in facilities organisation and techniques; the maintenance and restoration of soil fertility; and the provision of irrigation. All this will fail to confer full or lasting benefit unless the tiller of the soil is given a sense of security and self-respect and the economic and social condition of the agricultural labour.

The specific measures which have to be planned for the improvement of agriculture as part of the immediate programme will comprise the following:

(1) The provision of irrigation facilities by way of reconditioning old and constructing new tanks and wells including tube wells. Such minor works will appeal most readily to

the rural population and secure their active co-operation. They will supplement the irrigation that will be provided by the river valley projects which should be completed as early as possible as part of the long-term plans of the Central and State Governments.

(2) The rapid multiplication of better seed. A well regulated procedure is required in all the States for the production of nuclear seed, its multiplication under carefully controlled conditions and its testing before final distribution to the cultivator.

(3) The stimulation of compost-making if necessary by legislation and the full utilisation of the various other forms of organic manures available in the country. Definite planning is required for the conservation and use of waste material, human and animal excreta and residual matter from the carcasses of animals and for maintaining soil fertility.

(4) The reclamation and conservation of the soil. There are still large areas in most states which could be brought under cultivation with the help of tractors and other machines. New areas brought under cultivation could assist materially in the settlement of displaced population and works undertaken to prevent soil erosion will provide employment very appropriate to the agricultural worker.

(5) The development of an effective and wide-spread agricultural extension service. Such a service will act as a two-way link between the cultivator and the scientific departments of the State, so that the cultivator's practical difficulties are solved in the laboratories and the results are conveyed to him convincingly. It should be the special concern of the services to bring about an improvement in the arrangement for the designing, production and maintenance of better implements. (The quotas for the supply of iron and steel required for agricultural implements must be raised for a significant improvement in this direction to be possible.)

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Agriculture will remain in a state of flux so long as the structure and pattern of rural economy does not become clear and definite. It is, therefore, necessary to shorten the period of transition by expediting the abolition of *zamindari* and *malguzari* by paying compensation if necessary in bonds. Provision should be made for fixity of tenure to the tiller, subletting even if allowed should be for a period of just less than five years and for regulated rates of rent.

Co-operative Better Farming Societies should be organised in every region in a planner manner with fixed targets. Experiments in co-operative joint farming may also be made in selected areas. Both to multipurpose co-operatives and co-operative joint farms special facility should be granted by the State and they should receive priority in all matters of State assistance. In areas where fragmentation is intense, consolidation of holdings should be undertaken in a determined manner. Special efforts should be made to organise co-operatives for uneconomic holdings.

Special attention should be given to the organisation of agricultural labour for the betterment of their condition. Agrestic serfdom should be made a cognizable offence and the President of the Union Board of the village *panchayat* might be empowered to enforce the law. Debts of agricultural labourers should be selected down and wherever found inequitable wiped out. High priority should be given to provision of house sites for agricultural labourers and to the removal of the disabilities attached to the present house-sites.

The problem connected with the development of India's agriculture offers a challenge to the planner and an immense scope for purposeful co-operation between the Government and the people; and success or failure in solution of these problems will make all the difference between growing prosperity and continuing poverty in the land.

Source: Indian National Congress. (1954)
Resolutions on Economic Policy and Programme.
New Delhi: A.I.C.C., 52–53.

general, men are concerned with what goes on outside the house, and women are responsible for what occurs within it. Men deal with the production and disposal of crops and animals in the fields; women deal with food storage and preparation, with fodder and seed storage, with servants and those who provide services for the household, and with the household budget. The principal woman is usually the wife of the household head and the mother of the active sons. The head man is the senior male and the father of the working sons or someone of his level, depending on competence. Since property rights are generally acquired by birth rather than by succession, the household acts much more as a partnership than as an autocracy.

Among Households The division of labor among households involves three main occupational groups that are substantially uniform across the region except in remote areas, where tribal customs prevail. The most populous group, about half the population, is the farmers, who usually share membership in one or a small number of local clans (*got* or *gotra*). About one-third of the families are agricultural laborers, and the remainder are specialized artisans, such as shopkeepers, potters, masons, carpenters, blacksmiths, tailors, cotton ginners, and weavers.

Village occupational specializations cannot be accurately characterized as based on caste. Although villagers recognize an idea of caste, in the sense of a stereotypical family occupation based on a distinctive inherited property, as a part of their ideas of kinship relations, they recognize the occupational division of labor as a separate matter that follows different rules. People are hired according to need, competence, and return. Wages are set by bargaining. Nevertheless, all arrangements must contain certain components, and a definite sense of a fair wage dominates as opposed to simply what the market will bear. While sweeper, blacksmith, mason, and carpenter are recognized castes, agricultural laborer and landowner are not. It is impossible to predict with confidence the caste of any household from its occupation. The work of masons, carpenters, and blacksmiths, for example, is commonly done by men who answer to any of the labels, and a village usually includes more families who do not perform their stereotypical caste occupations than those who do.

Labor usually is hired under one of three arrangements: a partnership, an annual contract, or a daily wage. In a partnership, an employee works with a landowner for a year or a season and receives a share

of the crop. Under an annual contract, an employee works for a farmer for a full year and receives a fixed annual fee, or an employee provides a specified service for the household for a year in return for a fixed payment in cash, in kind, or both. An example of the latter would be a potter supplying pots to a household in exchange for foodstuffs, cash, or both. Under the third arrangement, a daily wage, a farmer makes an agreement with a worker or a group of workers, who agree to perform a certain operation on a specific field in return for payment in cash or in kind calculated daily.

Payments for labor normally involve money and maintenance. Under an annual contract the maintenance component might be food, clothing, and medical expenses for the year. For the worker receiving daily wages, maintenance would include a specific understanding about meals and teas that the farmer provides for the laborer to eat in the field.

Village Organizations Villagers commonly make collective arrangements that affect agriculture by (1) differentiating between land that will be used for house sites and land that will be used as agricultural fields; (2) maintaining village roads, work areas, and public areas, such as cremation grounds or burial grounds; and (3) constructing village irrigation tanks and wells. Villages are usually strongly nucleated with agricultural fields laid out around the centers. In areas prone to flooding, the populated areas are on the high elevations, and the fields are on lower ground. Some roads radiate out from the populated center to the main fields, but they do not reach every field. Accordingly fields are unfenced except for those devoted to permanent orchards. Security most of the year is based on mutual assistance, and when crops are particularly vulnerable family members stand watch day and night.

Village irrigation tanks, filled by rainfall, from a local stream, or from a canal, are particularly common in peninsular India and in Sri Lanka. Usually the village land watered by irrigation tanks is reserved for rice, and the rain-fed land is devoted to millets and other dryland crops. Historically irrigation tanks were managed by a hereditary village water tender, who was paid a set share of the crops he tended. Villages arranged to share the trapped fish at the end of the irrigation season and to share collective maintenance responsibilities. Management arrangements coped with low-water years by reducing the area irrigated. Each farmer was allowed a share of the reduced area proportional to his or her share in the entire area. After Indian independence, state or national governments took control of irrigation tanks. The traditional

arrangements were disrupted, and irrigation performance has declined.

Organizations beyond the Village Beyond the village, the principal organizations that influence agriculture are the government, cooperatives, and private firms. The government, over most of history, has provided economic markets, collected taxes, and introduced new crops and products for trade, and sometimes it has built canals and reservoirs. During the colonial period, tax collection was institutionalized in revenue departments, and irrigation departments had oversight of irrigation construction. Agriculture departments, marketing boards, and a few specialized research institutes were established to stimulate the adoption of productive technologies and crops deemed especially important either as strategic commodities or for international trade, including the rice, wheat, jute, cotton, indigo, tea, coffee, sugar, rubber, spices, and oilseeds not readily grown in Europe. The first agricultural colleges were founded in 1886, but these institutions only trained prospective government officers and did not conduct research.

After independence, beginning in the mid-1960s, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India developed agricultural universities patterned on the American land-grant system. The principle aims were to stimulate the spread of scientific farming technologies among the farm population and to undertake extensive basic agricultural research, including but not limited to research supporting the introduction of Green-Revolution crops and technologies. The effectiveness of the institutions varies greatly by country. The American program stands on the three equal and interdependent legs of research, teaching, and extension. In Pakistan, Bangladesh, and most Indian states, however, the extension programs are either limited or nonexistent; consequently research is driven by government priorities, as was typical in the colonial-era agriculture departments, rather than by farm problems.

The lack of credit continues to constrain agricultural growth in the region. No significant commercial credit is available to small farmers. Only India has a nationally supported system of cooperative credit. Even there, government appointees dominate the management in most states, and a majority of the farmers are not members of cooperatives.

Private firms have become increasingly important. Large industrial firms produce a full range of modern agricultural chemicals and farm equipment, such as well pumps and tractors. Smaller manufacturers produce simpler tools, like plows and fodder choppers, of-

TABLE 1

Increases in paddy and wheat production from 1965 to 1995		
	Paddy	Wheat
All South Asia	193%	258%
Bangladesh	143%	not significant
India	209%	260%
Nepal	127%	349%
Pakistan	222%	237%
Sri Lanka	348%	not grown

SOURCE: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2000).

ten of improved designs originating in the agricultural universities.

Prospects

In the 1950s it was widely believed that South Asia’s population growth would soon outpace its food production, and in the mid-1960s widespread famine was averted only by massive imports. Subsequently governments and international agencies have placed a higher priority on agricultural development, encouraging efforts such as the Green Revolution between about 1965 and 1978. Steady growth continues, and with the exception of Bangladesh, the region became self-sufficient in about 1980. Table 1 gives the increases in paddy (unmilled rice) and wheat production from 1965 to 1995 for the region as a whole and for each major producing country. All production figures are from the statistical service of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. The FAO in turn receives data from the statistical services of the respective countries; therefore quality varies widely.

Despite the gains, yields do not approach those attained in developed countries. Table 2 gives some comparisons for 1998.

TABLE 2

Yields in South Asia and in developed countries in 1998					
(in kilograms per hectare)					
	Cereals, total	Wheat	Paddy	Sorghum	Pulses, total
South Asia	22,479	23,735	28,344	8,239	6,160
France	74,084	76,028	58,252	55,573	52,445
Italy	50,643	35,785	58,333	55,584	15,777
United States	56,799	29,034	63,542	42,262	18,489

SOURCE: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2000).

The differences indicate the force of existing institutional and financial constraints and suggest a scope for improvement.

Murray J. Leaf

See also: Green Revolution-South Asia; Rice and Rice Agriculture; Water Issues

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AGRICULTURE-SOUTHEAST ASIA

Southeast Asia, as a whole, is richly endowed with natural resources. Expansive river valleys and deltas, generally rich soils, and a humid tropical climate ensure that the constraints to agricultural development have historically been more economic and institutional than environmental. Agriculture was the primary source of income, employer of labor, and contributor to export revenues in the precolonial and colonial eras (until about 1950). Agricultural output, value, and trade volumes have continued to grow in the past half century.

However, the character of Southeast Asian agriculture has changed dramatically, and its relative importance, as measured by its shares of national income, employment, and trade, has diminished tremendously as other sectors have expanded. Whereas in 1965, agriculture accounted for between one-fourth and one-half of GDP in the market economies of Southeast Asia, by the late 1990s its share had fallen to 20 percent in the Philippines, 16 percent in Indonesia, and even less in Malaysia and Thailand, according to the World Bank. In today's Southeast Asia, the only countries in which agricultural activities still dominate national income are those, such as Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar (Burma), that have failed to grow in other ways. Within the market economies of the region, with the exception of plantation sectors producing specialized export crops and remote, poor areas with little or no complementary infrastructure, other forms of economic activity now dominate the lives of most households.

Agriculture remains important in terms of land area, even though cropped area per person averages only 1/5 hectare, or about half an acre, and is growing at an average rate of less than 2 percent per year. Temporary crops, of which rice is the single largest by area, are the dominant agricultural land use in all countries except Malaysia. About a quarter of temporary crop area is irrigated.

Overview and History

Southeast Asian agriculture has always been centered on rice, the staple cereal and the major crop grown in the large, fertile, and densely populated river deltas. Two countries, Thailand and Vietnam, are among the world's top three exporters of this crop (along with the United States), but most other countries are net importers. In the poorer countries of the region, rice provides more than two-thirds of daily calorie intake, a figure that falls to about one-third in the region's wealthier countries. Because of its importance as a foodstuff and income source, rice has been, and remains, a crop with powerful cultural and political significance. Throughout the region, seasonal festivals are keyed to rice planting and harvesting dates. The success of the rice crop and the provision of adequate food for the population remain major responsibilities for Southeast Asian governments. Historically, this was reflected in religious rites requesting divine intercession to ensure a good crop; the turning of the first sod for rice planting is an annual ceremony still presided over by the monarchy in Thailand and Cambodia. In modern times, achieving and maintaining national self-sufficiency in rice has persisted as a

policy goal, and even as a measure of the competence and credibility of political regimes.

While rice is grown primarily for domestic consumption, a number of crops of global economic and/or culinary importance are native to Southeast Asia, and in modern times the region has become a leading world producer of several others. Early trade between West and Northeast Asia and the "Spice Islands" located in what is now eastern Indonesia consisted of the exchange of silver, ceramics and other manufactures, and silk for nutmeg, mace, cloves, and pepper. The earliest European contacts with the region (and, indeed, virtually all the great early European voyages of discovery, by Vasco da Gama, Magellan, and others) were motivated by the trade in these highly prized and very expensive foodstuffs. So lucrative was the global spice trade that in the early seventeenth century the Dutch, seeking to establish monopoly control, traded Manhattan to Britain in exchange for the tiny nutmeg-growing island of Run in the Banda archipelago, Indonesia.

Trade with early Europeans also led to the introduction of some other plant species that have since become important in Southeast Asian diet and economy. These include maize, peanuts, and chilies (dubbed "red peppers" by Columbus), all of which are native to the Americas but are now grown widely in the region.

During the colonial period entrepreneurs introduced commercial cultivation of several export-oriented plantation crops including sugarcane, coffee, oil palm, rubber, and coconut. For the latter three crops, Southeast Asian supply now dominates the world market. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand account for 81 percent of world oil palm production, and the region as a whole produces 74 percent of the world's natural rubber. More than one-half of world coconut production (54 percent) comes from Southeast Asia, one-third of it from Indonesia alone. In addition, regional coffee production has risen from 12 percent of the world total in 1990 to 20 percent in 2000, with Vietnam's share rising from 1.5 percent to 11.5 percent in just a decade. The spread of these plantation crops has been an important factor driving land colonization since the late nineteenth century, especially in Malaysia, southern Thailand, and the islands of the Indonesian archipelago.

The fortunes of other major Southeast Asian crops have fluctuated over time. Tropical fruits—bananas, mangoes, pineapples, and many others—and other horticultural crops have become significant export earners, especially for Thailand and the Philippines. Livestock raising, in the sense of large commercial herds, has

never been a major feature of the Southeast Asian rural economy, although of course animals raised in small-scale and backyard operations provide a significant source of protein and rural income. Fiber crops such as abaca and kenaf have declined in importance, especially with the development of cheaper synthetic fibers.

Population Growth, Land Scarcity, and Food Policy 1950-1965

Whereas Southeast Asia was historically a region of food surplus and labor scarcity, rapid population growth beginning in the late nineteenth century soon began to apply pressure to the agricultural land base. In the two decades after World War II, a period during which the region's population grew very rapidly, the "land frontier" (the geographic limit of productive arable land) was reached or neared in several countries. With static technologies, domestic food production per capita began to decline, and the share of food in the value of imports to rise. Ultimately, pressure on land was alleviated by a combination of technical progress, investments in infrastructure, industrialization, and increasing openness to trade. However, the period from the 1950s to the 1970s was formative in Southeast Asian history, and agricultural development was at the center of the picture.

First, food security—and more specifically, national self-sufficiency—became a highly sensitive political goal and inspired a great deal of policy. Initially, the governments of the region played a dominant role, controlling trade, distribution, prices, and even (in some countries) production, through state agencies. These entities, most notably Bulog in Indonesia, developed into large and highly diversified commercial enterprises and, with liberal budgetary support, featured prominently in efforts to promote rural development. High levels of state intervention in food markets were apparent even in Thailand, whose natural resources make it one of the developing world's least import-dependent food producers. Second, in spite of these investments, increasingly intense competition for land spawned or encouraged rural-based antigovernment insurgencies, some Communist and others based on ethnic or cultural divisions. Some of these insurgencies degenerated into armed conflict and even civil war. Thus the increasing shortage of land spilled over into national politics with calls for land tenure reform as a measure to redress income inequity, poverty, and the spread of Communism.

Many regional governments attempted to overcome domestic food shortages and to alleviate civil unrest in the 1950s and 1960s by investing in irrigation,

land development, and productivity-improving infrastructure. They also supported internal migration. In Malaysia and Indonesia, federal agencies cleared forests, built roads, houses, and schools, and sponsored resettlement in frontier areas by rural households from more densely populated regions. In the Philippines, the National Irrigation Authority (NIA) was formed to undertake major investments in the construction and operation of dams, canal systems, and drainage in agricultural lowlands. As with state grain-trading corporations, these investments seldom recouped even a fraction of their costs—indeed it is unlikely that they were ever intended to do so. As such, they constituted a means of redistributing income to rural areas through government expenditures.

Other economic policies were also deployed as tools of agricultural development. In the immediate post-war decades, all food-importing Southeast Asian countries made strenuous attempts to control prices received by farmers and paid by consumers. While the intent of such policies was to promote development, they often backfired. In exporting countries such as Burma and Thailand, export taxes and quotas diminished farmers' incentives to produce and export rice, and promoted smuggling. In Indonesia and the Philippines, the loss-making state trading agencies displaced private grain trade and storage. By the mid-1970s, the NIA and the National Grains Authority, the state rice-and-corn trading corporation, were the two most heavily indebted government corporations in the Philippines. In spite of this, frequent rice price "crises" (most notably in 1972, but as recently as August 1996 in the Philippines) testify to the incapacity of state agencies to maintain effective price controls and adequate domestic supplies during droughts and other periods of unexpectedly low domestic production.

Agricultural Technology and Resource Use since 1966

Massive public investments in agricultural development helped somewhat to mitigate, but not forestall, a crisis of agricultural development in Southeast Asia. Indonesia in particular was widely identified as a country where population growth was expected to outstrip productive capacity; one writer observed that as the result of population growth Java, the main island, was "asphyxiating for want of land" (Keyfitz 1965:503). In the early 1970s, a series of crop failures caused by drought and disease left the region critically short of rice. Food availability in the largest importing countries (Indonesia and the Philippines) was maintained only by massive imports and infusions of foreign aid, and most food prices rose sharply.



Workers harvest rice in a field near Mount Agung, the most sacred mountain in Bali, Indonesia. (LINDSAY HEBBERD/CORBIS)

In the long run, the solution to food security in the largest food importers came through technical progress. Research directed at producing high-yielding rice varieties, especially that carried out at the International Rice Research Institute, an international agricultural research center based in the Philippines, led to the release of new plant types with properties that greatly enhanced the productive capacity of irrigated rice land. The "modern varieties," first released in 1966, were stiff-strawed and of short stature, to increase light-use efficiency and reduce grain losses when plants bend (or "lodge") under the weight of their grain during monsoonal rain and winds. They were also rapid-maturing and non-photoperiod sensitive, meaning that plant growth and grain maturity occurred in a fixed number of days rather than in response to seasonal changes in day length and climate. These properties made it possible to grow rice at all times of year, and more than once per year on a single plot of land. Finally, the new rice varieties were highly responsive to nitrogen. The "Green Revolution" technological package of modern rice varieties, irrigation, and fertilizer proved capable of yielding double or even triple the quantity of grain produced per crop by traditional cultivars.

The technology of the Green Revolution spread quickly through Southeast Asia. In countries and sub-national regions with adequate irrigation, and where

fertilizer and other complementary inputs were available to farmers, rice yields increased rapidly. Higher yields and correspondingly greater demand for labor both helped transform these regions' agricultural economies. In the two decades following the release of the modern varieties, rice production in Southeast Asia's rapidly developing economies grew rapidly, while the total harvested area grew by much less, or even declined. In Indonesia, per-capita rice availability rose from 83 kilograms of milled rice in 1962–1964 to 140 kilograms in 1986–1988. Once the world's largest rice importer, Indonesia achieved the politically significant goal of self-sufficiency in 1985.

In many areas, the adoption of modern rice varieties was accompanied or shortly followed by mechanization. In most countries the adoption of mechanical technologies was motivated by the desire to reduce costs in economies experiencing rapid growth of labor demand. In Thailand, for example, the adoption rate of farm tractors accelerated rapidly as wages began rising in the late 1980s, reflecting the increasingly rapid transfer of labor to nonagricultural sectors.

Gains in rice production were generally achieved at some cost to other agricultural sectors. In most countries of the region nonfood crops, and even corn and other grains grown mainly for feed, received relatively low allocations of public spending and research effort. Until the 1980s, production and yields of these crops

typically grew much less quickly than for rice. As agricultural diversification became the watchword toward the end of the decade, nonrice agricultural production and research began to receive a larger share of public resources and policy attention.

Modern agricultural development in Southeast Asia has been associated with tremendous stress on natural resource stocks and environmental quality. The expansion of cultivated area has been achieved at the expense of forest resources, and intensification (the shortening of fallow periods, and land-use changes from perennial to annual crops) has resulted in increased land degradation and soil erosion in many areas. In the 1970s, large areas of northeastern Thailand were deforested during an export boom in cassava, a crop that was sold to the European Union as an ingredient in animal feed. In the late 1990s, fires used to clear forests for agriculture (especially oil palm plantations) contributed to an annual "haze" that blanketed the Indonesian islands, Singapore, and large parts of the Malay Peninsula. The spread of irrigation has raised demands for water at the same time that deforestation has reduced the natural capacity of watersheds to store this precious resource during monsoon rains and to release it gradually throughout the year. Chemical residues and suspended solids from soil erosion have contributed to the degradation of drinking-water supplies, silting of dams and irrigation canals, and damage to estuarine and coastal ecosystems. Although "environment friendly" pest-management techniques such as Integrated Pest Management (IPM) are increasingly popular, chemical control remains the norm. Uncontrolled pesticide use and inappropriate application methods account for many ailments and deaths among farmers and their families. There is growing concern over biodiversity losses in areas where monoculture and plantation crops such as oil palm have experienced rapid growth.

All of these resource and environmental costs have become pressing policy concerns, and occasionally the subjects of heated public debate, in the region. The Green Revolution may have also brought some indirect environmental benefits, however. Productivity gains and increased rice supplies in irrigated lowlands, where they occurred, helped to alleviate pressures for forest conversion and agricultural intensification at the land frontier in uplands and watersheds. In this way, increases in lowland employment and incomes helped compensate upland farmers who, lacking irrigation and often facing difficulties obtaining credit and agricultural inputs, had generally derived little direct benefit from Green Revolution technologies.

Globalization, Trade-Policy Reform, and Agricultural Trends

In the final two decades of the twentieth century, trade and agricultural policy liberalization again helped transform the economic scene for Southeast Asian agriculture. Some policy reforms were undertaken as the result of regional trade agreements (such as AFTA, the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement), in response to bilateral trade opportunities, or as conditions for accession to international trading institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). Others were forced upon countries by economic and political crises. Whatever their motivation, the effects of trade and price policy liberalization have been profound.

Liberalized rules governing domestic and international trade in cereals, and a lessening of the earlier emphasis on self-sufficiency in rice, have in general been associated with greater stability in food supply and food prices. At the household level, trade reforms have helped improve incomes, and not only through their direct effects on agriculture. Policy reforms that reduced discrimination against labor-intensive manufacturing sectors such as garments, consumer appliances, computer parts, and semiconductors have promoted employment growth and wages in nonagricultural sectors. Export crops such as pineapple, mango, and other fruits have benefited from easier access to foreign markets, and area planted has grown accordingly. These trends have reduced the reliance of Southeast Asian rural households on the vicissitudes of weather and agricultural prices.

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See also: Forest Industry-Southeast Asia; Green Revolution-Southeast Asia; Rice and Rice Agriculture; Terrace Irrigation

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Wheat fields along the road between Shahrud and Shahpasand, Iran. (ROGER WOOD/CORBIS)

AGRICULTURE—WEST ASIA Although industry is advancing more rapidly than agriculture, the latter is of considerable importance in the economies of West Asian nations. Local farming produces much of the food consumed in the region and employs a large part of the workforce. The value added by agriculture to the gross national product (GNP), as well as the number of people employed in agriculture, has shown great variability. This variability is due to the economic and political crises experienced in the region and to agriculture's vulnerability to the vagaries of the weather. In Turkey, agriculture usually contributes about 16 percent of the GNP, in Iran about 20 percent, and in Iraq about 40 percent. In the 1990s, agriculture employed approximately 40 percent of the workforce in Turkey and about 30 percent in Iran and Iraq.

Natural Conditions

Natural conditions play an important role in agriculture in West Asia. Climate, for example, is especially significant for agriculture and varies greatly from one subregion of West Asia to another. Both the growing season and the range of crops are limited by the amount of precipitation, which, in general, is insufficient in West Asia. Average annual precipitation ranges from 5 centimeters in the Iranian deserts to more than 254 centimeters near the Black Sea in Turkey. Only about one-fourth of the land in Iran can be farmed because of a severe water shortage.

The most productive farmlands in Turkey are Thrace, the Mesopotamian lowlands, and the coastal

TABLE 1

Land use and irrigation in 1998									
(in thousands of hectares)									
Country	Total area	Land area	Arable land	Permanent crops	Permanent pasture (1994 data)	Forest and woodland (1994 data)	Other land (1994 data)	Irrigated land	As % of land area
Iran	163,319	162,200	16,837	1,966	44,000	11,400	87,841	7,562	4.66
Iraq	43,832	43,737	5,200	340	4,000	192	33,765	3,525	8.06
Turkey	77,482	76,963	24,438	2,530	12,378	20,199	16,615	4,200	5.46
Total	284,633	282,900	46,475	4,836	60,378	31,791	138,221	15,287	5.40

SOURCE: Data for this table from *European Marketing Data and Statistics 2001* (2001) and *International Marketing Data and Statistics 2001* (2001).



THE ANNUAL CYCLE

This extract of text from an ethnographic study of a farming village in central Turkey summarizes the annual farming cycle and also provides some insight into the Turk view of manual labor.

As soon as the spring comes, the men get busy. The oxen weakened by the long winter must be got into training work, and spring ploughing and sowing must be done. The ox-herds and shepherds take charge of the animals. The sheep are lambing and in each household a woman must be ready at midday to milk the ewes. Ploughing and sowing of spring wheat and barley is immediately followed by the ploughing of the year's fallow, which goes on perhaps into May, even until June, depending on individual circumstances. Meanwhile the vineyards must be dug over, and potatoes and other vegetables sown. Most of this later work is done by women.

In June, all grasses and weeds growing in odd places among the crops are cut for hay, again mostly by women. During late May and June the men are comparatively idle. In July the harvest begins, first with vetch and lentils, then with the main crops of rye and wheat. Threshing follows the reaping; reaping, threshing, and storing together last about two months of ceaseless activity for everyone; a whole household frequently works right through a moonlit night.

In September the pressure eases. As soon as rain falls on the hard baked ground—even before, if the rains are late—the men must plough again and sow their winter rye and wheat. By November there remains for the men only a visit to town to lay in supplies of coffee, paraffin, salt and so on, and perhaps cheap vegetables for the months of winter isolation, and then idleness again until the spring. He was overstating his case and, as someone commented, in two months harvesting they do four months' work; but the idea of having, like an English agricultural labourer, to work for wages day in and day out all year round was greeted with horror.

Source: Paul Sterling. (1965) *The Village Economy*; London: Charles Birchall & Sons, 47.

regions; in Iran, the most productive farmlands are the Caspian Sea coast and the fertile valleys in the northern and central parts of the Zagros Mountains; in Iraq, the southern plain, which begins near Samarra and extends southeast to the Arabian-Persian Gulf. More than half of West Asia's arable land is in Turkey, and half of the irrigated land in the region is in Iran. (See Table 1.)

Contemporary Status

On the basis of the methods used, the agrarian sector of West Asia must be defined as highly dualistic. Generally, in the most productive subregions, agriculture has a high level of mechanization, uses modern irrigation schemes, and has considerable export potential. In contrast, in the remote mountain subregions, the wooden plow and hoe are still the most

TABLE 2

Production of cereals in 1999					
(in thousands of metric tons)					
Country	Wheat	Barley	Maize	Rice	Total
Iran	8,687	1,919	941	2,300	13,847
Iraq	800	500	100	240	1,640
Turkey	18,000	9,000	2,400	317	29,717
Total	27,487	11,419	3,441	2,857	45,204

SOURCE: Data for this table from *European Marketing Data and Statistics 2001* (2001) and *International Marketing Data and Statistics 2001* (2001).

commonly used agricultural implements. In the Anatolian plateau and eastern Turkey, as well as in the northern plain in Iraq and in the central plateau of Iran, modern agricultural machinery is used on only a limited scale.

There are big differences among the nations in agricultural production. Turkey has a strong agricultural base. It is self-sufficient in cereals and exports much of its agrarian production. Turkish farms are predominantly family businesses with small landholdings. One of the main problems in Turkish agriculture is that the average size of farms is declining because of the inheritance custom of dividing land equally among sons. Large estates do still exist, mainly in the south, but about 70 percent of farmers cultivate holdings of just 1.5 hectares.

Iran must import much of its food. Before 1970, Iran was self-sufficient in agricultural production and exported many crops. However, contemporary Iran faces many problems because successive governments have neglected agriculture, the population has increased rapidly, and the productivity of farms is low.

In the 1990s, Iraq’s agriculture experienced serious problems. Some of these problems were due to

scarceness of agricultural inputs (that is, fertilizer and pesticides) caused by U.N. sanctions since 1990. Even with good rainfall, contemporary Iraq usually has low crop production, which is attributed to inadequate use of fertilizer and herbicides; poor land preparation due to lack of machinery; deteriorated farm and irrigation infrastructure; increased infestation by insects, pests, and weeds; and continuous use of land without crop rotation.

Agricultural Structure

In West Asia, farming and animal husbandry are equally developed. About 50 percent of the cropland is used to grow grains. Wheat is the chief grain, followed by barley and maize. Turkey is the main producer of cereals in the region. (See Table 2.) Central Anatolia accounts for nearly 40 percent of Turkish wheat production. However, this subregion often has long droughts that cause serious losses of crops.

West Asia is a major producer of sugar beets, potatoes, fruits, and vegetables. (See Table 3.) Large quantities of cotton are grown for both fiber and cottonseed oil. Turkey produces and exports large quantities of tobacco, which is grown along the Black and Aegean Seas, as well as eggplants, grapes and raisins, hazel-

TABLE 3

Production of selected crops in 1999					
(in thousands of metric tons)					
Country	Sugar beet	Tomatoes	Potatoes	Grapes	Apples
Iran	4,987	3,204	3,430	2,315	1,944
Iraq	8	800	380	290	80
Turkey	20,000	6,600	5,315	3,650	2,500
Total	24,995	10,604	9,125	6,255	4,524

SOURCE: Data for this table from *European Marketing Data and Statistics 2001* (2001) and *International Marketing Data and Statistics 2001* (2001).

TABLE 4

Circulation of livestock in 1999				
(in thousands)				
Country	Horses	Cattle	Sheep	Goats
Iran	250	8,047	53,900	25,757
Iraq	46	1,100	6,000	1,300
Turkey	391	11,185	30,238	8,376
Total	687	20,332	90,138	35,433

SOURCE: Data for this table from *European Marketing Data and Statistics 2001* (2001) and *International Marketing Data and Statistics 2001* (2001).

nuts, melons, and oranges. Iran exports dried fruits and nuts.

The mainstays of West Asia's stockbreeding are sheep and goats. (See Table 4.) Nomadic stockbreeding still exists in some areas, especially in western and southwestern Iran. Turkey raises half of the world's Angora goats. Wool is Turkey's most valuable livestock product. Iran is among the world's largest exporters of karakul lamb. Turkey and Iran supply the world with large quantities of hides and skins.


Turkey is the main producer and exporter of agricultural products in West Asia. About half of Turkish agricultural exports are shipped to the European Union. Other main markets include the Middle East and North Africa, which absorb about half the exports of fruits and vegetables and virtually all the exports of livestock and meat.

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AHMADABAD (2001 est. pop. 3.5 million). Ahmadabad, the gateway to Gujarat state in western India and its principal city, sprawls on the Sabarmati River about 450 kilometers (280 miles) north of Bombay. It is one of the busiest industrial centers in India, with cotton milling predominant. Ahmadabad was



A woman carrying a load on her head in the market in Ahmadabad in c. 1982. (ADAM WOOLFITT/CORBIS)

founded in 1411 by the Muslim ruler Sultan Ahmad Shah; it thrived in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries under the early Mughal kings and prospered again since the British annexation in 1818. Of particular interest are compact housing clusters of families linked by caste, profession, or religion, dating to 1714.

Many monuments of Hindu, Muslim, and Jain architecture in the walled city testify to its past glory and present prosperity. Kankaria Lake, built in 1451, offers promenades, boating, an aquarium, and a museum designed by Charles-Édouard Jeanneret (called Le Corbusier; 1887–1965). The Sidi Bashir Mosque features the mysterious "shaking minarets." From the Satyagraha Ashram, in 1930, Mohandas K. Gandhi (called Mahatma; 1869–1948) began his march to the sea to protest the British salt tax. A memorial center and sound-and-light show highlight his life and the Indian Freedom Movement.

C. Roger Davis

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AI QAP *Ai Qap* was a Kazakh journal published in Troitsk by Energiia Press from January 1911 until September 1915. Starting as a monthly, by the end of 1912 it appeared twice a month until it ceased publication. Edited by Mukhammedzhan Seralin, *Ai Qap* was the first successful independent Kazakh-language periodical published before World War I. It became a vital forum in which Kazakh intellectuals could collectively articulate their growing social concerns and discuss the various issues confronting the Kazakh economy, culture, language, and national future. In addition, the journal devoted attention to a myriad of other subjects. Education and land redistribution dominated, but other issues graced its pages, including Russia's role in the war. Many notable Kazakhs published articles in *Ai Qap*, including Alikhan Bokeikhanov, Akhmet Baitursynov, Mirzhaqyp Dulatov, Sultanmakhmud Toraihyrov, and Saken (Sadvakos) Seifullin. The journal also published translated works by Lermontov, Krylov, Tolstoy, and Pushkin. In its four-and-a-half-year existence *Ai Qap* published a total of eighty-eight issues. Never sufficiently capitalized, the journal finally succumbed to the material and economic pressures brought on by World War I. *Ai Qap*'s success was clearly due to Seralin, who gathered reformists and nationalists together, as well as a host of diverse scholars, educators, politicians, and writers.

Steven Sabol

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AICHI (2002 est. pop. 7.1 million). Aichi Prefecture is situated in the central region of Japan's largest

island, Honshu. A leading industrial area, it occupies an area of 5,139 square kilometers. Its primary geographical features are the Mikawa Highland in the east and the Nobi Plain in the west, with the Kisogawa and the Yahagigawa as the main rivers. Aichi is bordered by the Pacific Ocean and by Mie, Gifu, Nagano, and Shizuoka Prefectures.

The prefectural capital is Nagoya, which grew around the castle erected in 1614 by Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542–1616), the first of the Tokugawa shoguns; it was controlled by his descendants until the 1868 Meiji Restoration. Rebuilt following bombing damage sustained in World War II, Nagoya at the dawn of the twenty-first century is Japan's third-largest city. It is a leading commercial and industrial center with a busy port. It is home to Nagoya University and to Atsuta, the imperial shrine second in importance only to Ise. The prefecture's other important cities are Toyohashi, Toyota, Ichinomiya, and Okazaki.

During Japan's medieval period (1185–1573), the prefecture was divided into Mikawa and Owari Provinces. Beginning in 1573 three warlords from this region, Oda Nobunaga (1534–1582), Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536–1598), and Tokugawa Ieyasu, completed the unification of Japan. In 1872, following the Meiji Restoration, the prefecture assumed its present name and borders.

During the twentieth century, the prefecture developed into an important industrial area, anchoring the Chukyo Industrial Zone (the region between Tokyo and Kyoto) and leading all other prefectures in industrial production. The main industries are steel, chemicals, automobiles, ceramics, and textiles. Agricultural products include rice, vegetables, and chickens. Lumber processing also is a major economic activity.

E. L. S. Weber

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AIDS Asia contains 60 percent of the world's population and almost 20 percent of the adults with HIV infections—some 6 million of the estimated 34.4 million worldwide at the end of the twentieth century. But the epidemic is relatively new to the region. It was first detected in the early to mid-1980s, the earliest cases of infection reflecting sexual contacts with infected persons from outside the region. By 2000, there were an estimated 6 million infections; national experiences were diverse as to sources, levels, and prospects.

Estimated HIV prevalences ranged from near zero in the Democratic People's Republic of (North) Korea to one per several thousand in most countries and as high as 2–3 percent in Cambodia, Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, and some states of India.

Today, all the governments of the region have HIV/AIDS task forces and action plans to deal with the threat, though these commitments are relatively recent and the translation into real programs remains variable. In Thailand, action by both the Thai government and the private sector has been aggressive and notably effective since 1987. Other governments generally have expended less in resources and have less to show for their efforts.

Drivers of the Asian Epidemic

Across much of the region, the spread of HIV is driven by sex work and associated sexual networking and by patterns of use of injected drugs. There are external, visitor-driven, and internal dimensions to each of these. The initial patterns were focal epidemics of some intensity involving men having sex with men (MSM) and intravenous drug users (IDU). Rates of infection due to MSM have since declined, while rates of infection due to IDU have not. Whether in each national population there is breakout to the general population is mainly a function of patterns of heterosexual sex in sexual networks. The pattern and magnitude of the heterosexual epidemic in each society reflect the social structures and behaviors characteristic of each, particularly the prevalence of men having multiple partners, including sex workers.

Demographic and Social Impacts

In Eastern and Southern Africa, AIDS is among the top ten causes of death, and AIDS deaths have substantially diminished the rate of population growth. The demographic impacts are much weaker thus far in Asia, though population growth rates have already been reduced slightly in Myanmar, Cambodia, and Thailand, and it is estimated that those three countries have each lost three years of life expectancy. One key to understanding the social impact is the fact that HIV infection disproportionately strikes the adult population rather than children or elderly people, resulting in the loss of economically productive members of households and of society as a whole. The repercussion is a dramatic loss of quality of life or even of life chances among infants and children, due to orphanhood and diminished household incomes. A full accounting of impacts must consider lost productivity and economic progress, the private (that is, family) and



In Asia, many women and children are HIV-infected. Here, a one-year-old HIV-infected girl plays in her bed at Phaya Thai Baby's Home, a facility for HIV-infected children in Bangkok, Thailand. (AFP/CORBIS)

public costs of medicines and care, and the social costs of weakened families and other institutions.

Prospects for Behavior Change and Control

Projections of the spread of HIV infections and cases of AIDS vary dramatically by country and with what is assumed about the national epidemic patterns. The future of HIV in Asia hinges on what occurs in certain critical countries, among them China, India, Thailand, Myanmar, and Cambodia. The Monitoring the AIDS Pandemic or MAP network lists five countries in which HIV prevalence is increasing and another ten in which it is slowly increasing. This leaves only two countries in decline (Australia and New Zealand), and one, Thailand, which is tending to stabilize.

The case of Thailand is illuminating. In the mid-1980s, there was worrying evidence from IDU data and data on sex work, and by 1993 the HIV rate among army recruits (virtually a representative sample of young adult males) was at 4 percent (much higher in the north, due both to the greater poverty there as well as the prevailing sexual behaviors, which encourage the spread of infection). Infection levels then peaked and have been declining as a direct consequence of imaginative programs. Some of these have brought messages about the dangers of infection and the protection afforded by condoms directly into the brothels. Levels of condom use in brothels have risen dramatically. Similarly, HIV prevalence among pregnant women

peaked at about 2 percent in 1995. Whether the same positive experience can be shared by other Asian countries depends on their government and private-sector efforts and policies.

Myanmar, Cambodia, and Vietnam are showing the patterns and levels once witnessed in Thailand. Their epidemics have thus far been driven by intravenous drug use and sex work, though Cambodia has high infection levels among pregnant women as well. These countries illustrate the potential for HIV to spread quickly. In China, Malaysia, and Nepal, HIV has spread among IDU populations but apparently not yet outside those groups. Cambodia has begun to show hopeful signs. Government and nongovernmental institutions are in place, and campaigns are underway. Condom use in brothels rose between 1997 and 1999, as did HIV prevalence among young sex workers.

China is viewed as a potential focus of rapid epidemic spread. There is now in place an extensive sentinel or monitoring system, by 1999 covering nearly a hundred sites in thirty provinces and focused on female sex workers, intravenous drug users, long-distance truck drivers, blood donors, and antenatal women. Recent returns from this system indicate rising infection rates for IDU and female sex workers. Overall, reported sexually transmitted infections reached 836 thousand in 1999. The government estimates that there are 3 million drug users in China and that needle sharing is common. There are a similar number of sex workers, half of whom report never using condoms. The working estimates of HIV infections in China were 400,000 at the end of 1998, 600,000 in 2000, and probably over 1 million by late 2001. There is enormous potential for pandemic and massive numbers of infections.

India displays a diverse set of experiences across its states and metropolitan areas, from very low HIV prevalences to as high as 2 percent of adults in the state of Tamil Nadu and the city of Mumbai (Bombay), from epidemics driven by heterosexual transmission (Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra) to epidemics driven by intravenous drug users (Maniput). A surveillance system was put in place only recently, and the 1999 estimate of 3.5 million HIV infections certainly will be revised as new data are examined.

Considering the diversity of national patterns and mixture of experiences for subgroups within countries, overall projections are difficult. The United Nations' AIDS coordinating agency or UNAIDS produces such projections, and these were incorporated into the United Nations' 1998 round of population projections. Among the twenty-nine largest countries with

HIV prevalences of 2 percent or greater, three are in Asia: India, Thailand, and Cambodia.

Observations

Unlike many other diseases, with HIV/AIDS, behavioral knowledge and behavioral change are intimately connected. The HIV/AIDS epidemic is behaviorally driven and linked to intimate areas of personal life. The knowledge-gathering needed to deal with HIV/AIDS is akin to an X ray of the social corpus, with the HIV virus taking the role of radioisotopes, revealing aspects not usually seen. There is revealing new knowledge of marriage, family, and sexual systems, and even national polities are being placed under a scrutiny that exposes political interests and underlying values.

The attention now being given throughout Asia to heretofore off-limits behavior is generating pressure for change. Before the HIV/AIDS pandemic has become history, it is likely that important social changes will occur or will be accelerated because of it: in gender relations (such as wives' changed expectations of their husbands, and more openness within unions about marital and sexual relationships), in family-based care and in the role of governments and private agencies in supplementing it, in the relationships between parents and their young adult children, in the role of public or private reproductive health services to young unmarried people, and in the status of marginalized population groups such as sex workers and drug users.

Peter Xenos

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AIKIDO Aikido is a Japanese martial art that takes several different modern forms. The sport was founded by Ueshiba Morihei (1883–1969) who in the 1920s and 1930s combined techniques from Daito-ryu jujutsu with ancient Japanese philosophical beliefs to create a new martial art form that stressed defense and the use of one's opponent's strength and aggression. In general, aikido is less aggressive than other martial arts and is characterized by grabbing, joint-twisting, balance-breaking, and pinning. The popularity of aikido outside Japan is due largely to the work of Ueshiba's students and the Aiki-kai association he founded. Modern forms of aikido are associated with particular schools and associations, including the Japan Aikido Association (Tomiki Aikido), Yoshin-kan, Ki no Kenkyu-kai (Ki Society), and Yosei-kan. Each school promotes somewhat different techniques and philosophy and they also differ in their support of competitions as opposed to training sessions for personal growth. Because of the emphases on training and the performance of choreographed routines called *kata*, aikido is popular as a form of exercise with women and the elderly.

Fumiaki Shishida

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AIMAG The Mongolian People's Republic is divided into eighteen *aimags*, or provinces—Bayan Olgii, Hovd, Uvs, Zavhan, Gov'altay, Bayanhongor, Arhangai, Bulgan, Hovsgol, Selenge, Tov, Ovorhangai, Dundgov', Omnogov', Dornogov', Hentii, Suhbaatar, and Dornod. In 1994, the regions around three prominent cities (Erdenet, Darhan, and Choir) were also declared *aimags* with largely urban populations (respectively, Orhon Aimag, 2000 population 72,000; Darhan-Uul, 2000 population 83,000; Gobi-sumber, 2000 population 12,000). Mongolia's national capital, Ulaanbaatar, is its own administrative unit with a population of 760,000.

The Eastern Provinces

Mongolia's eastern provinces of Dornod, Suhbaatar, and Hentii are dominated by grassy steppe, a

geography that suits the region's major economy—sheep, cattle, and horse breeding. Although several minority peoples make these provinces their home, the population consists primarily of the Khalkha majority. Dornod is the farthest east of Mongolia's provinces (2000 population 75,000, area 123,000 square kilometers), famous for free-ranging herds of antelope that often number in the thousands. The province's Halhyn Gol region became noteworthy in 1939 when Mongolian troops and the assisting Soviet Red Army routed a large force of invading Japanese soldiers. Suhbaatar Aimag (2000 population 65,000, area 82,000 square kilometers) in the southeast was named after Damdiny Suhbaatar, the founder of the Mongolian People's Republic and one of the region's native sons. The Dariganga volcanic plateau, a region with dozens of extinct volcanoes, interrupts the province's undulating plains. Hentii Aimag (2000 population 71,000, area 82,000 square kilometers) in northeast Mongolia is considered by many to be the native home of Genghis Khan. Mountains of the Hentii range cover the province's northern region and gradually slope into a hilly steppe in the south. Mineral springs are found throughout the province.

The Gobi Provinces

The three Gobi provinces of Dornogov', Omnogov', and Dundgov' have some of the smallest population densities in Mongolia and are almost exclusively populated by the Khalkha ethnic majority. Mining and camel or sheep breeding contribute most to these regions' economies. Dornogov' (2000 population 51,000, area 110,000 square kilometers) is in the southeastern part of the country, dominated by rolling plains and semidesert. An ancient caravan route from Russia to China, which has now been subsumed by the Trans-Mongolian Railroad, once passed through this area. Fluorite mining has made important contributions to the region's economy. Omnogov' (2000 population 47,000, area 165,000 square kilometers) occupies the extreme south of the country and is the *aimag* with both the largest area and the smallest population. The great massifs of the eastern Gov'altay range and the Gobi Tian Shan dominate the province. The wealth of prehistoric fossils in this region makes it a popular spot for paleontological research. Directly north of the other two Gobi provinces, Dundgov' (2000 population 52,000, 78,000 square kilometers) consists more of rich grassy steppes than of desert.

The Central Provinces

The five central provinces of Tov, Selenge, Bulgan, Ovorhangai, and Arhangai occupy a region of

well-watered mountains and rich, fertile valleys. Drawing water from two mountain ranges, this lush, arable region supports a large population, the majority being Khalkha speakers. Tov Aimag (2000 population 99,000, area 81,000 square kilometers) is the site of Mongolia's capital, Ulaanbaatar. The province's economy reflects its unique location, with most activity geared towards supplying the capital city and servicing the Trans-Mongolian railway. Directly north of Tov Aimag, Selenge Aimag (2000 population 100,000, area 65,000 square kilometers) occupies the fertile basin of the Selenge River and serves as Mongolia's breadbasket. In 1990, 40 percent of the country's cereal crop production came from this region alone. The region also served as the cradle of the Mongolian People's Revolution when Damdiny Suhbaatar recruited the first units of volunteer militias here in the early twentieth century. The province's Amarbaysgalant monastery stands as one of the few prominent monasteries that the revolution left untouched. To the west of Selenge, Bulgan Aimag (2000 population 62,000, area 49,000 square kilometers) occupies a portion of the Selenge River basin and the northern Hentii Mountains. The 70 percent of land that is not covered by forest is used for farming and livestock breeding. West of Bulgan, Arhangai (2000 population 97,000, area 55,000 square kilometers) lies in the basins of the Selenge River's tributaries and rises to the high parts of the Hangay highlands. The province is famous for the state-protected Terhiin Tsagaan Lake, formed when volcanic lava dammed up the Sumangiin Gol River. Livestock breeding is the primary economic activity, with yak and yak hybrid comprising 40 percent of the province's herds. To the south of Arhangai, Overhangai (2000 population 91,000, area 64,000 square kilometers) lies between the fertile regions of the north and the semideserts of the Gobi. The province attracts many with its natural wonders, most notably its 24-meter-high waterfall, Ulaan Tsutgalan. It is also the site of Karakorum, the ancient Mongolian capital, and one of Mongolia's largest Buddhist monasteries, Erdene Zuu. Livestock breeding concentrates on sheep and horses.

The Northwestern Provinces

The three northwestern provinces of Hovsgol, Uvs, and Zavkhan cover a rugged mountainous region. Hovsgol Aimag (2000 population 119,000, area 102,000 square kilometers) is named after the enormous freshwater lake for which the province is famous. The forested mountains that surround the lake have led some to call Hovsgol Aimag "Mongolia's Switzerland." Most livestock breeding focuses on cattle, yaks, and yak hybrids. Near Lake Hovsgol, the Tsataan ethnic group

has become famous for its reindeer herding. West of Hovsgol, Zavhan (2000 population 90,000, area 82,000 square kilometers) is the home of Otgon Tenger, the highest peak of the Hangay Mountains and a sacred spot for many Mongolians. From the high peaks of the Hangay range the province descends westward into semidesert and desert expanses. The intermediate region is suited to sheep breeding, and the province boasts the largest sheep population in the country. Farther west, Uvs (2000 population 90,000, area 84,000 square kilometers) has a majority of Dorvod speakers. The province's many rivers and lakes are frequented by several species of waterfowl, including the rare pink pelican. Besides being a major supplier of coal fuel to the country, the province specializes in sheep, cattle, and horse breeding.

The Southwestern Provinces

The four southwestern provinces of Bayanhongor, Gov'altay, Hovd, and Bayan-Olgii cover arid regions of high mountains and wide deserts. Despite their barren appearance, they are home to rare Mongolian wildlife—the wild camel, Gobi bear, and steppe antelope. Bayanhongor (2000 population 85,000, area 116,000 square kilometers) descends from the South Hangay plateau to the Gobi Desert. The province is famous for its mineral springs, and specializes in goat breeding. Gov'altay (2000 population 87,000, 142,000 square kilometers) is at the easternmost tail of the Altay mountain range. The province's great Gobi Reserve is Mongolia's largest protected area and a habitat for rare Mongolian wildlife—the mountain sheep, wild goat, snow leopard, steppe antelope, and reed boar. West of Gov'altay, the Altay Mountains of Hovd (2000 population 64,000, area 76,000 square kilometers) are home to a wide variety of ethnic groups. The farthest west of Mongolia's provinces, Bayan Olgii (2000 population 91,000, area 46,000 square kilometers) is unique among the Mongolian *aimags* in that the majority of its inhabitants are a non-Mongolian speaking ethnic group—the Kazakhs. Much of the province's official and cultural business takes place in Kazakh.

Daniel Hruscbka

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AINU In the Ainu language the word *ainu* means "human being." For the rest of the world, the word



A SHIP'S CAPTAIN REFLECTS ON THE AINU

In *A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean*, William R. Broughton, captain of the HMS *Providence*, presented his analysis of the Ainu in the late eighteenth century:

This people appear to have intelligence. Their beards are long, black, and strong. They have brown skin and their heads are shaved with the exception of a tusk of hair the size of two fingers, which rests at the front of the head. They put their hands together below their heads as a greeting. They are dressed in bear skins and armed with bow and arrow. . . . The people seem to have no religion. They eat like barbarians, without any sort of ceremony. . . . They seem to have no government, no writing or books, and no one seems able to read or write.

Source: W. R. Broughton. (1804) *A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean* 1804, 89ff.

designates the small indigenous population that lives in the northern part of Japan. Although Japan has several minority groups (Burakumin, Koreans, Chinese), only the Ainu are both ethnically distinct from the Japanese and have lived in the Japanese islands from long before written history.

In prehistoric times, the Ainu could be found on the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Sakhalin, and the Kurile Archipelago; in modern times, they mainly inhabit Hokkaido. Their number at present is estimated to be around twenty-five thousand, but after decades of intermarriage with the Japanese it is now rare to encounter a person purely of Ainu blood. The population estimate thus represents those people who think of themselves as being both Ainu and Japanese.

Origins

The origins of the Ainu people and their language are unknown. Many different theories have been proposed, but none has managed to gain general acceptance among scholars. For a long time, Western scholars believed that the Ainu were of Caucasian descent, which greatly stimulated research and resulted in a large body of literature on all aspects of Ainu culture. The theory was never widely accepted by Japanese scholars and has been thoroughly discredited by newer research. A consensus gradually emerged that the ethnic origins of the Ainu must be sought in Japan's prehistoric Jomon culture (10,000–300 BCE).

The Ainu language has no writing system. Traditions, beliefs, and tales about the past were orally transmitted through epics, songs, and stories memorized and told by the old to the young. There were originally three distinct dialects of Ainu—Sakhalin, Kurile, and Hokkaido. However, there is no longer anyone who speaks the Ainu language as a mother tongue.

The traditional lifestyle of the Ainu was based on hunting, fishing, and gathering edible plants. Society centered on villages (*kotan*) of five to twenty families under the leadership of a male chief (*otona*). Villages were usually placed near a river to ensure access to water and fish. Deer and fox were hunted near the villages, and brown bear were hunted in the mountains—all with bow and arrow.

Customs

The Ainu are famous for their skilled woodwork. Formerly, the products were bowls and utensils, decorated wooden prayer sticks, and whittled sticks offered to the gods. In modern times, most woodcraft is aimed at the tourist trade. Clothes were woven from the shredded bark of the elm tree and decorated with dyed patterns or cotton appliqué. Men and women wore coat-like dresses fastened with a belt. Accessories such as headgear, earrings, and necklaces were used for festive occasions. Shoes were made from fish skin.



A NINETEENTH-CENTURY VIEW OF THE AINU PEOPLE

Isabella Bird, an adventurous traveler to Japan in the late 1800s, recorded her impressions of the Ainu in *Unbeaten Tracks in Japan*:

They have no history, their traditions are scarcely worth the name, they claim descent from a dog, their houses and persons swarm with vermin, they are sunk in the grossest ignorance, they have no letters, or any numbers above a thousand, they are clothed in the bark of trees and the untanned skins of beasts, they worship the bear, the sun, moon, fire, water, and I know not what, they are uncivilisable and altogether irreclaimable savages, yet they are attractive, and in some ways fascinating, and I hope I shall never forget the music of their low sweet voices, the soft light of their mild brown eyes and the wonderful sweetness of their smile (Bird 1881: 75).

Source: Isabella Bird. (1881) *Unbeaten Tracks in Japan: An Account of Travels in the Interior Including Visits to the Aborigines of the Yezo and the Shrines of Nikko and Ise*. London: Murray.

Male and female lineages were kept separate. The men's lineage was shown by their totem animal (*itokpa*) on various utensils, whereas the women's lineage in the form of patterns on a belt (*upsor*) was worn under the clothes. Women also wore tattoos around the mouth and on their forearms and hands. These were produced by making small incisions with sharp stones and rubbing soot into the open wounds.

The Ainu gods are called *kamuy* and are believed to be present as spirits everywhere in nature, as well as in a spirit world of their own. Everything in the human world is seen as a visitor from the spirit world. The most important *kamuy* was the brown bear. Every year, all over Hokkaido, bear cubs were caught and kept in cages in villages. When a cub reached young adulthood, a ceremony was held to send its spirit back to its ancestors in the spirit world. By providing an elaborate ceremony and honoring the bear, it was hoped that it would speak well of human beings to the other bear spirits. If this happened, many bear spirits would venture into the land of the humans, ensuring a steady supply of bears for hunting. After the bear was ceremoniously killed, its meat was eaten by the villagers and its head was placed on an altar outside the chief's house.

The Ainu and the Japanese

The Japanese knew of the Ainu as far back as the tenth century, when Ainu were still present on the

main island of Honshu. By the fifteenth century the Japanese had managed to establish several strongholds in southern Hokkaido from which they traded metal and rice to the Ainu for fur, fish, and other natural products. By the beginning of the Edo period (1600/1603–1868), Matsumae, a Japanese warrior clan, gained authority over the Japanese-dominated parts of the island and established a trade monopoly. Trade came to be conducted through Japanese merchants who traveled to specified trading posts on the island under the control of the Matsumae clan. Deceiving the Ainu in trade transactions was common, and a number of Ainu were forced into slave-like labor for the Japanese. This situation gave rise to several Ainu rebellions, but eventually the Ainu succumbed to the Japanese.

After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Ainu came to be considered as Japanese citizens and were forced to adopt Japanese names. They were, however, still considered second-class citizens and were greatly disadvantaged in terms of education, health, and employment. The Meiji government started a large-scale colonization of Hokkaido that led to mass immigration from other parts of Japan, and eventually the Ainu were reduced to only a small percentage of the total population on Hokkaido. Deprived of their lifestyle as hunters and fishermen, they quickly sank into poverty and apathy. To ameliorate this situation, the Hokkaido

Former Aborigines Protection Act was enacted in 1899, granting education and small plots of land to the Ainu.

In the late twentieth century, a new pride in being Ainu emerged. Cultural events, language classes, and study groups attempted to revive the Ainu culture. Bowing to pressure from Ainu organizations that saw the protection law as discriminatory, in 1997 the government repealed the Protection Act and replaced it with a new law to promote Ainu culture and facilitate public understanding of Ainu tradition.

Kirsten Refsing

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AIR POLLUTION Throughout Asia air pollution is a significant threat to human health and the environment. Industrial emissions from fossil fuel use constitute the bulk of the pollutants released into the atmosphere, but forest fires and the combustion of biomass fuels also add pollutants. Combating air pollution is difficult because it requires action on many different levels, from upgrading household stoves to reducing regional emissions to battling global climate change internationally. Scientists warn that, if current trends continue, by 2025 three times as many people in Asia will suffer poor health due to air pollution as did in 1990.

Industrial Pollution

Industrial development in the past century was powered largely by fossil fuels like coal, oil, and natural gas. Used to generate electricity, drive industrial processes, and send automobiles down the road, fossil fuels release sulfur dioxides, nitrogen oxides, and tiny particulates of partially combusted fuel into the atmosphere. Even the cleanest fossil fuels produce carbon dioxide emissions, formed when carbon in the fuel combines with atmospheric oxygen. Industrial air pol-

lution is a global problem but is nowhere more serious than in Asia, where fossil fuel consumption has risen by a factor of 20 in the past half-century.

The local effects of air pollution have been most severe in cities undergoing rapid industrialization and population growth. Of the fifteen cities worldwide suffering from the worst concentrations of air pollutants, twelve are in the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing, Chongqing, and other Chinese cities have the highest concentrations of sulfur dioxide, joined by Jakarta, Manila, and Seoul on the list of those with high levels of particulate matter. High levels of air pollution have meant increased rates of bronchitis, asthma, lung cancer, and infant mortality. A World Bank study attributes some 67,200 premature deaths and over a half-million cases of chronic bronchitis in Asia to urban air pollution.

Industrial air pollution also takes a toll on the environment. The area around Guilin, China, famous for its mountain scenery, has been especially hard hit. Not only has pollution from Guilin's factories obscured the mountain in haze, but the region's limestone geological formations are being eroded by the acidic sulfur dioxide. Acid rain, another by-product of atmospheric sulfur dioxide, damages forests and aquatic life far from the source of the pollution. While Japan has made significant progress in reducing its own air pollution, it now contends with acid rain originating in China and Korea. Japan, southern China, mountainous areas of Southeast Asia, and southwestern India all have soils and vegetation particularly sensitive to acidification.

Globally the most significant environmental changes may be due to emissions of so-called greenhouse gasses, which trap heat inside the atmosphere. Trace amounts occur naturally in the atmosphere, but their concentrations have risen exponentially since the Industrial Revolution. The increase of carbon dioxide, the most significant greenhouse gas, has been linked directly to increased use of fossil fuels and the loss of forests, whose trees and other flora absorb carbon dioxide. In 1990 international scientists predicted that an overall rise in temperatures, sea levels, and severe weather could be expected if greenhouse-gas emissions were not curbed. The consequences could be especially severe for Asia if climatic changes lead to reduced crop yields or the inundation of heavily populated coastal areas.

Pollution from Biomass Fuels and Forest Fires

In the developing countries of Asia the highest levels of air pollution occur inside homes where biomass fuels like wood, grasses, or animal dung are used for

cooking and heating. Three-quarters of India's households rely on biomass fuels. Smoke from these fuels contains many harmful chemicals and compounds. Women and children, who are in the home the most, have the greatest exposure; they risk developing respiratory infections, lung cancer, and eye damage. Half of India's cases of tuberculosis may be attributed to respiratory damage from cooking smoke.

Forest fires were the source of the air pollution that blanketed much of Indonesia and its neighbors in 1997 and 1998. An unprecedented number of fires decimated tropical forests on the island of Kalimantan (Borneo) during a two-year drought linked to the El Niño southern oscillation, a periodic shift in global weather systems. The disaster was exacerbated by the expansion of fire-prone oil-palm plantations. Some 12.5 million people in the surrounding region were exposed to hazardous air pollution levels, forcing the Indonesian president to apologize officially to Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand. The fires released as much carbon into the atmosphere as a year of fossil fuel use by Western Europe. As with other major forest fires, such as the giant blaze on the Chinese-Siberian border a decade earlier, the severest impacts were on the health and livelihood of the local community and surrounding natural environment.

Combating Air Pollution

Action to reduce air pollution is underway at many levels in Asia. While much attention has been given to international assistance programs promoting the use of expensive new technologies to remove pollutants from atmospheric emissions, the most successful strategies call for substituting cleaner fuel sources and using fuels more efficiently. China has long supported a program to popularize the use of biogas digesters; biomass fuels processed in these devices are converted to cleaner-burning methane gas, leaving a rich mixture of compounds useful as fertilizer. Elsewhere, biomass fuels are being replaced in the home by coal briquettes, natural gas, or electricity from power plants. For national power generation, China and India are taking steps to limit the use of coal high in sulfur, substituting other energy sources such as hydroelectric power, though these have their own environmental and social consequences.

The efficiency with which fossil fuels are used in Asia varies widely. Japan's fuel use is now among the most efficient in the world, but elsewhere in the region outdated technologies in factories and vehicles burn fuels less efficiently and pollute more. Modernization may help reduce pollution levels, an outcome especially critical in the area of greenhouse gasses.

Coal-dependent China and India are among the world's biggest sources of carbon dioxide, but, pointing to their low per-capita emissions compared with Japan, Korea, or other more developed countries, they argue that it would be unfair for international treaties to cap their emissions at current levels.

The Future

Air pollution poses ongoing challenges to human health and environmental quality in Asia, especially with Asia's growing economic development and increased fossil fuel consumption. The effects of air pollution are felt in the home, in rapidly developing urban areas, and across national boundaries. Current trends are alarming, but concerted efforts may reduce the damage air pollution causes to the people and environment of Asia.

Mark G. Henderson

See also: **Bhopal; Forest Industry—Southeast Asia**

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AIRLANGGA (991–1049?), Hindu-Javanese king. Airlangga lived when eastern Java had become a rival in the international spice trade of the maritime empire of Sriwijaya in Sumatra. According to the Calcutta stone inscription of 1041 CE, Airlangga was born to Balinese King Udayana and his wife, Queen Mahendradatta, daughter of the King Dharmawangsa Teguh of eastern Java. The latter kingdom was destroyed in 1017, either by Srivijayan attack or due to internal friction. After two years in a hermitage, Airlangga set out in 1019 to restore the kingdom of King Dharmawangsa. By 1035 he succeeded in subjugating all of Dharmawangsa's former vassals through military and political prowess. His kingdom became an international trade center and he himself a promoter of old-Javanese literature. Toward the end of his life, he retreated into the forest to become a hermit again. To forestall succession disputes between his two sons, he divided his kingdom into Kadiri and Janggala around

1049. After his death, he was revered as an incarnation of the Hindu god Vishnu.

Martin Ramstedt

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AITMATOV, CHINGIS (b. 1928), Kyrgyz writer. Chingis Torekulovitch Aitmatov is probably the best-known non-Russian author of the former Soviet Union. Aitmatov was born in the village of Sheker in Kyrgyzstan on 12 December 1928. His mother and father saw to it that he was exposed to Russian literature and language, while his maternal grandmother and aunt exposed him to the language, songs, epics, and folk tales of traditional Kyrgyz culture. Aitmatov experienced tragedy early in his life, as his father was killed in the Stalinist purges of 1937.

Aitmatov began writing in the late 1940s, contributing articles and sketches to local newspapers in Kyrgyzstan. He went on to train as a veterinarian but continued writing. The publication of several short stories while he was working as a livestock specialist in Kyrgyzstan earned him the right to join the writers' union and admission to the prestigious Gorky Literary Institute. He completed his studies at the institute in 1958.

Aitmatov's works were often pessimistic in tone and were openly critical of the Soviet system. His novels addressed such issues as the passing of traditional ways of life (*The White Steamship*, 1970) and the Stalinist terror (*The Day Lasts Longer than 100 years*, 1981).

Andre Sharp

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AJANTA (1991 pop. 600,000). Ajanta, a village located in the state of Maharashtra in the Sahyadri

Hills near the Waghora River in India, is the site of approximately 30 Hindu and Buddhist cave temples and monasteries first created between the second century BCE and the late fifth century CE, and expanded and lavishly decorated again during the Gupta period (c. 230–c. 500 CE).

The caves were carved from the granite walls of a ravine, and are approximately 80 meters high and 380 meters long. Their interiors are covered with vibrant frescos and relief sculptures. Some of the caves are lit by natural light at certain times of day, enhancing the artistic effect. The majority of the caves are Buddhist, the art is inspired by legends, Jataka stories (ancient Pali fables), and real life; both mythological figures and ordinary people engaged in everyday tasks are depicted.

In 1819 British officers in the Madras army rediscovered the caves. Some historic accounts state the group was on a military expedition; according to other accounts the British were hunting in the area. Zealous archaeologists and local officials damaged the paintings to allow the findings to be displayed in museums. Public fervor destroyed early preservation efforts, which began about 1839. To prevent further debasement of the monuments, wire screens were placed over the art in all the major caves in 1903; today, however, the paintings remain at risk of deterioration. Various methods of preservation, including sealing them behind fiberglass, have been proposed. Because the frescoes represent a major example of Buddhist painting and because of their extraordinary quality, the caves of Ajanta were designated a UNESCO World Heritage site.

Linda Dailey Paulson

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AJANTA CAVES—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

A treasure trove of ancient Buddhist art and sculpture, the Ajanta Caves were first constructed more than two thousand years ago. These caves were added to the UNESCO list of World Heritage Sites in 1983.

AJODHYA (2002 pop. 51,000). An ancient city also called Ayodhya, Oudh, or Awadh, Ajodhya, now part of the city of Faizabad, lies on the Ghaghara River in the eastern Uttar Pradesh state of northern India. Ajodhya is one of seven holy places for Hindus, revered as the legendary birthplace of Rama, hero of the *Ramayana* epic. It was the capital of the Ikshvaku dynasty's Kosala kingdom (sixth century BCE) and a center of Gupta power (third–fifth centuries CE). By the fifth century CE the Chinese Buddhist monk Fa-hsien reported one hundred monasteries there. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Ajodhya became part of the Kanauj kingdom, then the Delhi sultanate, the Jaunpur kingdom, and, in the sixteenth century, the Mughal empire. It came under the control of the East India Company in 1764.

In 1856 Ajodhya was annexed by the British; loss of hereditary rights helped spark the 1857 Indian Mutiny. Oudh joined the Agra Presidency in 1877 to form the North-West Provinces and later the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. On 6 December 1992, the sixteenth-century Mosque of Babur, built on a site sacred to Hindus and Muslims, was demolished by Hindu fundamentalists; over one thousand died in the ensuing riots.

C. Roger Davis

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Hindus lay the foundation stones at the temple in Ajodhya that had been the source of conflict between Hindus and Muslims. (ZEN ICKNOW/CORBIS)

AKAEV, ASKAR (b. 1944), President of Kyrgyzstan. Askar Akaev was born in 1944 in the village of Kyzyl-Bairak, located in the Chon-Kemin region of Kyrgyzstan. He is not, by profession, a politician. Prior to holding the office of president of Kyrgyzstan he had never held a public political office. Akaev began his adult life as a professor of engineering and computers. From 1962 to 1972 he obtained his education at the Leningrad Institute of Precise Optics and Mechanics. Upon returning from Russia to Kyrgyzstan, he moved steadily up the academic ladder to become president of the Academy of Sciences in 1988. Two years later, on 27 October 1990, Akaev was appointed by the parliament as president of Kyrgyzstan. Early Western euphoria over Akaev's commitment to authentic democracy and economic reform has significantly diminished due to increasing repression and corruption.

The first serious repression began in 1994 when Akaev, disillusioned with the democratic constraints on his executive power, launched an authoritarian offensive that has increasingly strangled democratic culture. First, Akaev formed the Committee to Defend the Honor and Dignity of the President. Next, Akaev began building a power base to support him as a permanent president. In February 1996 President Akaev held a referendum that greatly extended his powers. This referendum violated both the constitution and the Law on Referendums. Voter apathy was high, turnout was low, and ballot stuffing was rampant, yielding results "reminiscent of the Soviet era" (U.S. Department of State 2000: 11).

Akaev's power was thus consolidated, and he became the dominant political force in Kyrgyzstan—not so much "the head of the executive branch but a kind of republican monarch who serves as the guarantor of the constitutions . . . operating at the pinnacle of state power" (Huskey 1997: 17). He has the power to nominate the prime minister and appoint government ministry heads and the director of the state bank. Akaev also controls the courts and has taken serious measures (mainly via the courts) to silence and subjugate the media. The culmination of these controls was evident in the February–March 2000 parliamentary elections, where blatant governmental manipulation resulted in spontaneous countrywide protests, including demonstrations, hunger strikes, and even a suicide, by citizens frustrated with the overt corruption and their inability to elect their own representatives.

L. M. Handraban

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AKBAR (1542–1605), Mughal emperor. The greatest emperor of the Mughal dynasty in India, Akbar, the eldest son of Humayun, ruled from 1556 to 1605, initially with the help of the regent Bairam Khan. An ambitious man, a superb strategist, and a diplomat, Akbar conquered Gujarat in 1573 and took control of Bengal in 1576. Kashmir came under his control in 1586, and by the time Asirgarh was conquered in 1601, he ruled over most of north, west, and east India, and his suzerainty was acknowledged by kingdoms in central India as well.

Akbar's conquests were accompanied by political consolidation and administrative reorganization. His administrative changes included reforming the *Mansabdari* rank system in the military to root out corruption, introducing a uniform, high-quality coinage and mint, and improving revenue assessment and collection. Akbar sought to reduce the authority of individual revenue holders by converting lands into crown holdings and distributing territory under the direct administration of salaried officers.



AKBAR ON EUROPEANS AND ALCOHOL

"[The Emperor] Akbar published a decree permitting intoxicating spirits to be sold to Europeans, because, he said, 'they are born in the element of wine, as fish are produced in that of water, and to prohibit them the use of it is to deprive them of life.'"

Source: Philip Anderson: *The English in Western India* (1856)



The tomb of Akbar in Sikandra, India, in 1975. (CORBIS)

Akbar's belief in universal toleration and the political need to unite Hindus under the Muslim Mughals found expression in his marrying two Hindu princesses; one, Jodha Bai, was mother of the heir to the throne. Akbar also appointed Hindus (particularly Rajput kings) to important state positions, abolished religious taxation, and even founded his own religion, the *Din-i-Ilahi* ("divine religion"), an eclectic mix of different faiths, including Brahmanism, Christianity, and Zoroastrianism. Though illiterate and lacking a formal education, Akbar was a cultured sovereign and a generous patron of the arts.

Chandrika Kaul

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AKHA The Akha are a highland people inhabiting parts of eastern and southern Shan State in Myanmar



An Akha girl in traditional costume in northern Thailand in 1986. (CHRISTINE KOLISCH/CORBIS)

(Burma) as well as adjoining border regions in China, Thailand, and Laos. They speak a Tibeto-Burmese language that is related to that of the Lahu people who inhabit many of the same mountain areas. Reputedly descended from the ancient Lolo peoples, the Akha are believed to have migrated into Shan State from China's Yunnan Province in a centuries-long process of migration into Southeast Asia that continued into the twentieth century.

Few academic studies have been completed on the Akha in Myanmar. Under British rule (1886–1948), they were indirectly governed under the Frontier Areas Administration. Subsequently, many Akha-inhabited areas were badly disrupted by the Chinese Guomindang invasion and insurgencies that began in the late 1940s after Myanmar's independence. As a result, over the years Akha villagers have sometimes crossed as refugees into Thailand. However, despite the degree of political violence within Myanmar, the Akha have never formed armed opposition organiza-

tions along nationality lines, unlike the Shan, Wa, and other ethnic neighbors.

The Akha population of Myanmar is estimated at around 100,000. In 1995, there were an estimated 500,000 Akha in Yunnan, China, 40,000 in northern Thailand, and 66,108 in Laos. They represent 50 percent of the Tibeto-Burmese family in Laos. The highest concentrations of Akha in Myanmar are in rural districts around Kengtung. Many Akha communities can be recognized by the wooden gateways at the entrance to each village. Generally, Akha villages are situated in higher mountain areas, where many communities still practice swidden (slash-and-burn) agriculture. Their principal crops include maize, tobacco, sugar cane, and opium, although in the 1990s a number of crop-substitution schemes were introduced after cease-fires were agreed to by local armed opposition groups.

The Akha subgroups are most often distinguished by the distinctive headdresses of their women, many of whom wear a traditional costume of black clothes and embroidered jackets. According to Akha legend, there are seven families or clans, who represent the seven brothers from whom all Akha people descend. Other names for the Akha are Iko, Ikor, Kho, Kha Ko, and Ekow. They call themselves Akha.

During the twentieth century, both Christianity and Buddhism had increasing impact on Akha communities. Nevertheless, Akha history and myths continue to be preserved by a strong oral tradition of storytelling. There are, however, growing concerns among Akha elders about the social effects of armed conflict, internal displacement, narcotics abuse and, more recently, the spread of HIV/AIDS, all of which threaten the traditional fabric of Akha society.

Martin Smith

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AKITA (2002 est. pop. 1.2 million). Akita Prefecture is situated in the northern region of Japan's is-

land of Honshu. Known for its mountainous terrain and heavy snowfalls, it occupies an area of 11,613 square kilometers. Its primary geographical features are the Oga Peninsula and the Ou and Dewa Mountains. The main bodies of water are the rivers Omonogawa and Yoneshirogawa, along with Lake Tazawa and part of Lake Towada. Akita is bordered by the Sea of Japan and by Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, and Yamagata Prefectures. In ancient times Akita Prefecture was part of the Ugo section of Dewa Province; the prefecture assumed its present name and borders in 1871.

The capital of the prefecture is Akita city, situated at the mouth of the river Omonogawa. Akita is home to five universities, including Akita University, and it is the site of the famous Kanto lantern festival (4–7 August), associated with welcoming and seeing off the spirits of one's ancestors. A distribution center for agricultural goods, it also is a manufacturing center for petrochemicals, fertilizer, machinery, wood pulp, and zinc. Akita originated from a military fort (Akitajo) built in 733 CE to pacify the indigenous Ezo people. It prospered in the 1600s as the castle town of the Satake family. In the Akita Incident of 1881, a cabal of farmers and former samurai attempted to overthrow the government. The other important cities of Akita Prefecture are Noshiro, Yokote, Odate, and Kazuno.

The coastal alluvial Akita Plain in the central area is cultivated in rice, and the large crop supplies an active sake-brewing industry. Forestry supports pulp and plywood production, and the area's mines yield copper, gold, silver, and zinc. The west coast Akita oil fields, at their maximum output in 1959, pumped over two-thirds of Japan's crude oil production. An offshore oil field started in 1960 continues to supply the prefecture's petroleum industry. The major tourist attractions include hot spring resorts, Towada-Hachimantai National Park, and the Kurikomayama peak (1,628 meters).

E. L. S. Weber

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AKSAKAL In the former Soviet Central Asia country of Kyrgyzstan, renewed tribalism since the collapse of Soviet rule has resulted in practices such as the revived Aksakal courts. These courts, the name of which is literally translated as "white beard courts," consists of the oldest men in the village who make all moral and family decisions. The Aksakals are not elected, but their powers of judgment and punishment are sup-

ported by the police force of Kyrgyzstan's President Akayev.

The Aksakals were reorganized following a call reportedly made by President Akayev at a January 1995 national congress. He is alleged to have encouraged the creation of a network of autonomous and active civil institutions, independent of state and political structures. The 1995 congress reportedly adopted a provisional status regulating the activities of Aksakal courts, whereby Aksakals were given responsibility for examining cases of administrative violations; property, family, and other disputes; and minor crimes passed to them by state procurators. The president is reported to have signed a decree approving this statute on 25 January 1995.

President Akayev has publicly supported the role of Aksakal courts and has reinforced and revived their importance in Kyrgyz society despite reported cases of medieval punishment, such as public stoning by the Aksakals as punishment for violating local custom and rules. Allegations of human rights abuses by the Aksakals, including illegal detention, whippings, and stonings, have been brought to the attention of human rights groups. The U.S. State Department Report for 1996 charged these local elders with abuses, including torture. Militias, known as *choro* and operating under the authority of the Aksakal, have little restriction placed on their activities by regular law enforcement bodies. In some villages, *azindans*, or places of illegal detention, have even been established. Corporal and capital punishment by the Aksakal and *choro* have also been reported.

L. M. Handraban

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ALBANIANS In Asia, Albanian settlements exist throughout Turkey, especially in Istanbul and Bursa, and in Damascus, Syria. The large Albanian colony in Egypt, dating from the nineteenth century, has all but disappeared. Albanians first arrived in Turkey as conscripts for the Turkish janissary forces (the janissaries were established in the fourteenth century) and subsequently for the Ottoman forces in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A second wave of Albanians,



Albanian soldiers serving the Ottoman Empire pose in distinctive uniforms, c. 1900. (MICHAEL MASLAN HISTORIC PHOTOGRAPHS/CORBIS)

from Kosovo and southern Serbia, arrived from the 1930s through the 1960s. The Serbs deported several hundred thousand of these Kosovo Albanians from Yugoslavia against their will under the absurd pretence that, as Muslims, they were Turks.

In Albania, the Albanians form two cultural groups separated by the Shkumbin River: the northern Albanians or Ghegs, sometimes spelled Gegs, and the southern Albanians or Tosks. Though dialect and cultural differences between the Ghegs and Tosks can be substantial, both sides strongly identify with their common national and ethnic culture, and both speak dialects of Albanian, an Indo-European language.

In Europe, in addition to the Republic of Albania with its centrally located capital city of Tirana, Albanians live in ethnically compact settlements in other large areas of the southwest Balkan Peninsula. The Republic of Albania, which includes only about 60 percent of all Albanians in the Balkans, is a mountainous country along the southern Adriatic coast across from the heel of Italy. An approximately 10 percent Albanian minority population lives north of Albania in Montenegro, in regions along the Albanian-Montenegrin border. Northeast of Albania is the United Nations-administered territory of (the self-proclaimed Republic of) Kosova, also known as Kosovo, techni-

cally a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Kosovo's population is about 90 percent Albanian speakers. East of the Republic of Albania is the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, about one-third of which, along the Albanian border, has an Albanian majority.

There are no reliable figures for the (largely assimilated) Albanian population living in Asia (mainly Turkey), but there are an estimated six million Albanians in Europe. Of these, about three and a half million live in the Republic of Albania, about two million in Kosovo, about half a million in the Republic of Macedonia, and about 100,000 in Montenegro. There are also large Albanian minorities in Italy and Greece.

Albania is on the border dividing three great religions: Islam, Greek Orthodoxy, and Roman Catholicism. Approximately 70 percent of Albanians in the Republic of Albania are Muslim. Among them are the Bektashi, a Muslim sect closely linked to the Albanian nationalist movement of the late nineteenth century. About 20 percent of Albanians, mostly in the south, are of Orthodox background, and about 10 percent, mostly in the north, are of Catholic background. Albanian history is intertwined with that of the Ottoman empire. Albanians were the backbone of much of the Ottoman military and administrative system. Many Al-

banians rose from the ranks of the janissaries to high offices in the Ottoman empire; some even became ministers and prime ministers of the imperial court.

Robert Elsie

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ALBUQUERQUE, AFONSO DE (1453–1515), Portuguese viceroy. Born in Alhandra, south of Lisbon, Afonso de Albuquerque was the architect of the Portuguese maritime empire in the Indian Ocean. His strategy of securing key points along major trade routes and establishing fortresses with permanent settlers achieved the dual objective of carrying the crusade against the Muslims in Asia and capturing the lucrative spice trade, then under the control of Arab and Indian Muslims in the Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean region, and Southeast Asia. Albuquerque himself gained his early military experience in North Africa fighting the Berbers or Moors, before traveling to the East in 1503.

Following Vasco da Gama's pioneering voyage in 1498 around the Cape of Good Hope and to India, Cochin was captured by the Portuguese in 1503. Dom Francisco de Almeida, the first viceroy of Portuguese India (1505–1509), defeated a confederation of Muslim powers (Egypt, ruled by a Mameluke sultan; Gujerat, ruled by Bahadur Shah; Calicut, ruled by Samorin [Zamorin]) at the Battle of Diu off the northwest coast of India in 1509.

Albuquerque succeeded as viceroy in 1509 and set out to conquer the Gulf of Aden, for control of the Red Sea; Ormuz (today's Hormuz) Strait on the Persian Gulf; Goa state in India; and Melaka, the spice-trade emporium on the Malay Peninsula. Attempts to capture Aden failed, but Albuquerque conquered Socotra Island in 1507, before becoming the second viceroy of Portuguese India. He seized Goa in 1510 and Melaka in 1511. At Melaka, Albuquerque constructed an imposing fortress, A Famosa, which withstood all attacks for 130 years. Ormuz fell to the Portuguese in 1515. Following the Ormuz campaign, Albuquerque was taken ill and died en route to Goa.

Keat Gin Ooi

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ALEPPO (2001 est. pop. 2 million). Aleppo, the second city of modern Syria and one of the oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world, is 110 kilometers inland from the Mediterranean and 30 kilometers south of the Syrian-Turkish frontier. Until the mid-nineteenth century, Aleppo was the western terminus of the Silk Road, ensuring its long-lasting prosperity.

Aleppo passed under several occupiers until the Arab conquest in 636 CE. Many of its best-known buildings (including the imposing Citadel and the Great Mosque) were restored or constructed under the Zangids and their successor Saladin (1137/38–1193) in the twelfth century. Under the Ottomans (1516–1918), the city prospered and grew, becoming one of the leading commercial centers of the eastern Mediterranean. Evidence of this prosperity can still be seen in the souks (marketplaces) and caravansaries (inns) dating from Ottoman times. The presence of foreign traders and diplomats also benefited their local intermediaries, often members of the Christian and Jewish minorities, who accounted for some 35 percent of the population in 1900.

After the creation of Syria in 1920, Aleppo suffered from the loss of its traditional markets in Anatolia and northern Iraq and for the first time became administratively subordinate to Damascus, the new capital. It gradually recovered its commercial and industrial vigor, partly as a result of the expansion of the cultivation of cash crops to the east of the city and also through large-scale migration from the countryside.

Peter Sluglett

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ALEVI MUSLIMS The Alevi Muslims, also known as Alavis, Alawis, Alawites, or Alouites, form a distinct branch of the twelve-imam Shi'ite tradition (Twelvers). Their interpretation of Islam and Shi'ism is known as Alevism or the Alevi faith. Various Alevi sects differ in some aspects of their faith, but they all subscribe to an unorthodox interpretation of Islam, which makes them distinct from all other Muslims whether Shi'ite or Sunni. The Alevis, who live mainly in Turkey, are estimated to be between 12 and 20 million in number, with much smaller communities in Syria, Iraq, and Iran.

Like other Muslims, the Alevis recognize the prophet of Islam, Muhammad, as the last prophet. Like Shi'ite Muslims, they believe that Imam Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad, is his true successor and rightful imam. They also believe that the other eleven Shi'ite imams, who were all descended from Ali, were Imam Ali's true successors. Their heavy emphasis on Imam Ali as the perfect human plays a key role in their faith. This is reflected in their name, Alevi: "of Ali" or "follower of Ali." The latter emphasis is one of the factors making them distinct from other Shi'ites.

Certain characteristics also distinguish the Alevis from other Muslims, both Shi'ite and Sunni. While believing in the Qur'an, they do not follow it as the guide to their faith. Rather, they consider it a holy book along with those of the Jews and Christians, and all the holy books, according to them, are all the same in essence. The Alevis have no mosques or formal clergy, and they do not observe daily Islamic prayers. They do not fast in the month of Ramadan like other Muslims, but in the month of Muharam and for a period shorter than a month. For the Alevis, making a pilgrimage to Mecca is not a religious necessity. Unlike other Muslims, their religious ceremonies include men and women praying together through speeches, poetry, and dance. The drinking of alcohol is not forbidden among most Alevi sects. The Alevis forbid polygamy and generally advocate equality of all people regardless of gender. For this reason most Alevis are against Islamic restrictions on women, including veiling. Most favor the separation of religion and state and advocate secularity.

These distinctive characteristics of the Alevis have provided grounds for the persecution of their main community in Turkey. The Sunni clergy of Turkey consider them non-Muslim. This has created a justification for their persecution by Sunni extremists in that country, including attacks on their lives and property.

Hooman Peimani

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ALGHOZA *Algboza* is a generic term for various types of twin-fluted wind instruments originating in Sindh, the southeastern province of Pakistan, and in northern India. The musician plays both flutes vertically at the same time, producing the two sounds simultaneously.

The lengths of the wooden flutes vary from region to region but are commonly around 48 centimeters (19 inches). Each flute has six finger holes on the lower end. Continuous sound is achieved through the technique of circular breathing. The melody is produced on both flutes. A variation is the smaller (27 centimeters [11 inches]) double-fluted *parvo*, made from bamboo, which has one melody flute and one flute sounding the drone. It is thought that the *algboza* and its variations are over two thousand years old. The sweet melodies played on the *algboza* are reminiscent of the Western recorder. Traditional *algboza* music revolves around the themes of love, separation, and sorrow. Renowned contemporary players of the *algboza* include Khamiso Khan and Misri Khan Jamali.

Daniel Oakman

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ALI JANHAR, MOHAMED (1878–1931), prominent figure of India's independence movement. The Ali brothers, Mohamed and Shaukat, were born in Najibabad, Bijnor District, Uttar Pradesh. Both were good orators and well-educated Muslims. Mohamed Ali became an established scholar who produced one of the most authoritative translations of the Qur'an into English.

In 1912, Mohamed Ali and M. A. Ansari led a Red Cross mission to Turkey during the Balkan Wars. Mohamed and Shaukat Ali later became leaders of the Khilafat movement, which arose in reaction to the humiliating terms imposed on Turkey at the Versailles Conference in 1919. This movement soon collapsed, however, because Kemal Ataturk (1881–1938) dra-

matically revived Turkey; the caliphate there was abolished in 1924; and despite its Muslim majority, Turkey declared itself a secular state. Mohamed Ali then joined with Mohandas Gandhi (1869–1948) in leading the Non-Cooperation Movement during the 1920–1924 period and, in so doing, for the first time united Indian Hindus and Muslims in a political endeavor. In 1923 Mohamed Ali became president of the Indian National Congress. Later he broke with Gandhi when the latter founded the Civil Disobedience Movement in 1930. Nonetheless Mohamed Ali remained an influential Muslim and nationalist leader for the final year of his life. He died in London in 1931 while attending the First Round-Table Conference between British authorities and representatives of the Indian National Congress.

Paul Hockings

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ALI KHAN, BADE GHULAM (1902–1968), Hindustani vocalist. Bade ("The Great") Ghulam Ali Khan was one of the finest Hindustani vocalists of the twentieth century, one whose style and standing reflect a unique historical setting. Bridging the gap between royal cultivation and public appreciation, his was a generation of musicians whose artistry linked nineteenth century restraint to twentieth century romanticism.

Ghulam Ali was trained by his uncle, Kale Khan, and his father, Ali Baksh Khan, the latter a court musician to the Maharaja of Kashmir. As royal patrons were often musically erudite, Ghulam Ali's years of discipleship were spent in a musical ethos that was unhurried, rigorous, and majestic. Yet, his own career grew in an age of radical social transformation—bringing new patronage (the state), a changed economy (capitalism) and a new sovereign (independent India). Ghulam Ali consequently became the first of a new generation of musicians who was sensitive to a new "public" audience: one that was increasingly large, varied, and anonymous.

Ghulam Ali was born and musically groomed in Kasur, just outside of Lahore, Pakistan. From his debut in Calcutta in 1939, he toured throughout India, becoming widely known. After Partition, he made Pak-

istan his "home." While the government of India granted him visas for short concert tours, it prohibited radio broadcast of his recitals, even forbidding mention of his name. A decade later he became a citizen of India.

Ghulam Ali's *khayal* style of singing was so dominant that two generations of musicians continue to emulate it. What endeared him to the masses, however, were his renditions of *bhajan-s* (devotional songs) and his incorporation of folk tunes. He became, as such, India's first classical celebrity, a musician whose reputation lay in its circulation between the radio broadcast, the commercial recording, and the public concert.

Dard Newman

ALISHER NAVOIY SAMARQAND STATE UNIVERSITY

The Alisher Navoiy Samarqand State University is one of the oldest institutions of modern higher education in Central Asia. It was established in 1927 as the Uzbek Higher Pedagogical Institute, with sixty-five students and ten faculty members. Samarqand was then the capital of Uzbekistan and the Higher Pedagogical Institute was part of the Soviet regime's efforts to train teachers as part of its program of eliminating illiteracy and establishing a system of universal education. Postgraduate classes began in 1931, and in 1933, the pedagogical institute was turned into the Uzbek State University. During World War II, the university briefly became a satellite campus of the Central Asian State University in Tashkent. In 1960, it acquired its present name.

The Soviet regime's efforts to fight illiteracy and establish universal education have succeeded, and the university has grown over the decades. In the early 2000s, it has an enrolment of nearly ten thousand students who attend classes in a modern skyscraper not far from the city's historic center.

Adeeb Khalid

ALL BURMA STUDENTS DEMOCRATIC FRONT

The All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF) is an armed student group that became prominent in the decade following the assumption of power by the military State Law and Order Restoration Council in 1988. Students have stood in the forefront of political protest in Burma (now Myanmar) since the 1930s, when student leaders such as Aung San (1915–1947) and U Nu (1907–1995) led the opposition to British colonial rule.

The decision to take up arms was made by student leaders after the Burmese army's suppression of pro-democracy demonstrations in 1988. A three-prong strategy was implemented: the mainstream All Burma Federation of Students Unions remained the above-ground face of student politics; a new organization, the Democratic Party for New Society, was established to pursue legal party politics; and the ABSDF was formed in October that year among the thousands of students who had fled into territory controlled by armed ethnic opposition forces. At one stage, eighteen student battalions were organized in Myanmar's borderlands.

The ABSDF, however, was badly weakened during the 1990s by a factional split into two wings, headed by Dr. Naing Aung and Moe Thee Zun, respectively. The ABSDF was also hampered by logistical difficulties and strained relations with several of its ethnic minority hosts. As a result, the number of armed ABSDF members dwindled steadily. Instead, many students took political asylum abroad, where ABSDF exiles became active voices in the international campaign for democratic transition in Myanmar.

Martin Smith

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Hindus taking a ritual cleansing bath in the Ganges River in Allahabad during the Khumb Mela festival in 1988. (JANEZ SKOK/CORBIS)

ALLAHABAD (2001 pop. 990,000). Allahabad is a holy city in India, whose name means "City of God." Located in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh, it is at the junction of the Ganges and Jumna Rivers, which Hindus consider sacred places of spiritual cleansing. In addition to attracting many religious pilgrims, Allahabad is an important historic and cultural site. In 2001 it was the location of the world's largest religious gathering, when perhaps 70 million devotees coming to participate in the Maha Kumbh Mela, or Grand Pitcher Festival, a Hindu festival which is held about once every 12 years. Founded in about 200 CE, ancient Allahabad's structures remain partly intact today. Major architectural sites include a monument from the reign of Ashoka, a third-century-BCE king famed for his benevolence; the Jama Masjid or Great Mosque; and the palace and fort constructed in 1583 by Akbar, the Mughul emperor who gave the city its present name. Allahabad was ruled by the Marathas, an ethnic group in India, the Pashtuns, an ethnic group in modern Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the British. The city was the capital of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, now Uttar Pradesh state, between 1901 and 1949.



NIGHT LIFE IN COLONIAL ALLAHABAD

"Allahabad is now one of the gayest, and is, as it always has been, one of the prettiest stations in India. We have dinner-parties more than enough, balls occasionally; a book society; some five or six billiard-tables; a pack of dogs; some amongst them hounds, and (how could I have forgotten!) fourteen spinsters!"

Source: Fanny Parks (1832) *Wanderings of a Pilgrim in Search of the Picturesque During Four and Twenty Years in the East with Revelations of Life in the Zenana/Fanny Parks*. London: Pelham Richardson.

Two of India's most famous modern politicians were born in Allahabad: Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Indian prime minister, in 1889, and Indira Gandhi, his daughter and also a prime minister, in 1917. The Nehru family estate now houses a museum. The ashes of Mohandas K. Gandhi, assassinated in 1948, were consigned to the Ganges at Allahabad. Today Allahabad is an important commercial center with exchanges for cotton, sugar, and other agricultural products.

Linda Dailey Paulson

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ALMATY (1999 est. pop. 1,129,400). Almaty is a former capital and the largest city in the Republic of Kazakhstan, a Central Asian state. Situated in the southeastern part of the country, Almaty sits on the banks of the Bolshaia (Greater) Almatinka and Malaia (Lesser) Almatinka Rivers, at the foot of the Zailiysky Alatau mountains, and in a seven-river valley known as Jetysu in Kazak, or Semirechie in Russian. The city was founded as a Russian fortress named Vernoe (Loyal) at the ancient site of Almatu in 1854. In 1867, Vernoe was recognized as a town and received the slightly different name of Verniy. It was the main stronghold during Russia's further invasions in Central Asia.

In the late nineteenth through the twentieth centuries, Verniy was a place of exile for Russian revolutionaries. In 1916, it was the center of the major anti-Russian Jetysu Rebellion, which was crudely suppressed. After the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia (1917), Verniy became the headquarters of the anti-Bolshevik Beloe Dvizhenie (White Movement) in Semirechie (1918–1920), which eventually was defeated by the Red Army. In 1921, the city was renamed Alma-Ata (Father of Apples) after its remarkable apple orchards.

From 1929 to 1991, Alma-Ata was the capital of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, a constituent part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In December 1986, the city was the site of a massive student uprising to protest against Moscow's decision to replace Dinmukhamed Kunaev (1912–1993), the first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, with Gennady Kolbin (b. 1927), a native Russian. After the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, the city received its original name of Almaty in 1994 and remained the capital of the Republic of Kazakhstan until 1997. In

January 1998, the capital of Kazakhstan was transferred to Aqmola, subsequently renamed Astana, in northern Kazakhstan.

Present-day Almaty remains the country's most important business and cultural center, with 7.5 percent of the entire population of Kazakhstan. Almaty survived two major earthquakes, in 1887 and 1911, and a massive mud slide in 1921. The famous highland ice rink Medeu (inaugurated in 1951), with an area of 10,500 square meters, is situated 15 kilometers southeast of Almaty, at an attitude of 1,700 meters above sea level. The historical declaration on the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Alma-Ata Declaration, was signed by the leaders of twelve Soviet republics in Almaty on 21 December 1991.

Natalya Yu. Khan

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AL-NAJAF (2002 est. pop. 563,000). Also known as Mashhad 'Ali, al-Najaf is one of the holiest cities of Shi'a Islam. It is located in Central Iraq, a few kilometers west of the Euphrates River near Kufa. Prior to their expulsion during the Iran-Iraq War, nearly one-quarter of the city's population was of Iranian descent.

According to tradition, the city contains the burial site of 'Ali ibn Abi Talib (c. 600–661 CE), cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, fourth caliph, and the spiritual founder of Shi'a Islam. A shrine was built over 'Ali's presumed tomb in the early tenth century after it had already become a center of pilgrimage. The shrine was destroyed and rebuilt several times, and today it constitutes a sanctuary with a large mosque and an adjoining Shi'a college. The old city is still encircled by a wall that dates back to Ottoman times, and the outskirts contain a number of Shi'a cemeteries. Also nearby are the remains of several early Christian monasteries. The city contains a series of mazelike cellars that was constructed to provide shelter from the desert heat and has been used as a hiding place for political opposition groups. Due to its religious status al-Najaf developed a strong tradition of political autonomy, which often led to resistance and rebellion against the central authorities in Baghdad.

Thabit Abdullah

ALPAMISH Alpamish is an oral epic found among the Turkic peoples of Central Asia, in particular the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Karakalpaks. Versions of the epic are also found among the Tatars, Bashkirs, and Altaians. The best-known version of Alpamish is the epic written down from the Uzbek singer Fazil Yoldash-oghli in 1928. The earliest version of the Alpamish story is found in the tale of Bamsi Beyrek in the Oghuz epic of *Gorkut Ata* (Grandfather Korkut). The story is in two parts: the winning of the bride and the return of the hero. In the first part, Alpamish wins the hand of the beautiful Barchin in a suitor contest involving a horse race, bow shooting, and a wrestling match. In the second part, Alpamish becomes a captive in the land of the Kalmucks, but is finally rescued from the dungeon with the help of his horse. On his return home, his wife is about to be remarried to the usurper of his realm. Alpamish tests his wife's fidelity in a song contest and overcomes his rival in a bow-shooting contest. The epic is also important in offering a close parallel to the return of Odysseus.

Karl Reichl

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ALTAIC LANGUAGES The Altaic languages are a group of languages and language families, widespread in and dominating parts of Central and Northern Asia. The name *Altaic* alludes to the Altai mountain range in southern Siberia, where nineteenth-century scholars located the original habitat of the speakers of these languages.

Linguists usually consider the Turkic, Mongolian, and Tungusic languages, often referred to as micro-Altaic, as the principal members of this group; some scholars also include Korean and Japanese, referred to as macro-Altaic. While linguists agree that all these languages show a high degree of structural uniformity and many shared lexical (word-related) and, to a lesser degree, morphological (form-related) materials, the "Al-

taic theory" continues to be one of the most controversial issues in contemporary comparative linguistics.

The gist of this debate is the question of whether these language families—or a subset of them—are to be viewed as members of a higher-level family of languages (often called a macrofamily), for which a common linguistic ancestor (a protolanguage) can be reconstructed and from which the languages diverged, or whether the common traits and elements found in these languages arose during millennia-long processes of "areal convergence," or large-scale language contact, of originally unrelated languages.

The Altaic Debate

Scholars noticed the high degree of structural similarity shared by the Altaic languages as early as the late eighteenth century and thus assumed that the languages were genetically related. One salient typological feature is vowel harmony: words may contain only vowels belonging to one of two or more mutually exclusive classes, such as front versus back or rounded versus unrounded vowels. The principal morphological technique in Altaic languages is that of agglutination: largely monofunctional affixes (almost exclusively suffixes) added to the roots they modify, in a fixed order, and without the high degree of fusion common, for instance, in Indo-European languages (as in the Latin word *librorum* ["of the books"], where the ending *-rum* simultaneously carries the functions of plural and genitive). The basic word order in ordinary sentences in Altaic languages is generally subject—object—verb; modifying constituents, like adjectives, always precede the constituent they modify; postpositions rather than prepositions are found.

Modern linguists, however, no longer view such typological similarities as indicative of genetic relations, mostly because the similarities can change (especially in situations of intensive language contact), and because these and other phenomena once viewed as "typically Altaic" traits occur on a global scale unknown when the Altaic theory was first developed.

Furthermore, critics of the Altaic hypothesis often point to the fact that some typological hallmarks of Altaic languages are historical innovations. For instance, the earliest Mongolian texts (thirteenth century CE) have elements atypical for Altaic (when compared with Old Turkic, for instance), including grammatical gender, no rigid verb-final word order, and adjectives following rather than preceding nouns. Mongolian later developed into a "typical" Altaic language. Somewhat similarly, in Tungusic, the Evenki and Even languages, spoken on the northern and west-

ern fringes of the language family's territory in central Siberia and Mongolia, are typologically much more divergent from the Altaic archetype than those spoken in the center, where they have been in contact with Mongolian for centuries.

Proponents of the genetic relations theory usually maintain that the Altaic languages share many lexical items from all semantic spheres, including basic vocabulary. These lexical commonalities are characterized by highly regular phonological correspondences, the most important criterion for genetic relationship. A considerable number of shared morphological elements (affixes) have been identified, and all these observations imply that these languages share a common origin.

Critics of the genetic approach to Altaic linguistics often argue that while the great number of lexical commonalities cannot be denied, most if not all can be explained as early borrowings. In micro-Altaic, the most readily identifiable layers of borrowings are Turkic loans in proto-Mongolian and Mongolian loans in proto-Tungusic. From the time of Ghengis Khan (c. 1162–1227) on, Mongolian elements begin to abound in Turkic languages, and a thin layer of Tungusic loans in early Mongolian is sometimes acknowledged. In particular, the fact that many words common to Turkic and Mongolian show, in Mongolian, traits of one of the subgroups of Turkic, namely the Bolgharic branch (of which modern Chuvash is the sole survivor), leads to the hypothesis that a strong proto-Bolgharic influence on proto-Mongolian is responsible for most commonalities in the two language families. The borrowing hypothesis is further strengthened by the fact that the Altaic languages share few lexical items that belong to those semantic areas that are generally thought to be stable over time and least amenable to linguistic borrowing. Altaicists claim that phonological correspondences between the languages are highly regular, which presupposes the acceptance of many etymologies; these are problematical for numerous reasons, including philological problems of determining the earliest Turkic, Mongolian, and other forms that alone should enter any external comparison; problems of inexact or vague semantic mapping in forms and words compared; and so on. The systems of correspondences proposed by Altaicists contain gaps, as well. Morphological elements compared by Altaicists are mostly confined to derivational morphology and usually involve very short morphemes, often consisting of merely one phoneme, the functions of which may be vague.

Some critics of the Altaic theory maintain that, once all comparisons for which these and similar objections



ALTAIC LANGUAGES

"The Altaic languages share almost no basic vocabulary, nor do they possess any uncontroversial material parallels in their morphological systems. The only logical conclusion is that the Altaic entities were both genetically and geographically clearly separate from each other, until . . . intensive contacts arose between Pre-Proto-Bulgharic and Pre-Proto-Mongolic."

Source: Juha Janhunen. (1996) *Manchuria: An Ethnic History*. Helsinki, Finland: Finno-Ugrian Society, 241–242.

may be brought forward are removed, the remaining potentially comparable items are so few that they could all be explained as chance similarities. Others do not completely reject the Altaic theory, believing that the evidence, when sifted through, will justify a leaner version of the theory.

All these points have been and continue to be addressed by proponents of the theory; both the methodological principles (such as insisting on allowing internal reconstruction of proto-Mongolian, proto-Turkic, and so on always to precede external Altaic-level comparisons) and the factual claims (for example, the acceptability of individual etymologies and sound-correspondences based on them) of their critics have been challenged. Thus, the Altaic debate still continues and has developed into an ideal testing ground for the methodology of assessing (or rejecting) the genetic relations of languages in general.

Stefan Georg

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ALTAY MOUNTAINS The Altay Mountains are a complex and multifrontier chain with three distinctive spurs: the Altay proper (Russia and Kazakhstan), Mongolian Altay (Mongolia and China), and Gobi Altay (China). The assemblage stretches 2,000 kilometers (1,250 miles) in a southeast to northwest direction from the Gobi Desert to the West Siberian Plain and reaches an elevation of 4,506 meters (14,783 feet) on Belukha. In the Turkic-Mongolian language, *altan* means "golden," reflecting the belief of early inhabitants that the mountains were rich in precious metals. Sediments dating from 500 to 300 million years ago were uplifted during the recent Quaternary period (1.6 million years ago) and have since been sculpted by glacial and river erosion into an alpine appearance. There are 1,500 active glaciers, 3,500 lakes, and 4 distinct mountain vegetation zones (subdesert, steppe, forest, and alpine). Animal life is of Mongolian (e.g., marmot, antelope) or Siberian (e.g., bears, lynx, musk deer) origin. The extreme continental climate results in long and very cold winters and short, warm summers. Average annual precipitation varies with elevation, from 500–1,000 millimeters (20–40 inches), and is highest on the windward western slopes. Altay ridgelines divide the Arctic-bound Ob/Irtysh River from the interior and often saline basins of Central Asia.

Indigenous Altaic peoples, Russians, and Kazakhs share the Altay proper. Khalkha Mongols and Kazakhs predominate in the Mongolian and Gobi Altay. Livestock (cattle, sheep, and horses), agriculture, mining, forest products, and food processing are the most



ALTAY MOUNTAINS— WORLD HERITAGE SITE

The Altay Mountains in western Siberia are a wonder of ecological abundance. The more than 1.6 million hectares of mountain, lake and alpine plain are home to snow leopards and two major rivers. The mountains were designated as a World Heritage Site in 1998.

important economic pursuits. Since the 1940s, Soviet and Chinese government policies have opened this once remote region to logging, mining, and hydroelectric development.

Stephen F. Cunha

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ALTYSARIN, IBRAHIM (1841–1889), Kazakh educator, social activist, author. Altynsarin is considered by many scholars to be one of the first Kazakh intellectuals whose principal professional activity was to create greater educational opportunities for Kazakh children. In 1850 he entered the Orenburg School for Kazakhs, where he was educated in Russian classics, such as by Alexander Pushkin and Mikhail Lermontov. In addition, he was trained in mathematics and the natural sciences. In 1864 he opened a school for Kazakh children in Turgai. He was a supporter of the Nikolai Il'minskii's educational system for Russia's national minorities. The Russian government, concerned that Tatar religious views were having a potentially negative influence on young Kazakhs, supported steps to introduce lessons in the Kazakh vernacular. Altynsarin was assigned the task of compiling the lessons used in the textbook. In 1879 Altynsarin's most significant work, *Nachal'noe rukovodstvo k obucheniiu kirgiz russkomu iazyku* (Beginning Handbook for Teaching a Kazakh

the Russian Language), was published with the twin goals of educating Kazakh youth in the Russian language and eliminating illiteracy among the Kazakh population. He was also a leader in the effort to publish a newspaper in the Kazakh language; however, the authorities always denied his requests. In addition, Altynsarin worked tirelessly to educate Kazakh girls. In 1891, two years after his death, the first school for girls was opened in Turgai.

Steven Sabol

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AMAMI ISLANDS (2000 est. pop. 150,000). The Amami Islands, or Amami Gunto, form the northern half of the Nansei Island chain, south of Kyushu, Japan, and are located between 29° and 27° north latitude. The islands include Amami Oshima, Kikaishima, Tokunoshima, Okinoerabu, and Yoronjima, as well as several smaller islands, eight of which are populated. Amami Oshima is the largest of the Amami Islands, with an area of 720 square kilometers and a population of about 74,000; it ranks third in size among Japan's offshore islands (after Okinawa and Sado). The main city is Naze, located in Amami Oshima, and serves as the business, political, and administrative center of the islands. The semitropical islands, while hilly, are chiefly agricultural, with sugarcane, sweet potatoes, and fruits being the main products.

The Amami Islands are administered as part of Kagoshima Prefecture. Prior to becoming an administrative part of Kagoshima in 1871, they were controlled by the Satsuma domain in Kyushu, which took over the islands in 1609. Before that, the islands had belonged to the Ryukyu Kingdom (1429–1879) in Okinawa. After World War II, the United States occupied the islands from 1946 to 1953, when they were returned to Japanese control, following a reversion movement led by local education and political leaders and those from Amami living in Tokyo and other parts of mainland Japan.

Robert D. Eldridge

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AMANGKURAT Amangkurat (to have the world on one's lap) is a Javanese royal title. The rule of the four Amangkurats in Javanese history was dominated by bloody crises and repeated interventions of the Dutch East India Company (VOC). Sultan Agung (reigned 1613–1646) had established the greatest Javanese realm since the time of Hindu-Buddhist Majapahit. With the rule of his son and successor Amangkurat I (reigned 1646–1677), however, the hegemony of the Mataram dynasty in central and east Java came to an end. Amangkurat I's tyrannical rule, alienating him from powerful court allies and regional vassals, isolated the monarchy and weakened its military might. The empire disintegrated, and in 1677 the court of Mataram fell to rebel armies. Only with the help of the VOC was his son and successor Amangkurat II (reigned 1677–1703) restored to the throne, founding the new court of Kartasura. During the First Javanese War of Succession (1704–1708), the VOC supported Amangkurat II's brother, the future Pakubuwana I (reigned 1704–1719), against Amangkurat III (reigned 1703–1708). Pakubuwana I's death in 1719 initiated the Second Javanese War of Succession (1719–1723). Amangkurat IV (reigned 1719–1726) succeeded him upon the throne but also needed the VOC to fight for him.

Edwin Wieringa

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AMANOLLAH (1892–1960), King of Afghanistan. Amanollah Khan, also known as Amanullah Barakzai, was the king of Afghanistan from 1919 to 1929. He was responsible for leading Afghanistan to independence from Britain in 1919 as well as instituting major economic, political, and social reforms to modernize Afghanistan.

Born the third son of Habibollah Khan, who ruled in Afghanistan from 1901 to 1919, Amanollah served as the governor of Kabul. When his father was assassinated, Amanollah used his political shrewdness to gain the throne over the claims of his brothers and uncle. He soon initiated war against the British rule in his country and, within one month, had secured independence for his people. The Soviet Union quickly embraced the newly independent administration, and Amanollah went on to establish relations with France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Ottoman empire.

During his reign, Amanollah instituted some far-reaching changes, some of which have prevailed to the present. He reorganized the administrative divisions within the country, declared a constitution, instituted a new tax system, and allowed a free press to operate. However, he also instituted some cultural changes toward a more secular way of life, such as removing the requirement for women to wear veils, which created a backlash of opposition. In addition, he alienated his army through changes in compensation, which left him without military support when several revolts took place in 1928. These pressures ultimately led Amanollah to relinquish his throne in May of 1929. He tried to regain his throne through a military campaign toward Kabul, but it failed. He ultimately left the country to live in Italy in exile.

Houman A. Sadri

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AMASYA (2002 est. pop. 78,000). Amasya, known historically as Amaseia, is the capital city of the province of Amasya (population 346,191) in Turkey. The city straddles the Yesilirmak River in central Anatolia.

The city was under the rule of nine different civilizations, beginning with the Hittites (second millennium BCE) and ending with the Ottomans (1453–1922), before it became part of the Turkish Republic. The town most likely began as a Hittite settlement, falling to Alexander of Macedon in the fourth century BCE. Under King Mithridates II (123–88 BCE; ruler of the Pontic kingdom that flourished from the fourth century to 66 BCE), Amasya flourished as the Roman royal capital of the kingdom of Pontus. Much of its wealth and power derived from its strategic location on the Roman road system. In about 47 BCE, as Roman influence in Anatolia declined, the city fell under Byzantine (330 CE) and then Seljuk (1075) rule.

The Mongols under Genghis Khan routed the city in the thirteenth century. The town was finally lost to the Ottoman army, led by the sultan Bayezid I (c. 1360–1403). Under Ottoman rule, Amasya flourished as one of the training and education centers for crown princes who often served as governors. During the fif-

teenth century, it was a center for calligraphic monograms (*tuora*), and during the nineteenth century it became a major center of Islamic education.

The city also played a major role in Turkish independence when, on 12 June 1919, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), the founder of the Turkish Republic, came to Amasya. There he met secretly with associates to plan the war of independence to drive out the victorious Allies and Greeks and make Turkey an independent nation. The city suffered a devastating fire in 1915, which destroyed many of its buildings and monuments, as well as earthquakes in 1734, 1825, and 1939.

Amasya is known for its orchards of apples, cherries, and peaches; as well as the rock tombs of the rulers of Pontus, Ottoman buildings, and nineteenth-century wooden homes. Economic activity centers on agriculture, textiles, and mining. It is also known as the birthplace of the Greek geographer and historian Strabo (64 or 63 BCE–after 23 CE).

T. Isikozlu-E.F. Isikozlu

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AMBEDKAR, B. R. (1891–1956), Indian reformer and statesman. Dr. Bhimrao Ramji (Babasaheb) Ambedkar has two claims to fame. He was India's undisputed untouchable leader of the untouchables, creating a movement that has brought much progress to that religiously, socially, and economically oppressed group. He was also a statesman who often testified to government commissions and served as labor minister in the preindependence cabinet of India and as law minister in the first cabinet after 1947. His work as chair of the drafting committee for India's new constitution is honored today. His statue or portrait is visible in untouchable homes and neighbors and in city centers all over India.

Born to an army schoolteacher, Ambedkar was one of the first untouchables to graduate from college. Aided by non-Brahman reformist princes, he then secured an M.A. and Ph.D. in economics from Columbia University in New York and a D.Sc. from the London School of Economics. He became a barrister from Grey's Inn. Returning to India, he immediately began newspapers, organized conferences for "The Depressed Classes," began work in education, pressed for the political rights of untouchables, taught at Government Law College, began a political party and a



B. R. Ambedkar in 1950. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

labor union, and, at first, conducted temple entry campaigns.

By the time of his death, he had established his third political party; converted to Buddhism along with millions of his followers; and created a network of educational institutions run by his People's Education Society, which in turn produced more innovations, including a new literary movement called Dalit (oppressed) sahitya.

Eleanor Zelliot

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AMBOINA MASSACRE In 1605 the Dutch East India Company (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, VOC) seized the island of Ambon (Amboina) in the Moluccas or Spice Islands as a military base and center for clove production. An important element in VOC policy was to exclude Western trading rivals from the Indies (today's Indonesia), but in 1619 a treaty between Britain and the new Dutch Republic required the VOC

to cooperate with its British counterpart, the East India Company. Although there was little or no commercial cooperation, the VOC was forced to permit British traders to work from Ambon and other centers.

Relations between the two nationalities were difficult, and in 1623 the Dutch governor of Ambon arrested eight British traders and some Japanese mercenaries on charges of plotting to seize the island's fortress. After they were tortured, the accused were summarily tried, found guilty, and executed. The executions became a cause célèbre in Britain and contributed to mounting hostility between Britain and the Netherlands. The main effect, however, was to convince the British to withdraw from the Indies and to concentrate their commercial and imperial efforts in India.

Robert Cribb

See also: **Dutch East India Company; Dutch in Southeast Asia**

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AMNOK RIVER The Amnok River (in Korean, Amnokgang), known in Chinese as the Yalu River, is the longest river in Korea and is one of two rivers that form the border between North Korea and China. (The name Yalu is supposedly derived from the green color of the ducks' heads, which match the green colored river waters.) It begins on the slopes of Mount Paektu and flows southwest in a deeply entrenched course for 790 kilometers until it passes through an industrial area to its mouth at two cities on the East China Sea (Yellow Sea)—Sinuiju, North Korea, and Dandong, China. In its middle reaches it is up to 160 meters wide, although the flow varies from season to season. It has a drainage basin of 38,700 square kilometers, half of which is in the Chinese provinces of Jilin (Kirin) and Liaoning. In the early 1900s, the Amnok was navigable for 672 kilometers by 1,000-ton ships, but due to sedimentation, only 500-ton ships can navigate the river at present.

The Amnok River has been the tentative northwest border of Korea since the end of the fourteenth century. Under King Sejong of Korea (reigned 1419–1450) four outposts were created along the upper Amnok River, making the river the de facto northern border.

In 1875 it became the legal international border. During the Korean War (1950–1953), the Chinese army crossed the Yalu River to fight the United Nations forces.

The Japanese colonial rule (1910–1945) built a series of dams along the Yalu River in order to harvest hydroelectric power for Korea and Manchukuo. The Yalu River remains an important source of hydroelectric power for both North Korea and China.

Brandon Palmer

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AMRITSAR (1991 est. pop. 709,500). Well situated on a southern extension of the Silk Route, Amritsar ("a pool of nectar") is a vibrant commercial, cultural, and transportation center in India's Punjab state. An important center of the Sikh faith, Amritsar was founded around a sacred pool in 1577 by Ram Das, the fourth guru of the Sikhs. The city's the Golden Temple or Hari Mandir houses the *Granth Sahib*, a sacred scripture compiled by the fifth Sikh guru, Arjun in 1604. Amritsar is also believed to be where the sage Valmiki wrote the Hindu epic *Ramayana*. Sacked by Afghans in 1761, the temple was rebuilt in 1803 and its dome covered in gold foil, by

Ranjit Singh, the maharaja of Punjab and ruler of the sovereign Sikh commonwealth until 1849 when Amritsar was annexed by the British.

Amritsar was the site of two violent political clashes. During the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre, 13 April 1919, British troops fired on a crowd of Indian protesters, killing at least 400 to 2,000 by some accounts and wounding hundreds more. On 6 June 1984, Indian Army troops killed hundreds of Sikh separatists—again casualties numbering 2,000 in some reports—at the Golden Temple where arms were being stored for attacks on the government of Indira Gandhi. In an act of retaliation Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated in 1984.

C. Roger Davis

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AMU DAR'YA The longest river in Central Asia (length measurements vary between 2,200 and 2,500 kilometers), the Amu Dar'ya (Oxus) has two annual floods: in the spring, from precipitation, and in the summer, from the Pamir Mountains' melting glaciers and snows. On contemporary political maps, the Amu




Sikh pilgrims at the Golden Temple in Amritsar in July 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

Dar'ya begins with two streams rising in the Pamirs plateau in northwestern Afghanistan, continues northwest through the Hindu Kush, forming the boundary between Tajikistan and northeastern Afghanistan, then flows west and northwest through Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, into the marshes on the south shore of the Aral Sea in the Karakalpak Autonomous Republic. Its delta at the mouth is about 161 kilometers long, and the river basin is some 466,000 square kilometers.

The river's lower extent and associated oases divide the Kara-Kum and Kyzyl Kum Deserts and have been critical to the cultural ecologies of Central Asia throughout the history of human occupation. Beginning with early hunter-gatherers, societies arose in the river's proximity and developed complex economies based on systems of agriculture, pastoralism, or both. Bronze Age irrigation projects allowed the region's first urban civilizations to emerge; ancient *qalas* (fortified cities) became local political and commercial centers. Collectively these civilizations' early city-states became the basis of wider regional and extraregional trade networks, such as those from as early as the third and second centuries BCE making up the Silk Road through Central Asia. While societies rose and declined along the Amu Dar'ya throughout the Bronze and Iron Ages and afterward, effective irrigation was a constant concern for the region's aristocratic and commercial elite; some speculate, for instance, that Khwarezm's shift of capitals to Khiva was due largely to natural alterations of the Amu Dar'ya.

Beyond the origins of societies and urbanization, the Amu Dar'ya was also a symbolic frontier in Central Asian history. For the Achaemenid rulers of Persia (c. 553–331 BCE) the river bounded the region they controlled or sought to advance beyond; cities were founded along its course in Alexander of Macedon's pacification campaign of the fourth century BCE; it marked a limit to the subsequent Chinese advance into Central Asia (second century BCE); and since medieval times it constituted a powerful psychological (and often geopolitical) boundary separating Turkic and Iranian peoples and states. Its seventh-century crossing by Arab armies represented the advance of Islam. Over the following centuries, enabled by an increased construction of irrigation works known as *qanats* or *kariz* and by the investments of new regional leaders and states during and after Islamicization, urban centers grew both in terms of their populations and infrastructure. This was a period of cultural (e.g., architectural, literary, artistic, and so forth) florescence due to the patronage of local and regional elites.

In the early eighteenth century Peter the Great commissioned the Amu Dar'ya's exploration with the



hope of securing a route to India, though the region was not fully under Russian control until the twentieth century. Associated with cotton production for centuries, this part of Central Asia was the core region in Leninist plans for the Soviets to attain self-sufficiency in this commodity. A water-intensive crop, cotton cultivated at this scale in this environment required massive irrigation projects (e.g., Turkmenistan's Kara-Kum Canal, the largest in Central Asia). The consequence of these projects was environmental degradation of catastrophic proportions, with destruction of the river's deltas, desiccation of the Aral Sea, associated climatic changes, exhaustion and salinization of once productive lands, and declines in local food production.

Though cotton production peaked in 1977 at more than 5.5 million metric tons, construction of man-made diversions continued into the post-Soviet era. By the mid-1990s more than seventy thousand irrigation canals were in operation, and their collective inefficiency is considerable; most waters diverted are actually lost to seepage and evaporation. Alleviation of this worsening crisis is not likely, due to the increasing development demands of the states and societies in question (primarily Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan), their perceived lack of alternatives, barriers to the scale of multinational cooperation critical to its resolution, and the ongoing and cumulative degradation of local and regional ecosystems.

Kyle T. Evered

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AN DUONG VUONG (reigned c. 257–c. 208 BCE), Legendary founder of Vietnam. An Duong Vuong, whose given name was Thuc Phan, is traditionally considered the founder of the nation of Vietnam. In 258 BCE, according to legend, Thuc Phan, a warlord and ruler of neighboring lands, conquered the Van Lang, the territory of modern-day Vietnam. He renamed it Au Lac and gave himself the name An Duong Vuong (King An Duong).

Related legends hold that while building his capital city, Co Loa, An Duong Vuong saw all the work accomplished during the daytime crumble each night. After a couple of weeks, he learned in a dream that the site of his city was located on the back of a turtle god. The king changed the location of his capital, and a large city in the form of a conch shell was constructed in no time at all. As a token of thanks, the turtle deity offered the king one of its claws, which, when used as a trigger on a bow, multiplied its arrow by the thousands. As a result, Zhao To, a Chinese general, failed time and again in his attempts to subjugate Au Lac, until Zhao To married his son to An Duong Vuong's daughter and the son stole the magic weapon. Zhao To finally succeeded in annexing Au Lac to his own Chinese territory and founded the kingdom of Nan Yueh (Nam Viet) in 207 BCE.

Truong Buu Lam

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ANALECTS The *Analects* (Chinese *Lunyu*) is one of the most influential texts in Chinese philosophy. It was compiled by the disciples of Confucius (551–479 BCE) and their followers, though scholars argue over exactly when. D. C. Lau holds the traditional view that the first fifteen books were written shortly after Confucius' death and the remaining five by the second generation of disciples. John Makeham argues that the changing textual material was not settled into its present form until 150 BCE. E. Bruce and Taeko Brooks propose that books four through eleven are the old-

est, that nine through eleven were written by second-generation disciples, while what remains was written at different times.

It is known that the *Analects* was basically in its present form by 55 BCE based on the fragments excavated at Dingzhou. The *Analects* is first among the so-called Four Books, the Confucian texts whose mastery was required for the imperial civil-service examination system up to 1905.

The *Analects* is composed of brief statements mostly attributed to Confucius; some are ascribed to his disciples or rulers. The modern reader is generally struck by the brevity of the statements and the apparent lack of sustained prose or argument, which may very well have been Confucius' method of pedagogy. He expected his students to be eager to learn: He only gave them one corner, and if they did not return with the other three, he would not review the lesson (*Analects* 7:8).

The general thrust of the text is to assist the reader in self-cultivation so that the reader might become a moral example for others. One might find the proper way to live and behave by practicing various virtues (*de*), thereby becoming a humane person (*ren zhe*) or a prince of virtue (*junzi*, usually rendered "gentleman"). Humanity or benevolence (*ren*) is the most important virtue in the *Analects*; it is mentioned more than one hundred times. *Ren* is an achievement concept; one is not born humane, but one must learn to become so. *Ren* means to love others (*Analects* 12:22). The practice of ritual action (*li*) is the best way to express one's human kindness. Ritual action is not limited to state and religious functions, but covers the spectrum of human behavior. Speaking pragmatically, first a child must learn filial piety (*xiao*) and brotherly love (*di*); then, as one grows one can extend one's family love to others in the form of *ren*.

Confucius emphasized literacy, study, and learning to develop the practice of moral wisdom. Rote memorization is not sufficient; one must be thoughtful. Confucius also expected his disciples to be loyal and to do what was proper, especially in government service. When Zigong asked if there was a single word that one could use as guidance, Confucius replied (*Analects* 15:24, 12:2) that perhaps it would be empathy (*shu*): to "never do to another what you do not desire."

James D. Sellmann

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ANAND, MULK RAJ (b. 1905), Indian writer. An influential Indian novelist and short story writer in the mid-twentieth century, Mulk Raj Anand was born in 1905 in Peshawar, now in western Pakistan, and as a young man was active in literary circles in England until 1939. His first novels formed a trio: *Untouchable* (1935), *Coolie* (1936), and *Two Leaves and a Bud* (1937). Written in English, such books struck a chord with a somewhat leftist readership both in Britain and in India. They offered a rather superficial political and psychological analysis of India's "downtrodden masses" that drew its inspiration from D. H. Lawrence, E. M. Forster, Emile Zola, Charles Dickens, various Russian novelists, Marxism, and Gandhian nationalism. But Anand was able to contribute something new to Indian writing by showing how a novelist can make use of the drama of revolutionary nationalism. Tellingly, he wrote little of any note after India gained independence in 1947. Like his contemporaries Raja Rao and R. K. Narayan, Anand was concerned with exploring the importance of Indian society for humanity at large.

Paul Hockings

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ANAND PANYARACHUN (b. 1932), Thai political leader. Anand Panyarachun is one of Thailand's



Former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun (L) in November 2000 at a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. (AFP/CORBIS)

most prominent political figures. In 1952, Anand graduated from Cambridge University in law. He joined the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1955, eventually becoming a top diplomat. In the 1960s, Anand served as Thailand's representative to the United Nations before being named ambassador to Canada and, later, the United States. In 1976, he was appointed deputy foreign minister before serving as ambassador to West Germany in 1977. In 1979, Anand left public office for the business world, serving as president of Saha-Union and chairman of the Thai Industrial Federation.

However, his renowned integrity and leadership drew Anand back to politics. Between 1980 and 1988, Thailand was led by Prem Tinsulanond, the former Thai army chief, who managed the nation with a series of coalition governments through a considerable economic boom, as well as two failed military coups. However, having never actually joined a political party, and never standing for an election as a member of Parliament, Prem was not seen as "democratic." Amid pressure to push further economic and political reforms in Thailand, Prem was defeated in the 1988 election by another former general, Chatichai Choonhavan. Although Chatichai presided over continued economic prosperity, his coalition government was notoriously corrupt. Following a bloodless military coup in February 1991, Anand emerged as a reform-minded consensus leader. He reluctantly accepted an appointment as interim prime minister, widely seen as the only politician capable of steering Thailand toward democracy.

After national elections in March 1992 produced a shaky five-party coalition, the military effectively seized power by positioning former strongman Suchinda Kraprayoon as prime minister. Opposition

to the move mounted dramatically between March and May, when the military was called in to Bangkok to replace police dealing with protesters. Between 17 May and 20 May 1992, violence broke out between the army and thousands of protesters, leading to one of the darkest episodes in Thai political history. Although official statistics listed fifty-two killed, other reasonable estimates were over two hundred killed. Only the personal intervention of King Bhumipol Adulyadej prevented an even bloodier conflict. Still widely popular with the Thai people, on the king's advice Anand was again chosen to lead the government.

In his second term as prime minister (June–September 1992), Anand boldly tackled the military's political power in hopes of distancing it from government. He also set in place numerous other political and economic reforms that helped stabilize the nation and stimulate its financial boom. In recognition of his distinguished career, in 1997, Anand won the highest award for government service. Although officially retired from politics, Anand remains one of the most important and respected public figures in Thailand.

Arne Kislenko

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ANARKALI Anarkali is a commercial district in inner-city Lahore, Pakistan, famous for its retail shops and colorful atmosphere. The area derives its name from a mausoleum dated 1615, purportedly that of a slave girl named Anarkali ("pomegranate blossom"), buried alive in a wall by order of the Mughal emperor Akbar (d. 1605) in 1599. As William Finch, an Englishman visiting Lahore, first reported in 1611, Akbar allegedly suspected Anarkali of an illicit relationship with his son Prince Salim (later crowned emperor Jahangir, d. 1628). Because the legend is not mentioned in Indian sources until the nineteenth century, most commentators believe that the story is either false or heavily embellished. Nevertheless it inspired writers

(e.g., the Urdu drama *Anarkali* by Imtiaz Ali Taj) and filmmakers.

Archeological research showed that Anarkali's tomb does contain human remains, though these may belong to a wife of Jahangir who died in Lahore around this time. The tomb was originally surrounded by extensive gardens. After the British annexation of Lahore in 1849, the tomb served as a Protestant church from 1851 to 1891 and then as a government records office. The present Anarkali bazaar, which evolved gradually over the past 150 years, is particularly well known for women's apparel.

Shahzad Bashir

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ANATOLIA (1997 est. pop. 54 million). Anatolia, also called Anadolu or Asia Minor, is Turkey's Asiatic region, a mountainous peninsula surrounded by the Black Sea on the north and the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas on the south and west. To the northwest are the Bosphorus Strait, Sea of Marmara, and Dardanelles. Anatolia encompasses 743, 634 square kilometers—about three-fifths of the area of Turkey.

The Pontic and Taurus (Toros) Mountains border the flat, central Anatolian plateau on the north and south. Mount Ararat is Anatolia's highest peak (5,172 meters). The region is prone to earthquakes. Major rivers are the Euphrates and Tigris. Of the three hundred lakes that enrich the land, Lake Van in the east is the largest. Anatolia's climate ranges from cold winters in the central plateau to sweltering heat in the Mediterranean region. Its crops include grain, tobacco, olives, figs, and cotton; animal life includes the Angora goat.

Anatolia, considered the cradle of many cultures and civilizations, was inhabited at least as early as the eighth millennium BCE and served as a bridge between Europe and Asia; it is rich in architectural and archaeological remains, rock reliefs, burials, pottery, and stone implements. Ancient inhabitants included the Hatti, Hittites, Trojans, Urartians (kingdom of Urartu, later, Armenia), Phrygians (led by King Midas), Lycians, and Lydians.

The Persians invaded Anatolia in 546 BCE, Alexander of Macedon in 334 BCE. By the end of the second century BCE, Anatolia was under Roman rule. Following a civil war in the early fourth century, the victor, Constantine, established the capital at Byzantium and renamed it Constantinople. After his death, the new empire was divided. The eastern half, centered in Constantinople, came to be known as the Byzantine empire. By 711, all Anatolia was under Byzantine rule.

Early in the eleventh century, the Seljuk victory at the battle of Manzikert (1071; modern Malazgirt) opened Anatolia to further Turkish invasions. The territory gradually became Turkicized after the rise of the Ottoman Turks around the thirteenth century. Anatolia came under Muslim Ottoman rule when Mehmet II (reigned 1432–1481) captured Constantinople in 1453. In 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), a nationalist general, established the new Turkish Republic.

Anatolia has seventy-four provinces, grouped into seven regions: Black Sea coast; Marmara and Aegean coasts; Mediterranean coast; western Anatolia; central Anatolia; southeastern Anatolia; eastern Anatolia. Ninety percent of Anatolia's population is Turkish, and 99 percent is Muslim. Non-Turkish elements are mostly Greeks, Jews, Armenians, Kurds, and Arabs.

T. Isikozlu-E.F. Isikozlu

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ANAWRATHA (d. 1077), King of Burma. Anawratha (also Aniruddha, reigned 1044–1077) was the first great king of the classical Burmese kingdom of Pagan as well as an important figure in the early history of Theravada Buddhism in Burma. A number of significant historical developments are attributed to Anawratha, although the historicity of these attributions is open to question. Under Anawratha, Pagan's rulers are believed to have undergone a transition from chieftains to kings. But he is chiefly remembered in Burmese history because of his perceived role in the early development of Theravada Buddhism in Burma. He himself is said to have been converted to orthodox Theravada Buddhism by the Mon monk Shin Arahan. In 1057, Anawratha captured Thaton, the Theravada center of southeastern Burma. According to the fifteenth-century Kalyani inscription, Anawratha brought Theravada Buddhist monks back to Pagan with thirty copies of the Tipitaka, the orthodox Theravada Buddhist scriptures.

Anawratha is also credited with purging Pagan's Buddhist monkhood of the "heretical" Ari sect. Today, Anawratha is considered one of Burma's greatest kings. The achievements of his rule were carried by a later successor, Kyanzittha (reigned 1084–1112).

Michael Walter Charney

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ANAYASA. See **Constitution—Turkey.**

ANCESTOR WORSHIP—EAST ASIA Asia's widespread tradition of venerating ancestors has been shaped by indigenous folk beliefs and major religious traditions. Depending on the local culture, this worship or veneration may combine elements of filial piety, agricultural traditions and seasonal observances, lineage patterns, animistic concepts of the actions of spirits in the world of the living, an emphasis on obligations to superiors, and the idea that human beings become deities at death. Confucian ancestral rites and the fundamental concept of filial piety and the Buddhist tenet of transmigration of souls are common ancestral beliefs throughout Asia, but the relative importance of these two organized religions vis-à-vis local folk beliefs makes for diversity. Scholars debate, for example, whether ancestor worship in Japan primarily sprang from indigenous beliefs or was imported from China. Before the introduction of Buddhism, the Japanese had already incorporated Confucian ancestral rites and the concept of filial piety. Buddhism certainly made a major contribution to the development of the ancestral cult in Japan, but the Japanese practice that evolved is unlike that of other Buddhist cultures of Asia.

Characteristics

The basic premise of ancestor worship is that the world of the living and the spirit world of the dead are interdependent. What happens in this world is, to use Mark Mullins's term, "causally influenced" by the world of the spirits. While all the spirits command a certain amount of respect, one should show particular devotion to one's ancestors. Some scholars interpret this devotion not as worship, but as an expression of



THE CHANGING SIGNIFICANCE OF ANCESTOR WORSHIP

Ancestor worship is a key element of traditional religion in East Asia. It has survived and even influenced the spread of major religions in the region. However, in the last half of the twentieth century it did decline in importance, for some of the reasons mentioned in the discussion about rural China that follows.

Today the ancestral cult is very largely in eclipse. The social changes sponsored by the government—especially the equality of status of males and females, the new marriage practices, and the greater emphasis on the importance of the younger generation—have undermined the cult. Directly, the validity of the old supernatural belief was contradicted by the orthodox Marxist doctrine of atheism which informs the whole school curriculum and is propagated in the speeches of government leaders and all lesser officials. The process is a cumulative one. The village has been going through a period of rising material welfare. Success, not failure, has followed the desertion of old practices and beliefs for new. The prestige of the new doctrine and of the teachers of it is therefore high amongst a people in whom part of the motive for cultivating their ancestors was the search for material benefits.

Source: W. R. Geddes. (1963) *Peasant Life in Communist China: Monograph #6*. Ithaca, NY: Society for Applied Anthropology, 48.

gratitude and respect toward those to whom one is indebted.

The ancestral cult is essentially a patrilineal phenomenon. As Janelli and Janelli noted about Korean practice, commemorating ancestors was the obligation of the oldest son, and women were normally excluded from officiating at veneration rites. These scholars saw a correspondence between property inheritance or household succession and the degree of obligation to carry out rituals:

In China, where all sons normally inherit equal shares of property, and none succeed to the headship of their parents' household, each descendant is equally obligated to his forebears. . . . In Japan, by contrast, ritual obligations are vested in corporate households, not descent lines. Whoever succeeds to the headship of the household inherits all of its property; and only members of a household worship its preceding heads, their spouses, and its deceased dependents. . . . The Korean pattern for allocating ritual obligations has similarities to both the Chinese and Japanese systems. Each son receives a share of his parents' property and is obligated to participate in their rites. Yet the eldest son

receives the largest share of their ancestors' property and succeeds to the headship of their household, and in return he is expected to bear most of the costs of the rituals and to offer these rites at his home.

(Janelli and Janelli 1982: 179–180)

Actual hereditary lineage is not an essential condition for ancestor worship. Robert J. Smith points out that in Japan "ancestors" are foremost a category of the dead who exercise powers over a group to whom they are considered ancestors. In other words, blood ties are not as essential as the sense of a shared heredity, but in this framework there is a commonly recognized order of ascendance. The descendant group may be a household, some linkage of families, a village, a guild, or even the entire nation. Freedman points to similar elements in China: "In a very general sense the ancestors collectively embody the dignity and authority of the groups over which they preside. Their due is gratitude and praise. And in paying them their due, the living are made conscious of their membership of the groups within which they worship" (Freedman 1979: 297).



THE STORY OF THE ANCESTOR TABLETS

A common feature of the rural Chinese home is the ancestor tablet. This folk-tale provides one version of how such tablets came to be.

I once asked a Chinese schoolboy about the origin of the ancestral tablet, and he told me the following story:

Once upon a time there was a very cruel and bad man who did not love his mother. He did nothing she wanted him to do, but only scolded her. Whenever he came home he immediately wanted a meal. But who can make a whole meal in a minute? So he beat her and scolded her. But the softhearted woman did not complain. One day, when working in the fields, the son heard the cawing of crows in the air and saw a crow with food in its mouth, coming from a far away place to a tree at the corner of the field, to feed its young. He was moved and thought, 'These crows are birds but even they collect food from their relatives and care for them. This means that I am not even as good as a bird. I am acting ungratefully towards my mother. My father died long ago, and even if I were to behave as well as I could, I still could not make her forget his death. Shame upon me.' He decided to be nice to his mother from then on.

Just at this time, his mother came to bring him his lunch. As soon as he saw her, he started running toward her to take lunch so that she wouldn't have to walk so far. It was his first good deed for the old lady. But how could she know about his sudden change of heart? She thought he would beat her as usual. So she hurriedly put down the basket with the lunch and started running away. It happened that she hit a small tree, fell down, and died. The son was deeply disturbed, and in order to keep his mother and this unhappy event in mind forever, he cut down the tree and made a small tablet which he preserved. Thus the ancestral tablet came into being.

Source: Wolfram Eberhard. (1952) *Chinese Festivals*. New York, NY: Henry Schuman, 43–44.

In this worldview it is only natural that the living perform rituals and make offerings to their ancestors, if they appropriately recognize their indebtedness to them. The living honor this debt through memorial services, on the assumption that success and prosperity in this life partly depend on the beneficent protection of the ancestors. The spirits of the ancestors are believed to be pleased by any positive accomplishment by a descendant, and announcements of such achievements before the memorial tablets on the altar or at the grave are considered important. In contrast, health problems, failures in enterprise, and problems in social relationships may be attributed to the failure of

descendants to properly venerate the ancestors. The unpacified spirit may then exact retribution from the ungrateful descendants.

Ancestor Worship and Earthly Authority

Ancestor worship in Japan, for example, was affected by political and administrative factors, according to Smith. Smith convincingly argues that the veneration of ancestors alternately served the purposes of various religious bodies, the national government, and reformers throughout Japan's history. In the sixth and seventh centuries, ancestor worship was first employed

in the promotion of Buddhism, and the two were linked for the next thousand years. In the early Tokugawa period, however, that relationship changed when the government used Buddhism to suppress Christianity by requiring every household in Japan to establish a formal registration with a Buddhist temple. Until that time, ancestor worship had been centered in the home and practiced without priests. As a consequence of the decree, ancestor worship became another ritual requiring the services of the Buddhist clergy and temples. In the twentieth century, worship of one's own ancestors was co-opted to support veneration of the imperial line and political actions.

Everyday Practice

In daily observance, veneration of ancestors may take the form of making offerings such as cooked rice, water or tea, flowers, incense, and other cooked foods at a Buddhist altar in the home or at the family grave. Annual observances involving ancestors often include families' visiting the household grave at the beginning of the new year and around the spring and fall equinoxes; during the visits families clean the grave and offer prayers and incense. At the beginning of the period of the Buddhist Festival of the Dead, also known as the Feast of Lanterns and the Feast of All Souls, the family greets the returning spirits with lanterns to ensure that they can find the way back.

Memorial services in the Buddhist tradition are held for individual ancestors, beginning with services every seventh day until the forty-ninth day following death. These ceremonies are of paramount importance in Buddhist belief, because after a person dies, he or she is thought to wander between this world and the next. The rites held for the benefit of the dead conduct the soul safely to the next world. Should the rites not be performed, the spirit of the deceased may wander, causing misfortune and calamity.

Demographic changes including the shift of population toward cities, declining birth rates, and the increasing ratios of nuclear families as well as changes in the legal systems regarding inheritance of property seem to have been accompanied by a steady decrease in the significance of ancestor veneration. While annual observances continue to be observed, dependence on the other world for support in this world seems to be on the decline. Current indications are that the traditional sense of gratitude and respect to previous generations will continue to decrease, the primary question being at what pace within each of Asia's cultures.

James M. Vardaman, Jr.


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ANDAMAN AND NICOBAR ISLANDS

(2001 est. pop. 356,000). The Andaman and Nicobar Islands, a territory of the Indian Union, form a narrow chain running mostly north-south and stretching over 1,000 kilometers. The Andaman Islands (6475 square kilometers) to the north have four main and 200 small, mostly uninhabited islands. Divided by the Ten Degree Channel, the Nicobar Islands (1852 square kilometers) consist of three groups of nineteen islands. Part of a submarine Tertiary-period-fold mountain, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands are generally hilly, with Saddle Peak (738 meters above sea level) and Mount Thullier (614 meters) the two highest peaks on North Andaman and Great Nicobar, respectively. Because monsoons bring ample rainfall and temperatures are high, lush tropical forests with great biodiversity (including 242 bird and 78 reptile species) cover around 90 percent of the land. Such forests, partly still virgin, have great commercial value and represent the main source of income. Agriculture is only sparsely developed, with cultivation of rice, coconuts, and fruit trees. Foreigners are banned from the Nicobar Islands, but tourists are welcomed at the capital of Port Blair on Andaman and from there can visit other islands via day cruises.

Four different groups inhabit the Andaman and Nicobar Islands: Andamanese aborigines, Andaman Indians (descendants of an Indian penal colony functioning from 1848 to 1945), neosettlers who migrated from the mainland after Indian independence, and Nicobarese aborigines. The majority are Andaman Indians and neosettlers. The aborigine groups are each distinctive. With a total population of a few thousand, the Nicobarese aborigines are Indo-Chinese who are either animists or converted Christians and who still practice shifting cultivation. The Andamanese aborigines are pygmies and Negritos who hunt and fish. Though the Andaman and Nicobar Islands are sparsely and unevenly populated, around one-third of the inhabitants live in Port Blair, the only town and the business and commercial center. Elsewhere peo-



ple live in clusters of small villages. The only (domestic) airport for regular flights to Calcutta and Madras is at Port Blair, which is also the most important seaport, connecting all other major islands by regular boat service.

Manfred Domroes

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ANDAMAN SEA The Andaman Sea is located east of the main body of the Bay of Bengal and is bounded by Myanmar (Burma) to the north, southeastern Myanmar and southwestern Thailand to the east, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (which belong

to India) and the main body of the Bay of Bengal to the west, and the Strait of Malacca and Sumatra to the south. The Andaman Islands and the Nicobar Islands are divided into two groups: the Great Andaman (North, Middle, and South Andaman Islands) and the Little Andaman. The chief town and port is Port Blair (founded 1868), located on South Andaman Island. The Nicobar Islands are located 120 kilometers south of South Andaman Island and include Car Nicobar and Great Nicobar.

The Andaman Sea's strategic position just north of the Strait of Malacca (and thus between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea) has made it a historically important site of Asian interaction. In the nineteenth century, the British attempted to colonize the Andaman Islands. In recent decades, India has also attempted to promote settlement of the islands.

Michael W. Charney

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ANDHRA PRADESH (2001 pop. 75.7 million). Andhra Pradesh is the fourth-largest state in India, having a population of 75.7 million and covering 275,068 square kilometers in the southeastern part of India. It has the longest coastline of all Indian states—970 kilometers along the Bay of Bengal. It is flanked by the states of Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, and Orissa on three sides apart from the long eastern coastline. Andhra Pradesh was the first state in India to be formed on a purely linguistic basis in 1953 with the merger of Telugu-speaking areas of the Nizam's Dominions and Madras State, subsequently expanded to include more such territory in the aftermath of the States Reorganization Act of 1956.

Andhra Pradesh has twenty-three administrative districts, which can be divided into three distinct regions: Andhra, incorporating nine coastal districts; Rayalaseema, incorporating four districts in the interior; and Telengana, incorporating ten districts, including the capital, Hyderabad. Because of its heterogeneous composition, Andhra Pradesh has grappled with the problem of regional imbalance in different forms. The state has a unicameral legislature with 295 seats. It has a representation of eighteen seats in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House) and forty-two seats

in the Lok Sabha (Lower House) of the Indian Parliament. Historically, Andhra Pradesh has been associated with the reign of successive Indian dynasties, beginning with the Mauryas in the fourth century BCE and continuing, most notably, with the Kakatiyas in the thirteenth century and the Vijayanagar kings in the next two centuries. Later, it came under the rule of the Qutb Shahis and the Asaf Jahis, Muslim rulers of the Deccan who created the modern city of Hyderabad and struck an alliance with the advancing British colonial power. Traces of this legacy still exist in the form of monuments and architectural ruins.

A key feature of the state's terrain is the fertile coastal plain in the east. The two major rivers of the state, Godavari and Krishna, flow from the west to the east into the Bay of Bengal and form deltas. This fertile delta region supports extensive rice cultivation, which is the main crop, along with millet, groundnuts, chili, turmeric, tobacco, and sugarcane. Agriculture is the main occupation of the people, although a few major industries like machine tools, shipping, fertilizers, and electronics supplement income and employment. In recent times, Hyderabad has turned into a hub of economic activities, with particular emphasis on the growth of software technology. The state was the first to float the idea of e-governance in India through the use of computers in day-to-day administration. Among the main tourist attractions, the Golconda fort at Hyderabad, the Venkataswara temple at Tirupati, and the Nagarjuna Sagar dam are prominent.

Ram Shankar Nanda

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ANDO TADAO (b. 1941), Japanese architect. Ando Tadao was born in Osaka on 13 September 1941. Unlike most contemporary architects, Ando did not receive any formal architectural training but was a carpenter's apprentice for a short time, during which he learned traditional Japanese wood construction. He taught himself architecture by visiting temples, shrines, and teahouses in Kyoto, Nara, and various other parts of Japan and through travels in the United States, Europe, and Asia, where he made a number of his detailed sketchbooks. In 1969, Ando established his

own architectural firm in Osaka. He received his first award, the Architectural Institute of Japan's annual prize of 1979, for his row house in Sumiyoshi. He has designed some of the simplest and most lyrical buildings, especially houses, churches, temples, museums, and art galleries. By the manipulation of massive exposed concrete structures, Ando has produced a minimalist type of architecture. Among his well-known projects are the Rokko Housing I (1978); the Church on the Water (1985); the Church of the Light (1987); the Japanese Pavilion for International Expo 92 in Seville, Spain (1989); the Museum of Literature II (1993); the Suntory Museum in Osaka (1995); the UNESCO Mediation Space in Paris (1994); and the Modern Art Museum of Fort Worth, Texas (1997).

Nathalie Cavasin

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ANG LEE (b. 1954), Chinese film director. Ang Lee was born in Taiwan on 23 October 1954. In 1978, he moved to the United States where he studied theater at the University of Illinois and film production at New York University. Lee directed his first feature film, *Pushing Hands*, in 1992, a tale of a Chinese family struggling to adapt to life in the United States, which in Taiwan won him three Golden Horse awards and a special jury prize for direction. *Pushing Hands* was followed in 1993 by *The Wedding Banquet*, a comedy about a gay Chinese man living in New York City, which received the Golden Bear award in Berlin. These films led to increased funding for *Eat, Drink, Man, Woman* (1994) and *Sense and Sensibility* (1995), both of which earned Academy Award nominations for Lee. In his next films, *Ice Storm* (1997) and *Ride with the Devil* (1999), Lee focused on American subjects. In a return to Chinese-language films, the martial arts adventure *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon* (2000) won four Academy Awards including best foreign language film.

Bent Nielsen

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Ang Lee holds his Oscar for the best foreign language film at the 25 March 2001 Academy Awards in Los Angeles. (AFP/CORBIS)

ANGKATAN BELIA ISLAM MALAYSIA

Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement, or ABIM) was established in 1971 by Anwar Ibrahim, among others. The movement was officially registered by the Malaysian government on 17 August 1972. Among ABIM's objectives are Islamic training, defense, and propagation (*dakwah*) through mobilizing Muslim youths both in and out of school. Although not affiliated with any political party, the movement addresses sociopolitical issues and trains future politicians. For this reason, in particular, it is closely monitored by the authorities.

The first president of ABIM, Razali Mawawi, was replaced by Anwar Ibrahim in 1974. Upon his resignation as president of ABIM in 1982, Anwar was replaced by Siddiq Fadil. Siddiq was succeeded by Muhammad Nur Manuty in 1991. Ahmad Azam Abdul Rahman was elected as ABIM's fifth president in September 1997.

Although the ideology or mission of ABIM remains to foster the development of Islam and to voice Islamic aspirations, as expressed by the Malaysian Muslim community, its theme has evolved over the decades. In the 1970s, ABIM was more aggressive toward and critical of the government, an attitude that meshed with the general political climate of that decade. For example, while he was the ABIM secretary-general and president, Anwar defended impoverished Malay farmers from alleged government abuses. He was arrested in 1974 and then jailed without trial for twenty months under the Internal Security Act. ABIM regarded this Act as un-Islamic and accused the government of being secular-nationalist and arbitrary. In the 1980s, ABIM softened its attacks but remained critical of the ruling regime, as shown by its inclination toward problem solving by adopting the "working in the light of wisdom" approach. In the 1990s, the movement adopted a proactive approach and became a government partner in nation building. Since the leadership of Ahmad, ABIM has fostered the theme: "Revitalizing ABIM's ideals and extolling the movement's dynamism and struggle."

ABIM has long been the voice of the Islamic community, leading Muslims toward a more modern, nonconservative approach to religion and toward eventual leadership positions in all sectors. Despite his political contribution to these achievements, Mahathir Mohamad, the prime minister of the country since 1981, has dropped from his administration many of ABIM's most prominent leaders linked to Anwar, who served as deputy prime minister until 1998. This was particularly the case after the sack of Anwar and his imprisonment as a result of a power struggle between Anwar and Mahathir. Today, although ABIM is still recognized by the government as an Islamic organization, its influence is limited to the socioreligious and cultural spheres. ABIM, along with other Islamic organizations, has raised the idea of *reformasi* (a reform movement), continuing its criticism of the government, while the government uses all the powers at its disposal to keep ABIM under surveillance.

Andi Faisal Bakti

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ANGKOR WAT While more than one hundred major temple sites are found in and around the town of Siem Reap and Tonle Sap ("Great Lake") in north-west Cambodia, Angkor Wat is unique among them. An early capital of the Khmer empire, which flourished in classical Southeast Asia from the sixth to the mid-fifteenth century, Angkor Wat is the largest temple complex in the entire Angkor plain (other famous sites on the plain include Bayon and Ta Prom) and the largest religious monument in the world. Reputedly constructed as a funerary temple and mausoleum from sandstone at Phnom Kulen by Suryavarman II (1113–1150 CE), the ruins encompass an area of approximately 104 square kilometers and took more than

thirty years to build. It was named a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1992.

Architecture

Angkor Wat was dedicated to the Hindu god Vishnu, but its impeccably crafted and detailed ornamental architecture and bas reliefs depict all manner of Khmer legends and history of Angkor Wat. Measuring 1.5 by 1.3 kilometers in size, the complex is distinguished by its westward orientation, as well as by the wall and moat (measuring 190 meters wide) that surround it. These features not only delineate the temple boundaries but also represent other mountain ranges and oceans. A central avenue, 475 meters in length, connects the main entrance—accessed via a causeway across the moat—to the central temple, passing between two libraries and reflecting pools. The central temple consists of three stories, each of laterite, with five towers. The central tower, rising 55 meters above the ground, stands for Mount Meru, in Hindu mythology the center of the universe and home of the gods. The towers also serve as the current symbol of the Kingdom of Cambodia.

History

Established by Yasovarman I (reigned 889–900/910), Angkor achieved its zenith in the twelfth century, when the Khmer empire ruled over an area that stretched from Vietnam to China and India. However,



Monks at the ruins of the Bayon Temple, Angkor Wat, Cambodia, in 1996. (KEREN SU/CORBIS)



ANGKOR WAT— WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Angkor Wat was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1992 because it is the most important archaeological site in Southeast Asia. Special measures have been taken to protect the site and the surrounding area.

the city was sacked by the Chams of southern Vietnam in 1177, and Angkor Wat was converted into a Buddhist temple prior to the Siamese conquest of 1431. Jayavarman VII (c.1120–c.1215; reigned 1181–c.1215) subsequently established a new capital, Angkor Thom, which was abandoned in 1434. Overgrown by jungle, the ruins of both were rediscovered by the French in 1861, although their existence was well known to local Khmer residents and early European explorers.

Warfare in Cambodia in the 1970s and 1980s prevented tourists from visiting the site, a threat that persisted in remote parts of the complex through 1999, when guerilla soldiers of the Khmer Rouge even occupied Angkor Wat itself for a brief period. In the first years of the twenty-first century, tourist visits to Angkor Wat are again on the increase, and tourism has become a major source of foreign exchange for the Cambodian government. Land mines continue to be a threat in rural areas surrounding the complex, however, while theft and vandalism are the most serious physical threat to the monuments themselves. In order to prevent statues and carvings that give vitality to the temples and their histories from being stolen for private collectors, many have been removed for safekeeping and restoration.

Greg Ringer

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ANGLO-DUTCH TREATY The Anglo-Dutch Treaty (1824) aimed to terminate Anglo-Dutch rivalry in the Malay Archipelago and East Indies. It attempted to end clashes and disputes between British and Dutch merchants by dividing the Malay Peninsula and the East Indies into British and Dutch spheres of influence. The treaty was signed in London by British and Dutch officials without consulting the local rulers concerned.

The line demarking British and Dutch spheres of influence was south of the Straits of Singapore. The Netherlands transferred to Britain her factories in India, relinquished Malacca and its dependencies, and accepted British occupation of Singapore; Britain surrendered its dependencies south of the Straits and Bencoolen on the southwest coast of Sumatra. The Dutch agreed to terminate tin monopoly treaties with Perak and Selangor in the Malay Peninsula. Both parties agreed not to conclude treaties with local leaders or form new settlements on islands in each other's spheres of influence.

The treaty did not fully end Anglo-Dutch rivalry. The British claimed Dutch agents still occasionally penetrated their territory. The Dutch protested in the 1840s and 1870s, when James Brooke and Dent and Overbeck took control over what are now parts of Sarawak and Sabah. Since the treaty failed to define the position of the island of Borneo, the British claimed Borneo was not covered by it.

The treaty broke up the Malay empire of Johore. The British and Dutch effectively excluded other powers from the region, using the treaty as a means of controlling what became British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies.

Geetha Govindasamy

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ANGLO-INDIANS Although "Anglo-Indian" originally meant someone of British descent who was born and lived permanently in India, after about 1900 the term came to mean a person of mixed European and Indian ancestry, a Eurasian.



THE MAKING OF ANGLO-INDIANS

"I had often admired a lovely Hindostanee girl who sometimes visited Carter at my house, who was very lively and clever. Upon Carter's leaving Bengal I invited her to become an inmate with me, which she considered to do, and from that time to the day of her death Jemdanee, which was her name, lived with me, respected and admired by all my friends by her extraordinary sprightliness and good humour. Unlike the women in general in Asia she never secluded herself from the sight of strangers; on the contrary, she delighted in joining in male parties, cordially joining in the mirth which prevailed, though she never touched wine or spirits of any kind."

Source: Alfred Spencer, ed. ([1787] 1913) *Memoirs of William Hickey*. London: Hurst & Blackett, Ltd.

Until the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, British men vastly outnumbered European women in India, and these male residents commonly took Indian women as mistresses or housekeepers. After the canal opened, women could more easily travel from England, and the Anglo-Indian community then became a stable and largely endogamous unit.

Only a few thousand Anglo-Indians remain in India, since most emigrated to Britain, Australia, or Canada during the past half-century. The last census to enumerate them, taken in 1951 while their exodus was in progress, recorded 11,637 Anglo-Indians.

The main characteristics of the Anglo-Indians are Christian religion; English as mother tongue; European lifestyle and home décor; Western dress for children and adults; and employment in particular administrative and service professions (typically requiring fluency in English and a high-school education), such as the post office, railways, police work, teaching, and nursing.

Paul Hockings

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ANGLO-MYSORE WARS The Anglo-Mysore wars were four wars conducted by British forces against Hyder Ali (1722–1782) and his son Tipu Sultan (1749–1799), the rulers of the kingdom of Mysore (now Karnataka), in southern India, during 1767–1769, 1780–1784, 1790–1792, and March–May 1799. The final conflict ended with the death of Tipu Sultan during his defense of Seringapatam, Tipu's capital.

Mysore was a rich agricultural territory with many superbly built hill forts, and it was a prize that the British East India Company saw as holding the key to a large conquest of southern India and to blocking French aspirations in the region. The wars began when Hyder Ali was fighting the Marathas to the north, and the British lent support to the nizam (ruler) of Hyderabad, who then invaded Mysore territory with a British detachment. Hyder got the Marathas on his side, won over the nizam, and then vented his fury on the British, who were based in Madras and outlying towns. Hyder reached the walls of Madras City, where he dictated a treaty to the panic-stricken residents.

His exasperation with the British flared anew in the Second Anglo-Mysore War, caused by the British failure to honor the treaty and render him assistance in his renewed struggle with the Marathas. Again Hyder marched on Madras, this time hoping to get assistance from the French based in Pondicherry. It failed to materialize. During this war Hyder Ali died of cancer, but his son Tipu Sultan took up the crusade against the British, who made peace with him in 1784 (the Treaty of Mangalore).

The next war began because the British in Madras wrote to the nizam of Hyderabad that they would help him regain territories lost to Tipu's forces. Anticipating further hostilities, Tipu attacked Travancore and thereabouts in 1789–1790. The British then entered into league with the nizam and also with the peshwa, the chief minister of the Marathas. In 1790 the British moved into southern Mysore, but Tipu denied them any clear victories. Lord Charles Cornwallis (1738–1805), the governor-general of India, then assumed command himself. He captured Bangalore and moved toward Seringapatam (or Sri Ranga Pattana), just outside Mysore City. Now Tipu's scorched earth policy brought famine into the British camp and obliged Cornwallis to retreat. He had more success in a subsequent campaign, and in 1792 besieged Seringapatam. This led to Tipu's submission, and another treaty was

concluded in March. Tipu was obliged to surrender two of his sons as hostages, pay a massive indemnity, and cede up half of his dominions, which were then incorporated into the British East India Company territories as the "Ceded Districts". Tipu also was forced to cede territory to the Marathas and the nizam.

The Fourth Mysore War, a three-month engagement, was caused by Tipu's refusal to accept an alliance with the British. The new governor-general, Lord Richard Wellesley (1760–1842), suspected Tipu's intentions because following the previous treaty Tipu had tried to form alliances with France, Istanbul, and the shah of Afghanistan, hoping to drive the British out of India altogether. Three armies, one led by Arthur Wellesley (1769–1852), the future Duke of Wellington, converged on Seringapatam and with two fierce attacks brought the war to an end. Tipu's dead body was found, sword in hand, among those of his soldiers at a north gate, on 4 May 1799. The nizam was given some of the captured territory, but much of it was restored as the Kingdom of Mysore under Krishnaraja, the maharaja of Mysore, and remained with Mysore until 1947. The alliance with the British was finally signed.

Paul Hockings

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ANH DAO DUY (1904–1988), Vietnamese journalist, historian, leader in anticolonial struggle. Highly critical of Confucian culture that he believed bound the country to feudalism and colonialism, Anh Dao Duy established a Hue-based study group and began to publish books in *quoc ngu*—the Vietnamese vernacular—that introduced the Vietnamese public to Western social sciences in the 1920s. He was arrested by French authorities in 1929 for organizing the New Vietnam Revolutionary Party. Imprisoned for one year, he was given a three-year suspended sentence that led him to abandon politics and pursue scholarship. In 1938, he published the seminal *An Outline History of Vietnamese Culture*. Following the 1954 Geneva Accords, Anh joined a large number of North Vietnamese artists and writers who began to demand intellectual and literary freedoms, which the Lao Dong

Party had stripped in its attempt to impose the rigid tenets of socialist realism on arts and letters; an event that became known as the Nhan Van–Giai Pham Affair. Anh asserted that the party's rigid adherence to Marxist ideology constrained social science research. Anh also attacked the cult of personality surrounding Ho Chi Minh and the monopoly of power held by the Lao Dong Party. In an April 1958 crackdown on the dissident intellectuals, Anh was forced to write a self-criticism. Effectively silenced, Anh died in 1988.

Zachary Abuza

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ANHUI (1995 est. pop. 59.6 million). The central eastern Chinese province of Anhui (Anhui) is bordered by Hubei and Henan on the west, Shandong and Jiangsu on the north, Jiangsu and Zhejiang on the east, and Jiangxi on the south. The province, where agriculture is the principal occupation, covers an area of 139,000 square kilometers, making it one of China's smallest. It is traversed by the Chang (Yangtze) River from west to east. The capital Hefei (1993 population 1.1 million) is situated in the center of Anhui, north of Lake Chao, and the province is divided into nine regions and seventy counties.

Anhui is separated into two distinct regions by mountain ranges running northeast-southwest, with peaks in the western part reaching to 1,751 meters. The northern region, which has been densely popu-



ANHUI-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Designated by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site in 2000, the Xidi and Hongcun villages in southern Anhui are uniquely preserved examples of rural trade posts from China's feudal period. Somehow the two villages have survived almost intact, down to the original decorations and water systems.

lated since the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), has a temperate monsoon climate, while the south, which was settled by Han Chinese from the seventh century on, has subtropical monsoon climate with a growing season of eight to nine months. The mountainous areas are mainly concentrated in the southern and western parts of the province; the rest is mostly fertile plains. Major crops in the north are wheat, soybeans, and cotton, while the southern region crops are dominated by rice and tea.

Bent Nielsen

ANIME *Anime*, the Japanese term for animated films, refers to Japanese animation. Since the early 1950s, when the father of *anime*, Tezuka Osamu (1928–1989), created such famous series as *Jungle taitei* (known in the United States as "Kimba the White Lion") and *Tetsuo atomu* (known in the United States as "Astro Boy"), Japan has produced a stream of innovative and original animated films. Artistically, *anime* are known for their use of color, their textured and detailed backgrounds and foregrounds, and their complex camera points of view, which approximate those of acted films. Sympathetic characters are often depicted with enormous eyes, oddly colored hair, and childlike features. Story lines tend to be complex, and many *anime* appear as long series of episodes, with a multitude of characters and subplots.

Anime often have their roots in *manga* (comic books, or graphic novels), though not always; in recent times computer games have also inspired *anime*, as in the case of *Pokemon*. Other children's *anime* that have crossed the Pacific to intrigue U.S. audiences include *Mach Go! Go! Go!* (U.S. "Speed Racer"), *Uchu senkan Yamato* (U.S. "Starblazers"), *Dragonball Z*, and *Sailor Moon*. There are also many *anime* aimed at an older audience, which feature graphic sex and violence. Some *anime* are serious films; *Princess Mononoke*, the 1999 U.S. version of a full-length animated film by Japan's premier *anime* director, Miyazaki Hayao, received critical acclaim in the United States.

Michael Ashkenazi and Francesca Forrest

See also: **Cinema-Japan**

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ANKARA (1997 pop. 3.7 million). Ankara (formerly Angora) is the capital and second-largest city of the Republic of Turkey. Located on the Central Anatolian plateau, Ankara is approximately 355 kilometers southeast of Istanbul, Turkey's largest city.

History

Ankara has been the site of continuous settlement since at least the Neolithic era (c. 10,300/10,000–3500 BCE) and was a sizable town throughout most of antiquity. Its situation along major caravan routes and its ample supplies of freshwater and easily defensible position were ideal for a trading town. Ankara was incorporated into the Roman empire in 25 BCE and was controlled at various times by the Persians, Arabs, Seljuks, and Byzantines.

The city was conquered in 1354 (some sources say 1356) by the second Ottoman sultan, Orhan I (c. 1281–1360). Orhan's son Murad I (1326–1389) incorporated Ankara into the Ottoman empire in 1360 or 1361. In 1402 the Mongols under Timur (Tamerlane, Timur-Lang; c. 1360–1403) defeated the Ottoman sultan Bayezid I (c. 1360–1403) in a battle just outside Ankara. Despite the ensuing civil war, Ankara remained under Ottoman control and served for some time as the regional capital of the province of Anatolia (Anadolu). Kuthaya eventually replaced it as regional capital, but Ankara was restored as a provincial center in the nineteenth century.

Throughout this period Ankara was a center of grain production. During the nineteenth century a luxury trade based on mohair, a particularly warm and soft fabric made from the hair of the local Angora goats, increased in importance, as did carpet production for the European market. A railway between Ankara and Izmit, financed by the Deutsche Bank and begun in 1889, increased Ankara's commercial importance as well as its ties to broader economic trends.

The Twentieth Century

Ankara's significance increased markedly during the Turkish War for Independence from 1919 to 1923. The British occupied the Ottoman capital of Istanbul, and Sivas, the initial center of nationalist resistance, was too far from the front. Consequently the nationalist forces chose Ankara as a new base of operations. On 27 December 1919 the nationalist government,



An aerial view of the mausoleum of Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey, in Ankara. (YANN ARTHUS-BERTRAND/CORBIS)

under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (later Ataturk) (1881–1938), arrived in Ankara and began the workings of government in the town's agricultural school. The nationalist parliament (Buyuk Millet Meclisi) convened on 23 April 1920.

Such was the power and prestige of Istanbul, however, that the decision to make Ankara the capital in October 1923 was met with considerable surprise and not a little dismay. Compared to cosmopolitan Istanbul, Ankara was distinctly unglamorous, a sleepy town, dusty in summer and muddy in winter. However, this shift involved important symbolism. The move to Ankara underlined the republic's break from its Ottoman legacy and the foundation of a distinctly Turkish and Anatolian nation.

Ankara's new status as the Turkish Republic's capital brought dramatic growth and development to the city. In the first years of the republic a large number of important buildings were constructed in or near what is referred to as the Old City, principally around the Ulus district. After 1930 a broader plan for the city developed, and major institutions were constructed in districts southeast of the original town center. Planning could not control the effects of explosive population growth, however, and many districts were made up of unlicensed housing of varying quality, locally called *gecekondular* (literally, constructed at night). Although Ankara developed no actual "downtown," the district of Kizilay generally has been considered the

city's hub. The wealthier district of Cankaya also has been an important center of trade and government.

Ankara Today

Ankara houses the parliament, presidential palace, and governmental ministries, and the city has become a cultural center of Turkey. Ankara University, Hacettepe University, Middle East Technical University, and Bilkent University, a private university, are important institutions for learning and research. Ankara is also home to the Ethnographic Museum and a world-class archaeological museum called the Museum of Anatolian Civilizations. The Haci Bayram Mosque (1429), dedicated to an important Muslim saint, is a point of local pilgrimage, and the Mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (Anit Kabir), designed by Emin Onat and Orhan Arda, is an example of republican-era architecture and a testament to Ataturk's place in the republic's national consciousness.

Despite its role as the seat of government, Ankara remains, culturally, economically, and demographically, Turkey's "second city" after Istanbul. Nevertheless, while Istanbul's palaces and mosques are a constant reminder of an Ottoman past, Ankara embodies the future, both as the capital of the Turkish Republic and as the urban embodiment of the republic's modernizing mission.

Howard Eissenstat

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ANSARI, ABDULLAH (1005–1089), Sufi religious figure. Khwaja Abdullah Ansari was a Sufi sheikh from Heart, Afghanistan, and a Hanbali traditionist, renowned for his sermons in rhymed prose and for his polemics against rationalist theology (*kalam*). Ansari, a descendant of a Medinan companion of the Prophet Muhammad, was an exceptionally gifted child who composed poetry in Persian and Arabic and learned the Qur'an and the Prophetic traditions (*hadith*) before the age of nine. He embarked on the Sufi path under the guidance of his father, but his mysticism was tempered by rigorous scholastic training, and he shunned practices that sought to induce ecstatic states. He was also a renowned teacher of the Qur'an and the *hadith*, who castigated the influential Ash'arite theologians for subjecting the revealed word to logical inferences.

Ansari was primarily an orator, not a writer, and his works abound with assonances and rhythmic patterns that aid memorization. Most were either compiled from disciples' notes or dictated to scribes in his old age. Among his famous works are *Manazil al-Sa'irin* (The Stages of the Pilgrims), a Sufi spiritual guide in Arabic analyzing the psychological states and stations of the Sufi path; *Tabaqat al-Sufiyya* (Biographies of Sufis), an expanded translation of the Arabic work of the great Sufi master Sulami (c. tenth–eleventh centuries) into the ancient dialect of Herat; and *Kashf al-Asrar* (Unveiling of the Secrets), the first systematic commentary on the Qur'an written in a non-Arabic

language. His popular appeal rests primarily on his quatrains and on the *Munajat* (Intimate Conversations)—mystical invocations to God abstracted from his other works. Ansari is one of the most influential early Sufi authors whose rhymed prose, interspersed with parables and verses, was emulated by Sa'di, Jami and influenced other Persian classics.

Marta Simidchieva

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ANTAKYA (1994 pop. 137,200). Antakya, the capital of Hatay (a province of approximately 1.2 million people) in southeastern Turkey, on the eastern bank of the Asi (Orontes) River, was an important city of the Roman empire. The Macedonian Seleucus I founded the city about 300 BCE and named it Antiochus (later Antioch). The city served as a central station for Roman commercial and military routes between Asia Minor and Mesopotamia and as a Roman army base for campaigns against the Persians. Although famous as a nucleus of Christianity, its original settlers were of many races and religions. The prosperity of Antioch diminished after a major earthquake in 526 and destruction by the Sasanid ruler Khosrow I in 540. The Arabs took Antioch in 638 CE.

After a brief Byzantine occupation Antioch fell to the Muslim Seljuk Turks in 1084. In 1098 the city was raided during the First Crusades and raided again in 1268 by Baybars I, Mamluk sultan of Egypt. When the Ottoman sultan Selim I (reigned 1512–) captured Antioch in 1516, the city was peopled primarily by Muslim Turkmen and Arabs and had long lost its importance as a Christian center. Antioch remained part of the Ottoman empire until after World War I. The city was occupied by French troops in 1919 and placed under French mandate by the League of Nations. An independent regime known as the Republic of Hatay was established in 1938 with Antioch as its capital. After a referendum the whole territory officially became



**A QUATRAIN BY
ABDULLAH ANSARI**

Great shame it is to deem of high degree
Thyself, or over others recon thee:
Strive to be like the pupil of thine eye—
To see all else, but not thyself to see.

Source: Edward Browne. (1964)
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part of the Turkish Republic (founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 1881–1938) on 23 June 1939. Since then the city has been officially called Antakya.

Surrounded by rich orchards, Antakya stands at the junction of important roads between Anatolia and other Middle Eastern countries. Its climate is mild, and its economy is based mainly on agriculture. The chief crops are cotton, grapes, wheat, rice, olives, vegetables, and fruits. Industries include olive-oil and soap factories, as well as cotton ginning and silk and shoe manufacturing. The Archaeological Museum of Antakya contains magnificent Roman mosaics and coins dating from the second and third centuries CE. A popular resort and tourist attraction is the site of ancient Daphne near Harbiye, perhaps the place where Antony married Cleopatra in 40 BCE. Another monument in the area is the Church of Saint Peter, where the apostle supposedly preached the first Christian sermons.

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ANTALYA (2002 pop. 571,000). Antalya, capital of the province of Antalya (population 1 million; known in ancient Greece as Attalia) in southwestern Turkey, was founded in the second century BCE by Attalus II, king of Pergamum. Antalya is a Mediterranean port on the Gulf of Antalya, otherwise known as the Turquoise Coast. Due to its strategic location, it was once a sea-port used by Crusaders to avoid Seljuk territory on their way to Palestine. Among many monuments from Antalya's past is the Hadrian Gate, a splendid structure consisting of three identical arches, built in CE 130 to commemorate Roman emperor Hadrian's visit. Saints Paul and Barnabas also visited the city on their way to Antioch. After the Seljuks captured Attalia in 1207, it became Antalya. Although Antalya was first occupied by Sultan Bayezud I (reigned 1389–1402) in 1391, it was not incorporated into the Ottoman empire until the late fifteenth century. Italian troops occupied Antalya after World War I until Turkish nationalist forces expelled them in 1921. Its ideal climate, beautiful natural setting, and proximity to ancient sites make Antalya a tourist resort. One of Turkey's fastest-growing cities, it is a center of art and culture. Natural vegetation includes bananas, citrus fruits, pine forests, and palm trees. The regional economy is largely supported by tourism and cotton production.

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ANTI-FASCIST PEOPLE'S FREEDOM LEAGUE-MYANMAR

The Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) started out during World War II as an underground resistance movement against fascist occupation of Burma (now Myanmar) but was transformed into the dominant political party in postindependence electoral politics between 1948 and 1962. Originally founded as the Anti-Fascist Organization (AFO) in August 1944, its early leadership included Aung San (president), Than Tun (secretary general), and Thakin Soe. At various times, the AFO included the Burma Communist Party (BCP), the People's Revolutionary Party, Maha Bama, the Fabian Party, Myo Chit, the Shan Association, and the Youth League. Initially it declared its aim as resisting Japanese occupation.

The AFO was renamed the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League at a mass meeting on 19 August 1945; organizers added the goal of securing national independence. When British colonial government returned to Burma in October 1945, the AFPFL demanded majority representation in it. When the British ignored this demand, fierce competition took place among different factions for influence. After a period of resistance and strikes against the colonial government, and after two changes in governor, the AFPFL finally emerged under Aung San as the force with which the British came to terms in September 1946. After a period of internal strife within the AFPFL, Aung San negotiated national independence from the British with the signing of the Attlee–Aung San agreement in January 1947.

In July 1947 Aung San was assassinated along with other cabinet ministers. After Aung San's assassination, U Nu took over the leadership of the AFPFL. Under U Nu's leadership, the AFPFL became the dominant parliamentary party until the coup by General Ne Win in 1962. During its years in power, the AFPFL was gradually weakened by four splits. The first of these splits occurred when Aung San expelled the BCP in November 1946. This was followed by the defection of the Peoples' Volunteer Army to the BCP in July 1948, the expulsion of the Burma Workers and Peasants Party in 1951, and the split in leadership between the Nu-Tin "Clean" and the Swe-Nyein "Stable" factions in 1958. The dominant role of the AFPFL ended when the Revolutionary Council under General Ne Win abolished all political parties on 23 March 1964 when it promulgated the Law Protecting National Unity.

Gustaaf Houtman

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ANTI-TAURUS The Anti-Taurus or southeastern Taurus (Güney Dogu Toros) Mountains are a folded limestone range lying between the Iranian border in southeast Turkey and the Seyhan River, at longitude 35° 30' east. The range forms an arch. The western end merges with the Nur Mountains and the eastern with the Zagros Mountains of Iraq. Inside the arch is a plateau averaging 600 meters high, sloping gently down to the north Syrian plain. North of the Anti-Taurus is Turkey's largest lake, Lake Van. The Anti-Taurus range is up to 170 kilometers wide from north to south and includes (from west to east) the Tahtali (maximum height 3075 meters) and the Cilo-Sat (maximum height 4170 meters) Mountains.

Rainfall is generally around 500 millimeters, rising to over 1000 millimeters at the west and east extremities; in the Cilo-Sat Mountains, with ten permanent glaciers, rain falls mainly as snow. Most of the region has hot, dry summers and some snowfall in winter, melting quickly; tree cover has been removed by indiscriminate felling.

The range is dissected by three major rivers—the Ceyhan, Euphrates (Firat), and Tigris (Dicle); the last two supply irrigation and drinking water for Turkey, Syria, and Iraq as far south as the Persian Gulf. On the Euphrates are the Keban Dam (Baraj) and the Ataturk Dam and their lakes; they supply 26 billion kilowatt-hours per year of electricity and irrigate well over one million hectares. The road hub is Diyarbakir, from which passes run to Bitlis, Bingöl, Elazığ, and Gaziantep, with roads to Malatya-Kayseri and Adana.

The practice of transhumance, moving flocks in season to high summer pastures, is now less profitable than the cultivation of orchard trees, cotton, and vegetables on irrigated lands. The population, historically Turkish, Kurdish, and Armenian, and now mainly Kurdish, has been reduced by the military policy of evacuating villages believed to help the Kurdistan Workers Party or PKK, a Marxist terrorist organization. A small amount of petrol comes from the Batman area; copper mines at Ergani and chrome deposits at Guleman are exploited by Etibank, the State mining concern. The most popular tourist destination is Nemrut Mountain, near Adiyaman, where a Roman

client king erected a tomb and statues on an isolated summit.

Kate Clow

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ANWAR, IBRAHIM (b. 1948), Malaysian politician. Ibrahim Anwar is the popular former Malaysian deputy premier who was ousted in 1998. Born in 1948 in Penang, Anwar was a youth leader and vocal critic of the government in the 1970s. In 1972 he founded the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (Islamic Youth Movement, or ABIM), which grew to some 100,000 members. He was courted by the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) party leaders, and he joined the ruling party in 1982. He won a seat in parliament that year and also narrowly won the UMNO Youth leadership, putting him in touch with the party's grass roots. In 1987 Anwar became one of UMNO's three vice presidents. In 1991 he became the power-



Former deputy premier Anwar Ibrahim arriving at court in Kuala Lumpur on 5 October 1999. (AFP/CORBIS)

ful minister of finance, a post he held until 1998. In 1993 he became UMNO deputy president, the country's deputy premier, and a member of UMNO's 35-person supreme council.

Anwar was arguably the country's most popular politician, especially among the youth and indigenous Malays. His popularity was in part due to his stature as a student activist who challenged the political status quo and later became a youth leader for UNMO, but more so because he had become a model of a devout Muslim who was still committed to modernism and economic development. Although he was Prime Minister Muhammad Mahathir's hand-chosen successor, relations between the two began to sour in 1994. Anwar never challenged Mahathir in a leadership contest, though many within UMNO encouraged him to do so, and Mahathir saw Anwar as a threat and sacked him in 1998. Mahathir argued that Anwar was unfit to rule owing to corruption and sodomy allegations, but he was actually ousted over economic policies after the 1997 Asian economic crisis, which discredited Mahathir. Anwar was arrested and sentenced in a highly politicized trial to six years' imprisonment for corruption; he was later tried and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment for sodomy. Despite his arrest and imprisonment, Anwar remains a very popular politician. His supporters have rallied behind his wife, Wan Aziz, who founded the opposition Justice Party.

Zachary Abuza

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AO DAI The *ao dai* (pronounced "ow zai" in the north and "ow yai" in the south and literally meaning "long dress") is the traditional dress of the Vietnamese people. The *ao dai* is a contoured, full-length dress worn over black or white loose-fitting trousers that brush the floor. The dress's body-hugging top splits into a front and back panel from above the waist and runs to just below the knee. The *ao dai* was originally designed for both genders, but the dress is more common today among women. Early versions of the *ao dai* date back to 1744, when Lord Vu Vong of the Nguyen dynasty (1802–1955) decreed that both women and men should wear an ensemble of a short gown that buttoned down the front and loose-fitting trousers. It

was not until 1932 that the modern-style *ao dai* appeared. Vietnamese designer Cat Tuong fitted the bodice to the curves of the body, moved the buttons from the front position to closer along the shoulder and side seam, and lengthened the top so that it reached the floor. During the 1950s, two tailors in Saigon, Tran Kim and Dung, started producing the dress with raglan sleeves that created a diagonal seam running from the collar to the underarm. The color of the top is traditionally indicative of the wearer's age and status in society. Young girls and students wear white, older but unmarried women wear soft pastels, married women wear rich, strong colors, and red is worn at weddings.

Traditionally the *ao dai* is custom made, accounting for the flattering fit that highlights the figure of the wearer, but today the popularity of the dress outside of Vietnam has dictated that it be mass produced to make it more available and affordable.

Richard B. Verrone

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AOI MATSURI The Aoi Matsuri, held in Kyoto on 15 May, is the oldest festival in Japan and possibly in the world. It was first held in the mid-sixth century as a petition to the goddess of rain and the god of thunder for relief from the terrible storms and floods that were battering the country and destroying the harvest. The plea was successful, for the storms and floods soon abated; the ceremonies have been reenacted ever since in gratitude and to ensure a bountiful harvest.

The grand procession, shrine offerings, and rituals are the culmination of a series of purification rites that take place during the first half of the month. The day's events occur in three parts: *kyuchū* (at the palace), *rochū* (on the road), and *shachū* (at the shrine). Traditionally, a messenger from the emperor, together with an entourage of around five hundred nobles and courtiers, performed sacred rituals at Kyoto Imperial Palace, early in the morning. The participants then left the palace grounds and proceeded to Shimogamo Shrine and then Kamigamo Shrine in the stately procession

that formed the highlight of the festival. Those events are now recreated by actors; the gorgeous costumes are authentic recreations of the sumptuous court dress of the Heian period (794–1185). The mounted imperial messenger and two ox-drawn lacquered carts, decorated with wisteria flowers and fine bamboo blinds, lead the procession, followed by a retinue of officials and attendants. Then comes the *saio-dai*, an unmarried princess-priestess wearing the elaborate twelve-layer silk robes of a Heian noblewoman and riding on a palanquin, attended by court ladies, dancers, and mounted guards.

When the entourage has arrived at Shimogamo Shrine, prayers and offerings are presented to the deities and ceremonies and ancient court music and dances are performed. The procession then continues to nearby Kamigamo Shrine, where prayers and dances are again offered and the final ceremonies are performed.

Often translated as "hollyhock" the name *aoi* actually refers to the *futaba aoi* wild ginger plant (*Asarum caulescens*), whose evergreen leaves are considered sacred and a powerful charm against thunderstorms. These leaves are used to decorate the festival costumes and carriages and the eaves of houses along the processional route, in addition to being offered to the deities at the two shrines. Today the Aoi Matsuri continues to be one of the greatest events in Japan's festival calendar, counting among Kyoto's three foremost festivals and attracting hundreds of thousands of spectators.

Lucy D. Moss

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AOMORI (2002 est. pop. 1.5 million). Aomori Prefecture is situated in the north of Japan's island of Honshu. A prime agricultural and fishing area, its Seikan Tunnel links Honshu with the island of Hokkaido to the north. It occupies an area of 9,619 square kilometers. Aomori's main geographical features are the Dewa and Ou Mountains, and the largest rivers are the Iwakigawa and the Oirasegawa. Two peninsulas, the Tsugaru on the west and the Shimokita on the east, form Mutsu Bay. Aomori is bordered by the Pacific Ocean, Tsugaru Strait, and the Sea of Japan and by Iwate and Akita Prefectures. In ancient times, Aomori was known as Tsugaru and Nambu districts,

which were combined in 1871 as Hirosaki Prefecture, later renamed Aomori Prefecture.

The capital of the prefecture is Aomori city, situated on Aomori Bay. It long has been a center for shipping and fishing since its harbor was constructed in 1624. Until the 1988 opening of the Seikan Tunnel, it also was the terminal for ferry service to Hokkaido. Aomori is famous for its Nebuta Festival, celebrating the ancient victory of the Tsugaru clan with a nighttime parade of illuminated floats. The prefecture's other important cities are Hachinohe, Hirosaki, Misawa, and Towada.

The economy is dominated by agriculture, forestry, and fishing, which permits a large catch of mackerel, pollack, and squid. While the cities of Aomori and Hirosaki continue the production of traditional lacquerware, some modern industry has clustered around Hachinoe. Tourists are drawn to the region by its many hot spring resorts, by Towada-Hachimantai National Park, and by the Shimokita Peninsula volcano of Osorezan, which has a temple featuring traditional shamanism.

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APRIL 19 REVOLUTION-KOREA The April 19 Revolution refers to the 1960 collapse of the government of Syngman Rhee (1875–1965), the newly reelected president of the Republic of Korea (South Korea). On 15 March of that year, Rhee, the leader of the Liberal Party, had again won the office of president, but his success came amid widespread electoral fraud. A month later, on 19 April, massive student demonstrations rocked Korea, and Rhee was forced to resign and flee into exile.

Rhee was a complex figure. An aristocrat, a Methodist, and a proponent of republicanism, he had struggled to replace Korea's monarchic system with a modern government and in 1948 became the first president of the newly founded Republic of Korea. But his authoritarian manner—including his willingness to use the military and civil police to suppress any democratic dissent threatening his power—was apparent long before the 1960 election. When police killed a secondary student in a town outside the southern city of Pusan, anti-Rhee sentiments soon spread to Korea's capital, Seoul. In the following days, the violence con-

tinued, but the students, now joined by their teachers, succeeded in forcing Rhee's resignation.

Although the expulsion of Syngman Rhee reveals the importance of popular protest in the history of modern Korea, Rhee's ouster came in the aftermath of World War II, amid a much broader, fiercely fought struggle between the United States and its then rival, the Soviet Union. The Cold War (as this struggle became known) affected many other nations besides the two opponents. For instance, after World War II, Korea had been abruptly divided into two mutually hostile regions: a Communist north and a democratic south. Yet even today, the precise nature and extent of democracy in South Korea from 1945 and 1987 are widely debated.

In 1949, Kim Ku (b. 1876), the only figure capable of challenging Rhee's political legitimacy, had been assassinated. Rhee, who enjoyed the support of the U.S. military government in Korea from 1945 until his election as president in 1948, may have known about the assassination plan in advance. In 2001, documents resurfaced suggesting a possible connection between Ku's assassination and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States.

Michael Goodwin

See also: Rhee, Syngman

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AQUINO, BENIGNO (1932–1983), political leader in the Philippines. Born in Concepcion, Tarlac, as the son of a politician of national fame, Benigno ("Ninoy") Aquino, Jr. became a journalist and came to national prominence when he negotiated the surrender of the Huk rebel leader Luis Taruc in 1954. A reporter for the Manila *Daily Mirror*, Aquino had been secretly appointed by President Ramon Magsaysay to negotiate with Taruc.

Aquino entered politics and in 1956 was elected mayor of his home town, Concepcion, at the age of twenty-four. He became governor of Tarlac in 1961 and senator in 1967. His marriage to Corazon Cojuangco in 1954 produced five children.



Benigno Aquino in San Francisco in July 1983, just weeks before he returned to the Philippines, where he was assassinated on his arrival in Manila. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

The leader of the political opposition, Aquino was arrested one day after President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law on 22 September 1972. Kept in solitary confinement for eight years, he was put on trial in August 1973 on charges of murder, subversion, and illegal possession of weapons. The trial was off and on for four years, and the sentence of death by firing squad was not carried out.

In March 1980, Aquino suffered a heart attack and was allowed to travel to the United States for medical treatment. After bypass surgery, he accepted a fellowship at Harvard University and became an outspoken critic of the Marcos regime.

When Aquino returned three years later, he was assassinated in Manila as he left the plane. The Agrava Commission that convened to investigate the murder concluded it was the work of a conspiracy of army and air force officers, including General Fabian Ver, Marcos's cousin and chief of staff. Aquino's body lay in state for ten days, in the bloodstained clothes he was

wearing when martyred. Millions lined the 30-kilometer route to the cemetery through metropolitan Manila. The procession took eleven hours. His death is seen as the catalyst to the events that led to the ouster of Ferdinand Marcos.

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AQUINO, CORAZON (b. 1933), seventh president of the Third Philippine Republic. Corazon ("Cory") Cojuangco Aquino was born 25 January 1933 in Tarlac, Philippines, and served as president of the Third Philippine Republic from 1986 to 1992. Born into one of the wealthiest families in the Philippines, she was educated in the Philippines and the United States. After she married Benigno ("Ninoy") Aquino, Jr. on 11 October 1954, she remained in the



Former president Corazon Aquino hangs yellow ribbons in February 2000 to mark the anniversary of the overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos in February 1986. (AFP/CORBIS)

background and stayed at home to raise their five children while her husband successfully pursued a political career.

After her husband's assassination on 21 August 1983, the devout Catholic housewife came to symbolize and represent the moral opposition to the regime of Ferdinand Marcos (1917–1989), who ruled the Philippines from 1966 to 1986. Although reluctant at first, she became the united opposition's candidate for the presidency in the "snap election" called by Marcos for 6 February 1986. Both Aquino and Marcos claimed victory. A military revolt led to the famous EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos, for the street where much of the action occurred) revolution and the victory of People Power. (People Power refers to the nonviolent gathering of hundreds of thousands of Filipinos in protest and to reject the Marcos regime. They gathered at the urging of Cardinal Jaime Sin to protect a group of military officials whose arrest had been ordered by Marcos.) Although not a participant in the EDSA revolution, Aquino benefited from it as Marcos, under strong pressure from Washington, left the country and she assumed the presidency on 25 February 1986. She issued a presidential proclamation on 25 March 1986 that based her government's legitimacy on the EDSA revolution rather than the election. Aquino promulgated a provisional constitution and appointed a commission to write a new constitution. This new constitution was ratified by popular vote in February 1987.

The question has been asked: Did the events of EDSA represent a revolution or a restoration? Aquino's government marked the return to power of the oligarchy that had controlled much of Philippine politics and the economy before the declaration of martial law by President Marcos on 22 September 1972. Her presidency was threatened by various coup attempts, but she survived to the end of her term in 1992. As of 2001, Aquino continues to be active in Philippine politics as a leader in People Power II, which led to the ouster of President Joseph Estrada (b. 1937) amid allegations of corruption on 20 January 2001.

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ARABIC Arabic, *al-‘Arabiyya*, or *lisan al-‘Arab*, is the language spoken by 200 million people in twenty-one countries from the Arabian Gulf to the Atlantic. As the liturgical language of Muslims, it is the medium for a billion people all over the globe. It is a Semitic language, and its early extant script dates back to about 300 CE at Temple of Ramm in Sinai and about 328 CE at Nemara, in the Syrian desert. Early Arabic evolved from a number of dialects between the third and the sixth centuries, leading to the classical language, which received its full expansion between 632 and 710, when the message of Islam reached many lands east and west.

As the language of the Qur’an, the revealed word of God to all Muslims, it is inimitable. Taken as the standard for excellence, classical Arabic, the written language, has survived the ravages of time. Codification and standardization of Arabic began in the eighth century, following early Islamic expansion and the growth of urban centers, especially in Basrah, Baghdad, and Damascus. It was carried out not only to counteract solecism and corruption concomitant with intercultural and ethnic mixing but also to sustain its lexical and grammatical models, taking the Qur’an, pre-Islamic poetry, the Prophet’s sayings, and early Islamic orations, poems, and speeches as the standard. The effort between the eighth and tenth centuries to collect and verify poetry, speech, and proverbs as carried out by Arab and non-Arab scholars proved to be of great value, both in explaining Qur’anic word usages and meanings, and in ensuring the survival of Islamic and Arabic tradition and culture.

The written grammatical standards as set by al-Khalil (d. 791) and carried out by his student Sibawayhi (d. 804) made use both of attested data, such as the Qur’an, poetry, and elicited material from the Prophet’s tribe (Quraysh), and of analogy, or the use of explanation to rationalize speech that deviated from the norm.

Morphology and Syntax in Classical Arabic

The basis for Arabic morphology lies in the distinction between aplastic, or simple and unanalyzable words, and the complex, analyzable ones. Complex or analyzable words build on a trilateral root for further enriching the derivative process that gives Arabic its distinguishable life and richness.

Syntax, in Arabic grammar, is governed by the two formidable notions of ellipsis and conjecture, or paraphrase, which simultaneously sustain compression and enforce attention. Arabic rhetoric grew out of the study of the stylistic inimitable Qur’an, burgeoning

into treatises on linguistics, literature, law, jurisprudence, philology, theology, and the art of prose. Of relevance in this context is Arabic lexicography, beginning with al-Khalil’s lexicon *al-‘Ayn* with its phonetic and phonological ordering, to be followed by the works of Ibn Duraid (d. 933), al-Jawhari (d. 1003), Ibn Sidah (d. 1066), and many others before reaching Dawud al-Antaki (d. 1405) and al-Bustani (d. 1883).

Spoken Arabic

While the term classical Arabic applies to writing at large, based on standardized norms since the classical period (that is, from the eighth to the thirteenth centuries), we must understand it in relation to its descendants, early Middle Arabic and Modern Standard Arabic (MSA). Insofar as MSA is concerned, the syntactic and morphological standards are there, largely sustained through education and cultivated media programs. Despite geographical and cultural obstacles and barriers among Arab lands, the classical norm in writing and public speeches is respected. It is a sign of cultivation and genuine belonging and is sought after by politicians and public figures. Spoken Arabic, on the other hand, varies, and vernaculars abound.

Dialects remain outside the domain of the classical. Islamic expansion since 632 CE entailed the leveling of dialects, but it also brought some interdialectal habits and forms. A makeshift practice could easily emerge among newly converted people, freedmen, and indigenous non-Muslim tribes and inhabitants. Although aspirants to high position needed a polished style and lucid expression to fit into the ruling discourse, artisans, laborers, and businessmen could survive with this or that Arabic dialect or with the remnants of indigenous languages and dialects.

The Decline of Classical Arabic

From the start of the decline of the Abbasid caliphate in the late tenth century, and well before the fall of Baghdad in 1258, there was a decline in the use of classical Arabic outside formal or solemn occasions. Arabic language of the Seljuk period (1038–1157), for instance, demonstrates a mixture of the classical and the colloquial. Aside from the Andalusian practice of using local dialects in strophic street songs (*zajal*) like Ibn Quzman’s (d. 1160), writers like Ibn Danyal (d. 1294) show a similar bent. Conversely, epistolographers since the fifteenth century insisted on writing in a polished style. The fact remains, however, that historians, scientists, and philosophers since the fifteenth century have resorted to the use of Middle Arabic, which largely kept to standards without meticulously following classical expression and usage. The

descendant of this Middle Arabic can be traced in the present-day language of the media and official reports.

Arab philologists of the nineteenth century were aware of the increasing impact of the media, and the Lebanese Ibrahim al-Jazidji (1847–1906) wrote his book *Lughat al-Sabafab* (The Language of Dailies) to draw attention to faultiness and deviations from classical norms. Many royal academies were established to curb the impact of the media on Arabic classical usage. Purists like the Iraqi Christian cleric P. Anstane al-Karmali issued in 1911–1931 *Lughat al-Arab* (The Language of the Arabs), to consolidate the classical against both the media Middle Arabic and the vernaculars that were beginning to appear in writing. While the purists put up a fight, they recognized the need to cope with modernization processes through appropriation of scientific words, adaptation of others, and expansion of vocabulary through derivation. At present, the classical in its middle usage is largely used in writing, ceremonies, and solemn occasions. In its standard form it provides the written medium throughout the Arab world, and among devout Muslims. Vernaculars and dialects are there in spoken Arabic, oral communications, and daily transactions.

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ARABS Although there are references to Arabs in ancient Assyrian and Babylonian inscriptions, which use the names *Aribi* or *Arabu* to identify the nomadic people living in northern Arabia, today the term identifies the Arabic-speaking peoples who inhabit the countries of North Africa and western Asia. The Arabs of western Asia inhabit modern-day Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Yemen, and former Palestine, today comprising Israel and the Occupied Territories of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza.

Though the Arabic language is the most obvious trait Arabs share, all the Arabs of western Asia—the Muslim majority and the Christian and Jewish mi-

norities—are also bound by a culture that expresses itself through social, religious, and political institutions. The main institutions of the Islamic societies of western Asia emerged between the eighth and sixteenth centuries, centered on Islam as the basis of all thought and organization, and Arabic as the medium of expression. This Arabic-Islamic culture defined the structure of social classes, the status of women and non-Muslim minorities, the content and transmission of knowledge, and the formation of cities.

The Pre-Islamic Period

In the period before Islam was founded in 622 CE, Arabic-speaking people lived as nomads organized in tribes or clans in the Arabian and Jordanian deserts, engaging in desert produce (camel raising). For these Bedouin, poetry emerged as the pinnacle of cultural expression: poets praised the virtues of loyalty to the tribe, bravery in battle, and hospitality to guests. Other Arabs established advanced urban settlements, such as the second- and third-century Nabataean centers in Petra (southern Jordan) and Palmyra (central Syria) that serviced trade along the caravan routes.

Arab-Islamic Culture

These examples of ancient Arab culture and language remained confined to Arabia, Jordan, and the Levant until Muhammad Ibn Abdallah (c. 570–632), a merchant from Mecca, southern Arabia, founded a new religion—Islam—based on what Muslims believe were divine revelations communicated to Muhammad in Arabic, which were later collected to form the Qur'an. Arab-Islamic culture emerged in this desert region and extended throughout the Middle East.

The culture that developed in the subsequent centuries stressed Islam as a guiding principle in thought and social organization, and Arabic as the main idiom of expression. Two successive Arab-Islamic dynasties, the Umayyads (661–749/750 CE), based in Damascus, and the Abbasids (749/750–1258 CE), who ruled from Baghdad, contributed to the formation of this Arab-Islamic culture, with Islamic law, theology, and philosophy based on belief in Muhammad's divine revelation. Those who possessed and controlled knowledge of this language and religion, known collectively as the *ulama*, wielded great authority and status in society, acting as its judges, lawyers, teachers, and religious leaders.

By the eleventh century, Arab-Islamic culture had appeared in the main social and religious institutions of Western-Asian Arab cities. Most of these urban centers included ornate congregational mosques, such as



FASTING AND RAMADAN

Adherence to Islam is an important element of Arab cultural identity, even though not all Arabs are Muslims. Among the central tenets of Islam is fasting during the month of Ramadan.

Next to prayer the most important religious observance in Arabia is fasting. Every Mohammedan must fast one lunar month out of the twelve. The month called Ramadhan is set apart for this observance. By fasting the Arab means abstinence from all food, drink, and tobacco from early morning to sunset. From the time in the morning when a black thread can be distinguished from a white one until sundown, he may taste nothing. During the night, however, men may eat and drink, and thus it happens that the fast month by day is a feast month by night. It is the season *par excellence* for indigestible pastries and impossible candies. The bazaar is frequently open and brilliantly illuminated the whole night. More cases of acute indigestion come to the hospital during this month than in any other two . . .

But violations of the spirit and letter of this law are rare among the Arabs. The month is a time of great hardship for cultivators and other working men. Since the Mohammedan year of twelve lunar months is about ten days shorter than a solar year, the different months move gradually around the circle of the four seasons. The fast month works less hardship in winter than when it comes to summer. A pious Arab considers it next to infidelity to complain of any hardship caused by the fast, and the men who do the heavy work of the cities are frequently the most scrupulous of all in its observance. Their constancy reflects no small credit on their religious devotion, especially in summer when the days are long and hot. From the beginning of the fast at early dawn till sunset may be sixteen hours or even more, and heavy work under an almost tropical sun for that period of time without food or drink is an indication of real religious zeal. There is no difference between Sunni and Shiah here. All are examples of faithfulness.

Source: Paul W. Harrison. (1924) *The Arab at Home*. New York: Crowell, 238–239.

the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus; theological colleges (*madrasaba*) to teach religion, law, and philosophy; and shrines, such as the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem.

Non-Muslims and Women

Christians and Jews were seen by the Muslim majority as "People of the Book," that is, communities that were linked to Islam by being recipients of God's

earlier revealed books—Torah, Psalms, and Gospels—of which the Qur'an was the final revelation. These groups were tolerated but were required to observe limitations in dress and to pay poll taxes; nonetheless, many flourished in crafts, in trade with East Asia, or as high-ranking administrators in the service of Muslim rulers. Though women in Arab-Islamic society rarely engaged in production or trade, many pursued education privately, possessed property, and regularly

sought redress in Islamic courts concerning personal and financial disputes.

The strength of Arab-Islamic culture is attested to by its persistence in western Asia despite invasions by Christian, Turkic, and Mongol armies between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries.

The Encounter with the West

By the nineteenth century, the increasing influence of European culture and politics in the Middle East challenged the beliefs and institutions of this traditional Arab-Islamic culture. The advent of modern methods of industrial production and more efficient means of transportation (steamships, railroads) led to an expansion of Middle Eastern trade with Europe. Concurrent with these technological advances were improvements in the art of war and weaponry that allowed European armies to conquer Arab lands, beginning with Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798.

In the face of these military and political threats, many of the Arab political and intellectual elite in western Asia maintained that Islamic societies needed to adopt modern European methods of government, thought, and technology to limit the European commercial, cultural, and military incursions in the Middle East. For a society traditionally based on the knowledge of Islam and the Qur'an, this acceptance of non-Islamic ideas articulated through European languages signaled a profound cultural shift and an undermining of the traditional Arabic-Islamic culture.

European military penetration into the Middle East continued after World War I, as the British and French imposed League of Nations Mandates on Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq. Britain's promise to secure a homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine led to the declaration of the state of Israel by Palestine's Jewish community in 1948 and a war between the Arab states and Israel in that year, the first of five (1956, 1967, 1973, 1982).

The Challenge to Arab-Islamic Culture

The upheavals in Palestine after World War II and the continued influence of Britain and France over Arab countries inspired the political movement known as Pan-Arabism, which called for greater unity among Arab countries, independence from Western powers, and secular reforms in law and government. But in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the disparity in wealth among Arab countries has inspired many poorer Arabs to abandon secularist ideals and to support Islamic political movements that address their

grievances: poverty, the Palestinian issue, and the increasing influence of Western culture. Clearly, the growing support for an indigenous source of identity in politics (Islam) signals the failure of foreign political ideals (Western secular nationalism) to mobilize Arabs and confront issues important to them. For Arab women, such factors as class, state legal systems, and differences between rural and urban lifestyles determine how extensively they can participate in the most important institutions in society, such as government, education, and the workforce.

Though the Arabic-Islamic culture continues to be an important source of identity for the Arabs of western Asia, modern technologies, changes in law and education, and exposure to various cultural influences have challenged how this Arab-Islamic culture is received and interpreted by Arabs.

Awad Eddie Halabi

See also: **Islam-West Asia**

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ARAKAN YOMA MOUNTAINS The Arakan Yoma Mountains are a range stretching 650 kilometers from north to south in Myanmar (Burma). The range divides Myanmar into the Irrawaddy Valley to the west and a thin strip of coastal land known as Arakan to the east. The average altitude is between fifteen hundred and two thousand meters, with the highest point being Mount Victoria at 3,010 meters. The Arakan Yoma range is traversable via three major passes: the An, the Gwa, and the Taungup.

The Arakan Yoma range is sparsely populated. Chins, Nagas, and other groups populate its numerous valleys and slopes. Prior to British rule, these groups were not brought under the control of any of the precolonial lowland kingdoms of either Arakan or the Irrawaddy Valley.

The Arakan Yoma range is important to Myanmar history chiefly for two reasons. First, the Arakan Yoma is a "rain barrier" to dry middle Myanmar, blocking monsoonal rains coming from the southwest off of the Bay of Bengal. Second, the Arakan Yoma range has historically split the Burmans into two branches: the Burmans of the Irrawaddy Valley and the Arakanese, the latter living along the thin coastal strip of land on the western slope of the mountain range.

Michael Walter Charney

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ARAKI SADAŌ (1877–1966), Japanese general and politician. Araki Sadao was a general, politician, and leader of the Imperial Way faction (Kodoha, an ultranationalist group during the 1930s). A native of Tokyo and a graduate of the Japanese Military Academy and the Army War College, Araki served in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 and with the Japanese forces in Siberia in 1918. Before he served as principal of the war college, he was promoted to lieutenant general in 1927. In 1931 he briefly served as inspector general of the Army Educational Administration. The same year he became army minister in the Inukai Tsuyoshi (1855–1932) and Saito Makoto (1858–1936) cabinets, retaining the position until he resigned in 1934.

A failed coup d'état plan against the government in October 1931 sought to overthrow the cabinet and install Araki as prime minister. In February 1936 a group of junior-ranking army officers rose up in insurrection, assassinating Saito Makoto and other cabinet members. As Araki had tacitly supported the insurrectionists, he was forced to quit his position. Appointed minister of education in 1938, Araki reinforced military instruction at the schools. After World War II, he was convicted of class-A war crimes and sentenced to life imprisonment, but he was released in 1955 due to ill health.

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ARAL SEA The Aral Sea is the world's fourth-largest lake, but because of human influence, it has been shrinking since the 1960s at a pace that is unique in modern times. Desiccation has caused a spectrum of severe environmental and human problems. National and international efforts are underway to cope with them, but they will be enormously costly and require many years to deal with.

The Aral Sea is a terminal lake, that is, a lake without surface outflow, in the deserts of Central Asia. Its level is mainly determined by the balance between surface inflow from two large rivers (the Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya) and net evaporation (evaporation minus precipitation). Most of the sea's drainage basin is located in the territory of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan, newly independent states that were part of the former Soviet Union until the end of 1991.

For the first six decades of the twentieth century, the Aral's water balance was in equilibrium and level fluctuations minor. In 1960 the Aral had a level 53 meters above sea level and an area of 67,381 square kilometers. It had an average salinity of around 10 grams/liter, and its twenty indigenous species of fish supported a major fishery. The Aral also served as a key regional transportation route. The deltas of the Syr Dar'ya and Amu Dar'ya rivers sustained a diversity of natural flora and fauna as well as having major economic importance for agriculture, animal husbandry, and fishing.

Changes in the Aral Sea Region since the 1960s

Over the past four decades, the Aral Sea has steadily shrunk as expanding irrigation diminished inflow to it





A boat grounded in a receded area of the the Aral Sea in Uzbekistan in 1992. (SHEPARD SHERBELL/CORBIS)

from the Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya. In 1987, the sea split into two bodies of water. During the 1990s, average annual inflow was only 27 percent of the 1911–1960 figure.

The Aral's drying up has caused severe harm. The sea's native fishes disappeared by the early 1980s as salinity rose beyond their ability to adapt. This ended commercial fishing and threw tens of thousands of people out of work. Areas well beyond the sea and its immediate shoreline suffered as well. A 400,000-square-kilometer region around the sea, with a population of 3–4 million, has been designated an "ecological disaster zone" by the Central Asian governments.

The rich ecosystems of the Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya deltas have been particularly hard hit. Desertification has severely affected both deltas, as native plant communities are displaced by others, more tolerant of saline soil and dry climatic conditions. The extent of unique *tugai* forests, primarily composed of water-consuming trees and shrubs that once stretched along the main rivers and delta channels, has substantially diminished, as has the diversity of animals inhabiting the forests. Lakes and wetlands, which provide prime habitat for a variety of permanent and migratory waterfowl, have diminished significantly, along with aquatic bird populations.

Because irrigation now uses reduced and salinized river flow from upstream, crop yields have fallen. Declining productivity of pastures has harmed animal husbandry. Salt and dust blown from the former sea bottom carries far downwind and settles over a considerable area. This has substantially slowed plant growth and depressed crop yields. Even the climate in a 100-kilometer-wide band around the sea's former coastline has changed, with a steady trend toward warmer summers and cooler winters. The growing

season has shortened, forcing a switch from cotton to rice in the northern part of the Amu Dar'ya delta.

The population living near the Aral Sea suffers acute health problems directly related to the sea's recession. These include respiratory and digestive afflictions, possibly cancer from inhalation and ingestion of blowing salt and dust, and poorer diets from the loss of Aral fish. Bacterial contamination of drinking water is pervasive, leading to very high rates of waterborne disease.

Rehabilitation Efforts

In the late 1980s, the Soviet Union initiated programs to deal with the Aral Sea problem, but they stopped with the collapse and dissolution of the USSR in 1991. Responsibility for dealing with Aral issues fell on the five newly independent nations of the Aral Sea basin. The states signed a water-sharing measure in 1992 that guaranteed a certain share of the flow of the Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya to the Aral Sea and the river deltas. Subsequently, they signed an agreement that created an Interstate Council on the Aral Sea (ICAS) and the Interstate Fund for the Aral Sea (IFAS). The former was charged with developing and implementing a program for dealing with the Aral crisis in coordination with foreign donors. The latter's responsibility was to raise money from the five member countries for carrying out the program. The two entities merged in 1997 under the IFAS name.

International help began in 1990, but only became significant after 1991. Through its Aral Sea Basin Program, the World Bank has been coordinating the most ambitious efforts. Other key players have been the European Union, United Nations (through UNEP and UNESCO), the United States, and the Asian Development Bank.

Partial restoration of the separated northern part of the Aral Sea is feasible. This would cut salinity to levels tolerable by indigenous fishes and allow commercial fishing to resume. But restoring the much larger southern part would be much more difficult. It would require a substantial increase in water inflow from the Amu Dar'ya, which in turn would require major improvements and reductions in irrigation. Neither is likely in the foreseeable future.

Philip Micklin

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ARARAT, MOUNT Mount Ararat (Agri Dagi), positioned at latitude 44°20' east, longitude 39°20' north, is the highest mountain in Turkey at 5137 me-

ters. From the main peak, Buyuk Agri, it is less than 20 kilometers southeast to the Iranian frontier and 30 kilometers northeast to the Russian frontier. Great Ararat is an extinct volcanic cone, accompanied by a secondary cone, Little Ararat (Kucuk Agri), which rises to 3885 meters just 12 kilometers southeast of its larger brother. Together they encompass about 250 square kilometers and rise spectacularly 4250 meters above the surrounding plain at Dogubeyazit. Ararat is the final volcano in a fault-line chain that includes Mounts Erciyes, Suphan, and Nemrut, and that crosses Turkey from the southwest.

Ararat includes basalt and andesite and is a major source of obsidian, used by early humans for the manufacture of tools. Fresh lava flows date from the last eruption on 2 June 1840, when Ahora town and a monastery on the northeast slopes were buried. The summit is permanently glaciated; the longest glacier descends to an altitude of 2500 meters and is reputed to contain the remains of Noah's Ark.

Josephus, in 70 CE, mentioned the existence of the Ark. Dr. Nouri, archdeacon of Babylon and Jerusalem, claimed to have located it in 1893. Russian expeditions during the two world wars took photographs (subsequently lost), and a sighting was claimed by an American researcher in 1987. Ararat was once the focus of the Urartean and later the Armenian civilizations. The area is now occupied by Kurds and features songs and legends documented by Yasar Kemal.



Mount Ararat with the village of Dogubayazit at its base. (ADAM WOOLFITT/CORBIS)



MARCO POLO DESCRIBES MOUNT ARARAT, c. 1295

"In the heart of Greater Armenia is a very high mountain, on which Noah's Ark is said to have rested. It is so broad and long that it takes more than two days to go round it. On the summit the snow lies so deep all the year that no one can ever climb it. But on the lower slopes the herbage is so lush and luxurious that, in summer, all the beasts from far and near resort here and yet the supply never fails."

Source: James Bryce (1996) *Transcaucasia and Ararat*. London: Macmillan and Co.

Confounding Marco Polo (c. 1295), who thought that the snow on the summit was so deep that no one could climb it, Ararat was first climbed by Professor Parrot, a German, in 1829. With military permission, a guide, and two overnight camps en route, it presents no technical problems, and mountaineering tourism is becoming an important source of local income.

Kate Clow

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ARATA ISOZAKI (b. 1931), Japanese architect. Born in Oita City, Japan, Arata Isozaki took an approach to architecture that was rooted in postwar art movements. His work has been described as "conceptual architecture" (Drew 1982: 18). Isozaki often used quotation to establish a certain sense of displacement; many of these references were obscure and personal, including distorted abstractions referring to Mickey Mouse and Marilyn Monroe, but a number also drew from the Western architectural canon.

In the 1960s Isozaki was best known for his drawings of dystopian structures rising from ruins. Isozaki's concurrent buildings reflected a fascination with technology, but were deliberately cold and abstract, rejecting their surroundings. In the 1970s, this abstraction

grew pronounced; Isozaki developed a series that toyed with cubic volumes and barrel vaults to achieve a neutral emptiness. Inevitably, the emergence of postmodern architecture in the West during the 1980s created many opportunities for Isozaki to work abroad, particularly in Spain and the United States, but his biting approach was frequently lost in the translation.

The 1990s and beyond saw Isozaki return to a criticism of technology, often juxtaposed with fragments from Western architecture. Throughout his career, Isozaki was a prolific essayist, and his writings offer a remarkable commentary, not only on his own work, but also on the trends influencing architects both in Japan and abroad.

Dana Buntrock

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ARCHAEOLOGY-TURKEY Archaeology began in Turkey with Heinrich Schliemann's (1822–1890) dramatic discovery and excavation of ancient Troy, where he worked from 1870 on, and has continued to be dominated by foreigners who, in conjunction with Turkey's own archaeologists, use more and more sophisticated methods to unravel the history of this key land mass. Turkey's Cultural Ministry attracts some 0.02 percent of the state budget, only a fraction of which goes to the Museums and Sites Directorate for the preservation of huge concentrations of prehistoric and historic sites along Turkey's trade routes, coasts, and river valleys. Turkey has the greatest cultural variety of archeological remains of any country in the world.

One of the world's oldest towns has been discovered in Turkey—Catalhuyuk (dating from 6500 to 5500 BCE), and the supposed resting place of Noah's Ark, Mount Ararat, lies in Turkey, as do Van, capital of the ancient Urartean kingdom (which flourished from about the thirteenth to about the seventh century BCE), and Bogazkoy, capital of the mighty Hittite empire, which flourished from about 1700 to 1380 BCE. Other historic sites include Urfa, the birthplace of Abraham; Miletus, a colonizing Greek city-state;



Remains of the Library of Celsus in Ephesus, Turkey, in 1997. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

the seven churches of Asia originally founded by Saint Paul; Constantinople, the capital of the Eastern Roman empire; Hagia Sophia, the world's largest church; the medieval Armenian kingdom of Cilicia; a sprinkling of Crusader castles; and Trabzon, the last surviving outpost of Byzantium. The uniquely Turkish Seljuk and Ottoman empires are also represented almost exclusively in present-day Turkey.

Since the fashion for the grand tour began in Europe in the nineteenth century, this cultural storehouse has been raided by western collectors and museums; authorized exports include the Pergamon Zeus Altar, which has its own museum in Berlin; the tombs of Xanthos, in their own room in the British Museum; and the Heroon from Myra, on display in Vienna. Other collectors took advantage of a country of uneducated peasants, who, until only fifty years ago, filled the time between sowing and harvest by tomb raiding and treasure seeking. The treasures of Troy adorned Schliemann's wife and now reside in Russia; as recently as 1962, Dumbarton Oaks acquired early Byzantine silver artifacts that had been smuggled out of Turkey illegally, and the Getty Museum has recently returned portions of a Greek sarcophagus. Not surprisingly, to prevent a recurrence of art theft, all excavations in Turkey are now supervised by Cultural Ministry staff.

The first famous Turkish archaeologist was Osman Hamdi (1842–1910), who excavated the Royal Ceme-

tery at Sidon and brought the sarcophagi back to the new Istanbul Museum. The Ankara Museum (established in 1921) resulted from Atatürk's interest in the Hittites. Together these institutions sparked a change in the perception of the educated public. Foreign organizations, in particular the British Institute of Archaeology in Ankara; the Spanish Archaeological Mission; the Middle Eastern Culture Center, Tokyo; the German Archaeological Institute; the Institute for Aegean Pre-History; the Institute for Classical Archaeology, Vienna, as well as universities in the United States, France, Belgium, Italy, and elsewhere have participated in investigations and excavations in Turkey. The drowning of many important prehistoric, Roman, and early Turkish sites by the construction of twenty-two dams on the Euphrates and the plan for a similar sequence of dams on the Tigris have made rescue archaeology an important part of the Turkish scene.

Prehistoric Period

The excavation of Upper Palaeolithic cave settlements near Antalya demonstrated early hominid occupation there. The Neolithic site of Catalhuyuk, near Konya, represents one of the world's first permanent settlements; it was discovered in 1958 by James Mellaart. Excavation continues, and this town, with houses and shrines decorated with relief sculptures and wall paintings, is now a World Heritage Site.

Bronze Age

Central Anatolia was ruled by the Hatti (early Bronze age indigenous inhabitants of the region, up until about 1800 BCE), whose royal tombs at Alacahoyuk were excavated from 1940 on by the Turkish archaeologists Remzi Oguz Arik and Hamit Kosay. They discovered bronze, silver, and gold objects of extraordinary beauty, including the famous deer standard now used as a symbol of Ankara. The excavation of the Assyrian trade colony at Kanesh (which dates from 1950 BCE) by Tahsin Ozguc and Nimet Ozguc yielded thousands of clay tablets inscribed with trade records in cuneiform script, as well as traces of early Hittite occupation. Levels contemporary with the Kanesh excavation at Troy held bronze weapons, silver objects, and Schliemann's treasure; sophisticated wheel-made pottery was also found.

Early Civilizations

Excavations at Bogazkoy, the capital of the Hittite civilization, whose physical remains were previously unknown, were begun by Hugo Winckler in 1906, suspended during World War I, and recommenced from 1931. The magnificent ruins of the site were uncovered, and a huge stock of cuneiform tablets was gradually deciphered to reveal a rich code of laws, legends, and customs; a contemporary fort at Ortakoy (Corum) is under excavation. Neo-Hittite sites under investigation include Arslantepe, Sirkeli Hoyuk, and Carchemish (Karkamis, which is to be submerged under a new dam on the Syrian border).

Farther east the Urartean site at Toprakkale, Van, was wrecked in the nineteenth century by Austin Henry Layard's hasty unprofessional excavation; Altintepe, near Erzurum, was excavated by Turkish archaeologists and yielded impressive graves; Oktay Belli is currently excavating a pair of Urartean fortresses near Van.

Four contemporaneous west Anatolian cultures (c. 700–300 BCE), the Phrygian, Lydian, Carian, and Lycian, have yielded important sites. Gordion, capital city of King Midas, was excavated first by German then by American teams; ornate grave goods, including inlaid tables, are now in the Ankara Museum. Sardis, the capital of Croesus's Lydian kingdom (c. seventh century–546 BCE), is currently under American excavation. Site of the world's first minted coins, it has yielded smelting furnaces. Lycian Xanthos has been excavated by the French since 1958, and Turkish excavations at nearby Patara have shown that the site was occupied as early as the eighth century BCE.



TROY-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Troy was designated a UNESCO World Heritage site in 1992. Immortalized in Homer's *Iliad*, Troy is considered one of the world's most important archeological sites for its contribution to the understanding of early European culture.

Greek and Roman Periods

The first Greek colonies were founded on Turkey's western seaboard from 1000 BCE and began to expand in the seventh century BCE; most of these cities continued in occupation through the period of conquest by Alexander of Macedon (356–323 BCE) and the Roman annexation; by the first century CE the Romans had absorbed the independent states of the interior as far as the Euphrates. Development of the cities of Asia Minor accelerated progressively after Alexander until Marcus Aurelius (176 CE). The slow decline that followed was interrupted by periods of Byzantine revival, until many sites were abandoned in the face of the advance of Islam (eighth century). These glorious cities are currently being excavated and restored as tourism showcases and provide a source of revenue for the Culture Ministry. The most magnificent examples are Pergamon and Didyma, both currently being restored by German teams; Ephesus, with its huge, nearly intact theater, and a villa suburb where members of the Austrian Archaeological Institute are at work; the *colonia* of Sagalassos, where a systematic and thorough investigation and excavation under Marc Waelkens is supported by Belgian funds; and Aphrodisias, where conservation and a new museum mark considerable progress under the Americans. In comparison, the Turkish excavation of Saint Paul's city of Antioch in Pisidia is underfunded and poorly exhibited.

Rescue Archaeology

At a Roman villa suburb at Zeugma on the Euphrates, excavators fought against time to save mosaics from drowning beneath the Birecik dam in 2000. Some of the rescued mosaics are now on exhibition in Gaziantep museum; a new annex is being built to accommodate more. But frescoes at the site were lost and much of the site lies unexcavated beneath the water. The Chalcolithic-Bronze Age-Urak sites of Hainebi, Tilbes, and Horum Hoyuk are due to disappear beneath the same lake. Roman Samosata and several medieval churches were sub-

merged under the Atatürk Dam. Museums in the area have participated in excavations of prehistoric sites and have excellent displays. Throughout Turkey individual museum directors are empowered to conduct salvage operations during local construction projects, but the loss of Turkey's, and particularly Istanbul's, Byzantine and Seljuk historic buildings is the most tragic aspect of Turkish archaeology today.

Later Periods

Since most Byzantine monuments were built over Roman sites, they must be excavated to get at the Greek and Roman remains beneath; only one or two churches have been excavated for their own merits. Seljuk and Ottoman sites are similarly neglected, although recent research projects have documented sites at Artvin, Ardahan, Harput, Binbir Kilise, and Aya Tekla, as well as the Georgian churches in the area between Bayburt and Artvin and churches at Nigde and Akhisar.

Prospects

At present, unless tourism promises a profit, Turkey's government will not prioritize archaeology; thus projects often depend on outside pressure and funding. Further rescue archaeology is now required before the Tigris valley dams flood the glorious medieval cave city of Hasan Keyf and other sites. However fund-raising is nearly complete for excavations at the tourism destination of Nemrut Dagi, where the tomb of Antiochus Commagene lies under a mountaintop tumulus surrounded by a pantheon of stone gods.

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ARCHITECTURAL DECORATION—CENTRAL ASIA

Throughout Asia indigenous peoples use local resources in developing regional types of architecture. Desert regions use clay, adobe, and fired bricks. In Western Asia, parts of India, China, Japan, and Korea, builders used carved wood. Great stone temples were built in Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia.

In Asia there is a distinction between the private and the public sphere. Public architecture must con-

form to certain rules. Public decorative architecture relies heavily on symmetry, which helps place the building and its users in a societal hierarchy that defines the rank of building itself. In China it is the difference between Taoism and Confucianism. Taoism is private and Confucianism is public. In the private sphere the symmetry collapses, and naturalistic forms of flowers, plants, and representational art are used to decorate structures. Private homes in China have unpainted wood, and ink paintings on the rough plaster walls. In Mughal India, harem buildings have paintings of dancing girls that would be strictly forbidden for a throne room.

In China, dating back to the Shijiu dynasty, the use of colors defined status. Yellow was reserved for the royal family and black was for peasants, according to societal laws that remained in force until the end of the nineteenth century. Tie beams were carved with motifs of stylized dragons, mythical animals, nine-tailed turtles, and lucky symbols (including the auspicious swastika, a symbol of the sun or the rolling of time). The glazing of roof tiles began in the Tang dynasty.

In Muslim countries, geometric patterns are used to conform to the nonrepresentational art of Qur'anic law, and colors create distinctions between ruling powers. During the classical phase of Islamic architecture, the use of *muqarnas* (stalactite or honeycomb vaulting) was introduced. In the mosques, the formal structure is organized with the orientation of the *mibrab*, the niche that indicates the direction of Mecca. In Bukhara the ninth- to tenth-century mausoleum of the Samanids exemplifies the use of patterned and carved brick in a jewel of geometric balance. In Samarqand, palaces, mosques, and mausoleums displayed faultless, exquisite blue tiles; color variation was not allowed. In China, all decorations on the Temple of Heaven are perfect and geometrically precise; the woodwork, beams, brackets, floor tiles, and cobalt-blue roof tiles are as close to perfection as humanly possible. By contrast, in Japan the height of style and elegance is a tea-house with thatched roof, unpainted posts and lintels, and a floor made of rough boards. Nowhere in Asia was the imperfect valued as highly as in Japan.

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ARCHITECTURE—CENTRAL ASIA Architecture in Central Asia has a very long history—the oldest evidence of human-made structures was discovered in early farming settlements dated around 7000 BCE. These sites lie in the oases north of the Kopet Dag Mountains that extend about 645 kilometers between present-day northeast Iran and Turkmenistan. Here in southern Turkmenistan, the Neolithic village of Djeitun had thirty one-room houses made of mud bricks, with plastered floors, hearths, and often wall paintings. In the same area, at the Early Chalcolithic site of Chagilli Tepe, dated around 5000 BCE, were multiroom houses that formed large complexes along streets and alleys.

Larger settlements arose in Central Asia during the Middle Chalcolithic Age (c. 4000–3500 BCE). In the Tedzhen River delta in present-day south Turkmenistan, fortified settlements arose; these had circular towers connected to thick walls, with a large rectangular house on a platform in the middle. Proto-urban settlements (Namazga Tepe and Altyn Tepe) arose in the Late Chalcolithic (c. 3500–3000 BCE) and expanded in the Early Bronze Age (3000–2500 BCE), reaching areas of fifty and twenty-five hectares, respectively. At Altyn Tepe, pilastered ramparts 2.3 meters thick were flanked by two rectangular towers in the north, while two rectangular towers protected the main entrance, flanking the 6-meter-thick wall in the south. There was also an elite quarter with richly decorated multiroom houses and wide streets, a crafts quarter with pottery kilns and copper-smelting furnaces, a priests' quarter with shrines, and a monumental towerlike structure on a stepped platform, resembling Mesopotamian ziggurats (temple towers).

Several large settlements with square-shaped fortresses appeared in the delta of the Murgab River that flows through northwestern Afghanistan and southeastern Turkmenistan. Large sites are also noted north and south of the Amu Dar'ya River that flows from the Pamirs to the Aral Sea. In this region, the fortified settlement of Sapalli Tepe consisted of several multiroom quarters with T-shaped corridors clustered along the streets. Smaller fortified settlements with citadels appeared in the Murgab delta during the Early Iron Age (1200–800 BCE). Iron Age (700–400 BCE) settlements in the Fergana Valley, in today's Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, had defensive walls with towers and monumental buildings.

The Rise of Cities

Several urban-type settlements and fortresses arose in southern Turkmenistan when this area became in-

cluded in the Parthian kingdom (c. 250 BCE–c. 226 CE). The largest settlement, New Nisa, had a palatial building and several temples.

Following the eastern campaigns of Alexander of Macedon (356–323 BCE), Central Asia became part of an independent Bactrian kingdom (250–130 BCE), greatly influenced by Greek culture. The city of Ai Khanum, located on the left bank of the Amu Dar'ya River and protected by thick mud-brick walls, possessed impressive public buildings, including a royal palace, gymnasium, theater, arsenal, and Greek-style residential houses.

Later, Bactria was incorporated into the powerful Kushan kingdom (78–200), whose rulers encouraged the spread of Buddhism. The city of Airtam, on the Amu Dar'ya, had a significant Buddhist temple with a sculptured frieze. The city of Khalchyan on the Surkhandarya River in today's Uzbekistan included a palace with a gallery of sculptures of local rulers. Dalverzin Tepe on the same river had a citadel, palace, and residential areas within the city walls.

As early as the eighth or seventh century BCE, Afrasitab (Samarqand before the time of Timur, the Turkic conqueror, 1336–1405) and Yerkurgan had developed as fortified settlements along the middle stretches of the Zeravshan River, which flows through today's Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. During the third through sixth centuries, Yerkurgan possessed a palatial building and at least two temples. At the same time, Toprak-Qala, north of the Amu Dar'ya and opposite the city of Urganch in western Uzbekistan, was protected by rectangular clay walls; it had three towered castles with a range of palatial halls. The so-called Hall of Kings had painted walls and housed a collection of clay statues of local rulers, their wives, and warriors, some of them of Indian ancestry. A different architectural design consisting of concentric circles was found at the nearby site of Koy-Kryglan-Qala.

The fourth and fifth centuries saw a decline in urban development in Central Asia following the collapse of the Kushan state in India and the conquest of the region by the Persian Sasanid dynasty (224/228–651). In the sixth through eighth centuries, the older cities such as Samarqand, Toprak-Qala, and Mary (in today's Turkmenistan) recovered, and new ones (Pendjikent and many others) were established. These included fortified sites (such as castles, *kesbk*), palaces, ritual places, and dwelling houses. Pendjikent consisted of blocks of two-story houses with vaulted roofs and walls often covered with paintings and decorated with carving. In Uzbekistan, the cities of Afrasiab, Varakhsha, and Pendjikent had monumental palaces

erected on elevated platforms, with several large halls adorned with wall paintings. Ritual places reflected a multitude of religious beliefs: Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, and Manichaeism.

Islamic Architecture

The spread of Islam following the Arab conquests in the seventh and eighth centuries led to the emergence of architecture that was typically Islamic. The oldest mosques in Samarqand (Afrasiab), Mary, and Bashan are dated to the ninth and tenth centuries. Early mausoleums or monumental tombs are known in the city of Bukhara in Uzbekistan and Samarqand, among others. During the Seljuk dynasty (1038–1157), stone-built caravansaries arose along the Central Asian trade routes.

Timurid Architecture

The Mongol invasion in 1220–1221 led to almost total destruction of urban life in Central Asia. Only mausoleums have survived from that period. Timur, however, who made Samarqand his base of power in 1370, contributed to a new rise in urban development with the erection of numerous monumental buildings. Architectural traditions were enhanced under the reign of Ulugh Beg (1394–1449), Timur's grandson, who made Samarqand a center of Muslim culture. Impressive monuments of the Timurid era (fourteenth to fifteenth centuries) included mausoleums, mosques, and *madrasabs* (religious colleges) in Samarqand, as well as libraries, hospitals, and water-supply facilities.

Traditional Central Asian architecture included several types of mosques: a dome over a square chamber, an open barrel-vaulted hall, a richly decorated

portal (the *iwan*), and an open court surrounded by arcades; the minarets or prayer towers were circular or conical. Mausoleums usually had a domed structure raised over a square base. The *madrasab* consisted of an inner courtyard surrounded by one- or two-story buildings that included a mosque, lecture rooms, and living rooms.

Developments in the Sixteenth through Nineteenth Centuries

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, urban development was restricted to larger cities such as Samarqand and Bukhara, where impressive architectural assemblages were erected. Large mosques had a main dome, typically onion shaped in Central Asia, and an impressive arched *iwan* along the central axis; smaller district mosques had open *iwans*; *madrasabs* were designed with four *iwans*, a central court, numerous cells, a monumental *pishtak* (portico), and corner minarets. Domed bazaars and water reservoirs also date from this period.

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, impressive palatial buildings were erected, particularly in Khiva, in the oasis west of the lower Amu Dar'ya in Uzbekistan. After Central Asia became part of the Russian empire in 1860, European-type agglomerations developed alongside the older structures in major administrative centers such as Tashkent and Samarqand in Uzbekistan and Ashkhabad in southern Turkmenistan. Under Soviet rule (1920–1991) there was an intensive development of residential housing throughout Central Asia, along with public buildings (theaters, museums, educational and recreational facilities). After independence in 1991, new official buildings were constructed, particularly in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, with the intention of developing an infrastructure for tourism.

Pavel Dolukhanov



ITCHAN KALA—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

The last oasis before Iran for caravaners crossing the desert, Itchan Kala in Uzbekistan was designated a UNESCO World Heritage site in 1990. The site still contains a few superb examples of Central Asian architecture, including the Djuma Mosque and two magnificent nineteenth-century palaces.

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ARCHITECTURE—CHINA Since earliest times, Chinese aboveground construction has been dominated by wood. The timber frame is China's major technological contribution to world architecture, and its wooden architectural design is unparalleled in its flexibility, adaptability, versatility, and ability to withstand earthquakes.

The wooden support system can be traced through more than four millennia of Chinese building history, from the Neolithic period in the fourth and third centuries BCE into the twenty-first century CE. Other features of Chinese architecture with a multimillennial history include the foundation platform and the decorative roof. The part of the Chinese wooden structure in which change can most readily be seen is the bracket set, the group of wooden interlocking components that attach to pillars to help support the roof without the use of abrasives or other aids in joinery.

Chinese building styles evolved over time, but the developments often do not correspond to the change in dynasties. The Chinese most often define their architectural tradition according to early, middle, and late periods. Early structures are those from the beginnings of the Chinese building system in Neolithic times through the Bronze Age (last two millennia BCE), the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), and the period of disunion known as the Three Kingdoms and Northern and Southern dynasties (220–589 CE). The middle period begins with reunification under the Sui dynasty (581–618 CE) in the 580s and continues through the Tang dynasty (618–907) and the Song period (960–1279). Architectural historians do not agree on the break between the middle and late periods. Most understand the period of Mongolian rule (the Yuan dynasty, 1267–1368) as transitional, with later, or pre-modern architecture, defined as the fourteenth through nineteenth centuries. In this evolution, the years 1103 and 1734 are benchmarks. Those are the dates of issue of the two complete and extant court-sponsored building manuals, the *Yingzao fashi* (Building Standards) and *Gongbu gongcheng zuofa zeli* (Engineering Manual for the Board of Works). From these writings, it is known that even though general principles of Chinese construction seem to change little over long periods of

time, at any given time the differences between important, or high-ranking, architecture and more humble construction are always apparent.

Three other features distinguish the Chinese building tradition from those of most other parts of the world. First, to a Chinese, the word architecture means not only buildings such as pagodas or temples, but cities, gardens, and tombs. Second, a Chinese building is almost always part of a complex of structures, joined to one another and interrelated physically by covered walkways or spatially by construction around courtyards. Third, rarely is the name of an architect associated with a building in China. Designs for palaces and cities and for imperial monasteries and imperial gardens were produced at court, the pay scale and allotments of materials for building construction were standardized, builders were craftsmen, and an overriding modular system made it possible for a group of craftsman-builders to erect a timber frame based on proportional units.

Early Architecture

Most of our knowledge of Chinese architecture before the first millennium CE has come from excavation. Some of the sites such as the Shang (c. 1700–1100 BCE) capital at Anyang (c. 1300–1050 BCE) have been studied for nearly eighty years. Others have been discovered and opened within the last decade. Most impressive about the Neolithic sites such as Banpo in Shaanxi, Chengzhiyai in Shandong, Hemudu in Zhejiang, and Niuwuliang in Liaoning is that although a different Neolithic culture is represented at each of them, each had four-sided structures defined by exterior columns, each had a great hall or temple, each shows evidence of platforms or walls made by the terre-pise method (also known as the rammed-earth method), and probably each was enclosed by an outer wall.

Anyang was preceded by six Shang capitals, two others also in Henan. From the three sites, we know that Shang cities were enclosed by walls as long as seven kilometers in perimeter, that large structures may have been palaces, that residential architecture was raised on building foundations, and that tombs of immense proportions were dug underground and were faced with wooden walls. It is also known that buildings, presumably funerary shrines or temples, stood above ground on top of the burial chambers.

Our first evidence of gardens is from the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE). So far, information about gardens and pleasure palaces is known only through literary sources. Zhou was an extremely important pe-

riod in the history of Chinese urbanism. Each of the hundred-plus rulers of cities or states had a walled capital. Among them were many with a wall-enclosed palace-city inside the outer wall. This feature was to become a trademark of Chinese imperial planning, preserved even in the last great capital, Beijing, and its Forbidden City. Among the plans of Zhou cities were three distinct ones: the palace area could be near the center of the outer wall, in the north center, or it could be adjacent to the outer city. Sometimes this last type is known as a double-city and sometimes the two walls reflect more than one building period. Finally, from the Zhou we have texts that describe the ideal ruler's city and ritual halls. The earliest remains of imperial ritual halls, so far, are from the Han dynasty.

From the period of unification of the Chinese states by the man known as the First Emperor (Qin Shi Huangdi, c. 259–210 BCE) in 221 BCE until the fall of the subsequent dynasty, the Han, in 220 CE, we have both aboveground building remains and extensive information about funerary architecture. The most impressive architectural achievement of the age was the Great Wall, the idea for which was promulgated by the First Emperor and construction of which occurred off and on from the Qin dynasty up through the sixteenth century. Inside the walls of the Qin capital at Xianyang and the Han capitals at Chang'an and Luoyang, palace complexes extended for miles.

Most of the freestanding architecture of the Han period is of a form known as *que*, a gate tower. These multistory, narrow structures stood in pairs at the entrance to tombs and on either side of gateways to cities and palace complexes and were mimicked in structures atop the corners of walls that enclosed palaces and cities. Additional evidence for the *que* form is preserved in countless relief sculptures that once lined the walls of Han tombs, especially in the provinces of Sichuan, Henan, and Shandong and in murals in tombs from almost every part of China. The actual burial chambers of the First Emperor and emperors and empresses of the Han remain unopened, but hundreds of Han tombs have been excavated. From them, it is known that while common people were buried in simple pits, wealthy citizens, aristocrats, and members of the royal family built tombs with as many as nine or ten rooms, the large ones connected along a line and joined to smaller side chambers by corridors. Made of permanent materials, primarily brick and stone, for eternal residence in the afterlife, these underground palaces were believed to have followed the forms of residential architecture above ground that were built in perishable wood. From the tombs and replicas of architectural forms, it is known that by the Han pe-

riod, bracket sets, ceramic-tile roofs, and vaulted ceilings were in widespread use.

The last period that represents early architecture in China was one in which Buddhism, brought to China from India and other Western regions, was the main religion. A capital city like Luoyang had more than 1,300 Buddhist monasteries in the period of Northern Wei rule (493–534). Only foundations remain from any of those temple complexes. Buddhist architecture of the third through sixth centuries survives in the form of pagodas and in interior construction and decoration of worship caves.

The earliest dated pagoda in China, from 523, stands at Songyue Monastery on Mt. Song in Henan Province. Its dodecagonal shape and fifteen tiers of densely spaced eaves are unique. The single-story, four-sided pagoda at Shentong Monastery in Licheng, Sichuan, was built in 544. In general, Chinese pagodas were four-sided in plan through the early years of the Tang dynasty, but in profile they could be of uniform exterior dimension, such as was the case at Shentong Monastery, or they could diminish in perimeter from base to roof. Made of either brick or stone, the exteriors were decorated with columns, bracket sets, and roof eaves in imitation of wooden architecture. Pagodas of both shapes are found inside Buddhist caves known as central-pillar caves.

Middle Period

The oldest extant wooden architecture in China is a hall dated to 782 of the Tang dynasty (618–907) at the Nanchan Monastery on the sacred Buddhist peak Mt. Wutai in Shanxi. The other three extant wooden buildings from the Tang period are also in Shanxi, a second on Mt. Wutai and two in the southern part of the province. The timber frame had reached full maturity at this time.

No palace building survives from the Tang, but excavation at the capital city, Chang'an, largest city in the world in the eighth century, with a population of more than 1 million, has been so extensive and textual descriptions are so excellent, that the placement of every building in every Tang palace complex is known. Many have been reconstructed on paper. The sites of the tomb of each emperor and empress of the Tang period are also known, and the monumental sculptures that lined the approaches to those tombs survive at several of them. Scores of tombs of Tang princes and princesses have been excavated; many of these are satellites to the tombs of the emperors and empresses. Finally, the earliest open-spandrel bridge in the world, Anji Bridge in Zhao county, Hebei, survives from the

first decade of the seventh century, just before the founding of the Tang empire.

About fifty wooden buildings survive from the two centuries following Tang, including several of the most extraordinary wooden structures ever built in China. In far North China, in Inner Mongolia, the non-Chinese Liao dynasty (947–1125) commissioned pavilions and pagodas in wood that used more varieties of bracket sets than ever before in a single structure. The 67.31-meter pagoda of Fogong Monastery in Ying county, Shanxi, tallest wooden structure in the world, has fifty-four different types of bracketing. It also exhibits a second feature characteristic of Liao wooden buildings, concealed interior stories that do not correspond to those visible outside. The pagoda has five exterior stories plus a sixth set of roof eaves, and four additional mezzanine levels inside. In masonry construction, the Liao built four varieties of pagodas, some with base, shaft, and densely placed eaves like the pagoda dated to 523 on Mt. Song and others with a shaft and roof for each story. Most pagodas of Liao and Northern Song (960–1126), the Chinese dynasty to Liao's south, were octagonal in plan. Octagons and hexagons also became widespread in the shapes of underground rooms of both Liao and Song tombs.

Later Architecture

The modern period of Chinese architecture was ushered in by Mongolian rule. In spite of the ethnic background of the imperial family, most construction during the period known as the Yuan dynasty (1267–1368) followed Chinese building standards. More than 250 wooden buildings remain from the Yuan period. Among the most famous are a gate and three halls at Yongle Daoist Monastery in southern Shanxi.

The Forbidden City is the architectural masterpiece of China's last great age, the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties. First and foremost, the Forbidden City was the home of Chinese emperors and the center of their universe. Its plan embodies the 2,000 years of architectural history leading up to it. The focus of the Forbidden City is the Three Great Halls, elevated together on a triple-layer marble platform. The capital-I shape of the platform was reserved for China's most eminent architectural arrangements. It is replicated directly behind, in the Three Back Halls, where the emperor and empress slept and where the empress held audiences. Surrounding are an array of palaces, where every aspect of life from the education of the princes to preparation of food to intrigues was enacted. Today, most of the Forbidden City is used for public exhibition halls

for former imperial treasures and offices of the Palace Museum. Directly in front, on ground once restricted from public passage, is Tiananmen Square.

Many of China's other architectural masterpieces of the Ming and Qing dynasties are in Beijing or its suburbs. Most important are the Ming Tombs, where thirteen emperors and their empresses are buried underneath circular mounds with ceremonial halls in front of them. Some of the ceremonial halls are raised on three-tier marble platforms like the one under the Three Great Halls, and the individual halls follow the forms of the principal halls of the Forbidden City. Surrounding the Forbidden City were the suburban altars, epitomized by the Altar of Heaven complex. Its three main halls along a north-south line were the locus of annual imperial supplications to heaven on behalf of the Chinese state. Circular in plan but surrounded by a four-sided enclosure, the Hall for Prayer for a Prosperous Year is the only Chinese structure with a three-tier conical roof. Qing imperial architecture extended beyond Beijing to include five summer palaces north of the Forbidden City; The Eastern and Western Imperial Tombs in Hebei; a palace and tombs in Shenyang, Liaoning; and a Summer Palace in Chengde, Hebei.

The last periods of premodern Chinese history were also times of architectural accomplishment outside the imperial sphere. Private gardens of wealthy citizens, especially in southeastern cities like Suzhou and Yangzhou, have attracted international attention. Contrasting with the poetics of landscape architecture are the residential styles of China's populations on the fringes of the empire—flat-roofed houses designed for mountainous settings in Tibet, tents of the Mongolian grasslands, houses raised on stilts in the humid swamplands of the south, circular houses of the Hakka in Fujian, and two-story houses with skywells in the center in Anhui, for example. It was finally in the Qing period that ethnicity became apparent in Chinese architecture.

Until modern architecture was imposed by city ordinances or national laws in the last half of the twentieth century, Chinese architecture resisted modernization. Chinese-style roofs still cap schools, hospitals, and government offices otherwise made of reinforced concrete. Public buildings retain courtyards at their entrances. Hotels and restaurants relinquish precious space for miniature replicas of Ming gardens. And the Forbidden City has remained the immutable focus of Beijing and symbol of all of China.

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See also: **Architecture, Vernacular—China; Courtyards; Great Wall; Imperial Palace**

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ARCHITECTURE—INDIA The architecture of India, from all periods in its history, presents a complex picture for the casual observer for several reasons. First, the country's continuous tradition of settled culture, from the fourth century BCE until the early 2000s, is punctuated by numerous political, social, religious, and cultural changes, affecting its built environment in significant ways. Second, the immense variety of formal treatments and spatial arrangements within Indian architecture have made any straightforward categorization extremely difficult. Scholarly research has, therefore, concentrated on particular periods or phases, rather than attempting a holistic treatment. Third, variations in Indian architecture (at least in its ancient and medieval phases), and particularly those dealing with stylistic and iconographic issues, were neither culture-specific nor region-specific. In the Indian context, styles of architecture over history were not necessarily limited by geographical, cultural or political constraints. Therefore, not only were there large variations and similarities in the architecture of different regions within a larger empire, but also in the architecture of successive dynasties.

Architectural developments in India are classified into four chronological phases, which, while being stylistically distinct, incorporated several common formal, spatial, and compositional characteristics. The first extended from the fourth century BCE to the fifth century CE. The second spanned the fifth to the thirteenth centuries. Building activity between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries constituted the third, while the fourth phase began with the colonial period and continues in the twenty-first century.

Fourth Century BCE through Fifth Century CE

Documented remains from the earliest period of Indian architecture were brought to light in 1920s, through the excavation of Mohenjo Daro and Harappa, two cities in the Indus plain. Although more than four hundred miles apart, both were apparently organized on a rectangular plan, and had largely iden-

tical urban layouts—evidence that they were part of an extensive culture that once flourished over a large region. That culture reached its peak in the first quarter of the second millennium BCE. Beyond this, glimpses of ancient Indian settlements and building types may be gained from the enormous corpus of ancient literature, including great epics such as the *Mahabharata* and *Ramayana*; collations of folk legends, such as the *Jatakas*; or the *shastras*—all of which contain descriptions of ancient cities and buildings. Corroborating relief and fresco cycles seen at Sanchi, Bharhut, Amaravati, and Ajanta describe a great deal more, showing exactly what kinds of buildings were constructed in this era, and how they varied in size, function, complexity, and context. Also apparent are conventions that defined the physical layouts of structures (mainly sacred sites), settlements, military camps, and large cities.

Within this vast gamut, two specific kinds of buildings still survive for us to examine in more detail. These are the stupa (burial mound), and the rock-cut sanctuary, both structures serving the needs of the two predominant religions of the time, Buddhism and Jainism. From early versions constructed from impacted mud and clay, and serving as a simple demarcation of the deceased's remains, the stupa developed its typical hemispherical form, fixed at the cardinal points by formal gates or *toranas*. At the Mahastupa at Sanchi, this mound was enlarged to nearly twice its original size over a high drum-like plinth and clad in brick and stone. A double-ramp led to a terrace that ran around the drum, and was itself contained within an elaborately carved railing. The Mahabodhi temple at Gaya followed similar principles, although the vertical attenuation of the temple-tower, unusual for a stupa, resembled a temple *shikhara*. The Sanchi complex also has substantial remains of sanctuaries or monasteries. Organized either as rooms around a building courtyard or around centralized, enclosed spaces such as those in rock-cut *chaitya* halls, they served as hostels for traveling monks. Within the architectural details of the stupa and sanctuary, possibly the most striking feature is the rendition of timber details in stone, strongly suggesting that similar structures had existed in the past, constructed of wood. In several examples, fake stone beams and overhanging eaves seemingly supported barrel-vaulted, rock-cut halls. The Lomas Rishi Hall, for instance, was given a facade representing a timber structure with inclined posts, purlins, rafters, friezes, and bowed roof and pot finial, all carved out of solid rock. Similar discoveries have been made at Bhaja, Nasik, Junnar, Bedsa, Karle, Kanheri, Kondane, Pitalkhora, Aurangabad, Ellora and Ajanta.

Fifth through Thirteenth Centuries

Historically one of the most complex for developments in Indian architecture, this period was characterized by the growing popularity of Hinduism in large parts of the Indian subcontinent. The expansion of Hinduism coincided with an elaboration of the physical structure of the temple itself, which began to be controlled by a system of proportions and metaphysical rhythms in plan and elevation contained within the science of *Vastushastra*.

Early freestanding structures, such as Temple Seventeen at Sanchi and the Mahadeva Temple at Udayapur, were relatively simple, consisting of a portico connected to a flat-roofed square cella. In later constructions, in addition to an elaborate, stepped plinth that served to position the building, an upper shrine chamber was introduced above the cella. At the Durga and Meguti Temples at Aihole, a further preoccupation with the apsidal form of temple buildings occurred, allowing for two separate zones of ambulation—one within the cella, and the other outside. Meanwhile, extensive experimentation had also modified the temple structure, as demonstrated in the richly decorated *shikhara* of the Lakshmana Temple at Sirpur.

Rock-cut sanctuaries of the earlier period were elaborated upon in a similar manner. The relatively simple, apsidal, primarily residential *chaitya-griha* was modified into an elaborate rectangular hall with surrounding cells and portico, based to some extent on the nine-square formula that was also adopted for the layouts of freestanding temples. This was to be the characteristic feature of most of the major constructions at Ajanta, Ellora, and Elephanta. Finally, there were also points when temple construction and rock-cut sanctuaries merged. Perhaps inspired by the elaborate, gigantic rock-excavated constructions, there was a significant move towards building colossal structures, which served as physical evocations of the omnipotent sublime. The *rathas*, carved from solid rock at Mahabalipuram, the Virupaksha Temple at Pattadakal, and the Kailasa Temple at Ellora, are important in this respect. Equally awe-inspiring for their size and grandeur are the temple complexes at Tiruvarur, Chidambaram, Darasuram, and Tanjavur.

Thirteenth through Eighteenth Centuries

Spanning the thirteenth through the eighteenth centuries, the third phase of developments comprised two separate trends: the activities of the Delhi sultanate (1192–1526), and architectural patronage under the Mughal empire (1526–1857). For both trends, the city of Delhi (the capital of present-day India) was a

primary center of activity and retained its status as the imperial capital, although the actual site of the city or settlement changed substantially, giving rise to the celebrated legend of seven cities comprising Delhi.

The Delhi sultanate began with the Ghurid and Ghaznavid invasions of northern India, especially Delhi, between 940 and 1150. Within the occupied city of Delhi, the general Qutb-ud-din Aibak built the Quwwat-ul-Islam Masjid (the Might of Islam Mosque) in 1192. Incorporated within its construction were large parts and remains of older Hindu and Jain buildings; at a deeper level, however, it expanded on the formal, spatial, and iconographic vocabulary prevalent in pre-Sultanate-period constructions. Consequently, local masons employed for its construction, and for the several other monuments completed in this early period, were able to recycle older building elements (columns, capitals, beams, corbeled brackets, and domes) to create new ensembles following their own decorative and structural traditions. In effect, monuments such as the Quwwat-ul-Islam Masjid and the Ahrai-din-ja Jhompra at Ajmer, while being improvised versions of the hypostyle prayer-hall (prayer halls whose roofs were supported by rows of columns) prototypes typical in Iran and Central Asia, were evidence of an emerging aesthetic in the making. Stucco and tile were replaced by extensive stone carvings of vegetal motifs. Experimentation with the indigenous system employing columns (posts), beams, and corbels replaced the shell and vault constructions prevalent in large parts of Iran and Central Asia. There was also a great deal of innovation, particularly as Islamic building conventions blended with Indian traditions. Significant examples include the facade of five-corbeled ogee arches screening the Quwwat-ul-Islam Masjid's prayer hall; the red sandstone, gray quartzite, and white-marbled circular and acute-angled projections on the Qutb Minar; Iltutmish's richly carved, domed mausoleum; and the Sultan Ghari monument—a novel combination of an octagonal, subterranean tomb and mosque.

In addition to buildings, several new urban foundations in and around Delhi were established in this period: Siri, with its legendary Hazar Sutun (thousand-pillared) palace, founded by Ala-ud-din Khalji (1296–1316); the impregnable city of Tughlaqabad, built for Ghiyas-ud-din Tughluq out of massive masonry; the royal seat of Muhammad Tughluq (1325–1351) at Jahanpanah with the Begumpuri Mosque; and Kotla Firoz Shah, the fort palace of Firoz Shah. Additionally, other areas of the Indian subcontinent came under Muslim (Arabo-Persian) influence. These included Gujarat, where a spectacular capital and necropolis

were created at Ahmedabad (1411–1442) and Sarkhej (1442–1451) respectively, both arrayed with superb mosques, *wavs* (public wells), and *rauzas* (mortuary complexes). In Bengal, the city of Gaur was established at Lakhnauti. Architectural innovations introduced there included an enormous *iwan* (arch) at Adina Masjid, the mosque of Sikandar Shah (1358–1389) at Hazrat Pandua, and the doubly curved *bangaldar* (bow- or boat-shaped) roof in the Eklakhi Mausoleum—elements that would reoccur in Mughal architecture in the centuries to come. At Jaunpur, established by Malik Sarwar, the Tughlaq viceroy, the extraordinary Atala Masjid with its massive, pylonlike *iwan* frontispieces came closest to the architecture of Bibi-Khanum Mosque, completed in 1394 at Samarqand for Timur (1336–1405).

Some of the Hindu kingdoms that successfully halted the onslaught of the Muslims also produced important architecture. The kingdom of Vijaynagara (1397–1565) was first among these, and its capital city (Hampi) was embellished with a royal complex and four magnificent temples. Other examples were the Rajput capital at Chittor under Rana Kumbha (1433–1468), the ancient hill-fort of Gwalior, and the great palaces of Orcha and Datia built between 1501 and 1627.

Few trends in Sultanate-period architecture, however, prefigure the elaborate developments of the Mughal period. The empire's Turko-Mongol lineage from the Timurids of Central Asia provided a unique stylistic element to their experiments in architecture and urban planning. From the time of Babur (1483–1530), an evident obsession with elaborate gardens, running water, and impressive pavilions is observed. Babur's successor, Humayun (1508–1556), witnessed the first of the architectural hybrids created by this process. A huge Mughal citadel, with the octagonal Sher Mandal (a miniature derivative of the Persian *hasbt behisbt*), dominated his capital at Dinpanah, itself based on a nine-square, urban maxigrid scheme. The other important structure from this period, though Afghan and not Mughal in its patronage, was the mausoleum of Sher Shah at Sasaram (1545). An octagonal structure, it was positioned at the center of a square pool of water.

The hybrid style was furthered by Akbar (1556–1605), who provided a substantial degree of imperial patronage during his long reign. Consequently, urban foundations at Agra, Lahore, Fatehpur Sikri, and Burhanpur developed very much on the lines of the great Timurid capitals in Central Asia, while retaining a distinct local character in buildings and urban ensembles. The Jahangiri Mahal in the Agra Fort was exemplary in drawing its inspiration from the Man-

Mandir at Gwalior, Timur's Aq Saray at Sharisyabz, and the great caliphate tradition of palace planning. Experimentation with local building techniques, materials, and craftsmen was also demonstrated at the Fatehpur Sikri complex. Here a complex arrangement of courtyards, open and closed spaces, and service and private areas effectively intermeshed to produce an urban environment with new building prototypes, which were emulated over the next few centuries.

Akbar's grandson, Shah Jahan (1628–1658), improved on these achievements, creating some of the most important architectural masterpieces of the Mughal period. The planned city of Shahjahanabad, with its grand bazaars, urban squares, mosques, caravanserais, baths, and impressive citadel, was completed between 1639 and 1648. Substantial additions to the urban structures at Agra and Lahore followed. In addition to cities, Shah Jahan's reign was characterized by a great refinement in the design of several important buildings, particularly mosques and mausoleums. While the Jami Masjid (Friday Mosque) at Shahjahanabad (1650–1656) was grand and large, being an imperial institution meant to serve the urban population, those at Lahore and Agra—the Mothi and Nagina Masjids (1645 and 1654)—were small and gem-like and meant for private prayer. Among mausoleums, the Taj Mahal (1632–1643), built for Shah Jahan's wife, has achieved lasting worldwide renown.

In addition to building funded by royal patronage, in many parts of the empire ancient traditions of temple architecture still survived, as did regional vestiges of older Indo-Islamic styles. Curious hybrids, drawing on provincial Mughal, Indo-Muslim, and traditional forms flourished in areas away from the Mughal court, especially as the empire declined in the eighteenth century.

Colonial Period to the Early 2000s

The arrival of Europeans in the eighteenth century infused Indian architecture with fresh elements, although older practices and traditions were not entirely discarded. British colonial architecture created through this interaction was termed the Indo-Saracenic. It was either a random mix of elements, or a complex hybrid that effectively combined foreign and indigenous styles. While its evolution depended partially on the fancy of the individual architects, it embodied above all a vision the British had of themselves as the rulers of India, linked directly to the Mughals, and hence to India's glorious past. Within this process, the most significant colonial structures were built at Calcutta, Mumbai (Bombay), Madras, and Bangalore, and at the imperial capital at New Delhi. In addition to churches, numerous minor structures were built across the country in

a blander, standardized style, termed the Public Works Department (PWD) style.

Two distinct phases have characterized modern Indian architecture since the country's independence in 1947. The first, between 1947 and the early 1980s, relied more on trends of the international style prevalent in Europe and the United States to meet the growing needs of building design and construction in the country. The government buildings built at Chandigarh by French architect Le Corbusier (1887–1965) exemplified this trend. The second stage, stretching between the 1980s and into the 2000s, evolved to include more complex issues such as modernity, tradition, the vernacular, and new interpretations of institutions. The growing demand for new architecture, and consequently more architects, is reflected by the proliferation of architectural schools across the country, with those at Ahmedabad, Delhi, and Mumbai earning international acclaim. Some of the most important Indian architects today include B. V. Doshi, Anant Raje, and Charles Correa.

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See also: **Taj Mahal**

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ARCHITECTURE, ISLAMIC—WEST ASIA

To understand Islamic architecture in the region comprising present-day Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, one must first understand its roots. The builders of Islamic cities

that arose in the desert where no city existed before used architectural styles that they knew from other places. Nevertheless, they adapted these older styles to express new ideas about the meaning of Islam, its values, and its power. Older cities enveloped into Islam contained older structures that were reused and readapted to suit the new rulers.

Symbolism in Islamic architecture is often conveyed by the use of simple everyday geometrical forms in special ways. The dome placed over a cubic space is sometimes simply a convenient means of roofing and sometimes an awe-inspiring symbol of the heavens above the earth, which carries the further message of the all-powerful oneness of God. The arch may be used to indicate the direction in which one is to pray, but it may also be used in colonnades at a palace or as windows in a city house. Vernacular architecture (the architecture of the common people as opposed to sacred or civic architecture) shared many of the architectural elements found in sacred buildings such as mosques and *madrasabs* (religious schools).

The Ka'ba

The first Islamic building was the Ka'ba, a sacred monument that was the center of pagan pilgrimage and worship in Mecca, the "House of God," that, according to Muhammad's revelations, was built by Abraham and Ishmael to demonstrate their faith in the One God. The Ka'ba is a rectangular stone building approximately 14 meters high. The sacred black stone built into one of the walls had been venerated by Arabs since before Islam and was a site for pilgrimage and worship. All Muslims face the black stone in the Ka'ba when they pray, and all mosques face the Ka'ba. The Grand Mosque of Mecca that surrounds the Ka'ba has been built and rebuilt many times over the centuries and is not in itself a notable example of Islamic architecture.

Development of the Mosque

Although the first mosque no longer stands, essentially it was simply an empty rectilinear enclosure of some fifty-six square meters. Nine small rooms along the outside of one of the walls served as humble quarters for Muhammad's family. A shaded space facing the black stone contained in the Ka'ba in Mecca was constructed of a double row of palm trunks covered with a roof of palm leaves plastered with mud, and another shaded space was constructed to protect the poor from the blazing sun of the Hijaz. Its size and flexible character indicates that the courtyard was meant for communal worship. In addition, the first mosque was used for public gatherings and as a place to make an-

nouncements, adjudicate legal cases, and lodge visitors, and served as the center of the emergent state.

At some point a *mibrab* (prayer niche) was added in the *qibla* (the wall indicating the direction of prayer) to mark the place where Muhammad had led prayers. In Islam, prayers are said five times a day, and the way that Muhammad conducted these prayers would set the pattern for Muslims throughout history. The architectural history of Islamic history has its roots in these patterns.

About a century following the death of Muhammad, two distinct types of mosque emerged. One, the *masjid*, was a place for worship, and often came to be constructed as part of a complex including fortified garrisons housing the soldiers of an expanding empire, and theological schools meant to train the faithful in the Islamic sciences. A second type of mosque, called the Congregational, Friday, or Cathedral Mosque (*jami*), was designed for large-scale public worship on Fridays. Rather than having enough space for hundreds of worshippers, it could contain thousands.

Sometime following the death of Muhammad, during the expansion of the Islamic empire, Muslims began to add minarets to their mosques. From this high point, the muezzin would chant the call to prayer. This combination of the human voice and the lofty position of the muezzin differentiated the Islamic call to prayer from the Christians, who used bells or wooden clappers, and Jews, who used the shofar (a ram's horn trumpet) in their worship.

The Dome of the Rock

The caliph (leader of the Islamic faithful) 'Abd al-Malik (646–705) ordered the construction of the Dome of the Rock on the Herodian platform of the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem, which was known to Muslims as the Haram al-Sharif, or Noble Sanctuary. It was completed in 691 CE, making it the earliest surviving Islamic monument. It was also the first major artistic achievement of the earliest of the Islamic empires, the Umayyad (661–750). The methods of design and decoration were drawn directly from the Sasanian and Byzantine traditions, but the architecture of the Dome of the Rock achieved a distinct expression of Islamic faith and triumph.

The Dome of the Rock was designed as a pilgrimage site and invites comparison to the Ka'ba, with its own sacred rock (from which Muhammad ascended into heaven, and which bears his footprint) and tradition of worship. With its doors opening to the four points of the compass, the idea of pilgrimage is strongly suggested. The decoration of the building's

interior with mosaics depicting Byzantine and Sasanian crowns and jewels, vegetal motifs suggestive of paradise, and Qur'anic inscriptions asserting the victory of Islam over Christianity and its completion of God's revelation to man emphasize the triumphant stance of the Umayyads in the former stronghold and birthplace of Christianity.

The unusual plan of the building makes it unique in world architecture. The octagonal form crowned by a dome was used in Byzantine architecture to indicate where a special event had occurred. The Dome of the Rock is not a mosque, but a *mashbad*, a place of witness, marking the site of Muhammad's ascension to heaven after his miraculous journey on al-Buraq. Its gilded central dome rests upon a drum pierced with sixteen windows, which in turn rest upon a circular arcade of four piers and sixteen marble columns. Around this is an octagonal arcade of eight piers and sixteen columns. The octagonal exterior was finished with marble, but during the Ottoman period this was replaced with magnificent ceramic tiles. The lavish mosaics depict no animals or human beings. One of the most striking aspects of the Dome of the Rock is that the diameter of its dome is equal to its height, making for a perfect interior space. Decorated in reds and golds, the Dome of the Rock glows with an atmosphere of sanctity.

Abbasid Architecture in Iraq

When the administrative center of the Islamic empire shifted from Damascus to Iraq, economic development and Islamic culture became extremely rich. The growth in trade and agriculture was sustained by the enormous geographical sweep of the Abbasid empire (749–1258).

Perhaps the most outstanding feature of Abbasid architecture was the city of Baghdad itself. Over the years its original plan has been obscured, but written descriptions give us a fairly detailed view of what the city may have looked like. Baghdad was founded in 762 by the caliph al-Mansur (reigned 754–775). It was built in the shape of a circle to symbolize the navel of the universe. The outer ring of the city was made up of shops and houses with stout walls made for defense. This circle was divided into quadrants by four long streets covered with barrel vaults. Each street opened to the outside with a magnificent two-story gate and a complex of vaults and bridges over moats. On the top story of each great gate was a domed reception hall where travelers could be met and interviewed before being allowed to pass into the city. These gates were more symbolic than military, however, reflecting the great sense of security felt by the early Abbasids.

The large central area of the city was mostly empty, focusing attention upon the mosque and palace at the very heart of the circle. The mosque was joined to the palace and large enough to contain all the inhabitants of the city.

The Great Mosque at Samarra (north central Iraq), built by al-Mutawakkil (reigned 847–861) is the largest known in the Muslim world. Its outstanding feature is the unusual spiral minaret outside its walls. A second Samarra mosque is Abu Dalaf, which resembles the Great Mosque but is not quite as large.

The Shi'ite tombs at Kufa, Najaf, and Karbala are original structures but they have generally been inaccessible for scholarly study. The Great Mosque of Mosul, built between 1120 and 1122, is a notable structure, as are the Congregational Mosque of Dunaysir and the Mosque of Diyarbakr, also built in the twelfth centuries.

Abbasid Architecture in Iran

The emigration of Turkic tribes from the east into the Islamic world had an enormous influence upon urban society. The architectural styles that they brought with them eventually melded with Islamic designs as the soldiers and tribespeople became Islamicized, leading to the construction of notable mosques and tombs decorated with ornately carved stucco applied to brick constructions and elaborate brick structures in which the design is integrated into the structure itself. One of the most striking of these mosques was at Nayin (east of Esfahan) and dates to the tenth century. A Samanid tomb built around 914 in Bukhara is another remarkable structure dating from this period; there brick is used in a most elaborate way, fulfilling both structural and ornamental functions simultaneously. The influence of Turkic brick towers and stucco ornamentation on the minarets of Damghan and Jam in Iraq, as well as in locations in Central Asia, is readily appreciated.

The Great Mosque (Masjid-i Jumah) of Esfahan is one of the most celebrated of Islamic monuments. Built by the famed Seljuk vizier Nizam al-Mulk (1018–1092) between 1072 and 1092, it is a vast complex of buildings with 476 vaults, most of them topped by domes, which has been altered and added on to many times through the centuries. It contains a large rectangular courtyard, but also features an important new design element: the *iwān*. The *iwān* is a vaulted or flat-roofed hall that is open at one end. This mosque has four *iwāns* facing the inner courtyard and the entire composition is formal and elegant. Each of the *iwāns* frames a *pishtaq*, a lofty arch which marks a monumental entrance.

Architecture in Iran after the Mongol Invasions

Following the Mongol invasions of 1253–1258, the architecture of Iran was enriched by vibrant tiles that were used to decorate the exterior surfaces of buildings. One of the earliest buildings to survive from the Il-Khanid period (1256–1355) in Iran is the Tomb of Uljaytu, an enormous octagon topped by a dome, which had been part of an large citadel complex housing many structures, including a mosque, *madrasah*, hospice, hospital, and guesthouse. At Natanz in central Iran, the shrine of 'Abd al-Samad (1307) has a magnificent brick dome that masterfully uses vaulting made up of individual cells or small niches to bridge the transition between dome and pedestal, a technique first used in Egypt and North Africa in the twelfth century.

When Timur destroyed Damascus in 1401, he deported many of the engineers and artisans of that city to his capital, Samarqand (in present-day Uzbekistan), where they would work on Timurid projects. Khorasan also became a center for architectural innovation, as evidenced by the renovation of the shrine of Imam Riza (1416–1418) at Mashhad. The architect Qavam al-Din Shirazi developed a new kind of interior vaulting known as squinch-net vaulting, which allowed the weight of the roof to be distributed onto intersecting points of the vaults themselves, allowing the piercing of the walls by windows to let in light. This kind of vaulting dispensed with the need for piers, opening the rooms up and allowing for other ways to divide interior spaces. The Complex of Gauhar Shad in Mashhad (1417–1438) is a good example of this kind of design. The color and technical proficiency of the superb turquoise blue tiles that decorate the Blue Mosque of Tabriz (1465) in northwestern Iran have never been surpassed. Although many Timurid buildings have been lost, their influence upon the later Islamic architecture was enormous. The Safavid, Ottoman, and Mughal dynasties all incorporated Timurid ideals into their art and architecture.

Islamic Architecture in Anatolia (Turkey)

The first Ottoman capital of Bursa boasts some of the finest early examples of Ottoman architecture. In 1339 Orhan Gazi (c. 1288–c. 1360), the second Ottoman emperor, built a palace in the citadel, a public soup kitchen, a bath, a caravansary (resting place for caravans), and several mosques. Like the Mamluks (who ruled Egypt and Syria from 1250 to 1517), Ottoman rulers built public works as both a service to their subjects and as a way to legitimize their authority.

Other Turkic principalities in Anatolia built notable structures during the fourteenth century. Among

these were the Menteshids (ruled southwestern Anatolia from the eighth century to 1421, when they were conquered by the Ottomans), who built the Mosque of Firuz Beg at Milas in 1394 and the Mosque of Ilyaz Beg in Balat in 1404. These buildings are noteworthy for their elaborate and fine stone carvings. The Qaramanids, a Turkish dynasty that ruled the area around Konya and Nigde from 1262 to 1475, built the Ak Madrasah at Nigde in 1409. This mosque was modeled after a Seljuk hospital built in the fourteenth century in Amasya: it had an open courtyard with two *iwans* flanked by rooms on two stories. It also has beautiful masonry typical of the Qaramanids.

In contention with the Christian Byzantine Empire, the Ottoman sultans also had to demonstrate the vitality and superiority of Islam over the defeated Christian authorities. This desire found expression in their architecture. Following the plan of an early Ottoman building in Iznik (Nicaea), they created mosques with a central dome, a domed vestibule, and a five-bay porch. These buildings also featured *iwans*, and the structure was designed to shelter the Muslim-warrior brotherhoods responsible for the expansion of the Ottoman state. The Ottoman ruler Bayezid I (c. 1360–1403) also built a large congregational mosque in Bursa's central commercial district in 1399–1400 with booty from one of his victories over the Hungarians. This mosque featured multiple domed bays, a characteristic that increasingly became a mark of Ottoman style.

In the fifteenth century the newly resurgent Ottoman state again built impressive monuments. One of the first of these, and certainly among the most important Ottoman buildings, was the Yeshil Jami, or Green Mosque, begun by Mehmed I (reigned 1412–1421) at Bursa in 1412 and completed in 1424. The complex included a *madrasah*, soup kitchen, baths, and tombs. This mosque also featured the beautiful tiles made in a process known as *cuerva seca*, or dry cord. This technique, revived by the Ottomans but developed earlier, allows for the firing of numerous glazes on one tile, separated by a thin line of greasy manganese that, when fired, leaves a matte black line, giving the tile an effect similar to stained glass.

Sultan Mehmed II (1432–1481) was known as the Conqueror for his conquest of the Byzantine capital of Constantinople (1453). In addition to his military successes, he is known for his patronage of the arts and his interest in learning from Turkish, Persian, and European scholars, artists, and writers who eagerly came to Istanbul to assist in his many building projects, perhaps the most famous of which is the Top-

kapi Palace. This enormous complex overlooks two seas and two continents. It took over a decade to complete and has been repaired and remodeled many times. Its arrangement appears haphazard, with kiosks, pavilions, halls, gardens, kitchens, and stables arranged in no particular way, but in fact the buildings were placed to take advantage of the views and the breezes. The name of the palace, which means "cannon gate," and the symbolic location overlooking the Dardanelle Straits reflect the security and confidence of a world power at the height of its military successes.

Today, the palace is a treasure trove of great works of all periods of Islamic art. The beautiful tile work there—especially the famed Iznik tiles, with their deep red glaze, brilliant white slip, and glowing turquoise hues that have never been reproduced—is stunning. In this palace one can appreciate the enormity of the jobs undertaken by the sultan in providing food for his entourage and for the city of Istanbul: the massive kitchens and workrooms in the palace could provide food for thousands at a time. The palace had barracks and stables for a large military contingent, musical bands, and other officials responsible for the financial records and the massive reports written by palace bureaucrats concerning their far-flung empire. Within one of the palace buildings the sultan could sit unseen behind a wooden grate to hear the petitions of his subjects. Palace schools trained the sultan's servants in the ways of the bureaucracy, as well as in courtly manners, the Islamic sciences, history, literature, and art. This was the administrative and artistic center of one of the greatest empires in human history.

Another of Mehmed's great building projects was the Fatih (Conqueror's) Complex, erected between 1463 and 1471. It was built in accordance with the Ottoman imperial mosques in Bursa, and was influenced by the Hagia Sophia Church. A central mosque dominates the symmetrical complex, which unlike the Topkapi palace does not take the landscape or views into account at all. Here the focus is upon the mosque, surrounded by imperial tombs, a primary school, a library, *madrasahs*, baths, residences, latrines, a hospital, a hospice, a soup kitchen, a caravansary, military barracks, a covered market, and an open-air market for horses, stable workers, and equestrian trades.

It was during the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent (1494–1566) that Ottoman architecture reached its peak. The most important of all Suleyman's many buildings was the Suleymaniye Complex in Istanbul, built from 1550 to 1557 by the famous architect Sinan Pasha (1489–1588). The Suleymaniye Complex emulated the Mehmed Fatih Complex. It includes a great

congregational mosque, two mausoleums, a hospital, six *madrasabs*, a children's school, a bath, a hospital, a hospice, a public kitchen, a caravansary, rows of small shops to provide rental income for the complex, and a small *zawiya* (warriors' lodge). In the endowment deed, Suleyman specified that this complex was to become the center for religious law in the Ottoman empire.

The entire complex seems to be a mountain, its summit an enormous dome. The enormous interior space of the mosque, uninterrupted by any columns or piers, is a truly awe-inspiring sight. The four slim minarets, with their strong Turkish character, are elegant counterpoints to the mass of domes ascending to the topmost dome. The calligraphic decorations are one of the most remarkable features of the mosque. Suleyman is buried behind the mosque in a tomb that was modeled after the Dome of the Rock.

Iranian Architecture in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries

In Iran the Safavid dynasty (1501–1722/36) regained its strength under Shah Abbas (1571–1629), who established a new capital in Esfahan in the 1590s, and in the process developed a new style of architecture. The new capital in Esfahan featured an enormous square (*maidan*) for sports, promenades, and processions. Four monumental entrances face the *maidan*, one leading to the bazaar, one leading to the Mosque of Shaykh Luftallah, one leading to the Masjid-i Shah (Mosque of the Shah), and one leading to the royal palace. A magnificent boulevard was built, lined with the fine mansions of Safavid notables. One section of the boulevard was reserved for animals and carts, while the other was reserved for pedestrians. Surrounding the *maidan*, and housed in the elegant arched facades, were the stalls and shops of skilled craftsmen and merchants of valuable commodities. A special caravansary for textile merchants, goldsmiths, jewelers, and engravers was housed close to the royal mint. The overall appearance of the ceremonial square surrounded by the hubbub of the market enchanted European visitors to the royal city. Fifty thousand ceramic lamps suspended from long wooden poles illuminated the square at night. There was a music pavilion where the royal band would play during the day.

Each of the individual buildings in this massive complex was richly ornamented with tiles, carved wooden screens, and all of the traditional elements of Islamic architecture: *iwans*, *muqarnas* (the units used to create the typically Islamic honeycomb or stalactite vaulting), vaults, domes, and arches. In Esfahan these elements

achieve a marvelous balance, so that the rich ornamentation creates an atmosphere of tranquility and repose.

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ARCHITECTURE—JAPAN Japan's architectural achievements, both secular and sacred, reflect the foreign and native influences that shaped Japanese culture as a whole.

The Early Period

The Jomon culture (10,000–300 BCE) offers the first evidence of architecture in Japan. Archaeological remains tell of square pit-dwellings, so named because their floor was approximately a half meter below



THE VARIETY OF JAPANESE ARCHITECTURE

This late nineteenth century description of Japanese homes makes clear the considerable diversity that existed at the time while also noting that the untrained Westerner might easily miss the diversity.

Whatever may be said regarding the architecture of Japan, the foreigner, at least, finds it difficult to recognize any distinct differences among the houses, or to distinguish any radical differences in the various types of dwellings he sees in his travels throughout the country. It may be possible that these exist, for one soon gets to recognize the differences between the ancient and modern house. There are also marked differences between the compact house of the merchant in the city and the country house; but as for special types of architecture that would parallel the different styles found in our country, there are none. Everywhere one notices minor details of finish and ornament which he sees more fully developed in the temple architecture, and which is evidently derived from this source; and if it can be shown, as it unquestionably can, that these features were brought into the country by the priests who brought one of the two great religions, then we can trace many features of architectural detail to their home, and to the avenues through which they came.

Source: Edward S. Morse. ([1896] 1961) *Japanese Homes and Their Surroundings*; New York: Dover, 47.

ground level. A thatched roof supported by posts and beams leaned into the middle of the structure, with one post at the very center. The more advanced Yayoi culture (300 BCE–300 CE) saw the advent of rice cultivation, and new buildings were developed for grain storage. Constructed of wooden boards with a thatched roof, the rectangular granary was raised off the ground and had a stepped plank leading into it. This style of building would have an influence on the shrines of later periods.

Important early evidence concerning architecture in Japan, however, comes from earthenware figurines known as *baniwa* (literally, "clay cylinder") that were placed around tomb mounds in the Kofun period (300–710 CE). The *baniwa* depicted buildings of different types, including single-story homes and two-story granaries. They show a main home conjoined by smaller secondary structures with hipped roofs covered in thatch; some had ridge-crossing cylinders, likely used for holding the rafters in place. Whatever their function, these striking architectural elements

later became a mark of both imperial buildings and Shinto shrines.

Two examples of early Shinto architecture may be found at the Ise and Izumo shrines, which date to the third and fourth centuries. Their simple style and elevated floor recall the Yayoi granaries. The distinctive features are the extensions of the outermost rafters (*chigi*) that extend up like horns forming a large V, and the row of weight-blocks (*katsuogi*) set along the ridge at right angles to it.

Buddhist Influence

The arrival of Buddhism in the sixth century had a tremendous influence on Japanese architecture, particularly the building of temple complexes. Based on Chinese models, early temples consisted of an entrance gate (*chumon*) that was part of a roofed enclosure encircling the main precinct, the pagoda, and the golden hall (*kondo*), as in the Horyuji temple near Nara, Japan's earliest surviving temple, which dates from the late seventh century. The buildings in Horyuji are the

world's oldest wooden structures. The *kondo*, following Chinese precedents, is set on a platform and utilizes post-and-lintel construction whereby the roof is supported by a system of brackets. The mid-eighth-century Todaiji complex, also at Nara, reflects the grand style of Chinese Buddhist architecture of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE). The magnificent Daibutsuden (Great Buddha Hall) is approximately 47 meters high, 87 meters long, and 47 meters deep, making it the world's largest wooden building. The grand style of the Nara period (710–794), however, is best seen at Toshodaiji. The building is low and long, imparting a feeling of stability; the hipped roof with its extended eaves is supported by a three-tiered set of wooden brackets.

With the importation of esoteric Buddhism from China in the Heian period (794–1185), temples were located in mountainous areas away from the main centers of Nara and Kyoto. The temple complex of Muroji, of the late eighth or early ninth centuries, exemplifies this mountain-temple architectural style. The buildings are scaled down and set into the terrain, and they make use of rustic materials such as cypress-bark for roofing (in contrast to the tiled roofs of the earlier temple buildings). This influence is also seen in *shinden zukuri*, the Heian-period secular mansion favored by court nobles, consisting of a complex of buildings within an expansive garden. The main hall, *shinden*, was the master's residence and was surrounded on three sides by secondary living quarters. The garden was located to the south and contained a



A Japanese man in his garden. (HORACE BRISTOL/CORBIS)



HIMEJI-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

A pristine sixteenth-century Japanese castle, Himeji's labyrinthine eighty-three buildings and defense architecture still evoke Japan's classic Shogun feudal period. Himeji-jo was designated by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site in 1993.

large artificial pond. Covered verandah corridors connected the buildings to the garden, emphasizing the importance of this natural setting.

The Kamakura period (1185–1333) is known for both old and new architectural styles. The rebuilding of the Daibutsuden of the Todaiji, which was destroyed by fire in 1180, was a major project in the early years. Ties with China at this time are evident in the style known as *daibutsuyo* (Great Buddha style), in which brackets project at right angles from the wall in six increasing levels, with two more levels to support the roof. The other main architectural style during this period, also imported from China, was that of the Zen temple, which followed conventions of strict symmetry on a central axis. This architectural style was known as *karayo* (Chinese style). By contrast, the older styles came to be known as *wayo* (Japanese style). *Karayo* used decorative details such as bell-shaped windows, wooden latticework on transom windows, and complicated patterns of brackets. The support columns tapered at the top and were set upon stone bases.

Momoyama and Tokugawa Periods

The next major architectural innovation occurred in the Momoyama period (1573–1600) and was influenced by the interests of the samurai class. One type of building to develop was a distinctly Japanese form of castle. Constructed in the first half of the sixteenth century, the Japanese castle reached the height of its form in the early seventeenth century. Designed as a place to live, conduct business, and enjoy cultural activities, it was a testimony to the superior status of its occupants. The most beautiful castle in Japan is Himeji, also known as the White Heron Castle (1601–1609). Because Himeji was added to by a series of successive owners, the complex consists of a number of interlocking buildings placed in a mazelike arrangement. These include the five-story main building, several three-story structures, and watchtowers. The white buildings and hip-gabled roofs with Chinese-style up-

turned eaves give the impression of a large and graceful white heron. The other innovation of this period was the *shoin zukuri*, a grand residence characterized by its asymmetry and use of sliding doors (*fusuma*) and folding screens (*byōbu*) to delineate interior space. The main room consisted of two levels, the upper level reserved for the highest-ranking samurai. Attached to this room was a study (*shoin*) and a number of other rooms, depending on the needs of the owner.

During the Edo or Tokugawa period (1600/1603–1868), the new shogunate refurbished and rebuilt older structures and erected new ones. Among the types of buildings constructed at this time was the Confucian temple, the need for which was underscored by the growing emphasis of Tokugawa shogunate policy on the study and practice of Confucianism by the samurai class. However, the next major innovation in architecture occurred in the Meiji period (1868–1912), when Japan began to adopt Western architectural styles. Architects from abroad introduced new materials and techniques to the Japanese. The most influential architect in shaping Japan's vision of Western buildings was Josiah Conder (1852–1920), an Englishman responsible for such structures as the Ueno Imperial Museum and the Rokumeikan (Deer Cry Pavilion), neither of which is extant. Conder's chief legacy may be found in the work of his students, who continued Conder's vision into the early twentieth century.

Catherine Pagani

See also: **Architecture—Modern Japan**

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ARCHITECTURE—KOREA Early forms of construction in Korea, in the form of shelters made of animal hides strung from posts and covered by branches, go back to the Upper Paleolithic period (40,000–10,000 BCE). Although these constructions evolved in shape and materials during the Neolithic

period (6000–1000 BCE), it was not until the Bronze Age (1000–300 BCE), when inhabitants of the Korean Peninsula started to become sedentary, that significant signs of architecture appeared. The structured society of that time, with its dominant and dominated classes, gave birth to different types of houses and also to other constructions like dolmen (which needed a significant amount of labor) or ramparts to protect human settlements.

Early Sources of Characteristics

Apart from the few archeological traces of these remote periods, including remains of ancient Korea (also known as "Old Choson," or *Ko Choson*), the traditional Korean architecture that can be seen today dates mostly from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. There are two reasons for this: the fragility of the building material, wood, which needs frequent restoration and reconstruction because of natural alterations as well as accidental ones like fires; and the recurrent and devastating invasions, first by the Mongols, then by the Japanese, and last by the Manchu (the last not ending until 1636).

Despite these invasions and more benignly introduced influences (especially from China), Korean architecture has its own characteristics. Temples, civil buildings like academies, and even palaces are of small scale and sober in style compared with those of Korea's neighbors. With the flourishing of Buddhism on the Korean Peninsula, especially during the Unified



A Buddhist pagoda in Keosong, North Korea, dating back to the twelfth century. (WERNER FORMAN/CORBIS)

Shilla period (668–935 CE), architecture of great quality appeared, with religious constructions such as the Sokkuram grotto or the Pulguk temple in the Kyongju area. The first of these, the only existing Buddhist grotto in Korea, is artificially constructed of granite blocks and covered with an earthen mound, so as to look like a natural element in its environment. A statue of Buddha stands in the middle of the circular main hall, whose carved walls reproduce the figures of bodhisattvas and guardian deities. The Pulguk temple is famous for its elegant stone stairways leading to the terrace where the temple stands, as well as for its two stone pagodas symbolizing Buddhism's contemplation of and detachment from the world.

Later, when Confucianism became Korea's official doctrine (under the Choson dynasty, 1392–1910 CE), the construction of temples declined while the construction of Confucian shrines and academic buildings notably increased. The architecture of this period expressed the principles of Confucianism, with its rigor, symmetry, and hierarchy, well demonstrated in the Chongmyo Palace in Seoul. Geomancy (building structures in accordance with cosmological principles), which became popular in Korea through the monk Toson (early tenth century CE), led to a sound integration of constructions and landscape, as the relationship of the building to the site was guided by the idea of cosmological balance. Last but not least, the hypocaust, or floor heating system (*ondol*), found in housing is unique in Asia and goes back to the Iron Age (200 BCE–200 CE), with prototypes developed a couple of centuries earlier.

Construction Techniques

From a technical point of view, buildings are structured vertically and horizontally. A construction usually rises from a stone subfoundation to a curved roof covered with tiles, held by a console structure and supported on posts; walls are made of earth (adobe) or are sometimes totally composed of movable wooden doors. Architecture is built according to the *k'an* unit, the distance between two posts (about 3.7 meters), and is designed so that there is always a transitional space between the "inside" and the "outside."

The console, or bracket structure, is a specific architectural element that has been designed in various ways through time. If the simple bracket system was already in use under the Koguryo kingdom (37 BCE–668 CE)—in palaces in P'yongyang, for instance—a curved version, with brackets placed only on the column heads of the building, was elaborated during the early Koryo dynasty (918–1392). The Amita Hall of the Pusok temple in Antong is a good example. Later

on (from the mid-Koryo period to the early Choson dynasty), a multiple-bracket system, or an inter-columnar-bracket set system, was developed under the influence of China's Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). In this system, the consoles were also placed on the transverse horizontal beams. Seoul's Namtaemun Gate—Korea's foremost national treasure—is perhaps the most symbolic example of this type of structure.

In the mid-Choson period, the winglike bracket form appeared (one example is the Yongnyongjon Hall of Chongmyo, Seoul), which, according to some authors, better suited the peninsula's poor economic situation that resulted from repetitive invasions. Only in buildings of importance like palaces or sometimes temples (Tongtosa, for instance) were the multicluster brackets still used. Confucianism also led to more sober and simple solutions.

Temple Styles

Different styles of temples also arose in each period or culture. During the Three Kingdom period (Koguryo, Paekche, and Shilla; 57 BCE–668 CE), the "one-pagoda" style prevailed, in which only one pagoda was erected in a temple's hall. Sometimes, however, variations occurred: the Koguryo kingdom is famous for its "three-hall, one-pagoda" style (that is, one pagoda standing in the central hall). Among the temples of the Paekche period (18 BCE–663 CE), Miruksa is well known for its arrangement of three pagodas, each in front of one hall, along an east-west axis, giving the impression of three separate temples. During the Unified Shilla period, the "two-pagodas" style was favored, while during the Koryo period, both the one- and two-pagoda styles almost disappeared as specific shrines were added to temples.

Other Construction

Korea also has a rich architectural heritage of tombs and town-wall construction. The brick tomb of King Muryong (501–523 CE) is remarkable for its vaulted ceiling and arch construction. The most famous town walls are those of Seoul and Suwon. The capital's stone wall, constructed in 1396 and rebuilt in 1422, was sixteen kilometers long (only traces remain today) and had eight gates (including Namtaemun, the South Gate); Suwon's town wall, completed in 1796, was a model of construction methods in Asia at that time, as it benefited from Western influence and techniques.

Modern Architecture

Modern architecture in Korea has been ruled by the political context until very recently. During Korea's



Houses on South Korea's Cheju-do Island in 1986 showing the distinctive house shape and roof style. (MICHAEL S. YAMASHITA/CORBIS)

colonization (1910–1945), the Japanese introduced Western-style architecture (mainly made of stone, bricks, and concrete). After the Korean War (1950–1953), North Korean architecture followed a monumental Stalinist style, whereas South Korean architecture has been influenced by the so-called (Western) International style. Nevertheless, following the examples of innovative local architects such as Kim Sugun (1931–1986), who was a student of the Japanese architect Kenzo Tange, and Kim Chung-op (1922–1988), a disciple of the modernist Swiss architect Le Corbusier, today's young South Korean architects are developing a language of their own, aware of worldwide theoretical and aesthetic architectural debates, and are attempting to construct a more specifically Korean contemporary architecture.

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ARCHITECTURE—MODERN JAPAN In the mid-nineteenth century, the profession of architecture was introduced to Japan from abroad, and the first architects were trained to use Western historical

styles in their work. At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the architect and architectural historian Ito Chuta (1867–1954) undertook to develop a modern local architecture, defining Asian traditions stylistically and through proportion. Ito remained tied to historical eclecticism. He moved comfortably between quasi-Japanese forms, illustrated by his Earthquake Memorial Hall (1930), and European styles, exemplified by his neo-Renaissance Kanematsu Lecture Hall at Hitotsubashi University (1927). However, his greatest impact was in encouraging the architects who followed him to draw on Japan's traditions; the most successful invariably blended these with Western abstraction and technology.

Emerging Japanese Approaches to Architecture

It was particularly in the 1920s and the early half of the 1930s that Japan's architects struggled to build a local architecture while also engaging in discourse with their peers abroad. For some, the solution was to marry a heavy roof, inspired by Japanese temples, to buildings that were essentially contemporary in their structure and building materials. This "Imperial Roof Style" persisted until the end of World War II. By contrast, Japan's first intellectual movement, the 1920s Bunri-ha (Secessionist School), advocated an architecture based in personal expression, linked more to the fine arts than to history.

As architects attempted to develop more nuanced fusions of Japanese and Western architectural practices, many turned to the *sukiya* style, associated with Japanese teahouses, emphasizing rich materials within a simple, structured organization. Teahouses also drew on the rustic beauty of Japan's vernacular architecture, neatly coinciding with the Arts and Crafts influences in European modern movements. The remarkable promise of this period, however, was cut short by a series of historical events. By 1927, Japan was in a recession that was followed by the Great Depression. Subsequently, Japan initiated a war with China that led to World War II; construction materials, especially steel, were diverted for military use. Sutemi Horiguchi (1895–1984), arguably one of the most skilled designers of the prewar period, completed only eighteen buildings between 1920 and 1945, and most of these were houses. Junzo Sakakura (1901–1969) designed the Japan Pavilion for the 1937 Paris Exposition. It received international acclaim, but Sakakura had few other opportunities to build during the war.

The period from 1937 to 1947 saw little construction. The profession of architecture survived through the publication of competitions and the construction of institutional buildings in Japan's colonies. There



JAPANESE INFLUENCES IN THE WEST

The Museum of Modern Art (MOMA) in New York City is an unlikely setting for a house designed in the style of a sixteenth-century Japanese villa, but in 1954 and 1955, just such a house was exhibited in the MOMA courtyard.

Japan's influence on individual architects is often controversial, but most scholars agree that some effect can be seen in the work of designers as diverse as Charles Renee Mackintosh (1868–1928) and Margaret MacDonald (1865–1933), the Austrian émigré Rudolph Schindler (1887–1953), and the California residential designers Charles Greene (1868–1957) and Henry Greene (1870–1954). Particularly important, though, is the impact of Japan on Frank Lloyd Wright and its exploitation by Modernists.

Frank Lloyd Wright (1867–1959) minimized the effect of Japanese architecture in his work, in favor of his enthusiasm for Japanese woodblock prints. His exposure to both came quite early, with the Hooden and a smaller Japanese "teahouse" at the 1893 World's Colombian Exposition in Chicago. Historians relate Japanese architecture to Wright's heavy roofs, open planning, spatial horizontality, and even the colors used in his "Prairie School" architecture. Ultimately, his passion for woodblock prints and later opportunities for work resulted in Wright making four trips to Japan. During his last, longest trip, he designed the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo (1922) and several minor buildings.

Wright made no effort to influence the direction of Japanese architecture. By contrast, Bruno Taut (1880–1938) significantly affected which buildings Japanese and Western architects considered important while in Japan in the 1903s. Taut rejected the popularity of Nikko's Toshogu (1636) in favor of the understated character of Katsura Rikyu (1625), an unknown villa in Kyoto,

and published his convictions in English, German, and Japanese.

It is not surprising that Taut favored Katsura's restraint. The German Modernists promoted standardization and modularity, simplicity, and the articulation of a clear structural frame; there were marked similarities between their work and Japan's *shoin*-inspired residences. However, there seems to have been no attempt to promote these connections until Walter Gropius (1883–1969), a former director of the German Bauhaus, emigrated to the United States.

Americans resisted the aridity of Modernism, and intellectuals countered by drawing attention to Modernism's resemblance to Japan's traditional homes. Gropius made a highly publicized trip to Japan in 1954. Writing about that trip in *Katsura: Tradition and Creation in Japanese Architecture* (a celebrated English-language book on Katsura published in 1960), Gropius noted, "I had found . . . that the old handmade Japanese house had all the essential features required today for a modern, prefabricated house." (This was hardly a discovery, as Gropius's first contact with Japanese architects occurred over thirty years earlier.)

It was at this time that the Japanese house was built in MOMA's courtyard. MOMA's curator Arthur Drexler (1925–1986) also published a book on Japan's architecture, arguing that the endurance of residential styles confirmed the timelessness of Modernist architecture. Ironically, just as the West set about idealizing traditional Japanese houses, the Japanese people were more and more likely to move into contemporary concrete apartment buildings, contradicting the similarities promoted by Western theorists.

Dana Buntrock

was a division between theory and building; virtually none of the competitions led to construction and little of the colonial work demanded sophistication. Consequently, few architects were able to nurture their ability to execute work that was both intellectu-

ally refined and well crafted. Kunio Maekawa (1905–1986) was one exception.

The rupture caused by economic depression and the later collapse of construction destroyed the careers of many promising architects. Most had difficulty reviv-

ing their practices after the war. Even some of the notable landmarks of the immediate postwar period, such as Sakakura's Museum of Modern Art (1952) or Antonin Raymond's (1888–1976) Reader's Digest Building (1951), were isolated anomalies. Only Maekawa produced work appreciated for both its theoretical and commercial strengths. He received accolades around the world for his Harumi Apartments (1959) and the spatially complex Tokyo Metropolitan Festival Hall (1961). The Japan Industrial Bank of Tokyo (1974) demonstrates Maekawa's continued prowess.

Architects in Postwar Japan

Few architects were trained during World War II. Into the breach stepped Kenzo Tange (b. 1913). His compelling design for the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park was completed in 1955, and he subsequently went on to produce virtually all of the major works symbolizing Japan's international hopes (the Olympic Stadium complex of 1964), technical optimism (the 1960 plan for 10 million people to be housed over Tokyo Bay), and a critical political shift to local governance (for example, the Kagawa Prefectural Offices of 1958). Tange also responded to the influence of pre-war theorists by developing a modern architecture that drew on specific Japanese icons, especially Ise Shrine and Katsura Imperial Villa.

Many of the leading architects of the next generation were Tange's students, including Fumihiko Maki (b. 1928), Kiyonori Kikutake (b. 1928), Arata Isozaki (b. 1931), and Kisho Kurokawa (b. 1934). They published a manifesto in 1960 calling for an entirely new movement to rise from the ashes of the war. Eschewing tradition, the "Metabolists," as they were known, proposed an architecture that celebrated the nation's new technological prowess. One of the best-known works of this period was the Nakagin Capsule Hotel (1972) by Kurokawa; with unusual precision, tiny sleeping units made from shipping containers were attached to the side of a concrete core holding vertical transportation and building services. Gloomier representations, such as Isozaki's drawing entitled "Destruction of the Future City" (1968), presaged the collapse of Metabolism following the critical failure of the Osaka Exposition (1970).

Isozaki and Kurokawa have stood as weathervanes of subsequent architectural trends. As Kurokawa moved to the simple graphic style of his Rikyu period, named for the sixteenth-century tea master Sen no Rikyu, Isozaki adopted pop abstraction and the iconography of Marilyn Monroe. These architects, distracted by their attempts to develop coherent theoretical constructs, are better known for shaping the



Tokyo City Hall in the Shinjuku District. It was designed by Kenzo Tange and is the tallest building in the city. (MICHAEL S. YAMASHITA/CORBIS)

practice of architecture than they are for their body of work. However, Isozaki produced the Gumma Prefectural Art Museum (1974), which ranks among the finest buildings of the period. By contrast, their colleague Fumihiko Maki concentrated on construction. His best works, such as the Hillside Terrace complex (1969–1992) and the Spiral Building (1985), demonstrate an interest in urban form, spatial experience, and materials, although he has sometimes been dismissed as too decorative in his approach.

Although architects in the 1950s and 1960s were expected to perform internationally, two leading designers, Kiyonori Kikutake (b. 1928) and Kazuo Shinohara (b. 1925), advocated a more individual approach. Their influence became clear as the architects they educated and trained emerged, including Toyo Ito (b. 1941) and Itsuko Hasegawa (b. 1941). The architect and critic Hajime Yatsuka (b. 1948) has referred to this group as the Superficial Generation; their early work, mostly residential, explored a detached architectural language

unrelated to trends at home or abroad and intended to be derived from personal conceits rather than professional concerns. As these architects matured, however, they struggled to find a more public role for their buildings. Hasegawa's Shonandai Culture Center (1991) and Hara's Yamato Building (1987) both did so through explicit references to village life and nature.

As a foil to the personal disposition of most architects of his generation, the pugnacious Tadao Ando (b. 1941) developed an austere minimalist style utilizing an uncompromising concrete construction. Less well recognized is the way Ando defined carefully modulated spatial progressions and shifts from a human to monumental scale. His work was recognized internationally at an early stage, and along with Maki, Ando is one of the few Japanese architects to have received the prestigious Pritzker Prize, the equivalent of a Nobel Prize for architecture.

In the 1990s, as Japan's economy again entered a prolonged recession, architects returned to a dignified modernism. Yoshio Taniguchi (b. 1937, Yoshiro Taniguchi's son) and Riken Yamamoto (b. 1945) have surpassed their more flamboyant cohorts in this setting. Taniguchi's crisp exactitude is best seen in his Kasai Rinkai Park Visitor's Center (1996) and in the Gallery of Horyuji Treasures (1999). Yamamoto came into his own with his Saitama University campus (1999). Younger architects working in a similar vein include the partnership Kazuyo Sejima (b. 1956) and Ryue Nishizawa (b. 1966), and Kengo Kuma (b. 1954). While clearly designing in an international style, their attention to detail, sensitivity to the use of light and translucent materials, and overlapping spatial zones remain rooted in earlier efforts to draw upon Japanese traditions as well.

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See also: **Architecture-Japan**

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ARCHITECTURE-SOUTHEAST ASIA

By nature the architecture of Southeast Asia is always hybrid and eclectic, as open as its geographical context, and as receptive as its people's way of life. Located at the crossroads of world trading routes, Southeast Asia has been very open toward various influences from outside: Indian, Arab, Chinese, European, Japanese, and from the rest of the world. All of those influences were absorbed and adopted into local culture, then expressed in unique architectural forms and styles. Diversity, eclecticism, fusion, acculturation, and adaptation can perhaps describe the nature of Southeast Asian architecture and urbanism.

Vernacular Tradition

Vernacular architecture in Southeast Asia is largely made of wood and other perishable building materials. Post-and-beam frames, raised living floors, and dominant and elaborate roof forms are identifying characteristics.

There is a strong indication that the vernacular stilt house in the Southeast Asia and Pacific regions, which has some basic similarities, developed out of the rice-growing culture in the tropics. It appears to have originated from granary architecture and developed into a dwelling place. The attic under the roof is the place for gods and valuables, the middle space is the living area, and the underneath space between the floor and the ground is for utilities. For symbolic protection the roof was decorated with sharp objects, horns, dragons, or other animals. The saddle roof type is often interpreted as an imitation of the ancestral boats.

Indian Legacy

Around the first century CE Indian cosmology began to influence the formal and spatial ordering principles of Southeast Asian architecture and settlements. Hinduism and Buddhism were spreading from India northeastward to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam and southeastward to Sumatra, Java, and Bali.

From the fertile Mekong delta region, the source of the rice culture of Southeast Asia, the first kingdom of Funan was established in the Mekong delta around 100–600 CE, followed by the Chenla (600–790 CE), Pagan (849–1287), and Khmer (790–1431) kingdoms. To the east and northeast, the Champa kingdom flourished from 192 to 1471. The wet-rice culture, river systems, and international trade links with India and China that these kingdoms maintained influenced the architecture and settlement patterns of the Chams, Khmer, and Siamese. There are still marvelous artifacts from this period in the stone temples of Angkor



ASIAN COSMOLOGY AND ORDERING PRINCIPLES

Humanity occupies the middle position between the two poles of the universal order (good and evil, upper and lower, mountain and sea, north and south; or between sunrise and sunset, east and west, and so forth). The hierarchy of these three cosmological divisions serves as a metaphor for parts of the human body: the head, the torso, and the feet. It is also the metaphor for elements of the universe: the sky, the surface of the earth, and the ground underneath.

Traditional settlements across Southeast Asia follow this cosmological pattern, by situating a village in between a mountain and the sea or a river. The most important building or site (temple of origin, chief's house, ancestor's grave) is placed on the highest point of the village or to the direction of the mountain. The objects or functions associated with death or impurity (temple of death, dirt, waste disposal) were placed down near the waterfront. In many cases the rice barns—essential in a rice-growing community—were situated on the east side of the village facing the sunrise.

This indigenous cosmology was then elaborated further by the Indian mandala principle. (A mandala is a graphic symbol of the universe.) In a geometrical sense, a mandala can be drawn as a square subdivided into nine subsquares. It can be perceived as two superimposed hierarchies of space (upper and lower) facing towards the North and the East (the two primary orientations). The middle space is the neutral, the navel, the womb, or the center. The upper-right corner space is the head, the inner sanctum, or the most respected place. The lower-left corner space is the feet, the lowest, the dirtiest, or the threshold to the impure outside world. A city, a village, a house, or a room can be arranged according to this hierarchy of values and meanings. This basic spatial pattern can be found in Indian cities and temples, Balinese villages and houses, Chinese courthouses, and even in Japanese tearooms.

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in Cambodia and the brick temples of Champa in southern and central Vietnam.

The decline of those inland rice-growing kingdoms was soon followed by the rise of the Srivijaya empire of the Malay archipelago (600–1290), which took effective control of the main trading routes of the Malacca Strait and the Java Sea. The physical remains of this great cultural, political, and military Buddhist kingdom have almost vanished, due to the use of non-durable clay brick and timber materials, except for some archaeological sites and several rounded temples, such as Muara Takus temple in southern Sumatra. In Java many Buddhist and Hindu stone temples from around the eighth century still survive. The Mandalay palace complex in Myanmar (Burma) and the Angkor

temple complex near Siemreab in Cambodia exemplify the transformation of basic Hindu design principles in Buddhist architecture. The enormous Buddhist stupas of Borobudur and the articulated Hindu portion of the Prambanan temple in central Java are the best artifacts from this period.

Palaces and ordinary buildings from this period have not survived, but archaeological findings suggest that the layouts of the royal capitals from this period (such as Ayutthaya near Bangkok and Majapahit in eastern Java) clearly show the underlying ordering principle of the Indian mandala. The same clear and strong spatial hierarchy, axiality, and orientation of structures still characterize contemporary Balinese dwellings and village architecture; the shrines and

temples of Myanmar, Thailand, and Cambodia; and Javanese houses and palaces. The vernacular tradition has internalized Indian cosmology.

Buddhism spread from India northeastward to Nepal, Bhutan, Tibet, China, Korea, and Japan, eastward to Myanmar, Siam, Sumatra, and Java, and southward to Ceylon, generating unique forms of stupa architecture (temples, monasteries, and palaces). The best examples of this kind of architecture in Southeast Asia can be found in Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. The simple rounded dome shape of stupa architecture in India and Ceylon became highly elaborate and complex in Southeast Asia. The largest Buddhist stone architecture in the world is Borobudur temple in central Java, Indonesia. Even though Buddhist rituals and symbolism determined its shape, the temple incorporated various Hindu ornaments and spatial patterns as well.

Islamic Legacy

Islam entered and spread throughout Southeast Asia along two main routes. The first one was through China along the Silk Road, and then by the voyages of the Ming-dynasty admiral Zheng He (1371?–1435) from southern China to the northern coast of Java, then to Melaka and throughout the Indonesian archipelago. The second route was through India, and was taken by Gujarat and Tamil traders to the Malay peninsula, to the west coast of Sumatra, and finally to the northern coast of Java and the entire Indonesian archipelago. Arab and Persian traders also opened direct trading routes to Southeast Asia, connecting Europe with Asia.

Islam introduced a new orientation (the *qiblat* or praying orientation toward Mecca) and new typology in architecture and urban space (sultans' palaces, mosques, urban central open space) into the vocabulary of Southeast Asian architecture and urban planning. Again the fusion process is clearly evident. The transition and transformation processes took place peacefully and naturally at such sites as Demak (the first Islamic sultanate in Java and the primary Islamic mission in Southeast Asia), Kudus, and Cirebon (both early Islamic cities on the northern coast of Java). The Javanese mosque typology, with three layers of pyramid roof, also existed in Melaka on the Malay Peninsula, in old Singapore, and in different parts of the Indonesian archipelago. It represented a blend of Hindu-Javanese architecture with Indian, Chinese, Malay, and even Greek and Persian architectural elements.

In the British Straits Settlements of the Malay Peninsula, mosques erected by the Muslim commu-

nity from southern India—also in eclectic architectural style—can be found in Melaka and Singapore. Located in the middle of Chinatown, in the same row as other religious buildings (Chinese temples, Hindu shrines), these southern Indian mosques reflected the cosmopolitan and tolerant nature of Southeast Asian urban culture in embracing and incorporating new foreign elements. Craftspeople from different racial and cultural groups worked together and blended their artistry and skill to create a new and unique building tradition and architectural totality.

Chinese Legacy

The Chinese dominated northern Vietnam from the second century BCE to the tenth century CE. Thang Long (the origin of Hanoi) was built as a new capital in 1010, following the traditional Chinese model for a capital city. A Chinese spatial order was superimposed on the previous vernacular organic settlement structure. Thang Long was dominated by Buddhist, Taoist, and Confucian primary elements (temples, pagodas, monasteries, public buildings, palaces). This ancient urban tissue persists especially in the Thirty-Sixth Street district of Hanoi, around the Citadel, where several temples and pagodas can be found scattered around the old quarter.

The voyages of Zheng He left traces along the coastal regions of Southeast Asia in the form of early southern Chinese trading posts and colonies. Many of these colonies were situated near river estuaries beside the preexisting native villages. Some of these early settlements then grew into flourishing entrepôts (for example, Pattani, Melaka, Palembang) because of international maritime trading activities. The main features from this period were the Chinese temple dedicated to Mazu (goddess of the sea, protector of sailors), the fish market in front of the temple near the harbor, and the early typology of shop houses.

The Chinese architectural elements blended with local vernacular design patterns and features and created numerous variations of fusion building styles. One good example is the typical trader's house in Palembang, south Sumatra. The building plan and some of its construction methods are those used for the southern Chinese courthouse, but the saddle roofs, open verandah, timber material, and raised floor are definitely local.

The waves of Chinese immigrants from southern China in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries further enhanced the development of unique architecture and the particular pattern of the cities within this region. More temples with different functions and

different gods were erected, along with the construction of new generations of shop houses, community halls, and clusters of urban row houses for clan members. During this time, the Chinese played a strategic economic role as middlemen between the European colonialists and the local populations, and became prosperous. Their prosperity was expressed in the adoption of European design features into their architecture. The kind of architecture developed by the Chinese in Southeast Asia diverged from architecture in mainland China, reflecting instead the architecture of their adopted places.

European Legacy

The Europeans implemented their hegemonic ambitions beginning in the late fifteenth century, starting with the Portuguese (in India, Melaka, Java, eastern Indonesia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Japan), followed by the Dutch (in India, Melaka, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Japan), the British (in India, the Malaya peninsula, Bengkulu, Java, and China), the Spanish (in the Philippines), the French (in Indochina and China), and the Germans (in China). Although Thailand remained an independent kingdom, it too absorbed influences from Europe. The Europeans came first as traders and missionaries and stayed as colonizers supported by military power, gradually and effectively penetrating and dominating the whole of Southeast Asia for almost five centuries.

The Europeans introduced such new architectural elements as boulevards, streetscapes, and façades, along with new building techniques and new types of buildings (military establishments, public buildings, churches, urban squares and plazas, markets, railroads, stations, plantation houses, and many more). The image of Paris was transplanted to Indochina in such cities as Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Hanoi, Saigon, and Danang in the form of wide boulevards and urban parks, multistory apartment blocks, monumental public buildings, villas and bungalows, and so forth. The Dutch transplanted the canals of Amsterdam and its row houses and elite villas into the old city of Batavia (present-day Jakarta). The British built esplanades and cricket fields in the Straits Settlements (Malaysia, Singapore). The Portuguese and Spanish created plazas, churches, and cathedrals in eastern Timor and the Philippines.

At first European design was directly applied in tropical Southeast Asia with only minor modifications. But then more responsive design solutions were invented, to adapt building and urban design to local climatic, aesthetic, and social-cultural conditions. There are European-style buildings with deep verandas and ventilation holes, for example, and gradually Chinese,

Indian, Malay, Arab, and other influences made themselves felt. As had happened with earlier influences, the European influences were naturally and openly accepted into the vocabulary of Southeast Asian architecture and urbanism.

The Legacy of Modernism

The ideas of modernism were brought into Southeast Asia by European-educated architects in the early twentieth century. They developed a new generation of modern buildings in various architectural styles including Orientalism (a mixture of all stylistic elements of the East) and modern-European-indigenous eclectic styles. In the 1920s and 1930s garden-city concepts—modified to suit local climates and environments—were implemented in major cities in Java, Sumatra, the Malay peninsula, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

To create order and healthier and safer cities, building codes and regulations were implemented. Jack roofs, light wells, and sufficient openings in buildings were required in order to provide enough ventilation. Service areas were located in the backyard, connected to the back alley. Party walls were built between dwelling units to prevent the spread of fire, and a 1.5-meter arcade, known as a five-foot way, was provided between rows of shops to protect pedestrians from tropical rain and heat, particularly in the Straits Settlements (Malaysia, Singapore) and some cities in Indonesia. Density and zoning regulations were implemented to control urban growth.

New modern regional styles adapted to local environmental and cultural contexts gave a strong sense of identity to Southeast Asian architecture and cities until the Great Depression of the 1930s and the outbreak of World War II. The Depression and the war destroyed many parts of Southeast Asia's cities and ended a creative period of unique modern architectural discourse.

Soon after the war, a totally new kind of modernism—the International Style—appeared everywhere. In Hanoi a strong and rigid Soviet socialist utopian model of urban planning and architectural style changed the cityscapes. A huge mausoleum and vast parade ground were erected in the civic center, eliminating the previous colonial palace axis. Standardized public housing replaced older styles of dwelling. In the newly independent nations of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Myanmar, the International Style was used as a symbol of departure from the past. Japanese war reparation money and aid played an important role in the implementation and realization of these nationalistic ambitions in some Southeast Asian countries.

In Search of Identity

In Southeast Asia, diversity and harmonious unity are traditions, passed from generation to generation. All sorts of outside cultural influences have been considered as positive inputs and have enriched individuals, families, tribes, clans, peoples, and even nations. This has been expressed clearly in all levels of architecture, from ornaments and furniture to buildings, settlements, and cities.

The immense economic growth in Southeast Asia within the last two decades has changed the course of its architecture and urbanism dramatically. The models developed in America and Europe have been broadly and carelessly applied to Southeast Asian countries, creating conflicts, tensions, confusion, and loss of identity. New architectural styles, used for corporate office towers, commercial superblocks, and housing clusters for the newly rich, stand beside vast slum areas and shantytowns.

Amid these contradictions, Southeast Asia's own architects are creating many excellent designs. New and unprecedented discourses on Southeast Asian architecture and urban studies are flourishing across the region in architectural schools and the architectural profession. With its long history of plurality and creativity, and its long experience of blending everything harmoniously, Southeast Asian architecture has very promising prospects of finding its own identity.

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See also: **Angkor Wat; Borobudur; Mandalay Palace**

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ARCHITECTURE, VERNACULAR—CHINA

China has a variety of climates and landforms as well as fifty-six diverse ethnic groups in an area nearly equal to that of the United States. Consequently China's vernacular architecture appears at first glance bewildering in variety. However, a closer examination reveals remarkably similar elements in layout and materials across space and through time. The ubiquitous, simple I-shaped dwellings are complemented by strikingly distinctive buildings of great complexity. Structures include extraordinarily beautiful centuries-old dwelling complexes built for merchants, quadrangular residences in the Beijing area, massive multistoried fortresses in the hilly south, and unique below-ground cave-like dwellings in the north, as well as tents and pile dwellings occupied by minority populations in remote areas of the country.

Divisions of Space

Throughout China, houses exhibit a limited range of conventional spatial forms in their plan and general layout. These fundamental building elements are rooted deeply in Chinese building traditions, and they have influenced the spatial conceptualization and building traditions of Japan and Korea as well. Chinese builders are attentive not only to structures—that is, enclosures with a roof—but also to open spaces for living, working, and leisure activities. The common denominator of any Chinese building, whether opulent palace or humble home, is a modular unit known as *jian*, a fundamental measure of width, the span between two lateral columns that constitutes a bay. *Jian* also represent the two-dimensional floor space between four columns and the volumetric measure of the void defined by the floor and the walls. Sometimes *jian* form a room, although quite often a room is made up of several structural *jian*. As a modular form, *jian* can be created and linked relatively easily as a family's circumstances and resources change over several generations.

Most Chinese dwellings consist of at least three *jian* linked laterally along a transverse line to create horizontal, I-shaped structures. In northern China *jian* range between 3.3 and 3.6 meters in width, while in southern China they are typically between 3.6 and 3.9 meters. The bays are usually deeper in southern China, reaching as much as 6.6 meters, while those in the north rarely exceed 4.8 meters. *Jian* generally are clustered in odd multiples, such as three, five, or seven,

since the Chinese believe that odd-numbered units provide balance and symmetry. The traditional Chinese sumptuary regulations contributed to the standardization and modularization of Chinese houses by dictating the dimensions of timber. Decorative details and colors along the roof ridge, under the eaves, and on the gate, which indicated positions in the social hierarchy, were also written into sumptuary regulations. The central *jian* of a three- or five-bay rectangular dwelling typically is wider than the flanking *jian*, since the central *jian* is usually the principal ceremonial or utility room in the dwelling. Symbolic of unity and continuity, this space often is accentuated by the traditional placement of a long, narrow table facing the door. That table holds ancestral tablets, images of gods and goddesses, family mementos, and ceremonial paraphernalia.

Uncovered open areas of various dimensions, often referred to as courtyards, are critical divisions of exterior space in any fully formed Chinese dwelling. While open spaces are axiomatic elements of Chinese domestic spaces, their scales differ to such a degree that neither the common term "courtyard" nor its Chinese-language equivalents describe them clearly. From northeast to southeast China, the proportion of open space to enclosed space diminishes significantly. While courtyards may be expansive in northern China, in southern China they are usually condensed, so the Chinese term *tianjing*, translated as "skywell," catches their essence.

The quintessential Chinese courtyard in the northeast is in the Beijing *sibeyuan*, an open space and the surrounding quadrangle of low buildings, whose traditions go back to the eleventh century BCE. The courtyard of a *sibeyuan* represents about 40 percent of the total area of the dwelling. The back walls of the *sibeyuan* lack windows and doors, and they are oriented to the cardinal directions. Further common characteristics of *sibeyuan* include axially (balanced side-to-side symmetry), a hierarchical organization of space, and a south- or southeast-facing main hall (south is considered the most auspicious direction in geomancy [feng shui]). Skywells in southern China are rectangular open spaces or voids that are so small and compact that they do not qualify as true courtyards. Ingenious sunken interior cavities whose scale restricts their openness to the sky, skywells are well designed for the hot and humid conditions of southern China as they catch passing breezes and release interior heat. Southern dwellings often have multiple skywells, each an atrium-like enclosed vertical space. The size, shape, and number of skywells vary according to the scale of the residence. Although dwellings with skywells are found

throughout southern China, perhaps the most distinctive are those in the multistoried dwellings that survive from the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) in Anhui, Jiangxi, and Zhejiang provinces. Unlike northern structures that emphasize horizontality and openness to the sky, these southern dwellings resemble squat boxes or elongated loaves with solid walls and limited windows. While their building materials appear modest from the outside, the brick walls and expensive woods on the inside are ornamental as well as structural.

The courtyard evolved over thousands of years to meet changing environmental and social conditions. In both its expansive and its condensed forms, it remains an adaptable component of the spatial composition of Chinese residences throughout the country.

Building Materials and Structural Systems

Chinese houses generally incorporate a conventional set of elementary building parts (foundations, walls, and roofs) and commonly available structural materials (wood, earth, and stone). The walls of Chinese dwellings sometimes do not directly support the weight of the roof above but rather serve as curtains between complicated wooden frameworks. These wooden frameworks lift the roof and are independent of the walls, creating a kind of osseous structure, which Liang Sicheng, China's preeminent architectural historian of the twentieth century, characterized as analogous to the human skeleton. Two basic types of timber framework are employed widely, heavy pillars and beams in the north and pillars and transverse tie beams involving mortise and tenon joinery in the south. The latter is important in areas where earthquakes are common.

Traditional Chinese dwellings are built directly on compacted earth or are raised slightly on a solid podium of earth, stone, or brick to carry the substantial weight of a building safely to the ground without allowing it to become deformed. Basements are extremely rare. Fully developed structures, whether dwellings or palaces, always include a wooden skeleton of structural pillars and beams to lift the roof rather than relying on the walls to perform this task. Some houses have a relatively simple framework, but others are elaborate structural ensembles. For any Chinese house, the framework is the most costly and difficult building component to replace, while walls are reconstructed fairly easily from inexpensive local materials. Because a wooden skeleton of structural pillars and beams lifts the roof, the surrounding walls provide only enclosure and are not load-bearing components. Many types of materials, including tamped

earth, adobe brick, fired brick, stone, wooden logs or planks, bamboo, and wattle and daub, may be added to the timber framing to enclose and protect the interior space.

The profile of a house constructed with a pillar-and-beam framework appears roughly similar to that of a house in the West constructed with roof trusses. However, the cross section of a Chinese pillar-and-beam structure, unlike that of the rigid triangular roof truss system, allows a degree of functional and aesthetic curvature in the roofline. The southern framing system of pillars and transverse beams permits more curvature than the northern system of pillars and beams. Traditional wooden frameworks rarely are secured with metal fittings, such as nails and clamps, but use dowels and wedges to ensure a snug fit.

Walls that enclose and surround space also protect and divide it. Walls either encircle the wooden skeleton or simply fill the gaps between the pillars. In southern China non-load-bearing walls are often relatively weak, composed of grasses, grain stalks, and cob (sand mixed with straw) that cannot support more than their own weight. However, some walls include sawed timber and bamboo and are quite strong.

Sturdy, load-bearing walls, which are far more common in the construction of Chinese dwellings than is generally acknowledged, are made of a variety of natural materials that are tamped, formed, or hewn. Mixtures of clay-textured soils and amalgamations of other substances are tamped. Blocks of clay are molded into bricks that are either sun-dried or kiln-fired. Hewn stone or timber must be shaped with tools. Load-bearing walls often combine these formed materials with naturally occurring materials, such as rocks, which have not been altered.

Tamping or pounding clay soil or other materials into solid walls, called the *bangtu* method of construction, has been used for much of Chinese history to erect houses and other buildings, to enclose compounds and open areas, and to fortify villages and cities. In the third century BCE the Qin emperor supervised the construction of an immense tamped earthen wall, the precursor of China's legendary Great Wall. Firing bricks was common by the third century BCE but did not become economical and widely available for housing construction until the fourteenth century CE.

The Chinese invest much effort in technique and symbolism when devising the form of the roof, unlike Western builders, who usually stress a building's facade. Distinctive roof profiles exhibiting a powerful elegance in their curvatures and coverings are more

common in the residences of people with means than in humble dwellings.

Unprecedented rural prosperity during the last twenty-five years of the twentieth century led to the indiscriminate destruction of much of China's architectural patrimony in spite of efforts to preserve the residences of important historical personages. New styles of vernacular architecture in rural, urban, and suburban areas use materials and plans that differ significantly from traditional patterns. Builders now accept the use of reinforced concrete columns and beams where wood once was used exclusively, a compelling need in a country still plagued by a shortage of timber. New rural dwellings are all too often relatively nondescript blockish structures that have imposed a monotonous rhythm to villages. Public apathy, lack of coordination of conservation energies, and inadequate financial incentives for conservation frustrate efforts to preserve China's vernacular architectural heritage.

Ronald G. Knapp

See also: **Architecture—China; Courtyards; Feng Shui; Great Wall**

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ARCHITECTURE—WEST ASIA The West Asian nations of Iran, Turkey, and Iraq have a rich and varied architectural heritage dating back thousands of

years. Many civilizations have left their mark on this region, and architecture has always been important to this region. In fact, many buildings of West Asia have played an important role in the development of world architecture. The history of architecture in West Asia can be broadly divided into three periods: architecture produced before the introduction of Islam to the region in the mid-seventh century CE, architecture produced after the introduction of Islam, and modern architecture (produced after 1850). This article discusses modern architecture. Even though the architecture of these three nations does not have a prominent position internationally, in the past century many of their important structures have helped shape the identity of these countries throughout the modern period.

Iran

The beginning of modern architecture in Iran goes back to the period from 1921 to 1941, as exemplified in such works as the Museum of Ancient Iran, designed by foreign architects hired by the government. During this period many Iranian cities were transformed to include such new building types as office buildings, factories, banks, and railway stations. These buildings were originally designed by foreign architects, but eventually foreign-educated Iranians and then, with the establishment of the first school of architecture in Iran in the early 1940s, Iranian-educated architects joined this group. In most of the architecture of this period, elements taken mostly from buildings from pre-Islamic Iranian architecture were mixed with new European elements.

The second period in modern Iranian architecture was from 1941 to the late 1960s. During this period, most architectural projects were carried out by a few Iranian architects. In these projects, greater attention was paid to the past architecture of Iran, especially the geometrical patterns that are characteristic of Islamic Iranian architecture. One of the most prominent works of this period is the mausoleum of the Islamic scientist and philosopher Ibn Sina (Avicenna, 980–1037) in Hamedaan, by Hooshang Seyhoun.

The third period was from the late 1960s until the early years after the Islamic Revolution of 1980. During this period, the trend of infusing modern concrete buildings with elements from pre-Islamic and Islamic Iran was continued. The 1970s were characterized by the works of such architects as Nader Ardalan and Kamran Diba, who sought to preserve Iranian architecture by restoring several projects throughout Iran.

The fourth period, which started just after the revolution and continues today, is characterized by such

works as the National Museum of Water by Seyyed Haadi Mirmiran, the National Iranian Library by Kaamraan Safaabhakhsh, and the Academies of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The architecture of this period relies heavily upon the inclusion of Islamic motifs, such as geometric patterns and arches, in its design and decoration.

Turkey

The beginning of modern architecture in Turkey can be traced to the nineteenth century when the Balyan family of architects introduced into the architecture of Istanbul (then the capital of the Ottoman empire) motifs inspired by contemporary European architecture. European architects were also commissioned. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, European architects were also recruited to teach architecture at the Academy of Fine Arts (founded in 1883) and the College of Civil Engineering (founded 1884). Late Ottoman architecture in Istanbul became dependent on Western funding, technology, and ideas. Most of the buildings that were built in the last decades of the nineteenth century combined elements of neo-classical European architecture with elements from Islamic architecture. This style of architecture continued in the early twentieth century with buildings designed by Turkish architects. This style became known as the First National architectural style.

From the late 1920s, under the Republican government, new styles emerged, inspired by European Modernism. A number of European architects worked in Ankara, the new capital of Turkey, and influenced its architectural appearance. In 1931 the first Turkish architectural journal, *Mimar*, was founded, and it described works in the modern style by Turkish architects. During the 1930s, with the encouragement of the Republican government, monumental buildings inspired by German and Italian architecture were commissioned.

From the late 1930s, however, there was a shift in emphasis, known as the Second National architectural style, in which architects began to express in their work an awareness of a vernacular Turkish architecture but without a total rejection of Modernism. One of the most influential architects of this movement was Sedad Eldem, who defended local styles over international ones and included local features in his architecture. The main building of this period, the mausoleum of the soldier and statesman Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938) in Ankara (1944), by the architects Emin Onat and Orhan Arda, also expressed the preoccupation with this new style.

In the 1950s American and European architectural influences became important in Turkey. The Hilton Hotel (1952) in Istanbul, by the American architectural firm Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill with the collaboration of Eldem, was influential as an example of the International style (a movement in modern European and American architecture, famous for its use of glass, steel, and reinforced concrete and for its preoccupation with unornamented plane surfaces). The 1950s also brought industrial development and urban growth, especially in the cities of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. Skyscrapers were introduced into city centers, and unplanned neighborhoods grew around the various cities. From the 1960s onward, new materials, such as exposed concrete, and new construction techniques have become increasingly common in Turkish architecture. Other prevalent trends in modern Turkish architecture include the integration of older architectural forms into modern buildings, as well as renovation and restoration of older buildings, especially in Istanbul.

Iraq

The mid-twentieth century marks the beginning of modern architecture in Iraq. It was introduced by foreign architects and later taken up by Iraqi architects such as Mohamad Makiya, Mahmoud al-Ali, and Rifat Chaderji. In 1959, Mohamad Makiya (who designed many residential and commercial buildings in Iraq) founded the first department of architecture in Iraq at Baghdad University.

One of the first expressions of modern architecture in Iraq was manifested in urban renewal projects in the capital of Baghdad, where many traditional neighborhoods were destroyed to make way for new commercial buildings and a new civic center (completed in 1986). The civic center includes the Municipality Building by Hisham Munir, the Income Tax Building by Mahdi al-Hassani, and the Water Board Building by Mahmoud al-Ali. Until the 1970s, much of the modern architecture of Iraq relied heavily upon Western styles. However, some architects (most prominently Rifat Chaderji) became concerned with the disappearance of traditional Iraqi architecture and set out to combine principles of traditional architecture with modern technologies. This attempt to preserve traditional Iraqi architecture also led to a project (headed by Chaderji, the Iraqi firm Mahmoud al-Ali and Partners, and the Architecture and Planning Partnership) to conserve and restore some residential neighborhoods and important Islamic shrines around Baghdad (their work stopped in 1984, and the project was not completed).

Since the mid-1980s, the majority of Iraqi architecture has been state-sponsored monumental architecture aimed at promoting and validating the rule of Saddam Hussein (b. 1937), Iraq's current leader.

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ARDABIL (2000 est. pop. 500,000). A city in Iran's mountainous northwest and a provincial capital since the 1993 formation of Ardabil Province, Ardabil (Ardebil) was previously the most northeastern city of Iran's East Azerbaijan province. The vast majority of the population are Azeri Turks. Since its genesis, estimated to be at least as early as the fifth century CE, the city has been an overland junction. This was especially true when the silk trade flourished, during several centuries when Ardabil was capital of the Azerbaijan region of Persia. Close today to Iran's Caspian province of Gilan and to the international border between Iran and Azerbaijan, Ardabil continues to be a significant overland point in the region.

In historic terms, Ardabil is known as the hearth of the Safavid dynasty. Its most significant landmark is a circular, domed tower known as the shrine and mausoleum of the Persian saint Safi-od-Din (1252–1334), for whom the dynasty is named. In addition to his tomb, this mausoleum is also the resting place of his sons and other notables, including Shah Ismail I. Nonetheless, by the early-sixteenth century, Tabriz had eclipsed Ardabil as the center of the Azerbaijan region. Yet Ardabil should also be noted for its capacity to resurrect itself. Razed by Mongol armies in 1220, the city has been devastated numerous times throughout its history by earthquakes. The late-ninth-century earthquake centered on Ardabil accounted for roughly 150,000 deaths, making it one of the top ten most destructive earthquakes in recorded history.

Kyle Evered

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ARIQ WATER SYSTEM The traditional method of distributing irrigation water to fields in pre-Soviet Central Asia, *ariq* in Uzbek simply means irrigation canal. This distribution system was arranged around the Islamic premise that water, like other natural goods, was the gift of God and could not be owned. Equitable distribution of water to fields was therefore a communal responsibility, although one which in the Emirate of Bukhara was regulated by the state. Canals were constructed and maintained by hand as part of a communal enterprise, which it was incumbent on all men in a community to perform on pain of losing their field holdings. Before the Soviet takeover, Central Asians (in what would be the republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) held water as a common good to be distributed according to need, with water theoretically being supplied on an equitable basis according to size of holding, fertility, or other considerations.

The construction of canals was overseen by an *usta* (expert) who used no surveying equipment beyond eye, thumb (to estimate elevation), and toe (to mark eventual course). Consequently, canals were often needlessly long, and suffered from evaporation and leakage. Channels were also prone to silting. Twice a year (at the end of February for major canals, March for minor ones) they were cleaned communally and the silt used as fertilizer.

At the village level, water supply was controlled by a *mirab* (literally "water controller") who channeled water to each holding by turn, judging the quantity needed by eye. Channels to individual fields were maintained by the farmer, but the system as a whole was supervised by an *aqsaqal* (authority) responsible for cleaning and maintenance and elected by all the villages using a main canal. In theory this prevented upstream villages taking more than their share of water, but in practice the system was open to abuse at both *aqsaqal* and *mirab* level. By the time of the Soviet takeover this system had fallen into considerable infrastructural decay, and it was replaced by more modern techniques.

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ARJA *Arja*, which developed from *gambuh*, Balinese dance, is a form of Balinese musical comedy incorporating song, dance, drama, comedy, and pantomime. It is commonly accompanied by a gamelan (Indonesian percussion instrument) gong orchestra, although early versions apparently had all-male casts and no gamelan accompaniment. A version with all-women casts also apparently existed at one time, but modern casts are mixed, albeit with comic female roles often played by men. Over the years, the comic elements have grown considerably in proportion to the dramatic action.

The main difference between *gambuh* and *arja* is that the latter places a much greater emphasis on drama and song rather than on dance and music, and *arja's* representation of dramatic action is considerably more flexible than that of the older genre. The musical accompaniment of *arja* is not continuous, allowing long passages of dialogue, often comic. The plots tend to be stereotyped romantic or sentimental narratives but also include stories from the medieval Javanese Panji romances, the Mahabharata epic, and Chinese sources. As in other Balinese genres, the clown servants Punta and Wijil serve the function of interpreting the action from the speech forms of classical theater into the vernacular.

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ARMENIANS The Armenians emerged as a people in about 600 BCE, occupying a rugged region in the Transcaucasus in western Asia. Although at various times the Armenians created an independent state, which under the ruler Tigranes the Great (c. 140–c. 55 BCE) extended from the Caspian to the Mediterranean, the strategic importance of the Transcaucasus and Caucasus ensured that foreign powers continually struggled to control the region. Thus the Achaemenid Persians, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Seljuk Turks, Mongols, Ottomans, and Russians, among others, successively controlled the Armenian peoples, and the



Armenians, severely treated by the various foreign invaders, again and again emigrated to avoid persecution.

Although Armenians are thought to have descended from both native Transcaucasian populations and foreign invaders, the Armenian language is Indo-European, written with a unique thirty-eight-letter alphabet. The Armenian Apostolic (Orthodox) Church is one of the oldest Christian churches, having been established in the region two decades before Constantine made Christianity the official religion of the Roman empire (c. 313).

Early Armenia and Persian Dominance

Present-day Armenia, located in the Transcaucasus, occupies but a fraction of the territory of ancient Armenia, then known as eastern Armenia. Most of the land of the ancient kingdom (western Armenia) is now located in eastern Turkey. A small part of Georgia, another Transcaucasian country, falls within the region once occupied by ancient Armenia.

Of all the foreign powers that controlled the Armenians, the Persians were the most influential until

the third century CE. Persian dominance was weakened, however, by the conversion of the Armenians to Christianity and the conquest of Persia (Iran) by the Arabs, Seljuk Turks, and Mongols. In the eleventh century, the Seljuk occupation of Armenia drove many Armenians into Iran.

Ottoman Rule

The Ottomans began their penetration into Armenia in the sixteenth century, about three centuries after the Ottoman empire was established, and during numerous wars in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Ottomans conquered and annexed parts of the Armenian land now located in eastern Turkey. These wars led to the forcible relocation of many Armenians, who moved to Iran; other areas of the Transcaucasus, including the current Armenia and Azerbaijan; and parts of the Ottoman empire. As the neighbor of Armenia, Iran became the home to the largest Armenian diaspora, concentrated in the current provinces of Isfahan, Tehran, and western and eastern Azerbaijan. Much smaller communities were



A tenth-century Armenian church in western Turkey. (O. ALAMANY & E. VICENS/CORBIS)

created in present-day Turkey, especially in the areas close to the Transcaucasus and in Istanbul. In 1639, the Treaty of Zuhab partitioned Armenia between the Ottomans and the Iranians. The former took western Armenia (now part of eastern Turkey), and the latter took eastern Armenia (present-day Armenia). Turkey has kept its part to this date. The persecution of the Armenians in the Ottoman empire and their forcible relocation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led to the migration of many Armenians from western Armenia to Iran.

Struggles with Russia

The fall of the Iranian Safavid empire in the early eighteenth century allowed the Russian empire to extend its influence to the Caucasus. This also encouraged the Ottoman empire to conquer the entire region. Consequently, the Caucasus and Transcaucasus, including Armenia, became the scene of wars and rivalry between Russia, the Ottomans who wanted to expand their territories, and the Iranians who wanted to regain their lost lands. For most of a century until 1828, the Armenians were ruled by three empires whose territories in the region expanded and contracted several times.

Two long series of wars between Iran and Russia led to the Turkmenchai Treaty of 1828. This confirmed Russia's annexation of the Caucasus and Transcaucasus, including present-day Armenia. The

Bolshevik Revolution gave rise to a short period of independence for Armenia, which emerged in 1918 as the independent republic of Armenia.

After crushing the Armenian republican forces, the Soviet Union regained control over Armenia in November 1920 and incorporated the Armenians into the Soviet Union as part of the Transcaucasian federation, which also included the Azerbaijanis and the Georgians. In 1936, Armenia became a full republic of the Soviet Union. It regained full independence only after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Armenians Today

At the present time, the Armenians live in Armenia and many other countries. Their voluntary and involuntary migrations have created large Armenian diasporas throughout the world. The population of Armenia is about 3.5 million, but between 800,000 and 1.5 million Armenians have migrated to other countries since independence in 1991 because of economic reasons, political instability, or both. About 1 million Armenians live in the countries of the former Soviet Union, and there are about 4 million Armenians in large communities in Iran, India, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, the United States, Canada, Argentina, and Western Europe.

The relations between the Armenians and the Turks have been particularly hostile. The Ottomans' persecution and the forcible migration of the Armenians living in western Armenia have been two major

factors in this hostility. The Armenian diaspora continues to press the Turkish republic to accept responsibility for the genocide of 1915, estimated at costing 500,000 to 1.5 million Armenian lives.

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ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

On 26 October 1955, when Ngo Dinh Diem proclaimed the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) with himself as president, all of the RVN's army units became known collectively as the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, or ARVN. The ARVN, successor to the French-led Vietnamese National Army of the First Indochina War, had an initial strength of 150,000 troops and eventually grew to almost one million at the time of its demise in 1975. Organized in the mid-1950s by Lieutenant-Generals John W. O'Daniel and Samuel T. Williams, successive heads of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, modeled after the U.S. Army, and designed to meet a People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) attack across the demilitarized zone (the DMZ: established 22 July 1954 along the seventeenth parallel in Vietnam), the ARVN initially was made up of four field divisions and six light divisions with thirteen territorial regiments for regional security.

Growing as the U.S. military presence in South Vietnam grew, the ARVN was beset by multiple problems, such as corruption, low morale, and poor leadership, which severely limited its effectiveness as a fighting force. The ARVN lacked officers, especially in the higher ranks, and many officers were appointed according to social rank and political favor rather than ability and integrity. The result was an almost entirely Catholic officer corps that led a fighting force that was more than 60 percent Buddhist. Logistics and technical services were crippled by senior officers' corruption. Many officers operated their units for financial gain by overreporting personnel numbers and pocketing the surplus pay, sharing the unit's confiscated materials with others who often sold the goods on the black market, and smuggling drugs.

Perhaps the most serious problem with the ARVN was that it was modeled on the U.S. Army and, like the U.S. Army, gauged to fight a conventional war in an unconventional war milieu, largely ignoring the

counterinsurgency nature of the conflict. In addition, the ARVN grew to depend on the American military's assistance in everything from command and control to logistics and material support. Such dependence weakened the ARVN to the point that it could not stand up to PAVN assault without substantial American assistance. In 1975, during the final operation to liberate South Vietnam, PAVN easily crushed the ARVN forces, with the exception of elite airborne and ranger units, and reunited the two Vietnams.

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ARNIS Arnis is a Filipino martial art and the national sport of the Philippines. It is based on the ancient Filipino martial art of *kali*, the traditional martial art of *eskrima*, other Asian martial arts, and Western-style boxing. Arnis emerged after World War II as a distinctive Filipino martial art, with training and ritual requirements resembling other Asian martial arts and competitions similar to boxing matches. Arnis competitors use 76-centimeter-long rattan sticks and score points by cleanly striking or disarming the opponent. Competitors wear a helmet and body padding to minimize injury. Although the sport remains popular only in the Philippines, the International Arnis Federation promotes the sport in some thirty nations.

David Levinson

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ARUNACHAL PRADESH (2001 est. pop. 1.1 million). "The land of the dawn-lit mountains," Arunachal Pradesh became a state in northeastern India in 1987. From 1947 to 1972 it was known as the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), then in 1972 it became a union territory. Arunachal Pradesh stretches north to the main crest of the eastern Himalayas and east to an irregular line that passes through a series of lofty peaks that were known as "the Hump" during



A narrow suspension foot bridge crosses over the forest in Arunachal Pradesh. (LINDSAY HEBBERD/CORBIS)

World War II, when supplies to China were airlifted over it. Arunachal Pradesh borders China and Tibet to the north and Bhutan to the west with verdant mountain ranges sloping down to the plains of Assam, India, to the south.

According to legend, Parasurama, the sixth of the ten incarnations of the Hindu god Vishnu, created a passage through the hills for the Brahmaputra River with a stroke of his axe at Brahma Kund (in eastern Arunachal Pradesh), now a popular pilgrimage destination. Arunachal Pradesh's recorded history dates only from the sixteenth century, when the Ahom kings began their rule in Assam. By 1826 the British had made Assam part of British India, and in 1882 a political adviser was appointed to bring the area under British administrative control. In general the indigenous peoples of the region, labeled "hill tribes," were left to themselves until World War II. After Independence, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) supported efforts to prepare the tribes for the impact of the modern world. Developments toward village democracy increased after China invaded Tawang (in western Arunachal Pradesh) in 1962. The river valleys, separated by forbidding north-south ridges, have enabled distinct microcultures to flourish

in Arunachal Pradesh. The region has at least fifteen distinct tribal groups known collectively to outsiders as the Abor. Among the principal tribes, whose beliefs blend Buddhism and traditional religions, are the Apa Tanis, Aka, Dafla, and the Sherdukpen.

Arunachal Pradesh, one of the last wilderness areas in India, exhibits great biodiversity in flora and fauna, including over five hundred species of orchids, in settings ranging from glacial terrain to alpine meadows and subtropical rain forests. Namdapha National Park is home to the rare hoolock gibbon, the legendary snow leopard, tigers, bears, pandas, and elephants. The capital, Itanagar, features the Jawaharlal Nehru State Museum and a Buddhist temple consecrated by the Dalai Lama.

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ARYAN The Aryans, far from being a "race," were speakers of Vedic Sanskrit in India, the earliest form of that classical Indo-European language. These people entered India from the northwest about 1500 BCE, and their descendants today form most of the population of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and northern India, although these people do not identify themselves primarily as Aryans.

The term *arya* in Sanskrit means "noble" and doubtless refers to these people's high position in the Iron Age society they established. This term has been used, and largely misused, by European writers since 1835 and has fallen into disfavor among scholars because of the Nazi propagandists' assumptions that a community of speakers was equivalent to a biological race and that the mixed populations of northern and central Europe were the purest representatives of an "Aryan race."

Aryan speakers were certainly a major civilizing force in India (as they were in Iran), though not the first. They built the cities of the north from about 700 BCE and laid the foundation for the liturgy and theology of Hinduism, the caste organization of Indian society, and the flowering of the first among many Indian literatures. Their mark has been indelible.

Paul Hockings

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ASHGABAT (1999 est. pop. 606,700). Ashgabat is the capital and largest city of the republic of Turkmenistan, a Central Asian state. It is situated at the northern foot of the Kopet-Dag mountains, on the edge of the Kara-Kum ("black sand") desert, only 19 kilometers from the country's southern border with Iran.

The city was founded in 1881 as a Russian military fort and was named Ashkabad after a nearby Turkmen settlement. It became the administrative center of Russia's Zakaspiiskaia oblast (Transcaspiian province), formed in 1881. In 1919 when Soviet power was established in this province, the city was renamed Poltoratsk, after the Russian revolutionary Pavel Poltoratsky (1888–1918). In 1927 Poltoratsk was re-

named Ashkhabad. From 1924 to 1991 the city was the capital of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic, part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ashgabat has been the capital of the republic of Turkmenistan. In October 1948 the city was leveled by a powerful earthquake, which killed 110,000 people (two-thirds of the population). Present-day Ashgabat is Turkmenistan's biggest industrial, administrative, and cultural center.

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ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK The Asian Development Bank is a developmental financial institution that provides loans, equity investments, and technical assistance to its member owners. Those owners are various nation-states with commercial interests in Asia. They refer to themselves as Developing Member Countries (DMCs), although several, most prominently the United States and Japan, are among the world's most advanced economies.

The bank opened for business in 1966 and must be understood within the context of world politics at that time. The motivating force was the United States, deeply involved in Asia through various anti-Communist military alliances but also, and more importantly, through its military adventure in Vietnam. That conflict made Asia the major foreign-policy concern for the presidential administration of Lyndon Johnson. That administration was severely criticized, at home and abroad, for its determination to seek a military solution to the various armed conflicts then raging in Southeast Asia. There was especial concern that little was being done to improve the life of the then-impooverished masses of Asians and, furthermore, that this oversight could only strengthen the appeal of Communist ideology in East Asia.

A financial institution dedicated to Asian economic progress thus offered several advantages to U.S. policymakers. It would demonstrate that the administration had a positive policy toward Asia and did not just rely on military solutions. This might placate domestic criticism of U.S. policy, while it could also entice various Asian nations to throw their lot with the West in the Cold War. Real economic progress in Asia would, it was believed, make that region of the world

resistant to Communist penetration. Finally, there was a component of humanitarianism, a longtime staple of U.S. foreign policy, which genuinely looked to improve the common lot in East Asia. This somewhat awkwardly mixed collection of motives often prompted the charge that the bank was founded merely as a cat's-paw for U.S. foreign policy or that it was implicitly designed to expedite U.S. commercial penetration in Asia.

History

Twenty-one countries, operating under auspices of the United Nations, founded the bank during a conference in Manila (where its headquarters remains to this day). It was initially capitalized at \$1 billion, with the United States subscribing to some 20 percent of that amount. No Communist countries participated. The bank was to be autonomous in nature, with governance similar to that of the International Monetary Fund.

When the bank was established, Asia, with the sole exception of Japan, was mired in millennia-old poverty. When compared with European and North American countries, nations such as Thailand, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Korea were largely rural, technologically backward, undereducated, and unindustrialized. Little more than a generation later these same states counted among the most advanced economies on the planet, although many factors besides the bank brought this about.

As an institution dedicated to Asian development, the bank took a broad view of its mission and sought to provide financing for projects that might stimulate long-term economic growth. It was not established to provide humanitarian aid as such, this being the provenance of international aid organizations or other foreign aid. As one bank publication put it, "The sheer numbers of the poor in Asian countries is sufficient reason for believing that a program consisting of a few welfare projects would have no perceptible impact on poverty" (Asian Development Bank 1978: 215). The bank, therefore, directed its attention away from the ordinary credit ventures associated with private lending and toward underwriting those things that might fundamentally ameliorate the inequitable distribution of wealth or, even better, create new sources of wealth.

Agriculture, for instance, was a prime concern of the bank from its earliest days. The bank looked to encourage land reform in those societies where agricultural property was concentrated in a few, often inefficient, hands. Furthermore, it was especially interested in funding enterprises that would alter the traditional subsistence or local market economy farming of much of Asia. This included such areas as fer-

tilizer production and genetic research. Finally, the bank was attentive to the credit needs of small farmers who could likely greatly increase yield if modest capital was made available to secure even a low level of mechanization and other improvements. Thus, the bank's lending was in some instances directed toward a restructuring of traditional societies.

Role in the Asian Financial Crisis

The bank has also performed some of the functions of a central bank, either by itself or in conjunction with other lending institutions. This includes assisting in currency stabilization, debt management, and emergency loans to sovereign states. Its involvement in the severe Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s was a premier example of this. Working with the International Monetary Fund and various national banks, the bank underwrote loans to, among various countries, Indonesia, Korea, and Taiwan. These loans relieved the liquidity crisis and assisted in stemming the precipitous drop in value of certain Asian currencies. The bank also acted as a sometime "policeman" to monitor national compliance with bailout plans put together by various financial institutions acting in concert.

By the early twenty-first century, the bank has grown substantially from its modest beginnings to become a significant factor for economic advancement and stabilization in Asia. Its membership has grown to nearly sixty nations, and it maintains offices in fourteen countries. Its employees number more than two thousand, some of whom are distributed in local liaison offices that supplement the formal branch structure of the bank. Its annual loans approach \$6 billion, most of which has been lent to public entities in Asia for various projects aimed at alleviating poverty or promoting sustainable growth in new or existing industries that might benefit large sectors of the population. This sum is relatively modest when compared with capital made available from private lenders but still far from insignificant. In addition, the bank acts as a resource for sociological and financial scholarship on problems and opportunities among member companies. Its publishing house is a prime source for information on contemporary trends in Asian economies.

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ASIAN DIASPORA. See **Chinese, Overseas; Koreans, Overseas; Refugees–South Asia**

ASIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 1997 By "Asian currencies" one normally means those of Japan and of the former Asian "tiger" countries—Korea (won), China (yuan), Hong Kong (dollar), Taiwan (dollar), the Philippines (peso), Thailand (baht), Malaysia (ringgit), Singapore (dollar), and Indonesia (rupiah)—all of which have been strongly impacted by the profound currency and banking crisis that has gripped Asia and much of the world since 1997. It began in the summer of that year with the decision of a desperate Thai government to float the baht after exhaustive efforts to support it in the face of a severe financial overextension that was in part real-estate driven. It sank like a rock and took Thailand with it. At the time Thailand had acquired a burden of foreign debt that made the country effectively bankrupt even before the collapse of its currency. The drastically reduced import earnings that resulted from the forced devaluation then made a quick or even medium-term recovery impossible without strenuous international intervention.

From Thailand, contagion quickly spread south, all but closing down the Indonesian economy and severely impacting the Malaysian. In Indonesia, which was particularly hard hit, it resulted in the 1998 fall of Indonesia's Suharto, whose power had once seemed a permanent fixture. Also severely impacted, once the contagion turned north, was Korea, which suffered a financial meltdown comparable to those of Thailand and Indonesia. In Hong Kong, which had the dubious benefit of a stable currency pegged to the dollar and the support of China, the currency and banking system survived but at the cost of a major recession. In the Philippines growth dropped to virtually zero in 1998. Only Singapore and Taiwan proved relatively insulated from the shock, but both suffered serious hits in passing, the former more so due to its size and geographical location between Malaysia and Indonesia. Even before the crisis, Japan had been in a state of profound recession due to a highly inefficient banking system laboring under mountains of bad debt, much of which up to that point had been relatively invisible because of the established Japanese banking practice

of hiding the losses of major customers. The ripple effect ultimately spread to Brazil and threatened to take Latin America down like a house of cards, too. If it had fallen, the United States might well have been pulled down as well.

Identifying the Causes

The causes of the debacle are many and disputed. Clearly Thailand was an economic catastrophe waiting to happen with an economy that was little more than a bubble fueled by "hot money," that is, short-term capital flow that is expensive and often highly conditioned (for quick profit), and with more and more required as the size of the bubble grew. Much the same can be said of Malaysia, although Malaysia had better political leadership, and Indonesia, with the added complication of what has been called "crony capitalism." Development money went in a largely uncontrolled manner to certain people only, not particularly the best suited or most efficient, but those closest to the centers of power. In Korea, in the haste to build great, Japanese-style conglomerates to take on the world, Koreans forgot that the purpose of capital investment in a business is ultimately to ensure a return and profitability. The great Korean conglomerates, more or less completely controlled by the government, simply absorbed more and more capital and never looked back.

Other factors were globalization, in this case, the spread of American- and European-style capitalism to the entire world after the end of the Cold War, whether the world was ready for it or not, and economic shifts that have made much of the traditional Asian approach to business obsolete. One such shift has been the move to merchandising in which the consumer, not the producer, determines the product, contrary to recent Japanese and Korean practice. Another longer-term influence has been the changing relationship between the United States and Japan, with the United States no longer openly supporting the highly artificial trade environment and exchange rates that governed economic relations between the two countries for almost four decades after World War II.

International Response

Such was the scope and the severity of the collapses involved that outside intervention, considered by the Malaysians, among others, as a new kind of colonialism, became urgently needed. Since the countries melting down were among not only the richest in their region, but in the world, and since hundreds of billions of dollars were at stake, any response to the crisis had to be cooperative and international, in this case

through the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF created a series of bailout packages for the most affected economies, tying the packages to reforms that were intended to make the restored Asian currency, banking, and financial systems as much like those of the United States and Europe as possible.

Above all, capital had to be administered democratically in the future, with no favored parties receiving funds by preference. There had to be adequate government controls set up to supervise all financial activities, ones that were to be independent, in theory, of private interest. Insolvent institutions had to be closed, and insolvency itself had to be clearly defined. In short, exactly the same kinds of financial institutions found in the United States and Europe had to be created in Indonesia, Korea, and elsewhere, as a price for IMF support. In addition, financial systems had to become "transparent," that is, provide the kind of reliable financial information used in the West to make sound financial decisions. No more massive losses under the table, as in Japan, or loans off the books.

Although such reforms were, in most cases, long needed, the countries most involved—Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia—have ended up undergoing an almost complete political and financial restructuring. They have suffered permanent currency devaluations, massive numbers of bankruptcies, collapses of whole sectors of once-booming economies, real estate busts, high unemployment, and social unrest. Even the Philippines, which came through the storm less damaged than other economies, has also had to suffer severe IMF intervention, while Malaysia has walled itself off from the world and gone its own way (only Singapore, with its rigid control system, and China and Hong Kong, isolated from the turmoil by the controls of the Chinese currency system, have come through the storm relatively unaffected). For most of the countries involved, IMF intervention has been a bitter pill for which the international agency has been roundly criticized and a bitter pill that may or may not result in the regional renewal the IMF expects.

Assessment

The story of Asian currencies recently has been the story of the decline and fall or near-fall of the Asian "tigers," but their problems are by no means unique to them, and the recent crisis may be just the first of many. The United States, for example, has had its own financial bubble fueled by consumer debt and overpriced stocks (although the rapid depreciation of many stock values recently has now reduced this danger), and a U.S. meltdown could involve many of the recovering Asian states (especially Korea) in a new round

of collapse, including, this time, some that were relatively spared by the last crisis. This specter was raised again after 11 September 2001, when the economic ripples of the shock and U.S. recession were felt as far afield as Mongolia.

China, which kept itself above the fray in 1997 and 1998, depends heavily on trade with the United States and suffers from enormous financial weaknesses, including a primitive and inefficient banking system with too many bad loans, leaving aside the issue of a public sector that is just too big and too inefficient. Another cause of contagion may be Russia, which has absorbed masses of aid funds, including gigantic IMF loans. Although economic growth has resumed again under Putin, the economy remains fragile, and a Russian meltdown would take much of Europe with it—and Europe, with the United States, is a major funder of the IMF. Deprived of most of its funds, the IMF would then be unable to intervene in even a minor Asian state with currency or other financial problems.

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ASIAN GAMES The Asian Games are the major Pan-Asian sports festival in which athletes from nearly all Asian nations are allowed to compete. Beginning in 1954 with the second Games, the Games have been held every four years, in the year midway between the Summer Olympics. The Games were established at India's suggestion after World War II. The first Games were held in the Indian capital of New Delhi in 1951, with only eleven nations sending athletes and only six events (all Western in origin): Japan was the major contender. Since then, Western sports have dominated the program, although attempts have been made to add indigenous Asian sports including martial arts and the Indian pursuit sport of *kabbadi*. Japan won the most medals from the first festival, a success that continued until 1982 when China emerged as the major regional sports power. The Thirteenth Asian

Games were held from 6 to 20 December 1998 in Bangkok, Thailand. They were the largest Games to date, with 9,469 athletes and officials from over forty-one nations. Unlike many earlier Games, they were free of major political problems in the spirit of its motto: Friendship Beyond Frontiers. In their current form, the Asian Games are the major Olympic "tune-up" festival, with most world-class athletes competing in preparation for the Olympics.

A defining feature of the Games for much of their history has been the effect of political conflicts across and beyond the region that have often resulted in some nations being excluded or refusing to participate in the Games. For example, Israel has often been excluded because of its ties to the West; Taiwan suffered the same fate in 1962. Mainland Chinese athletes did not compete until 1974, and Iraq was barred in 1990. The Games have also been used by political leaders in the host nation to build national pride and to enhance their own and their nation's power in Asia and beyond. In 1962, President Sukarno of Indonesia used the Jakarta Games to assert Indonesian leadership in the



INDIGENOUS SPORTS AT THE ASIAN GAMES

Promoting Asian culture is one of the goals of the Asian Games and toward that end an effort is made to include indigenous sports. One such sport is sepak takraw (known as footbag in the west), described below as it was played in Burmese villages in the late 1800s.

A very common amusement amongst Burmans, rarer amongst Talaing and still rarer amongst Kareng, is a game of ball called *khyee-loon*. The ball is made of open wicker-work and is struck with the sole of the foot, the elbow or any part of the body except the toes and hands. There are no sides but half a dozen lads or men join and standing in a ring endeavor to keep the ball off the ground, any one near whom it descends striking it upwards.

Source: *Gazetteer of Burma*. (1983) New Delhi: Cultural Publishing House, 394.



HOST CITIES OF THE ASIAN GAMES

1951—New Delhi (India)
1954—Manila (Philippines)
1958—Tokyo (Japan)
1962—Jakarta (Indonesia)
1966—Bangkok (Thailand)
1970—Bangkok (Thailand)
1974—Teheran (Iran)
1978—Bangkok (Thailand)
1982—New Delhi (India)
1986—Seoul (Korea)
1990—Beijing (China)
1994—Hiroshima (Japan)
1998—Bangkok (Thailand)
2002—Puson (South Korea)

Third World, and angered both rival India and the International Olympic Committee as a result. His response was to found "The Games of the Newly Emerging Forces," which foundered after his political demise in 1965. Similarly, for the 1982 Games, which India hosted, Indira Gandhi spent nearly \$1 billion to construct new sports facilities, and the South Korean government created a government ministry for sports when it hosted the 1988 Games. That action helped to make South Korea a legitimate power in several sports. At the same time, Korea was criticized for its repression of student protestors during the Games.

In addition to the Asian Games, there are several other major regional sports festivals in Asia. The largest is the Southeast Asian Games, a biannual festival for the nations of Southeast Asia. The first eight festivals (up to and including 1975) were called the Southeast Asian Peninsula Games. Since 1977, nations from outside the peninsula have participated as well. Also important are the East Asian Games and the recently inaugurated West Asian Games, which were first held in Tehran, Iran, in November of 1997. As with the Asian Games, most sports are Western Olympic sports and the festivals are now more about preparing athletes for international competition than nation building.

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ASIAN-CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE For centuries Christianity and the religions of Asia existed with little or no mutual contact or genuine dialogue. There was not even a desire for dialogue, if by "dialogue" is meant a respectful, empathetic conversation aimed at understanding the other religion as it understands itself. Such dialogue would even permit participants to be changed by what they learned. Until recently contacts between religions were more monologic than dialogic, more aimed at conversion or debating than mutual understanding.

Some early contacts did take place. Jesuit missionaries from Europe, such as de Nobili, Ricci, and Francis Xavier, brought the Christian message to India, China, and Japan. They respected the traditional cultures they encountered and sought to interpret Christian theology through the lens of local religious traditions. More commonly, however, Christian missionaries dismissed the cultures and religions they encountered, proclaiming that Christian beliefs should be understood in the context of European culture—an approach inimical to authentic dialogue.

The Asian religions of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism are inherently tolerant of a variety of religions, tending not to claim that any one is the sole path to truth, salvation, or liberation. Christianity is different; it is a religion of orthodoxy (right belief) emphasizing the precise propositional expression of theological truths. Islam, which is an Eastern religion in that most of its adherents live in the Middle East and Asia, is also a religion of orthodoxy, but Christian-Muslim dialogue will not be discussed in this article.

In East and South Asia, boundaries between religions could be crossed, allowing participation in the beliefs and practices of more than one religion. In the West, however, the boundaries around a particular religion tend to preclude participation in any other.

European proselytizing in Asia actually converted very few, and Christianity remains a statistically small presence there to this day. Asian religions are, however, growing rapidly in the West through immigration and conversion, although adherents of Asian religions still make up a small percentage of the population.

Prelude to Dialogue

Dialogue between East and South Asian religions and Christianity formally began at the 1893 World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago with the World's

Parliament of Religion. While most participants were from the West, Asian religious traditions were represented. It was radical for the times and gave new social and intellectual respectability to all religions involved.

Many events and individuals in the nineteenth century made the Parliament intellectually possible. Western colonialism and the opening of Japan exposed the West to the histories, cultures, and religions of Asia. Faster travel and communication augmented East-West contacts, as did a certain amount of immigration, particularly from East to West, fueled by growing Western economies, especially that of the United States.

More fundamentally, the United States saw the emergence of religious and intellectual movements either influenced by or compatible with aspects of Asian thought. As disseminated by Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882) and Henry David Thoreau (1817–1862), Transcendentalism claimed association with ancient ideas connected with Hinduism and Buddhism, ideas such as the divinity or infinitude of each person. Although primarily a philosophical and literary reaction to the perceived limitations of the Enlightenment with its rational and empirical bias, Transcendentalism was deeply influenced by newly translated Asian religious texts.

Other American movements also contributed to a climate favoring dialogue. Theosophy (divine wisdom)—associated with Helena Blavatsky (1831–1891), Henry Steel Olcott (1832–1907), and the founding of the Theosophical Society in New York City in 1875—taught that the divine must be directly experienced to be knowable. Behind Theosophy lay a range of historical, philosophical, mystical, and religious influences, at the heart of which was the spiritual heritage of India as found in the early Vedas, the Upanishads, and later writings. Buddhism and Taoism also contributed to the content of Theosophy. New Thought, proposed by Phineas Quimby (1802–1866), likewise taught the infinitude of the individual, but maintained that evil and illness were manifestations of wrong thinking and a lack of spiritual insight. While influenced by Platonism, Swedenborgianism, philosophical idealism, and American Transcendentalism, a main source of New Thought was ancient Hinduism, especially its monistic understanding of ultimate reality.

The new availability of Asian religious texts in translation allowed Asian religions to have an influence. A prime source of such texts was the work of the German Orientalist and philologist Max Müller (1823–1900). Müller published translations of important Vedic texts and between 1879 and 1904 edited a fifty-one-volume series entitled *The Sacred Books of*

the East. The English scholar T. W. Rhys Davids (1843–1922) and his Pali Text Society made Theravada Buddhist texts available to complement available Mahayana Buddhist texts.

Two further scholarly developments were also vital: biblical criticism and the new field of comparative study of religion. Biblical criticism took various modern critical methodologies that were applied to ancient texts and used them in studying the Bible as historical and literary writing. This approach treated the Bible and Asian religious texts alike as objects of academic investigation, seeking similarities and differences between them in context, purpose, use, and meaning. The academic study of religion emerged in the nineteenth century as an interdisciplinary means for intercultural study of the intentions, meanings, structures, and ideas of religion. This included a search for the origins both of religion and of the range of myths found in all religions—starting points for discussion between Asian and Western religions.

The rapid and overwhelming success of science and technology in the nineteenth century was also a factor uniting different religions. All faiths were challenged by issues such as the nature of the cosmos, the source of knowledge and the means of knowing reality, human values and the significance of the individual, and the worth of ancient religious wisdom.

Toward the end of the century the ecumenical movement arose within Protestantism to attempt to reverse denominational splintering and seek cooperation and even reunification among different churches. In the twentieth century ecumenism expanded to involve Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy. This ecumenical disposition affected how and why dialogue arose between Asian and Western religions.

Dialogue Begins

The 1893 World's Parliament of Religion—recognized as epochal at the time—was possible only because of earlier historical, cultural, and intellectual developments in the nineteenth century. At the opening, Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902), a Hindu from India, hailed the spirit of tolerance and pluralism embodied in the gathering. Rabbi Emil Hirsch of Sinai Temple, Chicago, and the high priest of the Shinto religion in Japan, the Rt. Rev. R. Shibata, both praised the results of the Parliament.

Professor Max Müller regretted missing the Parliament. Jabez Sunderland (1842–1936), a Unitarian Universalist who attended the Parliament, noted its significance. Twentieth-century commentators on the Parliament continued to see it as pivotal in East-West

dialogue. The Western scholar Carl Jackson said that after Emerson spoke highly of Eastern religions, a series of events and movements gave Asian religions a growing prominence in the West that reached a pinnacle at the 1893 Parliament.

World War I shattered the nineteenth-century belief in inevitable social evolution powered by scientific and technological progress. Just as the postwar vision of a League of Nations faltered, so did the call of the religion scholar Rudolph Otto (1869–1937) for an Inter-Religious League. Nevertheless, the World Congress of Faiths started in the 1930s, and there was a World Alliance of Religions in the 1950s. The genocide of European Jewry during World War II made it obvious that in spite of modern scientific advances, religious hatred could still be used to justify state-sanctioned murder. The ecumenical movement intensified, and the Roman Catholic Church's Vatican Council II expressed a positive attitude toward Asian religions and the need for dialogue and understanding between Western religions and those of the East.

Key individuals heightened the desire for interreligious dialogue. Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi (1869–1948), a devout Hindu who practiced nonviolent opposition to the British rule of India, was deeply drawn to elements of the Christian gospels, especially Jesus' Sermon on the Mount. He said that there would not really be peace in the world until there was peace among the religions. D. T. Suzuki (1870–1966), a Japanese Buddhist, worked for years to introduce Buddhism—particularly Zen—to the West. The faith of the American Christian monk Thomas Merton (1915–1968) was profoundly affected by his developing understanding of Asian religions, especially Buddhism. While on the trip to Asia during which he unexpectedly died, Merton had a transformative religious experience at a Buddhist shrine in Sri Lanka and had warm meetings with the Dalai Lama, the leader of Tibetan Buddhism. The Dalai Lama has advocated East-West dialogue for decades and is one of the few universal voices of compassion and moral vision listened to in both Asia and the West.

Main Topics of the Dialogue

A main purpose of the dialogue has been to find ways for religions collectively to promote peace, justice, and reduction of human suffering. The dialogue has also addressed intellectual and theological topics, from the meaning of the Ultimate/God, the true self, ethical values, and salvation/liberation, to mystical experience and the understanding of the sacred in a secular, scientific age.

While Hinduism's view of the Ultimate has been thought of as incorporating aspects of both polytheism and monotheism, it actually tends more toward monism, or belief in a singular, all-pervading reality called Brahma. Hinduism says that Brahma is really beyond all human categories of thought and is ineffable. The individual self, called atman, is seen as one with Brahma, and human life is the passage beyond ignorance of one's true identity as divine. The reincarnation cycle is based upon karma, or action—a universal moral law based upon one's quality of virtue and insight in seeking liberation from the cycle of birth and death. This cycle ends with the full realization of one's divinity (*moksa*).

Buddhism developed out of Hinduism and came to see that there is no enduring, separate self (teaching of the no-self, or *anatta*). Awareness of this, or awakening, frees one from the cycle of suffering that belief in a permanent self makes inevitable. This freedom is called nirvana or the extinguishing of cravings, especially the craving to be an autonomous self. As in Hinduism, religious experience and meditation are vital to spiritual growth, along with compassion and devotion to the sacredness of existence.

Taoism, with its emphasis upon the Way of nature (the *Tao*), simplicity, harmony with the natural world, nonactive action (*wuwei*), and spontaneity, has attracted the attention of the West, but has not explicitly participated in interreligious dialogue other than to give new perspectives upon wisdom for living.

The very different views of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism on the one hand and Christianity on the other make for interesting dialogue. Christianity rejects the notion of reincarnation in favor of a theistic interpretation of the Ultimate as a creator God. While being the creative source of human life and the self, God and the human self remain distinct entities. A human self is thought to endure; salvation is the action of God in freeing people to be fully themselves in the divine presence.

More generally, the interreligious dialogue has had to grapple with the difference between the East and South Asian focus on nothingness and emptiness as significant aspects of reality and the Western focus on being and fullness as central. Are the differences real or apparent? Dialogue makes clear which differences cannot be glossed over and where there are commonalities.

Perspectives and Prospects

The Asian-Christian interreligious dialogue has highlighted various attitudes toward religion itself and its claims. Exclusivism holds that one's own religion,

or only one religion, is valid and is the path to truth. Inclusivism tends to advocate syncretism—the development of a universal religion shaped by all individual religions—or to claim that one's own religion is expansive enough to assimilate or constructively accept other religious paths. A third perspective is religious pluralism, which maintains the value of other religions without diminishing either the centrality or historical, theological uniqueness of one's own. One respects other religions and seeks to learn from and understand them empathetically.

The centennial of the World's Parliament of Religion was observed in 1993, again in Chicago, to mark the sometimes-dramatic developments in Asian-Christian interreligious dialogue that took place during the twentieth century. As Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism gain influence in the West, the West will learn not only other ways of seeing, but new ways to understand itself. And Asian religions can learn from Christianity not only different understandings of the nature of the cosmos and time, but also how to reinterpret themselves in the contemporary world.

Alan Altany

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ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION FORUM Today, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum is commonly referred to pejoratively as "four adjectives in search of



Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, Thailand Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, and U. S. President George W. Bush at the APEC summit in October 2001 in Shanghai, China. The key issues were terrorism and trade. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

a noun." Historically, the APEC forum was founded as an informal ministerial meeting of twelve Pacific Rim economies (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and the United States) meeting in Canberra, Australia, in November 1989. The Australian prime minister Bob Hawke initiated the call to create the framework for the APEC. In light of the increasing pace of regional economic interdependence, the ministers acknowledged a need for more consultations to help strengthen the multilateral trading system, to foster greater opportunities for regional trade and investment, and to identify common economic interests. The ministerial communiqué and the report of the chairman (Gareth Evans, Australian minister for foreign affairs and trade) have provided substantial scope for an ambitious program. Despite significant results in the early meetings of the APEC forum, the prospects for APEC are unclear. Nevertheless, two major developments have completely changed APEC.

One was that the former U.S. president Bill Clinton invited all APEC members to a summit in Seattle, Washington, in 1993 to discuss world economic issues, such as the reduction of trade and investment barriers, economic cooperation and interdependence, and the expansion of the world economy and support for an open international trading system. Since then, the APEC summit meeting has been held yearly. The other major development was economic. At the 1994 meeting in Bogor, Indonesia, APEC set itself the ambitious goal of achieving free and open trade and investment among APEC members by 2010 for developed economies and by 2020 for developing members.

By 2002, APEC membership had grown to twenty-one countries (Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile; People's Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua, New Guinea; Peru; Philippines; Russia; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; United States; and Vietnam). By the end of the twentieth century, APEC economies had a combined gross domestic product of over \$18 trillion, more than half of the total world economy. The APEC Secretariat is located in Singapore and has an official website (www.apecsec.org.sg/body.htm). A number of APEC members have created their own websites, including Canada (www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canada-apec/), China (www.apec-china.org.cn), New Zealand (www.apec.govt.nz), and the United States (<http://us-info.state.gov/regional/ea/apec/>).

Although the APEC summit meeting usually focuses on economic issues, at the 17–18 October 2001 meeting in Shanghai the global political agenda, including antiterrorist activities, was also addressed. Despite the events of 11 September 2001 in the United States, the U.S. president George W. Bush attended this summit. APEC's condemnation of terrorist acts was included in the communiqué of the summit.

APEC members, however, have their disagreements. Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia, for example, proposed that an East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) made up only of East Asian nations meet. The United States strongly objected to this proposal. Moreover, European countries considered their interests unrepresented by APEC. Competition between the two continents (North America and Western Europe) over Asia has escalated. In March 1996, Europe and East Asia inaugurated the ASEM (Asia–Europe Meeting) in Bangkok, Thailand. Both the APEC and the ASEM represent attempts by the state policy-making elites of East Asia to consolidate the channels of economic and political communication with the other two developed regions of the world.

Unryu Suganuma

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ASIATIC SOCIETY OF JAPAN Among the various learned societies that sprang up in Asia at the end of the nineteenth and throughout the twentieth century, the most active and prestigious has been the Asiatic Society of Japan. The society was established in Yokohama in 1872 and has continued its work despite financial and other difficulties, overcoming even the ordeal of the Pacific War. In 1997, the society's 125th anniversary was celebrated in Tokyo in the presence of four princes of the Japanese imperial family.

The society was founded by a group of learned and dedicated foreigners, mainly British. In the course of time, however, membership expanded to include other foreigners as well as several Japanese. The society is now open to all people who are interested in studying and disseminating Japanese culture in connection with other Asian cultures.

The society has always had two main pillars of activity: monthly lectures by distinguished speakers followed by discussions, and the publication in English of a widely acclaimed academic journal, *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*.

A council, elected by the members every year, various specialized committees, and the board of editors of *Transactions* are the driving force of the society. A monthly bulletin helps to keep members in Japan and abroad in touch with one another and with the various events and publications.

The names of the society's past presidents read as a kind of who's who of early Western scholars of Japan: Robert Grant Watson, Jane C. Hepburn, William G. Aston, Basil Hall Chamberlain, Sir Ernest Satow, Sir Charles Eliot, George B. Sansom, Dr. Robert Haus van Gulik, and many others.

In the early 2000s, the society faced financial difficulties as donors became scarce; it had to rely on the modest membership fee as the basic source of revenue.


Nevertheless, it has survived and continues its dedication to academic work.

George A. Sioris

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ASOKA (d. c. 232 BCE), Maurya emperor. Asoka, or Ashoka (in full, Asokavardhana), third emperor of the Maurya empire (c. 325–180 BCE), ruled in India from about 269 to 232 BCE. He was also the king of Magada. There is much fable about his life, in both Sanskrit and Pali sources, and the Buddhist texts in particular paint his life in glowing images. He was the grandson of the founder of the Mauryan empire, Chandragupta, and only came to the throne himself, it was told in Sri Lankan sources, by first killing off



A worshiper before the Asoka Stupa in Patan, Nepal in 1996. (MACDUFF EVERTON/CORBIS)

ninety-nine of his brothers and half-brothers in war. He had two or more queens and several sons.

His empire covered most of the Indian subcontinent, except the far south, and was marked archaeologically by the creation of several dozen edicts, written in Brahmi script, on rocks and pillars located all over the country, many of which still exist. Two found in Afghanistan are in another local script. These inscriptions give a picture of a caring ruler who wanted to extend the law and the sense of dharma to all his subjects. Although hundreds of thousands had been killed in his early wars with the Kalingas of eastern India, in later life he either became a Buddhist or at least supported their missionary efforts. He did so even to the extent, it is believed, of sending his daughter Sanghamitra and his son Mahendra to introduce Buddhism to Sri Lanka.

Asoka's edicts show much concern for his people, calling for religious tolerance and for respect toward parents, elders, priests, and monks. He established rest houses for travelers and clinics for sick people and animals and had roadways planted with shade trees. He is said to have gone on tours of his realm and to have sent missionaries to foreign lands, even to Syria and Egypt. He made donations not only to Buddhist sects but also to their religious rivals. Asoka is also said to have established the main features of Buddhist pilgrimage by having set up throughout his realm 84,000 stupas (reliquary mounds) in which relics of the Buddha were preserved, and by formulating the basic itinerary of pilgrimage sites.

Paul Hockings

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ASSAM (2002 est. pop. 27.2 million). With an area of 478,524 square kilometers, Assam is the largest of India's northeastern states and produces 60 percent of India's tea. It is connected with the rest of the country by a narrow submountainous corridor between Bhutan and Bangladesh. Named from the Sanskrit *Asoma* (peerless), Assam offers beauty and a rich legacy of civilization. Home to several different peoples—Austroasiatic, Mongolian, Dravidian, and Aryan—Assam developed a composite culture. The state is dominated by the river Brahmaputra, whose lush 700-kilometer valley is sandwiched between the Himalayan

foothills to the north and the hills and plateau of Meghalaya to the south.

The early history of Assam is obscure. The *Mahabharata* and the Puranas refer to a great kingdom known as Kamarupa in this region, ruled by a legendary king Narakasura. The first reliable description of the kingdom was that of the Chinese pilgrim Xuanzang, who in 640 attended the court of Bhaskaravarman, an ally of the Gupta monarch Harsha and a patron of Hinduism. Stone and copperplate inscriptions indicate a succession of Hindu dynasties, but any centralized kingship had collapsed into loose confederacies of Hindu rajas by the early thirteenth century. The Ahom kings from Myanmar (Burma) adopted Hinduism and provided increasing power and prosperity, culminating under King Rudra Singh (1696–1714), the renowned military strategist and patron of the *buranji*, or Ahom chronicles, who established an extensive trade with Tibet, repulsed seventeen Mughal invasions, and built the great cities of Nowgong and Rangpur. A Hinduism rejecting the caste system and based on community prayer was spread in monasteries that became centers for dance, music, and manuscript painting. The British eventually drove out the Myanmar invaders and made the area part of British India in 1826.

Following Indian independence in 1947, Assam shrank through cessions to Pakistan and the creation of new states and territories—in 1963, Nagaland; in 1972, Meghalaya; in 1986, Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram. From the 1960s to the 1990s, Assam was the scene of recurrent riots and violence by minority ethnic groups including the Bodo, Mizo, Nagas, and Tripuri, and by the Assamese against outsiders, such as immigrants from Bangladesh. The United Liberation Front pursues the independence of Assam, and several militant Bodo groups promote a separate state.

C. Roger Davis

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ASSAMESE Assamese is similar to the Bengali language and is one of the state languages of India. Assamese speakers occupy the present state of Assam, which lies in the middle valley of the Brahmaputra River in northeastern India. Before the Age of Explo-

ration the Assamese were the most easterly-dwelling people who spoke an Indo-European language. The population of the state of Assam totals about 22 million; there are about 15 million Assamese (as of 1991), as well as numerous tribal groups and recent immigrants who speak other languages.

The original Assamese were Ahoms from the Shan states in eastern Burma who migrated from Myanmar/Burma in the thirteenth century, after which they began to rule over the Brahmaputra valley region. "Assam" and "Aham" are variant names for the country. The Ahoms maintained chronicles of the main events that occurred during the reign of each ruler. In 1822 the region came under British control and remained so until 1947.

The majority of Assamese are Hindus, who live in rural settings in multicasite villages. Assamese mostly engage in rice agriculture, although tea is the important crop in the neighboring hills. While polytheistic Hinduism is the dominant religion, there are also egalitarian Hindu sects that are monotheistic and in which membership is by invitation. Here, as in some Protestant churches, people engage in congregational worship, have direct access to scriptural revelation, and believe in salvation through faith and mystical union. Among the Assamese there are also many Muslims and some Buddhists and Christians.

Paul Hockings

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ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established on 7 August 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The organization's goals are spelled out in the ASEAN Declaration, adopted on the same date. ASEAN was formed to promote regional collaboration in Southeast Asia and, in so doing, to contribute to peace, development, and prosperity in the region. The relations between the member states are governed by two fundamental documents adopted in 1976: the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC, also known as the Bali Treaty) and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. The core element of the structure of formal collaboration in ASEAN is the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, which has been organized by member-states on a rotation basis since the establishment of the Association. As collaboration in ASEAN has expanded, the number of meetings has

considerably increased, and now there are hundreds of meetings each year in various field of cooperation. In 1981, the ASEAN Secretariat was established, and it has assumed a coordinating role.

Formation

ASEAN was established in 1967, but it was not the first attempt to establish a subregional association in Southeast Asia. In 1961, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was established, bringing together what was then Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand. In 1963, Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines established MAPHILINDO (a term formed from the combined first letters of the member nations' names) in an attempt to promote cooperation among the three countries. Cooperation within both ASA and MAPHILINDO was seriously hampered by the conflicts between Malaysia and Indonesia and Malaysia and the Philippines, respectively, over the formation of Malaysia in 1963. The decision to create ASEAN grew from the necessity to manage the relations between the five founding members.

Development

In 1967, ASEAN's expressed goal was to promote social and economic cooperation among the member states of the association. However, it is generally recognized that ASEAN has achieved more in terms of cooperation in the political and security fields than in the economic field. Through a system of informal and formal meetings between leaders, ministers, and senior officials, the ASEAN states have managed to build confidence, familiarity, and understanding of the positions of one another on different issues. ASEAN is renowned for its decision-making process, which requires that all decisions be reached by consensus. Particular emphasis has been put on promoting and achieving regional resilience—based on the internal resilience of each of the member-states—through economic development. This should result in greater political support for the governments and lead to enhanced political stability.

Achieving a high level of interaction, cooperation, and understanding among the original member states of ASEAN was a gradual process influenced by both intra-ASEAN developments and developments in the broader Southeast Asian region. The conflicts in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and the progress of the leftist forces in the early 1970s leading to total victory by 1975, couple with the gradually diminishing U.S. involvement and then total withdrawal, created a new situation in Southeast Asia, bringing the perceived threat of international Communism to the doorstep of

ASEAN members, particularly Thailand. The ASEAN countries responded to these developments by issuing the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on 27 November 1971, which called for the creation of a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia. The next step came on 24 February 1976 with the signing of the TAC (which had been formulated in response to developments in the region) and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (which grew from the evolving intra-ASEAN collaboration during the so-called formative years of 1967 to 1976), in connection with the first ASEAN Summit in Bali.

ASEAN has also achieved a high degree of success in its relations with countries outside the association. The strength obtained from acting together as one political force stems from a collective stand on major foreign policy issues. The most obvious example is ASEAN's success in gaining widespread international support for its stand on the Cambodian conflict. ASEAN expressed open condemnation of Vietnam's military intervention in Cambodia, attempted to secure a total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from that country, and supported Cambodian groups opposing the Vietnam presence. In the post-Cambodian-conflict era, ASEAN has initiated two major initiatives, one leading to the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the other to the expansion of membership in ASEAN within the Southeast Asian region.

The ARF grew out of an increased awareness among the ASEAN states that there was a need for a multilateral forum to discuss security issues within the broader Pacific Asian context as a result of the end of the Cold War and indications of a reduction in the U.S. military presence and of its commitment to East and Southeast Asia.

The expansion of membership in ASEAN in the 1990s (Brunei had already joined in 1984) grew out of the rapprochement between ASEAN and the three Indochinese states (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) following the settlement of the Cambodian conflict in 1991 and the ASEAN policy of "constructive engagement" toward Myanmar (Burma). These two processes led to the accession to the Bali Treaty by the four states. This was followed by ASEAN observer status and membership in ARF for the four states. Finally, Vietnam (in 1995), Laos and Myanmar (in 1997), and Cambodia (in 1998) acceded to full membership in ASEAN. The integration of the new members is a challenge to ASEAN and is leading to the gradual emergence of a more heterogeneous association.

The early 1990s also witnessed a strengthening of economic cooperation within ASEAN through in-

creased intra-ASEAN trade and investment. In 1992, an agreement was reached on the establishment of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) within fifteen years. The member states also signed an agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff, which is the key instrument in the process through which AFTA will be established. Beginning in 1997, the expansion of economic cooperation was considerably slowed down by what came to be called the Asian financial crisis of 1997, which caused a regionwide economic recession. Some ASEAN members have still not recovered from the crisis, which has been a major issue of concern for them.

Challenges

Some observers argue that ASEAN was a success story up to the mid-1990s but that thereafter its image was tarnished by the challenges brought about by its expanding membership, the impact of that expansion on the association's coherence, and the impact of the Asian financial crisis that began in 1997. A more balanced picture is that ASEAN was not such a success story by the mid-1990s and that cooperation within ASEAN has not been weakened to the extent argued by its critics. Nevertheless, ASEAN faces many challenges, both interstate (relations among the member states) and intrastate (problems within the member states).

Ramses Amer

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ASTANA (1999 pop. 319,300). Astana (Akmolinsk until 1961, Tselinograd from 1961 to 1992, and Aqmola from 1992 to 1998) is the capital of Kazakhstan and is located on the Ishim River in north-central Kazakhstan. It is an important transportation entrepot



The public square in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan. (LIBA TAYLOR/CORBIS)

on the Trans-Kazakhstan and South Siberian Railways, and is Kazakhstan's sixth-largest industrial and commercial center.

Akmolinsk was founded in 1830 as a Russian military settlement after Russians acquired the land from local Kazakh tribes, and gradually it became an important entrepot for trade between Turkistan and Russia. In 1868 it became a provincial center. After the delimitation of borders between the Russian Federation and the Kazakh Autonomous Republic in 1925, the city became an administrative center of the Aqmola Province of Kazakhstan. In 1929 to 1931 the strategically important railways were built, connecting the city with Petropavlovsk and Karaganda. Akmolinsk's importance was enhanced during the Virgin Land Campaign, as it became a center of Tselinnyi Krai and was renamed Tselinograd. It became an industrial and cultural center, with the population growing from 31,000 in 1939 to 180,000 in 1970 and to 222,000 in 1977. After independence in 1991, the city was renamed Aqmola. In 1994 Kazakhstan's government decided to move the capital from Almaty to Aqmola, and in 1998 it changed the name of the city to Astana. According to various estimates, during the first five years the government invested approximately \$2 billion to upgrade infrastructure and to build new government facilities in the city.

Rafis Abazov

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ATATURK (1881–1938), founder of the Republic of Turkey. Kemal Ataturk, the father of modern Turkey, was born in Thessaloniki, modern Greece, the son of a minor government official. His given name was Mustafa; the nickname Kemal (perfection) was given him at school. In 1934 he took the epithet Ataturk (father of Turks).

Ataturk attended the Second Military School in Thessaloniki from 1893 and was a cadet at the Military Academy at Monastir (now Bitola, Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia) from 1895 to 1899 before graduating from the Staff College, Istanbul, in 1905. Posted in Damascus, Syria, Ataturk supported the Young Turk revolution of 1908 but failed to make an impact as a politician and returned to the military. He saw action in the Turko-Italian War in 1911–1912, when the Dodecanese were ceded to Italy, and the Second Balkan War of 1913, when Turkey lost virtually all of its European territory, including Thessaloniki and Monastir.



Ataturk in his military uniform, c. 1900. (HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS)

Ataturk rose to prominence during World War I, when he defended the Dardanelles (Gallipoli) from a combined Australian–British–New Zealand assault. For this action, he won the honorific Ghazi (Warrior of the Faith).

A general at the close of the war, Ataturk refused to accept the peace terms imposed on the Ottoman sultan and established a rival government, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, in Ankara in 1920. After driving out an invading Greek force in 1922, Ataturk abolished the sultanate, although a Turkish Republic was not formally declared until October 1923.

In 1923, Ataturk negotiated the Treaty of Lausanne, guaranteeing Turkish integrity inside its present borders, and in 1925 he signed a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union, protecting the nation from Soviet territorial claims on behalf of the Armenians. He was now free to pursue a domestic policy based on six principles, which were enshrined in the Constitution in 1937. These were republicanism, nationalism, secularism, statism, populism, and revolutionism.

Ataturk's aim was to create a European-style secular nation-state. To this end all traces of the past were attacked and expressions of non-Turkish identities suppressed. Ottoman political and religious institutions were abolished and replaced by Western models in law (the Swiss code adopted in 1926), literature (the Latin alphabet introduced in 1928), and dress (European clothing enforced in 1925). In particular, Islam as the basis of traditional Turkish society was attacked, with the abolition of the caliphate, religious courts, and Sufi orders and with the emancipation of women. Secularization in Turkey went further than anywhere outside the USSR. Ataturk's reforms remain the basis of the Turkish state.

Ataturk suffered from kidney disease from 1919. Famed for his love of women, opera, and alcohol, he died of cirrhosis. Described by Yapp as "ruthless, ambitious, ungenerous, intolerant, and given to impulsive rages," he was nevertheless a man of exceptional determination and intellectual abilities, who salvaged modern Turkey from the wreckage of the Ottoman empire.

Will Myer

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ATHEISM, OFFICIAL-CHINA Since religion has permeated the fabric of Chinese social life from time immemorial, the rise to power of modern political forces, especially the avowedly atheist Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in 1949 seemed likely to have a profound impact on the state and society. Would the Communist Party state pursue a policy of reckless suppression of religious life, or would it tolerate religion, at least temporarily? Except during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the religious policy of the CCP has been guided by practical considerations rather than by its atheist ideology.

Atheism as a Modern Concept

In the context of this article, atheism will be understood as a concept that rejects any form of religious belief. This definition does not include certain strands of Confucianism and Buddhism that are sometimes labeled as atheist on the grounds that they are not based on the concept of a personal deity. In fact, there is no reason to assume that they are incompatible with other forms of religion, and by and large they did not interfere with sacrifices and other forms of worship. As far as religious policy was concerned, the imperial authorities tried hard to suppress "heterodox" teachings and practices that were regarded as a threat to the state; at the same time, they sought to promote as well as control "orthodox" forms of worship.

Atheism as herein defined is a modern concept based on a strictly secular worldview. It entered China around 1900, along with a number of other ideologies imported from the West. Foremost among these were Social Darwinism, nationalism, and socialism/communism. They were based on a specific notion of human progress and pursued a secular goal (a vigorous nation-state or a classless society) that served as a substitute for religious attitudes. Transmission of these ideas was intimately linked to the emergence of a modern Chinese intelligentsia. Young urban intellectuals who were attracted by the new ideological currents became hostile to any form of Chinese religion, including folk religion, Taoism, Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, and, though it is not a religion in the strict sense of the term, Confucianism, which came under fire for its association with the official cult of the state. Since these intellectuals formed the backbone of revolutionary movements and of the emerging political parties, atheism played an important role in the political transformation of China.

Atheism in the Republican Period

Chinese atheism was first and foremost directed against religion's most "superstitious" form: folk, or popular, religion, which also includes certain elements



CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA OF 1982

Article 36

Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief.

No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion.

The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state.

Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination.

Source: Kenneth Lieberthal. (1995) *Governing China. From Revolution through Reform.* New York: Norton, 363.

of Buddhism and Taoism. The Republican Revolution of 1911 witnessed the first large-scale campaign against popular religion, in which many temples and shrines were destroyed. Although the provisional constitution of the newly founded Republic of China guaranteed religious freedom, attempts to weaken the institutions associated with popular religion (temples, religious associations, etc.) continued until about 1915.

The May Fourth Movement of 1919, a pro-Western intellectual movement, gave rise to the next wave of antireligious activity. In addition to the general critique of religion (which was guided by a belief in modern science), two specific targets were singled out: Confucianism, regarded as the main cause of China's conservatism and stagnation, and Christianity, by then regarded as an ally of Western imperialism.

The Guomindang (GMD), which established a national government in 1925, to some extent succeeded the antireligious movements of the 1920s but was not clearly atheist. The GMD did claim the supremacy of its ideology, the "Three Principles of the People," over all forms of religion. However, some of its leading members (including Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and their families) were Christians, and in the 1930s attempts were made to revive Confucian doctrines. This ambiguity notwithstanding, GMD governments at various levels campaigned against "superstition," though with limited success.

Atheism in the People's Republic of China

The CCP took the Marxist view that religion was the opiate of the masses, but that it would ultimately disappear in the process of transition to a classless society. However, the party dealt with religion within the framework of its united front policy, a strategy designed to incorporate noncommunist social forces into the process of revolution and state building. Within this framework, the party could form alliances with religious people despite its disapproval of religious doctrines.

The religious policy of the CCP was therefore guided by practical considerations rather than by a narrow ideological approach. Although the party was clearly atheist, the state that it monopolized was not. This is reflected in constitutional law, which binds the state organs, though not the party. The constitution of 1954 granted the citizens "freedom of religious belief" without being very specific about what this exactly meant. The emphasis on belief rather than religious practice gave state and party the opportunity to suppress popular religion. Institutional religions were tolerated but brought under the supervision of the state. For that purpose, a number of so-called patriotic reli-

gious associations were set up to represent the five officially recognized religions: Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism (the latter two being regarded as separate religions rather than as different branches of the same religion). The Bureau of Religious Affairs, founded in 1954, served as a link between the state and the patriotic religious associations but was also to guide and control the latter. In spite of the constitutional guarantees, all religious organizations were under heavy pressure from the authorities. This was especially true of those religions suspected of foreign domination, particularly the two Christian ones, even though all Western missionaries had been expelled from China during the Korean War (1950–1953).

During the Cultural Revolution, all religions suffered from persecution and destruction. Leaders and activists were determined to eradicate religion, which was viewed as part of the "Four Olds" (old culture, old thinking, old habits, and old customs) that were to be destroyed. At the same time, constitutional law moved into the direction of state atheism. The constitution of 1975 declared that citizens enjoyed "freedom to believe in religion and freedom not to believe in religion and to propagate atheism." In other words, atheist propaganda was constitutional, while religious propaganda was not.

In the course of the policy of opening and reform initiated in 1978, the CCP has reassessed its religious policy. Although the party remains convinced that religion will eventually disappear as the result of the transition from socialism to communism and hence forbids its members to have any religious affiliation, it acknowledges that religion will continue to exist for some time. The Constitution of 1982, therefore, not only confirms the right to freedom of religious belief, but also establishes a framework for religious practice. The state protects "normal" religious activities, but it is unconstitutional to use religion to disrupt public order. Of course this provision leaves ample room for the authorities to decide which religious activities are "normal" and which are unlawful. The harsh treatment of Protestant "house churches" and the persecution of Falun Gong (a social movement with Taoist and Buddhist overtones) and its adherents, for example, must be viewed as attempts to maintain control over religious affairs and to suppress religious groups regarded as a threat to Communist rule.

Historical Review

Ever since Western secular ideologies found their way to China around 1900, atheism has had an enormous impact on the religious policy of the Chinese state. However, although the political elites that ruled twentieth-century China were frequently influenced by atheism, they have rarely tried to implement a thoroughly atheist policy. They took measures to combat superstition in the form of popular religion, but for the most part did not attempt to eliminate religion in general. Rather, they sought to control religious activities by officially recognizing a number of religious organizations. This is true of the most explicitly atheist political party, the CCP. The Communists have tried to incorporate the major institutionalized religions into the state (the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution being the exception rather than the rule). In the 1980s and 1990s, not only the officially recognized religions, but even popular religion has experienced an astonishing revival, by and large tolerated by the authorities.

It is true that the Chinese state still has sufficient power to crack down on religious groups charged with threatening public order. If in the future it will tighten or loosen its grip on religion remains yet to be seen. That it will take steps to actively promote atheism, by force, if necessary, is far from likely.

Thoralf Klein

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ATSUTA SHRINE Located in Nagoya, Japan (in Aichi Prefecture), Atsuta Jingu (Atsuta Shrine) is one of the fifteen prestigious shrines entitled to receive visits from imperial messengers at festivals. It purportedly enshrines Kusanagi no Tsurugi (Grass-Mowing Sword), one of the three imperial regalia. This sword is said to have been removed from the tail of a serpent by Amaterasu's brother (Susano no Mikoto) and dedicated to his sister as a sign of submission to her rule. The shrine enshrines Atsuta no kami, Amaterasu, Susano no Mikoto, and Yamatotakeru, the possessor of the sword who died in the area.

Situated on 200,000 square meters of land, with groves of thousand-year-old camphor trees, the shrine was originally built in the Taisha style, as was the Izumo Shrine, with a slightly concave thatched roof and steep wooden steps at the entrance. It was rebuilt in 1893 and again in 1935 in the Shinmei style, long in frontage and short in depth, with logs placed at intervals across the ridgepole. Partly damaged during World War II, it was repaired in 1955 and now is popular for first visits at the New Year.

James M. Vardaman, Jr.

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AUEZOV, MUKHTAR (1897–1961), Kazakh writer, poet, dramatist, social activist, scholar. Born in 1897 in eastern Kazakhstan, Mukhtar Auezov received his early education at the local Islamic school. He graduated from the Russian Teachers' Seminary in Semipalatinsk in 1908. While completing his studies he became active in the Kazakh political movement Alash Orda (The Horde of Alash). Alash Orda was a Kazakh political party that proclaimed independence during the Russian Civil War. It fought against the Bolsheviks; however, in 1920 it was forced to negotiate, and eventually surrendered and disbanded. Most members joined the Bolsheviks, but were purged from the Communist Party in the 1920s for "nationalist tendencies." Auezov did not fight, but was politically active.

After the Russian Civil War, Auezov attended the Institute of Language and Material Culture at Leningrad University. He continued his education at the Central Asian State University in Tashkent, receiving his degree in Oriental languages. His literary career began in 1918 with the publication of the drama *Baibishe Toqal* (Respectable Second Wife). This work and others contain elements of Kazakh folklore and traditional themes. During the purges of the 1930s, Auezov avoided arrest by publicly admitting his mistakes and "nationalist tendencies." He continued to write, and in 1939 he published the serialized version of his greatest work, a two-part fictional biographical work of the well-known Kazakh poet Abai Kunanbayev, *Abai zholy* (The Path of Abai), which was published in Russian in 1958. During his life he received numerous honors from the Soviet government, including the Order of Lenin. He died in 1961.

Steven Sabol

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AUGUST REVOLUTION In Vietnamese history, the August Revolution was the proclamation of a sovereign Vietnamese government in August 1945. The Japanese occupied Vietnam during World War II and allowed the French, who were the colonial power

in Indochina (present-day Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), to continue to administer the region. In May 1941, at Pac Bo in northern Vietnam, the Vietnamese Communists, led by Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969), formed a national front organization, the League for Independence of Vietnam, to fight against both the French and the Japanese. The League, better known by its Vietnamese abbreviated name, the Viet Minh, sought to enlist any Vietnamese citizen who would fight for national liberation from the French and Japanese.

When Japan surrendered at the end of World War II in the wake of Allied victory, Ho stepped in on 16 August 1945 and proclaimed himself president of the provisional government of a "free Vietnam." The Allies had other plans: they had agreed that Britain would occupy the southern part of Vietnam and the Nationalist Chinese would occupy the northern portion of the country. Before the Chinese troops arrived, the Viet Minh marched in and seized power in Hanoi on 19 August. The emperor of Vietnam, Bao Dai (1913–1997), complied with Ho's demands and abdicated and left for exile in France. On 24 August in Saigon (present-day Ho Chi Minh City), Tran Van Giau declared insurrection underway in the south. On 27 August Ho convened his first cabinet meeting in Hanoi, at which it was agreed that 2 September would be set as National Independence Day. On that day Ho publicly announced the formation of the Provisional Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) with its capitol at Hanoi. In subsequent negotiations with the French, who were allowed to reoccupy Vietnam, Ho agreed to the return of 25,000 French colonial troops in the north for a five-year period rather than face occupation by the Nationalist Chinese. Ho placated his disgruntled comrades with reassurances that colonialism was dying and that the



HO CHI MINH ON FOREIGN DOMINANCE

"He [Ho Chi Minh] bluntly stated, 'I prefer to sniff French shit for five years than eat Chinese shit the rest of my life.'"

Source: Stanley Karnow. (1991) *Vietnam: A History*. New York: Viking, 169.

French would have a difficult time reestablishing permanent rule, and reminded them that the Chinese had occupied Vietnam in the past for over a thousand years and were the greater threat. The DRV and the French soon clashed over administrative and military issues after the French returned to Vietnam, resulting in the eruption of the First Indochinese War.

Richard B. Verrone

See also: **Franco-Viet Minh War; Ho Chi Minh**

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AUM SHINRIKYO SCANDAL In March 1995, a nerve gas attack by devotees of the Japanese religion Aum Shinrikyo killed twelve and injured thousands of commuters on the Tokyo subway. Police investigations subsequently found that besides this attack, Aum had engaged in criminal activities since the 1980s, including a nerve gas attack in the town of Matsumoto in June 1994, murders of opponents and dissident members, and attempts to manufacture biological and chemical weapons.

Led by its founder, Asahara Shoko, a charismatic leader who claimed to possess psychic powers, Aum was a millennial movement that believed the world was evil; only through ascetic practice could one escape its negative influences and attain salvation. Asahara preached that catastrophe would engulf the world at the end of the twentieth century, resulting in a war between the forces of good and evil in which he and his disciples would lead the forces of good and crush evil materialism. This message, along with Aum's promises of enhanced spiritual powers, attracted ten thousand followers, the majority of whom were young, well educated, and idealistic. Around eleven hundred followers renounced the world and severed all ties with their families to live at Aum's communes.

Aum's zealous followers failed to persuade the wider public of the validity of their message of imminent catastrophe, and this failure, coupled with strong criticism from opponents, including parents of mem-

bers, made the organization increasingly introverted and hostile to the outside world. It used violence against members suspected of lacking faith, attacked critics, and confronted local authorities that impeded the development of its communes. Asahara's teachings became more extreme, emphasizing that Aum alone taught the truth, which had to be defended at all costs; those who opposed this truth deserved to die and go to hell. Such doctrines eventually legitimated the murder of opponents, while the belief in the imminence of a final war, coupled with Asahara's paranoia in which he believed the world was conspiring to persecute and destroy his movement, fueled an escalating cycle of violence.

Aum attempted to establish a political party and campaigned in elections in 1990, but lost. After this, the group abandoned all hope of influencing the world, which it condemned as unworthy of salvation, and began to manufacture biological and chemical weapons for use in the inevitable final war that Asahara prophesied. By March 1995, police raids were planned against the movement. Learning of these, Asahara ordered a preemptive strike on the Tokyo subway to stall the police and strike a blow against the materialist society he hated.

Immediately afterward, the police moved on Aum, uncovering evidence of its extensive criminality. Nearly two hundred Aum devotees were charged with serious offenses, including murder. Some were imprisoned or sentenced to death, while others, including Asahara, still await trial. Punitive laws have been enacted against the organization, and the majority of followers have renounced their faith. Around one thousand devotees continue to proclaim their faith in Asahara and support Aum.

The Aum affair provoked debates in Japan about the nature of Japanese society. While public interpretations portrayed Asahara as a crazed manipulator who beguiled naive and idealistic people into sharing his paranoid visions, they also recognized that his criticisms of society had a particular resonance for many people. Thus, the Aum affair was seen not only as a product and expression of the problems and failures of Japanese society, but also as an expression of the need for reform.

Ian Reader

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AUNG SAN (1915–1947), Burmese resistance leader. Aung San is popularly remembered in Burma as principal leader of the resistance against foreign occupation, as hero-martyr in the struggle for independence, and as unifier of modern Burma.

Educated at a monastic school and a national high school, he joined Rangoon University in 1932. By 1935, after being elected to the Students' Union executive committee and becoming editor of the union magazine, he was expelled from the university for not revealing the name of a contributor. He joined U Nu, who had also been dismissed, in leading the 1936 university strike. The same year, after getting his B.A., he left the university and joined the nationalist Thakin movement. He started a Marxist study group, then with Ba Maw, he cofounded the Freedom Bloc and became its general secretary, leading resistance against the British in 1939. He approached the Japanese and, as lead member of the Thirty Comrades trained in Japan, then became founder and first commander of the Burma Independence Army that spearheaded the Japanese invasion of Burma in 1941. Unhappy with Japanese intentions toward Burma, he cofounded the Anti-Fascist Peoples' Freedom League (AFPFL) in 1943 to resist the Japanese.

Aung San negotiated the 27 January 1947 Attlee–Aung San Agreement that was to secure Burma its national independence in 1948. However, he was assassinated on 13 July 1947 along with six other colleagues while in charge of the Constituent Assembly engaged in writing a constitution for independent Burma. His functions in the AFPFL were taken over by U Nu. As a hero and martyr, to whom postindependence civilian politicians and army chiefs alike look back for inspiration, Aung San provided the basis for U Nu's political path. His speeches and slogans also influenced the declared ideology of the Burma Socialist Programme Party after the 1962 coup. However, after 1988 his political legacy became problematic under the State Law and Restoration Council–State Peace and Development Council regimes, when Aung San Suu Kyi challenged military control over the country in the name of her father, claiming that he had stood for democracy and not for military control. Aung San continues to be an inspiration to generations of Burmese students and the Burmese in general.

Gustaaf Houtman

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AUNG SAN SUU KYI (b. 1945), Burmese political leader and activist. Daughter of national hero and martyr Aung San (1915–1947), who was assassinated when she was only two years old, Aung San Suu Kyi was brought up in Myanmar (then Burma) until 1960, when her mother, Daw Khin Kyi, was appointed ambassador to India. In 1964 she started a B.A. degree in philosophy, politics, and economics at St. Hughes College, Oxford. After completion, she assisted Hugh Tinker in his research on Burma at the School of



Aung San Suu Kyi speaking at a press conference in Yangon in September 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

Oriental and African Studies in London and then moved in 1969 to New York, where she worked at the United Nations Secretariat. In 1972 she married Michael Aris, joining him in Bhutan, where she worked for two years as research officer on United Nations affairs for the Bhutan foreign affairs ministry. After her return to England, she gave birth to two sons, Alexander, in 1973, and Kim, in 1977. She briefly catalogued Burmese books in the Bodleian Library at the University of Oxford and then joined Aris at the Advanced Research Institute in Simla, northern India. She took up a one-year visiting fellowship in Kyoto in 1985–1986 to research the Japanese dimension of her father's biography, after which she returned to Simla on a fellowship. Shortly after returning to Oxford in 1987, she enrolled at the School of Oriental and African Studies for an advanced degree.

Aung San Suu Kyi has been preoccupied with Myanmar throughout her life in terms of research interests and through family and social contacts. It was her mother's stroke in March 1988 that took Aung San Suu Kyi on a visit to Myanmar from which she did not return, not even for her husband's funeral in March 1999. In the wake of Ne Win's resignation, the pent-up desire for change within the country after three decades of military control thrust her into the role of a political leader bringing fresh ideas to a hitherto closed country. Her speech at the Shwedagon

Pagoda on 26 August 1988 marked her public acceptance in Myanmar as the most promising national leader, much as her father's Shwedagon speeches had done in the 1940s. She subsequently cofounded the National League for Democracy, which won the May 1990 elections by a landslide majority and for which her popularity had been instrumental. The regime ignored the election outcome and she and her party members were subject to harassment and house arrest. Aung San Suu Kyi was kept under house arrest by the military-appointed State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) between 1989 and 1995 and has been prevented from traveling outside Yangon (Rangoon) for most of the time after that. She was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991 and continues to advocate nonviolence.

In September 2000, Aung San Suu Kyi and other leaders of the National League for Democracy were confined to their homes by military authorities. On 6 May 2002, the Myanmar government freed Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest. The action was seen by democracy advocates in Myanmar and outside observers as evidence that Myanmar's repressive regime might be entering a new era, giving rise to expectations that at least some political prisoners might be freed and that restrictions on the press may be lifted.

Gustaaf Houtman



The Bibi-ka-Maqbara, modeled on the Taj Mahal and built as the mausoleum for Rabia Durtrani, the wife of Aurangzeb. (HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS)

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AURANGABAD (2001 pop. 828,000). Named after the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb (1659–1707), the Indian city of Aurangabad served as a vice regal capital of the Mughal empire (1526–1857) in the Deccan region of South India. Prior to the advent of the Mughals, it was known as Khadki ("rocky place") and later renamed Fateh Nagar. It is located in the Marathwada region of the state of Maharashtra. Modern Aurangabad is an active city and a noted tourist center, well connected with the state capital, Mumbai (Bombay), and the city of Pune.

The attractions in Aurangabad include the Bibi-ka-Maqbara and the Paani-chakki. The former is a tomb built by Aurangzeb's son in 1679 in memory of his mother, Rabia. The architect Ata Ullah modeled it on the Taj Mahal, but it is hardly comparable to the architectural splendor of the original. It is, however, the only example of Mughal architecture in the Deccan. The Paani-chakki (water mill) is used for grinding flour for the residents of a *madrasah* (seminary) built by a Sufi saint, Baba Shah Muzzafar, in 1624.

Aurangabad is famous for the production of *him-roo*, a typical fabric of the region, which has an intricate pattern woven in cotton and silk and is used for drapery, tapestry, and other items.

Sanjukta Das Gupta

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AURANGZEB (1618–1707), Mughal emperor. Aurangzeb was an unscrupulous seventeenth-century Indian prince who, as the third son of the Mughal emperor Shah Jahan (1592–1666), came to power by imprisoning his father and defeating and killing his brothers—including the heir apparent, Dara Shikoh.

Having spent many years in the Deccan, he became obsessed with extending the Mughal empire (1526–1857) southward. But in so doing, he overextended the military and political resources of the Mughal state. His long absences from the capital of Delhi encouraged internecine conflict and proved politically destabilizing. He founded a new city, Aurangabad, but overall these campaigns only served to undermine Mughal authority and deplete the royal coffers without providing long-lasting gains of territory or prestige. His other major nemesis was the Maratha kingdom in western India, where the Hindu



A portrait of Aurangzeb by Pierre Duflos in 1780. (STAPLETON COLLECTION/CORBIS)

king Shivaji successfully resisted subjugation through a sustained guerrilla campaign.

Though a cultivated and learned man, Aurangzeb's fanatical devotion to the Sunni Muslim faith led him to make political decisions based on religious prejudice. He reimposed the *jaziya*, or poll tax, on non-Muslims, enforced a strict orthodox Muslim political culture, sanctioned the destruction of Hindu and Sikh religious shrines and the erection of mosques instead, removed Hindus from key administrative posts, and alienated substantial segments of the population. He is generally recognized as the most intolerant of all the Mughal emperors.

Chandrika Kaul

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AUSTRALIA-ASIA RELATIONS It is often said that culture and geography contradict each other with respect to Australia's place in the Asian region. A result of European, primarily British, settlement just to the south of the Asian landmass, the relationships between Australia and Asia are bound to be complex. The situation is also complicated by the variety of Asian countries to Australia's north, ranging from some of the poorest nations in the world to some of the richest, from Christian to Buddhist to Hindu, and from reasonably democratic to totalitarian. It is little wonder that there have been, and continue to be, frictions between Australia and Asia.

These relationships, however, have undergone dramatic changes in the latter half of the twentieth century. From being a country dominated by Britain and dealing with multiple European colonies within Asia, Australia—and its relationship to Asia—has matured significantly, with successive Australian governments having to come to terms with many newly independent Asian countries. Today the connections between Australia and Asia, while still often difficult, are in most cases steadily becoming more cohesive and durable.

Early Connections

When Europeans first settled in Australia some two hundred years ago, it was primarily for the purpose of ridding England of unwanted convicts. The goal was to move them as far away from England as possible, and Australia seemed an apt choice. Being located on the southern fringe of Asia, however, left the descen-

dants of the new arrivals with the long-term challenge of dealing with neighbors of very different cultural backgrounds.

In the early days, there was relatively little interaction with Asia. The original inhabitants of Australia were the aborigines. The groups of aborigines who lived in the northern parts of the country had, for hundreds of years, carried out low-level trade with the region that is now eastern Indonesia. Beyond some limited trade with the European colonies of Asia, Australia remained in relative isolation.

The gold rushes of the mid-1800s began to more clearly define the relationship between Australia and Asia. Along with prospectors from around the world came significant numbers of Chinese. They were both fleeing the poverty of their homeland and being attracted, like other newcomers, by prospects of striking it rich. Problems soon followed. The key consideration seems to have been one of competition. The Chinese were seen to be a threat by virtue of their hard work and ambition. This was complicated by cultural characteristics that were not shared by the dominant European inhabitants.

Competition between Asians and the European settlers was complicated by the question of labor. After the gold rushes had subsided, the economy in what is now Australia grew by fits and starts. Particularly when there were recessions, the frictions came to the fore. Australian workers resented being placed in competition with low-cost Asian labor, primarily from China, Java, and the Pacific Islands. This economic problem was exacerbated by intolerance and racism. This was a time when social Darwinism was on the ascent, and European treatment of nonwhite settlers as well as aborigines was, on the whole, deplorable. Racism was a broadly accepted attitude of the day. Indeed, one of the first acts of the new government of Australia in 1901 was the Immigration Restriction Act, which sought to close the country to nonwhite, particularly Asian, immigration.

At the same time, Asia offered alluring opportunities for trade. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, there were Australian trade commissioners stationed in Asia who spoke eloquently about the possible markets for Australian products, particularly wool. On the whole, however, these voices were rare, and Australia's economic, political, and social systems remained closely intertwined with those of Britain.

World War II and Its Aftermath

The event that dramatically changed Asia-Australia relations was World War II. Until that time, Aus-



KEY EVENTS IN AUSTRALIA-ASIA RELATIONS

- 1800s** In mid-century, Chinese immigrate to Australia to participate in gold rushes.
- 1901** Australia enacts the Immigration Restriction Act, which seeks to close the country to nonwhite, particularly Asian, immigration.
- 1940-1945** During World War II a strong fear of Asia emerges in Australia.
- 1950** The Colombo Plan brings students from the developing countries of Asia to Australian universities.
- 1960s** Australia and Japan become trade partners and Japan becomes a major market for Australian raw materials.
- 1965** Australia sends troops to Vietnam as part of a strategy to keep Asian wars in Asia, not in Australia.
- 1973** The Immigration Restriction Act is repealed, making possible a rapid rise in immigration from Asia.
- 1989** Australia joins the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation grouping to ensure its continued access to Asian and North American markets.
- 1990s** Immigrants from Asia account for 50 percent of all immigrants to Australia.
- 1999** Australian troops are stationed in East Timor to protect its independence from Indonesia.

tralian had rested, perhaps complacently, under the protection of the United Kingdom. The Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia, delivering the war right to Australia's doorstep (including repeated bombings of Darwin), brought home to Australians their vulnerability. They were a small, mostly white, relatively rich country sitting beside countries that were populous, nonwhite, and mostly poor. The image of the yellow peril took hold of the Australian imagination and was reinforced by the menace of Communism in the post-war period. Poverty and instability in much of Asia kept many Australians in fear of Asia.

This fear drove Australian governments to undertake a massive immigration program. "Populate or perish" was the slogan of the time, with migrants needed both for protection of Australian soil as well as labor to build up an industrial economy. Australian immigration officials went to Britain on a recruiting drive. Unfortunately for their goals, insufficient numbers of English people were interested in migrating to Australia, and the search area had to be expanded. Italy and Greece were subsequently targeted, and massive numbers of people from those countries arrived in Australia.

The new immigrants had a profound effect on Australian society, transforming it from an essentially English colonial backwater to a more cosmopolitan, multicultural society. At the same time, through the 1950s and 1960s, the dominant European powers gave up most of their colonial possessions, and attitudes of acceptance and tolerance toward Asians began to take root. The United States and Canada dismantled their restrictive immigration acts, and Australia was forced to follow suit, though belatedly. It was not until 1973 that the Immigration Restriction Act was finally repealed, making possible a rapid rise in immigration from Asia.

The postwar period was also a time of positive relationship-building in other areas. The Colombo Plan of 1950, an initiative of Australia that was carried out in partnership with half a dozen other former British colonies, brought students from the developing countries of Asia to Australian universities. While there was obvious self-interest in raising the standard of living in the poorer countries of Southeast Asia (especially with Communism taking hold), it also brought Australians into direct contact with Asians, helping to reduce cultural barriers and paving the way for changes in the immigration system.

A more common Australian response in the 1950s and 1960s was continued fear of Asia. Although Australia sent troops to the Korean War and was involved in a low-level war (entitled *Confrontation*) with Indonesia in the early 1960s, the best-known response

was the decision in 1965 to send Australian troops to Vietnam. This was a period of what the Australian military termed "forward defense," with the idea being to fight wars in Asia before they could spill over to the Australian mainland. Australian troops were conscripted, and the reaction in Australia followed the American pattern—general acceptance followed by disillusionment and then widespread antiwar demonstrations as the conflict continued.

Economic Relationships

One could argue that Australian integration with Asia from the 1960s to the present has been driven by economic imperatives. Australia's economy then, as now, was dominated by primary production—agricultural products and mineral resources. The main markets for these materials were the rapidly growing Asian economies. Especially important here was the beginning of the Common Market in Europe. When the British joined this organization, with its system of preferential tariffs for European trade, Australia was forced

to look elsewhere to find markets for its products. Japan, which experienced rapid economic growth starting in the 1950s and which lacked raw materials, was a logical partner. Indeed, the first trade agreement was made with Japan in the late 1950s, and Japan has been, for some years, Australia's largest market.

Trade with Japan exemplifies the complexities of Australia's engagement with Asia: cross-cultural difficulties and wariness on the one hand and economic need on the other. Of all Asian countries, antagonism toward Japan runs the deepest in Australia. This was a direct result of Japanese aggression in World War II, particularly its treatment of Australian prisoners of war (POWs). Many Australian soldiers were trapped in Southeast Asia, especially Singapore, with the rapid advance of Japanese troops down the Malay peninsula in late 1941. The maltreatment and deaths of Australian POWs in Changi prison in Singapore and while helping to build the Thai-Burma Railway (immortalized in the film *Bridge over the River Kwai*) continue to create anti-Japanese sentiment in Australia, particularly among the older generation.

Economic imperatives have taken precedence in the Australia-Japan relationship, however, and in the decades since the war the trade connection has become important to both countries. Japan is one of the largest investors in Australia, particularly in mineral-extraction industries, automobile manufacturing, and tourism, and Japan is Australia's largest trading partner (20 percent of exports and 13 percent of imports in 2000).

The relationship has not been an easy one, however. In addition to lingering wartime hostility, there has been the aggressive nature of Japanese trade and investment. Japanese companies, like other powerful multinational corporations, seek the best return for their shareholders. They are tough negotiators and play the world market for the best prices. Coal has been a particular point of contention here. Japanese companies will put, for example, Canadian coal companies in competition with those in Australia to secure the best export price. The result is charges of unfair trade practices from both Canada and Australia, though from the Japanese side this is simply good business practice.

Investment is a second area of friction. Japanese companies invest in the areas in which there is a demand in Japan, hence their interest in coal, pulp and paper products, and tourism. The response in Australia is that Australia has become a combination of Japan's quarry and playground. Australians complain that if Japanese tourists fly to Australia on Japanese airlines, stay in Japanese hotels, and visit Japanese-owned tourist facilities, then Australian companies are

not gaining substantially in this area of services trade. The charge on the Australian side is vertical integration in the tourism industry. Japanese involvement in this sector was particularly evident in the late 1980s when, in the wake of the strengthening of the Japanese currency, massive investments were made in Australian real estate in tourist areas. Those Australians who were selling land and buildings benefited, while Australians seeking real estate were priced out of the market by the inflated prices that the land speculation generated. On the other hand, the Japanese became the most numerous tourists in Australia (nearly three-quarters of a million visitors annually in 2000) and the biggest spenders on a daily basis, inevitably resulting in positive economic benefits for Australia in spite of Japanese investment in this area.

A fundamental problem in Asia-Australia trade is that Australia has remained a supplier of primary products while importing value-added products from Asia. In other words, Australia exports minerals and foodstuffs and imports cars and consumer electronics. One could argue that Asian investment in areas of primary production has skewed investment priorities so that manufacturing has fallen behind. Successive Australian governments could be charged with short-sighted economic policies. The result, however, is that Australia faces a significant problem today. While the U.S. economy did well in the late 1990s as a result of the growth in the computer and associated high-technology industries, Australia is being charged with having a primary-producer economy, with agricultural products and minerals still dominating exports. At the same time, Australian manufacturing industries cannot compete with the low-wage countries of Asia, and progressively more industries are going bankrupt or leaving the country. In recent years, this has been particularly evident in the clothing and textiles industries. The mathematics on production costs is simple: It may cost \$25 to make a shirt in Australia, whereas the same company can ship its machinery to Indonesia or the Philippines and make the same shirt for \$2. Of course, this problem is also faced by Japanese and American companies, and they too are responding by relocating their production systems offshore, but they have other industries to replace them, in the high-technology area. Australia is experiencing difficulties in making this next technological leap.

A second major fear on the part of Australian companies is that, as the world appears to be dividing into trading blocs, they will be left out. Australian companies learned a hard lesson when Britain joined what became the European Union, and the North American Free Trade Agreement is causing further anxiety.

The result was the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation grouping, an initiative of the Bob Hawke Labour government in 1989. Australia's agenda in supporting the development of this organization is to ensure its continued access to Asian and North American markets. The disadvantage, from the point of view of Australian corporations, is that they will have to learn to function in a low-tariff environment, whereas until recently Australian industry was highly protected. Globalization is, therefore, already having, and will continue to have, a profound effect on Australian business and community attitudes.

Political Relationships

While the 1950s and 1960s could be characterized by a fear of Asia, the following decades saw a maturing of the political relationships between Australia and Asia. By the mid-1970s, the Communist insurgency in Malaysia was at an end, as was the war in Vietnam. The isolation of China was also ending, and that nation was emerging as both a promising new market and a powerful new competitor. With an increase in Asian immigration (rising to half of all new immigrants by the early 1990s), Australians were becoming more comfortable in the region.

This is not to say that Australia's foreign relations are now either smooth or easy. Its difficulties are, in part, a result of the multiple types of political systems with which it has to deal. One point of contention here

is the way in which Australia balances its position on human rights with trade considerations. Sometimes this is relatively straightforward, as in the case of Myanmar (Burma). As this country is not important to Australia in an economic sense, the high ground of human rights is clearly Australia's position. The complexities come to the fore in the case of China. With the rapid growth in China's economy and increasing interconnectedness with regional economies, Australia must tread a fine line between its political and economic goals. Given the delicate relationship between China and Taiwan, for example, or the Chinese government's sensitivity over Tibet, Australia has to be careful in its diplomatic position. It does not have the economic, political, or military power of the United States and therefore tends more to a middle road in diplomatic terms.

This is less the case with the important Australia-Indonesia relationship. Diplomatic relations between the two countries have been on a roller coaster since the 1940s, and a particularly difficult issue has been that of East Timor. A Portuguese colony that was annexed by Indonesia in 1975, East Timor has remained a sticking point in Australia-Indonesia relations (particularly in the area of human rights) since then. The issue was complicated by the alleged killing of six Australian journalists when Indonesian troops invaded the colony in 1975. The result has been a division within Australia, with diplomatic efforts at odds with the



An Indonesian soldier accompanies Australian soldiers arriving for peacekeeping duty in East Timor in September 1999. (AFP/CORBIS)

media's antagonism toward the Indonesian government. When the Suharto government fell in 1998 and East Timor obtained independence (1999), Australian troops were stationed in the country to protect its independence. The use of the Australian military on former Indonesian territory has caused a nationalistic backlash in Indonesia and a deterioration in Australia-Indonesia relations.

The Future

The future of Australia-Asia relations promises to be as difficult as its past. Of particular concern is the impact of globalization, which will bring Australian industry under further pressure to be competitive in a global environment. As a high-wage country that is still dominated by exports of primary products, Australia's standard of living is steadily falling in relative terms. The reaction in domestic politics has been the rise of right-wing parties and policies that mistakenly favor a return to relative isolation and the greater wealth of the immediate postwar period; an attempt to resurrect those times through actions such as high tariff barriers would lead to economic disaster for the country. Such isolationist policies, while erroneous in conception and not economically viable, find fertile ground among those people disadvantaged by global competition. Anti-Asian sentiment is one offshoot.

On the international scene, Australia will remain a middle-level power that must engage with the countries to the north to sustain its economy. Nearly two-thirds of Australia's merchandise exports go to Asia, and this is highly influential in Australia's foreign economic and political policies. Given the political, economic, and cultural variations within Asia, Australia faces significant challenges in the future.

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AUSTROASIATIC LANGUAGES The Austroasiatic family, the principal linguistic substrate of mainland Southeast Asian languages, exists today as a patchwork of more than a hundred languages spread across an area that ranges from central India to Vietnam and from Yunnan in China to Malaysia and the Nicobar Islands of the Andaman Sea. In only two countries are Austroasiatic languages the official tongues: Cambodia (Khmer, or Cambodian) and Vietnam (Vietnamese). In all other cases they are minority languages, spoken in single villages by only a few hundred people as well as in communities of several million people. Long ago before the domination by groups such as Thais, Burmese, Malays, and Indo-Aryans, the Austroasiatic peoples were probably the main population in Southeast Asia, and their languages may have been spoken even more widely than today, particularly in Indonesia and China.

Evidence of Common Ancestry

The common ancestry of the Austroasiatic languages is shown by their retention of a distinctive basic vocabulary, which readily identifies that group.

Because it was a prehistoric culture, the location of the original Austroasiatic homeland is not known, but some linguists speculate that it was in the hills of southern Yunnan in China, between 4,000 and 6,000 years ago.

Despite their common origins, Austroasiatic languages are structurally diverse, principally because many of them have been influenced by other, very different, language families for a long time. In India the Munda languages, which are in contact with the Aryan and Dravidian languages, have a complicated word structure that permits two or more syllables per word and an extensive system of grammatical affixes for both nouns and verbs. At the other typological and geographical extreme is Vietnamese: its lexicon or vocabulary is basically monosyllabic, and it relies on word order and compounding to express grammatical functions. In this case the direct influence of Chinese is clearly responsible. The great bulk of Austroasiatic languages lie between these extremes, utilizing a combination of affixation and word order.

Common Features

Most Austroasiatic languages have a rather distinctive word structure. Words may have one or two syl-

lables, but in the two-syllable type the first syllable is never stressed, and the vowel in this syllable is normally short and neutral in quality. Words may begin with clusters of three or even four consonants, but the set of possible final consonants is always restricted. The range of word shapes in a typical Austroasiatic language is illustrated with the following examples from Jruq (West Bahnaric, Laos):

simplest:	CV	<i>ka</i> fish
	CVC	<i>dak</i> water
	CCVC	<i>plǎj</i> fruit
	CCVC	<i>ptɛh</i> earth
most complex:	CCCVC	<i>kbreh</i> blink
C = consonant		
V = vowel		

By contrast Munda languages permit much more complicated word shapes because many affixes can be used to build a single word or even a sentence, for example (Mundari, India):

<i>suku-le-n-a-ko</i>	<i>renge?-ta-n-a-n</i>
"They had been happy."	"I am poor."

The set of distinctive sounds (or phonemes) can be large and have some unusual articulations in comparison to other languages of the world (including imploded and/or glottalized consonants and voiceless nasal and lateral sounds), and there may be tones or so-called registers (distinguishing breathy or creaky vowels). The Austroasiatic languages have the largest inventories of vowels of any language in the world, with some having more than thirty or even forty!

In many Austroasiatic languages the grammar is largely expressed by word order, although there is normally a moderate to large inventory of prefixes and some infixes, which have functions such as word derivation (e.g., deriving nouns from verbs) and marking grammatical relations such as causative (e.g., "to fall" or "to make fall"), reciprocal (e.g., "to hit somebody" or "to hit each other"), or instrumental (e.g., "to hit"

or "to hit with something"). The Munda languages go much further, adding affixes to verbs to mark such things as tense (past and present versus future), aspect (complete or incomplete action), and transitivity (whether the sentence has a grammatical object).

Word order in these languages tends to be "left-headed"—modifying words (for example, adjectives, verbs) occur to the right of the "head" word they modify. Sentence-level word order is usually Subject-Verb-Object, or less often Subject-Object-Verb.

Classifying Austroasiatic Languages

The classification of Austroasiatic languages is a difficult issue, particularly because many of the languages are not well known or studied, while the better-known ones have borrowed significant lexicon and even grammar from unrelated languages such as Chinese, Pali, and Malay. However, field linguists continue to publish new and more detailed descriptions, and progress is being made in historical reconstruction. Most published texts present a classification of Austroasiatic languages based on rather preliminary studies carried out in the 1960s and 1970s with simple statistical methods. Recent research has greatly improved scholars' understanding of the internal structure of the family.

For most of the twentieth century it was thought that the Austroasiatic family consisted of two fundamental divisions: Munda and all other Austroasiatic languages. However this view was based on typological considerations and has not been supported by historical reconstruction. Also, the placement of Vietnamese in the Austroasiatic family was disputed for a long time, with many scholars (even now) believing it to be derived from Chinese. However it has been convincingly shown that the Chinese lexicon in Vietnamese was borrowed during the Middle Chinese period, and the development of tones and monosyllabic structure are internal Vietnamese developments.

TABLE 1

Comparison of words in Austroasiatic languages							
	Mundari	Khasi	Wa	Viet.	Semai	Khmer	Bahnar
<i>Blood</i>	majam	sna:m	nham	—	bhi:p ^m	jha:m	pha:m
<i>Bird</i>	sim*	sim	sim	cim	cɛ:p ^m	—	sɛm
<i>Eye</i>	med	khjmat	—	mát	mat	—	mat
<i>Hand</i>	ti	kti	tai?	taj	tək ^h	taj	ti:
<i>Louse</i>	siku	ksi	si?	cáj	cɛ:?	caj	si:
<i>Root</i>	red	tjnrai	riah	rè	r?ɛ:s	rik	rə:h
<i>Nose</i>	mū	khmut	miih	mū	muh	crəmuh	mu:h

* chicken

Below is the classification of the Austroasiatic language family based on the most recent comparative historical work. There are eleven principal branches listed, but various poorly documented and isolated languages spoken in China may yet turn out to reflect branch-level groupings. Language names are given in italics—the list below is not exhaustive, merely representative.

1. **Aslian** (Malaysia, Thailand):
 - a) Jahaic: *Batek, Chewong, Jehai, Tonga, Kin-siu, Semang*
 - b) Senoic: *Temiar, Semai, Jab Hut*
 - c) Semelaic: *Semelai, Temoq, Semaq Bri*
2. **Bahnaric** (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia):
 - a) North Bahnaric: *Sedang, Jeb/Halang, Rengao, Hre*
 - b) Central Bahnaric
 - Alak*
 - Kasseng/Taliang*
 - Cua*
 - Tampuon, Bahnar*
 - South Central: *Cbrau, Kobo, Ma', Mnong, Stieng*
 - c) West Bahnaric: *Loven/Jruq, Nhabean, Sapuar, Sok, Oi, Cheng, Suq, Brao/Laveh, Lawi*
3. **Katuic** (Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia):
 - a) *Katu of Vietnam*
 - b) *Katu of Laos*
 - c) *Ngeq*
 - d) *Pacoh*
 - e) North Katuic: *So, Bru, Tri, Makong, Siliq, Katang*
 - f) Central Katuic: *Ta-Oi, Ong, Ir*
 - g) West Katuic: *Suei, Nbeu, Kuy, Kuay*
4. **Khasic** (Assam [India]): *Standard Khasi, Llynggam, Synteng, War*
5. **Khmeric** (Cambodia, Thailand): *Cambodian, Surin Khmer*
6. **Monic** (Myanmar, Thailand): *Mon, Nyabkur*
7. **Nicobaric** (Nicobar Islands [India]):
 - a) North Nicobar: *Car, Chowra, Teresa*
 - b) Central Nicobar: *Camorta, Nancowry, Trinkut, Katchall*
 - c) South Nicobar: *Great Nicobar, Little Nicobar*
8. **Northern** (Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, China):
 - a) Palaungic
 - i) East Palaungic: *Danaw, Palaung, Ri-ang, Yinchia*

- ii) WestPalaungic: *Bulang, Lamet, Lawa, Samtao, U, Wa*
- b) Khmuic
 - i) *Kbao*
 - ii) *Kbmu, Mal-Pbrai*
 - iii) *Ksinhmul*
 - iv) *Mlabri*
- c) Mangic: *Mang*

9. **Pakanic** (China): *Bolyu/Lai*

10. **Pearic** (Cambodia, Thailand): *Chong, Pear, Suoi, Saoch, Samre*

11. **Vietic** (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia):

- a) Viet-Muong: *Vietnamese, Muong*
- b) Pong-Chut: *Arem, Maleng, Pong, Sach, Thavung*

There have been various proposals to link Austroasiatic with other language families of Southeast Asia into an "Austric" macrofamily. The long history of contact between the language families of Southeast Asia has resulted in many areal similarities that make the task of determining wider genetic relations difficult or impossible.

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AUSTRONESIAN LANGUAGES The Austronesian language family is one of the largest recognized language families in the world, with close to one thousand members. About half the languages in this family, and the great majority of the speakers, are found in Southeast Asia. Several major languages of the region, as well as hundreds of smaller ones, belong to this family.

The Austronesian Family and Proto-Austronesian

Family resemblances among neighboring languages of the Southeast Asian island region must have been apparent for millennia. Awareness of the Aus-

tronesian family's full extent, however, dates from the 17th century, when comparison of the vocabulary of Malay with those of Polynesian languages, such as Futuna, and Malagasy, the language of Madagascar, showed clear similarities that implied a common ancestor. From this linking of distant points comes an earlier name of the family, "Malayo-Polynesian." It is now recognized that Austronesian speakers are to be found from Madagascar in the west to Easter Island in the east—more than half the distance around the world.

An example of the sort of resemblance that would have been noticed on even a casual comparison of these languages is the following:

	Two	Eye	Stone
Malay	<i>dua</i>	<i>mata</i>	<i>batu</i>
Malagasy	<i>rua</i>	<i>masu</i>	<i>vatu</i>
Futuna	<i>lua</i>	<i>mata</i>	<i>fatu</i>

Although this family thus extends beyond Asia into the African and Pacific regions, it is in Southeast Asia that the largest concentration of Austronesian speakers is to be found, and it was undoubtedly in this region that the original ancestral language (Proto-Austronesian) was spoken. Comparing some numerals from languages spoken in several Asian countries shows the same family resemblance:

	Two	Four	Five	Ten
Paiwan (Taiwan)	<i>Dusa</i>	<i>sepach</i>	<i>Lima</i>	<i>puLuq</i>
Ilokano (Philippines)	<i>dua</i>	<i>uppat</i>	<i>lima</i>	<i>sangapulô</i>
Jarai (Vietnam)	<i>dua</i>	<i>pâ</i>	<i>rema</i>	<i>pluh</i>
Tetun (Timor)	<i>rúa</i>	<i>hât</i>	<i>líma</i>	<i>sanúlu</i>
Javanese	<i>loro</i>	<i>papat</i>	<i>lima</i>	<i>sapuluh</i>

Systematic description and comparison of a wide range of Austronesian languages by many scholars during the nineteenth century culminated in the work of the German physician Otto Dempwolff (1934–38), who demonstrated how various present-day languages had developed via regular sound changes from their common ancestor, Proto-Austronesian. The vocabulary items compared above, for example, are derived from hypothetical ancestral forms **duSa* (two), **maCa* (eye), **batu* (stone), **Sepat* (four), **lima* (five), and **puluq* (ten).

The establishment of historical relations of these many languages to their common ancestor makes possible a "family tree" showing closer and more distant relationships within the family. This linguistic evidence can be combined with evidence from archaeology and other disciplines to produce an outline of the

origins and migrations of the peoples who spoke these languages.

The precise interrelations of the Austronesian languages of Southeast Asia have yet to be fully worked out. One point of widespread agreement, however, is that the languages of the aboriginal people of Taiwan divided from the rest of Austronesian at a very early date, and are thus of prime importance in understanding the history of the family. This primary division between Formosan languages and the rest suggests that Proto-Austronesian was spoken either in Taiwan or possibly on the nearby Chinese mainland. Beginning at least 5,000 years ago, Austronesian speakers would have migrated south into the Philippines, Indonesia, and New Guinea, and from there east into the Pacific (during the second millennium BCE) and eventually west to Madagascar (during the first millennium CE).

Although the Austronesian languages have been diversifying from their common ancestral form for thousands of years, and have spread over a vast geographical range and a wide variety of cultures, certain family traits have persisted, not only in basic vocabulary (as shown above), but in certain aspects of word structure and grammatical devices. One feature that differentiates Austronesian from other major language families of the region is a preference for two-syllable nouns and verbs, with consonants permitted at beginning, middle, and end, as in Tagalog: *payat* (thin), *ngipin* (tooth), *gatas* (milk). Possessive pronouns appear as suffixes on the possessed noun, as in Rampi (Sulawesi): *umo'-ku* (my father), *umo'-mu* (your father), *umo'-ne* (his or her father). Another very widespread Austronesian feature is the distinction of first-person plural pronouns into "inclusive" and "exclusive," depending on whether the person spoken to is included or not. So Tagalog *kami* (exclusive) means "I and others," as contrasted with *táyo* (inclusive) "I, you and others."

Austronesian Languages Yesterday and Today

Both Javanese (Kavi) and Malay appear in inscriptions from the middle of the first millennium CE, written in scripts of Indian origin. A number of other languages of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have had Indian-derived writing systems, and after the arrival of Islam the Arabic alphabet was used to write Malay and other Austronesian languages of the region. Although some of these scripts have continued to be used into the present, the trend of the last few centuries has been for them to be replaced by orthographies based on the Roman alphabet.

Throughout their history, these languages have continued to supplement their inherited Austronesian vocabulary with new words borrowed from a variety of sources. The strong influence of Indian culture at the period of earliest literacy is also reflected in numerous Sanskrit words adopted into the vocabulary, such as Malay *babasa* (language), *warna* (color), and *jaya* (victory). Islamic culture brought with it words of Arabic origin such as *hukum* (law) and *waktu* (time). Additions to the vocabulary during the last few centuries have reflected differing colonial histories: Spanish words in the Philippines, Dutch in Indonesia, and English in Malaysia.

In 2002, Austronesian languages were spoken by more than 90 percent of the population in Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines; in Singapore, Malay speakers are a substantial minority (15 percent). Within this region, apart from modern-era immigrant languages such as Chinese and Chabacano (creole Spanish), the principal non-Austronesian language areas are those of the Orang Asli of the Malay Peninsula, and the various Papuan language groups in eastern Indonesia (Irian Jaya, Halmahera, Timor). Various Austronesian language groups form one or two percent of the population in Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Taiwan; while China and Myanmar have a single Austronesian community each (Tsat on Hainan Island in China, Moken in coastal Myanmar) with a few thousand speakers. At the opposite extreme from these tiny enclaves are some languages which number their speakers in tens of millions, including Javanese (75 million), Malay (35 million), Sundanese (27 million), Tagalog (17 million), and Cebuano (15 million). Some of these exercise an influence beyond their communities of native speakers through use as national languages. Tagalog forms the basis of Filipino, the national language of the Philippines, while Malay (which has been a regional lingua franca for centuries and developed many local varieties) has been made a national language of both Malaysia and Indonesia.

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AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY In 2000, Asian factories assembled 18 million four-wheel vehicles, 30 percent of the world output of 58 million units; Asian firms also accounted for another 6 million units made outside their home market, primarily in the United States and England. Japan, with domestic output of 10 million units in 2000, was by far the largest producer, followed by South Korea and China, the only other Asian markets with domestic production or domestic sales over 1 million units. World automotive trade was also substantial, about \$550 billion in 1999. However \$207 billion of that trade was internal to Europe, and another \$98 billion was inside NAFTA; intra-Asian trade was only \$17 billion, an indicator of the different structure of Asian markets.

Almost all Asian nations produce some vehicles domestically, including Uzbekistan, Jordan, and Myanmar (Burma). Despite small markets, in most countries over a dozen manufacturers coexist behind trade barriers, each turning out 20,000 or fewer units at high cost. Even though their output is minuscule by world standards, these firms typically loom large on the local landscape. At one extreme there is Toyota, Japan's largest manufacturer and the core firm in the world's fourth-largest automotive group, turning out 6 million units a year. At the other extreme is Iran Khodro, with output under 200,000 units a year, the largest producer in the Middle East and Iran's largest manufacturer. Similarly in Malaysia, the state-owned firm Proton looms large both politically and in the local economy, and Asian producers in general have strong ties to local elites and interest groups.

Defining the auto industry is not easy. Japanese data provide one example. In its mature market, Japanese auto parts account for two-thirds of the industry—assembly in Japan employs 262,000 people, while parts manufacturing employs 626,000. Denso, the largest parts firm, has 85,000 employees worldwide and has a consolidated auto-sector revenue larger than Suzuki or Fuji Heavy Industries (Subaru). Ancillary sectors, such as dealerships and repair facilities (1.28 million), petrol stands and other services (1.1 million), or for that matter transportation workers (3 million), each employ far more workers than does manufacturing proper. Comprehensive data are lacking, but in most

Asian markets the parts sector, while limited in the components produced, still employs more workers than does vehicle assembly.

A second aspect is that in most of Asia, automobiles are not the dominant segment. In India in 2000, passenger-car output was 580,000 units, but commercial vehicle output totaled 700,000 units—300,000 trucks and jeeps, 200,000 three-wheel trucks, and 200,000 tractors. At a total of 1.3 million units, the three- and four-wheel vehicle market was still dwarfed by sales of 3 million mopeds, scooters, and motorcycles. The same was long true in Japan, where trucks dominated the market until 1968.

Despite this heterogeneity, Asian markets share many features. One is that throughout the region, the industry is viewed as a potential leading sector and has developed behind high trade barriers. But because markets are fragmented between cars and trucks and into additional segments within those two broad categories, production volumes of individual vehicles are small. In contrast, industry leaders in Japan, Europe, and North America perceive economies of scale to be increasing, due to the research and development (R & D) required to develop new technologies such as fuel-cell and hybrid vehicles and the investment needed to incorporate electronic and safety systems in new vehicles. For example, on top of \$6 billion of investment in plant and equipment, Toyota will undertake R & D expenditures of \$4 billion in 2001, and other major firms are spending comparable amounts. At the same time, the information-technology (IT) revolution makes it easier to coordinate vehicle development and engineering for individual markets off a common "platform."

As evidenced by a series of mergers, acquisitions, and alliances, industry executives apparently believe that a firm must produce five million units annually to be viable. With the exception of Honda and BMW, since 1997 the smaller firms in the European Union (EU), Japan, and the United States have been incorporated into one of six global groups: GM, Volkswagen, Toyota, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, and Renault. If alliances under negotiation in 2001 come to fruition, no sizable independent producers will remain in the United Kingdom, Scandinavia, Italy, or Korea. Similarly, major direct (Tier I) suppliers to car companies are now consolidating and reorganizing, with mergers and divestments—and bankruptcies. One motive is to be able to design, engineer, and assemble "modules" or "systems," such as an entire heating-cooling system, rather than individual components such as a fan, air ducts, or air conditioning compressor. In addition suppliers are

being asked to set up operations wherever their customers are located. Major suppliers are thus spinning off and acquiring units to match this new strategy, as well as investing in manufacturing capacity around the world, including Japan and elsewhere in Asia.

Domestic manufacturing is nevertheless expanding in most countries. The industry's long-term tendency is to build where vehicles are sold rather than rely on trade, due to logistics costs, the vagaries of foreign exchange rates, and the need to adapt products to match the idiosyncratic nature of local markets. In addition, analysts project that much of the growth in world demand during the first two decades of the twenty-first century will be in Asia. Producers with a low presence in the region are thus seeking a foothold, investing in new capacity at the same time that incumbents are upgrading existing facilities in advance of World Trade Organization (WTO)-mandated trade liberalization, which will be phased in by 2006. Indeed during the 1990s the automobile industry added 19 million units of global capacity in a slowly growing aggregate market, resulting in excess capacity of 20 million units; Asia has about 7 million units of excess capacity and an average utilization rate of under 70 percent. As a result auto assemblers are not very profitable; among major firms only Honda and BMW earned a reasonable return on assets in 2000. Nevertheless the industry is poised for significant expansion in many Asian markets, in vehicle assembly and in the parts sector. It will require a decade for this process to stabilize and for excess capacity to be trimmed.

Commonalties: Political Economy

The automotive sector is large—5 percent of the economy in countries with a substantial industry, from Turkey to Malaysia and Thailand to Korea and Japan—and as a consumer good, is visible to citizens. Geographic concentration and formal organization (industry associations, unions) add to its political saliency. Volkswagen's "People's Car" strategy was widely copied. While in the 1960s the Japanese bureaucracy repeatedly failed in its efforts to designate one or more "national champions," President Mahathir of Malaysia and the sons of Indira Gandhi in India and Suharto of Indonesia all sponsored such projects, and China has adopted a series of "Big Three" policies.

Even without a national champion, the automotive industry received favorable treatment in the Asian region—above all, protection from imports. As intended, such policies led to new entry, with one or two firms producing vehicles in each niche, turning out a few thousand or even just a few hundred vehicles a year.



AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY GIANTS

Of the twenty largest automobile manufacturers in Asia, sixteen are in Japan, two in South Korea, and one each in China and Indonesia. On the basis of sales revenues as reported in *Asia Week* (9 November 2001), the five largest firms are Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Mitsubishi (all in Japan), and Hyundai in South Korea. In 2001 Nissan was by far the largest with gross sales of \$124,565.5 million, over twice that of second place Honda.

At one extreme China, with a history of local autonomy, had 119 producers in 2000, of which 26 had output of under 100 units. But even Malaysia, despite its small market (300,000 units) and the favored position of the dominant firm, Proton, had 14 firms; in addition Honda will start production in 2003 with a factory geared to turn out 20,000 cars a year with output split among four dissimilar models. Efficient plants in the developed world, however, are designed to churn out 240,000 similar models a year, fifty times the volume Honda anticipates in Malaysia.

Such inherently high-cost production can prevail only in markets where competition is repressed. In the case of Malaysia, tariffs of up to 300 percent are required to enable Proton's survival; import charges are 100 percent in India and 80 percent in China, compared with 2.5 percent in the United States and 0 percent in Japan. Initially, imported parts faced lower rates, encouraging completely knocked-down kit assembly. That, however, generated little employment, and Asian governments therefore mandated increasing levels of local content over time. But parts production often has greater economies of scale than does assembly, and local content rules typically lead to higher overall costs.

In Japan a combination of economic growth and a large domestic market eventually engendered sufficient competition to drive costs down to the point where exports were feasible; China, India, and Indonesia have large enough populations that this might also eventually happen. These countries have also chosen to liberalize their domestic markets, in line with the WTO, to accelerate this process. For idiosyncratic reasons Turkey (as an EU hopeful) and Thailand (with hopes for trade within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN) have done the same.

Reform is a difficult political challenge, and WTO membership is being wielded to inhibit backsliding. The WTO requires that automotive tariffs be lowered to 25 percent, quantitative import restrictions eliminated, and direct foreign investment freed from mandates to use local partners, achieve minimum levels of local content, or commit to minimum levels of exports.

In practice, liberalization in larger markets results in increased inward investment and heightened competition. This is true even in Turkey, with access to EU markets, and in Thailand, which has a critical mass of suppliers, despite repeated economic crises. In contrast, consumers in markets such as that of Malaysia continue to pay extraordinarily high prices, without attracting a commensurate amount of investment.

The Dominant Force in Asia: Japan

Japan has both the largest and the oldest auto industry in Asia; Japanese firms, through local partners and trade, also dominate Asian markets, with the exception of Turkey and China. Volume production dates to 1925–1927, when Ford and General Motors set up local assembly plants, though rising nationalism led to their shuttering in 1936, just when Ford was set to break ground on a large-scale, integrated operation as an export base for Asia. Protection thus delayed the industry's rise as a major exporter for thirty-five years, until around 1971.

Toyota and Nissan entered the market in 1937, while the forerunners of Daihatsu and Mazda made three-wheelers, and Isuzu expanded from contract truck assembly for the military. However, production ceased in 1942, and though these firms resumed operations after 1945, output was still minimal in 1950. But economic growth and import prohibitions after 1955—40 percent tariffs proved insufficient to keep foreign cars from dominating the market—stimulated additional entry, with a peak of thirteen or fourteen producers in the early 1960s, spread across multiple niches. In 1960 the largest segment was three-wheel trucks, in a total vehicle market of under a half-million units. By 1968 passenger car output hit 2 million units, finally exceeding that of trucks. Competition pressured firms to lower costs, and new factories built to handle higher sales facilitated introducing better designs and production methods. Prices fell steadily until the late 1960s, by which time small Japanese cars were comparable in cost to those made in Europe.

From the 1950s low volumes of trucks were exported throughout Asia. Then, in the late 1960s, the Volkswagen Beetle ignited a small-car boom in the United States, and General Motors, Ford, and

Chrysler turned to Japanese firms for imports to counter the German invasion. The 1973 and 1979 oil crises increased that segment from a single-digit niche to 30 percent of the market in 1981, and imports from Japan rose to over 2 million units. A "voluntary" export restraint (VER) to the United States imposed in 1981 capped Japanese imports at 1.68 million units, well below the level of demand for the small, fuel-efficient cars, effectively creating a cartel and allowing Japanese firms to raise prices dramatically. This tactic generated huge profits, which the car firms used to finance the development of larger cars and the construction of "transplant" assembly operations in the United States. (Several European nations negotiated similar VERs, and Japanese firms responded similarly by setting up factories in the United Kingdom and, more recently, France and Eastern Europe.) Exports peaked in 1985, when a strong yen and escalating labor costs cut into competitiveness. The transplant operations turned to new European- and Japanese-owned parts plants—three hundred firms from each area entered the market—to cut import costs and keep transplant assembly competitive. During the next two decades Honda, Toyota, and Nissan built stand-alone operations in North America, from dealership networks, market research organizations, and car design studios to transmission and engine manufacturing, which enabled them and several smaller producers to grab 26 percent of the U.S. market in 2001, almost all through local production. Operations in the EU were begun later, and Japanese producers hold a smaller share of the market, since unlike in the United States they faced stiff competition in small-car segments there.

With the bursting of Japan's "bubble" economy in 1991, domestic car sales dropped by 20 percent, and truck sales by more. Although Japanese production outpaced that in the United States and the United Kingdom during 1980–1991, output during 1998–2001 dropped by 30 percent from the peak to 10 million units or less, while the North American and European markets boomed to surpass 17 million units in 2000. Unfortunately the industry was busily expanding in 1991, adding 1.5 million units of new assembly capacity, with comparable increases by parts makers. The industry thus entered the late 1990s with 15 million units of capacity; in 2001 Toyota alone could assemble 1 million more cars inside Japan than it could sell, either at home or through exports. Domestic red ink thus reinforced the trend toward global consolidation. Toyota purchased Hino (2000) and Daihatsu (1998), Ford took over full control of Mazda (1996), Renault acquired Nissan (1999), and GM now controls Isuzu (1998) and has a dominant 20 percent stake

in both Suzuki (2000) and Fuji (1999); only Honda remains outside the fray. A similar consolidation of parts producers is under way, and during the first decade of the twenty-first century the domestic industry will gradually cut employment and shutter factories to deal with excess capacity.

At the same time, Japanese firms have continued to expand overseas. Honda began volume production abroad first, in the United States in 1982. Other firms quickly followed; by 2000 Japanese firms produced 6.3 million units outside Japan, 2.5 million of which were in the United States. Parts suppliers likewise have been building an international presence, with over three hundred firms in the United States, as well as nineteen of the hundred largest global suppliers. Growth has been slower in Europe, but Japanese firms dominate most Asian markets and are expanding in China and Turkey, where they lag behind European firms.

Continental-Sized Producers: China and India

The world's two most populous economies both grew rapidly during the 1990s, driving the market for transport. Neither India nor China had strong indigenous producers. Of three incumbent firms in India, Premier Motors is now defunct, while in 2001 Hindustan Motors still produced the Ambassador, a 1953 British design. China, with protection at the local level, had at least one producer in each province. When foreign ventures were finally allowed, the initial entrants—Suzuki as a partner of Maruti Motors in 1986, and Volkswagen with Shanghai Automotive Works in 1983—quickly dominated the market, and both still account for over half of passenger-car sales.

By the mid-1990s, Volkswagen and Maruti achieved mass-production volumes, with over 200,000 units per year of a single model. Like incumbent firms, however, once in the market neither had an incentive to introduce new models. With new entry and the promise of increased competition as WTO provisions are phased in, both Volkswagen and Maruti scrambled to introduce new models and to lower prices; in 1999–2000 both lost money, though sales recovered thereafter.

In India, Korean firms and Ford have a foothold; in China, GM, Toyota, and several smaller producers now offset Volkswagen. The initial foreign ventures, however, have established supplier networks; Shanghai Auto Works has forty joint ventures in parts production, and additional firms use China (and, increasingly India) as a base for exporting labor-intensive items to their home markets, as well as to supply the million-plus vehicles made in each country.

This combination—at least one firm of large scale, a network of suppliers, a growing domestic market, and an apparent commitment to the WTO process—offers scope for increasing efficiency without the need for exports. Both India and China are likely to remain modest exporters of vehicles but growing exporters of parts, as assemblers are focused on the domestic market. But since entry is outpacing market growth, not all firms will profit, and indeed several ventures must ultimately fail.

Export-Oriented Markets: Turkey and Thailand

As noted above, Turkey and Thailand both turned away from the extreme protectionism that characterized Asia around 1991. In each market several of the dozen-plus incumbent joint ventures responded by modernizing and expanding their plants. They now appear well positioned to export vehicles to supplement sales to the domestic market, allowing an economic scale of operations. Due in part to lower sales taxes on trucks, Thailand is the second-biggest market for full-sized pickups, larger even than Canada; Ford and GM-Isuzu will use production there rather than in the United States to source global exports, while the joint venture Mitsubishi Sittipol exported 63,000 pickups in 2000. Similarly Oyak-Renault, Fiat Tofas, and Ford are producing versions of certain models only in Turkey and will export much of their factories' output to complement the versions they make elsewhere.

The same factors encouraged parts producers to expand or enter, co-locating with potential customers while eyeing exports. The result is an automotive infrastructure that makes it easier for other assemblers to locate in that country. Thailand now has 1.2 million units of assembly capacity, and BMW will add to that; Turkey will soon have over 1 million units, with plants under construction and Toyota planning on entering. This expansion is occurring despite recurring economic crises. Projects that were put on hold in Thailand in 1998, when sales fell to 25 percent of 1996 levels, were restarted by 2000 and are now in operation, while Ford's Ikon project in Turkey progressed despite the 2000 earthquake and 2001 economic crisis. As a result of such dynamics, Turkey and Thailand are the only two new Asian producers to achieve over 100,000 units in exports on a purely commercial basis, levels that assemblers expect to rise as additional unique products enter production. With modest domestic markets and lower import barriers, output will be increasingly centered on these export-oriented plants, while low-volume producers will exit, as GM Opel did in Turkey in 2000.

National Champion Policies: Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Iran

Four countries have fostered national favorites, with varying degrees of failure. In Indonesia's case, favored treatment of Timor Putra National, owned by a son of the late president Suharto and tied to Kia of Korea, resulted in Japan's filing a WTO case, which Indonesia lost. The firm was shut down following the 1997 economic crisis, leaving Astra, a joint venture of Toyota, as the dominant force.

In Malaysia President Mahathir supported Proton, producing vehicles under license from Mitsubishi Motors. After fifteen years, output has reached only 200,000 units, too low a volume to support stand-alone operations. Indeed, while in 2001 the Malaysian government trumpeted the development of its own engine, the big global firms are designing engines with target production volumes of at least 750,000 units per year, while investing billions of dollars on hybrid and fuel-cell systems, not the traditional gasoline engine of Proton.

Volumes in fact are limited in part because of the focus on national champions. In theory different countries in ASEAN could specialize in different product niches, an idea backed since 1977 by a series of regional endeavors. ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO), the 1996 successor to the 1988 Brand-to-Brand Complementarity plan, promised 5 percent tariffs and no local content provisions for intra-ASEAN trade by 2003. While parts production under AICO provisions is expanding, for finished vehicles AICO and earlier schemes have all failed, in AICO's case due to Malaysian intransigence. With 300 percent tariffs needed to make Proton viable, Malaysia unilaterally announced it would extend protection through 2005, rather than allow imports from Thailand and Indonesia. This action led to so-far unsuccessful claims for compensation by Thailand (negotiations were still in progress in 2001). Proton clearly faces little near-term pressure to increase efficiency. But it also has limited growth potential; despite its privileged status, it has been unable to quash new entry, including a second national champion, Perodua, producing vehicles for the small-car segment. The willingness of political leaders to postpone liberalization that threatens vested interests keeps the industry inefficient and limited to local markets.

Iran also falls into this pattern, with a national champion, Iran Khodro, which continues to churn out the 1960s-vintage British Hillman Hunter Paykan, benefiting from a 1992 ban on imported vehicles. Nationalized in the 1979 Revolution, the industry is strongly

tied to the government, helped by industry employment of 235,000 (and more in parts production). Foreign trade restrictions hamper outside investment; although Iran Khodro will finally introduce a new Peugeot model in 2002, that deal relies on foreign-exchange barter to pay for fees and imported components. High vehicle prices nevertheless have encouraged the French Citroën and Korean Daewoo to attempt ventures with SAIPA, the second-largest producer in Iran. But the tight monopoly seems likely to inhibit growth and investment during the coming decade.

Korea is different in that its industry is competitive in export markets, with calendar-year 2001 sales (including parts exports) likely to surpass \$14 billion. Its major firms even have overseas manufacturing operations, especially in India and Eastern Europe; Daewoo is Poland's largest producer. However Daewoo, in bankruptcy in 2001, will likely be bought by GM, while Kia absorbed the truck producer Asia Motors only to encounter financial problems; it was absorbed in turn by the country's leading producer, Hyundai. But DaimlerChrysler now owns 10 percent of Hyundai, which is likely to relinquish autonomy, first in truck production (Renault purchased the rival Ssangyong) and gradually in passenger cars (given its long-standing dependence on Mitsubishi Motors for technology). In the space of four years the domestic industry has been completely restructured, and national champions have lost their autonomy.

Korea prevented vehicle imports, but that will change with WTO-mandated liberalization, inevitably cutting further into domestic sales. The industry will remain dependent on export demand to maintain volume and hence will be vulnerable to the health of overseas small-car markets, especially in the United States,

and to any appreciation of the *won*, the Korean currency. International ownership may mitigate this vulnerability, if Korea is used as a global source of small cars. For the time being its existing supplier base—Korea is the only Asian country besides Japan with a parts firm large enough to rank among the top one hundred in the global auto industry—will keep it attractive as a manufacturing locus, helped by a domestic market over four times larger than that of Thailand or Turkey.

Future Prospects

Too small to fund necessary R & D, and with WTO-linked liberalization threatening their viability even at home, independent, locally owned producers have not proved viable. Even in Japan, nine of eleven incumbent firms have lost their autonomy, leaving only Toyota and Honda—and Honda produces and sells more outside than inside Japan. Rather than being shaped by government policy, henceforth the local industry in Asia will depend on each country's historical legacy, as well as geography—the size of domestic and neighboring markets—and economic stability. Not all countries will be known as major producers, but the imperative to build where they sell will result in manufacturers in all of the larger Asian economies. At present, however, with excess capacity in virtually all markets, plant closures are inevitable.

As the first decade of the twenty-first century progresses, the parts sector will fare better, although it too will be dominated by large global players that design and manufacture modules rather than individual components. Its heterogeneous nature, however, makes it less visible politically and in the media, even if this sector is where the greatest gains in employment, exports, and profits are realized.

Mike Smitka



THE ISUZU Z.E.N.

In an effort to combine tradition with modernity, the Japanese carmaker Isuzu unveiled the new Z.E.N. model at the November 2001 Tokyo Motor Show. The car's steering wheel and seats fold away to create a tatami mat floor for tea drinking in a "traditional" setting.

Source: Asia Week (16 November 2001): 14.

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AUTONOMOUS REGION OF MUSLIM MINDANAO Following an agreement in 1976 (known as the Tripoli Agreement) between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Philippine government during the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos, autonomous Muslim governments were set up in Regions IX (Western Mindanao and Sulu) and XII (Central Mindanao). But the autonomy arrangements were never accepted by the MNLF or by the majority of Philippine Muslims. After the People Power Revolution of 1986, a new constitution made specific provision for an Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and a Regional Consultative Commission was appointed to draft the terms of the ARMM. These were eventually set out in Republic Act 6734 of August 1989.

Following the Tripoli Agreement, the scope of the ARMM was defined as the thirteen provinces and nine cities of Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan claimed by the MNLF as traditional Muslim territory. But following a plebiscite in 1989, which was again boycotted by a large number of Philippine Muslims and by the MNLF, only four provinces and no cities voted to join. In 1996 MNLF chairman Nur Misuari returned to the Philippines and became governor of the ARMM. Under the terms of a 1996 peace agreement between the MNLF and the Philippine government, new legislation for an expanded ARMM was to be drafted and submitted to a plebiscite; the mandated plebiscite, however, had still not been held by mid-2001. Meanwhile, there were complaints that the ARMM was underfunded and that its effectiveness had been undermined by inefficiency, nepotism, and favoritism toward MNLF supporters.

The plebiscite was eventually held in August 2001. Predictably, given the present demography of Mindanao, the proposed expansion of the ARMM to include the (now) fifteen provinces and fourteen cities covered by the Tripoli Agreement was supported in the four provinces of the existing ARMM (Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi) plus the province of Basilan and the city of Marawi but was rejected in all other provinces and cities. This outcome disappointed Muslim autonomy supporters and further undermined the position of Governor Misuari, who subsequently abandoned his office and launched an armed assault on national government forces. Misuari was arrested in Malaysia. In his absence, the national government-supported candidate, Parouk Hussin, was returned as governor in scheduled ARMM elections in November 2001.

Ronald J. May

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AWADH An historically important province of North India, Awadh was incorporated within the state of Uttar Pradesh after independence (1947). According to legend, it dates back to the days of the epic *Ramayana*. The name *Awadh* is derived from Ayodhya, the capital of the ancient Hindu kingdom of Kosala. Little is known of Ayodhya's history between the seventh and eleventh centuries. Awadh came into prominence under the rule of the Delhi sultans in the twelfth century. Later, it became a province of the Mughal empire after Babur annexed it in 1538. Under Aurangzeb (1658–1707), the capital city, Lucknow, developed as a notable Sunni theological center.

Under the later Mughals, centralized control declined. The governor Sadat Khan (1722–1739) made Awadh practically independent. Subsequently, the English East India Company gained ascendancy over the province. After defeating Nawab Shuja-ud-daulah (1753–1775) at the Battle of Buxar (1764), the company gained the right to free trade in Awadh. During the reign of Wajid Ali Shah (1847–1856), the British government finally annexed Awadh in 1856. Lucknow flourished in the eighteenth century as an important cultural center and rivaled Delhi in its patronage of art, music, and literature.

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AWAMI LEAGUE The Awami League (AL) is the oldest of the major parties in Bangladesh. It was founded in 1949 by Husain Shahid Suhrawardy (1893–1963), who later became prime minister of Pakistan. It was strong only in East Pakistan (present-day

Bangladesh). After Suhrawardy's death, Mujibur Rahman, or Mujib (1921–1975), became de facto leader and led the party to an overwhelming victory in the 1970 elections. In 1966 Mujib put forward a six-point program for provincial autonomy for East Pakistan, which he championed in the 1970 election called by Pakistani president General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan (1917–1980) as part of his plan to return Pakistan to democracy. Mujib also proclaimed four goals for the AL and for Bangladesh (which he led after the country's independence from Pakistan in 1971): nationalism, secularism, socialism, and democracy. These principles, with the exception of socialism, which has been discarded, still guide the party. Democracy was also discarded when Mujib created a civilian authoritarian state in January 1975, but this lapse was corrected with the return of a freely elected government in 1991. After Mujib's assassination in 1975, the party did not hold power again until Mujib's daughter, Hasina Wajid (b. 1947), became prime minister following the June 1996 election. In the interim, the AL was the principal opposition party, opposing Ziaur Rahman's and Khaleda Zia's Bangladesh



Awami League supporters in Dhaka protest the results of the 1 October 2001 elections after they were defeated by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. (AFP/CORBIS)

Nationalist Party or BNP (1979–1982 and 1991–1996) and H. M. Ershad's Jatiya Party (1982–1990) both within parliament and, when parliament did not exist, in extraparliamentary activity. During the H. M. Ershad (b. 1930) regime, the AL shared the opposition role with the BNP although the two parties did not cooperate until late 1990, when they caused the downfall of Ershad.

Craig Baxter

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AYUB KHAN (1907–1974), president of Pakistan. General Muhammad Ayub Khan (1907–1974) was president of Pakistan from 1958 to 1969. Born in Rehanna, which was at that time in British India, Ayub Khan rose to power within the Pakistani Army, becoming commander in chief in 1951. He served as minister of defense as well for one year beginning in 1954. In 1958, Ayub Khan was appointed chief martial law administrator by President Iskander Mirza during a time of political turmoil when martial law was declared. Eventually, Ayub Khan took over the role of president, which was confirmed by a referendum in 1960. Five years later, he was reelected. However, he did not complete his term. He started to lose support due to events arising from the war with India in 1965. People believed he was wrong to accept a cease-fire and to agree to the Tashkent Agreement. Political unrest directed at him resulted in his resignation in 1969.

During his presidency, however, Ayub Khan was responsible for several significant reforms and developments. For instance, he was architect of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), an organization devoted to economic cooperation and cultural exchanges among its members—Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. Although the organization did not reach the status envisioned by its creators, it nonetheless enhanced relations between its member states in a nonthreatening and beneficial manner. After the Iranian revolution, RCD was abandoned in 1979, but it was reestablished as the Economic Cooperation



Ayub Khan with Jacqueline Kennedy at the Kennedy estate in Virginia in September 1962. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

Organization (ECO) by Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran in 1985, when the three nations realized the need for a regional organization to promote trade. In 1992, ECO was expanded almost overnight when six former Caspian-region Soviet republics and Afghanistan joined. The expansion of the organization highlighted the necessity of regional cooperation, which was a dream of Ayub Khan.

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AYUTTHAYA, KINGDOM OF Ayutthaya (1350–1767) politically, economically, and culturally

dominated mainland Southeast Asia for four hundred years. Located at the confluence of three major rivers (the Lopburi, Pasak, and Chao Phraya) in the Menam Basin in central Thailand, the distinctive culture that Ayutthaya developed during the reigns of its thirty-three kings has evolved into modern Thai culture and society. UNESCO declared the historical city of Ayutthaya a World Heritage Site in 1991 as a masterpiece of urban planning with a unique cultural heritage.

King Uthong or Ramathibodi I (1314–1369) established Ayutthaya in 1350 when the kingdoms of Sukhothai and Angkor were weakening. The kingdom's location on an island in the middle of the river confluence was strategic defensively since the vicinity was flooded most of the year, protecting the city from attack. The periodic flooding created a fertile alluvial plain capable of sustaining a large population and the development of rice cultivation for export. Ayutthaya's proximity to the sea was advantageous for maritime trade. Ayutthaya controlled access to the kingdoms in the interior and thus became a major communications

and trade center. King Uthong's successors expanded the kingdom to occupy present-day central Thailand and the northern section of the Malay peninsula, incorporating the territories of Sukhothai and part of the Angkor empire.

Khmer culture heavily influenced Ayutthaya in its early years. Ayutthayan monarchs adopted the concept of the *devaraja* (god-king) cult, elevating themselves to the status of gods, particularly as the reincarnation of Vishnu. The royalty operated in secrecy, increasing the mystery surrounding the king. The kings rarely made public appearances, and these appearances were often grandiose. The kings integrated Hindu and Mahayana Buddhist religious ceremonies to legitimate and ritualize their rule. Brahman priests presided over these ceremonies, such as the coronation and oath of allegiance, and the Thai monarchy continues this tradition. Sukhothai and Sinhalese cultures also shaped the kingdom beginning in the fifteenth century. The Sukhothai kingdom was previously in control of the region before Ayutthaya overpowered Sukhothai, and Uthong used the laws of Sukhothai as a base for the Ayutthayan code of law. The Buddhist foundation of Sinhalese culture influenced Ayutthaya as it converted to Theravada Buddhism.

The Ayutthayan monarchs created a sophisticated administration and hierarchical social system to control the kingdom's large territory and population. The system comprised a number of ranked and titled officials. Ayutthayan society was stratified into three major classes: royalty, the officials or nobility, and commoners. Persians, Indians, Chinese, Indonesians, Japanese, Europeans, and other foreigners who came to Ayutthaya as merchants were generally excluded from the social strata. Kings such as Trailok or Borommatrailokanat (reigned 1448–1488) also developed an elaborate code of law.

Theravada Buddhism flourished at Ayutthaya, and the Mahayana Buddhist ceremonies that legitimized kingship were incorporated into this other sect of Buddhism, which was adopted throughout mainland Southeast Asia. Ayutthaya was closer to the centers of Theravada Buddhism, Ceylon and Burma, and its central location meant that monks passed through it before traveling to other cities. Ayutthayan monarchs were generous patrons of religion and the religious arts. Kings sent for Sinhalese monks to preside over ceremonies and monasteries and constructed over four hundred monuments and temples, giving the *sangha*, or Buddhist monkhood, wealth and power. Trailok was the first king to be ordained as a monk, and this tradition continues with the Thai monarchy today.



AYUTTHAYA-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Constructed in 1350, the ancient Kingdom of Siam's second capital remains relatively intact despite its destruction by the Burmese in the eighteenth century. Designated by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site in 1991, Ayutthaya's massive monasteries and sky-scraping spires continue to impress.

Ayutthaya excelled in classical and performing arts, including the fields of literature, painting, classical dance and drama, music, sculpture, architecture, and other art forms. Religious literature flourished, with the adaptation of Indian works such as the *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata*. The *Ramakien*, the Thai version of the *Ramayana*, became the subject of other arts such as painting, dance, and drama. *Khon* was a classical dance form based on this epic, and the use of masks in *khon* began during this period. The masks became the most important part of the *khon* costume, and the use of the masks initiated the narration of the drama since the performers were unable to speak wearing the masks. The courts also entertained with puppetry: *nang yai* (shadow puppets) and *hun* (marionettes). The performances were confined to palace grounds, where they continued for many days accompanied by a *piphat* (orchestra composed of four to eight musicians). Music flourished in Ayutthaya, and compositions and songs from that period continue to be played today.

Numerous poetic forms developed, such as the *chan*, *kaap*, *klawn*, *klong*, and *rai*. The first two forms, *chan* and *kaap*, originated in India, but the poets of the Ayutthayan courts developed their own adaptations of these forms. The Ayutthayan poets borrowed 17 or 18 of the original 109 meters of *chan* and added rhyme schemes and changed the rules concerning syllables. The rules of the poetics forms differed according to tonal, syllable, and rhyme schemes. *Lilit Pbra Lo* and *Lilit Yuan Phai* are just two of the epics written during this era. Ayutthayan court artisans developed a distinct painting style and other art forms such as niello ware—in which silver and gold receptacles are decorated with motifs etched onto the receptacle with an alloy metal—and the use of gold leaf on lacquer. The artisans mastered bronze casting and created massive Buddhist icons. Their iconography included the elongation of the lotus flower base and the representation of Buddha in different postures and dressed as a prince.

The images became symbols of the mystic nature of the king.

Religious architecture experienced major transformations. The spire of the Sinhalese *chedi*, or stupa, with its bell-shaped base, was elongated in Ayutthayan style. Temples became massive, imposing structures symbolizing the kingdom's power and indestructibility. The roofs of Ayutthayan temples were very steep and elaborately decorated. Domestic architecture adapted to the amphibious environment of the kingdom. The Siamese elevated house evolved into floating rafts to accommodate flooding and to allow the inhabitants to live near their rice fields.

Ayutthaya as an international trade port became a cosmopolitan city. There were numerous international settlements of Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, Persians, Indians, Malays, and even Europeans. The Portuguese established the first European embassy in 1511, and the Dutch, French, and English soon followed suit in order gain trading contracts with the court. The kings also exchanged missions with the French and Chinese courts. Foreign advisers became influential to some kings; an example is Constantine Phaulkon, a Greek, who advised King Narai or Phra Narai (1632–1688). Ayutthaya used the exposure to the different countries to its advantage. The kingdom was able to modernize its military and munitions by using the technological advances of others.

The Burmese sacked Ayutthaya in 1767, destroying temples, palaces, and art works and returning to their own kingdom with booty. The Burmese presence in the kingdom of Chiang Mai since the sixteenth century made Ayutthaya vulnerable to attack from the north. Ayutthaya had enjoyed a century of relative peace, but there was instability around the throne, causing the kingdom to be ill prepared defensively. The Burmese took many of Ayutthaya's inhabitants as war captives. Ayutthaya ceased to be the center of the Siamese world when the new capital, Thonburi (1767–1782), was established further south on the Chao Phraya River by a new ruler. Thonburi was chosen for its strategic location for trade and defense. Another ruling dynasty came into power in 1782 and moved the capital to the other side of the Chao Phraya River to Bangkok in order to increase its defensible position from Burmese attack.

Linda McIntosh

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AZAD, ABU'L-KALAM (1888–1958), president of the Indian National Congress. Born in 1888 in Mecca, Islam's main center of pilgrimage, to a family of Afghan origin, Azad Abu'l Kalam settled with his parents in the Indian city of Calcutta in 1890. Here, his father became famous as spiritual guide and religious scholar (*maulana*). Azad was taught at home, receiving a traditional Islamic education, though he secretly studied English and the writings of the Indian Muslim reformer Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898). Nevertheless, his religious ideas were traditional, far from Islamic modernism and reformism: God was the supremely authoritative center of the universe, and man's duty was to admire, obey, and worship Him.

Around 1910, he joined the Hindu anti-British revolutionaries of Bengal, in spite of their anti-Muslim attitude. In 1912 he started publishing an Urdu weekly, *Al-Hilal* (The Crescent), which had a wide circulation among the Indian Muslim community. Due to its radical political and religious ideas, the British banned the weekly in 1914. Granted the honorific title of *maulana*, Azad became one of the leading political nationalists, fighting against both the British presence and the partition of India into two different states for Hindus and Muslims. He supported the concept of a confederation of autonomous provinces with their own constitutions, but with strong central ties.

Repeatedly deported and arrested by the British for his ideas, in 1923 he became the youngest president of the Indian National Congress. In 1928 he presided over the Nationalist Muslim Conference. Between 1940 and 1946 he held, for the second time, the position of president of the National Congress. After partition, he served as minister in the Indian government.

Riccardo Redaelli

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AZAD KASHMIR Azad Kashmir ("Free Kashmir") is the portion of Kashmir controlled by Pakistan, comprising Gilgit, Baltistan, and western Kashmir, an area about 51,200 square kilometers.

Azad Kashmir came about because of convoluted political maneuvering that followed the end of British rule in India in 1947. At that time, all of Kashmir was ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh, whose forefather Maharajah Gulab Singh had bought the province from the British in 1837 for a million pounds sterling.

It was also in 1947 that Punjab and Sind were partitioned and Pakistan created, thus giving Muslims of the subcontinent a homeland.

Hari Singh was not willing to let his land be divided between India and the newly created Pakistan. Instead, he chose to remain independent of the two nations. However, forces larger than he could control erupted in Kashmir. Historically, Kashmir was 60 percent Muslim and 40 percent Hindu and Sikh. The Muslims in Gilgit and Ladakh revolted and by October 1947 they had set up an area that they declared free ("azad") of Hindu and Sikh dominance (rhetoric similar to that used in the creation of Pakistan). Thus was established Azad Kashmir, with its capital at Muzaffarabad. Before long, an army was created, supported and supplied by Pakistan, and many thousands of tribesmen entered Kashmir and headed for Srinagar, the maharaja's capital. Widespread fighting broke out in the region; Hari Singh ceded his kingdom to India and sought refuge in New Delhi.

The Indian army immediately moved to quell the violence. In response, in May 1948, Pakistan sent in troops to defend Azad Kashmir against efforts by the Indian army to overrun the area. The two sides fought each other to a stalemate; in January 1949, they petitioned the United Nations to broker a cease-fire. The U.N. sent in a peacekeeping force and established a cease-fire line, which divided Gilgit, Baltistan, and western Kashmir from the rest of Kashmir. Neither side recognized the cease-fire line as an official border; it was merely a temporary line to keep apart the two warring nations.

Lengthy and fruitless talks followed between India and Pakistan, which did not settle the fate of Kashmir.

Both sides wanted to hold a plebiscite, but could not agree on how it would be managed. Pakistan argues that Hari Singh's cession of his lands to India was not legitimate; therefore, Indian troops must withdraw. Only then can a plebiscite be held. India, on the other hand, claims the maharaja's actions were legitimate and wants all Pakistani troops to withdraw, especially from Azad Kashmir, while Indian troops will stay to keep the peace. And only then can a plebiscite be held. Both sides have fought two wars over Kashmir; in the second war, Pakistan lost 15 percent of its territory, with the creation of Bangladesh.

In 1972, India and Pakistan signed the Simla Accord. According to this agreement, the previous cease-fire line became a permanent line of control, and both nations agreed not to use force to change this boundary. The area remained peaceful until 1989. Unrest has plagued the area ever since, with sporadic violence and buildup of tension. The demands of the last fifty years have not changed, and Kashmir remains a flash point that could send the two nations into another war.

Nirmal Dass

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AZAHARI, A. M. (b. 1929–2002), Brunei political leader. Sheikh Ahmad Azahari bin Sheikh Mahmud, known as A. M. Azahari, led the Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB) in an abortive revolt against the Brunei government in December 1962. Born in Labuan of mixed Arab-Malay parentage, Azahari was mission-educated and studied veterinary science at Bogor, Java, under Japanese sponsorship during the Pacific war (1941–1945). He deserted to join anti-Japanese movements and participated in the Indonesian independence struggle. Azahari became politically active in the early 1950s, agitating for Brunei's independence. Inspired by the left-wing Partai Rakyat Malaya, he formed the PRB in 1955.

Azahari made the resurgence of the ancient empire of Brunei his priority. He supported a "Northern Borneo Federation," mooted by the British (1957), but

intended that Brunei would hold the pivotal role and himself the reigns of government. In January 1962 he was nominated to the Brunei Legislative Council and the Brunei-Malaysia Commission (to ascertain public views on the formation of a "Malaysia" federation). Azahari opposed entry into a Malaysia federation on the grounds that it would negate a revival of Brunei hegemony. In April 1962, his motion of resurrecting the "historical sovereignty" of the Sultan of Brunei over Sarawak and British North Borneo was defeated in the council, which resulted in his resignation.

Azahari was in Manila when the revolt broke out. He declared himself prime minister of Negara Kesatuan Kalimantan Utara (NKKU, the Unitary State of North Borneo). But within a week, British forces crushed the rebellion, PRB was proscribed, and Azahari went into exile until his death.

Ooi Keat Gin

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AZERBAIJAN (2002 pop. of Republic 8.1 million), (2002 pop. of East Azerbaijan, Iran, 3.4 million), (2002 pop. of West Azerbaijan, Iran, 2.8 million). Azerbaijan is a mountainous region in West Asia, bounded by the eastern Caucasus, northwestern Zagros range, Talish Mountains, and Caspian Sea and divided between the Republic of Azerbaijan in the north and Iran in the south. The word *Azerbaijan* is derived from the province's ancient name of Media Atropatene and from the Persian satrap Atropates (flourished c. fourth century BCE), who established an independent dynasty there after Alexander of Macedon's death.

Islam was introduced into northern Azerbaijan after the Arab conquest in the seventh century, gradually displacing the Zoroastrianism of the Iranian-

speaking majority. Although Turkic elements had a long presence in ethnically diverse Transcaucasia, most experts agree that Turkification of the region started in the eleventh century, with the massive migration of Oghuz nomads from Central Asia to Asia Minor, under the banner of Seljuk conquest.

Between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries various conquerors incorporated Azerbaijan into vast empires stretching from Asia Minor eastward to the Oxus River. The Safavids (1501–1732), who laid the foundations of modern Persia and made Shi'ism its state religion, came from Azerbaijan. Russia's expansion into the Caucasus in the nineteenth century led to Persian-Russian wars and to the final division of Azerbaijan along the Araks River in 1828.

The Republic of Azerbaijan (area 86,600 square kilometers) is bounded by Iran, Armenia, Georgia, the Russian Federation (Dagestan), and the Caspian Sea. It includes Nakhchevan, separated from the rest of the country by a strip of Armenian territory, and the Karabakh Mountain Area, inhabited mostly by Armenians. A drive for the unification of Karabakh with Armenia in 1988 sparked ethnic violence and led to war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1991–1994. In 1922 Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia were incorporated into the Soviet Union. Azerbaijan became a separate Soviet republic in 1936. It declared independence in 1991.

The country has significant oil reserves, exploited intensively since the 1870s, and oil-producing and petrochemical industries centered in its capital, Baku, a Caspian seaport. Azerbaijan oil was critically important for the Soviets during World War II, as were the weapons- and machine-building plants established there. In the twenty-first century Azerbaijan's oil continues to spark Western interests in the country.



BAKU-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

A potpourri of Central Asian and Middle Eastern architectural styles, the walled city of Baku in Azerbaijan allows a unique glimpse at several divergent cultural forms in one place. Baku was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2000.



Iranian Azerbaijan includes East Azerbaijan (capital Tabriz), with an area of 65,840 square kilometers, and West Azerbaijan (capital Orumiyeh), with an area of 43,657 square kilometers. Azerbaijan is Iran's most fertile region, producing cereals, tobacco, sugar beets, apricots, and almonds.

Marta Simidchieva

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AZERBAIJANIS The Azerbaijanis are a unique group in the Muslim world: they are mostly Shi'ite Muslims, although ethnically and linguistically they

are Turks (Oghuz Turks). The Azerbaijanis (also known as Azeris or Azerbaijani Turks) number 30 to 35 million and live primarily in present-day Iran (20 million), the Republic of Azerbaijan (7.5 million; the nation's independence was reestablished after the fall of the Soviet Union), today's Turkey (1 to 2 million), and Russia (1 million). Under Seljuk (1038–1157) rule, major waves of immigration of Oghuz Turks into Azerbaijan created a clear Turkic majority. Historians debate the ethnic-linguistic composition of the areas north and south of the Araks River and the historical borders of Azerbaijan before the major waves of Turkic immigration there. More Turks came during Mongol Ilkhanid rule from the thirteenth through the fourteenth centuries and during the Qara Qoyunlu and Aq Qoyunlu Turkmen dynasties in the fifteenth century. In the northern part of Azerbaijan, a native Shirvanshah dynasty ruled through the sixteenth century.

Azerbaijani Religions

The Islamization of Azerbaijan took place during the Arab conquest at a date given variably between

639 and 643. Prior to the Islamic conquest, Zoroastrianism was prominent in Azerbaijan and it remains a significant cultural influence among the Azerbaijanis. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Azerbaijanis were among the first proponents of secularism in the Muslim world, advocating study of secular subjects in schools and limitations on the role of clerics in politics. In its constitution of 1996, the Republic of Azerbaijan declared a clear separation between religion and state, and the nation has no official state religion. The majority of the Azerbaijanis in the Republic of Azerbaijan are secular, and Islam is primarily a cultural force in the republic. Among the Azerbaijanis in present-day Iran, a substantial segment is religiously observant, and a large proportion of the clerical elite in Iran is of ethnic Azerbaijani origin.

Azerbaijani Territory

The area that many Azerbaijanis consider their historical territory stretches through much of the Transcaucasus (the south Caucasus) and northwest Iran. The borders in the region of the Republic of Azerbaijan have frequently shifted; the Republic (which is bounded by Russia, the Republic of Georgia, Armenia, Iran, and the Caspian Sea) fills only a small part of the Azerbaijanis' traditional lands. The Azerbaijanis often refer to the part of Azerbaijan north of the Araks River (called Aras in Iran; the river runs through Asiatic Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) as north Azerbaijan, while the area south of the river in Iran is referred to by them as south Azerbaijan.

For much of its history, Azerbaijani territory has been part of Iran. Iran's capital was frequently in the Azerbaijani provinces, and the rulers of a number of Iranian dynasties (the Safavids, for instance, who ruled from 1501 to 1722 or 1736, depending on which event one chooses to mark their downfall; or the Qajars, who ruled from 1794 to 1925) were predominately ethnic Azerbaijani Turks. In the early nineteenth century, Russia and Iran fought for control of the Caucasus. Iran was defeated in the first military campaign. The sides concluded the Treaty of Gulustan in 1813, and Iran ceded a large part of the Caucasus to Russia. Major confrontation erupted again in 1825, and again Iran was defeated. In February 1828, the Treaty of Turkmenchay was signed, and Iran lost the rest of the Caucasus, including most of the northern part of Azerbaijan. The border was set at the Araks River, thus dividing the Azerbaijanis under two separate empires—Russia and Iran. In the eyes of many Azerbaijanis, this treaty symbolizes the separation of the people.

The Azerbaijani States in the Transcaucasus

During the twentieth century, the Azerbaijanis north of the Araks River have twice established an independent state. The first state, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918–1920), declared in its constitution equal rights for all citizens regardless of religion, ethnic origin, or gender and granted suffrage to women. Azerbaijan was the first Muslim state to grant women the vote.

The Republic was overrun by Soviet troops in 1920 and incorporated into the USSR. In October 1991, the Republic of Azerbaijan declared its independence from the USSR, and the state was established with the downfall of the Soviet regime in December 1991.

Azerbaijanis in Iran

Iran's three northwesternmost provinces are inhabited predominantly by Azerbaijanis: East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, and Ardabil. Tehran, the capital city, has a large Azerbaijani population as well, estimated at close to 50 percent of the city's residents.

In the twentieth century, Azerbaijani autonomy movements emerged several times in Iran. Whenever central power weakened, Azerbaijani activists and other ethnic groups have exploited the opportunity and articulated ethnic-based demands. This was evident during the 1918–1920 provincial revolts, which precipitated the fall of the Qajar regime, the World War II Allied occupation of Iran (1941–1945/6), and the Islamic Revolution (1979). During 1945–1946, Iranian Azerbaijanis established an independent provincial government in Iran's northwest provinces. This short-lived government was attacked by Tehran's troops, and the rebellion collapsed.

Despite the language and cultural restrictions on ethnic minorities in Iran, distinctive Azerbaijani identity is retained by vast numbers of the Azerbaijanis there. However, most see no contradiction in maintaining both ethnic and Iranian identity and feel ties to both.

Azerbaijani Language and Culture

The language spoken by the Azerbaijanis and that spoken in Turkey are mutually intelligible. Until the twentieth century, Azerbaijanis wrote their language in the Persian-Arabic script. In 1924, the Latin alphabet was officially adopted in Soviet Azerbaijan, predating its adoption by the Republic of Turkey in 1928. In 1940, the Cyrillic alphabet was imposed by the Soviets on the Turkic peoples of the USSR, and thus the Azerbaijanis in the north began writing their publica-

tions in this script. This created a gap between the Soviet Azerbaijanis and their co-ethnics in Iran, who have continued to use the Persian-Arabic script. After independence, the Republic of Azerbaijan officially adopted the Latin alphabet, and the use of this script has expanded, especially among the youth, since new textbooks are written in the Latin script. In the Republic of Azerbaijan, the language is referred to officially as Azerbaijani, but on the grassroots level it is often called Turkish.

In Iran, the use of languages other than Persian is restricted (for instance, as of 2000 no schools were allowed to operate in the Azerbaijani language), and only a small segment of the Azerbaijani population is literate in the language, although most ethnic Azerbaijanis frequently speak the language. In their publications, some Iranian Azerbaijani intellectuals have modified the Persian-Arabic script with vowel markers to accommodate their highly vowel-based language. In Iran, the language is often called Azeri or Turki.

Despite the separation of the Azerbaijanis under different empires and regimes since 1828, Azerbaijanis on both sides of the border share many common historical memories, mutual symbols, and family bonds. Throughout most of the Soviet period, when direct ties were severely restricted by both the USSR and Iran, many Azerbaijanis retained connections with their relatives beyond the border, and when the limitations were removed with the Soviet demise, there was an outpouring of family visits and renewal of interchange and cooperation. While many differences have emerged between the Azerbaijanis in the Republic of Azerbaijan and those in Iran since their separation, most tend to view themselves as belonging to the same ethnic group, though not predominantly sharing identification with the same state or political structures.

Family ties are highly valued among Azerbaijanis and have played an important role in preserving the common identity of many Azerbaijanis despite their separation in different states. Most Azerbaijanis in the Republic of Azerbaijan have kinship ties to Azerbaijanis in Iran. The strong extended family network provides assistance and social services to family members

and often fulfills functions that in the West are provided by the state or public organizations. However, these strong family ties often inhibit nationalism and state-building efforts.

In terms of national literature, the Azerbaijanis revere the epic *Dada Qorqut* (twelfth century) and the poetry of Nizami Ganjavi (1369–1404), an ethnic Azerbaijani who wrote primarily in Persian, and of Fizuli (1498–1556), who wrote primarily in a form of Turkish that was common to Azerbaijanis and other Turks in that period, in addition to Persian and Arabic. Azerbaijani folk bards (*ashuq*) continue to recite traditional poetry; Azerbaijanis are known for their love of music and singing.

The writer Mirza Fath Ali Akhundzade (1812–1878) played the most prominent role in the development of modern Azerbaijani literature. Primarily through the plays he wrote, Akhundzade propagated among the Azerbaijanis, and throughout the Turkic and Iranian worlds, the idea of rationalism, anticlericalism, and modern education.

Azerbaijanis are well known for their hand-woven carpets and kilims, especially those from the Tabriz and Kuba-Shirvan regions. Azerbaijani cuisine is highly valued in Iran.

Brenda Shaffer

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BA JIN (b. 1904), popular Chinese writer. Ba Jin (Li Feigan), who has written numerous works in a variety of genres, is one of the most popular Chinese writers of the twentieth century. From the early 1950s until the 1980s, he suffered sometimes vicious political persecution. Although his popularity and prestige were revived in the post-Mao era, the injustices he endured from the 1950s onward seem to have put an end to his creative writing. However, from the late 1920s to the late 1940s, Ba Jin was an extremely prolific writer of fiction, penning more than seventy short stories and twenty novels. These sometimes melodramatic but consistently humanitarian works criticize poverty, war, greed, and other social injustices. His characters confront difficult ethical situations demanding the sacrifice of personal interests for the sake of a larger good.

The best known of these works is his novel *Jia* (*Family*), first published in 1931. *Family* chronicles the breakdown of the large and wealthy Gao family between the years 1919 and 1923. In it, Ba Jin represents the traditional Chinese family as a structure that smothers the individual dreams and aspirations of idealistic youth. The novel also depicts the suffering of women in modern China and momentous historical events of the time. *Family* has been canonized as one of the great masterpieces of modern Chinese literature.

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BA TRIEU (Third century CE). Lady Trieu, or Ba Trieu, is also known as Trieu Trinh Nuong or Trieu Thi Trinh. History describes her as a young woman riding an elephant down from the mountains, leading a rebellion against Chinese control over her country in 248 CE. She had a famous mark of distinction: her breasts were so long that she had to throw them over her shoulders while riding into battle. Her insurrection ended in defeat. Two explanations are given for the lack of success. The first is that upon hearing about her, the Chinese commanders ordered their troops to shed all clothes and advanced toward her stark naked. Lady Trieu could not bear the sight of so much exposed flesh, so she turned her elephant around and commanded her troops to retreat. The Chinese pursued them relentlessly until they destroyed all the insurgent forces. The second explanation is less frivolous. After two hundred years of Chinese efforts at assimilating the Vietnamese population, the majority of the local people identified their interests with those of the conquerors so that they no longer supported anti-Chinese movements wholeheartedly as they had done with the Trung sisters, who had led a successful rebellion against the Chinese occupation two hundred years earlier and ruled Vietnam as queens from 40 to 43 CE. Lady Trieu's supporters, indeed, came mainly from the mountains where they had withdrawn to live away from Chinese influence, which became overwhelming after the Trung sisters' rebellion.

Truong Buu Lam

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BABA TATSUI (1850–1888), Japanese statesman and political thinker. Baba Tatsui was born in Tosa Province (now Kochi Prefecture) in the area of Kaneko Bridge, Nakanoshima Town, near Kochi Castle. He initially studied at Fukuzawa Yukichi's Keio Gijuku School (now Keio University); later, during the 1870s, he studied English law and politics in England. A champion of the Freedom and People's Rights Movement, he organized the Kokuyukai with the aim of spreading democratic values and became a leader of the Jiyu-to (Liberal Party), Japan's first national political party. Baba later left the party over a disagreement. Critical of Meiji leaders, he was prohibited from writing and speaking in public. In 1885, he was arrested for antigovernment activities, charged for having illegally purchased explosives. Acquitted in 1886, he sought political asylum in the United States where he wrote a long essay in English entitled "The Political Condition of Japan: Showing the Despotism and Incompetence of the Cabinet and the Aims of the Popular Parties" (1888). He died in Philadelphia and was buried there in the Woodlands Cemetery.

William Nelson Ridgeway

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BABIRUSA The babirusa (pig deer, *Babyrousa babyrussa*), a pig-like animal, is distantly related to the hippo and restricted to the Indonesian island of Sulawesi. Babirusa stand 65–80 centimeters high, are often nearly hairless, and range in color from off-white to brown. The upper and lower canine teeth of the male curve toward the forehead, forming four prominent tusks that are used in fights over females and ter-

ritory. Babirusa are nocturnal and eat fruit, coconuts, and beetles. Babirusa have a complex stomach, like cattle, rather than a simple one like pigs. This observation has given rise to a suggestion that they chew the cud, meaning that their meat might be *halal* (permitted for Muslims), but recent research suggests this is not the case.

Robert Cribb

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BABISM Babism was founded in 1844 by Sayyid 'Ali Muhammad Shirazi (1819–1850) in Shiraz, Iran. The religion grew out of the Shaykhi school of Twelver Shi'ite Islam, which emphasized Gnostic ideas. Many Shi'ites expected that the Twelfth Imam, a supernatural messiah, would return in 1844 CE. In May of that year, Sayyid 'Ali Muhammad declared to a young Shaykhi leader, Mulla Husayn Bushru'i (c.1814–1849), that he (Sayyid 'Ali Muhammad) had a special relationship to the hidden Twelfth Imam, and so was a "Bab" (Arabic for "door"). He wrote a commentary on the sura of Joseph from the Qu'ran that alluded to these assertions. Mulla Husayn and other young Shaykhi leaders accepted his claims.

The Bab went on pilgrimage to Mecca. On his return to Shiraz he was questioned by the Shi'ite religious authorities about his claims, and found ways to appear to recant them. He was placed under house arrest by the governor of Shiraz, and in 1846, when plague struck Shiraz, he was able to relocate to Isfahan. There he gained the patronage of the governor, Manuchehr Khan. He was summoned by Muhammad Shah (reigned 1834–1848) to Tehran. But the prime minister, fearful that the Bab might gain the royal ear, had him imprisoned in a fortress in Azerbaijan instead.

In 1848 the Bab wrote *Bayan* (Utterance), a book of homilies and laws intended to supersede the Qu'ran, and so made a claim to be a prophet in his own right. He taught that one should try to see God in the faces of others; that interest should be allowed on loans; that unrelated men and women might converse, and that European carpetbaggers should be excluded from some Iranian provinces. By 1849 he was said to have attracted 100,000 Iranians, mostly artisans, merchants, and lower-level clergy, to his religion. Fighting broke out between his partisans and conservative Shi'ites. The state executed the Bab in Tabriz in 1850, and the Babi

disturbances were brutally suppressed. In revenge, a cabal of Babis in Tehran attempted unsuccessfully to have Muhammad Shah's successor, Nasir al-Din Shah (1831–1896), assassinated in 1852. In response, Nasir al-Din launched a pogrom against Babis. Altogether, some 5,000 persons perished in Iran during these events. In 1863 one of the Bab's disciples founded the new Baha'i religion, which most Babis accepted.

Juan R. I. Cole

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BABUR (1483–1530), founder of the Mughal empire. Born in Fergana in Central Asia on 14 February 1483, Zahir-ud-din Muhammad—better known as Babur or "the Tiger"—established what became known as the Mughal (or Moghul or Mongol) empire (1526–1857) in India (though he regarded himself as a Timurid Turk). One of the largest centralized empires in the premodern world, the Mughal empire lasted until the British exiled the last emperor in 1858. Babur was an excellent military commander, being a keen archer, horseman, and swimmer, as well as a cultured monarch and a lover of music, nature, gardens, and poetry. He wrote *The Baburnama*, considered to be the first autobiography in Islamic literature, a book that provides us with an official chronicle as well as an intimate personal memoir.

Although most widely associated with India, little about his life was Indian. He was born prince of Fergana in Transoxiana (modern Uzbekistan and Tajikistan), scion of a dynasty that reigned in eastern Iran and Central Asia, and was descended from Amir Temur (c. 1336–1405) on his father's side and Genghis Khan (1167–1227), the famed Mongol ruler, on his mother's. He occupied the throne of Samarqand at twelve, although the following decades were to see him lose and recapture this throne and several other kingdoms, including Kabul, on several occasions. Though a Sunni Muslim, he became, from his thirties, addicted to drink. His political philosophy was dictated by a driving ambition that saw him move due south and east to the Indian subcontinent. Though his forces were vastly outnumbered, Babur was successful through superior military strategy, firearms—matchlock guns and field cannons—and fast cavalry in defeating Ibrahim Lodhi (reigned 1517–1526), the ruler of the Delhi sultanate in North India, in a historic battle at Panipat in April 1526, thereby capturing the throne of Delhi. He spent



The grave of Babur in Kabul, Afghanistan. (PAUL ALMASY/CORBIS)

1527 and 1528 expanding his empire, principally by defeating the other major power, the Rajput kings of northwestern India. However, he died at Agra, in northern India, on 25 December 1530 at the young age of forty-seven, bequeathing to his son a kingdom—consisting of Central Asian territories, Kabul, the Punjab, Delhi, and part of Bihar to the east and south to Gwalior—that had been conquered but not consolidated. He was later reburied in Kabul.

Chandrika Kaul

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BAC SON UPRISING The Bac Son uprising took place in a northern province of Vietnam that borders on China. The event happened in late 1940, after the German-sponsored government of Vichy France and Japan, an ally of Germany, had already signed an agreement whereby Japan acknowledged French sovereignty over its Indochinese colony. In exchange, Japan was allowed to use all Indochinese military facilities as well as station a specific number of troops in Indochina. Notwithstanding that accord, on 22 September 1940, the Japanese Canton army attacked and overran a few French outposts along the

Sino-Vietnamese frontier. The operation lasted only three days, but it was sufficient to demonstrate that French Indochinese forces were in no position to resist the Japanese onslaught.

Capitalizing on these circumstances and waiting for the French along their humiliating retreat, Vietnamese anti-French groups—such as members of the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang, the local cadres of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), and the Tho minority—all took up their arms in an attempt to chase the French military out of the northern provinces of Vietnam, including Bac Son's province of Thai Nguyen. The insurgents succeeded in occupying a couple of French military positions, disarming a number of French and indigenous soldiers, and issuing declarations of independence. Vietnamese historians label this movement the Bac Son uprising, elevating it—as well as the insurgency that occurred two months later in the south, known under the name of the Southern Vietnam uprising—to the same level as many anti-Chinese struggles in the past, such as that of the Trung Sisters in 40 CE, Le Loi in the fifteenth century, or the Tay Son in the late eighteenth century.

The Bac Son uprising naturally ended in disaster within less than a month. In effect, even if the French could not mount an appropriate resistance to Japanese troops, they were ten times better armed and more adequately trained than a few thousand thinly armed and untrained freedom fighters, no matter what degree of determination and enthusiasm the rebels had attained. It has been said that the Bac Son uprising contributed greatly to the military training of the members of the Indochinese Communist Party, for Bac Son constituted that organization's first armed confrontation with colonial forces, and it was also there that the first guerrilla units were set up.

Truong Buu Lam

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BACHCHAN, AMITABH (b. 1942), Indian actor. Amitabh Bachchan is the son of the acclaimed Hindi poet Harivansh Rai (b. 1907). He was born in Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh, India on 11 October 1942. After completing his education at Delhi University, Amitabh entered the world of Hindi films (also known

as Bollywood) and in the early 1970s had his first string of successful feature films, including *Zanjeer* and *Deewar*. From the 1970s through the mid-1980s, Amitabh continued to dominate India's big screen with films such as *Sholay*, *Silsila*, and *Sharaabi*.

In 1984, he cashed in on his box office stardom and made a successful bid for a seat in the Indian parliament. However, his stint in politics was short-lived, and he soon returned to Bollywood as an actor and CEO of his own entertainment company, Amitabh Bachchan Corporation Limited (ABCL).

To date, Amitabh has appeared in more than 100 Hindi films, and as a testament to his overwhelming worldwide popularity he was selected by the public to be the first Bollywood star immortalized at Madame Toussaud's Wax Museum in London. Amitabh Bachchan lives in Bombay and is married to the famous screen actress Jaya Bhaduri (b. 1948).

Ami P. Shah

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BACTRIA The name of an ancient country in Central Asia, Bactria was the home of Iranian-speaking people from about the eighth century BCE and is thought to have been the birthplace of Zoroaster, the prophet of Persian religion. Bactria lay between the Hindu Kush and the Amu Dar'ya River, in today's Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Its capital city, Bactra, was situated in northern Afghanistan, but since the nineteenth century the site has been no more than a village near the modern city of Mazar-i-Sharif.

Despite its rugged, mountainous, and desert terrain, Bactria was strategically located on the Silk Road linking Europe and China via Western Asia. To control this lucrative trade and to try to subdue the troublesome nomads inhabiting Bactria, Cyrus the Great (c. 585–c. 529 BCE) incorporated Bactria and the nomadic Bactrians into the vast Persian empire that once stretched from Egypt to India. Alexander of Macedon (356–323 BCE), during his conquest of the Persian empire, took Bactria in 328 BCE and ordered the execution of Bessus (d. c. 328 BCE), the ruler of Bactria. A Persian who had been the satrap of Bactria and Sogdiana, Bessus fought with the Persians against Alexander's forces but plotted the murder of the last Persian monarch, Darius III (d. 330 BCE), and tried unsuccessfully to usurp the Persian throne.

Alexander left a small Greek garrison in Bactria and installed a Greek governor, before continuing to India on his campaigns. For the next half-century, Bactria was a province of the Seleucid empire, ruled by Alexander's Macedonian Greek successors, but during the reign of the satrap Diodotus I Soter (reigned c. 256–235 BCE), Bactria revolted and became independent.

Bactria remained an island of Greek culture in Central Asia and during its zenith controlled a significant part of what is now Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Around 135 BCE, however, an invasion of Saka nomads from the steppes overran the country. Kushan nomads, from the eastern steppes, in turn conquered the Saka and introduced their Buddhism to Bactria. By around 55 BCE, Bactria had disappeared as an independent political entity and was home to various nomadic groups whose loyalty did not extend beyond the borders of their lands.

The region of Bactria then became known as Balkh; it fell to the Muslims in the seventh century, and thus Islam spread through the area. The violent history of Bactria, however, even today continues to influence the politics of the region.

Rafis Abazov

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BADAKHSHAN Badakhshan is a mountainous region divided between northeastern Afghanistan and the republic of Tajikistan. China borders both units to the north.

Once part of the ancient Greek kingdom of Bactria, the rugged mountain and valley terrain of the Badakhshan Province (2002 pop. 992,000) in northeast Afghanistan covers 43,626 square kilometers between the Hindu Kush Mountains and the Amu Dar'ya River. A panhandle extension juts northward to the Xinjiang region in China, and separates Tajikistan to the north and Pakistan to the south. The extraction of gold and precious stones, such as lapis

lazuli, emeralds, amethysts, and rubies, is the chief economic pursuit in the mountains. The fertile river valleys support barley, wheat, opium, and apricots, while animals (cattle, sheep, and goats) graze wherever moisture supports forage. The provincial capital and commercial center is Faizabad (2002 population 149,000 people), on the Kokcha River. The tree-lined streets are in stark contrast to the barren mountains that surround the city. Tajiks comprise the majority ethnic group.

Within Tajikistan, the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast is a poor, sparsely populated, and isolated administrative unit with little political influence. During winter it is an enclosed geographical "dead end" resulting from border closures with neighboring China and Afghanistan and snows that block roads into western Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This multifrontier corner of Central Asia has 44 percent of Tajikistan's land area (165,760 square kilometers) but only 3.3 percent of the population. Khorog (2002 population 29,000) is the capital. The majority Mountain Tajiks share this highland with Kyrgyz nomads, a dwindling number of Russians, and a mixture of Uygars, Kazakhs, and Mountain Tajiks from Afghanistan. The economy revolves around subsistence farming and animal husbandry. Opium smuggling has soared since the 1991 Soviet devaluation and subsequent Tajik independence.

Stephen F. Cunha

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BADAWI, ABDULLAH AHMED (b. 1939), Malaysian politician. Abdullah Ahmed Badawi is Malaysia's deputy prime minister and minister of home affairs and the vice president of the ruling United Malay National Organization (UMNO) party. Born on 26 November 1939 in Pulau Pinang, Badawi graduated from the University of Malaysia in 1964. He was a respected civil servant before running for parliament on the UMNO ticket in 1978. Not always one of Prime Minister Muhammad Mahatir's loyalists, Badawi was one of several politicians who challenged the prime minister in a leadership contest in 1987. But he never left UMNO, and chose to rise through the ranks. He served as minister in the prime minister's office (1981–1984), minister of education (1984–1986), minister of defense (1986–1987), and minister of foreign affairs (1991–1999). Badawi has held key



Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi speaking at the UMNO Party convention in Kuala Lumpur in May 2000. (AFP/CORBIS)

UMNO party posts as well. He was elected party vice president for 1984–1990 and 1996–2000. He was a member of UMNO's thirty-five-person supreme council in 1991 and 1993–1996. Following the sacking and arrest of his longtime political rival, Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, Badawi was promoted to the posts of deputy prime minister, minister of home affairs, and vice president of UMNO, making him the prime minister's heir apparent. Badawi is a pragmatic politician, a pro-business secularist who has supported women's rights and fought against the Islamization of Malaysian politics.

Zachary Abuza

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BAGHDAD (2002 est. pop. 5.6 million). Baghdad, on the Tigris River 150 kilometers from the ancient

city of Babylon, was founded by the second Abbasid caliph, al-Mansur, in 762 CE on a site inhabited since the mid-third millennium BCE. The city, which is the capital of modern Iraq, achieved its greatest prominence in the medieval period; it became the capital of the Abbasid empire (749/750–1258) after its foundation and remained the capital until its sack by the Mongols in 1258. In its heyday in the ninth and tenth centuries, Baghdad was probably the largest city in the world, with a population estimated at 1.5 million, covering an area roughly the size of modern Paris inside the outer boulevards.

Named *Madinat al-Salam* (City of Peace) by its founder, the original eighth-to-tenth-century city was constructed on an immense scale: 100,000 laborers were employed to build a circular inner city some five kilometers in diameter, surrounded by a rampart with 360 towers. Only a few years after its foundation, Baghdad had expanded outside the walls, to the south (Karkh) and to the east bank of the Tigris. The location of the new Abbasid capital reflected the new Eastern orientation of the Islamic *dawla* (state); as was clearly indicated by the rebellion that brought the Abbasids to power, their power base lay in Iraq and western Iran.

Baghdad in Its Heyday

Medieval Arab geographers left detailed descriptions of the city, stressing its magnificence, its huge domed palace (Bab al-Dhahab), and its numerous mosques and extensive markets. Under the Abbasids an elaborate court ritual developed, in which the rulers (descended from the family of the Prophet Muhammad) were segregated from their subjects. They made only ceremonial appearances, in a manner similar to that of the Sasanid monarchs (whose great ruined palace at Ctesiphon lies some forty kilometers south of the medieval city) who had ruled the area from the third to the seventh centuries, and of the Achaemenid rulers who flourished from 559 to 330 BCE.

The city went through many vicissitudes as a result of struggles both between members of the Abbasid family and between the Abbasids and various dynasties that attempted to seize, sometimes successfully, political power during the tenth and eleventh centuries. Despite these conflicts the medieval city was almost unparalleled in its day as a center of law, learning, culture, and commerce. It was the home of the Hanafi and Hanbali schools of Islamic law and of numerous poets, historians, and scholars and had a diverse and international population. Even the Abbasids' rivals (such as the Shi'ite Buyids in the tenth and eleventh



The Saddam City Housing Estate in Baghdad in February 1997. (CAROLINE PENN/CORBIS)

centuries and their Sunni successors, the Seljuks) continued the architectural traditions of the past, with such buildings as the Adudi hospital (982) and the Nizamiyya *madrasab* (Islamic theological college; 1066). Baghdad was also the center of an elaborate and far-reaching banking system, which was crucial in ensuring the city's continuing commercial preeminence. The seventh and ninth Shi'ite imams, Musa al-Kadhim (745–799) and his grandson Muhammad al-Taqi (c. 810–835), are buried at al-Kadhimiya (Kadhimain) just outside Baghdad, and this site remains an important Shi'ite pilgrimage center.

Baghdad's Decline

Baghdad was already in decline in the twelfth century, but major and almost mortal blows were struck by the invasions of the two Mongol conquerors Hulegu (1258) and Timur (Tamerlane; 1393, 1401). Large numbers of the city's inhabitants were killed, and many of its great public buildings destroyed. A period of stagnation and decay followed until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the city was fought over by the Safavids and the Ottomans, finally passing to the Ottomans in 1638. The Ottoman Evliya Chelebi and other travelers of this period described the city as a prosperous trading center, the main intersection of commerce between Arabia, Anatolia, and Persia. However, little of the splendid medieval architecture survived the Mongol attacks.

The city remained a provincial capital (although under Mamluk governors between 1749 and 1831) for the rest of the Ottoman period, undergoing a brief period of reform and modernization under the energetic Midhat Pasa (1822–1883), governor between 1869 and 1872. Midhat established several modern (secular) schools and introduced a tramway and a printing press, as well as a river steamboat line between Baghdad and Basra. He was also responsible for introducing the body of Ottoman administrative and legal reforms known collectively as the Tanzimat, which had been promulgated elsewhere in the Ottoman empire since the 1830s. The Ottoman *sabnamehs* (provincial yearbooks) for 1900–1901 give the male population of the city as 70,000 (57,000 Muslim males, 12,000 Jewish males, and 1,000 Christian males), from which a total population of 120,000–130,000 can be extrapolated.

Baghdad in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries

Southern Iraq was invaded by British troops in 1914, and Baghdad was eventually captured in March 1917. After the war and the collapse of the Ottoman empire, Baghdad became the capital of the new state of Iraq, which remained under British mandate until 1932. The British introduced a monarchy headed by Faisal, son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca, who reigned from 1921 until his death in 1933. In 1958, the monarchy was overthrown in the course of a military coup,

and a republic was installed. Baghdad and the rest of Iraq has been ruled by a military-civilian group nominally associated with the Ba'ath Party since 1968; in fact, the form of government since 1979 has been a totalitarian dictatorship under the presidency of Saddam Hussein.

The city has grown immensely in recent years. The aggregate of urban communities is mostly populated by Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims, although the Shi'ites are probably more numerous. The Jewish community, a lively presence in the city until mass migration to Israel in the late 1940s and early 1950s, has almost entirely vanished; its commercial role was largely taken over by Shi'ite businesspeople. There are a number of (rather small) communities of Orthodox and Catholic Christians. Baghdad has several universities, as well as the Iraqi Museum, established in the 1920s, which houses unique collections of pre-Islamic antiquities, many marking the beginnings of civilization in the ancient Near East.

Baghdad suffered extensive destruction by aerial bombardment in January–February 1990 during the U.S.-led attack following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and the economic sanctions imposed since that time have gravely affected the city's infrastructure. The economy and the urban fabric are unlikely to recover substantially while the present regime remains in power.

Peter Sluglett

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BAGONBANTA, FERNANDO (c. late 1500s–c. early 1600s), Ladino poet. Fernando Bagonbanta is credited with writing some of the earliest Tagalog poetry written in the Spanish alphabetic form. These poems appeared in early catechisms and served to

teach Filipinos the Spanish language and Catholicism. In 1605, works of Bagonbanta were included in *Memorial de la vida cristiana en lengua tagala* (Guidelines for the Christian Life in the Tagalog Language), published by Francisco Blancas de San José, a Dominican friar, and intended to be an exposition of basic Catholic doctrines in Tagalog. Blancas introduced Bagonbanta as a Ladino, one well versed both in Spanish and Tagalog. Included in *Memorial de la vida cristiana en lengua tagala* is "Salamat nang ualang hanga" (Endless Thanks), a poem translated by Bagonbanta from the Spanish. Little else is known about Bagonbanta's life.

Damon L. Woods

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BAGRAM In 330 BCE, during his military campaigns in Bactria and Central Asia, Alexander of Macedon founded a city fifty miles north of the modern city of Kabul in Afghanistan, at the confluence of the Ghorband and Panjsher Rivers, and named it Alexandria. A few centuries later, due to its position, this military outpost had grown to be a major mercantile emporium on the Silk Road and a Buddhist center, especially under the Kushan dynasty (78–200 CE). The Kushans, a nomadic people, belonged to the Yueh-chih confederation; after having unified all the other Yueh-chih, the Kushans created an empire in present-day north-central Afghanistan and north-western India. Under the Kushan king Kanisha (c. 78–144 CE), Bactrian Alexandria, now known as Kapisa, became the Kushan summer capital. Rich archaeological discoveries were revealed at the site in the twentieth century.

Probably destroyed in 241 CE by the Iranian Sasanids, Kapisa (modern Bagram; est. pop. 454,000) faced a long period of decline. Deserted by its inhabitants, it became the spring grazing ground for local nomadic tribes. In the 1950s the area, with the Islamic name of Bagram, was selected as a main base for the Afghan air force. Its airport was widely used by the Red Army during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1988). During the subsequent civil war among different Afghan factions, the area was repeatedly conquered and suffered extensive damage. In late 2001 the Bagram airport again became an important base—this

time used by U.S. military personnel conducting air strikes against Taliban forces in Afghanistan.

Riccardo Redaelli

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BAGUIO (2001 est. pop. 252,386). Baguio (from the Ibaloi word *bigyiw*, a native mosslike green plant), a city in Benguet Province, northwest Luzon, the Philippines, is an important commercial, educational, and cultural center. It was the summer capital of the country until 1976. It is situated 260 kilometers (161 miles) north of Manila, on the pleasant hills of the Cordillera Mountains at about 1,500 meters (4,920 feet) above sea level.

The history of Baguio began in the nineteenth century, when Spanish colonizers began to exploit natural resources, such as copper and gold, in northwest Luzon and established *rancherías* in the fertile valleys of Benguet. After the American occupation of the Philippines in 1898, the governor, William Howard Taft, who later became the president of the United States, suggested building a modern city in Kafagway (later renamed Baguio) to escape the summer heat of Manila. In 1903 Baguio was officially named the summer capital of the Philippines. Between 1904 and 1919 roads and an airport were built to connect Baguio with Manila. However, during World War II the United States was forced to abandon the country, and in 1941 the Japanese Imperial Army occupied the Philippines. During the war a garrison and a concentration camp were established in Baguio. In 1945 the U.S. Army defeated the Japanese occupation forces, and Japanese general Yamashita Tomoyuki was brought to Baguio to sign the capitulation.

After World War II, Baguio grew significantly and became an important commercial, educational, and recreational center for Benguet Province as well for the Cordilleras and Northern Luzon, relying on agriculture, mining (copper and gold), and tourism. It was seriously damaged during an earthquake in 1990 but was quickly rebuilt. It is the home of the Philippine Military Academy, the University of Baguio, St. Louis University, and other universities.

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BAHADUR SHAH (1775–1862), last Mughal emperor of India. Born in Delhi, Bahadur Shah II, second son of Akbar Shah II (reigned 1806–1837), was the last Mughal emperor of India, reigning over a large part of the Indian subcontinent from 1837 to 1857. Although the titular sovereign, Bahadur Shah had no actual power, since the British retained real suzerainty over all the Indian territories they controlled, either directly or indirectly, through the well-known administrative system of "indirect rule." Particularly after the Charter Act of 1833, which expanded British rule over India, his authority extended no further than the walls of his palace.

In 1857, during the so-called Indian Great Mutiny against British colonial rule, the elderly Bahadur Shah became the unwilling leader of the revolt and was used as a figurehead by the mutinous Indian troops. When Delhi was recaptured by the British a few months later, Bahadur Shah was exiled to Rangoon in Burma, and his sons were brutally killed by British soldiers after they had surrendered. Bahadur Shah died in exile.

Bahadur Shah's real interest was not power, but poetry, miniatures, music, and calligraphy. Under the pen name of Zafar, he wrote poems of some note; his lyrics, set to music, were frequently performed in Delhi, while his court became a renowned artistic center.

Riccardo Redaelli

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BAHA'I Baha'i is a relatively new world religion that was founded and initially developed in Iran in the 1860s. It emerged from Iranian Shi'a Islam and drew most of its initial adherents from the earlier Babism

movement in Iran. Adherents have been at times persecuted as heretics by Muslims in several Islamic nations, including Iran, and as Baha'is sought religious freedom elsewhere, the movement spread to other Asian nations, Europe, and the Americas. In Asia in the twenty-first century, India is the center of the Baha'i religion, while the United States (with a major center in Wilmette, Illinois) and Israel (with world headquarters in Haifa) are also important in the global Baha'i religion. Estimates of the number of Baha'i adherents worldwide are unreliable, ranging from a low of 130,000 to a high of 5,000,000.

Founding and Early Development

The Baha'i faith was founded in Baghdad, Iraq, in 1863 by Mirza Hosayn Ali Nuri (1817–1892), known as Bahauallah (Glory of God). Baha'i grew out of Babism, a messianic movement of Iranian Shi'ite Islam that was suppressed in the 1850s. Mirza Hosayn Ali was a middle son of a high-ranking Iranian official, Mirza Buzurg Nuri (d. 1839). He became a Babi in 1844 and also converted his brother Subh-i Azal. In 1852, in the wake of a Babi attempt on the life of the shah, Bahauallah was imprisoned. Although he was found innocent, he was nevertheless exiled to Ottoman Baghdad. In the 1850s, many claimants, including his brother, arose to Babi leadership. Although he outwardly supported the claim of Azal, Bahauallah attracted a following through his mystical treatises and poetry. Many, including the Ottoman and Iranian governments, acknowledged him as the true leader of the movement.

In spring 1863, the Iranians succeeded in pressuring the Ottomans to move Bahauallah from Baghdad, where he was in constant touch with Iranian pilgrims, to Edirne in European Turkey. Before he left Baghdad, Bahauallah openly declared to a handful of family members and friends that he was the promised one foretold by the Bab. After a brief stay in Istanbul, Bahauallah spent from 1863 to 1868 in Edirne, where he gradually made his claims public. By early 1866, Bahauallah had split with Azal, whose authority as putative pontiff of Babism was shaken. Over time all but a small minority of Babis adopted the new Baha'i faith as followers of Bahauallah.

The dissension between the Babis came to the attention of the Ottomans, who decided to exile the two leaders yet again. Azal was sent to Cyprus. Bahauallah and his followers were sent to the fortress at Akka (now Akko in Israel), along the coast of Ottoman Syria. After two years Bahauallah and his followers were allowed to move into the town of Akka, and he spent the rest of his life in Palestine. In 1872, he finished his *Kitab-*

i Aqdas (Most Holy Book), the book of laws for the new religion he had founded. Bahauallah said he received divine revelations and was a messenger of God, destined to be as influential as Moses, Krishna, Jesus, Zoroaster, and Muhammad. He emphasized that all the great religions had the same divine source, and he preached against religious intolerance. He advocated international peace conferences and an end to war and arms races, sought improved status for women and universal education, opposed royal absolutism and urged parliamentary government, and prescribed local steering committees called houses of justice to administer the affairs of the Baha'is. He ordained a global house of justice as the head of his religion in the future. In the meantime, he advised his followers to look for guidance after his death to his eldest son, 'Abdu'l-Baha 'Abbas (1844–1921). During his own lifetime, Bahauallah's disciple Jamal Effendi spread the Baha'i faith to the Indian subcontinent and Burma, where small communities were established. Bahauallah died in Palestine in 1892.

Baha'i under 'Abdu'l-Baha

Soon after his father's death, 'Abdu'l-Baha faced a schism brought on by the opposition of his younger half-brother Mirza Muhammad 'Ali. 'Abdu'l-Baha responded peacefully, urging his own partisans simply to shun the schismatics, and managed to maintain the unity of the community. In other respects 'Abdu'l-Baha was progressive. He advocated parliamentary democracy and the adoption of modern education and technology in Iran. He condemned the interference of religious authorities in affairs of state, saying that history proved such interference to be a disaster. He was initially wary of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911 and cautioned the Baha'is against becoming involved in the struggle. However, in 1909, after the success of the Constitution was assured, he urged the Baha'is to support constitutionalism and to attempt to elect Baha'is to the new Iranian parliament. 'Abdu'l-Baha was freed from Ottoman restrictions by the Young Turk Revolution in 1908–1909.

In the 1890s, a Lebanese convert had brought the Baha'i faith to the United States. By 1912, the small American community succeeded in inducing an elderly 'Abdu'l-Baha to speak throughout the country, preaching his father's universalistic teachings and adapting them to a Western audience. He also spoke in Europe. In America, the Baha'i community, although small, survives to this day; the largest American Baha'i center is outside Chicago in Wilmette, Illinois.

'Abdu'l-Baha ordained national houses of justice and established the institution of "the guardian" to

serve as the interpreter of scripture after his death. He appointed his grandson Shoghi Effendi Rabbani as the first guardian. The guardians were to be aided by learned Baha'is referred to as "hands of the cause."

Baha'i under Shoghi Effendi Rabbani

In 1921–1957, the Baha'i faith was headed by Shoghi Effendi from Haifa. Shoghi Effendi postponed having the universal house of justice elected; however, he organized the Baha'is into national communities under the close leadership of their national spiritual assemblies, several of which were established in the 1920s, including that of India. Shoghi Effendi accomplished a major reformation of the Baha'i faith, which had previously been somewhat non-creedal, tolerant, and universalistic. Unlike 'Abdu'l-Baha, he forbade the Baha'is to be members of political parties or hold high political office. Whether or not it was Shoghi Effendi's intention, during his ministry Baha'i officials steered the religion toward tight organization, the strict authority of Baha'i institutions over individuals, an emphasis on doctrinal purity, and a more literalist approach to scripture. Shoghi Effendi introduced new sanctions and extended the use of shunning, even to his own parents. He appointed a cadre of hands of the cause to serve as lay bishops. He launched a number of missionary campaigns, which succeeded in spreading the religion thinly around the world. Although the increasingly regimented Iranian Baha'i community probably shrank during his ministry, from perhaps 200,000 to 100,000 committed Baha'is, his emphasis on missionary work in the Third World began to bear fruit toward the end of his life.

The sudden death of Shoghi Effendi without an heir in 1957 bewildered the Baha'is, who had been promised a string of guardians. The hands of the cause took control and worked toward the election of the universal house of justice. This new body, originally envisaged by Bahau'llah, was elected in 1963 by the members of national assemblies around the world. One of its first members was Hushmand Fatheazam, a Persian professor and Iranian emigrant to India who was then serving on India's national assembly.

Baha'i after Shoghi Effendi

In 1961, mass conversions to the Baha'i faith had begun in Malwa, India, among scheduled-caste (low-caste) peasants. The Baha'i community of Malwa had originally been small and of largely Parsi ethnic origin. After the conversions, however, India began to emerge as a major Baha'i center. Many of the strict



'ABDU'L-BAHA ON THE EQUALITY OF WOMEN AND MEN:

And among the teachings of Bahau'llah is the equality of women and men. The world of humanity has two wings—one is women and the other men. Not until both wings are equally developed can the bird fly. Should one wing remain weak, flight is impossible. Not until the world of women becomes equal to the world of men in the acquisition of virtues and perfections, can success and prosperity be attained as they ought to be.

Source: Selections from the Writings of 'Abdu'l-Baha. Rev. ed. (1982) Haifa: Baha'i World Centre, 302. Quoted at: <http://www.bahai.org/article-1-3-4-6.html>.

rules that had limited the religion in Iran were relaxed in India, and allowances were made for the syncretism of peasant Hindu converts. The unity of God, unity of religions, and abolition of prejudices were stressed, appealing to low-caste and outcaste converts, although some Indians complained of Iranian Baha'i paternalism toward them. To downplay the Islamic origins of the religion, Baha'i scriptures and prayers were translated into a form of Hindi that is much closer in vocabulary to Sanskrit. By the 1990s there were claims of 2,000,000 Baha'is in India; however, insider estimates were closer to 110,000, and only 5,000 Baha'is were reported in the 1990 Indian census. Similar mass conversions in Vietnam were stopped by the 1975 Communist victory. In the year 2000, there were about 10,000 Baha'is in Thailand and about 25,000 in Pakistan (mostly drawn from the remnant of Hindus in Sind who did not flee from Pakistan to India at partition in 1947). Elsewhere, national communities were quite small, often less than 2,000. The 1979 Islamic revolution brought to power Shi'ite clergymen who had long despised the Baha'i faith as a dangerous heresy. Under Khomeini, around 200 Baha'is were executed, and thousands were imprisoned or expropriated. Many were forced to renounce the faith. The center of the Baha'i religion in Asia thus shifted decisively to India.

Juan R. I. Cole

See also: Babism; Iran—Human Rights

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BAHASA INDONESIA Modern Indonesian is an Austronesian language, belonging to the same family as Hawaiian, Maori, Tagalog, Cham, and Malagasy. It is based on Malay, the main language of the Malay Peninsula and the eastern coast of Sumatra. Malay's importance derives from its role as the language of a succession of commercial states—notably Srivijaya, Jambi-Melayu, and Melaka—which dominated the lucrative trade routes of the Strait of Malacca from about 500 CE. From the thirteenth century, Malay appears to have spread widely in the coastal regions of the archipelago as a trading lingua franca.

In 1436, Melaka became the first large state in the archipelago to convert to Islam and the city became a major center of Islamic learning and the Malay language, which in turn became the principal language of Islamic conversion and discourse in the region. Arabic script was modified into a form, called *pegon*, suitable for writing Malay. Both Islam and the Malay language were spread further by the Muslim Malay diaspora that followed Melaka's fall to the Portuguese in 1511.

The Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) initially used Malay as a trading language, but found it useful also for administration. Whereas Javanese, the other major language of the archipelago, has elaborate levels of speech which make conversation difficult unless the hierarchical relationship of the speakers is clearly established, "trading Malay" had no such levels and became a conveniently neutral medium of communication. The spread of Malay was also assisted by Dutch ambivalence about promoting use of their own language, preferring to restrict Western education to those whom they felt needed it. Malay was also the main language of urban *peranakan* Chinese—that is, Chinese who retained their broad cultural identity but assimilated much local culture, including language.

In the late nineteenth century, newspapers began to appear in Malay, which gradually became the main indigenous language for engaging with the modern world. In the twentieth century, Malay was extensively used as a literary language by the Balai Pustaka, an official colonial publishing house whose task was to promote literacy. Indonesian nationalists also favored Malay because it was widely known, easy to learn, and lacked the hierarchical rules of Javanese, which they often rejected as "feudal." In 1928, a nationalist youth congress formally adopted Malay as the national language, calling it Indonesian—Bahasa Indonesia—after the independent country to which they aspired. There was no doubt it would be the official language after independence. The transition from Dutch, now rarely used in Indonesia, was hastened by the Japanese occupation (1942–1945), during which the use of Dutch and other European languages was banned. Following independence, Indonesian became the sole language of administration and public life. Regional languages, taught for only a few years in primary school, have been in retreat, though they have been sustained in Christian regions by their use in church services.

Characteristics

The vocabulary of Bahasa Indonesia has been extensively influenced by outside languages, especially Sanskrit, Arabic, Chinese, Dutch, and English, as well as local languages such as Javanese. European influence on syntax has also been considerable. A national language commission has existed since shortly after independence with the dual task of developing Indonesian as a language able to cope with a full range of technical and philosophical topics and of protecting the language against unwanted change, including outside influence. Despite these efforts, however, vocabulary in Indonesian changes rapidly, and urban dialects, incomprehensible to standard speakers, develop and disappear rapidly.

Indonesian has no conjugations or declensions: order rather than inflexion determines the role of words in a sentence. It has, however, an elaborate system of prefixes and suffixes that alter the part of speech of a root word. For instance: the root word *tinggal* (to stay) gives rise to *tinggalnya* (place of residence), *menginggalkan* (to leave behind), *ditinggalkan* (left behind), *ketinggalan* (remainder), *peninggalan* (remains), *sepeninggal* (in the absence of), *tinggalan* (inheritance), and *meninggal* (to die). Other prefixes such as *pasca-* (post-) and *tuna-* (without) are recent developments reflecting Western influences.

Charles Adriaan van Ophuijzen, a colonial education official and later professor of Malay at Leiden

University, developed a spelling system for Malay in 1901, but this system was modified after independence to remove several conventions based on Dutch: in 1947 *oe* became *u* and in 1973, under an Indonesian-Malaysian Language Agreement, *ch* changed to *kh*, *dj* to *j*, *j* to *y*, and *tj* to *c*. Malay also gave rise to the national language (*bahasa kebangsaan*) of independent Malaysia, which differs from Bahasa Indonesia only in accent and some vocabulary.

Robert Cribb

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BAITURSYNOV, AKHMET (1873–1937), Kazakh poet, journalist, linguist, educator. Akhmet Baitursynov, born 15 January 1873 in Turgai Oblast, is most noted for his efforts to standardize Kazakh orthography. While Baitursynov was still a child, his father, Baitursyn, was exiled for fifteen years in Siberia for an alleged attack against a czarist official. The family was left destitute, but Baitursynov was able to enroll in 1886 in a Russian-Kazakh secondary school in Turgai. Graduating in 1891, he entered the Orenburg Teachers' School, where he spent the next four years. Both of these institutions were heavily influenced by pedagogic methods established by Ibrahim Altynsarin that stressed teaching in both Kazakh and Russian. Baitursynov graduated in 1895 and held teaching positions at a number of schools in Aqtobe, Kustanai, and Karkaralinsk. That same year he published his first article, "Kirgizskie primety i poslovitsy" (Kazakh Omens and Proverbs), in the regional newspaper, *Turgaiskaia gazeta*. In October 1905 he joined other Kazakhs in the city of Ural and helped create the Kazakh branch of the Constitutional Democrat Party, beginning his active political career. In 1909 he published *Qyryq mysal* (Forty Proverbs), which was influenced by Ivan Krylov's fables but written in a manner that seemed best suited for a Kazakh reader and corresponded to Kazakh culture and nomadic sensibilities. His collection of translations was followed in 1911 by an original collection of poetry entitled *Masa* (Mosquito). Whereas *Qyryq mysal* was pedagogic in nature, *Masa* was much more political and incendiary. In 1913 Baitursynov became the editor of the newspaper *Kazak*, which became the most successful prerevolutionary Kazakh periodical. Following the 1917 Russ-

ian Revolution, he became a leader of the Kazakh political party Alash Orda (The Horde of Alash), which fought for an independent Kazakh state. In 1920 the Bolsheviks consolidated power in Central Asia, and Baitursynov joined them. Throughout the 1920s he was active in educational reforms and helped establish the first Kazakh university. In 1937 he was arrested for harboring bourgeois nationalist sentiments and executed during the Stalinist purges. He was rehabilitated in 1989.

Steven Sabol

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BAKSHSH, DATA GANJ (d. c. 1072), Sufi master and writer. An honorific title meaning "Master Bestower of Treasure" given to the Sufi master 'Ali b. 'Uthman Jullabi Hujviri, whose shrine in Lahore, Pakistan, is one of the foremost Muslim religious sites in South Asia. Data Ganj Bakhsh was born in Afghanistan and arrived in Lahore in 1039 after an extensive study tour across Arab and Iranian lands in search of religious knowledge. He is best known for his Persian work *Kashf al-mahjub* (The Revelation of the Veiled), an early systematic presentation of Sufism as a distinct Islamic perspective. His mausoleum was constructed soon after his death and has been renovated and expanded numerous times.

In addition to his being revered for his scholarly reputation, Data Ganj Bakhsh has served as the patron saint of the city of Lahore since the twelfth century. His tomb was a major pilgrimage site for kings, Sufi masters, and common people through the medieval period, and its popularity has increased in modern times. Although the shrine is busy year-round with visitors offering prayers and seeking material as well as spiritual benefits, the saint's annual death celebration ('Urs) takes place on the twentieth of Safar (second month of the lunar Islamic calendar) and is now administered by the government of Pakistan. The celebration in 1999 was attended by an estimated 600,000 to 700,000 pilgrims, making it one of the largest

gatherings of its kind in the Islamic world. The shrine also regularly hosts concerts of *qawwali* music and performances of *dbamal* dance. The shrine complex is surrounded by both a bazaar and charitable institutions that provide food and medical care to the indigent.

Shabzad Bashir

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BAKHTARAN (2002 est. province pop. 2 million; 2002 est. city [Kermanshah] pop. 771,000). Bakhtaran, a province in midwestern Iran formerly called Kermanshah, is both mountainous and endowed with valleys. With an area of approximately 24,500 square kilometers, Bakhtaran is bounded on the north by the province of Kurdistan; on the south by Lorestan and Ilam; on the east by Hamadan; and on the west by Iraq.

The Sasanids founded the city of Kermanshah in the fourth century. The Arabs captured it in the seventh century, and it later became a fortress on the frontier with the Ottoman empire, which managed to occupy it several times, including during World War I.

The economy of Bakhtaran province relies heavily on agriculture. Wheat, oats, barley, corn, clover, beans, oilseeds, rice, and various fruits and vegetables are produced, in addition to animal husbandry and fishing. The main industries in the province are textile manufacturing, food processing, oil refining, carpet making, sugar refining, and production of electrical equipment.

Kurds, Lurs, Arabs, Azeris, and Persians inhabit the province, which is known for its nomadic communities. The official language is Persian, but other languages such as Kurdish, Lori, and Azerbaijani are widely spoken. The major religions are the Shi'a and Sunni branches of Islam. The city of Kermanshah serves as a transition base for Shi'ite Muslims on pilgrimage to Karbala in Iraq, a holy city with the shrine of a grandson of Muhammad, Caliph Hasan, who was

murdered there in 680. Numerous caravansaries serve these pilgrims.

Payam Foroughi and Raissa Mubutdinova-Foroughi

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BAKHTIARI A nomadic group inhabiting the mountains of Khuzestan, a province in southwestern Iran, the Bakhtiari number almost 900,000. Traditionally, they migrate seasonally with their livestock between summer and winter pastures.

The Bakhtiari are mostly Shi'ite Muslims, but they retain many pre-Islamic customs. They can be divided into two main groups, the Haftlang (fifty-five tribes) and the Charlang (twenty-five tribes). They speak a dialect of Luri, an Iranian language closely related to Kurdish.

Women have an unusually high place in Bakhtiari society; they go about unveiled and can travel freely. The wives of khans or chieftains have been known to act as judges, and women sometimes head a migrating group of other women and children in the summer, after the men depart with the animals to mountainous pastures.

History

Although their origins are obscure, the Bakhtiari are believed to have migrated from Syria in the tenth century CE. They were known as the Great Lurs and retained regional autonomy during the rule of the various empires that dominated the region. In the early twentieth century, oil was discovered in the area they inhabited, and the British courted their khans and paid them to protect the oil wells and pipelines. The Bakhtiari played a pivotal role in the deposition of Ahmad Shah (1898–1930), the last ruler of the Iranian Qajar dynasty (1794–1925), in 1908–1909.

Modern Times

Reza Shah Pahlavi (1878–1944), who was elected shah in 1925, forced many Bakhtiari into settlements in the 1920s and 1930s during his attempts to modernize the country, but the Bakhtiari regained their prominence following his abdication in 1941. His son and successor Muhammad Reza Pahlavi (1919–1980) married Soraya, the daughter of a Bakhtiari khan, and many Bakhtiari returned to their nomadic way of life.

With the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the Bakhtiari became second-class citizens; both their ethnicity and their unorthodox religious practices made them a target of suspicion. Today they make much of their income by weaving and exporting rugs.

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BALI Bali, one of the islands of Indonesia, begins the archipelago stretching to Timor that is known as the Lesser Sunda Islands. Among these islands, the most densely populated have been Bali and its neighboring island of Lombok. The island of Bali has an area of 5,620 square kilometers. Lying just 8° south of the equator, the island has the even and warm climate of the tropics. These tropical weather conditions, together with the scenic natural beauty of the island, have made it a well-known holiday resort destination.

Bali's volcanic range dominates the landscape and also divides the island in half, since it stretches from east to west. The tallest mountain is the Gunung Agung, or Great Mountain. This was 3,140 meters high before it erupted in 1963. The population density is high, with some 2.5 million people living on the

island. The most densely populated areas are the plains of central Bali. These plains produce two crops of rice a year. Large streams that have fanned out southward from the line of active volcanoes have built up a fertile inclined-alluvial plain. This is constantly rejuvenated by water-borne volcanic ash, upon which dense settlements and rice fields have been developed on ingeniously irrigated terraces that extend inland and upward to about 600 meters. The other major crop in terms of acreage covered is maize.

The people of Bali are mostly Hindus. Descended from high-caste Hindu Javanese who were driven eastward by the Islamization of Java, the people have retained an aristocratic society and a strongly communal life that has found expression in an elaborate artistic culture that has reached higher forms on Bali than anywhere else among the island peoples of Indonesia. The temple architecture of Bali is therefore unusually striking and complex. The Balinese also have long-standing traditions of craftsmanship in wood, stone, gold, silver, and weaving. These have export value and also support the considerable tourism industry.

Kog Yue Choong

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Farmers work their terraced rice fields in Bali. (YANN ARTHUS-BERTRAND/CORBIS)

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BALI BARONG-RANGDA Barong dances, among the most sacred in Bali, symbolize the intertwining of good and evil and the complex relationship between man and the supernatural. The term *barong* can apply to the dance, the mask, or the character depending on context. The *barong* animal mask represents good, and its types include the tiger, boar, and buffalo; the most characteristic, however, is the *barong kek*, a mythical animal. Two men dance; the one in front carries the *barong* mask, which is sacred and must never touch the ground. Evil is personified by Rangda—literally "widow," but interpreted as a witch associated with spirits of the dead. Several men armed with *keris* (daggers) accompany Rangda when she enters. Under her influence, they go into a trance and stab themselves, but are protected from injury by Barong's presence. Barong's eventual victory is taken to affirm his protection of the village. Both *barong* and *rangda* masks are kept in the village temple between performances. Though interpreted as good versus evil, the two sides are more equivocal, and Barong's victory is never regarded as conclusive.

Tim Byard-Jones

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BALI SUMMIT The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 between Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The first leaders' meeting was the Bali Summit of February 1976. ASEAN, officially organized to engage in economic and social cooperation, was actually more concerned with diplomatic and security issues in Southeast Asia. The importance of the Bali Summit was the display of solidarity by the noncommunist nations of Southeast Asia in the aftermath of communist takeovers in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos

in 1975, and insurgencies elsewhere in the region. The Bali Summit was a milestone for the regional organization, as it established the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, which brought the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN, 1971) formally into the ASEAN ambit, and concluded the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). ZOPFAN represents an ASEAN attempt to exclude great power conflicts from the region, while TAC codified an existing understanding that member states respect each others' sovereignty and peacefully resolve disputes. TAC has become the cornerstone of ASEAN cooperation, helping to smooth over a number of intra-ASEAN problems. This has meant solidifying disputed colonial borders, by, for example, mollifying the Philippine claim to Sabah (in East Malaysia), as well as commitments not to interfere in domestic problems, such as secessionist tendencies in Irian Jaya and Aceh (in Indonesia) and among the Muslim population of southern Thailand; at the same time ASEAN also supported Indonesia's controversial annexation of East Timor. Formal defense ties were, however, not included in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. The Bali Summit also saw the establishment of a secretariat, based in Jakarta, which functions as a coordinating organization for the various ASEAN meetings and a repository of information.

Anthony Smith

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BALINESE The Balinese are the ethnic and cultural group inhabiting the island of Bali in Indonesia in the Indian Ocean east of Java. Though like other Indonesians they are primarily of Malay ancestry, the Balinese are distinguished by their Hindu religion and culture, dating from before the tenth century. Historically the Balinese were associated with the classical kingdoms of Java. The Majapahit court was the center of the Majapahit empire (thirteenth to sixteenth centuries), the Hindu-Javanese civilization that united much of today's Indonesia. In many respects, today's Balinese culture can be thought of as a fossilized version of Majapahit culture, which had moved to Bali in the fifteenth century. Bali was later divided into several small kingdoms.

The origins of the Balinese are uncertain; the earliest remains of their civilization are stone carvings of

the ninth century, but it is thought that the Balinese as an ethnic group are much older. A small group, the Bali Aga (Old Balinese), are thought to be the aboriginal inhabitants of the island.

Balinese society was not significantly influenced by Hindu-Javanese culture. Dutch colonial control over the island was not established until 1908 and had little impact on local culture. The Balinese still retain their distinctive identity in independent Indonesia.

There are about 2.9 million Balinese in Bali. They speak Balinese, an Austronesian language. Balinese has three levels, in reality different languages, depending on the social status of the speaker and listener. Balinese have a strong awareness of space, using the mountains and sea to orient themselves. The position of the mountains and sea, as well as the four cardinal directions, determines the siting of buildings and the direction for sleeping. Balinese believe that their island, and particularly the volcano Gunung Agung, is the center of the world.

Balinese practice their own variation of Hinduism, which pervades all aspects of their culture. Ritual and ceremony are important parts of everyday life. There are many rites of passage, beginning with birth and ending with death; the dead are always cremated. Trances and cockfights are also important social functions. Balinese have a rich artistic tradition stemming from their religious beliefs. Among the most important Balinese arts are batik and ikat textiles, masks and other forms of wood carving, stone sculptures, gamelan music, and a rich literary and dance tradition.

The Balinese are traditionally divided into the four Hindu castes of Brahman (priests and scholars), Kshatriya (warriors and nobles), Weisya (merchants), and Sudra (farmers and laborers), but the caste system in Bali is not as rigid as that of India. More than 90 percent of Balinese belong to the Sudra caste. The family is the basic unit of Balinese life, and a family, or close group of families, lives together in a compound of houses, surrounded by a wall. The *banjar*, or ward, is the next largest social unit. The *desa*, or village, consists of a group of *banjars*. An additional organization is the *subak*, a farmers' society.

Balinese are primarily an agrarian people, though tourism has become increasingly important as a source of income. Today Bali and the Balinese themselves are objects of tourism. Balinese have adapted well to the presence of tourists, and tourism has in some respects helped to preserve and revive aspects of local culture, while exposing the Balinese to global influences.

Michael Pretes

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BALINESE SANGHYANG *Sanghyang* is a generic term for Balinese ritual trance dances, accompanied by choral chanting or gamelan gong and often performed to repel evil influences believed to underlie natural disasters and disease. The following general description disregards local variation.

Sanghyang is performed in temples. Dancers are often eight- to ten-year-old girls, "pure" enough to be intermediaries with the spirits. Offerings to the temple goddess and prayers for intercession precede the dance. The trance is induced by prayer, choral chanting, and inhaling incense smoke. In some types of *sanghyang*, gamelan accompaniment starts once trance is achieved. Once dancers are in trance, offerings are made to deities believed to inhabit their bodies. The dancers can be asked to provide healing by recommending herbs to treat sick suppliants. During epidemics, the dancers may be carried through the streets. In the 1930s, *sanghyang* gave rise to the *kecak* form, performed for entertainment and popular with tourists.

Tim Byard-Jones

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BALISONG The *balisong* is a Philippine butterfly knife with a blade and two mobile half-handles, which can be opened quickly with one hand. *Balisong* (literally "broken horn"—the handles of the knife were traditionally made from water buffalo horn) comes from the Tagalog *bali*, meaning "broken," and *sungay*, meaning "horn." The *balisong* is also known as the Batangas knife, after the Philippine province where it supposedly originated; *Balisong* is also the name of a barrio in Batangas, but it is unclear whether the place

was named after the knife or the knife after the place. In any event, many *balisong* shops are found in Balisong, as well as in outlying barrios. The normal length of an open *balisong* is 29 centimeters, for which reason it is sometimes referred to as the *vientinueve* ("twenty-nine" in Spanish); however, other lengths are also available. *Balisong* knives were popularized in the West by U.S. soldiers who brought them home to the United States after World War II. As a weapon, the *balisong* belongs to an ancient Malayo-Polynesian fighting system called *kali*, and knife-wielding techniques using the *balisong* are often taught to students of Philippine martial arts. *Balisong* techniques require finger dexterity; some of these are the single flip-up opening and closing, the double flip opening, and the toss and catch opening.

Hishashi Sanada

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BALKHASH, LAKE Lake Balkash is a large lake located in southeast Kazakhstan at 342 meters (1,122 feet) above sea level and covering an area of 17,275 square kilometers (6,670 square miles). The lake is 605 kilometers (376 miles) long, with the western part being 87 kilometers (54 miles) wide and the eastern part only 10 kilometers (6 miles) wide. The two parts are connected by a narrow strait, the Uzynaral, with a depth of only 6 meters (21 feet). These two parts make for hydrological diversity. The water in the western part of the lake is fresh and suitable for consumption, agriculture, and industry, while the water in the eastern part is salty. Overall, the lake is covered with ice between November and April, and the average annual water temperature is about 9° C (48° F).

Several rivers flow into the lake with no outlet. Contributing 80 to 90 percent of the total influx into the lake is the Ili River. However, the volume of water has been reduced by two-thirds due to the installation of the Qapshaghay hydroelectric power station, and the lake's surface has dropped by 2.2 meters (7 feet) between 1970 and 1987. In addition, increased pollution and salinity of the water has limited the fishing industry and diminished the surrounding habitats. So far, no action has been taken to reverse the ecological damage that the lake has suffered.

Daphne Biliouri

BALTAZAR, FRANCISCO (1788–1862), Filipino poet and playwright. Dubbed the "Prince of Tagalog Poets," Francisco Baltazar is best known for his masterpiece *Florante at Laura*, a staple reading in secondary schools throughout the Philippines. Born Francisco Balagtas on 2 April 1788 in Bulacan province, Baltazar went to Manila to pursue his education when he was eleven years old. He enrolled at Letran College, where he achieved a reputation for eloquence. People commissioned him to write poems and love letters for them, and during these years he also wrote plays.

He met and fell in love with a beautiful young woman named Celia, but his rival, a rich and influential man, had him imprisoned on trumped-up charges. While in prison, he was prompted to write *Florante at Laura*, which he dedicated to Celia. This poem, set in ancient Albania, told the story of two lovers, Florante and Laura, but it also symbolized Filipino suffering under Spanish rule and Filipino struggles for nationhood. Released from prison in 1840, he later moved to Bataan province, where he worked as a government clerk. He married a woman from a rich family in 1842 and settled in the town of Orion.

In 1849 Balagtas changed his surname to Baltazar, consistent with the decree of Governor-General Narciso Claveria, who ordered that every Filipino native adopt a Spanish surname. In 1856, he was imprisoned for shaving the head of a rich man's servant. His wife spent her entire fortune to defray the court expenses. He languished in prison until he was released in 1860, after which he continued writing to support his impoverished family. Baltazar died at Orion, at the age of seventy-four.

Aaron Ronquillo

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BALTISTAN The most remote region of Pakistan, Baltistan lies in the portion of Jammu and Kashmir that is controlled by Pakistan. It is situated in the Northern Mountains, at Pamir-Nod, where the Hindu Kush, Pamir, Karakorum, and Himalayan Mountains meet, and where the famed K2 and Nanga Parbat

Mountains tower. The Indus River divides Baltistan; in one of the basins created by the river, the old capital city of Skardu is located. Baltistan is commonly known as "Little Tibet." The population of Baltistan is mostly Tibetan-speaking; some of the population have red or blond hair and blue eyes.

Baltistan was once a thriving region, thanks to the extensive trade route that linked China and Kashmir. From earliest times, it was in the cultural sphere of northern India. Alexander of Macedon (356–323 BCE) subdued Baltistan and brought Hellenic influence to the area. Thereafter, Baltistan was part of Gandharan culture and was an important center of Buddhism. It was only in the eighth century CE that Tibetan tribes made inroads into the region and became a dominant part of the population.

In the thirteenth century, during the rule of the Makpon dynasty, Islam came to Baltistan, and the majority of people converted to the new faith. It is often said that only with the Makpon rulers did Baltistan acquire its identity. Their rule lasted until 1840, when the maharajah Ghulab Singh, the Hindu ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, seized the area. When Pakistan was carved out of western India in 1947, the Muslim majority in Kashmir struggled for freedom from the Hindu Dogra regime, which had ties to India. In 1948, Baltistan became a federally governed area of Pakistan.

Nirmal Dass

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BALUCHI Baluchi is the name of an ethnic group, most of whom inhabit the province of Baluchistan in modern Pakistan. Other Baluchi live in Afghanistan and Iran, and a small number are found in Turkmenistan, Oman, and the coast of East Africa. Their total population numbers around 7.5 to 11 million people.

The Baluchi claim to be descendants of Amir Hamza, the uncle of the Prophet Muhammad, and as a result, most Baluchi follow the Sunni sect of Islam. Some, however, are members of the Zikri sect, followers of a fifteenth-century mahdi (an Islamic messiah) called Nur Pak ("Pure Light"). Zikris are estimated to number more than 750,000; they live mostly in southern Pakistan.

The Baluchi language belongs to the Indo-Iranian family and is thought to be derived from the ancient Median or Parthian language. The Baluchi believe that they originated in the Aleppo region in Syria and then migrated east during the fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries CE until they reached their present homeland, Baluchistan, in the mountainous coastal regions of the Caspian Sea.

For several centuries thereafter, the Baluchi governed themselves through their clan system, except for occasional attempts by Persians, Arabs, and Hindus to conquer them. Not until the twelfth century, under the leadership of Mir Jalal Khan, was there an attempt to unite several Baluchi tribes into a political unit, called the First Baluchi Confederacy. This confederacy did not last due to political rivalries, but it laid the ground for future attempts at political integration and cohesion among the Baluchi. The sixteenth century witnessed the existence of three political Baluchi groups in Baluchistan: the Dodai Confederacy, the Kalat Confederacy, and the Makran State. In the eighteenth century, Mir Adbullah Khan of Kalat managed to unite almost all the Baluchi into one confederacy.

In 1841, British expansion in the region interfered in Baluchi affairs, and the British exerted control over Baluchi territory in an effort to check Russian influence in the area. The British achieved complete administrative control in some areas in 1876 while holding others by military force.

When Pakistan achieved independence in 1947, the Baluchi reacted fiercely against being integrated into this new political entity, and violence between the Baluchi and the Pakistani government erupted. Currently the Baluchi view themselves as an overlooked minority in Pakistan.

The Baluchi are organized into tribes led by a *sardar* (head chief). The tribes are structured through kinship in clans, clan sections, and subsections. Society is patriarchal; a boy's birth is heralded with much fanfare, and ceremonies mark important rites of passage for male children. Seminomadic pastoralism and dry-crop cereal farming are the mainstays of the Baluchi economy, although fishing plays a role in the coastal regions.

Houman A. Sadri

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BALUCHISTAN Baluchistan, a mountainous region overlapping Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan, consists of Baluchistan Province in southwestern Pakistan (2002 pop. 7.2 million, 344,747 square kilometers; capital Quetta) and Baluchestan va Sistan Province in eastern Iran (2002 pop. 2.1 million, 181,471 square kilometers; capital Zahedan). Baluchistan is an arid plateau descending into narrow coastal plains. Dates, sorghum, barley, and other crops grow in a few well-watered areas (only 4 percent of the land is arable), while pasturing provides sustenance for nomadic and seminomadic peoples in the barren hinterlands.

The Baluchi, most of whom are now Sunni Muslims, migrated here from eastern Persia (eleventh to fifteenth centuries). Various powers overran this rugged buffer between empires dominating the Iranian plateau and the Indian subcontinent—Persians (sixth century BCE), Alexander of Macedon (fourth century BCE), and Arabs (707 CE). The khans of the Kalat region established local rule in the seventeenth century, but in 1876 Britain gained indirect control over Kalat. Eventually the khanate and other Baluchi territories became a province of British India, whose borders with Afghanistan and Persia were settled in 1885 and 1896. Eastern Baluchistan was incorporated into Pakistan in 1947 and granted provincial status in 1970.

Marta Simidchieva

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BAMBOO Bamboo is the generic term for more than one thousand unique subspecies of the grass family that resemble trees. These species are organized into around one hundred families and may be found in tropical and subtropical climates throughout the world, although they are most common in Southeast Asia. Bamboo has thin, oblong, pointed leaves and a strong wooden hollow stem divided into compart-

ments by the joints. It is among the fastest-growing plants in the world, and some species may grow up to 0.5 meter per day. The size of species varies, and the largest bamboo may grow a stem up to 60 meters tall during a lifetime ranging from 12 to 120 years. Bamboo only blossoms and produces seeds after several years of growth, and after blooming, the plant dies. When large areas of bamboo plants blossom simultaneously, it seriously affects the fauna of the area; those animals, like the great panda, that feed on bamboo shoots are forced to migrate and forage elsewhere.

Bamboo is a very strong and flexible material, and it is used for a virtually endless variety of products. In ancient China, strips of bamboo bound together with strings were used as books. Sections of large stems closed by the joint at one end have been used as containers, to hold water or to place writing brushes in. Large stems have also been used as building materials and are widely employed as scaffoldings even when building high-rises. Four to five large stems tied together constitute a small vessel used for fishing on the rivers of southern China. Traditionally, fireworks were made from bamboo, and the stems are also used for furniture, various tools, canes, fencing, fishing poles, musical instruments, papermaking, and pipes of different sorts. Parts of the plant are used in traditional Chinese medicine; the roots are used in treatment of cancer. Both bamboo seeds and shoots are an integral part of Chinese cuisine. The leaves are used to make fodder for animals and fish. In China the bamboo plant has been celebrated for centuries as the symbol of a person's integrity and nobility, and it is an extremely popular motif with painters and poets. Being a fast-growing plant and a high oxygen generator, bamboo has recently been used to revitalize waste-



Bamboo has many uses in Asia. Here, a man climbs on a bamboo construction scaffolding in Hong Kong. (TRAVEL INK/CORBIS)



THE MANY USES OF BAMBOO

Bamboo is a versatile plant that is widely used throughout East, Southeast, and South Asia. The following excerpt tells how bamboo was used to build houses in rural Burma at the end of the 1800s.

The houses are usually marquee-shaped and consist of one or more rooms with the floor raised on posts seven or eight feet from the ground and another in front much lower and forming a kind of veranda, sometimes open in front. The poorer classes use posts of common wood or even of bamboo and make their walls of mats; the richer use Pyeng-ga-do (*Xylia dolobriiformis*) or some other durable and more expensive timber and planked walls. The roof is sometimes composed of small, flat tiles but more generally of thatch; in some places of dhanee leaves soaked in salt water to protect them from the ravages of insects; in others of wa-khat, a kind of flat tile six feet long by two feet broad made of coarse bamboo matting; in others of bamboos split in half longitudinally and, with knots removed, placed side by side and touching each other with the concave side upwards, extending from the ridge to the eaves, over these is placed another series with the concave side downwards so that the roof looks like one of the elongated pan tiles; elsewhere the leaves of the Tsa-loo (*Licuala peltata*) or of the Tawhtan (*Livistona speciosa*): in some of the larger towns shingles are being introduced. The flooring consists of planking in better houses, and of whole bamboos laid side-by-side on bamboo cross-beams and tied with cane in the poorer.

Source: *Gazetteer of Burma*. (1893) New Delhi: Cultural Publishing House, 408.

land, and it has also become a favorite garden plant in the West.

Bent Nielsen

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BAMIAN (2002 est. city pop 30,000). Bamian refers to a city, a pass, and a valley lying at the foot of the Hindu Kush Mountains in Afghanistan, where, until

recently, stood two huge carved statues of the Buddha, designated as world heritage monuments by UNESCO. These sculptures were completed in the second century CE, during the reign of King Kaniska (flourished 78?–103?) of the Kushan dynasty (78–200), whose realm included most of Afghanistan and the northwest portions of Pakistan as well as India.

The statues exhibited a serene blending of Greek and Indian artistic traditions, in the Gandhara style. The larger statue was about fifty-four meters in height, and the smaller about forty meters. Both were carved into the cliff face of the mountains that tower over Bamian. The statues stood in niches shaped like body halos, in Buddhist fashion. Lining the niches were rich frescoes, depicting scenes from the life of the Buddha, as well as of various deities, the most famous of which was the sun god (either Surya or Mithra).

Bamian was an important Buddhist pilgrimage center, and some ten monasteries were built into the surrounding mountains. It also lay at the heart of the Central Asian trade route that linked east and west and north and south; it was especially renowned as a re-export center for gems, pearls, ivory, and spices.

Afghanistan and most of northwest Pakistan remained Buddhist until the arrival of Islam, at which time many of the ancient monasteries and shrines were destroyed. Centuries later, a similar fate befell the Buddhist statues and frescoes at Bamian. On 12 March 2001, both statues were blown to bits on the orders of the Taliban then ruling in Afghanistan. This destruction was part of a massive effort by the Taliban to rid Afghanistan of its non-Muslim past. Despite pleas from art institutions around the world, many Hindu and Buddhist antiquities were destroyed; these were seen as graven images by the devoutly Muslim Taliban and therefore an abomination before the sight of God.

Nirmal Dass

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BAN CHIANG The village of Ban Chiang, located in Udon Thani Province in northeastern Thailand, is the site of important archaeological excavations. Discovered in 1966, the site has revealed evidence of a prehistoric society dating back to around 3600 BCE. Ban Chiang is one of the largest Bronze Age sites in Thailand, covering approximately 70,000 square meters (753,000 square feet). Excavations have revealed the presence of a highly developed bronze metallurgy, dating back to at least 2000 BCE, and iron metallurgy dating back to around 1000 BCE. Unlike in other Bronze Age discoveries in China, the existence of metallurgical technology in Ban Chiang was not accompanied by the creation of weaponry or ceremonial vessels associated with an advanced political hierarchy. Instead, metal objects were used for personal adornment and hunting, fishing, and woodcraft. Highly decorated ceramic forms found at Ban Chiang provide further evidence of an artistic tradition characterized by sophistication, creativity, and experimentation.

Ban Chiang challenges popular understanding of late prehistory based on Western data and Thai views

of prehistory and suggests that the invention of bronze metallurgy occurred more than once at independent locations around the world. Excavations across Thailand have found evidence of prehistoric communities similar to Ban Chiang, namely at Sakon Nakhon, Nakhon Phanom, and Khon Kaen. Ban Chiang was inscribed on the World Heritage List in 1992.

Daniel Oakman

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BANDA SEA Over 200,000 square nautical miles, the Banda is Indonesia's largest and deepest sea. It is located in eastern Indonesia and bounded on the south by a series of small islands and archipelagoes that curve east and north toward the eastern coast of Sulawesi. Banda Sea's convoluted sea floor is mostly four to five kilometers deep. It contains basins—such as the North Banda Basin, South Banda Basin, Weber Deep, and Wetar Trough—as deep as seven kilometers. These act as reservoirs, stabilizing fluctuations in the important water exchange between the South Pacific and Indian Oceans that flows through the Lifamatola Strait at depths below 200 to 300 meters.

The Banda Sea is associated with the fabled spice islands—the Moluccas—the origin of cloves, nutmeg, and mace that attracted Indian, Chinese, Arab, and later European traders. The center of the spice islands is Ambon, capital of Maluku province. The Bandas, southeast of Ambon, are among Indonesia's most interesting island groups.

Wong Poh Poh

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BANDAR ABBAS (2002 pop. 321,000). Located on the Persian side of the Strait of Hormuz, Bandar Abbas is the major port in southeastern Iran. Its population is mainly a mixture of Arabs and Persians. The fortunes of the early town, known as Jarrun, were closely linked with the nearby island of Hormuz. Attracted by its strategic location at the entrance of the Persian Gulf, the Portuguese captured Hormuz and Jarrun in the early sixteenth century. In 1623, after expelling the Portuguese, the Safavid Shah 'Abbas I (1571–1629) renamed the port after himself. Determined to make it the preeminent port of his empire, he granted favorable terms to merchants, particularly the English. After a century of unrivaled prosperity Bandar Abbas declined after the Safavid dynasty collapsed in 1722. The establishment of Bushire as Persia's new port further reduced Bandar Abbas's importance, and from 1793 to 1868 it was leased to the ruler of Oman. The modern establishment of road and rail links encouraged some growth, but it was not until the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) that important development took place. Its distance from the battlefields led to major investment in infrastructure development. Recently an oil and gas refinery and a ship-building yard were added to its existing cotton mill and fish-canning plant.

Thabit Abdullah

BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN (2002 pop. 75,000). Bandar Seri Begawan, capital of Brunei Darussalam,

is situated five kilometers upstream from the estuary of the Brunei River. Its existence as a settlement on stilts in reference to the famed present-day Kampong Ayer ("water village") dates back to the sixth century BCE, according to Chinese records. Portuguese descriptions of it during the sixteenth century attested to the glory and prosperity of the ancient empire of Brunei.

Formerly referred to as Brunei Town, Bandar Seri Begawan was named in honor of Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III (1914–1986), who abdicated in October 1967 and assumed the title of Seri Begawan Sultan. Perched on the northeastern corner of Brunei, Bandar Seri Begawan is the major urban center of the kingdom, where one-third of the total population of Brunei (276,300 as of 1993) resides. Bandar Seri Begawan functions as the seat of government as well as a commercial center and river port. It is connected by road with major towns such as Seria and Kuala Belait and has an international airport.

During the Japanese occupation (1941–1945), much of the town was destroyed by Allied bombings before the Australian reoccupation. Postwar reconstruction brought about the emergence of new buildings that are juxtaposed with a few remnants of the past.

The landmarks in and around Bandar Seri Begawan include the renowned Kampong Ayer. This floating confederation of more than forty villages, each with its own headman, demonstrates the close affinity of



An aerial view of Begawan and the Brunei River. (MICHAEL S. YAMASHITA/CORBIS)

the local inhabitants to the river and the sea. Rising majestically and overlooking Kampong Ayer is the glittering golden dome and towering minaret of the Omar Ali Saifuddin Mosque, opened in 1958 during the reign of and as a tribute to Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III, who was regarded as the "father of modern Brunei." Adjoining the mosque is a reconstruction of a sixteenth-century royal Brunei barge that "floats" in the lagoon, which almost encircles the entire mosque complex. On the outskirts of Bandar Seri Begawan, sprawling one-third of a mile long on a hillock with a view of the Brunei River, is the Istana Nurul Iman ("palace of the light of faith"). Completed in 1984, this magnificent palace combines Western engineering and Eastern architectural designs. With 1,788 rooms, twelve enormous chandeliers, and two golden domes, it is reputedly the world's largest residential palace.

Keat Gin Ooi

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BANDARANAIKE, SIRIMAVO RATWATTE DIAS (1916–2000), Sri Lankan politician. Sirimavo Bandaranaike dominated the Sri Lankan political scene for four decades, becoming an internationally acclaimed politician. She was born on 16 April 1916 to an influential family. Her parents were Banned Ratwatte Dissawwa and Ratwatte Kumarihamy. In 1940, she married S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, who became prime minister of Sri Lanka in 1956. He was assassinated three years afterwards. Sirimavo led the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, founded by her husband, and became the world's first female prime minister in 1960. Dominating the politics of the country as prime minister (1960–1965 and 1970–1977) and the leader of the opposition, she changed the name of the country from Ceylon to the ancient Sri Lanka, promulgated a new constitution in 1972, called the Non-Aligned Movement's Conference in 1975, and settled the dispute with India over Kachchative Island.

With adroit political skill and determination, she initiated social welfare programs and nationalization of essential sectors in the economy. Sinhalese was made the official language, resulting in alienation of the Ceylonese Tamils. She was debarred from holding any office after being convicted of abuse of power, but she again made a startling comeback and was ap-

pointed president in 1994 by her own daughter Chandrika Kumaratunge, who was then prime minister. She died on 10 October 2000 from a heart attack.

Patit Paban Misbra

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BANDARANAIKE, SOLOMON WEST RIDGEWAY DIAZ (1899–1959), Sri Lankan political figure. In British times (since 1776), the Bandaranaiques and the Obeyesekeres were the two richest plantation families in Sri Lanka. Since Portuguese times (c. 1540–1656), this family of originally South Indian origin had occupied important offices and regularly adapted the catholic, protestant, and Anglican religions of the respective colonial rulers. Solomon Bandaranaike's father held the highest position reserved for a "native gentleman" in the British colonial administration, the office of head *mudaliyar*, which dominated and represented the totality of the Sinhalese customary village and district office holders. Bandaranaike thus was well prepared to participate in Sri Lankan mass politics as it emerged in the early 1930s.

In 1936, he founded the Sinhala Maha Sabha, a radical pro-Sinhalese organization that operated as a faction in the dominant Ceylon National Congress (CNC). When the CNC was transformed into the United National Party (UNP) in 1946, Bandaranaike feared he would be sidelined by the dominant party leaders and after independence (1948) he established in 1951 his own party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). From the beginning, the SLFP, which advocated an anti-imperialist, anti-minority, and pro-Sinhalese program, attempted to mobilize voters that had not been reached by the UNP or that felt alienated by its pro-Western policy and attitudes. In 1956, an election year that coincided with the 2,500-year jubilee of the Buddha's enlightenment, Bandaranaike, under the slogan "Sinhala only," succeeded in integrating diverse Sinhalese special interest and social groups in a de facto movement: the ad hoc party alliance, Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP), was comprised of young, low-ranking socialist monks, poorly paid Sinhalese school teachers, nurses, ayurvedic (or traditional Indian) doctors, and various classes of village office holders. Based on this network, the SLFP persuaded voters that "Sinhala only" meant the reestab-

lishment of the political, economic, and cultural hegemony of the "Sinhala" people, the "lion race," in addition to the establishment of Sinhala as the exclusive language of state. The SLFP was unable immediately to fulfil these ambitions, and in 1959 Solomon Bandaranaike was shot by a disgruntled Buddhist monk. The participants in, and real motives of, the assassination were never discovered.

From 1959, Bandaranaike's widow, Sirimavo, the daughter of an influential aristocratic family, presided over the party, which won election victories in 1960 and 1970. After seventeen years of political harassment by the UNP, the SLFP, then represented by Sirimavo Bandaranaike, but in effect dominated and reformed by her daughter, Chandrika Kumaratunga, returned to power.

Jakob Roesel

BANDUNG (2002 est. pop. 2.9 million). Bandung is the capital of West Java and Indonesia's third-largest city. The Sundanese language as spoken in and around Bandung has the highest social status. Bandung was developed by the Dutch after 1810 as a center for the region's plantation industry. It became the capital of West Java in 1864. The city grew rapidly after the building of a railway line to Batavia (Jakarta) in the 1880s. The early twentieth century witnessed a building boom, during which Indonesian architectural motifs were combined with European Art Deco architecture. Its many fine parks and gardens as well as its striking Indo-European buildings earned Bandung the title of the "Paris of Java." The Bandung Institute of Technology was opened in 1920 as the first Dutch-founded university for Indonesians. Here Sukarno, who was to become Indonesia's first president, finished his engineering degree in 1926. The city was proposed as an eventual capital of the Netherlands Indies, and after Indonesia's independence there was speculation (until 1962) that it was to become the capital of Indonesia. In April 1955, Bandung was the site of a grand diplomatic event, the Asian-African Conference (also called the Bandung Conference), in which twenty-nine states participated.

Edwin Wieringa

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BANDUNG CONFERENCE The decolonization that characterized the decades following the close of World War II saw a substantial increase in the number of new states throughout Asia. These new nation-states, often called the Third World or the Developing World, eschewed the emerging Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Their leading concerns were remaining nonaligned vis-à-vis superpower conflicts; ending economic dependence on the West; and pursuing ongoing decolonization and economic development.

Indonesia played host to twenty-nine nonaligned nations at an Afro-Asian summit, which was held 18–24 April 1955 in the city of Bandung, Indonesia. This conference marked the emergence of these nations as a third grouping in international politics. The three unofficial leaders of the Third World were present at the Bandung Conference—Indonesia's founding president, Sukarno; China's premier, Zhou En-lai; and India's founding prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. At the conference, the People's Republic of China's (PRC) attempted to gain influence in the Third World, and thereafter the PRC pursued a course independent of the Soviet Union. For Indonesia, hosting this conference signaled the emergence of its policy of seeking Third World leadership. The Bandung Conference also led to the formal creation of a nonaligned movement, which, despite the end of the Cold War, has enjoyed an expanding membership, reaching almost one hundred different nations. (*See sidebar overleaf.*)

Anthony Smith

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BANDUNG INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY The origins of the Bandung Institute of Technology (Institut Teknologi Bandung—ITB) in Bandung, West Java, trace back to 1920 and the founding of the Technische Hogeschool, though the institute in its current form was not officially opened until 2 March 1959. One of Indonesia's most prestigious centers of scientific education and research, ITB offers specializations in science, technology, and fine arts.



UNITY ACROSS THE THIRD WORLD

At the close of the Bandung Conference on 24 April 1955, India's Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, summarized the sense of unity and growing influence felt by delegates from non-aligned nations.

But, there is yet another spirit of Asia today. As we all know, Asia is no longer passive today; it has been passive enough in the past. It is no more a submissive Asia; it has tolerated submissiveness for so long. Asia of today is dynamic; Asia is full of life. . . . We are great countries in the world who rather like having freedom, if I may say so, without dictation. Well, if there is anything that Asia wants to tell them it is this: No dictation there is going to be in the future; no 'yes-men' in Asia, I hope, or in Africa. We have had enough of that in the past. We value friendship of the great countries and if I am to play my part, I should like to say that we sit with the great countries of the world as brothers, be it in Europe or America. It is not in any spirit of hatred or dislike or aggressiveness with each other in regard to Europe or America, certainly not. We send to them our greetings, all of us here, and we want to be friends with them, to cooperate with them. But we shall only cooperate in the future as equals; there is no friendship when nations are not equal, when one has to obey the other and when one dominates the other. That is why we raise our voice against domination and colonialism from which many of us have suffered so long and that is why we have to be very careful to see that any other form of domination does not come our way. Therefore, we want to be friend with the West and friends with the East and friends with everybody because if there is something that may be called an approach to the minds and spirit of Asia, it is one of toleration and friendship and cooperation, not one of aggressiveness.

I realise, as the Prime Minister of Burma said, that we cannot exercise tremendous influence over the world. Our influence will grow, no doubt.... But whether our influence is great or small, it must be exercised in the right direction, in an intelligent direction, in a direction which has integrity of purpose and ideals and objectives as shown in our Resolution. It represents the ideals of Asia, it represents the new dynamism of Asia, because if it does not represent that what are we then? Are we copies of Europeans or Americans or Russians? What are we? We are Asians or Africans. We are none else. If we are camp followers of Russia or America or any other country of Europe, it is, if I may say so, not very creditable to our dignity, our new independence, our new freedom, our new spirit and our new self-reliance.

Source: George M. Kahin. (1955) The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April, 1955. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 73-75.

Formerly affiliated with the University of Indonesia, ITB has five faculties and twenty-four departments; its Graduate Studies Program offers twenty-nine degree programs. The faculties are Mathematics and Natural Sciences, Industrial Technology, Civil Engineering and Planning, Earth Sciences and Mineral Technology, and Fine Arts and Design.

ITB also offers nondegree three-year programs providing specific training to civil servants. These include polytechnics for banking, accounting, and computer programming, as well as a photogrammetry and cartography center. Affiliated institutions include schools of railway engineering and telecommunications, and institutions for community research and service.

ITB has two campuses on seventy-seven hectares of land, employs more than one thousand faculty members and has over ten thousand students. The institute has a reputation as a center of student political activism.

Andi Faisal Bakti

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BANGALORE (2001 pop. 4.2 million). Bangalore, traditionally known as the garden of India, is now dubbed the Silicon Valley of India and has become the most important center of information-technology software in the nation. The city is the capital of Karnataka State in southern India and is the sixth-largest city in the nation. With one of the highest population-growth rates in India, Bangalore is likely to have a population of nearly 7 million by the year 2011. The city is famous for historical monuments, luscious gardens, and sandalwood and rosewood carvings of statues of gods and goddesses, toys, puppets, historical figures, buildings, and other items that depict social and cultural values of India. Due to the congenial climatic conditions, the Lalbagh Botanical Garden is the main center of attraction for tourists, especially for its centuries-old trees. Another tourist attraction is the Glass House, which is modeled on London's Crystal Palace. It contains a unique collection of tropical and subtropical plants.

Historically, Bangalore is famous for the royal palace of Tipu Sultan (1750–1799, ruler of the erstwhile state of Mysore in Karnataka State), the son of Muslim ruler Haider Ali (1721–1782). Tipu Sultan fought valiantly against the British empire in 1793 and died while fighting the British in the 1799 war to maintain the autonomy of Mysore State against British designs to spread their power and influence by annexing territories in the southern part of India. The British army and the Hyderabad and Maratha rulers had agreed to wage a combined war against Tipu and later distribute among the rulers the conquered territories.

Architecturally, Bangalore is famous for the Bull Temple, which has a tall carved-granite statue of Nandi, a bull on which rode Siva, the creator of the universe according to Indian mythology. There are many beautiful hill resorts in the vicinity of Bangalore. The most famous are Devarayanadurga and Nandi Hills. The waterfalls of Gaganachukki and Bharachukki are the main source of the city's hydroelectric power plant, built in 1905. Bangalore is also known for its Kolar gold mines, the deepest mining pits in the world, with a depth of 10,000 feet beneath the earth's surface. These mines are located 100 to 130 kilometers from Bangalore city.

Bangalore is one of the most modern cities of India and the fastest-growing center of the software industry in the nation. There are approximately one thousand companies in Bangalore in the information-technology sector. This sector contributes one-fifth of the total revenue of Karnataka State. Bangalore is also the center for aircraft manufacturing as well as for defense- and electronic-equipment makers. It is the headquarters of the Indian Space Research Organization. For research and development in silk technology, the city has the only Central Silk Technological Research Institute in the nation.

B. M. Jain

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BANGKOK (2000 est. pop. 10 million). Bangkok is situated on the Chao Phraya River. It is both the capital and hub of the country; Bangkok's residents establish standards, outlook, dress, and physical comforts that are imitated, in varying degrees, by people in other parts of Thailand. Bangkok is about forty-five



Cars and trucks speed along Sukhumvit Road in Bangkok in 1993. (JAY SYVERSON/CORBIS)

times more populous than Thailand's second-largest city, Chiang Mai. The increasing dominance of the city can be gauged from the 56 percent of the urban population that now live in it, compared with 42 percent in 1947. The metropolis is growing at a rate of 6 percent per year, which is three times the national growth rate. The greater Bangkok area, with only 15 percent of the country's population, generates about half of the gross national product of Thailand and provides about half the number of jobs.

Bangkok used to be a city connected by canals, and was once known as the Venice of the East. Due to population congestion in recent decades, many of the canals have been filled in to serve as roads. The remaining canals are very dirty and polluted, though long boats still serve as taxis on some canals.

One of Bangkok's main business and commercial district lies in Chinatown, which is characterized by bazaar shopping. Ratchadamnoen Avenue is an important artery; formerly many government ministries were located there, though some are now located in less congested parts of the city. Silom Road is the primary road for financial and banking institutions. A stretch of Sukhumvit Road, which is one of the three

longest roads in Thailand, cuts through inner Bangkok, housing middle-class residences, hotels, and restaurants. The low-lying, unsanitary, and flood-prone inner areas of the city's core are being abandoned to the poor by the rich, who are moving to estates outside the city. By 1990, the city had a million registered motor vehicles and massive traffic congestion was common. The Greater Bangkok Plan gave Bangkok an elevated expressway to connect suburbs and downtown areas; in 1999 a state-of-the-art sky train was launched. A ring road project has also been launched to help motorists avoid the inner city area.

Ooi Giok-ling

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BANGKOK DECLARATION Beset by internal conflicts and divided by ideology, history, religion, and culture, various countries in Southeast Asia came to recognize the need for some sort of cooperative grouping to deal with their unstable environment. Against the backdrop of the Cold War and the conflicts in Laos and Vietnam, on 8 August 1967 Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand established the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Bangkok Declaration was issued to assert that ASEAN was established first and foremost for the purpose of economic, social, and cultural collaboration and not as a security alliance. To contour the future direction of the region and to promote mutual peace, prosperity, and stability, the Declaration proposed economic partnerships, social relations, and cultural linkages among member countries as a means of accelerating and sustaining peace. Over the years, the Declaration has served as a reference point in dealing with internal squabbles among member countries. The eventual inclusion of all the Southeast Asian countries—Brunei Darussalam in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar (Burma) in 1997, and Cambodia

in 1999—is a testimony to the success of the fundamental principles of the Bangkok Declaration.

Geetha Govindasamy

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BANGLADESH-PROFILE (2001 est. pop. 131.3 million). Bangladesh (officially Gana Prajatantri Bangladesh, or People's Republic of Bangladesh) is a relatively new nation, having become independent in 1971 following a war of independence against Pakistan (it was formerly known as East Pakistan), of which it was previously a part. It is also one of the poorest countries, having been ranked the lowest in Asia in the 2000 Human Development Index prepared by the United Nations Development Program. It was ranked 146 out of 174 countries studied, almost all of those ranked below being from Africa. Per capita gross domestic product is estimated as \$1,570 on a purchasing-power basis.

The population density is highest of any country except the city-state of Singapore. Its area is approximately 144,000 square kilometers, about the size of the state of Wisconsin. Bangladesh is bordered in the south by the Bay of Bengal; on the west, north, and much of the east by India; and the southern portion of the east by Myanmar (Burma).


Geography

Bangladesh is a vast delta with few hills. It drains three of the major river systems of South Asia: the Ganges and its tributaries, including the Yamuna (Jumna); the rivers flowing south from Nepal and those flowing north from the Vindhya mountains in India; the Brahmaputra, which rises in Tibet; and the Meghna, which has sources in the Indian state of Meghalaya, portions of which receive the greatest amount of rainfall in the world. Until the sixteenth century, the principal out-

let of the Ganges was through the present-day Bhagirathi and Hooghly rivers, passing present-day Calcutta. This route became heavily silted, diverting the main body of the river eastward. The restoration of much of the Ganges flow through its former route is the object of the Farakka barrage just across the border in India. The division of the Ganges waters is a major area of dispute between the two countries.

The rivers are both a blessing and a curse for Bangladesh. They provide transportation, water for irrigation systems, and in flood deposit fertile silt on the riparian areas. Their floods, however, also destroy crops and interrupt road, rail, and water transport systems. In general all over Bangladesh, with the exception of mountainous Chittagong Hill tracts, groundwater is contaminated with arsenic, which has proven difficult to correct. The Chittagong Hill Tracts in the southeast are the only high ground in the country. On the Karnaphuli river, which rises in the Hill Tracts, is the only hydroelectric station.

With the exception of natural gas, Bangladesh has few natural resources other than arable land. There are a few coal deposits that are generally unworkable. No significant petroleum sites have been found. Gas is used for power generation, fertilizer production, and industrial and domestic uses. The quantities that have been discovered and anticipated have made natural gas a potential export, especially to India. Whether or not





BANGLADESH

Country name: People's Republic of Bangladesh
Area: 144,000 sq km
Population: 131,269,860 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 1.59% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 25.3 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 8.6 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: -0.76 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio: total population: 1.05 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 69.85 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth: total population: 60.54 years, male: 60.74 years, female: 60.33 years (2000 est.)
Major religions: Islam, Hinduism
Major languages: Bangla (official), English
Literacy: total population: 56%, male: 63%, female: 49% (2000 est.)
Government type: parliamentary democracy
Capital: Dhaka
Administrative divisions: 5 divisions
Independence: 16 December 1971 (from West Pakistan)
National holiday: Independence Day, 26 March (1971)
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal
GDP-real growth rate: 5.3% (2000 est.)
GDP-per capita (purchasing power parity): \$1,570 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: 35.6% (FY95/96 est.)
Exports: \$5.9 billion (2000)
Imports: \$8.1 billion (2000)
Currency: taka (Tk)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Factbook* 2001. Retrieved 18 October 2001 from: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

to export the natural gas has been the subject of debate, however: the government opposes the export of a national resource, but others support exporting natural gas either in its raw form or as electrical power, seeing it as a potential earner of hard currency.

The People

The people of Bangladesh are Bengalis, a branch of the Indo-Aryans who migrated from Central Asia in the second millennium BCE and gradually spread across the northern subcontinent. Bengal was probably inhabited by Dravidians before the arrival of the Indo-Aryans and some Dravidian characteristics remain in the population. There are also Mongoloid characteristics evident in some residents of Sylhet and Chittagong divisions. There also are a number of tribal

groups, especially in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (the largest group being the Chakmas), but also in the lowlands, particularly in the north where tribes such as the Garos, who inhabit the hill states of northeastern India, spread into Bangladesh.

The dominant religion is Islam; followers make up about 88 percent of the population. Most of the Muslims are Sunni, with only small numbers of Shi'ites (some of those being Ismailis). Islam began to spread in Bengal early in the second millennium CE, brought mainly by itinerant Muslim preachers, many of whom were Sufis. There seems to be no logical explanation why Islam spread more widely in eastern Bengal than in western areas. The first Muslim ruler of Bengal came in 1202 when a general of the Delhi sultanate conquered Nadia (now in West Bengal) and deposed

the Hindu Sena dynasty. From then until the assumption of power by the British in the eighteenth century, the rulers of Bengal were Muslim.

Fundamentalist Islamic political parties have had little electoral impact on the political scene. This is not to say that Islam is not a very important personal matter for Bangladeshis, but the impression given is that it is a personal matter and not one for the state. During the rule of Husain Muhammad Ershad (b. 1930) in the 1980s, however, Islam was made the state religion. Sufism is an important aspect of religious observance for many Bangladeshis, and there are many shrines to *pirs* (honored founders or leaders of Sufi orders).

Most of the remaining Bangladeshis, about 10 percent, are Hindus. Prior to the 1971 war of independence, about 18 percent of the population was Hindu, but many fled to India during the war and did not return. There also was a large exodus of Hindus in the early 1950s following communal riots mainly in Khulna division.

Most of the Hindus remaining in Bangladesh are of the Scheduled Castes, that is, the former untouchables (in India, now called Dalits, or "downtrodden"). Generally, these people are poor and suffer the same disabilities as any who are poverty stricken. Those who are better educated, usually from higher castes, however, do not appear to be discriminated against on the basis of religion. Several have been members of parliament and of the cabinet, and many have held high positions in government service, education, commerce, and industry.

There are small numbers of Christians and Buddhists, often members of tribal groups. Several of the tribes in the Chittagong Hill Tracts are Buddhist, while others are Hindu or animist. Many of the Christians are from lowland tribal groups who live on both sides of the border with India.

Language

Bangladesh is unique in that it is the only unilingual state among the major South Asian states. There are few, if any, persons in Bangladesh who cannot communicate in Bengali (*Bangla*). Knowledge of English is growing, despite an immediate post-1971 effort to force Bengali even to the extent of forbidding English-language signs.

History

The earliest references to Bengal are in the tablets prepared during the Mauryan empire in the fourth and third centuries BCE. Bengal was either independent (or

perhaps semi-independent) or a tributary to various north Indian dynasties, including the Guptas in the fourth and fifth centuries CE.

In 750, Bengal produced a dynasty that came to rule areas outside Bengal itself. This was the Pala dynasty, based at Vikrampur (near Dhaka) in Bengal. As it spread westward, the seat moved to Monghyr (now in Bihar). The Palas were ardent Buddhists. Power gradually declined, and the Palas were overthrown in 1155 by the Senas, an equally ardent Hindu dynasty, which during its short reign worked to revive Brahmanism as the religion of Bengal. This imposition of the caste system after the freedom of casteless Buddhism is thought by some scholars to have made casteless Islam welcome in Bengal.

In 1202, the Sena capital of Nadia (now in West Bengal) fell to a general of the Delhi sultanate and Bengal remained under Muslim rule until the British gained the power of taxation (*diwani*) from the Mughal emperor in 1765, following the British victory in 1757 at Plassey (Pilasi) over the Nawab of Bengal (governor under the Mughal emperor). The capital of Bengal moved from Murshidabad to Calcutta.

The British established Calcutta as the capital of British India as well as the capital of Bengal, and it remained so until the British Indian capital was moved to New Delhi in 1911. Under the British, Bengal included Bihar and Orissa. In 1905, the eastern portion of Bengal was joined with Assam to form a new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam. Muslims welcomed this, as the new province had a Muslim majority. Hindus strongly opposed the loss of the agricultural area that was supplying Calcutta with jute and rice. The partition was revoked in 1911: Bihar and Orissa were split off to form a new province (they became separate provinces in 1937), Assam was separated, and eastern and western Bengal were reunited.

Through acts of parliament, the British granted a measure of local government in 1885 and electoral participation in provincial government through Government of India Acts in 1909, 1919, and 1935. The last of these acts provided "provincial autonomy," under which provincial governments would control most governmental functions. It also continued the system of "separate electorates," under which religious communities would be represented separately with members of each community voting only for candidates from that community. There also were special seats representing interests such as labor, commerce, and industry and, in Bengal, a greatly inflated representation for Europeans. As a result, the majority Muslim community was actually denied a majority in the legislative assembly.

Within the Muslim community, there were two major parties in 1937 (after the 1935 act came into force): the Muslim League, which emphasized national concerns of Muslims throughout British India, and the Krishak Praja Party (KPP, Farmers and Peoples Party), which was concerned primarily with the problems and goals of the Bengal Muslim community. When Pakistan (which included present-day Bangladesh) became independent in 1947, the Muslim League, although in power at that time, began to fade.

Politics

Since its independence, Bangladesh has experienced presidential democracy and civilian and military autocracy. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it was a parliamentary democracy.

Following the Pakistani surrender on 16 December 1971, the Awami League (a political party formed by former members of the Muslim League) assumed governance of the newly independent state. The Awami League saw a Bangladesh that would be based on the points enunciated by the party's leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1920–1975): nationalism, secularism, socialism, and democracy. Mujib (as he was often called) returned from jail in Pakistan—where he had been imprisoned during the war for Bangladeshi independence—on 10 January 1972, and accepted the role of prime minister. Before the end of that year, the constitution for a parliamentary system was completed.

The period of reconstruction following the war was marked by increasing corruption and incompetence in government. In January 1975, Bangladesh changed from a parliamentary system to a presidential one, with Mujib as president. In June, Mujib decreed that Bangladesh would become a one-party state, effectively placing all power in his hands. On 15 August 1975, Mujib and many of his family were assassinated by disgruntled army officers. What followed was a period of turmoil, culminating in attempted coups in November.

The military restored order in November but installed a martial law regime in which Major General Ziaur Rahman (known as Zia, 1936–1981) became the dominant figure, assuming the presidency in 1977 and being elected to that office in a contested election in 1978. Parliamentary elections were held in 1979 in which the party established as a vehicle for Zia, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), won about two-thirds of the seats. The Awami League came second. Thus, what started as martial law gradually was converted into a presidential system. Zia initiated many

steps toward economic and social development and was the primary mover behind what became the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation. Zia was assassinated on 30 May 1981.

He was succeeded by Vice President Abdus Sattar (1906–1985), who was then elected to the office of president in November 1981. The Sattar regime was weak, and the way was opened for another general, Husain Muhammad Ershad (b. 1930), to assume power.

Ershad continued many of the policies of Zia but never achieved the same level of popularity. He brought a number of members of the BNP and the Awami League into his cabinet and into his newly formed Jatiya Party (JP, People's Party). Both the BNP, now led by Zia's widow Khaleda Zia (known as Khaleda, b. 1945), and the Awami League, now led by Mujib's daughter, Sheikh Hasina Wajid (known as Hasina, b. 1947) strongly opposed Ershad but also strongly opposed each other. It was not until late 1990 that the two worked together and forced Ershad's resignation in December 1990.

In the election that followed in February 1991, the BNP won a plurality and, with support from the Jama'at-e-Islami (a Muslim fundamentalist party), formed a government under Khaleda. The constitution was amended to return to a parliamentary system. The personal dislike between Khaleda and Hasina meant that much energy was spent in this conflict rather than development and governance. Khaleda resigned in November 1995 and called a new election, which the opposition boycotted. New elections took place in June 1996 under a "neutral caretaker government."

The election resulted in a plurality for Hasina's Awami League. It joined in a coalition with Ershad's Jatiya Party to form the government. In a continuing tangle of Bangladeshi politics, the Jatiya Party split, with Ershad's faction supporting the BNP and the other faction remaining in the government. Stability is not the hallmark of politics in Bangladesh.

Economy

The economy of Bangladesh remains based primarily on agriculture, although there has been some growth in industry. The principal agricultural products are rice, jute, and tea, the first for domestic consumption and the latter two largely for export. Bangladesh remains an importer of rice, although production has increased markedly since the late 1970s. Jute, the raw material for burlap, faces a decreasing demand as plastic has overtaken the packaging field. Whether or not natural gas will be exported remains to be decided.

Garments are a growing and important export. Bangladesh has used its low labor costs to great advantage (as have several of its neighboring countries) in the readymade garment sector. There are political and social problems involved with this, especially the issue of child labor. Other industries include the manufacture of nitrogenous fertilizers (using natural gas as the base), the processing of agricultural products, and the assembling of equipment from imported parts.

Farming is almost entirely on small holdings. Land reform laws do not permit the owning of more than thirty-three acres (approximately 13 hectares), but most holdings are much smaller; the average land holding being just under one hectare.

Craig Baxter

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BANGLADESH—ECONOMIC SYSTEM

After becoming independent from Pakistan in 1971, Bangladesh shifted in the mid-1970s from a socialist to a market-oriented model of development. Despite several economic reforms, however, the country is still far from enjoying an efficient market economy. Bangladesh's economy remains largely agricultural, with a relatively small industrial-manufacturing sector. While agriculture remains dominant in terms of

contribution to total gross domestic product (GDP) and employment, the percentage of total agricultural employment nonetheless decreased from 85 percent in 1961 to 63 percent in 1996. The service sector's contribution to total GDP increased sharply from 36 percent in 1970 to around 57 percent in 1998.

Bangladesh has one of the lowest per capita annual incomes in the world (\$345 in 1998). Income levels in rural and urban areas differ significantly. In rural areas opportunities for wage employment are limited, and wage rates are low. The level and composition of consumption expenditure also differ in rural and urban areas.

Agriculture

Bangladesh's agriculture is dominated by rice, the staple food crop, which occupies about 75 percent of the total cropped area. Since the early 1980s wheat production has increased significantly and is now around 5 percent of the total cropped area. Potato, chilies, pulses, and oil seeds are complementary noncereal food crops that supplement the staple diet. Besides rice, wheat, and jute, sugarcane and tobacco are major crops. On an experimental basis rubber, coffee, and palm trees are cultivated on a small scale in some areas. Small and medium-sized households produce barely enough food crops to meet their own consumption requirements. Only large farm households can generally sell their surplus cereal products in the market.

Jute is the major cash crop in Bangladesh. Rice and jute are small-scale farming operations in which land, labor, and capital equipment are often interchangeable. The agricultural technology is predominantly traditional and consists mainly of plows, shovels, bullocks, and homemade irrigation implements. Since the early 1970s a considerable number of high-yielding seed varieties (HYV) have been adopted. From 2 percent of the cropped area in 1970, the share of land under HYV cultivation grew to around 30 percent in the 1990s.

Bangladesh agriculture has a very low and declining land-labor ratio. Over time, the average size of farms has become smaller and smaller. For example, in 1960 the average farm size was 1.4 hectares, but in 1984 it was less than one hectare. Along with decreasing farm size came an increasingly unequal distribution of land holdings and increasing landlessness. In the active tenancy market in Bangladesh, around 25 percent of cultivable land is transferred, so that the distribution of cultivated land is less unequal than the distribution of ownership.



Bangladesh has an agricultural economy and the land is both benefited and harmed by flooding. This flooded field is located in the Barisei region. (YANN ARTHUS-BERTRAND/CORBIS)

Industry

Of the various large- and small-scale industries, jute, carpets, paper and newsprint, rayon, sugar, cement, chemicals, fertilizer, and tanneries are the most important. Other notable industries are cotton yarn and textiles, engineering and shipbuilding, iron and steel, oil refining, electric cables and wires, matches, and cigarettes. Of cottage industries, carpet making, shoemaking, bamboo and cane products, earthenware, brass and metal products, small tools and implements, ornaments, and handicrafts are important. In terms of employment, cottage and small-scale industries occupy a significant place. These are for the most part family-oriented enterprises with low capital intensity and traditional technology. Since the late 1980s the ready-to-wear garment industry has rapidly expanded; it now employs more than one million workers (mostly female) and contributes more than 50 percent of total export earnings.

In 1972 the government under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1920–1975), popularly known as Sheikh Mujib, nationalized all major industries. While the nationalization decision solved initial political and administrative problems, Sheikh Mujib's government later encountered serious political and economic problems that lasted until he was killed during a military coup in 1975. After political change in 1975, industrial policy was revised to provide a greater role for private enterprise. Since the early 1980s successive

regimes further revised industrial policy, but no regime has denationalized the most unprofitable industries, whose losses were caused primarily by disruptions in production, inappropriate and inflexible pricing policy, managerial inefficiency, and above all large-scale corruption.

Bangladesh is a relatively open economy, where the ratio of foreign trade to GDP is around 37 percent and steadily rising. However, its narrow export base is dominated by a few primary commodities (although ready-to-wear garments have become dominant in the export trade in recent years), whereas its essential imports are either basic consumption goods or raw materials and intermediate goods. The narrow base of exports and the noncompressible structure of imports have given rise to a large trade deficit.

Financial System

The financial system of Bangladesh includes an organized or institutionalized financial sector and an unorganized credit market. Dominating the financial sector and accounting for more than 95 percent of its assets is the banking system, composed of the Bangladesh Bank, four nationalized commercial banks, twenty-seven private domestic banks, thirteen foreign banks, and five government-owned specialized banks. The nationalized commercial banks dominate the commercial banking sector, accounting for more than

two-thirds of its assets. The foreign banks, with a share of around 10 percent of bank assets, remain active primarily in international transactions relating to foreign trade. Such credit allocation started following the nationalization of domestic banks and financial institutions in 1972. Since then, especially since the 1980s and 1990s, credit has been allocated more by political authorities than by market forces. After meeting the needs of the politically influential sectors, the limited available funds were rationed among economically and politically powerful borrowers. A lack of accountability created incentives for borrowers to default willfully, which led to a culture of loan default as big borrowers treated bank loans as a windfall. As a result during the 1980s and early 1990s, the nationalized banks had to be recapitalized by the government a number of times to keep them operationally solvent. Because the nationalized banks are not subject to competitive pressure or hard-budget constraints, they keep the loan rate of interest high, intending to recover some of the losses caused by the huge "privileged" loans. The indifferent attitude of depositors (and the government) has kept otherwise insolvent banks liquid, but at the cost of financial efficiency.

Future Prospects

Bangladesh remains a test case of economic development. In terms of traditional development economics jargon, Bangladesh has yet to break the "vicious circle of poverty" or "low-level equilibrium trap" to set the economy on the path to self-sustaining growth. How to do this remains controversial. While it is easy to be gloomy, a close examination of the economy reveals some strengths. Remarkably the Bangladesh economy can feed an ever-increasing population from its narrow land base. Food production has increased to near self-sufficiency, with stabilizing food prices. The economy has been gradually deregulated since the early 1980s, and the rate of private saving is rising. Even though foreign investment is not yet forthcoming on a large scale, there are good prospects for the future. As the economic survival of the nation is at stake, Bangladesh cannot afford to fail in its quest for development.

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BANGLADESH-EDUCATION SYSTEM

The constitution of Bangladesh directs the state to adopt effective measures for extending free and compulsory education for all children "to such stage as may be determined by law." Recent years have recorded some advances in the education sector in Bangladesh. Given the scope of the development problem faced by Bangladesh, however, these improvements are inadequate. After three decades and many education commission reports, Bangladesh has yet to attain the goal of providing free primary education to all children. One reason for this is the failure of politicians and members of the education commissions to commit themselves firmly to the vision of basic education as a fundamental human right and an instrument of social and economic change. Studies have shown that cost recovery as a percentage of unit costs in Bangladesh is higher in primary education than in either secondary or higher education.

Recent Trends and Statistics

Public expenditure on education has been low. The distribution of the overall public-sector budget among the various educational sectors has remained stable in recent years. Primary education has received roughly 47 percent, secondary education 22 percent, and higher education 33 percent of government spending on education over the years. Primary education has gained at the expense of secondary education, while the tertiary sector has maintained its position. Among institutions that teach scientific and technical subjects, only medical colleges have gained in real terms. According to Tan and Mignot's World Bank study, the share of cumulative subsidies accruing to the best-educated 10 percent in a generation in Bangladesh stands at 72 percent, compared with the Asian average of 37 percent (28 percent for Sri Lanka and 31 percent for China). Another measure of inequality, the "education gini coefficient," is a highly unequal 82 for Bangladesh compared with the Asian average of 43 (33 for Sri Lanka and 44 for China; the gini coefficient is a measure of inequality of distribution of education funds. Zero equals complete equality, and one equals complete inequality. The higher the value within this range, the greater the proportion of education funds spent on the few, and the greater the inequality).

Government statistics on educational attainments suggest some optimism. According to the Fifth Five Year Plan (1997–2002), the current literacy rate of 58 percent is increasing at the rate of 7 percent per decade. According to most informed observers, however, these figures are overly optimistic and ignore many problems, not the least that of resources. The



A girl in a school in Dhaka in 1992 draws on her blackboard. (LIBA TAYLOR/CORBIS)

school-age population at the end of the twentieth century expanded at the rate of roughly 1 million each year, putting enormous pressure on the entire school system. Nongovernmental organizations took up the challenge of opening and running primary schools in areas where government schools did not exist. The most famous are those run by the Bangladesh Rural Academy Council, which established some thirty thousand schools not under government auspices in rural areas.

The Structure of the Education System

Ten years of basic schooling culminate in a matriculation exam. For those who do well, this is followed by two years of college. Written public examinations, administered by four regional boards, decide the student's qualifications at each level. These two public examinations are known as the Secondary School Certificate and the Higher Secondary Certificate. The universities and other tertiary institutions have their own entrance examinations. Most public universities follow the British system of a three-year bachelor's (honors) program, although the new private universities have moved to the American model of four-year bachelor's programs. Postgraduate education consists mostly of master's programs, with very few doctoral programs.

Various vocational secondary schools and training centers have developed over the years. Religious education also occupies an important position in the education sector of Bangladesh. The presence of *madrasabs* (Islamic religious schools) is impressive but raises issues of uniform standards.

Primary and Secondary Schooling

Enrollment data in the primary schools show some positive trends, including a rise in female enrollment.

The overall enrollment according to official statistics is 80 percent of the age cohort, although gross enrollment rates are close to 100 percent, because of inclusion of older children in the count. An estimated 20 million students are enrolled in primary schools today. The goal of achieving full enrollment in the six-to-eleven-year age cohort poses major public-policy challenges, due to a shortage of classrooms and teachers in the countryside. The quality of education in the primary sector is low, the overall learning environment poor. Problems include high student-teacher ratios, inadequately trained teachers, and lack of proper books, supplies, and facilities such as laboratories.

The secondary education level also has been severely neglected by policy makers in Bangladesh. According to a survey by the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, overcrowding at the secondary level is common. The number of secondary schools has simply not expanded to accommodate all those graduating from primary schools. The enrollment rate has increased to about 30 to 35 percent of the age cohort.

Public and Private Tertiary Education

Public higher education in Bangladesh is nearly free. Since the vast majority of students come from well-to-do households, this may be a luxury the nation cannot afford. Access and equity continue to be major problems in the entire education sector but especially in tertiary education. Until the early 1990s, university education was provided only by public universities (including the highly specialized medical colleges, engineering universities, and polytechnic institutes and colleges). Today, vocational secondary schools, training centers, and on-the-job training opportunities in the private sector are springing up to serve the labor market. The rapid increases in population, urbanization, and incomes have created an enormous demand for good schools at all levels. Parents generally believe that a good education is the ticket to social and economic success. The demand for private tutors is also high. As expected in an environment of weak governance, this has created many opportunities for fraud at all levels in the education sector.

Private universities were first allowed under the Private University Act of 1992. Today, there are seventeen private universities of varying quality operating under this act. The Private University Act requires that at least 5 percent of the student body receive full tuition waivers. This is intended to help poor students take advantage of these institutions. Additionally, the

choice of a private university by students from rich families helps create vacancies in the public universities for other students. Proponents of private universities have argued that an expansion of the private universities would improve access to tertiary education for *all* students. After nine years, it seems that, although private universities have increased choice in higher education for many students, the overall impact on equity and access is mixed.

The better private universities have research centers, modern fully networked computing facilities, and air-conditioned classrooms. The full-time faculty and administrators are assisted by a large group of visiting faculty on sabbatical leave from universities all over the world. In their curriculum, books, and faculty training, the private universities have a strong bias toward the U.S. higher education system. The motivation for private universities came from the serious deterioration of education in Dhaka University; the hold of socialistic ideas over academia in general; and the large-scale exodus of local students to foreign institutions, especially to neighboring India. According to one estimate, in 1993 over eighty thousand Bangladeshi students were in Indian colleges, sent there by their parents to get a better education. The loss of foreign exchange entailed by such an import of education from India and the fear of indoctrination by a foreign culture were important concerns for the founders of the private universities. Tuition costs for the entire four years are approximately \$10,000 in the best private universities. This is exorbitant compared with the cost of tuition at public universities, but the growth of private universities shows that they clearly met a latent need.

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BANGLADESH HISTORY Bangladesh is a relatively new nation but an old region. During British rule, the entire Bengali-speaking region of eastern India was known as Bengal or Bangladesh (land of Bengal). Upon the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, much of that region became East Bengal and then East Pakistan, part of the predominantly Muslim nation of Pakistan. It was separated from the rest of Pakistan by 1,600 kilometers of predominantly Hindu India; language, culture, and lifestyle also separated it from western Pakistan. In 1971, after a civil war, East Pakistan became the independent nation of Bangladesh.

Premodern History

Although only a nation-state since 1971, "Bangladesh" is not a new term. We come across it in an ancient inscription of 1025, which refers to "Vangladesa" as a rainy country. Vanga, or Banga were used to denote Bengal or Bangladesh from 500 BCE to 500 CE. Vanga may derive from the Tibetan word *bans*, meaning "wet." Others take the term Bangla and derive it from an Assamese dialect, in which the original meant "wide plains." The Mughal scholar Abu-l-Fazl (1551–1602) took the original name to be Bang, and took *al* to be a word meaning flood embankments, or dikes, which were common in the region; hence the name Bangal, and eventually Bangladesh, meaning "the country of Bangal" (Bengal). Before the Muslim conquest of Bengal, the different parts of the region had different names, either of the petty dynasties that ruled them or of the subregions ("little Bengals," to paraphrase some scholars). The Muslim conquest led to the integration of the little Bengals into one Great Bengal.

The region is known to have been inhabited by various pre-Aryan peoples around 2500 BCE; by 600 BCE it became part of the Aryan culture, adopting Hinduism and its caste structure. Northern Bengal was part of the Maurya empire (c. 324–c. 200 BCE), and northern Bengal and parts of eastern Bengal also came under the control of the Gupta dynasty (c. 320–c. 500 CE). A period of anarchy followed; then from 750 to 1160 most of eastern and parts of northern Bengal were ruled by the Buddhist Pala dynasty. This period also witnessed the reigns of various petty dynasties throughout the region. In 1160 the Hindu Senas became the hegemony of almost the whole of Bengal; they ruled until their overthrow by Turkish Muslim invaders from the north in 1206. The region was



KEY EVENTS IN BANGLADESH HISTORY

- 2500 BCE** Pre-Aryan peoples known to inhabit Bangladesh.
- 600 BCE** Becomes part of the Aryan culture, adopting Hinduism and the caste structure.
- 1025 CE** First mention of Bangladesh, called Vangladesa and described as "rainy country" in an inscription.
- c. 324-c. 200 BCE** Northern Bengal falls under the Maurya dynasty.
- c. 320-c. 500 CE** Parts of northern and eastern Bengal fall under Gupta dynasty.
- 500–750 CE** Period of anarchy.
- 750–1160 CE** Most of eastern and parts of northern Bengal were ruled by the Buddhist Pala dynasty.
- 1160** Hindu Senas became hegemony of almost all of Bengal.
- 1206** Senas overthrown by Turkish Muslim invaders from the north. They convert populace to Islam.
- 14th–17th centuries** Converts to Islam settle the riverine delta of eastern Bengal.
- 17th century–1757** Bangladesh is controlled by Muslim empires (Delhi sultanate and Mughal empire).
- 1757** British conquest.
- 1757–1947** Bangladesh ruled by the British as part of India.
- 1947** Partition of India into India and Pakistan, which was divided into West Pakistan and East Pakistan.
- 1952** Language riots in East Pakistan when M. A. Jinnah tries to impose Urdu as the national language. Several students are killed, and hope for a united Pakistan fades.
- 1954** Awami Muslim League party attempts to sustain a democratic government in East Pakistan, but this is shut down by the federal government who accuses the Chief Minister of anti-Pakistani activities.
- 1956** Framing of the Constitution of 1956, which asserted the dominance of Punjab as the most important Pakistani state.
- 1958** General Ayub Khan stages a military takeover of Pakistan and installs himself as President of a new "limited" democracy where 40,000 Muslims were selected to vote and delegate money. This alienates the Eastern Pakistanis, deepens the spending gap between West and East Pakistan, and creates incredible grassroots corruption.
- 1964** Mujib, a leader of the Awami Muslim League party, becomes an outspoken advocate for Bangladeshi autonomy, despite being incarcerated almost continuously between 1959 and 1969.
- 1965** Ayub Khan attacks India over Jammu and Kashmir. East Pakistanis denounce India and fight bravely.
- 1966** Mujib announces the famous Six-Point Program, demanding full autonomy for all provinces of Pakistan and special paramilitary troops and separate currency for East Pakistan to stop further flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. Mujib is incarcerated again. The massive press coverage introduces the concept of breaking away from West Pakistan to most Bengalis.
- 1969** Ayub Khan is forced to resign after signing a peace treaty with India.
- 1970** Mujib is released and his party wins an absolute majority in the National Assembly for Pakistan elections (162/300 seats). Instead of transferring power to Mujib, General Yahya Khan, the new president of Pakistan, succumbed to the pressure of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928–1979), who won eighty-three seats in West Pakistan. Bhutto wanted power to be transferred to the two "majority leaders" in the two parts of Pakistan.
- 1971** Bengali masses under student leadership started a movement for total independence; Mujib asks for non-violent civil disobedience. Pakistani troops start indiscriminately killing Bangladeshis, and arrest Mujib. Major Ziaur Rahman officially declares independence, and on 10 December, Bangladesh gains its independence.
- 1972** Mujib is released and becomes Prime Minister.
- 1975** Mujib and most of his family killed during a coup d'état; the populace celebrated as the inexperienced Mujib and his administration had caused considerable damage to the country. General Zia (the same Major who declared independence) takes power and later is actually elected.
- 1981** Zia is killed.
- 1982** Hussain Muhammad Ershad takes power.
- 1988** Ershad introduces Islam as a state religion.
- 1990** Corrupt Ershad regime is overthrown.
- 1991** Neutral caretaker government holds elections, Mujib's daughter Sheikh Hasina contests them after failing to win a majority.
- 1996** Sheikh Hasina wins election, accepts results.

Islamized under the influence of various Sufi saints, who helped non-Aryan peasant cultivators bring forestland under cultivation. They introduced both the Qur'an and the plow to their new converts, who settled the riverine delta of eastern Bengal from the fourteenth through the seventeenth centuries.

Muslim empires (the Delhi sultanate and the Mughal empire) controlled Bengal for about 200 years, until the British conquest in 1757. Bengal was part of British India until independence and partition in 1947.

East Bengal at the Time of Partition

The genesis of Bangladesh was inherent in the body politic of Pakistan, as the two parts of Pakistan in 1947 had begun on uneven terms. While the western part was already more developed, urban, and industrialized, with a better land-person ratio and communication network than the eastern part, the mass immigration of Hindu business people and professionals to India after the partition further impoverished the eastern part. In contrast to East Bengal, the western part of Pakistan got a generous flow of capital from thousands of rich Muslim emigrants from India who later industrialized the region. Besides the natural advantages of the western part and the inflow of capital from the Muslim Indian emigrants, West Pakistan's discriminatory policy against East Bengal further enriched the west at the cost of the east. It was generally believed that while East Bengal was earning more than 60 percent of Pakistan's total foreign exchange up to the mid-1960s, it received less than 30 percent of the total import and always had a trade deficit with West Pakistan. West Pakistanis held 80 percent or more of the key positions in the civil and military departments in Pakistan. Thus East Bengal practically became a colony of West Pakistan not long after the creation of Pakistan.

Despite their decisive role in the creation of Pakistan and unflinching support for the nation, most East Bengali Muslims were viewed by West Pakistanis as non-martial, inferior, untrustworthy, and lacking the qualities of good Muslims. East Bengalis faced discrimination, contempt, and condescension from West Pakistanis. What started with the arrogance of M. A. Jinnah (1876–1948), the founding father of Pakistan, trying (in 1948) to impose Urdu (the minority language) as the state language of the nation on the majority Bengalis led to the so-called language riots in 1952.

Separatist Movement Begins

In February 1952 Pakistani police killed several unarmed Bengali students at Dhaka for demonstrating in favor of Bengali as one of the state languages of Pak-

istan. The Language Movement organized by Bengali students signaled the beginning of the end of a united Pakistan; afterward Bengalis' estrangement from West Pakistan gradually turned into a separatist movement.

Meanwhile, some Bengali stalwarts of the Muslim League Party, which spearheaded the drive for an independent Muslim Pakistan in the 1940s, organized the People's, or Awami, Muslim League (called the Awami League since 1954) and tried in vain to restore democracy and accountability in Pakistan. In 1954, their attempts to sustain a democratic government in East Bengal failed within a couple of months when the federal government, led by bureaucrats from Punjab, in West Pakistan, unceremoniously dismissed it on the specious charge that the chief minister had engaged in "anti-Pakistani" activities.

The military takeover of Pakistan by General Ayub Khan (1907–1974) in 1958 further alienated many Bengalis from the center, as martial law signaled the completion of the "Punjabization" of Pakistan. Soon Ayub Khan declared himself president of the republic and introduced guided "basic democracy" by disenfranchising all but eighty thousand Pakistanis (forty thousand from each part of the nation), who would elect members of the National Assembly and the president. They were also entrusted with money to spend on development projects in their localities. This bred corruption and vested interests at the grassroots level. Ayub Khan spent the lion's share of the gross national product (GNP) and foreign aid money on development projects, defense, and the new capital at Islamabad. Because the bulk of the money spent during the ten years of Ayub's regime went to West Pakistan, benefiting mostly the Punjabis, most educated Bengalis were resentful.

By 1964 most of the Bengali old guards of the opposition had died, and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib) (1920–1975) of the Awami League emerged as the most outspoken Bengali leader, championing the cause of greater autonomy for East Pakistan. With the introduction of the new constitution of Pakistan in 1956, East Bengal became East Pakistan, as the four provinces in the western sector were collectively called West Pakistan. This act, to the chagrin of East Bengalis and people of Sind, Northwestern Frontier, and Baluchistan in the western wing, signaled the ascendancy of West Punjab, the most populous and dominant province in the western wing, as the dominant province of Pakistan. Another demagogue was the not-so-educated, grassroots-based Maulana Bhashani (1880–1976), who in 1957 demanded independence for East Pakistan but in the mid-1960s adopted a compromising attitude toward

Ayub Khan. By then Mujib had emerged among all the prominent leaders of the province as the only champion of an autonomous East Pakistan. Ayub Khan feared Mujib most and kept him behind bars most of the time between 1958 and 1969.

While Mujib and other leaders were in jail, pro-Awami League student leaders organized a secret cell called the Bengal Liberation Front under the leadership of Sirajul Alam Khan (b. 1941). In the late 1960s and up to the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971, they played the most vital role in mobilizing support for an independent country. They coined the radical slogan "Jai Bangla" ("Victory to Bengal") in early 1969, initially to the annoyance of Mujib. They first unfurled the national flag of Bangladesh and persuaded Mujib to hold it in public in March 1971.

Pakistan in the 1960s was going through a difficult time. It annoyed the United States, an old ally and benefactor, by supporting Chinese aggression toward India and afterward by establishing a special friendship with China. At home, Bengalis had been a constant pain in the neck for Islamabad. By 1965, Ayub Khan was convinced that a war with sworn enemy India was winnable. Consequently, he went to war against India with the goal of occupying Indian-occupied Kashmir—a goal that, if achieved, would have given him both legitimacy and lifelong popularity in both parts of Pakistan. During the 1965 India-Pakistan War, East Pakistani Muslims forgot their internal differences with West Pakistan and denounced India, the common "Hindu enemy," as the aggressor. Pakistan, however, did not gain any long-term benefit from the anti-Indian feelings of most Bengalis.

Soon Bengalis realized that the government of Pakistan on the one hand had not made adequate defense arrangements for their province and, on the other hand, did not trust or treat them well, despite Bengali soldiers' heroic performance in the war with India in the disputed Punjab region. Consequently, in February 1966, Mujib announced the famous Six-Point Program, demanding full autonomy for all provinces of Pakistan and special paramilitary troops and separate currency for East Pakistan to stop further flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. Contrary to Ayub Khan's expectations, the Six-Point Program received enormous support from Bengalis. Soon Mujib was incarcerated and implicated in the so-called Agartala Conspiracy to dismember Pakistan with Indian help. The wide media coverage of the Agartala trial proceedings aroused mass enthusiasm in East Pakistan, and the average Bengali no longer abhorred the idea of breaking away from West Pakistan. By early 1969

Ayub Khan had become unpopular even in West Pakistan for signing a peace treaty with India; he was forced to resign in March. Meanwhile, the government had to withdraw the Agartala case and release Mujib and others accused.

After his release, Mujib catapulted to the peak of his popularity. In 1970, his party won 162 out of 300 seats, an absolute majority, in elections for the National Assembly of Pakistan. The Six-Point Program was a crucial factor in winning the election. Instead of transferring power to Mujib, whose party had the absolute majority, General Yahya Khan, the new president of Pakistan, succumbed to the pressure of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928–1979), who won eighty-three seats in West Pakistan. Bhutto wanted power to be transferred to the two "majority leaders" in the two parts of Pakistan. In March 1971, Bengali masses under student leadership started a movement for total independence.

On March 7 Mujib addressed a mammoth public meeting in Dhaka. On the one hand, he asked the Bengalis to start a nonviolent, Gandhian campaign of non-cooperation against Islamabad, and on the other hand, he declared that "this time the struggle is for independence." Soon Yahya and Bhutto came to Dhaka, and Mujib had several rounds of talks with them. While people were getting mixed signals about the outcome of the talks, on March 25 Pakistani troops began indiscriminate killing of Bengalis, initially in Dhaka and later everywhere in East Pakistan in the name of preserving the integrity of Pakistan. Before Mujib could react, Pakistani troops arrested him and took him to West Pakistan.

On March 27 a Bengali major, Ziaur Rahman (1936–1981), formally declared independence for Bangladesh over radio at Chittagong, approximately 280 kilometers from Dhaka. Meanwhile, Bengali civilians and members of the armed forces had started the liberation struggle without waiting for any declaration. Ten million Bengalis took refuge in India. Finally, with Indian armed intervention, Bangladesh was liberated on 16 December 1971. In January 1972 Mujib was released and on his return he became prime minister of Bangladesh. However, his tenure of three and a half years proved disastrous for both the nation and his image. In August 1975 some disgruntled young army officers staged a coup d'état and killed him and most of his immediate family. The people who had once admired Mujib as their deliverer from Pakistani misrule, instead of condemning the military takeover and his assassination, celebrated the end of autocracy and one-party dictatorship. The inexperienced Mujib

and his associates with similar lower-middle-class and peasant backgrounds had bungled the administration and economy by nationalizing the profit-making privately run industries and financial institutions in the name of socialism and by engaging in corruption, nepotism, and terror.

General Rahman Assumes Power

In November 1975, General Ziaur Rahman (Zia), who first declared the independence of Bangladesh, assumed power in the wake of a mass civil and military upsurge against an attempted pro-Awami League military takeover. He was later elected president and soon emerged as the most popular, honest, and dynamic president of the republic. Whereas the civilian Mujib, known for his love for democracy, had introduced one-party dictatorship, the soldier Zia restored multiparty democracy. He also introduced market economy and shunned "socialism" and "secularism," which had been two of Mujib's Four State Principles along with "nationalism" and "democracy."

Zia's assassination in an abortive military takeover in 1981 by a group of ambitious military officers opposed to Zia's civilianization attempts was followed by a successful military takeover under General Hussain Muhammad Ershad (b. 1930) in 1982. Like Zia, Ershad used Islam to legitimize his regime. Whereas Zia had used Islamic rhetoric, Ershad in 1988 introduced Islam as the state religion by amending the secular constitution. Mujib had failed to understand that although most Bengali Muslims supported Bangladesh, they were less prepared to accept socialism, let alone secularism, as state principles. He should have remembered how they condemned India in support of Pakistan in 1965 during the heyday of Bengalis' struggle for provincial autonomy. Besides the traditional Indophobia or Hinduphobia of East Bengali Muslims, the abysmal failure of Mujib's government to restore law and order and decent living standards for the majority, let alone to attain the promised "Golden Bengal" through socialism and secularism, drew the population to Islamism not long after independence as an alternative to the elusive and counterproductive state ideologies of secularism and socialism. Both Islamic and secular opponents of Mujib exploited the Islamic sentiment of the people to gain legitimacy and political leverage. Globally, poor Muslims in the wake of the Cold War are leaning toward political Islam, and Bangladeshi Muslims are no exceptions.

Since the overthrow of the corrupt military regime of Ershad in 1990, the nation has held three rounds of parliamentary elections under "neutral" caretaker

governments, in 1991 and 1996. Sheikh Hasina (Mujib's daughter; b. 1947) and her Awami League party contested the 1991 elections only to reject the outcome after she failed to get the required majority seats to become prime minister. Finally, in 1996, she succeeded in becoming prime minister after organizing a vitriolic campaign through nationwide general strikes against the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Khaleda Zia (widow of Zia; b. 1945) of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Whereas the former has portrayed the latter as "anti-Liberation" or "pro-Pakistani," the latter, along with other opponents of the Awami League, has portrayed the former as "anti-Islamic" and "pro-India."

The ascendancy of the nouveau riche "vernacular elite" (peasant and lower middle class) as political leaders signals the ascent of clannish, factional, patron-client values at the cost of modern, urban, and middle-class values. Lower-middle-class and peasant leaders of the Awami League, in the name of Bengali nationalism, have displaced dominant Muslim middle and upper classes, who again benefited most by replacing dominant Hindu middle and upper classes that left after the partition of 1947. Meanwhile, due to the corruption and inefficiency of both politicians and bureaucrats, education, political institutions, democratic values, and the economy are degenerating. Political unrest and killing of political opponents and others, at the cost of law and order, education, and stability of the nation, have become the norms. Mutual trust, an essential for democracy, development, and a market economy, is grossly lacking. It is for that reason that parliamentary elections since 1991 have been held under caretaker governments for the sake of transparency—although the losing parties in 1991 and 1996 rejected the election results as rigged and manipulated. Overseas donors prefer to give aid money to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which are supposed to represent honest members of society, rather than to "corrupt" politicians and government servants. However, there are allegations about rampant NGO corruption, lack of accountability, and lack of transparency.

In sum, Bangladesh is a Third World nation that had good beginnings and potential to grow after independence but instead stagnated and suffered. The most legitimate question is why, despite the end of West Pakistani exploitation, 50 percent of the population live below the poverty line. The simple explanation would be mismanagement and corruption at every level of administration. There are other unanswered questions regarding the roles of Mujib, Bhutto, and the Pakistani military junta in the creation of Bangladesh. As it appears from *The American Papers*,

hitherto classified state papers, Mujib did not want the dismemberment of Pakistan because, he feared, it would lead to a Communist takeover of East Bengal. Other documents suggest that he wanted to become prime minister of Pakistan and end the exploitation and deprivation of East Pakistan by Islamabad. It is curious that for the sake of the integrity of Pakistan, the Pakistani occupation army indiscriminately killed Bengalis, actions that would antagonize even the most ardent supporters of a united Pakistan. It is equally curious that eventually Bhutto and the army abandoned East Pakistan by waging an unwinnable war against India, by which time most Bengalis had already committed to Bangladesh. These premeditated acts suggest that for various reasons, especially fear of the specter of Bengali domination, neither Bhutto nor the military junta was any longer interested in keeping the two parts together.

Taj I. Hashmi

See also: **Bangladesh Political System; Rahman, Mujibur**

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BANGLADESH-POLITICAL SYSTEM

Since winning its independence from Pakistan in 1971, Bangladesh has seen periods of presidential and parliamentary democracy and of civilian and military authoritarianism. Until 1947 Bengal was under British imperial rule, and with the partition and independence of India in 1947, the territory that eventually became Bangladesh formed the eastern province of Pakistan. Known as East Bengal until 1955, the province was called East Pakistan from 1955 to 1971.

Colonial Heritage

The Government of India Act, passed by the British Parliament in 1935, provided what it called "provincial autonomy" to the several provinces of British India. The act took effect on 1 April 1937.

The electoral system prescribed in the act contained two elements that affected political development. First, it did not provide universal adult suffrage. To qualify to vote a person had to meet certain educational or tax-paying levels, although the levels were lowered from those stipulated in the previous act of 1919. In Bengal and elsewhere many adults were excluded from the franchise. In Bengal those excluded were most often Muslim peasants in the Muslim majority areas of eastern Bengal. Second, the act continued the system of "separate electorates." Under this system the several religious communities were allotted a specific number of seats in the legislature, and the electors of those seats belonged exclusively to that religious community. In other words, Muslims voted for Muslims, Hindus for Hindus, and so on. As Muslims formed the majority of the population in Bengal, it might be assumed that the Bengal legislative assembly would have a Muslim majority among its members. This, however, was not the case. Of 250 seats, only 119 were designated Muslim, while 80 were designated "general," that is, Hindu, and a substantial number of seats were reserved for special categories, such as labor, commerce and industry, and landholders. There were also a large number of seats for Europeans. The Muslim League governing Pakistan continued the practice of separate electorates, and the 1954 East Bengal provincial election was held under that system.

The careers of three prominent Muslim political leaders of this period had profound effects on politics after Pakistan's independence in 1947. Fazl-ul Haq (1873–1962), a lawyer from the small town of Barisal, was known as "Sher-i-Bangla" (Lion of Bengal). Lead-

ing the Krishak Praja Party (KPP, Farmers' People's Party), the vehicle of the eastern Bengal Muslim agriculturists, small traders, and professionals, Fazl-ul Haq served as premier of Bengal from 1937 to 1943. Khwaja Sir Nazimuddin (1894–1964), a member of the landholding Nawab family of Dhaka, was the Bengali leader of the Muslim League and was premier from 1943 to 1945. Husain Shahid Suhrawardy (1893–1963), also then of the Muslim League, was the scion of a prominent political and intellectual family based in Calcutta. He was premier from 1946 to 1947.

Nazimuddin was described as a member of the "national elite," a group that generally addressed national Muslim issues but appeared to neglect the local issues of Bengal. Suhrawardy began to withdraw from the "national elite" during his tenure as prime minister and, as partition approached in 1947, sponsored an unsuccessful plan to create a Bengal dominion separate from India and Pakistan. He also worked to broaden the Muslim League's base of support among Bengali Muslims. After Pakistan's independence, he founded the Awami League (People's League) to expand participation in politics, and he strongly supported joint electorates as opposed to the separate electorates retained by the Muslim League governments of Pakistan. Fazl-ul Haq was the leader of what has been described as the "vernacular elite," based on the use of the Bengali language and concerned first with Bengali interests, not the least of which was the abolition of landlordism. Interestingly the three men are buried in adjacent graves in Dhaka.

The Pakistan Period


The period from 1947 to 1971 in Pakistan saw first a parliamentary form of government in which the parliament was not directly elected. With the early death of the leader of the Pakistan movement and the nation's first governor general, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), followed by the assassination of the first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan (1895–1951), the government became unstable. It was unable to enact a constitution until 1956, and the electoral provisions of that constitution eventually ignited East Pakistani anger. The concept of "parity" meant that East and West Pakistan elected the same number of representatives to the legislature even though the population of East Pakistan was greater than that of West Pakistan (the ratio was about 7 to 6 in 1971).

East Pakistanis felt they were shortchanged by the constitutional arrangements, felt poorly represented in the civil and military services, and resented the greater investments made in West Pakistan. As early as 1954 Bengali grievances had been put forward by the United

Front, a combination of the Awami League and Fazl-ul Haq's renamed Krishak Sramik Party (KSP, Farmers' and Workers' Party), which crushed the Muslim League in provincial elections that year.

In 1958 the military coup of Muhammad Ayub Khan (1907–1974) dismissed the elected government and eliminated the East Pakistan Legislative Assembly as a base of protest. In addition Khan curtailed the press and disqualified certain political figures, including Suhrawardy and Fazl-ul Haq.

Mujibur Rahman (1920–1975), who was called "Sheikh Mujib," became de facto leader of the Awami League on the death of Suhrawardy. In 1966 Mujib proposed six points that would, in his view, redress the apparent inequalities between West and East Pakistan. He suggested that (1) the federal parliamentary government provide free and regular elections; (2) the federal government control only defense and foreign



Public political protests are a common feature of politics in Bangladesh. Here, opposition leader Khaleda Zia leads a road march in September 1999 to protest the government's decision to allow Indian goods to be shipped across Bangladesh. (AFP/CORBIS)



PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF BANGLADESH

(In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful)

We, the people of Bangladesh, having proclaimed our Independence on the 26th day of March, 1971 and through [a historic war for national independence], established the independent, sovereign People's Republic of Bangladesh;

[Pledging that the high ideals of absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah, nationalism, democracy and socialism meaning economic and social justice, which inspired our heroic people to dedicate themselves to, and our brave martyrs to sacrifice their lives in the war for national independence, shall be fundamental principles of the Constitution;]

Further pledging that it shall be a fundamental aim of the State to realise through the democratic process to socialist society, free from exploitation—a society in which the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedom, equality and justice, political, economic and social, will be secured for all citizens;

Affirming that it is our sacred duty to safeguard, protect and defend this Constitution and to maintain its supremacy as the embodiment of the will of the people of Bangladesh so that we may prosper in freedom and may make our full contribution towards international peace and co-operation in keeping with the progressive aspirations of mankind;

In our Constituent Assembly, this eighteenth day of Kartick, 1379 B.S corresponding to the fourth day of November, 1972 A.D., do hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this Constitution.

Source: Government of Bangladesh. Retrieved 11 April 2002, from: <http://www.bangladeshgov.org/pmo/constitution>.

affairs; (3) a separate currency or separate fiscal accounts for each province control the movement of capital from east to west; (4) all power of taxation be at the provincial level, with the federal government subsisting on grants from the provinces; (5) each federating unit enter into foreign trade agreements on its own and control the foreign exchange earned; and (6) each unit raise its own militia.

Demand for Autonomy Leads to Independence

Ayub fell in 1969 and was replaced by another general, Muhammad Yahya Khan (1917–1980). Yahya promised an end to martial law, an election, and a new constitution. He proposed an election held on the ba-

sis of population, giving East Pakistan a majority of 162 seats in the constituent assembly of three hundred, and the addition of thirteen seats for women. He kept his promise on the election, which was held in December 1970. Mujib's Awami League won 160 seats, all in East Pakistan, giving it a majority in the assembly, and Mujib insisted on the full inclusion of his six points in the constitution. Yahya objected to the one that would allow only the provincial governments to levy taxes. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928–1979), whose People's Party had won a majority in West Pakistan, also opposed Mujib's points.

Negotiations failed, and the Pakistani army struck in East Pakistan on 25 March 1971. Mujib was among

those arrested. In the subsequent armed conflict, the Bangladeshi Mukti Bahini (Freedom Force) faced the Pakistani forces. India supported Bangladesh and joined the conflict in early December 1971. (This is the date India admits; Pakistan claims the intervention took place in late November.) The conflict ended with the Pakistani surrender on 16 December 1971.

After Independence

Mujib returned to Bangladesh in January 1971, and the Bangladesh Parliament passed a democratic constitution with a parliamentary form of government embodying the basic principals of nationalism, secularism, socialism, and democracy. However, much of the country had been devastated during the conflict, and the people governing it were inexperienced. Poor governance and heightened corruption made the regime increasingly unpopular despite the overwhelming victory of the Awami League in 1973. The victory came amid numerous reports of election rigging.

In January 1975 the parliament supported Mujib's suggestion to change from a parliamentary form to a presidential form of government with Mujib as president. In June he declared Bangladesh a one-party state under the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League, combining the names of the parties founded by Suhrawardy and Fazl-ul Haq. Mujib was assassinated by disgruntled army officers on 15 August 1975.

A brief civilian government followed, but in November another army uprising was put down. At that point a martial-law government (oddly headed by a civilian) was put in place, supported by the strongman Major General Ziaur Rahman (1936–1981), known as Zia. He assumed the presidency in 1977 and was elected to the office in 1978. Parliamentary elections were held in 1979, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), formed as a vehicle for Zia, won a two-thirds majority. The Awami League was a distant second. Zia initiated a nineteen-point program for the economic and social development of the country that was well under way when he was assassinated in May 1981 in an attempted coup led by a disaffected army officer.

Zia was succeeded by his vice president, Abdus Sattar (1906–1985). Not as strong a leader as Zia, Sattar allowed the BNP to factionalize. Nonetheless, he was elected president in November 1982, defeating an Awami League candidate.

Sattar was ousted from the presidency by a military coup on 24 March 1982 headed by Hussain Muhammad Ershad (b. 1930), and Bangladesh fell into a military dictatorship. General elections in 1986 and 1988

did not change the character of the administration, as Ershad formed the Jatiya Party (JP, another translation of People's Party) as his vehicle and remained the strongman. He adopted Zia's program in effect but did not democratize the system. Opposition was strong, led by Khaleda Zia (b. 1945), Zia's widow, of the BNP and Hasina Wajid (b. 1947), Mujib's daughter, of the Awami League. Although the two women were rivals, they came together in late 1990 to force the resignation of Ershad in December of that year.

In the subsequent election in 1991 Khaleda and the BNP gained a plurality and formed a government with the support of the Jama'at-e-Islami (JI) even though the JI did not join the government. Opposition from the Awami League was intense, making governance difficult. The league demanded new elections under a "neutral caretaker government." Granted this concession, the Awami League was successful in the election in June 1996 and formed a coalition government with the JP. Nevertheless, amid continuing strenuous opposition, good governance has not been the hallmark of the Awami League coalition, as it was not of the BNP government previously.

However, the BNP government managed a notable achievement. The system changed from a presidential democracy to a parliamentary democracy, returning to the original principle of the first independent government. The Awami League completed its term of office in July 2001.

Craig Baxter

See also: Awami League; Bangladesh Nationalist Party; Bangladesh-Pakistan Relations; British Indian Empire; Jatiya Party; Mughal Empire

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Protestors in Dhaka participate in a 30-hour strike to protest the government's decision to allow India to ship goods across Bangladesh. The protest was led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. (AFP/CORBIS)

BANGLADESH NATIONALIST PARTY

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) was formed in 1978 under the name JAGODAL (Bengali acronym for People's Party) as a political vehicle to support Bangladesh president Ziaur Rahman (Zia). The titular leader was Abdus Sattar (who succeeded Zia as president when the latter was assassinated in 1981). The party's program is embodied in the nineteen points of Zia that outlined the direction Bangladesh should take in political, economic, and social development. It also strongly emphasizes Bangladeshi nationalism as opposed to a wider Bengali nationhood. The party won more than two-thirds of the parliamentary seats in 1979. The Sattar presidency was weak and was overthrown in 1982 by General Hussain Muhammad Ershad. Looking for stronger leadership, the BNP called upon Khaleda Zia, the widow of Ziaur Rahman, who continued the program and was unstinting in her opposition to Ershad as well as to Awami League leader Hasina Wajid. While the two leaders combined briefly to cause Ershad's resignation in 1990, they have since opposed each other in elections and governance. The BNP won a plurality in the 1991 parliamentary election and formed the government with the support of the Jama'at-i-Islami, but it finished second to the Awami League in the 1996 election. The animosity between the BNP and the Awami

League has decreased the effectiveness of the government.

Craig Baxter

See also: **Awami League**

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BANGLADESH-INDIA RELATIONS

Bangladesh-India relations are peculiar because Bangladesh is bounded by India on three sides—north, east, and west, except for a small portion on the east, where it borders Myanmar (Burma). Bangladesh depends on India for harnessing the resources of the Bay of Bengal, which forms its southern boundary, as well as for providing safe international water routes for trade and commerce. India and Bangladesh share many things due to their geographic proximity: both regions experienced British colonialism, and both have numerous cultural linkages. Both countries lie in the basins of the Ganges and Brahmaputra (known as

the Jamuna in Bangladesh) Rivers, on which they both depend.

Early Relations

Bangladesh gained independence from Pakistan in 1971. Bangladesh–India relations began on a positive note when in March 1972 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1917–1984) was given a rousing welcome in Bangladesh’s capital, Dhaka, by Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1920–1975), who expressed his country’s gratitude for India’s role in the creation of Bangladesh. The two signed the twenty-five-year Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Peace on 19 March 1972 in Dhaka. According to the terms of the treaty both governments determined to maintain good neighborly relations in a spirit of peace and friendship. The two leaders resolved to eliminate the vestiges of colonialism, racism, and imperialism. During the regime of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, New Delhi and Dhaka signed an interim agreement to share the waters of the Ganges River.

Hard-line nationalists and conservative Muslims in Bangladesh accused Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of tilting government policy heavily in favor of India. After his assassination during a coup d’état on 15 August 1975, Bangladesh–India relations grew much more tense. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s successor, General Ziaur Rahman (1936–1981), ruled Bangladesh from November 1975 to May 1981; unlike his predecessor he was unfavorably disposed toward India.

Tensions started building between the two countries, mainly because of the strong influence of the general’s ultra-left and right-wing supporters, who were anti-India. Rahman’s fear that India might attempt to destabilize his government impelled him to forge close strategic and security ties with the United States, Pakistan, and China, with a view to containing Indian influence in the subcontinent. Bangladesh also started buying weapons from China, a move that irked India. Border skirmishes in 1976 produced further deterioration in India-Bangladesh relations. The Indian government of Morarji Desai (1896–1995; in power 1977–1979) staunchly opposed cross-border migration and smuggling from Bangladesh, which also strained ties.

Relations in the 1980s

The change in regime in Bangladesh following Rahman’s assassination in 1981 and the military coup staged by General H. M. Ershad (b. 1930) in March 1982 contributed more irritants to bilateral relations. Nevertheless, a protocol on inland water transit was signed in 1984 to provide for the development and

maintenance of inland waterways. During the Ershad regime, several outstanding unresolved bilateral issues surfaced. These included the repatriation of Bangladeshi Chakama refugees; transfer of the Teen Bigha corridor (a piece of land 85 by 178 meters in area) in the eastern vicinity of West Bengal, and Ganges water sharing on the Farakka barrage, located across the Bhagirathi-Hooghly Rivers in Calcutta.

The Chakama refugees from the Chittagong Hill tracts in southern Bangladesh started pouring into the Indian state of Tripura as early as 1986 in the wake of the looting of their lands and their forced dislocation by dominant Bangladeshi Muslims. The Indian government gave them shelter and humanitarian assistance, a considerable financial burden. India urged Bangladesh to repatriate the refugees, who were creating internal security problems because of their smuggling and drug-trafficking activities in northeastern India and because of the refugees’ connections with Indian militant groups in the states of Assam, Tripura, Manipur, and Nagaland. This issue was ultimately resolved in February 1997 at the initiative of the Bangladesh government, which offered a comprehensive package for the resettlement of refugee nationals who returned to their homeland.

Another issue that rocked Dhaka–Delhi relations was related to the transfer of the Teen Bigha corridor to Bangladesh to facilitate access of Bangladeshis to the Angarpota and Dahagram areas. This issue was amicably settled when India transferred the corridor to Bangladesh on a perpetual-lease basis in June 1992. With the removal of this irritant, relations between the two countries improved considerably.

A more complex issue and constant source of friction between Bangladesh and India was the question of distribution of the Ganges’s waters after India constructed the Farraka barrage in 1975. An interim agreement on sharing the Farraka waters was signed by the two governments, enabling Bangladesh to use the maximum quantity of water needed for irrigation, except during the dry season. From time to time Bangladesh and India signed memoranda of understanding to work out the use of water, but Bangladesh accused India of not releasing sufficient water. Bangladesh’s prime minister, Begum Khalida Zia (served 1991–1996; 2001–present), sought to internationalize this issue by raising it at the U.N. in October 1995, while arguing that unilateral withdrawal of waters by India had created severe problems of desertification, environmental degradation, and unemployment in her country. This issue was later amicably resolved when the Bangladeshi prime minister Sheikh Hasina (served 1996–2001) and her Indian counterpart, H. D. Deve

Gowda, signed a thirty-year treaty on sharing the Ganges Farakka waters in New Delhi on 12 December 1996.

Current Relations

Nevertheless, Bangladesh and India still have a troubled relationship. In India's view the major issue is that the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) carries out anti-Indian activities on the soil of Bangladesh. The Indian government has accused Bangladesh of coordinating its activities with Pakistan's ISI and also of shipping weapons from Bangladesh into the northeastern states of India to supply militant groups such as the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), thus accentuating India's internal security problems. The Indian government urged Bangladesh to help stop such activities in the interest of better bilateral ties. The Hasina government reassured India that Bangladesh was taking measures to stop such activities on her country's soil.

Bangladesh favors reconciliation between India and Pakistan and considers it a crucial factor for regional peace and stability. In view of the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan in May 1998, Bangladesh favors a nonproliferation regime and strongly supports transforming South Asia into a nuclear-weapon-free zone, contrary to the Indian stance. Bangladesh is eager to have the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation address the common problems of poverty, hunger, unemployment, and economic instability facing the countries of this region. Both Bangladesh and India share similar views on this issue.

Despite the problems between the two countries, India and Bangladesh have an opportunity to work together in economic and trade areas and to harness the natural resources of both countries for their mutual benefit. Together the two must sort out the problem of the demarcation of maritime boundaries through mutual consultation so that their respective economic interests can be protected by judiciously sharing the products and resources of the area. They must come to an understanding on the geostrategic, geopolitical, and security issues they face in order to maintain a positive and friendly relationship.

B. M. Jain

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BANGLADESH-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

Bangladesh–Pakistan relations make a compelling study for a variety of reasons. The countries share a common history and religion as well as strong fraternal ties. Bangladesh, formerly known as East Pakistan, was part of Pakistan from Pakistan's independence in 1947 until December 1971, when Bangladesh became an independent and sovereign state after a prolonged civil war. East and West Pakistan were geographically separated by a distance of one thousand miles of Indian territory, and, despite their shared history, they had very different cultures and languages. Economically, the plight of the people of East Pakistan was far worse than that of their counterparts in West Pakistan. This led to deepening domestic unrest, as did the neglect that East Pakistan's Bangla Muslims suffered at the hands of Pakistan's ruling elite.

On 7 December 1970, East Pakistan's Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the head of the Awami League Party, won elections with an overwhelming majority in East Pakistan and a comfortable majority in the Pakistan National Assembly, but Yahya Khan (1917–1980), Pakistan's president, and his military advisers refused to let Sheikh Mujibur Rahman form a government. In March 1971, Pakistan's army was called in to put down a revolt in East Pakistan. Other factors provoking the revolt included West Pakistan's economic exploitation of East Pakistan; the lack of adequate participation by Bengali Muslims in the central administration; and the excessive number of West Pakistanis in top civil and military bureaucratic positions. India offered military support to East Pakistan's Mukti Bahini (Freedom Fighters), and Pakistan's Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi ultimately surrendered to Indian forces. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman became the first prime minister of independent Bangladesh.

Bangladesh–Pakistan relations in the very beginning were marked by mutual apathy and coolness; psychologically, Pakistan was reluctant to accept Bangladesh as a sovereign nation. During the regime of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (president of Bangladesh from December 1971 to 1972 in absentia; prime minister 1972–1975), relations between the two countries were at the lowest ebb. Although Pakistan's Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928–1979) visited Bangladesh in June 1974, he failed to bridge persisting differences on issues such as the repatriation of stranded Bihari Muslims to Pakistan and the division of assets and foreign debt. With the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rah-

man on 15 August 1975, hopes were raised in Pakistan for friendship and cooperation with Bangladesh. The pro-India stance of Mujib (as Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was known) was soon replaced by an anti-India stance under the military regime of President Ziaur Rahman (1936–1981). This change helped patch up Bangladesh's differences with Pakistan.

It was at the initiative of President Ziaur Rahman that the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was set up in December 1985; its first summit was held in Dhaka, Bangladesh's capital. At the summit meetings, leaders from seven countries of the South Asian region discussed bilateral and regional issues. They expressed a desire to oppose Indian hegemony in South Asia and shared a common perception of India as a threat to regional peace, security, and stability.


Relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan were also helped by the installation of a democratically elected government in Pakistan in November 1988, under the leadership of Benazir Bhutto (b. 1953). As Pakistan's prime minister, she visited Bangladesh in October 1989 and was accorded a warm welcome by President Hussain Muhammad Ershad (b. 1930). Both leaders agreed to resolve the repatriation issue amicably and to consolidate their fraternal ties for the economic well-being of their peoples. Bhutto underlined the long-term importance of bilateral economic and trade relations. Ershad and Bhutto agreed to set up sugar and cement plants in Bangladesh, and Bangladesh agreed to provide technical assistance to Pakistan in the field of telecommunication and electronics.

Era of Friendship

The early 1990s saw changes in regimes in both Bangladesh and Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif (b. 1949) became Pakistan's prime minister in November 1990, and Begum Khilda Zia (b. 1945) became the prime minister of a democratic government in Bangladesh in March 1991. Friendship and cooperation blossomed between the two countries. Sharif reassured Bangladesh of Pakistan's support in setting up profitable joint ventures. Prime Minister Sharif, during his official visit to Dhaka in May 1991, offered help to the cyclone-affected people of Bangladesh in the form of rice, clothing, medicines, and tents, as well as a check for twenty million rupees. In addition, frequent meetings between Begum Zia and Sharif at the SAARC summit in New Delhi (May 1991), the Harare Commonwealth summit (December 1991), and the Organization of Islamic Conference Summit at Dakar (December 1991) helped consolidate mutual ties and develop a coherent and cooperative approach to re-

gional issues, especially on Kashmir, nuclear nonproliferation, and arms control. Zia made a second visit to Islamabad in August 1992, during which she discussed a wide range of issues with Sharif, including trade, commerce, and social and cultural interaction between common peoples of both countries. They reiterated their firm commitment to the idea of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia.

During the second government of Nawaz Sharif (1997–October 1999), Bangladesh-Pakistan relations were marked by increasing interaction between Sharif and Prime Minister Zia, and then between Sharif and Bangladesh's newly elected prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wajed (b. 1947). Prime Minister Hasina Wajed visited Islamabad in June 1998, after the May nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan. She discussed the nuclear situation in South Asia and appealed to both countries to exercise nuclear restraint and resolve the Kashmir issue amicably through peaceful negotiation.



A Bangladeshi man dressed as Pakistan leader General Pervez Musharraf participates in a protest in Dhaka in September 2000. The Bangladeshis are protesting the atrocities committed by Pakistan army in 1971 during the war that led to Bangladesh's independence. (AFP/CORBIS)

Strained Relations

With the installation of a military regime in Pakistan in October 1999, relations between Dhaka and Islamabad began to deteriorate. Sheikh Hasina's personal dislike for the military regime in Pakistan was apparent when she delivered her speech at the United Nations Millennium Summit in New York, staunchly opposing dictatorial regimes everywhere and advocating the revival of democracy and the safeguarding of human rights globally. General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's president, was offended by her comments. Their relations were further strained when sections of the Hamoodur Commission Report, written in Pakistan, on the causes of Pakistan's military defeat in 1971 were made public. The report held that by not transferring power to East Pakistan's duly elected representatives, Yahaya Khan and his top military aides were responsible for the political turmoil created in 1971. Pakistan's deputy high commissioner, Ifranun Rahaman Raza, further inflamed the situation while speaking at a seminar in Dhaka on 27 November 2000, when he made highly controversial remarks about the liberation war in Bangladesh. He said that the atrocities of genocide and rape perpetrated in 1971 in East Pakistan were ignited by Awami League miscreants, not by Pakistani forces, and he discounted any possibility of Pakistan's apologizing to Bangladesh for the actions of the Pakistani army in 1971. In the wake of these remarks, he was declared *persona non grata* by the government of Bangladesh. The Pakistani government recalled him immediately. Some of the party leaders of the Awami League demanded a boycott of Pakistani goods, but Sheikh Hasina refused to take such a drastic action. Musharraf urged Bangladesh to set aside the tragic past, but Pakistan's military regime revived old misgivings that Pakistan has not yet been reconciled to the reality of Bangladesh as a sovereign and independent nation.

B. M. Jain

See also: **Awami League; India-Pakistan Relations**

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BANGSAWAN *Bangsawan* is a form of Malay theater that first came into existence during British colonial rule. It was most popular between 1900 and 1945

but nearly ceased to exist in the 1950s, having failed to compete with other forms of entertainment like films, radio, and television. Today, the Malaysian Ministry of Arts, Culture, and Tourism sponsors the few existing *bangsawan* groups to ensure that *bangsawan* lives as a national heritage and treasure.

Bangsawan is believed to have begun in Penang, Malaya, in the 1870s. It was developed by Wayang Parsi, an Indian theatrical group. It then spread to Singapore, Sumatra in Indonesia, and parts of northern Kalimantan in Borneo, also part of Indonesia. Although *bangsa* means "race" and *wan* means "noble," there is no concrete evidence that *bangsawan* was ever attached to royal courts; there were no court troupes or royal performers. However, *bangsawan* was performed for kings and nobles.

Over the years, *bangsawan* was used as a tool of political propaganda (especially during the Japanese occupation, during which plays produced had to have anti-British sentiments) and also was used for commercial purposes.

Principal *bangsawan* roles included *orang muda* (the hero), *seri panggung* (the prima donna), comedians, the sultan, queen, king of the genies, and ministers and courtiers, hermits, warriors, and female court attendants. *Bangsawan* stories were drawn from local history as well as Middle Eastern, Indian, Chinese, Indonesian, Thai, Islamic, and Western sources. The themes often emphasized adventure, romance, and moral teachings.

Bangsawan had no script. Only the synopsis of the story was given to the cast at the outset. Actors and actresses had to be smart and quick enough to improvise dialogue and action according to the moods of the audience. The success and failure of *bangsawan* relied heavily on the prima donna, who had to be beautiful and able to sing well.

The *bangsawan* stage was much influenced by the Western concept of a closed theater, and it was the first Malay theater form to use a proscenium stage. Wings, borders, and painted backdrops were also used. *Bangsawan's* musical influences came from the Middle East, India, the West, and traditional Malaya (today's Malaysia). The costumes conformed with local settings and cultures.

Nor Faridah Abdul Manaf

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BANKING AND FINANCE INDUSTRY—SINGAPORE

Due to its role as an entrepot for Southeast Asia, Singapore has had a relatively sophisticated financial sector since its colonial period (1819–1959). Trade financing has been the most important activity of the commercial banks, most of which were and are foreign. Recognizing that sustained economic growth (which Singapore has enjoyed) is underpinned by a sound financial system, financial-sector development policy since independence in 1965 has focused on this. An additional objective has been to develop as a major financial center. These objectives have generally been achieved. Singapore's financial system is sound and stable; the country was relatively unscathed by the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, and its financial system remained intact.

Singapore is also a financial center of international repute. It pioneered the Asian dollar market in Asia (the counterpart of the Euro dollar market) in 1968 and futures trading in Asia in 1984, with the launching of the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX). The country is the fourth-largest foreign exchange trading center in the world, after London, New York, and Tokyo, with an average daily turnover of around \$100 billion. The financial sector currently contributes around 12 percent to the gross domestic product, a substantially higher rate than that of most countries, where it averages between 4 and 8 percent. Around 5 percent of the labor force is employed in this sector.

Financial Structure

At the apex of any financial system is the central bank, here the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), established in 1971 and endowed with all central-banking functions except that of currency issue. Through a coordinated policy framework that includes regulation and supervision and infrastructure and human-resource development as well as fiscal incentives, the MAS has contributed to the achievement of sustained economic growth and the development of Singapore as a major financial center.

Table 1 summarizes the present structure of financial institutions in Singapore.

Banking Services

Commercial banks, the largest providers of banking services, are divided into three categories: full, restricted, and offshore. While full-license banks provide the full range of banking services to residents and non-residents, full-license foreign banks are restricted in terms of their branch and ATM network. The country's four largest banking groups, the Development Bank of Singapore, the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation, the United Overseas Bank, and the Overseas Union Bank, account for more than 80 percent of local bank assets. Generally, the local banks, with their larger deposit base, are the net lenders in the interbank market, and the foreign banks are the net borrowers. Since 1987, commercial banks have been permitted to engage in the securities business.



The Bank of Hong Kong in Singapore, c. 1900. (UNDERWOOD & UNDERWOOD/CORBIS)

TABLE 1

Financial institutions in Singapore	
	End March 1999
Banks	142
Local	9
Foreign	133
Full banks	22
Restricted banks	13
Offshore banks	98
(Banking offices including head and main offices)	(561)
Asian currency units	205
Banks	135
Merchant banks	70
Other	-
Finance companies	15
Merchant banks	70
Insurance companies	159
Direct insurers	59
Professional insurers	49
Captive insurers	51
Representative offices	69
Banks	68
Merchant banks	-
Finance companies	1
Stockbroking companies	78
Investment advisers	148
International money brokers	9
SGX-DT members	
Corporate clearing members	33
Corporate non-clearing members	22
Individual members	520
Commercial associate members	16

SOURCE: MAS (2001: 103).

Restricted and offshore licenses were granted from the 1970s to promote offshore financial services. Their activities are somewhat restricted in the onshore or domestic market to prevent overbanking.

Any bank, with the approval of the MAS, may set up separate accounting units, which are called the Asian Currency Units (ACU), for offshore transactions. This separation is to allow for better monitoring of domestic banking transactions to ensure monetary control. ACUs enjoy preferential tax and regulatory treatment. These and other policies have boosted offshore financial activities. In 1999, ACU deposits reached \$448 billion; this compares with deposits of \$68 million when the market started in 1968.

Banking services are also provided by finance companies, all of which are local and many of which are bank affiliated. They are restricted to accepting fixed (time) and saving deposits and may, with approval of the MAS, deal in foreign exchange and gold. Their loan portfolio is concentrated in areas generally not taken up by the commercial banks, such as hire purchase (subject to an unsecured lending limit of \$5,000), leasing, and factoring. They both compete and complement the

activities of banks. Foreign participation in locally owned finance companies is restricted to 20 percent.

As a group, merchant banks (known as investment banks in some countries) are less homogeneous than commercial banks, because they specialize in one or more areas of corporate finance. In Singapore they are nondepository; they may raise funds from banks, other approved financial institutions, equity holders, and companies controlled by equity holders, and they are permitted to operate ACUs. Their number has expanded rapidly due to the growth of offshore and capital markets.

Contractual Saving Institutions

Singapore's insurance market includes fifty-nine direct insurers and hundred reinsurers and captive insurers, which provide insurance mainly for offshore business. Growth of the market has been rapid since the mid-1990s, fueled by both local and offshore demand. The life-insurance market is fairly concentrated, with the four largest companies accounting for around 90 percent of all premiums. The market for life insurance has been closed for several years to new entrants. This policy was reviewed in 2000. As with banking, there is a desire to develop a few local insurance companies that could effectively compete with foreign companies and in foreign markets.

The other important contractual saving institution is Singapore's compulsory saving scheme, the Central Provident Fund (CPF), established in 1955 to generate savings for retirement. Both employees and employers contribute monthly at prescribed rates, and the savings may be used to purchase approved assets before retirement. Due to its scale and scope, the CPF is an important financial intermediary with significant microeconomic and macroeconomic effects. Because benefits are tied to contributions, it is different from pay-as-you-go social-security systems. Surplus CPF moneys are invested in Singapore government securities, providing a noninflationary source of finance.

Capital Markets

Table 2 shows the funds raised in the capital market during the 1990s. Funds raised expanded significantly from Singapore \$9.2 billion in 1991 to reach Singapore \$24.4 billion by 1999. More significantly, the shares of equity and debt securities increased from 11.4 to 25.2 percent and 21 to 38 percent, respectively, over the period. Even so, commercial banks remain the main providers of funds, with loans amounting to Singapore \$146.5 billion in 1999. There thus is room for capital market expansion.

TABLE 2

Net funds raised in the domestic capital market (S\$ Billion)			
	1990	1995	1999
Net funds raised by government	6.2 (67.6%)	10.4 (65.7%)	9.0 (36.8%)
Capital raised by the private sector	1.1 (11.4%)	1.7 (10.6%)	6.1 (25.2%)
Issues of debt securities	1.9 (21.0%)	3.8 (23.7%)	9.3 (38.0%)
Total net funds raised	9.2	15.9	24.4

SOURCE: MAS (2001: 112).

The government-securities market was revamped in 1987 to activate secondary trading. Recent reforms, including the issue of more varied maturities, have increased turnover.

Established in 1973, the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES) expanded rapidly to become an important regional stock market. It is composed of a Main Board and an over-the-counter market, SESDAQ, a market for the equity needs of small- and medium-sized enterprises.

Financial Reforms

In mid-1997, a Financial Sector Review Group was established to review financial regulations to enable the sector to face the challenges of globalization and to develop Singapore as a premier financial center. The general direction of the reforms is toward opening up financial markets, because prices (interest and exchange rates) were deregulated during the 1970s, and product and practice liberalization is ongoing.

Liberalization of the banking sector will allow foreign banks greater access in the domestic banking sector, partly as a result of international pressure and partly to strengthen local banks. Although foreign ownership of local banks is no longer limited to 40 percent, there are safeguards to protect national interest. To reduce systemic risk, separation of financial and nonfinancial activities of banks is required.

In regard to bank regulation, the MAS has shifted its stance from regulation to supervision, with a view to reviewing the risk management processes, control systems, and asset quality of banks. In line with international best practices, higher standards of corporate governance and transparency are required to reduce information asymmetry and consequently systemic risk.

To make Singapore a leading insurance hub in Asia, the MAS has liberalized entry for direct insurers and

insurance brokers. The 49 percent limit on foreign shareholdings of locally owned direct insurers has been abolished to allow mergers and alliances with reputable foreign firms. The enhanced competition should promote efficiency.

In the capital market, the Singapore Exchange was inaugurated in 1999 following the demutualization and merger of the SES with SIMEX. Access will be fully opened from 2002, while commission rates have become fully negotiable. To add breadth and depth to the capital market, restrictions on foreign firms wishing to issue Singapore dollar bonds and transactions in Singapore dollar-denominated securities and derivatives also have been liberalized.

A Financially Strong Singapore

Over the past several decades, Singapore has achieved sustained and rapid economic growth due in part to the efficient mobilization of financial resources. Today, Singapore's fairly diversified and developed financial system not only contributes significantly to output but also reflects its role as a major financial center. Recent and ongoing financial reforms to meet the challenges of globalization are designed to maintain its competitive edge and to reduce systemic risk.

Amina Tyabji

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BANTENG The banteng (*Bos javanicus*), also called *banting*, *tsaine*, *sapi-utan*, or *tembadau*, is a bovid species distributed among Assam, Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, Malaysia, Borneo, Java, and Sumatra. It is a shy, often nocturnal, animal found in forested and dry areas. The



A pair of wild banteng oxen at the Doi Inthanon National Park in Thailand in 1994. (GALEN ROWELL/CORBIS)

banteng has been heavily hunted and is now quite rare in the wild. It is still sometimes found in regions where there is good forest cover and little human disturbance. The male is dark brown with a white patch on the rump and white stockings; the female and young are reddish brown. In Myanmar, however, the bulls are also a rufous brown. The banteng has short, rounded olive-green horns and a distinctively pointed head like a deer's. It has a hump behind the neck, but no dewlap, and ranges in height between 150 and 175 centimeters at the withers. In Bali the animal is domesticated and known as the Bali cow, and in some regions a hybrid is bred with zebu.

Paul Hockings

BAO DAI (1913–1997), last of the Nguyen emperors of Vietnam. Bao Dai was born Nguyen Phuc Vinh Thuy. Educated in France, he was crowned emperor on 8 January 1926, took the name Bao Dai ("Protector of Grandeur" or "Keeper or Preserver of Greatness"), and moved back to France at the request of the French. In 1932 the French government allowed him to return to Vietnam, where he attempted a series of reforms in the hope of establishing a modern imperial government and of convincing French officials to allow limited Vietnamese independence under his rule. France rebuffed his attempts, and the emperor settled into a lifestyle characterized by gambling, hunting, and women. During World War II, Bao Dai cooperated with the Japanese and, at their urging, proclaimed the "Empire of Vietnam," independent from France.


When the Communist-led Viet Minh took control during the August Revolution in 1945 after the Japanese withdrawal, Bao Dai abdicated his throne, became known as First Citizen Vinh Thuy, and served in the

new Viet Minh legislature. Disillusioned with the Communists, Bao Dai left Vietnam in 1946 and eventually returned to Europe. After signing the Elysée Agreements with French President Vincent Auriol on 8 March 1949, Bao Dai returned to Vietnam as head of state. He ruled Vietnam (within the French Union) through the 1954 Geneva Accords that ended the 1946–1954 war between France and Vietnam and retained his position during the first year of the new Republic of Vietnam (RVN). His administration was marked by the institutionalization of corruption, prostitution, smuggling, racketeering, and drug trafficking through his association with the Binh Xuyen gang in Saigon. After losing an election rigged in favor of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1955, Bao Dai eventually left the country and spent the majority of the rest of his life in France.

Richard B. Verrone

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Emperor Bao Dai relaxes in Paris in April 1954. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

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BARAKA *Baraka* is an important Islamic concept that describes the magical blessing that flows from a holy man or a holy place. *Baraka (barakat)* does not vanish with the death of the holy man but rather continues. Therefore, shrines of saints are venerated, and the devout can partake of blessing, which is thought to hover like an aura around the holy place. *Baraka* can also be obtained from the relics of a holy man (often his personal effects).

The strongest *baraka* comes from Mecca, the holiest city for the Islamic faith, because it is thought to be the first city created by Adam. The story goes that at Mecca Abraham erected the Kaaba, deemed to be the center of the world, where can be found the Black Stone, a potent source of *baraka*.

People who participate in the annual Hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca are thought to possess powerful *baraka*, which is said to last a lifetime (and perhaps even beyond). Holy objects obtained in Mecca are also considered a powerful source of blessing. One such object is water from the well of Zamzam. Islamic tradition states that the angel Gabriel dug Zamzam in order to save Hagar and her son Ismail from dying of thirst. Probably this tradition dates from pre-Islamic times.

Nirmal Dass

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BARISAN SOSIALIS In July 1961, Lim Chin Siong and seven pro-communist People's Action Party (PAP) members of the Legislative Assembly challenged the PAP leadership. When their challenge failed, they were expelled on 26 July 1961 and thirteen PAP assembly members and twenty-two PAP branch officials quit the party to form the Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front). The new party's officers were Lee Siew Choh, chair; Sandra Woodhull, vice chair; Lim Chin Siong, general secretary; and Ppo Soon Kai, assistant general secretary. They opposed Singapore's merger with Malaysia on the terms proposed by the PAP. In 1963, twenty-four leading members of the

Barisan Sosialis (excluding Lee Siew Choh and the other Barisan assembly members) were detained in a security operation named Cold Store, together with twenty-one trade union leaders, nineteen university graduates and undergraduates (including seventeen from Nanyang University), seven members of rural associations, and five journalists. In the 1963 general election with compulsory voting and a 95 percent turnout, the Barisan won thirteen of the fifty-one seats with 33 percent of the votes.

In 1965 the Barisan Sosialis, having given an unconvincing performance in the Hong Lim by-election of that year, was already a flaccid political force, made weaker by internal fissures. The thirteen Barisan Members of Parliament boycotted Parliament when the Constitution Amendments Bill and the Singapore Independence Bill were passed by a two-thirds majority on 22 December 1965. In 1966, eleven Barisan MPs resigned on the grounds that neither national independence nor parliamentary democracy existed in Singapore. The Barisan decided to take their struggle "against imperialist oppression" to the streets. By 1967, when they called for a general strike, only three trade unions participated and twenty-six declined, and since then Barisan has failed to secure a seat in Parliament.

Kog Yue Choong

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BASEBALL-JAPAN Baseball, perhaps the most popular sport in Japan, is played by many schoolboys and college students, and millions of spectators view professional games in ballparks and on television. Brought to Japan by Americans teaching in Tokyo in the 1870s, baseball was at first a recreational activity for college students. However, it became a serious and competitive intercollegiate and interscholastic sport by the close of the nineteenth century.

Baseball's Early Years

The first three decades of the twentieth century were the golden age of amateur baseball in Japan, and college and secondary school tournaments became national phenomena. Just as professional baseball began to emerge, government policies aimed at promoting Japanese nationalism placed controls on amateur baseball and played a role in diminishing public support for the professional game. Baseball disappeared

during World War II but resumed after the war in schools and colleges.

An expanded professional presence arose in 1948. By the mid-1950s, professional baseball had become the most popular spectator sport in Japan, with two professional leagues, the Central and Pacific Leagues, consisting of six teams each. The 1953 season saw the first televised game, and baseball quickly became a television mainstay.

In a uniquely Japanese feature, almost every team is owned by a major corporation that uses the team for promotional purposes. The most successful and best-known team was the Yomiuri Giants, and the best-known player was that team's home-run hitter, Sadaharu Oh, who played from 1959 to 1980. Even when they were no longer dominant on the field, the Giants remained a symbol of Japanese baseball, just as the New York Yankees have symbolized American baseball for many people.

The Connection with the United States

Throughout the history of Japanese baseball, officials, players, and coaches have maintained contact with the baseball establishment in the United States. Japan was quick to import the latest equipment, techniques, and on a limited basis, American coaches and players. For example, Bobby Valentine, the coach of the New York Mets when that team finished second to the New York Yankees in the 2000 World Series, coached in Japan in 1995, and Charlie Manuel of the Cleveland Indians and Jim Tracy of the Los Angeles Dodgers played there in the 2001 season. The flow of talent in the other direction was slower to develop. Hideo Nomo, who pitched for the Kintetsu Buffaloes, became the first Japanese player in the U.S. major leagues when he joined the Los Angeles Dodgers in 1995. He was followed by several other players, including Ichiro Suzuki of the Seattle Mariners, who was the American League's most valuable player in 2001. American teams employed translators to make the transition easier. In addition, games between American and Japanese teams are now played on a regular basis, and the New York Mets and Chicago Cubs opened their 2000 season in Japan and played their first three games in Tokyo.

Baseball's Popularity in Japan

One of the questions scholars have asked about Japanese baseball is why the sport, which began in the United States, became so popular in Japan. The answer is unclear, but several factors seem to have been involved. First, baseball appeared in Japan along with

other Western sports, such as soccer, rugby, and tennis, at a time when Japan was seeking to strengthen ties to the Western world. Second, the physical, mental, and spiritual battle between pitcher and batter was culturally congruent with Japanese values and indigenous sports, such as sumo. Third, the sport was supported by major corporations, who viewed the teams, their uniforms, the stadiums, and media coverage as significant promotional opportunities. Fourth, the sport was amenable to change to fit Japanese culture, such as the hierarchical organization of player rosters. These factors have combined with Japan's continual involvement in sports at the global level to make baseball popular in Japan. Even though baseball remains one of the most popular sports in Japan, global expansion of mass media, particularly television coverage, and talented players' migrations to the United States have greatly affected Japanese baseball today.

Hajime Hirai

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BASHO (1644–1694), Japanese haiku poet. Matsuo Basho (also known as Kinsaku) is commonly regarded as the greatest haiku poet of Japan and also the one who raised haiku above the level of trivial entertainment, creating an enduring literary form. Basho was born near Osaka of samurai heritage. As a young man he moved to Edo and renounced his samurai status to devote himself to poetry. Recognizing the potential of haiku, Basho's first poem in his new style was written in 1679:

On a withered branch
A crow alights
Autumn evening.

The stark simplicity of the scene and the intersection of the momentary (the crow alighting) and the cosmic (the ending of the year) are characteristic of Basho's style. As Basho was a student of Zen, many of his poems are resonant with Zen philosophy. One of Basho's key aesthetic contributions was the discovery of rustic beauty.



This painting by Yoshitoshi Tsukioka in 1891 shows Basho celebrating the mid-autumn festival with two farmers. (ASIAN ART & ARCHAEOLOGY, INC./CORBIS)

The last decade of Basho's life was devoted chiefly to travel as he recognized that life itself is a journey and sought to embody that metaphor in his own life. In recording his various trips, Basho developed a new literary genre, *haibun*, combining prose narrative and haiku poetry. The finest of his travel diaries, *The Narrow Road to the Deep North*, is a classic of Japanese literature.

The pen name Basho, meaning "banana tree," derives from the plant growing beside his hermitage in Edo where he met disciples and instructed them in poetry. This beloved dwelling was destroyed by fire in 1682, which inspired his decision to spend his final years on the road.

Stephen W. Kohl

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BASI *Basi* or *su kbouan* is an animist ceremony performed at critical points in a person's life to strengthen the soul or spirit in Laos, Thailand, and other nations with a Tai ethnic population. *Basi* is Pali for "ties of thread," and *su kbouan* is Lao for "defending the spirit or soul." A group will perform the ceremony to mark a recent or upcoming event such as a birth, marriage, departure for a trip, or arrival from a trip. The group gathers around a centerpiece made from banana leaves on a tray with offerings to the spirit or spirits. The offerings include food, alcohol, incense, candles, and the ties. The master of ceremonies is a male village elder who chants and offers the food and alcohol to the participants' spirits. The participants touch the tray with one hand during the incantation. The master of ceremonies then ties threads around the participants' wrists. Onlookers continue to tie the string around the wrists while wishing good luck. These actions allow the onlookers to receive some of the blessings invoked for the occasion. The objective of the ceremony is to prevent the spirit from wandering from the body during critical moments. The ceremony is a group event that bonds the community together and demonstrates the persistence of animist beliefs in Lao culture.

Linda McIntosh

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BASMACHI MOVEMENT The Basmachi was a Central Asian social and military movement organized in early 1918 to oppose units of the Red Army that, in February 1918, overthrew the Quqon (Kokand) Autonomy—a government established 26 November 1917 in today's eastern Uzbekistan by the fourth Extraordinary Regional Muslim Congress to address the interests of the non-Russian peoples of Central Asia. Those who escaped from the Communist takeover of the Quqon Autonomy, including intellectuals such as Zeki Validov Togan (1890–1969), formed the core of the Basmachi leadership. These intellectuals, some of whom espoused pan-Turkic ideals (holding that the various Turkic peoples of the world should somehow forge closer ties to each other), formed a loose coalition with other local figures, such as religious leaders who sought an Islamic state, nationalists, and the traditional elite from the Bukhara emirate and the Khiva khanate (ancient kingdoms also in today's Uzbekistan), after those entities fell to the Soviet advances and were established as "People's Republics" in 1920.

Though never unified, Basmachi forces were active in the Fergana Valley, parts of which are today in southern Uzbekistan and southeastern Tajikistan, as well as the region around the Aral Sea, from 1918 to 1922. Numbering several thousand (with some estimates as high as 20,000), Basmachi units continually threatened the new Soviet governments in the ancient city of Tashkent (in eastern Uzbekistan) and elsewhere, as well as the Bolshevik-backed regime in Bukhara.

In November 1921, Enver Pasa (1881–1922)—a Turk who was the hero of the Young Turk movement (Ottoman officers who sought to reform what they saw was a corrupt political system in Turkey) and an erstwhile supporter of the Bolshevik regime—defected to the Basmachi side and consolidated many of the forces in eastern Bukhara. However, before he could establish his legitimacy with the other local leaders, Enver Pasa was killed in a battle at Bal'juan (also spelled Balzhuan or Baljuwan; today in western Tajikistan) in August 1922. This effectively ended any effort by Basmachi leaders to present a common front against the ever-growing forces of Mikhail Frunze (1885–1925), the Russian Soviet Army commander.

Small units of the Basmachi fought on during the late 1920s and early 1930s against the collectivization campaign that the Soviets were attempting to institute in Central Asia, which placed both agricultural holdings and pastoral grounds under state ownership. Ibrahim Bek (d. 1932), an ethnic Uzbek, tried to revive the Basmachi movement at the time of the early collectivization campaign. His last attacks, into today's Tajikistan, took place in 1931. His capture that year was the last significant Basmachi event.

During the Soviet period, the term "Basmachi," which can be loosely translated as "bandit" or "brigand," carried a negative connotation. Soviet historiographers stressed the "illegal and backward nature" of the movement and contrasted it with the "positive" character of the Bolsheviks who "liberated" Central Asia. Since 1991, there has been a reevaluation of the Basmachi movement and a resultant positive portrayal of the leaders. Particularly in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, the heroic efforts of the fighters are highlighted, although the Islamic nature of some of the movement's factions is minimally addressed, given current concerns over Islamic extremism in the region.

Roger D. Kangas

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BASRA (2002 est. pop. 1.0 million). Located on the west bank of the Shatt al Arab River 116 kilometers from the Persian Gulf, Basra is Iraq's only outlet to the sea. Most of the population are Shi'ite Muslims originating from the surrounding countryside, while the indigenous inhabitants have remained largely Sunni. The original city, located about 13 kilometers southwest of modern Basra, was founded on the orders of the Caliph 'Umar bin al-Khattab (586?–644) in 638 CE. During its first two centuries Basra was the site of numerous conflicts including the first major in-



In January 2001 an Iraqi woman views the ruins of her house, destroyed by air raids in Basra during the 1991 Gulf War. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

ter-Muslim battle in 656 CE. Despite this instability Basra was home to some of classical Islam's greatest thinkers, including the theologian Hasan al Basri, the belletrist al-Jahiz, the poet Abu Nuwasand, and the Mu'tazilah school of Islamic interpretation. Basra's fortunes declined with the waning of the Abbasid dynasty (749/750–1258). By the fourteenth century the dwindling population was already relocating to the more secure site of the present city. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Basra vacillated between Persian, Ottoman, and independent tribal control. By the eighteenth century Ottoman control was well established, and for the next two centuries Basra witnessed a rise in commercial activity, particularly through its growing ties with Europe. These ties were further strengthened after British occupation in 1914, when the introduction of modern port facilities allowed Basra to become the world's leading exporter of dates. In 1948 major oil deposits were discovered nearby and Basra was soon transformed into a center for oil refining and export. The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) and the 1991 Persian Gulf War caused extensive damage to the city. U.N. sanctions, imposed since 1991, have not allowed the city to rebuild.

Thabit Abdullah

BASSEIN (1999 pop. 150,000). Bassein (Patheingyi), on the east bank of the Bassein (or Ngawun) River in the Irrawaddy Delta, is the fifth-largest city in Myanmar (Burma). Situated 160 kilometers west of Yangon (Rangoon), it is the capital of Irrawaddy (Ayeyarwady) Division and a principal market and inland seaport for the region, with capacity to develop into a major growth center.

Known to early European travelers as "Cosmin," Bassein has obscure origins. Bassein was part of the old Mon kingdom of Lower Burma until its conquest in the sixteenth century by King Tabinshwehti (1531–1550) and was depopulated in subsequent Mon-Burmese warfare. Following the British annexation of Lower Burma in 1852 and the delta's economic transformation, Bassein became a major rice-milling and rice-export center and an entry point for Indian migrant labor. The population is predominantly Burman but also includes many of Indian descent, as well as Karen (Kayin) and Arakanese (Rakhine).

Bassein is famed for its production of painted parasols and *balawa* confectionary. Its largest and most celebrated temple is the Shwe-mok-daw, which houses a fifteenth-century Buddha image dedicated in the reign of the Mon queen, Shin Sawbu (1453–1472); other



The Lei-kyun-yan-aung Pagoda in Bassein, 1996. (RICHARD BICKEL/ CORBIS)

temples are the Tagaung Mingala-zedi-daw and the Hpaya Ko-Zu, as well as the Mahabodhi Mingala-zedi and Lei-kyun-yan-aung (both extensively renovated in the 1990s).

Patricia M. Herbert

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BATAVIA Batavia, currently known as Jakarta, was once the capital city of the Dutch East Indies and was named after the Batavii, prehistoric inhabitants of the Netherlands. In 1610 the Dutch East India Company (VOC) established a trading post in the small port of Jayakarta in northern West Java. The site became the VOC's Asian headquarters in 1619. The settlement quickly overwhelmed Jayakarta, becoming a small Dutch city, complete with canals, walls, and gabled houses, but largely populated by Chinese traders and laborers, who lived within the city under their own laws. In 1740, Dutch fears of a rebellion allegedly planned by Chinese led to the massacre of some of the Chinese residents and the temporary expulsion of the rest.

During the eighteenth century, the city sprawled beyond its walls, and its architecture became more adapted to the tropics. Indonesians, both slave and free, made up an increasing proportion of the popu-

lation and formed the basis for an evolving mestizo culture. The city retained, however, a reputation as dangerously unhealthy, and there was a high death rate among all population groups.

Batavia's economic role increased with the completion of a modern port at Tanjung Priok in 1886, but it lost some administrative importance in the twentieth century with the movement of government offices to Buitenzorg (Bogor) and Bandung. The city became a municipality in 1903. It was renamed Jakarta by the Japanese occupation forces in 1943.

Robert Cribb

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BATIK The word batik is derived from two words: the Javanese word *amba* (to write) and the Malay word *titik* (dot). Thus *ambatik*, shortened to batik, means "to write dots." Patterns are drawn in wax on the cloth by means of a canting, a metal stylus with a reservoir for molten wax, or stamped in wax with blocks carrying patterns. From the initial years of the batik industry (1920s) in the east coast of West Malaysia, the block method "chop" or "stamp" was adopted. The earliest batik made of repeated patterns stamped out using wooden blocks was known as *kain pukul* (stamped cloth). Sometimes the background cloth was dyed while parts of the pattern were painted in by hand. Modern batiks are made by screen printing techniques,



A textile worker creates a batik in Kota Bharu, Malaysia. (EYE UBIQUITOUS/CORBIS)

beginning with one color on white cotton. A later development in this method was to add a layer of wax to obtain the crack lines characteristic of traditional wax-drawn batik. By the 1960s, a Malaysian style of batik emerged. New motifs were tried and a new hand-drawn batik evolved. By the 1970s, the tourist market became a new motivation for batik production. This type of batik goes through very simplified processes, and the patterns are much less complicated. In the early 2000s, batik in Malaysia has come to be defined by certain design styles and sensibilities, and by the high percentage of floral motifs, and not so much with the process used.

Hanizab Idris and Shanthi Thambiah

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BATMONKH, JAMBYN (1926–1997), president of Mongolia. Jambyn Batmonkh has the distinction of having been the last president of Mongolia (1984–1990) during the Communist era. He also served as premier of Mongolia from 1974 through 1984. His position as premier ended when then-president Tsendenbal (1916–1991) was removed from the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP, also referred to as the Communist Party of Mongolia), and from state leadership in 1984. Batmonkh became the general-secretary of the MPRP in August 1984 and later the chairman of the presidium of the People's Great Khural (parliament) in December 1984, making him the leader of the country.

After his rise to power, he varied little from the policies of Tsendenbal. Toward the end of the 1980s, Batmonkh faced the pressures of perestroika, forcing



his government to follow policies of economic reform that included the restructuring of government. The restructuring of government was inadequate, though, leaving the MPRP bureaucracy in charge of the economic reforms. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the weakening of the Soviet Union, Batmonkh could no longer rely on Soviet support. Thus, when the people of Mongolia called for an end to Communist rule, Batmonkh's regime floundered and collapsed in March 1990. After that, Batmonkh remained out of the public eye, only rarely appearing in public. He died in Ulaanbaatar in 1997.

Timothy M. May

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BAY OF BENGAL The Bay of Bengal occupies the northern part of the Indian Ocean between the Indian subcontinent and mainland Southeast Asia. Shaped like a triangle between the mouth of the Ganges-Brahmaputra Rivers, Sri Lanka, and the Strait of Malacca, the Bay of Bengal roughly covers 1.6 million square kilometers. The waters are usually calm; however, tropical cyclones (originating in the Bay of



KONARAK-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

A monumental temple to the sun god Surya, Konarak was constructed in the thirteenth century as a Brahman sanctuary. The temple Konarak features a lavishly carved, baroque stone chariot with twenty-four wheels and six horses. Overlooking the Bay of Bengal, it was designated in 1984 as a UNESCO World Heritage Site.

Bengal and called "Bengal cyclones") can hit the coastlands and lowlands along the Indian Peninsula and the deltaic Bangladesh. Due to its huge water surface, the Bay of Bengal strikingly influences the monsoon air masses across the mainlands of South and Southeast Asia by diverting the Bay of Bengal branch of the Indian southwest monsoon into one airflow toward the eastern parts of the Indian peninsula and another airstream toward Southeast Asia and by saturating the southwest monsoon and northeast monsoon air masses. Due to the heavy lifting of the landmasses, the Bay of Bengal is surrounded by a rather narrow shelf while the Bay gradually deepens toward the south up to 3,470 meters below sea level.

The eastern part of the Bay of Bengal is traversed by the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which are built on a submarine tertiary fold ridge between the Arakan mountains (Myanmar) and Sumatra (Indonesia). East of the islands, the Strait of Malacca enters the Andaman Sea from the south, secluding it from the Bay of Bengal. The Mergui archipelago is scattered close to the coast of Southeast Asia, whereas the northernmost part of the Andaman Sea is occupied by the Bay of Martaban. In a submarine depression, the Andaman Sea drops in its central part even to 4,171 meters. The tides are highest along the Myanmar coast with a maximum of seven meters at Rangoon, while elsewhere the mean tides are two to three meters. As most of the streams and rivers of the Indian subcontinent and also some rivers of Southeast Asia flow into the Bay of Bengal, which at the same time experiences heavy monsoon rains (around 3,000 millimeters annually), its waters show a low salt content (mostly below 30 percent). The Bay of Bengal is a secluded part of the Indian Ocean, and it develops its own ocean currents that whirl mostly clockwise, flowing in the Bay of Bengal at a low speed. Along the southern margin of the Bay of Bengal, ancient seafarers found safe passage, which continues for those traveling present-day

shipping routes connecting Singapore with Colombo (passing the Strait of Malacca) en route between Europe and East Asia.

Manfred Domores

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BAYAR, MAHMUT CELAL (1884–1987), president of Turkey. Celal Bayar was cofounder of the Democrat Party and Turkey's third president (1950–1960). Educated in the Bursa French School, Bayar entered a career in banking. Following the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, he served as director of the Izmir chapter of the Committee of Union and Progress. After organizing nationalist forces in Izmir and Bursa in 1919, Bayar joined the nationalist government in Ankara in 1920. In 1924, during the presidency of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938, ruled 1923–1938), Bayar was named director of Is Bankasi (Business Bank); in 1932 he became minister of the economy, and from 1937 to 1939, he served as prime minister. Bayar held a seat in the National Assembly during World War II, but split from the Republican People's Party to form the Democrat Party in 1946, along with Adnan Menderes (1889–1961) and others. When the Democrat Party won the 1950 election, Bayar became the third president of Turkey, and the first president to come from a nonmilitary background. In 1960, the military overthrew the Democrat Party government, and Bayar was removed from office. Tried and convicted of corruption and crimes against the nation, Bayar received a death sentence, which was commuted to life in prison. After serving six years, he was released for health reasons but was forced to retire from active politics.

John M. VanderLippe

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BAZARGAN, MEHDI (1905–1995), prime minister of Iran. Mehdi Bazargan is probably best known as the first prime minister of revolutionary Iran, since

Ayatollah Khomeini (1900–1989) gave him the job of premier of the provisional government soon after the victory of the revolutionary regime in 1979. Nevertheless, Bazargan's work in the Iranian political sphere was considerably more varied.

Born in 1905 to an affluent trading family in Tabriz, Bazargan started a career in education by teaching engineering at Tehran University after earning a degree in engineering from Paris University. He became politically active by joining the Iran Party, which changed to the National Front when it banded together with two other groups in 1949. When the oil nationalization movement emerged during Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq's tenure as prime minister, Bazargan was given the position of managing director of the newly nationalized oil industry, which was overseen by the National Iranian Oil Company. However, he returned to teaching when Mosaddeq was overthrown by the 1953 coup.

In May of 1955, he was charged with treason and confined until 1960 after he voiced opposition to some of the shah's policies. Upon release, he joined forces with Ayatollah Mahmud Talequani to establish the Iran Freedom Movement (IFM) political party, which is also known as the Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI). Soon, he was sentenced to ten years in prison for his criticism of the shah's economic and political plan, known as the White Revolution. This time after his release, he stayed out of the political realm until 1977, when he helped found the Human Rights Association.

Then, in 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini designated him prime minister of the provisional government. He resigned just nine months later, disillusioned with his powerlessness against the Islamic Revolutionary Council and the Revolutionary Guards Corps, culminating in his ineffectiveness regarding the student hostage takeover of the American embassy. He did not disappear from the political scene but, instead, publicly opposed the new regime's suppression of basic freedoms and the continuation of the war with Iraq. His party, IFM, was the only legal opposition party in the new government, a move that some considered as largely symbolic. Bazargan was elected to the parliament in 1980, but he was blocked from running for the presidency in the 1984 elections. Often he found his party offices ransacked and was denied facilities for distributing his views. This situation continued beyond Ayatollah Khomeini's death and until his own death in 1995. Nevertheless, many consider Mehdi Bazargan a religiously moderate, progressive, and respected nationalistic leader who advocated the interest of Iran above the interest of Islam.

Houman A. Sadri

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BEDAYA In Java, Indonesia, *bedaya* are dancers who perform ritual court dances, including the Bedaya Ketawang sacred dance. *Bedaya* are living embodiments of traditional Javanese high culture, and in addition to dance are expected to be proficient in the Javanese language and literature, as well as able to practice batik and the healing arts. Although many traditional Javanese dances have disappeared, the Bedaya Ketawang of central Java has survived and continues to be performed by *bedaya* once a year.

Bedaya Ketawang emerged in the early seventeenth century in the Javanese state of Mataram and commemorates the coronation of the king of Surakarta, one of the two Mataram divisions. The dance depicts the relationship between Panembahan Senopati, the first ruler of Mataram, and Kanjeng Ratu Kidal, the goddess of the sea and protector of the royal family. The dance is performed by nine *bedaya* wearing the makeup and dress of brides. The dancers prepare for the dance as they would for a marriage ceremony, and the hour-long dance is open only to a select audience who refrain from smoking, drinking, and eating. Some believe that a tenth dancer—the goddess herself—also performs and can be seen by some.

David Levinson

BEDIL *Bedil* is a Malay term meaning a man-made weapon. Technically the term means "small cannon"; it is commonly used in Brunei and Indonesia. In the Malay Peninsula, the term *bedil* is less common than *meriam*, which means the same thing. In addition to a barrel, breech, and firing mechanism, the *bedil* has a hook and some ornaments, which are generally a local variation of Chinese and Muslim motifs. Balls or projectiles are launched by firing gunpowder. The length of the Malay cannon varies from half a meter to more than two meters, and the diameter of the inside muzzle can range from three centimeters to more than ten centimeters.

The origin of firearms, or more specifically cannons, in the Malay archipelago cannot be explained with any certainty. However, when the Portuguese attacked Melaka (Malacca) in 1511, they found quite a large number of cannons in the capital. The cannon can be traced to Muslim and Chinese origins. When, after the fourteenth century, the Muslim rulers in Southeast Asia established closer religious and political relations with their counterparts in the Middle East and South Asia, they also brought home some models of cannons. Intensive diplomatic relations between Muslim rulers in Southeast Asia and the Chinese court from the early fifteenth century could also have provided the Malay rulers in Southeast Asia with access to Chinese cannons.

The use of cannon in the Malay world was not limited to warfare but was also a status symbol. By the fifteenth century Malay rulers began using cannons to provide them with military advantage. Little is known, however, about exactly how the cannon was used at this period. The European expansion to Southeast Asia after 1511 proved the superiority of European can-



Women wearing antique *bedaya* ornaments borrowed from the museum perform the Deoyo dance at the wedding of Sultan Mangkunegara in Java, Indonesia, in 1989. (LINDSAY HEBBERD/CORBIS)

nonry. Subsequently, the Malay *bedil* assumed a new role more as an heirloom than as a weapon. This can be seen in the various titles and names given to the allegedly historical *bedil* used previously in major battles.

Iik A. Mansurnoor

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BEIJING (2002 est. pop. 7.1 million). Although it did not become the capital of China until the establishment of the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), Beijing has long been a politically important northern city. Situated in Hebei Province on the northern edge of the fertile great northern plain and near mountain passes leading from both Manchuria and Mongolia, Beijing is a major junction for road and railroad trans-

portation routes in all directions. Unlike most capitals, Beijing is not located on a major river, although it has been connected to the Grand Canal by means of a smaller canal and the White River (Bai He) since the reign of the Mongol Khubilai Khan (1215–1294). The city's economically and militarily strategic location has led Beijing to serve as regional or national capital for at least two millennia. As the national capital, Beijing served as both a cultural and political center during the imperial era and has acquired, in addition, a greater economic significance since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949.

History

Beijing has been the capital of a unified China during most of the time since the establishment of the Yuan dynasty to the present, but had earlier been capital of the state of Yan under the Liao dynasty (907–1125) and then of northern China under the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234) from 1153. Known as Yanjing (Capital of Yan) under the Liao, Zhongdu (Middle Capital) during the Jurchen Jin dynasty, and Dadu (Great Capital) during the Yuan, the city was given the name Beijing (Northern Capital) by the third Ming emperor, Yongle (1360–1424), in 1406. The city has been called Beijing ever since, except during the Nationalist era (1927–1949), during which time the national capital was moved to Nanjing, and Beijing was renamed Beiping (Northern Peace).



Bicyclists on a main street in Beijing. Bicycles remain a major form of transportation despite the increasing use of automobiles. (EYE UBIQUITOUS/CORBIS)



BEIJING—THEN AND NOW

"It began, literally, by accident. On the Tuesday after the Knudsen's At Home, when rumors were stilled and all was peace, a party had ridden out under Touchy's auspices to the Marco Polo Bridge, about eight miles from Peking. It was getting late for cross country riding; the spring planting was beginning and there was no galloping slap across the dusty cold fields from landmark to landmark—to a red-walled tomb, a dark patch of wood marking some burial plot. But Touchy, who relieved the monotony of his duties as Commandant of the Legation Guard by the more onerous and exciting ones of Joint Master of the Drag Hunt, knew the county like the inside of his pocket, and led them by devious ways of his own—now along narrow sunk roads, from which only their heads projected as they road along, now across an open sandy patch, still free for an inspiring gallop, till they reached the long high-backed bridge spanning the Hun-ho. It was a hot soft April day—the brilliant light poured over the flat brown landscape, on which the colored walls of temples and tombs, and the dark masses of graveyard trees, detached themselves with great vividness; and all of the way the sharp outline of the Western Hills kept them company on the right, like a bright pink and lavender colored back cloth hung on the sky. They had ridden up on to the arc of the bridge between the Chippendale-looking panels of the carved stone parapets, topped at intervals with those little green effigies of beasts which amused Marco Polo so much as that he counted them in 1263, when he rode across the same bridge into Ch'angtu, or Xanadu, the old Peking. The General handed out this piece of information for the benefit of Judith and Little Annette. 'I expect traffic then looked much as it does now,' he added. 'The road is still the start of the great trade route to Tibet.' Small hooded carts with solid wheels creaked up the slopes of the bridge, drawn by mules or shaggy ponies; strings of donkeys with their laden panniers tripped over the huge steep paving slabs and their neat unshod feet, urged on by men with rough faces and wild clothes; now and then a group of Tibetans, in flapping green and yellow garments, strode past, their wrinkled faces much more than typically Mongolian than the Chinese. Long files of camels were fording the river a little above the bridge, moving with the curious slow rhythm that suggests a waltz in every leg, lifting their strange supercilious heads in a timeless challenge to the distances and deserts."

Source: Ann Bridge. (2000) *Peking Picnic*. London: Rediscoveries, 51–53.

From the Yuan dynasty until the end of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), Beijing housed both the imperial family and much of China's vast civil-service bureaucracy. The presence in the capital of a Confucian bureaucracy that was staffed through examinations led to Beijing's development as an educational and cultural center. Even as Beijing's political significance declined during the politically tumultuous first half of the twentieth century, the city remained culturally significant with the growth of modern educational insti-

tutions. From 1949 to the present, Beijing has resumed its position as national capital and houses the political leadership of the nation. The city also continues to be the educational center of China.

As a municipality, Beijing answers directly to the central government and is autonomous of surrounding Hebei Province. During the decades immediately following the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, the Beijing municipal government undertook



VENDING MACHINES FOR BEIJING

In order to modernize for tourists and especially for the 2008 Olympics, the government installed 1,400 vending machines in Beijing. The machines provide noodles, soda, tea, and juice and are expected to cut into the business of small food shops. The machines are expected to provide a profit for the vendor, although problems with maintenance, placement, and vandalism have already been reported.

Source: AsiaWeek (2001) "Beijing Touts the Machine Touch," 9 November: 16.

to transform the city into a model socialist city by encouraging the growth of industry, widening many major streets, building new drainage and sewage systems, constructing new government buildings, turning imperial sites into public spaces, and redeveloping parts of the city. In spite of this attempt to reconfigure the city into a new-style Communist capital, however, Beijing retains many of its traditional attributes.

Geography

Beijing as an imperial city was first built by Kubilai Khan in the thirteenth century and later rebuilt by the emperor Yongle in the early fifteenth century. It was constructed according to specifications laid out in the Confucian classics and thus has symbolic as well as political significance. It is situated on a north-south axis with all important buildings facing south, and consists of a series of three concentric walled cities, with the Forbidden City at the center, surrounded by the imperial city and the outer city. The emperor lived in the Forbidden City and performed rituals at important symbolic sites in the outer city, including the Temple of Agriculture and the Temple of Heaven. The massive walls encircling the city were intended to impress as well as protect. Under the Qing dynasty the imperial city was given over to Manchu residents, and Chinese were restricted to the outer city. Qing emperors also built two summer palaces in the western outskirts of Beijing. The first of these, built by the second Qing emperor, Kangxi (1654–1722), was destroyed by Anglo-French forces in 1860. The second

was built by the extravagant Empress Dowager Cixi (1835–1908) in the late nineteenth century.

During the twentieth century, the city limits expanded well beyond the 62 square kilometers encircled by the outer city walls to an area of 16,800 square kilometers. Today's Beijing is both rural and urban, agricultural and industrial. In general, however, the municipality lacks natural resources, including water, and has to import raw materials such as oil and iron that are required by its industries.

Demographics

Beijing's population, which was approximately 800,000 at the beginning of the twentieth century, has now risen to over 13 million in the Beijing administrative district (7.1 million in the city alone), in spite of government efforts during the 1950s and 1960s to keep urban population growth to a minimum. Owing to the city's location and history as a capital city, Beijing's population has historically been racially and ethnically diverse, including Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans, and other groups as well as the majority Han population. By the late twentieth century, however, racial and ethnic minorities had become a tiny percentage of Beijing's population, which is now over 95 percent Han.

Economy

Roughly 20 percent of Beijing's economy is agricultural. Beijing's economy has been dominated by industry since 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party determined to transform Beijing from a center of consumption into a model center of production. Until 1980, the bulk of Beijing's manufacturing sector was engaged in heavy industry, but since then there has been an increasing emphasis on replacing resource-draining and polluting industries with lighter, more environmentally friendly, technology-intensive industries. Nonetheless, Beijing continues to suffer from severe industrial pollution.

As China's population grows and its economy transforms, Beijing's future position in the nation is becoming less certain. Beijing is the political and cultural center of an increasingly fragmented China. An important question for the future is whether both the nation and Beijing's significance within it will remain the same.

J. Megan Greene

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BEIJING OPERA Widely considered the finest of China's varied opera traditions, Beijing Opera (*jingxi*) combines music, song, speech, mime, dance and acrobatics, exciting spectacle, and subtle beauty. Divided into two basic styles, civil plays mainly concerned with love and martial plays that enact spectacular battle scenes, its subject matter is drawn from historical and mythical tales and classic novels.

Characters depict defined role types such as the clown, the "painted face" warrior, the "flowery" woman, and the martial woman. Each role has its own style of movement, voice, costume, and makeup—the acrobatics of the clown; the platform boots and confident strides of the warrior; the long, flowing "water sleeve" of the "dark-clothed" modest woman. The stage is largely bare, so mime is central to its art.

Music is crucial in the opera; in Chinese they say listen to opera (*tingxi*) not watch. A drummer directs the action on stage and leads a group of gongs and cymbals, which opens the action with a brilliant and earsplitting set. The actors move to the beats of the drum, and each character and type of action is accompanied by a set percussion piece, one for the warrior's entrance, one for riding a horse, and so on. The two-stringed fiddle is the most important melodic instrument, used especially to accompany the singing. Other instruments include a larger fiddle, plucked lutes, flute, and occasionally shawms in the martial plays.



A Beijing Opera singer performs in *Stopping the Horse* in 1981. (DEAN CONGER/CORBIS)

The opera developed comparatively late in nineteenth-century Beijing, but it draws on older forms such as the classical southern *kunqu* opera and regional musical styles—the lively *xipi* and more sedate *erhuang*. Traditionally young boys were sold into the operatic profession and given rigorous training in its exacting arts. These boys, especially those trained in the female roles (women began to perform on stage only in the 1930s), were often prostituted to rich opera enthusiasts. Into the late nineteenth century, families of star performers arose, and the Empress Dowager even had an opera stage constructed in the Forbidden City. However, performers never shook off their dubious societal reputation. After 1949, Beijing Opera was formalized as a national art, and performers were organized into state schools and troupes. During the Cultural Revolution the notorious revolutionary Model Operas were widely promoted, while the traditional plays were banned. Beijing Opera's popularity has waned in modernizing China, but groups of amateur enthusiasts still meet in town parks to sing excerpts from the plays.

Rachel Harris

See also: **Music-China**

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BELO, BISHOP CARLOS (b. 1948), Peace advocate and Nobel laureate. Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo is known as an outspoken fighter for peace and reconciliation in East Timor. Born on 3 February 1948 near Baucau, East Timor, and educated at missionary schools in Timor, he left for Portugal in 1974 to study theology. During this time he became a member of the Salesian Order. Belo returned to East Timor in 1981 as the director of Fatumaca College, where he developed his famed ties with the Timorese youth. Two years later, the Vatican appointed him as Apostolic Administrator of the Dili Diocese, making him the head of the East Timor church, and in 1988 he was consecrated as bishop.

Bishop Belo's calls for peace and freedom began in 1989, when he wrote to the United Nations secretary-general, condemning the cruelty and abuses of the Indonesian military and denouncing the serious humanitarian situation in his home country. Despite

strong pressure from the Indonesian government, he became a focal point for the expression of national aspirations and local culture. His outspokenness on behalf of peace in East Timor was honored in 1996 when he and José Ramos-Horta were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The Oslo committee saw him not only as a mediator but also as a representative of hope for a better future. In independent East Timor after 1999, Bishop Belo became an advocate for a society built on compassion and reconciliation.

Frank Feulner

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BENDAHARA The word *bendahara*, related to the Sanskrit word for "treasurer," denoted a job title held by senior officials in Sumatra and Java, whereas in the Malay Peninsula the word denoted the chief minister. Perhaps because of its association with the word *bandar* (a Persian loanword meaning "harbor"), the title could also imply responsibility for the coastal regions; in the *Kaba Cinduo Mato*, an undated Minangkabau text presenting a model of the ideal state, the *bendahara* has responsibility for the coast. In the *Sejarah Melayu* (Malay Annals)—a Malay historiographical text that was probably commissioned by a Malacca *bendahara* and depicts the world of Malacca in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries—an ideal picture is presented of powerful *bendaharas* who always play a prominent role and come off better than the other courtiers and even better than most sultans.

Controlled by one lineage, and marrying into Malacca's ruling house, the *bendahara* family came to wield great power, and the *bendahara* frequently acted as kingmaker. Because a Malay ruler tended not to be involved in the day-to-day running of government, the position of *bendahara* offered considerable scope for the exercise of executive power. Sometimes a *bendahara* could assume so much honor and authority that they challenged those of the king. The last Malacca ruler was so convinced that the *bendahara* intended to usurp the throne that he sentenced the *bendahara* to death. Due to the role of the *laksamana* (admiral) as the defender of Johor, Malacca's direct heir, against Acehnese and Portuguese invasions, the *laksamana*

family eclipsed the *bendahara* family in importance by the early seventeenth century. The great offices of state of the former Malacca sultanate became the titles of regional chieftainship in the nineteenth-century Malay states, with the Malacca *bendahara* becoming ruler of Pahang, on the peninsula's east coast.

By 1853 Bendahara Ali (reigned 1806–1857), who already acted as an independent ruler, felt sufficiently confident to declare his autonomy, and in 1881 his son Ahmad assumed the title of sultan. The eighteenth-century Malay state of Perak, however, was a radical deviation from common political practices. In Perak the office of *bendahara* had become a post that the ruler awarded to friends, relatives, or supporters, and finally the title of *bendahara* was regarded as a prerogative of the royal family.

Edwin Wieringa

See also: **Laksamana**

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BENGAL, WEST (2001 pop. 80.2 million). West Bengal is a state in northeastern India, lying to the immediate west of Bangladesh and southeast of Nepal. Its southern boundary is formed by the Bay of Bengal, and its capital city is Calcutta (or Kolkata). The state covers an area of 88,752 square kilometers (the same size as Austria). Both the Ganges and the Brahmaputra Rivers flow through the state, giving it the basis for a rich rice agriculture. The state receives an average of from 160 to 200 centimeters of rain annually, most of it from the northeasterly monsoon.

The state was created in 1947, at the time of Independence, when the Muslim-dominated part the region that had been East Bengal became the eastern wing of Pakistan. The state is divided into sixteen districts and is governed by a 294-seat legislative assembly, which has long been dominated by Marxists. In addition to rice, agricultural products include jute, tea, potatoes, oilseeds, tobacco, wheat, barley, and maize. The numerous manufacturing industries include cars, chemicals, electronics, aluminum, pharmaceuticals,



THE PLEASURES OF COLONIAL LIFE IN WEST BENGAL

"Most Gentlemen and Ladies in *Bengal* live both splendidly and pleasantly, the Fore-noons being dedicated to Business, and after Dinner to Rest, and in the Evening to recreate themselves in Chaises or *Palankins* in the Fields, or the Gardens, or by Water in their *Budgeroes*, which is a convenient Boat, that goes swiftly with the Force of Oars; and, on the River, sometimes there is the Diversion of Fishing or Fowling, or both; and, before Night, they make friendly Visits to one another, when Pride or Contention do not spoil Society, which too often they do among the Ladies, as Discord and Faction do among the Men."

Source: Sir William Foster, ed. ([c. 1706] 1930)
New Account of the East Indies by Alexander
Hamilton. London: Argonaut Press.

ceramics, glass, footwear, steel, railway locomotives, and ships. Coal and china clay are also mined here. The principal language is Bengali, but Hindi and English are widely understood, and the dominant religions are Hinduism and Islam.

Paul Hockings

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BENGALI LANGUAGE Bengali (or Bangla) is spoken by some 230 million people in the Ganges River delta and elsewhere in India, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Distinct dialects of Bengali include those of the Bangladeshi districts Sylhet (Sylhetī) and Chittagong (Chāggāyā) Some consider the latter different enough from Dhaka or Calcutta Standard forms to be a separate language.

A member of the eastern branch of Indo-Aryan, Bengali emerged as a distinct language about a millennium ago, as reflected in a compilation of Buddhist songs, the *Caryapada* (*Caryāpada*). Middle Bengali literature (1200–1800) consists of religious songs and poetic texts. Modern Bengali has conveyed national(ist)

sentiment since the nineteenth century and is thus both a treasure and an area of struggle. Nineteenth-century Calcutta was a major center of linguistic modernization, where the longer verb endings and Sanskritized lexicon that constituted *Sāddbu bhāṣā* ("pedantic language," that is, a literary register originally developed for the sort of Hindu philosophical discourse that flowered in the Bengal Renaissance) shifted to the shortened endings of the *Calit bhāṣa*, or colloquial Standard, dominant among urban Bengalis today. Literary prose per se emerged along with modern Bengali itself in the nineteenth century colonial context, as did tensions between forms of the language identified with Hinduism and Islam—Sanskritized *Sadbu* versus Persianized *Mussalmani Bangla*. At least in rural areas a mixture of these roots prevailed.

A gap (*diglossia*) not unlike that between *Sadbu* and *Calit* still exists between everyday speech and the forms of writing and speech associated with high culture. Relevant dimensions of variation thus include geographic and religious variants and class-linked diglossic differences. In the United Kingdom, where children of immigrants may need language classes to help them maintain their Bengali heritage, tensions among these variants are manifested in a prejudice against Sylhetī among Bengali-speaking teachers.

Phonology, Sound Symbolism, and Script

Bengali has many of the sounds of Sanskrit, including voiced aspirated stops *bb*, *db*, and *gb*, though in eastern dialects these merge with *b*, *d*, and *g*. Regional dialects vary markedly in phonology. Nasalization is not phonemic in most eastern dialects. Several consonants in Standard Bengali, like *kb* and *k*, become *b* in eastern dialects.

Spoken Bengali reflects rich sound symbolism, onomatopoeic words that Dimock described as "an unstudied poetry of the spoken language" (Dimock 1989: 55), or even regular associations between individual vowels and feeling-tones (e.g., *a* associated with unpleasantness). The Nobel laureate poet Sir Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) was among the first to write about this phenomenon.

Bengali is written in a script very much like neighboring Assamese, which is derived from the ancient Brahmi. Read from left to right, it hangs below the line. The script is a syllabary, where the characters symbolize syllables; the vowel *ɔ* or *a* rather than *ə* as in Hindi, is implied by consonant symbols.

Syntax, Morphology, and Sociolinguistic Issues

The commonest order of elements in a simple transitive sentence in Bengali is Subject-Object-Verb, and Bengali has postpositions rather than prepositions to

express relations like "for," "under," or "in." But not all sentences need verbs. No linking verb is needed to express such constructions as "He [is] my brother."

Bengali preserves some Sanskrit inflectional morphology. Verbs are marked for aspect, mood, and tense; aspect markers like perfective *-l* or habitual *-t* immediately follow the verb root. (Grammatical forms that signal the frequency, duration, or degree of completion of actions are "aspect" markers.) Nouns and pronouns may be marked for case—nominative, objective, genitive, or locative. Subjects of Bengali sentences may be "experiencers" rather than agents. Such subjects take genitive or accusative case, and subject-verb agreement is suspended. Nouns are not marked for gender. Number marking is optional. There are about a dozen noun classifiers. These include *-tā* for countable things, *-khānā* and *-tuku* for other things, and *-jon* for persons. Pronouns are marked for number and for either respect or intimacy. Likewise, verbs are marked for the speaker's respect versus intimacy toward the subject, as well as for person (first, second, or third). This presents an ideological problem for some Bengalis who dislike making distinctions among people.

Does one call domestic workers *āpni*, as one would a teacher, *tumi* (an equal), or *tui* (an intimate or a social inferior)? Dil found that Hindu children generally call their parents *tumi* and receive the affectionate *tui* in return, and Muslim children generally call their parents *āpni* and receive *tui* in return. Kin terms and greeting formulas also differ in Muslim and Hindu usage. Yet both communities acknowledge a common poetic-linguistic heritage.

James M. Wilce

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BENGALIS Bengalis are the people of the Bengal region of South Asia, which since 1971 has consisted of the nation of Bangladesh and West Bengal in India. There are also large Bengali populations in the neighboring Indian states of Assam, Bihar, and



A Bengali woman picks tea leaves in what was East Pakistan in 1962. (ROGER WOOD/CORBIS)

Tripura, as well as overseas communities in Great Britain, the United States, and Canada. The worldwide Bengali population is about 150 million in Bangladesh and West Bengal. Bengalis speak Bangla, a language with a long literary tradition. In 1913 Bengali writer Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) became the first Asian to receive the Nobel Prize for literature, and many other leading South Asian poets, novelists, filmmakers, and musicians have been Bengalis.

Bengalis are adherents of both Islam and Hinduism, with most Bengalis in India being Hindus and most in Bangladesh being Muslims. There are also small Christian and Buddhist minorities. The Bengalis are mainly a rural people, with about 80 percent of the people in Bangladesh and West Bengal living in small farming villages where wet-rice agriculture is the primary economic activity. A caste-based occupational structure is important in Hindu communities; in Muslim communities it is present but less significant. Villages in both West Bengal and Bangladesh, though part of national and state political systems, are also often governed by councils of elders (*panchayats* in India, *samaj* in Bangladesh), which exert considerable informal control.

David Levinson

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BENTINCK, WILLIAM CAVENDISH (1774–1839), British governor general in India. William Bentinck is best remembered in Indian history for pioneering reforms in Indian society. Born on 14 September 1774 at Bulstrode in England with a silver spoon in his mouth, the second son of the third Duke of Portland was appointed governor of Madras in 1803. He was held responsible for the mutiny in Vellore and was recalled four years afterward. He was elected a member of the British House of Commons in 1815.

Bentinck was appointed governor general of Bengal in 1827 and was successful in turning the annual deficit of about £1.5 million into a surplus of about the same amount. Consequently, the Charter Act of 1833 renewed the government of East India Company, and Bentinck became the governor general of India in 1833. Strongly influenced by the tradition of Utilitarianism—a political school of thought, influenced by Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, which believed in reform through rational administration—he brought about important changes in the administrative structure of India, such as an end to discrimination in public service recruitment, adoption of a liberal attitude toward the press, and the far-reaching measure of making English the official language of India. Although he followed a policy of nonintervention in the day-to-day running of Indian states, he annexed Mysore, Coorg, and central Cachar. He abolished the practice of female infanticide prevalent among some Rajput tribes. Indian reformers such as Raja Rammohan Roy (1772–1833) advocated abolition of the sati system (the custom of burning widows alive with the dead bodies of their husbands). In Regulation of XVII of December 1829, Bentinck declared sati illegal. He also abolished flogging in the Indian Army. In 1835, Bentinck resigned and was replaced by Sir Charles Metcalf; he died four years later in Paris.

Patit Paban Mishra

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BENTO The origins of the lunchbox style food service (*bento*) are contested. The first *bento* may have been a simple conveyance of foodstuffs for theatergoers during the Tokugawa or Edo Period (1600/1603–1868). It may have begun backstage as a meal to be eaten by actors and stagehands while preparing for a performance. The phrase *maku no uchi bento* designated a style of square box with internal partitions separating rice and the staple food from other pieces of accompanying food such as fish, chicken, pickles, and boiled vegetables. *Maku no uchi* means the space curtained off for parties of outdoor picnickers or the backstage separated by a curtain. Another theory holds that *bento* were used first by travelers on the road, particularly officials journeying between Edo and the provinces. In addition, *bento* may have been used by warriors camping on battlefields or by spectators at sumo wrestling matches.

The chief characteristic of a *bento* is portability. A *bento* is usually individually portioned and prepared for one person; the container may be wood, lacquer, wicker, cardboard, or plastic. In premodern times the foods were salted or dried, convenient for carrying or keeping over time. The main foodstuff is rice, whether wrapped in seaweed, shaped into rice balls, or packed into a compartment in the container. The term "lunchbox" implies a container for a makeshift meal to be eaten as a stopgap while away from home. *Bento* in Japan, however, are often more elaborate preparations.

The preeminent celebration involving the use of *bento* is the spring cherry blossom viewing (*hanami*) on rice matting spread under the cherry trees. Some *bento* for special events are stacked lacquer boxes, fitted out with elaborately prepared foods for sharing. Another version of the stacked box is the *jubako*, the ten-stacked lacquer trays forming a tall *bento*, each containing different types of foods (*osechi ryori*) prepared ahead for the three days of entertainment and celebration at the New Year.

Less elegant, but equally entrenched in Japanese custom, is the *ekibento* (station lunchbox), which was first sold in 1885 for passengers going from Utsunomiya Station to Tokyo's Ueno Station. *Bento* became a significant aspect of travel and stations everywhere have many kiosks selling great varieties of *bento* evoking seasonality and the regions of Japan. Far from being a stopgap meal or fast food, these *bento* have special cachets. Regular travelers know where to

buy each variety of *bento* and some stations have to stock up on favorites for the droves of visitors at certain times of year.

The homemade *bento* most people know best is the school lunchbox. Children carry lunchboxes to schools where lunches may not be provided; the "correct" lunches, according to nutritionists and school officials, observe the formula of "something from the mountains and something from the sea," meaning fish, fish paste or seaweed, chicken, pork, beef or egg, and vegetables and grains (usually rice). During wartime when foods were scarce, children's lunchboxes contained sweet potatoes or pumpkin; if the scarce and coveted rice was included, a single red pickled plum (*umeboshi*) embedded in the center of a rectangle of rice would symbolize the Japanese flag (*Hinomaru*). *Hinomaru bento* was thus supportive of the war effort by encouraging a spartan diet and by visually representing a national icon. School lunches in the early 2000s are often served in classrooms and are more likely to include stews, curries, and breads on metal trays rather than pickles and rice. Still, a home-prepared *bento* is said to emblemize the loving and hardworking mother, just as the wartime box evoked the national struggle.

Merry Isaacs White

See also: **Cuisine-Japan.**

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BHAKTI The path of bhakti, the major form of Hindu worship and communal religious practice in India, refers to the devotional love of a deity or deities. The reason for much Indian artistry, bhakti is demonstrated in statues, paintings, temples, and elaborate feasts. The most accepted etymology derives the word from the Sanskrit root *bhaj*, which means "to worship," "to share in," and "to belong to." In the bhakti tradition, love and concern are shared between the god or goddess and the worshiper.

Most forms of Hindu bhakti are monotheistic, emphasizing the worship of a single, personal god, who created the world and cares for its inhabitants. However, some forms also worship a divine couple, a divine family, or a deity and his or her emanations and

incarnations. The goals of this worship are to glorify the god or goddess and to gain blessings in life and salvation after death.

Early Developments

Elements of bhakti are found in the earliest Indian religious texts, the Vedas and Upanishads. The worship of the gods Indra and Varuna in the hymns of the Rig Veda contain devotional elements, and the Upanishads speak of a "supreme person" or "inner controller," a view of an ultimate reality or an impersonal Brahman that can be understood as a belief in a personal god. The Katha and Mundaka Upanishads also speak of the ultimate reality bestowing grace on those it chooses. In the *Bhagavad Gita*, a part of the epic story known as the *Mahabharata*, the god Krishna describes in detail the importance of bhakti and declares it superior to other forms of religious belief and practice.

The earliest devotional poetry comes from South India, in hymns to the god Murukan of the third century CE. From the fifth to the ninth centuries CE hymns were written in the Tamil language to the gods Siva and Vishnu, who remain highly popular in India. The bhakti style of worship spread throughout the rest of India in texts such as the Puranas and in the performances of wandering poets, singers, and storytellers.



POEM TO KRISHNA: MIRABAI

My Dark One,
they've placed him off limits—
but I won't live without him.
Delighting in Hari,
coming and going with sadhus,
I wander beyond reach of the world's snare.
Body is wealth
but I give it away—
my head was long ago taken.
Full of rapture,
Mira flees the jabbering townfolk—
going for refuge
to what cannot perish,
her Dark One.

Source: Andrew Schelling, trans. (1993) *For Love of the Dark One: Songs of Mirabai*. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 53.



BHAKTI

Poem to Kali: Ramprasad Sen

O Mother! my desires are unfulfilled
 My hopes are ungratified,
 But my life is fast coming to an end.
 Let me call You, Mother, for the last time
 Come and take me in your arms...
 This world knows not how to love;
 My heart yearns, O Mother, to go there
 Where love reigns supreme.

Source: Jadunath Sinha. (1966) *Rama Prasad's Devotional Songs: The Cult of Shakti*. Calcutta, India: Sinha Publishing House, 7.

The bhakti tradition was appealing because it emphasized the equality of all people in worship. It thus denied India's caste inequities, giving new religious status to low-caste people, to women, and to outcasts. It also emphasized that religious emotion was of greater value than classical knowledge of written texts, so people who were illiterate and uneducated could still be great bhaktas, or devotees.

Bhakti Groups

The Hindu tradition includes three major bhakti groups. The largest group worships the god Vishnu, and its members are called Vaishnavas. Vishnu is most popularly worshiped as Rama and Krishna or Hari, though he has many other forms. The second-largest bhakti group worships the god Siva, and they are known as Saivas or Saivites. The third-largest group worships the goddess as Mother of the Universe, most often as Shakti, Durga, Lakshmi, or Kali. Worshipers of the goddess are called Shaktas. Each of these groups has various subgroups with different understandings of the nature and actions of the deity, different lineages of teachers with their own interpretations of texts and preferred ritual practices, and different regional languages and traditions. Smaller bhakti groups worship other deities.

Bhakti Practices

While some devotees are renouncers, who spend their lives in prayer and service to the god or goddess,

most are householders, who worship daily at a home altar and on various holidays and festivals at temples and shrines. The major form of bhakti worship is *puja*, in which the deity, in the form of a statue, picture, or iconic symbol, is presented ritual gifts. The god or goddess is offered flowers, fruit, incense, and other valuable or cherished items, accompanied by prayers and songs. It is believed that the food is accepted by the deity and transformed into *prasada* or sanctified food. This food is eaten by the devotees, who then share in the deity's grace. Sometimes devotees who love the god intensely may have a direct sense of the god's presence, called *darshan*, which involves mutual sight, recognition, and caring between god and devotee. *Puja* may be performed on holidays as a part of traditional yearly worship or at other times to gain special favors. It may be performed to fulfill a promise made to the god or as a form of service to the god and the temple or shrine.

Bhakti rituals also include singing hymns, called *bhajan* or *kirtan*, chanting the god's name or sacred Sanskrit words and phrases, called *mantrajapa*, and reenacting the adventures of the god or goddess in plays and dances. Visualizing the god or goddess and his or her heavens and chanting mantras or sacred words are a part of disciplined bhakti yoga. More ascetic bhakti practices involve difficult pilgrimages to distant holy places, fasting, and extended meditation on the god or goddess.

The goal of bhakti practice is a closer relationship with the god or goddess. The various bhakti groups define this relationship differently, and the most complex literature on the topic derives from writers in the Bengali Vaishnava tradition. Human emotions, *bhavas*, correspond to universal emotional essences or *rasas*, and the goal of bhakti is a full appreciation of these emotions. The most intense emotion is divine erotic love, the passionate love of the god Krishna. He may be loved through five basic relationships: god as master and devotee as servant; god as child and devotee as parent, which is sometimes reversed; god as beloved and devotee as lover; god and devotee as friends; and god and devotee as ultimately one shared spirit, which is the least desirable for Vaishnavas as it lacks passion and drama. Love may be selfish or selfless, but the highest form of love is selfless *prema*, in which the only goal in life is loving and serving the god.

In South Indian Vaishnava bhakti, the most important act is self-surrender (*prapatti*), the worshiper's total dependence on the god Vishnu. This dependence makes a person a devotee. Morality is important; the devotee must refrain from malice, lying, egotism, and unfriendliness. The god may be loved in his divine or

heavenly form or in his earthly incarnations, called avatar forms.

The Indian tradition of Saiva-siddhanta includes four stages of love for the god Siva. The devotee follows first the path of the slave, doing temple services such as cleaning, lighting lamps, and growing flowers; then the path of the good son or daughter, meditating on Siva as light and preparing for ritual worship; then the path of the associate, yogic practice; and finally the path of truth, full awareness of Siva. The devotee must have knowledge, ritual action, yogic practice, and a virtuous way of life. When the devotee reaches union with Siva, the sweetness of that state is compared to sugarcane and honey. Love of the god is reflected in the love of all humanity.

The goddess may be worshiped as the single Mother of the Universe; as a couple, with her consort Siva; or in one of her ten manifest forms as the ten Wisdom Goddesses or *dasa mahavidyas*. In Bengali Shaktism the major devotional roles portray the goddess as protective mother and the devotee as child or the goddess as innocent daughter and the devotee as nurturing parent. Worship of the goddess may also be yogic or tantric, in which emotion is less important than detachment and wisdom.

In all these forms of Hindu bhakti, devotion to the god is more important than knowledge, caste and purity rules, and social status. Bhakti is a religious path of love, dedicated to the god or goddess and reflected in compassionate behavior toward humankind, creativity in literature and the arts, and the practice of religious ritual.

June McDaniel

See also: **Caste; Hindu Philosophy; Hindu Values; Hinduism-India; Sanskritization**

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BHARATA NATYAM. See **Dance-India**.

BHIL One of the largest ethnic groups in South Asia (only the Gond in India are slightly more numerous), the Bhils number over 8 million today. The Gond are a Scheduled Tribe inhabiting hills and forests in the western part of central India, primarily the watershed of the Narmada River. Their main concentration, over 2 million, is in Madhya Pradesh state in central India. The term "Bhil," derived from the Dravidian word for "bow," their quintessential weapon, covers many subgroups well known by other names, such as Dubla, Garasia, Patelia, and Vasava.

Bhils are a settled agricultural people, albeit with some brigandage in their past. Those without land work as laborers. The villages have a scattered layout, with less than a hundred huts spread over perhaps three to four square kilometers. Each village is surrounded by fields and communal grazing areas. In the past Bhils exploited the forest by hunting and gathering and also practiced slash-and-burn agriculture until it was made illegal. Farms now grow maize, wheat, millet, wild rice, tobacco, peanuts, and a variety of vegetables. Bhils depend on numerous castes in the area for many basic necessities.

Each village, consisting of two or more extended families, is led by a hereditary headman. The villages are generally exogamous, and marriage is virilocal (married couple living in the husband's family's village). Polygamy is rare. A few Bhils are Christian and Muslim, though many are Hindu, and are animists who worship Wagh deo, the tiger god, Nandervo, the god of agriculture, or Kalika, the earth mother.

Paul Hockings

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BHIT SHAH Located in Pakistan 200 kilometers from Karachi, the shrine of Bhit Shah is the resting place of Shah Abdul Latif (d. 1752), a noted poet and musician of Sind, a province in modern Pakistan. This Sufi mystic wrote the *Risalo*, a collection of thirty Sindhi poems arranged according to musical notes, or rhythmic patterns.

The mausoleum and mosque of Shah Abdul Latif were built by Ghulam Shah Kalhoro (d. 1772), the

ruler of Sind, in 1765. The ornate buildings (with adjoining graveyard) are covered in blue and white glazed tiles fired in the kilns of nearby Hala. The domed mausoleum has a square plan; the cenotaph of the saint stands beneath the dome, enclosed behind an ornate wooden screen. The mosque has a portico of carved marble columns that seem to spring from blossoming lotus buds. The two buildings, with their compact scale and composite motifs, are beautiful examples of Islamic and Hindu syncretism in the architecture of the Indian subcontinent.

On Thursday evenings local musicians gather around the courtyard of the shrine and recite the Shah's poetry. The *urs* (wedding) ceremony of Shah Abdul Latif is celebrated from the fourteenth until the sixteenth of the month of Safar with a yearly poetry and music festival held in Bhit.

Kishwar Rizvi

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BHITAI, SHAH ABDUL LATIF (1689–1752), Sufi poet of Sind. Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai is the most famous Sufi poet of Sind, the region that is now the southeastern corner of Pakistan. Born in the village of Haveli (the present district of Hyderabad), he built nearby the small hamlet of Bhit (Sandhill), where he lived for a large part of his life.

Although not a man of great education, Shah Abdul Latif wrote remarkable lyrics, dialogs, and tales in the Sindhi language. His poems were collected over a century after his death in the famous book, *Shah Jo Risalo*.

In his poems, often based on simple traditional folktales of rural Sind, he emphasized human need for the love, compassion, and wisdom of God. Many of the poems were set to music and sung. His love tales and folk stories, such as *Sassui and Punbun* and *Lilan and Chanesar*, represent the core of popular Sindhi culture. After Shah Abdul Latif's death in 1752, the ruler of Sind, Ghulam Shah Kalhoro built a mausoleum in the poet's honor in Bhit, which is still regularly visited by pilgrims and devotees, and where his poems are continuously recited and sung.

Riccardo Redaelli

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BHOPAL (2001 est. pop. 1.4 million). Bhopal, the capital of Madhya Pradesh State in central India, was founded on the north bank of the Upper Lake in 1723. Cotton, electrical goods, and jewelry are among the city's manufactures, and its major buildings include the Palace of the Nawab, the University of Bhopal, and the still unfinished Taj-il Masjid, which was begun in the late nineteenth century and is said to be the largest mosque in India. In addition the Birla Museum and the State Museum house valuable collections.

In 1984 a large pesticide factory belonging to Union Carbide, an American conglomerate, leaked poisonous isocyanate gas in Bhopal, killing at least 2,500 people and leaving over 100,000 people homeless, the world's worst industrial disaster to that date. The Indian law courts forced the parent company to make financial reparations, but the legal ruling was so complex that even a decade later many of the victims had not received adequate compensation, if any. It seemed that a small army of lawyers and state bureaucrats were the only recipients of the money. Even though the chief executive officer of Union Carbide,



Demonstrators with anti-Union Carbide posters observe a moment of silence to mark the fifteenth anniversary of the disaster on 3 December 1999. (AFP/CORBIS)

an American, was found guilty of homicide, he was never extradited to India.

Paul Hockings

See also: **Air Pollution**

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BHOSLE, SHIVAJI (1627–1680), Maratha hero. Shivaji, an important figure in Indian history, is remembered for his valor and relentless struggle against the last of the Mughal rulers, Aurangzeb (reigned 1658–1707). Born on 19 February 1627 at Shivaneri, near Junnar in western India, Shivaji's father, Sahaji Bhosle, sent him to the dense jungles of Pune. Under the able guidance of his mother, Jijabai Nimbalkar, and tutor Dadoji Konddev, Shivaji took the vow of driving out the Mughal enemy. He began a career of adventure that captivated many of his and later generations. Beginning as a small fief holder, he carved out the large Maratha kingdom in western and southern India, which included present-day Pune, Raigarh, Ramnagar, Konkan, Kolhapur, and some areas of Karnataka. The killing of Afzal Khan (military commander for the Bijanpur sultanate) in 1659, the attack on Shayiste Khan (Mughal viceroy of Deccan), and the sack of the Mughal port Surat were landmarks in his eventful career. On a visit to Agra, Shivaji was imprisoned by the Mughal emperor. However, he and his son made a dramatic escape in baskets of sweetmeats. Shivaji declared himself sovereign king of Maratha in 1674 in a ceremony at Raigarh, in which he gave himself the title of *Chhatrapati* (sovereign king). Six years later, he died on 3 April 1680 at the age of fifty-three. He bequeathed a well-organized state to his son Sambhaji.

Patit Paban Mishra

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BHUBANESHWAR (2001 est. pop. 647,000). The capital of the Indian state of Orissa since 1948, Bhubaneswar lies in the district of Puri and is famous for its Hindu temples. Most of the temples of Bhubaneswar were built between the seventh and thirteenth centuries. The remains of 500 temples still stand around the Bindu Sagar Lake in the Old City. The important temples include the Lingaraja Temple (eleventh through fifteenth centuries), the Parasurameshwara Temple (seventh and eighth centuries), the Mukteshwara Temple (early tenth century) and the Kapileshwara Temple (mid-fifteenth century).

Bhubaneswar's history dates to the third century BCE. It served as the capital of the Kalinga kingdom in the fourth and fifth centuries CE. The seventh century CE saw the establishment of the Saivite Hindu tradition in the region under the rule of King Sasanka. After Sasanka's death, the Bhauma Kara dynasty came to power, followed by the Soma dynasty. Muslim forces made their presence felt at the end of the sixteenth century. Finally it became British territory in 1757 when Robert Clive defeated the Bengal Nawab Siraj-ud-daula.

Bhubaneswar today is divided into two sections, the Old City and a modern New City, designed by the architect Otto Koenigsberger, and is an important commercial and political center. Significant industries include cotton textiles and electronics.

Sanjukta Das Gupta

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BHUMIPOL ADULYADEJ (b. 1927), Thai monarch. His Majesty King Bhumipol Adulyadej (pronounced Pumipon Adunyadet) is the longest-reigning monarch in the world, having been on the throne since 1946. He is the ninth monarch of the Chakri dynasty, founded in 1782, and celebrated his golden jubilee in 1996. King Bhumipol was born 5 December 1927 in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where his father Prince Mahidol was studying medicine at Harvard. His mother, a nurse, was a commoner, later to become the beloved King's Mother (Somdech Ya).

It was not expected that Prince Bhumipol would become king. However, his father passed away in 1929 and his older brother (Prince Ananda Mahidol), then



The Royal Family of Thailand in 1952. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

a ten-year-old student in Switzerland, was later chosen to become King Rama VIII, following the abdication of King Rama VII. However, in 1946, King Ananda died unexpectedly, resulting in Prince Bhumipol being made the ninth Chakri king at age nineteen. Then a student in Switzerland, he shifted his study from science to political science to prepare for his new leadership role. After his formal coronation in 1950, the king decided to take up residence not at the Grand Palace, but instead at the much more modest Chitlada Villa.

King Bhumipol has many versatile and impressive abilities. His nine major talents and roles (as depicted in Ratchamangkala Hall of the King Rama IX Royal Park) can be briefly summarized as (1) the family man, (2) the artist, (3) the sportsman, (4) the musician, (5) the monarch, (6) the philanthropist, (7) the statesman, (8) the developer, and (9) the innovator of royal projects.

In Thailand's constitutional monarchy, the king is above the normal political arena, though he does sign legislation as a royal formality. Without question, King Bhumipol is the most popular leader anywhere in the world. If an opinion poll were taken in Thailand, he would receive a 99.99 percent approval rating. He is universally admired and respected by the Thai people because of his dedication and commitment to his people. In the years from the mid-1960s to 1994, he never traveled outside Thailand, but instead traveled to all areas and regions of Thailand to

understand the needs of his people. He does not involve himself in partisan politics. However, in 1973 and again in 1992 he intervened to stop political violence and chaos related to confrontations between the military and students and other citizens. Also, on occasion he will speak not as the monarch but as an ordinary Thai citizen to express concerns of the people to the government. In response to the economic crisis of 1997, he proposed his theory of *setakit popieng* (economic self-sufficiency). His power to withhold or grant legitimacy to a government is also an important informal power, which he rarely uses except at the time of a major political crisis.

Gerald W. Fry

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BHUTAN-PROFILE (2001 est. pop. 2 million). Bhutan is a small, landlocked eastern Himalayan kingdom of 47,000 square kilometers. A natural barrier of mountain ranges separates Bhutan from Tibet in the north, Arunachal Pradesh (India) in the east, and Sikkim in the west. Bhutan's foothills meet the Indian plains of West Bengal and Assam in the south.

While Bhutan shares most of its cultural elements with Tibet, politically the country is part of South Asia, with especially strong links to India by treaty, communications, and recent history. Bhutan's identity is bound up with its Buddhist religion, first introduced by the semi-legendary eighth-century Indian mystic and teacher, Guru Padmasambhava or Guru Rimpoche, the Precious Teacher, who was said to have lived more than one thousand years. Always regarded as different in geography and development from the Tibetan Plateau although the two areas share many cultural features, Bhutan was constituted as a separate state in the seventeenth century and has maintained a distinctive identity ever since.



BHUTAN

Country name: Kingdom of Bhutan
Area: 47,000 sq km
Population: 2,049,412 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 2.17% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 35.73 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 14.03 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: 0 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio: 1.07 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 108.89 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population: 52.79 years, male: 53.16 years, female: 52.41 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Lamaistic Buddhist 75%, Indian- and Nepalese-influenced Hinduism 25%
Major languages: Dzongkha (official), Bhotes speak various Tibetan dialects, Nepalese speak various Nepalese dialects
Literacy—total population: 42.2%, male: 56.2%, female: 28.1% (1995 est.)
Government type: monarchy; special treaty relationship with India
Capital: Thimphu
Administrative divisions: 18 districts
Independence: 8 August 1949 (from India)
National holiday: National Day (Ugyen Wangchuck became first hereditary king), 17 December (1907)
Suffrage: Each family has one vote in village-level elections
GDP—real growth rate: 6% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita: (purchasing power parity): \$1,100 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: not available
Exports: \$154 million (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Imports: \$269 million (c.i.f., 2000 est.)
Currency: ngultrum (BTN); Indian rupee (INR)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Factbook* 2001.
 Retrieved 5 March, 2002 from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>

From the eighth to the seventeenth centuries, religious dynasties controlled life in the valleys, and there was no central authority. During this period, Bhutan was regarded as a hidden land, a place of refuge and exile from the troubles of the Tibetan Plateau. One such exile was the great teacher Longchen Rabjampa (1308–1363), who wrote a eulogy of central Bhutan. Another such exile, Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyel (1594–1651?), founded the Bhutanese state.

Physical Characteristics

The country consists of a series of interlocking mountain valleys, running north to south, divided laterally into three belts. The high northern belt is

marked by peaks of over seven thousand meters and by major passes; it is sparsely inhabited by yak herders who move to the lower valleys in winter to barter their yak milk and meat.

The middle belt consists of wooded valleys separated by north-south ridges that frame rivers flowing into the Indian plains. These rivers sustain the fertile valleys of the central zone, which lie at altitudes ranging from approximately 1,200 to approximately 2,700 meters. Much of the country's population is concentrated in this area. Rice, maize, and wheat are cultivated in the lower valleys, and barley, buckwheat, and millet are grown higher up. This belt also abounds in dense forests of pine, cypress, fir, maple, oak, and



birch. The county's main road runs west to east through this belt.

The southern belt consists mainly of wooded foothills, rising to 1,500 meters above sea level, with a hot, humid climate. In the twentieth century, this area was settled by Nepali-speaking migrants, whom the government was keen to integrate into the national mainstream, based on the culture and tradition of the historically significant middle belt. The north-south roads to India run through this area.

It is the middle region that is the center of Bhutan's political and historical identity. In the west of this region, the beautiful valley of Paro is the site of Bhutan's holiest shrine, Taksang (the Tiger's Nest), believed to be the place where Guru Padmasambhava arrived on a tiger's back. Tragically, it burned down in 1999. Political power centers on the valley of Thimphu, the capital since 1961. The valley of Bumthang is also full of associations with Guru Rimpoche, while Tongsa is the seat of the present Wangchuck dynasty. The east of the country has its own language and cultural style. It is hotter, drier, and less forested than the west. It is the source of Bhutanese textiles, woven by eastern women working on hand looms.

Three of Bhutan's four major language groups are found in the central belt. Ngalongkha is spoken in the five western valleys that formed the core of political authority in Bhutan. It is from Ngalongkha that the official national language, Dzongkha, was developed.

The second language group is Bumthangkha, which includes dialects spoken in the central valley of Bumthang and its neighboring valleys of Kheng, Kurto, and Mangdelung. The third group is Tsangla, the languages of the Sharchops, who live in the east.

Government

Bhutan is a monarchy. The present ruler, Jigme Singye Wangchuck (b. 1955), is the fourth king in a line founded in 1907. The king and a Council of Ministers, or Lhengye Zhungtshog, constitute the executive authority. They are assisted by the Royal Advisory Council, or Lodoi Tsokde, which has both lay and ecclesiastical members. The king and the Lhengye Zhungtshog are responsible to the National Assembly, which meets twice a year. In 1998, in a major reform initiated by the king, the annually rotating chairman of the Council of Ministers was made the head of the government. The king is head of state. There are no political parties. One national newspaper, *Kuensel*, provides national and international news in English, Dzongkha, and Nepali editions.

At the local level, the village headman is chosen by open voting, as are representatives to the National Assembly. For internal administration, the country is divided into twenty *dzonkhags*, or regions, so called after the *dzongs*, which combine the function of local government center and monastery. The head of a *dzonkhag* is called a *dzongda*, who is appointed by the central government. Since the late 1980s, devolution of power to the *dzonkhags*, especially in education, is a government policy.

Politics

Bhutan's overriding aim is to balance development and modernization with maintenance of its traditional culture. Bhutan did not enter the television age until 1999; in the same year that it established Internet capacity. The primacy of Bhutan's traditional culture is emphasized by a policy of *driglam namza* ("discipline and propriety"), which includes the compulsory wearing of national dress and proper ways of behaving in the presence of authority. The king has often stated that his policy is to promote "gross national happiness," rather than a narrowly defined gross national product.

Bhutan's most controversial political issue is the so-called southern problem involving the Nepali-speaking population of the south. Some of the southern population opposed a government census and imposition of *driglam namza*. While an outright rebellion in 1989 was nipped in the bud, demonstrations took place, and the government arrested many implicated in the conspiracy. Supporters of the rebels (called *ngolops*, or antinationals, by the government) subsequently fled to United Nations-run refugee camps in Nepal. The population of these camps is given by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as 100,000, but the Bhutanese government says many are

not Bhutanese at all or are illegal immigrants. Leaders of the escapees say that all those in the camps are Bhutanese and were forcibly expelled under a program of ethnic cleansing and suppression of human rights.

Several rounds of minister- and official-level talks between Nepal and Bhutan have established the modalities under which the refugees may be categorized, and there has been a promise from Bhutan to accept the return of all those classified as Bhutanese. Most of those arrested have been freed, including Tek Nath Rizal, regarded as the main leader.

Economy and Way of Life

Bhutan is overwhelmingly agricultural (94 percent of the population), with a superstructure of ecclesiastical and government officers. Government revenues are provided by the sale of electricity, direct subsidies from India, and taxes. In 1961, the government took a leading role in economic planning through a series of five-year plans based on the Indian model. More recently, since the 1980s, an increasing role has been given to the private sector, with transport, postal, and banking services already contracted out. Bhutan's largest single source of revenue is the huge Chukka hydroelectric project. This dam was built by India, which pays Bhutan for the electricity generated and exported to India's northeast. Other electricity projects have been set up, and more are envisaged.

Industrial employers include the Penden Cement Authority, Bhutan Wood Particle Products, Bhutan Carbide and Chemicals Ltd., a fruit-processing plant at Samtse, and distilleries. Tourism and stamps provide foreign-currency income. Commercial ventures include Tashi Commercial and Gaseylu Construction. There are no large-scale industries in Bhutan; royal relatives form corporations in areas such as oil and gas supply (obtained from India), department stores, and construction. Much of the construction work undertaken is paid for by the government or by foreign aid projects, as with the new sewage system for the capital, built with Japanese and Danish government and private aid and employing many local workers.

Land is an important source of wealth, and farmland is passed through the female line. Perhaps uniquely in Asia, there are usually no marriage ceremonies; the groom's moving into the bridal home is generally enough to constitute a marriage. Divorce and second marriage are common. Relative sexual equality and a rather open attitude toward sexuality are also in contrast to Bhutan's southern neighbors.

Bhutanese villages tend to be scattered households surrounded by fields. Towns are a recent phenomenon,

having grown around the *dzongs*. Some, such as Paro or Jakar, have been rebuilt as substantial, planned townships, following fires. Others, such as the new town of Punakha at Kuruthang, are built by government plan. Family houses tend to be substantial affairs of two or more stories with shingle roofs and mud walls. The lower story is mud or stone, and the upper a wooden framed structure, frequently attractively painted. Houses are rebuilt every couple of generations, with the tamping down of the mud walls being the women's job and the erection of the wooden framework of the upper stories the responsibility of a carpenter.

Bhutan's gross domestic product is given as \$1,100 per capita, but figures do not do justice to an economy still largely subsistence and barter based. The countryside appears prosperous with neat terraced fields, substantial houses, and people clothed in elegant traditional garments. Unlike much of Asia, there are few urban slums and little begging or unemployment. Rice is a staple but grows only at altitudes below approximately 2,100 meters. Red rice from Paro and Punakha is especially prized. Higher altitudes and poorer soils grow maize or buckwheat and potatoes, a cash crop exchanged for white rice. Chilies are essential to Bhutan's cuisine; the sight of red chilies drying on shingle roofs is a common feature of Bhutanese villages. Cattle grazing is usually carried out in tandem with farming. The herds provide milk for cheese (a hard variety is popular for trekking) and butter but not meat, because of Buddhist precepts about taking life. Average landholdings are between five and thirty acres and are held freehold, but all kinds of arrangements for rent and sharecropping exist.

The government is largely responsible for education and health and has made huge efforts to increase the school-going population and to provide basic health clinics in difficult geographical circumstances. As a result of those efforts, literacy and life expectancy have increased dramatically in the last thirty years.

There is one international airport at Paro; Druk Air is the national carrier. A system of roads has been built and maintained with Indian help, although much of the transport at village level remains on foot and by pony.

Bhutan is very conscious of environmental issues, and official controls on logging are reasonably well enforced. Forests occupy some 60 to 70 percent of land area. Restrictions on hunting and collection of wild plants and animal products, such as musk, are in place.

The government strongly supports traditional arts. Houses must conform to Bhutanese style, and agencies have been set up to promote and preserve traditional crafts. The export of antiques is forbidden,

although a series of robberies of religious artifacts, culminating in 2000 with the theft of the country's most sacred relic, a bone of the founder of its main religious sect, carved in the form of the Buddhist deity of Compassion, has revealed a breakdown in traditional respect for religion.

Bhutan has made its policy of preserving its unique culture and identity a top priority. This policy also agrees with the way that much of the world would like to perceive Bhutan and with modern ideas of sustainable development, as well as with the sentiments of the religious-minded and deeply independent people of Bhutan, who have never been colonized. The policy is both successful and timely: Bhutan has taken on many features of modern life while remaining deeply traditional in feeling.

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BHUTAN—HISTORY In Bhutan, history is simultaneously religious and political. For example, the native name of the country, Druk yul, is derived from the name of the Drukpa Buddhist sect. Even now the administrative center (*dzong*) of each district functions as both a monastery and secular governor's seat. The head abbot of the Drukpa sect resides in the main *dzong*, in the capital, which is also the seat of the national government and enjoys parity of esteem with the king.

Bhutan's history was linked to that of Tibet—in which, however, it was never politically included—until the powerful Buddhist Gelug sect of Tibet, founders of the Dalai Lama rulership in the seventeenth century, tried to invade Bhutan several times in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They were repulsed and after a treaty in 1734 Bhutan's focus

turned southward. The Chinese takeover of Tibet and the 1959 flight of the Dalai Lama finally ended official relations with Tibet. Thus while the study of ancient Bhutan is part of Tibetology, contemporary Bhutan belongs to South Asia.

Two of the twelve border-subduing Buddhist temples that the first Tibetan religious king, Songtsen Gampo (d. 649/650) built in the seventh century are in Bhutanese valleys. During the long period in which Tibet was without real central authority (mid-ninth–seventeenth centuries) Bhutan seems to have adopted systems of local rule based on clans and on religious dynasties called *choje* similar to Tibet's, without centralized leadership. The rugged terrain, swift rivers, and thick forests isolated Bhutan's valleys from their neighbors and bolstered the rise of regional powers under elite families or influential local Buddhist centers, before the country's unification in the seventeenth century.

Emergence of Centralized Rule

The Drukpas, a subset of the Kargyu sect of Mahayana Buddhism, originated in Tibet. Phajo Druk-gom Shigpo (1184–1251) carried the sect from Tibet to Bhutan and set up his sons as *choje* in the Thimphu area. The popularity of the Drukpas provided the foundations on which the Bhutanese state was built in 1616 by Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyel (1594–1651?), a Tibetan lama forced to flee Tibet in a succession dispute. In Bhutan he set up a dual system of religious-secular rule, embodied in his seal of the sixteen I's (the sixteen spokes of the wheel, the wheel being highly symbolic in Buddhism and the "I" being the ego). In this seal Shabdrung announced himself as uniting religious and secular power, a concept implicit in Tantric Buddhism, where political power is not distinguished from spiritual mastery. So strong was the impact of Shabdrung that his death was kept secret for sixty years to allow the development of the new state.

To establish its identity as a Drukpa state, Bhutan under Shabdrung and his successors fought five wars with the Tibetan state of the Dalai Lamas and their Mongol allies. The last of these was in 1730 and led to a settlement brokered by the Panchen Lama and Chinese emperor in 1734, establishing a Shabdrung reincarnation as the head of Bhutan. Victory in these wars is still celebrated in festivals, especially the annual *Domche* at Punakha.

Real power then devolved to governors, or *desis* (the *deb* rajahs of British accounts) after the "retreat" of the Shabdrung in 1651 and continuing throughout the eighteenth century when the Shabdrung incarnations



KEY EVENTS IN BHUTAN HISTORY

- 1300s** The Drukpas, a subset of the Kargyu sect of Mahayana Buddhism in Tibet, are brought to Bhutan by Phajo Drukgom Shigpo.
- 1616** A Bhutanese state is established by Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyel.
- 1734** A series of wars with Tibet and the Mongols end in victory for Bhutan and the establishment of a Shabdrung reincarnation as the head of Bhutan.
- 1700s** The border area with India known as the Duars comes under Bhutanese influence and control.
- 1800s** Life is disrupted by civil wars and conflict with the British in India.
- 1907** The British recognize Ugyen Wangchuck as king.
- 1910** The Treaty of Punakha with Britain affords Bhutan full internal sovereignty, while Bhutan agrees to abide by British advice in foreign relations.
- 1958** Indian premier Jawaharlal Nehru visits Bhutan, and announces a policy of respect for Bhutan's sovereignty while helping its development efforts, a policy still in effect.
- 1959** The Chinese military occupation of Tibet turns Bhutan more firmly toward India for support.
- 1960s** King Jigme Dorje Wangchuck promotes education and technical development and internal political reform.
- 1972** Bhutan joins the United Nations.
- 1990** Ethnic Nepalis who had settled in southern Bhutan begin fleeing the country, claiming organized persecution by the government and lack of human rights.
- 1998** King Jigme Singye Wangchuck allows a six-member Council of Ministers approved by the National Assembly to take more control of state affairs.

failed to exercise much power. The regents were the main power till the civil wars of the latter half of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries established the local rulers as the main powers, finally leading to the establishment of the monarchy.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries religious authority was centered in the figure determined to be the reincarnation of Shabdrung (called by the British "dharma raja"). The fourth *desi*, Tenzin Rabgay, brought the east of the country into the orbit of the Drukpa state. However the system proved unstable, and local rulers (*pönlops*) became dominant powers in the land, especially in Paro and Tongsa districts, displacing both *desis* and dharma rajas.

In the eighteenth century the border area with India known as the Duars came under Bhutanese influence and control; Bhutan looked to the Kamrup rajas of Assam for booty, political support, and economic ties—Kamrup rupees circulated in Bhutan as currency.

As the British expanded their rule in India and as Bhutan expanded its interest in the south, Bhutan was

brought into the ambit of British Indian policy. Memoirs of successful British expeditions to Bhutan between 1774 and 1783 provide independent accounts of Bhutan at the time. Missions in 1815 and 1838 were less successful, culminating in a disastrous expedition by Ashley Eden in 1863–1864, which led to war in 1864. Bhutan then ceded its Duar territories to Britain in return for annual compensation, then totaling 50,000 rupees.

Hereditary Monarchy

Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Bhutan's civil wars led to the gradual focusing of political power around the governors of Paro and Tongsa. Ultimately the Tongsa governor Ugyen Wangchuck (1862–1926) was successful in uniting the country. He tilted Bhutanese policy toward British India by accompanying the expedition of Francis Edward Younghusband (1863–1942) to Tibet in 1903–1904 as translator and mediator. His role led to his being knighted by Britain. In 1907 the British recognized him as king after he signed a coronation agreement,

or *genja*, with lay and ecclesiastical leadership. From then on Bhutan was ruled by a hereditary monarch of the Wangchuck family.

The foundation of the monarchy ended both the period of civil war and conflicts with British India. The British signed the Treaty of Punakha (1910), allowing Bhutan full internal sovereignty, while Bhutan agreed to abide by British advice in foreign relations. Independent India reaffirmed the status quo in the 1949 Indo-Bhutanese Treaty, and this arrangement continues today.

Relations with India were cemented in 1958 when the Indian premier Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) paid a visit to Bhutan, at a time when there were no drivable roads there. Nehru announced a policy of respecting Bhutan's sovereignty while helping its development efforts, a policy still in effect. The Chinese military occupation of Tibet in 1959 meant that Bhutan turned even more firmly toward India and began to look further afield for international support, the lack of which had doomed Tibet.



The memorial in Thimphu to King Jigme Dorje Wangchuck who died in 1972. (DAVID SAMUEL ROBBINS/CORBIS)

Bhutan joined international bodies such as the Colombo Plan (1962); the United Nations (1972); the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation, of which it was a founding member in 1983; the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (1981); and the Nonaligned Movement. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Swiss, Danish, Dutch, and Japanese bodies are generous aid donors.

The monarchy has been a modernizing institution in Bhutan. The third king, Jigme Dorje Wangchuck (1928–1972), introduced cooperation with India and with Swiss agencies to promote education and technical development. He also brought about rapid institutional change, setting up a National Assembly and a Royal Advisory Council. He reformed the civil service, making it more modern, and introduced modern secular education in schools not linked to the monasteries. He also granted citizenship to those who had settled in southern Bhutan before 1958. The fourth and present king, Jigme Singye Wangchuck, came to the throne in 1972 and was officially crowned in 1974. In 1998 the king allowed a six-member Council of Ministers approved by the National Assembly to take more control of state affairs, with the head of government being rotated annually among the Cabinet members and the king remaining head of state. He has continued his father's modernization policy. Since 1990 ethnic Nepalis who had settled in southern Bhutan have fled from Bhutan, claiming organized persecution by the government and lack of human rights. About 100,000 have been housed in camps run by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in eastern Nepal. Another problem is the rise of separatist movements in the neighboring Indian state of Assam. In response to pressure from the Indian government in 1999 and 2000 Bhutan tried to close down the militants' camps. The problems have yet to be resolved.

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See also: **Bhutanese; Wangchuck, Jigme Singye**

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BHUTAN-RELIGION Bhutan's identity is wrapped up in its religion. The country owes its indigenous name (Drukyl) to the Drukpa school of Tibetan Buddhism, which is the official religion of the state. The state founder, Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyel (1594–1651?), was a Buddhist monk of the Drukpa school, and today the king and head abbot of the Drukpa Kargyu sect are held in joint esteem at the peak of the national hierarchy. While the country's religion belongs firmly to the world of Tibetan Buddhism, and its texts are written in classical Tibetan (*Chokey*), Bhutan selected and developed its own strands of this overarching culture. Of the four main Tibetan sects, the Nyingma and Kargyu are present, with the Drukpa subject of the Kargyu dominant.

Introduction of Buddhism to Bhutan

Bhutan's initial encounter with Buddhism occurred in the seventh century, when the Tibetan king Songtsen Gampo (d. 649/50) built two of the earliest Tibetan Buddhist temples—Kichu in Paro and Jambay in Bumthang. His temple-building scheme was based on the geomantic (referring to magic based on geographic features) notion that the whole of Tibet was a female demon, which had to be pinned down by the construction of temples. Both temples continue to this day as active religious centers patronized by the royal family.

Bhutanese traditions commonly date the independent introduction of Tibetan Buddhism into Bhutan as a whole to the eighth century, and credit Padmasambhava, popularly called Guru Rimpoche ("Precious Teacher"), a largely mythical figure rumored to have lived from 800 BCE to c. 800 CE. The Nyingma tradition founded by him is characterized by a personal relationship between a guru and his disciples rather than by institutionalized monasticism. Legends of Guru Rimpoche's role as tamer of demons and bringer of culture are popular among other Himalayan Buddhist societies, where he is revered as the second Buddha.

Introduction of the Drukpa Subject

The Drukpa subject of the Kargyu sect of Tibetan Buddhism, introduced into Bhutan in the early thirteenth century by Phajo Drukgom Shigpo (1184–1251), came to be particularly identified with Bhutan. It emerged in the seventeenth century as Bhutan's religious-political core under its incarnate head Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyel (1594–1651?), who had sought refuge in Bhutan. The Drukpa theocracy gave the country its name, "Drukyl," and the inhabitants the name of "Drukpas." The predominance of the

Drukpa tradition is shown in the invocation of the principal deities of the Drukpa pantheon, such as Palden Lhamo and Yeshey Gonpo, in annual monastic rituals in villages. However the Drukpa Kargyu tradition coexists amicably with the devotion to Guru Rimpoche. Although the state-supported monastic organization is mainly Drukpa Kargyu, some centers are dedicated to the Nyingma tradition. In Bhutan monks are commonly trained in Nyingma tradition to perform Drukpa rituals, and vice versa. Most household prayer-room altars have the statue of the Buddha in the middle flanked by those of Guru Rimpoche on the right and Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyel on the left.

Native Religious Practices

Positioned outside, but coexisting with, the Drukpa monastic tradition is the complex of local ritual specialists called *nenjorms* (female) or *powas* (male). This complex is centered on local deities and is oriented toward such material goals as healing and prosperity rather than the spiritual goals of Buddhism. It is an oral tradition, passed from pupil to teacher. A typical rite involves the chanting of verses to summon the practitioner's divinity. The divinity then takes possession of the *nenjorm* or *powa*. These rites are performed at household and village levels.

The landscape is full of religious sites—prayer flags flutter in the wind, prayer walls line the paths, temples appear on cliff faces, and water-turned prayer wheels and large and small *chortens* (structures representing the Buddha's enlightenment) are ubiquitous. Along with mountain hermitages and retreats (*gonpas*), there are legends of local saints, with rituals and observances associated with them.

Organization of the Official Church

The head of the Bhutanese official church is the head abbot, *je khenpo*. The national flag displays the yellow and orange colors representing monarchy and religion. The *je khenpo* is chosen for a three-year period, after which he retires into meditational retreat. Under him are four *lopens*, or teachers of the monastic body, which numbers about 1,200. The *je khenpo* has two monastic seats, Punakha in winter and the capital Thimphu in summer. The main monastic body moves annually with him. There are other government-supported monastic communities in the various *dzongs*, or fortified monasteries, and smaller communities of monks throughout the country with their own lamas and adherents supported by local patrons. Members of these communities outside the main monastic body number about 2,000.



Young Buddhist monks watch a dance performed in honor of the king's birthday in Thimphu, Bhutan. (ALISON WRIGHT/CORBIS)

Religious Practices among the People

For the ordinary believer in Bhutan, religion begins with the domestic altar or home prayer room. The deities invoked by each household are ancestral. Ritual is overwhelmingly important, and monks are called from the nearest *dzong* to offer rice sculptures called *tormas*. The head practitioner sits in the prayer room to chant the ritual from texts, accompanied by subsidiary practitioners blowing flutes and beating drums facing the altar. Local practitioners, including lapsed monks and nonmonastic religious practitioners called *gomchens*, also provide these services in both towns and villages. In the east, *gomchens* lead ritual performances, scripture recitations, and village-level festivals.

Religious Personalities

Religious faith and identity hinge on the veneration of the powerful personalities who brought Buddhism to what was believed to be an untamed and demon-inhabited area. Many of these were exiles from a foreign land, usually Tibet, who found both refuge and power in the "hidden land" of Bhutan.

Of these personalities Guru Rimpoche is the most important. He is believed to have come to Bhutan flying on a tiger and to have landed at the Tiger's Nest shrine in Paro valley. He also went to Bumthang, where he left his imprints on a rock, now the site of Kurje Temple. A popular legend recounts how he converted the Bumthang king by imparting his teachings through a Bhutanese consort. Each *dzong* celebrates an annual *tsechu* (festival) in his honor, where masked dancers represent the guru in his eight manifestations and his consorts.

Phajo Drukgom Shigpo is also venerated. Chronicles tell of his spreading the word according to

prophecy, his battle with opposing sects, and his union with a local woman. The Bridge of Prophecy (*Lungtenzampa*) at the site where he first met her is still the principal bridge into the capital, Thimphu, in the area of his main foundations. His four sons became lineage leaders in various parts of Bhutan.

The most beloved saint and hero of Bhutan is Drukpa Kunley (1455–1529), the mad yogi. Also from Tibet, he found opportunities for his brand of crazy mysticism in Bhutan. His tantric sexual exploits are known to all, and places associated with him became pilgrimage sites. Pilgrims go to Chime Lhakhang at Lobesa to be tapped on the head with the saint's magic *dorje* (thunderbolt of wisdom), which guarantees fertility.

Bhutan is most proud of its native saint, Pema Lingpa (1450–1521). Belonging to the treasure-discoverer tradition of the Nyingma school, he found a series of texts and precious objects and revealed dances, still enacted in Bhutanese monasteries. The Burning Lake (*Membartsbo*) where he discovered his most important treasure is a pilgrimage site, and his temple of Tamshing in Bumthang displays a suit of chain mail that he is said to have forged.

The Future

Religious practice has a continuing vitality in Bhutan today as it is wrapped up with feelings of both regional and national identity. People establish their local and family roots by honoring ancestral deities. The state and royal family support the religious work of monasteries, while the people participate fully in religious rites at festivals. Pilgrimages are a regular feature of life. Lay patrons still support monks, rituals, scripture recitations and the building of religious edifices. Initiations by revered gurus are well attended. In 2001, there were plans to set up a university for the study of Buddhism.

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See also: **Buddhism—Tibet**

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BHUTANESE "Bhutanese" refers to the people of Bhutan or to one of the languages spoken there. "Bhutan" is the official name of the Himalayan kingdom; the word probably derives from *Bhotanta*—the edge of Tibet—*Bhot* being the Sanskrit version of the Tibetan word for Tibet and *Anta* meaning "end." The term seems to have been picked up by the British from local Indian usage. The Bhutanese themselves call their country Drukylu and themselves Drukpa. The word "Druk" means dragon and refers to the sect of Tibetan Buddhism that became dominant in Bhutan. "Yul" means land, and "pa" is a suffix denoting person. The government promotes a concept of Bhutanese national identity by promoting Bhutanese culture, language, and tradition (*Drilam Namza*, "Code of Conduct and Dress"). Bhutanese dress is compulsory, and government departments are enjoined to use Dzongkha, rather than English, for correspondence.

The Bhutanese are related primarily to the Tibetans in culture, ethnicity, and language. Southern



A Bhutanese man outside a hotel in southwestern Bhutan. (PAPILLIO/CORBIS)

Bhutan is now populated by ethnic Nepalis, but the overall culture of the country remains that of the people of the north and center. Officially "Drukpa" means any citizen of Bhutan, but the term is used loosely to denote the Buddhist peoples in distinction to Nepali-speaking Hindus of the south, although this usage remains unofficial and controversial. The eastern people called Sharchops speak a different language, but share much of their culture with the westerners. The people of the south are referred to officially as Lhotsampas—southerners—under the policy of national unity.

The Himalayas have been less of a barrier to migration than the dense jungles of the southern foothills. Consequently, the southern Himalayas, such as Ladakh, Sikkim, and eastern Nepal, have been populated by waves of migrants from the Tibetan plateau, with which they share cultural, ethnic, and linguistic links. The Drukpa people of Bhutan may be regarded as within this cultural and ethnic band. Historical dates are hard to fix for this process, but the Bhutanese date their identity as Buddhists from the arrival of Guru Rimpoche in the eighth century CE. The ethnic Nepalis came much later, in the twentieth century, as hired workers on projects, as well as small farmers escaping poverty in Nepal.

There are several regional languages in Bhutan. The official language is Dzongkha, "language of the monastery," based on the language spoken in the northwestern valleys. Other Bhutanese languages are Sharchop or Tsangla spoken in the east, Bumthangkha and Mangdep spoken in the center, and Khenkha, a southern language. All these languages belong to the Tibeto-Burman language family. While the northern, western, and central languages are related to the Tibetan family, Sharchop is affiliated with the Tsangla languages, also spoken in the Tawang district of India's Arunachal Pradesh state. Nepali is widely spoken in the south. Most Bhutanese are excellent linguists, fluent in one or more of the local languages as well as Dzongkha, the official language, border Indian languages, Nepali, and, if educated, English.

Michael Kowalewski and Sonam Chhoki

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BHUTTO, BENAZIR (b. 1953), Prime minister of Pakistan. Benazir Bhutto made history as the first woman to lead a government of an Islamic state on 2 December 1988, when she became prime minister of Pakistan. She served until 1990 and again from 1993 until 1996. She was dismissed from office by two presidents: Ghulam Ishaq Khan (in 1990) and Farooq Leghari (in 1996). Both times she was accused of corruption.

She is the daughter of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who served from 1971 to 1977. Born in 1953 in Karachi, she completed her early studies in Pakistan. Her higher education was received at Radcliffe College in the United States, where she received a degree in philosophy, politics, and economics. She also attended Oxford University's International Law and Diplomacy program.

Bhutto became politically active by opposing Pakistan's leadership at the time. She became involved with the opposition party, the Pakistan People's Party. This resulted in her being arrested several times, totaling six years of confinement. Her platform focused on the plight of the poor, drawing attention to health, welfare, and education programs.

As prime minister, Bhutto worked hard to heal old wounds and rid society of that which divides, including discrimination between the sexes. She instituted health and education reform throughout Pakistan. Her efforts earned her the Bruno Kreisky Award for Human Rights in 1988. In addition, her alma mater bestowed an honorary Phi Beta Kappa award on her in 1989.


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BHUTTO, ZULFIQAR ALI (1928–1979), Pakistani political figure. As foreign minister of Pakistan from 1963 to 1966, Bhutto established an alliance with China in 1963 and encouraged President Ayub Khan (1907–1974) to wage war against India in 1965. Soon after Ayub Khan's defeat he parted company with him and then started the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in 1967. His rhetoric was vaguely leftist, and in 1965 he became critical of the American alliance, which had not been of much use to Pakistan. In the elections of 1971, the PPP got a majority of seats in West Pakistan and



Bhutto representing Pakistan at the United Nations in December 1971 during a discussion of a cease-fire with India. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

none in East Pakistan. It was thus in Bhutto's interest to hasten the secession of Bangladesh, which he nevertheless publicly deplored. He then became president of Pakistan. In 1972 he signed the Simla Agreement with India, conceding that future conflicts would have to be settled bilaterally. The election of 1977, which he won, was probably rigged. The unrest that followed prompted General Zia ul-Haq to stage a military coup. He deposed and arrested Bhutto, accused him of murder, and had him executed in prison in 1979.

Dietmar Rothermund

BIDYALANKARANA (1876–1945), Thai writer and publisher. Prince Bidyalankarana was a man of many talents, occupying high administrative offices, chiefly in financial affairs, while earning a reputation as one of the most accomplished writers of his day, both for his verse and his prose fiction. He was born in Bangkok, the son of Prince Wichaichan, last of the Second Kings. On completing his education at Suan Kulap School, he worked in the Ministry of Public Instruction and then in the Ministry of Finance before accompanying King Chulalongkorn on the king's first state visits to Europe. After a year studying at Cambridge in 1898, he returned to Bangkok and brought out a monthly magazine called *Lak wittbaya* (Stealing Knowledge; 1901–1903), a landmark on the Thai literary landscape for bringing to Thai readers translations of Western fiction and providing Thai writers with an outlet to develop a new style of writing, albeit imitative of Western fiction. It was in the pages of *Lak wittbaya* that the first translation of a Western novel, Marie Correlli's *Vendetta*, was serialized. Prince

Bidyalkarana was well known as a writer, many of his works appearing under the pen-name "N.M.S." Best known is his *Chotmai Changwang Ram* (Letters of Deputy Ram), a series of seven letters written by a father to his son, which drew its inspiration from George Horace Lorimer's *Letters from a Self-Made Merchant to His Son*. The father's letters offer advice on education, finance, career, friendship, love, marriage, and Buddhism to his son, who is at first studying in England and then returns to resettle in Thailand.

David Smyth

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BIHAR (2001 est. pop. 82.9 million). A state of the Indian Union, Bihar is bordered on the north by Nepal and by the states of West Bengal on the east, Uttar Pradesh on the west, Orissa on the south, and the new state of Jharkhand on the south and southwest. Its capital city is Patna, and the principal language spoken is Hindi. Bihar has a number of rivers flowing through it. The most important is the Ganga (Ganges); others include the Sone, Poonpoo, Falgu, Karmanasa, Durgawati, Damodar, Gandak, Ghaghara, and Kosi.

Bihar always played a significant role in India's history and witnessed the rise and fall of several empires. It finds mention in the Vedas and Puranas. It was here that Siddhartha Gautama (c. 563–c. 483 BCE; the Buddha) and Vardhamana (c. 599–527 BCE; prophet of Jainism) preached their faiths. Great kings of ancient times include Bimbisara, the founder of the Magadhan empire, Udayin who established the city of Pataliputra (modern Patna), and Candragupta Maurya and Asoka of the Maurya dynasty. Then came the Sungas, the Kanvas, and Candragupta Vikramaditya of the Gupta dynasty.

During the medieval period, Bihar was first incorporated within the Delhi sultanate and then became part of the Mughal empire. Taking advantage of the weakness of the later Mughals, the British established their foothold in Bihar with the battle of Plassey in 1757 and consolidated their position through successive battles. Bihar was a part of the Bengal presidency until 12 December 1911, when a separate state of Bihar and Orissa was formed. In 1936 Bihar was separated from Orissa, and in November 2000 Bihar was again bifurcated. The state of Jharkhand was created, consisting of the tribal-dominated districts of south Bihar.

As with most of India, Bihar is predominantly an agricultural state. The principal food grains are paddy rice, wheat, maize, and legumes, and the main cash crops are sugarcane, potatoes, tobacco, oilseeds, onions, chilies, jute, mangoes, and kenaf or *mesta*.

South Bihar was famous for its rich mineral resources, but since the bifurcation of the state in 2000, the industrial and mineral-rich zone has come within the state of Jharkhand. There are however, other important industries located in northern Bihar, including the alumina plant of the Indian Aluminium Company at Muri, the railway-wagon factory of Bharat Wagon Limited at Muzaffarpur and Mokama, and cotton-spinning mills at Siwan, Pandaul, Bhagalpur, Mokama, and Gaya. There are also sugar mills in northcentral Bihar, distilleries, tanning and leather industries in the northern part of the state, and three jute mills at Katihar and Samastipur.

Sanjukta Das Gupta

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BIN LADEN, OSAMA (b. 1957), Islamic militant. Osama bin Laden, an Islamic militant and terrorist, was born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the seventeenth son in a family of over fifty children. His father, Muhammad bin Laden (d. 1968), who came to Saudi Arabia around 1930 from South Yemen, founded the Bin Laden Corporation, one of the largest and richest construction companies in the Arab world.

Osama studied management and economics at Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, graduating in 1978. The continuing Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 contributed to his increasing radicalism and anti-Western views. Osama went to Afghanistan shortly after the Soviet invasion, where he associated himself with the anti-Soviet mujahideen or guerrilla fighters and helped finance their operations. He was especially angered by American involvement in the Gulf War and moved to the Sudan in 1991, where he set up several terrorist training bases.

Osama returned to Afghanistan in 1996, to establish his headquarters, al-Qaeda ("the base"), with the support of Afghanistan's ruling Taliban movement. Osama is the alleged mastermind behind numerous

terrorist attacks against Western countries, including the bombings of the U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, as well as the attacks on the New York World Trade Center and Pentagon in Washington, D.C., on 11 September 2001. Although thought to be at large or killed in Afghanistan, his whereabouts as of mid-2002 were uncertain.

Michael Pretes

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BIRCH, JAMES W. W. (1826–1875), First colonial administrator of Malaysia. Born in England on 3 April 1826, James Wheeler Woodford Birch was a midshipman in the Royal Navy, an administrator in Ceylon (1846–1870), and Colonial Secretary at Singapore (1870–1874). But history remembers him as a tragic figure: Within a year of being appointed the first British Resident to Perak, Birch was murdered at Pasir Salak.

According to the terms of the 1874 Pangkor Engagement, the British Residential system was introduced to the hitherto independent western peninsular Malay states of Perak, Selangor, and Sungai Ujong. In theory the British Resident served as an adviser to the Malay ruler; in practice he held executive power. Named British Resident, Birch was a meticulous, energetic, and able administrator. But he was also ignorant of Malay culture and language, impervious to Malay sensitivities, and considered the ruling elite rapacious and incompetent.

His reforms radically and adversely affected Sultan Abdullah and the Malay chiefs. In particular, his reorganization of the revenue system including new taxes and license fees, the abolishment of debt-slavery, and the codification of civil and criminal law earned Birch their fatal enmity. The task of eliminating him was entrusted to the Maharaja Lela. Following the assassination, the British swiftly apprehended the murderers and sentenced them to death. Sultan Abdullah and other chiefs guilty of complicity were banished to the Seychelles. Yusof, the only chieftain untainted by the affair, was appointed regent, and in 1876, became Sultan of Perak.

Ooi Keat Gin

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BIRDS AND BIRD CAGES Raising and domesticating birds, as well as the display of birds in finely crafted cages, have played a significant role in Chinese popular culture for at least two thousand years. Today, in such heavily populated urban areas as Hong Kong, Beijing, and Shanghai, birds and bird cages provide an important opportunity for socializing and are a key component of urban China's vital early-morning park culture, particularly among the elderly.

While a visit to a typical Chinese bird market will reveal dozens of varieties of caged birds, among the most popular birds displayed in parks are the *huamei* (babbling thrush, *Garrulax canorus*), the *bailing* (lark, *Alaudidae*), and the *bage* (myna, *Acridotheres cristatellus*). The *huamei* is known for both its singing ability and its fighting ability. The many species of *bailing* are cherished for both their singing and their dancing and are known for their ability to imitate the sounds of other animals. The *bage* is most famous for its ability to imitate human speech. For all species, the price of the bird in the marketplace can fluctuate wildly. While appearance and health are the main factors determining price, the seller's eye for what the customer can or will pay is at least as important.

Most Chinese bird cages continue to be constructed from the traditional building material, bamboo. Bird collectors value bamboo not only for its beauty but also for its strength and lightness, key factors for elderly collectors who may carry several bird cages at one time on daily trips to the park. For stronger or more destructive birds, owners generally prefer metal cages. Wooden cages are generally used only for birds that are breeding. The type of bird is the main factor in determining the shape of the cage. In general, small birds such as the *furong* (lotus bird or canary bird, *Serinus canaria*) are given small, square cages, while *huamei* are given slightly larger, round cages. Other

cage shapes include cylindrical, hexagonal, multilevel, and partitioned. Cage shape may also vary according to regional tastes. Cages with special functions include bathing cages, breeding cages, fighting cages, and incubating cages.

The future of raising caged birds as a recreational activity in China appears to be bright. China's economic expansion in recent years has resulted in increased leisure time for the urban working class, and the country's aging population ensures there will be a retired sector in need of hobbies for many years to come. Both these factors have contributed to an ongoing expansion of interest in raising birds.

Adam D. Frank

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BIRLA FAMILY Members of the Birla family have been leading industrialists in Rajasthan state, India, for well over a century. Seth Baldevdas Birla (1860–1902), later known as Raja Birla, was a Maheshwari Marwari (trading caste) member who migrated from Calcutta in the 1890s and established his family at Pilani, in the Shekhavati region of Rajasthan. Here he continued to work as a broker and trader until his death, when his sons took over, expanding the family business into areas Indians had not previously been able to exploit. Their industries included jute mills, cotton cloth, coal, and paper. Since independence, the family has been so successful that they have been acknowledged as India's leading industrialists.

G. D. Birla (1894–1983), one of these business magnates, was also one of the sponsors of the first national press agency, the Free Press of India, established in 1927. During the 1929–1931 period, G. D. Birla was a member of the Royal Commission on Labour (also known as the Whitley Commission), which investigated all aspects of labor conditions in British India and made many recommendations. In the 1931–1932 period, G. D. Birla, along with Mohandas Gandhi (1869–1948), was one of the delegates to the second session of the Round Table Conference in London. This session was to grapple with the problem of com-

munal representation in general and Muslim representation in particular.

Paul Hockings

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BISHKEK (1999 pop. 780,000). Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, was named Pishpek until 1926 and Frunze throughout most of the Soviet period. In April 1991, Bishkek acquired its present Kyrgyz name. The city is situated in the valley of the Chu River, north of the Kyrgyz Ala Tau range, at an elevation of 750 meters. Bishkek is on a railway branch connecting the Kyrgyz Republic with Kazakhstan; highway connections with other cities of the republic are complicated by the mountainous topography. There is also an international airport. The population of the city consists mainly of Kyrgyz, Russians, Uzbeks, and Ukrainians.

In the Nestorian Christian cemetery at Bishkek, the oldest tombs date to the Kara-Khitay period (twelfth century). (The Nestorian Christian church separated from the Byzantine church after 431 because of a doctrinal difference.) The khanate of Quqon (Kokand) erected a fortress at Pishpek in the early nineteenth century, which czarist Russian forces destroyed in 1862. The Russian town that arose on the spot was designated a city and district center in the Semirech'e region in 1878. Soviet power was proclaimed at Pishpek on 1 January (or 14 January by the Gregorian calendar), 1918, and the city (renamed Frunze in honor of native son and Red Army commander Mikhail Frunze [1885–1925]) became the capital of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic from its establishment in 1936.

Major industries in Bishkek include spinning, textile production, and machine building. Today Bishkek is home to government offices, several universities and institutes, the National Academy of Sciences, theaters, orchestras, museums, and parks.

D. Prior

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BITAB, SUFI (1892–1958), Afghan poet and mystic. Sufi Abdul Bitab, a poet laureate of Afghanistan, also became the leading proponent of mystical thought in his capacity as the master of the Naqshbandi Sufi order. He was born in Kabul and received his initial education from his uncle, Mullah Abdul Ghafur, a prominent Islamic jurist and cleric. For a time, Bitab taught at Kabul's Habibia School and at Kabul University.

His poems are suffused with the Sufi governing principle of love for God and the soul's desire to know and unite with the Divine. Despite the strong mystical tone to his poems, they nevertheless clothe this mysticism in a readily accessible vocabulary of love, desire, and yearning for union. His poems do not show the typical divergence of Sufi thought from orthodox Islam. This is in part due to his training by his devout uncle, and more important to his leadership of the Naqshbandis, who are known for their strict adherence to Sunni Islam. Aside from being a well-known poet, he was also a respected religious scholar and wrote many commentaries on the hadith (a compilation of Islamic traditions). Bitab was made the poet laureate of Afghanistan in 1951. He resided in Kabul all his life and died there.

Nirmal Dass

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BIWA The *biwa* is a Japanese plucked lute, usually with a bent neck, four or five strings, and from four to six frets. It is pear-shaped, with a shallow wooden body, three sound holes, and twisted silk strings wound on lateral pegs; it is played with a *bachi* (plectrum). A descendant of the Chinese *pipa*, the *biwa* entered Japan in the late seventh century. *Gakubiwa* denotes the larger type used for *gagaku* (ensemble court music) and solo styles, often mentioned in literary sources. A second category, *mosobiwa* (blind monk's lute), was connected with Tendai Buddhist sutra recitation in Kyushu. *Heikebiwa* arose in the late twelfth century to accompany *heikyoku*, the narration of *The Tale of the Heike* by blind itinerant lay priests known as *biwa boshi*.

Biwa interludes punctuating sung text were thought to pacify the spirits of dead warriors. *Heikebiwa* guilds influenced *shamisen* styles as well. The *mosobiwa* was the ancestor of more modern instruments and performance styles, such as the *satsumabiwa*; Shimazu Tadayoshi (1492–1568) wrote songs for the *satsumabiwa* to encourage samurai values. Brought to Tokyo in the Meiji period (1868–1912), the orthodox (*seiba*) *satsumabiwa* school and two offshoots, *kinshinbiwa* and *nishikibiwa*, were extremely popular, especially until the Pacific war's end. Percussive effects, vibrato, and glissandi techniques distinguish *satsumabiwa* styles. A child of the *mosobiwa* of northern Kyushu, *chikuzenbiwa*, begun by Tachibana Kyokuo (1848–1919), appealed to women players with its smaller instrument and style that was suited to lyrical preoccupations. Tsuruta Kinshi (1911–1995) and Takemitsu Toru (1930–1996) brought new attention to the modified *satsumabiwa* with modern compositions.

Linda H. Chance

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BLACK SEA An inland sea located between Southeast Europe and Western Asia, bordering Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Georgia, the Black Sea is about 4.2 million square kilometers in area. Its average depth is 1,300 meters, reaching 2,245 meters in the central area. The Black Sea is connected with the Mediterranean Sea via the Bosphorus, Sea of Marmara, and Dardanelles; the Kerch Strait links it with the Sea of Azov. The rivers that empty into the Black Sea, including the Danube, Dniester, and Dnieper, dump into it 310 square kilometers of fresh water and a sediment load with a considerable amount of pollutants. No marine life exists below 200 meters in the sea, due to a high concentration of hydrogen sulfite.

The total length of the coastline is 3,400 kilometers, with the Crimea being the only peninsula. The Caucasian and Pontic Mountains face the Black Sea in the east and south. The Danube forms an impressive delta on the west.

In summer, the weather is hot and dry, with average July temperatures of 22–24°C, sometimes reaching 30–35°C. Winters are cold, often with rain, snowfall, and severe storms resulting from the intrusion of Arctic air masses. The average January temperatures of 3–8°C may drop to minus 20–30°C in exceptionally cold winters.

The area around the Black Sea was a cradle of various civilizations, including Greece, Rome, Byzantium, Turkey, and Russia. Today, ports and naval bases dot its shores, such as Odessa in the Ukraine, Novorossiysk in Russia, Varna in Bulgaria, and Batumi in Georgia.

Pollution is a major concern of the nations surrounding the Black Sea, who have initiated several cooperative projects aimed at environmental protection. In 1989, eleven countries—Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine—signed the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Pact with a goal of promoting greater democracy, peace, and development in the Black Sea region.

Pavel Dolukhanov

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BLAVATSKY, HELENA PETROVNA (1831–1891), founder of theosophy. The granddaughter of a Russian princess, the woman known to the world as Madame Blavatsky was born Helena Petrovna Hahn in Ekaterinoslav (now Dnipropetrovsk) in the Caucasus. At age fifteen she began to study alchemy. To escape continual family problems, she immersed herself in the occult. At age eighteen she married Nikipor Blavatsky, vice governor in Armenia. Within months she left him and escaped to Istanbul. From there she went to Cairo as a snake charmer, then on to London, Paris, and New York. Inspired by the teachings of a



Helena Petrovna Blavatsky in the 1880s. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

nonmaterial "master," she developed an understanding of spiritualism.

In 1874 Blavatsky founded the Theosophical Society in association with Colonel Henry Olcott. Leaving New York in 1878, she settled in Madras (now Chennai), India, and established the society's headquarters in Adyar. Membership in the society grew, especially through Blavatsky's successful courting of rich Hindus interested in spiritualism. In 1884 she returned to Europe, where she slowly wrote *The Secret Doctrine* (1888), which influenced W. B. Yeats, George William Russell ("AE"), and Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi. Blavatsky returned to London in 1887 and spent her final years there. At her death, the Theosophical Society had close to 100,000 members, including many thousands of Westernized Indians attracted by her promises of a scientific demonstration of spiritual phenomena. Eventually, though, her promises proved empty, as her demonstrations were based more on chicanery than on science.

Paul Hockings

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BOARD GAMES The oldest board game in Asia, pachisi, is a race game to move pieces from start to goal on the board. Pachisi in ancient India had ninety-six spaces on a cruciform board. Four people play with four pieces, which are moved from outside to inside. The first player who takes all his pieces from start to goal wins. Pachisi and its transformation, *ludo*, spread rapidly to Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. In the third century BCE, a combat board game named *shaturanga* (four persons) was invented in India. Four people battled with eight pieces (four pawns, a chariot, a horse, an elephant, and a king). *Shaturanga* is the ancestor of Western chess and Eastern *shogi* (*xiang-chi* in China).

The most popular board games in East Asia are go (*wei ch'i* in China; *baduk* in Korea) and *shogi*. They are played by millions of people in Asia today, especially in China and Japan. Go was invented in China by the sixth century BCE. In the game, two players alternately put black and white stones on the board to surround an area. A stone must be placed on the intersection of the vertical and horizontal lines. There are nineteen horizontal and nineteen vertical lines on the board that forms a grid of 361 points. Whoever has more territory at the end of the game becomes the winner. The oldest Chinese reference (sixth century BCE) said that go was a most elegant game because it was intellectual. Go was introduced into Japan from China or Korea and was spread among priests and aristocrats in Japan.

Shogi is a kind of chess developed from *shaturanga* in India, which was brought to Japan in the eleventh century. In *shogi*, there are nine horizontal and nine vertical lines on the board. *Shogi* is similar to Western chess in that it is played by two players and its object is to checkmate the opponent's king. Checkmate is achieved when the king cannot escape. A game also comes to an end if a player must resign because the king's position is hopeless. In many ways, however, *shogi* is different from chess. The major differences are that the captured pieces may be reused by the capturing player and that each piece becomes stronger when it enters the portion of the board marked as the opponent's area by three horizontal lines. Most *shogi* players feel that this makes *shogi* more profound and interesting than Western chess.

Hisashi Sanada

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BOAT PEOPLE Among the many human tragedies of the conflict in Vietnam was the remarkable odyssey of the Vietnamese "boat people." Throughout the early months of 1975 there was mounting anxiety in South Vietnam over the possible collapse of the government. In anticipation of that event, thousands of South Vietnamese began preparing to flee the country. Motivated by the expected political chaos and fears of persecution, some fled overland to Cambodia, although the majority sought to escape by sea. Thousands of people bought passage on small, rickety, and often unseaworthy wooden boats to flee across the Gulf of Thailand or the South China Sea, giving rise to the term "boat people." More than a million Vietnamese and Hoa (Chinese-Vietnamese) fled their country by boat over the next two decades.

The boat people faced significant challenges right from the start. The typhoon season in Southeast Asia makes travel by sea very dangerous; Thai pirates were a constant threat; gathering supplies was difficult, and most were left with little or no money after paying money for boat passage and bribes to allow them to leave. Many of the boat people initially found asylum in camps in the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Some even reached Japan and South Korea. The first waves of boat people in 1975 headed for southern Thailand, the nearest landfall. As attacks by Thai pirates increased, their destination shifted to Malaysia, despite the additional mileage and longer time at sea. As conditions in Vietnam worsened in 1976, their numbers rose dramatically, reaching a high of over 21,000 in November alone, a figure larger than the entire total of 15,690 for 1977. When tension between Vietnam and China intensified a year later, ethnic Chinese became a majority of the boat people. During the first seven months of 1979, most of the 66,000 who had reached Hong Kong were ethnic Chinese.

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a total of 214,555 refugees had escaped to Hong Kong after 1975, 160,000 had reached Thailand, 51,722 had arrived in the Philippines, 121,708 in Indonesia, 254,495 in Malaysia, and 1,400 had been granted temporary refuge in South Korea. Many of the boat people who survived these perilous journeys were granted asylum

in various Western countries, although a smaller number repatriated to Vietnam. In recent years small numbers of boat people have continued to flee Vietnam. In May of 1999 the last remaining Vietnamese refugee camp at Pillar Point in Hong Kong was formally closed by the government, bringing to an end the long odyssey of the Vietnamese boat people.

James Allan Hafner

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BODH GAYA (2001 est. pop. 31,000). A small town in central Bihar state, northeastern India, west of the Phalgu River, Bodh Gaya (also spelled Buddha Gaya) is one of the holiest Buddhist sites. Here, under the *bodhi (bo)* tree, Prince Siddhartha Gautama (c. 566–486 BCE) attained enlightenment after years of penance and became the Buddha. A sapling from the original tree was carried to Anuradhapura in Sri Lanka; that tree flourishes there, and a cutting from it was

returned to Bodh Gaya when the original tree died. Adjacent to this descendent tree is the Mahabodhi Temple, a place of pilgrimage for all Buddhists, also sacred to Hindus, who see the Buddha as an incarnation of Vishnu. It is on the site of a temple erected by Asoka in the third century BCE; the current temple (restored in the eleventh century and again in 1882) houses a large gilded image of Buddha.

Bodh Gaya also includes the Shankaracharya Math (a Hindu temple), a Japanese temple, and Burmese, Chinese, Sri Lankan, Bhutanese, Vietnamese, Nepalese, Korean, Taiwanese, and Bangladeshi monasteries. A twenty-five-meter Great Buddha statue in the Japanese Kamakura style was unveiled by the Dalai Lama in 1989. Various monasteries and institutes offer Hinayana and Mahayana meditation courses and retreats.

C. Roger Davis

See also: **Siddhartha Gautama**

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BODRUM (2000 pop. 35,000). In the early twentieth century, Bodrum was a remote fishing village on the Aegean Sea coast in Turkey, but today it is a sophisticated and free-spirited holiday resort. In ancient



The Bodrum harbor on the Aegean Sea. (NIK WHEELER/CORBIS)

times, Bodrum was known as Halicarnassus, a city in the kingdom of Caria and the site of the tomb of the Persian satrap Mausolus. Built around 350 BCE, this monument, which inspired the word "mausoleum," became one of the wonders of the ancient world.

Herodotus, the father of history, was born in Halicarnassus around 484 BCE. He traveled extensively around the known world, even visiting Egypt, before settling in mainland Greece and then Italy, where he died. As well as providing a view of the lands he visited, Herodotus's writings show his methods of gathering and evaluating historical information.

Dominating modern Bodrum is the Castle of Saint Peter, dating from the early fifteenth century CE. It was both a hospice and a sanctuary for the monastic order of the Knights of Saint John, a Christian order of warrior-monks who lived in Bodrum until 1522. Following Turkish independence in 1923, the castle became a prison for over two hundred exiled apolitical Turkish nationals. Today, the castle is a museum, featuring underwater treasures rescued by the Institute of Nautical Archaeology.

Bodrum's latter-day popularity stems from the enthusiastic writings of a legendary intellectual, the so-called Fisherman of Halicarnassus, who was exiled here in 1925. Modern Bodrum is known for sponges, citrus fruits, and boat building. It also draws celebrity vacationers and wealthy part-time residents, including Ahmet Ertegun, the founding partner of Atlantic Records.

Suzanne Swan

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BOGDO KHAN Bogdo Khan, along with Bogdo Gegeen, is a title for the Living Buddha. Those designated with this title are the "holy enlightened ones," who were high-ranking religious personages considered to be incarnations of the great Mongolian Buddhist scholar and savant Javzandamba (Jebsumdamba) Hutughtu Zanabazar (1635–1723). They became leaders of Mongolian lamaism (the Mongolian version of the Tantric Buddhism practiced in Tibet) from the seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

The eighth and last Bogdo Khan, Agvaanluvsanchoyjindanzanvaanchigbalsambuu (1896–1924), was born into the family of a clerk of the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, Tibet, and taken to Mongolia at four years of age. In 1911, Mongolia proclaimed its independence

from Manchu China and created a Tibetan theocracy with the installation of the Bogdo Khan as head of state, a title he retained even after the Communist revolution in 1921. The eighth Bogdo Khan had a mixed reputation during his lifetime because he married and was known to be a sexual profligate and drunkard. After his death, the Communist government disallowed any new incarnations. Since the end of Communism in 1990, the last Bogdo Khan's reputation has been somewhat rehabilitated, but the matter of a new incarnation remains unresolved.

Alicia J. Campi

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BOGOR DECLARATION The Bogor Declaration was a free-trade manifesto issued by the multinational Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC), which held its annual meeting in Bogor, Indonesia, in 1994. APEC came into being in 1989 with the goal of promoting liberalized trade among various Pacific-area countries. Its member states include some of the world's most robust and rapidly expanding economies, among them the United States and Japan.

Various heads of state attended the Bogor Conference, including Bill Clinton, the U.S. president from 1993 to 2001. Indonesia's President Suharto hosted it. Suharto's human rights record was open to question (he was overthrown a few years later) and some observers felt that the presence of Clinton, and other heads of state, constituted a tacit endorsement of the Indonesian ruler.

The chief result of the conference was an eight-page "Declaration of Common Resolve," which committed APEC's membership to move to "free and open trade and investment" by the year 2010 for industrialized members and by 2020 for developing economies. The members further set as a goal the liberalization of trade with non-APEC countries. The general nature of these commitments and the extended period allowed for their accomplishment caused some to question whether anything substantial was accomplished beyond politically attractive rhetoric.

Robert K. Whalen

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BOKEIKHANOV, ALIKHAN (1866–1937), Kazakh scientist, writer, political activist. Born in 1866 in the province of Karkaralinsk Uezd, Alikhan Bokeikhanov was enrolled in the Muslim school (*madrassa*) in Karkaralinsk, but soon he moved on to the local Russian-Kazakh school, graduating in 1886. Shortly thereafter he enrolled in the elite Omsk Technical School. He graduated in 1890 and enrolled to study in St. Petersburg at the Imperial Forestry Institute. In 1894, he returned to Omsk, where he lived and worked for the next fourteen years. In 1896, he was selected to participate in the so-called Shcherbina Expedition, which was organized by the czarist government not only to assess the natural environment of the steppe region, including land and water resources, but also to research the culture, economy, society, and way of life of the indigenous population. Subsequently, he accepted a position with another government-sponsored mission charged with collecting economic and demographic data in regions that paralleled the Trans-Siberian Railroad from Cheliabinsk to Tomsk in the northern steppe territory. Bokeikhanov's contribution, "Ovtsevodstvo v stepnom krae" (Sheep-Breeding in the Steppe Land), was a thorough analysis of the state of animal husbandry, particularly sheep and goats, in three steppe oblasts (Semipalatinsk, Akmolinsk, and Turgai). During the revolutionary upheaval of 1905, Bokeikhanov became a leading member of a group of Kazakh intellectuals who gravitated politically toward the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets). In 1906, he was elected to the first Russian Duma (Parliament) and after its dissolution by the czar, he fled with other delegates to Vyborg, Finland, to protest the czar's action. In 1910, Bokeikhanov published his major political commentary and best-known work, "Kirgizy" (The Kazakhs), in the Kadet volume on nationalities edited by A. I. Kostelianskii. In 1913, he helped establish the Kazakh-language newspaper *Kazak*, and he published numerous articles there during the next several years. In 1917, he was elected president of the Kazakh political party Alash Orda (The Horde of Alash), which fought unsuccessfully for Kazakh independence from Soviet Russia. In 1920, he joined the Bolshevik party and throughout the 1920s he continued his scientific work. He always remained, however, under a cloud of political suspicion. He was arrested in 1926, in 1928, and again in 1930. He was banished to Moscow where he continued to work, al-

beit under closely monitored circumstances. In 1937, he was arrested a final time and executed on 27 November of that year. He was rehabilitated (his reputation was favorably restored) in 1989.

Steven Sabol

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BOKEO (2002 est. pop. 141,000). Bokeo province is located in northern Laos near the intersection of the borders of Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar—commonly known as the "Golden Triangle." It is the smallest province in the nation, and contains 36 towns and more than 400 villages within its provincial borders. The inhabitants of this region represent about thirty-four ethnic groups, making it one of the most ethnically diverse populations in the nation. The makeup of the province changed in 1992 when the districts of Paktha and Pha Oudom were moved to the jurisdiction of Bokeo province.

The city of Huay Xai, which is on the border with Thailand along the Mekong River, is the most populous city in the province. It has been termed "woolly" because it is a boisterous frontier city with a troubled history. It is known for opium trafficking and was a staging point for U.S. troops during that nation's involvement in civil wars in the region starting in the early 1960s.

Linda Dailey Paulson

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BOLAN PASS Bolan Pass is one of the seven great passes near the western border of Pakistan that have historically linked that land with Afghanistan and Central Asia in conquest and commerce. Being the southernmost pass, it lies in Baluchistan, about 40 kilometers southeast of the city of Quetta, on the great military route leading from the plains of the Indus Valley to the highlands of Sarawan and the Afghan city of Kandahar. At its eastern end the pass commences about 8 kilometers west of Dadur. At this point the elevation is only about 265 meters, whereas at the western outlet it is 2,790 meters. The total length of the

pass is 96 kilometers. As one walks westward, the road rises steadily at a rate of about 18 meters every kilometer. The hills on either side of the pass do not seem very high and are mostly less than 125 meters above the road, but they are quite lofty at Bibi-nani, some 42 kilometers from the eastern entrance. At Sir-i-Bolan the passage was so narrow that three horses abreast could hardly pass by the limestone cliffs. At the western end, the pass does not descend again but rather opens out onto the Dasht-i-Bidaulat, a high plain that leads on to Quetta and Khorasan.

Until 1877, when British forces secured the pass, it was subject to brigandage perpetrated by the Marri Baluch. In 1888 the Khan of Kalat ceded control to the British. At the end of the nineteenth century a railroad was built through the pass from Sibi to Quetta and on to the Afghan border at Chaman, as part of British military strategy. The local people are both Brahui (who speak a Dravidian language) and Baluch.

Paul Hockings

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BOLLYWOOD. See **Cinema-India**.

BOLOVENS PLATEAU Located in southern Laos, the Bolovens Plateau is a fertile plain that has historically served as a strategic site in civil and regional warfare. It is located between the Mekong River and the Annamese Cordillera foothills. The basaltic plateau sits at an elevation of 1,100 meters, with its highest peak rising 1,583 meters above sea level. It also gets the heaviest rainfall in the nation—in excess of 406 centimeters annually. This geology and topography contribute to its fertility.

Paksan is the largest city on the plateau, with an estimated population of 25,000. Several ethnic groups reside in the area including the Loven, Nha Huen Sovei, and Sou of the Lao-Theung or Mon-Khmer.

The Bolovens Plateau was a key strategic point in the Indochinese War. The so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail, a conduit for supplies to the North Vietnamese Army, ran from Laos through the area to South Vietnam. The United States Central Intelligence Agency recruited, trained, advised, and paid indigenous personnel in Southern Laos in the late 1960s and early

1970s to combat the North Vietnamese Army. Fighting was reportedly most heavy in 1971 as opposing forces struggled to control the Bolovens Plateau. Many area residents continue to suffer from remaining unexploded ordnance left from the war.

Although much of the plateau remains undeveloped at the turn of the twenty-first century, this is changing. Mining of pagodite, a stone commonly used for carving, is one of the area's industries. Agricultural products—predominantly spices, such as cardamom, and durians—are also important.

The government takes most pride in the regional coffee, which is the nation's primary agricultural export. Of the 4,800 tons of coffee produced in Laos annually, most is grown on the Bolovens Plateau. According to the government of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, "Lao coffee is slowly making a name for itself on the international market as people begin to find out about it and discover that its quality ranks in the front line with Colombian and Brazilian coffees. Lao coffee from the Bolovens Plateau, also called Paksong coffee, has long been famous within Laos for its delicious and strong taste and now that the international community has begun to experience its qualities the future looks fairly bright for this brew."

Land in coffee production has reportedly doubled since 1993; in some instances, coffee has replaced subsistence crops, according to the Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement (CIRAD), which is among the international agencies assisting the Laotian Ministry of Agriculture. Issues related to making agricultural improvements in the area have included eliminating monocropping on the Bolovens Plateau and efforts to boost coffee quality.

Linda Dailey Paulson

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"THE DANCE OF THE GINGER"

This is a traditional song sung at the Bon festival. Even in the 1930s, it was fading from use and was remembered only by the elderly.

1. In the ginger dance
Beat with the feet, beat with the hands;
If the feet are not in rhythm,
One cannot dance.
2. Shonga old lady
Likes *mezian* cakes
Last night nine, this morning seven (ate she).
Last night's nine
Indigestion did not give.
This morning's seven indigestion gave.
3. In the middle of the ginger field (we made love)
He promised to give me the slipper; I've been fooled.
Now he doesn't even mention the slipper.

Source: John F. Embree. (1979/1939) *Suye Mura: A Japanese Village*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 286.

BON MATSURI Bon Matsuri (Bon Festival), commonly called by its honorific, Obon, is the ancient Buddhist Festival of the Dead, held throughout Japan on 13 to 16 July or August (depending on the region). Solemn rites and observances mark this period when, according to Buddhist belief, the souls of the ancestors are welcomed back to this world for a brief visit. Memorial services are performed, offerings of food, incense, and flowers are made, and graves are visited and cleaned. These actions comfort the souls of the ancestors and thus gain merit for the living.

As the festival approaches, many people travel to their hometown to visit family graves and summon the ancestral spirits. Fires and lanterns are lit in cemeteries and at the entrances to homes to welcome and guide the ancestral spirits, and a sacred branch is erected as a channel to this world. Folk dances (*bon odori*) are performed to distinctive tunes in order to entertain the visiting spirits.

Finally, sending-off fires (*okuribi*) are lit to bid farewell and to guide the spirits safely back to the

realms of the dead. Alternatively, lanterns may be floated downstream, carrying the spirits out to sea and back to the shores of the afterworld.

Lucy D. Moss

See also: **Ancestor Worship—East Asia; Buddhism—Japan**

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BONSAI Bonsai, written in Japanese with two characters meaning "pot" and "to plant," refers to the art of growing miniature plants in containers. Generally bonsai range from five centimeters to one meter in height. Certain techniques, such as pruning, training,

and modifying the growing environment, keep the plants small. Some bonsai live longer than fifty years and are cared for by multiple generations.

Bonsai originated in China over one thousand years ago. Japanese envoys returning from China during the Chinese Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) introduced bonsai into Japan. Descriptions of bonsai appear in records from the Japanese Heian period (794–1185), and the art of creating them matured along with the rise of Zen in the fifteenth century. During this time, bonsai appear to have been limited to the world of aristocrats, political figures, scholars, and Buddhist monks, but in the Edo period (1600/1603–1868) bonsai became widespread as a recreation among common people. This trend continued in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Bonsai were first introduced into the West in London in 1902, and subsequently professional bonsai artists have exhibited around the world. Bonsai is practiced as a hobby worldwide, and numerous international bonsai clubs and societies exist.

In Japan, evergreens are the most popular plant for bonsai, though other plants, such as bamboo and plums, are also used. In creating a bonsai, the artist or hobbyist usually tries to re-create miniature versions of the natural, untamed world. But the bonsai might also reflect personal interests, for instance, re-creating the settings of famous plays.

Over thirty recognizable styles of bonsai exist, with the following are the most common. The formal upright style (*chokkan*) allows a straight plant to grow vertically. The informal upright style (*moyogi*), in which a plant is encouraged to follow its natural kinks or twists, is popular. In the cascading style (*kengai*), a plant hangs over the edge of its container, often trailing to the ground like a waterfall. In the windswept style (*fukinagashi*), the tree trunk and branches are swept to one side



A man prunes a pine tree bonsai to shape at the Saburo Kato nursery in Omiya, Japan. (MICHAEL S. YAMASHITA/CORBIS)

to imitate the shape of a tree buffeted by the wind. In the rock-planting style (*isbitsuki*), the tree grows from a crack in a rock. The twisting-trunk style (*bankan*) makes use of a gnarled trunk. In the literati style (*bunjūjin*), which imitates the landscape paintings created by literati artists, the trunk grows in an unconventional shape. Bonsai is still widely practiced, not only in Japan but also in many different countries today.

Miyuki Katabira

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BORNEO Borneo is the third largest island in the world after Greenland and New Guinea. Politically, it consists of Kalimantan (the Indonesian portion of the island), Sarawak and Sabah (East Malaysia), and the oil-rich, independent sultanate of Brunei. Well noted for its rich biodiversity, it is a unique place to study natural tropical ecosystems.

Mountain ranges run through the center of the island from north to south. Few peaks exceed 2,000 meters and the highest peak is Mt. Kinabalu (4,101 meters) in Sabah. More than half of the island is under 150 meters in elevation, and tidal water can go up to 100 kilometers inland. Many rivers radiate from the central uplands, the three largest being the Kapuas (1,143 kilometers) flowing to the west, the Barito (900 kilometers) to the south, and the Mahakam (775 kilometers) to the east. They provide an important means of travel as much of the lowland plain, especially in the south, is poorly drained and swampy. Despite the luxuriant vegetation, soils are generally of very poor quality and have high levels of weathering, leaching, and biological activity. The island has a moist, tropical climate. Temperatures are relatively constant throughout the year, 25°C in the lowlands. Rainfall occurs throughout the year, with few months of less than 200 millimeters of rainfall.

Borneo has some of most species-rich habitats on earth. It has an estimated ten to fifteen thousand species of flowering plants, at least three thousand species of trees (including 267 species of dipterocarps,



the most important group of commercial timber trees in Southeast Asia), two thousand species of orchids, and one thousand species of ferns. It is home to the remarkable carnivorous pitcher plant, occurring in twenty-eight species of the genus *Nepenthes*. Its rich fauna is Asian in origin and characterized by deer, wild cattle, pigs, cats, monkeys, apes (the orangutan being best known), squirrels, and oriental birds.

The island is sparsely populated by 12.5 million people (1990) confined mainly to the coast. But they have far-reaching impacts on the environment, especially in the past twenty years in exploiting the tropical forests, oil and gas resources, and other mineral wealth. Rapid deforestation results from logging, clearing for agriculture, and human settlement schemes. For example, Sabah began exporting timber in early 1960s and by the 1990s all major lowland forests had been logged. Traditional slash-and-burn agriculture is still carried out in Borneo.

There is a strong need for Borneo's development to be planned in a rational way for sustainable use. Its diverse tropical habitats and rich biodiversity are important reservoirs of genetic material for humankind.

Wong Poh Poh

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BORNEO PEOPLES The island of Borneo, the world's third largest, falls under the administration of three modern nations, namely Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Territories under Malaysia are divided into Sabah and Sarawak, whereas those under Indonesia are known as Kalimantan. Borneo is home for many indigenous groups. Demographically the island is encircled by a ring of Muslim settlements of the Banjarese, Malay, Bugis, Melanau, Bajau, and other smaller language groupings. In almost all major settlements and towns the Chinese can be found as traders, service providers, and businesspeople. The Dayak, Dusun, and Penan and their respective language groupings or ethnic subdivisions predominate in the interior and along the major riverbanks.

The total population of Borneo is estimated around 12.6 million. The Dayak, Dusun, Iban, and Penan and their subgroupings total some 3.2 million or 25 percent of the total population of Borneo. The Land Dayak (Bidayuh), Iban, and Penan and their respective language groupings total around 44 percent of the total population in Sarawak. In central and west Kalimantan, the Dayak form a significant segment of the population. The Dusun in Sabah form some 30 percent of the total population in the state.

The Dusun or Kadazan and their language groupings are found largely near the coastal areas of north Borneo from Kudat to Beaufort and in the interior centering on Tambunan. They traditionally live in longhouses, each accommodating between 150 and 200 inhabitants in two rows of rooms. They form the largest language grouping in Sabah, apart from the Bajau, Malay, Murut, and Chinese. A sizable proportion of the Brunei population also consists of the Dusun, who generally live in the upper parts of the Tutong and Belait rivers.

The Dusun are traditionally known as dry-rice growers. In post-independence Malaysia, the Dusun, like many others, have enjoyed social and political ascendancy. Not only do they hold a national festival of Ka'amatan during the rice harvest season, but they also join diverse modern occupations in the public and private sectors. Most Dusun continue to maintain their traditional way of life and belief system. Several influential chief ministers of Sabah, such as Donald Stephen and Joseph Pairin Kitingan, came from among the Dusun.



A wooden sculpture decorates a Dayak house in Kalimantan, Borneo, Indonesia, c. 1991. (CHARLES & JOSETTE LENARS/CORBIS)

The term "Dayak" in Borneo generally refers to inland or upriver inhabitants. In Kalimantan, the Dayak, known in earlier writings on Borneo as "headhunters," include the major groupings such as the Maloh, Jagoi/Sadong (Bidayuh), and Iban in the Kapuas basin; the Ngaju, Ma'nyan, and Ot Donum in Central Kalimantan; and the Kenyah, Kayan, Bahau, Long Dayeh, Long Bawang, and Modang in east Kalimantan. The Dayak in Kalimantan may be divided into four major groupings: those who live along the Kapuas in the west, along the Barito and other major rivers in the south, along the Mahakam and other major rivers in the east, and at river heads and beyond in the center. In Sarawak, the term "Dayak" has been used to refer to the Bidayuh (Land Dayak) and the Iban (Sea Dayak). The Bidayuh are generally more oriented to the land, whereas the Iban are increasingly found to spread along the rivers and even the seacoast of west Sarawak. By the end of the twentieth century, the Iban had become the most numerous and scattered language grouping in Sarawak. Both the Iban and the Bidayuh in Sarawak claim to have their origins in some part of Kalimantan.

The Dayak traditionally live in longhouses, although, like many other indigenous societies in Borneo, younger couples increasingly live in nuclear families. Dry-rice shifting cultivation continues to be the mainstay of the Dayak subsistence economy. It suits their communal lifestyle, as can be seen in rice

harvesting and the annual celebrations of different kinds, including the Gawai Dayak in Sarawak and the Erau in Kalimantan. The Dayak have developed gender-based division of labor: women tend the rice fields and home, whereas men seek extra income outside the home. For example, the latter take up the cultivation of pepper, fishing, hunting, and collection of jungle products. The kinship of Bornean peoples cannot be generalized; however, it may be categorized as parental or dualistic, having elements of both patrilineal and matrilineal categories.

During the days of the Brooke rajas (1842–1946), the Iban were recruited in larger numbers as security forces. In independent Malaysia, the Iban and Dayak in Sarawak, like their counterparts in Sabah, founded their own political parties with some degree of success. Many prominent Dayak in Sarawak have emerged as respected state and national administrators; Jugah Anak Bariang is an example. Due to a particular political climate, the Dayak in Kalimantan never established a successful political party; however, several Dayak leaders such as Tjilik Riwut won national respect in Indonesia.

The Penan form an important segment among the Borneo peoples. First of all, the majority of the Penan maintain a relatively more autonomous jungle lifestyle than any other indigenous group, even though their number is insignificant. Due to their unique lifestyle,

they are believed to be remnants of Borneo's oldest inhabitants. They subsist by gathering and hunting, not rarely maintaining surreptitious barter trading with the settled communities within their range of movement. Some of the Penan also participated in the various resettlement schemes launched by the governments. In recent years the Penan have won international attention from the media coverage of their plight. With the encroachment of modern plantation and logging concessions in their territories, the Penan have increasingly found less space for their traditional subsistence and lifeways.

If the coastal population of Borneo have become Muslims and the majority of the Chinese maintain their version of Buddhism or Taoism, the interior and upriver inhabitants, especially the Dusun and the Dayak in general, have opted to accept Christianity or, to a lesser degree, Islam, and many continue to uphold their traditional beliefs, such as Kaharingan in Kalimantan.

The indigenous peoples of Borneo have responded to rapid change in diverse fields. The introduction of modern education and diverse development plans, cash crops, logging concessions, timber, plywood, and mining industries have direct impact on local economies and social arrangements. Many of the youth join the workforce in the newly established factories, industries, offices, and services in bigger towns. Such urbanization has led to the decline, or at least stagnation, of the interior population and thus the decreasing numbers of longhouses in many communities. Politically, the peoples of Borneo have exercised a more assertive voice in the running of local affairs. As Indonesia and Malaysia hold regular general and local elections, the Borneans have increasingly won their wish to administer their own affairs and participated in running the government. More significantly, since movements across national borders in Borneo have been regularized, many language groupings formerly separated by modern national borders now have more opportunities to renew closer ties and establish cooperation.

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BOROBUDUR Situated in the Borobudur district of central Java, this Buddhist temple is an architectural wonder of the world. Its construction was started in 778 CE by the Sailendra ruler Vishnu and was completed during the reign of his grandson, Samaratunga, in 824 CE. It became the central point in legitimizing Sailendra rule. Borobudur was selected to be the Mount Meru (mythical mountain at the center of the world) of the kingdom and a miniature cosmos was built and dedicated to Buddha. The site was abandoned for centuries and was buried under volcanic ash and vegetation until the beginning of the nineteenth century, when it was cleared. The Dutch began its restoration in 1907.

Representing the nine previous lives of Buddha, nine stone terraces were carved out of a rounded hill. With a height of 42 meters, an area of 15,129 square meters, and 504 Buddha statues, the whole structure resembles the sacred flower of Buddha, the lotus. A large bell-shaped stupa crowns the center. Although Indian in conception, the Borobudur temple reflects the best tradition of Javanese artists carving beautiful Buddha icons and modeling indigenous sculptural patterns. It represents the highest genius of the Sailendra period and is testimony to the Javanese artistic temperament.

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BOSCH, JOHANNES VAN DEN (1780–1844), Dutch colonialist. Johannes van den Bosch was born in Herwijnen, Netherlands. As a young man he served as a military engineer in the Dutch East Indies before returning to senior posts in the Netherlands. In



The ruins of Borobudur Temple with Mt. Merapi in the distance. (EYE UBIQUITOUS/CORBIS)

1829, his proposals for ensuring the profitability of the colony led to his appointment as governor-general (1830–1833). He argued against the liberal ideas that had influenced colonial policy during the preceding two decades, such as allowing market forces to stimulate the planting of tropical crops like coffee and indigo, which were in demand in Europe. Instead he proposed a system of forced cultivation backed by the traditional authority of co-opted indigenous rulers. His so-called Cultivation System (*Cultuurstelsel*) required villages to devote one-fifth of their land and one-fifth of their labor to growing export crops designated by the government, especially indigo, sugar, and coffee. The harvest was then to be delivered to the government at fixed prices and the proceeds were to be offset against land tax (*landrente*). In practice, however, the system varied enormously across Java and was widely seen as oppressive. Van den Bosch argued for restricting the Dutch empire to Java, Sumatra, and tin-rich Bangka, and he reduced the principalities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta in central Java to small enclaves. He was Netherlands minister of colonies from 1834 to 1839.

Robert Cribb

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BOSE, SUBHAS CHANDRA (1897–1945), Indian freedom fighter. Subhas Chandra Bose, called "Netaji," has a semimythical status today as an Indian freedom fighter who sided with the Japanese against the British in World War II. Born into a large family in Cuttack, Orissa, on 23 January 1897, Bose studied in Calcutta, where he spent much time in meditation and graduated in philosophy. He then studied for two years at Cambridge, England, and placed fourth in the Indian Civil Service examinations. He soon resigned from the civil service and then met Mohandas Gandhi (1869–1948) in Bombay.

Bose became a Calcutta municipal official but was soon arrested for terrorism and jailed for three years. He was released in 1927 because of continuing ill health. He disagreed with Gandhi over nonviolence but continued on in the Indian National Congress. He was again arrested in 1940 by the British authorities but was soon released after threatening to fast unto death. He was still under house arrest when he disappeared in January 1941.



Bose with British Labour Party politician George Lansbury in London in January 1938. (HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS)

After walking to Afghanistan, in November 1941 he surfaced in Berlin, broadcasting Nazi propaganda and arguing, "our enemy's enemy is our friend." Bose met Hitler in May 1942, and the latter approved plans for Bose to go to Myanmar (Burma). He left a year later and took command of the Azad Hind Fauj (AHF), or Indian National Army (INA), in fact a rag-tag army made up of deserters from the Indian army and other Indians, mainly Japanese prisoners of war. These men fought near the Indian border against the British but soon became a liability to their imperial Japanese sponsors, who were then retreating in Southeast Asia just as the INA was falling back on Mandalay, then Rangoon (now Yangon), then Bangkok. Bose died in the crash of a Japanese aircraft in Taiwan, in August 1945.

Paul Hockings

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BOSPORUS The Bosphorus, the strait separating the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara, is generally viewed as the boundary between Europe and Asia. About 30 kilometers long, it varies in width from 3,550 to 700 meters and in depth from 37 to 124 meters. It

is the only year-round sea outlet for Black Sea countries. The Dardanelles extends for 61 kilometers and links the Sea of Marmara with the Aegean Sea; its average depth is 55 meters, with a maximum of 105. Together the Bosphorus and Dardanelles are known as the Turkish Straits.

Heavy pollution in the Black Sea has had adverse effects on the marine life and ecology of the Turkish Straits and the Sea of Marmara, and increasing maritime traffic through the straits has posed safety and pollution concerns for Turkey. The problem is more acute for the Bosphorus, as strong currents and narrowness in several parts of the strait make navigation hazardous. At the start of the twenty-first century, an average of 50,000 commercial vessels and 6,500 oil tankers passed through the Bosphorus annually; an estimated 15 percent of vessels carry dangerous cargo. Thousands of smaller passenger boats and ferries also use the Bosphorus. The strait is four times as busy as the Panama Canal and three times as busy as the Suez Canal. Turkey's largest city, Istanbul, with a population of over 11 million, is situated on both sides of the Bosphorus and is vulnerable to the hazards of increasing Black Sea traffic.

Under the 1936 Montreux Treaty, navigation through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles is unrestricted for commercial vessels except in wartime. Accidents in the straits and the growing danger of environmental and safety hazards have led Turkey to adopt new rules to enhance the safety of traffic. In 1994 the Turkish government issued regulations governing shipping in the straits, including speed limits for large vessels and the requirement that ships inform Turkish authorities in advance if they carry hazardous cargo. Other regulations require large oil tankers to be accompanied by tugboats in case of breakdown. Not all ships abide by the new regulations: Russia, Greece, and other users of the straits have cited the freedom of passage provided by the Montreux Treaty and questioned Turkey's authority to introduce unilateral measures governing shipping through the straits.

Shipping through the straits has a political dimension as well. In a bid to reduce oil shipping through the straits in the future and with the support of the United States, Turkey strongly backed the construction of a pipeline from the Azerbaijani port of Baku to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. Greece and Bulgaria promoted an alternative oil pipeline plan involving shipping Caspian Sea oil from the Russian port of Novorossiysk to the Bulgarian port of Burgas on the west coast of the Black Sea. This pipeline would link Burgas with the Greek Aegean port of Alexandroupolis, bypassing the Turkish Straits. Whether

either pipeline will be constructed is unknown. Although pipelines might relieve the passage of oil through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, Turkey's anxieties about the volume of maritime traffic and ecological damage persist.

Tozun Babcheli

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BOXER REBELLION The Boxer Rebellion was an antforeign and antimodern upheaval at the beginning of the twentieth century in north China. It was initiated in the late 1890s by the Chinese martial arts groups known as Yihe Quan ("Boxers United in Righteousness") and reached its climax in 1900 with the support of the central government of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). Suppressed by a foreign relief army in late 1900, the uprising stands as the strongest and most violent reaction to the escalation of Western aggression in China.

The martial arts tradition had a long history in north China. In the 1890s, some martial arts groups in Shandong province, such as Yihe Quan, Dadaohui ("Big Sword Society") and Shen Quan ("Spirit Boxers"), became especially active and began to be known collectively as Yihe Quan. The belief system of the Boxer movement was loose and inclusive, drawing largely from folklore and popular religion. Although many hold that it was an offshoot of the White Lotus sect, there is not sufficient evidence to establish such a connection. Under the supervision of their masters, the Boxers practiced martial arts by altars or in boxing grounds; they believed their training would render them invulnerable to bullets. Charms and spells were also used to achieve the same purpose. The Boxers were mainly enlisted from peasants, craftsmen, dismissed soldiers, laborers, and jobless drifters. Although the Boxer masters commanded high respect from their followers, no uniform leadership in the Boxer movement existed. Each master could form his own group and create his own tenets.

As the Western powers intensified their imperialist expansion in China after the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), the Boxers in Shandong, Zhili, and Shanxi provinces became increasingly antforeign.

Meanwhile, a series of natural calamities hit north China and deprived many peasants of their livelihood, exacerbating an already tense situation. Believing that the Western presence and the introduction of modern facilities such as railroads and telegraph lines played a role in causing those natural disasters, the Boxers staged a fierce antforeign upheaval, attacking foreigners and Chinese Christians, and destroying their properties and churches. This brought them into conflict with the Qing local authorities. But some conservative, xenophobic officials sympathized with the Boxers and tried to recruit them for semiofficial local militia. The local officials changed Yihe Quan to Yihe Tuan ("Militia United in Righteousness"), which served as an endorsement for the Boxer movement. The Boxers also changed their slogan from "oppose the Qing and destroy the foreign" (*fan Qing mie yang*) to "support the Qing and destroy the foreign" (*fu Qing mie yang*).

The Qing central government, headed by the Empress Dowager Cixi (1835–1908), also began to change its policy toward the Boxer movement. Annoyed by the suspicion that the Western powers had attempted to remove her from power, Cixi decided to make use of the antforeign fanaticism of the Boxers. She ordered the Qing local officials to stop suppressing the Boxers and invited them to Beijing, the capital of the Qing dynasty, to teach martial arts. With the support of the Qing central government, the Boxer movement rapidly spread in the northern and northeastern provinces. Tens of thousands of Boxers entered Beijing from the northern provinces. Their altars mushroomed in Beijing and other northern cities. Women's martial arts organizations, chief among which was



A palace eunuch (L) and a scholar official being arrested by British forces in Beijing in 1901. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

Hongdengzhao ("Red Lanterns"), were also formed and joined the Boxers.

In June 1900 Cixi ordered the Boxers and Qing soldiers to attack the foreign legations in Beijing and subsequently declared war on the Western powers. The siege of the foreign legation district lasted for about two months. During the disturbance, hundreds of foreigners, including the German minister Clemens von Ketteler (1853–1900), and thousands of Chinese Christians were killed and numerous churches were destroyed. Qing provincial officials in the south and southeast did not join in the central government's support for the Boxers. Under the excuse of maintaining order, they ensured that the foreigners in their respective jurisdictions were protected and that no anti-foreign activity was carried out.

Western powers responded resolutely to the escalation of antforeign tumult in north China. In June 1900 eight countries (Britain, the United States, Germany, France, Russia, Japan, Italy, and Austria) formed an international relief army (the Allied forces). In July, they attacked and captured Tianjin, a major coastal city in north China. The Allied forces fought the Boxers all the way to Beijing. Refusing to use Western weapons and relying solely on their martial art, the Boxers' resistance soon collapsed. On 14 August 1900 the Allied forces occupied Beijing. Cixi led her court to take refuge in Xi'an, a provincial capital in the northwest. The German general Alfred Waldersee (1832–1904), who was appointed the commander-in-chief of the Allied forces in August, requested reinforcements and continued to suppress the Boxers in the north. Tens of thousands of Boxers, Qing soldiers, and civilians were massacred. By the end of 1900, the Boxer Rebellion had been suppressed.

In December 1900 the Allied forces proposed a truce to the Qing dynasty. In September 1901, the Qing representatives Yikuang (1836–1918) and Li Hongzhang (1823–1901) and those from eleven countries concluded the Boxer Protocol to settle the incident. This treaty stipulated that China pay 450 million taels of silver to the countries that were affected by the Boxer uprising; that the Qing government apologize to those countries and punish the officials who encouraged the antforeign actions; and that China allow foreign armies to be stationed at strategic points in north China. The Qing dynasty underwent a radical change in policy toward the West after this incident. To mend the damage the Boxer uprising had done to her reputation and to regain endorsement by the Western powers, Cixi launched a radical reform movement starting in 1901, which would eventually

have led China to a constitutional monarchy but which was interrupted by the 1911 Revolution. Having been re-created in literature, art, and folklore, the Boxer Rebellion remains the most terrifying chapter in the relationship between China and the West, and an enduring inspiration for nationalistic agitation in China.

Yingcong Dai

See also: **Qing Dynasty**

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BRAHMAN Brahman (Brahmin) refers to the priestly category of Hindus. Though only a small minority of the Indian population, Brahmans hold the highest position in the caste system because of their extreme purity and sacerdotal profession. Some also live outside India in Nepal, Sri Lanka, or in small Hindu enclaves in Bali, Lombok, and Thailand. In India there are several hundred Brahman castes, which recognize differences of status among themselves. They constitute a caste-block or *varna*. The various castes are distinguished from one another first in terms of mother tongue (e.g., Tamil Brahmans); then in terms of philosophical sect (e.g., Smarta Brahmans); and finally in terms of a locality that had long been their homeland (e.g., Kongudesa Brahmans, those from the Kongu kingdom in Tamil Nadu).

For at least 2,500 years Brahmans have served as temple priests or family priests (*purohita*). In modern times they have been teachers, scribes, landowners, or government officials. Because they are disproportionately influential in modern politics, some states have experienced an anti-Brahman backlash.

Brahmans' essential attributes are (1) their supreme level of purity, maintained by a vegetarian diet and by caste endogamy; (2) their literacy in Sanskrit and other



BRAHMAN—WHO ARE THEY?

Thurston's *Castes and Tribes of Southern India* contains a very long section on the Brahman castes of the region. The following text is the opening of the section and indicates just how complex this caste category was and remains in India.

Brahman.—The Brahmans of Southern India are divided into a number of sections, differing in language, manners and customs. As regards to their origin, the current belief is that they sprang from the mouth of the Brahma. In support of thereof, the following verse from the Purusha Suktha (hymn of the primaeval male) of the Rig Veda is quoted:—From the face of Prajapathi (Viratpurusha) came the Brahmans, from the arms of arose the Kshatriyas; from the thighs sprang the Vaisyas; and from the feet the Sudras. Mention of the fourfold division of the Hindu castes is also made in other Vedas, and in the Ithihasas and Puranas.

The Brahmans fall into three groups, following the three Vedas or Sakas, Rig, Yajus and Samam. This threefold division is, however, recognised only for ceremonial purposes. For marriage and social purposes, the divisions based on language and locality are practically more operative. In the matter of the more important religious rites, the Brahmans of Southern India, as elsewhere, closely follow their own Vedas. Every Brahman belongs to one or other of the numerous gotras mentioned in Pravara and Gotra Kandams. All the religious rites are preformed according to the Grihya Sutras (ritual books) pertaining to their Saka or Veda. Of these, there are eight kinds now in vogue, viz.:—

Asvalayana Sutra of the rig Veda}
 Apasathamba}
 Bharadwaja}
 Bhodyana} _____ Sutras of the black Yajus
 Sathyashada}
 Vaikkanasa}
 Kathyayana Sutra of the white Yajus
 Drahyayana Sutra of Sama Veda

All Brahmans claim descent from one or more of the following seven Rishis:—Atri, Bhrigu, Kutsa, Vashista, Gautama, Kasyapa, Angiras. According to some, the Rishis are Agasthya, Angiras, Atri, Bhrigu, Kasyapa, Vashista, and Gautama. Under these Rishis are included eighteen ganams, and under each gnam there are a number of gitras, amounting in all to about 230. Every Brahman is expected to salute his superiors by repeating the Abhivadhanam (salutation) which contains his lineage. As an example, the following may be given:—"I, Krishna by name, of Srivathsa gotra, with the pravara (lineage) of the five Rishis, Bharagava, Chyavana, Apunvana, Aruva, and Jamadagini, following the Apasthamba sutra of the Yajus Saka, am now saluting you." Daily at the close of the Sandhya prayers, this Abhivadhanam formula should be repeated by every Brahman.

Source: Thurston, Edgar & Rangachari, K.(1909) *Castes and Tribes of Southern India*. Madras: Government Press, 267–268.



RITUAL PURITY

This account from a Hindu village in Tamil Nadu, South India, shows the importance of ritual purity and pollution in maintaining the high status of the Brahmans in the Hindu caste system.

Brahmin *jathi* [occupational] groups in the village adhered strictly to the rules of vegetarianism, auspicious time (*raaku kaalam*) and menstrual tabu. The Beri CeTTiar followed the rules more scrupulously than other non-Brahmin *jathi* groups, but all non-Brahmin *jathi* groups indulged in the consumption of meat and fish—foods that were considered to be *kavacci* or polluting. The *jathi* groups who ranked second to the Beri CeTTiar such as Mutaliar, Saliar, Kanakkar, ITaya, Kammaalar and Baljia NaiTu, paid greater attention to the rules than did the next-ranking *jathi* groups such as Vanniar, NaaTaar, Kusavar, AmbaTTar, Pandaaram, Itayar, NaaTTaar, PaTTanava and Karayaar. Villiar and Harijan *jathi* groups paid the least attention to the rules of ritual abstinence and tabus.

Source: Ebenezer T. Jacob-Pandian (1972) *Dravidianization: A Tamil Revitalization Movement*. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 113.

languages; and (3) their knowledge of Hindu liturgy. Their services are still in great demand for weddings and other family ceremonies, and are essential conducting *puja* (worship and offerings) in many temples.

Paul Hockings

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BRAHUI Brahui is the name of a group of tribes that live in Pakistan, eastern Iran, and Afghanistan. Scholars puzzle over their origin because they speak a Dravidian-based language, such as is commonly found in the south of India, despite their northern location.

The largest concentration of Brahui lives in Baluchistan Province in Pakistan. Their numbers are estimated between just under a million to a million and a half.

The Brahui homeland is on the Kalat plateau, in Pakistan. It was in Kalat that the Brahui succeeded in mobilizing and attaining power. In 1666, Mir Ahmed Khan I rose to power as the leader of a group of Brahui tribes. From then on, the khanate of Kalat remained in the hands of Brahui leaders for almost three hundred years. That succession was broken when the British took control of Kalat as part of their expansion efforts in the region. The British retained control until Pakistan achieved its independence in 1948.

The Brahui observe the teachings of Islam, following the Sunni sect. However, some of their traditions originate in India. It is a patriarchal society, where a son's birth is more valued than a daughter's. The societal unit is the tribe, which is governed by a *sadar* (hereditary chief). Blood ties are not the only indicator of membership in a tribe; other factors, such as loyalty and stature, are taken into account as well. In the past, the Brahui were mostly nomadic shepherds. Although some still follow that lifestyle, now others have largely settled into agricultural activities. Their standard of living is low as a result of Pakistan's depressed economic conditions and their own inefficiency in agricultural operations. Government aid has been unable to alter their living conditions. The Brahui are diminishing in numbers as fewer speak Brahui and more become integrated with the Baluchi.

Houman A. Sadri

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BRAMAPUTRA RIVER The Bramaputra River, 2,900 kilometers long, is the world's tallest river over sea level. Its source is in the Himalayas, and it flows into the Indian Ocean. The river runs east for 1,800 kilometers through most of southern Tibet (Xizang Autonomous Region), where it is known as the Yarlung Zangbo River, before it suddenly turns south and crosses the Himalayas in 5,000-meter-deep gorges. Reaching India, the Bramaputra (son of Brahma) runs west and south through Assam and Bangladesh, where it merges with the Ganges and forms a huge delta. In Bangladesh, the river is also



known as the Jamuna. The river is navigable for most of its length except for the passage through the Himalayas.

The middle reaches of the riverbed are the agricultural center of Tibet, but heavy flooding and mudslides caused by deforestation are frequent. In Bangladesh, the water level rises four to five meters during the rainy seasons, and almost every year the river breaks its banks or changes course. When on-shore storms simultaneously push the seawater into the delta, it results in disastrous floods. At the same time, the inundation and irrigation leave large deposits of fertile soil, so fields in the river valleys are intensively cultivated.

Bent Nielsen

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BRITISH EAST INDIA COMPANY The British East India Company was founded on the last day of 1600 through a royal charter signed by Queen Elizabeth I. In many ways it failed to achieve its initial aim of trade in spices and other items favored by the English people. British subsequent dominance over the Indian subcontinent came only following the Dutch withdrawal for the more lucrative isles of modern Indonesia.

From the beginning there was always tension between the company directors in London and the company officers in the field. The communication technology of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was slow; it often took a message two years to travel from London to India and back.

The company made unremarkable small gains until the eighteenth century. The eighteenth century, like the twenty-first, saw an expansion of multinational corporations with the means of enforcing their will. During the early period, factories or trading posts were established through grants from the native rulers in several parts of the subcontinent. To protect these areas, the company employed European and sepoy (*sipahi*, native troops) guards. Slowly, the company gained territory through the employment of military force. In 1757, Sir Robert Clive (1725–1774) won a remarkable victory at Plassey, which solidified British control over the vast territory of Bengal.

Throughout this phase, many of the British who went to India to serve the company were highly corrupt, seeing self-aggrandizement as their main goal. The London company set out to gain greater control over its Asian possessions. Warren Hastings (1732–1818) was commissioned to straighten out the corrupt administration. He is now recognized as the greatest of the governors-general, but he ran afoul of London for political decisions he made. Hastings was sent home to undergo one of the longest and most famous trials of the eighteenth century. After a long legal fight, Hastings was acquitted of the charges. Another famous figure in company history is Arthur Wellesley (1769–1852), later the duke of Wellington of Waterloo fame, who served under his brother, Governor-General Richard Wellesley (1761–1842). Sir Arthur defeated the famous Tipu sultan, acquiring large tracts of territory to the south in 1799.

But the company's history was not all wars and local battles. The permanent settlement of land revenues in 1793, enacted by Lord Cornwallis (1738–1805), brought much hardship to the Bengal peasantry. The last governor-general, Lord Bentinck (1774–1839), was both a social reformer and a builder of infrastructure that would much later set India ahead of other Third World countries after its independence in 1947. Unfortunately, many of his social reforms put the more conservative elements of the subcontinent at odds with the company's rule, leading to the Great Mutiny of 1857–1858.

During the mutiny, the British were barely able to hold on to their great prize. After miraculously winning, the British Crown took over the governance of



TREATY BETWEEN THE BRITISH EAST INDIA COMPANY AND BENGAL

The following text is the first ten articles of a treaty between the British East India Company and the Nawab Shujau-d-daula, of Oudh, and the Nawab Najmu-d-daula, of Benagal set forth in 1765 after the British had established themselves as the rulers of Bengal. The treaty allows British control over trade, a military presence, and also requires Bengal to pay compensation to England for its expenses in the war.

Article 1

A perpetual and universal peace, sincere friendship, and firm union shall be established between His Highness Shujau-d-daula and his heirs, on the one part, and His Excellency Najmu-d-daula and the English East India Company on the other; so that the said contracting powers shall give the greatest attention to maintain between themselves, their dominions and their subjects this reciprocal friendship, without permitting, on either side, any kind of hostilities to be committed, from henceforth, for any cause, or under any pretence whatsoever, and everything shall be carefully avoided which might hereafter prejudice the union now happily established.

Article 2

In case the dominions of His Highness Shujau-d-daula shall at any time hereafter be attacked, His Excellency Najmu-d-daula and the English Company shall assist him with a part or the whole of their forces, according to the exigency of his affairs, and so far as may be consistent with their own security, and if the dominions of His Excellency Najmu-d-daula or the English Company, shall be attacked, His Highness shall be in like manner, assist them with a part of the whole of his forces. In the case of the English Company's forces being employed in His Highness's service, the extraordinary expense of the same is to be defrayed by him.

Article 3

His Highness solemnly engages never to entertain or receive Cossim Ally Khan, the late Soubahadar of Bengal, & C., Sombre, the assassin of the English, nor any of the European

deserters, within his dominions, nor to give the least countenance, support, or protection to them. He likewise solemnly engages to deliver up to the English whatever European may in future desert from them into his country.

Article 4

The King Shah Aalum shall remain in full possession of Cora, and such part of the Province of Illiabad [Allahabad] as he now possesses, which are ceded to His Majesty, as a royal demesne, for the support of his dignity and expenses.

Article 5

His Highness Shujau-d-daula engages, in a most solemn manner, to continue Balwant Singh in the zemindaries of Benares, Ghazepore, and all those districts he possessed at the time he came over to the late Nabob Jaffier Ally Khan and the English on condition of his paying the same revenue as heretofore.

Article 6

In consideration of the great expense incurred by the English Company in carrying on the late war, His Highness agrees to pay them (50) fifty *lakhs* of rupees in the following manner; *viz.* (1) twelve *lakhs* in money, and a deposit of jewels to the amount of (8) eight *lakhs* upon the signing of this Treaty, (5) five *lakhs* one month after, and the remaining (25) twenty-five *lakhs* by monthly payments, so as that the whole may be discharged in (13) thirteen months from the date hereof.

Article 8

His Highness shall allow the English Company to carry on a trade, duty free, throughout the whole of his Dominions.

Article 9

All the relations and subjects of His Highness, who in any manner assisted the English during the course of the late war, shall be forgiven, and no ways molested for the same.

Article 10

As soon as this Treaty is executed, the English forces shall be withdrawn from the dominions

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of His Highness, except such as may be necessary for the garrison of Chunar, or for the defence and protection of the King in the city

of Illiabad [Allahabad] if His Majesty shall require a force for that purpose.

Source: A. B. Keith. (1922) *Speeches and Documents on Indian Policy, 1750-1921*. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 28-30.

India under Queen Victoria's Proclamation of 1 November, 1858, to the Princes and Peoples of India. This executive order was the end of a series of laws that had been limiting the prerogatives of the British East India Company. Although there is an organization today called the East India Company, since 1858 the company has not been a political player on the world's stage. It now sells tea.

Geoffrey Cook

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BRITISH IN SOUTHEAST ASIA From the early nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, Britain (the United Kingdom) became the world's preeminent naval and trade power. To advance its interests, Britain acquired the largest empire ever known, primarily for purposes of global trade rather than territorial conquest. The extension of British rule into Southeast Asia, including Burma (now Myanmar), Malaya, British Borneo, and Singapore, was primarily to bolster the defense of India, the so-called jewel in the British crown, and to secure the trade routes to China. British rule was largely indirect and accommodating of local power structures—unless British interests were threatened.

The British in the Malay Peninsula and Borneo

Until 1874, British interests in the Malay Peninsula were limited to the three Straits Settlements that facilitated trade through the Strait of Malacca—Singapore, Melaka (Malacca), and Penang—all of which were established in the early nineteenth century by the British East India Company (EIC). The three possessions formed vital links as important seaports to

service ships that plied vital trading routes and the naval vessels that protected them. Singapore, for example, was occupied by several hundred indigenous Malays upon its establishment in 1819, but had grown to a population of 85,000 by the 1860s. The British brought in large numbers of Chinese coolie laborers as well as Indians to act as administrators in the Straits Settlements.

By 1873 the British began to drop the policy of non-interference in the affairs of the Malay states because it desired to control the tin, rubber, palm oil, and other resources with which the Malay states were blessed. Tin, mostly from the states of Perak and Selangor, was particularly useful in the manufacture of barrels to store oil and for construction materials. The western states of Perak and Selangor were also notorious for piracy that hampered merchant trade; this provided the British with further reasons for intervention. The murder of the British resident (highest-ranking British official) of Perak, J. W. W. Birch, in November 1875 was a pretext to introduce British-led troops, to enthrone a pliable sultan, and to strengthen British control. The residents acquired vast powers, but by and large the sultans continued to run the daily affairs of those under their rule—notably on issues of custom and religion. Pahang (1888) and Negeri Sembilan (1889) were added and eventually the four states under British rule collectively formed the 1895 Federated Malay States (FMS). Neighboring Siam (now Thailand), under modernizing King Rama IV (Chao Fa Mongkut, reigned 1851-1868), cleverly avoided colonization but was forced to sign the Anglo-Thai agreement of 1855 giving Britain favorable trade access. Thailand also lost the Malay territories of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu to British control in the early twentieth century.

On Borneo, James Brooke, adventurer and scion of the Brooke family, independently established himself as the British "white raja" in the mid-nineteenth century. Like Singapore's founder, Sir Stamford Raffles, Brooke wanted to push farther into Southeast Asia than the more cautious British government, which had assumed Borneo to be within the Dutch ambit. Brooke's

increasing power in the northern portion of the island, forged largely through alliances with local peoples and the sultan of Brunei, meant that unwittingly "British Borneo" became apart of the empire. The Brooke family dynasty lasted from 1846 until the onset of World War II. In 1963, all of the British territories of maritime Southeast Asia were given independence and merged to form the Federation of Malaysia. Singapore left this federation in 1965 to become an independent nation-state. Unlike the other colonial powers in maritime Southeast Asia, the British had largely preserved the traditional power structures of the Malay Peninsula. The British had also attempted to establish commercial transactions with the Malay people in order to generate a trade market for British goods. This was in direct contrast to the Dutch, who ran more of a tribute system with the Indonesians, whereby produce was exacted as a form of taxation.

The British in Burma

The case of Burma was different in many ways. The British viewed it as an extension of India for reasons of both perceived cultural similarity and strategic value. There was also growing concern that France would try to exercise some influence in the multiethnic region. However the British encountered fierce resistance to their proposed overlordship. Three Anglo-Burmese Wars occurred in 1824–1826, 1852, and 1885, during which Burma was effectively annexed in three phases—Arakan (now Rakhine), Lower Burma, and Upper Burma, respectively. The most serious conflict was the first, with enormous loss of life on both sides. The second conflict arose over disputes over the teak trade and trading routes to southern China. The third and final conflict saw Burma collapse to British authority in fifteen days with the loss of ten men. In February 1886, Burma was officially incorporated into India. However, the Burmese resisted British rule fiercely, and the subsequent occupation was vastly more difficult than Britain's occupation of India or Malaya. After World War II, at Burmese insistence, moves for independence were speeded up and concluded on 4 January 1948. British rule had never been popular in Burma.

The Postwar Era

In the aftermath of World War II, Britain played a crucial role in preparing all its colonies for independence—a move that officials in London saw as the best way to achieve stability in the region in the face of the growing Communist threat. This was in direct contrast to the Netherlands and France, which fought savage wars to return their colonies to the prewar sta-

tus quo. For some years afterward Britain stationed forces in Malaya/Malaysia and Singapore, largely meeting the twin threats of the Communist Emergency (1948–1960) and confrontation with Indonesia (1963–1965). Britain also helped channel considerable aid funds to Southeast Asia through the Colombo Plan, initially to the Commonwealth members but subsequently also to non-Commonwealth nations, forming part of a network of postwar aid relationships designed to create a more stable global environment in the face of potential instability and out of desire to promote affluent trade markets in the long term.

Anthony L. Smith

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BRITISH INDIAN EMPIRE Formally, the British Indian empire existed for ninety years (1858–1947). The empire consisted of large parts of most of the countries in South Asia and briefly included Burma as well. In area and population, British India was the largest colony the world had ever seen. In political and economic importance India was the centerpiece of the British empire. During its time, imperial rule greatly shaped the economy, society, and culture of modern South Asia.

The British Rise to Power

In the eighteenth century Europeans controlled India's maritime trade with Europe. By the end of that century the British East India Company commanded political power in Bengal. The transition from trading to direct rule is explained partly by the needs of trade itself. Indian textiles were the most important items in this trade, paid for by bullion from Europe. The bullion export invited mercantilist criticism in Britain. Local political circumstances that enabled the British to command land revenues in Bengal provided a less-controversial means of payment.

What were these local circumstances? The state system that developed under the Mughal empire (1526–1857) was in disintegration in the eighteenth century, giving rise to a group of successor states that depended on the financial accommodation of Indian merchant-bankers. Pressed to raise more revenues for



This illustration from the *Voyages of Madelslo* published in 1727 shows the first English trading station in India, established at Surat in 1613. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

the army or for the maintenance of the courts and sometimes in a bid to shake off indebtedness, these states tended to be extortionate on their financiers. The tacit collaboration of these disaffected financiers was crucial in the British rise to power in India. Progressively between 1800 and 1857 the East India Company expanded the area under its direct administration and entered into treaties with the many princely rulers. The treaties promised the states autonomy in return for recognition of British rule outside their territories.

These subsidiary alliances, however, were unequal in a number of senses, and the inequities fed the widespread discontent that exploded in a military mutiny in 1857. The British Crown took over the rule of India after the mutiny was suppressed in 1858.

The Imperial Impact

Crown rule transformed the economy of South Asia. Through trade and investment South Asia and Britain developed close ties, and through Britain, South Asia developed ties with the rest of the world. Trade expanded enormously. India was crucial to Britain as a market for its manufactures, chiefly textiles, machinery, and metals, and as a source of foodstuffs, industrial raw materials, and a few manufactured goods intensive in labor and natural resources. Private property rights and contract laws became well defined,

and imperialism created a powerful centralized state, a modern bureaucracy, and a modern judiciary. Large-scale railway building and the telegraph integrated the region internally, and India was one of the first nations in the world to operate a functioning telegraph line. Export opportunities, well-defined property rights, and the new infrastructure encouraged production of goods for the market instead of for subsistence or local exchange. In turn this commercialization led to a limited form of peasant prosperity and more efficient agriculture in several regions.

Who benefited more from the empire, India or Britain? Classical writings on imperialism, Marxist development scholarship, and major schools of historiography in India argued that the imperial ties and domestic policies conferred more benefits on Britain than on the colonies. If this is the case, economic gains might have continued to provide the impetus for imperialism. In more extreme versions of such views, India was actually impoverished by it. The impoverishment case is weakened, however, by evidence that South Asia experienced positive and significant growth of real income in the last half of the nineteenth century. That Britain received economic gains from its colonies cannot be disputed. Nevertheless, quantitative research suggests that these gains were neither as large as earlier imagined nor crucial to explaining capital accumulation and industrialization in Britain.



BRITISH ENGINEERING IN INDIA

One of the efforts made by the British during their rule of India was the modernization of agriculture. One part of that effort was massive engineering projects to create and re-create irrigation systems like the ones described below.

One of the first steps which had to be taken by the British irrigation engineer was the restoration, remodelling, and extension of derelict works which suffered from faulty alinement and the absence of a system of distributory canals. Original works were next taken in hand designed on a scale of which India had no previous knowledge. It is not necessary to enter into details of the different systems but some idea may be given of the magnitude of the triumphs which engineering skill achieved. The Grand Anicut, which was built in 1835-6 across the bed of the Cauvery, the first British irrigation work in South India, has a length of over 2 miles. Of the Ganges canal, the first great work in North India, Lord Dalhousie proudly wrote in 1856 that there was not a single canal in Europe of half its magnitude and that it was a work unequalled in its class and character among the efforts of civilized nations. A tunnel over a mile long has been blasted and drilled through the Western Ghats; another, 2 miles long, pierces the Malakand range. The main and distributory canals of the Gadavari system stretch for 2,500 miles; those of the Upper and Lower Ganges canals for nearly 8,000 miles, and they irrigate 2 1/2 million acres. The Chenab canal has a discharge about six times as great as that of the Thames at Teddington; the Sukkur barrage is the largest of its kind in the world; some of the canals in Sind are wider than the Suez Canal. In the Punja alone the area served by State irrigations works is nearly double that irrigated in Egypt. In British India as a whole it is 32 1/2 million acres or one-eighth of the total cultivated area.

Source: Lewis S. S. O'Malley, ed. (1941) *Modern India and the West: A Study of the Interaction of Their Civilizations*. London: Oxford University Press, 244-245.

Furthermore whether or not these gains depended vitally on political subordination is open to debate.

Regardless, imperialism did impose crippling burdens on the South Asian economy. For example, India made a large payment to Britain on the government account for services Britain rendered to the colony. This was a national drain of potential investment funds. To the extent many of these services were overpriced, such as the inflated salaries of British bureaucrats in India, an element of drain indeed existed. However, the true scale of the drain cannot be estimated, for India needed many of the services for which Britain charged

it. A second example is colonial India's large defense spending. The huge Indian army defended the British empire worldwide at the expense of the Indian taxpayer, and the fiscal burden was a heavy one.

The imperial impact had many dimensions. Western learning, Western ideas, and economic exposure together gave rise to a new elite different in mentality from the old landed elite. The new elite consisted of urban middle-class professionals who were more exposed to and deeply impressed by Western science, technology, and the ideas of rationality and humanism. Previously, the principle of equality was practi-



ONE ENGLISHMAN'S OPINION

The following poem by a British colonial official summarizes the positives and negatives of life in India.

What varied opinions we constantly hear.
 Of our rich, Oriental possessions;
 What a jumble of notions, distorted and queer,
 Form an Englishman's "Indian impressions"!
 First a sun, fierce and glaring, that scorches and bakes;
 Palankeens, perspiration, and worry;
 Mosquitoes, thugs, cocoanuts, Brahmins, and snakes,
 With elephants, tigers and curry.
 Then Juggernat, punkahs, tanks, buffaloes, forts,
 With bangles, mosques, nautches, and dhingees;
 A mixture of temples, Mahometans, ghats,
 With scorpions, Hindoos, and Feringhees.
 Then jungles, fakeers, dancing-girls, prickly heat,
 Shawls idols, durbars, brandy-pawny;
 Rupees, clever jugglers, dust-storms, slipper'd feet,
 Rainy season, and mulligatawny.
 Hot winds, holy monkeys, tall minarets, rice
 With crocodiles, ryots, or farmers;
 Himalayas, fat baboos, with paunches and pice,
 So airily clad in pyjamas.
 With Rajahs—But stop, I must really desist,
 And let each one enjoy his opinions,
 Whilst I show in what style Anglo-Indians exist
 In Her Majesty's Eastern dominions.

Source: George F. Atkinson. (1854) *Curry and Rice on Forty Plates or the Ingredients of Social Life at "Our Station" in India.* London: Day & Son, London in 1854.

cally alien to Indian society, but imperial laws instituted equality, and new schools with a reformist bent propagated the idea of equality. These laws and the new education encouraged social reform movements throughout South Asia. The positions of women, who were severely disadvantaged, and of the lower castes were key themes in this modern discourse on reform, fueled as it was by liberal thinkers and Christian missionaries.

On the other hand, tradition was selectively preserved and perhaps even reinvented as a result of the empire. The British rulers were averse to intervening directly in personal law. Hierarchy was reinforced by the predominance of the Brahmans and the other upper castes in public administration. Hierarchy and the distinctions of caste were also reinforced by the influence of Brahmanical interpretations of Indian society in British administrative ideology. For example, the myth of traditional India as a sedentary, self-sufficient peasant society influenced British policy on landed property.

From Empire to Nation

The journey from empire to nation, or the process of decolonization in India, can be attributed to two types of development: voluntary disengagement of private capital and rising nationalism. Britain's share in Indian trade and investment declined in between the two world wars. Nationalism in South Asia progressed along at least four trajectories: political action to undermine British rule, social reform, religious revivalism, and protests by the laboring or subaltern classes against localized repression. Inevitably, as the idea of equality took deeper root, the desire for freedom grew in intensity. Freedom had different meanings. Freedom from imperial rule was important, but to fight the British effectively required emancipation of the masses from varieties of indigenous repression. Nearly all the major figures in Indian nationalist discourse had to address the problem of how this double mission should be accomplished. Eventually the anti-imperialist struggle took priority over the reformist program. If this nationalism built upon freedom and equality, a different type of nationalism built upon denunciation of European modernity and on illusions about Indian traditions. These illusions were partly a result of British interpretations of traditional India.

The nationalist struggle took shape in the late nineteenth century, and 1930 was a turning point. The mainstream nationalist movement led by the Indian National Congress adopted the idea of total freedom from imperial rule about 1929. After 1930 the world economy and the Indian economy were in mild or deep

depression, the commercial significance of India for Britain was becoming steadily more obscure, and the aims of British and Indian economic policies came in sharp and evident conflict. At the end of a decade and a half racked by economic instability, political outburst, and severe repression, freedom became an accomplished fact in South Asia.

But freedom came with fierce Hindu-Muslim violence and a political breakup of the region. The origin of Hindu-Muslim disunity has been a matter of debate. In one school of thought the British cultivated it strategically. In another view it had long been an intrinsic divide. In either case a strong current of religious revivalism had deepened the communal divide, making the accommodation of religious differences in-

creasingly difficult and sharply separating secular politics from the communally sensitive ones.

In the postimperial period the legacy of the empire is evident in the modern economy and infrastructure India retains. In addition the empire's influence shapes the relations between India and Pakistan, the Indian diaspora worldwide, and the seemingly conflicting co-existence of liberal and intolerant political ideologies within both India and Pakistan.

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BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION

British Military Administration (BMA) was imposed on territories in the Southeast Asia theater under the military responsibility of the South East Asia Command (SEAC), under Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander (SAC). SEAC was responsible for the reoccupation and establishment of military administration over vast territories inhabited by more than 160 million people of diverse ethnicity and creed. BMA was established in Burma (present-day Myanmar) from January 1944 to October 1945, in Malaya (present-day peninsular Malaysia) from September 1945 to April 1946, and in British Borneo (now Sarawak, Brunei, and Sabah) from January to July 1946. In Burma, BMA was functioning while military operations against the Japanese continued in earnest. Although no form of BMA was established in Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, or Indonesia, British military authorities played a major role in maintaining law and order in the period following the capitulation of Japan on 15 August 1945.

Toward the end of 1942, planning had commenced for the establishment of military governments in the Japanese-occupied territories of Southeast Asia. The planning for Burma was in the hands of the government of Burma in exile in Simla, India. The Colonial Office in London undertook this task for Malaya and British Borneo. Both Raja Vyner Brooke of Sarawak, then in Australia, and the Court of Directors of the Chartered Company that administered North Borneo (Sabah) in London agreed to the Colonial Office's handling the planning in consultation with their respective representatives.

BMA's immediate aims were to disarm and remove Japanese troops from the reoccupied territories and to liberate and relieve the hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war and civilian internees. BMA functioned on two levels. At the administrative level, its functions included the provision of transport, equipment, clothing, accommodation and housing, the import of supplies (mainly rice, other foodstuffs, and consumer goods) for the civilian population, and the relief of refugees and displaced individuals. The Civil Affairs Service was responsible for these administrative tasks. At the political level, BMA dealt with local nationalist political groups and militant resistance movements; these often had left-wing elements that vociferously demanded sovereignty and independence. In general, political issues were the responsibility of the Supreme Allied Commander.

BMA confronted two equally acute challenges in the course of its operations, which can be summed up in two words: "rice" and "independence." In the pre-war period, Burma, Siam, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam were major exporters of rice, the staple food of Southeast and East Asia. Wartime conditions had retarded rice production, as producers reverted to subsistence in the absence of markets, and the cessation of exports during the Japanese occupation had been severely felt. BMA was faced with shortages and the responsibility of distributing the available rice supplies. The task was worsened by widespread lawlessness in the aftermath of the Japanese surrender. Seriously threatening and even forestalling BMA operations were strong nationalist movements—militant and left-wing, fairly organized, well-armed (ironically, with arms supplied by the Allies during the war), and full of self-confidence derived from their wartime experiences.

Burma

SEAC assumed the administration of liberated Burma in January 1944. Subsequently, the Civil Affairs Service (Burma), or CAS (B), established BMA in Burma. Although responsible for restoring law and order, CAS (B) had no authority in political matters; neither did the Supreme Allied Commander. Instead, that authority resided with the exiled Burmese government in India. Furthermore, CAS (B) had to contend with operatives of Force 136, a unit of the Special Operations Executive based in Ceylon (Sri Lanka). Force 136 was charged with fostering guerrilla opposition to the occupying Japanese—an activity fraught with political implications—and in pursuit of its duties it deferred to neither the Supreme Allied Commander nor the Civil Affairs Service.

The task of CAS (B) in Burma was monumental. Apart from Japan itself, Burma suffered the worst destruction of the war: the country had been fought over from south to north in 1942 and again in 1944–1945. In addition to the physical destruction, CAS (B) faced opposition from the nationalist Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), led by Aung San (1915–1947). In May 1945, a British government White Paper suggested a delay in Burmese self-rule; AFPFL rejected such proposals, demanding nothing less than complete independence from the British Commonwealth.

When the Japanese surrendered, CAS (B) was administering nearly all of Burma except for the area east of the Sittang River. The cessation of hostilities hastened the handover to civilian government. Although the governor of Burma, Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, assumed office in October 1945, it was another five months before the full transfer of responsibility was effected. During its tenure, CAS (B) had managed to restore the railway and inland water transport system. Acute shortages in consumer goods persisted, however, and prices remained astronomical.

Malaya

Malaya had not been exposed to the same level of Allied bombings as had Burma; hence conditions during the postwar period reflected dilapidation and neglect. Acute shortages of rice and widespread malnutrition were conspicuous problems. The main tasks of the BMA in Malaya were the relief of prisoners of war and internees and the rehabilitation of the country's economy. Both tasks were accomplished, due in great part to advance planning and efficient implementation. Smooth execution of the Key Plan for British Military Administration in Malaya (approved in March 1945) enabled the BMA to be ready to hand over responsibility even before the civilian government was ready to assume control. On the political level, BMA had to contend with the deterioration of relations between Malaya's Malay and Chinese populations, which erupted in armed clashes, food riots, lawlessness and banditry, and several leftist-led industrial strikes. A new political-administrative scheme, the Malayan Union, was in the process of being adopted. The scheme envisaged the union of the nine Malay states and the Straits Settlements of Penang and Melaka; Singapore was to remain a separate British colony. Citizenship under the scheme offered equality of rights to all irrespective of race or creed and also allowed dual citizenship. The Malayan Union came into being on 1 April 1946 and marked the end of BMA in Malaya.

Borneo

Originally, British Borneo came under U.S. command; later, Australia was entrusted with its occupation. After a six-month tenure of military administration under the Australian British Borneo Civil Affairs Unit (BBCAU), British Borneo came under SEAC responsibility. Brigadier C. F. C. Macaskie was in command of the British 50 Civil Affairs Unit and BBCAU. While the former remained behind in Australia, Macaskie and BBCAU established the initial military administration following the Australian Ninth Division landings at Brunei Bay on 10 June 1945. Several British officers served in BBCAU; however, when SEAC assumed responsibility for British Borneo, these officers reverted to 50 Civil Affairs Unit, which then was redesignated the British Military Administration (British Borneo), or BMA (BB). North Borneo and, to a lesser extent, Brunei suffered from Allied bombings that destroyed most urban centers; Sarawak was the least scarred. By the time BMA (BB) commenced operations in January 1946, active hostilities had ceased. BBCAU had performed most of the urgent tasks: containing the spread of disease, clamping down on minor incidents of unrest, relieving prisoners of war and internees, and distributing foodstuffs. It was left to BMA (BB) to continue these tasks and rehabilitate the economy.

Postwar planning in London had decided to convert the British protectorates of Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo to crown colonies and to retain the protectorate status of the sultanate of Brunei. Both Raja Vyner Brooke of Sarawak and the Court of Directors of the Chartered Company had agreed to cede their respective domains to Colonial Office administration largely owing to the financially burdensome task of postwar rehabilitation and reconstruction. Accordingly, the new British colonies of Sarawak and North Borneo came into being (1 June 1946 and 15 July 1946, respectively). The case of Sarawak was peculiar. Transfer of authority to the raja's government was made on 15 April 1946. The raja then ceded Sarawak to the British government, and the new colony of Sarawak came into being. The duties of BMA (BB) continued for the sake of distribution of civil supplies until its dissolution on 15 July. On the same date, the handover was effected in North Borneo. Handover in Brunei occurred a week earlier on 6 July 1946.

Ooi Keat Gin

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BRITISH-DUTCH WARS Although the British and Dutch cooperated to counter Spanish and Portuguese influence, the alliance was uneasy as one tried to take advantage of the other's weakness. Rivalry first emerged over control of the Banda Islands and their nutmeg production. Beginning in 1616, the British settlement on Pulau Run (Run Island) was blockaded for several years, causing the death of expedition leader Captain Nathaniel Courthope. The Dutch governor of the Netherlands East Indies, Jan Pieterszoon Coen, shifted the center of Dutch operations to Batavia (Jakarta) from Bantam after British threats. In 1619, Coen ordered an attack on two British ships, causing the death of Captain John Jourdain. In March 1620, news arrived of a peace agreement signed between Britain and the Netherlands, giving Britain a minority share of the spice trade but granting the Netherlands free rein in the Spice Islands. Coen used the agreement to take full control of the Banda Islands, forcing the British out. The British formally gave up their claim in 1667 with the Peace of Breda following hostilities with the Dutch in the English Channel. The Netherlands emerged dominant in maritime Southeast Asia.

Trouble resurfaced in the late eighteenth century. As the Netherlands was allied to France, Britain took control of some strategic enclaves in the Spice Islands between 1776 and 1801, but it returned these in the 1802 Peace of Amiens treaty. However, in the early nineteenth century the Netherlands came under the sway of Napoleonic France. The arrival of Francophile governor Herman Daendels in 1808 led to British concern over French proxy influence in Southeast Asia. A decision was taken to protect Indian security and Chinese trade by assuming control of Java and its dependencies. In August 1811, a British force of 12,000, led by Lord Minto, easily took Batavia, establishing Stam-

ford Raffles as lieutenant governor of Java. The Dutch had little choice but to cooperate with the new administration.

Raffles's dream of expanding the British Empire into Java and the surrounding islands ended with Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo, as the British wished to reestablish the Netherlands as a strong independent state. Dutch administration was restored to the Dutch East Indies in 1816. Dispute, however, arose over the ownership of Singapore (claimed by the British in 1819) and British presence in western Sumatra. The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 solidified the boundaries of maritime Southeast Asia, surrendering Sumatra to the Dutch, while granting the British Malacca and Singapore. By this stage the Netherlands had to accept British military and economic dominance and the fact that Dutch colonial rule relied on British guarantees.

Anthony Smith

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BROOKE, JAMES (1803–1868), English adventurer and ruler of Sarawak. Brooke established a dynasty in Sarawak, northwest Borneo, and he and his descendants ruled Sarawak as rajas for a century (1841–1941). Brooke's father was an official of the East India Company (EIC), and Brooke was born in India but educated in England. He joined the EIC and shortly thereafter received a commission as a cavalry officer. A casualty of the Anglo-Burmese War of 1824–1826, Brooke returned to England to recuperate. He resigned from the army and from the EIC. Eager for adventure, he made two voyages to China (1830–1831 and 1834), visiting Penang and Singapore en route.

During the early nineteenth century, Stamford Raffles (1781–1826), who established the British settlement of Singapore in 1819, advocated a greater role for Britain in the Malay Archipelago vis-à-vis the Netherlands. In a prospectus published in 1838, Brooke supported Raffles's vision by arguing that territorial possession should be the basis for developing British trade and commerce instead of the current tentative treaty arrangements.

From his inheritance, Brooke bought the schooner *Royalist* and embarked on a scientific expedition to the Malay Archipelago and New Guinea. Brooke called at Kuching in 1839 to convey to Pangeran Hassim, the regent of Brunei, a letter from the mercantile community of Singapore, thanking him for his aid to shipwrecked British merchant seamen.

Sarawak, then covering the river basins of the Lundu, Sarawak, Samarahan, and Sadong, was a fiefdom of the sultanate of Brunei. The mineral-rich region of Upper Sarawak attracted Hakka Chinese gold miners from Sambas in the early 1820s; in the mid-1820s, Brunei became interested in obtaining antimony from there as well. Owing to ill-treatment from Pangeran Makota, the raja of Sarawak, the local inhabitants of Malays and Bidayuhs (Land Dyaks) staged an anti-Brunei rebellion (1836–1840) that disrupted the antimony trade. Hassim, the regent of Brunei, was sent to Sarawak to end the troubles. Hassim asked Brooke, then en route to Singapore, to quash the uprising and promised to make him raja of Sarawak if he succeeded. Brooke quelled the rebellion, and in 1841 he was proclaimed raja of Sarawak in place of Makota.

Brooke created a regime of enlightened paternal despotism, where the raja ruled in consultation with the Malay *datu* (nonroyal chieftains). He emphasized the development of free trade, protection of native interests, and promotion of their welfare. He opposed the introduction of large-scale European and Chinese capitalist ventures and also eschewed radical changes; changes, if deemed necessary, were to be introduced gradually.

During the 1840s Brooke and the Royal Navy greatly reduced the raiding and plundering activities of the Saribas and Skrang Ibans, which had disrupted trade. Headhunting was suppressed. Brooke survived the Hakka Chinese attack on Kuching of February 1857, defeated Iban resistance led by the warrior Rentap (late 1857), and eliminated a Malay conspiracy aimed at toppling his regime (1860–1861). At the expense of Brunei, Brooke extended the boundaries of Sarawak to the Bintulu River (1861). He was instrumental in establishing the British crown colony of Labuan (1847), with himself as its first governor.

After Brooke died in England in 1868, Sarawak remained relatively unknown to the outside world despite its recognition as an independent state by the United States in 1850 and by Britain in 1863. Brooke's nephew and his nephew's son continued his benevolent practices and ruled as second and third rajahs from 1868 until 1941, when Sarawak received a constitution and was ceded to Great Britain. While rudimentary

trade had begun to take root under the Brooke dynasty, the various native inhabitants continued to practice their traditional subsistence-based livelihood.

Ooi Keat Gin

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BROOKE RAJ. See **White Rajas**.

BRUNEI-PROFILE (2001 pop. 344,000). Negara Brunei Darussalam, the official title assumed by the former British protectorate upon full statehood in 1984, closely resembles a Southeast Asian equivalent of a Middle-Eastern petroleum state. Independent Brunei has taken its place in the world and enjoys multiple political, military, commercial, and cultural links within the region, to the Islamic world with which it identifies, and, not least, with Great Britain, whose protectorate it was from 1888 until its independence. Its capital is Bandar Seri Begawan (formerly Brunei Town). Situated on the northwest coast of the island of Borneo, Brunei shares an ecological niche with the diverse peoples of this huge equatorial island. Ruled by an Islamic dynasty tracing its lineage back to the fourteenth century, modern Brunei comprises but a vestige of its historical territorial sway over the northern half of Borneo island. The combination of small population and sufficient reserves of petroleum and natural gas has propelled this nation of mostly self-sufficient agriculturists and fisher folk to enviable prosperity and even some fame within the course of a single generation.

Physical Geography

Enclosing an area of 5,770 square kilometers, the modern boundaries of Brunei were given definition only in the late nineteenth century. Through a series of cessions and aggressions undertaken by the British and their agents, notably the Brooke dynasty that established its presence in Sarawak in the 1840s, the Sultanate was progressively stripped of its Bornean territories, including large swaths of what today



BRUNEI

Country name: Negara Brunei Darussalam
Area: 5,770 sq km
Population: 343,653 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 2.11% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 20.45 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 3.38 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: 4.07 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio—total population : 1.1 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 14.4 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population : 73.82 years, male: 71.45 years, female: 76.31 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Islam (official), Buddhism, Christianity, indigenous religions
Major languages: Malay (official), English, Chinese
Literacy—total population : 88.2%, male: 92.6%, female: 83.4% (1995 est.)
Government type: constitutional sultanate
Capital: Bandar Seri Begawan
Administrative divisions: 4 districts
Independence: 1 January 1984 (from UK)
National holiday: National Day, 23 February (1984)
Suffrage: none
GDP—real growth rate: 3% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita (purchasing power parity): \$17,400 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: not available
Exports: \$2.55 billion (f.o.b., 1999 est.)
Imports: \$1.3 billion (c.i.f., 1999 est.)
Currency: Bruneian dollar (BND)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Factbook* 2001.
 Retrieved 18 October 2001 from: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

constitutes the East Malaysian states of Sarawak and Sabah, along with the island of Labuan. The cession of the Sarawakan territory of Limbang was long disputed; Limbang physically divides Brunei. Temburong, the portion of Brunei to the east of Limbang, is the least developed district of the nation. It is 1,304 square kilometers in area. The smallest (571 square kilometers) but most populous administrative district of Brunei is Brunei-Muara, named after the river and its estuary. As the historic fount of the Sultanate, the Brunei River is also home to the historic Kampong Ayer, or water village precinct. Today, however, the modern capital, including the landmark Istana, or royal palace, sprawls across the west bank of the river. To the west of Brunei-Muara lies Tutong with an area


of 1,666 square kilometers, while the largest and most westerly district is Belait with an area of 2,724 square kilometers. Besides the nation's capital, other population concentrations are found in Muara, the major deep water port, along with the coastal towns of Tutong, Seria (the center of oil production), and Kuala Belait, commercially oriented toward Sarawak, to which it adjoins.

With a coastline of about 180 kilometers, bisected by four important rivers, the Belait, the Tutong, the Brunei, and the Temburong, Brunei hosts a number of ecological zones, varying according to altitude. From the riverine mangrove forests and freshwater swamps of the lowlands, one ascends hilly terrain covering most of the country to the interior highlands, which rise to

913 meters in Temburong. Some 80 percent of the land remains covered with forest, including extensive strands of primary tropical rain forest in Temburong.

Traditionally, this lush tropical environment fostered a range of economic activities, especially concentrated along the lower reaches of the rivers and their flood plains, such as fishing, hunting, rice farming, and trading, in addition to the gathering or harvesting of exotic forest products, such as the bark of mangroves. It can be said that, prior to the exploitation of Brunei's hydrocarbon resources, subsistence agriculture was the dominant form of production. Aside from small-scale logging, little attempt was made during the Protectorate to exploit or develop Brunei's agricultural and forestry resources. One exception was the establishment of rubber plantations, an industry that faded in the post-World War II period. Coal was exploited at Muara and in Brunei Town during the Protectorate. Reserves of silica sand remain unexploited.

The discovery and exploitation of Brunei's hydrocarbon resources, in line with technological advances, has shaped the man-nature relationship in Brunei and the nation's economic destiny. Oil was first discovered on land near Seria in 1929 by Shell Oil Company, but the focus of oil and gas exploitation has moved in the post-World War II period to offshore fields. While recent attempts have been made to reverse the trend, today a shrinking percentage of the population is engaged in agriculture or fishing activities.



Human Geography

The historical royal center in Brunei was grafted upon a highly heterogeneous indigenous population. Ethnic distinctions, however, have become increasingly blurred since independence. This situation arises not only from homogenizing nation-building strategies of the modern state, but also from conversions as members of the various *puak* (indigenous tribes) embrace Islam and enter the category "Malay" (now defined as totaling 69 percent of the population). Even so, Malay is a catch-all designation embracing not only the dominant Brunei Malay, speakers of a language that is perhaps 80 percent cognate with standard Malay, but also the Dusun (mostly from the Belait district), Tutong, Murut, Kedayan, and Bisayah peoples. One could go further and say that Brunei "Malayness" is problematic. Consider the Kedayan case. An agricultural people whose traditions suggest separate origins from the Malayanized ruling-trading classes, the rustic Kedayan have in recent decades become acculturated to the point where ethnicity no longer becomes a significant cultural marker. The conversion to Islam above all else defines Brunei Malayness.

Standing apart from this privileged category of Brunei "Malays" are the true indigenes, the Iban and Punan, who are animists. Also known as Dyak, the Iban share traditions with their far more numerous ethnic kin in Sarawak and in Indonesian Kalimantan. The Punan minority, a group of hunter-gatherers mostly concentrated in Belait, are also more numerous in Sarawak. Iban and Punan together constitute some 5 percent of the population.

Immigrant groups are dominated by Chinese, whose demographic strength reached 26 percent of the population in the 1960s but has declined to around 15 percent at present. Although many Chinese—speakers of Hakka being most numerous, followed by speakers of Hokkien—can trace their ancestry in Brunei back many generations, most are deemed "stateless," as not having Brunei citizenship. Besides Chinese, whose numbers continue to decline from out-migration, Brunei has attracted a floating population of international expatriates that includes workers in the oil industry, members of the teaching and other professions, and working-class Asians, especially Thai construction workers and domestics from the Philippines.

Governance

Brunei remains a hierarchical and status-riven society in keeping with its feudal origins and absolutist political system. Reigning sultan Hassanal Bolkiah, who has ruled since 1968, is an absolute monarch in whose person are concentrated the powers of prime minister,

finance minister, and defense minister. In Sunni Muslim belief, he is also considered by his subjects as head of religion. Paradoxically, certain of the symbols of state reflect the pre-Islamic origins of Southeast Asian monarchy. In appending the term *Negara* to the official title of the newly independent state, Brunei links its traditions with the *negara*-states of the Malay world, whose kingship and court ritual were Hindu in pattern.

While some progress, with British encouragement, had been made toward constitutional monarchy in 1959, the experiment was suspended in 1962 following the unsuccessful armed rebellion by the Indonesian-backed populist Sheikh Azahari. To this day the constitution is but a memorial, parliament remains suspended, elections are unheard of, and political parties lack membership. The only concession to representative government is the creation of village councils.

In Sultan Ali Saifuddin III (reigned 1950–1967) the British secured a staunch ally, and the pro-Western bias continued when Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah replaced his father in 1968. As a profligate prince-playboy in his earlier years, the sultan undoubtedly attracted some of the negative attention now attached to his youngest brother, Prince Jefri. Nevertheless, building upon Islamic and Malay traditions deeply accommodated by his father, the Malaysian- and Sandhurst-educated Sultan Hassanal has gone further in strengthening both his own Islamic credentials and those of the nation. The term *darussalam* ("abode of peace") was contrived at independence to further strengthen the nation's Islamic credentials.

With independence on 1 January 1984, the sultan consolidated family power, with five ministries controlled by four family members. Until stripped of the position in 1999, the Finance Ministry went to Prince Jefri and the Foreign Affairs portfolio to his younger brother Mohamed. Commencing in 1986, the cabinet system was "modernized" with the inclusion of a number of nonroyals. Nevertheless, with key provisions of the constitution suspended, and with the sultan wielding key executive power, the country has been ruled by decree since 1962. A recent example was the declaration of "a state of emergency of the whole state" on 27 June 1998, ostensibly to allow the sultan to make special financial provisions to redress the impact on the budget of a fall in world oil prices. The saving grace for the monarchical system is its perceived ability to provide jobs and welfare.

Economy

In per-capita terms Brunei is one of the richest states in Asia, with an estimated \$17,400 per-capita in-

come. Citizens are undoubtedly well provided for in terms of welfare, but poverty is not unknown among certain communities, such as the Iban.

Originally a Shell monopoly, the petroleum industry in Brunei today is dominated by a number of companies belonging to Brunei Shell, a company owned by the royal family, and Shell International. Brunei Shell is responsible for exploration and production of oil and natural gas as well as oil refining. Brunei Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) works with Mitsubishi Corporation of Japan in liquefying gas, while another company is concerned with supplying the liquified gas to major clients in Japan, including Tokyo Electric Power Company, the Tokyo Gas Company, and the Osaka Gas Company. In recent years, South Korea has also emerged as a customer for Brunei's natural gas. Also, in recent years a number of new players have entered the oil industry, most notably Elf Aquitaine in a tie-up with royal family interests. Little downstream economic activity is generated by the enclave economy based on hydrocarbon exploitation, nor has Brunei Darussalam been particularly successful in attracting foreign investment along the lines of other growth economies of Southeast Asia. Networks of *bumiputra*, or local businessmen active in such activities as construction, survive on government favors and licenses, but they are highly vulnerable to economic cycles.

Discussions of Brunei's "national" wealth would not be complete without reference to the finances of the royal family, almost a special sector of the economy. The ruling family is arguably the richest family in the world, and there is no distinguishing its fortunes from those of the state. As supreme executive and sovereign, the sultan has the power to dispose of all state assets as he sees fit. The sultan is simply above the law. Even the Brunei government is immune from the process of law, and businessmen in conflict with the government have no recourse to the courts. The net worth of the sultan is the subject of much speculation; he may at one time have been worth between US\$40 and US\$80 billion, a figure equal to Brunei's reserves. The sultan's international assets include luxury hotels, cattle stations in Australia, and jewelry and art collections. At home the Bolkiah family wealth and presence loom in the shape of sprawling palaces and domains expanding in tandem with the family itself. Family assets include Prince Mohamed's controlling interest in Singapore-registered QAF Holdings and the enormous financial interests of Prince Jefri, including the Sultanate's largest conglomerate, Amedeo Company. It is notable that royal family's economic activity is not reflected in national accounts and falls outside surveys conducted by the government Economic Planning Unit.



The Southeast Asian Games flag is raised to open the 20th Games, held in Brunei in August 1999. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

One must also consider the link between the Brunei Investment Agency (BIA) and the state, the business elite, and international capital. In theory, it is the BIA, established in 1983 within the Finance Ministry, that is vested with managing the Sultanate's reserves. The directorship of the BIA also passed to Prince Jefri as finance minister. The modus operandi of the BIA has seldom entered public discourse, though its former managing director once revealed that the agency only handled 40 percent of the Sultanate's foreign reserves, with the balance divided among eight foreign banking and investment institutions, or in stocks and shares. But, as exposed in 1998, the BIA's assets, said to be worth US\$60 billion before depletion, were depleted of US\$16 billion, the amount lost by Prince Jefri in the wake of the collapse of Amedeo Company. Sensationally served a civil suit in the Brunei courts by the sultan, Prince Jefri agreed to an out-of-court settlement as testimony began to cast aspersions upon the wider circles of the royal economy and its close beneficiaries. Only the rebound in oil prices from historic

lows beginning in the latter half of 1999 brought a financial reprieve to Brunei in the wake of the damaging Amedeo scandal.

Major Issues Facing the Nation

In a land without politics the question must eventually be asked, Can the system of dynastic rule be perpetuated forever? The answer from the Middle East is not comforting, as we see in the rise of radical military-led secularist regimes from Libya to Yemen. Examples from the Persian Gulf point up the vulnerability of dynastic monarchies to internal conflict, while the case of Kuwait famously reveals the fragility of resource-rich states in internationally fragile arenas. Political Islam reinvents itself constantly in neighboring Malaysia and Indonesia, and Brunei is not immune to regional currents. Such challenges are real, as even suggested by the environmental crisis visited upon Brunei in the late 1990s by the great Borneo forest fires. The Brunei economy is by definition extroverted and vulnerable because of the way it collects and recycles external rents; it would benefit tremendously from diversification. Modulating the Islamic challenge and meeting the rising economic aspirations of a better-educated population will require skillful and wise leadership, especially on the part of a dynastic successor.

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BRUNEI-POLITICAL SYSTEM Negara Brunei Darussalam—the name Brunei assumed on full independence from Great Britain on 1 January 1984—retains many features of a Middle Eastern dynastic system despite its Southeast Asian location on the northwest coast of the tropical island of Borneo. One of the few absolute monarchies in the world, Brunei Darussalam projects itself to the world as a peerless Islamic state, albeit imbued with the characteristic features of Malay world kingship and civilization.

Reigning Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah (b. 1946), who came to the throne in 1968, is twenty-ninth in a line that stretches back to a fourteenth-century Malay Muslim ancestor; he holds supreme political power as prime minister, minister of defense, and, since purging his younger brother Jefri in 1999, minister of finance. The sultan's younger brother Mohamed holds the position of minister of foreign affairs. Highly trusted nonroyals also have been permitted to hold office within a limited cabinet system. Power is centered on the prime minister's office, and the sultan is advised by certain key councils.

Brunei was a British protectorate from 1888 and, with the exception of the period of Japanese occupation (1941–1945), was guided by a British Resident installed in 1906. Great Britain retained responsibility for defense and foreign affairs until independence. Although a written constitution and constitutional form of government were forced on the present sultan's father, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III, by the British in 1959, a rebellion staged in 1962 by Sheik Azahari, the republican-leaning and Indonesian-backed leader of the popular Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB), was crushed by the British. This led to the suspension of important sections of the constitution and the implementation of state-of-emergency legislation, which was still technically in force in 2001. As a result, parliament has not been convened since 1962; important liberties remain circumscribed; and political parties—two of which exist in principle—are largely inoperative, supported by minuscule membership.

Ideological Basis

With independence and the growth of modern media, along with developments in higher education, the state in Brunei has sought to reinforce Malayness, Islam, and Sultanism around the concept "Malay, Islam, Beraja" (Kingship), or MIB. More than a slogan, however, MIB is actively proselytized in the officially con-

trolled media and education system and is taken as an article of faith in official pronouncements.

Brunei supports a heterogeneous population of indigenous peoples such as the Iban, who are also found in the neighboring Malaysian state of Sarawak, along with a significant immigrant Chinese population. It is Brunei-Malay-speaking "Malays," however, who are politically privileged in Brunei. Citizenship remains a restricted category from which most Chinese are excluded. Special privileges are offered to distinguish Brunei-Malay speakers from members of other ethnic groups, such as the Kedayan, Bisayah, Murut, and Belait.

Harking back to a Brunei golden age when the kingdom held sway over large parts of coastal Brunei and traded with the Philippines, the Indonesian archipelago, and even China, modern Brunei exults in its Islamic history, even though archaeological evidence of a Hindu-Buddhistic *negara* (a Malay term for "state") supports the thesis of a flourishing pre-Islamic kingdom astride the Brunei River. Crucial to received models of kingship in Brunei, however, is the historical legacy of borrowing certain key royal insignia, emblems, and symbols, as well as an elaborate code of ranked titles, from the Malacca sultanate. More feudal than Islamic in this Malay setting, the sultan's own title, Yang Di Pertuan ("he who is supreme"), is emblematic of absolutist temporal and religious authority at the apex of a social hierarchy buttressed by a strict code of stratified social relations, in a status-obsessed social-political system.

While MIB is represented as reaching back to a hoary past, the question arises as to just how traditional the current political system actually is. The sultan, a Sandhurst-trained officer, is no stranger to Western ways and, via the British connection, is seen to be a loyal pro-Western ally and client for defense and other contracts. British-derived law, a British-Indian-Malaysian civil-service ethos, and a professional military, along with other imported forms bequeathed to independent Brunei, supply a complete armature of postcolonial controls and censorship necessary to stifle dissent, cripple initiative, and stave off political challenge. Even so, cooptation rather than oppression has been the general modus operandi, with the notable exception of imprisonment of surviving members of the PRB.

Contradictions nevertheless abound. While the trend to Islamicization and even Arabization in religious affairs is increasingly apparent, such as in the increased frequency of the hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) and the officialized use of Jawi, or Arabic script, in writing Malay, a palpable Westernization is also evi-



The Sultan of Brunei Hassanal Bolkiah inspects the guard of honor during the celebration of his 53rd birthday. (AFP/CORBIS)

dent, not only by way of an expatriate presence but also as a product of economic globalization. To the disdain of many traditionalists, Brunei is increasingly a materialistic society. While Bruneians, the sultan included, revel in the liberalism afforded by overseas study or visits abroad, no such liberalism is tolerated at home. But even where the royal family has been known to indulge in pleasures at home, such extravagances are translated in the language of the *rakyat*, or subjects, as the natural rights of a benign Malay Islamic monarch.

Challenges

Sharing many features with Middle Eastern ruling dynasties, including vulnerability to challenges from would-be reformists and conservatives, it is not surprising that Negara Brunei Darussalam is nonetheless prepared. There is no legal political challenge, as legitimate parties exist only as memorials, and parliament does not convene. Potential military challenge to the person of the sultan is checked by a praetorian guard in the form of a battalion of Gurhka soldiers, while potential disaffection in the armed forces has in part been offset by a move to split it into three distinct services. A potential Islamic challenge to Sunni orthodoxy has in effect been neutralized by the sultan's adroit brokering between modernists and conservatives, with the sultan and his two wives increasingly adopting a more pious public demeanor. Family challenge, doubtless anticipated by the August 1998 nomination of the sultan's eldest son, Al-Muhtadee Billah, as Crown Prince, is always a wild card in dynastic monarchies. Foreign subversion, including a challenge to offshore oil fields or spillover of any war over the Spratly Islands dispute in the South China

Sea, cannot be ruled out. Possible spread of the post-Suharto violence raging in neighboring Indonesia is also a threat. Economic collapse in Brunei Darussalam is unlikely; however, withdrawal of economic legitimacy, such as that triggered by major financial losses, would imperil the closed political system, just as major international exposure of family scandals would damage legitimacy at home.

Geoffrey C. Gunn

See also: **Borneo; Islam-Brunei**

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BUDDHA. See **Siddhartha Gautama.**

BUDDADASA BHIKKU (1906–1993), Thai Buddhist intellectual and priest. Buddhadasa Bhikku ("servant of the Buddha"; also known as Phra Thep-wisutthimethi or Ngu'am) established Suan Mokka-balarama (now known simply as Wat Suanmokkh, "Garden of the Power of Liberation") as a forest monastery in southern Thailand in 1932. Reflecting Buddhadasa's goal to promote a pure form of Buddhism, Wat Suanmokkh differs dramatically from the vast majority of Buddhist temples in mainland Southeast Asia. There are no gilded Buddhas or the opulent decorative art associated with temples in the region. Monks' *kuti* (small living quarters) are scattered through the forest, and there is a spiritual theater that contains artworks reflecting Buddhist concepts from diverse traditions such as Zen and Tibetan Buddhism.

Buddhadasa was a prolific scholar who wrote hundreds of books and articles about Buddhism. An entire room in the National Library of Thailand is dedicated to his collected works. He emphasized *vipassana*, a deep understanding of the basic principles of the Buddha's teaching, which have practical relevance to everyday life. His work has inspired many Thai intellectuals and activists such as Sulak Sivaraksa, who criticized the growing materialism in modern Thai

society and who practiced socially engaged Buddhism. Buddhadasa welcomed dialogue with other religious traditions such as Islam, Christianity, and Hinduism and looked for common bonds among such religions. One of his last acts was to create at Wat Suanmokkh an International Dhamma (doctrine) Heritage to welcome individuals from around the world interested in learning about the core principles of Buddhism.

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BUDDHISM—CENTRAL ASIA Buddhism reached Central Asia before it reached its second home, China, some time between the third century BCE and the first century CE. The travels of the Buddhists who brought it to Central Asia from India were modeled on the career of Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha (c. 566–486 BCE). He had spent his career, after his enlightenment, traveling to the courts of various rulers in search of support for his growing community of adherents (the *sangha*), and generations of later Buddhists did the same thing throughout Central Asia. The earliest Indian Buddhist ruler who sent Buddhist missionaries into Central Asia was Asoka (d. 238 BCE).

Central Asia can be defined in various ways; one definition includes most or all of modern Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Mongolia, Tibet, southern Siberia, and northwest China. Buddhism spread throughout nearly this entire area from the third century BCE on, and still exists in several areas. During this long period, Buddhism encountered many religions, among them Christianity, Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, Islam, and Taoism, and there were numerous reactions back and forth between these. Several may have influenced important developments in Buddhism.

The peoples of Central Asia who supported Buddhism were diverse; they included dwellers in the city-states that flourished along the trade routes and water sites, residents of small villages, and pastoral nomads. Some were traders who made their living leading car-

avans from one city-state to another, plying the trade routes which connected Europe with South and East Asia and distributed silk, spices, and other goods westward. Central Asia thus presented Buddhism with a variety of natural, social, and religious environments.

Because of all the above factors and others, it would be better to speak of "Buddhisms" in Central Asia, and describe separately each culture's special forms of Buddhism. However, this essay will limit itself to developments common to all or most cultures, because these had the greatest impact not only throughout Central Asia, but also in, for example, China, which obtained its Buddhist teachings largely from Central Asia.

The Historical Record

Knowledge about Buddhism in Central Asia comes from three main sources: texts and inscriptions, archaeological remains, and anecdotal mentions of Buddhism in historical, geographical, and other writings. In general, it may be said that texts tell a lot about what particular Buddhist groups believed (their doctrines), what sacred texts were popular in which areas, what rules were observed in their monastic communities, and something about what rituals were performed. Inscriptions often tell us about how rulers believed in, or used, Buddhism. Archaeological sites show us what monasteries looked like and how temples were arranged. Remains of stupas, which may be either memorials to the Buddha or funerary structures, also tell us about Buddhist worship. Anecdotal literature, which often comes from non-Buddhists, gives us another view of their religious life. In it we can sometimes see the relationship, and conflict, between Buddhism and other religions; we also find details about the spread of Buddhism and the relationship between Buddhism and local societies that Buddhist materials themselves don't mention, and that we sometimes cannot determine from archaeological findings. All these sources must be used to get the fullest picture of what local variations of Buddhism were like in Central Asia.

The Importance of Central Asian Buddhism for China

Of these sources, Buddhist texts in the languages of the area have been the most studied. From these sources it is clear that Hinayana ("Lesser Vehicle") Buddhism was popular for a very long time, especially in western Central Asia. Mahayana ("Great Vehicle") Buddhism was limited, from the period of the second century BCE to perhaps the sixth century CE, mostly to the area around Khotan, in modern Xinjiang, China. This explains why Hinayana Buddhist litera-

ture and monastic culture were so important in later forms of Buddhism in Tibet, China, and elsewhere, even though those areas were Mahayana. These texts also help scholars understand better how Hinayana and Mahayana Buddhism developed in general; thus they complement data on Buddhism in India and the many questions that have arisen about its history in India. This appreciation of Buddhism in Central Asia represents a departure from earlier scholarship, which held that Central Asia had no impact on Buddhism as it traveled from India to China. Now we know that the first translators of Buddhist materials into Chinese were Central Asians, and most of the important early translations were made from texts in Central Asian languages, not directly from Sanskrit.

Interaction of Buddhism with Other Religions

Archaeological data reveals instances in which Buddhism interacted with other religions. One drawing, with inscription, seems to suggest the Buddha was equated with Ahura Mazda, the chief Zoroastrian deity, in part of the Iranian world where Zoroastrianism was established. The study of ruins of monasteries may help understand how Buddhist monasticism influenced the development of Christian monasticism. (Texts in Chinese and Sogdian Iranian are also good sources for studying mutual influences between Buddhism and Nestorian Christianity and Buddhism and Manichaeism.)

Perhaps the most overlooked data is the anecdotal. To give just one example, al-Biruni (973–1048), an Arab scholar, stated in about the year 1000 that, prior to the coming of Islam, Buddhism had been established as far as Mosul, present-day southern Iraq. Other Chinese, Persian, and Arabic writings contain much data that should be studied to help us develop a clearer picture of the rich cultures of Buddhism in that vast area.

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BUDDHISM, CHAN Chan (Japanese: Zen) Buddhism is one of the Mahayana Buddhist schools that developed in China. The Chinese term *chan*-(*na*) is a transliteration of the Sanskrit word *dhyana*, which means meditation. In origin, Chan refers to a Buddhist form of meditation, a religious discipline aimed at mental absorption or trance. Although meditation has always been an essential part of Indian Buddhism, as a Buddhist school Chan is distinctively Chinese. During the course of its development, Chan was closely associated with Chinese literati culture and thought. In addition, Chan also incorporated such indigenous Taoist philosophy into its teachings as non-dualism, spontaneity, naturalism, and skepticism toward written and spoken language.

History

Toward the end of the seventh century, certain monks were particularly famous for their engagement in meditation. One monastic community devoted to meditation was the East Mountain School (*Dongshan famen*) on Mount Shuangfeng (Twin Peaks Mountain) in Huangmei (present-day Hubei province) led by Hongren (601–674 CE), who was later known as the Fifth Patriarch of the Chan School in China.

In the eighth century, as Chan came to establish itself as an independent Buddhist school, legends and histories arose that formed a legitimate link between Chinese Chan and the Indian patriarchs. According to classical accounts of the early Chan lineage, Chan was a teaching that descended directly from the Buddha Sakyamuni, who in a sermon made a wordless mind-to-mind transmission (*ixin chuansxin*) to his disciple Mahakasyapa by simply holding a flower while smiling. The line of transmission was carried on through twenty-eight Indian patriarchs and eventually to Bodhidharma (d. 532 CE), an Indian monk who traveled to China and became the First Patriarch of the Chinese Chan School.

From Bodhidharma, the Chan patriarchal lineage allegedly continued through Huike (c. 485–574), Sengzan (d. 606), Daoxin (580–651), and Hongren. At

Hongren, however, the Chan lineage was said to have been split into two main branches: the Northern School led by Shenxiu (605?–706) associated with the teaching of gradual enlightenment (*jianwu*) and the Southern School led by Huineng (638–713) associated with the teaching of sudden enlightenment (*dunwu*). Huineng was later recognized as the legitimate Sixth Patriarch of the Chinese Chan School, and his school continued to flourish after the decline of Shenxiu's school. The *Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch (Lizuzi Tanjing)* written around 780 is an important text that purports to record Huineng's autobiography, sermons, and dialogues with his disciples.

Following Huineng, the Chan lineage was further divided into the so-called Five Houses (*wujia*). Of these Chan branches, the School of Linji (Japanese: Rinzai) founded by Liji Ixuan (d. 866) and the School of Caodong (Japanese: Soto) founded by Caoshan Benji (840–901) and Dongshan Liangjia (807–869) gained prominence in the Song dynasty (960–1267). Both schools have flourished in Korea and Japan. Although Chan as a Buddhist school declined in China after the Song, Chan meditation was a common form of Buddhist practice; the joint practice of Chan meditation and the Pure Land *nianfo* (Japanese: *nembutsu*), reciting the Buddha's name, became very popular in late imperial China.

Doctrine and Practice

The vision of Chan as a unique form of Buddhism is epitomized in the following four-part slogan:

A separate transmission apart from the scriptural teachings (*jiaowai biechuan*);

Not setting up words and letters (*buli wenzi*);

A direct pointing to the human mind (*zhibzhi renxin*);

Seeing one's self-nature and realizing Buddhahood (*jianxing chengfo*).

Although individual phrases appeared in the Tang period (618–907 CE), this conception of Chan's identity was formulated during the Song dynasty and attributed retrospectively to Bodhidharma.

Chan's assertion of the universal accessibility of Buddhahood is derived from the ideal of the *tathagatagarbha* (Chinese: *rulai zang*). Meaning literally the embryo of the Tathagata, this doctrine asserts that the Buddha-nature, the absolute reality that is both immanent and empty (Chinese: *kong*; Sanskrit: *sunyata*), is the basis of human existence and perfectibility. Accordingly, every sentient being is endowed with the

Buddha-nature and is inherently enlightened. Enlightenment does not involve a radical transformation of the mind that would entail a long process of cultivation; it is simply the realization of one's innate Buddhahood through one's own effort. Chan rhetorically claims that enlightenment can be attained by anyone regardless of age, gender, and social class.

Many Chan masters of the Tang period were famous for their use of intuitive, iconoclastic devices (shouting, beating, illogical responses, and enigmatic gestures) to enlighten their students. Later in the Song these encounter dialogues (*jiyuan wenda*) between Chan masters and disciples were recorded and became "public cases" (Chinese: *gong'an*; familiar to Westerners by the name "koan," the Japanese for *gong'an*) used in Chan teaching and training. While the Linji school was particularly associated with *gong'an* meditation, the Caodong school focused on sitting in meditation (Chinese: *zuochan*; Japanese: *zazen*), also known as silent-illumination Chan (*mozhao chan*). Members of Chan monasteries, however, have often practiced both forms of meditation nonexclusively.

Chan and Chinese Literati Culture

The sudden/gradual polarity that characterized the development of Chan became a dominant theme in Chinese poetic criticism, painting theories, and intellectual discourse. Critics and poets frequently discussed poetry in terms of Chan's notion of the relationship between practice and enlightenment. Theorists of painting analyzed artistic expression by analogy to the Northern and Southern Schools. In the realm of Neo-Confucianism, the Chan concept of lineage transmission had significant influence on Zhu Xi's (1130–1200) theory of the orthodox succession of the Dao (*daotong*). During the Song and Ming (1368–1644) dynasties, Chan's assertion of the inherently enlightened mind also played a crucial role in the Neo-Confucian advocacy of Learning of the Mind (*xinxue*).

Chan in the Twenty-First Century

While Chan Buddhism as a school declined in China after the thirteenth century, it continues as an important form of Buddhism in present-day Korea and Japan. In addition, Chan doctrine and practice have also attracted a large number of people in the West since the 1960s. There are many Chan meditation centers in America and Europe, and Chan literature is widely translated and read. Known commonly in the West as Zen, Chan has become a popular form of meditation and an intriguing philosophical teaching in the world.

Ding-bwa Hsieh

See also: **Buddhism-China**; **Buddhism-Japan**; **Buddhism-Korea**

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BUDDHISM-CHINA Buddhism in China underwent a long process of sinicization in which the imported Indian religion was adapted to the indigenous cultural milieu and became an integral part of Chinese life. In the process, Buddhism gained patronage from the ruling elite and support from the common people. It also contributed significantly to the Chinese culture and thought. At the same time, Buddhism was profoundly transformed by Chinese culture, as can be seen in the development of the distinctively Chinese Buddhist schools and the subordination of the Buddhist *sangha* (monastic community) to state control and regulation. Buddhism in China, in short, represents one of the most fascinating cases of acculturation in world history.

Buddhism's Arrival in China

Buddhism arrived in China around the first century CE during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). The

Silk Road between China and Central Asia was an important route for transmitting this religion. Dunhuang, the frontier town on Han China's northwestern border, became a great Buddhist center; a great number of Buddhist scriptures, sculptures, and wall paintings from that period are preserved. Buddhism also reached central China via Nepal and Tibet, southwest China via Burma, and south China by sea from India.

At the time of Buddhism's arrival, China had already developed a highly advanced culture with sophisticated religious traditions and philosophical systems. Its two main indigenous religious traditions were Confucianism, the teaching of Confucius (551–479 BCE), and Taoism, the teachings of the legendary Yellow Emperor (mid-third millennium BCE) and Laozi (sixth century BCE).

The Han imperial state sponsored Confucianism, which emphasized family values, social responsibility, and the virtues of filial piety and loyalty. Buddhism, with its emphasis on monasticism, celibacy, and withdrawal from society, ran counter to Confucian ethics, and therefore met resistance among the Confucian ruling elite, who saw it as subversive to the Han imperial order.

Although Taoism was not yet constituted as a formal religion, its ideals of longevity and immortality were very popular among the Chinese people. In religious Taoism there were many meditative techniques to help practitioners maintain health, achieve a long life, and even become immortal. It was through its alliance with Taoism that Buddhism was able to take root in China. Many of the Buddhist texts that were translated during this early stage were on the subjects of meditation, and Taoist practitioners helped the foreign monks translate Buddhist scriptures.

The Chinese who converted to Buddhism helped to spread the faith. Some wrote treatises to defend Buddhist teachings against Confucian accusations; others composed apocryphal texts (*weijing* or *yijing*) in an attempt to increase the acceptance of Buddhism. Indian or Central Asian origins were claimed for these apocryphal texts, but in fact they were produced by native Chinese.

Growth and Expansion

Buddhism offered the people solace during the period of disunity that followed the fall of the Han dynasty. In the north, the non-Chinese rulers were impressed by Buddhist culture and gave Buddhism their full support. In the south, elite members found consolation in Buddhist religious messages, and many of them became interested in Buddhist metaphysics. The "Learning of Mystics" (*xuanxue*) emerged during



TIMELINE—BUDDHISM IN CHINA

- 1st century CE** Buddhism arrives in China during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), from Central Asia.
- 3rd–5th centuries** Buddhism offers people solace during the period of disunity that followed the fall of the Han dynasty and is supported by the non-Chinese rulers in the north. The "Learning of Mystics" (*xuanxue*) emerges as a result of the mixture of philosophical Taoism and the Mahayana Buddhist doctrine of emptiness and important religious documents are written.
- 589** China is unified under the Sui dynasty (581–618). By this time Buddhism has spread across all of China.
- 618–907** During the Sui and Tang dynasties Buddhism in China enjoys its golden age. Buddhist texts are brought from India and translated into Chinese, new schools of Chinese Buddhism emerge, including Chan and Pure Land, and Buddhism comes under state control.
- 842–845** The Huichang Suppression takes place during the reign of Emperor Wuzong with empire-wide destruction of temples and shrines, confiscation of temple lands, and laicization of Buddhist clergy.
- 960–975** Buddhism is revived when Song dynasty Emperor Taizu issues an imperial decree integrating Buddhism into the state's civil order.
- 972–983** The first Chinese edition of the Tripitaka (the Buddhist canon) is printed in Sichuan. Four other editions are published during the Song.
- 1280–1368** Tantric Buddhism (a form of Tibetan Buddhism) flourishes under the Mongol Yuan dynasty and later under the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644–1912), but is not adopted by the general Han population.
- 1535–1615** Ming monk Zhuhong promotes Lay Buddhism, which continues to be popular through the end of the nineteenth century.
- 1920s** A number of Buddhist institutes are established.
- 1929** The Chinese Buddhist Society is founded.
- 1953** The Chinese Buddhist Association is founded in Beijing and becomes the national leader of Buddhism after the Cultural Revolution ends.
- 1966** The Ciji Foundation is founded in Taiwan by the venerable nun master Zhengyan and by the 1990s becomes the largest civic organization in Taiwan.
- 1966–1969** During the Cultural Revolution Buddhism is repressed with temples closed and monks and nuns sent to work in fields and factories. After the Cultural Revolution, with the aid of government grants, Buddhist monasteries and nunneries are restored, and the damaged Buddhist statues, images, and temples are repaired.
- 1980s** In Taiwan, as authoritarian rule weakens, civic organizations gain more autonomy and many Buddhist communities and organizations become prominent.

this period as a result of the mixture of philosophical Taoism and the Mahayana Buddhist doctrine of emptiness. Important Mahayana scriptures like the Vimalakirti Sutra (Scripture of the Layman Vimalakirti), the Prajna Sutras (Scriptures of the Perfection of Wisdom), and the Saddharmapundarika Sutra (Lotus Sutra) were translated and widely circulated among Chinese intellectuals. Kumarajiva (344–413?), a native

of Kucha in Central Asia, was the most important translator of his day.

On the popular level, the Buddhist theory of karma and doctrine of impermanence gained acceptance among the common people. Many Chinese men and women joined Buddhist monastic orders, which offered a welcome haven to those who wanted to escape wars, conscription, and corvée labor. By the time

China was unified in 589 under the Sui dynasty (581–618), Buddhism had pervaded the realm.

The Period of Maturity

The period of the Sui and Tang (618–907) dynasties is often viewed as the golden age of Chinese Buddhism, characterized by intellectual vitality and creativity. The most famous translator was Xuanzang (d. 664), who made a pilgrimage to India and brought back to China hundreds of Buddhist scriptures. He later founded the Faxiang (Mind-Only) School, corresponding to Indian Yogacara Buddhism. The esoteric (Tantric) forms of Buddhism were also introduced to China and flourished briefly. However, the most significant development during this period was the formation of distinctively "sinicized" Buddhist schools: Tiantai, Huayan, Chan, and Pure Land all emerged with great creativity and prominence.

During this period, the state also assumed control over the Buddhist *sangha*. The government took charge of almost all Buddhist activities; it sponsored translation projects, regulated ordination procedures, and controlled the size of the clergy through clerical examinations. Meanwhile, the monasteries were also deeply involved in local community projects, commercial activities, and charitable programs. The "transformation texts" (*bianwen*; marvelous stories drawn from the Buddhist scriptures) and "transformation illustrations" (*bianxiang*) discovered in the Dunhuang area are surviving examples of contemporary efforts to reach the Chinese people on a grassroots level.

In the late Tang, however, the expansion of the Buddhist monasteries, the growth of the clerical population, and the increasing accumulation of tax-free temple lands and wealth eventually prompted the court to suppress Buddhism. The Huichang Suppression (842–845), which occurred during the reign of Emperor Wuzong (reigned 841–846), brought empire-wide destruction of temples and shrines, confiscation of temple lands, and laicization of Buddhist clergy. Although the Huichang Suppression was not the first such incident in Chinese Buddhist history (two earlier incidents occurred in 446 and 574–577), it was the most severe, marking a turning point in the history of Chinese Buddhism. Some argue that Chinese Buddhism entered into an age of decline at this point, while others say that in the following centuries Chinese Buddhism took a new direction to retain its vitality and popularity.

Syncretism

After bringing an end to a century of domination by military warlords, the Song dynasty (960–1267) es-

tablished a new civil order under a centralized government. Emperor Taizu (reigned 960–975) issued an imperial decree integrating Buddhism into the state's civil order, and the first Chinese edition of the Tripiṭaka (the Buddhist canon) was printed in Sichuan in 972–983. Four other editions were also published during the Song.

Although the Song did not witness the emergence of new Buddhist schools, it was a period marked by doctrinal developments, institutional growth, and a tendency toward syncretism. After a period of decline, Tiantai was revived through the editing of old texts and the composing of new ones. Tiantai also consolidated its institutional foundation by gaining imperial recognition and local support. Huayan, though it ceased to be an independent school, influenced Tiantai and Chan teachings. Pure Land Buddhism was popular among people of all social classes. Chan developed its unique identity and became the dominant form of institutional Buddhism, enjoying prominence both within clerical circles and among the secular elite.

A strong tendency toward syncretism was evident in Chinese religions from Song times onward. It was reflected in the advocacy of harmony among the various Buddhist schools and also in the promotion of "the Unity of the Three Teachings" (in other words, Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism). Tantric Buddhism, whose Tibetan form flourished under the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1280–1368) and the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644–1912), held little appeal for the Chinese common people in general. Lay Buddhism, a Buddhist movement that became popular in the Song, rose to prominence under the leadership of the Ming monk Zhuhong (1535–1615) and continued to be active through the end of the nineteenth century.

Chinese Buddhist Schools

Huayan, Tiantai, Pure Land, and Chan were the most significant Buddhist schools in China. While both Chan and Pure Land focused on practice, Huayan and Tiantai were doctrinal schools. Both Tiantai and Huayan built their theories of universal salvation on the doctrine of *tathagatagarbha* (Chinese: *rulai zang*; "embryo of the Tathagata [Buddha]"), or the doctrine of the Buddha-nature. The Tiantai School was named after Mount Tiantai in Zhejiang, southeast China, where its founder Zhiyi (or Zhikai; 538–597) resided. The basic text of the Tiantai School was the Lotus Sutra. Zhiyi's most significant contribution to Chinese Buddhism was his theory of "doctrinal classification" (*panjiao*). He divided the Buddha's divergent and often contradictory teachings into



People lighting prayer candles at Chong Qing, Sichuan, in 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

chronological periods based on the Buddha's life in an attempt to integrate them into a complex and coherent scheme. In this way, Zhiyi established an eclectic school that recognized all forms of Buddhist teachings and ranked them in a hierarchical order.

Tiantai emphasizes mutual identification between all things and the absolute on the basis of the Mahayana doctrine of emptiness. The whole universe is present in a grain of sand or a drop of dew, and the wisdom of the Buddha is present in every individual's mind.

The Huayan (garland) School is named after its scripture, the Avatamsaka Sutra (Huayan jing in Chinese). Like Tiantai, Huayan was a purely Chinese product, with no Indian counterpart. Huayan's Third Patriarch, Fazang (643–712), and the Fifth Patriarch, Zongmi (780–841), were the most significant masters. Fazang, who was often considered to be the real founder of the Huayan School, systematized Huayan teachings into a well-coordinated system. Zongmi synthesized Chan and Huayan teachings, and his theory of sudden enlightenment versus gradual enlightenment had significant impact on the development of Chan.

Like Tiantai, Huayan is concerned with the relationship between absolute reality and things in the phenomenal world. The entire universe is seen as a single nexus of conditions in which everything simultaneously depends on and is depended on by everything else.

Buddhism and Chinese Culture

Buddhism introduced many new terms into the Chinese vocabulary and led the Chinese to invent new devices of phonological and grammatical analysis to deal with foreign languages. Buddhism as an organized system of religion stimulated the organization of religious Taoism into an institutional entity with its own canons, doctrinal system, and priesthood. In addition, Buddhism exerted a great impact on Neo-Confucian theories of lineage transmission, mind cultivation and concentration, and attainment of Sagehood. The Buddhist concept of karma and retribution became a dominant theme in Chinese vernacular literature, and images of Buddhist deities and figures such as the bodhisattva Avalokitesvara (Guanyin) and arhats (*lohan*) were common subjects of artistic expression.

Nonetheless, to assume that Buddhism developed in China as an independent entity is to ignore the long, complex process of acculturation between Buddhism and indigenous elements. The feminization of the bodhisattva Avalokitesvara and the transformation of Maitreya (*milo fo*), the Future Buddha, into a fat, laughing monk show how Indian deities evolved in the context of Chinese popular religious beliefs and practices.

Buddhism in Contemporary China

In the early twentieth century, the monk Taixu (1889–1947) led a reform movement to organize the Buddhist clergy, promote social engagement and pop-

ular education, and propagate Buddhist studies among intellectuals. Under the leadership of Taixu, a number of Buddhist institutes were established in the early 1920s, and the Chinese Buddhist Society was founded in 1929. The movement, however, was hindered by the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and the Civil War between the Communists and Nationalists (1946–1949).

After the Communist victory in 1949, Buddhism suffered from official denunciation and periodic suppression. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1969), Buddhist temples were closed and monks and nuns were sent to work in fields and factories. After the Cultural Revolution, however, with the aid of government grants, Buddhist monasteries and nunneries have been restored, and the damaged Buddhist statues, images, and temples are being repaired. The government has also helped organize provincial and regional Buddhist associations. The Chinese Buddhist Association in Beijing, which was founded in 1953, has now resumed its national leadership. It sponsors the publication of Buddhist journals, establishes training centers for monks and nuns, and promotes Buddhist studies. The association is eager to extend its network to an international level, and it sends delegates to Buddhist conferences in South Asian countries, the United States, and Europe.

While Buddhism suffered a serious blow under the Communists, it flourished in Taiwan, where the Nationalist government moved after their defeat in 1949. Since the end of martial law in the late 1980s, the government has increasingly granted autonomy to civic organizations, and, as a result, many Buddhist communities and organizations have risen to prominence. Moreover, the lineage of *bbiksuni* (fully ordained nuns) in Taiwan has become the main source of legitimacy for Buddhist women in the world who aspire to receive full ordination. The Ciji Foundation, founded in 1966 by the venerable nun master Zhengyan (b. 1937), is the largest civic organization in Taiwan, claiming 4 million members worldwide in 1994. It has its own medical hospitals, college, and research center. Each year it distributes \$20 million to people all over the world suffering from poverty and natural disasters. Under the inspiring influence of Zhengyan and many other Buddhist leaders, Buddhism in Taiwan has moved to a new stage of social engagement.

Ding-hwa Hsieh

See also: **Buddhism, Chan**

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BUDDHISM-JAPAN Although Buddhism is not the native faith of Japan, any attempt to understand the culture of the archipelago would be futile unless one considers the Buddhist dimension. One should also examine the development of Buddhism in

close association with the history of the land. The teachings of the Buddha came to Japanese shores after being filtered through the immense landmasses of Central Asia, China, and Korea, transmitting in the process not only new religious and philosophical ideas but various other aspects of arts, literature, and ethics. At the same time, the unique character of Japan put its imprint on the foreign faith, reaching, during certain historical periods, a harmonious fusion with the preexisting doctrine of Shinto. The best way, therefore, to approach Japanese Buddhism is to follow its trajectory through the evolution of the history of Japan.

Buddhist-Shinto Synthesis

It is noteworthy that the original faith, Shinto, acquired its particular name only after the introduction of Buddhism in Japan, around 538 CE. It was at that time that the Korean Paekche monarch sent to Japan a small statue of the Buddha and some Buddhist scriptures. This gesture divided the powerful Japanese clans of the times; some showed favor toward the new faith; others were hostile. Buddhism, however, succeeded in penetrating society, especially the aristocracy, mainly due to the support of Prince Shotoku (572–621). Combining administrative talent with scholarly dedication, in addition to having a vision of the importance of Tang China as a cultural model, Prince Shotoku was instrumental in the propagation of Buddhist ideas. The notion that religious and moral systems in Japan can be represented by a tree, where the roots reflect Shinto, the branches and the stem Confucianism, and the flowers Buddhism, is attributed to Prince Shotoku.

Basic Characteristics

In its earliest days in Japan, Buddhism was characterized by elements of both Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism (the two basic "vehicles" into which Buddhism is divided). Later on, Japanese Buddhism almost exclusively followed the Mahayana.

Initially, the movement was from the upper levels of society to the lower, as the aristocracy held most of the power. As power shifted to other classes, however, Buddhism began to expand and flourish among the common people. For a long time, Buddhism was closely associated with the state, as those in power tried both to support and to control it.

Buddhism was also closely associated with family rites, particularly with ceremonies surrounding death, which led to the axiom that while Shinto is connected with the happy moments of life, Buddhism is associated with death and funerals. In addition, Buddhism was associated with ideas and practices of magic.

Finally, Buddhism's ability to avoid falling into the categories that Joseph Kitagawa calls "semi-autonomous pigeonholes of human experience" (Kitagawa 1996: 13)—religion, ethics, and culture—is especially evident in its history in Japan.

Historical Development

In the Nara period (710–794 CE), six major Buddhist schools or sects were influential in religion and government. The words *sects* or *schools* should not be understood in terms of Western dialectics, that is, as mutually antagonistic and polemic. On the contrary, the term meant a kind of friendly and scholarly division among various Buddhist approaches to Truth. Movements of adepts from one school to another were neither uncommon nor blameworthy.

The Six Nara Schools The six schools of Nara Buddhism were Sanron, Hosso, Kegon, Jositsu, Kusha, and Ritsu, and their presence spans roughly the period from 625 to 753. Some scholars have tried to distinguish between those closer to the Theravada and those closer to the Mahayana, but distinctions are not so clear-cut, and a variety of cross-influences can be discerned. The only certainty is that the Ritsu School is the closest to the *vinaya* (moral regulations and monastic rules of discipline) of the original Theravada. It is perhaps the only sect in the Mahayana world that still observes the original rules, which were long forgotten or modified by other sects.

The main characteristic of all six Nara schools is a deep philosophic approach, dealing with the notion of time, matter, reality, suppression of polarity and pursuit of the middle path, and causation. The schools reflect the inclinations of the prevailing Nara aristocracy and seem rather far from the spiritual needs of the common people.

Tendai and Shingon The next phase of Buddhist evolution coincides with the Heian period (794–1185), known for its literary refinement and the cultural influence of Tang China (618–907). The two main Buddhist schools of this period were Tendai and Shingon, which had an enduring influence on Japanese Buddhism. Both Tendai and Shingon were considered esoteric, as the essence of their teachings was transmitted orally from masters to initiates. Their respective founders, Saicho (Dengyo Daishi, 767–822) and Kukai (Kobo Daishi, 774–835), both visited China in search of Buddhist learning and have always been revered in Japan. In fact, legend holds that Kukai did not really die but still sits in deep meditation within the grounds of his monastic center on Mount Koya.



Todai-ji Temple in Nara. (CORBIS)

Tendai's center was on Mount Hiei, at Enryakuji monastery. Saicho's teaching approaches Buddhism from the standpoint of the Five Periods (Time of Wreath, Inducement, Development, Wisdom, and Nirvana) and the Eight Doctrines (Abrupt, Gradual, Mystic, Indeterminate, Hinayana, Mahayana, Distinct, and Perfect). It is firmly based on the Lotus Sutra and in meditative practices. At a later time, around 1100, Tendai monks became militant and periodically descended on the capital to antagonize the government.

Shingon is considered a branch of Tantric Buddhism and is associated with spectacular rites and mystical practices in which mandalas play a powerful role. Apart from visual elements, sounds are also significant: the word *shingon* is a translation of the Sanskrit term *mantra*, the embodiment in sound of a divine power. Kukai himself was greatly influenced by Confucianism, Taoism, Sinhalese Buddhism, and some of the Nara sects. One of his major works, the *Sango-shiiki* (The Ultimate Truth of the Three Teachings) is the first text of comparative philosophy in Japan. It discusses Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism in depth.

At this point a parenthesis has to be opened regarding the interesting phenomenon of amalgamation between Buddhism and the native beliefs of Shinto.

This is known by the term Ryobu Shinto, based on the related concept of *bonji suijaku* (true-nature manifestation). In essence, the two streams converged harmoniously by an acceptance and adaptation of Shinto divinities into the Buddhist pantheon. This is why, even today, foreign pilgrims in Japan are often puzzled by Buddhist elements in Shinto shrines. This trend survived until the eighteenth century, when a revival of Shinto occurred, to be further substantiated in 1860 when Shinto was reestablished as the main doctrine and separate from Buddhism.

Pure Land Pure Land teachings coincide with the vigorous and militarist Kamakura period (1185–1333), when Buddhism was brought closer to the common people. These were times not only of continuous strife but also of a deeper consciousness of the impermanence of life and of constant fears about the end of the world, corresponding to the Buddhist notion of *mappo shiso* (degeneration of the dharma). Pure Land (Amidism) is centered on the concept of the benevolent Amitabha (Japanese, Amida), who offers hope of salvation in his Western Paradise. Salvation could be attained through faith alone, a doctrine quite at odds with earlier notions of spiritual cultivation on the road to enlightenment. The greatest advocates of this teaching, apart from some earlier precursors, were

Honen (1133–1212) and Shinran (1173–1262). Honen established the Jodo Sect of Pure Land; he stressed the paramount importance of calling the Buddha's name with a sincere and longing heart (*nembutsu*) as a way to guarantee entry into the Western Paradise.

Shinran established the True Pure Land Sect (Jodo Shin Shu) and concentrated veneration on Amida alone, to the exclusion of Sakyamuni (the historical Buddha). He abolished monasticism and accepted the idea of devout lay religious, thereby breaking down the division between clergy and laity that had been a hallmark of Theravada Buddhism.

Nichiren Nichiren is peculiar in the sense that it symbolizes an unusual tendency in Buddhist terms, that of fanaticism and polemics, along with determination and faith. The founder of the sect, Nichiren (1222–1282), based his teaching on the Lotus Sutra, but also created a sort of personal *nembutsu*, the mantra *namu myōō renga-kyō* (reverence to the wonderful Law of the Lotus), focused on the sutra itself rather than on a Buddha. Fearing the era of *mappō*, foreseeing the Mongol invasions, experiencing exile on the remote island of Sado, witnessing constant turbulence and warfare, and mingling with the lowest classes of people, Nichiren developed nationalistic religious ideas. Some Western scholars have called him "the Savonarola of the Orient" because he sought regeneration through adherence to "the true Buddhism." He was an intolerant man, but one with a sense of national mission.

Zen Zen (in Chinese, Chan) represents a specific phase of Buddhist evolution in Japan. Zen originated in India but was deeply marked by its passage through China. It defies any claims at complete analysis, as its very anchor is the axiom that "truth lies outside discussion" and can be grasped only by intuition and through strenuous meditative processes. (Whoever talks about Zen is exterior to Zen.) This discussion will leave aside the great founder, Bodhidharma, who transmitted Zen from India to China in the late fifth century CE, and the illustrious Chinese Patriarchs, and will focus on its adaptation in Japan.

There are three schools of Zen in Japan: Rinzai, represented by its leader Eisai (1141–1215); Soto, represented by Dogen (1200–1253); and Obaku, represented by Ingen (1592–1673). Rinzai and Soto are basic to the tradition; Obaku is a later and minor addition.

The central themes of Japanese Zen are the koan (Zen riddles), satori (instantaneous enlightenment), discipline, total obedience to the master, meditation, and work. Zen influences on Japanese culture are found in the Noh theater, haiku, calligraphy, flower

arrangement, painting, gardening, the tea ceremony, and a wide spectrum of Japanese aesthetics.

At its origin, Zen symbolizes the encounter of Chinese with Indian thought; its syncretism can be seen in the Tendai, Shingon, and Tantric ideas expressed in Dogen's *Shobogenzo* (Eye Storehouse of the True Law), a treatise on Zen practice and doctrines.

Tokugawa and Later Times

The Tokugawa period (1600/1603–1868) was marked by the policy of *sakoku* (seclusion), almost total exclusion from contact with the outside world. The separation of Buddhism from Shinto and the policy of *haibutsu kishaku* (exterminate the Buddhas and abandon the scriptures) of the years 1860 and 1871 was a heavy blow to Buddhism. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, there was a revival of Buddhism and new religions were born that were basically Buddhist. Tenrikyo emphasized faith healing. Rissho Kosei Kai (founded in 1938 by Niwano Nikkyo and Naganuma Myoko) and Soka Gakkai (founded in 1930 by Tsunesaburo Makiguchi and for many decades under the dynamic leadership of Ikeda Daisaku) constitute active lay Buddhist movements with numerous international activities in the interests of Buddhism and world peace. Both Rissho Kosei Kai and Soka Gakkai draw on the ideas in the Lotus Sutra.

Buddhism has greatly influenced and in turn been influenced by Japanese tradition and culture. Buddhism contributed to Japanese culture by exposing the archipelago to the intellectual and artistic treasures of China and continental Asia. A new faith, it elevated the spiritual life of a people preoccupied only by "this-worldly" concepts to new heights of "transcendental speculation" and "yearnings for a beyond," in the words of religious scholar Anesaki Masaharu (Anesaki 1995: 7).

Tolerant by definition, and having already peacefully absorbed many ideas and practices through its long route through Central Asia, China, and Korea, Buddhism reached a harmonious coexistence with Shinto. For their part, the Japanese, in adapting Buddhism, showed a unique capacity to selectively draw and transform without blind adherence, a quality they have exhibited in other cultural fields. This has resulted in enduring forms of Buddhist philosophy and practice that are distinctly Japanese.

George A. Sioris

See also: **Buddhism-China**; **Buddhism-Korea**

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BUDDHISM—KOREA Buddhism has a sixteen-hundred-year history in Korea. Contemporary Korean Buddhism is distinguished from Chinese Buddhism by the importance it assigns to meditation, and from Japanese Buddhism by its relative lack of strong sectarian divisions.

History


Buddhism first arrived on the peninsula three centuries before the peninsula was brought under the control of one Korean government in 668 CE. Buddhism reached Korea from China and Central Asia and, according to traditional histories, was adopted by the rulers of the northern kingdom of Koguryo in 372 CE, the southwestern kingdom of Paekche in 384 CE, and southeastern kingdom of Shilla in 527 CE.

In the beginning, Buddhism in Korea was a religion for the elite, accepted by government officials as a tool for centralizing authority and as a way to overcome the decentralizing influence of the folk religion of Korea, with its multitude of local deities. By the seventh century, however, various buddhas and bodhisattvas had joined the pantheon of spirits worshiped by peasants, and commoners added temples to the sacred sites they frequented to pray for supernatural intervention in their lives.

Despite the popular appropriation of Buddhist deities and rituals, institutional Buddhism continued to be utilized by governments on the peninsula to reinforce their authority over the general population. When the Shilla kingdom defeated Koguryo and Paekche near the end of the seventh century, it dispatched monks to temples in the countryside to serve as ecclesiastical reminders of Shilla hegemony. The Koryo dynasty, which replaced Shilla early in 936, further institutionalized the role of the Buddhist clergy as an extension of state power by instituting state

examinations for monks to parallel the civil service examinations for government officials. Even the Neo-Confucian Choson dynasty (1392–1910), which replaced the Koryo dynasty and demoted Buddhism from its privileged status as the official state religion, assigned warrior monks to state-built temples in strategic locations near the capital and around the country.

In the twentieth century, soon after the Japanese empire absorbed the Choson dynasty in 1910, the Japanese restructured Korean Buddhism, which never formally recognized married Buddhist clergy prior to the twentieth century, by challenging the traditional Korean insistence on clerical celibacy and reserving positions of ecclesiastical authority for married monks. When the Japanese were forced out of Korea in 1945, the anti-Japanese Syngman Rhee government that arose in South Korea reversed the Japanese policy and began expelling married monks from major temples and replacing them with the few monks who had remained celibate and thus faithful to Korean tradition. In North Korea, however, the Japanese tradition of



Buddha Statue at Popchusa Temple in Taejon, South Korea. (CHRIS LISLE/CORBIS)

married monks remained the norm for those few hundred monks who manage the approximately fifty temples that were allowed to remain open to support the claim by the North Korean government that it respects religious freedom.

An Eclectic Nonsectarianism

The dominant Buddhist influence in both North and South Korea is the Mahayana. The same sacred texts and the same sacred personalities that are found in the rest of East Asia are also found in Korea. The Lotus Sutra (the best known Mahayana scripture in East Asia and the main text of the Chinese Tiantai school) has been an important doctrinal guide for Koreans since at least the sixth century, and the Flower Garland Sutra (the main text of the Chinese Huayan school) since the seventh. There is evidence of Pure Land Buddhism and the worship of Amitabha Buddha as well as worship of Maitreya (the future buddha), as early as the first decades of the seventh century. The bodhisattva Avalokitesvara (Guanyin) has also been an important object of devotion in Korea for over a thousand years. Esoteric Buddhism has been on the peninsula so long that the world's oldest printed *dharaṇī* (secret incantations), from the middle of the eighth century, was found in Korea. Meditative Buddhism established its first temples in Korea less than a century later, in the early ninth century.

Korean Buddhism, however, is not an exact copy of Buddhism in China or Japan. Koreans proudly claim that Korean Buddhism is less sectarian than Buddhism in Japan and less dominated by Pure Land rituals than Buddhism in China. Monastic Buddhism in Korea is primarily meditative Buddhism erected on a foundation built from years of doctrinal study and reinforced by Pure Land practices. Korean Buddhists see nothing incongruous in demanding that meditative monks receive rigorous academic training in Buddhist philosophy or in erecting a hall for the recitation of Amitabha Buddha's name within the grounds of a monastery dedicated to the study of doctrine. Koreans trace this eclecticism to the influence of two influential monks, Wonhyo (617–686 CE) of the Shilla dynasty and Chinul (1158–1210), of the Koryo dynasty.

Wonhyo is famous both as a philosopher and as a preacher. He wrote over two hundred works analyzing and harmonizing the arguments of the various competing schools of Buddhist philosophy in China. When he was not writing scholarly treatises, he wandered through the villages of Korea, preaching to illiterate peasants the Pure Land tradition of reciting the name of the Amitabha Buddha. Five centuries

later, Chinul bridged the gap between sutra-oriented and meditation-oriented traditions that had divided Koryo Buddhism. Chinul believed that a lengthy and intensive study of the Buddhist sutras was an essential preparation for successful meditative practice. He insisted that monks and nuns had to be well versed in the verbal teachings of Buddhist tradition before they could move beyond them into the nonverbal realm of meditation. Chinul's two-step approach to the pursuit of enlightenment, along with Wonhyo's acceptance of Pure Land chanting, has become the dominant model for Buddhist practice on the peninsula. As the twentieth century drew to a close, nearly 9 million South Koreans, almost one out of five of those living in the Republic of Korea, called themselves Buddhist.

The Twenty-First Century

The Chogye order, the largest denomination in Korea in the twenty-first century, shares with the T'aego order, the second largest, the mutual acceptance of doctrinal, meditative, and Pure Land traditions. The only major difference between the two denominations, which together claim the allegiance of the vast majority of Korean Buddhists is that the T'aego order allows its clerics to marry while the Chogye order insists on celibacy. The Chogye and the T'aego orders, though they are the products of a relatively recent split between the 6,500 clerics who were married in 1945 and the 500 who remained celibate despite Japanese pressure, nevertheless represent continuity with the centuries of nonsectarian Buddhism oriented toward monastic life. Won Buddhism, a third order that was founded in 1916, shares the traditional eclecticism but within a modern, lay-oriented approach. Founded by Pak Chung-bin (1891–1943), Won Buddhism is often identified as a new religion because it replaces Buddhist statues with a simple painted circle, and replaces the traditional sutras with sermons by its founder that reformulate Buddhist doctrines in modern language.

Though at the beginning of the twenty-first century only 9 million Koreans, around one out of five of those living in the South Korea, called themselves Buddhist, most Koreans recognize that Buddhism is an integral part of Korean culture. Over 70 percent of the designated national cultural treasures in South Korea are Buddhist in origin. When Koreans want a break from the hustle and bustle of urban life, they visit Buddhist temples in the mountains. Buddhist images and sounds are often used to provide a traditional backdrop for contemporary movies and television programs. Sixteen hundred years after it was imported

from central Asia and China, Buddhism has become Korean.

Don Baker

See also: **Buddhism-China; Buddhism-Japan; Buddhism, Pure Land**

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BUDDHISM-MONGOLIA The history of Buddhism in Mongolia is one of sudden starts and stops. From the introduction of Buddhism to the Mongolian nomads (c. 100 BCE) to the early 2000s, there have been years and even centuries where its influence was virtually nonexistent. Yet there were also periods where it was either the state religion or played an important role in almost every aspect of daily life, with lamas serving not only as religious figures, but also as doctors, teachers, and astrologers. Thus, much like the Buddhist belief that history is cyclical, so is the history of Buddhism in Mongolia.

Pre-Mongol Empire

Buddhism first arrived in Mongolia in the 100s BCE with the Hsiung-nu tribes. The religion, however, did not become widespread until much later; indeed, after the decline of the Hsiung-nu, Buddhism was not at all prevalent. In the post-Hsiung-nu period the influence of Buddhism was negligible.

With the ascension of the nomadic tribal confederation of Juan Juan (400–522 CE), Buddhism was revived, although no monasteries were built. Essentially, lamas were able to travel through Mongolia and proselytize, but they still did not have much influence.

The status of Buddhism improved greatly with the rise of the Turks (522–745 CE). It particularly flourished during the reign of the Qaghan T'o-Po (573–581). T'o-Po even commissioned shrines to be built in

Mongolia. Eventually, however, Buddhism went into another decline, though the reasons are uncertain. One reason may have been that the Turkic warrior aristocracy became wary of Buddhism, as it did not promote a warrior spirit. Another reason was the defeat of the ruling royal family in 617. The Turks may have concluded that if the royal family, which had converted to Buddhism, had been defeated then Buddhism was lacking as a spiritual force. A final reason is that Buddhism may have declined because of perpetual wars with the Uighur tribes. Although the Uighurs were initially Buddhists, they converted to Manicheism in 744 as a reaction against the growing influence of the Buddhism in the first two hundred years of the Tang dynasty (617–906 CE).

Mongolia did not experience another Buddhist revival until the tenth century, although Buddhism increasingly influenced northern China. During the Khitan era (970–1125), Buddhism once again flourished in Mongolia. The Khitans, a Mongol people who conquered part of Mongolia and northern China, established cities on the Kerulen and Orkhon Rivers that became centers of Buddhism. Under the Khitans, Buddhism became a state religion and acted as a counter to Chinese Confucianism, which often permeated the court and bureaucracy of foreign powers that conquered China. It also served as a bond between the people and the new rulers. Although Buddhism flourished in the cities that were built in Mongolia, it did not win many converts among the nomads and few monasteries were established outside of the cities.

Mongol Empire

Buddhism was once again eclipsed after the fall of the Khitans and their defeat by the Jurchen, Tungus tribes from Manchuria. Not until the establishment of the Mongol empire did Buddhism resurface as a force in Mongolia. Even then, its hold was tenuous and dependent on court favor. Although there were many Nestorian Christians in Mongolia, the Mongols as a whole were shamanistic. Buddhism, as well as Islam, only had an impact later. No one is sure which of the Mongol princes invited lamas from Tibet to Mongolia. Some credit Genghis Khan (1165–1227), but it is more likely that either his son Ogodei (c. 1185–1241) or Genghis Khan's grandson Kotei, who ruled Koke Nur, established Buddhism once again in Mongolia. Buddhism, however, did not gain many adherents until the reign of Khubilai Khan (1215–1294).

Before his reign as emperor, Khubilai Khan had been involved in a number of religious debates between Taoists, Buddhists, Muslims, and Nestorian Christians. Although he did not convert to any of these



BUDDHISM IN MONGOLIA TIMELINE

- 100s BCE** Buddhism first arrives with the Hsiung-nu tribes, but does not spread for several centuries.
- 400-522 CE** With the ascension of the nomadic tribal confederation of Juan Juan, Buddhism is revived as lamas travel through Mongolia and proselytize.
- 522-745** The status of Buddhism improves greatly with the rise of the Turks.
- 573-581** Buddhism flourishes during the reign of the Qaghan T'o-Po. T'o-Po commissions shrines to be built in Mongolia.
- 617** Buddhism experiences another period of decline, marked by defeat of the ruling royal family who had embraced Buddhism.
- 970-1125** Buddhism flourishes again during the rule of the Khitans who establish cities on the Kerulen and Orkhon Rivers that become centers of Buddhism and make Buddhism a state religion.
- c. 1185-1241** Following another period of decline, Buddhism emerges again under the Mongols, perhaps during the reign of Ogodei or Genghis Khan's grandson Kotei.
- 1235-1280** During the reign of Kubilai Khan Buddhism flourishes again.
- 1578** Altan Khan converts to Buddhism initiating a Buddhist renaissance, with adherents spread across a broad expanse of inner Asia.
- 1912-1915** Mongolia becomes an independent nation and then an autonomous part of China. The Mongols establish a Buddhist theocracy.
- 1924** With Mongolia now under Soviet rule, religion is repressed and the "last" Jebtsun Damba Qutuqtu dies, ending the Mongolian theocracy.
- 1939** After two decades of Soviet repression, Buddhism effectively disappears as a religion in Mongolia.
- 1990s** Following the end of Soviet rule, Buddhism again flourishes and in 1995 the Dalai Lama locates the ninth Jebtsun Damba Qutuqtu.

religions, Khubilai professed a preference for Buddhism. During his actual reign, Khubilai Khan found the 'Phags pa Lama (1235–1280) of the Sa skya sect a useful political ally. Appointed as state preceptor, 'Phags pa Lama was put in charge of all sects of the Buddhist clergy. As 'Phags pa Lama's political power increased, Khubilai Khan was able to extend his influence in Tibet. The lamas at Khubilai's court also provided the religious sanction he desired for his reign. Furthermore, although Khubilai Khan did not convert to Buddhism, other members of the royal family did.

Post-Mongol Empire

In 1550, several Mongol princes waged a civil war for mastery of Mongolia. In addition, the Oirat Mongols, whose rulers were not descended from Genghis Khan, also competed for power. Altan Khan (1507–1582), descended from Genghis Khan, was the khan of the Tumed Mongols and one of many princes who

sought to unify the Mongol tribes who fragmented into civil war after the fall of the Mongol empire. Despite being a very competent general, Altan Khan could not secure enough support to rise to power. He realized that he needed something to neutralize the influence of Genghis Khan's descendants. At the same time, he also had to counter the Buddhist Red Hat Sect, which flourished in parts of Mongolia and attracted some princes. On one raid, Altan Khan came into contact with a lama and converted to Buddhism. How sincere his conversion was is questionable, but the common people also began to convert.

At the same time, Khutuktu Setsen Khungtaiji, Altan Khan's nephew, entered Tibet after campaigning against the Oirats. He demanded the submission of the Tibetans he encountered, and thus he came into contact with the Yellow Sect lamas. Altan Khan's nephew learned that there were numerous sects in Tibet also struggling for control of Buddhism and the country,

and the Yellow Sect was emerging as a dominant power. The nephew reported this intelligence to Altan Khan, who between the years 1567–1576, invited many lamas to his court. In 1578, he invited the chief lama, Sonam Gyatso to personally instruct him in Buddhism. The meetings between Altan Khan and Sonam Gyatso are recorded in the *Altan Tobchi* (Golden Chronicle) and the *Bolor Erike* (The Crystal Rosary).

Sonam Gyatso and Altan Khan agreed that Mongolia should be Buddhist and that Altan Khan would support the conversion. Altan Khan in turn would lend support to Sonam Gyatso in Tibet. Thus they established the *xoyar yusun* ("dual principle"), two prominent men who share religious and political power. In matters of doctrine, the religious figure was absolute; however, in temporal matters the political figure had absolute power. Altan Khan was confirmed in his title Tsadrawar Sechen Khan, or Wise Khan, and he named Sonam Gyatso the Third Dalai Lama.

Altan Khan's power was further secured in the doctrine of reincarnation. The Dalai Lama experienced a revelation that Altan Khan was actually the reincarnation of Khubilai Khan, which gave Altan the power of direct lineage. As Altan Khan was the reincarnation of Khubilai Khan, he was closer to Genghis Khan than the other princes. Later historians even traced his lineage back to the Buddha.

After Altan Khan's conversion in 1578, Mongolia was transformed by a Buddhist renaissance. The religion extended from Tibet into northern and southern Mongolia as well as reaching the Oirats in western Mongolia and eastern Kazakhstan and the Buryats around Lake Baikal located in Russia, just north of present-day Mongolia.

Mongolian Buddhism

The Mongols practiced the Tibetan form of Buddhism, in which the lamas were sheltered in monasteries and were mendicants, that is, dependent upon the population for support. The religious orders promoted clerical celibacy and were only open to males. Under this influence, the numbers of lamas increased dramatically, as often one son from each herdsman family entered the clergy.


The spread of Buddhism in Mongolia had the unintended effect of promoting urbanism. The monasteries became urban centers with nomadic families clustered around them. In return for shelter in times of war, welfare in times of need, or medical and spiritual care, the nomads provided alms and donations of goods. The monasteries also served as banks and commercial centers.

The large monasteries were headed by a figure called a *qubilgan*, or reincarnation. Eventually, the number of *qubilgans* rose to one hundred thirty, each possessing a monastery and territory. Above the *qubilgans* were fourteen *qutuqtus*, or bodhisattvas.

The *qutuqtus* resided in the thirteen largest monasteries, which were also centers of political power. The Jebtsum Damba Qutuqtu, a *qutuqtu* from one of these monasteries, emerged as the primary lama in Mongolia. Behind the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, the Jebtsum Damba Qutuqtu was considered the third most important leader in Tibetan Buddhism. The first few Jebtsum Damba Qutuqtus were Mongols. In 1740, however, the Manchus or Qing dynasty (1644–1912) mandated that the Jebtsum Damba Qutuqtu's incarnation could only be found in Tibet. By the same mandate, the Dalai Lama was selected from among the Mongols of western China. The monasteries of the *qutuqtus* were also transformed into major trade centers that accumulated vast amounts of wealth. By the twentieth century the treasuries of the *qutuqtus* stored almost a quarter of Mongolia's wealth, while approximately one-third of Mongolia's male population served as lamas or were connected in some way to the monasteries. Most of these men were essentially serfs (*shabi-nar*) who were permanently attached to the monastery. The *shabi-nar* maintained the herds of the monasteries and also did work from which the lamas were prohibited, such as slaughtering animals, tanning, and gathering dung for fuel.

During the period when Mongolia was part of the Qing empire, another lama existed within the monasteries of the *qutuqtus*. This individual was the Da Lama, an administrative figure placed in the monasteries by the Manchus. The Da Lama did not possess any religious function, but simply oversaw what happened in the monastery. In most cases, the Da Lama was not a Mongol but a Manchu. Often he had not received any training as a lama, and possessed a separate staff of bookkeepers and accountants. In this fashion, the Manchus maintained control over the wealth and ensured that the monasteries did not become centers for revolt.

One widely held misconception is that the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing dynasties encouraged the spread of Buddhism in Mongolia, as they believed it would pacify the Mongols and lessen the threat of raids. There is little evidence to substantiate this claim. While Buddhism became an integral part of daily life, the Mongols remained a feared military power until the Khalkha, or Eastern Mongols, fearing the Oirats (who were Buddhist), submitted to the Qing for protection. The Oirats' martial prowess was so great that



Buddhist monks at a temple in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, in 1997. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

they were not subdued until the mid-eighteenth century. In addition, the Kalmyks of the Volga River in Russia actively served in the armies of Peter the Great and also raided the Muslim tribes of the steppe until the late-eighteenth century, when the majority of them returned to the Qing empire. Buddhism became an integral part of daily life. Lamas were frequently consulted in regard to medical, spiritual, and even herding problems. The Mongols consulted a lama before undertaking any major endeavor during this time.

Twentieth Century

In the early twentieth century, Mongolia and much of the Manchu empire was in a state of tumult. When the empire collapsed in 1912, Mongolia won its independence, although the treaty of 1915 between Imperial Russia, China, and Mongolia relegated it to an autonomous part of China. The Mongols established a theocracy, with the Jebtsum Damba Qutuqtu as head of state. Although he was not Mongolian, the Jebtsum

Damba Qutuqtu remained a unifying figure, and the Buddhist faith was still revered.

In 1921, Chinese suzerainty over Mongolia ended with the invasion of a White Russian army that attempted to establish a base there against the Bolsheviks. Again the Jebtsum Damba Qutuqtu was kept as the nominal head of the government. In late 1921, the Whites were replaced by the Bolsheviks. When the Soviets and the Mongolian revolutionaries took over, they recognized the importance of keeping the Jebtsum Damba Qutuqtu as a figurehead in order to gain popular support. The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP), however, mistrusted the Jebtsum Damba Qutuqtu and forced him to relinquish his secular powers. In 1924, the problem was removed as he was either assassinated or died from a stroke. The MPRP and the Soviets also decreed that the eighth Jebtsum Damba Qutuqtu was to be the last, and they found or forged documents that supported their claim. Thus Mongolian Buddhism lost its titular leader.

The MPRP, following the doctrine of Marx, viewed Buddhism as an "opiate of the people"; however, the majority of the Mongols opposed moving against Buddhism, as both Buddhism and the monasteries were integral to Mongolian life. Several prominent members of the military and government, however, lost their lives when they disagreed with Stalin that Buddhism must be eradicated in Mongolia. It was not until Stalin's puppet Choybalsan (1895–1952) ascended to power that action was taken against the monasteries.

At first, force was attempted and troops were sent against the monasteries. Not only were the monetary assets of the monasteries seized, soldiers also burned the religious texts, and executed the lamas who resisted. Naturally, rebellion occurred in conjunction with attempts to collectivize the nomads.

The MPRP also attacked the monasteries through legal means. New taxation laws were passed. Legislation that prohibited the building of new religious buildings and limited the political activity of the lamas also was enacted. The wealth of the monasteries was drained, and religious instruction to train new monks was prohibited. Moreover, conspiracies were contrived in which many lamas were accused of spying for the Japanese or other countries. The lamas were arrested, tortured into confession, and either imprisoned or executed. By 1939, the population of the monasteries was drastically reduced.

After this period, only a few monasteries remained, and Buddhism as a functioning religion disappeared from Mongolia until the fall of Communism in 1989–1990. During the 1990s, Buddhism once again flour-

ished. In 1995, the Dalai Lama located the ninth Jeb-tsum Damba Qutuqtu. Although it is unlikely that Buddhism and the monasteries will ever return to their former prominence, there has been a rebirth of interest in the Buddhist religion. Once again, Buddhism has become a vital part of Mongolian life.

Timothy May

See also: **Buddhism-China; Buddhism-Tibet**

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BUDDHISM, PURE LAND Pure Land Buddhism is a Mahayana Buddhist tradition originating in India around 100 BCE–100 CE. Although Pure Land is not indigenous to China in terms of its doctrine and scriptures, it became in spirit and character an integral part of Chinese Buddhism. Today it is one of the most prominent forms of Buddhism in China, Korea, and Japan. The term Pure Land or Land of Bliss (Chinese *jingtu*; Japanese *jodo*) derives from the Sanskrit word *sukhavati*, a blissful Western Paradise. The Buddha presiding over the Pure Land is Amitabha (Measureless Light; Chinese *Amito fo*; Japanese *Amida*), also known as Amitayus (Measureless Life). Out of his compassion for all sentient beings, Amitabha vows that anyone who has faith in him will be reborn in his Pure Land.

History

The Chinese Buddhists became interested in Pure Land Buddhism as early as the third century CE. In 402, the monk Huiyuan (334–416 CE) founded the Pure Land Society on Mount Lu (present-day Jiangxi Province), where he and his followers practiced meditation and sought rebirth in Amitabha's Pure Land. Huiyuan was later regarded as the founder and also the first patriarch of Chinese Pure Land Buddhism.

After Huiyuan, the three recognized Pure Land patriarchs were Tanluan (476–542), Daochuo (562–645), and Shandao (613–681), who all made significant contributions to propagating Pure Land Buddhism among the populace. Other important Pure Land masters were Cimin Huiji (680–748) and Fazhao (c. 800), both of whom sought to harmonize Pure Land and Chan teachings and practices.

It is, however, important to note that Pure Land Buddhism did not become a full-fledged school (*zong*), with a clear lineage and system of doctrine, until the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279), and even then its establishment was due mainly to the efforts of masters of Tiantai Buddhism, another school. Throughout most of Chinese history, Pure Land was mingled with or incorporated into other forms of Buddhism.

Scriptures

The three principal scriptures of Pure Land Buddhism are the Shorter Sukhavativyuha Sutra (the Shorter Scripture Displaying the Pure Land; Chinese *Amito jing*), the Longer Sukhavativyuha Sutra (the Longer Scripture Displaying the Pure Land, Chinese *Wuliangshou jing*), and the Amitayurdhyana Sutra (the Scripture on Contemplating the Buddha of Measureless Life; Chinese *Guan Wuliangshou jing*).

The Shorter Sukhavativyuha Sutra contains a dialogue between the Buddha Sakyamuni and his disciple Sariputra in which the Buddha expounds the nature of faith and devotion for being reborn in Amitabha's Pure Land. The Longer Sukhavativyuha Sutra begins with a dialogue between Sakyamuni and his disciple Ananda about a monk named Dharmakara, who is one of the previous births of Amitabha. Before he attains enlightenment, Dharmakara takes a series of forty-eight vows that express his determination to attain perfect Buddhahood, become a savior of all beings, and establish a Buddha field where people can achieve liberation with ease. After Dharmakara becomes the Buddha Amitabha, he keeps his promise that those who have faith in him, are mindful of his name, or visualize him and his land will be reborn in his paradise.

Both the Shorter and Longer Sutras describe in detail the wondrous qualities of Amitabha's Pure Land. Once one is reborn in the Pure Land, the experience will be blissful because suffering, old age, and death no longer exist. The land is filled with fragrant trees, beautiful flowers, and is decorated with precious gems. Everywhere one goes, one can hear the teachings of the Buddha intoned amid pleasant music and joyful sounds. Gods and humans are spiritually inspired and blessed by Amitabha's power and grace, and they will

make easy progress toward nirvana, which is the ultimate outcome of rebirth in Amitabha's Pure Land.

The Longer Sutra (Chinese *Wuliangshou jing*) was translated by Sanghavarman around 252 CE. The Shorter Sutra was translated into Chinese around 402 CE by Kumarajiva (344–413? CE). The Shorter Sutra is the most popularly read Pure Land text, with numerous commentaries produced in many East Asian languages.

The Amitayurdhyana Sutra is a meditation text that details sixteen ways of meditation and the spiritual attainments based on these meditative practices. Aside from meditation through visualizing the Pure Land and the image of Amitabha, the text also teaches a simple path designed for the laity, namely, reciting the phrase "Homage to Amitabha" (Chinese *Namwu Amito Fo*; Japanese *Nanmu Amida Butsu*). There are no extant Sanskrit versions of this scripture. The Chinese version is titled *Guan Wuliangshou jing*, which is said to have been translated by Kalayasas (n.d.) in the first half of the fifth century. However, many scholars think that it was actually composed in China or Central Asia, not in India.

Doctrine and Practice

Pure Land Buddhism teaches a path of devotion by which one cultivates sufficient faith in the power and grace of the Buddha Amitabha. Because of their weaknesses, however, human beings cannot attain salvation through their own efforts. Some Pure Land masters furthermore teach the doctrine of the "Final Days of the Dharma" (Chinese *mofa*; Japanese *mappo*), an era of spiritual decline when traditional practices for enlightenment taught by the Buddha are no longer effective. Salvation in Pure Land Buddhism, therefore, can only be achieved at another time (in the next rebirth), in another place (the Pure Land), and through another power (Chinese *tali*; Japanese *tarikī*), that of Amitabha. Faith and devotion are the essential requirements for one's rebirth in Amitabha's Pure Land.

Rebirth in the Pure Land can be attained through the practices of chanting the Pure Land scriptures, meditating on Amitabha and his Pure Land, worshipping the image of Amitabha, performing meritorious deeds, and reciting Amitabha's name or the phrase "Homage to Amitabha." Of these practices, the recitation of the Buddha Amitabha's name (Chinese *nianfo*; Japanese *nembutsu*) has become the most representative practice of Pure Land Buddhism.

Although Pure Land and Chan held different views about salvation, the Chinese tendency toward harmonization of different forms of Buddhism resulted in a

combination of Chan meditation with the Pure Land use of beads to recite the name of Amitabha. Practitioners believed that this joint practice could lead to tranquility and an internal vision of the Pure Land that was identified with one's inherent Buddha-nature.

In addition, it is believed that in order to make his task of salvation more efficient, Amitabha has as his assistant Avalokitesvara (Chinese *guanyin*; Japanese *kannon*), the bodhisattva of compassion. Avalokitesvara is a savior bodhisattva frequently mentioned in Pure Land and other Mahayana Buddhist scriptures. Originally an Indian male deity, Avalokitesvara was transformed into a female in Chinese Buddhism. Her feminine representations began to appear in the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) and became prevalent in the Song (960–1279). With the wide spread of Pure Land Buddhism, Avalokitesvara has also become the most popular celestial bodhisattva worshipped by East Asian Buddhists.

Pure Land Buddhism represents a good example of how religion has successfully made changes and adjustments to appeal to a wider audience.

Ding-bwa Evelyn Hsieh

See also: **Buddhism, Chan; Buddhism-China**

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BUDDHISM-SOUTH ASIA South Asia, the large geographical region that includes the modern nation-states of India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka, is the original birthplace and homeland of Buddhism. Over time, however, Buddhism vanished in the heartland of the Indian subcontinent and flourished only at its margins: It is the main religion of Bhutan and Sri Lanka and has a significant presence in Nepal. In the latter decades of the twentieth century, however, Buddhism returned to India, via the migration of Tibetan refugees and the conversion of large numbers of Dalits (formerly called untouchables) and other low-caste Indians.

Origins


Buddhism begins with its founder, Siddhartha Gautama (566–486 BCE). According to traditional biographies of the historical Buddha, however, his career began many, many eons ago when he was a Brahman boy named Sumedha, who worshiped a buddha (the Sanskrit word means "awakened one"). The historical Buddha is regarded as the latest of a long lineage of previous buddhas, including Dipankara. This act of worship was regarded by Dipankara as a sign of the boy's future buddhahood, and he predicted that Sumedha would undertake a long journey, perfecting his character over many lives that would culminate in his birth as Siddhartha Gautama. The tradition tells many of the stories of these former lives in the collection of tales called *jatakas*. In his final birth as Gautama, he was raised a prince in a kingdom in what is now southeastern Nepal and at the age of twenty-nine renounced his royal inheritance and left his parents, young wife, and newborn son in pursuit of religious awakening. After six years of searching, Gautama is said to have attained release from suffering and obtained the title "buddha" at his Awakening.

The Buddha formulated his discovery in terms of four Noble Truths: (1) life in the endless chain of rebirths is inherently dissatisfactory, full of suffering, and mitigated by only fleeting and insubstantial happiness; (2) there is a cause of this suffering; (3) the cessation of suffering is possible; and (4) the path to the cessation of suffering is the Noble Eightfold Path. This path consists of perfecting eight factors of human life:

understanding, thought, speech, action, livelihood, effort, mindfulness, and concentration. The Buddha began to teach what he had discovered to others and founded an order of monks and nuns, who adopted a celibate and peripatetic discipline. The monastic order (*sangha*) was dependent on a larger community of laypeople who earned religious merit by providing monks and nuns with alms.

After the Buddha's death, a council was held to recite and preserve what his disciples recalled of his teachings. Over time these schools codified, in different languages, the Buddha's discourses (sutras) and the monastic code (*vinaya*). A third body of scholastic treatises, called the *abhidharma*, was eventually added to these collections, and collectively the three came to be regarded as the scriptural canon, or Tripitaka. Over the next few centuries, the small community grew in size and split into sectarian divisions, initially primarily over minor differences over monastic discipline but later over scholastic disputes. A second council was held approximately one hundred years after the death of the Buddha, which resulted in a schism between two schools, the Sthaviravada and the Mahasanghika. One early tradition records the presence of as many as eighteen different schools by the third century BCE. As Buddhism spread geographically in India, the various schools preserved their versions of the scriptures in Sanskrit and a variety of linguistic variants of Sanskrit called Prakrits.

By the third century BCE, Buddhism attracted the patronage of the emperor Asoka (d. 238?), who had conquered most of the Indian subcontinent. Asoka brought Buddhism prestige and global aspirations as a religion of the imperial state. He sent Buddhist missions to the far reaches of his empire and beyond,



SANCHI-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

A center of Buddhism in India until the twelfth century CE, the ruins of Sanchi are the oldest surviving Buddhist sanctuary in India. Overlooking a plain 40 kilometers from the city of Bhopal, the remains contain pillars, palaces, monasteries, and temples that date as far back as the second century BCE. Sanchi was designated by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site in 1989.



A SKEPTICAL OBSERVER

The following comments by an early British resident in India indicate just how difficult it was to get an accurate description of Buddhism and other "exotic" practices in South Asia.

The popular account of Buddhism which follows I regard with some distrust, as it reached me through the translations of missionaries, who seem to have falsified, or at least exaggerated, some of the absurdities of the system, in order to obtain a stronger hold over the minds of their proselytes, very few of whom are learned enough to have recourse to their books in the originals for information, and therefore quietly acquiesce in the belief that Buddha and Satan are one and the same person; while their spiritual guides impress on their minds the sinfulness of worshipping the devil. Even the Maha Modeliar, who is a Dutch Protestant, though a man of sense, is so possessed with this idea, that he would fain to have dissuaded us from going into the temple, where there were only some devils, as he called the images of the gods.

Source: Maria Dundas Graham (1812) Journal of a Residence in India. London: n.p.

including Gandhara (in Central Asia), Myanmar (Burma), and Sri Lanka. It is not clear what became of all of these missionary efforts, but the Sri Lankan emissary succeeded in establishing Buddhism on the island, where it continued unbroken to the present day. The main school of Buddhism to take hold in Sri Lanka was the Theravada, which preserved its form of the scriptures in the Pali language.

Archaeological evidence from this early period in India depicts a religiosity of merit-making centered on the cult of stupas, that is, constructed monuments often containing bodily relics of the Buddha and his disciples. The *sangha*, which had originally been a community of wandering mendicants, gradually settled in established monasteries. Monks, nuns, and laypeople worshiped relics and made donations for the construction of monasteries and temples located at important sites in the Buddha's life—such as at Lumbini, his birthplace, and Bodh Gaya, the site of his attainment of nirvana (awakening). At Bodh Gaya stands the great pipal tree, which sheltered the Buddha on the night of his awakening and became an object of worship and a site for pilgrimage. Seedlings from this tree were planted throughout the Buddhist world. The largest and oldest sites in India are those at Bharhut and Sanchi, which provide evidence of the worship of

objects such as relics, footprints of the Buddha, and the symbolic wheel of the Buddha's teaching. Later, Buddhists would also worship images of the Buddha.

The Emergence of Mahayana Buddhism

In the early years of the Common Era, a new movement gradually emerged in northern India that called itself the Mahayana (the Great Vehicle), in contrast to the earlier eighteen schools that were dubbed the Hinayana (the Lesser Vehicle). The Mahayana provided a broader religious vision for the laity and redefined the religious ideals of Buddhism. It replaced the ideal of the arhat—one who has awakened, following the teachings of a buddha—with that of the bodhisattva—one who has taken a vow to attain awakening. While the arhat is depicted as one who has followed an individualistic path to obtain nirvana, the bodhisattva is a model of compassion, delaying the attainment of nirvana so that he can help others advance spiritually.

Although they did not reject earlier scriptures, the adherents of Mahayana Buddhism declared themselves to be in possession of texts (sutras) that superseded them. These texts were said to be composed by the Buddha but held back from the community until such time as people were ready for them. The sutras artic-

ulated Mahayana polemics against the earlier schools, elaborated new doctrines, and celebrated a new pantheon of supernatural buddhas and bodhisattvas who were regarded as saviors. Mahayana Buddhists worshiped figures such as Avalokitesvara, the bodhisattva of compassion; Maitreya, the buddha who is yet to come; and Manjusri, the bodhisattva of wisdom. While Mahayana Buddhism did not abolish the monastic establishment, it did evolve an expanded vision for the laity beyond earning merit by supporting the *sangha* through donations. Theoretically, the aspiration to become a bodhisattva is accessible to anyone, and anyone can be the object of a bodhisattva's compassion.

Theories about the transfer of merit from one person to another had begun to emerge even before the arrival of Mahayana Buddhism, but these theories came to be central to Mahayana ideas about the ability of compassionate beings to act on behalf of others. In its fullest expression, the doctrine of merit-transfer culminated in a school of thinking that suggested that the merit of buddhas and bodhisattvas could be accumulated in a cosmic realm known as the Land of Bliss, where one could be reborn and easily obtain nirvana through the merit of compassionate beings. This notion of rebirth in the Land of Bliss, developed in India in the first century CE, introduced an element of saving grace to Mahayana Buddhism. This and other such ideas also entailed the development of new cosmologies to house the proliferation of various buddha lands and celestial bodhisattvas.

Alongside this increasingly devotional strain of religious practice, Mahayana Buddhism developed and expanded in new directions the earlier traditions of meditation and textual study. Philosophical developments regarding the impermanence and insubstantiality of the human self were expanded to articulate the emptiness of all phenomena, even Buddhist doctrine itself. The Mahayanists built universities and developed sophisticated scholastic and philosophical traditions. One such monastic university was Nalanda in northern India (established since at least the second century CE), the most important center of Buddhist learning for nearly a millennium. Notable philosophers from within the Mahayana tradition over the next few centuries include Nagarjuna (c. 150–250), founder of the Madhyamika school of Buddhist philosophy; the brothers Asanga and Vasubandhu (fourth century), founders of the Yogacara school; and the logicians Dignaga (fifth century) and Dharmakirti (seventh century).

Despite the influence and popularity of Mahayana Buddhism, some Hinayana schools continued to flourish up through the seventh and eighth centuries CE. Their differences were mostly philosophical and geographic. The Pudgalavadins, who articulated a more substantial sense of personhood than other Buddhists were willing to admit, were successful under the patronage of the emperor Harsa (seventh century) of Kanauj. The Sarvastivadins advocated a philosophical realism and flourished in northwestern India and



The façade of the Anuradhapura Stupa in Sri Lanka. (EYE UBIQUITOUS/CORBIS)



THE EARLY BRITISH VIEW OF BUDDHISM

This description from 1908 provides some insight into the British view of the Buddhism they encountered in northern South Asia. Clearly, they were more accepting of what they saw as the original form and critical of Tibetan Buddhism.

It is to the indefatigable researches of Brian Hodgson that we owe the discovery of Buddhism as a living religion in Nepal. While resident in Katmandu he investigated the subject closely, and the results are embodied in a most interesting paper in the second volume of the *Transactions of Royal Asiatic Society*. He showed how the philosophic agnosticism of Buddha gave way to the theory that the Adi Buddha, by his union with the primordial female energy called Pranja, gave birth to five Buddhas, who each produced from himself by *dhyana* (meditation) another being called his Bodi-satwa or son. The chief of these latter was Avalokita, who, with his Sakti, Tara, eventually became the key-stone of Northern Buddhism. Those arose also numerous other Buddhas, demons and deities, all of which were objects of worship; and then came the introduction of the Tantrik mysticism, based on the pantheistic idea of Yoga, or the ecstatic union of the soul with the supreme spirit. At this stage, as in Tantric Hinduism, the Saktis, or female counterparts of the Bodhusatwas, occupied the most prominent position, and the esoteric cult of these female deities became every whit as obscene as that practiced by the Kaula or extreme sect of Sakta Hindus. It was this form of Buddhism which was introduced into Tibet, where it became even more debased by the incorporation of demon worship which preceded it, as has been ably described by Colonel Waddell (*India Census Report*, 1901, paragraph 648).

Source: *Imperial Gazetteer of India: Afghanistan and Nepal*. (1908) Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 111.

Central Asia. An offshoot of this school was the Sautrantika, which also had a significant following in the same region. The Vibhajyavadins, who, like the Theravadins, can be traced back to the Sthaviravada branch, could be found in South India. Unfortunately, none of these Indian schools has survived to the present day, and our knowledge of their scriptures and texts comes mostly from Chinese translations of Sanskrit and Prakrit text fragments.

The Theravada in Sri Lanka, although not always fully supported by royal patronage, developed for the most part geographically isolated from many of the vicissitudes in political fortune that helped determine the fate of Indian Buddhist schools. The Theravada was not immune to internal schisms, however, and was for part of its history divided into three fraternities—

the Mahavihara, the Jetavana, and the Abhayagiri. The Abhayagiri was less conservative than the other two sects and was receptive to some Mahayana ideas. A critical figure in Theravada history is the scholar-monk Buddhaghosa (fifth century), an Indian who traveled to Sri Lanka to translate into Pali the ancient Sinhala commentaries and to compose new exegeses and texts of his own. Buddhaghosa and his circle are responsible for the codification and interpretation of the main doctrines of Pali Buddhism.

In India, Buddhism flourished during the Gupta period (c. 320–c. 500 CE) and for the next several centuries alongside Hinduism and Jainism, often competing with them for the patronage and support of ruling dynasties. By the eighth century, however, Buddhism was in decline in India, and its great universi-

ties were gradually taken over by a new Buddhist movement called Tantra.

The Development of Tantra

As Mahayana Buddhism had critiqued the Buddhist establishment and infused the tradition with new creative energy centuries earlier, the Tantric movement played a similar role in the seventh and eighth centuries. Although undoubtedly dating to much earlier than the seventh century, Tantra refers to esoteric religious teachings that emerged in medieval India in both Hindu and Buddhist contexts. Tantric teachers were wandering saints called *siddhas*, said to be in command of ritual and magical powers. They used *dharmas* (sacred mantras, or incantations), mandalas (circular diagrams of psychological and spiritual achievements as well as meditation aids), and rich symbolic language and ritual practice to bring about radical religious experience and transformation. Some yogic techniques and symbols were antinomian (rejecting established morality) and violated social, sexual, and dietary norms. For this reason, many of the teachings of Tantric Buddhism were secret. Elaborate initiation rituals and careful tutelage under a guru were required for adherents to gain access to them.

Despite its initial esotericism, however, Tantra came to be incorporated into the monastic establishment, and its methods of meditation, its philosophical and literary traditions, and its ritual practice became institutionalized. For some it was regarded as a natural development within Mahayana Buddhism, whereas for others it came to be considered a third vehicle called the Vajrayana (the Diamond or Thunderbolt Vehicle).

For reasons not entirely clear to historians, Buddhism gradually disappeared in India. Some scholars have argued that the Mahayana turn toward devotional styles of worship made Buddhism susceptible to assimilation and absorption by the predominantly Hindu culture, in which devotional worship (*bhakti*) of deities gained great popularity in the medieval period. Others suggest that laxity and decay in the *sangha*, combined with its failure to elicit broad support from the laity, led to an inherent weakness in Indian Buddhism. In any case, after the sixth century, Buddhism lost widespread state support to Hinduism, although it continued to receive royal patronage in eastern India from the Pala dynasty (c. 750–1150). The great monastic centers and universities were already in decline when the Turks arrived and sacked them in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Theravada Buddhism continued to have a presence in South India until the seventeenth century.



GOLDEN TEMPLE OF DAMBULLA— WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1991, this enormous cave-temple complex has been one of the most important pilgrimage spots for Sri Lankans for more than 2,200 years. Covering an extraordinary 2.1 square kilometers underground, Dambulla's intricately painted murals and 157 statues are perfectly preserved.

Remnants and Recent Developments

At the same time as Buddhism was disappearing in India, it was spreading throughout Asia. Theravada Buddhism was established in Sri Lanka from the third century BCE, and it became the dominant religion of the island and the principal source of the expansion of Theravada Buddhism to mainland Southeast Asia. Mahayana Buddhism was exported in the early centuries of the Common Era to China and from there to the rest of East Asia, whereas Vajrayana came to be established in Tibet and Nepal, as well as other regions of the Himalayas, including Bhutan, Sikkim, and Ladakh.

The Newar community of the Kathmandu valley preserves the only forms of Mahayana and Vajrayana Buddhism that have endured in a South Asian cultural environment. This form of Buddhism is closely interwoven with Hinduism, the dominant religion in Nepal. Theravada monasteries have been established in Nepal since the 1950s by monks and nuns from Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia. They have attracted some support and even "conversion" on the part of traditionally Newar Buddhists.

In modern times, Buddhism was reintroduced to India from several different directions. A Sri Lankan monk named Anagarika Dharmapala (1864–1933) founded the Mahabodhi Society in 1891 to reawaken Indian interest in Buddhism and to restore and maintain Buddhist pilgrimage sites in India. These pilgrimage centers, especially Bodhi Gaya, witness a steady stream of Buddhist pilgrims from the entire Buddhist world. Among some Vaishnavite Hindus, Buddhism is embraced as one form of Hinduism and as a component of Indian cultural heritage that inspires national pride.

Buddhism also has been enlisted as a religious ideology that could sustain a social movement seeking justice, self-esteem, and emancipation for India's un-

touchables against the dominant Hindu social order. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (1891–1956) promoted a humanitarian and egalitarian interpretation of Buddhism among the untouchable caste of *mahars* in Maharashtra. This led to the mass conversions of millions of his followers to Buddhism, some of whom regard Ambedkar as a bodhisattva.

The Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1959 resulted in large numbers of Tibetan refugees fleeing to India. The Dalai Lama and his community in exile currently live in Dharamsala in northern India. The Tibetan refugees have built monasteries and centers of learning and have attracted worldwide attention to their cause.

Buddhism has not remained untouched by colonialism and modernity. In Sri Lanka, reform movements have developed an interpretation of Buddhism that privileges its rational, ethical, and humanitarian aspects over ritual practice and supernaturalism. Meditation practice is now used widely by laypeople as well as monks as a means of coping with the stresses of modern life, in a way unprecedented in premodern times. Western scholarship also has developed its own scholastic history and conventions and prompted a renewed interest in the textual tradition among South Asians.

Maria Heim

See also: Literature, Sinhalese; Siddhartha Gautama

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BUDDHISM, THERAVADA-SOUTHEAST ASIA In orthodox Buddhism, Theravada, "the way

of the elders," is a tradition that has sought to preserve and uphold the teachings and practices of the Buddha, Siddhartha Gautama (c. 566–486 BCE), the historical founder of the tradition. The present-day Buddhist communities of the Southeast Asian countries of Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia are self-consciously Theravadin. While orthodoxy remains a central ideal, the Buddhist world of Southeast Asia is diverse and complex, a variegated landscape of institutions, practices, and beliefs, both historically and phenomenologically.

History of Buddhism in Southeast Asia

A historical overview of Buddhist Southeast Asia can usefully be divided into three broad periods: an early phase of religious diversity; a classical period during which Theravada Buddhism rose to preeminence; and a period of modernization shaped in part by colonial and postcolonial forces.

Early Phase In the earliest stage of development, many forms of Buddhism were present in Southeast Asia. Theravada, Mahayana, and Tantric Buddhist traditions are evident in Sanskrit, Pali, and vernacular inscriptions, as well as in archaeological and artistic remains. Inscriptions from Sriksetra in lower Myanmar, dated to the fifth and sixth centuries CE, attest to the presence of Theravada Buddhism in the region. A century later the Chinese traveler Yijing recorded the presence not only of Theravada, but also of other early Buddhist schools in this region. Mahayana Buddhist traditions were in evidence in the Burman kingdom of Pagan (flourished eleventh–thirteenth centuries), in the Dvaravati-Mon kingdoms that flourished in present-day Myanmar and central Thailand, and the Angkor kingdom in Cambodia.

Brahmanical and Hindu religious traditions were also present throughout Southeast Asia. Hindu gods appeared in the religious pantheon of Southeast Asia, and *dharmasastras*, or legal traditions, were followed in royal courts. Angkor, a powerful Khmer kingdom founded in the ninth century CE in present-day Cambodia, was a predominantly Hindu kingdom centered around the cult of kings who identified themselves with the great Hindu gods Siva or Vishnu. Indigenous religious practices continued to be widespread throughout Southeast Asia after the introduction of Buddhist and Hindu traditions, which remained elite, courtly traditions until as late as the thirteenth century.

Classical Period The thirteenth century marks a period of significant change in the religious landscape of Southeast Asia. Theravada Buddhism assumed a preeminence through the influence and importation of



POVERTY, WEALTH, AND MERIT

Contemporary Buddhists in Thailand are faced with the task of reconciling ancient beliefs about the virtue of poverty with the modern emphasis on wealth. In the village of Sagatiam in Central Thailand, people reconcile the two through sayings such as the following:

The Lord Buddha taught us to be good, not to be rich or poor.

If we are good, we are apt to be rich later.

If we do good, we shall be richer later. Merit helps us.

Source: Jaspar C. Ingersoll. (1969) *The Priest and the Path: An Analysis of the Priest Role in a Central Thai Village*. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 255.

the Sinhalese Theravada lineage from Sri Lanka beginning in the twelfth century, when Southeast Asian Buddhist monks traveled to Sri Lanka to study with Sinhalese monks. While Mon monks made up the majority of this group according to some sources, a son of the Angkor Buddhist king Jayavarman VII (c. 1120–c.1215) also traveled to Sri Lanka as part of this monastic assembly. Reordained in Sri Lanka, these Southeast Asian monks returned to Myanmar and spread the Sinhalese lineage throughout mainland Southeast Asia, thereby establishing the Theravada as the dominant form of Buddhism in the region. Theravada then became a popular religion for the first time, one that changed and was changed by the still-present indigenous and Hindu traditions that continued to be a part of the total religious landscape of Southeast Asia.

Modern Innovations The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries brought new forces and innovations to the Theravadin world as the ideas and ideals of European modernity interacted with the Theravadin worldviews and the colonial powers entered Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos. In Thailand, the only Southeast Asian country never colonized by an outside power, Buddhists both resisted Western influences by maintaining traditional thought and practices and modernized some Buddhist practices in response to Western ideas. Most notable was the reform of the Buddhist monastic community during the reigns of the Thai kings Mongkut (1804–1868) and Chulalongkorn (1853–1910), who modernized the educational system and consolidated the Thai *sangha* (monastic community) into a national institution, contributing to the dynasty's rule of the entire country from the capital in Bangkok.

The interaction between Buddhism and the colonial powers elsewhere in Southeast Asia was complex; the transformation and modernization of Buddhism was not solely the result of Western influences but also a result of Buddhist responses and innovations under these historical conditions. In Myanmar the monastic community suffered from the withdrawal of patronage that had been provided by the king and aristocracy, but it also proved resilient under colonial domination. Political monks came to the fore and led movements of resistance to colonial power and cultures.

Southeast Asia and the Buddhist World

Arguably of equal importance to the record of dates, kings, and kingdoms that make up the Buddhist history of Southeast Asia is the conception of historical development present in Buddhist historical sources. Buddhist chronicles display a consciousness of being part of a larger Buddhist world. These chronicles, writ-

ten in both Pali and vernacular languages, articulate a Buddhist historical vision describing an origin in the birth of the historical Buddha, the development of his religious teachings and order in India, the flourishing of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, and the transmission of Buddhism to Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian Buddhists saw themselves as the preservers and upholders of the Theravada tradition and as the legitimate inheritors of the Buddha's teachings. Southeast Asian chronicles such as the *Jinakalamali*, a sixteenth-century Pali chronicle from northern Thailand, describe both the Buddha's journeys to Southeast Asia during his lifetime and his predictions of the Buddhist kingdoms that would arise in the millennium after his death.

Buddhist Thought and Practice in Southeast Asia: Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha

The Buddha of the present historical age, Buddha Gautama, stands at the center of the Theravadin worldview, teachings, and devotional practices. According to orthodox Theravadin thought, only one Buddha can be present in the universe at a time, but the Theravadin pantheon is not limited to the Buddha Gautama alone. A lineage of Buddhas arises sequentially in the universe and extends into a limitless past and future. Theravadin literature focuses on twenty-six Buddhas, the twenty-four Buddhas who preceded the Buddha Gautama and the Buddha Metteyya (in Sanskrit, Maitreya) who follows him.



THE COMPLEXITY OF THAI BUDDHISM

Buddhism as it is expressed in Thailand, as across much of Buddhist Asia, is complex and reflects influences from Hinduism and local religious traditions. The following description from the village of Sagatiam in central Thailand shows how this complexity plays out in the form of the different religious practitioners who serve the local population.

Several observers of village Buddhism have pointed out the elaborate richness of the religious fabric: the diverse threads of the Buddhist and Brahmanic [Hindu] traditions along with the indigenous tradition of worship of spirits and a host of supernatural objects; as well as the complex interweaving of religious, magical and divinatory emphases. In such a rich social-cultural fabric, we naturally find a large inventory of religious roles to be played. These roles vary greatly in the extent to which they are elaborated, in the number of actors who perform them, and in the number of other roles these actors also perform.

The most important religious figure in Thai society is the Buddhist priest (*pra*), whose social status has the most highly elaborated and formalized role expectations in Thai culture... In addition to the general laity, composed of people with greatly varying degrees of piety and of participation in temple affairs, we find also people practicing several types of healing and divination which have religious associations. Some actors performing these healing or divining activities occupy definite statuses with distinct role expectations, while other people similarly engaged do not have positions with very fully patterned expectations. Indeed, some of these activities scarcely lend themselves to neat role classification, since the actors tend to mix the various types of healing and divination practices in different combinations. Also, people may spend as much as full time in one or more of these activities or as little as a few occasions a year.

[. . .]

One main type of occult specialist not particularly associated with the priesthood, who deserves mention here, is the medium or shaman who goes into a trance. The death some years ago of the Sagatiam's head priest's mother removed the last person in the village of Sagatiam who could become possessed by spirits. This woman became possessed by a spirit called Lord of the Place (*jao tii*).

Source: Jaspas C. Ingersoll. (1969) *The Priest and the Path: An Analysis of the Priest Role in a Central Thai Village*. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 64–66.

Buddhas permeate the Theravadin world of Southeast Asia. A multiplicity of Buddhas depicted in artistic and narrative representations serve as focuses for devotion and worship. In temples throughout the re-

gion, multiple Buddhas are present: altars are filled with statues of Buddhas, and murals depict their life stories. The walls of the central hall of Wat Sutat in Bangkok, Thailand, are painted with murals depicting

the lives of the twenty-four Buddhas preceding the Buddha Gautama, who is represented by a magnificent statue.

Throughout Southeast Asia the five Buddhas of the present cosmological age, the *bhadda kappa* (the auspicious eon), are most frequently represented and worshiped. The Shwezigon Pagoda in Yangon (Rangoon), Myanmar, is said to contain bodily relics of not only the Buddha Gautama but also his three direct predecessors, the Buddhas Kakusandha, Konagamana, and Kassapa. The presence of these relics contributes to the power of this sacred place.

Metteyya is the focus of particular devotion in Southeast Asia. Merit accrued in a variety of forms of worship and practices as diverse as making a donation to the monastic community or hearing the preaching of Buddhist texts is dedicated to being reborn in the future when Metteyya will arise in the world, ushering in a utopian era of happiness and well-being. In Myanmar the *weikzas*, practitioners of esoteric meditation and alchemical rituals, attempt to prolong their lives supernaturally so that they may still be alive in the time of Metteyya.

The *dhamma* (in Sanskrit, dharma), the teaching of the Buddha, takes many forms in Southeast Asia. The *dhamma* can be thought of as the collection of teachings in Buddhist texts. For Theravada Buddhism, the most important texts are in the Pali canon; these texts, in orthodox Theravadin thought, contain the original words and teachings of the Buddha. The Pali canon has three divisions: the *vinaya*, or monastic codes; the *suttas* (in Sanskrit, sutras), discourses of the Buddha; and the *abhidhamma* (in Sanskrit, *abhidharma*), or scholastic treatises. These texts were maintained orally for centuries after the Buddha's death and took written form only during the first century BCE to the first century CE. The presence of the Pali canon is one of the primary unifying features of these Theravadin cultures, but in many ways this canon has a greater value as an idea than it does in actual practice. The Pali canon as a library of texts is not commonly used in monastic centers throughout Southeast Asia.

Particular texts and genres form what Anne Blackburn called a "practical canon" popularly used in teaching and preaching the dharma. Chief among these texts are the *jataka* stories, narratives of the Buddha's previous lifetimes as a bodhisattva, or Buddha-to-be. The *jakatas* are classified among Theravada canonical texts, but literary and artistic traditions based on these stories have continued to evolve in Southeast Asia. Of the over 550 *jataka* stories, the final ten are the most popular and best known in South-

east Asia. This cycle of the Buddha's ten final lifetimes before his rebirth as the Buddha Gautama is told and represented in painted murals. Postcanonical *jataka* stories were composed in Southeast Asia in both Pali and in vernacular languages.

In Southeast Asian Buddhist thought, the *dhamma* has power not only through its meaning but through the very forms of the words themselves; when the *dhamma* is preached, it can effect change. Throughout Southeast Asia and in Sri Lanka as well, Pali texts are chanted as a form of protection. This practice, called *paritta* ("protection"), speaks to the power of the Buddha's *dhamma* and of the monks who chant the texts. Collections of *paritta* text are popular throughout the region in practices focused as much on sound and power as on meaning.

Another primary way of encountering the *dhamma* is through meditative practices. While meditation was traditionally practiced almost exclusively by monks—and by only a small percentage of monks at that—in the second half of the twentieth century, meditation movements grew among the laity as well. Developing originally in Myanmar, lay meditation has become an increasingly important and popular practice for laymen and -women alike. Large meditation movements exist in Thailand as well, where meditation training is directed by both monks and lay meditation masters. One of the most popular movements in Thailand in recent decades is the Dhammakaya movement, where meditation is taught as part of modern Buddhist practice. Training the mind and body through meditation is seen as efficacious for dealing with the complexities of the modern world.

As in all Buddhist cultures, the Buddhist community in Southeast Asia is made up of two primary constituencies: the monastic *sangha* and the laity. Monastic



Buddhist monks in Bangkok, Thailand, receive alms. (EYE UBIQUITOUS/CORBIS)

populations in Myanmar and Thailand are very large, among the largest in the Buddhist world, although the number of monks is constantly in flux. The majority of men who take ordination in the *sangha* do not become monks for life, but rather for a more limited time, from a few months to several years. Some monks remain in the monastic community for their whole lives, but there is neither a requirement that monks ordain for life nor a stigma about leaving the monastic robes to return to a lay life. This is a decidedly different pattern of monastic life from that practiced in other parts of Buddhist Asia. Among Theravada Buddhists in Sri Lanka, men must make the commitment to ordain for the length of their lives; those who leave the monastic life are often seen as disgraced, although this judgment has softened in recent times.

In Southeast Asia on the other hand, ordination as a novice or a monk is part of life-cycle rituals for many Buddhists. Boys or young men may ordain as novices or monks for a limited time as both part of the transition to adult life and a way to earn significant amounts of karmic merit through taking ordination. This merit is often dedicated to the parents or family members who support the ordination rituals by giving the *sangha* their sons, the greatest possible gift. Traditionally ordination was an avenue for education and social mobility. In recent decades, especially in Thailand, other possibilities for advancement are open for young men, but a monastic education is still seen as a valuable resource for later life. As monks, men learn at least basic Pali chanting that can be incorporated into lay rituals at other stages of life. Furthermore, once a man leaves the monastic *sangha*, he often becomes a strong lay supporter of his local wat, or monastic temple, performing duties that are prohibited for monks according to the monastic code, such as dealing with the wat's finances.

The monastic community in Southeast Asia is officially limited to monks. A lineage of nuns was introduced into Myanmar but disappeared after the thirteenth century. There has never been a tradition of fully ordained nuns in the rest of Southeast Asia, but women do lead religious lives apart from the lay world. Taking a set of vows in addition to the ordinary vows that structure the moral and spiritual lives of Buddhist laity, these women dedicate their lives to ethical and spiritual goals similar to those of monks. Wearing robes and shaving their heads, the *maeji* in Thailand and the *thila-shin* in Myanmar construct lives for themselves as renunciants. Support of these female renunciants varies in different parts of Southeast Asia. In Myanmar, where there are large numbers of women living as *thila-shin*, the role of these renunciant women

is visible, and they receive the support of the lay community. This has not always been the case in Thailand, where the *maeji* have fought for recognition and support and face difficult obstacles to pursuing the education and training available to monks and novices. In recent decades a movement has grown throughout the Buddhist world, including the Theravadin countries, to renew the ordination of women. While some members of the Theravadin community support the reintroduction of an official nuns' lineage through still-existent Mahayana nun lineages in East Asia, there is also large-scale opposition in the monastic *sangha*. Some monks argue that it is impossible to reintroduce a legitimate Theravadin ordination lineage for nuns because the ordination ritual requires the presence of nuns fully ordained in a Theravadin lineage.

The Buddhist world of Southeast Asia is endlessly complex and evolving. Ideals of orthodoxy are preserved in dynamic traditions interacting with other religious traditions, influences from other parts of the Buddhist world, as well as the forces of modernity in and outside Asia. While common patterns of belief and practice reveal the connections between the Buddhist traditions of Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, scholarly attention to the history and living traditions of these Buddhist cultures reveals not only these shared patterns of the Theravadin world but also its diversity.

Karen Derris

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cultural area, which includes not only the central provinces of Tibet (the "Tibet Autonomous Region" of the People's Republic of China) and the eastern and western regions of the Tibetan plateau (divided among several Chinese provinces), but also neighboring areas in northern Nepal and India, the independent states of Bhutan and Mongolia, parts of Russia, and several Central Asian republics that were parts of the former Soviet Union. In recent decades the influence of Tibetan Buddhism has spread beyond this vast geographical area; Tibetan Buddhism is now attracting followers in North America, Europe, and Australia.

History

Buddhism was first formally introduced to Tibet in the seventh century. Traditional Tibetan accounts relate that the history of Buddhism began in the distant past when the buddha sPyan ras gzigs (pronounced Chenrezi) began to prepare the land and its people for the eventual dissemination of Buddhism. This preparation enabled King Srong btsan sgam po (Songtsen Gampo, c. 618–650 CE) to begin the formal establishment of Buddhism in Tibet by marrying two Buddhist women from neighboring countries. Traditional accounts contend that the king and his wives were really emanations of buddhas who assumed their respective identities in order to bring Buddhism to Tibet.

The process of dissemination continued during the reign of King Khri srong De btsan (Trisong Detsen, c. 740–798), who invited the Indian scholar to Tibet. Despite the king's sponsorship, Santaraksita reportedly encountered opposition from both demons and people loyal to the old order (referred to in Buddhist histories as "Bon") and was forced to leave the country. The king subsequently invited Padmasambhava, an Indian master with a reputation for magical powers, who according to traditional accounts defeated the demonic and human forces that had frustrated Santaraksita's mission. Subsequently, the three founded the first monastery in Tibet, bSam yas (Samye), and Tibetans began to enter the Buddhist monastic order.

Buddhism grew rapidly under the sponsorship of the Tibetan kings. This success, however, engendered opposition, and King Ral pa can (Relbachen, reigned 815–836), an ardent supporter of the new religion, was assassinated and replaced by King gLang dar ma (Lang Darma, reigned 838–842), who reportedly persecuted Buddhism. King gLang dar ma in turn was assassinated by a disaffected Buddhist monk, and his death marked the end of the Tibetan royal dynasty.

The following centuries were characterized by a period of interregnum during which no person or group

BUDDHISM—TIBET Tibetan Buddhism is the dominant religious system throughout the Tibetan



BUDDHISM IN THE MOUNTAINS OF TIBET

"Tibetan Buddhism incorporates beliefs that reflect that mountainous environment of the region. Given the importance of the mountains, it is not surprising that mountains are associated with the gods.

"The other great divinity, in some ways more central in the Sherpa conception of Mani Rimdu, is a god associated with the sacred mountain of the region, Khumbila. Sacred mountains quite often symbolize repositories of ancestral collective generative power in Tibetan thought. Mount Khumbila is thought to be holy in part because it is shaped like a torma, or ritual offering cake. Since a torma is at once symbolic of a god's body, of food for him and of his body as food, and of a phallus, this mountain and its deity are well suited to play the role of 'father' in a drama of the primal crime.

"According to Jerstad... this god is called the gnassrung, which means 'place protector,' and his name in full is Zur-ra ra-rgyan. He is, furthermore, according to Jerstad's informants, a local manifestation of the meditation god named Rdo-rje-thig-le. Rdo-rje-thig-le is, in turn, one particular manifestation of the great deity Kun-tu-bzang-po (Sherpa Kuntu Zangbu) the principal Sherpa representation of the Adi-Buddha or primordial Buddha."

Source: Robert A. Paul (1982) *The Tibetan Symbolic World: Psychoanalytic Explorations*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 116.

was able to consolidate power. Despite the political turmoil, however, Buddhism continued to grow. The dominant tradition of Buddhism was based on a scholastic archetype inherited from the great monastic universities of northern India, from whence Buddhism was disseminated to Tibet.

The most influential early proponent of this model was Atisa (982–1054), one of the four directors of Nalanda Monastic University. His arrival in Tibet in 1042, in response to an invitation from the kings of western Tibet, marks the beginning of what traditional histories refer to as the "second dissemination" (*spyi dar*) of Buddhism. Atisa stressed the importance of intensive study of Buddhist philosophy, practice of meditation, and adherence to monastic discipline. This model became the paradigm of the dGe lugs pa (Gelukpa) order, which continues as the largest order in Tibetan Buddhism.

In addition to the scholastic model advocated by Atisa, other forms of Buddhism enjoyed significant popularity in Tibet. The most influential of these were charismatic and often iconoclastic lineages that mostly came from the Indian regions of Bihar and Bengal.

These lineages emphasized esoteric meditative and ritual practices derived from texts called *tantras*, which focused on the manipulation of subtle energies combined with visualizations. These practices were emphasized in the rNying ma pa (Nyingmapa) and bKa' brgyud pa (Kagyupa) schools, the lineages of which are traced to Indian tantric masters. The other two orders of Tibetan Buddhism, the Sa skya pa and dGe lugs pa, place greater emphasis on the scholastic traditions that were largely derived from Indian monastic universities. It should be noted, however, that all four orders of Tibetan Buddhism have scholastic lineages as well as esoteric tantric practices, and that they combine both traditions in their teachings and meditative training.

In the thirteenth century the Sa skya pa order assumed temporal hegemony in Tibet when Sa skya Pandita (Sakya Pandita, 1182–1251) was appointed regent by the Mongol ruler Godan Khan. This followed Sa skya Pandita's mission to Mongolia, during which he ceded sovereignty of Tibet to the Mongols, but which also led to Godan Khan's conversion to Buddhism. The Khan offered to serve as patron of Bud-



An artist painting a terra cotta religious icon at Jokhang Temple in Lhasa, Tibet, in 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

dhism; in turn, Sa skya Pandita and his successors became chaplains in the Mongol court.

Sa skya pa supremacy lasted until the fourteenth century, when Mongol power waned. Various Mongol chieftains continued to exercise considerable influence in Tibet, however, and in the seventeenth century the Fifth Dalai Lama, Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho (Ngawang Losang Gyatso, 1617–1682), assumed temporal leadership of Tibet with the backing of Mongol troops. Thus began a period of rule by successive Dalai Lamas that continued until the invasion and annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China, which began in 1950 and was formalized in 1959.

The Twentieth Century

Following the victory of Mao Zedong (1893–1976), leader of the People's Republic of China, and the Communists in 1947, China set its sights on Tibet. Mao claimed that Tibet had always been a part of China and that its independence (which was formally declared by the Tibetan government in 1911) was an aberration, one that had been engineered by the machinations of "foreign imperialists."

In 1950, Mao dispatched thousands of troops to Tibet with the aim of "liberating" the country and rejoining it to the Chinese "motherland." Initially, Tibetans were told that the invaders only wanted to

improve the lot of the peasant masses and that they would not harm traditional Tibetan religion or culture. After solidifying their control, however, Chinese soldiers began to reshape the culture in accordance with Mao's interpretation of Marxism. At the same time, Chinese officials gradually reduced the power and authority of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government. Matters came to a crisis in March 1959, when a massive demonstration by Tibetans against Chinese rule led to military actions in which an estimated 80,000 Tibetans were killed.

The Fourteenth Dalai Lama, bsTan 'dsin rgya mtsho (Tenzin Gyatso, b. 1935), fled to India, where he was given asylum and allowed to form a government-in-exile in the hill station town of Dharamsala in Himachal Pradesh. During the Cultural Revolution, communist cadres (both Chinese and Tibetan) went on an orgy of destruction in Tibet, destroying thousands of monasteries, looting countless works of religious art, and ransacking the vast libraries. In addition, thousands of religious leaders were imprisoned, and according to Tibetan government-in-exile estimates, over one million people were killed. Following Mao's dictum that "religion is poison," Chinese Red Guards attempted to eradicate the old religion and culture of Tibet.

Over 100,000 Tibetans followed the Dalai Lama into exile, and the new arrivals were given tracts of land by the Indian government. In the ensuing decades, the exiles built several prosperous farming communities,



BUDDHISM IN TIBET—THE VIEW OF EARLY WESTERN MISSIONARIES

The following text written by two French missionaries in the mid-nineteenth century provides a less than positive view of Buddhism as they enter Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, in search of converts.

After eighteen months' struggle with sufferings and obstacles of infinite number and variety, we were at length arrived at the termination of our journey, though not at the close of our miseries. We had no longer, it is true, to fear death from famine or frost in this inhabited country; but trials and tribulations of a different character were no doubt about to assail us, amidst the infidel populations, to whom we desired to preach Christ crucified for the salvation of mankind. Physical troubles over, we had now to undergo moral sufferings; but we relied, as before, on the infinite goodness of the Lord to aid us in the fight, trusting that He who had protected us against the malice of man, in the very heart and capital of Buddhism.

Source: Huc Evariste-Regis and Joseph Gabet. ([1851] 1987) *Travels in Tartary, Thibet and China, 1844–1846*. New York: Dover Publications, 168.

mostly in southern India, and reestablished many of the monasteries that were destroyed in Tibet.

In Tibet, meanwhile, the numbers of monks allowed by the Chinese government have been severely reduced, and the three great central Tibetan monasteries of dGa' ldan (Ganden), Se ra (Sera), and 'Bras spungs (Drepung)—which formerly housed tens of thousands of monks—today are allowed only several hundred monks each. In addition, monastic activities are strictly monitored by the government because monks and nuns have been at the forefront of anti-Chinese agitations. Chinese secret police are in permanent residence in many Tibetan monasteries, and several army bases have been built near major monastic centers. Monks and nuns are required to spend most of their days studying Marxist dogma in "patriotic reeducation" courses and are actively discouraged from learning the traditional curriculum that was once the foundation of Tibetan Buddhist study and practice.

Despite the repression in the land of its origin, Tibetan Buddhism is popular all over the world. Thousands of Tibetan Buddhist centers operate in the United States, Europe, and Australia, and Tibetan teachers like the Dalai Lama commonly draw large

crowds when they lecture. Major events such as the annual Kalacakra initiation given by the Dalai Lama attract people from all over the world, and Tibetan religion and culture are the subjects of major Hollywood films and popular writing. Westerners in the tens of thousands consider themselves to be Tibetan Buddhists, and the popularity of the tradition continues to grow, fueled by the charisma of prominent Tibetan teachers, the enthusiastic support of celebrities, and sympathetic reporting by most of the Western media.

John Powers

See also: **Buddhism—Central Asia; Buddhism—China; Buddhism—Mongolia; Dalai Lama; Potala Palace**

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BUDDHISM—VIETNAM Buddhism is the main religion in Vietnam, practiced by three-quarters of the population. Unlike its Southeast Asian neighbors, who are largely Theravada Buddhist, Vietnam embraces Mahayana Buddhism, including both Chan (Zen) and Pure Land traditions. (In southern Vietnam, a largely Khmer minority practices Theravada Buddhism.) Although Buddhism entered Vietnam from both India and China, the predominant political, cultural, and religious influences were Chinese. Over the centuries, however, the Vietnamese have created a form of Buddhist religiosity that is distinctively their own.

History

The first few centuries of the first millennium were marked by the expansion of Indian culture and religion into Southeast Asia. Archaeological evidence from Champa, in what is now central Vietnam, yields figures of buddhas and bodhisattvas and Sanskrit inscriptions dating from the second or third century CE. Inscriptions address Hindu gods predominantly, especially Siva, but there are also praises to the Buddha. Later archaeological finds from Dong Duong in central Vietnam indicate the presence of Buddhist temples and statues. Although most of this evidence is suggestive of Mahayana Buddhism, a Hinayana presence is mentioned by the seventh-century Chinese traveler Yi Jing. As for northern Vietnam, in the second and third centuries CE, the Giao Chi province was visited by such prominent figures as the Sogdian monk Kang Seng Hui and the Indian monks Kalyaonaruci and Marajavaka; they propagated the dharma, founded relic mounds (stupas) and temples, and translated Buddhist scriptures from Sanskrit into Chinese.


Chinese Buddhist influence in Vietnam, however, was eventually far more substantial and enduring than

Indian Buddhist influence. Vietnam was ruled by China for more than a millennium (111 BCE–939 CE), and Chinese political domination and culture exerted a more direct and profound impression on Vietnam than on any other Southeast Asian culture. The first recorded instance of a Chinese missionary in Vietnam is Mou Po, who propagated Buddhism in northern Vietnam in the second century CE. However, Mahayana Buddhism from China really became dominant and widespread beginning in the fifth century CE. Buddhism in Vietnam, as in China, existed throughout its long history alongside, and sometimes in competition with, Confucianism, Taoism, and ancestor worship.

The most prominent form of Buddhism to take hold in Vietnam was Thien (in Sanskrit, Dhyana; in Chinese, Chan; in Japanese, Zen). Traditional sources record the transmission of three major Thien sects from China, beginning with the arrival of the Indian master Vinataruci in 580 CE, who was trained in China in the lineage begun by Bodhidharma. He came to be regarded as the first Thien patriarch in Vietnam. The founder of the second Vietnamese Thien school was Vo Ngon Thong, a Chinese master who arrived in Vietnam in 820. The founding in the eleventh century of the third Thien tradition, the Thao Duong school, occurred after Vietnam's independence from China. Buddhism attained increasing importance as the state religion for several of the subsequent Vietnamese dynasties. The Thao Duong advocated a unified practice of Thien and Pure Land traditions. Chan meditation practice and Pure Land recitation came to be regarded as compatible methods for attaining enlightenment, and the unification of these two traditions was seen as politically expedient for seeking favor for Buddhism at court.

During the Tran dynasty (1225–1400) the Vietnamese people pressed southward and brought Champa under their rule. At this time an additional school of Buddhism, the Truc Lam, developed. It fused Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism in a spirit of national unity against foreign domination, especially against incursions by the Mongols. Truc Lam combined the otherworldly aspirations of Thien insight with the practical humanism of Confucianism. In time, however, the political elite increasingly supported Confucianism at the expense of Buddhism, though a resurgence of Buddhism occurred in the seventeenth century, stimulated by the arrival of Chinese monks of the Linji (in Vietnamese, Lam-Te; in Japanese, Rinzai) tradition. The Lam-Te became the foundation of most of Vietnam's present-day monastic institutions.

During the Nguyen dynasty (1802–1955), the political elite favored Confucianism exclusively, and Buddhist monks withdrew from political activity. Christian



The White Statue of Buddha on Thuy Son Mountain south of Danang in 1993. (STEVE RAYMER/CORBIS)

missionaries started arriving in Vietnam beginning in the sixteenth century, and the increasing influence of Christianity under French colonial rule presented a further challenge to Buddhism.

Buddhism experienced a revival in the twentieth century starting in the 1930s, when it was embraced as a central component in the various nationalist movements that sought independence from the French. Their efforts included an emphasis on the study of Buddhist texts, a new focus on projects of social welfare, and an attempt to abolish what were regarded as superstitious elements. One particularly influential Buddhist movement was the Hoa Hao sect, which taught a heterodox form of Buddhism propounded by its charismatic founder Huynh Phu So (1919–1947). In 1951 the All-Vietnam Buddhist Association was founded, uniting all the previous Buddhist organizations and sects of Buddhism and declaring Buddhism to be Vietnam's national religion. Buddhism was also prominent and visible in the

protest movements in the years of war that followed independence. In the 1960s activist Buddhist monks contributed to the downfall of the Diem regime; in the decades following, they sought alternative systems of economic development and social progress to those provided by Western capitalist and Marxist ideologies.

Beliefs and Practices

Buddhism emphasizes the release of human beings from suffering. The schools most prominent in Vietnam incorporate dual aspects of Mahayana Buddhism, namely, wisdom and compassion, and regard them as compatible and skillful means for attaining liberation from suffering. Thien recommends insight, wisdom, and realization through meditation, while the Pure Land tradition emphasizes compassion, worship, and recitation of the name of the Buddha Amitabha. Adherents of Pure Land Buddhism seek rebirth in the Pure Land, or Western Paradise, through single-minded devotion to Amitabha rather than spiritual awakening through their own meditative achievements. In the Pure Land, enlightenment is easily attained.

The nonsectarian and unified nature of Vietnamese Buddhism is apparent in the temple practices of monks and laypeople. Buddhist temples in Vietnam include images of both Sakyamuni and Amitabha, as well as numerous bodhisattvas. Monastic temples incorporate a daily regimen of meditation, study, and sutra chanting, as well as name recitation. Laypeople practice Buddhism by name recitation, visiting temples to offer flowers, incense, and candles to the Buddha and the monastic community (monks traditionally have been revered not only for their ideals of personal salvation, but also for their supernatural powers and skills in healing and divination), and praying for deceased loved ones.

The popular religion has always been eclectic, and elements of Confucianism, Taoism, ancestor worship, and spirit cults continue to complement Buddhist practices. Veneration of sacred objects, including relics, sutra texts, and amulets, for their protective qualities, is also common. With its long history of change and adaptation, its eclectic syncretism, and tolerance by Vietnam's Marxist government, Buddhism in Vietnam seems likely to enjoy continued popularity in the twenty-first century.

Maria Heim

See also: **Buddhism-China; Buddhism, Chan; Buddhism, Pure Land**

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BUDDHIST LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY-CAMBODIA During the 1980s, civil war wracked Cambodia. One faction, the Kampuchean People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), was headed by Son Sann (1911–2000), onetime prime minister from 1967 to 1968 under Prince Norodom Sihanouk (b. 1922). The KPNLF mobilized its support in Cambodian refugee camps in Thailand.

Since Son Sann lived in Paris, and thus was physically removed from Cambodia, the KPNLF opened a Bangkok office, which was headed by Ieng Mouly (b. 1950). The KPNLF was the only faction favoring a liberal democracy for Cambodia. For the election in 1993, the KPNLF retitled itself the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP), with Son Sann as president. The BLDP won only six seats, but it was included in the ruling coalition along with the two major parties. Ieng Mouly became the Minister of Information.

The BLDP split in May 1995. The government then recognized the BLDP as represented by the faction of Ieng Mouly, who was elected BLDP president in July. In August, Son Sann and his supporters were expelled from the BLDP, whereupon they formed the Son Sann Party. Later, a breakaway BLDP faction formed the Light of Liberty Party. During the 1998

election, none of the three parties won a seat, so they disbanded. Former BLDP members then joined either the Cambodian People's Party or the Sihanoukist Party, which were the two main political parties.

Michael Haas

See also: **Cambodia-History**

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BUDI UTOMO On 20 May 1908, Indonesia's Wahidin Sudira Usada (1852–1917) founded Budi Utomo (Noble Conduct), the first organized movement to create Indonesian nationalism and seek the end of Dutch rule through peaceful means. Wahidin believed that education was the key to reviving national awareness among the *priyayi* (elite). The Javanese princess Raden Adjang Kartini had already stressed the importance of education to awaken the Javanese. Wahidin worked closely with Gunawan Mangunkusumo of the School of Training Physicians in Batavia (now Jakarta) to raise the status of indigenous people through Western knowledge and their own traditional culture. Budi Utomo grew rapidly, and about forty branches were established. Students and bureaucrats joined the organization, and it worked to broaden its scope. Budi Utomo began to emphasize improvements in agriculture and trade. The radical members wanted political activity, which was opposed by the conservatives. With the rise of the political party Sarekat Islam from 1912 to 1916, Budi Utomo was no longer felt to be effective, and its membership went down. In 1935, it was dissolved officially. However, its importance in the early phase of the Indonesian independence movement can be gauged by the fact that 20 May, its date of founding, is commemorated in Indonesia as the Day of National Awakening.

Patit Paban Mishra

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BUFFALO, WATER The Asiatic water buffalo is considered the true buffalo, *Bubalus bubalis*. The African or cape buffalo is *Sycerus caffer*. Buffalo is known as *carabao* in the Philippines, *shui niu* (water buffalo) in China, and *kerbau* in Malaysia.

The size of buffalo varies. Small buffalo in China weigh 250 kilograms. Buffalo in Thailand weigh between 450 and 550 kilograms; those in Laos, up to 500 to 600 kilograms. Some weighing even 1,000 kilograms have been observed. Height varies from 100 to 148 centimeters, depending on age. Similarly, body length ranges from 160 to 215 centimeters.

Buffalo are sensitive to extreme cold and not as adaptable as cattle to very cold climates. They do not do well where the sun is inadequate to ripen crops such as cotton, grapes, or rice. Although the general belief is that the buffalo is a tropical animal, river buffalo have been employed to pull snowplows during the winter in Bulgaria. Buffalo are also found in the former Soviet states of Georgia and Azerbaijan as well as in the cold and mountainous areas of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Nepal. Sizable herds in Italy and the former Soviet Union range above 40° N latitude.

Likenesses of buffalo have been found on seals made in the Indus Valley in India and Pakistan more than five thousand years ago, and records show that the buffalo was in use in China more than four thousand years ago. Although some evidence suggests that the buffalo was domesticated in the areas that are now

India and Pakistan, some experts argue that the buffalo was first domesticated as a work animal in Mesopotamia during the Akkadian dynasty, about 2500 BCE. Archaeological evidence of buffalo as a domesticated animal has been limited to seals and bone findings. Buffalo, however, were brought from Mesopotamia to modern Syria, Israel, and Egypt only in 600 CE. Buffalo migrated eastward and westward from their countries of origin in Mesopotamia, India, and Pakistan. In the last two millennia, such migrations have accounted for colonies of buffalo being established in the Philippines and Indonesia.

Types of Domesticated Buffalo

There are two general types of domesticated water buffalo—swamp buffalo and river buffalo. The distinction is based on habitat. The swamp buffalo is native to swampland and wallows in mud and feeds on coarse marsh grasses and reeds. The river buffalo, on the other hand, prefers to wallow in rivers and ponds. River breeds include all the milking breeds in India and Pakistan, such as the Murrah, Jafarabadi, Mehsana, Surti, and others.

Swamp buffalo are slate gray, droopy necked, and look like oxen with huge backswept horns. They are native to the eastern half of Asia from India to Taiwan. These buffalo are found in China and areas stretching from the Philippines in Southeast Asia to as far west as India. The swamp buffalo has been iden-



A boy riding a water buffalo in Yangon, Myanmar, in 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

tified essentially as the China buffalo. Although mostly employed as a work animal, the swamp buffalo is also used for meat but almost hardly ever for milk. But some experts believe that this buffalo has the potential for milk production similar to that of the milch river breeds, with the milk yielding a product rich in butterfat (ghee).

River buffalo are native to the western half of Asia and are found farther west in India, Egypt, and Europe. They are usually either black or dark gray. They have tightly coiled or drooping straight horns and actually prefer to wallow in clean water and ponds. River buffalo produce more milk than swamp buffalo and are used in dairies.

Water buffalo are generally herd animals with an innate attachment to a site or a herd. Their lifespan ranges from twenty to thirty years—two to three times the lifespan of cattle. The gestation period is 270 to 285 days—about a month longer than that of cattle. Poor management and poor nutrition have been blamed for the belief that the buffalo is slow to mature sexually and slow to rebreed after calving. Buffalo estrus is difficult to detect, and the estrus cycle averages about twenty-four days. Matings occur at night.

Buffalo cows normally reach breeding age at about two years and can bear their first calves at three. The bulls generally reach breeding age at about three but are not fully mature until they are about eight years old. The large bulls that have been deemed best for breeding are often selected for draft animals, which are castrated. Others are sent to slaughter. In China, the castration of male calves not required for breeding is done by knife and ligature at around one year of age.

Buffalo and cattle belong to the same family, although genetically buffalo are further removed from cattle than from the American bison, which has been hunted to near extinction. A closer living relative is the European forest bison. The domesticated swamp buffalo is almost identical to the wild arni, whereas the domesticated river buffalo has no wild prototype. Buffalo do not generally interbreed with domestic cattle, although cross-breeding by farmers has been reported but not well documented. Worldwide, the population has been rising, but in many countries in Southeast Asia, there has been a decline.

Ooi Giok-Ling

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BUH Buh wrestling, along with archery and horseback riding, is considered one of the three "manly" sports of Mongolia. At its highest level of competition, Buh takes place at the annual Nadam (meetings) held by the various nomadic (or formerly nomadic) tribes in Mongolia. These competitions in Inner Mongolia attract some 30,000 spectators annually. Buh is believed to have developed out of Mongolian horseback riding techniques and perhaps was practiced to develop and maintain these skills. Wrestlers wear riding boots, a belt, and a leather vest called a *zudg*. The goal is to force one's opponent to touch the ground with any part of his body except the soles of his feet or palms of his hands. In its traditional form, there is neither a ring nor a time limit, and it is a test of strength and endurance. Buh wrestling has gained some popularity in Japan, as it similar to Japanese sumo wrestling.

David Levinson

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BUKHARA (1997 est. pop. 237,000). Bukhara is an ancient city in modern Uzbekistan. Long a major center of learning in the eastern Islamic world, Bukhara was also capital of a state of the same name, from the sixteenth century to 1924.

Bukhara was an important trading post on the Silk Route connecting China with the Middle East well before Arab armies conquered the city in 709. After the Arab conquest, the population gradually converted to Islam. In the late ninth century Bukhara became the capital of the Samanid dynasty (892–1005), which presided over the revival of the Persian literary tradition after two centuries of Arabic-language domination. Bukhara remained a major center of Persian language and civilization until the twentieth century.

After the decline of the Samanids, the armies of Ghengis Khan sacked Bukhara in 1220. Although the



The Ark Fortress or Citadel in Bukhara which since the first millennium has served as the home of various rulers of the region. It has also been destroyed and rebuilt numerous times. (DAVID SAMUEL ROBBINS/CORBIS)

city's political eclipse continued until the mid-sixteenth century when it became the capital of Shaybanid dynasty, Bukhara was celebrated as a center of Islamic learning. Imam Ismai'īl al-Bukhari (d. 869), the great collector of hadith, or the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, had worked in Bukhara. Baha' al-Din Naqshband (d. 1388) established the influential Naqshbandi Sufi order in Bukhara. After the sixteenth century Bukhara's *madrasas* (seminaries) attracted students from all Central Asia and from as far away as Tatarstan and India.

Bukhara came under Russian protection in 1868; in 1920 the Soviets, with the help of disaffected Buk-

harans, overran the country and established a Bukharan People's Soviet Republic. In 1924 Central Asian state boundaries were redrawn on an ethnonational basis, the Bukharan republic was abolished, and Bukhara was included in Uzbekistan. Bukhara lost its status as a capital city; Uzbek replaced Persian as the official language.

Today Bukhara is a regional city in Uzbekistan, with an economy based on the exploitation of nearby oil and gas resources and the processing of cotton and karakul-sheep wool. Much of the city's architecture dates from the Soviet period, but the old city boasts several architectural monuments, such as the tenth-century mausoleum of the Samanid dynasty and the Kalon minaret, the tallest structure in the world when it was built in 1127.

Adeeb Khalid



BUKHARA-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

The Historic Centre of Bukhara was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1993 for its architecture and urban environment that have remained intact over many centuries.

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BUKHARA, KHANATE OF The Bukhara khanate, so-called after the ancient city of Bukhara (located in the present-day Republic of Uzbekistan), was one of two khanates or kingdoms founded by the successors of Muhammad Shaybani-khan (1451–1510), descended from Shayban, a grandson of Genghis Khan, in 1511. Following in the footsteps of the prolific Timurid dynasty, the Shaybanid empire of Central Asia at its peak included all of Central Asia to the Iranian plateau and the Hindu Kush mountain range. The first khanate at Bukhara and the second at Khwarizm were founded on the ruins of Shaybani-khan's conquests.

Between the 1560s and 1860s, Bukhara was thus the capital of an independent state—the khanate, later the emirate of Bukhara. It was situated at a crucial location on the Silk Route and had embassies and extensive trade arrangements with the Russian czars, the Mughal empire, and parts of Western Europe. Items of export from the khanate included varieties of fruits, rice, cotton, and silk. The city of Bukhara, at the center of the khanate, was an urban center with protective walls, a fortress, several residential and commercial quarters, and numerous religious monuments. In addition, there were numerous elaborate caravansaries (inns for traveling caravans), specialized bazaars, and vaulted galleries, all attesting to the commercial importance of the city in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The Shaybanid dynasty ended at Bukhara in 1598 and at Khwarizm (later named Khiva) in 1687, adding political disintegration to the already existing economic and cultural decline of this area of Central Asia. The outlying areas of both these khanates, which had previously been loosely bound to the central cities, now broke away to form independent principalities, while the Uzbek tribal aristocracy seized power at the center. Tribal skirmishes continued for control of the two governments, though power was actually wielded by a mayor of the palace (called the *atalik* in Bukhara and the *inak* in Khiva), while dynastic rulers merely served as figureheads. The khanate survived in the region in a reduced form, until its absorption into the Russian empire in the 1880s.

Manu P. Sobti

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BUKHARIAN JEWS Bukharian Jews, who call themselves *yabudy*, are one of the world's most ancient Jewish communities. Related to Iranian and Afghani Jews, they speak a Bukharian dialect of the Tajik language. The first Jews came to Central Asia after it was conquered by the Persian empire about 520 BCE. Archaeological findings point to several waves of resettlement of Jews from Persia to Central Asia in the fourth century BCE as well as in the first four centuries CE. Major Jewish communities were established in the ancient Central Asian towns of Merv, Termez, and Balkh.

After the Arab conquest of Central Asia in the seventh century, Bukhara and Samarqand become the main centers of Jewish life in the region. As many as 30,000 Jews lived in those cities, according to the great twelfth-century Jewish traveler and explorer Benjamin of Tudela.

The Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century hit the Jews of Central Asia hard: all the communities except the one in Bukhara were destroyed, and subsequently all Jews in Central Asia were known as Bukharian Jews. During the reign of Timur (or Tamerlane, (1370–1405), Jews settled in Samarqand and Shakhrisabz. Beginning in the sixteenth century and for almost three hundred years, Jews live in almost total isolation, confined to their own urban quarters, denied basic rights, and limited to such occupations as silk dyeing, crafts, and minor trade.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, Jews were living in almost every Central Asian town. At this time the Mahallai Yahudien, or Jewish Quarter, was built in Samarqand and still exists today. During the Russian colonization of the region (1853–1872), Jews actively supported the Russians, who gave them Russian citizenship and encouraged their investment in industry and trade. Many Jews were involved in the textile business, processing and trading cotton. As the result, by the beginning of twentieth century, the Jewish com-

munity was substantially richer. A national intelligentsia emerged. Contacts with Jews from Russia and other countries spread the idea of Zionism, and emigration to Palestine began. (In 1892 a Bukharian quarter in Jerusalem was established called Sh'hunat Buhori.)

With the establishment of Soviet rule in Central Asia (1917–1922) and the founding of the Soviet Republics of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenia, Bukharian Jews played a significant role in the region's cultural and socioeconomic development. But due to Communist policies, they had largely assimilated and lost their cultural heritage by the early 1970s. The rise of anti-Semitism and nationalism caused a mass emigration of Bukharian Jews to Israel (about 100,000), the United States (60,000), and other nations. Today, only about 10,000 Bukharian Jews remain in Central Asia, and their communities are on the verge of vanishing.

Mikbail Degtiar

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BULGARIANS Descendants of the medieval Bulgars and Slavs, Bulgarians form the ethnic majority in Bulgaria. The Slavs settled in the Balkans in the sixth to seventh century CE, absorbing the indigenous Hellenized Thracians. They lived in tribes and farming communes ruled by a *knyaz* (lord), who presided over the tribal council attended by all men of military age. The Slavs venerated the thunder god Perun, the goddess of love Lada, and other deified forces of nature.

The Bulgars were Turkic nomads originating on the Central Asian steppes. Their society was a military hierarchy headed by a khan (chieftain) from the noble clans. The Bulgars worshiped Tangra, creator of the sky and the earth, and venerated the wolf, dog, horse, and other animals.

Early History

In the early seventh century, khan Kubrat (d. 650?) united the Bulgars between the Black and Caspian Seas in a tribal confederation known as Great Bulgaria. It was overrun by the Khazars shortly after his death. Afterward, Bulgar tribes led by Kubrat's son khan As-

parukh migrated to the Danube delta. They formed an alliance with the Slav tribal confederation of the southern Danubian plains and defeated the army of Constantine IV Pogonatus. In 681, the Byzantine emperor ceded to the Bulgars the lands between the Danube and the Balkan mountains. The first Bulgarian kingdom, founded in that year, was ruled as a khanate until the middle of the ninth century.

In 864, Boris I (852–889) converted to Orthodox Christianity and made it the state religion, also adopting the Byzantine model of government. The new faith augmented the integration of Bulgars and Slavs into one polity. In 866, Boris I adopted the Cyrillic (Slavic) alphabet, created by the Byzantine monks Cyril and Methodius. Slavic Bulgarian became the official language of liturgy and state administration and the basis of Bulgarian national identity.

This sense of identity survived the fall of the state under Byzantine rule in 1018. An uprising in 1185 led to the establishment of the second Bulgarian kingdom, but Tatar incursions from 1273 on, and feudal rivalries, contributed to its decline and culminated in the Ottoman conquest of 1396.

Ottoman Rule

During the early centuries of Ottoman rule, Bulgarian culture was centered in the monasteries; the native aristocracy disappeared, replaced by Ottoman military landholders, and the higher church hierarchy was in the hands of Greek clergy, since all Christian subjects of the sultan were considered a single millet, or religious group. A Bulgarian national revival in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was spearheaded by merchants and craftsmen guilds, and the quest for political independence led to a Bulgarian uprising in 1876, which was crushed. The subsequent Russo-Turkish war ended in 1878 with a treaty stipulating an independent Bulgarian state, but European fears of Russian dominance over the area forced the creation of the independent principality of Bulgaria and the autonomous East Roumelia in the Ottoman empire. The prince, elected from one of the minor European dynasties, was to be approved by the great powers. Most potential candidates were from the numerous German principalities. The unification of Roumelia and the principality in 1885 through a militia coup provoked a Serbian offensive against Bulgaria, which was successfully repelled.

Territorial disputes among the successor states of the Ottoman empire led to two Balkan wars (1912–1914) and played a part in Bulgaria's joining the Central Powers in World War I. After the war popular

discontent led to political dissension, uprisings, and government retaliation. In 1941, Bulgaria allowed German troops on its territory, becoming a member of the Axis alliance.

World War II and After

In September 1944, with the Soviet Army at the borders and partisans marching into the cities, the Fatherland Front, an alliance of leftist parties, took power and declared war on Germany. The monarchy was abolished in a 1946 referendum and a people's republic proclaimed. The following year a Soviet-type constitution entrenched the Communist Party's sole right to govern and paved the way for the nationalization of industry and cooperation of farmland.

As in most of Eastern Europe, the Communist regime fell in 1989 amid mass demonstrations. Presently, the country is a parliamentary democracy with a National Assembly of 240 members elected by proportional representation. The president, elected by direct vote for not more than two five-year mandates, appoints the prime minister from the majority party.

Marta Simidchieva

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BULLYING. See **Ijime**.

BULOSAN, CARLOS (1913–1956), Filipino writer and poet. Carlos Bulosan was born in Binalonan, a small village in Pangasinan Province in the central Philippines, on 2 November 1911. In 1930, at the age of seventeen, he left his homeland for the United States, and paid \$75 for passage on the Dollar Line to Seattle, Washington. He would never return to the Philippines, nor would he ever become a U.S. citizen. Bulosan lived difficult years of unemployment, illness, and dangerous labor-union activity on the farms of California and fish canneries in Alaska. In 1942 he published a volume of poetry entitled *Letter from America* and in 1943 another book of poems, *Voice of Bataan*, a tribute to those soldiers who died in

that battle. In that same year, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt commissioned Bulosan to write one of the essays, "Freedom from Want," in "The Four Freedoms," a wartime collection that appeared in the *Saturday Evening Post*. He attracted nationwide attention for his *Laughter of My Father* (1944), a collection of short stories serialized in the *New Yorker*. *America Is in the Heart* (1946), considered by many to be his most important work, is a semiautobiographical book describing his boyhood in the Philippines, his journey to America, and the many hardships he encountered as a Filipino and migrant worker in that country.

During the postwar years, he became an outspoken critic of those who exploited workers and the poor. Associated with leftist and socialist causes, Bulosan, along with other labor activists, was blacklisted in the 1950s. He spent his last years in Seattle, poor and in failing health. At the same time McCarthyism was starting to rear its ugly head, Bulosan was being re-discovered in literary circles. Carlos Bulosan died on 11 September 1956. In 1995, a posthumously discovered novel, *The Cry and the Dedication*, about the Huk rebellion against colonization and U.S. domination of the Philippines, was published.

Craig Loomis

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BUMIPUTRA Literally "son of the soil," *bumiputra* is a term used to describe the indigenous Malay population in Malaysia that is constitutionally granted "special rights" in society. During the 1959 negotiations that led to the creation of Malaysia, the leaders of the three ethnic communities reached an understanding that in return for citizenship and full legal and economic rights for the Chinese and Indians, the Malays would dominate the civil service and political leadership. Ostensibly barred from the public sector, the more urbanized ethnic Chinese community went on to dominate Malaysia's private sector, causing a widening socioeconomic gap among the ethnic communities.

In 1965, the Bumiputra Economic Congress was held and, for the first time, economic aspirations were presented in racial terms. As a result, the Bumiputra

Bank was established to channel capital to Malay-oriented projects and Malay-owned corporations. Yet communal tensions increased, culminating in the 13 May 1969 race riots in which 196 people were killed. After the riots, the government took great steps to strengthen the Malay identity of the state.

From May 1969 to March 1971, democracy was suspended and the National Operations Council ruled by emergency powers. During this period the government implemented the New Economic Policy, a radical affirmative action program that sought to improve the standard of living of the *bumiputras*. The New Economic Policy had two goals: to reduce and eradicate poverty and to eliminate the identification of race with economic function. To achieve the first goal, the government concentrated on developing the countryside where the majority of Malays lived. To achieve the second goal, the government adopted a radical affirmative action program so that jobs and higher-education opportunities reflected the racial composition of the country. In addition to affirmative action, the replacement of English with Malay as the official language and language of instruction by 1982 greatly favored the Malays at the expense of the minority communities.

The government set goals for the share of corporate equity owned by Malays from 2.5 percent in 1970 to 30 percent by 1990. To achieve this, the government discriminated against ethnic Chinese and citizens of other countries in favor of *bumiputras* by giving Malay business special preferences, licenses, contracts, and credits, while putting pressure on Chinese and foreign-owned firms to take on Malay partners. As a Malay middle class and upper class have emerged after three decades of affirmative action, there are now growing calls to end race-based programs and policies—yet they remain supported by the majority of the rural-based *bumiputras*, whose standard of living still remains below the national average.

Zachary Abuza

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BUN BANG FAI The Bun Bang Fai Festival is one of twelve lowland Lao religious customs and celebrates the oncoming of the rainy season and fertility. The two-day festival is held in lowland Laos and neighboring Thailand during late May or early June. The timing of the festival varies depending on each village. Bun Bang Fai is sometimes celebrated with Visakha Bucha, a Buddhist holiday celebrating the birth, death, and rebirth of the Buddha. The village coordinates with the local temple, which holds a ceremony on the morning of the first day of the festival. After the temple ceremony, the villagers parade around with rockets made from bamboo or plastic tubing filled with gunpowder, charcoal, and sulfur. Carrying phallic images, both male and female participants dance after the rockets. Such displays are meant to provoke the gods into releasing lightning followed by rain. The contest for the best rocket then begins. The rockets are shot into the sky, and the rocket that travels the farthest is the winner. The intention of the explosions is also to startle the gods, causing the release of rain. The celebration continues with folk music performances and other activities. Bun Bang Fai underlines the animist and agricultural foundation of Lao culture with the emphasis on rain to insure a prosperous season for rice, other crops, and ultimately life.

Linda S. McIntosh

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BUNJINGA The Japanese term *bunjinga* refers to a style of painting produced by literati (*bunjin*). *Bunjinga* traces its roots to the paintings of Chinese literati of Song dynasty (960–1267). In Japan, *bunjinga* is also known as *nanga* (Southern pictures) in reference to the theories of the Ming-dynasty connoisseur, critic, and painter Dong Qichang (1555–1636), who categorized Chinese painters as belonging either to the orthodox and academic Northern School or to the creative and expressive Southern School. In Japan, *bunjinga*'s origins may be traced to the philosopher Ogyu Sorai (1666–1728), who believed in the Chinese notion that the true gentleman was well versed in the arts of painting and calligraphy.

Bunjinga painters came from diverse backgrounds and included samurai, *ronin* (masterless samurai), poets, and professional painters. Japanese artists learned about Chinese literati painting from the Zen priest-

painters who came to Japan in the seventeenth century, Chinese professional and amateur painters in Nagasaki, Chinese woodblock-printed painting manuals, and imported paintings. *Bunjinga* paintings were done with brush and ink, and occasionally also with color. These paintings were often contained by a poem, which demonstrated the artist's calligraphic expertise. *Bunjinga* could take a variety of formats, including hanging scrolls, hand scrolls, small-format album leaves, and folding screens, and their subject matter was diverse, ranging from realistic depictions of birds and flowers to abstracted landscapes.

Of the Japanese *bunjinga* artists, Ike no Taiga (1723–1776) and Yosa Buson (1716–1783) are notable. Taiga's work is characterized by its wittiness and humor as well as its use of dotted and textured brushstrokes accompanied by light and cheery color. In addition, Taiga was an accomplished calligrapher. Buson was a highly praised haiku poet who saw painting as a career that would allow him to earn a living to support his poetry writing. His paintings are light and airy with a playful spirit.

The literati tradition continued into the nineteenth century as artists sought to emulate Chinese ideals more closely than their predecessors. Nineteenth-century *bunjinga* painters came largely from the educated samurai class. Notable among these artists were Okada Beisanjin (1744–1820) and Uragami Gyokudo (1745–1820). While Beisanjin employed a variety of styles in his paintings, his later works are characterized by forceful brushstrokes that create unusual forms and give texture to his images. Gyokudo's work is more dramatic and somber; he uses layers of brushwork to create feathery mountains and clouds. Whether relying on Chinese style or departing from it, the *bunjinga* tradition allowed the artists of Japan a creative freedom that resulted in the production of some of the culture's finest works of art.

Catherine Pagani

See also: **Painting-Japan; Calligraphy-Japan; Poetry-Japan**

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BUNRAKU Bunraku, named after the theater manager Uemura Bunrakuken (1737–1810), is the most revered of Japan's many forms of puppet theater (*ningyo shibai*). Three arts are intertwined in a performance: puppet manipulation (*ningyo zukai*), chanting of the dramatic text by a single narrator (*tayū*), and musical accompaniment by a single samisen (a three-stringed lute) player. The musical style is known as *gidayu*, after its creator, the chanter Takemoto Gidayu (1651–1714), or *yoruri*, from a sixteenth-century narrative *Joruri junidan* (Twelve Tales of Princess Joruri) that became a popular puppet play. When the theater district in the city of Edo (now Tokyo) burned in 1657, many puppet troupes moved to Osaka, which thereafter became the center for puppet theater in Japan.

History

A sophisticated, professional puppet theater came into existence in the early eighteenth century when two theaters, the Takemoto-za and the Toyotake-za, competed with each other in Osaka's Dotonbori entertainment district. At the Takemoto-za, playwright Chikamatsu Monzaemon (1652–1724), chanter Takemoto Gidayu, and theater manager Takeda Izumo I (d. 1747) produced the first domestic play (*sewamono*) written for the puppets, *Sonezaki shinju* (The Love Suicides at Sonezaki, 1703), and history plays (*jidaimono*) such as *Kokusenya gassen* (The Battles of Coxinga, 1715). Chikamatsu's dramas are known for their beautiful language and psychological depth of characterization. In the 1730s, puppeteers created complex puppets whose eyes, eyebrows, mouth, hands and even fingers moved realistically. Each puppet required a team of three puppeteers responsible for movements of the head and right hand, the left hand, and the feet, respectively. Revolving stages and trap doors created magical special effects. Exciting all-day plays were written to take advantage of the new technical developments. Over a period of three years, Takeda Izumo II (1691–1756), Namiki Senryū (1695–1751), and Miyoshi Shoraku (1696–1775) jointly wrote the "Three Great Masterpieces" of puppet drama for performance at the Takemoto-za: *Sugawara denju tenarai kagami* (The House of Sugawara, 1746), *Yoshitsune senbon zakura* (Yoshitsune and the Thousand Cherry Trees, 1747), and Japan's most famous revenge play, *Kanadehon chushingura* (The Treasury of Loyal Retainers, 1748). At the Toyotake-za, *Ichinotani futaba gunki* (Chronicle of the Battle of Ichinotani, 1751) was so popular with audiences that it ran for twelve



Famous Japanese puppeteer Yoshida Tamao holds a Bunraku puppet, c. 1979. (JACK FIELDS/CORBIS)

months. Kabuki troupes quickly mounted live versions of the plays, retaining the chanted narrative and thus adding *gidayu* music to their other styles. In the mid-eighteenth century, Bunraku's popularity rapidly declined as the scale of competing Kabuki productions became ever more lavish and spectacular. From the middle of the nineteenth century to the present time, a single puppet troupe continued the Bunraku tradition in Osaka.

Characteristics

Bunraku puppet dramas have high literary value and are performed for adult audiences. The team of chanter and accompanying samisen player, which changes at the beginning of each scene, sets the pace and mood of a performance, while puppeteers follow the tempo and emotion of the music. The chanter is so important that chanting without puppets (*sujojuri*) can be staged. Puppeteers spend up to thirty years learning to create natural, human movements with the puppets. The spectator sees, in addition to four or five puppet characters, a dozen or more puppeteers surrounding them and the chanter's facial expressions that powerfully convey anger, laughter, or anguish. In order to infuse the inanimate puppets with life, the chanter uses a richly emotional vocal style that draws audience attention to him. Therefore, the spectator's perception of a "character" in drama is multifaceted, created from all of the components of the performance. In especially important scenes, five or six chanters may be seated onstage, each taking the voice of one character, a technique that was borrowed from the first-person acting of competing Kabuki theaters.

Today, a single Bunraku troupe, subsidized by the Ministry of Education, is housed in the new National Bunraku Theater in Osaka. The troupe performs a

repertory of traditional plays in Osaka, Tokyo, and other cities, usually for runs of two or three weeks.

James Brandon

See also: **Drama-Japan**

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BURAKU LIBERATION LEAGUE The Buraku Liberation League (BLL), or Buraku Kaiho Domei, is the main pressure group of Japan's largest minority, the *burakumin* (hamlet people). For over fifty years, BLL has fought against discrimination and for equality for the *burakumin*, whose ancestors belonged to the outcast group called *eta* or *hinin* during the Edo period (1603–1868). By the end of the 1990s, the BLL counted 200,000 members and 2,200 branches throughout thirty-nine prefectures in Japan.

One of the BLL's predecessors was the Greater Japan Brotherhood Society for Reconciliation (Dainippon Doho Yuwakai), founded in 1903. Its main

objective was to urge *buraku* people to improve their social, economic, and educational situation through their own efforts, so as to win acceptance by the rest of Japanese society. However, self-improvement did not lead to any changes in the discriminatory attitudes of non-*burakumin* people. Thus in 1922, another attempt was made with the creation of the National Levellers' Association (Suiheisha), which was the direct antecedent of the BLL. Suiheisha changed its focus from self-improvement to denunciation of those who discriminated against *burakumin* (*kyudan toso*), and people were forced to apologize for their discriminatory behavior. Suiheisha achieved considerable success, but with the beginning of World War II the campaign was discouraged and the Suiheisha ultimately dissolved.

In 1946, the fight against *buraku* discrimination was taken up again with the founding of the National Committee for Buraku Liberation, or NCBL (Buraku Kaiho Zenkoku Iinkai), which was renamed the Buraku Liberation League (Buraku Kaiho Domei) at its tenth annual convention in 1955. The committee and later the BLL successfully encouraged the national government to enact laws to improve the living environment of *buraku* areas.

In 1979, the BLL underwent internal struggles, and a breakaway group formed the National Buraku Liberation Alliance (Zenkoku Buraku Kaiho Rengokai), which was closely affiliated with the Communist Party. This group claimed that special measures were no longer necessary and actually reinforced discriminatory practices. BLL, however, remained close to the (former) Socialist Party and campaigned for special measures like the enactment of the Fundamental Law for Buraku Liberation.

Due to the BLL's continuous efforts, the social, economic, and political situation of the *burakumin* improved decisively until the end of the 1990s. Nevertheless, discriminatory attitudes and behaviors seem to prevail, for instance, the secret circulation of lists of *buraku* areas and *buraku* people among businesses. Thus further BLL "enlightenment" initiatives are needed.

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BURAKUMIN In Japan at the end of the nineteenth century awareness of family social status was disappearing. It ceased to make a difference which of the four main social groups—samurai, peasant, artisan, or merchant—one had belonged to before 1870; success in the new social and economic circumstances was more important. However, the descendants of the outcaste population, called variously *eta*, *karwata*, or *binin*—today's *burakumin* (literally, "hamlet people")—remained in their ghetto-like communities. Mainstream Japanese avoided employing or marrying them. By the middle of the twentieth century, the government estimated that there were over a million *burakumin*, as they came to be called; however, the Buraku Liberation League, the pressure group active on their behalf, suggests that there are over 3 million Japanese who continue to face status discrimination, or would be discriminated against if their status origins were known. Policies adopted since 1960 have improved the social situation of *burakumin*, but in the early 2000s still have failed to completely erase social stigma.

Background

In Tokugawa Japan (1600/1603–1868), residents of communities outside the four main classes performed a variety of functions considered socially unacceptable. Some were tanners or disposed of dead animals; others were beggars or street performers; still others worked in prisons. Some were directly under the control of the daimyo (feudal lord) and policed and maintained the major roads. Many were peasant farmers toiling on the poorest land who also pursued trades such as working leather or bamboo. Some of these occupations, such as working leather, were regarded as ritually polluting in Shinto or Buddhist traditions, but not all were; nevertheless, the status regulations of the premodern period prevented normal social contact between outcastes and their neighbors. All regions of Japan were host to at least one outcaste community, but the largest concentration was found in central and western Japan.

The dismantling of the status structure in the 1870s included the emancipation of former outcastes from strict rules on what they could wear and where they could go, but prejudices about their literal and ritual uncleanness endured. Moreover, in many areas the local bureaucrats made sure that *burakumin* be identified in the newly created family registers, and some

continued to work at jobs associated with dead animals such as butchers or shoemakers. Overall, during the late nineteenth century *burakumin* were unable to escape from the margins of society. Often they could find only work that others refused, for example, in match factories or poorly capitalized mines.

Steps toward Improvement

In the 1870s and 1880s a few of the wealthier *burakumin* families joined the liberal protest movement, but this had little impact on public consciousness or government policy. Working class radicalism after 1918, which inspired the formation of an organized labor movement and the development of the early feminist movement, encouraged the creation of a society dedicated to fight for *burakumin* interests—the Suiheisha or Levelers Association. The Suiheisha was founded in 1922 and for twenty years survived government attempts to close it down. It encouraged *burakumin* to oppose the discrimination they encountered in everyday life and demanded changes in government policy and the social structure that, it argued, sustained and re-created prejudice.

After 1945, there was a brief period of optimism that the occupational reforms might have removed the social bases of discrimination. As the economy began to revive and society adapted to new circumstances, it became clear, however, that *burakumin* communities were not benefiting from the rapid economic growth; indeed, their residents were excluded from employment in major companies and still shunned in marriage arrangements. The 1950s and 1960s were a time of mass migration to the cities to fill the growing factories. Some *burakumin* sought individual solutions to their problems in the anonymity of the metropolitan areas, deliberately cutting themselves off from their families and friends. As long as their backgrounds were not investigated too carefully, they passed as mainstream Japanese and found employment and a marriage partner. The other solution was for *burakumin* to organize to improve their own self-esteem and to demand that the government enforce equality of treatment. In 1955, the Buraku Liberation League was formed as a direct successor to the Suiheisha. At first the government did not take its demands seriously and established a committee of enquiry only in 1961. On the basis of the report produced four years later, a ten-year improvement program was launched in 1969. Ten years was not long enough to solve the problem, and the program was extended several times.

In many *burakumin* communities, the living environment was transformed by the provision of high-

rise apartment blocks, new schools, clinics, and community centers. Grants were made available to encourage *burakumin* children to stay in school. Some money was directed into projects aimed at challenging and changing popular attitudes. In the early 2000s there are signs that the vicious circle of poverty, low educational achievement, and poorly paid work may have been weakened if not entirely destroyed. Over 90 percent of *burakumin* children continue in school until they are eighteen. There is evidence, too, of some success in both business and politics.

Nevertheless, private detectives are routinely hired by prospective parents or employers to check out an individual's status background even though local authorities such as the Osaka prefecture have made this procedure illegal. Prejudice and discrimination remain. Severe distress, sometimes leading to suicide, still occurs when parents prevent their children from marrying because of the partner's family background.

During the 1990s, the Japanese government adopted a more robust commitment to human rights protection and promotion that may translate into proactive measures to dispel discrimination and provide redress for those who feel their rights have been violated. However, despite signs that old ideas are weakening, it is clear that discriminatory ideas endure.

Ian Neary

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BUREAU OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS The Bureau of Religious Affairs, an official government agency within the People's Republic of China (PRC), enforces PRC policies related to religious affairs. It is directly administrated by the State Council and was established in 1954.

The bureau's task is to register venues (such as monasteries and churches) for "normal religious activities," to ensure that religious organizations are not subject to any foreign domination and to protect freedom of religious belief. Article 36 of the 1982 constitution defines "normal religious activities" as activities

that do not "disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens, or interfere with the educational system of the state." This definition reflects the post-1976 shift away from the fiercely antireligious stance of Mao Zedong (1893–1976).

The PRC claims that the bureau fosters the rule of law and patriotism by linking legitimate religious activities with the maintenance of state order, national unity, and socialist development. The bureau has been instrumental in helping various religious bodies reclaim and restore properties lost or destroyed during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). It also has tended to scrutinize or prosecute some religious groups and activities more than others, especially so-called ethnic religions (Buddhism in Tibet and Inner Mongolia, Islam in Xinjiang), small unregistered bodies (charismatic Protestant Christian "house churches"), "superstitions" (*mixin*) such as fortune-telling and faith healing, and politically suspect groups (Falun Gong/Falun Dafa).

Jeffrey L. Richey

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BURMA. See Myanmar.


BURMA INDEPENDENCE ARMY The Burma Independence Army (BIA) was the founding armed movement of young Burmese nationalists during World War II and the forerunner of the modern Burma army, or Tatmadaw. The BIA was formally inaugurated in Bangkok, Thailand, on 28 December 1941 by a meeting of the famed "Thirty Comrades," including Aung San (1915–1947) and Ne Win (b. 1911), who had been trained on Hainan Island by Imperial Japan. Shortly afterward, the first BIA troops

entered Burma with the Japanese Fifteenth Army. In the next few months, the BIA expanded to around 23,000 soldiers under arms, fighting one major battle with retreating British forces at Shwedaung near Prome (Pyay). But against the backdrop of war, the BIA was later accused of abuses against Karen civilians and local Muslims. In August 1942, the BIA was replaced by the Burma Defense Army, which in 1943 was superseded by the Burma National Army (BNA). On 27 March 1945, the BNA joined the uprising against the Japanese, and later became the Patriotic Burmese Forces under the interim British administration (1945–1948). It formed a central element of the Burmese army at independence in 1948.

Martin Smith

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This section of the Burma Road in China photographed in June 1944 contains 24 switchbacks. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

BURMA ROAD Opened to automobile traffic in 1938, the famous Burma Road, linking northeast Myanmar (Burma) with southwest China, was the country's most strategic road link with the outside world for much of the twentieth century. Starting from the railway terminus at Lashio in northern Shan State, the road winds through mountain terrain for much of its 1,120-kilometer (700-mile) course, crossing the China frontier at Muse en route to Kunming, the Yunnan Province capital.

Built mostly by Chinese workers, the road was of major geopolitical significance, opening the way for trade and modern communications between British Burma and China. As a result, its completion hastened the Japanese invasion of Burma during World War II in an attempt by the Imperial Japanese army to cut off this new supply route to the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek. However, the grandiose Japanese war aims to occupy both Burma and China ultimately failed. The region became a major theater of conflict, and, for a brief period at the war's end, the Burma Road was linked up by the British with the Ledo Road, enabling direct road connections between India, Burma, and China.

After independence, commercial traffic along the Burma Road steadily declined. During a quarter century of isolationist government by General Ne Win's Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP, 1962–1988), much of the territory adjacent to the Burma Road was under insurgent control.

Only after the collapse of both the BSPP and the insurgent Communist Party of Burma during 1988 and 1989 were efforts made to upgrade the road with the support of neighboring China, which began to build closer relations with the new State Law and Order Restoration Council government in Yangon (formerly Rangoon). In the twenty-first century, the Burma Road was again earmarked for major business expansion.

Martin Smith

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BURMA-THAILAND RAILWAY The Burma-Thailand Railway was built by the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) between June 1942 and October 1943 using Allied Prisoners of War (POWs) and Asian laborers. The labor force consisted of over 60,000 American, Australian, British, and Dutch POWs and an estimated 270,000 conscripted workers from Burma, Malaya, and Thailand. The Japanese estimated that the 420-kilometer (260-mile) railway line linking Ban Pong, 50 kilometers (31 miles) east of Bangkok and Thanbyuzayat, 60 kilometers (37 miles) south of Moulmein in southwestern Burma, would take between five and six years to complete. Fearing that their positions in Burma were vulnerable to attack, the IJA decided early in 1943 to increase the rate of construction. Working from both ends, they planned to complete the line within sixteen months and launch an attack on India.

The appalling physical conditions endured by those working on the railway were compounded by increasingly heavy workloads and the brutal treatment meted out by prison guards. During the construction, an estimated 80,000 Asian laborers and 13,000 POWs died of malnutrition, disease, overwork, and beatings. The railway was completed on 16 October 1943, but it was used only once before Allied forces bombed the bridge spanning the Kwai River, a tributary of the Mae Klong River in western Thailand. Most of the railway was dismantled after the war, although a small section, including the bridge, is still used.

The Burma-Thailand Railway has come to symbolize the brutality of the IJA during World War II. The events inspired the novel *Bridge on the River Kwai* by the French writer Pierre Boulle, which in turn inspired a film of the same name. Every year the destruction of the Kwai River bridge is symbolically reenacted with a fireworks display in memory of those who died.

Daniel Oakman

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
BURMANS The designation "Burman" (Bama[r] in Burmese) is mostly used to distinguish the ethnicity of the people associated with the kingdom of Myanmar (Burma), which had become dominant in the region from the tenth century, from the ethnicity of the peoples of other Buddhist kingdoms in the area or from other ethnic groups in general. The native language of Burmans is Burmese, also known as Myanma(r), and Burmans make up approximately 68 percent of Myanmar's estimated 47 million people. Though not consistently, "Burman" usually denotes a particular ethnic group, but "Burmese" by contrast has historically referred mostly to citizenship or nationality, including members of all of Myanmar's ethnic groups.

Burman Royal Dynasties

Burmans arrived relatively late in the region from the highlands north of present-day India and from Yunnan in today's China, assimilating or supplanting several indigenous groups. They asserted themselves in Upper Burma at the expense of earlier established and highly sophisticated Pyu and Mon kingdoms, from which they benefited in their writing, arts, and religion. They established the Pagan dynasty (c. 849–1287 CE), which reached its height under King Anawrahta (reigned 1044–1077) and his son Kyanzittha (reigned 1084–1112). Having adopted Theravada Buddhism, they built an impressively large number of pagodas and Buddhist monasteries. However, the kingdom succumbed under Mongol and Shan attacks, after which the Shan dominated Upper Burma and the Mon Lower Burma.

Burmans reasserted control in the Toungoo dynasty (1530–1752). Centered upon Toungoo in Lower Burma, it reached its height under King Bayinnaung (d. 1581). However, the dynasty was weakened by war with the Siamese, war in Manipur, and wars with the Portuguese and was finally ended by a Lower Burma rebellion.

The Konbaung dynasty (1752–1885), the last Burman royal dynasty, was established in Shwebo under Alaungpaya (1714–1760), who defeated the Mon, attacked the British Negrais trading post, and sacked the Siamese capital of Ayutthaya. This dynasty brought Arakan, Manipur, and other areas under Burman control for the first time.



Buddhism is an important element of Burman identity. Here, a Buddhist monk walks through a monastery in Mandalay. (CHARLES & JOSETTE LENARS/CORBIS)

Colonial History

After adventurers came missionaries, traders, and then representatives from foreign governments. After the Portuguese and the Dutch, the British arrived. From neighboring India, the British conquered the country in the course of three Anglo-Burmese Wars between 1824 and 1885 and put an end to the Burman royal dynasties.

The British emphasized trade, for which control over the sea-lanes was vital. After the third war, Mandalay, the old Burman capital in central Burma, decreased in importance relative to Rangoon (now Yangon) in the delta, leaving the British in control of riverine and sea trade involving the ports and considerably weakening Burman royalty. The colonial government made use of many non-Burmans: the civil service, police, military, and commerce involved mostly Indians, Chinese, and some non-Burman ethnic groups. Many people were brought in, especially from India and China, to fulfill this need. Burmans were primarily targeted by the British to help expand agriculture, in particular, rice cultivation.

Under the royal system, the king was the chief patron of Buddhism, and the British policy of separating state and religion meant that the office of the last *sangbaraja* (*thathanabaing*), the senior monk adviser to the king, was not renewed. Since Burman ethnicity was shaped by and understood in terms of Buddhism as sponsored by the king, these developments contributed to Burmans' feeling marginalized. They asserted themselves in the early decades of the twentieth century primarily through newly founded Buddhist institutions, including the Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA), established in 1906. Buddhism became politicized through the "shoe question" (whether Europeans

would be allowed to wear shoes in monasteries and pagodas) in 1917. Uncertainty arose over how Burma, until then ruled as part of India, fit into the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms (proposed in 1918 but implemented in 1919) on the question of India's independence. In the wake of this, the Greater Council for Burmese Associations, an alliance of Buddhist groups, was founded in 1920. It took a more political turn, advocating the boycott of foreign goods. Leadership during this period still came primarily from monks, including U Wisara and U Ottama, who set early parameters for Burman nationalism.

Burman nationalism was strengthened by various factors. The economic downturn of the 1930s indebted Burman farmers, culminating in the 1930 Saya San millenarian rebellion. In the context of this unrest, the nationalist Dobama (or Thakin) movement, founded on narrow Burman ethnic grounds in 1930, most effectively rallied for national independence. This movement recruited students from Rangoon University, including U Nu and Aung San, who eventually became the country's leaders and developed a more inclusive, though no less recognizably Burman form of nationalism.

During the colonial period, other ethnic groups such as the Karen and Indians received what Burmans regarded as favorable treatment from the British. Ethnic groups that during the Konbaung period had been on tributary terms with the king were permitted to keep their traditional chiefdoms, received special employment, and also were deemed more sympathetic to British colonialism and more receptive to "foreign" intervention. Many had converted to Christianity. Where they were Buddhist, many also had a *sangha* (monastic order) independent of networks dominated by Burman nationalists. This contributed to a politicized ethnicity from which it is still difficult to escape today.

Yet to categorize the population of Myanmar predominantly in terms of Burmans versus non-Burmans is unsatisfactory. With no incontrovertible racial or other markers, the category "Burman" has historically been permeable and open to construction: royal dynasties drew on a variety of ethnicities, and there is much variation among those who consider themselves Burmans. Some ethnic minorities, in particular, the Pyu, dominant between the seventh and ninth centuries, are thought to have been completely assimilated into Burman and other ethnic groups, leaving traces only in their writing, archaeology, and Chinese sources. Some individual members of ethnic groups, particularly Mon, Shan, Karen, and also Chinese residents, may identify themselves as Burmans

to various degrees, some to the extent of complete assimilation.

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BURMESE Burmese is the national language of Myanmar (Burma) and is the native language of the Burman ethnic majority, who make up approximately two-thirds of Myanmar's population of slightly over 50 million. The rest of the nation's indigenous population is diverse, speaking between sixty and one hundred other languages between them, depending on the criteria used to distinguish languages from one another. In urban centers there are also long-established and substantial communities speaking various South Asian and Chinese languages. Most non-Burmans live in the areas near Myanmar's borders with Thailand, Laos, China, India, and Bangladesh, although many live interspersed with Burmans and with each other and speak Burmese and other languages in addition to their native language. Burmese is little spoken outside Myanmar but is widely dispersed, and fragmented communities of Burmese expatriates may be found around the world.

Burmese belongs to the Tibeto-Burman language family, which comprises approximately 350 languages spoken across a vast territory stretching from the Himalayas to mainland Southeast Asia. Burmese has by far the largest number of speakers of any of the Tibeto-Burman languages, most of which have only a few thousand speakers and many of which may disappear during the twenty-first century.

Most of the other languages spoken in Myanmar also belong to the Tibeto-Burman language family, in-

cluding some languages, such as Arakanese (Rakhine), Intha, and Danu, which are so similar to Burmese as to be considered by some to be dialects of Burmese rather than separate languages. Other Tibeto-Burman languages of Myanmar include the Loloish languages, such as Lahu, Lisu, and Akha (Hani), spoken in the Golden Triangle area near the borders with Thailand, Laos, and China, and others such as the Karen, Kachin, and Chin groups of languages. The remaining languages belong to the Mon-Khmer family, such as Mon, Wa, and Palaung, and the Tai-Kadai family, to which Thai also belongs, such as Shan and Tai Khun.

Burmese Script

Burmese script is a close cousin of Mon script, which was adapted from a script used in southern India, a descendant of the Brahmi script, which was the ancestor of many Indic scripts found in South and Southeast Asia. The earliest examples of written Burmese are stone inscriptions of the eleventh and twelfth centuries CE. It is widely believed that the square-shaped letters of the stone inscriptions developed into the distinctive round-shaped letters of Burmese today because texts were traditionally written on palm leaves, which would split easily if angled shapes were scratched on them. Whether or not this is true, to this day Burmese handwriting with consistent, even, round shapes is praised.

The writing system evolved between the period of the early inscriptions and the sixteenth century CE, when it assumed a form similar to its present-day form. As in English, the spoken language has changed considerably since that time, with the result that a faithful transliteration of written Burmese, such as the American Library Association-Library of Congress (ALA-AC) system designed for library cataloguing often gives little impression of the way words are pronounced in Burmese today because some combinations of symbols are pronounced differently from the sounds represented by the symbols individually. The phonetic transcription used in this article is the one devised by John Okell (1994) to represent the sound of Burmese words for learners of Burmese who know English. The difference between the ALA-LC transliteration and the phonetic transcription can be seen in the following example: the Burmese word for “television” would be transliterated as *rup' mrañ' sam krā'* but is transcribed here as *youq-myin-than-jà*.

The Indian script from which Burmese script is derived was originally designed for Indo-Aryan languages such as Pali, the language of the Buddhist scriptures. Burmese script has retained certain features and symbols that are needed for writing the many

words Burmese has borrowed from Pali. The doubled consonants and retroflex consonants common in Indian languages do not occur in Burmese words. Pali loanwords (words taken from another language and at least partially naturalized) in Burmese, typically specialist and learned vocabulary, are often easily identified by these features. Compare the Pali loanword for “indication,” written *lakkaṇā* (pronounced *leq-khā-na*), with a close Burmese equivalent *ǎ-c'eq*.

Burmese script is mostly alphabetic and is written from left to right like English. There are separate symbols to represent vowels and consonants, but the symbols are organized in syllabic clusters. Within each cluster, the symbols are not necessarily written in left-to-right order and so are not always arranged in the same order that they are pronounced. For example, to write the syllable *ti* (“worm”), the vowel *i* is placed on top of the consonant *t*, but to write *tu* (“nephew”), the *u* must hang below the *t*.

The literacy rate in Burma has often been said to be high compared to that in other nations in the region, but accurate data are difficult to obtain. One recent source suggests that nearly 80 percent of Burmese people over the age of fifteen are literate, but other sources have put the figure much lower.

Burmese Grammar

Like the vast majority of the languages spoken in mainland East and Southeast Asia, Burmese is a tone language. The tonal contrasts involve not only the usual differences in pitch and vowel length, but also differences in phonation type—whether the voice is breathy or sharp in character. The presence or absence of a glottal stop, written as a final *-q* in the transcription, at the end of the syllable may also be considered to be part of the tonal system.

Some of the sounds used in Burmese are considered unusual because they occur relatively rarely in many of the world’s languages. These are the so-called voiceless nasals, which include the sound of air escaping through the nose. The Burmese word for “investment,” *yin-bnì-hmyouq-bnan-hmú*, contains examples of two such sounds, written *bn-* and *hm-* in the transcription.

In Burmese, most morphemes, or single units of meaning, consist of a single syllable. Words and phrases may be formed by combining morphemes in pairs or sometimes longer strings. Four such morphemes, “picture-see-sound-hear,” combine to form the word for “television” *youq-myin-than-jà* mentioned earlier.

As in most Tibeto-Burman languages, in Burmese the verb usually comes at the end of the sentence,

following its object. Otherwise, the order of words and phrases in the rest of a Burmese sentence can be ordered in many ways to reflect the tone and emphasis of an utterance. The meaning remains unambiguous because grammar words can be attached to words and phrases to show their syntactic relationship with one another, to identify the subject and object, and so on. Thus a typical Burmese sentence consists of a number of phrases marked with grammar words, ending with a verb at the end. For example, the sentence “U Ba came to Mandalay with his mother” would be rendered in Burmese as “U Ba-SUBJECT Mandalay-TO mother-WITH came-verb” (*Ū Bá-gá Mandālè-go ã-me-néh la-deh*).

Pronouns denoting people and things (such as “I,” “we,” “it”) can often be left out of a sentence in Burmese when the context makes the intended meaning clear. One would normally respond to the question “Did he slice the mango?” with just the verb “sliced” (*hli-deh*) in Burmese because it is clear from the context who had sliced what.

The Burmese language exists in a colloquial style used in spoken, informal contexts and a literary style used in official, formal settings. The main difference between the two is that they have separate sets of grammar words and some other vocabulary. The colloquial-style example sentence used earlier, “U Ba came to Mandalay with his mother,” could be rendered in literary style by simply substituting the literary style for the grammar words and the word for “mother,” giving *Ū Bá-dhi Mandālè-dbó mí-gin-bnín la-í*.

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BURMESE ARTS In Myanmar (Burma), no distinction is made between fine arts and applied arts, and

the term "arts" encompasses architecture as well as a wealth of traditional arts and crafts. Much of Myanmar's artistic expression is inspired by and devoted to the nation's predominant faith, Buddhism. For centuries, Myanmar's kings and people have supported the building of Buddhist temples and monasteries as meritorious deeds. The scale of temple-building achieved at Pagan (Bagan) from the eleventh to thirteenth century has never been matched, but the tradition survived the ending of royal rule and patronage brought about by British colonial rule (from three territorial annexations in the nineteenth century until 1948) and continues today under state and private patronage. The construction and ornamentation of temples (by wall paintings, stucco relief work, carvings, and sculptures) and of monasteries are a primary focus for Myanmar's artistic expression. Much of Myanmar's cultural life from the village level upward is dominated by Buddhist activities such as communal alms-giving and novitiation ceremonies and by temple and other festivals—all occasions for music, song, and dance. Myanmar's ethnic groups also possess distinctive music and dance traditions and art forms.

Arts and Crafts

Artisans, as skilled producers of artifacts for religious and devotional use as well as for domestic, secular use, are traditionally accorded high respect. Pagan-period inscriptions record the types of crafts that the Burmese people classify as the ten arts (*pan hse myo*), comprising the artistic creations of: blacksmiths, gold and silversmiths, bronze casters, stone masons, stone sculptors, stucco and plaster workers, woodcarvers, wood turners, painters, and lacquer artists. Other crafts include cloth appliqué hangings (*kalaga*), textile weaving, pottery, basketry, lapidary, and gold-leaf production. Many art forms show influences from India and China and, most notably, from Mon and Thai (Siamese) traditions, introduced by artisans and musicians who were brought back as captives from conquests of neighboring kingdoms. From the late nineteenth century onward some Western influence is apparent. During the colonial period, many local crafts declined, unable to compete with cheap imports and a decline in patronage, but efforts were also made under government auspices to nurture arts and crafts by establishing schools for weaving, lacquer, and ceramics and by holding exhibitions with prizes for outstanding artists. The Burmese people excelled in producing masterpieces of intricate woodcarving, ornate silverware, and fine lacquerware. From the late 1980s, the opening of the nation to tourism and foreign investment has given fresh impetus to some tra-



Two Burman women in a workshop making lacquerware. (EYE UBIQUITOUS/CORBIS)

ditional arts, particularly lacquerware and cloth hangings, as well as to the reproduction of antiquities.

Performing Arts

Myanmar has a strong performing-arts tradition that preserves many classical forms but that has also been receptive to new elements and influences. The court or classical arts, as practiced for centuries under royal and noble patronage, are still performed at state and public performances. Theatrical performances take various forms, all accompanied by music and with dance, song, dialogue, and poetry recitations.

Puppet Theater Although puppetry is recorded as early as an inscription of 1444, the puppet theater's development and popularization date from the patronage of the eighteenth-century minister for theater, U Thaw. Performances traditionally lasted a whole night, with a full-length drama presented to the audience by a cast of twenty-eight hand-carved stringed puppets. The dramatic themes were taken from previous lives of the Buddha (the *jataka* stories) and from the Burmese chronicles. The puppet theater (*yok-thei thabin*) declined greatly from the 1920s onward and survives only in a truncated form in state cultural performances, tourist shows and, occasionally, pagoda festivals.

Classical Drama Burmese plays or drama shows (*zat pwe*) are musical plays with dancers, and performances can last a whole night. The plays draw their inspiration from the Buddhist *jataka* stories and the lives of

kings and also from the *Ramayana*, introduced as a dance-drama form from Thailand after the conquest of Ayutthaya in 1767. The works of the nineteenth-century court dramatists U Kyin U and U Ponnya have endured. A more lighthearted operetta-type performance is the *anyein*, which has much clowning and repartee as well as all female dancers. Famed twentieth-century dancers and theatrical performers were U Po Sein (d. 1952) and, in the postwar period, Shwe Man Tin Maung (d. 1969). The advent of foreign films and the founding of Myanmar's own motion picture industry in 1918 contributed to the decline of some traditional forms of entertainment but also to the rise of such new forms as modern melodramas and contemporary plays (*pya-zat*).

Music and Song The first historical record of Myanmar's music and dance comes from Chinese accounts describing a mission from the ancient Pyu kingdom in 800–802 CE. Among the instruments mentioned were the boat-shaped harp (*saing-gauk*) and the crocodile zither (*mi-gyaung*), both still played today. The distinctive thirteen-stringed Burmese harp is played as a solo instrument and as an accompaniment to solo song. Another traditional instrument is the bamboo xylophone (*pat-tala*). The Burmese possess a unique musical ensemble known as the *hsaing-waing*, which is used for theatrical performances and religious and festive occasions. It is composed of drums, percussion, and wind instruments, the most important being a circle of drums (*pat-waing*) suspended from a circular



Dancers in traditional costume in a performance of the *Ramayana* in March 2000. (NIK WHEELER/CORBIS)

wooden frame (with the player seated in its center), a gong circle (*kyi waing*), oboes (*bne*), bamboo clappers, brass cymbals, and a distinctive large drum (*pat-ma*) suspended from an elaborate gilded and glass-inlaid frame in the form of a composite flying animal (*pyin-sarupa*). Drums are played to announce and accompany processions and entertainments and include the *si-daw* (royal drums), double-headed drums formerly played at court and other ceremonial occasions, and the *do-bat*, a small double-headed drum worn suspended across the player's chest and played at village and religious festivities.

The Burmese possess a repertory of several hundred traditional classical songs (*thachin-gyi*) whose texts have been collected into standard reference anthologies, the *Maha Gita* and the *Gita Withawdani*. Categories of song include the *kyo*, *bwe*, and *thachin-gan* (old court songs based on classical literature) and *yodaya* (songs of Thai origin), as well as *nat-chin* (songs associated with the spirits) and *barw-le* and *lun-gyin* (laments).

Preservation and Sponsorship of the Arts

Following independence in 1948, state schools for the fine arts and music and drama were opened in Mandalay and Rangoon (now Yangon) as part of the government's program to promote and revive the nation's cultural heritage, which was perceived as having declined under British colonial rule and the Japanese wartime occupation (1942–1945). The national museum and national library, founded in the 1950s, faced the task of recovering from the wartime loss of treasured collections and research materials. Myanmar's Ministry of Culture consists of the Department of Fine Arts, Department of Cultural Institute, and Department of Archaeology. The Department of Fine Arts is responsible for state entertainments (music, theater, dance programs, and tours) and promoting, through research and preservation, Myanmar's cultural heritage. In the 1990s, a new National Museum and a new National Library as well as a Defense Services Museum were constructed in Yangon, and many museums—including Chin, Kayah, Rakhine (Arakan), and Mon State cultural museums, the Motion Picture Museum, and the new Bagan Archaeological Museum—were opened. The Department of Archaeology is responsible for archaeological excavations at ancient sites, for renovation of ancient temples and buildings, and for the maintenance of newly reconstructed palaces at Mandalay, Pegu, and Shwebo. Some of these government-sponsored works have been criticized for the standard of workmanship and alleged use of forced labor. In 1996, the University of Culture opened, offering courses in music, dramatic arts, painting, and sculpture. Modern art forms and design, cinematography, and musical innovations are increasing as Myanmar becomes more open to outside influences and markets, but artists and performers are still very much subject to state censorship and control.

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See also: **Literature—Myanmar; Mon; Pagan, Pagodas, Burmese**

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BURSA (2002 pop. 1.2 million). Bursa, capital of the province of Bursa (2002 population 2.2 million), at the foot of Ulu Dag (Great Mountain) near the thermal springs of Cekirge in northwestern Turkey, was founded as Proussa by Prusias I of Bithynia in the second century BCE. In the fourteenth century Osman I (1251–1326), founder of the Ottoman empire, attempted to capture the city by staging a blockade outside its walls. First attempts failed, but in 1326 the besieged city surrendered to Sultan Orhan (reigned 1324–1362), son of Osman. Orhan named the city Bursa. Under Ottoman rule, Bursa was the Muslim city closest to the Christian world. Silk became the city's largest export, and the Ottoman court its greatest consumer. Bursa saw the birth of Ottoman architecture, including the Ulu Mosque, erected in 1399 under Bayezid I (1389–1402). After Timur's troops captured Bursa in 1402 and destroyed most of the city, the Ottoman capital moved to Edirne, although Bursa remained the heart of the Ottoman empire for many years. Even after Mehmed II (1432–1481) conquered Constantinople, Bursa was still the center for campaigns to the east. Today automotive industry has replaced the silk industry, but the early Ottoman mosques and tombs recall Bursa's distinguished past.

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BUSTARD, HUBARA The Hubara bustard (also Houbara or Macqueen's; *Chlamydotis undulata*) is one of five species of the Otididae family of game birds found in South Asia. The name "hubara" is derived from Arabic, while "bustard" is a corruption of the Latin *Avis tarda* ("slow bird"). Bustards are three-toed, mostly polygamous birds adapted to running.

The Hubara bustard is a large bird with a thick ruff of black and white feathers down each side of the neck. The lower parts of the body are white, with bluish-gray bars running through the tail. The bird visits

South Asia in the winter, during September to March, migrating to the desert and semidesert areas of Pakistan and northwestern India from the Near East. The same species has also been sighted in northwestern Europe. In spite of its protective coloration, Arab elites and others hunting the bustard with falcons have greatly reduced the numbers in recent times. The flesh of this and other bustards has long been esteemed in Europe and Asia.

Of the other four bustard species found in South Asia, the smaller species are called Floricans, while the Great Indian bustard (*Choriotis nigriceps*) is the largest and best known, though extremely rare today. The Great Indian bustard too occurs in Pakistan and northwestern India, can weigh up to 18 kilograms, and can have an overall height of a meter. The recent spread of agriculture into semidesert areas of South Asia threatens all bustards with extinction, as do tourism and the wide use of chemical pesticides.

Paul Hockings

BUTO. See **Dance, Modern-East Asia.**

BUZKASHI *Buzkashi*, a traditional sport of Central Asia, is still played by men in northern Afghanistan and by Afghan refugees in Pakistan. In the past it was played by Turkic peoples in Central Asia and western China. During a violent equestrian contest, riders on horseback compete to grab the carcass of a goat or calf off the ground and ride off with it. The sport probably developed as an offshoot of the riding activities of the nomadic peoples of Central Asia.



Two Afghan teams compete in a *buzkashi* match in Peshawar, Pakistan, in March 2000. (AFP/CORBIS)

Buzkasbi is closely related to local power structures in rural Afghanistan. Horses are bred, raised, and trained by local political leaders who hire riders to compete in the tournaments organized by the owners. Tournaments are held in the winter when men are free of agricultural responsibilities and also to mark special occasions such as a marriage. Staging a well-attended and successful tournament raises the status of the sponsor, whereas a poor tournament damages the host's reputation.

Play begins with men riding around a field and charging to the center to fight for the carcass. A rider is victorious when he takes the carcass from the crowd of riders, rides off with it and drops it to the ground. A brief chant of praise is then offered for the rider, horse, and owner, and another round of play begins. The winning rider receives a prize of a carpet, rifle, or money, and the owner of the horse gains the prize of prestige. Disputes are common, over rough play and over who controls the carcass, and, more important, between political rivals whose day-to-day political rivalry is played out on the field by their hired riders.

In the 1950s, the Afghanistan government promoted *buzkasbi* as a tourist attraction and a symbol of centralized power and national unity; there were provincial teams and an annual tournament overseen by the king. In 1983, the annual tournament was ended by the Soviet-controlled government. The sport was transferred to Pakistan by Afghan refugees and in the Taliban era was played primarily in the northern provinces.

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BYZANTINES The Byzantine empire is conventionally said to begin in 330 BCE, the year that the Roman empire's eastern capital was transferred to Constantinople. The Byzantines called themselves Romaioi, citizens of Rome, and regarded their ruler as absolute temporal and spiritual head of Rome and all its conquests. The emperors successfully defended the reduced eastern Roman provinces against onslaught from Persian and then Islamic invaders, but the effort left them powerless to protect the western empire, where the last emperor was deposed in 876

CE. Despite betrayal by western Christianity, the Byzantine empire survived as the repository of Greek and Roman civilization for 1,100 years.

History

The history of Byzantium is that of Constantinople—the queen city—and its emperors. Constantine I (c. 272–337 CE) emerged from civil war to found New Rome, named Constantinople, on the site of Byzantium, a colony Miletus built on a strategic peninsula where Asia meets Europe. The empire he bequeathed his sons included Roman provinces from Africa to England, but northern Europe was soon lost to Frankish, Visigoth, and Lombard invaders, and, better to command their armies, the emperors resided in Antioch. Theodosius II (401–450) divided the empire between his two sons; the West was reduced to a remnant before Emperor Justinian (483–565) sent General Belisarius and then Narses to recapture it.

From 600, the eastern flank was under attack; during the reign of Heraclius (575–641), the Persian Sasanid dynasty encroached as far as the Euphrates and disputed the *theme* (regional political unit) of Armenia. In 626, the Sasanids joined Avar invaders from the Balkans to besiege unsuccessfully Constantinople. In 647, Islamic raiders began annually to penetrate the heart of Anatolia, besieging Constantinople in 674 and 717. In 813, the Bulgars camped outside the Theodosian walls; the death of their leader, Krum, saved the city, and his successors were paid to push back the Rus (Russian tribes), who in 860 made a whirlwind naval attack on Constantinople.

Basil I (?–886) founded a dynasty that expanded the empire almost to its former borders, but from 894 the Bulgar attacks resumed; the death of their leader Simeon (927) saved the city again. Final victory went to Basil II (958–1025); in 1014, he blinded 15,000 Bulgar prisoners, and Bulgaria was absorbed into the empire.

In 1025, misrule by various rival factions enabled the Seljuk Turks to expand westward from Baghdad and penetrate central Anatolia; the emperor Romanus IV Diogenes (?–1071) cobbled together an army that met the Turks at Malazgirt (former Manzikert) in 1071. His rival General Andronicus Ducas deserted at a critical moment; the battle was lost, and the emperor captured. Armenia was taken, Cilicia became a separate Armenian kingdom, and the Seljuks parceled out south-central and east Anatolia to their followers, who forcibly converted the population.

In 1204, the Fourth Crusade, supporting the disinherited Alexius V, succeeded in capturing Constan-

tinople, and Count Baldwin of Flanders became the first Latin emperor. Three Byzantine successor states were established at Nicaea, Trebizond, and Epirus.

In 1261, the emperor of Nicaea, Michael VIII Palaeologus, recaptured Constantinople and secured his conquests by dynastic marriages. Succeeding emperors reopened negotiations on unity with the Church of Rome, but their subjects preferred the turban to the miter and repudiated agreements. The Ottoman Turks had deprived the empire of its hinterland, and in 1453, after a siege in which a sea blockade played a decisive part, the city fell to Sultan Mehmed II, surnamed the Conqueror.

The Army and the Law

The Byzantine emperor, a religious, political, and military leader drawn from one of the leading landowning dynasties, was supported by his patriarch, a senate, and a huge civil service. Free bread and entertainment, religious endorsement, and military success kept the emperor in power. A strong emperor could appoint his successor; otherwise the succession fell to aristocratic candidates supported by the army. The blue and green chariot-racing factions represented rival parties, whose conflicts culminated in the Nika riots (532) and the burning of the city. The city's Theodosian walls, completed by Arcadius (c. 377–408), a massive ditch and double wall construction that still totally surrounds the peninsula, kept invaders at bay.

The legal and administrative system, which was recodified by Justinian and described by Constantine VII (907–959), concentrated local power in the hands of the governors of the *themes*, administered by civilian and military governors. Unlike western powers, the empire had to maintain a standing army, consisting of regiments raised from each *theme* and the emperor's personal Varangian Guards (from 989) as well as a navy. The major defensive weapon was Greek fire, an incendiary mixture that could be shot by bellows from city walls or the deck of a warship. Military tactics originally consisted of leading huge, well-drilled armies on foreign campaigns. Against fast-moving border raiders, Nikephorus II Phokas's (?–969) book *On Skirmishing Warfare* marked a change to staged ambushes of returning bands loaded with booty at passes in the Taurus Mountains.

Religion

Orthodox Christianity became a state-sponsored hierarchic cult intertwined with civil life and culture. At the first Church Council at Nicaea in 325 CE, by

presiding himself, Constantine demonstrated that he would cede neither the administration nor the creed to his nominee, the patriarch. Schism after schism sloughed off alternative churches—the Arians (325), Nestorians (431), and, most seriously, Monophysites (Syrian Orthodox Church) and Gregorians (Armenian Church) (451). By failing to contain these two substantial churches in the state system, the empire created potentially rebellious groups on the crucial eastern frontiers. Surprisingly, despite sporadic persecution, there is no evidence that Syrians or Armenians deserted en masse to the Persian or Islamic cause.

From the fourth century, monasticism spread from Egypt; the church, by amassing huge untaxed estates and removing able-bodied men from productive enterprise, became a drain on the economy. As the Islamic advance continued, from the seventh century the patriarchs of Alexandria, Jerusalem, and Antioch fell under foreign domination. The army ascribed the invaders' success to the Islamic embargo on human images, and Emperor Leo III (c. 685–741) banned icon worship. Many monks fled, protecting their treasures both from the invading Muslims and overenthusiastic Iconoclast mobs, but icons were finally restored in 831.

Culture

Constantine decorated his rebuilt capital by plundering art treasures and building materials from Greek and Roman sites as far afield as Egypt. Surrounded by classical models, Byzantine art gradually developed more formal, stylized designs first seen in the churches of Justinian, including Saint Sophia, a magnificent dome-over-transept cathedral of revolutionary design, with four acres of gold tesserae and a jeweled cross set against stars in the dome. Church ceremonial was arranged to display the emperor directly under the dome, a symbol of God and empire. After the barren Iconoclastic period, the ninth century saw new Greek poetry, Photius the Patriarch's encyclopedia of Greek culture, the invention of the telegraph, and a famous golden plane tree with singing birds. Art (mainly religious) continued to flourish until the sack of Constantinople in 1204; looted material is displayed in Venice. The position of the peasants, who, from the time of Diocletian (?–305) had been a repressed and exploited workforce, worsened as the empire shrank.

Legacy

Byzantium produced a ruling class of magnificent simplicity and dedication coupled with individual

characteristics of duplicity and pragmatism; the system persisted in the centralized authoritarian organization of the Muslim state. Both European and Turkish neglect of Byzantine history is rapidly being reversed; however, the fate of surviving monuments is far from secure.

Kate Clow

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CADRE SYSTEM-CHINA In China, the term "cadre" refers both to all party functionaries and civil servants in administrative institutions, public organizations, and armed forces and to persons in leading positions. It is important to differentiate between party, administrative, and military cadres. As the term covers party and state leaders as well as village officials or policemen, it does not refer to a homogeneous group.

Since 1956 cadres were classified according to twenty-five ranks (*ji*). Grade twenty-five was the lowest grade. The original classification was dependent on the time a person had attended the revolutionary movement or was admitted into the Communist Party as well as one's contributions to the revolution or "liberation." The early classification was influenced by the Soviet cadre system but also by traditional ranking patterns of the civil service in imperial times.

The cadre system that had been in existence in China since the 1950s was remodeled in 1993 by the Provisional Regulations for Public Service into fifteen grades, starting with the prime minister at grade one and running down to ordinary officials at grades ten through fifteen.

The grading is the same on each level of the party, in the People's Congresses (parliaments), and in the Political Consultative Conferences. This same grading also regulates salaries and privileges. State cadres, that is, civil servants paid by the state, are put on the official schedule by the responsible personnel offices. Organization departments are responsible for party cadres. State cadres are paid out of the official budgets, whereas the other rural cadres have to be paid by extrabudgetary means. Each cadre grade is treated dif-

ferently, with privileges increasing as grade level rises. "High cadres" (grade five and up) enjoy the greatest privileges as far as salaries, labor conditions, size and standard of accommodation, medical treatment, and pensions are concerned. They also receive more servants paid by the state, a better official car with driver, the right to travel first class in trains and planes on official trips, and last but not least, access to detailed information on China and foreign countries.

This hierarchical system is similar to China's traditional civil-service hierarchy, which was also divided into grades in what was known as the *ji*-hierarchy. There were two main categories: civil and military service. From the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) onward, each category was divided into nine grades, each grade being divided into two classes, upper (*shang*) and lower (*xia*), for a total of eighteen ranks. Each grade was characterized by special insignias and salaries. The higher the rank, the greater the attendant privileges and nonmaterial advantages.

Today, as in the past, losing an official position or exclusion from the hierarchy means the loss of all kinds of privileges as well as a significant decrease in standard of living. Success in such a system and the social security it offers make it very attractive to become a member of the party and to join some kind of network that will guarantee advancement in the hierarchy.

Thomas Heberer

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CAGAYAN RIVER The Cagayan River is the longest and largest river in the Philippines. The Cagayan Valley in Luzon is covered by the deep alluvium deposited by the river and its various tributaries, the main ones being the Chico, Ilagan, and Magat Rivers. Sediments of Tertiary and Quaternary origin, mostly limestone sands and clays blanketed the Cagayan Basin to deposits of 3,000 to 4,500 meters. The Cagayan Valley is one of the chief tobacco areas in the Philippines and also produces rice, corn, yams, bananas, and coconut. The river rises at an elevation of approximately 1,524 meters in the Caraballo Mountains of central Luzon, and flows north for some 446 kilometers to its mouth at Bubuyan Channel at the town of Aparri.

The river drops rapidly to 91 meters above sea level some 227 kilometers from the river mouth. Most of the larger tributaries of the Cagayan enter the valley from the cordilleran lands to the west of it. From the point where the river enters the valley, it flows north in broad meanders and acquires the major tributaries of the Magat and the Ilagan.

Both the Cagayan River and all its tributaries are subject to extensive flooding during the heavy rainfall that occurs during the monsoon and also the typhoon seasons. The Cagayan River has not been a major transport artery except for light barges, which can ascend the river for about sixty-five kilometers. Small craft often use the Cagayan.

Kog Yue Choong

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CALCUTTA Capital of West Bengal state, former capital (1773–1912) of British India, Calcutta (in Bengali, Kalikata) is India's largest metropolitan area and a major port. Founded in 1690 by Job Charnock, a British merchant, the area included three villages. The British East India Company gained proprietary

rights to them in 1698 under the Mughals. By 1727, shipping in Calcutta totaled 10,000 tons: silks and muslins from Dhaka, cotton fabrics from Bengal, saltpeter from Bihar, rice, sesame oil, and sugar all had a ready export market. The population grew from 12,000 in 1710 to 100,000 in 1735.

In 1756, the nabob of Bengal sacked Calcutta and imprisoned British soldiers in what became known, after many prisoners had suffocated, as "the Black Hole of Calcutta." The British recaptured the city in 1757, and the Regulating Act (1773) gave the governor of Bengal the position of governor-general of British-controlled India. During the governorships of Warren Hastings (1773–1785) and Richard Colley Wellesley (1798–1805), the European enclave assumed an elegant look: Lord Wellesley wanted India to be governed from an impressive palace rather than a mercantile office. The Indian town, however, was filled with bazaars and slums.

A "Bengal Renaissance" produced such figures as Rammohan Roy (1772–1833) and Sir Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941), a Nobel-laureate poet, along with an accent on intellectual freedom, a monotheistic version of Hinduism, and a moral code suited to an educated middle class. A powerful spiritual movement led by Ramakrishna Paramahansa and Swami Vivekananda in the late nineteenth century, followed by a nationalist upsurge, conferred unique leadership status on the city. Despite Rudyard Kipling's negative focus in *City of Dreadful Night*, many citizens were proud of the British empire's largest city after London.

The 1943 famine, wartime anxieties, the 1946 riots, the partition of Bengal in 1947, the postwar population explosion, and declining industry since the 1960s, along with widespread poverty and chronic labor unrest, have increasingly put the city in crisis. The work of Mother Teresa's Calcutta mission focused worldwide attention on the city's squalor, starvation, and disease. Calcutta continues, however, a major financial, cultural, and educational center, catering to a cosmopolitan population speaking Bengali, English, Hindi, and Urdu. The Calcutta moviemakers produce commercial gems, and Dominique Lapierre's book *City of Joy* may outweigh Kipling's view of the city.

C. Roger Davis

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CALENDARS—EAST ASIA East Asia has a rich tradition of astronomical observation. Until the nineteenth century, the chief calendars in use in the region were derived from the Chinese. To this day, traditional calendars are used to mark religious and traditional festivals and holidays; the Gregorian calendar regulates civic affairs.

The Chinese Calendar

The beginnings of the Chinese calendar are steeped in legend; it is said that the legendary emperor Huangdi created it in 2637 BCE. Evidence for the calendar can be traced back to the fourteenth century BCE. In effect, it is a lunisolar calendar, derived from astronomical observations of the longitude of the sun and the phases of the moon. Therefore, its year matches the tropical year (the period between two successive times that the sun reaches its most northerly point in the sky), and its months concur with the synodic months (the period between two successive full moons or two conjunctions of the sun and moon). In the Chinese calendar as in the Jewish, an ordinary year has twelve months, while a leap year has thirteen months. An ordinary year has 353, 354, or 355 days, and a leap year has 383, 384, or 385 days.

In order to arrive at a Chinese year, the dates of the new moons are determined. A new moon is construed as the completely "black" moon (when the moon is in conjunction with the sun), not the first visible crescent as stipulated in Jewish and Islamic calendars. The date of the new moon is the first day of a new month. Next, the dates when the sun's longitude is a multiple of 30 degrees are calculated. These dates are known as the Principal Terms and are used to calculate the number of each month. Therefore, each month carries the number of the Principal Term that occurs in that month.

All astronomical observations are made for the meridian 120 degrees east of Greenwich, which approximately matches the east coast of China. Unlike other calendars, the Chinese calendar does not count years in an infinite sequence. Instead, years have names that are repeated every sixty years. Within a given sixty-year cycle, each year is assigned a name made up of two parts: the Celestial Stem, whose terms cannot be translated into English, and the Terrestrial Branch, whose terms correspond to animals of the Chinese zo-

diac. This method of using a sixty-year cycle is ancient; the sixty-year cycles are numbered from 2637 BCE, when the Chinese calendar is said to have started.

The Japanese Calendar

The Japanese calendar is similar to the Chinese, given the many cultural exchanges between the two nations, and is said to date from 660 BCE, from the reign of the emperor Jimmu, the legendary first emperor of Japan. In China and elsewhere, the calendar was used to count the passage of time, but in Japan, the reckoning of time as such had little importance. The Japanese used the Chinese sixty-year cycle for naming days and years, with each day being determined as "good" or "bad." Side by side with this practice, by 807 CE, a seven-day week, with names related to the planets, was also in use, although the need to know "good" or "bad" days continued. By 1007, the seven-day week was common in Japan.

Little attention was paid to the calendar as a means of reckoning time until 1684, when three Japanese astronomers (Harumi Shibukawa, Anbu Yasutomi, and Jinzan Tani) advocated calendrical reform. However, their efforts met with little success, since the ruling elite was more interested in astrology and mystical interpretations of the days of the week than in precise timekeeping. The three reformers labored on in isolation, completely unaware of the advances being made by the Chinese with the aid of Jesuit missionaries. Only in the Meiji period (1868–1912) did Japan finally use a consistent and relatively accurate method for recording time, with the adoption of the Gregorian calendar. However, the old associations intrinsic to Japanese culture remain, such as the determination of festivals, the naming of years after the current emperor, and the significance of astrology and the zodiac.

The Korean Calendar

As with Japan, the source of the Korean calendar is China. The Korean calendar was not merely a method of keeping time, it was also an expression of divine will in that, as in Japan, it was used to determine "good" and "bad" days. It was the responsibility of the king to maintain an annual calendar. The Korean calendar served as an astronomical almanac, predicting the movements of the sun, moon, and five visible planets over the course of the year. These predictions then allowed court astrologers to determine "good" or "bad" days.

One of the first recorded Korean calendars is the Tai Chu calendar, which was created by Hong Loxia during the reign of emperor Wu (156–86 BCE) of the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), who had incorporated

Korea into China. Given the use of the Chinese ephemeris (a table of locations of heavenly bodies), many errors had crept into the Tai Chu calendar by the time of the Northern Song (960–1126) and the Southern Song (1127–1279). These inaccuracies necessitated calendrical reform during the reign of Kubilai Khan (1215–1294), who reconquered Korea, and again under the first Ming emperor, Hongwu (1328–1398), who also ruled over Korea. Finally, Kim Yuk (1580–1658), a Korean official, strongly advocated calendrical reform using Gregorian calculations. He was following the lead of China, which had adopted the Western methodology under the guidance of Johann Adam Schall von Bell (1591–1666), a German Jesuit missionary and astronomer, at the beginning of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912).

But it would be another century before Korea finally adopted Gregorian principles and established the new Shixian calendar. However, this adoption met fierce resistance in the character of Yi Hangno (1792–1868), a scholar who defended traditional ways against innovations from the West. Yi Hangno argued that although the Western calendar was accurate and precise, it failed to fulfill the traditional role of a calendar in Korean society, namely, the determination of sacrificial rites, rituals for the end of the year, marriage rites, daily tasks, and monthly recitations. In short, the Gregorian calendar destroyed Confucian ritual, ethics, and philosophy. However, once Gregorian principles were established, there was no going back to the old ways.

Nirmal Dass

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CALENDARS—SOUTH ASIA Differences among calendars arise because a year does not fall into equal units of any sort, and various peoples have used

various units to divide the solar year (the time the sun takes to perform a complete revolution around "the heavens," beginning from a certain star and returning to the same), which is 365.2422 days long. The several calendars of South Asia—Hindu, Christian, Islamic—were either solar or solilunar (like the ecclesiastical calendar in Europe)

Indian Calendars

The earliest calendar used in India counted twelve lunar months in a year of 360 days. A lunar month averages 29.53 days, and twelve lunar synodic (relating to the period between two successive conjunctions of a heavenly body) months yield a year of 354 days, 8 hours, 48 minutes, 36 seconds—10.88 days shorter than a solar year. In the oldest-known Sanskrit text, the Rig Veda (of perhaps 1000 BCE), a passage suggests that scholar-priests understood the need for an extra intercalary month every so often; the Atharva Veda mentions this practice as a way of making events fall in their "proper" seasons.

The basic principles of the Vedic calendar of the first millennium BCE are recorded in the *Jyotishavedanga*. Although far from clear, this work seems to acknowledge a year of 366 days, divided into three seasons of four months each. The seasons were important for agricultural as well as ritual reasons. Indians later subdivided their year into six seasons: spring, hot season, rainy season, autumn, winter, frosty season; each contained two months.

Ancient Indian astronomy and calendrical reckoning were no doubt advanced, as compared with the rest of Asia (except for China and Babylonia). However, there were two inadequacies: India had no telescopes before the seventeenth century, and astronomers north of the Narmada River calculated the year as 365 days, 6 hours, 12 minutes, 34 seconds, while those south of that river calculated 365 days, 6 hours, 12 minutes, 30 seconds. (A true astronomical or solar year is 365 days, 5 hours, 48 minutes, 46 seconds.) Ancient Indian astronomers had only two instruments, the gnomon (the pointer on a sundial) and the armillary sphere (a model of the circles of the celestial sphere). From the time of the noted astronomer Aryabhata (c. 476–550 CE), however, they were commonly aware that the earth revolved around the sun. The Indians were concerned with achieving such accuracy in their calendar because of the need to fix the date of various Brahmanic ceremonies to coincide with given moments in the cosmic cycle and thus to ensure their regularity and effectiveness.

Of various early Indian writings on astronomy, the *Surya Siddhanta* has to some extent survived. It makes

use of an extraordinary "quadruple period" (*caturyuga*) or Great Year (*mabayuga*) of 4,320,000 solar years, divided into four cosmic years. The synodic month was divided into thirty lunar days (*tithi*), which were of shorter duration than solar days (*savana*). The theory explaining the equinoxes maintained that an oscillation occurred, with a velocity of fifty-four *savana* per year.

In a different usage of the term *yuga*, one *yuga* consisted of sixty months plus one intercalary month, to equal 1,830 days. At first in the Brahmanic period (c. 800–600 BCE), an intercalary month of thirty days was added every five years, but later (in the *Satapatha Brahmana*) this was adjusted to a twenty-five- or twenty-six-day month: five years with an intercalary month of thirty days gave a total of 1,830 days; five years with an intercalary month of twenty-six days gave a total of 1,826 days; and five years with an intercalary month of twenty-five days gave a total of 1,825 days. (The actual number of days in five years is 1826.25.)

The passage of time was also measured in terms of politically based Indian eras, some of which are still cited by nationalists. The oldest of these is the Vikrama era, dating from the start of the reign of King Vikramaditya of Ujjain in 58 BCE. More common in modern usage is the Saka era, dating from the beginning of the Saka dynasty in Ujjain in 78 CE. There is also the Gupta era, commemorating the ascent to the throne by Candragupta I in 320 CE. Finally the Harsa era dates from 606 CE, when the influential emperor Harsavardhana of Kanyakubja began his reign.

Christian and Islamic Calendars

Both the Christian and the Islamic calendars have been in widespread use throughout South Asia, the Christian one since the eighteenth century and the Islamic one since the thirteenth century. The Christian calendar dated events from the purported birth of Christ (year 1), and the traditional Christian method of dating events either BC (before Christ) or AD (*anno domini*, "in the year of our Lord") persists to this day. Even the terms CE and BCE (Common Era and Before the Common Era), popularized as a way of avoiding the Christian terminology, are still anchored to the Christian calendar.

The Islamic era dates from Muhammad's hegira (*Hijra*), or flight to Medina, which is believed to have occurred on Thursday, 15 July 622 (old style; 18 July new style). Year 1 of the era began on the following day. The Islamic year is lunar, with twelve lunar months and no intercalation. This means that the months retrograde throughout the entire year in the course of 32 1/2 solar or astronomical years. (To con-

vert a *Hijra* year to a Gregorian one, multiply 0.970224 by the year, and add 621.5774. After cutting off six decimal places from the product, the sum will be the year of the Common Era.)

Paul Hockings

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CALENDARS-SOUTHEAST ASIA The Western calendar is effectively universal in today's globalized world, but parts of Southeast Asia still use their Indian-derived calendars for local and religious purposes. These calendars divide, historically, into three groups: the calendar used in Cambodia and Champa from the seventh century CE, using the era dating from 78 CE, which is called the *saka*; the calendar used in Indonesia, especially Java, from the ninth century, which also uses *saka*; and the calendar used in Burma, Thailand, and Laos from the thirteenth century, using the era of 638 CE, called the *thekkarit* by the Burmese and *chulasakarat* by the others (the term means "little era," whereas the *saka*, which it largely replaced, was called *mabasakarat* ("big era"). European influence in mainland Southeast Asia and Muslim influence in Indonesia eventually weakened these indigenous modes. They are called indigenous despite their Indian origin because each region developed its characteristic way of adopting and amplifying the Indian mode.

Lunar Months

These calendars all use the moon's path to measure the months of the year. The moon's circuit in the sky was divided into twenty-seven sections called *naksatra*, twelve of which gave their names to the lunar months because the moon was in or near that *naksatra* when it was full. A Cambodian variant upon using the Indian (Sanskrit) names of the months was sometimes to use Indian seasonal names instead, whereas the Burmese used their own particular set of names as equivalents, and the Thai used numerals with a complexity typical of this whole subject. Focusing on the conventional first month of the lunar year, Caitra, then in southern Thailand this was month 5, in most of the north it was month 7, and in parts of the north and of Laos it was month

6. One can see the difficulties historians face in making conversions, or in correctly interpreting the data.

Expressing the Year

It is common today to simply say, for example, "It is 2 May 2002." In Asia generally, dates were expressed in a far more elaborate way, each main region having its own distinctive style. A year number usually formed part of the date (given according to the various eras mentioned above, or perhaps in terms of the Buddha Era, dating variously to 544 BCE or 543 BCE), but then various additions were customary, the most familiar of which is known from the Chinese custom of attaching one of twelve animal names to the year: 2001 for instance was the year of the horse. The Thai inherited this custom and added to it by using pairs of words (also of Chinese origin, that have no meaning in Thai) to designate the years on a cycle that in this instance lasted for sixty years, not just twelve. If one year was "rat *kap cai*," the next year would be "ox *dap plao*," and the next rat year—which would come eleven years later—would be "rat *rawai cai*." The cycle would wind on until "rat *kap cai*" eventually came round again. This system has its uses. If a king is said to have come to the throne in an "ox *dap plao*" year, then it should normally be possible to verify in which block of 60 years the event occurred.

The Burmese, for their part, also adopted a cycle of twelve years, but they took over the names that the Indians and the rest of Southeast Asia applied to the lunar months (Caitra, Vaisakha, Jyestha, Ashadha, Sravana, Bhadrapada, Asvina, Karttika, Margasirsha, Pausa, Magha, and Phalgun).

Moving to Cambodia there is an even more elaborate system, used also in India, known as chronograms. We have five senses and we have two eyes, so we could write "senses-eyes-senses" if we wanted an exotic way to represent the number 525. This is what the Cambodians did. On an inscription we might find, for instance, that the year is not called 561, but (by their mapping of noun to number) "arrows-seasons-face."

The Indonesians, on the other hand, were content merely to give the year in numeric form, as they had very elaborate ways of embroidering the remainder of the date. There could sometimes be fourteen elements in a date, of which five (called the *pancanga*—another Indian inheritance) were in effect obligatory. The first was the day of the month in the lunar calendar; days of the month were known as the *tithi*. Each *tithi* had two halves, called the *karana*; this was the second obligatory element in a date. To these items were added the day of the week (each one consisting of three

elements), which was the third obligatory element. The *naksatra* (which defines the moon's position, as mentioned above) was the fourth, and the fifth element was the *yoga*, an arbitrary number derived by finding the positions of the sun and the moon in degrees of celestial longitude, adding the two values together and dividing the result by 13 degrees and 20 arc minutes. (This last step is taken because 13 degrees and 20 arc minutes, if multiplied by 27—the total number of *naksatras*—equals 360 degrees).

Balancing the Calendar with Extra Days and Months

For the days of the lunar month, everyone used the moon's waxing and waning phases, where one choice—used by the Indians—was to take account of where the moon actually was. Thus, if the moon was still in the same *naksatra* on successive days (moving slowly), that day's number would be repeated, whereas if the moon traversed an entire *naksatra* in one day (moving fast), that day would be suppressed. Both fluctuations often happened in the same month so the succession of days might be . . . 8, 9, 9, 10. . . . 19, 20, 22, 23. . . Here the moon's motion is slow toward the start of the month and fast toward the end. The second choice, used by the Burmese and the Thai, was to have no extra or suppressed days within a month, but to alternate the length of the month, with twenty-nine days in one month and thirty days in the next.

Adjusting the days in a month, however, was not sufficient: it was also necessary to adjust the months themselves in order to keep the calendar in sync. The procedure in mainland Southeast Asia involved on occasion giving a year thirteen lunar months instead of the usual twelve, and even less frequently adding an extra day to a month that would normally have only twenty-nine days. The frequency required was seven extra months in nineteen years (twenty-one months in fifty-seven years) and an additional eleven extra days in fifty-seven years. With alternate months of twenty-nine and thirty days a "normal" lunar year had 354 days in it; the occasional extra day gave the Thai years with 355 days in them, and the extra month gave them years with 384 days in them. This was because if a year had an extra day in it, the Thai did not allow it also to have an extra month. The Burmese, on the other hand, reversed the rule and said only years with an extra month could have an extra day, resulting in lunar years that were variously 354 days, 384 days, and 385 days long. Even these close neighbors had lunar calendars that would often not agree with one another.

Recalling that the Indians dropped or added days to the lunar month as immediately required, it is not

surprising to learn that they did the same thing for the months. The Indonesians followed suit, slotting in the extra month as soon as it became due. If the moon was in the same *naksatra* (at dawn) two days running, that day was counted twice. By the same thinking, if the sun was in the same sign of the zodiac for two new moons in a row, that month was counted twice. There was much less need to suppress lunar months: this occurred only rarely and at a point late in the lunar year.

The Days of the Week

For the weekdays, all groups adopted names equivalent to those used in the West, using the Sanskrit equivalents for the sun, the moon, and the five planets of ancient astronomy (Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn). Sun-day (Sunday) is *aditya-vara*, Moon-day (Monday) is *chandra-vara*, and so on. The order in which the weekdays occur has an astrological principle behind it. Assume that each planet in turn governs successive hours of the day through the week. If you make the sun rule the first hour of day one, then by rotation the moon will rule the first hour of day two, and so on round.

This planetary week received two kinds of embellishment: In the north of Thailand it was combined with the cycle of sixty that the Thai also employed for the years. Thus, 1 January 2002 is "snake *ruang sai*" as to the year and "Tuesday *kat sai*" as to the day. In Indonesia two other kinds of week were recognized, one of six days and the other of five days. This gave a cycle of 210 days ($5 \times 6 \times 7 = 210$), which was then divided into thirty lots of seven days, called the *wuku*. In this system 1 January 2002 would be labeled *was paniruan anggara* (Tuesday) in the *wuku balamuki*.

Each of the basic ingredients of a date—year, month, day, and weekday—had its own elaboration, which developed differently in different regions. Each of these calendars, therefore, deserves consideration in its own right.

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CALENDARS—WEST ASIA West Asia has a long history of reckoning time, and each important culture in the region has devised a calendar that serves to mark important religious and social events. It was only in the early twentieth century that Asian nations adopted the Gregorian calendar, and traditional calendars continue to retain their importance in the religious and cultural life of the region.

One of the earliest surviving calendars is the Jewish or Hebrew calendar, which was established by the patriarch Hillel II about 359 CE and which retains features that hark back to the calendar used by the Babylonians in the seventh century BCE. These features include the names of the months and the nineteen-year cycle. The Hebrew calendar, as currently in religious use, was fully formulated by the tenth century CE. It is used by Jews all over the world and is the official calendar of Israel.

The Jewish calendar is lunisolar; that is, the years agree with the tropical (solar) year and the months coincide with the synodic (lunar) months. This formulation can lead to complications. Because twelve months are approximately eleven days shorter than the tropical year, a leap month (or an intercalary month) is inserted every third year to keep the calendar synchronized with the seasons. In ancient Israel, religious leaders determined the date for Passover each spring by observing if the roads were dry enough for pilgrims and if the lambs were ready for slaughter. If not, another month would be added. Structurally, an ordinary (or nonleap) year has 353, 354, or 355 days, and a leap year has 383, 384, or 385 days. An ordinary year has twelve months, and a leap year has thirteen months. Every month starts on the day of a new moon. The three lengths of the years are known as "deficient," "regular," and "complete." A complete year is created by adding a day to the month of November (Heshvan); a deficient year results when a day is removed from the month of December (Kislev). New Year's Day can fall on four days: Rosh Hashanah (a celebration of the creation of the world, usually 1 October); Tu B'shevat (the new year for trees, when fruit tithes are to be brought, usually 15 February); New Year for Kings, which starts on 1 April; and New Year for Animal Tithes (a time for taxes, which starts on 1 September). A Jewish day begins not at midnight, but either at sunset or when three medium-sized stars become visible. Sunset marks the start of the twelve hours of night, whereas sunrise marks the start of the twelve hours of day. Thus, night hours may be longer or shorter than day hours, depending on the season. In the Jewish calendar, years are counted from the time of creation of the world, which is said to have taken

place in 3761 BCE, which was the start of year 1 am (Anno Mundi, the year of the world).

Islamic Calendar

The Islamic (or Hijri) calendar, on the other hand, is a purely lunar calendar and was introduced about 632 CE by 'Umar ibn al-Khattab (c. 586–644 CE), who was the second caliph and a close companion of Muhammad (c. 570–632), the founder of Islam. The Islamic calendar contains twelve months based upon the motions of the moon. Therefore, the Islamic calendar is consistently shorter than a tropical year, because twelve synodic months equal about 354 days. The calendar is based upon two verses found in the Qur'an.

The originating date of the Islamic calendar is the Hijrah (flight), when Muhammad fled Mecca (after facing persecution for his teachings) and found refuge in Medina. The date of this flight is determined as 16 July 622 CE, which became the year 1 AH (Anno Hegirae, the year of the hegira). To Muslims, the Hijri calendar has great religious and historical significance. Each month starts when the lunar crescent is first seen (by a cleric) after a new moon. Although new moons can be predicted with fair accuracy, the actual visibility of the crescent is more problematic to predict. Factors such as weather, the atmosphere, and the location of the cleric all become crucial factors. This makes it difficult to predict when exactly a new month will start. Most Muslims depend on a local sighting of the moon, but some follow an authoritative declaration made somewhere else in the Muslim world. Both are deemed valid in Islam, although they often lead to different starting days for the months. One consequence of this practice is that a reliable Islamic calendar cannot be printed because only estimates of the visibility of the lunar crescent can be given, and the actual month may start a day earlier or later than what is predicted in the printed calendar. However, since 1999 Saudi Arabia has not relied on a visual sighting of the crescent moon to determine the start of a new month. Rather, the Saudi Islamic calendar is based on a calculated astronomical moon, where the times when the sun and the moon set are compared on the 29th of an Islamic month. If the sun sets before the moon, the next day is the first of a new month; and if the moon sets before the sun, the next day is the last (30th) of the current month. The times for the setting of the sun and the moon are based upon the coordinates of Mecca.

Permutation in Iran

A permutation of the Islamic calendar occurred in Iran during the nineteenth century, when a new religion, Baha'i, was established. The Baha'i faith advo-

cates the oneness of all humanity and the oneness of all religions, and works toward bringing harmony between religion, science, and reason in order to achieve world peace.

Given their strong adherence to reason and science, it is not surprising that the Baha'is sought to rectify the Islamic calendar. Their religious calendar is purely solar, consisting of 365 days. Each year is divided into nineteen months; each month has nineteen days, with four intercalary days (five in a leap year). Baha Allah (1817–1892), the founder of the faith, stipulated that leap days should always precede the nineteenth month because it was during these days that followers were taught to fast, be hospitable, feast, and give gifts in charity. Baha Allah also divided time into cycles of nineteen years (the Vahid). Nineteen such cycles equal one period (Kul-e-Shai). This nineteen-year cycle brings time reckoning in western Asia back to the era of the ancient Babylonians.

Nirmal Dass

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CALICUT (2001 est. city pop. 437,000). Calicut (or Kozhikode) refers to both the city of Calicut and to the surrounding district. Located on the southwest coast of India on the Arabian Sea, Calicut is a major city of the state of Kerala.

Vasco da Gama landed off Calicut in 1498, assuring it a place in all Western atlases. In the years between 1102 and 1498 CE, Calicut became the most important political power in central and north Kerala under the rule of the Zamorin. The tolerant policies of the Zamorin toward Arab traders and its position as an important port for spice and timber trade contributed to the growth of the city.

Calicut was briefly under Mysorean occupation ending in 1799. Subsequently, the British annexed it. In the colonial period it was the headquarters of the Malabar District. Calicut continued to be an important port engaged in international maritime trade until the 1920s.

Today Calicut city measures 30.61 square kilometers and has a population of 420,000 with 100 percent



CALICUT

This extract is from one of the earliest and one of the best-known travel guides to India. It has been reprinted by several publishers in the 1990s

Can those three or four bungalows, with that stick-like lighthouse between them and the half-dozen tiled and thatched roofs peeping from amongst the trees, compose Calicut—the city of world-wide celebrity, which immortalised herself by giving a name to calico? Yes... We shall meet few Europeans in the street: there are scarcely twenty in this place, including all the varieties of civilians, merchants, missionaries, and officers... Most of the residents inhabit houses built upon an eminence to the north of the town; others live as close as possible to the sea. A dreary life they must lead, one would suppose, especially during the monsoon, when the unhappy expatriated's ears are regaled by no other sounds than but the pelting of the rain, the roaring of the blast, and the creaking of the cocoa trees, whilst a curtain of raging sea, black sky, and watery air, is all that meets his weary ken."

Source: Sir Richard Francis Burton ([1851] 1991) *Goa and the Blue Mountains; Or, Six Months of Sick Leave*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

literacy. Calicut district has a population of 2.6 million. It is one of the most industrially advanced districts of Kerala. The main commodities exported and imported are pepper and rice respectively. Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity are the chief religions of the district.

R. Gopinath

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CALLIGRAPHY-CHINA Chinese calligraphy (from the Greek *kalligraphia*, "beautiful writing") is the art of writing that educated Chinese have practiced for millennia. All students of written Chinese practice calligraphy, but becoming a good calligrapher requires practice, self-discipline, and an artistic sense. Chinese calligraphy, therefore, is more than just the mere art of penmanship.

The Chinese Character

Chinese is an ideographic, and in some cases pictographic, language. Thus each Chinese character is a

monosyllabic word that conveys an idea. Characters, insofar as they are sometimes pictographic, also provide a visual expression of the ideas that they represent in a way that purely phonetic scripts do not. Characters, each composed of a series of strokes, make up words when written in a particular order. No matter how many strokes a character may be composed of, it must fit perfectly inside an imaginary box that is the same size as those of the characters preceding and following it. A character usually has two components: a radical that indicates meaning in a very broad sense, and a phonetic component that indicates sound, also in a broad sense. These components may be side by side or one on top of the other, inside the imaginary box within which each character is composed. Calligraphy is the art of writing these characters.

History of Writing and Calligraphy

Historically, writing and power have been intimately related in China, and calligraphy has been of much greater importance there than penmanship has been in Western societies. The earliest examples of writing in China appear on oracle bones from the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE). These oracle bones were tortoise shells and scapula of mammals, etched



A Buddhist monk at the Jade Buddha Temple in Shanghai practices calligraphy. (DAVE BARTRUFF/CORBIS)

with questions for the gods and then held over heat until they cracked. Shamans (magicians), who had written the inscriptions in the first place, interpreted the cracks as divine answers to the questions. People with the ability to write in ancient China, therefore, had the power to communicate with heaven and to interpret heaven's will. Early Chinese rulers, eager to empower themselves in every possible way, surrounded themselves by those who could write and help them communicate with heaven.

Although, as the oracle bones show us, writing existed in China at least three thousand years ago, there was not a unified written language in China until the third century BCE. At that time, Qin Shihuangdi (c. 259–210 BCE), the first emperor of the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE), who was trying to reshape the numerous kingdoms of the Chinese landmass into a unified empire, standardized writing. The creation of a single, unified written language in a nation full of spoken dialects, where there was no universally compre-

hensible spoken language, made the written language that much more important.

Over time, education in China's written language became essential to participation in government, and an imperial examination system evolved to test candidates' skill in written expression. From the Tang (618–907) to the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), calligraphy was considered an important criterion for passing all three levels of these civil-service examinations. The quality of one's calligraphy was thought to provide insight into one's moral character. Beautiful calligraphy became a symbol of culture, education, self-discipline, and erudition.

Certain people became known for their calligraphy, and the calligraphy of other people became known because the calligraphers themselves were famous or powerful. Writing on paintings, memorials, and other materials became a way for superiors to impart wisdom, advice, and injunctions to their inferiors. Virtually any literate person recognized the calligraphy of the emperor and the most important government figures of the time.

Calligraphic Styles

A variety of styles of calligraphy, or scripts, evolved over time, each coming to be identified with particular types or styles of writing. The script that became standard during the reign of Qin Shihuangdi is known as small seal (*xiaozhuan*) script. Today, this script is difficult for people to read and is generally used only in works of art. Among other scripts that have evolved, the most common is regular (*kaishu*) script, in which each stroke of a character is clearly written. Because of its clarity, regular script is generally used for printing. The clerical (*lishu*) style was developed during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). Today, it is most commonly used in inscriptions on monuments and public buildings. Writers of informal notes or letters probably use the running (*xingshu*) style of script, in which the separate strokes of a given character are often run together. A variation on the running style is the grass (*caoshu*) style, which actually omits strokes and joins separate characters together. The grass style was particularly popular among literati in the late imperial era.

Calligraphy as Art

Chinese calligraphy is ornamental. Its beauty lies in both the concepts expressed and the form of expression. Throughout the Chinese world, people display decorative calligraphy in homes and businesses. Couplets, often written on strips of red paper, hang at the entrances of homes; lucky characters are pasted on the

walls and windows of shops, restaurants, and homes at the Chinese New Year; and scrolls of calligraphy hang in living rooms.

Perhaps because calligraphy is an art form and a means of self-expression rather than simply a vehicle for conveying meaning, works of art, such as paintings, sculptures, and buildings, are themselves often adorned with calligraphy. In many cases, the inscriptions on paintings and etchings on buildings, monuments, and places of natural beauty are expressions of appreciation, commentaries, or labels appended by later owners or observers (often the emperor). These calligraphic additions are not generally seen as detracting from the original piece, but as adding something to it.

Contemporary Calligraphy

During the twentieth century, China underwent several attempts to simplify the written language. Language reformers, hoping to increase literacy, introduced both phonetic scripts using roman letters and simplified characters, the forms of which, interestingly, are derived in many instances from *caoshu*, or the grass style of calligraphy. Although the phonetic systems have not become especially popular, more than two thousand simplified versions of commonly used characters were introduced by the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the official written form between 1956 and 1964; their use in the PRC has relegated the more complex forms of characters and the art of writing them to the past for most Chinese.

Nonetheless, calligraphy has remained important in post-1949 China, and the calligraphy of famous Communist Party members can be seen on various signs throughout China. The characters for the name of the newspaper called the *People's Daily* (*renmin ribao*), for instance, are printed in the calligraphy of Mao Zedong (1893–1976). The presence of Mao's calligraphy on the front page of every edition of the *People's Daily* shows the world that the paper benefited from his patronage. While the forms of characters may have changed during the twentieth century, therefore, the functions of calligraphy have remained essentially the same. Calligraphy is the artistic expression of the power of language by the individual. Both the form and content of calligraphy inform the reader or viewer about the morality, education, and dedication of the calligrapher.

J. Megan Greene

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CALLIGRAPHY-JAPAN *Sho* is the modern Japanese term for the art of brush writing, and refers to calligraphy in which Chinese characters or Japanese phonetic writing or both are transformed into objects of artistic expression or works of art. *Shodo* is the traditional term for calligraphy, and means "the way or practice of brush writing." It has been practiced in Japan ever since the introduction of Chinese characters and calligraphy about fifteen hundred years ago. At that time Chinese calligraphy was already one of the oldest and most distinctive art forms in East Asia, so that Japanese calligraphy began as the inheritor of a long and illustrious tradition. Today the terms *sho* and *shodo* are often used interchangeably, but *shodo* is used more for practice that focuses on beautiful writing and artistic expression, whereas *sho* generally refers to artwork by calligraphers with an interest in or commitment to the underlying philosophy, aesthetic principles, and historical tradition.

Calligraphy is one of the most respected art forms in Japan because the brush strokes are able to capture the artist's intentional and unintentional artistic expression as well as every nuance of their character, spirit, and state of mind. The *sho* artist requires a high degree of classical training, and an ability to improvise in the manner of a jazz musician, responding spontaneously to constantly changing conditions. Japan's first modern philosopher, Kitaro Nishida (1870–1945), referred to *sho* as congealed music. The primary tools used in the art of *sho* are called the Four Treasures: *fude* (brushes made of long, flexible animal hair); *sumi* (black ink made by grinding carbon ink sticks on an ink stone); *suzuri* (the ink stone); and *gasen-shi* (a highly absorbent paper that gives the brush strokes a wide range of hues, tones, shading, and diffusion).

Kanji and Kana: Two Traditions of *Sho* in Japan

Japanese calligraphy evolved along two separate paths. The first maintained a fidelity to classical Chinese writing but gradually infused it with a subtle but distinctive Japanese aesthetic, related to form, composition, style, and even subject matter. The second borrowed elements from Chinese characters to develop a Japanese syllabary with original calligraphic principles, aesthetic values, and style.

Kanji is the Japanese name for Chinese characters, and kana is Japanese phonetic writing, which the Japanese devised from kanji gradually, during the eighth and ninth centuries. By the time the art of calligraphy was introduced to Japan at the end of the fifth century CE, China had five main script styles and numerous variations. The three structural scripts were known in Japanese as *tensho* (the ancient seal or primitive style), *reisho* (the scribe or semi-primitive style), and *kaisho* (the standard, formal style). Two more-fluid scripts lent themselves to artistic and emotional expression: *gyosho* (semi-cursive, running style) and *sosho* (cursive, grass style).

Kaisho, *gyosho*, and *sosho* appealed to Japanese kanji calligraphers, who tended to specialize in using the one that most suited their personality and temperament. They studied by copying the compositions, techniques, and script styles of the Chinese masters, after which they would create original compositions with Chinese poems and prose. In the late twentieth century a number of kanji artists have started actively creating compositions using their own original poetry and prose.

As the Japanese adapted kanji to represent sounds in the language, each of the syllables came to be represented by more than one kanji, with a few hundred in all, many chosen for the similarity of their sounds. This style of writing was called *man'yo-gana*, named after the oldest collection of poems in Japanese, *Man'yoshu*, all of which were written in this style. Gradually, an elegant and fluid form or *man'yo gana* evolved, and all the variations that developed during this process are called *bentai-gana*. Over the next hundred years these became quite abstract, and many no longer resembled the original Chinese characters.

At the same time a second form of writing evolved using one kanji for each syllable. These were gradually simplified by palace women as a practical kind of shorthand. By the tenth century the kanji had been transformed into minimalist letters, each representing a syllable. This syllabary was called *hiragana* and was also known as *onna-dé* or "woman's hand." Although *hiragana* and *bentai-gana* were initially different, these elegant, delicate, and distinctively Japanese forms of calligraphy were often combined. Later on, as the written language developed, kanji characters were combined with *hiragana*. As a result, many kana *sbo* artists often combined *bentai-gana*, *hiragana*, and kanji characters (used for the meaning, not the sound, of the characters) in their calligraphy.

Three special features give kana *sbo* its beauty: *renmen-tai*, the threads of ink that connect the syllables in fluid, continuous streams of writing; *chirashi-gaki*,

an organic irregularity in the composition, with variations in the shape and tone of the lines and in the shape of the negative spaces between and around the lines; and the vast selection of letter forms that can be chosen for each syllable. The *katakana* alphabet, which is primarily used for writing words of foreign origin, never developed into a form of *sbo*.

Historical Background

The art of calligraphy became established in Japan when a number of Korean monks and artisans immigrated to Japan around the end of the fifth century CE, by which time it had already reached a high artistic level in China. In the mid-sixth century another group of Koreans came to Japan to introduce Buddhism, and this further extended the awareness and practice of *sbo*. One of the leading figures in the advancement of *sbo* was Prince Shotoku (574–622), who mastered Chinese calligraphy and encouraged the teachings of Buddhism. Under his influence, many great masterpieces of calligraphy were imported from China. In 610, a Korean monk introduced the technology for making ink sticks and paper, and this facilitated the spread of *sbo*. During the Chinese Tang dynasty (618–907), many Japanese monks and students were sent to China to study Chinese culture and calligraphy.

When China entered a state of decline at the end of the ninth century, Japan's Emperor Uda (867–931) took the opportunity to suspend trade and diplomatic relations in order to foster a more indigenous Japanese culture. Over the next couple of centuries kana *sbo* experienced a golden age of creativity.

During the twelfth century Taira no Kiyomori (1118–1181), the head of what was briefly Japan's most powerful clan, encouraged the reopening of trade with China and the importation of Song-dynasty culture. The Japanese monk Eisai (1141–1215) was sent to China to study Buddhism and returned with the teachings of Chan (in Japanese, Zen). The spirit and philosophy of Zen eventually had a profound impact on Japanese culture, including the practice of kanji *sbo*, and after some time, a piece of calligraphic art was displayed as an integral part of tea ceremony (*cha no yu*).

Up to the end of the twelfth century, educated people practiced forms of kana and kanji *sbo* that placed considerable value on technical excellence. As the samurai rose to power, they were influenced by the values of naturalness and simplicity in Zen philosophy, which led to a significant shift in artistic taste and moral values. Emphasis was given to the practice of kanji and a writing style that expressed the artist's total being and reflected his state of mind and inner consciousness. Several monks

of the period, including Ikkyū (1394–1481) were renowned for *sho* that had a bold, grounded quality and expressed deep spirituality and a sense of freedom.

For a couple of centuries the interest in kana *sho* remained quite low, and the writing styles became formalized by a few schools that preserved this art form. In the latter part of the sixteenth century, three exceptional kana artists helped revive the practice of kana *sho* and it began to recover its position within Japanese culture. The most illustrious calligrapher of the three was Koetsu Hon'ami (1558–1637), who was also a renowned *raku* potter and *makie* lacquerware artist.

The Meiji era (1868–1912) was a period of total transformation, and the influence of foreign, mostly European culture and values was strongly felt in Japan. Tenrai Hidai (1872–1939), the leading *sho* artist of his day, shifted the conceptual emphasis of calligraphy from the practice of self-cultivation and technical proficiency (or both) to one that added the element of artistic merit. Hidai recognized *sho*'s potential as a modern art form and set an example by his own artwork and teaching. Public interest and appreciation in *sho* was increased by advances in printing technology that made it possible to publish many books on calligraphy, and many fine reproductions of well-known Japanese and Chinese calligraphers.

Contemporary *Sho*

After World War II, artists began to embrace self-expression, liberalism, and artistic freedom. In the early 1950s, a group of young kanji artists led by Shiryū Morita created *zen-ei sho*, a new genre of avant-garde calligraphy that had spatial form, energy, and dynamic movement, inspired in part by modern Western abstract art, and in part by Zen philosophy and aesthetics. They often transformed Chinese characters into abstract images, or created large-scale works in which impressionistic single characters swept off the paper. Although their art was not looked on favorably or even accepted by mainstream Japanese *sho* artists, it received international recognition and was widely exhibited in Europe and the United States.

Mainstream traditional *sho* is divided into four categories: kanji, kana, *chowa-tai* (which combines kanji and kana), and *tenkoku* or seal carving. There are also three categories of nontraditional *sho*: *sho-jisu sho*, which is art created with one or two kanji; *kindai-shibun sho*, a contemporary style of kanji and kana used in writing modern poetry; and *zen-ei sho*, with its avant-garde kanji characters.

Today, a small number of brush artists are creating a form of modern abstract expressionist brush art

called *boku-sho*, which means ink images. This contemporary lyrical style has an aesthetic that Westerners can relate to quite easily, and the future may well see the influence of this brush art spread beyond Japan's geographic and cultural boundaries.

Mondo Secter and Ari Tomita

See also: **Calligraphy-China; Calligraphy-Korea**

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CALLIGRAPHY-KOREA Calligraphy has been an art form in Korea since at least the fourth century CE. It derives from written Chinese, which was adopted for writing Korean around the second century CE. Even after the first phonetic alphabet was devised for Korean in 1446, writing Chinese characters with artistry and skill was highly valued and a requisite of the Korean nobility.

Korean calligraphy is categorized into five basic writing styles. Block style (*baeso*) consists of square characters such as those used in woodblock printing and modern-day newspaper and book printing. The cursive style (*choso*) or "grass writing" is used by those adept at writing Chinese characters as a daily practice. The style is so named because it joins the abbreviated and simplified strokes of characters into a woven image resembling a blade of grass. The semicursive style (*haengso*), also commonly used in everyday writing, combines characteristics of both the block and cursive styles. The two most ornate styles are *chonso* and *yeso*. *Chonso* contains long lines of a uniform width and most closely resembles the early form of Chinese characters. *Yeso* is a highly stylized form with origins dating back earlier than those of the block style. There are



At a meeting of North and South Korean leaders in Pyongyang in June 2000, the leaders attend a calligraphy demonstration at the children's palace. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

subcategories within each of these styles, and accomplished calligraphers develop their own unique styles.

Although it is known that calligraphy was taught at royal academies and state institutions during the Three Kingdoms period (57 BCE–667 CE), few examples from that period remain. Following Chinese practice, the rulers of the Koryo kingdom (918–1392) included the composition of verse and its calligraphic rendering in the recruitment examinations for state officials. Throughout this period and much of the Choson dynasty (1392–1910), calligraphy styles closely followed those of the great Chinese masters. In the nineteenth century, however, Korean calligraphers developed individual, creative styles independent of Chinese models. Most noted of these is the *chusa* style of Kim Chong-hui (1786–1856). Kim was a leader in Korean experimentation with seal-style characters and the simplified square-style calligraphy found on ancient steles. Through this experimentation, Kim's uniquely Korean *chusa* style developed.

Calligraphy using the Korean alphabet began in the late eighteenth century. Stroke formation of Korean alphabet calligraphy closely resembles that of the basic writing styles for Chinese characters. Calligraphy written in both Chinese and Korean characters is taught in elementary schools and in private calligraphy schools. The most influential Korean calligrapher of the twentieth century was Son Che-hyong (1903–1981, artistic name Sojon), who was a master of all five basic calligraphy styles. His organizational efforts led to the inclusion of the popular calligraphy division in the Republic of Korea's National Arts Exhibition.

David E. Shaffer

See also: **Calligraphy-Japan**

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CAM RANH BAY Located in Vietnam's Khanh Hoa Province, about 33 kilometers south of Nha Trang, Cam Ranh Bay is a protected natural deep-water harbor that has been an important way station for navigators since the days of Marco Polo. The bay is very large at its widest berth (three to five kilometers) and is surrounded on three sides by land and slight hills. These geographic features enable ships to find safe harbor easily and make the bay easy to protect. Cam Ranh Bay saw its most active usage during the Vietnam War (1954–1975). In the 1960s, as the American military buildup increased, the need for another deep-water port to relieve congestion in Saigon, South Vietnam's only modern port facility, was realized at Cam Ranh Bay. Beginning in May–June 1965, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers began to construct large cargo-handling facilities, connecting roads, warehouses, fuel tanks, and a large pier that could handle six large vessels simultaneously. In June 1972 the U.S. turned these facilities over to the Republic of Vietnam, which surrendered them to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in April 1975. Since then the bay and base have been used by both the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the former Soviet Union as a port and naval facility.

Richard B. Verrone

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CAMBODIA-PROFILE (2001 est. 11.4 million). Cambodia occupies 181,040 square kilometers of peninsular Southeast Asia. Modern Cambodia is bordered by Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, and the Gulf of Thailand, which is a part of the South China Sea. It is all that remains of the once-powerful Khmer empire that flourished in the ninth through the twelfth centuries and dominated much of mainland Southeast Asia.

The frequency with which the official name of the country has changed is emblematic of the many polit-



CAMBODIA

Country name: Kingdom of Cambodia
Area: 181,040 sq km
Population: 12,491,501 (2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 2.25% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 33.16 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 10.65 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: 0 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio: 0.94 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 65.41 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population: 56.82 years; male: 54.62 years; female: 59.12 years (2001 est.)
Major religion: Theravada Buddhist
Major languages: Khmer (official), French, English
Literacy—total population: 35%; male: 48%, female: 22% (1990 est.)
Government type: multiparty liberal democracy under a constitutional monarchy established in September 1993
Capital: Phnom Penh
Administrative divisions: 20 provinces and 4 municipalities
Independence: 9 November 1953 (from France)
National holiday: Independence Day, 9 November (1953)
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal
GDP—real growth rate: 4% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita: (purchasing power parity): \$1,300 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: 36% (1997 est.)
Exports: \$942 million (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Imports: \$1.3 billion (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Currency: riel (KHR)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Book Factbook 2001*. Retrieved 5 March 2002, from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

ical and social changes that have characterized modern Cambodia. Cambodia's current official title, the Kingdom of Cambodia, marks a return to name it had in the years immediately following independence, granted by the French in 1953. It has also been known officially as the Khmer Republic (1970–1975), Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979), the People's Republic of Kampuchea (1979–1989), and the State of Cambodia (1989–1993).


Geography

Cambodia could be compared to a saucepan, or to a bowl. In the center of the country is a lowland plain, which is bordered by the Dangrek Mountains along the Thai border, the Cardamom Mountains to the

south, and the Elephant Mountains even further south. There are also mountain ranges in the east. The country's highest peak is Mount Aural, which rises 1,813 meters (5,948 feet) above sea level.

The most significant geographical feature of Cambodia is the Tonle Sap. Tonle Sap is the name given to a river that is a tributary of the Mekong River, which flows through China, Myanmar (Burma), Laos, and Thailand, before running for more than 500 kilometers (more than 300 miles) through Cambodia, into Vietnam, and then to the South China Sea. Tonle Sap is also the name of a lake, into and from which the Tonle Sap River flows.

The Tonle Sap is remarkable because its flow reverses with the seasons. During the dry season (November



to April), the Tonle Sap River flows south from the lake into the Mekong River. During this period, the lake remains narrow and long, covering about 5 percent of Cambodia. During the wet season (May to October), the Mekong River rises, and the Tonle Sap River can no longer flow into it. The Tonle Sap river reverses its direction, flowing north into the Tonle Sap lake. The lake swells and overflows, covering almost 15 percent of the country. When the Tonle Sap flows into the Mekong, it leaves behind a layer of soil rich in nutrients. Rice farmers capitalize on this soil to grow their crops, and in the lake, the nutrients are eaten by fish. Together, fish and rice form the staple of the Cambodian diet.

Politics

Politics in Cambodia reflects the country's turbulent modern history. Having passed through a series of revolutionary changes since independence, the most radical and infamous of which was the rule of the

Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1979, the current system of government is officially a multiparty liberal democracy under a constitutional monarchy. This system was formed after warring factions in Cambodia agreed, in 1991, to conduct national elections under the direct supervision of the United Nations.

In 2001, the head of the government was Prime Minister Hun Sen (b. 1952), a former low-ranking officer of the Khmer Rouge who quickly rose through the ranks of the Khmer Rouge's Vietnamese-backed successor regime, the People's Republic of Kampuchea. Hun Sen was appointed prime minister after national elections conducted in 1998 delivered a majority of seats to his Cambodian People's Party (CPP), which governed in coalition with the royalist FUNCINPEC (Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif; National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia) party, led by Prince Norodom Ranariddh. The

prince is a son of Cambodia's King Sihanouk (b. 1922), who remains the country's most enduring political figure.

Economy

More than 75 percent of Cambodia's workforce is employed in agriculture. The primary agricultural crop is rice. Other crops include corn, rubber, sugarcane, and vegetables. Many Cambodians earn a living fishing from the Tonle Sap, while others grow a variety of fruit—among them being bananas, durian, mango, and papaya. Set against the agriculture sector is a steady growth in the industry sector, primarily fueled by the establishment of foreign-owned garment factories, which capitalize on Cambodia's cheap labor. The garment industry employs more than 100,000 people, and accounts for almost \$700 million per year in exports.

A major feature of the economic system is its dependence on international assistance. During the 1980s, it was the assistance of Vietnam and the Soviet-led international socialist bloc that prevented the Cambodian economy from collapse. In the last decade of the twentieth century, the international community supported the Cambodian budget, and provided the funds for most capital investment, with China emerging as a major donor to the government. While self-sustainability is a long-term goal of the Cambodian government, this remains elusive.

People

Unlike many of its Southeast Asian neighbors, Cambodia is relatively ethnically homogenous. The dominant ethnic group is the Khmer, whose language (Khmer) is the national language of Cambodia, and whose religion, Theravada Buddhism, is also the national religion. The largest ethnic minority groups in Cambodia are the Chinese and the Vietnamese, many of whom have lived in the country for several generations. While relations between the Khmer and Chinese normally are quite amicable, and often feature intermarriage, relations between the Khmer and Vietnamese are often characterized by suspicion and animosity that are rooted in history and stem from the Khmer perception that the Vietnamese desire to "swallow up" Cambodian territory. The Chams, descendants of the former kingdom of Champa, now central Vietnam, are the third most populous ethnic minority. While the majority of the people of Cambodia are Buddhists, most Chams are Muslim.

In addition to the Khmer and these three dominant ethnic minorities, there are other less populous ethnic groups in Cambodia. Referred to as Khmer Leou (highland Khmer), these ethnic groups live in the mountainous regions of Cambodia. They include the Brao, Kuy, Saoch, and Pear ethnic groups, as well as ethnic Thai and Lao minorities. Each of these groups has its own language and customs.



Boats on the Mekong River at sunset in 2001. (STEVE RAYMER/CORBIS)

Contemporary Cambodia

Cambodia remains one of the poorest countries in the world, and is faced with a raft of significant social and political challenges. Paramount among these is the alleviation of poverty, especially in rural Cambodia, where more than 80 percent of the population lives. Rates of infant mortality are among the highest in Asia, while the access of the majority of the population to education, health care, and a sanitary water supply remains at critically low levels. In recent years, the popular belief that the majority of rural Cambodians owned the land they lived on has been undermined, and rural landlessness has emerged as a major factor in explaining the incidence of poverty. This problem has been exacerbated by land-grabbing by government officials and high-ranking members of the armed forces, who are able to take advantage of a poorly developed legal system and a culture of impunity among those exercising political power.

Apart from poverty, another challenge facing contemporary Cambodia is how the country will reconcile calls for more vibrant democracy and a more active role for civil society with a hierarchical political culture firmly grounded in centuries of tradition. A proliferation of local nongovernmental organizations and the establishment of a fledgling trade union movement provide evidence of an emerging civil society. Drawing on the traditions of a hierarchical political culture that inhibits popular participation and a dialogue over the formulation of policy, the government continues to struggle with how it should integrate these new democratic institutions into the broader political system.

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CAMBODIA-CIVIL WAR OF 1970-1975

On 18 March 1970, while Cambodia's leader, Prince Norodom Sihanouk (b. 1922), was on an official visit to the Soviet Union, he was deposed by his country's national assembly. Leading the coup against Sihanouk

were his erstwhile ally, Lon Nol (1913–1985), and his cousin, Prince Sisowath Sirikmatak. Within days, as political chaos enveloped Cambodia, a civil war erupted. For the next five years, before the Khmer Rouge assumed control of the country and began its nearly four-year reign of terror, the once relatively peaceful Cambodian countryside served as a battlefield for the warring factions. It was a period of stark divisions: between rural and urban Cambodians, between politicians and their constituents, between the beneficiaries of massive corruption and its victims, and between the richest and poorest members of Cambodian society.

The Coup

The 1970 coup in Cambodia had been brewing since at least 1966, when Norodom Sihanouk lost control of the National Assembly, which had been his rubber stamp since the elections of September 1955. The elections had proved a disaster for the Cambodian left, which eventually claimed only five of eighty-two assembly seats, and they provided a resounding victory for the conservatives, many of whom harbored anti-Sihanouk tendencies. Capitalizing on the poor employment prospects of urban youths, surging anger over corruption, and blatant mismanagement of public utilities, the right-wing assembly—led by Lon Nol and ably encouraged by the charismatic Sirikmatak—sought to overturn much of Sihanouk's socialist economic agenda. The prince's opponents finally moved against him while he was out of the country, using the National Assembly to withdraw confidence in him as chief of state.

While the coup has become synonymous with Lon Nol, he was an unlikely conspirator against his leader. Lon Nol had loyally served Norodom Sihanouk since before Cambodia achieved independence in 1953. He had been the flamboyant Sihanouk's unassuming minister of defense as well as his prime minister. Sihanouk's ouster pitted the two contrasting figures against each other. In Phnom Penh, Lon Nol and the other leaders of the coup set about dismantling the 1,900-year-old Cambodian monarchy and establishing a Khmer republic. Sihanouk responded to the coup against him by aligning himself with his sworn enemies in the Khmer Rouge movement, which, for much of the previous decade, he had sought to eliminate. The prince gave the Khmer Rouge the air of legitimacy they had for so long lacked. In turn, the Khmer Rouge submerged their own revolutionary agenda beneath a rhetoric that centered on calls for the prince's return to power.

International Dimensions

The conflict that ensued had such complex international dimensions that it may be inappropriate, at

least in its early days, to label what actually transpired as a civil war. In Moscow at the time he was informed of his ouster, Sihanouk flew on to Beijing, where he met with North Vietnam's premier Pham Van Dong, who offered him the support of Cambodia's Khmer Rouge, the North Vietnamese Army, and the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong). Sihanouk used Radio Beijing to issue a call to arms and soon after announced the establishment of the Royal Government of National Union, more commonly known by its French acronym, GRUNK.

Opposing Sihanouk's unlikely alliance with the Khmer Rouge was the republican regime of Lon Nol. Vehemently opposed to the Vietnamese Communists, and especially to their use of Cambodian territory to aid their war effort against the United States and the South Vietnamese government, the republican regime enjoyed both U.S. and South Vietnamese support. Cambodia effectively became what has been eloquently referred to by the author William Shawcross as a "sideshow" to the conflict in Vietnam.

On the Battlefield

Any assessment of what happened on the battlefield in the civil war is overshadowed by the fact that the war was won, convincingly in the end, by the Khmer Rouge and Sihanouk. In the first months of the civil war, with Sihanouk's GRUNK supported by five fully equipped North Vietnamese Army units, the republican army suffered massive territorial losses. It lost control of almost all of the provinces of Svay Rieng, Rattanakiri, and Mondolkiri, and more than a half of Kompong Cham, Prey Veng, Takeo, and Kampot. While it is plausible to argue that the GRUNK victories were the result of massive Vietnamese assistance, it is equally plausible to argue they were the result of the totally inept leadership of their opponents.

The foot soldiers of the Khmer Republic were as brave and as skilled as were their Khmer Rouge opponents. Benefiting from the fruits of U.S. assistance, they were also in many cases much better equipped than their rivals. They ultimately failed, not because of their own deficiencies, but because those who led them were incompetent and oftentimes corrupt and because they rarely demonstrated any genuine concern for those they commanded. Many of the republican generals conducted the war effort from Phnom Penh, where they became regular patrons of popular nightspots and cafés, and from where they could speculate on Phnom Penh real estate with the money they had siphoned from the coffers of American assistance. Commanding officers frequently sent understrength

units into battle, as they had enlisted nonexistent "phantom soldiers" on their payrolls so that they could pocket their salaries. These same officers, and their superiors, frequently sold arms and supplies to their opponents.

As the battles raged on, the Khmer Rouge were able to assume increasing control of the war effort. Capitalizing on Sihanouk's popularity in the countryside, their forces swelled from approximately 15,000 early in 1970 to more than 200,000 by the end of 1972. Many also joined the Khmer Rouge ranks after witnessing the destruction wrought by U.S. B-52 bombers and Cambodian T-28 fighter planes. Between February and August 1973, the United States dropped more than 250,000 tons of bombs on Cambodia.

The Final Siege

It was arguably the massive U.S. aerial bombardment campaign that prolonged the life of the war and that slowed down what seemed an inevitable result. By late 1974 the Khmer Republic could be defined almost in terms of the city limits of Phnom Penh and Battambang, Cambodia's second city. Overflowing with displaced persons who had fled from the strife-ridden countryside, the cities became hotbeds of dissatisfaction with the inept Lon Nol regime. As the Khmer Rouge tightened its grip over the country, Phnom Penh's survival became dependent on a U.S.-sponsored airlift of rice and other basic commodities. Travel through the city became increasingly dangerous, while measures for fuel and electricity rationing were tightened.

The Khmer Rouge began their final assault on Phnom Penh on 1 January 1975. Republican politicians who had not already fled overseas tried to maintain a sense of normalcy. A few sought to stitch together a last-ditch compromise with Sihanouk and his allies, but their efforts were to no avail. Having ringed the city and cut off essential supplies, the Sihanoukists and Khmer Rouge had little motivation to compromise. With victory in sight, they continued to tighten the screws. On the morning of 17 April 1975 Khmer Rouge troops began to march victoriously into Phnom Penh. Former ministers and high-ranking officials of the republic were asked to report to the ministry of information, where they were arrested and later executed.

Lon Nol had already fled to Hawaii, where he would remain until his death. Sirikmatak, taking refuge in the French embassy, surrendered to Khmer Rouge forces on 20 April. He was taken to the French sports club, the Cercle Sportif, where he was executed.

The Khmer Rouge ruled Cambodia for the next three years, eight months, and twenty days.

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See also: **Khmer Rouge; Killing Fields; Lon Nol; Phnom Penh; Phnom Penh Evacuation; Sihanouk, Norodom**

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CAMBODIA—ECONOMIC SYSTEM The nature of Cambodia's economic system reflects the deep complexity of Cambodian society. On one hand, it has witnessed great changes, having ebbed and flowed with the shifting ideological convictions of the country's ruling regimes and with their shifting international and political alliances. On the other hand, it has been characterized by the continuity of the seasons of planting and harvesting that have molded social and religious life in Cambodia for centuries. Cambodia's economic system, like the society it supports, has been shaped by the country's agricultural heritage and orientation. This article provides an overview of this economic system, tracing its evolution and structure, and describing how it functions on the outer fringes of the global economy.

Evolution of the Economic System

Following substantial destruction and disruption to Cambodia's economic infrastructure and economic management apparatuses during the 1970–1975 civil war, the Khmer Rouge effectively overturned economic life in Cambodia. It is this period (1975–1979) that is central to understanding the economic system of Cambodia today. Intent on rebuilding the country from the ground up, the Khmer Rouge regime was responsible for implementing massive changes in the nature of the Cambodian economic system. First, the

regime ruthlessly dismantled the formal economic structures of the regimes they had succeeded. Cambodia's currency, the riel, was abolished; the national bank was literally blown up; and the systems of taxation and fiscal and monetary regulation were ignored. Second, the regime overturned the informal agricultural economic sector by collectivizing village-centered economic activities. The legacy of these collectivization measures continues to hamper agricultural productivity in some parts of Cambodia today, with the massive but poorly planned dikes and irrigation works of the Khmer Rouge upsetting the natural irrigation flows.

The regime that succeeded the Khmer Rouge in January 1979, the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), was confronted with the enduring legacy of its predecessor. With many of the country's brightest technicians dead, and with economic infrastructure in ruins, the PRK was supported by Vietnam and by the Soviet-led international socialist bloc in rehabilitating economic life in Cambodia. The result of their endeavors was a centrally planned economy, heavily reliant on Vietnamese and Soviet technical assistance, that traded almost exclusively with Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries. Economic activity was concentrated on a slowly reemerging agricultural sector, with very little industrial activity and a services sector that did little more than support agricultural development and the activities of the Communist government.

When the Soviet Union began to collapse, so too did Vietnamese and Soviet economic support to Cambodia. The Cambodian government responded to what was a critical economic crisis by introducing measures to liberalize the local economy. Private property rights, which had been partially restored by the regime in 1985, were fully restored in 1989; private enterprise and investment were encouraged, price control mechanisms dismantled, and national bank activities reformed. The pace of economic liberalization accelerated after the peace agreements were signed by Cambodia's warring factions at Paris in 1991. Gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an annual average of 5.9 percent (in real terms) between 1990 and 1995. Fueled by the arrival of the United Nations personnel who had been sent to Cambodia to supervise the elections that were at the core of the Paris agreements, much of the growth was concentrated in the industry and services sectors. Agricultural performance during this critical period, especially in rice production, was poor.

The Economic System since UNTAC

The Cambodian economic system since the UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cam-



Women prune and weed bean plants on the Banteay Dek Commune in Kandal Province, Cambodia, in 1996. (KEVIN R. MORRIS/CORBIS)

bodia) period, when the United Nations launched its most expensive single peacekeeping operation in order to create an environment where free and fair elections could be conducted in Cambodia, has been characterized by a number of features. First, there has been continued growth in the industry sector, led by a proliferation of new garment factories. Nonexistent before the UNTAC period, the garment industry has expanded so rapidly in recent years (more than 60 percent since 1998) that it now accounts for almost \$700 million a year in exports, approximately 70 percent of which are exported to the United States. The industry employs more than 100,000 Cambodians, the majority of them young women. In recent times, it has become the focus of a fledgling trade-union movement.

A second feature of the economic system has been the effect of the violence that enveloped Cambodia's political environment in July 1997. When Hun Sen ousted his political rival and co-prime minister, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, many of Cambodia's foreign investors and international aid donors scaled back or canceled their involvement in the country. Coupled with the effects of the Asian economic crisis that was dominating the region at the time, the events of July 1997 caused Cambodia's economic growth to fall from 7 percent in 1996 to 1 percent in 1997 and 1998. It also had a dramatic effect on the tourism industry. Tourist arrivals in the second half of 1997 were down more than 50 percent compared with arrivals in the

second half of 1996, hotel vacancies increased, and investment in tourism-related infrastructure stagnated. Following the 1998 national elections, international aid donors slowly returned to the country, and the local tourism industry also rebounded strongly.

A third feature of the economic system has been the gradual decline in external investment. The events of July 1997 and the Asian economic crisis precipitated a fall in investment in Cambodia from which the country has not yet recovered. Foreign investment in the first quarter of 2000, for example, was down 79 percent on investment figures for the first quarter of 1999. A number of factors have accounted for the declining investment, including perceptions about lack of government stability and competence in Cambodia, concerns about the level of corruption in the government, and the decline in intraregional investment in Southeast Asia—an obvious consequence of the Asian economic crisis.

A fourth feature of the economic system has been its dependence on external support. An important outcome of the Paris agreements was Cambodia's return to the fold of development assistance from the wider international community, including both multilateral and bilateral development agencies. These agencies have played significant roles in providing the government with the advice and technical assistance it has needed to shift from the command economy of the

1980s to its current free-market orientation. They have also been instrumental in reconstructing, rehabilitating, and developing the infrastructure and productive capacity of Cambodia's economic system. The downside of the massive influx of development assistance has been increased dependency on that aid. Development assistance has accounted for approximately 20 percent of Cambodia's GDP since the signing of the Paris agreements, with development aid per capita among the highest in the region.

Massive reform initiatives, often driven by foreign donors, have been a fifth feature of the contemporary economic system. With inflation during the period immediately prior to the 1993 elections running at more than 120 percent, a poor revenue base, low levels of investment, and state industries often recording massive losses, Cambodia's economic system was in dire need of reform. The government embraced a reform agenda oriented toward developing a market economy with a flourishing private sector. Measures have been adopted to attract investment, control inflation, and increase revenues from taxation. These measures aside, the reform agenda has often stumbled, with concerns about generous tax concessions given to foreign investors, poorly developed measures for tax collection, the diversion of revenues from logging operations, and the activities of corrupt officials at all levels of government.

The final feature of the economic system has been the continued division between the formal and informal economies. While the government, with the support of international agencies, has been particularly concerned with economic reform in Cambodia as well as with the country's integration into the regional and global economies, the majority of Cambodians have minimal interaction with this formal economy. Most Cambodians live in rural areas, so few pay income taxes, and few produce goods that are sold to regional and international markets. Instead, they participate in essentially local economies, selling their labor or surplus to purchase what they do not produce themselves. Increased consumerism, fueled by demand for Western consumer products, will inevitably result in a greater interaction between rural Cambodians and the formal economy.

Money and Banking

Cambodia's currency and banking systems were abolished by the Khmer Rouge regime between 1975 and 1979. The systems that were reestablished by the PRK regime in 1980 followed the central-planning models of Cambodia's Communist benefactors, Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Currency was controlled

by a national bank, which merely printed money to match the government's liquidity needs. Commercial banking functions, undertaken through a meager branch network, were also the sole domain of the national bank. Economic liberalization measures adopted in 1988–1989 resulted in the establishment of a two-tier banking system in which national bank and commercial banking functions were separated. The government actively encouraged the opening of foreign and domestic private commercial banks, while the national bank was encouraged to take a more independent approach to monetary policy.

Since then, it would seem that the liberalization measures have had mixed and limited successes. While there has been an official separation between national bank functions and the activities of the government, the bank has been guilty, on several occasions, of printing money to meet the government's spending requirements. The number of players in the private banking sector has proliferated since the 1993 elections. Although this indicates that the government's market-oriented ideology has had some success, there are concerns about the activities of some commercial banks, with several critics suggesting that they have been established in conjunction with elaborate money laundering schemes and with a burgeoning narcotics industry.

An additional concern is the practice of substituting foreign currencies for the Cambodian currency, the riel. In Phnom Penh, and throughout much of the remainder of Cambodia, U.S. dollars are frequently substituted for the riel, especially in larger transactions. Prices in many stores are quoted and advertised in U.S. dollars, while many employers pay their workers in the American currency. The baht of neighboring Thailand is the primary substitution currency in many regions of Cambodia's west. The major problem with currency substitution is that the government's control of monetary policy is reduced. Plans were set in place in the mid-1990s that were intended to lead to the "dedollarization" of the economy, but there is little evidence that this has occurred.

External Trade

Since the breakdown of the Soviet bloc, with which Cambodia conducted most of its external trade through the 1980s, measures have been taken to liberalize the country's international trade. These measures have included the streamlining of many tariffs as well as the abolition of quantity restrictions on a broad range of goods. Stimulated by these measures by high levels of economic growth among neighboring countries and by the growth of the domestic

economy, Cambodia's foreign trade expanded rapidly through the 1990s. The downside to this improvement is that Cambodia ran current account deficits through the 1990s that on occasions reached almost 16 percent of GDP.

Cambodia's export trade is concentrated in two areas: natural resources and light manufacturing. Together, exports in these areas have accounted for almost two-thirds of Cambodia's total exports through the 1990s. The export of Cambodia's natural-resources is a source of considerable concern, as raw timber has been felled (with and without the approval of the authorities) at a rate that even the government concedes is unsustainable. Light manufacturing exports are almost all from the garment industry, the remarkable growth of which is largely attributable to the Cambodian government's attractive foreign investment incentives and the country's relatively low labor costs. The nature of Cambodia's exports reflects the economy's weak productive capacity, with few manufactured goods (excluding garments) or consumable items figuring in total export patterns.

In stark contrast to export patterns, Cambodia's imports have consistently reflected a demand for petroleum products, transport vehicles and machinery, and basic manufactured goods. While the majority of these products are imported to provide the industry and services sectors with essential capital goods, others (such as televisions, stereos, and motor scooters) reflect increased consumerism among the Cambodian people, especially among those living in urban areas. The current account deficit and the export and import patterns discussed above are of concern to the government, which aims to put in place long-term policies that will ensure that Cambodia is able to produce or finance what it consumes.

Cambodia's major trading partners are its Southeast Asian neighbors. Singapore is by far the largest source of imports, as the island state is a major source of transshipment of goods from other countries with final destinations in Asia. After Singapore, Cambodia's nearest neighbors—Thailand and Vietnam—are its largest sources of imports. Together, these three countries accounted for approximately 70 percent of Cambodia's imports through the 1990s. Cambodia's exports follow a similar pattern, with Thailand and Singapore being the dominant export destinations. Cambodia's recent admission to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), delayed because of the events of July 1997, will in all likelihood reinforce these trading patterns, with ASEAN countries continuing to dominate Cambodian exports and imports.

With an infrastructure that continues to struggle to overcome the devastating legacies of the past, poor productive economic capacity, an unskilled labor force, and relatively inexpensive labor, Cambodia will continue to hold its position on the outer edges of the global economy. The capacity of the country's economic system to deliver greater prosperity to the Cambodian people will continue to be dependent on significant changes and policy reforms. There remains an urgent need to address the many inappropriate relationships that exist between the government and big business, ad hoc taxation arrangements, corrupt officials, and knee-jerk politically motivated policy changes if Cambodia's economic system is to develop to the benefit of the Cambodian people.

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CAMBODIA-EDUCATION SYSTEM

Cambodia's education system holds a very important place in the country's plans for integrating itself into the regional and international economies and for reducing the poverty of its people. The Cambodian government, and the many international and non-governmental organizations that provide it with development assistance, regard education as the key to developing the human resources and skills that will allow Cambodia to take its place in these economies. The country's education system, once the envy of many countries in Southeast Asia, was almost totally destroyed during the 1970s, and it has had to contend with the legacy of this destruction in the years since.



Students in their uniforms on the playground of Sisowath School in Phnom Penh in 1996. (KEVIN R. MORRIS/CORBIS)

Structure of the Education System

The formal educational structure consists of six years of primary school (grades 1–6), three years of lower secondary school (grades 7–9), and three years of upper secondary school (grades 10–12). Before 1996 the structure was 5:3:3, and before 1985 it was 4:3:3. In prerevolutionary Cambodia, the educational structure was 6:4:3. Therefore, while educational provision has increased in recent years, it has not yet reached the level of the period prior to the rule of the Khmer Rouge. Higher education is available at the Royal University of Phnom Penh, the Royal Agricultural University, the Royal University of Fine Arts, the Faculty of Medicine, the Faculty of Law and Economics, the Faculty of Business (National Institute of Management), the Institute of Technology of Cambodia (formerly the Higher Technical Institute of Khmer-Soviet Friendship), and the Maharishi Vedic University (an Australian-funded institution in rural Prey Veng Province). Private education exists at all levels of the education system. In primary and secondary education, private schools have been opened by ethnic minority communities as well as for the children of the relatively small wealthy expatriate community residing in Cambodia. Private higher education is available at Norton University and at a number of other institutions, such as Regent College. Also, there is a flourishing industry, especially in Phnom Penh, in unregulated private schools that offer students instruction in foreign languages and computer skills.

The current structure of Cambodia's education system stems from the chaos that enveloped the country in the aftermath of the destruction caused by the Khmer Rouge. The Ministry of Education, while operational since 1979, was officially formed by a Council of Ministers subdecree in 1980. Although the ministry's departments were restructured in August 1998, there is still no legislation in place to regulate the new arrangements. Provincial authorities, with meager funding from the Ministry of Economy and Finance, continue to bear the burden of responsibility for local education budgets, while several government higher-education institutions remain outside the authority of the Ministry of Education. The result is that educational management and systems for educational planning and administration remain highly fragmented and often largely ineffective.

Historical Development of the Education System

A system of education has been in place in Cambodia since at least the thirteenth century. This traditional education system was centered on local temples and involved teaching students about the foundations of religion, basic literacy, and skills such as carpentry that were relevant to the rural life of most Cambodians. While this nonformal system endured after the arrival of the French in Cambodia, it was gradually replaced by a Westernized educational model. The French authorities did not pursue this modern educa-

tion system with any great enthusiasm and seemed reluctant to devote the educational resources that were needed to meet local demand. The educational legacy of the colonial period in Cambodia was the importation of the Western idea of a formal school system and the gradual undermining of its traditional counterpart. The colonial era introduced to Cambodians the idea that education could lead to upward social mobility. It was a realization that led to unprecedented demand for access to education in the years that immediately followed independence.

Contrary to popular perceptions that the postindependence period was a golden era of development in Cambodia, the education system was characterized by chronic crisis. Policies focused on getting as many students as possible enrolled at all levels of the education system were often unaffordable, and were concentrated on the very small modern sector of the economy (to the detriment of rural needs). While Cambodia's educational enrollment statistics were often the envy of many other countries in the region, they hid the reality of an education system that was largely irrelevant, had too many underqualified teachers, and possessed poorly equipped classrooms.

In 1970, with the outbreak of civil war, Cambodia's educational problems went from bad to worse. Many schools were leveled by bombs, while others were used by the warring parties as barracks, munitions warehouses, and prisons. Teachers fled their posts, moving to the city, joining the army, or attempting to move abroad. The victory of the Khmer Rouge only compounded the destruction. Cambodia's new rulers swiftly cast aside the education system of the old regime. Classrooms were abandoned, books were left to rot or were used to roll cigarettes, and former schoolteachers, professors, and higher-education students were targeted as class enemies and were often singled out for execution. The Khmer Rouge regime did have a ministry of education, and even produced a couple of school textbooks. By 1979, however, very few children in Cambodia were receiving any form of instruction. The education system was effectively ruined: infrastructure had degenerated significantly, books and teaching materials no longer existed, and many of the nation's teachers were dead.

The regime that succeeded the Khmer Rouge was staffed by its survivors. Confronted with unparalleled destruction, it valiantly struggled to overcome educational chaos. By the end of the 1980s, educational enrollment levels (especially in primary schools) had largely overcome the legacy of the Khmer Rouge period. While this was an impressive achievement, other problems remained.

Education in the 1990s and Beyond

After the peace agreements were signed by Cambodia's warring factions in 1991, the reconstruction and development of the education system was considered to be of critical importance. Marked improvements to educational infrastructure over the 1990s are evident. The quality, relevance, and availability of school textbooks have also improved. Beyond these improvements, which have been largely driven and financed by foreign aid donors, the education system remains incapable of delivering to Cambodia a skilled workforce.

The country's teachers, who are grossly underpaid, have resorted to charging their students unofficial fees. Many are spending less time in the classroom as they seek additional employment elsewhere. Almost 20 percent of students in urban areas, and 26 percent in rural areas, have repeated at least one grade at school. From every one thousand students who begin primary school, only twenty-seven will graduate from upper secondary school. Girls, students from remote areas, and the poor are all grossly underrepresented in education statistics. With these significant problems as a backdrop, and the school-age population continuing to grow, the Cambodian government still denies the education sector the funding it needs to realize its important role in Cambodian society.

David M. Ayres

See also: **Royal University of Phnom Penh**

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CAMBODIA-HISTORY The origins of the earliest inhabitants of Cambodia are unknown. Scholars are uncertain whether they came from China, India, or insular Southeast Asia. Sources indicate that as far back as 4000 BCE a mix of prehistoric and Khmer people lived in the area that is now Cambodia. Although a language related to present-day Khmer was



KEY EVENTS IN CAMBODIAN HISTORY

- c. 4000 BCE** Khmer and other peoples are living in the region.
- 1st century CE** A language related to Khmer is spoken in the region. The Funan state, influenced by India, rules the region.
- 6th century** The Funan state is displaced by the Chenla state from the north.
- 9th–14th centuries** The Angkor empire flourishes across much of mainland south-east Asia.
- 12th century** The Hindu Angkor empire converts to Buddhism.
- 1353** Angkor falls to the Siamese and over the next five centuries loses territory to neighboring states.
- 1863–1941** Cambodia is a French protectorate.
- 1941–1945** Cambodia is occupied by the Japanese.
- 1942** The monks' rebellion marks the beginning of Cambodian nationalism.
- 1945** The French resume control.
- 1953** Cambodia becomes an independent nation with the end of French rule.
- 1955** In elections marked by corruption, Sangkum, the party of Norodom Sihanouk, comes to power.
- 1970** Sihanouk is deposed and replaced by Lon Nol. The nation is renamed Khmer Republic.
- 1970–1975** The period of civil war.
- 1975–1979** Cambodia is ruled by the Khmer Rouge.
- 1978–1988** Vietnam attacks and occupies Cambodia. Cambodia is renamed the People's Republic of Kampuchea.
- 1989** The name is changed again to the State of Cambodia.
- 1991** The Paris Peace Agreement is signed creating a large U.N. peacekeeping effort in Cambodia.
- 1993** An election is held under U.N. direction but the results are set aside and a power-sharing government is created.
- 1996–1998** The power-sharing government fails.
- 1998** Following elections a coalition government is formed.

spoken in the region in the first century CE, the earliest recorded sources are Chinese records from the first century. These refer to Funan, the first Indianized state in the region and a precursor to the Khmer empire. Indianized influences included Hinduism and Sanskrit and may have been introduced from Java. The importance of Funan declined during the sixth century, when Chenla, a neighboring political entity to the north, became dominant.

The Angkorian Empire

The Angkorian empire flourished between the ninth and fourteenth centuries, at its height incorporating not only present-day Cambodia, but also much of Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. Originally a Hindu kingdom, it became Mahayana Buddhist during the

twelfth century. The empire established sophisticated administrative structures; a system of roads connecting government outposts, towns, and cities; and the temple complex known today as Angkor Wat.

The first Angkorian king, Jayavarman II (c. 770–850), was consecrated in a ceremony at Phnom Kulen in 802. The ceremony, recorded in Khmer and Sanskrit inscriptions, marked the beginning of Angkorian civilization. It is not known precisely where Jayavarman II came from, possibly the island of Java or a kingdom in Sumatra. He established a royal Brahmanic cult based on worship of a specific *lingam* (a stylized phallic symbol) representing Siva. The *lingam* bestowed Jayavarman II and future Angkorian kings with sacred legitimacy, establishing the religious basis of the Angkorian monarchy. From this, the notion of the uni-

versal monarch emerged. The association of Phnom Kulen with the source of Khmer identity continues into the present day.

The art and architecture of Angkor evolved over time, expressing the political and religious course of Angkorian civilization. The next important monarch, Indravarman (reigned 877–889), created a reservoir for the irrigation system that inextricably linked agrarian and urban development. While allowing for irrigation during the dry season, the reservoir symbolically embodied the oceans surrounding Mt. Meru—home of the gods—and, by implication, further affirmed the association of the king with the gods. During the reign of Suryavarman II (d. 1150), the kingdom expanded through wars against the Chams in the east and the Mons in the west. It was during this reign that the Angkor Wat temple was built.

Angkor was sacked by the Chams in 1177, and hydrological projects were abandoned. The next Angkorian king, Jayavarman VII (c. 1120–c.1218), defeated the Chams in battle, scenes of which are depicted in bas-relief at Angkor Thom. The last of the great Angkorian kings, Jayavarman VII represented a departure from previous notions of kingship. A Buddhist, he transformed Angkor into a Mahayana Buddhist kingdom and sought to deliver himself and his people from suffering. His reign was characterized by great public works projects, including roads, temples, rest houses, reservoirs, and hospitals. Under his authority, Angkor reached the height of its political and territorial power.

The Middle Period

After the death of Jayavarman VII, the Angkorian empire declined. This has been attributed to internal rebellions, the introduction of Theravada Buddhism, and the rise of Siam (Thailand). Angkor fell to the Siamese first in 1353 and then again in the mid-fifteenth century, when it was abandoned as a political center. The capital moved south, first to Udong, and eventually to Phnom Penh.

From the fall of Angkor until the mid-nineteenth century, Cambodia lost territory to its more populous neighbors, Siam and Vietnam. With external threats on either side, Cambodia's kings appealed to either one side or the other for protection. This led to continuing loss of territory and fear of obliteration. By the 1830s, much of eastern Cambodia was a satellite of Vietnam, and two provinces in the northwest were under Siam. Cambodia was approximately its present size when it became a French protectorate in 1863.

French Colonialism

During the period of the French protectorate (1863–1941), there were many international interventions in Cambodia. Although the French claimed they saved Cambodia from further territorial losses to Siam and Vietnam, some say the creation of French Indochina furthered Vietnamese hegemonic designs on Cambodia. The French used Cambodia as a buffer between their investments in Vietnam and the Thai and British presence to the west. While the French focused on Vietnam as the center of capitalism, infrastructure, and education in the colony, Cambodia was preserved as a quaint romantic backwater. Education was not a priority. Stereotyping the Khmer as childlike, seductive, and lazy, the French placed the Vietnamese in civil service positions throughout Indochina. A large influx of Vietnamese settlers into Cambodia at this time reinforced the notion that Cambodia was a portion of Indochina first and Cambodia second. Thus the French, whether intentionally or not, fostered animosity between the Cambodians and the Vietnamese that would remain a strong undercurrent.

Three incidents of resistance during colonial times show that Cambodia was not simply the sleepy backwater the French imagined. The first was the Affair of 1916, when large delegations of peasants traveled from



The Silver Pagoda at the Royal Palace in Phnom Penh which was built by King Norodom in 1892. The floor is covered by 5,000 silver tiles. (BRIAN A. VIKANDER/CORBIS)

the provinces to Phnom Penh to petition the king to lower taxes. The second was the killing of a French tax collector, Bardez, who was beaten to death while on duty. And the third was the monks' rebellion in 1942, which marked the emergence of Cambodian nationalism. Although none of these incidents had significant repercussions in shaping colonial rule, they are important for showing the gulf that existed between Cambodian and French perceptions.

Nationalism and Independence

Nationalism emerged late in colonial Cambodia. Before World War II, there was little organized activity. Nor did the Japanese, who occupied Cambodia from 1941 to 1945, promote anticolonial sentiment there as they did in other places. During the Japanese occupation, the French remained in administrative positions, placing Prince Norodom Sihanouk (b. 1922) on the throne in 1941. In 1945 the French were removed from office and were interned by the Japanese; Sihanouk declared Cambodia free from the French protectorate. After the war, the French returned with the compliance of Sihanouk and against the wishes of the nationalists.

After the return of the French, Cambodian nationalism was supported by Thai and Vietnamese interests anxious to have the French leave for their own purposes. The Khmer Issarak (Free Khmer), an opposition political group, was prominent in rural areas, while the Democrat Party dominated urban politics. Both groups criticized Sihanouk for seemingly acquiescing to the French. Sihanouk, meanwhile, negotiated for independence on his own, and the French, who were preoccupied with their problems in Vietnam, granted it in 1953.

In the years following independence, Sihanouk became the prominent figure in Cambodian politics. He abdicated the throne and created the national organization Sangkum Reastr Niyum, effectively eclipsing his opposition. In the election of 1955, which was marked by widespread corruption and violence, the Sangkum won all the seats in parliament. In the following years, while Sihanouk portrayed himself as a benevolent father figure presiding over an island of peace, his opponents criticized his violent suppression of political opponents.

Sihanouk pursued a policy of isolation and neutrality that became increasingly difficult during the Vietnam War. It also exacerbated Cambodia's disconnection from the economic, cultural, and political changes of the time. In 1963 Sihanouk refused U.S. aid, and when U.S. troops entered the war in 1965, he

broke off diplomatic ties with the United States. In 1970, a coup supported by the United States deposed Sihanouk and installed his defense minister, Lon Nol (1913–1985). The country was renamed the Khmer Republic and the monarchy was abolished. As a result, Cambodian Communist movement, the Khmer Rouge, which opposed the American-backed Lon Nol government, gained increasing support. Support came from Chinese and Vietnamese Communist organizations and from Sihanouk. Students, teachers, and intellectuals joined, and the Khmer Rouge significantly increased its base. From 1970 to 1975, Cambodia was plunged into civil war, and the eastern provinces were bombed by the United States in the secret mission Operation Breakfast. This created massive displacement and famine.

Khmer Rouge

The Khmer Rouge ruled Cambodia from April 1975 to January 1979. At the time they took over and renamed the country Democratic Kampuchea, no one could foresee the violence that would follow. No single explanation for what happened can suffice. Rather it was the convergence of particular events, in a particular place and juncture in history, that allowed the situation to unfold. The factors are subject to scholarly debate. They include the experience of the Khmer Communists in the Indochina Communist Party, the isolation of the Khmer Rouge in the jungle since 1962, the experience of the Khmer Rouge leadership in France when the French Communists were in their most Stalinist period, the association with Sihanouk, the displacement of the population during the war, the absence of any foreign presence, and the severe lack of food and infrastructure in Cambodia in 1975.

On 17 April 1975 the Khmer Rouge entered Phnom Penh, declared victory, and ordered the evacuation of the city. The Khmer Rouge was a Maoist-inspired group who believed that the Cambodian revolution was unique in the history of the world. After a visit to China, where Chinese premier Chou En-lai (1898–1976) counseled them to move slowly in order to avoid the mistakes China had made in the Great Leap Forward, they proclaimed, "Our country's place in history will be assured. We will be the first nation to create a completely communist society without wasting time on intermediate steps."

The Khmer Rouge embarked on a massive social reengineering project, which was implemented with Stalinist terror. Criticizing the corrupting power of modernization, the Khmer Rouge emptied the cities, forced the population into agricultural collectives, closed the country to outside influences, and outlawed

money, private property, and organized religion. Cambodia was turned into a massive agricultural work camp laboring under the rulers' obsessive compulsion for self-reliance, which drove them to demand two rice crops a year.

The Khmer Rouge coveted secrecy. Its authority was *angka*, the organization. *Angka* produced few written documents. The identity of the leaders was unknown for some time. Eventually it became clear that Pol Pot (c. 1925–1998) was Brother Number 1. A pseudonym for Saloth Sar, Pol Pot was a former teacher who had been educated in France. His brother-in-law, Ieng Sary, was Brother Number 2, Son Sen was minister of defense, and Khieu Samphan was president. The Khmer Rouge became increasingly paranoid over time and purged many of its own inner circle. An estimated 1 to 3 million people perished from starvation, disease, and state-sponsored killings during the Khmer Rouge period.

The People's Republic of Kampuchea

The Khmer Rouge period ended almost as abruptly as it began. On 25 December 1978, responding to Khmer Rouge attacks inside Vietnamese territory, Vietnamese forces entered Cambodia, pushed the Khmer Rouge to the Thai border, and began their ten-year armed occupation of the country. Three days later, they announced the formation of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), a government based on a Vietnamese Communist model, and named as president Heng Samrin, a former Khmer Rouge officer who had fled to Vietnam.

The PRK did not receive widespread legitimacy in Cambodia or in the international community. It was not seated at the United Nations, was refused U.N. aid, and was boycotted by the United States. A three-part resistance movement was formed on the Thai border, which was composed of the Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC (the royalist resistance group organized by Sihanouk), and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), organized by former Prime Minister Son Sann. More than 300,000 refugees lived in refugee camps on the Thai-Cambodia border. In 1985 internal power shifted within the PRK, and Hun Sen, another former low-level Khmer Rouge officer, became prime minister. In 1989, the PRK changed its name to the State of Cambodia (SOC).

The Paris Peace Talks and UNTAC

In the early 1990s, the Cambodian conflict was perceived as a leftover remnant of the Cold War. The Paris Peace Agreement was signed on 23 October

1991. It was a compromise solution worked out by foreigners to end international assistance to the warring factions and to transform the military conflict into a civil one. This was to be accomplished through an election—a peaceful transition of power.

The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was the largest and most expensive peacekeeping mission the U.N. had ever undertaken. Its mandate was to create a neutral political environment by disarming the four factions—FUNCINPEC, DK, KPNLF, and SOC. This did not happen. The SOC refused to relinquish control to UNTAC, and the Khmer Rouge pulled out of the process. They refused to disarm, stopped cooperating with UNTAC, and boycotted the election. This meant that none of the factions could be demobilized, a fact that ultimately strengthened the existing SOC structure. The SOC maintained control of the bureaucracy, army, police, media, and judicial system. UNTAC's successes were limited to repatriating the 300,000 refugees from the Thai border, promoting human-rights awareness and voter education, and organizing the election.

The election was held on schedule in May 1993, despite the flawed political environment. Ignoring threats to their personal safety, over 90 percent of the registered voters voted. FUNCINPEC won a plurality of votes, and the SOC's Cambodian People's Party (CPP) came in second. Hun Sen refused to acknowledge the results, however, and threatened to resume civil war. After some confusion, and contrary to the U.N. mandate, Sihanouk brokered a power-sharing agreement whereby FUNCINPEC's Prince Norodom Ranariddh became first prime minister, and Hun Sen became second prime minister. This created parallel structures throughout all levels of government, based on previous hierarchical patterns of patron-client networks. FUNCINPEC and CPP operated as factions more than as political parties, each maintaining their own army and police force. The CPP remained, as it had during UNTAC time, in control of the system.

Cambodia to the End of the 1990s

The coalition, never workable, unraveled in the mid-1990s. Rural commune elections scheduled for 1997, and parliamentary elections scheduled for 1998, loomed as potential sources of conflict. In spring 1997 Hun Sen provoked a rift within FUNCINPEC. In March his bodyguards were implicated when nineteen people were killed in a grenade attack on a peaceful demonstration led by opposition leader Sam Rainsy outside the National Assembly. In July he ousted the first prime minister in a violent confrontation.

Paralleling the disintegration of the coalition was the disintegration of the Khmer Rouge. The two were not unrelated. In August 1996, Ieng Sary, who controlled the northwest city of Pailin, had defected, bringing ten thousand Khmer Rouge troops into the government forces. In return, Ieng Sary had been granted amnesty and allowed to maintain control of Pailin. From then, the two prime ministers began to compete for the remaining Khmer Rouge. Both framed their appeal under the guise of national reconciliation. In spring 1997, in response to reports that Khmer Rouge soldiers were negotiating with Ranariddh, Pol Pot ordered the killing of Son Sen (Pol Pot's former defense minister), his wife, and twelve other members of his family. In July, on the pretext that Ranariddh was illegally negotiating with the Khmer Rouge, Hun Sen staged his ouster.

The confrontation exploded in two days of street fighting in Phnom Penh. Over a hundred people were killed, many having been tortured and executed. Ranariddh and other opposition leaders were forced into exile. As a result, Cambodia lost its seat at the U.N. and its entrance into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was delayed.

In the spring of 1998, under pressure from the international community and wanting to legitimize his rule, Hun Sen agreed to let the opposition return and participate in the election of August 1998. The results of that election were contested by both FUNCINPEC and the Sam Rainsy organization. The CPP won a plurality but not enough votes to form a government without a coalition. Initially the opposition parties refused to join and protesters filled the streets of Phnom Penh. After negotiations with the king, FUNCINPEC eventually agreed to enter a coalition and a government was formed in November 1998.

Jeanne Morel

See also: **Angkor Wat; Cambodia—Political System; Cambodia—Profile; Hun Sen; Khmer Rouge; Phnom Penh; Ranariddh, Norodom; Sihanouk, Norodom; United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia**

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CAMBODIA—POLITICAL SYSTEM Cambodia's political system is a product both of the country's troubled and oftentimes turbulent modern history and of factors rooted deeply in its premodern development. This article examines the political and governmental units that constitute Cambodia's political system and explores the political system in terms of its current structures and its historical development.

Structure of the Contemporary Political System

Cambodia's system of government officially is a multiparty liberal democracy under a constitutional monarchy. This system was established and adopted in September 1993, after the conclusion of a process of political reconstruction sponsored and overseen by the United Nations. King Norodom Sihanouk, who had first assumed the throne in 1941, before abdicating in favor of his father in 1954, returned as chief of state after the conclusion of that process. Under the framework established by the constitution, the king serves as the head of state for life. Possibly in response to the very active and often controversial roles Sihanouk has played in the political process in Cambodia since independence, the constitutional framework also clearly articulates that the king reigns but does not govern and is to serve as the symbol of the unity and continuity of the nation. The head of government, elected in 1998, is Prime Minister Hun Sen, whose appointment was officially made by the monarch after a vote of confidence by the National Assembly.

The National Assembly constitutes the first of the two legislative branches of the system of government. Its 122 members are elected by popular vote to serve five-year terms in parliament. The July 1998 elections resulted in a victory by Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party (CPP), which secured 41 percent of the vote, and therefore 64 seats in the assembly. The CPP's major opponents were the royalist FUNCINPEC (Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif; National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia) party (32 percent of the vote and 43 seats) and the Sam Rainsy Party (14 percent of the vote and 15 seats). The second legislative branch of the government is the Senate. It was formed following the November 1998 coalition agreement signed between



THE PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF CAMBODIA

Adopted 21 September 1993

We, the People of Cambodia

Accustomed to having been an outstanding civilization, a prosperous, large, flourishing and glorious nation, with high prestige radiating like a diamond

Having declined grievously during the past two decades, having gone through suffering and destruction, and having been weakened terribly,

Having awakened and resolutely rallied and determined to unite for the consolidation of national unity, the preservation and defense of Cambodia's territory and precious sovereignty and the fine Angkor civilization, and the restoration of Cambodia into an "Island of Peace" based on multi-party liberal democratic responsibility for the nation's future destiny of moving toward perpetual progress, development, prosperity, and glory,

With This Resolute Will

We inscribe the following as the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia:

Source: Cambodia Information Center. Retrieved 8 March 2002, from: <http://www.cambodia.org/facts/constitution.html#Preamble>.

the CPP and FUNCINPEC, which settled an impasse over FUNCINPEC allegations of electoral discrepancies in the July elections. The Senate currently has 61 members, whose appointments are officially made by the king, who also nominates two of its members. Of these appointments, CPP recommended 31 members, FUNCINPEC 21 members, and the Sam Rainsy Party 7 members.

The system of government also provides for an independent judiciary. At the head of the judiciary is the Supreme Council of the Magistracy, which was provided for in the 1993 constitution, and which was eventually formed in December 1997. Judicial authority is exercised through a supreme court and lower provincial courts.

Development of the Cambodian Political System

Examining Cambodia's political system only in terms of the formal structures that were adopted as a part of the United Nations-sponsored peace process

would lead to a substantially skewed understanding of the system. An appreciation for Cambodia's historical development is essential to understand the nature of the country's political system completely. In particular, we need to account for the development of the political culture that has dominated Cambodia since the Angkor era (eighth to thirteenth centuries CE), when the Khmer ruled the most powerful state in Southeast Asia. We also need to account for the destructive legacies of Cambodia's more recent past, which left the local political scene fractured and factionalized.

Cambodia's political culture has been established upon a complex system of patron-client relations. The roots of this system are grounded in the Angkor era, which began with the consecration of a united Khmer state under King Jayavarman II. In 802 CE Jayavarman participated in a religious ritual that celebrated the cult of the God-King (*devaraja*), and in which he became a universal monarch (*chakravartin*). These events provided the foundations of a political culture in which



Two Cambodian women in Phnom Penh with voter registration forms in 1992. (CATHERINE KARNOW/CORBIS)

leaders are distanced from their subjects, and that does not recognize an obligation for those with power to serve the interests of those over whom that power is exercised. The legacy of the political culture is that power, in the Cambodian political environment, has become an end in itself—those with authority seeking to become more powerful without regard for the lives of those over whom they exercise that power.

That attitude, which for centuries has facilitated the rise of leaders with no sense of accountability to those they lead, was institutionalized in modern Cambodia with the political rise of Norodom Sihanouk. Selected by Cambodia's French colonial masters to assume the throne because of a perception he would be easily manipulated, Sihanouk soon turned on the French and was credited with achieving independence for Cambodia in 1953. Over the next several years, especially after he had abdicated the throne but retained his royal credentials, Sihanouk established a political system that placed him firmly at its center and that gave him almost absolute control over the levers of power. While the veneer of democracy was maintained with a National Assembly and national congresses, through which the people could take their grievances directly to Sihanouk, power was effectively concentrated in the hands of one person, who seemed able to do as he pleased without responding to voices of his constituents.

The political system revealed its inherent weakness when Sihanouk was eventually deposed by the National Assembly in 1970. Without the apparatuses, institutions, or historical precedents to facilitate reasoned debate, or even to tolerate opposing voices and figures of opposition, the political system was cast aside in favor of armed conflict. While the regime that deposed Sihanouk tried to reorient the political system, dispensing with the monarchy and embracing re-

publicanism, its fundamental tenets remained unchanged. Cambodia's new ruler, Lon Nol, adopted an authoritarian approach to ruling Cambodia and ignored many of the new democratic political institutions he had established.

Sihanouk was cast outside Lon Nol's political system and aligned himself with the communist Khmer Rouge, who assumed power in 1975. Maintaining the authoritarianism of their predecessors, the Communists continued to see no relationship between rulers and ruled and established participatory institutions in name only. When the Khmer Rouge was ousted in 1979, Cambodia's new Vietnamese-sponsored rulers again refused to allow those with alternative political ideas to participate in their system. Instead, opposition groups camped on the Thai-Cambodian border and waged war with the ruling regime for more than a decade.

The Paris Peace Agreements, signed on 23 October 1991, were intended to lay the groundwork for the establishment of a political system based on a pluralistic democracy. The peace agreements provided for the conduct of national elections, through which a constituent assembly could be elected and a new constitution could be promulgated. While the new constitution that eventually was adopted provided the framework for governance discussed above, it failed to account for the authoritarian political culture that has evolved in Cambodia for more than a millennium. The result is that many of the institutions and processes established by the 1993 constitution have been ignored by Cambodia's post-1993 political leaders. The National Assembly rarely debates issues of pressing national concern, the Senate is largely inactive, few commentators would attest that the judiciary is independent, and political violence—directed especially at opposition political figures—remains endemic.

David M. Ayres

See also: **Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party; Cambodia-Civil War of 1970-1975; Cambodian People's Party; FUNCINPEC; Heng Samrin; Hun Sen; Khmer Rouge; Killing Fields; Lon Nol; Phnom Penh Evacuation; Pol Pot; Ranariddh, Norodom; Sam Rainsy; Samphan, Khieu; Sihanouk, Norodom; United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia**

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CAMBODIA-LAOS RELATIONS As neighboring nations, Laos and Cambodia have passed through many difficult phases in their relations. Territorial acquisition in the historical period, a shared 535-kilometer border, and similar experiences at the hands of the French and the United States have affected relations between the two nations. Ethnic Lao are found in Rotanak Kiri, Preah Vihear, and Banteay Meanchey Provinces in Cambodia, and Khmer live in Champassak and Attapeu Provinces in Laos.

Interaction Prior to the Twentieth Century

The political and cultural interactions between the two countries were shaped by expanding kingdoms in ancient and medieval times, as the Khmer ruins at Wat Pho and in southern Laos suggest. Cambodian kingdoms such as Funan, Chenla, and Angkor controlled parts of Laos, and some Khmer Brahmanical and Buddhist elements penetrated into Laos. The Indianized state of Funan began to disintegrate in the middle of the sixth century. Chenla, its vassal state, had its capital at Sresthapura in southern Laos. The central and upper regions of Laos were occupied by Chenla ruler Jayavarman I (reigned 657–681). Jayavarman II (c. 770–850), the ruler of Angkor, even had built a hospital at Sai Fong.

Laos was unified after the Lao prince Fa Ngum rose to power in 1353. He established the state of Lan Xang (million elephants) in 1353 with the help of Angkor king Jayavarman Paramesvara, and his kingdom extended from SipSong Panna in the upper Mekong to northern Cambodia. Fa Ngum's queen, Jayavarman's daughter, was responsible for converting the people to Theravada Buddhism, and Fa Ngum received from his father-in-law a gold statue of the Buddha, Pali scriptures, and a mission of monks under Phra Mahapasaman. The statue, called Prabang, was installed at Fa Ngum's capital, which was renamed Luang Prabang.

The Colonial Period

The next important stage in Lao-Cambodian relations was set when the three Indochinese nations (Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) came under French colonial rule. Laos became a French protectorate in 1893, the Indochinese Union was created in 1907, and the fates of the Indochinese nations were linked as a

French colony. Vietnam, the most powerful of the three, held the dominant position. Outsiders such as the French, Chinese, and even Vietnamese exercised control over the two other countries' administration and economy, and the concept of an Indochinese federation was frequently raised. At the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I, Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969), the Vietnamese revolutionary, pleaded for self-determination for the Indochinese people.

Strains of nationalism developed in the three countries, with different intensity and ideologies, but a Communist-led nationalism was common to all. The French reestablished control of Indochina after World War II, leading to the First Indochina War (1946–1954), in which Vietnam's Viet Minh, Cambodia's Khmer Issark, and Laos's Pathet Lao fought against the French. On 1 March 1951, a Viet-Khmer-Lao alliance was formed with the goal of defeating the colonial masters and achieving real independence.

The Vietnam War Era

After the Geneva Conference of 1954, Laos and Cambodia went their separate ways, but their destinies again became closely intertwined in 1960s. Cambodia was a party to the Geneva Accords of 1962, which dealt with the fate of Laos. Cambodia's Prince Norodom Sihanouk (b.1922) was in favor of a neutral Laos and made efforts to end its civil war.

With the escalation of the conflict between the United States and North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia became increasingly involved in the Vietnam War. The Ho Chi Minh Trail—a supply route from North to South Vietnam that the United States wanted to cut—passed through both countries. Hanoi's primary aim was unification of both Vietnams.

In Cambodia, the coup by General Lon Nol (1913–1985) on 18 March 1970 added a new dimension to the turmoil. On April 21, the United Indochinese Front was established. The summit conference was attended by Pham Van Dong representing North Vietnam, Norodom Sihanouk as head of the National United Front of Cambodia, Souphanouvong (1909–1995) from the Pathet Lao, and Nguyen Huu Tho, representing the provisional government of South Vietnam. The delegates pleaded for solidarity among peoples of Indochina.

The Communists strengthened their position in the border regions of Laos, South Vietnam, and Cambodia while at the same time there was increasing cooperation between General Lon Nol and the rightist leaders in Laos. It was even suggested that a defensive alliance of South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, and

Laos be created to combat the Communists. The Communist Pathet Lao and Khmer Rouge were increasing their hold on Laos and Cambodia, respectively, however, and with the departure of the last American troops from Vietnam and the fall of Saigon in 1975, the whole of Indochina became Communist.

Fallen Comrades: Battlefield to Marketplace, 1975-Present

Peace in Indochina proved elusive, however, and the former comrades soon went to war again. Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1977 to overthrow the brutal regime of Pol Pot, who rejected Souphanouvong's peace initiative. Laos signed a friendship treaty with Vietnam in July 1977, but relations between Cambodia and Vietnam were deteriorating. The Vietnamese attack on Cambodia in December 1978 and the Chinese attack on Vietnam in February 1979 changed the scenario, and Laos and Cambodia's relations cooled. Laos dispatched a token number of troops to Cambodia to help the Vietnamese. After the installation of the Heng Samrin regime in Cambodia, the two countries again became close and signed a co-operation agreement in March 1979. The Indochinese Federation and United Resistance (1979–1984) targeted China as the main enemy, and Vietnam's hegemony over Indochina was again established.

The Indochinese states have been moving towards reconciliation and greater regional cooperation, with "market economy" as their new mantra. Laos and Cambodia have begun multilateral cooperation through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Mekong River Commission. They are also cooperating in tourism, fisheries, wildlife, national biodiversity conservation, and the preservation of historic sites. As a sign of this improved relationship, a boundary demarcation project was launched in February 2001, and Laos and Cambodia can again look to the future with renewed hope.

Patit Paban Mishra

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CAMBODIA-VIETNAM RELATIONS Formal contacts between Vietnam and Cambodia date back to the early seventeenth century, when Cambodia was the stronger of the two countries. Prior to the

seventeenth century the two countries did not share a common border since the kingdom of Champa still existed in central Vietnam. As Vietnam gradually absorbed Champa and expanded southward, contacts with Cambodia were established and increased. The second half of that century saw a shift in strength and the first two Vietnamese military interventions in Cambodia. Both interventions followed requests by members of the Cambodian royal family for military support in succession struggles. Vietnam's first formal annexation of Cambodian territory took place in 1698, and by the end of the eighteenth century Vietnam had expanded southwards to the shores of the Gulf of Thailand.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, Vietnam's influence over Cambodia increased, leading to de facto administrative control over the central and eastern parts of the country in the 1830s and early 1840s. During this period Vietnam temporarily gained the upper hand over Thailand in the competition for influence in Cambodia. However, Thailand never completely lost its influence as the western and north-western parts of Cambodia remained under Thai control or influence up to the arrival of the French in the 1860s.

Since the end of the French colonial era in the mid-1950s, relations between Cambodia and Vietnam have been complex and characterized by periods of open hostility and warfare. Cambodia was dragged into the expanding Vietnam War in the late 1960s and early 1970s. After the end of the wars in both countries in 1975, relations between Cambodia and Vietnam were tense; they deteriorated sharply in 1977 and 1978, leading to full warfare. The Vietnamese military intervention on 25 December 1978 resulted in the overthrow of the existing government in Cambodia and a Vietnamese presence that would last for over a decade. Following the Vietnamese withdrawal in 1989, relations have been manageable but with recurring differences relating to two main issues: the situation of the ethnic Vietnamese minority in Cambodia and the disputed border between the two countries.

Relations from the 1950s until 1975

Following the end of the French Indochina War in the mid-1950s, independent Cambodia experienced good relations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) but less amicable relations with the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). During the 1960s relations between Cambodia and the National Liberation Front (NLF) in South Vietnam were good, and this led to increased tension between Cambodia and the South Vietnamese government. Following the

overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in early 1970, relations between Cambodia and South Vietnam improved, but Cambodia's relations with North Vietnam and the NLF deteriorated sharply because the leadership of Cambodia's new regime was opposed to the foreign policy of the overthrown government. Cambodia was also directly drawn into the expanding Vietnam War. The political changes in Cambodia were followed by a wave of attacks on ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia. The ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia were caught in an upsurge of officially mandated anti-Vietnamese sentiments that linked them to the military presence of North Vietnam and NLF armed forces in Cambodia. Large numbers of Vietnamese fled Cambodia for South Vietnam. In the early 1970s, the exiled Prince Sihanouk and the Cambodia Communist Party (also known as the Khmer Rouge or Red Khmers) formed an alliance, which was supported by North Vietnam.

Relations from 1975 to 1978

Following the end of the wars in both Cambodia and Vietnam in April 1975, relations between the two countries, now both ruled by Communists, were expected to be good, but this was not the case. Most of Cambodia's remaining ethnic Vietnamese were driven out, and military clashes occurred along the border in May and June 1975. During the second half of 1975 and throughout 1976 the situation along the border remained stable. Then, in early 1977, Cambodia gradually increased activity, escalating to military attacks, to emphasize its claims to certain areas that were under Vietnamese control. Eventually Vietnam responded by attacking Cambodia, and by the end of 1977 the two countries were in a de facto state of war. On 25 December, Vietnam launched an intervention that resulted in its takeover of Phnom Penh on 7 January 1978.

Relations from 1979 to 1991

Vietnam's military intervention brought down the Cambodian government, but the overthrown leadership was not captured. In early January 1979, a new government was formed in Phnom Penh by Cambodians who had earlier taken refuge in Vietnam and who opposed the former government. The new administration, with Vietnamese support, gained control of the major populated areas, but the deposed government remained militarily active in rural areas, particularly along the Thai border. This situation prevailed for most of the 1980s. Vietnam gradually withdrew from Cambodia, its last troops leaving in September 1989.

During the 1980s, people who had sought refuge in Vietnam in the 1975–1978 period began to return to Cambodia. Those returning included not only ethnic Khmers but also ethnic Vietnamese, leading to the reemergence of a Vietnamese minority in Cambodia. The official policy of the Cambodian authorities was to regulate Vietnamese migration to Cambodia but not to prevent it.

Relations since 1991

Following the Paris Agreements of 23 October 1991, which officially ended the Cambodian conflict, the United Nations carried out an ambitious peacekeeping operation, leading up to general elections in May 1993. During this period relations with Vietnam came to focus mainly on the repeated attacks on the ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia. Most of the attacks were attributed to the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK); some, however, may have been carried out by ordinary Cambodians encouraged by the anti-Vietnamese rhetoric of the PDK and other parties. Such violence has continued to be an issue of concern between the Cambodian coalition governments and Vietnam and has been broadened to include the Cambodian government's policies towards the Vietnamese minority.

Another issue in bilateral relations has been how to manage the disputed borders—both on land and at sea. Overall the two countries desire to resolve the disputed issues, and they have initiated talks both on border issues and on the issue of violence toward ethnic Vietnamese.

Ramses Amer

See also: **United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia**

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CAMBODIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY The Cambodian People's Party (CPP) was founded in 1951, when the Khmer People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP) was formed. The party maintained its historical

continuity from that date, distancing itself from the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge), which was formed at a KPRP congress in 1960. When the Khmer Rouge regime was ousted in 1979, the KPRP assumed state power in Cambodia and ruled the country until 1991. In October 1991, as Cambodia prepared for national elections under the supervision of the United Nations, the CPP officially abandoned its Marxist-Leninist roots and embraced the free market.

The CPP lost the 1993 elections to the royalist FUNCINPEC party (National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia). With control of much of the army, security forces, and local administration, the CPP forced itself into a coalition government, with its leader, Hun Sen, named second prime minister. In 1997 Hun Sen led a coup against FUNCINPEC first prime minister Norodom Ranariddh. While a FUNCINPEC official, Ung Huot, maintained the position of first prime minister, Hun Sen's rule over the country was virtually unopposed. The CPP won the majority of seats at the July 1998 elections, with Hun Sen assuming the role of the sole prime minister of Cambodia.

David M. Ayres

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CAMEL, ARVANA DROMEDARY The dromedary, or one-humped camel (*Camelus dromedarius*), is considered a semidomesticated animal, freely ranging but under the herder's control. The Arvana breed developed in Turkmenistan in antiquity and may have been domesticated there 5,000 to 6,000 years ago (separately from the Arabian dromedary). Rock drawings of dromedaries dated 3000–1500 BCE occur in northern Turkmenistan. The Seljuks probably introduced camels to Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan during their conquests in the twelfth century. For Turkmen tribes in the Kara-Kum Desert, Arvana camels supply milk, meat, wool, and transportation (as pack and riding animals). Of all dromedary breeds, Arvana camels have the highest milk yield (averaging fifteen kilograms a day), with 4 percent fat. They are reared all over Turkmenistan and in Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan. Females are bred when

they are three years old. The average gestation lasts 385 days; females give birth about every two years. The wool (two to three kilograms in an average clipping) is widely used to produce yarn for knitted wear. As beasts of burden, dromedaries are unsurpassed in their ability to cross deserts. In an eight- to ten-hour day Arvana camels can carry packs weighing up to three hundred kilograms for a distance of up to thirty-five kilometers. Males are used for pack service from four to five until fifteen to sixteen years of age.

Victor Fet

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CAMEL, BACTRIAN The two-humped Bactrian camel (*Camelus bactrianus*) of Afghanistan, northern China, Mongolia, and the former Soviet Union is valued for its resistance to dry conditions, its ability to travel for long periods with little water or food, and its hardiness to cold weather. While Mongols place great importance on the horse, they often prefer the camel for long-distance movement, across the Gobi Desert, for example. The camel was also the preferred beast on the Silk Road.

The camel was the favorite mount of the Turkish founders of the Seljuk empire (1038–1157), as illustrated by the fact that the Mongolian word for a gelded horse referred to a gelded camel among the Seljuks. Rashid al-Din (c. 1247–1318), the Persian historian,



A man rides a Bactrian camel on the sand dunes near Dunhuang, China. (WOLFGANG KAEHLER/CORBIS)

noted that the Turks first invaded Iran and other points in the Middle East because the area provided good grazing land for camels, that is, dry with limited but good grass.

Although camels generally are not considered a food source, some Asians eat camel meat, and *shubat*, fermented camel milk, is a Turkish favorite. Among the Kazakhs, who rank it second only to koumiss from mares in desirability, *shubat* is considered healthful, particularly for tuberculosis prevention and treatment. Kazakhs and other Asians find uses for camel leather as well.

In addition to its economic significance, the camel holds a special position in regional folklore. Camels are considered cantankerous, obstinate, and willful. Genghis Khan's mother compared him to a "randy camel bull snapping at the heels of its young" (Ligeti 1971: 47) after he killed his younger brother during a dispute. Despite its bad reputation, the camel is also considered spirited, and today the "white orphan camel colt" of the popular Mongolian folk song, abandoned by all, pulling up the rear with the heaviest load, has become the very symbol of Mongolia as it tries to catch up to the modern world despite its limitations.

Paul D. Buell

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CAMERON HIGHLANDS Cameron Highlands, an area of about 670 square kilometers (260 square miles), is located in peninsular Malaysia, in the northwest corner of the state of Pahang. Its name is strongly associated with tea, farming, and tourism. The tea plantations, begun in the 1920s, are on the steeper slopes and are a mainstay of the Malaysian tea industry. Vegetable farming is carried out by ethnic Chinese farmers mainly in the valleys nearer to the main road leading to the highlands. Per year, intensive farming yields three to four crops, which are exported to Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh, and Singapore. Some slash-and-burn cultivation is also carried out by the

Orang Asli, the indigenous minority peoples of peninsular Malaysia.

With its cooler temperatures (18°–22°C) and a reduced seasonal effect from the monsoons, Cameron Highlands was used as a "change-of-air" station for British officers during the colonial period. Later, it developed into a significant tourism center, with economic activities centered around three townships: Ringlet, Tanah Rata, and Brinchang. Bungalows and hotels, the first of which was constructed in 1934, are available for short- and long-term rentals.

Wong Pob Pob

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CANDI OF JAVA *Candi* are archaeological treasures from past civilizations in Java. Many originally served as religious monuments, while a number of them also used to be related to the courts of various Javanese kingdoms. There are hundreds of *candi*, large and small, that have been excavated so far. Only a few of them have undergone restoration. The most dense population of *candi* can be found in the interior heartland of Java, as well as in the eastern part of the island. A few *candi*, albeit not as numerous and elaborate in their structure as the *candi* of Java, can also be found in West Java and some parts of Sumatra.

The builders of the *candi* of Java were the various Buddhist and Hindu dynasties ruling Java from the eighth century through the fifteenth century CE. The Hindu kingdom of Mataram was credited with building many of them. The oldest of these excavated *candi* is a complex of *candi* found in the Dieng plateau in central Java. They were built in the late eighth to early ninth centuries.

While most *candi* are Hindu, a number of them were built by Buddhist dynasties. The largest of the *candi* of Java, the Borobudur, was in fact built by the Buddhist dynasty of Sailendra in the ninth century. Covering an area of 15,129 square meters and standing 42 meters high, the Borobudur is one of largest ancient monuments in the world. The most elaborate of the Hindu *candi*, the Prambanan group, was built around half a century after Borobudur was completed.

Built by the Hindu Mataram kingdom, the Prambanan consists of 3 large *candi* surrounded by 224 minor ones. It was built as a commemoration of the return of Hindu rule in Java after the demise of the Buddhist Sailendra. It is also believed that Prambanan was meant as a Hindu's answer to the grandeur of Borobudur.

With the shift of power to the east at the turn of the second millennium, *candi* construction also moved eastward. The major east Java kingdoms, such as Kediri, Singasari, and Majapahit, are credited with building *candi* in this area. While serving in functions similar to those of central Java's *candi*, the east Java variants are rather distinct in their construction material and layout. For instance, while the central Java *candi* are invariably built with andesite, many in east Java, especially from later period (thirteenth to fifteenth centuries under Majapahit), used red bricks. While most of the *candi* in central Java are facing to the east, the east Java ones face to the west.

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CANNING, CHARLES JOHN (1812–1862), Governor-General of the British East India Company. Viscount Charles John Canning of Kilbrahan, County Kilkenny, Ireland, was educated at Eton College and Christ Church in Oxford, England, where he graduated in classics and mathematics in 1832. Entering Parliament in 1836, he became undersecretary of state for foreign affairs in 1841. In 1855, the government of Lord Palmerston (1784–1865), then prime minister, appointed him governor-general of the East India Company's possessions in India, and he assumed office in February 1856.

Canning's career is indelibly associated with the suppression of the first large-scale Indian revolt against British rule (1857–1858), known variously as the Indian Mutiny, the Great Indian Rebellion, or the First War of Indian Independence. He became the first viceroy of British India after the takeover of the territory by the British in 1858. He combined fairness with firmness in his handling of the mutiny and its aftermath, earning the respectful title "Clemency Canning."

He believed that undue harshness and racially motivated punishments of Indians would damage prospects for the reestablishment of peaceful government.

Canning was raised to an earldom in 1859. He initiated major reforms in the armed forces and the finances of the government of India, introducing, for instance, the income tax. The Indian Councils Act of 1861 greatly improved the administrative basis of the empire. Canning retired in March 1862, broken in health and spirit by the death of his beloved wife in 1861. He died in London on 17 June 1862.

Chandika Kaul

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CANTONESE. See **Yue.**

CAO DAI Cao Daism (also called *Dai Dao Tam Ky Pho Do*, Third Revelation of the Great Way) is an indigenous Vietnamese religion centered in Tay Ninh Province in southern Vietnam that was officially founded and first propagated by Ngo Van Chieu (1878–1926), an administrative official in the French colonial administration that ruled Vietnam from the second half of the nineteenth century until 1945. Chieu claimed to have a series of revelations in 1926 that stated that all religions were one. Cao Dai is an amalgam of different beliefs that borrow from Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, Taoism, and Western nineteenth-century romanticism and grew under the leadership of its first Supreme Chief, Le Van Trung.

Tenets

Cao Dai (literally "High Palace") is the name of God to the religion's followers, who believe that the history of religion is divided into three major periods of revelation, as told by Chieu's revelations: the Era of Creation (or Era of Innocence), the Era of Progress (or Era of Wars, or Era of Self-Destruction), and the Era of Annihilation (or Era of Preservation). In the first two, individuals chosen by God were given the mission to serve humanity by founding the Great Way and its five branches, Geniism (a Vietnamese indigenous religion), Christianity, Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism, each based on the customs of the the people who embraced them.

These religions and their truths, as revealed by their messengers, were to represent all human spirituality.

But the people of the world, through inherent weakness and the multiplicity of those religions, brought about conflict instead of love and peace. In the third period, God gave the world a final liberation, uniting those religions into one religion to bring about ultimate unity.

Cao Daists believe that God created the universe, the plants and animals, and mankind, and to each he gave a part of his spirit. All human beings are brothers and sisters and come from the same God, the father of all. God himself is worshiped in the form of a single eye shining over a pantheon of saints, Buddhas, genies, and immortals that together represent a universal consciousness of which mankind is a part. From a moral standpoint, Cao Daism stresses to people their duties toward themselves, their family, their society, nature, and humanity (the universal family). Philosophically Cao Daists renounce wealth and riches as paths to true spiritual fulfillment and emphasize the control of greed, anger, and desires. Spiritually, Cao Daism endorses reincarnation and teaches meditation and self-cultivation as the way to spiritual elevation and fulfillment. Followers venerate such figures as Sun Yat-sen, Joan of Arc, Vietnamese prophet Tranh Trinh, Julius Caesar, Buddha, Confucius, and Victor Hugo.

Organization

Cao Dai has an elaborate organizational structure. It has a governing body called the *Cuu Trung Dai* (College of Men) with one *giao tong* (pope) who leads the *Cuu Trung Dai*. There are three *chuong phap* (legislative cardinals), one belonging to each of the three legislative branches: the *Nho* (Confucianist), the *Thich* (Buddhist), and the *Dao* (Taoist). There are three *dau su* (cardinals), one for each branch. The *chuong phap* decide on religious laws and the *dau su* have the right to direct, both spiritually and temporally, the so-called Disciples of God or lay faithful, and also have the right to enact laws, which must be submitted for the approval of the pope. Next in line of power are the thirty-six *phoi su* (archbishops), twelve for each branch, with three *chanh phoi su* (principal archbishops). There are seventy-two *giao su* (bishops), twenty-four for each branch, who are responsible for the education of the disciples. The three thousand *giao huu* (priests) are also split evenly among the branches, presiding over ritual ceremonies in the province temples. The *giao huu* are in charge of propagating the religion. There are an unlimited number of *le sanh* (student priests), who are drawn from the most virtuous of the subdignitaries, or *pho tri su*. The *chanh tri su* (minor office-bearers) look after the adepts in the villages. There are also *pho tri su* (subdignitaries) and *thong su*



The Cao Dai Holy See and Grand Temple in Tay Ninh, Vietnam, in 1993. The temple was built in 1927. (STEVE RAYMER/CORBIS)

(religious village administrators). Finally, there are an unlimited number of *tin do* (adepts), or followers, of Cao Dai. Female dignitaries may reach the rank of cardinal only.

In the 1950s the Cao Dai joined the forces opposed to Ngo Dinh rule in the Republic of South Vietnam (RVN). They formed a Cao Dai army and joined a military alliance with the Binh Xuyen gang and the Hoa Hao religious sect that also fought against Diem's forces. The coalition was eventually defeated and a fragile coexistence between the RVN government and the three groups was recognized.

Before the fall of the RVN in 1975, the Cao Dai claimed between 1 and 2 million adherents. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam officially recognized Cao Daism in 1986, and the movement still has its world headquarters in Tay Ninh Province. Today there are perhaps 6 million Cao Daists around the world.

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CAO XUEQIN (1715–1763), Chinese author. Cao Xueqin (Ts'ao Hsueh-ch'in) was born in Nanjing into a powerful and wealthy family. Shortly after Cao's birth, the family became involved in political intrigues, falling into disgrace and financial ruin. From 1742, Cao lived in poverty in the western suburbs of Beijing, making a little money selling his own paintings. It was here he wrote *Shitou ji* (The Story of the Stone). Although the manuscript was left unfinished when he died in 1763, hand-written copies with eighty chapters began to appear before long. In 1792, the novel was printed with an additional forty chapters, usually attributed to Gao E, under the title *Honglou meng* (The Dream of the Red Chamber). It is one of the most celebrated novels in the history of Chinese literature. The novel, which has some strong autobiographical elements, focuses on the downfall of the Jia family. The principal characters are Baoyu, who is born from a stone into the Jia family, and Daiyu, who is deeply but unhappily in love with Baoyu. The decline of the Jia family follows the death of one of the daughters who was an imperial consort, but in the end the imperial favors are restored, and Baoyu passes the imperial examinations. The novel has been translated into English several times.

Bent Nielsen

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CAPPADOCIA Cappadocia, which used to be known as Katpatuka (Land of Beautiful Horses) in old Persian, is a region in central Anatolia, 300 kilometers southeast of Ankara, the capital city of modern-day Turkey.

Cappadocia is known for its unusual landscape, the result of the violent eruption of volcanoes, Mount Er-ciyes (3,917 meters) and Mount Hasan (3,268 meters), some 3 million years ago. Lava and volcanic dust and ashes covered the region, which eventually hardened



CAPPADOCIA-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

A UNESCO World Heritage Site since 1985 and a backdrop for *Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade*, Cappadocia is world-renowned for its Byzantine sanctuaries and fourth-century underground towns actually chiseled into its rock face.

into a thick layer of tuff. Over the years, water and wind eroded the soft and brittle volcanic surface, creating deep valleys and many different types of strange rock formations, such as rock cones and fairy chimneys.

Archaeological evidence shows that Cappadocia was inhabited as early as the Paleolithic period (c. 2.5 million BCE –10,000 BCE), and continued to serve as home to the peoples of many different civilizations, including the Hittites, Greeks, and the Romans. Dwellings were dug into the rocks and provided shelter from the environment, defense against foreign invasions, and refuge from religious persecution. These dwellings interconnect, forming some two hundred to three hundred underground cities, equipped with elaborate air ventilation systems, water storage units, and in some cases, even stables and wineries. One of the most famous and well excavated is Kaymakli, where Christians hid from the pagan Roman invaders during the seventh century.

Parts of the underground cities are still used by Cappadocia's present-day inhabitants. For example, underground canals are used to regulate water in the nearby farmland, and local produce, such as potatoes and citrus fruits, is stored in subterranean storage units. People still live in above-ground rock structures, some of which are even used as hotels and inns. Cappadocia is a popular tourist destination, with over a million foreign visitors in 1997.

Junhee Kim

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CARABALLO MOUNTAINS Formed by the merging of the Cordillera Central and the Sierra Madre mountain ranges in north central Luzon Island, the Caraballo Mountains lie in the center of Luzon,

the largest island in the Philippines archipelago. The mountains' highest elevation is around 1,680 meters.

The Caraballo Mountains remain one of the few heavily forested areas in the Philippines, and the timber resources of the region are much exploited. The mountainous areas also include watersheds: the Cagayan River, the longest river in the country, begins in the Caraballo Mountains. The river flows northward, providing irrigation water for several provinces.

Some of the least populated areas in the Philippines are located in the Caraballo Mountains. The climate in this area is relatively mild, with a dry season from November to February and a wet season from May to October. The area is situated outside the direct path of typhoons.

The Caraballo Mountains witnessed heavy battles at the end of the Second World War. After U.S. troops recaptured Manila in early 1945, General Yamashita Tomoyuki, the Japanese commander of the occupation troops in the Philippines, retreated with around 120,000 soldiers to the Caraballo Mountains and the Cordillera Central. This densely forested area with its numerous mountain passes and caves formed a natural defense line for the Japanese. Intensive fighting continued for several weeks, leading to losses on both sides. With the help of Filipino guides, U.S. troops managed to outmaneuver the Japanese, forcing them to surrender.

Several ethnic groups inhabit the Caraballo and Cordillera Mountains. One tribe, the Ikalahan, controls almost 15,000 hectares of tribal lands in the mountains and is preserving them from agricultural development while protecting the forests and watersheds. Using wild fruits growing in the forests, the Ikalahan produce fruit products, which they sell in urban markets, and are planning to do the same with orchids, truffles, and mushrooms.

Rafis Abazov

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
CARAVANS The English word "caravan" comes from the Persian word *karwan*, used throughout Cen-

tral Asia to signify an organized, traveling column of animals, people, and cargo. Before the advent of motorized transport, a caravan following the Silk Road between China and the Middle East might consist of a thousand or more Bactrian (two-humped) camels each carrying several hundred pounds of goods or passengers, slung in panniers on the camel's back. Depending on caravan size and cargo, a caravan chief's staff might consist of a guide, accountant, supervisor of food and campsite, and security detail for defense against bandits, as well as scores of camel drivers, one for every twenty or thirty camels. The convoy might also include horses, a few dromedary camels for riding, guard dogs, and sheep.

Commercial caravans were best suited to carry compact, valuable, imperishable goods. Silks, spices, jade, brass, coral, and rhubarb roots once figured in the east-west trade; in the twenty-first century illegal narcotics have met the criteria for caravan transport in remote areas of Central Asia.

The normal pace of Bactrian camels, between two and three miles an hour or roughly thirty miles a day, determined a caravan's speed; wells could be fifty or even a hundred miles apart. Camels could go without water for three days, perhaps four if travel was by night, as it often was in East Turkistan's Taklimakan Desert.

A caravansary or caravan inn, with sleeping alcoves in tiers around a courtyard, usually lay at the end of each day's stage. At a prosperous oasis city such as Samarqand, caravansaries clustered around a city gate. Sometimes a day's stage ended in the countryside at a fortified caravansary or *rabat*, which resembled a small town with a market, café, bath (*hammam*), latrines, and perhaps a small mosque.



SAFRONBOLU-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Safronbolu was an important stop for trade caravans en route to Europe or Asia; the architecture in this Turkish city became the model for urban development in the Ottoman empire. Designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1994, the city contains classic wood and stone dwellings.

The ruins of Rabat-i-Sangbast, twenty-four miles south of Mashhad in modern Iran, lie at the intersection of three historic caravan routes, one from the Mediterranean via Hamadan and Neyshabur, another from India via Herat, and a third from China via Samarqand and Mary (former Merv).

David Nalle

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CARDAMON MOUNTAINS The Chuor Phnom Kravanh (Cardamon Mountains) in southwest Cambodia derive their title from the spice of the same name. Generally oriented on a northwest-southeast axis, this range of high hills extends somewhat discontinuously for approximately 160 kilometers west from the Chuor Phnom Damrei (Elephant Range) to the Thailand border. Dense tropical forests cover the western slopes, where annual rainfall averages 3,800–5,000 millimeters, while the eastern slopes along the interior plain rarely exceed 1,500 millimeters. The highest mountain in Cambodia, Phnom Aural (1,813 meters), is located near Pouthisat, between Kompong Chang and Kompong Speu provinces, while farther west, the elevation reaches 1,563 meters.

Sparsely populated by Dravidian peoples who commercially grew cardamoms and pepper until 1975, the Cardamon Mountains were a stronghold for soldiers of the Khmer Rouge (Cambodian Reds) as recently as 1998. The area retains a high degree of biodiversity, and several species once presumed extinct have recently been discovered alive in the mountainous interior. In support, the national government, with the

assistance of World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and the United Nations Development Program, has designated a number of protected reserves in the area. Increasing in-migration by both Khmer and Khmer Islam (or Cham) from nearby provinces, including Kampot, Kompong Speu, and Kompong Cham—some of whom are returning to their home province after years of displacement by the Pol Pot regime, while newcomers come to buy land on which to settle and farm—and environmental pressure from extensive gem mining and logging—both legal and illegal—present serious challenges to the mountainous ecosystem, however.

Greg Ringer

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CARPETS-CENTRAL ASIA In Central Asia, remnants of fine handmade wool carpets preserved in graves as old as the fifth century BCE imply that the tradition of carpet weaving dates to still earlier times, although these ancient rugs were not necessarily locally woven. Central Asian rugs today are traditionally wool pile on a wool foundation. In older rugs, cotton was used in the pile or to supplement the foundation, but cotton warps are a late introduction. Some few Central Asian carpets use silk, but these are rare, compared with those of wool. (Kilims are rugs or covers made by Turks of Central Asia of flat-woven material.)

With the exception of sixteenth-century court carpets and some later Uzbek city carpets, Central Asian carpets are primarily village-woven wool rugs, bags, horse trappings, and other small pieces. The traditional color of Central Asian rugs is madder-dyed red (from the madder herb), with indigo blue the usual secondary color, along with small amounts of brown, yellow, and other colors. Until the second half of the nineteenth century, only natural dyes were used, which explains the deep brilliant reds still preserved today on nineteenth-century examples. A common design is a repeated geometric motif known as a gul (Persian for rose), an octagon-shaped pattern sometimes called an elephant foot. Little is known about the history of Central Asian rugs, aside from those pieces made in

royal courts; some village-made rugs have been dated as early as 1650.

Turkmen Rugs

The best-known and most highly prized Central Asian rugs are those made by Turkmen, primarily in Turkmenistan, northeast Iran, northern Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan. The oldest Turkmen confederation is the Ersari (Azeri), and until recently the elite clan of the Ersari was the Saltuq (Seljuk). The Ersari, who lived in the old emirate of Bukhara, in the southern Amu Dar'ya region of Uzbekistan, and in northern Afghanistan, included many groups, each of which had distinctive rug patterns, such as the Chub Bash, Kizil Ajak, and Sullayman (sixteenth–late nineteenth century). Ersari rugs tend to be more coarsely woven than other Turkmen rugs and have the most archaic patterns.

In Turkmenistan proper, there were two main weaving divisions in the Turkmen social order, the Salor confederation and the Yomut. The Salor, the dominant confederation in the West, split, with first the Saryk (early eighteenth century) and then the Tekke (eighteenth century) usurping power in southern Turkmenistan. Rug collectors prize Salor, Saryk, and Tekke weavings, and antique Salor and Tekke rugs generally bring high prices at auctions.

The Yomut are in the Caspian area and in northern Turkmenistan. By allying themselves with the Uzbek khans of Khiva, they gained power (1600–1873) and dominated several other groups whose weaving are lumped with theirs into a homogenous Yomut group that to this point has not been differentiated. Yomut rugs have more variations in design than do other Turkmen weavings, no doubt because they were made by various groups dominated by the Yomut. Another distinct weaving group, the Chaudor, produces the darkest and least attractive Turkmen rugs overall. They are also the least likely to depend on red and blue, featuring colors such as brown, often with an olive-green cast.

Uzbek Rugs

One of the most prolific non-Turkmen weaving groups is that of the Uzbek people. Because they frequently copy the rugs of their Turkmen neighbors, it is difficult to distinguish Uzbek rugs, and for many years, most Uzbek rugs were sold as Turkmen. In the 1990s, experts began to attribute many of the so-called Afghan Turkmen rugs to the Uzbek, particularly those with less evenly spaced patterns. Yet even today significant numbers of rugs described as Turkmen, particularly those coming from Afghanistan, are actually

Uzbek. Complicating this is the fact that Uzbek carpets include some made by Tajik weavers, and it is unclear how to tell one from the other.

Not all Uzbek carpets are village-made. Carpet workshops in Bukhara and other cities wove excellent large carpets (c. fifteenth to twentieth century). Some Uzbek formal-workshop carpets that date to the sixteenth century are much like the best Persian rugs of the Safavid dynasty (1501–1722/1736) in quality, differing only in colors and designs. These masterpieces are referred to as Salting carpets (1588–1598), after a magnificent carpet in the Victoria and Albert Museum in London. Based on color, artistic style, and writing (lines of poetry woven into the borders), some were probably produced in the Uzbek courts at Herat and Bukhara around 1590.

Rugs of Other Central Asian Peoples

A number of Turkic weaving groups produce small numbers of wool pile rugs primarily for domestic use: the Karakalpaks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Mongols. Because these groups were never encouraged to produce rugs for export, they stayed truer to the old traditions. The Turkmen and Uzbek, on the other hand, wove the majority of their rugs for sale. The designs reacted first to Russian and then to Western market forces. The noncommercial weaving groups tended to weave objects suited to their lifestyle, such as bags, door covers, yurt or *gur* wrappings, horse trappings, and odd-shaped small rugs.

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CASHMERE INDUSTRY Cashmere hair from varieties of cashmere goats is a major agricultural product of China and Mongolia. Cashmere is the down hair shed by goats living in the high, dry altitudes of Eurasia. Cashmere lies beneath the coarse outer hair and provides insulation from the cold. This rare precious natural fiber has been known since Roman times for its lightness, warmth, and softness. For hundreds of years, it was used exclusively in luxury fabrics that only royalty could afford. Napoleon gave cashmere shawls to his empress, Eugenie, and Queen Victoria prized the fabric. In the 1920s, it was developed into fashionable clothing by the Parisian designers Coco Chanel and Jean Patou.

China is the world's largest producer of cashmere, generating around 10,000 tons per year, over 60 percent of the world market of 16,500 tons. Mongolia is the second-largest producer with about 3,000 tons annually; the cashmere industry has been a major component of the Mongolian economy. Other cashmere-producing countries are New Zealand, Nepal, Iran, Afghanistan, Australia, and the United States.

Originally the cashmere-manufacturing industry developed in Scotland, which was noted for its specialized-weave knit techniques in underwear. In the second half of the twentieth century, cashmere processing and manufacturing increasingly moved to the countries of fiber origin, especially China, although Scotland still produces very high quality cashmere clothing.

It takes a Kashmir goat four years to produce enough hair for one sweater. To collect the hair, the herders comb the goats by hand every spring, and the hair is sold in bales. The cashmere industry is divided into three distinct sectors: raw (greasy) cashmere gathered by herders; processed (dehaired) cashmere, the product of a refined combing, cleaning, and sorting process; and finished (manufactured) cashmere products, including yarns and clothing, usually knit on hand-operated machines. Two kilograms of raw cashmere yield one kilogram of dehaired cashmere.

The Cashmere Industry in China

Cashmere-down hair in China comes from goats grazing on the plains of Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and the Himalayan Mountain highlands leading to the Tibetan Plateau—regions surrounding the Gobi Desert.

The fibers are locally combed, cleaned, dyed, and spun before being knitted into fabric in North Chinese mills or before being exported. In 1997, China produced 9,742 tons of raw cashmere and imported 827 tons of raw cashmere, exporting no raw greasy cashmere. A sum of 5,285 tons was processed; half was used in the domestic market, and half was exported. The half that remained in China was made into finished goods, about a quarter of which went into domestic sales, while the rest was exported.

The Cashmere Industry in Mongolia

Cashmere is the second-largest hard-currency-earning export of Mongolia. In 1997, Mongolia produced 2,558 tons of raw cashmere. A total of 1,731 tons remained in the domestic market, while 827 tons were exported to China. Some 866 tons were processed in the country, and 603 tons were exported. Mongolia manufactured 263 tons of cashmere finished goods, exporting all but 38 tons of it.

At the end of 1997, Mongolia had over 10 million cashmere goats, double the herd size of 1990, grazing mainly in the eight Gobi provinces. The number of goats has been increasing from 12.3 percent to 18.5 percent annually in the past decade. If such increases continue, the U.S. Agency for International Development postulates that by 2014 goat numbers will increase to 14 million head and will supply 4,200 tons of raw cashmere.

Cashmere Trade and Future Prospects

During Mongolia's socialist era (1921–1990), cashmere was exported mainly to Europe. Exports shifted dramatically to China in the democratic era since 1990, with the prime beneficiaries being the Mongolian *arat* (nomadic herder) producer and the Chinese manufacturing establishment. With the rapid growth of cashmere loans from the Western banking system, Mongolian customers were unable to buy the nomads' raw cashmere, so that the nomads increasingly turned to Chinese traders who came to them in the Gobi Desert. With a change of government from Communist Party rule to a coalition of democratic parties in 1996, the Mongolian authorities were convinced to lift their mid-1990s ban on the export of raw cashmere and replace it with a 30 percent export tax on raw cashmere. The tax was poorly implemented, as corrupt senior officials realized that they could make fortunes by selling raw cashmere tax free to Chinese factories. It is estimated that at least 50 percent of Mongolian raw cashmere is smuggled to China with no duties paid on either side. This has enabled China to capture the

Mongolian raw cashmere-export market, depress the Mongolian manufacturing sector, and take control of the world cashmere market.

The Chinese now mix the longer Mongolian hair fibers with shorter Chinese fibers to increase yarn strength. In the 1990s, Chinese dominance of the world's cashmere market and rapid expansion of Mongolian goat herds led to what most experts agree was an oversupply of low-quality cashmere. World prices of raw cashmere dropped from about \$60 per kilogram in 1989 to \$15 per kilogram in 1998. Mongolia's lower-quality fibers come from its older goats. Diseases and the collapse of the Russian goat-meat market in the 1990s reduced Mongolia's goat slaughter. The older goats produced thicker, lower-quality fibers, which added to the Chinese hair resulted in a less luxurious and less expensive product. This accounts for the flood of finished cashmere goods at greatly reduced prices, which became available on the world market in the 1990s. However, two successive disastrous winters in 1999–2001 in Mongolia and Inner Mongolia killed off millions of goats, which will improve fiber quality in the short term. It is expected that breeding-improvement-programs are needed to improve quality in the long run.

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CASPIAN SEA The Caspian Sea divides the Eurasian landmass, separating the mountainous Caucasus region to the west from the deserts of Central Asia to the east. At 372,000 square kilometers in area, the peanut-shaped Caspian Sea is the world's largest inland lake, enclosed by Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan. The Caspian basin is twenty-eight meters below sea level and is fed mainly by the Volga River, which flows southeast from Russia. The salty lake plunges to a depth of about one thousand meters in the south, but is only somewhat over three meters deep in the northern waters. The Caspian is a seasonal habitat for birds migrating from Europe and Asia, including flamingos and the rare

white-tailed eagle. Baku, Astrakhan, Aqtau, Atyrau, and Makhachkala are the most important ports.

Oil and Natural Gas

The Caspian Sea contains some of the world's largest deposits of oil and natural gas. Hydrocarbon exploitation in the Caspian Sea was limited during the Soviet era, but since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Caspian basin's huge, undeveloped natural resources have been the source of much international attention. Previously, the sea's legal status was governed by 1921 and 1940 treaties between the Soviet Union and Iran, but since Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan received their independence, the Caspian littoral states have been unable to agree on a new legal regime governing the use of the surface, water, and subsea hydrocarbon resources. Despite the absence of a multilateral agreement, several countries already have begun oil and natural gas exploration in the Caspian. International energy consortiums, such as the Azerbaijan International Operating Company, have invested billions of dollars in developing infrastructure to develop and export the oil and natural gas.

Caviar

The Caspian Sea is also the source of about 90 percent of the world's caviar. However, the lack of an international agreement safeguarding the sea's environment has led to overfishing and poaching of sturgeon, the fish whose roe or eggs are used to make the delicacy, resulting in dwindling fish stocks. Environmentalists have warned that poaching of beluga, the largest and rarest sturgeon, is threatening to push the species into extinction. Legal trade in Caspian caviar is estimated to be worth \$100 million per year, but the illegal catch in the four former Soviet republics is believed to be ten to twelve times higher. In spring 2001, the United Nations Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) banned exports of caviar from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan. Despite opposition from environmentalists in March 2002, CITES lifted the export ban on the former Soviet republics, citing improved management of their sturgeon stocks.

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CASTE "Caste" refers to a rigid system of ranked social inequality with significant barriers to mobility or to intimate associations between different strata. The word also refers to one of the ranked strata or subgroups that make up such a system. Traditional India is considered the classic example of a caste system, but the concept has also been used to describe extreme forms of racial, ethnic, and class segregation in other societies. "Caste" comes from the Portuguese *casta*, meaning lineage, breed, race, or category (first attested used in English in 1613).

Caste in Traditional India

Hindus usually describe the caste system with one or both of two ancient concepts: *varna* and *jati*. *Varna* (color) refers to the categories that are described in the early Indian religious texts such as the Rig Veda (origins 1500–1200 BCE; present form c. 200 BCE) and the *Laws of Manu* (c. 200 BCE–100 CE). These texts describe four ranked categories: priests (Brahmans), warriors (Kshatriyas), farmers and merchants (Vaisyas), and laborers and servants (Sudras). The first three categories are considered "twice-born" (*dvijias*) and are allowed to study the sacred scriptures. A fifth category of outcasts is referred to in *The Laws of Manu* as *chandala*. They are supposedly outside Hindu society, but historically are an integral part of it. Westerners have referred to this group as untouchables. They were usually associated with activities considered to be polluting, such as removing feces or dead animals. In contemporary India, the government refers to these groups as Scheduled Castes. Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi (1869–1948) called them *Harijans* (children of God). Many of them have adopted the name *Dalits* (the oppressed).

The actual social structure in India has long varied from the *varna* scheme described in the sacred texts. Society has been differentiated into several thousand named social categories usually referred to as *jatis* (lineage, species, race). Scholars do not know whether *jatis* developed from *varnas*. It is clear that the *varna* scheme has long served as a simplified indigenous model of the caste system, whose legitimacy was advocated primarily by Brahmans and other high-caste groups. The description of the *jati* system that follows attempts to summarize the information developed during the period that Britain ruled India (1848–1947 CE) and the views of social scientists in the first quarter-century after Indian independence.

Most *jatis* were associated with a particular traditional occupation or ritual activity, such as barber, drummer, cow herder, priest, and so forth. These categories were ranked in a rough hierarchy based to a

significant degree on their supposed ritual purity, with Brahmans at the top and untouchables at the bottom. Ritual purity was partly an attribute of birth, and partly due to the fastidiousness with which individuals and castes conformed to certain lifestyle norms. Bathing before meals, purification of cooking areas, being a vegetarian, minimizing associations with those of low caste, keeping women relatively secluded, not allowing widows to remarry, and avoiding manual work in the fields were a few of the behaviors usually associated with ritual purity. The status of a caste was also affected by the members' wealth, political power, and the *varna* category with which they were associated. For example, Rajputs, who are common in much of northern India, are usually classified as Kshatriyas and hence claim a higher status than the Vaisya or Sudra castes in their region.

These *jati* categories were divided into—or more accurately composed of—numerous regional subcastes, ranging from a few hundred families to tens of thousands. Subcastes were usually endogamous, (composed of families who intermarried with one another and refused to marry others). Because of endogamy, many members of a subcaste were kin by birth or marriage. Most castes also practiced commensality; that is, they ate only with members of their own or a higher caste.

Most castes participated in agricultural production or modern occupations. In only a few artisan and service castes, such as clothes washers, barbers, and goldsmiths, did most members earn their living by carrying out their traditional occupation. Many castes, however, performed their traditional functions on specific occasions. For example, drummer castes in south India serve as drummers for certain festivals or rituals. The great majority of castes were classified as Sudras, though their ritual status varied from quite high to very low. Some of the most common Sudra castes were barbers, carpenters, blacksmiths, goldsmiths, oilseed pressers, farmers, potters, cow herders, shepherds, flower growers, vegetable gardeners, grain parchers, sweetmeat makers, tailors, weavers, clothes washers, and bangle makers. The three higher *varnas*, as well as the category of untouchables or Scheduled Castes, each contained a number of distinct castes.

A typical village might include members of from five to twenty-five castes. There were nearly always some type of Brahman and an array of Sudra castes in a local area. In some places, there were castes that claimed to be Kshatriyas or Vaisyas, but in many areas of the South, those *varnas* were not represented. Typically, a dominant caste or coalition controlled most local political and economic resources—especially land and the labor needed to work it. While caste rank was associ-



CASTE

Edgar Thurston's *Castes and Tribes of Southern India* is an attempt to provide a full accounting of all the castes of the region. Although incomplete, it remains the most comprehensive list. The following is a sample of the listings.

Baita Kammara.—The name, meaning outside blacksmiths, applied to Kamsala blacksmiths, who occupy a lowly position, and work in the open air or outside a village.

Bajantri.—A synonym of Mangala, indicating their occupation as professional musicians.

Bakuda.—A sub-division of Holeya.

Balanollu.—Balanollu and Badranollu are names of gotras of Ganigas, the members of which may not cut *Erythoxylon monogynum*.

Balasantosha.—The Balasantosha or Balasanta vandlu (those who are children) are described in the Kurnool Manual as "ballad reciters, whose chief stories are the Bobbili katha, or the story of the siege of the fort of Bobbili in Vizagapatam by Bussy"; the Kurnool settled in the Tamil district of Madura.

Bovi.—The name of the palanquin-bearing section of the Mogers of South Canara. Some Besthas from Mysore, who have settled in this district, are also called Bovi, which is a form of Boyi (bearer).

Boya (see Bedar).—Boya has also been recorded as a sub-division of Malam, a name for Ekari.

Source: Edgar Thurston and K. Rangachari. (1909) *Castes and Tribes of Southern India*. Madra, India: Government Press, 266–267.

ated with economic and political power, the correlation was very imperfect. In most areas, the controllers of land and labor were not Brahmans; frequently they were higher-status Sudra castes. The dominant caste was often able to mobilize considerable physical force to protect its interests. Members of this dominant group typically served as patrons (*jajmans*) for whom Brahman priests performed religious rites in return for gifts and fees. The dominant caste was also the patron of a variety of specialist castes—barbers, blacksmiths, sweepers, and so forth—who provided various goods and services. In return for their services, these clients were given a portion of the patron's grain at harvest time. Where the integration of the division of labor at a village level was accomplished by patron-client (*jajmani*) relationships, markets and extreme forms of coercion (for example, slavery or serfdom) may have been less prevalent. Scholars disagree about how extensive this system was.

In contrast to a caste, which was a category of people of similar rank and characteristics, a subcaste was

an actual social group or network. Families were linked to members of their subcaste in other villages in the region. In many areas, daughters had to marry men from other villages, creating intervillage networks of kin and in-laws. Many subcastes had a council of respected leaders (*panchayat*) who settled disputes and disciplined errant members. These regional subcastes were usually endogamous; that is, husbands and wives had to be from the same subcaste. In turn, their children were members of this subcaste. Endogamy was the primary determinant of subcaste boundaries. The exception was a number of castes in north India and a few in south India who practiced what anthropologists refer to as hypergamy. That is, males could marry women from a caste of slightly lower rank. In all castes, parents arranged most marriages. While a local *jati* or subcaste was a circle of peers, there were important variations in the status of the families in a subcaste. These differences were related to wealth, influence over other families, and lifestyle, especially ritual purity. A family's status could be increased if it arranged marriages with higher-status families.

Typically, a local caste category was segmented into several endogamous subcastes. For example, there was often more than one subcaste of cow herders in a given area or even in the same village. From the perspective of others, the cow herders belonged to the same caste; from their perspective, enough differences existed so that they neither intermarried nor ate with one another. Most people in a village knew the broad caste category of everyone else, though they often did not know their subcaste.

In principle, individuals and groups could not change their caste, but in practice there was considerable social mobility—usually involving small shifts in rankings. This typically occurred when a subcaste or lineage increased in wealth or political power. It then emulated the lifestyles of higher castes, adopted a new name, or claimed that it belonged to a higher *varna*. In a local area, the exact ranking of groups was subject to dispute and debate. Most disagreement was over whether a caste was just above or just below another local caste.

Most religious minorities in India, including Muslims, Christians, and Sikhs (who together make up about 15 percent of the population), also had caste-like divisions. Marriages were usually within these caste subgroups, and various forms of deference were shown to high-ranking strata. Non-Hindus are, however, usually less concerned about purity and pollution and commensality. The representation of these groups in any given area is, however, enormously variable. For example, in some areas of the Punjab, Sikhs constitute the overwhelming bulk of the population, while the same is true for Christians in a few areas of south India.

There have long been protests against the caste system, including those by the historical Buddha (563–483 BCE), the bhakti (devotional movements; 800–1800), and the anti-Brahman movement in south India (c. 1916–1940).

Theories of Caste

Scholars have proposed various explanations for this system of inequality. Louis Dumont has argued that the patterns found in Hindu India are due to its unique ideology, which values hierarchy based on distinctions of ritual purity and pollution. This notion contrasts with Western ideology, which places a high value on equality and individualism. McKim Marriott has emphasized even more strongly the distinctive nature of the Hindu caste system. In contrast to the Western dualistic understanding of biology and morality, Hindus, according to Marriott, have a monistic concept; there is no clear line between biol-

ogy and morality. The substances that make up the body are inherited from parents. They affect not only one's physical capacities, but shape one's moral capacities. Conversely, the morality of an individual's behavior eventually affects the quality of the substances that make up the body. Both Dumont and Marriott have been criticized for overemphasizing the role and ideas of Brahmans and for neglecting the resistance of lower castes, alternative indigenous ideologies, and the frequent deviation of actual behavior from these largely Brahmanical ideals. Moreover, their theories provide little insight into the changes that are occurring in contemporary India.

Beginning with A. M. Hocart, another scholarly tradition sees those with significant political and economic power (kings, lesser rulers, and dominant castes) as the creators and sustainers of the caste system. Specialized groups of subordinates provide rulers and dominant castes with services, and eventually these groups develop into castes. Kings and local rulers enforce this division of labor and the related status distinctions. An obvious criticism of this theory is that while most agrarian societies have had kings and local rulers, only India developed an elaborate caste system. Gerald Berreman has suggested that castes emerged as tribal and ethnic groups were incorporated into larger state structures. Nicholas Dirks has argued that the extreme elaboration and rigidity of the caste system did not fully emerge until the *pax Britannia* of the early nineteenth century. The colonial regime gave upper castes nearly unqualified control of property and prevented lower castes from using force to resist upper caste domination and ideology. The government census attempted to record officially the ranking of castes, which made the system more rigid than it had been.

Murray Milner, Jr., argues that in traditional India, status was a crucial form of power and, relative to most societies, independent of economic and political power. Hence, castes are best understood as an extreme form of status group. Milner proposes a theory of status relationships based on four characteristics of status. Status is not expandable; hence, if some move up, others must move down; therefore, mobility tends to be restricted. Status is inalienable; property and wealth can be stolen or taken by force, but status is dependent on the opinion of others and cannot simply be appropriated. Hence, once status systems are institutionalized, they are relatively stable; some form of the caste system has existed in India for three thousand years. Status is acquired through conformity to the norms of the group; hence, those with high status tend to elaborate and complicate the norms to make conformity difficult. The extensive norms governing



ENDING CASTE DISCRIMINATION

The founders of modern India believed that discrimination and the lack of opportunity for many Indians associated with the caste system was a serious hurdle to modernization and political stability. Caste discrimination was banned and "affirmative action" as a remedy was accepted in India's first Constitution, adopted on 26 January 1950.

Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.

(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.

(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to—

(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment; or

(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing *ghats*, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public.

(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children.

(4) Nothing in this Article or in Clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.

Source: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. (1957) India's Constitution. Delhi: The Ministry.

purity and pollution are an obvious example of this process. Status is acquired through associations: associating with superiors increases your status; associating with inferiors decreases it. This is especially so for intimate associations. Eating and sex are symbols of intimacy in all societies: hence the strong emphasis on dining with and marrying those of similar status. (As the theory suggests, these behaviors are found in other caste-like systems such as aristocracies, racially segregated societies, and adolescent cliques.)

Feminist scholars have elucidated the role of women and gender differences in the understanding and significance of caste and the centrality of gender inequality and male dominance in the caste system. Male dominance may be a necessary but not sufficient condition of the caste system.

Caste in Contemporary India

The Constitution of 1949 outlawed untouchability and government discrimination based on caste. Places in Parliament, universities, and government jobs were specifically reserved for the Scheduled Castes, or former untouchables. In 1990, the government expanded the number of government jobs and university admissions reserved for disadvantaged castes from 22.5 percent to 49 percent. In addition to Scheduled Castes, positions were reserved for Other Backward Classes (OBC), which includes mainly lower- and middle-status Sudra castes. The openings available to upper-caste members were significantly reduced—in a job market where there was already high unemployment. This action led to violent protests in many parts of India and to increased emigration of professional



Villagers view the victims of a massacre in India on 22 April 1999. The low caste villagers were killed by the Ranvir Sena militia in retaliation for the earlier killing of 35 upper caste farmers by Communist rebels. (AFP/CORBIS)

families to developed countries. The reservations program was upheld by the Indian Supreme Court, but it has accentuated the mobilization of castes as political entities.

In 1996, a coalition of parties called the United Front and dominated by OBC gained control of the government of India; the cabinet contained only one Brahman—an indication of the increased influence of lower castes. Political parties dominated by upper castes mobilized in the name of Hindu nationalism (*Hindutva*), and in March 1998 they gained control of the government. The emergence of Hindu nationalism was associated with the sometimes violent persecution of Muslims, Christians, and lower-caste groups. Similar caste-linked political struggles and conflict took place for control of many of the state governments. Hindu nationalist parties and organizations have recruited some lower-caste members into leadership positions. Of course, many factors (in addition to caste) shaped political coalitions and outcomes.

With greater urbanization and industrialization, it has become impractical for people to be overly concerned about who is sitting next to them in public restaurants or factory lunchrooms. Hence, the norms of commensality have been greatly weakened. Even in arranging marriages, wider categories of people are considered appropriate as potential spouses, and increased attention is paid to their education and financial resources rather than to their subcaste. Public statements about the superiority or inferiority of castes are now unusual and considered inappropriate, though in private they are still expressed and taken into account in arranging marriages. Subcaste councils (*panchayats*) have few effective sanctions for deviant members, though more inclusive caste associations (*shabas*) are increasingly active in pressing the economic and political interests of their members. These changes are occurring in villages too, though their intensity varies by region and caste. Muslims and other minorities are even more likely to reject the legitimacy

or presence of castes within their communities, claiming that it is a Hindu institution. Just as Westerners differ greatly on the meaning of class or race, the very meaning of caste for Indians has become more variable and ambiguous.

Murray Milner, Jr.

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CATHAYA TREE The cathaya tree (*Cathaya argyrophylla*) belongs to the pine family (*Pinaceae*). The only two living species of the cathaya are found in southwest China in the southeastern parts of Sichuan, the northeastern parts of Guizhou, the southwestern parts of Hunan, the northeastern parts of Guangxi, and in the Kunming area of Yunnan. The cathaya is an evergreen tree bearing cones and grows to about twenty meters. It was only in the 1950s that this species

was discovered, and the extent of the cathaya, as far as can be ascertained, is limited to some three thousand trees. It has therefore been considered an endangered species, and cathaya seedlings are being raised by Chinese conservation organizations. One fossil species of the cathaya has been found in Germany.

Bent Nielsen

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
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CATHOLICISM, ROMAN—PHILIPPINES

The Philippines is the only Christian nation in Asia. Although more than 80 percent of Filipinos are said to be Roman Catholic, many fewer are genuine Catholics. There is a wide gap between professing Catholics and orthodox Catholics. Most people believe in a Christianized Bathalism (from the name Bathala, or God), and the traditional indigenous religions and respect for nature have profoundly shaped religious beliefs and practices in the Philippines.

Introduction of Catholicism

The Roman Catholic faith was introduced by the Portuguese navigator Ferdinand Magellan (c. 1480–1521) in 1521, but the expedition led by the Spanish explorer Miguel Lopez de Legazpi (c. 1510–1572) brought a permanent presence. As was the case in Latin America, the mendicant orders (orders combining both cloistered and community work) were responsible for bringing and spreading the Catholic religion among the local inhabitants.



BAROQUE PHILIPPINE CHURCHES—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

For representing a unique interpretation of sixteenth-century Spanish Baroque by traditional Filipino and Chinese craftsmen, the churches of Manila, Santa Maria, Paoay, and Miag-ao were designated World Heritage Sites by UNESCO in 1993.



THE CONVERSION OF FILIPINOS TO CATHOLICISM

Perhaps the most enduring of Spain's influences on the Philippines is Roman Catholicism. In 2001, nearly five centuries after Spanish arrival, a majority of Filipinos are Catholics and the Philippines is the only Christian nation in Asia. The following is the account of the first baptism of Filipinos by Magellan's companion Antonio Pigafetta on 7 April 1521.

After dinner the priest and some of the others went ashore to baptize the queen, who came with forty women. We conducted her to the platform and she was made to sit down upon a cushion, and the other women near her, until the priest was ready. She was shown an image of our Lady, a very beautiful wooden Child Jesus, and a cross. Thereupon she was overcome with contrition and asked for baptism amid her tears. We named her Johanna after the emperor's mother; her daughter, the wife of the prince, Catherina, the queen of Mazaua, Lisabeta, and the others each their (distinctive) name. Counting men, women and children, were baptized eight hundred souls. The queen was young and beautiful, and was entirely covered with a white and black cloth. Her mouth and nails were very red, while on her head she wore a large hat of palm leaves in the manner of a parasol, with a crown about it of the same leaves, like the tiara of the pope; and she never goes any place without an attendant. She asked us to give her the little Child Jesus to keep in place of her idols; and then she went away. In the afternoon the king and queen, accompanied by numerous persons came to the shore. Thereupon, the captain had many trombs of fire and large mortars discharged, by which they were most highly delighted. The captain and the king called one another brothers. That king's name was Raia Humabon. Before that week had gone, all the persons of that island, and some from the other islands were baptized. We burned one hamlet which was located in a neighboring village because it refused to obey the king or us. We set up the cross there for those people were heathens. Had they been Moros, we could have erected a column there as a token of greater hardness, for the Moros are much harder to convert than the heathen.

Source: Emma H. Blair and James Robertson, eds. (1903–1909) *The Philippine Islands*. Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark, I: 97.

In addition to the six Augustinian friars who accompanied Legazpi's expedition, twelve Franciscans came in 1577, and Dominicans and Jesuits arrived in 1581; all carried on programs of evangelism and indoctrination. Financially supported by the Spanish crown, the friars represented a political as well as a religious presence. The Spanish friar was often the figure of authority outside Manila.

The early optimism that had characterized Spanish missionary work was later replaced by a disillusion-

ment partly caused by the realization that the Filipinos were not passive recipients of this new religion. Catholicism in the Philippines was to a certain extent unique because the Filipinos added aspects of their traditional religion to it.

Nature of Filipino Catholicism

Catholicism provided a world of metaphors that Filipinos continue to use, particularly in times of crisis. Their enthusiasm for certain aspects of Catholi-



St. Williams Cathedral and the Ten Commandments at Laoag, Ilocos Norte, in 1998. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

cism should not, however, be mistaken for total acceptance of it. For example, in Philippine culture, where women had been equal to men and had often been in positions of power as priestesses, the Virgin Mary became the symbol of the new faith. In addition, where childhood had been idealized, the Santo Niño, or Holy Child, was venerated.

The foreignness of Catholicism was demonstrated in at least two areas: education and the clergy. Although the Spaniards established a number of schools and colleges (for example, the University of Santo Tomas in 1611), these were closed to Filipinos. The religious orders were also closed to Filipinos because of the Spanish concept of purity of blood—the requirement that the applicant prove that his or her family had been Christians for four generations. It was not until the eighteenth century that Filipinos were trained to be priests, and even then they became only "lay" priests and were not allowed to become friars (members of mendicant orders) or regulars. Regulars are those who belong to a *regula*, or order, such as Augustinian or Dominican.

During the Spanish domination of the Philippines, the various orders (with the exception of the Franciscans) amassed large tracts of land, often as the result of donations or by direct purchase. Prior to the Philippine Revolution in 1896, the orders owned 25 percent of the farming land in the provinces surrounding

Manila. Thus, the church became a major economic force, in addition to its religious and political importance, and this fact had social consequences. Those who worked with and for the friars in managing their haciendas became an emerging elite at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The conflict between the Philippines and Spain that culminated in the Philippine Revolution was in part an extension of the ongoing hostilities between secular Filipino priests and Spanish friars and as such can be viewed in religious as well as political terms. The execution of three Filipino priests, Mariano Gomes, José A. Burgos, and Jacinto Zamora, on 17 February 1872 illustrated the lengths to which the friars would go. The three were falsely accused of participating in the Cavite Mutiny in January 1872 and were put to death.

After independence was declared on 12 June 1898, the new constitution included a provision for the separation of church and state, and this policy continued with the arrival of the United States.

Philippine Catholicism in Recent Times

Vatican II (1962) and the declaration of martial law (1972) resulted in significant changes in the role of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines. The cause of social justice was taken up by priests and nuns, often at the risk of their lives.

The imagery or metaphors of Catholicism were sometimes associated with those opposing the regime of Ferdinand Marcos (1917–1998) and the martial law imposed at that time. For example, Al Santos used the *sinakulo*, a dramatic presentation of the Easter story, to illustrate the condition of those living in the slums of Manila, who are presented as suffering Christs, oppressed by those in power. Other uses of Catholic metaphors were unintentional. The political martyr Benigno Aquino, Jr. (1932–1983), came to be viewed as the slain savior, and his widow Corazon Aquino (b. 1933) as the suffering Mary Magdalene. She spoke of her husband's death as the country's resurrection.

Yet, despite the changes introduced in recent years, Catholicism in the Philippines has remained much the same as it had been from the beginning. The ancient animistic deities have been transformed into Christian figures, and ancient beliefs have continued to permeate religious beliefs and practices.

Damon L. Woods

See also: **Iglesia Ni Cristo; Philippine Independent Church**

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CATHOLICISM, ROMAN—VIETNAM Although an estimated 80 percent of Vietnam's population practice Buddhism to some extent, there are an estimated 3 million Roman Catholics in Vietnam, approximately 3.75 percent of the nation's population. Catholicism first reached Vietnam in the sixteenth century with the arrival of Portuguese missionaries. By the early seventeenth century, Catholic priests from Portugal and France had established several missions in Vietnam. In 1624 there were an estimated twenty-one Jesuits in the nation. At first the Portuguese priests were dominant in numbers and in influence. In fact, the Vietnamese referred to Catholicism as the "Portuguese religion," and they tended to view all Europeans as Portuguese.

Alexandre de Rhodes

Despite the early predominance of Portuguese Jesuits, the most influential missionary in Vietnam in the

seventeenth century was Father Alexandre de Rhodes (1591–1660), a Frenchman. De Rhodes, born in Avignon, possessed an unusual gift for learning and for understanding languages, and his major contribution to Vietnamese history was the development of *quoc ngu*, the romanized script of the Vietnamese language. This process of alphabetizing the Vietnamese vernacular had been undertaken earlier by a Portuguese missionary, but de Rhodes pursued the work further, believing that the development of *quoc ngu* would help the spread of Catholicism in Vietnam. *Quoc ngu* is now the official writing system of Vietnam. De Rhodes also codified the Vietnamese language and produced a number of written works, including the famous *Dictionarium Annamiticum* and a Vietnamese language catechism. In addition, de Rhodes wrote several memoirs and a history of Tonkin.

While in Vietnam, on and off between 1627 and 1645, de Rhodes did not limit himself to academic pursuits. He is said to have trained Vietnamese catechists and to have baptized an estimated nine thousand Vietnamese.

Persecution

Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, missionaries continued to attempt to spread Catholicism throughout Vietnam. Several Catholic orders, such as the Jesuits and the Dominicans, were present. In addition, there were also orders of Catholic nuns who established convents in various parts of the country. At times, the missionaries were tolerated by the Vietnamese government, but more often than not they were persecuted. Some missionaries, Alexandre de Rhodes among them, were simply expelled from Vietnam; others were executed. These persecutions were more pronounced during the eighteenth century, and they tended to follow the political climate in Vietnam. Persecution of Catholics tended to occur when the Vietnamese government needed to consolidate its power or assert its authority. At such times, Catholicism's doctrine was the principal problem. The facts that Catholicism is monotheistic and that its claims to spirituality are exclusive brought it into conflict with the traditional, Confucian order of things in Vietnam. In spite of this, by the early nineteenth century, there were hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese Catholic converts.

Catholics and the Colonial Government


Following the creation of the Société des Missions Étrangères (the Society of Foreign Missions) in 1664, French missionaries became the most active and the most numerous in Vietnam. The Société's principal aim was the spread of Catholicism in Asia, and it re-

ceived not only the support of the papacy, but also of the French monarchy. Often dependent on merchant ships to transport them to Vietnam, French missionaries developed close ties with French merchants. As a result, in the eyes of many Vietnamese officials, there was little difference between French missionaries and French merchants. French interests in missionary activity in Vietnam followed the political situation in France itself—waning during the French Revolution, but waxing again on the eve of French consolidation of power in Vietnam in 1885 when Emperor Ham Nghi was forced to flee the capital. By the time France had colonized Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in the late nineteenth century, there were an estimated 2 million Vietnamese Catholic converts. In fact, repression of Catholic missionaries and Catholic converts provided a rationale for bringing French troops in to Vietnam to protect them.

Despite the strong anticlerical sentiments of many French administrators, French colonial authorities were not averse to missionary activity since it was hoped that Catholicism would foster Vietnamese acceptance of the French colonial government. In addition, some Catholic missions in Vietnam served a useful purpose in the eyes of the French administration, since many offered Catholic schooling to Vietnamese children at little, if any, cost to the French colonial government. French colonial administrators appreciated these schools both for their cost efficiency and for the fact that they helped inculcate Vietnamese children with French cultural and social values. Among the most famous of these schools was the Collège d'Adran, founded in 1861. There were also a number of girls' schools established by orders such as the Sisters of St. Paul de Chartres.

Because of their close ties with the French administration, Vietnamese Catholics tended to dominate in the fields of business and education. Vietnamese Catholics were more likely to hold civil-service positions within the colonial administration, and their higher levels of education meant that they were also more likely to become professionals. As a result, Vietnamese Catholics tended to be wealthier than their non-Catholic compatriots. In spite of the fact that the majority of Vietnamese Catholics, particularly in the northern area of the country, were peasants, the influence of the educated Catholics was significant.

During the Franco-Viet Minh War (1946–1954), many Vietnamese Catholics favored independence from France, but most were wary of the Viet Minh leadership's Marxist leanings. As a result, they supported, in 1949, the institution of the Bao Dai government, which the French supported. Following



St. Joseph's Cathedral in Hanoi. The cathedral was built in 1886. (CHRISTOPHE LOVINY/CORBIS)

France's defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva accords of 1954 that established a demilitarized zone at the seventeenth parallel, an estimated 600,000 to 700,000 Vietnamese Catholics from northern Vietnam made their way to the south of the country in order to support the government of Ngo Dinh Diem (1901–1963), himself a Catholic. This influx of Vietnamese Catholics in southern Vietnam raised their numbers from approximately 450,000 to 1.1 million. This Catholic community in the south became the backbone of Ngo Dinh Diem's government. They were to become a formidable presence thanks to Diem's patronage. Diem's government gave key positions in the military and in the government to Vietnamese Catholics. Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Thuc, was archbishop of Hue.

Catholics in the Vietnamese Government

The favored position of the Vietnamese Catholic minority in southern Vietnam created conflict with the

majority Buddhist population. Buddhist protests resulted in severe repression of Buddhist monks and communities during the Ngo Dinh Diem government. The tension and the repression of Buddhists subsided somewhat following the assassination of Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, who headed South Vietnam's police and security forces, in 1963 and during Nguyen Van Thieu's government (1965–1975).

Following the end of the war with the United States and reunification of Vietnam in 1975, a considerable number of Vietnamese Catholics left Vietnam for fear of reprisals and persecution for having supported the Ngo Dinh Diem government and the government of South Vietnam. Many have made their way to the United States and to France. In Vietnam today, Catholicism is protected by the Vietnamese constitution. In spite of such safeguards, Catholicism has been monitored closely by the Vietnamese government and Catholic activities have been significantly curtailed. There are presently an estimated 3 million Catholics in Vietnam.

Micheline R. Lessard

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CAUCASIA Caucasia is an isthmus bounded by the Black and Caspian Seas and by the steppes of the southern tier of the Russian federation and Iran. The region is dominated by the Caucasus Mountains. Historical Caucasia encompasses not only the central region of Georgia and the southern region of Armenia but also Caucasian Albania and Azerbaijan in the east and the diverse peoples of northern Caucasia. The preeminent communication and commercial arteries are rivers, especially the Terek in the north, the Kura in Georgia and Azerbaijan, and the Araks in Armenia. Caucasia's historical importance rests upon its central position in Eurasia and the endurance of local cultures in the face of tremendous imperial pressures.

To medieval Arab geographers, Caucasia (al-Kabk) was "the mountain of languages." Although Armenian

belongs to the Indo-European linguistic group and Georgian anchors the separate Caucasian linguistic family, both languages show evidence of intimate contact with Persian and with one another. Connections between Georgian and Sumerian and between Georgian and Basque (ancient Greek writers referred to both ancient Spain and Georgia as "Iberia") have been hypothesized but remain unproven. Many of the languages of northern Caucasia—including Chechen, Ingush, Avar, Lak, Lezgian, and Udi—belong to the northeast subgroup of the Caucasian family.

Caucasia has long been an arena for Eurasian cross-cultural encounters. Some investigators have situated the Garden of Eden in the area, a notion seemingly reinforced by the Judeo-Christian tradition that the ark of Noah came to rest on Mount Ararat in present-day Turkey. Historically, Caucasia was affected by five of the great periods of Eurasian integration: the period when the ancient Silk Road flourished, the period of the Hellenistic civilization of Alexander of Macedonia, the period of Islamic expansion, the period of the Mongol empire, and the period of the Russian empire and the Soviet Union.

Caucasia and the Persian Sphere

For much of its early history Caucasia was the northern limit of Persian (Iranian) civilization. The Scythians, Sarmatians, and other nomads of ancient northern Caucasia were Persianized. The sedentary Georgian and Armenian peoples, too, were members of the expansive Persian commonwealth. Scholars have exposed many links between Caucasian and Persian civilizations, including linguistic parallels, the sharing of Persian proper names, Zoroastrianism, long-distance trade, conceptions of kingship (including *farnab*, or divine radiance), and legendary and historical traditions—particularly the Persian epic tradition crystallized in the eleventh-century CE *Shahnameh* by the Persian poet Firdawsī. Achaemenid and Sasanid inscriptions demonstrate that the Persians were cognizant of the social and cultural bonds with their Caucasian neighbors.

Greco-Roman influence already had penetrated Caucasia by the time of the Greek city-states, as is symbolized by Jason and the Argonauts, who reputedly journeyed to Colchis in western Georgia. However, classical influence was limited mostly to coastal regions. Although Greek was adopted by some of the local elites as their written language, Aramaic—the scribal language of Achaemenid Persia—seems to have been more widespread. More important, classical civilization did not displace the Caucasians' traditional orientation toward Persian-dominated western Asia.

The Effect of Christianity

Georgian and Armenian, along with Caucasian Albanian, became written languages only with the conversion of local dynasts to Christianity in the first half of the fourth century. In some respects Christianization was truly revolutionary. Armenian and Georgian developed into literary languages, and distinctive written historical traditions were created. Conversion also enabled a possible future alliance with Christian Byzantium. With the destruction of Zoroastrian Persia by the Muslims in the seventh century, the sedentary peoples of Caucasia increasingly came to identify themselves with Christian Byzantium.

Sasanid Persia's campaigns to restore Georgia and Armenia to the Persian political and religious sphere were unsuccessful. They did, however, nudge Georgia and Armenia into the Byzantine orbit. Beginning in 387 CE, Armenia was often partitioned between the Byzantines and the Persians. In 428, the Sasanid "King of Kings" managed to disband the Armenian Arsacid monarchy; a similar fate met its eastern Georgian counterpart by the year 580. Georgian political elites subsequently associated themselves with Constantinople in the seventh century. A result of this association was their acceptance of the Council of Chalcedon (in 451) definition of Christ as both divine and human in nature, and this, in turn, sparked lasting tensions between the Georgians and the Armenians, who leaned toward Monophysitism—the doctrine that Christ's nature was purely divine.

Rise of the Bagratids

The destruction of Sasanid Persia in 651 and the subsequent occupation of much of Caucasia by the Muslims upset the noble hierarchy of central and southern Caucasia. The Armenian Bagratid family took advantage of the tumultuous situation and established itself throughout the Armenian districts, also seizing power in neighboring Georgia. The Bagratids, who were Christian, then assumed the charge against the Muslims. Simultaneously, its Georgian branch established itself along the Byzantine-Georgian frontier and entertained close relations with Constantinople.

From the late ninth to the eleventh century, the Bagratids carved Armenia into a number of kingdoms and principalities, although one realm, Vaspurakan, was ruled by the rival Artsruni family. Pressures from the Seljuk Turks and the Byzantines and the rivalries among the Bagratids themselves led to the Byzantine annexation of the Armenian kingdoms in the mid-eleventh century. As a result, some Armenian elites migrated to southeastern Asia Minor and established the independent Armenian Cilician kingdom.



It was the Georgian branch of the Bagratid family that was to have lasting success in Caucasia itself. These Bagratids gathered the disparate Georgian territories, creating the first politically unified Georgian enterprise in the early eleventh century. They subsequently annexed much of Caucasian Armenia. Although the Muslim Seljuks were the chief adversary, the Georgian monarchs minted Islamic-type coins, patronized Sufis (Islamic mystics), and sponsored epic literature at their court written along Persian lines, such as the thirteenth-century *Knight in the Panther's Skin* by Shota Rustaveli. In many respects, Caucasia was still oriented toward the Near East.

The Georgian pan-Caucasian empire fell into disarray with inept rule early in the thirteenth century and was dismantled shortly thereafter by the Mongols. At this time, several autonomous principalities and kingdoms appeared in Caucasia. Following a number of particularly destructive invasions led by Timur (Tamerlane) in the late fourteenth century, the Christian princes of Caucasia lost one of their most important allies when Constantinople fell to the Ottomans in 1453. In the following century, Caucasia again became the arena of imperial competition with the Ottomans and Safavids of Persia vying for control. One historian considered the period from the fall of Armenian Cilicia in 1375 until the reign of Shah Abbas in the early seventeenth century to be the dark ages of Armenian history.

The Rise of Russian Influence

In the sixteenth century, the Persians and Ottomans waged a bloody competition for control of Armenia. At the same time, the Russians were expanding southward. In 1554, the Russians captured the city of As-

trakhan, giving them dominance over the Volga River and a foothold in the vicinity of the Caspian. Shortly thereafter a series of Russian embassies was dispatched to the Georgian kingdoms. This marked the first substantial and sustained contact between Caucasia and the Russian empire. Indeed, after the dissolution of Byzantium, many Caucasian Christians looked to Orthodox Russia as a potential savior. The eastern Georgian realm voluntarily became a protectorate of Russia in 1783. In 1801, the Russian czar, Alexander I, unilaterally annexed eastern Georgia. In the ensuing decades, much of Caucasia—*Zakavkazia* (Transcaucasia), a concept reflecting Russian imperialism—was brought under czarist authority. However, not all of Armenia fell under Russian rule. A large part of historical Armenia was controlled by the Ottoman government and remains part of Turkey today. The genocide unleashed upon the Armenians in 1915 is a lasting memory of this division.

Although Russian occupation halted indigenous political autonomy, it also brought unprecedented stability to Transcaucasia. Standardized written languages, educational systems, infrastructure, and unprecedented national consciousnesses for the Georgians, Armenians, and Azeris were created during Russian rule. Through Russia, Caucasian elites acquired access to European intellectual ideas, including socialism, Marxism, and nationalism.

When Nicholas II was removed from power in February 1917, political authority in Transcaucasia fragmented. In November 1917, the Transcaucasian Commissariat was formed to govern the entire region. By the following January, the Democratic Federative Republic of Transcaucasia was established. The federation was short lived, however. After a month, it dissolved into three independent republics: Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. All were crushed by Bolshevik troops in 1920–1921. They were reunited in the Federal Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of Transcaucasia in 1922, and then each emerged as an independent constituent republic of the USSR in 1936. The three retained this status until the collapse of the Gorbachev revolution in the early 1990s. By the end of 1991, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia emerged from the turmoil as independent nations.

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CEBU (2000 est. island pop. 2.4 million; est. city pop. 718,000), City and island in the Philippines. The oldest city in the Philippines, Cebu City (the capital of Cebu province, on the east coast of Cebu Island) is the third-largest metropolis in the country and the major city in the southern Philippines. Cebu Island lies in the central Philippine archipelago, surrounded by the Bohol Strait in the southeast, the Tanon Strait in the west, the Visayan Sea in the north, and the Camotes Sea in the east. The island is approximately 196 kilometers long and 32 kilometers wide, with a land area of 4,422 square kilometers. Overpopulated, the island suffers from environmental degradation because of the dense population.

According to historical records, the island hosted the first European settlements in the Philippine archipelago. Ferdinand Magellan (c. 1480–1521), the Portuguese explorer, landed on Cebu on 7 April 1521 in the course of discovering the Philippines (he was later killed at nearby Mactan Island). An Italian traveling with Magellan, Antonio Pigafetta (1491–1534?), in an account of his experiences on the voyage, wrote that he saw ships from Siam, China, and Arabia at Cebu when the Portuguese sailed into the port; thus the city was already an important settlement before the Europeans arrived.

Miguel López de Legazpi (c. 1510–1570) founded the first Spanish settlement and Catholic mission on the island on 27 April 1565. Cebu City remained the capital of the Spanish possessions in the Philippines until 1571, when Manila on Luzon Island became the main administrative center. In Cebu City are the oldest church in the Philippines, the Basilica Minor del Santo Nino, in front of which is the cross that Magellan erected for the first Mass celebrated in the Philippines; the oldest school—San Carlos, founded in 1595; and the oldest street—Colon.

Today, Cebu City is an important economic center not only for Cebu Island but for the Visaya Islands and Mindanao as well. Cebu Island's economy includes agriculture, mining (coal, copper, limestone, silver), and small-scale manufacturing, such as food processing, textile, footwear, and furniture. Cebu City is also the educational center of the southern Philippines, with several major universities and colleges. The city has an international airport, and the port has maintained its international importance through the centuries.

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CELEBES SEA The Celebes Sea (Sulawesi Sea) is a roughly triangular section of the western edge of the Pacific Ocean, located just north of the equator between the east coast of Borneo, the south coast of Mindanao Island (Philippines), and the northern reaches of Sulawesi. It occupies a total area of around 427,000 square kilometers (165,000 square miles), stretching approximately 675 kilometers (420 miles) north-south and 837 kilometers (520 miles) east-west. The Sulu archipelago and Mindanao Island form the northern borders of the sea; the Sangi Islands lie to the east; Sulawesi (Celebes) Island borders the south; and Borneo is on the west. The Celebes Sea opens on to the Philippine Sea in the east and is connected to the Java Sea through the Makassar Strait in the southwest.

The deepest area is around 6,220 meters (20,406 feet). In the area close to the major islands and archipelagos, however, the sea is warm and not very deep. There are numerous seamounts, many of them volcanic, rising from the sea floor and capped with corals. The warm tropical water (annual average 26° C) makes the Celebes Sea an abundant fishing ground. Many areas around the numerous beautiful islands are suitable for diving and attract foreign tourists, contributing scarce hard currency to the Indonesian and Philippines economies.

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CENTRAL ASIA—EARLY MEDIEVAL PERIOD

The history of early medieval Central Asia is distinguished from that of other regions by the transition from a primarily Iranian population to a Turkic population. This region, particularly the part of Central Asia between the Syr Dar'ya and Amu Dar'ya Rivers, was traditionally home to nomads as well as a sedentary population located around cities and oases. The inhabitants were originally composed of Iranian stock, mixed with other groups. However, as the ancient period ended in the sixth century CE, a new dominant group entered Central Asia. Originating from Mongolia, the nomadic Turks began as overlords of a more sedentary Iranian population but eventually supplanted the Iranians as the majority population by the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, as nomadic migrations brought more Turkic groups to the region.

The Turkic Empire

The Turks originated in present-day Mongolia, in or around the Altay Mountains. Ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous, the Turks are thought to have been a subgroup of the Juan-Juan people. Under the leadership of Tumen, the Turks became independent in 552 CE.

Unsatisfied with only independence, Tumen then led the Turks against the Juan-Juan and defeated them, which allowed Tumen to carve out a new empire. Although much of their new Turkic empire centered on the former Juan-Juan lands in Mongolia, Turkic forces marched west into the areas of modern-day Kazakhstan, Xinjiang, and other regions of Central Asia in pursuit of the fleeing Juan-Juan. Tumen remained in Mongolia, ruling the eastern Turks as the *qaghan* (emperor); he died in 552, while his brother Ishtemi ruled Central Asia as the *yabghu* (prince). By 558, Ishtemi (reigned 552–576) had extended Turkic rule to the Volga River.

Although the eastern Turks had been in contact with major sedentary powers since the rise of Tumen, the western Turks had limited contact with sedentary powers until they crossed the Syr Dar'ya River. In 557, Ishtemi allied with the Sasanid dynasty (224/228–651) of Persia against the Hephthalite empire that occupied much of Mawarannahr (the territory between the Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya Rivers) and present-day Khurasan and Afghanistan. By 565, the Hephthalite empire had fallen, and the Amu Dar'ya served as the

border between the nomadic Turks and the sedentary Sasanids. The Turks, however, continued to expand their power westward through the steppes, eventually reaching the Black Sea.

At this time, the Turkic empire remained heterogeneous not only in ethnic and linguistic terms but also in terms of its religions. Zoroastrianism had existed in the region for hundreds of years, and Nestorian Christianity had made inroads, as had Buddhism from India, although most of the Turks remained pagans.

Under the Turkic regime, trade grew steadily. The trade routes, particularly the famous Silk Road, fell under the protection of the Turkic *qaghans*. Furthermore, Central Asia served as a key intermediate region for the exchange of goods from China for those of Persia, Siberia, and even present-day Europe. The result of international trade in the region was a growing cross-cultural influence in Central Asia due to the stability of the Turkic empire.

The importance of trade came to the forefront when war broke out between the Turks and the Sasanids in 569 over trade issues. Although the Turks crossed the Amu Dar'ya and invaded the region of Khurasan, their efforts were fruitless because they could not overcome the fortification systems and the resilience of the Sasanid army. War erupted again in 588–589 between the two powers, again with negligible results.

The Turkic empire was fairly short lived, however. Due to a severe famine and a resurgence in Chinese power under the Sui dynasty (581–618) and later the Tang dynasty (618–907), combined with a succession crisis, the eastern Turkic empire collapsed. The western Turks, fairly distant from China, continued, but also underwent a period of civil war. The eventual winner of this war was T'ung Yabghu (reigned 618–630). Again, trade began to flourish, but with his assassination in 630, civil war again erupted, effectively disrupting not only the empire but also trade. For almost a hundred years, Central Asia was in a state of civil war fought between a number of factions for mastery of the former western Turkic empire.

A second empire formed under Su-Lu (reigned 717–738), who accepted the suzerainty or overlordship of China. Essentially this amounted to sending a mission to China to offer tribute: China's authority was only nominal. In addition, Su-Lu maintained close ties with the Sasanids, who were under attack by a rapidly rising Arab empire with a new religion. Under Su-Lu, the Turks successfully foiled the invasions of the Arabs, defeating them in 737, shortly before Su-Lu's death. After his death, however, a central figure

failed to emerge among the Turks, and the armies of Islam conquered the rest of Mawarannahr.

Muslim Conquest of Central Asia

After the decline of the Turks, numerous local dynasties of Turkic and Sogdian origin arose in the cities and trade centers. (The Sogdians were the Iranian population dwelling in much of Central Asia before the arrival of the Turks; during the time of Alexander of Macedon, much of the region was known as Sogdia.) Little unity existed among these dynasties, although they soon would have reason to establish a common cause.

The collapse of the Sasanid dynasty in Iran under the attacks of the armies of Islam brought the Arabs to the Amu Dar'ya River. In 655, Muslim troops crossed the river to raid rather than conquer. The true invasion did not occur until 682, the delay being due to the first Arab civil war, which lasted from 656 to 661. Another civil war in 680–692 also delayed the penetration of Islam in Central Asia because it shifted considerable forces from Mawarannahr to the Middle East.

The first Muslim governor of Mawarannahr did not take power until 705, when Qutayba ibn Muslim (reigned 705–715) arrived. He settled soldiers in the towns, which helped maintain Muslim control over the conquered lands. Furthermore, to increase his troop strength, Qutayba also demanded troops from the conquered dynasts. Relying more on brutality than diplomacy, Qutayba expanded his province while destroying much of the pre-Islamic culture. His tenure of office ended abruptly in 715 when he was killed. His death led to the defeat of the Muslim armies; thus much of the territory that Qutayba had conquered was lost.

The Abbasid caliphate replaced the Umayyad caliphate after a brief war lasting from 744 to 750. The Abbasids, who found most of their support in Khurasan, bordering Central Asia, established a new caliphate. Due to their Khurasanian origins, the Abbasids evidenced Iranian and Central Asian influences. During this period, Central Asia truly became part of the Islamic world.

Two other powers also had designs on Central Asia. The Tang dynasty reestablished Chinese presence in eastern Turkistan (the region of present-day Central Asia and Afghanistan). At the same time, an emerging Tibetan empire also expanded into Central Asia. The Tang armies, however, defeated the Tibetan armies. By 749, the Tang armies reached the Fergana Valley. In 751, at the Talas River in present-day Kyrgyzstan, however, the Tang efforts fell short as Zayid ibn Salih, an Arab general in command of the Umayyad caliphate

forces in Central Asia, defeated their armies. With the defeat of the Tang and Tibetan empires, combined with the decline of the Turks, the Abbasid caliphate began to assert its control firmly over Central Asia.

Despite these conquests, Islam as a religion penetrated more slowly as it competed with well-established religions such as Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Nestorian Christianity, and even Judaism. Despite the population's slow conversion to Islam, a new culture emerged in Central Asia combining elements of Islam and nomadic, Persian, and traditional sedentary cultures.

Although Islam triumphed, unity was not guaranteed. Eventually, the local dynasties that had remained in power either through submission or conversion to Islam, as well as new dynasties, began to assert themselves against the Abbasid caliphate. The dynasty that came to the fore in the ninth century became known as the Samanids (864–999).

In 738, Saman-Khudah, the Persian ruler of Balkh, a region in modern Afghanistan, converted to Islam. His grandsons all became governors of Mawarannahr in the ninth century, but the true founder of the dynasty was Isma'il ibn Ahmed (892–907), who became governor in 893 and ruled until his death in 907. Under his leadership, the Samanids defeated the Karluk Turks north of the Syr Dar'ya as well as the emerging Saffarid dynasty (873–900) in Iran. Isma'il maintained his allegiance to the caliph, although he effectively acted as an independent ruler. With the defeat of the Saffarids, the Samanids added the province of Khurasan to their domains.

Isma'il and the Samanids ruled a confederation of tribes and cities in which regional dynasts ruled the provinces. The key to the Samanids' success came through their army, the core of which was based on the *ghulam* (slave) system. Slaves, usually Turks, were purchased and then trained as warriors or administrators. This gave rise to a professional army and civil service or bureaucracy. In turn, the role of the nobility, who had formerly occupied border fortresses, was reduced. They then moved into the cities, making a transition from involvement in a military elite to involvement in local affairs. Despite their normal loyalty to their master, the *ghulams*, like all professional soldiers, could overthrow the ruler and place one who better represented their interests on the throne.

Certain conditions promoted prosperity. First, the rulers ensured security for the growth of trade and agriculture. Second, the ruling powers had an interest in their subjects' welfare. This was usually demonstrated by taxing fairly rather than taxing for exploitative gain. The Samanids carried out both of these

conditions, which resulted in urban growth and maintenance of the irrigation system that was central to the regional agriculture. Furthermore, under the Samanids, trade expanded in all directions.

A cultural renaissance also occurred. The Samanids, as well as the nobles who now lived near the cities, became patrons of knowledge and the arts. With the spread of Islam, Arabic, as the language of Islam, also spread. Persian, however, remained the vernacular. The Samanids also attracted many of the great scholars of the Islamic world, such as Ibn Sina (Avicenna) (980–1037) and Firdawsi (940–1020).

Despite the Iranian origins of the Samanids, Central Asia slowly became Turkicized through the importation of Turkic *ghulams*. Turkification became more rapid, however, as more Turkic tribes entered Samanid territory. By 1000, Turks had overrun the Samanid realm, and local governments asserted their own authority in the ensuing chaos. Two Turkic governments replaced the last Iranian rulers of Central Asia, yet they maintained strong ties to the system of government used by the Samanids.

Ghaznavids and Karakhanids

The Ghaznavid dynasty (977–1187) arose from *ghulams* who established their own state in Khurasan, Afghanistan, and northern India. Sebuk Tegin (reigned 977–997), the governor of the city of Ghazni in eastern Afghanistan, established the Ghaznavid empire in 977. His son, Mahmud (reigned 998–1030), became its most renowned ruler after gaining control of the empire in a civil war. Mahmud also established the empire's independence from the Samanids by renouncing Samanid suzerainty. Furthermore, he sought and secured the recognition of the Abbasid caliph. The Ghaznavids, particularly under Mahmud, fought as *ghazis* (frontier soldiers, often religious fighters along the frontiers of the Islamic world) and expanded the influence of Islam into India. Despite an impressive army, the Ghaznavid empire was eventually eclipsed by the Seljuks, who settled in Khurasan.

The Karakhanid dynasty (999–1212) ruled Mawarannahr, East Turkistan, and the lands north of the Syr Dar'ya. It is thought that the Karakhanids originated from Karluk Turks around Kashi in modern Xinjiang Uygur in western China, who converted to Islam through the influence of Sufi Muslims. Under Sufi influence, Islam continued to find converts in Central Asia, particularly among the Turks beyond the Syr Dar'ya. The emergence of the Karakhanids marked the shift to the Turkification of the region as well.

Initially, the Karakhanids fought the Samanids and slowly conquered Mawarannahr, achieving final victory in 999 with Nasr Ilis's (d. 1012) conquest of Bukhara. In 1001, Nasr Ilis and Mahmud of Ghazni completed a treaty that drew the Amu Dar'ya as the border between their respective states. With the Karakhanid domination of Central Asia, the Turkic language replaced Iranian as the primary language and even emerged as a medium for literature with the publication in 1069 of *The Wisdom of Royal Glory*, which was a mirror for princes on how to rule, based on Turk, Muslim, and Sufi traditions. In addition, the Karakhanids maintained the Samanid administrative apparatus but ruled from the steppe. Unlike the Samanids and Ghaznavids, the Karakhanids relied on conscription of nomadic cavalry rather than professional armies of *ghulams*. Still, these two empires were eventually supplanted by another group of Turks.

The Seljuks

The Seljuks (1038–1157) were part of the Oghuz Turkic tribes and were named after their khan, or ruler, Seljuk. In 985, Seljuk converted to Islam, like the Karakhanids, through the influence of Sufis. Seljuk and his tribespeople first served as mercenaries for the Samanids and the Karakhanids but eventually crossed the Amu Dar'ya and were allowed to settle in Khwarazm, the region from the lower Amu Dar'ya River valley west to the Caspian Sea and east to Bukhara.

After Mahmud of Ghazni conquered Khwarazm, he realized the growing power of the Seljuks and defeated them. The Seljuks, however, persevered, and soon more entered the region during the reign of Masud (b. Mahmud; reigned 1031–1041). At first the Seljuks wished to settle in the region in return for their military services. Masud, however, also feared their growing numbers and engaged them in war.

The Seljuks defeated Masud and eventually brought most of the Ghaznavid empire under their dominion. By 1055, their armies had reached Baghdad and defeated the Shi'ite Buyid dynasty (c. 945–1055). As a reward, the caliph named Toghril (founder of the Seljuk dynasty; reigned 1038–1063) sultan, thus effectively making Toghril the secular leader of Islam.

Using armies of nomadic tribesmen and *ghulams*, the Seljuks expanded their empire from Central Asia into Anatolia. Alp Arslan (reigned 1063–1072) led the onslaught into Anatolia by defeating the Byzantines at Manzikirt in 1071. In Central Asia, Alp Arslan's successor, Sultan Malikshah (reigned 1072–1092), conquered Mawarannahr in 1074 and captured the cities of Bukhara and Samarqand. Like the Ghaznavids and

Karakhanids, the Seljuks maintained the Samanid system of government by governing through local dynasties and were heavily influenced by the great *wazir* (vizier) Nizam al-Mulk. As the leaders of the Islamic world, the Seljuks spread Sunni Islam.

The decline of Seljuk power began with the death of Malikshah in 1092, followed shortly by the assassination of Nizam al-Mulk. This period also marked the end of the great conquests, resulting in less plunder for nomadic groups and a slow ascension of several local dynasties. Sultan Sanjar (reigned 1118–1157) attempted to maintain order, but his authority declined after his defeat by the Kara Kitai in 1141. In 1155, Oghuz tribesmen captured and killed Sanjar, effectively ending a unified empire. Although local Seljuk dynasties continued to rule in parts of Iran, Anatolia, and the Arab lands, Central Asia fell to the Kara Kitai.

Kara Kitai

The Kara Kitai initially ruled northern China and part of Mongolia as the Liao dynasty (907–1125). The Kara Kitans, a Mongolian people, were however driven out of China in 1124/5 by a Manchurian group, the Jurchen. A group of Kara Kitans fled west under the command of Yeh-lu Ta-Shi (reigned 1124–1143). Although the ruling corps was made up of predominantly Kara Kitans, other ethnic groups joined them.

In 1129, the Kara Kitans conquered Kashi and Hotan, also in western Xinjiang Uygur. Choosing the city of Balasaghun in the Chu Valley in southeast Kazakhstan as their capital, Yeh-lu Ta-Shi ruled as the Gur Khan. In 1137, his armies entered Mawarannahr and began its conquest, ending with the defeat of Sanjar at the Qatwan steppe in 1141.

Like previous conquerors, the Kara Kitans left the local dynasties as their governors but maintained their dominion through the use of fast-moving nomadic armies. Kara Kitai was a very diverse state. The majority of the subjects were Muslim, but the ruling elite were Buddhists and of non-Iranian or Turkic heritage. Although order was maintained, the arrival of Kuchluq, prince of the Turkic Naimans and a rival of Genghis Khan, ignited underlying emotions as he persecuted Muslims and deposed the Gur Khan to set up his own short-lived kingdom, which lasted from 1211 to 1218.

As the Seljuks declined, the province of Khwarazm steadily increased in power. It had benefited greatly from Ghaznavid rule, and even during the rule of the Seljuks, Khwarazm remained fairly independent. Its rise to the height of its power began in 1097 with the appointment of Muhammad ibn Anushtegin (a vassal

of the Seljuk sultan; reigned 1097–1127) as governor. He received the title of Khwarazmshah and accepted Seljuk suzerainty.

Muhammad's son Atsiz (reigned 1127–1156) followed his father's example for much of his reign. However, with the defeat of Sanjar in 1141, Atsiz shifted his tribute to the Kara Kitai and rejected the Seljuks as his overlords. The caliph also recognized Atsiz as an independent sultan, boosting the legitimacy of his rule. Atsiz, no longer fettered by the Seljuks, then expanded northward by conquering land on the Syr Dar'ya and Mangishlai on the Caspian Sea.

After the death of Atsiz in 1156, Atsiz's son II-Arslan (reigned 1156–1172) continued to build the kingdom into a powerful state that controlled the trade routes from the Kipchak steppe (stretching from the Black Sea through modern Kazakhstan), the Middle East, China, the Russian principalities, and Siberia. Although he continued to pay tribute to Kara Kitai, the Khwarazmshah was fairly independent. Khwarazmian expansion continued under the next ruler, Tekesh (1172–1200), who conquered Khurasan.

Tekesh's successor, 'Ala al-Din Muhammad II (1200–1220), brought the empire to its apogee and also caused its destruction. With the aid of Kuchluq, Muhammad II defeated the Kara Kitan armies near Talas. While Kuchluq received the territories north and east of the Syr Dar'ya, Muhammad II received Mawarannahr. The vainglorious Muhammad II soon considered himself to be the second Alexander of Macedon. Because his empire stretched from the Syr Dar'ya to Iraq, it was difficult to refute his claims.

Despite his military success, his empire was fragile. Muhammad II suffered from poor relations with the Abbasid caliphate, which he failed to conquer in 1217. Furthermore, his power base rested on Kipchak tribesmen, whose primary loyalty rested with his mother, the daughter of a Kipchak khan. Muhammad II also alienated the local nobility by breaking with Samanid tradition. Instead of relying on the local dynasties, he appointed numerous family members as governors and local rulers.

Muhammad II's downfall began when a caravan arrived in Otrar on the Syr Dar'ya River (in present-day Kazakhstan) from Mongolia. Merchants, sponsored by Genghis Khan and his newly created empire, had come to trade. In addition they wished to establish friendly diplomatic relations with the Khwarazmshah on behalf of the great Mongol ruler. Muhammad II, whether through ego, greed, or other motives, allowed Inalchuq, the governor of the city of Otrar, to massacre the merchants and offend Mongolian ambas-

sadors who sought reparation before hostilities escalated. The ambassadors returned to Genghis Khan highly insulted, thus setting the Mongol armies in motion and resulting in the complete collapse of the Khwarazmian empire.

Timothy May

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CENTRAL ASIA—HUMAN RIGHTS The five republics of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, began their existence as independent countries with a common Soviet heritage in regards to human rights. For both governments and citizens, economic and social rights are now at least on a par with freedom of expression, association, religion, and other traditional measures of human rights. None of the states has a particularly good record in implementing internationally recognized human-rights standards, though all insist that they respect those standards and aspire to put them into practice. Some Central Asian officials point to their Asian as well as their Soviet heritage to justify the problematic human-rights records of their countries. The Central Asian republics have subscribed to the standards laid out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

While each Central Asian state has a distinctive record in the observance of human rights, some shortcomings are common to all. Human-rights problems most frequently cited by citizens of the Central Asian countries include law enforcement that has failed to abandon the Soviet-era belief that it is more important to have a high rate of success in "solving" crimes than it is to catch the actual perpetrator, with resultant police brutality directed at extracting confessions; lack of an independent judiciary, with the result that those in power misuse the courts for political purposes, and there is little opportunity to challenge arbitrary actions of

officials or to seek redress for human-rights violations; pervasive corruption, leading to a host of perceived human-rights violations; and poor prison conditions.

Kazakhstan

When Kazakhstan began its existence as an independent state, it had the beginnings of a civil society, in the form of numerous grassroots public organizations, some of which were engaged in human-rights monitoring. A large number of independent print and broadcast media developed throughout the country and began reporting abuses by officials. The national parliament actively opposed some actions of the executive branch. In view of these developments as well as the Kazakstani leadership's commitment to privatization and a rapid transition to a market economy, the country gained the reputation in the international community of making a respectable start on the road to democracy.

But postindependence elections have been consistently criticized, by domestic monitors and by foreign observers, for falling short of international standards. After complaining that the national parliament was hampering his plans for the economy, President Nursultan Nazarbaev in 1995 dissolved the legislature and for a time ruled by decree. He obtained additional powers for himself under a new constitution that also limited the powers of parliament, thereby weakening the system of checks and balances that had begun to develop.

In 1999, two opposition politicians were refused registration as presidential candidates on grounds of previous minor legal infractions (in one case, having taken part in an unauthorized public meeting), and opposition parliamentary candidates were harassed by the authorities. In at least four cases, government complicity was alleged in physical assaults on candidates.

The problems of government opponents did not end with the elections. Former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, one of the disqualified presidential candidates, fled the country to avoid prosecution on charges of embezzlement, which he insisted were invented by the government. Official attempts to have him detained abroad and to have his foreign bank account frozen were unsuccessful until July 2000, when he was arrested in Italy on an Interpol warrant. An Italian court promptly freed him.

Despite progressive encroachments on political rights, in the opinion of many of the country's citizens, Kazakhstan's most serious human-rights violations occur in the socioeconomic field, where living standards have declined, salaries and pensions have frequently been in arrears for months if not years, and

unemployment has spread. Corruption has remained pervasive. Strikes and unauthorized public protests over living conditions have often led to arrests and beatings; in a major strike in southern Kazakhstan in 1998, demonstrators beat police.

In the early years after independence, several non-governmental organizations developed specifically to monitor the observance of human rights. Among the most active on the national level were the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and the Rule of Law and the Kazakhstan Helsinki Federation, but many more, including the independent trade unions, were involved in human-rights monitoring and reporting. A human-rights commission was set up in 1996 to report to the president, but its findings were never made public. The commission's initial advisory board included leaders of two human-rights monitoring groups who almost immediately became involved in a dispute with the executive secretary, after the latter publicly attacked all nongovernmental organizations as a threat to the state. The commission was subsequently weakened, in the view of independent human-rights monitors, by the appointment of members unfamiliar with human-rights concepts.

After 1995, the media were subject to increasing government restrictions and sometimes to outright harassment. The government used its ownership of all printing facilities to exert control over the print media. In 1997, a redistribution of broadcast frequencies took place; the government took the opportunity to close down a number of critical private television and radio stations by rejecting their bids for frequencies. In 1999, the government closed some independent newspapers and pressured the media to limit coverage of opposition presidential and parliamentary candidates.

Although Kazakhstan's leadership is officially committed to maintaining ethnic balance, and stirring up ethnic enmity is a serious criminal charge, policies favoring ethnic Kazakhs have become more and more prevalent. A law requiring half of all broadcasting to be in Kazakh, which has the status of a state language, has been resented not only by non-Kazakhs but also by ethnic Kazakhs whose first language is Russian. Nongovernmental groups representing the interests of the Slavic community have been regularly harassed by the authorities. Groups representing Cossack interests were not allowed to function legally until several years after independence.

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan acquired an international reputation as the Central Asian state farthest advanced on the road

to democracy. But the promise of its early postindependence years has been unfulfilled, as the government of President Askar Akaev has become more authoritarian and gains in implementation of human rights have been eroded. The sharpest decline occurred in 2000, when the Kyrgyz leadership harassed and even imprisoned opposition politicians and human-rights activists to limit their success in parliamentary and presidential elections.

More than in any other Central Asian state, Kyrgyzstan's parliament has acted as an active check on the power of the executive branch. Political parties, ranging from the Communists to liberal democratic groups, have played a considerable role in the life of the country and have ensured a healthy opposition, though they were subjected to increasing harassment by the authorities in 1999 and 2000. Pressure on the opposition culminated in 2000 with the disqualification and subsequent arrests of several well-known opposition candidates for the parliamentary election; some candidates were disqualified between the first and second rounds of voting. Felix Kulov, the most credible opponent of President Akaev in the presidential election of October 2000, was arrested during the parliamentary election. Although Kulov was freed after an international outcry, the sentence was later reconfirmed by a higher court, and he remains in prison, facing additional charges. The parliamentary election was judged by international observers to have fallen short of international standards.

In the immediate postindependence period, Kyrgyzstan developed relatively liberal conditions for the information media. Attacking government officials for corruption and abuse of office became a favorite theme, especially in the print media. Some officials retaliated by charging journalists and editors with libel, which remained a criminal offense despite the efforts of the president to persuade the parliament to change the law. Several prominent journalists spent time in jail or faced heavy fines as a result of such charges; the independent media regarded these cases as government intimidation.

A broad spectrum of grassroots nongovernmental organizations has formed in Kyrgyzstan, where the concept of civil society seems to have become well rooted. Several groups monitor human rights, including social and economic rights. Some groups have clashed with the police during unauthorized demonstrations in support of pensioners and others who have suffered severe declines in their living standards. In 1998, the government deregistered the most prominent of the human-rights monitoring groups, the Kyrgyz Committee for Human Rights. It was later

reregistered, but experienced constant harassment by the authorities, culminating in 2000 with an attempt to arrest the group's chairperson, who sought refuge with the International Helsinki Federation in Vienna.

Although attempts have been made to reform the judiciary and free it from government influence, many citizens consider that the strong role of the state prosecutor, who is seen as a guardian of the government's interests, ensures that courts do not protect the interests of ordinary people.

A human-rights commission was established under the president's office in 1997. Human-rights activists have complained that though a well-known opposition politician was appointed to head the commission, none of its members has any experience in the field of human rights. As of 2000, Kyrgyzstan was in the process of creating an ombudsman's office with help from international organizations.

Tajikistan

Tajikistan's existence as an independent state has been overshadowed by the civil war that began in mid-1992. A peace accord was signed in 1997 between the two main combatants, the government in Dushanbe, representing primarily former Communist elements from the southern region of Kulyab, and the Islamic and democratic opposition. Large segments of the political spectrum in the country were excluded from the peace agreement, which resulted in sporadic fighting and armed attacks on individuals.

During the civil war, scant regard was given to human rights, though this situation began to change as active fighting wound down and the thousands of refugees who had fled to Afghanistan and other neighboring countries returned to their homes. International organizations, in particular the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, assisted in the resettlement and reintegration of the refugees to ensure that their basic human rights were respected. Reports indicate that this process has been largely successful.

National and local officials, journalists, businesspeople, and others continued to be assassination targets well into 2000. Some killings have been attributed to rival government factions. Attempts to disarm former opposition fighters were not completely effective, and large numbers of weapons remain in circulation, making it easy for small independent groups to arm themselves. In addition to assaults by political rivals on one another, the government's security forces have attacked civilians, sometimes holding individuals for ransom. The country as a whole was reported to have

serious problems with the kidnapping and rape of women. The inability of the government to establish control throughout the country has meant that law enforcement remains ineffective and unable to protect citizens' rights. In 1996 the Tajik government promised to establish the post of human rights ombudsman, but nothing came of it.

Once opposition political parties were legitimized as part of the peace process, some of them began to publish their own newspapers. The government has closed or harassed these and other independent publications. A number of independent television stations obtained licenses but also experienced government harassment.

President Imomali Rakhmonov, a former Communist official, has repeatedly described Islam as a political threat, but bowed in 1998 to international pressure and persuaded the parliament to drop a ban on political parties with a religious orientation. Despite the participation of officials of the Islamic Revival Party in the government, the Muslim community is still overseen by the State Committee on Religious Affairs, and private religious instruction is restricted.

Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan is considered by many in the international human-rights community to have the poorest human-rights record of any state in Central Asia. Political and economic reform has hardly begun, and some of the gains of the late Soviet era in freedom of speech, association, and religion have been undone. The country's leader, President Saparmurat Niyazov, has not only surrounded himself with a personality cult outdoing that of Stalin, but is in the process of creating a state ideology focusing on the president as the omnipotent father figure of the nation, so that there is no need for civil society. In any case, an independent entity, whether a nongovernmental institution or a genuinely private enterprise, is regarded with great suspicion by the authorities.

Opposition political groups were always small and weak in Turkmenistan; by 2000, the few individuals who actively opposed government policies were either in prison or under close supervision of the National Security Committee, and their influence was nonexistent. Several grassroots environmental organizations were able to register in the early 1990s and enjoyed some degree of cooperation with the Ministry of Nature Protection because environmental protection was perceived by the authorities as apolitical. At least two of these groups later drew governmental ire when they began monitoring human-rights problems. There

were no groups engaged specifically in human-rights monitoring, but a number of unregistered nongovernment organizations tried to deal with specific human-rights issues, such as the rights of the handicapped, hospital patients, and refugees. Few nongovernmental organizations could register with the Ministry of Justice after 1995.

In 1999 and 2000, thousands of prisoners were released under a series of amnesties. This may have been in reaction to international criticism of prison conditions in which many prisoners died of disease and extreme heat. At the end of 1999, the People's Assembly formally abolished the death penalty.

The information media have been under tight government control. Both print and broadcast media were used by the state as propaganda devices rather than as providers of information. Foreign, including Russian, newspapers were available by subscription but were too expensive for most citizens. Satellite antennas could be purchased and installed, but few outside the cities could afford them. In the years after independence, a number of private Internet providers appeared in Turkmenistan; they were closed down in May 2000.

In Ashgabat, thousands of people were displaced from their homes as part of the grandiose presidential scheme to reconstruct the capital. Some were offered apartments in poor-quality Soviet-era housing developments, but many received neither compensation nor other living quarters. Under a presidential decree issued in 2000, the police were prohibited from searching private homes. The government cited this as an example of state concern for human rights, but oversight for implementation of the decree was handed to the very agencies (the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Prosecutor's Office, and the security service) that had most abused citizens' privacy.

Uzbekistan

Since 1992, the leadership of Uzbekistan has used the threat of Islamic extremism to justify its authoritarianism and disregard for human rights. Socially conservative pious Muslims have been a particular target of government harassment, especially after the Tajik civil war broke out in 1992, and again in 1998 when the murder of a policeman in the conservative Fergana Valley town of Namangan was the pretext for the arrests of thousands of Muslims. In February 2000, a series of bombs was detonated in Tashkent. President Islam Karimov announced that he was the intended target and unleashed another round of arrests of "Muslim extremists," which swept up a number of

human-rights activists. Some were incarcerated in a new prison that had become notorious for the number of deaths of inmates, from both police brutality and disease.

Genuine political opposition is not tolerated, though a number of political parties exist. Opposition groups (the mildly nationalist Birlik Movement and the Erk Democratic Party) that were allowed not only to exist but to publish their own newspapers until a few months after independence were stripped of their registration in 1993. The few people who later considered themselves members of these groups were harassed by the authorities; many of those who did not leave the country were jailed in 1999–2000. Some members of opposition groups formed organizations to monitor human rights. The government used this as an excuse to refuse registration to all but one human-rights nongovernmental organization, claiming that the other groups were merely fronts for banned political organizations.

An ombudsman's office was set up under the parliament in 1997 to deal specifically with human-rights problems. In her annual reports, the ombudsman noted that the majority of cases brought to the office involved problems with the law enforcement and judicial systems. The office's success rate in dealing with these problems was low.

As is the case elsewhere in Central Asia, law enforcement officials in Uzbekistan are notorious for beating detainees. They are also reported to plant evidence, usually small amounts of narcotics, a few bullets, or weapons, on persons arrested for political reasons. Independent media exist in Uzbekistan, but they function under fairly strict government scrutiny. Criticism of the government is not tolerated.

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CENTRAL ASIA—LATE MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN Central Asia entered modernity in the wake of Russian conquest in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Russian penetration into

the Kazakh steppe from western Siberia began in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and was completed in the 1840s with the suppression of the Kazakh hordes. In 1864, Russian resumed its conquest, finishing in 1884 with the capture of the last Turkmen oasis of Merv. The imposition of Russian rule in Central Asia resulted in the distortion of "native" capitalism in the area, which was subsequently turned into a major supplier of raw materials, predominately cotton, to Russian industries.

The Kazakh Steppe and the Start of Russian Conquest

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Kazakh ethnic groups, who lacked political unity, coalesced into three confederations. These were Uly Juz (the Greater Horde), occupying the Jetysu (Seven Rivers) district in the southeast portion of present-day Kazakhstan; Orta Juz (the Middle Horde) in the central part; and Kishi Juz (the Lesser Horde) between the Aral Sea and the Ural River in the west. The division was the result of varying conditions for cattle rearing, which prevailed on the Kazakh steppe.

Each horde, composed of a number of ethnic groups, was ruled by a khan with a group of subordinate sultans, who claimed to have descended from Genghis Khan. The Genghisid descent was also a central factor in the peculiar vertical division of Kazakh society into two groups—the Aq Suyek (White Bone) people, of high status, and the Qara Suyek (Black Bone) people, who were commoners.

Islam, which began penetrating into the southeastern Kazakh steppe after a battle at the Taras River in 751, had very little effect on the social structure of Kazakh society, although descent from eminent Muslim ancestors could also entitle some individuals, called *qojas*, to prestigious White Bone status. The main effect of Islam on the Kazakhs was in culture, that is, education and literature, and even here its impact was limited due to their nomadic lifestyle.

Kazakh justice was to a large extent based on the principle of *qun* (retribution), which varied from the death penalty to fines, depending on the offense. Kazakh customary law had three sources: custom, practice in the court of the *biis* (the nobles), and resolutions taken at regular meetings of the *biis*.

The social and political structure of Kazakh society was highly codified in what is known as *Jeti Jarghy* (Seven Verdicts) during the reign of the Middle Horde's khan Tauke (1680–1718), who succeeded in briefly reuniting the three Kazakh hordes.

The eighteenth-century Kazakh economy was based on cattle breeding, although the encroachment of the Kazakh ethnic groups on the regions south of the steppe in the sixteenth century had resulted in some urban and agricultural development and trade with the settled population. To the north and west, commercial relations with the Russians had also begun.

The Russian advance into the Kazakh steppe was a gradual process, the actual beginning of which is usually associated with the request by Khan Abulhair (Abilay; 1693–1748) to Russia to be a suzerain (overlord) of the Lesser Horde. The request was granted in 1731. Nevertheless, the founding dates of such Russian towns as Uralsk (now Oral), Guryev (now Atyrau; 1645), and Ust-Kamenogorsk, or Oskemen (1720) indicate that the actual Russian encroachment into the western and northeastern steppes started long before.

A bloody invasion by the Jungars (a subdivision of the Mongols) in 1723 and threats constantly emanating from the east forced the khans of the Middle and Greater Hordes also to accept Russian suzerainty in 1740 and 1742, respectively.

While signing an oath of allegiance, the Kazakh khans pledged to protect adjacent Russian borders, to defend Russian trade caravans, to provide troops when needed, and to pay tribute to Russia. Until the end of the eighteenth century, the political picture of the area remained unchanged, because during that period Russia was engaged in subduing the Caucasus.

Beginning in the early nineteenth century, Russia initiated a more aggressive policy toward the Kazakh hordes in an effort to annex their territories. New strategic goals led Russia to abolish the Middle Horde in 1822, the Lesser Horde in 1824, Bukey's (Bukeevskaia) Horde (formed c. 1800 to the west of the Lesser Horde) in 1845, and the Greater Horde in 1848. With the suppression of the Kazakh hordes, the first stage of Russia's conquest of Central Asia was completed.

Transoxiana in the Eighteenth Century

By the start of the eighteenth century, Transoxiana, the territory between the Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya Rivers, was dominated by three principalities—the Bukhara emirate, the Quqon khanate, and the Khiva khanate.

The Bukhara emirate, the most populous (3 million people in the nineteenth century) and influential of the three, was situated in the basin of the Zeravshan River. It was ruled by the Uzbek dynasty of Mangyt,

who rose to power in the early eighteenth century as *ataliq* (majordomo) under the Astrakhanid (Janid) dynasty (1598–1785), which was of Genghisid origin.

The first Mangyt *ataliq* was Khudoyar Bi, who began his service in 1714 and made the position hereditary. In 1722, he was succeeded by his son Muhammad Hakim Bi, whose term (1722–1740) was marked by fighting with the Kazakh hordes who were escaping from the conquests of the Jungar Mongols from Xinjiang in western China. The next Mangyt *ataliq*, Muhammad Rahim Bi (reigned 1740–1758), further consolidated his power, although the throne was nominally occupied by the Janids until 1785.

The actual start of the Mangyt dynasty is associated with the accession of Shah Murad (reigned 1785–1800), who assumed the title of emir, which was most probably derived from *amir-al-muminin* ("commander of the believers"). The shift to an emirate was a significant step, aimed at stressing an Islamic, rather than tribal, legacy and consolidating Bukhara's leading position in Transoxiana.

Administratively, the emirate was divided into *vilayats* (*viloyat*, *velayat*: provinces), ruled by *bokims* (heads of provincial administration). The *vilayats* were subdivided into *tumans* (districts) and finally into *kents* (settlements). The principal function of *bokims* was collection of taxes and distribution of water. There were two types of taxes—*zakyat*, a tax on merchandise, movable property, and cattle; and *tanap*, a tax on land property. The land tax constituted the bulk of the emir's revenues, and it was generally paid in cash, although calculated as a percentage of the harvest. In the Bukhara emirate, the land, being the most valuable commodity, was of several types: *waqf* (possessions of religious institutions), *mulk* (freehold), and *tankhwah* (gift-lands handed over, usually to the military, by the emir, largely exempt of taxation).

The system of justice was based on Islamic *shari'a* (canon) and *adat* (customary) laws. The chief judicial official was the *kazi* (judge), assisted by the *aglian* (barriers). The muftis (jurists) were the exponents of the law; the chief mufti was the emir's chief counselor.

The Bukhara economy was based on irrigated agriculture and trade. The main trade items were cotton and textiles, and the main trading partner was Russia. Among other exports were silk, dyes, and fruits, whereas from Russia Bukhara imported pottery, metal products, sugar, paper, tin, fur, mercury, candles, textiles, and other manufactured goods. Although other towns also conducted trade directly with foreign countries, Bukhara was the emirate's most important commercial center. It was also the center of silk production

and astrakhan-cloth trade. Domestic trade developed as well, serving as a unifying factor.

For the eastern part of Transoxiana, the Fergana Valley, the eighteenth century was marked by the rise to power of the Ming dynasty of Uzbek origin (distinct from the Chinese Ming). It eventually led to the establishment of the Quqon khanate, with a population of a million people, in 1798. Quqon rulers Irdana Biy (reigned 1740–1769) and Narbuta Biy (reigned 1769–1788) succeeded in consolidating the state.

Starting from the nineteenth century, the Quqon khans fought to expand their territories in the north and northwest into the steppe along the north bank of the Syr Dar'ya River. In 1803–1809, they conquered the cities of Tashkent, Shymkent (Chimkent), and Sayram. Akmeshit (now Kyzyl Orda) was founded in 1820. A stronghold was built in Pishpek (now Bishkek, capital of Kyrgyzstan) in 1846. Quqon's military campaigns led to a series of wars with Bukhara and the Kazakh and Kyrgyz ethnic groups during the first half of the nineteenth century. The Kyrgyz accepted Russian suzerainty in 1855–1876.

The Quqon khanate reached the zenith of its might during the rule of Madali Khan (reigned 1822–1842). The khanate then consisted of modern-day southern Kazakhstan, northern Uzbekistan, the Pamir regions of Tajikistan, and almost the whole of Kyrgyzstan.

The administrative system of Quqon was virtually the same as that of Bukhara, except that the subdivisions of the *vilayats* were known as *beklik* instead of *tuman*. Quqon's economy was also based on irrigated agriculture, trade, and silk production. The Quqon khans were known for their patronage of the arts.

During the eighteenth century, the khanate of Khiva (500,000 people), situated on the lower Amu Dar'ya River, was ruled by the Uzbek Yadigarid dynasty (1603–1804) and was subsequently replaced by the Kungrat (Inakid) dynasty (1804–1920). In 1804, Iltuzer, an Uzbek noble holding the hereditary position of *inak* (prime minister), proclaimed himself khan of Khiva and established a new dynasty.

Unlike Bukhara and Quqon, Khiva had no subdivisions, and its towns enjoyed more autonomy. The majority of land was in the possession of the khan and of Muslim institutions. Extensive irrigation canals, fed by the Amu Dar'ya, were maintained by forced labor, usually made up of one male from each family. About 75 percent of the population was settled and carried on irrigated cultivation of wheat, millet, cotton, and fruit. Both internal and external trade evolved but to a lesser extent than in Bukhara and Quqon. Khiva's

foreign-trade partners were Afghanistan, Persia, and Russia. The Amu Dar'ya was extensively used for the conveyance of goods.

The Karakalpaks, another Turkic people living around the Amu Dar'ya delta, frequently revolted. Khiva's north and southwest borders were raided by Kazakh and Turkmen groups. The latter were the principal supplier of Persian slaves to the Khiva and Bukhara markets. The nomad Turkmen, lacking political unity, consisted of a number of separate ethnic groups, the most remarkable of which were Tekke, Tomud, and Ersary, occupying the territories immediately south of the Khiva khanate and the southern portion between the Caspian and Aral Seas.

At the middle of the nineteenth century, the ruling and living standards in Central Asia were much lower than those in medieval Europe, where large-scale foreign invasions, pillage, and devastation had ended some two hundred years earlier than they did in Central Asia. This situation, along with the absence of agreement between the three principalities, made them vulnerable to Russian conquest.

The Second Stage of Russian Conquest (1864–1884)

Russia's engagement in the Crimean War (1853–1856) and the pacifying of Sheikh Shamil's mutiny in the Caucasus (1843–1859) resulted in an interval of relative calm for several years between the suppression of the Kazakh hordes (1848) and the start of the final stage of Russian conquest (1864). Yet during this period, the Quqon strongholds of Ak Mechet and Pishpek were seized in 1853 and 1862, respectively. In addition, in 1854 Russians founded Fort Vernoe (now Almaty) in order to have access to Transoxiana across the Syr Dar'ya. The Russians resumed their conquest in 1864 with the seizure of the Quqon towns of Shymkent and Aulie Ata (now Zhambyl) in what is now southern Kazakhstan. Tashkent was routed in 1865. In 1868, after losing several battles to Russia, the emir of Bukhara, Muzaffar al-din Bakhadur Khan (reigned 1860–1885), signed a peace treaty. Under the treaty, Bukhara became a Russian protectorate and lost a considerable portion of its territories, including Samarqand.

In 1869, Russian troops reached the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea from the Caucasus and established the harbor of Krasnovodsk (now Turkmenbashi), a stronghold for future advances into Khiva and the Turkmen lands. In 1873, Khiva became a Russian protectorate, lost its western lands, and pledged to pay tribute. In 1876, the Quqon khanate was abolished.

In 1879, Russian troops moved against the Turkmen ethnic groups but were defeated at Geok-Tepe. In 1881, after the second attempt, Geok-Tepe fell. With the seizure of the last Turkmen stronghold of Merv in 1884, Russia's military conquest of Central Asia was completed. From Merv, Russia brought its troops farther to the south, close to the Afghan border, which caused a brief military clash (the Kushka Incident) between Russia and Afghanistan in 1885.

In the early 1890s, Russia pushed farther from Fergana to the Pamirs, close to British India. To avoid further confrontation, in 1895 Russia and Great Britain reached an agreement on their mutual respecting of zones of interest. This agreement was confirmed by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.

As a result of the Russian conquest, new administrative divisions were introduced in Central Asia. The territories acquired in Transoxiana were united into the governorate-general of Turkistan, with headquarters in Tashkent. The governorate-general was divided into five oblasts (districts), namely Syrdarya (with the capital in Tashkent), Semirechie (Vernyi), Fergana (Skobelev), Samarqand, and Zakaspiyskaia (Ashkhabad). The emirate of Bukhara and the khanate of Khiva became Russian protectorates.

The western part of the Kazakh steppe was converted into the Uralsk oblast (center Uralsk), the central part into the Turgai and Akmolinsk oblasts. The Akmolinsk oblast was united with the eastern Semipalatinsk oblast to form the governorate-general of the steppe.

The Russian conquest of Central Asia was overwhelmingly motivated by economics. After the establishment of Russian rule, the area became a valuable market for Russian industrial goods and a source of raw materials, primarily cotton. By 1914, more than 50 percent of the cotton used by Russian light industry was supplied from Central Asia. The region's industrial development centered on cotton. Two-thirds of the local labor force was employed in cotton-processing and textile enterprises. At the same time, Central Asia was heavily dependent on Russia's grain imports. The construction of railroads and a telegraph network, crucial for exercising control over the new territories, also aided the region's development.

The other major consequence of Russian conquest was colonization by agricultural settlers, mainly Russians and Ukrainians. In 1895, a special Russian mission was sent to the Kazakh steppe to establish a land fund for newcomers. The nomads' grazing lands in the northern, eastern, and western steppes were expropriated.

The Russians did not interfere with the natives' general way of life, although they did abolish slavery.

Education continued to be based on the Qur'an and on Arabic-Persian tradition. At the same time, the Russians opened a number of schools for natives where Russian was the language of instruction. Jadidism, the Muslim progressive movement for cultural reforms that arose in Central Asia in the early twentieth century, was to a large extent catalyzed as a result of the introduction of Western cultural achievements in the wake of Russian colonization.

Thus, in the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century, Central Asia was distinctly divided into the nomad Kazakh steppe to the north and the three Transoxianan principalities to the south. The Kazakh hordes, who had failed to produce any efficient political unity by that time, felt insecure in the face of the constant invasions of Jungars from the east, and this insecurity caused their submission to Russian suzerainty. Russia's subsequent penetration into the area, followed by a military conquest (1864–1884), was firmly consolidated by the end of the nineteenth century. By imposing its rule in Central Asia, Russia sought to meet economic and geopolitical goals. For Central Asia proper, the capitalization of its agriculture and the acceleration of segmental industrialization had little impact on the traditional way of life and left feudal socioeconomic structures to a great extent intact.

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CENTRAL ASIA—MODERN The modern era of Central Asian history begins with the Russian empire's conquest of the region. Russian expansion toward Central Asia was facilitated by the absence of any physical obstacles; having consolidated their hold over the steppe lands inhabited by Kazakh nomads, Russian armies moved rapidly southward between 1853 and 1873, winning easy battles against each of the three states in the region—Quqon, Bukhara, and Khiva, all in modern Uzbekistan. Russian armies annexed parts of their territory and reduced the remaining parts to vassal status. Quqon was fully annexed in 1878, but Bukhara and Khiva continued as protectorates until 1920. The annexed territories were formed into the Russian province of Turkestan, with the capital at Tashkent. The Kazakh lands became the Steppe province.

The Colonial Order

Although Central Asia was physically contiguous with European Russia, its relationship to the center was typical of the high age of European imperialism. Russians saw little in common between themselves and the indigenous population and built new "European" cities there for themselves.

In northern Central Asia the nomadic lands (both in the Steppe province and in northern Turkestan) became targets for planned settlement by Russian peasants from European Russia and the Ukraine. The floodgates opened with the creation of the Resettlement Administration as an organ of the imperial Russian government. This resettlement was intended to ease the pressure on Russia's agricultural regions by settling allegedly "excess" land not used by the nomads.

Southern Central Asia, already densely populated, saw little Russian settlement except in the cities. Here the colonial relationship was based on the production of cotton, which fed Russia's textile industry and freed it from dependence on imported cotton. The introduction of long-fiber American varieties in the 1880s started a boom that continued until World War I and transformed local Central Asian society and economy, as older elites suffered a loss of status, while new groups rose to prominence. Among the successful were merchants, who benefited from the new economic situation, and urban intellectuals. At the same time, the region became increasingly dependent on European

Russia for its food supply, as more and more land was devoted to cotton cultivation.

The new Central Asian intellectuals, called the Jadids ("proponents of the new method," from the new, phonetic method of teaching the Arabic alphabet that they advocated), sought to articulate a new vision of the future for their society. Intensely aware of their lack of political power, they argued that only through education and the acquisition of modern knowledge could they take their rightful place in the world. They favored thorough cultural reform, beginning with elementary school education. In advocating social and cultural reform, the Jadids also introduced new visions of identity based on the idea of the nation, replacing the dynastic and tribal identities of the past. Their conception of the nation was rooted primarily in the common Muslim faith of Central Asia, but they gradually came to emphasize the people's Turkic ethnic roots as well. The Jadids faced opposition from both conservative elites in their own society and from the Russian state, always suspicious of unauthorized political activity. The rural population, however, remained outside these debates.

The Crisis of the Colonial Order

Peace ended in Central Asia in 1916, when, after two years of debilitating losses in World War I, the Russian government revoked Central Asians' exemption from military service and mobilized them for work behind the lines. The announcement heightened existing tensions, especially among nomads who had recently lost their land to Russian settlers. The result was a massive uprising of the local population in which government bureaucrats and Russian settlers were attacked. Official vengeance was swift and brutal. The government confiscated large amounts of the nomads' land, forcing thousands of families to flee to Chinese territory. In some districts as much as 20 percent of the nomadic population died.

The crisis was heightened by the fall of the Russian monarchy in March 1917, but the Russian Revolution brought great hope to Central Asians. The Jadids saw the revolution as an opportunity for inclusion in the mainstream of a liberal democratic Russia. For the rural population, however, concerns were much more immediate. The grain harvest was poor in 1917, and with Central Asia's dependence on imported food, a full-fledged famine raged in the region by the end of the year.

The famine, far more than any empirewide trends, defined the political struggle in Central Asia during the course of the Russian Revolution and the civil war that followed. The Russian community in Central Asia



MODERN CENTRAL ASIA TIMELINE

- 1853-1873** The Russian empire consolidates control of the region through a series of military conquests. Varieties of long-fiber American cotton are introduced and start a boom that continues until World War I and transforms Central Asian society and economy.
- 1880s** The Jadids, a new intellectual movement, articulate a new vision of the future for Central Asian society based on education and the acquisition of modern knowledge.
- 1916** The Russian government, which had previously exempted Central Asians from military service, conscripts them for work behind-the-lines in World War I. Massive uprisings by Central Asians are severely repressed by the Russians.
- 1917-1920** The Russian Revolution ends the rule of the Russian empire. Central Asian efforts to achieve political independence are crushed by the Soviets. In 1917 the region experiences a serious famine.
- 1920s-1930s** Islam is repressed by Soviet authorities with Islamic schools replaced with public education, mosques closed, clerics persecuted, and Arabic writing replaced with Latin script and then Cyrillic in 1940.
- 1924-1925** The Soviets bring their policy of creating "ethnic-based" republics to Central Asia and the Soviet Socialist republics of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are created.
- 1929** Agriculture is collectivized and nomadic pastoralism repressed.
- 1929** Tajikistan is established as an autonomous republic in the Soviet Union.
- 1936** Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are established as autonomous republics in the Soviet Union.
- 1953-1982** A period of relative political stability in the region, with national and local leaders loyal to the Communist leadership in Moscow.
- 1986** Nationalist riots erupt in Almaty, the capital of Kazakhstan when the Soviet leadership replaces the Kazakh Communist leader.
- 1991** The Soviet Union dissolves and the five Central Asian republics become independent nations and join the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States.
- 1991-2001** The nations seek to establish economic and political stability, establish relations with Western nations, and control internal unrest tied to political corruption and the emergence of Islamic nationalism.

sought to maintain its privileged access to food during the political crisis. In Tashkent, Russians seized power in the name of the Soviets in October 1917, even before the Bolshevik Revolution had taken place in Petrograd, and sought to exclude the Muslim population from the new institutions of power. The violence against the Kazakh nomads that began in 1916 never abated, and indeed it intensified under a new revolutionary guise. An autonomous government proclaimed by the Jadids in Quqon on November 1917 as an alternative to the Tashkent Soviet regime was destroyed by military force in February 1918.

In this chaos emerged the Basmachi, armed bands, locally organized and owing allegiance to individual

commanders, who provided basic protection to Muslim peasants and attempted some alleviation of the terrible famine. Although they have been both reviled as counterrevolutionary bandits and celebrated as heroes of national liberation, their goals were local. They did not have a well-articulated political program but instead reacted to the situation as it developed. Because of the famine, the struggle in Central Asia became one between the cities and the countryside; the cities ultimately triumphed, thanks to the might of the Red Army. The Basmachi were won over by what turned out to be temporary political and economic concessions. Many Basmachi leaders fled to Afghanistan; others were captured and tried.

The Soviet Order

When Moscow finally acquired control over Central Asia in 1920 with the Red Army's victory in the civil war, it set out actively to recruit Central Asians in the new institutions of power. Among the Central Asians entering the new institutions were many Jadids, who saw in the new order an opportunity to transform their society. There was indeed a great deal in common between the programs of change espoused by the Jadids and those of the Bolsheviks in the early years of the Soviet period. The Bolshevik agenda included universal literacy and elementary education, improving the position of women, and transforming cultural conceptions of hygiene and public health. Much of this coincided with the program of change the Jadids had articulated.

Bukhara provided the best example of the community of interests between the Jadids and the Bolsheviks. The Russian Revolution of 1917 gave Bukharan Jadids hope that the emir, or local ruler, might proclaim reforms, but the hope was dashed and the Jadids were brutally suppressed. They escaped to Turkestan, where they organized openly under the name of the Young Bukharans. Desperation radicalized their political stance, while the Bolsheviks provided a clear example of what was possible. The Young Bukharans drew closer to the Bolsheviks, who helped them overthrow the emir by armed force in September 1920. The emir escaped into the mountains of present-day Tajikistan, and the Young Bukharans proclaimed a Bukharan People's Soviet Republic (BNSR). Broadly similar events led to the installation of a people's republic in Khiva, now renamed Khorazm.

The BNSR had a short and traumatic life. Throughout its existence it faced insurgency in the mountainous eastern area of the country. The Soviet government recognized its independence, but was not inclined to let its leaders choose policies entirely independently. It pushed the BNSR government to adopt radical social and economic policies and to tie its economy more closely to that of the Soviet Union. Frustrated by this pressure, some Young Bukharans went over to the insurgency in 1921, while others continued to seek compromise.

The Soviets were committed to the process of national self-determination for the many nationalities inhabiting the vast country, and to the creation of territorial entities in which this self-determination could be exercised. This countrywide process arrived in Central Asia in 1924 and, among other things, spelled the end of the BNSR. Turkestan, Bukhara, and Khorazm were all entities whose boundaries bore no resemblance to the ethnic composition of their populations; such dis-

regard for ethnic boundaries had been common in the premodern world. By 1924 central authorities in Moscow had decided that this abnormal situation could not be allowed to continue. The territory of Central Asia was divided so that each "national" group had its own republic. During 1924 and 1925 the demarcation was completed with the full participation of local party and state officials, and the three existing republics were replaced by the Soviet Socialist republics (SSRs) of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan included in it the autonomous republics of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which were upgraded to SSR status in 1929 and 1936, respectively. At the same time, certain areas of Turkestan were ceded to the Russian Federation, where they were combined with other Kazakh-inhabited areas to form the autonomous republic of Kazakhstan, which in turn became an SSR in 1936.

This political organization in Central Asia was based on a radically new principle of national identity, and the division into five republics presumed a clear-cut division that did not always exist in fact. Nevertheless, over the next several decades, these new national identities were endowed with great power through state-sponsored cultivation of individual national languages, literature, arts, and education.

What the regime brought about was nothing short of a cultural revolution: rapid modernization and forced secularization of society and culture. The traditional system of Muslim education, of which Bukhara was especially a major center, was dismantled through economic pressure in the 1920s and overt repression in the 1930s. In its place appeared a widespread system of modern schools. The literary languages were reformed and brought closer to the vernacular. In 1928 the Arabic script universally used in Central Asia was replaced by the Latin and in 1939–1940 by the Cyrillic. State funding also allowed for books and newspapers to be printed in unprecedented quantities.

The Jadids were enthusiastic participants in this revolution, although they had no control over its direction or scope, and indeed it went much further than they had envisaged. This was especially the case with the campaign against Islam that the Soviets pursued from the mid-1920s on. As a result Islamic education was pushed underground, and religious observance decreased greatly. Mosques were closed by the thousands, and Muslim scholars arrested, exiled, or executed in great numbers.

Central Soviet policies also called for the "nationalization" (*korenizatsiia*) of the state apparatus in the non-Russian parts of the Soviet Union. Members of



**JOINT STATEMENT OF THE MEMBER STATES
OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL PROGRAMME
FOR THE ECONOMIES OF CENTRAL ASIA (SPECA),
U.N. ECE, AND ESCAP AT
THE PRESENTATION OF SPECA**

Following the demise of the Soviet Union and establishment of independent nations in Central Asia, these nations faced major economic problems. In March 1998 at Tashkent, agreement was reached on programs to develop the economic infrastructure and those programs were supported by a statement issued in Akmaty, Kazakhstan, in April 2000.

New Stage of Implementation of the United Nations Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA)

The Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific (ESCAP) actively develop international cooperation aimed at accelerating economic development of all the states of Central Asia. We do appreciate that further strengthening of economic ties among the Central Asian states and their economic integration with Europe and Asia will contribute in a positive way to the process of their transition to a market economy.

It was for this purpose that in March 1998 our States have adopted the Tashkent Declaration on the United Nations Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA). Since that time, a serious progress has been registered at some priority areas of the Programme. SPECA Project Working Groups on Rational and Efficient Use of Energy and Water Resources in Central Asia, on Transport Infrastructure and Border Crossing Facilitation and on International Economic Conference on Tajikistan in the Regional Context of Central Asia have started their work. These inter-state groups have agreed their Programmes of Work and have come close to the stage of developing and implementing concrete projects of regional importance. We have finished with organisational issues of SPECA and have improved environment for the implementation of the Programme by adopting the Concept of the Programme.

Today we reconfirm our dedication to the aims and purposes of the SPECA Programme and officially announce the beginning of a new stage in its implementation. We shall join our forces in order to progress in solving priority tasks of the Programme for the benefit of the peoples of our states. We appeal to the world community to share with us both the difficult tasks of implementing the Programme and the benefits of developing regional cooperation.

Source: Documents about Special UN Programmes for the Economies of Central Asia. Retrieved 5 December 2001, from: <http://missions.inu.int>.

local populations were to be inducted into positions of authority to overcome the imperial past that the new regime had inherited. In Central Asia nativization never went far enough to completely eliminate Russian influence, but nevertheless, it was a resounding success in terms of creating a new political class completely at home in the Soviet order. During the 1920s this class edged out older intellectuals from positions of power.

In 1929 the state decreed the collectivization of agriculture. This campaign was conducted with great violence, especially in nomadic areas, where it also entailed the sedentarization of the nomads. In Kazakhstan the dislocation of the nomadic economy created a tragedy that assumed genocidal proportions. Although no indisputable figures exist, perhaps as many as 1.5 million Kazakhs died in the 1930s. Between 1928 and 1932 alone, 80 percent of herd animals were destroyed. Along with collectivization came a centrally planned economy, which concentrated decision making in Moscow, as well as a purge of public figures in which two generations of local political and cultural leadership were destroyed in Central Asia. Thousands were executed, and many times that number sent off to prison camps. Leadership passed to a new generation.

The centrally planned economy in Central Asia meant, above all, the predominance of cotton. The Soviet Union pursued a policy of "cotton independence" for its textile industry, and Central Asia was assigned the task of ensuring this independence. Central Asia was turned into a massive cotton plantation, so that at the end of the Soviet period, Uzbekistan alone was producing more cotton than the United States. The ecological consequences were devastating. Relentless irrigation led to the shrinking of the Aral Sea, while reckless use of pesticides and fertilizers produced lethal levels of pollution.

Nevertheless, in the peaceful years after Khrushchev (who led the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1964), cotton also provided a way for Central Asian political elites to reclaim some local autonomy. As stability became the most important virtue in Soviet political life under Brezhnev (who led the country from 1964 to 1982), party elites in the republics were largely left to their own devices as long as they fulfilled centrally imposed economic obligations and did not rock the boat politically. During this period all five republics were headed by long-serving Communist Party leaders who headed largely autonomous political machines serving, on the one hand, to deliver cotton to the center and, on the other, to distribute political influence locally. While these leaders enjoyed all the benefits of power

in the Soviet order, they also emerged as *national* leaders. These political arrangements, built on informal ties among a cohort of politicians, are only now being understood by historians.

Post-Soviet Central Asia

These political arrangements were questioned by Brezhnev's successors, Yuri Andropov (1982–1984) and Mikhail Gorbachev (1985–1991), in their attempts to root out corruption in Soviet life. A federal investigative commission found massive corruption in Uzbekistan. Numerous high-ranking officials were dismissed and disgraced. But such measures, which were seen as attacking the autonomy of Central Asian republics, produced national resentment. In December 1986, when Moscow summarily dismissed Dinmuhammed Kunaev, the long-serving Kazakh Party secretary, and replaced him with a Russian functionary sent from Moscow, nationalist riots erupted in Almaty, the capital of Kazakhstan. Nevertheless in the following years, as the Soviet order weakened for reasons having little to do with Central Asia, the republics of Central Asia remained the most stable parts of the Soviet Union and supported the USSR's continued existence to the very end. The economies of Central Asian republics were much too tightly tied to the rest of the Soviet Union to make independence an attractive option.

Events in 1991, however, left the countries of Central Asia no choice. As the Soviet Union dissolved, they emerged on the international stage as sovereign states. Their leaderships, still rooted in the political machines that had crystallized in the 1960s, appealed to strong national identities forged in the Soviet years to provide legitimacy to the new states. At the same time there has been a strong impetus to rediscover aspects of national history and culture that were taboo under the Soviet regime. The region has witnessed a substantial re-Islamization, as people have sought to rediscover their spiritual heritage. The collapse of the centralized Soviet economy has generated massive crises, leaving the newly independent countries to overcome their dependence on cotton and to attempt to enter a global marketplace to which they had little exposure in the previous century.

The complex heritage of modern Central Asia defies easy categorizations. The period of Russian and Soviet rule saw the merciless exploitation of the natural resources of the region. It witnessed two terrible famines, a civil war, and a prolonged period of political bloodletting in which the flower of two generations perished. The same period, however, saw the elimination of illiteracy, the establishment of modern state forms, and the creation of national identities that

undergird the regimes of the post-Soviet period. Central Asia today embodies the contradictions inherited from the twentieth century.

Adeeb Khalid

See also: **Communism—Central Asia; Energy—Central Asia; Ethnic Conflict—Central Asia; Islam—Central Asia; Jadidism; Media—Central Asia; Nationalist Movement in Central Asia; Perestroika; Post-Communism; Radioactive Waste and Contamination; Russification and Sovietization; Westernization—Central Asia**

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CENTRAL ASIA-CHINA RELATIONS Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, China faced the challenge of managing bilateral relations with the newly independent Central Asian states. The independence of these states exacerbated long-smoldering ethnic unrest in China's Xinjiang Autonomous Region, which borders several of the Central Asian states. After establishing relations with the Central Asian republics in early 1992, China signed more than twenty agreements on boundaries and economic and cultural cooperation with these nations within a short period.

Boundary Settlements

The China–Central Asian boundary was originally established by "unequal" treaties—the 1860 Treaty of Beijing, the 1864 Protocol on the Northwest Boundary, the 1881 Sino-Russian Treaty of Ili, and the 1884

Sino-Russian Treaty of Kashgar. According to the Chinese, by these treaties, Czarist Russia gained 440,000 square kilometers of territory at the expense of China. After the independence of the Central Asian states, China was willing to accept the unequal treaties as the basis for new boundary agreements.

Following several years of negotiations, on 4 July 1996, China concluded a boundary agreement with Kyrgyzstan. China and Kyrgyzstan have since concluded agreements to open new border crossings and construct a rail line linking the two countries. On 4 July 1998, leaders signed a Sino-Kazakhstan boundary treaty. This marked the comprehensive settlement of questions unresolved by history concerning the unsettled 1,700-kilometer Sino-Kazakh boundary.

Beijing has not concluded an agreement resolving the historically complicated Sino-Tajik boundary dispute. China has consistently asserted that Russia violated the 1884 Sino-Russian Kashgar Boundary Treaty in 1892 and occupied more than 20,000 square kilometers of Chinese territory in the Pamir Mountains and that the boundary remains undelimited. Nevertheless, the leaders of the two nations have negotiated many agreements, including an agreement to open a road connecting China and Tajikistan to ease border trade.

Regional Strategic Concerns

The Central Asian states see China as a potential economic and demographic threat. One concern is China's dramatic population growth. With its large territory and abundant natural resources, Central Asia is logically a place for China to covet. More than 300,000 Chinese have settled in Central Asia, and this may grow to 500,000 over the next few years. Kazakh officials believe that if the flood of Chinese coming to Kazakhstan continues, Chinese will overwhelm Kazakhstan in ten to fifteen years. Chinese traders have purchased considerable amounts of real estate in Kyrgyzstan.

China is also very apprehensive about instability along the border. Following a Shanghai summit, on 26 April 1996, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed an agreement with China on confidence-building measures along the border. On 24 April 1997 they agreed to withdraw military forces 100 kilometers along the 3,500-kilometers boundary. A third agreement of 3 July 1998 emphasized cooperation to dampen ethnic unrest in the region. Each government pledged to take steps to fight against arms smuggling and not to allow its territory to be used for activities undermining the national sovereignty, security, and social order of any of the five countries.

Ethnic Unrest

Since the independence of the Central Asian states in 1991, ethnic unrest in Xinjiang has been a major concern for Beijing. A continuing source of tension in China–Central Asian relations are the sensitive issues of pan-Turkic nationalism and the Xinjiang separatist movement. Historically, China has struggled to maintain central government control over the region. Russian and Soviet intrigue and local independence movements have been recent issues. An Eastern Turkestan Republic was briefly established in 1944, in what is now Xinjiang; it had a national anthem and a national flag—a white crescent and star against a blue background. Led by Islamic scholars, the Uighurs of Xinjiang wanted a homeland free of Chinese influence. In 1962 China crushed a revolt by tens of thousands of Kazakhs who then fled across the border to Soviet Kazakhstan. Chinese now feel that the smoldering independence movements in Xinjiang are the main threat to stability in western China.

A central issue in most all communiqués and agreements between China and other Central Asian states is a commitment not to support any separatist movements. Both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, with 200,000 and 80,000 Uighurs respectively, have agreed to suppress such movements. Several separatist movements have moved from Kazakhstan to Turkey, and Kyrgyzstan has prevented organization of an ethnic Uighur political party. The Uighur nationalist organizations that continue to operate from within the Central Asian states remain a major cause of tension in Central Asian relations with China.

Countries with fundamentalist Islamic orientations are a factor in promoting ethnic unrest in the region. The Jama'at-e-Islami, based in Pakistan, has encouraged Islamic activism in Xinjiang, as have other Islamist movements, such as the Taliban (when it was in power in Afghanistan). Uighurs do receive religious training in Pakistan, and Afghan and Islamic militants have smuggled arms into China. The number of Islamic schools in China has grown rapidly; in 1997 the government closed down as many as three hundred "illegal" schools. Many small neighborhood mosques have become the focal point of anti-Chinese activities. The Chinese have clamped down on what it considers "illegal religious activities" and has closed many mosques.

The rise in ethnic unrest and pro-independence demonstrations and other activities in the 1990s have deep historical and religious roots and will persist for the foreseeable future. Many leaders are not simply religious fanatics, but are Pan-Turkic nationalists. The support for the movement comes from neighboring Turkic-speaking countries. Despite the pledge by the

governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan not to support the Xinjiang separatist movement, supporters of the movement openly operate from these countries. Uighurs living in Turkey also support the movement. Pan-Turkic nationalism and anti-Chinese colonialism are important causes of the unrest. Uighurs are trying to preserve their cultural identity and to resist the mass influx of Chinese settlers into their region.

Economic Interests

In the 1990s Central Asia quickly became an important center of China's economic attention. Border trade is an important part of the growing economic ties. In 1989 Xinjiang's trade with Soviet Central Asia amounted to only \$118.5 million. Trade has continued to grow and now accounts for 60 percent of the region's foreign trade. In 1995 total trade between China and Central Asia was an estimated \$718 million, of which \$500 million was accounted for by border trade. Since 1991, China has emerged as the second-largest trading partner for the Central Asian countries, significantly displacing Russian influence in the region. China is now Kazakhstan's major trading partner, and 25 percent of Kyrgyzstan's foreign trade is with China.

The development of oil and gas is an area of important strategic economic cooperation. In 1994 China signed an agreement with Turkmenistan to construct a Turkmenistan-China-Japan gas pipeline. In 1997 China won the bid to develop Kazakhstan's Uzen oil field and construct a 3,000-kilometer oil pipeline from Kazakhstan's Caspian oilfields at Tengiz to Xinjiang and then to China's eastern coast. Additionally, China signed agreements with Kazakhstan to develop the Aktyubinsk oil fields along the Russian-Kazakh border. Total Chinese investment in developing oil resources in Kazakhstan is estimated at \$9.7 billion, equivalent to 50 percent of Kazakhstan's gross national product. These agreements are a clear indication that China and Central Asia are developing an important economic and strategic link. China not only is seeking to ensure its energy security for the future, but also is attempting to shift the focus of Central Asia's global vision toward China and away from Russia and Turkey.

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CENTRAL ASIA—RUSSIA RELATIONS

Political, cultural, and military clashes have strongly affected Central Asia—Russia relations. In the nineteenth century, Russia tried to put the territories of today's Central Asian states under its control in order to benefit from the region's natural resources and fertile agricultural lands. Russia also hoped thereby to play an active role in the Middle East and South Asia. The Central Asian states strongly opposed Russian policies and fought to preserve their national identities and economic and political autonomy.

The Czarist Period

Until the 1860s, czarist Russia occupied the entire Kyrgyz Steppe (in present-day central Kazakhstan). Turkistan was under the political control of three Turkish khanates, Bukhara, Khiva, and Quqon (Kokand). These khanates had simple social, military, and administrative organizations, and they were often in conflict with one another. To gain a commercial advantage by controlling the historic Silk Road, at that time the main commercial link between Europe and Asia, the Russians attacked the Quqon khanate. In 1865, they occupied the city of Tashkent in the Bukhara khanate and then created a separate Turkistan province, whose area included today's Kazakhstan and parts of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The emir of Bukhara asked the Russians to leave Tashkent, but the Russians defeated the Bukharans and seized the cities of Khojend (present-day Khudzhand) and Uroteppa.

In January 1868, General K. P. von Kaufman, the first governor-general of Turkistan, signed a peace treaty with Quqon that made the latter a vassal of Russia. In June 1868, the emir of Bukhara was forced to sign a similar treaty, which made his khanate part of Russia. In 1873, General Kaufman organized a military operation to Khiva and forced the khan to accept the Russian protectorate. Thus all three khanates became vassals of Russia, and much of their territory was absorbed into Turkistan province.

After building a strategic railroad from the Caspian Sea to Turkistan, Russia defeated the Turkmen in 1881 and created the Transcaspian province. In 1884, the Turkmen were forced to recognize Russian authority. By 1886, Russia had divided the Turkistan governorship-general into three parts: Syr Dar'ya province, Fergana province, and Zeraushan district.

Although czarist Russia tried to solidify its dominance over Central Asia, three problems emerged. First, Russia encouraged an increased production of cotton in the region, which created a grain deficit that led to a famine. Second, because Russians were encouraged to colonize Turkistan, the native Turkic inhabitants were forced to move to less fertile lands. Third, the Russian settlers began to dominate commercial activities. Thus the Turkic communities in Central Asia came to resent Russian domination and hoped to put an end to Russian colonization and settlement.

After the 1905 Revolution by Russian workers and military officials in Central Asia against the czarist regime, Muslim nationalists, known as Jadids, began to surface in the Kyrgyz Steppe and Turkistan. In 1909, the Jadids established their first political organization in Bukhara and advocated setting up schools that taught both religion and such secular subjects as Tatar, Arabic, and Russian languages and literatures; history; philosophy of history; history of Islam; sociology; arithmetic; geography; agriculture; physics; and chemistry. They supported the unification of Turkistan under the Russian empire, but their opinion ultimately failed to carry the day.

The October 1917 Revolution

Leftist groups—the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and members of the Social Revolutionary Party—had begun to appear in Turkistan in 1917. On 7 April, the three leftist groups set up the Turkistan Committee of the Provisional Government, which then arrested General Aleksey Nikolayevich Kuropatkin (1848–1921), the czarist governor-general of Turkistan. A soviet (council) of workers and soldiers was also established in the city of Tashkent. The Turkish communities, however, did not involve themselves in the conflict between the czarist regime and the leftists. At a May 1916 congress of the Muslims in Russia, delegates elected a Central Muslim Council, dominated by the Jadids. At congresses in May and September 1917, the Turkish inhabitants of Central Asia demanded the creation of an autonomous federated republic of Turkistan in the new Russia.

At the same time, the leftist groups in the Tashkent soviet had diverging views of the new regime in Rus-

sia. On 19 November 1917, the Bolsheviks of Tashkent created their own government, the Council of People's Commissars. In turn, another All-Muslim Congress met in Quqon on 26–27 November 1917 and set up the Muslim Provisional Government of Autonomous Turkistan. But because this government lacked military power, it decided to join an anti-Communist organization called the Southeastern Union of Cossacks, Mountain Caucasians, and Peoples of the Steppe. Upon the military suppression of the Tashkent soviet by the Moscow Bolsheviks, the emir of Bukhara signed an agreement with the Tashkent administration of the Bolshevik government in Moscow, in which the latter recognized the independence of Bukhara.

In 1919, at the Third Congress of the Communist Party of Turkistan in Tashkent, a struggle between the Muslims and the Russian settlers emerged at the governmental level. The Fourth Red Army drove the Russian anti-Communist forces out of Turkistan in July. In September, the Eighth Congress of Soviets and the Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of Turkistan met in Tashkent. During the sessions, the Russian settlers rejected direct participation of native people in local governmental organs. But when the Soviet troops of the Fourth Red Army returned to Tashkent to suppress the growing uprising there (encouraged by British forces, which desired to control Iran and the Transcaspian region), the political situation altered in favor of the Muslims. To solve the problem in Tashkent, the Moscow government authorized the Fourth Red Army to investigate the situation. The Fourth Red Army Party Conference overruled the previous decision concerning the nonparticipation of Muslims in local Soviet organizations.

Near the end of the civil war (1918–1920) in Russia, the Soviets decided to reorganize Khiva. On 25 December 1919, Soviet troops from Russia crossed the Khivan borders, and a pro-Soviet Revolutionary Committee was set up. On 4 April 1920, Khiva became the People's Republic of Khorezm. The Soviet government in Moscow used similar tactics with Bukhara, when the Russian workers and the small revolutionary Young Bukharan group staged a revolt there. In September 1920, with the assistance of Russian troops, the People's Republic of Bukhara was established.

Formation of Soviet Central Asia

In the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924), the founder of the Soviet Union, declared all people in Russia to be equal and sovereign. Everyone had a right to self-determination, and during the civil war people were allowed to freely develop their native cultures, a mea-

sure enacted to obtain the support of local Muslims in Central Asia for the Bolshevik regime in Moscow. But in 1918, when the Bolsheviks began to consolidate their power in Moscow, they discussed the right of self-determination within the framework of debate on the future structure of the Soviet regime. Two conflicting proposals appeared. The first was a loose political arrangement in which socialist states would remain sovereign entities, thus rejecting the founding of an integral Soviet federation. The second was a proposal put forward by Joseph Stalin (1879–1953) for autonomization, which meant withdrawing state sovereignty from independent socialist republics and providing them with only limited autonomous status. Lenin chose the middle way. The socialist republics would have a right to self-determination, but only the workers could participate in this decision.

The Turkic communities were disappointed with this new policy. Some nationalist groups rebelled against Soviet authority, but they were ultimately forced to become part of the Soviet federation. At Lenin's request, Stalin prepared a new policy for non-Russian nationalities, which promoted a process of nation building. At the same time, independent socialist republics would have only limited autonomous status.

In December 1922, the Communist Party granted the larger non-Russian nationality groups the status of republics in the Soviet Union. In October 1923, the Fourth Congress modified the Soviet Union's constitution, and on 29 September 1924, the Fifth Congress decided to change the name from People's Republic to Socialist Republic. In October 1924, the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union voted to establish two socialist republics in Central Asia (Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan), as well as two autonomous republics (Tajikistan and Kazakhstan). (A socialist republic was a sovereign Soviet state that had united with other Soviet republics in the USSR, exercising independent authority in its territory and having its own constitution; an autonomous republic was a constituent part of a socialist republic.) On 5 December 1929, Tajikistan became a republic of the Soviet Union, and on 5 December 1936, the same status was granted to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. These republics together made up Soviet Central Asia.

The Cold War Period

Under the Soviet regime, Russian dominance over Central Asia reached its highest level. In the political arena, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union put all regional and local organizations under its control. The decisions of the republics had to conform with the policies of the central authority in Moscow.

Although in each republic the first secretary of the republic's Communist Party was a native inhabitant, the second-secretary, who was a Russian, controlled and managed all administrative, economic, and governmental affairs. Thus the native people were absent from the policy-making process of the Soviet Union.

In the economic field, Moscow planned and regulated the economic policies of each republic of the Soviet Union. The Soviet regime encouraged Russian specialists and workers to migrate into the non-Russian republics.

In the cultural field, the Soviet regime tried to create a unified Soviet nationality; thus non-Russians were subjected to a Russification policy. In the 1930s, the number of Russian schools in the non-Russian republics was increased. The Russian language was promoted as the first language of all the Soviet peoples. Finally, Russian became the official language of the republics and had to be used in all official communications.

The Central Asian republics were sensitive about their traditions and national identities and reacted against Russian dominance, particularly the nationality policy. Despite Moscow's policies, native inhabitants tried to preserve their identities and objected to the Russians' view of themselves as civilizers of primitive people.

Collapse of the Soviet Union

Mikhail Gorbachev (b. 1931), the last secretary-general of the USSR, proposed that the Soviet Union preserve its powerful position while granting more autonomy to the various republics. The president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin (b. 1931), wanted to retain some form of union among the Soviet republics, and this was the view of the Central Asian states as well. On 23 April 1991, Gorbachev and the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the five Central Asian members signed an agreement for a new treaty that provided for a union of sovereign states to replace the Soviet Union. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and officials of the Red Army and KGB attempted a coup against Mikhail Gorbachev's administration in Moscow (19–21 August 1991) in the name of restoring order and law in the USSR, but they failed to overthrow the government.

But the August coup intensified the nationalistic feelings of the Soviet republics and their desire for independence. During the election campaign Boris Yeltsin had maintained that Russia should become independent in order to solve domestic economic and social problems. Ukraine and Belarus had the same idea. After the aborted August coup, Yeltsin became

more popular and powerful. Ukraine became concerned that implementation of the new union treaty was not possible, and therefore held a referendum in which voters opted for independence. Russia for its part realized that without Ukraine, the new union treaty would be meaningless. As a result, on 8 December 1991, without consulting with the Central Asian states, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus signed a formal agreement announcing the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

This agreement angered the Central Asian states, because it destroyed their hopes of retaining a strong center. The Central Asian states held a meeting on 12 December 1991 in Ashkabad, the capital of Turkmenistan, and discussed the establishment of a Turkistan federation. At the request of Nursultan Nazarbaev (b. 1940), the president of Kazakhstan, the other members accepted the idea, and joined as cofounders. After the Slavic republics (Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine) accepted the proposal, the CIS recognized the independence and the existing borders of its eleven cofounders: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldavia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The agreement created only a loose federation, because its governing bodies, a council of heads of states and a council of heads of governments, lacked authority to impose decisions on any member. The council was to be assisted by committees that focused on areas such as foreign affairs, defense, and economics. The agreement did not settle questions about a common military policy and nuclear-weapons control.

Post-Cold War Era

From 1991 to 1993, the Russian authorities viewed any close relations with the Central Asian states as destructive to their economic and democratic reforms—in their eyes, the Central Asian leaders had failed to establish democratic regimes, maintaining instead authoritarian regimes that violated human rights. For that reason, the Russians refused any form of union with the Central Asian states. Russia introduced economic reforms without consulting the Central Asian states, stopped financial assistance to Central Asia, and followed protectionist economic policies that created difficulties for Central Asia. In short, Russia's economic and monetary policies prevented the Central Asian states from conducting independent economic, budgetary, and financial policies. As a result, the Central Asian states introduced national currencies and limited their relations with Russia. They attempted to gain direct access to world markets. In 1993, they even decided to create a Central Asia Regional Council, ex-

cluding Russia. Under the influence of ultranationalist and Communist groups, Russia changed its policy toward Central Asia in 1993, attempted to create a CIS customs union, and increased its financial assistance to these states.

In December 1991, at the first summit of heads of CIS member states in Minsk, the CIS decided that each state should be free to create its own national army. On 15 May 1992, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed the Treaty on Collective Security during the summit of heads of CIS member states in Tashkent. The treaty established a collective security council consisting of heads of member states and commanders of CIS joint armed forces. In addition, the member states were to refrain from the use of force or threat of force in their relations with one another. They were to abstain from entering into blocs hostile to one another, and they agreed to conduct consultations on security issues and coordinate their defense policies.

In October 1992, the CIS reached an agreement on military security in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The CIS decided on the establishment of collective observer and peacekeeping forces to end armed conflicts in the CIS. But the attitudes of Russia and other member states jeopardized the agreements regarding collective security. Central Asian members were concerned that such agreements might be dominated by Russia. During the CIS summit in February 1995 in Almaty, Kazakhstan, Russia proposed a common defense of CIS frontiers, including airspace. This proposal was rejected.

On the question of Russians living in the region, the Central Asian states tried to avoid any confrontation with Russia. They were concerned that Russia might use these Russians as an excuse to intervene militarily in their domestic affairs. Nevertheless, despite Russia's demands, the Central Asian states (except Turkmenistan) refused to grant dual citizenship.

In the case of transportation of oil and gas reserves of the Caspian Sea region, the Central Asian states prefer to follow a multiple pipeline-network policy. They do not want to see Russian dominance over their regional resources. There is still a debate among the Central Asian states on the nature of Russia's involvement, its percentage share, and the transportation routes.

Present-Day Relations

The Central Asian states today completely oppose any continuation of Russian dominance over the region; they prefer to develop alternative economic, political, and security relations with other major countries, such the United States and the European Union,

while preserving their relations with Russia. The Central Asian states want to preserve their independence and territorial integrity and intend to become members of the international community.

In military affairs, the Central Asian states see Russia as a potential ally in their struggle against domestic opposition, radical Islam, and ethnic and territorial conflicts in the region. They welcome the Russian presence to balance the power of neighbors such as China, Iran, and Afghanistan.

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CENTRAL ASIAN LANGUAGES An enormous number of languages are spoken by the various ethnic groups that inhabit Central Asia. Turkic languages, which belong to the Altaic family of world

languages, are the most frequently spoken in Central Asia, followed by the Iranian (mainly Tajik) and Slavic languages (Russian and Ukrainian), which belong to the Indo-European family. The numerous languages of Central Asia reflect the various peoples who moved into and through the region and demonstrate the significance of this area not only for its natural resources but also for its strategic role as a major crossroad in Asia.

The Russian language has been an important influence in Central Asian education, administration, and interethnic communication since the time of imperial Russia and during the Soviet regime. Each ethnic language used in the area was given its own Cyrillic alphabet by the Soviet regime during the 1940s. In post-Soviet Central Asia, however, the independent states changed their language policies, declaring the language of the ethnic majority as the state language. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have also changed their alphabets from Cyrillic to Latin. Central Asian states use their state languages increasingly in education, although they are having difficulties in finding course materials in these languages. There is a growing demand for courses in English as a foreign language, rather than Russian, because there is a desire to integrate with the international community.

Languages of Kazakhstan

The official language of Kazakhstan is Kazakh, a Turkic language, although Russian is also commonly used and is the language of interethnic communication. Most of the population is bilingual in Russian as well as their own ethnic languages. The languages spoken in Kazakhstan are Kazakh, Russian, Ukrainian, German, Uzbek, Tatar, and "other", a category that includes languages as diverse as Armenian, Bashkir, Korean, Polish, and Romanian.

Languages of Kyrgyzstan

The official language of Kyrgyzstan is Kyrgyz, a Turkic language. Russian is used as the interethnic language of communication. Seventy percent of the population can speak Kyrgyz. One-third of the Kyrgyz and many of the minorities speak Russian fluently. The most commonly used languages are Kyrgyz, Russian, Uzbek, Dungan, Ukrainian, Uighur, Crimean Tatar and Tatar, Meskhetian Turkish, Kazakh, Tajik, German, and Korean. As in Kazakhstan, a large number of other languages are also present in small numbers.

Languages of Tajikistan

The official language of Tajikistan is Tajik, an Iranian language. Russian is used as the interethnic lan-

guage of communication. Major languages used are Tajik, Uzbek, Russian, Tatar, Kyrgyz, and "other."

Languages of Turkmenistan

The official language of Turkmenistan is Turkmen, a Turkic language, spoken by 77 percent of the population. Other major languages are Uzbek, Russian, Kazakh, and "other."

Languages of Uzbekistan

The official language of Uzbekistan is Uzbek, a Turkic language. It is spoken by 74.3 percent of the population, of which ethnic Uzbeks make up 80 percent. Russian is the other main language. Although Russian may act as the interethnic language of communication, the minorities are increasingly learning Uzbek. Other languages spoken in Uzbekistan include Tajik, Kazakh, Karakalpak, Tatar, and "other."

Turkic Languages of Central Asia

Although almost all Turkic languages are represented in Central Asia, the Turkic languages with the most speakers in the area are Bashkir, Crimean Tatar, Karakalpak, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Volga Tatar, Turkmen, Uighur, and Uzbek. Most of the Turkic languages are closely related, and it is sometimes difficult to draw the distinction between languages and dialects. Spoken forms are generally mutually intelligible, with intelligibility decreasing the greater the distance separating two languages. The imperial Russians and later the Soviets classified and named the Turkic languages to fit their own political aims, sometimes naming dialects as separate languages and giving them their own alphabets. Because of population movements—voluntary or forced migrations (such as those initiated by Stalin during the 1940s)—Turkic-speaking groups have been mixed. The influence of Islam can be seen in the Arabic and Persian words in the lexicons of the Turkic languages. The influence of Iranian languages is greater in some languages, such as Uzbek, because of the speakers' geographical proximity to and history shared with speakers of Iranian languages. The influence of Russian, which was the main language of administration and education during both imperial Russian and Soviet periods, is felt especially in the lexicons of individual languages and in the sound systems. Since the early 1990s, Uzbeks and Turkmen have worked to eliminate Russian and other foreign words. The Turkic languages spoken in Central Asia were written in Arabic script before the 1920s. During the late 1920s, there was a common Latin alphabet for all Turkic languages, but around 1940 the Soviets decided to give the Turkic languages and dialects their own

Cyrillic alphabets. After 1990, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan adopted Latin alphabets. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan still use their versions of the Cyrillic alphabet.

Similarities between the Turkic languages start with vowel harmony, which is the main aspect of their sound systems. Vowel harmony is the agreement of vowels in a word according to where they are produced in the mouth; that is, whether they are pronounced in the front or the back of the mouth, or whether the lips are rounded or not, and so forth. The main feature of the syntactic system of Turkic languages is agglutination through a rich system of inflectional and derivational suffixes. For example, the verbs carry time and aspect suffixes as well as personal endings, along with suffixes for negation and question; therefore it is possible to have very long words rather than the sentences typical of other languages. Nouns can be made into verbs and into other nouns; verbs can be changed into nouns and into other verbs through adding suffixes. Adjectives and genitives always precede the noun, and the position before the verb is reserved for the new information that is the focus of the sentence. The normal word order is subject-object-verb; thus the subject occurs at the beginning of the sentence, and the direct object immediately precedes the verb. Instead of prepositions, Turkic has postpositions, and the nouns take dative, accusative, ablative, locative, genitive, and possessive suffixes.

Bashkir Bashkir belongs to the Kipchak (Uralian Kipchak) branch of the Turkic languages. It is spoken in Russia as well as in Central Asia. It is close to Tatar. Its dialects are Kuvakan, Yurmaty, and Burzhan. It was given its own Cyrillic alphabet by the Soviets.

Crimean Tatar Crimean Tatar belongs to the Kipchak (Ponto-Caspian, or Southern) branch of the Turkic languages. It was written in Arabic script until 1928, but between 1928 and 1938 the Latin alphabet was used; this was followed by Cyrillic, and after 1990 the Latin alphabet was adopted. The standard language is based on the Central dialect, but there are also Northern and Southern dialects. It is spoken in Central Asia due to forced migrations from the Crimea in the 1940s.

Karakalpak Karakalpak belongs to the Kipchak (Central) branch of the Turkic languages. It has two main dialects, Northeast and Southeast. It is spoken in the Karakalpak region of Uzbekistan, as well as in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. It is very close to Kazakh, although the region where it is spoken is part of Uzbekistan.

Kazakh Kazakh belongs to the Kipchak (Central) branch of the Turkic languages. Its dialects are Northeastern Kazakh, Southern Kazakh, and Western Kazakh. It is the official language of Kazakhstan; outside Central Asia it is spoken in China, Mongolia, Iran, and Afghanistan, as well as by small groups in Turkey and Germany. Kazakh and Karakalpak are closely related; the latter can be regarded as almost a dialect of Kazakh.

Kyrgyz Kyrgyz belongs to the Northern branch of the Turkic languages. It has Northern and Southern dialects. Outside Central Asia, it is spoken in Afghanistan and China, where the Kyrgyz are an official nationality and use an Arabic script. It is also used in Turkey by Kyrgyz immigrants.

Tatar Tatar belongs to the Kipchak (Uralian Kipchak) branch of the Turkic languages. It has three main dialects, which are sometimes referred to as languages: Volga Tatar (also known as Middle Tatar or Kazan Tatar), Western Tatar (also known as Misher), and Eastern Tatar (Siberian Tatar). Tatar is spoken in the Republic of Tatarstan in Russia and in a number of districts in Bashkortostan, Mari, El, Udmurtia, Mordvina, and many other regions of European Russia, as well as in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. The oldest surviving Tatar texts date to the thirteenth century. The modern literary language has developed under the influence of spoken Tatar since the nineteenth century. The writing system was based on Arabic script until 1927, when a Latin alphabet came into use; it was replaced in 1939 by a Cyrillic script. Recently a decision to switch to the Latin alphabet was made.

Turkmen Turkmen belongs to the Southwest (Oghuz) branch of the Turkic languages. Its major dialects are Yomut, Teke, Salir, Sarik, Goldeng, Arsar, and Chowdr. The standard, based on the Yomut and Teke dialects, was developed in the 1920s. As a literary language, Turkmen appeared during the eighteenth century in Arabic script. A Latin alphabet was introduced in 1929 and was replaced by a Cyrillic alphabet in 1940. In 1993, a new Turkmen alphabet in Latin script was adopted.

Uighur Uighur (Eastern Turki) belongs to the Eastern branch of the Turkic languages. It is the official language of the region of Xinjiang Uygur (along with Standard Mandarin) in northwest China and the native language of ethnic Uighurs. In Kazakhstan the Taranci dialect and in Uzbekistan the Kashgar-Yarkand dialects of Uighur are used. Soviet Standard Uighur was written in the Latin alphabet, and later a

Cyrillic alphabet was introduced. In China, Cyrillic was introduced during the 1950s, followed by Latin in the 1960s, and in 1983 an Arabic alphabet was reinstated.

Uzbek Uzbek belongs to the Eastern branch of the Turkic languages. It has been the official language of Uzbekistan since 1989. It is used also in Afghanistan and China as well as in the states of the former Soviet Union. Written standard Uzbek is based on the form of the language spoken in Tashkent and the Fergana valley, areas under the influence of Iranian languages, namely Tajik. Its major dialects are Qarlug, Kipchak, and Oghuz. Uzbek is known as the direct descendant of Chagatay, a medieval literary language commonly used in Central Asia. After being written in various forms of the Arabic alphabet until the late 1920s, a Latin alphabet was used until the 1940s, when a Cyrillic alphabet was given to the Uzbeks by the Soviet administration. In 1993, after independence, Uzbekistan adopted a Latin alphabet and started a language-cleansing project to get rid of borrowed Russian words.

Indo-Iranian Languages in Central Asia

The Iranian branch of this group is common in Central Asia, mainly in Tajikistan, where it is known as Tajik, a dialect descended from Middle Persian.

In the Iranian languages, the nouns are inflected for case, number, gender, and definiteness or indefiniteness. There are prepositions and postpositions (which mark belonging or definiteness). Another typical feature of these languages is the distinction between absolute and oblique cases. The absolute case is used for the predicate nominative, and the oblique case is the marker of indirect, postpositional, or prepositional objects. The verb system is complex, with conjugations and suffixes. The basic word order is subject-object-verb. Relative clauses follow the noun they describe, and most adjectives follow rather than precede the noun.

Tajik Tajik belongs to a subgroup of the West Iranian languages that includes Farsi and Dari, the languages spoken in Iran and Afghanistan, respectively. Because of intense contact with Turkic-language speakers and a high rate of bilingualism with Uzbek and Kyrgyz, Tajik has been influenced by the Turkic languages. Its lexicon also has many terms from Russian. The main dialect division in Tajik is between the Northwestern and Southwestern groups. The Northwestern dialects, which are the basis of Standard Tajik, are also spoken in southern Uzbekistan. The most northern Northwestern dialects have the most Turkicized structure. The language has no grammatical gender or articles, but person and number distinctions are

maintained. Nouns are marked for specificity: one marker in the singular and two in the plural. Objects of transitive verbs are marked by a suffix. Verbs are formed using one of two basic stems, present and past; aspect is as important as tense. Verbs agree with the subject in person and number. Tajik verbs are normally compounds consisting of a noun and a verb. Word order is subject-object-verb.

Tajik was written in Arabic script until the early 1900s. A Latin alphabet was introduced in 1928 and was used until replaced by the Cyrillic alphabet in 1940. A modified Cyrillic alphabet is in use, but recently the government has attempted to return to the Latin alphabet.

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CENTRAL ASIAN REGIONALISM Central Asian regionalism is a somewhat abstract notion that suggests cohesion among the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan based on common circumstances of geography, ethnicity, language, culture, history, and religion.

Geography and History

Geographic proximity is the main influence in shaping regional understandings, and Central Asia is no exception. Located at the crossroads of the old Silk Road, the Central Asian states have historically shared the same fate when confronted by expansionist powers—conquest. Invaders came from all sides; the geography

of Central Asia (Russia and the open steppes to the north, mountains to the south and east and the Caspian Sea to the west) lent itself to the strategic pursuit of power and wealth. The ancient cities of Bukhara, Samarqand, Osh, Merv, and Almaty served not only as trade centers for the settled urban populations of the region, but also as trophies for foreign invaders.

Dating back to the Scythian conquest of the Cimmerian state between 750 and 700 BCE, the peoples of Central Asia have suffered a long succession of foreign invasions. Invading peoples have included the Greeks, the Mongols, the Huns, the Avars, the Khazars, the Turks, the Arabs, the Russians and the Soviets. As a result of these conquests there were great infusions of language, culture, and religion that worked to shape the region by blending foreign and local customs. In this fashion many of the more distinctive features of Uzbek and Kazak society, for example, became diluted in favor of a more homogenous "Central Asian" identity.

Ethnicity

The interplay between ethnicity and identity in Central Asia is a major contributor to the notion of Central Asian regionalism. As waves of conquerors moved through the region the indigenous Central Asia peoples mixed with ethnically similar and dissimilar peoples. Over time, whole ethnic groups were moved in and out of the region in order to create a more manageable political situation for the invading armies. Accordingly, ethnic identity became relatively fluid, as past influences, such as a sedentary or nomadic lifestyle and "traditional" geographic homelands and bloodlines became intertwined or even eliminated. Today, tribes and clans are most commonly described as the institutions that exercise localized control of politics and economics. Historically they are perpetuated through family bloodlines, geography, and past allegiances. Regional power groupings maintain local bases of support, while national offices preserve regional and local connections. Today government ministries are often dominated by members of a single clan, as is the case in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

To complicate matters, however, the term *clan* is employed differently across Central Asia. In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan the clans are based on lines of descent, emanating originally from the Kazakh Greater, Lesser, and Golden Hordes. Their respective political and social structures are based on kinship, which was traced patriarchally. Their territories are named after the inhabiting groups (Turkmen in Turkmenistan, Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan, and Karakalpaks in Karakalpakstan). This nomadic model of clan identification con-

trasts with the sedentary model of clan organization and identification in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, where clans are based on regional networks of patron-client relations, themselves based on the political and administrative institutions of their respective states. As a consequence of this structure, clan names are a derivative of their geographic locale, most often an oasis city, rather than blood lines. Uzbek examples include the Samarqand, Bukhara, and Tashkent clans. Examples from Tajikistan include the Khujandi and Kulabi clans. As is the case in Afghanistan, Central Asia's southern neighbor, the institutions of tribes and clans and their direct connection to ethnicity and identity can produce social, political, and economic instability on a grand scale. And yet it is these same institutions that provide the fundamental logic for the assertion of Central Asian regionalism.

Language

A common Turkic linguistic heritage, except in Tajikistan, where the dialect is a derivation of the Persian Farsi, and the accompanying cultural markers, such as festivals and customs, underscores the ethnicity and identity elements of regionalism. It is important to note that while each of the Central Asian states has experienced a cultural renaissance since their independence, most notably expressed by the official adoption of the titular languages, Russian remains the lingua franca of the region. This holdover from the colonial past serves as a unifying factor across the region for the conduct of business, science, and other cooperative affairs.

Religion

Finally, the prevalence of Islam across the region is yet another factor that contributes to the construction of Central Asia as a single collective unit. The ability of Islam to cross ethnic, linguistic, social, political, or territorial boundaries makes it both a great force for consolidation and peace and a force for instability and violence. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Islam in Central Asia is seen as a threat to the Western powers, and as such something that needs to be contained. To date the leaders of the Central Asian republics have been all too happy to oblige the West in its attempts to suppress "radical" or "fundamentalist" Islamic movements. Religious-based political parties, or popular fronts, as they are better known in the region, are outlawed in all five of the Central Asian states. No other factor, including the independence of the region from the former Soviet Union, is considered more important as a defining factor for the future of the region.

Regionalism in Central Asia will continue to evolve as the leaders and populations of those republics seek to define and establish their place within an increasingly integrated world.

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CENTRAL HIGHLANDS OF VIETNAM

(1990 pop. 2.9 million). The central highlands of Vietnam comprise three provinces—Gia Lai–Kon Tum, Dac Lac, and Lam Dong. They include 55,569 square kilometers or 16.6 percent of the country's total area but only 4.1 percent of its total population. The population density of the central highlands is 52 persons per square kilometer, compared to 215 for the country and more than 1,000 in the Red River Delta. While the Kinh-Vietnamese are the dominant ethnic group in the low coastal areas, the central highlands are the home of indigenous peoples such as the Xo-dang, Ba-na, Giou-rai, E-de, Mo-nong, and Ma. These Austroasiatic and Austronesian groups arrived from southern China and settled in the highlands around 2500–1500 BCE because of the fertile soils, rich fauna, and favorable climate. Some groups are still practicing swidden (slash-and-burn) agriculture and living in longhouses.

In the sixteenth century CE, the Kinh-Vietnamese conquered the eastern lowlands, and traders bartered salt, fabrics, and ironware for bush products without endangering the indigenous cultural patterns. In the middle of the nineteenth century, a few French priests moved near the city of Kon Tum in order to evangelize the hill tribes. From 1888 onward, the French administration encouraged Kinh settlements in the central highlands to relieve the overcrowded Red River Delta and, at the same time, to procure labor for the new plantation sector. By 1954, French colonists had extended the tea, rubber, and coffee plantations to about 110,000 hectares, and the number of Kinh working there had risen to at least 150,000 people. One-half to two-thirds of the Kinh in the central highlands, as well as some ethnic Chinese people, lived in towns associated with the plantations, such as Kon Tum, Pleiku, and Buan Me Thuot.

During the Vietnam War (1954–1975), the peoples of the central highlands were suspected of disloyalty by both the Communist Viet Minh and the South Vietnamese government, and they suffered ill-treatment from both sides. Defoliation programs during the war caused large areas to become toxic. Altogether, between 200,000 and 220,000 people died. In the postwar period about 2 million Kinh were sent to "new economic zones" in the highlands, greatly affecting the cultural patterns of the hill tribes, who now comprise less than a quarter of the population of the central highlands.

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CERAMICS-JAPAN The radical changes that Japan has undergone over the last hundred years to become a major world economic power have not resulted in the loss of the country's rich and diverse ceramic tradition. In the early 2000s, Japan's ceramic artists and craftspeople are among the most numerous of any country in the world.

The art of the tea ceremony (*chado*) is connected to the history of ceramics in Japan. The old imperial capital city of Kyoto is one of many localities known for its ceramics, particularly the low-fired *raku* pots that are associated with the tea ceremony's founding tea master, Sen no Rikyu. *Raku* means "leisure," but it is also the family name of the Kyoto potters who made tea bowls using what is now generically called the *raku* process, in which a highly porous, partly fired clay pot is glazed, fired to maturity, and cooled quickly. The red-hot pot is removed from a small kiln and quickly placed in leaves or other material that smokes and creates accidental effects through the uneven removal of oxygen from the glaze, carbon deposits on parts of the pot, and sometimes crackles in certain glazes. These tea bowls epitomize the aesthetic sense of *shibui*—quiet, simple beauty.

Kaiseki, the food served to guests at a tea ceremony, also required special ceramics. *Kaiseki* originally consisted of a combination of simply prepared foods pre-

sented in an elegant way that incorporated ceramics as an important element. The appropriate foods must look well in a dish, and both dish and food must fit the season and be compatible with the space in which the meal takes place. Even prior to the development of *kaiseki*, Japanese party food was served in small individual and separate dishes, because mixing items on one plate or bowl compromised the purity of the unique flavors of each item. This preference is expressed in the proliferation of various shapes, sizes, glazes (or lack of glazes), colors, and textures used in ceramic plates, bowls, and teapots that are part of the same feast. The ware used must also fit the type of food or drink: coffee or English tea requires special European-style cups with saucers, while Japanese tea and rice wine (sake) require their own ware.

Other traditional arts that utilize ceramics have contributed to the development and appreciation of pottery: the tiny water bottles used with ink stones in calligraphy, clay incense holders for altar offerings, vases for ikebana (flower arrangement), and pots for miniature tree cultivation (bonsai). Motifs from ceramic decorations appear in other forms, for example, on kimono silks, fans, and wrapping paper. Ceramic objects are a ubiquitous part of Japan's consumer culture, which, in turn, has ensured the vitality of ceramics as an artistic as well as commercial enterprise.

Origins

The people who inhabited Japan during the Jomon period (10,000–300 BCE) were named after the traces they left in clay—rope impressions made when cords of fiber were pressed onto soft, moist clay. Jomon culture evolved into the more complex Yayoi culture (300 BCE–300 CE), during which time Japan partook of the spread of Chinese influence and the economic transformation introduced by rice cultivation.

Japanese ceramics, like other aspects of Japanese culture, were affected by the recurring waves of contact with China and Korea. Along with the introduction of new technology and techniques for kiln building, firing, glazing, and forming, Buddhist and Confucian ideas affected the way in which potters and their patrons and clients approached the craft.

Arita, Imari, and Porcelains

In the early sixteenth century, a Japanese is said to have returned from a five-year visit to China, where he learned porcelain manufacture with blue-and-white decoration (*some-tsuke*). He introduced to Japan the technique of using cobalt salts to paint designs on pots formed of the white clay brought from China, which

were then glazed and fired. Production was not to last, however, since this type of clay was not available in Japan until the early seventeenth century, when abundant China clay (porcelain) deposits were discovered in the Arita region of Kyushu. In the mid-seventeenth century, the Dutch East India Company began to import Japanese porcelain made by potters using the cobalt salts technique in Arita. A large-scale export industry developed, and because the porcelain ware was shipped from Imari port in Arita, the export ware was called Imari ware by Europeans.

Arita designs were originally influenced by Korea and China, but in time Chinese and European potteries began in turn to copy Japanese Imari designs. Arita is also known for two other types of porcelain, Nabeshima and Kakiemon, which had styles distinct from the export porcelains. Both are highly valued by Japanese collectors and have ornate designs that reflect the tastes of the Tokugawa period (1600/1603–1868). Arita continues to be a major pottery region in Japan.

Another major ceramic-producing locality is Seto, located near Nagoya City; Seto has a variety of different potteries, some small and some with automated



A Bizen ware sake bottle, c. 1392–1573. (SAKAMOTO PHOTO RESEARCH LABORATORY/CORBIS)



BIZEN WARE

Glazes are not applied to Bizen ware before firing, instead the unique characteristics spring from the firing process. The chemical oxidation and reduction of the iron rich clay found in the Bizen region during the firing, plus flying ash from the pine wood used as fuel, create the delightful effects that are prized.

Pots touching each other protect the clay surface from some of the effects caused by the kiln atmosphere to create interesting "shadows" that contrast with the surrounding surface. Ash flying about in certain parts of the kiln reacts with the superheated clay surface of pots to create rough textured glaze spots called *goma* (sesame seeds). A blue-black hue (*ao-Bizen*) is produced when the oxygen content of the kiln's atmosphere is reduced, causing iron oxide and metallic iron to appear on the clay body. Cords of straw soaked in brine and wrapped around pots create *hidasuke* (fire-cord markings) during the firing: the straw burns away, allowing sodium from the salt to react with the clay to form bright red glaze streaks on the neutral background of the pot's surface. All of these effects and their variations (pots coming from the same kiln vary), give Bizen its distinctiveness. Bizen's spontaneity, directness, and simplicity evoke its subtle aesthetic.

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production-line methods of turning out huge numbers of pots. Seto, like many pottery-producing areas of Japan, dates back to feudal times and is an area that has good supplies of natural clay.

Scattered throughout Japan are numerous active kiln sites, many of which trace their histories to the Momoyama period (1573–1600), when Korean craftspeople were brought (often forcibly) to Japan to produce various wares. The six old kiln sites that have survived from these times are Tamba, Bizen, Shigaraki, Echizen, Seto, and Tokoname. Many potters had been supported by feudal lords, but with the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the fief system was abolished, and clan potteries went into decline. Some of the craftspeople active today in these areas, however, are considered direct descendants of the founding potters.

Western Influences

The most important Western influences on ceramics came after the opening of Japan to the West

in 1853. Beginning in the late 1800s, new techniques, including mass production, rapidly entered Japan with the Meiji government's efforts to destroy feudal institutions and to industrialize and modernize the nation. The German chemist and engineer Gottfried Wagner (1831–1897) was hired as a government adviser, and through his work in Arita, potters and manufacturers were introduced to plaster molds, new glazes and pigments, use of coal for firing kilns, and other Western approaches to pottery making. Trade schools were established to train workers for modern industries, including ceramics.

The mass production of ceramic ware created a new industry, but some traditional potteries continued. Revitalization of traditional methods began primarily after World War II. For example, Toyo Kaneshige (1896–1967), a seventy-eighth-generation potter in Bizen in Okayama prefecture, noting the decline in quality of Bizen ceramics over the generations, revived interest in the high artistic standards set by the tea

bowls of the medieval period and began experimenting with the firing methods (such as using no kiln furniture to stack the pots) of his ancestors, creating spectacular examples of Bizen ware. In recognition of Kaneshige's contributions, the national government designated him a Living National Treasure.

Over the years, ancient kiln sites that had fallen into disuse and near oblivion were in many cases later reestablished by potters attempting to revive and reproduce the ceramic traditions of the site, while claiming that the new pottery had authentic connections with the distant past. Thus there is a certain myth-making aspect to the history of ceramics in Japan that smoothes over discontinuities by implying an unbroken tradition.

Japan also was influenced by the European reaction against mass-produced ware. This revolt was articulated in Victorian England by William Morris (1834–1898), who called for the recognition and appreciation of the beauty of traditional arts and crafts in the industrial age. In Japan, Soetsu Yanagi (1869–1961), with the celebrated potters Shoji Hamada (1894–1978) and Kanjiro Kawai (1890–1966), started the *mingei* ("people's crafts") movement and founded the Japan Folk Art Association. Yanagi wrote essays on the philosophy of *mingei*, and his work *The Unknown Craftsman* represents a fusion of Buddhist philosophy and the ideals of the Arts and Crafts Movement. Yanagi was concerned about the decline of traditional village potteries and worked to create an appreciation of the ceramic works produced in villages. He was also especially interested in the revival of the folk arts of Korea (which Japan ruled from 1910 until the end of World War II) and Okinawa. At the same time, he helped the formation of an aesthetic mystique of the anonymous crafts-artist who works intensely, but is not driven by individualistic ego, which continues to inspire Japanese and Western craftspeople. The English potter Bernard Leach (1887–1979) was a strong supporter of the Japanese *mingei* movement and formed close friendships with Yanagi, Hamada, and Kawai.

Hamada, originally from Tokyo, established himself in the pottery village of Mashiko, where he lived the life of a *mingei* potter, not signing his pots in the belief that the collective tradition was the author.

Proliferation of Styles

Some potteries have been established more recently, born of the fact that ceramic styles proliferate depending on the market. Many potters adopt the style that is in fashion, while others work in the same style for several generations.

The variety of ceramic ware found in Japan is partly due to local conditions—clays vary widely depending on the site, and potters enjoy treating unique characteristics of the clay body as elements in the design of a pot. For example, tiny stones found in the clay in the old city of Hagi (Yamaguchi prefecture) can burst through the clay during firing, forming various subtly colored effects that make some Hagi ware highly prized.

The variety is also due to the periods of influence from abroad—Chinese and Korean cultures have greatly affected Japanese ceramics, just as they did other arts. As mentioned earlier, a major influence occurred in the Momoyama period, when the warlord Hideyoshi brought Korean master potters to Japan.

Some potters in villages today are direct descendants of the original potters from Korea, and Karatsu ware (named after its locale, a castle town on the coast of the Sea of Japan) is a notable example of Korean influences. One type of Karatsu ware uses a suspension of iron oxide in water, which is painted onto a glazed ware before it is fired. After the iron oxide painting of a tree or other design dries, a thin overglaze is applied, and when the pot has been fired, the effect is that of an elegant brush painting on the teacup or dish. Another type of Karatsu ware utilizes impressed patterns on the moist clay that is covered with a white slip (a creamy mixture of clay and water), which is carefully scraped off so that the white slip remains in the impressions. This inlay technique is called *mishima* (named after a shrine in Japan's Mishima city) by international potters, though the technique actually originated with the captured Korean potters brought to Japan. In Korea, the *mishima* technique was taken to elegant heights in the gray-green celadon porcelain ware of the Koryo dynasty (918–1392). Much of the signature work of the potter Tatsuzo Shimaoka (b. 1919) uses this technique in a unique way: impressions made by cords (reminiscent of ancient Jomon earthenware patterns) are inlaid with white slip and high fired using a transparent glaze.

Toward Modern Expression

The ceramic artist Kenkichi Tomimoto (1886–1963) freed the art of pottery from its traditional constraints, including *mingei*. Along with Bernard Leach, Torimoto used the potter's wheel, rather than having workers make the pots that the potter then glazed. Tomimoto also excelled in creating original works and in 1949 started the first ceramic arts department in a college in Japan: the Kyoto Municipal College of Fine Arts. Since Tomimoto, Japan has seen a growth of studio ceramists who create contemporary expressions in clay, some inspired by artists such as America's revolutionary Peter Voulkos

(b. 1924), who treated ceramics primarily as an expressive medium, breaking out of the constraints of its utilitarian functions. Two examples of this opening of Japan to the international contemporary movement in ceramics are Mutsuo Yanagihara (b. 1934), who studied under Tomimoto, and Kimpei Nakamura (b. 1935), whose father Banzan makes tea bowls in the traditional manner.

Victor Kobayashi

See also: **Ceramics—Korea**

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CERAMICS—KOREA Korea has a long history of pottery making, dating back to the prehistoric era, and for the last two millennia it has been a leader in ceramic arts. A sizable portion of the ceramics work



A Longquan ware celadon jar with lotus petal lid created c. 1279-1368. (ASIAN ART & ARCHAEOLOGY, INC./CORBIS)

in the world today owes its genesis to techniques developed by Korean craftspeople. Early Korean pottery was highly influenced by that of neighboring China, but truly indigenous ceramic ware appeared in Shilla early in the Three Kingdoms period (220–265 CE). High-fired stoneware first appeared in the fourth century, and ceramics took the form of jars, pots, cups, urns, figurines, and roof tiles. The pottery of this period came to be identified by the kingdom in which it was produced. Koguryo and Paekche ceramics were noted for their brown and green glazes, while Shilla ceramics were recognized by more random color in the glazes.

Koryo Celadons

Ceramics reached their zenith in the twelfth century during the Koryo kingdom (918–1392). This period is most noted for its exquisite greenish celadons (glazes). Early Koryo plain celadons were influenced by Song China, but later works show a unique and distinct style. Some celadons were painted with white or black slips or iron oxide, while others were inlaid using an ingenious Korean technique. The pattern was incised and filled with white or black slip. The work was then fired, covered with celadon glaze, and refired. With the Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century, slight changes in firing methods and simplification of techniques led to degradation in designs, decorative patterns, and color quality.

Choson Porcelain

The decline of Koryo celadon gave rise to an unusual type of pottery known as *punchong* ware, which was the only pottery allowed for use by commoners in the first two centuries of the Choson dynasty (1392–1910). Although the glazing was similar to that of Koryo celadon, the decorative technique was different. The most typical type of *punchong* decoration was the stamping-and-inlaying technique. It consisted of stamped-on designs with white slip brushed on. After the set slip was scraped off, the stamped designs remained filled with white clay. During the Japanese invasions of 1592–1598, exquisite pieces of celadon and *punchong* ware were seized and kilns were destroyed, bringing an end to the production and use of *punchong* ware.

After the Japanese invasions, Choson white porcelain developed under royal patronage. The Confucian state required a more simple style than the elaborate designs of Koryo. Choson white porcelain was first characterized by an opaque whiteness, later by cobalt-blue decorations, and later still by folkloric designs. In the twentieth century, Koryo kilns in the far southwest were excavated by South Korea in an at-

tempt to research the techniques used and duplicate these fine ceramics.

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See also: **Ceramics-Japan**

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CHAEBOL A *chaebol* is a type of Korean conglomerate, similar to the prewar *zaibatsu* of Japan, which has multiplied in the Republic of Korea (South Korea) since the 1960s. A *chaebol* may be defined as "a diversified business group which is exclusively owned and controlled by a person and that person's family" (Kang 1997: 31). Its two major characteristics are that it is a business group that is owned and governed by the dominant shareholder and his family (a divergence from the legal definition of a *chaebol*—according to the Fair Trade Law of Korea—as a large-scale business group), and that it is a diversified business group with coverage extending from manufacturing to services, and from small retailers to multinational corporations.

The fact that it is family-owned, however, constitutes a major difference between the Korean *chaebol* and the prewar Japanese *zaibatsu*. The Japanese *zaibatsu* "family" was not always made up of blood relatives. An excellent manager could belong to the "family" in Japan, but not in Korea. The ownership of currently existing corporate groups in Japan has been diversified to their affiliates, main banks, and the public. To make another comparison, in the United States in the 1960s, conglomerates were diversified in business and assets, but not necessarily owned by dominant families.

Thirty *chaebol* are famous: their names are announced officially as the thirty largest business groups on the first of April every year. In 1998 they accounted for 46 percent of total sales in the manufacturing sector, 24.1 percent of value added (comprised of wages, cost of borrowing, rent, depreciation, and net profit before corporate tax), and 12.9 percent of employment in the same manufacturing sector.

Chaebol have been the leading force in Korean economic development. At the same time, however, they

are the target of strong and widespread criticism. That is, the *chaebol* are successful but are not necessarily fair competitors.

The Development of the *Chaebol*

Historically, the *chaebol* have grown under a government-led development strategy. The South Korean government selected as "national champions" certain companies in the major industries during the first Five Year Economic Development Plan in the early 1960s, and subsidized them through financial aid, tax exemptions, suppression of the labor movement, and so forth. The firms singled out by the government received enormous economic benefits and were able to rise to a level of international competitiveness.

With their information-gathering and lobbying power, the *chaebol* leadership could influence government officials to approve policy loans, which were obtained by forcing the banks to follow government policy. The *chaebol* thus were able to borrow continuously under favorable conditions, based not on the soundness of



Daewoo Group chief Kim Woo-choong in July 1999. After promising major reforms, the organization, the second largest chaebol in South Korea, collapsed in August 1999. In 2001, Kim was reported by Korean officials to be hiding in Europe to escape prosecution (AFP/CORBIS)

their operations but on their lobbying power. In addition, the *chaebol* got special tax exemptions.

This unhealthy development policy eventually drove the Korean economy to the financial crisis of 1997. In November 1997, bad loans held by Korean banks comprised about 15 percent (32.2 trillion won) of their total loans, while the corresponding figure for advanced countries is generally less than 1 percent. Most of these nonperforming loans had been granted to the thirty largest *chaebol*.

The Korean *chaebol* have diversified through various related and unrelated fields of business including electronics, the automotive sector, heavy industry, textiles and garments, petrochemicals, banking, information, and telecommunications. Often depicted as an octopus, the typical *chaebol* has grown many different business legs in order to diversify its operations and thereby minimize its risks so as to secure financing at low interest rates.

Two strategies were used by the *chaebol* to facilitate their rapid expansion: mutual loan guarantees between related companies within the same *chaebol*, and cross investments between the affiliated companies of one *chaebol*. These strategies allowed the *chaebol* to increase their leverage while maintaining the unity of their corporate governance.

Negative Impact of *Chaebol* on Korea

While the *chaebol* have helped Korea attain rapid economic growth and are the manufacturers of world-renowned brand names, they have also become an obstacle to further economic development. First, the *chaebol* have hindered and distorted efficient market development through their wielding of both market and nonmarket power. This has allowed them to block the normal development of small and medium-sized industries, due to unfair distribution of resources and entry barriers. Second, they hinder smooth industrial development in this time of transition from traditional to information- and communication-based industries. The problem is that the *chaebol* still operate via traditional mass-production systems for standardized products, using unskilled or semi-skilled laborers. Third, the development of the financial industry itself has been stunted because capital from the financial institutions is concentrated in *chaebol* loans—as shown by the large number of nonperforming loans. Fourth, the *chaebol* have distorted the distribution of income and assets.

Reforms

In response to the 1997 financial crisis, the Korean government has carried out reforms of banks and

corporations. The *chaebol* reforms include enhancing transparent business management through the early introduction of consolidated financial statements, banning the system of cross guarantees between individual subsidiaries of a business group, defining core sectors and cooperation with small and medium-sized firms, making majority shareholders and management more accountable for their actions, banning *chaebol* dominance of nonbanking financial institutions, prohibiting mutual investments between subsidiaries, and banning illegal hereditary transfer of *chaebol* ownership.

Some of the reforms have shown good results, but others have yet to bear fruit. By the end of 1999, the *chaebol* had eliminated almost all mutual loan guarantees between affiliates—loans which for the top thirty business groups amounted to four times their own capital in 1997. The average debt/equity ratio of the top five groups, excluding Daewoo, fell from 386 percent in 1998 to less than 200 percent by the end of 1999. By June 1999, the top thirty *chaebol* had spun off 484 firms; this has helped them focus on their core competencies and has enhanced their competitiveness.

Reform of the corporate governance structure is still incomplete. Until transparent corporate governance systems are set up, *chaebol* reform cannot be termed a success. Until recently, the corporate governance structure of a *chaebol* was centered in the owner and the *chaebol* subsidiaries, whose average combined shareholdings reached 50.5 percent in 1999 but declined to 44 percent in 2000. The *chaebol* head dominated decision making, a practice that is criticized because of the consequent lack of surveillance, supervision, and accountability.

Since the foreign exchange crisis of 1997, the Korean *chaebol* have begun to change their corporate structures (e.g., by establishing protections for minor shareholders and by allowing directors from outside the firm) including their governance, though management is still dominated by the owner-manager head.

In the twenty-first century, the new model for corporate governance ought to ensure proper surveillance from both inside and outside the firm. The decision-making power should be shifted from the dominant family to a board of directors that represents the greater number of shareholders. A 1999 law required that companies whose assets are more than two trillion Korean won must nominate directors from outside the firm for more than half the total board members. In addition, the group-suit system will be legalized in 2002. Along with these reforms bank management should be allowed to be independent from

government manipulation. One important reform will be to shift the *chaebol's* traditional group management system to an independent management system, as the group system is contrary to fair market competition.

Korea will probably choose to replace its rent-seeking model with the market-based corporate governance model that is popular in Western countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, where household and institutional investors are the main shareholders: they empower the board of directors, which in turn supervises management and hires and fires the CEO. This is the desirable and expected direction of *chaebol* reform in the twenty-first century.

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CHAGANG PROVINCE (2002 pop. 1.5 million). Chagang province (Chagangdo) is located inland along the northern border of North Korea. The Amnok (Yalu) River, which flows between Korea and China, marks the province's border. North Korea created Chagang province in 1949 from portions of North P'yongan and South Hamgyong provinces. Since then, Chagang has been reconfigured four times and currently has an area of 16,764 square kilometers, divided into 15 counties (*kun*). The provincial capital is at Kanggye, and the other two cities are Manp'o and Hich'on.

The Nangnim mountain range accounts for the province's high average elevation. The province also has many rivers because of the numerous tributaries of the Amnok River. Abundant waterways and fertile soil support a robust agriculture, whose key products are rice and grains, beans, fruits, and vegetables. Nearly a thousand species of trees and plants thrive

throughout the province. Lead, zinc, gold, copper, lime, and coal are mined, among other minerals.

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CHAGATAY Chagatay, also known as Chaghatay, Chagatai or Jagataic, was the Turkic literary language of Central Asia in the fifteenth to early twentieth centuries, written in the Arabic or (in a few early manuscripts) the Uighur script. Some of the greatest works of Islamic literature were written in Chagatay, including the autobiography of the emperor Babur (1483–1530) and the poems of Nava'i (1441–1501). Chagatay was also the language of the Khivan tradition of historiography, which spanned four centuries, and was the official chancery language of the khanate of Khiva (1804–1873).

The present name of the language is ultimately identified with the Mongol prince Chagatai (d. 1242), one of the sons of Genghis Khan, whose name in subsequent centuries came to be applied to the state centered on his original *ulus*, or portion of the Mongol Empire, including the Central Asian oasis region of Transoxania. Having outlasted the end of the Chagatai state and the rise of the Timurids (fifteenth century), the term Chagatai denoted the nomadic Turkic population of this territory, and later to some extent the Turkic literary language of the region, though Turki or *Turk tili* (Turk language) remained the usual native name for this language down to the first decades of the twentieth century. The designations Chagatay and Eastern Turkish were popularized in the nineteenth century by European Orientalists, some of whom restricted Chagatay to mean the classical language of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Soviet scholars have used the term *Starouzbekskii iazyk* (Old Uzbek language) to denote a group of spoken and written forms including Chagatay.

Over its entire history Chagatay could claim to unite, in a developed and flexible idiom, a widespread and diverse literate population from Khorasan to Kashgaria, and from European Russia beyond the Aral Sea to the steppes of Kazakhstan. Besides numerous works of poetry and fiction, writings in Chagatay include histories, biographies, religious literature and hagiographies, genealogies, geographical works, travels, various treatises (*risalah*), and a wide variety of documents and correspondence.

The Language

Chagatay is classified as a Central Asian Turkic language, with some linguistic traits related to Kipchak and Oghuz Turkic. Chagatay followed the Karakhanid (eleventh–thirteenth centuries) and Khorezmian (thirteenth–fourteenth centuries) literary languages in the Eastern Middle Turkic period. Its vocabulary was considerably enriched by borrowings from Persian and Arabic. The position of Chagatay as a precursor of the modern literary Uzbek and Uighur languages is assumed but has not been fully investigated.

Throughout the period of its use Chagatay coexisted with literary Persian. There were many bilingual writers, and most Chagatay authors adopted Persian and Arabic expressions extensively. Nevertheless, the language contributed to a distinctive Turkic ethnic consciousness in Central Asia. The fifteenth-century poet Nava'i devoted his last composition, *Mubakamat al-Lughatayn* (Judgment of Two Languages, 1499), to a vigorous argument on the superiority of Turki (Chagatay) over Persian.

The Literature

With few exceptions, poetry in Chagatay was modeled closely upon Persian examples. The oldest surviving works of Chagatay belles lettres belong to the early fifteenth century. During this period, Sakkaki and Ata'i wrote panegyrics and other court poetry for Timurid royal patrons, including Ulugh Beg (1394–1449). Some poems in the single *divan* (collection) of Ata'i record Turkic proverbs, adages, and folk meters. Lutfi (1370?–1460?) was a master of the *tuyugh*, a difficult native Turkic quatrain form with an *aaba* rhyme scheme in which the rhyming words must all be homonyms. Mir 'Ali Shir Nava'i, or Nava'i, wrote in both Chagatay and Persian, though his Chagatay works earned greater renown. Nava'i brought the Chagatay language to its full development as a mode of literary expression and presided over its classical era. Among his numerous works in all genres are four *divans*, a five-part cycle of verse tales (*mathnavi*) entitled *Khamsab*, a translation from Persian of a Sufi hagiographic work by his friend the poet Jami (1414–1492), and *Mubakamat al-Lughatayn*. One of the most important sources on Timurid society is Nava'i's biographical compendium in Chagatay, *Majalis an-Nafa'is* (Assemblies of Refined Men, 1490/1), which gives biographies and literary samples from over four hundred men of letters, many of whom Nava'i knew. It is virtually the only source of information on the lives of the forerunners of Nava'i in Chagatay literature. The emperor Zahir ud-Din Muhammad Babur, founder of the Mughal dynasty in India, was also a celebrated au-

thor. His memoir, the *Babunamah* (Book of Babur), is treasured as a work of biography for its lucid depiction of events in the life of a compelling historical personality. Babur also wrote excellent poetry. His *divan* contains all types of the poetic art characteristic of his times, including examples of the virtuosic *tuyugh* quatrain. Chagatay poetry continued to be composed down through the era of the nineteenth-century khanates of Khiva and Quqon, though the artistic ideal was generally imitative.

Perhaps the most popular and influential work of religious literature in Chagatay was a *divan* of prayers and hymns supposed to be the work of the famous twelfth-century Sufi Hoja Ahmad Yasavi, though the collection is known only from much later manuscripts. The genre of Islamic hagiography (stories of the lives, works, and lineages of holy men) also produced several original works in Chagatay.

The oldest histories in Chagatay were produced for the early Shaybanid Uzbek rulers, whose invasions from the steppes drove the Timurids from power at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The *Zubdat al-Atbar* (Cream of Annals, after 1525) by 'Abdallah Nasrallahi was the first example in Chagatay of the Islamic general history. Subsequently, Chagatay historiography was written mostly in Khiva, and to a lesser extent Quqon. The Khivan king and historian Abu'l Ghazi Bahadur Khan (1603–1663) wrote his general history, *Shajarah-i Turk* (Genealogy of the Turks), by himself because, he said, he could find no one else in his realm who was qualified to do so. This book was one of the first Central Asian historical works to become known in Europe. In the nineteenth century, Khivan historians beginning with Shir Muhammad Munis (1778–1829) wrote an uninterrupted series of original works that chronicled the rulers of the country, the Qongrat dynasty (eighteenth century–1873). One of the last works in late Chagatay was Muhammad Yusuf Bek Bayani's *Khwarizm Tarikhi* (History of Kwarizm [Khiva], 1921), which, though written in medieval manuscript form, featured the innovated use of punctuation, apparently in imitation of Russian writing.

In the 1920s, the Soviet government's intensive efforts to construct and promulgate an Uzbek literary language finally supplanted Chagatay, and the latter disappeared from use. The Chagatay documents in the archives of the khanate of Khiva (preserved in Saint Petersburg, Russia) remain a valuable and largely untouched body of source material on the history of medieval Central Asia.

D. Prior

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CHAGOS ARCHIPELAGO The Chagos Archipelago (formerly called the Oil Islands) is a cluster of islands in the central Indian Ocean, administered by the United Kingdom, and having a total land area of 197square kilometers. They are actually a group of atolls arranged in a circle around the Chagos Bank and lie 500 kilometers due south of the most southerly island in the Maldive Republic. The only product is coconut oil.

In 1971 the Chagos inhabitants, who are mainly French Creole in origin, were ordered to leave by the British government and most were resettled in Mauri-

tius, where the archipelago had been administered. This move was mandated so that the large island of Diego Garcia, where most of the people lived, could be leased to the United States as an intercontinental air base. However, in 2000 the British High Court ruled that the inhabitants had been illegally evicted, and ordered that those who wanted to return there from Mauritius be allowed to do so. Most of the returnees would resettle Peros Banhos or Salomon, but not Diego Garcia 150 kilometers to the south of those islands.

Paul Hockings

CHAJON NORI *Nori* means "play" or "game" in Korean. Chajon Nori is one of the traditional massive battle games in Korea. This game dates from about 1000 CE, during the latter Three Kingdoms period. The game commemorates victory in battle; nowadays, it celebrates the harvest.

This battle game, also known as the "War of Moving Bodies," is held around the fifteenth day of the first month of the lunar calendar. It is played in most parts of Korea. Villagers make chariots with oak trees after supplicating the Mountain God for his approval. The villagers are divided into two teams, the East and the West, on the festival day. Everyone has his own part to play in this game. The players in the lead, with their arms crossed, push their opponents with their shoulders, or mount an attack against the opponent, pulling down the opponent commander. The game comes to an end when the chariot of either team is pulled down to the ground or the commander falls to the ground. It sometimes lasts until midnight. The players on the winning team celebrate their victory by throwing their straw sandals high up into the air, or throwing away the parts of the enemy chariot. Winning is supposed to portend a good harvest.

Hisashi Sanada

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CHANDIGARH (2001 est pop. 808,000). Chandigarh became the capital of the Punjab and Haryana states in northwestern India in the 1950s. After partition in 1947, when Punjab's principal city Lahore was

claimed by Pakistan, the new state needed a capital. Premier Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) seized the opportunity to realize his vision of a city symbolic of the future of India. The originally chosen architect, Matthew Nowicki, was killed in a 1950 airplane crash. Swiss-French modernist architect Charles-Édouard Jeanneret (called Le Corbusier; 1887–1965) produced the master plan. Chandigarh is orderly and regulated, with modern concrete buildings, broad boulevards, and open parks; it has an air of prosperity and is considered the cleanest and healthiest city in India. Yet it has been controversial ever since it was completed in the 1960s. Detractors complain that its design was flawed, self-indulgent, and "un-Indian," with provision for fast-flowing traffic, unnecessarily large parking lots, and buildings requiring expensive air conditioning. The premier attraction of Chandigarh is the Rock Garden, a series of interconnected rocky grottoes, walkways, and landscaped waterfalls, including more than five thousand animal and humanoid figures fashioned from discarded materials. Also of interest are the Museum and Art Gallery, the Science Museum, and a large Rose Garden containing over a thousand varieties of roses.

C. Roger Davis

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CHANG FEE MING (b. 1959), Malaysian artist. Chang Fee Ming is known for large watercolor paintings depicting traditional Asian arts and ways of life in a photo-realist style. A native of Dungun in Terengganu in northeastern Malaysia, Chang is a self-taught artist with a background in commercial design. As he developed his distinctively detailed and colorful style, Chang was inspired during travels in Bali and became committed to recording vanishing arts and preindustrial scenes in his work. Evoking an atmosphere of timeless, sun-drenched calm, Chang's paintings are often detailed depictions of traditional arts, such as intricately woven and decorated fabrics.

Chang's work was shown at "The Road to Mandalay," an exhibition and sale held in Jakarta in 1995, to which only patrons of his work were invited. Traveling for several months every year to make sketches for the exacting paintings executed in his studio in Terengganu, Chang has journeyed to India, Nepal, and Thailand as well as to Myanmar (Burma), in addition to frequent excursions within Malaysia and to Bali. As his reputation grows, collectors in distant

cities have sought to acquire Chang's paintings, a few of which are available in the form of prints.


E. M. Hill

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CHANG RIVER Called the Changjiang (Long River) in Chinese, the Chang (Yangtze) at 3,900 miles is the third-longest river in the world and the longest one in Asia. It originates in the Tanggulashan on the border of Tibet and Qinghai Province and then runs south until it empties into the East China Sea near Shanghai. The river derives its name from the ancient kingdom of Yang, which settled regions along it.

The Chang originates in the Kunlun Mountains and then runs south through the high mountain valleys in Qinghai, Tibet, and Yunnan Provinces before turning northeast at Shiigu. From there, the Chang flows through Sichuan Province before entering the famous Three Gorges. It then crosses central China through Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Anhui, and Jiangsu Provinces before emptying into the East China Sea at Chongming Island, ten miles north of Shanghai. Stretching the length of the country, the Chang has served as the unofficial boundary between north and south China—no bridge was built over the eastern section of the Chang until 1969, when the Changjiang Daqiao Bridge was built at Nanjing.





THE YANGTZE

Writer and editor Simon Winchester had the rare opportunity to travel the length of the Chang (Yangtze) River. In the excerpt below, he reflects at the end of his journey.

I reached into my pocket for the little prayer block that the monk had given back in Dêgê—I had hoped, I think, that I might imprint a few good thoughts on the waters and send them scurrying down to sea level. But it was not there: I had left it behind, carelessly. It was back in the army base. In any case, I told myself, for me to do such a thing was more than a little out of character: I was no Buddhist, I had no real idea what sentiments had been inscribed on the wood, and would feel plagued that I had performed some disingenuous act, just for the symbolic sake of it.

So instead I got out a cigar. A friend had given it to me in Hong Kong. The Mandarin Hotel had imported a Cuban maestro from Cohiba in Havana, and had set him to work hand-rolling cigars in a corner of the hotel lobby. My friend had bought two for me, for some exorbitant sum. One, he said, was to be smoked at the start of the Yangtze journey, and the second was to be savored in the mood victorious if, and only if, I reached the headwaters. This battered and somewhat stale object that I pulled from my jacket pocket was the very one.

I straightened it as best I could and listened to it: there was the slightest crackle of a few stale leaves, but not too much—it seemed to have kept most of its supple softness, and it might not be too bad. So I tilted my head out of the breeze and lit it slowly and carefully, then blew a cloud of pure blue smoke out into the chilly air.

Once, a few weeks back, this had been a grand cigar; now, old and tired from its journey, it had just a hint of its glory: in any restaurant it would have been sent right back. Out here, though, it was the best smoke I could ever, ever imagine. And so I sat there in a state of utter contentment, listening to the gurgling of the stream, listening to the lone Tibetan behind me marshaling the yaks from a herd that had been scattered in the storm, and listening to the souging winds. They began to pick up again, and they started to scatter the grass and ruffle the calm surface of the river waters once more.

Source: Simon Winchester. (1996) *The River at the Center of the World: A Journey up the Yangtze and Back in Chinese Time*. New York: Holt, 393–394.

Throughout Chinese history, the Chang has featured prominently in the development of culture and trade. As far back as the Neolithic period, settlements have been found along the lower Chang. Qin dynasty founder Qin Shi Huangdi built waterways and canals to allow trade from Yangzhou to

Guangzhou, a distance of 1,200 miles. Since then, the Chang has been the main transportation artery across central China as it passes through many of its economic and industrial centers. Since the Tang era, the Chang delta has become a center for growing and shipping rice.

About 1,800 miles of the Chang is navigable year-round. In the early 1990s, the Chang and its major tributaries drained an area of 1.8 million square kilometers—a quarter of China's total cultivated land—in which 386 million people live. The network of rivers and associated canals carries some 85 percent of China's domestic waterborne traffic. It passes through many of its major cities, including Kunmin, Chengdu, Chongqing, Wuhan, Shanghai, and Nanjing. The gross value of industrial product of the areas along the Chang makes up about 40 percent of China's total.

Keith Leitich

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CHAO ANOU (1767–1829), Lao monarch. Chao Anou, or Anuvong, was the last ruler of the Lao kingdom of Viang Chan (present-day Vientiane, capital of Lao People's Democratic Republic) and a significant patron of Lao Buddhism. Born in Viang Chan, Chao Anou ascended the throne in 1805 and initiated construction of many temples, including Vat Si Saket. He also undertook repairs to the Phathat Luang temple complex and added the cloister surrounding the stupa, a dome-shaped structure that serves as a Buddhist shrine.

Chao Anou improved relations with the reigning Nguyen dynasty of Vietnam and united the central and southern kingdoms of Laos by placing his son on the throne of Champasak, the southern Lao kingdom. In 1826, Chao led an unsuccessful attempt to win independence from Siam, Viang Chan's suzerain, and recover lost territory on the Khorat plateau. The Siamese retaliated, destroying Viang Chan, except Vat Si Saket and Phathat Luang. The Siamese troops took tens of thousands of the people in Viang Chan and its vicinity captive and relocated the prisoners of war to Siam. Chao Anou fled to Vietnam but returned in 1828 to find his capital in ruins. The Siamese eventually captured Chao Anou, who died cruelly in a Bangkok prison a year later. Chao Anou is considered a national hero for his attempts to unify the Lao kingdom and gain independence from Siam and for his contributions to Lao Buddhism.

Linda McIntosh

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CHAO PHRAYA RIVER AND DELTA The Chao Phraya River is the primary river in Thailand, formed by the confluence of the Ping and Nan Rivers. The headwaters meet near the city of Nakhon Sawan in western central Thailand. The river is more than 230 kilometers in length and flows south to the Gulf of Thailand. It is key to the region's transportation and economy.

The river drains one-third of the nation, including the central plains and lowlands. Its numerous tributaries are part of the delta, which serves as the watershed for western Thailand.

The Chao Phraya River is entirely navigable by watercraft and continues to be important to the Thai economy. The river valley is the nation's most productive agricultural region. The World Bank helped finance irrigation of the river basin beginning in the 1960s. Its waters continue to irrigate various crops, primarily rice. Thailand is consistently one of the world's leading rice exporters (usually ranked first or second). The delta's tributaries are interconnected by a series of canals, also used for transportation.

Linda Dailey Paulson

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CHART THAI Chart Thai is one of Thailand's major political parties, founded in the 1970s by General Chatichai Choonhavan (1922–1999). In the July 1988 election, Chart Thai and its political allies won a majority, giving it the right to form the coalition government. Chatichai was credited with restoring democracy as he became the first prime minister in twelve years to have been elected following a string of appointed prime ministers, though appointment was constitutionally legal and Chatichai himself did not do anything to restore democratic rule. He rose to power on the urban middle-class support that had grown substantially during the 1980s, and enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy owing to the restoration of democracy

and rapid economic growth. Chart Thai had a probusiness platform and oversaw significant deregulation of the Thai economy between 1988 and 1991. But Chart Thai politicians were hampered by constant allegations of corruption, and in the 1990 election, Chart Thai was accused of spending \$120 million in vote-buying. Rampant corruption on the part of Chatichai and his government was the military's justification for the February 1991 coup d'état, led by Generals Suchinda Kraprayoon and Sunthorn Kongsompong, though in reality the military's fear of losing power to powerful business interests was the prime motivation of the coup and Chatichai's arrest.

In the March 1992 election, the Chart Thai finished second with 73 seats and joined the military-led coalition government. Throughout the 1990s Chart Thai served as an opposition or minor coalition partner, but, tarnished by corruption scandals, it has been unable to regain its popularity. Chart Thai joined the Democrat Party-led coalition government in November 1997 and the Thai Rak Thai-led coalition government in February 2001. Chart Thai is the party most associated with vote-buying and money politics and has been unable to broaden its base of support.

Zachary Abuza

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CHATTERJEE, BANKIM CHANDRA

(1838–1894), Indian writer. Born to a high-caste Brahman family in Kantalpara, Bengal, British India, Chatterjee, or Bankim, as he is known to Bengalis was a noted scholar of Bengali, English, and Sanskrit as a student. He was in the first group of students to pass the Entrance (1857) and the Bachelor of Arts examinations of the Calcutta University. In 1869, he obtained a Bachelor of Law degree.

Bankim joined the Provincial Executive Service in 1858 and served at various places as deputy collector and deputy magistrate (the highest ranks achievable by Indians at that time). He was greatly respected for his judicial wisdom and for his impartial and effective management of areas under his jurisdiction. However, his independent spirit often caused trouble with his British superiors, most of whom did not have his erudition.

Bankim was a prolific author in Bengali, writing poems, prose, and drama. He was the first major Bengali

author and set the style followed and modified by subsequent authors, especially in prose. He also was an acclaimed journalist, the founder of and frequent contributor to *Bangadarsban* (Review of Bengal), a successful periodical. His prose works included romances, historical fiction, and essays, which in the guise of humor examined and criticized the many absurdities, wrongdoings, and injustices of the British and the Indians of the times. While his poems were not of as high a standard as his prose, one, *Vandemataram* (Hymn to Mother), became a rallying cry for the seekers of Indian independence.

Bankim vehemently protested demeaning articles on Hinduism by a British missionary. He went to write extensively on Hinduism, going back to the original texts, and played an important part in the movement that some have called neo-Hinduism. Apart from many articles, his opus consists of thirty-three books (and collections) in Bengali and one in English. Many of his Bengali books were translated into English in his lifetime. Since then they have also been translated into Swedish and German.

Ranès C. Chakravorty

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CHAUDHURI, NIRAD CHANDRA

(1897–1999), Indian critic and writer. Nirad Chaudhuri, who for the first half of his life was a civil servant, was one of India's foremost critics and writers who opposed the withdrawal of the British empire from the Subcontinent. He was born in Kishorganj, a small town in East Bengal, and moved to Calcutta at the time of Indian independence. He then rose to prominence with the first of two autobiographical books, *The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian* (1951). The second, written toward the end of an extremely long life, was *Thy Hand, Great Anarch! India 1921–1952* (1987), in which he showed himself as a "scholar gypsy" living only for literature. In between these two masterly volumes, there were several others, all of which received the acclaim of Western critics. Most notable—although controversial for many Indian critics—were his overviews of Indian society entitled *The Continent of Circe: Being an Essay on the Peoples of India* (1965) and *Hinduism, a Religion to Live By* (1979). From 1953 to 1965, he was attached as a

writer to the French Embassy in New Delhi, but late in his life he moved to Oxford where he died in 1999.

Paul Hockings

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CHAVALIT, YONGCHAIYUDH (b. 1932), Thai general and politician. Chavalit Yongchaiyudh was a career military officer, graduating from the Royal Military Academy in 1953 and from the Command and General Staff College in the United States in 1964. He served as army commander in chief in 1986 before his appointment as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, the position he held from 1987 to 1990. Chavalit was a member of a group of politically oriented soldiers who sought to address social injustices and alleviate rural poverty while ensuring the military's dominant role in Thai politics. Under Chavalit's command, the military also became involved in business ventures.

He resigned from the army in 1990, having achieved the rank of general, and entered politics. He was appointed by Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan to be deputy prime minister and minister of defense in March 1990, positions he only held for ten weeks before the coalition lost a no-confidence vote. Chavalit went on to form the New Aspiration Party (NAP), which has been a coalition member in several governments since 1992. Chavalit served in a number of cabinet positions: minister of interior (September 1992– December 1994), minister of labor (September 1993– January 1994), deputy prime minister (July 1994–October 1994), and deputy prime minister and minister of defense (July 1995–November 1996). Following the vote of no confidence that forced Prime Minister Banharn Silpa-Archa from office, the NAP won the November 1996 election and Chavalit became prime minister, a position he held from November 1996 to November 1997. But his government was unable to effectively respond to the 1997 Asian economic crisis. Following the vote of no confidence that forced Prime Minister Banharn Silpa-Archa from office, the NAP won the November 1996 election and Chavalit became prime minister, a position he held from November 1996 to November 1997. He was initially thought of as a reformer, and he advocated drafting a new constitution that he hoped would codify the military's leading role in politics. Chavalit's political support came from the rural northeast where he engaged in rampant vote buying, at the expense of the urban mid-

dle class. Yet, as the economy fell into recession, he was unable to support rural development projects. As the economy worsened, Chavalit's varied policy responses led to a deepening crisis. Fiscal mismanagement, a growing debt crisis, and the protection of several major financial corporations led to the collapse of the baht. Chavalit contended that only by centralizing power further could the economy be restored, and he tried to block the passage of a new constitution in 1997 that shifted political and fiscal control to the provinces. Both the military and his rural constituency, however, supported the new constitution, and he was forced to accept it.

He called for emergency powers so that he could restore political and economic order, but the military withdrew their support for him. Under intense pressure from the king and the military, Chavalit was forced to resign and call early elections in November 1997, based on the new constitution approved that October, which was the most democratic constitution in Thai history. He reentered the government in February 2001 as minister of defense and deputy prime minister in a coalition government headed by Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.

Zachary Abuza

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CHEJU PROVINCE (2000 pop. 543,000). Cheju Island is the largest island in and a province of South Korea, located about 140 kilometers south of Mokp'o in the East China Sea (Namhae, or South Sea, in Korean). The product of Mount Halla, the tallest mountain in South Korea at 1,950 meters, the rugged island is composed of unique volcanic rock formations and maintains a subtropical climate. Originally known as the isolated island kingdom of T'amna, it first came under the control of the Koryo kingdom (918–1392) in 938 and was later conquered by the Mongols and used to raise cattle and horses during the fourteenth century. The island was governed as part of Cholla province from the thirteenth to the twentieth centuries. In 1925, it fell under Japanese colonial rule. Finally, after the withdrawal of Japanese forces from Korea, it was declared a province in 1946.

The people of Cheju have developed a distinct dialect and lifestyle, focused on two major cities: Cheju

on the north side of the island and Sogwip'ŏ on the south. Agriculture, fishing, and tourism are the main industries. Besides ancient guardians made from volcanic rocks called "stone grandfathers" (*tol harubang*), Cheju is famous for its subtropical fruits, such as tangerines, pineapples, and bananas. Successful demonstrations by the islanders have kept modern industrial factories from being built, which has contributed to the preservation of many beautiful beaches.

Richard D. McBride II

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CHEN DUXIU (1879–1942), Chinese politician. Born on 8 October 1879 in Anqing, Anhui, Chen Duxiu was famous for his role in the iconoclastic intellectual and revolutionary political movements in China. Chen's experience in studying for and passing the lowest level of the traditional imperial examination (*xiucai*) convinced him that the dynastic government of China was corrupt and disastrous for the Chinese people. In 1901 he studied in Japan and began his lifelong commitment to political organizing, founding the reformist *Chinese Youth Society*. From 1903 to 1907, he established and wrote for revolutionary journals in Shanghai and Anhui. In 1907 he fled in exile to Japan.

After the 1911 revolution, Chen held a minor government position and then took up teaching. During the 1913 "Second Revolution" he fled again to Japan. These early life experiences and defeats influenced him to become a critic of Chinese civilization and society. In 1915 Chen founded *Youth* magazine. This magazine, which changed its name a year later to *New Youth*, became the most important liberal and revolutionary magazine in China. It was a forum to propagate science and human rights under the famous slogan "Support Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy." Chen was influenced by the reformist ideas in Japan and the political philosophies of eighteenth-century France and nineteenth-century America. He layered his political criticism of China's feudalism with a scathing attack on Confucianism. He blamed Chinese culture for destroying human dignity, oppressing women, and suppressing individuality and creativity. His withering attacks provided a generation with the ammunition to criticize Chinese tradition.

In 1917 Chen was named dean of Beijing University's School of Letters. In this capacity he befriended Chinese student leaders and intellectuals. He formed study groups and journals that discussed the cause of China's deterioration. In 1919 he resigned his deanship to join the students who were protesting the Beijing government's domestic and foreign policies, and became a leader in the May 4th movement of that year. Initiated in Beijing, violence, massive protests, and arrests became nationwide. Chen, too, was a prisoner for three months. Upon his release from jail, he became a Marxist, and within two years, in 1921, he was established as Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party. He held this post until 1927.

Chen's leadership of the Communist Party is still highly debated. He favored a traditional Marxist revolutionary program that relied on the working class, established an independent political organization, placed social reform as a priority before military uprisings, and sought equality with Moscow in determining the world revolutionary movement. Chen was accused of deviating from the party line in all these areas. He opposed Mao Zedong's strategy of placing the rural areas in command and of relying on armed force; he criticized Moscow's plan to ally with the Guomindang; and he failed to respect Stalin's leadership. In 1928 he refused a summons to travel to Moscow for an evaluation of his failures. The following year he became attracted to the writings of Stalin's major rival, Leon Trotsky. As a result, Chen was expelled from the party. His negative experience in the party was further exacerbated by the execution of his two sons by the Nationalist Chinese in 1927 and 1928.

Chen led the Chinese Trotskyist Party from 1930 until his arrest by the Nationalists in 1932. In 1933 he was sentenced to thirteen years in prison but was released in 1937. He began to organize against the Japanese invasion of China. The Communists, however, attacked him for his Trotskyist position and accused him of being a spy for the Japanese. He retreated into private life and wrote his autobiography, along with letters to friends expressing his faith in democracy and science. Some claim he was still a socialist in the Trotskyist tradition, and others claim he returned to his old May 4th views, but without the denunciation of Confucianism and Chinese culture. He died of a heart attack on 27 May 1942 in Jiangjin, a remote area of Sichuan Province.

After decades of abuse, the Chinese government allowed Chen to be reburied in his home town, and, beginning in the late 1980s, allowed for extensive and

objective research of his life and political views. Independent societies were established for the study of Chen Duxiu. His influence as a democrat, socialist, iconoclast, and promoter of human rights was gradually recognized.

Richard Kagan

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CHEN KAIGE (b. 1952), Chinese film director. With his film *Yellow Earth* (1984), Chen Kaige was the first member of the acclaimed Fifth Generation of Chinese film directors to achieve international success. The Fifth Generation, who were graduates of the first class of the reopened Beijing Film Academy following the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), came of age after the death of Mao Zedong (1893–1976) and reacted against the melodrama and didacticism of the Chinese film tradition. *Yellow Earth* contains gorgeous visuals similar to Chinese paintings. Deceptively simple with minimal dialogue and action, it is a multilayered examination of the impact of China's feudal culture and modern revolution on the peasants. Chen's next film to make a big international splash was *Farewell My Concubine* (1993), a lavish production set in the Beijing Opera of the twentieth century and dealing with the betrayal of art and love. It garnered the Palm d'Or prize at the Cannes Film Festival and other prizes. Chen's most recent film, *The Emperor and the Assassin* (1999), is a historical epic about Qin Shi Huangdi or Ying Zheng, the emperor who unified China in the third century BCE.

With the collapse of the state film industry in the 1990s, Chen and other filmmakers had to seek overseas financing for their projects. Domestic critics have accused them of pandering to Western taste and distorting Chinese realities. Chen, however, is an intensely personal artist who believes that the redemption of China lies in its cultural tradition.

Robert Y. Eng

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CHEN SHUI-BIAN (b. 1951), president of the Republic of China. Chen Shui-bian became the president of the Republic of China (Taiwan) on 20 May 2000 in only the second direct popular presidential election held in that country. He ran as an opposition pro-Taiwan independence candidate against Lien Chan, the Guomindang (Nationalist) candidate and James Soong, the Independent candidate. His accession to the presidency was heavily criticized by the officials in Beijing, because they feared he would declare Taiwan an independent and sovereign state.

Chen was born on 18 February 1951 in a poor Taiwanese family in Tainan county in southern Taiwan. In June 1969 he attained the highest possible score on the university entrance examination and entered the prestigious National Taiwan University, where he majored in commercial law. In law school, Chen met his wife, Wu Shu-jen, a woman with a strong sense of Taiwanese nationalism. Soon after graduation, Chen joined the Formosan International Marine and Commercial Law Office, where he worked until 1989, rising to the position of chief lawyer. This position gave him the financial independence to engage in politics.

In 1980, encouraged by his wife and his loyalties to his friends, Chen became a defense lawyer for the leaders of the Tang-wai (Opposition) Party, who had been charged with sedition in the famous "Kaohsiung" incident of 1979. His participation in this lengthy trial aroused him to enter politics on a mission of promoting human rights, democracy, and social justice. During the 1990s, he served on the Taipei City Council and in the Legislative Yuan. He became a leading figure in the opposition party, renamed the Democratic Progressive Party in 1987. His popularity made him and his family the focus of political attacks. His wife was crippled when a truck ran her over in a clearly politically motivated accident. Chen himself served six months in jail on the charge of libel.

In 1994 Chen ran successfully for Taipei mayor. In this position, he attacked corruption, lowered the crime rate, and opened relationships with other countries by establishing sister city programs and hosting international conferences. His improvements earned Taipei a place in *Asiaweek's* top five best cities in Asia.

Richard C. Kagan

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CHEN YUN (1905–1995), Chinese political figure. Chen Yun was noteworthy for his continuous place in the inner group of Chinese leaders and long service on the Central Committee and Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), yet was never a contender for top leader from the 1930s until his death in 1995. Born in Qingpu near Shanghai 13 June 1905, he worked as a typesetter in Shanghai before joining the CCP in 1925. He later served as a union organizer, guerrilla soldier, and secret agent. He participated in the Long March and emerged as a key party economic thinker and ideological theorist, especially during the 1942 Rectification Campaign. In 1949, he became the head economic planner, responsible for stabilization and reconstruction.

Close to Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) and Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) in outlook, Chen agreed with Zhou on the need for incentives to spur agricultural production. At the critical Lushan conference to review the results of the Great Leap Forward in 1959, he remained silent and did not criticize Mao Zedong (1893–1976). Following the Great Leap, he toured the countryside to assess its failures, and later supported the moderate policies of Deng and Liu Shaoqi. Nonetheless, his efforts to reduce the costs of grain shipments to urban areas laid the ground for the later internal deportation of youth. "Set aside" but not punished for his moderation during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Chen began to formulate many of the ideas that later formed the core of the Deng era reforms. He disagreed with Deng only over timing of the early reforms, but from the mid-1980s criticized the reform process for going too far.

Chen supported Deng's second return to power in 1977, and was rewarded with chairmanship of the Central Disciplinary Inspection Committee in 1978. As Deng's reforms got underway, Chen described them as a caged bird, that is, the economy could fly freely, but within the limits of state planning. Chen held no high positions during the 1980s, except for his membership on the Central Committee; due to his prestige and influence, however, he was considered fifth in the hierarchy. Though he resigned from the Central Committee in 1987, Chen was a crucial supporter of Deng's hard line during the Tiananmen Incident of 1989. Nevertheless, he aided efforts to sideline Deng after 1989, and fought Deng's last reform campaign in 1992. He died on 10 April 1995.

Joel R. Campbell

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CHENAB RIVER The Chenab River, one of the five great rivers that give Punjab its name (in Persian *panj* means "five" and *ab* means "river"), has a total length of 1,087 kilometers. It rises in Lahul, Kashmir, south of Ladakh, and then flows through Kashmir, and south into Pakistan. In the upper reaches it is called the Chandra. After leaving the mountains it follows a southwesterly course, and becomes navigable at Aknur. It joins with the Jhelum near Jhang Maghiana, and here the Emerson (or Trimmu) Barrage has been built. Further downstream to the west of Bahawalpur the Chenab joins with the Sutlej River at the Panjnad Barrage, the two then forming the Panjnad River. This soon joins with the Indus River to the northeast of Chachran. Ancient names for the Chenab were Asikni and Chandrabhaga. Classical Greek writers rendered these names as Akelines, and Sandabaga or Sandabal.

The Chenab Canal, opened in 1887, is the largest canal in Pakistan. It irrigates extensive lands lying just to the south of the Chenab River. In 1892 the Chenab Colony was formed, an irrigated tract of land that quickly became a rich and thickly populated agricultural area of over a million hectares.

Paul Hockings

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CHENGDE (2002 pop. 166,000). Chengde is a middle-size city in northern Hebei Province, China. It developed around the hill station of Bishu Shan-zhuang (Mountain Hamlet to Flee Summer Heat), where the Qing court used to stay several months a year between 1703 and 1820. Designed in 1703 by the Kangxi emperor (reigned 1662–1722) and enlarged by his grandson, the Qianlong emperor (reigned 1736–1795), the summer residence of Chengde forms a unique ensemble of mighty hills, natural parks, artificial lakes, and palatial complexes that provides refer-



The Temple of Universal Peace in Chengde. (PIERRE COLOMBEL/CORBIS)

ences to the architectural landmarks of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). The landscape of the hill station was indeed conceived to represent a microcosm of China and Central Asia. The Waiba Miao monasteries, a series of Buddhist temples with a Tibetan appearance, surround Bishu Shanzhuang on two sides. The Potala Temple and the Sumeru Temple are the best-known samples of Sino-Tibetan architecture. The residence's most prominent temple is the Taoist Jinshan pagoda at the center of the garden district. The temples, palaces, and forests suffered extensive damage from the warlords of the republican period (1912–1949) and the Red Guards of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Restored during the 1980s, Bishu Shanzhuang and Waiba Miao are now on the UNESCO World Heritage List.

Philippe Forêt

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CHENGDU (2002 est. pop. 1.9 million). Chengdu is the capital of China's Sichuan Province and is situated in the center of the province on a fertile but dry plain. Chengdu was founded in the third century BCE by the ancient state of Qin, and benefited from one of the oldest and best Chinese irrigation systems, con-

structed in the same century with water from the Min River, which is still in effective use today. It has remained a prosperous city through the centuries and gained a position as one of the most important trade centers of the empire; traders in Chengdu were the first to use paper money, in the tenth century. Chengdu also became the center of the silk brocade manufacturing industry. The 1937–1945 Japanese occupation of eastern China gave Chengdu an unexpected boost, because the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang) established its capital in Sichuan and moved important industries to the city.

Chengdu has a wide variety of industries. Heavy machinery, aluminum plants, chemical plants, and electronics are important. In addition to that, the textile industry, manufacturing cotton, wool, silk, and satin products, is a major part of the economy. The city has a number of universities and other higher education institutions, including a college of traditional Chinese medicine.

Bent Nielsen

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Mao statue and Western brand-name billboards in Chengdu in June 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

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CHENNAI. See **Madras.**

CHERA Chera (or Kerala) is the name of a Tamil dynasty that for over eleven centuries ruled most of the area of the modern state of Kerala as well as western districts of what is now the state of Tamil Nadu in southern India. During that era the Tamilagam or Tamil-speaking territory extended to the west coast of India, and a separate Malayalam language had not yet developed. The Chera capital was originally Vanji, on the Periyar River near Cochin; later Tiru-vanjikkalam near the mouth of that river became the capital. The kings were said to be of the Vanavar tribe and were Tamil speakers.

Around the beginning of the Common Era the Chera king Nedunjeraladan went to war with Perunarkilli, king of the neighboring Chola dynasty, and both perished. Subsequent generations of the two royal families fought with each other, but in the second century CE the two dynasties were united by a marriage. When the Chola capital of Puhar was de-

stroyed by floods, its king was aided by the Chera king Cenguttuvan, a grandson of the Chola king Karikkal. Under him the Cheras were the dominant power in the south. For a while there seem to have been two royal lines among the Cheras. However Karikkal's successor Cey was conquered by the neighboring Pandya dynasty, which assumed the ascendancy until it was overcome in turn by the Pallava dynasty. Nonetheless the royal line lingered on until Chera rule finally disintegrated in the twelfth century CE. As late as the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the rajas of Cochin claimed descent from the Chera line.

Chera history is known mostly from epic poetry. In addition an Alexandrian Greek mariner's handbook, *The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea*, mentions five thriving seaports on the Kerala coast in the first century CE. In later centuries Jews and Christians moved to this coast from the Middle East. Roman and Alexandrian traders came here, and an as yet undiscovered temple of Augustus was reported to exist in the city of Kuran-ganur. Today the modern population in the area of the former Chera kingdom is probably ethnically similar to the ancient inhabitants, and the Dravidian languages of Tamil and Malayalam are spoken in the region.

Paul Hockings

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CHHATTISGARH (2001 pop. of new state 20.8 million). Chhattisgarh, a region of central India with an area of 97,612 square kilometers, is noted for its distinct tribal populations. It has also been called Gondavana, "the land of the Gonds," who form the largest tribal entity. Other important groups include the Baiga, Birhor, Kamar, Kanwar, Oraon, and Saura. In very early times the region was known as South Kosala; the name "Chhattisgarh" is scarcely two centuries old. The region was ruled by the Kalchuries of Ratanpur until the mid-1800s and then occupied by the Bhonsales of Nagpur. After the fall of the Delhi sultanate in 1857, the region came under British rule, and with the British administration came railways and substantial population growth. The region was known as the Chhattisgarh division in a greater administrative unit known as the Central Provinces.

Chhattisgarh today is also the name of a new state created in 2000 from the eastern third of the state of Madhya Pradesh; it lies exactly in the Chhattisgarh region and has an area of 169,452 square kilometers. This state consists of sixteen districts taken from the older Madhya Pradesh state, with Raipur as the capital. Totally landlocked, Chhattisgarh is surrounded by the states of Jharkhand, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh. Probably India's richest state in terms of its natural and mineral resources, in 1998–1999 Chhattisgarh's net domestic product was nevertheless in the range of only \$210–\$299.

Paul Hockings

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CHIANG KAI-SHEK (1887–1975), Chinese Nationalist general and president. A major twentieth-century Chinese leader, Chiang Kai-shek headed China's first modern government after 1928 and led the country against Japan in World War II. Chiang Kai-shek (in pinyin romanization, Jiang Jieshi) came from a gentry family in Fenghua county in Zhejiang province. He

studied at military academies in China and Japan in preparation for a military career.

In Japan, Chiang joined Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary society, the Tongmenghui, which later evolved into the Guomindang, or Nationalist Party. Chiang returned to China in 1911 and participated in various campaigns with Nationalist units against the Manchu Qing dynasty, which had ruled China since 1644. The last Qing emperor abdicated in 1912, and the Nationalists took control of China. In 1922 Sun summoned Chiang to Canton to work for his reorganized Nationalist party. Chiang traveled to the Soviet Union in 1923 to observe the Red Army and became chief of staff of the Nationalist army and commandant of its military academy (called the Whampoa Military Academy, later the Central Military Academy).

In July 1926 Chiang was appointed commander-in-chief of the National Revolutionary Army and launched the Northern Expedition to unify China (the north at that time being under the control of various warlords). Rapid successes against larger warlord forces resulted in intense competition between the left wing of the Nationalist party and its allies (the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists) and the anti-Communist forces led by Chiang. He ended the coalition with the Soviet Union and purged the Chinese Communists from the Nationalist party. The Northern Expedition completed the nominal unification of China in 1928 and established its capital at Nanjing.

Chiang led the Nationalist government and its military forces during the Nanjing decade (1928–1937), defeating rivals within the party and making many reforms. But his government was trapped between Japan's rising imperialism, which sought to conquer China before it could modernize and truly unite, and the Chinese Communists, with their vision of a Marxist China. Japanese aggression culminated in the July 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident. The result was an eight-year Sino-Japanese war, which merged to become part of World War II in Asia in 1941.

China emerged as one of the victorious Big Four allied powers in 1945, but the war had shattered China's economy and the morale of the Nationalists. Mao Zedong won the ensuing civil war and established the Communist People's Republic of China in 1949. Chiang's defeated Nationalists retreated to Taiwan. Elected president of the Republic of China in 1948, Chiang continued to serve on Taiwan until his death in 1975.

The United States, which withdrew its support for the Nationalists in the civil war, resumed its alliance with Chiang's government after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. U.S. military and economic aid

and reforms instituted by the Nationalist government turned Taiwan into an economic powerhouse, and later a democratic nation.

Jiu-Hwa Lo Upsbur

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CHIANG MAI (2000 est. pop. 170,000). Chiang Mai is Thailand's second biggest city, located approximately 700 kilometers (440 miles) northwest of the capital Bangkok. Chiang Mai is roughly twenty times smaller than Bangkok, but in many ways it rivals the capital as Thailand's cultural and historic heart. Chiang Mai is an ancient city dating back to the thirteenth century (in 1996, it celebrated its 700th birthday), when it served as the capital of Lan Na ("a million rice fields")—one of the Tai peoples' earliest kingdoms.

Chiang Mai is also a province, the fifth largest in Thailand, with a population of approximately 1.5 million (1999). Thailand's administrative system is organized by province, not by region. Therefore, Chiang Mai, known as the "Rose of the North," is the provincial capital.

Built within a series of moats, the old city of Chiang Mai covers only about 4 square kilometers (2.5 square miles) yet is packed with markets, temples, and narrow streets. More modern development and construction, prohibited in the old city, has focused on the growing suburbs. The result is a city that represents Thailand's colorful and rich past, while at the same time providing the best that a modern metropolis can offer.

With over three hundred temples—nearly as many as Bangkok—Chiang Mai is one of the most important religious centers in Thailand. The oldest temple in the area, the spectacular Wat Prathat, is situated near the summit of Doi Suthep mountain, around which Chiang Mai was built. The temple, which contains relics of the Lord Buddha, attracts Buddhist pilgrims from all over the world.

Alongside this history, Chiang Mai is also rapidly modernizing and developing into a major commercial center. Tourists use the city as a base for jungle trekking in Northern Thailand, and to visit the re-

gion's various hill tribes. Chiang Mai offers a wide array of tour operators and business services for those wanting to explore the more remote parts of the north. Renowned for its night bazaar, Chiang Mai is a vital hub for silks, lacquerware, teak, silver, stoneware, and jewelry. Craft shops can be found throughout the city and local area. Less flattering, Chiang Mai has also become a base for narcotics, as well as the government's war on the drug trade. Located close to the infamous "Golden Triangle" border region between Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar (Burma), the city is considered by some to be the unofficial capital of the opium trade's distribution. At the end of the twentieth century, the Thai government had some success in reducing opium production in the north of Thailand.

Chiang Mai is widely considered to be more "relaxed" than Bangkok and other cities in Thailand. Life generally has a slower pace there, and the residents are famous for their easygoing attitude and good sense of humor. With a unique combination of old and new, Chiang Mai is one of the more fascinating cities in Asia.

Arne Kislenko

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CHIBA (2000 est. pop. 5.9 million). Chiba Prefecture is situated in the central region of Japan's island of Honshu. A residential and industrial satellite of Tokyo, Chiba occupies an area of 5,150 square kilometers, with its population mostly concentrated in the northwest. Its main geographical features are the Kanto Plain in the north, which meets the hilly Boso Peninsula in the south. The main rivers are the Tonegawa and the Edogawa. The prefecture is bordered by the Pacific Ocean and Tokyo Bay and by Tokyo, Saitama, and Ibaraki Prefectures. In earlier centuries the prefecture comprised Shimosa, Kazusa, and Awa provinces. It assumed its present name and borders in 1875.

The capital of the prefecture is Chiba City, some 34 kilometers southeast of Tokyo. A military base during World War II, the city later was reconstructed to make it a core of the Keiyo industrial region with its thermal power and steel plants. Chiba is one of Japan's main international ports. It is home to Chiba University, and land reclaimed from Tokyo Bay provides housing for Tokyo commuters. In feudal times, as a castle town it

was ruled by the Chiba family, and in the Edo period (1600/1603–1868) it was a post station for several highways. The other important cities of the prefecture are Funabashi, Ichikawa, Matsudo, and Choshi.

Industrial pollution ended fishing in Tokyo Bay. In prewar days, weaving and soy sauce production were traditional occupations. The northwest is the site of heavy industry, such as petrochemical processing, electrical and steel industries, and shipbuilding. Elsewhere are intensive rice growing and dairy farming. Narita is the site of the new Tokyo International Airport and thus the center of the nation's air transport. The cultural and recreational amenities include Narita's Buddhist temple Shinshoji, excellent ocean beaches in the Kujukurihama area, the national parks in Suigo-Tsukuba and southern Boso, and Tokyo Disneyland, which opened in 1983.

E. L. S. Weber

CHICKEN According to ancient Chinese texts, the chicken or common fowl came to China around 1400 BCE; it is one of the first domesticated animals mentioned in writing. Most geneticists think that the ancestor of domestic chickens (*Gallus gallus*), the red jungle fowl (also *Gallus gallus*), was first domesticated in South Asia, in present-day Vietnam and Thailand, perhaps as early as the sixth millennium BCE. Red jungle fowl still flourish in the wild in southern Asia from Kashmir east to Sumatra, living in the teak forests and in the Himalayas as high as 2,000 meters; thus they are a rare example of a domesticated animal's wild ancestor still being alive today. Red jungle fowl are about 65 centimeters long and are often seen feeding in forest clearings, usually one cock with several hens; each hen may have five to six chicks.

In Southeast Asia, domestic chickens are valued not only for their flesh and eggs, but for the fighting proclivities of cocks. In Indonesia and nearby lands, fighting cocks provide a major sport for the inhabitants.

Chickens were probably not seen in Greece until around 600 BCE; nowadays, the animals are common around the world. In Roman religion, the bird was sacred to Mars, the god of war, and to many ancient peoples cocks symbolized courage. In Christianity, the cock's crow signifies the resurrection of Christ.

Paul Hockings

CHILDREN'S DAY-JAPAN Children's Day (*kodomo no bi*) is a national holiday in Japan, celebrated

on the fifth of May. The day was formerly named *tango no sekku* (Boys' Day) and honored only boys, and it retains a strong male emphasis. Girls participate in various group activities to mark the day, but they do not have special rituals of their own.

Boys are reminded of the virtues of strength, courage, and perseverance, and wishes are made that they will grow up healthy, strong, and successful. The carp fish, admired for its strength and determination in swimming upstream against powerful currents, is a favorite symbol, and huge carp flags (*koi nobori*) fly from house rooftops in honor of each of a family's sons. Boys display their collections of miniature suits of armor, helmets, weapons and traditional warrior and hero dolls (*musba ningyo*). Popular characters include Shoki (a celebrated general) and Kintaro (a Herculean boy). Boys invite their friends and relatives to share sweet rice cakes wrapped in bamboo, and iris or oak leaves, which symbolize strength and the overcoming of obstacles. Long sword-shaped iris leaves are considered particularly auspicious, for their Japanese name *shobu* has the same pronunciation as the word meaning striving for success. Iris leaves are added to hot baths on this day as a charm against illness and bad luck. In many areas children give public performances and events highlighting children are held.

Lucy D. Moss

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CHILDREN'S DAY-TURKEY In 1935, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, founder of the Turkish Republic, dedicated National Sovereignty and Children's Day to Turkey's children. This holiday is celebrated in Turkey each year on 23 April. During Turkey's Independence War, the provisional Grand National Assembly met in Ankara for the first time on 23 April 1920 and laid down the foundations for the national republic that replaced the Ottoman empire. This event became Turkey's National Sovereignty Day and remained the only official holiday—besides religious holidays—until 1925, when the anniversary of the republic's 1923 establishment became another holiday. In 1929, the Association for the Protection of Children sought to establish a special state holiday devoted to making less fortunate children happy and joyful. The government thus declared the last week of every April to be Children's Week and 23 April to be Children's Day. The association encouraged holding a na-

tionwide series of celebrations for children, and in subsequent years Children's Day was incorporated into National Sovereignty Day celebrations. In 1935, the two holidays were combined and named National Sovereignty and Children's Day.

During celebrations children perform on the fields of most stadiums throughout the country, with many spectators in attendance. As part of their activities, children send representatives to substitute for high governmental officials, including the president, prime minister, governors, and mayors. Children also replace deputies in the Grand National Assembly and hold a session to discuss children's issues. For the past several decades, Turkish officials have sought ways to internationalize Children's Day. As part of these efforts in 1986, the Turkish National Assembly decided to invite children of other nations to celebrate this holiday. Each year groups of children from other nations travel to Turkey to join the festivities held for them and to stay with Turkish families. Foreign children's groups also participate in the special session of the Grand National Assembly and pledge to foster world peace. UNICEF thus recognized Children's Day as International Children's Day.

Emine Ö. Evered

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CHILUNG Chilung (Keelung, Jilong) is situated on the northeast coast of Taiwan and is the seaport of the capital Taipei, 27 kilometers to the southwest. Chilung is built at a natural harbor sheltered by mountains. The harbor is not located near the mouth of a river, so there is no problem with silting. A fort was built during the Spanish occupation in 1626. Later, the harbor came under Dutch occupation, but the town was not founded until 1723 when Chinese settlers brought it under Chinese jurisdiction. In 1862, Chilung became one of the treaty ports, and during the Japanese occupation of Taiwan (1895–1945), the harbor was enlarged and developed. When the Japanese retreated, the harbor was totally devastated and clogged with more than 150 sunk vessels.

The harbor has been renovated and connected with the city by a highway and railway tunnel, and it is one of the most important deep-water harbors in the re-

gion. Chilung has a large modern fleet of fishing boats and a substantial fishing industry. Important industries are shipyards, manufacture of fertilizers and cement, and computer hardware and accessories.

Bent Nielsen

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CHIN The Chin are a Tibeto-Burmese people who predominate in the great range of hills that run up western Myanmar (Burma) from the Arakan Yoma into Mizoram in northeast India. More than forty different subgroups have been categorized among the Chin inhabitants of Myanmar, including the Kuki, Chinbok, Tashon, and Asho. There are also related subgroups in neighboring India, but, in general, the Chin of Myanmar are known by the collective name of *Zomi*, whereas their ethnic cousins in India are known as *Mizo*.

There are few records of early Chin history. Chin settlers are believed to have lived in the lowlands of central Myanmar from around the middle of the first millennium CE, but Chin communities were gradually forced westward into the mountains by ethnic Burmans and other migrants during the next thousand years. Several Chin subgroups maintain the traditional custom of wearing facial tattoos, which is believed to date back to these times since, according to folklore, it prevented slave-raiding by Burman men or other incomers who found Chin women attractive.

In modern times, the socioeconomic development of the Chin peoples has been held back by the rugged terrain, which has made communications difficult. Of all the ethnic minority regions in Myanmar, the Chin hills have always been the most dependent on lowland areas for food and supplies.

The development of modern Chin political movements has also lagged behind, partly due to the diversity of subgroups. Like the Karens and Kachins, many Chins converted to Christianity under British rule and also served in the British colonial army. But under the colonial system of administration there was little advancement of Chin peoples in national representation or government.

After Burmese independence in 1948, although a special division was created from the former Chin hills

territory under the British, the Chin region continued to be characterized by its isolation, with many villagers continuing to pursue traditional methods of swidden (slash-and-burn) cultivation in the hills. Many young Chin men also joined the Burmese armed forces as a way to escape the continuing poverty.

Eventually, a Chin state was refashioned in 1974 from the special division. However, many Chin people also live in the adjoining Rakhine State, as well as Sagaing, Magwe (Magway), and Pegu (Bago) divisions. As a result, during the twentieth century Chin nationalists advocated creating a "pan-Chin" state to combine all these populations (estimated at more than 1 million), with some leaders even wanting to include their Mizo cousins in India. This was an idea that the British also briefly considered before their departure from the two countries in 1947–1948, but any substantial restructuring of boundaries is likely to remain a pipe dream.

Nevertheless, during the 1990s Chin nationalism appeared to be on the rise, with an insurgent Chin National Front movement active in the Indian borderlands and Chin representatives winning seats in the 1990 election. Christian evangelism was also resurgent, leading to restrictions by local Burmese army commanders who, it was alleged, gave preference to the Buddhist faith.

Martin Smith

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CH'IN DYNASTY. See **Qin Dynasty**.

CHIN STATE (2000 pop. 532,000). The Chin State in northwestern Myanmar (Burma) comprises some of the least developed hill regions in the country. Formerly governed under the British Frontier Areas Administration, a Chin Special Division was created from these mostly forested highlands at independence (1948). In 1974 the division was politically upgraded into a Chin State, measuring 36,019 square

kilometers (13,907 square miles) in area. Consisting of 9 townships and 505 wards or village-tracts, the capital is located at Haka in the northern part of the state. Other towns include Falam, Tiddim, and Paletwa.

With an estimated population of only 410,000 people (1990), Chin State's population density is one of the lowest in Myanmar. Most of the inhabitants are ethnic Chins, although there are ten thousand Rakhines, who mainly inhabit the Kaladan River valley in the west of the state. Other ethnic groups include Nagas and Burmans.

The difficult geography of the state historically has played a dominating role in political and economic life. Many communities live at subsistence level. Despite its borderland location, there are few road or communication links with either central Myanmar or its international neighbors. To the west lies Bangladesh, to the north the Mizoram and Manipur states of India, to the east the Sagaing and Magwe (Magway) Divisions, while to the south is the modern-day Rakhine State. The highest peak is Mount Victoria (3,053 meters [10,200 feet]), which is situated in the southeast near the Magwe (Magway) Division border.

Timber—teak, cane, pine, and other woods—is the state's most valuable natural resource. Economic modernization, however, has largely bypassed the territory. Farming, including swidden (slash-and-burn) cultivation, is the main economic activity for most inhabitants. The principal crops are rice, maize, and millet, as well as local planting of wheat, chilies, groundnuts, cotton, sugarcane, apples, oranges, and other garden fruits. During the twentieth century, attempts were made to increase agricultural production through methods such as irrigation, terraced farming, and the use of fertilizers and insecticides, but the total acreage under cultivation remained low.

In the first decades after independence from Britain in 1948, the Chin State was infrequently disrupted by insurgencies. From the late 1980s, however, ethnic discontent increased, manifested by the formation in 1987 of the Chin National Front—which carried out guerrilla strikes in the Indo-Bangladesh border region—as well as the victory of Chin opposition candidates in the 1990 general election. Demands included calls for greater autonomy as well as the right to develop closer economic and cultural linkages with Chin communities living outside the state's borders.

Martin Smith

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revolution in 1949, China has been known as the People's Republic of China (PRC). For the most part, its borders have been unchanged since then. However, there is some disputed territory on the high Himalayan borders between Tibet, which is under PRC control, and India. In a remarkably peaceful transition, Hong Kong (a port on China's southern coast) returned to PRC sovereignty from British colonial control in 1997, and nearby Macao from Portuguese colonial control in 1999. The thriving island economy of Taiwan, off the coast of the China mainland, is populated by Chinese people; whether or not it is a part of China is in dispute.

CHINA—PROFILE (2001 est. pop. 1.3 billion). China is a complex civilization with a history spanning several millennia. Since the success of a Communist-led



CHINA—PROFILE

Country name: People's Republic of China
Area: 9,596,960 sq km
Population: 1,273,111,290 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 0.88% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 15.95 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 6.74 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: -0.39 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio—total population: 1.09 male(s)/female
Infant mortality rate: 28.08 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population 71.62 years, male: 69.81 years, female: 73.59 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Daoist (Taoist), Buddhist (officially atheist)
Major languages: Standard Chinese or Mandarin (Putonghua, based on the Beijing dialect), Yue (Cantonese), Wu (Shanghaiese), Minbei (Fuzhou), Minnan (Hokkien-Taiwanese), Xiang, Gan, Hakka dialects
Literacy—total population: 81.5%, male: 89.9%, female: 72.7% (1995 est.)
Government type: Communist state
Capital: Beijing
Administrative divisions: 23 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, and 4 municipalities
Independence: Unification under the Qin dynasty 221 BCE ; Qing dynasty replaced by the Republic on 12 February 1912; People's Republic established 1 October 1949)
National holiday: Founding of the People's Republic of China, 1 October (1949)
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal
GDP—real growth rate: 8% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita (purchasing power parity): \$3,600 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: 10% (1999 est.)
Exports: \$232 billion (f.o.b., 2000)
Imports: \$197 billion (f.o.b., 2000)
Currency: yuan (CNY)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Factbook* 2001. Retrieved 18 October 2001, from: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.



At the start of the twenty-first century, China, with 21 percent of the total global population, is the world's most populous nation. Its vast territory covers an extreme range of altitudes, climates, landforms, and natural resources. The PRC is a poor country that is developing rapidly. Its economy is one of the fastest growing on earth. Its government is one of the world's few remaining Communist regimes. The political system is struggling to remain viable by transforming China from a command economy to a successful socialist market economy. The social transformation of China's people is also breathtaking. To understand what is going on in Asia during the early twenty-first century, it is essential to comprehend the rapid changes taking place in China.

Geography

China is similar in size and latitude to the lower forty-eight states of the United States. It is mostly in

the temperate zone of the northern hemisphere, with its southernmost areas in the subtropical zone. Most of China experiences strong annual extremes in temperature and rainfall because of its location on the huge Eurasian continental landmass. On the east and south, China is bordered by seas that facilitate ocean commerce. Moving from east to west, China rises from sea level to high plateaus and mountains, including the Himalayas, the world's highest mountains, in Tibet. Therefore, most of China's major rivers flow from west to east.

Where people live in China is determined largely by climate and topography. The half of China's territory that is located in the west, northwest, and north is mostly deserts, arid grasslands, high plateaus, and mountains. About 6 percent of the population lives there. In contrast, 94 percent of the population lives

in the half of China's land area that includes the warm, moist, southern, southeastern, and central provinces, the densely populated eastern and coastal provinces, and the northeast.

Politics

During the PRC's first twenty-seven years, during which the nation was led by Chairman Mao Zedong (1893–1976), China's totalitarian government established and maintained tight control of the population, right down into families. A U.S.-led embargo isolated China starting in the early 1950s; at the same time, China closed off its borders and defended itself from any perceived colonial or imperialist threats. Especially from the late 1950s through the subsequent decade, China heightened its own isolation, suppressing most information about what was happening in the country and focusing inward. The Communist government attempted to overcome the past and transform the beliefs and ideas of China's people, using a succession of disruptive and even catastrophic ideological movements, including the Great Leap Forward from 1958 to 1961 and the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s and the 1970s. Arbitrary imprisonment, murder, maiming, and other forms of political harassment and physical harm were commonplace during the Maoist decades.

After Mao's death in 1976, his successors Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) and then Jiang Zemin (b. 1926) instituted some political changes. As a result, the Communist Party greatly reduced its intrusion into people's personal and family lives. Other improvements include experiments with local village elections and attempts to establish and strengthen a legal system to replace arbitrary rule. But the whole political and economic system is riddled with corruption. Political rights in China are still very limited and human rights are frequently violated. Since troops massacred demonstrators in and around Beijing's Tiananmen Square in 1989, the government has cracked down on democratic movements and unofficial religious groups. Because capitalist and democratic ideas from abroad have eroded the perceived legitimacy of the Communist government in the eyes of the people, the government is now using nationalism to rally its citizens. By Western and advanced Asian standards, the people of China today do not yet have a free press or independent media, freedom of association, freedom of religion, or free speech.

Population

China's first modern census in 1953 counted 583 million people, a far larger number than expected. In the 1950s, the government equalized access to food-

growing land in its rural land reform and widely introduced public health measures to improve health and reduce mortality. By 1957, in comparison to the late 1940s, the country's death rate had been approximately halved. However, Mao Zedong's ill-conceived Great Leap Forward brought about agricultural disasters and famine, causing 30 million excess deaths in the period 1958–1961. Thereafter, the government moderated its rural policies and the death rate dropped again. Mortality has remained low ever since. China's low death rate, combined with continuing high birth rates, caused rapid population growth from the 1950s into the 1970s. China's compulsory family-planning program was implemented in rural areas in the 1970s, reducing the birth rate and population growth rate to low levels beginning in the late 1970s. China's population is growing at one percent per year, which is low for a developing country. By the year 2000, China's population had reached approximately 1.3 billion, well over twice the 1953 count.

Economy

In 1949, almost the entire Chinese population was engaged in subsistence agriculture. Only 11 percent of the people lived in urban areas. Modern industry had been brought in by foreign colonial powers only to the coastal city of Shanghai and the northeast provinces (Manchuria). China's Communist government used the Soviet Union as its model of economic development: Starting in the mid-1950s, China's leadership collectivized agricultural land and siphoned off surplus rural production for investment in heavy industry in the cities. This system successfully promoted China's rapid heavy industrialization, but the distortions it introduced into the economy were serious and long-lasting. For example, laborers were prevented from leaving the countryside even if they could be more productive in a town or city. Further, the rural and urban structures of compensation were remarkably flat, and incomes were kept extremely low. The minimal or nonexistent rewards for educational attainment, efficiency, creativity, or work effectiveness in urban and rural areas suppressed incentives to work hard and to excel.

By the 1970s, it was clear to many of China's leaders that certain parts of the economy were not succeeding. Collective agriculture was barely able to keep grain production ahead of China's rapid population growth, and per capita production of other essential foods had declined since the 1950s. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping launched the economic reform period, which began with the abandonment of collectivized agriculture and the return of agricultural land-use rights to each rural family. The government also raised the official purchase prices of

grain and other agricultural commodities, and greatly increased the supply of chemical fertilizer. In response, agricultural production increased rapidly in the early 1980s. Simultaneously, the government began to allow rural industries (called "township and village enterprises," or TVEs), light industries, provision of services, village and street markets, and private companies. With this partial introduction of a market economy, growth of the gross domestic product has averaged 8 percent a year since 1978. On the whole, the piecemeal dismantling of China's command economy and gradual introduction of market forces has been a success.

One factor in this success has been the invigoration of rural and urban work incentives in a liberalized policy environment. Another element has been China's opening to the outside world during the economic reform. The booming economy has been based partly on export-led growth, as foreign investors have set up companies and joint ventures in the coastal provinces to make light industrial products for the global market. A third element has been a belated and ongoing shift of laborers from agriculture to industry and services, accompanied by a policy change allowing some migration out of rural areas for work in towns, cities, and other parts of the country. Surplus rural laborers can now more easily go where their work is in greater demand.

Education and Human Capital

Part of China's economic success is traceable to the fact that the human capital embodied in China's working-age population increased dramatically in the second half of the twentieth century. The PRC began with a huge population that was very poor and agrarian, illiterate and uneducated, frequently ill, and traumatized by civil war, Japanese invasion, and high mortality. In contrast, by the 1990s the average life expectancy was around seventy years. Most diseases that plagued the people in the mid-twentieth century were gone or controlled fifty years later.

China's government promotes universal literacy and attainment of at least a primary education. Of the working-age population (arbitrarily defined as between ages fifteen and sixty-five for international comparison) at the beginning of the twenty-first century, only 6 percent of men and 17 percent of women are illiterate. Success in achieving basic literacy is more pronounced in urban areas than rural, and in eastern and coastal provinces compared to most of the provinces in the western half of China.

Environment

China has an unusual variety in its ecological systems and a rich natural resource base, but its enormous

population places huge demands on its environment. Continuing population growth and rapidly rising living standards are combining to pollute China's air, water, and soil, and to strain the country's food-growing capacity, deplete forests, and exacerbate water scarcity in north and west China. Amidst great natural diversity of animals and plants, many species are threatened or have become extinct. In arid regions, the deserts are expanding, taking over existing grasslands and arable land. China's national government is aware of environmental problems and pollution, and is implementing some policies to reverse or slow ecological deterioration. However, a high priority of China's leaders is the fastest possible economic development. When economic goals and environmental goals conflict, the economy tends to take precedence.

Peoples and Ethnicity

China has a largely homogeneous population based on its officially designated ethnic categories. The Han Chinese nationality comprises 92 percent of the population, though there are some intragroup differences among the category defined as Han Chinese. The fifty-five minority nationalities are unevenly distributed throughout the country. In most of China's populous provinces, only from 1 to 2 percent of the population is non-Han. In general, each minority group is concentrated in one province or several contiguous ones. In only two provinces are Han Chinese in the minority: Tibet in the west and Xinjiang in the northwest. Most of China's land border regions are inhabited by minority nationalities with ethnic kin across the border, which, from the government's perspective, causes major security problems.

Most of China's minority nationalities have been strongly influenced by the Chinese language, historical Chinese culture, and powerful intrusions during the Communist period. Many of the minority groups are highly assimilated. Others remain distinctive in their religion, clothing, housing, language, food, lifestyle, economic life, arts, or customs. Most of the minorities appear to have adapted to overwhelming Han numerical dominance, but some members of certain minority nationalities (Tibetans, along with Uighurs and some other Muslim minorities) are particularly restive. Policies toward the minorities have varied over time. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, some of the minority groups are allowed to have one (or more than one) additional child per couple above the quota for Han Chinese. Other preferential policies are financial subsidies, health and economic assistance, and some affirmative action programs to give the minorities political representation

or educational advantages. At the same time, China's government suppresses minority individuals or groups campaigning for freedom of expression and religion, genuine autonomy within the PRC, or independence.

Culture and Language

China has a rich ancient culture. For more than a century, Chinese thinkers and leaders have struggled to determine what aspects of that culture should be preserved and which aspects should be discarded so that China may become a modern, developed, great power. Mao's Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), during which traditional culture came under attack for its perceived elitism, represented an extreme of intentional destruction, but even today the government attempts to discredit cultural forms that it feels do not sit well with its Communist ideology. Much of China's cultural heritage has also been lost or destroyed through invasion from abroad, civil war, neglect, and globalization. Elements of Chinese traditional culture that remain today are near-universal marriage, close family life, Chinese cuisines and special foods, Chinese traditional medicine, intensive agricultural production, traditional walled-courtyard housing, great respect for education, patrilineal family structure, son preference, male dominance in the workplace, a China-centered perspective, disdain for most other cultures, deference to individuals of higher status, ability to function in hierarchical systems, traditional arts and handicrafts, spoken Chinese dialects, and China's written language.

Society

For a century, the experiences of each new generation in China have differed vastly from the experiences of the previous generation. A series of cataclysmic events—collapse of the last dynasty, civil war, the Japanese invasion, Communist social transformation, attacks on certain social groups, famine, the Cultural Revolution—traumatized tens or hundreds of millions of people at vulnerable stages in their life cycle. At the same time, Chinese society was permanently transformed in many positive ways as well. China's brutal traditional custom of binding and breaking the feet of girls and women completely ceased in the twentieth century, saving hundreds of millions of girls from this crippling disfigurement. The social position of China's girls and women rose sharply in that century, a wrenching cultural shift in any society. There has been vast, generally positive change in male-female relationships. Quality of life for almost all China's people has improved to a stunning degree, especially with regard to survival and health, quantity and variety of food, education, and living standards.

Though China remains primarily rural, the urban proportion of the population increased from 11 percent in 1949 to 36 percent at the end of the twentieth century. Communist policies have set up an economic, political, and social structure that gives extreme advantages to the urban population at the expense of rural people. The World Bank reports that rural incomes are less than one-third of urban incomes, a difference much higher than in most countries. Barriers to geographic and social mobility instituted or strengthened in the Maoist period continue to hold down rural incomes. However, the economic reform period has lifted the great majority of the population out of absolute poverty; remaining pockets of poverty tend to be in mountainous and remote areas.

China in the Twenty-First Century

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, China's people and government wish for the nation to take its rightful place of leadership in global affairs. In many ways, the PRC does function as a responsible, sometimes forward-looking international leading nation. It is an active member of most United Nations organizations, the World Bank system, and many Asian regional organizations. Other Asian nations tend to treat China with caution and respect, in part because of its huge population and territory and rising economic clout, and in part out of fear of possible Chinese aggression. For example, China claims vast reaches of the South China Sea and East China Sea in areas much closer to other countries and claimed by them also. China's unilateral occupation of islands in the disputed regions has raised widespread concern.

Compared with most other developing countries and with other countries in transition from command economies to market or capitalist economies, the PRC is succeeding extraordinarily well. China's biggest economic problem today is employment. The age structure is greatly concentrated in the working-age groups, and the population of working age is still increasing rapidly. As a legacy of China's traditional economy and of Maoist economics, China has one or two hundred million surplus laborers in agriculture, plus tens of millions of surplus workers in industry and government. About one-third of the state-owned enterprises are reported to be losing money, including many of the larger ones. The banking system that has been propping them up is crippled by nonperforming loans to the state sector. Transforming the economy to increase efficiency and productivity means at least temporarily laying off surplus rural and urban workers. The biggest economic challenge is to generate new employment opportunities for those adults who are

unemployed, laid off, underemployed, or looking for more productive employment.

China's government is trying to prove that a Communist one-party political system is still viable in the modern world, even though most such governments have now collapsed. The pervasiveness of corruption at all levels weakens the government's claims to popular legitimacy. The government is trying to confront the corruption problem and shrink the bloated bureaucracy, but the perceived necessity of keeping the Communist Party in power at all costs continues to mean denying democratic freedom to China's people, imprisoning those who speak out against autocracy, arresting and suppressing journalists, preventing people from forming non-governmental organizations, and biasing the content of education. As China's people become wealthier, more educated, and in greater contact with international norms, the PRC political system becomes less viable over time.

Chinese society and culture have been weakened and transformed in myriad ways both by the Communist government from within and by foreign influences from without. Change has been so fast and confusing that many Chinese people are experiencing a spiritual and cultural vacuum. One of China's big issues in the twenty-first century is to build a modern, stable society that satisfies the needs of China's own people as they perceive them.

China's historic demographic transition from traditional high death and birth rates to modern low death and birth rates is nearly complete. The process occurred very quickly. This implies that in the coming decades, China will experience rapid and extreme aging of its population structure. Elderly dependency will place great burdens on China's families and on society because of the escalating needs of the aged for health care, personal care, and financial support.

The cumulative harm to China's environment caused by population growth, rising affluence, industrialization, and the low priority given to addressing this environmental destruction is another concern. Annual economic losses from pollution, deforestation, erosion, desertification, and other ecological disasters are estimated to equal 5–10 percent of China's gross domestic product. Many of China's leaders would like to postpone cleaning up China's environmental problems until China is a rich country more easily able to afford the cost, but others argue that the losses are too massive and the country must reverse the deterioration immediately.

The Future

China has just experienced a century of instability and rapid change in most aspects of life. Almost every

part of Chinese society is still in flux. Economic transformation continues unabated. Living standards are rising and lifestyles are changing fast. Politics is shifting more slowly. China may follow the pattern already seen in many other Asian societies, in which economic development has preceded political development, with democratization lagging a decade or two behind the achievement of fairly high incomes and educational attainment. The achievement of full equality between males and females will take decades more. Continuing urbanization will tilt the balance away from conservative rural customs and attitudes. As China continues to modernize, it may come to resemble more closely Taiwan or Hong Kong, places where Chinese culture has adapted to the interconnected global system without losing its distinctive characteristics. Nevertheless China, by virtue of its huge geographic and population size, will remain unique in many respects.

Judith Banister

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CHINA—ECONOMIC SYSTEM In the last two decades of the twentieth century, the Chinese economic system changed from a command economy, which dated from shortly after the Communists took control in 1949, to a mixed economy.

The Command Economy before Reform

A command economy is an economic system in which the means of production are publicly owned and economic activity is controlled by a central authority that assigns quantitative production targets and allots raw materials to production units. It involves comprehensive economic planning on the basis of targets and balancing of materials.

China's command economy was first established in 1950–1951 and was followed by the introduction of a Soviet-style five-year plan, the First Five-Year Plan, for the period of 1953 to 1957. The Soviet model was

ideologically sound in that it was supported by Marxist theory, but more important, it seemed to the Chinese a necessity when they had to face the deterioration of the economy following a century of wars and turmoil. With the ability to mobilize resources quickly on a national scale, this administrative approach was effective in its initial phase.

From the early 1950s, the Chinese central industrial ministries and administrative regions were required to assign production targets to the enterprises under their jurisdiction. Each group of enterprises was then required to formulate annual production, cost, and labor plans and to submit them to the higher echelons—that is, the industrial ministries or bureaus—for approval. During the same period, procedures for making annual plans "from the bottom to the top" and "from the top to the bottom" were introduced and standardized. There were frequent consultations and exchanges of information at various levels of the hierarchy. Moreover, a centralized system of supplying raw materials was established.

The central bureaucracy played a predominant role in the economy. In the industrial sector, for example, the state owned outright enterprises that produced more than 60 percent of the gross value of industrial output, and all but a small portion of the remainder was owned collectively. In the urban sector, the government not only prescribed output targets and allocated energy resources, it also set the prices for key commodities, determined the level and general distribution of investment funds, set wage levels and employment targets, ran the wholesale and retail networks, and controlled financial policy and the banking system. The foreign-trade system became a government monopoly in the early 1950s as well. Similarly, in the countryside, from the mid-1950s, the government prescribed cropping patterns, set the level of prices, and fixed output targets for all major crops. Most rural commercial transactions were carried out by the Supply and Marketing Cooperatives—nominally an organization of farming cooperatives but in fact a heavily bureaucratized organization that functioned as the rural wing of the Ministry of Commerce.

In order to run the command economy, the chief organ of planning, the State Planning Commission, was established in 1952 and placed under the State Council when the latter was made supreme executive body by the 1954 constitution. At the same time, the State Construction Commission was organized to oversee capital investment under the five-year plans in 1956; the State Economic Commission was established to take over short-term—up to annual—plan responsibilities, leaving the State Planning Commission to concentrate on long-term and perspective planning. Also



FIVE LARGEST COMPANIES IN CHINA

According to *Asia Week*, the five largest companies in China are as follows.

Company	Sector	Sales (\$ millions)	Rank in Asia
State Power	Energy	42,587.7	19
China Petroleum and Chem.	Chemicals	39,729.5	21
Petrochina	Petroleum	29,231.4	28
China Telecom	Telecom- munications	20,812.9	44
Sinochem	Chemicals Trading	18,035.5	58

Source: *Asia Week*. 2001 (9 November): 111.

created in 1956 were the General Bureau for Supply of Raw Materials, to handle material allocation, and the State Technological Commission, to plan long-term technical development. The State Statistical Bureau was established in 1952, its provincial and municipal statistical departments in 1953, and below them administrative and special district officers in 1954.


Centralization and Decentralization The organization of planning grew more centralized, reaching a peak in 1955–1956. China had nearly 200,000 separate enterprises, operating with widely varying technologies, product assortments, and levels of efficiency, even within the same industry. Yet, the data gathered, transmitted, and processed for central planning were irregular, sometimes incomplete, and often overestimated. As both the number of commodities and the number of enterprises for which the central planning bodies assumed responsibility grew rapidly, the maintenance of such a high degree of centralization of both planning and management became increasingly cumbersome. In 1957 and 1958, the government adopted a series of decentralization measures to shift some responsibilities onto the localities, increase the scope for local initiative, and strengthen central control of the most important plan targets and enterprises.

In this round of decentralization, most planning tasks were transferred to officials closer to the scene of production in an effort to shorten lines of communication and reduce absentee management. This took place when the ministries passed most of the enter-

prises they had controlled to regional authorities, which gained more rights to allocate scarce resources. Most planning tasks then fell on the shoulders of regional and local authorities. This move was also a regionalization of planning, in which several industrial ministries were abolished after losing a majority of their enterprises. Subsequently, the sixty thousand communes received an administrative and planning role in rural areas. They replaced the *xiang*, or township governments, in 1958. In principle, only the most important enterprises remained under direct ministerial control. Even many of these were supposed to come under dual subordination to ministries and regional authorities, although in practice ministerial control came to dominate. The 1957–1958 decentralization was never entirely reversed.

The Chinese command economy traditionally operated with a strong centralized monopoly over commerce. Monopoly purchase of grain actually preceded agricultural collectivization in China, and even during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), when much of the industrial management system was being decentralized, central control of agricultural procurement and distribution of key consumer goods continued. Although there were around thirty thousand rural and suburban periodic markets (that is, markets that opened periodically), they were tightly controlled, and it was forbidden to transact goods such as grain and cotton, over which the Ministry of Commerce had a monopoly.

Shortages in China's Command Economy All command economies have followed development strategies that stress high levels of investment in, and give priority to, heavy industry. China was no exception. As might be expected, the focus on heavy industry was



A major development in the Chinese economy in the last half of the twentieth century was increasing industrialization. Here, workers on an assembly line assemble electronic boards in a factory in Dong Guna, Guangdong Province. (BOHEMIAN NOMAD PICTUREMAKERS/CORBIS)

accompanied by severe shortages of consumer goods as well as, ironically, producer goods.

The shortages seemed to arise from three sources. First, the government simply channeled so many resources into investment and heavy industry that there was little left for households. Second, shortages resulted from the soft budget constraints of enterprises. Most enterprises were quite profitable, and they faced no risk of bankruptcy. As a result, enterprises pursued unrestrained growth and had an almost unlimited desire for investment. Typically, each planning unit of an enterprise tried to make sure it would have the inputs it needed to fulfill its plan targets, plus a margin for insurance. Each therefore tended to overstate its needs and to treat the requirements of other planning jurisdictions as residual. Third, and related to the second, when managers were promoted based on their ability to fulfill the state-set output volume, their demand for inputs tended to expand until total demand ran up against the total available supply of resources. The overdemand for production inputs, without much concern about efficiency or quality of output, resulted in constant shortage of the supply of resources. Command economies have thus a built-in tendency to become "shortage economies."

Other Features of China's Command Economy In addition to the characteristics mentioned above, China's command economy adopted an urban-biased social-welfare policy to encourage industrial development. The policy provided not only lifetime full employment but also virtually free housing, free health care, and free retirement benefits. Excluded were nonurban residents, however, and the government controlled obtaining permits for urban residence.

The government also controlled internal migration and job assignment in the urban sector through a house-registration system, which largely replaced the free labor market after 1957, although the post-Mao reforms have attempted to revive it.

The Post-Mao Economic Reforms and a Mixed Economy

Since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, China has been trying to reform its economy, with gradual but somewhat parallel changes in the rural and urban sectors. The reforms of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) have been accompanied by a flurry of complaints about the inefficiency of Soviet-style central planning and, in particular, about China's unwieldy, overlapping, and inefficient administrative bureaucracy, along with the excessive dependence of enterprises on their planning apparatus. To end the latter, post-Mao leaders have

sought to institute a system of managerial and production responsibility, under which producers become more responsible for marketing their output, procuring supplies, operating in a cost-effective manner, and financing their investments from their own earnings or repayable bank loans. In these post-Mao reforms, the government has emphasized raising personal income and consumption and introducing new management systems to help increase productivity. It has also focused on foreign trade as a major vehicle for economic growth.


In the late 1970s, China started to pursue agricultural reforms, dismantling the commune system and introducing the household-responsibility system, which gave peasants greater decision making in agricultural activities. The development of the household-responsibility system itself can be roughly divided into three phases: the work-quota contract phase, the output-quota contract phase, and the responsibility contract phase. In the work-quota contract phase, the household was responsible for the hours of work contracted on the collective land with the production input from the collective. In the output-quota contract phase, the household was responsible for the quantity of output contracted given the production input from the collective. In the responsibility contract phase, the household was responsible for everything from input to output. The government has also encouraged non-agricultural activities, such as township and village enterprises, in rural areas. Agriculture thus has been decollectivized, small-scale private trade and workshops have been legalized, and the role of market forces has been substantially increased.

In the urban sector, the goal of enterprise reform grows ever loftier. Its original goal was to solve the problem of low incentive and inefficiency in state enterprises. As the reform has progressed, the goal has become changing the managerial mechanism to make state enterprises competitive in the market.

The Four Phases of China's Economic Reform Reform of China's state-owned enterprises has gone through four phases. The first phase (1979–1984) focused on giving a certain amount of autonomy to enterprises in exchange for their improved efficiency. The second phase (1984–1986) focused on ways to enhance the vitality of state enterprises. The third phase (1987–1996) focused on the reconstruction of state enterprises' managerial mechanisms. The fourth phase, beginning in 1997, has tried to get rid of money-losing enterprises, hence starting a period of much-delayed privatization.

As in other socialist countries, Chinese reformers have followed a dual approach. In addition to the state sector, they have allowed the more marketized sector—consisting mainly of small- to mid-sized private and collective firms—to expand explosively in both rural and urban areas. In some cases, the enterprise capital is still state owned, but the facilities are leased to individuals or groups that operate them on a profit-or-loss basis. Since the mid-1990s, stock and bond markets have also sprung up, and over 400,000 enterprises have incorporated themselves.

Within the planning network, many large enterprises still have a primary obligation to meet plan targets, but the latter are supposed to be set low enough to allow a margin of overfulfillment. Production that is beyond state targets or not covered by targets is to be sold in competitive markets, and enterprises that do this successfully are supposed to be able to keep part of the resulting profit for bonuses and investment under their control. Prices have also been gradually deregulated and are now largely free of controls for output not subject to mandatory planning, although subsidies and production quotas in agriculture still hold down grain prices.



CAN CHINA'S ECONOMIC INDICATORS BE TRUSTED?

Some experts argue that some of basic economic indicators published by the Chinese government are less than accurate. Among these are an economic growth rate of an average of nearly 10% per year from 1980 to 1999, which some experts believe is at least 2% too high and suspect figures about the amount of cultivated land in China. China once claimed only 95 million hectares of cultivated land and then claimed 130 million hectares in 2000. Experts believe that 150 million hectares is more accurate. The difference has important policy implications as China can feed itself on 150 million but not on 95 million and with more difficulty on 130 million.

Source: Vaclav Smil. (2001) "It Doesn't Add Up." *Asia Week* (30 November): 24.



FOR CHINA'S BANKING SECTOR, SMALL MAY BE BETTER

China's banking sector is dominated by the four large state-owned banks: The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, and China Construction of China. Experts agree that all are badly in need of reform to end chronic problems caused by mismanagement, ties to the government bureaucracy, and poorly performing loans. One source of overall reform might be the over 100 smaller banks that have emerged across China since 1996 when new policies allowed their formation. Many of these semi-independent, cooperatively owned banks have been more successful than the larger banks over the last five years. Their success is based on better customer service, more modern facilities, better management of loans, and a profit orientation. It is expected that they will also prove more able to compete in the global banking marketplace as China joins the World Trade Organization.

Source: Allen T. Cheng. (2000) "The Advantage of Being Small." *Asia Week* (16 November): 35.

Historically, price ceilings for consumer goods were supported by formal rationing of some staple foodstuffs and other daily necessities, as well as of a number of consumer durables. This system has been virtually replaced by market allocation, together with far higher prices, although housing may still be purchased through work units at a much lower price.

In recent years, a dual market for urban housing has sprung up, in which some apartments of relatively high quality are leased through the market at some of the world's highest rents. Shanghai, for example, has rents much higher than those in New York City and nearly as high as those in Tokyo.

Reform of Large-Scale Industry Although larger-scale industry has remained subject to central planning controls, similar market-type reforms have long been implemented. Reformers have worked to expand market links within the state-planning network while reducing control by government agencies. In 1982, the number of ministries and commissions directly under

the State Council was cut from ninety-eight to fifty-two and subsequently to forty-one, and their total staff was reduced from 49,000 to 32,000. As their decision-making rights grow, enterprises are supposed to become more profit oriented in order to be stimulated to reduce waste, raise quality and labor productivity, better tailor their products to user needs, and upgrade production. They are to move away from the one-sided emphasis on output volume—a hallmark of a command economy. In addition, provincial governments and over nine hundred enterprises now have rights to conduct foreign trade on their own.

By the late 1980s, the economy had become overheated with increasing rates of inflation. China's economy regained momentum in the early 1990s, after Deng Xiaoping's Chinese New Year's visit to southern China in 1992 gave economic reforms new impetus. The Fourteenth Party Congress later in the year backed up Deng's renewed push for market reforms, stating that China's key task in the 1990s was to create a "socialist market economy," an economy that would accommodate a variety of forms of ownership and permit coexistence of government planning and market mechanisms. Continuity in the political system but bolder reforms in the economic system were announced as the hallmarks of the ten-year development plan for the 1990s.

Challenges for the Twenty-First Century

Despite China's impressive economic development during the past two decades, reforming the state-enterprises sector, modernizing the banking system, and creating a social-welfare system remain major hurdles. Many small loss-making enterprises have now been closed or sold, but larger losing enterprises are usually merged with viable state enterprises or simply continue to be subsidized. Most discharged workers have continued to receive minimum compensation, including early retirement and opportunities to go into business for themselves. However, the rising unemployment rates are expected to be further pumped up after China joins the World Trade Organization.

There are three types of economic activities in China: those stipulated by mandatory planning, those done according to indicative planning (in which central planning of economic outcomes is indirectly implemented), and those governed by market forces. The second and third types have grown at the expense of the first, but goods of national importance and almost all large-scale construction come under the mandatory planning system. Operational supervision over economic projects has devolved primarily to provincial, municipal, and county governments. The market econ-

omy generally involves small-scale or highly perishable items that circulate within local market areas only. In addition, enterprises themselves are gaining increased independence in a range of activities. Almost every year brings additional changes in the lists of goods that fall under each of the three types of planning. Overall, the Chinese economic system contains a complex mixture of relationships: state ownership, shareholding, collective ownership, private ownership, foreign direct investment, and public ownership through shareholding. Indeed, the nonstate investment in fixed assets in China at the beginning of the twenty-first century reached 47 percent of its total, and it has continued to grow. The search continues for an optimal balance between plan and market, although the Communist Party reserves the right to make broad decisions on economic priorities and policies.

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See also: Development Zones—China; Shenzhen Special Economic Zone

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CHINA—EDUCATION SYSTEM China's education system, the world's largest, serves over 200 million primary and secondary school pupils. It achieved remarkable gains from 1949 to 2000 despite political upheaval and low levels of funding. When the People's Republic was founded in 1949, 20 percent of school-age children attended primary school. Fifty years later the net enrollment ratio was 99 percent, and the proportion of China's population that was illiterate had dropped from 80 to 14 percent.

The Cultural and Political Economy of Schooling

China's massive educational project is anchored by her citizens' belief in the power of schooling. Surveys indicate that educational expenses get first priority in

family budgets, followed by health and housing. Education reforms throughout the 1990s have resulted in a shift of financial responsibility from the central government to local communities. Funding comes from all levels of government, from enterprise taxes, from surcharges on rural households, and from tuition, fees, and private contributions. The government decreased its funding of education from 84.5 percent in 1991 to 68.9 in 1998, while tuition as a source of funding for education rose from 4.42 to 12.5 percent. Decrease in national funding has forced schools to generate income from school businesses, services, and fee-paying students, exacerbating educational disparities between rich and poor counties.

Such disparities hinder China's education "action plan," which calls for universal senior secondary schooling, a 15 percent matriculation rate to higher education, national systems of lifelong learning and knowledge innovation, and the elimination of illiteracy by the year 2010. However, the government's own officers criticize its disproportionately low investments in education. In 1999 China ranked 145th out of 153 nations in terms of per-capita education spending. Although national policy prescribes government educational expenditures of 4 percent of GDP, the current figure is 2.5 percent, virtually unchanged since the 1950s.

Beyond Access to Quality Primary Education

A majority of urban children have attended preschool since the 1980s, reflecting the mobilization of women outside the household and the one-child family policy. By the early 2000s, the government hopes to achieve a gross preschool enrollment rate of 45 percent for three- to five-year-olds, and 60 percent for children in their last year of kindergarten.

Nearly all children attend and graduate from primary school. In 1997 net enrollment rates of 98.9 percent and promotion rates of 93.7 percent represented an impressive increase over 1980 figures of 93 and 75.9 percent respectively. In 1999 China's 582,300 primary schools enrolled 134.7 million pupils. As China's baby-boom echo generation matriculates into secondary school, declining primary-school enrollments in cities like Shanghai and Nanjing have allowed officials to close poor schools, reduce class size, and raise teaching standards. Changed standards for the primary school curriculum, implemented on a trial basis in 2001, are designed to facilitate well-rounded training in language arts, social studies, mathematics and sciences, physical education, and art and music. English-language and information-technology instruction begin in grade three in schools with adequate resources.

Continuous media attention on funding irregularities and student workload indicates how competition for educational resources extends to the lowest levels of schooling. Shanghai's regulations on tuition and fees are typical in prohibiting donations linked to entrance, mid-year tuition increases, and extra fees for supplementary courses for all students. The Ministry of Education has made lightening the oppressive workload of school children its urgent educational goal for the new millennium. Yet, measures promoting that end (including restrictions on homework) can prove unpopular with parents who fear jeopardizing their children's educational future.

Universalizing and Diversifying Secondary Schooling

China's gross enrollment rate for pupils in junior secondary school (grades 7–9), part of the compulsory education system since 1985, was 88.6 percent in 1998. Coastal cities that have universalized junior secondary schooling have abolished selective entrance examinations in favor of neighborhood schooling. Nationally, junior secondary schools enrolled approximately 77 million pupils in 2000 and will operate for several more years under the strain of increased enrollments, with class sizes regularly exceeding fifty-five pupils.

Graduation from junior secondary school marks the transition of adolescents to stratified senior secondary schools, work, or unemployment. While junior secondary school dropout rates, 3.23 percent in 1998, remain a concern, promotion rates to senior secondary school increased from 40.6 to 57.5 percent between 1990 and 1997. Senior secondary schooling is nearly universalized in metropolitan areas like Shanghai, where 95 percent of junior secondary graduates continued their education in 2000.

Senior secondary-school reforms have included the introduction of new textbooks, elective courses, credit systems, information technology, and an approach to moral education that emphasizes community participation, discovery learning, and "healthy leisure." New curricular standards implemented in 2001 give individual schools more flexibility in deciding how their teachers can best engage students in a well-rounded course of study in Chinese, English, mathematics, computer sciences, social studies, biology, chemistry, physics, geography, music, arts, and physical sciences. College preparatory courses, criticized as too difficult, have been streamlined to offer students time for co-curricular pursuits. Systems of accreditation are being developed for advanced teachers and private schools, and increased educational qualifications and in-service training are mandated for teachers and principals.

The content, structure, and guidelines for competency and matriculation examinations are also changing to conform to changing curricular standards. Many cities and provinces have adopted a college entrance examination system that requires examinations in Chinese, English, and mathematics, plus one or two optional subjects, usually chosen from politics, history, physics, and chemistry. High-achieving students are sometimes exempted from exams. Expanding college enrollment fuels such reforms. The chances for students in metropolitan centers to enter college have never been greater (and college has never cost more). Of Beijing senior secondary graduates, 70 percent entered higher education in 2000. Living in educational centers drastically improves a student's opportunity for higher education; those areas have more resources to spend on education and consequently have more seats available in high schools, colleges, and universities. China's first Spring College Entrance Examination was held in 2000. Only 1,100 examinees sat for Beijing's 1,755 college places. In contrast, 35,000 examinees in Anhui province vied for 6,190 places, making it harder for qualified students to advance to the upper levels of schooling.

Expanding and "Commercializing" Tertiary Education

Relative to other developing countries, the base of China's educational pyramid is very broad while the top is very narrow. In 1990, 3 percent of Chinese eighteen- through twenty-two-year-olds were studying in tertiary institutions, compared to 8 percent in India, and fewer than one out of every 100 citizens was a college graduate. Since China's integration into the global economy, higher education has entered a period of unprecedented expansion. In 1999, enrollment in nearly 1,100 regular tertiary institutions was 4.13 million, an increase in one year of 770,000 students. Enrollment in adult higher education was 3.05 million, an increase of almost 250,000. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the proportion of eighteen- through twenty-two-year-olds in higher education is expected to expand from 9 to 15 percent.

Reforms in higher education are directed toward decentralized funding, ending state-supported higher education, institutional accountability, and quality. Generally, institutions are increasing in size due to expanded recruitment and consolidation. Disciplines and majors are being redefined. Some universities allow early graduation for qualified students. At the same time, housing, education, and health services for university staff and faculty have been cut as universities contract out services. While the number of university

students more than tripled from 1992 to 1999, the number of support staff fell 35.3 percent.

Student services and financial aid are at the forefront of change. National, provincial, city, and institutional measures to help students afford college have accompanied dramatic increases in tuition, which in Beijing ranged in 2000 from 4,200 *yuan* for ordinary majors at second tier institutions to 6,000 *yuan* for medical and foreign language courses at premier institutions. Universities offer teaching and research assistantships, and the banking industry along with the Ministries of Education and Finance are supporting national student loan programs.

Raising Teaching Standards in the Face of Teacher Shortages

Efforts are underway to require primary and secondary school teachers to have four-year college degrees, and a national continuing education mandate requires extensive in-service training of between 240 and 520 hours every five years. Coupled with expansion in secondary and tertiary education, efforts to raise standards have created a shortfall of qualified teachers. The teacher-student ratio in universities increased sharply in 1999; at the same time, a record number of faculty are on the verge of retirement. Universities are now compelled to attract faculty by increasing pay and opportunities for travel abroad. Competition has also developed among universities in the training of teachers. Comprehensive universities are encouraged to establish teacher-training programs, and normal universities are responding with more specialized and flexible training options.

Enhancing the quality and stability of the teaching force is urgent in rural areas where primary school teachers are not state employees but rather hired by local communities as *minban* (community managed) teachers. *Minban* teachers work in public and community schools but are paid by subsidies and nonbudgetary allocations from villages and townships. Because these teachers receive no regular salary from the government, it has been difficult for them to maintain an adequate standard of living. In response, several ministries recently issued a joint announcement to recognize qualified *minban* teachers as state employees. Regional variation in the quality of the teaching force has also inspired distance education programs for female and ethnic minority teachers in impoverished counties in rural and western China.

Private Schooling: Filling the Gap in Capacity and Funding

Private schooling reemerged at all levels of the system in the 1990s. In 2000 there were over 50,000 non-

state educational institutions, reflecting a diversity of programs and administrative and fiscal autonomy. Nonstate preschools and kindergartens made up 20 percent of the total. In addition, there were over 2000 nonstate primary and secondary schools, 37 nationally accredited nonstate colleges, and over 300 pilot nonstate colleges offering diploma courses.

Lack of state funding, rigidity in the public sector, and restricted entrance to public schools are among the reasons for the rise of private schools. The state's policy of actively encouraging, supporting, and guiding and effectively administering private schools is also designed to boost the economy by prompting families to use their savings on the one "commodity" they consistently desire—education for their children.

Private education has become a major force in reform. Many private schools are short-term or proprietary institutions; others provide a forum for experimentation in teaching and community-government relations. Private girls' schools, for example, experiment with a wide array of curricula—in music, drawing, driver's training, martial arts, information technology, and psychology—designed to meet the "special" needs of healthy female development. They fill educational gaps left by a state unable or unwilling to provide sufficient schooling to meet public demand. Because private schools face opposition from local authorities protective of scarce funds, many are embroiled in community-level conflicts.

Educating China's Margins

Disparities in access to quality education are a product of complex patterns of historical regional, ethnic, and gender discrimination. China's best and worst educated regions reflect the economic inequities that exist between the coastal and interior regions. Census data from 1993 indicate that Beijing and Shanghai are China's educational centers, with 5.5 and 3.2 university graduates and 14.3 and 15.3 senior secondary school graduates per 100 residents. By contrast, Shandong province and the Guangxi-Zhuang autonomous region counted only .3 university graduates and 5.7 and 5.3 senior secondary school graduates per 100 residents.

China has been a high-profile player in international initiatives to end illiteracy and exploitative child labor and to universalize basic schooling. External aid from organizations like the World Bank and the United Nations, and domestic support from programs like Project Hope, the China Youth Development Foundation's social welfare program, have been directed toward these ends, especially in regions inhab-

ited by the poorest 20 percent of China's population. Efforts in the 1990s have targeted the two-thirds of illiterates and school dropouts who are poor, minority, rural, females. China has reintroduced all-girls' schools and classrooms in rural and urban communities.

Females make up an increasing proportion of non-compulsory schooling. However, their location within the system (disproportionately weighted in the humanities, foreign languages, and teacher education) is still heavily determined by gender. Nationally as of 1997, 37.32 percent of students in regular higher education institutions were female. Female full-time college teachers made up 35.21 of the teaching staff, 38.16 and 48.28 percent of the general secondary and primary staff respectively, and 94.57 percent of kindergarten teachers. Female enrollment accounted for 63.17 percent of students in secondary technical schools, 45.56 percent of students in general secondary schools, 48.53 percent of students in vocational schools, 47.63 percent of students in primary school, 46.58 percent of students in kindergarten, and 36.2 percent of students in special education programs.

The push to universalize basic education has also thrown a spotlight on the ethnic minority regions, which span 60 percent of China's territory and generally lag behind on economic and education indicators. Although minority students on average attend primary schools at Han Chinese levels, literacy rates for 28 of the 55 minority groups are below that of the Han majority, and minority students are significantly underrepresented in secondary and higher education. A widespread system of two-track schools that teach in either Mandarin or the local minority language perpetuates discrimination. Originally designed to protect minority cultures, the system places minority students at a disadvantage in competing for jobs in government and business, which require Chinese-language skills.

Arguably, China's disabled population is the group most marginalized by the structures and practices of formal and nonformal education. In 1990 the government adopted legislation to protect the rights of China's 60 million disabled citizens, one-quarter of whom live in extreme poverty. The same year, the Ministry of Education signed a Special Education Project Task Agreement with 21 provinces to universalize compulsory education among disabled children. At that time 358,372 disabled children were enrolled in all types of schools, almost exclusively outside the mainstream system. The agreement provides for building and reconstructing special-education schools and training thousands of new special education teachers.

Chinese Education and Globalization

In 1999 China's State Council endorsed an "Action Plan for Vitalizing Education for the Twenty-First Century." The plan outlines the challenges facing Chinese education, including improving quality; enhancing teacher, vocational, moral, distance, and adult education; simultaneously expanding and improving tertiary education; and rationalizing educational law. China's leaders hope these initiatives will make high-quality, student-centered education more widely accessible, that they will encourage lifelong learning, and, ultimately, revitalize China.

How China handles its education challenges matters well beyond its national boundaries. Scholars and teachers worldwide look to China's educational system for inspiration. Students emerging from Chinese schools are shaping global patterns of the production of knowledge, especially in science and technology. Finally, collaborative scholarly networks, enhanced as increasing numbers of Chinese intellectuals participate in international scholarly and professional organizations, have led to an explosion of research on Chinese education. These trends indicate that China will be a leader in educational reform in the twenty-first century.

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CHINA-HISTORY. See **Cultural Revolution; Han Dynasty; Jurchen Jin Dynasty; Long March; Ming Dynasty; Qin Dynasty; Qing Dynasty; Republican China; Shang Dynasty; Sino-Japanese War; Sino-Japanese Conflict, Second; Sui Dynasty; Tang Dynasty; Warring States Period-China; Xia Dynasty; Yuan Dynasty; Zhou Dynasty.**

CHINA—HUMAN RIGHTS The history of human rights in China divides into three parts: the rallying cries of human rights activists, the political and academic arguments of the government and foreign scholars, and Beijing's suppression of human rights. The activists do not concern themselves with the intellectual or historical origins of human rights, or with their "Western" relationship to China. They are engaged in the application, not in the historical legitimacy of the rights. The cultural theorists argue whether China is exceptional and thus not part of the universal code of human rights, or whether China has a historical background that fostered human rights ideas. Beijing's actions have created a vast response of critics both inside and outside China.

Political Leaders and Movements

The earliest known discussions of human rights in China's context began in the late 1890s. Since the Chinese terminology was not standardized for several decades, the terms "natural law" (*tianfu*) and "human rights" (*renquan*) were used arbitrarily, just as they were in the West when Tom Paine introduced the term in 1791 in *The Rights of Man*. Revolutionaries such as Zou Jung (1885–1905) used a call to human rights to drive out the Manchu rulers and bring political freedom to the Chinese. Others changed their name to announce their new allegiance: Feng Zi-you means Freedom Feng; Liu Yazhi, a lifelong advocate of human and women's rights and constitutionalism, became so infatuated with Rousseau's views that he changed his name to Liu Jenquan, or Human Rights Liu, when he was only sixteen in 1902.

The acceptance of human rights for China was not universal. Radicals and reformers like Liang Qichao (1873–1927) adopted a Darwinian and Spenserian view that denied the existence of human rights because all rights were considered to be created by the powerful. From this point of view, only the strongest survived. It was necessary for the state to become strong in order to protect the people, even if the people's rights were denied. What is significant in the criticism of human rights doctrine is that the argument is not based on Chinese values, but on Western criticism of human rights theory. The debate within China about human rights was a pragmatic one—would they strengthen or weaken China; not whether they were foreign or domestic.

The collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911 ushered in a period of domestic and international chaos: warlords, Japanese intervention, the rise of nationalist reformers, and Communist revolutionaries. Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Guomindang, disparaged the con-

cept of human rights. All rights and power came from the political party or the state. People's rights were valid as long as they supported the state. Citizens who opposed the state lost their rights. These ideas were shared by the leaders of both the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek, and the current Communist leadership.

Conversely, many early Nationalists and Communists supported the rights of the individual. Gao Yihan (1885–1968), a GMD leader, advocated for political and civil rights—freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, freedom of assembly, and rule by law. Chen Duxiu (1879–1942), one of the founders of the Communist Party, initially argued for civil and political rights in the tradition of the American and French revolutions. Li Dazhao (1888–1927), another founder of the Communist Party, stressed the socialist rights of economic and labor rights over the civil and political rights of the individual. But he did not renounce the traditional nineteenth-century definition of individual rights. His stress on people's rights (*min ben*) was related more to the ideas of socialism than to the Confucian stress on the people's livelihood.

During and after the May Fourth Movement of 1919, many journals debated the nature and the pros and cons of human rights. The most vigorous debates were published in *New Youth*, *New Tide*, and *Human Rights*. Freedom of thought and of publication clearly and naturally dominated the concerns of these editors. Human rights were not only necessary to protect the individual from the state, but even more important, were also necessary to provide for the dignity of the individual. Without rights, people would lose their human dignity and collapse into a state of slavery. It was the duty of both the citizen and the state to provide for the common good of all people.

The trend toward social utility was reinforced by the visits of John Dewey (1859–1952) and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) to China and the writings of English idealists such as T. H. Green (1836–1882) and David George Ritchie (1853–1903), social liberals such as L. T. Hobhouse (1864–1929), and socialists such as Harold Laski (1893–1950). The popularization of terms such as freedom, democracy, and human rights made them part of the rhetorical framework of the 1920s. They were not always defined in academic terms because they were familiar and considered to be norms that were applicable to China's crisis.

The May Fourth Movement was not monolithic in its analysis of why human rights did not exist in China. The *New Tide* group felt that the tradition of Confucianism had caused the Chinese to repress their feelings



THE AMERICAN VIEW ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA

Criticism of Chinese human rights policies and practices by the United States is a continuing source of conflict in relations between the two nations. U.S. criticism is provided each year in the Country Reports on Human Rights published by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the U.S. Department of State. The extract below is from the 1999 report on China released on 25 February 2000.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

The Constitution states that freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental rights to be enjoyed by all citizens; however, the Government restricts these rights in practice. The Government interprets the Communist Party's "leading role," as mandated in the preamble to the Constitution, as circumscribing these rights. The Government does not permit citizens to publish or broadcast criticisms of senior leaders or opinions that directly challenge Communist Party rule. The Party and Government continue to control many—and, on occasion, all—print and broadcast media tightly and use them to propagate the current ideological line. There are more than 10,000 openly distributed publications, including 2,500 newspapers. All media employees are under explicit, public orders to follow CCP directives, and "guide public opinion" as directed by political authorities. Both formal and informal guidelines continue to require journalists to avoid coverage of many politically sensitive topics. Journalists also must not divulge "state secrets" in accordance with the State Security Law. These public orders, guidelines, and statutes greatly restrict the freedom of broadcast journalists and newspapers to report the news and lead to a high de-

gree of self-censorship. Overall, during the year press freedom deteriorated further. During the early part of the year, newspaper closures or suspensions increased; efforts by the authorities to block the reception of foreign news also increased during the year, particularly prior to sensitive anniversaries.

More than in recent years, the press was exploited by the Government as an effective propaganda tool to disseminate an official line. For example, in its press coverage of NATO's action against Serbia, NATO was depicted as bent on using the conflict in Kosovo as an excuse to expand its influence. Casualties caused by NATO attacks on Serb forces received prominent coverage, but there was almost no mention of the plight of ethnic Albanian Kosovars. The Government's manipulation of the press to mold public opinion had violent results when demonstrators targeted foreign diplomatic facilities in Beijing after NATO's mistaken bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.

Journalists were given explicit instructions during the year to minimize coverage of negative issues and emphasize positive achievement in preparation for the October 1 celebration of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the PRC. The general worsening of the political atmosphere greatly increased the tendency of journalists, writers, and publishers to censor themselves.

Source: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State. (2000) "China." In *1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* (25 February). Retrieved 12 October 2001 from: http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/china.html.

and their sense of dignity. The *New Youth* writers, Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, and Gao Yihan blamed the government and the warlords for violating what they claimed were their rights of freedom of thought, assembly, and representation in government.

During the Nanjing Decade, 1927–1937, and the war against Japan, 1937–1945, many of these debates became moot. The commitment to national salvation against the Japanese and the civil war between the Nationalists and Communists created a military campaign

mentality. The debate transformed to questions of dictatorship versus democracy. Nonetheless, liberals and scholars such as Hu Shi (1891–1962), Luo Longji (c. 1898–1965), Zhang Junmai (1886–1969), and Zhang Pengqun (1892–1957), also known as P. C. Chang, and organizations such as the *Xinyue* Group, the China League for Civil Rights, and the China Democratic League vigorously argued for the adoption of human rights, though from very different, and often contradictory, perspectives. Hu Shi argued for both civil and economic rights. For him, human rights were universal and were to be established in the legal and constitutional system of the Republic of China, a stance that created a backlash in the GMD, which attacked him for his views and passed laws that were even more authoritarian.

Luo's views were directly related to Harold Laski's argument that human rights were historical and contextual. Rights and laws reflected the needs of the social and economic system. They should be used functionally to create a safer and more wholesome society. At times, the individual's freedom may need to be curtailed. Zhang Junmai attempted to synthesize the humanism of neo-Confucianism with the philosophical perspective of human rights. He believed that China's traditional ethics, which were based on conscious and promoted human dignity, were not only the best approach to legitimizing human rights and democracy, but that, in fact, China may also have been the real source for the West's views of human rights.

P. C. Chang was China's chief representative to the Commission on Human Rights, which created the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He is given credit for Article 1, which refused to claim that rights were based on natural law or divine inspiration. Faintly, echoing Zhang Junmai, Chang stressed the innateness of dignity and conscience.

Human Rights with Chinese Characteristics

The establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 resulted in a total rejection of the legitimacy of human rights arguments. Human rights were a product of the bourgeoisie and were thus used to maintain the rule of the capitalist and imperialist class. With a few but startling exceptions in 1957 and 1978, any mention of human rights was taboo and resulted in imprisonment.

However, just before and after the massacre of pro-democracy students in Tiananmen Square (4 June 1989), the Communist authorities began to engage in the human rights debate to justify their authority and their rule. In 1991 a white paper on human rights de-

claimed that: "Since the very day of its founding, the Communist Party of China has been holding high the banner of democracy and human rights." This stunning declaration was followed up with academic conferences on human rights and the creation of several institutes especially devoted to human rights, such as the China Society for Study on Human Rights. From 1995 to 1998 the Confucius Foundation in Beijing sponsored a series of international forums with the purpose of discussing Confucius and Human Rights. By the late 1990s, Beijing signed the two covenants on economic, social, and cultural rights.

The study of human rights in China is initiated and managed by the Communist Party and the government. It has not included meetings with Chinese citizens or with local nongovernmental organizations active in human rights. The official position is that China has developed a socialist system of human rights with Chinese characteristics. Stages of economic and industrial development determine the scope and quality of human rights. Liu Huaqiu, head of the Chinese delegation at the Vienna World Conference on Human rights in 1993 defined the Chinese view succinctly:

The concept of human rights is a product of historical development. It is closely associated with specific social, political and economic conditions and the specific history, culture and values of a particular country. Different historical development stages have different human rights requirements. Countries at different development stages or with different historical traditions and cultural backgrounds also have different understanding and practice of human rights.

From this point of view, the most basic rights are those of subsistence and shelter. These "economic" rights are considered superior to, and of greater priority than, political and civil rights.

There is more to the definition than a mere enunciation of domestic policy. China argues that America and the West use the invasive argument that human rights are universal to force China to peacefully evolve into a colony of Western economic and political control. Beijing does not argue that Chinese cultural (e.g., Confucianism) values prevent it from accepting Westernization. Rather, it is China's anti-imperialist stand and its desire to create its own national identity in the twenty-first century that makes it refuse to accept standards that serve the interests of Washington, D.C.

Beijing's Repression of Human Rights

The Chinese government has maintained that its sovereignty excludes foreign powers from interfering

in its affairs. It has adamantly refused to allow independent agencies to investigate openly and report on its alleged human rights abuses. According to its critics, China has engaged in massive abuse of human rights. With regard to political and civil rights, it has tortured and executed prisoners of conscience, repressed religious organizations, prohibited democratic organizations and meetings, arrested and detained people without trial, and engaged in widespread abuse and repression of women, the unemployed, minorities, and the poor. The Chinese leadership has been accused of long-term genocidal practices against the Tibetan people. Contrary to the Beijing's claim that it favors economic and social rights, it has been accused of destroying the environment, censoring the educational system, exploiting workers, and engaging in organized official corruption.

The Tiananmen Square Massacre resulted in a massive amount of attention to human rights conditions in China. The call for human rights became widespread, though underground, in China, and was openly publicized by Chinese groups abroad. Wang Dan, Wuer Kaixi, and other leaders of the student movement found exile in America and Europe, where they organized resistance groups and published journals such as *China Spring*. American human rights organizations joined forces: Amnesty International and Asia Watch were joined by online sources—Tibet On Line Resource Gathering, and Asia Observer. The U.S. government's pressure on China to adhere to human rights standards was most visible in the arguments surrounding the congressional review of China's Most-Favored-Nation status and the arguments over entry to the World Trade Organization. The most sensational and informative moment for the Chinese citizenry came on 30 June 1998, when President Bill Clinton spoke on the "Shanghai Radio 990" call-in show. Broadcasting to China's largest city, the president declared, "whatever differences of opinion we have about what human rights policy ought to be . . . we still have a lot in common . . . I believe that the forces of history will bring about more convergence in our societies going forward."

Beijing's response to these overtures has been negative. A diatribe entitled *The China That Can Say No* best expresses the voluminous official reactions to the human rights movement. It counters the arguments by exposing America's human rights abuses and the hypocrisy of the leadership. In the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Beijing's diplomats claim their right of sovereignty and denounce what they depict as fallaciousness of the attacks on their integrity. Human rights activities in China are consid-

ered to be antigovernment in nature and result in harsh punishment. China also considers America's campaigns and support of human rights to be an extension of America's imperialistic attitudes. Thus, the creation and development of human rights remains primarily a political, not a cultural, response to repressive regimes. In the early twenty-first century, the struggle for human rights continues.

Richard C. Kagan

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CHINA-INTERNAL MIGRATION From the 1950s to late 1978, strict controls limited population mobility in China. Even by the time of the 1982 census, China still had a very low level of migration to urban areas for a country at its level of development.

Pre-Reform Migration

In the early 1950s, rural migrants moved to the cities in large numbers. Estimates suggest that from 1949 to 1953 the urban population grew by twenty million, 70 percent of which was attributable to migration. To combat the growing pressure on housing, transportation, education, and health facilities, a system designed to monitor population movement was introduced in 1951. Through a series of regulations culminating in the "Regulations of Household Registration in the People's Republic of China" issued in 1958, the Chinese government developed perhaps the strictest set of controls over the movement of population in the modern world. The basis of control was the *bukou*, or household registration system. Deriving from China's traditional household registration system, it also incorporated elements of the labor registration system of the Soviet Union. Under the system

each household possessed a registration book listing its members and categorizing the household as "agricultural" or "nonagricultural." This division has become a fundamental social divide in China, producing what has been called "a castelike system of social stratification" that keeps the peasants on the land and reinforces a spatial hierarchy in which Beijing, Shanghai, and the other big cities are considered the most desirable places to live and therefore the most difficult to move to.

Under the planned economy with overwhelming state control, people were supposed to reside and work only where they had their *hukou*; any stay in other places over three days needed to be registered at the police station. Transfer of *hukou* was granted only under such circumstances as an assignment to a job in another area or a marriage across administrative boundaries. The *hukou* was the passport to employment and the rations that were issued only locally.

Despite the severe restrictions, considerable rural-to-urban migration still existed. According to official estimates, between 25 and 30 million people obtained *hukou* transfers from one province to another between 1949 and 1978. This figure does not include *hukou* migration within provinces, which would have been of a greater magnitude, or unsanctioned, non-*hukou* migration.

The government organized both economic and political oriented migrations during this period. Economic migrations primarily involved skilled workers in large-scale development projects and students pursuing higher education. In the 1950s peasants were officially recruited into the urban labor force and given nonagricultural status. Later they would be recruited as contract workers for the urban labor force. At the same time, more than 1 million people were moved from heavily populated areas of Shandong Province to open up sparsely populated areas elsewhere between 1955 and 1960, while in January 1959 it was announced that Zhejiang Province was to send 300,000 young people to help develop Ningxia Province. Large public-works projects also forced significant migrations; by the mid-1980s, more than 5 million people had been moved to make way for reservoir construction.

Political migrations included job assignments to frontier areas such as Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet; punishment or political exile; and conscription. Punishment and political exile produced some of the most substantial urban-to-rural migration of the period. It is estimated that between 400,000 and 700,000 rightists were exiled to the rural areas in 1957, where some were to stay for more than twenty years. Dur-

ing the Cultural Revolution urban areas sustained a net loss of almost five million people to rural exile. Individuals who had been politically disgraced were sent for particularly long periods, but ordinary intellectuals and cadres were also sent to the countryside to undergo months or even years of labor reform. In the early 1970s, some 20 million Red Guards were directed to go to the villages for reeducation.

Apart from those organized migrations, spontaneous permanent migrations are estimated to have involved at least 10 million people from 1949 to the mid-1980s. Most spontaneous migrants were peasants continuing migration patterns established before restrictions were imposed. However, before the economic reforms of the late 1970s institutional barriers to migration imposed by the government made movement from a village to an urban area as difficult as movement across national borders elsewhere in the world.

Internal Migration since 1978

The scale of internal migration in China increased enormously with the advent of economic reforms. Figures commonly given for the migrant population vary from 40 to as high as 100 million. Migrants are generally divided into three categories: those who have crossed an administrative border with official permission (*qianyi renkou*), the floating population (*liudong renkou*) or "blind migrants" (*mangliu*) without official permission, and temporary contractual laborers from the rural areas (*mingong*). The floating population in the biggest cities is estimated to form between one-fifth and one-third of their total population. Big cities everywhere have attracted very large numbers, but migrants also go to rapidly industrializing areas such as the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong Province and the towns of southern Jiangsu.

The majority of migrations in China are within the same province. According to the 1990 census, between 1985 and 1990 there were more than 23 million movements within provinces, compared to more than 11 million between provinces. Available data indicate that approximately one-third of migration was interprovincial in 1990, representing rapid change from 1988, when less than one-fifth of migration had been interprovincial. Migrants from the eastern region tend to stay closer to their native areas, whereas migrants from the less developed central and western regions are more likely to travel to the more developed seaboard provinces, especially those of southeastern China.

Four major reasons have been commonly identified in migration during the reform era: urban-rural

disparity, rural surplus labor, development of township and village enterprises (TVEs) and urbanization of rural towns, and business opportunities. Indeed, rapid economic development has offered tremendous job opportunities to migrant workers.

Although it became much easier to move from one area to another after 1978, household registration has remained extremely difficult to change. In 1985 the Ministry of Public Security issued a new regulation on temporary residence certificates for the urban areas. Migrant workers who have obtained these are allowed to live in the urban areas but do not enjoy the social benefits to which permanent urban residents are entitled.

The impact of migration is varied. It has given some people the chance to lift themselves out of poverty and to acquire new skills. At the same time, the influx of rural migrants has caused the urban infrastructure considerable strain. Many migrants lead difficult lives in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions. While migrant earnings have brought new wealth to the countryside, some fear that the departure of so many young, educated residents will be to the detriment of rural society. However, there is no doubt that by providing cheap labor and filling in economic vacuums, migrants have made major contributions to China's economic success.

Xiaobo Hu

See also: **China—Population Resettlement; Rural Workers, Surplus—China**

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CHINA—POLITICAL SYSTEM China lags far behind other world powers in official government interest in democracy. This curious state of affairs cannot be fully explained historically. After all, every contemporary democracy has a nondemocratic past. But in China the past weighs unusually heavily.

A Tradition That Scorned Politics

Since before 500 BCE, politics in China were more social than institutional. In the past, various philosophical schools had contended, and something of a feudal structure had been evident, with healthy competition among aristocratic clans, emperor, and officialdom. But long before the People's Republic of China (PRC) was

founded in 1949, Confucianism overwhelmed other schools of thought, aristocracy faded, and emperor and officialdom fused into a unitary, though decentralized, overwhelmingly Confucian state. Ideas of popular sovereignty, rule of law, separation of powers, federalism, and checks and balances never blossomed under this stiflingly rigid tradition. Rather than favoring limited government achieved through fragmenting authority, the ideal was to achieve good government through a state with a virtuous ruler, resembling a family with a benevolent, protective father.

New Politics That Scorned Tradition

Twentieth-century Chinese political movements felt the need to look abroad for fresh ideas. European Marxism appealed more than European democracy, probably because although it was "modern" it differed less dramatically from traditional Chinese notions of power. Chinese tradition mixed with Marxism to create a hybrid ideology known as the political thought of Mao Zedong (1893–1976), which seemed to fit social revolution, a new intellectual orthodoxy, and a new centralized and unitary state better than did chaotic competitive democracy. Political-reform debates still turn on how global standards of democracy, human rights, markets, and private property with Chinese characteristics might be adopted. The weakness of old forms is criticized more sharply than the old forms themselves, inviting revivalist themes. Today, one official view (no longer limited to Mao's thought), one core leader, a single pyramid of state power, and a single Communist Party remain stronger ideals than do institutions that might divide and restrain state power.

From Scorn to Halting Reform

Having rejected almost every state form at one time or another, the PRC today faces the problem of what form to accept. China has rejected democracy in favor of Marxism, Marxism in favor of Mao's thought, and Mao's thought in favor of a less coherent "practical" approach to orthodoxy. China has rejected a constitutional state in favor of a Stalinist state, the familiar Stalin model in favor of a mobilizational Maoist variant (emphasizing ideological themes, political education meetings, mass rallies to demonstrate loyalty), and the Maoist variant in favor of a state more insulated from its ruling party. China has rejected liberal political parties in favor of a Leninist Communist party and now is deeply ambivalent about that move. In fact, even while strongly rejecting the idea of private factions, China has rejected any firm institutional direction in favor of more personal rule by factional elders. China today is more certain of what it does not want

than of what it does want. After several disruptive, occasionally violent spasms of experimentation, political change at the PRC's half-century mark proceeds cautiously, incrementally, and practically.

China's political system, far from a static structure, has evolved through a sequence of momentous cycles and continues to evolve, if less tumultuously. Each phase has added to the accomplishments of the previous one.

1949-1954

The phase from 1949 to 1954 opened with the Communist takeover of China and with land redistribution, party building, and struggle against U.N. intervention in Korea. It ended with the proclamation of a new state constitution. Characteristically, the new constitution was not a vigorously bargained popular grant of authority. Rather, as China's leader put it, "This Draft Constitution of ours is chiefly a summing-up of our experience in revolution and construction, but at the same time it is a synthesis of domestic and international experience" (Mao Zedong 1954: 141-147).

The PRC's first five years witnessed China's assertion of autonomy. China was no longer a territory occupied by a foreign army, a semicolony with its commerce dominated by foreign companies, or a divided society with a weak center—the one that served tea at meetings of international powers. The strong appeal of the new order was that a new China had stood up. Chinese abroad yearned to return and contribute to the glorious national project of building the new China.

The party-army that finally mounted a victorious military campaign after twenty years of rural guerrilla warfare abruptly faced the task of governing. And surprisingly quickly, images of wide-eyed peasants marching into cosmopolitan Shanghai were replaced with images of confidence. The Communists' patriotic credentials, hard won during years of resistance to Japanese occupation, were enhanced as they sent foreigners packing, confiscated foreign property, closed foreign missions, and within a year were fighting U.N. and American troops to a standstill in Korea.

In urban areas, with demonstrative political campaigns and draconian tactics, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took charge of seaports, swiftly clamped down on coastal smuggling, opium dens, and prostitution rings, and established effective control of banking, national security, and foreign policy. Not only was the party patriotic, it was also strong. Elites of the old regime were assured that patriotic service to the new



CHAIRMAN MAO ON THE BASIS OF THE CHINESE POLITICAL SYSTEM

"Wherever our comrades go, they must build good relations with the masses, be concerned for them and help them overcome their difficulties. We must unite with the masses; the more of the masses we unite with, the better."

Source: Mao Zedong (1976). Quotations from Chairman Mao Tsetung. Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 154.

order would be welcome. In rural areas, where the party presence was thinner, mobile work teams led sometimes-violent public rebuke of landlords and redistribution of property. For the first time in over a century, the nation was not embroiled in civil or foreign war. The new regime's standing would never be higher.

Nonetheless, after five years, despite political successes and despite aggressive party building, the first national census, a formal state constitution, and borrowed Soviet-style enterprises and civilian and military bureaucracies, the shape of the new political system had yet to be drawn.

1955-1961

The phase from 1955 to 1961 opened with a stepped-up pace of agricultural collectivization and early moves by Chairman Mao to stem loss of personal power to party leaders with factional networks. It passed through a bizarre attempt to reorganize rural China into radical "people's communes." It ended with Mao recovering from the visible failure of his "Great Leap Forward" experiment.

Yearning to perpetuate the politics that allowed his movement to rise to power, Mao felt he had to motivate succeeding generations to carry on the spirit of revolution. He maneuvered to establish a "correct" view of the political world, encourage universal study of it, and mobilize popular support directly without having to filter his message through channels controlled by CCP factions and bureaucracies.

An early battleground was rural property. Concerned that small landholders could not go it alone and that a controlling landlord class might revive, Mao



PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF CHINA

Adopted on 4 Dec 1982

China is a country with one of the longest histories in the world. The people of all of China's nationalities have jointly created a culture of grandeur and have a glorious revolutionary tradition.

After 1840, feudal China was gradually turned into a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. The Chinese people waged many successive heroic struggles for national independence and liberation and for democracy and freedom.

Great and earthshaking historical changes have taken place in China in the 20th century.

The Revolution of 1911, led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, abolished the feudal monarchy and gave birth to the Republic of China. But the historic mission of the Chinese people to overthrow imperialism and feudalism remained unaccomplished.

After waging protracted and arduous struggles, armed and otherwise, along a zigzag course, the Chinese people of all nationalities led by the Communist Party of China with Chairman Mao Zedong as its leader ultimately, in 1949, overthrew the rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, won a great victory in the New-Democratic Revolution and founded the People's Republic of China. Since then the Chinese people have taken control of state power and become masters of the country.

After founding the People's Republic, China gradually achieved its transition from a New-Democratic to a socialist society. The socialist transformation of the private ownership of the means of production has been completed, the system of exploitation of man by man abolished and the socialist system established. The people's democratic dictatorship held by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants, which is in essence the dictatorship of the proletariat, has been consolidated and developed. The Chinese people and the Chinese People's Liberation Army have defeated imperialist and hegemonist aggression, sabotage and armed provocations and have

thereby safeguarded China's national independence and security and strengthened its national defense. Major successes have been achieved in economic development. An independent and relatively comprehensive socialist system of industry has basically been established. There has been a marked increase in agricultural production. Significant advances have been made in educational, scientific and cultural undertakings, while education in socialist ideology has produced noteworthy results. The life of the people has improved considerably.

Both the victory in China's New-Democratic Revolution and the successes in its socialist cause have been achieved by the Chinese people of all nationalities, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism and Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, by upholding truth, correcting errors and surmounting numerous difficulties and hardships. The basic task of the nation in the years to come is to concentrate its effort on socialist modernization. Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere to the people's democratic dictatorship and the socialist road, steadily improve socialist institutions, develop socialist democracy, improve the socialist legal system, and work hard and self-reliantly to modernize the country's industry, agriculture, national defense and science and technology step by step to turn China into a socialist country with a high level of culture and democracy.

The exploiting classes as such have been abolished in our country. However, class struggle will continue to exist within certain bounds for a long time to come. The Chinese people must fight against those forces and elements, both at home and abroad, that are hostile to China's socialist system and try to undermine it.

Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic of China. It is the inviolable duty of all Chinese people, including our com-

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patriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland.

In building socialism it is essential to rely on workers, peasants and intellectuals and to unite all forces that can be united. In the long years of revolution and construction, there has been formed under the leadership of the Communist Party of China a broad patriotic united front which is composed of the democratic parties and people's organizations and which embraces all socialist working people, all patriots who support socialism and all patriots who stand for the reunification of the motherland. This united front will continue to be consolidated and developed. The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, a broadly based representative organization of the united front which has played a significant historical role, will play a still more important role in the country's political and social life, in promoting friendship with other countries and in the struggle for socialist modernization and for the reunification and unity of the country.

The People's Republic of China is a unitary multi-national state created jointly by the people of all its nationalities. Socialist relations of equality, unity and mutual assistance have been established among the nationalities and will continue to be strengthened. In the struggle to safeguard the unity of the nationalities, it is necessary to combat big-nation chauvinism, mainly Han chauvinism, and to combat local national chauvinism. The state will do its utmost to promote the common prosperity of all the nationalities.

China's achievements in revolution and construction are inseparable from the support of the people of the world. The future of China is closely linked to the future of the world. China consistently carries out an independent foreign policy and adheres to the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence in developing diplomatic relations and economic and cultural exchanges with other countries. China consistently opposes imperialism, hegemonism and colonialism, works to strengthen unity with people of other countries, supports the oppressed nations and the developing countries in their just struggle to win and preserve national independence and develop national economies, and strives to safeguard world peace and promote the cause of human progress.

This Constitution, in legal form, affirms the achievements of the struggles of the Chinese people of all nationalities and defines the basic system and basic tasks of the state; it is the fundamental law of the state and has supreme legal authority. The people of all nationalities, all state organs, the armed forces, all political parties and public organizations and all enterprises and institutions in the country must take the Constitution as the basic standard of conduct, and they have the duty to uphold the dignity of the Constitution and ensure its implementation.

Source: International Court Network.
Retrieved 8 March 8, 2002, from: http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/ch00000_.html.

advocated collective ownership. He pressed against mounting opposition for higher and higher levels of collectivization, from small Mutual Aid Teams to various forms of collective farm and finally giant People's Communes, some embracing thousands of families. At their zenith, the communes were a vehicle for Mao's Great Leap Forward (1958–1960), which assumed that peasants with proper political motivation could sharply raise production of everything from food to steel. Twenty-five thousand communes were hastily organized in four months. Approaching truly communist social organization, this experiment was the biggest, most radical in history.

The political system changed dramatically, to put the leader in direct communication with the public, bypassing established organizations. When Mao's opponents tried to use his failed Great Leap Forward program against him, he parried with renewed radicalism. Considering the CCP unsympathetic now, he promoted a political style designed to weaken the CCP in favor of dominance by the chairman. He began a campaign to emulate ideological study as practiced in the army, tighter censorship (by a central office not run by the party), purges of commune leaders (by central work teams not controlled by the party), and an open break with "revisionist" (no longer really Marx-

ist) Moscow. Cumulatively these initiatives weakened institution building in favor of personal leadership.

1962-1969

The phase from 1962 to 1969 opened with the unfolding of Mao's counterattack, passed through the first three chaotic and often-violent years of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–1969), during which the party actually ceased to function, and ended with the party's first National Congress in thirteen years. None of the specific political innovations of those three years lasted. Rather, their extremes afterward made possible a lurch in the opposite direction.

In contrast to the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution—especially during its first three years—was urban more than rural and was aimed at political organization more than economics. While party, army, and government were told to stand by passively, student and worker groups with militant names formed, arrested Mao's opponents, humiliated them with public parades and trials, and even commandeered weapons from army barracks to fight opposing groups in the streets. China recalled its foreign diplomats, withdrew from foreign trade, and shut out foreign culture. In addition to being ideological, the Cultural Revolution was strongly nativist.

Mao was seventy-five and suffering from Parkinson's disease when the CCP revived in 1969. At the end, his stature and reputation were as important as his program and strategic maneuvers. The political system almost froze as the chairman of thirty-five years withdrew from day-to-day leadership, but his authority remained uncontested. The pendulum swung left for the last time.

1970-1978

The 1970s continued the tumult with an attempt on Mao's life, followed by reopening of diplomatic relations with the United States. It progressed through Mao's last moves to keep his revolutionary vision alive, his death in 1976, and a two-year "moment" of controlled succession under Chairman Hua Guofeng. It ended with the rise of a leading target of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping, in 1978. So heavily personal was Mao's regime that it could not survive him for more than two years.

Under Deng and his supporters, the pendulum swung dramatically to the right. But while locking arms to reject Mao's legacy, Deng and his supporters differed on what to put in its place. Some advocated a return to the Stalinist 1950s before the Great Leap Forward. Others advocated forward-looking experi-

ments with markets and democracy. Popular sentiments reinforced each side. Many people, fearing unemployment and chaos, yearned for effective government, whatever its form. Many others, fearing old-style corruption and privilege, favored legal, market, and democratic reforms. Underneath it all was spreading economic and social complexity that would gradually tilt the balance toward government with expanding individual and associational autonomy.

1979-1989

The 1980s opened with a multipronged reform program to undo Mao's style. Out went ideological study, political campaigns, communes, and party control of every organization (except the army, a hierarchy of its own). In came a private sector, foreign investment, Chinese study abroad, and private hiring of labor (Marx's bedrock objection to capitalism because it treated people as commodities). Only politics were slow to change. Limited proposals for more democracy, freedom, and rule of law were voiced but stifled. A two-month occupation of Tiananmen Square in Beijing, outside the top leaders' compound, by student demonstrators campaigning for these proposals ended violently. The shooting of hundreds of demonstrators near the square on 4 June 1989 silenced the immediate protest but made reform of such authority a virtual necessity for the next generation.

1990-2002

At the twentieth century's end, China's political system was pushed by necessity more than it was pulled by design. Although the leaders remained unchallenged for office, their hold on power was in danger of eroding. China's authoritarian state had entered a period of gridlock and reactive evolution. The possibility of decisive restructuring toward any form of democracy seemed remote.

Today elite figures who prefer the pre-Great Leap Forward era are a voice for control, order, and planning. They have succeeded at that style of politics, trust it, and feel secure as long as it prevails. Their public is unemployed, economically insecure, or simply most comfortable with socialism and a paternalistic state.

Elite figures who prefer more law, markets, and democracy are a voice for reform. They mostly want China to grow strong and prosperous, and they observe the strongest and most prosperous nations to be capitalist democracies. Their public finds opportunity in the expanding private sector and a more narrowly defined role for government.

Lifting prospects of the reform side are trends that naturally make Chinese society more complex and hence less amenable to political interference. Markets rely on one another and on private banking, insurance, and law. Foreign investors expect internationally agreed commercial rules to apply. China's thriving private firms far outperform state-owned firms; a government wary of high unemployment and attendant crime and social unrest badly needs these private contributions. Young Chinese educated abroad introduce competitive innovations that their elders only dimly comprehend. Satellite communications and the Internet, both mushrooming all over China, bring information that no official censor can delete.

Eerily like the empire of old, authoritarian one-party rule in China may continue only insofar as it learns to live with these irrepressible social developments. If it tries to stifle them, most likely it will be discarded.

Institutions: Shrinking Scope, Growing Importance

The Chinese political system still has a leader, although he is less dominant than previously. The CCP continues to dominate, although a challenging party probably is not far away, given China's growing freedom. A few senior factional leaders still control the dominant party. The system remains hierarchical and formally centralized, although it is losing some control to increasingly active provinces. Actual federalism, though, as with other limits on central authority, remains elusive. State ideology is all but dead. The formerly rubber-stamp National People's Congress is beginning to assert a more standard, autonomous legislative role. And leaders are beginning to accept constitutional term limits.

The People's Liberation Army (PLA)—embracing air, land, naval, and strategic forces totaling at least 2.5 million, the world's largest military—seems destined to fall into line, although it remains unusually free of civilian authority and even has its own stake in the new economy. The leadership has made it a priority to ease the PLA out of the civilian economy. The stage is set for younger leaders to replace retiring senior generals by 2003. And public discussion of military doctrine is increasingly focused on high-tech modernization. Reining in the military may prove to be the most enduring legacy of Jiang Zemin—general secretary of the CCP (1992–2002), president (1993–2003), and chairman of the Central Military Commission (1992–present). How China evolves is actually part of a much larger story that matches relative political values deriving from various national cultures'

own historical experiences against political values stemming from the universal philosophical appeal of democracy.

Gordon A. Bennett

See also: **Communism–China; Confucianism–China; Cultural Revolution–China; Deng Xiaoping; Great Leap Forward; Jiang Zemin; Mao Zedong**

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CHINA POPULATION RESETTLEMENT

Compared with Westerners, the Chinese are relatively immobile. China's 1990 census and sample surveys during the 1990s estimated that on average less than 1 percent of the Chinese population move to another city or county each year. Even after taking into account migrants missed by the criteria used in these sources, the mobility of the Chinese is still far lower than that in Western societies. Until the 1980s, China was an overwhelmingly agricultural nation whose sedentary, family-centered production system discouraged mobility; when large-scale population movements did occur, they were usually caused by natural disasters or wars. The varieties, processes, and outcomes of population relocations that have occurred since the 1980s are useful lenses through which one can gauge the tremendous political, social, and economic transformations China has experienced.

Historical Population Relocations

For thousands of years the dominant form of population movement in China was that of peasants searching for new arable land. As they left the middle region and delta of the Yellow River—the cradles and

origins of Chinese civilization—they shifted the nation's political and economic center of gravity toward the south. During the Han dynasty (202 BCE–220 CE), the vast majority of the Chinese population resided north of the Chang (Yangtze) River. By the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), the Chang River Delta and Sichuan (in western China) had emerged as new centers of settlement; by the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) the Chang River Delta had become the most densely populated area in.

The southward movements of population were further accelerated by political turmoil and invasions from the north. Invasions by the Xiongnu and other "barbarians" during the Wei, Jin, and Northern and Southern dynasties (220–581), rebellions at the end of the Tang dynasty, and invasions by the Jin at the end of the Northern Song dynasty (960–1126), for example, all triggered large-scale population relocations toward southern China.

Government-Initiated Population Relocations Since 1949

The government of the People's Republic of China that was founded in 1949 has repeatedly initiated "planned" population relocations to achieve specific policy objectives. In the early 1950s, the government sent troops, farmers, and youths to northwestern and northeastern border areas such as Xinjiang and Heilongjiang, where they were to reclaim so-called wastelands and set up state farms. That would achieve the dual objectives of consolidating ethnic Han Chinese control over border areas and accelerating the economic development of those regions. Similarly, national security concerns motivated the government to relocate industries and personnel to "Third Front" inland regions during the 1950s and 1960s, driven by the rationale that coastal areas were too vulnerable during times of war.

Between the late 1960s and mid-1970s millions of educated youths were forced to leave urban areas and go "up to the mountains and down to the countryside" (*xiangshan xiaxiang*) to be reeducated by farmers. This rustication movement was a product of the Cultural Revolution; the young people were joined out in the countryside by the politically persecuted and counterrevolutionaries. After the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, however, the majority of these victims of forced relocation were able to return to where they had come from.

Government-initiated relocations since the 1980s have been mainly oriented toward economic development objectives. For example, poverty-alleviation pro-

grams have relocated hundreds of thousands of people from resource-poor areas to locations in more favorable environments. In addition, the construction of the Three Gorges Dam that began in the late 1990s necessitates the relocation of over a million people, mostly to newly constructed towns and communities near their original homes.

Household Registration, Mobility Control, and Self-Initiated Migrations

A hallmark of the Chinese centrally planned economy is the household registration (*hukou*) system, established in the late 1950s and still functioning as a means of state control in the late 1990s. Every person in China has a *hukou* that indicates where he/she legitimately dwells. During the 1960s and 1970s, *hukou* entitled individuals to rationed food and clothing. Three decades later, a local *hukou* is still essential for obtaining subsidized benefits such as housing, schooling, and health care. It is extremely difficult for peasants to obtain urban *hukou* or to transfer their *hukou* to urban areas, thus making their survival in urban areas almost impossible. For decades, then, the *hukou* system served as an effective damper on self-initiated, rural-urban migrations and divided China into two separate entities, one rural and one urban. At the same time, until the 1990s the government was the main agent of labor allocation, via job assignments to graduates and job transfers for state employees. Government-sponsored work-related relocations are typically accompanied by *hukou* transfers that legitimize the migrants' residence in the new location.

From the 1980s, strong push forces in the countryside and new pull forces in urban areas have compelled the government to relax migration control. The mammoth rural labor surplus, estimated as up to one-sixth of the population, urgently needed to be absorbed outside of agriculture. At the same time, economic reforms induced foreign investment and encouraged urban consumption and services, both demanding cheap labor. In response, the government invented a variety of new permits and *hukou* statuses to facilitate the temporary migration of peasants, unleashing a floating population estimated to be anywhere between 20 million and 100 million by the mid-1990s. Marketization, decollectivization, and decentralization further undermined the state's role in labor allocation and engendered the emergence of labor markets in China. But the labor market is highly gendered and segmented. Young single peasant women are sought after, but upon marriage and childbirth most women stay in the villages to farm while their husbands may continue to engage in migrant

work. In urban areas, peasant migrants are relegated to the bottom rungs and are generally blocked from prestigious and high-paying jobs.

Unlike the first three decades of the People's Republic, post-Mao China is marked by population relocations primarily from inland to coastal regions, high rates of rural-urban migration, increasing prominence of self-initiated moves that rely heavily on social networks, and in general a greater heterogeneity of migration types. But rural-rural migration continues to be important, especially since marriage migration remains the leading reason for female migration in China. The enormity of the population relocations, in conjunction with the legacies of social institutions such as the *hukou* system, have fostered new thoughts and debates on the social and economic implications of migration. Topics under discussion include the emergence of new social classes in Chinese cities, segmentation of the labor market, the impact of migrants on urban services, gendered division of labor in peasant households, and the feminization of agriculture.

C. Cindy Fan

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Modern Asia



Encyclopedia of
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Volume 2
China-India Relations to Hyogo

A Berkshire Reference Work
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Survey of Asia's Regions and Nations



The *Encyclopedia of Modern Asia* covers thirty-three nations in depth and also the Caucasus and Siberia. We have divided Asia into five major subregions and assigned the thirty-three nations to each.

West and Southwest Asia

The West Asian nations covered in detail here are Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. Afghanistan and Pakistan form Southwest Asia, although in some classifications they are placed in Central and South Asia, respectively. Afghanistan, on the crossroads of civilizations for thousands of years, is especially difficult to classify and displays features typical of Central, West, and South Asia.

Despite diversity in language (Persian in Iran, Arabic in Iraq, Turkish in Turkey) form of government (theocracy in Iran, dictatorship in Iraq, and unstable democracy in Turkey) and international ties (Iran to the Islamic world, Iraq to the Arab Middle East, Turkey to the West), there are several sources of unity across West Asia. Perhaps the oldest is geographical location as the site of transportation routes between Europe and Central, East, and South Asia. Since ancient times, people, goods, wealth, and ideas have flowed across the region. In 2002 the flow of oil was most important, from the wells of Iran and Iraq through the pipelines of Turkey. Another source of unity is Sunni Islam, a major feature of life since the seventh century, although Iran is mainly the minority Shi'a tradition and there have long been Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian, and Baha'i minorities in the region. Diversity is also evident in the fact that Turkey is a "secular" state while Iran is a theocracy, and in the conflict between fundamentalist and mainstream Islam in all the nations.

Another important common thread is the shared historical experience of being part of the Ottoman Empire and having to cope with British and Russian designs on their territory and, more recently, American influence. And, in the twentieth century, all three nations have sought to deal with the Kurdish minority and its demands for a Kurdish state to be established on land taken from all three nations.

Unity across Afghanistan and Pakistan is created by adherence to Sunni Islam (although there is a Shi'ite minority in Afghanistan) and the prominence of the Pash-tun ethnic group in each nation. Both nations also experienced British colonialism, although the long-term British influence is more notable in Pakistan, which had been

tied to India under British rule. West Asia is the only region in the world never colonized by Britain, although some experts argue that it did experience significant British cultural influence. In all nations resistance to external control—British, Russian, or United States—is another common historical experience.

Across the region (although less so in Afghanistan) is the stark contrast between the traditional culture and the modernity of liberation from imperial rule, still not complete across the region. This contrast is apparent in clothing styles, manners, architecture, recreation, marriage practices, and many elements of daily life.

In 2002 all the nations faced a water crisis of both too little water and water pollution. They all also faced issues of economic and social development, including reducing external debt, controlling inflation, reducing unemployment, improving education and health care, and continually reacting to the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, which exacerbates many of these problems. The governments also faced the difficult task of solving these problems while resisting Americanization and also while controlling internal political unrest. Political unrest is often tied to efforts at creating democratic governments and the persistence of elite collaboration with tyrannical governments.

Central Asia

Central Asia is known by many names, including Eurasia, Middle Asia, and Inner Asia. At its core, the region is composed of five states that became independent nations following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Scholars sometimes include Afghanistan, Mongolia and the Xinjiang province of China within the label Central Asia. For this project, Central Asia is restricted to the five former Soviet countries, while Afghanistan is classified in Southwest Asia, and Mongolia and Xinjiang as part of East Asia. These states have a shared landmass of 1.5 million square miles, about one-half the size of the United States.

The region's unity comes from a shared history and religion. Central Asia saw two cultural and economic traditions blossom and intermix along the famed Silk Road: nomadic and sedentary. Nomadic herdsman, organized into kinship groupings of clans, lived beside sedentary farmers and oasis city dwellers. Four of the countries share Turkic roots, while the Tajiks are of Indo-European descent, linguistically related to the Iranians. While still recognizable today, this shared heritage has developed into distinct ethnic communities.

The peoples of Central Asia have seen centuries of invasion, notably the legendary Mongol leader Genghis Khan in the thirteenth century, the Russians in the nineteenth and the Soviets in the twentieth century. For better or worse, each invader left behind markers of their presence: the Arabs introduced Islam in the seventh century. Today Islam is the predominant religion in the region, and most Central Asians are Sunni Muslims. The Russians brought the mixed legacy of modernism, including an educated populace, alarming infant mortality rates, strong economic and political participation by women, high agricultural development, and environmental disasters such as the shrinking of the Aral Sea. It was under Russian colonialism that distinct ethno-national boundaries were created to divide the people of the region. These divisions largely shape the contemporary Central Asian landscape.

Today the five Central Asian nations face similar challenges: building robust economies, developing stable, democratic governments, and integrating themselves into the regional and international communities as independent states. They come to these challenges with varied resources: Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have rich oil reserves; several countries have extensive mineral deposits; and the Fergana Valley is but one example of the region's rich agricultural regions.

Finally, the tragic events of September 11, 2001, cast world attention on Afghanistan's neighbors in Central Asia. The "war on terrorism" forged new alliances and offered a mix of political pressure and economic support for the nations' leaders to suppress their countries' internal fundamentalist Muslim movements.

Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia is conventionally defined as that subregion of Asia consisting of the eleven nation-states of Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Myanmar is sometimes alternatively classified as part of South Asia and Vietnam as in East Asia. The region may be subdivided into Mainland Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam) and Insular Southeast Asia (Brunei, East Timor, Indonesia, Philippines, and Singapore). Malaysia is the one nation in the region that is located both on the mainland and islands, though ethnically it is more linked to the island nations of Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines.

Perhaps the key defining features for the region and those that are most widespread are the tropical monsoon climate, rich natural resources, and a way of life in rural areas based on cooperative wet-rice agriculture that goes back several thousand years. In the past unity was also created in various places by major civilizations, including those of Funan, Angkor, Pagan, Sukhothai, Majapahit, Srivijaya, Champa, Ayutthaya, and Melaka. Monarchies continue to be significant in several nation—Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand—today. Subregional unity has also been created since ancient times by the continued use of written languages, including Vietnamese, Thai, Lao, Khmer and the rich literary traditions associated with those languages.

The region can also be defined as being located between China and India and has been influenced by both, with Indian influence generally broader, deeper, and longer lasting, especially on the mainland, except for Vietnam and Singapore, where influences from China have been more important. Islamic influence is also present in all eleven of the Southeast Asian nations. Culturally, Southeast Asia is notable for the central importance of the family, religion (mainly Buddhism and Islam), and aesthetics in daily life and national consciousness.

In the post–World War II Cold War era, there was a lack of regional unity. Some nations, such as Indonesia under Sukarno, were leaders of the nonaligned nations. Countries such as Thailand and the Philippines joined the U.S. side in the Cold War by being part of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). A move toward greater unity was achieved with the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, with the founding members being Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Subsequently other Southeast Asian nations joined ASEAN (Brunei, 1984; Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam 1997; Cambodia 1999). As of 2002, communism was still the system in Laos and Vietnam and capitalism in Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, the Philippines Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Political, economic, and cultural cooperation is fostered by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), with headquarters in Jakarta, Indonesia. Economically, all the nations have attempted to move, although at different speeds and with different results, from a reliance on agriculture to an industrial or service-based economy. All nations also suffered in the Asian economic crisis beginning in July 1997.

Alongside these sources of similarity or unity that allow us to speak of Southeast Asia as a region is also considerable diversity. In the past religion, ethnicity, and diverse colonial experience (British, Dutch, French, American) were major sources of diversity. Today, the three major sources of diversity are religion, form of government, and level of economic development. Three nations (Indonesia, Malaysia,

Brunei) are predominately Islamic, five are mainly Buddhist (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar), two are mainly Christian (Philippines and East Timor), and Singapore is religiously heterogeneous. In addition, there is religious diversity within nations, as all these nations have sizeable and visible religious minorities and indigenous religions, in both traditional and syncretic forms, also remain important.

In terms of government, there is considerable variation: communism in Vietnam and Laos; state socialism in Myanmar; absolute monarchy in Brunei; evolving democracy in the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, and Indonesia; and authoritarian democracy in Malaysia and Singapore. The economic variation that exists among the nations and also across regions within nations is reflected in different levels of urbanization and economic development, with Singapore and Malaysia at one end of the spectrum and Laos and Cambodia at the other. Myanmar is economically underdeveloped, although it is urbanized, while Brunei is one of the wealthiest nations in the world but not very urbanized.

In 2002, Southeast Asia faced major environmental, political, economic, and health issues. All Southeast Asian nations suffer from serious environmental degradation, including water pollution, soil erosion, air pollution in and around cities, traffic congestion, and species extinctions. To a significant extent all these problems are the result of rapid industrial expansion and overexploitation of natural resources for international trade. The economic crisis has hampered efforts to address these issues and has threatened the economies of some nations, making them more dependent on international loans and assistance from nations such as Japan, Australia, and China. The persisting economic disparities between the rich and the poor are actually exacerbated by rapid economic growth. Related to poverty is the AIDS epidemic, which is especially serious in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Thailand and becoming more serious in Vietnam; in all these nations it associated with the commercial sex industry.

Politically, many Southeast Asian nations faced one or more threats to their stability. Political corruption, lack of transparency, and weak civic institutions are a problem to varying degrees in all the nations but are most severe in Indonesia, which faces threats to its sovereignty. Cambodia and Thailand face problems involving monarch succession, and several nations have had difficulty finding effective leaders. Myanmar's authoritarian rulers face a continual threat from the political opposition and from ethnic and religious separatists.

In addition, several nations faced continuing religious or ethnic-based conflicts that disrupt political stability and economic growth in some provinces. The major conflicts involve Muslim separatists in the southern Philippines, Muslims and Christians in some Indonesian islands and Aceh separatists in northern Sumatra, and Muslims and the Karen and other ethnic groups against the Burman government in Myanmar. Since the economic crisis of 1997, ethnic and religion-based conflict has intensified, as wealthier ethnic or religious minorities have increasingly been attacked by members of the dominant ethnic group. A related issue is the cultural and political future of indigenous peoples, including the so-called hill tribes of the mainland and horticulturalists and former hunter-gatherers of the islands.

In looking to the future, among the region's positive features are the following. First, there is Southeast Asia's strategic location between India and China, between Japan and Europe, and between Europe and Oceania. It stands in close proximity to the world's two most populous countries, China and India. Singapore, the centrally located port in Southeast Asia, is one of two major gateways to the dynamic Pacific Basin (the other is the Panama Canal). Second, there is the region's huge population and related economic market, with a total population approaching that of one half of China's. Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous nation. Third, there is enor-

mous tourist potential in sites and recreational locales such as Angkor Wat, Bali, Borobudur, Phuket, and Ha Long Bay. Fourth, there is the region's notable eclecticism in borrowing from the outside and resiliency in transcending tragedies such as experienced by Cambodia and Vietnam. Fifth, there is the region's significant economic potential: Southeast Asia may well have the world's highest-quality labor force relative to cost. And, sixth, there is the region's openness to new technologies and ideas, an important feature in the modern global community.

South Asia

South Asia is the easiest region to demarcate, as it is bounded by the Hindu Kush and Himalayan ranges to the north and the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea to the south. It contains the nation-states of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka and the more distant island nations of the Maldives and Mauritius. Myanmar and Pakistan, which are considered part of South Asia in some schemes, are here classified in Southeast Asia and Southwest Asia, respectively.

While the region is diverse economically, culturally, linguistically, and religiously, there is unity that, in some form, has existed for several thousand years. One source of unity is the historical influence of two major civilizations (Indus and Dravidian) and three major religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam). Regionally, Sikhism and Jainism have been of great importance. There is also considerable economic unity, as the majority of people continue to live by farming, with rice and especially wet-rice the primary crop. In addition, three-quarters of the people continue to live in rural, agricultural villages, although this has now become an important source of diversity, with clear distinctions between urban and rural life. A third source of unity is the caste system, which continues to define life for most people in the three mainland nations. Another source of unity is the nature and structure of society, which was heavily influenced by the several centuries of British rule. A final source of political unity in the twentieth century—although sometimes weakened by ethnic and religious differences—has been nationalism in each nation.

South Asia is diverse linguistically, ethnically, religiously, and economically. This diversity is most obvious in India, but exists in various forms in other nations, except for the isolated Maldives, which is the home of one ethnic group, the Divehi, who are Muslims and who have an economy based largely on tourism and fishing.

The dozens of languages of South Asia fall into four major families: Indo-European, Austroasiatic, Dravidian, and Tibeto-Burman and several cannot be classified at all. Because of its linguistic diversity, India is divided into "linguistic" states with Hindi and English serving as the national languages.

Hinduism is the dominant religion in South Asia, but India is the home also to Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism. India also has over 120 million Muslims and the world's largest Zoroastrian population (known in India as Parsis) and Bangladesh is a predominately Muslim nation. India also has about twenty-five million Christians and until recently India had several small but thriving Jewish communities. Nepal is mainly Hindu with a Buddhist minority, and Bhutan the reverse. Sri Lanka is mainly Theravada Buddhist with Hindu, Muslim, and Christian minorities. Mauritius, which has no indigenous population, is about 50 percent Hindu, with a large Christian and smaller Muslim and Buddhist minorities.

Linguistic and religious diversity is more than matched by social diversity. One classification suggests that the sociocultural groups of South Asia can be divided into four general and several subcategories: (1) castes (Hindu and Muslim); (2) modern urban classes (including laborers, non-Hindus, and the Westernized elite); (3) hill tribes of at least six types; and (4) peripatetics.

Economically, there are major distinctions between the rural poor and the urban middle class and elite, and also between the urban poor and urban middle class and elite. There are also significant wealth distinctions based on caste and gender, and a sizeable and wealthy Indian diaspora. There is political diversity as well, with India and Sri Lanka being democracies, Bangladesh shifting back and forth between Islamic democracy and military rule, the Maldives being an Islamic state, and Nepal and Bhutan being constitutional monarchies.

In 2002, South Asia faced several categories of issues. Among the most serious are the ongoing ethnic and religious conflicts between Muslims and Hindus in India, the conflict between the nations of Pakistan and India; the ethnic conflict between the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils in Sri Lanka; and the conflict between the Nepalese and Bhutanese in both nations. There are also various ethnic separatist movements in the region, as involving some Sikhs in India. The most threatening to order in the region and beyond is the conflict between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir region, as both have nuclear weapons and armies gathered at their respective borders.

A second serious issue is the host of related environmental problems, including pollution; limited water resources; overexploitation of natural resources; destruction and death caused by typhoons, flooding, and earthquakes; famine (less of a problem today), and epidemics of tropical and other diseases. The Maldives faces the unique problem of disappearing into the sea as global warming melts glaciers and raises the sea level. Coastal regions of Bangladesh could also suffer from this.

There are pressing social, economic, and political issues as well. Socially, there are wide and growing gaps between the rich and middle classes and the poor, who are disproportionately women and children and rural. Tribal peoples and untouchables still do not enjoy full civil rights, and women are often discriminated against, although India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh have all had women prime ministers. Economically, all the nations continue to wrestle with the issues involved in transforming themselves from mainly rural, agricultural nations to ones with strong industrial and service sectors. Politically, all still also struggle with the task of establishing strong, central governments that can control ethnic, religious, and region variation and provide services to the entire population. Despite these difficulties, there are also positive developments. India continues to benefit from the inflow of wealth earned by Indians outside India and is emerging as a major technological center. And, in Sri Lanka, an early 2002 cease-fire has led to the prospect of a series of peace negotiations in the near future..

East Asia

East Asia is defined here as the nations of Japan, South Korea, North Korea, China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. It should be noted that Taiwan is part of China although the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) differ over whether it is a province or not. The inclusion of China in East Asia is not entirely geographically and culturally valid, as parts of southern China could be classified as Southeast Asian from a geographical and cultural standpoint, while western China could be classified as Central Asian. However, there is a long tradition of classifying China as part of East Asia, and that is the approach taken here. Likewise, Mongolia is sometimes classified in Central Asia. As noted above, Siberia can be considered as forming North and Northeast Asia.

Economic, political, ideological, and social similarity across China, Korea (North and South), and Japan is the result of several thousand years of Chinese influence (at times strong, at other times weak), which has created considerable similarity on a base of pre-existing Japanese and Korean cultures and civilizations. China's influence was

greatest before the modern period and Chinese culture thus in some ways forms the core of East Asian culture and society. At the same time, it must be stressed that Chinese cultural elements merged with existing and new Korean and Japanese ones in ways that produced the unique Japanese and Korean cultures and civilizations, which deserve consideration in their own right.

Among the major cultural elements brought from China were Buddhism and Confucianism, the written language, government bureaucracy, various techniques of rice agriculture, and a patrilineal kinship system based on male dominance and male control of family resources. All of these were shaped over the centuries to fit with existing or developing forms in Korea and Japan. For example, Buddhism coexists with Shinto in Japan. In Korea, it coexists with the indigenous shamanistic religion. In China and Korea traditional folk religion remains strong, while Japan has been the home to dozens of new indigenous religions over the past 150 years.

Diversity in the region has been largely a product of continuing efforts by the Japanese and Koreans to resist Chinese influence and develop and stress Japanese and Korean culture and civilization. In the twentieth century diversity was mainly political and economic. Japanese invasions and conquests of parts of China and all of Korea beginning in the late nineteenth century led to hostile relations that had not been completely overcome in 2002.

In the post-World War II era and after, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea have been closely allied with the United States and the West; they have all developed powerful industrial and postindustrial economies. During the same period, China became a Communist state; significant ties to the West and economic development did not begin until the late 1980s. North Korea is also a Communist state; it lags behind the other nations in economic development and in recent years has not been able to produce enough food to feed its population. In 2002 China was the emerging economic power in the region, while Taiwan and South Korea hold on and Japan shows signs of serious and long-term economic decline, although it remains the second-largest (after the United States) economy in the world. Mongolia, freed from Soviet rule, is attempting to build its economy following a capitalist model.

Politically, China remains a Communist state despite significant moves toward market capitalism, North Korea is a Communist dictatorship, Japan a democracy, and South Korea and Taiwan in 1990s seem to have become relatively stable democracies following periods of authoritarian rule. Significant contact among the nations is mainly economic, as efforts at forging closer political ties remain stalled over past grievances. For example, in 2001, people in China and South Korea protested publicly about a new Japanese high school history textbook that they believed did not fully describe Japanese atrocities committed toward Chinese and Koreans before and during World War II. Japan has refused to revise the textbook. Similarly, tension remains between Mongolia and China over Mongolian fears about Chinese designs on Mongolian territory. Inner Mongolia is a province of China.

Major issues with regional and broader implications are the reunification of Taiwan and China and North and South Korea, and threat of war should reunification efforts go awry. Other major regional issues include environmental pollution, including air pollution from China that spreads east, and pollution of the Yellow Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea. A third issue is economic development and stability, and the role of each nation, and the region as a unit, in the growing global economy. A final major issue is the emergence of China as a major world political, economic, and military power at the expense of Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, and the consequences for regional political relations and stability.

Overview


As the above survey indicates, Asia is a varied and dynamic construct. To some extent the notion of Asia, as well as regions within Asia, are artificial constructs imposed by outside observers to provide some structure to a place and subject matter that might otherwise be incomprehensible. The nations of Asia have rich and deep pasts that continue to inform and shape the present—and that play a significant role in relations with other nations and regions. The nations of Asia also face considerable issues—some unique to the region, others shared by nations around the world—as well as enormous potential for future growth and development. We expect that the next edition of this encyclopedia will portray a very different Asia than does this one, but still an Asia that is in many ways in harmony with its pasts.

David Levinson (with contributions from Virginia Aksan, Edward Beauchamp, Anthony and Rebecca Bichel, Linsun Cheng, Gerald Fry, Bruce Fulton, and Paul Hockings)

Regional Maps













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CHINA–INDIA RELATIONS As ancient civilizations, China and India coexisted in peace and harmony for millennia. However, as postcolonial modern nation-states, with the exception of a very short period of bonhomie in the early 1950s, relations between the two Asian giants have been marked by conflict, containment, mutual suspicion, distrust, and rivalry. Just as the Indian subcontinental plate has a tendency to constantly rub and push against the Eurasian tectonic plate, causing friction and volatility in the entire Himalayan mountain range, India’s bilateral relationship with China also remains volatile and friction- and tension-ridden.

Past Perfect: Ancient Civilizations

China and India are two of the world’s oldest civilizations, each with the quality of resilience that has enabled it to survive and prosper through the ages and against the odds. During the past three thousand years, every one of the Asian countries—some situated on the continental landmass, others being islands off the Asia mainland—has at some stage been directly influenced by one or both of these two great civilizations.

Both have long, rich strategic traditions: Kautilya’s *Arthashastra*—a treatise on war, diplomacy, statecraft and empire—in India and Sunzi’s (Sun Tzu’s) fourth-century BCE treatise, *Sunzi bingfa* (The Art of War) in China were written over two thousand years ago. The traditional Chinese concept of international relations was based on concentric circles from the imperial capital outward through variously dependent states to the barbarians. It bears remarkable resemblance to the Indian concept of *mandala*, or circles, as outlined in

Arthashastra, which postulated that a king’s neighbor is his natural enemy, while the king beyond his neighbor is his natural ally. The Chinese dynasties followed a similar policy of encircling and attacking nearby neighbors and maintaining friendly relations with more distant kingdoms (*yuan jiao jin gong*). Much like imperial China, tribute, homage, subservience, and not annexation were the rightful fruits of victory in ancient India.

Political contacts between ancient China and India were few and far between. In the cultural sphere, it was mostly a one-way street—from India to China: Hindu and Buddhist religious and cultural influence spread to China through Central Asia, and Chinese scholars were sent to Indian universities at Nalanda and Taxilla. Though Chinese and Indian civilizations reacted to one another during the first few centuries of the Christian era, the process of religious-cultural interaction on any significant scale ceased after about the tenth century CE. Since then, the two countries lived as if they were oblivious to each other’s existence for over a thousand years, until about the advent of the nineteenth century, when both came under the influence of European powers.

Before the age of European colonization, China accounted for about 33 percent of the world’s manufactured goods and India for about 25 percent. China under the Song dynasty (960–1267) was the world’s superpower. Under the Mughals (1526–1857), India’s economic, military, and cultural prowess also was an object of envy. Then in a complete reversal of fortune, the mighty Asian civilizations declined, decayed, and disintegrated and were eventually conquered by European powers.

Present Imperfect: From Civilizations to Nation-States

The gradual westward expansion over the centuries extended China's influence over Tibet and parts of Central Asia (now Xinjiang Province). In contrast, India's boundaries shrank following the 1947 partition that broke up the strategic unity of the subcontinent going back two thousand years to the first Mauryan empire. Then came the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950, as a result of which the two nations for the first time came in close physical contact and clashed. India's partition in 1947 and the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950 have allowed China to extend its reach and influence into a region where it had, in terms of history and civilization, previously exercised no influence at all.

China-India relations have been tense ever since a border dispute became a full-scale war in 1962. Several rounds of talks since 1981 have failed to resolve the disputed claims. Agreements on maintaining peace and tranquility on the disputed border were signed in 1993 and 1996. However, the prospects of a negotiated settlement of the Sino-Indian border dispute in the near future seem as remote as ever for the simple reason that China cannot brush aside its ally Pakistan's interests in such a settlement. This was not the case with the settlement of China's territorial boundaries with Russia or Vietnam. A resolution of the Sino-Indian border dispute would lead to the deployment of India's mountain divisions and other military assets on the India-Pakistan border, thereby tilting the military balance decisively in India's favor and much to Pakistan's disadvantage. This would deprive Beijing of powerful leverage in its relations with Pakistan and undermine its old strategy of keeping India under strategic pressure on two fronts.

Even if the territorial dispute were resolved, China and India would still retain a competitive relationship in the Asia-Pacific region. Other factors, apart from the territorial dispute, contribute to the fractious and uneasy relationship. These include the nature of China's ties with India's smaller South Asian neighbors (including its arming of them), the legacy of Cold War alignments (Beijing-Islamabad-Washington versus Moscow-New Delhi axis), unrest in Tibet and Kashmir, Chinese encroachments into what India sees as its sphere of influence, Beijing's plans for a naval presence in the Indian Ocean, power asymmetry and a rivalry for the leadership of the developing world, and, more recently, the nuclear and missile proliferation issues.

Since the days of Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964), independent India has entertained hopes of a joint Sino-Indian leadership of Asia as a counter to West-

ern influence, but the Chinese have shown no enthusiasm for sharing leadership of Asia with anyone, least of all India. After all, the main objective of China's Asia policy is to prevent the rise of a peer competitor to challenge its status as the Asia-Pacific's sole "Middle Kingdom." As an old Chinese saying goes, "one mountain cannot accommodate two tigers." Checkmated in East Asia by three great powers—Russia, Japan, and the United States—Beijing has long seen South and Southeast Asia as its spheres of influence and India as the main obstacle to achieving its strategic objective of regional supremacy in Asia. Chinese policymakers' preference for a balance of power approach in interstate relations has led them to provide military and political support to those countries that can serve as counterweights to Beijing's perceived enemies and rivals. Recognizing that India has the size, might, numbers, and, above all, the intention to match China, Beijing has long regarded New Delhi as one of its major strategic rivals and has aligned itself with Pakistan to contain the common enemy.

For its part, India has always perceived the Sino-Pakistani nexus as hostile and threatening in nature. As the pivotal power in South Asia, India perceives itself much as China has traditionally perceived itself in relation to East Asia. That the "strategic space" in which India traditionally operated has become increasingly constricted due to Chinese penetration became further evident from Beijing's forays into Myanmar (Burma) and the Bay of Bengal in the 1990s.

India's defense policy has always been based on the principle of "keeping one step ahead of Pakistan and at par with China." Seeing China as the reference point of India's economic, security, and diplomatic policies, India's strategic analysts have long emphasized the need to keep up with China militarily. Initially, India's nuclear capability was aimed solely at deterring China, not Pakistan. It is the adversarial nature of the Sino-Indian relationship that has driven India's and, in turn, Pakistan's nuclear weapons programs. The 1998 Indian nuclear tests were preceded by the Indian defense minister's statements calling China a "bigger potential threat" than Pakistan and describing how his country was being "encircled" by Chinese military activities in Tibet and alliances with Pakistan and Myanmar.

At the heart of Sino-Indian antagonism is the familiar Indian suspicion, which seems to have now matured into a certainty, that China is seeking to deny India its proper stakes in the game of international politics. That China does not want India to emerge as an equal is evident from its opposition to India's membership in the P-5 (UN Security Council), N-5 (Nu-

clear Club), ASEM (Asia-Europe Summit), APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), and G-8 (Group of Eight). Both remain suspicious of each other's long-term agenda and intentions. Interestingly, both are courting the United States to help balance their relationships with each other until they are strong enough to do so on their own. From New Delhi's perspective, Beijing's gradual but subtle penetration deep into the South Asian region in the second half of the twentieth century was primarily at India's expense.

In terms of history and civilization, India never played a second fiddle to China. Therein lies the root cause of volatile and strained relationship. Both China after a century and India after a millennium of decline are keen to assume the great power roles they believe have been made their right in view of their histories and civilizations. When Chinese and Indian elites speak of restoring their country's rightful place in the world, they give expression to a concept of "preeminence" in Asia and the wider world. This concept reflects their perception that as the foundation of regional cultural patterns, their rightful place is at the apex of world hierarchy. Both want a new international status that is commensurate with their size, strength, and potential. They oppose the economic and political dominance of the United States in world affairs. Both yearn for a truly multipolar world that will provide them the space for growth and freedom of action that befits great powers. Each wants to avoid entangling alliance so as to maximize its options and freedom of action. Both have practiced "tilted nonalignment" while preaching independent, nonaligned foreign policies. China and India have already attained the regional power status.

The similarities between the two countries' outlooks, aspirations, policies, and interests are indeed striking, despite their differing political systems. Both identify the present pattern of international relations with a world order designed to perpetuate the world domination of Western powers. Both oppose the status quo: China in terms of territory, power, and influence; India in terms of status, power, and influence. Furthermore, the Chinese Communist Party's national goal of "rich country, strong military" (*fuguo qiangbing*) bears remarkable resemblance to India's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party's slogan of "prosperous and powerful country." Both are focusing on increasing comprehensive national strength on a solid economic-technological base. Both are major competitors for foreign investment, capital, trade, and markets. Both see themselves as newly rising great Asian powers whose time has finally come. Both have attempted to establish a sort of Monroe Doctrine in their neigh-

borhoods without much success. Both are unable to reassert their traditional suzerainty over their smaller neighbors, as any attempt to do so encounters resistance from regional and extraregional powers.

Both China and India claim that their attitude toward their neighbors is essentially benevolent, while making it clear that those neighbors must not make policies or take actions, or allow other nations to take measures in their countries, that each deems to be against its own interest and security. If they do so, China and India are willing to apply pressure in one fashion or another to bring about desired changes. The two also share remarkable similarity in economic outlooks and policies. Both suffer from a siege mentality borne out of their elites' acute consciousness of the divisive tendencies that make their countries' present political unity so fragile. After all, much of Chinese and Indian history is made up of long periods of internal disunity and turmoil, when centrifugal forces brought down even the most powerful empires.

Future Tense

Obviously, China and India's strategic cultures require both to regain the power and status their leaders consider appropriate to their country's size, population, geographical position, and historical heritage. In the power competition game, while China has surged ahead by acquiring economic and military capabilities underpinned by a clear policy to achieve broader strategic objectives, India has been impeded in its power quest by its incessant political instability and economic weakness. The existing asymmetry in international status and power serves Beijing's interests very well; any attempt by India to challenge or undermine China's power and influence or to achieve strategic parity is going to be strongly resisted through a combination of military and diplomatic means.

The traditional Sino-Indian rivalry is now set to acquire a maritime dimension as China seeks to secure the country's oil supply and trade routes through the Indian Ocean to the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea and thereby further challenge India's power pretensions in the Indian Ocean in the twenty-first century. Beijing is investing heavily in developing the Bandarabbas base in Iran, the Gwadar deep-sea port in Pakistan, and naval bases in Myanmar. This adds to strains generated by differences over Pakistan, Tibet, and nuclear and missile proliferation. Furthermore, Beijing is now concerned that the logic and pull of geopolitics is pushing India, much like Japan, to a strategic alliance with the United States so as to contain China, even though U.S. relations with China have been much warmer in recent years.

For its part, Beijing is also watching with interest economic developments in India, especially its growing prowess in information technology, as the country could emerge as a potential competitor for foreign investment, technology, and markets. If the twenty-first century's first decade indeed turns out to be India's decade (in terms of a rapid increase in its economic and military might), just as the 1990s belonged to China and the 1980s belonged to Japan, Beijing will have to devise new strategies to keep India in check. Rapid power transitions have always been a major cause of instability and conflict in history, particularly when they are accompanied by arms buildups and sudden changes in regional military balances.

Indications are that bilateral relations are likely to remain adversarial for a long time to come. In the short to medium term, neither New Delhi nor Beijing will do anything that destabilizes their bilateral relationship or arouses the suspicions of their smaller Asian neighbors. Their efforts will be aimed at consolidating their power and position while striving to resolve more pressing domestic problems. However, instability in Tibet, coupled with China's military links with Pakistan and Myanmar, will pose a continuing complication in Sino-Indian relations. At the same time, both will continue to monitor closely each other's activities to expand influence and gain advantage in the wider Asian region and will attempt to fill any perceived power vacuum or block the other from doing so. In other words, China-India relations will be marked more by rivalry and competition than cooperation. However, both sides would want to keep the competition as muted as possible for as long as possible.

In the long term, neither Indian nor Chinese defense planners can rule out the possibility of a renewed confrontation over Tibet, Kashmir, Myanmar, or in the Indian Ocean. A Sino-Indian rivalry in southern Asia and the northern Indian Ocean (especially the Malacca Strait) may well be a dominant feature of future Asian geopolitics of the twenty-first century, which could force their neighbors to choose sides. The nature of the rivalry will be determined by how domestic political and economic developments in these two countries affect their power, their outlook on the region and the world, and their foreign and security policies.

There have been numerous occasions in history when China and India were simultaneously weak; there have been occasional moments of simultaneous cultural blossoming. But for more than half a millennium, Asia has not seen the two giants economically and militarily powerful at the same time. That time now seems to be approaching fast, and it is likely to result in significant new geopolitical realignments in

the region. The emergence of China and India as economic giants undoubtedly will throw a huge new weight onto the world's geopolitical balance. New economic prosperity and military strength would reawaken nationalist pride in India, which could bring about a clash with Chinese nationalism.

While they are potential competitors for power and influence in Asia, China and India also share interests in maintaining regional stability (for example, combating the growing Islamic fundamentalist menace), exploiting economic opportunities, maintaining access to energy sources, and enhancing regional cooperation. Cooperation could allow them to balance U.S. influence and increase their negotiating positions with the sole superpower. From only a few hundred million dollars a decade ago, China-India trade has already reached \$3 billion and is poised for a quantum jump as both economies further open up. On economic, environmental, and cultural issues, they may have far more reason to cooperate than to collide. It is possible that economically prosperous and militarily confident China and India will come to terms with each other eventually as their mutual containment policies start yielding diminishing returns. There is little doubt that future relations between the world's two most populous nations are critical to Asian—and global—security. A lasting global and regional security structure cannot be built without finding a place for both China and India.

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CHINA–JAPAN PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY After forty years of antagonism, China and Japan signed the China–Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty in Beijing on 12 August 1978. This treaty represented the turning point of Sino–Japanese relations and the cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy.

The path to the signing was not smooth. After the signing of the 1972 Sino–Japanese Joint Communiqué, in which Japan acknowledged the government in Beijing as China's legitimate government and diplomatic relations were reestablished, the path was opened for a treaty reflecting greater rapprochement. In November 1974, negotiations started, but the treaty was not signed until 1978.

Although it is called a peace treaty, it actually deals with political and economic relations. It reflects the principle of the Sino–Japanese Joint Communiqué and the essential principles of Chinese foreign policy. Article I of the peace treaty contains China's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. It does not address the Sino–Japanese territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. When the China–Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty took effect on 23 October 1978, to celebrate the event, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) visited Tokyo and said that the territorial dispute would be left for posterity to settle. It has not been settled.

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CHINA–JAPAN RELATIONS Geographically, the distance separating Japan from mainland Asia is 144 kilometers from Korea and almost 770 kilometers from China, a distance sometimes referred to poetically as "a narrow strip of water." In prehistoric times, migrants flowed into Japan across that strip of water, particularly from northeastern Asia and the Korean Peninsula. Recurrent flows via Korea explain why

Japanese and Korean languages are closely related, whereas neither is related linguistically to Chinese. By the seventh and eighth centuries, when Japan's own written records appear, Korea and China had long been culturally sophisticated, settled, and nonexpansionist. The two nations offered Japan rich materials for borrowing, without risk of invasion or interference—a marvelous advantage for island Japan.

Before 600 CE, local Japanese leaders sought relations with Korea and China for access to raw materials (iron for weapons, copper and tin for bronze) and for other benefits. Then, in 645 CE, a wholly Japanese initiative known as the Taika Reforms, modeled on imperial China, catapulted Japan from a regionally fragmented, often warring, and illiterate society to a rapidly centralizing, nonwarring, and literate society. Determined not to fall behind again, Japan maintained trade and other ties with China for most of its later history.

From this point onward, China–Japan relations fundamentally involved the flow of culture and knowledge to Japan from China, at Japanese initiative. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, that flow was suddenly reversed—to China and from Japan. This was the result of Japan's successful Meiji-period (1868–1912) transformation to defend against threats from the West. By mutual consent at the turn of the century, Japan served as a model and sympathetic helpmate for China. But rather quickly, Japan became entangled in military actions that, at their height from 1931 to 1945, turned Japan into China's deadly enemy. Japan's defeat in World War II and its postwar economic recovery under its 1947 antiwar constitution, along with China's Communist "liberation" after 1949, set the stage for a more balanced and mutually respectful relationship after diplomatic ties were restored in 1972.

Early Relations to 1200 CE

The only extant written records relating to Japan before 600 CE are Chinese records, because Japan lacked a writing system of its own. The *Shiji* (Records of the Grand Historian) by Sima Qian (145?–86? BCE) alludes to a Taoist mystic reportedly sent by China's first emperor, Qin Shi Huangdi (d. 215 BCE), across the "Eastern Sea" to Japan; brief treatments of Japan appear also in histories of the kingdom of Wei (writing completed c. 297 CE), the latter Han dynasty (completed c. 445 CE), the Liu–Song dynasty (completed c. 513 CE), the Sui dynasty (completed c. 630 CE), and the Tang dynasty (completed in the eleventh century). The first native Japanese accounts of early Japan appeared only in 712 and 720 CE, in the landmark volumes *Kojiki* (Records of Ancient Matters) and

Nibongi (Chronicles of Japan). Thereafter, Japan maintained public records employing China's ideographic writing system, the only writing system in East Asia at the time.

Writing, it could be said, was China's first great gift to Japan. Along with writing came Chinese political, social, and economic thought, public administration, literature and poetry, Buddhism, and much more. In all these arenas, Japan proved an eager and tireless student.

China's histories all report that tribal chieftains or "kings" of Wa ("Wa" was the name used for Japan, written using a Chinese character meaning "dwarf") sought relations with Chinese courts and confirmation of their rulership. Such Japanese efforts quickened in the fifth century as regional rulers sought ascendancy over rivals at home. As China itself neared political reunification under the Sui dynasty (581–618) after nearly four hundred years of political division, the now-dominant Yamato court of Japan in 587 came under the sway of the Soga family of pro-Buddhist and procontinental advocates of reforms. Prince Shotoku (574–622) is credited in 603 with adopting China's twelve-rank court system and, in 604, with promulgating the Seventeen-Article Constitution, a landmark set of principles of government infused with Chinese Confucian ideals. He is also credited with adopting the Chinese calendar, a radical step because it altered native notions of time.

The most encompassing of Japan's borrowings and adaptations from China involved reforms initiated in 645, around the new imperial era known as Taika, meaning "Great Transformation." These brought to full form a Chinese-style centralized state system. Used generically for the larger series of reforms culminating in the Taiho Code of 702, the Taika Reforms concentrated on practical matters of state: land nationalization and redistribution—upon which was based a complex system of taxation (all taken directly from Sui and Tang China)—and division of the nation into Chinese-style provinces, districts, and townships. Underlying this radical restructuring were Chinese political principles and ideals. Chinese-style military conscription was also adopted (but was abolished in 792). The Taiho Code of 702 formalized a fully Chinese-style central governmental structure around the Chinese Tang dynasty system of penal laws and administrative and household guidelines, which served as basic elements of Japanese law until after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, when Western models of governance were embraced.

These self-initiated measures were revolutionary in their consequences in the sense that Japan's public life

was radically and permanently restructured. No other large nation in world history has ever so thoroughly transformed itself through voluntary borrowing without the pressure of military threats or actual conquest. On the other hand, it is necessary to point out that elements of China's "core" were rejected by Japan. First, Japan rejected China's worldview of Heaven, Earth, and Man (or human being), a triad interacting to achieve a harmonious whole, in favor of its own primitive founding mythology, which said that the Japanese islands and people were created by sacred spirits, or *kami*. By this claim, Japan privileged itself over its culturally more sophisticated neighbors. Second, Japan rejected China's belief that a Son of Heaven (who acted as intermediary between Heaven, Earth, and Man) earned the Mandate of Heaven, or right to rule (which could be revoked and transferred to a more worthy claimant), through "rule by virtue," or benevolent and morally upright rule. Japan insisted that its imperial line, the Yamato (Sun) line, was divine, eternal, and nontransferable. Third, Japan rejected China's belief in an imperial administration by an "aristocracy of merit," selected increasingly by civil-service examination and open to commoners. Japan held to its idea of a titled and hereditary aristocracy of blood, who alone qualified for appointment to high office. For reasons like these, Japan remained distinctively Japanese despite massive borrowings of Chinese forms.

The intense Japanese interest in China from about 600 to 900 CE is celebrated by Chinese and Japanese alike as a kind of golden age of China-Japan relations. Between 600 and 614, the Japanese court dispatched as many as five diplomatic missions to the Sui court, consisting of scholars, Buddhist monks, and others with orders to report back about Chinese knowledge and institutions. China's short-lived Sui dynasty was followed by the glorious Tang dynasty (618–907). From 630 to 894, the Japanese court sent at least nineteen diplomatic missions to the Tang court.

Courtiers, scholars, and monks featured prominently in the missions, accompanied by physicians, diviners, archers, musicians, craftsmen, and artists. Kibi no Makibi (693–775), a Japanese court official, went to China in 717 as a student, stayed for nineteen years, and brought back texts on Confucianism, Buddhism, astronomy, divination, civil administration, and military organization. During the period 752–754, he went back to China as deputy head of a mission that, on its return, helped the blind Chinese monk Jianzhen (called Ganjin in Japan; 689–763) to reach Japan after having experienced five shipwrecks and other mishaps. Ganjin founded the Japanese Ritsu branch of Buddhism at Nara (imperial capital from 710 to 784) in

754. The Japanese monk Saicho (767–822), of Chinese descent and active at court, was dispatched to China by Emperor Kammu (737–806) in 804 to gain spiritual sanction for a new Buddhist complex on Mount Hiei, near the new imperial capital of Heian (capital from 794 to 1185 and today's Kyoto). In China, Saicho was drawn to Tiantai ("Heaven's Pedestal," called Tendai in Japanese), a syncretic school of Buddhism emphasizing the *Lotus Sutra*, and after returning to Japan in 806 obtained imperial sanction to establish the sect on Mount Hiei, where it flourished.

Fellow monk Kukai (774–835) traveled with Saicho to China in 804 aboard a separate ship. Drawn to the Buddhist master Huiguo (746–805) of the Chinese Zhenyan ("True Words," called Shingon in Japanese) esoteric school of Buddhism, Kukai so impressed Huiguo that Huiguo transmitted his secret teachings to this foreigner rather than to a Chinese disciple. Kukai returned to Japan in 806, held various religious posts, wrote compellingly about Buddhism, and after 823 (as abbot of the great Buddhist temple Toji in the imperial capital of Heian) laid the foundations for Shingon Buddhism, which emerged as the most influential Buddhist school of the Heian period. Partly because of Huiguo's choice of Kukai for his transmission, Zhenyan Buddhism disappeared as a separate sect in China.

The Japanese writing system was an important outcome of this cultural interchange. In China, Kukai had studied Sanskrit, the Indian script in which Buddhist scriptures were sometimes written. Kukai encountered in Sanskrit a syllable-based writing system suitable to the Japanese language, which, like Sanskrit, is multisyllabic with inflected verbs. Chinese, by contrast, is monosyllabic and not inflected. According to tradition, Kukai used the principle of written Sanskrit to invent the Japanese syllabary known as kana, which is still used today.

In 894, the refusal of eminent scholar Sugawara no Michizane (845–903) to lead an embassy to China because of turmoil there brought an end to Japanese diplomatic missions until 1404, more than five hundred years later. The Japanese court continued nonetheless to use Chinese writing for public records; interest remained high in Chinese classical studies, poetry, and the arts; Japanese Buddhist monks traveled to China; and Chinese trading vessels sometimes called at Japanese ports. The truly important story after 900, however, is that Japanese elites used this interlude to digest earlier cultural imports and to find their own path in such areas as women's literature of the court, the warrior tales that followed, and fine arts and crafts, all distinctively Japanese.

Japan's Medieval Period, 1200–1600

The Heian period (794–1185) ended as a result of fighting between factions at court in alliance with provincial military forces. Real power progressively shifted to those military authorities around an emerging system often labeled "feudal." From 1192 to 1868, a series of military governments ruled Japan, sanctioned by the imperial court. Japanese, observing post-Heian developments, looked to Chinese history for precedents and found a comparable Chinese "feudal" system that had existed prior to political unification under the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE). Japanese proceeded to apply pre-Qin Chinese terminology to post-Heian Japan: The head of the new military government was called shogun (Japanese pronunciation of the Chinese term "*jiangjun*," meaning "general"); the shogunal government was called *bakufu* (Japanese pronunciation of the Chinese term "*mufu*," meaning "tent headquarters" or "field headquarters"); and, later, after 1467, when Japan entered into more than a century of civil war, Japanese called the period Warring States, or Sengoku (1457–1568), the Japanese pronunciation of the Chinese period of history known as Zhan'guo (403–221 BCE).

Although China–Japan relations omitted further diplomatic exchanges until after 1404, China was very much alive in Japanese minds. Japan's first military government, the Kamakura *bakufu* (1192–1333), encouraged private trade with China, which made possible the importation of large quantities of Song-dynasty (960–1279) copper coins that fueled Japan's economy and commerce. Kamakura authorities also patronized a school of Buddhism that appealed strongly to Japan's new class of warriors, the samurai or *bushi*. This was Zen Buddhism—"Zen" being the Japanese pronunciation of the Chinese "Chan" (from the Sanskrit *dhyana*, meaning meditation). As in the past, key Buddhist monks went to China and returned with new teachings. The monk Eisai (1141–1215) went to China twice, first in 1168 and again from 1187 to 1191, where his enlightenment within the Linji (in Japanese, Rinzai) school of Zen Buddhism was certified by Linji master Xu'an. Along with Rinzai Buddhism, Eisai brought back Song China's enthusiasm for tea. He successfully urged both Zen and tea upon the new military government at Kamakura, which sought to distinguish itself from Nara and Heian Buddhism and culture. The monk Dogen (1200–1253), who traced his ancestry back to Heian-period emperors and aristocrats, in 1223 went to China, where he visited numerous monasteries and Buddhist masters in search of new teachings, and returned to Japan five years later to introduce Caodong (in Japanese, Soto), the other major branch of Zen Buddhism. Zen

flourished and fundamentally enriched all aspects of Japanese culture, including the tea ceremony and Zen gardens, minimalist poetry known as haiku, painting, and martial-arts disciplines. Zen's pervasive influence on Japanese culture far surpassed the influence of Chan Buddhism on Chinese culture.

After Kamakura, Japan established its second *bakufu*, or shogunal government, the Ashikaga shogunate (1338–1573). This period coincided with a vigorous Japanese interest in China under the Mongol Yuan (1279–1368) and the Ming (1368–1644) dynasties and a brief Ming interest in the outside world as expressed through its seven maritime expeditions (1405–1433), some of which reached Arab ports and the east coast of Africa. The third Ashikaga shogun, Yoshimitsu (1358–1408), had interests in China going well beyond trade, and it was he who reinstated embassies to China in 1404, followed by five more embassies up to 1410. These were received by China under its paternalistic system of foreign relations known as the tribute system. Japan dispatched eleven more embassies to Ming China between 1433 and 1547.

During the momentous sixteenth century, characterized by civil war and the arrival of Westerners and their guns in the 1540s, Japanese adventurers led ruinous pirate raids on the coasts of Korea and China. In 1592 and 1597, military unifier Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536–1598) led two devastating campaigns against Korea, the first step of an ambitious plan to conquer China. Chinese recall the Japan of this unhappy era as a precursor to the militaristic Japan of the twentieth century.

Japan's Tokugawa Period (1600/1603–1868)

After full political reunification under the new Tokugawa shogunal government (1600/1603–1868), Japanese authorities gave top priority to imposing social and political controls on all of Japan. To this end, the new government borrowed China's open social-class system of scholar-official, peasant, artisan, and merchant and enforced it upon Japanese society as a closed, castelike, and hereditary system, consisting of samurai-official, peasant, artisan, and merchant. Buddhism was also subjected to strict state control. Replacing Buddhism at the heart of Japanese intellectual life was Chinese Confucianism, a secular system devoted to ideals of social harmony and to the training of loyal administrators for the state. Confucianism for the first time formed Japan's true unifying ideological core and served as the content of education for samurai-officials throughout the Tokugawa period.

During Japan's Warring States period, unregulated foreign trade had been a source of danger and dis-

ruption to the nation, and it, too, was brought under control by two measures. First, in 1639, the Tokugawa authorities forbade the construction of oceangoing vessels and prohibited Japanese to travel abroad on penalty of death. Simultaneously, the government enforced a national policy of restricted foreign access to Japan, referred to by later historians as *sakoku*, or "closed nation," a form of self-isolation. Foreigners themselves were expelled, with the important exception of those Dutch, Chinese, and Koreans having government authorization. Confined to designated living quarters, these foreigners were allowed entry because they transported precious goods to Japan, like books on Confucianism, medical texts, agricultural manuals, and treatises on astronomy and technology. In this way, China—or at least the China of books and of Japanese imaginings—remained very much on Japanese minds. Japan in Chinese minds, by contrast, became increasingly peripheral, in the absence of pirate raids and military aggression. What shattered this system of regulated and limited contact was Britain's Opium War against China, 1839–1842, which alerted Japan to the rise of an outside enemy that demanded a concerted effort at resistance.

Rapid Transformations after 1840

After the Opium War, four major developments framed and conditioned China–Japan relations: Western imperialism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, China's rapid decline in the nineteenth century, Japan's rapid rise after 1868, and the wars, revolutions, and transformations of the twentieth century. The nineteenth century after 1840 was one of the worst periods of China's history. Faced with serious internal problems, China was diverted from these by relentless imperialist pressures, which led to a series of foreign wars: the Opium War, the Arrow Wars of 1856–1858, the Yili War with Russia of 1871–1872, and the Sino-French War over the Indochinese kingdom of Annam in 1884–1885. Japan watched in growing horror as China, the civilization it had long idealized, lost war after war, all the while proclaiming its own moral and cultural superiority. Alarmed further by instability in Korea, a magnet for Chinese, Russian, and Western intervention, Japan finally went to war with China over Korea. China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 was excruciatingly humiliating for China, robbing even the blindest Chinese of any pretense of superiority. Responsible Chinese became consumed with fears for survival in an imperialist world that, alas, would not go away.

It was to Japan that China then turned for the secrets of wealth and power, cautiously at first but after



EXTRACT FROM THE TREATY OF TIENTSIN

The Treaty of Tientsin was signed by China and Japan on 13 September 1871, a time when China's power was declining and Japan's increasing. It was only 24 years later that Japan would defeat China and establish a dominance that would last into World War II.

Article I. Relations of amity shall henceforth be maintained in redoubled force between China and Japan, in measure as boundless as the heaven and the earth. In all that regards the territorial possessions of either country the two Governments shall treat each other with proper courtesy, without the slightest infringement or encroachment on either side, to the end that there may be forevermore peace between them undisturbed.

Article II. Friendly intercourse thus existing between the two Governments, it is the duty of each to sympathise with the other, and in the event of any other nation acting unjustly or treating either of the two Powers with contempt, on notice being given [by the one to the other], mutual assistance shall be rendered or mediation offered for the arrangement of the difficulty, in fulfilment of the duty imposed by relations of friendship.

Article III. The system of government and the penal enactments of the two Governments being different from each other, each shall be allowed to act in entire independence. There shall be no interference offered, nor shall requests for innovations be obtruded. Each shall aid the other in enforcement of the laws, nor shall either allow its subjects to entice the people of the other country to commit acts in violation of the laws.

Article IV. It will be competent for either Government to send Plenipotentiary Ministers, with their families and suites, to reside in the capital of the other, either permanently or from time to time. Their traveling expenses as they pass through the country will be defrayed

by themselves. In the matter of their hiring ground or buildings to serve as Legations, of the passage of their baggage to and fro, of the conveyance of their correspondence by special couriers, and the like, due assistance shall be rendered on either side.

Article V. Although the functionaries of the two Governments have fixed grades, the nature of the offices conferred are different on either side. Officers of equivalent rank will meet and correspond with each other on a footing of equality. When an officer visits a superior, the intercourse between them will be such as is prescribed by the rites of hospitality. For the transaction of public business, the officials of the two countries will address communications to officers of their own rank, who will report in turn to their respective superiors; they will not address the superior officer directly. In visits, cards with the official title of the visitor shall be sent on either side. All officials sent on the part of either Government to the other shall present for inspection a letter bearing an official stamp, in order to guard against false personation.

Article VI. In official correspondence, China will use the Chinese language, and Japan will either use the Japanese language accompanied by a Chinese version, or a Chinese version alone, as may be found on her side preferable.

Article VII. Friendly intercourse having been established between the two Governments, it will behoove them both to appoint certain ports on the seaboard which their merchants will be authorized to frequent for purposes of trade, and to lay down, separately, Regulations of Trade that their respective mercantile communities may abide by in perpetuity.

Source: Treaties, Conventions, Maritime Customs between China and Foreign State. Vol. II. Shanghai: Imperial Maritime Customs, 1235–36.

1901 in a flood. Japan responded generously, out of a sense of cultural indebtedness to China and of new national pride, but also out of a sense of common threat in the face of Western imperialism. For the first time

in its long history, China adopted a policy of sending Chinese students to Japan, to bring back advanced learning. Between 1898 and 1911, 25,000 Chinese students traveled to Japan for all levels of modern



THE TREATY OF SHIMONOSEKI

The Treaty of Peace between China and Japan of 17 April 1895 ended the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. The defeat in the war and the conditions set forth in the treaty extracted below were a humiliation for China and contributed to the long-term mistrust between the two nations.

His Majesty the Emperor of China and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan desiring to restore the blessings of peace to their countries and subjects and to remove all cause for future complications, have named as their Plenipotentiaries for the purpose of concluding a Treaty of peace; that is to say, His Majesty the Emperor of China, Li Hung-chang, Senior Tutor to the Heir Apparent, Senior Grand Secretary of State, Minister Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports of China, Viceroy of the Province of Chihli, and Earl of the First Rank, and Li Cing-Long, Ex-Minister to the Diplomatic Service, of the Second Official Rank; and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Count Iro Hirobumi, Junii, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Paullownia, Minister President of State, and Viscount Mutsu Munemitsu, Junii, First Class of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs; who, after having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in good and proper form, have agreed to the following Articles:—

Article I. Independence of Korea. China recognizes definitely the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea, and in consequence the payment of tribute and the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Korea to China, in derogation of such independence and autonomy, shall wholly cease for the future.

Article II. Cession of part of Fengtien Province. China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories, together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property thereon:

(a) The southern portion of the province of Fengtien, within the following boundaries:—

The line of demarcation begins at the mouth of the River Yalu and ascends that stream to the mouth of the River An-ping; from thence

the line runs to Feng-huang; from thence to Haicheng; from thence to Ying-kow, forming a line which describes the southern portion of the territory. The places above named are included in the ceded territory. When the line reaches the River Liao at Ying-kow, it follows the course of that stream to its mouth where it terminates. The mid-channel of the River Liao shall be taken as the line of demarcation.

This cession also includes all islands appertaining or belonging to the province of Fengtien, situated in the eastern portion of the Bay of Liao-tung and in the northern part of the Yellow Sea.

(b) The island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or belonging to said island of Formosa.

(c) The Pescadores Group, that is to say, all islands lying between the 119th and 120th degrees of longitude east of Greenwich and the 23rd and 24th degrees of north latitude.

Article III. Delimitation of ceded territory. The alignments of the Frontiers described in the preceding Article and shown on the annexed map, shall be subject to the verification and demarcation on the spot, by a Joint Commission of Delimitation consisting of two or more Chinese and two or more Japanese Delegates to be appointed immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act. In case the boundaries laid down in this act are found to be defective at any point, either on account of topography or in consideration of good administration, it shall also be the duty of the Delimitation Commission to rectify the same.

The Delimitation Commission will enter upon its duties as soon as possible and will bring its labors to a conclusion within the period of one year after appointment.

The alignments laid down in this Act shall, however, be maintained until the rectifications of the Delimitation Commission, if any are made, shall have received the approval of the Governments of China and Japan.

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Article IV. War Indemnity to Japan. China agrees to pay to Japan as a war indemnity the sum of 200,000,000 Kuping Taels. The said sum is to be paid in eight installments, The first installment of 50,000,000 Taels to be paid within six months and the second installment of 50,000,000 Taels to be paid within twelve months after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act. The remaining sum to be paid in six equal installments as follows: The first of such equal installments to be paid within two

years; the second within three years; the third within four years; the fourth within five years; the fifth within six years; and the sixth within seven years, after the exchange of the ratifications of this Act. Interest at the rate of 5 per centum per annum shall begin to run on all unpaid portions of the said Indemnity from the date the first installment falls due.

Source: John V. A. MacMurray, ed. (1921) *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894–1919*. New York: Oxford University Press, 18–19.

schooling. Some of these students turned against their Manchu-ruled Qing dynasty (1644–1912) and, working with Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) and other revolutionaries, succeeded in bringing down the dynasty. This brief interlude of good relations was brought to a halt by the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. By this war, Japan acquired vast interests in Manchuria (northeastern China), which shifted Japan's stance from cooperation and support of China to self-serving actions that brought the two into conflict after conflict.

In 1915, Japan presented to the Chinese government of Yuan Shikai (1859–1916) its Twenty-One Demands, which called for the appointment of Japanese advisers to top civilian and military positions. Leaked to the press, these demands triggered an outburst of Chinese nationalist outrage and anti-Japanese sentiment. Under Chinese and international pressure, the most objectionable demands were withdrawn, but Chinese suspicions of Japan persisted.

World War I, which tied down European powers in the West, gave Japan the opportunity to accelerate its trade and involvement in China. China's so-called warlord era of 1917 to 1927 invited even more foreign interference. Growing Japanese militarism at home, accelerated by the world depression of 1929, set Japan on a course of escalating aggression in China: Japanese aggression triggered Chinese resistance, which in turn heightened Japanese demands, which further inflamed Chinese nationalism, until Japan launched its total war against this obstinate nation. More specifically, the Japanese assassination of warlord Zhang Zuolin (1872–1928) of Manchuria in 1928 served as a prelude to the Manchurian Incident of 1931, followed by formation of the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932; the demilitarization of North China under Japanese pressure in 1933; Japanese-orchestrated efforts to separate the five northern provinces of Hebei,

Chahar, Suiyuan, Shanxi, and Shandong from China in 1935; and finally, on 7 July 1937, the Marco Polo Bridge military clash outside Beijing that precipitated seven years of Japanese military rampage in China. Japan's actions in no small way contributed to undermining the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), which fell in 1949—a parallel to the years after 1550, when Japanese piracy along the China coast and Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea helped to bring down the Ming dynasty in 1644. The intensity and destructiveness of Japanese aggression of the 1930s and 1940s far exceeded that of the earlier period, however, and in Chinese minds brought China-Japan relations to an all-time low.

Japan lost its war against China and its allies. The Allied Occupation (1945–1952) that followed, under U.S. leadership, was the first foreign occupation of Japan in its entire history. Ironically, China accomplished the reverse of foreign occupation less than five years later: In 1949, China "liberated" itself from foreign control and intervention and expelled most foreigners other than its Soviet Russian allies. Relations between China and Japan after 1949 followed the lead of the United States. Japan established diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan under Chiang Kai-shek. Then, in 1972, the surprise visit to China of U.S. president Richard Nixon (1913–1994) and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger cleared the way for Japan to restore diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC) under Mao Zedong (1893–1976) in September 1972.

China–Japan Relations since 1972

Since 1972, China has made major shifts in policy, bringing itself increasingly in line with international standards and agreements. The death of Mao Zedong in 1976 brought to an end the Cultural Revolution



Soldiers in China's People's Liberation Army carry wreaths at a memorial ceremony for the 300,000 victims of the 1937 Nanjing massacre by Japanese troops. The ceremony on 14 December 1998 followed a Japanese refusal to provide a written apology for Japanese atrocities. (AFP/CORBIS)

(1966–1976). New policies from 1978 under Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) emphasized the "four modernizations" in agriculture, industry, science, and defense, accompanied by a commitment to *kaifang*—the policy of opening and reform. In this atmosphere, China-Japan relations have become more balanced and equal than ever before, marked by a resolve to maintain constructive relationships and to work out disagreements.

Providing the framework for relations since 1972 are the Joint Communiqué of the government of Japan and the government of the PRC of 29 September 1972, which affirmed that the government of the PRC is the sole legal government of China, that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China (calling for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue through discussions), and that China-Japan diplomatic relations would be restored as of 29 September 1972, and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China, signed on 12 August 1978, endorsing economic cooperation and political understanding. On 15 August 1995, Japanese prime minister Murayama Tomiichi (b. 1924) went beyond economics and politics to address officially the touchy subject of Japanese aggression against China, making a personal apology for the actions of Japan during the Sino-Japanese war of the 1930s and 1940s. His 1995 statement has been reaffirmed regularly by subsequent leaders.

Time will tell what effect these repeated apologies have. More notable has been Chinese distrust of Japanese apologies, even as Chinese demand more Japanese bowing and scraping. China plays the "war guilt" card against Japan and has utilized its controlled press to sensationalize outlandish statements by fringe right-wing Japanese elements, while denying any error or shortcoming of its own. Sustained healthy relations are handicapped by such circumstances.

The fact remains that China needs Japan and Japan needs China. Reaffirmation of this truth finds expression in two top-level agreements of 26 November 1998: the Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development and the Joint Press Announcement on Strengthening Cooperation between Japan and China toward the Twenty-first Century. Even at low points since 1972, China-Japan relations have been substantial, with Japan usually taking the lead for reasons such as economic gain, security concerns, sense of cultural affinity, curiosity and adventure, war guilt, and feelings of public and international responsibility.

Economic relations have been at the forefront of China-Japan relations since 1949. Before 1978, such relations were surprisingly complex, multilayered, and pluralistic. Trade was relatively substantial and constant as nongovernmental and pro-China trade interests in

Japan found ways to deal directly with China, bypassing official channels constrained by U.S. policies. As a percentage of Japan's world trade, it constituted a modest 2.5 to 3.5 percent, which, however, grew steadily after 1972. By 1985, Japan's exports to China (modern plant and technology, machinery, and petrochemicals) had climbed to about 7 percent of Japan's global export trade, whereas its imports from China (mainly crude oil and coal and, later, textiles) amounted to about 5 percent of Japan's total imports. Japan now ranks as China's largest trading partner, and China as Japan's second-largest, after the United States. To encourage trade liberalization, help manage bilateral economic relations, and resolve trade disputes with China, Japan since 1996 supported China's entry into the World Trade Organization. China achieved full membership in WTO, after fifteen years of negotiations, on 11 December 2001.

Political relations at an official level were meager before the restoration of diplomatic ties in September 1972. Thereafter, Japanese prime ministers (the head of state of Japan) and other high officials have visited China, and Chinese premiers (not the head of state of China, a position held by China's president) and other high officials have visited Japan. In October 1992, no less personages than the emperor and empress of Japan visited China, a first. In early 1993, Jiang Zemin (b. 1926), Chinese president and general secretary of the Communist Party of China, reciprocated in a visit to Japan, also a first for a Chinese head of state. In 1997, when Japanese prime minister Hashimoto Ryutaro (b. 1937) visited China, followed by Chinese premier Li Peng's (b. 1928) visit to Japan, the two nations agreed that every year one of their top leaders should visit the other nation. Annual exchange visits by top leaders of both nations have indeed materialized.

Cultural ties are an arena where attitudes find full expression. Complex sentiments of superiority and inferiority coexist, as assessed by Japanese scholar Ijiri Hidenori:

The Chinese have a superiority complex deriving from their cultural influence in pre-modern history and hatred stemming from Japanese military aggression against China in the modern period, while having an inferiority complex based upon Japan's co-operation in their modernization, and admiration for Japan's advanced economy. On the other hand, the Japanese have an inferiority complex due to their cultural debt to China and the sense of original sin stemming from their past aggression against China, while having a superiority complex based upon their assistance to China's modernization and contempt for China's backwardness.

Howe 1996: 60

These attitudes are part of the cultural baggage of Chinese and Japanese, whose numbers as travelers have exploded. In 1972 only nine thousand Chinese and Japanese traveled between China and Japan; in 1997 that number had risen to well over 1 million—a greater exchange than ever before. Among those were 23,000 Chinese studying in Japan, a figure representing more than 40 percent of all foreign students in Japan. (China began authorizing study and research abroad in 1979.) In the arena of religion, a dynamic Japanese Buddhism is assisting historic centers of Chinese Buddhism, like the home temples of Ganjin and Huiguo, to help Buddhism recover from the hardships, neglect, and attacks of the recent past. Japan is further assisting China at national and local levels to refine modern methods of law and administration and other areas of public life.

Thus, significantly, in matters of trade, diplomacy, study, law and administration, religion, industry, and technology—all areas of importance dating back to Sui and Tang times—relations are very much alive between China and Japan as they enter the new millennium.

Douglas R. Reynolds

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CHINA–KOREA RELATIONS It is difficult to overstate the comprehensive influence of traditional China on Korea's cultural development and social

institutions. That influence remained the single dominating feature of Korean culture until as late as the nineteenth century. Four elements of traditional Korean culture have manifested Chinese influence: political culture, popular and court artistic culture, language, and literature.

The long and continuous history of Chinese influence on Korean culture is said to have begun with the Lo-lang Commandery in northwestern Korea (modern P'yongyang province), which was established by the Chinese Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) in 108 BCE. The flourishing commandery led to the sinicization of Korea. Through Lo-lang, the accouterments of the superior Chinese civilization, including advanced techniques in pottery making and iron smelting and an ideographic writing system, were transmitted to the loosely knit Korean tribes. With the Chinese writing system were introduced Chinese notions about statecraft and religion, and with the introduction of iron and bronze tools, the development of agriculture.

Political Culture

It is impossible to understand the traditional cultural affinity between China and Korea without referring to the political culture of Confucianism. The fermentation and development of Confucian ideas and institutions were sustained over the course of Korean dynastic history. Culturally, the Unified Shilla kingdom (668–935) in Korea borrowed extensively from Tang China (618–907) by organizing its central and provincial government administrations, its land and taxation systems, national university, and civil-service examinations along Confucian-Chinese lines.

During the Koryo kingdom (918–1392), Korean social, political, educational, and administrative systems were even more sinicized. The Koryo aristocracy embraced Confucianism for its political precepts and ethical principles and accepted Buddhism for spiritual fulfillment. The later Koryo period saw the decline of Buddhism and the increasing stature of Neo-Confucianism, with a renewed emphasis on the civil-service examination system. Under the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) in China, Korea was subject to occasional Mongol political interference but retained its political and cultural identity. Nor did the switch to Manchu Qing vassalage (1644–1912) change the Confucian character of Korean political and civil society. The Manchus themselves relied on the Chinese-run Confucian bureaucracy in China, which they had subjugated politically and militarily but not culturally. Meanwhile, the Choson kingdom (1392–1910) in Korea replaced Buddhism with the Neo-Confucianism of Zhu Xi (Chu Hsi) as the state creed. The essential na-

ture and structure of Sino-Korean cultural relations thus remained intact.

Popular and Court Artistic Culture

From the first major period of Korean art, the Three Kingdoms (c. 57 BCE–668 CE), until the fifteenth century, Buddhism, introduced from China in 372 CE, remained the major source of inspiration in Korean visual art. Architecture, sculpture, and painting of the Koryo dynasty were largely influenced by the style of the Chinese Song dynasty (960–1279). Porcelain making, introduced in the late eleventh century from Zhejiang, China, was transformed by native artisans into a Korean form—kingfisher-colored celadons, which even the Chinese held in high regard.

During the Choson dynasty, Korean arts were influenced by Confucian culture. White porcelain was popular among Koreans for Confucian rites and ancestor worship. In architecture, the Choson court constructed grand buildings in the capital of Seoul, such as the fifteenth-century Kyongbok palace, designed after the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) Chinese prototypes in present-day Beijing. Paintings largely imitated northern Chinese style; professional court artists as well as scholar-gentry painters relied on Chinese themes and conventions. Not until the eighteenth century did distinctively Korean styles emerge.

Chinese music and instruments entered Korea at an early date, and over time Korea developed an extensive repertoire of Chinese-style court music and ritual dance, characterized by slow movements of the shoulders, hands, and neck.

Language

Although Korea has had its own language for several thousand years, its writing system dates only from the mid-fifteenth century; the indigenous Korean script, hangul, was invented in 1443 by King Sejong (1397–1450) during the early Choson dynasty. Most of what is known about the Korean language comes from that period. Information on earlier vocabulary is partly available in vocabularies compiled by the Chinese.

The Korean language borrowed many words from classical Chinese, including most of its technical terms and about 10 percent of its basic nouns, such as *san* (mountain) and *kang* (river). The borrowed words are sometimes written in Chinese characters. It is not known when the Chinese writing system came into widespread use in Korea, but the inscription on a great stele erected to honor the Koguryo king Kwanggaet'o in the early fifth century is the earliest extant historical record written with Chinese characters by Koreans.

Literature

Korean literature was written at first in classical Chinese, then in various transcription (*idu*, *byangch'al*, or *kugyol*) systems using Chinese characters, and finally in hangul. Korean scholars were writing poetry in classical Chinese style by at least the fourth century CE. The introduction of Buddhism and of Chinese characters during the Three Kingdoms period enriched Korean literature and changed the Korean worldview. The Unified Shilla court sent many students to study in Tang China (618–907), and a great body of prose narratives written in classical Chinese resulted from these contacts.

From the institutionalization of civil-service examinations in the mid-tenth century until their abolition in 1894, every educated Korean read Confucian classics and Chinese histories and literature. The Korean upper classes (the *yangban*) were bilingual in a special sense: They spoke Korean but wrote in Chinese. Many of their prose works were set in China, while those written by commoners were set in Korea. The most important literary works often belonged to the Confucianist tradition. Extant literary works indicate that despite the transcription systems, before the twentieth century much Korean literature was written in Chinese rather than in Korean even after the invention of hangul. The prestige of Chinese letters was so great that hangul was scorned by most educated people.

China–Korea Relations Today

Although the number of adherents to Confucianism is small in Korea today, most Korean families still follow its principles, including ancestor worship. In North Korea, ideology and philosophy, along with other forms of religion (shamanism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Ch'ondogyo), have been officially repressed since 1945. In South Korea, however, freedom of religion is constitutionally guaranteed. Although there is no national religion in the south, a significant proportion of the population still adheres to Buddhist beliefs.

Because of the predominance of Confucian culture and institutions, the economic aspect of Sino-Korean relations has not traditionally been most important. This is changing, however, as South Korea in particular and post-Mao China have both been striving to achieve higher levels of economic development. As for North Korea, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 left China as its only major ally. Yet since 1992, China has been cultivating friendly relations with South Korea as well. This is a far cry from the dictates of Communist ideology and from the days of the Korean War (1950–1953), when the People's Republic of China intervened on the side of North Korea.

That China now seeks good relations with both North and South Korea augurs well for Sino-Korean relations in the twenty-first century.

Anthony Alexander Lob

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CHINA–RUSSIA RELATIONS Political and ideological differences deeply embedded in a long history of conflict and territorial disputes have complicated China–Soviet/Russian relations, long before Communist regimes came to power in either China or Russia. Russian Cossacks pushed into Siberia in the seventeenth century as hunters and trappers. In the later 1600s these settlers moved into the Amur River basin to establish agricultural settlements. This expansion of czarist Russia into regions claimed by China's Qing dynasty (1644–1912) eventually resulted in confrontation along the Far Eastern frontier. The two powers concluded the Treaty of Nerchinsk in August 1689, delimiting the Far Eastern sector of the China-Russia boundary in an effort to avoid further conflict. The 1727 Treaty of Burinsk delimited the middle sector (roughly the current Mongolian–Russian boundary).

During China's decline in the nineteenth century, Russia continued to advance into the Far East. Concluded in 1858, the Treaty of Aigun redrew the boundary between the two countries along the Amur and



ESTABLISHING BOUNDARIES

The Treaty of Nipchu (Nerchinsk) of 27 August 1689 sought to establish and maintain peace on the border between China and Russia.

Article I. The river Gorbitza, which joins the Schilka from its left side near the river Tchernaya, is to form the boundary between the two Empires. The boundary from the source of that river to the sea will run along the top of the mountain chain [in which the river rises]. The jurisdiction of the two Empires will be divided in such a way that [the valleys of] all the rivers or streams flowing from the southern slope of these mountains to join the Amur shall belong to the Empire of China, while [the valleys of] all the rivers flowing down from the other [or northern] side of these mountains shall be similarly under the rule of His Majesty the Czar of the Russian Empire. As to [the valleys of] the other rivers which lie between the Russian river Oud and the aforesaid mountains—running near the Amur and extending to the sea—which are now under Chinese rule, the question of the jurisdiction over them is to remain open. On this point the [Russian] Ambassadors are [at present] without explicit instructions from the Czar. Hereafter, when the Ambassadors on both sides shall have returned [? to their respective countries], the Czar and the Emperor of China will decide the question on terms of amity, either by sending Plenipotentiaries or by written correspondence.

Article II. Similarly, the river Argun, which flows into the Amur, will form the frontier along its whole length. All territory on the left bank is to be under the rule of the Emperor of China; all on the right bank will be included in the Empire of the Czar. All habitations on the south side will be transferred to the other.

Article III. The fortified town of Albazin, built by His Majesty the Czar, is to be completely demolished, and the people residing there, with all military and other stores and equipment, are to be moved into Russian territory. Those moved can take all their property with them, and they are not allowed to suffer loss [by detention of any of it].

Article IV. Fugitives [lit., runaways] from either side who may have settled in the other's

country previous to the date of this Treaty may remain. No claims for their rendition will be made on either side. But those who may take refuge in either country after the date of this Treaty of Amity are to be sent without delay to the frontier and at once handed over to the chief local officials.

Article V. It is to be understood by both Governments that from the time when this Treaty of Amity is made, the subjects of either nation, being provided with proper passports, may come and go [across the frontier] on their private business and may carry on commerce [lit., buy and sell].

Article VI. All the differences [lit., quarrels] which may have occurred between the subjects [of each nation] on the frontier up to the date of this Treaty will be forgotten and [claims arising out of them will] not be entertained. But if hereafter any of the subjects [lit., traders or craftsmen] of either nationality pass the frontier [as if] for private [and legitimate] business and [while in the foreign territory] commit crimes of violence to property and life, they are at once to be arrested and sent to the frontier of their own country and handed over to the chief local authority [military], who will inflict on them the death penalty as a punishment of their crimes. Crimes and excesses committed by private people on the frontier must not be made the cause of war and bloodshed by either side. When cases of this kind arise, they are to be reported by [the officers of] the side on which they occur to the Sovereigns of both Powers, for settlement by diplomatic negotiation in an amicable manner.

If the Emperor of China desires to engrave [on stone] the Articles of the above Treaty agreed upon by the Envoys for the determination of the frontier, and to place the same [at certain positions] on the frontier as a record, he is at liberty to do so. Whether this is to be done or not is left entirely to the discretion of His Majesty the Emperor of China.

Source: Treaties, Conventions, etc. between China and Foreign States. (1908) III. Miscellaneous Series, no. 30. China. Shanghai: Imperial Maritime Customs, vol. I: 3–7.

Ussuri Rivers, but left territory east of the rivers in "joint possession" for future negotiations to settle. Two years later Russia prevailed on China to negotiate the Treaty of Peking (Beijing). This treaty granted the territory between the Amur and Ussuri Rivers and the Sea of Japan to Russia.

Russia also advanced into Central Asia, where China claimed control over the area that is today China's autonomous region of Xinjiang. The 1864 Chuguchak Protocol and the 1881 Treaty of Saint Petersburg (Treaty of Ili) defined generally the boundary between Russian Central Asia and Chinese Central Asia. Following the 1881 treaty, many boundary commissions worked to demarcate precisely the China–Russia boundary in Central Asia. This work was completed, except for one sector in the Pamir Mountains that was delineated by the 1884 Protocol on the Sino–Russian Boundary in Kashgaria (modern Chinese Turkestan, in Xinjiang) but was never demarcated. Russian troops occupied the area in the early 1890s, and the Qing court protested by sending Russia a note stating that it retained its claim to the region even if it did not maintain a garrison there.

Following the Japanese defeat of China in the Sino–Japanese War of 1894–1895, Russia prevailed on a weakened China to grant it the right to build a railroad across Manchuria to Vladivostok, with a southern spur running southward through Manchuria to the Chinese port city of Lushun (Port Arthur), which eventually became Russia's principal naval base in East Asia. Just days before the fall of the Qing dynasty, Russia compelled China to sign the 1911 Qiqihar Treaty, which ceded to Russia several hundred square kilometers near the eastern trijunction of Russia, Mongolia, and China. This legacy of Russian encroachment into regions that the Chinese consider their territory continued to plague China–Russia/Soviet relations until the final decade of the twentieth century.

The Sino–Soviet Alliance of the 1950s

Following the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, China and Russia signed a treaty of friendship and alliance. For the next decade, China followed the Soviet development model, adopting a centrally planned economy with state-owned factories emphasizing heavy industry. Thousands of Russian advisers went to China to train Chinese technicians, and Chinese students were sent to the Soviet Union to study. With time, however, China's growing resentment of Soviet domination, ideological differences between the two countries, and boundary disputes left over from the past sowed the seeds of con-

flict that led to the Sino–Soviet split in 1960, and eventually a border war in 1969.

Territorial Issues in China–Soviet Relations

Following the 1917 October Revolution, the new Soviet government issued the Karakhan Manifestos of 1919 and 1920, which renounced all the treaties concluded by the czarist government with China. However, new boundary treaties were not a high priority in subsequent negotiations, which dealt with the issues of Outer Mongolia and the Chinese Eastern Railway controlled by Russia.

Mao Zedong raised territorial issues in early 1950, while he was in Moscow negotiating the Sino–Soviet alliance. The two nations discussed the status of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) during this first Sino–Soviet summit. Mao stated his desire for the eventual reunion of Mongolia with China and raised the boundary issues as well. That the MPR and the Soviet Union were apprehensive about China's ambitions in Mongolia was made clear by Stalin's insistence on a Chinese declaration acknowledging the MPR's independence. Several times during the next ten years China raised the boundary question with the Soviet Union, but in 1960, with the open split in the Sino–Soviet alliance, the boundary dispute became a major source of tension.

As ideological and political tensions escalated between the Soviet Union and China, the Soviets grew concerned that the boundary question had become so salient an issue in Sino–Soviet relations. In May 1963 the Soviet Union proposed holding boundary consultations. At the talks, which began in February 1964, Mao prevented progress toward an agreement when he raised historical issues. He contended that during the czarist period, China had ceded more territory to Russia than to any other imperialist country and that czarist Russia had expanded its borders at the expense of China. Mao stated that the list of "lost" Chinese territory was too long, and the Chinese had not yet "presented their bill" for it. Russia accused China of betraying socialist internationalism, fostering a Maoist personality cult, and adopting radical Maoism. China accused Russia of Soviet imperialism and abandoning Marxism. After this polemical exchange, the two powers made no progress on boundary questions.

During China's Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the boundary dispute flared up again. In March 1969 a military confrontation at Zhenbao (Damansky) Island in the Ussuri River proved that the boundary dispute could very well be the cause of a larger military conflict. In the wake of the March clashes, tensions



CHINA AND RUSSIA BECOME ALLIES

The Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China signed on 14 February 1950 formalized cooperative relations between the two nations.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China;

Filled with determination jointly to prevent, by the consolidation of friendship and cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China, the rebirth of Japanese imperialism and a repetition of aggression on the part of Japan or any other state, which should unite in any form with Japan in acts of aggression;

Imbued with the desire to consolidate lasting peace and universal security in the Far East and throughout the world in conformity with the aims and principles of the United Nations Organization;

Profoundly convinced that the consolidation of good neighborly relations and friendship between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China meets the fundamental interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and China;

Resolved for this purpose to conclude the present Treaty and appointed as their plenipotentiary representatives;

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—Andrei Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China—Chou En-lai, Prime Minister of the State Administrative Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs of China;

Who, after exchange of their credentials, found in due form and good order, agreed upon the following:

Article I. Both High Contracting Parties undertake jointly to take all the necessary mea-

asures at their disposal for the purpose of preventing a repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state which should unite with Japan, directly or indirectly, in acts of aggression. In the event of one of the High Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or states allied with it, and thus being involved in a state of war, the other High Contracting Party will immediately render military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal.

The High Contracting Parties also declare their readiness in the spirit of sincere cooperation to participate in all international actions aimed at ensuring peace and security throughout the world, and will do all in their power to achieve the speediest implementation of these tasks.

Article II. Both the High Contracting Parties undertake by means of mutual agreement to strive for the earliest conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, jointly with the other Powers which were allies during the Second World War.

Article III. Both High Contracting Parties undertake not to conclude any alliance directed against the other High Contracting Party, and not to take part in any coalition or in actions or measures directed against the other High Contracting Party.

Article IV. Both High Contracting Parties will consult each other in regard to all important international problems affecting the common interests of the Soviet Union and China, being guided by the interests of the consolidation of peace and universal security.

Article V. Both the High Contracting Parties undertake, in the spirit of friendship and cooperation and in conformity with the principles of equality, mutual interests, and also mutual respect for the state sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs of the other High Contracting Party—to develop and consolidate economic and cultural ties between the Soviet Union and

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China, to render each other every possible economic assistance, and to carry out the necessary economic co-operation.

Article VI. The present Treaty comes into force immediately upon its ratification; the exchange of instruments of ratification will take place in Peking.

The present Treaty will be valid for 30 years. If neither of the High Contracting Par-

ties gives notice one year before the expiration of this term of its desire to denounce the Treaty, it shall remain in force for another five years and will be extended in compliance with this rule.

Done in Moscow on February 14, 1950, in two copies, each in the Russian and Chinese languages, both texts having equal force.

Source: Soviet Monitor. (1950) London: Tass Agency, no. 11 (15 February): 311.

also rose along the border in Xinjiang, and during the summer of 1969 several other military incidents occurred. Moscow became increasingly alarmed and even contemplated a preemptive strike against China's nuclear facilities. Both China and the Soviet Union understood the real possibility of escalation and agreed to renew boundary negotiations.

Boundary Settlement

During the 1970s and early 1980s the two countries made no progress toward a boundary settlement. However, with the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-1980s, Chinese-Soviet relations began to improve. A significant breakthrough came when Gorbachev, speaking in July 1986 in Vladivostok, showed a clear willingness to improve China-Soviet relations and publicly stated that Russia was willing to adopt the international standard and draw its eastern boundary with China by using the main channel of the Amur and Ussuri rivers rather than China's shoreline, as it had previously insisted. This significant leadership change, and Russia's new position on a boundary settlement, resulted in renewed negotiations.

Coupled with Gorbachev's Vladivostok initiative was the Soviet Union's growing willingness to withdraw its military from Afghanistan, which it had invaded in 1979, end its support for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, and dramatically reduce its troop strength along the Chinese-Russia border and in Mongolia. Progress in satisfying these three Chinese preconditions for normalization of relations resulted in the first Sino-Soviet summit in twenty years in May 1989, when Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping met in Beijing, formally ending the thirty-year-old Sino-Soviet split.

Mutual interest in improving bilateral relations as both Russia and China pursued economic and political reform led to quick resolution of the boundary dis-

pute. At the outset of new negotiations, both sides agreed to use the old treaties as the basis for determining the border and to delimit the boundary according to internationally accepted principles of international law. Following Gorbachev's May 1989 trip to Beijing, negotiations moved forward rapidly, and in June 1990 China and the Soviet Union agreed to sign a treaty covering areas on which they had reached a compromise. They signed the boundary treaty when the Chinese president Jiang Zemin traveled to Moscow in May 1991. The newly established Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation ratified the accord on 3 February 1992, and the Standing Committee of the Chinese National Peoples Congress ratified it on 25 February. Russia and China concluded a treaty delimiting the short fifty-three-kilometer boundary to the west of Mongolia in September 1994. The following month China, Mongolia, and Russia jointly drafted a protocol and map of the eastern and western boundary junctures. In April 1999 demarcation of the entire Chinese-Russian boundary was finally completed; the detailed maps and comprehensive documentation weighed more than thirty kilograms.

The only area that remained unsettled was a never-before-demarcated region in the Pamir Mountains of Central Asia. By the late 1980s, Moscow was willing to accept the watershed principle in establishing the boundary; that is, it was willing to draw the boundary along the highest peaks of the mountains. Nevertheless the issues remained complex, and both sides agreed to postpone a final settlement until after negotiations were completed for the eastern sector of the boundary. However, with the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1990, China was faced with negotiating boundary settlements with the newly independent Central Asian states of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. China has negotiated boundary settlements with Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan, but the Pamir Mountain boundary with Tajikistan remains unsettled.

Post-Cold War Relations

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, China-Russia relations entered a new phase. This sudden and fundamental shift in the global balance of power made it imperative for China and Russia to develop closer relations. In the mid-1990s, Chinese and Russian leaders formed a Sino-Russian "strategic partnership" to counterbalance American unilateralism in world affairs. These closer military and strategic relations between China and Russia are due in part to both countries' intensely nationalistic response to American power in the post-Cold War world. China and Russia, both undergoing a difficult transition from Communism to a market economy, have bruised national identities that make them natural allies against America's global cultural, economic, and military influence.

In 1992 President Boris Yeltsin of Russia and President Jiang Zemin of China both began promoting a strategic partnership between China and Russia. This new focus on China-Russia cooperation resulted in several high-level meetings and agreements. The two leaders formally announced the strategic partnership during a summit meeting held in April 1996 in Shanghai. The two countries now have a thriving military relationship, with Russia's cash-strapped military industries supplying China's technologically backward military with sophisticated jet fighters and naval vessels. In 1998 China ranked second, after India, as the major purchaser of Russian military equipment. Besides military hardware, Russia has also sold China production technologies and has helped China develop new weapons systems by sending Russian scientists to work in China's defense industries.

The present China-Russia strategic partnership is unlike the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s. China and Russia are not attempting to establish a formal military alliance. Nevertheless they are cooperating closely to improve military-to-military relations and to develop confidence-building measures. Both nations hope to further reduce tensions over borders, as well as over nuclear weapons, and to make themselves more secure in the face of the threat both countries feel from the United States.

Economic relations have improved more slowly than the military relationship. Trade over the past several years has stagnated at 5 to 6 billion dollars annually, only 2 percent of China's total foreign trade in 1997. However, a robust border trade has developed over the past decade, and several border towns have become "open cities" to facilitate this dynamic local trade. The slow development of economic and trade relations is due largely to the problems both countries

are experiencing with the transition from a centrally planned command economy to a market economy.

The greatest potential for cooperation is in developing the energy sector. China's rapid economic development during the past several decades has increased its demand for imported oil and gas. Estimates are that China will import 1.3 million barrels of oil a day in 2000 and 3.6 million by 2010. The Russian Far East has vast undeveloped oil and gas fields. However, Russians living in the Russian Far East are reluctant to develop closer relations with China because of their apprehension about the socioeconomic consequences of a stronger Chinese presence in the region. This apprehension is rooted in the deep historical differences and the history of conflict along the long mutual boundary. The demographic imbalance in the Far Eastern regions of Russia and northeastern China is also a point of concern. The Russian Far East has a population of roughly 8 million, while northeastern China has a population of approximately 100 million; the Russians fear Chinese in-migration will cause them to become a minority in their own country. Regional leaders in the Russian Far East have been more skeptical than leaders in Moscow about developing closer economic relations with China. They would rather develop closer relations with Japan, South Korea, and the United States.

Future Concerns

Although in the post-Cold War world China and Russia share common strategic concerns and some complementary economic interests, they will not easily overcome the deeply rooted historical and geopolitical legacy of conflict. Many inherent tensions are simply due to the fact that China and Russia share a long border. More fundamental causes of friction are the result of China's dynamic economic growth and Russia's precipitous economic decline, resulting in a shift in the balance of power between the two countries over the long term. Russian anxiety, especially in the Russian Far East, over what is perceived as a demographic time bomb just across the border in northeastern China will stymie economic cooperation and integration for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, if China and Russia effectively manage the inherent tensions in their bilateral relations, closer military and economic cooperation is possible. One factor that will determine the closeness of Russia-China relations is the relationship between the United States and China and between the United States and Russia. Certainly for economic reasons, both countries would value a better relationship with the United States more than a closer relationship with each other. However, con-

cern over American "hegemony" or unilateralism could cause a closer China-Russia strategic relationship that may form the cornerstone of an anti-American coalition seeking to undermine U.S. influence in important regions of the world, including the Middle East and Northeast Asia

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CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS Taiwan's first residents, who make up the island's aboriginal tribes, migrated to the island about six thousand years ago and are related to ethnic groups from southern China, Southeast Asia, and the Philippines. They now constitute just over 1 percent of the total population. Although Taiwan appeared in Chinese historical records before the Han dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE), the colonization of Taiwan by Chinese settlers began only in 610 CE, during the Sui dynasty (581-618 CE). The next large migration of Chinese to Taiwan started in the twelfth century. During the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), many Chinese settlers in Taiwan were

ordered to return to the Chinese mainland by imperial edicts. However, Chinese pioneers managed to continue to migrate to Taiwan in spite of the imperial prohibition. Soon Taiwan became a base from which Japanese and Taiwanese pirates attacked shipping in the South China seas.

Europeans also began to arrive on Taiwan. In 1590 Portuguese sailors landed on the main island and named it "ilha Formosa," meaning "beautiful island." Formosa remained the name by which Europeans knew Taiwan for centuries. In 1624 the Dutch invaded and occupied the main island. Two years later, the Spanish landed at Keelung, a northern port; they controlled Taiwan's coastal areas for two years. They were finally driven out by the Dutch in 1641.

In 1661, the Ming-dynasty general Zheng Cheng-gong (1624-1662), known to the West as Koxinga, took Taiwan from the Dutch and established an exiled Ming government in Anping (Tainan) in southern Taiwan. The Ming dynasty was overthrown by the Manchus on the Chinese mainland, but Zheng's son ruled Taiwan with a large number of Chinese followers until the Manchus finally took Taiwan in 1683. By then, Taiwan's population had exceeded 2.5 million, most of them from China's Fujian and Guangdong provinces.

By the nineteenth century, China was experiencing economic difficulties and political chaos. Western countries controlled territory along the eastern seaboard. At the end of the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan. Japan began its colonization of Taiwan and used it as a major military base for fifty years until the end of World War II.

Relations under the Two Chiangs

In 1911, the Manchu empire on the Chinese mainland was overthrown by a nationalist revolution spearheaded by the Guomindang (on Taiwan, Kuomintang) under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) and Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975). They established the Republic of China (ROC), which became an ally of the United States during World War II. On 26 November 1943 Chiang met with U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt and British prime minister Winston Churchill at Cairo, Egypt. They agreed that at the end of the war, Japan must return Taiwan to China. Taiwan was returned to Chiang's government on 25 October 1945.

A civil war in China erupted in 1945, pitting the Communist forces led by Mao Zedong (1893-1976) against Chiang Kai-shek's ROC government. Chiang

was defeated, and Mao established the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing on 1 October 1949. Chiang fled to Taiwan with more than 2 million mainlanders and reestablished his government there on 1 March 1950. It was widely expected within the United States that Mao's forces would soon invade Taiwan.

The outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 proved to be the saving grace for Taiwan. Fearing the spread of Communism across Asia, U.S. president Harry Truman immediately ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to defend Taiwan. Mao's troops on the mainland, virtually without a modern navy and air force, were in no position to challenge the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

In May 1951, the United States established its official Military Assistance Advisory Group in Taiwan to train Chiang's refugee troops. By 1954, Taiwan received a total of \$4.2 billion in military aid and \$1.7 billion in economic aid from the United States. These assistance programs, plus a 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States, helped Chiang Kai-shek to build up Taiwan from an impoverished and threatened island into a strong modern state.

During his twenty-five years of authoritarian rule, Chiang Kai-shek focused on preventing the spread of the Chinese Communists' power to Taiwan. He was not in favor of an independent Taiwan but rather considered the island as a base from which to fight Mao's Communism and to recover the mainland by any means at his disposal. He staged commando-style raids on the mainland, often with training and cooperation from the United States. He also forbade all forms of contact with the Communist-controlled mainland, including such seemingly trivial activities as reading mainland newspapers, listening to mainland radio broadcasts, or even receiving mail from friends or relatives still living on the mainland.

After the death of Chiang Kai-shek on 5 April 1975, the real power in Taiwan fell into the hands of his son, Chiang Ching-kuo (1910–1988), who was formally elected to the presidency in May 1978. Like his father, he absolutely opposed any demand for Taiwan's independence. Both Chiangs believed that Taiwan was a base from which the Kuomintang, and thus the ROC, could regain control of the mainland. To the two Chiangs, Taiwan was part of China, period.

However, Chiang Ching-kuo took significant steps to relax tensions with the Communist mainland government. For example, he permitted indirect trade and contacts with the mainland by Taiwan's residents. He was prepared to begin negotiations with the Communist government shortly after lifting the travel ban in October 1987, but before direct negotiations could be-

gin, he died of cardiac and pulmonary failure on 13 January 1988.

Relations under the Native Taiwanese Leaders

The death of Chiang Ching-kuo opened a new era in Taiwanese politics. A native-born Taiwanese, Lee Teng-hui, succeeded him in 1988. Since then Taiwan has become a more democratic and pluralistic society. In addition to the Kuomintang, another major political party, the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) is gaining considerable support among Taiwanese voters.

At first Lee Teng-hui continued his predecessor's open-door policy toward the Chinese mainland. Lee established the National Unification Council under the auspices of the President's Office (the White House of Taiwan). In February 1991 the council adopted "Guidelines for National Unification," which outlines three phases of unification: short term (exchange and reciprocity), middle term (trust and cooperation), and long term (consultation and unification). However, Lee refused to set a timetable for the implementation of the guidelines.

Lee Teng-hui also authorized the establishment of a semiofficial "Strait Exchange Foundation" (SEF) to make direct contact with the Chinese mainland's counterpart organization, the "Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits" (ARATS).

The Chinese Communists have always maintained that Taiwan is a Chinese province and must be reunited with the mainland. Their plans to achieve that goal have varied. Before 1978, the official policy was to use military force. In 1978 the third plenum of the Eleventh Chinese Communist Party Congress adopted a new resolution calling for "peaceful reunification" with Taiwan. Beginning in 1983, the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) made a number of concessions to Taiwan, and in early 1984 China offered a proposal that would take into account Taiwan's political and economic concerns: the "one country, two systems" proposal. "One country, two systems" continued to be China's official policy under Jiang Zemin (b. 1926).

Lee Teng-hui visited the United States in 1995 to give a speech at his alma mater, Cornell University. No Taiwanese top official had set foot on U.S. soil since the United States recognized the PRC in 1979. China feared Lee's visit indicated a move toward independence and would lead to recognition of Taiwan as a state by the world community. As a result, China conducted military exercises across the Taiwan Strait involving 400,000 troops. By 1996 four Chinese missiles had been fired within approximately fifty-one

kilometers of the island state. During that tense period, the United States dispatched two nuclear-armed aircraft carrier groups into the area. Ultimately, China concluded its military exercises.

Relations between China and Taiwan have become extremely tense again since July 1999. At that time Lee Teng-hui introduced a new element by insisting that negotiations must be based on a "special state-to-state" relationship. As a result, China published a White Paper, "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue" on 21 February 2000, in which it declared that they "cannot allow the resolution of Taiwan issue to be postponed indefinitely."

A political earthquake erupted in Taiwan on 18 March 2000, when Taiwanese voters elected a pro-independence DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bian (1951–), as president of Taiwan with 39 percent of the votes in a three-way race. China immediately demanded that Chen accept the "one-China" principle before any negotiations between China and Taiwan could be resumed. As of 2001, Chen continued to reject the one-China principle.

Future Prospects

If economics is the key to world politics in the twenty-first century, the future of China-Taiwan relations appears bright despite political upsets. Since the opening of trade relations between the two sides in 1979, trade across the Taiwan Strait has become a significant portion of total trade for both China and Taiwan. Taiwan's trade with China via Hong Kong rose from \$1.5 billion in 1987 to more than \$11 billion in 1997 and continues to rise higher. The Chinese mainland is now Taiwan's fourth-largest trading partner. Taiwan's investment on the mainland from 1979 to 1995, for example, exceeded \$11 billion, making Taiwan China's second-largest investor after Hong Kong. Furthermore, Taiwan has enjoyed a handsome trade surplus every year since 1980. Therefore, despite their rocky history, there is hope for better relations to come between China and Taiwan.

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See also: Chen Shui-bian; Chiang Kai-shek; Guomindang; Lee Teng-hui; Mao Zedong; Sun Yat-sen; Taiwan—Profile

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CHINA–UNITED STATES RELATIONS

Two centuries of relations between China and the United States have included conflict and cooperation in the diplomatic, economic, and social spheres. This relationship has been plagued by cycles of unrealistic expectations on each side of the Pacific, followed by deep disappointment. A common enemy, such as the Japanese during World War II or the Soviets in the latter stages of the Cold War, proved to be the single most important factor in building strong ties.

The Treaty Port Era

Trade formed the basis for the first Sino-U.S. contact. In 1784 the U.S. ship *Empress of China* carried silver and ginseng to the southeast coast of China, then returned to the United States with tea, silk, and porcelain. The *Empress* venture spurred in the United States an interest in goods from East Asia and dreams of prosperity through a limitless China market. The Chinese, then under the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), had little interest in the outside world and saw Americans as no different, albeit weaker, than other "barbarians" such as the British and French. Chinese purchased few Western products, and Americans quickly followed the British lead by selling opium to resolve a persistent trade deficit. Opium smuggling and demands for expanded trade sparked the 1840–1842 Opium War between Great Britain and China. The victorious British forced the Qing to sign the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing, which began a series of unequal treaties that required opening ports to foreign trade ("treaty ports"), limits on tariffs, and extraterritoriality. In 1844 the Qing signed the Treaty of Wangxia with American representatives. This agreement included a provision for most-favored-nation (MFN) status—thus enabling the United States to gain privileges the British enjoyed without firing a shot.

In the mid-1800s, humanitarian interests entered into the relationship, because Americans hoped to change China through Christianity. After France and Great Britain combined to defeat China in the Second Opium War, the resulting unequal treaty expanded trade rights in China, permitted diplomats to reside in the capital, and required that the Qing accept the presence of Christian missionaries. This enabled a growing number of American missionaries, primarily Protestants, to move freely about China.

Each side disappointed the other. Americans discovered that the China market was limited due to poverty and cultural differences, missionaries found the Chinese relatively uninterested in Christianity, and the Qing government showed no inclination to imitate Western political, economic, or social models. The U.S. role in the China trade declined relative to that of the British, Japanese, and Russians after 1900, and by the 1920s, Japan's share of U.S. imports and exports was more than twice that of China's. The most enduring legacy of missionaries was schools, orphanages, and hospitals, not converts. The Chinese became frustrated, because U.S. claims of benevolence did not bring changes to the unequal treaties.

Chinese immigration became another contentious topic. The 1868 Burlingame Treaty encouraged immigration to the United States, though ethnic Chinese had come to the United States earlier to work as miners or railroad workers. Many Chinese were contract laborers whose passage was deducted from their wages in what became known as the "coolie" trade. Growing racial discrimination and violence against the approximately 160,000 Chinese in the United States led to criticism on both sides of the Pacific. In 1882 the U.S. Congress, bowing to union concerns over jobs and cruder racist sentiments, forbade almost all Chinese immigration.

A Special Relationship?

Around the beginning of the twentieth century, U.S. leaders concluded that a unified China was central to long-term U.S. commercial interests and humanitarian endeavors. As the Western powers and Japan appeared poised to divide China into mutually exclusive spheres of interest, in 1899 Secretary of State John Hay issued the first of the Open Door notes, which requested that all nations respect China's territorial integrity. Most recipients were politely non-committal. During the Boxer Movement (1898–1900), violent antiforeign mobs attacked missionaries and other foreigners in Northeast China, creating a crisis that climaxed with the Qing alliance with the Boxers and declaration of war against the West in 1900. As a

multinational expeditionary force prepared to invade China, the United States issued a second note to deter other nations from taking spheres of influence. Following the occupation of Beijing, a coalition of Western powers (including the United States) and Japan forced the Qing to sign the Boxer Protocol, which required a huge indemnity from China. The United States, eager to differentiate itself from other imperialists, devoted its portion of the funds to education in China.

Increasingly, however, nationalistic Chinese rejected the idea of a special relationship, even as it became more deeply entrenched in the minds of U.S. officials and public. The Chinese attacked U.S. treaty privileges. Immigration policies and the treatment of Chinese in the United States spurred a boycott of U.S. goods in the coastal cities of China in 1905. Although the boycott died out after one year, the immigration policies remained unchanged.

Even after the overthrow of the Qing in the Revolution of 1911, many Chinese felt that the United States did not live up to the ideal of a special relationship. The United States supported a former Qing general, Yuan Shikai (1859–1916), rather than the revolutionary nationalists led by Sun Yat-sen (or Sun Zhongshan, 1866–1925). Also, in the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of November 1917, the United States acknowledged Japan's "special interests" in North China and Manchuria, while the Japanese offered lip service to support China's territorial integrity. Nor did American leaders support China's attempt to restore its national sovereignty at the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919.

Treaty revision remained a contentious issue. Western powers, the United States included, used the excuse of instability in China to avoid the issue even after the Nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-shek (or Jiang Jieshi, 1887–1975), unified China through the Northern Expedition of 1926–1928. Chiang carried on Sun's legacy of the Three Principles of the People (nationalism, democracy, and people's livelihood) by emphasizing that the unequal treaties had to be revised. However, Chiang's need for foreign loans and recognition of the Republic of China (ROC) limited his ability to press the issue.

Japanese aggression raised Chinese hopes for closer ties to the United States. In 1931 the Japanese Army plotted an incident as an excuse to occupy Manchuria. Although novels like Pearl Buck's *The Good Earth* built sympathy by portraying China as a nation of poor but hardworking and honest farmers, the United States took few concrete actions to support the republic. Secretary of State Henry Stimson's Nonrecognition Doc-

trine merely declared the unwillingness of the United States to acknowledge what the Japanese had taken by force. All-out war between the China and Japan in 1937 initially elicited little more than American sympathy.

From Allies to Enemies

In public, the period from Pearl Harbor to Japan's surrender was a golden era in Sino-U.S. relations, because the two peoples faced a common enemy and shared similar dreams of a strong, democratic China in the postwar world. The U.S. government supplied military and financial aid, and the American public, influenced by Chiang's propaganda efforts and the idealization of China offered by publications such as *Time* magazine, almost uniformly supported the Nationalists. Chiang appeared to elevate China to great power status by participating in the Cairo Conference of November 1943, where President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Chiang discussed the restoration of Chinese territory taken by the Japanese, such as Taiwan. Further, the United States and Britain surrendered extraterritorial privileges.

The reality of Sino-U.S. ties was more complex. The Nationalists often found themselves ignored, because Washington's first priority was defeating Germany, and few Americans perceived any vital interests at stake in China. Americans assumed that Chinese manpower would fight Japan and that aid was a lever to reform Chiang's authoritarian regime. These hopes clashed with the reality of a weak China, led by a regime more concerned with eradicating the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) than confronting the Japanese occupation. The Nationalists expressed dissatisfaction with the volume of U.S. aid and wanted to stockpile war materials in anticipation of a postwar struggle against the CCP. U.S. criticism of Chiang's war effort began within China, with U.S. diplomats and U.S. military adviser General Joseph Stilwell, but it gradually spread to Washington.

Communist leaders, such as Mao Zedong (1893–1976) and Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), wanted closer ties to the United States to balance the Soviets, to weaken the Nationalists, and to obtain military equipment, while Americans hoped that the CCP would serve as a more effective force against the Japanese. Roosevelt accepted the need for contact with the CCP, then based in Yan'an, and in 1944 authorized the Dixie Missions. These missions, conducted over Chiang's objections, led to discussions concerning cooperation against the Japanese. Other than allowing Mao and Zhou an opportunity to portray themselves as moderate agrarian reformers, these delegations accomplished little.

At war's end, the United States continued to support the Nationalists, even as it sought to mediate between Chiang and Mao. Efforts to create a coalition government failed, because the Nationalists assumed they would receive aid regardless of their actions, and the Communists lost faith in the ability of the United States to serve as a neutral arbiter. Civil war began in early 1947, and Chiang's forces, poorly led and overextended into Manchuria, were retreating southward by 1948.

The Nationalists' impending defeat spurred Chiang to request more United States aid, as he attempted to make the civil war part of the global Cold War. President Harry S. Truman, however, sought to distance the United States from its wartime ally. In August 1949, the Department of State released a white paper that signaled the end of support for Chiang, whose corruption and ineptitude were blamed for the Communists' victory. The Nationalists retreated to Taiwan, where they claimed to remain the sole legal government of China.

On 1 October 1949 Mao Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC). An uneasy waiting period ensued as Beijing and Washington sought to find a modus vivendi to build a relationship. The PRC's growing ties to the Soviet Union and America's hostility toward Communism made immediate recognition impossible.

Cold War and the Dilemmas of a Divided China

Uncertainty turned to conflict when the Korean War began in 1950. President Truman dispatched the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, thus signaling the U.S. determination to protect the Nationalists and contain the Communists. By the end of the year, United States troops and Communist "volunteers" were fighting on the peninsula. The leaders of the People's Republic perceived recognition of Chiang's government as a violation of China's national sovereignty. The mainland gave propaganda, if not material, support to anticolonial and anti-American revolutionary movements around the world, while Washington sought to isolate the PRC through diplomatic, military, and economic means.

To most Americans, Taiwan became China. Chiang offered the United States a staunch Cold War ally and valuable outpost for containing Communist power. U.S. aid and trade proved vital to the initial survival and later "economic miracle" of the ROC. Chiang also received military aid and support in international forums such as the United Nations. The December 1954 Sino-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty marked the high point of Cold War cooperation between the two. But President Dwight D. Eisen-



FIGHTING A UNITED STATES INVASION

During the Cold War era, the United States was concerned about Chinese expansion while the Chinese were concerned about an American invasion. The following text is Marshall Lin Piao's advice to Chinese generals in 1966 on how to combat an American invasion.

In order to annihilate the enemy, we must adopt the policy of luring him in deep and abandoning some cities and districts of our own accord in a planned way, so as to let him in. It is only after letting the enemy in that the people can take part in the war in various ways and that the power of a people's war can be fully exerted. It is only after letting the enemy in that he can be compelled to divide up his forces, take on heavy burdens, and commit mistakes. In other words, we must let the enemy become elated, stretch out all his ten fingers and become hopelessly bogged down.

Source: Donald S. Zagoria. (1967) *Vietnam Triangle: Moscow/Peking/Hanoi*. New York: Pegasus, 87.

hower emphasized that the treaty obliged the United States to defend the ROC from attack but did not include support for Nationalist raids on the mainland. Nevertheless, the United States did threaten military action against the mainland during military clashes between the PRC and the ROC in 1954–1955 and 1958.

In reality, the United States and the PRC showed restraint, because neither side sought direct military confrontation after the Korean War. Official contact between the two Cold War antagonists was limited. After the 1954 Geneva Conference (devoted to discussions of Korea and Indochina), U.S. and Chinese diplomats held a series of 130 meetings in Geneva, then in Warsaw. These talks accomplished little of substance, but they would offer an avenue for rapprochement in the early 1970s.

Neither President John F. Kennedy nor his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, showed imagination in their policy toward China, as domestic politics and international alliances made rapprochement seem impossible. In the PRC, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution increased the rhetoric attacking the United States and U.S. involvement in Vietnam spurred Chinese support of the Communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).

Rapprochement and Beyond

By the late 1960s, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai became convinced that the Soviet Union represented a

greater threat to China than did the United States. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and border clashes between the PRC and Soviet Union in 1969 heightened fears of an attack from the north. The PRC also sought improved relations with the United States as part of a larger drive to end its international isolation. In the United States, President Richard M. Nixon reasoned that closer ties to the PRC would be a counterweight to the Soviet Union, improve his domestic political standing, and demoralize North Vietnam. This effort began by relaxing restrictions on trade and travel—measures considered but rejected during the final year of the Johnson administration.

At Warsaw talks of January and February 1970, the Chinese offered to arrange a high-level meeting. This opened the door to secret contacts through Pakistan, which, in turn, facilitated National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger's trip to Beijing on 9–11 July 1971. Nixon's historic visit to China from 20 to 27 February 1972 marked a huge shift in Sino-U.S. relations. The trip concluded with the Shanghai Communiqué, which made clear that each nation shared concern over Soviet power. One sensitive issue was Taiwan. The United States professed hope that Taiwan's status be resolved peacefully, but acknowledged that both the PRC and ROC claimed Taiwan as part of China (the "one China" policy). Both parties also pledged to work toward normalized relations.

Although each nation opened liaison offices in 1973 in the other's capital, Nixon's domestic political travails delayed progress toward full normalization—much to the chagrin of Mao and Zhou. President Jimmy Carter came into office determined to move ahead. In December 1978 a joint communiqué announced the establishment of diplomatic relations and the termination of official U.S.-ROC ties and the Mutual Defense Treaty.

Normalization with the PRC left a delicate problem—the fate of U.S. ties to the Republic of China on Taiwan. In April 1979 Carter signed the Taiwan Relations Act, which set the rules for unofficial relations through the American Institute on Taiwan (AIT). The U.S. Congress reaffirmed the one China policy but pledged to sell defensive weapons to Taiwan and emphasized its interest in the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue. Under pressure from the PRC, in 1982 President Ronald Reagan promised to reduce the level of arms sales to the island. The ROC, however, maintained an effective lobbying effort in the United States, which limited the U.S. government's ability to distance itself from its former ally. PRC leaders such as Deng Xiaoping complained that U.S. arms sales and unofficial ties to Taiwan impeded progress toward reunification. Taiwan's economic success and democratic reform sparked further conflict. In 1987 Chiang Ching-kuo (Chiang Kai-shek's son and successor) lifted martial law on Taiwan, marking an important step toward peaceful democratic change on the island.

After Chiang's death in 1988, Lee Teng-hui, a native Taiwanese, assumed the presidency. His rejection of the one-China formula highlighted the problem of Taiwan's relationship with the mainland, even as his promotion of democracy drew praise in the U.S. media, Congress, and public. Lee's ambivalence over reunification drew threats from the PRC, which, despite U.S. wishes, refused to commit itself to a peaceful solution.

Overall, however, Sino-U.S. relations during the 1980s were strong, because the two nations shared economic interests and antipathy toward the Soviet Union. Under Deng's leadership, the PRC sought contact with the West in order to obtain technology and spur economic development, while the United States saw an opportunity to expand exports and reshape China in the U.S. image of capitalism and democracy. Trade spawned a powerful coalition of business interests in the United States that sought good relations with China. However, the violent suppression of pro-democracy demonstrators in Beijing's Tiananmen Square in June 1989 marked a major turning point. Deng blamed Western influence for the demonstrations, and President George Bush an-

nounced sanctions against the Chinese government. U.S. criticism of China's political system and human rights violations became a constant irritant to the PRC. Further, the collapse of the Soviet Union removed a key strategic motivation for rapprochement.

China–U.S. relations became more contentious after the Cold War. Beijing frequently criticized American "hegemony," and objected to the lack of U.S. pressure upon Taiwan to reunify with the mainland, missile defense schemes, the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia, continued intelligence gathering (such as the Hainan island incident of 2001), sympathy for Tibetan dissidents, and U.S. military intervention in the Balkans and the Middle East. Washington complained of Chinese sales of nuclear and missile technology to Iran and Pakistan, trade barriers, human rights violations, and threats against Taiwan. President George W. Bush's public support of a one China policy even as he approved arms sales to Taiwan satisfied neither the PRC nor the ROC. Nevertheless, the United States supported China's integration into the international economic order through institutions such as the World Trade Organization. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the world's most populous nation and its most powerful nation were increasingly bound together through trade, investment, education exchanges, and immigration.

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See also: **Boxer Rebellion, China—Profile, Chinese Communist Party, Deng Xiaoping, Mao Zedong, Opium War, Qing Dynasty, Taiwan, Yuan Shikai, Zhou Enlai**

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CHINA-VIETNAM RELATIONS China and Vietnam share a long history of relations marked by extended periods of collaboration and shorter periods of military conflict. Vietnam was for more than a thousand years a part of the Chinese empire before gaining independence in the tenth century CE. The independent Vietnam remained under Chinese cultural and political influence and a tributary relationship developed. This close relationship was ended by the period of French colonial rule in Vietnam during the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth.

After Vietnam regained independence from France in 1954, relations between China and Vietnam were officially very close up to the end of the War in Vietnam in 1975. Thereafter, relations deteriorated into open hostilities in early 1979, and tension remained high for most of the 1980s. From the late 1980s relations started to improve, leading to full normalization in November 1991. The 1990s have been characterized by two contradictory trends: expanding and improving relations in most fields on the one hand, and recurring periods of tension relating to border disputes on the other. Both countries are making considerable efforts to manage and eventually settle the border disputes.

Background

Relations between the countries were very close in the 1950s, and for two decades China provided the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) with extensive economic and military assistance. China sent thousands of advisers to assist in various fields. China also provided considerable assistance during the Vietnam War. However, irritants developed during the 1960s and into the first half of the 1970s due to different perceptions of the Soviet Union and divergent views on relations with the United States. After the 1973 Paris agreement, which led to the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam and established a cease-fire in the Vietnam War, the Vietnamese claimed that Chinese leaders had advised them to diminish the level of the fighting in the south for a few

years, advice perceived as aiming at keeping Vietnam divided. China rejected this claim.

Sino-Vietnamese Relations, 1975-1991

Following the end of the war in April 1975 relations between China and Vietnam began to deteriorate over China's uneasiness about Vietnam's relations with the Soviet Union and China's increasing support for Cambodia in the conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia. The Vietnamese military intervention in Cambodia in late December 1978 caused further tension. There were also territorial disputes along the land border, in the Gulf of Tonkin, and in the South China Sea. The clashes that occurred along the border had more significance as an indication of deteriorating relations and of divergence on other issues than as conflicts in their own right. Finally, there was the issue of how the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam were treated by Vietnamese authorities. The mass migration of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam to China in the spring of 1978 led to the open and public deterioration of bilateral relations between the two countries. Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia in December 1978 eventually led to China's attack on Vietnam in February and March 1979.

The normalization process began with low-level contacts in the mid-1980s and expanded to high-level meetings from early 1989. In early September 1990 a secret Vietnamese high-level visit to China took place. Despite this meeting, political normalization did not gain momentum until mid-1991. Increased diplomatic interaction paved the way for a high-level summit on 5-10 November 1991, during which bilateral relations were officially fully normalized.

Relations since 1991

Since full normalization, the relationship between China and Vietnam has been characterized by two contradictory trends: expanding contacts and cooperation in many fields, and continued territorial disputes. The positive trend in bilateral relations can be seen through the expanding political, cultural, economic, and military contacts between the two countries. Official delegations from one country regularly visit the other country to discuss ways of expanding relations in various fields. Increased economic ties since 1991 can be seen through bilateral trade, which grew from \$32 million in 1991 to \$1 billion in 1996 and was expected to reach \$2.8 billion in 2001. China also provides loans and assistance to upgrade Chinese-built factories in northern Vietnam. In the political field the close relationship between the two ruling parties—the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Communist Party of

Vietnam (CPV)—has expanded through a steady stream of exchange visits at various levels. The contacts between the armed forces of the two countries have also expanded through regular exchange visits.

Reverting back to the territorial disputes as a source of tension, it can be noted that since late 1991 sharp differences relating to all the disputes (i.e., overlapping claims to the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, to water and continental shelf areas in the South China Sea and in the Gulf of Tonkin, and to areas along the land border) were prevalent from May to November 1992. Differences relating to oil exploration in the South China Sea and the signing of contracts with foreign companies for exploration were prevalent during parts of 1994, 1996, and 1997. During 1998 there were shorter periods of tension relating to the disputes. During 1999 the focus was on reaching a settlement of the land border dispute and no significant tension was caused by any of the border disputes. During 2000 the focus was on resolving the Gulf of Tonkin dispute and no significant tension was caused by the remaining border disputes. The major achievements thus far are the signing of the Land Border Treaty on 30 December 1999 and the Agreement on the Demarcation of Waters, Exclusive Economic Zones, and Continental Shelves in the Gulf of Tonkin on 25 December 2000.

The progress in managing the territorial disputes in recent years contributes positively to the prospect of a long-term stability in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. However, the lack of progress in the talks on the disputes in the South China Sea area remains a potential threat to a stable relationship.

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CHINESE CIVIL WAR OF 1945–1949 Although the Chinese Nationalist and Communist movements had pledged to unite against Japanese ag-

gression in 1936, conflict between them actually grew during the war against Japan (1937–1945), setting the stage for a civil war. The approaches the Chinese Nationalists and Communists employed during the war against Japan basically determined the outcome of the civil war. From 1941 through 1945 the Nationalist government held back from major offenses against the Japanese while it grew in international stature and acquired a powerful and generous ally in the United States. Nevertheless, the Nationalists suffered from a variety of internal weaknesses, including loss of its economically advanced territories to Japan, serious inflation, and deteriorating popular support. For their part, the Chinese Communists made simple living and self-reliance into a patriotic virtue while winning widespread admiration for their aggressive anti-Japanese nationalism. Most important, they increased their territorial control across North China, where Communist military units, supported by local militias, knitted together popularly based regional governments behind Japanese lines. Operating largely without outside support, the Communists forces grew tremendously and developed a bold confidence in their newfound abilities.

U.S. Attempt at Intervention

The United States, fully aware by early 1945 of the looming Nationalist-Communist conflict, intervened in the hope of creating a single Chinese government as its chief ally in East Asia. When initial efforts by Ambassador Patrick Hurley stumbled, President Harry Truman dispatched General George C. Marshall to China. But Marshall failed to achieve compromises between the two sides during his fourteen-month mission from December 1945 to January 1947.

Full Civil War

As Japan's collapse loomed in early August 1945, both the Communists and the Nationalists set in motion hastily made plans to expand their territorial control. The Nationalists held Sichuan and the southwest as well as some parts of central China, but they needed to reestablish their pre-1937 control over East and South China, especially the rich and fertile coastal provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong. Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), the leader of the Nationalists, also intended to gain control of huge areas of China where his Nationalist government had never governed before 1937, including North China, Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, the northwest, and the huge but sparsely populated Xinjiang. Yet only two regions, North China under Communist control and Manchuria occupied by the Soviet Union, became the civil war's major battlegrounds.

Chiang rushed his forces to principal cities all around China, typically using U.S. air and naval units to transport his armies while demanding that defeated Japanese units hand over control only to his forces. Consequently, the Nationalists wound up with their armies in important cities throughout China, but their military and political strength was often thinly spread.

Communist strategy called for building on their present strength by surrounding and taking over the cities of North China. In a bold and ultimately decisive move, Communist leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976) dispatched General Lin Biao (1908–1971) with a large army to Manchuria, where he hoped the occupying Soviet forces might aid their fellow Communists.

Lin Biao's forces entering Manchuria received some assistance from the Soviet armies, but primarily in the form of letting Japanese arms fall into their hands. The Soviet Union still recognized Chiang's Nationalist government and so acceded to Nationalist occupation of the region's cities, ports, and railways. Before withdrawing in May 1946, the Soviets concentrated on looting Japanese factory equipment to rebuild their own war-ravaged economy.

On the U.S. side, doubts increased about the long-term prospects of its ally, the Chinese Nationalists. Chiang's problems were compounded in late 1945 as inflation continued, public confidence in the Nationalists did not revive, and relations between Chiang's armies and the recently liberated Chinese in the large coastal cities were uneasy. The Nationalists hoped for massive U.S. intervention on their behalf, but in the United States the postwar atmosphere demanded a return to normalcy. President Truman and General Marshall concluded that the Congress and American people would not be willing to commit the amounts of money, material, and fighting men needed to ensure a Chinese Nationalist victory. Nevertheless, the United States continued to give extensive economic and military support to the Nationalists.

American efforts in 1945 and 1946 to forge a compromise between the Nationalists and the Communists were unsuccessful because Chiang would not enter a coalition with the Communists, while the Communists insisted on maintaining independent control of the territory they administered. As Marshall prepared to return to Washington in mid-1946, he arranged the appointment of an American missionary educator, John Leighton Stuart, as the new U.S. ambassador. Although Stuart knew both the Nationalist and Communist leaderships in China, he was new to diplomacy and lacked Marshall's close connections in Washington, so his appointment indicated the shifting of U.S.

attention away from China. After his return from China in January 1947, Marshall became U.S. secretary of state and gave his name to a plan to revive the European economy, signaling that again Europe would be foremost in U.S. foreign policy concerns.

Even during Marshall's mission, Nationalist-Communist armed conflict increased. Overall, Nationalist armies fared well in these battles, and by late 1946 Chiang, certain of victory, reorganized his government with a new constitution followed by national elections. Taking Yan'an, the Communists' wartime capital, in March 1947, buoyed the Chinese Nationalist's military fortunes.

Turning of the Tide against the Nationalists

After July 1947 the Nationalist cause began to sputter. Reconciliation with Chinese who had been under Japanese occupation often proved difficult. The serious wartime inflation deepened, making it difficult to restart the modern sector of the Chinese economy. Fear of Communist influence led the Nationalists into general suppression of freedom of expression.

In the summer and fall of 1947, Communist armies began to win victories in North China. Then from December 1947 to March 1948, Lin Biao's armies won a series of major battles in Manchuria. By early November 1948, Lin had destroyed some of the Nationalist's best armies and taken over Manchuria. In these engagements, the Communist military adopted a new pattern that departed from its preference for guerrilla warfare by moving to regular battlefield formations composed of large infantry armies supported by some tanks, artillery, and aircraft. Nationalist divisions began to surrender to the Communists and then to reappear on the Communist side under new leadership with their modern American equipment.

In North China, Communist commanders used similar tactics with great success. As Manchuria slipped from the Nationalists' grasp, the Communists in October 1948 opened a general offensive in southern Shandong known as the Huaihai campaign. Chiang threw his best remaining divisions into the fray only to lose them by January 1949. As the full enormity of the Nationalist defeat emerged, the Nationalist general in command of the Beijing-Tianjin region surrendered with 200,000 soldiers.

Economic collapse compounded these battlefield disasters. Runaway inflation tore through the Nationalist economy like a great typhoon, leaving ruin everywhere in its wake. Opposition elements within the Nationalist Party forced Chiang to resign in January 1949, and General Li Zongren (1890–1969) became

acting president. In April 1949, Communist armies crossed the Chang (Yangtze) River and began the task of mopping up resistance in the huge areas under real or nominal Nationalist control. Chiang directed evacuation of the loyal remnants of his civil and military machines to Taiwan.

Stalemate

In the summer of 1950, with the outbreak of the Korean War, the struggle between the Communists and Nationalists became folded into the Cold War. Small-scale military incidents continued for several years, and then both sides entered a stalemate. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, even though the economies of the People's Republic of China (mainland China) and the Republic of China (Taiwan) have become closely interwoven, the Chinese civil war never has been formally ended.

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CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) emerged out of the infiltration of Western ideas into China at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century in the environment of the May Fourth Movement (1917–1921), in which Chinese students and intellectuals protested the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles. (The treaty ceded Chinese territory to Japan despite China's having participated in the war on the side of the allies; the actual demonstrations against it took place on 4 May 1919.) The founders of the CCP, Chen Duxiu (1879–1942), and Li Dazhao (1888–1927), were both then at Peking (Beijing) University.

Chen left the university after his arrest for leading street demonstrations. Like many others, he became in-

creasingly radicalized. During this period, Li, the more active Marxist, organized various study groups that included later leaders of the CCP, including Mao Zedong (1893–1976). By this time agents of Comintern, the international Communist organization dominated by the Soviet Union, were actively agitating for the formation of a Chinese Communist Party.

This step was finally taken in July 1921. The first party congress was held in secret at a girls' boarding house in Shanghai. Chen and Li were not among the twelve organizing delegates, but their views dominated. Chen favored revolution based upon urban workers, while Li wished to establish a more popular base for revolution, an idea later taken up by Mao.

The CCP prior to the Long March

The period between 1921 and 1927 was traumatic for the CCP. The Comintern was willing to sacrifice CCP interests to those of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party (Guomindang), with whom the Comintern compelled the CCP to work. The CCP also found it difficult to foment the urban, workers' revolution desired by Chen in China, as the vast majority of China's population was engaged in agriculture.

In 1927, the Nationalists, who leaned more to the right after the Northern Expedition (a campaign against regional warlords), turned against their CCP allies, more or less destroying its urban base. The CCP had no choice but to regroup in rural areas in south and central China.

Between 1927 and 1934, the CCP fought a losing battle against the well-armed Nationalist army. By 1934, its very survival was at stake, and surviving CCP armies began the trek to the north, then outside direct Nationalist influence, known as the Long March. It was completed in 1936. CCP forces regrouped in a stronghold in Shaanxi. By this time, Mao, by no means dominant before, had emerged as the CCP's leader.

War with Japan, Civil War, and the First Decades of the People's Republic

By 1936 the political situation in China had changed dramatically. Japanese aggression had become overt after the Manchurian Incident of 1931, in which the Japanese created an excuse to attack Chinese troops in Manchuria. Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) would have preferred to consolidate his regime and to suppress enemies, including the CCP, but he was propelled into a war with Japan by an outraged public. It was disaster. He lost their capital and most other important Chinese cities, and had to retreat to impotence and isolation in Sichuan.

The CCP, by contrast, safely out of the main line of Japanese advance, could nurture its strength. When the Allied victory in World War II came, the CCP quickly expanded its influence in the chaos following the Japanese surrender. It acquired large stocks of arms through its own efforts and with the help of the Soviets.

The United States wanted the Nationalists to negotiate with their CCP enemies, but the Nationalists trusted in their own power to win any civil war. They proved surprisingly inept militarily, while mismanagement of the economy lost them support. In 1949 they retreated to Taiwan and by 1950 held little else.

The People's Republic of China was proclaimed on 1 October 1949, under Mao's control. The next two decades were a period of national recovery and experimentation. Mao remained true to his populist roots, and radical policy was often the result. The most important of Mao's initiatives were the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960), a failed effort to industrialize China on the village level, and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), in which gangs of youth terrorized their elders and those in positions of authority, armed with the words of Mao. Only the behind-the-scenes guidance of Premier Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) prevented a total meltdown. The Great Leap Forward actually set China's industrial production back; it also caused widespread famine. During the same period, China broke with its Soviet ally.

The Era of Reform

In the waning years of the Cultural Revolution, the CCP had to reinvent itself, to become less radical, less isolated internationally, and more approachable to the majority of Chinese. As part of this change, the CCP allowed a normalization of relations with the United States after 1971. That same year, party insiders eliminated Mao's chosen successor, Lin Biao (1908–1971). Although radical leaders of the Cultural Revolution, led by Mao's wife, Jiang Qing (1914–1991), staged a comeback in 1973, the tide turned decisively against them after Mao's death. In 1977, the Gang of Four (as the leaders were known) was ousted and brought to trial. As their influence declined, Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), previously purged for his perceived capitalist tendencies by Mao's faction, reemerged as the dominant force in the party.

After 1977 the CCP decisively rejected radicalism and pushed economic liberalization. This has resulted in rapid growth and the emergence of a new class of wealthy Chinese, whose interests are now intertwined with those of the party. Most important, the party has survived the collapse of Soviet Communism, although at the cost of a frightful massacre of "democratic" el-

ements in 1989. Successions are now orderly rather than through power struggle, and there has been no repetition of the kind of events surrounding the downfall of Lin Biao or the trial of the Gang of Four.

In addition to its success with the economy, the party has achieved a number of foreign-policy successes. They include the 1997 return of Hong Kong to China, followed by that of Macao, and China's assertiveness, against the United States in particular, based upon a rapidly modernizing military.

The CCP in the Twenty-First Century

Nonetheless, the future is clouded. The party remains a geriatry, staid, conservative, and northern based. That the future may lie elsewhere, with the maritime region of the southwest, and an associated Taiwan and Singapore, and their wider economic community, may not be clear to those in power. Nor is the party actively considering the costs of militarism, perhaps because it is not in the interests of those driving the economy. Although the CCP has changed its spots repeatedly, it may lack the ability to respond to the new world of the twenty-first century. Some old ideas may be too thoroughly engrained within it.

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CHINESE IN JAPAN Extending as far back as 219 BCE when alchemist Xu Fu is said to have come to Japan with a shipload of Chinese youth, the presence, through the nineteenth century, of the Chinese in Japan has been characterized by flows from different regions in China. As a result of this diversity, the changing nature of Sino-Japanese relations, labor requirements, and immigration policies, the Chinese in Japan, unlike those in other parts of Asia, have established their own unique history.

Pre-Tokugawa Period

Japanese chronicles make numerous references to migration from the Asian continent from the first century CE. According to the *Shinsen shoji roku* (Newly Compiled Record of Names, 815 CE), 162 naturalized families of Chinese origin lived in the central



A Chinese shrine at the Kiyumiza-Dera Temple in Japan in 1989. (CARL & ANN PURCELL/CORBIS)

provinces during this period. Trade between China and Japan became significant from the late twelfth century and grew steadily until the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when it became a large factor in the economic life of Japan. Records indicate the presence of many Chinese enclaves in Satsuma, the fief of the Shimadzu clan in southern Kyushu.

Tokugawa Period (1600/1603–1868)

Although Japan's relations with China were severed as a result of the invasions of Korea (1592, 1597) by the Japanese warlord and statesman Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536–1596), unofficial trade with China and other countries was encouraged by the first Tokugawa shogun, Ieyasu (1542–1616), and resulted in a flourishing Chinese community in Nagasaki in the seventeenth century. Kyofukuji, Sofukuji, and Fukuza-iji, Chinese temples built in the 1620s, were recognized as Japanese national treasures and attest to the wealth of Chinese merchants of the period. The number of Chinese dropped dramatically after 1688 due to more stringent isolation policies. Many naturalized Chinese took Japanese names, while others used the names of their particular homeland in China.

Meiji Period (1868–1912)

When Japan was opened again in the 1850s, Chinese began to arrive at the various port cities in limited numbers, generally in the service of Western firms and individuals. The Sino-Japanese Commercial Treaty of

1871 granted Chinese port, residence, and trading rights, with residence limited to specified areas in Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, Kobe, Nagasaki, and Sakai. In 1899 Chinese and Koreans were granted the same privileges of travel and residence that were extended to Europeans and Americans. During the Meiji period the three pillars of overseas Chinese economy developed: trade with Shanghai, Hong Kong, Southeast Asia, the Americas, and other parts of the British empire; the "three-blades trades" (the cook's knife, the tailor's shears, and the barber's razor); and peddling, which permitted Chinese to travel and reside in areas other than the trade ports. Posts established along peddling routes eventually developed into small communities.

After Japan's victories in the Sino-Japanese War (1895–1896) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), Chinese students began to flood into Tokyo to learn from Japan's adaptation of Western theories and developments. In 1905 there were as many as eight thousand Chinese students within a mile radius of Tokyo's student quarters. Tokyo also became a haven for many Chinese political refugees and a training ground for political activists. Although most of these students and refugees returned to China, their influence endured in the overseas Chinese community.

The 1930s, World War II, and the Postwar Period

Japan's aggression in China during the 1930s led to dramatic drops in the resident Chinese population in

Japan, a trend that was countered by the importation of approximately forty thousand Chinese for slave labor primarily in Japanese mines. Following Japan's defeat in World War II, Manchurians and Taiwanese, formerly considered subjects of Japan, became Chinese citizens. The American Occupation government reported that there were then 14,941 Chinese of mainland origin and 15,906 Taiwanese in Japan.

When Japan signed a peace treaty with the Republic of China in 1952, many Chinese residents in Japan doubted whether the republic truly represented China and were irritated when the Guomindang tried to exercise authority over all Chinese nationals in Japan. In 1972, with Japan's normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, there was an increase in the number of Chinese seeking Japanese citizenship.

The Chinese migration to Japan between 1988 and 1998 involved mostly young, unmarried Chinese from the mainland who concentrated in the inner city and subsequently sent for family members and friends to join them. Inner-city ethnic communities began to spill over into adjoining suburbs, leading to increasing diversification in a nation usually thought of as remarkably homogeneous.

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CHINESE IN MYANMAR The Chinese in Myanmar (Burma) consist of several communities of different origins. In Upper Myanmar, overland inter-

action with the province of Yunnan in China has produced Myanmar's oldest Chinese community, drawn from interior China. In Lower Myanmar, immigrants from the Chinese provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan, speaking Hokkien, Hakka, Guangdong, and other dialects, have settled in Burma chiefly from the late eighteenth and late nineteenth centuries. Hence the Chinese in Burma are sometimes divided into overland or "mountain" Chinese and overseas or "maritime" Chinese. Other Chinese immigrants included Baba Chinese (Straits-born Chinese) from the British colonial ports of Penang, Melaka, and Singapore in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the remnants of Nationalist Chinese armies cut off from flight to Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War.

Many Chinese in Burma maintained their cultural identity, for example with language schools. During the World War II occupation of Burma by the Japanese, many Chinese fled to China and elsewhere. Between 1945 and the early 1960s, the Chinese in Burma attempted to rebuild their prewar communities and lives. The establishment of military rule in 1962 and actions by the military regime from 1964, however, led to the forcible closure of Chinese language schools, the prohibition of "Chinese" community activities (although Chinese were still allowed to congregate within dialect groups), and the closure of Chinese-language newspapers. As a result, two generations of Chinese have not had formal instruction in Mandarin and rely chiefly upon Burmese or a combination of Burmese and one of several traditional dialects (Hokkien, Guangdong, etc.).

Since the introduction of new citizenship laws in 1982 by the military regime, Chinese have been considered as foreigners and treated as second-class citizens. Carpenters, largely of Guangdong ancestry, for example, are not legally allowed to work without the full citizenship that they are denied, and are thus heavily represented among Chinese emigrants from Myanmar (many to the United States, Australia, and Taiwan). It is partly for this reason that the Chinese population of Burma has dropped from a high of about 350,000 (1.6 percent of Burma's population in 1961) to about 230,000 (0.6 percent of Burma's population in 1983) in the 1980s. Some estimates, however, suggest that the Chinese population in Myanmar in the 1990s is about 400,000 or higher.

Michael W. Charney

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CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA Since emigration from China began at least a thousand years ago, most migrants have settled in Southeast Asia. At least three-quarters of the world's Chinese outside China reside in the region. However, Southeast Asian Chinese comprise under 5 percent of the region's total population.

Assimilation of Southeast Asian Chinese to indigenous cultures prevents precise measurement of their numbers. Many are more proficient in local languages than Chinese, and most have adopted the citizenship of the countries where they reside. The extent to which Southeast Asian Chinese are considered to belong where they live varies. In Indonesia, for example, a large locally born Chinese community remains distinct from indigenous populations. In Thailand, Chinese descent is a source of pride among the political elite and even in the royal family. In British Malaya, a sizeable Chinese elite became thoroughly Anglicized through business and social interactions with their colonial rulers. In the Philippines, in contrast, an elite group of mixed Chinese-Filipino families become prominent in the anticolonial nationalist movement of the late nineteenth century

Distinctions exist among Southeast Asian Chinese according to ancestral origins within China. Distinct dialects are spoken in the three southeastern coastal regions where most emigrants were born in Guangdong and Fujian Provinces. Dialects and associated occupational differences and loyalties have set Chinese groups apart from each other in Singapore and elsewhere.

Southeast Asian Chinese tend to be urban. They are concentrated in the largest cities of the region, particularly Singapore, where about 70 percent of the population was Chinese in 2000. Because Southeast Asian Chinese are also concentrated in commercial and professional occupations, their economic success has been a sensitive issue. In Indonesia, the Chinese minority, believed to control most of the nation's aggregate wealth, is resented. The apparent dominance of Chinese entrepreneurs in Southeast Asian economies is partly a lasting effect of European colonial policies favoring the employment of Chinese merchants as government revenue agents. Moreover, groups fostering business connections with China and Chinese-owned firms elsewhere in the region have tended to maintain



A dragon in the Chinese New Year parade in Singapore in February 1987. (TED STRESHINSKY/CORBIS)

cultural ties as well, strengthening the association of business success with Chinese ethnicity.

The official view of China's imperial government toward emigration linked it to piracy and illicit overseas trade; only in 1893 was an official ban on emigration lifted and protection provided to Chinese nationals sojourning abroad. Although Southeast Asian Chinese strengthened ties to their ancestral homeland in patriotic solidarity during the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), during the Cold War most reacted to suspicions of Communist affiliation by emphasizing local loyalties. With economic liberalization of the People's Republic of China (PRC) since the late 1970s, Southeast Asian Chinese investments in the PRC have become significant.

Emily M. Hill

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CHINESE IN VIETNAM According to the 1989 census, there are 900,185 ethnic Chinese, or "Hoa," in Vietnam. This corresponds to only 1.4 percent of the total Vietnamese population. Nevertheless, as with other Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia, they play a very important role in the economic life of Vietnam. This has been the case since Vietnam gained independence from France in the mid-1950s and was particularly true in the former Republic of Vietnam (RVN) up to 1975. Ethnic Chinese have played a different but still important role in the socialist economy of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).

After the end of the Vietnam War and the demise of the RVN, the new Vietnamese authorities opted to pursue economic policies that were characterized by the gradual implementation of socialist transformation and that had a considerable detrimental impact on the economic interests of the ethnic Chinese. Relations between China and Vietnam also gradually deteriorated, and as this occurred, increasingly discriminatory policies were implemented against the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam. These factors caused a large-scale exodus of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam in 1978 and 1979. An estimated 430,000 to 466,000 ethnic Chinese left Vietnam between the end of the war in 1975 and the end of September 1979.

The 1980s and 1990s have been characterized by a slow process of reintegration of ethnic Chinese into Vietnamese society. This has been spearheaded by developments in Ho Chi Minh City, where about half of the ethnic Chinese live. Decrees of the Communist Party of Vietnam and government in 1995 and 1996, respectively, signaled the full reintegration of the ethnic Chinese. Apart from changes in the policies implemented at the local, government, and party levels directed at the ethnic Chinese, the overall policies of *doi moi* ("renovation") and economic liberalization have contributed to reintegration.

Given the overall situation today, the future of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam looks brighter than at any time since 1978. A pertinent question is whether the process of reintegration will continue or if there are potential pitfalls that could lead to the reemergence of past problems and possibly a new mass migration of Chinese. To a certain degree, the future development will depend on economic policies. As long as the policies of

economic renovation and reform are pursued, such a situation will not recur. Another important factor is the impact of China-Vietnam relations. In principle, as long as the bilateral relations are good and there is a willingness to maintain these relations, they will have a positive impact on the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam.

Ramses Amer

See also: Boat People; China-Vietnam Relations; Ho Chi Minh City; Population Resettlement—Vietnam; Sino-Vietnamese Culture

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CHINESE INFLUENCE IN EAST ASIA In the seventeenth century, European scholars presented their latest maps to the Chinese court. Although the Chinese were impressed with the cartographers' skills and technological sophistication, the court officials were offended that China was not pictured at the center of the world. Historically, China viewed itself as the Middle Kingdom. Their centrist worldview was based on objective criteria. As late as the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), China continued to be the world's most powerful nation in terms of size, population, commerce, wealth, technology, learning, fine arts, and literature. China's dominance in East Asia (Korea and Japan) for most of this region's recorded history was based on China's supremacy. It was the source rather than the recipient of culture.

Like the waxing and waning of the moon, there were periods when Japan and Korea resembled "little Chinas," because of their conscious imitation of China, while there were other periods of minimal interaction between these states. It is significant that the greatest influence China had on East Asian states occurred during the early centuries of their recorded histories. Consequently, Chinese culture is at the root of East Asian society. As humans are more profoundly influenced by experiences in their early years, Korea and Japan's formative years were marked by their acceptance of the Chinese economic, political, ideological, and social patterns. What Japan and Korea adopted in their early civilizations became the foundation for their more mature states.

Migrants from northern China were among the earliest inhabitants of Korea and Japan. During the first millennium BCE, these migrants developed a hunter-gatherer culture in Japan and Korea. The religion of the area was animistic with an apparent reverence for ancestors and nature. Because Korea was geographically attached to the continent, it was more directly influenced by the political machinations of China. During China's Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), China directly ruled the peninsula. Yet, a recurring theme between China and East Asia is seen early on in that when China faced internal crisis, its political influence in Korea and Japan diminished. Thus, the fall of the Han dynasty coincided with the increased strength of the indigenous Korean kingdoms of Koguryo (37 BCE–668 CE), Paekche (18 BCE–663 CE), and Shilla (57 BCE–935 CE).

Economic stability, brought about by the advent of rice agriculture, shifted the social structure of East Asia from a nomadic existence to a sedentary one with defined geographical boundaries. In battling for supremacy over a particular state, East Asian clans sought legitimacy for their positions by their affiliation with China. The political tug-of-war in the three native states in Korea and the emerging state of Yamato Japan (300–552 CE) produced centralized powers and definite political hierarchies. The rise of dominant states in East Asia coincided with the golden age of China—the period of the Sui (581–618 CE) and Tang (618–907 CE) dynasties. It was during this era that Korea and Japan adopted Chinese patterns in religion, philosophy, political structure, and literature.

Buddhism Spreads

India is the homeland of the Buddha, yet by the Han dynasty this world religion was beginning to flourish in the Middle Kingdom, while its influence waned in India. Buddhism continued to move east. In 372 CE, Buddhism was introduced to the Koguryo court. The religion spread throughout the peninsula as Chinese monks proselytized their faith throughout the Korean states. Concomitantly, Koreans traveled to China to study at influential monasteries. The implications of the Korean states' acceptance of Buddhism as the metaphysical explanation to reality were profound. The ties between Korea and China were now cemented by a common religion. The sacred Buddhist scriptures were written in Chinese characters, and the desire for the Koreans to understand Buddhism solidified the use of Chinese as the mode of written communication throughout Korea. In addition to adopting the Chinese written language, which is a significant gauge of Chinese influence, the Korean states adopted

the art and architecture that accompanied Buddhism. Korean dominant art forms mirrored Chinese works—temples and palaces were built according to the popular styles in China.

During the fifth century, elements of Buddhism crossed over from Korea to Japan, but its official introduction did not take place until 552. Chroniclers note that during the first half of the sixth century, the state of Paekche was at war with Shilla and Koguryo and, in an effort to bring Japan into the fray, Paekche offered to introduce a glorious new truth to the islands should Japan offer its assistance. Thus, it was officially through Korea that Buddhism was introduced to the Japanese court. It was adopted by the most powerful families at the court, who were relatively recent emigrants from the peninsula, and, like Korea, Japan's adoption of Buddhism affected language, art, and architecture in Japan. Chinese written language was the means of written communication throughout the islands, and Japanese art was barely distinguishable from the Chinese art of the day.

The influence of Buddhism on East Asia was from the top down. It was the elite families who first embraced it, though it eventually moved into all social classes. The leading states sponsored the propagation of Buddhism by building monasteries and providing economic relief to those tending the temples. Artisans were paid by the state to create Chinese-style Buddhist art pieces and this media filtered down to the general population. It might also be said that Buddhism spread throughout East Asia because indigenous religions were still evolving and they lacked the sophistication of Buddhism. The elaborate rituals, scriptures, mantras, and art that Buddhism offered was accompanied by other cultural influences from China.

Just decades after Buddhism was officially introduced to Japan, China was united under the glorious Tang dynasty. The political and economic splendor of Tang China was copied by the states of East Asia. In the political realm, the Tang concept of the state's supremacy and the emperor's complete authority was adopted in Korea and Japan. In Japan, this firmly established the still-extant imperial throne. Japan and the Korean states also copied the Tang pattern of taxation, which meant that a more sophisticated manner of assessing the land's resources was needed. The rulers of Korea and Japan partitioned their land into provinces, prefectures, and districts, with the assumption that all land belonged to the state, and taxes were required from those who worked the land. In Korea and Japan, as in China, rice was the currency of the day, and a certain percentage of the harvest,



CHINESE INFLUENCE IN EAST ASIA— A TWO-WAY STREET

China influenced Korea and Japan through travels to these nations by Chinese and travels by Koreans and Japanese to China. The following account describes some of the efforts of Korean scholars in bringing Buddhism to Korea.

Shortly after Buddhism was first introduced into Korea, Koreans began to make pilgrimages to the great temples and teachers of the law in China. A well known Chinese book on Buddhism gives the names of six Koreans who, in the latter part of the seventh century, found their way through China to India. In 583, the son of the King went. In 596, Payak of Kogoryu went to Mt. Tendai in South China and brought back the tenets of the Tendai Sect. In 600, Wunkwang brought back the teachings of the Sinin sect, and, in 634, Myungnang brought more of its rules. Wunkwang also brought copies of the Sungil, Non and the Nirvana Book, the sacred writings most used by this sect. In 617, Wunhyo, and, in 669, Wisang went to the land of Tang in China and brought back many books and relics. These last two were founders of the Pumusa monastery near Fusan, now one of the five largest in the country. Heikwan, in 625, brought back the teachings of the Samnon Sect from the land of Sul in China. By 625, there were five Buddhist sects in Korea.

Source: Charles A. Clark (1932) *Religions of Old Korea*. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 30–31.

approximately 40 percent of the crop, was paid to the state. The adoption of the Chinese political and economic patterns increased the political stability in East Asia. The increasingly sinicized states of Japan and Korea continued to look to China for legitimacy, learning, and culture.

The extent of China's influence during this era is exemplified in Japan's so-called seventeen-point constitution that was developed in the seventh century. It began with the Confucian injunction that the goal of the state is to establish harmony above and friendliness below. This was followed by the second point, which asserted that conversion to Buddhism would straighten everything crooked. In Korea, "universities" were established for the exclusive purpose of teaching the Confucian classics, and similar academies were founded in Japan. The Confucian principles of filial piety and rigid rules that govern relationships were propagated through these learning institutions.

Political Institutions Transformed

Political institutions were transformed in Japan and Korea during the Tang dynasty. In Korea, the government adapted the six ministries of the Tang government. In Japan, the ministries of a central secretariat and the imperial household were added to the conventional six of Tang. The most cosmopolitan city of the eighth century was Chang'an, the capital of China. Japan and Korea sent ambassadors to Chang'an. Not only did they borrow the architecture and art of Chang'an, but also they laid out their capitals in the checkerboard fashion that characterized the Tang capital. During the eighth century, Japan established Nara in the fashion of Chang'an. In 794, on the northern end of the Kyoto plain, the city of Heian was founded with dimensions of just over 5 by 5 kilometers, a bit more modest than the Chang'an measurement of approximately 9.5 by 8 kilometers.

Korea and Japan also sought to create a bureaucracy based on merit, as was the case in China. Positions were

set up in the government structures with the understanding that they would be filled by men of rank. In 958, the Korean civil-service exam was based on the Confucian classics, and one advanced through knowledge of these Chinese works. Yet, by the tenth century, there was a definite atrophy of Chinese influence in Korea and Japan. This was due to the hard times that faced China following the collapse of the Tang as well as a fundamental shift in China's state revenue system.

While Japan and Korea sought to emulate Tang China, there were aspects of the Chinese world that did not quite fit the Japanese and Korean models. China's neighbors never fully integrated the merit-based bureaucracy system, for example. Aristocratic families dominated the political and economic worlds of Korea and Japan, and an exam to level the playing field did erase the continued dominant role of the elite. The true breakdown of the Chinese system in East Asia, however, was due to the increase of tax-free lands. In Korea and Japan, portions of land were given to monasteries and families to whom the court owed favors. At the outset, these tax-free lands were minimal in size. These small parcels of land, however, grew into enormous tax-free estates. The state could do nothing about its declining tax revenue because the estate owners were either in under the patronage of the elite families or were from the elite families themselves. By the twelfth century, it is estimated that tax-free religious or estate zones accounted for more than 50 percent of the land in Korea and Japan. With the steady diminution of revenue, the states found it difficult to respond to internal crises—particularly in trying to maintain peace in an age in which marauding gangs preyed on farming villages. Estate owners and villagers turned away from the impotent state and to the warrior class for protection. Thus, the pattern of state-control and a scholar-led bureaucracy subtly underwent a change. In Japan, true power moved away from the imperial family to the *bakufu* (tent government), or military government led by the *sei taishogun* (barbarian-suppressing generalissimo, commonly called simply shogun) was headquartered with his retainers and advisors.

Korea and Japan's departure from the Chinese model in the political realm coincided with their adoption of indigenous written languages. Chinese character-based written language was always a difficult fit in the Korean and Japanese polysyllabic and inflected languages. One compromise was to use the Chinese characters to represent sounds rather than words. During the tenth century in Korea, a system called *Idu*—wherein Chinese characters represented sounds—became the mode of written communication. By the

fifteenth century, a Korean phonetic system known today as *hangul* replaced the Chinese character-based written language on the peninsula. In Japan, it was the women in the eleventh-century court that led the way in writing Japanese, while the men continued to use Chinese characters. Moreover, the literature the men produced was inferior to the more adaptable, but new, Japanese written language.

During the Yuan (1279–1368), Ming (1368–1644), and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties, Japan and Korea continued to acknowledge the supremacy of China in East Asia. It is true that Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537–1598) of Japan had visions of invading China at the end of the sixteenth century, but Hideyoshi's irreverent approach to China was the exception, not the rule. Buddhism, particularly the Chan sect from China (called Son in Korean and Zen in Japanese), profoundly influenced society in art, architecture, and philosophy during the premodern era of Japan and Korea. During Japan's Tokugawa period (1600/1603–1868), the prevailing ideology was Neo-Confucian thought, as this validated the division between the elite, farmers, artisans, and merchants. In Korea, the Choson era (1392–1910) was one of continued deference to China. The "little brother" sent tributary missions to the "elder brother" three times a year. Confucian ideology was more thoroughly integrated into Korean society during this period than it was in China.

China's Weakness Confirmed

It did not go unnoticed by the East Asian nations, however, that during two of its last three dynasties, China was ruled by outsiders, first the Mongols (1279–1368) and then the Manchus (1644–1912). China's vulnerability and weakness were confirmed by humiliating defeats in its wars against the British during the nineteenth century. Concessions were made to foreigners, and China's undisputed leadership of East Asia was soon to be a memory. During the last half of the nineteenth century, both Japan and China sought to strengthen themselves. China wished to stave off the Western imperial countries, while Japan coveted a first-class-nation status. Japan's lack of respect for the once-proud leader in East Asia was demonstrated in the 1984–1895 Sino-Japanese War and subsequent harsh Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895). Korea, the pawn in the game, was forced to recognize Japanese suzerainty.

The first Sino-Japanese conflict was a precursor to a much more bloody affair between these nations. Between 1937 and 1945, Japan and China were locked in mortal combat. The tragedy at Nanjing—often referred to as the Rape of Nanjing, where Japanese

soldiers butchered Chinese civilians—demonstrated the animosity Japan felt toward its old tutor. Some speculate that the anger the Japanese had against the Chinese was rooted in the Japanese embarrassment and disgust that the source of their culture had sunk so low. Korea, by contrast, was made part of the Japanese empire (1910–1945), and the Koreans, too, were treated harshly by their new colonial ruler.

Post–World War II East Asia can be understood only in the light of the Cold War. Sino-Japanese relations remained sour because of the memory of the Japanese war brutality and because the United States insisted for decades that Japan should not have relations with Communist China. The Korean peninsula was split in to two countries, with North Korea experiencing warmer relations with China. As China emerged as a free-market state, however, its relations with South Korea improved, while North Korea continued to flounder because of its large military budget and the collapse of its once-powerful ally, the Soviet Union.

Japan and Korea have experienced a sweet-and-sour relationship with China. China's influence in these two countries, however, is beyond estimation, because of the adoption of the Chinese pattern in the early civilizations of East Asian states.

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See also: China-Japan Relations; China-Korea Relations

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CHINESE INFLUENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

In November 1367, the Chinese, led by its first peasant-emperor, Zhu Yuanzhang (1328–1398), continued to wage war against the retreating Mongols. In calling up fresh troops, the emperor wrote to his subjects that since time immemorial the Chinese emperors ruled everything under heaven and that the outside "barbarians" were privileged to pay homage to China. Indeed, China believed that the world revolved around it, and the Chinese selectively spread their culture to "barbarian" states. Consequently, China's economic, cultural, and political influences in East Asian countries were profound. Moreover, China's prestige extended beyond its immediate neighbors; over the past two millennia its influence on the Southeast Asia has been as varied and complex as the region itself.

China and Vietnam

China's historical relationship with Vietnam did not follow the general principles that governed China's relations with the rest of Southeast Asia. Historically, Vietnam has experienced a deeper and longer-lasting influence from China than any other Southeast Asia country. The Vietnamese state was founded in the third century BCE by a Chinese military governor. Two hundred years later, in 111 BCE, China made much of modern Vietnam into a province in the expanding Han Empire (206 BCE–220 CE). Vietnam remained a part of China for one thousand years. Much like the early inhabitants on the Korean peninsula, urban Vietnamese took on Chinese culture in virtually every sphere of life, including politics, literature, ideology, written language, and religion. It is significant that while Theravada Buddhism came directly from South Asia to Burma, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand, where it became the established form of Buddhism, Mahayana Buddhism—the form of Buddhism practiced in China—took hold in Vietnam.

It must be noted that despite China's thousand-year-long political domination of Vietnam, the Vietnamese tenaciously held on to some indigenous aspects of culture, including the Vietnamese spoken language and their higher view of women. Scholars note that the more the Vietnamese accepted the culture of the

Chinese, the less likely it was that they would accept China's political suzerainty over their land.

Early Relations Between China and Southeast Asia

Economic opportunities rather than political interests dominated China's early relations with the rest of Southeast Asia. The early state of Funan (c. 50–550 CE) on the Mekong Delta River in modern-day Vietnam was a catalyst for Chinese-Southeast Asian relations. In Funan, Southeast Asians became the intermediaries between Chinese-Indian and Chinese-Middle Eastern traders during the first four centuries CE. By the fifth century, however, Southeast Asian entrepreneurs began substituting indigenous products, such as Sumatra pine resins and sandalwood, for the frankincense and myrrh from further west. With the rise of the Chinese Nan Qi state (479–502), trade between China and Southeast Asia dramatically increased as China was an insatiable market for nutmeg, cloves, and mace from the Moluccas, and for rhinoceros horn—which the Chinese prized as an aphrodisiac—from Borneo.

Between the seventh and thirteenth centuries China's influence in Southeast Asia turned political as more powerful states emerged in the region. Champa in present-day Vietnam, Angkor in present-day Cambodia, Pagan in present-day Myanmar (Burma), and Srivijaya and Majapahit in present-day Indonesia all had some type of political relationship with China though these states were more deeply influenced by India. India's prestige in Southeast Asia was due to the world religions it exported to its eastern neighbors. Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam took hold of Southeast Asian states, and the missionaries from these religions came mostly from India. It is said that India's influence in Southeast Asia was greater than that of China because India had no political agenda in the region.

The relationship between China and Srivijaya, the dominant state in maritime Southeast Asia between the eighth and fourteenth centuries, showcases China's influence in this region. Located close to the modern city of Palembang in southeastern Sumatra, Srivijaya was able to dominate the area due to its strategic location and its political savvy. The political acumen of its rulers included the decision to pay annual tribute to the greatest power in all of Asia—China. Like most early states in Southeast Asia, Srivijaya sought legitimacy and protection based on its tributary relationship with China. Paying homage to China proved to be a tricky game for Southeast Asian states, however. China promised protection to tributary states, but the bigger fish in Southeast Asia could swallow the smaller ones before

China could respond. Again, Srivijaya is a case in point. Majapahit, which was based in Java, gradually increased in wealth, influence, and strength, and was able to defeat Srivijaya before China could come to the latter's rescue. In 1397, twenty years after the fall of Srivijaya, the Chinese emperor wrote a letter to this defunct kingdom castigating it for the breakdown in the tributary relationship, apparently unaware that its client state had fallen.

The Ming-Dynasty Period

Three events led to China's increased economic importance to Southeast Asia during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). First, China was once again in the hands of the Chinese. The Mongol-dominated Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) had fallen, and under the Ming a series of capable emperors sought to extend their influence over Asia. Second, under the third Ming emperor, Yongle (1360–1424), the Chinese built enormous sailing ships that traveled as far as Mogadishu in western Africa. These impressive ships were more than 130 meters long (by comparison, Columbus's *Santa Maria* was only about 26 meters long that would appear and was built a hundred years later). For three decades these impressive transports traveled throughout Southeast Asia, demanding that each state pay proper tribute to China. Ambassadors from these states were ordered to appear before the Ming emperor and demonstrate the respect due to the Son of Heaven. This gunboat diplomacy not only increased interaction between China and its southern neighbors, it also increased the prestige and political dominance of China throughout East and Southeast Asia.

The third catalyst for China's economic growth in Southeast Asia was the arrival of the Europeans in Asia. The Chinese were able to keep the Western powers on the periphery until the nineteenth century. But when the Portuguese were able to set up a small colony in Macao, just off the major trading port of Guangzhou (Canton) in southern China, China's role in Southeast Asia changed forever. The Portuguese priests and Spanish friars set up a network of trade from Nagasaki to Macao to Melaka and Manila. The key to the entire trading network was the market and materials of China. A case study of the Manila galleon trade demonstrates the power China came to hold in Southeast Asian economics. Silver from Mexico and Peru made its way to China by way of the Philippines; the ship then returned to Acapulco with Chinese goods. Chinese porcelain ware and textiles were coveted in South America and Europe, and the payment for these goods was the silver from across the Pacific Ocean. Manila was where these ships to Acapulco were

loaded with Chinese products. This brought a greater number of Chinese into Manila and other parts of Southeast Asia, where global trading was directed by a growing network of colonial powers. Despite the increased presence of Chinese in Southeast Asia during the Ming period, the ethnocentric tendencies of many Chinese prevented their integration into cultures and societies that were unfamiliar to them. Rather, the Chinese in Southeast Asia produced a subculture of exclusive Chinese neighborhoods and schools.

Chinese Migration

The nineteenth century saw unprecedented Chinese migration to Southeast Asia. The internal factors that drove Chinese from their homeland were economic and political. During the first half of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), China experienced a dramatic increase in its population, so there was not enough land to pass down to the new generations because of the practice of dividing land among all heirs. At the same time, the price of silver—specie used to pay taxes—rose, and farmers weren't able to pay their taxes. Later in the nineteenth century, the Taiping rebellion (1850–1864)—a civil war that was responsible for some 20 million deaths—added to the misery of the Chinese. Revolution was one option to internal crises; migration was another.

Western colonization of Southeast Asia was another stimulus in bringing Chinese south. In the nineteenth-century British Straits Settlements of Singapore, Penang, and Melaka, the English found that the Chinese were willing to do work that the indigenous population found loathsome. In particular, the backbreaking labor in the mines of Malaya was mostly accomplished by Chinese rather than indigenous labor. By the 1860s, Chinese made up more than 50 percent of the population in Singapore, and Chinese businessmen moved to the Malaya Peninsula and helped the British administer the tin mines and rubber plantations. As Malays were reluctant to work for the British or Chinese, an economic opportunity for Chinese opened in the south, and thousands of Chinese, mainly from China's southeastern provinces, flocked to Malaya. Nineteenth-century colonial governments also encouraged Chinese businesspeople to set up shop in Indonesia and the Philippines. These overseas Chinese remained in Southeast Asia. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Chinese remain the dominant ethnic group in Singapore, and some 35 percent of Malaysia is ethnically Chinese. Chinese influence is apparent in the region's business communities, and ethnic tension between the Chinese and Southeast Asia's indigenous populations is blamed

on the inordinate economic power the Chinese enjoy in the region.

The People's Republic of China

The People's Republic of China (PRC) was formed on 1 October 1949. The PRC, with its Communist ideology, had a pronounced effect on Southeast Asia during the Cold War. Visionaries throughout the region, tired of corrupt governments and the continued presence of imperialist powers, looked to China as an example of a socialist revolution. Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines all looked to China for inspiration.

In the Philippines, landless peasants caught in a cycle of perpetual debt to rich landlords believed that socialism, as expressed in the PRC land reform movement, would bring economic equity to their country. Such Filipino organizations as the New People's Army and the Philippine Communist Party looked to China and its leader, Mao Zedong (1893–1976), for ideological direction. In the 1960s a small minority of disgruntled Indonesians also promoted the PRC ideology as an alternative to the government of President Sukarno (1901–1970). But perhaps the greatest impact of the PRC on these nations is that established leaders used the threat of supposed revolutionary Chinese influence in their countries to impose harsh and authoritarian rule. In Indonesia, thousands of Sino-Indonesians were killed to crush an alleged Chinese Communist coup in 1965. In the Philippines, President Ferdinand Marcos (1917–1989) declared martial law in 1972 in response to the threat of a Communist takeover of the archipelago.

In post-World War II Indochina (Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos), neutrality between China, the Soviet Union, and the United States proved impossible. The Chinese aided the Communist leaders and movements in each of these countries. During the 1954 Geneva Conference, which ended the conflict between France and its former Indochinese colonies, the enormous prestige China had in the region was demonstrated as China's representative to the conference, Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), helped to bring the various fighting sides into an agreement. While North Vietnam and various Communist elements in Cambodia felt betrayed by the PRC at Geneva, it is instructive to note that they signed the agreement. Chinese advisers continued to make their way into Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia following the 1954 conference, and war material was sent south to aid North Vietnam.

China's influence in Vietnam declined in the late 1960s, and the U.S. belief that North Vietnam and its leader, Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969), were PRC puppets

was false. Indeed, by the early 1970s relations between North Vietnam and China were acrimonious at best. The increasingly strained relationship between North Vietnam and China was due to the growing partnership between North Vietnam and the PRC's enemy, the Soviet Union. The PRC felt North Vietnam's friendship with the USSR was a slap in the face from a nation that had historic and cultural ties with China.

China took its revenge on Vietnam by supporting the Communist Khmer Rouge, who took over in Cambodia in 1975 and whom the Vietnamese opposed. The PRC recognized the Khmer Rouge government and sent high-level personnel to demonstrate its support of the new Communist state. When Vietnam intervened in Cambodia on 25 December 1978, China responded by sending troops into Vietnam to punish its wayward son two months later. Vietnam held its own in the battles with China and for the next decade the two countries sank into a military quagmire as Vietnam continued its military presence in Cambodia while China sent supplies to the Khmer Rouge guerrillas on the Thai border.

Analysts believe that China's influence will continue to grow in Southeast Asia. United, economically vibrant, and accustomed to political primacy, China has increased its hegemony in the potentially oil-rich islands and atolls in the South China Sea. The growing frustration felt in Southeast Asian nations is explained by Indonesia's leading maritime expert, Hashim Djalal who noted that when Southeast Asians try to stem China's increasing presence in the South China Sea, the Chinese respond by talking about dynasties and they bring out old maps. Understanding China's past influence in Southeast Asia may be the key to future relations between these two regions.

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CHINESE NEW YEAR Chinese New Year (*Chun Jie*) is the most important festival in the Chinese lunar calendar. *Chun Jie* means the "spring festival," and based on the almanac of the emperor Han Wu Di (140-87 BCE), it falls on the first day of the first month, which does not correspond to January first of the Western, Gregorian calendar. It is celebrated for fifteen days and culminates at the first full moon of the new year.

Before the New Year, Chinese families customarily conduct a thorough spring cleaning of their homes. Examples of auspicious Chinese calligraphy, such as *chun* (spring), *fu* (luck or happiness), and *shou* (longevity), as well as red-colored materials, are hung as decorative pieces in the home. In Chinese, the word for "red" sounds the same as the word for "prosperity." Festive delicacies (for example, biscuits and cakes) are prepared and new clothes purchased. On New Year's eve, family members gather for an annual reunion dinner. They offer food to the ancestral tablets, which are believed to embody the spirits of individuals who have produced sons capable of performing ancestral rites. In return for this attention, the ancestors ensure the fertility and prosperity of the lineage. This ritual renews and reaffirms filial ties. After dinner, many people visit local temples to offer prayers.

Throughout the period of the New Year celebrations, relatives and friends visit one another to offer felicitations. Gifts symbolizing tokens of good fortune, such as oranges and *bon poa* or *hong bao* ("red packets") containing money, are exchanged. In multiethnic nations in Southeast Asia, like Malaysia and Singapore, the practice of open houses has sprung up. Friends and acquaintances of other ethnic and religious back-



DEBTS AND NEW YEAR'S

The Chinese New Year celebration is far more than a public festival, as it also marks important social, political, and economic relations among people in the community. The following text points to one important function—the settling of debts.

But there is another, more serious reason for excitement in this last week of the year; it is the time when one must settle all debts. Western usages spread quickly in China; our business techniques are accepted by the big firms in Tientsin, Shanghai, and Canton, but the small shopkeeper as well as the ordinary citizen still feels obliged to follow this old custom of settling debts three times a year—just before the three great "festivals of living." It is, if one looks for a noneconomical explanation, another of these rites of "cleaning up," of chasing away the bad spirits. Before we enter a new year, everything should be clean—our hearts, our relations with our neighbors. An obligation of the dying year should not be carried over into the new one, just as the old dust in the rooms should not stay there over the New Year.

It is never more difficult to find cash than in these days, and there is no better opportunity for the foreign visitor than now, when someone may be forced to sell an old family piece to get some. Our "January sales" thus take place the week before New Year's in China, with the same "drastic reductions."

Source: Wolfram Eberhard (1952) *Chinese Festivals* New York: Henry Schuman, 26–27.

grounds pay visits to Chinese homes as a gesture of goodwill. Localized practices like these may be less in evidence in other parts of Asia.

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CHINESE, CLASSICAL Classical Chinese refers to the language of canonical literature and formal documents in China before the twentieth century. In the early twentieth century, language reforms were instituted so that writing was no longer carried out in the classical language, which was understood only by an educated elite, but instead was rendered in an approximation of the modern northern vernacular.

When trying to give a formal definition of classical Chinese, linguists tend to resort to one of two strategies: the first is to treat classical Chinese as all that is not in the vernacular—definition by default; the second is to try to pinpoint the historical period out of which classical Chinese developed and to state that classical Chinese consists of literary traditions that grew out of the speech habits of a particular time and place.

The Classical/Vernacular Divide

When stating that classical Chinese (*wenyanwen*) is the logical complement of vernacular Chinese (*baihuawen*), it is natural to ask where we draw the line and what criteria we are using. Criteria that have traditionally been used to distinguish classical and vernacular Chinese include:

1. Intelligibility: Is it readily understood by the average native speaker? Or is it language that only the educated elite can understand?
2. Spoken versus written mode: Is it more like natural speech or more like stylized writing?
3. Time depth: When we talk about "natural speech" and "average native speaker," are we using contemporary people as a point of reference (modern audience), or are we referring to people at the time the work was written (historical audience)?

Let us first look at the intelligibility criterion. By "intelligible," what is meant is that the language is comprehensible to a general audience; if it cannot be understood by the average native speaker without further training, it is considered "unintelligible." The intelligibility criterion cleverly captures the lay view of the vernacular/classical divide: Vernacular Chinese is Chinese written in language the layperson can understand; everything else is relegated to classical Chinese regardless of the source of the difficulty. This view is often reflected in popular comments about writing styles: certain styles are difficult to understand because they are too *wenyan* (classical/literary), as if classical Chinese stands for all that is obscure or arcane.

There are problems with this approach, however. The first is that intelligibility judgments are necessarily limited to the here and now, for we have no way of determining whether people in ancient times can

understand a particular style of writing or not. That is to say, we are tied to the judgments of a modern audience. If we were to do this, we run into a second problem, which is that we would have to exclude from our definition of vernacular Chinese the language of historical popular novels such as *All Men Are Brothers* (*Shuibu Zhuan*) and *Dream of the Red Chamber* (*Honglou Meng*), which are traditionally considered vernacular literature (*baibua xiaoshuo*), but which in modern times are not readily comprehensible to the uneducated reader.

An alternative to the intelligibility criterion is that of spoken language versus written language. Most of the world's languages maintain a difference between spoken and written varieties: the spoken variety is usually more informal and involved, employing more first and second person pronouns ("I," "you"), conjunctions ("and," "but"), and situation-dependent references ("last night," "over here"), whereas the written variety tends to be more informational, abstract, and explicit, often containing learned or technical vocabulary. Relying on such universal tendencies, we can determine whether the text at hand is closer to typical spoken language or written language. Texts that bear closer resemblance to spoken language are then labeled vernacular Chinese; those with attributes of written language are relegated to classical Chinese.

Note that the intelligible/unintelligible divide is not the same as the spoken/written divide. The reason for this is that most uneducated speakers can understand *some* formal language. It is not the case that uneducated speakers can only understand language in the spoken mode and that they find formal writing totally unintelligible. There is an in-between stage in which language can have characteristics of the written register and is yet comprehensible to the uneducated reader.

Whether we use intelligibility or spoken/written language as criterion, however, an additional variable is the historical period of the intended audience. Writing that is intelligible to or characteristic of the population of one historical period may be unintelligible to or uncharacteristic of the speech of another stage in history. For this reason, it is important to specify the period on which we are to base our definition.

A spoken-language, historical-audience-based definition of classical Chinese was given by the scholar Hu Shi (1891–1962), who was one of the chief proponents of language reform and vernacular writing in early Republican China. In his seminal work, *Baibua wenxue shi* (*A History of Vernacular Literature*), Hu implied a dichotomy in which vernacular litera-

ture is literature written in the spoken language of the day (which may be far removed the spoken language of *today*), and classical literature is that which is excluded from this scope by default. By this definition, what is vernacular and what is classical is not a fixed notion, but rather varies with each historical period. This dichotomy, however, while similar to the European notion of vernacular and mainstream literature, is foreign to the Chinese tradition. Hu's definition is often criticized for framing a definition of vernacular language that is too broad. His definition would necessarily include as vernacular obscure works of oral literature from remote periods, which speakers of modern Chinese have great trouble understanding.

A more widely accepted definition of vernacular and classical Chinese is that of Lü Shuxiang: The vernacular language is written text that corresponds to spoken language from the Tang dynasty (618–907) onward; all else is relegated to classical Chinese. Lü's treatment avoids the shortcomings of both Hu's working definition and the lay notion of the vernacular: It includes as vernacular drama and popular writing from the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties while excluding obscure pre-Tang works of oral literature. Lü's definition is sometimes criticized for its arbitrary choice of the Tang dynasty as a divide, but it is worth noting that intermingling of Sinitic and Altaic-speaking populations in cosmopolitan Tang society accounts for the considerable linguistic gap between Middle Chinese (265–1269) and Premodern Chinese (1269–1795). It is also during this period that basic Chinese word order began to shift from Subject-Verb-Object (SVO) to Subject-Object-Verb (SOV)—a change often taken to be an important distinction between classical Chinese and modern Chinese.

Classical Chinese throughout the Ages

Having defined the classical language as writing several degrees removed from the spoken language, it is natural to ask whether this writing style may have been derived from the spoken language of an earlier period. Linguists have found considerable overlap between classical Chinese grammar and the syntax of Old Chinese oracle-bone inscriptions and bronze inscriptions of the Shang (1766–1045 BCE) and Western Zhou (1045–771 BCE) dynasties. The inscriptions are for the most part short sentences describing ceremonies and divinations and are considered a more or less faithful record of the spoken language of the day in the Huang (Yellow) River basin.

With the breakup of the Zhou empire (256 BCE), however, a new culture of pluralism demanded a more stylized form of writing suited to political oratory. This

is reflected in the language of works such as Confucius's *Analects* (*Lunyu*) and *Mencius* (*Mengzi*), which is more concise and structured, is richer in rhetorical devices, and shows obvious imitations of earlier classics.

The later Warring States period (402–221 BCE) and the Qin (221–206 BCE) and Han (206 BCE–ce 220) dynasties saw a further move toward allegory and ornamentation, resulting in writing that is stylistically distinct from the vernacular language of the day. It was during this period that classical Chinese forged an identity as a literary language separate from vernacular speech, and it is the conventions of this period that later authors sought to emulate when writing in the "classical style." For this reason, some sinologists reserve the term "classical Chinese" for the writings of the Qin and Han dynasties and refer to the language of later imitations as "literary Chinese."

Following the Han dynasty, worship of form was taken to an extreme at the expense of substance, giving rise to the belletrist "parallel prose" (*pianwen*) of the South dynasties (420–589), in which balance of rhythm, imagery, and tonal patterns reigned supreme. This worship of formal elements created a backlash in the Tang dynasty, in which neoclassicists such as Han Yu (768–824) and Liu Zongyuan (773–819) called for a return to substance and the rhetorical styles of the Qin and the Han. From the Tang onward, different schools of writing offered different takes on the classical language, and literary aesthetics oscillated between form and substance and between arch conservatism and the adoption of new grammar and lexicon.

The dominance of classical Chinese came to an end after the first Opium War (1840–1842) as intellectuals began to see the classical/vernacular gap as a hindrance to greater literacy and called for the replacement of classical Chinese with the modern spoken language in education and media as part and parcel of the modernization of China. In the New Culture Movement of the late 1910s, promotion of Vernacular Chinese gathered momentum through the efforts of noted scholars such as Hu Shi, Chen Duxiu (1879–1942), Qian Xuantong (1887–1939), and Fu Sinian (1896–1950), culminating in the Vernacular Language Movement of 1917–1919. As a result of this movement, vernacular Chinese was adopted as the standard language of textbooks, and influential new works of literature by authors such as Lu Xun (1881–1936) began appearing in the vernacular.

To this day, however, the classical language lives on in government missives and legal documents and in all manner of writing deemed formal. Classical pat-

terns and set expressions appear frequently in vernacular prose—more so in Taiwan than in mainland China. Despite the efforts of early twentieth-century language reformers to make a clean break with *wenyan*, it does look as if it will be some time before the new writing born of the Vernacular Language Movement can forge an identity fully distinct from that of the classical language that has been standard for much of Chinese history.

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CHINESE, OVERSEAS At the end of the twentieth century, an estimated thirty-eight million ethnic Chinese lived outside China in almost every country on the face of the earth, including places as unexpected as Iceland and Panama. This geographic dispersion suggests the difficulties of counting exactly how many Chinese there are outside China. Chinese have moved within and beyond the borders of China for several millennia. Where they have both sojourned and settled among non-Chinese, they have experienced varying degrees of assimilation and acculturation, depending on local reception and opportunities. They have remigrated or returned to China as demanded by necessity and common sense. After multiple generations of life abroad, separate Chinese ethnic communities have become difficult to define, with some fading into local populations in appearance and culture, as in Thailand, and others remaining ethnically distinct but practicing a hybridized culture combining both Chinese and local elements, as in the case of the Babas of Malaya or the Peranakans of Indonesia.

History

People of Chinese origin have been crossing borders since prehistoric times, when the Thai and Burmese languages originated in what is now Chinese territory. Until the late eighteenth century, the small number of Chinese who ventured abroad were mostly



RESTRICTING CHINESE IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES

Chinese laborers played a major role in opening the western United States to settlement. Nonetheless, when they were no longer needed and thought to be too numerous, the United States enacted laws designed to restrict immigration. This Convention Regulating Chinese Immigration was enacted on 17 March 1894.

Article I. The High Contracting Parties agree that for a period of ten years, beginning with the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this Convention, the coming, except under the conditions hereinafter specified, of Chinese laborers to the United States shall be absolutely prohibited.

Article III. The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the right at present enjoyed of Chinese subjects, being officials, teachers, students, merchants or travellers for curiosity or pleasure, but not laborers, of coming to the United States and residing therein . . .

Article IV. In pursuance of Article III of the Immigration Treaty between the United States and China, signed at Peking on the 17th day of November, 1880, . . . it is hereby understood and agreed that Chinese laborers or Chinese of any other class, either permanently or temporarily residing in the United States, shall have for the protection of their persons and property all rights that are given by the laws of the United States to citizens of the most favored nation, excepting the right to become naturalized citizens. And the Government of the United States reaffirms its obligation, as stated in said Article III, to exert all its power to secure protection to the persons and property of all Chinese subjects in the United States.

Source: John V. A. MacMurray, ed. (1921) *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894–1919*. New York: Oxford University Press, 9.

merchants, pirates, and government agents. Chinese soldiers arrived on Borneo and Java in the twelfth century as part of an attempted Mongol conquest. Between 1405 and 1433, the Ming eunuch Zheng He (1371?–1435) commanded a flotilla of ships that traversed Southeast Asia, edged around India, and reached the eastern shores of Africa. The pirate Zheng Chenggong (1624–1662), or Koxinga, ruled a naval empire headquartered in Taiwan that stretched from Japan throughout the South China Sea. From this offshore stronghold, Zheng eluded Qing-dynasty (1644–1912) capture for seventeen years while advocating the cause of the fallen Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Fear of

such traitors mustering resources to the south led both the Ming and Qing dynasties to forbid emigration, a sporadically enforced ban that did not prevent a steady trickle of enterprising merchants from seeking their fortunes across the ocean for several centuries.

The number and nature of Chinese emigrating changed with European expansion into Asia. Colonial exploitation of land and natural resources provided a wealth of economic opportunity for those willing to work hard and contribute to commercial and industrial growth. Working-class Chinese joined wealthy merchants in the search for prosperity overseas. Growing networks of trade and technological advancements



A street scene in New York City's Chinatown in August 2001. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

improved communications, and travel became increasingly accessible through innovations such as credit tickets and steamship lines. To fill the insatiable needs of industry for cheap labor, hundreds of thousands of Chinese ventured overseas both willingly and under duress, as contract workers and as coolies. By 1900 an estimated 3 million Chinese lived abroad, 2.4 million of whom traveled between 1840 and 1900. Economic and political turmoil fueled continued migration throughout the twentieth century, a pattern cut short only by the first thirty years of communist rule. However, migration resumed in the late 1970s. Southeast Asia is still home to the majority of overseas Chinese, about 80 percent, although Australia, Canada, and the United States have become the destinations of choice because of their relatively liberal immigration policies.

Economic Roles

Although widely labeled "the Jews of Asia" for their appearance of disproportionate wealth and economic dominance in countries like Malaysia and Indonesia, overseas Chinese pursue a wide variety of occupations at all levels of society. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, colonial and local modernizing elites nurtured the fortunes of the overseas Chinese by employing Chinese as middlemen—local agents greasing the wheels of economic development who were permitted to become rich even though, as racial

outsiders, they had limited access political power. Because a highly visible handful gained wealth through intrinsically unpopular activities such as money lending and tax farming, Chinese in general served as scapegoats during times of economic depression, deflecting public attention from abusive governments. The majority of overseas Chinese, however, lived and continue to live humbly as petty store owners, farmers, miners, artisans, laborers, and service providers. Although they operate on the same business principles as others do, overseas Chinese appear to enjoy higher levels of success because access to a widely dispersed network of fellow Chinese aids their trading activities. Since the late 1970s, Chinese with professional degrees and entrepreneurial skills have become valued cogs in the wheels of global economic markets.

Social Organizations

Like other mobile peoples, Chinese rely heavily on ethnic networks and cooperation for support and survival. Chain migration is commonly practiced, and family remains the primary organizational unit. Continuing the family line through male descendants and advancing family fortunes remain key goals. Family and clan reliably provide future employees, business partners, and capital. In the past, the widely accepted practice of polygyny enabled Chinese men overseas to maintain multiple connections to China and to their places of settlement through the stability and accul-

turation represented by wives and children in key sites of business contact.

Principles of fictive kinship and native-place loyalty also provide crucial support and resources. The overseas Chinese communities established *buiguan*, or clan and native-place associations, as soon as a critical number of men from a particular place or of a particular surname had arrived. Adapted from migrant practices in Chinese cities, *buiguan* further evolved overseas to include umbrella organizations that combated anti-Chinese discrimination. During the early twentieth century, Chinese organizations emulated Western models in the form of Chinese chambers of commerce and service clubs. Late twentieth-century globalization has produced native-place, kinship, and business associations that are international in scope.

After emigrating, Chinese continued to practice their own religion, worshipping ancestors and a varying pantheon of gods. They established local temples and household altars but also proved fairly syncretic, adapting elements of or converting to local religions, as in the case of Chinese Catholics in the Philippines.

Political Orientation

Until the late nineteenth century, China's rulers usually ignored the overseas Chinese and only intermittently enforced bans on emigration. The status of overseas Chinese improved with imperial recognition of their economic successes, as reported by China's first diplomats during the 1880s. Sun Yat-sen, acknowledged by both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan as the "Father of Modern China," enshrined the overseas Chinese in modern conceptions of the Chinese nation by calling them "mother of the Chinese revolution" for their support while he campaigned abroad. During the 1920s and 1930s, Sun's political party, the Guomindang (GMD), courted overseas support through newspapers, schools, and government policies. Facing discrimination abroad and inspired by visions of a modern, strong China, many overseas Chinese responded to GMD appeals by sending money to China and traveling there themselves. And so evolved the concept of *huaqiao*, usually translated as "Overseas Chinese" but meaning Chinese sojourners who remain politically loyal to China despite long-term residence abroad. Although still used by the Chinese government, the term *huaqiao* generated many problems for overseas Chinese, because it carried the implication that Chinese settlers, who in fact were simply interested in economic gain and social stability, maintained loyalty to a foreign government. Fearful of the numerous Chinese in their midst who seemingly were not being assimilated, some host governments imposed harsh

restrictions and sanctioned anti-Chinese violence. The rise of the PRC exacerbated fears of overseas Chinese as a colonizing force and led to violence and expulsions from Malaysia and Indonesia during the 1950s and 1960s. Since the 1960s, the term *huaqiao* has been unpopular among most overseas Chinese, who prefer the more neutral *huaren*, or ethnic Chinese. From the late 1970s, in recognition of both the economic potential and the political risks of claiming overseas Chinese, the PRC has promoted business investments and visits in China while encouraging naturalization overseas.

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See also: **Chinese in Japan; Chinese in Myanmar; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Chinese in Vietnam**

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CHINESE-LANGUAGE NEWSPAPERS—SINGAPORE

Singapore's first Chinese-language daily was *Lat Pau*, which went into circulation in 1881. Modeled on Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong and Shanghai, its coverage aimed to satisfy the interests of the immigrant population by focusing on political and cultural developments in China.

The other two major Chinese newspapers were *Nanyang Siang Pau*, founded by Tan Kah Kee in 1923, and *Sin Chew Jit Poh*, founded by Aw Boon Haw and Aw Boon Par in 1929. *Nanyang Siang Pau* was intended to serve the unorganized Chinese business community and promote Chinese vernacular education. In 1971, the government of Singapore detained its editorial staff for allegedly stirring up communal sentiments. *Sin Chew Jit Poh* was an innovative newspaper and enjoyed high circulation in the 1960s and 1970s.

In 1982 these two papers merged, creating Singapore News and Publications Limited, and *Lianhe Zaobao* and *Lianhe Wanbao* were launched to take their places. Another newspaper, *Shin Min Daily News*, came onto the scene in 1967. The combined circulation of these three Chinese-language newspapers is approximately 500,000.

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CH'ING DYNASTY. See **Qing Dynasty.**

CHINGGIS KHAN. See **Genghis Khan.**

CHINTANAKAN MAI By 1985, the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, which controlled the government of Laos, recognized the need to adjust the nation's transition to socialism, primarily because of a lack of incentives to improve economic productivity. A new policy was introduced at the Fourth Party Congress in 1986 by party leader Kaysone Phomvihane. The new policy was called *chintanakan mai*, which literally means "new imagination" but is commonly translated as "New Economic Mechanism."

This new policy to move away from a state-planned economy to one emphasizing free-market mechanisms paralleled similar trends in Vietnam (introduction of *doi moi*, or renovation) and the former Soviet Union (perestroika, or openness). Among key structural re-

forms of *chintanakan mai* were deregulating prices; establishing a single floating exchange rate determined by market forces; privatizing state enterprises; opening the financial sector to foreign banks; liberalizing trade; and developing an explicit foreign investment code to facilitate increased international investments in Laos.

The government has implemented these reforms gradually. For example, it has been unwilling to adopt draconian measures to reduce the size of the public sector. Nevertheless, since 1989, Laos has divested itself of a large proportion of its state enterprises. Rather remarkably, even the national telecommunications company is now a foreign joint-venture company. Some privatization has also occurred in the education sector.

At the Fifth Party Congress in 1991, further elaboration of the economic reforms was articulated and specific national goals specified. Among these goals were export expansion, promotion of tourism, and further administrative and legal reforms to enhance the transparency (that is, making the rules of trade more apparent) of the Laotian economic and investment climate. Also in 1991, the hammer and sickle were removed from the state symbol of Laos and replaced by the most revered Laotian Buddhist temple, That Luang.

During the 1990s, Laos also became much more open internationally, with a significant increase in technical and economic assistance from both multilateral (World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and European Union, for example) and bilateral (Japan, Australia, Nordic nations, and Switzerland, for example) donors. Also, in 1997, Laos became the eighth member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Reflecting the success of the New Economic Mechanism, Laos in the early and mid-1990s had impressive macroeconomic performance with annual economic growth averaging 7 percent, much higher than the 1 percent average of the twenty years before 1985. Initially, it appeared that Laos might not be adversely affected by the Asian economic crisis of 1997, since its currency was not internationally traded and since it did not have a stock market. Unfortunately, in a delayed impact, the Lao economy suffered severely from the crisis, and its currency dropped dramatically, losing 87 percent of its value in only two years, with resulting serious inflation. In the early 2000s, the economy stabilized with real GDP economic growth estimated to be 4 percent in 2000.

In more recent years, some in the international community have expressed concern about the slowing of the reform process because of the political power



AN ECONOMIC MOTTO FOR LAOS

The slogan, "Produce as much as your capacity, consume as much as you desire" reflects the new economic orientation of *Chintanakan mai*.

Source: Vientiane Mai (15 May 1983).

of revolutionary leaders with strong ties to Vietnam and, increasingly, China.

Gerald W. Fry

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CHISHTIYA The Chistis are an important Sufi (Islamic mystic) *silsilah* (order). Each order consists of *murids* (disciples) of a particular sheikh or *pir* (spiritual master). Khwaja Abu Ishaq of Syria (d. 940) started the order in Chist village, Syria. The founder of the order in India, Khwaja Muinuddin Chisti, came from Sajistan in eastern Iran in 1190 CE and set up a *khanqah* (hospice) at Ajmer, India. Known as the Garib Nawaz (Showing Kindness to the Poor), he attracted many followers, and his disciples, such as Qutbuddin Bakhtiar Khaki and Shaikh Fariduddin, further popularized the Chisti order. Sheikh Nizamuddin Auliya (1236–1325) of Delhi, who witnessed the reigns of seven sultans, attracted both Muslims and non-Muslims to the order. The Chistis further expanded to areas of South Asia such as Sind, Punjab, Rajasthan, Bengal, Bihar, and Deccan.

The early Chisti saints were revered because of their religious tolerance, adoption of indigenous traditions, use of local languages, and egalitarianism. The miracles that were attributed to them strongly appealed to the common people. Although there was no digression from the *shari'a* or Islamic holy law, these saints allowed certain deviations. For example, there were *sama* or musical gatherings for personal union with God. A strong dislike for any form of political patronage and a dependence on God for livelihood were hallmarks of the Chisti saints. There was an emphasis on *wahdat al-wujud* (unity of being). The name

of God was recited both aloud and in silence (*dbikr jabri*, *dbikr khafi*).

The proliferation of Chisti branches such as Na-gauriya, Sabiriya, Nizamiya, Gaudri Shahi, and Zahuri began in the sixteenth century and continues today. There have been obvious changes in Chisti doctrine, and some of the earlier traditions like noninvolvement in politics and nonpossession of property have been given up. Nizami Chisti Hazarat Inayat Khan (d. 1927) established centers in the United States and Britain to propagate the message of universalism. Sayed Khwaja Habib Ali Shah of Hyderabad, India, inspired the South African branch. The Gaudri Shahi/Zahuri branch, established by Zahurul Hasan Sharib Gudri Shah Baba (1914–1996) of Ajmer and presently headed by Inam Hasan, has centers in Britain and the United States. Websites for the orders feature discussions, online discourses, *qawwalis* (a form of musical chorus, where one singer begins the songs and the followers recite), and so forth. The *urs*, a festival celebrating the anniversary of a saint's death, is held where the saint is buried, and the *dargah* (saint's tomb) attracts both Muslims and non-Muslims in the Indian subcontinent.

Patit Paban Mishra

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CHITRA/ARDHACHITRA/CHITRABHASHA Standardized aesthetic norms appeared in South Asian art from about the fifth century CE, coinciding with the Gupta hegemony of the subcontinent (c. 320–c. 520 CE). The consequent canonization of art spawned a rich descriptive and normative vocabulary for identifying the scope of Indian artistic representation. The terms *chitra*, *ardbachitra*, and *chitrabhasha* are used in this context to differentiate broadly between sculpture, relief, and painting, respectively.

Distinctions among *Chitra*, *Ardbachitra*, and *Chitrabhasha*

Although in the earliest theoretical texts on South Asian art, the term *chitra* is used to mean "sculpture" or "painting," in certain texts of the medieval period,



A 2nd century BCE statue of Yakshi, a female earth spirit. The statue is of terracotta and is housed in the National Museum in New Delhi, India. (ANGELO HORNAK/CORBIS)

chitra means "sculpture in the round," and a distinction is made between *chitra* (sculpture), *ardhachitra* (relief), and *chitrabhasha* (painting). Perhaps the most important of these texts is the late sixteenth-century *Shilparatna* attributed to Srikumara of Kerala. The earliest-known text dealing with *chitra* in general is the *Vishnudharmottara*, generally dated as contemporaneous with the flowering of classical South Asian art (fourth–sixth centuries).

Little of ancient South Asian stone sculpture is cut completely in the round. Among the earliest examples of South Asian sculpture in the historic period are the massive *yakshas* and *yakshis* (supernatural elementals) from Mauryan times (third century BCE), chiseled out of sandstone and given the high surface polish characteristic of this period. These figures stand out frontally from the stone base out of which they are carved, giving an impression of sculpture in the round but being, in fact, "flat-backed" stelae (stone slabs). Among the rare examples of true sculpture in the round are animals, such as lions or bulls, standing on

Asokan pillar capitals, also from this period. The gates (*toranas*) of the Great Stupa (50 BCE) at Sanchi, near present-day Bhopal in central India, carry what appear to be free-standing sculptures connecting architectural elements, but these, in fact, are slabs of stone rendered on both sides with back-to-back fronts, giving the impression of two reliefs brought together. Later (post-fourth-century) sculpture of India, occurring in temple settings, also features individual stelae, placed in niches or enshrined in a sanctum. A rare example of a popular image sculpted in the round from the early temple period is that of the theriomorphic representation of Varaha, the boar incarnation of Vishnu. Free standing and often colossal in scale, Varaha was evidently meant to be viewed from all sides during circumambulation. After the sixth century, Nandi, the bull-mount of Shiva, situated on an axis with the sanctum to enable a direct view of the shrine-image, is invariably carved in the round. But these are the exception rather than the rule, and it may be safely assumed that the predominant tradition in South Asian sculpture was relief.

The distinction among *chitra*, *ardhachitra*, and *chitrabhasha*, then, should be seen less as a clear separation of distinct modes of expression similar to sculpture, relief, and painting in the Western sense and more as a gradation in solid representation, painting being thought of as a constricted mode of sculpture, with relief occupying an intermediate zone. Several early texts describe painting as a form of illusionary relief, although actually flat. These include fifth-century literary texts, such as *Shakuntala*, where the eyes are said to stumble over the elevations and depressions of the picture surface, the reference being to the representations of landscape backgrounds, the voluptuous female form, or both. However, this illusion of depth is not to be confused with naturalistic illusionism in the Western sense, where the image is objectified through the systematic use of single-point perspective and chiaroscuro based on an external light source. In the South Asian case, the viewer is denied the experience of a privileged spatial inclusion in the three-dimensional reality of the image, an ontology (theory of the nature of being) of universal emergence, subsistence, and disappearance from or into a spaceless, timeless transcendental reality reinforced through the emphatic flatness of the background against which the play of relative depth occurs.


Sculpture

The history of relief sculpture (*ardhachitra*) in South Asia shows an interesting movement, especially when related to painting. Although sculpture in Mau-

ryan times (c. 324–c. 200 BCE) expresses the strongest feeling for plastic volume and, especially in the massive *yaksha* or *yakshini* stelae, comes close to sculpture in the round, relief proper appeared only from the second century BCE, with the establishment of an architectural context for images. Ananda Coomaraswamy pointed out that the early reliefs on the *vedika* (railing enclosure) walls of stupas, as, for example, at Bharhut (second century BCE), south of present-day Allahabad, in central India, approximate painting (*chitrabhasha*) more than solid sculpture (*chitra*), being closely compressed between the two planes of the wrought surface. On the *toranas* at Sanchi (first century BCE), there is a more heightened relief and a consequent movement in the direction of full sculpture from painting. This tendency continues through the Kushana (first century CE) and later Andhra (second century CE) periods, reaching its fullest expression of realistic emergent figural mass against the flat stone backdrop in the Gupta period and its aftermath (late fourth–sixth centuries). Subsequently, although the quality of the volume represented becomes more fluid and in some respects facile, relief continues to express a fullness of figural depth, the flat expanse of stone wall gradually replaced for its backdrop effect by the massive soaring temple structure, as in the medieval temples (tenth–twelfth centuries) of Khajuraho, Orissa, or the Hoysala kingdom.

In comparison with the shallow beginnings of relief sculpture, South Asian painting, in its earliest phases (i.e., in Caves 9 and 10 at Ajanta, second century BCE), is marked by an emphatic modeling, demonstrating its closeness to sculpture in the round. A similar impression of volume appears in relief much later, although in medieval times (eleventh–fifteenth centuries) a reversal of effect occurs in these two modes of expression. Now temple sculpture persists initially in its maintenance of high relief, whereas painting, particularly in the regions of Gujarat and Rajasthan, survives sculpture but becomes flattened. Coomaraswamy ascribed this flattening to psychological changes at the social level, relating to a shift of focus from a heroic will to a more reflective or contemplative intellect. In an article on *abbasa* (presentation), although Coomaraswamy equated this at first with a slackening of concentration (*shithila samadhi*), on further exploration, he advised a refusal of comparative judgment, treating the stylistic symptoms of an age phenomenologically in terms of the development of its own aesthetic.

Aesthetics of Sculpture Media used for sculpture included stucco, terra cotta, wood, stone, and metal. Of these the most significant surviving monumental



Detail of a stone relief sculpture at the Great Stupa of Sanchi built by Asoka. (ADAM WOOLFITT/CORBIS)

sculpture, occurring invariably in religious contexts, is that made in stone. By the late fourth century (Gupta period), a standardized aesthetic begins to become codified, and sculpture follows an elaborate set of technical and aesthetic guidelines. Figure sculpture predominates from this period, and prescriptive proportions and poetic metaphors, rather than live models, are used for translation into stone. Some of these visual metaphors are as follows: the facial outline should be like a hen's egg (*kukkutandavat*); the brows should resemble the arc of a bow (*caapaakaaram*); a variety of analogues could contextually shape the eyes, such as a bow (*caapaakaaram*), a lotus leaf or bud (*padmapatra*), the petal of the blue lotus (*nilotpala*), the eyes of a deer (*mrigaakriti*), or the belly of a fish (*matyodaram*). The neck should be shaped after the conch shell (*kambugriva*); the chin should resemble a mango seed (*aamra-vijam*); the nose should look like a parrot's beak (*shukanasa*); the pendant of the arm like an elephant's trunk (*gajatundaakriti*); the forearm should look like a young plantain tree (*baala kadali kaandam*); the male waist shaped after a lion's waist (*simbakati*);

the woman's waist after the middle of an hourglass-shaped drum (*damaru-madhyam*); the kneecap like the contour of a crab (*karkataakriti*); and the calf of the foot after a fish (*matsyaakriti*).

The *Visnudharmottara* also classifies a set of arrested stances in a rotational scheme of views for figures, ranging from a full frontal view, through a three-quarter view, a one-quarter view, a profile, and several fractional views, until it reaches a complete back view. Foreshortening, related to the preceding stances, is elaborated, as is a classification for feet stances. For each figural type, proportional measures are supplied, as are postures and gestures related to the subject of depiction.

In place of the frontality of Mauryan images, a variety of pleasing figural flexions were prescribed. These included the *samabhanga* or equipoise, with the plumb line passing through the middle of the body; the *abhanga* or gentle flexion, with a single break or bend in the plumb line; the popular *tribhanga* or triple flexion, which gave a sense of relaxed and rhythmic ease to the figure; and the extreme pliancy of *atibhanga*, with its maximum deviation from the plumb line. Similarly, sitting postures were also codified. For deep meditation, the *vajraparyanka* sitting posture was prescribed; for a more relaxed contemplation, the *ardhaparyankasana* was preferred; further relaxation while seated was depicted using the *mahaaraajaalilasana*. An attitude of comfort was designated by the *sukhasana* posture. A vocabulary of hieratic hand gestures, shared equally by art and dance, was also codified. Popular gestures included the *abhaya mudra*, made usually with the open right hand raised, palm outward, and signifying the gift of fearlessness; the *varada mudra*, made with an open right hand turned downward, palm outward, offering boons; the *dhyana mudra*, signifying meditation; and a number of more specialized gestures corresponding to iconographic context. The powers of gestures (*mudra*) were extolled as devices evoking special states of aesthetic emotion. According to aesthetic texts, where the hand goes, the eye follows; where the eye goes, the mind follows; where the mind goes, the mood follows; where the mood goes, there arises aesthetic mood (*rasa*).

The theory of *rasa*, or aesthetic mood, comes to be fused with the religious consciousness in these sculptural prescriptions. Thus, a classification of the range of emotional states that the sculptor needs to portray effectively is central to this systematization. These emotional states also make their first appearance in the *Visnudharmottara* and can be enumerated as the erotic (*srngaara*), the comic (*haasya*), the pathetic (*karunaa*), the heroic (*vira*), the intense (*raudra*), the terrible

(*bhayanaka*), the grotesque or odious (*bibhatsa*), the wonderful or mysterious (*adbhuta*), and the tranquil (*shaanta*).

In the depiction of deities, youth is glorified. Gods are ideally shown to be eternally sixteen years of age and are generally without a beard. A god or goddess may be occasionally shown as a child but never as old or infirm. Emaciated or obese images were avoided because, apart from aesthetic reasons, there were prevailing beliefs that worship of emaciated images would bring famine and that disease would strike on invocation of gross or obese images. Body, life, and mind controlled by spiritual power is the ideal portrayed in images of deities and heroes. Even in the midst of violent action or in erotic scenes, celestials and heroes are shown with an air of detached serenity and self-contained delight. Such an ideal is based on the practice of yoga, leading to a dynamic spiritual union. The features most expressive of this inward power and poise are the eyes, which undergo a development from wide open in the period preceding the fourth century to a half-closed state subsequently, signifying deep meditative concentration. Women, particularly goddesses (*yakshis*) and heroines (*nayikas*), are shown as voluptuous, with large hips and breasts, signifying creative fecundity, although here, too, tranquillity predominates, and the full maturity of young motherhood is preferred. Corresponding to the postural prescriptions, an elaborate iconography was prescribed for the depiction of supernatural beings. Particularly in Hindu sculpture, this included multiple hands, heads, and eyes to express superhuman omnipresence, omnipotence, and omniscience.

Depiction of Commoners In the depiction of commoners or lesser celestials, various activities with their characteristic postures are expressed. Among the activities most often shown are attendance upon kings and deities and performance of dance and music. The adversarial powers (*asuras*, *rakshasas*) are shown as powerful and grotesque, although in some cases human likeness is bestowed on them.

Painting

Chitrabhasha literally means the "appearance" or "semblance" of *chitra* and thus prioritizes sculpture as a form of visual expression whose semblance is caught in two dimensions through painting. However, the importance of painting in ancient South Asia is attested to by the fact that the *Kamasutra* lists painting as the fourth of its sixty-four courtly arts and by the references in literary and theoretical texts to the presence of *chitrashalas*, or art galleries, for the pleasure of royalty or urban citizens.



A fresco in Ajanta Cave, Maharashtra, with detail of a yaksha couple. (LINDSAY HEBBERD/CORBIS)

Most texts speak of three surfaces on which painting may be done. These are wall surfaces for murals, wooden board, and cloth. Of these, although a tradition in cloth painting (*pata-chitra*) is alive to this day (for example, in Orissa), only a few surviving murals (as at Ajanta) can be dated to an antiquity contemporary with textual sources such as the *Visnudharmottara*.

Painting Techniques Several theoretical texts provide glimpses of the techniques in use for painting. Of these, the *Samaraangana Sutradhara*, a text from the first half of the eleventh century, carries one of the most elaborate and comprehensive accounts of the techniques of painting, codified as the eight limbs (*ashta-angaani*) of painting. These are:

1. *Vartikaa*, or preparation of the "crayon" with which initial outlining of the figures to be painted will be done.

2. *Bhumibandhanam*, or preparation of the ground, enumerated as mentioned into the three surfaces—wall surface, wooden board, and cloth. In the case of murals, where texts imply a use of both tempera and *fresco-secco* (lime medium) techniques, this preparation is usually a mud plaster, sometimes followed by a lime plaster, both reinforced with vegetable fibers.

3. *Lepyakarma*, or priming, where the prepared ground is smoothed and made ready for holding paint.

4. *Rekhakarma*, or the process of making the first line sketch. In discussing this step, most texts

emphasize the need for the artist to visualize first the image in detail and with clarity. This act, equated with yogic concentration, is often made the expressive basis for the quality of pictorial realization, a deficient image being attributed to slack meditation. The first outline is drawn with the *var-tikaa*, or "crayon"; a second outline is then with a medium-sized brush carrying a pigment derived from ocher.

5. *Karsakarma* (also called *varnakarma*), or the preparation of colors. There is some variation in texts (sometimes in the same text) on the primary colors to be used. For example, the *Visnudharmottara* mentions white, yellow, red, black, and blue and, elsewhere, white, red, yellow, black, and green. The *Chitralakshana* section of the *Shilparatna* mentions white, yellow, red, black, and blue. Because, as the *Visnudharmottara* acknowledges, blue and yellow may be mixed to make green, most scholars take the five primary colors to include blue but not green. The *Visnudharmottara* mentions the minerals used for paints as gold, silver, copper, mica, lapis lazuli, tin, yellow orpiment, lime, red lake, cinnabar, and indigo. The metal colors are said to be laid on as foil or liquefied. The twelfth-century *Manosollasa* is more explicit about the relationship of color to source. Thus white is derived from conch shell, crimson from cinnabar, red from Asian sumac (*Rhus verniciflua*), blood red from ocher, yellow from orpiment, and black from lampblack.

6. *Vartanaa*, or modeling. This is among the most important aspects of *chitrabbasha* because it provides the illusion of three-dimensionality that makes the painting a "semblance of sculpture." The effect of depth is obtained through three devices: *patraka*, or cross-hatching, *binduka*, or stippling, and *hairika*, which Sivaramamurti interpreted as a corruption of *raikbika* and which means either fine lines or modulated outline. Mention is made of the use of brighter shades to depict higher grounds and darker shades to depict lower. Indian painting does not use single-point perspective or light and shade to create a consistent naturalistic illusion.

7. *Lekbakarma*, or brushwork. The brush is known as *lekbani* and is differentiated into five types according to thickness. The finest brushes are made from bark fibers and the rest from hair taken from a bull's ear or a mule's mane. Bamboo sticks, attached to the hair with lac resin, are used for handles. In tempera painting, the color is bound by using animal media derived from buffalo hide or elephant hide. In case of *fresco-secco*, lime is used as the binding medium. In the *Vishnudharmottara*, the brushed line is also strongly related to inner concentration. The ideal line is characterized as tranquil (*susnigdha*), distinct (*vispashta*), and uncrooked (*ajibma*).

8. *Dvichakarma* (*dvi cha karma*), or retouching. This is the final stage of painting, when highlights are added, particularly for surfaces, ornamentation, expression of depth, or final outlining.

Painting shares with sculpture elaborate classifications for types of figures relating to physiognomy and social differentiation. For each figural type, proportional measures are supplied, as are postures and gestures related to the subject of depiction. A vocabulary of metaphors related to body parts is also developed. All of these classifications and visual similitudes are prescriptive in nature and meant both to standardize figurative expression in a collective context of practice and to guide visualization and execution in a culture that, avoiding live models, turns the artistic gaze within. It is for this reason that these measures are termed *pramanani* (evidentiary standards or guidelines).

Debashish Banerji

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CHITTAGONG (1991 pop. 1.4 million). Chittagong is the primary port and second largest manufacturing city in Bangladesh. It is located on coast of the Bay of Bengal, 164 miles southeast of Dhaka. Previously a center of Buddhism, Chittagong came under the rule of the Hindu kings of the Sena dynasty in the twelfth century CE. In 1299, it was occupied by Muslim invaders, and by the early fourteenth century it had been incorporated into the Delhi sultanate (1192–1526). It was subsequently controlled by Portuguese pirates and Arakanese conquerors before passing under the Mughal rule in 1666 and British rule a century later. In 1947, after Indian independence, Chittagong became part of the newly created Pakistan. It has been part of Bangladesh since December 1971, when Bangladesh won its liberation struggle against West Pakistan.

Chittagong today has several distinct regions: the Old City, the British City, and the Modern City. The oldest part of the city is the Sadarghat on the banks of the Karnaphuli River. Near the Old City is the British City, now the business center of Chittagaong. The Modern City consists of contemporary buildings, as well as steel mills, an oil refinery, and cigarette factories. Chittagong also has several mosques, the most famous of which is Qadam Mubarak, dating from 1336.

Sanjukta Das Gupta

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CH'OE NAMSON (1890–1957), Korean writer, publisher, historian. A leading intellectual of the early twentieth century, Ch'oe Namson introduced modern free-verse poetry, worked to educate Korea's youth and edited numerous classical Korean works, and outlined a nationalistic view on Korean history. Born in Seoul in 1890, he first received a traditional education and later studied history and geography in Japan. Returning to Korea in 1906, he established himself as a publisher and in 1908 published Korea's first popular modern magazine *Sonyon* (Youth, 1908–1911), a monthly magazine that introduced the Western world to Korean youth. The first issues contained his most famous literary piece, the poem "From the Sea to the Young."

Ch'oe Namson drafted the Declaration of Independence on 1 March 1919, for which he was arrested by the Japanese colonial government but later released in 1921. He published several influential articles on Korean culture, among which the most famous are "A Treatise on Tan'gun" (1926) and "A Treatise on Purham Culture" (1927). His reputation as a nationalist was tarnished, however, when he later collaborated with the colonial government and published pro-Japanese articles and speeches. In 1949 he was arrested for his pro-Japanese activities but was soon released due to illness. He continued to edit classical Korean works until his death in 1957 of a cerebral hemorrhage.

Anders Karlsson

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CHOLA Chola (or Cola) was one of three prominent medieval kingdoms in southern India, the others being Chera and Pandya. The realm of the Cholas (Cholamandalam in the Tamil language) centered on the Coromandel coast, the east coast of the modern state of Tamil Nadu, and the lower valley of the Kaveri River. Already in the emperor Asoka's time (c. 265–238 BCE) Chola was mentioned in an inscription as an independent kingdom to which Buddhist missionaries were sent. The earliest historically known king was Karikkal (ruled c. 100 CE), who laid the foun-

datations of the great coastal emporium of Puhar (Kaveripattinam), fought a protracted war with Sri Lanka, and used Ceylonese laborers to build a 160-kilometer embankment along the Kaveri.

When the Chinese traveler Xien Qang visited the area in the seventh century, the dynasty had faded into obscurity, and the kingdom had shrunk. A powerful Chola dynasty reemerged, however, in the reign of Rajaditya I (947–949). Earlier in the tenth century several Chola kings had defeated the Pallava dynasty as well as the combined Pandyan and Sinhalese armies at Vellore. Later Chola rulers incorporated northern Sri Lanka into the kingdom; in 1025 King Rajendra's navy conquered the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Although toward the end of Kulottunga I's reign (1070–1120) the Hoysalas took some Chola territory, the king maintained trade contacts overseas with Srivijaya, perhaps even with China and the Khmers. The resurgence of the Pandyan dynasty threatened the Cholas, however, and Kulottunga III (reigned 1178–1218) found himself in a complex struggle with the Pandyas, Cheras, and Sri Lankans. At the end of his reign the Pandyas gained a notable victory. In 1279 during the reign of the last Chola ruler, Rajendra IV (reigned 1246–1279), the Pandyas' defeat of both the Cholas and the Hoysalas marked the end of the Chola kingdom. In 1310 Malik Kafur—a eunuch slave who had become the most trusted general of Sultan Ala-ud-din Khalji—overran these former Chola territories, which were absorbed into the Vijayanagar empire.

Paul Hockings

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CH'ONDOGYO Ch'ondogyo (Religion of the Heavenly Way) is the oldest organized indigenous religion of Korea. Founded in 1860 by Ch'oe Che-u (1824–1864) as Tonghak (Eastern Learning), it changed its name to Ch'ondogyo in 1905.

The god of Ch'ondogyo is usually referred to as Hanullim, a vernacular Korean term for "Lord of Heaven." Hanullim is not depicted as a deity residing in Heaven above, however. In fact, he is not depicted at all. There are no statues or paintings of God in Ch'ondogyo worship halls. That is because Ch'ondogyo perceives Hanullim as dwelling within the human heart.

The founder is said to have conversed with God and may have conceived of God as a transcendental personality. He emphasized the moral obligation of

men and women to serve God. However, Ch'oe Che-u's disciple and successor, Ch'oe Si-hyong (1827–1898), added that just as people should serve God, they should also serve their fellow human beings. Son Pyong-hui (1861–1921), the third man to head the religion, amplified that statement with the phrase "God dwells within each and every human being." This focus on the immanence of God has become a core tenet of Ch'ondogyo doctrine.

Because of this focus on God within, Ch'ondogyo worship services include moments of silent prayer in addition to hymns, sermons, and chants. Silent prayer is the norm because, since God dwells within the human heart, he is best addressed internally.

Ch'ondogyo teachings are summed up in a twenty-one-syllable formula that believers are enjoined to chant daily. That formula reminds men and women that they are filled with the animating presence of the Lord of Heaven and that they should always be mindful of his presence within, a presence that helps them become one not only with God but also with all creation. The doctrines of Ch'ondogyo are expounded upon further in *Ch'ondogyo kyongjon* (Sacred Writings of Ch'ondogyo). It contains the poems, essays, and sermons of the three founding patriarchs of Ch'ondogyo: Ch'oe Che-u, Ch'oe Si-hyong, and Son Pyong-hui.

At the end of the twentieth century, Ch'ondogyo claimed to have over 1 million followers in Korea and close to three hundred worship halls, although a government census found fewer than thirty thousand South Koreans who reported that they were members of Ch'ondogyo.

Don Baker

See also: **Tonghak**

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CH'ONGJIN (2000 est. pop. 1 million). Ch'ongjin is the capital of North Hamgyong Province in North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea). Ch'ongjin is a port city of approximately 275 square kilometers, located on the Sea of Japan (East Sea) about 100 kilometers south of the border between North Korea and Russia. The city became prominent with the establishment of its port in 1908. Ch'ongjin

grew in importance with the opening of the Hamgyong rail line connecting Pyongyang and the nearby city of Rajin. Ch'ongjin has been the provincial capital since 1944.

The port of Ch'ongjin accounts for much of the region's commerce. It provides a convenient port for trade between China and Japan. The port is connected by rail to the Musan iron mine, which exports 8 million tons of ore annually. The nearby Rajin-Sonbong Free Trade Zone also benefits from its close proximity to the port.

The region also hosts industries producing metals, machinery, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals. Ch'ongjin and North Hamgyong Province are also noted for their fisheries. Ch'ongjin is home as well to Ch'ongam Mountain, three hot springs, a fortress dating to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and prehistoric artifacts dating to before 3000 BCE.

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CHONGQING (1992 est. pop. 3.8 million). Chongqing, which is the largest city in China's Sichuan Province, is situated where the Jialing River flows into the Chang (Yangtze) River in the southeastern part of Sichuan. The old city, which was the main city in the ancient state of Ba, was originally built on a promontory between the two rivers. Chongqing remained on the fringe of the Chinese empire until the fourteenth century. During the Japanese occupation of eastern China (1937–1945), the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang) moved China's capital to Chongqing, and important industries followed. From the 1950s, Chongqing became a center for trade and transportation, and bridges and railways were built, making the city an important river port for transshipments from railways to the far cheaper transport via the Chang River to the east. Chongqing is also one of the main industrial centers in southwestern China, with such heavy industries as iron works and steel mills, and the city manufactures motorcycles, cars, and heavy machinery. Chemical and electronic industries as well as textile and food processing industries are also located there. In the 1980s Chongqing was chosen as model city for market economics to attract foreign invest-

ments, and in 1997 the city became an independent municipality directly under the central government.

Bent Nielsen

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CH'ONMIN *Ch'onmin* was the lowest social class in Korean society from the seventh to the nineteenth centuries. As with the three other social classes (the *yangban*, or elite; the *nongmin*, or farmers; and the *sangmin*, or freeborn commoners), membership in the *ch'onmin* marked one permanently. The *ch'onmin* class included all people doing dishonorable work; slaves, actors, entertainers, shamans, and butchers were all *ch'onmin*. Class governed the dress, language, and marriage and funeral ceremonies of the people, and relations between the classes were restricted. The people who belonged to the *ch'onmin* class were restricted in where they could live to areas assigned by the government.

Among the *ch'onmin* groups, slaves were treated the worst. They were registered as personal property and were owned entirely by the master, who had the right to trade and inherit them. During the latter years of the Choson dynasty (1392–1910), there were several emancipation movements that resulted in freeing *ch'onmin* to live wherever they pleased. In 1894 the *Kabo* reform policy was launched to prohibit the registration and trading of slaves; this policy finally proclaimed the release of all slaves. Social discrimination against the ex-slaves continued for a long time, but is today no longer an issue.

Seong-Sook Yim

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CHORMAQAN, NOYAN (1200–1240), Mongolian general. Chormaqan Noyan led the armies of the Mongol empire across the Amu Dar'ya River and into the area of present-day Iran in 1230, conquering much of what would later be the Il-Khanate (a Mongol dynasty that ruled in Persia from 1256 to 1353). Genghis Khan (1165–1227) originally delivered the

orders for this invasion in 1221 during the war against the Khwarizm empire, which lay on the lower Amu Dar'ya River, but a rebellion delayed the campaign. Chormaqan served in this earlier campaign as a *qorchi* (quiver bearer) for Genghis Khan's bodyguard.

Ogodei (1185–1241), the son and successor of Genghis Khan, renewed the command in 1229. Chormaqan's orders were to expand the Mongol empire and hunt down Jalal al-Din Khwarazmshah (d.1230–1231), the last sultan of the Khwarizm empire. While a subordinate commander, Taimaz, pursued Jalal al-Din, Chormaqan efficiently secured the conquest of Iran through force and diplomacy. By 1232, Iran was firmly under Mongol control.

In 1234, Chormaqan turned his attention to the region of Transcaucasia, the region of modern Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and parts of Turkey. After a five-year campaign, Chormaqan successfully conquered Transcaucasia. He ruled as the military governor for two years until he died. His wife Altan Khatun (flourished 1220–1245) succeeded him as regent until one of his lieutenants, Baiju (flourished 1230–1260), was named his successor.

Timothy May

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CHOSHU EXPEDITIONS Punitive expeditions were launched by the Tokugawa shogunate against the domain of Choshu (located in present-day Yamaguchi Prefecture) in 1864 and 1865. The first was a limited success, the second a bitter failure—and a major factor in the fall of the shogunate in the Meiji Restoration of 1867–1868.

Choshu, a domain long hostile to the Tokugawa government, initially drew the ire of the shogunate in the early 1860s when pro-imperial reformers took

control of the domain's capital, Kyoto. In 1863 troops from the domains of Satsuma and Aizu carried out a coup d'état at the court, driving Choshu forces out of the city. Choshu troops marched on Kyoto the following year and were roundly defeated. Spurred to action, the shogunate, by November 1864, had amassed a punitive force of 150,000 samurai from several domains around Choshu's borders. After scattered fighting, Choshu agreed to a limited surrender the following January. Conservative Choshu power holders ordered the execution of three "house elders" and the dissolution of the mixed samurai/peasant rifle troops that had attacked Kyoto. But the radical leaders of the mixed units refused to disband and instead fought the domain government in the Choshu Civil War of 1865. The war brought to power a reformist government committed to the shogunate's overthrow. It was staffed by many lower-ranking samurai who would play prominent roles in national government after 1868, such as Ito Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo.

In 1865 Shogun Tokugawa Iemochi led a second expedition to topple the new Choshu government but found circumstances quite different from those of two years earlier. Several domains that had participated in the first expedition refused to contribute troops to the second, and Choshu completed a secret alliance with the powerful Satsuma domain before the shogunate forces arrived to fight. Buoyed by this alliance, as well as the purchase of some 10,000 Western rifles (some from the recently ended American Civil War), the outnumbered Choshu forces easily defeated the shogun's troops. The defeat made it clear that the Tokugawa family's hegemony was over. In 1867–1868 Choshu and Satsuma installed the boy emperor Mutsuhito as the head of a new national government in what is called the Meiji Restoration.

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CHOSON KINGDOM Governing the Korean peninsula for over five hundred years (1392–1910), the Choson kingdom was the final stage of dynastic rule in Korea. Also known as the Choson dynasty or Yi dynasty, this era differed from that of its predecessor, the Koryo kingdom (918–1392), in that it formed a highly centralized government under royal authority with the influence of aristocrat-bureaucrats. The Choson king-



KOREAN KINGDOMS AND DYNASTIES

Koguryo kingdom (37 BCE–668 CE)
Paekche kingdom (18 BCE–663 CE)
Shilla kingdom (57 BCE–935 CE)
Unified Shilla (668–935 CE)
Koryo kingdom (dynasty) (918–1392)
Choson dynasty or Yi dynasty (1392–1910)

dom established Confucian rule that continued throughout the entirety of the reign of its twenty-seven kings. During the course of more than five centuries, Choson experienced periods of great development, foreign invasion, factional infighting, and self-isolation from the outside world.

Early Choson (1392–1592)

The Choson kingdom began with a Koryo general, Yi Song-gye (1335–1408), seizing military and political power and eventually placing himself on the throne. Neo-Confucian ideology and land reforms, which controlled land accumulation by the *yangban* (office-holding aristocrats) and improved the livelihood of the peasants, were instituted. From the beginning, the *yangban* had the right to intervene in the governmental decision making of the monarchy. Confucian classics were printed with movable metal type to further Confucian learning for the well-being of the newly founded state.

King Sejong the Great (1397–1450), the son of Yi Song-gye and the most renowned of Choson's kings, ruled during a period of marked advancement in numerous fields. He showed great concern for the peasant farmers, providing them with flood and drought relief as well as tax relief. Marked development in science, agriculture, administration, economics, medicine, music, and the humanities also took place. The most noted of his achievements was the creation of the phonetic alphabet for the Korean language, hangul, which enabled the illiterate peasantry to learn to read. Prior to this, all writing was in Chinese characters, which were inaccessible to the uneducated masses. It wasn't until the twentieth century, though, that the popularity of hangul overtook that of Chinese characters.

The century to follow was marked by instability and a decline in prosperity due to power struggles between the monarchy and the *yangban* bureaucrats. To offset *yangban* power gains, royal favor was shown to-

ward Buddhist and Taoist religious orders, and the literati *yangban* were suppressed; as the throne changed hands, however, there was a resurgence of Neo-Confucian rule and *yangban* influence in the royal court and administrative affairs. During this time, the plight of the peasant worsened and the power of the kingdom weakened.

Choson maintained almost no international trade or political ties, but was drawn into international affairs when Japanese warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536–1598) requested Choson's aid in attacking Ming China to consolidate his power at home. Choson refused and for this was brutally and repeatedly attacked during by Hideyoshi from 1592 through 1598. The Japanese invaders attained initial success in occupying strategic land areas but met stiffer resistance on the seas. Choson's most renowned military leader, Yi Sin-sin (1545–1598), devastated the Japanese fleet and its supply lines, eventually forcing a Japanese withdrawal. If it had not been for the ingenious warfare strategies of Commander Yi and his ironclad *kobukson* (turtle ships), Japan would almost assuredly have wrested control of the peninsula from Choson.

The war took a heavy toll on Choson—heavy loss of life, the abduction of artisans and technicians, the devastation of farming land, and the destruction of government records and cultural artifacts. Taking advantage of Choson's weakened state, the Manchus to the north, who had gained control of China, demanded that Choson acknowledge his suzerainty. When Choson refused, the Manchus attacked and overwhelmed Choson in a relatively short war; Chinese suzerainty was acknowledged, as it had been before the Manchu invasions.

Later Choson (1592–1910)

The destruction caused by the wars with the Japanese and the Manchus brought great social and economic upheaval. The cost of reconstruction was high and government financial difficulty led to repeated tax increases and the sale of aristocratic titles. The plight of the peasantry worsened, while the rise of a wealthy merchant class led to a new notion of wealth—mercantile wealth—as well as to the decline of the *yangban* society. All of these factors contributed to the rise of a new generation of scholars critical of the traditional Neo-Confucian order. This reformist school started the Sirhak (Practical Learning) movement in the seventeenth century and advocated the promotion of utilitarian knowledge, as well as political, economic, and educational reforms to promote political integrity, economic stability, and social accord. They had a true concern for the well-being of the common people.

The schism led to fierce factional strife among the *yangban* during the latter half of the seventeenth century. Realizing the seriousness of the situation, King Yongjo (1694–1776) effected a series of reforms. These reforms were intended to end factional feuding, improve the life of the peasants and commoners, and reassert the Confucian monarchy; it enjoyed, however, only limited success. Mercantile activities increased rapidly, with the *yangban* also becoming involved in activities that they once had disdained. The economy and social conditions improved, and, in the early nineteenth century, Western ideas of finance reform were seriously considered, though never implemented due to factional strife.

During first half of the nineteenth century, drought and flood fiercely undermined agricultural productivity, causing widespread famine. Excessive taxes were levied by a chronically debt-ridden government, exploiting the destitute farmers. These intolerable natural and social conditions led to peasant revolts in the northern part of the kingdom in 1812 and in the southern part in 1862. The adverse social conditions also gave rise in the mid-nineteenth century to a new ideology, Tonghak (Eastern Learning), which appealed to the farming class. It sought to rescue the peasantry from poverty and social unrest and to restore political and social stability throughout the kingdom. To succeed in this, it opposed government corruption, the privileged *yangban* class, social injustice, and Sohak (Western Learning), which manifested itself mainly in Catholicism, which had entered Korea in 1593 and had begun to take root among the populace in the late eighteenth century.

Attempts by American and French naval vessels to open Choson to commerce led to the adoption of a policy of isolation in 1871. In 1876, backed by naval force, Japan coerced the signing of a treaty establish-



HWASEONG—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Hwaseong—an eighteenth-century fort built around Suwon, the capital of Korea's Choson kingdom—was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1997. Six kilometers of wall, artillery towers, and gates still remain.

ing diplomatic and commercial relations between the two countries. In order to offset the Japanese influence in militarily weak Choson, similar treaties were soon signed with the United States and other Western nations. Choson sent diplomatic missions to Japan and the United States, and an influx of North American Protestant missionaries began.

This newfound knowledge of the outside world led to a progressive movement by young scholars to modernize the government and bring about social reforms. As efforts at modernization were blocked by government officials, the progressives, with Japanese support, resorted in 1884 to a coup, which was put down only with Chinese assistance. Ten years later, the Tonghak rebellion spread throughout the country and brought both Japanese and Chinese troops to Choson.

Japan, China, and Russia were now all vying for influence on the peninsula. Chinese influence was quickly removed by Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese war (1894–1895). In 1895, the Japanese instigated the assassination of the influential queen consort, Queen Min (1851–1895), the real power behind the throne, to increase their influence. With victory in the Russo-Japanese war (1904–1905), Japan was now unrivaled on the peninsula, and Choson had no choice but to become a Japanese protectorate. Annexation by Japan in 1910 brought an end to the kingdom of Choson and the beginning of thirty-five years of colonial rule.

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CHOU DYNASTY. See **Zhou Dynasty**.

CHOU EN-LAI. See **Zhou Enlai**.

CHOYBALSAN, HORLOOGIYN (1895–1952), Prime minister of Mongolia. Choybalsan was born in Achit Beysiyn (now the city of Choybalsan) in the Tsetsen Khan aymag (now Dornod province) of Mongolia. After running away from a Buddhist monastery at age seventeen, Choybalsan worked a variety of jobs while attending the Russian School for Translators in Nisfel Khuree, as Ulaanbaatar was then called. While attending school in Russia, he became one of the founding members of the Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Party, which established contact with the Bolsheviks.

After the successful Mongolian Communist revolution in 1921, Choybalsan attended a military academy in Moscow and eventually became the commander in chief of the Mongolian army. He then held several posts in the Mongolian government, ranging from foreign minister to minister of war. In 1939, however, Choybalsan obtained the position of prime minister and held it until his death in 1952.

Choybalsan was a close friend of Josef Stalin and is often referred to as Mongolia's Stalin. Like Stalin, he developed a cult of personality and purged thousands of dissidents. The death toll is still uncertain. In 1962, ten years after Choybalsan's death, the MPRP Central Committee admitted that many innocent people died as a result of his misconduct.

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CHRISTIANITY. See **Belo, Bishop Carlos; Catholicism, Roman—Philippines; Catholicism,**

Roman—Vietnam; Eastern Orthodox Church—Asia; Endo Shusaku; Jesuits—India; Ricci, Matteo; Oriental Orthodox Church; Protestant Fundamentalism—Southeast Asia; Saint Paul

CHRISTIANITY—CENTRAL ASIA In numbers of adherents, Christianity is Central Asia's second major religion after Islam. Missionaries, merchants, scholars, and diplomatic envoys traveling from Europe to the Far East all contributed to the penetration of Christianity to Central Asia. Over time, Christianity grew and consolidated itself to reach the present state of acceptance and coexistence with Islam. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the newly independent states of Central Asia guaranteed their populations religious freedom. Nevertheless, recently a new wave of religious regulation has appeared in a number of those states. Some fear that for security reasons new restrictions on religion may be imposed in the fight against Islamic fundamentalism.

The Early Years of Central Asian Christianity

The earliest Christian community in Central Asia emerged in what is now Iran in about 200 CE. Between the fourth and sixth century Christians were also found in China and Mongolia and in the seventh century in the present Central Asian Region. Many of the Turks who in the 1800s served in the army of the Governor of Bukhara (now in Uzbekistan) bore the sign of the cross on their foreheads. Coins and ornaments of the period also bore this cross-like image.

New information has come to light since the 1990s concerning the earlier stages of Christianity in Central Asia, and concerning a Christian community in the city of Merv in Turkmenistan in particular. At the Council of Constantinople (381 CE), the community was the first one granted metropolitan status (that is, it became an episcopal center). This was thanks to Bar Shaba (third century CE), one of the first active promoters of the Eastern Church, which appeared soon after the Roman Empire split in the fourth century. Exiled with his wife from Iran to Merv for his faith, Bar Shaba converted many people to Christianity. He constructed several churches in and near the city, and assigned them preachers, so that they could care for the people and perform religious services.

Churches and monasteries were built and ecclesiastical centers functioned. In Asia, Christians were regarded as excellent doctors, scribes, scholars, diplomats, and theologians, and often included top government officials. The Sogdian period from the sixth to the tenth centuries was the golden age of the Nesto-

rian Christians (Christians who emphasized the independence of Christ's human nature and his divine nature), who left traces of their presence all over Central Asia.

Another important historical site is the Armenian abbey on the shore of lake Issyk-Kul in Kyrgyzstan. According to legend, this is the location of the grave of Saint Matthew. On a hill to the south of Samarqand in Uzbekistan, along with various Christian symbols, a chancel of fire was found. As this is a Zoroastrian symbol, it shows that the two religions mingled.

Roman Catholic Forays into Central Asia and the Rise of Islam

An apostolic nuncio to the Tartars was appointed in April 1245 by Pope Innocent IV and made a long journey through Central Asia. His was probably one of the first Catholic diplomatic missions to the Far East. The Franciscan friar Giovanni da Pian del Carmine, a contemporary and disciple of Saint Francis of Assisi, reached the court of the Great Khan Guyuk in 1246, nearly thirty years before Marco Polo. But Venetians and Genoese merchants were already in Central Asia with their goods and their Catholic faith, and records indicate that Christianity was already current there. During his journey, the friar learned that Prince Michael of Tchernigov, a fervent Christian (later made Saint Michael of Russia) and his assistant Theodore (later Saint Theodore of Russia) had been executed for refusing to recognize the divinity of Genghis Khan. Another Franciscan, the German friar William of Rubruck, visited the area in 1253.

By the thirteenth century, Asia was conquered by the Mongolian Tartars, and Islam started to displace all other religions. But Muslims respected Christians and other "people of the book" and never interfered with their rites; they simply taxed them as foreigners. By the sixteenth century, Christianity in Central Asia came almost to a standstill, and visits by Roman Catholic missionaries became rare.

Eastern Orthodox Christianity in Central Asia

At the end of the seventeenth century, the first Russian settlers appeared in eastern Kazakhstan. In their new land, Russian peasants found an escape from serfdom, and Old Believers (those who refused to accept mid-seventeenth-century reforms to the Russian Orthodox Church) found a break from religious oppression. From the mid-nineteenth century, a new era of Christianity began in Central Asia, arising from the political interest of the Russian Empire in its southern borders. Unusual churches appeared—army

garrison churches, mobile vans that serviced the railway builders, and later, the first permanent church—in Kazakhstan, in 1847.

Poor migrants, most of them orthodox Christians, rushed to Asia in the hope of finding free land, jobs, and markets. The officialdom, military officers, and craftspeople included many Germans, Poles, and Lithuanians, who were Catholics and Lutherans. A Mennonite group established three different settlements in today's Kyrgyzstan. In addition, a community of Armenian Christians was engaged in winemaking, silkworm breeding, and trade. The inflow of Christians increased when prisoners and clergymen of World War I—Hungarians, Czechs, Poles, and Austrians—were brought here.

In 1871, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church and the State Council of Russia established the Turkestan eparchy with headquarters in Vernyi (now Almaty), and after 1916, in Tashkent. In order to survive, the eparchy—situated in predominantly Is-



Kazakh women pray during a mass celebrated by Pope John Paul II during his visit to Kazakhstan in September 2001. (AFP/CORBIS)

lamic territory and uniting a diverse community—had to find its own path. The picture was further confused a few years later by the problems of regulating the different religions' relations with the Soviet authorities. The Orthodox communities, whose numbers decreased sharply, were not allowed to keep their property, which was declared the common property of the people. Soviet authorities disbanded the Catholic and Lutheran communities. Religious celebrations were replaced by revolutionary holidays. A wave of terror was launched against the clergy.

The Communist attitude toward the Russian Orthodox Church changed somewhat during the World War II, when the Church played a big propaganda role in defending the motherland. But the negative view of any type of religion persisted until the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the collapse of the Soviet system finally removed the trammels of atheism.

Christianity in Central Asia in the Twenty-First Century

Today Christians of different denominations—Russian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Adventist, Baptist, evangelical, and others—are all actively involved in their pastoral activity and most of them are officially registered in the nations of Central Asia. Islam and Christianity coexist peacefully. Relative stability was achieved at the cost of compromises that the official church had to make with the state during the Soviet period and afterward. Today Christian festivities are celebrated not only by Central Asian Christians but also by people of other faiths.

In autumn 1996, in the presence of the holy patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, Aleksei II, Christians celebrated the 125th anniversary of the Tashkent-Central Asian eparchy. In the same period the Vatican also established a general nunciature (papal diplomatic mission) in Almaty (Kazakhstan), in charge of all Central Asian states and with missions in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.

On a darker note, a new wave of religious restrictions has appeared in various Central Asian countries. The secular governments are trying to protect themselves against a wave of Islamic fundamentalism, fearing terrorism and calls for an Islamic state in Central Asia. This new trend is being carefully watched by the democratic institutions in the West and may represent a sad new page in the history of Christianity's development in Central Asia.

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CHRISTIANITY—CHINA Christians have been trying to convert the Chinese for over a thousand years. Although Christians make up only a small percentage of the Chinese population, Christianity is an established minority religion in China, and Chinese and foreign Christians have had a great impact on China's modern history.

The Jesuits in China

Christianity first came to China in the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) when Nestorians established churches in Changan, but the first major attempt at Christianizing China came from the Jesuits. The most important early Jesuit was Matteo Ricci (1552–1610), who arrived in China in 1582. The Jesuits hoped to convert China beginning with the elite, and they managed to establish themselves at court and served the Ming and Qing emperors as astronomers, painters, and weapons makers. The Jesuits won some converts, as did their rivals the Franciscans, who concentrated on the lower classes, but their work was undermined by growing Confucian hostility to Christian philosophy and the long-running Rites Controversy, which ended with a papal decree that Chinese Christians could no longer participate in ancestor worship. In 1724, the emperor declared Catholicism a perverse sect, similar to the White Lotus, a Buddhist sect that was often at odds with the imperial government. The prohibitions against Catholicism were usually not rigorously enforced, but the numbers of Catholics fell. Catholicism remained a viable minority religion in a number of areas, but the greatest significance of the Jesuit interlude was the intellectual exchanges between China and Europe it facilitated.

Nineteenth-Century Missionary Activity in China

The next great attempt at the conversion of China began in the nineteenth century and involved both Catholics and Protestants. The attempts to convert China were only one part of a larger Euro-American drive to evangelize the non-Christian world, and the missionaries were also only part of a larger effort to control and transform China. For at least some of the missionaries the task of making China a modern nation was at least as important as making it a Christian

one. Missionaries played a significant role in helping build a new nation, but their connection to foreign imperialism loomed large in the eyes of many Chinese.

In the early nineteenth century, there was a revival of interest in missionary work that led to the creation of bodies like the French Catholic Society for the Propagation of the Faith and the London Missionary Society. Under the Canton system, which restricted where foreign traders could live, foreign missionaries could reside only in Macao and Canton, and until the Treaty of Tientsin (Tianjin) their efforts were mostly confined to translating and publishing Christian works. By 1900, however, there were 886 Catholic priests in China, and in 1905, there were over 3,000 Protestant missionaries, members of 63 missionary societies.

Problems of Acceptance

The presence of missionaries often created trouble at the local level. The gentry resented the political privileges that the treaty system gave the missionaries and saw them as agents of their governments, a charge that was sometimes true. The Christians were also associated in the popular mind with the opium trade and the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864). Anti-Christian violence was not uncommon. Although missionaries could sometimes reside in China for years without trouble, incidents like the Tianjin Massacre of 1870, which was sparked by rumors that Christian missionaries were using the blood of Chinese infants in their rituals, were also possible. The greatest anti-Christian outbreak was the Boxer Rebellion of 1899–1900, which tied together anti-Christian and anti-Imperialist sentiments.

In addition to problems simply maintaining their presence in China, the missions had far less success in converting the Chinese than had been hoped. Most of the missionaries could count only a handful of converts after years of work, and almost all the financial support for their efforts came from their home countries. At the beginning of the twentieth century there were 700,000 Chinese Catholics and 100,000 Protestants. For most Chinese the foreign religion was simply too foreign, requiring an end to ancestor worship and withdrawal from the religious rituals that defined local communities.

Christians and Education

Like the Jesuits before them, the nineteenth-century missionaries were important cultural conduits between China and the West. In addition to producing religious tracts, they were responsible for translations of many Western books into Chinese, bilingual



RELIGION IN CHINA FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A PROTESTANT MISSIONARY

"But whether a Chinaman is a Confucian, Taoist, or a Buddhist, he considers it to be his first duty to sacrifice to his ancestors. This Ancestral Worship, as it is called, is dearer to hearts of Chinese than any other kind of worship. They say that the idols belong to everybody, but their ancestors are their own, therefore they worship them. Of course it is only a dead ancestor who is worshipped; he is in the spirit-world and is supposed to have power over his living relatives, who think that he will cause some evil to fall upon them unless they please him by offering him sacrifices and worship. The relatives also think the departed spirit will in some way be better for these sacrifices. The worship is carried out at the graves and before the ancestral tablets which are put up to the memory of the departed in almost every house.

"In the face of all this the missionaries are bravely advancing, carrying the message of the Gospel into the strongholds of superstition and idolatry. They have made such progress during the last fifty years, that whereas just before the accession of Queen Victoria there were scarcely a dozen Protestant Christians in the land, to-day there are upwards of a hundred thousand."

Source: Mary Isabella Bryson. (1890) *Child Life in China*. London: William Clowes and Sons, Limited, 21–22.

dictionaries, and translation of the Chinese classics into English. James Legge, one of the first to undertake translations of the Chinese classics into English, justified his work on the ground that it was only by understanding the Chinese that missionaries could convert them; he and his compatriots also laid the foundations for the study of China in the West. It was through education and medicine that Christians first began to find a role for themselves in China. Christian-run hospitals were the first to introduce modern medicine to China and Christian schools provided education in Western subjects to a growing number of Chinese. For the many missionaries, especially Protestants, who were influenced by the doctrine of the social gospel, modernizing Chinese culture was as important a mission as evangelism. Missionaries were at the center of early efforts to eliminate opium smoking and improve the position of women.

Revolution

Christian education in China culminated with the founding of universities, perhaps the best-known being St. John's, founded in Shanghai in 1879. The goal of the universities was to create a Chinese Christian

elite, and partly because of the universities such an elite came to exist. Like most of the Christian universities, St. John's came to enroll more non-Christian than Christian students. Although the total numbers of Chinese Christians remained small, by the 1920s members of the urban elite were quite likely to have attended a Christian school. Two of China's most famous leaders, Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) and Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), were Christians. Despite this, and in part because of it, there was a considerable amount of anti-Christian feeling among educated Chinese. The May Fourth Movement, which began in 1919, was critical of Confucianism in particular and religion in general and of foreign control of important Chinese institutions, such as universities. This led to a rising tide of criticism of Christianity among the elite in the 1920s.

At the same time members of the elite were attacking the foreign nature of Christianity, more Chinese forms of Christianity were beginning to develop. Making Christianity into an indigenous Chinese religion had been a goal of most missionaries from the beginning, but the mainline missionary organizations made little progress in this direction. In addition to small independent congregations of Chinese Chris-

tians, groups like the True Jesus Church and the Little Flock emerged. These movements owed much to the Chinese sectarian tradition and the Pentecostal movement in the West. They were led by charismatic Chinese and often had contentious relationships with foreign-led Christian organizations.

Communism

The Communist victory in 1949 was not good for Chinese Christianity. Many organizations were banned and some individuals arrested. The fact that so many Christians had overseas ties was also a problem. Although official sanctioned churches continued to function, the religion was regarded with great suspicion by the authorities, especially during the Cultural Revolution. Since the death of Mao there has been a great increase of interest in religions of all sorts, and Christianity has grown rapidly. Although the state is not formally opposed to Christianity, it is very much opposed to groups that are not approved by the government.

Alan Baumler

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CHRISTIANITY—JAPAN Christianity arrived in Japan with Catholic missionaries in the mid-sixteenth century and flourished for approximately a century before being brutally suppressed. After that, isolated underground communities attempted to maintain Christian teachings without benefit of priests. With the reopening of Japan in the mid-nineteenth century, a new wave of missionaries arrived, and during this period the Japanese people alternated between interest in and rejection of what they saw as foreign to Japanese sensibilities.

First Encounter with Christianity

The history of Christianity in Japan began with the arrival of Portuguese traders, but formal instruction began in 1549 with the arrival of Francis Xavier in Kagoshima, the southernmost city of Kyushu. Xavier and those who followed were generally received amiably by local rulers, partly because the foreigners were obviously educated and partly because they were as-

sociated with profitable Portuguese trade. The Jesuits were successful in Kyushu and western Honshu, converting as many as thirty thousand Japanese by 1570, partly as a result of mass conversions under varying degrees of pressure from the local lords. Another factor in their success was an emphasis on conforming as much as possible with Japanese forms and customs and developing a native clergy. By 1614 there were an estimated 300,000 Christians out of a total Japanese population of 20 million.

The early mission activities took place during a nationwide power struggle, in which Oda Nobunaga (1534–1582), the first of the Three Unifiers of Japan, made the first steps toward broad centralized control. Out of hatred for the Buddhist hierarchy and interest in learning about European civilization from men of culture, Nobunaga was friendly toward the Jesuits and tolerant of their activities. Amiable relations continued when Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536/7–1598), the second Unifier, succeeded to power, culminating in his granting an interview to Vice-Provincial Gaspar Coelho in 1586 at Osaka. The following year, however, saw a radical change. Hideyoshi became incensed at the undue deference paid to the Jesuit fathers by the converted daimyo (regional lords) of Kyushu and at the forcible conversions of people within certain domains. The result was a sudden reversal of the favorable reception of the Jesuits.

Aggravating an already tenuous situation, rivalry between Portuguese and Spaniards and between the Jesuits and the Franciscans, Augustinians, and Dominicans, who arrived in Japan between 1593 and 1602, showed itself as mutual defamation. Things were brought to a head when a Spanish ship, the *San Felipe*, was driven ashore in Shikoku in 1596. The ship was confiscated, and the captain appealed to the representative in charge of negotiations. During the proceedings, the captain showed a map indicating the colonial possessions of the king of Spain, and when asked whether missionaries had played a part in acquiring the colonies, the captain replied that they had. Hideyoshi immediately adopted a policy of complete intolerance toward the missionaries and their Japanese followers.

In 1597 Hideyoshi had foreign and Japanese Franciscans active in the Kyoto area arrested. They were eventually executed by crucifixion as a warning that Christian missionaries and converted Japanese would no longer be tolerated. In 1614 an edict of persecution was issued charging Christians with intent to take charge of the government and the country. Churches were destroyed or closed, missionaries were forbidden to enter the country, and Japanese converts were forced to recant.



THE "ACCEPTANCE" OF CHRISTIANITY IN PREWAR JAPAN

The following description of women's interest in Christianity as depicted by characters in pre-World War II novels by Japanese scholar M. Kawaguchi suggests that Christianity had not taken hold.

None of the characters in these works has any clear religion. But the women are all "interested in" Christianity. Michiko in *Tsuki yori no Shisha* (Kume) becomes a nurse at the Fujimi Convalescent Home because, she says, "it is only fitting that we should bear all bear the suffering of the cross." Keiko in *San-Katei*, who can no longer bear to live with her unfaithful husband and goes home to her mother, tries to assuage her despair as she waits to bear that husband's child by reading the Bible. Emiko, whose mother is a Christian, sometimes reads the Bible, but in her case it is generally enforced reading as a punishment for coming home late. She reads the Old Testament stories—as literature. But interest in Christianity does not develop into Christian faith. The Christian Madame Isago is said to be "pompous in everything, prejudiced, lacking in understanding and unable to make allowances; her judgment of sin is swift and cunningly ruthless." Christianity is even held to be narrow and oppressive.

Source: R. P. Dore (1967). *City Life in Japan: A Study of a Tokyo Ward*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 360.

When suppression intensified, there was little choice but to apostatize or go underground. The strength of the conviction of Japanese Christians is witnessed by the estimated forty or fifty thousand who were martyred for their faith. Resistance effectively came to a close with the end of the Shimabara Rebellion (1637–1638). When peasants rose up in rebellion against extortionate taxation, religious persecution, and chronic poverty in Shimabara domain (current Nagasaki prefecture), the government viewed it as inspired by Christians. The rebellion ended with the slaughter of some thirty-seven thousand men, women, and children. The next year the entire country was closed to outside intercourse, with the exception of Dutch trade at Dejima, an island off Nagasaki, and by 1643 Christianity was ostensibly eradicated.

The Second Encounter

When Japan opened to the West in the 1860s, it was discovered that communities of *kakure kirishitan* ("hidden Christians") had survived for two centuries.

C. R. Boxer quotes a contemporary estimate that there were some forty thousand Christian believers at the end of the Edo or Tokugawa period (1600/1603–1868). The greatest concentration was in present-day Nagasaki prefecture, primarily in rural areas on islands isolated from the mainland and from each other.

The first Protestant mission to Japan began in 1859, but given Japan's continued hostility toward Christianity, open activity was virtually impossible. In 1873 the proscription against Christianity was lifted and small-scale American and European missions—Catholic, Protestant, and Russian Orthodox—entered Japan. The early years of these missions were taken up with mastering the Japanese language and making the Scriptures available in Japanese translation. The New Testament was published in 1880 and the Old Testament appeared in 1888.

Not every Japanese Christian welcomed the new missionary movement. Among these Christian believers was Uchimura Kanzo (1861–1930), who advocated

a return to the simplicity of the gospel and the early church, spurning the divisive denominationalism and stubborn institutionalism of the Christianity that had come in. In response, he sought to make Christian belief more congenial to the Japanese through the *mukyokai* (no-church) movement.

Renewed missionary activity had considerable impact in the field of education. A network of Catholic schools throughout the country led to the establishment of Jochi Daigaku (Sophia University), University of the Sacred Heart, and Nanzan University. The combined Protestant denominations established Doshisha University, Aoyama Gakuin University, Rikkyo University, and, much later, International Christian University. Schools were established also for women and for the physically challenged, both largely ignored by the national government of the day.

With the outbreak of World War II, foreign missionaries were either repatriated or interned, and Japanese Christians once again found themselves forced to keep their beliefs to themselves as nationalism promoted worship of the Shinto deities as an indication of national loyalty.

Contemporary Christian Activity

During the Allied Occupation (1945–1952) interest in Christianity was rekindled, but as Japan recovered and society stabilized, its appeal decreased. However, in the postwar period indigenous groups have founded new organizations such as *Iesu no Mitama Kyokai* ("Spirit of Jesus Church"), founded in 1941 by Murai Jun, and *Iesu no Hakobune* ("The Ark of Jesus"), formed in 1960. Like Uchimura, these groups share the conviction that their Japanese cultural expressions of Christian faith are truer to the spirit of New Testament Christianity than the distortions of the Western churches.

Today mainstream Christian activity in Japan remains unassuming and the Christian population is estimated at less than 1 percent of the total Japanese population. Primary activities include support of medical, social, and educational organizations.

Summary

When the first Christian missionaries arrived in Japan in the late sixteenth century, there was a spiritual and social openness resulting from a long civil war and increasing dissatisfaction with the political and social conditions that war created. The subsequent rejection of Christianity can be partially attributed to that religion's exclusivist nature. Requiring singular obedience to one religion was at odds with Japanese tolerance of multiple



People pray for victims of the 1945 atomic bombing of Nagasaki in August 2000 at the Urugami Cathedral in Nagasaki. (AFP/CORBIS)

beliefs. Second, the political ramifications of the foreign creed led to a conflict of interests. Loyalty to the deity and its foreign missionaries stood in the way of unchallenged subservience to their lord. For Japan's leaders, the risk of tolerating Christianity was just too great and the religion was suppressed. A similar pattern of acceptance during social instability and rejection as society returned to order followed both the Meiji period (1868–1912) and the years following World War II. It remains to be seen whether Christianity will become more accessible to a broader element of society or remain appealing to only a small segment.

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CHRISTIANITY—KOREA Christianity is a major religious force in Korea. Its influence began in the late eighteenth century with small communities of Korean Catholics who had learned the doctrines during encounters with Christians in China. For a century, the highly Confucian Korean royal government viewed Christianity as a dangerous heterodoxy, and there were frequent persecutions. This changed after Korea was "opened" to contact with the West in the 1880s and Korea's Protestant and Catholic Churches began to grow, first under the guidance of foreign missionaries and then under the leadership of Korean clergy. The growth continued under Japanese colonial rule and during the postwar ordeal of national division. By the 1980s in South Korea, where Christianity flourished after the Korean War, fully one-quarter of the population had come to identify itself as Christian.

Development

The success of Christianity in Korea is unique in East Asia, where in most countries the Christian population does not exceed 5 percent of the total. The reasons for this success have to do with Korea's modern history and the things Christianity has represented in the minds of Koreans. Though the traditional ruling elites of Korea disdained it in the beginning, Christianity was associated in the minds of commoners with advancement and better living. The early missionaries started schools that offered education to ordinary people. They promoted the use of the Korean hangul alphabet to boost literacy, which formerly had been reserved for the elite. Under Japanese colonial rule (1910–1945), adopting Western Christianity seemed to be an alternative to adopting the Japanese value system. Churches were among the very few organizational structures not controlled by the Japanese, so Christianity also came to be associated with nationalism.

World War II was a time of persecution for Christians, and their numbers dropped off. After the Allied victory, however, Korea was divided into northern and southern zones. Christianity had actually been stronger in the north than in the south before 1940, but after Korea's division, a Soviet-backed leftist government came to power in the north. Christians opposed the new government's ideology and thus were targeted for new kinds of political persecution. Many of North Korea's Christians moved to South Korea as refugees, starting new churches as centers for mutual

support as well as worship. Those who remained in the north were grudgingly tolerated until the Korean War, after which Christianity was officially persecuted as an enemy ideology.

In South Korea, by contrast, Christianity was associated with Western-style prosperity and American power. Koreans looking to the United States for support in their beleaguered situation found Christianity attractive for a combination of reasons. There were those who became Christians as a way of looking modern, of course; but there was also an authentic religious response to the comforts of Christian faith in a country that was undergoing multiple ordeals of reconstruction, urbanization, and revolutionary economic development. Korea's urban churches functioned as networking organizations for people arriving from the countryside, as ready-made communities of supportive cobelievers, and as affirming religious centers that helped maintain human and moral values in a world being turned upside down.

The theological traditions of Korean Christianity, whether Protestant or Catholic, are conservative, emphasizing personal morality, community, and the sovereignty of God. Korea's Christians believe that prayer and piety are keys to winning divine favor and that perseverance in the faith brings blessings in daily life. At times they have seen themselves as a people chosen by God to undergo unique trials that have purified them and empowered them to claim a leading role in society. During the Japanese colonial period especially, they often likened themselves to the children of Israel in the Old Testament. The ideological war between Christianity and communism contributed to this line of thinking, creating a tacit claim that Christians are uniquely suited to be national leaders. While some non-Christians regard this as arrogant, it helps explain the visibility of Christianity as a phenomenon on the contemporary Korean landscape.

South Korea's churches long ago became free of foreign missionary control and have developed into completely "Korean" organizations, being self-financed and self-directed. As a Korean religion, Christianity manifests traditional traits. One such trait is a strong Confucian authority pattern, notably patriarchal despite the fact that a majority of the members of all churches are women. Another is the tendency of Korean pastors to assume charismatic identities that recall Korea's shamanist tradition. The cherished practice of worship in natural settings, long a part of Buddhist practice, is reflected in the penchant for long sessions of prayer and fasting in mountain retreats. The health emphases of traditional Korean religions are reflected in the popularity of healing services, and the expectation of ma-



Worshippers at the Youido Full Gospel Church in Seoul in 1990. (BOHEMIAN NOMAD PICTURE-MAKERS/CORBIS)

terial benefit from religious practice is reflected in prayers for blessings. Indeed, some of Korea's fastest-growing churches emphasize the idea that God wants his people to be prosperous. Many churches (and their pastors) are conspicuously wealthy.

South Korea's biggest churches have members numbering in the tens and even hundreds of thousands, making them congregations that are actually denominations in themselves. They often spin off daughter churches and branch churches for immigrant communities overseas. Some of them engage in missionary activity, deploying members to countries in Asia and Africa as doctors, teachers, and evangelistic workers, exercising the same impulse that brought missionaries to Korea a century and more ago.

The first Protestant communities in Korea date from the mid-1880s; a small village church was founded in a house in the 1860s, but the first formal congregation, still extant, was founded in 1885. Protestants far outnumber Catholics in Korea, but the Catholic Church has also grown proportionately since the end of World War II. It was led by foreign priests before that and did not become free of missionary direction until 1962. In the 1960s and 1970s, Catholics were prominent in South Korea's democracy movement, opposing military dictatorship and identifying the Catholic Church with the struggle for political and economic justice. This stance attracted many youth, especially university students. In 1984 Korea's Catholic

bicentennial brought Pope John Paul II to celebrate a special mass, attended by many thousands, in which he presided over the canonization of 103 martyrs from the anti-Catholic persecutions of the nineteenth century.

Church and State

The division of Korea has played a major role in shaping the Korean Christian Church. In South Korea, Christian refugees from the north have helped make the Protestant movement strongly anticommunist and therefore inclined to support the South Korean government even during its worst periods of military rule and human-rights abuses. When the Seoul government used the memory of the Korean War and the evil personified in Kim Il Sung and his oligarchy in the north as an excuse to clamp down on dissent and free expression, Korea's conservative Christians tended to go along.

However, the manifest injustices of political life in South Korea under military rule between 1961 and 1992—the suppression of dissent, the use of torture in police interrogations, the low-wage strategy of Korean economic development, the abuse of police power to seek political advantage, and many other obvious violations of human rights—led many Christians in all denominations to demand democratic reforms. As was once the case under colonial rule, Christian leaders found that their institutions constituted platforms from which to speak out against dictatorship. Though they

were often blacklisted, arrested, and even tortured, Christians led the human-rights struggle. Prominent among them was Kim Dae Jung (b. 1925), a Catholic, who was once the archenemy of the regime but persevered in politics to be elected president in 1997.

The Future

As South Korea experiences material prosperity for the first time in its history, the church finds itself facing new challenges. Having grown under adversity and having been disciplined by colonialism, war, and political repression, it risks becoming complacent and fractious. Moreover, with national reunification remaining the top item for national discussion and the number-one problem to be solved in the future, Korea's Christians find it oddly difficult to agree on a role in the process. Many rallied to help alleviate the 1990s famine in North Korea, stressing their brotherhood with fellow Koreans in the north. Others, however, have tried to position themselves for an anticipated victory over North Korea. The "Christian reoccupation" of North Korea is unlikely to succeed if it is undertaken as a crusade. For Korea's Christians, reunification may well turn out to be the greatest test of all.

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CHRISTIANITY—MYANMAR Christians are estimated to constitute only 5 percent of the population of Myanmar (Burma), but the religion is dominant in a number of communities, especially among the ethnic minority Chin, Kachin, Karen, and Karenni peoples. The first Western Christian missionaries were Roman Catholics who arrived with the Portuguese in the sixteenth century. Subsequently, missions were established by Italian and French Catholics. However, it was only during British rule of Burma in the nineteenth century that the spread of Christianity began to accelerate.

The first large-scale conversions were among the Karens in the Tenasserim and Irrawaddy River delta

regions of southern Burma. Here, the pioneering Baptist missionary Adoniram Judson arrived in 1813. A key element in the spread of Christianity was the promotion of education among animist or spirit-worshipping communities. Many previously nonliterate languages, such as Karen and Kachin, were transcribed into writing.

The establishment of indigenous churches quickly followed, and in 1881 the Karen National Association was formed by Christian Karens to promote the advancement of the Karen people. Many Christians from ethnic minority communities also joined the government service and armed forces. Although perhaps only one-sixth of modern-day Karens are Christians, such cooperation with the British authorities led Burma's leaders to allege that Christianity was a key element in what they described as the colonial armory of the "Three M's": missionaries, merchants, and military. In response, in 1906 the Young Men's Buddhist Association was formed parallel to the Young Men's Christian Association, signaling the revival of the Burmese nationalist movement.

Further allegations of the divisive role of Christianity were made after the British departure in 1948 when Karen and Karenni leaders, the majority of whom were Christians, took up arms against the central government. In 1961, insurrection also began in Kachin State when Prime Minister U Nu (1907–1995) attempted to make Buddhism the nation's official state religion.

Under General Ne Win's Burma Socialist Program Party (1962–1988), a more secular policy was pursued by the government. All foreign missionaries were expelled from the country during a quarter-century of isolationism. Nevertheless, a diversity of Christian churches survived.

At the end of the twentieth century, the two strongest Christian religious groups were the Baptists (the largest denomination) and Roman Catholics, both of which have more than one-half million members. Other significant groups include Anglicans and Seventh-Day Adventists. Most of these Christian groups continue to work together through two umbrella organizations: the Myanmar Council of Churches, which links Protestant groups, and the Catholic Bishops Conference.

Under the State Law and Order Restoration Council, which assumed control of the country in 1988, church groups became more visibly active again in religion and community development. Although incidents of discrimination against Christians were reported (especially in Chin State), in other areas

church leaders acted as intermediaries in peace talks between armed opposition groups and the government, notably in Kachin, Kayah, and Karen States.

Martin Smith

See also: **Kachin Independence Organization; Karen; Karen National Union**

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CHRISTIANITY—SOUTH ASIA Christianity has been an important force in South Asian history. During the period of British rule in India (c. 1757–1947) British Christians were influential in securing social reforms such as the suppression of *sati* (suttee). Protestant and Catholic missionaries established widespread and influential mission school systems, which influenced the attitudes and outlooks those educated there. While some locals welcomed Christian missionary activity, others were hostile and feared conversion. This fear, together with a desire to adopt some teachings of Christianity, encouraged the emergence of Hindu and Buddhist reform and revival movements.

Origin and Character of Precolonial Christian Communities

Christians have been living in the Indian subcontinent since ancient times. A persistent tradition, reflected in the apocryphal Acts of Thomas (probably written in the Syriac language in the fourth century CE) that Saint Thomas preached and died in India, is echoed in Hindu and Christian belief that he founded the community of Saint Thomas Christians on the Kerala coast and was martyred at Mailapur, south of Madras City. The first evidence of Christian commu-

nities in Kerala dates from the sixth century. This evidence and subsequent material relating to the period until the arrival of the Portuguese in 1498 show that Saint Thomas Christians maintained close ecclesiastical, commercial, and family links with Syria and the Middle East.


The community's numbers were constantly augmented by settlers from Western Asia. The Christians pledged allegiance to the Syrian Patriarch of the East (whose seat was in present-day Iraq), who was the recognized leader of churches independent of the Church of the Roman Empire. The liturgy was in Syriac and the doctrine influenced by the Nestorians, who taught that Christ had two distinct natures, divine and human. While reflecting Middle Eastern influences, Saint Thomas Christians were also affected by their Hindu environment. Conscious of their high status as warriors and merchants in the caste system, they avoided contact with the lower castes. They enjoyed honored positions as donors or benefactors of Hindu shrines all over Kerala. The management of church affairs, the hereditary nature of the all-male priesthood, the use of torches, umbrellas, and banners in procession, and the performance of some minor Hindu-type rituals, all reflected the Hindu context in which the community developed.

Continuing Spread of Christianity, 1498–2000

In 1503 a West Asian prelate reported some 30,000 Saint Thomas Christian families in Kerala; the census of 1901 estimated the number of individuals in that community at nearly half a million. During the period of Portuguese and British rule the number of Protestant and Catholic Christians (those whose origin is associated with European missions) also steadily grew. In 1991 there were nearly 20 million Christians in India, mostly in the south and northeast, representing 2.34 percent of the total population. Christians represent about 8 percent of the population in Sri Lanka, 2 percent or less in Pakistan, and less than 1 percent in Bangladesh. In 1990 there were an estimated 50,000 Christians in Nepal.

Religious Inquiry and Conversion Movements

Historians place varying emphasis on the political, economic, religious, social, or other factors involved in the rapid expansion of Christianity during colonial rule. Less in dispute is evidence that those who wished to join Christian churches usually acted together rather than as individuals—representatives of caste, family, or other groups approached Christian leaders asking for information or requesting baptism. Some churches welcomed all who came irrespective of motive, hoping



Indian Roman Catholics leave the Sacred Heart Cathedral in New Delhi, India's largest, in September 1998. (AFP/CORBIS)

"inquirers" would grow in faith and practice in the church. Others were more selective, insisting on the application of strict criteria, which varied in different missions and which involved either rejection of the candidate or evidence of changes in belief or behavior before individuals or groups were admitted to full membership.

Issues Still Confronting Christian Communities

Since the development of Christian communities in Kerala and elsewhere, Christians have faced many of the same questions. What ought to be the relationship between Christians and the state or between indigenous Christians and the wider ecclesiastical and Christian movement? What does it mean to express one's faith in and through a South Asian culture as distinct from a Syrian or European culture? How does one preach the Gospel, teach, and heal effectively in the local multireligious environment?

Christians and Politics

One of the most sensitive issues in Christianity is the varying relationship between Christians and political authorities. While Saint Thomas Christians were integrated in the indigenous state system before the arrival of the Portuguese, most Christians in South Asia trace their origins to conversion movements occurring in the context of European missionary activity and colonial rule. European missionary paternalism, which often included a policy of keeping Indian Christians in subordinate positions within the church, created resentment especially among Western-educated Christians. That feeling heightened their awareness of the "evils" of foreign rule and encouraged Christian participation in the early stages of the Indian nationalist movement. However the rise of strident forms of Hindu nationalism soon raised fears among Christians of their eventual fate in a state dominated by the Hindu majority. After a period of considerable anxiety, Protestant and Catholic leaders threw their weight increasingly behind the Gandhian movement and the idea of an independent India as a secular state. Confidence in the new government of India was enhanced by acceptance of a Catholic proposal that minorities' rights be guaranteed in a new constitution.

The Present Pattern of Contrast

While churches operating in postcolonial South Asia continue to face political problems, there are opportunities for growth and participation in nation building. The sense of belonging to a persecuted minority in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and parts of India (where militant anti-Christian forms of Hindu nationalism have been increasing) contrasts with a sense of confidence and optimism associated with the continued rapid expansion of Christianity in northeastern India and Nepal.

The priorities, lifestyles, and forms of worship among Christians also vary. A preoccupation with internal issues such as power, property, and social standing (especially in the Church of South India) contrasts with other church programs of change and reform and increasing involvement in outward-looking welfare projects in rural areas and slums. Traditional forms of Christian worship are maintained alongside experiments in further indigenization and increasingly popular charismatic-type meetings throughout the region. The establishment of interdenominational national Christian councils in most South Asian countries, the formation of the Church of South India (1947), Church of North India, and Church of Pakistan (1970), which bring together Protestant denominations, and increasing Protestant and Catholic collab-

oration in educational and other programs, reflect both the practical needs of small but growing Christian communities and the new spirit of the global ecumenical movement.

Geoffrey A. Oddie

See also: Jesuits in India; Syrian Christians of Kerala

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CHRISTIANITY—SOUTHEAST ASIA With the exception of the Philippines, Christianity in Southeast Asia is statistically a minority religion. Nevertheless, because of its missionary convictions, organizational strength, and transnational connections, institutional Christianity generally has a high profile and exerts an influence far beyond its numbers. But like other religions in the region, it also has to "reinvent" itself in order to compete with powerful secularizing forces, and to maintain its appeal both for its own adherents and for the unevangelized. The Christian intelligentsia in Southeast Asia, as elsewhere in the Third World church, play active roles in theologically delineating the shape and direction of their faith. Christianity in Southeast Asia is not monolithic; it ranges from the hierarchical Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and Anglican churches, through established Protestant denominations—Lutheran, Reformed, Brethren, Methodist, Baptist, Presbyterian, and the Pentecostalist Assembly of God among others—to schismatic churches and fundamentalist, charismatic, and indigenized Christian sects.

History

Christianity in Southeast Asia has a long legacy that predates the arrival of Roman Catholicism in the fifteenth century and Protestant Christianity in the centuries following. Extant archaeological and literary evidence, although sparse, indicates that trading contacts between Persia and countries farther West were already known by the fifth and sixth centuries. Persia

itself had been exposed to Nestorian Christianity since the early centuries of the first millennium, when many Aramaic- and Syriac-speaking Jewish and Christian communities fled eastward after the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 CE. Through trading contacts with the region, Nestorian settlements were probably set up in the northwestern part of peninsular Malaysia and in northern Sumatra. As elsewhere, however, their traces have long disappeared because of displacement and persecution.

By the time Roman Catholicism arrived with Portuguese, Spanish, and French adventurers during the European age of exploration, commerce, and conquest in the sixteenth century, the region had long been under the sway of other world religions. At the beginning of the Christian era, Indian kingdoms and their civilizing influences were being established in various parts of Southeast Asia. By the fourteenth century, Theravada Buddhism had assumed dominance in mainland Southeast Asia (except Vietnam), and much of maritime Southeast Asia was Islamicized. Moreover, these religions had been culturally assimilated and translated into local idioms. Conversion to Roman Catholicism, particularly in the Philippines and Vietnam, followed similar processes despite periodic prohibitions and persecutions because of religious rivalry and political intrigue. Protestant Christianity, in comparison, spurred on by evangelical piety, arrived during the high colonial period of the nineteenth century. Adult literacy, modern education, the translation of the Christian Scriptures into the vernacular, and medical services were among the key strategies used to entice "pagans" into the Christian fold. Nevertheless, on the whole the numbers converting to Protestant Christianity are not phenomenal.

In most cases, though colonial governments generally did not openly favor Christianity, indirectly they created conditions that enhanced a degree of openness to the new faith. Christianity and Christian institutions were perceived as the legitimate religion and expressions of colonial power and also as means to escape the constraints of traditional social and economic burdens. In some instances, missionaries adopted a policy of nonintervention with the members of the dominant religion (for example, with Muslim Malays in British Malaya) to stave off political unrest for the sake of lucrative commercial interests. In comparison, post-World War II Southeast Asia and the postindependence milieu have seen the democratic principle of religious liberty enshrined in the constitutions of most countries. By and large, however, the influence of institutional Christianity has been undermined and circumscribed by nationalist forces and the exigencies of



CHRISTIANITY MEETS BUDDHISM

The following conversation between a Buddhist nobleman in Thailand and a Christian missionary in about 1850 makes clear the basic beliefs of each faith and suggests some of the difficulties faced by unsuccessful Christian missionaries in Thailand.

Nobleman. After all, my religion is a better religion than yours.

Missionary. Convince me of that and Your Excellency shall be *my* teacher.

N. This is my religion: To be so little tied to the world that I can leave it without regret; to keep my heart sound; to live doing no injustice to any, but deeds of compassion to all.

M. This is excellent: this accords with my teaching; but will Your Excellency tell me what those must do who have already committed sin?

N. Why should they commit sin?

M. Who has not sinned: We should own we have sinned; we Christians have One who has removed our sins from us, and taken them upon himself; but you—

N. Where have I sinned? I do not acknowledge sin.

M. But it is not enough that men should be honest and kind to one another. They owe allegiance to God, their great Sovereign. To disobey Him, to forget Him, to avoid His presence, to be indifferent to His favor—this is sin.

N. And so you think God is censorious and jealous of His creatures, and wants their services and their praises? No! Let us treat all men justly. God is absorbed, gone into annihilation. We need not be troubled or think about Him.

M. No! He lives above! He is *our* Master. It is not enough that servants should be honest towards their fellows, kind to their wives and children; they owe to *their* Master service and gratitude, and will be punished if they do not render them.

N. Who is to punish? You call sin what is no sin.

M. But does not Your Excellency flog your servants when they disobey? Do you pardon them solely because they have not wronged their fellow servants?

N. (Much excited). What service does God want of us? He is not envious and covetous, as you fancy Him to be.

M. Suppose I told Your Excellency's servants that nothing was required of them but to live honestly and pleasantly together; to care nothing about you—neither to seek to please, nor obey, nor serve you, nor be thankful for Your Excellency's kindness: will you allow this? . . .

N. Now I will tell you of your heavy sins.

M. Show it to me and I will confess.

N. Why don't you take a wife?— Why don't you provide successors to teach your religion when you are gone? Christ had thirty disciples, had he not? and his disciples had wives and children; and they multiplied, and have overrun the world; but your religion and your name would perish together if others followed your example.

M. Others will take care of this.

N. No! Each man has a duty for himself.

M. Your Excellency is right. I am beaten here; but your Buddhist priests enjoin celibacy.

N. Battle it then with the Buddhist priests and not with me. . . . Now how long have you American missionaries been here?

M. Nineteen years.

N. Have you made a single convert?

M. Not among the Siamese; and we acknowledge our disappointment but are not discouraged. If a merchant sent out his agents and they failed, he would recall them; but those who sent us would think their sacrifices well repaid if a single soul were saved; for a soul is not extinguished by death, but lives forever; and we know that Siam will become a Christian country.

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N. But the Siamese are not savages of the woods, having no religion and therefore ready to receive one. We have our religion, in which we have been brought up from our childhood; it will not easily be rooted out. Has

it been in any single instance? The work would be difficult.

Source: John Bowring. (1857) *The Kingdom and People of Siam*. London: John W. Parker and Son, vol. I: 378–380.

nation-building, given Christianity's negative association with colonialism. Since the 1980s, aided by modern technology, enterprising Christian fundamentalist groups, particularly from the United States and South Korea, have been successful in appealing to the peripheral and urban populace, as well as in drawing adherents from more well-established Christian denominations.

Brief Survey

Partly because of the longevity of Christianity in the country, the Philippines is the only country in the region where Christians constitute the majority, including some 94 percent of the population in 1999. Roman Catholicism is overwhelmingly dominant and deeply embedded in Filipino everyday life, as well as in religious and political culture.

Vietnam has the largest Catholic population (about 6 million in 1988) after the Philippines, and a long tradition of native clergy and catechists. Traces of Catholic missionary activity as far back as the fourteenth century exist. Having undergone periodic Confucianist persecution in the mid-nineteenth century and having borne restrictive controls imposed by the Communists in the twentieth century, Vietnam is now experiencing a period of religious liberalization and consolidation.

In expansive Indonesia, the Portuguese Roman Catholic mission to the Moluccas in the 1530s was one of the earliest in the region. The arrival of the celebrated Jesuit priest, Francis Xavier (1506–1552), was the highlight of that mission. He laid the foundation for subsequent missionary work by other Catholic orders. Nevertheless, in present-day Indonesia Protestant Christians, belonging to a diverse array of denominations and conciliar groups, exceed Roman Catholics in numbers.

Thailand is the only country in the region that escaped European colonial subjugation, and, despite the efforts of French and Spanish Catholic missionaries since the seventeenth century and Protestant missionaries beginning two centuries later, there are relatively

few Christians in the country (totaling less than 1 percent of the population). Myanmar (Burma), like Thailand, is steeped in Theravada Buddhism. Protestant missionary bodies have had more success than their Catholic counterparts in Myanmar. Work among the animist Karen and Kachin hill peoples by the American Baptists, in particular, has yielded one of the well-known missionary success stories of the region.

As elsewhere, Roman Catholicism arrived first in Malaysia with the Portuguese, who captured the important entrepôt of Melaka in 1511. Later, from the nineteenth century onwards, both Protestant and Roman Catholic missions concentrated on the urban non-Malay populations of the British-created Straits Settlements, comprising Melaka (or Malacca), Penang, and Singapore. In East Malaysia (comprising the states of Sabah and Sarawak), conversions among the numerous animist indigenous groups have been notable. Meanwhile, the number of Christian converts in Singapore has increased dramatically in the last decades of the twentieth century. According to a government report, the proportion of Christian adherents jumped from 10 percent in 1980 to 13 percent in 1990 to 15 percent in 1990. Most are young, educated adults with Taoist or Confucianist backgrounds. In March 1992,



A Khmer woman teaches a Thai woman the Khmer language for missionary work in Cambodia in 1994. (BOHEMIAN NOMAD PICTUREMAKERS/CORBIS)



Christian demonstrators occupying the grounds of police headquarters in Ambon, Indonesia, in February 2001. They are protesting the killing of Christians by Muslims on the island. (AFP/CORBIS)

the "Maintenance of Religious Harmony" bill was passed by the Singapore government, which, inter alia, allows the authorities to restrain any priest, pastor, imam, or other individual in a position of authority who is believed to have committed or attempted to commit "feelings of enmity, ill-will or hostility between religious groups" or to "promote a political cause under the guise of religious belief."

Transnational Christianity

Southeast Asian Christianity is anything but monolithic, and long-established doctrinal and ideological positions are further polarized by newer evangelical, ecumenical, charismatic, and fundamentalist nuances. These, in turn, are further shaped by the host cultures and political contexts, giving rise to varieties of indigenous theologies and localized practices.

Transnational Christian institutions in Southeast Asia do not adhere strictly to the boundaries of nation-states or regional blocs; they are linked to wider-based entities in the Asia and Pacific region. Institutionally, Roman Catholics have been organized through their respective parochial bishops. In 1970, a landmark decision was made to form the Federation of Asian Bishops Conference (FABC) as a network of Asian Catholic bishops. Programs and position papers emanating from the FABC bear the hallmarks of the reforming spirit of Vatican II, held in Rome during the early 1960s. Generally, the focus has been to evolve a church imbued with what are seen as the Asian values of harmony, holism, and inclusiveness.

The Christian Conference of Asia (formerly East Asia Christian Conference) is the major regional ecumenical body for Protestant Christians. Although its

origins can be traced back to the International Missionary Council meeting held in Tambaram, India, in 1938, it was only officially formed in 1957 at Prapat, Indonesia. Currently, it brings together 119 different churches from 16 Asian countries, and the total membership of these churches exceeds 50 million. Ideologically, the CCA leadership has opted to play an avant-garde role, rethinking traditional Christian doctrines, biblical exegeses, missiology, and ecclesiology in the light of nation-building and contemporary political and economic realities. Particular stress is given to evolving a contextualized theology that addresses the complex realities of unfettered capitalist development, poverty, democracy, and the religious and cultural plurality of the region. Like the FABC, the CCA also gives attention to evolving an Asian ecclesial identity that accords with the ethos of the region.

In the 1980s and 1990s, a number of ecumenical organizations addressing specific regional problems and concerns have also sprung up. They address such issues as human rights, child prostitution, migrant labor, tourism, people's movements, interfaith dialogue and cooperation, and feminism. By comparison, regional evangelical and fundamentalist Christian institutions have shied away from these kinds of Christian activism, contending that while social concerns should be high on the church's agenda, they are not central to the identity and mission of the church.

Future Directions

As Christianity in Southeast Asia develops in the twenty-first century, we can expect to see interchurch understanding and cooperation broaden, deepen, and mature. Additionally, with Southeast Asia's strategic position in the world taking on renewed importance, Christianity in the region is presented with intriguing possibilities as it becomes more localized in a region in which most of the world's major religions thrive.

Yeoh Seng-Guan

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
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CHRYSANTHEMUM The chrysanthemum (Japanese: *kiku*) is a revered flower in Japan, favored for its beauty and fragrance; its cultivation is considered an art form. Reflecting its significance, the Japanese word for chrysanthemum appears in several Japanese names, including *kiku* (chrysanthemum), *kikuko* (chrysanthemum child), and *kikumi* (beautiful chrysanthemum) for women, *kikuo* (chrysanthemum male), *kikuji* (chrysanthemum, second son), and *kikuta* (bold chrysanthemum) for men. The word *kiku* has also been used in place names, such as Kikuchi (chrysanthemum ground) in Kumamoto Prefecture, as well as for businesses. Until 1940, the prominent Kikuya Department Store (chrysanthemum store) operated in the Ikebukuro district of Tokyo, until it was purchased by Seibu Department Store. The Chrysanthemum Festival, held September ninth (the ninth day

of the ninth month), is one of five Japanese linked festivals (*gosekku*), including New Year's Day, involving odd prime numbers in which the number of the month and date coincide. One custom during this festival is drinking *kikuzake*, or sake flavored with bits of chrysanthemum flowers.

Chrysanthemums were used in homemade toiletries since at least the Heian period (794–1185). Cotton was placed over chrysanthemums at night; by morning, it was damp with a dew-like substance extracted from the flowers. These pieces of cotton, rich with the fragrance of chrysanthemums, were then used to wipe one's body, particularly on hot and humid late summer days. Symbolizing purity, chrysanthemums were historically used for funeral and temple displays to ward off negative spirits, while their fragrance helped mask other smells. Chrysanthemums symbolize long life, but are also associated with death because of their funeral usage. The famed *fugu* (globefish), parts of whose internal organs are poisonous, is often presented as *sashimi* slices of raw fish shaped like a chrysanthemum, evoking the deathly possibilities of mistaken preparation.

The chrysanthemum has been the Imperial family's emblem since the Kamakura period (1185–1333). During part of the Meiji period (1868–1912), laws banned its use by anyone outside the Imperial family. Now the chrysanthemum motif is used as a state symbol and appears on Japanese passports.



Japan's Imperial chrysanthemum crest at the Koishikawa Botanical Garden in Tokyo in the 1980s. (MICHAEL S. YAMASHITA/CORBIS)

The chrysanthemum is notably featured in foreign literary depictions and cultural analyses of Japan. Pierre Loti's nineteenth-century novel *Madame Chrysanthemum*, the basis of Puccini's opera *Madame Butterfly*, fascinated the European imagination. Ruth Benedict's classic mid-twentieth century anthropological analysis of Japanese culture (*The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*) highlighted the chrysanthemum as a symbol of Japan. This text was the inspiration for titles of later works on Japanese culture and society. One of these, Mamoru Iga's *The Thorn in the Chrysanthemum*, analyzes the issue of suicide in Japan. Another example is Robert Whiting's *The Chrysanthemum and the Bat*, a tribute to the importance of baseball in contemporary Japanese popular culture.

Millie Creighton

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CHU HIS. See **Zhu Xi**.

CHU NOM *Chu Nom* or *Nom* is Vietnam's only indigenous writing system. The etymology of the term *Chu Nom* is obscure. *Chu* unambiguously means "character," but *Nom* has been interpreted as "southern," "demotic," or "popular/native speech." Native *Chu Nom* should not be confused with imported *Chu Han* (Chinese characters), though the two scripts look similar to the untrained eye. The latter script was also known as *Chu Nho* (Confucian characters) due to its use in Confucian texts.

Although the precise origins of *Chu Nom* are unknown, it was clearly an offshoot of *Chu Nho*. *Chu Nho* and the Chinese language were imposed upon Vietnam during a millennium of Chinese rule (111 BCE–939 CE). After liberation from China, however,

the Vietnamese had no script of their own. The only script they knew was *Chu Nho*, which was specifically designed to write the syllables of Chinese. Hence the Vietnamese modified *Chu Nho* in a number of ways in order to adapt it to their own language. This process probably occurred over several centuries and cannot be attributed to any single person or group.

The resulting *Nom* script that emerged around the twelfth century consisted of three major types of characters: phonetic loans, semanto-phonetic compounds, and semantic compounds. Phonetic loans were *Chu Nho* graphs used as phonetic symbols, that is, the *Chu Nho* graph *da* "many" was used as a phonetic loan for the unrelated but homophonous native words *da* "banyan" and *da* "rice pancake."

Semanto-phonetic compounds each consist of a *Chu Nho* graph or graph element (radical) that hints at the meaning of the word and a *Chu Nho* graph representing the sound of the word. For example, the *Chu Nho* radical *trung* "insect" and the *Chu Nho* graph *de* "emperor" were combined into a semanto-phonetic compound representing the native word *de* "cricket."

Semantic compounds each consist of combinations of two *Chu Nho* graphs that hint at the meaning of the word. For example, the *Chu Nho* graphs *thien* "heaven" and *thuong* "above" were combined to form a semantic compound representing the native word *gioi* "sky." This final class of *Nom* graphs is the rarest.

In spite of the heavily phonetic nature of *Nom*, its thousands of graphs were never standardized and hence were difficult to learn. Nevertheless, *Nom* was in use among educated Vietnamese until the early twentieth century, when it was eclipsed by the *Quoc Ngu* (national language) alphabet devised in the seventeenth century by Catholic missionaries. *Nom* is virtually extinct today.

Marc Hideo Miyake

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CHU TEH. See **Zhu De**.

CHUAH THEAN TENG (b. 1914), Malaysian painter. Chuah Thean Teng, a Malaysian painter of Chinese descent, achieved an international reputation during the 1950s by developing a new art form that adapted the wax-resist techniques of batik textile production to create a painting medium. Chuah captured traditional Malayan ways of life on canvas in colorful scenes rendered in a semiabstract style.

During the decade following Malaya's establishment as an independent nation in 1957, Chuah was credited with giving artistic expression to a distinctively Malayan visual consciousness. Together with two sons, Chuah Seow Keng and Chuah Siew Tang, who have followed their father as painters in batik, Chuah established the Yahong Gallery in Penang. As well as serving as an exhibition space for the family's work, the gallery has become a well-known emporium for antiques and locally crafted jewelry and curios.

Emily Hill

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CHUAN LEEKPAI (b. 1936), **Thai prime minister**. Chuan Leekpai served as Thailand's prime minister twice: in 1992–1995, Thailand's fiftieth government, and again in 1997–2001, Thailand's fifty-third government. He was Thailand's twenty-second prime minister. He served longer as prime minister than any other civilian in the history of Thai politics. He is one of the few Thai prime ministers who had neither top-level military experience nor royal blood. He is of humble background from Trang in Thailand's South.

After a brief legal career, Chuan entered politics in 1969 under the banner of the Democratic Party, Thailand's oldest. At age thirty-three, he became one of the youngest Members of Parliament. In the subsequent twelve national elections, Chuan was elected to Parliament each time. Before serving as prime minister in 1992, he had served in nine different cabinet positions under various governments, handling such portfolios as justice, commerce, public health, education, and agriculture.

In terms of political style, Chuan has a humble, polite demeanor, with impressive interpersonal and public speaking abilities. He is perhaps the smoothest Thai politician since Pibulsongkram and is gifted at crafting

complex political compromises. He also has a reputation for being a politician with high personal integrity. He and his party lost the 6 January 2001 national election to the new Thai Rak Thai Party, primarily because of Thailand's persistent economic problems related to the Asian economic crisis. Basically, Chuan was perceived as being honest but weak in dealing with persisting economic problems and issues.

Gerald W. Fry

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CHUBU (1990 pop. 21 million). Chubu region of Japan is formed of nine prefectures: Niigata, Toyama, Ishikawa, Fukui, Gifu, Nagano, Yamanashi, Shizuoka, and Aichi. It is geographically divided into three areas: the Hokuriku region on the Sea of Japan side, the Central Highlands, and the Tokai region on the Pacific Coast—totaling 67,000 square kilometers. The region is mountainous, dominated by the Japanese Alps, and contains volcanoes such as Mount Fuji (3,800 meters). Some of Japan's longest rivers, the Shinanogawa (367 kilometers), the Kisogawa (227 kilometers), and the Tenryugawa (213 kilometers), flow through the region. The northern part of the region is characterized by heavy snowfalls, two to four meters in the mountain areas. The snow is a major natural resource. The water stored in the form of snow is important for generating electricity, irrigation, and industrial use. The Niigata Plain along the Sea of Japan is one of the major rice growing areas in Japan. Agricultural products include tea and mandarin oranges. Fishing is important all along the coast. The Nobi Plain, densely populated in and around Nagoya on the Pacific Coast, is a highly industrialized area. Chubu region includes three significant industrial areas: Chukyo, Tokai, and Hokuriku. The major industries are textile, ceramics, precision machinery, and automotive.

Nathalie Cavasin

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CHUCHE. See **Juche**.

CHUCI CHUCI (Verse of the Chu State) is regarded as the ancestor of anthologies in Chinese literature. The earliest known edition of the anthology, in sixteen *juan* ("fascicles" or "volumes"), was recompiled by Liu Xiang (c. 77–6 BCE) from earlier sources; this edition was subsequently augmented to 17 *juan* with commentary by Wang Yi (c. 89–ca. 158). The *Chuci buzhu* (Subcommentary on Chuci) of Hong Xingzu (1019–1155), which incorporates Wang's commentary, is the most important edition.

Most of the *Chuci* poems were written during the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) in the style of folk songs of the southern state of Chu (in modern Hubei and Hunan Provinces). Performed in the Chu dialect and recording Chu culture and history, it presents a distinctive Chu style.

The anthology consists of individual poems and suites. The first and most representative work in the collection is the "Lisao" (Encountering Sorrow). This first-person, politically oriented poem in 187 couplets is one of the greatest, and longest, poems in Chinese literature; the *Chuci* style is often simply named, after this monumental poem, the "Sao" style. The anthology also includes shorter lyrical and narrative poems, dialogues, and hymns to local deities, most of which have traditionally been interpreted as allegories for the poet's frustrations.

The attribution of the Chuci poems is problematic. Qu Yuan (c. 343–290 BCE), a high official of Chu who was later slandered, estranged, and finally exiled, was long considered the author of "Lisao" and of most of the *Chuci*, and these works accordingly were read against the story of his political fortunes. Although this view is not clearly proven by the evidence, it has found sympathy from readers who see in Qu Yuan a patriotic hero, who, thwarted in his efforts to serve his king, ended his life by throwing himself into the Miluo River in northeast part of modern Hunan Province.

Tim W. Chan

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CHUGEN *Chugen* is the traditional period of mid-summer gift giving in Japan. Households, businesses, and work associates offer gifts to those they are obligated to, often superiors or customers. The tradition is maintained today in two forms: gifts and bonuses. Gifts, normally costing between 1,000 and 5,000 yen (\$8 to \$40), are offered, usually from those in subordinate positions to those in higher ones. These gifts are comprised of preserves, cakes, cleaning materials, cooking staples such as oils, and so on. In rural Japan it is still possible to receive homemade *chugen* gifts such as pickles, dried fruit, or tea. Most *chugen* gifts, however, are bought, often as a packed box of several items. Supermarkets, department stores, and mail-order catalogs market a variety of prepackaged items that need only be addressed and delivered. Related to the *chugen* tradition is that of the bonus. Successful firms will normally provide their employees with bonuses of one month's salary. This gift is the formal recognition of the debt the firm owes its employees for their efforts. *O-chugen* (the honorific *o* is normally added) is matched by *o-seibo*, the gift-giving season at the end of December that begins the New Year. *Chugen* is not a religious event, but falls into the category of civil-cultural rituals that are a common part of Japanese heritage.

Michael Ashikenazi

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CHUGHTAI, ISMAT (1911–1992), Indian novelist. Chughtai started writing in the fourth decade of the twentieth century when Urdu fiction was still a fledgling enterprise. She and her contemporaries—Saadat Hasan Manto, Rajinder Singh Bedi, and Krishan Chander—freed Urdu fiction from a preoccupation with romance and fantasy and gave it a realistic conviction. Chughtai's contribution lies in her exploration of feminine sensibility and female sexual-

ity. Despite belonging to a movement of progressive writers that had great impact on Urdu literature in the 1940s and 1950s, Chughtai was fiercely independent and crusaded against any orthodoxy, religious or ideological. She wrote about eight novels and novellas—most notably *Terhi Lakeer* (Crooked Line, 1942), an autobiographical novel. Her fame rests chiefly on her short stories, which depict the lives of middle-class Muslims, particularly women, in northern India in the early decades of the twentieth century. Chughtai was a storyteller par excellence; stylistic directness, sparkling dialogue, brilliant turn of phrase, and scintillating humor are hallmarks of her style.

M. Asaduddin

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CHUGOKU (2000 est. pop. 7.8 million). Chugoku region, with an area of 32,000 square kilometers, encompasses the entire western tip of Honshu and comprises five prefectures: Hiroshima, Okayama, Shimane, Tottori, and Yamaguchi. With the Chugoku Mountains as the dividing lines, the Inland Sea side is called the Sanyo region, and the Sea of Japan side, the Sanin region. It is a mountainous region with many small basins and coastal plains. The natural features of Shimane are characterized by the Oki Kuniga coastline with tall cliffs, as well as Shinji-ko, the sixth-largest lake in Japan. The Tottori Sand Dunes, located in Fukube Village, measure sixteen kilometers from east to west and two kilometers from north to south. Forestry is an important industry with a high quality lumber production. The Okayama Plain and the coastal plains are important areas for the production of rice. Other agricultural products are citrus fruits, melons, and grapes. Industry and commerce characterize the Inland Sea coast. The most heavily populated areas are along the Inland Sea coast, around the cities of Hiroshima, Kurashiki, and Okayama. Coastal waters are among Japan's richest fishing grounds; however, catches of sea bream, prawn, and abalone have been declining due to increasing industrial pollution.


Nathalie Cavasin

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CHULALONGKORN, KING (RAMA V) (1853–1910), Siamese monarch. King Chulalongkorn, also known as Rama V, was the fifth king of the Chakri dynasty and ruled from 1868 until his death in 1910. He succeeded his father, King Mongkut, who had begun to modernize Siam in an attempt to stave off European colonial aggression. Educated in part by Anna Leonowens (featured with King Mongkut in the Rodgers and Hammerstein musical *The King and I*), Chulalongkorn was the first Siamese monarch to study abroad and, like his father, he surrounded himself with European advisers. An advocate of Western education, science, and technology, he sent all of his sons abroad to study. At home, Chulalongkorn implemented a Western-style educational system and founded the country's first university (later named Chulalongkorn University) in order to train a modern governmental bureaucracy.

Chulalongkorn implemented sweeping political and economic reforms that radically transformed



CHULALONGKORN'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE KINGSHIP

Chulalongkorn set forth his philosophy of the kingship in letters he wrote to his son Crown Prince Caofa Maha Vajirunhis, who died before he could succeed his father on the throne.

To live easily, first is to be a priest and second is to be rich. To be a king, there are duties to be performed. You must be restrained in love and conquer hatred, anger, flattery, and laziness. The result of your merit will appear when you die. You will leave a good name as preserver of the family and protector of the people. These are two principles which you must have in mind more than anything else. If you cannot keep them in mind, you cannot rule and take care of the country. . . . It is a blessing that you have everything to make you ready to acquire knowledge, behave well and follow the path of merit.

Source: King Chulalongkorn. (1950) *Letters, Miscellaneous*. Part I: 17. Bangkok, Thailand: n.p.

Siamese society. In 1874 he abolished slavery. Beginning in 1885, he began reforming the government, establishing ministries structured on functional lines. He stripped power from the old nobility, provincial elites, and hereditary court officials. He established a professional military armed with modern weaponry. Chulalongkorn reformed the tax system and established the country's first modern bank, the Siam Commercial Bank. Despite his reforms and attempts to modernize Siam, he resisted establishing a European-style constitutional monarchy, arguing that the people were not ready for it. Chulalongkorn was known for adroit diplomacy that preserved Siam's independence, though he had to accommodate most European demands.

Chulalongkorn died at the age of fifty-seven, having reigned for forty-two years, a period of dramatic change that saw Siam emerge as a modern state. He was succeeded by his eldest son, Vajiravudh (Rama VI), one of his seventy-six children from ninety-two wives.

Zachary Abuza

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CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY Chulalongkorn University was Thailand's first institution of higher learning and remains the nation's most prestigious academic institution. Though founded in March 1917, the school's roots date back to the reign of King Chulalongkorn (1853–1910), who in 1871 established a school that in 1902 became the Royal Pages School. The school's original mission was to train students for the civil service, but other disciplines, including international relations, commerce, agriculture, engineering, medicine, and teacher training, were added to the curriculum. On 1 January 1911, the school was renamed the Civil Service College and on 26 March 1917 was renamed Chulalongkorn University by King Vajiravudh (1881–1925). The original funding for the school came primarily from the royal family, who donated a large parcel of land where the university still resides. The five-hundred-acre campus is in the heart of Bangkok, and the university derives considerable income by renting some of its properties to commercial interests.

The university came under the supervision of the University Affairs Department, Ministry of Education.

When it was founded, the university had 380 students taking classes under four faculties: the faculty of medicine located at Siriraj Hospital and the faculties of law and political science, engineering, and arts and sciences. In 1927, the first female students were enrolled. The undergraduate school grew substantially, and, in 1961, the university set up the graduate school. The university currently has over 27,000 students, including 9,000 graduate students, in 351 study programs and 16 specialized institutes and colleges with 19 faculties. It is Thailand's preeminent research institution.

Zachary Abuza

CHUN DOO HWAN (b. 1932). Chun Doo Hwan was the president of South Korea from 1980 until 1987, when his handpicked successor Roh Tae Woo succeeded him. Born in 1932, Chun was raised in North Kyongsang Province, where he was a student at Taegu Middle School. Before he could finish, Chun transferred to the Korean Military Academy, from which he graduated in 1955.

After graduating from the Korean Military Academy, Chun quickly moved up the ranks, holding various army appointments before being named to the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction. Shortly thereafter, Chun was named the chief of the newly formed Korean Central Intelligence Agency before being named Commander of the Capital Garrison. Like his successor, Roh Tae Woo, Chun saw action in Vietnam as a member of the South Korean forces fighting with the Americans.

In 1979, Chun was named the Commander of the Defense Security Command. Following the assassina-



President Chun Doo Hwan and U.S. President Ronald Reagan at the White House on 26 April 1985. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

tion of President Park Chung Hee (1917–1979) in October 1979, Chun and a group of coconspirators seized control of the military. He was responsible for the brutal suppression of the Kwangju Uprising, a reaction against the military's control of politics in Korea, in May 1980. In August 1980, Chun eased out acting president Ch'oe Kyu-ha and took over the position; he was formally elected president in February 1981.

Chun's term in office can best be characterized by his attempt to open negotiations with North Korea—with little success. Domestically, Chun is best known for his relaxation of the restrictions imposed by the Yushin Constitution.

Keith Leitich

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CH'USOK The Harvest Moon Festival, known in Korea as *Ch'usok* and sometimes as *Han-gawi*, has been observed for more than two millennia. Along with the Lunar New Year's Day (*Sol*), it is one of the two most important of Korea's holidays. *Ch'usok* is observed on the fifteenth of the eighth lunar month, which is always a full-moon day. This date is the beginning of the autumn harvest season, in September or early October, and the harvest moon appears as the biggest and brightest of the year's full moons.

Although harvest celebrations by different ethnic groups occurred on or around this date for centuries before, the first nationwide celebrations on this day were held in the Shilla kingdom (57 BCE–935 CE) in the first century CE, originating in the culmination of a month-long hemp-weaving contest among the women of the capital.

As on *Sol*, ancestral rites are the most important events of *Ch'usok*. *Charye*, the early-morning offering of tables of foods, as well as full ceremonial bows, is held in the home of the oldest male of the family, where the extended family has gathered for the occasion. The second rite, *Songmyo*, is held at the tombs of the immediate ancestors. Here, too, foods are prepared as offerings, and ceremonial bows are made.

Because it is harvest time, foods are an important part of the celebration. Boiled rice is made from early-harvested rice from the year's new crop. From this rice is also made the holiday's specialty rice cakes (*song-*

p'yon). These round or half-moon-shaped rice cakes are filled with sesame seeds, boiled chestnuts, red *azuki* beans, or jujubes and are steamed over pine needles to give them a distinctive fragrance. Apples, pears, persimmons, chestnuts, and jujubes are also feasted on throughout the day.

Various games and entertainments are associated with *Ch'usok* festivities. Korean bullfights pitted two bulls against each other. The head butting, ramming, and goring continued until one bull overpowered the other. The tortoise dance (*kobuk-nori*) was among the most eye-catching of entertainments. The tortoise, actually two men covered with a shell-like mat, danced at village houses and then collapsed, feigning hunger until offered food. Food collected in this manner was distributed to the needy. A tug-of-war employing a gigantic, specially woven straw rope was held between teams from neighboring villages. Good fortune was believed to come to the village of the winning team.

The evening was the time for the women to gaze at the rising full moon, good fortune coming to the one who saw it first. While waiting for moonrise, the women would join in the circle dance (*kanggangsullae*). As the harvest moon rose in the evening sky, supplications were made to the brilliant orb, giving thanks for the harvest and asking for good fortune until the next harvest moon.

David E. Shaffer

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CI *Ci* ("words to be sung") was a type of lyric poetry that originated during the Tang dynasty in China (618–907 CE) and became the most popular style during the Song dynasty (960–1279). Many foreign tunes had made their way into China with foreign travelers, and many of the tunes became popular but needed Chinese words. Although originally associated with singing girls and prostitutes, the new form earned the favor of Emperor Xuanzong (reigned 713–755), who had the court music school add them to its training. Thus *ci* found their way into the repertoire of courtly music. The first anthology of *ci* poetry, *Hua jianji* (Among the Flowers), appeared in the tenth century. When northern China fell in 1127 to the Jin, the court musicians and singers moved south with the rest of the

court, taking with them the *ci* form, and its popularity increased.

Ci had lines of uneven length (unlike *shi*, classic Chinese lyric verse, which always had lines of the same length) and were composed to fit with existing popular folk tunes and their rhythmic and rhyme schemes as well as tonal patterns. As *ci* evolved into pure poetry, they eventually became difficult to sing. Theoretically, *ci* usually could be divided into two sections, one section focusing on human feelings the other section on the scene. Zhang Yan of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) broke *ci* poetry into two distinct categories: the first being Wan Yue (graceful and restrained) and the second Hao Fang (heroic and free).

Stacey Fox

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CI XI, EMPRESS DOWAGER (1835–1908), Dowager empress of China and regent. Nee Yehonala of the Manchu Blue Banner, also known as Ci Xi, held power over China's political life for almost half a century. She was a consort of Emperor Xian Feng (1831–1861, ruled 1850–1861) and bore his successor, Tong Zhi (1856–1875, ruled 1862–1874). After Emperor Xian Feng's death in 1861, Ci Xi seized power by removing eight conservative regents from the court and setting up her own regent over the boy emperor. In 1875, after Emperor Tong Zhi died with no heir, Ci Xi named her three-year-old nephew Guang Xu (1871–1908, ruled 1875–1908) to the throne.

In 1898, Ci Xi resumed the regency as a result of a coup in which she succeeded in crushing the emperor's effort to push through a number of radical proposals designed to renovate and modernize the Chinese government. In 1900, Ci Xi supported officials who encouraged the antiforeign secret society Boxer movement. A coalition of foreign troops soon captured the capital and Ci Xi was forced to flee from Peking to northwestern China, where she accepted the humiliating treaty, the Boxer Protocol, in 1901. Re-

turning to Peking in 1902, she finally began to implement a number of innovations that the reformers had sought in 1898, including the inception of China's constitutional establishment. Ci Xi died on 15 November 1908, one day after the emperor's death.

Shiwei Chen

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CILICIAN GATES The Cilician Gates (Gulek Bogaz) is the key pass leading from the central Anatolian plateau to the Cilician plain and gives access from the cities of Konya and Ankara to Adana and the Mediterranean at Iskenderun and Antakya. Running between the Bolkarlar and Aladag Mountains, the road descends along the course of the Cakir Cay, a tributary of the Seyhan River, to Gulek Bogaz, the narrowest point of the pass, at an altitude of 1,050 meters (3,400 feet). The original passage was cut through rock from gorge to gorge and was so narrow that two caravan camels could barely pass; the cut is now bypassed by the main E90 road. The total length of the narrows, where railway, main road, and river run squeezed together between rock walls, is seventy kilometers from Ulukisla in the north to Gulek in the south.

The pass assumed importance when Asia Minor was a province of the Persian Empire; the Royal Road that supposedly connected Sardis in ancient Lydia with Susa in ancient Persia ran through the gates, and one branch of the Silk Road went from there to Istanbul. It was a key obstacle to the invasion of Persia from the west, and Alexander of Macedon described the desertion of the gates by the Persian defenders (333 BCE) as the most amazing piece of luck in his entire career. The Cilician Gates has remained a major trade route ever since; the Byzantine fortress of Loulon defended approaches from the north, and a chain of ruined Seljuk caravansaries or inns is still visible along the road. The first Crusaders under Baldwin of Boulogne used the pass in 1097, but subsequent Crusaders, aware of the possibilities of ambush, used sea passage or alternative passes. Today the railway is little used, but the multilane highway is continuously and heavily employed by commercial traffic carrying goods from the refineries and steelworks at Iskenderun, the factories at Adana, and the free port at Mersin to the interior.

Kate Clow

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CINEMA—CHINA The history of modern Chinese cinema began on 11 August 1896, when a film by the French production studio Lumière Brothers was shown in Yu Gardens in Shanghai. The first Chinese production, the opera *Dingjun shan* (Dingjun Mountain) was filmed in 1903. In 1916, twenty years after the introduction of Western films into China, the first Chinese-owned film production company was established. From then on, China was able to address topics related to its changing political, economic, social, and international situation through its own lens.

The intended audience of these films, largely Chinese mainlanders, enjoyed the markedly different films made during the various eras of Chinese cinematic history. These included martial arts and romance films in the 1920s, leftist films in the 1930s (the first sound film, *Genu hongmudan* [Singsong Girl Red Peony], was produced in 1931), antiwar films in the 1940s, Soviet-style social realism in the 1950s, a mixture of revolutionary realism and romanticism (spearheaded by Mao Zedong's wife Jiang Qing) in the 1960s, and films of ideological correction and relaxation in the 1970s and early 1980s.

The first generation of Chinese film directors aimed to borrow Western techniques while building a national cinema resistant to Western influences. The second generation of film directors attempted to assist socialist nation-building after the founding of People's Republic of China. The third generation, represented by Xie Jin (*Tianyunshan chuanqi* [The Legend of Tianyun Mountain]), emerged after the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) and tried to forge Chinese film production with socialist Chinese characteristics. Before Xie chose to reflect the concerns of the majority of the Chinese at the time, film production had been either liable to excessive foreign influences or revolutionary romanticism. The fourth generation, represented by Teng Wenji, pushed Xie Jin's paradigm to its limits. The fifth generation, revolting against the previous schools, aimed at transforming Chinese culture through cinema. The sixth generation is now pushing the fifth generation's approach to its limit in a new historical context.

Censorship and Cinema

Censorship has been omnipresent throughout much of the history of Chinese cinema: against com-

munist by the republican government (1912–1927), and against Soviet revisionism (1958–1978) and "bourgeois liberalization" (1978–present) by the Chinese Communist government. Worthy of special mention is the impact on film production of Mao Zedong's policy of art for the sake of ideology. The policy aimed to maintain political correctness in every film. Mobile film projection teams presented these politically correct films to agricultural production teams and work and military units, helping to disseminate official ideology and policies to the masses in hopes of maintaining its legitimacy and political dominance.

Contemporary Cinema

Dissatisfied with the sterilization and wholesale politicization of the cinema, a younger generation of film directors, trained at the Beijing Film Academy after the Cultural Revolution, forged a new cinematic school characterized by cultural critique and reflection and bold artistic experimentation. These directors include Zhang Yimou (*Red Sorghum*, *Judou*, *Raise the Red Lantern*, *The Story of Qiu Ju*), Chen Kaige (*Yellow Earth*, *Farewell My Concubine*, *The King of Children*), and Tian Zhuangzhuang (*The Blue Kite*, *The Horse Thief*). Their films have not only drawn a large and diverse audience but have also attracted the attention of international film scholars. Many of these films have won international awards despite state censorship and are available in video stores throughout the world. These films have been acclaimed both for their exploration of the Chinese cultural psyche and their artistic innovation. In many ways this generation has renounced Mao's policy of art for the sake of ideology. As Zhang Yimou said: "Chinese filmmaking has to remain an open art, free" (Semel 1987: 140). This not only best sums up the aesthetic vision of the new school of filmmakers, but also applies to China's newest generation of film directors, as they seek to negotiate the forces of localism and globalism in constructing cinematic representations of the deeper flows of Chinese culture.

Wenshan Jia

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CINEMA—INDIA Cinema was introduced in India on 7 July 1896 when the Lumière brothers invited the residents of Mumbai (Bombay) to see their movies brought from France. In the next few years, Indian entrepreneurs flooded India with foreign motion pictures, which were actually of little interest to the Indian masses. It was Dhundhiraj Phalke, a young Brahman student of drawing, painting, and photography, who pawned his wife's ornaments to make the first Indian feature film, *Raja Harishchandra*, a mythological tale with titles in Hindi and English, which opened in Mumbai on 12 April 1913. In the next few years, Phalke made other mythological films, as well as animated films, travelogues, and documentaries. Indian tycoons such as J. F. Madan in Calcutta were responsible for a prodigious output of both social and mythological films in the following years. In spite of the popularity of Indian films, because of higher production values and a superior distribution system, about 85 percent of the movies shown in India by the late 1920s were American, a fact that dismayed both Indian filmmakers and British rulers.

Talking pictures came to India on 14 March 1931 with the showing of Ardeshir Irani's *Alam Ara*, a drama based on a stage play. Another important force in the 1930s was the Prabhat Film Company and its leader, V. Shantaram, who showed a Hindi film, *Amar jyoti* (Eternal Light), about the vengeance of women, at the Venice Film Festival in 1936 and won an award at that festival for his Marathi film *Sant tukaram* (Saint Tukaram) a year later. From the beginning, however, Hindi emerged as the dominant language of Indian cinema, although films in other languages of more limited reach, such as Bengali and Tamil, were also made. Building on the indigenous entertainment of India, every film included a multitude of songs, which rapidly evolved from folk music to a distinctive film song genre with its own emotional identity. The film song gradually became a separate source of entertainment, and the popularity of the songs, which were often released before the movie, determined the success of the movie. Given the importance of the film song and the difficulty of finding actors who were also good singers, by the 1940s the "playback" system had become universal, and the actors mouthing the songs on screen

were not the actual singers. The most famous of these playback singers is Lata Mangeshkar, who became the world's most recorded singer in her fifty-year career, which began in 1948.

Indian Cinema since Independence

With the independence of India and the partition of the subcontinent in August 1947, Indian cinema continued its development free of British censorship but subject to the censors and taxation rules of the new Indian government. The 1950s in Mumbai were marked by the filmmaker Raj Kapoor (1924–1988), whose films were mostly scripted by the famous film journalist K. A. Abbas (1914–1987). Kapoor, through his depiction of the lovable vagabond in films, such as *Awara* (Vagabond) and *Sabri 420*, became famous not only in India, but also in the Soviet Union and the Middle East. In 1957, ten years after independence, another famous director, Mehboob Khan (1906–1964), made *Mother India*, one of the most popular films ever made in India, in which the Indian woman as mother becomes a symbol for the nation. It was nominated for an Academy Award as best foreign film.

More than half of all the cinema halls in India were in South India, however, and therefore Madras soon became the film capital of India. Most of the films in Madras were made in Tamil, but many were made in Hindi also, such as the 1948 blockbuster, *Chandralakha*. The Tamil cinema also had a strong connection with South Indian politics because the famous Tamil film actor M. G. Ramachandran (1917–1987, known as MGR) became chief minister of the state of Tamil Nadu and was succeeded in that position by the actress Jayalitha.

The New Cinema

Although K. A. Abbas in 1954 made the Hindi film *Munna*, the first Hindi film without any songs or dances, it was in Calcutta that a new kind of Indian cinema arose. There Satyajit Ray (1921–1992), a young advertising man who had been active in the Calcutta Film Society, determined to make a film that would deserve worldwide acclaim. With a small subsidy from the state of Bengal, Ray made a film based on a famous Bengali novel about a boy named Apu who grew up in a small village. The film *Pather panchali* (Song of the Road) was shown at the Museum of Modern Art in New York and became the first Indian film to achieve extensive U.S. distribution. Ray completed the Apu trilogy with *Aparajito* (The Unvanquished) in 1957 and *Apur sansar* (The World of Apu) in 1959. During the centennial of the birth of Rabindranath Tagore, India's only Nobel Prize winner



Large movie billboards such as this one in Madras are a common way of advertising films in India. (HANS GEORG ROTH/ CORBIS)

in literature, Ray made a documentary on Tagore in 1961 and followed that with two films based on Tagore's literary works, *Charulata*, about a lonely wife in nineteenth-century Bengal; and *Two Daughters*, a film based on Tagore's short stories. Another Ray trilogy in the early 1970s dealt with the Calcutta middle class in the turbulent 1960s: *Days and Nights in the Forest* (*Aranyer Din Raatri*, 1969), *The Adversary* (*Pratidwandi*, 1970), and *Company Limited* (*Seemabaddha*, 1971). Ray stayed far away from the Mumbai stereotypes: no songs and dances, careful scripting, strong emphasis on authenticity, shooting on location, and careful selection of actors, who were often inexperienced. But Ray also worked with master actors, whom he had mainly discovered himself. Soumitra Chatterjee, who played the adult Apu in *Apur sansar*, worked with Ray for more than three decades, and Sharmila Tagore, Apu's wife in that film, appeared in Ray films throughout the 1960s. Except for *Shatranj ke khilari* (*The Chess Players*), which he made in Hindi-Urdu, all of Ray's films were in his native Bengali. Ray's prodigious output continued until his death in 1992, soon after receiving an honorary Academy Award in his Calcutta hospital bed.

The first Hindi movie of the new Indian cinema was made by another famous Bengali director, Mrinal Sen (b. 1923). The film was *Bhuvan Shome* (1969), and its moderate success was a harbinger of a new cinema

movement that was vigorous for more than two decades. Actors and directors graduated from the Film Institute in Pune and with the help of state subsidies made some good movies, such as *27 Down* in 1973, which, like *Bhuvan Shome*, had a railroad theme. The most prominent director of the new Indian cinema was probably Shyam Benegal (b. 1934), whose 1973 film *Ankur* (*The Seedling*), about the cruelty of landlords, was followed by *Mandhan* (*The Churning*), a film about exploitation of farmers by a dairy owner that was financed by Gujarati farmers.

In the last two decades of the twentieth century, in spite of vigorous production in regional centers like Madras, Mumbai continued its dominance and became universally known as Bollywood, a contraction of Bombay (Mumbai's former name) and Hollywood. After the often violent films starring superheroes such as Amitabh Bachchan, Bollywood in the late 1980s saw the rise of romantic musical films. The trend in musicals culminated with the hugely popular 1994 film *Hum aap ke hain kaun* (*Who Are We to You?*), which chronicles typical family events instead of including the typical movie plots and subplots. Emigrants from South Asia all over the world—via Indian movie theaters, VCRs, DVDs, and Indian cable channels—have made Indian cinema a world cinema.

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CINEMA—JAPAN Developing an art form that had originated in the West, Japanese cinema emerged after Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895. As with the later golden age of Japanese film, film art came into its own in the wake of upheaval. The predominance of ideas, of speculation and introspection, so common in Japanese cinema, began with the *banshi*, the narrator of Japanese silent films. The *banshi* explained, with flourishes, what was happening, with the premise that there was something of moment to communicate beyond what visual images provided.

Japanese cinema of the late 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s owed much to the new drama of Shingeki, the social drama born in the early 1900s and influenced by the works of Henrik Ibsen (1828–1906) and George Bernard Shaw (1856–1950). Film, like theater, would be an arena of social assessment, a means of examining and exploring the fate of society. Kaoru Osanai, a founder of the Shingeki movement, had studied at the Moscow Art Theater, where Sergey Eisenstein (1898–1948) was also a presence. (In this article, Japanese names are presented surname first.) Crucial to the history of Japanese film are Osanai's films and Minoru Murata's landmark *Rojo no Rekion* (Souls on the Road), made in 1921 and based partly on Maxim Gorky's *The Lower Depths*, a work that Akira Kurosawa would adapt as well.

By the late 1920s, the first great Japanese director, Teinosuke Kinugasa, had arrived on the scene. His masterpiece, *Kurutta Ippaiji* (1927; A Crazy Page, also known as A Page of Madness), brought Japanese film a world dimension. Combining German expressionism with Soviet montage (he had studied with Eisenstein), Kinugasa created Japanese film art. The work of Daisuke Ito and Masahiro Makino in the late 1920s prefigured the later golden age of the period film. This work attacked feudal society and, by implication, the

current social system. "Tendency" pictures, focusing on social problems and themselves influenced by the Russian Revolution, were a dominant trend when, with Heinosuke Gosho's *Madamu to Nyobo* (The Neighbor's Wife and Mine) in 1931, talking pictures came to Japan.

Just as American cinema distinguished itself in the early years of the twentieth century with the films of D. W. Griffith, and Soviet cinema reached its high point in the 1920s, Japanese cinema truly came into its own at the moment of Japan's defeat in World War II. It is at moments of transition in the social history of a culture that great art flourishes. After Japan's defeat in World War II, the country turned to a political and social reexamination of its national identity. This reexamination was assumed in the arts with the greatest verve and imagination, not by poets and novelists, but by film directors.

Some of the directors, like Ozu Yasujiro (1903–1963), had been making films since silent days. Others, like Kurosawa Akira (1910–1998), came into their own during the war. All explored in their films the theme of what it means to be Japanese. Some of their works, particularly those of Ozu, were set in the present. Other directors, like Kurosawa and Kobayashi Masaki, created their greatest art through period films: stories set as far back as medieval times, but mostly depicting another period of transition—the nineteenth century, which saw the fall of the Tokugawa dynasty and Japan's tentative and then thunderous entrance into modernism.

Kurosawa Akira

Kurosawa's subject, the passing of the samurai class from the stage of history in the sixteenth century, is the theme of the greatest Japanese film ever made, his *Seven Samurai* (1954). In the tragedy of the decline of the samurai, Kurosawa discovered a quality of being Japanese lost in the era in which he himself lived and worked. "Again we've survived—again we're defeated," says Kambei, played by Shimura Takashi, the humane leader of the *ronin*, those disenfranchised samurai who have come to save the peasant village.

The winners are the peasants who will live on in history, not the samurai, whose nobility has been tainted by corruption and upheaval. As Kurosawa revealed, the peasants are able to enlist only six wandering *ronin* to work for them, with no payment but the satisfaction of helping a community survive. Kurosawa depicted the subsequent ascendance of the merchant class in his searing satire *Yojimbo* (1960), a film that despite its historical setting speaks to this director's perception of the corruption of modern-day mer-

cantile Japan: its press, its industry, and its inequitable system of justice.

Ozu's *Tokyo Story*

The very rhythms of Kurosawa's films, from *Rashomon* (1950) to *Red Beard* (1965), trumpeted the inevitability of change, but Kurosawa's later films, from *Dodeskaden* (1970) on, do not share this optimism and belief in the possibility of social and human transformation. Even the Soviet co-production *Dersu Uzala* (1975), which followed *Dodeskaden*, is nostalgic and pictorial rather than full of the dynamic tension and implicit optimism that the world may be transformed, so characteristic of Kurosawa's greatest works.

Ozu's efforts to define being Japanese expressed in the postwar moral chaos a nostalgic appreciation for traditions of graciousness that were being lost as Japan modernized and embraced the values and culture of the West. The most telling moment in all his films may well occur at the climax of *Tokyo Story* (1953). The mother dies at the end of the film, allowing Ozu to offer a dialogue between daughter-in-law and youngest daughter that rises above the plot to speak to Ozu's worldview.


Most of the children have been selfish and mercenary. Appalled by her older sister Shige's selfishness—the materialism that allowed Shige at the moment of the mother's death to demand her best kimono as a "keepsake"—the youngest child, Kyoko, cries out in anger. Her siblings and indeed, for Ozu, people in general were all so selfish, she complains. Her sister-in-law, Noriko, who has lost her husband in the war, demands a more measured response. "At your age I thought so, too," she gently reminds Kyoko. Even Shige "meant no harm."

"Isn't life disappointing!" Kyoko concludes. It is Noriko, however, who speaks for Ozu with the spirit of *mu*, the peace that passeth understanding.

"Yes, it is," she smiles. There is no doubt that Ozu admires Noriko for attempting to retain her Japanese spirit, even as she suffers premature widowhood and is herself uneasy and discontented. "I'm quite selfish," Noriko had admitted to her mother-in-law. "I'm not always thinking of your son."

New Views of Women

Mizoguchi Kenji (1898–1956), following one of the edicts of the Allied Occupation that the efforts of women to assume their independence should be paramount among film subjects, created great works of cinema by depicting women of the past. In *The Life of*



A large billboard advertises a movie in Japan. (EYE UBIQUITOUS/CORBIS)

Oharu (1952) and *A Story from Chikamatsu* (1954), Mizoguchi spoke to the needs of the modern Japanese woman by exploring her subjection to patriarchal domination in the past.

Another director who concentrated on the social restrictions that thwart women was Naruse Mikio, whose greatest film, *A Wandering Life* (1962), depicts the struggle for fulfillment of a woman who became one of Japan's leading writers, Hayashi Fumiko. In 1960, Naruse remarked that people did not write about strong, independent women and that audiences preferred stories about weak women's torment and abuse. In film after film, Naruse transcended that perception. "I shared none of their feelings that untraditional women are unattractive," he confessed to an interviewer for the Japanese film magazine *Kinema Jumpo*, or "that strong-hearted women are despicable and disgusting."

Antiwar Films

Antiwar films flourished in the postwar period under the encouragement of the supreme commander of

the Allied powers, General Douglas MacArthur. From the edict that postwar Japanese films reject the values that led to the war came masterpieces of film art revealing the cruelty of the Japanese in China, such as Kobayashi Masaki's three-part epic, *Ningen no Joken* (1959; *The Human Condition*). Other films depicted how the war brought suffering to the ordinary Japanese who wanted no part of militarism.

The most moving of these films was *Twenty-Four Eyes* (1954), by Kinoshita Keisuke. It is the biography of a teacher on Sado Island in the Inland Sea. Miss Oishi must instruct a child, defying the previously prevailing ideology, that the emperor is not "in the cupboard" and that his portrait is no more than a portrait. The emperor is not omnipotent and omnipresent, but rather a man like any other—a view that was sacrilegious until 1945.

Culture Criticized

That Japanese directors were ready to make films critical of the culture that nurtured the war was revealed in Kurosawa's *No Regrets for Our Youth* (1946), a film about a woman who achieves liberation by marrying an antiwar activist who is murdered by the Japanese secret police. Yukie, played by the greatest actress of her day, Hara Setsuko, goes on to reject traditional Japanese views of femininity in exchange for becoming an assertive citizen of the society that has destroyed her possibility of personal happiness.

The generation of directors who followed Kurosawa, Mizoguchi, Ozu, and Naruse was no less obsessed by the theme of its unique Japanese identity. With passion and urgency, Shinoda Masahiro, Hani Susamu, Oshima Nagisa, and the most talented of them all, Imamura Shohei, explored the turmoil of postwar society. In *Pigs and Battleships* (1961), Imamura created a brilliant protest against the continuing military occupation of Japan; the marauding Americans are the "pigs" of the title, but so are the Japanese gangsters, the *yakuza*, who profit from their presence. Oshima challenged the inability of the older generation to face its responsibility for Japan's moral demise in *Ceremonies* (1971). A groom goes through with his wedding despite the fact that his bride has run away; Japan persists in meaningless traditions that have lost all purpose, even as the nation has lost its moral direction.

Oshima's masterpiece, *In the Realm of the Senses* (1976), located a uniquely Japanese appreciation of sexuality in characters who defy the conventions of the wartime moment, the late 1930s, to devote themselves exclusively to the joy and sensuality that belong to a Japan where sex was not associated with shame. Os-

hima's Sada and Kichizo invoked the aristocratic culture of tenth-century Japan, when people dedicated themselves to an appreciation of lovemaking, a mood reinvented for the last time in the flurry of pleasure seeking of late-Tokugawa Japan just prior to the opening of Japan to the West. As did the great generation of filmmakers who preceded him, Oshima used the past as a vehicle into the present.

In that ancient and more beautiful Japan, where sex was divorced from psychopathology and repression, Oshima located the heart of the unique Japanese identity. In that past, women were the equals of men in their mutual abandon. The need to make war was countered by the natural, physical fulfillment of lovemaking, a freedom that came to an end, Oshima suggested, in 1936 with the Officers' Coup that made Japan's participation in World War II inevitable. *In the Realm of the Senses* may indeed itself be seen as the punctuating moment of the great era of Japanese filmmaking. Subsequent directors have been content to revel in satire, outlandish action, and broad humor. Like that of other nations, France and Italy included, the Japanese cinema awaits its next resurgence.

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See also: **Cinema, Contemporary—Japan**

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CINEMA—WEST ASIA Film production in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran has struggled in the face of censorship, lack of government support, and competition from the U.S. film industry. Nevertheless, in the past few decades, Iranian and Turkish films have made their way onto the international scene, where they have garnered awards. Iraqi cinema faces more obstacles than Turkish or Iranian cinema and is rarely seen in the West.

Iraqi Cinema

Documentary films are the most common type of film produced in Iraq because of the prohibitive technical requirements and expenses associated with the production of feature films, and documentary film production is dominated by the state. High costs and lack of state support, combined with a history of domestic unrest, have prevented the emergence of a strong and independent private sector; currently only a limited number of films are privately produced each year. The most successful company is the Babil Corporation, which is partly owned by the government. The primary film producer in Iraq is the state-owned and -operated Cinema and Theatre Administration.

Not surprisingly, most Iraqi films are either complimentary narratives of Iraq's history and development or critical assessments of the impact of United Nations sanctions and military operations against Iraq. Although such films can be seen as mere legitimization exercises by the government, they also represent a viewpoint that is rarely given credence in the West.

Sanctions and Iraq's difficult political and economic situation have meant that few Iraqi films ever reach Western audiences. Furthermore, the future of both public and private sectors has been severely affected by the banning of raw film imports into Iraq under the U.N. sanctions. In light of the nature of Iraq's film industry and the failure of its films to have a presence in the Western market, it is not surprising that Iraqi films have been little studied. Whatever analysis there is has been published exclusively in Arabic.

Turkish Cinema

For many years, Turkish cinema was dominated by cheaply made films produced for a wide audience. Collectively referred to as *Yesilcam* (the Turkish version of Hollywood), such films were Turkey's answer to Hollywood, replete with swooning, blond-tressed falsetto-voiced women and hirsute men with handlebar mustaches. Most were simplistic depictions of life, often based on popular Turkish novels or American films.

However, Turkey's film industry has also been a medium through which the country's various domestic



A billboard advertising an Iranian movie in 1995. (DAVID & PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS)

conflicts are examined. For example, Halit Refig's *Sebirdeki Yavanci* (Stranger in the City, 1963) explored the conflict between Islamic and secular values in Turkey. *Karanlıkta Uyananlar* (Those Awakening in Darkness, 1964), directed by Ertem Gorec, dealt with the social consequences of a workers' strike. The conflict over Turkey's ethnic and religious identity has been expressed in various and often differing efforts to develop a national film culture. One example was the Milli Sinema, a national film movement that emerged in the 1970s as a promoter of Turkey's Islamic identity, producing several films with strong religious contents, including *Birlesen Yollar* (Joining Roads, 1970) and *Memleketin* (My Country, 1974).

The long and often bloody history of Turkey's Kurdish minority has also been reflected in the effort to develop a Kurdish film industry. The Kurdish film industry has struggled to survive, severely hampered at various stages by the efforts of Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq to prevent the realization of a Kurdish identity. The technological revolution in the late twentieth century, which saw the introduction of videos and satellite television, has made it easier for Kurdish filmmakers to produce independent films. Perhaps the best-known Kurdish movie is *Yol* (The Road, 1982). It won the Cannes Film Festival's highest award, the Palme d'Or, in 1982 but was not allowed to be seen in Turkey until 1992.

Although films such as *Yol* (The Road, 1982), *Etikiya* (Bandit, 1996), and *Hamman* (Turkish Bath, 1997) have drawn significant international audiences and won rave reviews at European film festivals, the growing international presence of Turkish films has been paralleled by the mounting obstacles that filmmakers face at home. Most filmmakers struggle to make films on limited budgets, with inadequate government support and in the face of the country's often volatile political and economic situation. Turkish films must also compete with American films, which, with the latest filmmaking technology and internationally recognized actors, are very popular in Turkey.

Iranian Cinema

The cinema industry has become one of Iran's best-known exports. During recent decades, Iranian films have won favorable reviews from Western filmgoers and critics alike and have gained numerous awards at international festivals. Two prominent examples are Abbas Kiarostami's *Ta'm-i Gilas* (Taste of Cherry, 1997), which won the Palme d'Or at the Cannes Film Festival in 1997, and Majid Majidi's *Bachchab'ba-yi Aseman* (Children of Heaven, 1997), which received

an Oscar nomination in 1998. Aside from their popularity, Iranian films present an alternative view of Iranians, who have traditionally been seen in the West as fanatical and intolerant. However, while displacing one negative image of Iran, the films have to a certain extent been popular because they depict other stereotypical images, of Iran's idealized past or of a sentimental view of children. Consequently, such films have been criticized for seeking popular acceptance by pandering to the Orientalism of the West by exoticizing and patronizing Iranian life.

Iranian filmmakers, however, have emphasized such content because it can easily pass strict government censorship requirements. Under these requirements, there can be no violence, no affection between men and women who are unrelated, no dancing, no female singers or alluring music. The story must not offend the clerical establishment or disagree with Islamic tenets. As a result, Iranian filmmakers have developed ingenious ways to surmount the censorship barriers. Mohsen Makhmalbaf overcame the ban on depicting a woman giving birth by donning a skirt and playing the role himself in his 1996 film *Gabbeh* (Gabbeh, 1997). Other directors have cast female and male actors who are related, thereby skirting the rule against characters demonstrating affection. Filmmakers have often resorted to allegory, satire, and symbolism to get their message across—hence the frequent use of small children.

Some filmmakers, however, have willingly dealt frankly with sensitive issues. Ibrahim Hatamikia's *Azbans Shishab'yi* (The Glass Agency, 1998) portrayed the plight of disabled war veterans in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war. Davoud Mirbaqeri's *Adambarfi* (The Snowman, 1995) has come under strong criticism from conservative elements in Iran for its depiction of male cross-dressing.

Like the press, television, and universities in Iran, the cinema has become a battleground where a war is waged between opposing ideological views—between those who want to reform Iran's conservative Islamic system and those who campaign for its continuation. Recently reformist politicians, in an effort to liberalize the arts, have encouraged the film industry by attempting to loosen cultural restrictions.

Adrienne Whitby

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CINEMA, CONTEMPORARY — JAPAN

Japanese cinema began in 1897 with the importation of motion picture cameras from France. By 1900 the Japanese were manufacturing their own equipment. The earliest Japanese films were actualities along the lines of the Lumiere Brothers in France, brief vignettes of street life or glimpses of landscapes. The Russo-Japanese War, beginning in 1904, was actually a boon to Japanese filmmaking, which catered to a seemingly inexhaustible demand for newsreel footage of the fighting—real or staged. The fiction film came into its own when it was integrated into stage plays to form a unique dramatic presentation known as *rensa-geki* (chain drama). Film sequences shot on location or scenes of dramatic chases became part of live theatrical performances. As the fiction film developed and increased in popularity over the documentary mode, theater, especially kabuki and *shimpa*, became the dominant model for Japanese cinema. Directors like Itami Mansaku (1900–1946), the father of Itami Juzo, and Makino Shozo (1878–1929) pioneered modern cinematic storytelling techniques, often in the *jidai-geki* (period film) mode, paving the way for masters like Mizoguchi Kenji (1898–1956), Yamanaka Sadao (1909–1938), and Ozu Yasujiro (1902–1963) to create a golden age of film in the 1930s. Wartime censorship and the exigencies of war soon put an end to this remarkable period of creativity and commercial success, which would be equaled and perhaps surpassed in the 1950s.

Decline, Fall, and Resurgence

By the 1950s, Japanese cinema was the envy of the world. Filmmakers produced critical favorites at festivals and commercial successes at home year after year. As U.S. cinema went into a decline because of judicially mandated changes in the film industry and increased competition from television, Japan's film industry entered another golden age. The decade came to a close with a record 547 films released in 1960. But this was the beginning of an end. Production levels, attendance, and number of movie screens all went into a gradual decline in Japan, until by 1978 only 350 or so films were released each year, the majority of which were low-budget exploitation films, termed, however

unfittingly, *roman-poruno* ("romantic-pornography"). By the end of the 1990s, production of *roman-poruno* declined, as liberalized censorship laws and cheap video production put an end to the genre for all intents and purposes. Production levels fell to around 250 films per year.

That number is deceiving, however, in terms of Japanese cinema as a whole. If one discounts *roman-poruno* from the production numbers of the 1970s, in the 1990s Japanese filmmaking experienced a noticeable increase, not only in quantity but, more important, in quality. While in the minds of many critics Japanese cinema of the 1980s had precious little to offer the serious film fan and even less to offer the national box office, the situation changed in the mid-1990s. With a host of new directors and talented stars, Japanese cinema again found itself the object of critical acclaim and commercial success.

Japanese Cinema in the 1970s and 1980s

One of the structural features of the Japanese cinema that prevented its resurgence amid the decline in the 1970s was the fact that major Japanese production studios were also major distribution outlets for foreign and domestic films, as well as in control of important theater chains. When domestic film production declined, the studios could turn to foreign films for distribution and exhibition. Thus, it is no surprise that the resurgent Hollywood cinema of the 1970s contributed to the declining Japanese cinema of that era. Similarly, the film studios also turned to television production to maintain a steady flow of income. Toei, for instance, reaped the rewards of its animation subsidiary during the *anime* (animation) boom of the 1980s and its live-action offshoots known as *sentai*, or five-hero shows, such as *The Mighty Morphin Power Rangers*. Mostly, however, the major studios kept themselves afloat with big-budget prestige films or middle-budget formula films guaranteed to turn a modest profit through advance ticket sales and blockbooking (forcing a theater to book a whole slate of a company's films, often sight unseen, rather than picking and choosing) practices. Toho, for instance, which scored a surprising hit in 1954 with *Gojira* (*Godzilla*) and then its numerous sequels, had put the venerable monster on hiatus in the mid-1970s. But in the mid-1980s the studio trotted him out again, and during the 1990s he reappeared with startling regularity. And, like Toei, Toho reaped the rewards of its *anime* connection, in particular with the films of Miyazaki Hayao: *Kaze no tani no Naushikaa* (*Nausicaä of the Valley of Wind*, 1984), *Tonari no Totoro* (*My Neighbor Totoro*, 1988) and *Majo no takkyubin* (*Kiki's Delivery Service*,

1989). More impressive was the case of the film studio Shochiku, which had a substantial hit with a light comedy called *Otoko wa tsurai yo (It's Tough Being a Man)* in 1969. From then on, the studio churned out two films per year detailing the romantic misadventures of the lovable Tora-san until the star, Atsumi Kiyoshi, died in 1996.

Serious Japanese cinema was kept alive in the 1980s through independent productions, mostly comedy films which tended to have more critical respect abroad than commercial clout at home. Directors such as Itami Juzo with *Ososhiki (The Funeral)*, 1985) and *Tampopo* (1986) and Morita Yoshimitsu with *Kazoku Geemu (The Family Game)*, 1984) appealed to overseas audiences with satire and dark humor by showing the Japanese family system under stress. Meanwhile, younger directors like Kurosawa Kiyoshi and Suo Masayuki were cutting their teeth on comic variations of *roman-poruno* and classical Japanese cinema with films such as Kurosawa's *Do-re-mi-fa-musume no chi wa sawagu (The Excitement of the Do-Re-Mi Fa Girl)*, 1985) and Suo's *Hentai kazoku: Aniki no yomesan (Crazy Family)*, 1983). Though often distributed by a major studio, these works owed nothing in style and spirit to the often plodding, formulaic films that passed for mainstream Japanese cinema at the time.

Japanese Cinema in the 1990s

One man deserves much of the credit for returning Japanese cinema to the limelight in the 1990s: Kitano Takeshi, better known as "Beat" Takeshi. A popular television personality, "Beat" Takeshi made his film debut in Oshima Nagisa's *Merry Christmas, Mr. Lawrence* (1983) and continues to act in numerous films, including Oshima's more recent, *Gohatto* (2000). It is, however, the films that he directs that demonstrated the possibility of an original and major voice emerging in Japanese cinema. Violent police or *yakuza* (gangster) films dominate his output (*Sonatine*, 1993; *Hana-bi*, 1997), but he is also capable of dealing sensitively with young people (*Kids Return*, 1996; *Kikujiro*, 1999). If he—along with Imamura Shohei, the 1960s director who has maintained his importance—is a major figure in Japanese cinema today, he is not alone in his impressive output or his interest in violence, loss, and youthful alienation.

A sense of extreme alienation, whether manifested in schizophrenia, murder, or in the death of a young person by disease or suicide, permeates much of the best Japanese cinema of the 1990s and early years of the twenty-first century. This thematic link is also manifested by stylistic similarities primarily revolving around the long take, an uninterrupted, unedited run

of the camera, creating single shots. In films as seemingly diverse as *Maborosi* (Koreeda Hirokazu, 1995), *Suzaku* (Kawase Naomi, 1997), *Okaeri* (Shinozaki Makoto, 1996), *Unagi (The Eel)*, Imamura Shohei, 1997), *Tokyo Yakyoku* (Ichikawa Jun, 1997), *M/Other* (Suwa Nobuhiro, 1999), *Charisma* (Kurosawa Kiyoshi, 1999), and *Eureka* (Aoyoma Shinji, 2000), the canny use of long takes lends emotional depth and stylistic beauty to recent Japanese films dealing with loss, betrayal, and incomprehensible grief.

To counterbalance the long-shot, long-take style, another group of young Japanese directors has appeared with crime films and thrillers in the pulp-fiction mode, creating stylish bullet-ballets that compare with films made by the likes of Quentin Tarantino and John Woo. These directors, including Takashi Miike (*Audition*, 1999; *City of Lost Souls*, 2000), Tsukamoto Shinya (*Tokyo Fist*, 1995; *Bullet Ballet*, 1998), and Tanaka Hiroyuki, working under the pen name of Sabu (*Dangan Runner*, 1996; *Postman Blues*, 1999), have pushed Japanese aesthetics into the MTV-age.

Films with styles somewhere between the austere and the frenetic, such as Suo's *Shall We Dance* (1996), or the veteran director Fukasaku Kinji's controversial *Battle Royale* (2000), have also helped to return Japanese cinema to box office success at home and abroad and to achieve the kind of critical acclaim that films of the 1950s and 1960s received. *Anime* films like *Akira* (1988) and *Mononoke hime (Princess Mononoke)*, 1997) draw domestic box office numbers unseen in a generation and appeal to worldwide audiences, as well.

In short, the range of subjects, themes, and styles apparent in Japanese cinema of the 1990s and beyond indicates that Japan's cinema continues to reveal the complexity and artistry of Japanese culture as a whole. Youthful alienation and Japan's increasingly multicultural society are likely to remain potent subjects for a newly vibrant Japanese cinema.

David Desser

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
CIRCASSIANS The Circassians (Cerkes in Russian and the Turkic languages or Adygea in the Circassian language) are a people of the northwestern Caucasus and northeastern Black Sea region whose languages belong to the Northwest Caucasian family, a non-Indo-European group. Beginning in the thirteenth century, the Circassians were under the nominal control of the Golden Horde and were a major source of slaves for the armies and households of the Islamic world. This trade was a principal source of wealth for the khanate of the Golden Horde and later for the khanate of the Crimea through the eighteenth century. With the expansion of the Russian empire in the eighteenth century, Circassian independence became more circumscribed; as a defense against Russian expansion, the Circassians fostered closer ties with the Ottoman empire. This move was no more than a temporary impediment to Russian expansion, but the Ottoman association did encourage a major change in

Circassian society: the majority of Circassians accepted Islam. With the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, the Ottomans ceded control of the region to the Russians; resistance to Russian imperial control assumed a more local color and persisted fiercely until about 1864.

Beginning in the 1850s and dramatically increasing after about 1862, many Circassians left the Caucasus for the Ottoman empire. Some one and one-half million Circassians are estimated to have fled to Ottoman territory before 1914. Most originally settled in the Balkans. Eventually, however, they settled mainly in Anatolia and the Ottoman province of Syria.

Today sizable Circassian populations are found in Syria, Jordan, Israel, and Turkey as well as in the republic of Georgia and the Russian Federation. Although the population figures offered here are only rough estimates, more than half of all Circassians presently live outside their homeland. Approximately 500,000 live in Georgia and Russia combined; up to one million live in Turkey, approximately 50,000 in Syria, 30,000 in Jordan, and 2,000 in Israel. These diaspora populations exhibit significant diversity. In Turkey, they largely assimilated into the general population, while the Circassians in Jordan play a notable role in public affairs and commerce and maintain a distinct sense of Circassian identity.

Howard Eissenstat



This illustration shows Circassians migrating to Turkey from Russia to escape persecution in the nineteenth century. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

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CITIZEN'S MOVEMENT The Japanese citizen's movement (*shimin undo*) was mobilized in the 1950s and early 1960s to oppose nuclear weapons, the United States-Japan security treaty, and the Vietnam War. At this time, citizens' groups joined left-wing students, labor, and socialist organizations to combat the conservative ruling party's decisions on social and political issues. Later in the 1960s, people's concerns turned to the industrial pollution and environmental destruction caused by economic development. Industrial poisoning incidents, such as the Minamata (mid-1950s) and Niigata (1964–1965) mercury poisonings, the Toyama cadmium pollution (1955), and the Yokkaichi asthma outbreaks (1961), led to lawsuits, which in turn forced the government to introduce victims' compensation. Movements organized by ordinary people such as fishermen, farmers, and peasants (*jumin undo*) also dealt with such issues and attempted to prevent the establishment of new polluting industrial plants. In 1964, these actions stopped a planned heavy chemical complex in Mishima and Numazu on the Pacific coast.

Many more such legal actions occurred from 1967 to 1973. By this time, the term *jumin undo* was used interchangeably with *shimin undo* throughout Japan. Citizen-action groups played a decisive role in changing Japan's environmental policy and were responsible for the Basic Law for Pollution Control in 1967, its revision in 1970, and the 1971 establishment of the Environmental Agency. In the 1970s, farmers protested the construction of Narita Airport in Chiba prefecture, and citizens opposed the development of the *shinkansen* (bullet train), because of its environment impact, such as noise and vibration. In the 1980s, housewives demonstrated about consumer issues such as prices and product quality.

The antinuclear movement in Japan had developed rapidly after the end of the U.S. occupation, and it was reinforced in the 1980s by the strong antinuclear and nuclear-freeze protests that spread throughout Europe, the United States, and the South Pacific. Since the 1990s, protests in Japan have concerned such issues as the construction of industrial waste dumpsites, nuclear power plants, and dams and the relocation of U.S. military bases.

Nathalie Cavasin

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CIVIL-SERVICE EXAMINATION—CHINA

China's examination system started during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) and continued until it was abolished by the dowager empress Cixi (1835–1908) in 1905. By the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), the civil-service examination had become the traditional method for recruiting civil servants in China, and this practice was eventually adopted by numerous countries throughout the world.

In traditional China, the concept of a state ruled by people of ability and virtue was an outgrowth of Confucian philosophy, which was concerned with benevolent rulers and rulership. The civil-service examination was an attempt to recruit people on the basis of merit rather than of family or political connections. Since success in the examination system was the basis of people's social status, education became highly regarded as the key to success. The Confucian classics were the texts studied for the examinations.

During the Tang dynasty (618–907), the system was reorganized in an effort to promote efficiency. In the Song dynasty (960–1279), the system again underwent changes, this time to address concerns that the examinations emphasized memorization rather than practical application. Wang Anshi (1021–1086), the prime minister responsible for the reform, stressed the importance of understanding the underlying ideas and being able to apply classical insights to contemporary issues.

Although only a small percentage of those who studied for the examinations could gain office, students spent twenty to thirty years memorizing orthodox commentaries in preparation for a series of as many as eight examinations for the highest degree of civil-service rank.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the examination system had come to be regarded as outdated and inadequate training for officials who faced the task of modernizing China. In addition, students who dropped out often became figures of rebellion in Chinese society. For instance, Hong Xiuquan (1814–1864), who took the examination many times, became

a key figure in the disastrous Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864) directed against the Qing government, which Hong hoped to replace with his heavenly kingdom (Taiping); the rebellion failed, and more than 20 million people may have lost their lives in the fighting.

Despite these facts, the examination system has some strong points. Chinese rulers found that the system provided them with an objective and institutionalized method of recruiting loyal government officials. Theoretically, almost all Chinese, regardless of social background, could take the examinations. Today, civil-service examinations in Japan, the United States, and European countries are strongly influenced by the Chinese examination model.

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CIVIL WAR OF 1956–1975—LAOS Laos's civil war of 1956–1975 was a struggle for power among three factions: the leftist Pathet Lao, the neutralists,

and the U.S.-backed right wing. Moderate Souvanna Phouma (1901–1984) was elected premier in the post-independence election of 1956. Souvanna initiated negotiations with the Pathet Lao to reach a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The outcome was the formation of a coalition government installed in 1957. The United States halted its aid to Laos, finding the Communists in the government intolerable. The right retaliated by removing Souvanna from office and arresting Prince Souphanouvong (1909–1995), the leader of the Pathet Lao, and other Pathet Lao members in 1959, dissolving the coalition government. U.S. aid increased, and agencies such as the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency began covert activities in Laos, including the mobilization of the Hmong and other ethnic minorities as a secret army. At the same time, the guerrilla-warfare activities of the Pathet Lao, headquartered in northeastern Laos, grew with the help of North Vietnam.

In 1960, an army captain named Kong Le seized control of the capital, demanding neutrality and returning Souvanna Phouma to power. However, the right quickly overthrew Kong Le, forcing him, Souvanna, and their supporters to flee the capital. The United States backed Prince Boun Oum as the new leader of Laos.

In an attempt to find a peaceful resolution to the war, a second Geneva conference was convened in



A parade in Vientiane in December 1980 marks the fifth anniversary of the end of the civil war and the establishment of the People's Democratic Republic of Laos. (TIM PAGE/CORBIS)

1961. The outcome was the second coalition government of 1962, which had failed by 1964. Souvanna continued as prime minister but held no real power due to U.S. interference. Fighting continued with neither side making any real gains until 1970. The United States began to withdraw its aid, which supported the right wing and thus prolonged the war, in the early 1970s under pressure from U.S. public sentiment.

Both sides began talks to resolve their differences and signed the Agreement on the Restoration of Peace and Reconciliation in Laos, calling for a cease-fire and removal of foreign troops, in 1973. Souvanna remained prime minister in the third coalition government, while Souphanouvong led the National Political Consultative Council. After the Communist takeovers in Saigon and Phnom Penh in 1975, anti-U.S. and anti-rightist demonstrations were held in Vientiane. King Sisa Vattana abdicated, and Souvanna Phouma resigned. On 2 December 1975, the Pathet Lao gained complete control of the government through the use of military force and established the People's Democratic Republic of Laos. Souphanouvong became president, while the king and the former prime minister served for a time as political advisers to the socialist regime, thus ending the Communist thirty-year struggle.

Linda McIntosh

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CLIFFORD, HUGH (1866–1941), colonial administrator of Malaya. Hugh Charles Clifford, one of the most outstanding colonial administrators of Malaya, had a deep understanding and affection for the Malays. Born in England and educated at Woburn Park, in 1883 he qualified for Sandhurst with a Queen's cadetship, but instead joined the administration of the western peninsular Malay state of Perak.

Clifford became British Agent (1887–1888) and was Resident from 1896 to 1899, and again in 1901. He also held high colonial posts in North Borneo, Trinidad, Ceylon, Ghana, and Nigeria before returning to Malaya as Governor and High Commissioner (1927–1929). But the country was suffering the collapse of rubber and tin prices and the onset of the Great Depression, and Clifford himself was gravely

tired. He later suffered a mental breakdown and had to retire in 1930.

Clifford was forthright and impetuous, sympathetic to the peasantry but highly critical of the traditional Malay political structure that he felt victimized the lower classes. He was a prolific writer, and his novel *A Prince of Malaya* (1926) was reprinted in 1989 as *Saleb: A Prince of Malaya*.

Ooi Keat Gin

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CLIMATOLOGY—SOUTH ASIA In South Asia climate is governed by the tropical monsoon system. The monsoons occur in summer and winter and are variable over space and time.

Monsoons

Because of atmospheric circulation, the monsoon over South Asia alternates seasonally between equatorial westerlies in summer and trade winds (tropical easterlies) in winter, which are mostly deflected to southwesterlies and northeasterlies at ground level. Both flows vary in rain capacity. The southwesterlies are associated with moist and unstable air masses of great rain-carrying capacity; the northeasterlies are comparably dry, stable, continental airflows with little rain-carrying capacity. In most areas the summer monsoon defines the rainy season and the winter monsoon the dry season. The duration of either season varies

depending on the region, as do rainfall totals. The summer monsoon is the major agricultural season; winter agriculture depends on irrigation, which is widely used throughout South Asia.

For South Asia the monsoon climate system defines on average four seasons: summer, from June through September; winter, from December through February; and two transition seasons, March through May (premonsoon) and October through November (postmonsoon). The onset of the summer monsoon may vary by several weeks or may even fail, upsetting the agricultural calendar and causing famine. It generally starts between late May in the south to early July in the north, and withdraws between mid-September and early December from north to south, varying in length, therefore, from six to three months. It affects rainfall throughout South Asia. The winter monsoon is a continental flow that establishes a dry season.

Rainfall

The striking seasonal nature of rainfall over South Asia is illustrated by computing the monthly distribution of rainfall through the year for 306 representative stations throughout India for a 120-year recording period (1871–1990). The monthly and seasonal rainfall totals are as follows, given in millimeters:

Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May
12	11	13	15	26	52
winter		36		pre- monsoon	
93					
June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.
163	275	243	171	77	31
summer			852		post- monsoon
					108

Seventy-eight percent of the annual total of 1,089 millimeters of rain falls during summer, and only 3 percent during winter; the transition seasons have 8.5 percent (premonsoon) and 10 percent (postmonsoon). Hence rainfall other than during the four months of summer is negligible.

In practice, however, rainfall varies to a hazardous degree over South Asia. The world's record rainfall total, at Cherrapunji (located in the Shillong Hills of Assam), averages an annual 10,798 millimeters, with the wettest year being 24,000 millimeters. In extreme contrast, desert conditions occur over most of the Indus plain and Tharr Desert (where in some locations annual rainfall is less than 100 millimeters). The overall distribution of rainfall shows the wettest parts over the western coastal lowlands on the Indian peninsula and its eastern provinces on the Deccan plateau, the

Ganges plains, Brahmaputra lowlands, and surrounding parts of northeastern India and the Bengali lowlands. The driest regions are northwestern India and Pakistan. In most parts of South Asia annual rainfalls vary between 750 and 1,500 millimeters, enough to support abundant crop cultivation in the rainy season.

The high interannual variability of rainfall makes monsoon rains unreliable for agriculture. Interannual variability is largest in dry regions, with a coefficient above 30 percent, and lowest in the wettest parts, with less than 15 percent variability.

Rainfall annual totals have changed over the years on a small scale. The maximum annual rainfall increase during the past one hundred years (588 millimeters) occurred at Bombay; the maximum decrease (679 millimeters) occurred at Nuwara Eliya, Sri Lanka. In South Asia low rainfall occurs during El Niño years and high rainfall during La Niña years.

Under the prevailing hot and warm conditions large amounts of water are evaporating at all times. Only during the summer monsoon is a rain surplus observed; that is, more water falls as rain than is evaporated. In all other seasons evaporation exceeds rainfall.

Temperatures

Temperatures also vary greatly over South Asia, though tropical temperatures principally prevail. Shown by a cross section from north to south, mean annual temperatures are high. The mean hottest (summer) month shows only slight variation across South Asia, while there is considerable difference in the temperature mean for the coldest (winter) month. The annual temperature range (the difference in temperature between the hottest and coldest month) increases with latitude. Winter and summer are therefore defined only over the northern parts of South Asia, while the southern parts have only slight annual temperature variation. Synchronously, as one moves south, the daily range of temperature also decreases, yet the daily temperature range surpasses the annual temperature range, a characteristic of tropical conditions. Temperature drops with increasing altitude, leading to freezing temperatures in the highlands (above 2,000 meters) of Sri Lanka and South India. The altitudinal decrease of temperature most strikingly affects the Himalayas and Karakoram mountains above 1,500 meters, where precipitation occurs as snow and ice. The affect of global temperature change on South Asia is discussed in the final paragraph.

Rainfall and temperature variabilities over space and time are summarized by climate diagrams in which annual variations in both elements are plotted month

to month. Changes in rainfall and temperature in most cases occur synchronously, such that summer is both wet and hot, while winter is dry and cold.

Floods and Cyclones

South Asia suffers from floods and droughts that originate from heavy rainfalls and failure of monsoon rains, respectively. The worst hazards are tropical cyclones, which originate in the Andaman Sea, move in a western direction, and three to five times a year visit the lowlands on the east coasts of India and Bangladesh. Tropical cyclones develop extremely heavy storms moving at over 200 kilometers per hour; they are accompanied by torrential rainfalls and high sea waves, which wreak havoc on the coast and in the hinterlands.

Resulting mostly from the rainfall conditions and to a smaller extent from snow precipitation on the northern fringe of South Asia and the Himalayas, river runoff is subject to extreme variations. The maximum flow is mainly in summer, the minimum in winter. The contrasting discharges of the Himalayan rivers are illustrated by the Brahmaputra at Pandu, with a maximum flood discharge over 70,000 cubic millimeters per second and a minimum at 3,000 cubic millimeters per second. The rivers of peninsular India also show great variation, with the Mahanadi having a maximum of 46,000 cubic millimeters per second and a minimum of only 6 cubic millimeters per second. In summer the rivers regularly inundate the land along their lower stretches, particularly the deltaic regions. Control of river discharge, by dikes and dams, is a major task on all rivers.

Global Temperature Change

Observations during the past one hundred years identify a warming trend over the northern, eastern, central, and southern parts of South Asia, which partly exceeds the global trend (0.55° C per 100 years), whereas a cooling trend prevails over the western and northwestern parts. Both trends show maximum values of 1.2° C. Both temperature increase and decrease are determined by the temperature trend during winter.

Manfred Domrös

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CLOISONNÉ Cloisonné is a technique employed in the decorative arts whereby pulverized multicolored

glass or enamel is fused onto a metal surface; the enamel is held in wire cells (from the French, *cloisons*). The technique came to China from the West in the fourteenth century (or earlier) and reached its height in the early Ming dynasty (1368–1644) under the rule of the Jingtai emperor (1428–1457). In fact, one of the terms by which cloisonné is known in China is *Jingtai lan*. Other names for cloisonné tell of the technique's foreign origins: a Ming text states that cloisonné came to China from Da Shi (Arabia) and Folang (Byzantium), thus yielding the names *dasbi yao*, Arabian ware, and *falan* or *falang*, likely a corruption of the Chinese name for Byzantium.

Cloisonné enameling uses cells formed from slender metal wires to hold the enamel paste. These wires become part of the overall design of the piece and are soldered onto a metal foundation. The enamel paste is added to the cells, and the piece is fired at a temperature high enough to fuse the paste without destroying the metal cells or the foundation. Pieces often need to be fired a second time to correct any flaws in the enamel and to fill up the cells. The piece is then polished with a pumice stone to smooth the surface and increase its luster.

The earliest pieces carrying a reign mark date from the fifteenth-century reign of the Xuande emperor (1399–1435). The usual colors of these early pieces are a distinctive turquoise blue, a lapis lazuli blue, deep brown-red, yellow, green, black, and white. (A true pink was not seen until the famille rose palette was developed for porcelains in the early eighteenth century.) The pieces are strikingly simple in both shape and decoration. One characteristic of Ming cloisonné is the presence in the enamels of the solder used to hold the metal wires to the base. This was remedied in the late seventeenth or early eighteenth century by the use of vegetable glues, which burned away in the heat of the firing.

During the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), production of cloisonné wares increased due to the establishment under the Kangxi emperor (1654–1722) in 1680 of imperial palace workshops. It has been said that the aesthetic quality of pieces during this time suffered in the quest for technical perfection. This was especially true during the reign of the Qianlong emperor (1711–1799), when the wires were gilded, designs were complex and busy, and frequent firings dulled the finish. Despite the technical achievements of the eighteenth century, fifteenth-century pieces remain a high point of the enameler's art.

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CLOTHING, TRADITIONAL—AFGHANISTAN Traditionally, Afghan dress reflects ethnic diversity and the socio-cultural, historical, and geopolitical dynamics of the region. The country and its people are positioned at the crossroads between the Arab, Persian, Turkish, and Asian empires. Consequently, Afghan dress shows strong aesthetic connections to areas contiguous to its borders: the Arab and Islamic Middle East and Persia, the Turkish Ottoman Empire, and, to a lesser degree, Mughal India.

Since the 1920s, Afghanistan's leaders, in an effort to maintain control of both human and natural resources, have struggled with the definition of women's rights and independence as exemplified in the propriety of dress. Afghan dress also reflects other aspects of identity in a variety of inseparable yet interrelated ways: gendered and generational status; religious affiliation; rural and urban differences; stages of the life cycle; and everyday or special occasions.

Afghan dress first and foremost distinguishes gender. Women customarily wear four items of dress: the pants (*tombaani*), an overdress (*parabaan*), a head covering (*chaadar*), and footwear (*payzaar*). This ensemble is referred to as *kalaa Afghani*, or Afghan women's dress. Men wear *tombaani*, an overshirt (*payraan*), a hat or cap (*kullaa*), and footwear or boots. In addition to this basic ensemble, Afghan men wear a vest (*waaskaat*), another hat (*pokool*), and a shawl (*shaal*) during colder seasons.

Women's *tombaani* are made of approximately two yards of cotton or silk-like rayon or acetate fabric. They are usually solid white, gathered drawstring pants with full legs. Frequently the pant cuffs are decorated with white machine- or hand-embroidered patterns. The *parabaan* are typically made from five yards of cotton, silk (or silk-like acetate), and plain or satin woven fabrics in bright colors (for young women) and darker colors (for older women), usually in tone-on-tone or floral patterns. Necklines vary but usually are rounded; occasionally pointed collars are added, as are gathered set-in sleeves with fitted or buttoned cuffs. Dress skirts are full and gathered at the waist and worn mid-calf length. *Chaadars* are made of similar fabrics—usually rectangular pieces of lightweight cotton or silk-like crepe, woven with machine- or hand-embroidered edges. Men's *tombaani* and *payraan* feature fewer dec-

orative details and are typically in natural-colored cotton fabric. *Kullaa* exhibit the most variety in shapes, colors, and embroidered patterns.

Dress also differentiates the age and generational status of the wearer. For example, though all females wear pants, overdress, and head and foot coverings, aesthetic characteristics vary according to age throughout women's lives. More costly materials and surface design embellishments are added to women's dowries. The decorative focus is on pants cuffs, dress bodices, and head covering borders as females age and gain more status when they become engaged, marry, and become mothers. These differences are evident to a lesser degree in men's dress as well. Shirt-sleeves, bodice shirtfronts, and hats are embroidered in regional and ethnic patterns by either their betrothed or wife.

Two items of dress are worth mentioning since they are the most visible to non-Afghans and are the most politically recognizable dress that Afghans wear. The *pokool* hat worn by Afghan men is a symbol of the Afghan freedom fighters, or the *Mujabideen*. It is a naturally colored wool hat with the characteristic versatile rolled edge. The second distinctive item of dress worn by Afghans is the woman's full body covering known as the *chaadaree*. The *chaadaree*, constructed of nine to ten yards of fabric with an embroidered face piece, conceals the entire women's dress ensemble of pants, overdress, and head covering. The original *chaadaree* is of Persian origins but over time became associated with the urban dress of middle and upper class Afghan women. The *chaadaree* has been incorrectly attributed as Afghan women's traditional dress; it only became mandated women's wear after dress sanctions were imposed by the Taliban in 1996.

Afghan dress also suggests religious affiliation. The majority of Afghans are Muslim, and presumed Islamic prescriptions of propriety and observance govern the manner in which items of dress are worn. For example, Islamic prescriptions govern the fit, transparency, and drape of dress. In general, the everyday dress for both males and females fit loosely so that the contours of the body are less noticeable. Prescriptions also determine the patterns embroidered on men's shirts and hats and women's pants, over dresses, and head coverings. The majority of these embroidered designs are floral, geometric, and abstract shapes, presumably because of Islamic prohibitions on representational art and aesthetics.

Afghan dress is also notable for its embroidery. Embroidery styles tend to be associated with geographic regions and ethnic groups. Whether from

Herat, Kandahar, or Kabul, regional associations are made. Styles generally are distinguishable by the fiber content of the fabric (plain weave cottons, pile woven velvets, or synthetic satin weaves) as well as the kind of thread (cotton, silk or gold metallic threads); a variety of embroidery techniques and the complexity of their execution; the floral and geometric motifs; and the design placement of the embroidery. Three such embroidery styles are the gold stitched embroidery or *chirma dozi*, known for the unique kind of metallic thread and braid used; *tashamaar dozi*, recognizable by the intricate counted stitch technique; and silk stitched flower embroidery or *gul dozi*, distinctive because of the rich use of colored threads.

Afghan dress observed in the context of daily life and during special occasions of secular and religious contexts distinguishes gender and generational, ethnic and regional, and religious identity. Dress serves to unify and maintain a sense of Afghan identity not only among Afghans living in Afghanistan, but also as Afghans differentiate themselves from other Middle Eastern and Central and South Asian populations in the Afghan diaspora.

Catherine Daly

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CLOTHING, TRADITIONAL—BHUTAN

In 1989 the Tshogdu, or National Assembly, of Bhutan announced that all Bhutanese citizens must wear the appropriate national dress in all public areas. For men in Bhutan, the traditional dress is a robe known as the *go*; women's traditional costume is a wraparound garment called the *kira*. Accounts, both written and pictorial, suggest that until around the seventeenth century the prevalent male dress was different from the current dress. The popularization of the *go* is attributed to Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyal (1594–1651), the creator of a unified Bhutan.

History of the National Costume

In 1616 Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyal fled to Bhutan to escape from conflicts in Tibet and by the time of his death in 1651 had not only set the stage for the creation of a unified Bhutan, but also made sweeping changes in the laws and customs. One such change attributed to him is the *go*, which in most respects resembles the Tibetan dress for males. In time the *go* achieved almost universal usage in Bhutan and even came to be recognized as an important element of Bhutan's distinct identity in the region. In contrast, it is believed that the women's dress, the *kira*, has been in use in Bhutan almost unchanged for centuries.

The national costumes of Bhutan have remained the principal choice of attire in Bhutan. By the end of the twentieth century, with the effects of modernization finally being felt, the national costumes gained even more prominence. For a small country surrounded by giant neighbors, the costumes were seen to be attributes that clearly set Bhutan apart from the rest of the region and gave the inhabitants a Bhutanese identity. Concern that such a symbol would inadvertently be discarded along Bhutan's path toward modernization led to considerable debate in the National Assembly of Bhutan as well as among private citizens in the 1980s and continues today. Thus, according to this pronouncement, the *go* and *kira* were formally declared the national costumes of Bhutan for men and women, respectively. This law ignored the existence of several ethnic minorities, each with a unique dress style, inside Bhutan's borders. Fortunately the seemingly radical move of ordering people to wear national costume was mitigated during its implementation and did not lead to the prosecution of ethnic minorities who wore their own dress in public. The affected minorities were mostly the Westernized Bhutanese youth, who preferred to follow the latest Western trends, and the ethnic Nepalese, who preferred to wear their own traditional costume. Western attire and Nepalese costumes were both considered foreign. The vast majority of Bhutanese were largely unaffected by this law since they already wore the national costumes. Strong calls for continuing the dress code have persisted unabated in the National Assembly.

Women's Dress

Traditional dress for women consists of the *kira*, *kera*, *koma*, *wonju*, *toego*, and petticoat. The *kira* is a large piece of woven cloth that is wrapped around the body in a series of folds. It is worn over a blouse, or *wonju*, and a cotton petticoat. Body-length petticoats are known as *gutsum*, and petticoats from the waist down to the ankle are called *meyo*. Wrapping the *kira*

is a complex process: with the *kira* behind the woman, she brings one corner from behind her left shoulder. Wrapping the other end from her right side, she hooks it with the corner by using a *koma*, a two-part brooch with a connecting chain. She then turns the *kira* around until the edges reach her right side, loops it back to her left, and draws it behind to her right shoulder. The two ends are again hooked together with the other end of the *koma*. The resulting pleats are adjusted until they are even, and the dress is fastened at the waist with a belt known as a *kera*. A jacket or *toego* is worn over this. Cuffs are formed by folding the *wonju*'s sleeves back over the sleeves of the *toego*. Tying the *kera* creates a pouch in the fabric above it, which is used as an ample pocket to keep anything from money to snacks. Ordinary women and villagers were expected to wear their *kira* ankle length; the nobility and wives of senior officials wore it to the ground, a practice that continues in rural areas.

Men's Dress

For men, the traditional *go* is a robelike dress that extends down to the toes. It is worn over a simple inner shirt known as a *toego* (not to be confused with the women's *toego*). The right half of the *go* is tucked inside the left, and then both ends are raised to around knee level, from where they are folded back to form symmetrical pleats. The garment is fastened by tying the *kera* around the waist. As with the women's dress, folding back the sleeves of the *toego* over the sleeves of the *go* forms the cuffs.

Three aspects of wearing a *go* traditionally reflected the wearer's station in society: the height of the *go*, the length of the cuffs, and the extent of exposure of the *toego* at the collar. Nobility, senior government officials, and members of the religious order generally wore their *go* below the knees. Everyone else wore a *go* that fell above the knee. Similarly, only the elite were permitted to display long cuffs and expose a considerable amount of the *toego* at the collar. By the 1990s however, through social custom, the increasing number of wealthy "commoners" made this distinguishing feature disappear.

Accessories

Most Bhutanese men carry a dagger known as a *dozom* in their *go*. It is a multiutility item whose use ranges from peeling betel nuts, to cooking, to self-defense. Other accessories are used for formal occasions, however. A *kabne* is a long scarf worn when visiting government offices and temples and when meeting senior officials. It is the traditional mark of rank, with the color determining rank. Ordinary people wear a

white *kabne*; senior officials wear red, which can be awarded only by the king. Ministers wear an orange *kabne*, and those of the king and the head of the religious body, the Je Khempo, are saffron. People in the military, when wearing the national costume, wear a shoulder sash for the same purpose. Women wear a *rachbu*, a woven sash worn on the shoulder, though here there is no distinction of colors to mark rank. On formal occasions, the attire for men requires the traditional boot known as *dalham*, a knee-high boot made of cloth and embroidered with decorations. Senior officials who wear a red scarf and higher must wear the traditional sword known as the *pata* on the right hip.

The textiles with which the *go* and *kira* are made are an important aspect of the national costumes. The different patterns, each with distinctive names, bring the *kira* to life and set the *go* significantly apart from its original form in Tibet. Bhutanese textiles are artistic and cultural assets that are also quickly finding markets outside Bhutan.

Other Ethnic Costumes

In addition to the national dress, other ethnic costumes are worn in Bhutan. The Doya men of southwestern Bhutan wear a dress known as the *pakhi*, a simple wrapped, sleeveless, knee-length garment belted at the waist. Women wear a similar garment that is closer to ankle length. European travelers to Bhutan in the eighteenth century reported that a dress similar to the *pakhi* was in use at the time.

Among the pastoral communities of the northeastern parts of Merak and Sakteng, the men wear thick jackets of yak wool with rawhide jackets over them. The lower garments are leather trousers belted at the waist, over which thick woolen shorts known as *kango* are worn. The women are dressed similarly, except that instead of shorts they wear a sleeveless tunic or *shinkha*, which extends to the knees and is belted at the waist. The pastoralists of Laya wear tunics and garments made of woven yak wool as well, which distinguish them considerably from the rest of the country. Among the Nepali-speaking minorities in the south of Bhutan, the dress is the same as is worn in Nepal. Similarly, the ethnic Tibetans settled in Bhutan wear traditional Tibetan dresses.

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See also: **Textiles—Bhutan**

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CLOTHING, TRADITIONAL—CAMBODIA The intricately patterned ikat silks (silks that whose threads are tie-dyed before being woven) created by the Khmer and Cham ethnic groups may come to mind when thinking of Cambodian textiles, but the peoples of Cambodia have produced many other cotton and silk textiles. Cambodians traditionally considered both domestic and imported textiles to be markers of identity, prestige, and wealth, and quantity and quality of textiles possessed by an individual or family contributed to their status within society.

Traditional dress in Cambodia is similar to traditional dress in neighboring Laos and Thailand. *Sampot* is the lower garment worn by either sex. The *sampot* for urban lower class and peasant women is a tube-skirt (sarong) approximately one and a half meters in length with both ends sewn together and is worn wrapped around the waist and secured with a cloth belt. Women of the middle and upper classes preferred to wear the *sampot chang kben* on a daily basis until the beginning of the twentieth century. This rectangular piece of cloth is approximately three meters long and one meter wide and is worn by first wrapping the cloth around the waist and stretching the ends away from the body. The outstretched ends are then twisted together and pulled between the legs and toward the back. The ends are tucked into the waist at the back, and the *sampot chang kben* is lastly fastened with a cloth or metal belt. Women of all social strata wear the *sampot chang kben* on special occasions such as religious ceremonies and weddings. Men also wear the *sampot chang kben*, but the traditional textile patterns worn by males differ from those worn by females. Traditionally, neither women nor men wore an upper garment. However, when the French colonial presence grew in Cambodia in the late nineteenth century, both men and women began to wear upper garments.

Even after the French presence in Cambodia from the 1860s onwards, Cambodians continued to wear traditional clothing. The Cambodian royalty and government officials combined the shot silk *sampot chang kben* (in the appropriate color for the day of the week) with a formal jacket. In the beginning of the twentieth century, Cambodians adopted forms of western style clothing such as a blouse or shirt. Men more readily adopted trousers as the lower garment for daily use, and both sexes continue to wear the *sampot chang kben* for formal occasions. Lower class and particularly rural women still wear a tube-skirt, but the material may be

printed batik-patterned cloth bought at the market rather than hand-woven silk or cotton.

Silk Textiles

The most important silk textiles of Cambodia are the ikat silks (*bol*), twill-patterned, weft ikat textiles. The pattern is made by tying vegetable or synthetic fibers on sections of the weft threads before the threads are dyed. This process is repeated for different colored dye baths until the patterns are formed and the cloth is woven. The two types of *bol* textiles have five traditional colors: red, yellow, green, blue, and black. The *sampot bol* is the lower garment mentioned earlier, made from *bol* cloth (*bol* cloth can also be used for *sampot chang kben*). The *pidan bol* is a ceremonial hanging reserved for religious or sacred purposes.

The *pidan bol* is an example of excellent craftsmanship. It may be presented to a Buddhist temple or hung in homes to create sacred space around the family's personal shrine. In a temple this textile is hung behind, above, or around the base of, a Buddha image. The narrative motifs of a *pidan bol* often depict tales of the previous lives of the Buddha.

Cotton Textiles

The various ethnic groups of Cambodia also produce cotton material for religious clothing and other purposes, such as for bedding and for various household textiles. The royal courts also imported Indian chintz with patterns especially for the Southeast Asian market.

The *kroma* is the all-purpose utility cotton cloth used by either men or women throughout the country as a head or neck scarf, belt, or towel. It is also used as a bag to carry things. This rectangular textile has a checkered pattern, usually blue and white or red and white, with striped ends. Political groups such as the Khmer Rouge have used the *kroma* to symbolize membership.

The Cham, an Austronesian group, are highly skilled silk weavers who produce cotton tube-skirts or sarongs for both men and women. Three or four hundred years ago, the Cham reportedly used to produce batiks (wax resist-dyed fabrics) in cotton similar to that of their kin in insular Southeast Asia. Cham women weave a checked or plaid cotton sarong for men. Natural or white cotton is important in Cham religious activities; it is worn by Cham priests and used as a sacred object during religious ceremonies.

Other Mon-Khmer and Austronesian minorities living in the northeastern region of Cambodia weave

cotton cloth on back strap looms for clothing and domestic use. The groups of both of these linguistic families weave similar textiles by attaching the warp beam of the back strap loom to a tree or part of a house in order to achieve the lengths of woven material needed for their loincloths.

The male loincloth is approximately 20 to 25 centimeters wide and 3 to 7 meters long. It is indigo blue or black with large red warp stripes and smaller yellow and white warp stripes. Supplementary patterns also decorate the stripes. The ends of the loincloth are patterned with red bands with supplementary patterns of animal or plant motifs. Red tassels and lead, glass, or plastic beading sometimes decorate the edges and ends of the loincloth. Men of the various Mon-Khmer linguistic groups sometimes wear a blanket over a shoulder during rituals, but otherwise do not wear an upper garment. Occasionally, men wear a simple tunic made from plant fibers such as bark cloth or banana leaves. These plant-fiber tunics are reported to have been more common when the technology to weave cotton was not familiar to these groups. It is now rare to find clothing made from these fibers. Men of the Jarai and Ede Austronesian minorities wear a collarless shirt of indigo or black cotton adorned with red yarn or metal beads on special occasions.

Women of the different ethnic minorities wear tube skirts. The long tube-skirt is worn tucked in around the breasts and is made from two pieces of material sewn together to form a tube. The shorter version is made from one piece of cloth sewn into a tube and is worn tucked in at the waist. The color scheme of the women's tube-skirts is similar to that of the men's loincloth. Women either do not wear an upper garment or wear a simple tunic made from a single piece of cloth with a hole cut in the middle of the textile for the head and the sides sewn together leaving open spaces for the arms. Ede women add sleeves to the tunic and decorate them with red yarn and metal beading.

As with other Khmer and Cham ethnicities, the minority groups of northeast Cambodia presently reserve traditional dress for special occasions. Textile production in Cambodia has experienced disruption because of political conflict, particularly during the Khmer Rouge regime of the late 1970s. Textile production increased in the calmer conditions at the beginning of the twenty-first century, encouraged by renewed local and foreign interest in hand-woven textiles, particularly in mastering the dyeing and weaving of the *pidan hol* produced prior to the twentieth century.

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CLOTHING, TRADITIONAL—CHINA

Prehistoric clothing in China was constructed from animal skins, furs, and the natural plant fibers hemp, wisteria, and ramie. Shell, bone, and stone ornaments have been discovered in caves and ancient tombs. Bone needles and awls have also been discovered; the discovery of the awl suggests the use of leather for clothing.

Characteristics of Clothing Before Manchu Rule

By the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE), trade and tribute with neighboring regions were well established. Tribute goods included cloth; weaving and dyeing were common during the Shang. The sericulture industry developed, and Chinese silk fabrics were highly prized trade goods. Simple cut-and-sewn garments such as straight, narrow robes, skirts, and trousers were worn during this period. Robes closed to the right, and sleeves were long and covered the hands to show respect. Hair was braided; hairpins were symbols of distinction and rank. Clothing was used to distinguish the stratified social classes.

Clothing continued to be used to maintain a stratified class system in the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE). The *Zhou li* (Book of the Rites of Zhou) included sumptuary laws regulating the use of dress to show rank; the designation of special robes with special symbols worn by the emperor; and the dictate that all garments must close to the right. The usual clothing worn was the long, slim, narrow-sleeved embroidered robe and trousers or skirt. Hats and shoes were symbols of distinction and rank. As Taoism was incorporated into Chinese life, the symbols for the Taoist immortals were frequently embroidered on clothing. These symbols include the fan (life infused into the dead), the bamboo tube (longevity), the magic saber (magic), the pair of castanets (music), the magic gourd (medicine),

the flute (harmony), the basket of flowers (longevity), and the lotus flower (purity).

Minority clothing influenced Chinese dress during the Warring States period (475–221 BCE). The *hu fu*, a short jacket and long trousers, was introduced. The *hu fu* was widely adopted throughout China by men and women, particularly those from rural areas. Robe sleeves began widening near the end of this period.

During the Qin (221–206 BCE) and Han dynasties (206 BCE–220 CE), color symbolism was defined and became an important characteristic of ceremonial and ritual robes. Black denoted darkness, dawn, or evening; green or blue was considered the color of creation or life; red meant burning brightly and was the color of the sun and happiness; white was associated with opening, clearing, and cracked ice; and yellow denoted sparkling light and sunshine. These colors also symbolized the universe and the elements: black signified North or water; green or blue indicated East or wood; red symbolized South or fire; white meant West or metal; yellow indicated center or earth. From the *Yi jing* (or *I ching*), red became associated with the masculine concept (*yang*) and blue became associated with the feminine concept (*yin*). During this period, the one-piece robe was the most popular garment. It was characterized by a straight cut silhouette and large, wide, curved sleeves. Wealth was displayed by type and amount of embellishment and amount of fabric used in the robe. Hats and ribbons continued to denote rank; the texture, color, and size of the silk ribbons were used to distinguish between social classes.

Buddhism reached China by the end of the Han dynasty, and Buddhist symbols were used as embroidery motifs on clothing; these symbols included the parasol (charity), fish (tenacity), the sacred vase (ceremonial), the lotus (purity and marriage), the seashell (appeal to wisdom), the canopy (spiritual authority), and the Wheel of the Law (infinite changing). Toward the end of the Han dynasty, women began to favor a two-piece ensemble consisting of a long, pleated, wraparound skirt and short jacket.

Sui dynasty (581–618 BCE) clothing featured a narrow silhouette. Women continued to wear the jacket and skirt; red became the most popular skirt color. Sleeves could be narrow or wide. A popular nonceremonial robe style that was worn by men was the "band robe." This robe featured a round neckline and a section of fabric sewn to the lower half of the front and back of the robe in a wide, horizontal band. Colors and fabrics continued to be used to indicate the rank of the wearer.

During the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) Chinese envoys spread Chinese costume throughout Asia, partic-

ularly affecting court dress in Japan and Korea. Tang-dynasty dress became fuller and more elaborate than the dress of previous eras. High-ranking men wore a stiff leather hoop belt with decorative plaques, often of jade, gold, or silver.

In the Song dynasty (960–1267 CE) cotton was introduced from India. It became an important textile crop in China for domestic use and foreign export and started to replace indigenous cellulosic fibers used in Chinese clothing. In particular, cotton became widely used in the clothing of the lower classes. Elements of Song dress included large, full robes, with large, wide sleeves. Robes opened down center front or closed to the right. Hoop belts with decorated plaques were also worn.

The tradition of foot binding, which was practiced in China before the Tang, was well established by the Song dynasty. Foot binding was usually characteristic of Han Chinese women (that is, women of the dominant Chinese ethnic group as opposed to women of ethnic minorities) only. Tiny, intricately embroidered shoes, called "lotus slippers" or "lily slippers" became important dress and cultural items.

Under the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1267–1368 CE), trade with other countries was encouraged. The cotton industries were well established. The Mongols considered the Han Chinese inferior but borrowed many Han Chinese dress traditions, such as color symbolism and items denoting rank. Mongols reduced the width of the robe, and introduced the finial, an ornament worn on the top of hats to designate rank.

The Ming dynasty (1368–1644 BCE) was the last Han Chinese dynasty to rule China. Ming means "brilliant" or "glorious," and red was its dynastic color. Sumptuary laws from the Han, Tang, and Song dynasties were reestablished and clothing regulations for all social classes were strictly codified in such documents as the *Ming Hui Dian*. For the upper classes, Ming dress was characterized by extreme width and very long, wide sleeves.

Changes Brought by the Qing

China's final dynasty was ruled by a conquering group of horsemen from the north, the Manchu (1644–1912 CE). The Manchu dynasty took the Chinese name Qing, which means "pure" or "clear." The Manchu instituted new sumptuary laws, many designed to assimilate the Han Chinese into Manchu culture. All Han Chinese men were forced shave their forehead and wear their hair in a long queue (braid) in the Manchu style; those in government positions had to wear Manchu-style garments, namely, one-



ADMIRATION FOR CLOTHING IN THE *BOOK OF SONGS*

The following short poem is from the *Book of Songs*, one of the Five Classics of Chinese literature, compiled about 600 BC.

How well your black coat fits!
Where it is worn I will turn it for you.
Let us go to where you lodge,
And there I will hand your food to you.

How nice your black coat looks!
Where it is worn I shall mend it for you.
Let us go to where you lodge,
And there I will hand your food to you.

How broad your black coat is!
Where it is torn I shall alter it for you.
Let us go to where you lodge,
And there I will hand your food to you.

Source: Arthur Waley, trans.
(1937) *The Book of Songs*. Boston
and New York: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 75.

piece robes with no pleats, sleeves ending in the distinctive horse-hoof cuffs. Horse-hoof cuffs were distinctive features of Manchu robes and derived their name from their resemblance to the hoof of a horse. They were wide, flaring cuffs that, when turned-down, extended over the hands of the wearer. The cuffs were turned down to protect the back of the hand, to help keep hands warm in cold weather, or to show respect when saluting high-ranking military, civil, or imperial officials. The Qing dynasty was also responsible for many regulations that controlled the use and the possession of the dragon robe as a court and official costume. Robes with dragons as the main design appear to have been in existence since at least the Tang dynasty and were worn by imperial and high-ranking officials of each successive dynasty; there are also records that robes with dragon motifs were also given as gifts to foreign heads of state. However, it was not until the Qing that the dragon robe became part of the Chinese official costume; in 1759, an imperial edict codified the use of dragon robes according to rank.

The styles characteristic of dragon robes worn by the emperor were regulated to set him apart from any other official. Qing imperial dragon robes had nine dragons embroidered on them and only the emperor could have five clawed *long* dragons. The emperor was the only person who could have all Twelve Auspicious symbols embroidered on his robe. These symbols, whose use dates back to the Han dynasty, represented the qualities desirable in an emperor: the sun, moon and stars (or constellations), enlightenment; the mountain as the ability of the emperor to protect his people; the dragon as adaptability; the pheasant as literary refinement; the water weed, purity; two sacrificial cups as filial piety (family devotion and loyalty); a plate of millet as the ability of the emperor to empathize with his people; fire or the flame as the brilliance of the emperor; the axe as the emperor's power to punish; and the *fu* symbol to represent the power of the emperor to discriminate between right and wrong. Groupings and placement of these symbols also had meaning. The sun and moon placed at the shoulder and the stars and mountains at the chest and back represented four important annual sacrifices that only the emperor could make. The *fu* symbol and axe groupings represented the emperor's authority over the natural world. The five elements of the natural world were also represented with a grouping of the mountain (earth), waterweed (water), flame (fire), sacrificial cups (metal), and plate of millet (wood or plant life).

Rank or insignia badges that indicated the rank of military and civil officials were also costume items that were regulated by Qing sumptuary laws. These

badges, known as mandarin squares in the West, had been used at least as early as the Ming dynasty to embellish robes; not until the Qing were regulations for their use formally structured. Qing rank badges were square-shaped and were sewn to the upper back and chest areas of robes. Animals were embroidered on badges awarded to military officials; birds were embroidered on badges awarded to civil officials.

Three basic types of robes were worn by men in the Qing court. The most formal was the *qao fu*, a one-piece dragon robe with a pleated skirt attached at the waist and horse-hoof cuffs on the sleeves. The heavily embroidered *pi-ling*, or cloud collar, was worn with this robe. The *qi fu* was a semi-formal dragon robe worn for festive occasions. It was in the typical Manchu style, having no pleats, horse-hoof cuffs, and side and center front and back slits (women's robes had only side slits). The *pu fu*, a plain surcoat, was often worn over the *qi fu*. The third robe was the *qang fu*, an ordinary robe worn for informal occasions. This robe was generally not embroidered, and was often worn with the *ma gua* or short jacket.

For women, the rules of dress were more relaxed, particularly for Han Chinese women, and there were distinct visual differences between Han Chinese and Manchu women's dress. Han Chinese women typically

had bound feet, wore a two-piece garment (a jacket and long pleated skirt or trousers), maintained regional hairstyles, and continued using embroidered sleeve band cuffs instead of the horse-hoof cuff. Manchu women did not bind their feet, usually wore the one-piece *qi pao*, and wore the distinctive Manchu black cloud headdress or *liang pa tou erb*, the "two handle headdress." This headdress consisted of a wire framework covered with black thread or yarn and with a black-satin-covered T-shaped projection rising from the framework. The black satin was draped over the T-shaped projection for an effect of wings spread out on each side. Hair, either real or false, could be draped over this framework and then decorated with various hair ornaments. Han Chinese women were also allowed to wear their husband's mandarin square on their outer jacket. Han Chinese women did not appear to borrow many Manchu dress traditions; Manchu women, however, frequently borrowed Han Chinese dress elements, such as the embroidered sleeve bands.

Everyday dress worn by the lower classes in the Qing Dynasty was simply cut and decorated. The *shan ku (sam fu)*, a two-piece ensemble, was worn by men, women, and children. The *sham sam* was a long- or short-sleeved, hip-length jacket that closed to the right, and the *ku (fu)* was a pair of trousers. These were usually made from wool, hemp, or cotton fabrics, and could be lined, quilted, or padded for warmth. These garments were cut to be comfortable, and to allow the wearer to work efficiently. By the end of the Qing, *sham* for men used a center front closure. Men who were wealthier wore a long robe, the cheongsam, with a center-opening hip-length jacket. A variety of sleeveless jackets could also be worn over the cheongsam. After 1912 the cheongsam was usually worn with a short jacket, the *ma gua*.

Western Influence After the Qing

After the overthrow of the Qing dynasty, Western influence became strong, especially in the coastal urban areas. Men who dealt with Westerners on a daily basis, such as bankers or businessmen, were the first to cut their queue and adopt total Western dress. More typical was the incorporation of Western dress with traditional clothing, such as wearing the *qiang pao* and cheongsam with Western hats, shoes, and a suit coat. Men in rural areas were less likely to adopt Western clothing.

Urban women in China embraced Western dress quickly, especially hairstyles and shoes, and many totally abandoned traditional clothing. Most urban women wore modernized versions of the jacket and

skirt, and also adapted the Manchu *qi pao* to Western design and style lines. Western trousers were not considered acceptable women's attire for social occasions. Peasant or lower-class women in urban and rural areas continued to wear the *shan ku*.

Changes During the Regime of Mao

Under Mao Zedong's regime, many restrictions on apparel were instituted, and people were allowed to own only a small quantity of clothing. The *qi pao* for women was not considered representative of the Communist regime, and after 1949, disappeared from mainland China. Mao favored a jacket and trouser combination for men and women, the *chieh fang i fu* or "liberation dress"; although originally the uniform of the Nationalist army, which opposed the Communists during China's civil war of the 1930s and 1940s, this suit became known as the "Mao suit." Under Mao, this was the only approved apparel and was usually made of blue cotton twill fabric. A uniform look was believed to be in keeping with the Communist precepts of universal comradeship and equality; wealthy Chinese, however, often had hand-tailored Mao suits of luxury wools.

During the last three decades of the twentieth century, clothing restrictions in China gradually relaxed as the result of changes in government policies. The Mao suit continued to be worn, especially by older people and those who lived in rural areas. Western clothing is nevertheless quite prevalent throughout the Chinese mainland. China plays an important role in apparel manufacturing for Western companies, and the high-fashion industry in China is experiencing a period of rapid growth. Historical Chinese costume also plays an important role for Western fashion designers, providing inspiration and new avenues to express creativity.

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CLOTHING, TRADITIONAL — HONG KONG

During the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), the local Hong Kong population wore the same garments, made of silk or cotton, as the rest of the Han Chinese (ethnic Chinese majority) mainlanders. The *changshan*, or long gowns, for men, had a curved front opening on the right side, fastened with buttons and loops, and an upright collar. Silk was often used for summer garments; winter garments were wadded or lined with fur. Women wore the *ao*, a knee-length dress styled like the *changshan*, with a full-length skirt consisting of front and back panels with pleats or godets (cloth inserts) at the sides to allow movement. The portion of the skirt that showed below the *ao* was originally heavily embroidered but later was made in plain black or other dark, undecorated fabric. Originally, loose baggy trousers, or *ku*, were worn under the *ao*, and these continued to be worn by women who performed physical labor. For middle- and upper-class women, accessories included an embroidered headband that concealed the plucked forehead, bound-foot shoes, and ankle covers.

A version of these garments continued to be worn through the latter part of the twentieth century as part of traditional ceremonial dress. *Changshan* for men and *qun gua*, skirts and jackets, for women, and *dajinshan*, blouses with large lapels that fastened with *huaniu* (buttons and loops) to the right, had their origins in everyday dress of previous decades. As heavily embroidered versions of earlier clothing, they were most fashionable between the 1960s and 1970s. Shops sold or rented traditional ceremonial costumes, the *changshan magua* (long gowns and short jackets) for men and *qun gua* (*gua*, a red front-opening jacket; *qun*, a long black skirt) for women. These garments were worn by upper- and middle-class people for birthday banquets or other formal occasions. Later the *qun gua*, made in red and embroidered with *longfeng*, the dragon-and-phoenix motif, became the ceremonial costume for brides. Other embroidered motifs included mandarin ducks, flowers, and plants. Traditionally, two decorative sashes are embroidered at the center of the lapel, *zisundai*, or offspring bands. Today, a version of the Western white wedding dress—theatrically styled with a padded bust, off-the-shoulder straps, tight waist, and hooped skirt—has replaced the red wedding dress, although a red dress may be worn for part of the wedding ceremony.

Styles after the Qing Dynasty

Qipao or *cheung sam*, literally meaning "long dress" or "Manchu gown," and *magua* (horse jacket), a man's

short jacket, were worn after the overthrow of the Qing dynasty. The jacket was slimmer-fitting than previously, had side slits, tight-fitting sleeves, and a high collar. Unusual for Asia, the *cheung sam* developed into a tailored garment; the front of the garment was constructed using bias-cut fabric to fit the chest area of the wearer in much the same way that a Western tailored jacket is molded to the body shape of its wearer. Later, the addition of darts allowed for an even closer fit. The fastened edge usually has a contrasting satin binding stiffened by glue. The *cheung sam* is characterized by its right-front fastening, standing collar, and side slits.

Originally worn by urban Chinese as a signifier of modernity in the early decades of the twentieth century, the *cheung sam* was worn with Western hairstyles, makeup, stockings, and high-heeled shoes. The depiction of girls wearing tight-fitting *cheung sam* in advertisements and in the prewar Shanghai film industry associated the *cheung sam* with fashion, overseas Chinese, and Hong Kong, where it became something of a national dress. It was considered a symbol of decadence in China after the Communist Revolution (1949) and was banned on the mainland during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). The link with alluring theatrical costume continued as the *cheung sam* became tighter and shorter, reflecting both Western fashion from the 1940s through the 1960s and the uniformity prevalent beyond the Hong Kong border in China during this period. The garment was worn by all of the local female population, and its tightness varied depending on the wearer's position and role in society, conforming to traditional Chinese ideas of modesty by concealing the neck, arms, and legs. Variations included sleeveless *cheung sam*, the use of shoulder pads, and zippers set in the slits at the hem that could be decorously lowered en route to work and raised after work in a club or bar. It was worn as a full-length garment for evening wear, and knee-length—reflecting Western fashion—for everyday use. Fabrics used included silks, rayon brocade, and, for everyday, printed cottons. The tailor was responsible for selecting the *huaniu*—the choice being an indication of his taste. The *cheung sam* continues to exist today as a theatrical dress-up item, worn by actresses, movie stars, and some local people at Chinese New Year. A small number of older women in prominent professional, social, or political positions wear the *cheung sam* on a daily basis, and many elderly women wear it on special occasions. Made of a plain woven cotton, the *cheung sam* is a much disliked school uniform at a number of Protestant girls' schools in Hong Kong.

The buttons and loops used on the *cheung sam* are made from bias-cut strips of glue-stiffened satin

reinforced with an iron wire. They were most in demand when fashions for the *qipao* were at their zenith in the late 1950s, early 1960s. In Hong Kong two styles seem to have been used; *luosiniu* for men's and *huaniu* for women's wear. They may include one, two, or three colors matched to the garment and its trimmings. Patterns include flowers, birds, fish, or insects, symbolizing Chinese characters with auspicious meanings. Each *huaniu* is part of a pair; the knotted end, *gong*, is male, and the part with the eye, *na*, is female. *Huanu* of the same size are used on women's gowns, while men's gowns have a larger *gong* and a smaller *na* stitched nearer the shoulder.

Bound-Foot Shoemaking

Bound-foot shoes were usually made by the women who needed them. In the past, the practice of binding women's feet was common among wealthy families, but women with bound feet are now very rare in Hong Kong. Having learned embroidery, women would start to learn how to make shoes for themselves at the age of eleven or twelve. The cutout parts of the shoe were embroidered before assembly. The sole was made from bamboo culm, washed, straightened, bound with layers of cloth, and stitched together with a thin linen rope. Winter shoes were lined with cotton wool. Heels were made from carved pomegranate or lychee tree wood wrapped in fabric. These were either self-made or purchased from vendors of string and wool. Fake bound-foot shoes, designed at first glance to mistake the heel for the ankle, also existed for women who had not had their feet bound but wished to look as though they had.

Clothing among Minority Peoples

The Hoklo people, of Fujian or Hokkien origin, make and continue to use a number of traditional items of clothing for festive occasions. Their everyday clothing is dark, but festive clothing is brightly colored. Children's garments and accessories, such as baby carriers, are elaborately decorated with beads, bells, decorative trim, and embroidery; small boys' hats are made in the shape of animals to confuse the evil spirits so that the child may grow up safely. Cotton purses are appliquéd with brightly colored thread and worn around the waist. Another minority group, the Tanka, who fish the waters around Hong Kong, also make brightly colored items such as baby carriers.

Hemp weaving was practiced in the early part of the twentieth century by the Hakka women. They wove narrow braids, *huadai*, on looms tied around their waists. These were used as straps to keep their *liang-mao*, a flat, circular bamboo brimmed hat with a blue

or black cloth fringe, in place. Hemp, handspun onto a bamboo pole, would also be woven by local weavers for use as blouses and dyed—usually dark colors—by boiling yam and dyer's weed in water or in commercial dyehouses in Kowloon.

Contemporary Styles

In Hong Kong today, the *cheung sam* is regularly revived by local fashion designers attempting to capitalize on Hong Kong's fashion past to create new collections, and by local design students attempting to find a new way to wear clothing that is now only associated with old people. Occasionally, international fashion adopts the *cheung sam* as a look, as most recently in 1997, when the fashionably dressed women of Hong Kong wore Christian Dior versions of the *cheung sam*. The most successful use of elements of traditional clothing are seen in the collections of New York designer Vivienne Tam, who references her origins in her collections, which are very popular in Hong Kong. The process of reappropriation via New York appears to be a critical element in her commercial success. Although a simplified phoenix-and-dragon robe is still worn at many weddings, more generally the use of traditional clothing is declining, both among the Cantonese and minority peoples of Hong Kong.

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CLOTHING, TRADITIONAL—INDIA Archaeological finds four millennia old mark the beginning of information on Indian dress, though sufficient information to develop a costume history is only available from the Mauryan dynasty, beginning 324 BCE. Study of Indian dress is further complicated by the high degree of social stratification, cultural diversity, and climate variation within the subcontinent. Similar garments, too, have different names by region. Moreover, India has always provided textiles and other components of dress to the world through trade, thereby in-

fluencing and being influenced by the dress of other societies as its industries negotiated the aesthetic requirements of its world markets. Thus Indian dress has never been a closed, unified, or rigid cultural tradition.

Wrapped Garments

Of all the countries in the world, India is most closely associated with wrapped cloth garments, the ephemeral form of folds, pleats, tucks, rolls, and knots which disappears as soon as the garment is taken off. The woman's sari; wrapped forms of men's dress such as the *dboti* and *lungi*; and the unisex *veshti* of south-western India are the primary garments worn by the adult population. They vary slightly in width but generally cover the distance between ankle and waist and range from 2 1/2 to 11 yards in length. They are wrapped to cover the lower torso in styles—from simple to complex—specific to region, caste, religion, or ethnicity. Women wear longer saris that cover both the lower and upper torso. The end of the sari, or the edge of any wrapped garment lying next to the waist, can be used to secure small objects such as money or tobacco. A wrapped garment easily accommodates changes in body size from aging, illness, diet, or pregnancy since fit is redetermined each time the garment is donned. Simple wrapping adjustments further adapt the garment to changes of temperature or activity through the day.

Head coverings, most commonly worn in the north and west, also consist of wrapped or draped cloth. The head wraps of men of specific communities, such as the Sikhs, or of high-ranking men, consist of a 12–22-foot-long cloth arranged in styles determined by sociocultural factors. Manual laborers casually wrap a much shorter cloth around the head. This informal 1 1/2-yard garment can also be used for incidental tasks such as wiping a seat or wrapping a small bundle around the waist.

Many married women in the north use part of the sari to cover their heads. Where the sari is not worn, the head covering consists of a cloth, the *dupatta* or *orbni*, for instance, 2 or 3 yards long, draped from the top of the head. Its ends dangle behind, are tucked into the waistline or neckline of other garments, or are drawn around the body to provide protection from cold or the unwanted gaze of others, according to customs of respect and avoidance.

Wrapped garments are surface designed or woven to size in decorative patterns. Decorations include woven or applied borders or more extensive designs in printing, tie dye, or embroidery. Border designs emphasize the style of wrapping.

Preshaped Garments

Through the ninth century CE, the wrapped garment remained the primary and often sole garment worn by men and women, though soldiers always wore preshaped garments and the many foreigners in residence or traveling through early India wore a variety of stitched garments. Over the next thousand years a variety of stitched and, much later, knit garments were broadly incorporated during the periods of Muslim influence and subsequent rule (beginning with raiding parties in 997 CE) and then European ascendancy (beginning with Portuguese capture of Goa in 1510). The history of particular garments that now comprise Indian dress is a complex intertwining of broad regional trends and court fashions. For example, the women's *coli*, a bodice front and sleeves secured by back ties, probably appeared in pre-Muslim Gujarat in the tenth century, yet only became widespread in the north as Muslim power spread. The modern sari developed from the ensembles of *veshti* and *mumdnai*, upper body cloth, and *ghaghra*, a gathered skirt reaching to the lower calf, and *orbni*.

While men's dress has evolved, women largely have adhered to wrapped garments, merely adding stitched accessories. In the twentieth century, a tight blouse, complete with back but baring midriff, became the common accessory to the sari or *veshti*. A petticoat was also incorporated, although some pant-like styles of wrapping the sari precluded it. Primarily stitched ensembles of *salwar* (loose-legged pants that narrow at the ankles) and *qamiz* (a knee-length tunic) with *dupatta*, or *ghaghra* and *coli* with *orbni* are characteristic of women's dress in specific communities in the north and west.

Men adhering to the wrapped *dboti*, *lungi*, or *veshti* in the early 2000s commonly accessorized it with preshaped tunics including *kurta* and Western-inspired shirts, including cotton knit shirts. Fully stitched male ensembles extended this variety of tunics to include the *achkan*, a knee-length jacket closed with buttons down the front, and paired them with a variety of pant types to create ensembles that marked the social occasion and identity of the wearer. Pajama, *curidar* pajama (pants that are skintight below the knee with extra length gathered at the ankles), trousers, shorts, and *salwar* were popular pants for men.

Gender Differentiation

A woman's marital and reproductive status is marked by elements of her head covering, such as specific items of jewelry, garment colors, body markings, or a veiling garment. Among orthodox Hindu women, the absence of decorative elements in a woman's dress

indicates that she is currently menstruating or that her husband is out of town or deceased. Motherhood, especially the birth of sons, is marked in some subgroups by small changes in dress. In veiling practices, characteristic of the north, arrangement of a woman's dress can further communicate that she is in the presence of her husband's senior relatives, before whom she always covers her head. In her natal family village or far from her husband's village she need not do so. Similar information is conveyed by the way a Muslim woman adjusts the several layers of face veils of her *burqa*, a preshaped garment donned over normal dress when outside the home to cover the body from head to toe.

Gender differences are apparent in the use of world dress in India. Men drawn away from the agriculture-based economy incorporate items or don complete ensembles of world dress. Cultural authentication of originally foreign garments makes them Indian; businessmen, for example, wear sandals, trousers, and a front-buttoning shirt with sleeves and European collar, with the straight hem of the shirt worn hanging out over the hips. The specific form and use of such garments follow the dictates of local environmental and non-verbal communication requirements, as well as Indian fashions in cut, fit, color, surface design, and ensemble building. Such localized forms represent Indian participation in the globalization of dress, and would be deemed foreign if worn in business contexts outside India.

Diversity in Dress

Because India contains one-sixth of the world's population and incorporates diverse cultural groups, dress quite distinct from that described above often constitutes the norm within specific groups or regions. The distinctive modes of dress worn by hundreds of millions of people in remote regions or among minority groups is nevertheless sometimes unfamiliar to members of mainstream Indian society. The Bondo, for example, are easily mistaken for residents of other continents. Women crop their hair close to the head, barely cover their hips with a narrow piece of cloth, and let their many necklaces suffice to dress the upper torso. Bondo men grow their hair long and wear a brief loincloth. The dress of some Assamese tribes indicates ancient connections to peoples in highland Southeast Asia. The dress of still other Assamese communities, and some central Indian tribes, mirrors ancient Indian dress, but with the addition of the modern sari blouse.

A 1993 government study of tattoo, jewelry, and headdress revealed that designs communicate the caste, religion, and regional or ethnic identity of much of the population. Such distinctions are also often

made in the cut, surface design, color, or wrapping style of garments. Indian dress is thus characteristically diverse. Anonymity regarding caste, religion, and ethnicity are more characteristic of the less than 30 percent of the population residing in cities. There, the *nivi* wrapping style for sari and Indian fashions in tradition-based and world dress garments create relative homogeneity.

Politics and Dress

Politics play a significant role in the design of Indian dress. Throughout history the political elite have enjoyed greater access to foreign dress and traders' wares. Muslim rule of the north, from 1192 to 1857 CE, radically influenced men's dress. Similarly, during European rule, ending in 1947, high-ranking men donned garments or complete ensembles fashioned on European lines. Eventually, various redesigned European garments were broadly culturally authenticated into Indian practice through all social ranks. The redesigned garments, no longer appropriate to European dress, became truly Indian in character. Common examples in the early 2000s included the sari blouse and man's shirt. Simultaneously, colonial rulers participated in the development of Indian dress traditions, such as the codification of Sikh headdress, still worn worldwide by Sikh men.

During the independence struggle, culminating in 1947, industrially produced cloth and overtly European or luxurious forms of dress were rejected. Nationalists donned plainer and tradition-based dress in sympathy with the most exploited members of colonial society. The fervent wore *khadi*, a cloth handwoven from handspun yarn. *Khadi* was woven into saris and sewn into the garments of an ensemble developed by Mahatma Gandhi. His design communicated a unified national identity, in contrast to conventional dress, which revealed the wearer's distinctive social identity. This chiefly male ensemble included pajama, *kurta*, and Gandhian cap. *Khadi* and the cap were also incorporated into other ensembles.

India's postindependence economic planning profoundly influenced dress. The government supported the handloom industry to maintain employment levels, and discouraged imports or the mechanization of weaving. Cotton fiber agriculture was encouraged until population increases demanded conversion of land to food production in the 1980s. Synthetic fiber production and blends with cotton are now encouraged. Thus, handwoven cotton wrapped garments remained a dress staple from ancient times until the mid 1980s. Handwoven synthetic blends have subsequently become popular. In contrast, luxury garments through-

out the twentieth century consisted of handwoven silk or industrially loomed synthetics, especially the discouraged imports from Europe and, later, Japan.

Fashion

Traditional forms of dress for the elite have undergone fashion changes well documented through two thousand years of artwork in stone, metal, and paint. Strong documentation for the dress of lower and middle ranks of society exists from the nineteenth century. Until the advent of Muslim influence in the north, fashionability in dress consisted largely in developments in wrapping style, garment dimensions, woven or surface design, color, and border widths. The addition of preshaped garments, with the associated possibilities of design through garment cut, and the covering up of the female upper torso, constitute the major cumulative changes in dress from 1000 CE to the present, though innumerable fashions in wrap or cut of garment have come and gone. Still, topless female dress sporadically occurs in minority communities in central and southern India and among the elder population in parts of the east and south.

The urban elite and youth led twentieth century women's fashion, which involved a movement toward gold jewelry and away from silver, experiments in surface design of fabrics, developments in the cut of commonly worn stitched garments, and increasing abandonment of caste-specific wrapping styles. Participation in broad fashion trends of the West also occurred, as in the rising and falling of *qamiz* and sari *pallav* (end-border design) lengths with Western skirt lengths. Yet women's dress generally maintained traditional silhouettes.

Two current trends mark urban professionals' and young educated women's dress practice. Ethnic Chic, beginning in the 1980s, consists in historic revivals and commodified ethnic traditions in dress spreading across the nation and its worldwide diaspora. Styles include a Gujarati way of wrapping the sari, *ghaghra-coli* ensembles, regional traditions in surface embellishment applied to saris and other garments, and most popularly the *salwar qamiz* ensemble. Ethnic Chic also affects menswear, primarily producing luxurious ensembles for urban elite and diaspora bridegrooms.

Indian forms of world dress are now appearing among urban upper class young women. As promulgated by Indian films serving both diaspora and national audiences, world dress is restyled to an Indian aesthetic in Bombay film industry costume workshops. Male youth, constituting the primary film audience, have long worn world dress, but increasingly young

elite women are donning jeans and shirts, too. Indian dress norms require that the shirt hang outside the jeans to obscure definition of a woman's hips and crotch. Despite this trend, the more than 70 percent of the Indian population residing in rural areas will continue to anchor women's dress for some time to come in the tradition of wrapping elegant saris.

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CLOTHING, TRADITIONAL—INDONESIA Indonesia has three hundred ethnic groups, each with their own costume variations. The majority of the population, the Javanese, wear Indonesian national dress. Western dress arrived in Indonesia in the sixteenth century and has been one of many sources of



Performers in traditional costume performing the Batak dance at Lake Toba, Sumatra, Indonesia, in 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONLADSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

tension between indigenous groups and colonizers. Dress is an indicator of cultural change in Indonesia; indeed, history can be divided into three eras categorized by dress terms: sarong (local dress), *jubbah* (Islamic influences), and trousers (Western influences).

The function of dress in Indonesia, with a population that is primarily Muslim, is complex. Although Islam had an impact on Indonesia prior to that of the Europeans, after centuries of Dutch domination, dress in Indonesia has become a way to express attitudes toward foreign, cultural, political, and religious influences. Although Western dress is most commonly worn today, traditional dress continues to be important in Indonesia, where varied forms of traditional dress testify to the wide variety of cultural subgroups in the nation.

Textiles

Indonesia has a long history of fine textile production; this traditional art is still considered important, despite Westernization. Indonesia is particularly noted for its textiles made with complex resist-dyed techniques. Batik is a patterned fabric produced by using wax as a resist agent. Where the wax has been applied, it prevents the dye from penetrating.

Another resist-dyed technique is *ikat*, in which the dye is applied to the warp yarns prior to weaving. The design is seen in the finished yarn goods, and is a re-

sult of the dyed warp yarns being woven with plain weft yarns, a process known as single *ikat*. When the warp and weft yarns are both resist dyed, an extremely complex form of double *ikat* results; these *geringsing* cloths are rare and are made only in Tenganan on Bali. These cloths are the most highly prized Indonesian textiles.

Other fine textiles produced in Indonesia include *songket*, a heavy silk handwoven fabric with gold- or silver-wire-wrapped thread used as a supplementary weft to form the pattern. *Pelangi* is a tie-dyed fabric, common in Bali. *Prada* cloth is a fine cotton fabric in vivid colors with floral motifs printed in gold dust or applied with gold foil and is often worn by Balinese dancers.

Traditional Dress

Traditional dress is still commonly seen in rural areas and is especially important throughout Indonesia for national ceremonial occasions. For both men and women, traditional dress in Indonesia includes a wrap-around lower-body cover—a *kain* (a rectangular length of fabric, generally in batik) or a sarong (a length of fabric with ends sewn together, more often in *ikat*). Women in Java and Bali wear sarongs and *kain*, held in place with a *stagen*, a narrow sash. The *kebaya* is a tight, often sheer, long-sleeved blouse worn on the upper body. It is often made of lace, but can also be made

of lightweight, sheer, elaborately embroidered cottons. In addition, women generally have a large rectangle of cloth called a *selendang* (*ikat* or *batik*) draped over the shoulder (on less formal occasions a large *selendang* is used to carry babies or objects); on Bali the *pelangi* (a sash) is worn over the *kebaya* around the waist when going to temple.

Indonesian men generally wear *kain* or sarongs only in the home or on informal occasions. A black felt cap, or *peci*, is occasionally worn; although it was once associated with Islam, it has acquired a more secular, national meaning since Indonesia's independence. These ensembles have become national dress in Indonesia because the vast majority of the population lives on Java and Bali. *Kebaya* and batik *kain* are considered Indonesia's national dress for women, and *teluk beskap*, a combination of the Javanese jacket and *kain*, are national dress for Indonesian men.

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CLOTHING, TRADITIONAL—IRAQ Artifacts found in Sumerian tombs suggest that the early inhabitants of Mesopotamia (c. 3500–2500 BCE) wore a wrapped sheepskin skirt, called *kaunakes*, with one end of the garment passed under a wide belt in front and over the left shoulder. After woven cloth was available, the garment was fringed at the hem to simulate the effect of fleece. Cloaks covered the upper body, and royal women wore elaborate gold jewelry. Later Babylonian and Assyrian (c. 1000–600 BCE) costume shifted from draped garments to tunics. Assyrian law codes prescribed veiling for free, married women and prohibited it for prostitutes and slaves. Mesopotamia was the land of wool production and weaving, and wool was the primary fiber for clothes, tapestries, and curtains, although linen, cotton, and even silk are mentioned. The industry was technologically sophisticated enough to produce elaborate woven and embroidered

figural motifs. Evidence of weaving guilds and apprenticeships, plus textile trade with other countries, attests to the importance of the textile industry.

The traditional dress of Iraq is a reflection of Iraqi technical skills, aesthetic and political ideals, moral standards, and religious values. Members of Iraqi society are deeply immersed in Islamic fundamentalism; consequently, costume reflects these ideals and values. Traditional dress is less prevalent in urban centers such as Baghdad and Basra than in rural areas. All social classes wear the same clothing, with only subtle differences. Arabs and Kurds exhibit distinct differences in their clothing, though both are predominantly Muslim.

The traditional dress of Arab Iraqi men includes the *dishdashba*, an ankle-length, typically white, loose-fitting, shirtlike garment allowing free air circulation over the body; the *aba*, a long cloak, tan or neutral in color, for cool weather; the *kaffiyeh*, a white or checked square scarf folded into a triangle and sometimes worn over a small white cap with the *agal*, a circular black rope or plaited-cord device to hold the *kaffiyeh* in place; and sandals. Men also wear undershirts and



Iraqi women at Friday prayers in a mosque in Baghdad on 1 January 1999. (AFP/CORBIS)

drawers, loose trousers, and a cotton or wool coat. The *disbdasha* may be hoisted up and secured for greater freedom of movement, and the *aba* may be doubled up over the head. To further protect against the elements, the ends of the headdress may be wrapped loosely around the neck, across the ears and lower face, or around the top of the head.

The Arab Iraqi woman's traditional costume is designed to conceal the woman and achieves this through *bijab*, or veiling, the practice of covering the woman's hair and body for the sake of modesty and adherence to socioreligious requirements. Veiling is believed to prevent men from falling into temptation and to protect women from unwanted sexual advances. The traditional costume includes the *abayah*, a long black cloak worn over a dress and covering the wearer from head to foot; the *asha*, a black head scarf; the *foota*, a black chin scarf; sandals or clogs; and gold or silver jewelry (for example, ankle bracelets, earrings, or pendants, valued not only as ornament but as insurance in case a woman's husband dies, leaves, or divorces her). The dress under the *abayah* is traditionally a black long-sleeved, ankle-length shift or yoke-style, but may be other colors. Younger women may wear the *abayah* and veil only when they leave the house but indoors wear dresses of printed cotton (during the summer) and flannelette (during the winter). In winter women may wear four or five layers of clothing—heavy black sweaters and black imitation caracul jackets—under the *abayah*. The *hashmiya* is a wide-sleeved full net or sheer black ceremonial gown that women wear for certain religious ceremonies.

The traditional costume of Kurdish men includes baggy pantaloons, a shirt, a cummerbund (in which valuables are kept, as well as a dagger or two), peaked leather slippers, a close-fitting cap or turbanlike head wrap, and, in winter, a quilted jacket and long cloak in bright colors. Kurdish women have never practiced veiling and enjoy considerable latitude in community activities. The traditional costume is modest but colorful, and it includes a loose-fitting dress or kirtle, a short collarless jacket, a headscarf or turban, and several pieces of jewelry. At times they wear a bifurcated garment similar to Turkish trousers.

An Islamic man may have up to four wives, and a large family is highly desirable, since the greater the number of children, especially sons, the greater the prestige of the father. Young girls are dressed in brightly colored print dresses, and boys are clothed in candy-striped *disbdashas*, or trousers. Typical footwear is sandals or tennis shoes. Children often wear sweaters, wool scarves, and caps in winter. Boys and girls are traditionally separated at puberty, and girls

are excluded from male society outside the family circle. Parents generally arrange marriages, preferably between relatives, and part of preparation for the ceremony includes decorative painting of the bride's hands and feet with henna, a natural red dye.

Westernization of traditional costume is prevalent throughout Iraq, and increasing educational levels and opportunities in the workforce encourage the abandoning of all or parts of traditional dress. Wealthy professionals in urban centers have adopted Western dress to a greater extent than other components of the population. Most men who have visited the city own at least one Western-style business suit, and women may wear highly fashionable Western dresses or suits with or without the *abayah*. Many women who discarded traditional dress after the revolution, however, have reverted to traditional dress as an expression of national pride.

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CLOTHING, TRADITIONAL — JAPAN

The basis of Japanese traditional costume is the kimono, a loose-fitting cloth garment constructed only of various sizes of flat rectangles, wrapped around the body and held in place with strings or sashes. Throughout its historical development, the structure of the kimono has remained basically the same.

Early Period to Premodern Period

Clay figurines and wall paintings found in prehistoric tombs show that the clothing of ancient Japan was similar to that of China and Korea, attesting to its cultural attachment to continental civilization. In 603, Prince Shotoku (574–622) established the first dress code in Japan and, following a Chinese model, fixed twelve court ranks distinguished by the color of their headgear. During the Nara period (710–794), intensive assimilation of continental culture continued. The oldest-surviving Japanese textiles were brought to Japan along the Silk Road through China and Korea from remote areas as far away as the Middle East.

During the Heian period (794–1192), Japanese native styles emerged. Male aristocrats wore *sokutai*, a combination of a cloak with a long tail and wide trousers, at official court ceremonies, and *ikan*, *noshi*, or *kariginu*, round-necked broad-sleeved cloaks, for less formal occasions. The most formal attire for female aristocrats was *karaginu-mo*, the so-called *juni-bitoe* (twelve-layered gown), which consisted of many layers of undergarments, a long-sleeved jacket (*karaginu*), a long, pleated divided skirt (*bakama*), and a long train (*mo*). When layering garments, the aesthetics of color combinations were particularly important. Color schemes were formulated, and sets of different colors were linked to specific flowers, seasons, or weather conditions.

In the Kamakura period (1192–1333), as the military class came to power, the ruling class adapted a more practical and restrained style of clothing based on warrior garments. *Hitatare*, a tailored suit with a broad-sleeved cloak and *bakama* trousers became the standard for men's clothing. Family crests often appeared as dyed motifs on fabrics. Meanwhile, a narrow-sleeved kimono called a *kosode*, originally an undergarment, became an outer garment. From this period through the Muromachi period (1336–1573), the *kosode* continued evolving and became the common dress for almost all classes of women. As it came to be worn alone without *bakama*, its full-length flat surface provided larger continuous spaces for two-dimensional decoration and encouraged new designs with striking colors and patterns.

The Momoyama period (1573–1603) was generally characterized by its bold extremes of taste initiated by dynamic social changes and economic growth. Costumes of this period displayed flamboyant designs. *Tsujigahana* dyeing, a method of exquisite surface decoration produced by a combination of stitched tie-dyeing, hand painting, and embroidery, was popular. Surviving cloaks (*dofuku*) decorated with *tsujigahana* worn by military leaders exhibit their extravagant taste.

During the Edo period (1603–1868), the urban population exhibited a passion for fresh textile designs. Some of the most celebrated painters of the time were involved in the textile industry, including Ogata Korin (1658–1716), a celebrated Kyoto painter. *Yuzen* dyeing, a technique of rendering detailed images on fabrics by defining outlines with rice-paste resist, was perfected by Miyazaki Yuzensai. Wealthy people sported garments dyed in the *yuzen* style, often combined with other embellishments such as tie-dyeing and embroidery, despite sumptuary laws set by the government. From the late eighteenth century, a more

understated style became popular around Edo (present-day Tokyo). This style employed simple patterns such as stripes or tiny repeated patterns in neutral or grayish colors, following the fashions of famous actors or smart customers of the pleasure quarters.

Modern Period

In 1854, Japan fully opened to the outside world after more than two hundred years of relative seclusion, and rapid Westernization began. The government adapted Western clothing styles for the official uniforms of national institutions and formal occasions, and Western costume became a sign of authority. A few decades later, however, intense reaction against rapid Westernization resulted in nationalistic movements aimed at preserving traditional Japanese culture. From then until the end of World War II in 1945, when Western-style clothing finally became the norm in everyday life, Western and Japanese styles coexisted and often were mixed according to individual needs. For example, Western dress tended to be worn more often by men than by women in formal settings, and Japanese dress continued to be worn in domestic settings by older women.

In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the kimono has survived mainly as a representation of or as a means to communicate Japan's cultural heritage. Many textiles and costumes have been designated as National Treasures or Important Cultural Properties to be exhibited at museums, and skilled textile craftspeople have been appointed as Living National Treasures for the preservation of traditional techniques. At the same time, many people still prefer traditional costumes for formal occasions such as wedding ceremonies, funerals, and coming-of-age celebrations. The kimono also plays an important role in other traditional activities such as performances of music and dance and in the tea ceremony. In addition to luxury kimonos worn at those formal occasions, *yukata*, an informal cotton kimono, is often seen at summer festivals and hot-spring resorts.

Augmenting the efforts to conserve the tradition as it is, a group of Japanese designers started to incorporate kimono designs into contemporary international fashions in the 1970s and 1980s. The kimono, with its delicate surface decorations and its flexible sizing, provided designers with new approaches to the body and clothing. Meanwhile, with the recently revived interest in the kimono, the kimono industry is promoting a new type that can be worn and laundered more easily.

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CLOTHING, TRADITIONAL — KOREA

Hanbok, the Korean traditional costume, is characterized by a keen appreciation and consciousness of the seasons, a sensitivity to color, symbolic motifs from myth and legend, and individual taste, value, and style. *Hanbok* offers a glimpse of Korea's past, representing hundreds of years of colorful history before modernization. Korean costume also reflects the lifestyles of aristocrats, nobility, and commoners in very distinct ways.

Hanbok consists of a jacket called *jubgori* and trousers called *baji* for men, and *jubgori* and skirts called *chima* for women. For men, a hat is essential for all occasions, as is a sash at the waist and high- or low-

cut shoes. These are the basic attributes of dress in cold countries and are especially suitable for farming and hunting. Laces (*daenim*) are tied around the ankles of men's baggy trousers to facilitate movement. Headdresses are important for presenting a refined appearance.

The textiles used for costume include *sambae* (hemp), *mosi* (ramie), *sa* and *ra* (stiffened silk gauze), *myungju* (soft silk pongee), and *dan* (opaque silk). A variety of accessories, such as highly ornamented royal crowns, elaborate earrings, necklaces, bracelets, hairpins, belts, and bronze shoes, adorned dress. Under the influence of Chinese culture, from the seventh century CE onward the sleeves of Korean jackets and robes became larger and trousers wider. Headdresses and robes were similarly modified.

Shilla Period

During the Unified Shilla dynasty (668–935 CE), which maintained close ties with Tang China, China's influence on Korean costume became more evident. Korean figurines unearthed from a mid-eighth century tomb in Kyongju, the capital city of the Shilla kingdom, were depicted in Chinese-style dress. In earlier tomb mural paintings, long jackets with belts at the waist were worn over long, pleated skirts, but the figurines from the Unified Shilla wore skirts over their jackets, a distinctively Tang Chinese style.



Korean girls in traditional dress in 1989. (DAVID & PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS)

Koryo Period

Extravagant style prevailed during the succeeding Koryo period (918–1392), until the Chinese styles of the Yuan dynasty (1267–1368) became popular in the declining years of Koryo. The Yuan Chinese influence dictated tighter sleeves and shorter jackets. (Previously, jackets were long enough to cover the hip line, with a sash tied around the waist.) The wearing of a *dae* (a belt or girdle) of jade, leather, or cloth, which indicated the rank of the wearer, ended with the advent of the Koryo period. Instead of the *dae*, the palace adopted the Chinese clothing and hat system to indicate rank. The *jogdoori* (today's women's wedding crown) and *doturak-daenggi* (doubled-long hair ribbon with embroidery and ornaments) were Yuan Chinese features adopted by Korea and were worn until the Choson dynasty (1392–1910). Commoner women wore white *gubn* (head scarves) and white clothes, but did not cover their face. Noblewomen wore *nubwool* (a veil) made from a foot or more of black, soft silk or *sa* (stiffened silk) over a small, umbrella-like cover worn on the head. The material and size of a woman's *nubwool* indicated her social status.

Official court attire was worn with *hwa* (boots). From the time of the Koryo dynasty's King Wu (c. thirteenth century CE), when a new dress system was decided, until the end of the Choson dynasty, black leather *hwa* were worn with official attire. On the other hand, commoners were absolutely prohibited from wearing *hwa*. They generally wore white clothes and straw sandals.

Choson Period

Clothing during the Choson dynasty was influenced by China's Ming dynasty (1368–1644); influences are apparent in the official and unofficial costumes of the royal court, where the Chinese ceremonial robe was adopted. For traditional ceremonies, a specific dress for a particular occasion was stipulated. A dress style intended for a certain ceremonial occasion could never be worn at another time. Under the ceremonial robe, however, women always wore the traditional *chima-jubgori* and men wore the *baji-jubgori*. Costume materials varied with seasonal change; cut and length of the *jubgori* went up and down with fashion and social standing; an individual's rank, class, sex, and age were distinguished by specific colors, lengths, and styles. Muted colors for the everyday wear of commoners persisted, as did the splendid, vibrant colors of the royal household, a statement of their absolute authority.

Twenty-First Century

Traditional *hanbok* are worn by men and women of all ages only as ceremonial dress on special occasions,

such as for traditional festivals, wedding ceremonies, and so on. Numerous prohibitions and sumptuary laws were decreed by almost every new king, leading to a gradual simplification of the clothing and the eventual evolution of the *hanbok* of today. The simplified version of *hanbok* remains a very common sight in the busy streets of modern Seoul.

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CLOTHING, TRADITIONAL—KYRGYZSTAN

Dress in Kyrgyzstan developed as a part of Central Asian costume, with clothing styles that were adapted to either a sedentary or nomadic lifestyle. In general, the styles and design of Kyrgyz costume were similar to those found in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and reflect the old traditions of textile manufacture and design that developed along the Silk Road. Political conquests brought in new techniques, such as felting, weaving, and quilting, that were adopted for clothing and textiles in the region. It is difficult to estimate origins of any kind of ethnic dress, but it is safe to say that traditional Kyrgyz dress developed over a few centuries and only began to show significant change in the mid-twentieth century after Westernization began.

As in much of Asia, men in Kyrgyzstan rapidly adopted Western dress and today few wear the traditional costume except for the hat (*kolpok*). For festivals, men may wear a traditional jacket (*jelek*) made of blue, black, or brown velvet, with a belt at the waist. Men's jackets have very little decoration, but may have trim around the neckline, at the sleeve edges, and down the center front. Pants are velvet and cut like Western pants, but might have decorations at the hem, like the *sakwar* of India.

Women's dress is much more complex. Traditional dress is worn more frequently by women and is commonly seen at weddings, rituals, festivals, and other cultural events. There are three categories of female dress, based on age.

Girls' Dress

Girls up to age seventeen wear long dresses (*koinok*). These dresses are semi-sheer, have high necklines, and have many layers of flounces or frills at the neck, sleeves, and skirt. White, red, yellow, and other bright

colors indicating youth are preferred for girls. A sleeveless jacket (*kamzol*) is worn with the dress. These vests come in different lengths, but girls usually wear the shortest vests. The *kamzol* is made from heavy fabrics, usually velvet, and can be many colors; it is decorated with embellishments referred to as *saïma*. The decorations are most extensive on the center front corners of the *kamzol*.

Girls' hair is traditionally arranged in about forty braids (*besh koku*) and is covered by headdresses such as a cone-shaped hat (*tebeti*) that may have feathers and silver or gold coins, precious stones, pearls, threads, and beads.

Young Married Women

For their weddings, brides wear more elaborate versions of the traditional dress; the wedding dress is long and white, and the *kamzol* is richly decorated. The special bridal headdress, or *shokulo*, is very high and cone-shaped, with a veil falling down the back; the veil may be used to cover the bride's face. Once a girl marries, her attire becomes a visible symbol of her married status. Dresses are longer and have fewer frills. For married women, *kamzols* are longer and plainer. In the winter, velvet wrap skirts (*beldemchi*) with appliqué designs decorating the edges and hem can be worn over the *koinok*. They are sometimes lined with fur.

Hair and headdresses also change with marriage, in deference to values of female modesty. Hair must be kept covered after marriage and is worn parted into two plaits (symbolizing the couple). If a woman's husband were to die, she would braid her hair into only one plait, indicating her solitary status.

Older Married Women

As women age, their entire ensembles continually become simpler, plainer, longer, and duller in color. Middle-aged and elderly women wear big white headdresses called *elechek*. Approximately ten meters of fabric are needed to make this turbanlike headdress with a drape under the chin, similar to a wimple from the European Middle Ages. In winter, shawls are worn for warmth, as are jackets (called *chapan*), often made of velvet or fur.

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See also: **Women in Central Asia**

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CLOTHING, TRADITIONAL—LAOS The geographical distributions of most Lao ethnic groups extend beyond Lao national borders into the surrounding countries of China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, and Myanmar (Burma). Across national borders as well as within nations, a group's costumes may differ. Additionally, costume components—from yarn, weaving techniques, and cloth to design, decorative elements, and jewelry—manufactured by one group may be used or adopted by another. This results in the complicated interdependence for which mainland Southeast Asia interethnic relations are famous.

Tai-Kadai Linguistic Groups

Tai-Kadai populations (approximately 66 percent of the population) came into Laos from what is now northern Vietnam, probably originating in southern China, during the last millennium and a half. Tai women brought with them the freestanding frame loom, silkworm cultivation and yarn preparation, and a three-part design for women's sarongs or wrap-around skirts (*sin*).

The adoption of Theravada Buddhism by many Tai speakers had a major impact on textile production and meanings. Theravada Buddhist monks may neither weave nor cook. Thus women's work includes not only the preparation of cloth for secular and ritual purposes but also the provision of textiles to members outside the family. Tai women provide white cloth to monks, who cut, sew, and dye it for the robes (*sirwon*) they will wear.

Women's *sin* display traditional designs abstracted from the natural and mythological worlds; men wear sarongs with blocked or checked patterns. The man's sarong is an elegant garment. Woven in plaid two-ply silk heavier than that used in a woman's skirt, or in cotton, it produces a shimmering color. The man's longer wraparound skirt (*yao* or *bang*), with its ends twisted together in front, pulled between the legs, and fixed into the waist band at the small of the back, is the product of many months of labor, with heavy plied silk forming both warp and weft. Utilitarian textiles, such as blankets and shawls, are usually without design, but can be checkered or have subdued patterns.

During the nineteenth century, European travelers recorded that everyday men's clothing was skimpy at best, and women were often bare breasted, wearing drab skirts. The *biang* (shoulder cloth) was a common woman's garment, draped over the shoulder and often used on ritual occasions. These long, narrow pieces often served to display a woman's aptitude for design as well as her command of weaving technology and dyes. In addition, explorers remarked that the blanket or shawl

(*hom*), made of two or more two-meter warp lengths sewn along the selvage, which could be draped around the shoulders to keep warm during chilly nights and mornings, was a major garment well known even in early colonial Cambodia and Saigon. In the early nineteenth century, large quantities of English textiles began appearing in Lao markets. Royalty was usually clothed, at least for state occasions, in Chinese imported textiles.

Austroasiatic Linguistic Groups

Documentation of Lao Austroasiatic-speaking groups (23 percent of the population) is sparse, particularly regarding costume history. Some have sought better lives by moving to lower elevations and assimilating into other ethnic groups through marriage. In the 1950s and 1960s, Khmu women wore a cotton sarong with simple horizontal stripes or with designs influenced by weavers of the Tai-Lue ethnic group. Their upper garment, a long-sleeved black blouse with a slight flare at the waist, had a center diagonal closure fastened at the side and sometimes decorated with sequins, appliqué, embroidery, or silver coins.

Austroasiatic speakers in southern Laos include a cluster of ethnic groups that historically had close trade relations. Some of these included the Katu, Nha Heun, Ta-Oi, and Alak. The Alak in the Attoupeu and Saravane provinces were known as fine weavers. In addition to weaving for themselves, they traded long lengths of cloth for making loincloths (*katiao*), sarongs, and blouses. A particular pattern was woven exclusively for the use of one ethnic group.

Men wore loincloths of varying degrees of elaboration according to their status within their village. Some were heavily beaded, the beads being strung on the weft before weaving. Women wore sarongs with horizontal stripes and sleeveless blouses made of two strips of cloth joined by side and center seams. Silver coins sometimes decorated the bottom edges. Brass and silver necklaces, anklets, and bracelets were also common. Most men wore loincloths until the 1960s. By 1970, only a few village elders wore them, and then only for special ceremonies. Because of heavy conscription during the war, many men switched to wearing army fatigues on an almost regular basis. In the 1990s, there seemed to be a revival of beaded weaving among the Katu in Champassak province, possibly stimulated by tourism.

Hmong-Mien and Sino-Tibetan Linguistic Groups

Lao highland groups (11 percent of the population) include the Hmong, Mien, Lahu, Akha, and Lisu, and



Hmong women in Laos in traditional costume. (BOHEMIAN NOMAD PICTUREMAKERS/CORBIS)

their traditional dress is basically the same as in Thailand. During the war in Indochina in the 1960s and 1970s, the lives of many of these groups were disrupted. Many Hmong and Mien were resettled internally in camps at lower elevations, and others eventually fled the country as refugees to camps in Thailand and then to third countries. Ethnic dress was largely exchanged for lowland sarongs, partly due to the hotter climate and partly to disguise identity in a strange environment where their ethnicity might cause problems. Life in the camps brought more free time, commercial marketing of textiles, and exposure to new designs and styles. Hmong and Mien who fled as refugees to other countries such as the United States and France began ordering traditional clothing from refugee camps in Thailand or from relatives in Laos. These costume components ordered from abroad were executed in much finer stitches and with more elaboration of appliqué, silver, and other ornamentation than had previously occurred in Laos.

Current Trends

Copious quantities of beautiful Tai textiles from Laos appeared in world markets in the 1980s and 1990s. These elegant pieces ably demonstrate Tai women's exemplary command of a technology for producing artistic masterpieces.

The Lao People's Revolutionary Party, which has had control of the country since 1975, imposed a standardized women's costume focused on the *sin* and *biang*, displacing more ethnic costume except in tourist contexts. However, commercialization, interest from abroad, and refugees nostalgic for their homeland have brought about a revival of indigenous production.

Today, Lao costume provides myriad meanings for a diverse clientele of ethnic groups and outside observers.

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CLOTHING, TRADITIONAL—MALAYSIA

Malays, the majority population in Malaysia, are a Muslim people indigenous to villages (*kampung*) in Southeast Asia. Village dress is situational and reflects relationships and contexts. Traditional dress for women is the *sarung kebaya*. The *kebaya* (blouse) may be diaphanous to near transparent and is commonly pleated significantly above and below the part of the garment covering the breasts. The *sarung*, a cotton skirt hemmed into a cylindrical shape, is stepped into, folded right to left, and tucked at the waist. It is commonly of a floral pattern. Although normally worn with a blouse or pullover top, it can also be worn alone; this is commonly done when sleeping or bathing. The final piece of traditional women's dress is a head scarf (*selendang*); although often serving as a veil, it can be worn in a number of ways.

The male shirt (*baju*) and small black hat (*songkok*) are usually reserved for formal occasions, such as Friday prayers or certain feasts. Men often wear *sarung*, differentiated from women's by the fold (left to right, below the navel) and the pattern (plaid, rather than floral).

In the distant past, both men and women used the *sarung* as the primary and often sole garment. However, varieties of dress have risen with increased trade and contact with other cultural groups. Even so, women are careful to conform to public forms of dress in the market, the mosque, and village celebrations. The more accepted contemporary form of public village dress is the *tudung*. Commonly, this consists of a matching long sleeved tunic and floor length skirt (*baju*



A Malay bride and groom in traditional wedding attire in Singapore. (EARL & NAZIMA KOWALL/CORBIS)

kurung), accompanied by a head scarf (*anak tudung*). It is not uncommon for women to mix and match long skirts and tunics, even substituting short-sleeved blouses or tee-shirts. The *baju kurung* is often made from very colorful cloth, and may also be patterned. In recent times, the *sarung kebaya* has fallen into disrepute as a public garment and been replaced by more modest clothing, usually a variation of the *baju kurung* ensemble. The *sarung* itself, however, continues to be a staple of the *kampung*.

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CLOTHING, TRADITIONAL—MONGOLIA Mongolian costume shares many characteristics with Chinese, Tibetan, and Manchurian costume forms and its manufacture and styling reflect a nomadic lifestyle. Because the climate is often very cold, costume pieces are worn layered and may be padded and quilted. Many of the long robes worn in Mongolia also have side or front and back slits to accommodate horse riding. Garments are cut and sewn with as little waste as possible, and are not closely tailored to the body. They are cut to hang loosely and comfortably on the body. Garments can be folded easily for storage and transport.

Fabrics used for Mongolian garments include imported cotton, silk, and velvet, indigenous wool fabrics, and animal skins and furs. Chinese silk fabrics are prized, especially silver and gold silk brocade fabrics. Cotton is used for the everyday dress of the common people and as a lining for silk garments. Chinese color symbolism is used in Mongolian costume, and yellow and red are considered to be sacred colors. Colors used in Mongolian costume are stronger in value and hue, however, than those used in Chinese costume. The use of animal skins with the fur worn towards the body is common, and is necessary for warmth in the winter season.

Garment details and embellishments vary depending on the tribe, but basic costume forms are similar for men and women throughout Mongolia. The *debel* is a long caftan-type robe, fastened at the throat, right shoulder, and down the right side with a variety of knot-and-loop closures. This basic garment is constructed from silk fabrics, cotton fabrics, wool felt, or animal skins. Often fur-lined, the *debel* has long sleeves that end in horse-hoof cuffs or in wide striped cuffs. (Horse-hoof cuffs resemble the hoof of a horse: they are wide, flaring cuffs that, when turned down, extend over the hands of the wearer.) The *debel* is seldom completely hidden by other garments layered over it.

Garments worn over the *debel* may fasten down center front or to the right. The *uudji* is a long, sleeveless, collarless robe that often has center back slits; those that close to the right have side slits. The *olba* is a sleeved garment that ends just below the waist; it may be collarless or have a stand-up or shawl collar. The sleeveless *khargilchi* is a vest that is collarless or has a stand-up collar.

Omudun are pants worn by men and women and constructed by sewing two leggings together with a

crotch gusset. Men and women may also wear *kboshiya*, or wraparound petticoats; when worn by men, these may be hunting and dancing skirts. The *kboshiya* is also part of lama dress. Mongolian footwear includes shoes and boots made from materials such as black cotton, silk, velvet, and black or brown leather; the surfaces of shoes or boots are usually highly decorated with embroidery. Mongolian shoes may be similar to the flat-soled Chinese shoe, or may have a wooden platform sole in the style common in the Manchu court of China's Qing dynasty (1644–1912). Boots, or *grotal*, have flat leather soles that cover the bottom and sides of the foot and that turn up at the toes. Stockings are cloth or felt and may be padded and quilted.

Diverse headwear is worn in Mongolia, not only for protection, but also to designate rank, status, and tribal or regional affiliation. Headwear includes conical hats, broad brimmed and upturned brim hats, bonnets, and hoods made from a variety of materials; headwear is often lined with fur. A popular soft hat has a helmet-like crown, with front and back brims and fur-lined



Mongolian men in traditional dress in Ulan Ude. (WOLFGANG KAEHLER/CORBIS)

earflaps; this hat may be fabricated from velvet, cloth, cotton, or fur and the brims may be turned up.

Although men and women share general costume, there are differences that distinguish the sexes. Women are more likely to wear the *uudji*. Women's *omudun* are never visible. Women may also wear a highly decorated separate neckpiece, the *ningdjala*, which is worn so that only its stand-up collar is visible. Waistsashes or *bous* are worn with *debel* by men and unmarried women; married women wear unbelted *debel*. Other costume is used to signify marital status and varies tribe to tribe. One special costume piece is often called the "elephant ears" or "mountain-goat horn" headdress. Sleeves on a married woman's *debel* have a tall, stiffly padded sleeve cap; married women also wear embroidered boots with felt uppers, and a red dot on each cheek. Married women wear much jewelry, including earrings, bracelets, pendants, necklaces, and hair ornaments; the jewelry is part of the wealth of the family.

Special costumes also exist for lamas, shamans, and wrestlers. Lama costumes are usually red or yellow, and many items are deliberately pieced or patched together. The *orkimdzi* is a toga-like garment draped asymmetrically around the body leaving the right shoulder bare. Other lama costumes include a leather *debel*, a *kboshiya* or petticoat, a shawl-collared patchwork jacket, and a *dagham*, a full-length, pleated cloak with a red collar; a helmet with a red or yellow plume is also worn for certain ceremonies. Ritual costumes include the skeleton dress, a two-piece red and white costume representing a stylized skeleton; this is worn with a mask. Other ritual lama robes are similar to Qing court costume and include a dragon robe; many of these robes do not have closures and slip on over the head. Masks are worn for many ritual dances.

Shaman costumes include leather tunics and pants; the tunics have no closures and slip on over the head. They are embellished with a number of materials, including metal objects, shells, beads, animal fur, horn, and stuffed animals. Shaman costumes also include stylized animal masks. Wrestling matches are an important part of Mongolian festivals, and wrestlers accordingly have a costume that is very different from standard male costume. Wrestling costume includes a short-sleeved jacket that exposes the breast, very full trousers; embroidered leggings, a loincloth of embellished silk, and leather boots with upturned toes.

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CLOTHING, TRADITIONAL—SOUTHEAST ASIA, TRIBAL Six colorful tribal groups in Thailand are the Karen, Hmong, Mien, Lahu, Akha, and Lisu. All have migrated from southwest and south-central China and have been mountain dwellers for many generations. All but the Karen can still be found in southern China, as well as in bordering countries. These groups have remarkable artistic skills, which the women express in the production of beautiful clothing for themselves and their families, providing their only relief from the rigors of subsistence agriculture. Although these six tribal groups live as neighbors, the techniques and skills they use in producing their clothing are unique for each group.

Karen

Karen girls and unmarried women typically wear simple white shifts with red trim. Married women typically wear red skirts and indigo-dyed blouses. Young boys typically wear red-striped shirts that hang down below their knees. Men wear red hip-length shirts that resemble those of boys', along with loose black pants. The upper garments for men, women, and children are basically of the same style: two strips of material folded lengthwise and stitched together with openings for the head and arms. Various lengths and embellishment indicate age, gender, and marital status.

While little girls' simple shifts have only a minimum of red at the waist, seams, and hemline, teenaged girls, who weave their own clothing, add color and attractive designs to their dresses. When they are betrothed, they weave their married woman's two-piece costume. The upper part of the blouse will be plain, but the lower third will either be beautifully embroidered or have an intricate woven design if the girl is a Sgaw Karen. If the girl is a Pwo Karen, the woven design will be in the upper part.

Karen women reign supreme among the tribes as skilled weavers. Skirts of the oldest style are woven of homespun thread. Some of the thread is tied with jungle grass, and then dyed with a rust-colored vegetable dye. When woven, this results in ikat patterns that are alternated with stripes of rust-colored thread. Some skirts are woven of commercial thread into very intricate colorful designs, with red predominant. Their distinctive embroidery is mainly created using the satin stitch, tastefully embellished with white rice-shaped Job's-tear seeds.

Sgaw women wear many colorful waist-length strands of beads around their necks and silver bangles on their wrist. Pwo Karen women, on the other hand, wear large quantities of beads wrapped layer upon

layer around their necks and tiered down to their waists. Their arms, both above and below their elbows, are lined with metal bracelets. Both Sgaw and Pwo women wear cup-shaped earrings with a cylindrical post that is inserted into large holes in their earlobes.

Hmong (Meo)

Unique among Blue Hmong women are their indigo-colored batiked skirts with bright cross-stitched and appliquéd borders. This full, accordion-pleated skirt swings gracefully from the waist. Women's jackets, with bold patterns of red appliqué and embroidery, large showy collars that hang in the back, and batiked and embroidered aprons with magenta tassels, are among the spectacular tribal costumes in Thailand. Although the white pleated skirts of the White Hmong women are not as spectacular as those of the Blue Hmong, the delicate embroidery, appliqué, and reverse appliqué that grace their jackets reveal unexcelled artistry.

The clothing worn by Blue and White Hmong men and children on special occasions is particularly splendid. At the New Year's festival, all the splendor of Hmong costumes can be seen. Family members, including the smallest children, don their finest clothing, enhancing it with the family's silver jewelry and ornamentation. Heavy chains with pendants of various shapes, four or five-tiered neck rings, finger rings, and earrings are worn, with the most elaborate pieces going to young men and women of marriageable age. The New Year's celebration is of utmost importance in each young person's life, since it is the time for courtship.

While everyday garb is less spectacular, most village Hmong people wear their traditional garb all the time. Little children nearly always wear beautiful caps, such as the rooster cap, bird cap, or flower cap, that showcase their mothers' finest skills.

Mien (Yao)

Mien women typically wear solidly embroidered pants and black tunics with red ruffs. While women of all tribes embroider, the Mien are most noted for their embroidery skills. Mien girls are taught to embroider from the age of five or six; by the time a girl enters her teens she can embroider a large assortment of designs, perhaps even inventing new ones. After her betrothal, she will use her finest embroidery skills to make her own wedding garments, as well as embroidered pants for her groom's mother.

Spectacular appliqué work is another skill of Mien women. Elaborate patterns of symmetrical shapes with many lobes and curlicues in red, black, and blue are

edged with white braid and appliquéd to women's aprons (also used as baby-carrying cloths), boys' caps, and saddlebags for horseback riders.

Elaborate caps are made for small children. The black or indigo homespun material of girls' caps is covered with beautiful embroidery. A large red, doughnut-shaped pompon circles the top, and ball-shaped pompons are sewn over each ear and in front. Other decorations may include silver buttons or coins, silk tassels, and small black and white beads. These caps are designed to make the little girls look like flowers. Boys' caps may boast bold appliquéd designs on panels of red and black cloth, an embroidered border, red pompons, and silver buttons.

Lahu

The Chinese-style Lahu woman's ankle-length black tunic opens on the sides, which are split to the waist. The edges of the split sides are embellished with neat bands of cut fold-and-stitch geometric piecework in primary colors, with red predominating. Around the neck and crossing the chest to the fastening under the right arm is a band encrusted with small silver buttons and dangles, some of which may be in the form of fish. Red and blue bands add a touch of color on the sleeves. The Lahu woman's sarong-style skirt is made of black homespun cotton or commercial cloth. The modern-style sarong is often brightened with strips of red and other colors appliquéd to the lower part of the skirt in decorative patterns. Each woman devises her own pattern, such as flowers, scallops, and zigzag designs. The short Chinese-style jacket of the Lahu man's black or indigo suit will have lines of red embroidery edging the jacket. Clusters of silver ball-shaped buttons will be inserted into loops to close the jacket. Very wide pant legs have lines of red embroidery on the cuffs.

Both men and women carry shoulder bags of the same appliquéd design that is on the woman's tunic. At New Year's, men carry bags that are decorated with an abundance of wool tufting and pompons to augment the gaiety of New Year's dancing. There are three other subtribes of Lahu in Thailand, but the Lahu Na, described above, are considered to be the group from which the others have branched out, both genealogically and fashion-wise.

Akha

Akha women are distinguished by their short dark skirts and ornate headdresses. Several styles of headdresses are lavishly decorated with silver ornaments, beads, Job's-tear seeds, buttons, feathers, and coins. Their dark jackets and colorful leggings are resplendent

with embroidery and intricate appliqué in bright colors and are edged with Job's-tear seeds or white beads. Quantities of glass beads hang around their necks and are slung from one shoulder to the waist on the opposite side. Men's indigo-dyed jackets are of a smart cut and are brightened with colored embroidery and appliqué. Silver medallion buttons or silver balls fasten them. A young man going courting wears a turban at a rakish angle, with silver rings threaded into it; he also wears heavy silver chains with dangles in the forms of fish, butterflies, and wheels. Children wear a miniature version of adult clothing, except for their close-fitting caps that have been embroidered and appliquéd by their mothers and studded with coins, silver ornaments, feathers, and pompons.

Lisu

Young Lisu women are characterized by their colorful blue or green tunics, full black pants, and bright red leggings. Their tunics have a wide yoke that consists of numerous narrow strips of bright-colored cloth. Similar multicolored bands are sewn to the red sleeves at the shoulders. They wear a wide black sash tightly wound around their waists, with two long tassels hanging in the back. These extraordinary tassels consist of a bundle of long strands made of tightly rolled cloth in bright colors with small pompons at the ends.

At New Year's the young women wear neatly wound turbans with red and yellow wool yarn attached at the front to fall over the crown and down to the shoulders in back. They wear velvet vests encrusted with silver buttons and ornaments over their tunics, and rings with a multitude of dangles around their necks. Young men wear velvet jackets studded with silver buttons, blue knee-length pants, and white turbans. They also wear black sashes with tassels like the women, but they wear them in front. Some young men wear "courting bags" over their shoulders. These bags are covered with a network of small beads, and silver dangles hang from the top border.

Most of the tribal people continue to wear their traditional clothing with some modern adaptations, but may wear them only at festive occasions. For convenience sake, many have adopted Thai or Western dress for daily wear, although there are those who still wear their own distinctive dress all the time.

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CLOTHING, TRADITIONAL—TAIWAN

The clothing worn by indigenous Taiwanese people was traditionally manufactured from locally available materials derived from plants and animals, and was of crude construction when compared with the garments of the mainland Han Chinese. Later, when Taiwan was incorporated into China during the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), Taiwan was subjected to the same dress regulations as the rest of China, and Taiwanese aboriginal groups were largely assimilated into the society of the mainland emigrants. Taiwanese dress began to diverge from mainland dress when Taiwan was occupied by Japan between 1895–1945.

Some traditional dress of the Paiwan and Puyama aboriginal tribes of southwest Taiwan has survived and can be seen at the Musée de l'Homme, Paris. A man's black cotton top made of rectangles of fabric with brightly colored embroidered edges, fastened with frog fastenings and silver buttons, was worn with a narrow, indigo-dyed, double ikat waist tie. Multicolor leg coverings made of strips of red, yellow, and green fabric, with insets of indigo-dyed double ikat around the crotch, were tied tightly with black braids around the knee and calf. The front thigh and calf area of the machine-stitched leg coverings were decorated with lozenges of geometric-patterned embroidery in red, yellow, blue, white, and black. A narrow, braided linen waist tie with embroidered ends and fringing was attached to the top of the leg coverings and tied twice around the waist; a second waist tie held an eighteen-inch-long dagger in place. A rectangular weft-faced linen cape—probably a woman's mourning cape—is also exhibited. Made in three sections, the cape has a cream background with red double stripes and edging, and is embellished with navy blue geometric embroidery. The cape ties with a thin braid around the neck. It is displayed with a padded, geometrically embroidered headband that resembles a simple turban and has an overlap allowing for size adjustment at the back.

Women wore a *zhanpao*, a long robe that fastened on the right and left and was decorated with a line of embroidery on both arms and brass bells. The *zhanpao* was worn with geometrically embroidered hand covers tied with cerise braids. Leg covers, similar to those worn by men, were made of indigo-dyed fabric with a double ikat spot motif. The below-knee length apron/skirt had an ikat spot motif, indigo-dyed edging, vertical bands of royal blue, and a central panel of geometric and stylized plant motif embroidery in black, red, and blue on an un-dyed linen ground. An older band in brown, red, and blue (possibly using natural dyes) was set in nearer the waist. Strands of conch

shells were worn around the neck but may also have been used to decorate garments.

During the Qing period, Taiwanese men wore the *zhanpao* and a *magua*, an outer jacket, or *gua*, a vest, worn outside the long gown. The horse jacket, shorter than the *gua* and reaching only to the mid-abdomen, was worn with skullcaps called "melon rind." Officials wore long "python gowns" and a short gown over it called *guazi* (longer than the *gua*), which resembled a modern windbreaker jacket. The garments were of plain colors and were worn in contrasting color combinations: dark or light green, blue, gray, white, or red. *Shan*, a shirt, and trousers, together known as *dangshan*, were worn with a bamboo hat by those engaged in manual work. Women wore *tadaoshan*, a tight-fitting, wide-sleeved jacket trimmed with ribbon, with *mamian chun*, a long skirt, for formal wear. *Gu*, trousers made of silk, were worn for formal occasions, and a cotton version was worn for everyday use. These were worn with bound-foot shoes and a headband. Shades of red were popular for women's dress, including carmine, peach, and pink. The upper and lower garments were often in contrasting shades.

Western Influences

When the Japanese took over Taiwan in 1895, they made little effort to introduce changes in dress, apart from banning the practice of foot binding. Residents of Taiwan soon began to combine Western dress with traditional Chinese dress. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Han Chinese men in Taiwan wore the *zhangshan* with Western leather shoes and hats. In Japan at this time, Western dress was embraced as a manifestation of a forward-looking ideology. In 1911 men in Taiwan cut their queues, as did those on the mainland, and women adopted Western style leather shoes worn with a traditional jacket and pants. In the 1920s women wore silk stockings and knee-length skirts with traditional style short-sleeved velvet jackets, and carried a parasol and handkerchief. By the 1920s Western dress had largely replaced traditional Taiwanese dress, but differences between Han Chinese women who originated from the Fujian or Guangdong (Hakka) provinces were visible in their dress; Fujian styles were more lavish and intricate, while the Hakka preferred simple, decorative but durable materials.

Chinese and Japanese Influences

Under Chinese rule, imported Chinese cloth was used to make clothes, as there was no sericulture and little cotton or hemp grown. That which was grown was dyed locally, with chemical dyes gradually replac-

ing plant dyes. Pineapple fiber, taro flax, jute, and banana fiber were also used for textiles. Pineapple fiber was the most successful as it did not cling to the body in Taiwan's humid climate. After 1918, Japanese spinning and weaving technology was imported and large-scale production developed using Japanese cotton, which became the fabric of everyday wear, replacing Chinese imports by the middle or end of the Japanese occupation. After two to three decades of occupation, Japanese fabric patterns and the pale "refined" colors favored by the Japanese (pink, baby-blue, lake-green, grayish blue, and beige), became standard, replacing the patterns and bright colors favored during the Qing dynasty and earlier.

Only after Japan declared war on China in 1937 did the Japanese attempt to weaken Taiwanese cultural links with China and discourage adoption of Chinese fashion. While older men continued to wear traditional dress, many young men adopted military uniforms, *muge* (Japanese wooden clogs), and "duck's tongue" hats—a wider version of the cloth cap traditionally worn by working class men in northern British cities. Women adopted the kimono and both genders adopted Japanese-style names.

As on the mainland, children were dressed like small adults: hats and cloaks had decorated hems, tassels, and embroidery for special occasions. Like mainland garments, pants had split seats. Western-style school uniforms were introduced in 1925.

The *qipao*, or cheongsam (as it became more widely known internationally), that is, the asymmetrically fastened dress worn by women, was worn in Taiwan during the twentieth century, peaking in popularity the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. The Sun Yat-sen suit went out of fashion after Communist rule was established on the mainland, but continued to be worn by a few older officials of Taiwan's republican government on formal occasions. Tailored in khaki colored woven wool cloth, it featured breast pockets with military style flaps, brass buttons, and a high collar.

In the mid-twentieth century, the *hong gua*, which consisted of a red embroidered jacket and a black embroidered skirt featuring phoenix and dragon motifs, was worn for special occasions with an elaborate head-dress. In rural areas, for special occasions, men wore a traditional blue gown with a red sash worn diagonally, and gilt hat sprays on each side of a trilby hat or skullcap. There was a gradual discontinuance of traditional styles during the 1960s and 1970s as fashions from the West were adopted.

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CLOTHING, TRADITIONAL — TAJIKISTAN

Traditional Tajik costume developed as a part of Central Asian costume, and had common style and design features with other countries in the region. Until the twentieth century, both men and women wore bulky pants and long tunic shirts with no opening down the center front. The only difference between shirts for males and females was in the neckline shape: men's shirts had horizontal necklines, while women's had vertical necklines, designed for breastfeeding. In some ethnic groups young women's tunic shirts had the horizontal neckline shape until they were married or had their first child. Tunics for men and women had the same cut. The body of the garment, front and back, was made of one rectangular piece folded at the shoulders with underarm panels. The sleeves usually had a rectangular shape as well, or were slightly narrowed to the wrists. This design did not require scissors to cut; often the fabric was torn by hand. The center and side panels were cut with the fabric grain going lengthwise, while the grain in the sleeves went across, creating interesting pattern with the stripes in the men's coat, called *khalat*. The coat had no fastener, but could be tied with a sash or big colorful handkerchief folded diagonally. Money, tobacco, and other personal effects were kept in the folds of the sash.

In common with all Central Asian men, Tajik men had a large variety of headwear. They wore fur hats, turbans, and stiff squared little black caps, called *tubeteika*, with a white stylized pepper or cucumber embroidered on them. Men wore their hair closely cropped.

As in many Asian countries, women wore pants under their tunics, which were made in white or other light colors; to wear only a tunic was considered sin-

ful. Pants were very wide at the waist and hips, tight at the ankle, and had a decorative trim at the bottom. Pants were an important part of the costume—women kept them on, even while sleeping. It was common to make the pants of two fabrics: plain white cotton for the upper part, and a colorful patterned silk or fine calico for the legs, which could be seen from under the dress. This tradition was developed not only to save expensive fabric, but also because they believed in the magical power of the color white, which was supposed to provide a woman with fertility and happiness.

A Tajik woman was not allowed to put her arms into the sleeves of a coat or wear any tops with a center front opening. A well-known proverb of the time explained this rule: "God told men to wear coats, but not women." Although women had a special kind of coat, called a *parandja*, they could wear it only with the a high neckline. In the winter females wore a little padded shirt under the long tunic. In the cities during the nineteenth century, women were required to cover entire their body, including the face. They used a specially designed scarf or net made of horsehair. A big white square scarf made of high-quality cotton or silk was used to cover the head. The typical jewelry was silver earrings, rings, and necklaces of coral or coins. Women braided their hair into thirty or forty tiny long plaits: the number marked the degree of beauty.

When this region of Asia was joined to czarist Russia at the end of the nineteenth century, traditional costume began to respond to Western culture, trade, and fashion. These changes were new for a Muslim country, where traditions and stability in the costume had been strictly protected by religion and prejudices. Mass-produced, inexpensive fabrics from Russian mills began to predominate over domestic home-woven textiles, making clothing cheaper and more affordable for everybody. The greatest transformation in traditional costume, however, occurred after the October Revolution (1917). The transformation continued during the building of the Asian Soviet republics over the following decades.

Modifications in traditional costume started with reforming the basic tunic cut. A more flattering shoulder line and a round armhole and sleeve cap made the garment more comfortable. In the late 1920s women started to wear *tubeteika*, which usually were made of black velvet or wool, embroidered with silver and colored threads, and decorated with hanging silver coins. Later, Tajik women adopted Western style for outerwear: the *parandja* was transformed into a fairly tight-fitting jacket. Some elements of the traditional costume—such as the *tubeteika*—are still widely used in Tajikistan. The men's coat is still tied with a sash,

especially by old men or in the villages. Tajiks often wear contemporary fashion but made from textiles with traditional patterns and hues.

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CLOTHING, TRADITIONAL — THAILAND The numerous ethnic groups of Thailand traditionally have produced a wide array of cotton and silk textiles. Each ethnic group wove textiles in distinctive patterns for clothing, domestic, and ceremonial purposes, thus transforming textiles into markers of identity. The various Thai linguistic groups, as well as the Khmer, Kui, and Malay ethnic minority groups living in the lowland areas of Thailand used cotton and silk fibers to create their textiles. A combination of fiber, color, and technique distinguishes a textile of one group from that of another, but the structure of textiles made throughout Thailand is similar.

Women's Traditional Dress

The *pha sin*, or tube skirt, is the traditional lower garment for women of the various ethnic groups of lowland Thailand. The *pha sin* consists of three sections: *bua sin* (head or top), *tua sin* (body or midsection), and *tin sin* (foot or border). The three sections of the *pha sin* are either woven in one piece of cloth with patterns differentiating the three sections or are made from two or more pieces of cloth sewn together.

The top section is made from plain-woven cotton cloth of various colors. The Tai Lue of northern Thailand and the Lao Song Dam of central Thailand use indigo cotton for the top section, while the Tai Yuan living in the north prefer natural or white cotton, sometimes with a strip of red cotton, for this section. The Tai Lao and Khmer use a single piece of material for all three sections of the *pha sin*; they distinguish the top section by the absence of motifs.

The midsection is the largest section of the tube skirt. Weavers of the various ethnic groups use a variety of techniques to decorate the midsection, including ikat (tye-dyeing the thread before weaving it), tapestry, and supplementary warp and weft patterning. The Tai Lao, Lao Khrang, Khmer, and Kui weavers favor weft ikat or *mat mii* technique, while the Tai Lue

employ tapestry and other techniques to create complex patterns. The Lao Phuan of Sukothai and Utaradit provinces weave an overall supplementary warp pattern for the midsection and attach a complicated patterned border to their tube skirt.

The skirt border is either plainly woven or very elaborate. The most intricately patterned border is the *tin chok*, a border pattern with decorated *chok*, or discontinuous supplementary weft motifs. The skirt border is highly valued, and many women of various ethnic groups possess a *pha sin tin chok* (a *pha sin*, or tube skirt, decorated with a discontinuous supplementary weft border) for special occasions. The Tai Lue prefer a simple border of plain indigo cotton, while the Phu Tai and Lao Song Dam weave a thicker border, approximately five centimeters wide, decorated with supplementary patterns or stripes. Some women dress in tube skirts or sarongs with an overall pattern. Mature Khmer women of northeast Thailand often wear tube skirts with a checked or plaid pattern. Malay women in the south favor batik or wax-resist-dyed sarongs similar to Malay dress of neighboring countries.

The *chong kraben* was the lower garment traditionally worn by women of central Thailand and Cambodia. Central Thai women used a variety of textiles for the *chong kraben* including Indian chintz; they also used different types of silk textiles such as silver and gold brocades on silk made locally or from India; local weft ikat silk; and imported Chinese and Cambodian silk. The use of an upper garment by women varied until the beginning of the twentieth century. Most women did not wear an upper garment, but wrapped a rectangular cloth, *pha sabai*, around the breasts or across a shoulder when attending religious or ceremonial functions. Prior to the twentieth century, women belonging to ethnic groups originating in colder climates (for example, the Tai Lue, Lao Song Dam, and Phu



Costumed lakorn dancers perform at the Lak Muang shrine in Bangkok in 1995. (KEVIN R. MORRIS/CORBIS)

Tai) wore blouses or shirts of indigo or black cotton decorated with silver buttons, embroidery, or appliqué. For special occasions, an elaborately patterned shoulder or breast cloth was added to complete the outfit. The Phu Tai *pha phrae wa* was an outstanding example of a shoulder cloth; this red silk textile is decorated with bands of complex patterns and is approximately three meters long. Women began to wear European-style blouses in the 1900s.

Men's Traditional Dress

Unlike women, men no longer commonly wear traditional clothing. The traditional clothing of men was not as elaborate as women's dress and did not vary much among the different ethnic groups. Men wore a short version of the *chong kraben* as a loincloth, made of plain or plaid patterned cotton. This shortened version of the *chong kraben* exposed the wearer's thighs, which were usually tattooed. Men reserved a silk *chong kraben* for special occasions such as weddings and ordination ceremonies into the Buddhist monkhood. A plaid or checked cotton sarong was another lower garment favored by Malay men in the southern region of Thailand.

Men did not wear an upper garment on a daily basis, and draped a cloth over one or a both shoulders for special events. Men of ethnicities from colder climates dressed in cotton shirts with a shoulder cloth for ceremonies and religious activities. Men also used a plaid cotton cloth or *pha khao ma* as a sash, bag, belt, head cloth, scarf, and towel. Both sexes carried a shoulder bag that could be plainly or elaborately patterned. A young woman might create an intricate bag to give to a man as a token of her affection.

Household Textiles

Women produce an array of textiles used for such purposes as mattresses, blankets and covers, pillows, and mosquito nets. These items are made from cotton, but items reserved for a wedding may be silk or decorated with silk and often contain elaborate motifs. The Tai Lue favor black and red geometric motifs on a natural cotton background. The Lao Song Dam adorn their special household textiles with green, red, orange, and white silk appliqué. The Lao Khrang prefer a natural cotton blanket with elaborate supplementary patterns at the ends, bordered with red cotton.

Religious or Ceremonial Textiles

Women also weave textiles for religious or ceremonial purposes. Laywomen provide dyed cotton cloth for Buddhist monks' robes, as well as household

textiles. Family members usually donate these items to monks at ordination ceremonies and at subsequent religious festivals. Ceremonial textiles are also donated to hang inside and outside a temple and to cover palm-leaf manuscripts.

Textiles for the Royalty

Until the beginning of the twentieth century, Thai royalty consumed textiles that were similar in design and structure to villagers' textiles but were of higher quality. Court weavers produced gold and silver supplementary-patterned silks for the royal family and aristocracy. The elite also commissioned highly skilled weavers throughout the kingdom to supply finely woven silk and cotton textiles. The royalty imported specially designed textiles from India, China, and Cambodia; their laws restricted the use of the imported fabrics to the higher strata of society. Thai kings wore the finest materials when their dress mimicked the deities.

The adoption of Western-style clothing among the Thai elite began in the mid-nineteenth century. Western missionaries also introduced and persuaded women to wear blouses with the traditional lower garment in the late 1800s. Men more readily adopted Western clothing (such as trousers) during the first quarter of the twentieth century. The *pha sin* continues to be worn in rural areas on a daily basis by some women, and the elite are returning to modernized versions of traditional dress inspired by Her Majesty Queen Sirikit of Thailand for special events. Local and foreign interests alike currently sustain traditional textile production, and perhaps will continue to do so into the near future.

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CLOTHING, TRADITIONAL — TIBET

Tibetan costume reflects the environment and nomadic lifestyle of many of Tibet's people. A long his-



TIBET DRESS IN THE 1840s

The dress of the Thibetan women closely resembles that of the men; the main difference is, that over the robe they add a short, many-coloured tunic, and that they divide their hair into two braids, one hanging down each shoulder. The women of the humbler classes wear a small yellow cap, like the cap of liberty that was in fashion in France at the time of our first republic.

Source: Huc Evariste-Regis and Joseph Gabet. ([1851] 1987) *Travels in Tartary, Thibet and China, 1844–1846*. New York: Dover Publications, 174.

tory of intermarriage between Chinese and Tibetan nobility, resulting in exchanges of material culture, has also influenced Tibetan dress. Fabrics used for Tibetan clothing include hemp, Chinese cottons and silks, rayon, indigenous animal furs, felted fabric derived from the hair of the yak, and *pulu*, a traditional woolen cloth. Chinese silks are believed to have been brought to Tibet when a Chinese princess married a Tibetan noble during the Tang dynasty (618–907). *Pulu* became a popular tribute item given to China. Other Chinese costume characteristics, such as color symbolism and the right-over-left closure method, are also reflected in Tibetan costume. Tibetan and Mongolian traditional costumes also share characteristics; in particular, lamas of both countries share similar costumes, among them the *zi xia* (crested helmets). Although basic garments worn throughout central and northern Asia may be similar, distinctions exist not only between countries, but also between regions and tribes within each nation.

Tibetan garments are worn layered, and many basic pieces are worn by men and women alike. Most garments close to the right and are fastened with a variety of closures. The *anju* is a full-length, long-sleeved garment made of silk, cotton, or rayon, worn close to the body. Over the *anju* is worn the *andub*, a full-length, sleeveless garment usually made of black *pulu* and lined with blue fabric. Men and women also wear leggings tied to a waist girdle. The basic Tibetan outer garment is the *giuba*, a long-sleeved, round-collared, loose-fitting robe of *pulu*; it closes to the right and is tied at the waist with a sash or belt. The *giuba* may be as long as seven feet, with the upper part bloused over the waist tie to adjust the length to knee level for men

and ankle level for women and priests. Waist ties—leather belts or silk or cotton sashes—keep the *giuba* in place and allow the wearer to pull out his or her arms for cooling. This garment can also be used as a blanket or sleeping bag.

Other robes include the *giuiu*, a sleeveless, broad-shouldered robe made of black *pulu* or animal skins, and the *giubjialo*, a lined *pulu* robe with a floral design on the collar. The *cha* is a fur-lined robe worn by men and is made either from jacquard silk fabric (for special occasions) or plain-colored leather (for everyday wear). Waist-length jackets, both sleeved and sleeveless, may also be worn over the *giuba*. Square-toed *sunpa* (boots) are a popular type of footwear. *Sunpa* have soles of thick yak hide and fabric foot and leg sections. They are secured with cloth ties and often have embroidery at the ankle area.

Headwear is also an important part of Tibetan costume, and the shape and quality of the hat indicate rank, status, and regional and tribal affiliation. The *xi-*



A woman in Lanmdakh wearing a *peyrak*, the traditional headwear for married women in Tibet and northern India. (RIC ERGENBRIGHT/CORBIS)

amou jiasi (golden flower) hat is worn in winter by men, women, and children. The *xianmou jiasi* has a tall crown of fabric, felt, or leather, four fur flaps, and is often trimmed with gold rickrack imported from India or China.

Costume indicates a woman's marriage status. Married women wear the *bangdian*, an apron-like garment made from three widths of hand-woven, horizontally striped fabric in shades of red. Different hairstyles and hair ornaments are also important marital indicators and vary by region and tribe. A basic married woman's hairstyle is a Y-shaped style, or *peyrak*, with the hair curving into two ram-shaped horns that encircle the head. Women's hair is also embellished with many hair ornaments of precious metals and materials.

Accessories are important to Tibetan costume, serving decorative and practical purposes. Silver belt buckles and belts are common for both sexes. Many accessories hang from the waist ties. Males typically hang Buddhist boxes, cartridge clips and belts, and *bagu* (metal wallets) from their waist ties or belts. Women often hang needle cases from their waist ties. Men and women wear jewelry such as earrings, bracelets, and necklaces; men may wear only one large dangling earring. Coral, jade, silver, and gold are highly prized jewelry materials. Women wear more jewelry than men; part of the wealth of the family is kept in women's jewelry. One of the most important accessories worn by women is the *kou*, a square metal box with a diamond shape on it. The *kou* is worn around the neck on a chain so that it rests on the woman's chest and contains a Buddhist religious artifact.

The *kba-btags* or *kata* is an important Tibetan textile material artifact. It is a white scarf symbolizing purity that is offered as a gift when greeting people. The *kba-btags* are also used as offerings when visiting shrines and during other rituals such as wedding and funeral rites. This tradition is believed to have evolved from an ancient custom of clothing statues of deities.

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CLOTHING, TRADITIONAL—TURKEY

In Turkish costume, highly ornate ensembles are composed of many layers of textile and nontextile items. Older forms of Turkish traditional dress do not include Western-style dress, which exhibits rapid change

and is available through a system of mass production and distribution. Traditional dress was once the everyday dress of people living in the rural areas of Turkey; today it is worn daily only by a few rural women, by others for ceremonial use, and by Turkish folk-dance groups.

The traditional dress of Turkey has changed slowly; this is important historically because it informs us about the people who produced it. Surface decoration and the way costume elements are arranged on the body serve as a means of communication, indicating membership in tribal or village groups, and myriad other anthropological messages.

Turkish traditional dress exhibits tribal and village distinctions while sharing features with Central Asian dress, the dress of the Ottoman Court, and Middle Eastern dress. The common features can be attributed to the cultural contacts of the Turkic peoples over the centuries. The Turkish people are believed to have migrated south and west from the Altai Mountain regions south of Lake Baikal, entering Persia, Iraq, Central Asia and Eastern Europe. By the eleventh century they penetrated the Anatolian plateau, the landmass forming the peninsula in western Asia that comprises the bulk of the modern Republic of Turkey. By the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Turkic groups formed many villages, some of which remain intact today. This stability of geographic location coupled with relative isolation in inner Anatolia, away from the waterways on the periphery, allowed for stability and slow change in traditions of dress.

Turkic peoples influenced and were influenced by cultural contact with civilizations along their migration routes, by the earlier inhabitants of Anatolia, and by the remains of Anatolia's ancient civilizations. The vast Ottoman empire (fourteenth–nineteenth centuries), which eventually encompassed the Balkan Peninsula, Greece, Transylvania, Moldavia, Wallachia, most of Hungary, Podolia, the entire north coast of the Black Sea, Crete, Cyprus and the Aegean isles, Armenia, most of the Caucasus, the Tigris and Euphrates valleys to the Persian Gulf, the eastern Mediterranean coast, a strip along the Arabian peninsula, Egypt, Tripoli, Tunisia, Algeria, and the Anatolian peninsula, brought the Turks in contact with people from other lands. Those contacts also had an effect on the dress and textiles of Turkey.

Forms of Turkish Traditional Dress

Characteristic features of Turkish traditional dress include the layering of garments, distinctive surface or woven-in decoration on the fabrics, and a geometric



Men in traditional dress at the festival of Edirne in 1954. (STUDIO PATELLANI/CORBIS)

cut. Wool, silk, and cotton, fibers indigenous to Turkey, are commonly used for apparel. Separate garments are layered to accommodate the need for adjustments according to climate; to create storage areas for coins and other small items in fabric folds; and to create a system for holding garments onto the body. Careful cutting exposes portions of garments underneath the top layers. Surface design is achieved by embroidering, dyeing, or weaving.

Common items are the *salvar* (baggy trouser), *gomlek* (chemise), *ucetek* (three-skirted cloak), and elaborate headgear that always includes one or more headscarves for women. Sleeveless vests and waist-length jackets are also common, as are aprons for women. The layers are held together by a girdle or belt, or by a shawl (*sal kusak*) that is folded and wrapped around the waist. With the exception of the face, the body completely covered. Portions of the men's body are left exposed, such as the head, face, and neck, with the exception of a headdress. In the traditional dress of some areas of Turkey, portions of the legs are exposed. Turkish traditional dress was relatively unisex, but certain distinguishing features clearly indicated gender. Primary among these was the style of headdress. In the Ottoman court, male headdress distinguished social and economic positions. Headdresses such as the turban, used throughout the Ottoman empire from before the Turks' capture of Constantinople in 1453 to the early nineteenth century, and the fez, used for about 100 years after the demise of the turban, became symbols of identity for

Turkish men during their respective periods of use. Both were outlawed: the turban in 1829 when the fez was adopted, and the fez in 1925—in favor of the Western-style brimmed hat. The headscarf for women remains an important article of dress among segments of the population in modern Turkey.

Recent Changes

Over 60 percent of the inhabitants of modern Turkey live in urban areas. Forces of the global economy have created changes in lifestyles, particularly since 1970. Traditional dress and textile production is disappearing at an astounding rate. Fabrics formerly were produced in villages, but now changing markets and improved infrastructure have made it possible for women to purchase fabrics and trims, produced throughout Turkey and the world, in their local markets. Women in some villages continue to wear all or parts of their traditional dress, especially for ceremonial events such as weddings. Common in most villages is the baggy trouser (*salvar*) worn sometimes with a skirt over the top, a long-sleeved blouse or T-shirt, a sweater-vest, and a headscarf. Turkish folk dance groups have kept some of the elaborate dress ensemble traditions alive. In the urban areas of Turkey, men and women wear typical Western clothing, although some Muslim women cover this dress with a coat and wear a headscarf, or cover themselves completely with a black cloak.

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CLOTHING, TRADITIONAL — TURKMENISTAN Dress in Turkmenistan developed as a part of Central Asian costume, and the styles and design of clothing were similar to those in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Until the 1880s, traditional clothing

had the same basic form—a long, loose, simple tunic style. Styles were similar for all social classes, often differentiated only by the quality of the cloth and accessories, and the quantity of clothing in a wardrobe. The costume, however, was visibly different depending on the individual's age and social status.

The modern Turkmen women's costume includes a colorful, three-quarter-length jacket, or caftan, over a fairly tight-fitting dress with narrow sleeves and a little stand-up collar. The front panel, center front edges, and neckline of the dress are outlined in white embroidery. The jacket's front edge, hem, and bottom of the sleeves are decorated with velvet bands, metal disks, and beads. The cap, or *tubeteika*, in a bright color matching the jacket, is covered with silver jewelry and hanging coins.

The famous Karakul sheep are bred in Turkmenistan, and their gray, black, or brown wool has always been used extensively in clothing. Cotton and heavy silk were used in traditional clothing for the summer season. Women's costume was usually made from plain fabrics. All colors were used, but yellow, red, green, and blue were especially popular. The most popular color was red, in all its shades.

Everyday clothing was simple and consisted of a long tunic shirt and pants. The upper part of pants was wide, gathered with a lace. Pants were worn very low, almost at the hip level, leaving the belly bared. Pants' legs narrowed from knee level down. Women wore scarves and little woolen dome-shaped caps on their heads. Women's flat, soft, leather shoes or boots had pointed, slightly upturned toes.

An important part of the Turkmen women's costume was silver jewelry with semiprecious stones, which were necessary elements of everyday attire. Women wore rings, earrings, necklaces, and special decorations for forehead, temples, overcap and dress. The jewelry was often heavy with hanging coins. Even women from the poorest families had to have some jewelry—at least a ring—because the Turkmen believed that food cooked by a woman with no ring was bad. Children, both girls and boys, began to wear silver decorations at the age of five. Girls from nine to twelve years old, who were ready for marriage, and married women who had not yet had their first baby, had many more decorations than middle-aged women (thirty to thirty-five years of age).

Until the middle of the twentieth century, basic dress for men included a cotton or woolen shirt in dark colors and black or brown pants tucked into leather boots. The shirt had a rounded neckline with an opening on the right side and was worn over the pants and tied with

a brightly colored sash; men would keep little necessities and tools in the pleats of the sash. For outerwear, men wore a three-quarter-length cotton robe or long sheepskin coat. The robe had dolman sleeves (wide at the shoulders but coming to a tight cuff), was decorated with a braid on the outer edges, and could be padded. Every Turkmen man carried arms, which was a part of the costume. A high, sheepskin bonnet, or *papakha*, was worn during summer and winter.

Today in Turkmenistan people wear a mixture of modern Western dress and traditional costume. The most complete version of the traditional costume can be seen during national holidays or special occasions, such as wedding ceremonies. However, some elements of the traditional costume, such as the *tubeteika*, and specific textile colors and patterns in the cloth, can be seen every day in the streets of big cities and tiny villages. Women still wear pants under their dresses, and older females always cover their heads with scarves. During the last decade of the twentieth century, after Turkmenistan became independent from the former Soviet Union (1991), the country began to revive its native culture, and interest in the history and style of the traditional costume increased.

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CLOTHING, TRADITIONAL — UZBEKISTAN Traditional Uzbek costume remained unchanged until the end of the nineteenth century. As in all Muslim countries, Islamic values in Uzbekistan were reflected in the style of dress. Men and women alike had limited items in their wardrobe; these included a long tunic shirt, pants, and a coat. The style of a garment was not subject to change and was similar for both sexes and all social classes. For example, the only difference in a tunic shirt for men and women was in the neckline openings—horizontal for men, vertical for women. Wealthy people could be distinguished from the poor by the superior quality of their fabrics, their more expensive jewelry, and the presence of decorative elements in their costume, such as embroidery, studded stones, and beads.

Despite similarities in costume style, each ethnic group created a unique look, artistically combining the elements of design, color palettes, textile patterns, and trims. Within an ethnic group or region, costume differed because each family had to spin, weave, and dye

its own fabrics to make clothing. This led to the colorful variety in Uzbek traditional dress.

Men's Clothing

The most important part of Uzbek men's costume was the loose-fitting cotton coat, called the *khalat*. The *khalat* was long-sleeved, knee length or longer, and made from fabric with a variety of colorful stripes. The bottom of the sleeves, center edges, hem, and neckline of the coat were sewn round with a decorative braid, which was believed to protect a person from evil powers. The side seams were slit for ease when walking, riding a horse, or sitting down. Wearing two or more coats at the same time was common in both winter and summer, and gave a man a certain prestige while showing the prosperity of the family. The outer coat could be padded with batting. A white tunic shirt was worn under the coat. The coat or shirt was tied with a big folded handkerchief or a band. This band was an important accessory, and could be made of fine fabrics, decorated with complicated silver embroidery, studded with stones and silver coins, and hung with little bags for tobacco and keys. Pants were loosely cut but narrowed to the bottom and were tucked into soft leather boots with pointed toes. Skullcaps were popular all over Central Asia. The *tubeteika* is an Uzbek cap made of velvet or wool, beautifully embroidered with silk or silver threads. Over the cap men could drape a turban, or *chalma*, in different colors. Fur hats were also worn.

Women's Clothing

Women's traditional dress consisted of a tunic, pants, a scarf, and a coat. The long, loose tunic had wide sleeves reaching to the wrists. Loose-cut pants were often made of the same fabric as the tunic, or out of complementary fabric. The bottom of the pants was gathered and decorated with embroidered braid. Women's coats were similar to men's *khalat*.

For centuries cotton has been used extensively for clothing in Uzbekistan. Home-woven striped and white cotton were the most common fabrics for everyday wear. Textile patterns often included up to six or seven different colors in the typical geometrical or stylized floral design. Fabrics were brightly colored, in shades of red, yellow, blue, green, violet, and orange. The color of the costume was an important signal of a person's age or social status. Red and pink were common for girls and young women; middle-aged women were supposed to wear shades of light blue and gray. White was the most popular color and appropriate for all ages, especially for the elderly. Black, dark blue, and violet were colors of mourning.

It was not appropriate for a woman to be seen bare-headed, even by family members. The scarf was tied round the head, leaving long ends hanging down the back. Similarly, a woman was required to cover herself with a cloak when outside of the house. In different ethnic groups a big scarf or a special kind of stylized coat, or *parandja*, was used. *Parandja* was worn with the neckline resting on the top of the head, partially covering the woman's face and draping around the entire body. In many Muslim countries females are not allowed to show their faces in public, and one common cover in Central Asia was a black net made of horsehair. The length of the net varied, depending on the region, from waist-level to the hip-level, or sometimes longer. Only in large Central Asian cities such as Tashkent, Farghona, and Bukhoro was the veil a necessary part of a woman's wardrobe at the end of the nineteenth century. In villages, women used the hanging ends of the scarf tied round the head to cover their faces when in public.

Women's long, black hair was braided into two or more plaits. In addition to common Central Asian jewelry, it was popular among young Uzbek women to pierce the nose and decorate it with a ring set with stones. Shoes were made of felt or colored leathers and had low heels.

Clothing in the Twentieth Century

Russian influence was seen in the early twentieth century. Shirts and coats became more comfortable and closer fitting with the introduction of shoulder seams, cut armholes, and rounded sleeve caps. The traditional tunic shirt evolved into a dress with a waist seam and, later, a front yoke. Today the dress with a yoke is considered the traditional Uzbek women's costume.

In the 1920s, during the Civil War and the creation of the Asian Soviet Republics, Western clothing began to appear in Central Asian wardrobes. This trend first developed in larger cities. Men added pieces from military uniforms as well as civil Western dress to their everyday attire. Although women were more conservative and slow in reshaping their wardrobe than men were, they started to appear in public with uncovered faces.

The modern version of traditional women's costume consists of the dress, pants, and headwear. Dress length varies from the knee to calf level. Pants, which are still an irreplaceable part of an Uzbek woman's wardrobe, can be very long, draping over shoes, or shortened for young women. A hip-length jacket or a waist-length vest can be worn over the dress. The skullcap, or *tubeteika*, is now extremely common. A tassel is placed on the top of a woman's cap for festive occasions.

At the end of the twentieth century, Western fashion dominated, but fashionable styles are still produced with native design elements and in traditional multi-colored textile patterns and hues. Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the creation of an independent Uzbekistan in 1991, the culture as well as the economy has been in transition, influencing modern Uzbek appearance.

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CLOTHING, TRADITIONAL — VIETNAM

Most Vietnamese men now wear Western clothing but most Vietnamese women wear the *ao dai*, a front opening, knee-length, coat-like garment with a stand collar and splits from hem to waist level at each side. The *ao dai* is tailor-made from plain or printed cotton for summer use, or from silk for special occasions; these fabrics often are mixed with polyester to reduce creasing. The *ao dai*, worn in winter, is made from wool, or a wool/polyester mix. The *ao dai* is always worn over *quan*, zip-fronted pants with two buttons at the waist. *Quan* may be black or white depending on the *ao dai*; women wear matching *ao dai* and *quan* if wealthy or for special occasions. Schoolgirls and students often wear *ao dai* with a white ground with white pants, but blue and lavender are also popular. Elderly women prefer brown and navy blue, worn with black pants. Black is not worn much in the hot southern summers. The *ao dai* may also be embroidered. The length of the *ao dai* varies, depending on fashion and occasion, from a few inches above the ankle (for evening wear) to just below the knee. The collar may also be round necked or V-necked, depending on fashion. Sleeve lengths are long or three-quarter length.

Although it has not been commonly worn since the 1930s, men's traditional dress displayed features similar to women's dress. It comprised a long-sleeved, indigo-dyed tunic with silver button fastenings. As with women's dress, the tunic sometimes had contrast edging on the collar, cuffs, and lower hem, and was worn with either a woven, skirtlike garment to mid-calf, or with simple pants. Tunics were worn loose, tied with a sash, or worn with a tabard. Headdresses varied from plain wrapped fabric to tassel-decorated caps.

Tribal Clothing

As recently as the 1930s and 1940s tribal women wore elaborately decorated, woven traditional dress;

this has largely been replaced by a simplified version of dress worn everyday in rural areas. In the north, women wear a loose-fitting shirt with a skirt and headscarf, while women in the south may wear a loose-fitting shirt and pants with a headscarf. Among tribal groups, fabrics are woven on back strap or simple looms, using homegrown cotton, hemp, or ramie, to make striped waistcloths and warp-faced ikat. Embroidery includes motifs of trees, flowers, eight-pointed stars, and sugarcane leaves. Brocade fabric is produced using up to 150 supplementary threads in cotton or silk. Dress is worn with pride as a marker of ethnic identity among hill tribes and subgroups. Each group has local nuances in spoken dialect and in women's clothing.

In the North The Tai people form eight subgroups totaling over three million people in northern Vietnam. Other tribal groups living in northern Vietnam are the Jarai, the Phen, the Lao, the Lu, the Nung, and the Pa Di, while the Hmong, Yao, and Pathern spread from the north to the northwest. Women's garments are distinctive to each group, and permutations of indigo-dyed cotton, embroidery, and silver decoration signify tribe membership, gender, and status.

Many Tai women wear long black tunics, while those worn by the Nung (Ngan) are shorter. The Tai also wear a wrapped, sarong-style waistcloth with bands of decoration. Pants or leggings are worn under the skirt, a waist tie holds the waistcloth in place, and pendants on chains of silver links complete the ensemble. The Jarai decorate loincloths and waistcloths with geometric bands of supplementary weft decoration. The Phen wear brown-colored clothing; the Lao wrap their heads in cone-shaped headdresses; the Pa Di women wear a headdress shaped like a house roof and trimmed with silver balls.

The garments of some groups are similar to those of other groups; for example, Nung and Pa Di women both wear a short black tunic that opens on the right, with a decorated stand collar, and contrasting blue and white cuffs. The fabric seam at the sleeve join is embroidered and the front fastening is decorated and fastened with silver balls. The Lu wear a short black cotton tunic with a peplum (a short overskirt attached at the waist). The tunic is decorated at all seam joins with embroidery, and adorned with silver coins at the front. The waistcloth has a vertically embroidered and appliquéd central panel, and an outer waistcloth with an embroidered panel is worn around the hips. The Hmong batik the central panel of their distinctive circular skirts using bamboo pens and beeswax. Made from hemp, cotton, and silk, and now stitched by ma-



Vietnamese women in *ao dais* on the street in Hanoi in 1993. (OWEN FRANKEN/CORBIS)

chine, women's circular pleated skirts are indigo dyed, batiked, embroidered, and appliquéd. Additional Yao decoration includes tassels, beading, fringing, and silver lozenges used as fastenings. The linear-patterned batik is applied using different sized pens for eight-pointed stars, spirals, flowers, and gourds. The Yao use larger motifs, and the Pathern, use red as a ground color rather than black. The Lisu, Akha, Hmong and Micu all use Chinese methods in the construction of their garments, especially jackets, trousers, pleated skirts, aprons, and kaftans. Indigo dye on cotton cloth is decorated with colorful bands of appliqué, cross-stitch embroidery, and the inclusion of tufts of wool, seeds, silver bosses, and club-shaped pendants. Motifs are mostly geometric or record the natural environment. Weaving and needlework are prized skills; a prospective bride's work may be examined by future in-laws as a means to determine character. The Muong live in an intermediate area between the mountains and the coastal plains; here they grow cotton used for white, front buttoning, women's tunics and folded headdresses, similar to the caps of Western nurses. These are worn with plain green or patterned waist sashes and long waistcloths.

In Central and Southern Vietnam The Mon-Khmer of Truong Son Cordillera and the Central Highlands are spread throughout the central and southern areas of Vietnam. Other groups in this area include the Bahnar, the Ta Oi, the Cotu, and the Gie-Trieng. The Mon-Khmer has a population of three-quarters of a

million people, and includes fifteen subgroups. The Khmer people have rich textile traditions, producing belted aprons, vests, skirts, waist ties, scarves, blankets, bags, and baby carriers. The Bahnar weave cotton on an Indonesian-style loom on which the warp threads are held stretched between beams six feet above the ground and tensioned by a wooden back rest. This kind of loom is used to produce supplementary weft cloth up to a meter wide. Fabric is indigo and may combine pre-dyed threads. The Mon-Khmer use predominantly black, dark red, and ochre colors. The fabric of the Ta Oi, the Cotu, and some Gie-Trieng has glass or lead beads strung on the horizontal weft threads before weaving the decorative motifs.

Outlook for Traditional Clothing

As education and economic opportunities become increasingly available to the tribes of Vietnam, all aspects of women's dress is evolving, including the fabrics and dyes used, types of decoration, and construction (generally moving to simpler construction). The future of Vietnamese dress seems intimately bound up with the country's future economic prosperity: If industrialization continues at its current pace, with increased communications and logistics, the availability and affordability of Western goods will bring a multitude of fashion choices to people of Vietnam, and it is likely that the popularity of traditional Vietnamese women's dress will decline as men's dress has already done. Alternatively, a sense of cultural

identity and nationalism—strongly felt in Vietnam—may help retain the use of Vietnamese dress in the same way that the Indonesian sarong has remained part of the Balinese dress.

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CO LOA THANH Co Loa Thanh (Co Loa Citadel) is located approximately 20 kilometers north of Hanoi, Vietnam, in the Dong Anh district. The citadel and the city were built around 257 BCE by King An Duong Vuong (Thuc Phan, reigned c. 257–c. 207 BCE) to enhance defense of the area from Chinese invasion. An Duong Vuong made Co Loa Thanh the capital of his Au Lac kingdom.

The shape of the citadel gives it its name, Loa Thanh, which means "snail-shaped citadel." The three principal mud walls of the citadel were constructed in a pattern of concentric circles resembling the shell of a snail. The first, outer wall had a perimeter of 7.6 kilometers; the second, 6 kilometers; and the third, 1.6 kilometers. The walls rose from 4 to 12 meters in height and were from 8 to 30 meters thick.

Following King An Duong Vuong's military defeat and subsequent suicide in 207 BCE, Co Loa Thanh was pillaged and abandoned throughout the period of Chinese rule in Vietnam (111 BCE–939 CE). After Chinese rule ended in 939 CE, Prince Ngo Quyen (897–944) made Co Loa Thanh the capital city of his new Vietnamese administration. It remained the capital city until 944.

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COASTAL MALAYS The origins of the modern Deutero-Malay or Coastal Malay people are the subject of much debate. Some believe they came to the coastal regions of the Malay Peninsula from mainland

Southeast Asia around 2000 BCE. The Malay settlers who first came to the peninsula kept to the rivers, and earlier races were driven inland to the mountains and swamps. These Malays intermarried with the indigenous peoples but failed to absorb them.

Folklore recorded in the Malay Annals has it that the founder of the Malay dynasties in much of insular Southeast Asia from the Malay Peninsula through the archipelago was a prince named Sang Sapurba. He was the son of Raja Suran, the "Ruler of the East and the West," by his marriage to a mermaid who was the daughter of the Kings of the Sea. This prince was believed to have revealed himself on the hill of Si-guntang, near Mount Mahameru, in the hinterland of Palembang, a port city near the east coast of Sumatra.

The legendary Sang Sapurba was said to have crossed the central range of Sumatra into the mountains of Minangkabau, where he slew the dragon Si-katimuna and became king and founded the line of princes of Minangkabau, the noblest Malay dynasty. His relative, Nila Utama from Palembang, had meanwhile crossed the sea, first reaching the island of Bintan and then the island of Temasik, on which he founded Singapore.

The modern or Deutero-Malay of Southeast Asia are believed to be descended from Proto-Malays who lived in the southern states of the Malay Peninsula, the Riau-Lingga Archipelago, Bangka Island, and certain districts in eastern Sumatra. Anthropologists caution against inferring that every modern Malay is descended from Proto-Malay tribe members. The modern Malay are a mixed race and differ among themselves considerably. They developed from intermarriage with Chinese (as early as the Chou period), Indians from Bengal and Deccan, Arabs, and Thais.

The earliest immigrants to the Malay Peninsula from the Indonesian archipelago were Minangkabaus from Sumatra. Attracted by the wealth and commerce of Melaka, they moved into what are now the Malaysian states of Negri Sembilan and Melaka. Their legacy of matriarchal social structures remains visible in Malay culture today. In the early eighteenth century, the Bugis of Celebes established themselves in what is now the state of Selangor, later becoming politically dominant in the Riau-Johor empire.

This migration from the archipelago differentiates southern Malays from those in north of the Peninsula in Kedah and Kelantan. These differ from other groups, such as the Patani Malays of northern Perak (another state in modern peninsular Malaysia). These Malays were driven south from Thailand in the mid-nineteenth century and retain aspects of Thai culture.

Southern Malay communities generally spoke Malayan dialects or a language from which Malay has developed. In British Malaya they were known as Biduanda, while in the south and on the islands they were called Orang Laut, or people of the sea. Many of these people were unacquainted with agriculture and lived by fishing. The coastal Malays did well by the sea, as the coasts and rivers of Southeast Asia where they settled were rich in marine life, and the waters yielded more than did the inland jungles. The Orang Laut in their coastal villages had specific indigenous customs, but few of these are left to the Malay.

Coastal Malays appear to have settled along the coasts of Malaya and surrounding areas and intermarried with Chinese and Indians who migrated to and traded in the region, giving rise to the Deutero-Malay. The Malay spoken today is thought to have originated in a language from the archipelago. In the remote past, it is believed that the two great language groups—the language spoken on the archipelago and that spoken by the Indo-Chinese—were connected.

Historians agree that prior to recorded history in the Malay Peninsula and archipelago, there was already a substantial population with a fairly well-developed culture. Early Malays knew how to navigate by the stars on the open ocean and maintained some sort of political and social organization.

Unlike their predecessors, modern Malays are pre-eminently an agricultural people, and wet rice cultivation and fishing have been traditionally their main occupations wherever they settled. In the Melaka and Kelantan-Trengganu regions, fishing was revived as the main occupation because of better transportation in the eastern coastal region and the substitution of money for barter, which allowed for the division of labor and specialization in fishing by the coastal Malays.

The Malays today number over 200 million people in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia who share similarities in religion, language, general culture, and even political identity. Islam has proven to be a unifying force whose extranational character links the most remote mountain farmers to the townspeople of other Muslim communities in Southeast Asia.

Kog Yue Choong

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COCKFIGHTING Cockfighting, which pits two male chickens against each other, is a blood sport indigenous to Asia. The chicken, or common fowl, is most likely a native of the Indian subcontinent, where both a red jungle fowl (*Gallus gallus*, 65 centimeters long) and a gray one (*G. sonneratii*, 80 centimeters long) are found. Chickens were domesticated in the forests of mainland Southeast Asia perhaps as long as six thousand years ago. Over the years, a variety of domestic fowl was bred for culinary and ritual purposes, and some were bred for their fighting ability as well. When cockfighting first appeared is unknown, but sculptures found at Angkor Wat in Cambodia indicate cockfighting took place there one thousand years ago. As the chicken spread around the world, cockfighting followed, and it became a worldwide activity.

In Asia, cockfighting remains popular in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines. In all places, the basic elements of the fight are the same. The key players are the cocks, the breeder-owners, and the audience. Betting is a vital component, and various rules and structures are in place that ensure that bets are collected and paid quickly and fairly. Fights take place in cockfighting pits and are attended almost exclusively by men. The goal of the fight might be for one bird to be killed or for one bird to be judged victorious without necessarily killing the other. Cocks may fight with their spurs, with attached blades, or with their spurs covered with padded gloves.

David Levinson

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COEN, JAN PIETERSZOOM (c. 1586–1629), governor-general of the Dutch East Indies Company in Indonesia. Born to a burgher family in Hoorn, the Netherlands, Jan Pieterszoon Coen learned bookkeeping in Rome before joining the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC, Verenigd Oostindische Compagnie, United East Indies Company) at the age of twenty.

After his first visit to Indonesia in 1607, Coen rose in the ranks of the VOC. In 1614 he wrote an influential analysis of the company's strategic position, arguing for monopolization of the spice trade, the establishment of strong bases in the Indies, and the expulsion of other Europeans and introduction of Dutch settlers. Coen was appointed fourth governor-general in 1617, taking up his post in 1619. He was convinced of the need to establish a central headquarters for the company in Asia, both for military and administrative reasons, and for this headquarters to become the hub of a network of Asian trade routes. In 1618 Coen established a fort at Jayakarta (now Jakarta) in western Java for this purpose, later naming it Batavia.

Coen ruthlessly enforced the VOC's spice monopoly in eastern Indonesia, attacking the nutmeg-producing Banda Islands in 1621 and slaughtering or deporting the entire indigenous population. Coen left for Holland in 1623, but returned for a second term as governor-general in 1627 and died in Batavia during a siege by Javanese forces.

Robert Cribb

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COIMBATORE (2001 est. pop. 923,000). Coimbatore is situated on the banks of the Noyil River on the Coimbatore Plain 425 kilometers southwest of Madras City (now Chennai). It is an industrial city of the northwestern Tamil Nadu state and the headquarters of Coimbatore District. It was an important site along a trade route between the east coast and the west coast even in Roman times; numerous Roman coins have been found in the district. Several medieval kingdoms maintained a fortified stronghold there. Coimbatore was developed as an administrative and industrial center under the British administration, and during the twentieth century, it has had varied industries: hides, glass, photographic goods, coffee, sugar, cotton cloth, electrical goods, tea, fertilizer, and other agricultural products. Coimbatore is the site of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural University, Bharatiar University, and several others institutions of higher learning. It has an airport and a military airfield.

The extensive Coimbatore District (7,469 square kilometers) was under British rule from 1799 until Independence in 1947. Bordered on its northern edge by the Nilgiri and Periyar districts (and the Bavani

River, which forms the border of these two districts), the Coimbatore District has rich farmland that is irrigated in several areas. The Bavani Sagar dam is an important part of the irrigation system, but many farmers who are unable to get water from the dam system use wells instead.

Paul Hockings

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COLOMBO (2001 est. pop. 770,000). The commercial and business center of Sri Lanka, Colombo is a multifunctional and multicultural cosmopolitan city. Colombo city is merely the core of the Greater Colombo agglomeration that sprawls over 60 kilometers in a narrow band along the west coast of Sri Lanka near the Indian Ocean. Greater Colombo, with a total population of approximately 1.5 million, suffers from burgeoning social, traffic, and environmental problems resulting from high population and insufficient urban planning. As one of the major harbors in Asia, Colombo is the overseas port of call for Sri Lanka, and it lies at the crossroads of all domestic road and rail traffic. The international airport of Colombo (the only international airport in Sri Lanka) is located at Katunayake, at the northern edge of the Greater Colombo agglomeration, 38 kilometers from the city center, next to the biggest free-trade zone in Sri Lanka.

Greater Colombo has a decentralized structure, with light industry and working-class quarters at the peripheries, and the city center, called Fort (as a reminder of the old colonial fortification), accommodating the commercial district. The bustling traditional bazaar quarter (Pettah) and the fashionable residential quarter (Cinnamon Gardens) are adjacent to the center. Mount Lavinia (in the south) and Negombo (in the north), also part of greater Colombo, are home to many tourist resorts. Despite its great cultural and religious diversity, Colombo's many ethnic and religious groups enjoy peaceful coexistence. Colombo's religious diversity is evident from its many Buddhist and Hindu temples as well as its churches and mosques. Present-day Colombo proudly preserves the impressive colonial buildings of its colonial past, but it is also well stocked with modern hotels and futuristic shopping centers, suggesting that Colombo is forward-looking. Colombo is still regarded as the capital of Sri Lanka, although in 1982 Sri Jayawardenapura Kotte (located on the west-

ern outskirts of Colombo), which houses a modern parliament complex, officially became the nation's capital.

Manfred Domroes

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COLOMBO PLAN The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia was proposed at the Colombo, Sri Lanka, meeting of the foreign ministers of the British Commonwealth nations—Australia, Ceylon, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom—in January 1950. Later these nations were joined by Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam and still later by Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, and Indonesia.

The meeting was intended to discuss international affairs, but the ministers realized that unless there was economic stability in Asia, there would be revolutionary disturbances, most often of the community sort. They understood that progress depended on economic improvement. It was decided that to promote development in Southeast Asia, they would give financial and technical assistance to their Asian counterparts.

The Consultative Committee, representing British Commonwealth governments, met in Sydney at the behest of the Australian government. At the meeting, nations planning development were asked to submit a "reliable" scheme for the next six years to act as a draft on their own future economic progress.

Next came the scheme for technical assistance and expertise necessary to practicalize large development programs. Governments providing aid were to bear the cost of basic salaries of experts they made available, and governments receiving aid were to bear the local costs of the experts. To aid in the preparation of the details of the scheme, a council for technical cooperation was proposed to meet at Colombo to aid in the economic development of Southeast Asia by providing technical assistance. This also required experts to participate directly in the process of development in Asia.

But this did not mean that there was a general Colombo Plan fund, although at the Sydney meeting the British Commonwealth governments had promised to provide 8 million pounds for the ensuing three years.

Every offer of assistance would be subjected to bilateral negotiation between the nations concerned, and

the progress reports would be discussed at periodic meetings. This was stipulated as a necessary caveat.

Finally, in September and October 1950, there was a further meeting of ministers in London, during which several development schemes were cleared and the need for "financial support of outside agencies" was approved. The Colombo Plan was originally proposed to run for six years, but at the Singapore meeting in 1956, its tenure was extended to 1961.

Ranjit Roy

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COMFORT WOMEN From 1938 until its surrender at the end of World War II in 1945, Japan forced women from regions captured or otherwise occupied to serve as prostitutes for its military forces. The terms "comfort women" and "comfort stations" (the brothels set up by the Japanese military forces) are euphemisms for these women and the facilities set up for them. The Japanese word for comfort women, *ianfu*, is equivalent to the Korean *chongshindae* and the Tagalog *lola* (grandmother).

Japan's System of Military Prostitution

The establishment of a system of military prostitutes began with use of Japanese professional prostitutes who would be sent to overseas locations. These women were provided to Japanese military forces beginning in the 1920s, but often had high levels of venereal diseases. It was later decided to use foreign women, who, not being prostitutes to start out with, were relatively free of disease. An estimated 200,000 women from Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, China, Taiwan, and to a lesser degree Burma (now Myanmar), Malaya (now part of Malaysia), and Vietnam, as well as some British and Dutch women were used as comfort women. As the war drew to a close, many of these women were abandoned or killed, or claims were made by the Japanese that they had been nurses. Discussion of forced military prostitution was avoided during the American military occupation of Japan because of cultural sensitivities; women who had been forced into sexual slavery were unlikely to admit to the experience in the decades following the



Two elderly Korean women at a rally in Seoul, in May 2001. Both were forced to serve as comfort women to Japanese soldiers during World War II. They are protesting a new Japanese history textbook which Koreans feel downplays Japanese atrocities. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

war, due in part to the psychological pressures which had resulted from the experience.

The Positions of the Japanese Government

The involvement of the Japanese army was denied by the government of Japan until 1992, when documents implicating the imperial government were discovered by a Japanese historian. Since that time the Japanese government has held that the "comfort women issue" is not one to be resolved through official channels, since war reparations had been agreed upon with its wartime enemies years before.

To be more precise, the government of Japan has adopted a series of official positions that acknowledge varying degrees of complicity, while maintaining that it holds no blame for any wrongdoing that may have occurred. The positions range from absolute denial that comfort women ever existed to an acknowledgment that the current government should accept historical evidence and apologize to the few who are still alive.

The Japanese educational system has also been hesitant to include discussions of comfort women. In 1997, for the first time, middle school social studies texts included references to *ianfu* (without explaining what they were). This drew criticism from politicians who criticized what they characterized as the "masochistic" inclusion of such material. The Japanese Ministry of Education was required to review all proposed school texts before they could be used, and could require publishers to change or delete passages that did not comply with official policy.

Two sets of feelings were apparent by the mid-1990s: members of the wartime generation, who were by that time in their sixties or older, saw themselves as victims and felt little remorse for other, non-Japanese victims. Members of the postwar generation, for their part, have been educated to believe in personal accountability for actions, not collective accountability, and therefore feel no sense of responsibility for acts carried out by the army before they were even born.

The Controversy Surrounding the Asian Women's Fund

To deal with public pressure to acknowledge past wrongdoing while still avoiding a public apology, in 1995 the Asian Peace and Friendship Fund for Women (commonly known as the Asian Women's Fund, or AWF) was established. As first proposed, the AWF was to be a nongovernmental means to make amends to former comfort women. This, it was thought, would settle the issue of reparations without involving formal channels. Payments of approximately \$20,000 from the fund (which would be created from private and government contributions) would be accompanied by a letter of apology from the Japanese prime minister. This approach was widely criticized by former comfort women, and led to refusal to accept the payments. Former comfort women from South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, and the Netherlands asked Japanese legal and labor organizations to end support for the AWF, saying that the fund ignored the victims, who had declared they would not accept payments from it. Lila-Pilipina, a Philippines-based Filipina support group for former comfort women, announced its members would reject the offer from the AWF since it did not constitute a formal apology. The AWF's ability to make payments was complicated by an unwillingness on the part of those to be compensated to accept payments from an organization perceived as a smokescreen for the Japanese government.

The AWF attempted to defuse the issue by pledging to give 380 million yen over a ten-year period to the Indonesian government for distribution to private social institutions. This backfired when the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation criticized the government plan to accept the AWF payments without an official apology from the Japanese government. The South Korean government asked Japan to cease payments because the AWF was seen as an attempt to avoid an official admission of responsibility, and interfered with South Korea's own support programs, since payments to former comfort women are made in secret.

The Japanese stance has also been criticized by the United Nations. In 1998, the United Nations Sub-

commission on Human Rights denounced the AWF for its failure to provide legal compensation to former comfort women. In 1999, the special investigator for the United Nations Commission on Human Rights commented that the AWF would be viewed with suspicion as long as Japan attempted to avoid responsibility.

The comfort women issue will not likely be forgotten. South of Seoul, the Historical Museum of Japanese Military Sexual Slavery depicts the sufferings of those Korean girls who were taken from their homes to be used as *ianfu*.

Thomas P. Dolan

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COMMUNISM—CENTRAL ASIA The application of Communist ideology to the Central Asian environment was always a difficult undertaking. Throughout much of the Soviet Union's history, efforts were made to revise, adapt, or forcibly introduce Communist thought in the region, with mixed results. As was often the case, local leaders made use of the structure of the Soviet state and the rhetoric of Communism, but maintained their traditional views on power relations and society. Thus, when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, it was no surprise that Communism, as an ideological force, dissipated.

The Introduction of Communism to Central Asia

According to Marxist thought, the Socialist-cum-Communist revolution was to take place first in industrialized countries and only then proceed to the feudal (that is, less-developed) states. Imperial Russia was in the process of industrialization when Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1870–1924) sparked the Bolshevik Revolution. In that empire, the Central Asian region was largely agrarian or pastoral. The small communities of industrial workers that existed were overwhelmingly ethnic Slavs. Thus, one of the more significant problems for the Bolshevik leadership and theoreticians was how to introduce Communism to a region that had

recently been under either feudal or precapitalist forms of government and society. (The Bolsheviks sometimes called Czarist Russia "precapitalist," suggesting that the basic elements of capitalism were present in the industrial sector, but that other parts of the economy and the mentality of the population were still lagging behind.)

During the Bolshevik Revolution, the local population in Central Asia generally viewed the new ideology as a foreign import and stayed away from much of the political wrangling that took place in 1917 and 1918. However, the collapse of the Russian empire did prompt members of indigenous elites to call for independence and for new states in Central Asia, and during the Civil War, a myriad of conflicting organizations and groups vied for power.

Many in Central Asia viewed Communism not necessarily as an ideology, but as a political and military force that would ensure continued Russian domination of the region. Some opposition groups of native inhabitants became part of the Basmachi revolt, a movement of Central Asians of all ethnicities who sought to create an independent political entity in the region. The weakness of the Basmachi was the varying views of participants—from Jadidist ("New School") thinkers who wanted to emulate the Young Turk movement in Turkey (Ottoman military officers who sought to reform what they saw as a corrupt political system in the late 1800s and early 1900s) to Islamic fundamentalists who wanted to recreate a caliphate in the region and base the new society on precepts of Islamic law. The divergence of views ensured that the Basmachi would not be able to cooperate successfully, and by 1922, the Bolshevik Red Army controlled much of the region.

In contrast, the reformist elite in Central Asia, particularly those living in the principalities of Bukhara and Khiva, saw the Bolsheviks as potential allies in their efforts to modernize the region. By enlisting the support of the Red Army, it was argued, the reformists could overthrow the repressive and conservative regimes in the respective states (ruled by executive councils modeled somewhat after the Bolshevik leadership structure in Russia) and create new, progressive entities. However, instead of being able to create their own independent states, these leaders found themselves beholden to the Bolshevik victors. By 1924–1925, Central Asia was delimited along ethnic- or national-republic borders—in spite of the fact that Lenin had originally rejected the notion of national republics and had adhered to the classic Marxist belief that ethnic identities would disappear in the new state.

Communism and the Stalinist State

During the 1920s, Joseph Stalin (1879–1953), as the Commissar for Nationalities, developed the policy for minority groups in the Soviet Union. In theory, minorities were to be given rights in the areas of language and cultural policies, but the eventual goal—according to Marxist theory—was for these groups to merge into one Soviet people. Relics (*perezhitki*), such as religious practices and certain backward aspects of a society, were discouraged, with the thought that they would finally disappear.

This theory required some creative explanation of Marxist thought when it was applied to the Central Asian region. Even Lenin thought that this area would be difficult to incorporate, and he reluctantly tolerated the national Communism exhibited by Central Asians, who followed the example of the Tatar, Mir Said Sultangaliev (1880–1939?). In the 1910s and 1920s, this activist presented to the Muslim peoples of the Soviet Union a form of Communism that underscored how one could blend Communist ideology with nationalist sentiments. He suggested that national differences would continue for some time but that, at some point, different nationalities would start to band together to work for larger, transnational ideals, assisting in the spread of Communism to other countries. The notion of combining national liberation with Communism was expressed in such places as the University of the Toilers of the East, an institution located in Tashkent (in present-day Uzbekistan), which was devoted to educating anticolonial revolutionaries.

Communism became the dominant, and then sole, ideology of the region, as it was an integral part of the Soviet Union's ideology. Leadership changes that took place in the 1920s and 1930s focused on the removal of nationalist and feudal leaders in favor of a young, pro-Communist elite. However, even these fell victim to the Stalinist purges of the 1930s.

In particular, the Communist ideology required that the local elite focus on education, improved social conditions, and women's rights—all sectors in which progress was demonstrated in the Soviet period. The Communists decided on women's liberation as a vehicle through which the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism could take hold in the region of Central Asia. Families were largely patriarchal, and women were traditionally not afforded educational and career opportunities. In the 1920s, universities, gymnasiums, and primary schools were opened to women and girls in Central Asia.

One of the more dramatic liberation campaigns was the 1926 unveiling (*bujum*) campaign. Women, par-

ticularly wives, daughters, and sisters of Communist Party officials, were encouraged not to wear veils and even to remove and burn them in public ceremonies. Reactions to the campaign were mixed, with some fathers murdering daughters who disgraced themselves by unveiling.

Islam became another key target for Communism in Central Asia. By definition, the inherent atheism of Communist thought gave theoretical credence to any effort to curtail religious activity. The state policies on religion dictated in 1918 and 1928 clearly reduced the formal role of religion in Central Asia. Through the 1920s and 1930s, thousands of mosques and *madrasas* were closed, and religious leaders were persecuted. In the campaign against religion, Communism was an atheist ideology with its own principles, in opposition to all religions. Yet although official mosques and religious institutions were limited, Islam still survived during this period. What was often called parallel Islam began to emerge as a powerful force in Central Asia, particularly the Sufi orders that had existed in the region in centuries past. Studies today note that Muslims were able to adapt to the repressive environment, and Islamic customs were practiced during the entire Soviet period, albeit often in secret.

In 1942, while the outcome of the Great Patriotic War (World War II) was uncertain, the Soviet leadership decided to enlist the support of religious leaders throughout the Soviet Union to boost morale and offer yet other legitimizing reasons for supporting the war effort. In the following year, 1943, the Spiritual Directorate system was introduced, creating a structure through which Islam could be practiced and controlled. Mullahs and other religious figures were limited in their activity, but as long as they were state sanctioned, they could legally carry out their responsibilities.

Postwar Communism in Central Asia

From 1945 to 1991, the force and importance of Communist ideology went through several cycles. As an ideology, it was laying the groundwork for the eventual movement to a pure socialist and then Communist state. As the Central Asian region was considered backward, massive industrialization campaigns took place there in the 1950s and 1960s. In particular, major cities such as Tashkent and Alma-Ata (now Almaty), as well as the belt of cities in northern Kazakhstan, experienced significant developments.

Leadership policies saw a softening during this period. While the Stalinist years were typified by regional leaders who were devout Communists first and then national figures, during the post-Stalinist years

leaders thrived who paid proper fealty and loyalty to Moscow while maintaining more traditional forms of power in their respective republics. For example, Dinmukhamed Kunaev (1911–1991) of Kazakhstan and Sharaf Rashidov (1917–1983) of Uzbekistan were first secretaries of their respective republics for almost twenty-five years each. They, as well as their contemporaries in the other Central Asian republics, maintained intricate networks of authority in their republics that resembled the pre-Soviet period rather than the organizations that the regime in Moscow would have preferred. Both Kunaev and Rashidov rose to the ranks of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), although neither was viewed as a top decision maker in that elite body, which was dominated by ethnic Slavs.

Communist thought with respect to national merging was also softened. Indeed, under the administration of Leonid Brezhnev (1906–1982), the official ideology favored the flowering (*rasvet*) of nationalities. It was declared that in the future Soviet state, national and cultural distinctions would remain and would actually compliment each other. For the Central Asians, this cultural relativism meant that they were now encouraged to demonstrate and hone their "national music," "national costume," and "national traditions." Not surprisingly, the Russian culture remained supreme in the country vis-à-vis the Central Asian cultures.

It was still difficult to discuss fully the early nationalists, and, in classic Communist verbiage, most histories of Central Asia continued to focus on the overall forces of social development in the region, led by Russians. In the 1970s and early 1980s, several Central Asian authors, including Chingiz Aitmatov (b. 1928) and Mamadali Makhmudov (b.1943), wrote on nationalist themes, but couched them sufficiently in the language of Socialist Realism (realistic style and content prescribed for Soviet arts) to have them published. These efforts, and the push to increase the study of local languages in schools, were the early forms of national awakening in Central Asia.

However, it should be noted that most Central Asians seemed to like the social and economic benefits derived from being part of the Soviet Union. The Communist social contract, in which the state maintained authority and the population received extensive social-welfare benefits as justified in Communist thought, was maintained throughout much of the later Soviet period. Indeed, Central Asia was often presented as a success story to the developing world, especially to those states in Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and Latin America that were allies to or sympathetic of the Soviet Union.

Communism and the Gorbachev Reforms in Central Asia

During the years of Mikhail Gorbachev (b. 1931), as the Communist Party attempted to reevaluate itself and become more efficient, interest in Communism as an ideology and as a form of political power waned in Central Asia. According to the Gorbachev leadership, Communism, as a belief system, could exist in the Soviet Union, with its diverse societies and cultures. However, it was essential that the old guard, who were continuing to take advantage of the spoils system of Communist Party leadership, be removed. The general populations took such sackings of old party bosses as signs of national crackdowns and actually protested the removal of co-ethnic figures, even if they were corrupt. Gorbachev ousted Kunaev because he felt that this long-time office-holder in Kazakhstan was simply too corrupt and extremely nepotistic. However, when Kunaev was replaced by an ethnic Russian, Gennadi Kolbin, riots erupted in the Kazakh capital of Alma-Ata. This ouster was considered an affront by Central Asians, who saw Gorbachev as more of a Russian chauvinist than a modernizer.

The Central Asian people had a similar reaction to Gorbachev's condemnation of Rashidov regime and the infamous Uzbek cotton scandal. Although the investigation of financial improprieties in Uzbekistan took place during the years of Yuri Andropov (1914–1984), the case became a national issue in the late 1980s. In the so-called scandal, over three hundred top Uzbek officials were arrested and imprisoned for long-term falsification of cotton-harvest records and the resulting overpayment by Moscow of countless millions of rubles to local economic units. The Uzbek Communist Party was decimated as key personnel were implicated in the crime. The culprits were often described in Communist terms as closet capitalists and even feudal warlords, and stories of regional bosses amassing great fortunes appeared in the Soviet press. From the Central Asian perspective, these were not criminal investigations at all, but rather assaults on local cultures and leaders.

At this time, Communism as such was equated with Russia or Russians. In the Central Asian states, the non-Russian peoples began to assert themselves in the areas of political and cultural rights. In Uzbekistan, demonstrations with over twenty thousand participants took place in the late 1980s over the issues of language rights and primacy of the Uzbek language in the republic. Such sentiments were expressed in the other Central Asian states as well, although not at the level of protest seen in the Baltic republics and Ukraine.

Past leaders who had been declared nationalists were reexamined, and a number of victims of the Great Purge (the Stalinist campaign of 1934–1939 to eliminate opponents within the Communist Party apparatus and the Soviet military) were rehabilitated. Communist excesses were highlighted, much to the discredit of the official ideology that was being challenged throughout the Soviet Union. Thus, by the time of the Soviet collapse, the Central Asian view of Communist ideology was already low. However, this discrediting of Communism was not equated with a drive for independence, as the Central Asian peoples still saw the benefits of staying within the union.

The Collapse of Communism in Central Asia

In 1990, requests to join the Communist Party were decreasing as people no longer seemed to believe in the ideology. The politically savvy first secretaries in each of the Central Asian republics followed the examples of their counterparts in other republics of the Soviet Union and focused on their political offices, often being elected president of the respective republics. In a sense, their legitimacy was now derived from constitutional or institutional sources and not from being part of the Communist system.

In the last year of Gorbachev's tenure as General Secretary of the CPSU, the Politburo was reconstructed to include the first secretary of each of the republics of the Soviet Union. In theory, the goal was to diversify the leadership and elevate the position of the marginal republics. The Central Asian leaders appear to have been supportive of this and, in contrast to the other republics, maintained fairly strong support for remaining in the USSR. The Communist system's centrally planned economy, in general, benefited the Central Asian states in that they received more state subsidies than they paid to the central planners, in contrast to, say, the Baltic states, which paid more than they received. While the region was weaker relative to the European republics, conditions in Central Asia had improved considerably over time. Compared to the situation prior to the Russian/Soviet period, levels of education, health care, women's rights, industry, and transportation all improved. There were also costs—loss of sovereignty and many casualties during the collectivization campaign and the Great Purge. But die-hard supporters of the regime equated Communism with social and economic success, contrasting conditions in the Central Asian states with the conditions in war-torn Afghanistan to the south.

The collapse of the Soviet Union was soon followed by the gutting of Communism as a force in Central Asia. Quickly, the ideological veneer of Communism

and the hierarchy of the Communist Party structure were replaced by new forms of regionally based nationalism and political authority founded in the presidential apparatuses of the respective countries. Within months, the Communist Parties of each of the Central Asian republics were renamed, and the notion of having a Communist Party was challenged. Tajikistan was an exception in that its Communist Party did not change its name until three years after independence.

Attitudes toward Communism in Central Asia in the Twenty-First Century

All five Central Asian states are in the process of rewriting their histories, attempting to purge them of Communist ideology and Soviet political correctness. Unfortunately, these past portrayals are being replaced by similarly dogmatic nationalist concepts, often using the same techniques of their Communist predecessors. Communism as an ideology never quite took hold in Central Asia but remained a force in opposition to strong local values and belief systems. That Central Asian leaders were able to work within the Communist system and perpetuated their own power relationships underscores this failure.

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COMMUNISM—CHINA The decay and fall of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) produced a China racked by sociopolitical instability and unable to prevent foreign military attacks and political interference, including the imposition of concessions over which foreign powers had control and under which foreigners were not subject to Chinese law (extraterritoriality). These problems caused many Chinese to search widely for explanations; traditional thought systems

such as Confucianism offered inadequate answers. The New Culture Movement of 1915 spurred students to investigate competing foreign ideas, including the ideologies of socialism and anarchism, but anarchist and socialist initiatives failed.

Early Days

In early 1920, the Communist International (Comintern) sent the young revolutionary organizer, Gregori Voitinsky (1893–1953), to China to establish a Chinese Communist party. Before he arrived, the Soviet Union issued the Karakhan Declaration renouncing imperial Russia's claims on China. This declaration set the Soviet Union apart from the West, which continued its exploitation, passing Germany's concessions in China to Japan in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, despite China's having been an ally in World War I. As a consequence, many Chinese lost faith in Western ideals, and Voitinsky found a warm welcome.

Voitinsky helped Chinese intellectuals such as Li Dazhao (1889–1927) and Chen Duxiu (1880–1942) form Marxist study groups in Beijing, Shanghai, Changsha, Guangzhou (Canton), and Jinan. In mid-1921, delegates representing about sixty members became the core of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), committed to ending exploitation based on private ownership. Yet the CCP was tiny, while the Guomindang (GMD), or Nationalists, led by Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) was a growing revolutionary anti-imperialist party with an army. To promote revolution, the Comintern pressed the CCP into an alliance with the Nationalists. The aim was for the CCP to help the GMD develop while simultaneously extending Communist influence to eventually make the Nationalist Party a Communist one.

The first period of GMD-CCP cooperation (The First United Front) ended in April 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), the commander of the GMD forces, turned on the Communists. Communist membership fell from 58,000 to 4,000 active members, now experienced in organization, activism, and military and political affairs. While its urban influence evaporated, the CCP survived in the countryside, where, under Comintern direction, it instigated a series of failed uprisings, established worker-peasant-soldier soviets (councils), and implemented radical agrarian revolution, violently confiscating and redistributing land to the poor.

In October 1934, encirclement and attacks by GMD and local elite forces forced the CCP to flee the Chinese Soviet Republic it had established in Jiangxi, southeastern China, in November 1927. During this

retreat, known as the Long March, Mao Zedong (1893–1976) rose to prominence. The threat of war with Japan allowed the Communists to portray themselves as patriots heroically advancing to fight Japan despite GMD resistance.

From the Second United Front to Civil War

In 1937, popular opinion and pressure from the Soviet Union forced the GMD and CCP into their second period of cooperation, this time against Japan. This alliance formed half of the CCP's Second United Front. The other half consisted of winning as many allies as possible among intellectuals, warlords, landlords, and others by making concessions in Communist ideology and practice. Mao justified these concessions by invoking the idea of "New Democracy," a period of transition from the allegedly old "semi-feudal, semi-colonial" society to a socialist one. This transition would entail the long-term coexistence of different classes and forms of property ownership until the forces for the final transition to a classless socialism were strong enough. During this time, all classes allied to the CCP would be represented in the political system. This policy was reflected in moderate policies including rent and interest-rate reductions rather than radical land confiscation and redistribution.

Inside its rural bases, the CCP experimented with policies determined by local class structures and attitudes, GMD responses, rural conditions, attitudes of local elites, and international conditions. There was no overarching revolutionary theme of nationalism or land revolution that would guarantee success for any one policy throughout China, although the CCP made much of its patriotism and worked extremely hard to win support from the poor and landless in particular.

After the end of World War II in 1945, the CCP delayed civil war as long possible, building military and political strength. Meanwhile, the GMD, racked by infighting and corruption, rapidly deteriorated. The GMD lacked a strong political and social base, while the economy suffered hyperinflation, further undermining the GMD's legitimacy. Reviving the anti-CCP civil war cost the Guomindang more support, and its political weakness became increasingly obvious. The GMD was eventually defeated by CCP armies of rural soldiers won over by the promise of land, GMD deserters, disaffected students, and others who were promised a New China. The GMD fled to Taiwan.

The People's Republic of China

On 1 October 1949, Mao declared the founding of the People's Republic of China. The CCP quickly



CHAIRMAN MAO ON COMMUNISM

A well disciplined Party armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism, using the method of self-criticism and linked with the masses of the people; an army under the leadership of such a people; a united front of all revolutionary classes and all revolutionary groups under the leadership of such a Party—these are the three main weapons with which we have defeated the enemy.

Source: Mao Zedong (1976). Quotations from Chairman Mao Tsetung. Beijing, China: Foreign Language Press, 3.

moved to eliminate potential enemies, institute thought reform, confiscate many businesses, and implement land reform. The CCP subjected private businesses to repeated campaigns aimed at delegitimizing them and forcing them into state or cooperative ownership. Soviet-model rapid industrialization using central planning to develop state-owned enterprises was implemented according to five-year plans. Despite the Korean War (1950–1953), in which China was involved, the economy grew quickly. In 1956, Mao declared the transition to socialism complete and ended New Democracy.

Maoism

Despite the apparent success, Mao also saw increasing bureaucratism, dogmatism, and sectarianism in the CCP. Mao's methods for rectifying these problems included allowing intellectuals to criticize government. Mao's 1957 speech, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions," implied there was no more need for class struggle and reassured many that it was safe to speak up. However, Mao was shocked when his Hundred Flowers Movement, intended to encourage constructive criticism of CCP shortcomings, including criticism from the CCP's united front allies, also elicited severe criticisms of both the party and himself. In response he launched the Anti-Rightist Campaign. This campaign reemphasized class struggle and encouraged anti-intellectualism. Mao promoted the use of big character posters, public meetings, and debates to force criticism and self-criticism, so-called big democracy. These methods often involved public humiliation and even torture of critics. Accusations of rightism could refer to denying the centrality of class

struggle, advocating markets in economics, or opposing central planning or party control over politics and culture. Hundreds of thousands were labeled, exiled, imprisoned, demoted, and sidelined. These features of Maoism also marked the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976).

The Great Leap Forward was an experiment by Mao to overcome the problems of central planning and to speed up industrialization. These goals were to be achieved by emphasizing mass mobilization, native ingenuity, and correct ideological viewpoint. Moral incentives rather than financial rewards were stressed, and distinctions between politics and technical knowledge were to be eliminated to make individuals both "red and expert." Relying on surpluses from agriculture to fund industrialization, the Great Leap accelerated the socialization and industrialization of agriculture by creating communes of up to five thousand households, where private plots, markets, and sideline businesses such as selling homemade pickled vegetables were eliminated. Decentralization and self-sufficiency were also key goals. The most famous Great Leap initiative was the building of backyard furnaces to raise steel output, but instead created large amounts of unusable pig iron at enormous cost in labor, raw materials, and wasted resources. The CCP mobilized the masses to build rural infrastructure such as dams and irrigation projects. Unfortunately, poor planning, excessive state extraction of grain taxes, shortcomings in communes, and other problems, together with bad weather, resulted in an estimated 20 million deaths from starvation in rural areas.

After 1959, stung by the failure of the Great Leap, Mao retreated from leadership. Pragmatic leaders, including Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969) and Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), then instituted moderate policies, allowed private plots and sidelines, and rehabilitated some alleged rightists. Mao saw this moderation as revisionism and betrayal of revolutionary ideals. He began building support in China's army (the People's Liberation Army) and in September 1962 asked everyone never to forget the class struggle. In 1964, Mao began to reimpose his will and ultimately created the Cultural Revolution.

Through the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, as it was officially named, Mao encouraged the army and students in particular to criticize those like Liu and Deng whom he saw as taking the capitalist road. Mao told students that rebellion is justified and that they should fight selfishness and criticize revisionism. CCP leaders and intellectuals such as teachers became targets of student Red Guards, who had prepared themselves by memorizing *Mao zhuxi yulu*

(*Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong*), nicknamed the Little Red Book. Many people, including Liu Shaoqi, were tortured and died as a result. In line with Mao's calls, students also worked to destroy old ideology, culture, customs, and habits (the "four olds"). However, Mao's egalitarianism also spurred the development of basic health care and education and attacked traditional elitism.

China and the CCP since Mao

The CCP now describes the Cultural Revolution as ten years of chaos and waste. After Mao's death in September 1976, there was an interregnum under Chairman Hua Guofeng (b. 1921), during which the so-called Gang of Four (including Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, 1914–1991) and others were arrested and blamed for the Cultural Revolution. In 1978, Zhao Ziyang (b. 1919) replaced Hua as China's premier, but it was Deng Xiaoping who came to wield the most power. The new leaders began rebuilding support among non-"Red" classes, especially intellectuals, former business people, and those with overseas connections. The goals were the four modernizations (agriculture, industry, science and technology, defense) and a dramatic increase in economic growth. Farmers benefited first when the communes were replaced with the Household Responsibility System, under which individual families again had responsibility for many decisions in the management of agriculture and rewards related directly to their success in production. The state increased produce prices and allowed the revival of private markets.

In 1980, Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were established in China's south, where foreigners, overseas Chinese especially, could invest in manufacturing for export. After the SEZs proved successful, efforts to attract foreign investors spread widely. The state also began gradually relaxing controls on private business. Rural industries built by communes for self-reliance assisted rapid rural industrialization, because their products could be sold at the revived rural markets or exported. Township and village enterprises (both village and privately owned) are now a major feature of the Chinese economy. State-owned enterprises have dramatically declined in importance and efficiency, and most are now heavily indebted and a drag on the economy. The CCP's reform and opening-up policy marked a shift from autarky. The intent was not to abandon Communist ideals but to create a socialism with Chinese characteristics, which proved itself by building national strength and raising living standards.

The changes created by reform have created major dilemmas for the CCP and its ideology. China is now

a major economic power, but only after abandoning most tenets of its original ideology and retreating from full socialization of ownership to mixed ownership and markets. In 1987, Zhao Ziyang justified the CCP's return to a New Democracy-type economy by declaring that China was in the initial stage of socialism and that full socialism could be achieved only when all the productive forces were fully developed and modernized. This formulation was reinforced by the 1992 promulgation of the concept of the socialist market economy, under which the declining state-owned sector coexists with cooperatives and foreign-owned and joint-venture businesses as well as, increasingly, Chinese privately owned enterprises.

In 1980, Deng Xiaoping had mooted major political reforms after blaming feudal and undemocratic traditions for the overconcentration of power in one person, which resulted in excesses like the Cultural Revolution. Deng advocated a separation of the roles and powers of the CCP and government and called for more people's democracy and debate in the party itself. A party theorist, Liao Gailong (b. 1919), promoted reforms, including direct elections at all levels and a two-house national parliament—one for regions and one representing economic interests—but with the CCP maintaining overall power. Deng's ideas and Liao's corporatist proposal were forgotten after the rise of Poland's Solidarity trade-union movement highlighted the threat of relaxing controls over mass movements by demonstrating how such movements could easily become dangerously politicized and threaten CCP rule.

A similar fate befell Zhao Ziyang's modest late-1980s proposals to build socialist democracy, a broadening of representation and participation in the political system by new groups and experts in particular areas, by developing the national and lower-level People's Congresses and by expanding united-front work and its public face, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. While the congresses are elected and have nominal power to make decisions, conference representatives are appointed. They can only review laws and policies and can only make recommendations to the government, the CCP, and public organizations. The student movement of April–June 1989, during which student demands for better living conditions, jobs, and less corruption, escalated to calls for an undefined democracy; the army violently suppressed the protests on 4 June 1989. Zhao was sacked for his sympathy for the students' demands, and his reforms were dropped.

The current leader, President Jiang Zemin (b. 1926), endorses Deng Xiaoping's four cardinal principles:

upholding the socialist path, proletarian dictatorship, leadership of the CCP, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought. While maintaining CCP dominance, these principles leave little room for democratization. The party repeatedly campaigns against bourgeois liberalization (any calls for Western-style political reforms) and spiritual pollution while promoting construction of an ill-defined socialist spiritual civilization and nationalism as counterweights.

The Future

Since 1987, there have been incremental improvements in village elections, and in 2000 there were indications that this experiment would be extended to towns. There have also been steady improvements in China's legal system, but toward establishing rule-by-law rather than a rule-of-law that would better guarantee the rights of Chinese citizens as written in the Chinese constitution. This development and China's accession to the World Trade Organization will promote rule-based decision making over arbitrary fiat.

Among possible indications of the direction of future change are experiments in Hainan Island and Shenzhen to develop a "small state, big society" in which groups themselves, rather than the state, police their own members. In February 2000, President Jiang Zemin began promoting the CCP as being the representative of advanced forces of production, of the fundamental interests of the broad masses, and of advanced culture. These three forces could all be used to advance radical change, including fundamentally altering the political system and the CCP itself. Only the future will tell whether the CCP can attempt such change and succeed.

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COMMUNISM—NORTH KOREA The core of the original North Korean communists consisted primarily of Koreans who lived out the Japanese occupation in either the Soviet Far East or in various parts of China. Upon Japan's defeat they returned to Korea and organized into the Korean Workers' Party (KWP); factions grew among KWP members based on their colonial-era locations as refugees. The party served as the nucleus of the communist state since its inception in 1948. Following the Korean War, in 1955 Kim Il Sung (1912–1994) unified the factions through successfully purging his opposition. Throughout the remainder of his life he strengthened his power base through building a near-religious cult, his name appearing on everything from flowers to universities. His "on-the-spot guidance" and that of his son Kim Jong Il (b. 1942), it was reported, helped strengthen North Korea's industrial, educational, and military sectors. He initiated mobilization campaigns, similar to China's Great Leap Forward, to stimulate labor toward increased production. Kim Jong Il officially inherited the elder Kim's titles in 1994 following Kim Il Sung's death; the son (and the North Korean people) had been preparing for this transition from the 1980s.

Bruce Cumings describes this form of communism as "socialist corporatism," a political system built around a social family (Cumings 1998, 398). The glue holding this corporate family together is the ideology of *chuch'e* (or *juch'e*), a term that has most often been translated as "self-reliance" but behaves closer to the idea of "self-determination." This thinking was obvious in the 1960s with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK's) success in playing off the two communist giants, the USSR and China. It is seen in the dynamics of the DPRK in its negotiations with the United States. The KWP remains to this day the central organizing body of North Korean communism.

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COMMUNISM—VIETNAM Communism in Vietnam developed in the context of Vietnam's anti-colonial struggle against France, the growing Sino-Soviet ideological and military conflict, and Vietnam's localization of foreign influences.



The political memorial billboard at Reunification Palace in Ho Chi Minh City in 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

Communism was adopted in Vietnam as an anti-colonial solution. Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969), founder of the Vietnamese Communist Party and father of Vietnam’s independence, noted that it was patriotism rather than communism that led him the ideas of Lenin. This approach remained valid into the 1950s during Vietnam’s war with France and into the 1960s and 1970s during Vietnam’s war with the United States. Although Leninism was often cited in Vietnamese Communist writings, the Communist system that developed in Vietnam was mainly shaped by Stalinism and Maoism. The Vietnamese Communist movement adhered to the Moscow line in the 1930s, adopted the Maoist model of guerrilla warfare in the late 1930s, and executed Stalin’s suggestion of, and the Maoist model of, land reform in the 1950s. The government in Hanoi vacillated between Moscow and Beijing in the 1960s, culminating in an internal conflict that is called the “revisionist” incident. Hanoi clashed with Beijing between 1979 and 1991 over Cambodia and moved closer to the Soviet bloc.

Tensions in Vietnamese Communism

Throughout the history of the Communist period, however, there was not only conflict between the Stalinist and Maoist models of socialist development but also between Communism as a foreign ideology and Vietnamese political tradition, three salient elements of which were patriotism, Confucianism, and village

culture. This conflict with Vietnamese political tradition can be seen in several examples: (1) Ho Chi Minh’s conflict with the Moscow-led Comintern in 1930, when he named the Communist party he founded the Vietnamese Communist Party instead of the Indochinese Communist Party (though the name was later changed); (2) his drafting a political thesis that did not advocate the Moscow line of class struggle; (3) the founding of a united front organization known as the Vietnam Independence League, or Viet Minh, that incorporated every sector of society; (4) the dissolution of the Indochinese Communist Party in 1945 after the revolution; (5) the public apology for the mishandling of land reform in the mid-1950s; and (6) the absence of the use of brutal force as a means to develop socialism or to deal with political opponents.

Confucianism and Communism

Ho Chi Minh relied on Confucian concepts and terms in introducing, recasting, and propagating Communist ideological concepts, making the latter more compatible with Vietnam’s Confucian-based tradition. Presented in Confucian terms, Ho’s revolutionary ethics consisted of the five principles of *nhân* (humanity), *ngĩa* (duty), *tri* (knowledge), *dũng* (courage), and *liêm* (integrity). Selected elements of village culture were incorporated into the new socialist discourse. One aspect of village culture selected was the image of the peasant family as a stable social unit

engaged in agricultural activities. Internal family relations were marked by equality, reciprocity, and mutual sacrifice, and family work was characterized by equal distribution of responsibilities. These aspects of family relations were extended to govern relationships among friends and in society at large.

The Development of Vietnamese Communism

The Vietnamese Communist movement was founded in 1930 by Ho, then known as Nguyen Ai Quoc. Since then, the movement has assumed several names: the Vietnamese Communist Party (February–October 1930), the Indochinese Communist Party (1930–1945), the Vietnam Worker Party (1951–1976), and the Communist Party of Vietnam (1976–present). The revolution that broke out in August 1945 can be considered a war for independence. It was not until the years 1949–1950 that the war became a socialist revolution. This development unfolded in the context of intensified military conflict with France in the 1940s and 1950s, the crystallization of the Cold War in the 1940s and 1950s, and the victory of the Communists in China's civil war in 1949. Politically, signs of a socialist revolution were seen through the revival of the Indochinese Communist Party under the name Vietnam Worker Party in 1951 and a rise of absolute party control over the state apparatus. Economically, socialist development can be seen in the land reform of 1954–1956, in the collectivization of agriculture and nationalization of domestic industries beginning in the late 1950s, and in the imposition of central planning in the 1960s. In the intellectual realm, Maoist practices of ideological rectification were imported into Vietnam in 1949–1950, and the period between 1953 and 1956 was one in which peasant-based political and economic ethics penetrated the content of every type of writing. This intellectual trend led to conflicts between the party-state and intellectuals known as the Nhan Van Giai Pham Affairs in the mid-1950s.

Communism in South Vietnam

Until 1975, Communism developed only in Vietnam north of the seventeenth parallel, in the area known as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or North Vietnam. Communism was imposed on the South only after reunification in 1975. The Hanoi regime moved to collectivize agriculture, nationalize industries, and control wholesale and retail trade. In the south, agricultural collectivization did not succeed because by the mid-1970s the distribution of land ownership had already become fairly egalitarian; the Hanoi government's agricultural collectivization turned out to be an attack on the interests of the mid-

dle-income and rich peasants who had benefited from the land distribution policy of the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam in the 1960s. The government's move to nationalize industries and control retail and wholesale trade disrupted production and supply in the south. Severe economic crises resulted and led to the practice of "fence breaking," whereby production units spontaneously violated rules and regulations. The party-state responded by endorsing policies to reform the socialist system.

The reform process can be divided into two phases. The first phase lasted from 1979 to 1985, when reforms were carried out within the framework of central planning. Measures adopted included the endorsement of the concept of a multisectoral economy in 1979 and subsequent reform policies in the areas of foreign trade, agriculture, industry, and the pricing system in the early 1980s. The second phase lasted from 1986 to 1989. In 1986, the Sixth Party Congress endorsed a policy of reform known as *doi moi* (renewal), calling for abolition of the central planning system. Major policies put forth during this period included the promulgation of a law dealing with foreign investment in 1987, the call for withdrawal of troops from Cambodia in 1987, the decollectivization of agriculture in 1988, and abolition of the two-price system in 1989.

Vietnamese Communism's contribution to the process of national liberation and its localized nature helped legitimize the authority of the Vietnamese Communist Party in the face of the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the challenge to Communism in China between 1989 and 1991.

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COMMUNIST PARTY OF BURMA Despite failing to gain power, the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) was a major influence on political life in Myanmar (Burma) during the twentieth century. Marxist ideology played an important role in the national liberation struggle, leading to the formation of the CPB by a cell meeting of underground leaders in 1939. The most famous of these, Aung San (1915–1947), subsequently left the party over political differences, but CPB membership grew rapidly during resistance to the Japanese occupation (1941–1945). At one stage, the CPB was reputedly the strongest organization within the coalition Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) that later led the country to independence.

Ideological differences, however, caused the CPB to walk out from the AFPFL in 1946, and, in March 1948, the party began armed insurrection. Inspired by communist victories elsewhere in Asia, CPB militia seized control of vast central areas of the country with the aid of several senior commanders in the Burmese army who deserted with their troops. In the Chin-Arakan borderlands, a smaller "Red Flag" faction, headed by Thakin Soe (1905–1989), gradually dwindled in strength, but the mainstream "White Flag" party, led by Thakin Than Tun (1911–1968), remained a considerable thorn in the government side for many years in central and southern regions of the country. Staging frequent guerrilla raids, it also enjoyed the support of both trade union and student activists in the towns.

In the mid-1960s, an internecine "Cultural Revolution" saw the party take a dogmatic turn towards Maoism, which was modeled on developments in China. This precipitated the deaths of Than Tun and other key leaders in a series of violent incidents. However, following anti-Chinese riots in Yangon (Rangoon), the CPB was able to open a major new front along the Chinese border in 1968 with full-scale military backing from the People's Republic of China. In the following decade, the CPB's Northeast Command built up significant "liberated zones" in the Shan and Kachin States, with its own radio station and 15,000-strong People's Army. The scale of this new front compensated, in part, for the loss of the party's remaining base areas in the Pegu Yoma highlands during the mid-1970s.

The CPB's Northeast Command, however, was never able to break out from its strongholds along the China border. Here the CPB, which was mostly led by ethnic Burmans, clashed as often with ethnic insurgent forces as with government troops. Eventually, it was ethnic dissatisfaction that led to mass mutinies from the CPB's People's Army and the party's virtual

collapse in 1989. Thakin Ba Thein Tin (b. 1914) and the party's veteran leaders retired into China, and during the 1990s only a few loyal cadres were occasionally reported to be still active inside Myanmar.

Martin Smith

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CON DAO ISLANDS The Con Dao Islands consist of fourteen islands located southeast of Vinh Loi off the coast of southern Vietnam. Until the eighteenth century, there were no permanent settlements or inhabitants on the islands. In 1702, Britain's East India Company established a base on Con Son (Poulo Condore), the largest island on the archipelago. The British ultimately left following a rebellion, and France took possession of the islands in 1861. On Poulo Condore, the French found a prison with 119 inmates of Vietnam's Hue government. The French continued to use the island as a prison, which they expanded on over the course of their rule in Vietnam.

A great number of Vietnamese patriots and revolutionaries, such as Phan Chu Trinh, Luong Van Can, and Le Duan, served time on Poulo Condore, earning the prison the reputation of being a "revolutionary training ground." By 1934, there were at least 2,700 Vietnamese prisoners on the island.

Following France's defeat in 1954, Poulo Condore continued to be used as a prison by the government of the Republic of Vietnam. In 1993, Poulo Condore became a national park and the archipelago now boasts a population of about 1,500 residents. There are plans to further develop the area for tourism.

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CONFUCIAN ETHICS Confucian ethics is best understood as a contextualistic virtue ethics based on self-cultivation. There are three general categories that are used to classify moral systems: absolutism, relativism, and contextualism. Ethical contextualism means that there are no absolute moral rules and that cultural customs or feelings cannot be blindly followed; alleged absolute codes or customs and feelings can serve only as guidelines. Each person must decide what is the best that she or he can do in that particular context to complete in action a higher value such as authenticity, love, or virtue. The philosophies of Aristotle, Confucius, and the existentialists and modern situation ethics are examples of ethical contextualism. Confucian ethics can be summarized as the art of contextualizing the practice of virtue.

Confucian ethics bears some similarity to Aristotelian ethics. Both are virtue-based systems (virtue ethics refers to the moral quality of one's character or personality as opposed to merely obeying moral rules), which acknowledge that there are no fixed and binding rules to govern the moral life. Rather a person must be well trained and habituated to weighing the relative value of actions in specific situations in regard to particular persons.

Confucians and Aristotelians soon part company, however. Aristotle held what has been called the doctrine of the golden mean, namely, that most of the virtues are at the midpoint between the extremes of deficiency and excess. Regrettably, *Zhongyong* ("centrality and commonality") was misleadingly translated as the Doctrine of the Mean, allowing for superficial comparisons. The Confucian concept of "centrality" refers to the condition before feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are expressed; clearly it is not the mean between extremes.

Confucius and Before

Confucian ethics began long before the time of Confucius (551–479 BCE). It was rooted in the clan values of the early Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE) aristocracy. Confucius was both a traditional and an innovative thinker; he breathed new life into the traditional aristocratic clan ethics of the Zhou. Confucius's innovation was that he sought to transform aristocratic values and practices into everyday practices and values for com-

mon people. Thus, he reinterpreted the label for "prince" (*junzi*, "the son of the ruler") to mean any person who achieves the status of being a noble and moral example for others, that is, a "prince of virtue."

Although Confucius had his gender biases, the content and practice of his moral teachings are similar to those of the feminists who advocate a contextual care ethic. Speaking very generally, Confucius, like the feminists of care, was concerned about interpersonal relationships founded on love and affection; his known writings contain nothing of an ethics based on impersonal duty. In the writings of both Confucius and certain feminists, moral values are learned at home by participating in a morally healthy parent-child relationship. The writings of Confucius emphasized the father-son relationship rather than the feminist mother-child relationship, but both advance the importance of proper child rearing for the cultivation of a moral personality that learns to contextualize values and actions in particular situations in relation with unique persons.

All Confucians agree that moral education begins at home. Only after a child learns filial respect for parents and brotherly love for siblings can he or she be expected to extend respect and love beyond the family. Methodologically, filial piety (*xiao*) is primary; ontologically, person-to-person care (*ren*, usually rendered as "benevolence" or "humanity") is the significant trait of being human. To be a caring person is to be a moral example or moral authority for others to follow. After proper rearing, a person needs instruction from a Confucian teacher to develop his or her practice of caring. This instruction focuses primarily on literary achievement (*wen*); memorizing the Four Books (four ancient and venerated Confucian texts), large sections of the Five Classics (also important Confucian texts), and other important Confucian works; and learning Confucian rituals and music so as to habituate the student in the practice of being virtuous.

The Confucian virtues are best understood in terms of actual human behavior, rather than intellectual beliefs. Confucians, both past and present-day, are concerned with the practice of taking care of others, not the abstract idea of care. The five constant virtues are person-to-person care (*ren*), ritual action (*li*), rightness (*yi*), trustworthiness (*xin*), and moral wisdom (*zhi*). Person-to-person care is defined as "love" in the *Analects*. Confucians do not advocate random acts of love; all of the virtues must be practiced according to the requirements of ritual action. Confucian society is one of ritual order, not legal order.

The art of contextualizing the virtues in practice is clearly expressed in being a person of rightness (*yi*).

Although the examples of the ancient sages serve as a guide, there are no absolute standards of rightness. Rightness entails doing the right thing to the right people at the right time in the most appropriate manner. Confucius invested a lot in trustworthiness (*xin*); exemplars of the moral must stand by their words. They must practice before they teach others, and they must teach only what they themselves have practiced.

Even moral wisdom (*zhi*) should be understood in terms of practice, or doing the right thing, rather than merely knowing what should be done. It is bolstered by the virtues of literary accomplishment (*wen*) and studiousness (*xue*). Any virtue may have to be practiced with bravery (*yong*). The virtues of reverence (*jing*) and sincerity (*cheng*), only briefly mentioned by Confucius, were developed by later Confucians and were understood to be part of the structure of the universe.

Mencius and Later Philosophers

Where the writings attributed to Confucius were primarily concerned with the practice of moral behavior, those attributed to Mencius (372?–289? BCE) understood the cardinal virtues to constitute the operations of the human heart-mind. While the writings of Mencius and Xunzi (c. 310–213? BCE) disagreed on the natural goodness of humans, with Mencius claiming that people are basically good and Xunzi that they are basically deviant, both emphasized the importance of proper rearing, education, and ritual action for the correct expression of moral virtues. It was not until Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073) and Zhang Zai (1020–1077) revitalized the study of Confucianism that all the Confucian virtues came to take on a cosmological as well as a social moral role. To the extent that Korean, Japanese, Vietnamese, and other Southeast Asian cultures adopted and adapted Confucianism, they also accepted and transformed Confucian ethics to meet their social and moral needs.

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See also: **Confucius; Mencius; Xunzi; Zhou Dynasty**

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———. (1979) *Humanity and Self-Cultivation: Essays in Confucian Thought*. Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press.

CONFUCIANISM—CHINA The system of thought known as Confucianism derives its name from the highly esteemed teacher and sage Confucius (551–479 BCE), or Kong Fuzi (Grand Master Kong). Confucianism includes the complete literature, practices, and teachings of the traditions which align themselves with Confucius. It is interesting to note that in the Chinese language there is no equivalent expression for Confucianism. The Chinese refer to specific thinkers or trends; for example, they refer to the *Kong-meng shi xue* (teachings of Confucius and Mencius) or to the Song- and Ming-dynasty study of principle (*Song Ming lixue*), which is called "Neo-Confucianism" in English. When bibliographers of the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) codified the books in the imperial library, they classified the works of Confucius and his followers under the heading "Literati."

The basic teachings of Confucianism stress the importance of education for moral development of the individual so that the state can be governed by moral virtue rather than by the use of coercive laws.

Syncretism in Confucianism

It is often said that traditional China was a Confucian society or that Confucianism was the official state religion and philosophy of China before the twentieth century. Such claims are misleading overgeneralizations. First, the syncretic nature of both early and later Confucian thought must be understood. Second, the hybrid syncretic character of later state-sanctioned Confucianism must be explained.

Generally speaking, East Asian cultures, philosophies, and religions are syncretic or composite in nature. Because of their practical orientation, they do not place great store in exclusive ideas or practices, but rather prefer to absorb and integrate whatever proves useful or satisfying. This is especially true of Chinese culture and philosophy, and is in large part the reason why the dynastic system was effective and long lasting.

What made the teachings of Confucius so compelling and attractive to so many thinkers for over 2,500 years is their syncretic amalgamated content and character. Confucius, his disciples, and most of the later followers celebrated and incorporated various forms of literature. They emphasized poetry, history and legend, divination, music, and ritual. They integrated

self-cultivation and virtue with the notions of harmony and a political philosophy of rulership. The Confucian curriculum was well rounded and eclectic, consisting of the six arts: ritual, music, archery, charioteering, calligraphy, and mathematics. Confucius also advocated that any serious student, even a commoner, should have some training in military arts. The Confucians assumed that the masses would be vigorously engaged in agriculture and related industry. In this regard, the Confucians incorporated agricultural skills into their social program, though they did not place great emphasis on these because they were far more concerned with moral cultivation.

Given the number of shared values found in the *Analects* (*Lunyu*) of Confucius (one of the basic texts of Confucianism) and the *Daodejing* (one of the basic texts of Taoism) it is likely that those who later generations labeled as Confucians and Taoists originally shared a common ground. Both stressed the significance of self-cultivation, acknowledging the need for special training that would make one a true and better person. Although the Confucians emphasized the human-to-human relationships and the Taoists underscored the human-to-nature affinity, nevertheless the writers of the *Zhongyong* (Centrality and Commonality, another basic text of Confucianism) reasserted the importance of the relationship between humans and nature in Confucianism. In their emphasis on the mutual complementarity of opposites (such as yin and yang), Confucianism and Taoism have borrowed and absorbed ideas and practices from each other, increasing their respective longevity and profundity.

Borrowing from the statesmen who debated and were concerned about properly naming job titles and evaluating job performance, Confucius and others, especially Mencius (372?–289? BCE) and Xunzi (310–213? BCE), delineated the meaning of the "rectification or attunement of names" (*zhengming*). This was important because knowing the precise name for one's position in the world (as prince, for instance, or father, or son) let one know one's duties and responsibilities.

Superficially speaking, the Confucians appear to have been most at odds with the Legalists (*fajia*), who advocated a rigorous notion of the rule of law—as opposed to the Confucian notion of rule by example. Although Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi advocated ruling the people with virtue by setting a moral example, they certainly recognized the need for law. Tradition has it that when Confucius was the chief of police, even he had to authorize the execution of a criminal. The Confucians, like the Legalists, wanted to standardize a code of human conduct, but the Legalists sought to do so by instituting public law,

whereas the Confucians placed greater emphasis on instituting a homogeneous system of ethics to govern human interactions, holding the law in reserve for when egregious behavior occurred.

It is clear, then, that Confucius did not create a pure philosophical system; he borrowed from various approaches. The followers of Confucius likewise absorbed elements from the other schools of philosophy to bolster their interpretation of Confucius.

Mencius and Xunzi

Mencius is noted for advancing Confucius' teachings. Confucius was concerned with the details of proper moral behavior; Mencius advocated a more abstract philosophy, focusing on goodness of human nature (*xing*) and the development of the mind (*xin*). Although Mencius had syncretic tendencies, he also vehemently attacked other philosophers, including the early Taoist Yang Zhu (c. late fourth century BCE); Mozi (479–438 BCE), the founder of Mohism, a philosophy that stressed universal love; and Xu Xing (c. late fourth century BCE), who argued that a king should labor in the field alongside his subjects. (Mencius answered that the king should concentrate on ruling and leave agriculture to the farmer.)

A century later, Xunzi revitalized Confucian teachings by invigorating them with practical political measures such as economic means to enrich the state and placing greater emphasis on public law. Xunzi is noted for soundly attacking Mencius' idea that human nature is basically good; on the contrary, Xunzi argued that people are basically selfish given limited resources, but that they can be trained to be good through the practice of ritual action and education. Xunzi's approach dominated Confucian thinking from the Han dynasty to the Song dynasty (960–1279). During the Song dynasty, Mencius' philosophy was used to develop Neo-Confucianism.

Syncretism and State-Sponsored Confucianism

The syncretic approach to philosophy and the arts of rulership became especially popular toward the end of the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) and during the first portion of the Han dynasty (the so-called Western Han; 206 BCE–8 CE).

After the short-lived Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE), the Han emperors continued to grapple with the problem of systematizing political philosophy and the arts of rulership. During the reign of Emperor Wu of the Han (156–87 BCE) Dong Zhongshu (c. 179–104 BCE) constructed a composite syncretic form of Confucianism that became the state-sanctioned philosophy. Dong

was a Confucian in that he praised Confucius and generally adhered to the Confucian ideas of self-cultivation and rule by virtue, but he effectively integrated aspects of the Five Phases philosophy (a philosophy of the mystical composition of the universe out of five elements), Taoism, and Legalism into Confucianism. Dong established his philosophy on a temporal order, and explained history and dynastic succession in terms reminiscent of the Five Phases, although he delineated only three stages. The authoritarian structure of his sociopolitical philosophy made it attractive to Han rulers. Dong advocated the "three bonds" in which the king rules the people, the father disciplines the son, and the husband provides for the wife.

After the Han dynasty, the intellectual life of Confucianism stagnated, becoming a lifeless dogma for nearly seven hundred years. In the Tang dynasty (618–907), Han Yu (768–824) reawakened Confucianism with his study of the moral way (*daoxue*), claiming that he had received the correct transmission of the teachings via Mencius; he rejected Xunzi and emphasized the goodness of human nature.

Zhou Dunyi, the Cheng Brothers, and Zhu Xi

A Tang-dynasty Taoist alchemical document called the Diagram of the Great Ultimate (*Taijitu*) was transmitted to Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073) in the Song dynasty. Zhou Dunyi wrote a short but profound work on that document, in which he linked the moral nature of human beings with the nature of the universe, putting forward the notion that the goodness of human nature is part and parcel of the moral goodness of the universe. Zhou was also influenced by Buddhism, especially Zen. He also taught the Cheng brothers.

Cheng Hao (1032–1085) and his younger brother Cheng Yi (1033–1107) developed Zhuo's idea of a universal principle (*li*) inherent in all things, making it the cornerstone of their respective philosophies and the main concept of Song-dynasty Neo-Confucianism. They proposed that the proper subjects for study were principle (*li*) and human nature (*xing*) and that ultimately human nature was identical to principle. For them, the investigation of things is crucial for self-cultivation. They asserted that the universe is a process of giving life and that the life-giving principle is goodness. They influenced the Neo-Confucian scholar Zhu Xi (1130–1200).

Zhu Xi systematized the teachings of Zhou Dunyi and the Cheng brothers. Zhu Xi argued that reality consists of two components: principle (*li*) and material force (*qi*). Principle is the form of all that exists,

while material force fills and activates things. Zhu said that human nature is basically good because it is endowed with the principle (*li*) that is goodness. People learn to be bad, and so the purpose of education is to retain the good principle in one's original nature and remove acquired pollutants. Zhu Xi sided with the rationalistic tendencies in Cheng Yi's philosophy, and what is called the Cheng-Zhu school of Neo-Confucianism dominated China for several hundred years. Zhu Xi debated with Lu Xiangshan (1139–1193) who supported the idealistic tendencies in Cheng Hao's philosophy. Lu did not emphasize human nature the way Zhu did. Instead, Lu focused on the human mind, advocating that it is one with principle. For Lu, the investigation of things meant the study of the mind. Lu argued for the unity of the Way (*tao*), opposing Zhu's distinction between principle and material force.

Confucianism in the Ming and Qing Dynasties

In the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), Wang Yangming (1472–1529) developed the idealism of Lu Xiangshan. The reader should note that in philosophy "idealism" means that reality is in the mind, or in the ideas of the mind; it does not denote a perfect (ideal) world. Wang championed the School of Mind (*xinxue*), in contradistinction to Zhu's School of Principle (*lixue*). Wang argued that anyone could become a sage because everyone possesses a mind that contains innate knowledge of the good. This innate goodness extends outward, starting with a natural love for oneself and one's family, extending to one's community, and then outward to all other people, creatures, and things. Wang is also well known for advocating that knowledge and action form a unity. The purposeful character of his philosophy influenced later thinkers such as Tan Sitong (1865–1898) and Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925).

In 1644, the Manchus conquered China, establishing the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). Under foreign occupation, Chinese government officials were marginalized, and many turned to scholarship and the study of Confucian philosophy to avoid criticism or punishment by the Manchus. Dai Zhen (1724–1777) and Kang Youwei (1858–1927) are two important Confucians of the Qing. Dai Zhen dedicated his life to studying the *Mencius* (the text associated with the philosopher of the same name). The rationalism of the Cheng-Zhu school was still popular in his day, but Dai Zhen boldly rejected it. Dai proposed that human morality had its origin in blood-and-material force and the knowing mind. He argued that principle only exists when the feelings are not mistaken. Kang Youwei accepted a basic tenant of the Lu-Wang school that book learning must be complemented with profound

action. He was a learned scholar, and he also advocated social and political reform. Kang understood Confucius to be an innovative institutional reformer. He also proposed that Confucius was a divine being or god, and the founder of a great religion. Borrowing an expression from the Mencius, Kang argued that the core of human nature was the mind that cannot bear to see the suffering of others. Kang adapted Dong Zhongshu's idea of the three ages and modified it into a theory of historical evolution, proposing that human history begins with an Age of Disorder, followed by an Age of Small Peace, and culminating in an Age of Great Peace. In the Age of Great Peace, everyone and everything will be treated exactly the same; there will be one humanity, one world order, one great unity (*datong*).

Confucianism in the Twentieth Century

In the twentieth century, Feng Youlan (1895–1990) revitalized rationalistic Neo-Confucianism. He argued that everything that exists is undergoing a continuous process of realizing principle (*li*) by means of material force (*qi*). He proposed that humans live in one of four spheres of life: the innocent sphere, the utilitarian or practical sphere, the moral sphere, and the transcendent sphere. Philosophy, he contended, assists people to live in the last two higher spheres of life. Xiong Shili (1883–1968) reconstructed idealistic Neo-Confucianism. Xiong advocates that reality is change, a perpetual process of production and reproduction, or closing and opening. By closing, Xiong means that reality has the tendency to integrate, to momentarily be what we call matter. By opening, he means that reality has the tendency to maintain its own nature, to be its own master, what we can temporarily call mind.

When Mao Zedong (1893–1976) and his Communist followers won the civil war in 1949, Confucianism and Confucius were strongly attacked. Feng, Xiong, and all other scholars were forced to denounce Confucius and their own decadent views. The Communist Party became far more tolerant of Confucianism after the Mao's death, such that by the 1990 party propaganda began to cite the ideas of Confucius or his followers. In addition, there are still in both Taiwan and the West practicing Confucianists.

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CONFUCIANISM—JAPAN The ideas of the great Zhou-dynasty Chinese philosopher Kong Qiu (551–479 BCE), or Confucius, as he is known in the West, diffused to the Korean kingdoms nearly a millennium later, in the early fourth century CE. A century after that, in 405, these ideas were brought to Japan by scholars from Paekche, the southernmost of the Korean kingdoms. It was not until the latter part of the next century, however, as the Yamato state began to solidify its rule, that Confucianism really took hold in Japan. Confucian scholars accompanied the Buddhist missionaries sent by the king of Paekche to the Yamato court, and by the reign of Empress Suiko (593–628), the Confucian classics, in combination with Mahayana Buddhist theology preached by the Korean missionaries, had become the foundation of the nascent imperial regime. The man who accomplished

this synthesis was one of the most important figures in Japanese history, Suiko's regent and kinsman, Shotoku Taishi. Prince Shotoku's famous "Seventeen-Article Constitution," the goal of which was to provide the basis for a harmonious and hierarchical political system centered on the imperial monarchy, was in large measure based on Confucian precepts.

The *Junzi* and the Ideal of *Ren*

The essential idea of Kong Qiu's teachings is that the source of all morality is filial piety, that is, a child's absolute respect for and loyalty to his parents. This, in turn, is reflected in the relationship between the ruler and his subjects, with the ruler the equivalent of the morally upright father. One must cultivate virtue at all times so as to become a "superior man," or *junzi*. The most important component of the "superior man" was *ren* (or *jin* in Japanese), which can be defined as benevolent altruism. The virtuous ruler is one whose behavior is suffused with *ren* and who commands the loyalty and obedience of his subjects, not by terror, but by example and by enlightened benevolence. Moral training was to be exclusively the province of the father/male ruler; indeed, women play hardly any role in traditional Confucianism.

These ideas are contained in a series of classical texts, including the *Yi jing* (Book of Changes), an ancient divinatory manual that Confucius was believed to have edited; the *Shu jing* (Book of Documents); the *Shi jing* (Book of Songs); the *Chun qiu* (Spring and Autumn Annals); and, most importantly, the *Lun yu* (Analects), a collection of sayings by Confucius and his disciples. Until modern times, when they were finally translated into the vernacular, these texts were studied by Japanese scholars in classical Chinese.

Confucianism in Ancient Japan

In addition to contributing to the Seventeen Article Constitution, Confucian ideas influenced the Taika Reform (646), which abolished all private ownership of rice lands and called for the establishment of a permanent capital and an elaborate administrative bureaucracy on the Chinese model. Indeed, several of the scholar monks who engineered the coup d'état of 645 had spent time in China studying Confucianism, as well as Buddhism, and the resulting *ritsuryo* system, in which land was periodically redistributed according to need, was based on Confucian principles. So was the Taiho Code of 701, which set up a bureau that was charged with performing divinatory rituals according to the Confucian model. Another manifestation of Confucianism in ancient Japan was the appearance of

historical chronicles, such as the *Kojiki* (Record of Ancient Matters, 712) and *Nihonshoki* (Chronicle of Japan, 720). Chinese Confucianism placed great value on historical scholarship, as it could provide lessons on proper statecraft and the moral behavior of rulers. By ordering the compilation of national histories, Japan's newly established Nara regime (710–794) sought to establish its authority and legitimacy.

Neither China's intensely patriarchal family structure nor the Chinese model of a bureaucratic elite steeped in the Confucian classics ever took firm root in Japan; however, filial piety and a profound respect for education and the teacher (*sensei*) became integral elements of Japanese culture and have continued to shape the Japanese worldview.

Medieval Japan and the Tokugawa Period

During China's Song dynasty (960–1279) Confucianism underwent a radical reformation. The chief figures were the Cheng brothers: Cheng Hao (1032–1085), Cheng Yi (1033–1107), as well as Zhu Xi (1130–1200) and Wang Yangming (1472–1529), who shifted the focus of Confucianism from ritualism and virtuous rulers to individual ethical and spiritual enlightenment and, in the process, added a mystical, quasi-religious aspect to the tradition. This reformed Neo-Confucian tradition was transmitted to Japan in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, primarily by Zen monks who had studied in China, and it soon came to play a role in the samurai-based society that took shape during the Kamakura (1185–1333) and Muromachi (1333–1573) periods. The spiritual aspect of Neo-Confucianism helped reinforce the warrior mystique, as well as the ideal of absolute loyalty to one's master.

After the establishment of the Tokugawa shogunate in 1603, Neo-Confucianism received state sponsorship and became the official ideology of the *bakufu* (shogunal government). The Neo-Confucian emphasis on spiritual discipline, hierarchy, and social harmony was ideally suited to Tokugawa policy, the cornerstone of which was to rebuild Japanese unity under the benevolent but absolute authority of the *bakufu*, after centuries of internal strife. The Tokugawa also drew heavily on the concept of *ren*, as prolonged peace caused the samurai to evolve into a class of gentlemen bureaucrats broadly analogous to those who traditionally managed affairs in China and Korea. The Confucian ideal of the scholar-administrator led the regime to subsidize schools in each of Japan's feudal domains; there local samurai could study the Confucian classics. In 1632, the third Tokugawa shogun,

Iemitsu, established a shrine to Confucius in the capital, and in 1704, the *bakufu* constructed the only Confucian temple in Japan in what is now the Hongo district of modern Tokyo.

The Confucian Legacy

After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, when the center of power in Japan shifted once again to the imperial monarchy and Japan began to absorb Western philosophical, religious, and ethical ideas, the importance of Confucianism waned briefly. However, as the new regime crystalized, especially after the Imperial Rescript on Education (1890), Confucianism once again came to play an important role by defining the filial relationship between the emperor and the nation. Indeed, in the early 2000s it still permeates almost every aspect of Japanese culture, at least to some degree, from the persistence of filial piety and respect for teachers to the way corporations are organized and business conducted. Together with people in China, Korea, and Vietnam, the Japanese continue to be inspired by the teaching of Kong Qiu and his disciples.

C. Scott Littleton

See also: **Confucianism—China; Confucianism—Korea; Confucius; Neo-Confucianism; Zhu Xi**

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CONFUCIANISM—KOREA Koreans are fond of bragging that Korea is the most Confucian country on earth. They note that over 230 Confucian academies are still open south of the border that divides North Korea from South Korea. They also boast that Confucianism has been an important part of Korean culture for at least 1,600 years. However, the Confucianism found in South Korea in the twenty-first century differs from the Confucianism that existed on the Korean peninsula a millennium and a half ago. Moreover, both forms of Confucianism differ from the Confucianism that dominated Korea during the five centuries of the Choson dynasty (1392–1910).

Early Confucianism in Korea

Confucianism originally entered Korea from China as an administrative tool. In the fourth century, two of the three kingdoms on the Korean peninsula at that time, Koguryo (37 BCE–668 CE) and Paekche (18 BCE–663 CE), established Confucian academies to teach lower-level government officials how to keep historical records and write diplomatic documents in the format and language used by Confucian government officials in China. The third kingdom, Shilla (57 BCE–935 CE), did the same in the seventh century.

This Confucianism was for government clerks. High government officials were not expected to have a Confucian education until the Koryo dynasty (918–1392). A substantial percentage of upper-echelon Koryo officials passed the Confucian civil-service examination after they had embarked on their careers in government. This suggests that a Confucian education had become an aid to promotion, although it was not yet required for an initial appointment.

The Koryo civil-service examination system was a modified version of the civil-service examination sys-



JONGMYO—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

A UNESCO World Heritage Site since 1995, Jongmyo in South Korea is the oldest remaining Confucian royal shrine in existence. Unchanged since the sixteenth century, sacrificial song, dance, and music rituals are still performed at Jongmyo.



Women musicians in traditional Korean Confucian costume perform at the Grand Ceremony at Chongmyo, the Royal Ancestral Shrine in Seoul. (NATHAN BENN/CORBIS)

tem of Tang-dynasty China (618–907). The men who took the Koryo examinations could choose to be tested either on their ability to analyze classical Confucian texts or on their ability to write essays and poems in the style of revered Chinese Confucian writers. Because most who sat for the examinations chose the composition track, Confucianism remained primarily a guide to good writing.

Neo-Confucianism in the Choson Dynasty

This approach changed in the Choson dynasty, which replaced the Koryo at the end of the fourteenth century. The Choson dynasty was Korea's first and only Confucian dynasty, and most entry-level government officials were required to pass a Confucian civil-service examination. This examination focused on policy and morality more than on literary style. In the preceding periods, Buddhism had dominated court ritual and ethical discourse. Confucianism was confined primarily to defining how official histories, government documents, and literary compositions should be written.

Confucian influence on Korean moral thinking before the fourteenth century, however, was not insignificant. Confucian moral rhetoric, particularly terms such as loyalty and filial piety, had penetrated Korea via the texts taught to government clerks in earlier periods. Confucian virtues had become an inextricable part of the Korean ethical discourse, but they

existed alongside, and often as a supplement to, the ethical principles of the official state religion, Buddhism.

During the Choson dynasty, Neo-Confucianism replaced Buddhism both inside and outside government as the principal arbitrator of how human beings should live. Neo-Confucianism, which Koreans called "the learning of human nature and principle," insisted that Confucian moral principles not only defined how human beings should interact with one another, but also defined what human beings were when they realized their full human potential. In other words, moral principles constituted human nature.

In order to help human beings realize that full potential, Neo-Confucianism offered two tools to replace the sutra study, chanting, and meditation Buddhism had offered. The first was ritual and etiquette, detailed prescriptions of how to behave in specific situations. The second was practical moral psychology, techniques for cultivating a moral character that could follow those prescriptions.

One of the more important guides to proper behavior during the Choson dynasty was *House Rules of Master Zhu*, a guide to household ritual and etiquette by the great Chinese Neo-Confucian Zhu Xi (1130–1200). Koreans became aware of this work near the end of the Koryo dynasty, but only in the Choson dynasty did it assume so much importance that family relationships were restructured to bring them more in

line with its prescriptions. According to Zhu Xi, only eldest sons could host ancestral memorial services. This contradicted the Koryo practice of letting younger sons and even daughters lead rituals honoring their parents and of letting younger sons and daughters inherit the property that provided enough income to host such rituals. In order to bring Korean ritual practices in line with Neo-Confucian ritual prescriptions, the Choson dynasty redefined the family to give priority to the eldest son, reducing the inheritance rights of younger sons and depriving daughters of any inheritance rights whatsoever.

Korean Neo-Confucians accorded as much importance to the cultivation of a proper mental attitude for such rituals as they did to the rituals themselves. The most effective approach to such character cultivation became a hotly debated issue in the sixteenth century. For the next three centuries, Koreans argued about whether to follow the advice of Yi Hwang (1510–1570, pen name T'oegye) or Yi I (1536–1584, pen name Yulgok). T'oegye recommended sitting in quiet concentration to rid the mind of disturbing self-centered emotions. Yulgok, on the other hand, encouraged his followers to cultivate an attitude of sincerity so that they always acted appropriately in whatever situation they found themselves, whether hosting an ancestral memorial service or advising their king.

Confucianism in Korea Today

When the Choson dynasty fell in 1910, Neo-Confucianism lost its institutional base and could not maintain its hegemony over government, ritual, philosophy, and ethics. Nevertheless, a century later, Korea still shows traces of its Confucian past. Koreans continue to mourn their ancestors with Confucian ritual, albeit modernized and simplified. And they continue to wield Confucian terminology in debates over ethical issues. Sixteen hundred years after Confucianism became established in Korea, Korea remains in many ways a Confucian country.

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CONFUCIUS (551–479 BCE), Chinese philosopher. Confucius, whose family name was Kong and personal name was Qiu (stylized as Zhongni), is recognized as China's greatest teacher. He was eventually given the title "Kong the Grand Master" (Kong Fuzi), which has been Latinized as Confucius. He was born in the state of Lu (in Shandong Province), during the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE). His father died when he was three; by seventeen, he supported his mother. Confucius married at nineteen, had two daughters and a son, and held a minor office in Lu. He dedicated his life to teaching, but believed he was called to reform the decaying Zhou culture. At the age of fifty-one, Confucius was promoted to magistrate and subsequently to minister of justice. Discouraged by conditions in Lu, at the age of fifty-six, Confucius and his closest disciples traveled to other states in search of a worthy ruler to implement his teachings. After almost thirteen years, Confucius returned to Lu to teach. Tradition claims that he wrote or edited the Five Classics (*Shujing*, *Shijing*, *Yijing*, *Chunqiu*, and *Liji*) and the now-lost classic of Music. Of the traditional three thousand students, only seventy-two mastered his teachings, and only twenty-two were close disciples.

After his death, Confucius's reputation underwent a process of apotheosis. By the time of Mencius (371–289 BCE), he was called a sage. Emperors of the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) made offerings at his tomb, which became a shrine and later a temple. He was given the imperial title "duke" in 1 CE, "foremost teacher" in 637, "king" in 739, and "perfect sage" in 1013. By 1906, the ritual for the "emperor on high" was performed in the name of Kong Fuzi.

Details of Confucius's life and teachings are found in the Four Books; among them, the *Analects* is most important. With typical "Chinese" humility, Confucius claims in the *Analects* to be a transmitter, not an innovator. This is certainly not the case, but it displays the importance of maintaining historical precedent, namely, following the example of the ancient sages for self-cultivation, to sacrifice personal needs and wealth for the good of the community and to rule by virtue rather than law.

Confucius was an innovative teacher. His school was open to all serious students, even commoners, transforming aristocratic values into collective moral values. His methods went beyond vocational training, emphasizing moral cultivation, which institutionalized the literati class and influenced Chinese history.



An undated portrait of Confucius. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

Confucius emphasized literacy (*wen*) and demanded that his students be enthusiastic, serious, and self-reflective. His teachings are of a practical nature. He held that all persons, but especially the ruling class, must develop their moral integrity by practicing ritual action (*li*) to express person-to-person-care or humanity (*ren*) to become a consummate person (*junzi*). Empathy (*shu*), defined in the *Analects* as "never do to another what you do not desire," summarizes his teachings in one word. With the renewed interest in Confucius even in the People's Republic of China, his teachings continue to influence Chinese and Asian cultures.

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CONNECTIONS. See **Guanxi**.

CONSTITUTION—INDIA One of the longest and most comprehensive documents in the history of modern Asian legislature, the Indian constitution has twenty-two parts, 395 articles, and twelve schedules that provide an enormous body of instructions and provisions that affect almost every aspect of Indian life.

Most of the framers of the Indian constitution had extensive experience in constitutional law during the British rule in India. Soon after India gained independence on 15 August 1947, its Constituent Assembly started working on constructing a constitution for a country beset by the centuries-old socioeconomic inequities of the caste system and the unsatisfactory postcolonial sharing of political powers between the central and provincial authorities. Ironically, the committee that wrote the constitution worked under an untouchable leader of India, Dr. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (1893–1956), a law graduate from Columbia University, New York. The first draft constitution was published in February 1948. Its final version was officially adopted on 26 November 1949 but went into effect on 26 January 1950. Mohandas K. Gandhi (1869–1948) was not there to guide the framers of India's constitution while it was being written, but the ideals for which he had struggled were enshrined in it: liberty, equality, justice, and fraternity.

The Contents of the Constitution

The preamble states the solemn resolution of the people of India: that of turning the country into a sovereign socialist secular democratic republic that will secure social, economic, and political justice for all its citizens. It guarantees liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith, and worship; equality of status and of opportunity; and promotion of fraternity, securing the dignity of the individual, and the unity and integrity of the nation.

Articles in the twenty-two parts of the constitution mainly deal with the Indian union and its territories; citizenship; fundamental rights; principles of state policy; fundamental duties; the union government; the state governments; the *panchayat* (village council) system; city municipalities; tribal areas; relations between the central and state governments; finance, property, contracts, and suits; trade; commercial dealings within the territory of India; services under the union and the states; tribunals; elections; special provisions relating to certain classes; official languages; emergency provisions; miscellaneous matters; amendments to the

constitution; temporary, transitional, and special provisions. The authoritative text of the constitution is in Hindi.

Redressing Historical Inequity

India's constitution provides equal opportunity for all citizens regardless of their creed or color. Article 16 promises equal opportunity in matters related to employment or appointment for any office under the state. No citizen, therefore, shall be considered ineligible or discriminated on the bases of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, or residence. Since the government of India, through its military and bureaucracy, is the largest economic provider in the country, Article 16 opened public positions to lower-caste members of the society who had hitherto been excluded from pursuing economic and political opportunities.

Abolition of untouchability was the crowning achievement of the Indian constitution. India's vast majority of untouchables—whom Gandhi called Harijan, or "children of God"—were among the most oppressed people in the world. Article 17 declares the practice or enforcement of untouchability in any form as an offense punishable in accordance with the law. The constitution not only did away with special powers for the privileged social and economic classes such as the feudal lords but also provided special protection and quotas for the historically oppressed castes and tribes. With these leveling measures, the constitution changed for the better the social, political, and economic conditions of India's 1 billion people. Reservation of seats and quotas for depressed classes in union and state governments—and especially in educational institutions—brought about revolutionary changes in India. And even though there were calls to end such reservations, they were extended in 1952.

Although discrimination against women is unconstitutional, it has been rampant in every aspect of Indian life. Thanks to the growing women's rights movement and the rise in female education in India, politicians are now more responsive to women's needs. Although the socioeconomic and political conditions of women in rural India are far from satisfactory, the status of the educated and liberated women in cities and urban centers is a spectacular success story. India is a signatory to the worldwide women's resolution to set aside 33 percent of national and state legislative assembly seats for women, and in Indira Gandhi (1917–1984) has already had a powerful female prime minister.

National and Local Government

Central and state powers are balanced by organizing India into a federal democratic republic of twenty-

five states headed by governors and seven union territories administered by ministers, all appointed by the president. India has a bicameral parliament composed of two bodies: the Rajya Sabha, or Council of States; and the Lok Sabha, or House of the People. The Rajya Sabha has 250 members, of which 238 are elected by their state legislative assemblies every second year. The president nominates the other twelve members, who are known nationally for their sound knowledge and experience in the fields of arts, literature, social sciences, and natural sciences. The Lok Sabha has 550 seats, with 530 members from the states and twenty members from the union territories.

Amendments

With more than eighty amendments as of 2000, India's constitution stands as one of the most frequently amended documents. Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), the first prime minister of India, insisted that India's constitution must be flexible and responsive to new changes in the country. There are three ways to pass amendments to the constitution. First, a simple majority of both houses of the legislature can amend only those articles that are related to matters in the schedules—those parts in the constitution that deal with states and union territories, state governors, allocation of seats in the state councils, administration of tribal areas, and state languages, and so forth. Second, a two-thirds majority in both houses of the parliament is required for amending articles that deal with important matters, such as fundamental rights, citizenship, state policies, duties of the executive, constitution of parliament and state legislatures, legislative powers of the president, state governors, relations between the union and the state, and elections under the union and the states. Third, in addition to the two-thirds majority in each house of parliament, an amendment related to the distribution of legislative authority between the central and state government also must be passed by 50 percent of the state legislatures.

Checks and Balances

The Indian Supreme Court and Election Commission are recognized as the bedrock of Indian democracy; these two bodies stand up to the enormous powers that the constitution invests in the central government in general and to the unbridled powers of the Indian prime minister in particular. The checks and balances that are provided by the constitution also smooth out the strained relations between the central government and the states by limiting the central government's ability to interfere in the states' affairs. Usually, either the state government or a political party may file an appeal

or a writ petition in the Supreme Court against a policy or practice of the union or a state.

Although India's constitution follows the British parliamentary system, it is the constitution and not the parliament of India that reigns supreme. As in the United States, the Indian courts interpret the constitution and adjudicate the laws passed by the parliament. Although the parliament has the authority to amend the constitution, India's courts have made sure that the parliament does not change its fundamental structure, which guarantees economic opportunities, social justice, and religious and political freedom to all its citizens. Although political corruption and coercion are rampant in India—as they are in other developing countries—the courts are judiciary guarantors of India's freedom from oppression.

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CONSTITUTION, IRAN—ISLAMIC The Iranian Islamic Constitution was approved by a national referendum in December 1979. The concept of *vilayat-i faqih* (rule of religious jurisprudence) is at the core of this constitution.

Soon after Ayatollah Khomeini (1900–1989) rose to power in Iran in January 1979, he gave the task of drafting a new constitution to the provisional government. The latter prepared a draft constitution, which was ready for national referendum in June of that year. However, several prominent figures insisted that an expert panel should review the draft constitution before it was put to a vote. Ayatollah Khomeini agreed and appointed an Assembly of Experts to review the draft constitution. The Assembly of Experts, made up of seventy-three members, was heavily weighted in favor of religious leaders and supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini's vision. The result was a substantially modified constitution, which institutionalized the role of clerics in the government. Reportedly, it was approved with over 98 percent of the vote.

The Islamic Constitution established the role and functions of the *faqih* (spiritual leader) as well as the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of the government. The *faqih* is given oversight responsibil-

ity over the other three segments of the government in order to make sure they are operating within the tenets of Islam. He or she has the right to declare war or peace based on the recommendation of the Supreme Defense Council, over half of whose members the *faqih* nominates. He or she can depose the president if either the Supreme Court or the *majlis* (parliament) considers it appropriate. In addition, the *faqih* is responsible for selecting the supreme judge, the chief of the general staff, and half of the members of the Guardian Council. Ayatollah Khomeini was named the first *faqih* of the Islamic Republic and was given this position for life. The Islamic Constitution makes provisions for an Assembly of Experts, which is composed entirely of clerics, in order to choose successive *faqih*s based on constitutional criteria.

The executive branch of the government is composed of the president and cabinet. The president is elected for a four-year term. The legislative branch is represented by the *majlis*, 270 members who are also elected for four-year terms. The *majlis* handles the budget, general policy matters, and the introduction and passage of bills. However, any bill passed by the *majlis* must be reviewed by the Guardians Council, a group of six lawyers and six judges who verify that all new legislation and laws do not contradict Islamic principles.

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CONSTITUTION, JAPAN—POSTWAR

Drafted by the staff of General Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964) in 1946, Japan's constitution created a democratic, pacifist nation. Japan gives more per capita support to the United Nations than any other nation but cannot use military force to defend the U.N. Charter. Despite North Korean missile threats,

growing Chinese dominance in East Asia, and nuclear bombs in South Asia, Japan still depends on American forces for its national security.

On 15 August 1945, Japan surrendered to the Allies. American occupation forces under General MacArthur, the supreme commander of the Allied powers, ordered Japan's demilitarization and democratization. To Americans, revising the Japanese constitution was the best assurance of democracy. The Japanese favored limited constitutional change preserving the imperial institution. Government proposals in September and October 1945 seemed promising but never reached the cabinet; a committee led by Prince Konoe Fumimaro (1891–1945), which MacArthur initially encouraged and then denounced, ended in Konoe's suicide in December; the cabinet's conservative effort led by the state minister Matsumoto Joji (1877–1954) failed in January 1946, partly because of lack of support and advice from MacArthur.

By early February 1946, several developments had convinced MacArthur of the need to draft a "model" constitution for Japan. Emperor Hirohito (1899–1989), fearing Allied retribution, sought MacArthur's protection by cooperating and revealing an interest in Christianity, which MacArthur saw as the foundation of democracy. The Allied powers attempted to gain control over Japan's constitutional reform, and Australia and the Soviet Union wished to try the emperor as a war criminal. On 25 January 1946, MacArthur warned the U.S. government of the dangers of this course of action. On 1 February, the Japanese press leaked the Matsumoto committee's conservative proposals for revising the constitution.

Two days later, MacArthur ordered his government section, under General Courtney Whitney (1899–1969), to draft a new constitution for Japan in one week, making the emperor the head of state without power and prohibiting Japan from having military forces or war potential, even for self-defense. Whitney presented the draft to Matsumoto and to the foreign minister Yoshida Shigeru (1878–1967) on 13 February. The stunned Japanese ministers had only an hour to look over the draft in English. Whitney said MacArthur wanted the cabinet to produce a Japanese draft, quickly, using this model.

The cabinet reluctantly accepted the draft constitution on 26 February and rushed an unfinished Japanese draft to Whitney's office on 4 March. Thirty hours of nonstop debate, translating, and redrafting ensued, ending shortly before MacArthur published the document on 6 March as a draft produced by the Japanese government and approved by himself and the

emperor. An election was scheduled for 10 April to elect representatives to adopt Japan's new constitution. Thirty-one days had passed since MacArthur's order to write a model constitution for Japan.

The liberal provisions of the draft surprised many Japanese: the antiwar article: a powerless emperor as a symbol of the state; guarantees of basic freedoms, universal education, and equality of women with men; a true parliamentary system; and a powerful supreme court. The cabinet independently rewrote the document in vernacular Japanese. Prime Minister Yoshida, eager to end the military occupation, urged a quick approval.

Historians have understated the role of Japanese constitutionalists and politicians in the debate. Despite vigilant American monitoring, members of the national diet (created in 1889) engaged in spirited debate, refashioning a distinctly Japanese understanding of the draft, particularly about the role of the emperor; reshaping the peace clause; expanding the bill of rights; elevating the supreme court; and generally developing a sense of proprietorship over the text. Approved by both houses of the diet, the new constitution was promulgated on 3 November 1946 and took effect on 3 May 1947.

Movements for constitutional revision have roiled Japanese politics since the end of the American occupation in 1952. Again in 2000 Japan was engaged in a public debate over the relevance of the antiwar article. According to Article 9 and court rulings, Japan can use its self-defense forces, which are never called the army, navy, or air force, only to defend itself. So far, however, Japan has not felt that it can legally commit these forces to take part in U.N. peacekeeping missions or to help the United States in its self-proclaimed war on terrorism.

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Sakamoto Yoshikazu. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 107–132.

CONSTITUTION—TURKEY Since the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923, it has adopted three different constitutions and a series of constitutional revisions. A common characteristic of Turkish constitutions is that all of them were developed in reaction to the political problems of a previous period, and each successive constitution tried to prevent recurrences of these problems through constitutional restrictions.

The First Constitution of 1920

The first constitutional document of modern Turkey was created by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) during the war for independence. The Law of Constitution, dated 20 January 1920, designated the TGNA as the supreme organ of the state. It was given executive, legislative, and judicial powers. The executive power was exercised by a council of ministers, or cabinet, which the TGNA elected from among its members through direct vote. The ministers of the council were individually responsible to the TGNA, which also resolved executive disagreements in the council.

The First Constitution of the Republican Era of 1924

Problems associated with the concentration of power in the hands of the TGNA led to a change in the Law of Constitution. In 1924, the newly elected members of the TGNA, then dominated by the Republican People's Party (RPP) under the strict control of Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk), developed the first constitution of the Republican era. The 1924 constitution maintained the supreme status of the TGNA by vesting the sovereignty fully and unconditionally in the nation; the TGNA was empowered to exercise its sovereignty on behalf of the nation (Article 5). The constitution did, however, transfer the exercise of executive power to the president and the Council of Ministers, so-called after 1924. The Council of Ministers was accountable to the TGNA under the principle of "collective responsibility." The president, however, was kept out of the principle and was not vested with political responsibility.

The Constitutional Amendments of 1934

The 1924 constitution was amended in 1934, and the six principles of the ruling RPP's program—republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism, etatism, and reformism—were included in it as the defining charac-

teristics of the state. Although the 1924 constitution had recognized civil liberties and social and political rights, it failed to put them under constitutional protection. The constitution had also lacked effective check-and-balance mechanisms over the legislative and executive bodies, which became extremely damaging after the transition to the multiparty period in 1950. The unlimited rule of the majority party, the Democrat Party (DP), finally led to the collapse of the first Turkish Republic in 1960.

The Second Republican Constitution of 1961

A military coup was carried out in 1960 by a group of junior officers, who declared their intention to create a democratic constitution and to transfer power to civilian rule. Unlike the 1924 constitution, which had been developed by the popularly elected TGNA, the 1961 constitution was prepared by a bicameral Constituent Assembly. The junta, which called itself the National Unity Committee, constituted the first chamber. Members of the second chamber included representatives of various social groups and political parties, chosen either by indirect election or by appointment. Exclusion of the supporters of the banned DP from the Constituent Assembly clouded the legitimacy of the 1961 constitution for the coming decades.

The 1961 constitution, which was approved by 60.4 percent of the popular vote, was a reaction to the problems of the DP era of the 1950s. It aimed to prevent the hegemony of an elected parliamentarian majority over the political system. The constitution foresaw a complete separation of powers and implemented a strong mechanism of checks and balances over government and parliament. The new system had a strong bicameral legislature, a weak executive, and an autonomous and strengthened judiciary.

Distrust of political bodies led to the establishment of the Constitutional Court, empowered to review the constitutionality of legislation. The 1961 constitution also renamed the National Unity Committee; it became the National Security Council—a permanent advisory body to assist the cabinet in issues related to national security, which legitimized the role of the military in government. The 1961 constitution was considered progressive because it expanded civil liberties and social rights and put them under constitutional protection. The constitution also granted administrative autonomy to various public organizations and civil-society institutions (nongovernmental, nonmilitary institutions). Although the 1961 constitution was liberal in tone, it still restricted participation of certain political groups and ideologies in the political arena. Progressive aspects of the constitution were later

blamed for the country's woes and were curtailed by the 1971 and 1973 constitutional amendments. These amendments also strengthened the executive body by granting it power to use government edicts and increased the institutional autonomy of the military.

The Third Republican Constitution of 1982

The third constitution was developed after the 1980 military coup. The new constitution created in 1982 restricted civil rights, freedoms, and political expression even further. It was prepared by a bicameral Constituent Assembly established for the purpose, but even less representative than the previous one. The National Security Council was given more power than it had been granted in 1961; it now constituted the first chamber. The second chamber, handpicked by the National Security Council, excluded members of all political parties and all social groups of the previous period. Unlike the 1961 constitutional referendum, which allowed the expression of opposing views, the 1982 referendum campaign did not allow any debate on the draft constitution.

Identifying weakness of the executive as the root of the problem with the 1961 constitution, the 1982 constitution aimed to provide a strong executive and a weak unicameral legislature. Distrust of elected politicians and civilian institutions led to strengthening the powers of the presidency and the National Security Council. The president was given substantive powers in appointing heads of public organizations and could also dismiss the prime minister and other cabinet members, dissolve parliament and call for a general election, and declare a state of emergency. Under the 1982 constitution, individual rights and freedoms were limited; freedoms of association and of political participation were restricted; the privileges and autonomy of civil-society institutions were reduced; and the powers of the judiciary were limited.

The 1982 constitution has been criticized for its undemocratic nature. Although constitutional change has been on the agenda of every political party in the 1990s, political dynamics in the country have delayed any amendment of the constitution. Since 1995, some articles of the constitution, related mostly to freedom of association and freedom of political participation, have been amended. These amendments, however, have brought little improvement in the protection of civil rights and liberties in Turkey.

The Constitutional Court

The Constitutional Court was introduced in the 1961 constitution as a body to review the constitu-

tionality of legislation and to prevent arbitrary and partisan rule by the elected bodies and governments and domination of the political system by the majority party. The Court was empowered as a high council to try senior members of the state, to prevent the abuse of political power, and to outlaw political parties that acted outside constitutional limitations. The rulings of the Court were final and binding on all the organs of the state.

A wide range of political and social institutions were given the right to request review of the constitutionality of laws by the Court. The president, the parliamentary groups of political parties, political parties that had won at least 10 percent of the popular vote in a general election, or one-sixth of the members of the TGNA, as well as civil and public organizations as long as the matters submitted for review dealt with these groups' functions, could exercise this right.

The Constitutional Court consisted of fifteen regular and five substitute members. Two members of the court were appointed by the president. The remaining members were chosen by the Court of Account (one regular), the TGNA (five regular and two substitute), the High Court of Cassation (four regular and two substitute), and the Council of State (three regular and one substitute) from among their members.

The Court was under constant attack by political parties in the 1961 constitutional era. It was accused of usurping the prerogatives of parliament and obstructing the government's performance of its executive duties. The Court was also criticized for closing down the Turkish Workers' Party and the National Order Party because of their ideologies.

Under the 1982 constitutional regulations, the function and scope of the Constitutional Court have been remarkably restricted. Review of the constitutionality of laws and decrees issued by the National Security Council during the interim period is no longer under the Court's authority. Its membership is reduced to eleven regular and four substitute members, and all members are appointed by the president. Only the president, the parliamentary group of the governing party or the main opposition party, or one-fifth of the members of the TGNA may request review of the constitutionality of laws. Presidential decrees are kept out of the Court's jurisdiction. The Court's status as a high council to try senior members of the state and to outlaw political parties acting outside constitutional limitations remains intact.

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CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS OF 1881 The revolutionary changes introduced by government leaders during the Meiji period (1868–1912) provoked a great deal of uncertainty and unrest throughout Japan. For a variety of different reasons—from unfair taxation to reduced incomes and loss of political status—the samurai and farmers were extremely dissatisfied with the direction in which the new government was headed. Amid such growing turmoil, the Popular Rights movement (*minken*) evolved, one of whose leaders was Itagaki Taisuke (1836–1919). In 1874, Itagaki and other like-minded political leaders gained enough influence to submit a proposal to the government calling for the establishment of a national assembly. Cronyism and despotism were rotting the country, they complained. If Japan had any hope of keeping pace with the West, free public discussion must be permitted, and the best way to do that was to establish a national assembly.

In mid-1878, the home minister Okubo Toshimichi (1830–1878) was assassinated. Okubo had singled out a politician, Ito Hirobumi (1841–1909), to succeed him, but another Okubo favorite, Okuma Shigenobu (1838–1922), had also developed a strong following. Meanwhile, the Popular Rights movement was sweeping the country, and pressure to establish a national assembly intensified. Various councilors and politicians submitted proposals favoring a gradual movement toward a constitutional government, but in March 1881 Okuma startled them by presenting a paper calling for the speedy drafting of a constitution on the English model. This threw the principal parties into immediate conflict.

The political upheaval reached a boiling point in summer 1881, when Okuma and his followers refused to approve a proposal to sell at a huge discount the government's holdings in a Hokkaido project (Hokkaido Colonization Commission) to a business consortium headed by a former official, calling it the most blatant form of favoritism. Angered by Okuma's condemnation, not to mention his attempt to bypass their constitutional proposals, the councilors insisted in August that he and his followers be expelled from the government. Okuma and his cohorts resigned their official posts shortly afterward.

In an effort to calm the political agitation that the government knew would come with Okuma's ouster, the councilors agreed that a constitution would be granted by the emperor within the next decade. Ito was given the task of drafting it, but took Prussia as his model rather than England or the United States. Eight years later, on 11 February 1889, the Meiji Constitution was proclaimed.

Craig Loomis

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
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CONVEYANCE ARTS The tradition in South Asia of conveyance arts—decorating vehicles of all kinds—can be traced to the classical periods of Indian history. This article focuses mainly on conveyance arts in Bangladesh and Pakistan, with a brief discussion of the phenomenon in India and Afghanistan.

Bangladesh

Contemporary artisans in Bangladesh who decorate the three-wheeled cycle rickshas or pedicabs with elaborate pictures, scrollwork, calligraphy, and fancy machine-sewn, appliquéd, and painted plastic hoods are drawing on a long tradition. In past centuries, palanquins and pleasure boats were beautifully ornamented, often with gilt and colorful designs; animal transports were also lavishly decorated. Cycle rickshas became popular modes of transport by the mid-twentieth century. Ricksha art began to appear in Bangladesh a few years later, by the mid-1950s.

Today's rickshas are designed and hand-painted by special ricksha artists (*shilpakars*), or decorations are handmade by ricksha artisans (*mistris*) who assemble rickshas to order for customers. Many of the artists speak and read some English; they often designate themselves as "artist" or "painter," adopting the English terms. Most ricksha artists either learn by working under an artist master or are self-taught. The main image on a ricksha is the backboard picture panel (*chobi*). It is separately painted and hangs behind the ricksha, at the base of the cab between the rear wheels. Since the 1990s, commercial mass-produced photo prints have appeared as decoration on some ricksha backboard panels, possibly indicating a future trend toward the decline or even the elimination of hand-painted art.



A man with his decorated ricksha in Dhaka, Bangladesh. (EYE UBIQUITOUS/CORBIS)

The range of content of conveyance arts is both exuberant and varied. The artists denote certain picture themes by special names: for example, *jongler shin* (jungle scene), *shoborer shin* (city scene), *posbu shin* (animal scene), *filmi shin* (movie scene), *goromer shin* (village scene), and *mukti joddha shin* (liberation war scene), to name the most common selections. Movie scenes (or *manusher chitra*—people pictures) are mainly drawn from foreign, Indian, or local films. These may feature Tarzans, Rambos, and Bengali heroes or danger women sporting weapons, such as the real-life bandit queen Phulan Devi of India, who inspired popular films in India and Bangladesh. Glamorous actresses and actors from Dhaka and Calcutta films often are depicted, as well as political heroes—for example, the Bengali schoolboy Khudiram Bose, of Indian independence fame; Saddam Hussein, of Gulf War vintage; or the Awami League Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. In the 1970s, jungle scenes of animals congregating at a waterhole, animal-human impersonations, and fantastic courting birds were predominant.

Overall decor on a costly ricksha includes intricately handsewn appliquéed hoods, which fold or unfold like umbrellas. These are decked with medallions in which

they place shiny gold, silver, black, or pink peacock cutouts applied to a central white, red, or yellow field. Sometimes hand-painted red roses, butterflies, candles set within lotuses, or flowers are inserted in the medallions instead of peacocks. Hood designs, together with certain other features, can usually identify the city or region from which a ricksha originates. The seat base, ornamented by variably shaped recessed niches and bordered by gleaming nail heads, was filled with painted paired birds—peacocks or pigeons—signifying love or sexual fulfillment, or inserted view cards of movie stars. The footboard bore geometric or curvilinear designs (hearts pierced by arrows were popular). Painted conventional floral designs covered the ricksha's metal frame. Hand-painted designs on plastic, artfully cut and installed, upholstered the seatbacks and arm rests. The passenger's seat cover bore a conventional lotus design, suggesting (ironically, perhaps) that the rider is a petty deity, since deities are seated on lotuses.

The driver's seat was dotted with colored plastic flower cutouts. Handlebars sported small brass flower vases containing plastic flowers and colored plastic streamers. In Bangladesh, a nation with a Muslim majority, undecorated rickshas or imagery featuring only scenery or birds were favored by pious owners who observed the traditional Islamic prohibition on graven images, a practice based on several *hadith* (traditions of the Prophet). Birds are messengers of Allah in the Qur'an, and emblems of the soul in Sufi thought. They are thus not offensive to piety, although they might subversively suggest the motif of male desire, which is a foundation of this popular art form.

Ricksha arts are part of the male public culture. In the late twentieth century, a few women ricksha artists emerged, but women usually participated as family members in some artist's or ricksha maker's shop. Made to be seen "at a glance," the significations of ricksha art seems to be male desire in its major forms: for sex, competitive power and wealth, for one's home village, for the blessings of religious devotion, for new things. After the United States put a man on the moon in 1969, a few rickshas featured a man, in a spacesuit, planting a Bangladesh flag on the moon. In the late 1990s, auto taxis featured travel-poster images of far-flung places such as Sydney Harbor, Mt. Fuji, European-style palatial mansions with red sports cars in the driveway, and Tower Bridge in London, a prime emigration goal of many Bangladeshis.

India

In India, various conveyances, such as auto taxis and trucks, also tend to be decorated. The auto taxis, however, are usually not as fully decorated as they are in

Bangladesh, nor are the trucks as flamboyant as those found in Pakistan. In Rajasthan during the 1998 Diwali festival, trucks sported multiple glittering tinsel streamers and garlands in gold and colors, but hand-painted décor on the sides or on truck bodies was sparse. The state of Kerala boasts some of India's most outstanding conveyance art; the décor seems to reflect a regional style. Colorful boards with carved edges that suggest painted garlands of flowers and birds, surmounted by a rectangular name board, are installed above the cab. The names on the name board may be women's names (such as Sajna), inspirational names (Sunrise, for example), or Muslim names, (Nizamol, for example). Painted in blocky calligraphy, the truck names are spelled out either in English or romanized Malayam. The hood often sports apotropaic eyes; a demon mask may be hung below the front bumper—both intended to ward off evil. The sides of the cab are built up to the headboard above the cab door, and painted with dense millefleur designs interest with small, conventional landscape cameos. Here one might find slogans amidst the posies: "Do for India; Die for India," for example. Behind the cab (at the cab end of the truck bed) is a large square picture; common themes are the Taj Mahal or Lord Ganesa, the Hindu god who is the remover of obstacles; also popular are parrots or a gigantic red rose, all popular images throughout the subcontinent. Floral styles surrounding the truck door resemble those found in other Keralan fold arts in their large scale and sculptural-

mimesis painting technique, especially as compared to floral representations on trucks in other parts of the subcontinent.

Pakistan

The decoration of trucks in Pakistan resembles the decoration of rickshas in Bangladesh in many ways, although the artists tend more assiduously to avoid depicting people, favoring instead scenic landscapes, complicated geometric designs, fantastic gardens, pillared mansions, rockets, airplanes, wild animals and birds, and calligraphy. Pakistani trucks began to be decorated with flamboyant art design in the mid-twentieth century, a period when interprovincial transport began to expand, truck owners were getting rich, and display became competitive. As in the rest of the subcontinent, royalty traditionally decorated both human-carried palanquins and animal transports, including camels, which still today sometimes sport elaborate necklaces of bells and colored plush tassels. Truck art today is a fulsome elaboration from earlier conventional geometric and floral designs as well as from banners (now devolved into plastic streamers) and camel or donkey necklaces with pendants, which have evolved into ornamental chain pendants that hang below a truck's front and rear bumpers. Since approximately the 1970s Pakistani motorized three wheeler transports (auto taxis) have also been decorated with designs and movie material, but their overall impression is not as outstanding as that made by the trucks.



A decorated truck hauling ice in Karachi, Pakistan. (NIK WHEELER/CORBIS)

Pakistan truck art—most of which originally was produced in Rawalpindi but now is made in other cities as well—is also handmade. Like the ricksha artists, Pakistan truck artists may use cheap printed calendars and illustrated paper books from the bazaar as reference material for their designs. They do not copy these but redesign them to suit their own taste or the truck's structure. Several men, the master artist and helpers, work on one truck.

Pakistan truck designs since the 1950s have become increasingly more elaborate geometrically, such that almost the entire surface is decorated, an old tradition in Islamic arts. The style at beginning of the twenty-first century emphasized vertically stacked horizontal friezes of fish, birds, and geometric designs, on which contrasting designs or framed picture scenes, and pious calligraphy are superimposed. As with the Bangladesh ricksha arts, in gender-segregated Pakistan all the artists are men. The pious inscriptions include such wisdom as "Before going on this journey, pray for forgiveness for your sins. This might be your last trip." Pakistan trucks—commonly, English Bed-fords—show architectural propensities in the built-out decorated crown (*taj*) towering above the cab and projecting forward over the motor hood. In addition to the *taj*, gigantic pictures applied to the back slats of the truck bed or to the round rear end of a tanker truck and multiple panel or scenic medallion designs on the sides are central decorative features, imposing in size and astonishing in overall lavishness.

The truck crown is built up to twice the height of the truck below the cab, providing a grand billboard for colors and designs. Every color in the usual palette is used, with red, gold, silver, and green (the heraldic color of Islam) being favorites. Sculpted and painted fish or peacock framing devices might overlay bands of repeated geometric figures, or square boards bearing calligraphic proverbs or Qur'anic verses might be placed front and center on the *taj* and draped with cloth scarves.

Motorbuses are also elaborately painted and decorated, often with flat or three-dimensional multicolored scenic medallions, peacocks, hearts, and birds. One motif found repeated on the side of panels (under the windows) of a bus was a delicate woman's hand with polished fingernails holding up pearl necklaces and flower garlands, juxtaposed with a flower vase holding a lighted candle.

Afghanistan

Decorated trucks have been found in Afghanistan for several decades. Most of them were painted in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, once the only site of truck art

decoration in the general area and a city on a main route between Afghanistan and Pakistan. These trucks originally resembled Pakistani trucks in style and picture themes; at that time, the crown over the Afghan truck cab was not built up as high as it now is in Pakistan. Under the Taliban, in power in Afghanistan from 1996 through late 2001, truck decorations were most likely restricted to purely geometric and calligraphic designs, in compliance with the Taliban's prohibition against representations, in home or in public, of humans or animals.

Joanna Kirkpatrick

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COOMARASWAMY, ANANDA KENTISH

(1877–1947), Sri Lankan art historian. Ananda Kentish Coomaraswamy was an art historian who, in a series of influential books, greatly advanced the understanding of Hindu and Buddhist iconography. Originally trained as a geologist, he gained a Doctorate of Science in that subject from London University (1905). On returning to Ceylon, he felt that the traditional culture had been corroded by Western influences and was in need of a spokesman, which he then became. After about a decade in Ceylon, he left for the United States, where he founded the first museum department of Indian art at the Boston Museum of Fine Arts in 1917.

In his writings, Coomaraswamy presented South Asian art as a form of knowledge strongly imbued with a religious feeling. He was strongly influenced by mystics and metaphysicians, considering art "an effective expression of metaphysical theses." He was thus profoundly concerned with the communicative characteristics of art, viewing traditional art not from an aesthetic so much as an inspirational position, in which technical function was fused with symbolic meaning. He discovered the Rajput school of painting, and related it to Indian literary forms. Perhaps his most re-

markable achievement was his demonstration of the way in which the Hindu temple represented the body and house of God. He was a pioneer in presenting South Asian art within a similar intellectual framework to that which had long been applied to Western art. In this, he set his thinking in opposition to the conventional dismissals of Indian art that had come from European critics such as Hegel (1835) and Ruskin (1859), who had considered it irrational and unnatural.

Paul Hockings

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CORDILLERA CENTRAL The Cordillera Central is the centrally located mountain range on Luzon island in the Philippines. It consists of three parallel mountain ranges. These ranges are the Malayan, Central, and Polis. Mount Pulog, which is the highest peak on Luzon and the second highest in the country, is within the Polis range. These mountains vary greatly in width—from 58 kilometers to 86 kilometers (36 miles to 54 miles). The average height of its peaks is about 1,800 meters (5,900 feet). The Philippine mountain ranges typically are oriented in the same direction as the islands on which they are located. This is approximately north to south for the Cordilleras.

This mountain range connects with the Sierra Madre Range and the Caraballo Mountains. Located between these ranges is the Cagayan Valley. Several rivers' headwaters begin on the slopes of Mount Data, which is located within this mountain range. The Abra and Agno rivers in particular are controlled by the massive Cordillera Central mountains until they reach the sea. The metamorphic rocks that form these mountains are exposed. For this reason, much of the Philippine metals mining (for ores such as copper and gold) is concentrated in the Cordillera Central.

Linda Dailey Paulson

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CORMORANT Cormorant, or shag, refers to any of about thirty species of the family Phalacrocoracidae, a family of dark-colored water birds. The large

cormorant (*Phalacrocorax carbo*) is one of the most widespread of birds, occurring near rivers, lakes, cliffs, and seashores throughout Eurasia, as well as in eastern Canada and Iceland to the west, parts of Africa to the south, and Australia and New Zealand. In the Himalayas it is found in Ladakh, a region of Jammu and Kashmir, up to 3,000 meters. Friar Odoric (c. 1265–1331; a Franciscan monk who traveled from Italy to the East) reported seeing cormorant fishing from boats in China.

The young are easily trained to fish. The large cormorant and the slightly smaller Japanese cormorant (*Phalacrocorax capillatus*) are the two species that have been domesticated in eastern Asia for fishing, mainly in China, Vietnam, and Japan; the large shag was once used in France and England in the same way.

A speedy swimmer, the cormorant catches a fish underwater and brings it to the surface in its gular (throat) pouch. It then tosses the fish in the air and swallows it—unless a fisherman-owner has put a strap round the bird's neck. In one day it can eat up to half a kilogram of fish. The birds nest communally in great colonies with other water birds. The body of the adult bird may be 80 centimeters or even one meter long. Its remarkable agility underwater depends on the webs between the four toes, the long, stiff tail, and in adults the absence of external nostrils. The cormorant numbers over half a million in Europe alone (2001), where it is now seen as a threat to inland fisheries. In Asia, its numbers are probably much greater.

Paul Hockings

CORRUPTION Corruption, a serious problem in many Asian countries today, refers to "the misuse of public power, office, or authority for private benefit—through bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, speed money, or embezzlement" (United Nations Development Programme 1999: 7). (See Table 1.)

In Table 1, the higher the rank, the worse the corruption. The table shows that, except for the city-states of Singapore and Hong Kong, corruption is rampant in many Asian countries, with Pakistan and Indonesia being perceived as among the most corrupt nations in the world. Why has corruption been minimized in Singapore and Hong Kong on the one hand, and why is it rampant in Indonesia and Pakistan on the other hand?

The extent of corruption in Asian countries depends on two factors: the causes of corruption and the

TABLE 1

Ranking of Twelve Asian Countries on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index from 1995 to 2001								
Country	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Average
Singapore	3	7	9	7	7	6	4	6
Hong Kong	17	18	18	16	15	15	14	16
Japan	20	17	21	25	25	23	21	22
Taiwan	25	29	31	29	32	28	27	28
Malaysia	23	26	32	29	32	36	36	31
South Korea	27	27	34	43	50	48	42	39
Thailand	34	37	39	61	68	60	61	52
China	40	50	41	52	58	63	57	52
Philippines	36	44	40	55	54	69	65	52
India	35	46	45	66	72	69	71	58
Pakistan	39	53	48	71	87	-	79	63
Indonesia	41	45	46	80	96	85	88	69
Sample (N)	41	54	52	85	99	90	91	73

SOURCE: Data from Transparency International (2001).

degree to which government anticorruption measures are effective. Governments that have correctly diagnosed the causes of corruption and taken appropriate measures to eliminate them are more effective than governments that do not observe the same logic of corruption control.

There are three patterns of corruption control in Asian countries, depending on the types of anticorruption agencies and laws employed. The first pattern is adopted in Mongolia, which introduced the Law of Anti-Corruption in April 1996, but has no independent anticorruption agency. The task of controlling corruption is shared among the police, the general prosecutor's office, and the courts. The second pattern of corruption control can be found in China, India, and the Philippines, which employ many anticorruption laws and rely on multiple anticorruption agencies.

The third and most effective pattern of fighting corruption is the combination of comprehensive anticorruption laws impartially implemented by an independent anticorruption agency. Singapore and Hong Kong demonstrate this pattern, and it is not surprising that they are both perceived to be the least corrupt countries in Asia.

Causes of Corruption

In his comparative study of bureaucratic corruption in Hong Kong, India, and Indonesia, Leslie Palmier identified three important causes of corruption: opportunities for corruption, which depend on the degree of involvement of civil servants in administering or controlling lucrative activities; salaries; and policing or the probability of detection and punishment. He contended that the combination of these factors

accounts for the level of corruption in a country. When there are few opportunities, good salaries, and effective policing, there is little corruption, and when there are many opportunities, poor salaries, and weak policing, there is considerable corruption.

Low Salaries Political leaders and civil servants who are poorly paid are more vulnerable to corruption, as they are more likely to succumb to temptation by making use of their position or authority for their personal benefit. Singapore's former prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew (b. 1923), justified raising the salaries of political leaders in March 1985 when he noted that political leaders and civil servants should be paid the top salaries that they deserve to ensure a clean and honest government. If they were underpaid, they would succumb to temptation and be corrupt.

In Indonesia and the Philippines, corruption was a serious problem during the colonial period under the Dutch and Spanish, respectively, as civil servants were poorly paid and had many opportunities for corruption. In 1971, the salaries and allowances of Indonesian civil servants constituted about one-third of their monthly income. In the Philippines, civil servants are paid starvation wages and are forced to sell goods in the office, hold a second job, teach part time, practice their profession after office hours, work as researchers and consultants, and resort to petty corrupt practices. Finally, in contemporary Mongolia, which has a per capita gross domestic product of \$390, the major cause of corruption is the low salaries of civil servants and politicians; the highest monthly salary is \$71, and the lowest monthly salary is \$35.

Ample Opportunities for Corruption David J. Gould and Jose A. Amaro-Reyes observed that the expansion

of the government's role in developing countries contributed to the bureaucracy's monopolistic position and increased the opportunities for administrative discretion. Red tape and enhanced bureaucratic discretion provide ample opportunities for corruption, as civil servants extract bribes from individuals or groups competing for access to such goods and services. Thus, Hong Kong's experience shows that when the government must control certain activities, there is ample room for corruption.

According to Donald Warwick, the opportunities for corruption in Indonesia depend on whether an agency is "wet" or "dry": "Wet" agencies, such as the police, customs, immigration, and internal revenue, provide more opportunities for corruption than "dry" agencies, such as research and administrative departments, which do not interact with the public. Ratus Prawiro, the Indonesian coordinating economics minister from 1989 to 1993, identified the tax office and customs service as the most lucrative "wet" government agencies in Indonesia.

Low Risk of Detection and Punishment As corruption is illegal in all countries, individuals convicted of corruption should be punished. However, in reality, the probability of detection and punishment of corrupt offenses varies in Asia. Corruption thrives in those Asian countries where the public perceives it to be a low-risk, high-reward activity and is not a serious problem in countries where it is perceived as a high-risk, low-reward activity.

For the population in a country to perceive corruption as a high-risk, low-reward activity, the government must publicize through the mass media the detection of corrupt behavior among civil servants and politicians and their punishment according to the law if they are found guilty. Such adverse publicity serves as an effective deterrent against corruption. Conversely, those governments that muzzle the media, such as Indonesia under President Suharto (b. 1921) or India during the emergency of the 1970s, actually encourage corruption.

Pattern 1: Anticorruption Laws without an Independent Agency

Mongolia became the first Communist state in Asia in July 1921 and was dependent on the former Soviet Union for foreign aid, technical assistance, and a large market for its exports until the departure of the Soviet advisers in 1991. Corruption existed in Mongolia during its seven decades of Communist rule. However, the transition from a Soviet-style command economy to a market economy since 1991 has increased the op-

portunities for corruption and made the environment conducive for corruption for three reasons: the poverty of the population, the low salaries of public officials, and the lack of enforcement of the anticorruption laws.

The Law of Anti-Corruption (LAC) requires all Mongolian public officials to declare their incomes and assets and those of their families within a month of assuming their positions and thereafter to submit their annual declarations during the first two weeks of February. Failure to submit such declarations results in fines of between \$6 and \$29. Officials who do not monitor the declarations are fined between \$24 and \$35. Failure to declare gifts or foreign bank accounts results in fines of between \$35 and \$47. Finally, corrupt officials are discharged or displaced according to the procedure provided in the law.

The LAC is ineffective; only three members of Parliament have so far been convicted of corruption since its enactment in April 1996. The LAC's first weakness is that no specific agency is responsible for its implementation; Article 5 indicates that all state organizations are required to perform four common duties to prevent corruption. Second, the penalties imposed on officials for their failure to submit or monitor their annual income and assets declarations are too low to be effective deterrents, and there is no imprisonment.

Corruption offenses are first handled by the Criminal Police Department, which investigates and refers the cases to the Investigation Department. Both departments investigate complaints of corruption against public officials, and if there is evidence to substantiate these complaints, the cases are handed over to the General Prosecutor's Office (GPO). From the GPO, the cases are processed by three levels of courts.

This lengthy procedure for dealing with corruption offenses itself provides opportunities for corruption among the officials involved as each can interpret the law differently. For example, a bribery case by the police can be interpreted as a smuggling offense by the GPO and as illegal crossing of borders by the courts. As judicial salaries are low, individuals can pay the poorly paid judges to make decisions in their favor.

Pattern 2: Anticorruption Laws with Many Agencies

China, India, and the Philippines are examples of this pattern. China's battle against corruption has intensified as economic reform presented more opportunities for corruption; India has battled corruption since its independence in 1947, and the Philippines began fighting corruption in the 1950s.

China As corruption was endemic in China during the post-1978 reform period, the regime of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) relied on the Criminal Law of 1979 as the major law for curbing corruption. This law was amended twice: in 1982, to impose heavier penalties for corruption; and in 1997, to link the penalty for corruption to the amount involved. For example, a person found guilty of corruption involving more than 100,000 yuan (\$12,000) is punished by ten years' imprisonment or the death penalty.

The various anticorruption agencies in China are organized along three sectors. The Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP) was formed in 1978 to combat corruption in the judicial sector. Below the SPP, the Bureau for Embezzlement and Bribery of the People's Procuratorate handles and prevents cases of embezzlement and bribery. Given China's vast domain, it is not surprising that there are 3,563 agencies for embezzlement and bribery. In December 1986, the Ministry of Supervision (MOS) was reorganized to curb corruption and maladministration in the civil service. Finally, the Central Disciplinary Inspection Committee (CDIC) was created in 1978 to check corruption among the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members.

Even though the MOS had received more than 700,000 reports in 1993, both the CDIC and MOS failed to reduce corruption because of the lack of political will to deal with corruption among senior party members. Until recently, few senior party officials have been convicted of corruption because they can seek help from their protectors in the CCP hierarchy. However, since 1999, Premier Zhu Rongji (b. 1928) has waged a crusade against corrupt officials; in March 2000, Hu Changqing, the deputy governor of Jiangxi province, became the highest-ranking public official to be executed. One month later, the deputy mayor of Guigang city, Li Chenglong, was executed for taking \$478,000 worth of bribes.

India The Prevention of Corruption Act of 1947 is implemented by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), the state anticorruption bureaus, and the state vigilance commissions. The CBI was created in April 1963 to investigate cases of bribery and corruption, but it could do so in a state only with the consent of the local government. This requirement became a problem after the decline of the Congress Party, as some state governments withdrew the consent given by their predecessors. The CVC was formed in February 1964 to investigate complaints of corruption against civil servants. Apart from requesting reports from ministries, departments, and public enterprises to check and su-

pervise their vigilance and anticorruption efforts, the CVC can also request the CBI to investigate a case.

The CBI, however, is perceived by the public as ineffective; only 300 of the 1,349 cases (22.2 percent) in 1972 and 164 of the 1,231 cases (13.3 percent) in 1992 resulted in conviction. The CBI tends to concentrate on minor wrongdoers; its record in investigating more important cases is dismal: There have been no convictions.

The Philippines The Philippines has relied on seven laws and thirteen antigraft agencies since its fight against corruption began in the 1950s. The Forfeiture Law of 1955 authorizes the state to acquire property illegally obtained by corrupt officials, but there were no convictions after four years. The most important law is the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960, which identifies eleven types of corrupt acts among public officials and requires them to file every two years a detailed and sworn statement of their assets and liabilities. The other laws are the presidential decrees (PD) issued by President Ferdinand Marcos (1917–1989) after the establishment of martial law in September 1972. For example, PD No. 6, which identifies twenty-nine administrative offenses and empowers heads of departments to dismiss guilty officials immediately, has resulted in the termination of nearly 8,000 public officials.

The large number of anticorruption agencies in the Philippines can be attributed to the frequent changes in political leadership; such agencies are either created or abolished by the president. During May 1950 and January 1966, five anticorruption agencies were formed and dissolved, during five changes in political leadership. President Marcos created another five anticorruption agencies, the most important of which were the Sandiganbayan (Special Anti-Graft Court) and the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman), which were established in July 1979.

Similarly, President Corazon Aquino (b. 1933) created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and the Presidential Committee on Public Ethics and Accountability (PCPEA) during her term of office. However, both agencies were ineffective. The PCGG itself was accused of favoritism and incompetence as five of its agents faced graft charges and thirteen more were under investigation, and the PCPEA lacked staff and funds. Aquino's anticorruption stance was honest, but she lacked the political will to punish corrupt officials.

In 1994, President Fidel Ramos (b. 1928) formed the Presidential Commission against Graft and Cor-

ruption (PCAGC). In June 1997, the Inter-Agency Anti-Graft Coordinating Council was set up to control graft in government through the sharing of information and resources among the Commission on Audit, the Civil Service Commission, the National Bureau of Investigation, and the PCAGC. However, the Philippines' sixty-fifth ranking on Transparency International's 2001 Corruption Perceptions Index reflects the ineffectiveness of its anticorruption strategy. Eufemio Domingo, the head of the PCAGC, concluded that the anticorruption agencies in the Philippines were not working because the anticorruption laws were not implemented.

Pattern 3: Anticorruption Laws with an Independent Agency

Singapore and Hong Kong, the two Asian countries that show relatively low levels of corruption, are examples of this pattern. In both cases, severe corruption was overcome through the implementation of this pattern.

Singapore The Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO) was Singapore's first anticorruption law, introduced in December 1937, and it was implemented by the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) within the police force. The ACB was ineffective as it did not have sufficient staff and resources, and it failed to deal impartially with police corruption. The discovery by the British colonial government that police officers were involved in the theft of S\$400,000 of opium in October 1951 demonstrated clearly the ACB's inability to curb corruption. The British authorities realized the importance of creating an independent anticorruption agency that was separate from the police. Accordingly, the ACB was dissolved and replaced by the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in October 1952.

When the People's Action Party (PAP) government assumed office in June 1959, corruption was a way of life in Singapore and was perceived to be a low-risk, high-reward activity. To minimize corruption and change the public perception of corruption to a high-risk, low-reward activity, the PAP leaders initiated a comprehensive anticorruption strategy in 1960 by enacting the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) and strengthening the CPIB. As Singapore was a poor country with a per capita gross domestic product of S\$1,330 (\$443) in 1960, the PAP government could not afford to raise the salaries of civil servants. Accordingly, it was left with the alternative of strengthening the existing anticorruption laws to reduce the opportunities for corruption and to enhance the penalty for corruption.

The POCA of 1960 removed the POCO's weaknesses, increased the penalty for corruption to five years' imprisonment and/or a fine of S\$10,000, and gave the CPIB more powers to perform its duties. The penalty for corruption was increased to S\$100,000 in 1989. The CPIB has grown from eight officers in 1960 to its current size of seventy-seven staff. While the CPIB investigates corruption complaints in both the public and private sectors, its emphasis is on misconduct by public officials; it also examines the practices and procedures in the civil service to reduce opportunities for corruption. The CPIB can perform its duties without a large staff as its location within the prime minister's office and its legal powers enable it to obtain the required cooperation from both public and private organizations.

Hong Kong Following Singapore, the POCO was introduced in Hong Kong in 1948 and implemented by the ACB of the CID of the Royal Hong Kong Police Force. The ACB was separated from the CID in 1952, but it kept its name and remained within the police. In 1968, the ACB reviewed the POCO and recommended a scrutiny of the anticorruption laws of Singapore and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). A study team visited the two countries during 1968 to examine how their anticorruption laws worked in practice. The study team was impressed with the independence of the anticorruption agencies in these countries and attributed Singapore's success in minimizing corruption to the CPIB's independence from the police. The knowledge gained from the study tour contributed to the enactment of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) on 15 May 1971.

The introduction of the POBO in May 1971 led to the upgrading of the ACB into an Anti-Corruption Office (ACO). The escape to England of a corruption suspect, Chief Superintendent P. F. Godber, on 8 June 1973, angered the public and undermined the ACO's credibility. The governor, Sir Murray MacLehose, decided to form a new anticorruption agency that was independent of the police.

The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) was formed on 15 February 1974 with the enactment of the ICAC Ordinance and was entrusted with two tasks: to stop corruption and to increase public confidence. The ICAC is independent in terms of structure, personnel, finance, and power. Before the handover of Hong Kong to China in July 1997, the ICAC was directly responsible to the governor, and its commissioner reported directly to him and had easy access. Since July 1997, the ICAC reports directly to the chief executive of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and is directly responsible to him.

Corruption in Asia Today

For anticorruption measures to be effective, they must be properly designed to attack the causes of corruption and must be supported by the political leadership. This explains why the third pattern is more effective than the first two; the experiences of Singapore and Hong Kong have shown the critical importance of political will in curbing corruption. The political leaders in a country must be sincerely committed to the elimination of corruption by demonstrating exemplary conduct and adopting a modest lifestyle themselves. Those found guilty of corruption must be punished, regardless of their position or status in society. Political will is absent when the rich and famous are protected from prosecution for corruption, and only ordinary people are caught.

Political will is the most important prerequisite for implementing a comprehensive anticorruption strategy. It ensures the allocation of adequate personnel and resources and the impartial enforcement of the anticorruption laws by the anticorruption agency. Thus, even though the Philippines has the most anticorruption laws and agencies in Asia, it has been ineffective in curbing corruption because of the lack of political will among the political leaders. Similarly, the anticorruption strategies in China, India, and Mongolia are ineffective because of the absence of political will in those countries.

In addition to political will, Pattern 3 is also more effective because the anticorruption agency is a specialized agency dedicated to the task of minimizing corruption. The agency is not distracted by other competing priorities. For example, India's CBI is not only concerned with fighting corruption but also with organized crime and terrorism. In contrast, Singapore's CPIB and Hong Kong's ICAC focus their resources on curbing corruption.

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CORRUPTION—CHINA The Chinese term *tanwu* is similar to the Western term "corruption," meaning the abuse of a public position to line one's own pocket. Opinion polls in the 1980s and 1990s show that the population regards corruption as the most important social problem. Even the party leadership realized that the phenomenon was seriously threatening its legitimacy, and has repeatedly started anticorruption campaigns. China is now accused of being one of the most corrupt countries in Asia.

Corruption has a long history. Even in early classical documents, affairs covered by the current meaning were regarded as moral depravity on the part of the government (and consequently also of society), as errors that violated the prevailing moral code. An emperor who was "corrupt" in this sense of the word had betrayed his Mandate of Heaven. Excessive public corruption was often the cause of rebellions and uprisings such as the Taiping rebellion in the nineteenth century. In this early period there were already criminal punishments for what is today referred to as corruption. The criminal code of the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) included a catalog of strict punishments for all offenses related to "dereliction of duty in office."

In the People's Republic, corruption has been defined differently in each period according to the political aims. In politically radical times it was identified as ideological deviation, supposedly antisocialist or bureaucratic behavior. In public, however, the topic was mainly taboo. Only at the end of the 1970s, as reform policies began to emerge, was the press permitted to report cases of corruption again. To begin with, the

"Gang of Four" were held responsible, but the dramatic increase in corruption in the 1980s made new explanations necessary.

There are factors embedded in the system that favor corruption, for example overcentralization of the economy, the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) monopoly position, lack of a clear division between public and private spheres, bureaucratic planning, and state control of resources. In addition, there are psychological factors such as the failure of the revolutionary model, changes in values, and development deficiencies such as shortages of goods and resources, and the town-country divide. The introduction of reforms (decentralization, openings to the outside world, extension of market mechanisms, migration, and diversification of property structures) has led to increases in corruption in some areas. Since the CCP's monopoly on power has not been affected, and since no instruments to control cadres have been introduced, functionaries can use the CCP's monopoly on power and their right to distribute goods and resources quite freely to line their own pockets. Some officials, however, have been accused of corruption and subsequently punished—including Chen Xitong, the former party secretary and member of the Political Bureau of the CCP, who was sentenced to many years in prison in 1998; and Chen Xitong, the vice-chairman of the National People's Congress, who was executed in August 2000.

Thomas Heberer

See also: Guanxi; People's Republic of China; Qin dynasty

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CORRUPTION—KOREA Known as the "Korean disease," corruption pervades South Korean society and has manifested itself in many forms in everyday life. Widespread corruption, such as influence peddling, cronyism, and bribery, has long been a part of Korean culture and has served as a catalyst for change in Korean history as far back as the Koryo dynasty (918–1392 CE), when corruption among Buddhist monks eventually led to the downfall of the

dynasty and the adoption of neo-Confucianism in the following Yi dynasty (1392–1910). More recently, the April Students' Revolution of 1960 was a revolt against Republic of Korea President Syngman Rhee's corrupt administration.

Although corruption occurs worldwide, corruption in Korea has exhibited unique characteristics. The centralization of power and the abuse of power within the governmental and bureaucratic structure of South Korea have provided opportunities for individuals to accrue power and influence.

Interestingly enough, preventing widespread corruption has been the focus of successive presidential administrations as the lethal effects of corruption have created a public backlash. During the 1990s, a series of accidents was blamed on corrupt bureaucrats and inspectors. Yet changing the entrenched culture where gift-giving and kickbacks are routine has proved difficult as corruption and graft have been tied to the highest levels of government, with many of the politicians and bureaucrats charged with curbing corruption having themselves become corrupt. Moreover, governmental agencies charged with investigating corruption have often failed to investigate wrongdoing and indict those responsible in criminal corruption cases.

Things may change in the Republic of Korea with the passage in 2001 of legislation that tightens anti-corruption laws by protecting whistle-blowers, requiring civil servants to report wrongdoing, and allowing for the confiscation of bribes.

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COURTYARDS The courtyard house is the archetypal form of traditional Chinese dwelling. Its basic design of a central courtyard surrounded on four sides by buildings or pavilions parallels the basic model of traditional Chinese-built environments, including cities and gardens: a central open space enclosed by buildings. The buildings face the courtyard, which

provides outdoor space for leisure activities, work, air circulation and ventilation, water drainage, and storage. Access to the enclosed courtyard house is provided through a south or east entrance. Carved arches or ornate door lintels signify the class and trade of the resident, and many entrances are flanked by stone lions. A courtyard complex may be expanded by adding more courtyards in front, in back, or on either wing. Different regional variations cater to local environmental conditions. In Beijing and other northern cities, courtyards are large in area to admit more sunlight, while in southern cities they are smaller so that more shade and better ventilation are provided.

During the chaotic Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976, many families were evicted from their courtyard homes in Beijing because of their "bad class backgrounds." Following the Tangshan earthquake of 1976, refugees poured into the city and took shelter in the courtyard gardens, and many stayed. With the current economic boom in China, land prices have skyrocketed, and urban renewal programs to clear neighborhoods of one-story courtyard houses to make room for multistory buildings are under way. Courtyard houses are becoming mere memories.

Robert Y. Eng

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CRAM SCHOOLS "Cram school" is the English translation for *juku*, the Japanese word for a wide range of private, after-school schools. During the Edo period, *juku* included the highly academic private academies organized around one scholar who was renowned in a particular field. Some offered instruction in Japanese musical instruments, abacus, calligraphy, martial arts, and tea ceremony. When the modern education system was introduced into Japan at the end of the nineteenth century, academic *juku* almost disappeared.

In the latter half of the twentieth century, *juku* has meant private classes, usually intended as preparation for entrance exams to high school and university, or a type of remedial education. Nonacademic *juku*, also known as *okeiko*, provide instruction in traditional arts and defensive skills, as well as enrichment classes such as music lessons. *Juku* range in size from home-based operations to large nationwide corporations.

Education in Japan has been described as having a dual structure. The cram-school industry is the informal side, and public and private schools comprise the formal side. In public schools all students must learn at the same pace, but it is widely acknowledged that entrance exams to the best high schools, and therefore the top universities, require more advanced instruction. Students from both public and private schools, therefore, attend *juku* to maximize their chances in the examination competition. If students fail the entrance exam to the university of their choice, then they may also attend an intensive one-year exam preparatory school known as *yobiko*.

In 1998, the Education Ministry reported that 37 percent of public elementary students, 72 percent of public junior high, and 35 percent of high school students were attending cram schools. The increasing role of *juku* as a supplement to the formal education system in Japan was acknowledged for the first time in the early 2000s by the Education Ministry. On a final note, while the *juku* phenomenon is sometimes seen as typically Japanese, similar cram schools exist in Korea and Taiwan, where they fulfill similar functions.

Tetsuya Kobayashi and Diane Musselwhite

See also: **Japan—Education System**

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CRANGANUR (2002 est. pop. 36,000). Cranganur (Cranganore, Kadungalloor) is a small city on the Alwaye river estuary in northern Kerala state, India, lying 26 kilometers to the north of Cochin. While of minor economic importance, exporting some timber and peppers, in ancient times it was the site of one of the great entrepôt centers of the East, the Roman emporium of Muziris (its Greek name).

Muziris was the best harbor on the Kerala coast (before silting occurred). Saint Thomas is thought to have

founded a church there in 52 CE. Muziris in 341 CE was the seat of government of Cheraman Perumal, a king of the early ninth century, who sanctioned the first settlement of Jews and Christians on this coast. The town has a synagogue three centuries old, and a Portuguese tomb dating to 1551.

In classical times the port exported tropical lumber, pearls, ivory, silk, diamonds, sapphires, and pepper. The town was so important to the Romans that they maintained a legion of soldiers here, around five hundred to one thousand men, and the city boasted a temple to Augustus (undiscovered, but probably submerged in the estuary). An ancient Tamil poem captures the bustle of the ancient port: "Agitating the white foam of the Periyaru [River] the beautifully built ships of the Yavanas [Ionians] come with gold and return with pepper, and Muziris resounds with the noise."

Paul Hockings

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CRICKET A sport originating in a small Hampshire village in seventeenth-century England, cricket was introduced to South Asia by the British in the early eighteenth century. The first recorded cricket match in South Asia took place in 1721 in Cambai, western India, between the officers and men of a British ship. Although at first played only by the British, cricket eventually gained a following among local populations. Indians formed their first cricket club, the Orient Cricket Club, in Bombay in 1848. Today cricket is immensely popular throughout the subcontinent and is regarded as a national sport in several South Asian countries.

Cricket is a bat-and-ball game played between two teams of eleven players each. Each side takes turns at bat, while the fielding and bowling side attempts to get the opposing batsmen out for the least number of runs. The team with the highest number of runs wins. Most cricket matches are concluded in one day, but games at higher levels of competition may last longer. For example, Test matches (international matches between the top ten cricket-playing nations) are played over five days.

The subcontinent has produced world-famous cricketers, such as Ranjitsinhji (1872–1933), after whom India's Ranji trophy is named, and the Nawab



CRICKET

As this notice in a Bombay newspaper of 1825 illustrates, it was important to find "amusements" for "the ladies" who would not be among the cricket players.

There will be tents for the ladies, and as the cricketers are all to be dressed in an appropriate uniform, we anticipate one of the most gay and animated scenes that has ever graced our island.

We feel infinite pleasure in announcing amusements which tend to counteract the effects of this enervating climate, by raising the spirits from apathy, and the physical powers from that feminine indolence which is generally rewarded by premature old age, skin hanging in drapery, and muscles reduced to pack thread.

Source: Hilton Brown. (1948) *The Sabibs*. London: William Hodge & Co, 184–185.

of Pataudi (1910–1952). Both of these players represented England before India was accorded Test status.

In the modern era, India and Pakistan have been the traditional cricketing powers of Asia. In 1983, with stars such as Kapil Dev and Sunil Gavaskar, India won the Cricket World Cup, becoming the first country from South Asia to win this major international competition. Current players such as Sachin Tendulkar are national heroes in India. Pakistan, too, has fielded some excellent national teams, especially in the early 1990s under its legendary captain Imran Khan. Waqar Younis, Shoaib Akhtar, and Wasim Akram are among the current Pakistani stars. In recent years Sri Lanka has performed well in international competition, while Bangladesh attained full Test status in the summer of 2000 (the International Cricket Council determines which countries compete at this highest level of cricket). India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh play regular series against other Test nations (England, the West Indies, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Australia, and New Zealand). These games create intense interest among fans of cricket in South Asia and are widely regarded as highlights of the sporting calendar.

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CUI JIAN (b. 1961), Chinese singer and musician. Cui Jian is China's first rock and roll star. Born to musician parents of Korean descent, Cui was raised in Beijing during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). He began learning trumpet at age fourteen and in 1981, joined the Beijing Philharmonic Orchestra as a trumpet player. In his spare time he explored popular music.

While Cui's first album was a largely unnoticed collection of pop music covers (*Lanzigui*, 1984), he soon began writing his own music and lyrics and developing his trademark gravel-voice style, drawing inspiration from Western rock bands like the Beatles, the Rolling Stones, and the Police. In Beijing in May 1985, Cui performed one of his first rock songs, "Nothing to My Name," a disconsolate ballad melding western rock with traditional Chinese melodies and instrumentation. The performance rocketed him to stardom and the song remains his signature hit and an anthem of loss for the Tiananmen generation, the youth who witnessed the bloody crackdown on student democracy activists on 4 June 1989.

Cui's albums include *Rock and Roll on the New Long March* (1987), *Solution* (1991), *Balls Under the Red Flag* (1994), and *Power of the Powerless* (1998).

Alexa Olesen

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CUISINE—AFGHANISTAN Afghani cuisine blends the flavors and ingredients of Central Asia, the Middle East, South Asia, and China. Afghanistan's lo-



An Afghani girl carrying bread on a street of damaged buildings in Kabul. (BACI/CORBIS)



SAMOOS-I-YIRAKOT

Samoos (or samosas) are a popular dish in Afghanistan and South Asia. Samoos are fun to make and are a good appetizer or hors d'oeuvre.

1 tbs. corn oil
 1 medium onion; chopped
 1 garlic clove; chopped
 1 potato; peeled and cut into small pieces
 ½ cup cauliflower; chopped
 ½ cup carrot; chopped
 ½ cup green peas, fresh or frozen
 ½ cup thin-sliced green beans
 ¼ tbs. salt
 ¼ tbs. freshly ground black pepper
 1 cup corn oil, for deep-frying

Mix the meal, egg and salt together, adding just enough water to make a moist dough that holds together. Set aside. Heat the oil in a skillet, add the onion and garlic, and stir-fry over moderate heat until light brown, about 3 minutes. Set aside. Take the potato and ½ cup each of any other 3 vegetables and blanch in boiling water for 5 minutes. Drain well. Add these to the pan with the onion and garlic and stir-fry over moderate heat for 3 minutes, to mix well. Add salt and pepper. Cool. Take 1 heaping tablespoon of the dough and press it out on a flat surface into a 2½-inch square. Put 1 tablespoon of the vegetable mixture on the bottom half of the square and fold it over into a triangle. Prepare all the samoosi this way. Heat the oil in a wok or skillet and brown the turnovers over moderate heat for about 3 minutes. Drain on paper towels. Serve warm. Makes about 20 turnovers.

Source: Afghan Cooking Channel. Retrieved 15 March 2002, from: <http://www.afghan-network.net/Cooking>.

cation at the hub of the Silk Road accounts for the wide range of culinary influences on the country, with typical dishes ranging from traditional Indian breads to meat kabobs that are the staples of Middle Eastern cuisine.

Breads (such as nan and chapattis) and noodles are central to meals. Short-grain rice is used for *bata* (sticky rice), and long-grain rice is the basis for a wide variety of flavorful pilafs. Fried turnovers stuffed with potatoes (*boulanee*) or vegetables (*samoosi*) are popular



THE TRADITIONAL AFGHAN DIET

"Necessity compels the Afghans to live soberly and frugally, and they subsist on fruit nearly half the year. Meat, unless swimming in grease, is not approved; and no meat may be eaten unless it is *halal*, that is to say the animal must have had its face turned towards Mecca and its throat cut in a particular part, to the accompaniment of certain words of prayer. Rice and wheaten bread are consumed by the well-to-do, the former generally cooked with meat and fat in the shape of *pilao*. The principal food of the villagers and nomads, out of the fruit season is *krut*, a kind of porridge made of boiled Indian corn, bruised between two stones, or simply unleavened bread, with which rancid grease is eaten."

Source: Imperial Gazetteer of India: Afghanistan and Nepal. (1908) Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 28.

appetizers. Spices such as saffron, cumin, mint, cardamom, orange peel, cinnamon, and Chinese chives are part of many dishes; yogurt, nuts, and raisins are often-used ingredients as well.

Vegetables are more widely available than meat. Pumpkin is used as the main ingredient for turnovers and soups, and eggplant and spinach figure prominently in many dishes. Lamb is the most popular meat and is used in curries, kabobs, and stews (*korma*). Recipes also include ground beef, chicken, and goat. Although spices in these dishes are wide ranging and exotic, Afghan cooking is considered to be somewhat mild compared to other Asian cuisines.

Seasonal fresh fruits such as melons and grapes are often served at the conclusion of a meal. Sweet treats are considered an extravagance and are not routinely served, but such foods as *firmee* (a milky pudding flavored with rose water and pistachios), baklavah, and halvah would be among the dessert items for special occasions.

Marcy Ross

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CUISINE—CENTRAL ASIA Central Asian cuisine encompasses the traditional culinary practices of the region's five countries, whose methods of food preparation can be divided into two groups. Historically, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were populated primarily by nomadic peoples, who for centuries herded sheep, camels, and horses. Their constant movement left no time for agriculture or complex cooking; the people of these countries relied mainly on the meat and milk provided by their herds, with very little else to diversify their diet. In contrast, inhabitants of the more settled regions of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan cultivated crops and developed sophisticated cooking techniques, thanks to greater availability of produce as well as their ability to spend time at the hearth.

Central Asia's largely harsh and arid climate meant that even in the agricultural regions people relied heavily on meat and cultured dairy products, with relatively few vegetables beyond hardy root crops. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, however, many new crops were introduced, and as the traditional nomadic way of life began to disappear, more garden crops were sown, a process accelerated by the use of widespread irrigation during the Soviet period. Today, after more than a century of change and outside influence, the differences among the Central Asian countries are far less pronounced than they once were, and it is possible to make certain generalizations about the foods of the region.

Meats and Meat Dishes

Meat remains an important food source throughout Central Asia. Lamb is the most popular, although the Turkmens favor mountain goat or kid, while Kazakhs are partial to organ meats. The Kyrgyz consider horsemeat sausage a delicacy. The two most wide-



Two women in Old Town, Khiva, Uzbekistan, make flatbread in an outdoor oven. (WOLFGANG KAEHLER/CORBIS)

spread methods for preparing meat are grilling and boiling (or steaming). Uzbekistan is renowned for its many varieties of kabob (skewered grilled meat, either in whole pieces or ground). The excellent *kiyma* kabob is made by shaping seasoned ground lamb around a skewer.

Turkmen and Tajik meat cookery also depends on the grill, but in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan boiled meats are more common. An ancient dish still eaten today is *kavurdak*, meat that has been stewed in its own fat and then stored in vessels for long keeping. Meat is also preserved by drying it on tall poles in the sun. Both methods reflect the necessities of itinerant life.

Meat is used to flavor a variety of soups; especially prized is the *lagman* found throughout Central Asia, a hearty soup of lamb, carrots, and noodles. Unlike many clear European and Asian soups, the soups of Central Asia are nearly always stew-like, enriched with thickeners like potatoes, chickpeas, or mung beans. These soups tend to be rich and filling from the addition of the prized fat from fat-tailed sheep.

Domestic fowl is not as popular as red meat; more highly appreciated are wild fowl such as pheasant and quail. Since pork is proscribed under Islamic law, it is consumed solely by the minority non-Muslim population. Fish is regularly eaten only in regions that have a significant water source, such as western Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan bordering on the Caspian Sea.

Dairy Products

The second most important component of Central Asian cuisine is the wide array of cultured dairy products made from the milk of sheep and camels and, to a lesser extent, goats and cows. These include *koumiss* (slightly fermented milk), *ayran* (yogurt mixed with water), *kaymak* (clotted cream), and *suzma* (yogurt cheese). Uzbek cuisine in particular boasts numerous milk-based soups, one of the best being *shirkovok* (milk soup with pumpkin and rice). Eggs are not significant in Central Asian cookery.

Grains, Legumes, and Breads

Central Asian cuisine is perhaps best known for its extensive variety of rice pilafs (*palov*). Uzbekistan alone is said to have one hundred different types, and their proper preparation is considered an art. Often legumes such as chickpeas (*nut*) and mung beans (*masb*) are mixed with the rice for extra protein. Pilafs are also made from other grains including millet, barley, and sorgho. All of the Central Asian countries enjoy tasty flatbreads, dumplings, and pies made with wheat-flour dough. *Manty* (large steamed dumplings filled with

meat or vegetables), *chuchvara* (small boiled dumplings), and *samsa* (baked or fried pies filled with meat or vegetables) are encountered throughout the region. Kazakhstan is also known for its *beliashi* (open-faced pies fried in a skillet). Central Asian flatbreads are baked in a *tandyr*, a clay oven similar to the Indian tandoor. *Non*, a large, flat round bread pricked in a decorative pattern with a special instrument, is the most popular. These round breads were originally baked to mimic the shape of the sun. They are eaten out of hand or used as a plate to hold meat or vegetable stews.

Seasonings

Although different regions favor different spices and seasonings, certain flavors characterize Central Asian cuisine as a whole. Onion is used abundantly, as is the fat of the fat-tailed sheep, which lends intense flavor to meat and vegetable dishes. Hot red pepper and black pepper add heat to a wide variety of dishes. *Zira* (cumin), sesame seed, nigella, basil, dill, cilantro, parsley, and mint are all used to enliven foods from soups to salads to pilafs. Cinnamon and saffron are used less widely. Garlic adds intensity to many dishes, while dried barberries contribute a sour tang.

Beverages

Tea, either black or green, is the most popular beverage of Central Asia; the preference for one type over the other depends on the locale. Kazakhs tend to drink more black tea, while the Kyrgyz enjoy green tea served with milk or cream and slightly salted. In Uzbekistan black tea is drunk more often than green. Black tea, often in traditional pressed brick form rather than loose leaf, is boiled with milk and served as a rich beverage. Central Asians drink tea from a *pialy*, a bowl-like cup without a handle, and serve it as a ritual part of their hospitality. Other beverages include the aforementioned *koumiss* and *ayran* as well as a variety of refreshing fruit drinks with sugar (*sherbet*).

Fruits and Vegetables

Kazakhstan is the birthplace of the apple (the name of the capital city, Almaty, means "father of apples"), and Uzbekistan and Tajikistan produce exceptionally sweet melons. Other fruits include apricots, peaches, cherries, quince, persimmons, and pomegranates; Central Asian raisins and dried apricots are among the best in the world. The most frequently encountered vegetables are root crops such as carrots, turnips, radishes, onions, and garlic. Carrots alone come in a surprising variety of shapes and colors and have a rich, sweet flavor. Pumpkins and squash are frequently used

in soups and as fillings for dumplings and pies. Typically, vegetables are not served alone but are added to soups or paired with meats or pilafs.

Sweets

Traditional Central Asian sweets consist of fruits or nuts simmered in a sugar- or honey-based syrup, served either as a compote or allowed to dry and crystallize. Often fruits are boiled down to make *bekmes*, a concentrated syrup. Other desserts include halvah, made from ground sesame seeds, and dough fried in coils or balls and sweetened with syrup. Although European-style cookies and cakes were introduced under Russian rule, they never displaced the traditional Eastern sweets that still constitute the best ending to a Central Asian meal. Ice cream, however, is extremely popular.

Two centuries of Russian domination did little to change the traditional foodways of the region, and Central Asian cuisine today still reflects a historical reliance on meats and cultured dairy products. The local foods also reveal the influence of centuries of trade, from Chinese noodles to tandoor-baked flatbreads to Persian-style pilafs. Central Asian cuisine is much more diverse now than it was in the past, with vegetables and fruits making up a larger part of the diet. One thing that has remained constant over the centuries, however, is Central Asia's great tradition of hospitality, which is still very much alive in the region's many *chai-khanas* (tea houses) as well as in private homes.

Darra Goldstein

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CUISINE—CHINA China's cuisine has spread to all corners of the earth, and the lavishness and variety of Chinese meals is legendary. Yet, through most of history, the vast majority of Chinese have eaten very simple fare, and have considered themselves lucky if they had enough of that. Dense population, unpredictable weather, poverty, and progressive environmental damage combined to give the country a reputation in literature as a land of famine. Only since about 1970 has China been free of major food shortages. The cuisine developed its sophistication partly

through the constant need to use every possible resource with maximum efficiency.

History

Early humans populated East Asia approximately one million years ago. They lived by hunting, fishing, and gathering plants and shellfish. Agriculture began before 8000 BCE in China. Recent finds have shown that by this time rice agriculture was well established along the Chang (Yangtze) River and agriculture based on foxtail millet (*Setaria italica*) was established in the drier, cooler drainage basin of the Huang (Yellow) River. By 4000 BCE, cultivation or domestication of many of the basic elements of Chinese food was already widespread: rice, Chinese cabbages, pigs, chickens, sheep, cattle, and various fruits and nuts. Hunting and fishing were still important, however. Archeological finds have revealed that by 3000 BCE a wealth of sophisticated cooking implements and eating utensils existed. Inequalities in wealth were also well established by this time. Perhaps wheat and barley had also arrived from the Near East. They appear by 2000 BCE, but were rare until later.

Chinese cuisine enters the written record in the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE), when recipes begin to appear in ritual texts. Supernatural beings and human elders had to have food prepared according to specific rules. The *Book of Songs* (*Shi Jing*), a collection of folk and popular songs from about 1000–500 BCE, includes the names of most of the commonly eaten plants and animals. Although the record of ritual cooking runs primarily to meat—always a luxury and feast food—and grain, with liberal amounts of *jiu*, mildly alcoholic drinks brewed from fermented grains (usually translated "wine," but technically beer or ale), the *Book of Songs* gives a wider perspective, with mentions of vegetables, fruits, nuts, herbs, fish, and game. Grain was the staple food, with vegetables a very long second in importance. The basic distinction between *fan* (cooked grain) and *ts'ai* (vegetables, or any dish eaten with grain) was already being made. It continues to be basic in Chinese food. Soybeans were known, but not much used.

In the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), contacts with West and South Asia brought new things, including grapes and wine, but, more important, advanced milling technology. This enabled the Chinese to do far more with wheat and soybeans, both of which need to be ground to be useful. It is probable that China's enormous wealth of wheat products—noodles, dumplings, breads, steamed buns, fermented pastes, sauces, gluten products, and more—began its evolution at this time. Soybeans were used for soy sauce and

pastes, and probably for tofu (bean curd), though the evidence is thin.

In the next several centuries, Chinese cooking became more elaborate. In the Song dynasty (960–1267), growing prosperity and the arrival of new foodstuffs led to the development of the complex, sophisticated cuisine we know today. Crucial to this, according to modern scholars, was the development of a middle class. Unable to afford the sheer quantity of game and domestic meat that dominated the tables of the nobility, the middle class developed complex culinary techniques, making small amounts of ordinary ingredients into refined, elegant fare. Buddhism, which values simplicity, contributed to this development. In the northwest, Persian and Central Asian influences were particularly strong, due to trade along the Silk Road.

When the Mongols conquered China and founded the Yuan dynasty (1267–1368), influences from western Asia flowed into China, profoundly shaping court cuisine. Dishes from Baghdad and Kashmir were served along with Mongol and Chinese foods. Such influences remained primarily in the north and west. The east developed a highly complex cuisine that made much use of fish, shellfish, and vegetables.

The Ming dynasty (1368–1644), a native Chinese dynasty, reasserted Chinese traditions, partly because of new nationalism. Cuisine perceived as central Asian became steadily less popular. Dairy products, for instance, were popular in west and north China during the entire period of Asian influence but lost ground during the Ming dynasty. Animal herding was displaced by grain agriculture in many areas as the population rose. Most East Asian adults cannot digest lactose (milk sugar) and get indigestion from fresh milk, but they once consumed much yogurt and similar products in which the lactose is destroyed by fermentation.

The Ming dynasty saw the arrival of new foreign influences. Portuguese and Spanish traders introduced New World crops domesticated by Native American peoples. China's economy was radically transformed by maize, sweet potatoes, peanuts, tomatoes, chili peppers, tobacco, and minor crops from pineapples to guavas. Maize and sweet potatoes (and, later, white potatoes) became famine staples and animal feeds; peanuts were a new source of protein and oil.

The Qing dynasty (1644–1912), China's last imperial dynasty, saw a steady increase in European influence on China. The expansion of the tea trade integrated China into the expanding world trade in foodstuffs. After the fall of the Qing dynasty, the incorporation of China into the global economy pro-



CHA XIAO BAO (ROAST PORK DUMPLINGS)

Dim sum or yum cha dates back to the tenth century when little dumplings began to be served with tea. These treats have evolved considerably since then and are one of the most delicate and complex Chinese dishes.

Dough

20 oz. flour
1 cup sugar
6 tsp. baking powder
1½ tsp. white vinegar
2 tbsp. lard
6 oz. lukewarm water
wax paper
2 egg whites

Filling

10 oz. roast pork
1 clove garlic
1 sprig scallion
5 tbsp. cornstarch
6 tbsp. water

Sauce

4 tbsp. sugar
4 tbsp. light soy sauce
1 tbsp. dark soy sauce
2 tbsp. oyster sauce
1 tsp. sesame oil
dash of pepper
⅔ cup water

For the filling, start by frying the garlic and scallion in 2 tbsp oil. Add the sauce ingredients and the roast pork. Thicken with the starch and water.

For the dough, sift the flour with the baking powder. Heap the flour, making a crater in the middle. Add sugar, beaten egg white, vinegar, lard, and water. Mix the ingredients together and knead into a ball. Leave dough to rest for half an hour. Then roll the dough between your palms into a long cylinder about 1½-inches wide. Cut into 20 pieces.

Flatten each piece of dough into a disk and add the filling. Bring the edges up and gather at the center. Put each dumpling on a piece of wax paper and put into a steamer. Bring the water to a rolling boil. Put the steamer over the boiling water, cover and let steam for 10 minutes over high heat.

Source: "John Sui's Recipes by Request." Retrieved March 15 2002, from <http://www.galaxylink.com.hk/~john/food/cooking/canton/chaxiaobao.htm>.

ceeded apace. China has taken advantage of the global economy to spread Chinese cuisine worldwide. Such items as soy sauce and tea are known and used throughout the world.

Current Changes

Chinese food continues to evolve and change. One change—deplored by traditional gourmets—is the coming of monosodium glutamate, which was isolated from seaweed in Japan in the early twentieth century and only since 1960s spread into Chinese cooking. Another addition is the "fortune cookie," invented by a Chinese bakery in California in the late nineteenth century; it reached East Asia in the mid-twentieth century. Western food, including the fast food offered at McDonald's, has come to China. Another recent development has been the spread of the Cantonese cus-

tom of making a leisurely breakfast of dim sum. The Cantonese phrase *dim sam* (Mandarin *dienxin*) literally means "dot the heart" but may more idiomatically be translated "hits the spot." Dim sum are small, savory, high-calorie snacks, most often various kinds of stuffed and steamed dumplings and buns. They are eaten with endless cups of tea. Traditionally a breakfast for workers or for weekend outings, dim sum have become exceedingly popular in urban China, and in many distant urban centers to which Chinese have migrated.

General Characteristics

Chinese cuisine shows similarities with other cuisines of East Asia, partly because of China's influence in the region. Throughout East Asia, meals are typically boiled grain with some form of mixed topping involving vegetables, spices, and soy products. Soup is



BOK CHOY SOUP

This recipe is adapted from Ken Hom's *Easy Family Recipes from a Chinese-American Childhood*. Hom recalls that his neighbors would grow bok choy and other traditional Chinese vegetables in small garden plots in Chicago's Chinatown.

- 4 cups chicken stock or reduced-salt canned broth
- 1 cup bok choy, cut up
- 1 egg
- 2 tsp. sesame oil
- 1 tsp. sugar
- 1 tsp. salt
- ¼ tsp. freshly ground white pepper
- 1 tbs. light soy sauce
- 3 tbs. finely chopped scallions, white part only
- 3 tbs. finely chopped green scallion tops (for garnish)
- 1 cup shredded iceberg lettuce

Put the chicken stock in a pot and bring it to a simmer. Separate the leaves and stalks of the bok choy, and cut the leaves into 2-inch pieces. Peel the stems, cut them into diagonal slices, and wash them well in several changes of water.

Lightly beat the egg and then mix with the sesame oil in a small bowl. Toss the sugar into the simmering stock, taste, then add salt, pepper, and soy sauce and give the stock several good stirs. Next toss in the bok choy and scallions and then drizzle in the egg mixture in a very slow thin stream. Using a chopstick or fork pull the egg slowly into strands.

Remove the soup from the heat and toss in the shredded lettuce, stirring all the while. Garnish with the finely chopped scallion tops and serve at once.

Source: Ken Hom (1997). *Easy Family Recipes from a Chinese-American Childhood*. New York: Alfred E. Knopf, 51–52.

abundant and important. The grain is most often rice, simply boiled (often miscalled "steamed"). Boiled rice (or a substitute such as millet or cracked maize) is topped with a mixed dish, usually involving a good deal of highly flavored sauce that can soak into the rice. Next most common, especially in China itself, are noodles—usually made of wheat, often of rice or other grains. These are most often cooked in soup, but they are frequently boiled and then fried with vegetables and flavorings (the familiar "chow mein"—more correctly *chao mien*—and its relatives). Steamed buns, small breads, dumplings, and other products, usually made of wheat but often of maize, buckwheat, or other grains, are common. These are usually eaten by themselves, as snacks or quick meals. In some of the poorest parts of China, heavy flat cakes of maize or buckwheat were

staples. They have since been replaced by wheat and rice products over the last thirty years.

Within China, pork is the commonest meat. China is home to two-thirds of the world's domesticated pigs. Chickens—native to China—come second. Fish and shellfish abound wherever there is water. Thousands of species of marine life are used. Most fish are now supplied by pond farming. This practice was invented in China at least 2,000 years ago and continues to increase. Hundreds of species of vegetables and fruits are eaten.

Traditionally, oils were most often made from cabbage seeds (rapeseed oil). Later came unrefined sesame, maize, and peanut oils, whose marked tastes added much to the cuisine. Today, rapeseed and soy

oils are common; maize and peanut oils continue to flourish; all are refined and essentially tasteless.

Food is usually boiled, steamed, or fried. Soup is traditionally present at virtually every meal, and often is the entire meal. Water was (and still often is) highly polluted, and had to be boiled; making it into soup or tea thus made good sense. Frying usually involves the famous process called *chao* in Chinese and "stir-frying" in English: Food is cut into small pieces and stirred in a small amount of extremely hot oil. This process spares oil and fuel. The custom of eating with chopsticks (*kuayzi*) was already established by the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE).

The mix of spices and flavorings distinguishes Chinese food from other cuisines of East Asia. Flavorings in a Chinese meal almost always contain at least some of the following: Soy sauce, fermented soybean paste (or whole beans), garlic, onions (often small green onions), chili peppers, fresh ginger, Chinese "wine," and Chinese vinegar. The latter two are made by fermentation of grain, using special strains of fungi and bacteria that yield complex and distinctive flavors. In impoverished or climatically stressed areas, food flavorings may be little more than garlic and onions and a bit of soy sauce. In overseas restaurants that cater to non-Chinese, the flavorings are usually reduced.

Chinese cooking evolved as a cooking of scarcity. Several characteristics of the cuisine follow from this. First, food, especially meat, is cut into small pieces. This allows it to cook more quickly and go farther in serving, and to make it manageable by chopsticks. Second, dishes and stoves are designed to use little fuel. This, with the thin slicing, allows ordinary people to cook a meal on a handful of grass or splinters; until recently, this was all the fuel available for many or most families. Third, by putting small dishes of cut-up vegetables and meat on the rice, in a closed pot, cooks can produce a three- or four-course meal in one pot, cutting back still further on fuel use. These are only a few of many tricks for saving fuel and food.

Another type of efficiency is gained by using almost everything edible. Tough leaves can be boiled for soup. Frogs, small shellfish, and minnows are consumed. Wild herbs and berries are sought out. Many crops are grown, the choice governed by what grows best in each local habitat—streamsides, rice paddy banks, groves, pots, even roofs. The result is an enormous variety of foodstuffs and of dishes. Restaurants often have 400 dishes on their menus and can make many more on request.

Most important of all, Chinese cuisine is based on foods that produce an adequate diet on a minimum of

land. Rice is the highest yielding of all grains. Sweet potatoes and other root crops extend the range of cultivation. Soybeans are high in protein that complements rice protein in the diet. Chinese cabbages and other popular vegetables are high in vitamins and minerals.

Many foods are eaten solely for their high nutrient value. An example is *kou ji cai* (*Lycium chinense*), "the poor people's vitamin pill," whose leaves and berries are among the richest sources of vitamins known. Long before anyone analyzed vitamins, the leaves and dried fruits of this plant were known to be nutritious and strengthening. Handfuls of the fruits (*kou ji zi*) are used in soups for women recovering from childbirth or for persons convalescing from sickness.

Regional Variations

Within these general guidelines, Chinese cuisine varies greatly by region. The basic divide is between north and south. The north is dominated by wheat, with maize, sorghum, millet, and rice playing minor parts. The south is dominated by rice. The northern limit of the Jiang River basin is the approximate dividing line; the Jiang drainage basin grows both rice and wheat (and now a great deal of maize). Maize is produced in large amounts almost everywhere in China, but it is usually used for animal feed and is not popular with humans.

In the north, distinctive subtypes have evolved in the major geographic divisions. Particularly famous are the cuisines of Shaanxi (centered on Xi'an), Hebei (centered on Beijing and Tianjin), and Shandong. All are characterized by the dominance of noodles, dumplings, and steamed breads. All use a great deal of onions and garlic. Lamb, very rare southward, is used in the northwest. Shaanxi food is simple and often flavored with local vinegar. Beijing is more elaborate and has its own elite tradition in the form of the cuisine of the Forbidden City; the disappearance of the imperial court led to great reduction of this cuisine, but it survives in a few restaurants and banquet halls. Shandong food uses many vegetables, soybean products, seafoods, and dumpling varieties.

The classic centers of the south are Hunan-Sichuan, the Chang delta, and Guangdong. Hunan and Sichuan have always had a spicy cuisine. Until chilies arrived from the Americas, the "heat" came from smartweed (*Polygonum* spp.), Sichuan "pepper" (actually a prickly ash or fagara, *Xanthoxylum* spp.), and black pepper and relatives (*Piper* spp.). Chilies gave local cooks a chance to escalate the heat level. This spicy style has spread to, or has influenced, most of southwest China.

Life in the Chang delta originally centered around several great cities: Hangzhou, Suzhou, Ningpo, Shanghai (recently), and others. Each city has its own variant of a general style characterized by sweet-sour dishes, much oil, a smooth and mellow texture, and very heavy use of vegetables and seafoods.

Guangdong (Cantonese) cuisine is marked by its enormous variety of ingredients (even by Chinese standards) and its heavy use of various fermented soy-bean products, including the distinctive fermented "black beans" (Mandarin *dou shi*, Cantonese *tausi*). Seafoods are intensively used, and are often made into salty pastes and sauces; these resemble similar South-east Asian products.

Several other important southern styles exist, including Chaozhou (Teochiu, Chiuchow), Fuzhou, and others. Distinctive cuisines also characterize the many minority groups that speak non-Chinese languages. The largest of these, the Zhuang minority (speaking languages very close to Thai), is noted for heavy vegetable use and for certain fermented products. Some Zhuang villages are characterized by high life expectancies, due in large part to their healthy diet of relatively unprocessed grains and varied local vegetables.

Issues for the Twenty-First Century

Overuse of wild foods, especially rare animals (with the distinction between medicine and cuisine blurred), is now a serious problem. Erosion, deforestation, spread of cities and roads onto farmland, and other processes are destroying much of the landscape. Unless conservation is taken far more seriously, China will again be the land of famine.

Gene Anderson

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CUISINE—INDONESIA Indonesian cuisine is as distinct and diverse as the many thousands of islands that make up the archipelago. On the routes of commerce between India, China, and the Middle East, Indonesia developed a cuisine that reflects these foreign influences in its curries and stir-fries. In the ba-



GADO-GADO (INDONESIAN VEGETABLE SALAD)

2 cups sliced lettuce
2 cups sliced steamed cabbage or cauliflower florets
2 cups steamed bean sprouts
1 boiled potato, thinly sliced
½ cucumber, thinly sliced
1 large tomato, thinly sliced
Arrange the vegetables in a platter

For garnish:

1 hard boiled egg, sliced
crushed *krupuk* (prawn crackers)

Peanut Sauce

1 cup crunchy peanut butter
2 tbs. sweet soy sauce
1 tbs. fried onions
2 tbs. brown sugar
1 tbs. lime/lemon juice
1 cube chicken bouillon
1 cup boiling water
salt to taste

Simmer ingredients for the sauce over low heat. Cool and pour over salad, garnish with sliced egg and prawn crackers.

Source: Catharina Purwani Williams

sic Indonesian staples of rice (*nasi*) and vegetable dishes, fish, and occasionally beef or pork, the cuisine also reflects local products. Rice is grown in places with rich volcanic soil, either by terraced, wetland cultivation or by dry cultivation in eastern Indonesia.

The Wallace line divides the Indonesian archipelago into two parts with distinctly different fauna and flora. The west consists of the larger islands of Sumatra, Java, Bali, and Kalimantan, while the east consists of Sulawesi, Maluku, the Lesser Sunda Islands, and West Papua. The differences in produce and cuisine roughly follow this biological division. Another dividing factor is the proximity to coastal areas, which are known for many fish and coconut dishes combined with spices and vegetables and complemented with tropical fruits.

Javanese, Sumatran, and Balinese cuisine represent the dominant Indonesian cuisines and are widely available across the archipelago because of interisland migration. Beef *rendang* is well known internationally.



SAMBAL DENDENG **(SPICY SHREDDED BEEF)**

This spicy, deep-fried shredded beef dish is typical of Indonesian cuisine. A blend of Chinese and Southeast Asian influences, sambal dendeng is a good dish for entertaining or for exploring the culinary pleasures of Southeast Asia

- 1 lb. beef round, cut into ¼-inch-thick pieces
- salt as needed
- oil as needed
- 4 Holland red peppers (fresh cayenne may be substituted)
- 8 garlic cloves
- ½ tsp. shrimp paste
- 1 tsp. minced zedoary (ginger can be substituted)
- 2 thinly sliced galangal (ginger can be substituted)
- 2 tbs. lime peel
- ½ tsp. tamarind (the pulp from a lemon or lime can be substituted)
- ½ cup coconut milk
- 1 cup water

Sprinkle some salt on beef pieces then deep fry them in oil for 7 minutes. Drain on a paper towel then let cool. Shred beef into small pieces. If they are too tough or rubbery, pound them with a meat tenderizer before shredding.

Grind Holland red peppers, garlic cloves, shrimp paste, zedoary, and galangal to a fine paste. Heat a deep frying pan, add 2 tablespoons of oil. Sauté spice paste for about 5 minutes then add lime peel, tamarind, coconut milk, and water. Bring sauce to a boil then lower heat to simmer. Add beef to the sauce, then simmer, covered, until beef is tender and sauce is almost dry. Season with salt. Serve with steamed rice.

Source: Indokitchen.com. Retrieved 15 March 2002, from:
<http://www.indokitchen.com>.

From West Sumatra, this dish is a beef curry cooked in spices, chilies, and coconut, simmered until dry. It is purchased in tiny stalls (*warung* Padang) in remote regions of the eastern islands of Indonesia and together with *nasi goreng* (fried rice) has become a café-style take-out food all over the world and in upmarket Asian restaurants in the Netherlands, United States, and Australia. During the centuries before air travel, the mainly Muslim inhabitants of West Sumatra brought *rendang* with chilies and spices as preservatives on their long pilgrimages to Mecca.

Javanese *tempe* (tempeh) and *tabu* (tofu), both made from soybeans, are the basis of many Javanese dishes. In the West, they are often sold in health shops and Asian groceries. They have become popular daily

foods throughout Indonesia because of their high nutrition, low cost, easy storage, and delicious taste. Eastern Indonesia, which is partly non-Muslim, offers pork-based dishes.

Meals

In prosperous times, people expect to eat rice three times a day, accompanied by a main dish and side dishes. In Java, it is customary to offer to share food with others, and this practice has been adopted throughout Indonesia as a social gesture of inclusion: *selamat makan* or *bon appétit*. Guests arriving around mealtime are invited to share the meal. The food is placed on the table or floor mat where the diners serve themselves. In a middle-class home, a plate, spoon, and

fork are used, while others use banana leaves as plates and eat with their right fingers.

Rice and a variety of dishes based on vegetables, fish, poultry, beef, pork, and pulses (beans) are cooked in a wok or a pot. The main ingredient is mixed, marinated, broiled, fried, or simmered with spices. Spices include pepper, nutmeg, coriander, lesser galangal, turmeric, candlenuts, garlic, onions, and chilies, which are crushed using pestle and mortar. During feasts, such as weddings and *Lebaran* (the Muslim celebration at the end of the fasting month of Ramadan), a variety of dishes are served: for instance, yellow (turmeric) rice accompanied by fried chicken, fried fish, chicken curry, or prawn curry and garnished with thinly sliced omelettes and greens. This combination is the basis of the internationally acclaimed rijstafel (rice and a set of special dishes), a Dutch colonial's gastronomic adaptation of the typical East Indies (as Indonesia used to be known) feast.

Everyday cooking relies on vegetables, such as cabbages, *kang-kung* (a kind of watercress), Chinese cabbages, snake beans, a variety of bean sprouts, and summer squash, available daily in the market. *Gado-gado*, a famous Indonesian vegetarian dish, consists of vegetables, including tomatoes, garnished with thinly sliced boiled eggs and crushed *krupuk* (prawn crackers), and complemented with peanut sauce as a dressing. This low-cost but healthy dish is popularly eaten as a snack or main meal during midday, competing with chicken *satays* (cubed meat on a skewer), both of which are available in street food stalls or from hawkers and restaurants.

Sweets and Beverages

Indonesians eat sweets as snacks, not as desserts. Dessert is commonly a selection of tropical fruits in season, particularly bananas, which are available all year. Cakes, puddings, biscuits, and pastries have been much influenced by the Dutch, while traditional sweets are made of cassavas, sweet potatoes, glutinous rice, palm sugar, or grated coconut or a combination of these. The mainly Muslim population does not drink alcohol with meals; however for feasts and special occasions in some areas, people may drink a locally produced fermented palm wine, known as *tuak*, *moke* (palm wine or *lontar* palm), *arak* (distilled liquor from sugar palm), or *brem* (fermented rice). People usually drink hot or iced tea or water with their meals.

Today Indonesian cuisine also reflects the Western influence of fast foods such as breads and hamburgers and the Chinese influence of noodles, along with the traditional foods based on fresh tropical produce with

various tastes: spicy, sweet, savory, sour, pungent. The home of a wide range of spices, Indonesia became famous during three and a half centuries of colonial rule for these condiments and since then for its cuisine.

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CUISINE—IRAN Because of its relatively large size and diverse climates (from the Persian Gulf in the south to the Caspian Sea in the north), a history of several thousand years, and the many ethnic groups that populate it, Iran has a rich variety of foods that differ from region to region and sometimes even season to season. The national cuisine of Iran, however, which has spread to and influenced the cuisines of other cultures and countries in South and Central Asia and the Middle East, consists of ethnic and regional foods that have been refined and perfected over the course of many centuries, particularly by the master chefs of the royal courts. To Western tastes, Iranian food seems both exotic and familiar: exotic because the many combinations of vegetables, herbs, spices, and fruits are new; familiar because almost all the ingredients are commonly used in the West. What characterizes this cuisine is essentially its emphasis on flavors.

Based on the ingredients used and methods of preparation, Iranian foods are categorized in a dozen or so main groups, some of which are *polo* (rice mixed with other ingredients such as legumes, meats, vegetables, and herbs), *kboresh* (stew-type dishes that are usually served over *chelo*, plain rice), *kabab* (skewered meats), *ash* (thick pottage-like dishes), *abgusht* (soups), *dolmeh* (stuffed vegetables and grape leaves), *kufteh* (meat and/or rice balls), and *kuku* (vegetable or other soufflé-type dishes). Rice is one of the most important staples in the Iranian diet and is often the main dish. The most popular way of making rice in Iran, which is quite different from that of most other cuisines, results in fluffy, separated grains of rice. For this kind of dish, a high quality, long grain rice such as basmati is used, which has a unique flavor and aroma. Rice dishes are usually



DOLMEH-YEH FELFEL

An Iranian classic, the flavor-infused rice and dense but delicate taste and textures characteristic of Iranian foods are wonderfully presented in this recipe. Adapted from the Iranian culinary "bible," Rosa Montazemi's *Honar-e Ashpazi* or *Art of Cooking*, dolmeh-yeh felfel or stuffed peppers are relatively simple to make and absolutely delicious.

2 medium onions, finely chopped
 cooking oil
 ½ lb. ground lamb or beef
 salt
 black pepper
 3–4 tsp. tomato paste
 ⅓ cup parsley, finely chopped
 ⅓ cup mint, finely chopped
 ½ cup spring onions, finely chopped
 ⅓ cup garlic chives, finely chopped
 ⅓ cup tarragon, finely chopped (optional)
 3½ oz. of long-grain or basmati rice
 4 large green or red peppers
 2–3 tsp. sugar
 3–4 tbs. fresh lime juice

Fry onions in cooking oil over medium heat until golden. Add ground meat and fry further until meat changes color. Add ½ cup water, salt, pepper and most of tomato paste. Mix and cook further until water boils off.

Fry prepared herbs and spring onions in cooking oil over medium heat until wilted. Boil 2 cups of water in a small pot. Add 1 teaspoon of salt and rice and boil further until rice softens. Drain the water and let cool slightly.

Cut a circle at the top of the peppers and remove seeds. Boil 2 cups of water in a large pot. Add 1 teaspoon of salt and the peppers. They should be placed side by side (make sure not to stack them). Cook until they soften slightly. Take care not to overcook or they might fall apart later on. Drain the water and let cool.

Mix well-prepared meat, vegetables, most of the lime juice, most of the sugar, and rice. Sprinkle some salt inside peppers, fill them with the mix and close the tops. Again place the peppers side by side (avoid stacking them) in a large pot. Prepare sauce by mixing ½ cup of hot water with the rest of sugar, lime juice and tomato paste. Pour the sauce in over the peppers and simmer for 5–10 minutes. Serve this dolmeh hot with the sauce. Makes four servings.

Source: Iranian/Persian Recipes. Retrieved 17 March 2002, from: <http://www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/Personal/F.Mokhtarian/recipes>.

decorated with saffron-flavored grains of rice. Traditionally, red meat (usually mutton) and poultry are not consumed in the quantities that are customary in the West. Meats are often used to flavor dishes, as are other ingredients. Iranian foods are by no means bland, which

is not to say that they are spicy, as is Indian cuisine. What distinguishes an Iranian table is the subtlety of the combination of flavors. A typical Iranian meal may consist of a rice dish with a meat sauce; yogurt; fresh herbs such as mint, basil, and tarragon; and freshly

baked bread, of which there are many varieties available on every street corner.

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CUISINE—IRAQ Iraq's rich and varied cuisine reflects the nation's long history. Located at the geographic center of the Middle East, modern-day Iraq also encompasses ancient Mesopotamia, the so-called land between the rivers. On the rich soils between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, some of the world's first agriculturalists started domesticating livestock and raising crops ten to twelve thousand years ago. From these earliest origins came a number of the staples of modern Iraqi cuisine: dates from palms that dotted the oases; wheat, rice, and barley from lush, intensively cultivated fields; and meat from lambs, sheep, goats, cattle, and camels that served as the basis of nomadic Iraqi life.

Iraq's location has also made it a crossover point for cuisines. Along the Silk Road from China came ingredients such as peas and apricots, as well as techniques for combining sweet and sour flavors. Mongol invaders brought tea, a drink popular to this day. Periods of rule by the Sumerians, Babylonians, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Ottomans, and the British also left their marks.

Baghdad served as a center for culinary mixing as well as a center for gastronomic extravagance. Medieval Islamic caliphs, for instance, threw lavish banquets in which their guests feasted for days and wrote poetry exalting their food bounty.

From the neighboring Persians, Iraqi cooks learned to create sweet and savory dishes combining meats with dried and fresh fruits. Like their Turkish neighbors, Iraqis enjoy stuffed vegetable dishes, including stuffed grape leaves (dolma). Well-traveled Jewish chefs also left their mark, introducing French and Italian influences in the eighteenth century, notably a pizza-like dish consisting of flat yeast bread coated with a tomato sauce and ground meat.

Formal meals consist of multiple courses, starting with appetizers that might include kebabs (skewered



OVEN BARBECUED FISH WITH TRADITIONAL STUFFING

A traditional Iraqi method for preparing fish with a pungent but delicious stuffing.

- 1 whole fish (approx. 3 lbs.), cut open lengthwise head to tail through the back
- 4 tbs. vegetable oil
- 8 chopped onions
- 12 garlic cloves, minced or pressed
- 2 tsp. curry powder
- 2 tsp. salt
- 2 tbs. tamarind paste (can substitute pulp of lemon or lime)
- 1 cup warm water

Place the open fish skin down on a cookie sheet. Broil for 3–4 minutes until partially cooked. Heat oil in a saucepan, and sauté the onion and the garlic, stirring until the onions are tender. Add curry powder and salt. Stir. Dissolve the tamarind in the warm water, then add it to the onion mix. Let cook on medium heat until the mixture is a thick paste (about 30 minutes). Spread the onion mixture on the broiled fish.

Bake the fish in a 350° oven for 15–30 minutes or until done. Place the fish under the broiler for few minutes until a thin crust has formed on the stuffing. Serve with rice and green salad.

Source: Saleh's Iraq. Retrieved 15 March 2002, from: http://www.mecookbook.com/Book_Maklooba.html.

grilled meats) or yogurt dishes. Flavored rice dishes serve as the foundation of meals and also mark a cook's skill. The most common meats include lamb and mutton, but the meat of cows, goats, chickens, and even camels is still used. Pork is prohibited by Muslim law throughout the region. Fish, however, forms the basis for perhaps the country's most famous dish, *mas-goof*, a skewered river fish barbecued and spiced with salt, pepper, and tamarind. Pickled vegetables (*turshi*) link Iraqi cuisine to that throughout northeast Africa and the Middle East.

Abroad and at home, Iraqi cooks continue to adapt their cooking techniques, responding to new influences while retaining millennia of traditions.

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CUISINE—JAPAN The basic characteristics of Japanese foodways may be traced to its ecological and historical contexts, above all, to the conditions related to island life and to the periods of isolation and borrowing from Asia and European culinary influences. Reliance on the products of the sea made fish, shellfish, and sea vegetables preeminent in the Japanese diet, and the suitability of Japanese soil to rice growing made rice the staple carbohydrate. Rice is the center of any meal; in fact, most older Japanese would not consider a meal complete without rice. Other dishes, such as pickles, cooked vegetables, and small amounts of salted fish and egg are flavor accompaniments to the main dish of rice. Before modern transportation permitted a more varied diet, people ate whatever their regions afforded.

Legendary Times Through the Nara Period

Prehistoric evidence from archaeological sites demonstrates the dominance of seafoods, especially shellfish—*asari* (short-necked clam), *hotategai* (scallop), and *awani* (abalone)—as represented in ancient shell mounds. It is probable that fish such as *tai* (sea bream), *suzuki* (sea bass), *koi* (carp), and *umagi* (eel) were also central to the diet during the Jomon culture (10,000–300 BCE). In addition, the diet may have included deer, crane, duck, boar, and rabbit. There is evidence too of other foods such as nuts and melons. Pottery and tools indicate that boiling and grilling were the main cooking methods. By the third century BCE, mainland Asian rice, millet, and wheat had come to Japan. Salt extraction from seawater permitted the pickling, preserving, and fermenting of foods; it is in this period that the standard meal evolved, consisting of a central grain dish accompanied by small portions of pickles and vegetables.

Rice growing depends on the cooperation of many people and the coordination of irrigation systems. By the seventh century, reliance on rice cultivation helped to create a political and social system in which mutual dependency for labor and irrigation was managed and controlled by a landlord class that gained economic and political power. Taxation of agricultural production was managed by a bureaucracy that could reach every farm worker and tie local organizations and authorities to the imperial capital, which by the eighth century was established in Nara. The court at Nara

received the bounty of the outlying regions, and a more diversified and elite cuisine became the object of courtier connoisseurship. Along with the refinement of taste, preparation methods were codified. Artisan tableware developed and an aesthetics of dining manners was created for courtiers. Class distinctions in diet and manners were apparent. Chopsticks (*hashi*) were used by aristocrats, while common people ate with their fingers. Peasants, agricultural producers of the aristocratic rice, ate less refined grains such as millet.

Heian and Kamakura Periods

During the Heian period (794–1185), court life featured elaborate presentations based on Chinese cooking methods. At the same time, the variety of foodstuffs declined under the influence of Chinese Buddhism, which prohibited the use of animal products. Japanese culinary historians look to this period as a time when the ubiquitous soup stock, *dashi*, was developed. Literature of the time includes details of dining. While rice was clearly the staple food, noodles were also prepared. A banquet might include raw fish, a soup, boiled foods, grilled and fried foods, followed by more boiled and steamed foods and ending with pickles and rice. Murasaki Shikibu, author of the Heian-period novel *The Tale of Genji*, records that the meals were taken at midmorning and midafternoon, supplemented by snack foods during the day and evening.

In the Kamakura period (1185–1333), the dominance of the warrior class spread a culture of simplicity and tough frugality, in which it became a virtue to simplify one's meals. Indeed, going without a meal was seen as a sign of good character. The need for foods transportable to battle sites and campgrounds may have been the origin of the *bento*, prepared foods that would keep longer. The *umeboshi* or pickled plum is said to have been created in this period; it became a necessary accompaniment to rice and other grains. In the court and in temples, however, refinements were based on Zen Buddhist simplicity, rather than warrior sensibilities, and on the tea ceremony, which was developed and practiced by Buddhist priests. The development of a Zen Buddhist cuisine elevated frugality and vegetarianism to an art in which "eating with the eyes" (*me de taberu*) was a value, and the aesthetics of food preparation and presentation became a tenet of Buddhist culinary practice.

The Tokugawa Period

The influences of European foodways began in Japan in the 1500s, when traders and missionaries from Spain, Portugal, and Holland brought methods of preparation such as breading and deep frying, as well

as new foodstuffs such as leavened bread. Most of these *namban ryori* (southern barbarian cooking) foods, however, did not influence local diets beyond the more cosmopolitan samurai and official classes. Moreover, there were as yet no routes to disseminate these novelties, and most people's diets were still determined by locally available foodstuffs.

By the Edo or Tokugawa period (1600/1603–1868), the elaborate cuisine attached to the tea ceremony (*chakaiseki ryori*) defined an order of service and mode of eating. *Kaiseki* cuisine emerged as the most refined eating, and evolved as a formal meal independent of the tea ceremony from which it derived. Seasonal fresh foods were emphasized, and the quality of ingredients was highly regarded. *Kaiseki* service stipulated that each element in the meal be prepared separately to ensure freshness and that it be prepared according to its own nature. The idea of separate courses in a meal was established by this principle. As a correlate, the appearance of each dish became very important and serving ware and implements had to be designed to reflect color and taste, as well as to present each element of the meal to its best advantage. The order of service, as established and elaborated from the Heian period banquet, began with *sakizuke* (appetizers), tiny portions of elegantly prepared fish. Second was *chinmi*, a kind of salad, tofu, or wheat gluten. Third was a soup, often a simple and elegant clear broth with a tiny vegetable, fish or clam decorating the bottom of a dark lacquer bowl, perhaps suggesting a miniature landscape. Next was *mukozuke*, a portion of sashimi or raw fish, followed by *takiawase* (a vegetarian simmered dish). There followed *mushimono*, steamed items flavored with a sauce based on soy sauce and garnished with grated *tororoimo* (mountain potato), a *yakimono* or grilled dish, a vinegar *sunomono* (salad), and finally rice with *miso* soup and pickle. Variations on these themes



A Japanese woman assists a man who is eating a sashimi meal of *fugu* in Fukuoka in 1995. (JAMES MARSHALL/CORBIS).

abound, and *kaiseki* came to include a wide variety of ingredients and preparations, combining the virtues of Buddhist simplicity with elaborate aesthetics.

During the Edo period, peace and bureaucratic centralization allowed for the flowering of arts and the development of an urban culture. The rise of the merchant class and a money economy meant the creation of a new urban consumer culture, which included an emphasis on entertainment and eating. Restaurants such as noodle shops, tempura shops, and grill houses became popular in the entertainment section of the cities. There were also *yatai*, stalls where workers could stop for a stand-up or sit-down meal. New foodstuffs continued to diversify the diet of the townspeople, and foreign ingredients and modes of preparation were introduced. Chinese tradition also continued to influence the diet. The bureaucratic centralization of the nation included compulsory sojourns in Edo (present-day Tokyo) for local *daimyo* (feudal lords); the frequent travel this system demanded helped to establish regular routes to the capital along which restaurants and teahouses sprang up. As ever, social class distinctions were reflected in food consumption patterns. Elaborate entertainment focusing on food were popular among the aristocracy and some members of the merchant class. Among commoners and peasants, a much simpler diet prevailed.

Meiji and Taisho Periods

Western food traditions continued to influence Japan even in the *sakoku jidai* (closed country) of the Tokugawa period. It was in the Meiji period (1868–1912), however, that full exposure to foodstuffs and cultures of the West occurred. At first many people were reluctant to try exotic substances, but the diffusion of a sophisticated cosmopolitan urban culture through media such as women's magazines that included recipes for roast meats and dairy-based dishes like custards, puddings, and butter cakes spread the fashion of eating foreign foods. Many older people, however, rejected the meals based on bread, potatoes, and starches other than rice. Meat eating had arrived in Japan much earlier, when Spanish and Portuguese missionaries had made beef eating part of the Christian conversion experiences of nobles in the sixteenth century. Ordinary people, however, did not eat beef until the Meiji era. Some Meiji leaders encouraged beef eating as a means for strengthening Japanese physically. The Meiji Emperor proclaimed the suitability of beef for the Japanese diet, and dishes like *sukiyaki* became popular. Western dining habits began to influence home meals. A dining table and chairs took the place of a traditional low *kotatsu* table and sitting on the floor. Using Western cutlery was also a novelty, and etiquette books be-



PORK CUTLET ON RICE (*KATSUDON*)

This dish, adapted from a recipe by master chef Shizuo Tzujii, is a staple in homes and restaurants throughout Japan.

6–8 cups hot cooked short-grain white rice
 4 6-ounce pork loin cutlets (pork tenderloin steaks or chops without bone)
 salt and pepper

Breading

6 tbs. flour
 2 eggs, beaten
 2 cups breadcrumbs
 vegetable oil for frying (peanut or corn oil works well)

Onion-and-Egg Topping

1 small onion
 2½ cups *dashi* (Japanese soup stock; vegetable broth can be substituted)
 7 tbs. *mirin* (rice wine or sake)
 6 tbs. soy sauce
 4 green onions, cut into 1½-inch lengths
 6 eggs, beaten

Pound cutlets with a mallet or bottle to flatten slightly. Remove fat at the edge of the cutlets to keep the meat from curling during frying. Salt and pepper both sides.

Dust with flour, dip in beaten egg, and coat both sides thickly with dry or fresh breadcrumbs. Let stand 2 or 3 minutes before frying. Note: Alternatively, the frying can be done in ¾ inch of oil in an ordinary skillet

Heat a generous amount of oil in a heavy-bottomed pot or deep-fryer to a medium temperature (340°F/170°C), and deep-fry cutlets one at a time, turning once, till golden brown, about 6 minutes each. Remove and drain on absorbent paper, and cut crosswise into ½-inch slices. Keep hot.

Meanwhile slice onion into rounds or half moons and, in a large frying pan in a scant amount of oil, sauté onion over high heat till transparent and soft. Add the *dashi*, *mirin*, and soy sauce to the pan. Simmer, and add the green onion lengths.

Finally, pour the beaten egg over the simmering onions. Stir when the egg begins to set. The egg is done when it is a little runny and juicy.

To serve, put a single portion of hot rice, 1½ to 2 cups, into a *domburi*-type bowl. Arrange one of the cutlets so it covers half the rice. Use the fried onion-and-egg topping to cover part of the cutlet and the rest of the rice. Use all the liquid. Serve immediately. Makes 4 servings.

Source: Shizuo Tzujii. (1981) *Japanese Cooking: A Simple Art*. Tokyo: Kodansha International, 445–446.

came popular describing the precise fork and spoon to use with a course or dish.

In the Taisho period (1912–1926), the Japanese began to create uniquely Japanese versions of adopted foodstuffs, as with the Japanese versions of British versions of Indian curries (*kare raisu*). Pork dishes like *tonkatsu*, using the Portuguese method of deep frying

the meat and serving it with shredded cabbage salad, became ordinary urban restaurant food, as did *korokke* (croquettes), torpedo-shaped fried mixtures of potato, chicken, and other foods, derived from French and other European dishes.

Food technology also changed since the beginning of the Meiji period. Industrialization involved changes



FRIED *FUGU* WITH POTATO SALAD

Oddly enough, the potentially poisonous effects of *fugu*—the ovaries and liver are toxic and require removal by a licensed chef before the fish can be prepared—make it a rare delicacy. This recipe allows you to substitute other fish, chicken, or pork for *fugu*, which can cost up to \$200 when served in a fine restaurant in Japan.

Thinly sliced *fugu* (or any other white fish, chicken, or pork)
Thinly sliced potatoes
Watercress
Red pepper or soy sauce

Fry *fugu* slices. In place of *fugu*, you can use any white fish, chicken, or pork.

Slice potatoes very thinly and place in water. Take potatoes out of water and spread on a plate. Place *fugu* on top, and decorate with cress. Season lightly with red pepper. If you prefer, serve with Chinese-style dressing or soy sauce.

Source: Sake Bar. Retrieved 15 Mach 2002
from: <http://www.sakebar.net/special/foods/food5.html>

in household technology, as well as changes in agricultural and food processing technologies. Refrigeration in food locations, as well as in transport vehicles for fresh foods, meant a greater distribution of fresh foodstuffs and better preservation without salting, pickling, drying, and fermenting. In the post-World War II era, more people had refrigerators at home, allowing the purchase of foods for several days' use, and daily shopping was no longer necessary. Home ovens also began to appear after World War II, but only became popular after 1970. Other domestic equipment began to appear such as electric mixers, toasters, and later, food processors have become popular as well.

Globalization produced new influences on the daily diet of most Japanese people. Fresh and frozen seafood and produce can be transported to Japan from anywhere in the world within twenty-four hours. In the early twenty-first century, Japan became the buyer of about 55 percent of the tuna caught in the world. At dockside in many small harbors along the Maine Coast, lobster buyers from Japan are ready to purchase catches as they come in, and local fishermen know the rigid

specifications they must adhere to if the lobsters and fish they catch are to be acceptable to Japanese buyers.

Conversely, foods from Japan also have penetrated the foreign markets, and sushi is eaten in every major city in the world by people who have never been to Japan, but who now know words like *maguro*, *toro*, *uni*, and *unagi*. Instant ramen is recognizable in most of the world too, though it is not seen as a Japanese product. In fact, it is a modern version of a Chinese food that was thoroughly assimilated in Japan and then sold as a convenience food everywhere.

Fast foods and family restaurants are everywhere in Japan. There were local fast food places in Japan before the advent of hamburgers, fried chicken, and donuts, but these tended to be unique operations, run by a family who lived above the shop and catered to a local clientele that might drop by after work to pick up prepared food such as yakitori, sushi, and soba.

The extraordinary period of economic boom demonstrated the full diversification and spread of the Japanese diet, as restaurants of high quality prospered and food trends became more elaborate. Eating as entertainment of clients, family, and friends became expensive propositions, and meals of delicacies such as *fugu* (the poisonous blowfish that requires preparation by a licensed chef) could cost as much as \$300 per person. Indeed, single cups of coffee at one Ginza coffee shop could cost that much—because of the pure gold leaf that was served in them.

The bursting of the bubble economy did not slow development of new food trends. In the 1990s, restaurant eating continued to be popular, although the business expense account for dining significantly diminished. Consumers continued to explore new cuisines and ethnic restaurants became popular. The leading new cuisine in the early twentieth century has been Italian, but other trends include Thai, Vietnamese, African, Indian, and Sri Lankan foods, American regional cuisine, and refinements of regional French and Spanish dishes. There is almost no food that cannot be obtained in Japan. Food-related television programs such as the hit show "Ryori no Tetsujin" (Iron Chef) became popular in the 1990s, along with food and cooking-related magazines. These included not only women's magazines, but also magazines for men, young people, and the elderly, who have joined women in taking cooking classes. Food tourism also has become a prominent travel industry, with small groups of connoisseurs visiting vineyards, restaurants, food-preparation establishments, and cooking schools all over the world.

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CUISINE—KOREA As was the case with other aspects of Korean culture, Korean cuisine developed under the strong influence of its powerful neighbor, China. Rice and fermented soybean products (soy sauce, soybean paste, and soybean curd, or tofu) occupy a prominent place in the diet of the Korean people. The use of chopsticks is another indicator of

Chinese influence. The emphasis on five elements in Korean cuisine, for example, five flavors (salt, sweet, sour, hot, bitter) and five colors (red, green, yellow, white, black) has Chinese origins as well.

Rice and Meat

The technology of rice cultivation was brought to the northern parts of the Korean peninsula from China probably late in the second millennium BCE, but rice became a staple of the Korean diet only in the Shilla period (668–935). Earlier staples had been buckwheat, millet, and barley. Before the late twentieth century, furthermore, rice was not the staple for everyone, but was rather a symbol of wealth. The old phrase "White rice with meat soup," for example, connotes the good life, while tacitly acknowledging that not everyone could afford either rice or meat.

Buddhist influences in Korea did not have much impact on meat eating. (According to Buddhist principles, Buddhists should be vegetarians, although nowadays this is not always the case. Buddhism forbids the eating of animal flesh, which is closely connected to killing



SPICY PORK STIR-FRY (*JAE YOOK BOKUM*)

This hefty Korean side dish goes well with kimchi.

- | | |
|---------------------------|----------------------------------------|
| 20 oz. thin cut pork meat | 3 tbs. sugar |
| 1 onion | 2 tbs. chopped green onion |
| ½ carrot | 1 tbs. chopped garlic |
| 2 thick green onions | 1 tbs. ginger juice (or ginger powder) |
| 3 smaller green onions | 2 tbs. rice wine |
| 2 tbs. red bean paste | 1 tbs. sesame oil |
| 1 tbs. ground red pepper | ground black pepper |
| 2 tbs. soy sauce | oil |

Pork meat should be as thin as possible, about 1 inch. Use meat tenderizer and lightly beat the meat. Cut onion and carrot into thin strips and cut green onions diagonally. In a large bowl, mix red bean paste, red pepper, soy sauce, sugar, chopped green onion, chopped garlic, ginger juice, rice wine, sesame oil, and black pepper. If your pork meat is too big, cut them the way you want.

Marinate pork meat and vegetables with the seasoning mixture for about 30 minutes. Coat a large skillet with oil, and stir fry meat and vegetables until meat is completely cooked. Serve over rice.

Source: Julia's Cook Korean Site. Retrieved 15 March 2002, from: http://www.geocities.com/ypmljulia/images/Stir-Fry/spicy_pork_stirfry.htm.

a living organism; some vegetarians exclude milk and eggs as well.) Beef, pork, lamb, chicken, and various types of game were regularly consumed by the Korean upper classes. Still, before the economic growth of the 1970s, for common people in Korea, the eating of meat was a luxury. Farmers, who formed the majority of the Korean population, rarely ate meat apart from the three days in summer when dog stew was served and a special day in winter when sparrows, wild boar, or wild rabbit was prepared. In both cases, the eating of meat, which was not part of the daily fare, was intended to strengthen physical resistance against extreme weather conditions.

Fermented and Pickled Products

The techniques of wine making and *chang* (a semi-liquid predecessor of soy sauce and soybean paste) making were also introduced from China and by the seventh century were already highly advanced. This was also the time when fermented seafood (*chotkal*) developed, along with vegetables preserved in salt. The latter eventually evolved into kimchi—the spicy pickled cabbage that is nowadays a symbol of Korea and Korean culture.

Kimchi is considered to be quintessentially Korean by Koreans and foreigners alike. Yet, in the form we know it today, it matured only a hundred years ago, after chili pepper and *chotkal* were added to the fer-

mentation process. The addition of chili pepper took place in the mid-eighteenth century and gave kimchi its characteristic red color and pungent taste. *Chotkal*, which has been included in the pickling from the late nineteenth century onward, not only enriched the taste of kimchi, but also increased its regional diversity. While at the end of the seventeenth century only eleven types of kimchi were classified, the regional varieties of *chotkal* (some regions use shellfish, others anchovies or other fish), which is now one of kimchi's vital ingredients, contributed to the development of several hundred varieties of kimchi. The vegetables that are pickled have also changed. Gourd melon and cucumber have been used since ancient times, followed by eggplant and Chinese radish. The Chinese cabbage that is most commonly used for making the popular *paech'u* kimchi was introduced only about a hundred years ago.

Chili pepper was brought to Korea at the end of the sixteenth century, most probably via Japan. It began to be widely cultivated a century later and by the twentieth century had become an integral part of Korean cuisine. In addition to being an indispensable component in kimchi, chili pepper contributes to the flavoring of the majority of Korean dishes through chili pepper powder and chili pepper paste (*koch'u-jang*). Both are not only used extensively in the kitchen, but often appear as a relish at the table.



Street vendors prepare a batch of kimchi on a sidewalk in Kyoonggi-do, South Korea. (MICHAEL FREEMAN/CORBIS)



KIMCHI

This powerful smelling, fiery dish provides much of the vegetable content of Korean cuisine. Most recipes require at least a week of fermentation for the lactic acids to break down the cabbage or radish, but this recipe only needs about a day. Kimchi may be a bit of an acquired taste for some, but its enormous nutritional content and purported anticancer properties make it a good addition to any diet, even if you don't eat the half pound a day the average Korean does.

1 lb. Napa or Peking cabbage	½ tbsp. chili flakes
½ tbsp. salt	¼ cup light soy sauce
1 tbsp. chopped spring onions	¼ cup white vinegar
½ tbsp. minced ginger	¾ tsp. sugar
½ tbsp. minced garlic	sesame oil

Coarsely chop the cabbage and place in a glass dish (metallic dishes can discolor and contaminate the kimchi). Sprinkle the cabbage with salt and let stand for 3–4 hours, or until the cabbage is thoroughly wilted (the high salt content breaks down the cell walls of the cabbage and makes it easier for the bacteria to digest). Remove the cabbage from the brine and squeeze out the excess liquid, and then add the next 7 ingredients. Transfer the mixture to sterilized jars to ferment, seal, and leave in a cool place for at least 24 hours. The kimchi should keep for a few weeks in the refrigerator, but will be best if eaten within a few days. Sprinkle the kimchi with sesame oil before serving. Yields 1 pound.

Source: Jacki Passmore. (1991) *Asian Food & Cooking*. Singapore: Kyodo Printing, 151.

The Typical Korean Meal

Throughout the ages, Korean cuisine developed two distinct types of cooking: home cooking of the common people, matured within the family and the province of the housewife, and the more refined cuisine of the royal court, with its intricate cooking methods and elegant presentation. With the economic and social modernization that took place during the twentieth century, the distinction between the two became increasingly blurred. The twentieth century was also the time of Westernization of Korean cuisine. This process was initiated during the Japanese occupation (1910–1945), when Western food and drink, such as bread, confectionery, and beer, became popular in Korean cities, and a Western-style food processing industry in Korea began. Some Japanese food items were also adopted into Korean cuisine at that time, such as *tosirak* (the assorted lunch box) and sushi rolled in sheets of seaweed, which was popular in Korea under the name of *kimbap*.

A contemporary Korean meal is structured around plain boiled rice, accompanied by soup (*kuk*) and side dishes (*panch'an*). The number of side dishes varies, from three at ordinary meals to as many as twelve at more elaborate occasions. Stews (*tchigae*) and greens (blanched or sautéed and then mixed with a dressing) constitute the majority of *panch'an*. A variety of seafood and a wide selection of vegetables, along with beef, pork, and chicken, are the major foodstuffs. Seaweed is also used, but less extensively than in Japan. Chili pepper, soy sauce, soybean paste (*toenjang*), sesame oil, garlic, and green onions in various combinations give Korean dishes their characteristic flavor.

Eating Utensils and Eating Habits

A spoon and metal chopsticks are used while eating. Rice, soup, and other liquids are eaten with the former, side dishes generally with the latter. Soup and rice are served in individual bowls, but side dishes can

often be shared by more than one diner. Nowadays, bowls are usually made of stoneware, steel, or plastic, but for special occasions white porcelain is used. In the past, the tableware of the upper classes changed depending on the season: brass bowls were used in the winter and white porcelain ones in the summer. It is considered inelegant to lift bowls from the table (contrary to the rest of East Asia, where it is customary to lift bowls up to the mouth).

The majority of eating-out facilities in Korea have two dining areas: one with Western-style tables and chairs and one with an elevated floor where customers, seated on cushions, dine at low tables. Similarly, most Korean households use Western-style tables with chairs on a daily basis (with the table usually in the kitchen) but share meals seated on cushions on the floor, at a low table with short legs, when guests are entertained. The most traditional dining device is a small table designed for one or two persons. In upper-class households, such tables were once laid in the kitchen and then carried to different parts of the house where family members dined, divided according to age, gender, and position.

Fast Food

In recent decades, dairy products, confectionery, and a variety of Western-style dishes that are available at restaurants and fast-food outlets have become increasingly important items in the diet of the Korean population. Various noodles (*kuksu*) and stuffed dumplings (*mandu*) are popular and quick lunch dishes. Noodles are usually served in soupy liquids; stuffed dumplings are steamed, fried, or simmered in soups (*manduguk*).

Although Korean family meals still remain relatively uncontaminated, the share of commercially prepared foods is rising, as opposed to the pattern of home processing that prevailed before the 1970s. It may be surmised that further changes will take place in the decades to come. However, change rather than stability characterizes Korean cuisine, as any other.

Katarzyna J. Cwiertka

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CUISINE—MALAYSIA Malaysian cuisine reflects the rich multicultural heritage of the nation. When the port sultanate of Malacca (1400–1511) was founded, it attracted traders from both the East and West. Later culinary traditions were brought by Portuguese (1511–1641), Dutch (1641–1876), and English (1876–1957) colonists, as well as merchants from China, India, Saudi Arabia, and the Indonesian archipelago.

The dietary staples of rice and noodles reflect in part geography and native plant life, while the spice trade left an indelible impression on present-day tastes. The cuisines of Malaysia's three main ethnic groups, the Malays, Chinese, and Indians, form the core of Malaysian cuisine.

Various manifestations of rice dishes abound, and accompanying dishes are highly spiced in traditional Malay cuisine. Coconut cream features prominently. Malay food is ever evolving as old recipes for curries, *sambals* (spicy chili-pepper-based paste), and chutneys (spicy fruit- or vegetable-based paste) reappear. The best-known forms of Malay cuisine are *satay*, meat kebabs served with a spicy peanut sauce, cucumbers, onions, and rice cooked in coconut fronds; and *nasi lemak*, rice cooked in coconut cream and served with various condiments.

Malaysian Chinese cuisine can be categorized as Cantonese, Hainanese, Hakka, or Hokkien. Again,



A Malaysian steamed fish dish served in Penang in 2001. (MACDUFF EVERTON/CORBIS)



SOTO AYAM (CHICKEN SOUP)

Chicken soup is a Malaysian classic. This particular recipe makes heavy use of some of the Malaysia's more Indian culinary influences, such as cumin, turmeric, and fennel and stirs it up into something uniquely Malaysian.

1 packet compressed rice (or noodles)
 4 cloves
 1 stick cinnamon
 several tbsp. ghee (unsalted butter may be substituted)
 2 liters chicken stock (either from bones or cubes)
 pandan leaves (also known as screw pine leaves)
 1 chicken cut into big pieces
 salt
 MSG
 bean sprouts

Grind the following:

10 shallots or 1 red onion
 ½ inch ginger
 3 cloves garlic
 1 tsp. fennel seeds
 1 tsp. cumin seeds
 1 tbs. coriander seeds
 1 tsp. black pepper
 3 candlenuts (Be sure to cook them well as they are toxic when raw. Macadamia nuts may be substituted.)
 ½ tsps turmeric powder

Boil compressed rice packet in water till cooked, take out and leave to cool.

Fry ground ingredients, cloves, and cinnamon in a little ghee till fragrant, add stock, pandan, and chicken. Cook till chicken is done. Remove chicken and shred. Strain soup, season with salt and MSG. (Reduce the stock if necessary)

To serve, pour hot soup over rice, bean sprouts, and chicken in a large bowl.

Source: Thian's Mom. Retrieved 15 March 2002, from: <http://www.makantime.com>

rice and noodles are staples in the offerings of one-dish meals. Seafood and vegetables as well as meats are served with rice, and noodles are prepared in many different ways. Notables include hawker fare from the northern island-state of Penang and Cantonese offerings in the Klang Valley situated in the state of Selangor, and the city of Ipoh in the state of Perak.

Indian food, contrary to popular belief, is not always spicy. Vegetarian offerings are plentiful in Malaysian Indian cuisine, and the most popular dishes include rice with various curries served on a section of banana leaf, in south-Indian style. Indian-style breads are numer-

ous, among them *roti canai* (local name for *paratha*, a crispy bread with several thin layers), chapati (a thicker whole-wheat bread), nan (a thick bread of northern Indian origin), and *thosai* (a thin pancake made from the paste of ground lentils). Styles of preparations of accompanying dishes differ according to India's various regions and states, and there are distinctions between Indian Muslim and South Indian cuisines.

Overall, with constant exposure to cuisine from around the world, Malaysia's cuisine goes through a continual process of metamorphosis. The rise in "self-consciousness" about Malaysian cuisine also plays a large role

in its evolution, exemplified by the plethora of Malaysian cookbooks and the mushrooming of Malaysian restaurants in Western cities during the last decade.

Mark Stephan Felix

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
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CUISINE—MONGOLIA Traditional Mongolian foods have been and remain whatever the Mongols can obtain from their flocks (above all, milk, usually consumed fermented; more rarely, meat, generally boiled) and by hunting or gathering (or today, by importing). In general, these foods are monotonous, and access is highly seasonal and uneven. The Mongols also eat a number of bread foods when they can get access to flour. These foods are often in forms borrowed from a larger Eurasian world, e.g., the varieties of *boov* (from the Chinese *baozi*, meaning bread or bread food) that range from pastry to steamed dumplings



A woman cooking in a large pot in her yurt in Hovd Province, Mongolia, in 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)



HORSHOOR

Mutton and beef should taste just fine in this traditional Mongolian recipe, since goat, camel, and horse tend to be a little stringy—not to mention being difficult to find in supermarkets.

- 2 lbs. meat (mutton or beef; camel, horse, or goat for the true Mongolian dish)
- chopped cabbage and onion
- vegetable oil
- water
- 3 cloves minced garlic
- 1 tsp. salt
- 2 cups flour

Partially fry meat, vegetables, and garlic and set them aside. Make a pastry dough of flour, the salt, and enough water to make a pie-like dough. Mix the pastry ingredients together and knead until well blended. Let the dough sit for 10 minutes, roll out into little circles and fill with the meat mixture. Either place another circle atop the first and seal the edges or bring the sides together and pinch closed.

Fry the *horsboor* in about an inch of oil on medium-high until golden brown.

Source: Chicago Area Peace Corps Association Newsletter. Retrieved 15 March 2002, from: <http://www.capca.org>.



MONGOLIAN BEEF

A slightly Westernized version of Mongolian beef, this fairly easy recipe evokes notes reminiscent of true nomadic Mongolian cuisine.

4 cups peanut oil	½ tsp. salt
15 green onion tops	1 tsp. chili paste with garlic
1 tbs. minced ginger	¼ cup chicken stock
2 lbs. flank or sirloin steak	2 tbs. soy sauce
1½ tbs. water chestnut flour	¼ tsp. sugar
2 egg whites	1½ tbs. of dry sherry
cornstarch paste	

Cut tops of green onions into 2-inch-long pieces. Combine sauce ingredients (at right) in small bowl and stir thoroughly. Cut steak across the grain into thin slices, about ½-inch deep by 2-inch long. In a large bowl, combine egg whites, salt, and water chestnut flour. Beat with chopstick until frothy. Add steak and use fingers to coat each slice.

In a wok, heat oil to moderately hot. Fry meat in small batches; drop in 1 slice at a time to avoid sticking. Cook until lightly brown, about 1 minute. Drain on a paper bag.

Next, remove all but 2 tablespoons of oil from wok. With wok at medium heat, quickly stir-fry green onions and ginger for about 20 seconds. Add sauce; bring to boil on high heat while stirring. Add beef all at once, and toss with sauce until beef is hot and coated. Push beef out of sauce, dribble in cornstarch paste to lightly thicken. Recombine. Serves 4.

Source: Food Down Under. Retrieved 15 March 2002, from: <http://fooddownunder.com/cgi-bin/recipe.cgi?r=34250>.

similar to those eaten in China. Mongols also directly use grain, ground or semiground, in such dishes as *tsampa* (battered grain). Tea is now ubiquitous, most popularly as *suutei tsay* (Mongolian tea), made by long boiling of compressed bricks of tea in milk, with various additives, including butter or cream. Elites living a more completely sedentary life have often assimilated the foods of neighboring Russians and Chinese. In Inner Mongolia, for example, urban Mongols and the best-educated often serve foods that are more North Chinese than Mongolian, strictly speaking, but these North Chinese foods themselves have been heavily assimilated from central Eurasia by centuries of contact.

Mongolian cuisine was not always so dull as this description implies; the Mongols were once briefly arbiters of international taste, as is evidenced by the rich cuisine of the *Yinshan zhengyao* (Proper and Essential

Things for the Emperor's Food and Drink), presented to the Mongolian court in China in 1330 by its author, the Sino-Uighur dietary physician Hu Sihui. In this work, whose recipes for traditional foods run the gamut from roast wolf to a Kashmiri curry eaten with a fennel yeasted bread, there is an underlying foundation of *shulen* (banquet soups). These are exquisite blends of lamb, spices, and ingredients from one end of Asia to the other, melded in an attempt to create a cuisine that has a little something for everyone but is, at the same time, firmly based in a Mongolian love of boiling.

Paul D. Buell

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CUISINE—PHILIPPINES The cuisine of the Philippines reflects its complex history of colonialism and its geographic location. Beginning in 1521, three hundred years of Spanish colonization were followed by fifty years of American rule. These events have left their indelible marks on the foodways of the Philippines, making it one of the "centers for gastronomic change" (Sokolov 1991, 14–25). Combined with these influences is a history of commerce with Chinese and Malay neighbors, and the result is a dynamic cuisine where no one dish can properly represent the country. *Sinigang*, a broth of fish or shrimp paired with vegetables and flavored with tamarind, guava, or citrus fruits, may be the most indigenous dish, which best symbolizes the sour-salty combination preferred by Filipinos. *Adobo*, made with chicken or pork cooked in vinegar and garlic, originates in Mexican-Spanish in-



Lunchtime at a Jollibee fast-food restaurant in Manila in April 2000. The company controls 46 percent of the fast-food business in the Philippines. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

fluences, while *pancit* (noodles crowned with meat, vegetables, or local ingredients) and *lumpia*, a spring roll fried or served fresh, derive from Chinese cuisine.

Composed of 7,000 islands, the Philippines is surrounded by the sea. Fresh seafood is a must, especially in *kinilaw*, where fresh fish is marinated in vinegar and immediately eaten. Fish and a jar of palm wine were the first gifts to greet Magellan and his party. Today, fish served with rice is a Filipino meal boiled down to its essence. There are at least 160 words relating to rice and its prominent role as the staple grain, although in some areas corn or sweet potatoes are preferred. Beloved for its versatility, rice not only makes a meal but is used for rice cakes called *puto* as well as numerous sweets. The coconut is a close second to rice; its juice and meat are consumed fresh or used to flavor cooking, while the heart of the tree is enjoyed as a delicacy. Reliance on nature is another trademark of Filipino cuisine, seen in the use of cooking utensils that flavor food. The hollow of a bamboo pole can be made to boil rice while banana leaves steam fish or meat as well as flavor *bibingka* (rice cakes topped with sugar and native cheese).

Each province or region is known for its specialties. In Pampanga, a province reputed to harbor good cooks, cured meats are among the specialties. *Tocino* is made from thin slices of seasoned pork and served with eggs over fried rice for breakfast, or sometimes it is *longanisa*, a slightly spicy and sweet pork sausage. *Pinakbet*, a vegetable dish of bitter melon, eggplant, and *bagoong*, a popular condiment made from fermented tiny shrimp or anchovies, typifies Ilocano foodways. Down south, in Muslim Mindanao and Sulu, pork is avoided. Instead, goat, beef, and seafood cooked with coconut milk and spicy red chilies are favored.



SINIGANG SHRIMP

- 5–7 cups water
- 1 onion, sliced
- 2 jalapeño peppers or 2 whole chilies (optional)
- long string beans, cut into bite-size pieces
- 1–2 taro root, peeled and sliced into chunks.
- 1 packet Sinigang tamarind mix (if unavailable, use a few teaspoons tamarind paste)
- 1 pound whole raw prawns, unshelled (fish or pork can be used)
- 2 tomatoes
- kangkong (swamp cabbage) or substitute spinach or other leafy vegetable

Boil water with onion. Add peppers, string beans, taro root, and tamarind mix. Simmer until taro root is done. Add shrimp and tomatoes; cook for a few minutes. Add kangkong or leafy vegetable. When vegetables are barely cooked, just before serving, smash the tomatoes. Serve with hot rice and fish sauce.

Source: Margaret Magat



TINOLA (CHICKEN WITH GREEN PAPAYA)

2–4 garlic cloves
 1 tbs. minced ginger
 1 medium onion, sliced
 1 green papaya, sliced into chunks
 chicken pieces, skinless and defatted
 6–7 cups water
 chili pepper leaves (if unavailable, whole chilies)

In a deep pot, sauté garlic, ginger and onions. Add chicken, sauté until the outside is barely cooked. Add water and boil until chicken is tender, then add papaya and simmer. Minutes before serving, add chili leaves. Serve with hot rice and fish sauce.

Source: Margaret Magat

Fiestas and special occasions like Christmas call for rich Spanish-based dishes, such as *lechon* (roasted pig), *paella* (saffron-flavored rice seasoned with tomatoes and garlic and topped with meats and seafood), and chicken or fish *relleno* (stuffed chicken or fish), with *leche flan* (an egg custard) for dessert. For everyday meals, lower and middle classes prefer Malay- and Chinese-influenced dishes. *Merienda* is the afternoon snack, as simple as a mango or as elaborate as *puto* and *dinuguan* (pork blood stew). Favorite *pulutan* or snacks like fertilized duck eggs called *balut* are both street food as well as snacks eaten during drinking sessions, and are believed to be an aphrodisiac for men. Despite foreign influences, the liberal use of flavoring condiments like *bagoong*, chilies, crushed garlic, and vinegar can be said to indigenize Filipino cuisine, making dishes unique to that country.

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CUISINE—SOUTH ASIA Like Europe, South Asia has a variety of sophisticated local, regional, and ethnic cuisines. The most familiar and recognizable cuisine of the subcontinent is Indian cuisine, but some of what passes for Indian food is actually Bangladeshi or Pakistani cuisine. The cuisine of each locality and ethnic group in the subcontinent was usually inspired by local ingredients, and each region boasts distinct specialties and recipes handed down from generation to generation.

However, until the Green Revolution of the 1970s, certain regions in India and Bangladesh regularly suffered from overpopulation, which, along with drought and floods, led to pronounced and repeated food scarcity. Today India is self-sufficient in food grains and suffers no major shortages, but the same is not true for all of South Asia.

Some of the distinctive culinary regions of South Asia are the Punjab area in the central Indo-Gangetic plain, including parts of Pakistan, dominated by spicy baked meats (such as tandoori chicken) and flat breads made of wheat flour; the Bengal region to the east, including Bangladesh, known for mustard-spiced fish dishes and *rossogollas* (cottage-cheese sweets); the Tamil/Kerala area in the south, including Sri Lanka, known for rice-based meals, snacks such as *idli* (steamed rice cakes), and meat and vegetables cooked in rich coconut sauces (*sambhal*); and the Kashmiri region in the Himalayas, influenced by Afghani cuisine, with meat and rice cooked Persian fashion with raisins and nuts.

The use of spices and sauces is the unifying thread of an otherwise diverse cuisine, as is the variety of unleavened flat breads made with wheat flour, rice, and ground legumes. Dairy products, such as ghee (clarified butter), buttermilk, curds (yogurt), along with dals (dried peas and beans) and vegetables, are dietary staples. Vegetables are generally fried to make curry (Tamil *kari*) or are served with gravies or in legume-based soups.

A traditional meal (*thali*) for lunch or dinner is eaten with the fingers. Originally served on a leaf, now commonly served on a stainless-steel platter, a typical meal includes several vegetable dishes, rice, puris or chapatis (fried unleavened bread), pickles, *papads* (lentil wafers), salads, dessert, and yogurt. The *thali* can be vegetarian or can include meat dishes. The meal is usually accompanied by tea, coffee, or hot water and followed by a *paan* (betel leaf and nut, eaten as a digestive).

South Asian cuisine also offers much in the way of vegetarian and nonvegetarian snack foods. These are

usually savory dishes served with chutneys and pickles and eaten at any time of day.

Cooking in the subcontinent was traditionally associated with religious practices and moral beliefs. For example, India has a centuries-old tradition of cooking highly sophisticated and elaborate ritual food (*prasadam*) for sacred offerings to temple deities and for life-cycle rituals of devotees. This tradition is still alive today, and there is a vast resource of indigenous cooking knowledge and expertise in the subcontinent.

Diets and dietary restrictions in the subcontinent are closely linked to religion. India is predominantly Hindu, and while it is believed that all Hindus are vegetarian, the practice is usually confined to the Hindu upper castes; lower castes eat meat such as poultry and mutton, but no beef. Muslims of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh eat mutton, beef, poultry, and seafood, but no pork. Christians of the subcontinent eat poultry, fish, pork, mutton, and beef on a regular basis.

Historical Influences

South Asia was a destination of spice traders from the second through fourteenth centuries, so that foreign elements inevitably seeped into the culinary culture and modified local cuisines. The major influences were the Mughals, the Portuguese, and the British.

In 1527 the Mongol emperor Zahir-ud-Din Muhammad (Babur) invaded India and established the Mughal dynasty (1526–1857). The Mughals created the "Mughlai" court cuisine, heavily influenced by Afghani and Central Asian cuisine. Spices were added to cream and butter, rice was cooked with meat, and dishes were garnished with nuts. India was also introduced to kebabs and pilafs, as well as a variety of sweets made of wheat, cream, honey, and nuts. Today Mughlai cuisine is the core of the cuisines of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.

The Portuguese had traded in Goa on the southwestern coast of India as early as 1510, and Portuguese rule in Goa lasted for 450 years. Portuguese traders introduced such New World crops to Goa as potatoes, tomatoes, chilies, pineapples, yams, tobacco, and guavas, transforming the cuisine of the entire subcontinent.

In 1600 the British East India Company was established under a royal charter of Queen Elizabeth I for a fifteen-year period of spice trading. That event marked the beginning of the British empire's rule, which lasted three centuries on the subcontinent. With the British came a new cuisine called Raj—a compromise between British cuisine and that of the subcontinent. Bombay duck (native dried fish) replaced kippers at the colonial British breakfast table, and Bengali breakfast foods such as kedgeree (steamed rice and pulses) were exported from the subcontinent to the British table.



Kashmiri chefs in Srinagar, India, preparing a wedding banquet in an outdoor kitchen. (EARL & NAZIMA KOWALL/CORBIS)



MASALA DOSAI

The *masala dosai* is the traditional south Indian lunch dish. The *dosai* is a large rice flour pancake often filled with the rich but refreshing spicy coconut chutney and spicy potato curry described here. *Dosai* are very versatile and can be filled with a variety of different foodstuffs, although these by far the most common.

2 cups par boiled rice
 2 cups raw rice - 1 cup *urud dal* (yellow lentils)
 1 tsp. fenugreek seeds

Rinse the above ingredients in water for about 2–3 hours. Then grind in a blender (with adding water in steps) into a very fine flour. Add salt and keep it aside (to get sour) for 12 hours.

Heat the pan and spread a drop of oil on it. When the pan is fully heated, take some flour and spread it on the pan into a round shape. Turn it over so that both sides are cooked well. When it is almost cooked spread a teaspoon of coconut chutney over it. Place some potato curry and roll the *dosai* on both sides and move it to a plate.

Coconut Chutney

1 cup grated coconut
 2 green chilies
 ¼ tsp. salt
 pinch of *asafetida* (garlic or onion powder may be substituted)
 pinch of tamarind (lemon or lime pulp may be substituted)

To the coconut, chilis, and salt, add a pinch of tamarind and grind everything into a thick paste. Splatter with mustard seeds and *urud dal*.

Potato curry

1 lb. potatoes
 3 ½ oz. onions
 3 ½ oz. green peas
 1 tsp. mustard seeds
 1 tsp. *urud dal* (lentils)
 3 small green chilies
 1 twig of curry leaves
 ½ tsp. of salt

Boil the potatoes fully, peel and mash them. Heat some oil and add mustard seeds and *urud dal*. Add finely cut onions, fresh green peas and fry until the onions turn transparent. Add some fine pieces of green chillies and add the mashed potatoes, salt and fry. Add some curry leaves.

Source: India Tastes—South Indian Recipes—Masala Dosai. Retrieved 15 March, 2002, from: <http://www.indiatastes.com/categories/22.html>.

The British also introduced the word "curry," which people today associate with food from the sub-continent. British cooks ground spice powders to season meats and vegetables and cooked them into a kari,

a stir-fried preparation with gravy. The British called the ground spices "curry powder" and took it back to Britain, where it became popular. In 1997 Britain declared curry Britain's national dish, and in a



THE COLONIAL DIET

"You ask what shops we have. None at all; the butler buys everything in the bazaar in his bill every day. One of the Court native writers translates it into English, and very queer articles they concoct together! Such as, 'one beef of rump for biled;'—'one mutton of line beef for *alamoor estoo*,' meaning *à-la-mode stew*;—'mutton for curry pups' (puffs);—'eggs for saps, snobs, tips, and pups' (chops, snipes, tipsy cake, and puffs);—'medication (medicine) for ducks;'—and at the end 'ghirand totell' (grand total, and 'howl balance')."

Source: Julia C. Maitland. (1846) *Letters from Madras during the Years 1836–39*. London: Wm. Clowes & Sons.

countrywide survey 51 percent of people claimed they were "curryaholics," a word that may soon be listed in the Oxford English dictionary.

Vegetarianism

Toward the end of the Vedic period (1500–500 BCE), the concept of vegetarianism arose in the subcontinent primarily as a reaction to the dissolute upper castes who ate meat and drank liquor. The Buddhist notion of ahimsa (nonviolence) forbade the killing of animals as food, and this idea further influenced the Hindus not to eat meat. Asoka (d. 238 or 232 BCE), the Buddhist ruler of three-fourths of the subcontinent, further contributed to the development of vegetarianism by banning meat eating in his empire. Upper castes adopted vegetarianism soon afterward, and today vegetarianism is linked with upper-caste diet and behavior. Lower castes adopted vegetarianism as part of the process of Sanskritization (emulation of higher castes). Many vegetarian dishes of contemporary South Asia, especially of India, have been exported to the West, especially for those cultivating a healthful alternative lifestyle.

Contemporary South Asian Food

Today in South Asian cities like Delhi and Dacca, multinational companies such as McDonald's, KFC, Wimpys, and Pizza Hut offer pizzas, hamburgers, fried chicken, and other American and European foods. However, the indigenous food industries on the subcontinent compete with multinational interests in anticipating the needs of South Asian consumers.

In the indigenous food industry, Indian, Pakistani, Bengali, and other regional recipes are simplified for fast production, which decreases preparation time and costs for consumers. Food products include those for immediate consumption, as well as prepared foods such as snacks, spice powders, lentil wafers, pickles, and chutneys. Many of these prepared foods are exported to Britain and the United States for consumption by the South Asian diaspora, and today foods from various parts of the subcontinent are popular all over the globe.

Tulasi Srinivas

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CUISINE—THAILAND Thai cuisine is defined by its balance of four flavors: spicy, salty, sweet, and sour. Preserved fish or seafood generally provides the



Bowls with an assortment of spices to make Thai curry. (MAC-DUFF EVERTON/CORBIS)



***LAAP KAI* (MINCED CHICKEN SALAD)**

2 chicken breasts (approximately 1 pound)
 2 cloves garlic, minced
 2 ½ tbs. fish sauce
 3 tbs. lime juice
 1 tsp ground cayenne pepper
 1 tbs. roasted rice powder*
 2 tbs. chopped scallions, ends only
 ½ cup fresh mint leaves, roughly chopped
 lettuce leaves
 1 cucumber peeled and sliced

Cook chicken in a covered skillet over medium heat until done, about 20 minutes. Add 1–2 tablespoons of water to prevent chicken from sticking to the pan while cooking if needed. Let the chicken cool and then chop it by hand or in a food processor into small chunks.

Transfer the meat into a mixing bowl. Add garlic, fish sauce, and 2 tablespoons of lime juice and mix well. Add more lime juice according to taste. Mix in ground pepper and rice powder, and then toss in chopped scallions and mint leaves.

Transfer mixture to serving plate lined with lettuce and arrange cucumber slices. Serve with steamed sticky rice.

*Roasted rice powder may be purchased at Asian grocery stores or made at home. Roast 1 tablespoon of uncooked sticky rice in a dry pan. When the rice granules turn brown, remove from heat and pound in a mortar and pestle.

Source: Linda McIntosh

salty flavor, while the spiciness originates from chilies and peppercorns. Palm sugar and coconut milk lend sweetness, and the sour or citrus flavor comes from sources such as lemon grass, kaffir lime, and tamarind. Indian, Chinese, and Western cooking has influenced Thai cuisine, which also shares similarities with the cuisine of Thailand's neighboring countries—Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), Laos, and Cambodia. Despite these external influences, Thai cuisine is distinguished by its combination of fresh ingredients and its relatively short cooking time.

The foundation of Thai food is rice. Jasmine rice is the staple in central Thailand, while people living in the north and northeast prefer a glutinous or sticky rice. Various Thai noodle dishes were adopted from the Chinese. Abundant rivers and coastal areas make fish and seafood, either fresh or in a preserved form

such as fish sauce, shrimp paste, or fermented fish, another staple of Thai diets.

Thailand's four regions offer distinct cuisines. Central Thai food, the regional cuisine most commonly found in Thai restaurants, is known for its coconut-based curries. The people of north and northeast Thailand eat sticky rice and *laap*, a salad dish made from minced raw or cooked meat, including that of water buffalo and catfish, flavored with garlic, chilies, lime juice, and mint. In the northeast, Thailand's poorest region, exotic foods such as ant eggs are frequently eaten. Southern Thai cuisine, heavily influenced by Malay and Indian cooking, uses many spices. The majority of the south's population is Muslim and of Malay descent, so the influence from these countries comes naturally. Seafood is a common dish in the south, where the primary occupation is fishing.



KHAO NIEO MAMUANG **(MANGO AND STICKY RICE)**

8 oz. (1 cup) sticky rice
6 oz. coconut milk
1½ tbs. sugar
pinch of salt
2 ripe mangoes
4 tbs. coconut cream

Soak sticky rice in water for at least 4 hours. Drain rice and steam for 20 minutes or until tender, stirring occasionally while cooking. Transfer steamed rice to a bowl.

In a small mixing bowl, combine coconut milk, sugar, and salt. Combine the coconut milk mixture with the rice. Mix well and let rice sit for 30 minutes or until the milk mixture is absorbed.

Peel and slice the mangoes. Slice the two halves of the mango alongside its pit. Slice each half into diagonal, ½-inch-wide slices.

To serve, divide the rice and mango slices among four plates. Dribble 1 tablespoon of coconut cream onto the rice on each plate.

Source: Linda McIntosh

A typical Thai meal consists of several dishes, including a soup, a curry, a fried dish, and a spicy salad accompanied by rice. A fork and spoon are the usual Thai eating utensils; chopsticks are reserved for noodles. Fresh fruit to cleanse the palate typically follows the meal. Sweets are generally eaten as snacks throughout the day. Traditional Thai sweets include sweetened sticky rice with mango or durian and a custard called *sangkbaya*. Thai cuisine has received international attention as Thai restaurants have spread across North America and Europe. Thai ingredients are now found on the shelves of Western supermarkets. Thai cuisine is likewise thriving in its homeland with endless food stalls, markets, and restaurants, despite the popularity of foreign—especially Western “fast food”—restaurants.

Linda McIntosh

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CUISINE—TURKEY Turkey, the unique Muslim Republic with a democratic and secular regime, located in the eastern Mediterranean where it bridges Europe and Asia, has always been a bridge between European and Middle Eastern cultures with its historic and contemporary customs and traditional cuisine.

The richness and diversity of Turkish cuisine is a result of the Ottoman empire (453–1922), which reigned for centuries over a varied geography and landscape combining characteristics of Europe, Africa, and Asia, and which interacted with different cultures throughout the centuries. Thus Turkish cuisine has many specialties and variations, and it is understandable that people from Greece or Lebanon can claim that moussaka, for instance, is a Greek or Lebanese dish.

Meals at Home and in Restaurants

Turkish cuisine generally consists of soups; salads; sauced dishes prepared with cereals, vegetables, and meat; pastries with meat and vegetable fillings; cold vegetable dishes cooked in olive oil; and flour- and semolina-based desserts.

A typical Turkish breakfast consists of white cheese, fresh tomatoes, black or green olives or both, honey and jam, boiled eggs, fresh bread from the bakery, and tea. New healthy eating habits imported from Europe and the United States, such as consuming cereals and fruits, are welcomed by Turkish families. However, consumption of meat products such as ham or sausage is still not popular.

Families and working people who lack the time to get together tend to skip lunch. However, in restaurants, the lunch served includes soup, seasoned lamb or chicken with vegetables, a rice- or bulgur- (cracked and boiled wheat) pilaf dish, and salad. Milk desserts are preferred for lunch.

Most Turkish dinners start with appetizers called meze. Mezes are a category of food, consumed in small quantities, at the start of a meal and traditionally intended to accompany alcoholic drinks, especially raki, an anise-flavored liqueur. White-bean salad, smoked eggplant puree, green salads, pickles, feta cheese, fresh vegetables drenched in yogurt sauce and garlic, pastrami (dried tenderloin or sirloin), *tarama* (fish puree), humus (chickpea puree), and fava (broad-bean puree) are served as mezes. The main course that follows is grilled or fried fish or meat with fried tomatoes, green pepper, and sautéed potatoes. Fruits and desserts are served before enjoying Turkish coffee.



SHISH KEBABS

A classic Turkish dish, shish kebabs are basically meats on a stick. These barbecued meats are gently marinated and, while cooking, infuse with flavors from the peppers and onions.

Marinade

1 whole squeezed lemon
1 tsp. coarse sea salt
6 cloves garlic
1 tsp. mint
1 tsp. oregano
Dash olive oil

Kebabs

1½ lbs. lamb (or beef) cut into 1½-inch pieces
button mushrooms
cherry tomatoes
yellow bell pepper cut in 2-inch pieces
red bell pepper cut into 2-inch pieces

To make the marinade, add together squeezed lemon, garlic, coarse sea salt, mint, oregano, and olive oil. Coat the lamb chunks and refrigerate for about 2 to 3 hours. Thread the meat onto one set of skewers and the vegetables on a separate set of skewers. Cook the lamb over medium-high fire until done (about 6 minutes). Cook the vegetables until slightly charred (about 8 minutes). Serve with tahini, pita, and lemon.

Source: Adapted from *Food and Wine*. Retrieved 25 March 2002, from: <http://www.foodandwine.com>.

Vegetables

Vegetables are consumed in large quantities. Generally they are not boiled in water or used as garniture. It is customary to cook vegetables with meat, onions, tomatoes, or tomato paste. Vegetables are also cooked in olive oil. A specialty of Turkish cuisine is the *zeytinyagli* or olive-oil course. Oil is important in Turkish cuisine: Vegetables, such as root celery, green string beans, artichokes, leeks, eggplants, or zucchini can be cooked in olive oil and served at room temperature. Vegetables such as peppers, eggplants, carrots, or zucchinis can also be fried and served with a tomato-garlic or yogurt-garlic sauce.

Onions and tomatoes are the main ingredients of almost all dishes. Chopped onions fried in oil and fresh tomatoes (or tomato paste) are added to dishes and are also chopped into most salads.

"Dolma" is the term for stuffed vegetables. There are two kinds of dolmas: those filled with ground meat and eaten with a yogurt sauce, and those with seasoned rice mix and cooked in olive oil. The former is a frequent main-course dish. Any vegetable that can be filled with or wrapped around these mixes can be used to prepare dolma: zucchini, pepper, tomato, cabbage,

grape leaf, and eggplant are examples of such vegetables. Eggplant (or aubergine) has a special place in Turkish cuisine.

Meat

Sheep, lamb, beef, and veal meat are generally consumed with vegetables in dishes served hot at home. However the real taste and flavor of meat can be best appreciated by tasting kebabs at restaurants. Kebab is widespread in many Mid-Eastern countries, but is originally Turkish. Shish kebab is grilled cubes of skewered lamb or veal. *Doner* kebab is made by stacking layers of ground meat and sliced leg of lamb on a large upright skewer, which is slowly rotated in front of a vertical charcoal fire. As the outer layer of the meat is roasted, thin slices can be cut and served with rice pilaf. Southern and southeastern cities of Turkey are famous for the variety of their kebabs.

Pilaf

Pilaf is another specialty of Turkish cuisine. The most common types are cracked-wheat pilaf and rice pilaf. Pilaf is made of rice boiled in beef stock with cubed onions and tomatoes and green peppers



ALMOND BAKLAVA

This Turkish delight is sticky, crisp, and rich, yet surprisingly easy to make. Be warned, though, that baklava is very rich and dense, so unprepared diners may need a jolt of mud-thick Turkish coffee to keep them from napping after eating it.

Pastry

¼ cup sugar
2 tsp. cinnamon
4 cups almond slivers
filo dough
¼ cups butter, melted

Syrup

4 cups sugar
3 cups water
½ cup honey
1 stick cinnamon
6 whole cloves

Mix together ¼ cup of sugar, the cinnamon, and the almond slivers. On a medium-size buttered pan lay out one of the sheets of filo dough, butter it, and layer on another five or six buttered sheets of filo. Try and keep the dough covered for as long as possible, as the paper-thin pastry tends to dry out.

Lay out another sheet of filo dough, without buttering it this time. Spread on some of the almond mix, enough to cover it evenly, about a sixteenth of an inch. Keep doing almond layers until all the mix is gone.

Fold in the dough that hangs from the side of the pan. Some of the edges will be dry, so just cut them and discard them. Continue layering the remainder of the filo dough (about 5 sheets), making sure to butter each one and fold in the edges before adding the next one. Butter the top sheet very well, and sprinkle a little bit of water on it so the top doesn't burn in the oven.

Bake at 375° for about 20 minutes or until golden. Remove from oven, slice into small rectangles and serve dripping with syrup. To make the syrup, combine the remaining sugar, water, honey, cinnamon and, cloves in a small sauce pan and heat, stirring frequently over medium heat until the mixture is thick and syrupy. Remove cloves before serving.

Source: Botherless Baklava. Retrieved March 21, 2002, from:
<http://www.geocities.com/NapaValley/2267/baklava.html>

sautéed in butter and usually served with vegetable and meat dishes.

Bread and Pastries

Accompanying the main dishes is a variety of bread made of wheat and corn flour. Pita, a flatbread with various toppings, *simit*, ring bread with sesame seed, and *manti* (Turkish ravioli) are some examples of breads and pastries. But the true specialty is the *borek*, a special pastry of thin sheets of homemade dough (*yufka*). The pastry sheets are layered or folded into various shapes after being filled with cheese, vegetable, meat, or other mixes, and then are baked or fried.

Spices and Seasonings

Various spices are used in Turkish cooking, the most common being red pepper, cinnamon, thyme, and cumin. Widely used seasonings are dill, mint, parsley, and garlic. Fresh or dried mint is also consumed.

Yogurt and Ayran

Yogurt, a contribution of Turkish cuisine to the world, is a popular food and a staple in the Turkish diet. Turkish chefs can cite at least hundred recipes in which yogurt is used as an ingredient or a sauce. *Ayran*, a widely consumed national nonalcoholic drink, is a

diluted and salted sour yogurt, served with meals or with snacks.

Desserts and Beverages

The best-known sweets associated with Turkish cuisine are Turkish delight (*lokum*) and baklava. *Lokum* is a jelly sweet often mixed with walnuts or pistachios, cut into cubes, and rolled in powdered sugar. Baklava is the paper-thin pastry sheets that are brushed with butter and folded, layered, or rolled after being filled with ground pistachios, walnuts or heavy cream, baked, then soaked with a thick syrup.

Muhallebi, made with milk, sugar, and rice flour, is a traditional dessert in Turkish cuisine, as is halvah, made by pan-sautéing semolina and pine nuts in butter before adding sugar, milk, or water and briefly cooking until these are absorbed.

Turkish traditional drinks include Turkish coffee, preferred after meals, and Turkish tea, with its deep red color and unique taste. *Çay*, Turkish tea, is brewed over boiling water; it is served in special small, thin-walled glasses.

Among alcoholic drinks, raki is usually mixed with water at the table; in everyday language, it is called lion's milk. *Şerefe* (cheers) is a common toast.

Eating is taken seriously in Turkey. It is inconceivable for family members to eat alone, or eat and run, while others are at home. The concept of having a potluck meal at someone's house is also entirely foreign to the Turks. Despite the increasing presence of frozen and canned foods and fast-food chains in the big cities, Turkish cuisine is resisting the new habits of eating, both in domestic settings and in restaurants.

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CUISINE—VIETNAM The most common Vietnamese word for food has the basic meaning of "cooked rice" (*com*). Vietnamese has many words for rice, depending on whether it is husked or unhusked, cooked or uncooked, plain white rice or sticky (glutinous) rice. At most Vietnamese meals, a bowl filled with white rice sits in front of everyone present. Plat-

ters of food, sauces, and condiments are shared family style, with small helpings added on top of the rice. If enough rice is available, several bowls of steamed white rice form the foundation of almost every meal. Fish, meat, and even vegetables are used mainly as condiments to be eaten with the rice. Without adequate rice, many people feel they are hungry, even if other food is available.

When rice is scarce, people add substantial amounts of corn, manioc, yams, or sweet potatoes to their diet to make their rice supply last longer. These foods are sometimes boiled and eaten separately and sometimes mixed in with the rice. But rice is almost always preferred. With certain dishes or for ceremonial offerings, glutinous rice is preferred. There are many kinds of both regular and sticky rice, depending on whether the grain is short or long, heavy or light. Ordinary rice is also pounded into powder to make different kinds of noodles and cakes, while glutinous rice is used for certain pastries.

Meat and Fish

Most Vietnamese eat little meat; the meat eaten is mainly pork and chicken. Beef is not often eaten; it is scarce, expensive, and poor in quality. Almost all parts of slaughtered animals are eaten, including organs and intestines. Bones are used to make soup. Most people eat more fish than meat. Fish come from rice fields, ponds, rivers, lakes, streams, and the sea. People also eat meat from goats, ducks, and geese. Crab, shrimp, snail, and eel are also eaten where available. In the north, some people eat field rats and dogs, the latter dish being usually preferred by older men. A few restaurants in and around major cities and resort areas specialize in snake meat; others serve exotic game dishes.



Shrimp rolls ready for eating in Ho Chi Minh City. (CATHERINE KARNOW/CORBIS)



TET ROAST BEEF SALAD WITH SPRING ONION OIL

This special dish is one of the foods often served during Tet, the Vietnamese New Year.

Salad

1 large cucumber, peeled
 1 large carrot, peeled
 2 limes
 ½ tsp. sugar
 ½ tsp. crushed red pepper flakes
 ½ tsp. toasted sesame oil
 1 clove garlic, minced
 1 piece ginger, ½ inch in length, peeled and minced
 ½ lb. spinach, washed, trimmed, and dried
 ½ lb. roast beef, thinly sliced
 3 tbs. crushed toasted peanuts
 cilantro sprigs
 fresh cracked pepper

Spring Onion Oil

¼ cup canola oil
 4 large chopped green onions, including green part
 ¼ tsp. salt

Slice the cucumber into thin rounds. Lightly salt the rounds and leave in a colander to drain for at least 15 minutes. Slice the carrot into thin rounds and set aside. When the cucumbers have drained, squeeze out the excess water with your hands.

Cut 1 lime into wedges and set aside. In a small bowl, mix together the juice of the remaining lime, sugar, red pepper flakes, sesame oil, garlic and ginger. Toss the cucumbers and carrots with this sauce and let them sit 5 minutes.

Toss the spinach with 2 tablespoons of the spring onion oil, or amount to taste. Arrange on a platter. Pour the cucumber and carrot mixture, with the dressing, on top of the spinach. Arrange the roast beef slices around the edges of the salad. Spoon 1 to 2 tablespoons of the remaining spring onion oil (with toasted onion bits) on top of the roast beef. Serve topped with the toasted peanuts, sprigs of cilantro, fresh cracked pepper and the reserved wedges of lime on the side.

To make the spring onion oil, heat the oil in a saucepan on high until very hot. Add the onions and salt. Fry the onions until they become crisp and the edges begin to brown. Turn off the heat and let the onions continue to cook in the hot oil until they become very brown. Drizzle sparingly on salads, cooked chicken, noodles, soups, and other dishes, sprinkling a bit of the onion bits on top.

Source: Adapted from Kate's Global Kitchen. Retrieved 15 March 2002, from: <http://www.globalgourmet.com/food/kgk/2000/0200/onion.html>.

Sauces and Garnishes

Dipping sauces and garnishes are important parts of Vietnamese cuisine. Meat and vegetable dishes are often highly seasoned (with garlic, chili peppers, lemon grass, ginger, or any of a number of herbs) and heavily garnished with mint, basil, dill, slices of chili pep-

pers, bean sprouts, or crushed peanuts. Most meat dishes, even whole chickens, are chopped (bones and all) into bite-size pieces that are dipped into one or another of half a dozen common dipping sauces. The most prevalent of these is a sauce made from fermented fish (*nuoc mam*), which is also used in cooking. For dip-

ping, the fish sauce is mixed with crushed garlic, lime juice, sugar, and chili pepper, then slightly diluted with water. It is often served in individual dipping bowls, to which chili peppers can be added to taste.

Vegetables and Fruits

Vegetables include a spinach-like green grown in water (*rau muong*) and many different kinds of beans, squash, pumpkins, cabbages, lettuce, eggplant, turnips, cucumbers, both regular and green onions, carrots, and tomatoes. These are eaten fresh, boiled, sautéed, or fried. Some are pickled, and some are dried for use in cooking. There are also many varieties of corn, yams, sweet potatoes, Western white potatoes, manioc, and other tuber crops.

Fruits are abundant, and most Vietnamese eat a lot of fruit. Common fruits include papaya, mango, orange, lime, pomelo, tangerine, watermelon, jackfruit, litchi, rambutan, custard apple, jujube, persimmon, plum, dragon fruit, milk apple, star fruit, and mangosteen. Some Vietnamese like durian very much; others, not at all.

Beverages and Soups

Most Vietnamese drink large quantities of tea, usually warm green tea with nothing added. A thermos of hot water is often kept at the ready in homes and offices for making a pot of tea or topping up a pot that has been sitting and has got cold. Many varieties of tea are available: black, green, lotus, and jasmine. Tea bags can now be found in quite a few urban homes. Most Vietnamese do not drink much coffee, and they tend to drink it very strong with a generous dollop of sweetened condensed milk in it. Limeade is popular, and vendors sell drinks of juice from crushed sugarcane in the streets.

Most Vietnamese drink alcoholic beverages only moderately and mainly at social and ritual occasions, although some men are heavy drinkers. Locally distilled rice whiskey (*ruou de*) is a common and affordable drink throughout Vietnam, and beer is very popular. Inexpensive, locally produced draft beer of variable quality is readily available in all cities and most towns. Canned and bottled beer, both imported and domestic, has recently become popular, but is expensive for many people. Western-style wine made from grapes was once largely imported and expensive, but the quality of domestic wines has been improving. A growing but still small number of Vietnamese can now afford to buy an occasional bottle of wine or champagne. Many ethnic minority groups make wine from fermented rice or sometimes from manioc. Brandy is

popular among those who drink hard liquor. Some people have developed a taste for imported scotch, bourbon, or blended whiskey. Gin and vodka are less popular but are readily available in shops and stalls in major urban centers.

Soup and noodle dishes are also important parts of Vietnamese cuisine. The most popular Vietnamese soup is *pho*, which contains flat rice noodles in either beef broth or chicken broth, with small amounts of meat. Another popular soup is made with a different kind of flat rice noodle (*bun*). Often this noodle is served in a bowl of broth containing grilled and seasoned meat (*bun cha*) or with snails (*bun oc*). Another common soup is rice porridge (*chao*), a rice gruel to which may be added chicken, fish, pork, shrimp, organ meat (heart, liver), or even eel. Other soups are made with Chinese wheat noodles (*mi*), which are also sometimes served sautéed with vegetables, meat, or seafood. Most of these soups are commonly eaten in small restaurants or soup stands or purchased from sidewalk vendors. Soup is eaten at all hours of the day, as a meal or a snack. Clear, light soups (*canh*) are often served with meals both in homes and in restaurants. In cities, one can find wonton soup, eel soup, crab and asparagus soup, and many others.

Desserts

Vietnamese normally do not eat much dessert. A meal may end with tea and perhaps a little fruit. Sometimes a kind of pudding or custard (*che*) may be served. These desserts usually contain glutinous rice, soy beans, black beans, green beans, tapioca, or lotus seeds. They usually contain no milk products, but are made with plenty of sugar and one of a variety of flavorings (ginger, sesame, or others). Such dishes may be called dessert dishes, but they are commonly eaten as snacks.

Regional Specialties

There are hundreds of regional specialties, but some are common all over Vietnam. One of the best-known Vietnamese dishes is the distinctive Vietnamese version of a spring roll, known as *nem* or *cha gio*. Another dish, *chao tom*, is made by pounding shrimp, garlic, and other ingredients into a paste and wrapping the paste around a thick stick of the inner portion of a sugarcane and then grilling it. Another dish (*banh xeo*) is something between a pancake and an omelet. Ingredients include eggs, rice flour, coconut milk, green onions, beans, and bean sprouts, fried in a hot skillet.

There are hundreds of special dishes associated with a region, a city, or even a particular street. In Hanoi, a famous fish dish (*cha ca*) is associated with one small

street, and shrimp cakes (*banh tom*) are sold mainly in a short strip along West Lake. Ho Chi Minh City cuisine features a sumptuous meal of "seven kinds of beef" (*thit bo bay mon*). Hue cuisine includes many varieties of distinctive cakes and dumplings and an astonishing variety of vegetarian dishes.

In Vietnam, what people eat and how they prepare it depend on social class, region, and the seasons. In winter in the north, people eat more meat and more fried dishes, and they season the food more. In summer, people eat more fruit and vegetables and more soups and puddings. Throughout the year, people take advantage of whatever produce is fresh and at the peak of its season.

Food and the Theory of Yin and Yang

Vietnamese cuisine was influenced by the ancient East Asian model of yin and yang, the two primordial forces from which everything in the world was created. A balance between yin and yang was necessary in all things. Illness was thought to be caused by a lack of balance between yin and yang, either within a person or between a person and the environment. It was believed that diet could disrupt or restore harmony. All foods were thought to have an essential nature, to be hot, warm, cool, or cold. Hot and warm foods were yang; cool and cold foods, yin. Depending on weather, environment, and symptoms of illness, one would eat certain foods and avoid others to preserve or regain good health.

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CUKONG Derived from the Chinese word *hokkien* (master), *cukong* is a pejorative term in the Indonesian language for a clever Chinese businessman who plays a role as a middleman with connections and cooperation with those in power. The figure is not unique to Indonesia but occurs in other Southeast Asian countries as well.

The concept of the Chinese businessman as *cukong* arose from the nature of Dutch colonial policies in the

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Indonesia. These policies estranged the Chinese minority from the rest of the population. Forbidden government jobs, the Chinese were forced into roles as traders. As traders, they established networks and developed their management skills.

A broadening of the concept of *cukong* began in 1965 when the army took over political power in Indonesia and asserted control over the country's economic resources. Lacking skills, experience, and trading networks, some army officers authorized Chinese businessmen to run the army's businesses and manage their economic interests.

These army officers believed that their collaboration with the Chinese businessmen, coupled with discriminatory laws and the weak political base of the Chinese minority in Indonesia, would maintain the army's political and economic power more effectively than it would be maintained if the officers collaborated with indigenous, or *pribumi*, businessmen. This system has developed into what is known in Indonesia today as the "*cukong* system," a web of collusion and corruption among Chinese businessmen, bureaucrats, and military officers. The *cukong* specialize in administering business affairs while the bureaucrats and military officers provide them with government funds, facilities, and security protection.

Andi Achdian

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CULT OF MAITREYA The cult of Maitreya (Mile) in China was originally associated with the vows of monk-scholars to be reborn in what they called Tusita heaven. The goal was that they might hear the dharma directly from the mouth of the future Buddha Maitreya and thus attain Buddhahood. These elite monks, and the aristocrats and royalty who patronized them, commissioned images of Maitreya, both standing and seated in meditation, as objects of worship and as aids for visualization and contemplation. Standing images of Maitreya were indicative of his preaching in Ketumati, and seated images portrayed Maitreya's waiting in Tusita. Both styles are found closely con-

nected in the art of the Northern dynasties (220–589 CE) and the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) and demonstrate that these two aspects of the cult of Maitreya were interrelated in early medieval China.

The origins of the monastic aspect of the cult of Maitreya in China may be traced to the exegete Daoan (312–385), whose worship was focused around his desire to be reborn in Tusita heaven in the presence of Maitreya so that his doubts concerning the scriptures could be resolved. The famous Buddhist pilgrim Xuanzang (Hsuan-tsang, c. 596–664) was a fervent devotee of Maitreya who desired rebirth in Tusita, so the cult became closely associated with his school of Chinese Yogacara.

The Maitreya cult was an important focus of Buddhist belief in early medieval China. Since the sutras about Maitreya suggested that he would descend from Tusita to inaugurate a peaceful Buddhist millennium after years of warfare and the decline of the Buddhist teaching (*mofa*), worship of Maitreya spread throughout Chinese society. During the chaos that ensued at the end of the Sui dynasty (581–618 CE) and rise of the Tang, a few Buddhist monks and laymen justified their rebellions by claiming to be Maitreya, thus drawing upon the imagery and beliefs common to the cult. Later, Empress Wu Zetian (624–705) justified her usurpation of the Tang throne and declaration of her short-lived Zhou dynasty (690–705) by identifying herself with Maitreya. Followers of Maitreya rebelled frequently through the Song (Sung) period (960–1279), and rebels drew upon Maitreya cult imagery to lend authority and religious fervor to their uprisings.

The image of Maitreya and his cult have gone through many transformations in Chinese society. Maitreya was eventually reinterpreted iconographically, going from the slim and sleek figure of the Northern dynasties period to the roly-poly figure of Budai (Pu-tai) during the Song. The "Laughing Buddha," as he is commonly known, spread throughout Chinese popular culture during the late imperial Chinese period (1368–1912) and is a staple image of traditional Chinese culture that has been exported to the West through immigrant Chinese communities.

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CULTURAL REVOLUTION—CHINA The Chinese Cultural Revolution (CR), the full title of which was the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, was the largest and most important of the ideological campaigns of Mao Zedong (1893–1976). Because of the political movement's length, scale, and destabilizing effects, its significance for the history of China under Mao and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) he led was enormous. There is general agreement that Mao was by far the single most important figure in the campaign and that the Cultural Revolution gave rise to a massive personality cult surrounding him. Yet it was also a mass movement, involving many millions of people and considerable struggle between different sectors of Chinese society over the movement's control and direction. There was consequently much violence and even periods of localized civil war. However, Mao and his followers presented the CR to the people in Marxist ideological terms, the central feature being an extreme emphasis on class struggle, dubbed "the key link."

What Caused the Cultural Revolution?

Mao, the CCP chairman from the early 1940s until his death, had both ideological and political reasons for initiating the CR. He opposed the moderate economic policies that his former comrades in the CCP leadership had implemented following the failure of his own radical Great Leap Forward economic campaign, begun in 1958. He regarded the CCP as beginning to display the characteristics of a new ruling class and feared that the growing elitism and bureaucratization of the CCP would, if left unchecked, spell the end of his radical notions of revolution and result in a "capitalist restoration." The CR was thus both an ideological campaign and a struggle for power. Mao was supported by Lin Biao (1908–1971), Mao's chief deputy until 1971, and by his own wife, Jiang Qing (1913–1991). Their opponents in the CCP hierarchy were led by Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969), who in April 1959 had replaced Mao as China's president, and by Liu's chief supporter, Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997).

For Mao, the outcome of the CR would determine fundamental questions of policy regarding China's



To celebrate the Cultural Revolution, thousands of Red Guards wave Mao's Little Red Book on 1 May 1969 in Tiananmen Square, Beijing. (AFP/CORBIS)

economic and political direction. He believed in the need for an increasing socialization of China's economy and society and for continual revitalization of the revolution through a campaign-style of politics that both mobilized the masses and prevented the party and its cadres from becoming elitist. Liu, conversely, believed in the importance of careful economic planning under the control of the CCP. He also believed a retreat from the radical economic policies of the Great Leap Forward was necessary, and he reintroduced measures, such as rural markets and private farm plots for the peasants, which encouraged production through offering material incentives to the Chinese people. Mao believed Liu's policies facilitated the emergence of a new bourgeoisie, and it was consequently those "persons in authority taking the capi-

talist road" such as Liu and his supporters who were to become the main targets during the CR.

The Early Stages of the Cultural Revolution

Opposed by most of the party leadership, Mao turned to China's students and the People's Liberation Army under the control of Lin Biao for support in his struggle against the "capitalist roaders" within the CCP. Frustrated by attempts by the mayor of Beijing, Peng Zhen (1902–1997), to limit the CR's scope to strictly cultural affairs (Peng was initially put in charge of the movement), Mao had Peng purged and established a Cultural Revolution Group under the control of Jiang Qing and Chen Boda (1904–1989). This group encouraged and directed much of the radical activity over the next few years. In late May 1966, secondary and university students began to organize themselves into groups called Red Guards, which were central to the mass struggles and violence that characterized the CR. The first official party document on the CR was the sixteen-point "Decision" adopted by the Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee (August 1966). The "Decision," which set the intensely ideological tone of the CR and provided guidelines to run it, declared the CR to be a new stage in China's revolution, one that "touches people to their very souls." It emphasized the need to struggle against and overthrow those in authority taking the capitalist road and endorsed the struggle in education against "bourgeois" academic authorities. The "Decision" did, however, caution against violence as a means of resolving contradictions or differences among the people. It also declared that the "great majority" of cadres—party administrators and professionals—were "good" or "comparatively good," suggesting that Red Guards should not attack them without good reason. In the event, the commands against both violence and attacking "good" cadres were frequently disregarded, as Red Guard factions attempted to outdo one another in demonstrating their devotion to Chairman Mao.

On 18 August 1966, Mao, Lin Biao, and other CR leaders reviewed a mass rally of over 1 million Red Guards in Tiananmen Square in central Beijing. Some half-dozen such mass rallies were held in the square from then until late November. Rallies were also held in other cities. These helped to spawn a one-sided revolutionary atmosphere that brooked no view on any topic but the one supposedly authorized by Mao, with the result that fanaticism became commonplace.

The Red Guard organizations spread through society and across China, believing they had a duty to destroy old culture and habits, including anything traditional, and to establish new, supposedly socialist,



CHAIRMAN MAO ON IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL PURITY

"Recently there has been a falling off in ideological and political work among students and intellectuals, and some unhealthy tendencies have appeared. Some people seem to think that there is no longer a need to concern oneself with politics or the future of the motherland and the ideals of mankind. It seems as if Marxism was once all the rage but it is currently not so much in fashion. To counter these tendencies, we must strengthen our ideological and political work. Both students and intellectuals should study hard. In addition to the study of their specialized subjects, they must make progress both ideologically and politically, which means that they should study Marxism, current events and politics. Not to have a correct political point of view is like having no soul . . .

"All departments and organizations should shoulder their responsibilities in ideological and political work. This applies to the Communist Party, the Youth League, government departments in charge of this work, especially to heads of educational institutions and teachers."

Source: Mao Zedong. (1966) *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tsetung*. Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 142–143.

things in their place. The Red Guards subjected teachers to often-violent criticism and effectively closed down the education system. They frequently spearheaded the attack against the "capitalist roaders" within the CCP, ransacking party offices, parading cadres through the streets wearing dunce hats, and subjecting these persons to humiliating criticism sessions that often ended in violence. The ideological orientation of the Red Guard organizations was variable, and in the hothouse atmosphere of the CR, fueled by the cult of personality surrounding Mao, these ideological differences often ended in pitched battles between rival Red Guards, resulting in numerous casualties. From August 1966, Red Guards also destroyed or damaged religious buildings and attacked and humiliated their clergy.

In September 1966, *Mao zhuxi yulu* (Sayings of Chairman Mao Zedong), usually described as The Little Red Book, was published. This book, which became an icon for Mao's followers, especially the Red Guards, contained the nucleus of his thought. According to official figures, 350 million copies had been printed by the end of 1967. The obsession with following Mao's thought saw an emphasis on class struggle and "serving the people" (the title of Mao's most popular article) rather than on oneself or one's family, and on demanding sacrifices from ordinary people on behalf of socialism and the revolution. Meanwhile, the attacks on "old culture" created an extraordinarily narrow and restrictive cultural environment. Very few books were published other than those expressing Mao's thought or the CCP or revolutionary history. Many literary figures were humiliated and even persecuted to death, notably the famous fiction writer and playwright Lao She, who died 24 August 1966. All traditional theater was banned, and Jiang Qing imposed a theory of "model" dramas, based on a forum held in February 1966, which insisted that all literature and art should reflect and propagate the class struggle and revolutionary heroism.

Developments to the Ninth CCP Congress

The Red Guards' failure to observe the injunction against violence as well as the heightened radicalism and fanaticism of late 1966 and early 1967 led the CR leaders, in January 1967, to command the People's Liberation Army to restore order, extending its control to many civilian institutions. "Revolutionary committees" were then set up in the whole country from every province down to every factory, school, and people's commune to take over the power of old administrative authorities. These committees were a new administrative model regarded as appropriate for a mass revolutionary movement like the CR. They con-

tained representatives of the military, the Red Guards (the masses), and experienced cadres who had survived the CR relatively unscathed. However, the military soon occupied a prominent leadership role in these revolutionary committees.

A mid-1967 resurgence of radical Red Guard activity led to violent conflict between the Red Guards and the military in several areas. The most serious was a three-week civil war in July and early August in and around Wuhan, the capital of Hubei province central China. Fanned by Jiang Qing, this war ended in a victory for Mao and the Red Guard forces when the commander of the Wuhan military region, Chen Zaidao, was dismissed. In the international arena, Red Guard-inspired disturbances flared in Hong Kong, and there was a savage attack on the British chargé d'affaires office in Beijing on 22 August.

After another period of relative order, a further resurgence of fighting occurred from April to July 1968, with many small-scale civil wars in southern China, especially in the Guangxi Autonomous Region, bordering Vietnam. A war in April and early May in Wuzhou, in far-eastern Guangxi, brought about large-scale destruction in the city and the torture and deaths of several thousand Red Guards. Ultra-leftist groups plundered trains taking weapons to Vietnam, where the Vietnam War was raging.

Seeing that a continuation of this situation would throw the country into civil war, Mao moved to end the chaos. Early in the morning of 28 July 1968, Mao, Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, and other leaders interviewed several Red Guard leaders, condemned them, and began the process of sending large numbers of Red Guards to the countryside. This was carried out supposedly to broaden the revolutionary experience of the Red Guards, but the real motive was to get them out of the cities, thereby reducing the level of conflict and violence.

In October 1968, a CCP Central Committee plenum condemned Liu Shaoqi as a traitor and sent him to prison, where he died on 12 November 1969. Not until February 1980 was his death revealed to the world. After this revelation, he was rehabilitated by the post-Mao leadership of Deng Xiaoping, which adopted an extremely hostile view of the CR.

The Ninth Party Congress, held in April 1969, ended the most important and radical phase of the CR and stressed unity and the need to rebuild the CCP. Appearing as a total victory for Mao, it even declared Lin Biao his "close comrade-in-arms and successor" as well as the sole CCP vice-chairman. However, challenges to the CR's line were far from over.

The Lin Biao Affair and the Later Stages of the Cultural Revolution

The years from the Ninth Party Congress to Mao's death were characterized by a retreat from the radicalism of the early years of the CR, as the party rebuilt itself and reasserted its authority. Victims of this process were often those who had most ardently supported Mao's radical line. A campaign against Mao's erstwhile ally Chen Boda was initiated in September 1970, and the following year saw the Lin Biao affair, probably the most unusual example of intra-elite political conflict during the CR. According to official accounts, Lin and his main followers, including his son and wife, had concocted a plot to assassinate Mao but were killed in an air crash in September 1971 while fleeing from China after their attempt was exposed. Lin's death in the air crash is not in doubt, but there

have been many explanations of his fate, and Western scholars are generally skeptical that he had tried to assassinate Mao. What is clear is that to have Mao's "close comrade-in-arms and successor" condemned as the chairman's would-be assassin severely undercut the power of the Left. It also raised serious doubts among many Chinese about the validity of the CR and whether Mao's judgment was as reliable as the almost godlike status accorded him implied.

At the same time as the Lin Biao affair, enormous changes were taking shape in the field of China's foreign relations. Following the largely self-imposed isolation of the early phase of the CR, China moved to rejoin the international community. In October 1971, China was admitted into the United Nations, and in February 1972, the U.S. president Richard Nixon visited China. The first half of the 1970s saw China establish full diplomatic relations with numerous countries, including several major Western countries.

Signs of the relatively relaxed atmosphere continued in 1973, although factional struggles within the CCP leadership persisted. Deng Xiaoping was again referred to as vice-premier in April, after seven years in disgrace. The Tenth CCP Congress of August 1973 saw the trusted premier Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) replace Lin Biao as Mao's first deputy and CCP vice-chairman. On the other hand, Wang Hongwen, a radical young worker (and later a member of the Gang of Four) from Shanghai, emerged among the other vice-chairmen, showing that the influence of the CR was still alive. A series of ideological campaigns, initiated by either Mao or his radical supporters, followed. These were aimed at keeping alive enthusiasm for the CR. The last of these, beginning in February 1976, saw Deng Xiaoping condemned as an "arch unrepentant capitalist roader still on the capitalist road" and ousted once again from his leadership positions.

With Mao's death in September 1976, the CR lost its major source of inspiration. According to the Resolution of the 1981 Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP, the arrest the next month of the Gang of Four (Mao's widow Jiang Qing and three of her influential radical supporters, including Wang Hongwen) signaled the end of the CR.

The Cultural Revolution Assessed as a Setback to Development

The 1981 Resolution was unequivocal in its judgment, roundly condemning the CR and claiming that the CR had "led to domestic turmoil and brought catastrophe to the Party, the state, and the whole people." However, despite the authoritative status of the

Resolution, there are numerous divergent views, from both Western scholars and Chinese commentators, of the causes, course and consequences, and even the dates, of the CR. Yet most agree that the CR caused much suffering to millions of people and set back China's development for several years.

Deng Xiaoping returned to power in July 1977 and, from December 1978, was able to dictate an economic policy that was hostile to the spirit of the CR in nearly all respects. The condemnation of "old culture" gave way to a major revival of traditional arts. The revolutionary committees were dismantled, along with almost every other idea and practice spawned by the CR. It is thus evident that the CR failed to achieve the radical socialist objectives Mao had set for it. The CR nevertheless provided one of the most important chapters in the political and economic history of contemporary China, and it is only against its backdrop that the increasingly pro-market economic reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping after 1978 can be understood.

Nick Knight and Colin Mackerras

See also: Deng Xiaoping; Gang of Four; Great Leap Forward; Lin Biao; Liu Shaoqi; Mao Zedong; Red Guard Organizations; Zhou Enlai

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CURZON, GEORGE NATHANIEL (1859–1925), Viceroy of India. After brilliant undergraduate years at Oxford, George Nathaniel Curzon prepared himself for a grand political career. He traveled through most of the countries of North America and Asia, including Russia, China, and Afghanistan, and produced three solid books on contemporary Asian political affairs. He was elected to Parliament in 1885 and later served as undersecretary for India (1891–1892), undersecretary for foreign affairs (1895–1898), and ultimately as viceroy of India (1899–1905). In this position he behaved more like the president of a republic than the queen's representative in Calcutta. Ever fearful of Russian expansion, he dealt with the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, and the Amir Abdur Rahman in Kabul, and reorganized military operations in the new Northwest Frontier Province so as to maximize British influence along India's northern borders. He even sent an unsuccessful commercial mission into Tibet.

Within India, Curzon did much to rectify previous administrative errors, setting up commissions to deal with irrigation, railways, agricultural banks, and police. He even succeeded at currency reform and at reducing the amount of governmental paper flow. While much of this was quite popular in India and rather less so in London, his decision to split Bengal Province in two in 1905 was universally condemned, and the two parts had to be reunited in 1911—only to be split permanently in 1947.

Curzon made no attempt to involve the Indian public in his reforms. He clashed with Lord Kitchener, then commander-in-chief of the Indian army, and repeatedly clashed with statesmen in London. The disfavor he brought upon himself affected the positions he held after his return to Britain: chancellor of the University of Oxford, Lord Privy Seal, and president of the Air Board (1916); but then he became foreign secretary (1919–1924). He was elevated to the House of Lords, but was shattered when, in 1924, his old dream of becoming prime minister ended with the selection of Stanley Baldwin, and he died within a year.

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CUSTOMARY LAW. See **Adat**.



DA NANG (2002 pop. 446,000). Da Nang is a large city located on the central coast of Vietnam 973 kilometers (603 miles) north of Ho Chi Minh City and 30 kilometers (17 miles) north of Hoi An. It became an important port city at the end of the nineteenth century after Hoi An's access to the ocean, via the Thu Bon river, was filled in by silt runoff. In 1888, the French seized control of Da Nang, which they called Tourane, from Vietnamese emperor Gia Long after he reneged on a promise to assist them in Vietnam. During the first part of the twentieth century, the city was second only to Saigon as Vietnam's busiest port and most cosmopolitan city. Da Nang received much attention from both France and the United States during the ensuing wars in Vietnam. Da Nang, only 200 kilometers (124 miles) south of the Demilitarized Zone, was the first place U.S. military forces landed in Vietnam in 1965 and was the home of a large U.S. Air Force base from which bombing missions were launched against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). The influx of thousands of military personnel brought about rapid growth to the city both in population and in various businesses. Many South Vietnamese refugees used Da Nang as a staging area for escape from the country when the DRV took over the surrounding areas in 1975. Today Da Nang, still with its French and American vestiges in the form of wide avenues, old villas, and diverse entertainment, is only a remnant of its former bustling self.

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DADRA AND NAGAR HAVELI UNION TERRITORY

(2001 pop. 220,000). The Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli, located in western India, is surrounded by the states of Gujarat and Maharashtra. It is a predominantly rural area and has seventy-two villages. Its capital city is Silvassa, and the principal languages spoken are Gujarati and Hindi.

Originally a part of the Maratha Confederacy, Dadra and Nagar Haveli became the scene of prolonged skirmishes between the Portuguese and the Marathas in the eighteenth century. In December 1779, the Maratha government, in an effort to ensure the friendship of the Portuguese, assigned to them the revenue of a few villages of the region. Since then the Portuguese ruled over the territory until its liberation on 2 August 1954. Subsequently it merged with the Indian Union on 11 August 1961 as a Union Territory.

Agriculture is the major occupation of the people of the region, paddy rice and millet being the most important crops cultivated. Fruits, especially mango and banana, are also produced. Nearly 40 percent of the total geographical area of Dadra and Nagar Haveli is under forest cover, which provides a livelihood to the tribal population.

Traditional crafts of the region include pottery, bamboo, and leather goods. The establishment of a cooperative industrial estate by Dan Udyog Sahakari

Sangh Limited introduced industrialization in 1967–1968. Since then, modern industries have sprung up in the cities like Silvassa, Masat, and Khadoli. At present, the region boasts 988 cottage, village, and small-scale industries and 312 medium-scale industries in textiles, engineering goods, plastics, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals. A multiple-development project, the Damanganga Irrigation Project, a joint venture of the Union Territories of Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu and the state of Gujarat, is nearing completion. Despite its advantages, it has also caused hardship and displacement to some. The village of Kothar has been submerged, and four others partly submerged due to its construction.

Tourism is well developed in the region. Sites include the Tadkeshwar Siva temple, the Vanganga Lake, Dadra, Bindrabin, and the Tribal Cultural Museum and Hirvavan garden at Silvassa. Usually all Hindu, Muslim, and Christian festivals are celebrated in the territory. Members of the significant tribal population celebrate their own festivals. The Dhodia and Varli tribes celebrate Diwaso; Varlis and Koli celebrate Bhawada. Almost all the tribes perform Khali Puja after harvesting crops and Gram Devi before the harvest.

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DAENDELS, HERMAN WILLEM (1762–1818), Dutch colonial governor. Herman Willem Daendels's brief term as governor-general of the Dutch East Indies marked the beginning of a new era of direct colonial intervention and ambitious social and political engineering in the colony. After commanding the revolutionary "Patriots" who overthrew the oligarchic Dutch Republic in 1795, Daendels, who was born in Hattem, the Netherlands, rose to become commander of Dutch military forces under King Louis Napoleon (1778–1846). He took office as governor-general of the Dutch East Indies in 1808, after the Dutch government had dissolved the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) and placed the colony under metropolitan authority. His rule was energetic and autocratic. He incorporated Javanese "regents" (*bupati*) into the colonial bureaucracy, annexed new territories

in Java, and reduced sultans to the rank of vassals. He banned officials from receiving private income and moved the center of administration from old Batavia to a new suburb, Weltevreden. Daendels reformed the judicial system, establishing different courts for different population groups. He conscripted laborers to construct fortifications against an expected British attack and, at the cost of many lives, to lay down a postal road running the length of Java. To fund his reforms and defense works, he sold vast areas of land to Chinese and European investors and speculators. He was recalled to the Netherlands in 1811 and the following year served as marshal in the Napoleonic invasion of Russia. He was governor of the small Dutch colonies in West Africa from 1815 to 1818.

Robert Cribb

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DAGESTAN (2002 est. pop. 2.2 million). A southern Russian republic, Dagestan is bordered by Azerbaijan to the south, Georgia to the west, and the Caspian Sea to the east. Although Dagestan translates as "land of the mountains," the republic actually consists of three general geographic zones. First, there is an elevated southern region situated in the northeastern Caucasus that descends to foothills and mixed forests in the north. Second, there is an arid and sparsely vegetated northern region located in the Nogai Steppe. Third, there are narrow coastal lowlands in the east that run along the Caspian Sea, which include saline wetlands in their northernmost extreme. Although increasingly endangered, Dagestan is one of the leading hearths of biodiversity within the Russian realm.

Renamed after the revolutionary Dagestani leader Makhach, Makhachkala is the capital of Dagestan; the port city, on the site of a nineteenth-century Russian fortress, is located roughly in the middle of the republic's coastal zone. The city's chief industries are related to oil and gas refineries and pipelines, chemical factories, and manufacturing. Although there are considerable oil and gas resources in the republic, they remain relatively unexploited due to inaccessibility. Derbent, the other major city, dating to a fifth-century fortress, lies in the south at a narrow point on the coast between the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus

Mountains; Derbent translates as "gateway." However, the majority of Dagestanis (about 60 percent) live in rural areas.

The Dagestani population is characterized by extreme ethnic diversity. Although in the late 1990s the republic's population was estimated at fewer than 2.2 million, it includes many different national groups—between twenty and forty (although some sources put it as high as eighty). The largest of these, the Avars, constitute roughly 30 percent of the total population. Although Russian is employed as a common language, Avar is the most common local language, and is also the common medium for communication between those indigenous to the republic. The majority of the population is Islamic, and the Dagestanis are world-renowned for their carpet weaving and colorful, geometric designs.

Long before becoming a Russian republic Dagestan was legendary for its resistance to external powers (e.g., Arab/Islamic, Seljuk Turk, Mongol-Turkic, Ottoman Turk, and Persian armies). This image is personified in the histories and legends of Shamil, the nineteenth-century Imam of Dagestan. Reportedly an Avar, he established a Dagestani state and led Dagestanis and Chechens against the czarist empire, preventing pacification of the region by the Russians for over twenty-five years. Dagestan was designated an autonomous republic of the Soviet Union in 1921; it became a Russian republic in 1991. The stability of the republic is tenuous due to extreme instability in neighboring Chechnya, with Chechen rebels entering the republic in an attempt to unite with Dagestanis in a larger separatist movement, and Russian troops entering Dagestan to prevent such an escalation. There is also increasing activism among Islamists (both homegrown variations of Sufism and Wahhabism as fostered in the Middle East), Chechen rebels, cleavages between ethnic groups, and separatist movements, especially among the Lezgin peoples living on both sides of the Azeri-Dagestani border.

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DAI QING (b. 1941), Chinese journalist and environmental activist. Dai Qing is the adopted daughter of Ye Jianying, who was a high-ranking government official. Raised in a privileged revolutionary family, she was trained as a missile engineer and worked in military intelligence before starting her career in journalism. She came to prominence in the early 1980s for a series of investigative reports, written for the *Guangming Daily*, about persecution within the Chinese Communist Party in the early days of the revolution.

Dai went on to become the most outspoken critic in China of the Three Gorges Hydroelectric Dam. In 1989 she published a collection of essays condemning the \$30 billion project titled *Yangtze! Yangtze!* Later that year, Dai publicly denounced the 4 June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre and on 5 June 1989 quit the Chinese Communist Party. As a result, she was fired from the *Guangming Daily*, jailed for ten months, and her writing was banned in China.

Dai was awarded the Harvard University Nieman Fellowship for journalists in 1991, the Golden Pen for Freedom Given by the Paris-based International Federation of Newspaper Publishers in 1992, and the Goldman Environmental Award in 1993. In 1997 Dai published a second volume of critical essays on the Three Gorges project titled *The River Dragon Has Come!*

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DAI VIET SU KY *Dai Viet Su Ky*, also known as *Dai Viet Su Ky Toan Thu*, designates a collection of historical chronicles written by several different authors over a period extending from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries. Le Van Huu (1230–1322), considered the father of Vietnamese history, wrote the first narrative, relating events occurring between the years 207 BCE and 1225 CE. Phan Phu Tien (fifteenth century) continued Le Van Huu's account to 1446. Both of these works no longer exist as independent works. Ngo Si Lien, an official historian of the court of emperor Le Thanh Tong (1460–1497), reproduced

them while comparing them with Chinese official histories, Vietnamese nonofficial accounts, as well as other historical material such as biographies, genealogies, and eyewitness reports. He also added his own commentaries. In the presentation of his work to the emperor, Ngo Si Lien informs us about his conception of history: "History records events; whether good or bad, they can serve as examples for posterity." As for his method, he followed the footsteps of Sima Qian in his *Shi Ji* and Confucius in his *Qun Qiu*, which means that events are recorded year by year—earning for these histories the common title of annals—listed under the names of successive rulers.

Truong Buu Lam

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DAIGAKU *Daigaku*, the Japanese word for universities and colleges, has its origins in the earliest academic institutions of higher learning in Japan, centers of scholarship that developed at influential temples not only in Kyoto but in the Kanto region (eastern Japan) as well. The curriculum of these primarily secular institutions, which took their name from the Chinese term for schools that trained government officials, was centered primarily on Confucian texts and Chinese histories and literary anthologies that were transmitted to Japan beginning in the sixth century CE. Two types of schools of higher learning were established for the nobility: the Daigakuryo, a Confucian college for nobility in the capital, and branch schools for nobility in the provinces.

During his stay in Japan in the mid-sixteenth century, Francis Xavier noted that in addition to the university in the capital city of Kyoto there were five other significant universities with enrollments of over 3,500. Of these, the largest and most representative was the Ashikaga Gakko (Ashikaga School), located in the Kanto region.

After completing basic education at one of the numerous local temple schools, students would set out to further their education at centers of higher learning where they could gain the training that would lead to a successful career. Many students completed their training at the Ashikaga School, studying both Buddhist and Confucian texts.

During the Sengoku period (c. 467–1568), when rival clans were continually in a state of war, the university offered a curriculum that came to include medicine, military science, and astronomy, along with the ancient study of divination—all subjects essential to medieval warfare. During the Edo period (1600/1603–1868), there were *ban* (domain) schools for the samurai, as well as private schools that provided advanced instruction to both commoners and samurai in a variety of disciplines, notably "Western" studies. Prior to and immediately following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, desire for knowledge about the West grew rapidly, and institutions of higher education flourished.

In 1872 the Fundamental Code of Education delineated standards for a modern educational system. The first of the modern universities to be established was Tokyo Daigaku in 1877, a merging of two existing shogunal schools. National universities were later founded in Kyoto (1897), Tohoku (1907), and Kyushu (1910). Institutions such as Keio University (founded as a private academy by Fukuzawa Yukichi in 1858) and Waseda University (founded by Okuma Shigenobu in 1882) went through several transformations before becoming full-fledged universities. Several of the most prestigious universities were founded as Christian missionary schools; these include Doshisha, Sophia, and International Christian University. Today there are about 450 public and private four-year universities.

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DALAI LAMA The Dalai Lama is the spiritual and temporal leader of the Tibetan Buddhist peoples, by whom he is regarded as the earthly manifestation of Chenrezi, the bodhisattva ("incarnating deity") of compassion. Each Dalai Lama is regarded as being the reincarnation of his predecessor, and after the death of a Dalai Lama, a search is made for the young boy in whom he is considered to have taken rebirth. Tenzin Gyatso (b. 1935), the present Dalai Lama, is the



THE PALACE OF THE DALAI LAMA

The following text written by two French missionaries in the mid-nineteenth century provides a positive impression of the home of the Dalai Lama in Tibet, despite mainly critical comments about Buddhism in general found throughout their report.

The palace of the Talé-Lama merits, in every respect, the celebrity which it enjoys throughout the world. North of the town, at the distance of about a mile, there rises a rugged mountain, of slight elevation and of conical form, which, amid the plain, resembles an islet on the bosom of a lake. This mountain is entitled Buddha-La (mountain of Buddha, divine mountain), which upon this grand pedestal, the work of nature, the Talé-Lama have raised the magnificent palace wherein their Living Divinity resides in the flesh. The palace is an aggregation of several temples; that which occupies the centre is four stories high, and overlooks the rest; it terminates in a dome, entirely covered with plates of gold, and surrounded with a peristyle, the columns of which are, in like manner, all covered in gold. It is here that the Talé-Lama has set up his abode. From the summit of this lofty sanctuary he can contemplate, at the great solemnities, his innumerable adorers advancing along the plain or prostrate at the foot of the divine mountain.

Source: Huc Evariste-Regis and Joseph Gabet. ([1851] 1987) *Travels in Tartary, Thibet and China, 1844–1846*. New York: Dover Publications, 171.


fourteenth in a line of succession originating in a fourteenth-century disciple of the founder of the Gelugpa sect, the leading school of Tibetan Buddhism.

Commonly referred to in English by the title "His Holiness," the fourteenth Dalai Lama was born into a peasant family in the village of Takster, in the north-eastern Amdo Province of Tibet (now part of China's Qinghai Province). His predecessor had "passed to the heavenly fields" in 1933, and Tenzin Gyatso was recognized as his reincarnation in 1937. He was taken to Lhasa, the Tibetan capital, in 1939 and was enthroned in the Potala Palace in February 1940. While a regent ruled Tibet in his name, he began the lengthy course of studies that culminated in his being awarded the *Lharampa Geshe* degree (roughly equivalent to a doctorate in Buddhist studies) in 1959.

Due to the crisis caused by the Communist Chinese invasion of Tibet in October 1950, the sixteen-year-old Tenzin Gyatso assumed temporal power in

Tibet on 17 November 1950. He remained there under Chinese authority until the excesses of the Communist regime prompted him to flee Lhasa in March 1959. Although closely pursued by Chinese forces, he succeeded in reaching India. There, with around one hundred thousand of his followers, the Dalai Lama established a Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamsala, in the Himalayan foothills of north India. He has since become the primary ambassador of the Tibetan cause as well as a world-renowned spokesman for non-violence and for the Buddhist ideal of "universal compassion." In October 1989 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

The fourteenth Dalai Lama remains the focus of Tibetan identity in the world. A charming and modest, yet charismatic figure, with a great appeal in the West, he prefers to be known as "a simple Buddhist monk." His leadership has been characterized by an openness to change, the promotion of dialogue be-



The Dalai Lama at a news conference in New Delhi, India, in May 1999 at which he announced a series of concerts entitled the "World Festival of Sacred Music." (AFP/CORBIS)

tween religions and science, and a steadfast belief in the principles of nonviolence.

Alex McKay

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DALAT (2002 pop 125,000). Dalat is a small city located in the central highlands of Vietnam 205 kilometers (127 miles) southwest of Nha Trang and 308 kilometers (191 miles) north of Ho Chi Minh City. Named for the "River of the Lat Tribe" after the native Lat ethnic group who live in the area, Dalat, with its cool climate, has been used by the Vietnamese and eventually the Europeans in Vietnam as a vacation spot that allowed an escape from the extreme heat of the cities and the Mekong Delta area. The Frenchman Dr.

Alexander Yersin (1863–1943), a protégé of Louis Pasteur, is credited with "discovering" Dalat for such purposes. During Vietnam's war with the United States, high-ranking North and South Vietnamese officials used Dalat as a nonpartisan resting locale before it was captured officially by the North Vietnamese on 3 April 1975. Dalat's most famous former resident was the last Nguyen emperor, Bao Dai, whose summer palace exists today as a tourist attraction. Today Dalat is used by Vietnamese as a favorite honeymoon destination and, with its many former colonial villas as guest houses, nice restaurants, and eighteen-hole golf course, is in the process of being transformed by the Vietnamese government into an international tourist destination.

Richard B. Verrone

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DAMAN AND DIU UNION TERRITORY

(2001 est. pop. 200,000). Daman and Diu Union Territory, comprising two separate districts, lies within the Gujarat state of western India. It was a part of Goa Union Territory until Goa achieved statehood in 1987. Goa, along with Daman and Diu, had made up Portuguese India (*Estado da India*) until it became part of the India in December 1961. The Portuguese acquired Daman and Diu from Bahadur Shah (1506–1537) of Gujarat in 1534.

Daman (formerly Damao), 170 kilometers north of Mumbai (Bombay), is on the east side of the Gulf of Cambay (Khambhat), while Diu, 270 kilometers northwest of Mumbai, lies at the southern tip of the Kathiawar Peninsula. Both districts—Daman and Diu—are coastal enclaves on the Arabian Sea. Fishing and shipping are common activities for both, but a water depth of only one or two fathoms is insufficient to accommodate large vessels. Both Daman and Diu have small airports. The Gujarati language is common to both settlements. Their crops include rice, groundnuts, pulse, beans, wheat, banana, mango, coconut, and sugarcane.

Daman

Daman has two forts: Little Daman, with a picturesque main gate in an aquatic motif, inside which is

the church, Nossa Senhora do Mar ("Our Lady of the Sea"); and Big Daman, which has a small park, houses, shops, and the remains of a seventeenth-century church and convent. The Damanganga River separates the two forts. The population of Daman in 1991 was 62,101. The area covers 78 square kilometers.

Diu

The coastal city of Ghoghla (formerly Gogolá) faces an island 11 kilometers long that contains the Fortaleza, the largest Portuguese fortress in Asia. In the channel between Ghoghla and the island is a "water fort" or *panikota* in Gujarati, *fortim do mar* in Portuguese. Built in 1536, the Fortaleza was besieged by Turks in 1538 and 1546. Today it holds a small garrison and is a local tourist attraction. Another tourist attraction is Nagoá Beach. On the island are several ancient homes, about 150 Hindu temples, and several mosques and churches, including the Sé Matriz Cathedral, which was built in 1601 and was formerly a Jesuit college.

East of Ghoghla is Simbor, where there is another *panikota*, S. António, in the estuary of a river. It was at S. António that in December 1961 the last European flag to fly over Indian territory was finally lowered. In addition to tourism, industries include salt processing and fishing. The population of Diu in 1991 was 39,485. The area covers 52 square kilometers.

Henry Scholberg

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DAMDINSUREN, TSENDIYN (1908–1986), Mongolian writer. Tsendiyn Damdinsuren, one of Mongolia's most distinguished writers, was born in what is now Dornod Province and grew up in the era of Mongolian autonomy and early Communism and became politically active in the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League. He gained election to its Central Committee in 1926 and later became editor of its publications. Subsequently Damdinsuren became chairman of the Council of Mongolian Trade Unions and later was involved in the forced collectivizations and seizures that brought Mongolia close to civil war. Young Damdinsuren had to tread carefully to avoid being purged or executed. In 1932, he joined the Communist Party while continuing his editorial work but

in 1933 went to Leningrad to further his education, returning only in 1938.

Once back in Mongolia, Damdinsuren became increasingly allied with Yumjaagiyn Tsendenbel, Mongolia's future premier and president, and his circle. Damdinsuren became involved in efforts to adapt the Cyrillic script to write Mongolian. Prior to that time Mongolian had been written with the Uighur script, which was both difficult to learn and use and divorced from spoken Mongolian. The new script and orthography, on the other hand, closely reflected living usage and were a common element in the rest of the Soviet world. According to some sources, it was Damdinsuren who proposed the change in the first place, and he later became one of its most active proponents. In connection with his linguistic work, Damdinsuren later worked on the first large Russian-Mongolian dictionary and between 1942 and 1946 was editor of the party newspaper *Unen*. In 1950, he served as chairman of the Committee of Sciences and between 1953 and 1955 as chairman of the Writers Union. By this time Damdinsuren was becoming increasingly famous for his literary works, above all his poetry, but also his prose, including literary studies and a translation of the *Secret History of the Mongols* into modern Mongolian.

Damdinsuren's style is lucid and readable, and he was a master of writing in the new Khalkha literary language that he helped create. He was a vivid storyteller, particularly when his stories focus on everyday Mongol life. Although he did not suffer as much as his contemporary B. Rinchen, Damdinsuren fell afoul of party authorities more than once. Unlike the academician Bazaryn Shirendev, he did not live long enough to see the triumph of the new Mongolia after the decline and collapse of Communism. His works remain in demand and have been frequently reprinted after his death.

Paul D. Buell

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DAMKOENG, AKAT (1905–1932), Thai prose writer. M. C. Akat Damkoeng Raphiphatna was born in 1905 at Rajaburi Palace as the sixth of eleven

children of Phra-ong Chao Raphiphatnasak Kromluang Rajaburi-direkruethi. The royal title M. C. (*Mom Chao*) was given to Akat Damkoeng as a relative of the king.

Though in poor health from his early childhood on, Akat Damkoeng was an extraordinarily good pupil, who—together with Kulap Saypratisth and Ja-eam Antrasen—engaged in writing and publishing as editor of the "Srithep Journal" of the Thep Sirindra High School in Bangkok. In 1924 he went to London to study legal science, but failed the examinations because of being more interested in literature and his own writing. Then he matriculated at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., for foreign studies. However, due to a serious ophthalmic disease he had to go back to Thailand in 1928 without a degree.

In Bangkok, Akat Damkoeng began to work at the Ministry of Interior, Department of Public Health, where he met his former fellow student Ja-eam Antrasen, who encouraged Akat to write.

In 1929, the first novel of Akat Damkoeng, *The Circus of Life*, was published and became a best-seller at once. A sequel to this novel, *Yellow Skin or White Skin*, was published in 1930. Only one year later, a collection of short stories and the manuscript of the novel *East or West* (in English) were finished. Permanently in poor health—physically as well as mentally—Akat Damkoeng died in 1932 of malaria. His short stories were published after his death in Thailand and Hong Kong, but *East and West* remains unpublished.

Jana Raendchen

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DANCE—BALI Dance is integral to Bali's cultural life, and includes sacred temple dances that are indispensable to religious rituals, adaptations of old temple or court dances now chiefly performed for tourists, and social folk dances. Balinese dance is rooted in the Hindu-Javanese culture that predates the coming of Islam in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, but the repertory has been continually augmented and developed. After Java's conversion to Islam, Balinese dance continued to develop in a sa-

cred, temple setting, while Javanese dance was centered in the royal courts. Balinese choreography generally tended to be more dynamic than Javanese choreography. Balinese choreography emphasizes controlled animation of the entire body, with stance, and leg, arm, hand, and eye movements all carefully defined and positioned.

Visitors to Bali can easily become confused by the plethora of regional variations and dance styles. The following descriptions are generic; details of costume, repertory, and performance vary widely among regions and villages. In Bali, it is customary to classify the dance repertory according to the division of the Balinese temple into three courtyards. The main dance repertory is thus divided between sacred dances traditionally performed in the *jeroan* (inner temple), less sacred dances performed in the *jaba tengah* (middle courtyard), and secular dances which belong in the *jaba*, or outer courtyard.

Jeroan Dances

The main *jeroan* dances are the *pendet*, *rejang*, and *baris gede*. The *pendet* is a dance of welcome for the gods, and is danced by a group of girls or women, each wearing ordinary traditional dress (as opposed to a special dance costume) and carrying an offering in her right hand. *Pendet* is widely taught to girls in Bali today, and has a more or less standardized form. The *pendet* is accompanied by a gamelan gong ensemble. The *rejang* is a stylized procession to entertain visiting spirits. *Rejang* is danced by a group of women and girls of all ages, wearing traditional temple dress along with a gold headdress decorated with flowers. *Baris gede* is a stylized warrior dance performed by a group of men, who form the personal guard of the visiting spirits. The dancers carry weapons—usually pikes, but sometimes *kris* (traditional daggers) or even firearms—and wear distinctive helmets decorated with pieces of shell. The dance represents military actions, including a mock battle. The *sanghyang* dance also belongs to the inner temple group, as does, by extension, the *kecak*. *Sanghyang* is a ritual trance dance accompanied by gamelan gong or chanting, performed to repel evil influences. The dancers are young girls of around eight to ten years old. *Kecak* is a modern offshoot of *sanghyang* developed in the 1930s, which uses the chanting of traditional *sanghyang* as an accompaniment to theatrical dance using stories from the *Ramayana* epic.

Jaba Tengah Dances

The *jaba tengah* dances are mostly narrative. The most important is the *gambuh*, which, like the *jeroan* dances, functions to welcome the spirits. The *gambuh*

has pre-Islamic Javanese court origins, and is generally held to be the source of all Balinese narrative dance forms in terms of movement vocabulary, character types, costume, plot development, dramatic conventions, and musical accompaniment. *Gambuh* performances originally lasted for several days, though today they rarely exceed an hour or two. Most *gambuh* performances tell stories from the early Javanese *Panji* romance cycle, often placing the central character in Bali rather than Java. Dialogue is in *Kawi* (Old Javanese), though the comic characters keep up a running commentary in Balinese.

The *topeng pajegan* and *wayang wong*—both masked dramatic forms—also take place in the *jaba tengah*. In *topeng pajegan*, a single dancer performs the entire story, changing masks and voices to represent the various characters, while in *wayang wong* a number of dancers present an episode from the Ramayana epic, again with dialogue in *Kawi*. There is also an outer courtyard masked dance known as *topeng panca* (masked dance of five), in which five dancers represent different characters.

Jaba Dances

Jaba (outer courtyard) dances can be performed outside the context of religious ceremony as purely secular, artistic events. Some of these are dramatic forms, while others, like the *legong* and *baris* dances, are choreographic character studies. *Legong* is performed by three young girls, and has a dramatic structure when performed in its entirety. Today, however, it is usually excerpted, the point being the grace and elegance of the choreography. *Legong* is normally the first dance taught to young girls when they start to study dance. *Baris*, in contrast, is a vigorous male dance style representing a warrior preparing for and engaging in combat. *Baris* is normally taught to all male dance students in Bali, as it contains all the fundamentals of Balinese male choreography. A modern development of the *legong* is the *kebyar duduk*, in which the dancer sits at an instrument of the gamelan gong *kebyar* (modern-style gamelan) ensemble, and the choreography, while based on *legong* style, incorporates playing the instrument.

Outside the temple are a number of genres of social dance, such as *joged bungbung* and *janger*. *Joged bungbung* is similar to the Javanese *tayuban*, and features a number of young female dancers paid to dance flirtatiously with male guests, usually inviting the man to dance by placing a sash around his waist. *Janger* resembles a secular version of the *sanghyang*, and features a group of performers split evenly between the

sexes. They sit facing each other in lines and sway rhythmically to their own chanting.

Balinese dance has been widely admired by foreign artists and scholars as a vibrant and vital strand of Balinese culture. Some of these, like German artist Walter Spies, contributed to the development of dance in Bali itself. The continued popularity of traditional dance with Balinese performers themselves should ensure the survival of the tradition even as Indonesian society changes around it.

Tim Byard-Jones

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DANCE—BANGLADESH Folk dancing in Bangladesh has to be viewed in the context of the history of the Indian subcontinent. Bangladesh is among the youngest nations of the world; it became a nation in 1971, following its independence from Pakistan, which itself became a nation in 1947. Bangladesh, as former East Pakistan, was far removed socially and culturally from West Pakistan and was closer in every respect to the neighboring Indian province of West Bengal. With its very strong emphasis on cultural preservation, Bangladesh has retained the majority of folk dances that were practiced in Bengal, drawing also from other Indian states such as Orissa and Bihar, with which there have been strong interactions for centuries. It is to be noted that even though a large number of folk dances have been inspired by Hindu rituals, they have been well preserved in Bangladesh, even though since 1947 that region has been predominantly Muslim. If some of the traditional folk dances have gone out fashion, then it is more due to the constraints of urbanized living than to any religious censure.

Mask Dances

The most prominent among the folk dances are mask dances, originally from the Mymensingh district but later performed in various other parts of Bangladesh as well. These dances, usually held after the harvest in March–April, are enactments of myths of the cult of the Hindu god Siva and the goddess Kali.

The wooden masks for the dancers are made by the village carpenter and painted by the potter. All the roles—male and female—are played by village boys. The local drum, the *dbaka*, is played dexterously, and the audience usually joins the performer in singing the chorus of the songs. In these dances, Siva is always shown as a bare-bodied ascetic. The dancer performing as Siva enters and dances; the songs begin in a slow rhythm, progressing toward a faster beat. In the second part of the performance, Kali, the consort of Siva, represented in a terrible form causing destruction, enters and circles around, while Siva lies prostrate on the ground. Kali stands for a while with one foot on the chest of Siva and then proceeds to perform the main section of the dance. These dances are largely improvised, and the songs are composed locally.

The Bara-buri ("old couple") dance also uses masks, but it is very different from the religious dances. The songs and demeanor of the masks depict a good-humored celebration of married life in old age. This dance is performed for fun at social and family functions. The actors are usually males and amateurs.

Other Popular Folk Dances

The most popular form of dancing associated with all Bengali territory is the Kirtana dance. This is a purely devotional dance for the worship of Krishna, started four centuries ago by the saint Caitanya (1485–1583). The movements of this dance are very simple, consisting of raising the hands above the head and clapping to the beat of the *khol*, an elongated wooden drum. Part of the dancing company vigorously plays the *khol*, and everybody sings "Hare Krishna" ("Hare" is the vocative case for "Hari," the name of Vishnu as Krishna). This dance has become known all over the world since the 1960s as part of the Hare Krishna movement.

A spectacular activity is the incense dance, held at the end of the Bengali year during dark, moonless nights. The dancers hold earthen incense pots containing glowing charcoal and throw incense at the end of the refrain while singing, creating a shower of sparks and smoke.

Because smallpox was a major threat in the subcontinent before the advent of modern medicine, regular worship was held for the goddess Sheetala, who was believed to prevent the disease or at least mitigate its fury; she was also believed to cure infertility in women. This worship, which is still used for curing infertility along with modern medicine, is a community effort in which the ritual lead is taken by one woman at whose house other village women gather be-

fore proceeding through the village to the riverbank. The leader carries a pitcher of water placed on a winnowing fan on her head, and all the women make loud ululations, a sound that marks many sacred activities in this region. After a ritual bath in the river, the company returns to the house of the leader, where songs and dances are held around the pitcher and fan. The next day, the pitcher and the winnowing fan are taken to various homes in the village, and dances are held in each house around these objects. A drummer of the lower caste plays the *dbak*, a small drum, and women perform ring dances accompanied by simple chants.

The Rayibeshe dances preserve the memory of a past martial tradition. They are no longer very common. Features include a gong called *kansi*, the *khol* drum, and dancing bells worn only on one foot. Rayibeshe dances were manly and vigorous, full of war cries, acrobatics, swordsmanship, and duels with knives and spears. They required long and special training. A similarly martial dance was the Dhali, albeit different in style.

The Shi'a sect of the Muslims holds a period of mourning, called the *Mubarram*, in memory of the death of Hussain and Hassan, the sons of Ali (the Prophet Muhammad's son-in-law) at the battlefield of Karbala. During this period, when Shi'ite Muslims avoid most song and dance, mourning songs—*marsiya* and *jari*—are sung with deep emotion and great finesse during nights in community gatherings. A special dance performed by men is held, in which they hold one end of their white undergarments (dhoti) in one hand and a piece of scarlet cloth in the other. Slow and mournful movements are made to the chiming of bell-anklets used to create sad rhythms.

Professionally Performed Dances

Khemta, another form of dance, is performed by professionals (for example, courtesans or prostitutes) in family and community gatherings and in religious processions. As most celebrations, including birth, child naming, marriage, and initiation of males, are occasions for dancing, the courtesan class are invited to add to the gaiety. The dance also serves the purpose of providing some extra income to courtesans. Family members, however, only watch; they do not dance along with the courtesans. These dances are usually accompanied by songs on the love dalliance of the god Krishna and his beloved Radha. Intricate footwork and certain features of refined dancing such as complex eye movements are also used. A typical feature of the costume of the main courtesan is a big necklace called *sinthi*. The supporting instruments are tabla

(small hand drums) and *sarangi* (an instrument similar to a violin). These are not folk instruments but are used by classical singers only, indicating a close connection with formal dance.

The professional dance that is best known is the Baul, performed by male, rarely by female, members of the Baul community. Simple but full of abandon, this dance has distinctive music and can be performed at any time for recreation. The Bauls are usually traveling mendicants.

Dance in the Twenty-First Century

Folk dances in Bangladesh, as in the rest of the subcontinent, are threatened in the twenty-first century, as the social climate in which they once flourished has changed with the modernization of society. Reduction of community activity such as harvest festivals, extended marriage feasts, lengthy personal and family rituals and loss of patronage from rich landowners and merchants have diminished their frequency. Amateur performers have migrated to big cities, so that training in the village communities is difficult. The new patronage given by academies and art centers is located in the cities and does not promote dances as part of the social fabric of everyday life but only as cultural entertainment. As a result, the folk dances are not only withering, they are becoming more contrived under city patronage, far removed from their native vitality.

Bharat Gupt

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DANCE—CENTRAL ASIA Located at the heart of the great Silk Road, Central Asia is crossed by an ancient network of caravan routes that linked China with the Mediterranean. The dances of the region reflect the rich legacy of many cultures, both indigenous and foreign. Through commerce and conquest, Iranian, Turkic, Indian, Arabic, Chinese, and Mongolian elements entered dance styles of the region. The spiritual traditions of Zoroastrianism, shamanism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam had an impact on dance. The great division between steppe and oasis that characterizes Central Asian geography influenced cultural development; as a result, the music and dances of nomadic people were less

elaborate and varied than those of the settled oasis dwellers.

Dance has long been integral to Central Asian peoples. On the territories of present-day Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, rock paintings known as petroglyphs depict dancing figures and date back to as early as the Bronze Age. Later objects, such as sculptures, frescoes, ornaments, ossuaries, and serving vessels, also portray dancing figures.

General Characteristics

Central Asian dance is often of a solo, improvisational nature, although line and circle dance also exist. Women, or young boys imitating them, usually perform the most celebrated dances. Men and women do not typically dance together and, if they do, they rarely touch.

Typical characteristics encountered in Central Asian dance include head slides and circles. Hands and arms are especially expressive. Wrist circles, hand undulations, and shifting arm patterns create intricate spatial designs around the body and above the head. Shoulder isolations can include up and down lifts, back and forth pushes, and sustained shimmies. The relatively uncomplicated footwork patterns create constant traveling steps over which intricate movements of the upper body are layered. Rhythmic accents occasionally punctuate some dances with stylized hand clapping, finger snapping, and foot stomping by the performer.

Traditionally, many dances were performed almost completely in place because they were done within a household, with guests seated around the perimeter of a room. In Persia, temporary wooden stages covered with carpets were created on top of the decorative ponds that were the central feature of courtyard gardens—another factor that limited performance space. Portions of the dance often took place with the performer kneeling on the floor, requiring a graceful ascent and descent. Spins and turns, ranging from simple to complex, have long been identified with the dance of the area. Folk dances sometimes included hops but rarely high leaps. Unlike Arabic dance, Central Asian dance has virtually no true pelvic isolations, although Persian and Azeri dance sometimes has simple hip twists. Acrobatic components, such as deep backbends or spins ending in a sudden drop to the floor, are usually encountered only in the dance of professionals.

Facial expressions of great emotional range play a central role in the dance performances of women and girls. In the *yalla* dance genre, which is accompanied

by song, the dancer must mirror the content of the lyrics in her movements and gestures.

With the exception of some ritual dances, performers wore traditional clothing from the region of a dance's origin. Professional dancers favored more opulent fabrics and jewelry, which were sometimes bestowed by a patron. (This practice continues even today.) Contemporary costumes frequently consist of stylized garments, sometimes from synthetic textiles, which more tightly fit a dancer's body than the voluminous robes of the past.

Ritual, Spiritual, and Healing Dances

Ritual, spiritual, and healing dances reflect a close spiritual relationship with the yearly cycle of nature and the animal world. The Iranian and Turkic peoples of Central Asia celebrated the New Year at the spring equinox with a pre-Islamic festival known as No Ruz (New Day). In ancient times it represented the sacred marriage between Innana, the queen of heaven, and her consort Tammuz, the shepherd god who represented the creative powers of spring. This ritual promoted the fertility of crops, animals, and humans for the coming year. Women still engage in the all-night ritual of making *sumalak*, a special dish of seven grains, singing and dancing while they take turns stirring a large cauldron. No Ruz continues to be celebrated and has enjoyed a revival in the Central Asian republics that were once part of the Soviet Union.

Vestiges of Central Asian shamanism can be linked to the incantational dances of medicine men and fortune-tellers that were still common at the beginning of the twentieth century but that largely died out under the Stalinist persecutions of the 1930s. Traces of the shaman's dance can be discerned in *lazgi*, a traditional healing dance from the Khorezm region that contains trembling movements common to trance dances, as well as gestures imitating animals such as birds or fish.

Some of the earliest references to dance reveal links to religious and spiritual practices. The cult of Mithra, widespread throughout Central Asia, included ritual dance. Zoroastrianism had a fire dance. The so-called whirling dervish traditional dance may have derived from the Tocharian spinning dance and was possibly brought to Asia Minor by Jalal ad-Din ar-Rumi (c. 1207–1273), who was born in the city of Balkh in present-day Afghanistan.

Another ritual was *suskbotin*, a dance entreating "the Lady of Waters" for rain. In the *zikr*, a ritual from the Sufi tradition of Islamic mysticism, dancers travel in a

circle with repetitive movements accompanied by chanting and percussion. The dance is still performed. Other folk dances depict daily chores, seasonal work, or important events. Some dances relate to ceremonies such as weddings and funerals.

Combat or War Dances

Martial dances not only developed agility but also aided warriors in achieving a frenzied state that banished fear. The Greek historian Xenophon (430–c. 355 BCE) in his work *Anabasis* described a Persian war dance in which the performer clashed shields together, crouched on one knee, and sprang up again—all accompanied by flute. Afghan men, before going into battle, traditionally performed the *atan milie*. The *atan* still figures in Afghan holidays and wedding festivities. The dancers hold swords and scarves, executing vigorous turns and twisting jumps, as they travel in circles around the musicians, who play the *dobl* (a drum) and *bajakhana* (double-reed oboe).

Court and Professional Dance

From the fourth to the eighth century, the professional dancers of the Samarqand, Bukhara, and Tashkent region enjoyed popularity at the court of the Chinese emperor. During the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), the celebrated Chinese poet Bo Juyi (772–846 CE) compared the movements of these dancing girls to the whirling of snowflakes. Silver and gilt ewers (pitchers or jugs) dating from the eighth century and discovered in Iran and Uzbekistan depict nude or thinly garbed females, adorned with jewelry, dancing with veils and finger cymbals.

The adoption of Islam subsequent to the Arab invasion of Central Asia in the seventh century promoted sexual segregation and the practice of veiling. Public entertainers suffered from a low social status; female dancers were often linked with prostitution. Respectable women danced for each other in the *ich kari* or *andaroon*—the women's quarters—away from the eyes of strange men.

Generally, public performance of dance became the domain of the *batcha* (dancing boy), who dressed in women's clothing, wore makeup, and danced in a decidedly effeminate style. Rulers and well-to-do merchants kept troupes of these dancing boys. Sometimes several men pooled resources to become patrons of a troupe, which then would entertain at parties.

In the rarefied setting of the court, female dancers entertained, as depicted in the miniature paintings that illustrated manuscripts produced in Central Asia and

Persia from the Middle Ages until the nineteenth century. Many of these dancers came from the non-Muslim population, such as Greek and Armenian Christians and Bukharan Jews.

The clownlike *maskbaraboz* were traveling players who performed in bazaars, wearing white-face makeup, tall hats, and patched coats. They developed a humorous dance form known as *gul ufari*, in which the mannerisms associated with various elements of society (wealthy aristocrats, for example) were lampooned.

In Bukhara, a tradition of female wedding performers known as *sozanda* developed. These women sang and danced while wittily improvising poetic verses in praise of the guests.

Social Dances

Important Central Asian festivals and celebrations have long featured dance. When Alexander of Macedon (356 BCE–323 BCE) visited Sogdiana, he was entertained by dancers at a wedding banquet. Line dances, common in the Caucasus and Asia Minor, especially among Kurdish and Azeri populations, are encountered less frequently than circle dances in Central Asia. Turkmen women and men dance in circle formation together in the *kush-depte*. Generally, dancers do not touch each other as they travel in a circular pattern. Solo improvisational dance is more typical, with several persons sharing the performance space but dancing as individuals.

Musical Accompaniment

Music for dance ranges from a purely rhythmic accompaniment to simple folk tunes and songs. Classical art dances are performed to intricate compositions, or *maqams*, played by ensembles of traditional instruments with singers. At times the dancers themselves create the rhythm by snapping their fingers or clapping their hands. Rhythm can also be provided by *zang* (wrist bells), worn by female dancers, and *kairok* (smooth river stones played somewhat in the manner of castanets). Dances in which the dancers provide their own rhythm range from simple folk dances to sophisticated art dances in which the performer moves to complex and constantly changing rhythm patterns. Even everyday objects of domestic life, such as saucers, thimbles, teacups, and teapots, become potential percussion instruments.

Traditional instruments include the *nai* (reed flute), *zurnai* (double-reed oboe) and *karnai* (long trumpet), *chang* (hammer dulcimer), *gidzbak* (spike fiddle) and

kemanche (three-string fiddle), *doire* (frame drum), and *davul* (double-headed drum.)

Western Influences

The Russian empire expanded into portions of Central Asia and the Caucasus in the nineteenth century. Although it made some effort to convert the local populations to Russian Orthodox Christianity, the government left most traditions and customs undisturbed. In the early twentieth century, pan-Turkist ideas of the Young Turks, led by Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk; 1881–1938), reached Central Asia. Another important intellectual current was the Jadid movement of Crimean Tatar educational reformer Ismail Bey Gaspirali (1851–1914), which encouraged the merging of Western advances with traditional Islamic values. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the subsequent creation of the Soviet Central Asian republics introduced additional Western influences. Perhaps of greatest impact were universal education for both genders and the *khujum* campaign to eliminate the custom of veiling.

With the increased freedom brought about by unveiling, public performances of dance by women and girls followed. In the 1920s, Tamara Khanum (1906–1990) became one of the first women to defy tradition and perform unveiled, often courting death at the hands of reactionaries. The brother of another dancer, Nurkhon, murdered her for dishonoring the family by dancing in public.

The Soviet government promoted the establishment of "national" dance ensembles in each republic and the creation of ballet companies. With state support, Soviet Central Asian republics developed professional folk-dance and ballet ensembles. If indigenous people did not have a significantly developed dance culture, specialists were sent to the area to create one. Elizavetta Petrosian, sister of Tamara Khanum, developed Karakalpak dance, inventing movements based on traditional carpet designs. These state folk-dance companies, following the Soviet dictum of "national in form, socialist in content," adopted Western staging techniques, creating choreographies based on politically approved themes. Some Central Asian performers and choreographers trained in Moscow.

Huge Soviet-style celebrations with mass dance presentations in large public spaces, popular from the 1930s to the end of the Soviet period, robbed dances of delicate, nuanced gestures. The advent of television brought back the intimacy of traditional performance settings; close-ups could reveal the subtle facial expressions and small movements that had been the hall-

mark of traditional styling. Televised dance concerts became prominent in Central Asia in the 1960s, and increased in popularity in the following decades. Special dance programming bestowed celebrity status on leading female dancers. Expanded contact with the outside world, especially in the 1980s, encouraged Western dance forms to flourish in Central Asia, including ballroom dance, break dance, aerobics, and hip-hop.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Central Asian republics embraced dance as an expression of national identity and included it in Independence Day celebrations. Nonindigenous forms were sometimes seen as unwelcome foreign imports. In March 2001, Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov announced that he would abolish the National Ballet of his country because the Turkmen people "have no ballet in their blood."

Contemporary Western influence continues through the media of television and movies and the incursion of foreign business people and tourism. Traditional dance has become more commercial in nature, abandoning many of the older classical dances in favor of more lively numbers performed to ethno-pop-style music on stages replete with fog machines and laser lights. Arabic and Turkish style dances, with pelvic movements and more revealing costumes, have also been incorporated into popular concerts and nightclub performances.

Central Asian dance continues to gain popularity with Western audiences; some foreign dancers have even mastered folk and classical repertoires. Uzbekistan, and specifically the capital Tashkent, continues to serve as the unofficial cultural center for the Central Asian republics. Leading performers such as Qizlarhon Dustmuhamedova, proclaimed the "People's Artist of Uzbekistan," instruct at dance seminars and work with professional Western dance companies, and similar developments are occurring throughout the Central Asian republics.

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DANCE, EAST ASIA—MODERN Modern dance in East Asia—Japan, Korea, China, and Taiwan—has a complex and varied history in the twentieth century. It is characterized by four main directions: (1) the work of pioneers who were influenced by the West, (2) the transformation of indigenous dance forms, (3) the introduction of foreign styles of modern dance, and (4) the introduction, assimilation, and creation of new works in the classical ballet genre. In addition, many traditional forms have been maintained and continued in new contexts.

Modern Dance in Japan

Modern dance pioneers in Japan were Ishii Baku (1886–1962), Eguchi Takaya (1895–1929), and Ito Michio (1892–1961). Ishii studied with Mary Wigman (1887–1973), a German modern dance pioneer. He then toured in East Asia and influenced dance there. Eguchi also studied with Mary Wigman and was influenced by Èthe eurythmics teacher Émile Jaques-Dalcroze (1865–1950). Ito worked in the United States and Europe. He also assisted the Irish poet and dramatist W. B. Yeats (1865–1939) with his work on Noh theater.

In 1948, Nihon Geijutsu Byoka Kyokai (NGKB, Japan Dancing Artists Association) was founded with Ito Michio as president. In 1958, ballet members of this society joined the then-established Japan Ballet Association. In 1971, NGBK renamed itself Gendai Buyo Kyokai (Modern Dance Association). In the late

1990s, a National Modern Dance Company was established at the new National Theater for Opera and Dance in Tokyo, which became a focal point to bring modern dancers together in a culture where cooperation among groups has been elusive.

Creative expression was curtailed by the military in Japan during the 1930s, but modern dance developed rapidly after World War II. Whereas the pioneers were influenced primarily by the German school, the postwar dancers looked to Martha Graham, musical theater, and later Merce Cunningham for inspiration. Major artists of this period included Fuji Mieko and Wakamatsu Miki. Orita Katsuko, Kanai Fumie, and Takeya Keiko are also notable. In 1985, Teshigawara Saburo founded a group called Karas. He was trained as a visual artist, and set design is an important part of his creations. Butoh, an indigenous Japanese genre, has influenced the development of dance artists worldwide. After its defeat in World War II and the devastation of the atomic bomb, Japan entered a period of social unrest; neo-Dada art was in fashion. Butoh artists rejected Western influences and expressed the spirit of postwar Japan in a way that was sometimes provocative and violent. There was an interest in the old, the ill, and criminals, and in how body memory can be reflected in postures and movements. The result has been called grotesque, shocking, humorous, poetic, and hypnotic. Training for Butoh dancers involves various strenuous activities, discipline, and a lifestyle similar to that of monks. Movement style became increasingly slow, focusing on basic emotional gestures. Often, the general atmosphere is one of chaos.

Three dancers influential in developing the Butoh style are Hijikata Tatsumi, Kasai Akira, and Ohno Kazuo. The dances of all three were characterized by an androgynous quality.

Ohno (b. 1906), the best-known Butoh dancer today, studied with Japanese pioneers Ishii and Eguchi. Ohno's signature work, "Admiring La Argentina," was first performed in 1977 when he was seventy years old. It has since been performed all over the world and is typical of the delicate and transient nature of Ohno's fragile and ascetic art. Ohno has also starred in films and is a writer.

Hijikata, who began to work in the 1950s, was endorsed by the writer Mishima Yukio. Hijikata's work started the trend of naked shaved-head dancers covered in white body paint. In 1963, he called his dances "Ankoku (dark) Butoh (dance)," and the word Butoh has been used since to refer to this style.

Kasai, a follower of Ohno, founded a group called Tenshi-kan in 1971. He came from a Christian background, but also studied Shintoism and Rudolph Steiner's mysticism; some of his works had a spiritual intensity. There was also an erotic element arising from his interest in the writers Jean Genet and the Marquis de Sade.

The two major Butoh companies are Dairakudakan and Sankaijuku. Dairakudakan, founded by Maro Akaji in the early 1970s, uses large-scale sets and huge casts to create spectacular effects. The basically male group works in a comic and exaggerated style borrowed from cabaret theater. Sankaijuku, founded by Amagatsu Ushio in the late 1970s, is known for its solemn reflective atmospheres. Both companies have toured extensively and are credited with making this uniquely Japanese art form known abroad. Major solo Butoh artists include Tanaka Min, Goi Teru, Ashikawa Yoko, and Ono Man. Butoh is now being seen and appreciated more in Japan after having gained recognition abroad, and many young artists are experimenting with this genre.

Two recent trends in dance in Japan can be seen in the work of Condors, an all-male group dressed in school uniforms, which satirizes Japanese pop culture and integrates film, speech, and visual gags into its format. The second trend is to look to Europe for new directions. Japan and its artists are known for continually searching for new trends in the arts and public culture.

Modern Dance in Korea

In 1922, Japan's Ishii Baku visited Seoul and performed a work titled "Dance Poem." After this, several Korean students went to Tokyo to study with Ishii. One of these was Choi Seung-hee (1910–?), a dance pioneer who returned to work on a new dance style for Korea. She later toured the West under the management of Sol Hurok, then spent her later years in North Korea, though little is known of her work there.

In 1962, a modern dance course was introduced at Ewha Women's University by Yuk Wan-sun, who trained in the United States with Martha Graham and is called the godmother of Korean modern dance. Ewha's is considered the top university dance program in Korea, and the university continues to graduate dancers who become leaders in the modern dance world there. Modern dance is taught in about forty universities in Korea, and many small companies have been established in recent years.

After World War II and the end of the Japanese occupation, many Koreans began to look to their own

cultural history for inspiration. One of the major artists in this effort was Kim Mae-ja, a master teacher of traditional Korean dance, who creates modern works based on that tradition. She teaches and performs frequently in China and has established the Chang Mu Arts Center in Seoul where her company performs along with other Korean and international dance groups. Kim Myong-sook, a professor in dance at Ewha University, also creates contemporary works based on traditional Korean genres and organized the Nuri Dance Company in 1996.

Many outstanding modern dance choreographers are active in Korea: Choi Chung-ja expresses the emotional intensity of pain and spirituality in her work; Park Myung-sook works with women's issues and inner feelings; Ahn Ae-soon deals with the Asian idea of opposites and suggestion in movement and in life; Nam Jeong-ho studied in France, and her works are called fresh and innovative; and Ahn Song-soo worked in New York and London and creates technically demanding choreography. Working in a more avant-garde style, Hong Shin-ja creates work that stems from a natural outdoor environment and traditional spirituality.

Modern Dance in China

Dance pioneers in mainland China were Wu Xi-aobang (1906–1995) and Dai Ailien (b. 1916). Wu trained in Japan and returned to China to establish his own school in Shanghai in 1931. In the 1930s his dance creations expressed his patriotism, and after World War II he worked in many institutes in the new China and wrote about theories and methods for his adaptations of Western modern dance to create a new Chinese dance tradition. Dai was born in Trinidad, studied ballet in London, and went to China in the 1940s to take part in the building of a new China. She helped to establish the Beijing Dance Academy, the Central Ballet Company, and after 1949 was one of the first dancers to go into the villages and study the dances of minority peoples. She was made to do hard labor during the Cultural Revolution, but after that traveled abroad as an ambassador for dance in China.

Around 1949, with the help of Russian ballet artists, a new classical Chinese dance was created that is a hybrid of classical ballet and Chinese opera movement. This newly created classical Chinese dance is taught at all the major dance academies in mainland China and in Hong Kong. In recent years this style has been expanded, with many new choreographic works in a contemporary style.

In 1987, Yang Meiqi led the establishment in Guangdong of the first school and company for mod-

ern dance in China. Choreographers and teachers from the United States have contributed to the development of the Guangdong Modern Dance Company, which tours internationally and has received glowing press reviews. One of the first choreographers for this company was Wang Mei, head of the Modern Dance Program at the Beijing Dance Academy. Resident choreographers Liang Xing and Sang Jija create works that illumine an experimental aspect of the spirit of the modern China.

In Hong Kong, City Contemporary Dance Company (CCDC), founded by Willy Tsao in 1979, is the major voice for modern dance. Tsao has been a major figure in Chinese circles as a producer and promoter of contemporary dance and is now working in Beijing as director of the Modern Dance Company. Other important Hong Kong choreographers, all connected with CCDC, are Helen Lai, who choreographs for many groups in Asia; Mui Cheuk-yin, best known for her innovative solos stemming from Chinese tradition; Poon Siu-fai, creating avant-garde pieces; and Yuri Ng, who works in a modern ballet style. CCDC has a strong education and outreach program that contributes to the growth of interest in dance as a career and to the raising of dance standards in Hong Kong. Since 1980, CCDC has made fifty-one international tours to over thirty major cities in Asia and the West. Also in Hong Kong, the School of Dance at the Academy for Performing Arts, founded in 1984, has become a major training center for modern dance (and for ballet and Chinese dance), and its graduates have established many small groups in Hong Kong and overseas.

Modern Dance in Taiwan

Modern dance in Taiwan was first introduced during the Japanese occupation by touring companies in the early 1930s. A young dancer, Tsai Ryueh, then went to Japan to study with Ishii Baku after the latter visited Taiwan, and Tsai returned to Taiwan to pioneer modern dance. In 1966, Al Huang Chung-liang came to Taiwan to conduct modern dance workshops at the Chinese Dance Arts Institute founded by Tsai. In 1967, Liu Feng-shueh began a modern dance center.

The best-known dance artist in Taiwan is Lin Hwai-min, who founded the Cloud Gate Dance Theatre in 1973. Cloud Gate, with Lin's choreography, draws heavily on Chinese culture, its legends, and its folklore. In the early years, his work was a synthesis of Chinese opera movement, ballet, and Graham technique; in recent years, however, the primary source of movement inspiration and training has been tai chi and improvisation. Lin was also instrumental in 1983 in

establishing the Dance Department at the National Institute of Arts in Taipei, now the main training center for modern dance in Taiwan. Cloud Gate tours internationally and is the best-known Asian modern dance company. Before his dance career, Lin was famous as a writer in Taiwan and was known for his astute political sense and deep concern for the Taiwanese people.

Taiwan's many modern dance artists include Henry Yu, former member of the Graham company; Heng Ping, who established a dance center and the Taipei Dance Forum with resident choreographer Sunny Pang of Hong Kong; and Liou Shaw-lu, a former Cloud Gate member who directs the Taipei Dance Circle, which tours extensively and performs Liou's unique art of oiled bodies sliding around and over each other on large plastic floor cloths. Two others of note are Lo Man-fei, who formed a company of mature dancers, many of whom had danced with Cloud Gate, and Lin Hsiu-wei, who developed a modern theatrical dance style that draws heavily on Chinese opera tradition.

General Trends

For many years, East Asia has been exporting modern dancers and choreographers who have had successful careers around the world. A notable example from China is Chiang Ching, who worked in the United States and Europe in the 1970s. H. T. Chen of Taiwan has worked in New York's Chinatown for the past twenty years. From the 1960s through the 1980s, several dance artists from Japan came to the United States to pursue their careers. Kanda Akiko, Takako Asakawa, and Yuriko Kimura were soloists with the Martha Graham Company. In 1969, Takei Kei did her first group work, "Light," which began a life-long journey exploring the theme of an imaginary family of man in his ceremonies though time and nature.

The development of modern dance in East Asia is expanding at a phenomenal rate. Modern dance programs have been established in many secondary and tertiary educational institutions, and graduates are participating in a variety of ways in their local dance worlds. Moreover, many excellent new choreographers and companies are emerging and making important contributions to dance communities in Asia and around the world. In the near future, there is likely to be continued growth and exciting new trends in the modern dance of East Asia.

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DANCE—INDIA Dance in India is as diverse as the multiethnic society from which it stems. Each region, with its own language, literature, customs, costume, and cuisine, has its own dance forms, some of which are traced through wall paintings, ancient manuscripts, and temple sculptures to well over three thousand years ago. There are dances in which everyone participates, at religious festivals or private celebrations, and those performed only by specialists who undergo rigorous training from childhood. Some forms are considered classical, while others are classified as folk; each is part of larger theater, music, religious, and even cinema traditions.

Indian dancers gesture with the eyes, head, neck, and hands. With wrists bent and arms flowing, the dancer interprets the lyrics of accompanying songs, telling stories through facial expression and hand gesture; with bare feet, rhythms are beat on the ground to complement percussion instruments like drums, sticks, and cymbals. Indian classical dances have influenced court and temple dance in most of Southeast Asia—Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, Indonesia, and Cambodia. Dance sequences in modern Indian films, choreographed to extremely popular songs, have captivated peoples all over the world.

Ancient and Classical Dance

Detailed descriptions of ancient Indian theater and dance are found in Sanskrit texts like the *Natya Sastra* (Treatise on Dramaturgy, second century BCE) and the *Abhinaya Darpana* (Mirror of Gesture, thirteenth century CE), which present the theory and technique of a highly developed art. Elaborate lists of eye, neck, head, and hand movements, and of walks and turns, include the various meanings that can be conveyed. Sections are devoted to the performers, music, costume, and stage, as well as to the sacred and aesthetic purposes of dance performance.



THE ESSENCE OF DANCE IN INDIA

"Wherever the hand moves, there the glances follow; where the glances go, the mind follows; where the mind goes, the mood follows; where the mood goes, there is the flavor."

Source: Ananda Coomaraswamy and Gopala K. Duggirala, trans. ([1917] 1970) *The Mirror of Gesture: Being the Abhinaya Darpana of Nandikesvara*. Reprint ed. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.

By the end of the nineteenth century, both the texts and the dances they described had fallen into obscurity due to lack of patronage and also to attitudes introduced by the British about the immorality of dance. Dance was associated with *nauch* (dancing) girls, many of them *devadasis* (female servants of gods) attached to temples who performed at temple festivals and palace parties. Regarding them as prostitutes, some outraged British women led an anti-*nauch* movement and sought to ban dance.

The rediscovery and translation of ancient manuscripts, the birth of Indian nationalism, and growing pride in indigenous art forms led to a revival of many dance forms. The first dance form to be revived in the 1930s, that of the *devadasis* from temples in south India, was renamed *Bharata Natyam* (Theater of Bharata) after the legendary author of the *Natya Sastra*.

With the ascendance of other forms like *Kathak*, *Odissi*, *Kathakali* and *Kuchipudi*, dances performed by men, and dances originating in royal courts, *Bharata Natyam* remains the paradigm of Indian classical dance. Traditionally taught by hereditary male gurus (maestros), who rarely performed, classical dance training includes the study of ancient texts on theater, aesthetics, mythology, and music. Many universities offer academically rigorous degrees in dance.

Folk and Popular Dance

While classical dances are presented by specialists and associated with elite social groups (the ideal spectator is learned, noble, and refined), everyone can participate in folk dances. Like one's mother tongue, these are learned while growing up in a community. Each region and ethnic group has its own dances, as various as the dances of warriors carrying spears and

the dances of women in swirling skirts with several water pitchers balanced on their heads. When dancers from all over India come to the nation's capital to participate in the annual Republic Day parade, their nationally televised performances require a sports stadium.

People dance at village fairs, street festivals, and in homes during marriages. They carry their dances with them when they emigrate to other provinces, or even abroad. Folk dances from different regions are now taught in high schools, and in many cities, when one ethnic group dances during its festivals, members of other ethnic groups join in. Traditional dances to a disco beat are popular among young and old, from Mumbai (Bombay) to London. Dance dramas or ballets, modeled on Western and indigenous forms in which a story is enacted through dance, are also popular among professional and amateur dance groups.

Most popular of all are *filmi* dances that accompany the many songs that characterize Indian cinema. Clips of these dance sequences, in which stars lip-sync the lyrics while performing hip-jerking movements in an array of romantic settings and while wearing a range of form-revealing costumes, are a major part of television programming. Street children in many countries break into the more famous routines the minute they see an Indian tourist. Commercially produced extravaganzas, at which cinema icons perform live, are extremely successful in India.

Music and Costume

Musical accompaniment for dance is as varied as the dances. In general, dances from the south are allied to the Carnatic musical tradition, and those of the north to the Hindustani system and so follow their distinctive musical modes (ragas) and rhythmic cycles (talas). Beyond that, each dance form—folk, popular, or classical—has its own melodies, rhythms, and instruments. A *chenda* double-headed drum signals an all-night dance theater from Kerala, whereas a *pungi* double clarinet with a gourd reservoir accompanies a gypsy dancer from Rajasthan. As with the rest of Indian music, the leading instrument is the human voice, and, even within a single form, individual dances are defined by specific songs.

Apart from percussion instruments and feet with bells, rhythms are also expressed by vocalized syllables, like *tat*, *dbit*, *gadbi gheba dbaa*. In classical dance these syllables are chanted by the leader of the musical ensemble and accompany sequences of rhythmic dance. Songs can be set just to Indian musical syllables—sa, re, ga (the Indian do, re mi)—or to poetic

texts or both. Poetic texts are interpreted with mimed as well as abstract movement. Lyrics usually refer to deities and characters from Hindu scriptures who, particularly in female temple-dance forms, are directly addressed in passionate love songs through which the dancer expresses a human's yearning for union with the divine soul.

Dancers' costumes are usually the festive wear of the communities from which they stem, characterized by colorful fabrics and elaborate ornaments. In keeping with their earlier ritual status as "brides of a deity," temple dancers are dressed as brides; actor-dancers of theatrical forms sometimes wear masks or masklike makeup, especially in Kathakali dance. Traditional dance and theater rarely employ scenery or props.

Dance in the Early 2000s

As India modernizes, becomes more urban, and is influenced by a world economy, the traditional dance ethos is changing. Dance festivals, organized by the government or supported by businesses, are held at ancient ruins and in foreign countries. Dance is becoming increasingly prestigious and performers are highly valued; they win national awards and receive government land to start academies. A new generation of spectators is encouraging dancers to update the form and style of dances and to experiment with non-traditional themes.

Indian dancers travel widely; many live, choreograph, and teach abroad. Each artist subtly adds to and even changes the traditional forms, whether working within those forms or breaking away to find a more contemporary idiom. Fusion is a growing trend—Kathak and Flamenco, Bharata Natyam and jazz, Kathakali and ballet, filmi dance and Western disco. Yet the fount remains the traditional, particularly the classical, forms with which most dancers, including film stars, are familiar. Indeed, it is this interplay between popular and classical that has characterized Indian dance throughout the ages and makes it a vibrant expression of Indian culture.

Rajika Puri

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DANCE—KOREA Traditional dance in Korea can be divided into two categories, folk dance and court dance. Ritual folk dance is performed by women and men, although originally only men performed the sacred dances within Confucian shrines. Ritual dance in North Korea tends to be more athletic, with jumps and quicker tempos, while South Korean ritual dance is more meditative and slow. Also known as "shaman dancing," ritual dance is used in some cases to exorcise bad spirits. The *Salp'uri* is a slow/fast, joyful, often bewitching and entrancing style of dance. Ritual dances honoring various deities as well as the folk dances celebrating the various agricultural seasons of the earth and the farmer's festivals were also used in the training of peasant militia groups during ancient times.

Music and dance associated with the agricultural aspects of Korean life are called *nongak*. *Nongak* is one of the oldest traditional forms of Korean dance, tracing its roots back to the period of tribal states (first century BCE) and before. Although *nongak* was performed during the course of everyday farm work as well as festivals, professional musicians and dancers also performed the style for entertainment. These performers also wore masks. *T'al'ch'um* is the Korean form of a masked dance drama. The masks themselves represent the five geographic directions: Yellow = center, red = south, blue = east, white = west, and black = north. *T'al'ch'um* was originally a style of Buddhist morality plays from China. The Korean style of the form evolved a comic sense, making light of everyday situations, and at times could be quite racy with theme and dialogue.

Court dance in Korea is much more reserved than folk dance. This style is often described as *chong'joong'dong* or "motion within stillness." The movements are elegant, graceful, flowing, and restrained, with the movement controlled by the dancer's inhalation and exhalation. The costumes cover the entire body: long full skirts and tops with extended sleeves that help to augment the small delicate movements of the hand and forearm, making the dancer appear to float weightless during performance.

Dance continues to evolve in Korea through contemporary modern styles. Young dance artists such as



Dancers participate in a folk dancing competition in Aanyan, South Korea, in 1989. (STEPHANIE MAZE/CORBIS)

Hong Sin-cha, Nam Jeong-ho, Lee Kyung-ok, Kim Hyon-ok, Kim Mae-ja, and Ch'ang Mu Hoe explore both the traditional spirituality, breaking the boundaries established by their predecessors, while finding their own unique movement vocabularies.

Stacey Fox

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DANCE—MALAYSIA Dances in Malaysia are categorized into court-classical dances, folk dances, ethnic-tribe dances, and dances from immigrant communities such as Chinese, Indian, and Portuguese, as well as modern dance. Although Malaysia is a Malay-dominated nation, it is multiethnic.

Court and folk dances are mainly Malay. Even though Malaysia has thirteen states plus the federal territory of Kuala Lumpur and Labuan, Sabah, only nine sultanates survived—Perlis, Kedah, Perak, Kelantan, Terengganu, Pahang, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, and Johor. Melaka, regarded as the beginning of Malay civilization in the fifteenth century, was captured by the Portuguese in 1511. The fall of Melaka resulted in the birth of other sultanates such as Johor

and Perak. The Malay court dances originated from these courts. The courts of the northern Malay states of peninsular Malaysia are perceived as culturally richer. The best-known court dance is Asyik from Kelantan.

Other dances include *inai* of Perlis, *gamelan* of Terengganu, and *mak yong* of Kelantan, the latter being dance theater that encompasses many dances within it, such as Mengadap Rebab and Belan-belan Bejalan. Some of the Malay folk dances were also performed at court for special social functions, either as presentation or as social dance, such as *joget*. The word *joget* could actually be translated as "dance" but is commonly translated as "folk dance." The court-classical dances are normally much slower and performed by women, which is one of the reasons why the court dances disappeared after these courts became more Islamic. The folk dances are normally performed as social dance in villages for special occasions such as weddings and engagements. The ethnic-tribe dances are common among ethnic groups in Sabah and Sarawak as well as among the Orang Asli (Original People) of peninsular Malaysia. Most of the ethnic-tribe dances are related to rituals of tribes, such as the harvest festival.

Other dances include ballet, modern, and contemporary dance. Contemporary dance in Malaysia is not restricted to Western modern and contemporary dance, but includes contemporary Malaysian dances



Dayak women performing in a costumed dance drama in Sarawak, Borneo, Malaysia. (CHARLES & JOSETTE LENARS/CORBIS)

that include Chinese, Indian, Malay, and ethnic issues. Perhaps the early contemporary dances could be traced to dances created for films in the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1970s, contemporary dances developed further when dance and theater groups collaborated for new works. Today, the contemporary dances continue to be developed by incorporating Malaysian issues (that is, issues that affect all citizens of Malaysia, not just ethnically Malay citizens) rather than Malay issues, especially with new performance venues and the Malaysia Dance Society and National Arts Academy teaching both traditional and contemporary dances. Traditional Malay and ethnic dances continue to be performed for tourists.

Zulkifli Mohamad

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DANCE, SRI LANKA—KANDYAN Kandyan dance is a style of classical dancing that flourished under the patronage of the rulers of the kingdom of Kandy (1597–1815), in central Sri Lanka. Kandyan dance is known as *uda rata natam*; it is one of three distinct styles of traditional dance in Sri Lanka. (The other two are *pabatha rata natum* and *sabaragamuwuwa* dance.) Kandyan dance is characterized by very elaborate costumes and by a highly developed rhythmic system (*tala*), which is carried by drums and tiny cymbals (*thalampataa*).

Drumming is such an integral part of Kandyan dance that the very act is surrounded by sanctity. The basic drum scale is made up of the drum syllables *tha - ji - tho - nun*, and these individual notes are considered a salutation to, respectively, the Buddha, the gods, the master or teacher, and the audience. Of several drums that are used, the most important for dance is the *gete-bere*, which is played on all festive occasions in Sri Lanka. It consists of a single piece of wood hollowed out to form a cylinder, with a drumhead on each end: one is made of monkey skin, the other of oxhide. The drum is slung round the drummer's waist so that he can play it with both hands.

The term "Kandyan dance" actually embraces five distinct types. *Ves* dance is derived from an ancient purification rite and is still performed as propitiation, by



Kandyan dancers performing at the Esala Perahera festival in Kandy, Sri Lanka, in 1981. (TIM PAGE/CORBIS)

male dancers only. The elaborate dance costume is thought sacred, as belonging to the deity Kohomba, and it has only been a century since the dancers were first permitted to perform outside the Kankariya Temple in Kandy.

Another of the dance types is *uDekki* dance. This uses a small, lacquered, hand-held drum called *uDekki*, the parts of which are believed to have been given to humankind by various gods. It has strings that can be tightened to change its pitch. It is difficult to play, especially as the dancer is singing while playing it.

Pantheru dance employs an instrument called *pantheruwa*, which resembles a tambourine but without a skin. This dance is believed to have come down from the time of the Buddha (c. 566–486 BCE). The gods are said to use this particular instrument to celebrate their victories in battle, and Sinhalese kings used to use *pantheru* dances in the same way.

The *naiyaaNDi* dance is performed during preparations for the Kohomba Kankariya festival and other religious festivals. It is characterized by a special dance dress.

Vannam dance derives from the Sinhalese word *var-Nana* ("descriptive praise"). Originally these *vannams* were only sung, but later they were adapted for solo dancing, each one expressing a single dominant idea. There are eighteen principal *vannams*, and the songs are said to have been composed by the sage Ganithalankara. They take their inspiration from many different themes, and bear titles like "elephant," "precious stone," "lion," "arrow," and "peacock."

Paul Hockings

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DANCE DRAMA, MASK—KOREA Korean mask dance drama, *t'alch'um* (*sandaenori*), dates back to prehistoric Korean shaman rituals. Mask dance dramas were performed to propitiate the spirits during the agricultural year, repel evil, honor ancestors, and ensure bountiful harvests. With the introduction of Buddhism to Korea, influences from India via China were adopted, as noted in the lion dance. Performed at New Year's, Buddha's birthday, and the Tano and Ch'usok festivals, the dramas were a lively folk tradition. Today, the dance dramas, in reality short skits, are a combination of music, dance, song, and narrative combined with humor.

The dramas, handed down as part of an oral tradition, were always performed outdoors at night by firelight. The performers were exclusively men, usually farmers, until recently, when women began to participate. Drumming and music were a crucial component, with a different rhythm introducing each new character. The characters included humans, gods, spirits, and animals. The masks (made of wood, gourds, or paper) were exaggerated and brightly colored to compensate for the low light. Colors have special significance; black is used for the faces of the elderly, red for a young man, and white for a young woman. Most of the masks are backed with black cloth to signify hair and to secure the mask. Some masks have movable parts, such as the eyes or lower jaw. Some of the roles are acted in pantomime and dance alone. Performances can last the entire night or only a few hours. Improvisation often is used. The artistic masks used in traditional dance dramas were often destroyed after performances.

Performances are often opened with a ritual ceremony to ensure the success of the play. The most common theme of dance dramas is social satire. Many of the satires ridicule the ruling classes, wayward Buddhist monks, and shrewish women. Broad humor is a strong component. The *Kosong ogwangdae*, a mask dance drama from southeastern Korea, has five scenes including a leper, a disreputable Buddhist monk, and a ruined aristocrat. Complicated love triangles between a man, his proper wife, and his courtesan abound. Traditionally, masks depicting the *yangban* (ruling classes) usually were given unattractive features such as a harelip or lopsided leer. Such entertainment enabled the common people to voice social criticisms and rebellious sentiments safely.

In the 1980s, interest was revived in this folk art form, and many small troupes were formed. Modern *t'alch'um* performances can be seen in Seoul at the Chong-dong Theater.

Noelle O'Connor

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DANCHI During the Meiji period (1868–1912), Japanese cities rapidly industrialized, bringing large numbers of people from rural areas to urban centers. Some neighborhoods in Tokyo became virtual tenements, with almost 200 percent occupancy in some dwellings. However, the situation in Japan never ap-

proximated the slum conditions of industrializing urban areas in America and Europe due to the nature of labor migration. Most early factory workers lived in dormitory-like accommodations, established by factories for *dekasegi rodo*—young people (especially women) brought for a contracted term to live in the cities but to return to the rural areas after a fixed period, with their wages sent home to the countryside, and their housing and food provided by the employers. Thus a permanent urban working class was slow to form in Japan, compared to the earlier industrializing nations. However, with the devastation of the 1923 Tokyo earthquake, many workers needed housing, and *danchi*—large-scale apartment dwellings—were constructed to meet these needs. Some of these complexes were envisioned by their developers as communities, with a central plaza or square in the center of the surrounding buildings, and with facilities for residents held in common. In general, these large buildings were relatively clean and hygienic and provided reasonable accommodations in close quarters. Construction was suspended in wartime, when bombings and fire destroyed many homes.

In postwar Japan, the remaining housing was overcrowded and lacked amenities. Many families doubled or tripled up, sleeping took places in shifts, and workers sometimes stayed at their place of employment rather than return "home." The enormous apartment complexes built on city fringes since the war also create bedroom towns in suburban areas. These *danchi* may contain as many as 400 or more units. They were first built in the late 1950s to accommodate workers migrating to urban industrial areas, and workers displaced from war industries or from former colonies. Soon, burgeoning white-collar workplaces brought more educated young people from the countryside and provincial cities to the capital. The residents of *danchi* were often young couples living on their own, away from their rural or provincial extended households. During this period very few of these young wives worked outside the home, though some older wives and mothers did *naishoku* (take-home employment) as piecemeal work for small-scale enterprises contracting out light manufacturing or assembly work. Because of the isolation from their natal families, young women with small children and little contact with adults during the day, sometimes fell victim to *danchibyoo*, or "apartment complex sickness," a syndrome characterized by depression and neurasthenic symptoms—similar to suburban housewives' depression-related symptoms in postwar America.

Some *danchi* are private apartments and some are rented at highly subsidized rents to workers, with most

of the cost covered by the employer. *Danchi* continue to be built, some resembling small towns, with community services, shopping, and day-care centers included. Some *danchi* now are specially built to accommodate the increasing number of elderly, who living alone or in couples, away from caregiving children or other relatives, are provided with some assistance, such as visiting home aides, meals on wheels, and telephone chain contact.

A typical *danchi* apartment is known as a "2LDK," because it has two "living areas" and a kitchen-dining room, along with a separate toilet and a bathroom. It is also likely to have a small balcony with a washing machine and clothes drying lines. Such an apartment may have one large Western style room with a carpeted floor. Frequently, the other "living" area will be tatami matted. New buildings may have no tatami-matted rooms at all. These two large rooms will have large closets on one side where futons (sleeping mats, mattresses, etc.) are kept during the day, and brought out at night. Most families with young children tend now to have a designated "children's room" once the children are of kindergarten age (before that age, children tend to sleep next to their parents on futons), and there may be bunk beds or fixed furnishings, less flexible than the older style of mobile bedding.

Merry Isaacs White

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DANGREK RANGE The Dangrek Mountains, known in Khmer as the Chuor Phnum Dangrek, divide Thailand and Cambodia along an east-west axis. The range is located along the northern Tonlé Sap Basin and is primarily a steep escarpment. The average elevation of the escarpment is about 500 meters. Its peaks range from 450 to 700 meters in height.

The Dangrek escarpment is located on the southern edge of the Khorat Plateau. The mountains extend west from the Mekong River to approximately San Kamphaeng, Thailand. This watershed serves as the boundary between Thailand and Cambodia, run-

ning about 800 kilometers in length. Although there is a main road in the area connecting these two nations, travel and communications are difficult. The Mekong valley, located at the eastern end of the range, and the Mekong Delta, in the southeast, provide land and water access between Cambodia and Laos.

Because this geographic feature has served as a border between nations, it has also been a region in which military activity has taken place during periods of civil unrest and war. The Dangrek Mountains have a place in history as having been where Pol Pot (1925–1998), the leader of the Khmer Rouge, died.

Linda Dailey Paulson

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DAOISM. See **Taoism**.

DARDANELLES The Dardanelles is a 61-kilometer-long strait separating European and Asian Turkey, linking the Aegean Sea with the Sea of Marmara. Its widest point is 7 kilometers, its narrowest only 1,600 meters. During classical antiquity the strait was known as the Hellespont, and its modern Turk-

ish name is Canakkale Bogazi. The Dardanelles, together with the Bosphorus Strait farther north, has been a major crossing point between Europe and Asia and also controls navigation between the Black and Mediterranean Seas.

The ancient city of Troy was located near the Dardanelles, and both Xerxes I of Persia (c. 519–465 BCE) and Alexander of Macedon (356–323 BCE) crossed the strait during their military campaigns. During the Byzantine and Ottoman empires, the strait was used in the defense of Constantinople (now Istanbul) and was fortified for this purpose. In World War I, the Allied powers attempted to pass through the strait, but two early attempts, in 1915, were unsuccessful. The second of these, the Gallipoli campaign, resulted in great loss of life. In 1918, the Allies passed through the strait and took Constantinople. Following the war, several international treaties demilitarized and internationalized the Dardanelles, but the Montreux Convention of 1936 allowed Turkish remilitarization while guaranteeing access to foreign vessels. The strait remains important as a shipping lane for Black Sea nations.

Michael Pretes

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A cruise ship docks in the harbor at Canakkale on the Dardanelles. (WOLFGANG KAEHLER/CORBIS)

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DARHAN (2000 pop. 66,000). The city of Darhan (elevation 700 meters) located some 219 kilometers north of Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, on the Trans-Mongolian Railway, is the third largest city in Mongolia. Before 1961 the site where Darhan now stands was nothing but rolling pastureland in Selenge Province. What sets this site apart from other regions of Mongolia, however, is its proximity to the country's only transnational rail line and a surplus of raw materials, including coal, marble, and limestone. For these reasons, the Mongolian government and its former economic partner, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, envisioned locating a fledgling industrial complex here and in 1961 began building the city from the ground up. Beginning with the building of a reinforced concrete factory, which contributed to further development, the city grew quickly and by 1990 had reached a population of 70,000. The population is as young as the city, with 90 percent of all inhabitants under the age of thirty-five (in 1990). Construction workers and specialists from other socialist countries—as far away as Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary—played a large part in the city's rapid growth. For this reason, Darhan is known as the "town of international friendship."

Daniel Hruschka

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DARI Dari, a language of Indo-Iranian origin, is one of the official languages spoken in Afghanistan (Pashto is the other official language of Afghanistan). Dari is a dialect of Farsi (or Persian), the official language of Iran, and the two languages are so similar in their structure, syntax, and lexicon that Iranians and Afghans can communicate with each other with little difficulty. Nevertheless, there are some distinctive differences between the two. The accent in Dari is not quite as stressed as in Farsi; the vowel systems of the two languages differ; and Dari employs more consonants than Farsi. Finally, when a designation is specified, Dari adds a suffix, *ra*.

Dari uses a modified Arabic script with thirty-two alphabetic characters, and the language has many loanwords from Arabic as well as Persian. There is a for-

mal and more proper version of the language as well as an informal one. In fact, the word "Dari" originates from the word "*dar*," or "*darbari*," which means "court language." Dari, like Pahlavi Middle Persian, is thought to have been spoken in the eastern Iranian royal courts. The language, however, may have originated as common people's speech, which later became formalized to bring it to the level required for use in the royal courts. Today the language has evolved to a stage where the formal style is more closely associated with Farsi, while the informal one resembles more the language spoken in Tajikistan.

Dari is spoken by approximately 5 million people in Afghanistan. Several ethnic groups, including the Chahar Aimak, Hazara, and Tajik, speak Dari as their main language. In Afghanistan Dari is spoken when people who speak different languages come together.

Dari has a rich literary tradition and history. It was the language chosen by several prominent ancient and modern literary figures to weave an epic tale or compose a touching poem. Poets who wrote in the Dari language include Abu Hafs-I Sughdi, Abu al-Abbas-I Marvarzi, and Yazid Ibn-I Mifraq. A modern Afghani poet, Ustad Khalilullah Khalili, also writes in Dari, and many critics consider his use of the Dari language to be brilliant. Khalili has written almost fifty literary works, which include poems, fiction, history, and Sufi studies, all representing some of the finest literary points of the Dari language.

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DARJEELING (2002 est. pop. 110,000). Celebrated as a hill resort and tea-producing center, Darjeeling is a city in India situated along a ridge in the Himalayan foothills of northern West Bengal State, 500 kilometers north of Calcutta. Its name is derived from the Tibetan Dorje-Ling, "place of the thunderbolt," and much about the city is Tibetan in sensibility. It has three parts, joined by flights of steps and steep narrow streets; highest are hotels, shops, private schools, and entertainment for visitors and the wealthy, near the ridge line; lower, homes of residents, smaller hotels, and shops; at the bottom, the main market and bazaars. The rajas of Sikkim controlled Darjeeling intermittently until 1816, when the British



DARJEELING HIMALAYAN RAILWAY—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

The Darjeeling Himalayan Railway was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1999 for its singular demonstration of the profound sociological and economic impact railroads had on the nineteenth-century world. The railroad still provides transportation to and from the hill-top tea-producing city of Darjeeling.

gained use of the area. In 1835, the British established a sanatorium in Darjeeling. Tea arrived in 1856, and within twenty years 113 estates were producing 4 million pounds of tea per year. By the early 1900s, Darjeeling was considered among the most glamorous outposts of the British empire. After World War I, it became a staging ground for expeditions to Mount Everest. From the 1980s through the 1990s, the local population called for political autonomy from West Bengal. Attractions are the "toy train" (a narrow-gauge extension of the North Bengal State Railway); Tiger Hill, with its magnificent view of Kanchenjunga and, occasionally, Mount Everest; botanical gardens; Buddhist monasteries; and museums.

C. Roger Davis

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DARUL ISLAM Darul Islam (House of Islam) was a revolutionary Islamic movement that fought between 1948 and 1963 to make Indonesia an Islamic republic. The Darul Islam arose from Muslim militias formed to fight the Dutch during Indonesia's independence war (1945–1949). It was founded in West Java by S. M. Kartosuwiryo (1905–1962) in May 1948, after the Indonesian Republic agreed to surrender that region to the Dutch. Kartosuwiryo proclaimed himself imam of an Islamic State of Indonesia, which was to replace the Republic. The Darul Islam continued its struggle after the Dutch were defeated and the movement was loosely allied with Islamic rebels in South Sulawesi from 1952 under Kahar Muzakkar (1921–1965) and in Aceh from 1953 under Daud Beureueh (1899–1987).

The movement controlled only rural areas, but its operations extended to the fringes of many towns and cities, including Jakarta. The movement's administration was based on Islamic law as interpreted by Islamic teachers (*kyai*), but in many areas its forces were little more than rural bandits. In 1957 the Indonesian authorities pacified Aceh with an offer of special status for Islamic law in the region, but the Java and Sulawesi movements were suppressed by the army, which captured and executed Kartosuwiryo in 1962 and killed Kahar Muzakkar in battle in 1965.

Robert Cribb

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DASHT-E MARGO Dasht-e Margo (Desert of Death) is located in the southwestern part of Afghanistan. Sometimes referred to as the Western Stony Desert, it is dry, dusty, and full of sharp, wind-blasted pebbles. The Iranian border with Afghanistan and the Iranian desert are in the western part of Dasht-e Margo. To the north lies the base of the Hindu Kush (killer of the Hindus). It is approximately 900 meters above sea level, very hot during the day, and freezing at night. The only plants to be found are deep rooted and generally have very sharp thorns. The only possible food source comes from the sap of the razor-sharp camel grass found in certain parts of the cracked earth.

The harsh climate, barren landscape, and waterless earth have left this region relatively unexplored. However, Afghanistan is home to a hardy group of pastoral nomads called the Kuchis. The Kuchi nomads have been crossing the Dasht-e Margo two times a year for generations during their migration seasons as they search for water for their flocks.

Jennifer L. Nichols

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DASTAN, TURKIC Traditionally, there are three epic genres in Asia: Altaic, Persian, and subcon-

tinental (of the Indian subcontinent). While the latter two have been studied to a certain extent, the Altaic genre, the origin of Turkic *dastans*, has been largely inaccessible until recently.

The term "*dastan*" is relatively new to the Turkic epic genre and was first recorded in the twelfth century. Some six to eight centuries earlier, oral composers, reciters, and owners of this genre among the Turks either used only the name of the work, which intrinsically referenced the genre, or employed specific autonomous terms such as *chorchok*, *jir*, and *sav*. Though in various dialects, all refer to the same concept, that is, the words of the forefathers.

Performers of and Occasions for *Dastans*

Therefore, a *dastan* is thought to contain the words of the forefathers, embellishing the story of how a particular Altaic lineage and polity gained independence. The reciter, called an *ozan*, or, depending on geographic location, an *akin*, *ashik*, *bahshi*, or *kam*, performs the work, while accompanying him- or herself on a traditional stringed instrument. The occasion of such a performance is an event itself. Apart from that, the recitation is a standard requirement for momentous anniversaries: births, burial ceremonies of rulers, annual festivals, marriages.

The Epic Hero

The main character of the epic is an *alp*, or epic hero, who endures the worst possible scenarios in life to save his or her people from military defeat and slavery. The work is usually known by the *alp*'s name. He or she is fully supported by a sizable cast of characters and is opposed by powerful and treacherous foes and villains. Regardless of the hopelessness of the circumstances, the *alp* can never be subjugated and can never abandon the fight. In the end, under appalling conditions, the *alp* and his followers triumph.

The villains are generally punished lightly. Usually their shame is made public, but they are allowed to wander the earth searching for forgiveness. The victorious ending is celebrated by a grand feast, during which, of course, the *chorchok*, *jir*, *sav*, or *dastan* is joyfully recited by the *ozan*.

Cultural Values in *Dastans*

Apart from the messages of independence, the genre is also a repository of identity. As such, *dastans* are carriers of early cultural values, including ancient spiritual values, such as the Tengri belief system— one of the earliest monotheistic religions. Because the

genre contains immutable linkages to the past, it is common to quote from older *dastans*. This assures and reminds the audience and owners of the works that they are the same people, sharing common goals. The genre is alive and well across Asia, with dozens of original plots, each replete with several dozen variants.

H. B. Paksoy

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DAUD, MUHAMMAD (1909–1978), Afghan political figure. Muhammad Daud belonged to the royal family of Afghanistan. Educated in Europe (1921–1930) while his father was in temporary exile, he joined the army on his return to Afghanistan. In 1934 he married the sister of the new Afghan king (and his cousin), Zahir Shah.

A resolute supporter of the modernization of Afghanistan, though not of its democratization, and a tough Pashtun nationalist, Daud became minister of defense in 1946, but in 1948, after a disagreement with the prime minister, he was sent to Paris as ambassador. A year later, he became minister of the interior and,

in 1953, prime minister, holding that position until 1963.

During this period (the so-called Daud decade), he exacerbated the question of Pashtunistan—the creation of a single state for all the Pashtun—which poisoned relations with Pakistan, since that state had a strong Pashtun minority. For his policy of modernization, he looked for military aid and economic assistance from both the U.S.S.R. and the United States, cunningly playing on their rivalry.

In 1963 he was forced to resign in order to prevent a serious confrontation with Pakistan and was excluded from active political life. Nevertheless, Daud maintained strong ties with the army and the communist activists. In 1973 he seized power with a bloodless coup, declaring Afghanistan a republic and becoming its president. The worsening of his relations with the Afghan communist activists and with Moscow weakened his position. In April 1978 he was killed, along with his family, during the communist coup, which paved the way for the Soviet invasion of 1979.

Riccardo Redaelli

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DAUYLPAZ The *dauylpaz* is a small kettledrum used by the Kazakhs in falconry. Falconry was one of most popular and entertaining forms of hunting in Kazakhstan and other parts of Central Asia from the earliest times. For fowling they used sparrow hawks and goshawks; for hunting wolves, foxes, and mountain goats, the *berkut* (golden eagle) was irreplaceable. The *dauylpaz* has similar names among the Turkic peoples: The Kyrgyz call it *doolbas*, the Uighur *tevilvaz*, and the Azerbaijanis *tebl-baas*, which all derive from the Arabo-Persian *tabl-baz* (where *tabl* stands for drum, and *baz* for falcon). Falconry scenes were often depicted in the Islamic miniatures of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The *dauylpaz* had a helmet-shaped body with a leather head (diameter about 300 millimeters, height 160 millimeters) and was often beautifully ornamented. A flat leather strap, a beater, or sometimes a hand was used to produce sound. The instrument was attached to the saddle under the left hand of a horseman, while the falcon rested on his other hand. The *dauylpaz* could also be held in the hands. The *dauyl-*

paz was used as a signaling instrument in military activities as well.

Another term in Kazakh used for this instrument is *shyndaulyl* (similar to the Uzbek *chindaulyl*). Some experts believe the only difference between a *dauylpaz* and a *shyndaulyl* is that the body of the latter was of metal (copper), while the body of the *dauylpaz* was of wood. Both these kinds of kettledrums have not been used since the end of the nineteenth century. Modified forms of the *dauylpaz* are used in the Kazakh folk instrument orchestras.

Aygul Malkeyeva

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DAVAO (2000 est. pop. 1.1 million). Davao, an important commercial, educational, and cultural center of the southern Mindanao region, is one of the largest seaports in the Philippines. Davao lies on the southeast side of Mindanao Island, occupying a total area of 2,440 square kilometers, with an average population density of 491 persons per square kilometer. Davao port services interisland and international shipments. The city is situated 974 kilometers south of Manila, on the shore of Davao Gulf. "Davao" also refers to three provinces: Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, and Davao Oriental. Davao City is located in Davao del Sur but is politically and administratively independent of the province.

When Spaniards first visited Davao in 1528, they found thriving communities of various ethnic groups, such as Bagobos, Mandayas, B'laans, and Manobos. Some of these later embraced Islam and were called Moros or Moors by the Spanish. The modern history of Davao began in the mid-nineteenth century, when Spanish colonizers defeated a rebellion of Moros and established a Roman Catholic settlement on the strategically important bank of the Davao River. Thus the Spanish gained leverage over the flourishing and lucrative regional trade, yet they were unable to establish full control over many parts of Mindanao Island.



A community of buildings on stilts in Davao. (YANN-ARTHUS-BERTRAND/CORBIS)

The American occupation of Davao began after the Spanish were defeated in the Spanish-American War (1898). Davao grew further in the twentieth century. In addition to the rich agriculture on Mindanao Island, mining flourished, and international trade grew to supply a strong worldwide demand (especially from the United States) for abaca hemp (from the banana leafstalk), cotton, coffee, and rubber. During this time, a large Japanese community settled in Davao and became one of the most influential communities in the city. In 1937, Davao was formally inaugurated as a city.

World War II arrived to Davao in 1941; the Japanese made Davao the regional headquarters of the imperial army. The city was heavily damaged in heavy fighting between Japanese and American troops in 1945.

Davao was extensively rebuilt after the war, with its economy now based on food processing, textiles, mining, and regional and international trade. During this era, most of the forest in and around Davao was destroyed, damaging Davao's status as a city in a jungle. Between the 1960s and 1990s, Davao experienced a new wave of industrialization and population growth, although in the early 1980s its business environment was heavily damaged by kidnappings and attacks by guerrillas and leftist groups such as the Communist New People's Army.

In response, citizens of Davao formed *Alsa Masa*, a vigilante group organized with the support of the

Philippine military. Some view this organization as exacerbating the already-volatile situation in Davao by focusing its vigilante justice on the New People's Army and Muslim separatists. The political situation in Davao is still unstable, although after the fall of the regime of Ferdinand Marcos (1917–1989) in 1986 most guerrillas ceased their operations in the city. Public officials still tolerate the existence of self-defense groups that engage in extrajudicial killings, ostensibly to fight crime, drug trafficking, and Communists and Muslim extremists, but Davao City is more peaceful than it was during the height of *Alsa Masa* activity. At the turn of the century, Davao had become one of the fastest-growing cities in the Philippines, with a population growth of 3.23 percent; its population doubled between 1980 and 1999. If the city maintains peace and order through the rule of law, its economy will become even more successful.

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DAVID, COLLIN (b. 1937), Pakistani painter. Born in Karachi, Pakistan, Collin David produces

minimalist paintings that are complex studies of line and structure, which question the very humanity of the women who inhabit them. David first attended the National College of Art and then the Fine Arts Department, Punjab University, from which he graduated with a master's degree in 1960. David studied under the tutelage of the landscape artist Khalid Iqbal, but found his own forte in portraiture and figurative art. After attending the Slade School of Art in London for one year, he joined the faculty of the National College of Art, Lahore, in 1964, where he has continued to teach.

David's art focuses primarily on women, but he is unconcerned about the social or psychological dimension of his subjects. The bodies, nude or clothed, form part of the spatial composition of his canvases. Artistic trends of the 1960s like op art influenced his early work to some degree, as in the 1970 painting *Ghazala*, which depicts a woman in the center of a concentric grid, her striped clothes interacting and colliding with the background in an optical pas de deux.

Kishwar Rizvi

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DAWAI, ABDUL HADI (1894–1982), Afghan poet and diplomat. A native of Kabul, Afghanistan, Abdul Hadi Dawai belonged to the Pashtun tribe, a group that predominates in southern Afghanistan.

In 1912, at the age of eighteen, he graduated from Habibia High School and became the assistant editor of the magazine *Seraj*, a Persian-language journal, where he published his first poems and articles. In 1920, he moved on to edit *Aman-e-Afghan*, another Persian-language journal. In his writings, he critiqued society and politics from a socialist point of view and expounded on the beauties and strengths of Afghan culture. He published his poems in Dari (Persian as spoken in Afghanistan) under the pen name Pareshan, meaning "perplexed."

In addition to his writing career, Abdul Hadi Dawai became a diplomat and was present at the peace conferences held in Rawalpindi, modern Pakistan (1919), and Mussoorie, India (1920), when Britain and Afghanistan formally signed a peace accord that ended years of hostility between the two nations. Thereafter, from 1922 to 1933, he served in various diplomatic posts in London, Berlin, and Afghanistan.

From 1933 to 1946, he was imprisoned for his support of the former Afghan king Amir Amanullah Khan (1892–1960), who had been forced into exile because of his policy of modernization. After Abdul Hadi Dawai's release, he again entered Afghan politics, was elected to parliament, and became speaker of the house. He also served as secretary to King Muhammad Zahir (b. 1914) and tutored the crown prince, Mohammad Akbar Khan, from 1933 to 1942. After 1958, he retired from political life and devoted himself to writing. He died in Kabul in 1982.

Nirmal Dass

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DAZAI OSAMU (1909–1948), Japanese writer. Born into a wealthy family in Tsugaru, Aomori prefecture, Dazai Osamu showed a strong interest in writing as a student. Feeling alienated from his family, which had political connections at the national level, and attracted to a bohemian lifestyle and left-wing politics, he failed in his studies. Nonetheless, in 1929, following the first of several attempted suicides, he gained admittance to Tokyo Imperial University. In Dazai's seminal work, "Omoide" (Recollections), published in 1933, he employed his characteristic method of autobiographical storytelling; in "Omoide" the narrator struggles to find some worth in his existence. Plunging into the literary life, he failed to graduate from university, attempted suicide two more times, suffered from peritonitis, became addicted to painkillers, and failed to win the first Akutagawa Prize (a prestigious literary award), which he desperately craved. Encouraged by his mentor Ibuse Masuji (b. 1898), he married and achieved a new stability that allowed him to write short stories and gain recognition. Commissioned to write a travel book about his home province, he published *Tsugaru*, a masterpiece of reminiscence and anecdote, in 1944. Gradually, he slipped back into his self-destructive ways, and this provided him with the stimulation for his great novel *Shayo* (The Setting Sun, 1947), which depicts a determined heroine struggling to survive in postwar Japan. In the following year, he published *Ningen shikkaku* (No Longer Human), a reworking of earlier themes. Only a few weeks later he committed suicide with Yamazaki Tomie, one of his disciples.

James M. Vardaman, Jr.

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DAZU ROCK CARVINGS Dazu County, located 160 kilometers (100 miles) west of Chongqing, Sichuan Province, in central China, contains an exceptional series of rock carvings, most dating from the ninth to the thirteenth centuries CE. Construction of the Dazu carvings began during the early period of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) and continued until the late Song dynasty (960–1279). Buddhist, Daoist, and Confucian influences are evident in the fifty thousand individual statues found in grottoes and shrines at seventy-five major sites across the mountainous county. The largest and most spectacular grottoes are found at Beishan and Baodingshan. Built during the Song dynasty, the Baodingshan Grotto is carved beneath the overhang of a horse-shoe-shaped cliff. The grotto, known as the "Great Buddha Bend," stretches for 500 meters (1,640 feet) and houses over ten thousand sculptures. The Dazu sculptures depict religious and secular life in China and are noted for their diverse subject matter. Many bear inscriptions asking people to embrace moral and religious principles. Dazu County has attracted pilgrims and other travelers for over a thousand years. The rock carvings were inscribed on the World Heritage List in 1999.

Daniel Oakman

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DEFENSE INDUSTRY—CHINA Upon its establishment in 1949, the People's Republic of China was faced with a hostile Western world and came to rely on the Soviet Union for military and technological assistance. This resulted in the adoption of the Soviet organizational model, compelling each factory and industrial sector to be as self-sufficient as possible, even at the expense of efficiency. In 1960, the abrupt end of Soviet assistance forced China's defense research and production to

stand alone, adversely affecting the country's overall industrial development.

Perceived threats from abroad between 1965 and 1971 led to a massive "third-front" (or third-line) construction model, an effort to build a huge self-sufficient industrial base in the remote southwestern and western regions. (The "first front" usually refers to coastal areas, which would be hard to defend; the "second front," inland from the first front, might have to give way to the third front, still farther inland and thus more suitably defended in a protracted war.) Approximately 50 to 55 percent of China's defense industry was located in provinces such as Sichuan, Shanxi, Hubei, Yunnan, and Guizhou. By 1975, the percentage of domestically manufactured weapons was 71, 75, 89, and 97 percent, respectively, for tanks, aircraft, naval ships, and cannons.

In 1977, after the Cultural Revolution, the defense industry adopted the policy of "combining the military with the civilian" and "using the civilian to support the military" to fulfill the overall goal of economic reform and modernization. Under the joint supervision of the Central Military Commission and the State Council, the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) was established in 1982 to ensure better coordination in defense-industry leadership. In that year as well, the machine-building ministries were renamed to indicate their functional responsibilities. For example, the Second Machine Building Ministry became the Ministry of Nuclear Industry. The 1980s also witnessed the production of some civilian goods by the defense industry, thus involving it in dual functions and profit-making activities.

The significance of high-tech weapons during the Persian Gulf War (1990–1991) renewed China's interest in technological development. In March 1998, COSTIND was headed for the first time by a civilian bureaucrat, a change regarded as an attempt to avoid the military's heavy-handed interference in China's defense industry's operation. While the General Armaments Department, newly created within the People's Liberation Army, now oversees weapons research, the military is expected to pay more for weapons and equipment from COSTIND's defense factories, due to further involvement in the nuclear economy. On 1 July 1999, corporations in the main defense industrial sectors were split for further specialization. For example, the nuclear industry was divided into the China National Nuclear Corporation and the China Nuclear Engineering and Construction Group Corporation.



CHINA'S NATIONAL DEFENSE IN 2000

On 16 October 2000, the State Council of the People's Republic of China issued a white paper, "China's National Defense in 2000." The foreword to that paper, which follows, stresses China's commitment to peace even as it pursues a strong national defense.

"The turn of the century has opened a new chapter in the development of human society.

"When we look back on the twentieth century we notice that mankind created enormous material and spiritual wealth never seen before. We also experienced two world wars, hundreds of local wars and the Cold War that lasted for nearly half a century, suffering tremendously from the scourge of wars or the menace of wars. The Chinese nation has gone through many hardships. The Chinese people have fought bravely for their national independence, liberation, democracy and freedom. They have finally brought the country onto the road toward modernization. The Chinese people know full well the value of peace.

"Humanity is facing a rare chance for development as well as tough challenges in the new century. To safeguard world peace and promote the development of all are the themes of the times and the common aspirations of people all over the world. China is engaged wholeheartedly in its modernization drive. A peaceful international environment and a favorable surrounding environment serve China's fundamental interests. China steadfastly follows an independent foreign policy of peace and is committed to a new world of peace, stability, prosperity and development. China firmly pursues a defensive national defense policy and is determined to safeguard its state sovereignty, national unity, territorial integrity and security. The Chinese people are ready to work together with other peace-loving people of the world and contribute their wisdom and strength to world peace and development, and a more beautiful future for mankind.

"At this important point in history—the turn of the century—we publish this white paper, China's National Defense in 2000, to express the Chinese people's sincere aspirations for peace and to help the rest of the world better understand China's national defense policy and its efforts for the modernization of its national defense."

Source: Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. "China's National Defense in 2000." Retrieved 21 February 2002, from: <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/highlights/paper/ndefence.html>.

Achievements

China claims that its military-industrial complex, which is composed of thirty thousand state-owned entities engaged in the aerospace, aviation, ordnance, shipbuilding, and nuclear industries and which builds everything from warships to washing machines, produced and exported \$7 billion worth of goods in 1997.

The Chinese defense industry's nearly unrivaled access to supplies and its rarely challenged methods of marketing have gradually been forced to change, however, and to respond to market trends. In the 1980s, a shift in emphasis from preparation for war to preservation of peace necessitated the reorganization of the defense industry. Conversion to civilian production

mitigated the pain caused by the cuts in military spending and symbolically showed China's willingness to contribute to global peace. While data vary for different sectors, civilian goods in the late 1990s approached 80 percent of the gross output value of China's defense industry. In 1997, for example, China's defense industry claimed credit for producing 50 percent of motorcycles and 30 percent of color televisions in the domestic market. The goal is for the defense industry to be increasingly self-sustaining, efficient, and innovative. In addition, loosening state control has given defense factories flexibility in interaction with foreign business communities.

Another phenomenon of the 1990s was the formation of big-business conglomerates to link firms vertically and horizontally so that they could participate in economies of scale. One such conglomerate is the China North Industries Corporation, reported in 1997 to have more than three hundred affiliated units with fixed assets of at least \$7.5 billion.

Indigenous efforts and access to foreign know-how may enable the defense industry to close technological gaps between China and the world's other major powers. China's defense industry has been working on advanced weapons systems such as cruise missiles and satellite-positioning systems. In 1999, China successfully launched and recovered an unmanned spacecraft. As long as China's economic boom continues and the government increases the budget for military procurement, the defense industry has great potential for growth.

Challenges

The legacy of central planning has hurt the economic vitality of China's defense factories. Many defense plants have found themselves with duplicate production, oversupply, and brain drain to lucrative private enterprises. For the "third-front" defense factories, inconvenient sites and worn-out infrastructure have scared off new investors. Although defense factories have been successful in joint-venture deals with companies like Mercedes-Benz (now Daimler Chrysler), Suzuki, and McDonnell Douglas, by 1998 fewer than six hundred joint ventures had been forged, despite years of courtship.

Overall, the viability of China's defense industry relies as much on public-policy design, the political will of leaders, and military circumstances as on economic development. Problems like a bloated labor force and ever-increasing costs for technological innovation must be solved. Most important, a defense industry long accustomed to government planning must make

a difficult shift to a market mentality in consolidating and rationalizing its industrial layout and operation.

With recipients like Armenia, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and Brazil, China's aggressive arms-transfer policy made China the sixth largest supplier for the 1993–1997 period. Although China had a new arms-export statute in place in 1998, its nontransparent practices have occasionally violated certain international agreements and norms governing global arms transfers. Even with the 1999 structural separation of COSTIND from the military, the image of the defense industry's symbiotic association with China's military persists. This mammoth military-industrial complex poses a hindrance to the central authority. Eventual loosening of military control over the defense industry and more transparent arms-transfer procedures seem to be the main task for the healthy development of the defense industry. The detachment of COSTIND from military control was just the first step.

Wei-chin Lee

See also: **People's Liberation Army**

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DEFORESTATION For millennia people have known the importance of trees. The Sumerians described in their tablets how the forest canopy shades the earth and moderates the climate. The authors of the Old Testament realized that trees were necessary for year-round springs and rivers. Plato told how forests prevented flooding and runoff, thereby preserving the earth's fertility. Today it is known that forests and their soils absorb great quantities of car-



A dirt road cuts into the rain forest in remote West Kalimantan, Indonesia, to provide access for loggers. When the land is cleared, it will be occupied by migrants from Java. (ECOSCENE/CORBIS)

bon dioxide, and that the forest canopy exudes oxygen and provides living space for a myriad of creatures.

Throughout history people have plundered forests to obtain the wood needed for construction and fuel. Until the late nineteenth century, all ships were built from hull to mast of timber. The spokes, wheels, and chassis of almost every cart, chariot, or wagon were made of wood, as were the bridges they crossed. Transportation would have been impossible without wood. Timbered beams and rafters held up ancient palaces and propped up the world's mines. Wherever trees have abounded, people invariably build their homes of wood, and wood has been used for uncountable tools and domestic items; more trees have been lost to fuel than have been lost to lumber.

When civilization first arose in Asia, so too did large-scale deforestation. Today, Asia still leads the world in the aggregate amount and percentage of forestland lost. Since the rise of the first great civilizations, the continent had a little over 15 million square kilometers of forest; today, only around 4 million square kilometers of forested land remain.

The first accounts of humanity's attack on forests come from ancient Mesopotamia, China, and India. The *Epic of Gilgamesh*, the world's first written saga, tells of Mesopotamia's founding king and his entourage stripping the mountains of their forests. Mesopotamian kings of the third millennium BCE

boast in cuneiform script preserved on clay tablets how they made paths in cedar mountains and cut its cedars with their great axes.

Likewise, deforestation dominates the founding legend of historical China. According to the ancient Chinese philosopher Mencius (c. 372–289 BCE), the legendary emperor Yao (c. twenty-fourth century BCE) felt great anguish to see the land overgrown by vegetation and crowded by swarming birds and beasts. Yao's handpicked successor, Shun, acted to rid the landscape of what had so offended his mentor. He ordered his forester, Yi, to set fire to the forests and vegetation on the mountains and in the marshes so that the birds and beasts fled away and grain could be planted. Over the centuries the mountains and plains of China underwent a similar transformation.

The policies of Mao Zedong (1893–1976), the leader of China's Communist revolution, continued the destruction of forests. His Great Leap Forward resulted in tens of thousands of villages cutting down nearby timber stands to fuel their backyard iron furnaces. A loss of over 100,000 square kilometers of forest resulted from Mao's other initiative: "Taking Grain as the Key Link." That program converted 700,000 square kilometers of forestland to agricultural uses.

The topic of forest destruction also comes up in the *Mahabharata*, the national epic of India. The ancient Aryan heroes Krishna Vasudeva and Arjuna help the

fire god devour the great Khandava Forest in northern India and make sure none of the fleeing creatures survive. They want the forest cleared so that the new kingdom they have fought for will be assured of sufficient farmland. In India's other ancient epic, the *Ramayana*, the hero Rama shows no compunction in ordering the felling of whole forests to build a great causeway for his troops to cross. Thousands of years later, the British continued the destruction of India's woodlands. Independence did nothing to ameliorate what the British had done to India's forests; in fact, deforestation accelerated. Taken together, only 20 percent of China and India's original forests remain.

The accelerated deforestation of China and India's neighbors to the east and south has more recent origins. As late as 1919, almost 70 percent of the original forests in the Philippines were intact, but as of 1989, that figure had dropped to 20 percent. Other recent deforestation flash points include eastern Myanmar (Burma), northern and northeastern Thailand, Vietnam, the state of Sarawak in eastern Malaysia, and Sumatra and East and South Kalimantan in Indonesia. This rapid loss of forests coincides with an almost twelve-fold increase in logging in the region since 1950 and the population explosion that began in the 1960s. Loggers cull hardwoods from among other trees in the forest. To gain access to these trees and to haul the logs overland for export, they build roads that allow the landless masses to enter the forests. Once there, the landless burn down what trees are left, and plant what crops they can. When that patch inevitably gives out, they move deeper into the forests and continue to slash and burn. In this fashion, more and more forested land turns barren.

Deforestation in Asia follows a world pattern. Between 1990 and 1995, the developing world has cleared 65 million hectares of forestland. Deforestation in Asia as well as in the rest of the developing world ranks along with global warming among the world's gravest environmental problems faced in the new millennium.

John Perlin

See also: **Forest Industry—Mongolia; Forest Industry—Southeast Asia; Mangroves**

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DEHRA DUN (2001 est. population 448,000). A city in northwestern Uttar Pradesh state, India, Dehra Dun is a popular retirement area in the Himalayan foothills, known for elite private schools and long-grain Basmati rice. It was founded in 1699 when the heretical Sikh Guru Ram Rai, driven out of the Punjab, built a temple there. During the eighteenth century it was occupied by successive invaders, culminating in the Gurkhas. At the end of the Gurkha War in 1816, it was ceded to the British.

Tea processing is the main industry, along with wheat, millet, and timber. Dehra Dun is home to the Forest Research Institute and headquarters of the Survey of India, which has produced maps of Indian cities, states, and regions since 1767. It is an important railroad on the Northern Railway. The city was once known for its exquisite climate, lush green forests, and clean environment. Building and mining have denuded the hillsides and wrought other unwelcome changes. Since 1988, however, Supreme Court rulings have sought to restore the environment, and the government plans to develop a technology center to encourage Dehra Dun's emergence as a major center for higher education, including medicine and engineering.

C. Roger Davis

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DEKKAN The Dekkan (or Deccan) Plateau, in Sanskrit Dakshin (meaning "south"), is a triangular plateau covering central India, at an average elevation of 450 to 600 meters, with a gentle sloping toward the east, which drains several major rivers in that direction. The northern boundary is the Vindhya range or the Narmada Valley, while to the south it reaches to the Kaveri River, the Malabar Coast, and the Coromandel Coast, tapering off in the plains of Tamil

Nadu. A more restricted use of the term Dekkan applies to the land between the Narmada and the Kistna rivers. In its broad usage Dekkan has been contrasted with Hindustan, an old term for the Indo-Gangetic Plain to the north. In the Puranas and other Sanskrit texts the region was referred to as Dakshinapathi or Dakshinatya.

Between the mid-fourteenth and the late-seventeenth centuries, six Indo-Islamic sultanates were established in several parts of the region, each evolving a distinctive art style and culture, and all known collectively as the Deccan Sultanates. Otherwise the Dekkan has historically been a Hindu preserve for the most part. Today the region encompasses most of the states of Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Karnataka. Three major inland cities are Hyderabad, Pune, and Bangalore; and the main agricultural produce includes cotton, sugarcane, and food grains.

Paul Hockings

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DELHI UNION TERRITORY (2002 est. pop. 14 million). India's third-largest city (after Calcutta and Mumbai) and a union territory, Delhi has served as the capital of various regimes for over ten centuries. Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), India's first prime minister after achieving independence, called it "the symbol of old India and new." The union territory (federal district) includes the area known as Old Delhi, the population center, with many mosques, museums, and forts, and New Delhi, built as the imperial capital by the British, with wide avenues, many embassies, government buildings, and research centers. The population of the city of Delhi (Old and New) was approximately 10 million in 2002.

Situated in north-central India at the intersection of the route from the Khyber Pass to the Ganges-Yamuna valley, the Aravalli hills, and the south-flowing Yamuna River, Delhi has always been a transportation, trade, and communications center. It was the central place for regimes aspiring to hold the Punjab, Afghanistan, Rajasthan, and the Gangetic plains east of the Yamuna. The area survived much rebuilding and much devastation. The earliest settlement Indraprastha (est. 1400 BCE) is featured in the epic poem *Mahabharata*, though none of its archaeological remains have been found. From the twelfth to



HUMAYUN'S TOMB— WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Humayun's Tomb—the Mughal empire's first garden tomb and precursor to the Taj Mahal—was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1993 for the profound effect its beautiful geometric style had on Mughal architecture.

the fourteenth century CE, royal enclaves were located ten miles west of the river. Rainwater tanks were then supplemented by elaborate canals. The Tomar Rajputs built Lal Kot, the core of the first of Delhi's eight successive cities, in 736. Qutb-ud-Din-Aibak made Delhi his capital in 1206 and built the Quwwat ul Islam mosque and the towering Qutb Minar. After the sack of Baghdad in 1258, Delhi's court and *madrasabs* (Islamic seminaries) made it the most important cultural center of the Muslim east.

Allaudin Khilji established Siri, the second city, in 1304. The third Delhi was Tughlagabad (1321); the fourth, Jahanpanah (1325); the fifth, Firozabad, was famous for its Ashokan pillar; and Purana Qila was the sixth. Shajahanabad was the seventh Delhi, serving as the Mughal capital from 1639 to 1771, when Hindu Maratha princes held it off and on until 1803—after which time Delhi came under British rule. The Red Fort remains as a reminder of the Mughal period. The writings of Delhi's Persian and Urdu poets from the fourteenth to the nineteenth century—Amir Khusrau, Mir, Ghalib—became widely known.

Delhi was a center of the Indian Mutiny. In 1857 revolting Indian soldiers (sepoys) seized Delhi for several months where fighting ensued between the British army and mutineers. The imperial capital New Delhi was completed by 1931. Delhi became a union territory in 1956. With twenty-five daily newspapers and 125 weeklies, Delhi continues to be both daunting and alluring, an intellectual and tourist center as well as a political and administrative one. Besides its stunning architectural backdrop and overall scale, attractions include Delhi University; Delhi Zoo; many religious celebrations and secular festivals; and the National Museum, with paintings, sculptures, manuscripts, weapons, jewelry, pottery, and relics dating back four thousand years.

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DEMIREL, SULEYMAN (b. 1924), Turkish political leader. Suleyman Demirel is a major political figure in contemporary Turkey. He was born in a modest peasant family in the village of Islamkoy, located in the Isparta province of central Anatolia. Benefiting from government scholarships, he obtained a degree in civil engineering from Istanbul Technical University in 1949 and went to the United States for further study on a Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship. In return for the scholarships, Demirel completed his obligatory service in the Turkish State Statistical Institute and the State Hydraulic Works. The prime minister, Adnan Menderes (1899–1961), appointed him the director-general of the State Hydraulic Works, in 1955, when Demirel was thirty-one.

After the 1960 military coup, he joined the newly founded Adalet Partisi (Justice Party). In 1964 following the death of the party's first chairman Ragip Gumuspalala (1897–1964), Demirel was elected chairman, and he held this post until the dissolution of the party in 1980, when all political parties were dissolved following another military coup. His first cabinet post was as the deputy prime minister in the 1965 cabinet of Prime Minister Suat Hayri Urganlı (1903–1981). Following the victory of the Justice Party in the 1965 general elections, he was appointed the prime minister at the age of thirty-nine. He held the post for seven different terms, from October 1965 to April 1993.

Demirel was largely blamed for the unstable political coalitions of the Turkish government during his tenure as prime minister in the 1970s, which pushed Turkey into economic crises and urban violence. His reign was interrupted by military intervention in 1971 and again in 1980. Following the 1980 coup, he was banned from politics together with other political leaders of the pre-1980 era. He returned to active politics as the chairman of the Dogru Yol Partisi (True Path Party) after a 1987 referendum, which removed the political ban. His party won 27 percent of the popular vote in the 1991 general elections, and Demirel was appointed the prime minister for a seventh time.

In 1993, after the death of President Turgut Ozal (1927–1993), Demirel was elected as the ninth president of the Turkish Republic. His term of office ended

in May 2000. During his presidency, he played a pivotal role as an arbiter between the army and the politicians, especially through the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) crisis.

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DEMOCRAT PARTY—TURKEY The Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti; DP) was the first party in Turkey to challenge successfully the rule of the Republican People's Party (RPP). The DP ruled the nation from May 1950 to May 1960, when it was overthrown and shut down by the Turkish military.

During the single-party period of the RPP (1923–1945), some members of the RPP increasingly opposed a political system that was seen as inflexible, unresponsive to the people, and undemocratic; they also opposed the power of the party leader, Ismet Inonu. In late 1945 Celal Bayar (1884–1987), Adnan Menderes (1899–1961), Fuat Koprulu (1890–1966), and Refik Koraltan (1889–1974) were expelled from the RPP for criticizing the leadership and calling for changes. In May 1946 the four joined to form the DP. As the new party's leaders recruited members and began to set up a national organization, the party immediately attracted widespread support from businesspeople, merchants, and manufacturers, among others. Despite calls to boycott early elections set for 1946, the DP issued a platform supporting a program of liberalism, including lowering taxes, shrinking the public sector in favor of private enterprise, having less state control of cultural matters, and showing greater respect for Islam. In 1946 the DP gained 65 of the 465 seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (the RPP won 390 seats), where members continued to demand reform of the electoral system.

In 1950 the Democrat Party won 53 percent of the vote and took control of the National Assembly. President Bayar named Menderes prime minister. During the 1950s the DP encouraged growth of the private sector and development of agriculture, as well as close relations with the United States. In 1954 and again in 1957, the DP was returned to power. By the end of the 1950s, however, the party's popularity was wan-

ing, and Menderes began to adopt more authoritarian policies in a bid to retain power. In May 1960 a group of officers overthrew the DP government. The DP was shut down, and Bayar and Menderes were both tried for charges ranging from corruption to crimes against the nation. Menderes was convicted and executed; Bayar served six years in prison. The DP's agenda was adopted by the Justice Party, which held power in the late 1960s and 1970s.

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DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST PARTY—JAPAN In 1960 the right wing of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) split off, and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) was formed. Three issues divided the left and right wings of the JSP. One was the far-left faction's continued adherence to the goals and tactics of Marxism, such as the elimination of capitalism and the establishment of a workers' state by means of violent revolution. The second issue was the right's support for the existence of the Japanese military (the Self-Defense Force), and the third was its interest in an expanded security role for Japan in international affairs by being a more active partner with the United States and by taking a more visible role in international organizations.

The DSP moved away from doctrinaire socialism and toward centrism, accepting private enterprise instead of public ownership of the means of production and emphasizing welfare issues. It saw its role primarily as a coalition partner with other moderate parties such as the Clean Government Party. The DSP drew support from labor and in particular the federation of unions representing industrial and trade workers mostly from the private sector.

In several elections, the DSP tried to present itself to voters as an alternative to the Liberal Democratic Party. The strategy worked in that LDP losses translated into DSP gains and vice versa. In the party realignments of the 1990s, the DSP was unable to make headway. Smaller parties were joining with each other to form new parties and the DSP was no exception. In 1993, the party disbanded and its members joined the New Frontier Party.

Louis D. Hayes

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DEMOCRATIZATION—SOUTH KOREA

South Korea's movement from authoritarian rule toward a more democratic form of government has been a record of irregular progress since the nation developed political independence in 1948. The movement toward democracy has been interrupted by the involvement of high-ranking military officers who have seized power in times of crisis, but a central group of opposition candidates have, over time, led the nation from authoritarian rule to a more democratic system.

Korea's First Elections

Korea's first elections were held in 1948. In that year, United Nations-sponsored elections were to be held in all of Korea, but the election was not permitted to be carried out in the Soviet-controlled north. The election, held in the U.S.-controlled south, chose a National Assembly that wrote a constitution and appointed Korea's first president, Yi Seung-man, known in the West as Syngman Rhee (1875–1965). While the president was indirectly chosen in this first election, he governed, according to the constitution, at the will of the National Assembly. When the Assembly sought to remove Rhee from office in 1952, however, he declared martial law and forced into effect a revision to the constitution that called for direct election of the president.

Rhee was elected by popular vote in 1952, and in 1954 the constitution was revised to permit him to run for an unlimited number of terms. He was reelected in 1956 (after his opponent died of a heart attack ten days before the election) and again in 1960 (when another opponent died just before the election); however, because of widespread suspicion over balloting, Rhee resigned, and a new constitution, placing executive power in the hands of a prime minister, was drafted. In July 1960, Chang Myon (John Myon Chang) was chosen as the prime minister of the Second Republic.

Political Difficulties in the 1960s and 1970s

Economic difficulties in 1960 led to political difficulties for the new regime, and in May 1961 General Park Chung Hee (1917–1979) seized power in a coup organized by Colonel Kim Jong-pil (b. 1926). A new constitution approved in late 1962 returned power to the president (who was to be elected by popular vote) and diminished the power of the National Assembly.

Park left the military to seek election in 1963 and was elected that year and subsequently reelected in 1967 and 1971. In the 1971 election, Park was nearly defeated by the opposition leader Kim Dae Jung (b. 1925), who received 45 percent of the vote. Kim Dae Jung lost votes to another opposition candidate, Kim Young-sam (b. 1927). President Park named Kim Jong-pil as his prime minister.

President Park subsequently declared martial law in South Korea and in October 1972 instituted the Yushin (Revitalization) constitution, which provided for election of the president through an electoral college, ending direct election of the president.

During this period of martial law, Kim Dae Jung was in Japan; in 1973, he was kidnapped from a Tokyo hotel by agents of the South Korean government and smuggled back to South Korea, where he was placed under house arrest. He was arrested for subversive activities in 1976 and sentenced to five years in prison but was released in 1978 for health reasons.

President Park was elected by an electoral college in 1978 for a six-year term, but was assassinated by the head of his own Korea Central Intelligence Agency in 1979. In accordance with the Korean constitution, Prime Minister Choe Kyu-ha (b. 1919) became acting president and declared martial law. Within a few days, President Choe began the release of political prisoners (including Kim Dae Jung) from house arrest and prison and subsequently pardoned hundreds.

Political Repression in the 1980s and the Beginning of Democracy

The officer in charge of the investigation of Park's assassination, Lieutenant General Chun Doo Hwan (b. 1931), began to consolidate his power within the military and seized power from Choe in May 1980; Choe retained his position as president, but Chun held actual power, leading to massive protests in the city of Kwangju. Chun authorized the use of the military to put down the riots and retake control of the city. Hundreds of citizens were killed in the fighting, and Kim Dae Jung was arrested and sentenced to death as a protest leader (his sentence was later commuted to twenty years, and he was released in exile to the United States). Chun rose to four-star rank, retired from the military, and was named president by the electoral college in August 1980.

Under a new constitution, President Chun was reelected to a single seven-year term in February 1981. Kim Young-sam, was placed under house arrest for two years. Kim Dae Jung returned to Korea in 1985 and was placed under house arrest with his civil rights



In October 2000 South Korean students protest and block the arrival of former president Kim Young-sam at Korea University. They hold pictures of people who died during his presidency. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

suspended. As this political repression was taking place, South Korea hosted the 1986 Asian Games and prepared for the 1988 Olympic Games.

South Korea's democratization is often said to have started with the election of President Roh Tae Woo (b. 1932) in 1987. A new constitution that year provided for the first direct election of a president since 1971, the others having been conducted with an electoral college similar to that in the United States. However, Roh was a former army general, a classmate of Chun Doo Hwan at the Korean Military Academy, class of 1955, and had been in charge of the military forces that had put down the protests in Kwangju in 1980.

The 1987 electoral campaign was hotly contested, and the primary opposition candidate, Kim Young-sam, led in some polls late in the campaign. In what was claimed to be an act of good will, President Chun restored Kim Dae Jung's civil rights late in the campaign. Kim Dae Jung declared himself a candidate for the election, which split the opposition vote between himself, Kim Young-sam, and Kim Jong-pil. This division of the opposition vote allowed Roh to win the election with 8.2 million votes. Kim Young-sam received 6.3 million, while Kim Dae Jung received 6.11 million. Once again, a former general had come to power, although this time by more democratic means. During Roh's administration, his former political rival Kim Young-sam brought his political party into a coalition with Roh's.

South Korea's Government in the 1990s

In 1992, South Korea elected its first president since Syngman Rhee who had not been in the military, and Kim Young-sam won with 42 percent of the

vote. Kim's main competitors were Kim Dae Jung, who received 34 percent of the vote, and Chung Ju-young, the founder of the Hyundai Group, an industrial conglomerate. President Kim initiated a campaign against corruption in government, asserting that no official should profit from his or her position. To this end, in 1995, the former presidents Chun and Roh were tried and convicted of mutiny, treason, and corruption. Chun was sentenced to death (later reduced to life in prison) and Roh to twenty-two years in prison (later reduced to seventeen years).

In the national elections of 1997, Kim Dae Jung was elected president, winning over 40 percent of the popular vote. Kim's popularity was based largely on his continued role in opposition to past administrations, despite accusations of his being pro-North Korea. One of his first actions was to pardon the former presidents Chun and Roh, who were present at his inauguration.

Kim Dae Jung held a summit meeting with North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Il (b. 1941) in June 2000, the first summit ever between the leaders of North and South Korea, and reestablished cross-border family reunions. Advances in public welfare, human rights, and the economy were primary goals of his administration. However, he has been criticized for his government's hard line on labor issues.

Thomas P. Dolan

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DENG XIAOPING (1904–1997), leader of the Chinese Communist Party. Deng Xiaoping, head of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the 1980s, survived the purges of the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976 to assume the party leadership. The eldest son of a prosperous landlord, he was born on 22 August 1904 in Paifang Village, Sichuan Province. Like many of his contemporaries, Deng went to France through the work-study program, where he became involved with what would be the future leadership of the CCP. Following his time in France, Deng went to Moscow, where he trained as a political activist and organizer. After working briefly as Communist Party organizer in Southwest China, Deng moved to the Kiangsi Soviet to be with party leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976). From 1938 to 1952, Deng served in the forerunner of what would later be the People's Liberation Army, where he led forces against



A billboard in Shenzhen features Deng Xiaoping and reads: "Uphold the party's fundamental line—we will not waver in a hundred years." (EYE UBIQUITOUS/CORBIS)

the Japanese and later against nationalist forces during the Chinese civil war.

Following the Chinese civil war, Deng's loyalty to the CCP was rewarded when he was named vice premier. Deng primarily worked in the ministry of finance, where he would formulate economic policy. He later was appointed to the Politburo, where he eventually became general secretary. He held that post until 1966, when he was denounced for his opposition to Mao's Socialist Education Movement (1962–1965) and removed from his post by Mao, Lin Bao, and Chen Boda. In 1973 Deng was rehabilitated and returned to office. In 1975 he once again was denounced and removed from office, this time by the Gang of Four, a group of radical leaders who sought to seize control of the CCP. Following Mao's death and the arrest of the Gang of Four, Deng again assumed the mantle of leadership within the Communist Party and maintained this position until his death on 19 February 1997.

Keith A. Leitich

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DENKI ROREN Denki Roren, or the Japanese Federation of Electric Machine Workers' Unions, was the sector-level labor-union federation for Japan's workers in the electrical machinery, electrical appliance, and electronics industries between its May 1953 formation and its July 1992 conversion into Denki Rengo (Japanese Electrical, Electronic, and Information Union).

Formed out of remnant enterprise unions in the electrical sector following the late 1940s purge of Communists and other militant elements, Denki Roren pursued a "neutral" brand of unionism that steered clear of the political rivalry between Sohyo (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan) and Domei Japanese Confederation of Labor) and was the leading industrial federation in Churitsu Roren, or the Federation of Independent Unions (formed September 1956). While actively participating in Sohyo's annual wage offensive (*shunto*) and sharing with Sohyo

support of "unarmed neutralism" in foreign policy, Denki Roren simultaneously championed an enterprise-oriented cooperative approach to labor-management relations that overlapped with that of Domei unions and the International Metalworkers Federation Japan Council (IMF-JC), in which it took an active part. It was thus quite fitting that when the Japanese labor movement began to move toward consolidation during the late 1970s, Denki Roren was at the forefront of the efforts to merge Sohyo and Domei, and that Denki Roren's president, Tateyama Toshifumi, was selected as the Rengo's first president in 1987.

Lonny Carlile

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DEPARTMENT STORES—EAST ASIA In East Asia, department stores are more than just glittering showplaces for merchandise. They have reflected and helped propel urban development, the growing middle classes, and the transition to consumer lifestyles. Pivotal in the transition to a Westernized and internationalized lifestyle, East Asian department stores have introduced foreign goods, customs, and holidays. Conversely, they have also helped preserve traditional customs and activities. They have mediated historic transitions, addressing issues these changes have brought for consumers. Further, they have provided education and entertainment and have been primary promoters of art and culture.

Japan

Japan's department stores boast a four-hundred-year history. These stores stem from two traditions. The older historic tradition is the development of department stores from *gofukuya*, clothing and drapery stores, which originated as large merchant houses during the Edo or Tokugawa period (1600/1603–1868). These accompanied the rise of Japan's early cities and the new middle classes that emerged from the formerly lowly ranks of artisans and merchants. Early in the twentieth century, some decades after Japan opened to the outside world, these stores expanded into *byakkaten*, "one-hundred-things stores," or department stores. The second tradition for the development of department stores in Japan is with railroad companies, which built department stores at stations at urban intersections and in outlying suburban areas as railroads became prominent in commuting within



Ornate light fixtures in Lotte department store in Seoul, South Korea, in 1998. (CATHERINE KARNOW/CORBIS)

cities and in connecting cities to the outlying areas where many urban employees lived. These stores were called *tetsudo depaato* ("railroad department stores"). Over time both types of department stores came to be referred to as either *hyakkaten* or *depaato*. *Depaato* is more common in colloquial speech, while *hyakkaten* is used more in official store titles.

Japanese department stores played a major role in introducing the West to Japan. One of the earliest department stores, Mitsukoshi, established ties to British stores and British royalty while also promoting American connections. Department stores brought in Western goods and taught people how to use them. Specialized employees taught the Japanese how to put on Western-style clothing with buttons, which were very unfamiliar to a populace who daily wore kimonos wrapped or tied into place. Department stores also promoted foreign holidays, such as Christmas, Valentine's Day, Mother's Day, and Father's Day. After a fire at the Mitsukoshi department store in Tokyo, several shoes went missing in the rush to exit the store, and the store began requiring its employees and customers to wear shoes in the store, ending the previous Japanese business custom of removing outside footwear and wearing slippers in shops. Several kimono-clad women died in another fire at the Shirokiya department store because they would neither jump nor slide down chutes for fear their clothing might become

disarrayed and embarrassingly revealing. The store joined the Tokyo municipal fire department in promoting the adoption of Western-style underpants so both lives and honor could be saved in a fire.

Japanese department stores proffered entertainment with concerts, craft fairs, and recreational facilities inside stores and on rooftops. They offered education in the form of seminars, health and medical guidance for new parents, and in-store science fairs and educational contests for children. Typically, such seminars and other free information services did not involve the expectation that customers would buy anything on that occasion, but were geared toward developing loyal patronage through an ongoing relationship with the store. Stores also sent educational specialists into schools. Tokyo's Seibu department store started a "community college" (requiring course fees) with over four hundred course offerings, a major innovation in personal-interest education in Japan. Most department stores have exhibit and gallery spaces for art and folk craft displays. Isetan and Seibu department stores inaugurated legally designated museums of art within their stores. These museums, galleries, and exhibit halls have been pivotal in circulating Japanese and foreign art. In the last few decades of the twentieth century in Japan more international art circulated through department store museums than through government and private museums. These

stores also responded to Japanese nostalgia for lost Japan by sponsoring Japanese traditional crafts and hosting calendrical festivals associated with a rural agrarian past.

South Korea

Department stores in the Republic of Korea (South Korea) have also been pivotal in introducing foreign culture by popularizing Western customs and trends from Japan. Seoul department stores became focal arenas of fashion couture, while department stores in other areas disseminated these new trends to smaller cities. In Seoul the rise of a middle-class consciousness was strongly associated with frequenting the city's glistening new department stores as opposed to shopping in traditional market districts like Namdaemun (South Market) or Tongdaemun (East Market). Among status-oriented female consumers, shopping for daily family goods at department stores rather than at open markets became a sign of rising family status.

South Korean department stores have hosted entertainment and educational offerings within stores and in addition have established other amusement centers. The department store conglomerate Lotte built the entertainment theme park Lotte World, an amusement park similar to Disneyland in concept but featuring Lotte's own characters, in a Lotte department store on the outskirts of Seoul.

China

Chinese department stores also mirror historical changes, further development of urban centers, and the rising middle class. The immense early-twentieth-century entrepreneurial development in China's main cities was reflected in the rise of department stores. Shanghai in particular became a major industrial and commercial center after the end of the Sino-Japanese war in 1895. Nanjing Road, Shanghai's version of New York's Fifth Avenue, saw the birth of glamorous department stores that offered the increasing numbers of middle-class customers a different shopping experience from traditional shops and markets. Along with the visible array of a wide spectrum of goods, fixed prices, and extensive services, these Chinese department stores provided rooftop tea gardens, music recitals, and dancing parties. Sincere department store had an attached hotel, showing that a trip to Shanghai for shopping had itself become a vacation objective. Chinese department stores mediated the transition to Westernization and modernization, tutoring customers on issues of style and essentials of modern life. As in Japan, department stores were linked to the development of railroads and

involved a reinterpretation of the merchant classes. Whereas traditionally merchants had been seen as unproductive to society, merchants were increasingly seen as entrepreneurs whose economic activity could be advantageous to society, partly because of the rising prominence of department stores.

Regional Trends

East Asian department stores have influenced women's employment and domestic roles. In 1900 Sincere department store caused a sensation with the opening of a Hong Kong branch with female shop clerks; previously women were employed only in family shops. Due to the public outcry over this public employment of women at that time, these women were laid off, but by the late 1930s female sales clerks were an accepted part of Chinese department stores. In Japan, even before the Equal Employment Opportunity Law of 1985, department stores promoted more women to managerial positions than did other private or government concerns because the overwhelming proportion of both department-store employees and walk-in customers were women.

Another trend has involved the establishment of large Japanese and Chinese retailing concerns in Europe, North America, and Australia. Some of these stores, such as Yaohan, were considered extended supermarkets in their home countries but have been perceived as department stores in the foreign context. These stores primarily cater to Asian customers abroad and to Asian-descent populations, but they also appeal to non-Asian Westerners. Where East Asian department stores have long introduced Western goods and culture to Asian countries, now the reverse is also true. Stores originate in East Asia, and they transmit food, styles, fashions, culture, and trends from their Asian countries of origin to the Western countries where they do business, thereby acting as mediators between culture and consumption.

Millie Creighton

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DEV, NANAK GURU (1469–1539), founder of Sikhism. Nanak Dev, who laid the foundation of Sikhism, endeavored to synthesize both Hinduism and Islam in the new religion and combat social inequality. Born in the village of Talwandi in western Punjab to Kalyan Das Meheta and Tripta Mahal, Nanak was attracted to spiritualism from childhood and contributed monetarily to charitable works. His marriage at the age of eighteen to Sulakhani Devi did not deter him from spiritual pursuits, and he traveled throughout India and even to Mecca, Medina, Tibet, and Sri Lanka.

Nanak rejected the prevailing social system based on caste and class. Identifying with the downtrodden, he declared, "I am lowliest of the low." He was also averse to rituals and idol worship. Holding woman in high esteem, he asked, "Why denounce her form [of] whom even kings and great men are born?" One of the important aspects of Nanak's teaching was monotheism, and to him God was timeless and everlasting. He advocated an honest livelihood and shared earnings. His simple and universal message had widespread appeal. Nanak's followers were known as Sikhs, and after his death in 1539, Sikhism became an important religion.

Patit Paban Misbra

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DEVELOPMENT ZONES—CHINA The creation of development zones in China since 1984 marked the intensification of an open-door policy and

a wider engagement of China with the outside world. By 1988 China had designated fourteen development zones: Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Ningbo, Qingdao, Yantai, Zhanjiang, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Nantong, Lianyungang, Fuzhou, Minxing, Hongqiao, and Caohejing. These development zones were located in close proximity to coastal cities and placed major emphasis on export processing, technology development, and foreign investment. With tax incentives and preferential policies, development zones function as new growth poles of the economy. This in turn results in their quick development and diversification.

Concept and Characteristics of Development Zones

The idea of development zones did not originate in China. Development zones became popular following World War II in such forms as free ports, free trade zones, export-processing zones, science and industry parks, and border trade zones. China modeled its own development zones on this international experience, treating them as new means to open China to the outside world. It aimed to create an attractive business and investment environment to encourage foreign investment, joint ventures, and technology development and transfer and to learn advanced management skills.

China's development zones are similar in many respects to special economic zones (SEZs) but they have some distinct features. First, SEZs are relatively independent in administration; their administrative rank is equivalent to that of a province. Development zones, by contrast, are managed by local governments through a development zone committee. Second, SEZs are encouraged to develop into a cross-sector comprehensive economic structure; development zones focus on export-led industry and technology or other special sectors. Third, all types of investment enjoy tax incentives in SEZs, while development zones are only intended to offer tax incentives for investment in industry and technology or in other designated sectors.

Development zones have advantageous locations. Economic and technological development zones and tax-free zones are normally located in coastal cities and ports. Border cooperative zones are located in inland border trade areas. High-tech development zones are located in large or medium-size cities across the country. In short, they have easy access to transport networks. They are often in or close to areas with well-developed industrial foundations or an advanced economy. Development zones are provided modern infrastructure and high standard services.

History of China's Development Zones

In 1983 China opened up fourteen coastal cities to the outside world, and in late 1984 and early 1985, the government designated eleven development zones in eleven coastal cities. Shanghai was approved to establish two development zones in 1986 and a further one in 1988. The main work during this initial period (1984–1988) included: (1) the establishment of an administrative committee to oversee the development zones, as well as the establishment of the Economic and Technological Development Corporation; (2) the planning of the development zones; (3) the preparation and creation of regulations and policies relating to the development zones; and (4) the construction of physical infrastructure.

The forms of development zones have been diversified since 1988. The first high-tech development zone was established in Beijing in 1988, and tax-free zones were created in 1990. Development zones have received unprecedented rapid development since 1992, when paramount leader Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) toured south China and called for further opening up of China's economy. After that, even small cities, counties, and townships began to create their own development zones.

Achievements and Problems of the Development Zones

Although development zones only account for 0.004 percent of China's land, they account for about 10 percent of the total national foreign investment. More than two hundred giant international corporations have invested in China's development zones, which are particularly effective in advancing technology development and in facilitating national economic restructuring. In most of the development zones, more than 60 percent of the industrial projects are high-tech or new technology projects.

Development zones have created extremely rapid growth and high productivity. The gross industrial product in the first thirteen development zones increased about 450 times within ten years and had grown to 135 billion yuan (China's currency) in 1996. The per capita productivity in Minxing, Tianjin, Dalian, Hongqiao, Beijing, and Kunshan exceeded 200,000 yuan in 1996; Minxing, in particular, recorded a high of 419,000 yuan. Problems include a lack of strategic coordination and effective control in the development of development zones. For example, 1992 saw the sudden creation of more than two thousand new development zones, which were more than twenty times the total number created before 1992. Among

these, only 1.1 percent were approved by state, province, or city governments. Counties, small cities, and townships were also striving to establish development zones. This led to uncontrolled expansion of such zones to occupy 33.34 billion square meters of land, of which 80 percent was arable land. This resulted in the wasteful use of land resources and the abuse of preferential policies by local authorities.

The Future

After more than two decades of open-door policies, China is turning its attention to establishing a fair competition environment throughout the country. This will result in the gradual reduction and eventual abolition of tax incentives and preferential policies enjoyed by development zones.

Xing Quan Zhang

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DEVI, PHOOLAN (1964?–2001), Indian political figure. In contemporary India, Phoolan Devi's name is intimately connected to the country's history of caste and class animosities. Born in a north Indian village, Devi grew up amid extreme poverty. At a young age, she was abducted, repeatedly assaulted, and raped. Although a great deal of controversy surrounds the exact details of her early life, it is generally believed that she reacted to her harrowing upbringing by participating in the "Valentine's Day Massacre" in 1981, in which twenty people of an upper caste background were killed. After leading life as a bandit for three years, she surrendered in 1983, and was incarcerated for the next eleven years.

Following the release of her biography by Mala Sen in 1991 and the film *Bandit Queen*, directed by Shekhar Kapoor and released in 1994, Phoolan Devi became a well-known public figure. She was released from prison in 1994 and subsequently went on to become a successful politician. With support from lower caste

groups and women, she was elected twice to the Indian parliament. In 1995 she converted to Buddhism, an act viewed by many as a political move. In July 2001 she was shot dead by unidentified assailants outside her Delhi home on her way back from Parliament.

Vivek Bhandari

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DEVIL DANCING. See **Possession**.

DHAKA (2002 est. pop. 8.5 million). Located in central Bangladesh, Dhaka (formerly Dacca) lies on an alluvial terrace above the northern bank of the Buriganga River, which offers access to several of the major regional rivers, including the Brahmaputra, the Meghna, and the Padma. Dhaka's early history is linked to the prominence of the nearby administrative urban center of Sonargaon, which lay to the east along the Buriganga. Dhaka grew as a result of the commercial and political prominence of Sonargaon from the late thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries, as indicated by the names of neighborhoods in the old town,

which point to a pre-Mughal Hindu presence there. The old town is bounded by the Dulai River, a waterway coming from the north and curving eastward as it joins the Buriganga.

In 1610, the Mughal governor Islam Khan (ruled 1608–1613) chose Dhaka as the regional capital. He built an artificial canal joining the Dulai to the Buriganga, thus forming a western boundary for the old town. The Mughals expanded Dhaka to the west and north along the Buriganga, building two large forts and several major mosques. Dhaka was the center of the eastern Mughal empire, hosting diplomatic and commercial visitors from around the globe, including Sebastian Manrique, Jean Baptiste Tavernier, and Thomas Bowrey, each of whom published an account of his visit. During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the Mughals allowed Europeans to build factories along the river; these structures were still extant when James Rennell's *Bengal Atlas* was published in 1780. An Armenian community grew in the old town, and the Portuguese built a small church and community in the northern suburb of Tejgaon. Dhaka remained the regional capital until 1717, when the Mughal prince Azim Shah (1697–1712) shifted the capital to Murshidabad.

During the eighteenth century, Dhaka's population and urban infrastructure declined; paintings of the city emphasize its decay, as evidenced by Charles D'Oyly's *Antiquities of Dacca* series, done between 1814 and 1827. In the nineteenth century, the British East In-



A crowded ferryboat in Dhaka in 1996. (TIZIANA AND GIANNI BALDIZZONE/CORBIS)

dia Company built the residential area of Wari in the old town and cleared Ramna Park to the north. Between 1905 and 1911, Dhaka was the capital of the short-lived province of East Bengal and Assam. After Independence and the partition of British India into Pakistan and India in 1947, Dhaka served as the capital of the East Pakistan province. In 1971, a bloody civil war led to the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh, with Dhaka as its capital. The American architect Louis Kahn (1901–1974) designed its striking parliament building (completed 1974). Dhaka has preserved its pre-Mughal, Mughal, and European histories in its contemporary urban fabric.

Rebecca M. Brown

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DHAMMAYUT SECT Founded by King Mongkut (1804–1868) of Siam during his twenty-six years of monkhood, the Dhammayut sect (Thammayut or Dhammayuttikanikaya, those attached to the dharma, or Buddhist teachings/doctrines) is distinguished from the other order of Theravada Buddhism in Thailand: Mahanikaya (the great congregation). Both sects cooperate in some ways and for some rituals and are united in Thailand under the nationwide Council of Elders, or Sangha Supreme Council. While the laity rarely pay attention to the differences between the two sects, each sect has its own rituals and emphases, and the Dhammayut sect is known for its greater orthodoxy and closer relationship with royalty and the aristocracy.

After Mongkut was ordained in 1824, he became the principal religious figure in Siam at the time. Studying the Pali (the language of the Theravada Buddhist canon) scriptures and the strict discipline of Monks, he became convinced that Siamese Buddhism had gone astray and came to demand from his followers more serious study of Pali and the Vinaya (the Buddhist scriptures pertaining to monastic rules) and more dedication to and proficiency in meditation. He sought to put aside superstitions and tried to discern the most accurate pronunciation of Pali, demanding monks learn this. He also insisted that laypeople perform tasks such as cleaning, robe-washing, and distributing monk's food so the monks could adhere more strictly to their discipline. The most visible sign of the difference in Mongkut's order at its founding was the

style in which monks wore their robes. At the founding of the order, Mongkut insisted that the robes cover both shoulders, allowing the right arm freedom. (Later, when he became king, Mongkut would allow monks to choose for themselves what style of robe they preferred.) Other changes in monastic practice included ordination rituals, daily routines, and observance of different religious days. When Mongkut left Wat Bowonniwet, the center of the sect, in April to be crowned king in May 1851, he vowed to support both Dhammayut and Mahanikaya.

During the reign of Mongkut's son Chulalongkorn (1853–1910; reigned 1868–1910), Prince Vajiravudh (1881–1925), who was another of Mongkut's sons and a half brother of Chulalongkorn, led the Dhammayut sect to a period of particular influence. Prince Vajiravudh eventually headed the entire *sangha*. Chulalongkorn unified Siamese Buddhists into a national organization, and monks throughout the country helped determine its policies and programs. While originally the Dhammayut sect made up an elite group, the demand for rigor and study led to standardization of discipline, education, and rituals throughout the country. A standard monastic curriculum was established and a state-sponsored Buddhist nationalism arose without the diversity found previously in customs, practices, and emphases. In 1864 a Khmer monk who had studied in Siam brought the sect to Cambodia, leading to a similar division between Mahanikaya and Dhammayuttikanikaya devotees in that country.

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DIKIR BARAT *Dikir barat* is a form of popular Islamic-oriented musical entertainment particularly associated with the northern Malaysian state of Kelantan. It may be derived from the Arabic *zikir*, which generally refers to a form of Islamic chanting in which the various names of Allah are repeated, leading the

reciter into a state of trance. In Malaysia, however, this practice has evolved into a popular form of poetic debate, *dikir barat*. Originating among the Malays of the northern state of Kelantan, it is usually sung by teams in a responsorial (solo-chorus) fashion.

A team consists of a chorus (*awok-awok*) of ten to fifteen singers, who sit cross-legged on the floor and sing in unison; a lead singer (*tok juara*); and a second solo singer (*tukang karut*), who spontaneously creates and sings lyrics. The *tok juara* begins the performance by chanting a *pantun* (four-line quatrain of Malay origin) in free rhythm, while the chorus repeats a fixed verse, interjecting syncopated shouts, clapping their hands, and making dancelike movements with their hands, arms, and upper torsos. The *tok juara* and chorus alternate until the final chorus, when the *tukang karut* takes the lead, spontaneously creating new lines of text and singing in a responsorial style with the chorus.

The vocalists are accompanied by a small ensemble of frame drums (*rebana*), a bossed gong (*tetawak*), a pair of small knobbed gongs suspended over a wooden resonator (*canang*), and maracas. The *rebana* and maracas establish a recurring rhythmic pattern, while the *tetawak* and *canang* mark larger two- or four-beat units.

Contemporary *dikir barat* texts often have heavy religious or political content. Competitions are common, and performances are frequently broadcast on television to increase public awareness of social issues. Originally performed only by male vocalists, female *dikir barat* choruses have become popular.

Margaret Sarkissian

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DILI (1999 pop. 250,000). Dili is the largest town and capital of East Timor, with a premier seaport located on the northern coast of the island of Timor on Ombai Strait. Dili was once the capital of Portuguese Timor where Portuguese traders arrived as early as 1512. The population is mostly Timorese and Atonese with minorities of Eurasians and Arab Muslims. The importance of Dili as a trading post has been in decline since the 1920s, as the sandalwood trade declined and Portugal fell into depression. Dili's modest prosperity is derived from the production and export of coffee.



An East Timorese woman and her child stand in front of a destroyed home in Dili in October 1999. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

After the end of the dictatorship in Portugal and fighting in East Timor between groups favoring integration with Indonesia and proindependence groups, the last Portuguese soldiers left Dili in 1975. With Indonesia's invasion and East Timor's formal integration into Indonesia on 17 July 1976, Dili became the capital of Indonesia's twenty-seventh province. After the announcement of the United Nations-sponsored public consultation on the future of East Timor in September 1999, Dili was rampaged and destroyed by pro-Indonesian militia forces, and most of its inhabitants fled. Since 1999, Dili has been rebuilt and as of 2001 is the administrative center of an independent East Timor.

Frank Feulner

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DILI MASSACRE The Dili Massacre, also known as the Santa Cruz Massacre, took place on 12 November 1991 in East Timor. This event became a turning point in the search for a final political status for the territory. Since Indonesia's military invasion in December 1975, the military's behavior was characterized by a pattern of human-rights violations. However, this became a major international news issue only in 1991.

On 12 November, a memorial mass was held for Sebastião Gomes, a proindependence East Timorese,

killed on 28 October by the Indonesian military. In the procession from the Church of Motael to the Santa Cruz cemetery, there was a small clash between the participants in the mourning and Indonesian soldiers. Later, when the crowd had reached the cemetery, the military opened fire against the crowd, began beating them, and bayoneted those inside the cemetery.

Contrary to other human-rights violations committed before in the territory, this time there were seven foreigners present—one of them was killed—at the cemetery when the events took place. The English cameraman Max Stahl recorded what happened and was able to smuggle the videotape showing the events out of East Timor. On 13 November, the European community condemned Indonesia's behavior, and in the next few days several governments suspended their aid programs to Indonesia.

A first official Indonesian version of what happened admitted only nineteen deaths. The East Timorese estimated that the true number was at least five times higher. Owing to the international criticism, Indonesia was compelled to form a national commission to investigate the facts. On 26 December, the commission admitted the occurrence of fifty deaths. Two days later, President Suharto replaced the East Timor military commander Brigadier General Rudolf Warouw and his immediate superior based in the Bali Udayana Command, Major General Sintong Panjaitan. Moreover, he also ordered the army chief of staff Edi Sudrajat to form a military tribunal—a Council of Military Honor—to recommend whether any officers should face court-martial. The Council operated from 2 January to 20 February 1992. On 27 February, it became public that six officers had been disciplined, but their names were never made public.

The Dili Massacre triggered a rare instance of public criticism of the Indonesian military, the need for an allegedly independent report, and, especially, a response by Suharto. It was the first time that Indonesia was compelled to appease international criticism since its invasion of East Timor. In fact, the Indonesian foreign affairs minister Ali Alatas would later describe those events as a turning point in Jakarta's international support.

Paulo Gorjão

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DIN MOHAMMAD, MUSHK-E-ALAM

(1790–1886), Afghan hero. Din Mohammad is a national hero of Afghanistan, renowned for his undying enmity to the British. He was a mullah (Islamic cleric), whose grandfather came from India and settled in Ghazni, a city southwest of Kabul.

Din Mohammad studied with various religious teachers, one of whom gave him the name Mushk-e-Alam ("Musk of the World"), because of his erudition. He was a militant mullah and in time opened his own religious school where he propounded his aggressive views. This ensured him a following of like-minded mullahs, many trained by him, and he became a man of considerable influence among the Ghilzais, the clan that inhabited Ghazni and the surrounding area. He was given an allowance by Shir 'Ali Khan (1825–1879), the amir of Afghanistan from 1863 to 1879.

Din Mohammad openly preached jihad or holy war against the British during the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1881). When 'Abdorrahman Khan (c. 1844–1901), the ruler of Afghanistan from 1880 to 1901, tried to limit his influence and his rhetoric, Din Mohammad incited the Margul and Ghilzai tribes to open rebellion in 1886. Din Mohammad died during this revolt, but his son, the mullah Abdul Karim, took up his father's cause and led the Margul and Ghilzai uprising; it was only with great difficulty that the amir 'Abdorrahman suppressed the rebellion.

Nirmal Dass

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DING LING (1904–1986), Chinese novelist. Born in Hunan Province, Ding Ling studied at several schools in Shanghai and Beijing. She began to publish short stories in 1927 and quickly emerged as the country's foremost woman writer. After she joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1932, she was arrested by the Guomintang government and held in detention for three years. Her husband Hu Yepin was killed secretly by the Guomintang.

In 1936 she went to Yanan, the capital of the Soviet government of China. There she published the well-known essay "Thoughts on the March 8 Festival (Women's Day)," in which she examined women's situation and sharply criticized discrimination against them. This made her a target of the Yanan Forum in 1942. Though she held senior official positions for several years after the establishment of the People's Republic of China, she was once again criticized in 1955. From that time on, she was either in jail or in labor camps in north China until the end of the Cultural Revolution. She died in 1986.

Ding Ling always maintained a sincere interest in Chinese women. She was the first writer to portray women liberating themselves in Chinese society. From her maiden effort, "Mengke," to such representative works as "Miss Sophie's Diary" and "Mother," she described how the first generation of new women struggled to get free from the yoke of feudalism.

She Xiaojie

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DISEASE, TROPICAL Tropical diseases are those found in the tropics, which is the climatic region that lies between 30 degrees north latitude and 30 degrees south latitude. People living in the tropics are prone to the same infections that are found in other parts of the world, but tropical diseases are more prevalent in the tropics. Tropical diseases vary in time and space. Factors such as population distributions, cultural patterns, political circumstances, economic situations, and the physical environment determine the spatial and temporal distribution of these diseases. The countries of Asia that are in the tropics include India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Myanmar (Burma), Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Taiwan, Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and parts of Japan and China. Most tropical countries have high average temperatures and humidity, and these conditions are conducive to the prevalence of many tropical disease vectors. Some diseases, such as African sleeping sickness, are confined to tropical areas because the transmission of these diseases can occur only in tropical climates.

Most of the tropical countries of Asia are poor and therefore diseases caused by nutritional deficiencies are common. Many tropical countries have inadequate



SURVIVING IN THE TROPICS

This account indicates the horrors that awaited many Europeans who traveled to tropical regions of Asia. In India, there was the two-season rule: if one survived two tropical seasons, the chances were good that one would survive in the future.

The Common Distemper that destroys the most in *India*, is Feavers, which the *Europeans* with difficulty escape, especially if they have boild up their Spirits by solemn Repast, and been in-gag'd in a strong Debauch. Besides this, the Mordechine is another Disease of which some die, which is a violent Vomiting and Looseness, and is caus'd most frequently by an Excess in Eating, particularly of Fish and Flesh together. It has been Cur'd by Red-hot Iron clapt to the Heel of him that is sick, so close that it renders him uneasie by its nearness, whereby it leaves a Scar behind it.

Source: John Ovington. (1690) *A Voyage to Suratt in the Year 1689* (1690), as quoted in *The Sabibs*, edited by Hilton Brown (1948). London: William Hodge & Co., 37.

public health systems and a poorly educated population, two factors that contribute to the spread of disease. Increased international travel has facilitated a rapid increase in the spread of tropical diseases into temperate countries by refugees, immigrants, tourists, and business people. Development itself may also introduce new health problems. The construction of dams and irrigation canals may create breeding sites for the vectors of malaria, yellow fever, and schistosomiasis.

Factors Contributing to Tropical Diseases

A hot, wet, tropical climate is an ideal habitat for many microbial agents, parasites, insects, and rodents. Insects and other arthropods serve as vectors for disease agents. Numerous species of animals, especially rodents, live near humans and are reservoirs for diseases. Close contact with animals exposes humans to a wide range of zoonotic diseases (diseases that are transmissible from animals to humans). Genetic factors also contribute to the spread of tropical diseases. For instance, leprosy is more prevalent in Caucasian and East Asian populations than in Africans because of genetic predispositions. While natural immunity can explain why some people do not suffer from certain infections, immunity acquired during childhood by being exposed to a disease or by getting a vaccine against it is a more usual explanation. Vaccines control the spread of diseases that were once highly prevalent worldwide. Efficient vaccines exist for many diseases, including yellow fever, polio, measles, and tetanus. However, they have made little impact in many developing countries of the tropics because vaccine programs are expensive and difficult to administer. Exposure to certain tropical diseases, such as onchocerciasis does not lead to meaningful immunity against them, and therefore vaccines for these diseases do not exist.

Diseases of malnutrition are related to the availability and cost of food, which are dependent on the economic and political circumstances in a particular region. Malnutrition is also associated with the prevalence of gastrointestinal infections as well as traditional practices and taboos that may limit the use of available food. Acute infectious diseases, especially respiratory infections, measles, and gastroenteritis, still account for the high infant mortality in some parts of the tropics, where up to 40 percent of children die before five years of age. Acute infections such as measles may cause specific forms of malnutrition including protein deficiency (kwashiorkor). The absence of a clean water supply and sewage disposal system, especially in the urban slums of the tropics, leads to a high




The *Plasmodium falciparum* parasite, which causes malaria, one of the most common and most deadly diseases in the tropics. (LESTER V. BERGMAN/CORBIS)

prevalence of gastrointestinal infections. Poor sanitary conditions contribute to the spread of diarrheal diseases, especially among children.

Prevalent Tropical Diseases in Asia

Tropical diseases that lead to the highest number of deaths in tropical Asia include respiratory infections and diarrheal diseases. Other diseases that lead to a high number of deaths include measles, nutritional deficiencies, tetanus, pertussis, AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases, leishmaniasis, and dengue fever. Acute respiratory infection is the most common cause of childhood death in the world. Bacterial pneumonia and tuberculosis are the most common respiratory infections in Asia. Chronic bronchitis is rare in most rural areas of Asia, although it is common in North and Central India, where it is attributed to smoke from wood fires in dwellings.

Worldwide, 10 million people die each year from diarrheal diseases, and children who live in the tropics are at highest risk. Many different disease agents are responsible for diarrheal diseases; common agents are cholera, rotavirus, *Escherichia coli*, salmonella, shigellosis, and giardia. Diarrhea is often associated with bottle-feeding when baby formula is mixed with contaminated water. Most diarrhea attacks are self-limiting within several days, but if diarrhea is severe and treatment is not available, severe dehydration and death may result, as is common with cholera. Infantile diarrhea is also the single most important cause of malnutrition in infants in the tropics. The most important treatment for diarrhea is rehydration, which can be accomplished



THE EPIDEMIC GHOST

In many Asian cultures, indigenous beliefs about disease exist alongside Western scientific medicine. In Central Thailand, rural villagers often attribute serious outbreaks of disease to a supernatural force—the epidemic ghost.

Until the Twentieth Century, Thailand was visited by terrifying epidemics of cholera, smallpox, and other devastating diseases. The physiological and psychological consequences of these sudden epidemics were shattering, and it is not at all surprising that the culture has evolved a specialized ghost that is considered peculiarly responsible for these visitations. Since buffaloes and other farm animals are also of vital importance in the livelihood of the Bang Chan farmer, this same ghost is considered responsible for epidemics of rinderpest and other economically disastrous animal diseases.

One frequently hears the word *haa* (epidemic) in everyday speech, usually of a rough sort. *Taaj haa* means to die of an epidemic disease. *Aaj haa* is an insulting term implying that the person spoken about derives from, or is associated with, the hated and feared *haa* ghosts.

The sole effect of Epidemic Ghost is to inflict sickness in the form of epidemic diseases. Conversely, diseases of epidemic proportions are caused only by Epidemic Ghosts, among all the *S-s* found in the culture. If a person is stricken by a disease which, at the time, is endemic rather than epidemic or nearly so, then the diagnosis will invariably be rendered in terms of other *S* other than Epidemic Ghost.

Although there are no standardized notions as to the derivation of Epidemic Ghost, it is not surprising that idiosyncratic notions tend to define this *S* as deriving from an out-group. Thus, Monk Doctor Marvin told me that Epidemic Ghost derives from a dead Muslim or Lao—explaining that those ethnic groups like to eat fresh raw meat. The Laos do in fact like raw meat prepared in certain ways. Nai Sin, on the other hand, believes that this *S* derives from a Muslim who, before death, specialized in slaughtering buffaloes and chickens, and who now, as a ghost, continued to indulge in killing those animals. Muslims around Bang Chan do in fact engage disproportionately in slaughtering, a service which they render commercially to their Buddhist neighbors, whose Merit-Moral system includes a firm prohibition against the taking of animal life.

Source: Robert B. Textor. (1973) *Roster of the Gods: An Ethnography of the Supernatural in a Thai Village*. New Haven, CT: HRAFLEX Books, 391–392.

by drinking oral rehydration solution or through the administration of intravenous fluids.

Several diseases can be caused by nutritional deficiencies of total calories, protein, iodine, vitamin A, vitamin C, and iron. Calorie deficiency, or marasmus, causes emaciation and can lead to death. Protein de-

ciency, or kwashiorkor, makes its victims more susceptible to other infections and can cause mental deficiency. Iodine deficiency may lead to enlargement of the thyroid gland, or goiter, which leads to various complications. Vitamin A deficiency leads to blindness, and vitamin C deficiency, or scurvy, leads to ane-

mia, bleeding of the gums, and bleeding under the skin. Iron deficiency also leads to anemia, which causes weakness and other complications.

Two especially deadly tropical diseases are visceral leishmaniasis and dengue fever. They are both diseases that are transmitted by insects. Visceral leishmaniasis is caused by a protozoan and is transmitted to humans by the bite of a sand fly. It causes damage to the spleen, liver, and bone marrow of its victims and has a high fatality rate. Prevention of leishmaniasis includes both control of the sand fly vector and control in humans through treatment. The sand fly vector has been successfully controlled by spraying insecticides on the walls of homes. Dengue fever is a viral disease that is transmitted by mosquitoes. It causes severe fever, headache, muscle pain, and a rash. Severe cases of dengue fever result in a syndrome called dengue hemorrhagic fever, which can lead to death. The only way to control the disease is to control the mosquito population.

Another tropical disease that is not responsible for large numbers of deaths in Asia but is a serious health problem is schistosomiasis. Schistosomiasis is a parasitic disease that is caused by blood flukes belonging to the genus *Schistosoma*. Infection occurs when a person wades or bathes in water that is infested with snails that transmit the blood flukes. The parasite infects an individual's blood vessels and is characterized by blood in the urine. The disease is associated with irrigation development schemes in many parts of the tropical world.

Fighting Tropical Diseases

Fighting tropical diseases involves not only diagnosis and treatment but also health education, environmental management, provision of a clean water supply, and development of a health-care infrastructure. However, many tropical countries in Asia have limited health budgets, making a comprehensive approach difficult.

Michael Emch, Aliya Nabeed, and Mohammad Ali

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DIWALI Although the religious practices of India are numerous and diverse, the festival of Diwali (array of light) is celebrated in most parts of India, primarily by Hindus. Diwali occurs on the new moon day of Kartik (a month during October and November).

The festival is celebrated by putting oil or ghee (clarified butter) lamps (*diyas*), wax candles, and sometimes colored electric bulbs around the house and setting off firecrackers during the night. The goddess of wealth, Lakshmi, is worshiped at night. Houses are cleaned and painted, and colored decorations (*rangoli*) adorn the doorways and courtyards to welcome the goddess. The trader community (*Banya*) begins the new financial year after Diwali.

According to popular stories about the origins of this ancient festival, *diyas* are lit to welcome Lord Rama, his wife Sita, and his brother Lakshmana to their kingdom of Ajodhya (former city in northern India) after a fourteen-year exile. Another story is that Diwali is observed to commemorate Krishna's killing of the demon Narakasura and the rescue of 16,000 women held captive by him. In southern India, Diwali celebrates the killing of the demon Hiranyakashipu by Vishnu in the form of a man-lion.

Hrushikesh Panda

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DIYARBAKIR (2002 pop. of province 1.4 million). Diyarbakir (formerly Diyarbekir, ancient Amida, capital of the province of Diyarbakir) is located in south-eastern Turkey on a basaltic plateau on the right bank of the Tigris River. Its old name, Black Amida, came from the black basalt walls surrounding the city. Diyarbakir is a very ancient city, dating back 5,000 years. Assyrians and Persians ruled there until Alexander of Macedon's conquests. The city walls, originally Roman (297 BCE), were rebuilt by the Byzantines. Arabs arrived around 638 CE and renamed the city Doyarbakir, "abode of [the tribe of] Bakr."

The collapse of the Byzantine empire in 1071 enabled the Seljuks to annex the city. Many nomadic pastoral tribes, especially Turkmens and Kurds, then settled in the area. The city was conquered by the Kara-Koyunlus in the fifteenth century, was occupied by the Safavids in 1507, and finally fell into Ottoman hands in 1515. The Ottomans organized the newly conquered territories into the province of Doyarbakir, centered on the city of Amida. One of the largest provinces of the Ottoman empire, it had special importance because of its position near the Persian frontier. In 1923 the city was officially named Diyarbakir under the new Turkish Republic. Today Diyarbakir is a largely Kurdish town and is the major center of trade, industry, culture, and education in southeast Anatolia.

T. Isikozlu-E.F. Isikozlu

DOAN THI DIEM (1705–1748), Vietnamese poet. A brilliant exponent of the Vietnamese *nom* (demotic script) verses, Doan Thi Diem was born in 1705 in the village of Gia Pham in Hai Hung Province, northern Vietnam, into a family of teachers. When she was twenty-five years old, her father died, and, as she was unmarried, she went to live with her brother, who held a doctor's degree. It was under his tutelage that Doan Thi Diem continued her education and writing career. Tragedy struck a few years later when her brother died. She then had to shoulder the responsibility of providing for her mother and her brother's family by engaging in two professions unprecedented for a Vietnamese woman: she practiced medicine and taught. She excelled in both while also pursuing her writing. She published collections of poems, but she was most famous for her translation into *nom* of a long poem, *Chinh Phu Ngam* (Lament of the Soldier's

Wife). The original version of this poem was written in classical Chinese by a Vietnamese scholar, Dang Tran Con (1710–1745), a contemporary of Doan Thi Diem. Her translation equaled its Chinese version in grace and elegance but surpassed it in sensitivity, as it was able to communicate to its audience in their own tongue the pain, distress, and anguish of a wife whose husband has gone to war. Doan Thi Diem died of a severe cold, contracted while accompanying her husband, an official, to his new post in the province of Nghe An, south of Hanoi.

Truong Buu Lam

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DOGRA DYNASTY The Dogra dynasty (1820–1947) was a lineage of Rajputs who ruled much of Kashmir and adjacent valleys. Dogra was in fact the name given to the country surrounding the small state of Jamma; the word meant "two lakes," in reference to the inhabitants' ancestral home between the lakes Siroensar and Mansar. During the First Sikh War (1845–1846) the Dogras won a high reputation as soldiers fighting on the British side, and during their later service in the Indian Army, they distinguished themselves in several operations late in the nineteenth century. Dogras were of mixed culture: Hindus, Muslims, and even Sikhs, all claiming Rajput status. They still have a dominating position in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

The first ruler of the Dogra line, Gulab Singh (1792–1857), was appointed raja of Jammu in 1820 by the Sikh ruler of the region. He became a mediator rather than a participant in the First Sikh War, and was rewarded by the British with the province of Kashmir. It was in this way that a largely Muslim state came to have a Hindu ruler, down to independence in 1947. In that year Hari Singh, the great-grandson of Gulab Singh, acceded to the union of Kashmir with India.

Paul Hockings

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DOI INTHANON Doi Inthanon (known as the Roof of Thailand) is the highest mountain peak in Thailand at 2,565 meters. The mountain is located in northwestern Thailand near the upper Ping River in the Chiang Mai province. On its summit rests the pagoda built by King Kue-Na in the fourteenth century that is said to house relics of Buddha.

Doi Inthanon, also designated a national park, covers more than 48,000 hectares. The park is splendid with mountains from the Shan Hills range, waterfalls and limestone rock formations and caves in the eastern end of the park. Forest floras include plants that grow in the park's temperate climate, such as rhododendron, pine, and laurel. Epiphytes can be found here, mainly orchids. Lichens, lianas, and fern are also abundant. The park has the largest number of bird species in Thailand. The Center for Wildlife Research at Mahidol University has recorded more than 360 species, making the park a popular destination among birdwatchers from around the globe.

Linda Dailey Paulson

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DOI MOI *Doi moi*, which means "renovation" in Vietnamese, is a set of political and economic reforms that were instituted in Vietnam by the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) during the Sixth Party Congress in December 1986 in response to severe economic problems and a lack of confidence in the government.

Economic Crisis

After Vietnamese reunification in 1975, an economic crisis and serious food shortages became increasingly problematic for the VCP. This was mainly due the U.S.-imposed trade and aid embargo and the difficulties that the government had converting the agricultural sector in the south to socialist collectivism. In response, the Vietnamese government instituted a series of economic reforms which can best be described as a trial-and-error process. Initially, the government recognized contracts signed without a legal basis by some state enterprises with other state enterprises and private entrepreneurs to address the insufficient supply of production tools and fertilizer. The agricultural contract system and the industrial three-

plan system (a three-fold production plan: Plan A was the general state plan with highest priority, Plan B authorized the purchase of production means and their autonomous use, and Plan C authorized the sale of products of lower value) were intended to increase private initiative, strengthen market functions, and intensify material production incentives. Between 1981 and 1985, low productivity, insufficient quality standards, and energy and material shortages, as well as inefficient management, further paralyzed economic development. Although policy papers recognized the important role agriculture played in the development of the country, state subsidies were allocated primarily to heavy industries. Despite this, in 1983 family agricultural production already accounted for 50–60 percent of the income and 90 percent of foodstuffs available in agricultural areas. It also provided 30–50 percent of the entire foodstuffs of the country.

Instituting *Doi Moi*

Initial discussion of the *doi moi* program occurred at the Eighth Plenary Session of the Vietnamese Central Committee in June 1985. At this session, members agreed that the main cause for the further deterioration of living standards were two basic concepts of the DRV model: bureaucratic centralism and the state subsidies system. These, they argued, led to large disparities between public and private prices. Further, the agricultural contract system was still inefficient because the state was not able to fulfil the provision of seeds, crops, and fertilizer. Consequently the Central Committee decided on currency, price, and salary reforms, as well as increased autonomy for the state enterprises and the abolition of the state subsidies system and the twofold price system (the official state prices and the free prices of the private market). When these reform measures resulted in a further decline of living standards, popular confidence in the VCP's economic competence began to suffer. Inflation, corruption, and smuggling only worsened the situation. During the Sixth Party Congress in December 1986, liberal reformers such as Nguyen Van Linh, Vo Chi Cong, and Vo Van Kiet gained decisive influence within the Party.

The rather vaguely formulated *doi moi* program also resulted in a restructuring of the government, which was publicly announced in February 1987. Twenty-two ministries were filled with new personnel and the National Assembly developed a more debate-oriented approach. In addition to making these personnel changes, the Party cited bureaucratic centralism, state subsidies, and international isolation as the major reasons for economic deterioration. Consequently the

Party's ideologically derived foreign policy changed, and in May 1988 the Politburo Resolution No. 13 codified the need for a "multidirectional foreign policy orientation." After the end of the Cambodian conflict, Vietnam succeeded not only in reestablishing relationships with member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN), but also in reestablishing diplomatic and economic relations with the United States and Europe. Vietnam became a member of ASEAN and the United States removed its trade and aid embargo.

Despite these efforts, however, the economic sector was affected by further decline and confusion for various reasons, including the national budget deficit, a patchwork of reform measures, tremendously high inflation rates, and the lack of a clearly defined *doi moi* policy. Controversy about the future role of the private sector led to ongoing discussions among the leadership and in the media. Then, in 1988, the reforms seemed to succeed partially. Substantial cuts of subsidies for state enterprises, the abolition of the central state price system, and a further devaluation of the Vietnamese currency resulted in a short-term economic recovery. The short-term nature of this recovery was due to the fact that financial reallocation from the industrial sector to the agricultural sector could not be effectively organized, even after the Sixth Party Congress. Although agricultural production increased in 1986, it decreased again in 1987 and the state-owned media admitted that about ten million people in the northern provinces suffered severely from starvation.

In April 1988, two new laws, one addressing agricultural management renovation and another dealing with land disputes, led to various reactions among the population. South Vietnamese peasants publicly argued about their right to take back confiscated parts of land. Early in 1988 a new contract system guaranteed peasants at least 40 percent of their harvest. During the second half of 1988 foodstuff production increased considerably and Vietnam even became one of the world's leading rice-exporting countries. According to Gerd Trogemann, this was not only due to the new contract system but also to better energy supplies and favorable weather conditions. As before, however, economic achievement did not prove to be sustainable. Cuts in subsidy programs and bad weather conditions were responsible for low productivity in 1991. Decentralization measures and the promulgation of efforts to develop a multicomponent economy accompanied an overall reform of state enterprises and efforts to reallocate budgets from heavy to light industries.

While *doi moi* was easily understood as renovation of the economic structure, political reforms still lagged behind societal development. Since the introduction of *doi moi*, however, political liberalization has gained a certain dynamism, especially among the mass media, which have shown more willingness to publish criticism and openly unveil cases of severe corruption among state officials. When intellectuals and artists have contributed to this political criticism, however, the government has reacted with political repression. Because civil society is still underdeveloped in Vietnam and an overall public consensus about the necessity of smooth and uninterrupted economic development prevails even among the opponents of the VCP, political reforms are still limited.

The Future

By the early 2000s, it has become clear that the renovation program is irreversible and that economic development is inevitably accompanied by certain structural changes within society. More freedom to participate in privately financed foreign exchange programs, as well as the increasing access to information from the Internet will certainly contribute to more open-mindedness in Vietnam. Time will tell how important a role the emerging middle class and private entrepreneurs will play in the future political liberalization process of the country.

Ursula Nguyen

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DOKMAI SOT (1905–1963), Thai novelist. Dokmai Sot ("Fresh Flower") is the pen name of M. L. Buppha Kunjara Nimmanhemmin. Born into an aristocratic family, she began writing in her early twenties. Her first four novels were published in installments in one of the major literary magazines of the day, but thereafter she published her novels herself, producing eleven novels between 1929 and 1940. Of these, the most famous is *Phu di* (A Person of Quality), first published in 1938, in which she intended to demonstrate that a person of quality was defined not by social status or wealth but rather by Buddhist qualities of patience, wisdom, and self-sacrifice.

Dokmai Sot's novels are mostly domestic dramas, admired for both their use of language and their content. Her novels were among the first to be accepted in literature syllabi at secondary- and tertiary-education level in Thailand. The author's penchant for including Buddhist epithets at the beginning of each chapter led the writer and critic Nilawan Pinthong to describe her as a preacher.

At the age of forty-nine, Dokmai Sot married Sukit Nimmanhemmin, a former minister of industry who later briefly held the position of deputy prime minister; she accompanied him to India when he was appointed ambassador in 1959. Her health was never robust, and she died of a heart attack in Delhi, India, in 1963.

David Smyth

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DOLL FESTIVAL. See **Hina Matsuri**.

DOMBRA The *dombra* belongs to the family of two-stringed lutes that are widespread in Central Asia and especially associated with pastoral nomadic peoples. They include the Kazakh *dombura*, the *dambura* of Turkestan and Badakhstan, and the Uzbek and Uighur *dutar*. The instrument consists of a rectangular or oval body usually hewn out of a single piece of wood, covered by a wooden soundboard, with a long, slender neck. It is usually unfretted, although modern versions of the instrument have added frets set at chromatic intervals. The *dombra* is strung by a single gut, or nylon string, which passes from a wooden tuning peg at the end of the neck, looped around a pin at the base of the body and up to a second peg to make two tunable strings. The strings are most commonly tuned a fourth apart—the higher string is physically below the other when the instrument is played—and they are plucked with the thumb and two fingers and held together with a sweeping back-and-forth movement.

The *dombra* is commonly used to play dance tunes, solo programmatic pieces, or to accompany songs and epic tales. Typically *dombra* music alternates between double and triple rhythms and has a general emphasis on fourths and fifths as basic structural intervals, with the widespread use of melody plus drone.

Rachel Harris

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DOST MUHAMMAD (1793–1863), founder of the Pashtun Barakzai dynasty in Afghanistan. Dost Muhammad, the twentieth son of the chief of the Pashtun Barakzai clan, spent his early years living with his mother's relatives, part of a Turkish nomadic tribe. After 1810, thanks to the favor of his powerful eldest brother, Fath Khan, he held important political and military offices in Kuhistan, Kashmir, and Herat, at that time part of the Afghan kingdom. Dost Muhammad demonstrated his military skills by capturing the Afghan cities of Kabul, Ghazna, and Jalalabad in 1818, after the king of Afghanistan, Mahmud Shah, had blinded his eldest brother. In 1826 Dost Muhammad became the effective ruler of Afghanistan, although he formally took the title of emir (king) only in 1834.

During the first years of his reign Dost Muhammad tried to secure the position of his ethnic confed-

eration, the Durrani, against the rival Pashtun group of the Ghilzay, and to recover lost Afghan territories. However, he was hindered by a Persian attack against the city of Herat in 1837 and the British invasion of Afghanistan in 1839. Dost Muhammad escaped toward Central Asia, where he was arrested and deported to India with part of his family.

The British crowned Shah Shuja (d. 1842) as the new puppet emir of Afghanistan. Ethnic outbreaks, however, continually challenged the British army, which was forced to retreat in the winter of 1841–1842 and was almost entirely slaughtered by Ghilzay tribes. Dost Muhammad returned to Kabul in 1843 and was restored as emir by the new British governor-general of India, Lord Ellenborough, who had decided to quit the country. Dost Muhammad dedicated the last twenty years of his life to consolidating Durrani authority, recovering the northern territories and the cities of Qandahar, Balkh, and Herat.

Riccardo Redaelli

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DOUMER, PAUL (1857–1932), governor-general of Indochina. Paul Doumer was governor-general of French Indochina from 1897 to 1902. Born in Aurillac, France, Doumer worked as a journalist before embarking on a political career. He was first elected to the French National Assembly in 1888 and served as minister of finance (1895–1896) just before his appointment as governor-general of Indochina.

During his five-year mandate in Indochina, Doumer instituted a number of reforms. He created a general budget for Indochina and established monopolies on salt, opium, and alcohol to finance colonial development projects. He promoted the construction of a railway line from Saigon to Yunnan (the Yunnan Railway project), and sanctioned public works projects, such as the building of roads, bridges, canals, and communications lines. Doumer also systematized the colonial civil service by creating departments of public works, customs, and agriculture and commerce. In 1898 he founded the *Ecole Française D'extrême Orient*, whose purpose was the study of East Asia.

Doumer returned to France in 1902 and was elected senator of Corsica (1912–1931). He eventually was

elected president of France in 1931 but was assassinated one year later by a Russian immigrant who accused him of siding with Bolsheviks.

Micheline R. Lessard

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DRAGON BOAT FESTIVAL The annual Dragon Boat Festival, commemorating the dead, is observed primarily in central and southern China. It occurs on the fifth day of the fifth lunar month and falls between 28 May and 25 June in the Western calendar. During this festival, people along the seacoasts and major rivers compete in races in boats made from wooden planks and carved with dragon heads and tails.

A team of young adult males rows the boats, directed by a team leader who synchronizes their action with a big drum. While racing dragon boats in competition, the competitors occasionally toss triangular-shaped rice cakes, typically made from glutinous rice with meat or sweet bean paste stuffing and wrapped in bamboo leaves, into the water. Popular folktale attributes this festival to the patriotic poet Qu Yuan, who lived in the third and second centuries BCE in the southern kingdom of Chu during late Zhou dynasty (1045–246 BCE). According to legend, Qu was dissatisfied with the ineptness of the Chu king. When the king spurned his repeated advice, Qu threw himself into a river in today's Hunan Province. The boat racing is said to have originated from the attempt to recover his body. Throwing rice cakes symbolizes a sacrificial offering to Qu.

Huang Shu-min

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Men row a dragon boat in Xishuangbanna, Yunnan, China, in c. 1996. (KEREN SU/CORBIS)

DRAMA—CHINA Chinese drama has a long tradition. Generally, the highly developed structure of dramatic text created in the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) is considered to have influenced later traditional theater literature, and therefore the Yuan dynasty often cited as the age in which Chinese drama began. Dramatic influences on Yuan drama, however, go back many centuries, beginning in the earliest courts of record—the Zhou (1045–256 BCE).

Drama during the Zhou Dynasty

One of the most important elements of Chinese drama, the performance synthesis of song, dance, and music, first appeared in the Zhou courts. The *Liji* (Book of Rites) describes performance synthesis as the inherent, correlative relationship between music, movement, emotion, and other aspects of performance wherein the sum of the parts creates a greater whole. Throughout Chinese theatrical history, the aesthetic of melding into a singular totality the skills of singing, dancing, acrobatics, special speaking techniques, and use of costuming, props, and dramatic storytelling has been an identifying feature. Both the Zhou court ritual dance-dramas and some of the acts staged by court jesters featured performance synthesis as an inherent element of the dramatic basis of their presentations.

Drama during the Qin and Han Dynasties

In the Qin (221–206 BCE) and Han (206 BCE–220 CE) eras, the court ritual of the Zhou was assumed for

new purposes, although quite likely revised, and new forms of dramatic entertainment arose in both the countryside and urban areas. Two of the most important forms were based on popular stories; in the dramatically enacted combat scenario of *chiyouxi*, or Chi You theater, one finds the epic myth of the cosmic battle between the demonic rogue Chi You and the Yellow Emperor (the legendary founder of the Chinese empire). In the second skit, *Donghai Huanggong* (Duke Huang of the Eastern Sea), a drunken shaman is overpowered by a tiger and killed after displaying a series of magical acts. These dramatic pieces, as well as others, were often performed as part of enormous variety shows (*baixi*, "hundred acts") staged by the courts as part of expensive displays intended to impress foreign envoys; they took the form of circus-like entertainments with costumed performers singing, dancing, and playing musical instruments among equestrian, acrobatic, and magic acts.

Drama during the Tang Dynasty

During the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), such skits as *Donghai Huanggong* continued to be popular presentations in the marketplaces, at court, and in temples, as well as in the homes of patrons. Other favored dramatic sketches of the Tang included *Tayaoniang* (Singing-Stepping Woman), in which male and female actors employed song and dance to comically portray the plight of a battered woman married to a drunken, egotistical official. In another favorite, *Botou* (Setting Matters Right), a son mourns his father, killed by a

tiger while journeying through some mountains, using a mixture of monologue and conventionalized movement patterns to portray the father's ill-fated trip. Similar to these entertainments was *canjunxi* ("adjutant theater"), wherein two actors enacted a comic scenario about a corrupt official who steals bolts of silk.

Also during the Tang period, Buddhist monks began to dramatize sermons with the aid of scrolls illustrating Buddhist teachings; this form was called *bianwen*, or transformational tales, and exhibited not only religious but also historical and social or political contemporary themes. All topics were presented through a mix of literary and vernacular styles, using song, prose, verse, and idiomatic speech. Additionally, *chuanqi*, or marvel tales, a more literary form composed of short stories with dialogue, originated during the Tang dynasty and initiated a greater interest in using literary stylization in the dramas of developing theatrical forms. Puppet performances may have also played a significant role in the evolution of drama at this time.

Drama during the Song Dynasty

During the Song dynasty (960–1279), dramatic developments began to take place that would distinguish northern from southern forms until the present day. Song *zaju* ("miscellaneous theater"), popular in both the north and south, included on a much smaller scale some of the variety-show characteristics found previously in Han *baixi*, but the primary focus of the presentation was on a central play or sketch. By the Southern Song dynasty (1126–1279), Song *zaju* was composed of three parts: (1) a curtain raiser, (2) the main comedy, and (3) a comic or variety-show act. A variation of early *zaju*, known as southern theater (*nanxi*), also developed at this time, as did ballad forms such as *daqu* ("great song set") and *zhugongdiao* ("various palace tones"), which, using direct speech rather than description, alternated song and speech. The Mongol Jin dynasty, operating in the north while the Southern Song continued in the south, developed *yuanben* ("courtyard literature"), instigating a tradition of crafting texts through writing guilds that collectively worked to craft their scripts of words, song, and music.

Drama during the Yuan Dynasty

During the Yuan dynasty, drama flourished. Some theorize that this resulted when the many unemployed literati, ousted from court office in the Mongol conquest and the subsequent political shift against Confucianism, used their free time to write drama to attack

the new government. *Yuanben* continued in the northern courts, but the most important form to evolve was that of Yuan *zaju*. The writing guilds of the court infused tremendous literary breadth into *zaju*, and the compositional form encouraged further development of actor technique, especially in singing. Yuan *zaju* was divided into four acts, each featuring a soloist. Every act contained several songs, all in a single key, giving the acts a musical unity. Metrical rules were set for the alternation of prose and poetry, with over 80 percent of the ends of lines rhyming. Each act, however, had a rhyme scheme differing from that of the other acts in the play. Additionally, a "wedge" (a simple song of one or two stanzas) could be placed between acts. Although the song sets (*qu*) were a primary element, the plots and dramatic dialogue were also rich; plays often contained forty or more acts and could have been staged in their entirety only over several days. The length of such scripts has strongly influenced presentation until this day; most modern performances stage only highlights of a drama instead of performing the whole story. In the south, *nanxi* continued to develop, employing duets and trios to present the alternating lines of sung and spoken dialogue.

Drama during the Ming and Qing Dynasties

In the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), various forms of music were combined with dramatic features of pronunciation, rhyming patterns, and regional singing fashions (alternating song and speech was a common trait), producing new forms. The dramatic texts for these forms included song and musical scores; some plays were shared, but altered, between forms. *Kunqu* (Kunshan opera) evolved in this age and is still performed by five major troupes located in both the north and south of modern China.

In the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), musical systems continued to be melded with regional songs and stories to produce forms such as Beijing Opera, now performed by hundreds of professional and amateur troupes. Between 1895 and 1905, plays using Western themes and traditional Chinese performance form were introduced and called New Theater (*xinju* or *xinqu*); an example is Liang Qichao's *Xin Luoma* (New Rome) staged in *kunqu* form with a theme relating the contemporary government to that of the Italian risorgimento (the nineteenth-century political movement toward Italian unity and the formation of a nation-state), with the characters of Dante and Cavour quoting Confucius and Tang poetry. *Huaju* (spoken drama), essentially Western nonmusical drama, was then imported and translated into Chinese, with favorites being works of Brecht, Shakespeare, and

Chekhov. Chinese authors, such as Cao Yu and Lao She, wrote their own plays using this dramatic style.

Drama in the People's Republic of China

During much of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), all theater was banished except for eight plays and one ballet. The plays, focused on concerns of workers, were performed in the style of traditional opera but without its elegant costuming. In 1972, the ban on theater was lifted, with traditional and new performances again becoming significant aspects of Chinese culture.

After the 1976 fall of the Gang of Four (the four people held responsible for implementing the Cultural Revolution), the "model" operas of the Cultural Revolution were no longer performed. During the next ten years, an open-door policy initiated an influx of foreign drama and theatrical personnel into China as well as an opportunity for Chinese artists to bring Chinese opera to America and Europe; Arthur Miller directed *Death of a Salesman* in Beijing in 1983, and the Shanghai Kunqu Troupe toured Europe with a *Kunqu*-styled production of *Macbeth* in 1988. Dramatic developments focused on experimental and social-problem plays. A Jia and other theorists began to elaborate on the result of combining Western schools of acting, especially the Stanislavsky method, with traditional Chinese drama form and with artistic elements taken from ancient Chinese poetics and painting. The result is an evolving style of drama, uniquely Chinese, combining realism and well-defined characters with performative techniques that focus on the actor's presence.

Although many of China's new works have developed under the auspices of major institutions, such as the Beijing People's Art Theater, China's minority groups have also actively produced works of their own. Two well-recognized productions are *The Battle of Potala Palace* by the Tibet Autonomous Regional Drama Troupe and *Hello, Standard-Bearer* by the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Drama Troupe. In 2000, the Nobel Prize for Literature was awarded to Chinese dissident Gao Xingjian, author of *Chezhan* (The Bus Stop) and *Bi An* (The Other Shore).

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See also: **Beijing Opera; Gao Xingjian; Lao She; Liang Qichao; Xiqu**

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DRAMA—INDIA India has a long tradition of dramatic forms dating as early as Mauryan times (c. 324–c. 200 BCE). The *Natya Sastra* of Bharata (flourished second century CE), a treatise on dance and acting, became the bible of Indian performers. Regional folk traditions like *kathakali*, *yatra*, and *yakshagana* enriched Indian drama. Indian theater as it exists today, however, appeared in India in the nineteenth century, as did European drama.

During the nineteenth century traditional Indian plays were written and acted to highlight the evils of society and the consequences of British rule. There were also dramatic presentations of plays translated from Western sources, particularly Shakespeare. The National Theatre of Calcutta, the first public theater in India, was created in 1872. Itinerant Parsi drama companies also attracted large crowds due to the plays' humor and grand spectacle. The *Krishnakumari* (1861) of Madhusudan Dutt, the *Niladarpan* (1860) of Dinabandhu Mitra, the *Kanchi Kaveri* (1880) of Ramshankar Ray, and the *Lalita Dukh Darsak* (1864) of Ranchodhbhai Udayram were some notable nineteenth-century plays.

In the beginning of the twentieth century, powerful dramatic literature began to appear not only in English, but in many Indian languages. The playwrights Sri Aurobindo, T. P. Kailasham, and Harindranath Chattopadhyay wrote in English. Iswar Chandra Nanda wrote plays in the Panjabi tongue, highlighting social problems. Imtiaz Ali's *Anarkali* was much acclaimed. P. Sambandha Mudaliyar brought new direction to the Tamil-language stage. Annapurna Theater kept the Oriya-language dramas alive. The *Gayopakhyaana* of Chilakamarti Lakshminarasimgha was well received by Telugu-speaking audiences. K. M. Munshi, Jayashankar Prasad, and D. L. Ray wrote plays in Gujarati, Hindi, and Bengali, respectively. The *Rakta Karabi* of Rabindranath Tagore is a landmark in Indian theater.

In 1943, the Indian People's Theatre Association began a progressive trend encompassing all of India. In the 1950s, new names came on the scene. Badal Sircar earned fame by introducing new forms. Instead of writing in regional languages, Girish Karnad, Vijay Tendulkar, Mohan Rakesh, and Adya Rangachari became all-India figures. *Ghashiram Kotwal* by Vijay Tendulkar was acclaimed throughout the country.

The Kendirya Sangeet Natak Academy and National School of Drama gave new direction to Indian drama. B. V. Karnath, Habib Tanvir, and Rattan Thiyam directed many modern plays. The *Bitter Harvest* by Manjula Padmanvan received international acclaim. By then there was a strong interplay between drama and film; many well-known film actors got their start on the stage.

Patit Paban Misbra

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DRAMA—JAPAN *This article deals with Western drama in Japan; traditional dramatic forms, such as Kabuki, are covered under their own names.*

Modern theater in Japan began as an attempt to import wholesale Western drama and theater of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Its development occurred in three stages, characterized first by adaptation, then borrowing, and finally rejection of Euro-American models. When Japan was forcibly opened to foreign commerce and diplomacy in the early Meiji period (1868–1912), the arts of Europe, and later America, flooded into Japan along with political, social, and economic ideas. Learning from Ibsen, Chekhov, Shaw, and Stanislavsky, young playwrights and directors staged Japanese versions of contemporary European drama that represented the present world in contrast to the ancient and feudal worlds dramatized by Noh, Kabuki, and Bunraku. Many producing companies emerged in the 1920s and 1930s, only to be suppressed during World War II for being too Western in orientation. In the half-century following Japan's wartime defeat, modern drama flourished, and in the early 2000s hundreds of troupes perform in newly built, state-of-the-art theaters.

Shinpa

In 1899, the young politically active actor-director Kawakami Otojiro (1864–1911) and his wife, Sa-

dayakko (1871–1946), embarked on the first of four trips to the United States and Europe, where they performed before elite Western intellectuals. Sadayakko received ecstatic reviews. More important than their success in bringing Japanese theater to the West was the opportunity their travels gave them to see Henry Irving, Ellen Terry, and Sarah Bernhardt onstage. Returning home, they performed *Hamlet* and *Othello* with contemporary Japanese settings. The style of performance, in which Western and Japanese theaters and cultures melded, was called Shinpa (new school) to contrast it with old-school Kabuki, which was rooted in the feudal age. Through the 1920s several Shinpa troupes staged newly written plays that dramatized urban life in Japan, mixing actresses and *onnagata* (men playing women's roles). The major Shinpa star before and after the war was the actress Mizutani Yaeko (1905–1979). Today a single Shinpa troupe continues under the management of the Shochiku Theater Company.

Shingeki

In contrast to diluting European art through adaptations, directors and actors of the Shingeki (new theater) movement attempted to replicate European plays as authentically as possible. In 1906, scholar Tsubouchi Shoyo (1859–1935) formed the Literary Arts Society (Bungei Kyokai) at Waseda University in Tokyo; it was dedicated to training students in Western realistic acting. The group's star, Matsui Sumako (1886–1919), was Japan's first modern actress. Director Osanai Kaoru (1881–1928) and Kabuki actor Ichikawa Sadanji II (1880–1940) founded the Free Theater (Jiyu Gekijo), in which professional Kabuki actors and young amateur actresses joined in epochal productions of Ibsen and Gorky. Kabuki actors, especially *onnagata*, found it difficult to abandon stylized acting, and the Free Theater was able to take only a few steps toward a genuinely modern theater. Authors in their twenties, such as Kikuchi Kan (1888–1948), Yamamoto Yuzo (1887–1974), and Tanizaki Junichiro (1886–1965), who went on to become famous novelists and playwrights, were stimulated to write plays in the style of Ibsen, Shaw, and Chekhov.

The construction of the 500-seat Tsukiji Little Theater (Tsukiji Shogekijo) in 1924 marked a major step in breaking away from traditional theater. The first theater in Japan expressly designed for modern drama, it was the brainchild of Hijikata Yoshi (1898–1959) and Osanai Kaoru. Hijikata and Osanai directed more than one hundred recent plays by O'Neill, Strindberg, Capek, Pirandello, and other Western playwrights, largely ignoring newly written

Japanese plays. Osanai's sudden death in 1928 precipitated a breakup of the theater into progressive and artistic factions; Hijikata became a leader of the progressive camp and later established the New Tsukiji Troupe (Shin Tsukiji Gekidan).

Shingeki was severely suppressed during World War II. In August 1940, the police arrested more than one hundred Shingeki artists, and thereafter most troupes were ordered to disband. Following Japan's defeat in the war, the American Occupation supported Shingeki as a means of conveying democracy and liberal ideas. During the 1950s, Shingeki was a major cultural force, and scores of troupes contributed to its reinvigoration. Socially concerned theater artists formed the People's Art Theater (Gekidan Mingei) to bring serious drama to village audiences and workers. Members of the Advance Theater (Zenshinza), who joined the Communist Party en masse, brought both Kabuki and modern drama to youth audiences throughout the country. Postwar playwrights whose works can be read in English include Mishima Yukio (1925–1970), Kinoshita Junji (b. 1914), Tanaka Chikao (b. 1905), and Abe Kobo (1924–1990).

The 1960s saw an abrupt rejection of the values of Western-based, realistic Shingeki and an explosion of experimentation in new theatrical and dramatic forms, known variously as *angura* (underground), *han-Shingeki* (anti-Shingeki), or *shogekijo* (little theater). Ohta Shogo (b. 1939) exposed the existential nature of human life in wordless dumb shows in his "theater of silence." Hijikata Tatsumi (1928–1986) and Ohno Kazuo (b. 1906) created a profoundly unsettling "dance of darkness," *Ankoku Butoh*, in which naked performers appear as tortured ghosts from another world.

During Japan's bubble economy of the 1980s, more than forty high-tech theater complexes were built throughout the country, and theater companies found generous subsidies. Despite a severe economic slowdown in the 1990s, the modern theater scene is diverse and active. On any given day in Tokyo, more than 150 performances of modern drama and theater are staged. Performance art, high-tech staging, and video art reflect Japan's digital age. Collaborations among contemporary and traditional performers are increasingly common. The latest teen idols of the music industry crossing over into theater compete with old-line Shingeki troupes; new productions by Suzuki, Ohta, and Ninagawa; and explorations in *Butoh*. Each holds a segment of a diverse audience for contemporary theater.

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See also: **Bunraku; Kabuki; Noh-Kyogen**

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DRAMA—KOREA Although scores of court and folk dances and dance-dramas are known in Korea, no forms using dramatic scripts evolved until the twentieth century. Masked-dance dramas (dramas or farces featuring masked performers) are especially characteristic of Korea and were performed throughout the Three Kingdoms era (37 BCE–935 CE), which includes the kingdoms of Koguryo, Paekche, and Shilla. The earliest records mention annual or biennial festivals honoring heaven; people danced and sang at these events to cement their tribal identities and may have used specific themes or stories to dramatize the dances.

Early Forms

In the later years of the Koguryo kingdom (37 BCE–668 CE), an influx of music and dance entered the central courts from the foreign courts of the Sui (581–618) and Tang (618–907) dynasties of China and from Central Asian sources, profoundly affecting the development of elite entertainment. In the neighboring kingdom of Paekche (18 BCE–663 CE), a presentation developed called *kiak* ("skill performance"). *Kiak* seems to have been a pantomime consisting of ten scenes with Buddhist ceremonial characteristics. It was probably performed by a masked dancer and no doubt aimed to promote Buddhism.

While essentially no evidence of drama survives from the Shilla kingdom (57 BCE–935 CE), theatrical presentations in the Unified Shilla (668–935) had probably existed, perhaps in a simpler form, in earlier times as well. One such form, *choyong kamu* ("to-tolerate-punishment song and dance") evolved through stages from the worship of mountain and dragon deities to entertainments that became a verse-drama form by the Koryo (918–1392) and Choson dynasties (1392–1910). In the courts of these dynasties, skits satirizing corrupt officials were often presented; one skit concerned a loyal soldier of the twelfth century, Ho Kong Jin.

Masked Drama and the Rise of Professional Organizations

In the Koryo and Choson eras, an important genre of dance-drama featuring masked performers began to be performed on upper-level stages, a practice that gave the name of the stages, *sandae* ("mountain platform"), to the presentations. Also in these eras, professional associations of performers, assembling to perform various specialties, aided dramatic development. New political ideas, and especially the dictate to reject Buddhism and respect Confucianism, influenced writings.

Furthermore, as a result of the schism between the aristocratic and common classes beginning in the Koryo period and continuing through the Choson era, performers began to specialize in particular skills. The *p'ansori*, or narrative song, became a popular entertainment under this continuing evolution of dramatic song and dance forms. Puppet plays staged by traveling performers were also a favorite attraction in the countryside. The dramas staged in many of the puppet plays are like those of the masked dance-dramas, and the same characters found in the *sandae* forms appear again as puppets.

Modern Korean Drama

In the twentieth century, Korea adopted Western realistic drama forms. Yi In-jik, returning from studying in Japan, wrote and staged the so-called New Dramas at the Wongaksa Theater in Seoul beginning in 1908. He was followed in 1911 by Im Song-gu, who focused on popular romantic sentiments in what became known as New-School Plays. The Drama Arts Society was organized in 1921, mostly by students returning from Japan, and the T'owolhoe (Earth-Moon Society) was formed in 1923 by students then studying in Japan. Though an amateur society, the T'owolhoe was consistently acclaimed for its high artistic standards and for introducing realistic themes. Its repertoire consisted mostly of original works written by its membership, but it also included translations and adaptations of world masterpieces. In 1931, the Society for the Study of Dramatic Arts was organized by the elite of Korea's theatrical and literary circles. This group presented great works of world drama as well as original scripts by its members.

Japanese authorities closed theater after theater during its rule over Korea (1910–1945), but the establishment of the Republic of Korea (1948) paved the way for a National Theater in 1950. The Drama Center of the Seoul Institute of Arts was established in 1962 by the dramatist Yu Chi-jin. Numerous young

writers in the 1970s adapted traditional theatrical forms such as the masked dance-dramas, shamanic rituals, and *p'ansori* into new works, a trend that influences theatrical practice to this day. O T'ae-sok is the most celebrated of the playwrights who have achieved national prominence. Drama in the 1990s has continued to flourish in Seoul with a growing interest in staging musicals.

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DRAMA—SOUTH ASIA Dance-dramas, both classical and folk or popular, have long been a part of South Asian culture. Many of these forms draw on the epics of the *Ramayana* (c. 300 BCE) and the *Mahabharata* (c. fifth century BCE) for their story lines. Performance styles of folk forms vary greatly, often reflecting the diverse religious traditions of each region. Classical forms evolved out of the system of dramatic theory and practice found first in the Sanskrit theater and are still present in the South Asian region.

Sanskrit Theater (c. 1000 BCE–Twelfth Century CE)

The oldest dramatic form, Sanskrit theater, is often considered to have had its origin in the dialogues of the Vedic hymns of the Rig Veda (c. 1000 BCE); the Vedic ritual performances featuring song, dance, chant, and impersonation that were staged for various deities; or to have developed from epic recitations. The earliest extant critical work on Sanskrit drama, the *Natya Sastra* (attributed to Bharata; flourished second century CE), reflects a highly sophisticated tradition of dramaturgy and theatrical activity already in practice by this time.

Although scholars disagree, the *Natya Sastra* is generally held to reflect a theatrical tradition that began in the ancient Gandhara region, covering areas now located in Afghanistan, northern India, and Pakistan. A prescriptive work, it describes a rigidly fixed system of theatrical presentation, according to which staging

was crafted and plays constructed throughout the lengthy history of Sanskrit drama. At its base are four styles of performance—the Verbal, the Grand, the Energetic, and the Graceful—which are further divided into specific varieties of action. According to the *Natya Sastra*, from out of these styles derive ten dramatic classifications ranging from elaborate multiact plots of the *nataka* (concerned with stories and characters out of legends) and *prakarana* (requiring an "original" plot from the author) to simple balladlike forms performed by a single performer. All classifications work toward an aesthetic sharing of emotions (categorized into eight primary *rasa*, or "flavors") between the actor and audience. The remarkably persistent use of these presentational guidelines continued until the decline of Sanskrit drama, which began in the tenth century CE and was complete by the twelfth century CE.

On reading a Sanskrit drama for the first time, a reader is most immediately impressed by the melding of prose and poetry in the language of the play. The remarkably descriptive passages lead the audience to imagine the environment and, therefore, stage settings—necessary in traditional Western theater—can be dispensed with. The extant scripts were only a part of the complicated performance activity; because the staging of a play was considered in its totality a visual sacrifice in the *Natya Sastra*, ritual acts of dance, chant, and song were integral to the performance.

According to Bharata, a Sanskrit drama performance began with eighteen preliminary actions, the first nine involving various prescriptive means of tuning instruments and preparations for dancers and singers. A curtain was removed and the presentation began, according to the *Natya Sastra*, with a series of songs, ritual actions, and recitations. The ritual preliminaries continued with a short scene played between the stage manager, a clown, and an attendant. Finally, a brief synopsis of the play and an appeal for the success of the presentation were made by the stage manager.

The major Sanskrit playwrights include Asvaghosa (80?–150 CE), Bhasa (c. third century CE), King Sudraka (c. fifth century), Kalidasa (c. fifth century), Bhavabhuti (flourished 700), Harsa (c. 590–647), and Visakadatta. It is important to note that of the primary authors of Sanskrit drama, all except Bhasa (of whom the least is known) were members of court environments (two, Harsa and Sudraka, were kings). Sanskrit drama was written and performed by professional troupes for court audiences, and their authors, at least, were members of the highest social class. The royal patronage of Sanskrit drama certainly contributed to

its lengthy history, providing a sheltered environment for its traditions of highly codified activity to develop. The essence of Sanskrit performance, as dictated by the *Natya Sastra*, is still alive in the tradition of classical forms of South Asia.

Classical Theater Forms

The *kuttiyatam* of Kerala, the oldest extant theatrical form in India (and, quite possibly, in the world), probably began as a regional derivation of Sanskrit theater and became well-developed in its own terms prior to the tenth century. Performed by male actors born into a special caste of performers, *kuttiyatam* presentations originally took place only in theaters constructed in temple compounds, but they now may be seen occasionally in more commercial venues. Performances still include extensive preliminary ritual preparations and require a lifetime of training to achieve a level of virtuosity in various verbal and physical techniques that closely resemble those discussed in the *Natya Sastra*.

Classical Indian forms such as *bharata natyam* and *kathakali*, among others, owe much to the traditions formed in Sanskrit theater. *Bharata natyam*, while often classified as a dance form of South India, requires an increasingly dramatic portrayal from the solo performer throughout the course of an evening's performance. *Kathakali*, perhaps the most internationally known theater form of India, dramatizes the epics using a particularly vivacious style of acting melded with singing and dancing. *Chau*, a dance-drama form (masked in two of its three forms), is found only in three districts of western India and is considered a classical form by the elite of one district who once served as patrons. The *yaksa gana* of Mysore is a dance-drama form featuring not only actor-dancers but also a narrator who uses both song and recitation to establish elements of the story. The *kandyan* dramatic dance of Sri Lanka also demonstrates many Sanskrit features.

Folk and Popular Forms

While many of the numerous folk and popular dramatic forms of the South Asian region are related, most are specifically associated with a single region and, in many cases, linked to a particular urban or rural area. It has been argued that the sophisticated presentation of the Sanskrit theater developed out of popular forms, and, with its decline, various forms of popular theater reemerged from the remnants. While this may be true for some folk and popular theater forms, many others developed out of tribal practices.

The Bengali *jatra* originally focused on stories of Krishna but now characteristically presents social and political commentaries to enthusiastic audiences in Bangladesh and the Indian states of West Bengal, Orissa, and Bihar. *Svang*, a narrative, operatic form of North India, has influenced variant forms, such as the northern *nautanki*, the *khyal* of Rajasthan, and the *maach* of Madhya Pradesh. Amateur rural theater, performed in regional languages and focusing on social issues, has become especially important in Bangladesh, Kashmir, and Pakistan in recent years. Parsi theater, dating to the second half of the nineteenth century and featuring large-budgeted productions, toured the subcontinent—beginning in the 1870s, peaking in the 1890s, and dwindling after 1925—influencing the growth of similar theatrical enterprises.

The urban theater of Mumbai (Bombay) and Calcutta is well developed; over three thousand troupes are registered in Calcutta and over five hundred in Mumbai, while only a few dozen exist in each of the other major urban areas of Delhi, Colombo, and Dhaka. Most plays presented in the urban areas are realistic. The generally middle- and upper-middle-class audiences see Western plays in translation as well as farces, social dramas, and experimental productions in regional languages. Few actors or directors are able to sustain a living on the salaries earned for stage per-

formances; many (especially young actors in Mumbai) hope to secure passage into the more lucrative Hindi film industry through their participation in plays.

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DRAMA—SOUTHEAST ASIA Numerous theatrical genres developed in Southeast Asia as a result of influences coming from India, the Islamic nations, and China. Additionally, as indigenous theater practices crossed national borders in the Southeast Asian region, they influenced new developments in adjoining countries. Finally, in many of the individual nations that collectively compose the region of



A man operates shadow puppets in a shadow theater in Wayang Kulit, Java, Indonesia, in 1992. (CHARLES & JOSETTE LENARS/CORBIS)

Southeast Asia, local forms evolved as specific responses to political and social conditions.

While primary elements of form differ between theater genres from area to area, certain dramatic elements are shared by most types of plays. Epic stories, often featuring the fall of kingdoms or great battles involving kings and gods, make up the dramatic text of performances throughout the region. Comic, serious, and farcical sentiments are collectively present in most plays, and most drama serves a didactic purpose, demonstrating the victory of good over evil.

Indonesia

Many ancient forms of theater are still popular in the Javanese-speaking area of the island of Java. *Wayang kulit* (leather shadow-puppet theater), the most popular form of theater in Southeast Asia, was well established by the time of its inclusion in twelfth-century court literature. Rulers patronized performances that took place during religious events. In *wayang kulit*, a *dalang* (a person functioning as a puppeteer, orchestral conductor, priest, and narrator combined) manipulates up to two hundred puppets in a drama beginning at dusk and continuing until dawn. A gamelan orchestra, composed of multiple chimelike instruments struck in repetitive rhythms, accompanies the action. The elegant puppets, intricately incised with cutout designs and subsequently coated with colored paint and gold, developed their current form between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries. The movable arms of the puppets, especially effective in the display of battle actions, were added during the final period of this development. During the eighteenth century, puppet sets included up to 400 puppets. By the nineteenth century, puppet shapes and coloring had become fixed.

During the performance, the *dalang* sits on one side of a white screen (*kelir*), originally lit by the flickers of an oil lamp but today usually by electric light. Audiences may sit on either side of the *kelir*, the side opposite where the *dalang* sits being favored to see the shadows on the screen. By sitting on the *dalang's* side, however, his skilled puppet manipulation and his tour-de-force vocal performance can be more clearly observed. The cycles of plays performed in *wayang kulit*, collectively known as the *purwa* (old) cycle, feature Java's most ancient myths, including those borrowed from the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*.

Several forms developed out of *wayang kulit*, each practiced almost exclusively in court environments. A derivative known as *wayang madja* (middle theater) employs leather puppets to tell stories of legendary Ja-



A Thai dancer performing traditional costumed dance. (CORBIS)

vanese kings. The shadow-puppet form of *wayang gedog*, created in the sixteenth century, dramatizes stories of the Javanese prince Panji. *Wayang klitik* uses wooden puppets enacting the rise of Damarwulan from village youth to national hero during the Majapahit era (1293–c. 1520). *Wayang dupara* depicts historic events from the central Javanese trade and cultural center of Surakarta. The Java War of the early nineteenth century provides the leather-puppet dramas of the *wayang Djawa*, and the period of Dutch rule is portrayed in the *wayang wabana*. *Wayang beber*, a puppetless form originally performed as a religious ritual, features a *dalang* punctuating his presentation by referring to illustrations painted on long scrolls, which he unwinds to musical accompaniment.

Wayang orang (literally, "human theater") also sprang up in the courts at some time prior to the fourteenth century. Stories taken from the mythology of early kingdoms were enacted by an unmasked human cast using dance and song, which was at times impro-

vised by the actors. Another form featuring human performers is *wayang topeng* (masked theater), which probably developed as a result of the influence of Indian dance dramas on indigenous animistic rituals. The *wayang Menak*, also known as *wayang tengul*, which uses leather puppets, depicts stories of the Islamic hero Amir Hamzah of the late sixth–early seventh century.

Developed in the twentieth century, *ketoprak* and *ludruk* are popular attractions. *Ketoprak* originated in central Java as a dramatic form based on stamping rhythms from rice-planting activities and uses dance-acting to dramatize Javanese legends. Performances today are fairly naturalistic and exclude dance, although both song and dance may precede the central play. Improvised dialogue is used by both male and female performers, and wing-and-drop scenery is conventionally employed. *Ludruk*, commonly associated with the city of Surabaya, developed in eastern Java. Although it traces its origins to an animistic form called *ludruk lerog*, today it is a realistic, spoken entertainment concerned with modern life; domestic comedies are particularly popular. Song and dance may be performed in the intervals between scenes, and a traditional dance known as *ngremo* precedes every *ludruk*. An unusual feature of *ludruk* is the appearance of female impersonators, rarely found in realistic theater forms in which women are included as cast members.

The western Sundanese region of Java developed a doll-puppet form called *wayang golek*. Because daytime performances were more popular than evening ones in this region, the doll-puppets supplanted the newly introduced *wayang kulit* during the nineteenth century. While Islamic themes with a proselytizing function initially supplied the dramatic content of *wayang golek*, present-day stories are intended primarily to entertain. The *dalang* has been replaced in most presentations by a female singer who performs popular songs. Sundanese theater also includes theatrical stagings called *sandiwara*, which may include dramatizations of scenes from the *Ramayana* and the *Mababharata* in the style of *wayang orang*, history plays presented in the style of *ketoprak*, or more realistic dramas depicting contemporary life.

Balinese *wayang kulit* is similar to its Javanese model, but simpler: the performance lasts only four hours, the puppet designs are less intricately patterned, and there are only sixty or seventy puppets in a set. Plots continue to be taken from the *Ramayana* and the *Mababharata*, but significant legends of the Balinese are also dramatized. In *wayang wong*, a Balinese derivative of *wayang orang*, characters often wear masks.

Since *wayang wong* was developed in the villages, the overall environment of a presentation contrasts greatly with the sophisticated court atmosphere of a *wayang orang* production. Only stories from the *Ramayana* are staged in *wayang wong*. Most important, where in *wayang orang* dance is featured, in *wayang wong* performers emphasize poetic recitation.

Wayang topeng is also popular in Bali, its masked performers remaining silent throughout the dance-drama in contrast to the presentation of Javanese *topeng*, in which characters may employ dialogue. A theatrical ritual known as the *barong* dance-drama presents a cosmic story relating the balance between good and evil. Chaos is magically ousted from the community through the reenactment of a fight between the lion-like figure of the *barong* and a witch named Rangda. Villagers, wielding sharp knives in a state of trance, join in the fight but neither Rangda nor the *barong* can be destroyed: the play's conclusion is a balance demonstrated between the forces of good and evil.

Thailand

Traditional Thai theater consists of several performance genres. The two most important classical forms are the *khon*, a masked court dance-drama in which scenes are staged from the *Ramayana* (called *Ramakien* in Thailand), and the *lakon*, a term covering various forms of dance-dramas. In addition, there is *likay*, a rural folk play in which actors boisterously improvise comic or melodramatic dialogue interspersed with dance and music, as well as *nang yai* or *nang talung* shadow-plays, found in southern Thailand.

The *khon* masked drama adopted movements from Indian temple dancing. During the Ayutthaya period (1350–1767), the *khon* was enacted by male court retainers playing both male and female roles. By the mid-1800s, men and women were performing together. *Khon* performances are characterized by their combination of song, dance, and acting. Actors and actresses are masked, and only clown characters speak onstage; narrative verses are usually recited and sung by a chorus sitting with the accompanying woodwind and percussion musical ensemble.

Generally in *lakon* and *khon*, little scenery is used, but costumes and props can be very elaborate. The oldest form of *lakon*, and indeed of all Thai theater, is the *lakon jatri* or "sorcerer theater." Beginning as an animistic ritual, *lakon jatri* developed into a dramatic form after Indian dance traditions were introduced into the telling of the Buddhist *jataka* tale of Manora; the theatrical form itself came to be known as *manora*. During the fourteenth century, *lakon jatri* arrived in

the central capital and evolved into *lakon nok* (also called *manora*), which relies less on dance and more on contemporary dialogue and bawdy humor.

Likay, a popular theater genre, developed at the beginning of the twentieth century. *Likay* is found primarily only in Bangkok today, but during the 1920s and 1930s hundreds of *likay* troupes attracted audiences throughout Thailand. A solo singer initiates the performance; then an actor engages the singer in a dialogue and introduces the drama. Common stories are taken from literature or history.

The puppet theaters of Thailand include both doll and shadow-theater forms. The *nang yai* shadow-theater is an ancient form that influenced the development of *khon*. Scenes from the *Ramakien* are performed to musical accompaniment.

Under King Chulalongkorn, Western forms of drama began to be popular. Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*, *As You Like It*, and *The Merchant of Venice*, as well as a number of English, French, and classical Sanskrit plays were translated by King Vajiravadh. Today many playwrights produce dramas written in the form of Western spoken drama or in a fusion of Western spoken drama and traditional Thai forms. One of the most widely produced playwrights is Supa Devakul, a writer of popular novels and of plays for stage and screen.

Laos

While few, the theater forms of Laos are diverse. *Mob lam* (literally, "singer of *lam*") is a folksinging performance originally involving a duet composed of a singer and a *khene* (reed organ) player. Developing out of the Buddhist melodic storytelling popular since the first millennium CE, early forms of *mob lam* included topics such as accounts of local and court news, bawdy ditties, and epic stories from the *Rama Jataka* (the Laotian *Ramayana*, containing strong Buddhist elements). Today, the popular presentations feature two singers competitively improvising love poems, according to strict traditional formulas.

In another form of *lam*, *lam luong*, the *mob lam* originally enacted all the roles, changing costume and movement with each character. Now, influenced by Thai *likay*, as many as thirty people perform the various roles.

Modeled after Khmer court performance in the fourteenth century, Laotian court theater (*lakon phrarak phraram*) included female dance, masked male dance, shadow-theater, and musical presentations. Patronized by the court, the elegant presentations were

refashioned to favor Thai stylistic elements after the Thai conquest of the Khmer kingdom. Remnants of *lakon phrarak phraram* are now occasionally staged in Laos and in overseas areas to demonstrate traditional culture.

Modern spoken drama (*lakon wau*) was introduced to Laos during the early 1980s. Today the National Drama Company presents works derived mainly from improvisations or adapted from Laotian legends, as well as translations of Western classics.

Cambodia

Thirteenth-century reliefs found at Angkor Wat testify that a form resembling Indian dance existed in the Khmer courts. Indian dance, and possibly dance-drama, probably accompanied Buddhism into Cambodia between the fourth and ninth centuries. Javanese dance-drama was also brought into the Khmer court by its Javanese founder, Jayavarman II (802–869). The court asserted its cultural identity by evolving an elegant classical dance-drama tradition maintained until the fall of Angkor in 1431. At this time, Siamese (Thai) forces transplanted the Khmer court along with its theatrical forms to Siam. During the nineteenth century, Thai classical dance, modeled after the transplanted Khmer dance-drama, was carried back into Cambodian courts; further developments created a repertoire of dance-dramas performed until the Pol Pot massacre of court performers. The government of Cambodia now cultivates this traditional dance, previously restricted to the court, at the National Theater Company, which also features Khmer shadow-puppetry and circus. Her Royal Highness Bopha Devi, a former classical dancer and the daughter of King Sihanouk, is now the minister of culture and is actively seeking to restore the vitality of Cambodian arts, including drama.

Popular twentieth-century theater forms include *lakon yike* and *lakon bassac*. *Lakon yike* resembles Thai *likay* in that both mix classical and contemporary choreography and instrumentation. *Lakon bassac*, featuring traits found in classical Vietnamese theater, Khmer theater, and even Hindi and Western movies, developed as traveling performers of different styles stopped at villages along the Bassac River. Modern spoken drama, originally in French, entered Cambodia in the 1940s. Plays focus on Khmer society.

Myanmar (Burma)

Sixteenth-century traveling entertainers performed Burmese spirit-plays, wherein a clown played the primary role. The existing *nat pwe*, in which a medium

performs Indian-like dance movements, descends from this form.

Captured Thai prisoners brought Thai classical dance-drama into the Burmese courts in 1767. At first presenting the Thai *Ramayana*, Burmese dramatists soon crafted their own adaptations and wrote new plays based on Burmese stories, until the demise of the court dance-drama with the British conquest a century later. Musical and dance characteristics of the Burmese courts continue, however, in the classical *zat pwe* musical plays found in central and southern Burma.

Vietnam

From the thirteenth through the early twentieth centuries, Chinese opera was reconfigured to please Vietnamese courtiers. While the new plays reflected Vietnamese concerns, performance elements continued to use costuming and makeup, conventionalized action, and symbolic use of scenery found in traditional Chinese opera. Popular throughout central Vietnam until the end of the nineteenth century, *bat boi* has practically disappeared since losing its court support. In the twentieth century, two popular variations of *bat boi* evolved: *tuong tau* and *cai luong*. Each adopted Vietnamese melodies, replacing the Chinese musical system of *bat boi*. Both added scenery and sought new dramas from Vietnamese history and love stories. The *tuong tau* repertoire was eventually subsumed into *cai luong*, effectively combining the two forms into one.

Modern spoken drama (*kich*) began in the cities with the introduction of French plays. It developed a variety-show format in which a half-hour play follows two hours of musical entertainment.

One of the most unusual forms of puppetry in the world is also found in Vietnam. Puppeteers stand on one side of a body of water and by using long strings operate puppets located on an island or a boat between the operators and their audiences. The spectators gather on the banks of the opposite shore to watch.

Malaysia

Javanese *wayang kulit* was introduced into Malaysia prior to the sixteenth century. Presented in Malay, stories came from Hindu and Islamic sources. An ensemble of Malaysian instruments replaced the Javanese gamelan. Some regional dance-dramas resemble Thai *likay* in their combination of dance, drama, opera, and comedy.

Bangsawan originated in Penang in the late nineteenth century. An operatic theater form, it combines

improvised dialogue, singing, dancing, martial combat, music, poetry, and comedy. Chinese opera is also popular with the Chinese community, although it is now in danger of losing its audiences since many younger Malaysian Chinese do not speak Chinese.

The Philippines

Epic recitations, brought by early Malay and Indonesian settlers and possibly also emerging from the early Negrito culture of the indigenous population, date to the pre-Hispanic era in the Philippines. In the seventeenth century, Spanish missionaries created the *moro-moro* play, or *komedya*, dramatizing through marches, stage combat, and music the Christian conquest of the Moors. A passion play, known as *sinakulo*, is still enacted during Lent.

During the period of U.S. colonization (1898–1945), the operetta form of the *zarzuela* was played before officials and traders. Anti-American sentiments and other social concerns fueled new dramas. Subsequently, companies turned primarily to Western drama, staging Shakespeare and musicals. Noted modern Filipino playwrights include Wilfrido Ma, Guerrero, Severino Montano, and Bienvenido Noriega.

Singapore

Reflecting its ethnically diverse population, Singaporean theater includes nonprofessional Chinese opera, called *wayang* by the Singaporeans; *bharata natyam* and *kathakali* (Indian classical dance forms), danced by committed amateurs in the Indian community; and Western dramas, musicals, and experimental forms staged by young directors. Singapore is home to Southeast Asia's largest performing arts complex, the Esplanade-on-the-Bay, and interest in theater has steadily grown since the early 1990s, when the government reversed its previous stance opposing theater and acknowledged theater as economically important to the community.

Brunei

Since the nation of Brunei Darussalam achieved independence from Britain in 1983, both government and nongovernment organizations have been established to support the preservation of traditional theater forms and the development of new dramas and musicals. Primary producing groups include the Senandung Badaya Groups (KKBS), Rusilia, Darah Kedayan, Putera Seni, Kastea, and Astrawani. Traditional performances are generally dramatic pieces featuring various combinations of song, dance, humorous banter, trance, and martial arts display. The most pop-

ular forms are performed on special occasions such as marriages (*alus jua dindang*, song-dance), harvests (*aduk-aduk*, dance and the martial art form of *silat*), coronations (*alai sekap*, dance), festivals (*henari*, dance and humorous banter), or as cures for sicknesses (*anding*, trance dance).

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See also: **Drama—Thailand; Literature—Laos; Literature—Myanmar; Music—Southeast Asia; Ramakien**

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DRAMA—THAILAND The principal traditional dramatic genres of Thailand are *khon* (masked drama), *lakhon* (dance-drama), *likay* (folk opera), *nang* (shadow theater) and *hun* (puppet theater). While there is a secondary school that specializes in training children to become classical performers, opportunities to pursue a career in traditional theater are extremely limited, for public performances are few and far between. Thai scholars writing in the 1930s often lamented the decline of traditional theatrical genres. Attempts to revive and revitalize the traditions have had limited success, although drama continues to be widely promoted as a symbol of national identity. Images of Thai classical drama are represented widely in advertisements and greeting cards in the form of souvenir dolls, ornamental *khon* masks, and miniature shadow puppets, while much-abbreviated performances are staged in restaurants for the benefit of foreign tourists.

Khon

The origins of *khon* are uncertain, but the prototype is generally believed to have existed in the fourteenth century CE. The most distinctive feature of *khon* performances is that nearly all the actors, with the exception of those taking female roles, wear elaborately painted masks. Performances are based on episodes in the *Ramakien* (the Thai retelling of the Hindu epic the *Ramayana*), with battle scenes in which the hero Phra Ram vanquishes the villain Thotsakan particularly popular. It is a convention of Thai theater, however, not to portray Thotsakan's death onstage, as it is be-



A Buddhist puppet used in Thai drama. (WERNER FORMAN/CORBIS)

lieved to bring misfortune. The story is narrated in verse by a chorus and there is an accompanying musical ensemble. The style of dancing and martial posturing, unlike the *lakhon* style mentioned below, puts emphasis on leg and body movements rather than refined hand gestures. Until the 1930s all parts were taken by male actors.

Lakhon

Lakhon emerged during the Ayutthaya period (1351–1767). It is subdivided into *lakhon nok* (dance-drama of the outside), performed outside the royal court, and *lakhon nai* (dance-drama of the inside), performed within the royal court. The differences between the two lie in the stories performed, style of dancing, musical accompaniment, and costume. The

stories performed in *lakbon nai* are taken from the epic poems known as the *Ramakien*, *Inao*, and *Unarut*. Traditionally, and as still practiced, women took both male and female parts, with men confined to playing the part of clowns. Performers do not wear masks unless taking the part of monkeys or demons; graceful arm movements and elaborate hand gestures are the outstanding characteristics of the dance movements, which are accompanied by an offstage chorus and a small orchestra. By contrast, *lakbon nok* is a folk dance-drama that employs faster dance movements, more action, and scenes of comedy and melodrama; its repertoire is drawn from the *jataka* tales (tales of the past lives of the Buddha). *Lakbon nok* was traditionally performed by an all-male cast but later by mixed casts.

Likay

Likay is a part of traditional popular "low culture." It appeared toward the end of the reign of Rama V (1868–1910), blending elements of *lakbon nok* with music, singing, and dancing of Indian or Malay origin. A *likay* troupe traditionally consisted of a mixed cast of between twelve and forty players and musicians. It would normally perform on a makeshift stage at temple fairs, markets, and other public gatherings, using garishly painted backdrops for scenery. Its repertoire was drawn from well-known historical tales, folktales, and literary works, featuring an array of kings, clowns, and star-crossed lovers. The *likay* audience, which tended to be made up largely of lower-class women, did not expect highly stylized and polished performances from the comically overdressed and gaudily made-up cast. *Likay's* charm came from its brashness, its vulgarity, the amateurishness of the untrained performers' movements, and the often-bawdy improvised dialogue; and at the same time it provided a relaxed backdrop for gossiping, eating, drinking, and chewing betel. Today *likay* is a rapidly dying art form; although it could still be seen and heard regularly on the television and radio in the 1980s, it faces ever increasing difficulty in competing to attract young audiences away from newer, more sophisticated forms of entertainment.

Nang

Nang is the traditional Thai shadow play, developed during the Ayutthaya period; it employed large, elaborately drawn figures or scenes, usually taken from the *Ramakien*, which were embossed on dried buffalo hide and painted. They were then mounted on two sticks so that they could be held up, either in front of or behind an illuminated white sheet, which served as background. A chorus narrated the story while the shadow puppets

were moved across the screen by men who adopted dancing postures and steps to fit in with the story. It has been speculated that the shadow theater was a possible precursor of the *khon* masked drama, which was likewise originally performed before a screen, and in which the masked characters still try to present a side profile to the audience rather than a full face. Another kind of shadow theater, *nang talung*, which originated in southern Thailand, employed much smaller figures, each of which had one arm that moved. The first surviving references to *nang talung* are during the reign of Rama V, when it was introduced to Bangkok, but its origin was doubtless much earlier.

Hun

Now resurrected only occasionally, this traditional puppet theater, which dates from the nineteenth century, was confined to the royal elite. The string puppets were beautifully crafted and dressed in elaborate costumes; unlike Western puppets, their legs and arms were manipulated from below. Plays were taken from classical tales. A new form of puppet theater, *hun krabok*, emerged during the reign of Chulalongkorn (Rama V; reigned 1868–1910) in which the puppets' arms and legs were manipulated by bamboo rods; plays performed in this style usually offered scope for slapstick humor and the genre continued to enjoy some popularity up to the late 1940s. In recent years university drama departments have played an important role in trying to preserve the dying art of *hun krabok*.

During the reign of Chulalongkorn there was an attempt to introduce a "sung drama," *lakbon rong*, imitating Western operetta, while Rama VI (reigned 1910–1925) actively wrote and promoted Western-style plays, termed *lakbon phut*, as a means of promoting patriotism. In the 1930s the nationalistic plays of Luang Wichitwathakan were given government support, while less didactic plays began to appear during the 1940s when the import of foreign films was banned. Today, live Western-style plays are produced almost exclusively in university drama departments and reach only a very limited audience.

David Smyth

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DRAVIDIAN LANGUAGES In terms of the number of speakers the Dravidian language family is the fourth or fifth largest in the world. It consists of at least twenty-three languages spoken primarily in South Asia by about 230 million people. Zvelebil's 1997 survey enumerated eighty-eight languages, most of which are unwritten (nonliterary, preliterate), and many of which are probably dialects of other known languages. Some of these languages are reportedly spoken by 350 speakers (Allar or Chatan in Kerala) or even fewer (Wishavan or Malarkuti, 150 speakers, in Kerala; Cholanaickan of Nilambur forest, Kerala, 20 speakers).

The Indian Constitution (1951) established the creation of states in the Indian Union along linguistic lines. Four Dravidian languages, Telugu (55 million) in the state of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil (48 million) in Tamil Nadu, Kannada (27 million) in Karnataka, and Malayalam (27 million) in Kerala, were recognized as official languages. All of them have written literature of high quality and great antiquity, with early inscriptions in all four dating to between the third century BCE and the ninth century CE. In each language literary composition began one or two centuries after the first inscriptions. Each of these four literary languages developed a distinctive writing system (so-called alphasyllabic scripts), which can be traced back to southern varieties of the Asokan Brahmi script (used in India from around 250 BCE). A number of Dravidian words have made their way into English (e.g., rice, pepper, ginger, mango, coir, curry, cheroot, catamaran, carborundum).

Languages of the Family

The Dravidian linguistic family is usually described in terms of four subgroups: South Dravidian, South-Central Dravidian, Central Dravidian, and North Dravidian. These subgroups were established according to typological similarities and diachronic or historical reconstructions.

Apart from the three great literary languages of Tamil, Malayalam, and Kannada, South Dravidian encompasses a number of nonliterary or preliterate languages, including Kota, Toda, Irula, Kurumba, Kodagu, and Tulu. Tamil is one of India's two classical languages, alongside Sanskrit, and the only one of the two with continuity between classical and modern forms. Tamil has a number of regional and social dialects and is also spoken outside India, in Sri Lanka, Malaysia, South Africa, and elsewhere.

Between 800 and 1200 the western dialects of Tamil developed into Malayalam, spoken mostly in Kerala; Malayalam speakers boast the highest literacy rate in

the Indian Union. The Nilgiri Mountains are home to a number of nonliterary languages such as Badaga, Kota, Toda, Irula, and Kurumba. Despite the small number of speakers, these languages have attracted linguistic, anthropological, and cultural interest. Kodagu is spoken only in the Coorg district of Karnataka. Tulu is probably the first language to have branched off from proto-South Dravidian; traditionally described as a nonliterary language, it has been written down for about the last 250 years in Malayalam and Kannada scripts.

South-Central Dravidian includes a great literary language, Telugu, and six nonliterary languages spoken in parts of central India: Gondi with numerous dialects, Koya, Konda, Kui, Kuvi, Pengo, and Manda. Telugu is the Dravidian language spoken by the greatest number of speakers (more than 60 million) and has four regional dialects and important ancient and modern literature. Among the other languages, Konda seems to be the most phonologically conservative of the group. Kui, Kuvi, Pengo, and Manda, are closely related and, unlike other Dravidian languages, have devised a system of object-verb agreement.

Central Dravidian includes five nonliterary languages, Gadaba, Kolami, Naiki, Ollari, and Parji, spoken in central India. Whereas South Dravidian languages developed the use of the auxiliary verb *iru* "be," Central Dravidian has not lost the ancient perfect tense auxiliary verb *man* "be."

North Dravidian languages include Brahui, spoken in Baluchistan, a province of Pakistan, and considered the first to branch off from the Dravidian protolanguage. Kurux (alias Oraon) is spoken in northeastern India and Bangladesh. It is also spoken in Nepal, where it is known as Dhangar or Jhangar. Striking in its grammar is a distinction between men's and women's speech, found also in the third language of the group, Malto (northeastern India, Bangladesh).

The count of the number of Dravidian languages and their speakers has steadily increased. The "father" of Dravidian linguistics, Robert Caldwell (1814–1891), listed nine languages in 1856, while a 1997 survey listed about ninety. Because of the absence of adequate description, it is impossible to decide whether all these languages are new or merely various forms of known languages. However, new Dravidian languages are likely to be discovered, particularly in central India and the mountains and forests of southwestern India.

Historical Dimension

Nothing definite is known about the ancient domain of the Dravidian ancestral speech. Dravidian

speakers must have been widespread throughout India because numerous features of Dravidian vocabulary and grammar appear in the Rig Veda, the earliest known Indo-Aryan literary composition. Proto-Dravidian probably existed as a single language as late as 4000 BCE, when the linguistic unity of Dravidian began to disintegrate, and distinct branches and individual languages began to develop.

The divergence of the last major branch, South Dravidian, might have taken place around 1500 BCE. The arrival of Dravidian speakers in India is shrouded in mystery, but linguistic evidence suggests that the present locations of Dravidian languages resulted from several distinct movements. Brahui, Kurux, and Malto may represent surviving islands of a speech once extant all over northern India and Pakistan. A widely accepted hypothesis proposes that ancient Dravidian speakers traveled from the mountains of eastern Iran to south India and ultimately to Sri Lanka, "dropping off" groups of languages along their way. This movement might have taken place between c. 4000 and 1500 BCE. Along the route various Dravidian speech-forms peeled off the main stock, and some of them may have played an important role in the ethnolinguistic composition of the Indus Valley (Harappan culture).

Dravidians continued to move until the southernmost part of the peninsula was reached by the proto-Tamils, who, between c. 600 and 400 BCE, established the first historically recognizable literate and cultured Dravidian-speaking civilization, with the adaptation of Emperor Asoka's (reigned c. 265–238 BCE) Southern Brahmi script to preliterary Tamil.

Characteristics of Dravidian Languages

The morphology of Dravidian languages is agglutinating and exclusively suffixal. An agglutinative language incorporates separate formal units of distinct meaning into a single word, but Dravidian morphology also distinguishes between so-called free and bound forms. Free forms are "words," and bound forms are "clitics." There are some elements of internal flexion (the alternation of short and long vowels in derived words) as well as regular alternation in vowel and consonant qualities in the root. Relatively low receptivity to change resulted in a slower rate of diachronic (historical) development than in Indo-European languages. The degree of phonetic divergence among the Dravidian languages is not very great; hence etymologies are not too difficult to discover. Proto-Dravidian seemed to have had just two parts of speech, noun and verb, identified by their characteristic inflectional morphology. The reconstruction of further parts of speech such as adjectives and adverbs in the pro-

tolanguage is controversial, but the daughter languages originated other parts of speech (word classes). In any study of Dravidian both evolution and diffusion must be taken into account.

The Sounds of Dravidian

The two most striking features of the proto-Dravidian sound-system are the surprising number of apical stop (plosive, obstruent) phonemes (perhaps the world's maximum) and the total absence of sibilants. The protolanguage contained five pairs of vowels, both short and long: *a, ā, i, ī, u, ū, e, ē, o, ō*.

There is no evidence for the reconstruction of diphthongs. The most important vowel developments are the gradual elimination of the contrast between short and long *ē* and *ō* in Brahui and the merger of proto-Dravidian *ī* and *ū* with *ē* and *ō* in South Dravidian before a consonant plus *ā*). The proto-Dravidian set of stops exhibits a six-way contrast: voiced stops are allophones of their voiceless counterparts in the protolanguage. Most consonant clusters appear only at morpheme boundaries; hence no consonant clusters occur in root morphemes, which are essentially monosyllabic. The prosodic structure of Dravidian is quantitative rather than qualitative. Only a limited number of syllabic structures can occur in the protolanguage. Several important and regular prosodic alternations have been reconstructed for the protolanguage. Stress occurs in many Dravidian languages but is not distinctive. It typically falls on the first syllable of a word. Some languages developed, after the loss of vocalic peaks, long consonant clusters: for instance the Kota *anzrčgčgvdk* "because of the fact that (someone) will cause (someone) to frighten (someone)."

Grammatical Features

Dravidian words consist of two or more morphemes strung together in the agglutinating process in a linear fashion from left to right with minimum morphophonemic intervention. Morphemes appear in the order (lexical root [+ derivative suffix] + inflectional suffix). Nouns are inflected for case and number and secondarily for person and gender. There are two numbers, unmarked singular and marked plural. The proto-Dravidian gender system apparently distinguished between human (animate) and nonhuman (inanimate) nouns. Animate nouns were often further divided into masculine and feminine. First person plural of pronouns distinguished between inclusive plural "we and you" and exclusive plural "we but not you."

Proto-Dravidian verbs distinguished two tenses, past and nonpast. The present tense developed inde-

pendently in various languages. Verbs also distinguished between affirmative and negative forms. All verbs were either finite or nonfinite (these last do not mark subject-verb agreement). A characteristic derivation is that of "pronominalized" (alias "personalized") nouns, for example, Tamil *īlai* "youth": *īlai-y-am* "young-we."

In a sentence, however complex, only one finite verb occurs (normally at the end), preceded (if necessary) by a number of nonfinite forms: for instance Tamil *rāmaṇ vantu eṇṇai-p pārttu ōṭi-p pōṇāṇ* "Raman came, saw me, and ran away." The determining member always precedes the determined: Tamil *pon* "gold" + *nakaram* "town": *ponnakaram* "golden town." Word order follows certain basic rules but is relatively free; however, the most frequent normal word order is subject-object-verb.

Vocabulary

Different Dravidian languages were receptive to loanwords in differing degrees. The existence of many cognate words of Dravidian origin (i.e., exhibiting no "outside" etymological relationships) and systematic correspondences among them enabled scholars to establish a Dravidian linguistic family, based on a comparative lexicon.

Among the literary languages Tamil has the lowest number of Indo-Aryan loanwords (18–25 percent, according to the style), although the modern spoken language adopts loanwords from English and other non-Indian languages. In Malayalam, Kannada, and Telugu the percentage of loanwords is higher. The most important sources of loanwords have been Sanskrit, Pali, Prakrits, and later Urdu, Portuguese, and English. There was not much lexical borrowing from one Dravidian language to another. Brahui was obviously most influenced by borrowing, mainly from Indo-Aryan and Iranian. In contrast Toda of the Nilgiris was probably least influenced by any other language.

At the beginning of the twentieth century a movement called "Tamil Only" was initiated to remove Sanskritic elements from the Tamil vocabulary and replace them with Tamil ones. This linguistic purism is still active, but similar movements have not occurred in the other cultivated languages.

Writing

Tamil, Malayalam, Telugu, and Kannada have phonologically based writing systems and are written from left to right. All these scripts are derived from South Indian Brahmi, used from around 250 BCE as

the medium of Buddhist inscriptions, carved at the orders of Emperor Asoka (reigned c. 265–238 BCE). In the script each consonant is represented by a consonantal symbol; a following short vowel *a* is considered inherent in each consonantal symbol. All other vowels are written as obligatory diacritics; a vowel in an initial position has an independent symbol. Consonants may also occur in sequences, particularly in words borrowed from Sanskrit (e.g., *str*). Writing systems of this Indic type, which indicate consonant-vowel combinations by vowel diacritics obligatorily attached (above, below, in front, or behind) to the consonants, are rather rare in the world. Such systems are usually called alphasyllabic, suggesting similarities with both alphabets and syllabic systems. The traditional order of symbols in all South Indian scripts is based on articulatory phonetics as developed from Sanskrit (i.e., *a ā ī ū e ē o ō . . .* etc.).

External Links of Dravidian

The Dravidian linguistic family is what is usually called an isolate; that is, no external (non-Indian) linguistic genetic kinship has so far been convincingly proved. As soon as Dravidian became known to Western scholarship and recognized as an independent linguistic family, the question arose of its origin and possible genetic kinship with other languages and language families. Among the possible candidates for such genetic relations were Scythian, Nubian, Finno-Ugric, and Japanese. The most plausible candidates are Elamite and Ural-Altaic. A few scholars explain Ural-Altaic and Dravidian affinities by actual genetic relations; however, although the typological and even material similarities may be striking, they can probably be explained by widespread diffusion and borrowing due to multilingualism, ethnic mixture, conquests, dominance movements, or accidental events somewhere in Central Asia—an area of prolonged and ancient contacts—rather than by genetic relations. Several scholars, particularly archaeologists, have accepted the Elamo-Dravidian hypothesis as almost a fact, but it too seems dubious for several valid reasons. Even less convincing is the Japanese connection. The most provocative hypothesis is the Indus Valley (Harappan) connection, which maintains that the language on the (as yet undeciphered) Harappan seals was an early form of Dravidian. None of the hypotheses of genetic relations is to be rejected without further rigorous study. There are still no adequate descriptive studies of most Dravidian languages, particularly their historical development, and no critical editions of the earliest texts in Dravidian. The reconstruction of proto-Dravidian itself is fragmentary and provisional.

As long as it remains so, the external links and possible genetic affiliations remain in the realm of typological and etymological speculations. This presents Dravidianists with a great challenge and opportunity. Among the tasks ahead is, above all, the full descriptive study of the various languages (including their dialects); a full diachronic, historical treatment of their development; and a new, revised etymological analysis and description of their respective lexica.

K. V. Zvelebil

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DRUG TRADE Asia has a long history of dealing with psychoactive substances. Many of them have existed from time immemorial all over the continent. Various places established traditional uses for some drugs and even integrated them into social codes. However, today's drug trade in Asia threatens the health and safety of its population as well as the stability of its countries. The drug trade is shaped and spurred by mercantilism and grows on the fertile and complex terrain of poverty and armed conflicts. In fact a direct relation between drug production, poverty, and war appears to exist. Thus drug production and trafficking can be perceived as the outcomes of economic as well as political events.

History

The first stage in the Asian commerce in drugs was probably the opium trade along the numerous and far-reaching precursors of the Silk Road and the early Chinese maritime trade that reached Africa by the first century BCE. However, the opium poppy, *Papaver somniferum L.*, most likely a European plant, was spread throughout Asia mainly by the Arab traders who transmitted it to the Indians in the seventh century and to

the Chinese a century later. It is questionable whether the Arabs themselves actually introduced the opium poppy into these areas, since early Indian traders or Buddhist pilgrims may have done it, but Arab traders undoubtedly were the main contributors to its commercial spread as a cash crop.

The next stage in the opium commerce was taken by European maritime colonial powers, who used it to balance their trade in spices and tea with Southeast Asia and China: first by the Venetians (in the fourteenth century), then by the Portuguese and the Dutch in the sixteenth century, and finally by the British from the seventeenth century and on. Through their powerful East India Company (founded 1600), the British brought to China opium originating in the poppy fields of India, where it had long been produced by the Mughal rulers. This led, in the mid-nineteenth century, to China's two Opium Wars, first with the British and second with a British-French coalition. The treaty of Nanjing (1842), which ended the first war, gave Hong Kong to the British; it went on to become the world's heroin hub. China, confronted with exploding opium consumption, eventually fostered local poppy production as a way to balance its growing trade deficit.

After the southern migration of some opium growers from Yunnan, pressured by imperial political repression and, later, by the enforcement of communist prohibition, opium production spread from China into Southeast Asia, which became the Golden Triangle (Burma, Laos, and Thailand), a precursor to the Southwest Asian Golden Crescent (Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan). Opium was integrated as a trade commodity, but it needed improvements to increase its global marketability. Consequently, after heroin was synthesized from opium in 1898, producers were able to transform opium into heroin, a product with a greater efficacy that was easier to trade than the bulky opium.

The Twentieth Century

Opium poppy production expanded to almost everywhere in Asia, from Turkey in the Near East to Japan in the Far East, along the succession of mountain ranges that stretch across Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Burma (Myanmar), Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and China, as well as in Russia and the Central Asian republics. Nonetheless, the opium poppy is of course not the only psychoactive plant thriving in Asia. *Cannabis sativa L.*, consumed as either marijuana or hashish, is prevalent as well. In fact Lebanon, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Thai-



THE TREATY OF NANJING

The Treaty of Nanjing between China and Great Britain marked the conclusion of the Opium War and the opening of trading ports to Britain. The Treaty heavily favored Britain.

Victoria, by the Grace of God, Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, etc., etc., etc. To All and Singular to whom these Presents shall come, Greeting! Whereas a Treaty between Us and Our Good Brother The Emperor of China, was concluded and signed in the English and Chinese Languages, on board Our Ship the Cornwallis, at Nanking, on the Twenty-ninth day of August, in the Year of Our Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and Forty Two, by the Plenipotentiaries of Us and Our said Good Brother, duly and respectively authorized for that purpose; which Treaty is hereunto annexed in Original:

Article I. There shall henceforward be Peace and Friendship between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the Emperor of China, and between their respective Subjects, who shall enjoy full security and protection for their persons and property within the Dominions of the other.

Article II. His Majesty the Emperor of China agrees, that British Subjects, with their families and establishments, shall be allowed to reside, for the purpose of carrying on their Mercantile pursuits, without molestation or restraint at the Cities and Towns of Canton, Amoy, Foochow-fu, Ningpo and Shanghai, and Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, etc., will appoint Superintendents or Consular Officers, to reside at each of the above-named Cities of Towns, to be the medium of communication between the Chinese Authorities and the said Merchants, and to see that the just Duties and other Dues of the Chinese Government as hereafter provided for, are duly discharged by Her Britannic Majesty's Subjects.

Article III. It being obviously necessary and desirable, that British Subjects should have some Port whereat they may careen and refit their Ships, when required, and keep Stores for that purpose, His Majesty the Emperor of China cedes to Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, etc., the Island of Hongkong, to be

possessed in perpetuity by Her Britannic Majesty, Her Heirs and Successors, and to be governed by such Laws and Regulations as Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, etc., shall see fit to direct.

Article IV. The Emperor of China agrees to pay the sum of Six Millions of Dollars as the value of Opium which was delivered up at Canton in the month of March 1839, as a Ransom for the lives of Her Britannic Majesty's Superintendent and Subjects, who had been imprisoned and threatened with death by the Chinese High Officers.

Article V. The Government of China having compelled the British Merchants trading at Canton to deal exclusively with certain Chinese Merchants called Hong Merchants (or Cohong) who had been licensed by the Chinese Government for that purpose, the Emperor of China agrees to abolish that practice in future at all Ports where British Merchants may reside, and to permit them to carry on their mercantile transactions with whatever persons they please, and His Imperial Majesty further agrees to pay to the British Government the sum of Three Millions of Dollars, on account of debts due to British Subjects by some of the said Hong Merchants (or Cohong), who have become insolvent, and who owe very large sums of money to Subjects of Her Britannic Majesty.

Article VI. The Government of Her Britannic Majesty having been obliged to send out an Expedition to demand and obtain redress for the violent and unjust proceedings of the Chinese High Authorities towards Her Britannic Majesty's Officers and Subjects, the Emperor of China agrees to pay the sum of Twelve Millions of Dollars on account of the Expenses incurred, and Her Britannic Majesty's Plenipotentiary voluntarily agrees, on behalf of Her Majesty, to deduct from the said amount of Twelve Millions of Dollars, any sums which may have been received by Her Majesty's combined Forces as Ransom for Cities and Towns in China, subsequent to the 1st day of August 1841.

Source: Treaties, Conventions, etc. between China and Foreign States. (1908) Miscellaneous Series, no. 30. Shanghai, China: Imperial Maritime Customs, vol. I: 159-160.

land, and Cambodia are among the most internationally renowned producers and exporters of cannabis. Kazakhstan for its part boasts the world's largest area of wild cannabis.

In Asia the production, trade, and consumption of opiates always have combined national and international issues and stakes. In fact the spread of drug trafficking in Asia and elsewhere is linked to its international prohibition. The 1955 Persian prohibition stimulated production in Afghanistan and Pakistan and affected even the distant Golden Triangle. In another example, Turkey began a long legal and power struggle with the United States in the early 1960s. In Turkey, poppies were grown legally for pharmaceutical purposes, and a large quantity of illicit opium was smuggled to France, where it was processed into heroin and subsequently shipped to the U.S. drug market. The United States pressured Turkey to institute a national prohibition against opium production, which, after many setbacks, Turkey instituted in 1972. The 1960s were bounded by two significant events that shaped the way all narcotic phenomena were addressed. In 1961 the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs reinforced the previous multilateral agreements that had followed the 1909 Shanghai Convention. The main international concern then was heroin. In 1971 the administration of U.S. President Richard Nixon declared a "war on drugs," setting up the "carrot and stick" system that conditioned U.S. financial aid on drug eradication and thus favoring a bilateral, biased approach over the multilateral approach of the United Nations. Turkey's compliance in 1972 had deep repercussions in Asian trade, spurring the Golden Crescent's production and further linking Asia's various poppy-growing areas.

These pressures on the drug trade were nevertheless counteracted by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which played a significant role in the drug trade in both Southeast Asia and Southwest Asia. Its anti-Communist covert actions benefited from the participation of some drug-related combat units who, to finance their own struggle, were directly or indirectly involved in drug production and trade. Considering the involvement of different groups in the drug trade (for example, the Hmong in Laos, the Nationalist Chinese [Guomindang] in northern Burma, and the Islamic mujahideen resistance [the party of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, notably] in Afghanistan), their backing by the CIA implied that the agency condoned the use of drug proceeds and considerably increased opiate production in Asia. Hence the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent remain the world's two major opium production areas. The Golden Triangle

led world production until 1991, with Myanmar ranking at the top. After that date the Golden Crescent took the lead, with Afghanistan breaking previous records in 1999. (In 2001 the Taliban government forbade opium growing, and production plunged.) Opium production in these two areas can be attributed to the protracted civil wars that have plagued Myanmar since 1948 and Afghanistan since 1979. The atmosphere of conflict during the Cold War also contributed. In the late twentieth century Thailand, Iran, and Pakistan, former important opium producers, coped with growing narcotics trafficking and, even more disrupting, local epidemics of narcotic addiction. Conservative estimates in Iran and Pakistan show 2 million opiate addicts in each country, and the number continues to grow. Afghanistan, mainly a producer, is likely to become an important consumer, as indicated by the spillover in Central Asia. In fact Iran, previously the primary trading route, has succeeded in partially diverting Afghan smuggling toward Central Asia.

Thailand, Myanmar's neighbor, faces the same problems and has reoriented trading routes toward China, Laos, and Vietnam. Thailand is now emerging as a pioneer in new drug consumption patterns as amphetamine-type stimulants overtake heroin in the kingdom, with Myanmar massively producing such synthetic drugs in its Shan states.

Drug production and trade in Asia thus evolve and adapt to the market, be it opium, heroin, amphetamines, or ecstasy. These types of trade and consumption, ancient phenomena, have benefited from world globalization and conflicts. Rooted in poverty, the drug trade quickly grows on the ruins of development and its related political conflicts. Wars have proven to nurture the drug trade, and drug profits prolong wars.

Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy

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DU FU (712–760), Chinese poet. Du Fu, who was also known as Zimei, is commonly recognized as the greatest poet in Chinese history and is referred to as the "Poet-Historian" or "Poet-Sage." The Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) was beset by the An Lushan rebellion just as Du Fu was seeking advancement as an official, so he experienced firsthand the decline of China's greatest dynasty. His own failures and frustrations in official life, criticism of the wrongdoings of those in power, praise of good officials, and sympathy for the common people became the main themes of his poetry, which presents a vivid picture of his troubled times. A prolific writer, with over 1,400 surviving poems, Du Fu was proficient in various poetic forms. He rigidly complied with the rules for regulated verse, but he also composed in various "ancient style" formal types, as well as creating new forms. Seen as exemplary in both prosody and morality, with his poems the focus of the attentions of generations of scholars and commentators, Du Fu became a paragon in traditional China for readers and poets alike.

Timothy Wai Keung Chan

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DUCK AND GOOSE, DOMESTICATED

Along with swans, ducks and geese belong to the Anatidae family of large waterbirds characterized by webbed feet. Ducks differ from geese in having shorter necks and legs, but both are at home on lakes and ponds; geese commonly graze on grassland even at some distance from water.

The mallard (*Anas platyrhynchos*, about 60 centimeters long) was domesticated in Eurasia and was the ancestor of most domestic breeds of duck worldwide; today wild mallards live throughout the Northern Hemisphere. Ducks were domesticated in China probably as early as the seventh millennium BCE; there are ten native species in that country. From northern China and Japan came the small Mandarin ducks (*Querquedula mandchurica*), first introduced to Europe in 1830. The goose was also domesticated in China from the Chinese, or swan, goose (*Cygnopsis cygnoides*), the largest living goose, today native to Siberia and eastern Mongolia.

Both ducks and geese are farmed for their meat and eggs, and sometimes their down. Centuries ago, the Chinese had invented incubators made of pottery that were capable of hatching a thousand eggs.

Paul Hockings

DUJIANGYAN Dujiangyan is one of the world's greatest water engineering operations, dating from the Qin dynasty. For over 2,000 years the Dujiangyan complex has provided water to millions of Chinese citizens while protecting them and their farms from flooding, a situation rarely if ever achieved anywhere else. The complex is located near the city of Guanxian, 56 kilometers (35 miles) from Chengdu in Sichuan Province, central China. The name Dujiangyan means "the dam on the capital's river." Construction of the project began in 256 BCE and was directed by the engineer Li Bing and his son Li Erlang. Dujiangyan incorporates a dike of piled stones that divides the Min River, a tributary of the Chang (Yangtze) River, into inner and outer channels. The inner channel is diverted for irrigation, allowing, at the time of its construction, about 1 million hectares of the Chengdu Plain to be irrigated without danger of flooding, supporting a population of 5 million. The complex has been in continual use since its construction, and expansion of the project in later years, along with annual silt removal, allows about 3 million hectares to be irrigated today. The role of the two engineers is commemorated in the Fulong Guan, or Temple of the Harnessed Dragon (referring to the river), a place of veneration for Li Bing, and the Erwang Miao, or Two Kings Temple, memorializing Li Erlang. Dujiangyan was inscribed on the World Heritage List in 2000.

Michael Pretes

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DULATOV, MIRZHAQYP (1885–1935), Kazakh writer, poet, dramatist, social activist. Mirzhaqyp Dulatov was born in 1885 in Turgai province to a poor family. His father and mother died while he was still young. His education started with a local mullah, and when he was twelve years old he enrolled in the

second class of the Russian-Kazakh school in Turgai. The education regime included studies in mathematics, history, geography, physics, philosophy, and other subjects. He quickly demonstrated talents as a skilled debater and musician. After graduating, he moved to Omsk to teach at a local school. He joined an underground Kazakh political organization and quickly established himself in local social movements. He became a staunch critic of the czarist government's policies and actively pursued reform that would alleviate the suffering among those Kazakhs who were forced to settle and give up their former nomadic way of life. In 1909 he published a book that was among the most important influences on the development of Kazakh national identity and consciousness. *Oian, Qazaq!* (Awake, Kazakh!) was a small collection of poems that attempted to rally Kazakhs to oppose the increased Russian migration to the steppe while identifying the internal disintegration of Kazakh society. For Dulatov and many other Kazakhs, the seizure of land came to symbolize colonial oppression and national humiliation. The work was criticized by czarist authorities and Dulatov was arrested several times for illegal political activities. In 1912 he published *Baqyt-syz Zhamal* (Unhappy Zhamal), the story of a poor Kazakh girl forced to marry against her will. It is regarded by many scholars to be the first novel in the Kazakh language. In 1913 he joined Akhmet Baitursynov on the editorial board of the Kazakh-language newspaper *Kazak*, contributing many articles during the next five years. In 1917 he became an essential leader of the Kazakh national movement Alash Orda (The Horde of Alash). Following the Bolshevik victory in the Russian Civil War, he joined the Communist Party and vigorously worked for Kazakh cultural autonomy, particularly in education. During the 1920s he published many more works about Kazakh history and culture and worked for the Soviet-Kazakh newspaper *Engbekshi Kazak* (Kazak Worker). In 1928 he was arrested for bourgeois nationalism and spent the next several years under constant surveillance. In 1935 he was arrested again and incarcerated in Solovetsk prison, dying of an illness while imprisoned.

Steven Sabol

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DUNGANS Dungan is the Turkic name for Chinese-speaking Muslims living in various parts of Central Asia. Significant Dungan communities in the Central Asian republics of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan came to Central Asia from China in the nineteenth century. A Dungan population living along the Myanmar (Burma)-China border is known as Pathay, their Burmese name.

Dungans are descended from communities of Muslim merchants, soldiers, artisans, and scholars who established themselves in China under the Tang dynasty (618–907) and later under the Yuan dynasty (1206–1368). These groups intermarried with Han Chinese and adopted the Chinese language, and today they are physically indistinguishable from the rest of the Han population.

The Dungan communities of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan arrived in two waves in the late nineteenth century. The first group crossed the Tian Shan range in the winter of 1877–1878, fleeing to the Russian empire after the suppression of a Muslim revolt in southwest China. The second group was invited to resettle in the Russian empire after the Treaty of Peking adjusted the Russo-Chinese border in 1881. Many Dungans who had been Russian subjects chose to remain part of the Russian empire rather than pass under the authority of the Manchu emperors of China.

Andrew Sharp

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DUONG VAN MINH (1916–2001), last president of the Republic of Vietnam. Duong Van Minh was born in 1916 in My Tho in the Mekong Delta. He received military training in France and in 1955 became an army officer in the Republic of Vietnam. Known as "Big Minh" because of his size (he was over six feet tall), he gained notoriety in 1956 when he captured Hoa Hao sect leader Ba Cut and had him publicly guillotined. Later that year, President Ngo Dinh Diem stripped him of military power by making him a "special adviser."

On 1 November 1963, Duong Van Minh headed the Revolutionary Military Council that ousted Ngo Dinh Diem (1901–1963) from power. The following day, Diem and his brother Nhu were assassinated, re-

portedly on Minh's orders. In January 1964, Minh was overthrown in a coup led by General Nguyen Kahn. In 1971, Minh ran for the presidency of the Republic of Vietnam but withdrew because he could not seriously challenge Nguyen Van Thieu (1923–2001).

In April 1975, President Thieu resigned and Vice President Tran Van Huong appointed Minh president. He was the Republic of Vietnam's last president. On 30 April 1975, he was arrested when North Vietnamese army forces marched into the presidential palace. In 1983, he immigrated to France.

Micheline R. Lessard

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DURRANI Durrani was the dynasty that ruled Afghanistan from 1747 to 1842. It was founded by Ahmad Shah Abdali (1722?–1773), who gained his power and prestige through successful raids on India. He was elected king by a tribal council in Kandahar and adopted the title Durr-e-Durran (the pearl of pearls); from the title the dynasty acquired its name "Durrani."

It was during Ahmad Shah's rule that Afghanistan became an empire. By uniting the various warring factions, he was able to extend Afghan rule from Delhi, Kashmir, and the Punjab to Meshed and from the Amu Dar'ya River to the Arabian Sea. Thus, Afghanistan became the second-largest Muslim empire, surpassed in size only by the Ottoman empire to the west.

After Ahmad Shah's death in 1773, rule passed to his son Timur Shah (reigned 1773–1793), who spent most his reign suppressing uprisings. The fifth and last ruler of the dynasty, Shah Shoja (1780–1842), concluded a treaty with the British in India by which he agreed to oppose any passage of foreign troops through Afghanistan. This move was to negate Napoleon's plan to invade India with the help of Russia from the north. Eventually, Shah Shoja was overthrown by the Barakzai brothers, who in 1826 founded their own dynasty, which lasted until 1973, when Zahir Shah (b. 1914) abdicated. The Barakzai dynasty may once again play a role in Afghanistan, now that Zahir Shah has returned to Kabul, his old capital.

Nirmal Dass

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DUSHANBE (2002 est. pop. 581,000). Formerly named Stalinabad (1929–1961), Dushanbe is the administrative, industrial, and cultural center of Tajikistan, a small republic adjacent to Afghanistan, China, and other Soviet Central Asian successor states. The site appears to be level, but it is actually a series of gently sloping and rocky alluvial fans at the base of the Pamir and Hissar mountains in Southwest Tajikistan. The Varzob and Kofanihon Rivers flow through the city. Rough roads connect it to Tashkent, Uzbekistan (314 kilometers to the north), and the Afghanistan frontier post of Termez (230 kilometers to the south). The city's 690-meter elevation and interior Central Asian location produce a long, hot summer lasting from May until September, where many days exceed 38° C. Mountain breezes ameliorate the intense July and August heat. The cold winter (0° C January mean) lasts from November through February. An average 85 millimeter (3.3 inches) of precipitation arrives during heavy spring rains or sporadic winter snowfall.

Dushanbe began as three small settlements of modest single-story rock and mud structures that served as the eastern administrative center of the Bukhara khanate until 1920 when Soviet troops toppled the emir. The heavy fighting destroyed many buildings. In 1924 the Soviets designated Dushanbe the capital of the new Tajik Autonomous S.S.R. They combined the three settlements and initiated rapid development and population growth that lasted until Tajik independence in 1991. The Transcaspian railroad linked Dushanbe with Turkmenistan in 1929, transforming the Monday bazaar into a daily event that remains its commercial and social heart. The city center offers broad tree-lined streets bounded by multistory Soviet-era government buildings. The many fountains, shaded plazas, and *chaikhanas* (teahouses) invite much bicycle and pedestrian traffic. Elsewhere, high-rise concrete apartment blocks alternate with pre-Soviet mud and brick structures designed to mitigate the severe earthquake hazard.

Dushanbe is also the financial and commercial center of Tajikistan. Aluminum and cement factories, large textile combines, and manufacturing plants for looms, electric cable, and appliances are nearby. It was the primary staging and supply center for the 1979–1989 Soviet-Afghan war. It remains an important military

crossroads. Since independence, Dushanbe has been the center of a prolonged civil war between competing ethnoreligious and political factions. The violence severely damaged the infrastructure and discouraged most foreign investment. The manufacturing sector is facing an uncertain future.

There are many fine parks; a zoo; two live theaters and an opera house; hospitals; medical, teacher-education, agricultural, and polytechnic institutes; the Tajik Academy of Sciences (1951); and the Tajik State University (1948). The Firdowski Library houses an impressive collection of medieval Islamic manuscripts. The abrupt termination of Soviet support is jeopardizing these institutions. The predominantly Tajik and Russian population includes Kirghiz, Kazakh, Uzbek, Tatar, and Ukrainian minorities. Since 1991 *ostravechnio* (outmigration of Russians) and persistent refugee movements inside and outside of Dushanbe have altered the demographic profile.

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DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY The Dutch East India Company, or Vereenigde Oost-indische Compagnie (VOC), was formed in 1602. VOC consisted of sixty companies aimed at monopolizing the spice trade, expanding Dutch colonial influence, and reducing competition from other commercial powers. The government of the Netherlands supported VOC financially, as well as giving it immense powers, including the right to trade, maintain military forces, take possession of territories, declare war, and make peace. At the height of its power, the company had roughly 150 trading vessels, 40 warships, and 10,000 soldiers.

With such power and authority, VOC dominated the spice industry, especially the cinnamon, clove, and nutmeg trade in the East Indies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The company's Asian base was in Batavia (modern Jakarta), which came under Dutch control in 1619. In 1650, VOC merchants became the first Europeans settlers in South Africa on the Cape of Good Hope; in 1652, the Cape of Good Hope became a Dutch colony, remaining so until taken over by Great Britain in 1814. The company's influence extended to Cape Town, which emerged as



The insignia of the Dutch East India Company on a building in the Netherlands in 1997. (DAVE BARTRUFF/CORBIS)

a key supply point for provisioning Dutch ships with food, water, and other goods. By 1670, VOC was the richest company in the world, controlling trade from the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Magellan.

In the Malay archipelago, VOC controlled the spice trade in Banda, Ternate, Grisek, Patani, Aceh, Johore, and Bantam. After its capture in 1605, Amboina (now Ambon) became the first Dutch possession in the East. Subsequently, VOC controlled and colonized local rulers, and drove the British and Portuguese from the Malay archipelago and Ceylon. The Anglo Dutch Treaty of 1824, which divided the Malay archipelago into British and Dutch spheres of influence, further enabled VOC to establish Dutch rule in Indonesia.

Throughout its existence, however, VOC had trouble maintaining its monopoly, as strong competition came from other European powers; the English, Portuguese, and Spanish challenged the Dutch whenever possible, as they too wanted a share of the spice trade. By the late eighteenth century, Chinese tea and textiles were more in demand than spices, and in 1789 VOC was disbanded, due in part to corruption, rising

debts, and competition from other traders. VOC was not merely a company that monopolized world trade, but was also the sole representative of Dutch political power in the East Indies for nearly 200 years.

Geetha Govindasamy

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DUTCH IN SOUTHEAST ASIA In the early 1600s, two maritime nations, Britain and the Netherlands, were emerging as powerful players in the world economy. Seeking to challenge the network of the Portuguese and the Spanish, who had divided the non-European world between them under the authority of a Papal Bull (edict), the two emerging Protestant nations sought to control the spice trade. In 1602 the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC, or the Dutch East India Company) was formed to gain a share of this lucrative spice trade. Britain and the Netherlands, although rivals in many senses, came to an agreement to divide trade with Asia. The Dutch, notably under Batavia-based governor-general Jan Pieterszoon Coen in the early 1600s, aimed to achieve a stranglehold on the spice trade. In 1641, with the help of the Sultan of Aceh, the Dutch captured Melaka (Malacca) from the Portuguese and at this point the strategic balance shifted in favor of the Netherlands.

Dutch Ascendancy

Like the Portuguese before them, the Dutch initially sought to take control of small strategic ports, while local potentates were left undisturbed to rule over the hinterlands. Initially this involved a series of processing factories scattered around India and what is now Indonesia, as well as the seizure of territory in Taiwan (Formosa), Sri Lanka, the west coast of Malaya (including Melaka), and Batavia, Flores, and Maluku



A Dutch trading building in the former colony of Sulawesi, Indonesia. (JEREMY HORNER/CORBIS)

in the Dutch East Indies (later known as Indonesia). The VOC forced local rulers to deliver spices at fixed prices and banned any trade with other outside powers in order to ensure the Dutch monopoly. Regular patrols were mounted to police these rules. The strategic possessions the VOC held in Southeast Asia were to enable the export of such spices as nutmeg and mace, cloves, and pepper.

Dutch control over Indonesia, from their arrival in the early seventeenth century, took more than three hundred years to complete and largely occurred without resort to large-scale conventional warfare, although rebellions were commonplace. There was no actual strategic decision or plan to assume control over the entire archipelago, but the Dutch found it necessary to control more and more of the hinterlands to prevent rebellions and attacks. After interfering in rivalry and dynastic disputes among the various Javanese kingdoms, the Dutch commercial empire had authority over Java by 1800. The empire of the Netherlands grew as far as possible within the geographical confines of neighboring empires. However, this imperial overstretch, which required funding a growing administration and military campaigns, meant that by 1799 the VOC was bankrupt and was subsequently abolished. In the first half of the nineteenth century the Dutch military fought a series of wars of against local resistance in Sumatra, Java, and Bali.

After 1800, pressure grew in the Netherlands to improve the livelihoods of the people of the Dutch East Indies. Pressure in the Netherlands, coupled with demands for greater self determination inside the Dutch East Indies, led to the development of the "Ethical Policy" to devolve authority to Indonesia, provide health

and education, and develop infrastructure. The Netherlands came to have far greater contact with the Indonesian people, but ultimately failed to keep vague promises of independence. The Ethical Policy helped unify the disparate ethnic groups into a collective consciousness. Significant gains were made in public health, resulting in the biggest population explosion that maritime Southeast Asia had ever seen—Java alone increased from a population of 4.5 million in 1815 to nearly 35 million a century later. One major reason for this exponential increase was the end, under the authority of Dutch overlordship (the so-called *Pax Neerlandica*), of regular warfare between the smaller feudal kingdoms. However, this belated attempt at development could not alter the fact that the rationale for the Dutch presence was the exploitation of natural resources and labor to generate capital for the Netherlands. It did nothing to undermine calls for independence; on the contrary, young Indonesian intellectuals such as independence leaders Sukarno (1901–1970) and Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980) trained in the Netherlands and learned about democracy, nationalism, and self-determination. Powerful nationalist (and religious) movements emerged in the Dutch East Indies from the first half of the nineteenth century until the Japanese invasion, in contrast to the localized rebellions of earlier times in Sumatra and Java.

Japanese Occupation and Its Aftermath

Japanese forces arrived in Indonesia in January 1942, primarily to seize the oilfields of the coastal areas of Sumatra and Kalimantan. Many Indonesians welcomed the Japanese as liberators but soon discovered that their new master was both far more ruthless and not serious about promises of independence. However, it was the Japanese invasion that broke Dutch rule; nationalists, led by Sukarno (later to be the first president of Indonesia) cooperated with the Japanese authorities as a means of gaining independence.

The Japanese left Indonesia in August 1945, and Sukarno and Hatta announced independence and the creation of the Republic of Indonesia. The return of Dutch administrators, initially backed by British troops, sparked a rebellion in Java and Sumatra. Against the advice of the British, who were preparing the Indian subcontinent and Burma (now Myanmar) for independence, in July 1947, the Dutch had marshaled enough forces (after tricking the Indonesian leaders through a peace agreement) to launch a "police action" to retake West and East Java, followed by a second police action in December 1948 to retake the remaining territory. With Sukarno and Hatta imprisoned, the Indonesian army of former Dutch officers and Japanese-trained troops under General Soedirman decided that armed revolution was the only solution and launched a fierce counterattack. This time, the United Nations condemned Dutch actions, while large numbers of Dutch soldiers, themselves former victims of the Nazi occupation, had no will to enforce Dutch imperial rule. The Dutch left Indonesia on 27 December 1949. They left behind a country of more than two hundred ethnic groups that had little in common except the experience of Dutch colonial rule and bonds forged between the intelligentsia as a result of the Ethical Policy, which had done little to prepare for independence. By attempting to recolonize Indonesia after World War II, the Dutch helped enshrine the Indonesian army as the "protector of society" that continues to be the justification for its interference in civil affairs.

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EARTHQUAKES Earthquakes are the result of rocks breaking under stress. The constant movement of the tectonic plates that cover the earth's thin outer crust, or lithosphere, causes stress to build up in the rocks beneath the earth's surface. Rocks adjust to this stress over time by folding, but occasionally the stress is released, creating seismic or energy waves that cause the sudden and sometimes disastrous vibrations known as earthquakes. Earthquakes occur throughout the world, but mainly along narrow belts marking the boundaries of the earth's major tectonic plates. Ninety

percent of all earthquakes take place at these plate boundaries, and about two-thirds of all large earthquakes are located in the circum-Pacific belt. This tectonic collision zone is one of the most active in the world and stretches from the Aleutians in the North Pacific through Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia to the Himalayas in northern India. Although there are hundreds of earthquakes in this belt each year, few are felt by the population. However, there have been more than sixty large earthquakes registering 7.0 or higher on the Richter scale in the last



An elderly woman walks in the ruins of Kobe following the 1995 earthquake which destroyed much of the city and killed over 6,000 people. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)



EXPLAINING EARTHQUAKES IN SOUTH ASIA

Throughout human history and across cultures, earthquakes have been terrifying events that are beyond human control. Numerous explanations have been set for earthquakes. The following is the explanation of the Andaman Islanders, the indigenous people of the islands of the same name in the Bay of Bengal.

The Andaman Islands are occasionally visited by earthquakes. An Aka-Kede account of how earthquakes are caused is that when a man dies he goes to the spirit world which is beneath the earth. The spirits hold a ceremony. My informant spoke of the ceremony as *Kimil*, which is the name of the initiation ceremonies. At this ceremony they have a dance similar to the peace-making dance . . . but instead of erecting a screen such as is used in that ceremony, they make use of the rainbow. As they shake the rainbow in dancing this causes earthquakes. The ceremony which newly-arrived spirits have to undergo in the world after death is a *poroto kimil*, i.e., the initiate eats *poroto* (*Caryota sobolifera*).

Source: A. R. Radcliffe-Brown. (1922) *The Andaman Islanders: A Study in Social Anthropology*. Cambridge, U.K.: University Press, 146–147.

quarter century, the largest of which released twenty times more energy than the annual energy consumption of the United States. Significant property damage and loss of life can result from earthquakes and the secondary hazards associated with these events, especially when they occur near urban centers or areas of high population density.

Earthquakes occurring at weak points in the interior of plates, away from the major plate boundaries, are more difficult to explain. They do not occur according to well-defined patterns like those at plate boundaries. Scientists have not yet been able to model their occurrence so that forecasts of time, place, and size of future earthquakes could be made. China, for example, experiences numerous intraplate earthquakes hundreds of miles toward the interior of the country. Since 1990 eight major intraplate quakes of 5.2 to 7.1 on the Richter scale have been recorded in

Yunnan, Hebei, Sichuan, and Menglian provinces in China.

The vibrations, or seismic waves, from an earthquake travel outward in all directions from the fault and, if the earthquake is large enough, are recorded around the world on special measuring instruments called seismographs. A seismograph measures the amplitude of the energy (or seismic waves) released; the measurement is expressed on the Richter scale. The most severe earthquakes recorded to date have not exceeded 9.0 on this scale, although there may be hundreds of low-magnitude quakes measuring 3 or 4 in Asia alone in a single year. Energy release and earthquake magnitude can be poor guides to the hazardous impact of earthquakes, however, because the duration of ground shaking is not accounted for in this scale. The extent of that hazard depends on many other factors, such as distance from the epicenter, rock and soil conditions, population density, and types of building construction.

Although ground shaking is the primary earthquake hazard and the cause of much structural damage and human injury, there are also important secondary hazards. Liquefaction, which happens when loosely packed, waterlogged sediments lose their strength in response to strong shaking, can damage structural foundations of buildings and highways, cause buildings to settle or tilt, and produce submarine avalanches that can destroy harbor facilities and break underwater telecommunication cables. Landslides and rock and snow avalanches can also result from earthquakes. Landslides triggered by earthquakes often cause more destruction than the quakes themselves. Since 1964 landslides resulting from large-magnitude earthquakes in Japan have accounted for more than half of all earthquake-related deaths. The most characteristic secondary earthquake-related hazard is the seismic sea wave, or tsunami. Most tsunamis result from tectonic displacement of the seabed associated with large shallow-focus earthquakes under the oceans, but can also be caused by exploding volcanic islands. These waves may reach 100 feet or higher and can travel across the ocean at speeds as great as 150 kilometers per hour. The 1883 volcanic eruption of Krakatau Island in Indonesia generated a tsunami that killed more than thirty-six thousand people in nearby Java and Sumatra. More than 370 tsunamis were observed in the Pacific from 1900 to 1980; Japan is particularly vulnerable to these events, especially on the eastern margins of the large island of Honshu.

Twentieth-Century Occurrences

More than one-half of the most destructive earthquakes in the twentieth century, those causing five thousand or more deaths, have taken place in Asia.

The three largest of these occurred in China, each with more than 200,000 deaths. The 1923 Tokyo-Yokohama earthquake resulted in 143,000 deaths. Indonesia, located astride the boundaries of the Indo-Australian and Eurasian plates, records hundreds of quakes each year; between 1994 and 2000 twelve registered 4.7 to 7.6 on the Richter scale. India had at least five major quakes of 6.2 to 8.4 magnitude in the twentieth century, each resulting in tens of thousands dead and injured. When earthquakes take place near urban centers or more densely settled areas, the impact can be catastrophic. The 1995 Kobe, Japan, earthquake, for example, was measured at a relatively moderate level of 6.9 but caused significant damage and loss of life because it took place in a densely populated port and industrial city. More than 5,500 people were killed and more than 300,000 left homeless due to shock waves, fires, and the collapse of housing built to withstand tropical cyclones but not earthquakes. A similarly disastrous earthquake registering 7.6 on the Richter scale hit northwestern Taiwan in June 2000, causing millions of dollars in property damage, killing 2,100 people, and injuring more than 8,000.

Programs for earthquake disaster preparedness and management in countries throughout the Asia Pacific region are quite varied. The 1990s saw a shift away from local disaster relief activities to increased preparedness and preventive strategies in how regional governments and disaster management organizations respond to earthquake hazards. Enhanced preparedness measures should be augmented with preventive strategies to mitigate earthquake hazards, link rehabilitation with sustainable human development, and focus on community-based disaster management (CBDM) approaches. For CBDM approaches to gain wider support and be more effective, however, there must be greater acceptance by national governments throughout the region. A number of international agencies, regional disaster training groups, and private philanthropic and nongovernmental organizations are increasingly engaged in discussing and planning new earthquake and disaster management strategies in this part of the world. Groups that are involved include the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, the ASEAN Earthquake Information Center, the United Nations Development Program, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, CARE, and Save the Children, among others. Information and lessons learned from other earthquake-prone areas of the world help to improve earthquake forecasting, disaster preparedness, and mitigation for this region of the world. This level of international collaboration is an encouraging development for the millions of people who are vul-

nerable to the social and economic consequences of earthquakes in Asia.

James Hafner

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EAST CHINA SEA The East China Sea (Dong Hai) constitutes part of the Western Pacific. It is 1,296 kilometers long from the north to the south and 740 kilometers wide from the east to the west and covers an area of 790,000 square kilometers. In the north, it borders on the Yellow Sea (Huang Hai), and in the east it borders on Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Fujian provinces of the Chinese mainland. In the south, the East China Sea is connected to the South China Sea (Nan Hai) through the Taiwan Strait. The southern Japanese archipelago with the Ryukyu Islands constitutes the eastern border. Except for an area around the Ryukyu Islands, where depths up to 2,700 meters have been measured, the East China Sea is on a shallow continental shelf most of which is less than 200 meters deep. The Chang (Yangtze) River flows into the East China Sea, leaving huge deposits of sediment. The climate is subtropical, and monsoon winds with summer rain predominate in the area. The East China Sea is China's most important marine fishing area, and the catches of hairtail, small and large yellow croaker, and cuttlefish account for two-thirds of China's total catch. Shanghai, just south of the mouth of the Chang River, is the largest port bordering the sea and also is the center for food processing.

Bent Nielsen

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EAST INDIA COMPANY. See **British East India Company**; **Dutch East India Company**; **French East India Company**.

EAST TIMOR—PROFILE (2001 est. pop. 800,000). On 20 May 2002, the former Portuguese colony of East Timor, occupied by Indonesia in 1976, became the world's newest independent state. East Timor burst into world attention on 30 August 1999, following a flawed U.N.-supervised referendum on independence that left Indonesian armed forces in charge of security. When almost 80 percent of registered voters rejected integration with Indonesia, a full-blown campaign of terror orchestrated by the Indonesian led to the destruction of 70 percent of East Timor's infrastructure. Many Timorese were murdered, kidnapped, or disappeared. As many as 500,000 were displaced from their homes. In response to international outrage, the U.N. Security Council mandated an Australian-led international force (INTERFET) to restore security and supervise the withdrawal of Indonesian occupation forces. Deemed successful, INTERFET was subsequently transformed on 25 October 1999 into a U.N. blue beret force (United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor) to provide security pending a transition to full independence.

Topography and People

Of recent geological formation, the island of Timor features a mountainous interior, with its highest peak, Tata Mai Lau, rising 3,000 meters above sea level. Situated at the extreme east of the Lesser Sunda chain, Timor island is subject to great climatic contrasts between monsoon seasons, and is ecologically more vulnerable than islands to the west. The southern coast supports an extensive coastal plain, which is more restricted in the north, where mountain spurs extend to



the sea. The diverse landscape is matched by a variety of climatic zones and supports a diversity of vegetation: swamps on the plains, pockets of tropical rain forest, and extensive eucalyptus forests on the mountain slopes.

While anthropologists differ as to specifics, there is broad agreement that eastern Timor was populated by successive waves of Malays and proto-Malays, and also Papuan elements, although none exist today in pure form. The linguistic situation is no less complex: there are sixteen distinct languages in the whole of Timor, thirteen of which are spoken in East Timor. Most of these fall into either the Austronesian or Papuan language families. Tetum, also spoken in parts of West Timor, serves as lingua franca in East Timor.

The Traditional Political System

Sharing cultural and political traditions with other islands and societies in the Lesser Sunda Islands, Timor's traditional political system conforms to what Dutch anthropologist F. A. E. van Wouden calls a "segmented society" (one divided along ethnic lines). Not directly touched by Indian or Islamic influences, Timor never developed a centralized government, aside from a highly mythologized center believed to have been located in Wehale, in West Timor, in what would eventually become Dutch territory. In fact, geography and the complex peopling of the island bequeathed many competing and warring societies, often in conflict with each other and with outsiders who came in search of Timor's coveted sandalwood. Real power was in the hands of the "*liurai*," a Portugalized term meaning "little king." While the traditional lineage of the *liurai* was ruptured by the Portuguese after the Boaventura rebellion of 1911–1912 in order to win and cement new alliances, they continued to wield considerable local influence, surviving even the Indonesian occupation.

The Portuguese Colonial System

First reached by Portuguese traders and missionaries in the early 1500s, the island of Timor was ruled from the early 1700s by Portuguese governors sent first to the enclave of Oecusse, and then, with the transfer of the seat of government in 1776, to Dili, the present capital. Although Timor was distant and neglected within its empire, Portugal nevertheless developed a successful coffee plantation system, as well as bequeathing the Timorese a Catholic and Portuguese heritage.

In the modern period, notably after the 1911–1912 rebellion, the Portuguese introduced new forms of lo-

cal government around military posts centered on districts, but in a classical colonial system that saw little Timorese representation in the upper echelons of colonial administration. The rising tide of anticolonial nationalism in Southeast Asia bypassed eastern Timor. The major threat to the status quo was always Indonesia, as proven by an Indonesian separatist rebellion in the Viqueque district of eastern East Timor in 1959, suppressed with much loss of life.

Treated as part colony, part protectorate, a system that saw metropolitan Portugal subsidize only a meager developmental budget—which left most Timorese outside the coffee economy living in an unmonetized or subsistence economy—there is a sense that Portugal actually conserved rather than dissolved feudal bonds and cultural forms.

Portuguese political life atrophied under the premiership of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar (1932–1968) and his successor, Marcello Caetano (1968–1974), but with Lisbon's "flower revolution" of 25 April 1974, in which reformist soldiers replaced the dictatorship, the independence of Timor was placed squarely on the table, and political parties sanctioned. But just as East Timor's majority Fretilin party prevailed in a short civil war against its adversary, União Democrática Timorenses, and proclaimed a democratic republic on 28 November 1975, Timor was robbed of its short-lived independence by invading Indonesian forces. After successfully waging a guerrilla war of resistance against the Indonesian occupier, the armed wing of Fretilin (Falintil) only grew in stature with the capture and incarceration of its leader, José "Xanana" Gusmão (born 1946 in Manatuto district of East Timor), in 1992. As leader of CNRT, an umbrella front conjoining Fretilin and other parties and personalities, Gusmão, along with countrymen Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo and José Ramos-Horta (recipients of the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize), became an international symbol of East Timor's struggle for freedom and justice.

The Indonesian Colonial System

Following an invasion on 7 December 1975, East Timor was annexed as the twenty-seventh province of the Republic of Indonesia. The Jakarta government reproduced in East Timor all branches and agencies of its own central and provincial governments. In a classic case of internal colonialism in which most East Timorese were economically and politically marginalized, Indonesian rule was supported not only by a cadre of collaborators, but also by an iron fist. The foremost Indonesian achievement in East Timor was undoubtedly the introduction of a universal education system that saw large numbers of Timorese students

rise through the educational hierarchy, some attending universities in Indonesia. The other tangible achievement of Indonesian rule was the expansion of the infrastructure bequeathed by the Portuguese. Both education and infrastructure served the counterinsurgency aims of the Indonesian military, as did such forms of population control as resettlement villages and the introduction of large numbers of Indonesian settlers. Sustained and repressive military actions, however, not only led to the deaths of up to one-third of the population of East Timor, but also destroyed the fabric of traditional Timorese society.

Rule under the United Nations Transitional Administration

Headed by a Brazilian diplomat, Sergio Vieira de Melo, answering directly to the U.N. secretary-general, and staffed by some one thousand international civil servants, the United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) formed the de facto government in East Timor from early 2000 until its dissolution in May 2002. UNTAET was also backed by eight thousand international peacekeepers, along with hundreds of civilian police. UNTAET was empowered to make and enforce laws, to enter into international agreements (such as the renegotiation of the Timor Gap Treaty), and to supervise all aspects of governance. UNTAET decrees covered the establishment of a central banking system, the nomination of the U.S. dollar as official currency, the creation of a police force, the rebuilding of the justice system, the creation of a civil-service commission, and the recruitment of a seven-thousand-member civil service. Nevertheless, in deference to East Timorese opinion, and sometimes frustration owing to disagreement with East Timorese over administrative issues, UNTAET sanctioned the establishment of a transitional National Consultative Council alongside a parallel East Timor Transitional Administration, thereby speeding up the "Timorization" process.

In mid-2001 UNTAET focused on drawing up electoral laws and the norms for the creation of political parties. An election in which sixteen political parties took part was conducted on 30 August 2001 for a second transitional Constitutional Assembly; Fretilin emerged victorious. Fretilin Vice President Mari Alkatiri was appointed the country's first chief minister. The main task of the transitional assembly was to debate and approve the new nation's constitution.

Having adopted both Portuguese and Tetum as official languages, the new Democratic Republic of East Timor remains true to its long history under European colonialism. Under East Timor's new constitu-

tion, East Timor will be governed by a mixed presidential and cabinet system; church and state will be separated. East Timor vows to uphold a democratic system with free institutions, but as a desperately poor country, it will remain dependent upon the goodwill of international donors for years to come. The United Nations maintains a scaled-down presence in East Timor to further assist in capacity building and to guarantee East Timor's security.

Geoffrey C. Gunn

See also: United Nations in East Timor

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EASTERN GHATS The Eastern Ghats are a somewhat fractured mountain range running down much of eastern India and thus forming the eastern border of the Dekkan Plateau. The geological formation is granite, with gneiss and mica slate. The Eastern Ghats rise in the northern part of Orissa and then strike in a south-southwesterly direction, parallel to the coast and at a distance of from 80 to 250 kilometers from it. There is thus a broad and fertile coastal plain, much of it devoted to rice and coconut cultivation. However, in the Ganjam and Visakhapattinam areas, the Ghats nearly abut on the coast; here too are found the highest peaks. With several wide breaks to allow the eastward passage of some major rivers, the Godavari, Kistna, and Kaveri, the chain continues in the same direction until it reaches South Arcot district in Tamil Nadu. Then, adopting a more westerly direction, the Eastern Ghats finally merge with the Western Ghats in the high Nilgiri Plateau. Outliers are found further south in Tiruchirappalli and Tinneveli Districts. The average elevation of the Eastern Ghats is about 450 meters; they are thus considerably lower than the Western Ghats. In Orissa, Chhattisgarh, and Andhra Pradesh, the hills are inhabited mainly by tribal people who have a mixed farming economy supplemented by some hunting and gathering.

Paul Hockings

EASTERN LEARNING. See **Tonghak**.

EASTERN ORTHODOX CHURCH The Eastern Orthodox (from Greek "right believing") faith is directly descended from the spiritual communities established by the apostles of Jesus Christ in the eastern Mediterranean region; Eastern Orthodox Christianity officially separated from the Western (Roman Catholic) branch of the Christian church in 1054, though the split had begun centuries earlier with the division of the Roman empire. Today Eastern Orthodoxy flourishes in Greece as the Greek Orthodox Church. The Russian, Bulgarian, Romanian, Serbian, and Georgian Orthodox churches have also reemerged following the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. Sizable Orthodox populations also exist in America and Australia.

The majority of early Christian communities, founded by St. Paul or his followers, shared common beliefs and liturgy, but worship was conducted in different languages. However, Syrian beliefs, originating from St. Thomas, emphasized the humanity of Christ. After the Roman emperor Constantine I (324–337) first adopted Christianity, he assumed the secular leadership of the Church and the patriarch of Constantinople (his capital) laid claim to religious authority over the whole church. Constantinople remained the center of Eastern Orthodoxy until the city fell to the Turks in 1453. Even today the patriarch of Constantinople has authority over the Greek communities in Turkey, the Greek islands, northern Greece, and the rest of the world. The other spiritual leaders of the early Christian church were the patriarchs of Rome, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem.



THE ORTHODOX CHURCH

"The Church also possesses the great tradition of the Hesychastic and ascetic fathers, the liturgical tradition, the immutable tradition of theological experience and thought, and the cultivation of letters and fine arts, particularly Byzantine iconography and music, as well as the equally important tradition of social philanthropy and conciliatory spirit."

Source: Patriarch Bartolomeos, reported by the Turkish Daily News, April 2000.



An Orthodox priest with prayer candles in the Phokas Orthodox Church in Istanbul in 1997. (DAVE BARTRUFF/CORBIS)

Early Offshoots of Eastern Orthodoxy and the Advent of Islam

Eastern Orthodoxy recognizes the authority of seven ecumenical councils, starting with the first Council of Nicaea (325), which were convened to decide matters of doctrine. Constantine imposed his personality on the council of Nicaea, but subsequently inter-patriarchal rivalry emphasized differences. At the third council (the Council of Ephesus, 431), the Nestorian church diverged, and at the fourth council (the Council of Chalcedon, 451), dispute about the nature of Jesus caused the Armenian, Syrian, and Coptic churches to secede. The other councils were the first, second, and third Councils of Constantinople (381, 553, and 680) and the second Council of Nicaea (787).

From the sixth century many Asian and Mediterranean Christians came under Persian and then Islamic Arab rule. The conquerors divided the Orthodox population into separate self-governing communities led by their own patriarchs. Except during times of war, Arab occupation did not cut cross-border contacts; the three Eastern patriarchs (of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem) and bishops were able to attend church councils; pilgrims continued to visit the shrines in the Holy Land. The Orthodox church in Asia was at its maximum extent in around 901, with 405 bishops, including fifty-four metropolitans and fifty autocephalous (independent) bishops; Orthodox missionaries also converted the Slavs, Bulgars, and Russians.

The Split between Eastern and Western Christianity

Eastern and Western Christianity diverged gradually. In 800 Pope Leo III anointed Charlemagne as

Holy Roman Emperor, thus placing the Western church under the protection of France; from this time forward Western Christianity regarded the Roman pope as the prime religious authority. The Eastern Church, however, asserted its historical precedence, and differences between East and West eventually led to a complete schism in 1054. Among the doctrinal differences dividing Eastern Orthodox and Western believers is the nature of the relation of elements of the divine trinity (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.) The Nicene creed adopted by the Western Church says that the Holy Spirit proceeds "from the father and the son," but the Eastern Church believes that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. The final insurmountable issue was a dispute over who had jurisdiction where: Pope Leo IX and Michael Cerularius, the patriarch of Constantinople, mutually excommunicated each other. Rome and Byzantium cooperated to some degree during the Crusades, but in 1204, during the Fourth Crusade, Westerners besieged and looted Constantinople.

Eastern Orthodoxy under Ottoman Rule

After the fall of Constantinople Sultan Mehmed II (1432–1481) set fairly generous rules for the surviving fifty thousand members of the Orthodox community and recognized the patriarch as the head of all the Christians in the Turkish empire. Saint Sophia, the central church in Orthodoxy, was immediately dedicated to Islam, but most churches remained in use. (Today, most surviving Orthodox churches in Turkey have become museums.) Superior training and knowledge of languages enabled much of the Orthodox community to monopolize the Turkish diplomatic service. The Orthodox patriarchate thus survived in Constantinople partly by collaboration with the Muslim overlords.

Informal leadership of Orthodoxy in time moved to the Russian church; in 1589 it received its own patriarch, but in 1721 Peter the Great (1672–1725) abolished it (it was reestablished in 1917). In the nineteenth century, when the Orthodox peoples of Asia were freed from Turkish rule, the Balkan states and Greece won church and state independence, and the patriarchate of Constantinople lost whatever religious powers it had enjoyed.

During World War I and the War of Turkish Independence Greco-Turkish animosities led to atrocities. The burning of Izmir is still referred to by Orthodox Greeks as the Catastrophe. In 1923 about 800,000 Greek Christians (Orthodox and Catholic) living in Turkey were exchanged with a population of

1.2 million Muslims living in Greece; about 100,000 Greek Christians, protected by the Treaty of Lausanne, remained in and around Istanbul. Today only an estimated 3,000 Greek Orthodox remain in Turkey.

Distinctions between Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism Today

Orthodox doctrines have always lacked precision, partly due to the conviction that it is presumptuous to define God, partly because, in Byzantine times, theology was a universal intellectual hobby. Few doctrinal differences separate Orthodoxy from Catholic Christianity; the dividing issues remain the governance of the church, papal versus conciliar authority, and a married priesthood. The seven sacraments of Catholic Christianity (baptism, confirmation, marriage, holy orders, penance, anointing of the sick, and the Eucharist) are augmented in Eastern Orthodoxy by others for special occasions. Both churches rescinded the mutual excommunications of 1054 in the twentieth century, and following Roman Catholicism's Second Vatican Council (1962–1964), ecumenical dialogue between the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church was undertaken.

Kate Clow

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EBINA DANJO (1856–1937), Japanese Christian leader and educator. Ebina Danjo, a native of Yanagawa in Japan's Chikugo Province (now a part of Fukuoka Prefecture), was a Christian leader and educator of the Meiji (1868–1912), Taisho (1912–1926), and Showa (1926–1989) periods. In 1872 Ebina attended the Kumamoto Yogakko, a school that was established in 1871 for Western studies, where he came under the influence of an American educator, Leroy Lansing Janes (1838–1909). He was then baptized. Thus, in 1876, converted to Christianity, he became a member of the Kumamoto Christian Band. He went to study at Doshisha (Doshisha University since 1920) in Kyoto under Nijima Jo (1843–1890). In 1879 Ebina became a pastor of the Annaka Church in Gumma Prefecture and traveled around Japan to spread Chris-

tianity. He was also engaged as a pastor in Kobe in 1893. It was especially when he was a pastor of the Hongo Church in Tokyo from 1897 to 1920 that he became known as a preacher and evangelist. In 1920 he also founded a Christian journal entitled *Shinjin* (New Man) and educated younger people such as Yoshino Sakuzo (1878–1933) and Suzuki Bunji (1885–1946). At Hongo, and as the head of Doshisha from 1920 to 1928, Ebina was a leading figure in the congregational church in Japan.

Nathalie Cavasin

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ECONOMIC PLANNING AGENCY OF JAPAN

Until January 2001, the Economic Planning Agency (Keizai Kikakucho) of Japan was an agency under the jurisdiction of the prime minister's office. One of its key responsibilities was to act as secretariat to the Economic Council (Keizai Shingikai), an advisory council to the cabinet. While the EPA was not a cabinet ministry, its director-general was officially a cabinet member. In January 2001, its offices and functions were reassigned to the newly organized Cabinet Office (Naikakufu, the successor to the prime minister's office), where they function as secretariat to the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (Keizai Zaisei Shimon Kaigi, which replaces the old Economic Council). The title of director-general has changed to minister of state for economic and fiscal policy.

The EPA was established on 20 July 1955, but its direct antecedents date back to 12 August 1946, when the Economic Stabilization Board (Keizai Anteibu) was established at the behest of the Allied Occupation forces. When the occupation ended, the board was officially renamed the Economic Deliberation Agency (Keizai Shingicho) on 1 August 1952 and became the Economic Planning Agency on 20 July 1955.

The EPA was responsible for preparing national economic plans and for compiling a variety of economic statistics and providing projections. In its early years, its planning functions were at the forefront. Based on assessments of potential output in different industries and of the barriers to achieving that poten-

tial, long-term (generally five-year) plans laid out a series of investment, employment, and production targets. These plans were primarily recommendations, since the Japanese government had limited authority to shape private-sector activities. However, private firms would take into account EPA plans and predictions of supply-and-demand conditions in their own planning.

EPA plans also affected government behavior. In the 1950s and 1960s, the lending programs of government financial institutions, such as the Japan Development Bank, were based on EPA plans. Public investment also reflected those plans to some extent. Over time, the plans changed their focus from post-war reconstruction to high-speed growth to social amenities. In the 1990s, many plans tended to focus either on responding to economic stagnation or on economic restructuring.

The most famous of the various EPA economic plans was undoubtedly the Income Doubling Plan (Kokumin Shotoku Baizo Keikaku). Promulgated under Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda in 1960, the plan called for a doubling of Japan's gross national product within a decade. Though widely considered unrealistic at the time, the goal was realized in slightly over seven years. While considerable government investment did result from the Income Doubling Plan, for the most part the plan's writers recognized the latent potential of the Japanese economy: a skilled but still underutilized workforce, rapid capital accumulation, and an ability to gain access to and assimilate technological improvements. Public investment was aimed mainly at transportation and regional development.

The EPA continued to engage in long-term planning, but the practical effects of the plans decreased in importance as the government's role in the economy declined. In the 1980s and 1990s, the most influential documents produced by the EPA were the annual cabinet economic forecasts (*Economic Outlook and Basic Policy Stance on Economic Management*, or *Keizai mitoshi to keizai un'ei kibonteki taido*). The macroeconomic projections in those forecasts provided the basis of budget and tax debates. In the 1990s, these predictions became controversial, outsiders deriding them as overoptimistic. Indeed, the predictions regularly exceeded actual growth rates.

The EPA produced a variety of publications based on statistical analysis and forecasting. Notable publications included the annual *Economic White Paper* (*Keizai hakusho*) and *White Paper on the National Lifestyle* (*Kokumin seikatsu hakusho*). The EPA collected some of the original data itself through surveys, but

relied on other ministries for much of its data. One of its main roles was to produce statistics on the economy and government finance that conformed to the internationally accepted System of National Accounts (SNA). The SNA was introduced by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1953. After spending several years investigating how best to meet those standards, the EPA began publishing such figures in 1966 and continues to do so. In the late 1990s, the EPA began to release many of its publications and statistical series in electronic form on the Internet.

While the EPA's responsibilities were important, it was considered to be weak politically. Its subordinate position was reflected in its agency rather than ministry status. Many of its staff were seconded from the powerful Ministry of Finance (MOF) and Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). In the 1960s, the EPA was the site of a well-known turf battle between MOF and MITI; career EPA staffers backed MOF, and the result was that MITI's role was sharply reduced. Subsequently, the Ministry of Finance was seen as particularly influential in the EPA.

The EPA was not in a political or administrative position to control forecasting and planning functions, despite its official mandate to do so. Line ministries such as MITI, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications have had the greatest control over those functions for industries under their jurisdictions. Similarly, while the EPA was the official compiler of economic stimulus packages, these were actually put together largely by the Ministry of Finance, which has responsibility for fiscal policy. The EPA's role was thus mostly technical, although in its early years it did participate in coordinating the various ministries' plans so as to match Japan's limited resources.

Career EPA officials have positioned themselves as technocrats and have worked to improve their expertise in econometrics and measurement. Additionally, the agency's Economic Research Institute was a resource for academic economists investigating public finance and various economic phenomena, and constructed sophisticated computer models such as the EPA World Econometric Model. Despite the EPA's origins as a central planning agency, its officials have been regarded as strong advocates of greater liberalization of the Japanese economy since at least the 1970s.

William W. Grimes

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ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM

After World War II, the United States initiated programs to demilitarize and democratize Japan. These were followed by additional initiatives designed to reform the Japanese economy. The main tasks were combating inflation and boosting production, with factions in both Japan and the United States divided over which was more important. In 1949, President Harry Truman appointed Joseph Dodge, president of the Detroit Bank, to spearhead an economic reform package. Dodge reluctantly accepted the position of "Financial Adviser" to the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP), but once in Japan he wasted no time drafting the Economic Stabilization Plan.

The "Dodge Line," as the plan is better known, aimed to balance the national budget, establish the U.S. Aid Counterpart Fund, fix a single foreign exchange rate, and decrease government intervention in the economy. Short-term successes were immediate: inflation dropped from 80 percent in 1948 to 24 percent in 1949, and the number of goods on the black market fell. Laid-off workers expressed discontent, however, a likely reason why Douglas MacArthur did not want to lead the economic recovery himself. Scholars debate the extent to which the Dodge Line contributed to Japanese economic recovery in the long run, especially since the Korean War, which began the year after Dodge's arrival, boosted Japanese production.

Marie Thorsten

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EDA SABURO (1907–1977), Japanese politician. Born in Okayama Prefecture, Eda Saburo left college to participate in the leftist farmer's movement. Those activities led to his becoming a member of the central executive committee of the National Farmers' Party and service in Okayama Prefecture's prefectural assembly. An activist for socialist causes all his life, he spent time in prison in the 1930s for his activities and worked for the North China Political Council in Beijing in the 1940s. He joined the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) after returning to Japan in 1946 and served several terms as party secretary-general in the 1960s. With Asanuma Inejiro (1898–1960), the head of the JSP, Eda led the movement opposing the renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which let the United States retain military bases in Japan. After Asanuma's assassination in October 1960, Eda took over leadership of the party; he then stood for election as the party head, but lost, despite his platform of structural reform. In 1976 he lost a bid for election to the lower house of Diet, and the following year he left the JSP.

William Nelson Ridgeway

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EDIGE The epic *Edige* has as its historical nucleus the emir of the Golden Horde Edige (also called Edigu, Idiga, Idiku, d. 1419) and his wars against Khan Tokhtamysh (d. 1406/1407) and the Russians. The epic is shared by a number of Turkic peoples who trace their origins back to the tribal confederation of the Golden Horde. The earliest known version is a Kazakh text that was written in the nineteenth century by the Kazakh prince Chokan Valikhanov (1835–1865). In the twentieth century the epic was recorded mainly from Kazakh, Karakalpak, Noghay, and Tatar singers. In the epic, Edige is presented as both a wise man and a hero who fights against an unjust khan and helps his tribe to survive and prosper in a hostile environment. The epic is important as a testimony to the transformation of history into heroic poetry and for exemplifying one of the main functions of the heroic epic, the celebration of a glorious tribal past.

Karl Reichl

See also: **Alpamish**

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EDIRNE (2002 pop. 128,000). Edirne is the capital of the province of Edirne in northwestern Turkey, near the border with Greece and Bulgaria and the confluence of the Tundzha, Maritsa, and Arda rivers. The city is the gateway from the Balkans to the east. The first settlers were most likely Thracian tribes, succeeded by the Macedonians and later by the Romans under the emperor Hadrian (76–138 CE), who named



The Sultan Selim Mosque in Edirne in the 1990s. (CHRIS HELLIER/CORBIS)

the city Hadrianopolis or Adrianopolis. The city was captured by the Ottoman sultan Murad I (1326?–1389) in 1362, after which it became Edirne, the second capital of the Ottoman empire after Bursa. From here Fatih Sultan Mehmed planned his attack on Constantinople in 1453. Due to Edirne's importance as one of the first capitals of the Ottoman empire, many Ottoman monuments, mosques, and palaces adorn the city. Most notable is the Sultan Selim Mosque, commissioned by Sultan Selim II (1524–1574), built between 1568 and 1574 by the distinguished Ottoman architect Mimar Sinan (1489–1588). The mosque's dome has a diameter of 31.5 meters, a few centimeters larger than the Saint Sophia dome in Istanbul, and has the second-highest minarets in the world, surpassed only by those in Mecca.

Edirne was occupied by the Russians during the Russian-Turkish wars in 1829 and 1878–1879, and by the Bulgarians in 1913. After World War I the Greeks laid claim to Edirne from 1920 to 1922. Edirne officially became part of the Turkish Republic in 1923 under the Treaty of Lausanne. Each summer Edirne hosts the popular Kirkpinar Festival, a 600-year-old competition of greased wrestling.

T. Isikozlu-E.F. Isikozlu

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EDOGAWA RAMPO (1894–1965), Japan's first modern mystery writer. Edogawa Rampo (whose real name was Hirai Taro) graduated from Waseda University in 1916. He worked alternately as a clerk, accountant, and editor, but in 1923 found himself unemployed. An avid reader of foreign mystery stories, he penned *Nisen doka* (The Two-Sen Copper Coin) and submitted it to the only mystery magazine in Japan, *Shin seinen*, which published translations of Western mysteries. Edogawa's short mystery was accepted, and it became the first original Japanese mystery story to be published. He chose as his pen name Edogawa Rampo, after the Japanese pronunciation of Edgar Allen Poe.

With the subsequent publication of *Shinri shiken* (The Psychological Test) in 1925 and *Yaneura no samposha* (The Attic Stroller) in 1925, he became the leading Japanese writer in the mystery genre. Gradually turning to longer mysteries, he published *Inju* (Dark Beasts, 1928), *Kumotoko* (Spider Man, 1930), and *Ogon kamen* (Golden Mask, 1931), which found a large

audience. As founder of the Japan Mystery Writers' Club and the Edogawa Rampo Prize, he encouraged young writers and wrote critical essays of works in the mystery genre.

James M. Vardaman, Jr.

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EHIME (2002 est. pop. 1.5 million). Ehime Prefecture is situated in the northwest region of Japan's island of Shikoku. It occupies an area of 5,672 square kilometers. The main geographical features include a mostly mountainous terrain, western Japan's tallest peak, Ishizuchisan, various coastal plains and river valleys, and a rugged shoreline in the south with many small offshore islands. Ehime Prefecture, once the ancient province of Iyo, is bordered by the Inland Sea and by Kochi, Kagawa, and Tokushima Prefectures.

The prefecture's capital is the centrally located port city of Matsumaya, Shikoku Island's largest city. Matsumaya Castle is one of the few feudal fortresses to survive relatively intact. The city's traditional crafts include *iyogasuri* (an indigo-dyed textile) and *tobeyaki* (blue and white porcelain). The larger industries include petrochemicals, soda factories, and wood pulp processing. Nearby is Dogo Onsen, one the nation's oldest hot spring spas. Matsumaya also is the site of eight of Shikoku's eighty-eight pilgrimage temples. The other important cities of Ehime Prefecture are Niihama, Saijo, Yawatahama, and Uwajima.

Ehime's warm temperatures make it the major source of Japan's mandarin oranges and other citrus fruit. Commercial fishing now has given way in part to shellfish fishing, pearl culture, and the production of *nori* (edible seaweed). Along the northeast coast is an industrial zone of plants for processing metals, chemicals, paper, textiles, and petrochemicals. Among the other tourist attractions are the Inland Sea National Park and the Ichizuchisan area.

E. L. S. Weber

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EKAPHAP *Ekaphap* (unity) is a word found in both Thai and Lao languages. Unity and preservation of a

distinctive national identity have been important priorities of both the Thai and Lao states. *Ekaphap* is one of the five major political slogans of the Lao government. The challenge to unity in both the Thai and Lao cases has been the existence of considerable ethnic diversity. Only 52.5 percent of the Lao nation is ethnically lowland Lao. Thailand also has considerable ethnic diversity, though less than that of Laos.

Thailand's leadership has been remarkably successful in creating national unity, primarily through the institution of the monarchy and a uniform, standardized modern educational system, which has required all to learn and use standard Thai, the national language and a unifying factor. His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej has been brilliant in using the institution of the monarchy to create solidarity and unity among all Thais. The king travels to all regions of the country on a regular basis to help build national unity. With the abolition of the Lao monarchy in 1975, Lao unity has been achieved primarily through the promotion of standard Lao language and the institution of the revolutionary party that led the long Lao struggle for political independence.

Gerald W. Fry

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ELBURZ Elburz is a mountain range located between the Caspian Sea and the central Iranian plateau. The range serves as a natural border for Iran and its northern neighbors (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkmenistan) in the Caucasus. The extinct volcano of Mount Damavand is the peak of the Elburz Range, rising to about 5,600 meters. Elburz is covered by an ice cap of about 140 square kilometers, with seventy-seven minor and steadily retreating glaciers radiating from it, some reaching 400 meters in thickness. Lakes are mostly of glacial origin, small in area, but deep.

The range consists of steep, narrow, parallel ridges crossed only by the Safid River, whose valley forms the main trans-Elburz route. The northern slope of the Elburz is rainy and forested, and the southern slope is semiarid. Snowcapped water peaks provide seasonal

flow used for irrigation and industry. Elburz is composed of both hard crystalline rocks and magma. In the surrounding valleys, mineral springs are common and in a few places, sulfurous fumes escape through fissures, often deep under the ice cover. Pine forests mingled with birch and mountain ash cover the north of the main ridge valleys and lower mountain slopes of Elburz. In higher elevations, forests have been replaced by alpine meadows rich in flowers. The foothills of Elburz, lying to the north of Tehran, act as a major recreational attraction for both alpinists and nature enthusiasts.

Payam Foroughi and Raissa Mubutdinova-Foroughi

ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY—JAPAN After being opened to the West in the mid-nineteenth century Japan quickly adopted the electrical technologies of the time. By the early decades of the twentieth century the Japanese military and some Japanese researchers had attained world-class levels in many areas of electronics. Japan's electronics industry, however, remained largely dependent on U.S. and European firms for technology and capital throughout the prewar era.

After World War II, Japanese firms effectively used, and often improved, foreign technology to become world leaders in electronics. For some time, the Japanese electronics industry has been second only to that of the United States. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, the Japanese electronics firms have been handicapped by the slow growth of the Japanese market.

The Introduction of Electrical/Electronics Technology in Japan

Despite being relatively isolated from the West until the middle of the nineteenth century, the Japanese were aware of important developments in Western science and technology. This was thanks to Japanese scholars who painstakingly translated science books acquired from Dutch traders into Japanese. Information on the telegraph, for example, was translated in 1848, ten years after Samuel Morse had demonstrated the device to the U.S. government.

In 1853 and 1854, a U.S. naval squadron under Commodore Matthew Perry (1794–1858) visited Tokyo Bay. Crew members demonstrated a telegraph and other modern Western technology. Perry's visit demonstrated the inability of the ruling government to protect Japan from the Western powers that had



Women assemble the electronic components of a high-tech toilet at the Toto Toilet Company in Miyazaki, Japan, in the early 1990s. (MICHAEL S. YAMASHITA/CORBIS)

already colonized most of Asia. It also suggested that Japan needed to adopt Western technology to maintain its national sovereignty. After some years of internal conflict, a new government determined to "modernize" Japan was formed in 1868. Just a year later, telegraph service was inaugurated between Tokyo and Yokohama.

In the 1870s, the government started a university-level program in electrical engineering and established electrical research laboratories. Now that Japan was more fully open to information flows from the West, the Japanese were quick to master the new electrical technologies. Japanese made a telephone receiver in 1878, only two years after Alexander Graham Bell. They started producing electric light bulbs in 1884. An electric lighting system was established in Tokyo in 1887, only five years after Edison established his first system in New York. That same year Japan built its first electric power plant and Tokyo Electric Lighting started supplying electricity to factories. General telephone service was introduced in Tokyo and Yokohama in 1890. In 1905 the Japanese Navy used wireless telegraphy to defeat a Russian fleet at the Battle of Tsushima. Radio broadcasting began in 1925, initiating modern electronics engineering in Japan.

The Japanese also made significant original contributions to electronics technology. The Yagi antenna, which became the world's most widely used radio and television antenna, was invented in 1926 by Yagi Hidetsugu and Uda Shintaro. Also in 1926, Takayanagi Kenjiro was one of the first in the world to successfully produce an all-electronic television image. Toshiba demonstrated Japan's first television set in September 1939, only eight months after RCA first demonstrated its television technology.

Origins of Major Private Firms

Japan's first firms in the electrical/electronics industry were established in the late nineteenth century. Many of these firms soon experienced severe difficulties. Electrical technology was advancing rapidly in the West and was becoming increasingly complex. After Japan joined the International Patent Convention in 1899, Japanese firms were less free simply to copy foreign technology. Another problem was that economic conditions in Japan made it difficult for the new electronics firms to get adequate capital.

Foreign firms often provided the solution to both the technology and capital shortages. In 1899, the U.S. company Western Electric established the firm that became NEC. In 1905, another U.S. company, General Electric (GE), acquired 51 percent of Tokyo Electric Lighting, and provided it with light bulb manufacturing technology. With GE's capital and technology, Tokyo Electric soon dominated light bulb production in Japan. In 1910 GE took 24.5 percent of the equity of Shibaura Engineering Works in exchange for technology. This allowed Shibaura to become Japan's largest producer of generators and other heavy electrical equipment. In 1939 Tokyo and Shibaura merged to form Tokyo Shibaura Electric, today's Toshiba. Westinghouse Electric of the United States and Mitsubishi formed Mitsubishi Electric in 1921; Germany's Siemens and Furukawa Electric formed Fuji Electric in 1923 (one of the spin-offs from Fuji Electric is Fujitsu).

A few Japanese electronics firms have always been independent from foreign firms. Hitachi, which started out as a mine repair shop in 1908, became a separate electrical/electronics firm in 1920. The company long prided itself on its independence from Western technology. Matsushita (also known by its Panasonic and National brand names) was founded in 1918. The firm that became Sharp was established as a metal-processing firm in 1912; it grew based on its founder's invention of a mechanical pencil (the Ever Sharp) and began making radios in 1925.

In the late 1930s, the Japanese government restricted the production of home appliances, and the electronics industry concentrated on producing electronics for the military. The foreign firms were increasingly forced to withdraw. Toshiba shared the technology it had gotten from General Electric with Hitachi, NEC, and other companies, but during the war years the Japanese electronics firms suffered from their loss of contacts with the rest of the world. Military electronics research in such areas as radar, however, was nearly equal to that in Western countries.

Postwar Recovery: Radio and Television

The environment facing the Japanese electronics firms changed drastically with the end of World War II. During the postwar occupation of Japan (1945–1952), U.S. authorities banned research in radar and other areas considered to be of military significance. One of Japan's premier centers of electronics research, the Naval Research Institute, was dismantled. And, of course, there was no longer a market for military electronics. One consequence of this was that talented researchers shifted their interest to consumer electronics. Masaru Ibuka (1908–1997) and Akio Morita (1921–1999), for example, left their positions as naval researchers and went on to found Sony in 1946. Other wartime researchers moved into leading positions at the other electronics firms.

The U.S. Occupation authorities regarded the development of commercial radio and television broadcasting as a way to build support for democratic institutions in Japan. High priority was given the establishment of commercial stations and the manufacture of radios. With this encouragement, around two hundred firms of various sizes began producing radios by 1949. Television broadcasting was begun in 1953. Sharp (then called Hayakawa Electric) put the first Japanese-made television receiver on sale in January 1953. By the end of the 1950s, there were 3.3 million television sets in Japan.

Technology Imports

Although Japanese technologies were being developed that might eventually have served as the basis for Japan's television industry, the faster route of using American standards and relying on foreign technology was chosen. Nearly forty Japanese firms quickly entered into license agreements for foreign television technology, most often with the dominant American firm at the time, RCA. Meanwhile Japanese electronics firms, beginning with Sony, quickly signed licensing agreements for the transistor technology developed at Bell Laboratories in the United States. Although U.S. firms were the first to market transistor radios, Sony developed a radio of the right size and price to appeal to a mass market. The production of transistors for transistor radios also established Japanese firms in the new semiconductor industry.

By 1959, more than one hundred Japanese companies were making transistor radios, and Japan was the world-leading producer of transistors. In 1960 transistor radios were Japan's second largest generator of export earnings, after ships. Although Sony and other Japanese firms deserve credit for developing transistor

radios that were popular with consumers, there was another reason for Japan's success with these products. These products were highly labor intensive at the time and Japanese firms were able to hire thousands of female factory workers for about ten cents per hour.

In the late 1960s, the integrated circuit (IC) and the LSI (large-scale integrated circuit) calculator played a role similar to that of the transistor and the transistor radio in the 1950s. While Sony had been the catalyst for the early technology, Sharp was the key early mover with the LSI calculator. In 1969 Sharp introduced a calculator based on U.S.-developed LSIs. Some fifty other Japanese firms quickly brought out versions of this product. Japanese semiconductor firms quickly developed the technical expertise to meet the needs of the calculator producers. This supported Japan's growing strength in the world semiconductor industry throughout the 1980s.

Japan continues to spend \$2 billion a year on imported electronics technology, but Japan's electronics firms are now also leading suppliers of technology, with annual receipts for technology exports of more than \$1.5 billion.

Developing a Japanese Technological Capacity in Electronics

Although imported technology was essential to the Japanese electronics industry, much more was needed. First of all, the Japanese firms needed to build a strong capability to absorb the technology. Secondly, creative adaptations in product design or production methods, as with the transistor radio and LSI calculator, were needed to make the technology a success. In some instances it was necessary to create new markets for products, such as Sony's Walkman, that had not previously existed. Some of these capabilities were developed through heavy spending on research. In some instances government provided funds and coordinated the activities of firms to develop technology and markets.

The Electronics Industry Law of 1958, for example, provided government subsidies for research and development. Special loans and tax policies encouraged investment in efficient new plants and equipment. Another major policy measure encouraged the formation of research associations—groups of firms subsidized by government and exempted from antitrust laws that worked on specific new technologies. The first of these in the electronics industry, the Japan Electronics Industry Promotion Association, was established in 1958 as the first major cooperative research program. Although it is not clear how many of

the research associations can be characterized as successful, the VLSI (Very Large Scale Integration) Consortium is often credited with helping Japan catch up with the United States in this technology and there may have been other successes in the electronics industry.

Evolving Domestic Market

While Japanese electronics exports attracted attention around the world and sometimes have been the subject of heated trade disputes, a major factor in the Japanese electronics industry's growth has been Japan's increasingly affluent and sophisticated domestic market. Black and white television helped propel the rapid growth of the Japanese electronics industry in the 1950s, but it was not long before the market for this product became saturated. By the time of the Tokyo Olympics, in 1964, about 90 percent of Japanese households had black and white television sets. The electronics firms quickly moved to the production of color television sets. In 1970 color televisions accounted for one third of total electronics industry sales. While a similar transition occurred in the United States and Europe, it extended over a much longer period.

As the Japanese market for color televisions neared saturation in the mid and late 1970s the electronics firms began introducing home video recorders. This time the Japanese domestic market received large volumes of a new electronic product ahead of the United States and Europe, giving an added advantage to the Japanese in export markets. By 1985 Japanese firms and their affiliates accounted for some 80 percent of world video recorder production. In 1979 Sony created another hit product, the Walkman. Other consumer products such as room air conditioners and compact disc (CD) players quickly sold in the Japanese market, contributing to the rapid growth of the Japanese firms.

The demand for increasingly sophisticated consumer products, added to that for calculators and computers, also meant lucrative new markets for Japanese semiconductor producers. Through most of the 1980s five and sometimes six of the world's ten largest semiconductor producers were Japanese. In 1987 Japanese firms had more than half the world's semiconductor market.

The 1990s and 2000s

By the beginning of the 1990s, Japan's household market for consumer products was largely saturated. Worse yet for the electronics firms, Japan's economy had entered a long-term period of stagnation at the

end of the 1980s. During the 1990s, although there was some growth in industrial electronics, sales in the consumer electronics segment of the industry dropped almost in half. The weakness in consumer markets also caused problems for Japanese semiconductor producers. At the end of the 1990s, more than a third of the demand in Japan for semiconductor products came from consumer products, compared to about 5 percent in the United States. Often the consumer applications required analog products, so semiconductors designed for these markets could not be used in the faster-growing computer market.

Another problem facing the Japanese electronics firms in the late twentieth century was the high level of Japanese wages. Beginning in the mid-1980s Japanese electronics firms began moving their facilities offshore to reduce their labor costs. In 1998 these firms had about eight hundred production facilities in Asia and another four hundred in other parts of the world. By the late 1990s, Japanese firms were producing about 40 million color television sets per year, but only about 10 percent of these were actually being made in Japan. Offshore production of video recorders was more than double domestic production. Similar patterns were being seen in the production of stereos, car stereos, and other consumer electronics products.

Despite their success in reducing labor costs by moving offshore, in the late 1990s and early 2000s Japan's "big five" industrial-electronics firms, Toshiba, NEC, Hitachi, Fujitsu, and Mitsubishi Electric (together accounting for 5 percent of Japan's GDP and more than a quarter of its exports) and Japan's largest consumer electronics firm, Sony, were all experiencing serious difficulties. Toshiba, for example, was experiencing its first losses in nearly a quarter of a century. The firms were all being widely criticized for a lack of focus and all were announcing moves to restructure their businesses. Vertically integrated single-nation electronics firms seem to be losing competitive advantage to multinational alliances of more specialized firms. In response to this trend, Japanese firms are increasingly entering into international alliances, most often with U.S. partners.

Leonard Lynn


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ELEPHANT, ASIAN The Asian elephant (*Elephas maximus*), also known as the Indian elephant, inhabits the forests and grasslands of Southeast Asia, from India and Sri Lanka to Thailand, Malaysia, and Sumatra. Enormously strong, Asian elephants are also intelligent and easily tamed. Asian elephants were first tamed over 5,000 years ago and can be trained to a very high standard. They are usually captured in the wild as young adults and the initial breaking in and taming process takes only a few weeks. Each elephant is assigned a handler known as a mahout who trains the animal according to detailed traditional procedures and may use tame elephants to calm the new captive and to teach by example. An unbreakable, lifelong bond often develops between a mahout and his elephant. They have served people as beasts of burden, as draft animals, in warfare, and for ceremonial purposes for several thousand years.

Males (bulls) stand three to four meters high and weigh up to six tons. Females (cows) are smaller. Their thick gray skin is wrinkled and almost hairless and their



An 1849 illustration of the Asian elephant in South Asia. (MICHAEL MASIAN HISTORIC PHOTOGRAPHS/CORBIS)

trunk, a fleshy, boneless nose, acts as a hand. Bulls have large ivory tusks, used for digging and fighting. Elephants have poor eyesight, but extremely keen hearing and sense of smell. They are herbivores, feeding primarily on leaves, grasses, bark, and roots. They also enjoy bananas and sugarcane. Food is ground down with their four huge molar teeth.

Elephants live and migrate together in herds and are very social animals. They have a lifespan of up to sixty years. Following a twenty-two-month pregnancy, a cow gives birth to a single calf.

Asian elephants are generally gentle, curious, and friendly creatures. However, enraged or stampeding elephants will trample everything in their path and have occasionally been known to kill people, usually those threatening or hunting them.

Asian elephants are seriously endangered due to loss of habitat and poaching, despite a ban on trading ivory. Most remaining wild elephants are in special reserves.

Lucy D. Moss

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ELEPHANT RANGE The Chuor Phnom Damrei (Elephant Mountain Range) is an extension of the Chuor Phnom Kravanh (Cardamom Mountains) of western Cambodia. Extending 110 kilometers south and southeast from the capital city of Phnom Penh to the Gulf of Thailand, with an average elevation of 500 meters, the name is literally translated as "the mountains around which the clouds turn." The Elephant Range was the principal center of Cambodia's pepper-growing industry until the Khmer Rouge, also referred to as Red Cambodians, took power in 1975. The heavily forested western slopes receive nearly 5,000 millimeters of rain each year from the southwest monsoons. The rainfall in the eastern hills, however, rarely exceeds 1,520 millimeters, because they lie in the rain shadow.

The highest point in the Elephant Range is Mount Bokor (1,081 meters), located near the coast between the towns of Kampot and Kampong Saom (Sihanoukville). Now a national park, the mountain contains the abandoned ruins of the Bokor hill station, once a popular retreat for the French administrators

who sought to escape the summer heat of Phnom Penh. More recently, it was controlled by Khmer Rouge guerrilla soldiers. Today, both visitors and residents seek out the mountain for its forested surroundings and scenic, panoramic views of the sea.

Greg Ringer

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EMAKIMONO *Emakimono* (*emaki*), meaning literally "pictures rolled," is a uniquely Japanese painting format in which a narrative is presented in both words and pictures through a long horizontal handscroll. *Emakimono* illustrate texts that can be either religious or nonreligious; the emphasis is always on the narrative and thus continuous landscape paintings, for example, cannot be considered *emakimono*.

The scroll, made of paper or silk, is attached to a wooden dowel at the far left end so that the picture may be rolled up for storage, secured by a braided silk cord. The *emakimono* is backed by silk to protect it and give it strength. Once rolled, the scroll can be placed on a shelf or in a large box if the work is comprised of several scrolls.

An *emakimono* is best seen by a single viewer who unrolls and rolls the scroll with both hands. The act of touching the scroll creates an intimate relationship between the painting and the viewer, who is able to control the action of the narrative by moving quickly along some parts of the scroll and pausing at others. As both the Chinese and Japanese languages are traditionally read from right to left, these illustrated handscrolls are intended to be viewed by unrolling the scroll from right to left as well. Typically, an *emakimono* begins with a frontispiece of decorated paper, and then proceeds to the main work where passages of text alternate with illustrations. There is no set length for either the illustrations or the text, but in general, the scenes of battle stories are longer because they convey intense drama.

A number of subjects are found in *emakimono* and include romances, famous battles, legends, and Buddhist themes, such as biographies of eminent monks and histories of temples. *Emakimono* were especially



A scene from the *Tale of Genji*. (ARCHIVO ICONOGRAFICO, S.A./CORBIS)

popular from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries when stories of this nature were enjoyed. Although the subject matter varied considerably, there are in essence only two types of *emakimono*—those composed of small scenes alternating with sections of text, which include Buddhist treatises and courtly romances, and those with long and dramatic scenes that are unbroken by passages of text, such as the fiery stories of military events.

At the end of the fourteenth century, the vogue for *emakimono* declined, largely due to the growing popularity of Zen-inspired ink paintings and later a market for decorative paintings to adorn sixteenth-century castles and palaces.

Catherine Pagani

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EMEI, MOUNT Mount Emei is a 3,099-meter mountain located 200 kilometers southeast of Chengdu in Sichuan Province, China. Dramatic cliffs provide excellent views of the Himalayan Plateau to

the west. It is notable for its very diverse vegetation, including a rare plant called the "dove tree." Monkeys heckle pilgrims for food on the trail, and bearded toads, tree frogs, silver pheasants, and a small species of panda inhabit the undisturbed wilderness of the mountain.

The site has been sacred for over 2,000 years. The Taoists practiced on the mountain during the Eastern Han dynasty (25–220 CE). The first Buddhist temple was said to have built there in the first century CE. Mount Emei is one of the four sacred Buddhist mountains in China. Imperial support of Buddhist institutions at Mount Emei came at the end of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) and during the Song dynasty (960–1279). The most remarkable was the Giant Buddha of Leshan, carved out of a hillside in the eighth century and looking down on the junction of three rivers. At 71 meters high, it is the largest Buddha in the world. Another famous image on the mountain is an enormous bronze statue cast in 980. This statue was mounted on a white ceramic elephant during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), which saw a revival of imperial patronage for the mountain's Buddhist monasteries. In the fourteenth century, over one hundred temples and thousands of monks and nuns could be found there; only twenty temples remain today. The mountain (in Tibetan: *Glang chen 'gying ri*), which is located within the sight of the cultural Tibetan border, is currently

a pilgrimage destination for Chinese and Tibetan Buddhists. In 1996 the mountain, including the Leshan Giant Buddha scenic area, was listed as a UNESCO World Heritage site.

Gray Tuttle

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EMERALD BUDDHA The Emerald Buddha is the most sacred Buddha image in Thailand, which prior to 1939 was Siam. It rests in its own chapel within the Wat Phra Keo, the royal palace and temple complex in Bangkok. Carved out of green jasper, the image is 66 centimeters (26 inches) high and is in *virasana*



The Temple of the Emerald Buddha in Bangkok, Thailand. (TIM PAGE/CORBIS)

mudra (sitting with hands on the lap). The Emerald Buddha is an object of national veneration and is believed to protect Thailand. Its origins, however, are mysterious. The *Chronicle of the Emerald Buddha*, an anonymous text of unknown date, relates a legend suggesting that the Emerald Buddha was sculpted in India by Nagasena and the god Vishnu. The *Chronicle* tells that the image then traveled to Sri Lanka, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand. The Emerald Buddha was discovered, encased in stucco and inside a stupa (dome-shaped Buddhist shrine), in Chiang Rai, Siam, in 1434. The image later traveled to Lampang, Chiang Mai, and Vientiane. It was brought to Siam in 1778, after the Siamese army sacked Vientiane at the command of King Taksin, the expansionist ruler who united Siam. The Emerald Buddha was first brought to Thonburi and then, in 1784, to Bangkok, where it was installed in its current location by King Rama I when he moved the national capital to Bangkok. Rama I used the image to legitimize his reign. Successive members of the Chakri dynasty (1782–present) have used the image in a similar way. The most important ceremony associated with the Emerald Buddha is the dressing of the image, which takes place three times each year, marking the beginning of the hot, rainy, and cool seasons. The king of Thailand cleans the image and changes its headdress, and then prays while a royal attendant changes the image's garments. The Emerald Buddha is Bangkok's most important treasure and is part of the Thai language name of Bangkok.

Michael Pretes and Daniel Oakman

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ENCHI FUMIKO (1905–1986), Japanese novelist. Enchi Fumiko was born Ueda Fumi, daughter of the well-known linguist Ueda Kazutoshi. She received a good education, including private tutoring in English, French, and Chinese classics. From childhood, she absorbed the Kabuki plays and Japanese classics, such as *The Tale of Genji* (eleventh century) and late Edo tales of the supernatural, which, combined with her knowledge of Western literature, formed the foundation for her writings. Her literary debut as a playwright occurred

in the late 1920s. After marrying the journalist Enchi Yoshimatsu in 1930 and having a daughter, she began writing fiction but fell into relative silence. Her unsatisfactory marriage provided her the emotional energy that fueled many of her powerful writings. Her mastectomy (1938) and hysterectomy (1946, from which she nearly died) also deepened her insight into women's psychology and sexuality. Her short story "Himogiji Tsukihi" (Hungry Years, 1953) brought her public recognition. Her masterpiece, *The Waiting Years* (1949–1957), depicts the unhappy marriage of a persevering woman, inspired by the life of Enchi's grandmother. It garnered the Noma Literary Prize (1958). Enchi's works often feature strong, suffering, and tenacious women. Recurrent themes from classical literature, such as spirit possession, shamanism, or blending of the real and the supernatural, also characterize her works. She also translated *The Tale of Genji* into modern Japanese, in ten volumes (1972–1973). In 1985 she received the Order of Culture.

Nobuko Miyama Ochner

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ENDANGERED SPECIES Tropical Asia and Australia appear to have a large number of endangered species and particularly high extinction rates. In the face of this global crisis, international treaties to control trade in wildlife and wildlife products, government education and species protection programs, and efforts by wildlife conservation programs have been developed and expanded.

Asia's Endangered Species

In twenty-six Asian countries stretching from Japan to Afghanistan, a total of 2,022 species of mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, fish, and invertebrates

were identified as endangered in 1996 by the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN). Among these countries, Indonesia, China, India, the Philippines, and Vietnam are among the richest in species and yet have the largest number of endangered species.

The 2000 IUCN Red List of Threatened Species reported that Indonesia harbors the highest number of threatened mammals (135 species), while India (80 species), China (72 species), and Thailand (32 species) rank among the top ten. In the Philippines, which has a large number of endemic species or mammals found nowhere else, 32 percent of those mammals are endangered.

A similarly discouraging profile of endangered bird species is also typical of Asia. Of the twenty countries with the largest number of threatened avian species, 50 percent are from Asia. According to the Red List, the Philippines, a biodiversity hot spot that has lost 97 percent of its original vegetation, has more critically endangered birds than any other country. Endangered species of doves, parrots, and perching birds (passerines) found in Southeast Asia have also shown marked declines due to continued deforestation. Indonesia and China, with some of the largest numbers of bird species in the world, are also countries with large numbers of threatened species. As is the case with the mammals, the countries with the most threatened species also have extremely high human populations. Since 1966, the number of threatened reptiles has grown more slowly, but the populations of freshwater turtles and tortoises are deteriorating rapidly in Southeast Asia. Their decline is due to heavy exploitation for food and medicinal use and to unregulated hunting. As these populations disappear in Southeast Asia, there are signs that this trade is shifting to the Indian subcontinent. Other Asian species, such as snakes and salamanders, are heavily exploited for use in traditional Chinese medicine, but the effects of this and other pressures on most of these species have not yet been assessed.

Various plant species, especially tropical timber trees, are also endangered in large areas of Southeast Asia. Malaysia, for example, has the most threatened number of plant species (681), followed closely by Indonesia with 384.

Preservation and Conservation

In 1975 the CITES treaty, or the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wildlife Fauna and Flora, was approved to control the trade in wildlife and wildlife products. Over 151 countries have signed this treaty, which identifies species and species

products that are illegal to purchase or sell for profit or whose sale is allowed only if it will not harm their survival. Other actions have been taken to protect endangered species and their habitats from one of the main factors driving their decline: humans. In Nepal, a second home for the endangered greater one-horned rhino was created in Royal Bardia National Park, helping that population grow to over 550 animals. China's giant panda, a universal symbol of endangered wildlife, has benefited in the past two decades by the creation of thirty-two reserves protecting more than 15,540 square kilometers (6,000 square miles) of panda forest habitat from timber harvesting. And similar efforts are under way to provide protected habitats for the endangered Asian elephant in Sumatra, Indonesia. These government efforts are often undertaken in cooperation with such organizations as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), the World Conservation Society (WCS), and the IUCN to provide training in conservation methods, conduct surveys of endangered species, and develop long-term species conservation and protection programs.

While there has been some success in species conservation over the last twenty years, these have come too infrequently and generally have been achieved through large investments that tackle immediate threats. There have been very few attempts to address the underlying driving forces that contribute to species endangerment or extinction. For this crisis to be addressed effectively, greater action is needed to remove the immediate threats to species and the driving forces causing their decline. These issues will be tackled only if there is much greater support for lifestyle changes, and this involves the political will of governments.

James A. Hafner

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ENDO SHUSAKU (1923–1996), Japanese writer. As a boy, Tokyo-born novelist and playwright Endo Shusaku, was baptized into the Catholic Church. Af-

ter majoring in French literature at Keio University, in 1950 he was selected as the first Japanese to study abroad. Endo spent two and a half years in France, reading especially French Catholic writers. Upon his return to Japan he began writing fiction, publishing in 1955 *Shiroi bito* (White Man), for which he won the Akutagawa Prize, followed by *Kiiroi bito* (Yellow Man). In these works he contrasted the Western and Japanese views of faith, guilt, and sin.

In 1958, Endo published *Umi to dokuyaku* (The Sea and Poison), which dealt with the vivisection of captive American soldiers. In *Ryugaku* (Foreign Studies, 1965) he examined the difficulties that Japanese have in absorbing the essence of Western culture, particularly Christianity. Perhaps his most well-known work is *Chinmoku* (Silence, 1966), concerning the martyrdom of Christians in Japan beginning in the late-sixteenth century. With *Samurai* (The Samurai, 1980), critics began to write of Endo as an eventual candidate for the Nobel Prize. While a devout adherent to Christian faith, to the end of his life he pursued as his subject the human psyche in its sometimes disturbing complexity.

James M. Vardaman, Jr.

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ENERGY—CENTRAL ASIA Among the many regions suddenly opened to the outside world with the end of the Cold War are the five countries of Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. These new nations, home to 55 million people in an area 40 percent the size of the United States, are best known in the West as lands of the ancient Silk Road that connected the European, Islamic, and Asian civilizations. But beneath the steppes, deserts, mountains, and river valleys, abundant energy resources lie waiting for investment and development.

Energy—including oil, natural gas, coal, electricity generated from these and hydroelectric sources, and nontraditional sources—is the most abundant and valuable natural resource of Central Asia. Kazakhstan has large reserves of oil and coal, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have significant reserves of gas, and Kyrgyzstan produces important amounts of hydroelectric power. Only Kazakhstan has an operating nuclear power station, but plans to build a new plant were

abandoned in 2000 over safety and cost concerns. All of these energy reserves form a basis for economic growth and development, with energy exports promising to generate foreign-exchange revenues. Central Asia is, in fact, poised to become a major world supplier of energy, especially in the oil and gas sectors.

To develop and restructure the energy sector in the Central Asian republics, energy planners are addressing two key issues: (1) overcoming periodic energy shortages and (2) reducing dependencies on unreliable sources of energy. All governments in the region are trying to develop new international markets that provide stable supplies of foreign exchange as they internationalize and develop ties with countries in the West and with their neighbors.

Oil

Oil is the most valuable commodity traded in the world; billions of dollars' worth of oil are globally traded daily. As such, oil serves as the economic foundation of many countries. Yet in Central Asia oil is only the second most important resource: on an energy-equivalent basis, Central Asia is still a gas-producing region, although this could change in the near future with the tremendous oil potential of places such as Kazakhstan.

Central Asia now produces more oil than it consumes, as a result of a dramatic increase in output during the second half of the 1990s. Production will probably continue to grow in the first decades of the twenty-first century as major projects are developed. Output from the entire region—50 million metric tons—amounts to about one-seventh that of Europe or Central and South America.

Kazakhstan is the main producer of oil in the region (35.3 million metric tons or 745,000 barrels daily in 2000), with proven reserves of 8 million barrels, or 1.1 billion metric tons. Uzbekistan has modest oil reserves (0.6 billion barrels, or 0.1 billion metric tons) and produces 7.5 million metric tons of oil and condensates each year. It could increase output relatively easily if a viable external market were identified. Like Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan has limited oil reserves, totaling 0.5 billion barrels in 2000. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan produce only small quantities of oil, with oil balances in these two countries likely to worsen in the immediate future if economic development proceeds briskly and demand for energy increases.

Natural Gas

Central Asia is predominantly a gas-producing region, with proven gas reserves amounting to 6.6 trillion cubic meters—2.9 trillion cubic meters in Turk-

menistan, 1.9 trillion cubic meters in Uzbekistan, and 1.8 trillion cubic meters in Kazakhstan. This represents slightly more than one-tenth of the known gas reserves of the former Soviet Union, which total 56.7 trillion cubic meters. Combined, Central Asia's output—106.7 billion cubic meters or 96.2 million metric tons oil equivalent—represents about half that of the Middle East.

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are the two leading gas producers, although Kazakhstan, too, has significant deposits. Until 1991 Turkmenistan produced nearly 80 billion cubic meters of gas per year, but output has fallen dramatically since then because of difficulties in paying for Turkmen gas in the Ukraine and harmful actions by Gazprom, the Russian gas line company. Turkmenistan's production totaled 43.8 billion cubic meters in 2000. Uzbekistan produced 52.2 billion cubic meters in 2000 and estimates it will export between 5 billion and 10 billion cubic meters per year in the future.

Gas from the region is generally high in sulfur, containing corrosive properties, as is also the case with oil from Kazakhstan and other parts of Central Asia. The pipelines therefore have to be well maintained and fuels cleaned before transportation.

As the economies in the region continue to develop, the demand for natural gas as a source of both heat and electricity will increase. Conversion from coal to gas for thermal power production would result in less pollution and reduce the cost of energy. But in spite of significant gas deposits, gas shortages are a continuing problem in some areas because of the inadequate gas pipeline network, inadequate energy policies, payment difficulties, and unstable government structures.

Coal

In spite of the importance of oil and gas in the region's export economy, coal remains the most common source of energy in Central Asia. It is the primary source of electricity in Kazakhstan, for example, and is a major source of heat in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Many thermal power plants in Uzbekistan are fired by coal, although an effort is being made to convert coal-fired power plants to gas in that country.

The biggest coal producer in Central Asia is Kazakhstan, with an estimated 120 billion metric tons of coal in Karaganda and other areas, but the quality is generally poor, and the deposits are far from major industrial locations. The quality can be enhanced, however, if it is mixed with higher-quality coal from other areas, just as oil and gas can be enriched. There is such a tremendous coal base in Kazakhstan that the gov-

ernment is considering converting coal to synthetic oil in the eastern part of the country, where it is economically feasible.

Electricity

Electric power is essential for economic development. The countries of Central Asia generate power by various means. Kyrgyzstan, which has large hydroelectric potential, generates most of its electricity through hydroelectric power stations. Uzbekistan relies primarily on thermal power stations fueled by natural gas, although cheaper energy produced by hydropower electric plants exists. The country also draws significantly on hydropower produced by power stations in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Kazakhstan depends primarily on coal to generate electricity.

With the exception of Turkmenistan, electricity shortages are a major problem in the region, particularly in Kazakhstan. To alleviate the power shortage, the Kazakh government has implemented a privatization program aimed at rejuvenating the entire electric power industry. Turkmenistan has excess electric generation capacity, and the country has the potential to boost its electricity exports.

Nontraditional Energy Resources

Some of the countries in Central Asia have made substantial commitments to support development of

nontraditional energy sources such as solar energy and wind power. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, the Kyun government agency is entirely devoted to examining alternative energy supplies, including solar, wind, geothermal, and coal-bed methane gas. Kyun is one of four key energy agencies or ministries in Kyrgyzstan directly under the Cabinet of Ministers and has the same level of authority and prestige as the other energy ministries.

In Kazakhstan, government officials have mapped alternative energy resources across the country to determine the feasibility of developing these resources. Kazakhstan's southern and northern tiers annually receive an abundance of sunshine and possess significant potential for solar energy. Potential wind and biogas resources have been identified in the west. Both southern and northeastern Kazakhstan have potential for geothermal energy. Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan have formed a joint venture to produce solar batteries and panel components for export to India and the People's Republic of China.

Major Trends in the Energy Sector

After decades of closed economies in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, local government officials are now encouraging rapid development of their oil, gas, coal, electricity, and nontraditional sectors. To do this, governments in the region are actively restructuring their energy sectors to improve efficiency, streamline operations, and internationalize. In both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, for instance, privatization is changing the agencies involved in energy production, transportation, and utilization. Government ministries involved in energy exploration, development, and use are being reorganized; large state enterprises are being disaggregated and their component parts converted to joint stock companies. In Kazakhstan, the government ministerial systems, including those engaged in energy development, have been restructured repeatedly over the past several years.

In addition to privatizing state enterprises, countries in Central Asia are soliciting foreign investment to facilitate rapid development of their energy reserves. Central Asian leaders now view their energy resources as a long-term source of revenue, and the nations, especially Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, are revising investment and taxation codes to woo foreign investors. To date, most private foreign investor interest in Central Asia has focused on providing technology and expertise for the development of the region's potentially huge oil and gas fields. Investment opportunities include refinery and pipeline



AN INTERCONNECTED POWER GRID

A fairly reliable regional electricity grid serving Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and five districts in the southern territory of Kazakhstan was established in 1960, under Soviet administration. During the first years of independence, there were relatively few problems with the region-wide system. Rainfall was abundant and Kyrgyzstan's Toktogul Reservoir was full. However, between 1992 and 1997 rainfall was less than average, and hydroelectricity generation from Kyrgyzstan became less reliable. As a result, shortages plaguing Central Asia's entire electric power system caused serious disagreements among the countries.

construction, enhanced oil recovery, and development of a regional pipeline system to distribute natural gas resources from wells to surrounding areas and neighboring republics.

James P. Dorian

See also: Oil and Mineral Industries—Central Asia

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ENERGY INDUSTRY—CHINA China is the biggest producer and consumer of coal in the world. Some 1.4 billion metric tons are produced each year. This means that coal industries, rather than petroleum or natural-gas industries, have played the most significant role in energy production and industrial development to date.

The use of coal to heat buildings and smelt metals began in China at least as early as the fourth century, when coal was simply excavated from surface deposits. Coal was a leading fuel by the year 1000, a time when settlements in Europe still preferred to use wood and charcoal (a fuel made from wood). Coal continued to dominate energy use in China for the next thousand years. In the 1960s, however, increasing concerns about the security of the domestic energy supply, as well as market demands for alternatives to coal, led to major initiatives in oil and gas exploration, including the development of the famous Daqing oil field. Proven oil and gas reserves on the mainland and offshore, however, will not meet increasing domestic demand. China has become and will continue to be a net

importer of oil and gas. Other diversification initiatives beyond oil and gas include developing untapped hydroelectric potential and the decision, in particular, to create the Three Gorges hydroelectric dam by blocking the Chang (Yangtze) River, the world's third-largest river after the Amazon and the Nile.

The sources of electricity production provide one key insight into the Chinese energy industry. Of the 1.16 trillion kilowatt-hours of electricity produced in 1998, 80 percent was supplied by coal industries. The balance came from hydroelectric and nuclear-power industries at about 18 percent and 1 percent, respectively. Other sources, including renewable sources, are insignificant. The amount of coal used in electricity production is 24 percent of total coal consumption. Industries such as iron and steel, armaments, cement, and chemical fertilizers also use significant amounts of coal.

Energy use by fuel type provides another key insight into the energy industry. Coal accounts for 74 percent of all energy use in China, ensuring the dominance of coal industries. Oil, at 20 percent of all energy use, is a distant second. Hydroelectric power, natural gas, nuclear, and renewable-energy sources account for 6 percent, 2 percent, 0.1 percent, and 0.1 percent, respectively.

Industrial Restructuring

The shift toward a market economy in energy in China has been fraught with difficulties. National-security concerns over the control of energy policy and the difficulty of separating government and enterprise functions in the energy sector represent two overarching challenges at the domestic level. At the international level, the Asian financial crisis of 1997, combined with low prices for oil and coal in the late 1990s, has made the economic climate for reforms more difficult.

The restructuring of the energy industry varies by sector, with the level of competition significantly less than that in the United States, Canada, and Europe. In January 1994, coal prices were deregulated and gradually allowed to float. This led to the closure of 31,000 unprofitable mines in 1999 and another 18,000 mines in 2000. Some 420,000 miners were laid off in 1998 alone.

The oil and gas industries, like other industries, were centrally controlled by the government. Since the economic reforms of the 1980s, however, state-owned oil and gas companies have been created to increase productive capacity through joint ventures with foreign oil companies. The fact that oil consumption has

outpaced domestic production since 1993 has further spurred efforts to increase domestic production. To this end, exploration licenses are now awarded to state-owned (but slightly privatized) companies on a competitive basis to meet national production targets. The energy reforms also saw the creation of two vertically integrated and publicly traded companies from government-controlled organizations that previously had to serve public-policy and regulatory functions. By creating two "market-based" companies, PetroChina and Sinopec, the Chinese government sought to have greater efficiency in energy production and to prepare the way for the competitive pressures that would arise from greater foreign direct investment in domestic-energy projects.

PetroChina was created from the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in 1999 with 480,000 of its 1.5 million workers. CNPC allocated the majority of its best assets to PetroChina while retaining the excess workforce and welfare obligations. At the outset, PetroChina ranked fifth in the world in estimated reserves, produced 68 percent of China's total oil, operated 3,400 gas stations, and owned pipelines transporting 84 percent of China's natural gas. A second company, Sinopec, followed in 2000. This company operates more than 20,000 gas stations, 1,100 bulk-storage facilities, and a number of refineries. A significant aspect of this restructuring has been the dismissal of excess staff. PetroChina laid off 38,000 employees by January 2001, and Sinopec is expected to cut its workforce of 500,000 by 20 percent by 2005.

Changes planned in hydropower production are also significant. A number of large hydropower dams are under construction. The Three Gorges dam, the largest of these, is scheduled for completion in 2009, when it will generate 84.7 billion kilowatt-hours a year.

Of the remaining sources of energy—natural gas, nuclear energy, and renewable energy—natural gas will probably be the most significant. China has significant domestic reserves of natural gas and a plan to deliver up to three times the amount currently consumed by 2010. A "West to East" natural-gas pipeline could involve partnership with Western companies. Nuclear-power capacity will also expand. There are currently two nuclear-power facilities, the first in Zhejiang Province south of Shanghai and the second in Guangdong province near Hong Kong. Several new nuclear-power facilities are under construction to expand electricity production from just over 1 percent to 3 percent. Of the renewable-energy sources, only



China relies heavily on coal as a source of energy as with this coal-fired power plant in northern China. (EYE UBIQUITOUS/CORBIS)

hydropower plays a significant role. Other sources of renewable power, such as biomass, wind, solar, geothermal, and tidal power, are minor in China compared with levels of 3 percent in nations such as Denmark and the United States. Their potential for development, however, is considerable.

Eco-efficiency

China's reliance on coal has led to serious energy-efficiency and environmental problems and makes the development of less harmful sources of energy a pressing challenge. Environmental problems created by burning coal include acid rain, smog, and greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide. Each of these problems has specific impacts on the environment and human health. Acid rain, for example, damages forests, croplands, and lakes. Smog, made up of particulate matter and sulfur dioxide emissions, covers many cities and affects people's health. In certain parts of China, the concentration of total suspended particles is two to three times the level specified as safe under World Health Organization guidelines. Carbon-dioxide emissions (the main cause of greenhouse-effect climate change) in China are second only to emissions in the United States. On a per-person basis, however, the average American creates 7.5 times more carbon dioxide than does the average Chinese.

Energy production is no longer a simple matter of economic efficiency, narrowly defined. Because energy production can have significant impacts on employment and the environment, capital markets are increasingly required to consider environmental, labor, and human-rights ramifications before they make their investment decisions.

Energy industries, whether they are publicly or privately owned, not only have to produce more energy from existing natural resources, they also have to produce it in environmentally responsible ways. Improving energy efficiency while linking energy production to environmental goals is part of a larger challenge China shares with other nations.

Robert Gale

See also: **Three Gorges Dam Project**

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ENGLISH IN ASIA English is an Asian language. That may sound strange at first, but the facts are clear. English has been used in various parts of Asia for almost two hundred years. It is the first language of two countries in Asia (Australia and New Zealand), the second language of seven others (Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, and Sri Lanka), and the first foreign language in the remaining Asian countries. More fluent users of English can be found in Asia (estimated at 350 million) than on any other continent; English is used predominantly to communicate with fellow Asians. Locally published English newspapers can be found in practically every metropolitan city across Asia. Conferences frequently are conducted in English (and their proceedings published in English) when only a few, if any, of the participants are native English speakers. English is the language of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), even though it is not the first language of any of the member countries. More students are studying English in this region than in any other part of the world. China alone has 100 million people learning English. Although most people in Asia do not speak English, Asian leaders in many fields (the arts, business and commerce, education, diplomacy, law, the military, space exploration, and tourism) usually do. English sometimes enables different ethnic groups

in the same country to communicate with one another, helping to establish a sense of nationhood.

The Debate on the Use of English

Ongoing articulate debates about English in Asia have continued for some time. One side takes the position that English is an instrument of cultural imperialism and neocolonialism. They argue that linguistic diversity is greatly diminished by the spread of English, which adversely affects minority languages. The other side does not see English as an alien language or as an instrument of Western hegemony. This group maintains that English belongs to those who use it, not only to native speakers, and that it also expresses Asian culture. They point out that leaders such as Mohandas K. Gandhi (1869–1948) and Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) wrote in English to reach a national audience and to promote a national agenda. They make the point that English has no claims to intrinsic superiority but that it has a preeminent role in Asia because it is a medium for science, technology, literature, and law. English has borrowed from the languages of Asia as well. A few examples include "bungalow" from Bengali, "pajama" from Hindi, "sugar" from Sanskrit, "serendipity" from Singhalese, "kowitz" from Mandarin, "ketchup" from Malay, "boondocks" from Tagalog, and "tycoon" from Japanese.

Features of Asian English

There are also national coinages in English, which are familiar primarily to a local population. These include "dirty kitchen" (in the Philippines, the room in a home where the real cooking is done), "minor wife" (in Thailand, a wife who is secondary to the major wife), "lah" (in Singapore and Malaysia, a mark of informality), "field chickens" (in China, frogs), "sayonara home run" (in Japan, the winning run), and "crow and sparrow story" (in India, a "cock and bull" story).

Pronunciations vary across Asia, but intelligibility of the different varieties of English is no more of a problem in Asia than it is in other parts of the world. As in the United States, grammar use across Asia ranges from pidgin to an international standard. Discourse patterns are frequently different in different varieties of Asian English.

Showing politeness is important in every culture, but it is done differently in the various forms of Asian English. Because the Japanese are reluctant to say "No" directly, a person from Osaka may say "I will consider it," or a person from Tokyo may say, "That will be difficult," when they mean "No." Nodding the

head and saying "Yes" do not always mean agreement from an Asian speaker of English; neither do "I'm sorry" and "I apologize" necessarily mean an acceptance of guilt or responsibility for a mistake. Often each of these means "I regret there is some unpleasantness here. I wish it were not so."

One way to learn about the use of English in Asia is to read creative writing by Asians. Talented authors include Anita Desai, Wimal Dissanayake, Ha Jin, Min-fong Ho, F. Sionil Jose, Catherine Lim, Shirley Geok-Lin Lim, R. K. Narayan, Arundhati Roy, Raja Rao, Bienvenido N. Santos, Pira Sudham, and Edwin Thumboo. There are also academic publications devoted to the topic of English in Asia.

The future of English in Asia is one of growth and variation. In almost every Asian country the percentage of the population fluent in English is increasing rapidly, and it is predicted that 30 to 35 percent of the population will use English on a daily basis by the year 2010. English will doubtless continue to be the language Asians use to represent their personal aspirations and public policies in the international workplace, the global media, and for Internet communication.

Larry E. Smith

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ENOMOTO TAKEAKI (1836–1908), Japanese government official. Enomoto Takeaki was a naval officer and diplomat who served the Tokugawa shogunate (known then by the name of Kamajiro) and later the Meiji government. Born in Shitaya, Edo prefecture, he studied at the Shoheiko (Shogunal College) and learned navigation from the Dutch in Nagasaki. Appointed director of the Shogunate naval school, in 1862 he went to Rotterdam to study military services and to supervise construction of the warship *Kaiyo Maru*, which was commissioned by the shogunate. After six years in Europe, he became vice commander-in-chief of the shogunate navy. When the rule of the house of Tokugawa was overthrown and power was

restored to the Meiji emperor, Enomoto, with a small army of supporters, took eight ships of the Tokugawa navy to the northern island of Hokkaido to establish an independent republic. He surrendered to imperial forces in 1869, spent three years under house arrest, and was pardoned in 1872. Restored to favor, he later received many important ministerial appointments within the Meiji government, including envoy to Russia (1873–1876). He concluded the Treaty of St. Petersburg (1875), by which Japan abandoned its claim to Sakhalin Island in exchange for the northern Kuril Islands. Enomoto was subsequently appointed navy minister (1876–1882), minister to China (1882–1884), and he held cabinet posts in communications, education, foreign affairs, agriculture, and commerce. He was made a viscount in 1887 and named adviser to the Privy Council in 1890.

William Nelson Ridgeway

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ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES. See **Air Pollution; Aral Sea; Bhopal; Deforestation; Earthquakes; Endangered Species—Asia; Green Revolution—South Asia; Green Revolution—Southeast Asia; Maldives—Profile; Mangroves; Narmada Dam Controversy; Nuclear Arms; Soil Loss; Sustainability—Asia; Three Gorges Dam Project; Typhoons; Volcanoes.**

ERDENET (2000 pop. 68,000). Erdenet (1,300 meters above sea level), located 240 kilometers northwest of Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, is the second largest city in the country. Erdenet is also one of Mongolia's youngest cities. Its establishment began with the discovery of massive copper and molybdenum deposits in Erdenet Mountain in the 1960s. By 1974, an ore-processing plant began operating in the area under a Mongolian-Soviet joint venture—the Erdenet Copper and Molybdenum Mining and Concentrating Combine. In 1975, the industrial complex, located in a valley between the Selenge and Orhon Rivers, was officially declared a town.

Although the city has several industries—including a carpet factory, a food-processing plant, and a timber-processing plant—its economy revolves around copper and molybdenum mining. By 1990, the city boasted Asia's largest copper-molybdenum ore-processing plant and accounted for up to 90 percent

of the total output of Mongolia's mining industry. The city also supplies 30 percent of the country's tax income and 60 percent of its exports.

Daniel Hruschka

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ERSHAD, H. M. (b. 1930), President of Bangladesh. Born in the Rangpur District of modern-day Bangladesh, Hussain Muhammad Ershad became a career officer in the Pakistan army, reaching the rank of lieutenant colonel by 1971. Stationed in Pakistan when Bangladesh and Pakistan split, he was interned there (as an East Pakistani he was believed to be disloyal to a united Pakistan) and did not return to Bangladesh until 1973, when he was included in the Bangladesh army. Ershad succeeded Ziaur Rahman (Zia) as chief of staff in 1978. From that position, he overthrew the Bangladesh Nationalist Party government of Abdus Sattar, who had succeeded to the presidency on the

death of President Zia. He assumed the title of president in December 1984, having earlier ruled as chief martial-law administrator. Although an unpopular and unelected leader (he did win an obviously rigged referendum in 1986), Ershad continued many of the development programs of Zia and was rather successful in reducing the rate of population growth, receiving a citation from the United Nations for this. Opposition, which was endemic, peaked in the last months of 1990, resulting in his resignation in December 1990. He had formed a party, the Jatiya (People's) Party, which contested in the 1991 and June 1996 elections, finishing third each time. In 1996 the Jatiya Party supported an Awami League-led coalition, but the party has since split and the faction led by Ershad has withdrawn support from Sheikh Hasina and joined Khaleda Zia in opposition.

Craig Baxter

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Former President Ershad at a Jatiya Party rally in Dhaka in March 1997. (AFP/CORBIS)

ERZURUM (2002 est. pop 333,000). Erzurum is one of the most important cities in eastern Turkey. The capital of the province of Erzurum, it is located between the Karasu and Aras valleys at an altitude of nearly 2,000 meters. Due to its geographic location, Erzurum has always held military and economic significance. Its strategic location also means it was often fought over in the past, despite the high frequency of earthquakes. The city first became significant in 415 when the Byzantine emperor Theodosius fortified and renamed it Theodosiopolis. For the next 500 years, it was held, alternately, by the Byzantines, Arabs, and Armenians (who called it Karin). The Byzantines reigned until the Battle of Manzikert (1071), which left Erzurum under Seljuk rule. It later fell to the Mongols, after which it was conquered by Sultan Selim I (1467–1520) in 1514 and incorporated into the Ottoman empire. Erzurum became the capital of the new province in 1534 and served as the primary military base for campaigns to Iran and Georgia throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During the Ottoman-Russian wars, Erzurum was occupied by the Russians in 1829, 1878, and 1916. On 23 July 1919 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881–1938), founder of the Republic of Turkey, held the first meeting of the National Congress in Erzurum. The city was linked to

the country's rail system in 1939. It is the location of the 3rd Army and Atatürk University, which opened in 1958. Erzurum is often used as a base for outdoor expeditions to nearby Mount Ararat.

T. Isikozlu-E.F. Isikozlu

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ESFAHAN (2002 pop.1.4 million). Esfahan, an ancient city located in central Iran, has played a significant role in Iranian history, as it was often the battleground between warring tribes and dynasties, undoubtedly because of its strategic position. Not much is known about the city before the Sasanid dynasty (224/228–651 CE). Its location, however, at the intersection of several important roads, suggests that it may have been a cultural and financial center. Some believe that Esfahan was the residence of a few Achaemenid royals, who called it either Gaba or Gi. In 642 CE the city was conquered by the Arabs, who made Esfahan the capital of al-Jibal Province. Esfahan was controlled by various rulers over the years and its prosperity depended upon their whims. When the Seljuk dynasty began in the eleventh century, Toghril Beg named Esfahan the capital of his realm. During this time the city flourished, increasing in size and population. With the demise of the Seljuk dynasty, however, Esfahan endured neglect and difficulty.

Esfahan experienced a renewal in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when it was designated the capital city of the Safavid ruler Shah Abbas I the Great, who used his riches to improve the city's sanitary conditions and architectural landscape. After the Safavid dynasty (1501–1722/1736) fell, however, Esfahan once again became the target of various warring factions. Political and economic stability did not return to Esfahan until the Qajar dynasty (1794–1925) rose to power in the eighteenth century. This stability continued through the Pahlavi dynasty. Toward the end of the Pahlavi dynasty (1924–1979), the people of Esfahan were active in their opposition to the shah's policies and instrumental in the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979.

Esfahan is currently home to Esfahan University, which was founded as part of a program to bring higher education to the provinces of Iran. Due to its ancient roots, Esfahan is also home to several famous

architectural sites: Meydan-i Shah (Royal Square), Masjid-i Shah (Royal Mosque), Masjid-i Shaykh Lotfollah (Lotfollah Mosque), A'li Ghapo (Royal Palace), the Great Bazaar, and Sadr Boulevard. These sites make Esfahan a beautiful Iranian city, which also enjoys the greenery that the Zayandeh River and its channel system bring. Esfahan is also an important manufacturing center, home to Iran's modern steel industry, and pipe-building, helicopter assembly, among others.

Houman A. Sadri

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ESTRADA, JOSEPH (b. 1937), president of the Philippines, 1998–2001. The thirteenth president of the Republic of the Philippines, Joseph Estrada was born José Ejercito. Against his parents' wishes, he became a movie actor, adopting the stage name Joseph Estrada and the nickname "Erap." In his thirty-two-year acting career, Estrada starred in 107 movies,



President Estrada with a baby in a Manila slum neighborhood in October 2000. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

often portraying Robin Hood-type roles. This endeared him to the masses, and he became a popular and recognizable personality.

His popularity served him well when in 1969 he ran for mayor of the Manila suburb of San Juan and won. During his sixteen years as mayor, he earned a reputation as a champion of poor people. Although he initially ran as an independent, he later became identified with the former president Ferdinand Marcos (1917–1989). In 1986, following the ouster of Marcos through popular demand, Estrada was unseated, along with other local officials, as a result of the massive governmental reorganization that Corazon Aquino (b. 1933) embarked on when she assumed the presidency.

The following year, Estrada successfully campaigned for a senate seat and was one of only two candidates who won under an opposition ticket allied with old Marcos forces. Elected vice president in May 1992, he used that position as a launching pad for his presidential campaign. In May 1998, he was elected president by the largest electoral margin in Philippine history.

Though poor people believed him to be their champion, Estrada did little to mitigate poverty or address land reform, and his presidency was short lived. Amid allegations of rampant corruption, he was criticized for giving lucrative business contracts and concessions to former Marcos cronies. He was later accused of receiving \$80 million in bribes from illegal gambling operators, as well as kickbacks from tobacco excise-tax receipts.

In 2000, as the house of representatives voted to impeach Estrada, the groundswell for his resignation heightened. The Philippine senate then began the impeachment trial, but after a close vote of eleven senators to ten, which in effect suppressed evidence supposed to prove Estrada's guilt, senate president Aquilino Pimentel and the entire house prosecution team resigned. Mass rallies took place, and in January 2001 several cabinet officials and senior military officers withdrew their support for him in favor of the vice president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (b. 1947).

When Estrada left Malacanang, the presidential residence, the supreme court regarded him as having resigned from his position and declared the presidency vacant. It then swore in Macapagal-Arroyo as president. Estrada was arrested in May 2001 and continues to be detained at a military hospital. He faces charges of perjury, corruption, and economic plunder and could receive the death penalty for the latter offense.

Zachary Abuza

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ETATISM—TURKEY Etatism (statism), derived from the French word *état* (state), was adopted as one of six ideological principles of Kemalism, the founding ideology of the Republic of Turkey, named after Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk). The others are republicanism, secularism, nationalism, reformism, and populism. The Republican People's Party (RPP), which was founded in 1924 and ruled until 1950 as the single and, therefore, dominant party, incorporated the principle of etatism into its program as the term defining the official economic strategy at its 1931 congress. In 1937 the principle was incorporated into the Turkish constitution.

Definitions of Etatism

Etatism has two interrelated meanings. Broadly, it referred to the state-centric component of Kemalist ideology, which stressed the autonomous role of the state in shaping policy outcomes and societal forces. It reflected the Kemalists' intentions to use the state as a pioneering and active agent of modernization. Etatism gained a more limited meaning after the fourth RPP congress, which was held in 1935. There the term was used to refer specifically to the economic strategy of the ruling RPP, which called for state involvement in the economy to advance the nation's welfare and prosperity. The state's involvement in the economy did not mean the abolishment of private initiative, as was the case of Soviet-style collectivism. Private enterprise was to play a fundamental role in the economy, but coordinated government intervention was considered to be essential to accelerate the accumulation of initial capital necessary for rapid economic development, since the private sector was too weak to undertake this task. Etatism encouraged indigenous capitalist development by shielding the local infant industries through various protectionist policies.

Turkish Economic History

The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923, the same year in which the Allies recognized Turkey as an independent state with the signing of the Lausanne Treaty. Successive wars since the Ottoman Empire's entry into World War I in 1915 and the War of Independence between 1919 and 1922 had had a devastating impact on the economy of the Anatolian peninsula. The Lausanne Treaty contained some re-

strictive clauses that set the tone for the economic policies of the new republic. Turkey was not required to pay war reparations, but it agreed to pay the debts of the former Ottoman empire—the last installment was paid in 1953. The treaty also prohibited Turkey from adopting a protective customs regime until 1929. The underlying rationale was to protect the rights of the foreign firms operating in Turkey. In exchange for its recognition as an independent state, Turkey agreed to that term, but the state then gave support to Turkey's weak private sector through a complex system of incentives and subsidies in line with the guiding principles adopted at the Izmir Economic Congress of 1923. The passage of the Law for the Encouragement of Industry in 1927 was the first sign of the expansion of state control over industry.

Having faced the aftereffects of the Great Depression of 1929, which signaled a collapse of liberal *laissez-faire* economics in Europe and the United States, republican governments began to formulate conscious etatist policies. Having been influenced by the interventionist trend in Western European economic theory and the practical insights drawn from the successes of the planned industrialization efforts (1928–1933) of the Soviet Union, the Kemalist elites, in search of some alternatives to *laissez-faire* economics, revised their earlier liberal economic policies along etatist lines. One of the first measures they imposed was the nationalization of foreign companies operating in such various sectors as infrastructure and the service sector. The nationalization program, completed in 1939, paved the way for further state control of the economy through expanding public ownership into different branches of the economy. In addition to the failure of *laissez-faire* liberalism in the late 1920s, the lack of initial capital formation and entrepreneurial spirit, as well as the need for protectionism, can be counted as three basic reasons for the state's turn to etatism in the 1930s.

The state took two crucial steps that constituted the backbone of etatist policies: first, large state-owned or -controlled companies, known as state economic enterprises (SEEs), were founded; second, industrial development plans were formulated. The state's active involvement in the economy under the guise of etatism created the earliest patterns of an inward-looking industrialization strategy in which the SEEs such as Sumerbank (1933) and Etibank (1935) would play a leading role. These were giant state companies, specialized in diverse manufacturing industries such textiles, mining, and extraction and founded for the production of intermediate, consumer, and producer goods. The foundation of People's Bank of Turkey

(1935) and the reorganization of Agricultural Bank of Turkey (1937) on etatist principles signaled the state's expansion in the financial sector through a network of credit facilities, grants, and subsidies.

To coordinate public and private industrialization efforts, the state launched comprehensive plans. The First Five-Year Industrial Plan was launched in 1934. The second one, launched in 1938, became obsolete with the outbreak of World War II in 1939. Some minor plans were also designed on a sectoral basis, as in the case of mining. Centrally planned industrialization strengthened etatist control over the economy, since the state began to intervene intensely in industry, commerce, and finance to achieve the objectives set in the plans.

Effects of Etatism on the Turkish Economy

Under etatist policies, the public sector had a pioneering role in the economy; etatism also provided a new basis of political legitimacy for Kemalism by making the state the most active institution, one that would lead the nation to the highest levels of material welfare. Etatist policies in effect from the 1930s until 1980 made the state a significant economic actor in Turkey.

After Turkey's transition to multiparty politics in 1950, all the major parties on both the left and the right supported the etatist policies that the RPP had launched in the 1930s. Therefore, vestiges of etatism survived until the 1980s in the form of central planning, protectionism, and the state's pioneering role in the import-substitution method of industrialization. These vestiges impeded the development of a full market economy. Etatist practices created an economic system that suffered from weak export capacity, chronic trade deficits, shortages of foreign currency, and balance-of-payment deficits.

Influenced by the West's popular supply-side economic policies, the Turkish economy was reoriented at the beginning of the 1980s and moved from a state-led model of industrialization to an export-oriented growth strategy. The etatist policies that the state had followed since the 1930s were severely challenged as the Turkish economy embarked on a journey of restructuring according to liberal principles.

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ETHNIC COLONIAL POLICY — INDONESIA For most of the long period of Dutch involvement in Indonesia, colonial authorities made clear administrative distinctions between ethnic groups. The sharpness of these distinctions and the extent to which it was possible to cross the boundaries varied, however, over time.

The Dutch East India Company (VOC) avoided having direct administrative control over non-Europeans, preferring to rule via traditional elites or by appointing other Asians—especially Chinese—to be agents, often called *kapitan*. Because few European women traveled to the Indies, many Europeans married or cohabited with local women, though from time to time laws were introduced to ban such practices. Their descendants were seen as European if they were Christian and recognized by their fathers; consequently, European society in the Indies was very much mestizo (of mixed ancestry) in culture and appearance. Christian Indonesians were close to Europeans in status.

After the end of rule by the VOC in 1795 and the imposition of direct rule by the Netherlands, a formal legal distinction between Europeans and "natives" (*inlanders*) began to harden. This distinction enabled the Dutch to restrict land ownership to natives, and after

about 1830 it was almost impossible for any European to buy land. This was partly to protect the native population, partly to enable natives to be tied to the land for tax purposes, and partly to preserve many elements of traditional law, culture, and social structure. It also allowed discrimination against Indonesians in employment conditions and in civil and political rights (especially in criminal procedure). This discrimination contributed to the eventual emergence of nationalism. As in VOC times, legitimate children produced by marriages of Europeans and natives followed the heritage of their fathers, while illegitimate children followed their mothers'. Those who were neither European nor native were attached to one category or the other for different purposes until a third category, "foreign Orientals" (*vreemde oosterlingen*), was developed in the late nineteenth century. Natives and foreign Orientals could legally acquire European status if they were culturally Europeanized or had legal need of the status, for example, as owners of businesses. In the late nineteenth century, many Dutch policy makers proposed abandoning such classifications to encourage modernization, but they were blocked by conservatives and supporters of traditional law.

In 1899, Japanese diplomatic pressure forced colonial authorities to grant Japanese subjects European status. There was increasing pressure from China to do the same for resident Chinese, especially in the 1930s. This led to a gradual change in emphasis from "racial" categories to various categories of citizenship.

The Dutch also distinguished among native ethnic groups, such as the Javanese, Balinese, and Timorese, particularly in matters of civil law and recruitment into the colonial army. These legal distinctions were, however, never legislatively defined and disappeared with Indonesian independence.

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ETHNIC CONFLICT—AFGHANISTAN

Ethnic differences are strongest when other significant differences—religious, ideological, economic, geographic, linguistic—reinforce distinctions between one ethnic group and another. Although Afghanistan

is a complex country in terms of ethnic composition, the importance of ethnicity in explaining conflict has varied significantly throughout its history.

In the original state named Afghanistan, dating back to 1747, the Pashtun ethnic group constituted an overwhelming majority. Until the late nineteenth century, Afghanistan was a fragile confederation of Pashtun tribes, and the word "Afghan" was used as a synonym for Pashtun. As part of a nation-building project early in the twentieth century, it increasingly came to imply "citizen of Afghanistan." The borders of the territory that now form Afghanistan were established toward the end of the nineteenth century, when the British and Russian empires were competing for control of the region. The Pashtun population was split, one part living in British India and the Pashtun majority in Afghanistan being reduced to around half the total population.

During his monarchy, Abdur Rahman Khan (reigned 1880–1901) attempted to build a stronger, more modern state, less dependent on shifting tribal alliances. Trying to establish authority throughout the country, particularly where ethnic minorities were dominant, the king battled several contentious groups, with especially harsh implications for the Hazara and Nuristani peoples. Whereas Afghanistan's majority are Sunni Muslims, the Hazara are Shi'a, and the Nuristani practice their own religion. Religion was used to legitimize warfare and ethnic persecution. Abdur Rahman Khan also forcibly moved large numbers of non-complying Pashtuns to minority-dominated areas in the north, thus forming people who were formerly a threat into an effective instrument for strengthening his rule in non-Pashtun areas. Pashtun nomads were granted privileges such as access to pastures in the Hazara-inhabited central region.

Twentieth-Century Events

Habibullah (reigned 1901–1919) and Amanullah (reigned 1919–1929) introduced constitutional reforms and outlawed slavery and other discriminatory practices that affected primarily minorities. King Amanullah fell in 1929, replaced by the sole non-Pashtun ruler in Afghan history, Bacha-e-Saqao—"son of the water-carrier." A Tajik from the Kohistan region north of Kabul, his position was based less on ethnicity than on support from a religious network.

Nader Shah (reigned 1929–1933), representative of a tribal Pashtun confederation, deposed Bacha-e Saqao after only nine months. After Zaher Shah (reigned 1933–1973) inherited the throne, the country was relatively calm for several decades. A short era of liber-

alization in the late 1940s was strangled by the ruling family in 1953, when Prince Daud Khan, the king's cousin, became prime minister. Daud, a strong proponent of Pashtun nationalism, wanted to expand Afghanistan to include the Pashtun population of Pakistan. This led to tense relations between the two countries and to the eventual ouster of Daud in 1963.

The constitution of 1964 allowed freedom of the press, and political parties were established. The pro-Soviet communist party, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), was dominantly Pashtun, but split into the Parcham branch of urban intellectuals with a tendency toward ethnic accommodation and the rural, authoritarian, and nationalist Khalq branch. The major Maoist party, Shula-e Jawid, arose in 1967 from divisions in PDPA. Faced with a variety of parties seeking to place ethnic discrimination squarely on the political agenda, the king responded by unofficially ensuring that minorities were represented in the cabinet, but the basic attitude toward ethnic differences was that economic modernization would lead to their gradual erosion.

When former prime minister Daud Khan regained power in 1973, the "new democracy" of the past ten years came to an end. He established an authoritarian rule that was overturned in a PDPA coup in 1978. PDPA immediately announced a Soviet-style nationality policy that addressed four areas: government participation, education, newspapers, and culture. PDPA's credibility was severely undermined by Pashtun dominance of the party and its attempts to foster Pashtun support by launching ethnic appeals.

With the 1978 coup and the Soviet invasion of 1979, Afghani resistance parties were established in Pakistan and Iran. The Pakistan-based parties were, with the exception of Jamat-i Islami, dominated by Pashtuns, and all had some form of Sunni Islamic orientation. Iran became the major backer of the groups active among the Hazara. The resistance based its legitimacy on various forms of politicized Islam, and ethnicity was low on the political agenda of the exiled parties in the early 1980s. Nonetheless, the fact that the resistance leadership was overwhelmingly Pashtun was problematic from the perspective of the non-Pashtun population. Resistance-based shadow cabinets were notoriously weak and fragmented, mainly because the resistance leaders could not accommodate Afghanistan's ethnic variety.

Once in power, the PDPA went on to announce a Soviet-style nationality policy. In practice, the will to implement such reforms was limited, and PDPA's credibility was severely undermined by its Pashtun

dominance. When President Najib took power in 1986, there was a change of approach. First, Najib's government was designed as a massive project in political accommodation. Second, the government realized that Soviet military presence in Afghanistan was on the wane, and ethnic and tribal loyalties were exploited to establish local militias to fill the gap. The so-called Uzbek militia of General Dostum and the Ismaili militia of Sayyed Mansoor developed into major military units. Ethnicity, for many, became an avenue to privileges. Military groups of different origins opposed or supported one another, as when Uzbek militias were used to reinforce the defense of threatened government garrisons in the Pashtun south.

The ethnic dimension was brought to the limelight as the resistance took power in Kabul in April 1992. Jamat-i Islami and its key commander, Ahmed Shah Massoud, were a major force, but different groups in the resistance soon split Kabul into separate sections, and the ethnic definition of the conflict gained in prominence. Alliances between resistance groups and sections of the old government army that shared ethnic identity emerged as key forces in the battle for controlling the capital. Alliances rapidly shifted; political and military leaders used ethnic arguments to build support, and common people had little alternative but to seek protection with their own group.

The Taliban emerged in late 1994 in reaction to the strife in Kabul and the lawlessness in the rest of the country. Based on traditionalist networks of Islamic scholars and village mullahs, the Taliban found supporters mainly in the Pashtun population. At first the organization avoided ethnic rhetoric, but gradually it began using pro-Pashtun as well as anti-Shi'a arguments. In the aftermath of armed confrontations with other groups, the Taliban often arrested and harassed people only for ethnic reasons. The movement's dominantly Pashtun membership and the frequency of ethnic violence have only contributed to further manifest ethnicity as a central component of the conflict in Afghanistan. It remains to be seen how the Taliban's removal from power in late 2001 will affect the complex ethnic conflicts in the country.

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See also: **Hazara; Pashtun; Taliban**

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ETHNIC CONFLICT—MYANMAR Ethnic conflict has been a central feature in the political life of Myanmar (Burma) since independence from Great Britain was obtained in 1948. Located on the crossroads between East, South, and Southeast Asia, Myanmar is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the region. But the failure of successive governments to resolve the issues of insurgency and equitable representation for the various ethnic nationalities is a major factor behind the country's long-standing malaise.

A Land of Diversity

Burma's 1974 constitution (the country did not become Myanmar until 1989) set aside states for the seven largest ethnic minority groups in the country: the Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan. The situation, however, is rather more complicated in the field. Minority ethnic groups, speaking a total of over one hundred languages and dialects, make up a third of the total population. These groups range in diversity from the Salum (Moken) sea-gypsies of the subtropical Tenasserim (Tanintharyi) division to the Nung-Rawang crossbow hunters in the mountains of Kachin state.

Under British colonial rule (1826–1948), the different peoples of Myanmar were kept on largely different roads of political and economic development. While minority ethnic groups in the borderlands remained under their traditional rulers in the Frontier Areas Administration, the Burman majority was governed separately under Ministerial Burma, in which a limited form of parliamentary democracy was introduced. Relations became dangerously inflamed during World War II, when many ethnic minority groups remained loyal to the British, while the Burma Independence Army (BIA) initially fought on the Japanese side and changed to the British side only in 1945. As a result, there were disturbing outbreaks of intercommunal violence, including the killing of Karen villagers and, during 1941–1942, the expulsion of ethnic Indians from the country, after BIA members accused them of supporting British colonialism.

In the hasty run-up to Burma's independence, many issues of ethnic social and political rights, territorial divisions, and legacies of the war were never fully re-

solved. A general agreement of principles was established at the Panglong Conference in February 1947, but a number of important groups were missing. As a result, the 1947 constitution was full of anomalies. While the Shan and Karenni (subsequently Kayah) states were granted the right of secession after a ten-year period, many other ethnic groups—such as the Mon, Rakhine, and Pao—went unrecognized. It also was decided to leave the controversial question of the designation of territory for a Karen state until after independence.

A State of Insurgency

Burma gained independence in January 1948 against a backdrop of political violence. This was tragically highlighted by the assassination of Aung San (1915–1947) and most of his cabinet in July 1947 by the gang of a political rival. Aung San was widely regarded as the one Burman leader who had the trust of most ethnic minority peoples. Even before the British departure, ethnic Rakhines and Muslims had begun guerrilla actions in Arakan (present-day Rakhine state). The situation deteriorated rapidly following an attempt to seize power by the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), beginning in March 1948. The CPB's insurrection was supported by widespread desertions from the fledgling armed forces of the new government.

Myanmar's ethnic nationalities were soon pulled into this spiral of conflict. The Karen National Union (KNU) took up arms in January 1949, rapidly followed by various Mon, Karenni, Pao, and Kachin forces. At one stage, as insurrections swept the country, the cabinet of the prime minister U Nu (1907–1995) became known as the "Rangoon six-mile government," as this was the only territory it controlled. A further descent into chaos took place at the end of 1949, when Chinese Guomindang remnants from Yunnan Province seized large areas of territory in Shan state.

In the late 1950s, a number of peace talks were held with different ethnic forces, but these groups failed to gain countrywide momentum. During the "Military Caretaker" administration (1958–1960) of General Ne Win (b. 1911), the rights of the traditional Shan and Karenni rulers were abolished. In 1961, U Nu attempted to make Buddhism the country's official state religion. Such moves only fueled disquiet in the Shan and Kachin states (the latter, especially, is home to many Christians), where a new generation of nationalist movements was now getting under way.

In March 1962, Ne Win seized power, and the former Shan president of Burma, Sao Shwe Thaikie

(1894–1962), and many other minority leaders from the parliamentary era (1948–1962) were arrested. An unsuccessful "peace parley" was then held during 1963–1964, but virtually all opposition groups rejected Ne Win's "Burmese Way to Socialism." Subsequently, Ne Win embarked on a twofold strategy: he conducted intensive counterinsurgency operations in rural areas while seeking to impose a one-party system under the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), which would radiate out from Rangoon (now Yangon) into the ethnic minority states.

Such tactics endured for a quarter-century, but they did not end armed resistance. As the Burmese economy declined, insurgency became a virtual way of life in many ethnic minority areas. Opposition groups were able to finance their struggles through control of the black-market trade in everything from luxury goods and medicines to teak, opium, and jade. Military supplies were also plentiful, both through illicit purchases in Thailand and also from the insurgent CPB, which was given military backing by China after 1968.

During the BSPP era (1962–1988), two main ethnic coalitions emerged: those allied with the CPB in northeastern Burma, who looked to the "autonomous region" system of China as their political model; and the eleven-party National Democratic Front (NDF), established in 1976, which sought the formation of a federal union of Burma. Together they maintained under arms some fifty thousand troops who controlled substantial "liberated zones" around all of Burma's borders.

Changes after 1988

Ethnic politics then underwent a dramatic reorientation during the epoch-making events of 1988–1990. The collapse of Ne Win's BSPP during the pro-democracy protests in 1988 was followed by mass ethnic mutinies from the fifteen-thousand-strong People's Army in 1989. The atmosphere of impending change was further enhanced by the flight of thousands of democracy activists into NDF territories following the assumption of power by the military State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). This momentum was then maintained by the landslide victory of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and nineteen ethnic parties in the 1990 general election. A fundamental realignment in Myanmar's politics appeared imminent.

Not for the first time, however, events now moved in directions that few observers predicted. Following the CPB mutinies, four new ethnic armies emerged in

northeast Myanmar, spearheaded by the United Wa State Party. These forces quickly agreed to cease-fires with the beleaguered military government, which unexpectedly announced a new peace policy toward all armed ethnic groups. Under these agreements, cease-fire forces would be allowed to administer their territories and join political discussions until Myanmar's new constitution was introduced. Subsequently, the Shan, Pao, Palaung, Kachin, and Mon nationality members of the NDF—as well as the Mong Tai Army of Khun Sa—all made peace deals with the SLORC government.

Underpinning these changes of strategy was a growing war weariness after more than four decades of fighting in which it is estimated that over a million people had died. In the process, many communities had been devastated, and as many as two million people had been displaced from their homes. Also prompting minority leaders was the desire to be on the inside of the political process at a rare moment of reorientation and transition in the country's history.

The importance of the ethnic issue was taken up by the United Nations, which called for "tripartite dialogue" between the military government, the NLD, and the ethnic minority groups as an essential element in the reform process. Differences, however, remained in all political camps. Among ethnic nationality groups, there were disagreements between cease-fire forces, which advocated a "peace through development" strategy, and the remaining non-cease-fire forces, centered around the KNU in southeast Burma, which continued to work with exile groups and underground opposition parties allied in the Democratic Alliance of Burma and the National Council Union of Burma. Following abortive peace talks with the SLORC in 1995–1996, the KNU in 1997 announced support for the NLD and called for "politics first" agreements as the only way forward.

This resulted in intensive Burmese army offensives against remaining KNU bases, the defections of more Karen guerrillas to the government side, and the continuing exodus of refugees into Thailand, where official refugee numbers passed the 100,000 mark. Fighting continued in Shan, Kayah, and also in several other borderland areas.

By the beginning of the twenty-first century, this situation created an ambiguous picture of life in ethnic lands. Whereas peace had returned to many areas for the first time in decades, there were many regions in which conflict continued. All sides agree that only inclusive dialogue and reform will bring about the stable peace that the peoples of Myanmar desire. To help

achieve this, during 2001, efforts were stepped up by Razali Ismail, the special representative of the United Nations secretary-general, to try to bring together representatives of the military government, the NLD, and the ethnic minority groups.

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ETHNIC CONFLICT—SOUTH ASIA Until the renewal of violent conflict in Central and Eastern Europe, and more spectacularly in the Balkans, at the end of the twentieth century, postindependence South Asia seemed more prone to violent conflict linked to nationalism and ethnicity than most other parts of the world. The terms "nationalism" and "ethnicity" have eluded the efforts of generations of scholars to define them precisely. The common assumption—stemming largely from the Central and Eastern European and Balkan situations—is that the two terms are so closely intertwined as to be interchangeable. The South Asian record shows that they are often intertwined, but clearly not interchangeable.

"Ethnicity" has many facets; scholars treat groupings as varied as communities, cultures, language groups, and even corporations as ethnic groups, under certain circumstances. The castes in South Asia, particularly



INDIA AND THE TAMIL-SINHALESE CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA

In 2002 the conflict between Sri Lankan Tamils (a people of Indian origin resident in Sri Lanka for centuries) and the dominant Sinhalese remains one of the longest-lasting and bloodiest ethnic conflicts in the world. The resolution which follows was passed by the Indian National Congress party in January 1953. It failed to prevent the conflict and some Sri Lankans place partial blame on India, which has been accused of supporting the Tamils.

This Congress views with grave concern the latest developments in Ceylon in regard to the people of Indian origin, who have long been resident there and who have not been or who are no longer citizens of India. The administrative measures and economic sanctions taken against these people have not only caused them considerable hardship but intend to make them stateless and thus create a grave situation. The Congress is of opinion that these measures of the Ceylon Government are not in conformity with justice or international practice, and appeals to the Government of Ceylon to give further consideration to this question which is not only important because it affects large numbers of people, but comes in the way of friendly and cooperative relations which should exist between such near neighbours as India and Ceylon which have had so much in common from immemorial times.

Source: Jagdish Saran Sharma. (1965) *India's Struggle for Freedom: Select Documents and Sources*. Vol. II. Delhi: S. Chand, 222.

Hindu India, for example, can be considered ethnic groups. There is no pure form of ethnicity, and definitions of ethnicity are therefore prone to circular reasoning. Scholars generally agree that ethnicity functions as a way to bind individuals to a group. An ethnic group becomes one because and when it successfully presents itself as one and, having secured acceptance of this identity by its own members, gains recognition by others. An essential feature of a mature or maturing ethnicity is an awareness of the common identity. Ethnic identities often carry with them deep-rooted historical memories that link ethnicity and nationalism.

South Asia offers many examples of identities that have withstood the passage of time and form part of the consciousness of people, whether such consciousness is linked to religion, as is the case with the Sikhs in India, or rooted in language and culture, as with the Ahoms of Assam. Nevertheless, despite the remarkable powers of survival that ethnic identities possess, they are not immutable. They are changeable and have

changed through the centuries. The core of most communities' ethnic identity is the traits that set them apart from others, primarily language and culture and often religion; as with castes in Hinduism a distinctive identity may be linked to a ritual status imposed and sustained by religious sanctions.

In the politicization of ethnicity, a process transforms an ethnic group into a political one. The South Asian experience shows that transformation of an ethnic group or community into a nationality or nation can be a dual process, partly cohesive and partly divisive. A new state faces the threat of separatist activity waged by ethnic groups; it often resorts to violence to prevent the separation, as in India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

Language and Ethnicity

In the early years of independence in South Asia, disputes about language policy were a more divisive source of political instability in India, Pakistan, and Sri



Sri Lankan soldiers patrol the outskirts of Jaffna in September 2000 following weeks of fighting that left 160 soldiers and about 600 Tamil Tiger separatists dead. (AFP/CORBIS)

Lanka than were religious tensions. When the terms of the transfer of power were being negotiated in the then-undivided India and in Sri Lanka, the assumption was that English, the official language of colonial rule, would be replaced after independence by indigenous languages or language. The political elite in all these countries, as legatees of colonial powers, viewed the replacement of English by an indigenous language as easily accomplished, but they soon learned how difficult it was.

The first overt threat to the stability of the newly independent Indian state came from linguistic nationalism, or ethnic identity based on language. Like the political leadership in both Pakistan and Sri Lanka, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), first prime minister of India from 1947, was ill prepared for the challenge posed by the forces of linguistic nationalism, but he handled these problems better than his counterparts in Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In Pakistan the challenge to the integrity of the state from 1947 came from the Bengalis in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), who resisted the attempt to impose Urdu as the national language in Pakistan.

The partition in 1947 of the British Raj into India and Pakistan had demonstrated that the religious divide between Hindu and Muslim was too deep for accommodation in a single state; twenty-five years later Pakistan was divided, showing that religion alone was not enough to bind a state together when ethnic identities based on language and culture divided it. The state of Bangladesh emerged independent.

Sri Lanka provides a classic example of the destabilizing effects of linguistic nationalism in a multiethnic society. Disputes about language policy were the

focal points of tension between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority in the 1950s and 1960s, each identifying themselves on the basis of language loyalties. Sri Lanka was unique in South Asia in the repudiation of the language settlement that had been agreed on before independence. Substantial progress had been made in the implementation of that policy, which envisaged the replacement of English by Sinhala and Tamil by the mid-1950s. The two languages were to have parity of status. Instead this policy was repudiated in 1956, and Sinhala was elevated to the status of sole official language in the country. Just as the Bengali majority in East Pakistan opposed the imposition of Urdu, so too in Sri Lanka the Tamil minority opposed the elevation of Sinhala. The upshot of this conflict was that the decade of peace and stability that the country had enjoyed since independence was over for many years to come.

Ethnicity and Separatism

In India as in other parts of South Asia, ethnic identities linked to language, culture, and religion, dating from precolonial times and acting separately or in combination, threatened the stability of the postindependence state. India confronts more separatist and autonomy movements than any other state in the world, with the exception of Russia in its present form, and many of these movements originated in the colonial expansion and consolidation under the British Raj. Thus Indian separatism and autonomy movements are rooted in two processes: first, colonial expansion and consolidation in the territories that now constitute India; second, the revitalized precolonial forces with identities linked to language, culture, and religion.

India has kept these latter forces at bay by a number of policies. One was the redemarcation of state boundaries, with the adoption of the recommendations of the Report of States Reorganization Commission in the mid-1950s and 1960s, on the basis of linguistic identities. Another is the creation of new states to meet the pressure of regional forces seeking autonomy in existing states. Thus the number of states in the Indian union has increased since the 1950s and 1960s. In a country as large and populous as India, where some states are larger than many independent countries in other parts of the world, demarcation of new states in response to agitation for regional autonomy can be unending. Another policy was the use of force to crush separatism when the integrity of the Indian state was seen to be threatened.

There have been very few successful separatist movements in the postcolonial societies of the third world. Bangladesh is generally considered the product

of the only successful separatist movement in postindependence South Asia and therefore a unique development. Even in Bangladesh's case the separatist struggle might not have succeeded but for India's intervention on behalf of the separatists.

Having lost its eastern unit to a successful separatist movement, Pakistan faced two other secessionist movements, in the frontier province and in Baluchistan, which reemerged under the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928–1979) in the 1970s. The military involvement first in putting down the guerrilla warfare in Baluchistan and later in running the government directly for almost a decade under General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq (1924–1988) alienated various communities in the smaller provinces—the Baluchis in Baluchistan and the Sindhis in Sind—even if these separatist aspirations were effectively thwarted. Thus ethnolinguistic identity emerged as an important issue in Pakistan's national politics in the 1980s and 1990s. The continuing ascendancy of Punjab in the state system of Pakistan, and the alliance between the Punjabi elite and their preferred partners, whether Urdu-speaking *mohajirs* (immigrants from India) in the past or the Pashtuns now, cause tensions in other provinces and among other communities.

In the mid-1980s the *mohajirs* themselves engaged in a struggle against a political system they had dominated from the time of the establishment of Pakistan in 1947. Their struggle has many peculiar features. The *mohajirs*, as a group, lack a common geographical, historical, or cultural identity; and they are differentiated internally along lines of class and sectarian loyalties, linguistic identities, and areas of origin. Yet they provide an unusual example of the deliberate construction of ethnicity for political purposes, the welding of a heterogeneous mass of people who had chosen to leave India at the time of the partition of the Raj, into a distinctive group. Their transformation into an ethnic group is by no means complete, and their rights to claim such a status do not remain unchallenged by others, especially the Sindhis, among whom a great many *mohajirs* live, especially in the city of Karachi.

Sri Lanka's separatist agitation is postcolonial; its strength, in recent times, owes a great deal to Indian intervention on behalf of the Tamil separatists. Indian intervention failed in most if not all of its objectives, and the Tamil separatist movement ranks as one of the most thwarted in South Asia. Early expressions of separatist sentiments (in the late 1940s and early 1950s) developed into a full-fledged movement over a period of twenty-five or more years. That transformation re-

sulted from several factors: a perceived threat to the ethnic identity of the Tamils from political, economic, and cultural policies; perceived grievances of a political or economic nature or both; and a sense of relative deprivation at the loss or imminent loss of the privileged position the Tamil minority enjoyed under British colonial rule.

Bangladesh is virtually unilingual; between 95 and 98 percent of the population speaks Bengali (or Bangla, as it is called in Bangladesh). Moreover, apart from a small Hindu minority of about 10 percent, almost everybody is Muslim. A tiny minority (about 1 percent) are Buddhists and animists living in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). Yet this minuscule minority is at the center of international attention as Bangladesh's most persistent minority problem and one that touches on every aspect of ethnic identity, separatism, and separatist agitation reviewed here. The crux of the problem is that the CHT constitutes 9 percent of the land area of Bangladesh but has only 1 percent or less of the population. Bangladesh, the most densely populated country in South Asia, has around twice the land area of Sri Lanka but more than six times Sri Lanka's population. Thus the temptation to disregard the special status conferred on the CHT by the British and the interests of the tribal population has been great, and resistance to that temptation has been little. Separated from the predominantly Bengali Muslim population of Bangladesh by language, culture, religion, and forms of livelihood, the tribal people have had little choice but to fight back.

In its more constructive form the combination of ethnicity and nationalism has been an instrument of national integration in South Asia. Nevertheless the record is somewhat ambiguous. Pakistan, as it was in 1947, lasted just twenty-four years. The Indian polity, on the other hand, has remained intact, with virtually the same territorial boundaries if not the same form, as it had at partition. In every South Asian country the combination of ethnicity and nationalism or the politicization of ethnicity has a historical dimension. Thus while the political establishments and political elites have some justification for their claim that the linkage between ethnicity and nationalism has been, more often than not, a stabilizing influence, they would have to concede that the same combination of forces is also the principal cause of internal disharmony and discord in all the states of South Asia.

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See also: Jammu and Kashmir; Nagaland

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ETHNIC RELATIONS—SOUTHEAST ASIA

Southeast Asia consists of the ten nation-states of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The people in each are of mixed ethnic backgrounds since they are composed of groups descended from indigenous people as well as migrant Chinese and Indians. These migrant groups settled in the region in large numbers during the colonial administration of many countries in Southeast Asia.

The population in Malaysia, for example, is 58 percent Malay and other indigenous peoples, 26 percent Chinese, 7 percent Indian, and 9 percent other ethnic origins. Similarly, Singapore's 4 million population is



A Chinese student is attacked by Indonesian youths at Republican University in Jakarta in October 1965. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)



A Karen child in a refugee camp in Thailand near the Myanmar border. (HOWARD DAVIES/CORBIS)

77 percent Chinese, 14 percent Malay, 8 percent Indian, and 1 percent people of other ethnic origins. This multiethnic mix is a characteristic of all Southeast Asian countries.

Colonization brought Western political and social influences to Southeast Asia. Western institutions of government and social organization were superimposed on indigenous structures and traditions. With independence from the Western colonial powers, emerging nation-states formed along the lines of the former colonies. The boundaries of these nation-states straddle territories long inhabited by indigenous tribes, migrant groups, and dominant ethnic groups. Even the concept of the nation-state is one derived from the West, and the governments in the Southeast Asian nation-states have faced major challenges in shaping a common national identity among their multiethnic citizenry. Former colonies of European industrialized nations were challenged with what must have seemed like an impossible task on independence—the construction of a national identity that would be simultaneously unitary and racially plural. The birth of the nation-state in Southeast Asia has been associated with ethnic strife and conflicts. These included racial riots in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia.

With the assumption of independence and the end of colonial rule, former colonies such as Singapore basically had to shape nation-states out of what were then considered as immigrant societies—different ethnic groups comprising immigrant groups mixed with indigenous and local groups but sharing relatively little apart from the territory on which they had settled. Indeed, many of the immigrants had continued to maintain strong links with kin and family in their countries

of origin. In a similar manner, the hill tribes and other such groups residing in the mainland Southeast Asian states of Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam have had to adapt to the new territorial identities that the imposition of national boundaries required. What it means to ethnic groups that straddle the borders of several nation-states to be citizens of just one of those states remains in question. Being nationals of several emerging nation-states has meant that ethnic groups such as the Karen, like the earlier immigrant Chinese and Indians, now belong to different nationalities depending on which side of the national borders they are living.

Interethnic differences have been accentuated by the coincidence of social and economic divisions with ethnic groups. In Indonesia as well as Malaysia, the Chinese have been perceived to be economically more successful than the indigenous people. This has led to the imposition of a preferential policy favoring the Malays and other indigenous people in Malaysia. Until the end of the Suharto regime in Indonesia, the Chinese were not allowed the use of their language or to celebrate their festivals.

Interethnic tension runs high in the region, with the Karen waging a separatist war in Myanmar, the Acehese people in northern Sumatra contesting the legitimacy of the government in Indonesia, and Muslim separatists active in southern Philippines and also southern Thailand. Since 1997 and the onset of the Asian economic crisis in the region, there have been armed conflicts between Christians and Muslims in Indonesia as well as between groups indigenous to the outer territories and other ethnic groups who have been resettled in these territories as part of the transmigration program meant to ease population pressures in and around Java. The growing popularity of an Islamic political party in Malaysia has been of concern given the decades of moderate Muslim leadership in both Malaysia and Indonesia, the two countries with the largest Muslim groups in Southeast Asia.

Given the national policies introduced to manage interethnic relations in the countries of Southeast Asia that have tended to favor one ethnic group over others, stability in these relations has been of major concern. With weakening of the unitary state that had earlier brooked no challenge to its policies on interethnic relations, there is great concern that race and religion will once again become the rallying platforms for the people in Southeast Asia who are discontented with the outcome of development.

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ETO JUN (1933–1999), Japanese writer and critic. Eto Jun was one of the most outspoken critics of post-war Japanese culture, society, and politics, who over the course of his long career dissented from both right and left wings. Born in Tokyo, he achieved recognition with his debut book in 1956 on novelist Natsume Soseki (1867–1916). The book, which casts Soseki in the light of Meiji period (1868–1912) historical contexts, disputes the critical consensus of Soseki as an individualist. After receiving recognition for his work on writer Kobayashi Hideo (1902–1983), Eto traveled to the United States and taught and researched at Princeton University.

In reflections on his cross-cultural encounters published as *Amerika to watashi* (America and Myself, 1965), Eto critiqued the problematic relationship between Japan and the United States. For the next three decades, Eto developed and sustained the notion that the Japanese defeat in World War II and subsequent U.S. occupation led to an unrecoverable loss of Japan's

autonomy and understanding of history. From 1979, Eto began to consider the long-term effects of the occupation, making his most controversial arguments that the militarists alone, not Japan as a whole, unconditionally surrendered, and that the imported "false" taboos of occupation censorship imprisoned all of postwar literature in a linguistic space closed off from true freedom. In his view, Japanese democracy today carries the taint of its undemocratic inception. Shortly after the death of his wife, Eto took his own life in 1999.

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ETOROFU ISLAND (Est. pop. 6,000). Etorofu Island (Russian: Iturup) is the largest of the Kuril Islands. A volcanic island 3,000 square kilometers in size, Etorofu is located 110 kilometers from the northeast of Cape Nosappu-Misaki on the northern extremity of the Nemuro Peninsula in Hokkaido, between the Sea of Okhotsk and the Pacific Ocean. Until the end of the eighteenth century, the population was exclusively autochthonous (Ainu). At the time of the Russian occupation in August 1945, the population, mainly Japanese, was expelled, and Soviet citizens were encouraged to settle on the island.

In 1941, the Japanese sailed from the Gulf of Hitokappu, located in the middle of the island on the Pacific Ocean side, to attack Pearl Harbor. Etorofu is one several islands (Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai group of islets) of the Northern Territories for which Japan asserted a claim in 1955, when Japan and the Soviet Union began negotiations toward a peace treaty. In 2001, it was still administered by the Russian Federation and the territorial dispute was not yet resolved.

Among the twelve volcanoes on the island, the highest is Chirippu-date (Chiripurupuri, 1,587 meters). The average annual temperature on the island is 4.3°C, and in winter, it drops to minus 5°C. The main products are salmon, trout, codfish, crabs, and seaweed. There was an active mining industry (sulfur) before World War II. Mineral deposits in-

clude tin, zinc, lead, copper, nickel, sulfur, and metallic sulfides.

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EUPHRATES RIVER The Euphrates River is the longest river in West Asia, crossing a distance of 2,700 kilometers. (The Euphrates is known in the Bible as Perath, in Arabic as al-Furat, and in Turkish as Firat.) It originates in the Armenian Mountains of eastern Turkey and flows southeast across northern Syria and southern Iraq to merge with the Tigris River



and form the Shatt al-Arab River, which enters the Persian Gulf.

The Euphrates is formed by the confluence of the Karasu stream, rising close to the city of Erzurum, and the Murat stream, rising close to Mount Ararat. The river flows through the Taurus Mountains of southern Turkey and descends to the plains of Syria and Iraq. In Syria, the Euphrates flows south-southeast into Iraq through entrenched valleys and collecting waters from its two main left-bank tributaries.

In its lower course, the Euphrates enters the Mesopotamian alluvial plain. The mainstream meanders slowly in braided channels with waters rapidly decreasing through seepage, evaporation, and irrigation. Depositing sediment along the vast plain, the river raises its bed level and becomes prone to seasonal overflow and spontaneous course changes. Just below the town of al-Fallujah, close to Baghdad, the Euphrates approaches the Tigris River at a distance of approximately 30 kilometers before it divides into two branches. The branches reunite after a distance of 175 kilometers near the town of al-Samawah, and the river continues downstream to join the Tigris and empty into the Persian Gulf.

To control the varied flow of the river and to draw water for irrigation and the generation of power, Iraq has developed a system of diversion and storage, including the drainage canal, the "Third River," 563 kilometers long, flowing between the Tigris and Euphrates. Since the 1970s, however, the construction of a series of large dams in Turkey and Syria has intensified rivalry among the riparian states over water usage.

Flowing almost parallel to the Tigris River, the Euphrates water is the source of life in Mesopotamia giving rise to the most ancient civilizations. On its banks emerged the great civilizations of Sumer, Akkad, and Babylonia, which drew sustenance from its waters through extensive irrigation schemes.

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EUROPE-ASIA RELATIONS Relations between Asia and Europe have come a long way since the colonial and postindependence periods in Asia. For the last thirty years, Europe has been building a constructive relationship with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The European Commission-ASEAN (EC-ASEAN) ministerial meetings established in 1980 are a forum for regular dialogue between the two entities. In February 1996, a Europe-Asia Meeting process (ASEM) was launched, thanks to Goh Chok Tong, the president of Singapore. ASEM hopes to promote political, cultural, and people-to-people dialogue along with traditional economic exchange.

The Missing Link

When compared with the involvement of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, the involvement of Europe has been weaker, despite strong historical links and growing economic interdependence. Strengthening the weak leg of the U.S.-Asia-Europe relationship—that is, the Asia-Europe relationship—provided the major rationale for the creation of ASEM. In July 1994, the EC published a discussion paper entitled "Towards a New Asia Strategy," which shed light on the necessity to upgrade European relations with all Asian countries, while continuing to emphasize ASEAN's centrality to Europe. In the 1980s, there had already been some concern about Japan-U.S. relations. Although Japan and Europe have made significant efforts to enhance their interchange, no formal relation had been established between Europe and East Asia before ASEM. Launched to balance the U.S.-Asia relationship and enhance the Europe-East Asia relationship, the ASEM process had no clear common vision, except the shared principle that regional cooperation and dialogue help regional stability.

The ASEM Process Meetings

The ASEM process brings the leaders of ten countries of East and Southeast Asia together with leaders from the fifteen member states of the European Union (EU). The inaugural meeting at Bangkok (1–2 March 1996) clearly reflected a shared enthusiasm, while the second meeting held in London (3–4 April 1998) stressed the necessity to elaborate materials to give stronger credit to the interregional relationship. The ASEM Trust Fund, established after the London summit, was a useful creation in the context of the Asian financial crisis. The Trust Fund, which became operational in June 1998, for two years, provides technical assistance and financial and social training. In 1997 and 1998, almost all Asian countries faced financial

and economic turmoil, leadership crises, and intraregional tensions. There was strong sentiment in these Asian countries that Europe was not doing enough to help: the London summit, in a sense ASEM's first test, showed that Europe's multilateral and bilateral contributions to the numerous international financial packages to Asian countries ranked second after those of Japan. The European financial and economic commitment to the recovery of Asia was reconfirmed with the ASEM Trust Fund. The launch of the Euro has also changed Asian perceptions of the European Union, since a successful Euro offers the possibility of diversifying Asia's debt structure and debt servicing, reducing vulnerability to major fluctuations in the dollar exchange rate.

Yet at the London meeting, the political and people-to-people dialogues were unsuccessful. At the Seoul meeting (20–21 October 2000), the countries issued the "Asia-Europe Co-operation Framework for the First Decade of the New Millennium"; this framework set the principles, aims, priorities, and mechanisms of the ASEM process for the ten following years and stressed the sociocultural intention of promoting both interregional political dialogues and economic partnerships. Among the mechanisms established were informal human-rights seminars, the last one of which occurred in Denpasar in July 2001, and the trade facilitation action plan, which began in 2001 and aims to remove trade obstacles between the two regions.

The Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF), based in Singapore, is the body in charge of promoting cultural, intellectual, and people-to-people exchanges. ASEF was created in February 1997, after the Bangkok summit. It organizes workshops on education, human rights, and the position of the individual, and strengthens cultural exchanges. Yet it remains to be seen whether the Foundation, with a staff mainly of career bureaucrats and with limited personnel and financial resources, can meet the challenge.

Problems Facing ASEM

The EU is a highly regulated area with its Commission, Council, and Parliament, while ASEAN is an informal structure based on consensus policy making and noninterference in member states' business. Northeast Asian countries (Japan, China, South Korea) are still trying to solve historical disputes and achieve cooperative interchange. The lack of unity in Asia, and also in a Europe still looking for a common foreign-security policy, makes it difficult to promote basic cooperative schemes.

Obviously, the first pillar of the ASEM process—political dialogue—takes longest to bear fruit, since

cultural sensitivities act as stumbling blocks. The issue of Myanmar (Burma) is a good example: Myanmar challenged the long-established EC-ASEAN relationship when it was admitted as a member of ASEAN in 1997. European criticism of Myanmar's record on human rights made official meetings between the EU and ASEAN virtually impossible for three years. Yet at the thirteenth EU-ASEAN ministerial meeting, held in Vientiane on 11–12 December 2000, with Myanmar attending, all sides showed some willingness to look beyond their differences.

Another problem is that Europe, lacking strategic interest in Asia, finds it difficult to play a significant role in security issues and in promoting regional stability, yet regional stability is probably one of the main concerns of both Europe and Asia. In 1995, ASEAN countries launched the ASEAN Regional Forum, the only structure in Asia in which all the Asian countries, together with the United States, Russia, and Europe, meet to discuss a security agenda. Europe has already showed commitment toward helping resolve such Asian crises as the aftermath of Cambodia's civil war, tensions between North and South Korea, and the struggles of East Timor for independence from Indonesia. Europe's increased interest in the security of the Asia-Pacific region mainly follows the "comprehensive security" theory, which emphasizes, among other concepts, political stability, economic prosperity, and environmental safety. Europe's experience in preventive diplomacy, confidence-building measures, and reconciliation has an appeal to its Asian partners. Learning from European expertise is perhaps preliminary to deeper cooperation on security issues between the two regions.

Although ASEM still lacks a clear vision or a shared philosophy of what the Asia-Europe relationship should be, it has enhanced the regionalization processes in Asia. The launch of ASEM coincided with the enlargement of the ASEAN ministerial meetings in Northeast Asia (Japan, South Korea, and China—a process called the "ASEAN plus three"), and there are signs of a possible dialogue among Northeast Asian countries. Whether the regionalization processes lead to more unified regions will be important for determining ASEM's future relevance. The invisible third party at the table, the United States, will also have a decisive impact.

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EUROPEAN UNION AND TURKEY The European Union (EU) is a multinational organization for economic and political integration in Europe, instituted on 7 February 1992 with the signing of the Treaty on European Union (known as the Maastricht Treaty).

History

Since 1870 three increasingly destructive wars were waged in western Europe. To bring stability and prosperity to Europe and to settle the historical feud between France and Germany (major contenders in all three wars), European powers agreed that a cooperation mechanism, including these two countries and other Western European powers, should be created.

In 1946 Winston Churchill called for the United States of Europe, and one year later he fostered the creation of the United European Movement. The French Council for a United Europe was created by Socialist parliamentarian René Courtin on 1 July 1947, and the Socialist United States of Europe was established in the same year. While the Council for a United Europe was absorbed by the United European Movement in 1953, the Socialist United States of Europe was renamed the European Left in 1961.

When the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction was launched in 1947, sixteen European states formed the Organization for European Economic Cooperation to coordinate the distribution of American economic aid. On 7–11 May 1948, the Europe Congress, fostered by the International Coordination of Movements for the Unification of Europe, met in the Hague and agreed to establish a European Deliberative Assembly and a European Special Council. France, Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Lux-

embourg, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Norway, and Switzerland then formed the Council of Europe in 1949.

On 25 March 1957, the treaties establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community were signed in Rome by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The European Parliament was established in March 1958. The Merger Treaty of 8 April 1965, which came into force on 1 July 1967, brought all these organs and institutions together and established a single executive called the European Community (EC).

In the 1970s and 1980s the EC was enlarged: in 1973 by granting membership to Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom; in 1981 by the addition of Greece; and in 1986 by Spain and Portugal. In 1986 the Single European Act, which planned the institution of a common market no later than 31 December 1992, was signed. The Maastricht Treaty (7 February 1992) produced a clear timetable for further progress on the road to economic and monetary union, including the introduction of a European Central Bank and a single currency no later than 1999. From 7 February 1992, the European Community (EC) became known as the European Union (EU).

Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU in 1995, and the EU started negotiations with thirteen other European countries interested in membership: Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia, and Turkey.

The European Parliament

The European Parliament, the EU's public forum, has 626 members, elected for five-year terms. Parliament members form political rather than national groups. Parliament's main power is to vote for the EU's budget. The distribution of the seats is as follows: Germany ninety-nine; France, Italy, and the United Kingdom eighty-seven each; Spain sixty-four; the Netherlands thirty-one; Belgium, Greece, and Portugal twenty-five each; Sweden twenty-two; Austria, Denmark, and Finland sixteen each; Ireland fifteen; and Luxembourg six.

The European Commission

The Commission, consisting of twenty commissioners, including the president and members who are nominated and appointed by the consensus of EU countries, proposes policies and is the only body al-

lowed to initiate legislation, with exceptions in the fields of common foreign and security policies, justice, and home affairs. It is also responsible for administration and ensures that the provisions of the treaties and the decisions of the institutions are properly implemented.

The European Council

The European Council is the EU's legislative body for a wide range of EU issues. It exercises its legislative power in co-decision with the European Parliament. It also coordinates general economic policies, concludes international agreements on behalf of the EU, with the parliament constitutes a budgetary authority that adopts the EU's budget, takes decisions necessary for defining and implementing common foreign and security policy, coordinates the activities of member states, and adopts measures in the fields of police and economic and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.

The council is composed of ministers representing the national governments of the fifteen member states, with a total of eighty-seven votes distributed according to the size of the countries. The numbers are as follows: Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom ten each; Spain eight; Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, and Portugal five each; Austria and Sweden four each; Ireland, Denmark, and Finland three each; and Luxembourg two.

The European Court of Justice

The court provides judicial safeguards necessary to ensure that the laws are observed in the interpretation and application of the treaties and in all of the activities of the EU. The Court is composed of fifteen judges, assisted by nine advocates-general. The judges and advocates-general are appointed by common accord of the governments of the member states and hold office for a renewable term of six years. They are chosen from jurists whose independence is "beyond doubt" and who are of recognized competence.

The Ankara Agreement

Turkey first applied to join the EEC in 1959. The EEC's response was to suggest a loose association until Turkey's circumstances permitted it to join. Ensuing negotiations resulted in the signature of the Ankara Agreement on 12 September 1963, which entered into force on 1 December 1964. It aimed at securing Turkey's full membership in the EEC through the three-phase establishment of a customs union that would serve to bring about integration between the

EEC and Turkey. The Ankara Agreement still constitutes the legal basis of the association between Turkey and the EU.

Turkey's Application for Full Membership

Turkey applied for full membership in 1987. The request underwent the normal procedures, and the commission's opinion was completed on 18 December 1989. It underlined Turkey's eligibility for membership, yet deferred the in-depth analysis of Turkey's application until the emergence of a more favorable environment. Although the commission argued that the EU was not ready at the time to accept and digest additional members, refusal of Turkey's application was, in fact, unofficially based on economic and political arguments. Turkey's democratic credentials, its high rates of inflation and unemployment, and the possibility of an influx of population to EU countries were points of concern. On the other hand Greece's resistance to Turkey's membership was also an effective factor in the decision. The commission stressed the need for a comprehensive cooperation program and added that the Customs Union should be completed in 1995 as envisaged.

Customs Union

Talks for the envisaged Customs Union (CU) began in 1994 and were finalized on 6 March 1995 at the Turkey-EU Association Council. Although basic agricultural products were excluded from the initial package, a preferential trade regime for those products was adopted on 1 January 1998.

Apart from technical provisions related to the establishment and proper functioning of the CU, the package also included an Association Council resolution providing for the intensification of cooperation between Turkey and the EU in areas not covered by the CU, such as industrial cooperation, trans-European networks, energy, transport, telecommunications, agriculture, environment, science, statistics, matters relating to justice and home affairs, consumer protection, cultural cooperation, and information. These provisions demonstrated that, despite predictions to the contrary, the Turkish economy was able to withstand EU competition.

The EU Enlargement Process and Turkey

In the Association Council of 29 April 1997, the EU reconfirmed Turkey's eligibility for membership and asked the commission to prepare recommendations to deepen Turkey-EU relations, while claiming that the development of this relationship depended on

factors relating to Greece, Cyprus, and human rights. The commission, however, excluded Turkey in its report entitled "Agenda 2000." While the report conceded that the CU was functioning satisfactorily and that it had demonstrated Turkey's ability to adapt to the EU norms in many areas, it repeated the same political and economic arguments against Turkey and made no reference to Turkey's full membership objective. The commission proposed measures that would reinforce the current relationship and complemented these measures with the idea of inviting Turkey to the European Conference.

After Turkey's rejection of the invitation and EU's various proposals, the Helsinki European Council held on 10–11 December 1999 produced a breakthrough in Turkey-EU relations. At Helsinki Turkey was officially recognized without any precondition as a candidate state on an equal footing with the other candidate states.


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EVEREST, MOUNT Mount Everest, known in Tibetan as Chomolungma ("mother goddess of the land") and in Nepali as Sagarmatha ("peak of the heavens"), is located in the Himalayan Range on the border between Nepal and Tibet. It is 8,848 meters high and thus the world's highest mountain. Its English name honors Sir George Everest (1790–1866),

the surveyor-general of India from 1830 to 1843. Although it had been surveyed from a distance and flown over, in 1921 George Mallory was the first European to attempt to climb it. He lost his life there in 1924. Sir Edmund Hillary (b. 1919), a New Zealand mountaineer, and Tenzing Norgay (1914–1986), a Sherpa, finally reached the summit in 1953. Subsequently many adventurers have made the ascent from several directions with the help of modern equipment. Six deaths on the mountain during an ill-fated climb in



CLIMBING MOUNT EVEREST— JUST A JOB

To the Sherpas of Nepal, guiding tourists up and down Mount Everest is just a job and the mountain itself a source of income.

Eight of Khumbu's most experienced and illustrious *sardars* unanimously agreed that virtually the only reason they climb is that they need the high income they cannot earn any other way. As one put it, if he had the education to qualify for a good office job, he would unhesitatingly choose that line of work. Sherpas see no intrinsic point in climbing; neither fame (though that is welcome since it helps them get their next climbing job more easily; it also accounts for the multiple ascents of Everest), nor challenge, nor adventure. Climbing is simply a high-paying job. None of the eight *sardars* expressed much enthusiasm for a hypothetical all-Sherpa expedition because they could not imagine any earnings accruing from it. Even though they enjoy the camaraderie and the scenic views and take pride in a job well done, these reasons alone would never motivate them to move up a mountain. Plans for a "First Sherpa Youth Mt. Everest Expedition 91" indicate contrary sentiments, but if skilled Sherpa climbers are paid on such an expedition, the view of the eight *sardars* will stand unchallenged.

Source: James F. Fisher. (1990) *Sherpas: Reflections on Change on Himalayan Nepal*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 129.



Snow-capped Mount Everest in Gokyo, Nepal. (ALISON WRIGHT/CORBIS)

1996 were seen as a consequence of increasingly novice climbers tackling the mountain. In 2000 a Slovenian mountaineer, Davo Karnicar, ascended to the summit in four days and became the first person to ski down.

Paul Hockings

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SAGARMATHA NATIONAL PARK— WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Home of Mount Everest, Sagarmatha National Park's deep glacial valleys teem with pandas and snow leopards. The park was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1979 for its ecological significance and indigenous Sherpa culture.

EXPORT-LED DEVELOPMENT "Export-led development" refers to the experience of nations in which strong export growth has been the leading factor driving strong overall economic growth. Such development has come to characterize the exceptional growth performance of Asian nations, especially Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Export growth has been credited as the main contributor to their high overall growth rates in the 1970s and 1980s.

Theoretical Considerations

Rigorous theoretical models link economic growth to factor accumulation (labor, capital) and productivity improvements. In these models, exports enter as a source of foreign exchange to finance capital accumulation or as a learning opportunity to assimilate more productive foreign know-how.

Exports as a channel to generate foreign exchange for investment in foreign capital goods has been the focus of the traditional growth literature, which focuses on the limited availability of capital in developing nations. In this way, available resources are channeled from domestic consumption to investment. Exports may also serve as a signal to foreign investors that external debts incurred today can be serviced in the future and thereby allow foreign savings to be tapped for further investments.

Exports as a channel toward rising productivity have been the focus of the new growth literature fo-

cusing on knowledge spillovers. Exports are much less effective for adopting foreign know-how than are imports or inward foreign investment. But a strong export performance can finance imports of advanced foreign goods. It can increase a location's profile as an export platform and thus attract foreign investments that tend to imply knowledge transfer into the economy.

More qualitative concepts, such as Michael Porter's "diamond" framework, incorporate factor conditions, the context for firm strategy and rivalry, demand conditions, and supporting and related industries in order to study factors driving productivity and productivity growth. In these concepts, export-led development affects, for example, the context for firm strategy and rivalry through companies' exposure to competition on international markets and to management practices at foreign business partners, as well as demand conditions through exposure to world-class customer needs.

The theoretical welfare implications of export-led growth are ambiguous. Moving from a closed economy to an open economy with exports unambiguously raises prosperity. Moving further to actively promoting exports in an otherwise undistorted economy, however, creates welfare losses in traditional growth models. In the new growth models and the competitiveness framework, as well as in traditional growth models with distortions, the welfare implications are ambiguous.

Development Policy Implications

The export-led growth performance of Asian nations had a major impact on policy discussions. The apparent success of the export-led model has refuted the earlier import-substitution development model. The role of government in the export-led model has unleashed a vigorous debate on the merits of government intervention. Moreover, the observation that export-led growth was driven by factor accumulation rather than productivity increases has shed doubts on the long-term sustainability of the export-led model.

The export-led growth model was preceded by earlier attempts in many parts of the world to use import substitution as an engine of development. Proponents of import substitution argued that companies from advanced economies had advantages over potential competitors from developing economies based on existing scale and thus would dominate industries with high potential for growth and value creation, absent government intervention. To counter these scale advantages of advanced economy companies, import-substitution policies closed developing nation markets to

imports and encouraged the creation of domestic companies to serve these markets. The experience with this approach—especially in Latin America, where it was pushed in the 1960s and 1970s by the U.N.'s Economic Commission for Latin America—was disappointing. Under the cover of import tariffs local companies remained inefficient and consumers had to put up with high prices and low-quality domestic goods.

The role of the government in export-led development has been debated since the success of Japan. In many nations associated with export-led development the government has played a role through, for example, export targets for individual companies, the allocation of credits for export-oriented investments, or a consciously undervalued currency. But did growth materialize because of government intervention, or in spite of it? Initially, the success of Japan and the other Asian nations that followed in its footsteps was credited to institutions such as Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Over time, however, it was pointed out that many of the most successful Japanese export industries had flourished against the advice of MITI, whereas industries that had been targeted, like the aircraft industry, turned out to be failures. Other nations such as Taiwan and Thailand also achieved success based on export-led development but with less interventionist economic policies. An emerging third view argues that government interventions had a positive impact when they encouraged exports and competition on world markets across companies and industries but had a negative impact when they targeted individual companies or industries for export success.

The long-term sustainability of the export-led development model has come into focus more recently. In an influential article, Alwyn Young pointed out that the growth performance of the Asian "tigers" following in Japan's footsteps can be almost exclusively accounted for by the increased use of factor inputs. The productivity of factor input use, however, has stagnated. Low productivity has two effects: It limits the growth potential for catch-up at increasing income levels, and it limits the prosperity that nations can enjoy as a consequence of growth.

Growth at higher income levels is limited because further factor accumulation becomes harder and less effective. In the past, the Asian nations were able to increase their industrial labor force by increasing female labor force participation and moving people from agriculture into industrial jobs. They were also able to increase their capital stock through heavy investment. Now, however, the labor pool is largely exploited, and further capital investments face diminishing returns.

Growth without productivity improvements also limits the level of prosperity that nations can enjoy. As the returns of further capital accumulation diminish, further wage growth can be supported only by productivity improvements. To turn wage growth into prosperity, nations need to have an efficient domestic sector in order not to diminish the real value of wages. High retail, real-estate, and local-service costs have, for example, limited prosperity in Japan despite high wage levels in the 1990s.

Status of the Current Debate

The debate on the implications of export-led growth, especially in Asian nations, continues: On one side of the spectrum export-led development and the Asian experience are seen as evidence for the merits of a more directive government role that sets clear sectoral priorities. On the other side of the spectrum it is argued that the Asian growth experience can be explained by traditional factor accumulation. Export orientation had a role within a procompetition policy agenda that also opened up internal markets and refrained from sectoral interventions. Although the de-

bate is far from over, more recently the majority view seems to shift in the latter direction.

Christian Ketels

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FA NGOUM (1316–1374?), founder of the Lan Xang kingdom of Cambodia. Fa Ngoum or Fa Ngum was born in Muang Sawa, a Lao principality located on the site of present-day Luang Prabang, and founded the Lan Xang Hom Khao (better known as Lan Xang) kingdom in Laos in 1353. Phraya Khampong, ruler of Muang Sawa and Fa Ngoum's grandfather, banished Fa Ngoum and his father, Chao Fa Ngiew, to the Khmer kingdom of Angkor in the 1320s due to his father's indiscretion with one of the grandfather's wives. Fa Ngoum subsequently married a Khmer princess, Keo Keng Nya. With the support of Angkor, Fa Ngoum returned to Muang Sawa with a Khmer army to gain control and consolidate his kingdom, Lan Xang Hom Khao—"land of one million elephants and a white parasol." The elephants symbolized military power since most battles were fought using elephants, and the white parasol symbolized royalty, particularly a Buddhist monarch. Fa Ngoum further legitimized his rule by enshrining the Prabang Buddha image as the spiritual protector of the kingdom in Viang Chan Viang Kham (present-day Vientiane). He made Xiang Dong Xiang Thong (later renamed Luang Prabang) his capital. Fa Ngoum is credited with introducing the Theravada Buddhist sect to the region when the Khmer monks who accompanied the image of the Prabang Buddha established a monastery in Lan Xang. Political turmoil ensued, and Fa Ngoum's son Oun Hueun (Sam Sene Thai, 1356–1417) succeeded the throne in 1368. Fa Ngoum died in Muang Nan in 1374 or 1375.

Linda S. McIntosh

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FAIZ AHMAD FAIZ (1911–1984), modern Urdu poet of Pakistan. Born in Sialkot, Pakistan, Ahmad Faiz symbolizes the heights that progressive poetry reached on the Indian subcontinent. He employed all the devices of classical Urdu lyrical poetry to convey a modern sensibility. The heady combination of ideological commitment and romanticism ensured his wide popularity. A recipient of the Lenin Prize for his work on behalf of the downtrodden and for peace, Faiz wrote eight volumes of poetry and six volumes of prose, as well as other works. His poetry represents the high point of progressive literature in the Urdu language.

Faiz's early poems were concerned with love and were written in the idiom and imagery current in Urdu poetry in the early decades of the twentieth century. His formative phase ended when Urdu poets were divided into three categories, depending on their ideological-artistic inclinations: first, those writing in the orthodox classical tradition who regarded any deviation in matters of style and prosody blasphemous; second, those who styled themselves progressives (whose objective was to work for social uplift rather than for aesthetic reasons) or their sympathizers; and third, the group called "Circle of Men of Good Taste," who claimed to write pure poetry, unencumbered by any social(ist) concerns. These distinctions were drawn in the 1940s and 1950s by the Circle of Men of Good Taste. Faiz belonged to the second group, though he did not share the extreme views of some of its members. The catholicity of taste, lyricism, and perfect blending of tradition and modernity in his poetry made him acceptable to all, encompassing ideological divides.

The first collection of his poems, *Naqsh-i Faryaadi* (Supplicant's Prayer), was published in Urdu in 1941.

His earliest poems, written mostly in the *ghazal* form, speak of love in the traditional vein. However, the poem *Mujh se pabli si muhabbat meri mahboob na maang* (My Beloved, Do Not Ask of Me My Former Kind of Love) marks the beginning of a new consciousness in which love for an earthly beloved is suffused with awareness of suffering humanity.

The poems in his second collection, *Dast-i Saba* (Fingers of the Morning Breeze, 1952), reflect his commitment to the progressive ideology at its height so much so that he characterized Indian independence in 1947 as a "much-stained radiance" in his justly famous poem *Subh-e azad* (Freedom's Dawn), which expresses Faiz's dissatisfaction with mere political freedom unaccompanied by economic freedom. In his inimitable style Faiz gave expression to a feeling of disillusionment with the false dawn of India's freedom from colonial domination, as well as feelings of resolve to continue the struggle against all oppressive regimes. Many of the poems in *Dast-i Saba* and all the poems in his third collection, *Zindan Nama* (Prison Writings; 1956), were composed during his imprisonment from 1952 to 1955 for opposing imposition of martial law in Pakistan and have an urgency about them. They speak of the need to fight against capitalism and dictatorship and to safeguard freedom of speech, the isolation of prison life, and undaunting courage in the face of suffering, imprisonment, even execution. At the same time Faiz also wrote poems about human feelings that are universal in nature, including "Tanhaai" (Solitude) and "Yaas" (Despair).

Faiz's diction is often consciously literary and decorative. He moved from the traditional rhymed verse in his early phase to free verse in his middle and later phases. In matters of style he blended the old with the new; his adherence to the traditional symbols and imagery of the *ghazal* is traditional, whereas his espousal of social themes is new. Innovation and experimentation for their own sake had no appeal for him.

M. Asaduddin

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FALUN GONG Founded by Li Hongzhi (b. 1952) in 1992 in China, the Falun Gong, or Falun Dafa, is the fastest-growing religious and social movement in

recent history. The Chinese government estimates the number of Falun Gong followers as between 2 and 10 million in China, but Li claims there are 100 million adherents in thirty countries. The movement first attracted the world's attention with a series of well-organized protests in Beijing in early 1999. Li left China in 1998 for New York City, probably in anticipation of his trouble with Chinese authorities. Alarmed by Falun Gong's organizational prowess and its challenge to the official ideology, the Chinese government declared Falun Gong a "heretical organization" on 23 July 1999 and launched a full-scale propaganda campaign against Li and his followers. Falun Gong has responded to the official ban with more protests and its own publicity crusade carried out mostly through Western news media and on the Internet.

The rapid rise of Falun Gong has as much to do with Li's charisma as with his message. All established religions in China have seen significant growth in their membership, and many new quasi-religious sects associated (like Falun Gong) with *qigong* were established there in the 1980s. *Qigong* is a three-thousand-year-old natural-healing discipline involving exercises and meditation. Like other *qigong* masters, Li emphasizes its spiritual element, but he distinguishes himself by linking *qigong* with Buddhist and Taoist cosmologies.

Falun Gong has spread through Li's many books and lectures and the testimonials of practitioners. Despite its proven capability of mobilizing people, Falun Gong remains a loosely organized movement as determined by Li's teaching. Practitioners can participate at exercise centers or cultivate on their own. Li is the only "teacher," or "master," in the religion.

Dian Li

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FAMINE—CHINA Famine is a result of multiple political, economic, social, and ecological disorders that combine to produce an increase in the number of deaths from starvation and epidemic disease. An ex-



A crowd at a government facility providing rice during the famine of 1948. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

amination of Chinese famines and Chinese official responses to famine conditions reveals universal features that apply to both traditional and modern times. Famine descriptions punctuate China's historical records. One survey noted that eighteen hundred famines were recorded between 108 BCE and 1929 CE. Chinese record keepers were careful to note that, in most cases, actual famine conditions did not result directly from drought, flood, war, or neglected infrastructure, but rather from failures of official intervention in the face of widespread popular distress.

Traditional Relief and Prevention

Famine relief and prevention traditionally formed an inherent part of Chinese official responsibility for popular welfare. Historical literature describes different episodes of famine and explains direct, indirect, and long-term measures for dealing with famine conditions. Lists of precipitating events point to differences between so-called heavenly calamities, such as drought or flood, and calamities linked to human causes, such as political ineptitude, rebellion, or war. Scarcities produced by grain transfers or extractions and failure to maintain irrigation works, dikes, and transport networks are classified as human causes.

A guiding principle for relief efforts called for them to be administered according to circumstances. Local investigators described famine conditions in terms of

degrees of hunger or the amount of food available per person during a given period. Immediate, or direct, relief measures included food and cash distributions to halt starvation. Indirect measures included tax relief, seed distributions to restore agricultural productivity, and work-relief projects to repair famine-related damage. Long-term relief measures included plans for water conservancy and programs to help settle famine refugees on unused land. Officials often planned projects ahead of actual needs so that they could be implemented quickly and without controversy.

An examination of Chinese official responses to famine conditions reveals that, overall, relief efforts succeeded best when China had a strong central order to mobilize physical and economic resources on behalf of popular welfare. When the central order was weak, millions were doomed. A hallmark of Chinese famine intervention called for grain storage to protect against the effects of crop failures. China's "ever normal granaries" served the dual goals of price stabilization and food relief by permitting officials to sell grain at reduced prices and to arrange grain transfers to avert hoarding and price gouging.

Historical data reveal that, by the mid-nineteenth century, the Chinese state could not mobilize resources necessary to carry out effective famine relief and that famine conditions occurred somewhere in China almost every year throughout the first half of the twentieth century.

Foreign Intervention

Foreigners in China during the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries made repeated attempts to provide famine relief, but they confronted a system in decline, and their efforts never evolved into coherent programs. Foreign efforts did, however, yield themes that were reiterated by a variety of relief agents and agencies in China. One was foreign insistence that China needed long-term physical and economic improvements before the constant threat of famine could be eliminated. A second proposed that the necessary improvements be instituted and run by foreign agencies and personnel. A third theme took form in negative reports that discouraged foreign donors and governments from contributing to Chinese official relief efforts.

Chinese officials regularly accepted foreign food and money for short-term relief and, with equal regularity, rejected long-term relief proposals for projects designed to be owned and run by foreigners. Ultimately, foreign relief efforts emulated Chinese trends. They succeeded best when they had strong external political support. They failed when foreign governments determined that conditions for relief were hopeless and refused to support agents and agencies operating in China.

China and the Great Leap Famine

Establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 brought dramatic improvements in medical care, disease prevention, and agricultural production. For a time it seemed as if official priority given to eliminating famine would bring positive results. Food production and distribution came under strict central controls, and the state gave high priority to increasing food supplies and improving transport networks. However, state collectivization policies produced disaster as outside assistance was halted, agriculture became collectivized, demands for huge quotas could not be met, and limited resources could not be distributed equitably. An estimated 30 million people died of starvation and disease during the Great Leap Famine of 1958–1962. It is now referred to as the worst famine in human history. A consensus holds that it was human made and that it resulted primarily from political failures associated with the Great Leap Forward, Mao's abortive effort to encourage rural industrialization at the expense of agriculture.

Since the death of Mao in 1976, China has gradually liberalized its economic policies and allowed for private control of agricultural land while maintaining firm centralized control of the government. It is to be hoped that these measures have put famine firmly in China's past.

Arline Golkin-Kadonaga

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FARID, KHWAJA GHULAM (1845–1901), South Asian Sufi poet. Khwaja Ghulam Farid was a great Sufi poet, mystic, and literary figure who remains revered and beloved by millions to this day all over the India-Pakistan subcontinent. Khwaja Ghulam Farid composed in the *kaafi*, the favored poetic genre of his native Multan in present-day Pakistan, to bring spiritual enlightenment to Muslim contemporaries, considered during that period to be in the throes of political, economic, and spiritual decline that manifested itself in widespread drug use, social ills, superstition, and debased religious practices.

Farid's poetry reflects his great love and knowledge of music and his homeland. He chose to compose in the regional language of Siraiiki rather than Persian or Urdu, the courtly and scholarly languages of the time. He added a romantic, ecstatic flavor and new musicality to the more ascetic devotional poetry of his predecessors. Effortlessly he takes the reader/listener through explanations of the highest mystical matters as well as charming depictions of everyday lives of simple folk. As a result, to this day, his mystical expressions of wonderment, love, humility, and gnosis bring delight to both the lover of poetry and the illiterate villager, while edifying the student of theology.

Like other Sufis of the subcontinent, Farid's expansive spirit of tolerance endeared him to Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh alike. Even today, his shrine in Kot Mithan is visited by thousands each year on the occasion of his *urs* (death anniversary).

Shabana Mir

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FARMERS' MOVEMENTS Japanese farmers face demographic and economic challenges. Their political strength of the early post-World War II period has waned due to a demographic shift away from rural areas. Deregulation of the agricultural commodity trade has put further pressure on Japanese farmers.

Comprehensive taxation on farmers was introduced from Tang dynasty China during the seventh century. Farmers faced an additional burden as drafted foot soldiers during the warring states period of the late-fifteenth to mid-sixteenth centuries. Their repeated rebellions against local lords resulted in confiscation of all swords from the farmers in 1588 by Toyotomi Hideyoshi and their complete separation from the warrior class.

Heavy tax burdens, especially during poor harvests, prompted farmers to rebel against domain lords. During the Edo period (1600/1603–1868), the decentralized and more sophisticated taxation on farmers by local domains and the ban on land transactions kept most farmers small-scale and poor. While most rebellions were quickly suppressed by the domain forces, the widespread rebellion by mostly Christian peasants in Shimabara (1637–1638) required intervention by the central government. Frequent famines after the late-eighteenth century and the development of urban commerce and industrial activities prompted informal transfer of land titles, dividing the farmers into a few rich landowners and many poor tenant farmers.

The two-tiered structure of the farmers largely continued throughout the pre-World War II period, despite limited land reforms, and the dual burdens of taxation to fuel state-led industrialization and military draft fell heavily on the tenant farmers. Some Marxist intellectuals, like Kawakami Hajime and his followers, and anarchists insisted on a political alliance of industrial workers and tenant farmers but had limited success due to state suppression. Farmers took part in the prewar proletariat movements in the stream of worker-farmer parties, such as Rodo Nominto, Nihon Ronoto, and Zenkoku Rono Taishuto. However, the military government and its control of agriculture

through the Food Control Law of 1942 tightly incorporated farmers into the war efforts.

More than half the Japanese population was engaged in agriculture at the end of World War II. The American-led occupation forces implemented a major land reform program, breaking large land holdings into small independent farms. The collective support of these small farmers became a backbone of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. The government used the Food Control Law for encouraging production and orderly distribution of rice under its monopoly during the food shortage following the war. The farmers set up the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives and successfully pressured the government into raising its purchase price of rice until the mid-1980s. Government efforts to deregulate the rice distribution system and discourage rice production through crop diversion programs had limited success. In other commodities, such as oranges and beef, quota-based imports started in the 1980s.

In the face of U.S. demands that Japan open its rice market to imports, Japanese farmers launched political campaigns to block imports and promote quality domestic rice. The former campaign delayed the opening of the rice market until 1994, when Japan agreed to institute a quota-based import program. In 1999, a tariff replaced the quota system. Meanwhile, the "quality rice" campaign networked farmers, environmentalists, and quality-conscious consumers and may provide a way for innovative farmers to compete successfully with imported rice. By the late 1990s, less than 10 percent of the Japanese population was engaged in agriculture, and half Japan's farmers produced commodities other than rice. The monolithic political strength of the farmers has vanished.

Yoichiro Sato

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FARS (2002 pop. 4.2 million). Fars, in southern Iran, is one of the largest Iranian provinces, with an area of 133,294 square kilometers; it is a region with great historical significance. The nucleus of the ancient Persian empire (c. 550–331 BCE), it was called Persis and was the seat of the royal cities of Pasargadae and Persepolis. An evolved version of the ancient Persian tongue (called Farsi or Parsi after the region) is still spoken today in Iran and is the official language of the country.

The Iranian-speaking Aryans first came to northern Fars; later the valleys of the Kur and Pulwar rivers became centers and remained so until the time of the Sasanid dynasty. Darius the Great (reigned 522–486 BCE) built Persepolis where the Pulwar flows into the Kur on the plain of Marwdasht. Another town on the banks of the Pulwar, called Istakhr in the Middle Ages, was the focal point of the Sasanid dynasty. Other cities of Fars later outshone Istakhr in terms of size and activity (namely Shiraz, Fasa, Siraf, and Arrajan).

Throughout history, Fars flourished and waned according to the fortunes of the dynasty in power. Shiraz was the capital of various dynasties, but eventually power, money, and prestige shifted from this area to the northerly cities of Tehran and Isfahan. Fars nevertheless remained a significant commercial and cultural center. Today Shiraz is not only the bustling hub of commerce for the Fars region, but is also one of the



Ruins of the Persian capital of Persepolis in Fars. (CORBIS)

most industrialized cities in Iran. It is a major destination for tourists who appreciate historical sites and art centers and wish to visit the tombs of the poets Sa'di and Hafez.

Several nomadic ethnic groups, including the Qashqais, inhabit Fars as they did in past centuries. Nomads mounted on horses or camels may spend summers on the high plateaus and move south to the Persian Gulf in the winter to search for pastures for their herds; others spend winters in a city. These groups represent not only an economic mode of production, but also a lifestyle that has strong cultural and traditional roots in many parts of Iran.

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FARSI-TAJIKI The Farsi-Tajiki or Tajiki language, the name given to one of the Iranian languages spoken in Central Asia, is also called Persian, Tajik, or Tajik Persian. This variety of names reflects the rather complicated history of the language.

Forms of New Persian

Farsi-Tajiki belongs to the Western branch of the Iranian language group (of the Indo-Iranian branch of the Indo-European language family), in which it is usually classified as New Persian. Today there are three standardized forms of New Persian: Farsi-Tajiki, Farsi, and Dari. In their standard forms, these three are to a large extent identical, although there are many regional spoken variants, which may differ considerably from the standard forms. Since 1989, Farsi-Tajiki has been the official language of Tajikistan, but it is also spoken in large parts of the neighboring republic of Uzbekistan and in Afghanistan. Farsi is the official language of Iran, and Dari the official language of Afghanistan.

History of Farsi-Tajiki

Farsi means "Persian," and Tajiki is derived from *Tajik*, a word with an obscure etymology, once implying "Muslim," but nowadays referring to the people of the Central Asian republic of Tajikistan. Farsi-Tajiki evolved from the classical New Persian language that gradually emerged as a new written lan-

guage, replacing Middle Persian and other Iranian languages in the centuries following the Muslim Arabs' conquest of Iran and Central Asia in the seventh century. (Iranian languages had long been spoken in Central Asia.) Classical New Persian, like the modern New Persian (Farsi) of today, is written in an adaptation of the Arabic script and is characterized by a large number of loanwords from Arabic. Farsi-Tajiki also has a relatively large number of Turkic loanwords. With the coming of the Turkic tribes from the tenth century on, Turkic languages, such as Uzbek, gradually superseded the Iranian languages once spoken in the area of Central Asia. More recently, Russian has deeply influenced Farsi-Tajiki.

The term "Tajik" began to be used widely from the sixteenth century onward to refer to speakers of New Persian in the area of the Oxus River (the modern Amu Dar'ya, in central and western Central Asia) basin and present-day northeastern Afghanistan, to distinguish them from speakers of Turkic languages in that area. The expansion of Turkic peoples, mainly Uzbeks and Turkmen, from the north to the south of Central Asia, in combination with the stabilization of national frontiers in the sixteenth century, separated the Iranians of the Iranian plateau from the Iranians to the northeast. From then on, the spoken Persian of the northeast developed separately from that of Iran.

However, the written Persian, in use for administrative and literary purposes in India as well as Central Asia, remained the same as the Persian used in Iran until the first quarter of the twentieth century. This language was called Farsi or Parsi (Persian, or more specifically New Persian) in the whole of the Iranian cultural area, which stretched from India to western modern Iran. The term "Farsi-Tajiki" or "Tajiki" came into use under Soviet influence around 1925.

Emergence of Farsi-Tajiki

The development of standard Farsi-Tajiki was instigated by the poet and novelist Sadriddin Aini (1878–1954), considered the founder of modern Tajik literature. He was trained in the medieval cloisters of a Bukharan *madrasab* (Muslim religious school), but he used his talents in the service of reform and revolution.

When Soviet rule was established in Central Asia in the 1920s, it was decided that the region should be divided into national republics. The republics were named after their dominant ethnic groups, whose languages had to be developed as tools for educating the proletariat. This division into national republics was artificial, not only since there were many more ethnic groups than national republics, but also because dif-

ferent ethnic groups had been living together in the same areas for centuries. A seemingly neat division was nevertheless carried through, and the newly appointed national languages were turned into modern Soviet-era languages by introducing elements from the vernacular to replace classical expressions. Sadriddin Aini was among the intellectuals who created the reformed Persian, which was called Tajiki. Aini apparently invented the term "Farsi-Tajiki," to mark the language's close relationship with the classical Persian heritage and with the Persian spoken in Iran and Afghanistan. Although this language was based on the spoken forms of Persian around Bukhara and Samarqand in present-day Uzbekistan, it was imposed as a new literary language on the inhabitants of the newly founded republic of Tajikistan, which was situated farther east and did not include Bukhara and Samarqand, the Tajik centers of old. Until then the area of Tajikistan had been only sparsely populated, and those who lived there mainly spoke different forms of Tadjiki or other Iranian languages, although Uzbek and Kirghiz were also spoken in western and northern present-day Tajikistan.

One of the first steps in transforming the allegedly old-fashioned and feudal image of the Persian language used in Central Asia was the adoption of a new alphabet. First, around 1930, the Latin alphabet was adopted. In 1940 the introduction of a modified Cyrillic alphabet facilitated the adoption of many Russian loan words, and the Russian language gradually gained importance in Tajikistan, marginalizing and Russianizing Farsi-Tajiki. This process ended in the late 1980s under the influence of glasnost and perestroika.

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the people of Tajikistan have tried to reintroduce the Arabo-Persian script and to decrease the use of Russian and Russian loan words in Tajiki. However, so far the poor economic situation prohibits an effective reintroduction.

In short, Farsi-Tajiki in its present form is a relatively new language, but it has a long history. Its direct ancestor is classical New Persian, which had been spoken in Central Asia since the emergence of Islam. Whereas the Soviets increasingly tended to isolate Farsi-Tajiki from the Persian (Farsi) of Iran and Afghanistan, since independence Tajiks have tried to emphasize Farsi-Tajiki's similarity to Farsi and Dari. Both Farsi-Tajiki and Farsi have a common heritage, although political and historical circumstances through the centuries have resulted in considerable differences in grammar and vocabulary, particularly in colloquial language.

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FAZILET PARTY. See **Refah and Fazilet Parties.**

FAZL, ABU'L (1551–1602), Indian historiographer. Born in Agra in 1550, Abu'l Fazl, the second son of Shaikh Mubarak, was a learned man of north India who became the faithful secretary and adviser of the Mughal emperor Akbar. His great scholarship as a historiographer is evidenced in his famous but adulatory book, the *Akbarnama* (Book of Akbar, 1590s), which chronicles the history of India in the time of Akbar, and in its supplement, the *Ain-i-Akbari* (Institutes of Akbar, 1593), a statistical account of the Mughal empire. The *Akbarnama* is the most important of all Mughal-era documents. Both books were written in an elegant style of Persian, the court language. Abu'l Fazl's brother Faizi was a noted court poet at the time.

After many years of service Abu'l Fazl was murdered at the instigation of Prince Salim while he was returning from a mission to the Dekkan (a plateau in southern India); the killer was a Bundella chief. (The Bundellas were a dominant clan in the region.) That prince, who had become jealous of the minister's influence, afterward became the emperor Aurangzeb.

Paul Hockings

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FEDERAL TERRITORIES—MALAYSIA

Malaysia has a federal system of government that is made up of thirteen states and three federal territories that are under the direct control of the federal government. Wilayah Persekutuan, the national capital region (often called the Kuala Lumpur Federal Territory) was created in February 1974 from part of the state of Selangor and includes the city of Kuala Lumpur and the surrounding area. Putrajaya is the newly built national capital and was declared a federal territory on 1 February 2001. The third federal territory is the island of Labuan, which the government is trying to promote as an international offshore banking center. When the Federation of Malaya was founded in 1957, the federal territories also included Pulau Pinang and the city of Malacca, in addition to Kuala Lumpur. Pulau Pinang and Malacca, however, became states in 1957.

The federal territories have a different political structure from the thirteen other Malaysian states. There is a cabinet-level minister of federal territories, who is assisted by an advisory board for the general administration of each of the three federal territories. The mayors of Kuala Lumpur, Putrajaya, and Labuan are appointed by the king of Malaysia on the advice of the prime minister.

Zachary Abuza

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FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS—PAKISTAN

(2002 est. pop. 3.5 million). Home to Pashtun tribes, the strip of territory along Pakistan's northwestern border with Afghanistan has retained a degree of autonomy since the territories' inception as a buffer zone during British colonial rule (1757–1947). Encompassing seven tribal areas (Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, Mohmand, Bajaur, North Waziristan and South Waziristan), the region makes up some 27,220 square kilometers of Pakistani territory.

Pakistan's constitutional agreement with the Pashtun tribes, who are the ethnic majority in neighboring Afghanistan, is much more than a mere formality. The Pashtun have successfully resisted occupation for centuries, and until pressure from the United States forced the Pakistani government to mount a helicopter

expedition into the area in 2002 to look for the Saudi terrorist Osama bin Laden, the last national military intrusion was by the British in 1897. That expedition never returned. The disastrous mission put an end to British colonial designs on the area, and instead of seizing and settling it (the British pattern for other problematic provinces), the British officially incorporated it into their North-West Frontier Province, but designated it a tribal area and stayed away from it.

When Pakistan gained its independence in 1947, the tribal areas voluntarily swore allegiance to the new government but stopped short of any actual integration and rejected the imposition of any governmental apparatus that might have threatened their autonomy. The tribes were granted a seat in the parliament, and technically universal suffrage applies to them, but with tribal law forbidding political parties, only the tribal elders vote.

The tribal areas have always been a center of smuggling in the region and refuge for some of Pakistan's worst criminals. The situation worsened in the 1960s, when worldwide demand for heroin increased (the tribal areas are centers of opium production, heroin processing, and distribution), and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 further exacerbated the situation. Always a center of arms production, with tribal law and custom dictating that every man should own a gun, the influx of arms from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan exponentially increased the availability and sophistication of the arms available to the Pashtun, particularly when the United States began covert sales of arms to the Mujahadeen rebels. The area came to be known as *ilaga ghair* ("the land without laws"), and is a big contributor to instability in the region. With the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, international pressure to bring the rule of law to the region is growing and will probably succeed, even if only temporarily.

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FEDERATED MALAY STATES The Federated Malay States (FMS) was a former federation of the states of Perak, Pahang, Selangor, and Negeri Sembilan on the southern part of the Malay Peninsula. British colonial administrator Frank Swettenham (1850–1946) suggested the idea, and the FMS was established 1 July 1896 and terminated in 1946. With the inclusion of the unfederated Malay States, the Federation of Malaya was formed in 1948.

The British Resident system had previously overseen local administration in the various states. However, Swettenham and other British officers, felt that a central government was needed for greater unity, uniformity, and cooperation between these states. The FMS headquarters were established in Kuala Lumpur, where a Federal Civil Service consisting of departments such as Justice, Communications, Finance, and Public Works was set up. A council of Malay rulers for the FMS was instituted to discuss matters of importance with the British rulers. The first conference of Malay rulers, popularly known as the Durbar (royal display), was held in July 1897 at Istana Negara, Kuala Kangsar, Perak. The Durbar conference was held nine times until the year 1939.

With the formation of the Federation of Malaya in 1948, the Durbar membership increased with the inclusion of the unfederated Malay States of Johor, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Trengganu. On 18 February 1948 its first conference was held in Kuala Lumpur. The Conference of Rulers was held fifty times from February 1948 until August 1957.

Khair Leong Ho

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FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA The Federation of Malaysia was the name given to the 1963 political union of several British colonies on the Malay

Peninsula, as well as Singapore and the island of Borneo. In 1946, Britain had separated Singapore, which remained a crown colony, and organized the nine sultanates and two federal territories on the peninsula into the Malay Union. Sarawak and British North Borneo (Sabah) were brought under direct colonial control at that time. There was considerable opposition to the Malay Union, which the local leaders felt consolidated British control. After protracted negotiations with Malay rulers, the British established the Federation of Malaya on 1 February 1948. In this agreement, the British committed themselves to preparing for the Federation's independence. A federal government headed by a British High Commissioner was established in Kuala Lumpur.

Local-level elections were established in 1951, and the first federal elections were held in 1955. Soon after these elections, the coalition government dominated by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) began negotiations with the British over independence, while Singapore was granted internal autonomy. As a result of an agreement between the British and ethnic Malay, Chinese, and Indian communities, on 31 August 1957, the independent Federation of Malaya was established. This compromise agreement gave ethnic Chinese and Indians citizenship rights but tacitly preserved the leadership role of ethnic Malays in government and constitutionally recognized the "special position and needs of the Malays," creating an affirmative action program. The agreement set up a parliamentary democracy with a bicameral parliament, composed of a nonelected upper house made up of the nine Malay sultans among whom the position of head of state, or paramount ruler, rotated, and an elected lower house.

On 12 May 1961, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman proposed that the Federation of Malaysia absorb Singapore and the British-controlled territories in northern Borneo, Brunei, Sabah, and Sarawak to create a united Malaysia. The proposal was well accepted in peninsular Malaya and Singapore, but was less popular in the three Borneo territories. The proposal infuriated the Philippines, which asserted a claim over Sabah until 1987, and Indonesia, which viewed it as a neocolonialist plot and began a low-intensity conflict as part of President Sukarno's policy of *Konfrontasi* from 1963 to 1965. Elections were held for the first time in 1962 in Sabah and Brunei, and an Anglo-Malay commission visited the three territories in 1962, where it reported that following a September referendum a majority of the population was in favor of integration. Although Brunei opted to remain outside the Federation, on 16 September 1963, Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore were constitutionally added

to peninsular Malaya to create the Federation of Malaysia. Under the constitution, the state governments have only limited autonomy and internal security; nation defense, foreign policy, and fiscal policy are prerogatives of the federal government.

Despite the founding of the Federation of Malaysia, there was little attempt to integrate Singapore into the Federation. UMNO extremists feared giving their Singapore counterparts economic advantages and government contracts, yet Kuala Lumpur demanded an increased percentage of Singapore's revenues. The creation of the Federation also radically changed the racial makeup of the country. Though there was a large increase in the number of Chinese, there was a similar rise in the number of indigenous peoples from Sabah and Sarawak. The UMNO campaigned in Singapore's September 1963 elections, and Singapore's ruling party, The People's Action Party (PAP), campaigned in Malaysia's April 1964 elections, causing mistrust. In May 1965, the PAP and four other Chinese-dominated opposition parties founded the Malaysian Solidarity Convention, which convinced many in the UMNO that there was a Chinese plot to take over the country. Communal tensions continued, and on 6 August 1965, the Tunku notified the Singapore chief Lee Kwan Yew that Singapore would be expelled from the Federation. On 9 August 1965, without any Singaporean representatives in attendance, the Malaysian parliament passed a bill favoring separation by 126 to 0. The Republic of Singapore was founded that day. The Federation of Malaysia then adopted the official name Malaysia.

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
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FELTING—CENTRAL ASIA Felt is one of the earliest and most important textiles used by the nomads of Central Asia. For over two thousand years, felt has been used to make tents, furniture, and clothing. Through the influence of the nomads, the textile spread out of Asia and into Europe, where it remains an influence.

Materials and Techniques

Felt is a textile usually made from sheep wool or goat hair, but it can sometimes be made from fur.



The exterior of a traditional yurt in Kyrgyzstan covered by decorated felt siding that can be removed and rolled for storage during travel. (JANET WISHNETSKY/CORBIS)

Throughout Asia, wool is the most common material used for felt. The most prevalent sheep of this region are those of the family called fat tailed, because of their large, fat-filled tails. These sheep produce wool that is coarse and easy to felt. The felt made from this wool is stiff and holds up well under heavy use. The outside walls of the Central Asian *ger* (yurt) are made of thick sheets of this stiff felt. Carpets of felt are folded and rolled to be used as furniture inside the *ger*. In addition, felt is used for cloaks, boots, hats, and saddle blankets. Mohair, from Angora goats, is also used to make felt. (The "whirling dervishes" of Turkey wear tall hats of mohair felt.)

The sheep are shorn twice a year, in the spring and at the end of summer. It is the summer fleece that is used for making felt. (The spring fleece is spun into yarn and used for weaving.) After shearing, the wool is laid onto a large piece of cloth on the ground and is beaten with long, flexible sticks. This causes the clumps of fiber to open up and become fluffy.

The fluffy wool is laid out on reed mats in a pile that is about 35 centimeters deep. Boiling water is sprinkled on top of the wool. A long stick is laid on one end of the reed mat, and the mat is rolled up with the wet wool inside it. Sometimes the roll is covered with a piece of canvas or tarp, and then the whole bundle is tied with strong cord in several places. In Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, a long cord is put around the roll, and it is pulled in such a way that it makes the roll

rotate. Then a group of people walks arm and arm and kicks the top of the roll as it is rotating. In Mongolia and parts of China, the roll is attached to a rope behind a horse or camel. When the animal is guided forward, the mat-roll turns and hits against the ground, causing agitation. The agitation caused by this action, along with the moisture, causes the wool fibers to expand and contract until they are tangled together. This tangled mass of fiber is what we call felt.

With each method, after a half hour or so, the roll is untied, more hot water is added, and the whole thing is rolled up again from the opposite end of the mat. This rolling process can go on for several hours. At this point, because the felt is still not quite hard enough to function well, it is removed from the reed mat, heated with boiling water, and rolled up on itself, without the center rolling bar. The workers roll it back and forth with their forearms for ten to fifteen minutes. The felt is then unrolled and rerolled from another direction; the process is repeated until it has been rolled from all directions and on both sides. When it is finished, the edges are trimmed and it is allowed to dry.

Felt Decorations and Carpets

Asian felt is often used for carpets. These carpets fall into two major categories: decorated single-layered felts and double-layered felts. Single-layered felts are known by various names and have various surface-decoration techniques. In Kashmir, the carpets

are called *numdab*, and the decorations are embroidered onto the finished piece of felt. The edges of these felts have a fleece fringe. In Mongolia, the carpets are usually quilted and sometimes have additional motifs cut from felt and appliquéd onto them. The carpet edges are cut, and a piece of wool rope is sewn to them for added durability. Kyrgyz people make a carpet called *alla kijiz*, in which all the designs are added as the felt is being made. In Europe and North America, this method of creating motifs in felt is called inlay.

Inlay techniques are a common method of decorating felt in Central and Western Asia. The design is created by laying bits of colored fleece either onto a background layer of wool or onto the reed mat before the background layer is placed on it. A variation is to use a sheet of partially made soft felt. Shapes are cut from this soft felt and used like the colored fleece bits mentioned above.

The double-layered felt carpets are among the most prized of Central Asia. Called *shirdak* by the Kyrgyz and *syrmak* by the Kazakhs, these carpets have a patchwork-felt top layer and a solid felt bottom layer, which are quilted together. In English, these types of carpets are called mosaic felts.

Socioeconomic Context

In most parts of Central Asia, the women of nomadic tribes make felt, usually for the family's use. They work together to make the felt, since it is a labor-intensive activity. In some cases, men help by leading the animals that drag the felt rolls. In the non-nomadic community, however, men make felt as a business. These city dwellers work in shops, with master felters doing the layout and design of the felt carpets and apprentices doing the heavy labor. Because felting is so laborious, the master felters find it difficult to find apprentices. This, together with the lack of commercial interest in felt carpets, has caused many felt businesses to close.

During the time of the Soviet Republics (1920s–1991), many nomadic people were relocated onto collective farms and could no longer travel along their nomadic routes. They raised sheep not for their own felting, but so that the wool could be exported to the carpet factories of Russia. As a consequence, people in some areas forgot their traditional methods of making felt. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, there has been a resurgence of felting, and government agencies are sending teachers out to the countryside to help as people try to resume their traditional way of life.

History

Until recently, the earliest known pieces of felt were found in frozen grave mounds (*kurgans*) in Siberia. These felt artifacts included wall hangings, stuffed animals, saddle blankets, and cloaks, dating from 600 to 100 BCE. The Siberian finds were ornately decorated with many of the same inlay techniques used by Asian felters today. The State Hermitage Museum in Saint Petersburg has a wonderful collection of these artifacts. However, in the late 1980s, Western scientists found some very old mummies in western China. These mummies, dating from 2000 to 500 BCE, in many cases were dressed in felt boots and hats. While these objects had simple ornamentation, their shapes were complex, and they were made in a sophisticated three-dimensional felting technique. Also of note are the felt carpets in the Shosoin Repository, in Nara, Japan. Dating from 618 to 906 CE, these items were collected from all over Asia to be part of the Japanese emperor's treasure. Their intricate motifs show a complexity that is unrivaled today.

While felting has been an important part of the culture of Central Asia for over two thousand years, the twentieth century was a troubled time for the craft. With the collectivization of the nomads, many people lost their knowledge of the technique. In the cities, felt carpet businesses shut down. In the early 2000s, however, there has been an effort across the region to help people reconnect with their past and bring this craft back to life.

Patricia Spark

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FEMININE LANGUAGE Sex differentiation in language has long been noted as a feature of some non-Western languages. It was only after the worldwide women's movement gained momentum in the 1960s and 1970s, however, that researchers in the United States, Europe, and other parts of the world seriously investigated various gender-related linguistic phenomena.

Scholars assume that differences exist between the way men and women speak in most languages, reflecting the universality of gender-based role divisions in human societies. Women generally speak in what is characterized as a feminine way, that is, more deferentially and less assertively than men. Although in most contemporary societies feminine language is less conspicuous than it has been in the past, some Asian languages preserve grammatical features strongly associated with feminine language. Japanese, the most well-known example, marks femininity through pitch, excessive politeness, hesitation, deletion of declarative predicates, and avoidance of final particles with strong assertion. Thai and Korean, although not as pronounced as Japanese, also are sensitive to the gender of the speaker.

Studies show that the feminine language is a social stereotype, that is, an idealized version of women's talk represented in literature and mass media (for example, television dramas) and that it is not as consistent in actual interaction as is often implied in existing literature on the subject. Studies also indicate that younger speakers tend to obscure the boundary between men's language and women's language, and some researchers predict that feminine language will gradually become more subtle than it is at present.

Katsue Akiba Reynolds

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FENG SHUI Feng shui is an ancient Chinese art of site orientation based on the belief that the human dwelling or tomb can be situated physically to take advantage of invisible currents of energy within the en-



THE ORIGINS OF THE NAME "FENG SHUI"

"Qi rides the wind (*feng*) and scatters, but is retained when encountering water (*shui*). The ancients collected it to prevent its dissipation, and guided it to assure its retention. Thus it was called *feng shui*. According to the laws of *feng shui*, the site that attracts water is optimum, followed by the site that catches wind.

"Where forces cease and features soar high, with a stream in front and a hill behind, here hides the head of the dragon. The snout and forehead are auspicious; the horns and eyes bring doom. The ears obtain princes and kings; the lips lead to death or injury from weapons. Where terrain winds about and collects at the center, this is called the belly of the dragon. Where the navel is deep and winding, descendants will have good fortune. If the chest and ribs are injured, burial in the morning will bring sobbing that night."

Source: Zangshu, or Book of Burial, attributed to Guo Pu (276–324), translated by Stephen Field.

vironment. This energy, called *qi* (*ch'i*), is the same force that is affected by the pierce of the acupuncture needle. The human body is an analogue of the Earth, such that the blood veins of one correspond to "dragon veins" of the other. When a tomb is excavated or ground is broken for a house, such action taps into these dragon veins. Whereas arteries and veins bring oxygen and nutrients to the cells of the body, the *qi* brings good fortune to those residing in a dwelling.

Seeking the Dragon Veins

The Chinese developed two different procedures for locating *qi*. One approach, first outlined in a fourth-century text, though it undoubtedly originated earlier, was based on the idea that water collects and stores *qi*, while wind captures and scatters it. So the auspicious site would be bordered on three sides by mountains to block the wind and fronted by a pond or nestled in the crook of a stream to attract *qi*. Practitioners of this technique are collectively called the Form School. Another approach, elements of which date back to the second century BCE, was based on the theory of *wu xing* (the five phases), which analyzes *qi* as a force alternating between the poles of yin and yang



FENG SHUI AND ONE'S FATE

In traditional rural Chinese society, the effective use of feng shui was thought to bring prosperity to the family. This account of the use of feng shui by the Miao people of southern China in 1937 before the government repressed the practice indicates its importance in controlling fate.

The Miao believe in feng shui. When I was in Ang-chi village, Lu Tsun-ying, the chiah'ang, told me that the reason the Miao people there were so poor was because the feng shui was not good there. He also pointed out how the feng shui was poor. The mountain peaks were too sharp, there was a lack of springs, and the aspect was too narrow, so that there was nothing from which wealth could issue. His cousin, a pao-ch'ang, also asked whether I knew how to practice feng-shui. I gave him a negative answer. He said he would save more money to enable him to engage a good master of feng shui, who would find for him a place of prosperity.

Source: Hsing-ju Wang. (1948) *The Miao People of Hainan Island*. Canton, China: Chu-hai University Press, 68.

as it progresses through the five elemental phases of earth, metal, water, wood, and fire. Each year has an elemental designation, as does each direction. Since each of these phases produces one of its fellows and is simultaneously destroyed by another, it is possible to avoid destructive *qi* by orienting dwellings or tombs toward productive directions according to one's year of birth. Practitioners of this technique became the Compass School.

Feng Shui in the West

Feng shui became accessible to the English-speaking world only at the end of the nineteenth century, when the British missionary Ernest Eitel published his landmark study of feng shui in 1873. But only in the last quarter of the twentieth century did the public at large discover this ancient system. One of the earliest proponents in the United States was Thomas Yun Lin, who founded a temple for American Black Sect Tantric Buddhism in 1986. His brand of feng shui dispensed with many of the traditional practices and relied on intuition and mystical knowledge. Subsequently every

major city in the United States attracted its own community of feng shui consultants, many of them trained by Lin or his school. There are now institutes of traditional feng shui—as opposed to the Black Sect variety—all over the Western world. Outside the United States, the practice of feng shui is most popular in England, Brazil, the Netherlands, and Australia.

Ironically, the practice of feng shui is no longer popular in China, where it was labeled a superstition and banned by the Communist Party; its practitioners there work mostly underground. The practice continues in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, however, and it is from there that feng shui has spread rapidly to the West.

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See also: **Five Phases**

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FERGANA VALLEY The Fergana (Farghona, Farghana) Valley, on the Syr Dar'ya River with an area of 22,000 square kilometers (8,494 square miles), is a fertile, densely populated irrigated valley in the south-eastern part of Central Asia. As a result of the Soviet demarcation (1924), the Fergana Valley is divided between three Central Asian states—Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The largest portion is in Uzbekistan.

The valley, which is 300 kilometers (186 miles) long and 170 kilometers (106 miles) wide, ranges from 330 to 1,000 meters above sea level. The Tian Shan and Pamir ranges enclose the valley on the north, east, and south. The valley is mainly accessible through the western Khudzhand Pass.

The Fergana Valley, as an important center of Central Asia, was first mentioned by Chinese sources in the fourth century BCE. The ancient Great Silk Road linking China with the Mediterranean crossed the valley and contributed substantially to the valley's prosperity. Islam was introduced in the eighth century. Starting from the late sixteenth century, the Fergana Valley was



part of Bukhara and Kokand khanates (principalities) until it was fully incorporated into Russia in 1876.

The Fergana Valley is irrigated by the Syr Dar'ya River, one of the two major Central Asia streams, and a wide network of canals. The major dams in the Fergana Valley are the Nurek dam (constructed in 1980), which at 300 meters is the tallest dam in the world; the Baypaza dam (1968); the Rogun dam (1983), all in Tajikistan; and the Toktagul dam (1974) in Kyrgyzstan.

The Fergana Valley is the most densely populated area in Central Asia. The average density in the central Andizhan Province of Uzbekistan is 465 inhabitants per square kilometer (1,203 per square mile). It is an important regional center of irrigated agriculture, silk production, and industry.


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FERTILITY Human fertility is the number of births contributed to a population. Historically, in Asia as a whole, the average levels of births and deaths have been relatively in balance and have been more significant than levels of migration; consequently, population growth has been slow.

Two measures based on annual births are sensitive to year-by-year changes. The first is the crude birthrate (CBR), usually calculated as annual births per thousand midyear population. In 1999 Asian crude birthrates ranged from nine in Hong Kong and ten in Japan to forty-three in Afghanistan and Oman. The second measure is the total fertility rate (TFR), the sum of the birthrates for each single age of women of reproductive age. When fertility is stable for decades, the TFR approximates completed fertility. Even when fertility is changing, the TFR provides a good index, and it also shows what completed fertility would be if the changes ceased. In 1999 Asian total fertility rates ranged from lows of 1.1 in Hong Kong, 1.3 in Georgia, and 1.4 in Japan and Taiwan to highs of 6.7 in Yemen and 7.1 in Oman. Most societies that have not attempted to control the number of births have recorded total fertility rates around six to seven, limited by early widowhood, sterility, and the cessation of sexual activity within marriage. Crude birthrates were rarely higher than forty-five. A total fertility rate of around 2.1 is considered population replacement. In the absence of immigration, sustained periods below this level lead to population decline, even with low mortality levels.



A woman with twin babies in Shanghai, China, in 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

TABLE 1

Total fertility rates, 1950–2000				
	1999 population (millions)	TFR immediately before decline	Period of TFR decline	1999 TFR
Asia	3,637	5.9	1970–1975	2.8
Subregions				
East Asia	1,481	5.7	1970–1975	.8
South Central Asia	1,451	6.1	1975–1980	3.6
Southeast Asia	520	6.1	1970–1975	2.7
West Asia	186	6.4	1970–1975	3.9
Largest countries				
China	1,254	6.1	1970–1975	1.8
India	987	6.0	1975–1980	3.0
Indonesia	212	5.7	1970–1975	2.5
Pakistan	147	7.0	1985–1990	4.9
Japan	127	5.7	1930–1935	1.4
Bangladesh	126	7.0	1985–1990	3.0
Vietnam	80	6.1	1980–1985	2.5
Philippines	75	7.3	1965–1970	3.5
Iran	66	7.3	1985–1990	2.9
Turkey	66	6.9	1960–1965	2.4
Myanmar (Burma)	48	6.0	1975–1980	2.7
South Korea	47	6.3	1965–1970	1.7

Note: East Asia includes China, Hong Kong, Japan, Macao, Mongolia, North Korea, and South Korea; South Central Asia includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; Southeast Asia includes Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam; and West Asia includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Gaza, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

SOURCE: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (1999: 408–839); Population Reference Bureau (1999); United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (1999).

The problems associated with land inheritance and food production during famines forced some agrarian societies to limit the number of children. Between 1500 and 1800, Western Europeans delayed or forwent marriage, and total fertility rates dropped to 5.5 or lower. Without lowering fertility, infanticide produced a similar effect in Japan, China, and northern India. In spite of these checks, economic growth during those centuries produced a considerable population increase in Japan and China, in the latter due to intensified cultivation and the migration of farmers to South China.

Fertility in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century

Table 1 shows the 1999 total fertility rates for Asia, its subregions as defined by the United Nations Population Division, and the area's twelve largest countries, which account for almost 90 percent of Asia's population. Demographers consider a fertility rate drop of 10 percent from a higher stable rate to be a fertility transition. In some countries fertility levels

rose immediately before the fertility transition because modernization brought a decline in widowhood, a shortened breast-feeding period, and possibly increased sexual activity.

Fertility transition in Japan began in the early 1930s, only to stall until after World War II. In the rest of Asia, population growth rates rose as mortality declined with unprecedented steepness, and many governments responded with national family planning programs, but there were no signs of fertility decline until the 1960s.

Fertility began to fall widely in Asia in the mid- to late 1960s following early signs of an incipient fall in Sri Lanka, Singapore, Turkey, and the Philippines in the late 1950s and in South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Thailand in the early 1960s. The beginning of fertility transition was delayed in Oman, Bhutan, Laos, and, among the larger countries, in Pakistan particularly.

At the end of the twentieth century, fertility in East Asia was below replacement level (TFR 2.1) except in Mongolia. In Southeast Asia fertility was below replacement in Singapore and Thailand; moderate (TFR 2.2–2.9) in Indonesia and Vietnam; moderately high (TFR 3.0–3.9) in Malaysia and the Philippines, where political and religious forces opposed fertility control; and very high in Cambodia and Laos, which were relatively underdeveloped. In South Asia fertility was moderate in Sri Lanka; moderately high in India, Bangladesh, and Iran; and very high elsewhere. In West Asia fertility was very high, except in Turkey, Lebanon, and Bahrain, where it was moderate. In the Asian states of the former Soviet Union fertility rose with the proportion of Muslims, from below replacement level in Armenia and Georgia to very high in Tajikistan, with the exception of Azerbaijan, which was 93 percent Muslim but had replacement-level fertility.

The Asian fertility decline of the late twentieth century was central to control of the global population explosion. Between 1995 and 2000 worldwide births numbered only three-fifths of the births that could have been expected if the fertility levels of 1955 to 1960 had continued. Asia was responsible for 70 percent of the birth decline, and three Asian countries—China, India, and Indonesia—were responsible for 50 percent of the decline.

The Causes of the Asian Fertility Decline

Underlying the Asian fertility decline were profound economic, demographic, and social changes, including rising per capita income, declining mortality, increasing urbanization and nonfarm employment, and dramatically rising educational and literacy levels. As a consequence the average age of female marriage

rose at least two years. While a minor factor in the fertility transitions of most areas, the delay in female marriage, to almost twenty-five years of age by 1981, was largely responsible for the beginning of the fertility transition in Sri Lanka.

The decrease in marital fertility was the major factor in the fertility decline in Asia, the only continent where nearly all fertility occurs within marriage. The decline likely was hastened by national family-planning programs. First initiated in India in 1952, these programs were confined largely to the Asian continent. Combining free or inexpensive access to contraception with information and moral suasion to control family size, they were most effective in Turkey and the arc of countries from South Asia to East Asia, where Brahman, Confucian, military, and communist elites encouraged family planning amid little social or religious opposition. Compared with elsewhere in the world, the resulting fertility declines began at lower per capita income levels and within lower levels of the Human Development Index, a measure of income, literacy, and mortality devised by the United Nations Development Program. The relative importance of socioeconomic changes and family planning programs in lowering fertility have been debated, especially with regard to Bangladesh.

Several individual national experiences are notable. China in the 1970s and India during the emergency of 1975–1977 showed that people could be coerced into adopting fertility control, while Indonesia successfully employed subtler pressures during that period. China reduced its TFR by over two-thirds in twenty-five years, from 6.1 in the late 1960s to 1.9 in the early 1990s. A comprehensive family planning program begun in Bangladesh in the late 1970s halved fertility in two decades. Iran, which experienced a TFR of almost seven after its 1979 revolution, began to facilitate family planning in the 1990s and subsequently halved its fertility level during that decade. Political and religious opposition at times slowed the fertility decline in the Philippines and reversed the decline among the Malay population of Malaysia. A diverse range of contraceptive methods, including sterilization, the intrauterine device (IUD), the birth-control pill, the condom, and traditional methods such as withdrawal and rhythm, effected the Asian fertility declines. Abortion, both legal and illegal, also became more widespread.

United Nations Projections

The United Nations medium-range population projections show Asia reaching the long-term fertility replacement level (TFR 2.1) around 2020 and slow population growth (under 0.5 percent per annum) in

2035. The long-range population projections suggest the Asian population will be stationary, that is, with fertility and mortality equal (TFR 2.1 or a little lower), by 2150, amounting to 6.1 billion people out of a world population of 10.8 billion people. Accordingly, Asia's population would constitute 56 percent of the world's population, a reduction from 61 percent at the end of the twentieth century.

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FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 1927 The financial crisis of 1927 in Japan was characterized primarily by a large-scale collapse of banks, both large and small, that resulted in greater financial control of the economy by the biggest banks, which took over the assets of bankrupt firms. The crisis originated in the latter stages of World War I, when companies had to decide whether to reduce commitments in view of an expected slowdown after the war or to expand investments to exploit an anticipated postwar recovery. Many Japanese companies chose the latter option, fueling their expansion with credit. When Japan's stock market crashed in March 1920, the superstructure of this expansion collapsed. Furthermore, now debt-ridden companies lacked the competitive power to engineer a recovery. Their prices had risen more rapidly during the war than those of their Western competitors but had declined more slowly after it due to the

underdeveloped state of Japan's technology and the higher costs faced by Japanese companies seeking to manufacture comparable products.

Initial government countermeasures were undermined by the massive Tokyo earthquake of 1923. The financial aftershock of the earthquake created an insurance crisis and greatly expanded the debt held by banks that took out loans to invest in the stock market and in industrial enterprises during the short-term boom after World War I. The government sought to ameliorate the situation with "earthquake bills," a second round of special credit. A key institutional feature of Japanese finance in this era was the "organ bank." Many banks had lent so much to related industrial firms whose fortunes were so precarious that cutting off credit would bankrupt both the firms and the banks. The largest such linkage, and the one that resulted in the biggest disaster, was between the Bank of Taiwan (which was a Japanese bank), and Suzuki Trading Company. In late March and early April 1927, the Finance Ministry warned the Bank of Taiwan to cut back on its loans to Suzuki. Mitsui Bank then called in some of its loans to the Bank of Taiwan, precipitating the closure of both Suzuki and the Bank of Taiwan, with the latter subsequently being reorganized. As a result of this crisis and the consequent short bank moratorium, many banks and the industrial firms that they had financed went bankrupt. Their assets were then acquired by the large *zaibatsu* (family-owned financial and industrial groups). With their consequent broader control over the banking sector, the top five banks increased their share of national deposits from 24 percent in 1926 to 40 percent in 1930.

The 1927 financial crisis can be placed within the larger patterns of Japan's modern history. At least through the 1980s Japan was credited with dealing exceptionally successfully with economic crises. A frequently cited example is its response to the energy crisis of the 1970s. That, however, was primarily a crisis of inflation. By contrast, the era immediately preceding the 1927 crisis was one of wealth (produced by the wartime boom) and deflation (meaning the decline in prices after the war). There is a striking similarity between that crisis and the prolonged financial crisis beginning in 1990. The latter manifested a similar sequence of boom (generated by inflated asset prices in real estate and stocks) and deflation (the bursting of the financial bubble followed by long-term price decline). This comparison suggests that in the twentieth century Japan has been singularly inept at handling problems of wealth and deflation.

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FINE ARTS—CENTRAL ASIA The art of Central Asia has always been the consequence of the contacts of local cultures with neighboring great civilizations. Being at the crossroads of the Persian, Hellenic, Indian, Arabic, Mongol, and Turkic worlds and later influenced by European culture, Central Asia was a melting pot of aesthetic systems, producing local schools that are interesting for more than their own aesthetic discoveries. The interaction of Hellenistic and Buddhist or Persian and Turkic elements, and the later meeting of West and East, brought about unprecedented intercultural penetration.

Prehistory to Middle Ages

The first artifacts known from Central Asia are rock paintings (showing the hunting scenes and magic symbols characteristic of prehistoric cultures) such as those of Zaraut-Sai, Uzbekistan, dating from the Mesolithic period (eleventh–sixth millennia BCE). The Neolithic period and the early Bronze Age (sixth–third millennia BCE) are represented by ornamental paintings preserved in the ruins at Iassydepe, Anau, in Turkmenistan. During the Bronze Age, when two types of civilization (sedentary-agricultural and nomadic-stockbreeding) existed in the region, two trends of artistic metal treatment were defined. The first, connected with early town culture, presented figures of oriental mythology in a local style. The second, the so-called animal style involving the symbolic depiction of animals, originated with the Sako-Scythian nomadic tribes of northern Central Asia. Prior to its conquest by Alexander of Macedon, this region belonged to the Achaemenid empire (559–330 BCE). Little is known of Achaemenid art in Central Asia apart from the scarce artifacts of the so-called Amu Dar'ya hoard, some animal-style artifacts, and a few preserved architectural structures (Kyzyltepa and Kutlugtepe, Uzbekistan). Historians accompanying the campaign of Alexander left accounts of numerous images of epic personages displayed in the homes of the people of Sogdiana (now in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan).

The Greek conquest (330–328 BCE) opened a new and important period in Central Asian art history. According to Galina A. Pugachenkova, this period was initially characterized by the rapid Hellenization of the art of Bactria (the region between the Hindu Kush mountains and the Amu Dar'ya river) between 323 and 140 BCE, evident in temple paintings of the Dioscuri found in Dilberdzhin north of Afghanistan and in the development of Hellenistic sculpture in North Bactria (Ai Khanum, Afghanistan). Between 100 BCE and 100 CE, a diversified Bactrianization of Hellenism took place (seen in artifacts from Dilberdzhin, Afghanistan, and Khalchayan, Uzbekistan). Sculpture of this period was especially distinctive in its synthesis of Greek masterpieces and its tendency to psychological expression in the depiction of local ethnic personages. Similar processes took place in neighboring Parthia (now northeastern Iran), where the Greek style was interpreted on the basis of Persian-Parthian traditions, evident in the statue *Rogoduna* and drinking vessels from Nisa (Turkmenistan, 200 BCE). A final phase known as the Kushanization of Bactrinism (100–300 CE) began with the rise of the Kushan empire (30–370 CE) and was characterized by the interaction of antique and Buddhist elements with local traditions (for example, the sculpture, painting, and architecture of Dalverzintepe, Fayaztepe, and Afrasiab in Uzbekistan).

The early medieval period (500–722 CE) was the height of mural painting of the Sogdian school, whose best-known frescoes are the Red Hall in Varakhsha Palace, Uzbekistan, and the so-called *Procession of Ambassadors* in Afrasiab, Uzbekistan, and especially the frescoes in Pedjikent, Tajikistan. These were characterized not only by an original graphic style that defined oriental miniature painting for several centuries but also by the depiction of figures from Central Asian folklore, later represented in the poetry of Firdawsi (c. 935–c. 1020).

The Arab invasion (late 700s–800 CE) prohibited the creation of sculpture and considerably limited the development of representational painting because of Islamic prohibitions. Visual art was mostly ornamental, and architecture became the dominant art form. Inventive bricklaying was the primary means of expression in the pre-Mongol period. The most interesting buildings in Bukhara are the mausoleum of Ismail Samani (Samanid era, 864–999) and the Kalyan minaret (Karakhanid era, twelfth century); in Merv, the mausoleum of Sultan Sanjar (Seljuk era, 1038–1157) is prominent. During the first half of the thirteenth century, the development of Bukhara and Khorezm as artistic centers was halted by the Mongol invasion (1220).



Much of the fine arts of Central Asia shows an Islamic influence. This tile mosaic of a vase with flowers is from a mosque in Kazakhstan. (BUDDY MAYS/CORBIS)

The high point of the art of Central Asia was reached in the epoch of the Timurids (fourteenth–fifteenth centuries). Historical documents reveal that fresco painting was revived, and architecture, miniature painting, decorative applied arts, and calligraphy all achieved a unity and harmony that have led some scholars to speak of a Timurid Renaissance. The highest achievements in architecture were created in Samarqand, center of the Timurid empire: the Bibi-khanum mosque, the memorial complex Shakh-Zindah, Gur-Emir (Timur's mausoleum), and the *madrasah* observatory of Ulugh Beg. Significant structures were also built in Turkistan (the mausoleum of Khoja Ahnaf Yassavi) and in Shakhriyab (Ak-Sarai, the palace of Timur). Miniature painting was highly developed in Samarqand and especially in Herat, where the renowned schools of Kamal al-Din Behzad (1455?–1536?) and the calligrapher Sultan-Ali Mashhadi (1442–1520) flourished during the reign of Sultan

Hussein (1438–1506). Miniature painting now took many forms: genre painting, portraiture, painted chronicles, and the lyric genre.

Another considerable phase in the development of medieval culture in Central Asia began in the era of the Shaybanid dynasty (sixteenth century) as the center of artistic life gradually shifted to Bukhara. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were the height of miniature painting and architecture in Bukhara and Samarqand, where Tajik and Uzbek artistic interaction took place, generating new schools of art and architecture. In this period, the main architectural monuments are Registan Square in Samarqand, the Kalyan mosque, and *madrasah* Abdulaziz Khan in Bukhara. With the nineteenth century a long period of stagnation in the art of this region began.

Modern Period

The modern phase of Central Asian art was initiated with the Russian colonization that began in the second half of the nineteenth century. Central Asia experienced three cultural interventions: European, Russian, and Soviet. Initial imitation of the Russian-European artistic tradition later gave way to transformation, which ultimately led to a regional reaction to Europeanization in the 1970s and 1980s. The art of Europeans resident in Central Asia developed alongside local art, and the two interacted with each other.

Colonial Period to 1917 Russian colonization triggered a wave of Orientalism in the art of Central Asia. This phenomenon was a consequence of the interest of Russian artists in the exoticism and ethnography of the East. Several Russian painters visited Russian Turkistan immediately after its colonization (1865), among them Vasilii Vereshchagin (1842–1904) and Nikolai Karazin (1842–1908), active participants in military campaigns who developed the principles of naturalism and interest in the ethnography of the region. Vereshchagin's works expressed a contradictory aspiration to justify the imperialistic ambitions of Russia and at the same time created symbolic images of the calamities of war (*Apotheosis of War*, 1870–1871). Other Russian artists, such as Rikhard Zommer (1866–1939), Sergei Iudin (1853–1933), Ivan Kazakov (1873–1935), and Lev Bure (1887–1943), adhered to the traditions of the late Wanderers (a Russian artistic group at the end of nineteenth century), painting landscapes and architectural studies. The Orientalism of Central Asia was defined by its descriptive nature and the tendency to cultural realism. In architecture, the colonial style was not aesthetically uniform. In the Caspian region the so-called Russian style predominated,

whereas a provincial modernism predominated in Tashkent and Quqon. Colonial urbanism differed markedly from the traditional dwellings, and traditional and European artistic cultures coexisted in relative independence.

Soviet Period, 1917–1991 The Russian Revolution was both a social and a cultural event with grave consequences for life in Central Asia as an ideologically indifferent czarism gave way to a Communist ideology envisioning radical social reconstruction. The East became one of the main regions of revolutionary transformation in which Soviet Central Asia was eventually divided from a larger cultural and geographical region called the Central East.

After new states came into existence in Central Asia following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, there were persisting discussions on the significance of the Soviet period in their history. According to popular opinion, characteristic of the official institutions of the new states, the local elite managed to return to the ethnicity-oriented path around the 1970s, and Sovietization did not stop but merely delayed the development of local ethnic cultures; its consequences were predicted to be quickly overcome when independence was achieved. However, the Sovietization of Central Asia meant the radical Europeanization of the local elite's consciousness, and it cannot be overcome by the surface changes in political ideologies. The twentieth-century art of Central Asia has been the arena of broad interaction of European and Asian spiritual paradigms.

Artistic institutions of a European cast emerged in Central Asia from the 1920s through the 1950s. Local institutions were founded to train artists, professional theater groups, philharmonic societies, and researchers in traditional and modern art. Two opposite tendencies followed: the Orientalization of the Russian avant-garde and the Europeanization of Central Asian thought and education. The most significant phenomenon of that period was the development of a moderate Central Asian avant-garde, represented by Ruvim (Il'ya) Mazel (1890–1967), Aleksandr Nikolaev (1897–1957), and Aleksandr Volkov (1886–1957), almost all connected with key members of the Russian avant-garde.

Developing in two principal directions, the Central Asian avant-garde sought to apply to Central Asian material the artistic principles of modern Russian European art (constructivism, decorativism, and primitivism), a trend seen in painters such as Volkov (*Pomegranate Tea-room*, 1925) and the photographer Max Penson. They also sought a synthesis of oriental

painting (mostly miniatures) with the broader European tradition (the Russian icon, the Italian Renaissance, and the twentieth-century European avant-garde), as seen in *Friendship, Love, Eternity* (1929) by Nikolaev (also known as Usto-Mumin).

During the 1920s various artistic groups appeared: the shock school of Eastern art (under Ruvim Mazel and Aleksandr Vladychuk, 1920–1926) was founded in present-day Turkmenistan; a local affiliate of the Association of Revolutionary Russian Artists opened in Turkistan in 1922 and has functioned ever since; and the group called Masters of the New East (Volkov, Nikolaev, Mikhail Kurzin, Vera Markova, Semen Malt, and others) was founded in 1929.

In the critical period of Stalinization (late 1920s through early 1930s), some members of the Central Asian avant-garde turned to new subjects and independently cultivated a style close to the Mexican muralists around Diego Rivera (Volkov, Nikolai Karakhan, and others), whereas others turned to the more stereotypical forms of socialist realism. Numerous members of the avant-garde were persecuted during the Stalinist repression of the 1930s (Kurzin, Nikolaev, and others). At the same time, an official aesthetic doctrine that emphasized the national character of art, promoting works that were ethnic in form and socialist in content, lent significance to folk art. Orientalism could now develop within Socialist realism, and Chingiz Akhmarov cultivated the principles of oriental miniature in monumental paintings from the end of the 1940s.

Constructivist ideas were popular in the architecture of Central Asia of the 1920s and 1930s. New building types were seen in such structures as communal housing. The most significant constructivist structures were government buildings by Moisei Ginzburg (1929) in Alma-Ata (present-day Almaty in Kazakhstan) and by Stepan Polupanov (1931) in Tashkent (the capital of present-day Uzbekistan). When criticized in the mid-1930s for using "bourgeois" and "anti-popular" styles, constructivist architects attempted a synthesis of Stalinist classicism and traditional architecture, chiefly expressed in opera and ballet theaters in Alma-Ata (by Nikolai Prostakov, 1941) and Tashkent (by Alexei Shchusev, 1947), in which buildings were decorated by masters of applied folk art.

The period from the 1960s to the 1980s was characterized by an open confrontation between Europeanism and an aspiration toward ethnic identity. During the 1960s, a European openness prevailed in the so-called strict style in painting and in a post-impressionist style in portraiture and still life (Iurii

Taldykin and Grigorii Zilberman in Uzbekistan; Salikhitdin Aitbaev and Tokbulat Tugusbaev in Kazakhstan; A. T. Amindzhanov, A. Ahunov, V. Boborykin, and K. Zhumagazin in Tajikistan; Chary Amangeldyev, S. Akmuhamedov, S. Babikov, and D. Bairamov in Turkmenistan; and Myrza Omorkulov and Altymysh Usumbaliev in Kyrgyzstan). A new specifically Central Asian international style evolved in architecture (the Public Library in Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan, by Abdula Ahmedov, 1961–1975; the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee Building and Panoramic Cinema in Tashkent by Sergo Sutiagin, Vladimir Berezin, Dmitrii Shuvaev, and others, 1964). Urban planning showed the influence of European principles, such as the garden city utopia (Navoi, Uzbekistan, 1970; downtown Tashkent, 1966). By the end of the 1960s, however, artists increasingly rejected cosmopolitan doctrines and sought new artistic means among local traditions.

In the 1970s, a search for local specificity prevailed, giving rise to a national romanticism in which artists adapted motifs from ancient and medieval Central Asian art (an influence of active archaeological excavations) to the present. Thus the *pandzhara*, an added sunshade, which was a modernization of the traditional geometrical ornamental lattices, became popular in architecture. Ceramic art was the most developed of the decorative arts and appeared not only in walls but also sculpturally in urban architecture. Painting and sculpture interpreted and used numerous sources: European Orientalist paintings of the early twentieth century, local oriental material, and the adoption of "ethnic" motifs from the Central Asian avant-garde of the 1920s. The influence of Latin American art was also evident.

Postmodernism was the prevailing style of the 1980s and 1990s. The 1980s witnessed the disintegration of official Soviet art and was the first period since the 1920s in which new artistic ideas were spontaneously formed. Postmodernism had two branches: that of the Central Asian Europeans, who turned mostly toward Western art, and that of the ethnic modernists, who turned to traditional art, local folklore, and the mythology of Islam, Buddhism, and Zoroastrianism. The two branches interacted, but whereas the Europeans situated their work in the context of modern and past (Asian) cultures, the traditionalists developed an individual style in which tradition was reflected. Painting dominated over other visual arts, and Central Asian art became known abroad through the work of Maksim Vardanian, Daima Rakhmanbekova, and Gairat Baimatov. Notably, the leaders of European art in Central Asia, after leaving Asia, became new Orientalists (Maksim

Vardanian, Konstantin Titov), whereas former leaders of the traditional movement of the 1980s, after leaving Central Asia in the 1990s, refused to use "oriental" motifs in their work and became "international" artists (Abduhakim Turdyev, Fayzula Shakirov). Thus the cultural preferences of both groups were polyvalent and could be converted reciprocally in other circumstances—one consequence of Europeanization.

Modern Period, 1991 to Present The independence of the Central Asian republics has had an ambivalent influence on the development of art in the region. The developing art market has been a positive consequence and has led to the secularization of artistic life and the formation of local art schools. At the same time, state regulation of art has intensified. In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, new official art has returned to the socialist realism of the 1940s and 1950s. By the end of the 1990s, many European artists had left the region, along with some local artists who founded small Central Asian art communities in Russia, Europe, and the United States. The architecture of this period has a clearly expressed Western character, whereas buildings that tried for an Oriental feel have a kitsch quality (Timur Museum, Tashkent, mid-1990s). The number of genres and types of art practiced in Central Asia has diminished, but some maintain the level apparent at the end of the 1980s.

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FIRDAWSI. See **Shahnameh Epic.**

FISH-FIGHTING Thailand is notable for indigenous sports that involve nonhuman competition including cockfighting, kite-flying, and fish-fighting. Fish-fighting is now a mainly rural sport, as it is banned in Bangkok. It involves placing two male Thai or Siamese fighting fish (*Betta splendens*) in a bottle and watching them tear at each other with their mouths until one dies or is severely injured. The spectators, including the owners of the fish, bet on the outcome throughout the match. *Betta*, which are native to Thai canals, are raised and bred by their owners to be ferocious fighters and those who win a match but are injured will be nursed back to health to fight again. Only males, generally no more than 5 centimeters long and 1 centimeter across, are used for fighting. It takes about six or seven months to raise a fish for fighting. Part of the appeal of the sport is the fighting and gambling and another is the bright colors of the *Betta*, one of the most popular tropical fish among fish enthusiasts around the world.

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FISHING INDUSTRY—CHINA The Chinese fishing industry has led world production since 1989. It produces primarily for domestic consumption and helps to absorb surplus labor in rural areas. It is divided into four sectors: marine fishing, mariculture, freshwater fishing, and freshwater culture.

The Traditional Fishing Industry

The Chinese have practiced fish culture for over 3,000 years; the first pisciculture manual, by Fan Li, dates from around 475 BCE. Polyculture (the raising of multiple species) was introduced in the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), when the consumption of common carp was forbidden because its name (*li*) had the same sound as the surname of the imperial family. Farmers responded by moving from monoculture based on common carp to polyculture. Compared to intensive monocultural systems with reliance on carnivorous fish species practiced today in developed countries, polyculture not only requires much less labor but also releases much less waste and is much more efficient in the conversion of biological energy. Up to nine different species of fish (primarily herbivores), each feeding on different resources, are spawned in the artificial and balanced ecosystem of a fishpond.

A distinctive method for pond fishing, integrated culture, was developed in the Pearl River delta in South China around 1400. In a complex dike-pond ecosystem, crops such as mulberry, sugarcane, fruits, and rapeseed are grown on the dike banks. These crops are used for fish feed in the ponds, and the fishes' waste in turn is used to fertilize the plants on the dikes.

The practice of paddy fish farming, first documented in the third century CE, probably evolved from the catching of wild fish in ponds that had been dug in the rice fields for water storage, irrigation, and water control. The most productive species, which can help to control rice weeds and harmful insects as well as provide fertilizer for rice fields, are selected for breeding.

The Modern Fishing Industry

Fisheries took off after the onset of economic reform in 1978. The government gave households greater freedom in managing aquaculture production, deregulated purchase and sales prices in 1985, and provided support through research and extension. Fisheries production rose rapidly: total aquatic production expanded more than eightfold between 1978 and 1998, from 4.7 million to 39.1 million metric tons. Fisheries' share of gross output value of primary food industries in China has risen from 1.6 percent in 1978 to 9.9 percent in 1998.

Marine capture fisheries dominated production until the 1980s, when the government focused on the development of aquaculture in response to the depletion of many major marine fishery resources. In 1978, the share of capture production was 73.9 percent of total aquatic production, but that share declined steadily

thereafter even as total quantity continued to grow. By 1993, aquaculture contributed over 50 percent of total fish production. China became the first major fisheries country with aquacultural production exceeding wild fishing.

Marine fishing has expanded in recent years primarily through the increase in number of motorized vessels, from around 50,000 to 274,000 vessels between 1980 and 1995. China fields over 1,600 ocean-going fishing vessels. The government has supported capture fisheries production through an extensive program of fishing vessel building, modernizing, and purchasing from abroad.

Mariculture, or marine culture in intertidal zones, small bays, and shallow seas, accounted for a negligible 5.8 percent of total catches in 1970. But production increased almost twenty times between 1978 and 1998, from 0.45 to 8.6 million metric tons. Seaweed, fish, crustaceans (especially prawns), and mollusks (particularly scallops) are its major products. Mariculture has benefited recently from the application of the principle of integrated culture. For example, some species of mollusks may be bred in prawn ponds or along with cultivated seaweed.

Varieties of carp continue to be the most important component of freshwater culture. Recently, however, over twenty foreign species, most notably the Nile tilapia, have been introduced into Chinese fish culture. Since the 1950s fish culture has spread from the original core areas of the Chang (Yangtze) and Pearl River deltas to virtually all provinces, and even lakes and reservoirs in remote regions and paddy fields in mountainous areas have been increasingly exploited. Nonetheless, output in freshwater fish culture has expanded primarily through the improvement and popularization of modern and traditional technologies rather than by enlarging the area under cultivation.

Before 1960, fish culture depended on fry (immature fish) originating from the natural reproduction of wild stock. The availability of fry increased greatly with the successful development from 1958 to 1960 of techniques for hormonally induced spawning of the four common species of carp. Subsequently, artificial propagation techniques, including induced breeding and hatching and larval breeding, were further developed and introduced for additional varieties of fish. The expansion of fry production by artificial propagation was especially rapid after 1978. By the 1990s most counties had at least one fingerling (fish up to a year in age) farm to supply local fish farmers, many of whom also reared fingerlings in their ponds and rice paddies.

After a period of rapid growth, the industry has encountered serious resource constraints. Already by 1990 average yields (per units of effort) in capture fisheries had dropped to less than 50 percent of 1950s levels. Some traditional species have been overexploited, and increasingly harvests shifted towards juvenile fish and lower-value species. Uncontrolled industrial effluent and domestic discharge have contaminated many lakes, rivers, and coastal areas. Red tides—massive concentrations of microscopic algae that flower and multiply rapidly—have caused serious losses in maricultural production along the South China coast.

The government first formulated a sustainable development strategy for its marine program in 1996. The revised Marine Environmental Protection Law of 2000 seeks to curb marine pollution and to conserve marine resources. Amendments to the 1986 Fishery Law promulgated in 2000 regulate the number of fishing permits and quantity of fish and strive to protect China's rights in its exclusive economic zones while maintaining stable relations with neighboring countries.

Competition over fishing rights and claims to territorial waters and associated marine resources had become a serious security issue in the western Pacific by the 1990s. China's Territorial Sea Law of 1996 claims sovereignty over islands and reefs also claimed by other countries. However, China also ratified the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1996 and signed bilateral fisheries agreements with Japan and South Korea in 2000.

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FISHING INDUSTRY—JAPAN Japan's fishing industry is divided into four types: coastal fishing, distant-water fishing, aquaculture, and recreational fishing. Coastal fishing of various species has continued since the country's premodern era, whereas distant-water fishing beyond its present exclusive economic zones (EEZ) started around the 1920s and increased dramatically during the food shortage of the immediate post-World War II period. Aquaculture has long been another feature of the Japanese fishing

industry, the oldest form being the farming of seaweed. Japan's recreational fishing industry is probably the largest in volume of sales and most diverse in the world, including everything from charter boat businesses and equipment and bait production and sales, to various fee-based fishing park operations.

The coastal fishing sector has been characterized mainly by small-scale independent boat owners organized into township fishery cooperatives that collectively deal with wholesale fish dealers. Japan's coastal fishing has suffered since the 1970s from both depletion of resources and the lack of successors. In recent years, the removal of trade barriers on fishery products and the reduction of government subsidies to the fishing industry have also forced coastal fishermen to change careers. Japanese trading companies and supermarket chains have bypassed the wholesale dealers, thereby increasingly challenging the hierarchically organized domestic fish distribution networks of the cooperatives.

Since the late 1970s, distant-water fishing has experienced the twin blows of unilateral proclamations by many coastal states of 200-nautical mile fishery zones and the adoption of the EEZ concept in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982. Coastal states' extended control over fishery resources in adjacent seas reduced Japan's free access to distant-water fish stocks.

UNCLOS also laid the legal foundations for the management of anadromous species (species that travel between fresh water and sea, such as salmon). Jurisdiction for the management of such species was given to the coastal states in whose rivers such species originated. Japan's offshore salmon fishing ceased as negotiations with the then Soviet Union failed. Highly migratory species (such as tuna) were placed under joint management by coastal states, which resulted in the imposition of international catch quotas and regulations on tuna fishing practices. Japan is a member of all such international tuna management bodies. According to the *GGT Newsletter* of 25 March 1999, the number of Japanese tuna boats declined from about 1150 in 1980 to 661 in 1997.

Japan's major fishing companies have transformed themselves into trading companies dealing in fishery products and have invested in the fishing industries of other countries. The high costs of operating Japan-based ships contributed to this trend. Retired tuna boats have been sold to owners in other countries, who in turn have registered their boats in countries such as Taiwan and Korea that do not belong to the international management bodies. The "flag-of-convenience"



Two sea bass fishing boats in Tokyo Bay in 1994. (MICHAEL S. YAMASHITA/CORBIS)

fishing operations by these boat owners continue to supply tuna to the Japanese market through the trading companies. Japan's Fishery Agency and the Fishery Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs consider access to distant-water fishery resources a matter of national security, and work jointly to defend the sustainable use of fishery resources in international waters against both unmanaged "pirate" fishing and dogmatic conservationists.

The declining coastal fishing industry is being replaced by aquaculture. Japan has a long history of aquaculture, from the farming of seaweed, pearl, and carp to more modern fish farming of yellowtail, snapper, jack mackerel, flat fish, and eel. In addition, coastal waters have been stocked with farm-raised juvenile snapper, flat fish, crayfish, abalone, and other species, to be later harvested. This has created conflicts between professional and recreational fishermen, the latter being accused of stealing and free riding. The aquaculture industry has suffered from the growth of toxic planktons and algae caused by nutrient-rich household wastewater. The industry has also been accused of destroying reef ecosystems with organic wastes from fish feed. Consumers are increasingly alarmed by the industry's use of antibiotics in fish feed.

The recreational fishing industry is growing fast. While recreational fishing in general has been considered an activity for older males, several developments have gradually altered this perception. American bass

fishing using artificial lures has become popular with a large number of younger Japanese, and increasing social independence and disposable income have contributed to the rising numbers of women in recreational fishing. Charter boat businesses provide exclusive charter, casual booking, and nonbooked individual services, targeting various species of fish. Operators of such businesses have joined environmentalists in opposing various land reclamation projects.

Japanese-made fishing equipment enjoys worldwide popularity. Computer-based high technology (using computer-assisted design techniques as well as microcomputers in fishing reels) and basic composite material are lavishly applied to reels and rods, and countless minor fishing devices have been patented.

Japan's fishing industry, like many other industries, is going through a major transformation to achieve higher added value. The era of fishing as a primary and commodity industry is passing, and the growing industrial aquaculture, manufacture of recreational fishing gear, and fishing-related services characterize the diversifying Japanese fishing industry.

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FISHING INDUSTRY—KOREA Korea is among the world's leading fishing countries (sixth in 1995 in terms of gross registered tonnage). Of the many varieties caught, the major ones by tonnage are squid, saury pike, Alaska pollack, shrimp, yellow corvina, sabre fish, mackerel, and anchovy.

Fishing was regarded as a plebeian business during the Yi (Choson) dynasty (1392–1910). Under the Japanese occupation, fishing in Korea started its modernization process, which was made possible by more modern ships, equipment, and technology. The industry was devastated by the Korean War (1950–1953) but has recovered rapidly. Over the long term, the rise in the catch has been closely matched by the tonnage of the fishing fleet, which increased from 262,079 tons in 1967 to 991,955 tons in 1999. During the 1990s the number of fishery workers dropped slightly, from 176,123 in 1995 to 170,590 in 1999, whereas the number of fishing vessels rose in the same period from 76,801 to 94,852. Nonmotorized vessels constituted only 6 percent of the total number in 1999. Of 535 Korean-registered deep-sea fishing vessels, approximately 65 percent were more than sixteen years old in 1999.

Increases in wages and reduced fishing territories created significant problems after the mid-1980s. For example, Korea's deep-sea catch reached a peak in the mid-1970s and then declined sharply due to rising fuel costs and the declaration of 200-mile economic sea zones by many nations. The total production has gone down considerably during the 1990s, from 3,348,184 metric tons in 1995 to 2,190,450 in 1999. Also contributing to this decline are the serious ecological problems affecting the coastal fishing industry and inland



THE SOCIAL ROLE OF FISHING

A major economic activity, fishing also plays a major role in the social interaction in Korean fishing communities. The account below shows how these social responsibilities can be more important than the economic issues.

Fish are an important medium of exchange in many social transactions within the village. "Gifts" of fish expressing the fulfillment of various obligations or an attempt to gain favors are frequent. Sokyp'o fishermen resort to considerable subterfuge in order to safeguard this traditional outlet for their catch from the demands of buyers. On four occasions I spent the entire day out fishing, each time on a different sailing junk. In three cases the boat owner put more than half of the choicest fish in a relatively inaccessible compartment on top of which lines and other heavy gear were piled as we approached the beach. Then when the buyer (or buyers) came scrambling aboard, the owner and crew, bewailing their small catch, showed them only the remainder of the fish that had actually been caught. Not until the dealers had been ferried off to the other shore were the rest brought out. Some were divided among the crew, and I was always given one. The rest was either distributed on the spot to villagers who had been alerted by some mysterious communications network that I never understood, or they were delivered by members of the boat owner's family directly to certain houses. Invariably the supply seemed insufficient to satisfy the demand.

Source: Vincent S. R. Brandt. (1971) *A Korean Village between Farm and Sea*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 63.

waters that Korea currently experiences as the result of land reclamation projects, industrial water effluents, and waste disposal. The ecosystem surrounding the Republic of Korea is very vulnerable to the coastal activities of adjacent nations. The primary sources of sea-based pollution of the marine environment are oil spills, aquaculture, and dredging. The decline mentioned above encompasses distant waters fisheries, adjacent waters fisheries, shallow-sea cultures, and especially inland waters fisheries. The production of aquaculture from inland waters, for example, dropped

from 20,365 metric tons in 1995 to 11,529 in 1999—that is to say, more than 40 percent. Korea's share in the world's commercial catches of fish, crustaceans, and mollusks dropped from 2.54 percent in 1993 to 2.07 percent in 1999.

The fishing industry remains an important source of revenue. Exports of fish and other seafood stayed stable in the 1990s, whereas imports went up sharply. To a great extent the future of the fishing industry depends upon Korea's success in negotiating fishing rights with other nations and improving processing methods.

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FISHING INDUSTRY—SOUTHEAST ASIA

Many Southeast Asian countries have extensive coastlines and river systems. Hence, commercial, local-market, and subsistence fishing have long been important economic activities. The region's total catch was estimated at nearly 86 million metric tons in the

1980s; Indonesia alone accounted for 2.8 percent of the world's total fish production, followed by Thailand (2.5 percent) and the Philippines (2.2 percent).

Southeast Asian waters are believed to be home to more different fish species than any other part of the world. Most of these live in shallow water, and because the coastlines in much of this region are fringed by wetlands, the fishing industry continues inland—in swamps, flooded rice fields and their canals, lakes, lagoons, and rivers. Until the 1960s, nearly three-quarters of Southeast Asian sea fishing was done at depths of less than 3 meters. Deepwater fish in Southeast Asia were only exploited commercially by Japanese trawlers; local fishermen were usually too poor to equip themselves for deepwater trips.

Among the most important commercial fish are anchovy, shrimp, and tuna. The primary tuna fishing grounds are found in the Pacific Ocean east of the Philippines and north of the eastern islands of Indonesia; anchovy fishing grounds are primarily found in the Celebes Sea; shrimp fishing grounds are in the shallow waters of the South China Sea extending into the Gulf of Thailand. In common with fisheries elsewhere, overexploitation is the greatest threat to commercial fisheries in the region. Such overfishing is particularly serious in the Gulf of Thailand and off the coast of peninsular Malaysia.



Fishing boats docked in a lagoon beside the small fishing village of Kuala Paka, Malaysia. (ECOSCENE/CORBIS)

TABLE 1

Marine and freshwater catches and aquaculture						
(in metric tons)						
Country	Average Annual Marine Catch	Average Annual Freshwater Catch	Average Annual Aquaculture 1993–1995			
	1993–1995	1993–1995	Freshwater Fishes	Diadromous Fishes	Marine Fishes	Mollusks and Crustaceans
Indonesia	3,277.5	611.5	292,635	161,268	9,273	139,936
Cambodia	31.8	76.4	7,940	-	-	597
Malaysia	1,164.6	16.1	14,468	5,970	3,111	93,812
Myanmar	610.6	220.7	70,987	-	-	7
Philippines	1,961.9	305.3	95,931	147,934	1,283	127,670
Singapore	13	-	22	239	315	2,203
Thailand	3,081.8	332.5	138,224	3,128	1,080	335,820
Vietnam	362.4	287.6	141,667	-	-	58,300

SOURCE: World Resources Institute (1998): 314–315.

Subsistence fishing is carried out in coastal waters and rivers. It is estimated that 3 million people fish for a living, although that number may be on the conservative side. Much of this catch finds its way to local village markets.

Commercial aquaculture in Southeast Asia has so far been limited, mainly for economic reasons. Such commercial aquaculture has been focused mostly on shrimp ponds and prawn farms in Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and, increasingly, in Vietnam. (See Table 1.) These produce mostly for export to cities, as well as to countries such as the United States and Japan. Southeast Asian countries, however, are far behind industrialized countries in their output for world markets.

A traditional form of aquaculture is still practiced in conjunction with wet rice cultivation in Java, Bali, Thailand, and Vietnam: rice farmers set aside a deep-water area for raising fish, or introduce fish, such as paddy eel, directly into the wet fields. Due to the Green Revolution, when it became common to plant high-yield varieties of rice that required the increased use of pesticides, it became very difficult to continue these traditional aquacultural practices, as the pesticides harmed the fish. In addition, many believe that the heavy exploitation of coastal areas for tourism and the development of other industries is contributing to declining fishing yields and major environmental problems. Both may have a major impact on aquaculture as well as on the region's marine fisheries.

Regional Survey

In Vietnam, investment by the state in the fisheries sector increased fivefold between 1996 and 2000, with additional plans to convert 300,000 hectares of rice

fields into aquaculture breeding farms in an attempt to earn \$3 billion in seafood export revenue over the next four years. This implies a yearly catch of 1.4 million tons, while fish farm stocks could reach 1.5 million tons.

Due to ongoing deforestation in Cambodia, the water quality of Tonle Sap (Cambodia's largest lake) and rivers in some provinces has been affected, and many fish species have been threatened with extinction. Other species are faced with degraded habitats that no longer support spawning and reproduction. This means the potential for fishing is declining in Cambodia.

Commercial fishing in Myanmar is small in scale and takes place in major rivers, as well as off the long Arakan and Tenasserim coasts. Much of the total catch, which amounts to nearly 389 million kilograms a year, is provided by part-time fishermen. Traps are commonly used in standing water and rivers. Farm families may also supplement their diets by fishing with nets or hooks and lines. In 1990, the total catch was 743,818 metric tons, which made Myanmar the twenty-third most productive fishing nation in the world. The catch suggests a per-capita annual consumption of about 17 kilograms, slightly more than in the United States, although a large proportion of this is in the form of a fish paste taken with rice.

As is the case in most Southeast Asian countries, in Indonesia fish remains the single most important source of animal protein. Nearly 75 percent of the catch is taken from marine fisheries off the western coast of Sumatra, the northern coast of Java, and the southern coasts of Kalimantan and Sulawesi, Bali, Nusa Tenggara, the Moluccas, and Irian Jaya. Inland fisheries, however, employ more people. More than 1

million families engage in inland fishing, while fewer than 500,000 families engage in marine fishing. Inland fisheries in Indonesia include open-water fishing in lakes and rivers, as well as the aquacultural cultivation of fish, shrimp, and prawns in freshwater ponds (*kolam*) and bamboo cages placed in streams and rice fields, brackish coastal ponds (*tabak*), and paddy fields. In 1989, Java contributed 44 percent of inland tonnage and 23 percent of marine tonnage. Overfishing in marine waters and a decline in the rate of fish production were sufficiently alarming to lead to a presidential decree banning trawling in marine waters.

Fishing accounts for 5 percent of the gross national product of the Philippine economy and supplies 60 percent of the animal protein in the Filipino diet. The Philippine archipelago has long been known for the availability of a wide variety of fish. Two million metric tons were caught in 1989; of this, inland fishing accounted for about a half million metric tons, and marine fishing the rest. More than half the catch came from subsistence fishing; one-third came from commercial fish ponds. Although production has been steadily increasing over the years, the industry has not been able to cope with the growing demand in the Philippines and the rest of Southeast Asia. Export revenue, mainly from shrimp, tuna, and dried seaweed, amounted to nearly \$500 million in 1990 alone.

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FIVE CLASSICS The Five Classics (Wujing) were lengthy collections of prose and poetry that formed the core of the Chinese Confucian canon from the

Western Han dynasty (206 BCE–6 CE) through the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279), when another collection, the Four Books, began to gain prominence through the influence of Neo-Confucianism. The Five Classics were the following: *Shijing* (Book of Songs; also called Classic of Poetry or Book of Odes), the *Shujing* (Book of Documents), the *Li* (Rites), the *Yijing* (Book of Changes, often known in English under its Wade-Giles romanization: *I-ching*), and the *Chunqiu* (Spring and Autumn Annals). A sixth, the *Yue* (Music), is no longer extant.

Although literate elites in China and elsewhere celebrated the Five Classics as primary expressions of Confucian thought, each of the classics had roots in traditions and practices far older than the era of Confucius (551–479 BCE) himself. The *Shijing* is made up of 305 verse texts of varying length, the earliest dating from the tenth century BCE and the latest from the sixth. Contents range from sacrificial hymns to folk songs. The *Shujing* purported to record key speeches of sage rulers; the earliest chapters dated to the tenth century BCE, and the latest were fourth-century CE forgeries. The *Li*, as codified in three distinct texts (the *Liji* [Record of Rites], the *Yili* [Ceremonies and Rites], and the *Zhouli* [Rites of Zhou]), detailed ritual prescriptions for a range of public events, from governmental entertainments to funerals and mourning, and defended the role of ritual propriety as a tool of social control. The *Yijing*, originally a divination manual constructed around sixty-four hexagrams and associated early Zhou mantic texts, came to include much cosmological and political philosophy in the form of commentaries. The *Chunqiu*, a terse chronicle of the years 722 to 479 BCE, was accompanied by three commentaries containing more extensive historical and exegetical material: the Zuo commentary (*Zuozhuan*) and the commentaries of the Gongyang and Guliang schools (*Gongyangzhuan*, *Guliangzhuan*).

By 136 BCE, when Han Emperor Wu (reigned 141–87 BCE) elevated the five works by appointing official teachers for them at the capital, the texts were strongly associated with Confucius, who was believed to have had edited or written parts of each of them. The Five Classics's canonical status was cemented in later centuries by the frequent appearance of new commentaries and by the court's expectation that most prospective candidates for government office would be able to demonstrate a basic knowledge of the works in their essays for civil service examinations. Confucian courts in Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and elsewhere also promulgated the Five Classics as a basis for moral philosophy and political practice. In contemporary China, debate over the antiquity and importance of

the Five Classics continues to serve as an index of cultural continuity.

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FIVE PHASES Zou Yan (c. 305–240 BCE) is traditionally regarded as the systematizer of the philosophy of the yin-yang (bipolar forces of the universe; yin is the dark, passive female force, and yang is the light, active male force) five phases (*wuxing*), namely, wood, fire, earth, metal, and water. Despite the pervasive affect of the five-phases concept on the philosophy of the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) and on subsequent Chinese science, cosmology, and medicine, little is known of Zou Yan’s teachings.

The *Ying tong* (Responding in Kind) chapter of *Master Lu’s Spring and Autumn Annals* is usually cited as the standard elucidation of Zou’s ideas. In this chapter, the five phases are used to explicate a cos-

mological order to explain historical political change according to the conquest cycle of the five phases. This influenced the justification of the "first emperor" of the Qin dynasty for adopting the symbols of "water" to show he had vanquished the "fire" of the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE). Subsequently, the idea was hotly debated by Han philosophers, some of whom sought to use it to justify Han rule.

The five phases explain the processes of change in terms of conquest and productive cycles. In the conquest cycle, earth is conquered by wood, wood is vanquished by metal, metal is melted by fire, fire is extinguished by water, and water is obstructed by earth—and thus the process continues. In the productive cycle, wood produces fire, fire’s ashes generate earth, earth begets metal, from metal drips water, and water nourishes wood—and thus the cycle continues. The five phases are bound up with the nondual correlative thinking of yin and yang, and they are correlated with the myriad aspects of nature and human experience.

The philosophy and classification system of the five phases left a lasting impression on Chinese science, medicine, and alchemy, on and the art of placement (*feng shui*). Because the five phases are correlated with every aspect of the natural world and human life and are believed to explain and predict change, they became indispensable tools for taxonomy and for un-



THE FIVES PHASES AND THEIR ASSOCIATIONS

In Chinese cosmology, each of the five phases is linked with specific manifestations of different categories of natural phenomenon. Knowledge of these associations is important to diviners who use them in formulas that help them predict and control the future.

Associations	Wood	Fire	Earth	Metal	Water
Seasons	Spring	Summer	Late Summer	Autumn	Winter
Directions	East	South	Center	West	North
Colors	Green	Red	Yellow	White	Black
Tastes	Sour	Bitter	Sweet	Acrid	Salty
Virtues	Benevolence	Wisdom	Faith	Righteousness	Decorum
Disease	Insomnia	Heartache	Stomach	Lungs	Sex Organs

Source: John L. McCreary. (1983) *The Symbolism of Popular Taoist Magic*. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 60.

derstanding transformation. Five-phases philosophy is still used in the practice of Chinese medicine and the art of placement. In Chinese medicine, the organs, acupuncture points, and herbs are correlated with the five phases. Thus, a weak heart correlated with the fire phase is treated by administering herbs correlated with fire and stimulating acupuncture points correlated with fire. In placement, the sink should go on the north wall and the stove on the south side of the kitchen, because water is correlated with the North and fire with the South.

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FIVE POWER DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS

The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), which came into effect 1 November 1971, refer to a collective agreement between Australia, Britain, Singapore, Malaysia, and New Zealand to maintain ongoing consultations and an agreement to consult in the event of external attack against Singapore and Malaysia. A series of exercises evolved from this framework. A tandem arrangement also saw the stationing of ANZUK (Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom) forces in Singapore and Malaysia, although in time they were withdrawn. The FPDA replaced the Anglo-Malayan ("Malaysian" from 1963) Defence Agreement (AMDA), which lasted from 1957 to 1971 and contained a far more overt commitment to assist Malaysia and Singapore in the event of a security threat. Thus, forces from Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom had fought, during the Malayan Emergency and *Konfrontasi*, in order to guarantee Malayan/Malaysian and Singaporean security. While the ANZUK forces were gradually withdrawn in phases—Britain by 1976, Australia by 1986, and New Zealand by 1989—FPDA has continued. This loose military alliance has evolved from one that initially intended to give confidence to Malaysia and Singapore to one of interoperability and joint military exercises. By the 1990s major sea and air exercises were held—often involving thirty warships and fifty aircraft in comprehensive exercises including all aspects of land, sea, and air defense and electronic warfare systems (Rolfe 1995: 9).

The FPDA has been criticized by those who view it as a product of either British colonialism or the Cold War, and by those who see it as contrary to greater Southeast Asian multilateralism and self-reliance. Some Indonesian officials and commentators have wondered aloud if the alliance is maintained with Indonesia firmly in mind (Methven 1992:126–130). Malaysia did briefly suspend participation in exercises in the late 1990s, most probably because of bilateral tensions with Singapore, while New Zealand has sometimes scaled back its participation due to budgetary reasons. However, the alliance members seem committed to FPDA, which shows no signs of being shelved. All members seem to view the alliance as useful for the following reasons: (1) all benefit from the utility of defense exercises with historical allies; (2) Malaysia and Singapore have additional assurance; (3) Australia and New Zealand are able to participate in the security of an area seen as important to regional security, as well as being in the last military alliance that includes traditional ally Britain; and (4) Britain is able to continue its presence and influence in Southeast Asia.

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FLORES SEA The Flores Sea or Laut Flores, with a surface area of around 240,000 square kilometers (93,000 square miles), is located off the eastern part of the Indonesian archipelago. It is a portion of the western South Pacific Ocean bordered on the south by the Lesser Sunda Islands of Flores and Sumbawa and on the north by the island of Sulawesi (Celebes). Part of Laut Flores is preserved in the Taman Nasional Taka Bonerate, a national park including a series of twenty-one coral atolls that cover a vast area of around 220,000 hectares, the third largest coral atoll network in the world after Maldiva and Kwadifein. Laut Flores is also well known for its beauty and the richness

of its underwater life. It has a greater diversity of submarine life than the other nearby shallow-water sea, the Java Sea (Laut Jawa).

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FOLK OPERA—BANGLADESH. See **Jatra**.

FOLKLORE—CENTRAL ASIA Through oral folklore the peoples of Central Asia express their identity in speech and song while renewing and refashioning links with their past. The numerous Central Asian verbal art genres are as diverse as life's varied situations, yet share common features owing to regional cultural contacts and common origins. The forms of folklore expression are intimately tied to language. The Karakalpaks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Uighurs, and Uzbeks all speak Turkic languages and have a shared stock of oral traditions; the Tajiks speak an Iranian language and have distinct traditions, but their Persian cultural heritage has influenced the folklore of their Turkic neighbors, especially the Turkmen, Uighurs, and Uzbeks.

"Oral tradition" refers not only to a body of tales, epics, songs, proverbs, and legends, but also to the ways in which these verbal materials are created and transmitted. Texts are rarely handed down verbatim through the generations; each successive bearer of the tradition, as an active practitioner of oral folk art, recreates an expression by using patterns, styles, and performance situations as traditional as the words themselves. Central Asian peoples have contributed significantly to folklorists' understanding of the worldwide phenomenon of oral composition-in-performance and of oral tradition in general. With the help of various techniques, specialists may even study the oral or oral-derived aspects of written texts hundreds of years old.

Written Records

The oldest records of Central Asian folklore are preserved in a dictionary of the Middle Turkic language, *Diwan Lughat at-Turk*, written around 1075 by Mahmud al-Kashghari. The numerous specimens of popular poetry and songs that Kashghari cited display a range of rhythms, assonances, rhymes, imagery, and word combinations found even today in the oral po-

etry of contemporary Central Asian Turkic peoples. Many of the specimens in the *Diwan Lughat at-Turk* are of heroic poetry, and other records of Turkic folklore from the Middle Ages, such as the *Kitab-i Dede Qorqut* (Book of Grandfather Qorqut), also attest to heroic and epic traditions with links to Central Asian nomadic peoples.

Speakers of a dialect of Persian, the Tajiks carry on Iranian oral traditions known in writings from medieval greater Iran. An early written folklore specimen from the region inhabited by the Tajiks is a partial Arabic translation of a satirical song composed in Balkh in modern Afghanistan in 725 CE. Tajik oral poetry before the twentieth century is discerned mainly through the abundant folk motifs in literary poetry, as in the Persian *Shahname* epic.

The search for national origins, which peaked in Europe in the nineteenth century, stimulated a generation of European and European-trained folklore collectors to study Central Asia, and the work of documenting oral traditions has continued through the czarist and Soviet eras to the present day. Thus there are numerous written records of Central Asian folklore from the last century and a half, including the nineteenth-century collections and translations of Chokan Valikhanov (Kazakh and Kyrgyz), Arminius Vámbéry (Khivan dialect of Uzbek), Wilhelm Radloff (Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Taranchi), and Abubekir Divaev (Kazakh and Karakalpak). Much early collecting work was done in the name of linguistic investigation.

After 1918 the Soviet government took an active role in preserving certain folk traditions for the sake of their content, and projects to collect folktales, epics, songs, and many other genres went hand in hand with concerted scholarly study and publication. Similar efforts have been carried out among the Uighur, Kazakh, and Kyrgyz populations of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of China. Today Central Asians themselves are responsible for most of the work being done to document and analyze Central Asian folklore. Western researchers, influenced by theories of verbal art performance, have introduced an emphasis on studying audio and audiovisual recordings of actual folklore events.

Genres and Practitioners

Folklore may be classified into prose and poetic genres. Central Asian legends and tales—folklore in prose—are heard in everyday situations that make up the context of traditional culture. Legends are short narratives in ordinary language about what people believe to be true events of the past, whether mundane

or supernatural. Central Asian legends share material with epic poetry; some feature giants, sprites, and magical feats. Miracles play a prominent part in legends connected with Sufi saints and their shrines. Ethnic groups have legends about their origins, and in some cases these refer to a divine progenitor or an animal such as a dog or doe that suckled the ancestor of the tribe. Numerous Central Asian legends mention local heroes who have a basis in historical fact. One of the oldest of these is Iskandar, or Alexander of Macedon, whose conquests in Bactria and Sogdiana in 329–328 BCE placed part of Central Asia under short-lived Hellenistic dominion.

Tales are stories that the teller and audience know are untrue. Tales about human beings typically have a happy ending. The hero or heroine of a Central Asian tale may be of noble or low birth; if the former, often the character begins poor and in reduced circumstances and only later learns the truth and regains a destined high position. The sovereign (khan or *padishah*) with whom the hero or heroine deals may be good, generous, and a just arbiter, or wicked, greedy, and a jealous antagonist. Some common stories are romantic tales, often about a poor girl who wins her "prince charming" by means of her intelligence or beauty, and animal tales, which usually have a moral lesson. The humorous tales (Tajik and Uzbek *latifa*) of the "wise simpleton" Nasruddin Hoja are enjoyed throughout much of the Islamic world, and Central Asia is no exception. One of the most popular facets of this humble figure is his gift for exposing and subverting the pretensions of the rich, powerful, and vain. The Uzbeks know him as Nasreddin Apendi or Afandi, the Kyrgyz as Apendi, and the Kazakhs as Khoja Nasr. Facetious tales about the deceptive, malicious, and cruel figure *Kose* (Beardless) occur in Uzbek, Kazakh, and Turkmen traditions.

Central Asian folk poetry is sung poetry. Thus, renowned practitioners of this art go by the general terms "singer" (Uzbek *bakhsbi*, Turkmen *bakhsby*, Karakalpak *baqsy*, Kazakh *olengshi* or *zhyrshy*, Kyrgyz *yrchy*, Kazakh and Karakalpak *zhyrau*) or "poet" (Uzbek and Tajik *shoir*). Other terms highlight genre specializations, such as the Turkmen *ozan* (epic bard) or Kyrgyz *manaschy* (singer of the *Manas* epic). Kyrgyz *akyn* means simply a poet, whether literary or oral, but in the context of oral tradition, *akyn* refers to a highly skilled songster who performs with an instrument, usually the lute. Good singers gain fame and enduring reputations, such as the eighteenth-century Kazakh bard Buqar-zhyrau or the Kyrgyz *akyn* Toktogul (1864–1933), who essayed his traditional poetic mastery in the new field of Communist propaganda.

The Central Asian folksinger entertains audiences with a wide variety of poetic genres, including epics, lyrics, complaints, admonitions, didactic verses, even insults and denunciations; in several of the Turkic languages, any improvised song is called *terma* or *terme*. Epic (*dastan*), the art of long narrative poetry (or mixed poetry and prose), is both widespread and diverse in Central Asia and is esteemed as a special repository of the people's identity and culture. Epic singers may perform other genres as well. Kazakh, Karakalpak, and Kyrgyz singers excel at virtuosic song-contests (Kazakh, Karakalpak *aitys*, Kyrgyz *aytysb*) in which two *akyns* match wits in impromptu composition while performing topical songs, with liberal doses of self-praise and jibing at their opponents. Genealogies (Kazakh *shezhere*, Kyrgyz *sanzhyra*) in the form of oral poetry and legends are a feature of the folklore of Central Asian peoples with a nomadic tribal past.

Folk songs are often classified without regard to the professional and specialist performance spheres, in such categories as work, ceremonial, lyrical, and children's genres. Work songs may reflect agricultural or pastoral work or a specific trade. Songs sometimes have ties to a specific socioeconomic group, as in the Tajik *gharibi* genre of plaintive songs about the difficulties of life, sung originally by transient laborers. Professional mourners, usually women, compose and perform long, eulogistic laments at funerals. The Uzbek and Turkmen *yar-yar* (Kazakh *zhar-zhar*) is a sometimes mournful, sometimes playful wedding-lyric sung by the bride, her parents, the groom's friends, and other participants, all linked by a common phrase in the refrains, *yar-yar* or *zhar-zhar* (beloved). Love lyrics are popular. The Tajik and Uzbek *lapar* is a dialogue-song sung by a boy and a girl in a competitive style; the dialogues, sometimes improvised, range from urgent expressions of love to satirical taunting as the singers attempt to outdo each other in witty repartee.

Proverbs, sayings, and riddles are concentrated folk expressions. Their brevity often belies artful structure and profound cultural reference. Proverbs, loosely defined, are distillations of popular wisdom in the form of simple idiomatic sayings or figures of speech ("To pour saltwater over a burn"—Tajik) or observations ("A knife wound will heal; a tongue wound will not heal"—Kazakh) or admonitions ("Don't throw your coat in the fire in annoyance at the fleas"—Karakalpak). Proverbs are highly portable bits of folklore, appearing as embedded elements in lyric and didactic poetry, epics, tales, and many other genres. Central Asian riddles may be no more than a phrase, such as the Kashgari (Uighur) riddle *Isbtin pes attyn igiz* (Lower than a dog, higher than a horse. Answer:

saddle), or they may constitute tiny poems in a symmetrical style, as in this Kashgari example:

<i>Qulagy quiruqynyng qashita,</i>	Its ears on the side of its tail,
<i>Ucheii qosaqynyng tashita (dutar)</i>	Its guts outside its belly (Answer: <i>dutar</i> , a lute with two gut strings)

Poetics

The quantitative meters of Persian oral and literary poetry dominate Tajik folk verse, and Islamized Turkic peoples have used Persian-based verse structures for oral poetry. In quantitative verse, the fundamental linguistic principle used to organize sounds into verse is the length (quantity) of the syllables: a long syllable usually has the same metrical length as two short syllables. The 'arudh system of metrics in Persian literature has had an influence on oral metrics. In turn, two popular literary verse-forms are believed to originate from oral models. The *ghazal*, a lyric miniature somewhat analogous to a sonnet, consists of five to fifteen *beits* (distichs or double lines) in a single rhyme, in which the first line sets the theme of the poem and the final line gives a concluding image or idea. The *ruba'i* is a quatrain of *beits* in an *aaaa* rhyme scheme.

In contrast to the quantitative poetics of Tajik folk poetry, the traditional Iranian meter for epic recitation is syllabic, or organized by the number of syllables in a line. The *Shabname*, *Farhad and Shirin*, and other Tajik epics follow an eleven-syllable verse scheme in rhymed couplets.

Turkic folk verse forms have found particularly rich development in Central Asia. The older Turkic meter is syllabic; this meter is common to the oral poetry of all Central Asian Turkic peoples. In Turkic syllabic poetry the basic poetic form derives from a combination of two fundamental features of Turkic grammar, the "agglutinative" principle of word formation (common to all Turkic languages), where meaning is built by stringing suffixes onto base words; and "vowel harmony," or rules by which the base vowel of a word governs the shape of the vowel in succeeding syllables (these rules are absent in most dialects of Uzbek). In poetic composition these principles of word morphology and phonology produce a class of effects known as rhythmico-syntactic parallelism. Kyrgyz, with clear-cut vowel harmony, affords a rich illustration of these effects in a few lines from the epic *Manas*:

<i>Aryp-darbyp miniship,</i>	Greatly excited, mounting (horses),
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<i>Aikyryp zholgo kiriship,</i>	Shouting and getting under way,
<i>Toogo chapy toptoshup,</i>	They galloped to the mountains en masse,
<i>Adyrga chapy antalap,</i>	They galloped to the hills in a group,
<i>Boksogo chapy bolunup,</i>	They galloped to the foothills breaking up,
<i>Talaaga chapy dabyrap.</i>	They galloped thunderously to the steppe.

Rhythmico-syntactic parallelism is found in poetic passages as far back as the *Diwan Lughat at-Turk* and subsequently in most oral poetic forms among the Central Asian Turkic peoples. It is also used in proverbs and riddles, as in this Turkmen riddle:

<i>Agbyr baly kakylmaiar</i>	The heavy carpet cannot be shaken;
<i>Kakylsa da dokulmeiar</i>	even if it shakes, they won't fall off
<i>(jildiz)</i>	(Answer: the sky and stars)

In addition to the seven- and eight-syllable lines seen in the examples above, compositions in eleven- and twelve-syllable lines are also common. In the early system, verses were loosely organized with respect to one another. The easygoing feel of the resulting rhythms is exemplified in two Kazakh and Kyrgyz verse-forms named after the gaits of horses: *zhorgo soz* (pacing speech) and *zheldirme* (jog-trot). Strophic structure, or organization of verses into stanzas, was a later development and is found in the folklore of most Central Asian Turkic peoples.

Folklore and Society

People's oral traditions preserve many aspects of their self-images and aspirations. Folklore performers know and exploit this situation by singing and speaking to their specific audiences. For example, a singer performing for a rich and powerful personage may improvise lines alluding to the preeminence of the patron or the patron's ancestors; this may even elicit a material reward from a happy patron. Other audiences may need to be consoled for their lot in life or reminded of their people's proud history or inspired to act for the good of the group.

Because folklore is an ideological phenomenon, Central Asian folklore traditions became the focus of ideological debate and struggles in Soviet society, especially during the 1930s to the 1950s. The Communist Party actively embraced folklore as a means of promoting approved values of the working classes,

such as love of the land and the nation, respect for hard work, and enmity toward religion and the exploitative classes. This emphasis went together with the forcible suppression of other popular traditions, such as religious legends and poetry connected with Sufism. Epic poetry was entwined with the sensitive issue of national identity and tended to espouse religious themes and a positive attitude toward ruling elites. For this reason numerous Central Asian epics were banned by the Soviet authorities around 1951. They were later rehabilitated, but the Soviet period of cultural indoctrination affected Central Asian peoples' views on the nature of folklore in general.

Today Central Asians are taking advantage of national independence and openness to revitalize their folklore traditions. While economic and political transition and globalization create challenges for Central Asians interested in recovering and preserving their cultural memory, folklore traditions may now advance to positions of unprecedented preeminence in society. For example, in 1995 the government of the Kyrgyz Republic recognized the epic *Manas* as the official basis of state ideology, and basic rules of social conduct devised by President Askar Akayev in the name of the hero *Manas* are taught in the schools.

D. Prior

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FOOD CRISIS—NORTH KOREA It has been reported that more than 3 million people out of 23 million have died from hunger in North Korea since 1995, the first of two consecutive years during which North Korea suffered floods. The flooding was followed by a serious drought, and the nation was hit by tidal waves in 1997. The succession of misfortunes brought about widespread famine. There have been reports of people surviving by eating the bark of pine trees and grass roots, or by selling items like clothing and furniture to buy food. The condition of the children has been compared to that of the children of Ethiopia during the famines of the mid-1980s. The World Food Program (WFP) continued through 2001 to warn that without food grain aid from outside, the most vulnerable people were still in danger of starvation.

Since North Korean authorities have provided no reliable data on demographics or the nation's criteria

for food rationing, it is difficult to evaluate the food situation in North Korea. According to a report of the North Korean Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee in March 1998, annual demand for food grain was shown to be as much as 7 million metric tons, while actual production in 1997 was 2.3 million metric tons. However, the Ministry of Unification in South Korea estimates that the north's total demand for grain is 5.5 million metric tons, while grain output was 3.9 million metric tons in 2001. According to these figures, a shortage of 1.6 million metric tons remains. An assessment by the WFP and other U.N. food assistance groups puts North Korea's annual grain demand at 4.8 million metric tons, with 2.9 million metric tons of grain harvested, also leaving a shortage of 1.9 million metric tons in 2000. However, this shortage should be eased by food assistance from the U.N., grain secured through the North Korea's bartering activities, and Chinese relief efforts. While it is hard to judge the accuracy of these figures, the general view is that North Korea suffers a food shortage of 2 million metric tons of grain annually.

Causes of the Food Shortage

The food shortage in North Korea has continued unabated because of the structural deficiencies of its socialist economy, combined with natural disasters and the disappearance of entire markets within the international socialist bloc. North Korea's cooperative farm system reduced farmers' incentive to work and dampened their productivity. Further, the cutting off of North Korea's oil supply, which had been provided largely by the former Soviet Union; a sharp drop in foreign trade; and the collapse of socialist countries, particularly the former Soviet Union, dealt a heavy blow to all sectors of the North Korean economy. Moreover, the government's expansion of farmland to hillside regions through bench-terraced farming was a major factor in the destruction of forestland, which increased the destructive force of the floods. The country's inadequate transportation system also compounded its deepening food crisis by making it difficult to ship food to where it was needed.

As the food crisis has worsened, the North Korean government has tried to minimize its responsibility to supply food grain through the central distribution system. It launched a national campaign, the "Arduous March" (1996–1997), in order to overcome the worsening food crisis. Grain rationing by the central government was curtailed to the minimum level, leaving local authorities and institutions to make up the bulk of the shortage. Although there are regional variations in food shortage due to the regional self-supply system,

food grain rationing by the central government was reduced to 300 grams (half a bowl) per day in most areas of North Korea, except the capital city Pyongyang.

It is not easy to confirm how many people starved to death during the "Arduous March" campaign. Based on interviews with 1,694 North Korean "food refugees" in northeast China, the Buddhist Chapter of the Movement for Mutual Help of Our Nation estimated that 3 million people (27 percent of the entire population of North Korea) died from hunger between August 1995 and March 1998. Before he defected to South Korea, Hwang Jang Yup, the former secretary of international affairs of the North Korean Worker's Party, claimed to have heard from a reliable source that 1.5 million people had starved to death by the end of 1996. The Council on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Congress estimates that the total number of deaths from starvation to date ranges from 1 million to 2 million.

In addition to those who have lost their lives due to food shortages, many people are suffering from malnutrition and a lack of adequate health care. According to a World Vision report of July 1997, out of 547 North Korean children of two years and under in five nursery schools in the cities of P'yongyang, Wonsan, Sariwon, Haeju, and P'yongsan, 85 percent were malnourished and 29 percent were severely malnourished. Although it is hard to forecast how the food crisis is going to be resolved in the near future, there seems no way out without a fundamental reformation of the sluggish economy.

Byounglo Philo Kim

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FOOT BINDING A practice that might have originated in the court of a decadent, late-tenth-century emperor with a fetish for small feet, foot binding spread through China from the end of the eleventh century and was a common practice by the time of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Girls between the ages of five and seven years were subjected to the practice, in which their toes and heels were bound together with tight bandages, so that their feet would ideally be about eight centimeters long. Originally an emblem of femininity and a marker of social status for upper-class

women, foot binding spread to lower-class women, for whom the possession of feet resembling "golden lotuses" represented opportunities for upward mobility in the marriage and service markets.

By keeping women largely confined to inner chambers (since it was difficult to walk any distance with bound feet), foot binding maintained the chaste roles prescribed for women by Neo-Confucianism, yet at the same time turned them into objects of erotic desire. Foot binding thus became a symbol for feminine beauty, social and sexual hierarchy, and Confucian morality.

By the early twentieth century Chinese reformers campaigned against foot binding and saw it as a source of national shame and weakness. For the reformers, foot binding symbolized China's vulnerability to Western imperialism, as it left a large portion of the population capable only of hobbling. Natural feet became the sign of feminine beauty. The anti-foot binding efforts of Chinese natural-foot societies and Western women and Christian missionaries living in China—combined with the fierce criticism of the May Fourth intellectuals (who favored the adoption of Western science and philosophy for the strengthening of China) and laws prohibiting foot binding and rewarding those who turned in women's binding cloths and lotus shoes—brought about the demise of the 900-year-old custom by the 1920s.

Robert Y. Eng

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FORBIDDEN CITY. See **Imperial Palace.**

FOREST INDUSTRY—MONGOLIA Forests occupy only 8.1 percent of Mongolia—a total of 17.5 million square hectares. Most forest reserves are pine, birch, and other conifers and are located in the northern uppermost corridor, which borders Siberian Russia. Forests are found mainly in Selenge Aimag (province), but also in the northern provinces of Bulgan, Khubsghul, and Hentii, and even in the Gobi Desert to the south near China. Although small, Mongolian forests provide ecological balance, soil

protection, and water collection. As of 1997, total forest resources were 1.337 billion square meters, with an annual growth rate of 5.6 million square meters.

Mongolia's first forest utilization/preservation law was passed in 1940; from 1970 to 1990, 1.7 million square meters of forest were cut annually; 270,000 hectares of forest were destroyed by fire, and another 70,000 hectares were lost to insects and diseases. At the end of the Socialist era in 1990, there were twenty-three small state-owned wood-processing companies. With the complete privatization of these companies in the past decade, in 2000 there were about fifty shareholding companies, mainly exporting nonprocessed wood to China. This represents about 6 percent of Mongolia's total industrial output. According to the Mongolian Ministry of Nature and Environment, Mongolia's few wood-processing plants have cut down almost half of the national timber resources over the last few decades and, if the pace continues, in seventy years Mongolia will have no forests.

The Mongolian government is concerned about deforestation and believes that the export of nonprocessed wood has an adverse impact on the price of domestic wood products. At the beginning of 1999, the government began limiting nonprocessed wood exports and imposing timber export taxes under the National Program on Forests. Nevertheless, the amount of exported timber in 1999 exceeded the limits set by Ministry of Nature and Environment. The government, to discourage additional logging, imposed a tax of 150,000 tugrik (\$1,500) per cubic meter of export timber. Also, a reforestation plan has been implemented: in 1999, young trees were planted over 6,000 hectares, and projects with foreign export partners are under development. The tax policy on timber has hurt an already-declining local industry. Many workers have lost their jobs, especially in Selenge Province. Wood-processing factories have gone bankrupt because the tax policy on timber has decreased Chinese market demand.

The Mongolian government is promoting development in three areas of the forest industry: (1) production of tincture for medicinal use, powdered vitamins, and oils from conifers and pine resins; (2) production of construction materials, cut board, and tree particle board; and (3) production of furniture and birch floor and construction materials.

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FOREST INDUSTRY—SOUTHEAST ASIA

An important source of raw materials and revenues, the forests of Southeast Asia have played a key role in the development of trade and commerce in this region for more than two millennia. Since World War II the forest industry in Southeast Asia has become an increasingly significant player in the international forest-products trade. The effects of many years of overcutting and forest conversion are transforming this sector. Forestry institutions as well as the forest industry are changing as concern for the social and environmental role of forests grows.

Historical Basis

Forest produce, as trade or tribute, has formed the basis of economic and political relationships between neighboring societies in this region since earliest times. Indian, Arab, and Chinese vessels plied southern seas conducting a thriving trade for more than a thousand years before Europeans arrived in Southeast Asia in the late fifteenth century. Historically important trade goods have included spices, aromatics (e.g., sandalwood and aloeswood), medicines, dyes, and decorative woods (e.g., ebony), plus a great variety of gums, resins, fruits, and various wild animals and animal products, all from the forest. Expansion of commerce has been instrumental in the domestication of several forest species, including pepper, cloves, and cinnamon, while products less easily cultivated (e.g., sandalwood) have been pressed to the brink of extinction.

As tropical timber was too heavy and cumbersome to haul long distances, industry tended to establish itself close to the sources, as in the case of teak and shipbuilding. With timber clearly of strategic importance in commercial and military terms, extensive forest clearing for agriculture, construction materials, and fuel in the early 1800s prompted fears of a timber famine and the introduction of "scientific" forest management into first India and later Southeast Asia by midcentury. Well into the twentieth century, however, the so-called "minor," or nontimber, forest products remained a primary source of revenues, and in volume terms nearly 60 percent of total wood removals in Asia ended as fuel.

Development of the Modern Forest Industry

With most countries in Southeast Asia achieving independence soon after World War II, government focus shifted to reconstruction and economic development. Nations looked to their forest reserves to play an important role in providing the resources, both physical and fiscal, for nation building. At the middle of the twentieth century, the area of productive forest

in Asia was about 0.3 hectares per person, approximately the same as Europe. Only about half of this area was accessible. Southeast Asia was generally considered well forested, with Indonesia alone harboring three to four times the forest area of any its neighbors. With extraction costs high, the primary market for tropical wood products was seen to be the richer, industrialized nations.

Technological advances in logging equipment soon brought previously inaccessible forests into production. Led initially by multinational firms, logging contractors advanced through the Philippines, Malaya, Borneo, and Sumatra in the 1960s. Technical and financial aid from bilateral and multilateral development assistance agencies promoted forest-industry development. Enticing foreign investors with low royalty fees, tax holidays, export credits, and tariffs on competing imports, governments promoted the establishment of manufacturing facilities to process rather than export logs. Manufacturers formed industry associations to improve bargaining power in international trade and nations cooperated under the auspices of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to develop and share information on economics, silviculture, and other management issues. In 1986 the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) was established to provide a framework for consultation and cooperation between producer and consumer countries on production, trade, and conservation of tropical timber worldwide.

The success of these efforts is seen clearly in the statistics. In 1950 little more than 30 percent of the 93.6 million cubic meters of total wood production in Asia was saw logs, veneer logs, or squared timber. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization's *Yearbook of Forest Products, 1993–1997*, in 1997 Southeast Asia accounted for nearly 41 percent of the 960 million cubic meters of industrial roundwood produced in Asia. A variety of finished products, including furniture, doors, molding, and parquet as well as lumber are produced from tropical hardwoods. Increasingly, industrial roundwood is being processed domestically with greater emphasis on fiber processing, especially for panel products such as particle board. The comparatively higher growth in processed goods indicates significant gains in utilizing raw materials and processing them efficiently. In 1994 Southeast Asia was the Asian leader in the export of sawed wood and wood-based panels. Indonesia remains the clear leader in absolute volume of roundwood produced, with 1997 output of 201.6 million cubic meters at approximately seventy times 1950 levels and more than four times that of any of its neighbors, according to the *Yearbook of*

Forest Products, 1993–1997. The financial crisis beginning in late 1997 severely affected tropical timber trade. Although the weakened Southeast Asian currencies made Southeast Asian timber more competitive, the industry suffered sharp declines in prices—some as much as 50 percent—for logs, sawed wood, and plywood. Global trade in wood pulp fell as well in 1998, reflecting the sharp drop in demand from East and Southeast Asia as well as global oversupply.

The Negative Impact of Industrial Development

The development of Southeast Asia's forest industry has not been an unqualified success. There have been both environmental and social consequences. Low stumpage fees have led to wasteful use of timber, and badly designed timber contracts have undermined sound forest management. Degradation of residual forests has resulted from unregulated harvesting and deliberate fires, as well as from the normal insect, pest, and disease problems. Subsidized factory installation has resulted in excess capacity and poor profitability for some products and inadequate investment in research has handicapped forestry vis-à-vis competing enterprises including plantation crops such as oil palm. Poor coordination of the broad spectrum of government policies has led to conflicts among the various sectors of the forest-products industry, and loss of forest land to often less productive uses. Logging bans instituted to protect forest often shift the burden of demand to neighboring countries where unstable political conditions or economic needs are conducive to overcutting. For example, Thailand's ban on logging teak resulted in increased cutting of teak in Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. At home these laws may actually accelerate forest destruction, because they have the effect of devaluing it (since it can no longer be regarded as a source of income).

From a socioeconomic perspective forest industry development in most instances has failed to produce the desired multiplier effects. Rather than training local people, contractors have brought in guest workers to operate the new technology, thus reducing benefits to local communities. Forests traditionally used by local communities to provide a myriad of useful and commercial products were assigned to logging companies who so badly mangled these areas that they became virtually useless and the target for illegal wood cutting and land clearing. Ignoring local community needs has resulted in social conflict detrimental to all. Swidden (slash-and-burn) agriculture, long decried as a threat to forests, reflects the failure of government development policies to deal effectively with a growing rural population. Reorientation of forest adminis-



A boat pulls logs on the Chao Phraya River to Bangkok, Thailand, in 1996. (JAMES MARSHALL/CORBIS)

trations to incorporate local community interests in forest planning and management, a process begun in the 1980s, still has far to go.

Prospects for the Future

Southeast Asia contains approximately 8.4 percent of the world's population. Rapid rates of economic growth, rising incomes, and rising expectations throughout Asia will mean continued strong demand for forest products. China's imports of tropical logs between 1996 and 1998 grew nearly as much as Japan's imports fell between 1997 and 1998. Although tropical-hardwood log and sawed-wood production fell worldwide in 2000, veneer and plywood production increased, led by Malaysia and Indonesia respectively. Malaysia supplied nearly half of the world's tropical log exports for 2000. The gap between recorded exports and imports in 2000 amounted to 3.6 million cubic meters, three times the level in the previous year, reflecting the rising rate of illegal logging in Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia. Thailand contributed

significantly to the increase in sawed-wood exports in 2000, while Indonesia and Malaysia together provided more than 90 percent of the tropical plywood exports. Exports of finished or secondary processed wood products rebounded in 1999, led by exports from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Although Japan retains first position as tropical plywood importer, China, now the leading importer of tropical logs, sawed wood, and veneer, the majority of which come from Southeast Asia, is likely to remain the strongest influence on the Southeast Asian forest products market for the foreseeable future (ITTO 2000, Table 2, pp. 115–118).

Southeast Asia contains 65 percent of Asia's remaining tropical forest and is one of richest areas of biological diversity in the world: Indonesia alone is estimated to have a greater variety of animal life than all of Africa. Over the past two decades concern over the fate of tropical forest has transformed it into a global resource. As forests in Southeast Asia are being lost at an estimated rate of 1.5 percent of forest area annually—and more than that in some areas—the services or nontangible benefits derived from forests, such as watershed protection, recreation, preservation of cultural heritage and biological diversity, habitat protection, and climate mitigation (carbon sequestration) are becoming of increasing interest and are expected to play a more important role in shaping future development of the forest industry.

The wave of new wood supplies—largely from plantations in New Zealand, Australia, and Chile—projected to enter Asia-Pacific markets by 2005, possibly meeting 10 to 15 percent of regional demand, will undoubtedly affect the world supply-demand balance. By some estimates this resource could meet some 70 percent of the world's present needs for industrial wood. The implications for industry are significant. The present market for timber and pulpwood-based products is already fiercely competitive; if estimates are correct, from about 2005 onward the tropical timber industry will face an oversupplied and even more intensively competitive market. We may well see production shift to specialty and decorative timbers and nontimber forest products.

With large-diameter logs of the old-growth, natural forests being replaced by smaller materials and plantation output, we are seeing a fundamental change that should affect all levels of the industry. Consumer demands for "certified" wood produced in a sustainable, environmentally friendly system will push up production costs and prices. Greater materials recovery, utilization of more species, and genetically improved stock should mean enhanced productivity per unit area of managed forest.

With the devolution of forest administration to local authorities in many countries in the region, there will be a trend toward community forest management, in which case we may find an increasing number of small-scale sawmills harvesting and preprocessing logs, such as are now seen in Indonesia.

Policy makers struggle with pleas for favoritism from this historically protected sector. Although a significant foreign-exchange earner for many countries (and source of political support for many in this region), the industry is often laced with corruption and is a poor environmental citizen. Issues that governments must deal with include devolution of authority; decentralization and participatory management; recognition of historical claims, traditional-use rights, and indigenous knowledge in the context of changing national priorities; and increasing competition in the global marketplace; as well as an increasing list of international commitments, economic and environmental. The demand for wood products, whose beauty and mechanical and structural qualities are broadly appreciated worldwide, will undoubtedly endure. For the forestry industry the essential challenge remains how to balance the demand for raw materials with the need to preserve and conserve forest areas.

Deanna G. Donovan

See also: **Cambodia—Economic System; Deforestation; Indonesia—Economic System; Laos—Economic System; Malaysia—Economic System; Myanmar—Economic System; Thailand—Economic System; Vietnam—Economic System**

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FORSTER, E. M. (1879–1970), British novelist and essayist. A prolific British writer of the twentieth century, Edward Morgan Forster was born in London on New Year's Eve in 1879 to Morgan and Alice Forster. His father died when Forster was near two years old, and his mother raised him. Educated at Tonbridge School and Kings College, Forster had been to Italy, Greece, Germany, the United States, Egypt, and India. He began his literary career with short stories, which he published in *Independent Review*, a literary journal that Forster along with Lowes Dickinson (1862–1932) started in 1903. Forster wrote his first novel, *Where Angels Fear to Tread*, in 1905 and the autobiographical work *The Longest Journey* two years afterwards. *A Room with A View* (1908), *Howards End* (1910), and *A Passage to India* (1924) brought him literary fame. *Maurice*, dealing with homosexuality, was published posthumously in 1971.

Forster's most famous novel, *A Passage to India*, was viewed as an indictment of British colonial rule in India and played an important part in molding Western perceptions of Britain's presence there. Published in 1924, *A Passage to India* is a discourse on the British Raj with a liberal-humanist touch, portraying cross-cultural friendship. Forster has been accused by some critics for succumbing to "Orientalism," the term generally associated with the study of non-Western culture by scholars from the West and their motivations. Although Forster writes about the failure of British rule in India, he also shares certain myths concerning Indian culture and people, which were hallmarks of the "Orientalists" of the nineteenth century.

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FOUR BOOKS Zhu Xi (1130–1200 CE), the great synthesizer of neo-Confucianism, was an innovator in

standardizing educational methods by compiling what came to be known as the Four Books. Before Zhu Xi, Confucian education focused on the Five Classics, that is, the books of *History*, *Poetry*, *Changes*, *Rites*, and the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, supplemented by the *Analects*, *Mencius*, *Xunzi*, Dong Zhongshu's (179–104 BCE) *Chunqiu fanlu*, and such other texts as the *Classic on Filial Piety* and *Ceremonies and Rites (Yili)*. Zhu Xi streamlined the educational process with the Four Books, namely, the *Analects*, *Mencius*, *Great Learning (Daxue)*, and *Centrality and Commonality (Zhongyong)*, often rendered as the *Doctrine of the Mean*. The latter two were extracted from the book of *Rites*.

Zhu Xi wrote special commentaries on these four books, reinterpreting their contents in the light of his syncretic approach, and used them as the basis of his moral, social, and political philosophy. His innovation had a lasting impact on Confucian education and Chinese bureaucracy, in that the Four Books were used as the basis of the civil-service examinations from 1313 to 1905. By emphasizing the Four Books, Zhu Xi removed many Buddhist and Taoist tendencies from neo-Confucianism. It is not an overstatement to claim that the Four Books influenced Chinese culture more than any other classics during the last six hundred years of the dynastic period.

The *Analects* contains the teachings of Confucius, which advocate moral self-cultivation and rulership based on virtue. The *Mencius* describes the teachings of Mencius, which expand Confucius's ideas, emphasizing the inner quality of the virtues and advocating humanitarian rulership. The *Great Learning* explicates the chain reaction that begins with the "investigation of things," initiating a process of moral cultivation that regulates the family and brings order to the state and ultimately peace on earth. *Centrality and Commonality* is usually mistakenly translated as the *Doctrine of the Mean*, which wrongly implies that it is similar to Aristotle's Golden Mean or the Buddha's Middle Way. Whereas Aristotle sought a balance between extremes and the Buddha proposed a way to extinguish extremes, the Confucian concept of "centrality" is defined as the natural condition "before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy come forth."

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FRANCO-VIET MINH WAR The Franco-Viet Minh War (1946–1954) began following skirmishes between French and Viet Minh (Vietnamese Liberation League) troops in Haiphong and Hanoi. The war lasted eight years and marked the end of French colonial rule in Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos).

Background

Although the war began in 1946, the conflict between France and Vietnam can be traced back to 1885, when France colonized Vietnam and divided it into three separate administrative areas: Cochin China, Annam, and Tonkin. Vietnamese resistance to French colonial rule was immediate and constant. In 1930 the Vietnamese independence movement reached a decisive turn, when Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969) helped create the Vietnamese Communist Party. The party later changed its name to the Indochinese Communist Party in order to include Laos and Cambodia. The party provided an organizational framework for obtaining independence from France. In 1941, at the suggestion of Ho Chi Minh, the Viet Minh was formed. This was a Communist-led and -dominated alliance of various nationalist groups, Communists and non-Communists alike. Viet Minh strategy called for a struggle for independence on both military and non-military fronts. In 1944 the Viet Minh created its first armed units while also sending some of its members into the Vietnamese countryside to politically "educate" the general population. Most of the Viet Minh's activities were restricted to Vietnam's northern and central areas (Tonkin and Annam), but Viet Minh

units also operated in the southern area (Cochin China). By 1945 the Viet Minh had made significant headway in securing the northern part of Vietnam, and it prepared itself to fill the power vacuum that would follow the end of World War II. Following Japan's unconditional surrender in August 1945, Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh mounted a general insurrection (the August Revolution), and on 28 August 1945 Viet Minh general Vo Nguyen Giap and his troops marched into Hanoi. By 2 September Ho Chi Minh had formed his administration and proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

In Paris, one of the postwar aims of the French government was to reestablish a measure of colonial rule in Indochina. The first obstacle was to remove the defeated Japanese troops from Vietnam. An agreement between France and her allies in July 1945 at the Potsdam Conference called on China's nationalist army to supervise the departure of Japanese troops in Tonkin and Annam. In Cochin China, this task was given to British troops. Although Britain's military had been ordered not to allow France to reclaim sovereignty in Vietnam, French troops previously arrested by the Japanese were armed and used to police the area. By October 1945 more French troops poured into Cochin China from France, commanded by General Jacques LeClerc. On 8 February 1946 French troops arrived in Tonkin. On 25 March 1946 French admiral Georges Thierry D'Argenlieu established an autonomous French-ruled republic in Cochin China.

There were numerous French and Viet Minh attempts to negotiate a political settlement. Viet Minh and French representatives met in Dalat, Vietnam, in April and May 1946, but negotiations failed. The two parties were unable to agree to a definition of Vietnamese independence. In addition, no resolution was reached to the problem posed by France's creation of a separate republic in Cochin China. Negotiations failed also at the Fontainebleau Conference of July and August 1946. As in Dalat, an obstacle at Fontainebleau was the question of Vietnamese integrity, of reuniting Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin China into one nation.

The Conflict Heats Up

By the fall of 1946, the autonomous republic established by France in Cochin China had failed. Viet Minh guerrillas had made their way into Cochin China, and the French high command in Vietnam now decided it needed to retake Tonkin and defeat the Viet Minh in order to maintain the colony. On 23 November the French navy bombed the port of Haiphong, killing thousands of Vietnamese. French troops were able to retake the northern port city of



VICTORY AT DIEN BIEN PHU

In the excerpt below, General Vo Nguyen Giap describes the Vietnamese effort that led to victory at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.

Truck convoys valiantly crossed streams, mountains and forests; drivers spent scores of sleepless nights in defiance of difficulties and dangers, to bring food and ammunition to the front. . . .

Thousands of bicycles from the towns also carried food and munitions to the front. Hundreds of sampans of all sizes, hundreds of thousands of bamboo rafts crossed rapids and cascades to supply the front.

Convoys of pack-horses from the Meo highlands or the provinces headed for the front. Day and night, hundreds and thousands of porters and young volunteers crossed passes and forded rivers in spite of enemy planes and delayed-action bombs.

Near the firing line supply operations had to be carried out uninterruptedly and in the shortest possible time. Cooking, medical work, transport, etc., was carried out right in the trenches, under enemy bombing and cross-fire.

Such was the situation at Dien Bien Phu. . . . Never had so many young Vietnamese travelled so far and become acquainted with so many distant regions of the country. From the plains to the mountains, on roads and jungle trails, on rivers and streams—everywhere there was the same animation.

Source: General Vo Nguyen Giap. (1962) *People's War—People's Army*. New York: Praeger: 183–184.

Haiphong and then the northern city of Lang Son. On 19 December Viet Minh troops mounted an attack in Hanoi, killing thousands of French residents there, and officially declared war on France.

The Viet Minh strategy of political mobilization had been effective. In March of 1945 there were approximately 1,000 Viet Minh armed soldiers, but they numbered an estimated 50,000 by the end of 1945, and 100,000 by the end of 1946. In addition to its regular army, the Viet Minh could count on guerrilla and regional and local self-defense forces throughout Tonkin, Annam, and parts of Cochin China. As for the French high command, in 1946 it could count on approximately 67,000 soldiers. Although French forces were able to retake Hanoi shortly after the 19 December Viet Minh insurrection, General Giap and his troops retreated to the northern countryside (the Viet Bac) and enjoyed the support of an estimated

800,000 members of the general Vietnamese population. In the hills of the Viet Bac, the Viet Minh leadership prepared for a prolonged war against France.

China's Role

The war took a decisive turn in 1949 after Mao Zedong's Communist forces won China's protracted civil war. From this point, what had been primarily a colonial war now also became an international Cold War conflict. Once in power, Mao's government soon officially recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries quickly followed suit. On 1 April 1950 a Sino-Viet Minh aid agreement was reached, and Chinese military matériel and advisers poured into the Viet Bac. Mao's military also contributed by training Viet Minh soldiers in China. Meanwhile, France received substantial financial aid from the United States.

It is estimated that by 1952, 40 percent of France's war effort in Vietnam was funded by the United States.

Chinese aid allowed the Viet Minh to change tactics, and the Viet Minh was able, for the first time, to engage in a direct attack, successfully overrunning a French military post at Pho Lu. In addition, Ho Chi Minh increased the size of the Viet Minh by declaring in May 1950 that all Vietnamese males in Tonkin and Annam between the ages of sixteen and fifty would be conscripted.

In early 1953 General Henri Navarre became commander of French forces in Indochina. Navarre's strategy was first to attack Viet Minh strongholds along the Red River delta in Tonkin. Rather than face French units head on, Giap's troops retreated to the hills. Viet Minh units focused instead on the northwest area of Tonkin and on the Lao border. Navarre decided that in order to counter this Viet Minh initiative, French troops needed to secure and hold a base in the area. He chose Dien Bien Phu, believing that the surrounding mountains made the area impenetrable. Navarre had underestimated the Viet Minh. By November 1953 French paratroopers controlled the garrison, but over the course of the winter, Giap's forces surrounded the area. The Viet Minh managed to position approximately fifty thousand soldiers around the French garrison, while hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese civilians helped by building roads and transporting food and equipment into the mountains.

Viet Minh forces, now known as the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), began their attack on Dien Bien Phu on 13 March 1954. They managed to damage the airfield, crippling French supply lines. Their siege of Dien Bien Phu lasted almost two months. French supplies ran out, and PAVN forces dug trenches in order to approach the French garrison. On 7 May 1954 the PAVN, in a horrendous battle, took Dien Bien Phu. An estimated 8,000 Viet Minh soldiers were killed. On the French side, an estimated 2,200 were killed. The fall of Dien Bien Phu was a serious setback for France and resulted in its permanent withdrawal from Indochina. The terms of withdrawal, the Geneva Accords, were drawn up between 8 May and 21 July 1954.

Micheline R. Lessard

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FRENCH EAST INDIA COMPANY Although originally established by a charter that King Henry IV granted in 1604, the French East India Company lacked funds and soon went out of business. In 1664, however, Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619–1683), the finance minister of Louis XIV, infused new spirit into the company through state funding and the granting of trade monopolies. He also equipped the company with guns and soldiers, so that it could compete with the Dutch and British East India Companies for raw materials and markets in Asia and Africa. To encourage French merchants and aristocrats to support the company, Louis XIV himself started investing in it and gave it his royal patronage. In 1674, headed by François Martin, the company established its headquarters in South India at Pondicherry and set up subsidiary factories at Surat north of Mumbai (Bombay) and at Chandernagar near Calcutta and the Hughli River. In 1722 the company brought the islands of Mauritius and Bourbon in the Indian Ocean under its military control.

The French East India Company gained further military and financial strength in 1742 under Joseph-François Dupleix (1697–1763), the French governor-general of Pondicherry. Dupleix easily captured Madras on the southeast Indian coast in 1746. When challenged by Anwar-ud-Din, the ruler of Carnatic in southern India, for the possession of Madras, Dupleix led 230 French soldiers supported by 700 Indian sepoys (soldiers) to victory over a 10,000-man Indian army and gained control of Carnatic.

With such easy conquests Dupleix came to believe that India was ripe for French imperialism, and he became a de facto ruler in the south of India. To secure the French East India Company's position against the British East India Company, Dupleix acted as a king-maker by aiding pro-French and anti-British Indian rulers. He also interfered in the dynastic problems of contending Indian rulers. When in 1748 the old Nizam (ruler) of Hyderabad died, Dupleix placed his own nominee on the throne against the Nizam's wishes. In the ensuing war Dupleix's French forces defeated the army of Nizam's nominee, whom the British favored. In 1754, however, the British East India Company, under Robert Clive (1725–1774), defeated the French forces of Dupleix, and Dupleix was recalled to France.

Dupleix had gained an enormous knowledge of India. But his expensive warfare against Indian rulers, and the Seven Years' War (1756–1763) between

France and England, led to the company's bankruptcy and ultimately to its complete collapse during the French Revolution in 1789.

Abdul Karim Khan

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FRETILIN Fretilin is an acronym derived from the Portuguese Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente (the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor). It is the most important political movement in East Timor and enjoys strong support from the local population.

Fretilin was founded on 20 May 1974 in Dili, East Timor, in the wake of the revolutionary armed forces movement in Lisbon, which advocated that Portugal grant independence to its overseas possessions. Established by a seminary-trained elite of intellectuals and civil servants, Fretilin's program called for immediate participation of Timorese in government, an end to racial discrimination, and an offensive against corruption.

Together with the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) it campaigned for independence from Portugal, but Fretilin's more radical stand attracted a growing number of politicized East Timorese. The radical rhetoric alarmed the leadership of neighboring Indonesia, which governed the western part of Timor. After fighting between Indonesian-sponsored groups and Fretilin ended in 1975 and negotiations failed, Fretilin declared a unilateral independence for East Timor on 28 November 1975.

Following a brutal invasion by Indonesia and East Timor's formal integration into Indonesia on 17 July 1976, Fretilin carried out a sporadic insurgency throughout the 1980s. In 1992 the commander of the Fretilin Armed Forces (Falintil), José "Xanana" Gusmão, was captured and imprisoned in Jakarta. Represented by an observer at the United Nations, which had refused to recognize the annexation of East Timor by Indonesia, Fretilin refrained from retribution against Indonesian troops during the U.N.-sponsored consultation on the future of East Timor in August 1999.

Frank Feulner

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FU BAOSHI (1904–1965), Chinese painter. Fu Baoshi was one of the most influential figures in early-twentieth-century Chinese painting. Born into an impoverished family in Nanchang, Jiangxi, Fu studied art history and sculpture at the prestigious Tokyo Academy of Fine Arts from 1933–1935. Upon his return to China, Fu developed his own distinctive painting style, integrating his studies in Western, Japanese, and Chinese painting. Although most famous as a figure painter, Fu also excelled at landscape painting. He composed his landscapes out of free interweaving broken ink brushstrokes and light washes rather than traditional calligraphic lines. His works are remarkable for their poetic eloquence and mood, and they emphasize a personal response to nature, rather than the physical appearance of the landscape. Fu was also one of the first historians of Chinese painting. His famous works include "Such Is the Beauty of Our Mountains and Streams," the large officially commissioned wall painting in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, jointly painted by Fu and Guan Shanyue in 1959.

Ying Chua

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FUGU Fugu is a globefish or blowfish from the family *tetraodontidae*. When these fish swell up, they puff their bodies into a nearly square shape. They are cultivated in cages in the sea off the coast of Japan, where they are a delicacy in the Japanese diet, cited in early records of cuisine. Part of the attraction is that the fugu contains a deadly poison. Since the Meiji Period (1868–1912), prohibitions and restrictions limit its sale, and only licensed chefs can prepare this fish as it is necessary to remove the ovaries and liver wherein the poison resides. A lethal dose, one milligram, can fit on a pinhead, and one typical mature fugu contains thirty times that amount. The poison acts by blocking sodium channels in nerve tissues, paralyzing muscles and causing eventual respiratory arrest. No antidote exists, but fisherman lore says that

burying the victim up to his or her head with sand will reverse the poison's course.

In spite of this hazard, connoisseurs enjoy fugu prepared as sashimi. It is a white fish, usually sliced in paper-thin translucent wafers and eaten in soups or arranged on a platter in the shape of a flying crane, the symbol of longevity. It is frequently served with *ponzu*, a mixture of citrus juice and soy sauce. Some daring (or foolhardy) gourmands like to include a tiny dot of the liver as they eat it, savoring the "high" of the numbness just short of dangerous ingestion—though no licensed chef would prepare it this way.

Winter is the best time to eat fugu, when its flavor is most delicate. The price is the highest between October and March. A fugu meal at a good restaurant will cost about \$200. In Shimonoseki, known as "fugu city," 80 percent of Japan's fugu catch is sold and a fisherman can make up to \$100,000 in an hour's auction. The sales rates of fugu, which decline in times of recession, are said to be an indicator of the economic climate.

Merry Isaacs White

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FUJI, MOUNT Mount Fuji rises on the border of the Shizuoka and Yamanashi prefectures in central Honshu, Japan, near the Pacific Coast. Identified as a conical stratovolcano, it is the highest peak in Japan at 3,776 meters above sea level. Mount Fuji has a complex history of growth. A group of overlapping volcanoes rather than a single structure, it is composed of Komitake, Ko-Fuji (Older Fuji Volcano), and Shin Fuji (Younger Fuji volcano). Shin Fuji experienced a period of lava flows from 11,000 BCE to 8,000 BCE that account for four-fifths of its current volume. The base of the volcano is about 125 kilometers in circumference with a diameter of roughly 40 to 50 kilometers. The summit is a circular crater about 500 meters across and about 250 meters deep below the highest point.

The volcano has erupted approximately sixteen times since 781 CE. An eruption from 16 December 1707 to 22 January 1708 contributed to the formation of a large, new crater on the east flank. This is known as Mount Hoei. The summit vent released steam between 1780 and 1820, and despite remaining dormant since then, the mountain is classified as an active volcano.

The temperature at the top of Mount Fuji averages -19.2°C in January and 5.9°C in August. At the foot the temperature averages 2.2°C in January and 23.8°C



Mount Fuji in November 1972. (CHARLES E. ROTKIN/CORBIS)

in August. Precipitation is important at the foot, where the annual rainfall reaches 2,000 millimeters. Flora and fauna are abundant. The more than 1,300 plant species include alpine varieties, and more than 130 bird species are native to the region. Many rivers flow through the area, including the Kisegawa, Ayusawagawa, Uruigawa, and Shibagawa. The eruptions of Mount Fuji have formed five small lakes at the mountain's northern foot. From east to west they are Lake Yamanaka, Lake Kawaguchi, Lake Sai, Lake Shoji, and Lake Motosu. The abundance of groundwater and streams around Mount Fuji has encouraged farming and has facilitated the establishment of paper and chemical industries.

A feature of Fuji-Hakone-Izu National Park, Mount Fuji is a popular tourist attraction and climbing site. Since early times the summit has been considered a sacred peak. In 1994 Mount Fuji was considered for registration as a World Natural Heritage site, and subsequent measures toward nature conservation have been significant issues in Japan.

Nathalie Cavasin

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FUJIAN (2002 est. pop. 36.2 million). Located on China's southeastern coast, Fujian Province covers an area of 121,400 square kilometers and is bordered by the Taiwan Strait to the east and the Wuyi Shan mountain range to the west. As of 1996, Fujian's capital, Fuzhou, had a population of 1.4 million. Xiamen is the second largest city of the province, with a population of 600,000.

Fujian has a long history and can trace its origins to the Warring States period (475–221 BCE), when it was a part of the kingdom of Yue. Yue was conquered by the kingdom of Chu, which was then conquered by China's first emperor, Qin Shi Huangdi, who annexed Fujian during his reign (221–210 BCE). Following the overthrow of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), a short-lived Yue kingdom was reestablished but lasted only a few years, until 946. Fujian was also the last stronghold of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644 CE) before its

downfall and the emergence of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912 CE).

Owing to its proximity to the sea, Fujian has long been a center of shipbuilding and trade. During the Song and Ming dynasties, shipbuilding and trade were the primary sources of income in Fujian Province, as ships laden with silk, porcelain, and tea sailed for Japan and Korea as well as Southeast Asia and the Middle East and brought back spices and herbal medicines. Foreign traders have also long plied the waters off of Fujian. As far back as the eleventh century, Muslim traders settled in the southern Fujian city of Quanzhou to trade ivory and spices for silk and tea. The sixteenth century saw the arrival of Dutch and Portuguese traders, who exported porcelain, silk, and tea from China.

Today, Fujian has a broad and varied economic base, producing bananas, fish, fruits, pears, rice, rubber, seafood, sugar, and tea. Fujian's nearness to Taiwan has also made it the center of the growing cross-strait trade between China and Taiwan as the two sides seek closer economic ties. Fujian Province is also tied linguistically to Taiwan, because about half of all current Taiwanese hail from Fujian and speak a dialect native to southern Fujian.

Keith A. Leitich

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FUJIEDA SHIZUO (1908–1993), Japanese novelist. Fujieda Shizuo is the pseudonym of Katsumi Jiro. Born in Shizuoka Prefecture, Fujieda graduated from Chiba Medical College and became an ophthalmologist. He published his first short story at the age of thirty-nine in the magazine *Kindai Bungaku* (Modern Literature). He wrote principally in the genre of autobiographical fiction (*watakushi shosetsu*) favored by Shiga Naoya, whose writing he most admired. Major works include *Iperitto-gan* (Eyes of Mustard-Gas, 1949), based on his experience as a medical doctor; *Inu no chi* (Dog's Blood, 1956); *Kuki atama* (Head of Air, 1967), a detailed account of his wife's recovery from tuberculosis and his own musings on a bizarre medical experiment; *Kyoto Tsuda Sanzo* (Outlaw Tsuda Sanzo, 1961), a nonautobiographical work based on

the attack on the Russian crown prince in 1891; and *Kanashii dake* (Only Sadness, 1979), a requiem for his deceased wife. Beset by senility and self-loathing, he continued writing spare and poignant novels, such as *Kyokai* (Empty Longing, 1983), until his death in 1993.

William Ridgeway

FUJISAWA TAKEO (1904–1989), Japanese novelist. Born in Osaka, Japan, Fujisawa Takeo began writing short stories as a high school student. He published in small *dojin zasshi* (literary coterie magazines) and soon won acclaim from established writers of the Shinkankaku-ha (Neo-Sensationalist School) such as Yokomitsu Riichi (1898–1947) and Kawabata Yasunari (1899–1972). He turned to writing proletarian fiction while a student at Tokyo University; *Kizudarake* (Song of the Bruised and Battered, 1930) is his best known work in that genre. He contributed to the left-wing magazines *Daigaku Saba* (University Left Wing) and *Senki* (Battle Flag, a major leftist literary journal) during the late 1920s.

After being institutionalized for tuberculosis treatment from 1930 to 1933, Fujisawa shifted his focus to popular fiction. His later fiction is characterized not by the autobiographical style favored by the naturalists but by a bright, cosmopolitan flair. As a town native, Fujisawa became the toast of the Osaka literary world. His novel of love and romance, *Shinsetsu* (Fresh Snow, 1941–1942), was made into a film in 1942. His autobiography, *Osaka Fijoden* (Osaka Autobiography), was published in 1974.

William Ridgeway

FUJITA TSUGUHARU (1886–1968), Western-style Japanese painter. A native of Tokyo, Fujita Tsuguharu was also named Fujita, Tsuguji, or Leonard Foujita. After graduation from Tokyo Bijutsu Gakko (now the Tokyo School of Fine Arts and Music) in 1910, Fujita went to France in 1913. He became associated with the École de Paris, developed his own style, and gained a considerable reputation in Parisian artistic circles through works such as *My Studio* (1921), and *Five Nudes* (1923). In 1931 he traveled in the Americas, before going to Japan in 1933. He became a member of the Association of Artists (*Nikakai*) and started to paint several murals such as *Early Events in Akita* (1933), and *The Festival of the Four Seasons in Akita* (1937). World War II brought him back to Japan, and he was appointed to the Imperial Art Academy. He painted war zones in China and Southeast Asia, and received the Asahi Cul-

ture Prize for *The Last Days of Singapore* (1942) and other paintings. He left Japan and went back to France, taking French nationality in 1955. He converted to Catholicism and was christened Leonard, which led him to design the stained glass windows and murals for the chapel of Notre-Dame-de-la-Paix built in Reims.

Nathalie Cavasin

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FUKUCHI GEN'ICHIRO (1841–1906), journalist, politician, and playwright. Fukuchi, who was also known by the pen name Ochi Fukuch, was born in Nagasaki. The son of a doctor, he studied the Dutch language during his youth. When he was eighteen, he went to Edo (now Tokyo) to study English, and in the early 1860s he was a translator for the Tokugawa government and acted as interpreter on Bakufu missions to the United States. In the same year as the Meiji Restoration, 1868, he was jailed for the publication of an antigovernment newspaper, *Koko Shimbun*. In 1870 he joined the new government and accompanied Hirobumi Ito (1841–1909) and Tomomi Iwakura (1825–1883) on missions abroad (1871–1872). From 1874 to 1888 he worked as an editor of the *Tokyo Nichi Nichi* newspaper. Later, he held a short tenure in the Finance Ministry. After becoming a leading journalist in Japan, he founded and led the pro-government *Rikken Teiseito* (Constitutional Imperial Party) in 1881–1883. He started to write novels, historical works, and Kabuki plays, and from 1887, he helped to build the Kabuki Theater. In 1904 he was elected to the Diet (legislature).

Nathalie Cavasin

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FUKUDA HIDEKO (1865–1927), pioneer of Japan's women's liberation and socialist movements. Born Kageyama Hideko in Okayama prefecture, Japan, Fukuda was first inspired to join the women's

liberation and democratic rights movements by a speech made by the women's rights advocate Kishida Toshiko (1864–1901) in 1882. The following year, she took an active part on behalf of the Liberal Party in Okayama by founding a private night school for girls. She ran the school until it was ordered closed in 1884. In 1885, Fukuda was arrested in Tokyo for her involvement with a group of radicals advocating the Korean reformation movement. She was later released from prison under the amnesty of 1889.

Married to a radical socialist for eight years, Fukuda became more deeply involved with well-known socialist groups of the times. She then became a socialist herself, particularly concerned with raising the status of women. In 1907, Fukuda began publishing the feminist journal *Sekai fujin* (Women of the World), which introduced Japanese readers to the activities of the women's suffrage movement around the world. Though Fukuda labored under financial difficulties and political suppression throughout her life, she continued to educate women and to advocate women's political and economic independence. She also supported various social and political movements. In 1904, she wrote an autobiography titled *Warawa no hanseigai* (My Life Thus Far).

Kyoko Murakami

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FUKUDA TAKEO (1905–1995), prime minister of Japan. Fukuda Takeo was born in Gumma Prefecture and graduated from Tokyo University. A career bureaucrat in the Ministry of Finance and a member of the House of Representatives from 1952 until his death in 1995, Fukuda held cabinet posts under various prime ministers; he served as minister of agriculture, of finance, and of foreign affairs. As foreign minister in the cabinet of Prime Minister Sato Eisaku (1901–1975), Fukuda handled negotiations with the United States during the conclusion and ratification of the 1971 agreement on the return of Okinawa. He successfully challenged Miki Takeo for presidency of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), resulting in his becoming president of the LPD and prime minister of

Japan in 1976. Unable to stabilize the economy and faced with declining public trust in his leadership, he was forced to dissolve his cabinet in 1978 when party members were implicated in the Lockheed bribery scandal, in which government and business colluded to purchase aircraft in exchange for kickbacks.

William Ridgeway

FUKUI (2002 est. pop. 829,000). Fukui Prefecture is situated in the western region of Japan's Honshu Island. Occupying an area of 4,192 square kilometers, it is divided into a more populous northern district of mountain ranges intercut with river valleys and coastal plains and a narrow rocky strip extending southward along Wasaka Bay. Its main rivers are the Kuzuryugawa, Hinogawa, and Asuwagawa. Fukui is bordered by the Sea of Japan and by Ishikawa, Gifu, Shiga, and Kyoto prefectures.

The capital of the prefecture is Fukui City, which grew around a castle built in 1575 by Shibata Katsuei (1522?–1583), the future governor of Echizen Province (subsumed into Fukui Prefecture in 1881). Severely damaged by bombing during World War II and by a 1948 earthquake, the city has since been rebuilt. Traditionally a weaving center, it now produces synthetic fiber as well as foodstuffs and machinery. Among its attractions are the former site of Fukui Castle; the remains of the Asakura family fortress, Ichijodani; and Asuwayama Park. Other important cities of the prefecture are Takefu, Sabae, and Tsuruga, the last near the Hokuriku Tunnel, the second longest in Japan.

Fukui's many archaeological sites are evidence of early human settlement. Rice culture, commercial fishing, and textile mills are the main economic activities. Modern chemical and machinery industries operate alongside more traditional producers of lacquer ware and cutlery. Fukui also supplies the Kansai region, comprising the cities of Osaka, Kyoto, Kobe, and Nara, with nuclear power. Visitors are drawn to Fukui by the ancient Buddhist temple complex of Eiheji and by Haku-san National Park and other parks along the coast.

E. L. S. Weber

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FUKUMOTO KAZUO (1894–1983), Japanese Marxist intellectual. The most influential ideologue of

Japanese Marxism in the 1930s, Kazuo Fukumoto introduced the question of subjectivity into Marxist thought with his postulate that the class struggle was a matter of self-transformation. He was born in Tottori Prefecture, graduated from Tokyo University in 1920, and taught at Matsue Higher School. In 1922, he went to study Marxism in Germany and France.

After returning to Japan in 1924, Fukumoto joined the Communist Party. With the support of his students, he criticized the theories of established Marxists such as Yamakawa Hitoshi (1880–1958) and Kawakami Hajime (1879–1946), and attempted to reorganize the Communist Party. In 1926 he became the head of the party's political section, but was forced to resign in 1927 due to increasing criticism from the Comintern and other Japanese Communists, who felt his ideas alienated the party from the masses, and that Fukumoto didn't understand the correct role of the party as distinct from the labor unions. This marked an end of Fukumoto's prominence. He was arrested in June 1928 and sentenced to ten years at hard labor but was imprisoned for fourteen.

After the Second World War, he joined the Communist Party again but was expelled in 1958 for disagreeing with other party members. In his sixties, Fukumoto turned to the study of economic history and Japanese culture, focusing on the Edo Period (1600–1868).

Nathalie Cavasin

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FUKUOKA (2002 est. pop. 5 million). Fukuoka Prefecture is situated in the north of Japan's island of Kyushu. Once a conduit for the transmission of culture from ancient China by way of Korea, it occupies an area of 4,963 square kilometers. Its main geographical features are the central Tsukushi Mountains, the river Chikugogawa surrounded by broad plains in the south, and the northwestern Fukuoka Plain. Fukuoka is bordered by Oita, Kumamoto, and Saga Prefectures, and by the Inland, Ariake, Genkai, and Hibiki Seas. The prefecture assumed its present name

and borders in 1876; it subsumed the former provinces of Chikuzen, Chikugo, and Buzen.

The capital of the prefecture is Fukuoka city, situated on Hakata Bay. It is Kyushu Island's largest city as well as its cultural, commercial, and political center. Fukuoka city began as the seventh-century port of Hakata; close by was Dazaifu, the administrative center for all Kyushu. In the thirteenth century the Mongols tried to invade Japan along the Fukuoka coast. Hakata flourished through trade with Ming China (1368–1644). In 1601, a castle was erected in Hakata and named Fukuoka. The city of Fukuoka resulted from the merger of the new castle town and Hakata in 1889. Following destruction in World War II, Fukuoka was rebuilt on a grid plan.

Today its cultural institutions range from Kyushu University to numerous shrines and temples, notably the Shofuku Buddhist temple, founded in 1195 by Eisai (1141–1215), the monk who established the Rinzaï sect of Zen Buddhism in Japan. Kyushu's oldest Shinto shrine, Sumiyoshi Jinja (1623), is also located in Fukuoka. Among the city's traditional crafts are silk weaving and dyeing and the manufacture of dolls. It is noted for one of the largest fish catches in Japan, and its modern industries include chemicals, textiles, electrical equipment, machinery, printing, and food processing. The other important cities of Fukuoka Prefecture are Kita, Kyushu, Kurume, and Omuta.

The prefecture's rich coal deposits fueled Japan's industrialization around the beginning of the twentieth century, although the coal output declined after World War II. Today the prefecture's larger industries include steel, glass, and ceramics. The agriculture of rice, vegetables, fruit, tea, and livestock remains productive. Visitors are drawn to scenic Inland Sea National Park and to the area's quasi-national parks, as well as to the Kofun tombs around the capital.

E. L. S. Weber

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FUKUSHIMA (2002 est. pop. 2.1 million). Fukushima Prefecture is situated in the northern area of Japan's island of Honshu. A prime agricultural region and the transportation link between northeastern and southwestern Honshu, it occupies an area of 13,784 square kilometers. Its primary geographical features are the Abukuma, Ou, and Echigo mountain

ranges that separate the coastal plains and central river basins. The main rivers are the Abukumagawa, Nip-pashigawa, and Tadamigawa. The region's highest peak is Hiuchigadake, rising 2,356 meters. The prefecture is bordered by the Pacific Ocean and by Yamagata, Miyagi, Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gumma, and Niigata Prefectures. Once part of Mutsu Province, Fukushima assumed its present name and borders in 1876.

The capital of the prefecture is Fukushima city. During the fifteenth century, it grew as a castle town and a post station town. Today it is home to Fukushima University and Iizaka Hot Spring. The prefecture's other important cities are Aizu Wakamatsu, Iwaki, Koriyama, and Sukagawa.

In the late nineteenth century the prefecture was a hotbed of popular resistance against the high taxes and conscript labor of the Meiji government. In the Fukushima Incident of 1882, some one thousand peasants assembled to demand the release of their leaders from jail. The leaders had opposed the public auction of the property of peasants unable to pay taxes, and the event came to symbolize commoners' resistance against unjust rulers.

Today, half of the prefecture's arable land is devoted to rice. Cucumbers, tomatoes, peaches, pears, and apples also are grown, as is tobacco. Nuclear energy powers such industries as the processing and production of chemicals, metal, machinery, and textiles. Visitors are drawn to Bandai-Asahi National Park and to the prefecture's many hot spring resorts.

E. L. S. Weber

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FUKUZAWA YUKICHI (1835–1901), Japanese intellectual. Of all the intellectuals associated with Japan's late-nineteenth-century transformation, none has earned more scholarly and popular attention than Fukuzawa Yukichi, a man whose name evokes the ideology of "civilization and enlightenment" that engulfed the country during the 1870s. Fukuzawa was born in the city of Osaka but raised in a samurai family of modest standing in the small domain of Nakatsu in Kyushu. Schooled in the Confucian classics, Fukuzawa, at age nineteen, ventured out in pursuit of "Western learning" first in Nagasaki, then Osaka, and finally Edo (Tokyo). The move to Edo in 1858 was precipitated by the request of the local domain offi-

cial that Fukuzawa open his own Dutch (soon to become English) academy. Over the next decade, this school, which eventually evolved into Japan's leading private institution for higher learning (Keio University), served as the institutional foothold for Fukuzawa's career as the nation's preeminent pedagogue of Anglo-American culture and thought. Fukuzawa's credentials were further enhanced when he joined missions to the United States and Europe during the 1860s that were sponsored by the Tokugawa *bakufu* (shogunate). From 1866, when he published the first volume of his famous *Conditions in the West*, until his death in 1901, Fukuzawa's writings on education, economics, government, and social etiquette circulated more widely than those of any other contemporary writer. Fukuzawa Yukichi's legacy, however, remains a subject of controversy. Fukuzawa was a man of striking ambivalence: an egalitarian liberal and iconoclast in some respects, but also a conservative bureaucrat with distinctly aristocratic pretensions. Among scholars of "Western learning," he stood at the progressive forefront in his call for individual freedom and independence, the universal pursuit of utilitarian learning, and the equality, at least in regard to property rights, of wives and husbands within the family. Still, for all of his celebrated disdain for "feudal" privilege and custom, Fukuzawa was himself a *bakufu* employee between 1860 and 1867 and, for the most part, remained an enduring defender of the old regime during its Restoration struggles between 1858 and 1868. Nevertheless, within the context of his times, Fukuzawa stands out as an innovative educator who helped to navigate the nation through its historical transition from the Tokugawa period (1600/1603–1868) to the Meiji period (1868–1912).

Donald Roden

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FUNAKOSHI GICHIN (1868–1957), father of modern karate. Funakoshi Gichin was born in Shuri, Okinawa, Japan, to a *Shizoku* (gentry) family. He was raised by his grandfather, a Confucian tutor to the Okinawan royal family. Funakoshi also became an educator, but is more popularly known as a master of Okinawan martial arts. He studied with a number of legendary Okinawan teachers such as Matsumura Sokon (1809–1901) and Kanryo Higaonna (1853–1917), but his closest teachers were Azato Yasutsune (1828–1906) and Itosu Yasutsune (1831–1916).

Funakoshi is considered today to be the father of modern karate. He was not the first proponent of the Okinawan martial arts to teach in mainland Japan, but he is remembered as the Okinawan master who popularized karate in Japan. Between 1917 and 1921, he was involved in a number of martial arts demonstrations, including one for Crown Prince Hirohito. In 1922, Funakoshi was selected by his teachers and peers to attend the Ministry of Education's National Athletic Exhibition in Tokyo, where he demonstrated various self-defense techniques and lectured about the health benefits of the Okinawan martial arts. At the request of a number of important Japanese officials, Funakoshi agreed to remain in Tokyo and teach his art.

Before these demonstrations most people in Japan had never heard of Okinawan martial arts. Within a few short years, however, Funakoshi had organized martial arts clubs at all of Tokyo's most prestigious universities and authored a number of books on the martial arts of Okinawa. It was around this time that Funakoshi popularized the name *karatedo* (empty hand way) to describe the practice he was teaching. Before this, the martial arts of Okinawa were usually referred to as "Chinese hand" or "Okinawan hand." By 1936, with the help of his third son Gigo (1907–1945), Funakoshi was able to open a private dojo (training hall), which his students named the Shotokan in honor of the Master's pen name Shoto (pine waves).

The interwar years were a dark time for Funakoshi. Not only did he suffer from dire poverty and hunger, as did most of Japan, but he also lost his wife, his son Gigo, and the Shotokan. In 1949, during the U.S. occupation of Japan, Funakoshi's students helped him to pick up the pieces and formed the Japan Karate Association with Funakoshi as its chief advisor. From this point, he began to teach once again, and karate began to gain popularity around the world.

Funakoshi continued to teach and write until his death in 1957. He dedicated his life to promoting an understanding of what he referred to as "the true meaning of *karatedo*." He felt that karate was grossly misunderstood and misused by most practitioners. He often commented that the practice of karate is best used for combating sickness and old age rather than people and that the highest goal in karate is to diffuse a potentially dangerous situation before it escalates into violence.

Matthew F. Komelski

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FUNCINPEC A Cambodian political party, the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia is known by its French acronym, FUNCINPEC. The party traces its origins to the non-Khmer Rouge political faction associated with King (then Prince) Norodom Sihanouk (b. 1922), which fought for control of the country from a base near the Thai-Cambodian border against the incumbent People's Republic of Kampuchea during the 1980s.

The FUNCINPEC returned to mainstream politics in the aftermath of the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements, when it emerged as one of the dominant parties contesting the 1993 national elections. Capitalizing on its royalist heritage, it won the majority of seats at those elections, with the party's leader, Prince Norodom Ranariddh (b. 1944), a son of Sihanouk, assuming the title of first prime minister. Since the FUNCINPEC's political infrastructure was poorly formed at local levels, its power-sharing coalition with the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) soon became inequitably weighted in favor of the latter, former rulers of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, who controlled much of the country's security forces and administration, and were therefore particularly influential in much of the rural countryside.

In 1997 problems between the coalition partners reached the boiling point, with CPP leader Hun Sen (b. 1952) ousting Ranariddh. Many FUNCINPEC officials fled the country, leaving the party in shambles. Those officials slowly returned to the country in late

1997 and 1998, when the FUNCINPEC again contested the national elections. The party came in second to the CPP in the national vote and assumed the role of junior coalition partner. FUNCINPEC leader Prince Ranariddh became the president of the legislature, the National Assembly.

David M. Ayres

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FURUKAWA ICHIBEI (1832–1903), Japanese entrepreneur. Born in Kyoto, Furukawa was engaged in the silk trade business for the Ono Group, a merchant company based in Kyoto. In 1874, Ono went bankrupt and Furukawa started independently in the same activities. After raw silk exporting became unprofitable, he turned to mining ventures. He went to manage a mining company that was operated by the Soma family in the Tohoku region. In 1877, with a loan and the aid of the financier and entrepreneur Eiichi Shibusawa (1840–1931), Furukawa purchased the Ashio copper mine from the government. His innovations in Ashio produced commercial success. By 1885, Ashio's production reached 4,131 tons annually, which represented 39 percent of Japan's total copper output. Furukawa extended the purchase of mines by acquiring in 1885 the Great Innai and Ani silver mines. He possessed by 1900 eighteen metal mines and four coal mines. In 1897, Furukawa's operations passed to his adopted son, Junkichi. After the death of Furukawa Ichibei in 1903, the enterprise was reorganized, to take the form in 1905 of a *zaibatsu*, one of the pyramid-type business conglomerates that dominated the Japanese economy until their dissolution in 1945.

Nathalie Cavasin

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FUTABATEI SHIMEI (1864–1909), Japanese novelist and translator. Futabatei Shimei (pseudonym of Hasegawa Tatsunosuke) was born in Edo (now Tokyo) to a samurai family. He is the author of Japan's first modern novel, *Ukigumo* (The Drifting Cloud, 1887–1889), which he began while still a student at Tokyo Gaikokugo Gakko (now Tokyo University of Foreign Studies). Futabatei's studies in Russian language and literature resulted in many fine translations, which he continued to produce until his death, including those of Turgenev, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Goncharov, and Chekov. He was able to achieve a literary style appropriate to the realistic fiction of contemporary Japan known as *gembun itchi* ("fusion of spoken and written language"). Futabatei also accomplished a psychological realism that his mentor, Tsubouchi Shoyo, had originally proposed in his *Shosetsu shinzui* (Essence of the Novel, 1885–1886) but could not himself realize. Futabatei had little trust in the public reception of his art and, unable to make a living from writing, took up a government post in 1889, withdrawing from literary circles but continuing to devote his time to writing. His ambivalence toward being a novelist is reflected in his choice of a pseudonym that sounds like the profanity *kutabatte shimae*, "go to hell." In the last years of his life, he again received critical attention for a novel on the common Japanese practice of adopting a son-in-law into a family that has no heir, *Sono omokage* (An Adopted Husband, 1906). The author's bitter attitude toward his literary milieu is summed up in his final novel *Heibon* (Mediocrity, 1907), a semiautobiographical study. Hired as a newspaper correspondent in Russia, he took ill soon after arrival and died on his return trip to Japan.

William Ridgeway

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GADJAH MADA UNIVERSITY In December 1949, Gadjah Mada University (Universitas Gadjah Mada, or UGM), in the city of Yogyakarta, located in the quasi-provincial area of Yogyakarta (Daerah Istimewah Yogyakarta, or DIY), became Indonesia's first national university. It superseded the Gadjah Mada Institute of Higher Learning, previously established on 3 March 1946 by, among others, Hamengku Buwono IX, Sultan of Yogyakarta, in the then capital of the newly proclaimed Republic of Indonesia.

To form the university, the Institute merged with the School of Engineering (founded by the Indonesian Department of Education), the staff and students of which were recruited from an engineering institution in Bandung, West Java. Also joining in the merger was the College of Political Science, a training center for bureaucratic and diplomatic staff run by the Department of the Interior. The new university was named after a fourteenth-century Javanese statesman.

The state-run UGM has eighteen faculties, including medicine, law, education, philosophy, engineering, animal husbandry, and forestry. It offers sixty-three undergraduate programs, sixteen diploma programs, and several nondegree programs. Its Graduate Studies Faculty comprises fifty-two programs. UGM has nineteen specialized research centers, five interuniversity centers and six community centers. With over 38,000 students and first-class academic and research facilities, UGM is one of Indonesia's largest universities.

Andi Faisal Bakti

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GAFUROV, BOBOJAN GAFUROVICH

(1908–1977), Tajik politician and scholar. Bobojan Gafurovich Gafurov led the Tajikistan Soviet Socialist Republic from 1946 until 1956 as the first secretary of the Communist Party. Born in Ispisar (a remote northern province of the republic) in 1908, he began his career as a journalist and lecturer before joining the Communist Party apparatus and climbing up to the highest political post in the republic under Josef Stalin (1879–1953), then Soviet leader. In 1956 he left the republic to become the director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Soviet Academy of Science in Moscow.

However, it was his works on the history of Central Asia, and particularly on the history of Tajikistan and Tajiks, that won him nationwide recognition in Tajikistan and a reputation as one of the founders of the Tajikistani oriental school and Tajikistani nationalism. In his publications, including two versions of *Tarikbi Mukhtasari Halki Tochik* (The History of Tajik People), he put forward the idea that the beginning of the Tajiks could be in ancient civilizations of Central Asia. This interpretation of history was widely used in the consolidation of the Tajik identity in the territory of modern Tajikistan.

Rafis Abazov

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GAJAH MADA (d. 1364), Javanese military leader. The Hindu-Javanese kingdom of Majapahit, established in 1293 by the East Javanese king Vijaya (d. 1328), experienced its golden age in the fourteenth century CE, owing to the military prowess and political cunning of Gajah Mada. Born a commoner, Gajah Mada rose to fame when he was still an officer of the royal bodyguard. After he overcame an insurrection against Vijaya's son, King Jayanagara (reigned 1309–1328), he was elevated to the rank of minister. His loyalty, however, waned when Jayanagara laid claim to Gajah Mada's wife. After successfully plotting the death of the king, he ascended to the height of his power under the reign of Jayanagara's daughter Tribhuvana (reigned 1328–1350), who appointed him as prime minister after he quelled another rebellion. True to his oath that he would conquer the whole archipelago, he subjugated Bali in 1343 as well as other smaller kingdoms. These conquests are related in the *Nagarakertagama* (Sacred Book of the Prosperous State), a Javanese epic that was written in 1365 under his sponsorship by the poet Prapancha. Tribhuvana, who abdicated in 1350, was succeeded by her son Hayam Wuruk (reigned 1334–1389). During his reign, Gajah Mada extended Majapahit's influence even further, up to mainland Southeast Asia. Gajah Mada died in 1364 under mysterious circumstances.

Martin Ramstedt

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GAKUREKI SHAKAI *Gakureki* is the Japanese word for an individual's educational record or history, and *gakureki shakai* describes the characteristics of Japanese society that make such a record crucial to a student's future social status. With the rapid expansion of enrollment in senior high schools and universities between the early 1960s and the late 1970s, not only the level of education obtained but also the rank or status of a person's alma mater became a major factor in determining his or her initial labor-market position.

The Japanese education system is generally considered meritocratic and egalitarian because of the open competition of the entrance exams. However, empirical studies show a consistent link between parents' educational or social status and the level of schooling attained by their offspring. Nevertheless, the Japanese educational selection system is widely regarded as legitimate among students and parents despite the severe academic competition.

Three characteristics of Japanese culture and society may explain this enduring legitimacy. First, no overt link exists between middle-class values and the knowledge tested on entrance exams. Unlike many European nations, which emphasized elite forms of social capital in schools and in interviews for job entry, Japan has historically emphasized Japanese national culture. This continued in modern education. Second, most Japanese do not believe in innate differences in either intelligence or ability. Most people view success as the product of individual effort. This belief is reinforced by the fact that students who do not study hard risk failure in the intense competition for high school or university entrance, even if they are gifted with academic ability. Third, education in high schools and universities and the transition to the job market revolve around competition. Students are faced with the constant possibility of losing or winning, and the status of past winners in future competitions is ambiguous, promoting a cycle of status anxiety and increased aspirations.

In the mid-1980s, concerns about intense academic competition and an eruption of school problems, including bullying, violence, and students refusing to go to school, engendered support for a series of educational reforms focused on individual differences, freedom in education, and creativity. Multiple selection criteria for admission to high schools and universities, including interviews and evaluations of extracurricular

lar activities, were introduced in the 1990s. However, these reforms were implemented without parallel changes in the job market, thereby increasing the popularity of *juku* (cram schools) and private schools that fuel competition. In addition, some argue that the introduction of the new criteria in the selection system creates inequality between students from different social classes, as disadvantaged students will have fewer opportunities to participate in extracurricular activities and may experience discrimination during interviews. *Gakureki shakai* will continue to flourish, even after a series of educational reforms to suppress competition, as long as no dramatic changes occur in the job market and in its legitimacy among participants.

Motoko Akiba

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GAMA, VASCO DA (c. 1460–1524), Portuguese explorer. Vasco da Gama discovered the sea route to India from Europe and established a Portuguese presence in India, which lasted until 1961. He was born in Simes, Portugal, around 1460. In 1497 King João II of Portugal sent him on a mission to India; da Gama was to find a route that would circumvent the Middle East, where travel and commerce were difficult for European traders. Da Gama sailed from Lisbon with four ships on 8 July and rounded the Cape of Good Hope in November, arriving in Calicut, in southwest India, on 20 May 1498.

The Zamorin of Calicut welcomed him, but because of Muslim opposition da Gama was unable to conclude a treaty. He returned to Lisbon in 1499 and was granted a triumphal homecoming; King Manuel I granted him the title of Dom (Sir) and named him Admiral of the Indian Ocean. He also received a large pension from the king.

In 1502, he was sent back to India to avenge the destruction of a factory the Portuguese had built in Calicut. He sank a ship sent against him, killing all on board; then bombarded the city. After concluding a treaty with the ruler of Cannanore, he returned to Portugal and retired to Évora. He was made Conde de

Vidigueira in 1519. In 1524, he was appointed viceroy of India and arrived there in September 1524, only to die in December in Cochin. His discovery of the route around South Africa was commemorated by the poet Camões.

Henry Scholberg

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GAMBANG KROMONG *Gambang kromong* refers to a type of ensemble, based in and around Jakarta, that combines Indonesian and Chinese instruments and styles. Its name derives from two of the instruments played: the *gambang*, a xylophone, and the *kromong*, a set of kettle-gongs on a rack. These are combined with instruments originating from China: a two-stringed fiddle and a side-blown flute. The remaining instruments in the core ensemble are percussion (hanging gongs, drums, and a set of clashing metal plates). Male and female singers, who sing lyrics in the popular Malay form of pantun, round out the ensemble. Western instruments may also be added, including electric guitars, trumpets, clarinets, saxophones, and electronic keyboards.

The music is performed and patronized by two groups who live in and around Jakarta (in Bekasi, northern Bogor, and Tangerang): Peranakan, people of mixed Chinese and Pribumi (native Indonesian) ancestry; and Betawi, who are considered Pribumi. Ensembles accompany male-female dancing at Peranakan weddings and other family celebrations. In this context, female dancers are hired as partners for men. Ensembles also accompany a form of popular theater called *lenong*.

Ethnomusicologist Philip Yampolsky has identified two repertoires that are part of modern performance practice: *lagu lama*, older songs oriented toward Chinese musical features; and *lagu sayur*, newer songs that tend to be based in Malay musical idioms. *Lagu lama* melodies were probably brought from the Fujian province of southern China to the Dutch colonial city of Batavia, presumably in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. At that time, *gambang kromong* groups played for private weddings and parties. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, as the music became part of a more public sphere, the instrumentation embraced Indonesian instruments, in-

cluding drums, gongs, and *kromong*. The *lagu sayur* repertoire emerged at this time, and in the early twentieth century embraced popular songs in the region around Batavia. The music became even more hybrid in the 1920s and 1930s, as it blended with U.S. and European popular music and jazz. A genre called *gambang moderen* ("modern gambang [kromong]"), associated with the actor and popular music composer Benyamin S. (1939–1995), is an important marker of Betawi cultural identity in contemporary Indonesia.

Andrew Weintraub

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GAMBUH The classical Balinese dance drama *gambuh* probably originates from the last eastern Javanese Hindu kingdom of Majapahit. Majapahit fell to the coastal kingdom of Demak—then mostly Muslim—around 1520, but its dance drama tradition continued in Bali. *Gambuh* was traditionally performed on secular and ritual occasions in temples, palaces, or villages, and related the life in the ancient Hindu-Javanese courts—the ancestral home of the Balinese nobility. Nowadays, *gambuh* is predominantly staged during rituals, and is flourishing after almost vanishing between the 1930s and the 1980s. Plots draw on the old-Javanese mythical epic, *Malat*, narrating the adventures of Prince Panji and Princess Candra. The old-Javanese historical epic, *Rangga Lawe*, is another source. The knowledgeable audiences appreciate the refined performance, complicated choreography, and accom-



Performers getting ready for a *gambuh* dance performance at Besakih Temple in Bali in 1997. (CATHERINE KARNOW/CORBIS)

plished dancing and singing. *Gambuh* is considered the basis for all the other classical dance forms. The dancers-cum-singers are accompanied by a *gamelan gambuh* orchestra consisting of bamboo flutes, a bowed lute, drums, cymbals, bells, and gongs.

Martin Ramstedt

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GAMELAN The term "gamelan" refers to various indigenous music ensembles of Java and Bali, the core instruments of which are usually drums, variously tuned bronze gongs, different sets of bronze metallophones, cymbals, and flutes. The bas-reliefs of some of the ancient Hindu and Buddhist temples in Central and East Java, dating from the eighth to fourteenth centuries CE, depict many examples of instruments similar to some of those used in contemporary gamelan orchestras, such as drums, flutes, small knobbed gongs, cymbals, and xylophones. Most contemporary instruments, however, are not represented on these reliefs. They actually much more resemble those used in traditional court orchestras throughout mainland Southeast Asia. The largest of the Javanese court gamelan, usually accompanying the sophisticated court dances (e.g., *bedaya*, *serimpi*, *wayang wong*) and shadow plays (*wayang kulit*), consist of various sets of metallophones (*demung*, *sarong*, *slentem*, *gender*), differently sized horizontally or vertically suspended gongs (*kenong*, *kempyang*, *ketuk*, *bonang*, *gong*), and spoon-shaped, cymbal-like instruments (*kemanak*) made of bronze, as well as drums (*kendang*), flutes (*suling*), plucked (*celempung*) and bowed (*rebab*) string instruments, xylophones (*gambang kayu*), and singing (*pesinden*, *dalang*).

In Bali, a variety of gamelan ensembles have been in use for centuries, both in village life and at the various courts, accompanying rituals as well as dance dramas and shadow plays. They, too, are usually different sets of bronze metallophones (*gangsra*, *kantilan*, *calung*, *jegogan*, *gender*), vertically and horizontally suspended gongs of different sizes (*gong*, *kempur*, *kemong*, *kempli*, *reyong*, *trompong*), cymbals (*ceng-ceng*), drums (*kendang*), and flutes (*suling*). Some of the ensembles



Musicians perform in a gamelan orchestra in Bali. (CHRISTINE OSBORNE/CORBIS)

also include a bowed string instrument (*rebab*) and singing.

Among the most conspicuous instruments of both the Javanese and Balinese gamelan are the various metallophones. Their bronze plates, struck with mallets, are vertically suspended over either a wooden resonance trough or resonance tubes made of bamboo. Each gamelan is unique in tone color and pitch, fine tuned by master gong-smiths in accordance with the seven-tone *pelog* tonal system, consisting of unequal intervals, or the five-tone *slendro* tonal system, consisting of equal intervals. Javanese gamelan are, in fact, composed of both a *pelog* and a *slendro* set of instruments, whereas in Bali the *slendro* scale is reserved for the ensembles (*gender wayang*) that accompany the shadow plays. Both *pelog* and *slendro* are determined by their respective relative intervals, that is, independently of absolute pitch. Each tonal system allows for different scales, which are classified according to different modes (in Java called *patet* and in Bali *tetekep*).

Martin Ramstedt

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GANDAN LAMASERY Gandan lamasery, nestled in the modern city of Ulaanbaatar, is the seat of Mongolian Buddhism and the largest monastery in the Mongolian People's Republic. Founded at nearly the same time as Ulaanbaatar, in the seventh century CE, Gandan lamasery shares a common history with the nation's capital. In 1651 Gandan lamasery was established at the behest of Dalai Lama Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso (1617–1682) in the young nomadic religious settlement of Orgoo in Mongolia. For over a century, the lamasery moved with Orgoo and became the center of the settlement's religious activities. Orgoo and Gandan lamasery settled in 1778 on the site of modern-day Ulaanbaatar, and gradually a city of merchants and craftsmen formed around the religious center. By 1900 Gandan lamasery boasted a majority of the city's 25,000 inhabitants. This changed with the beginning of socialist rule in the 1920s, when the government instituted strict rules against the practice of Buddhism and destroyed most of the monasteries in Mongolia. Due to its special status, Gandan was preserved as a religious museum during this time, but the number of lamas in its service decreased dramatically. With Mongolia's transition to democracy beginning in 1989, Gandan monastery reopened as a center of the Buddhist faith and has grown to include several thousand monks.

Daniel Hruschka

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GANDHI, INDIRA (1917–1964), prime minister of India. Indira Gandhi, daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), the first prime minister of independent India, married Feroze Gandhi, a Parsi (not related to Mohandas [Mahatma] Gandhi); their sons were Rajiv (who also served as India's prime minister, 1984–1989) and Sanjay. She joined the Indian



Indira Gandhi with her sons Rajiv and Sanjay in New Delhi in 1967. (HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS)

National Congress (INC) in 1938 and was its president from 1959 to 1960. She was a minister in Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri's cabinet from 1964 to 1966 and succeeded him in 1966. As prime minister, she concluded a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union and backed the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan. In 1974 she ordered the test of a nuclear device. When she nearly lost her mandate due to petition for early elections, she proclaimed a national emergency in 1975 and postponed the elections of 1976. In the elections of 1977 she was defeated, but she returned to power in 1980. When Sikh separatists occupied the Golden Temple of Amritsar, a site sacred to Sikhs, she ordered the army to capture the temple, resulting in 450 Sikh deaths. She was shot fatally by her Sikh bodyguards in October 1984.

Dietmar Rothermund

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GANDHI, MOHANDAS K. (1869–1948), Indian nationalist and promoter of nonviolent resistance. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi grew up in Porbandar, Gujarat, the son of a minister of a princely state. His father became a judge at a special court in Rajkot, Gujarat, settling disputes among princes. In such a court, nobody could be sentenced: the judges had to bring equitable compromises between the princes. Gandhi's father was good at this, and young Mohandas admired him for it. His mother was a pious woman who often took vows and observed them religiously. These parental virtues left a deep impact on him.



MOHANDAS GANDHI ON THE IMPORTANCE OF LAND OWNERSHIP FOR THE PEOPLE OF INDIA

"Real socialism has been handed down to us by our ancestors who fought: '*All land belongs to Gopal, where then is the boundary line? Man is the maker of that line and he can, therefore, unmake it.*' *Gopal* literally means shepherd; it also means God. In modern language it means the State; the People. That the land to-day does not belong to the people is too true. But the fault is not in the teaching. It is in us who have not lived up to it.

"I have no doubt that we can make as good an approach to it as it possible for any nation, not excluding Russia, and that without violence. The most effective substitute for violent dispossession is the wheel with all its implications. *Land and property is his who will work on it.*

"Unfortunately the workers are or have been kept ignorant of this simple fact.

"Continuous unemployment has induced in the people a kind of laziness which is most depressing. Thus whilst the alien rule is undoubtedly responsible for the growing pauperism of the people, we are more responsible for it. If the middle-class people, who betrayed their trust and bartered away the economic independence of India for a mess of pottage, would now realize their error and take the message of the wheel to the villagers and induce them to shed their laziness, and work at the wheel, we can ameliorate the condition of the people to a great extent."


Source: Jagdish Saran Sharma. (1962) India's Struggle for Freedom: Select Documents and Sources. Vol. 1. Delhi: S. Chand, 29

Gandhi was sent to London at the age of eighteen to study law. After obtaining his degree, he returned to India in 1891, but did not do well as a lawyer, as he was too shy. A Muslim businessman sent him to South Africa to resolve a legal dispute between two rich Muslims. Gandhi persuaded them to settle the issue out of court. He was about to return to India when he noticed that Indian immigrants in South Africa were about to be deprived of their right to vote. He

organized the Natal Indian Congress to fight against this measure. Soon he became involved in more issues affecting the civil rights of the Indian minority. He stressed that rights also implied duties and, during both the Boer War and the Zulu rebellion, he organized an Indian ambulance corps. The white militia's brutal massacre of the Zulus brought about a fundamental change in Gandhi's life. He renounced his profession, took a vow of chastity and decided to devote his life to political and social work. In this new capacity, he developed *satyagraha* ("holding on to the truth"), a strategy of nonviolent resistance to unjust laws. He empowered the Indian minority by organizing campaigns along these lines. He also wrote his manifesto *Hind swaraj* ("Freedom of India"), which was published in 1909. He stated that the British ruled India only because they could rely on the cooperation of the Indians. Nonviolent noncooperation would thus put an end to colonial rule.

When Gandhi returned to India in 1915, there was no scope for political campaigns. During World War I, the British-Indian government was armed with emergency powers. Gandhi devoted himself to local issues such as oppression of peasants by British indigo planters in Champaran, Bihar. After the war, the British extended their wartime emergency powers by means of an act that became known by the name of Justice Rowlatt, who had drafted it. In 1919, Gandhi organized a *hartal*, a kind of general strike of all traders, in protest. To his dismay, the campaign did not remain nonviolent, and the strike was brutally repressed by the British. When he launched his *satyagraha* campaign in 1920, he restricted it to a series of boycotts (for example, of elections, of the schools and law courts, and of foreign cloth). Gandhi also drafted a new constitution of the Indian National Congress, the political party agitating for India's independence. The participation of rural India in Congress politics and the creation of the Working Committee as a permanent leadership for agitation were the main features of this new constitution. Through his hold on the Working Committee, Gandhi controlled the Congress, even when he had no official position in the organization.

The British hesitated to arrest Gandhi during the noncooperation campaign for fear of adding fuel to the fire. In 1922, Gandhi terminated the campaign, as an outbreak of violence in a remote village had alarmed him. He was then sentenced to six years of rigorous imprisonment but was released for health reasons in 1924. Most people thought at that time that he was a spent force. When the Congress planned another political campaign in 1930, however, Gandhi was again



Mohandas K. Gandhi praying in December 1949. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

its main strategist. This time, he found the unjust salt law to be a proper target for *satyagraha*. The law gave the government a monopoly over the production of salt; Gandhi organized a march to the sea to collect sea salt. When agrarian prices dropped by half due to the Great Depression, peasants who had to pay revenue and interest at their old rates flocked to the Congress. The British viceroy, Lord Irwin, fearing a peasant rebellion, concluded a pact with Gandhi, who hoped that he could arrive at a similar pact with the British prime minister to secure substantial concessions for India. In this, he was to be disappointed. In subsequent years Gandhi devoted himself to constructive work in Indian villages and to the uplift of the untouchables.

Gandhi was only once more called on to launch a major campaign, when the Congress rejected the offer that the British minister, Sir Stafford Cripps, had taken to India in 1942, promising independence after World War II if Congress would back the British war effort. Gandhi asked the British to "Quit India" immediately, but before he could organize a campaign, he and all other Congress leaders were imprisoned.

On the eve of Independence, Gandhi had to be reconciled to the partition of India into two states, India and Pakistan, which he had opposed. The new Indian government was reluctant to agree to this, as India was already at war with Pakistan over Kashmir. Gandhi saw to it that Pakistan got its share, and for that he was shot fatally by a radical Hindu nationalist, five months after India's independence. Beloved by millions of Indians and admired by people worldwide, he became known as the Mahatma, or Great Soul.

Dietmar Rothermund

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GANG OF FOUR The Gang of Four (*siren bang*) is the name given to the four most influential supporters of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in its later stages, other than Mao Zedong (1893–1976). The group's main focus of activities was in Shanghai. There were three men, Zhang Chunqiao (1917–1991?), Yao Wenyuan (b. 1931), and Wang Hongwen (1935–1992), and one woman, Jiang Qing (1914–1991). According to the official Chinese Communist Party (CCP) version of history since the early 1980s, it was their arrest and overthrow on 6 October 1976 that signaled the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976).

The term "gang of four" was actually coined by Mao. It was first used publicly in a speech given by Beijing CCP First Secretary Wu De (1910–1995) on 24 October 1976 to an enormous crowd in Tiananmen Square in central Beijing. After Wu's speech, the term was widely used in China, with these four being blamed for virtually all the ills of the Cultural Revolution.

All except Wang Hongwen had been members of the CCP Politburo since April 1969. In August 1973, Zhang Chunqiao was added to the Politburo Standing Committee, the most powerful governing body in China, while Wang Hongwen became not only a member of the standing committee but a CCP deputy chairman as well. In July 1977, the CCP Central Committee dismissed all four from all posts, accusing them of being "bourgeois careerists, conspirators and counterrevolutionary double-dealers."

Jiang Qing, Mao's wife, had been extremely powerful since 1966 as a member of the Cultural Revolution Group, the body Mao set up that year to guide the Cultural Revolution, and she also gained power by being the person who transmitted instructions from Mao. Her best-known initiative was the reform of the Chinese theater, involving elimination of traditional items among many other changes. Zhang Chunqiao was noted as a radical ideologue, and it was he who led the abortive Shanghai People's Commune of January 1967. In November 1965, Yao Wenyuan wrote an article in a Shanghai newspaper that at the time was credited with launching the earliest stage of the Cultural Revolution.

The members of the gang of four were tried by a special court toward the end of 1980. They were accused of a range of crimes, especially of persecuting large numbers of people, including CCP and state leaders. Jiang Qing was most vocal in her own defense, arguing that she was simply carrying out Mao's wishes, despite which all four were convicted. Actually, she was right in the sense that none of the four could have done what they did without Mao's support, and it was he, not they, who was leading the Cultural Revolution. However, the Chinese press went to considerable lengths to clear Mao of any criminal motivation or action, instead laying blame on the gang.

The court issued its verdicts against the gang on 25 January 1981. It sentenced Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao to death with two-year reprieves. As it happened, neither was executed, and Jiang committed suicide in May 1991. Zhang Chunqiao died in prison, probably in 1991. Wang Hongwen was sentenced to life imprisonment, dying in 1992, while Yao Wenyuan was given twenty years but was released in October 1996.


Colin Mackerras

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GANGES RIVER The Ganges River, or Ganga, as it is known to Hindus, is the great river of India. By the fourth century BCE, the fame of the Ganges had reached the West. Alexander of Macedon (356–323 BCE), who regarded the river as the farthest



limit of the Earth, hoped to reach the Ganges and, by continuing east, to return to Europe through the Pillars of Hercules. However, he never reached his destination. Virgil, Ovid, and Dante all mentioned the Ganges, and the river held a unique position in medieval thought. In a curious blend of scripture and classical geography, Christian church leaders came to regard the Ganges as the Phison, the first river of paradise. Accepted by such notable figures as Saints Augustine, Ambrose, and Jerome, that belief prevailed throughout the Middle Ages.

What about the river so kindled people's imaginations? The sanctity of water has been a part of the Indian tradition from its beginnings in the Indus Valley well over four thousand years ago into the twenty-first century. At the start of the plowing season, before the seeds are sown, farmers in the Indian state of Bihar place water from the Ganges in a pot in a special place in the field to ensure a good harvest. Newly married women unfold their saris to the Ganges and pray for children and for long lives for their husbands. In the Ganges Valley and along the Bengal Delta, the Ganges is known as Ganga Mata or Mother Ganges. The image of the Ganges echoes throughout Indian history in the many tales of its generative powers: giving birth, restoring life, conferring immortality.

Historically the Ganges Valley was an entry point into the subcontinent for the first Indo-European invaders, who probably moved into India starting around the eleventh or twelfth century BCE. To these early wanderers the river loomed massive and omnipresent. Its current held the thread of contact with other settlements, old and new, and its route pointed ever eastward toward some unknown destination. As civilization grew on its banks and cities arose, the Ganges

increasingly became a part of the Indian ethos. With the flourishing of commerce and agriculture, its water performed a thousand functions. Just as few can resist someone who is utterly devoted, so people came to worship the river that offered them so much.

Beginning with the Hindu scriptures of the third century CE, the Ganges has played a vital role in religious ceremonies, especially in rituals of birth, initiation, and death. As a goddess the river has appeared with the great celestials of Hinduism, at times the child of Brahma, the wife of Shiva, or the metaphysical product of Vishnu. Always conferring a benediction, the river shares none of the destructive qualities of some other Indian goddesses or the sepulchral



HARNESSING THE GANGES

"A new development of the irrigation system is the Ganges Canal hydro-electric scheme in the United Provinces, of which the power stations were opened towards the end of 1937. This supplies power both for agricultural and industrial purposes. It protects 1 1/2 million acres against famine; it provides 88 towns with power for electric lighting, electric fans, and industrial undertakings; and it assists rural development by mechanizing agricultural processes and energizing industrial activities by means of the cheap power provided for local sugar-mills, oil-crushing plants, flour-mills, &c. By substituting electric power for manual and animal labour, the electric grid is transforming the social economy of the area which it serves. Flour used to be ground by hand; sugar-cane was crushed by primitive stone crushers operated by bullocks going slowly round and round in a circle; the water required for irrigating the fields was raised from wells, tanks, and ditches by bullocks pulling it up in leather bags or men swinging it up in baskets. These operations are now performed by electricity, and the labour of millions of hands has been released for more profitable work."

Source: Jagdish Saran Sharma. (1962) India's Struggle for Freedom: Select Documents and Sources. Vol. 1. Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 38.



SUNDARBANS—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Stretching across the border of India and Bangladesh, and containing the world's largest region of mangrove forest within its ten-thousand-square kilometers; Sundarbans National Park was designated a World Heritage Site in 1987 for its fragile ecosystem and abundant Ganges Delta wildlife.

goddesses of Greece. Even in mythical travels in the underworld, the Ganges forever points the way to paradise.

The river itself is born in the Gangotri glacier in the high Himalayas, and it flows 2,510 kilometers to the Bay of Bengal. The Gangotri glacier is a mountain of ice 32 kilometers long and close to 4 kilometers wide surrounded by peaks six or seven thousand meters high. From there the river's two main sources, the Alakananda and the Bhagirathi, flow past the sacred villages of Gangotri and Badrinath, revered centers of pilgrimage. The two streams merge just above Rishikesh and enter the plains at Haridwar (Hardwar), the Gate of Vishnu (Hari is a name of Vishnu; *dvara*, the Sanskrit word for "door" or "gate").

Pilgrims gather at Haridwar in May and September to provision for the long journey north. The water at Haridwar and at Rishikesh is considered the river's holiest, and people travel great distances to fill their vessels for special occasions, such as marriages, deaths, or when they must call on the Ganges to remind them of the dreams that have faded from their hearts.

In the Ganges Valley the river is joined by another sacred river, the Jumna (Yamuna). Legend has it that the two rivers are joined by a third, invisible course, the Sarasvati, which can be seen only through the eye of wisdom. This point where the three rivers meet, known as *triveni* (the three braids), is the place of oneness, where opposites cease to exist and the true believer steps beyond time.

Bengal, more than elsewhere along the river's course, feels the power of the Ganges. In Bengal its restless current has created and destroyed great cities, and its shifting silt has devastated entire regions. No wonder the river is so prominent in the literature and religion of the delta. The folk poet Phatik Chand sang:

On a river without water, a lotus blossom floats
while gazelles leap silver in the moonless night.
Whoever can surmount the vortex of Triveni,
where three rivers meet,
will float forever on the waves of time.

Such is the dream of the Ganges that people carry
in their hearts.

Steven Darian

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GANGTOK (2001 pop. 29,000). The capital of Sikkim State in northeastern India, Gangtok ("top of the hill") is wedged between Tibet, Nepal, and Bhutan on a long ridge flanking the Ranipul River, with breathtaking Himalayan views. It was the government seat of the kingdom of Sikkim until the area was annexed by India (1975). Tradition, hospitality, and ceremony prevail over speed in this version of Shangri-la, where steep slopes are striped with rice terraces and plantations of tea or cardamom, and temples and fairy-tale towns hang on the faces of sheer cliffs.

The capital is an active market center for corn, rice, oranges, spices, subtropical fruits, Nepalese silver spread on sarongs, and the work of tribal weavers; gardens bloom with hundreds of varieties of orchids and rhododendron. Gangtok has a hospital, secondary school, law court, and modern shops, hotels, and cinemas, along with the former royal palace and chapel, Enchey Monastery, and the Namgyal Institute of Tibetology, including a library and museum. The Buddhist monastery of Rumtek lies to the southeast. Mask dances performed by lamas in the monastery courtyards are among the most colorful in the world. Gangtok's spectacular scenery has made the city a popular vacation destination among Bengalis, especially during the ten-day Durga Puja holiday in September and October.

C. Roger Davis

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GANSU (2002 est. pop. 27.1 million). Gansu (Kansu) Province is located in northern China at the upper reaches of the Huang (Yellow) River. In the west, the province borders on Qinghai and Xinjiang, in the north on Mongolia, in the east on Ningxia and Shaanxi, and in the south on Sichuan. Gansu covers an area of 454,000 square kilometers and divides into three distinct topographical regions. The western region composes part of the Gobi desert and the so-called "Gansu corridor," a more than 1,000 kilometer-long and only 50 to 70 kilometer-wide east-west passage between the Tibetan Plateau in the south and the Gobi Desert in the north. The Gansu corridor was an important part of the ancient silk route, and agriculture in the oases here depend on the glacial streams from the Tibetan Plateau. The main crops are wheat, sugar beets, and cotton. The central region is part of the great loess plateau of northern China, an extremely eroded area, parts of which are the poorest districts in China. The southern region is a mountainous earthquake area rising between 2,000 and 4,000 meters above sea level.

About 90 percent of Gansu's population is Han Chinese. The remaining 10 percent is distributed over a number of minority nationalities who are either Muslims or who belong to Tibetan religions. The capital of the province, Lanzhou (1996 estimated population of 1.5 million), is situated in the rich agricultural area of the Huang River valley in the central region.

Gansu has been under Chinese control and influence on and off since the third century BCE and has played a continuously important role in trade between Central Asia and China. When China was strong, Gansu constituted the western frontier of China, and the Great Wall ends here. During the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), Gansu became part of the empire along with Xinjiang and Qinghai. The suppression of a Muslim rebellion in 1862–1878 almost devastated the area, and in 1928 Xinjiang and Qinghai became independent provinces. The present borders of Gansu changed several times in the twentieth century, and in 1958 a large part was cut out to become Ningxia Hui Autonomous region. In the fertile river valley of the central region, agricultural products such as millet, wheat, tobacco, melons, and fruit dominate. Gansu mainly has heavy industry, which is concentrated in and around Lanzhou, and manufactures heavy machinery, petrochemical products, and nonferrous metals. The pollution of the industrial center is high.

Bent Nielsen

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GAO XINJIANG (b. 1940), Chinese writer and Nobel Laureate. Gao Xinjiang, the first Chinese-language writer awarded the Nobel Prize in literature, in 2000, was born in 1940 in Ganzhou, Jiangxi Province, China, and grew up in a family that encouraged his interest in art, literature, and music. He studied French literature at the Beijing Foreign Language Institute from 1957 to 1962 and worked after graduation as a French translator for a bookstore.

During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), along with numerous other intellectuals in China, he had to destroy all his writing and go to the countryside for "rehabilitation." After the Cultural Revolution, however, he emerged on the literary scene as an important writer for his short fiction, plays, novels, and literary criticism. His essay entitled "Preliminary Exploration into the Techniques of Modern Fiction" contributed to the demolishing of "socialist realism," the then-regnant method of literary representation under Mao Zedong (1893–1976). But on the whole, Gao's voice was heard in China not so much for his fiction or literary criticism as for his works in such experimental plays as *Bus Stop*, a work highly reminiscent of Samuel Beckett's *Waiting for Godot*.

After he left China to settle in Paris in 1987, Gao supported himself mainly by painting. Meanwhile, he continued to write his novels and plays, which gradually gained recognition in France and Australia, though remaining less studied in Britain and the United States. His winning the Nobel Prize "for an oeuvre of universal validity, bitter insights and linguistic ingenuity," as the Swedish Academy stated, and his claim in his Nobel speech that literature is an apolitical enterprise, were not received without a sense of irony, since his selection and his award of the prize are felt by many to be unavoidably a political statement.

Jian Xu

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GARABIL PLATEAU Situated mainly in southeastern Turkmenistan, the Garabil (also spelled *Karabil*) plateau is a geological curiosity whose deposits of rock salt are among the largest in the world. The plateau marks the end of the sandy Turkmen Karakum Desert, between the Murgab and Amu Dar'ya Rivers. This area represents the foothills of the Paropamisus Mountains, part of the Hindu Kush, located in northern Afghanistan.

The plateau is rather low (only 832 meters at its highest point) and is semidesert; it is highly eroded, with large ancient valleys and basins. The region is known for its great variations in temperature and its rare precipitation. Savanna and groves of wild pistachio are the most common vegetation. However, the ecoregion has a wealth of plant and animal life, with more than 1,100 species of vascular plants (ferns) and a variety of birds, reptiles, urials (wild sheep), onagers, and gazelles.

Mainly used for pastures and for a little agriculture, the Garabil plateau is also of great economic importance because of large deposits of rock salts, estimated at 4 billion tons. Since Turkmenistan's independence, these deposits have begun to be cataloged and exploited.

Patrick Dombrowsky

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GARCIA, CARLOS P. (1896–1971), fourth president of the third Philippine republic. Garcia was born in the town of Talibon on the island of Bohol. His father served as mayor of the town for four terms. Garcia earned a law degree from Philippine Law School in 1923 and taught high school for several years after that. Due to his poetic abilities, he was known as the

"Bard from Bohol." He entered politics in 1925 as a member of the Nacionalista party and served as congressman of the third district of Bohol until 1931, when he became governor of Bohol. In 1941, he was elected senator, and was reelected after World War II. He became vice president in 1953. He assumed the presidency when President Ramon Magsaysay died in a plane crash on 17 March 1957. He subsequently won the presidency in his own right in elections of November of that year.

When Garcia won the presidency, his running mate, Speaker of the House Jose Laurel, Jr., was defeated by Diosdado Macapagal, marking the first time in Philippine politics that the president was elected with a vice president from the opposition. (Macapagal was from the Liberal Party.)

With serious economic problems confronting the Philippines, Garcia advocated fiscal austerity. He opposed a return to free enterprise in the Philippine economy and put forward the Filipino First policy, seeking economic independence from foreign dominance for the Philippines. His administration was tainted by corruption and, along with the dissatisfaction in some quarters with his nationalistic Filipino First policy, this led to his defeat in 1961 by Diosdado Macapagal.

Garcia was a delegate from his home district to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. He was elected president of the Constitutional Convention on 11 June 1971, but died three days later.

Damon L. Woods

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GARDENING—CHINA The Chinese garden is in essence an encapsulation of nature in a prescribed framework. Gardens are considered venues for spiritual and artistic endeavors, loci for celebrations, and themselves works of art. The history of Chinese gardens is complex and divergent, and it is important to understand not only their design principles, but also the spiritual basis of their construction.

History of Chinese Gardens


Two main garden traditions in China evolved over time: the vast imperial gardens, emblematic of the

power and wealth of the empire; and the scholar, or literati, gardens, built as retreats from the onerous world of officialdom. The earliest references to gardens in China are found in Zhou-dynasty (1045–256 BCE) records describing vast tracts of land to be reserved for hunting parks for kings and princes. Success in the hunt was a metaphor for a successful reign. Later, in the *Chu ci* (Songs of Chu), a fourth-century BCE text, a shaman singer attempts to entice the soul of a dying king back to life with a description of the beauties of a garden with winding streams, lotus lakes, and distant views of the mountains. In the Shanglin park of China's first emperor, Zheng (Shi Huang Di) (259–210 BCE), were countless animals, birds, and exotic plants gathered as tribute from vassal states, thus creating a living replica of his entire domain. Poets such as the famed Tao Yuanming (365–427 CE) recorded in verse the pleasures of strolling through one's garden. Both the Sui (581–618) and Tang (618–907) dynasties saw the further development of imperial and individual gardens. Wang Wei (699–759) created his Wangchuan villa in Lantian County, Shaanxi, a rustic retreat immortalized in poetry and paintings for centuries as the epitome of the scholar's retreat.

The Song dynasty (960–1279) gave rise to the proliferation of urban literati gardens, and at Kaifeng, Song Huizong (1082–1135) erected the Gen Yue mountain, an artificial construct approximately seventy-seven meters tall, including many famous garden rocks. Kublai Khan (1214–1294) of the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) built at Beijing an extravagant city complete with lakes and hunting parks. The subsequent Ming dynasty (1368–1644) revised and embellished the Forbidden City with myriad courtyards and gardens and developed the Park of the Sea Palaces, a vast complex of gardens and retreats for the imperial family. The most famous of the gardens of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) was the imperial Yuan Ming Yuan, commissioned by the Qianlong emperor (1711–1799), within the precincts of which were countless watercourses, pavilions, libraries, farms, training fields for the emperor's soldiers, and European-style fountains and buildings.

Cosmology of Chinese Gardens

The unique character of Chinese gardens has its roots in Chinese philosophy, most notably Taoism. A garden was seen as a mirror of the natural world. Everything in the universe was created from and a conduit for *qi* (vital energy, or life force). The universe was understood to be a combination of yin (female) and yang (male) elements in a state of constant fluidity. A balance of opposites in the construction of buildings, nat-



Gardens and pagoda at the Yu garden in Shanghai, China, in 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

ural features, and plantings was a goal of the garden designer. Recreating the natural world in a garden was thought to replicate the benefits of immersing oneself in nature, a belief similar to ideas about the benefits of landscape painting. Scholars whose official duties prevented them from visiting the mountains could enjoy the benefits of nature in their own gardens. The ancient practice of feng shui (literally, "wind-water," often translated as geomancy) consisted of situating homes, buildings, graves, and gardens properly in a landscape to receive the optimum benefit.

Elements of the Garden

The two main elements of a garden are rocks and water, symbolizing the yang and yin, respectively. Traditional Chinese gardens are constructed in a series of walled outdoor courtyards, joined by walkways or doorways. Use of garden rocks (yang) at strategic locations within a garden brings to mind the mountain ranges and peaks of nature. Incorporation of a watercourse, pool, lake, or cascade adds the water (yin) and

all its mutable forms. Plants are included for literary and cultural references, for seasonal suitability, and for aesthetic reasons, such as the beauty of their shadows against the light garden walls, or the harmony of the sound of wind and rain in their foliage. Buildings such as *ting* (pavilions with open sides), *xie* (gazebos), *tang* (formal halls), and covered walkways make accessible the featured sites in the gardens and the effects of the changing hours of the days and seasons.

Such garden structures are named with references to classical literature, and the addition of calligraphy adds another layer of appreciation to the garden. Often potted plants are placed in courtyards at the peak of their blooming seasons, and pools and lakes house water lilies, lotus, and fish. Gardens also include rockeries that are constructed of aggregates of bizarrely shaped rocks made into miniature mountains or roofs for artificial caves, both symbolic of the entrance to the realms of immortals and useful as an escape from the heat of summer.

Yuan Ye (The Craft of Gardens, datable to 1631–1634), written during the late Ming dynasty by Ji Cheng (late sixteenth–early seventeenth century), is considered the classic text on garden design. Encompassing both practical and aesthetic advice, the manual advises the garden designer to be sensitive to the proper use of contrasts and juxtapositions of elements and to seek the essence lying behind the forms. Details concerning window lattice patterns, doors and wall openings, brickwork for paths, and suitable alignment of the garden with existing landscape features are included.

Chinese Gardens Today

Beihai Park in Beijing in the Forbidden City, which was first built in the tenth century as a hunting lodge, currently encompasses approximately 67 hectares of lakes and artificial islands. There an example of a pre-revolutionary walled garden, the Limpid Mirror Studio (Jing Qing Zhou), once housed the Qing-dynasty princes. The West Lake in Yangzhou had its origins in the Sui and Tang dynasties. Suzhou's gardens include the Shizi Lin (Stone Lion Grove), built around 1336 for a Buddhist monk, Tian Ru, and the Wang Shi Yuan (Garden of the Master of the Fishing Nets), first constructed there in 1440.

Suzhou also contains the Zhouzheng Yuan (Garden of the Unsuccessful Politician). The Zhouzheng Yuan has antecedents dating back to the Tang dynasty. It has been variously a Confucian scholar's home, a garden, a Buddhist monastery, and a warlord's headquarters. It has changed hands many times and once was even sold

to pay gambling debts. It is most renowned for its association with the Ming artist Wen Zhengming (1470–1559), who lived there for a time and recorded it in paintings. Wen Zhengming, a Wu School artist and one of the so-called four masters of the Ming, was an unsuccessful politician who after many failed attempts at success in the imperial examination system finally secured a minor post but quickly relinquished it to devote himself to artistic pursuits and teaching.

Hangzhou's West Lake is one of China's most beloved parks. Many new Chinese gardens have been built within the last twenty years in America, notably the Astor Garden Court at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City and the Chinese scholar's garden at the Staten Island New York Botanical Garden.

Noelle O'Connor

See also: **Architecture—China; Architecture, Vernacular—China**

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GARO The Garo are a tribal people of India, about half a million of whom live in the Garo Hills of Meghalaya, northeastern India. Others live in neighboring West Bengal, Assam, Nagaland, and Tripura. In Meghalaya they are the major Scheduled Tribe (an ethnic subgroup that has faced discrimination and economic privation). They are well known as a matrilineal society who practice shifting cultivation. Being so numerous, they are divided into several dialectal and cultural groups, but nonetheless there is a strong sense of Garo identity, and the culture is still fairly uniform. The biggest distinction today is between Christian and non-Christian Garo, who live in separate villages.

The Garo have uxorilocal households; that is, a man usually finds himself living with his wife, her parents, her sisters, and all their children. The oldest of the sisters is recognized as the heiress. Neolocal residence (establishment of a new household rather than residence with a spouse's parents) also occurs today.

The society is divided into five matrilineal descent groups, or phratries. The clans that make up each phratry are exogamous; that is, members are required to find a spouse who is not a member of the same clan. Within each clan the most significant unit is called the

machong, a group of close matrilineal relations who play a key role in the formation and maintenance of each household, and in controlling the cross-cousin marriages. Only an heiress is expected to marry her father's sister's son, while other girls are free to marry more distant cross-cousins. In common with a number of other Indian tribes, the institution of the bachelor's dormitory—a building where young unmarried men lived—was until quite recently an important social institution.

The traditional Garo religion is Sangasarek, which recognizes a supreme being, but is much concerned with the propitiation of spirits that may otherwise bring misfortune. Today, however, about 70 percent of the population is Christian, an effect of British missionary work in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that followed upon British seizure of the area in 1873.

Several centuries ago the Garo were infamous as headhunters. The isolation this fostered gave way to numerous trade links with the plains, usually through bartering goods with Koch, Bengali, and various other Hindu or Muslim traders. Garo still go to the plains to sell baskets, ginger, chilies, and bamboo mats, getting rice in exchange. The traditional form of shifting cultivation, called *jhum*, is still practiced by about half the Garo today. Other land is farmed on a permanent basis, and is losing some of its fertility thereby.

Paul Hockings

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GAWAI DAYAK *Gawai*, a ritual festival, is celebrated by the Dayak people (a collective name for the native ethnic groups of Borneo, an island in the Malay Archipelago). *Gawai* is a form of communication with the spirit world. It is important to communicate with the spirit world in order to obtain blessings and to thank the spirits that have aided the Dayaks in agriculture or in healing an ailment. This ritual, involving chants and incantations, is a way to show gratitude to the spirits for the good harvest and health of the Dayak people.

There are four main *gawai*: rituals connected with cultivation of rice; with health and longevity; with acquisition of wealth; and with headhunting and prestige. The celebration of all *gawai* involves a series of

rites—first, sacrificial offerings (*piring*) are made; second, there is a cleansing ceremony (*biau*), which involves a summoning of spirits by incantation and a slaughter of cockerels and waving them as another sacrificial offering to the spirits; and third and most important, prolonged sacred chanting (*timbang* or *pengap*) by ritual experts or bards (*lemambang*).

Today, a *gawai* is usually a festival celebrating the Dayaks' bountiful harvest. (The other types of *gawai*, especially related to healing and head-hunting, are rarely practiced today due to modernization and mass conversion of the Dayaks to Christianity.) The festival marks the end of one paddy-harvesting season and the beginning of another. It is a time to show gratitude to the gods for the good harvest and to ask for their blessings for the coming season. The contemporary Gawai Dayak is a statewide celebration in Sarawak (a state on the island of Borneo), and is also an occasion to renew communal and cultural ties as well an opportunity for the Dayaks to share their festive mood with other communities.

Shanthi Thambiab

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GAZIANTEP (2002 pop. 795,000). Gaziantep, previously Aintab ("good spring") and commonly referred to as Antep, is the capital of Gaziantep Province in southeastern Anatolia, Turkey, forty-five kilometers from the Syrian border. Situated where important routes converge and first settled by the Hittites, Antep assumed importance only after the Byzantines captured Duluk (Doliche, now Dulukbaba) in 962. During the First Crusades (1096–1099) Antep was ruled by Armenian Philaretus and fell to the Byzantines in 1150 only to be captured by the Seljuks of Konya in 1151. After falling to various peoples, it became part of the province of Aleppo in 1153.

Timur (Tamerlane, 1336–1405) captured Antep in 1400, and various Turkmen dynasties conquered it before it fell to the Ottomans in 1516. Antep was occupied by the English in 1919 and by the French from

1920 to 1921. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), founder of the Turkish Republic, renamed it and added the prefix *Gazi* ("Muslim warrior for the faith") in honor of the Turkish nationalist forces who withstood a ten-month siege by French troops at the end of World War I.

Today Gaziantep is renowned for its pistachio nuts (*antep fistigi*) and the grape preserve called *pekmez*. Economically the city has benefited from the GAP Project (*Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi*, Southeastern Anatolia Project), a massive hydroelectric project under construction since 1974.

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GEISHA Geisha are professional entertainers and hostesses, skilled in the traditional Japanese arts. They are found throughout Japan; the largest and most highly respected geisha districts, however, are in Kyoto and Tokyo. The Western tendency to associate geisha with prostitution is based on a misunderstanding. The word "geisha" literally means "arts person," and a geisha must undergo rigorous training in the traditional arts—playing *shamisen* and *koto* (traditional Japanese stringed instruments) and dancing *nihon buyo*. Her job is to create a convivial atmosphere for her customers, typically wealthy businessmen and politicians, and entertain with music, dance, and intelligent conversation.

Male entertainers in the seventeenth century were the first to call themselves geisha. By the mid-eighteenth century they were outnumbered by female geisha, who were looked to as trendsetters and fashion icons. Bound by a code of secrecy, geisha became the confidants of important men and were influential in political affairs. The numbers of women who became geisha decreased during the twentieth century, although there are still several thousand and the profession shows no immediate signs of dying out.

Prior to World War II, geisha began their training before puberty and many girls were sold to geisha houses (*o-kiya*) by their impoverished parents. Those showing aptitude would be permitted to commence training as *maiko* (novice geisha), bound to the adoptive geisha mother by a strict contract. In the early 2000s, girls may apply to join a geisha house and become a *maiko* upon completing middle school. A *maiko* accompanies senior geisha to parties, wearing an or-



Geishas laughing at a party in the Gion district of Kyoto, c. 1993. (MICHAEL S. YAMASHITA/CORBIS)

nate long-sleeved kimono, an elaborate hairstyle, and distinctive thick white makeup. After several years of intensive artistic training, she must decide whether to become a geisha or to leave the geisha world. Transition to geisha status is marked by a ceremony and the adoption of more sober dress. Geisha may eventually leave their geisha house to set up their own establishment. Lesson fees and clothing costs are very high and many geisha receive financial support from a patron. A geisha must give up her profession upon marriage.

Geisha entertain at special teahouses (*o-chaya*), where Japanese-style rooms may be rented and food and drink is served. An air of exclusivity is an essential aspect of the geisha world, and accordingly, new patrons must be recommended by established customers and fees are extremely high. The geisha world has inspired numerous plays, films, and novels, including *Madam Butterfly* (1904), Nagai Kafu's *Geisha in Rivalry* (1917), and Arthur Golden's *Memoirs of a Geisha* (1997).

Lucy D. Moss

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GENGHIS KHAN (c.1162–1227), Mongolian ruler. Genghis Khan, also known as Chinggis or Chinghiz Khan, was born with the name of Temujin. After surviving tribal wars in Mongolia following the death of his father Yesugei, Temujin built a tribal confederation that dramatically restructured Mongolia.

After rising to power in 1185, Temujin experienced numerous setbacks and eventually victories. By 1206 Temujin was the paramount power in Mongolia and received the title Genghis Khan (thought to mean Oceanic Ruler). The years between 1185 and 1206 were, without doubt, the most difficult years for one of the most feared and respected men in history.

After uniting the various tribes of Mongolia into the Mongol supra-tribe, Genghis Khan went on to conquer much of northern China and Central Asia. In 1209, the Uighurs voluntarily submitted to Genghis Khan. Later in that year, the Mongols began their conquest of the Tangut kingdom of Xi-Xia, located in northwestern Gansu Province of China. After the Tanguts submitted in 1210, hostilities erupted between Genghis Khan and China's Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234). Although the Jin were not defeated until seven years after Genghis Khan's death, the Mongols conquered much of northern China during his lifetime.

Genghis Khan led his army toward Central Asia in 1219. In fighting with the Khwarazmian empire, the Mongols utterly devastated most of Central Asia and eastern Iran. After the destruction of the Khwarazmians, the Mongols withdrew to deal with their disobedient vassal Xi-Xia, which had refused to send troops for the campaign in Central Asia. It was during this campaign that Genghis Khan died from internal injuries suffered after he fell from his horse while hunting in August 1227.

His wars were as often a matter of retaliation as they were for territory or riches. Genghis Khan's organizational and strategic genius created one of the most highly disciplined and effective armies in history, but this same genius gave birth to the core administration that ruled it. Even after his death, the Mongol armies dominated the battlefield until the empire stretched from the Pacific Ocean to the Adriatic Sea.

His nonmilitary achievements include the introduction of a writing system to the Mongols, the ideal of religious tolerance throughout the empire, and unity among the Mongols. Genghis Khan's accomplishments should not be seen in terms of territory or military victories but in the presence of a Mongol nation and culture. Mongols still venerate him as the founding father of Mongolia.

Timothy M. May

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GERINDO Gerindo (Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia, Indonesian People's Movement), an Indonesian national political party, was formed in May 1937. Its leaders included A. K. Gani (1905–1958), Muhammad Yamin (1903–1964), and Amir Sjarifuddin (1907–1948). Like the earlier Partai Nasionalis Indonesia Baru (New Indonesia Nationalist Party), Gerindo's aim was to raise public consciousness of nationalist ideas by organizing the people. Gerindo's foundation, however, also reflected a growing willingness on the part of many left-wing Indonesian nationalists to cooperate with the Dutch. This willingness arose both from despair over the prospects for organizing effective nationalist resistance in the face of Dutch military and police power and from a conviction that collaboration against fascism (especially Japanese fascism) had the highest priority in world affairs. Gerindo hoped to achieve from this collaboration a full parliament for Indonesia. Shortly before the Japanese attack on Java, Amir Sjarifuddin received funds from the Dutch authorities to organize underground resistance. This movement was quickly ended by the Japanese, however, who also banned Gerindo along with all other political parties.

Gerindo's willingness to work with the Dutch prefigured the postwar strategy of the Socialist Party—including that of Amir Sjarifuddin as defense minister and later prime minister of the Indonesian Republic—in making far-reaching concessions to the Dutch to obtain international recognition of Indonesia's sovereignty.

Robert Cribb

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GERMANS IN CENTRAL ASIA Germans were first invited to settle in the Russian empire by Empress Catherine II. Large German communities on the lower Volga, the Black Sea coast, the Transcaucasus, and other areas prospered and soon sent out their own settlers. Several thousand Germans made their way to various parts of Russian Central Asia. By the outbreak of World War I, more than 50,000 settlers were living there and were cultivating more than 300,000 hectares.

Following the Russian Revolution the Soviet government initially seemed to favor the German minority, which received the first autonomous area (ASSR) in 1924. Things changed quickly, though, and the collectivization campaigns saw thousands of Germans sent into exile to Siberia and Central Asia. After Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, ethnic Germans were immediately suspected of collaboration. Mass deportations of German communities in Russia, the Ukraine, and the Caucasus began on the day the Germans invaded. Hundreds of thousands were deported to Central Asia. By 1945 more than 400,000 ethnic Germans had been deported to Kazakhstan alone. Though many Germans opted to emigrate after they were granted the right to leave their places of exile in 1972, substantial German communities remain in Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan.

Andrew Sharp

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GESER KHAN Although Geser Khan may have been a historical personage, he is primarily known as a protective deity of warriors and herds in Mongolian religion, both Buddhism and Shamanism, as well as in literature. The numerous epics concerning Geser Khan are rich sources of information about Mongol mythology and cosmological beliefs. He is particularly revered among the Buryat Mongols of Russia. It is thought that the worship of Geser Khan did not enter Mongolia until the early seventeenth century.

The Geser Khan of the Mongols may be the same figure as the Geser Khan of the Tibetans. They share many characteristics, both as cult and literary figures. Despite Geser Khan's possible Tibetan origin, the Mongol epics are distinct from their Tibetan

counterparts. For example, whereas the Tibetans deified some of the companions and opponents of Geser, this appears less frequently in the Mongolian cult of Geser.

In the Mongol tradition, Geser Khan comes into the world to rid it of evil for the betterment of humankind. Throughout time, Geser Khan's importance in Shamanism and Buddhism has remained constant for the Mongols, and special shrines to him existed into the 1940s. Some shrines may remain today; however, Soviet influence, whether overt or covert, seriously undermined not only the Buddhist religion among the Mongols but also the folk religion so that many traditions died out. Whether the Geser cult remains today is uncertain but probable, as more and more Mongols have begun to seek out their past religious systems. The epic certainly remains a vital part of Mongolian literature.

Timothy May

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GESTAPU AFFAIR The Gestapu affair was an ambiguous and abortive leftist coup on 1 October 1965, which triggered the end of Indonesia's Guided Democracy period. The term "Gestapu" is an acronym of Gerakan September Tiga Puluh (September Thirtieth Movement); Indonesians now generally use the term "G-30-S."

Troops under Lieutenant Colonel Untung, commander of the Presidential Guard, allegedly conducted the coup, ostensibly to prevent an expected rightist coup by pro-Western generals. Six senior generals, including the army commander General Achmad Yani, were killed, though the defense minister General A. H. Nasution escaped. Plotters seized radio and telecommunications buildings and formed a Revolutionary Council but otherwise failed to follow up their actions. The coup was suppressed within twenty-four hours by Strategic Reserve troops under General Suharto.

Contemporary observers believed the coup was directed by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The failed coup provided a pretext for a massacre of party members in which perhaps 500,000 people were killed, mainly in North Sumatra, Central and East Java, and Bali. Hatred of the Communists was exacerbated by the deliberate spreading of false rumors that the generals were tortured before being killed. More than a million people were detained for longer or shorter periods on grounds of "involvement" in the coup, though the events of 1 October were clearly the work of a small group of conspirators. Even in the early 1990s, family or other connections with those "involved" could mean exclusion from sensitive jobs, including teaching. Most of the conspirators themselves were tried in 1965–1966 in special military tribunals and then executed.

Evidence of PKI involvement in the coup is slight, and the leftist officers involved possibly acted mainly on their own initiative, though they would have expected approbation from the PKI and perhaps from President Sukarno, who feared a rightist military coup. Circumstantial evidence suggests that Suharto may have encouraged, or at least known of, the coup plans, which he was then in a position to foil and exploit to his advantage. Lack of evidence still makes it impossible to reach a conclusion on the origins of the coup, but the general scholarly consensus is that the PKI was too weak to take power and that the coup was a pretext for rather than a cause of the military takeover.

Robert Cribb

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GHALIB, MIRZA ASADULLAH KHAN (1797–1869), Indian poet. Ghalib (Mirza Asadullah Khan), commonly regarded as the greatest Urdu poet, also wrote poetry and prose in Persian and was a great wit and conversationalist. Born to a noble family of Mughal descent in Agra, India, he migrated to Delhi around 1813 and later became the poetic mentor of the last Mughal emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar (1837–1858). As he was accustomed to living like an aristocratic nobleman, his needs far out-

stretched his means, so that he was forced into a life of penury.

Ghalib started writing poetry at a very early age under the pen name Asad, which he later changed to Ghalib. A study of his earliest manuscripts demonstrates that he produced most of his significant verses before he was twenty-one. He spent much of his youth writing poetry in Persian, putting together his Persian Diwan (*Diwan-e Farsi*, c. 1835) at least three years before the Urdu Diwan (*Diwan-e Ghalib*, c. 1838). His two collections of letters, *Ud-e Hindi* (Indian Harp) and *Urdu-e Mua'lla* (High Urdu), show him to be a classic writer of Urdu prose. *Dastanbu* (Persian, Pellet of Perfume, 1858) records his impression of the 1857 upheaval (the Sepoy Mutiny; also regarded by some as the first war of Indian independence), while *Mibr-e Nim Roz* (Persian, Midday Sun, 1854–1855) is the first volume of a projected multivolume history of the Timurid dynasty (ruled in India 1513–1857, with a brief interruption of Pathan rule).

However, Ghalib's Urdu Diwan, containing 1,458 verses, has been most instrumental in establishing his reputation as a great writer. Each generation reads the poetry of Ghalib for its own reasons; the metaphysical cogitations and the tough intellectual content strike a chord in every mind.

The themes of Ghalib's poetry are varied—love, the nature of human life and existence, people's role in the universe, free will versus predestination. However, love between a man and a woman, the traditional subject of the *ghazal* (Arabic, a poetic genre), does not substantially engage his mind, and he views this transcendental passion with profound skepticism. Ghalib was a product of the Sufi tradition and had a highly eclectic mind and an attitude of cheerful irreverence toward God and institutionalized religion. If he asserted the dignity and self-respect of people in their relationship with God, he also advocated the value of humans as human, regardless of their religion and race.

To Ghalib the poet, sorrow and pain are essential conditions of human life. He does not neglect or underplay any experience but savors each to the full, even if it is painful. To him every experience becomes an ontological end in itself, regardless of the attendant pain or pleasure. In one of his couplets, he yearns for the inclusion of hell in heaven, as that would provide greater scope for his mind and imagination. In another verse, he exhorts his heart to find solace even in sorrow's song, because one day the body would be deprived of even this sensation, having become insensate and inert. This insatiable appetite for new experiences

remains the driving force behind much of his poetry and imparts to his images a private significance and an illuminating power.

Mohammad Asaduddin

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GHAZNA (2002 pop. 39,000). Ghazna is the old name of the present town of Ghazni, situated 145 kilometers southwest of Kabul in east-central Afghanistan at an altitude of 2,220 meters. The town is the administrative center of the province of Ghazni.

The early history of Ghazna is obscure. The town was probably the political center of the region of Zabulistan, invaded during the seventh century CE by the Arabs. In 977 CE, a slave commander of the Samanid dynasty, Sebuktigin, established himself in the city and founded the dynasty of the Ghaznavids. Under Mahmud of Ghazna (971–1030), it became the core of a vast empire, stretching from western Persia to the Indian subcontinent. With the decline of Ghaznavid power, Ghazna was sacked by the Ghurids in 1150–1151 and finally lost in 1163. Afterward, different kingdoms and empires, such as the Mongols, Timurids, and Mughals, contended for the city, but it never regained its old glory.

In 1747 Ghazna became part of the new Afghan kingdom of Ahmad Shah Durrani (1722–1773). During the first Anglo-Afghan War (1838–1842), the town was captured by the British, due to its important strategic position on the way to Kabul. During the twentieth century, Ghazni became the form in use for its name; the town rose again in importance as one of the main Afghan centers, mainly due to its geographical position along the Kabul-Kandahar road.

Riccardo Redaelli

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GIFU (2002 est. pop. 2.1 million). Occupying an area of 10,596 square kilometers, Japan's Gifu Prefecture is situated in central Honshu Island in the middle of the so-called Japan Alps region. Its primary geographical features are the Hida and Ryohaku mountain ranges and the Nobi Plain in the south. Gifu's main rivers are the Nagarakawa, Kisogawa, and Ibigawa. It is bordered by Shiga, Fukui, Ishikawa, Toyama, Nagano, Aichi, and Mie Prefectures.

The capital of the prefecture is Gifu, on the Nagara (Nagarakawa) River. The prefecture's other important cities are Ogaki, Tajimi, Kakamigahara, and Takayama. Gifu evolved from Inokuchi, the castle town of the Toki family during the Muromachi period (1333–1573). The warlord Oda Nobunaga (1534–1582) assumed control of the town in the late sixteenth century and changed its name to Gifu. During the Edo, or Tokugawa, period (1600/03–1868), Gifu flourished as a post station along the Nakasendo route, one of the five main highways that traversed Japan. Traditional crafts associated with the city include fans, paper lanterns, and paper parasols. A major attraction is cormorant fishing (*ukai*), the use of trained and colored birds to catch small river fish, which is carried out on moonless nights.

Present-day Gifu Prefecture was created from Hida and Mino provinces in 1876. As a historic crossroads of inland and marine routes, the region became the locus of such military encounters as the 1600 Battle of Segikahara, in which Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542–1616) defeated his enemies to become shogun, the paramount military leader of the newly reunified Japan.

As part of the Chukyo industrial zone, the prefecture produces lumber, pulp and paper, textiles, ceramics, and transportation equipment. Visitors are drawn to the scenic national parks and to the highland town of Takayama, known as "little Kyoto" for its fine old architecture and crafts, as well as for its Sanno Matsuri and Yahata Matsuri festivals.

E. L. S. Weber

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GINSENG *Panax ginseng* (Chinese *renshen*), popularly known as ginseng, is China's best-known medicinal product and has been highly sought after both in China and abroad. The swollen root is used (usually the whole root) after careful cleaning, drying, and wrapping in paper. Also used are medicinal extracts made primarily with alcohol and, primarily to suit Western tastes for medicinal teas, ginseng powders. Ginseng belongs to the Araliaceae family and is one of a number of related plants used primarily for their effects on the brain and nervous system. In China, ginseng is most prized because of perceived benefits to the urogenital systems of aging males, whose sexual problems were a major focus in traditional Chinese medicine.

The natural range of ginseng is comparatively limited. In China it grows principally in the lush forests of Manchuria. It is also cultivated to replace and expand root sources in areas where wild ginseng has died out. By the nineteenth century, interest in ginseng as a cure-all had also grown in the West, and the remotest parts of Manchuria were soon penetrated from end to end by ginseng hunters. They advanced far into Siberia as Manchurian resources were depleted, and by the late nineteenth century, China was even importing ginseng from the United States and Canada, a trade that still continues to a limited extent, although both of these countries are now net importers of ginseng, mostly from South Korea.

Paul D. Buell

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GION MATSURI Kyoto's Gion Matsuri, or Gion Festival, is one of Japan's grandest festivals, consisting of a series of major and minor events throughout July. Dedicated to the deity of the Yasaka Shrine in the Gion district of Kyoto, the festival has a history of more than 1100 years. It originated as a purification ritual (*goryo-e*) to placate angry spirits. The highlight occurs on 17 July, when thirty-two magnificent festival floats, some as much as twenty-four meters in height and twelve tons in weight, decorated with sumptuous textiles and figures are paraded through the city, accompanied by dancers and musicians.

In 869 CE, when plagues were raging across the country, the emperor ordered that special prayers be

offered at Yasaka Shrine. The plagues abated, and a thanksgiving procession was held. The procession was repeated later, and in 970 CE it was decreed an annual event. The procession gradually became more and more splendid with large and increasingly elaborate floats. By the sixteenth century Kyoto's prosperous merchants competed to create the most spectacularly decorated floats, donating mechanical figures and fine tapestries from China, Persia, and Europe.

The thirty-two floats, each belonging to a Kyoto neighborhood, are of two types. The nine massive *boko* floats, roofed and topped by a long pole, are hauled by teams of forty men and carry musicians who play distinctive folk tunes. The twenty-three smaller *yama* floats display historical and mythological figures and sacred pine branches. Following construction by traditional methods, the floats and art treasures are displayed for a three-day "eve of the festival" period (*yoi-yama*) prior to the Grand Procession (*yamaboko-junkô*) on 17 July. The order of the floats is determined by drawing lots, and the lead float has the honor of carrying the *chigo*, a young boy chosen to represent the "celestial child." He is entrusted with the task of severing a sacred straw rope stretched across the procession route, symbolically allowing the floats to enter the realm of the gods. Following the parade the floats are returned to their neighborhoods and are taken apart quickly to banish any unlucky spirits the festivities may have attracted.

While retaining its importance as a purification rite, the Gion Matsuri has become a celebration of Kyoto's heritage and a source of enormous civic pride. The greatest of Kyoto's three foremost festivals, it is designated an Intangible Cultural Asset by the Japanese government and attracts more than a million spectators.

Lucy D. Moss

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GOA (2002 pop. 1.4 million) The Indian state of Goa is approximately 400 kilometers south of Mumbai (Bombay). The states of Maharashtra and Karnataka lie to the north and southeast, respectively, and the Arabian Sea to the west. Goa occupies 3,702 square kilometers and has a population of 1,169,793. It is 62 percent Hindu, 34 percent Christian, 3 percent Muslim, and 1 percent "other." Divided into eleven *talukas*



The Dom Bosco Church in Goa. (EYE UBIQUITOUS/CORBIS)

(districts), Goa is governed by its chief minister. The union government in New Delhi appoints the governor, whose function is largely ceremonial. Its legislature is unicameral.

In addition to Goa University, there are numerous schools and colleges. The population of Goa is 77 percent literate, far above the national average of 52 percent. Goa's principal languages are Konkani (the state language), Marathi, and Kannada. Twenty newspapers have been published in English, Marathi, Konkani,

and Portuguese. English is the dominant language of journalism in Goa.

Goa is an agricultural state, rice being the principal crop. Coconuts, mangoes, and cashew nuts are also grown. The principal industries are iron mining and tourism. Although Goa is India's smallest state, it produces one-third of India's iron ore: annually, 14 million metric tons of iron ore are mined. Sandy beaches, temperate weather (25–30° C), and historical monuments make Goa a major tourist attraction.

The city of Old Goa is famous for the Sé Cathedral, the Basilica of Bom Jesus (which houses the sarcophagus of Saint Francis Xavier, the patron saint of Goa), and the Church of Saint Cajetan. Ponda is noted for the Mangesh, Mhalasa, and Mahalakshmi Hindu temples and the Safa Muslim mosque. Vasco connects Goa to the rest of India by rail, and the Dabolim airport is reached by domestic flights.

Panaji (population 43,165), the capital, is a port city on the Mandovi River. The origin of the name is uncertain. There are two possible meanings: *panalkhalli* ("place of running water") and *ponnje* ("marshy, fertile place"). The city of Old Goa was the original capital. When its population was decimated in 1759 following plagues, the viceroy moved his residence to Pangim (as it was known then). Pangim was renamed Nova Goa in 1843 and made the capital city.

Mormugao (population 83,200), at the estuary of the Zuari River, is the chief shipping center of Goa



CHURCHES AND CONVENTS OF GOA— WORLD HERITAGE SITE

These beautiful manifestations of the spread of Portuguese Catholicism in Asia were designated a World Heritage Site in 1986. The most famous of the churches, the Church of Bom Jesus, is popular with pilgrims all over the world who marvel at the mysteriously undecomposed corpse of Saint Francis-Xavier, the Apostle of the Indies.



THE SIGHTS OF COLONIAL GOA

"Goa, the Metropolis of *India*, under the Dominion of the Crown of *Portugal*, stands on an Island about 12 Miles long, and 6 broad. The City is built on the North Side of it, on a Champaign Ground, and has the Conveniency of a fine salt Water River, capable to receive Ships of the largest Size, where they ly within a Mile of the Town. The Banks of the River are beautified with noble Structures of Churches, Castles and Gentlemens Houses; but in the City, the Air is reckoned unwholsom, which is one Cause why at present it is not well inhabited. The Vice-roy's Palace is a noble Edifice, standing within Pistol Shot of the River, over one of the Gates of the City, which leads to a spacious noble Street, about half a Mile long, and terminates at a beautiful Church, called *Misericordia*. The City contains many noble Churches, Convents, and Cloisters, with a stately large Hospital, all well endow's, and well kept. The Market-place stands near the *Misericordia* Church, and takes up about an Acre square, where most Things of the Product of that Country are to be sold; and, in the Shops about it, may be had what *Europe*, *China*, *Bengal*, and other Countries of less Note furnish them with. Every Church has a Set of Bells, that one or other of them are continually ringing, and, being all christned, and dedicated to some Saint, they have a specifick Power to drive away all Manner of evil spirits, except Poverty in the Laity, and Pride in the Clergy; but, to those that are not used to nocturnal Noises, they are very troublesome in the Nights."

Source: Alexander Hamilton. (1702) *A New Account of the East Indies*, as quoted in *The Sabibs* (1948), edited by Hilton Brown. London: William Hodge, 23–24.

and, after Mumbai, India's largest port. Margao (population 58,500) is the chief industrial city of Goa, specializing in electronics, textiles, pharmaceuticals, plastics, and metals.

From the second century CE until 1312, Goa was under the Kadamba rulers, and for most of the fourteenth century Goa was dominated by Muslim invaders. It was annexed by Vijayanagar and later

conquered by the Bahmanis, who subdivided it in 1382, making it a part of the Bijapur kingdom, which it remained until the coming of the Portuguese. Alfonso de Albuquerque conquered Goa in 1510 and made it the headquarters of Portuguese possessions in India. Daman and Diu were added later. After India gained independence in 1947, a freedom movement led to the annexation of Goa by force in December 1961. Goa became a union territory in 1962 and a state in 1987. Daman and Diu have remained union territories.

Henry Scholberg

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GOAT The goat (*Capra hircus*), an even-toed hoofed animal that chews a cud, was probably domesticated in the area of present-day Iran in the mid-eighth millennium BCE and from there spread towards Southeast Europe. Its wild progenitors were three species: the markhor (*C. falconeri*), the pasang (*C. aegagrus*), and the extinct Balkan *C. prisca*. In recent times, domesticated goats have been kept throughout West Asia, South Asia, and northwestern China, as well as in the Mediterranean basin and Africa.

Being herded animals, sheep (*Ovis aries*) and goats are sometimes farmed together, with a goat serving as the leader of a flock of sheep. Yet their distribution is not identical, because sheep require dry grassland, whereas goats can flourish in a much wider variety of settings, including India and tropical Africa. Goats do better than sheep in the most marginal of dry lands.

Like other ruminants, goats have complex four-part stomachs in which vegetable food is slowly digested by a process of regurgitation and chewing the cud. They are about one meter in length, with hollow, curved horns, and are covered in long hair useful for spinning into thread. They produce one or two young at a birth; and the udders have two teats. Goat's milk is widely used for food, including cheese making, and goat meat is easily transported to market on the hoof.

Paul Hockings


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GOBI DESERT The Gobi Desert, 1.3 million square kilometers (500,000 square miles) of rugged plains crossing Mongolia and northeastern China, extends roughly from the Great Khingan Mountains (Da Hinggan Ling) in the east to the Tian Shan in the west and from the Altun Shan, Qilian Shan, and Yin Mountains in the south to the Altay Shan and Hangai Mountains in the north. Under this definition the Gobi Desert extends approximately 1,600 kilometers from east to west and 480 to 960 kilometers from north to south. In the Mongolian language the term "gobi" refers to any vast, flat, dry area where people are scarce and where sand and coarse pebbles cover the ground. In fact several deserts on the Central Asian Plateau bear the name, including Gaxun Gobi, Junggar Gobi, Trans-Altay Gobi, and Eastern or Mongolian Gobi.

The Gobi Desert's chalky plateaus consist of bare rocks with intermittent areas of shifting sand. The climate is continental and dry, with severe winters and hot summers. Annual precipitation varies from 6.9 centimeters (2.7 inches) in the west to 20 centimeters (8 inches) in the east. The average lows in January drop to -40°C (-40°F), and the average highs in July reach 45°C (113°F).

Although the region's harsh terrain is a natural barrier, it would be a mistake to describe the land as life-



less. Shrubs and bushes grow on plains watered by mountain streams. Sandy desert occupies only 3 percent of the total area, and much of the Gobi is high mountains and dry grasslands. These areas are home to wild camels, sheep, ibex, snow leopards, lynx, and steppe foxes. The Gobi was also home to the modern world's last remaining wild horse species, Przewalski's horse, which disappeared from the Mongolian steppe in the 1950s but has been reintroduced to the region since 1992. Animals, grazing lands, and subterranean wells are abundant enough to support sparse human populations of one person per square kilometer.

In the twentieth century the Gobi became noted for its wealth of dinosaur fossils. In 1922 the Central Asiatic Expedition under the direction of Roy Chapman Andrews (1884–1960) first discovered the fossilized remains of dinosaurs in the region, and subsequent researchers found the remains of hundreds of dinosaurs in the Gobi Desert. Many of these finds, including *Oviraptor*, *Stegoceras*, *Protoceratops*, and *Velociraptor*, were the first of their kind. In some instances the fossils were lying on the desert floor, covered only by a thin layer of dust.

Although the Gobi region has supported a rich variety of flora and fauna from prehistoric to present times, increasing urbanization, livestock grazing, and agricultural development in the last century have upset the Gobi's delicate ecological balance in many areas. For example, the outskirts of cities, such as Sainshand, Mongolia, have seen brushy and grazable land turn to infertile shifting sands as herds overgraze near the city and motorized vehicle traffic increasingly tears up the Gobi's delicate surface. Both the Chinese and the Mongolian governments have instituted projects to counter this man-made degradation, but only time will tell if the Gobi desert is destined to become in actuality the wasteland that many outsiders think it is.

Daniel Hruschka

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GODAVARI RIVER The Godavari (or Godavery) River, 1,445 kilometers long, originates in India's Western Ghats, in Nasik District, and then flows in a southeasterly direction across Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh, bisecting the Deccan Plateau, and then cutting a valley through the Eastern Ghats in a magnificent gorge only 200 meters wide. Above this,

however, the river in parts is 2 to 3 kilometers wide. After crossing a vast fertile delta, the river empties into the Bay of Bengal through three main distributaries in the central part of Andhra Pradesh. Rice is grown on the delta, which benefits from a system of irrigation canals as well as the several distributaries. The main canals are all navigable, totaling some 793 kilometers in length, and irrigating 268,000 hectares. The catchment area of the river has been estimated at 290,600 square kilometers.

Paul Hockings

GODPARENTHOOD—PHILIPPINES In the Philippines godparenthood based on *compadrinazgo* or *compadrazgo* is known as the *compadre* or *kum-pare* system. It is the mechanism whereby new relationships are created through participation in certain rites of passage. Ritual kinship is created through sponsorship at baptisms, confirmations, and marriages required by the Roman Catholic Church. *Compadrinazgo* combines *padrinazgo* or spiritual godparenthood with *compadrazgo* or ritual co-parenthood, with *padrinazgo* emphasizing the vertical relationships, that is between godparents and godchildren, and *compadrazgo* stressing horizontal relationships, that is, between the godparents and the natural parents.

The *compadre* system is not indigenous to the Philippines but an alien institution that has been adapted at different times to meet specific circumstances. Found in Europe as early as the ninth century, the practice was brought to the New World by the Spaniards, where it was quickly accepted and later exported to the Philippines. The *compadrazgo* system includes a mixture of Spanish, Latin American, and Filipino aspects.

In Philippine societies, which were emerging from the kinship stage (Phelan) at the time of the Spanish intrusion, *compadrazgo* represented possibilities for extended kinship systems. Among the features of the *compadre* mechanism are its adaptability to different situations and changing needs. What began as a means of creating extended kinship evolved into a mechanism for survival in a society controlled by colonial powers. Family in the Philippines should be seen as "the strongest unit of society, demanding the deepest loyalties of the individual, and coloring all social activity with its own demands" (McCoy 1995: 1). As such, its responsibilities include providing employment and capital, educating and socializing the young, providing medical care, and sheltering the handicapped and elderly. While blood kinship might not

be able to meet all these needs, a system that includes extended kinship has a better chance of doing so. As a result, kinship in the Philippines is not primarily vertical but horizontal and expands within each generation, creating an ever-wider safety net of fictive relationships.

With the emergence of a local elite, the *compadre* system became a tool for reinforcing the patron-client relationship. Both sides of the equation can gain by entering into a *compadre* relationship. The weaker party, the client, seeks the assistance of the stronger, wealthier party. The patron gains the allegiance of others, and can use this for political, social, and economic power.

Damon L. Woods

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GODSE, NATHURAM VINAYAK (1911–1949), assassin of Mohandas Gandhi. Nathuram Vinayak Godse, perhaps the most notorious assassin of the twentieth century, was the Hindu fanatic who shot Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi dead on 30 January 1948 in Delhi. He was a member of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a political faction angered at what it saw as Gandhi's pandering to the Muslims of India and his "emasculatation of the Hindu community" through a long-standing policy of nonviolence (*ahimsa*). With the end of British rule, this radical faction wanted Hindu Raj, a chauvinistic Hindu government.

In that time of extreme tension between Muslims and Hindus on the subcontinent, a Muslim's attempt on the saintly Gandhi's life would have ignited a bloodbath even greater than the one that had marked the splitting of Pakistan from India. But Godse was, like Gandhi, a Hindu, albeit a militant extremist and



Godse (front row, left) and codefendants at their trial. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)


a Brahmin. He was editor of two magazines published in Pune by the Hindu Mahasabha, another political organization. The immediate cause of Godse's anger was Gandhi's embarking on yet another fast to protest the communal violence that was tearing India apart. A fellow conspirator, Madan Lal, had failed to kill Gandhi the previous day with a bomb explosion. But Godse shot Gandhi at point-blank range after bowing to him, while Gandhi was on the way to evening prayers. Godse was tried, defended himself eloquently, and was sentenced, with his associate Narayan Apte, to execution and was hanged on 15 November 1949.

Paul Hockings

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GOH CHOK TONG (b. 1941), prime minister of the Republic of Singapore. Born in Singapore on 20 May 1941, Goh Chok Tong was educated at the elite Raffles Institution and later earned his B.A. from the University of Singapore in 1964. Upon graduation, Goh joined the Singapore Civil Service. In 1967, he earned a masters degree in economics from Williams College. Goh began his political career in 1976, becoming a member of parliament as a member of the ruling People's Action Party (PAP). In 1977, he became a minister of state for finance, and between 1979 and 1990 he held a variety of cabinet posts, including minister of trade and industry and minister of health. In 1985, Goh became minister for defense and the first deputy prime minister. In 1990, following the



Goh Chok Tong addressing the United Nations in New York in September 2000. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

resignation of Singapore's founding prime minister, Lee Kwan Yew (held office 1965–1990), Goh was elected prime minister. In addition to his cabinet posts, Goh has held senior PAP positions since 1979, including the post of secretary general, which he has held since 1992. Goh is a leading voice in the regional organization the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and has overseen Singapore's consolidation as a regional financial and economic power. A devoted party loyalist, he has ensured the PAP's domination of Singapore politics.

Zachary Abuza

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GOH KENG SWEE (b. 1918), finance minister and minister of education of Singapore. Goh Keng Swee was born in Melaka to parents of Chinese ancestry. After earning a doctorate from the London School of Economics, he became finance minister of Singapore in 1959. When Singapore became independent in 1965, Goh embarked on a pragmatic program of industrial development, which was to be financed by foreign capital. His program brought prosperity to the island republic while neighboring countries floundered economically.

At the core of his development plan were incentives to foreign corporations. Foreign firms were allowed to operate in tax-free enclaves, exempt from local regulations pertaining to working and other conditions. As a result, Singapore induced many multinational corporations to establish Southeast Asian regional offices there.

In 1979, Goh became minister of education during a crisis in which the government feared that Singapore's students were not ready to meet the challenges posed by an economy based on high technology. In response, Goh revamped the public school system, stressing English as the preferred language of instruction.

Goh retired from politics in 1984. Subsequently, he has served as an advisor to the governments of the People's Republic of China and Singapore on economic matters. His legacy to Singapore is that it became one of the top-ten countries in the world in per capita gross national product, surpassing even Great Britain, by the 1990s.

Michael Haas

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GOLDEN CRESCENT The Golden Crescent is the name given to Asia's principal area of illicit opium production, located at the crossroads of Central, South, and Western Asia. This space overlaps three nations, Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, whose mountainous peripheries define the crescent. In 1991, Afghanistan became the world's primary opium producer, with a yield of 1,782 metric tons, surpassing Burma, formerly the world leader in opium production. The Golden Crescent has a much longer history of opium produc-

tion than does Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle, even though the Golden Crescent emerged as a modern-day opium-producing entity only in the 1970s, after the Golden Triangle did so in the 1950s.

The distribution of opium in the Golden Crescent was a by-product of early commerce along the Silk Road and of Arab maritime trade. Indeed, places such as Kunduz and Kabul in Afghanistan, Peshawar in Pakistan, and the Makran coast of Pakistan served as commercial relays for merchants who undoubtedly traded in opium as early as the first century of the Common Era.

From at least the seventeenth century, the area's main opium-producing state was Persia (later Iran), until the Shah banned all production and consumption in 1955. Only as late as 1979, however, did opiate production really emerge with the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. During the 1970s, Afghanistan produced a mere 90 to 270 metric tons of opium per year, almost the same yield as neighboring Pakistan, before the latter achieved 720-metric-ton crop in 1979. If Persia's prohibition of opium trade had earlier contributed to Golden Triangle opium production, the 1978 drought that affected Southeast Asia contributed, in turn, to the growth of the Golden Crescent, as shown by the doubling of Afghanistan's opium output in 1983.

Although Pakistan has almost stopped production, it still has a huge addicted population that relies on Afghanistan's opiates. Afghanistan doubled its production again in 1999, reaching a stunning 4,123 metric tons of dry opium. Afghanistan thus emerged as the world's leading producer of opiates before suddenly and dramatically reducing this production by 85 percent in 2001, when it was banned by the Taliban rulers. At the close of 2001, with the Taliban forced from power, opium production is reappearing.

The evolution of opium production in the Golden Crescent was clearly the outcome of the protracted twenty-year Afghan conflict. Afghanistan's current socioeconomic situation makes opium production one of the country's only available economic means of access to land, labor, and credit. Along with the Golden Triangle, the Golden Crescent (with Afghanistan as its preeminent producer) remains one of the world's main areas for the production of illicit opiates. Short-term trends show great irregularities of production, while long-term trends indicate continuing strength in the region's illicit opiates industry.

Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy

See also: **Drug Trade; Golden Triangle**

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GOLDEN HORDE The Golden Horde is best known as that part of the Mongol empire that ruled the lands we now know as Russia from approximately 1237 to 1359. Originally, however, it consisted of those lands that Genghis Khan (1165–1227) bequeathed to his son Jochi (flourished 1184–1225). These consisted of the territories west of the Irtysh River (in modern Kazakhstan) and Khwarizm (in present-day Uzbekistan).

During the reign of Ogodei Khan (d. 1240/1241), the successor of Genghis Khan, the realm exploded in size. In 1237, Jochi's son Batu (reigned 1227–1255), assisted by Genghis Khan's famous general Sabutai (d. 1279), led a large army westward. They destroyed the Bulgar state, pacified the numerous Turkic tribes of the steppes, and conquered Russia's cities. In 1240, Mongol armies invaded Hungary and Poland. As news spread of the ferocity of the Mongol attack, Europe trembled in anticipation of an invasion that never came. In 1241, Ogodei Khan died and the Mongol armies withdrew to elect a new khan.

Batu established the Golden Horde, as his territory was known, as a semi-dependent part of the Mongol empire. The origins of the name Golden Horde are uncertain. Some scholars believe that it refers to the camp of Batu and the later rulers of the Horde. In Mongolian, Altan Orda refers to the Golden Camp or Horde. The golden color (*altan*) also connoted imperial status.

Batu died in 1255 and the next significant ruler of the Golden Horde was his brother Berke (1255–1267). Berke had converted to Islam and focused most of his energies against the Il-Khans of Persia. He completed an alliance with the Mamluks of Egypt, who also were enemies of the Il-Khans. The Il-Khanate collapsed in 1334.

The golden age of the Golden Horde occurred between 1313 and 1341, during the rule of Oz Beg (Uzbek) Khan. During this period, the Golden Horde

reached its pinnacle in terms of wealth, trade, influence, and military might. Also during this period Oz Beg Khan forced the conversion of the Golden Horde to Islam. During the mid-fourteenth century, however, the Golden Horde weakened as it, like much of the world, suffered from bubonic plague, civil wars, and ineffective rulers.

Toqtamish (reigned 1379–1391, 1392–1395) restored the Golden Horde to some of its former glory, but he also became embroiled in a series of wars with the Turkic conqueror Timur (Tamerlane; reigned 1369–1404). Timur emerged victorious; Toqtamish died in obscurity. The cities of Sarai and New Sarai were sacked and the trade routes never recovered from Tamerlane's predations. With the death of Toqtamish, the Golden Horde went into a downward spiral and eventually fragmented. By the mid-fifteenth century, it had shattered into the Crimean khanate, the Astrakhan khanate, the Siberian khanate, the Kazan khanate, the Nogai Horde, and the Great Horde.

Timothy M. May

See also: **Mongol Empire**

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GOLDEN TRIANGLE The Golden Triangle is one of Asia's two main illicit opium-producing areas. It is an area of around 350,000 square kilometers that overlaps the mountains of three countries of mainland Southeast Asia: Myanmar (Burma), Laos, and Thailand. Along with Afghanistan in the Golden Crescent (together with Iran and Pakistan), it has been one the most important opium-producing area of Asia and of the world since the 1950s.

The term first appeared in 1971, referring to the shape of Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand when taken together. The gold of the triangle is most probably that which the first opium merchants of the region used in exchange for the crops. Although the opium production that exists in the Golden Triangle is fre-

quently and erroneously thought to be an old traditional activity, in fact, opium growing is an altogether recent phenomenon. It is only at the end of nineteenth century that the poppy-growing tribal populations began their southernmost forced migration from China toward the highlands of mainland Southeast Asia. There they scattered and settled, having brought with them the practice and techniques of farming the opium poppy (*Papaver somniferum*).

As World War II drew to a close, this area was producing less than eighty tons of opium per annum. All that changed when China clamped down on opium production and addiction, spurring Southeast Asia to take over production. The sudden suppression of opium production in Iran in 1955 further reinforced the transfer toward Southeast Asia.

Later, due mainly to the internal protracted Burmese conflicts and ethnic and communist rebellions, the Golden Triangle's opium production literally exploded, exceeding 3,000 tons in 1989, with Burma alone producing more than 2,500 tons in 1996. The narcotics trade linked a marginal and isolated Southeast Asian region with principal cities of the Western world. The United States became the main destination of the Golden Triangle's heroin, the so-called China White, or heroin No. 4, renowned for its 98 percent purity.

At the end of the twentieth century, the Golden Triangle was clearly dominated by Burmese production, Thailand had suppressed almost all its poppies, and Laos was still fighting the battle. But a new scourge had arrived in the region: an explosion in amphetamine production in Burma and a large population of addicts in Thailand.

Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy

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GOLKAR Golkar (Golongan Karya, or Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups) was a government party in Indonesia during President Suharto's New

Order. It was created as an umbrella of anti-Communist civilian associations and trade unions in order to balance the influence of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI, or Partai Komunis Indonesia), which had grown during the period of Guided Democracy (1959–1965) established by President Sukarno. Golkar was sponsored by the Indonesian army. With Suharto's ascent to power in 1967, Golkar became the electoral organization of the New Order government. At first Golkar lacked the individual membership and special cadre of activists needed to form a strong political party. By 1971, however, it won the national election and subsequently had little competition from the other two political parties—the United Development Party and the Indonesian Democratic Party—that had emerged from Suharto's rationalization of the political system in 1973. By 1983, Golkar was considered a strong political party, widely supported because of Indonesia's economic successes under it but also because opponents were intimidated and election results were manipulated. At the general election of June 1999, Golkar was relegated to second place after Megawati Sukarnoputri's Indonesian Democratic Party, signifying the final demise of the New Order.

Martin Ramstedt

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GOND The Gonds, for the most part located in the state of Madhya Pradesh in central India, are the largest Scheduled Tribe (low-caste tribe) in southern Asia, numbering over 7.3 million in 1981. The more southerly Gonds speak Parji or Gondi, two Dravidian languages, whereas those in the north speak dialects of Hindi or Marathi, which are both Indo-Aryan languages.

The Gonds live, often as extended families, in dispersed housing in villages. Even where other tribes and castes are present, the Gonds tend to remain in separate hamlets. They either farm or work in the forests, collecting timber, honey, or wild plants. Most have been obliged to abandon their former pattern of shifting cultivation for settled farming, in some areas

on terraces. Millet, rice, wheat, gram, and other crops are grown, and animal husbandry is practiced. Women play an important role in farming, as well as in collecting fuel and forest produce.

Monogamy is the normal marriage pattern, though polygyny does occur, as well as divorce and widow remarriage. While it has a large population, the tribe was never a political unit. It has always been split into many subgroups, with little or no political influence in modern India. The main authority is the village headman and his council. These traditionally had a judicial role in the society.

The religion of the Gonds may be characterized as Hindu, but with many animistic practices devoted to nature spirits. Gonds believe all humans have two souls. They believe in an almighty god named Bhagwan, but little ritual is directed to him.

Paul Hockings

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GONDAVANA. See **Chhattisgarh**.

GONG LI (b. 1966), Chinese actress. Gong Li was born in Shenyang, Liaoning Province, China, in 1966. She graduated from high school in 1983 and was mentored by Yin Dawei, a stage director with the Jinan Military Drama Troupe, before entering Beijing's Central Drama Academy in 1985. While a student there, she was chosen by director Zhang Yimou to play the lead in his film *Red Sorghum* (1987), which went on to win the Golden Bear award at the Berlin Film Festival.

Zhang and Gong's first creative partnership led to many more films, including *Ju Dou* (1989), *Raise the Red Lantern* (1991), *The Story of Qiu Ju* (1992), *To Live* (1994), and *Shanghai Triad* (1995). For her role in *The Story of Qiu Ju*, Gong was awarded the best actress prize by the Venice Film Festival.

Over her career, Gong has tackled a wide variety of roles from the glamorous to the workaday, always imbuing her performance with tremendous confidence and charisma. She frequently portrays strong, inde-

pendent women who go against society's grain to pursue their own unshakable convictions.

Gong has also appeared in numerous films by other directors, including Chen Kaige, Wayne Wang, Lu Yue, and Huang Shuqin. In 1998 she became a delegate to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

Alexa Olesen

See also: **Zhang Yimou**

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GORKUT ATA The Gorkut Ata epic, or *Book of Grandfather Korkut*, is a collection of twelve narratives in a mixture of verse and prose, telling the heroic exploits of the Oghuz, a Turkic tribe from which the modern Turks, Azerbaijanis, and Turkmen arose. The telling of these tales is attributed to Grandfather Korkut, variously called Dede Korkut (Qorqut) or Gorkut Ata, the legendary singer and narrator of the Oghuz. The text of these epic tales is transmitted in two sixteenth-century manuscripts, but the narratives themselves are considerably older. Some may go back to the period when the Oghuz still lived on the Syr Dar'ya River in Central Asia (ninth–eleventh centuries CE). Famous among these narratives are the tales of Basat and Tepe Goz, a variant of the story of Odysseus and the Cyclops, and of Bamsi Beyrek, a version of the Alpamish epic. In spirit and form these narratives can be considered some of the first Turkic epics. The figure of Gorkut Ata is the subject of a number of legends and traditional songs in Central Asia, where he is venerated as the patron saint of epic singers.

Karl Reichl

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GOTO SHINPEI (1857–1929), Japanese politician. Trained in medicine, Goto made his name as a colonial administrator in imperial Japan's burgeoning

empire. He was subsequently influential as a bureaucratic politician in the transition period between oligarchic and political party rule.

Of samurai lineage from the Sendai domain (present-day Miyagi Prefecture), Goto studied medicine in Fukushima and Nagoya and at age twenty-five gained public recognition as the head of Aichi Prefectural Hospital. After two years of study in Germany, he served the empire as chief of the Sanitation Bureau of the Home Ministry (1895–1898), director of the Army Quarantine Office (1895), first head of civilian administration in Taiwan (1898–1906), first president of the South Manchuria Railway Company (1906–1908), and director general, alternately, of the Railway Agency and the Colonization Bureau between 1908 and 1918.

Among Goto's political appointments were membership in the House of Peers (1903–1929), minister of communications (1908–1911, 1912–1913), home minister (1916–1918 and 1923–1924), minister of foreign affairs (1918), and mayor of Tokyo (1920–1923). In addition to his service to the empire, Goto is celebrated for work in reconstruction after the 1923 Tokyo earthquake and his attempt to normalize relations with the Soviet Union in 1923.

Frederick R. Dickinson

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GRAMEEN BANK In 1999, Grameen Bank (GB) distributed \$1.5 million in microcredit loans every day. The bank was established in Chittagong, Bangladesh, in 1983 with the belief that credit is a "fundamental human right." The concept is also based on the belief that if poor people are provided with money and a few sound financial principles to live by, such as collective responsibility, close monitoring of repayment of loans, and compulsory and voluntary saving, they will help themselves.

The idea of Grameen Bank became a reality in 1976, when Professor Muhammad Yunus loaned \$27 of his own money to forty-two people living in a village in rural Bangladesh. The people to whom he lent the money were stool makers who only needed enough credit to purchase raw materials for their trade.

GB has reversed conventional banking practice by removing the need for collateral and has created a banking system based on mutual trust, accountability, participation, and creativity. Participants, typically small groups of borrowers, are required to set aside 5 percent of a loan as a fund from which all participants can draw, pending group approval. For GB, credit is a cost-effective weapon in the fight against poverty, and it serves as a catalyst in the overall socioeconomic development of the poor, who have been kept outside the banking orbit on the ground that they are not bankable.

Currently, GB is the largest rural finance institution in the country. It has more than 2.3 million borrowers, 94 percent of whom are women. With 1,128 branches, GB provides services in 38,951 villages, covering more than half of the total villages in Bangladesh. The repayment rate of its loans, which average \$160, is more than 95 percent. Interest on all loans is currently fixed at 16 percent.

Grameen Bank's positive impact on its poor and formerly poor borrowers has been documented in many independent studies by external agencies, including the World Bank, the International Food Research Policy Institute (IFPRI), and the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS). Grameen Bank has inspired people and institutions throughout the world with its success in poverty alleviation. More than 4,000 people from some 100 countries have gone through Grameen's training programs over the last ten years. Some of those visitors have returned to their countries and replicated the Grameen Bank financial system to help poor people in their own country to overcome poverty. A total of 223 Grameen replication programs in fifty-eight countries have been established during the last decade. Taken together, they have reached several hundred thousand poor borrowers with credit around the world.

Syedur Rabman

See also: **Bangladesh—Economic System**

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GRAND CANAL China's longest canal is the Grand Canal, stretching more than 1,700 kilometers from Beijing in the north to Hangzhou in the south. It is the world's longest man-made waterway and was built over the course of centuries beginning in the fourth century BCE. Major work was undertaken on it during the Sui dynasty (581–618) and the Tang dynasty (618–907); under the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) the course of the canal was shifted. All China's major rivers run west to east, but the Grand Canal runs north to south, connecting the Chang (Yangtze) River in the south with the Huang (Yellow) River in the north and providing a valuable alternative to overland or sea transport of goods.

The canal's primary use during the Sui and Tang dynasties was to bring grain grown in the fertile south to expanding cities in the north. It became a major trade route, with goods and people flowing in both directions. One important innovation was the invention of the pound lock in the tenth century. The pound lock allowed boats to move along waterways of different levels; the Grand Canal, for instance, rises more than 40 meters above sea level over its course. Currently there are twenty-four locks on the Grand Canal.

The Huang River's flooding and silting have always caused problems for the canal, but it was regularly maintained and used into the twentieth century, when the rise of coastal ports and railroad transportation led sections to fall into disuse. In the 1950s much of the canal was reopened for use, and it is again a major trade route as well as a tourist attraction.

Paul Forage

GREAT GAME The Great Game is the term widely used to describe the bitter nineteenth-century Anglo-Russian rivalry for influence in Central Asia. British and Russian strategists (mainly young military officers) saw the need for influence over Central Asia from a historical perspective. They argued that most military campaigns against the Indian subcontinent were undertaken through the territory of Central Asia, which at that time included Afghanistan and the eastern part of Iran. Thus for the British, primary influence over Central Asia was pivotal to defense of their interests in India against Russian advancement, while it was crucial for Russia to defend its communications lines with Siberia and the Russian Far East, the "soft underbelly" of the Russian Empire in Winston Churchill's words.

Both sides undertook a number of spying and counterespionage operations and highly adventurous geo-

graphic expeditions in search of allies and routes for troops, all of which were glorified by such writers as Rudyard Kipling. The Russians conducted the first expedition to Khiva in 1839–1840, but the campaign was unsuccessful, and they lost a number of soldiers and officers in this ill-prepared expedition. Then in 1842, two British officers, Colonel Charles Stuart and Captain Arthur Connolly, were hanged in Bukhara. The Russians collided with the Kokand Khanate when they captured Tashkent (1865), an important economic outpost of the khanate; Khodzhent (1866); and later Kokand (1875), which established their influence over the Bukhara Khanate (1868), advancing all the way to the borders of Afghanistan, the last political barrier before India. Perceiving this as a direct threat to British interests in India, the British advanced north-west in an attempt to establish direct control over Afghanistan.

In the eighteenth century, Ahmad Shah (reigned 1747–1773), the leader of the Abdali tribe of the Pashuns, had proclaimed Afghan rule as far east as Kashmir and Delhi, north to the Amu Dar'ya, and west into northern Persia. In the nineteenth century, as internal conflicts gradually weakened the Afghan empire, both the British in India and the Russians to the north sought to bring Afghanistan under their control. This resulted in two Anglo-Afghan Wars (1838–1842 and 1878–1880), which the British finally won, establishing their dominance over Afghanistan's foreign relations. Gradually, both sides, British and Russian, accepted Afghanistan as a buffer zone between their respective empires.

The strategic importance of Central Asia was highlighted again in the early twentieth century by Sir Halford John Mackinder, the British political geographer, who in 1919–1920 went as British high commissioner to southern Russia in an attempt to unify the White Russian forces against the Bolsheviks. He produced a simple geopolitical formula: "Who rules the Heartland [which included Central Asia] commands the World-Island [Eurasian Continent]. Who rules the World-Island commands the World."

Since the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991, a new competition for political influence and a share in the Central Asian market, especially for its natural resources, has emerged between various actors. This competition has often been described in terms of establishing influence over the newly independent Central Asian Republics on a basis strategically similar to the competition between Britain and Russia in the nineteenth century.

Rafis Abazov

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GREAT LEAP FORWARD The Great Leap Forward was the campaign launched by the Chinese Communist leadership in 1958 to quickly catch up to and leapfrog over Great Britain and the United States. Having become disenchanted with the Soviet-style development strategy that prioritized heavy industry, China's leaders, particularly Mao Zedong (1893–1976), believed that massive social mobilization would allow China simultaneously to develop industry and agriculture. Unfortunately, the campaign ended in utter failure and caused what is today known as the Great Leap famine.

Mao's Successful Promotion of Large Collectives

Any explanation of the Great Leap must begin with the ideological preferences of Mao and his colleagues. Mao's efforts to promote large collectives and communes were based on a belief in economies of scale and a desire to promote social equality. Even though Mao's earlier pursuit of progressively larger rural institutions, ranging from mutual-aid groups to cooperatives and then to collectives, had caused many disruptions in agricultural production, the disruptions were dismissed as temporary. Mao forged on with demands for larger collectives in the late 1950s.

The Chinese political system had no room for dissent at this time. Repeated political campaigns, particularly the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957, had banished those who spoke up, primarily intellectuals, to hard labor and even imprisonment. Those who raised questions a little later about Great Leap policy practices, such as the defense minister Peng Dehuai (1898–1974), were persecuted as rightist opportunists. In such a political system, those who aspired to mobility on the political ladder of success watched for cues to Mao's preferences and eagerly supported everything that Mao liked.

Once Mao endorsed the term "people's commune" in early August 1958, local leaders and political activists raced to establish communes and competed to build ever-larger ones. The number of communes proliferated. In just two months, most provinces claimed a successful transition to people's communes. Rural China was organized into 26,500 gigantic communes, each averaging 4,756 households. The communes

abolished private property and, in most cases, did away with all economic incentives. The commune mess hall epitomized the frenzy of the Great Leap. Commune members were encouraged to abandon their private kitchens, donate the pots and pans to backyard iron furnaces, and dine in communal mess halls so that women could join the labor force.

The Free-Supply System and Other Wasteful Practices

Amid the euphoria of Communist transition, China's leaders ceased to manage the economy but instead encouraged practices that in hindsight were downright criminal. The state statistical system stopped functioning and was replaced by wild claims of bountiful harvests. Such claims in turn engendered wildly exaggerated output forecasts and prompted prominent regional leaders such as Ke Qingshi (1902–1965) and Tan Zhenlin (1902–1983) to exhort peasants to eat as much as they could. As a consequence, the free-supply system was widely adopted, and the mess hall became the site of communal feasts in many places. The free-supply system induced overconsumption and waste of food, even while state grain procurement was increased sharply on the basis of wildly exaggerated output forecasts. With worsening Sino-Soviet relations, the Chinese leadership increased grain exports, again under the illusion of bountiful harvests, to accelerate China's debt payment to the Soviet Union.

Other practices, including the massive diversion of rural labor to backyard iron furnaces and water-conservation projects, led to gross neglect in harvesting the bumper crops of 1958 and contributed to the ensuing famine. By spring 1959, many communes, caught between higher government procurement and free supply, had exhausted their grain reserves and witnessed a collapse of production incentives. At this point, much could still have been done to avoid the worst of the famine. Unfortunately, during the Lushan Conference of 1959, in which Mao came down hard on Peng Dehuai, Mao unleashed a "second leap" and another push for commune mess halls. This further exacerbated the rural situation and undoubtedly contributed to the jump in China's mortality rates from 12 per 1,000 in 1958 to 14.6 per 1,000 in 1959 and 25.4 per 1,000 in 1960. Statistics reveal that those provinces that had a higher mess-hall participation rate at the end of 1959 also tended to have a higher mortality rate in 1960, the year that China had a net population loss of 10 million people.

Effects of the Great Leap Famine

The Great Leap famine was thus clearly rooted in politics rather than nature. Unfortunately, the peas-

ants who had put their faith in Mao's regime were largely left to fend for themselves when they had exhausted their food supplies. The demographer Judith Banister estimated that the number of excess deaths over 1958–1961 was between 15 and 30 million. In aggregate numbers, the Great Leap famine is the worst famine in human history. The incidence of the famine was emphatically rural, with the grain producers becoming the main victims of famine.

The intensity and magnitude of the Great Leap famine far exceeded the Great Depression in the United States and produced a lasting change in Chinese preferences and behavior. It shattered any nascent beliefs that the rural people might have had about large rural organizations and led them to question government policies. It also prompted Mao and his colleagues to moderate rural policies and scale down the sizes of rural collective organizations. But the famine also induced fissures among the top leaders. As Mao turned his attention away from the economy, he launched the notorious Cultural Revolution in 1966.

While the basic collective institutions were maintained during Mao's lifetime, the famine profoundly undermined popular support for such institutions and laid the foundation for China's eventual decollectivization following Mao's death. Through the early 1980s, the provinces that had suffered more severely during the famine were less likely to adopt radical rural


policies and institutions. Following Mao's death in 1976 and the defeat of radical leaders, farmers again turned to household contracting (contracting land to the household), particularly in those areas that had suffered the most during the famine. By the turn of the 1980s, the national leadership, now led by Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), had embraced rural decollectivization. The Great Leap famine was thus not just a monumental tragedy; it also laid the ground for institutional innovation. It is a great historical irony that the Great Leap Forward, launched to accelerate China's march toward communism, actually served to hasten the arrival of market reforms by precipitating the greatest famine in human history. The tragedy is that China had to go through such a terrible detour.

Dali L. Yang

See also: **Cultural Revolution—China; Mao Zedong**

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
A section of the Great Wall at Badaling, China. The wall has been reconstructed in this area and is a popular tourist site. (DEAN CONGER/CORBIS)

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GREAT WALL The best-known work of Chinese civil engineering is the Great Wall, a line of fortifications extending for more than 6,324 kilometers, if all the branch walls are counted, and 3,460 kilometers, if the main line alone is measured. As was customary, the wall was built with rubble foundations without binding material and with thin layers of bamboo stems spread between blocks to speed drying. Granite blocks as large as 4.3 meters by 0.9 meters were used in the foundation, and apparently only the simplest of tools were used, though on a vast scale. Reinforcements of wood and iron were used in some sections of the wall. Despite this, during periods of neglect, parts of it collapsed. After the third century CE, there was very little maintenance, though reconstruction was undertaken in later periods, particularly under the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). The wall was not a single massive engineering project, but was the connection of various walls that had been built in previous periods to protect northern Chinese regimes from attacks by the Mongols from the north. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, with China open to visitors from the West, the Great Wall has become a major tourist attraction, with sections reconstructed for that purpose.

Paul Forage



THE GREAT WALL OF CHINA— WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Built to repel the marauding nomadic cavalry of Central Asia, the Great Wall of China was begun in 220 BCE under the Qin dynasty and completed in the Ming dynasty. Clearly visible from outer space, the Great Wall of China became a World Heritage Site in 1987.

GREATER XING'AN RANGE The Greater Xing'an Range (Da Xing'anling) is a crescent-shaped mountain range running 1,400 kilometers from south to north in the northwestern parts of Heilongjiang and Jilin Provinces in northeastern China. The range is divided into a southern and a northern part by the Taer River near the border between the two provinces. The northern part of the range runs for about 670 kilometers, with peaks rising 1,000 meters above sea level; a few, like Mount Fengshui and Mount Dajiluqina, reach over 1,390 meters. The eastern slopes are steep; the western slopes merge into the Inner Mongolia Plateau, which is about 700 meters above sea level. It is an extremely cold area, with winters lasting more than eight months and an average temperature in January of -28° C. The southern part generally consists of lower mountains and has a slightly warmer climate.

The Greater Xing'an Range is one of China's most important timber areas and has been heavily forested since 1949, which is increasingly threatening the region's ecological balance. The range is sparsely inhabited by minority nationalities, of which the Orogens are most numerous. Their main sources of income are hunting and forestry. Some agricultural products for local consumption are grown in the lower valleys.

Bent Nielsen

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GREEKS IN TURKEY The Greek presence in Turkey and its islands has been continuous since at least the eighth century BCE. The legendary Greek poet, Homer, was from western Turkey, and with the division of the Roman empire into western (Rome) and eastern (Byzantium) portions, Greek culture flourished in the region, with Constantinople (Istanbul) and the Church of Hagia Sophia as the high watermarks of Hellenic civilization.

Although Byzantium endured and flourished for many centuries, its death knell was struck in 1453, when the Ottoman Turks, led by Mehmed II (1432–1481), invaded the region and toppled the eastern Roman empire. They quickly captured Constantinople and converted the Hagia Sophia into a mosque. Thus was established the modern state of Turkey.

The Fall of Byzantium

With the fall of Byzantium, the majority of the Greeks fled either to Greece or westward into Europe. They took with them a vast amount of learning and knowledge, which would provide the incentive for the exuberance of the Renaissance.

However, a large number also remained behind, and they faced the brunt of the ethnic cleansing to which the conquering Turks, who were Muslims, subjected the people. A large number were forcibly converted to Islam, and huge swaths of the nation were ethnically cleansed. Before long, Byzantium, which had been ethnically and linguistically Greek, became Turkish and Muslim.

Persecution of the surviving Greek minority continued through the ages, but in the early twentieth century, it became systematic extermination just after the Armenian genocide by the Turks during World War I and the ensuing Greco-Turkish War of 1922. The latter war ended with the Treaty of Lausanne when the two sides exchanged populations in 1923. Thereafter, a mere 200,000 Greeks remained in Turkey. Because of continuous civil-rights violations, the present Greek population in Turkey is only about 1,500 people, who are concentrated around the Bosphorus.

Pogrom of 1955

The worst form of persecution took the shape of a pogrom on 6–7 September 1955. This outburst of violence was directed at the Greek community in Istanbul, with a great loss of personal and commercial property, instances of rape, beatings, and murder. Many churches and schools were torched, houses and

businesses looted, and Greek cemeteries desecrated, with some bodies of the patriarchs of the Orthodox Church exhumed and defiled. Also, countless relics were destroyed. In 1995, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution that recognized this pogrom against the Greek community of Turkey and called upon the president to declare 6 September 1955, a day of remembrance of the victims of this state-organized massacre. In 1964, all Greek permanent residents of Istanbul (those who were born in the city but held Greek citizenship) were expelled on a two-day notice.

Religious Persecution

The tiny Greek community that currently resides in Turkey is still persecuted. It faces discrimination, intimidation, threats against its religious leaders, and an ongoing desecration of its holy places. The persecution is immediately discernible in the treatment of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, which is one of the oldest active institutions in Eastern Europe, having been established around 330 CE. It is the spiritual center for Orthodox Christians worldwide, as the Vatican is for Roman Catholics. The Patriarchate's printing facilities have been shut down; the Turkish government will not allow non-Turkish citizens to become bishops, and even the patriarch must be a Turkish citizen. This demand is next to impossible to meet because there are few Greeks left in Turkey, and the Turks themselves are Muslim. Turkey also did not allow the Patriarchate to open a representative office in Brussels, Belgium, in 1994, claiming that the Patriarchate was not a legal body and that thus there was no need for it to be represented in Brussels. In 1995, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution condemning the relentless persecution of the Patriarchate by the Turkish government because it violates international treaties to which Turkey is a signatory.

The Turkish government also closed the Patriarchal Theological School of Chalke, which was the primary educational institute for the Patriarchate clergy; many patriarchs throughout the world graduated from Chalke. Despite requests from the Patriarchate, the Turkish government refuses to reopen the school. In its 1995 resolution, the U.S. Senate also condemned the arbitrary closing of the School of Chalke.

Turkey also refuses to recognize the ecumenical nature of the Orthodox Church and thus will not allow anyone who is not a Turkish citizen to participate in the Patriarchate's affairs in Istanbul; this effectively bars most patriarchs and clergy, who are citizens of other nations.

Denial of Economic and Cultural Rights

Further, in 1986, Turkey revoked the right of ethnic Greeks to buy, sell, trade, or inherit property. This meant that all property once held by Greeks in Turkey eventually passed into Turkish hands. The Greek language is not allowed to be taught at Greek schools, and many young people face discrimination because of their ethnicity.

There are also Greek communities throughout Turkey, and these people have been completely disenfranchised. They live dual lives of sorts, in that they carry on as Turks in the wider society but practice their Orthodox faith secretly; they do not have a right to promulgate their language or culture. There is also a drive toward "Turkification," especially of names. The Orthodox Christians who live to the east of Istanbul cannot worship in Greek, nor can they claim to be Greek Orthodox in official documents and must describe themselves as Turkish; thus even their ethnicity is denied them—which is what the Turkish government hopes to achieve.

The islands of Imvros and Tenedos have been aggressively made Turkish. School property was seized, the thriving meat export industry was shut down, and a large prison was established on Imvros. The government also appropriated property that once belonged to Greeks and turned it over to Turkish settlers from the mainland.

Thus, through a systematic policy of persecution, the ethnic Greek population of Turkey has been driven out, its property turned over to the state, and its freedom to pursue its own culture, religion, and language denied.

Nirmal Dass

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GREEN REVOLUTION—SOUTH ASIA

The Green Revolution, a transformation in the organization of South Asian agriculture that took place mainly between 1964 and 1978, was attendant upon the adoption of high-yielding varieties (HYV) of major crops, including rice, wheat, maize, and some millets. While farmers traditionally planted seeds selected each year from their own crops, seeds for the high-yielding varieties were created in central facilities by systematic selection, hybridization, and genetic transfer. These HYV cultigens do not breed true to type, and pests and diseases constantly evolve adaptations to the new varieties. Consequently, once farmers adopted them, they became dependent on this large and advanced technological infrastructure. The result is a system of peasant agriculture that combines traditional farm management with some of the world's most advanced agricultural science.

Although the new cultigens are often described as "miracle" varieties, they do not produce increased yields under all conditions. They give increased yields primarily in response to heavier and more regular water, fertilizer, and pest control. Without such inputs, the yields of the new varieties are not consistently better than the yields of the traditional varieties, and they may be worse. Accordingly, even though adoption of the HYV crops has been widespread in South Asia, the benefits have depended largely on the quality of the agricultural-support structure in the several countries. Where yields of HYV cultigens have increased, as a rule the yields of many traditional varieties have increased also (Leaf 1998: 109–112). The transformation has been most widespread and most successful in India, followed by Sri Lanka and Pakistan. The effect has been marginal in Bangladesh and Nepal.

Technology

The core methods for transferring desired characteristics from one species to another were initially developed in two major international laboratories. Beginning in 1942, wheat and maize were developed at the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center in Mexico under the combined sponsorship of the Mexican government and the Rockefeller Foundation, headed by Norman Borlaug (b. 1914). Beginning in 1960, rice varieties were developed at the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines, sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Philippine government and based on the Mexican model. Later, millets were developed in India by the Indian Council for Agricultural Research (ICAR), again in collaboration with the Rockefeller Foundation,

with a view toward replicating what had been done to improve the yields of commercial millets in the United States.

Infrastructure

Since the resources on farms are limited in South Asia, much of the infrastructure necessary to provide the required input to HYV plants and to take the resulting crops to market must be created by organizations at or above the village level. The organizations specifically involved with the Green Revolution were primarily government package programs, agricultural universities and research centers, and cooperatives.

Before independence, agricultural research took place in state agriculture departments and a few central institutes, while agricultural colleges aimed almost exclusively at providing departmental staff. These institutions did little to change the historic pattern of a large but poor agricultural population producing only slightly more than it consumed. After independence, the governments of India and Pakistan recognized the contrast between their inherited institutions and the dynamic, productive system of agricultural research and education in the United States. On the basis of agreements between the government of India, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and a consortium of five U.S. land-grant universities, signed in 1954 and 1955, India in 1960 began to develop a series of agricultural universities modeled on the American land-grant colleges (Naik and Sankaram 1972: 83, 99).

Concurrently, in 1959, a team from the government of India and the Ford Foundation conducted a study of constraints on agricultural productivity. The result was the formation of the Integrated Agricultural Development Programme, begun in 1961–1962 with support from the Ford Foundation. The main idea was to concentrate development inputs in a few especially promising districts selected from around the country. The newly formed agricultural universities would recommend a package of crops for these districts, based on the best available science, and prescribe the services needed to produce them. The state governments would provide the services (Gill 1983: 205). The plan was successful and was quickly expanded to one district in every state under the new designation of the Intensive Agricultural Areas Programme and to still other districts starting in 1964–1965. Parallel efforts were urged in Pakistan but with little success, largely because Pakistan's rural economy is dominated by a small class of wealthy absentee landholders whose main historical interest has been in maintaining their

TABLE 1

Wheat production for 1965, 1975, 1980, 1995				
(in percentages)				
	1965	1975	1980	1995
South Asia	100	189	189	258
Bangladesh	100	338	2,382	3,604
India	100	197	197	260
Nepal	100	263	263	349
Pakistan	100	167	167	237

SOURCE: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations.

own power (Sims, 1988: 161–162, 189). A strong district administration responsive to the actual farmers would not serve this end.

The package programs demonstrated that the response of traditional crop varieties to increased inputs with increased yields was limited, and this set the stage for the adoption of the high-yielding varieties. In 1962, M. S. Swaminathan (b. 1925), "father" of the Green Revolution in India, urged the Indian Agricultural Research Institute to bring Borlaug to India to arrange a large-scale collaboration, arguing that otherwise it would be impossible to realize the full benefits of the package program (Randhawa 1980–1986: 4:367). The institute agreed, and in 1964 the cooperative effort established new centers that, along with several of the new universities, conducted adaptive research and began testing and multiplying seeds of the most promising varieties.

Results

Results varied according to the crop. Wheat yields in India increased from 9,132 kilograms per hectare in 1965 to 12,384 kilograms per hectare in 1975 and to 14,356 kilograms per hectare in 1980. By 1995, the yield in India was 25,590 kilograms per hectare. The yields in Pakistan were 8,631 kilograms per hectare in 1965, 11,375 kilograms per hectare in 1975, 15,680 kilograms per hectare in 1980, and 20,811 kilograms per hectare in 1995. That is, between 1965 and 1995, wheat yields in India increased about 280 percent, and those in Pakistan increased about 240 percent. Increases in total yields for the four producing countries in South Asia are given in Table 1. All production figures are from the agricultural database of the statistical service of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. The FAO in turn receives data from the statistical services of the respective countries; therefore data quality varies widely.

TABLE 2

Paddy production in 1965, 1970, 1980, 1985				
(in percentages)				
	1965	1970	1980	1985
South Asia	100	131	166	193
Bangladesh	100	106	132	143
India	100	138	175	209
Nepal	100	104	112	127
Pakistan	100	167	237	222
Sri Lanka	100	211	279	348

SOURCE: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations.

The impressive proportional gains for Nepal and Bangladesh largely reflect the fact that their calculations start from a particularly small base.

South Asia produces about twice as much rice as wheat. Improvements in rice production have lagged behind those in wheat production but have been sufficient to eliminate substantially the threat of famine. In India, an initiative by ICAR, IRRI, and USAID in 1967 introduced the new varieties through the Central Rice Research Institute in Cuttack, Orissa, and the new All-India Coordinated Rice Improvement Project at Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. Several states were involved in the project. In 1965–1966, the entire Indian production of rice was 30.6 million metric tons. By 1976–1977, it was 52.7 million metric tons. The percentage increases in paddy production from 1965 to 1995 for South Asia as a whole and for each major producing country are given in Table 2.

Assessment

In the early 1960s, South Asia faced the threat of severe food shortfalls. The Green Revolution averted that threat. Although hunger still exists in the region, it is the consequence of inequities in distribution rather than insufficient production. The Green Revolution accomplished what its authors promised, and its potential is far from exhausted.

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GREEN REVOLUTION—SOUTHEAST ASIA

The term "Green Revolution" is used for big increases in wheat and rice yields in developing countries from the 1960s brought about by new high-yielding crop strains combined with the use of fertilizers and agricultural chemicals. It was launched in Asia in 1960 at the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines; rice is the staple food for people living in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia as discussed herein consists of Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam but excludes Brunei and Singapore. The Green Revolution in Southeast Asia as was a technology package comprising improved high-yielding varieties of rice, irrigation or controlled water supply, improved moisture utilization, fertilizers and pesticides, and associated management skills. Some two decades later, several Southeast Asian countries adopted more of a market approach to rural finance. At the same time, local governments improved rural infrastructures such as transportation, telecommunication, postal, irrigation, and electrical systems to assist large and small farmers previously beyond the reach of technological innovations. The utilization of this technology package in suitable socioeconomic environments has resulted in greatly increased yields and incomes for many farmers in Southeast Asia.

Results

The beneficiaries of the Green Revolution have been the farmers and the consumers. Southeast Asia's population increased by 68.2 percent, or 139.3 million people, between 1970 and 1995. Cereal production in Southeast Asia more than doubled from 33.8 million metric tons to 73.6, and cereal yield increased from 1,352 to 2,237 metric tons per hectare. Food availability (measured as calories available per person per day) increased by 34 percent. Rural incomes (measured as per capita gross domestic product) increased by 193

percent, driven increasingly by urban-industrial growth from the 1980s onwards and by growth in the rural nonfarm economy. Using a benchmark of the international poverty line of US\$1 per day (purchasing-power parity, 1985 dollars), the absolute number of poor declined by 41.4 percent from 108 million in 1975 to 40 million in 1995.

Real food prices in Southeast Asia, indeed throughout the world, have steadily declined over the last thirty years as a result of the Green Revolution. Lower real food prices benefit the poor relatively more than they do the rich, since the poor spend a larger portion of their available income on food. Stationary threshers, tube wells, and flour mills have all reduced the drudgery of women. Recent studies of the impacts of the Green Revolution also suggest that it extended beyond the rice producers of Southeast Asia to include other crops and other socioeconomic settings.

The Green Revolution clearly averted a major food crisis in Southeast Asia. Indonesia attained rice self-sufficiency in 1984. Several Southeast Asian countries—Indonesia (pre-1997 crisis) and Vietnam, for example—went from running food deficits in the 1960s to being surplus producers in the late 1980s, despite increasing population. The Green Revolution was the foundation for startling economic growth in Southeast Asia. Since Green Revolution technologies boosted production using less labor without requiring a lot of capital, agricultural labor could easily flow to other sectors. As economies ceased to need to import food, foreign exchange was freed up for other uses. Higher incomes from agriculture caused domestic markets to expand. Indonesia, with the most rapid agricultural growth, has had the most rapid reduction in total poverty. In the Philippines, agricultural growth has been highly inequitable due mainly to the skewed distribution of land holdings and poor rural infrastructure. Overall performance in poverty reduction there has been disappointing because of the unequal distribution of wealth.

The use of high levels of inputs and the achievement of relatively high rice yield in Southeast Asia have made it more difficult to sustain the same rate of yield gains, as yields approach the economic optimum yield levels. Indeed, increased intensity of land use has led to increasing input requirements in order to sustain current yield gains. Environmental pressures are increasing as existing land and water resources come under threat from rapid urbanization, which increasingly withdraws land from agricultural production and create pressure for reallocation of water now used in agriculture.

Furthermore, the Green Revolution technologies were not without their problems. The necessity of using large amounts of agrochemical-based pest and weed control in some crops has raised environmental concerns as well as concern about human health. The chemicals applied as fertilizer and as pest and weed control can pollute rivers and lakes through runoff, and can pollute groundwater through leaching.

The land is increasingly unable to support the burden of intensive agriculture. Intensive farming practices have virtually mined nutrients from the soil. When fertilizers are added to a crop, a plant absorbs not only the extra nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium from the fertilizer, but also proportionately increased levels of micronutrients from the soil, including zinc, iron, and copper. Over time, the soil becomes deficient in these micronutrients. Their lack, in turn, inhibits a plant's capacity to absorb nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium. Consequently, crop yields are declining alarmingly. Many farmers are heavily in debt from their investments in new equipment and reliance on chemicals, and rural unemployment is increasing. These are ominous signs of a deteriorating farm economy.

The move to a higher-input environment naturally favored those farmers who had access to capital and skills. They strengthened their roles in society, sometimes at the expense of less well-endowed groups. Many studies have claimed gender bias in the development of the Green Revolution. The established roles of women in the farming systems were challenged by the new technology and the new economic structures, as work performed by women was now handled by machines.

A limitation of the Green Revolution has been its inability to have much direct influence on rain-fed farming systems, whose production may be adversely affected by droughts. As a result, income disparities between irrigated and rain-fed villages and regions have worsened and many rain-fed regions have barely benefited. The prospects for significant technological advances in rain-fed areas are hampered by limited and uncertain rains that often make water a critical constraint in plant growth, and by the diversity of local growing conditions that limits the geographic applicability of improved technologies.

For Indonesian rice farmers, the high costs of high-yielding rice varieties and the chemical nutrients and fertilizers are driving a return to organic farming using organic seeds, minimal fertilizer, and no pesticides. Across Indonesia, about a dozen nongovernmental organizations are seeking to popularize organic farming

methods as a sustainable, profitable, and environmentally safe alternative to fertilizers and pesticides.

The Future

In the twenty-first century, the world faces the prospect of a new and complex food crisis that will require better ways of ensuring that the hungry and the malnourished will be able to meet their food needs. To tackle this enormous challenge, a new Green Revolution must be launched that will protect the environment and boost agricultural output. Future agricultural growth will continue to be driven by improvements in crop productivity based on genetic manipulation of plants, and biotechnology will eventually accelerate this process, though genetically modified crop strains have foes in Asia, just as they do in Europe. The need for continuing and aggressive research in all related areas and disciplines is self-evident. Today's farmer requires far more knowledge in order to make environmentally appropriate decisions and to cut production costs. Information resources will need to substitute, in the future, for the currently all-too-frequent excessive use of physical resources.

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See also: **Agriculture—Southeast Asia; Green Revolution—South Asia; Rice and Rice Agriculture; Terrace Irrigation**

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GUANGDONG (2002 est. pop. 74 million). Located in southeast China, Guangdong Province covers an area of 196,891 square kilometers (76,000 square miles). It is bordered to the northeast by Fujian Province, to the north by the provinces of Jiangxi and Hunan, and to the west by the Guangxi Autonomous Region. A coastal province on the northern shores of the South China Sea, Guangdong has long played an important role in China's foreign trade—a

role that was expanded after the opening of the country in the 1980s and the creation of the Special Economic Zones at Shenzhen, Shantou, and Zhuhai.

The area was first integrated into the Chinese empire during the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE), although ethnic Han Chinese did not begin to settle there until the Tang era (618–907 CE). The region experienced a major influx of Han settlers during the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279), when migrants began to arrive after fleeing the Mongol invasion of northern China. In 1997 the majority (61.6 percent) of the province's population was ethnic Han Chinese, although minority peoples such as the Zhuang, Yao, Shui, Mulam, and Jing are present in sizable numbers, primarily in the mountainous regions of the interior. The main spoken dialect in the region is Cantonese. Another major dialect, Hakka, is the principal spoken tongue in the north and northeastern regions of the province.

Guangdong is also the point of origin for many overseas Chinese in North America and Southeast Asia, whose relatives left the province in search of work or to escape the political turmoil of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. During the late 1910s and early 1920s Guangzhou (Canton), the provincial capital, served as the headquarters of the Nationalists, first led by Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), the province's most famous son, and following his death by Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975). It was from Guangzhou that Chiang Kai-shek launched the Northern Expedition in 1926 to unify China and end the warlord era.

Between the Tang and Qing dynasties (618–1912) Guangdong emerged as an important agricultural province within the empire, producing large volumes of rice, sugarcane, silk, and fruits, and also as a point of contact with the outside world. Guangzhou was one of China's first great trading centers, first visited by Arab merchants during the Tang dynasty and European merchants during the late Ming and early Qing periods. This tradition of commerce was reinvigorated in the post-Mao period, as Guangdong capitalized on its proximity to the former British colony of Hong Kong to become a primary point of entry for foreign investment and trade with the People's Republic of China. Guangdong stands as one of the best examples of China's ability to move from a state-planned to a market economy that is open to the outside world.

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GUANGXI (2002 est. pop. 50.5 million). The Autonomous Region of Guangxi is located on the southern coast of China. Since 1958 the official name has been the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. The Zhuang nationality is China's largest minority group and constitutes a third of the region's population of 45.5 million (1996). Guangxi covers an area of 236,661 square kilometers and borders on Vietnam and Yunnan in the west, on Guizhou and Hunan in the north, on Guangdong in the east, and on the Gulf of Tonkin in the south. The region is dominated by mountains with peaks over 2,000 meters above sea level in the far west and the far north. Guangxi is traversed by sixty-nine rivers, most of which are tributaries to the Zhu (Pearl) River.

Guangxi has a subtropical monsoon climate, and the rainy season from April to September accounts for 80 percent of the annual precipitation of 1,250 to 1,750 millimeters. Average temperatures during January lie between 6° and 15°C, while the July average is between 23° and 28°C. The capital, Nanning (1996 estimated population of 1.1 million), is situated in the southern central part of Guangxi. The eastern part of the region became part of the Qin empire (221–206 BCE) in 214, and after a brief period of independence, it was conquered by the Han empire (206 BCE–220 CE) in 112–111 BCE. From the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) onward, the area has been part of various southern administrative divisions, sometimes divided into a Han Chinese region in the east and a Zhuang region in the west. Throughout the centuries, the region has been marked by rebellions against succeeding imperial governments and tribal warfare between the Zhuang and other minority nationalities that were pushed south by the Chinese migration from the north. The Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864) originated in Guangxi, and later in the nineteenth century, the French colonial power in Indochina extended its activities to the region.

Guangxi is one of China's most diversified areas with regard to population. Although the Han Chinese

today constitute 62 percent of the population, there are eleven minority nationalities, of which the Zhuang is the largest by far. Several of these minority groups number fewer than 100,000 people. The most important agricultural crops are rice, millet, and sugarcane, but the region grows a wide variety of crops, including tobacco, tea, fruit, soybeans, sweet potatoes, and peanuts. In the mountains in the northwest, forestry dominates, with pine, fir, oak, and camphor trees. Major industries include textiles, chemicals, machine building, and food and tobacco processing. The scenic areas, with karst mountains and underground caves, around Guilin and Yangshuo in the northeast provide a major source of income through tourism.

Bent Nielsen

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GUANGZHOU (2002 pop. 3.4 million). Guangzhou (Canton) is located on China's southeastern coast in the Pearl River Delta. It is the largest city in southern China and the capital of Guangdong Province, which is the main point of entry to China from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Guangzhou has had a long history as a center of economic activity. As far back as the eleventh century, foreign traders lived in Guangzhou trading ivory and spices for silk and tea. Guangzhou was further opened to the West in the nineteenth century when European nations imposed unequal trade treaties with China that gave European traders access to the Chinese markets. In addition to its importance as a trading center, the city played a central role in the Opium War, the Republican Revolution of 1911, and current economic and political reforms in China.

Following the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Guangzhou achieved notoriety for another reason—families with overseas Chinese relatives. Those with families abroad were either reeducated or punished. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Guangzhou residents were again attacked, this time by Red Guards for their overseas family connections. Those residents with relatives

overseas were either persecuted or endured harassment for their contact with decadent lifestyles.

Buoyed by its liberal economic policies, Guangzhou has played a pivotal role in China's recent modernization effort, attracting foreign capital and investment. Western companies seeking to enter the vast Chinese market have set up factories, shops, and hotels. Yet, despite their investment, overseas Chinese investors account for the majority of foreign capital.

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GUANXI The concept of *guanxi*, or "social relationships," is an important concept in Chinese everyday life. Both individual and group interests are asserted via such relationships. There is a particular image of society behind this concept. Many Chinese see society in the first instance as a hierarchically structured order covered by an interlaced network of relationships. While for many Europeans a person's outward appearance and behavior may be important, for many Chinese, who one knows and to which group or work unit one belongs are of consequence.

Not all interpersonal relations are based on *guanxi*. Relations between members of an immediate family or between spouses are based on other obligations (for example, obedience or respect). *Guanxi* relations arise when people have certain things in common, such as coming from the same local area, mutual experiences, or other social connections, and they are developed first of all with people with whom one is in direct contact.

Tong Relationships

Tong, or having something in common, is the most important basis for *guanxi*. The *tongban* (classmate), *tongbao* (person from the same region), *tonghang* (person in the same business), *tongshi* (colleague), *tongxiang* (person from the same hometown or village), and *tongxue* (person who studied at the same school) all have special relations with one another (*tong* relationships). Relations can also be forged through gifts, personal favors, or mediation by third parties. They include mutual obligations and expectations. For every action, something is expected in return. *Guanxi* is less a private relationship than a role-playing game that on

the basis of previous or current situations produces expectations. Those who do favors gain "face" and are recognized by others as people who have respect for those around them.

Friendship and *tong* relationships involve certain obligations, such as constant readiness to help and support not only the person directly involved in the relationship but also his or her family and friends. Refusing to give this help and support was and is seen as negative social behavior, as a complete lack of any kind of human feeling, or alternatively as proof that someone does not love those to whom he or she is naturally linked and therefore obliged to help. In these cases, refusing to help is seen as the highest form of inhumanity and a break with morality.

Guanxi as Connection

To make use of *guanxi*, both sides have to be able to give each other something (influence, protection, access to scarce goods and services, opportunities for promotion or profit). If no connection exists with an influential person, a link is "created" (*la guanxi*). To do this, a person from the same *guanxi* network is sought who can, via various channels, set up the connection: A requires something from D. However, there is no *guanxi* between them. In A's relationship network, there is B, who is connected with C. And C has *guanxi* with D. A therefore asks B to get in touch with C. B helps A and turns to C; C wants to help B and speaks with D. D wants to do C a favor and therefore helps A. Through this sort chain, new *guanxi* connections develop and with them new mutual obligations. In this way, *guanxi* fulfills the function of a social investment and can be seen as a relationship between people or institutions based on exchange and with a mutual understanding of the rights and obligations of both parties.

Guanxi Versus Corruption

Although there are distinct similarities between *guanxi* and corruption, the two phenomena are not identical, because the social and ethical concepts behind them are (at least theoretically) different. Unlike corruption, *guanxi* is based on real or imagined things in common and is therefore a question of personal emotions. This means that one looks after the person in question personally and is prepared to help him or her. These feelings can be maintained and extended through favors and gifts. Presents of this kind can be found in the traditions of many peoples, and it becomes corruption only within the framework of a rational state form.

***Guanxi* as Network**

There are different degrees of intensity of *guanxi* depending on the degree of emotion involved. The bigger the emotional aspect, the closer the relationship. And if the emotional aspect is less, the relationship is less intense. *Guanxi* relationships based on experiences in common plus emotional connections are therefore stronger than those that came about merely via mediation by a third party. The stronger a relationship, the more social, political, and economic use can be made of it; the more social capital it has.

Guanxi relationships have always played an important role in Chinese history. In premodern China, there was a life-long bond, including mutual political loyalty, between officials who had passed the same top-level exam. At the same time, they were politically loyal to the higher-rank officials who had examined them. This was an important basis for the emergence of "old-boy networks," which today still exist in the form of loyalty to those who studied at the same university or to former political leaders. People from the same village or from the same province clubbed together in areas far from their local region to form regional groups, the members of which are obligated to assist one another (this was still happening in 2002).

In the People's Republic, a system of personal dependencies on superiors developed, because superiors were responsible for hiring, promotion, rewards, punishment, or evaluation of political attitude and therefore could determine the whole life and career of their subordinates. This was encouraged by the fact that the *danwei* (work unit) was responsible not only for work matters but also for political, economical, and social affairs. In this way, an authoritarian culture with relationships based on personal loyalty and "old-boy networks" was encouraged. *Guanxi* relationships are particularly important here, because before the reforms, there were many shortages of goods and services that the state in its monopolist position oversaw, and officials enjoyed privileges that allowed them to use *guanxi* to obtain everything that was officially not available or available only in limited quantities. Friendship and acquaintance with official cadres still help ease some material problems, and political careers and promotion continue to depend on connections with leading functionaries.

Today, *guanxi* still runs through the entire social framework: from employment (retaining or changing jobs) to finance and economics (granting business licenses, loans, tax rates) and everyday life (distribution of housing, access to good medical care), to name only a few examples. Just about everybody has to use *guanxi*

to ensure trouble-free living and working. The reform era has even led to a significant expansion of *guanxi* relationships. The strong orientation toward a market economy, combined with the simultaneous retention of the party's monopoly on power, has led to more fostering and development of *guanxi* in the form of an explosion of present-giving and hospitality, which has meant significantly higher costs for individuals and institutions.

Specifically Chinese Institution

The main reason for *guanxi* is social uncertainty, particularly when other security structures such as the clan or the village community are no longer able to provide social protection. Those affected try to obtain personal protection through *guanxi*, particularly when in positions of political and legal uncertainty. In addition, studies have shown that the Chinese (because of their political and social experiences) are a lot more suspicious of other people and of their environment than, for example, Americans are. The conclusion from this is that suspicion and uncertainty make people seek security and trust not in the political sphere but in the private sphere and in *guanxi* relationships—an important factor in the creation of factions and "old boy networks."

Guanxi is an important instrument for contact and communication between social groups and communities (villages, clubs, associations, professional groups) and also between individuals and the state or party, particularly since it eases reciprocal bargaining processes and can lead to decisions that otherwise would not be taken or would be only partially reached. Where there are no formal avenues for participation and the mechanisms for institutional pressure are weak, *guanxi* becomes a means to influence politics and political decisions and serves to link the state (party) with society. However, because individuals and groups use *guanxi* to seek influence, power, or advantages and in doing so disregard state, ethical, moral, social, or political standards, actively breaking with norms when it is advantageous to those involved, this behavior encourages corruption and overlaps with it in part.

Guanxi is neither a "typically Confucian" nor a "typically socialist" concept. It should instead be interpreted as a principle on which society is organized that is explicable in both cultural and political terms and that functions in the People's Republic of China as well as in Taiwan and among Chinese living abroad. For example, in Taiwan, which is more modernized than the mainland, the phenomenon occurs mainly in the *guanxi* networks between entrepreneurs (known as

network capitalism or *guanxi* capitalism). In business, families are seen more as hierarchical and weak organizations, whereas *guanxi* guarantees incorporation in a relatively stable network of relationships that go beyond the family.

Thomas Heberer

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GUERRERO, FERNANDO MARIA (1873–1929), Filipino patriot and writer. Fernando Maria Guerrero believed that the only way to create a genuine Philippine literature was to draw on Philippine legends, history, and national life. Guerrero was the son of an artist, Lorenzo Maria Guerrero. He studied at the Ateneo Municipal and later at the University of Santo Tomas, where he obtained a law degree. Instead of becoming a lawyer, however, he became a writer for the newspaper *La Independencia* (Independence), writing under the pseudonym Fluvio Gil. His incisive writing made *La Independencia* a dynamic newspaper and brought fame to Guerrero.

In 1900, Pablo Ocampo (1853–1925), newspaper editor and later a member of the Philippine Assembly, employed him to write for *La Patria* (Fatherland), a short-lived newspaper because of the Sedition Law, which banned organs that espoused independence from the United States. Guerrero then tried his hand at running his own newspaper, *La Fraternidad* (Fraternity), but this too was short lived. He later joined *El Renacimiento* (Rebirth) and eventually became its chief editor; during his tenure, it was the most outstanding Spanish-language newspaper in the Philippines.

Guerrero pursued literature with a passion. From 1898 to 1900, he had written several lyric poems and

short stories. In 1914, he published *Crisalidas* (Chrysalis), a compilation of poems adjudged one of the ten best books about the Philippines. This was followed by another book, *Aves y Flores* (Birds and Flowers).

Guerrero was also active in politics. He was elected to the first Philippine Assembly in 1907 and later became secretary of the Philippine Senate and then secretary of the Commission on Independence. He was editor of the newspaper *La Opinion* (Opinion) when he died on 12 June 1929.

Aaron Ronquillo

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GUEST HOSPITALITY. See **Qingke**.

GUIZHOU (1999 pop. 37.1 million). "Not three days of weather the same, not three *mu* of flat land, not three *fen* in the pocket." Given that three *mu* is about half an acre and three *fen* is 0.4 U.S. cents, this traditional saying aptly sums up the southwestern Chinese province of Guizhou, located south and east of Sichuan and Yunnan provinces, respectively, and north and west of Guangxi and Hunan. Here some 37 million people are crowded into 176,100 square kilometers, much of which is habitable only at low densities or not at all, for three-quarters of the land is hills and mountains, mostly limestone. So limited is agricultural land that each acre must support seven people; each acre, even on slopes, must be cropped, on average, 1.8 times a year. Population pressure results in two-fifths of the total land being seriously eroded—3 percent of it is bare rock.

Seventy-two percent of Guizhou's workers are employed in the primary sector, mainly in agriculture. The main crops are summer rice and maize, winter wheat and rapeseed, with potatoes as a major subsistence crop at high elevations, plus some apple growing.

Secondary industries produce 43 percent of the wealth from 24 percent of the workers. These are concentrated mainly around the provincial capital, Guiyang, a city of just under a million people (the associated administrative region has a larger population), though there are industrial plants located in smaller towns, such as the large steel works at Anshun in the west, built at the height of the Cold War.

Provincial gross domestic product per person is the lowest in China. Poverty is widespread, exacerbated by relatively high levels of dependency and, for China, high birthrates. These conditions reflect the facts that 24 percent of the population is not Han Chinese, thus not subject to the "one family, one child" policy, and that most Han are rural and are thus allowed two children. Although Guizhou was part of the Chinese empire by the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), the Han population even in the sixteenth century probably did not exceed a few hundred thousand.

While the province is rich in coal and limestone resources, it will take very large investments to exploit them fully. Although annual rainfall ranges from 800 to 1500 millimeters, surface water is scarce. Limestone landscapes attract tourists mainly from within China, but all kinds of infrastructure in the province are weak. Levels of literacy are low, a quarter of the people being illiterate. Self-supported economic and social development is unlikely in the near term, for poverty extends to government. So long as the central government obtains better returns from development expenditure in the coastal provinces, growth in Guizhou is likely to remain relatively slow, with the province functioning basically as a reservoir of cheap labor. Until transportation infrastructure, especially, is improved, exploitation of that labor reservoir is likely to continue outside the province.

Ronald David Hill

GUJARAT (2001 pop. 50.6 million). The state of Gujarat is located on the west coast of India and is bounded by the Arabian Sea on the west, Pakistan in the north, and the states of Rajasthan in the northeast, Madhya Pradesh in the southeast, and Maharashtra in the south. It covers an area of 196,024 square kilometers, and its principal language is Gujarati. Gandhinagar is the capital city. Other important sites are Ahmedabad, Jamnagar, Rajkot, Junagarh, Bhuj, Cambay, and Surat.

The history of Gujarat goes back to 2000 BCE. It is believed that Lord Krishna left Mathura to settle on the west coast of Saurashtra, which came to be known

as Dwarka. Several kingdoms sprang up here at various times. Of these, the Mauryas, Guptas, Pratiharas, and Chalukyas were the most significant. During the medieval period, Gujarat passed under the rule of the Delhi sultans, who were followed by the Mughals, and finally by the British. The present state of Gujarat came into being on 1 May 1960, following the reorganization of the Indian states.

One of the most prosperous states, Gujarat is the main producer of tobacco, cotton, and groundnuts in the country. Other important agricultural products include paddy rice, wheat, and millet. Gujarat is also one of India's leading industrial states and a major center of trade and commerce. It has forty ports, of which Kandla is the most important. Gujarat is famous for industries such as chemicals, petrochemicals, fertilizers, engineering, and electronics. Registered working factories in the state numbered 19,771 at the end of 1999.

Among the annual fairs and festivals of the state is the Tarnetar fair, held at the village of Tarnetar in honor of Lord Siva in the month of Bhadra (mid-August–mid-September). The Madhavrai fair celebrating the marriage of Lord Krishna and Rukmini is held at Madhavpur in Chaitra (mid-March–mid-April). The Ambaji fair, held in the Banaskantha district, is dedicated to the mother goddess Amba. The traditional Hindu festivals of Janmashtami (the birthday of Lord Krishna), Makar Sankranti, and Navaratri are popular throughout Gujarat.

Gujarat attracts a large number of tourists. Tourist spots include sacred Hindu sites such as Dwarka, Somnath, Ambaji, Bhadrashwar, Shamlaji, Taranga, and Girnar. Porbandar, the birthplace of Mahatma Gandhi, Gandhi's ashram at Sabarmati, and archaeological sites at Lothal and Dhabol also draw visitors, as do the beaches at Ahmadpur-Mandvi, Chorwad, and Tithal; the lion sanctuary at Gir Forest; and the wild ass sanctuary at Kutch.

Sanjukta Das Gupta

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GUJARATI Gujarati is the name of both an Indian language and the people who speak it. The language is the official language of Gujarat state, in the west of India and just to the north of Mumbai (Bombay), with a population of 50.6 million in 2001.

Gujarati is an Indo-Aryan language, with considerable amounts of vocabulary borrowed from Sanskrit, Urdu, Arabic, Persian, Portuguese, and English. It is written in its own script, akin to Devanagari, which uses thirty-four consonants and eleven vowels.

The state of Gujarat has the longest coastline of any Indian state, about 1,600 kilometers, and has had strong overseas trade connections ever since the Harappan civilization, over four thousand years ago. The present Gujarat state, with Gandhinagar as its capital, came into existence in 1960 for reasons of linguistic politics, by merging the three former entities of Gujarat, Saurashtra, and Kachchh (Kutch).

Gujaratis of many castes practice farming, the Patidars and Rajputs being especially prominent as landholders. Sorghum, wheat, and rice are the major food crops, but there is also important commercial cultivation of cotton, tobacco, groundnut, and sugarcane. The Gujaratis who are more urbanized have a strong tradition of trading and money lending, especially those groups called Banias. These latter may be Hindu, Jain, or Muslim in religion; all three faiths have a large following in Gujarat.

Some parts of the state are extremely dry and desertlike, so that goat and camel pastoralism is a widespread subsistence practice. In recent times the state government has done a good job of industrializing and attracting foreign capital to support industry. However, many cities suffered a severe setback in 2001 because of a devastating earthquake centered on Bhuj, which was almost completely destroyed.

Foreign investment has been more easily attracted here than to many Indian states because of the large number of Gujaratis who are businesspeople and traders overseas, in East and South Africa, Britain, Canada, and the United States. In the United States today one finds Gujaratis holding a virtual monopoly on the management of certain motel and donut chains and in the running of magazine stalls in the New York City subway.

Paul Hockings

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
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GULF OF OMAN The Gulf of Oman is an extension of the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea lo-

cated between the countries of Oman in the southwest and Iran in the north. The Strait of Hormuz in the northwest links it with the Persian Gulf. The Gulf of Oman is 560 kilometers (350 miles) long and 320 kilometers (200 miles) wide. Summertime temperatures can reach over 49°C (120°F), making this one of the warmest regions of the world. The main ports along its shores are Gwadar Bay in Pakistan, Bandar Beheshti and Jask in Iran, and Suhar, Muscat, and Sur in Oman. For centuries local vessels have carried on a considerable trade across the Gulf of Oman between Iran, Arabia, India, and East Africa. Recently it has become quite important for the shipping of oil from the Persian Gulf region to the rest of the world. Fishing is also a minor industry.

Thabit A. J. Abdullah

GULF OF THAILAND The Gulf of Thailand is west of the South China Sea, surrounded by the Southeast Asian nations of Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, and Malaysia. This semienclosed sea of about 320,000 square kilometers is on the Sunda Shelf. It is considered relatively shallow with a mean depth of



45 meters. The Chao Phraya, Tha Chin, Mea Klong, and Bang Pakong rivers drain into the gulf.

Given its abundance of both living and mineral resources, millions of people derive their livelihoods from the gulf; its environment affects many more. Its ecosystem is of great concern. High demand for food items such as shrimp, crayfish, and prawns, for example, has led to the establishment of aquaculture to supplement those species depleted by overfishing and environmental destruction. The fisheries in 1996 were determined to be near collapse, with fishermen continually experiencing lower catches. There is worry over the presence of petroleum and other contaminants such as mercury in the gulf. Governments are reportedly enacting sustainable-use policies to preserve both resources and the environment; nevertheless, the environmental devastation has created problems for the surrounding population where fish and shellfish are often the only source of dietary protein available.

Linda Dailey Paulson

GULGEE (b. 1926), Pakistani artist. Abdul Mohammed Ismaili, better known as Gulgee, was born in Peshawar in 1926. This famous Pakistani artist began his career as an engineer, receiving advanced degrees from universities in the United States. Gulgee's early works were sketches and oil paintings, mostly government commissions, such as *Afghans*, a 1957 series of 150 portraits of King Zahir Shah and his household. He also composed mosaic portraits, using chips of lapis lazuli, of Saudi Arabian kings and leaders of his Ismaili faith.

In the 1960s Gulgee, like his Western contemporaries, turned to abstract expression, and he has continued in this genre for the past forty years. However, in its vibrant use of color and gold leaf and silver leaf, his painting is clearly inspired by local Sindhi craftsmanship, such as mirror work and block printing. Often, Gulgee's paintings incorporate abstracted Qur'anic verses that further the artist's claim that his paintings mark his Sufi disposition. The generous sweep of his brushstrokes and his dancelike performance when painting are indeed reminiscent of the devotional dances of mystics. The emotive intensity of Gulgee's paintings may thus place them in the context of Islamic devotional art.

Kishwar Rizvi

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GULISTON (2000 est. pop. 54,000). Guliston is a city in eastern Uzbekistan. It is the administrative center of the country's Syr Dar'ya Province, famous for its extensive irrigation network and cotton growing. Guliston is situated in the southeastern part of the Mirzachul, formerly the Golodnaia ("hungry") steppe, 120 kilometers southwest of the capital city of Tashkent.

Guliston was founded in the late nineteenth century as a Russian settlement with the name of Golodnaia Step (Hungry Steppe). After Soviet power was established in the region (1921), Golodnaia Step was renamed Mirzachul in 1922. In 1961, it was recognized as a town and received the name Guliston ("flower garden"). From 1963 until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Guliston was the administrative center of the Syr Dar'ya subdivision of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. Since 1991 Guliston has been the administrative center of the Syr Dar'ya Province and the Golodnaia Steppe Economic Region of the republic of Uzbekistan. Present-day Guliston has a railway station, a state university, and cotton processing, mechanical, and construction material plants.

Natalya Yu. Khan

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GUMMA (2002 est. pop. 2 million). Gumma Prefecture is situated in the central region of Japan's island of Honshu. Essentially a satellite of Tokyo, it occupies an area of 6,356 square kilometers. Gumma's main geographical features are a mostly mountainous terrain and a section of the Kanto Plain in the southeast. The Tonegawa, the nation's second longest river (322 kilometers), intersects the prefecture. Gumma is bordered by Saitama, Nagano, Niigata, Fukushima, and Tochigi Prefectures. Once known as Kozuke province, it assumed its present name and borders in 1876.

Gumma's capital is Maebashi, an important provincial town since the eighth century. In the Edo period (1600/1603–1868) it became a castle town and a market center for silk production. Recent decades have seen a greater reliance on lumber production and the development of factories for transportation machinery and electrical appliances. The prefecture's other important cities are Ota, Takasaki, and Shibukawa.

Today Gumma's extensive truck farms produce vegetables for the Tokyo market. The textile industry continues in Kiryu, Isesaki, and Tatebayashi, while the northward encroachment of the Keihin Industrial Zone has fostered chemical, electrical, and machine plants. Visitors are drawn to the Iwajuku archeological site; to the hot spring resorts of Minakami, Ikaho, and Kusatsu; and to skiing and hiking in Nikko and Joshin'etsu Kogen National Parks.

E. L. S. Weber

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GUNEY, YILMAZ (1937–1984), Turkish director and actor. YKlmaz Guney, also known as Cirkin Kral (Ugly King), was one of the most popular directors and actors of Turkish cinema. Born as YKlmaz Putin in rural Adana (Turkey) to poor Kurdish parents, he began his career doing odd jobs on movie sets and worked his way up as an actor, scriptwriter, and director. As a militant Communist, he spent more than eleven years in Turkish prisons. Nevertheless, he acted in 111 films, directed 17, and wrote 53 movie scripts.

Yilmaz Guney set new standards for realism in Turkish cinema. His script for the movie *Suru* (Herd) won the Berlin Film Festival prize in 1979. His most famous work, *Yol* (Path), was filmed according to his script and directions while he was in prison in 1980. *Yol* shared the top prize, the Palme d'Or, at the Cannes Film Festival in 1982, with Costa Gavras's *Missing*.

Guney spent his last few years as an exile in Europe. The military government of Turkey expelled him from citizenship and banned and destroyed his films. *Yol* (Path) was screened in Turkey for the first time in 1999. Guney died of cancer and was buried in Père Lachaise cemetery in Paris. He remains a cult figure in Turkish popular culture.

Aykan Erdemir

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GUNPOWDER AND ROCKETRY The development of gunpowder and the rocket have related



A woman with rockets and fireworks in her shop in Vietnam, c. 1995. (STEVE RAYMER/CORBIS)

histories, and both are believed to have originated in China by the late Song dynasty (eleventh century CE). Gunpowder was the first explosive and propellant and one of world history's most important inventions. It has three ingredients mixed together: potassium nitrate (also called saltpeter), sulfur, and charcoal. Gunpowder, also called black powder, propelled the first bullets and rockets. The rocket used a low nitrate, slower-burning gunpowder and was self-propelled once the powder ignited.

Origins

Most likely gunpowder and the rocket were surprise discoveries rather than inventions. For centuries, Chinese Taoist philosophers experimented with chemicals to seek the answer to longevity. One Taoist book, *Zhen yuan miao Dao yao lue* (Classified Essentials of the Mysterious Tao) of around 850 CE, warned not to mix certain ingredients, including sulfur, saltpeter, and other ingredients, because the mixture had been known to flame up, singe beards, and burn a house. This was one of several known Taoist alchemical explosions, and the Chinese of the period do not appear to have understood the true nature of combustion. As late as the seventeenth century, they still believed the combustion of gunpowder was caused by the interaction of the yin, or female element, and yang, the male element.

Early Chinese military terms are often difficult to interpret, but the earliest recognizable gunpowder formulas are found in *Wu jing zong yao* (Essentials of Military Classics), edited in 1044 by Zeng Guangliang. The first true gun appeared about 1260. Many theories have been proposed as to how the rocket appeared. One is that the discovery was made when a Chinese soldier modified an ordinary incendiary "fire arrow."

For certain, Chinese chronicles contain numerous accounts of gunpowder weapons from the late Song dynasty, though it is often unclear whether they refer to rockets. The most famous examples are the flying fire arrows, or more correctly, flying fire spears, used by the Chinese against the Mongols in the siege of Kaifeng in 1232. Some authorities believe the devices were no more than thrown "flying fire" spears, or perhaps handheld lances that merely shot fire into the air; others contend they were true self-propelled rockets.

The term *huo chien* (fire arrow) at first meant simply an incendiary arrow but later came to mean rocket. The earliest known depictions of Chinese rockets, in the *Wu bei zhi* (Treatise on Armament Technology, c. 1628) of Mao Yuanyi, show many variations of arrows with rocket tubes attached, which were therefore true rocket arrows. This may be strongest evidence that Chinese rockets evolved from ordinary incendiary arrows.

Ironically, the clearest early Chinese reference to a rocket device involves fireworks. In 1264, according to *Qi dong ye yu* (Rustic Talks in Eastern Qi, c. 1290) by Zhou Mi, a fireworks display was held in the courtyard of the royal palace. One firework, called a "ground rat," went up the steps of the throne of the empress mother and frightened her. It was thus self-propelled, that is, it was a rocket.

However the rocket appeared, it spread to Arabia by the late 1200s, and apparently from there into Europe, probably to northern Italy first, via maritime trade routes. By the fourteenth century, the first guns appeared in Europe. The spread of gunpowder and the rocket throughout the rest of Asia is less well known. The first rockets in Korea appeared in 1377 and may have been directly introduced from China.

Spread to Southeast Asia and India

One possible way to establish the spread of rocketry in Asia is by tracing the origins of allegedly centuries-old Asian rocket festivals. Northeast Thailand holds the annual Boun Bang Fai festival in which giant, decorated gunpowder rockets with bamboo guide sticks are fired by different villages to please the rain gods and ensure a good rice harvest. Neighboring Laos celebrates the identical animistic and Buddhist festival. A very similar practice is found in the remote Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous District in Yunnan Prefecture, adjacent to both northeast Thailand and Laos. In Myanmar (Burma), there is the Pa-O Rocket Festival of the Pa-O minority group in the Shan states.

Closer examination shows a definite link between festivals in Thailand, Laos, Yunnan, China, and

Burma, whose practitioners are all of the same Tai cultural stock. The actual histories of the festivals are unknown, but one theory advanced is that basic gunpowder and rocket technology started in China, in the eastern, more advanced area of the country, probably in the Song-dynasty capital of Hangzhou.

From this region, knowledge of gunpowder and the rocket probably spread via Chinese maritime trade missions to India in the early fifteenth century CE. In India, gunpowder, fireworks, and especially the rocket became well developed; Indian war rockets were used for centuries. From India, the technology may have spread first to neighboring Burma and from there to Thailand (Siam), Laos, and back again to China, to the more rural agricultural area of Yunnan.

Spread to Japan

In Japan, in several prefectures near Tokyo, annual Ryusei (Ascending Dragon) rocket festivals celebrate good harvests. However, the origin of the rocket festivals in Japan is more problematic. Undoubtedly knowledge of the rockets was imported at an unknown date to Japan and the festival was adapted to local culture. The Japanese had a seventeenth-century colony in Siam that conducted trade in gunpowder between the two countries, but no records have been found mentioning rockets.

Japan was introduced to gunpowder and guns in 1543 by the Portuguese. Fireworks were introduced in 1600, whereas one historian, without verification, claims that Japan imported "rocket arrows" from China about 1595.

Further Areas of Research

More research needs to be done to expand the picture of the overall development and spread of gunpowder in Asia. Information coming out of the rocket festivals presently held in Thailand, Laos, China, Myanmar, and Japan may be a key to determining the origin and spread of the earliest rockets through Asia and elsewhere.

Frank H. Winter

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GUO MORUO (1892–1978), Chinese intellectual. Born in Leshan, Sichuan Province, Guo Moruo (or Kuo Mo-jo) studied in Japan from 1914 to 1923 and graduated from Kyushu Imperial University with a medical degree. After returning to China, he began to write and became a famous poet, playwright, paleographer, historian, politician, short story writer, essayist, and translator. His collection of poetry, *Nu Shen* (The Goddesses; published in 1921), is generally regarded as the first significant book of poetry in modern China. His scholarly works on Chinese history and paleography are well regarded.

Guo founded the Chuang Zao She (Creation Society) with a small group of young and idealistic poets and writers who, like him, had recently studied in Japan. But although a writer and historian, Guo was also deeply involved in twentieth-century Chinese politics. During the Northern Expedition (1926–1927), a war that the Nationalists and Communists fought against the northern warlords, he served as a colonel and later a lieutenant general, in charge of public relations. In the Nanchang Uprising of August 1927, which gave birth to the Red Army, he served as director of public relations and during this period joined the Chinese Communist Party. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949, Guo Moruo served in many important positions, such as vice premier in charge of culture and education, president of the Chinese Academy of Science, president of the Chinese Writers' Association, vice president of the National People's Congress, and member of the Communist Party Central Committee.

Jian-Zhong Lin

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GUOMINDANG The Guomintang (Kuomintang), or Chinese Nationalist Party, has its roots in a movement established in 1894 and is China's oldest political party. The history of the Guomintang (GMD) can be divided into six periods. During the first period (1894–1912), before it was known by its current name, it was a movement led by Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), the so-called father of modern China, aimed at overthrowing the Qing (Manchu) dynasty

(1644–1912). Sun changed the movement's name several times, but it was best known in the early days as the Tongmenghui (Revolutionary Alliance).

In the second period (1912–1919), the name Guomintang was used for the first time, and the movement became a parliamentary party active primarily in the new national legislature in Beijing. Then, during the third period (1919–1928), Sun Yat-sen reorganized the Guomintang as an armed political force seeking to overthrow China's warlords and establish a one-party government. During the fourth period (1928–1949), under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), who had become the party's leader, the party followed Sun Yat-sen's plan to set up the Republic of China in Nanjing (Nanking) under the tutelage of the Guomintang until China was ready for full democracy. That regime became recognized internationally as the government of China, but it did not control all of Chinese territory.

In the fifth period (1949–1995), the Guomintang's Republic of China withdrew to the island of Taiwan, where it became an authoritarian one-party state allied with United States in the Cold War. For most of the fourth and fifth periods, Chiang Kai-shek (and later his son, Chiang Ching-kuo), occupied both the presidency of the Republic of China and chairmanship of the Guomintang.

Following economic growth in the 1960s, the Republic of China in the early 1980s began a process of political and social liberalization. By the mid-1990s it had developed into a multiparty constitutional democracy. In the 2000 Presidential election, the Democratic Progressive Party candidate, Chen Shui-bian, emerged as the victor with a plurality. This marked the beginning of the Guomintang's sixth period, in which it operates as one party within a multiparty constitutional democracy. This final form fulfills Sun Yat-sen's dream for a full-fledged democracy.

The Guomintang under Sun Yat-sen

Sun Yat-sen's supporters founded the Guomintang in 1912 to represent his views in the legislature of the newly established Republic of China. Sun had intended to serve as president of the new republic but in early 1912 lost out to Yuan Shikai (1859–1916), a general and diplomat formerly in the service of the Qing dynasty. As president, Yuan Shikai opposed parliamentary power and had the Guomintang's parliamentary leader, Song Jiaoren (1882–1913) assassinated.

In the chaotic politics of the next decade, the Guomintang survived as a parliamentary party but had no

power. Sun Yat-sen tried to revive the Guomindang in 1919 by moving its headquarters to Guangzhou (Canton), where he cooperated with a local warlord. This effort failed, and in 1923 Sun undertook a further reorganization. Combining assistance and inspiration from the Soviet Union, Sun Yat-sen re-created the Guomindang as a Leninist style party with a clear ideology, limited membership subject to firm party discipline, and a strong army under party control. Sun Yat-sen also permitted members of the tiny Chinese Communist Party to join the Guomindang without giving up their earlier affiliation, so the two parties were allied. Chiang Kai-shek, a military man loyal to Sun Yat-sen, headed the Guomindang's new Whampoa military academy but had no sympathy for Communism or the Soviet Union.

The Guomindang under Chiang Kai-shek

After Sun Yat-sen's death 1925, Chiang Kai-shek emerged as the Guomindang's leader. In the summer of 1926 the Guomindang's newly trained army undertook the Northern Expedition, an effort to end warlordism in China and establish a national government on Sun Yat-sen's model. In April 1927, Chiang Kai-shek's army and local gangs slaughtered Communist members in Shanghai, permanently alienating the Communists.

The Northern Expedition produced a new national government with its capital in Nanjing. Under a provisional constitution, based on Sun Yat-sen's ideas, it was a one-party regime tutoring the Chinese people for democracy. Chiang Kai-shek held both the presidency and chairmanship of the party, which operated along Leninist lines, with top-down control, political commissars, and enforced adherence to the party line. In actuality, however, the Guomindang could never suppress differing agendas within its ranks. Chiang Kai-shek became adept at manipulating factions but could never achieve the total control that Guomindang ideology advocated. In the cities, the Guomindang made alliances with bosses deeply involved in illegal activities. In rural areas, the Guomindang again lacked progressive allies and so had few effective programs. This Guomindang government at Nanjing had many weaknesses including limited territorial control, but promised to evolve into a stable regime that could represent all of China.

In the 1930s, with the rise of fascism in Europe, Chiang Kai-shek promoted some fascist-style organizations, including the New Life Movement, whose goal was to improve public morals, and the Blue Shirts, an organization of young men with ultranationalist

ideas. Also in the fascist style, his government asserted control over business and kept the media under close rein. From 1937 to 1945, the Republic of China was locked in war against Japan. During these years the Guomindang atrophied, and the state and military apparatus grew. The party's members, still split into factions, lost both their spirit and a vision for the future. At the war's end bureaucrats and generals, not the Guomindang, ran the regime, and the party lacked broad popular support. These fatal weaknesses in the Guomindang are seen as a major cause of Chiang Kai-shek's defeat in China's 1945–1949 civil war.

On Taiwan after 1950, Chiang Kai-shek established a garrison state committed to recapturing the Chinese mainland. A revived Guomindang had two important functions: As a parliamentary party, it controlled the national legislature. As a mobilizing force, it was intended to spur all levels of society to realize Chiang Kai-shek's dream of returning to rule the Chinese mainland. In practice, Guomindang members came from the ranks of 1.5 million mainlanders who had accompanied Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan in 1949–1950, rather than from the 11 million Taiwanese. Most Taiwanese had limited interest in Chiang Kai-shek's dream of retaking the mainland. Thus, although the Guomindang had become a more effective party, it still lacked widespread popular support.

The Guomindang under Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui

After Chiang Kai-shek's death in 1975 and under the leadership of his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, the Guomindang underwent important changes. Economic prosperity for all on Taiwan replaced a return to the mainland as the regime's principal goal. Chiang Ching-kuo encouraged youth groups, offering outlets for energies pent up by his father's stifling authoritarian anti-Communism. Also, Taiwan's provincial politics became an arena in which the Guomindang made common cause with some Taiwanese interests. By the late 1980s, the Guomindang, with more than 2 million members in a population of 23 million, had become well integrated into Taiwan on the local and provincial levels. Also, the Guomindang had become exceptionally wealthy through ownership of many of Taiwan's most profitable businesses.

Under the leadership of Lee Teng-hui (b.1923), a Taiwanese who succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo in 1987 as chairman of the Guomindang and president of the government, a sweeping series of political and general reforms gave Taiwanese a real voice in the regime. At the same time, increasing prosperity was accompanied

by a general liberalization in Taiwan's social atmosphere. The Guomintang remained in control of politics in Taiwan but in 1986 permitted the emergence of an opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In elections during the 1990s the Guomintang saw its control over political power erode as the Democratic Progressive Party and the New Party gained more and more positions.

The Guomintang after the 2000 Presidential Election

The Guomintang's dominance in Taiwan was crippled by the March 2000 presidential election, when James C. Y. Soong, a defector from the ranks of the Guomintang, ran as an independent and Lien Chan ran as the official party candidate. They split the party's vote, and the presidency went to the DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bian (b. 1950), who received a plurality but not a majority. Though deprived of the presidency, the GMD retained firm control over the legislature until the December 2001 parliamentary elections. In those elections the GMD's share of seats fell sharply from a majority to less than one-third of the seats, whereas the DPP increased its power to well over one-third. Yet, minority parties, including the People First Party (PFP) led by GMD dissident Soong, collectively won the remaining seats. In this new multiparty era, any government must be based on a coalition. Although the GMD has great financial resources and remains a major player in Taiwan politics, its era of dominance has ended.

David D. Buck

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GUPTA EMPIRE From the fourth through the middle of the sixth century CE the Gupta empire extended over all of northern India and much of the south. Under the patronage of the Gupta dynasty Indian culture flourished, and the era has rightly been termed the Classical or Golden Age of India.

At the end of the third century, before the rise of the Guptas, the Indian subcontinent was an aggregation of small kingdoms and autonomous states. Around this time a king named Srigupta and his son Ghatotkacha Gupta established an independent kingdom on the eastern Gangetic plain.

The family became preeminent under Chandra Gupta I (flourished c. 320), the son of Ghatotkacha Gupta. Chandra Gupta's son Samudra Gupta greatly expanded the empire and is considered by some to be the real founder. Samudra Gupta (reigned c. 340–380), a formidable warrior, established relations with (and probably some degree of suzerainty over) kingdoms adjoining his frontiers. Samudra Gupta was a patron of learning, a poet, and a musician.

Samudra Gupta's son Rama Gupta probably succeeded him for a short period, followed by another son (or grandson) Chandra Gupta II (reigned 380–c. 415). Under this ruler's long reign the empire flowered. Gupta territory extended in the west beyond the Hindu Kush range into today's Afghanistan and in the east to the western borders of today's Assam and Myanmar (Burma).

Chandra Gupta's son Kumara Gupta (reigned 415–455) had an uneventful and generally prosperous reign. His son Skanda Gupta fought the invading Hunas on the western border on at least three occasions and completely crushed them. Following the death of Kumara Gupta the Gupta empire gradually declined. By the seventh century it was fragmented and reduced in size by the Hunas in the west and by Indian kings on the other three borders.

Nevertheless the Guptas left an indelible mark on subsequent Indian history and culture. They established an efficient administrative system, and under their patronage intellectual and cultural activity flourished as never before. In literature, Sanskrit reached its peak with Kalidasa (drama and poetry), Dandin (poetry and prose), and Subandhu and Banabhatta (prose). Eminent writers from across the country made their

ideas universally available through the universal language, Sanskrit. Amara (flourished late fourth and early fifth century) composed the critical Sanskrit lexicon *Amarakosha*, and important explicatory texts in Brahmanic and Buddhist philosophy were created. Brahmanical Hinduism, both Saivism (worship of Siva) and Vaishnavism (worship of Vishnu), was established, while Buddhism and Jainism went into a decline. Much of the Puranic literature (literature reflecting ancient history, laws, and codes of behavior) and the *Dharmasastra*—the basis of Brahmanical Hinduism and Hindu law—took shape. Aryabhata (476–c. 550), one of many astronomers and mathematicians, wrote about quadratic equations and other algebraic rules as well as trigonometry; he also wrote that the earth rotated on its axis and explained solar and lunar eclipses. A great university was established at Nalanda.

The Gupta empire's excellence in metallurgy is evidenced by the outdoor iron pillar near Delhi. This architectural piece, which was erected to glorify the conquests of one of the Gupta kings, remains untarnished to this day.

The Gupta period is also known for the large, beautifully carved figures of Buddha, often with clinging drapery. Sculpture in the form of reliefs on walls of sanctuaries cut from rock was another achievement of this period, as evidenced by the caves at Ajanta; Gupta temple architecture and sculptural decoration are exemplified by the temple of Saranatha. Pillar engravings left intimate details of the empire and emperors. Relations were established with foreign cultures and rulers. Indian kingdoms were established on the subcontinent and across the seas in today's Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, the Malayan Peninsula, Java, Bali, and Borneo. The Guptas dominated Indian history and culture for two hundred years after their empire disappeared, and even today they are considered exceptional figures of Hindu India.

Ranès C. Chakravorty

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GURRAGCHAA, JUGDERDEMIYIN (b. 1947), Mongolian astronaut. Jugderdemidiyn Gurragchaa was the first Mongolian astronaut. He was born 5 December 1947 in the town of Gurvan-Bulak, in the Bulgan province of Mongolia. After attending the Ulaanbaatar Agricultural Institute, he was drafted

into the Mongolian army in 1966. In 1973, Gurragchaa attended the Zhukovskiy Air Force Academy in Moscow. Then, in 1978, Captain Gurragchaa trained for three years at the Yuri Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center in the USSR. In 1981, Gurragchaa and the Soviet cosmonaut Dzhaniybekov were launched into space aboard the *Soyuz 39* spacecraft. They spent seven days aboard the *Salyut 7* space station, performing a variety of tests that focused on mapping Mongolia.

Upon his return to Mongolia, Gurragchaa was promoted to colonel, then major general, and received several honors. He became a deputy of the People's Great Khural (parliament) in 1982, serving until the fall of communism in Mongolia in 1990. During the democratic elections he became the chairman of the electoral commission that organized and supervised the elections. He was also elected the chairman of the Federation of Societies for Friendship between Mongolia and the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States in 1992.

Timothy May

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GUS DUR. See **Abdurrahman Wahid**.

GUSMÃO, XANANA (b. 1946), East Timorese resistance leader. As the leader of the struggle for independence, Xanana Gusmão became the most important resistance figure of East Timor. Born on 20 June 1946 in Laleia, East Timor, José Alexandre "Xanana" Gusmão was educated at a Jesuit seminary and worked in the civil service. In 1974, he joined the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretelin) and became its leader in 1978. After years of violent struggle, he was elected commander of Fretelin armed forces (Falintil).

Believing that the fight for independence transcended political loyalties, Xanana developed a policy to unite various pro-independence groups and became the charismatic leader of the national Timorese resistance against Indonesian occupation. In 1992, he was captured by the Indonesian armed forces and imprisoned in Jakarta.

Despite imprisonment, Xanana remained the leader of Timorese resistance. A historic visit by Nelson



Xanana Gusmão arrives at a ceremony formalizing his release on 7 September 1999. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

Mandela in 1997 raised international awareness of the deteriorating situation in East Timor. In 1999, Xanana was transferred from prison to house arrest but was not allowed to participate in the pro-independence campaign during the process of the U.N.-organized consultation on the future of East Timor. As the president of the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT), he returned to his home country in 1999 and is seen by many observers as the person most likely to lead an independent East Timor.

Frank Feulner

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GUWAHATI (2001 pop. 808,000). Formerly Gauhati, Guwahati is the largest city in Assam State, India. It is situated on the Brahmaputra River, 300 miles northeast of Calcutta. As Pragiyotishpura ("the Eastern City of Light"), it was the capital of the Hindu kingdom of Kamarupa around 400 CE and is named in the *Mahabharata*. It was controlled alternately by the Muslims and Ahoms in the seventeenth century; the Ahom raja made it his capital in 1786. The Burmese held it from 1816 until 1826, when it became the British capital of Assam Province.

Guwahati is a busy river port and communications center. It is also the site of one of India's most important Kali temples, Kamakhya and Navagraha, "temple of the nine planets," once a great center of astrology and astronomy. The Siva temple of Umananda stands on an island bluff. Nearby are Hindu pilgrimage centers, a university and law college, the state high court, scientific museums, and a zoological garden. The Srimanta Sankaradeva Kalakshetra opened in 1998, promoting dance, drama, music, and art. Tea is the principal business, and the new Assam Tea Auction Center holds the world's largest tea auctions, supplanting those of Calcutta and London. A large oil refinery on its outskirts symbolizes Guwahati's recent growth.

C. Roger Davis

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HA LONG BAY Located in northeastern Vietnam 160 kilometers east of Hanoi and 55 kilometers northeast of Haiphong, Ha Long Bay is a 1,500 square kilometer area of water that stretches from the northern Gulf of Tonkin nearly to the Chinese border. In the bay are approximately 3,000 islands of limestone and dolomite that geologists attribute the formation of to sedimentary limestone formed between 300 and 500 million years ago, in the Paleozoic Era. Over millions of years, the water in the bay receded and exposed the limestone to rain, winds, and tidal erosion, resulting in the formation of the uniquely shaped small and large limestone outcroppings that now attract a multitude of tourists each year. The bay has been named by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization or UNESCO as a World Heritage Site.

Ha Long literally means "dragon descending" and, according to local myth, the bay and its many islands

were formed long ago when the forefathers of the Vietnamese were fighting Chinese invaders from the north. The gods from heaven sent a family of dragons to help defend their land. This family of dragons descended on what is now Ha Long Bay and began spitting out jewels and jade, which, on hitting the sea, turned into the various islands and islets dotting the seascape and formed a formidable fortress against the invaders. The locals were able to keep their land safe and formed what is now the country of Vietnam. The dragon family fell so much in love with this area for its calm water and for the reverence of the people of Vietnam that they decided to remain on earth. The mother dragon lies on what is now Ha Long (her scales forming the rocky islets) and her children lie on Bai Tu Long. The dragon tails formed the area of the beaches of Bach Long Vi. The myth compliments that of the origins of the Vietnamese people, which describes the union between a king (representing the dragon) and his bride (representing a goddess) who gives birth to one hundred children (the ancestors of the Vietnamese people). The myth of Ha Long Bay perpetuates the Vietnamese belief that throughout their history, they have been aided by their ancestors—the dragon and the gods—in the defense of their land.

Richard B. Verrone



HA LONG BAY—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Ha Long Bay, a beautiful and almost completely uninhabited area off the Gulf of Tonkin in Vietnam, was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1994 for its thousands of limestone pillars and abundant wildlife.

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HABIBIE, B. J. (b. 1936), third president of the Republic of Indonesia. Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, known as B. J. Habibie, was born in Pare-Pare in southern Sulawesi (Celebes), Indonesia. The young Habibie has been described as a serious student and strongly religious. Raised in an orthodox Muslim family, he met the future president of Indonesia, Suharto (b. 1921), when the latter was posted to Sulawesi as an army officer. During this period, when Habibie was still a young child, his father passed away. Suharto is believed to have taken a personal interest in Habibie, and the two formed a bond that later led to Habibie's rise in Suharto's government when the latter became the president of the Republic of Indonesia.

B. J. Habibie did his high school diploma course in Java, at the prestigious Bandung Institute of Technology, and got his diploma in 1954. In 1960, he graduated with an engineering degree from the Aachen Institute of Technology in Germany. He received his doctorate in engineering in 1965 from the same institution, graduating *summa cum laude*.

After completing his education, Habibie worked as a specialized scientist at the Hamburger Flugzügbau



President B. J. Habibie on 5 January 1999 shortly after withdrawing from the election for president. (AFP/CORBIS)

in Germany, later known as the Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm company (which had absorbed the company founded by Willy Messerschmitt [1898–1978], the designer of the Messerschmitt fighter aircraft that played so prominent a role in Hitler's Luftwaffe during World War II). Between 1969 and 1973, he headed the methods and technology division for commercial airplanes and military transport at this firm. He was called back to Indonesia in 1974 to develop strategies for achieving Indonesia's technological goals. The then president Suharto backed Habibie's strategy to enable Indonesia to compete technologically with the rest of the world by the end of the twentieth century.

Habibie headed several high-cost ventures supported by the Indonesian state, including the aircraft industry. In 1982, he became a member of the Indonesian parliament as a representative of the ruling party, Golkar. Between 1978 and 1998, he was the state minister of research and technology. In 1990, he became the chairman of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI); some observers have viewed this as a political role that Suharto gave Habibie to counterbalance the power of the Indonesian armed forces. ICMI also served as an alternative power base to the army.

Habibie was made the seventh vice president of the Republic of Indonesia in March 1998, when the authoritarian president Suharto was fighting for his political survival in the aftermath of the economic crisis in Southeast Asia. In May 1998, Suharto decided to step down after thirty-two years in power. Habibie then assumed the post of president.

Habibie has been described as highly energetic, mercurial in temperament, and excitable, as well as dismissive of criticism. His tenure as president, given the economic problems facing Indonesia, was troubled. In view of the voters' negative reaction to the ruling Golkar Party, which Habibie represented and which was blamed for the country's economic woes, it is not surprising that he lost his election bid in 1999. Habibie now lives in Germany.

Ooi Giok Ling

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HADOOD Hadood (plural of *badd*, Arabic for "punishments"), are four Law Ordinances that were ordered by General Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan on 10 February 1979, and passed by the Council of Islamic Ideology in Pakistan. The main purpose of the Hadood Ordinances is to Islamize the laws of Pakistan. The Hadood provide for stoning to death for unlawful sexual intercourse, even if consensual; amputation of hands for theft; and lashing for intoxication and gambling. The Hadood are based on the Qur'an (the holy book of Islam) and Hadith (traditions of Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam) the two sources of the *shari'a*, or the Islamic law. Although no person has been so far stoned to death and no limb amputated in Pakistan, such punishments have been carried out in Saudi Arabia. The Federal Shari'a Court of Pakistan, and the Shari'a Bench of the Supreme Court have the authority to listen to appeals against convictions reached by the criminal courts working under the Hadood Ordinances. According to the Law of Evidence the testimony of one woman, unless corroborated by another woman or man, is not admissible in a court. This provision makes it extremely difficult for a victim of rape, as women have found themselves in jail for the "crime" of naming their attackers.

Abdul Karim Khan

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HAEJU (2001 est. pop. 260,000). Haeju, the capital of South Hwanghae Province (Hwanghaenamdo), is a port and industrial city on the west coast of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), 140 kilometers south of Pyongyang. The city covers approximately thirty-two square kilometers. The major industries of Haeju are cement manufacturing and chemicals. In addition, the region is emerging as a tourist center because of its historical sites, such as the ancient fort at Suyang Mountain and the 128-meter Suyang waterfall nearby.

Because Haeju is located far to the south (just above 38° N latitude), it has nearly ice-free port conditions throughout the year. For this reason the South Korean companies Hyundai and Samsung plan major joint ventures there.

Haeju is historically significant because it is the birthplace of Kim Gu (1876–1948), a fighter for Ko-

rean independence. During the Donghak Rebellion of 1894, Kim led an attack against Japanese soldiers at the fort at Haeju. He was not captured in that attack, but following another the next year, he was imprisoned and tortured in Haeju. Ahn Chung-gun (1879–1910), another independence fighter, was also born in Haeju. Ahn was the assassin of Ito Hirobuni, Japan's resident general over Korea, in 1905.

Thomas P. Dolan

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HAIDAR ALI (1721–1782), Indian warrior. Haidar Ali (or Hyder Ali) was the son of a Panjabi Muslim adventurer. Although not formally educated, Haidar was a sagacious and pragmatic warrior who had many military successes. He learned the skills of warfare during the Anglo-French wars of 1751–1755 in South India and was fighting constantly with his neighbors. His three main enemies were the Marathas to the northwest of Mysore, the Nizam of Hyderabad to the northeast of Mysore, and the British to the southeast in Madras. Haidar would not go to war against any one of them except when confident the other two would not join in against him. He admired the British and French armies in India, and equipped the Mysore army along similar lines.

Haidar became commander of that army in 1759, and in 1761 rose to be chief minister of Mysore State. In 1766 the ruler of Mysore became a mere figurehead, and Haidar assumed complete control of the expanding kingdom. He unified Mysore for the first time since the fall of the Vijayanagar Empire in 1565. In 1766 he controlled the west coast through his conquests, and even organized a small fleet there, one of very few Indian commanders ever to do such a thing.

He then went on to fight the First and Second Anglo-Mysore Wars with great success (1767–1769, 1780–1784), but died before the second war was over. In the first of these wars he dictated terms to the British outside Madras City, and in general demonstrated that the British army was not invincible. When he lost some possessions to the British, however, he hoped that the French would come to his aid, but they never provided sufficient support for him to oust the British from South India; and indeed, when they

killed his son Tipu Sultan in 1799, British paramountcy was assured.

Paul Hockings

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HAIKU Haiku is a seventeen-syllable Japanese poetic form divided into three phrases: five syllables, seven syllables, and five syllables. Although the term "haiku" came into common use only after 1892, when Masaoka Shiki (1867–1902) revived and modernized the form, its origins as *bokku*, the opening verse of *haikai* (comic linked verse) date back to the Kamakura period (1185–1333) or even earlier.

Haiku came to maturity in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Matsuo Basho (1644–1694) developed what was a trivial form and made it into a serious poetic vehicle. As the opening verse of a linked-verse sequence, this form represents a dynamic movement in two directions simultaneously. It represents a breaking up of the traditional *waka* (a thirty-one syllable poetic form in phrases whose syllable lengths were 5-7-5-7-7) into two smaller units,

the 5-7-5 *bokku* and a 7-7 unit, called *waki no ku*. At the same time these smaller units can be linked and repeated to form a longer poetic sequence. Thus *bokku* always implies an incomplete poetic statement to be completed by the reader, and it requires complicity between reader and poet to complete the poem.

Due to its brevity haiku has always been in danger of becoming trivial, and indeed after Basho's life haiku relapsed into a period of easy popularity. Yosa Buson (1716–1783) encouraged a revival of Basho's style, and in the last years of the nineteenth century, after another lapse into triviality, Masaoka Shiki sought both to resurrect Basho's seriousness and to modernize haiku, keeping in step with the modernization of Japanese literature. Shiki insisted that the seventeen-syllable form stand as an independent poetic unit, which he called "haiku."

Early Western students of Japanese literature, such as Basil Hall Chamberlain (1850–1935), who introduced haiku to the world outside Japan, regarded these verses as nothing more than epigrams because of their brevity. Later Ezra Pound (1885–1972) and others recognized haiku as a serious poetic form.

One enduring feature of haiku is the *kigo* (seasonal word), which grounds the poetic moment in a natural context by locating it in the cycle of time. *Kigo* occur in other forms of Japanese poetry and link haiku with its broader cultural context. Another feature of haiku is the *kireji* (cutting word), which acts as a caesura and breaks the already short poem into two parts, making possible a contrast or association that serves both to engage the reader and to allow for poetic complexity. Haiku poetry has flourished in Japan and throughout the world and remains the most popular and well-known form of Japanese poetry.

Stephen Kobl



**THREE HAIKU BY BASHO
(1644–1694)**

Waterjar cracks:
I lie awake
This icy night.
Sick on a journey:
Over parched fields
Dreams wander on.
Lightning:
Heron's cry
Stabs the darkness

Source: "A Haiku Homepage."
Retrieved 12 October 2001:
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HAINAN (1996 est. pop. 7.1 million). Hainan, an island province in the South China Sea off the coast of China's Guangdong Province, covers an area of 34,000 square kilometers. Before 1988, when the is-

land obtained provincial status, it was part of Guangdong Province. The island has a mountainous inland with dense forests. The highest peak, Mount Wuzhi, rises to 1,867 meters above sea level. The coastal regions consist of plains, low hills, and volcanic terraces. The island has a tropical climate, with average temperatures of 22° to 26°C all year, but in extreme cases in the northern part of the island, temperatures may drop to 0°C. Annual precipitation varies; the western parts have an average of 1,000 millimeters, while the southeast, which is frequently hit by typhoons, averages 1,500 to 2,600 millimeters.

Hainan has a population of 7.14 million (1996), 12.8 percent of which belong to the indigenous Li nationality. Another important minority nationality is the Miao. The province's capital, Haikou (406,000, 1996), is situated on the north shore of Hainan, and there are several autonomous counties and townships mainly concentrated in the middle of the island and on the south coast.

Since the Han dynasty period (206 BCE–220 CE), the island has nominally been part of the Chinese empire, but for long periods, the Li evaded government control. During the Song dynasty (960–1279), when immigration from the mainland began, the island became part of Guangdong Province, a status that continued for centuries except for brief periods—during the Yuan dynasty (1267–1368) and in 1912–1921—when Hainan enjoyed independent provincial status. In imperial China, undesirable officials were commonly exiled to the island. Hainan was occupied by the Japanese from 1939 to 1945, and since 1950 the island has been part of the People's Republic of China.

Hainan is the only part of China with tropical crops. Forestry accounts for almost half of the agricultural output; Hainan has a big rubber production and coconut farming. Other important tropical crops include coffee, pepper, cashew nuts, cacao, pineapples, bananas, carambolas, longans, litchis, and jackfruits. As one of China's special economic zones, Hainan attracted foreign investments and underwent rapid economic growth in the 1990s. The economy is mainly based on light industry and tourism. Industries are concentrated in the area around Haikou, and industrial products include processed rubber and food, electronic articles, and textiles. The tourist industry is located on the south coast in the area around Sanya (145,100, 1996). The flow of outside investment to Hainan subsided drastically toward the end of the 1990s, and many unfinished construction sites have been abandoned.

Bent Nielsen

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HAIPHONG (2002 pop. 572,000). Located 103 kilometers (64 miles) east of Hanoi on the coast of northern Vietnam, Haiphong, Vietnam's third-largest city (behind Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi), is a major seaport and the main hub of northern Vietnam's industrial activity, and has been for more than a century. Haiphong has been a major seaport since the Tran dynasty (1225–1400) and, because of its strategic location, has seen numerous foreign invaders, including the Chinese, the Mongols under Kublai Khan, the Japanese, the French, and the Americans. The French bombing of Haiphong in 1946 precipitated the eight-year First Indochina War. During the Second Indochina War between Vietnam and the United States, Haiphong figured prominently again because of its strategic location and because of its role as an industrial hub and seaport. The United States bombed the city (especially notorious were the 1972 "Christmas bombings") and mined the city's harbor in 1972. In 1979, in the wake of the conflict between China and Vietnam, as many as 100,000 ethnic Chinese fled the city fearing Vietnamese reprisals, taking with them a large percentage of Haiphong's merchant class and economic power. In the last two decades of the twentieth century, Haiphong has sought recovery from its troubled past and has regained much of its economic and political power. Its port remains one of the busiest in Southeast Asia and the city's industry continues to develop.

Richard B. Verrone

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HAJI, RAJA (d. 1784), Bugis dictator of Riau-Johor. The Bugis were seafarers from the southwest arm of Sulawesi who were known as warriors and enterprising traders throughout the Malay Archipelago. Raja Haji reigned briefly from 1777 to 1784, a period that saw the deterioration of Dutch-Bugis relations.

Raja Haji was the son of Daing Chelak (reigned 1728–1745), one of the five Bugis brothers that fled their homeland of Makassar in Southern Celebes and subsequently imposed Bugis power and influence in the southern Malay Peninsula during the eighteenth century. Raja Haji continued the family tradition by extending Bugis hegemony to the old Malay empire of Johor and the Riau-Lingga Archipelago.

Raja Haji was determined to oust the Dutch in Melaka, the Burgis' rival for control of the archipelago's commerce. To thwart Dutch ambitions in the Riau-Lingga Archipelago, he offered the English a commercial base at Riau. Dutch-Bugis enmity came to the open when they quarreled over the spoils of a captured ship of the English East India Company. The Bugis attacked Melaka and the Dutch in turn raided Riau.

In 1784 Raja Haji and his nephew, Sultan Ibrahim of Selangor, launched an all-out siege of Melaka. A Dutch fleet under Admiral Jacob Pieter van Braam relieved Melaka in June 1784. In the ensuing battle Raja Haji was killed at Telok Ketapang near Melaka. His death marked the decline of Bugis influence in the archipelago, and by October the Dutch had expelled the Bugis from Riau.

Ooi Keat Gin

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HAKATA MATSURI Held from 1 to 15 July in the Hakata district of the city of Fukuoka in Japan, the Hakata Festival is officially named Hakata Yamagasa Gion, linking it to the famous Gion Matsuri in Kyoto. Like that festival, the Hakata Matsuri originated in a purification ritual (*goryo-e*) performed as a plea to the gods to stop a plague ravaging the city.

Dating back to the mid-thirteenth century, the festival marks the start of summer and has long been the highlight of Fukuoka's festival year. A series of purification rituals and festive processions leads up to the climactic high-speed race (*oiyama*) of festival floats that takes place at dawn on the final day. Each of the seven festival district committees selects a team of strong, healthy young men, who must then undergo purification and rigorous training. Participants cleanse themselves with sacred sand, receive an auspicious bamboo branch, and offer prayers for safety during the frenzied race. Each group constructs festival floats (*yamagasa*), which are of two types. *Kazariyama* are extraordinarily ornate, mountain-shaped floats adorned with dolls, ornaments, and lanterns and displayed around the city during the festival. *Kakiyama* floats are smaller but are still elaborately decorated with sacred pine branches and dolls representing heroes from legendary and historical tales. The seven *kakiyama*, each weighing about a ton, are raced through the city streets.

On 12 and 13 July the floats are paraded to Kushida Shrine, where the guardian deity of the city is enshrined. At 4:59 in the morning on 15 July, on the signal of a drumbeat, the first float leaves the Kushida Shrine grounds with the other six following at five-minute intervals. Shouldered by teams of twenty-eight young men in traditional festival dress of loincloths and *happi* coats (light cotton jackets), the floats speed along the five-kilometer course at a furious pace, while thousands of spectators cheer and splash them with purifying (and cooling) water. Many generations of local men have participated in this grueling contest, and the teams have developed fierce rivalries. The average time taken to cover the course is thirty minutes.

After crossing the finish line, the team members fight among themselves to obtain the best of the decorations to keep as souvenirs and talismans. Stripped down to its base, the float is returned to the Kushida Shrine to await use in the following year's festivities.

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HAKKA The Hakka are a Chinese ethnolinguistic minority group. The word "Hakka" means "guest people" or "newcomers" in Yue (Cantonese) and reflects

their migration from central to southern China from about the ninth century into the early twentieth century. They tended to settle in distinct Hakka communities. There are about 40 million Hakka in China. Most live in southern China, with Guangdong Province having the greatest concentration, particularly in northern Meizhou Prefecture. There are also sizeable populations in Fujian, Jiangxi, Guangxi, Hainan Island, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Estimates suggest that there may be more Hakka outside of China than in it, with large overseas communities in Malaysia, the United States, Canada, and Australia. The Hakka language is classified with Yue and Min as a southern Chinese language.

As an ethnolinguistic minority and late arrivals in southern China, the Hakka often had tense and sometimes violent relations with the Yue- and Min-speaking Han. The Han considered the Hakka to be inferior and a tribal people. Research indicates that their origins are Han Chinese, and the government classifies them as Han. Hakka men and women were known as skilled and hardworking farmers who grew sweet potatoes, rice, and vegetables on harsh land ignored by non-Hakka farmers. They also often served in the military and outside China worked in construction and on plantations. In cities, Hakka have been notably successful in academia, politics, and the professions. Well-known Hakka include China's leader Deng Xiaoping, Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui, Singapore's President Lee Kwan Yew, and Myanmar's President Ne Win.

Both inside and outside China, the Hakka are known for their ethnic solidarity, which may be a product of centuries of discrimination by the Han. Hakka interests are advanced by the Tsung Tsin (Cong-zheng) Association and the United Hakka Association.

Ooi Giok Ling and David Levinson

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HAKKA LANGUAGES Hakka languages are one of the seven major Chinese language groups (the others groups are Mandarin, Wu, Yue, Gan, Min, and Xiang). Although linguists class these as independent Chinese languages, traditionally they have been re-

garded as dialects, as they will be in this discussion. Native speakers of Hakka are found in Guangdong, Guangxi, Fujian, Xiangxi, Hunan, and Sichuan provinces on the mainland, as well as on Taiwan. Outside of China, Hakka speakers are found in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos. The estimated population of the native Hakka dialect speakers in 1988 was 37 million. In some places, Hakka dialects are also called Aihua, Majiehua, Xinminhua, or Tuguangdonghua.

The term Hakka is of Cantonese origin, *bak* meaning "guest", *ka* meaning "family/people." According to Chinese migration history, there were five major migration waves of the Hakka-speaking people, from the central plains of China to the south, beginning during the Eastern Jin dynasty (317–420) and in response to various non-Chinese invasions, civil wars, and other clashes with local peoples. The term Hakka itself, however, did not appear in any Chinese historical documents until the Song dynasty (960–1279). When Hakka-speaking people migrated to the northeastern part of Guangdong Province during the late Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and early Qing dynasty (1644–1912), the local people referred to the new immigrants, with whom they clashed over farmland as Hakka. From 1850 to 1920, the Hakka and the indigenous population clashed, which contributed to the development of the well-known strong sense of ethnic and linguistic identity of the Hakka. The famous family precept of the Hakka, "One would rather to sell one's ancestor's land than to forget one's ancestors' speech," shows this strong loyalty to their mother tongue.

Due to the different destinations of the various waves of Hakka migration, currently several Hakka dialects exist. Among them the Mexian subdialect, spoken in the northeastern part of Guangdong Province, is considered the standard. Chinese uses tone, the musical pitch of the voice, as a distinguishing mark of morphemes (characters or syllables). Traditionally, since Middle Chinese (seventh century CE), Chinese characters have been classified into four tonal categories: *ping* tone (even tone), *shang* tone (rising tone), *qu* tone (going tone), and *ru* tone (entering tone). Each tonal category may have undergone tonal split into two subcategories, *yin* and *yang*. But each tonal category has evolved into different tonal values (different types of pitches) as reflected in modern dialects. Mexian Hakka has six tones: *yin ping* tone (high level), *yang ping* tone (low level), *shang* tone (low falling), *qu* tone (high falling), *yin ru* tone (short low level), and *yang ru* tone (short high level). It has seventeen consonants, the primary of which are: *p*, *p'*, *m*, *f*, *v*, *t*, *t'*, *n*, *l*, *ts*, *ts'*,

s, \tilde{n} , ng, b; six nuclear (main) vowels: i, \tilde{i} , u, e, a, o; and three pairs of consonant endings: -m/-p, -n/-t, and -ng/-k. The bilabial and velar nasal, m and ng, may occur alone and form syllabic syllables.

Distinctive Characteristics of Hakka Dialects

The Hakka dialects are set apart from the other major Chinese dialects by unique phonological, lexical, and syntactic characteristics. Phonological characteristics that are typical in Hakka dialects include (1) the fact that Middle Chinese (from around the seventh century CE) voiced obstruent (obstruents are stops and spirants, such as b, d, g, v, and z) initials are pronounced as voiceless aspirated consonants; (2) Middle Chinese *shang* (rising) tone syllables with nasal, liquid, or glide initials are merged with Middle Chinese *ping* (level) tone syllables with a voiceless initial consonant; and (3) most of the velar fricatives (sounds like voiced b) of Middle Chinese are pronounced as f. Because the Hakka dialects share some common phonological features and lexical items with Gan, Yue, and Min (to a lesser degree), some scholars have argued that the Hakka dialect should be grouped with Gan to form a major Gan-Hakka group, while others prefer to assign the Hakka dialects to a different group. Some even suggest that the Hakka dialects should be considered subdialects of the Gan-Yue dialect group. Historically, Min dialects are known to preserve several Old Chinese (c. 1000 BCE) characteristics, which distinguish them from other dialects. Therefore, no scholar has ever tried to group Min and Hakka together. Currently, the most popular view is to treat Hakka as a separate group.

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EDIB ADIVAR, HALIDE (1884–1964), Turkish feminist reformer and writer. Halide Edib Adivar was a key figure in the emancipation of women in Turkey. After graduating from the American College in Istanbul in 1901, she married Salih Zeki Bey, with whom she had two sons. She divorced him in 1910 after learning he had taken a second wife. In the following years, she became involved in teaching, social relief work, and nursing. In 1917 Halide Edib married the Turkish politician Adnan Adivar.

An ardent champion of Turkish independence during the War of Liberation (1918–1922), she supported the movement through writing, mobilizing women, and organizing relief work and is one of the few women to have held military rank during the war. For many years Halide Edib lectured at universities in the United States and India. In 1939 she was appointed chairperson of the English department at the University of Istanbul and in 1950 was elected an independent member of parliament for İzmir. Halide Edib retired from political life in 1954 and died 9 January 1964 at eighty years of age.

Her novels include *Atesten Gomlek* (Shirt of Flame), *Vurun Kabpeye* (Strike the Whore), *Sinekli Bakkal* (Grocery with Flies), and *Akile Hanım Sokagi* (Madame Akile Street). Her works in English include historical writings and memoirs such as *Turkey Faces West*, *Conflict of East and West in Turkey*, and *Inside India*. Her own life served as a model for other women and combined with her advocacy of women's rights made her a pioneer in the women's rights movement in Turkey.

Tipi Isikozlu

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HAMADAN (2002 pop. 409,000). Hamadan (once called Ecbatana), an ancient city in western Iran, was the capital of Media; after the Persians overthrew

their Median overlords, the city became the Persian royal summer residence. Alexander of Macedon conquered the city in 330 BCE, while pursuing the last Persian ruler, Darius III. The Seleucids besieged Hamadan, and the Parthians incorporated it into their empire. The Arabs took the city in the seventh century, and the Seljuk Turks in the twelfth century, the Seljuks making Ecbatana their capital. After the Mongols invaded Iran in the thirteenth century, they devastated Ecbatana in 1220; the city of Hamadan rose above Ecbatana's ruins. Timur sacked Hamadan in 1386.

More recently Russians, Turks, and British have held Hamadan for various periods, with the Iranians finally gaining the city in 1918. In the 1980s, the Iran-Iraq war caused much damage to Hamadan.

Hamadan's location explains its history. The city lies on the road between modern Tehran and Baghdad, and whoever controlled the city also dominated north-south and east-west routes—between the Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf and between Europe and China. About one hundred kilometers west of Hamadan, in a mountainous region, is Darius the Great's inscription at Bisitun, meant to impress travelers passing between Assyria and Media. The Persian king's trilingual inscription on the rocky bluff was used to decipher cuneiform in the nineteenth century.

Modern Hamadan is a commercial center noted for fine Persian rugs and leather goods. Ironically Ecbatana's remains are buried beneath modern Hamadan, except for the Sang-e Shir (stone lion), a majestic but time-ravaged guardian of the city gates from the fourth century BCE. The fabled golden treasures of the Median and Persian palaces of Ecbatana await excavation, which is unlikely to occur because the modern city would have to be demolished.

The tomb of Avicenna (Abu Ali al-Husayn ibn 'Abd Allah ibn Sina; 980–1037), a Persian Islamic philosopher and physician, stands in Hamadan; Avicenna's medical text was widely studied in Europe as well as Asia. Also in Hamadan is a tomb said to be that of the biblical Esther and Mordecai; designed in Islamic style, the tomb is guarded by a Jewish family, who serve as custodians and guides.

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HAMENGGU BUWONO IX, SRI SULTAN (1912–1988), vice president of Indonesia. Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX was Indonesia's vice president from 1973 to 1978 during the New Order under Suharto (ruled 1966–1998). He also was the sultan (1940–1988) and the governor of Yogyakarta (1950–1988). The position of sultan has only a symbolic status in modern Indonesian, but it nonetheless became very influential under Hamengku Buwono IX.

Raden Mas Dorodjatun (his birth name before being appointed as sultan) was born in Yogyakarta on 12 April 1912. He was educated in Indonesia and the Netherlands. As sultan, he mobilized the people's army against the Dutch in the war of revolution in 1945 in central Java and declared that the Yogyakarta kingdom was part of the Republic of Indonesia. He initiated the famous *Serangan Oemum* (General Combat) against the Dutch on 1 March 1949, which showed the world that the new republic still existed.

He served in various ministerial posts after independence, with the exception of the period between 1953 and 1959. His ability to deal with the Dutch during and after the revolution and to mediate conflict between the civilian and the military authorities in the 1950s made him a respected minister of defense during 1949–1953. In the early years of the New Order (1966–1973), together with Suharto and Adam Malik (1917–1984), he was part of a leadership triumvirate, given the task of rehabilitating the economy. As the coordinating minister for economy and finance (1966–1973), he was successful in attracting Western donor countries to the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI). As the first vice president during Suharto's era (1973–1978), he also held other important positions, including the national head of the Indonesia Sport Committee and the head of the Indonesian Scout Movement. Hamengku Buwono IX passed away in the United States on 3 October 1988. Hundreds of thousands of people lined the twenty-six-kilometer length of road from the palace in Yogyakarta to the sacred Mataram cemetery at Imogiri, where the sultans of both Yogyakarta and Solo are buried.

Abubakar E. Hara

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HAMHUNG (1993 pop. 709,730). Hamhung is the capital of South Hamgyong Province in North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea). It is located on the Songch'on River on the eastern coast, 315 kilometers (200 miles) northeast of the capital city of Pyongyang. Together with the adjoining outer trade port of Hungnam, this industrial city plays an important role in the country's economy. It was the hometown of Yi Song-gye (1392–1398), founder of the Choson dynasty (1392–1910).

Hamhung is the center of the chemical industry in North Korea (plastic materials, synthetic tar). Chemical factories use local resources such as limestone and anthracite. There are large deposits of magnesite, lead, and zinc. Major industries include heavy equipment (metallurgy, mining, energy, chemical equipment), the electro-technical industry, agricultural machinery, and a hydroelectric power station. The city is also an important center for nonferrous metallurgy (aluminum), textiles (silk and wool), footwear, food, tobacco, fishing, and building materials.

Major industrial plants include the February 8 Vinalon Complex, the Hungnam Fertilizer Complex, and the Ryongsong Associated Machinery Bureau. The Hamhung Branch of the Academy of Sciences founded in 1960 is a general research institute involved in the scientific and technological development of the national chemical industry.

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HAN The Han are the majority people among China's fifty-six state-recognized nationalities, and comprise the people usually known worldwide as the Chinese. They are the most numerous of the world's nationalities, approaching 1.2 billion in 2000, and are renowned for their highly distinctive and powerful languages and cultures and for their long and eventful history. The main concentrations of Han Chinese are in the eastern half of China, including Taiwan. Under the People's Republic of China, the state decides who belongs to which nationality. This decision is made according to a rigid definition devised by Joseph Stalin. One group that has, on occasion, requested separate identity is the Hakka, but the state considers them part of the Han nationality.

Population

In the mid-seventeenth century, China's population was about 200 million, the overwhelming majority be-

ing Han. The 1953 census showed the Han population at 547 million, which was 93.9 percent of the People's Republic of China (PRC) total. Census figures for 1990 and 2000 put the Han population at 1.04 billion and 1.16 billion, respectively, or 91.99 and 91.59 percent of the PRC total. Since the late 1970s, Han families in the PRC have been subject to a very strict policy rarely allowing more than one child per couple, without which the 2000 Han population would have been somewhat higher than in fact it was. About 98 percent of Taiwan's 1997 population of 21.7 million were Han.

At the end of the nineteenth century there were an estimated 4 million overseas Chinese. In 1990, this figure had grown to about 37 million Chinese living outside China and Taiwan, with 88 percent living elsewhere in Asia. The country with the largest Han population outside China was Indonesia, with about 7.3 million Chinese; the country with the highest Han proportion was Singapore, where the 1990 census showed a total population of 2.69 million, 2.09 million of them (77.7 percent) Han. Hong Kong and Macao, then colonial territories, had about 6 million Han Chinese, the overwhelming majority of both populations. Outside Asia, the country with the largest Chinese population is the United States (about 1.6 million in 1990).

Language

Chinese belongs to the Sino-Tibetan family of languages. The Chinese written language dates at least to the fourteenth century BCE and consists of monosyllabic characters or ideographs. The characters were standardized in the third century BCE and remain essentially unchanged, although the PRC adopted a simplified writing system in the 1950s. Literate Chinese have always been able to understand each other through writing, which has acted as a unifying force throughout history.

Each character represents both a sound and a concept, but meaning is conveyed through characters either singly or in combinations. Chinese is not monosyllabic; objects, actions, or ideas are more likely to be represented through groups of two or three rather than a single character.

Spoken Chinese is sharply regional and divided into several sublanguages and numerous dialects. All of these are tonal and express grammatical relationships through word order, not word endings. The official language is Modern Standard Chinese, or Mandarin, which is based on the pronunciation found in Beijing. The north and southwest of the Han regions (essen-

tially the eastern half of those territories ruled as part of the People's Republic of China, plus Taiwan) of China are dominated by the Mandarin dialects, most of them intelligible to a speaker of Modern Standard Chinese. Sublanguages of the southeast include Yue (Cantonese), Wu (spoken in Shanghai), Hunanese, Jiangxi, North and South Fujian, and Hakka. In the south, even dialects are often mutually unintelligible. Fujian is known for strong dialect differences from one valley to the next.

Approximately two-thirds of Han Chinese speak one of the Mandarin dialects as their mother tongue. In the twentieth century, successive regimes have attempted to have Modern Standard Chinese spoken, or at least understood, by all Chinese through education, radio, and television. Of the southern sublanguages, Wu has the greatest number of speakers, followed by Cantonese.

Culture and Economy

Under Emperor Han Wudi (reigned 140–87 BCE), Confucianism began to dominate the Chinese state, including its ritual, and formed the ideological basis of duty and service for the scholar-official class, which ruled the country. Confucianism laid great emphasis on morality within hierarchical human relationships, on creating and maintaining harmony within society and on the family as the central social unit.

Confucianism accorded greater social respect to men than women and to sons than daughters. Until the twentieth century, marriages were arranged by parents through the aid of matchmakers, and women were very subordinate. Although the revolutions of the twentieth century greatly raised women's status, allowing them to enter the work force, gender equality is nowhere on the horizon among the Han.

Confucian ideology was one primary reason why Han governance was generally far more secular than that found in other great civilizations. In the twentieth century, Confucianism came under strong attack from modernist nationalism and Marxism-Leninism. Modernist nationalists denounced Confucianism as hierarchical, patriarchal, and oppressive, even though Confucianists argued that they were the real nationalists because they upheld Chinese values and traditions. Mao Zedong (1893–1976) orchestrated attacks on Confucian and religious values everywhere in China, but there has since been a revival of Confucian influence in the PRC, and it remains strong in Han communities outside China.

Secularity of governance does not mean the Han are irreligious. To this day, folk religions, which at-

tempt to harmonize relations between humankind and the cosmic order, remain highly influential. Buddhism and Taoism still have Han followers and their places of worship are common, though visitors are more often tourists than believers. However, religions that emphasize belief in a single God have never attained more than minor influence among the Han. Muslims are never classified as Han, but as Hui.

Below the scholar-official, Confucianism prized the peasant. Han society is based on agriculture. The staple in the south is rice and in the north wheat-based products, supplemented by a wide variety of vegetables. The meat most associated with the Han is pork. The Han do not care for dairy products, a taste even extensive Western influence has failed to change. To this day, local markets are important for the economy.

During the Song dynasty (960–1279), China was the world's most technologically developed society. Although Confucianism looked down on the merchant, China underwent a commercial revolution during that time, which produced a degree of prosperity that Marco Polo marveled at in the thirteenth century. However, China later fell far behind technologically and failed to undertake an industrial revolution until the second half of the twentieth century. Under Mao, the Han entrepreneurial spirit was suppressed. But since the late 1970s it has revived, with heavy industry being replaced by more consumer-oriented enterprises and self-reliance by foreign trade.

The commonalities of the Han should not disguise important regional differences. These apply not only to language but also to many aspects of culture and society, including cuisine, festivals, clothing, marriage customs, village architecture, and music and theater. Cuisine provides one example. The Han of the southwest (Hunan, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces) favor spicy dishes; in the southeast, Cantonese food is noted for its quick cooking and stir-frying at high temperatures, and for rich, sweet dishes.

Unity in the Twenty-First Century

The strength of their culture and the size of their population have made the Han at times inwardly focused, at times outwardly focused. Although there are periods of division in China's long history, and although localist elements remain influential to this day, the Chinese have shown a highly enduring sense of national unity. China's joining the World Trade Organization late in 2001 should reduce isolationist tendencies but will not undermine the essential features of Chinese culture or eliminate nationalism.

Colin Mackerras

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HAN DYNASTY The Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), which was founded by Liu Bang (256–195 BCE), or Han Gaozu, marks an era of consolidated imperial institutions in Chinese history. After the short-lived Qin regime (221–206 BCE), the Han ruled China for four centuries, governing one of the most successful empires of the time. Conventionally, the dynasty is divided into two periods separated by a short interregnum. The Former, or Western, Han (206 BCE–8 CE) had its capital in Changan; the Latter, or Eastern, Han (25–220) had its capital in the east at Luoyang.

Political Changes

As soon as he established the Han, Gaozu, the first commoner to found a dynasty in imperial China, abolished the brutal laws and heavy taxes of the Qin. With regard to governmental institutions, however, he basically copied the preceding dynasty's system. The imperial throne, whose succession was hereditary, was assisted by a civil bureaucracy. Officials at various administrative levels were recruited through recommendation and examination and appointed by the imperial court. The empire was organized into commanderies (*jun*) and kingdoms (*wangguo*); the former, subdivided into districts (*xian*), were centrally controlled, while the latter were largely autonomous under enfeoffed kings. Commandery and district officials were responsible for the census of the population and the register of the land, which constituted the basis of the main forms of taxation (the poll tax and the land tax) and military conscription. To relieve the threat from the powerful nomadic peoples of Central Asia known as the Xiongnu (called Huns later in Europe), Gaozu adopted a conciliatory policy, which was continued by his immediate successors. They wooed the Xiongnu leaders by sending valuable gifts and imperial princesses as brides.

Subsequent emperors followed the early Han policy of light labor service and taxation. Due in part to peace and frugal government, the economy expanded, and production soared; as a result, the state treasury was full, and granaries bulged. Meanwhile, the court took steps to isolate the kingdoms and reduce the size of their territories. After 154 BCE, when the imperial court defeated a revolt staged by seven kingdoms, the authority of the central government was further consolidated by splitting the kingdoms' territories and curtailing their powers.

Emperor Wudi (156–87 BCE) oversaw an expansionist era in Han history. Domestically, he sought to expand central power by imposing state monopolies for salt and iron, proclaiming Confucianism the state ideology, and establishing a Confucian imperial university to train officials. In foreign affairs, besides military campaigns, the Han court relied on diplomatic efforts to establish favorable relations with other peoples. As a result, the Han armies advanced to the southwest, into present-day Korea and Vietnam, and to the northeast as far as Dunhuang. It was at this juncture that the trade routes known as the Silk Road were established. The Silk Road connected the Chinese and Roman empires. China imported wool and linen fabrics, amber, wines, acrobats, and gold coins and bullion from the Romans. In imperial Rome, Chinese silk became a major luxury article. Under Wudi, the Han became one of the most powerful empires in the world.

After Wudi, most emperors of the Western Han were young and weak, and regents, eunuchs, and imperial consorts' families dominated court politics. In 9 CE, the regent Wang Mang (45 BCE–23 CE) took imperial power from the Liu family and named his dynasty the Xin (New). Claiming to have received the new Mandate of Heaven, Wang Mang initiated a series of social and institutional reforms. But his attempts antagonized the wealthier members of society and failed to increase the resources of the state. Wang Mang's regime was overthrown by large-scale peasant rebellions.

The Han house was restored by Guangwudi (6 BCE–57 CE), who established the Eastern Han dynasty with its capital at Luoyang. In his efforts to consolidate the government, Guangwudi reestablished the institutions of the Western Han and promoted the cause of scholarship. He also minimized the influences of eunuchs and imperial consorts' families. Under Guangwudi's immediate successors, the Han was once again rich and strong enough to adopt an aggressive foreign policy and assert its influence in Central Asia.



CHINA—HISTORICAL PERIODS

Xia dynasty (2100–1766 BCE)
 Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE)
 Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE)
 Western Zhou (1045–771 BCE)
 Eastern Zhou (770–221 BCE)
 Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE)
 Warring States period (475–221 BCE)
 Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE)
 Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE)
 Three Kingdoms period (220–265 CE)
 North and South Dynasties (220–589 CE)
 Sui dyansty (581–618 CE)
 Tang dynasty (618–907 CE)
 Five Dynasties period (907–960 CE)
 Song dynasty (960–1279)
 Northern Song (960–1126)
 Southern Song (1127–1279)
 Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234)
 Yuan dynasty (1279–1368)
 Ming dynasty (1368–1644)
 Qing dynasty (1644–1912)
 Republican China (1912–1927)
 People's Republic of China (1949–present)
 Republic of China (1949–present)
 Cultural Revolution (1966–1976)

The dynasty started to decline during the time of Hedi (79–105); his reign saw the return of powerful eunuchs and imperial consorts' families in court politics. All ten Han emperors who ruled after Hedi took the throne as minors aged between one hundred days and sixteen years. Political factions manipulated the imperial succession, and factional struggles corrupted politics and weakened the central government.

In local areas, powerful landowners defied the government by evading taxes and enlarging their holdings. Helpless peasants became the virtual serfs of these landowners in return for economic and physical security. The great families converted their manors into fortresses, taking over many of the functions of government in their respective localities. Their estates were largely self-sufficient, so that trade declined and cities shrank correspondingly.

In 184 CE, because of political corruption and land annexation, peasant groups across north China known as the "Yellow Turbans" revolted, severely attacking the great families and shaking the Han house. Cao Cao (155–220), who led the suppression of the rebels, dominated the court after the rebels were put down. He claimed the title of chancellor of the imperial government. In 220, after Cao Cao died, his son Cao Pi (reigned 220–226 as Wendi of the Wei state) forced the last Han emperor to abdicate. China then entered a prolonged period of disunity and disorder similar to that in the West following the collapse of the Roman empire.

Socioeconomic Changes

Han society was largely rural and its economy agrarian. According to the census of 1 CE, the Han population numbered about 60 million. Peasants made up the majority of the population; they paid the government land and poll taxes, rendered labor services, and served in the army. The average peasant family was estimated to consist of five people working about seven hectares of land. Women were significant economic assets to poor peasants: both husband and wife performed hard manual labor in the fields. In the north, millet, wheat, and barley were the grain crops; in the south, rice. Pigs and fowl were the common meat animals. Peasants used a variety of tools, but the most important was the plow. Wooden plows were still used, while cheaply made, yet more effective iron plows grew in popularity. More and more peasants used new tools such as three-legged seeders, iron harrows, and levelers, which were pulled by either draft animals or human laborers. Agricultural production was facilitated by government-sponsored irrigation projects, including reservoirs and canals.

In addition to grains, the Han also promoted sericulture (raising silkworms and spinning and weaving silk cloth). Silks were China's most valuable export commodity, and bolts of silk were used as currency and given as state gifts. Tending silkworms and carding the spinning silk was women's work, and each family was required to pay a tax in silk fabric.

Both manufacturing and commerce flourished. Craftspeople continued the Chinese tradition of excellent metallurgy. By the beginning of the first century CE, China had about fifty state-run ironworks, which smelted iron ore, processed it with chemicals, and fashioned the metal into ingots for tools and weapons. Bronze workers produced jewelry, utensils, and ritual objects. Perhaps the most remarkable product of Han imagination was the invention of paper, which the Chinese traditionally date to 105 CE. By the fifth century, paper was in common use, preparing the way for the invention of printing.

Merchants made tremendous fortunes during the Han. Retail merchants set up shop in stalls in the

markets, grouped according to their wares. All the butchers, for example, congregated in one part of the market, each trying to outsell the others. The markets were also the haunts of entertainers and fortune-tellers. The newly developed sturdy carts and wagons as well as networks of roads and waterways facilitated the transportation of goods. Nevertheless, according to government policy, merchants were put at the bottom of the social order, below scholars, peasants, and artisans. Emperor Wudi of the Western Han promulgated sumptuary laws that forbade merchants to flaunt their wealth. He nationalized the iron and salt industries and established a liquor-licensing system, setting up a pattern that persisted into the twentieth century. He also set up state granaries to stabilize grain prices and to discourage speculation. These legal and social restrictions became obstacles for further development of commerce.

Peasants often faced more serious problems. Without reserves to tide them over during times of poor weather or other difficulties, small landholders often went into debt; if they could not pay their debt, they lost their land and had to work as sharecroppers. As sharecroppers, peasants could keep only 50 percent of their yield. Some left the land to become laborers, and the most unfortunate had to sell their children or themselves into slavery to pay off debts. Rich families, meanwhile, accumulated great estates worked by tenants and slaves, and through their political connections they could often evade taxes, which placed a greater strain on the remaining small freeholders. Under these miserable conditions, peasants from time to time revolted. Indeed, it was the large-scale peasant uprisings that destroyed Wang Mang's Xin regime and precipitated the downfall of the Eastern Han dynasty.

Cultural and Intellectual Changes

Han China witnessed dynamic changes in religious and intellectual life. Under the first several emperors, Han thought was dominated by the Taoist notion of "nonaction," which emphasized frugal government and delegation of imperial authority. Han thinkers argued that the emperor must on the one hand uphold basic principles of government and on the other hand leave specific decisions and actions to the care of his officials. Meanwhile, government must adopt the policy of light taxation to alleviate the suffering of the people. Historians attributed early Han prosperity partly to lenient government policies guided by Taoist ideas.

Craving a grandiose empire, Emperor Wudi embraced Confucianism, a belief system that advocated active social participation. To facilitate Confucian

learning, the emperor established an imperial university and employed Confucian scholars to prepare future government officials with a curriculum based on Confucian classics. Han Confucianism, however, was influenced by other schools of thought, including yin-yang cosmology, legalism (the doctrine that emphasizes government by legal apparatus), and Taoism. The great synthesizer of Confucian teachings was Dong Zhongshu (c. 179–104 BCE), one of the court advisers of Emperor Wudi. According to Dong's interpretation, the universe consisted of heaven, Earth, and humans, operating on the basis of yin-yang forces and the five agents of water, fire, metal, wood, and earth. Having received the Mandate of Heaven, the human ruler, or Son of Heaven, served as the intermediary between the worlds of humans and spirits. It was his duty to develop his subjects' moral goodness, nourish their livelihood, and maintain social and cosmic harmony. If the ruler failed in such tasks, cosmic portents or even disasters would occur, and Heaven would punish him by revoking the Mandate. While Confucianism strengthened imperial authority, it certainly imposed heavy responsibilities on the emperor.

During the Han, a new form of Taoism—religious Taoism—flourished. Based on popular beliefs, this new trend was concerned primarily with drugs and potions to prolong life and attain immortality, and with alchemy to produce gold from base materials. These interests led to experiments that produced information valuable for chemistry, pharmacology, and other sciences and gave rise to the invention of the compass, which greatly helped navigation, and the discovery of sulfur and saltpeter, the ingredients of gunpowder. By the mid-second century CE, religious Taoists organized themselves into political groups. In 142, Zhang Daoling founded the sect named "Way of the Celestial Masters" in Sichuan. Decades later, Zhang Jue (d. 184) created the sect called "Way of Great Peace" in north China. These Taoist groups, to which peasants belonged, eventually revolted against the Han regime and expedited the fall of the dynasty.

Buddhism was introduced into Han China by Central Asian merchants. During the reign of Emperor Mingdi (28–75), the second ruler of the Eastern Han, some Chinese combined the Buddhist rites and fasts with Taoist practices aimed at physical immortality. In the next century, Buddhist monasteries appeared in the Han empire, and Buddhist texts were translated into Chinese. The Parthian monk An Shigao, for example, reached the Han capital of Luoyang in 148 and began translating a set of texts dealing with meditation practices and the Buddhist worldview. In later dynasties, Buddhism transformed the Chinese cultural landscape.

The Han produced great historians. Sima Qian (c. 145–86 BCE) wrote the first comprehensive history of China entitled *Shiji* (Historical Records). Divided into five sections—basic annals, chronological tables, monographs, hereditary families, and biographies—and 130 chapters, this massive work provided both historical information and moral instruction. Following the example of Sima Qian, Ban Gu (32–92) wrote the first dynastic history of China, *Hanshu* (History of the Han Dynasty). Ban Gu's sister Ban Zhao, the most famous female literary figure of the Han, assisted in the writing of the *Hanshu*. Possessing great historical and literary values, both the *Shiji* and *Hanshu* set the standard for later dynastic histories that continued to the early twentieth century.

Legacy of the Han

The Han dynasty set the pattern of civilization for subsequent Chinese history. It provided future generations with a model of a long-lasting, extensive, and unified empire. It consolidated an effective form of bureaucracy and established a distinguished tradition of political philosophy. It laid a solid foundation of belief system, social structure, and economic form for later dynasties. It also developed a basic mode of thinking and a scheme for dealing with foreign peoples. So strongly did the Han dynasty influence Chinese culture that 95 percent of present-day Chinese call themselves Han, their language the Han language, and their written script Han characters. The Han achievements made China a dominant force in the preindustrial world.

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HAN RIVER The Han River flows about 514 kilometers through Seoul, capital of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), rising from a spring in Odae Mountain in Kangwon Province and emptying into the Yellow Sea. Several prehistoric human settlements

have been excavated along the river. At present the Han supplies drinking water for 20 million people living within its basin—Kangwon and Kyunggi provinces, including the cities of Seoul and Inchon.

The South Han River, a distinct tributary of the Han River, flows through Kangwon province and North Ch'ungch'ong Province before it joins the North Han at Paldang Reservoir, an artificial dam providing the major source of drinking water for Seoul metropolitan area residents. The river also provides water for agricultural and industrial purposes and generates electrical power through three major dams. The Han is a symbol of South Korea's remarkable economic development in the 1970s and 1980s, which is known as the "Han River miracle." The 1988 Seoul Summer Olympic stadium is located along its banks. Other recreational facilities include the Yeouido Han Riverside Park, a 36.9-kilometer bicycle trail, swimming pools, and fishing areas. The Han is also popular for water skiing and yachting.

The water quality of the Han River is deteriorating due to increasing nonpoint sources of pollutants from agriculture and rapid urbanization of traditionally rural areas surrounding Seoul. The lack of a buffer zone between the river and increasing human settlement is another cause of environmental concern.

Yearn Hong Choi

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HAN YONG-UN (1879–1944), Korean monk, poet, nationalist. Born to a farming family in Chungchong Province, Han Yong-un was originally educated in Chinese classical literature in his village, where he became involved in the Tonghak sect. The Tonghak insurgency led to regional strife and subsequent Japanese intervention. Han went into hiding in the Paektam monastery near Seoraksan in eastern Korea, where he adopted the name Manhae (Ten Thousand Seas).

As a monk, Han traveled to Japan to study Zen Buddhism. When Japan annexed Korea, however, he left for Russia to form a base of resistance against the Japanese. Han returned to Korea and was one of the original signers of the Declaration of Korean Independence, for which act he was imprisoned by the Japanese until 1923. In prison he wrote "A Letter of Korean Independence," which is regarded as one of the founding documents of the 1919 independence movement.

Han's writings are considered among the best of Korean and Zen poetry, and his works have been published internationally. A memorial to him was erected at the site of the 1 March uprising in Tapkol Park (formerly Pagoda Park) in Seoul.

Thomas P. Dolan

HANGAI MOUNTAINS The Hangai (Khangai, Hangayn) Mountains dominate central Mongolia with their rich pastures and forests. The range extends 800 kilometers northwest-southeast and parallels the Mongolian Altai Mountains. Several of the range's snowy peaks reach an altitude of 3,500 meters above sea level, and the highest of these peaks, snow-capped Otgon Tenger (3,905 meters above sea level), remains a central and sacred place in Mongolian folklore. Medicinal herbs and minerals gathered from its slopes are a popular commodity in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia's capital.

The Hangai Mountains drain into the Arctic basin via the Orhon, Ider, and Selenge rivers, the last being the main tributary of Lake Baikal in Siberia. On the range's southern slopes, the dry beds of occasional watercourses feed into the Valley of Lakes, an arid plateau interspersed with freshwater and saline lakes. The Hangai Range's northern slopes are covered with forest and mountain meadows, while the southern slopes are generally treeless and arid. Frequent earthquakes in the region (the most recent in 1905) have left dramatic fissures referred to as the "trails of a giant snake." In this environment, musk deer, willow grouse, lynx, snow leopard, brown bear, wild boar, golden eagle, and the central Asian viper make their home.

Daniel Hruschka

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HANGUL SCRIPT Hangul is a script used in writing Korean, a language of 72 million speakers. It is, like the Roman alphabet, an alphabetical writing, consisting of 24 basic alphabet letters, 14 for consonants and 10 for vowels. Unlike the Roman alphabet in which independent alphabet letters are arranged linearly, for the hangul script, consonant and vowel letters are combined to create syllable blocks.

Whereas the origins of most writing systems are unknown, hangul, originally called *hunminjeongeum* (meaning "the correct sounds for the instruction of the

people"), was invented in 1443 by King Sejong the Great (1397–1450), the fourth monarch (reigned 1419–1450) of the Yi (Choson) dynasty (1392–1910), with his royal scholars.

Although it was promulgated in 1446, it was not until 1894 that the hangul script began to be used in official government documents. The first all-Korean script newspaper, *Tongnip Sinmun* (Independent News), was published in 1896 by Seo Jaepil (1863–1951). The name hangul ("Korean script") was given by Ju Sigyeong (1876–1914), one of the earliest modern Korean grammarians.

The design of the Hangul letters resulted from a deep understanding of phonetic principles and Chinese cosmological philosophy on the part of the king and his scholars. Originally, 28 basic letters (17 consonant letters and 11 vowel letters) were introduced, of which 3 consonant letters and one vowel letter have disappeared in the current writing system.

The consonant letters for *k* (or *g*), *n*, *s* (or *sh*), *m*, and *ng* are designed after the shape of the speech organs when they are pronounced. The other consonant letters are made by adding a stroke or two to these or by extending the initial forms. An extra stroke indicates a different articulatory feature, such as aspiration (extra puff of the air in producing a sound). In this respect, the Hangul Script is unique and more refined in representing sounds than any other script.

Vowel letters are designed based on the yin-yang philosophy of universal complementary forces and the East Asian cosmological belief that heaven, earth, and humanity are the three most fundamental features in the universe. The three initial vowel letters are designed after the round shape of heaven, the flat shape of earth, and the vertical shape of a man standing. The other letters are made by combining the three initial letters, with the combinations being guided by the principles of the yin-yang theory as to how heaven interacts either with the human being or with the earth.

Because of its systematic and scientific organization as well as its sophisticated phonetic representation, the hangul script is regarded as one of Korea's cultural treasures. Its linguistic and cultural value is also recognized by scholars outside Korea as a great intellectual achievement.

Hyo Sang Lee

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HANGZHOU (2002 est. pop. 1.2 million). Hangzhou was visited by Marco Polo in the thirteenth century. The city is one of the seven ancient capitals of China and today is the capital of Zhejiang province. Hangzhou was first mentioned in 221 BCE during the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE).

The city prospered after it was linked with the Grand Canal (the world's longest man-made waterway) in 610 during the Sui dynasty (581–618). Under the Tang dynasty (618–907), West Lake, now a famous tourist attraction, was created on the western edge of Hangzhou. An old harbor was also filled in, greatly expanding the size of the city.

At the inception of the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279), Hangzhou became the dynasty's capital. After the Mongols invaded China in the thirteenth century, Hangzhou continued to prosper through its river and sea trade, ship building, and naval industries. The city was opened to foreigners in 1895 under the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki.

Silk production has remained the mainstay of Hangzhou's trade and handicraft industries; the city is also noted for its Longjian (Dragon Well) tea, cotton textiles, steel and chemicals, scissors, hemp, mulberries, and crafts including sandalwood fans, bamboo items, and silk parasols.

Today Hangzhou's primary reputation is as a tourist mecca. West Lake is considered the symbol of Hangzhou, along with the popular Lingyin Si (Temple of Inspired Seclusion).

Carole Schroeder

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HANOI (2002 est. pop. 1.3 million). Hanoi, the capital of Vietnam, is located in the center of the northern part of the country and is bounded by the Red River to the north and east. It is considered one

of Asia's most beautiful cities, boasting a number of lakes, including Ho Tay (West Lake) and Ho Guom (Sword Lake), and parks. The Old Town, known for its thirty-six narrow and winding streets named after various trades, is still a vibrant part of the city. Founded in 1010, over the centuries Hanoi bore several names, such as: Dai La, Thang Long, Dong Do, Dong Quan, Dong Kinh, and Hanoi.

In 1009 Ly Cong Uan (974–1028) was proclaimed emperor and founded the Ly dynasty (1010–1225). The following year he decided to move the capital from Hoa Lu to the site of the Dai La citadel, about 70 kilometers to the north. En route, the emperor had a vision in which he saw a golden dragon rising from the Red River. He then decided to change the citadel's name from Dai La to Thang Long, meaning "ascending dragon." The capital city was then developed. The imperial quarters were located near Ho Tay. A civil area was created and divided into artisan, agricultural, and commercial sectors. Both the imperial



The Hanoi Municipal Theater in 1995. (STEVE RAYMER/CORBIS)

and the civil areas of the city were located within and protected by a citadel. Within a century of its founding, Thang Long had become an important cultural, economic, and political center. Under the Tran dynasty (1225–1400), the imperial quarters were reinforced, and new palaces were built. In addition, administrative units were constructed. By this time the capital city boasted sixty-one quarters. From 1258 to 1288, the city was subjected to three separate, but unsuccessful, Mongol attacks. In 1400 Ho Quy Ly replaced the Tran and founded the Ho dynasty (1400–1407). He moved the capital to Thanh Hoa, which he renamed Tay Do. He also changed Thang Long's name to Dong Do.

In 1407 China invaded Vietnam, and Thang Long was renamed Dong Quan. After Le Loi (flourished 1428–1443) succeeded in liberating Vietnam in 1428, the city changed its name to Dong Kinh. In 1802, Emperor Gia Long (1762–1820) of the Nguyen dynasty (1802–1955) moved Vietnam's capital to Hue, and Dong Kinh became Thang Long once again. Then in 1831 Emperor Minh Mang (1792–1841) changed the city's name to Hanoi, which means "within the river."

In 1884, after France had consolidated its rule in Vietnam, Hanoi was placed under French control. The city became the headquarters of the French administration in Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia). During the French colonial era, the city was expanded, blending French and Vietnamese architecture, and numerous broad avenues and tree-lined boulevards were created. On 2 September 1945, Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969) proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and Hanoi became its capital. Hanoi remained the capital after the country's reunification in 1975.

Micheline R. Lessard

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HANSHIK In Korea the 105th day after the winter solstice is known as Hanshik. This spring observance, falling on or near 5 April, has long been a day for paying homage to one's ancestors. In the most traditional of Korean families, ancestral rites are still observed. In the early hours of the morning, the ancestral rite, *charye*, is performed before tables piled with food

offerings to one's ancestors. After sunrise, families make their way to tombs—often located in auspicious spots on the many hillsides—of their most immediate ancestors for another ancestral rite called *songmyo*, which also includes food offerings and bows of respect.

Hanshik literally means "cold food," and traditionally no foods are cooked on this day. Consuming cold foods and performing ancestral rites on Hanshik date back to China's Three Kingdoms period (220–265 CE) and has its roots in Chinese legend. According to the legend, the date of Hanshik was set in commemoration of the ancient Chinese statesman of the Jin dynasty (third–fourth century CE) Jie Jitui (Chieh Chi-t'ui), who elected to die in a forest fire set to capture him rather than surrender and compromise his loyalty to his deposed emperor. Impressed by this act of fealty, the reigning emperor decreed that no fires be kindled and that only cold foods be eaten on this day.

The observance most likely originated out of an ancient spring festival at which new fires were set to symbolize spring. Hanshik became one of the four main observances of the Choson period.

David E. Shaffer

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HARA TAKASHI (1856–1921), Japanese politician and statesman. Born in Morioka (in present Iwate Prefecture) into a samurai family, Hara Takashi was an influential figure in Japanese politics in the first decades of the twentieth century. Also known as Hara Kei, he is regarded as one of the principal architects of party government (governing by formation of a cabinet, as opposed to the previous party system dominated by the so-called Meiji oligarchy, mainly former samurai from the clans of Choshu and Satsuma) in modern Japan. In 1918, he became the first prime minister in the history of modern Japan who was a commoner.

Hara was educated in the Nanbu domain school near his place of birth. In 1871, he left for Tokyo, where he joined the law school of the Ministry of Justice. He took a position in the ministry of foreign affairs in 1882. Under the auspices of Mutsu Munemitsu (1844–1897), Hara served as vice minister of foreign affairs and as ambassador to Korea.

After an interlude as a journalist, Hara in 1900 joined the Rikken Seiyukai party and became the party's first secretary general. He ran successfully for the lower house and served as home minister in several cabinets between 1906 and 1913. In 1914, he was elected president of the Seiyukai. After the resignation of Prime Minister Terauchi Masatake (1852–1919) in 1918, Hara formed his own cabinet—the first in Japanese history to be headed by an elected member of the majority party in the lower house.

Hara's popularity declined during his time as prime minister, since he undertook no major institutional reform. He was stabbed to death in Tokyo Station on 4 November 1921 by a right-wing nationalist. His diary continues to be regarded as an important source for historians.

Sven Saaler

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HARAPPA The Harappan culture, also known as the Indus Valley civilization, is one of the world's first urban civilizations. It thrived between 2500 and 1500 BCE in the fertile floodplains of the Indus River—present-day Pakistan and western India. Archaeologists have discovered two cities, Harappa and Mohenjo Daro, and numerous settlements. Excavations have revealed painted pottery, terra-cotta figures, and inscribed stamp seals. The cities are brick built and feature a high central citadel with public buildings, granaries, and a ritual great bath. The grid layout and extensive drainage and sewerage systems are early evidence of town planning and central administration. The economy appears to have been agricultural, with extensive trading links.

Excavations have uncovered several thousand square soapstone seals. Finely carved with animal images and short inscriptions, they may have served as merchants' signatures. The Harappan script has not yet been deciphered and remains one of archaeology's great enigmas. Little is known about the Harappan religion as well; however, an engraved figure, horned and seated in a yoga position, may be linked to the Hindu god Siva. Other figures have been interpreted as goddesses and high priests. The Harappan culture



The ruins of a neighborhood of artisans in the ancient city of Harappa, Pakistan. (PAUL ALMASY/CORBIS)

appears to have declined around 1500 BCE, perhaps because it was conquered by invaders or destroyed by flooding and climatic change.

Lucy D. Moss

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HARBIN (2002 est. pop. 2.8 million). Located on the southern bank of the Songhua River, Harbin is the capital city of Heilongjiang Province. Founded as a railway town by Russian engineers in 1895 when czarist Russia began to build the Trans-Manchurian Railway (later named the Chinese Eastern Railway), Harbin became home to the Chinese Eastern Railway's headquarters and tens of thousands of Russian engineers, colonial bureaucrats, soldiers, traders, and their families. It experienced an early boom in its economy and infrastructure during the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) when it served as the major supply base and staging area for the Russian armies in Manchuria. Following the Bolshevik Revolution, tens of thousands of new settlers arrived in Harbin—White Russians (supporters of the czar, or people who opposed the new regime). Its population swelled by these new arrivals, in the 1920s, Harbin boasted the largest European community in Asia.

The Japanese Guandong Army occupied Harbin in 1932 and used it as an outpost to observe developments in the far eastern reaches of the Soviet Union until 1945. Harbin was also the location of one of the most notorious branches of the Japanese military during World War II—Unit 731 of the Guandong Army. This unit was responsible for developing and testing chemical and bacteriological weapons using Chinese and Allied prisoners. After the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949), Harbin continued to play a central role in the transportation network in northeastern China. The city's industrial base was expanded to include tractor, cement, petrochemical, turbine, and machine factories. With the opening of China to foreign trade and investment in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Harbin witnessed a revival, and the city was again at the forefront of Sino-Russian border trade and contact.

Robert John Perrins

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HARI RAYA PUASA Hari Raya Puasa literally means "feast of fasting," and refers to 'Id al-Fitr, the celebration marking the end of Ramadan, as it is known to the rest of the Muslim world. This phrase is only known in the Malay world, i.e., Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, South Thailand, and South Philippines. It represents a return to original purity, after the cleansing of one's sins. It is also known as 'Id al-Saghir (minor feast), as opposed to 'Id al-Kabir (major feast) or 'Id al-Adha (feast of the sacrifice).

Though subject to the sighting of the crescent moon or astronomical calculations (*bisab*), Hari Raya Puasa always falls on the first of Shawwal. Celebrations start with prayers and a two-part sermon (*khutbah*), and continue over three days during which Muslims visit family, friends, and neighbors in order to ask their forgiveness for having wronged them. The Hari Raya Puasa sermon closes an intense period of

seeking God's forgiveness for past sins by fasting, reading from the Qur'an, reciting prayers, and almsgiving (*zakat al-fitr*) throughout Ramadan. Indeed, after this particular sermon is delivered, the value of almsgiving decreases to that of an act of charity (*sadaqah*), entailing lesser rewards.

For this feast, it is recommended that Muslims wear their best attire and perfume. In the Malay world, the meals served on this occasion feature traditional Malay-Indonesian food, such as rice wrapped in leaves. Children usually receive presents and special attention.

Andi Faisal Bakti

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HARSA (c. 590–647 CE), Indian ruler and poet. Born in Thaneshwar, Harsa (also Harsha or Harsavardhana) brought order to northern India when he conquered the region and became king (reigned 606–647). Harsa first ascended the throne of a small kingdom in the state of Haryana, Sthanvishvara (modern Thaneshwar), but became the last monarch of classical India to rule an empire covering the Indo-Gangetic Plain from Bengal to Gujarat and from the Himalayas to the Vindhya Range. Kanauj was his chosen capital. To conquer this hard-won territory, Harsa collected a large army and waged incessant war against other kings for six years.

His reign was noteworthy not only for the vast lands he ruled but also for the philosophical change that marked the emergence of medieval Hinduism from the earlier Brahmanic religion. Harsa proved to be as efficient in administration as in war. His court was celebrated by later authors for the king's patronage of art and literature; he himself was a poet and author of three major Sanskrit plays. His own religious practices were eclectic, as he worshiped Siva, the Sun, and the Buddha. In later life he was especially attracted to Mahayana Buddhism.

Paul Hockings

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HART, ROBERT (1835–1911), head of Chinese Maritime Customs Service. Born in Northern Ireland, Robert Hart went to China in 1854. He served in British consulates in Ningbo and Guangzhou (Canton) for several years before he became the second head of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service and a key instrument in the British "informal empire" in China in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In 1863, Hart succeeded Horatio Nelson Lay, whose brusque manner offended many in the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) government. Hart, by contrast, viewed himself as an employee of the Chinese government and urged the foreign employees in the service to learn about China and, indeed, the Chinese language and to respect Chinese customs and values. Chinese officialdom greatly appreciated Hart and looked to him as a trusted foreign advisor.

Under Hart, the Chinese Maritime Customs Service became one of China's few modernized institutions and relatively effectively collected the 5 percent ad valorem tariff permitted by the so-called unequal treaties that China had signed with foreign powers, and this helped provide a dependable and major source of income for the Qing dynasty. Although most of China's tariff revenue was used to pay indemnities to the imperialist powers required by the unequal treaties, some of the revenue did go to support reform efforts in the self-strengthening movement.

For his efforts in China, Hart was knighted by Queen Victoria (1819–1901), and as long as he was alive, the Qing dynasty appointed no other inspector-general for customs. Hart even declined an opportunity to serve as British minister to China in order to remain with his beloved Customs Service.

Charles Dobbs

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HARVEST MOON FESTIVAL. See **Ch'usok**.

HARYANA (2001 est pop. 21 million). With the partition of 1947, the Muslim part of the Punjab was assigned to Pakistan, and the Sikh and Hindu parts to India. In 1966 the mostly Sikh, Punjabi-speaking area

became Punjab, and the primarily Hindi-speaking area became Haryana. Haryana is said to mean "home of Hari," a name of the god Vishnu. The state has a proud history dating to the Vedic age. It was home to the legendary Bharata dynasty. The battle between the Kauravas and the Pandavas, described in the Sanskrit epic poem the *Mahabharata*, is believed to have been fought on the site of the modern Kurukshetra (a plain in the northern part of Haryana). Here Lord Krishna is said to have delivered to the warrior Arjuna the teachings of the Bhagavad Gita, venerated by Hindus as the highest code of ethics.

Epigraphic evidence indicates that Haryana was part of the Maurya empire in the third century BCE, and that a string of empires controlled the city after, including rulers from the Kushan, the Gupta, and the Harsha empires. In 1192 the region became part of the Delhi sultanate and remained so until 1526, when the city was seized by Mughals. With the decline of the Mughal empire in the seventeenth century, the region was claimed alternately by the Marathas and the Sikhs, and the British East India Company took control in 1803. In 1858 the region became part of the new province of Punjab and began to be overshadowed by a shift of power to Lahore in the Sikh-dominated, northern area. Well before India's independence from the Britain and the subsequent partition of Pakistan, strong sentiment existed among the region's Hindu residents for a separate statehood, due to cultural and linguistic differences. Increasingly fierce and violent calls were made for Sikh independence, so that the creation of a new state in 1966 was widely welcomed by both sides.

The state occupies a fertile tract of river plain and is the "bread basket of the nation," with irrigation canals and modern crop technology producing nearly a quarter of India's wheat, along with millet, rice, corn, sugar cane, and cotton, and one-third of its milk and dairy foods. Machine tools, electrical goods, cement, paper, and bicycles are manufactured. Passing through Haryana are the Northern Railroad and the Grand Trunk Road, the most famous highway in India. Described by Rudyard Kipling in his novel *Kim*, it stretches 2,000 kilometers from Peshawar to Calcutta. Haryana has a network of forty-three tourist complexes named after birds. The state boasts several colleges, temples, and archaeological sites. Annual fairs and festivals preserve Hindu religious and cultural traditions.

C. Roger Davis

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HASINA WAJID, SHEIKH (b. 1947), Bangladesh prime minister. Sheikh Hasina Wajid, the elder daughter of former Bangladesh president and prime minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib) (1921–1975), was born 28 September 1947 at the family's home in Tungipara, Gopalganj district. She had been generally uninterested in politics and was absent from Bangladesh when Mujib and many of his family were assassinated on 15 August 1975. However, when political activity was fully revived following the 1979 parliamentary election in which her father's Awami League fared badly, the party was left without a strong and well-known leader. Hasina was called back to Bangladesh and assumed leadership of the party on 17 May 1981. She opposed the Hussain Muhammad Ershad (b. 1930) regime, and she participated in the 1986 election, leading the Awami League. Despite a strong rivalry with Khaleda Zia (b. 1945) of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Hasina joined hands with Zia in a movement that led to Ershad's fall in December 1990. Following the February 1991 election, the Awami League became the principal opposition, a position from which the party and Hasina harassed the BNP government. In June 1996, the Awami League, in coalition with Ershad's Jatiya Party, formed a government, and Hasina became prime minister. Ershad himself left the coalition, but a faction of the Jatiya Party remains in Hasina's government. The lack of cooperation between the government and the opposition since the restoration of parliamentary government has hindered political development in Bangladesh.

Craig Baxter


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HASSANAL BOLKIAH (b. 1946), Brunei ruler. Born on 15 July 1946, Hassanal Bolkiah Mu'izzaddin Waddaulah II had his early education in Brunei. On 14 July 1961, he became crown prince. He continued his studies in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, at the Gurney Road School and the Victoria Institution. He left for Britain in 1966 to enroll at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. He returned to Brunei in 1967, when he was installed as ruler.

Hassanal Bolkiah ascended the throne of Brunei Darussalam ("Brunei abode of peace") upon the sudden voluntary abdication of his father, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III (d. 1986). Concurrently sultan and Yang Di-



Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah addressing the United Nations Millennium Summit on 8 September 2000. (AFP/CORBIS)

Pertuan ("He Who Is Made Lord," supreme ruler) of the kingdom of Brunei, from 1984 onward he has held numerous posts, among them prime minister, minister of defense, and minister of finance. Since 1967 he has been head of the Islamic faith in Brunei. He is also inspector-general of the Royal Brunei Police, commander-in-chief of the Royal Brunei Armed Forces, and the chancellor of Universiti Brunei Darussalam.

Hassanal Bolkiah concluded two treaties with Britain, one in 1971 whereby Brunei became a self-governing kingdom with full internal sovereignty, another, the Anglo-Brunei Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (1979), that set forth a five-year schedule for full independence. A sovereign and independent Brunei came into being on 1 January 1984.

Keat Gin Ooi

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HASTINGS, WARREN (1732–1818), governor of Bengal and governor-general of British India. Born in Churchill, Oxfordshire, in England, Warren Hastings was the son of a clergyman who abandoned him at an early age. Hastings was educated by his uncle at the Westminster School in London, but his education was cut short by his uncle's death, and Hastings sailed for India in 1750 to become a "writer" (junior clerical employee) for the East India Company. Directly or indirectly, he played a role in the transition of the East India Company from a commercial to a political power in the third quarter of the eighteenth century.

In 1765 disputes forced Hastings to leave service, but he returned to Bengal as the chief administrator in 1771. The administration of Bengal was then awkwardly shared between the nominally sovereign nawab of Bengal, in charge of governance, and the East India Company, in control of the finances. Hastings moved to take control of governance and reformed the administration of justice and the fiscal system, serving as governor of Bengal from 1771 to 1773. His tenure was weakened by corruption and bitter rivalries. From 1774 until his return to England in 1784, Hastings served as governor general of British India, and was mainly occupied in trying to contain belligerent Indian regimes perceived to be dangerous to British power. His method of financing wars in India, by politely forcing his allies to pay, was the subject of an inquiry and a trial (1788–1795) in which he was honorably discharged. Aside from his controversial but critical political role, Hastings is significant for his curiosity about Indian traditions in literature and scholarship, which led the way to a flourish of European studies of these subjects.

Tirthankar Roy

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HATOYAMA ICHIRO (1883–1959), prime minister of Japan. Hatoyama Ichiro was born in Tokyo, the first son of Dr. Hatoyama Kazuo, a legal scholar, lawyer, and (later) leading politician, and Hatoyama Haruko, a pioneer in women's education. After graduating from Tokyo Imperial University in 1907, Ha-

toyama served in the Tokyo City Assembly and then in 1916 was elected to the Diet as a member of his late father's party, the Rikken Seiyukai (Friends of Constitutional Government). He was elected a total of fifteen times.

Hatoyama was a nationalist, dismissing liberal professors from Kyoto University when serving as education minister from 1931 to 1934, and writing in support of Hitler and Mussolini in a book published in late 1938 following a trip to Europe. After the war, Hatoyama formed the Liberal Party, heading it until his purge by Allied Occupation forces in early 1946. Allowed to return to politics in August 1951, Hatoyama succeeded Yoshida Shigeru as party president and then prime minister in late 1954. During his time as prime minister (1954–1956), Hatoyama restored diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and subsequently secured Japan's entry into the United Nations. Domestically, he brought the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party together in 1955 to form the Liberal Democratic Party in what become known as the "1955 System," which pitted the conservative Liberal Democratic Party against the leftist Socialist Party.

Robert Eldridge

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HATTA, MOHAMMAD (1902–1980), Indonesian nationalist leader and politician. Born in West Sumatra, Mohammad Hatta studied economics in the Netherlands, where he led the student group Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesian Association, or PI) from 1922. In 1927 he was tried in the Netherlands for sedition but was acquitted. His thinking was strongly influenced by socialism, but by 1931 Communists dominated the PI, and he was expelled. He returned to Indonesia in 1932 and led the PNI-Baru (the "New" Indonesian National Education), a nationalist party that aimed to build a large but unobtrusive cadre party. In 1934, however, he was exiled, first to Boven Digul in Dutch New Guinea, and then in 1936 to the Banda Island of Indonesia. In 1942 he reluctantly agreed to work with the Japanese occupation, and in August 1945 he became vice president of the independent Indonesian Republic.

Although the vice presidency had no power, Hatta became a rallying point for opposition to the left, and from January 1948 he led a nonparliamentary cabinet



Vice President Mohammad Hatta in 1949. (HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS)

that suppressed the Communist Party following its participation in an abortive revolt in the East Java town of Madiun in September–October 1948. He was a member of the Indonesian delegation that concluded negotiations with the Dutch for the formal transfer of sovereignty in December 1949. In the 1950s he again attracted those opposed to President Sukarno (1901–1970) and the left, but when he resigned as vice president in 1956, he was unable to marshal enough support to return to executive power.

Robert Cribb

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HAWKINS, WILLIAM (1560–1613), first Englishman to reach the court of the Mughal emperors. William Hawkins, thought by some to be related to the famous sea-faring family of Plymouth, commanded the British East India Company's ship *Hector*, which reached Surat on India's western coast on 24 August 1608. In his possession were gifts and a letter from King James I of England (1566–1625) to the Great Mughal of India, Jahangir (1569–1627). Hawkins survived several assassination plots by the Portuguese—who were already present in India—and journeyed overland to the court of Jahangir at Agra. Hawkins, who spoke fluent Turkish, soon became a favorite of the emperor, who granted him the title "Khan." Jahangir also granted Hawkins permission to set up an English factory (trading post) at Surat.

The Portuguese, feeling their interests in the region threatened by this, convinced Jahangir to reverse his decision allowing the English to trade in India. Unable to persuade Jahangir to change his mind, Hawkins left Agra for Surat in November 1611. He and his wife—an Armenian Christian whom Hawkins had married at Jahangir's insistence—sailed for England via Java on 26 January 1612. Hawkins died at sea on 20 May 1613. Although he was unsuccessful at opening India to English trade, he led the way for the English mercantile venture that eventually resulted in Britain's Indian empire.

Deryck O. Lodrick

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HAYASHI As a small ensemble typically consisting of a flutist and three drummers, the *bayashi* is the main source of music for Japanese festivals. The term refers to both the musical accompaniment and the ensemble itself. The flute is a simple bamboo pipe with six or seven holes. The *o-daiko*, large drum, has a convex wooden body and two tacked heads and may be set on a crate or tipped with one head toward the player who strikes it with two blunt sticks. The smaller *taiko* drums consist of two heads lashed together with rope and tightened by a second encircling rope, through which a stick is inserted to tip the drum toward the player. A fourth addition is the voice of the drummers used instrumentally at a rhythmical high-point. An occasional fifth component is a small brass gong, *atari-gane*, suspended or held in the hand. The music tends to be casual and somewhat repetitive, and its primary function is to spur on folk dances.

In Noh accompaniment, the *bayashi* ensemble consists of one flute and two or three drums—*taiko*, *ko-tsuzumi*, or *o-tsuzumi*—the latter two of which have two heads lashed together and resemble an hourglass. In Kabuki, a similar ensemble performs onstage together with singers and shamisen players, while another group provides additional music backstage.

James M. Vardaman, Jr.

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HAYASHI RAZAN (1583–1657), Japanese Neo-Confucian scholar. Hayashi Razan, known also as Doshun, was one of the foremost Japanese Neo-Confucian scholars and an influential adviser during the Edo period (1600/1603–1868) in Japan.

Hayashi was born in Kyoto and trained himself as a Buddhist priest during his childhood. Later he abandoned Buddhism and studied Confucianism, devoting himself to the doctrines of Zhu Xi (1130–1200). In 1605, he met Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543–1616), who served as the first shogun of the Edo period from 1603 to 1605, at Nijo Castle in Kyoto. The meeting became a vital encounter for both men, as well as the basis for changes in the Japanese social order.

Ieyasu's main concern was the restoration of peace and order to the war-ravaged society. In order to accomplish this, Ieyasu turned to China and Confucianism, particularly Hayashi's thoughts on Neo-Confucianism.

Hayashi introduced the Confucian stress on loyalty and obligations that provided a standard code of conduct with which the Edo shogunate could govern autonomous territories and still maintain social order. Furthermore, he emphasized that the understanding of things can be derived only from understanding the Confucian principle of *li* (universal natural law) operating behind them. This led to the development of an empirical science in Japan, a method of knowledge that stressed the observation and study of material and human things. In addition, he emphasized the study of history and inaugurated several centuries of great Japanese history writing. Supported by Ieyasu, many social changes based on the teaching of Zhu Xi, such as establishing prohibitions for samurai families, occurred in Japan.

Hayashi continued to serve as an adviser until the fourth shogun, Ietsuna (1651–1680). Because of his position in the government, Hayashi Razan established a dynasty of Neo-Confucian philosophers in the Edo court. He, his son, and then his grandson built the uniquely Edo version of Chinese Neo-Confucianism in Japan; the Hayashi family ultimately headed Daigaku-no-kami, the state university, until 1906.

Unryu Suganuma

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HAZARA The Hazaras, an isolated group of Shi'a Muslims who lived in the mountainous regions of central Afghanistan until political upheavals forced them to scatter, were once the second-largest, although least-known, ethnic group in the country. Many scholars believe that the Hazaras are descendants of the Mongol army of Genghis Khan (c. 1162–1227), which invaded this area of Afghanistan in the thirteenth century. According to other theories, the Hazaras' ancestors were Buddhist monks who lived in the city of Bamian in central Afghanistan, when it became a center of Buddhism some two thousand years ago, but this explanation ignores the fact that the Hazaras are now Shi'a Muslims. Their physical characteristics suggest a Mongol ancestry, yet their language, called Hazaragi, is a unique, archaic version of Persian, albeit with remnants of Mongolian vocabulary.



Hazara children stand in front of the alcove that housed a statue of Buddha destroyed by the Taliban government of Afghanistan. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

The Hazaras lived mainly as shepherders in the center of the Hindu Kush mountain range. In recent Afghan history, they have become an oppressed minority, partly because of their Shi'ite beliefs. Due to the lack of arable land in this harsh, mountainous region, as well as the recent political developments limiting their access to trade routes in the Hindu Kush, many moved to the cities to work as menial laborers to provide food for their families.

During the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the Hazaras suffered massive losses from starvation and massacres by the Taliban, who brutally slaughtered thousands of Hazaras in an attempt to eradicate Shi'a Muslim believers. Most Hazaras now live as refugees in Pakistan, India, China, and Mongolia.

Jennifer L. Nichols

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HEALTH AND ILLNESS. See **Acupuncture; Aging Population—Japan; AIDS—Asia; Fertility; Massage; Medicine, Ayurvedic; Medicine, Traditional—Central Asia; Medicine, Traditional—China; Medicine, Traditional—West Asia; Medicine, Unani; Moxibustion.**

HEBEI (2002 est. pop. 70.4 million). Hebei (Hopei, Hopeh) Province in northern China covers an area of 187,700 square kilometers, borders in the west on Shanxi, in the north on Inner Mongolia and Liaoning, in the east on the Bohai Gulf—part of the Yellow Sea—and Shandong, and to the south on Henan. The province surrounds the self-governed municipalities of Beijing (8,400 square kilometers) and its seaport, Tianjin (3,900 square kilometers). To the west, the Taihang mountain range, with peaks up to 2,870 meters above sea level, form a physical barrier between Hebei and Shanxi, and in the north the Yanshan range, rising to 1,500 meters, constitutes the traditional frontier between China and the nomads in the north. It is

here that the eastern extension of the Great Wall is located. Southern Hebei, covering an area of about 78,000 square kilometers, is part of the north China plain, most of which is lowland under 50 meters above sea level.

The province has a temperate continental monsoon climate. Winters are cold and dry, and in January temperatures may drop to -21°C in the north (a minimum of -42.9°C has been recorded). It is less cold in the south. The rainy season stretches from June through August, and temperatures in July average 18° to 27°C , but most regions have recorded temperatures over 40°C . The capital, Shijiazhuang (1.6 million, 1996), is situated in the southern lowlands, which is also where the majority of Hebei's 64.6 million (1996) people live.

Hebei is divided into 10 regions, 142 counties, and 2 autonomous counties between Beijing and Tianjin that are inhabited by the Hui Muslims, who are the largest minority group in the province. There also are Manchu and Mongolian people in the northeast, but the Han Chinese make up 98 percent of the population. Traces of agriculture date back to 4000 BCE, but the marshy lowlands of southern Hebei were first drained and settled during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), and for centuries this densely populated area was one of the most productive in the empire. During the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), the area declined as the Chang (Yangtze) River valley was developed. Hebei was incorporated into a number of foreign dynasties, the Liao (916–1125) and the Jin (1115–1234). Beijing became the capital of the Yuan empire (1279–1368), and with brief interruptions, Beijing has remained capital of China.

The economy of Hebei has for centuries been dependent on Beijing, and the intensive agriculture in the lowlands has supplied the capital with wheat, corn, vegetables, and fruit. Light industry is distributed over the province, with major textile centers in Shijiazhuang and Handan. In 1976 a major earthquake (7.8 on the Richter scale) devastated the city of Tangshan in eastern Hebei.

Bent Nielsen

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HEIAN PERIOD The Heian period (794–1185) started with the transfer of the capital from Nara to the new imperial city of Heian-kyo (Kyoto) and ended with the establishment of a warrior government in Kamakura. This period was the peak of Japanese aristocratic and court life, a time during which literature and the arts flourished.

The *Ritsuryo* System

The *ritsuryo* system, first established in the Nara period (710–794 CE), was modeled on the political and economic system of Tang-dynasty (618–907 CE) China, which was composed of both a centralized government dominated by the emperor and nationally controlled estates. Although various attempts were made to preserve and augment the system, the expansion of *sboen* (private landed estates) and their exemption from taxation encroached on public land and reduced the authority of the central government. The creation of extra-statutory officials, such as *sessho* (regent) and *kampaku* (chief councillor), opened the way to power for non-imperial families among the nobility.

From the mid-ninth century, members of the Fujiwara family dominated the court and controlled the imperial line as *sessho* or *kampaku* by marrying their daughters to imperial successors. The rise of the Fujiwara family proved the failure of the *ritsuryo* emperor-dominated political system. From the late ninth century to the first half of the tenth century, however, emperors controlled the court without the Fujiwara regents. Emperor Uda (867–931), having no connection to the Fujiwara family, singled out Sugawara Michizane (845–903) to balance Fujiwara authority. But in 901, a member of the Fujiwara family, envious of the influence of Michizane, deceptively reported that Michizane was plotting against the emperor. Michizane was exiled to Kyushu and died there two years later. Emperor Daigo (885–930), Uda's successor, also avoided Fujiwara influence.

The Aristocracy

In the tenth and eleventh centuries, the Fujiwara ruled the court by reestablishing the tradition of regents. The period from 967 to 1068 was called *sekkon seiji* (Fujiwara regency government). Emperors were born of Fujiwara mothers and were completely dominated by their uncles, fathers-in-law, or grandfathers. Their influence reached its peak under Fujiwara Michinaga (966–1028), who dominated the court from 995 to 1027. Michinaga's son Yorimichi, a high-ranking



The entrance to Phoenix Hall, Byodo-in Temple, Honshu, Japan. (ARCHIVO ICONOGRAFICO, S.A./CORBIS)



JAPAN—HISTORICAL PERIODS

Jomon period (14,500–300 BCE)
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 Heian period (794–1185)
 Kamakura period (Kamakura Shogunate)
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 Momoyama period (1573–1600)
 Tokugawa or Edo period (Tokugawa Shogunate)
 (1600/1603–1868)
 Meiji period (1868–1912)
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noble for three-quarters of a century, continued Fujiwara glory until the accession of emperor Go-Sanjo in 1068, when the Fujiwara declined and a succession of non-Fujiwara emperors came to power.

This period was characterized by the development of a truly Japanese culture in art and literature, after having absorbed Chinese values. The *kana* script, one of the most important inventions in Japanese cultural history, contributed to the creation of great quantities of verse and prose. Murasaki Shikibu's *Genji Monogatari* (*The Tale of Genji*, c. 1000), is not only a brilliant record of life among the aristocracy, but also a masterpiece of world literature. *Waka*, or Japanese poetry, was a crucial part of aristocratic daily life, and proficiency in making *waka* was regarded as essential for nobles. In religion, the secret sects of Tendai and Shingon Buddhism continued to flourish, but they lost their purely religious goals by connecting Buddhism to formalistic court rituals. Instead, the doctrines of the Jodo (Pure Land) sect, which emphasized simple faith in Amida Buddha, grew in popularity in the late Heian period. These doctrines offered consolation to the common people during the social disturbances that occurred in this period.

Age of *Insei*

The accession of Go-Sanjo, the first emperor in one hundred years whose mother was not of the Fujiwara regents' line, initiated the last part of the Heian period, which extended until the establishment of the Kamakura shogunate (military government) in 1185.

This last phase was dominated by three successively powerful retired emperors—Shirakawa, Toba, and Go-Sanjo—who replaced the reigning emperors of the earlier period and the regents of the mid-Heian period as the supreme political figures. It was a time of imperial revival.

Emperor Shirakawa (1053–1129) retired early, became a nominal Buddhist monk, and established *insei* (often translated as "cloistered government," because it was government by retired emperors who had taken the monk's tonsure) to rule behind the throne. His successors continued the system off and on until the late Kamakura period. *Shoen* continued to expand, with the imperial family under the active leadership of retired emperors replacing the Fujiwara as the largest *shoen* holders in the land. The imperial family developed a strong household organization that attracted a number of clients among the nobility, and the fortunes of the imperial house increased immensely.

During this time, however, the *ritsuryo* system almost faded away. In the absence of central authority in the provinces, powerful local individuals, banding together in *bushidan* (large military groups), caused confusion. Meanwhile, the Buddhist temples in the capital collected large armies and fought against one another, against the nobles, and against the court, for both economic and religious prizes. The general anarchy led many to believe that the world had entered *mappo* ("latter days of the law"), the final phase of human decline according to Buddhist doctrine.

With the outbreak of civil disturbances in 1156 and 1160, caused by conflicts over political power in both the imperial and the Fujiwara families involving two warrior clans, the Taira and the Minamoto, the military or warrior class became essential to the maintenance of civil government in the capital and indispensable to court politics. The warrior-noble Taira Kiyomori (1118–1181) maintained tenuous control over the court until 1185, but lost power eventually to the powerful Minamoto clan, which established the Kamakura *bakufu* and ushered in a new era in Japanese history.

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HEILONGJIANG (2002 est. pop. 38.3 million). Lying in the northernmost part of Northeast China, Heilongjiang Province has a total area of 453,900 square kilometers, of which 60 percent is made of mountains, 10 percent rivers, and 30 percent farmland. It has a common boundary with the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and Jilin Province. In the north, it borders on the Russian Federation. Within its population are 2 million people of minority nationalities, including Manchus, Koreans, Huis, Mongolians, Daur, Hezhens, Oroqens, and Evenkis.

Heilongjiang has a cold-temperate continental climate and a mean annual temperature of 3° to -2°C, an ice-bound period of five to six months, and a frost-free period of 120 days. It has warm, rainy summers with an annual rainfall of 400 to 650 millimeters and long hours of sunshine, which is favorable to crop growth.

Named after its longest river, Heilongjiang—the Black Dragon River—has five large river systems: the Heilong, Songhua, Wusuli, Nenjiang, and Suifen rivers. Rivers and lakes provide good-quality water resources for agriculture, industry, and human consumption. It has vast expanses of flatland and wide areas of fertile back soil and is one of China's major commodity grain growers. It is nicknamed "the Great Northern Granary," denoting its abundant production of soybeans, maize, wheat, millet, sorghum, sugar beets, flax, and sunflower seeds.

Its land area also includes the country's largest known oil reserve. The Daqing oil field is not only the biggest one in China, but it also is one of the largest known oil fields in the world. The province is rich in coal, gold, copper, aluminum, lead, zinc, silver, molybdenum, bismuth, and cobalt. Heilongjiang has a forest area of close to 210,000 square kilometers, or 49 percent of the province's total area, and leads the country in timber reserves. The mountains and forests abound in alpine weasels, sables, otters, deer, and musk deer. Ginseng is cultivated.

Rail is the principal means of transport in Heilongjiang, with Harbin as the central hub. Heilongjiang has the most developed inland shipping among the northern provinces.

Harbin, the provincial capital (with an estimated population of 2.8 million in 2002), is located on the south bank of the Songhua River and is the economic, cultural, and communications center of the province. The city used to be called "Little Moscow," as a result of colonialism, cooperation with, and immigration from nearby Russia. The town looks a little like the last threadbare outpost of imperial Russia. Harbin is also famous worldwide for its annual Winter Ice Festival.

Di Bai

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HEISEI PERIOD With the death of Emperor Hirohito (b. 1901) in January 1989, the Showa period, which had taken Japan from 1926 through the post-war recovery, came to an end. In its place came a new emperor, Akihito (b. 1933), and a new period, Heisei. Already the Heisei period has seen dramatic changes. The tremendous Heisei economic boom has taken a precipitous turn into lasting recession. Faltering financial institutions, crashes in land prices, and the erosion of the lifetime employment tradition have altered Japan's economic and social climate. International conflicts have thrust Japan onto the geopolitical stage, while domestic political changes have begun to rattle the established bureaucracy and disasters such as the great Kobe earthquake and the Tokyo subway sarin gas attack have further shaken the nation's nerves.

The Heisei Boom

The Heisei period started out with a boom, riding in on a period of economic prosperity that had begun in 1986 and would last until early 1991. Not since the Izanagi Boom (1965–1970) had the Japanese economy experienced such a long, uninterrupted period of economic expansion. Domestic consumer demand, helped by government monetary policy, boosted the economy. With the signing of the Plaza Accord in 1985, the Japanese government had pledged to encourage consumer demand, let the value of the yen better reflect the strength of the Japanese economy, and regulate against inflation. In 1986, the government had cut the official discount rate. By February of the next year, the rate had fallen to 2.5 percent, the lowest in the post-World War II period. Spurred by lowered



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interest rates, investors snapped up land and property and bought more durable goods and machinery. This economic momentum continued into the early years of the Heisei period.

A strengthened yen, likewise, brought more buying power to individuals and corporations looking to invest abroad. From a record low of 240 yen to the dollar in 1986, the yen strengthened steadily to 130 yen to the dollar just two years later. By 1991, the last of the boom years, the yen stood at around 140. The yen went to 99 to the dollar in January of 1995, reaching 84 to the dollar in June 1995 and continuing to hold below 100 until September. The strengthened yen did little to curb Japan's export competitiveness abroad, as manufacturers could import raw materials at lower costs. A strengthened yen also helped government efforts to curb Japan's wide trade deficits and the associated "Japan bashing" that had arisen with trading partners abroad, particularly the United States.

During the same period, land prices soared as more and more investors turned their capital to real property. Prices nationwide, but particularly in Japan's largest cities (Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, and Nagoya), rose to a peak in 1990. Golf course development, along with other resort development initiatives, also gained steadily during the wealthy years of the Heisei boom. Concurrently, golf course memberships themselves were looked to as indicators of the economy's health. A golf membership fees index tracked the exorbitant prices that Japan's corporate wealthy were willing to pay for the privilege of belonging to and networking

at the nation's most prestigious golf courses. When Japanese investors bought the famed Pebble Beach Golf Course in California (along with a host of other high-publicity real estate purchases such as Carnegie Hall and Columbia Pictures movie studio), business professionals worldwide began to study the Japanese "economic miracle." Indeed, with Japan's gross domestic product (GDP) averaging about 4.5 percent growth, including a peak of over 6 percent growth in 1989, and unemployment rates at an all-time low, it looked as though the Japanese economy would increasingly dominate the twenty-first century.

Recession

However, as heady as the late 1980s and early 1990s were for many, there were signs that Japan's rising economy was, in fact, an overinflating bubble, filled with emptiness and ready to burst. By the middle part of the 1990s, it had. The overheated land prices with which the bubble had been inflated dropped precipitously. Corporations and financial institutions that had overextended themselves, often on risky investments and real estate ventures, found that they could not repay their loans or collect from bankrupt creditors. In August 1995, Hyogo Bank, the nation's thirty-eighth largest, and Kizu, the nation's largest credit union, shut their doors. Larger banks were to follow: in November two years later, Sanyo Securities, Yamaichi Securities, and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank announced financial collapse.

During the same period, eight of the country's mortgage lending companies (*jusen*) revealed 6 trillion yen (\$67.5 billion) of debt caused mainly by investments in high-priced real estate that had since lost value. When the Ministry of Finance (MOF) stepped in to prop up bad *jusen* loans, more controversy ensued. Historically reluctant to give out money, the MOF spent 685 billion yen (\$6.52 billion) of taxpayer money to recover investor losses. When rumors circulated of poor investment practices by *jusen* managers (a number of whom were retired MOF bureaucrats) and possible underworld involvement, the public labeled the incident the *jusen* scandal. Confidence in the Ministry of Finance declined, and greater public cries for transparency in financial institutions ensued. Further turmoil erupted when agricultural cooperative credit unions that had also extended real estate investment loans experienced similar troubles and demanded similar government bailouts.

To relieve the fears of depositors, in 1996 the national government committed itself to unlimited guarantees on all deposits at failed banks. Some critics,

however, complained that the government was not prompting bankers to change faulty policies rapidly enough. So-called Big Bang measures to bring more transparency, oversight, and accountability to financial bureaucracies were also introduced in 1996 and have been instituted with varying degrees of success.

In addition to propping up failing institutions, the government continued past policies aimed at priming the economy through government-funded development projects. Giving money to transportation infrastructure and resort and rural development projects, the government hoped to promote work throughout the country. However, although the construction industry flourished and the economy had made signs of recovery with GDP growth at slightly over 4 percent in 1996, by 1997 the GDP had once again begun to fall. By the following year, the GDP had slipped into negative numbers, and although slight growth rates were recorded in the following years, recession continued.

Not only company accounts suffered. Workers who once assumed lifetime employment and company-subsidized benefits found their jobs less secure. Companies began to trim excess workers from their payrolls, creating thousands of new jobless. Japan's jobless rate reached a record 6 percent in October 2001. In conjunction, the rate of homelessness has also risen.

The Asian Economic Crisis

The strength of the Japanese yen in the beginning of the Heisei period had prompted investment in neighboring nations. When the economic bubble burst, however, many companies began to restrict cash flow to overseas holdings and to withdraw capital from overseas banks. As regional currencies lost value, Asian banks struggled to meet dollar-denominated foreign debts. Japan's economic crisis directly contributed to economic crises in Southeast Asia and Korea at the end of the 1990s (particularly in 1997 and 1998, when various Asian nations struggled with plummeting currency values and bank failures).

In turn, Asia's poor economic performance has hindered Japan's recovery. In the late 1990s, nearly 38 percent of Japan's exports were aimed at Southeast Asia, but devastated currency values stopped many Southeast Asian consumers from buying higher-priced Japanese exports. Although the region has rebounded, economic performance is not yet what it was in the boom years of the "Asian Miracles."

Political Changes

Great changes have also taken place in Japan's political arena during the Heisei period. For the first time

in thirty-eight years, the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was knocked out of power in 1993 and joined a coalition government with various opposition parties. Although the LDP regained power the next year, significant political restructuring has followed.

Most sweeping has been electoral reform. In a large-scale effort at demographically based redistricting not seen since the end of World War II, Japan created three hundred new electoral districts. The newly drawn districts were designed to alleviate disparities between rural and urban voting power that disproportionately favored rural districts. Under the new system, the Lower House membership consisted of three hundred single-seat constituencies and two hundred proportionate seat constituencies elected from eleven regional districts (in proportionate seat elections, voters vote for a party slate whose members then proportionately fill the number of seats allotted to their party). The number of proportionate seats was reduced to 180 in 2000.

Although political reform was aimed at creating a two-party adversarial system similar to that in the United States, the LDP, along with its coalition partners, has continued to dominate national politics. In the summer 2001 election, for instance, the LDP, helped by the wave of popularity surrounding Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, won the national election handily and was able to continue its rule along with its New Komeito and New Conservative coalition parties. Moreover, the new electoral system has not kept smaller parties from entering into the political process. In fact, over thirty new political parties have been created since 1994, and more voters are describing themselves as independent. Similarly, redistricting has not alleviated rural-urban voting disparities and differences. Although rural support for the LDP has lessened somewhat (from what was once an assured support for the LDP's generally protectionist policies toward farmers and small business owners), rural districts still vote primarily for the LDP and its allies.

Peace and Conflict Abroad

Political challenges have not happened only on the domestic front, however. During the Heisei period, the bounds of Japan's postwar constitution have come under international scrutiny. Article 9, the constitutional "peace clause" that forbids Japan's involvement in acts of foreign aggression, has been overwhelmingly popular with the Japanese public. International allies, however, severely criticized Japan for not promptly sending more support during the 1991 Gulf War. A

belated \$13 billion in monetary support did little to bolster Japan's image as an international player.

To maintain better diplomatic ties with the United States and European allies, Japan committed financial aid and elections observers in support of U.N. efforts in the Bosnia-Herzegovina region in 1996. Following East Timor's independence in 1999, Japan contributed similar forms of aid and development personnel to peacekeeping and reconstruction projects.

More recently, after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, Japan took its largest steps yet into the arena of international conflict. Pushing to the limits of Article 9 and banking on his great popularity, Prime Minister Koizumi pledged not only money, but also noncombatant support troops from Japan's Self-Defense Force (SDF) to war and rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan. SDF personnel would be able to provide medical aid, intelligence-gathering support, and refugee relief in the Afghan and Middle East region. The move is significant and controversial because it sent SDF troops to an area of active conflict.

Agriculture

Debates on agricultural markets have also continued throughout the Heisei period, with intense controversy over the extent to which Japan should open its markets to foreign produce. At issue are questions of price, selection, health, rural economics, and food security.

Through quotas, tariffs, and rigid quarantines, Japan managed to buffer its small farmers from the brunt of international competition for decades. With small farm sizes (on average, 1 to 1.5 hectares), high operating costs, and an aging farm population, Japan's farmers have long feared unchecked imports and unsubsidized farming. However, as electoral politics began to shift and as more farmers began to retire, popular support for large farm subsidies began to decline. Price supports for rice fell, and more and more imported goods began to find their way into Japanese markets.

With the signing of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in September 1993, Japan agreed to limited imports of its most symbolic and most protected grain: rice. The agreement was a shock to rice farmers, who had suffered poor harvests in 1993 but had recovered with bumper crops by 1994. Angry farmers publicly derided the quality of imported rice, feeding it to their livestock on national television. However, the agreement

stood, committing Japan to yearly increases in rice imports.

Besides rice, Japan has been increasingly importing other food products from abroad, including apples and various vegetables, as well as meat and preprocessed products. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is possibly China that causes the most concern. Controversy has already raged over the import of Chinese leeks, garlic, ginger, mushrooms, and reed matting (tatami).

Proponents of continued agricultural protections point to the likelihood of exacerbated economic disparities between rural and urban regions if Japan's small farms go under. Japan must also consider issues of food self-sufficiency and national security. At present, Japan has the lowest food self-sufficiency ratio in the industrialized world, with only 40 percent of average caloric intake provided from domestic sources.

Shocks

Two particularly infamous events will forever mark the Heisei period. On 17 January 1995, an earthquake measured at 7.2 on the Richter scale rocked the city of Kobe in the early morning, killing 6,425 people. Fires raged around the city, highways and buildings lay toppled, and rescue teams had a difficult time reaching the wounded. In addition to the horrific human costs, the Kobe earthquake was Japan's costliest in economic terms. The earthquake also toppled the nation's feeling of security because many "earthquake-proof" structures crumbled.

Although all Japanese know that their land will shake, most had assumed that they remained relatively safe from crime and domestic terrorism. That peace, as well, was shattered a few months after the Kobe earthquake when, on 20 March 1995, members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult released sarin gas inside a Tokyo subway. The attack killed twelve and injured six thousand. Communities and law enforcement moved to squelch the cult, and membership is reportedly down from the ten thousand members it had acquired by 1995. The cult's leader, Asahara Shoko (b. 1955), has been jailed. The subway attack, however, painfully revealed Japan's vulnerability. It also revealed an alienated segment of Japanese society that some scholars say grew in number after the economic bubble collapsed.

What Will Come Next?

In December 2001, the nation celebrated the birth of Imperial Princess Aiko, the daughter of Crown

Prince Naruhito and Princess Masako. Many hope that the imperial family will revise current rules that permit only male heirs to take the throne. The idea of reform in imperial succession in the years to come cheers many in the current era of dim economics and uncertain international politics.

The Heisei period has already seen significant changes and challenges. The outcome of the period remains to be seen, but the events of its first years have already made a lasting imprint on Japan's modern history.

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HENAN (2002 est. pop. 100.8 million). Located in north-central China, Henan Province covers an area of 167,000 square kilometers and is bordered by Hebei, Shandong, and Shanxi Provinces. Today, Henan has a population of 92 million; its capital is Zhengzhou. Located on the North China Plain and with its close proximity to the Huang (Yellow) River, Henan Province has had a long history of flooding. For thousands of years, the Chinese have built dams and dikes here in an effort to stem the devastating effects of these yearly floods. Yet the floods have also deposited large quantities of rich silt, leaving Henan one of China's most fertile regions. The temperature is hot in the summer and cold in the winter, and annual rainfall averages 1,250 to 1,750 millimeters.

The province, known as the cradle of Chinese civilization, is one of the oldest inhabited regions of China. Archeologists have found evidence that Henan was inhabited as far back as the Neolithic period. Recent excavations have unearthed artifacts dating back to the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE). Several cities in Henan have served prominently in Chinese history. Anyang, located in northern Henan, was the first capital of the Shang dynasty, while Luoyang served as imperial capital of the Eastern Zhou dynasty (770–221 BCE), and Kaifeng was the imperial capital during the Five Dynasties period (907–960 CE) as well as the Northern Song dynasty (960–1126 CE).

The province is known as a major producer of wheat, tobacco, and cotton. Textile, electricity, and other industries developed recently. The provincial capital, Zhengzhou, located at the crossroad of several major railroad lines that transverse China, is one of the key points of China's national transportation system.

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HENG SAMRIN (b. 1934), president of the People's Republic of Kampuchea. Heng Samrin, president of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) from 1979 to 1991, was born in Kompong Cham Province in 1934. He became involved in Communist activity in the 1950s and later rose to become a Khmer Rouge division commander in the Eastern Zone. He fled to Vietnam with Hun Sen and others during the Khmer Rouge purges of 1978. On 3 December 1978 Radio Hanoi announced the formation of a united front of the National Salvation of Kampuchea under the leadership of Heng Samrin. Weeks later Vietnamese forces entered Phnom Penh, defeated the Khmer Rouge, and began their occupation of the country. On 10 January 1979 they formed the PRK and named Heng Samrin president. The PRK government was formed from the top down by recruiting those who both strongly opposed the return of the Khmer Rouge and were willing to work within the Vietnamese political structure. The Heng Samrin government was never widely recognized as the legitimate government of Cambodia. It was not seated at the United Nations, was refused

U.N. aid, and was boycotted by the United States. In the mid 1980s, power moved to Hun Sen, who became prime minister in 1985. Heng Samrin remained head of state until Sihanouk returned in 1991. Following the election of 1998, he became first vice chairman of the National Assembly.

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HENGDUAN RANGES The Hengduan region in northwest Yunnan Province in China, extending into neighboring Tibet and Sichuan, is China's longest and widest mountain system. The area is transversed by several big rivers running from north to south: the Nu, Lancang, Yalon, and Jinsha. The river valleys are 1,500 to 2,000 meters above sea level, while peaks in the southern part reach 4,124 meters (Tiancang); Guangmao in the eastern part reaches 4,023 meters. The peaks stand close together, and the area is almost without plateaus and broad valleys. There is a relative high annual precipitation, up to 2,500 millimeters on the western slopes of the mountains while the eastern slopes receive markedly less rain, about 900 millimeters annually. The region is sparsely populated. Most inhabitants belong to minority nationalities like the Yi, Lisu, Bai, and Tibetans, and the majority of the region is divided into autonomous districts. The main city of the area is windswept Xiaguan, situated at the southern end of Lake Erhai. Main sources of income are forestry, cattle, and sheep. Since tea plants were introduced in the nineteenth century, the region has become a major tea producer. The area is also one of China's important nonferrous metal industrial bases.

Bent Nielsen

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HENTII MOUNTAINS Located in northeast Mongolia, the Hentii (Khentii) range consists of

smooth, rounded mountains covered by large stretches of well-watered virgin forest. The range lacks the high mountaintop relief that one observes, for example, in the Rockies of North America. The highest point is located at Asralt Hairhan (2,751 meters above sea level).

The Hentii mountain range is one of the wettest regions in Mongolia, with a total annual precipitation of 250 to 300 millimeters at altitudes higher than 1,000 meters. Water collects in the range's glacial lakes or drains into one of two oceanic basins—the Pacific Basin via the Herlen and Haraa Rivers, and the Arctic Basin, via the Tuul, the Yoroo, and the Onon, a tributary of the Amur River.

Mountain forest, or taiga, covers a large portion of the lower Hentii range. Cedar and cedar-larch are the most commonly found tree species in the taiga-dominated areas. At higher elevations, low-lying shrubs and rocky outcroppings predominate. A variety of animals make the mountains their home. These include lemmings, sable, glutton (wolverine), northern pika, musk deer, elk, bear, Manchurian deer, and the Hentii mountain stout.

Daniel Hruschka

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HERAT (2002 est. pop. of province 1.3 million; 2002 est. pop. of city 167,000). An important historical, commercial, and cultural center in Central Asia, Herat (ancient Aria) is a city on the Hari River in northwest Afghanistan and the capital of Herat Province. Herat played an important role in the military and cultural history of the Central Asian region due to its strategic location on the Silk Road from China and Central Asia to Western Asia and Europe. According to historical records, a large settlement in this area had existed at least since the fifth century BCE; Herat Province may be the ancient homeland of Aryan-speaking people, and Aria was a satrapy of the Persian empire (sixth–fourth centuries BCE). Alexander of Macedon (356–323 BCE) destroyed the Persian citadel and the city around 328 BCE, during his conquest of the Persians. Nonetheless, the city was rebuilt and continued to serve the flourishing trade on the Silk Road, surviving turmoil and frequent wars.

In the eleventh century, Herat was captured by the Seljuks, and in the twelfth century, it was taken over

by the powerful Khwarizm empire centered on the valley of the Amu Dar'ya River. In the thirteenth century, Herat was destroyed by Mongols led by Genghis Khan (c. 1162–1227), who ordered the slaughter of all 80,000 citizens of the city, yet it was rebuilt again. In 1381, Timur (Tamerlane, 1336–1405) conquered the city, but his son, Shah Rokh (1377–1447), rebuilt Herat and made it his capital and an intellectual and cultural center. During this time, Herat was famous for its poets, painters of miniatures, and architecture.

From the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, Herat was fought over by various regional powers, and only in 1863 did Abdorrahman Khan (c. 1844–1901), the Afghan ruler, finally integrate it into Afghanistan with British support. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, the city experienced decay due to political turmoil, the Soviet occupation in 1980, and civil war. Presently it remains a commercial center that relies on agriculture and small-scale manufacturing, including food processing and textile and carpet manufacturing.

Rafis Abazov

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HIGASHIKUNI NARUHIKO (1887–1990), prime minister of Japan. Higashikuni Naruhiko was Japan's first prime minister following its surrender to the U.S. on 15 August 1945; he served from 17 August to 9 October 1945. An uncle to Emperor Hirohito by marriage (Higashikuni's wife, Toshiko, was the ninth and youngest daughter of the Meiji emperor), Higashikuni acted in the role of caretaker prime minister to peacefully turn over control of Japan to the Allied Occupation armies.

Higashikuni was born in Kyoto in 1887. As a member of the nobility, following the custom of the times, he entered the attached Primary School of the Imperial Army, followed by Officers' School and Army College. After graduation, Higashikuni married and in 1920 went to France to study, staying for seven years. While in France, Higashikuni developed affection for

Impressionist art and had a wide circle of friends, including Claude Monet and Georges Clemenceau. Through these acquaintances, Higashikuni learned about Western social and political thought and developed a reputation as a liberalist among the nobility.

Upon his return to Japan, Higashikuni rose to the rank of field marshal. After the fall of the Konoe Fumimaro cabinet in October 1941, he was recommended to become prime minister in the belief that he could prevent the march toward war, but Army Minister Tojo Hideki took the post instead. In August 1945, Higashikuni became prime minister; his main tasks were preparing for the official surrender and the start of the Allied Occupation. In October of that same year, Higashikuni and his Cabinet resigned due to policy differences with the Occupation authorities. In 1950, Higashikuni formed his own religious sect, Higashikunikyo. In 1990, one year after the death of Emperor Hirohito, he died at the age of 103.

Robert Eldridge

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HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY Asian development strategies typically have three stages. Initially, low-cost labor attracts labor-intensive and low value-added assembly businesses. Second, countries attempt to increase value-added capabilities to sustain economic development as wage rates rise. Finally, successful development requires that local firms expand operations into the global marketplace. Industry growth requires competitive economies of scale, which means that firms must obtain global market shares. Long-term leadership requires brand names to ensure global brand recognition and acceptance.

Electronics' Low-Cost Imperative

Less-developed countries such as China, India, and many Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries with low-cost labor attract companies with labor-intensive operations. In the 1970s and 1980s South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia benefited from such foreign direct investments; they are now newly industrialized economies (NIE). Unfortunately, per capita incomes have increased to only \$11,100 for Malaysia but to \$26,800 for Hong Kong. (See Table 1.) To stay competitive, NIE firms are moving operations to

TABLE 1

Comparative economic statistics					
	Malaysia	Hong Kong	Singapore	South Korea	Taiwan
GDP per capita	\$11,100.00	\$26,800.00	\$24,600.00	\$13,700.00	\$14,200.00

SOURCE: AsiaSource (2001).

less-developed countries (LDCs) such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and China. China received nearly 80 percent of all foreign investments in Asia.

Hong Kong's Shift to Mainland China Hong Kong's wages are among the highest in Asia. Between 1982 and 1994, Hong Kong's manufacturing firms lost cost competitiveness and moved labor-intensive operations to China; Hong Kong's industrial base declined nearly 10 percent annually between 1988 and 1991.

Hong Kong now lacks technical competitiveness with mainland China as well as with other NIEs, including South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Mainland China's successful attraction of leading-edge electronics firms has usurped Hong Kong's role in technology transfer. Today Hong Kong struggles to find a new competitive strategy that fits its high labor costs. Hong Kong continues to provide China with logistics support and capital, but these roles will be diminished as China builds its own capital markets, deregulates markets, and builds its infrastructure. However, in 2000 Hong Kong's gross domestic product (GDP) increased by 10.5 percent, the highest growth rate in thirteen years.

Taiwan's Search for Lower-Cost Labor Taiwan also found its competitiveness dwindling in labor-intensive businesses. To address the problems of increasing wage rates, the Taiwanese government allowed firms to import foreign workers for up to two years. Twenty-five percent of Taiwan's manufacturing workforce was foreign by 1996; the majority were well-educated and hard-working Filipinos.

Taiwanese firms also sent labor-intensive operations to countries like the Philippines, Vietnam, and China. (See Table 2.) Companies producing products such as power supplies, keyboards, and computer mice had been moved offshore by the late 1990s. Trade, investment, and travel restrictions between Taiwan and mainland China were rapidly lifted as Taiwan became the largest investor in China.

Singapore's Off-Shore Industrial Parks Singapore became a corporate headquarters center, with the

strategy of helping firms stay competitive by means of labor-intensive operations. Both domestic and foreign companies were encouraged to minimize overall costs by maintaining management and research functions in Singapore while shifting production and marketing operations to less-developed economies. Singapore created the first economic-development triangle in Southeast Asia in 1989. The Indonesian province of Riau and the Malaysian state of Johor supplied low-cost land and labor, while Singapore provided technology and capital. Singapore has built high-tech industrial parks in China, Vietnam, and India. The China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (CS-SIP), initiated in 1995, provided revenue of 1.63 billion yuan (\$196 million) to China in 2000, with an import and export value of \$3.4 billion.

Singapore's Vietnam Industrial Park was launched near Ho Chi Minh City in 1996. The International Tech Park in Bangalore, India, was officially opened in January 2000, with 150 infotech companies and 5,000 computer specialists. By 1999 India's software industry had reached revenues of \$3.9 billion and was projected to reach \$50 billion by 2008. In 1999 India had more than 160,000 programmers.

China's Mastery of Industrial Parks China has five special economic zones (SEZs), which are in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, Shantou, and Hainan. Across the border from Hong Kong, Shenzhen has 1,500 factories producing computer components. Thirty-six of the world's top-500 companies and 150 large multinationals have set up high-tech businesses in the city. Shenzhen bested larger Chinese cities in revenue from the high-tech sector, turning out high-tech products worth nearly \$10 billion.

The "Torch Program," established in 1988, promotes commercialization, industrialization, and the internationalization of China's high-tech achievements. By 1995 the central government had approved fifty-two high-technology development zones, which integrate research institutions like universities with start-up incubator facilities and firms that are committed to using the technologies. Six high-tech devel-

TABLE 2

Countries with low labor costs					
	China	India	Indonesia	Philippines	Vietnam
Population	1,236,914,658	984,003,683	212,941,810	77,725,862	76,236,259
GDP per capita	\$3,460.00	\$1,600.00	\$4,600.00	\$3,200.00	\$1,700.00

SOURCE: AsiaSource (2001).

opment zones have been established in the cities of Shanghai, Najing, Wuxi, Changzhou, Suzhou, and Hanzhou.

The Beijing Zhongguancun Science and Technology Park was the first science and technology industrial park in China, approved by the State Council in May 1988. In June 1999 the central government approved a ten-year construction plan for this park, now called China's "Silicon Valley" because it houses more than 4,000 high-tech enterprises. It is near Tsinghua University and Beijing University—the two leading seats of learning in China—and the Chinese Academy of Sciences.

The Chang (Yangtze) River Delta is one of China's economic powerhouses. One of the high-tech development zones in the area is Shanghai's Caohejing High-Tech Development Zone. It is six square kilometers in size, with 500 companies, of which 150 are funded from overseas. Major multinationals, including AT&T, General Electric Company, 3M, ICI, Philips, Toshiba, and DuPont, have subsidiaries there. High-tech firms in the zone are in microelectronics, bio-engineering, new materials, automation, aviation, and space technology.

The Shanghai Pudong Jinqiao Export Processing Zone is nineteen square kilometers in size and is located in the middle of the Pudong New Area. Pudong attracted \$6.13 billion of overseas investment for 661 projects in 2000 alone and accounted for \$20 billion in foreign trade. In microelectronics Pudong projects added ten production lines of integrated circuit chips and more than one hundred ventures for chip design, production, testing, and assembling.

The government plans to create about twenty industrial zones in inland regions during the next five-year plan, with more than 60 percent of resources earmarked for investment in western China to ease the tensions arising from economic disparity. The plan is to shift more capital-intensive industries into coastal areas as labor-intensive industries move inland.

Upgrading Electronics Technologies

Asian NIEs are upgrading their technologies. Strategies include developing government research institutes, targeting growth industries, and building technologies and components needed for next-generation products.

Building Research Centers Government-supported research institutes (GRIs) "prime the pump" for technology development. They focus on basic problems relating to technology development and transfer. Through the 1970s Korean GRIs carried out high-risk research in low-profit areas and in areas where universities lacked research capabilities. Private research focused on the imitation of foreign products and the licensing of foreign technology. Between 1982 and 1989 the number of private Korean industrial research institutes increased from 46 to 749 through the government's cooperative research and development (R & D) programs. By 1992 the number was 1,435 as a result of government support and tax incentives.

Singapore established the National Science and Technology Board (NSTB) in 1991 to promote R & D. NSTB initiated five programs for (1) partnering with industry; (2) recruiting and training of R & D personnel; (3) establishing and maintaining national research institutes and centers; (4) providing R & D infrastructure; and (5) building international alliances and cooperative agreements. Its GRIs encourage development in microelectronics, wireless communication, data storage, manufacturing technology, information technology and multimedia technology, neural networks, and artificial intelligence.

Taiwan has similar institutes. In electronics the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) has been the dominant player, with more than 6,000 engineers.

Building the Microelectronics Infrastructure The government of Taiwan has targeted electronics as a growth industry requiring component and product developments. Integrated circuits (IC) fabrication, IC

TABLE 3

Taiwan IC industry growth			
(in millions of dollars)			
	2000	1999	00/99 Growth rate
Industry revenue	16,480	12,512	31.7%
Design	2,660	1,973	34.8%
Fabrication	10,609	1,973	33.3%
Foundry	6,322	4,525	39.7%
Packaging	2,474	1,995	24.0%
Domestic-owned packaging	2,103	1,707	23.2%
Testing	736	585	25.9%
Product revenue	6,947	5,407	28.5%

SOURCE: Industrial Technology Information Services (2001)

module packaging, printed wire board assembly, liquid crystal (LC) module assembly, and final systems assembly were considered the critical capabilities. Each component and technology was systematically targeted for development. By 2000 the electronic-components industry reached revenues of more than \$16 billion. (See Table 3.) IC fabrication approached \$11 billion in revenues, and IC packaging was projected at nearly \$2.5 billion.

Taiwan's share of global IC capacity grew from 11.9 percent in 1999 to 13.4 percent in 2000. The first IC fabrication facility was established in 1979, and Taiwan had forty such facilities by 2001. The four leading firms had twenty-five facilities with eight-inch wafer production and had announced plans to build advanced twelve-inch fabs. In IC fabrication, wafers are the silicon disks that are used for water fabs. The

largest firm, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC), had revenues of \$5.3 billion, with net income of more than \$2 billion in 2000.

Building Essential Components and Products Taiwan continues to be a one-stop shop for electronic products and components and has led the world in information-technology production in fourteen product categories. (See Table 4.) Taiwan held 49 percent of the world market share in notebook computers, surpassing Japan's 40-percent share in 1999, with \$10.2 billion in sales, a trend that continues today. Other figures are equally impressive, with Taiwan holding more than 50 percent of the market share in computer monitors, motherboards, keyboards, scanners, video cards, and power supplies. Taiwanese firms have become original design manufacturers that sell "ready-to-go" products to original equipment manufacturers. With growing strength in product design and new product development, Taiwanese companies have continued to strengthen their global market position.

China's IC Industry According to the Ministry of Information Industry, the output value of China's electronics industry was expected to reach \$110 billion in 2000. China's electronic equipment production is expected to continue growing at a compounded annual rate of 16.8 percent to 2003, when it will reach about \$100 billion. China's \$7 billion semiconductor market has been growing annually at an average of 37 percent since 1992. Table 5 shows the breakdown between demand for metal oxide semiconductor (MOS) memory and logic ICs and analog devices. With only 10 percent of those chips made locally, the government had recruited foreign investment to establish IC facilities

TABLE 4

1999 Sales of Taiwan's major information-technology (IT) hardware products					
(Value in millions of dollars; volume in thousands of units or thousand of cards)					
Ranking	Product	Value	Value growth	Volume	Volume growth
1	Notebook PC	10,198	21.1%	9,355	53.7%
2	Monitor	9,330	24.0%	58,729	17.7%
3	Desktop PC	7,188	11.2%	19,457	35.7%
4	Motherboard	4,854	12.6%	64,378	21.0%
5	SPS	1,744	16.4%	80,221	36.6%
6	CD/DVD	1,740	25.4%	48,690	58.8%
7	Case	1,423	18.4%	75,768	22.3%
8	Scanner	925	13.1%	21,901	43.7%
9	Graphics card	848	44.3%	18,583	7.0%
10	Keyboard	512	2.8%	79,445	31.3%
11	UPS	370	15.6%	3,008	27.3%
12	Mouse	155	-9.0%	68,160	19.8%
13	Sound card	78	-41.4%	8,481	-39.7%
14	Video card	33	-17.0%	1,102	49.3%

SOURCE: Industrial Technology Information Services (2001).

TABLE 5

China semiconductor consumption*				
(in millions of dollars)				
	1998	1999	2000	CAGR
MOS memory IC	1,504	2,136	3,033	42%
MOS logic IC	1,180	1,651	2,312	40%
Analog devices	1,796	2,388	3,177	33%

*Not including Hong Kong

SOURCE: Wilson (1999).

to supply the local market. China produces less than 1 percent of the world's ICs, and the Chinese government added favorable policies to support the development of the microelectronics industry. Such overseas giants as Motorola, NEC, Philips, Siemens, and Toshiba are transferring technology, building wafer fabs, and forming joint ventures with Chinese partners. The Shanghai Grace Semiconductor Manufacturing Company plans a \$1.63 billion facility in Zhangjiang High-Tech Park, Pudong New Area, in Shanghai.

China's leading-edge semiconductor facility was NEC Corporation's \$1.2 billion fab, a joint venture with the Shanghai Hua Hong Group known as the government's "Project 909." Hua Hong invested \$250 million, a sum matched by Shanghai's local government. NEC put up \$200 million, and a Japanese bank and some Chinese banks will lend the remaining \$500 million. Although NEC is a minority equity partner, it keeps management control of the fab. NEC has been running a small Beijing foundry that has had modest success in the low-end market, producing 8,000 six-inch wafers per month at the 0.5-micron level.

Building Globally Competitive Brands

To sustain developing world-class technologies and products, firms must invest heavily in R & D. To support the high cost of R & D, a firm must expand sales beyond its home market, building global market recognition and brand names. Successful global competitors create a national dilemma in which global competitiveness requirements supersede national priorities. This becomes especially difficult in countries where industrial development policies are closely tied to company success.

Of the leaders outside Japan, Korean conglomerates (called *chaebol*) like Samsung, LG Goldstar, and Daewoo have built global brand names. By 2000 Tai-

wanese electronics firms had surpassed some of the leading Korean firms. (See Table 6.)

Promoting Local Enterprises Singapore's Economic Development Board has supported local enterprises with strong core capabilities, clear vision, and high growth potential—enterprises that could become multinational companies with strong brand names. Success stories include Aztech Technology, which has had the leading share of the world's sound card market. Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing (SCM) and IPC Corporation have established international market niches in ICs. SCM, Singapore's largest government-backed semiconductor foundry, has produced application-specific integrated circuits.

China's State-Owned Enterprises With deregulation and opening markets, China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) must become profitable and competitive. China has 305,000 state enterprises, 118,000 of which are industrial. World Bank statistics report that 50 percent of SOEs lost money in 1996 and that debt ratios reached 80 to 90 percent of assets. More than half of the SOEs were operating in the red in 1999. The government encouraged restructuring of SOE debts into equity holdings of banks and government. In 1996 three hundred Chinese firms were targeted to go global, becoming joint-stock companies with improved technological capabilities. The most likely candidates are firms that hold strong national brands. Some Chinese brands have moved into the international market on the back of competitive pricing, while Haier, one of China's leading home-appliance producers, has competed on product quality and efficient distribution and after-sales service. SOEs have improved management practices, acquired advanced technologies, entered joint ventures and strategic alliances, and commercialized research. To upgrade and modernize state-owned enterprises, China has reduced barriers to foreign venture with them.

TABLE 6

Leading Asian electronics firms			
Rank 2000	Rank 1998	Company	Country
5	14	Taiwan Semiconductor	Taiwan
6	53	Samsung Electronics	South Korea
7	29	United Micro Electronics	Taiwan
26		Infosys Technologies	India
34		Hyundai Electronics	South Korea
39	79	Acer	Taiwan
42		Quanta Computer	Taiwan
50		Chartered Semiconductor	Singapore

SOURCE: Financial Times (2000)

In 1999 Telecom equipment maker Shenzhen Huawei Technology had \$1 billion in revenue. The television firm Konka Electronics exported its own brand-name televisions into the U.S. market. China's leading personal computer (PC) vendors, Legend and Founder, dominated the domestic PC business. Legend has been China's leading domestic information-technology vendor, with production of 1.3 million units in 1999, a share of more than 20 percent. To become one of the world's top-ten PC makers in 2000, Legend increased capacity to 3 million units in 2000. In 1999 Legend surpassed Changhong, China's dominant television supplier, to rank as China's largest electronics firm in that year. Legend's goal was to reach \$10 billion in sales (five times its 1998 sales level) by 2004, the twentieth anniversary of its founding.

Future Considerations

Asian countries continue to aggressively build a strong competitive base in electronics. China is now the country to beat because it provides the largest potential market in Asia and captures nearly 80 percent of foreign direct investment. It provides an attractive low-cost labor force supported by special incentives and infrastructures such as high-technology industrial parks. At the same time, China is building nationally successful corporations that are beginning to move into the global marketplace. This evolution has been supported by heavy foreign direct investments by leading global players. Taiwan, with its leadership in information technologies, is the top investor in China and will probably be the primary long-term funnel of advanced technologies. Hong Kong continues to struggle to find a competitive strategy, but still provides capital and logistics support to mainland China. As the remainder of Asia continues to recover from the Asian financial crisis, countries must also compete for investment with China—a battle that they have been losing.

William Boulton

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HIKAYAT AMIR HAMZA The *Hikayat Amir Hamza* is a legendary prose story in the Malay language, based upon a Persian romance, which has Hamza, the paternal uncle of the Prophet Muhammad, as its main protagonist. The historical Hamza presented a highly suitable Muslim hero for tales of chivalry and courage. As the quest for fame, respect, and honor was a major preoccupation in Malay literature, the battlefield takes pride of place in this story. Its translation from Persian into Malay may well have taken place not much later than the fourteenth century because the story, in both its Persian and Malay forms, mentions firearms, which first became known in the Muslim world in the 1380s. The *Hikayat Amir Hamza* was certainly written before 1511 because it is mentioned in the so-called *Sejarah Melayu* (Malay Annals). The Malay version was adapted in Buginese, Macassarese, Balinese, and Javanese, whereas the Sundanese version seems to be based on the Javanese one. The Javanese work is generally known as the *Menak*, after a noble title given to the hero Amir Hamza. The adventures of Amir Hamza also form part of the repertoire of the Javanese and Sundanese rod-puppet theater (*wayang golek*).

Edwin Wieringa

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HIKMET, NAZIM (1902–1963), Turkish poet, playwright, and novelist. Nazim Hikmet is considered Turkey's foremost modern poet. A socialist whose humanistic views transcended national borders, he gained international acclaim for his writings. Nazim Hikmet was born in Thessaloniki, in today's Greece, then part of the Ottoman empire, into an upper-class family of bureaucrats. During the Turkish war of independence, he left the Turkish naval academy and worked in Anatolia as a teacher. He joined the Turkish Communist Party, which was founded in Ankara in 1920. The appeal of the Russian Revolution and its promise of social justice led him to Moscow, where he studied economics and political science. After returning to Turkey in 1926, he was soon arrested for his leftist activities. He escaped to Russia, where he stayed for two years; he returned to Turkey following the general amnesty of 1928. For the next ten years he was in and out of prison on a variety of political charges.

In 1938, Nazim Hikmet was arrested for inciting the Turkish armed forces to revolt through his writings and was sentenced to twenty-eight years in prison. While in prison, he published numerous novels and plays, as well as poems that revolutionized Turkish poetry, including his epic masterpiece, "Memleketimden İnsan Manzaraları" (Human Landscapes from My Country.) In 1949, an international committee formed in Paris to agitate for his release; it included Pablo Picasso and Jean-Paul Sartre. His name was finally included on the political amnesty list of the Democratic Party in 1950. Following his release, however, at the age of forty-nine, he was drafted for military service in Korea. Fearing for his life, he fled from Turkey for the second time. He spent the rest of his life as a political refugee in Poland, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union. Stripped of his Turkish citizenship in 1959, he chose to become a citizen of Poland. He died of a heart attack in Moscow at the age of sixty-one.

Although Nazim Hikmet's works have been translated into more than fifty languages, none were published in Turkey between 1938 and 1965. The ban on his books was lifted only after his death. Since the late 1960s his poems, novels, and plays, as well as a vast number of biographical works about him, have been published in Turkey.

The main themes of his works were universalism, social justice, and compassion. He expressed a passionate love for his native country in his poetry. Although he used his writings in the service of his political beliefs, his brilliant use of Turkish lyrics in almost-musical compositions saved his verse from becoming a propaganda tool.

Ayla H. Kilic

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HILL TRIBES OF INDIA The term "hill tribe" was long and inexactly applied to the indigenous inhabitants of upland and mountain areas in South Asia. The hill tribes are and were culturally distinct groups, usually endogamous social units, bearing a tribal name and having a distinct material culture, including, very often, characteristic styles of housing and dress. Often the isolated hill tribes speak their own languages.

The term "hill tribe" is little used today by anthropologists, yet it is not disappearing altogether, because the concept is enshrined in some national legislation. In India the two broad social categories of disadvantaged people, known since independence as the Scheduled Tribes and the Scheduled Castes, have incorporated nearly all of those groups formerly known as hill tribes.

Hill tribes are characterized by great diversity of culture. While early census officials often designated them as "Animists," many in fact follow a variety of "universal" religions, including Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity. Most practice some form of agriculture, but there are groups like the Todas who are pastoralists, others like the Kotas who are craftsmen, and some groups who are itinerant peddlers, magicians, or entertainers.

Paul Hockings

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HIMACHAL PRADESH (2001 est. pop. 6.1 million). Crowned by the "snowy mountains" from which comes its name, Himachal Pradesh is a state in northwestern India originally constituted in 1948, after independence, as an administrative unit of thirty hill states. It grew to include the former states of Bilaspur, Kulu, Simla, Lahaul-Spiti, and Kangra before achieving full statehood in 1971. A region of scenic splendor, with an area of 55,673 square kilometers, it is surrounded by Jammu and Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab, and Tibet, enveloped by the Pir

Panjral and Dhauladhar ranges in the northwest, and dominated by the great Himalayas in the north and east. Five snow-fed rivers provide an estimated 20 percent of India's total hydroelectric potential.

The earliest inhabitants were tribal Dasas who came from the Gangetic plains in 3000 to 2000 BCE. Aryan speakers arrived around 2000 BCE; tribal republics called *janapadas* (territory of the clan) emerged. The Guptas held parts of the region during the second to fifth centuries CE; then came other rulers, including, as early as 550 CE, the Hindu Rajputs. Muslim rulers appeared at the close of the tenth century. By the eighteenth century under Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the Sikhs had gained considerable strength in the west, while the Gurkhas consolidated power in the south. The Gurkhas were succeeded by the British, who made Himachal's capital Simla the summer seat of the viceroy and thus the government headquarters.

Among other distinctions, Himachal proved ideal for growing apples, and modern apple-growers figure importantly in area politics. Each of the state's districts has its own architecture, from rock-cut shrines and *shikharas* temples (a Hindu temple with a spire or tower) to colonial mansions and Buddhist monasteries. Culturally heterogeneous, with 90 percent of the population living outside the main towns, Himachal's districts maintain distinct customs, agricultural methods, and dress. Each village has its own patron saint or god. Hinduism dominates, but there are many Sikhs, Muslims, and Christians, and Lahaul-Spiti, and

Kinnaur has been home to Tibetan Buddhists since the tenth century. The approximately two hundred temples are dedicated mainly to Siva, Durga, and Buddha. The capital Simla, India's largest and most famous hill station, is a favorite destination for Indian families and honeymooners with its cool air, crisp light, and superb panoramas.

C. Roger Davis

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HIMALAYA RANGE The Himalaya Range is the world's highest mountain range, with the fourteen highest mountain peaks in the world; it spans over 2,400 kilometers. It is also one of the world's longest ranges. It runs from the Pamir Mountains in the west to the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh in the east, in a series of mountain ridges that help designate the border and form a buffer between India and Nepal and also between Nepal and Tibet. The entire mountain system forms the southern boundary of the Tibetan Plateau and divides North and Central Asia from the South Asian subcontinent.

Among the best-known Himalayan peaks are Everest (Qomolangma Feng), the world's highest mountain (8,848 meters), on the border between Nepal and Tibet; and K2 (Qogir Feng), the second highest (8,611



A portion of the Himalaya Range as seen from Nepal. (DAVID SAMUEL ROBBINS/CORBIS)



meters), on the border between Tibet and Kashmir. The third-highest mountain in the world is Kangchenjunga at 8,598 meters, on the border between Nepal and India; seventh-highest is Annapurna (8,091 meters) in Nepal. Not until the 1950s were these peaks successfully scaled.

The Himalayas are actually a series of parallel ranges running roughly northwest to southeast, the most important being the Great Himalayas, the



NANDA DEVI—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Nanda Devi National Park's rugged terrain, high altitude and remote location have kept this national park in northern India relatively intact. Designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1988, Nanda Devi is home to several endangered species, including the snow leopard and Himalayan musk deer.



THE FOUR SEASONS AND LIFE IN THE HIMALAYAS

"The Sherpa are one of the peoples of the Himalayas and perhaps the best known in the Western world because of their role as guides on mountaineering expeditions. Their life is governed by the four seasons which are symbolized by colors and marked by festivals.

"Four images of divinity corresponding to the four seasons of the years are generally found in the *gompas*. They have a special importance in the life of a Sherpa. *Ygri-gyemo* is the summer queen of azure colour; *gungi-gyemo* is the yellow winter queen; *tongy-gyemo* is the green coloured queen of autumn; and *chigi-gyemo* the red queen of spring.

"During the four seasons the Sherpa community is called upon to attend and participate in certain ceremonies to be performed at fixed times. The village or the temple is the place where such festivals and ceremonies take place. They take on special importance when the Lama clergy along with a number of representatives participate. They are of great value even from a choreographic point of view. Some festivals last only for a day, others six days. On such occasions the work in the villages comes to a halt and everybody goes to the festival. A responsible person of the village called Lawa is entrusted with the charge of organising such festivals. He collects funds, fixes duties and turns for assistants, regulates various phases of the festival and arranges for the distribution of good among spectators."

Source: Mario Fantin. (1974) *Sherpa Himalaya Nepal*. New Delhi: S. D. Chowdri for the English Book Store, 68.

Karakoram, the Zaskar, and the Ladakh Ranges. These were thrust upward by the abutment of the Indo-Australian tectonic plate against the Eurasian plate. All of these ranges are over 3,000 meters above sea level, and the highest series, the Great Himalayas, exceed 6,100 meters, with most of the highest mountains being in Nepal and the small Indian state of Sikkim. The Middle Himalayas range between 1,800 and 2,000 meters; to the south of them the low-lying Sub-Himalayas border India and Nepal.

The climatic variation is enormous, ranging from below freezing temperatures in the north to a subtropical climate in the south. The range protects the Indian subcontinent from the cold weather of Central Asia and affects seasonal rainfall markedly.

The ancient name of the range was Himavat (Sanskrit for "abode of snow"; in Pali, Hemavata), and there are numerous descriptive references to it in the *Mahabharata*, an ancient Indian epic. The people who have lived in the Himalayas did not scale mountain peaks, which were considered sacred places where gods resided; but they did use the high slopes for grazing yaks, goats, and other cattle. This changed in the late twentieth century, when foreign visitors began to overrun the region, to climb the mountains or to visit Buddhist and Hindu sacred sites. Most famous are the expeditions to Everest, named for Sir George Everest, a surveyor-general of India (1830–1843). From the mid-twentieth century the Himalayas became a major tourist attraction, and nowadays as many as a million people may visit them yearly. So popular has mountain climbing become that wealthy amateurs join expeditions that attempt to reach the summit of Mount Everest; even a blind man succeeded in 2001. The difficult route to the top and the harsh weather conditions sometimes result in injuries or death, even to the experienced climbers who lead these expeditions.

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HINA MATSURI Hina Matsuri (Doll Festival or Girls' Festival) is a Japanese celebration of girlhood held on the third of March. Girls display special dolls, hold parties for friends and relatives, and receive good wishes for health and happiness.

Baby girls are traditionally presented with a set of ceremonial *hina* dolls with which to celebrate the festival. A full set consists of fifteen dolls: the emperor and empress, three ladies-in-waiting, three guards, two ministers, and five musicians, all dressed in the elaborate court costumes of the Heian Period (794–1185). They are displayed on a tiered stand covered with bright red cloth, accompanied by miniature furniture and household goods. The imperial couple sits on the highest tier, before a golden folding screen with

lanterns to either side. Decorations of peach blossom symbolize traditional ideal female qualities of contentment and gentleness.

Girls and their guests drink *shirozake*, a mild, sweet rice wine, and eat colorful diamond-shaped rice cakes (*bishi-mochi*) and other delicacies. Following the celebrations the dolls are carefully packed away, for it is considered unlucky to display them year-round. Hina Matsuri originated in ancient purification rituals in which dolls acted as charms against evil spirits. Today *hina* dolls are greatly treasured and often passed down from mother to daughter.

Lucy D. Moss

See also: **Children's Day—Japan**

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HINDI-URDU Hindi and Urdu belong to the Indic branch of the Indo-European language family. Thus they are closely related to other Indic languages spoken in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka (for example, Panjabi, Sindhi, Marathi, Gujarati, Bengali, Nepali, and Sinhala) and more distantly related to other Indo-European languages such as English or Russian. Both modern Hindi and Urdu developed from New Indo-Aryan vernaculars spoken in north India around the eleventh to fourteenth centuries CE. With the influx of Turkic- and Persian-speaking peoples in the Muslim courts and armies, first under the Delhi sultanate (1192–1526) and later under the Mughals, Persian and Turkic words began to enter the language. Urdu began to differentiate from the common spoken language of the area as the *Zabaan-e-Urdu-e-Mu'alla* (language of the royal camp), which developed in Delhi after the Mughal court shifted there from Agra in 1648. Modern Urdu was first referred to as "Urdu" by the poet Mashafi (1750–1824) toward the end of the eighteenth century. Since then, Urdu and Hindi have increasingly differentiated over time because of both natural linguistic change and conscious attempts to shape the languages, in particular by the use of quite different scripts. As the Mughal empire declined, an effort was made to exclude Sanskrit words from Urdu and to increasingly Persianize the language. Later, in the nineteenth century, as Hindi and Urdu came increasingly to be associated with religion, attempts were made to Sanskritize Hindi. Similar lan-



CREATING A NATIONAL LANGUAGE

In an effort to create national unity in the face of much cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity, the advocates of Indian independence recommended that Hindi be made the common language and that it be taught in all schools.

The object of including *Hindustani* as a compulsory subject in the school curriculum is to ensure that all the children educated in these national schools may have a reasonable acquaintance with a common *lingua franca*. As adult citizens they should be able to cooperate with their fellow countrymen belonging to any part of the country. In teaching the language the teacher should in various ways quicken in the students the realization that this language is the most important product of the cultural contact of Hindus and Muslims in India. It is the repository—in its more advanced forms—of their best thoughts and aspirations. They should learn to take pride in its richness and vitality and should feel the desire to serve it devotedly.

In *Hindustani*-speaking areas this language will be the mother-tongue, but the students as well as the teachers will be required to learn both the scripts, so that they may read books written in Urdu as well as in Hindi. In non-*Hindustani*-speaking areas, where the provincial language will be the mother-tongue, the study of *Hindustani* will be compulsory during the 5th and 6th years of school life, but the children will have the choice of learning either one or the other script. However, in the case of teachers who have to deal with children of both kinds, knowledge of both the scripts is desirable.

Source: Jagdish S. Sharma, ed. (1965) *India's Struggle for Freedom: Select Documents and Sources*. Delhi: S. Chand, 113.

guage planning efforts continue in the twenty-first century, resulting in the present situation.

The Language Continuum

Hindi and Urdu can be considered as two ends of a language continuum in which the grammar is almost entirely shared, but differences in vocabulary and to a lesser degree in phonology develop in the more formal and literary registers of the languages. The Hindi end of the continuum incorporates many words newly added from Sanskrit, the Indic ancestor language of Hindi, whereas the Urdu end includes many Arabic and Persian words. The middle range of the continuum represents the common spoken language of North India and Pakistan, which is understood by speakers of any variety of these languages. In contrast, the language varieties at each end of the continuum

are, to a significant extent, not mutually intelligible. This situation can be schematized as follows:

Urdu	"Hindustani"	(High) Hindi
Many exclusively Urdu words of Perso-Arabic origin	Common vocabulary	Many exclusively Hindi words; Sanskrit words

Phonology

Except where noted, the following description applies to both Hindi and Urdu. The consonant system includes the following contrastive oppositions: (1) voiced versus voiceless (pronounced with as opposed to without vibration of the vocal cords, as in the contrast between English /b/ and /p/); (2) aspirated (including an audible puff of breath immediately after the

consonant sound) versus unaspirated (with minimal breath). This difference is like the difference in the /p/ sound in English "pin" (aspirated) and "spin" (unaspirated); (3) dental versus retroflex (position of the tongue touching the front teeth, or at a point farther back in the mouth). Hindi has these consonant phonemes: /k/, /kh/, /g/, /gh/, /c/, /ch/, /j/, /jh/, /T/, /Th/, /D/, /Dh/, /t/, /th/, /d/, /dh/, /p/, /ph/, /b/, /bh/, /m/, /n/, /y/, /r/, /R/, /Rh/, /l/, /w/, /s/, /ś/, /h/. (Capital letters represent retroflexes.) Urdu has the additional consonants /q/, /γ/, /x/, /z/, and /f/. The vowel phonemes are /a/, /ā/, /i/, /ī/, /u/, /ū/, /o/, /e/, plus the diphthongs /ai/ and /au/. The vowels have nasalized counterparts.

Hindi is written in the Devanagari script (derived from Brahmi), whereas Urdu script (Nastaliq) derives from Arabic, with modifications introduced to represent Persian and then Urdu sounds not present in Arabic.

Morphology

The noun system distinguishes the grammatical categories of number (singular and plural) and gender (masculine and feminine). Some nouns bear a characteristic mark of grammatical gender, that is, *ā* for masculine nouns like *laRkā* (boy) and *ī* for feminines like *laRkī* (girl), whereas others are not so marked, like *mez* (table, feminine) and *dūdh* (milk, masculine). Similarly, some adjectives bear markers for gender that are the same as those for nouns, for example, *acchī laRkī* (good girl), *acchā laRkā* (good boy), and some do not, for example, *lāl mez* (red table).

Basic verb forms are constructed on the verb stem, the imperfective participle, with characteristic ending *-t-@*; or the perfective participle with characteristic ending *-(y)@*, where @ represents gender/number adjectival marking. Hindi is a "split-ergative" language, in which perfective tenses of transitive verbs agree with an unmarked direct object (rather than with the subject). The normal word order in a sentence is subject, object, verb.

Hindi Speakers

Hindi is the official language of the Union of India and of the following states: Bihar, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Delhi, and Chandigarh. Because it is spoken over such a vast region, there is much dialectal variation within Hindi. Important varieties include Braj, Bhojpuri, Khari Boli, Awadhi, Bangaru, and Bundeli. It is difficult to give a precise number of Hindi speakers because of differences in the way languages are grouped in census reports and the language that people choose to report as their "mother tongue." But it appears clear that

Hindi is spoken by over 180 million as a first language in India and another 2 million worldwide. Including second-language speakers, the total number of users is over 346 million in India and 418 million worldwide. Large numbers of Hindi speakers live in Bangladesh, the United States, Mauritius, South Africa, Yemen, Uganda, Singapore, Nepal, New Zealand, Germany, Kenya, Canada, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.

Urdu Speakers

Urdu is the national language of Pakistan, where it is spoken as the first language by about 8 percent of the population (approximately 11 million speakers) and understood as a second language and used as a lingua franca by an increasing majority in all parts of the nation, whose total population is approximately 142.4 million. It is the main language of education and the information media. In India, where there are over 45 million Urdu speakers, it is one of the eighteen designated national languages and is the official language of Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir. A distinctive Dakhini variety of Urdu, which developed from the common language of Delhi carried to the Deccan in the fourteenth century, is spoken around Hyderabad, India. Significant numbers of Urdu speakers live in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Middle East, Norway, and Germany. The worldwide total of first-language Urdu speakers alone is over 58 million. Taken together, Hindi and Urdu rank fourth in the number of speakers worldwide, after Chinese, Spanish, and English.

Elena Bashir

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HINDU KUSH The Hindu Kush, a rugged mountain range in Central and West Asia, lies mostly in eastern Afghanistan. The range extends for a total distance of about 965 kilometers, from the plateau of the Pamirs on the east in eastern Tajikistan, along the borders of Jammu and Kashmir, and Pakistan, and west and southwest into Afghanistan as far as the Koh-i-Baba range west of Kabul. It forms a watershed between the Amu Dar'ya River tributaries on the north

and the Kabul River on the south. The range is an extension of the Himalayan system, with its main expanse toward the southwest. Several peaks of the Hindu Kush exceed 7,000 meters, and one, Tirich Mir, rises to 7,690 meters.

The range is crossed by several important passes that were ancient trade routes, with the Baroghil Pass, at a height of 3,797 meters above sea level, being the most significant. The Amu Dar'ya, Helmand, Kabul, and Konar Rivers rise in the Hindu Kush.

The local warrior tribes inhabiting the region are collectively called Pathans (in Pakistan) or Pashtuns (in Afghanistan). The modern Salang Tunnel allows the Afghan capital, Kabul, to be linked to the north-eastern part of the country and to Tajikistan through this mountain range. At the end of 2001, these mountains saw fierce fighting, including heavy bombing, when U.S., British, Afghan, and other forces were jointly breaking the power of the Taliban and al-Qaeda leadership.

Paul Hockings

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HINDU LAW Hindu law has several denotations: (1) the whole body of ancient Indian law; (2) under British rule, only those aspects of Hindu civil law not covered by general laws; (3) Hindu law in independent India. In this last sense, it encompasses a series of laws that have radically reformed family law.

Ancient Hindu Law

The all-encompassing term for ancient Hindu law is dharma, which can refer to either a code of conduct or the cosmic law of the universe. The ancient *dharmaśāstras*, the Hindu law books, prescribe rules of conduct and penalties for misconduct; they also regulate all kinds of rituals, including expiations. The most comprehensive early book of this genre is the *Manusmṛiti*, which originated between the second century BCE and the second century CE. It was probably preceded by the *Arthashastra*, a treatise on politics and economics, attributed to the Hindu statesman and philosopher Kautilya (flourished 300 BCE). The *Arthashastra* contains a chapter on judges in which Kautilya distinguishes four sources of law: dharma, the tra-

ditional law; *vyavahara*, transactions, procedures, and court practice; *caritra*, local customary law; and *rajāsana*, the king's edict. According to Kautilya, the order of these sources indicates a ranking, in which the king's edict occupies the highest position.

An Indian king was himself subject to dharma and was obliged to uphold it, but in litigation he was the final court of appeal, and his interpretation of dharma prevailed. The Brahmans who established the norms tried to provide the king with appropriate advice—which might also limit his discretionary powers. In establishing these norms, the Brahmans took care to define the institution of caste and to enshrine their own privileges in Hindu law.

The *Manusmṛiti* reflects this tendency. It is the subject of numerous commentaries, and with each one arguments were further refined and recommendations for verdicts in special cases increased. This tradition of jurisprudence culminated around 1100 CE with the *Mitākshara* of Vijnanesvara and the *Dayabhaga* of Jimutavahana. (The former originated in western India and the latter in Bengal.) The authors agreed on most legal issues, but fundamentally differed on the law of inheritance. According to the *Mitākshara*, a son is a coparcener (joint heir) in his father's estate from birth; according to the *Dayabhaga*, he is not—a son can inherit and divide his father's property only after his father's death. This difference is essential. The *Mitākshara* severely restricts the rights of the father concerning disposal of his property: he must respect the rights of his coparceners. This protects the joint Hindu family as a legal institution.

Hindu Law under British Rule

The British gradually imported an enormous body of their own law—English common law—into India. Early on in their colonial rule, they showed great interest in Hindu law. Sir William Jones (1746–1794), the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Calcutta, requested that Jagannatha Tarkapanchanana, his Brahman associate, compile a code of Hindu law, which was then translated into English by Henry Thomas Colebrooke (1765–1837) and published in 1797. Colebrooke was an excellent Sanskritist and had also served as a judge. The code that he translated was the *Digest of Hindu Law*, known as Colebrooke's Digest, which became the most important reference manual for British courts in India when dealing with Hindu personal law.

By this kind of codification, however, the British reduced the flexibility of Hindu law, freezing it once and for all. There was no attempt to reform the law:

the main aim of the British was to do "justice" to their Hindu subjects and not disturb their "prejudices." In the process, Hindu law was more or less reduced to property relations within the family, everything else being a matter for British civil and criminal law.

Hindu Law in the Republic of India

A uniform civil code was initially sought in independent India, but the idea was dropped so as not to disturb Indian Muslims. Instead, the government concentrated on a reformed "Hindu code." Since this was opposed by orthodox Hindus, the first Indian president, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), opted for piecemeal reform enshrined in the following acts: the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, the Hindu Succession Act of 1956, and the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act of 1956. Nehru regarded this reform as his major political achievement.

Departure from the old patriarchal order and emphasis on the rights of women were the main features of this reformed Hindu law. Earlier, Hindu men could have had several wives, but now only monogamy was recognized. As long as polygamy had been permitted, divorce was unnecessary; now even women were permitted to sue for divorce. Inheritance had earlier been restricted to men only; now women could also inherit, disrupting the old pattern of the joint Hindu family. The asking for and giving of dowry was also prohibited. The orthodox Hindus particularly resented this, and the practice survived in the form of "gifts."

The act regulating adoption was also seen as violating traditional Hindu custom, which had prescribed the adoption of a son by a man without male issue and permitted a widow without a son to do the same. There was, however, no adoption of daughters. The new act changed all this and permitted men and women to adopt both sons and daughters. Critics predicted that these acts would be repealed after the generation of reformers had passed away, but this did not happen. The new Hindu law had come to stay.

Dietmar Rothermund

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HINDU NATIONALISM Since the end of the 1980s, Hindu nationalism has emerged as a major po-

litical force in India. Although it had played only a marginal role in Indian politics for many decades, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People's Party, or BJP) succeeded in gaining more and more votes during the various national elections from 1989 on, ultimately forming the central government of India as leader of a multiparty coalition in 1998. For the first time in the history of modern India, Hindu nationalists had come to power at the national level. Parallel to the growing support for the BJP, the Congress Party lost its former ideological and political hegemony and now finds itself in the role of an opposition party. However, the Hindu nationalists' gradual accession to power was also marked by a high level of militancy, at its worst on 6 December 1992, when Hindu fanatics destroyed the Babri Mosque at Ayodhya and subsequent riots left more than one thousand people dead and many others injured.

History

The origins of Hindu nationalism can be traced back to the 1920s and even further to 1875, when the neo-Hindu organization Arya Samaj (Society of Aryans) was founded by Dayanand Saraswati. In 1915 the Hindu Mahasabha (Hindu General Assembly) came into being, followed in 1925 by the elitist Rashtriya Svayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteer Union, or RSS), which is still the organizational and ideological backbone of Hindu nationalism today. The Bharatiya Janata Party, the political party of Hindu nationalism, was created in 1951 under the name of Bharatiya Jan Sangh (Indian People's Union); it was renamed in 1980. Other important Hindu national organizations include the Vishva Hindu Parishad (All-Hindu Council, founded in 1964) and its youth wing, Bajrang Dal (Bajrang's Troop, founded in 1984). Together they form the *sangh parivar* (Sanskrit term for RSS family) and play different roles in a common strategy to create a Hindu India. Most BJP leaders are also members of the RSS.

Ideology

The Hindu national organizations all share a common ideology of cultural nationalism—the ideology of *Hindutva*, Hindu-ness. This ideology was expounded first by V. D. Savarkar (1883–1966) and later in a more radical form by M. S. Golwalkar, both Brahmans from Maharashtra. In his booklet *Hindutva*, published in 1923, Savarkar defined what makes an Indian a Hindu and what joins Indians together in a Hindu nation mainly in terms of opposition to others, that is, Muslims and Christians. According to Savarkar, a Hindu is a person who regards India as his or her *pitrabhu*

(hometown, land of his or her forefathers) as well as *punyabhū* (holy land). With this definition, Muslims and other minorities are seen as foreign to the Indian nation. Their loyalties are divided, and they do not look on India as their holy land.

In this ideology India is the land of the Hindus; the Indian nation is a Hindu nation. To be an Indian means to be a Hindu, and *Hindutva* is the national identity of India. The inner unity of the Hindus is firmly anchored in this Hindu-ness, which rests on a common homeland (*rashtra*), a common ancestry (*jati*), and a common culture (*sanskriti*), which have existed since time immemorial. In its election manifesto of 1998, the BJP openly referred to the three essentials of *Hindutva* when formulating the slogan: "One nation, one people, and one culture." This exclusiveness leads to the Hinduization of the nation and the nationalization of Hinduism.

This idea of the common territorial, genealogical, and cultural basis of the Hindu nation is central to Hindu national ideology and politics. It first evolved in response to the colonial challenge and is rooted in fears of inferiority, weakness, and domination by others. Hindus, the Hindu nationalists say, are in danger of becoming a minority in their own country, Hindustan, Land of the Hindus.

Hindu nationalists see this deplorable situation as arising from a lack of unity among Hindus. The solution is for Hindus to stand together and to defend themselves against the West and the Muslims. They must resurrect the glorious Hindu past with its timeless cultural heritage, to overcome the misery of the present.

The *sangh parivar*, the RSS family, tries to organize people along ethnic-cultural lines. Since the 1980s, well-orchestrated campaigns have been launched to strengthen Hindu unity and to integrate Hindus into a defensible community against the threatening "others." The overarching goal of the *sangh parivar* is to make India a strong and prosperous Hindu nation where all live in harmony and peace as they do in a large Hindu extended family. Therefore Hindu nationalism rejects the idea of a hierarchical caste system and, in particular, untouchability.

The most prominent of these campaigns was aimed at the "liberation of Rama's birthplace." (The god-king Rama, hero of the epic *Ramayana*, is seen as a perfect incarnation of a righteous Hindu ruler ready to defend a posited Hindu nation.) In December 1992, the campaign led to the demolition of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, regarded as the epitome of Muslim conquest and intolerance. This mosque, it is al-

leged, had been erected in 1528 by the first Mughal ruler, Babur, on the ruins of a great Rama temple marking the birthplace of the beloved god-king. This attack on a religious monument was justified as an act of Hindu self-assertion against Muslim aggressiveness. Only by the reconstruction of a magnificent new Rama temple on this very site would the "liberation" be consummated.

Support from the Middle Classes

The rise of the BJP to the center stage of Indian politics can be attributed to political, socioeconomic, and cultural factors. The self-induced decline of the Congress Party created a political vacuum that gave the BJP the chance to present itself as a disciplined body of principled, selfless politicians and to successfully position itself as a second major national party in India. The mounting political assertiveness of minority groups such as the Sikhs and the Muslims, together with the growth of separatist movements in the Punjab, the northeastern states, and Kashmir, has also contributed to the success of the BJP. The conversion of untouchables to Islam stirred up fears of a Muslim conspiracy supported by the oil-rich Arab countries. The BJP has always criticized the Congress Party for its "pseudosecularism," which conceded special rights and privileges to the minorities at the expense of the Hindu majority.

However, more important factors are the socioeconomic changes resulting from the ongoing modernization process and leading to new constellations in the social fabric of Indian society. The middle classes in particular have been becoming more assertive. Traditional roles and values are eroding and need to be redefined. The new material success has to be legitimized. The growing economic competition in a liberalizing and globalizing economy makes these people fear other competitors and the possibility of becoming a loser. This new situation must be reflected in a meaningful set of explanations offering a firm anchor in a quickly changing, unpredictable social environment.

In the face of this challenge, Hindu nationalism today can be interpreted as an attempt to redefine modernity by reconciling modernity and tradition. Economic progress and material success are embedded in a traditional interpretation of the glorious Hindu culture that must be resurrected. Economic competition is balanced by the idea of a harmonious society of equals where trust, solidarity, and mutual respect prevail. In theory, all people, including the minorities, would be equals in a true Hindu nation.

The *Hindutva* ideology obviously addresses the anxieties and aspirations of Indians who belong mainly to the upward-moving middle classes. Surveys have shown that the majority of the BJP voters are young, male Hindus of high-caste origin, having a good educational background, living in cities, and enjoying a relatively high standard of living. During the recent elections, however, the BJP has also broken new ground among lower castes.

Future Prospects

In its propagation of a strong Hindu nation founded on a uniform Hindu culture, Hindu nationalism is a political attempt at building a national identity based on a highly questionable and selective interpretation of Indian tradition, with a strong Brahmanical bias. It uses religious symbols and beliefs for political ends. The concept of *Hindutva* as the basis of a Hindu cultural nation contradicts the very nature of the Hindu tradition, with its extreme heterogeneity in almost every respect. Moreover this heterogeneity, on the level of the individual, often goes hand in hand with multiple, overlapping identities that change according to context and go beyond a politicized Hindu-Muslim antagonism.

To be successful, the politics of *Hindutva* would need to homogenize a cultural tradition that has evolved over more than three millennia. Furthermore, the *Hindutva* ideology rests on a foreign concept of cultural or ethnic nationalism imported from the West during colonial times, which makes the "Hindu-ness" of *Hindutva* fictitious. The social reality in present-day India, with its extreme hierarchy and social cleavages, openly contradicts the idea of equality and solidarity among all Hindus.

To broaden its electoral base, the BJP has refrained from a radical pro-Hindu, anti-Muslim policy since 1993, so that it seems more liberal. Since then, intra-party differences have surfaced also because of the issue of a strict *svadeshi* (national economic policy). It is doubtful that the RSS and other hard-liners will support this policy of "soft" Hindu nationalism in the long term. The question remains whether the Hindu nationalists can provide convincing answers to the manifold problems India faces at the beginning of the third millennium.

Clemens Jürgenmeyer

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HINDU PHILOSOPHY Hindu philosophy is a collective title for the vast number of doctrines and beliefs that evolved in the Indian subcontinent (called *Bharatvarsha* or *Bharatakhanda* in Sanskrit texts) from ancient times to the present. In the first millennium BCE, the Persians used the term "Hindu" for the lands around the Indus River; with the Greeks the word became "India." This initially geographic term was first applied to the religious and philosophical doctrines of India by Arab and Turkish historians in the second millennium CE. In the eighteenth century, European scholars restricted the term "Hinduism" to the beliefs and philosophies following the Vedas (the earliest Hindu sacred writings), thus separating Hinduism from the Buddhist, Jain, and Sikh sects, despite the overlapping of these systems with Vedic beliefs.

The Vedic Foundation

The Rig Veda is the oldest text of religious and cosmic vision in India. Scholars date it anywhere from 1500 to 4000 BCE. Along with the other three Vedas, the Sama, Yajur, and Atharva, it is the only record of the beliefs that existed well before the epic age of the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* (beginning of the first millennium BCE). The Vedas indicate that major deities like Indra, Varuna, Mitra, Prajapati, Sarasvati, Usha, Rudra, Savita, Agni, and many others were worshiped with offerings made through sacrificial fire (*yajna*). These gods were not given iconic form but were prayed to and placated only through various *yajnas*. The Greeks and Iranians also shared this mode of worship through fire.

The Vedic religion did not have a single prophetic founder; the Vedas are a collection of inspired verses



THE SPIRITUAL LIFE OF THE ELDERLY

Across much of Asia, the aged were usually venerated and treated with much respect. Depending on the religious tradition, the elderly were also expected to devote much time to spiritual matters, as with Hindus in India. This particular extract pertains to Tamil Indians in South India in the 1950s.

As his sons grow into the age of *grabasta* or married adulthood, an old man is customarily expected to retire gradually from the world, to curb his enjoyment of living, and to turn his thoughts still further towards spiritual life. This is ideally the period of *sannyasa* or meditation and chastity in old age. To undertake it fully, a man should surrender his home and property to his sons and wander forth as a stranger begging food and engaging in meditation. As a less extreme course, he may go with his wife to occupy a small hut outside the village, and lead a life of prayer, simplicity, and chastity. One Brahman of the next village had done this. He conducted daily fire-offering to the Vedic gods, and tried by silent meditation to attain union of his soul with the divine soul which he believed to be immanent in all creation but to be personified as Siva. He received young disciples on weekends and instructed them to memorize Sanskrit prayers, to meditate, to perform yogic exercises, to fast periodically, and to gain control over earthly desires. One old man in Kumbapettai lived quietly apart from his family in a separate small house on the street, returning home only for meals. Four others performed regular meditation, prayers and offerings to Siva in their homes, and claimed to live in chastity.

Source: Elizabeth K. Gough. (1956) "Brahman Kinship in a Tamil Village." *American Anthropologist* 58: 838.

or mantras, revealed to seers called *rishis*. The texts have been preserved by oral transmission, a practice that survives even now. Whether written versions of the Vedic text were used to aid this transmission before the tenth century CE is still unknown.

The Vedas postulate that the gods who grant devotees' desires are themselves governed by the cosmic and just principle of truth called *Rit*, which is also called Brahma because it is the universal reality. Other beliefs are explicitly stated or implied in the Vedic hymns. These include beliefs in the existence of the individual soul after death; in the accumulation of merit and demerit in the soul (the theory of karma); the existence of upper and lower worlds (*lokas*); the return of the soul to this world (rebirth); the existence of a world of ancestors; merit in rituals, and moral conduct; purity as

a power of soul, mind, body, and environment; word or speech as a psychic force; and obligations or debts to gods, ancestors, teachers, and guests.

No archeological evidence of Vedic civilization has yet been unearthed. The earliest excavated remains are those of the Harappan civilization (ending around 2000 BCE). There is a debate over whether the Harappan culture preceded, succeeded, or equaled the Vedic. Harappan beliefs are virtually unknown, although some motifs in Harappan art recur later.

The ritual aspects of the poetic mantras of the four Vedas were elaborated in later texts called the Brahmanas and Aranyakas. The philosophic kernel was elaborated in the Upanishads, which hold that the ultimate reality is Brahma, manifested as this and other worlds. Brahma can be perceived through inner con-

templative knowledge, a practice bringing immortality. Despite intense metaphysical speculation, life was not considered a vale of tears, and subsidiary texts on medicine, archery, grammar, drama, and music (Upanvedas, or subsidiary Vedas) were composed to uphold its fullness. The later texts of the classical period stated that a complete life must have four aims (*purusharthas*): dharma (right action), *artha* (wealth), *kama* (satiation of desire), and *moksa* (enlightenment). The epic and mythic texts called *Itihasa* and Purana connect these values to daily living through the lives of heroes.

Vedic literature also indicates that some faiths neither followed the practice of sacrifice nor revered the pantheon of the Vedic gods. Some sects' members were phallic worshipers; in others, wandering saints preached beliefs scarcely recorded. As they all rejected the authority of Vedic ritual and mantras, they were collectively called *Nastikas* and are supposedly the precursors of the later Jain, Charvaka, Shakta, Tantric, and Buddhist sects.

The Advent of Temple Worship

In the middle centuries of the first millennium BCE, the worship of deities conceived as idols emerged. Major deities, transformations of the earlier Vedic gods, were Brahma the creator (not to be confused with Brahma, the ultimate ground of reality, mentioned earlier), Vishnu the preserver, and Siva the destroyer. The mother goddess of the Harappan age became Shakti, who later developed into different forms such as Uma, Bhavani, or Annapurna the benign, or Kali, Karali, or Chamundi the destroyer. By the third century BCE, temples to Vasudev, Surya the sun god, Kamadeva or Eros, Saraswati, and many other deities proliferated. The elaborate temple rituals, supported by dance and music, which characterize Hinduism to this day, were established as a distinctive feature.

Rules of moral and social conduct were formalized in codes called the *smritis*, of which those of Manu and Yajnavalkya are most prominent. The earlier but looser division of society into four major-castes (*varnas*) was now more rigorously imposed. These four castes—Brahmans (intellectuals), Kshatriyas (rulers), Vaishyas (merchants and farmers), and Sudras (servers)—supplemented by other mixed categories, were primarily an economic order of Hindu society, not part of its crucial religious or philosophic tenets, as is often presumed by non-Indians.

The Six Systems of Philosophy

The story of formal philosophy in India is best told in reference to the *shatdarshanas*, or the six schools.

Buddhists, Vaishnavas, Pashupatas, Jain, Charvak, Tantra, Shaktas, and Saivas all developed distinct systems by using the precepts of the *shatdarshanas*.

Nyaya Founded by Gautama, this system defined knowledge as dependent on *pramatri* (subject), *prameya* (object), *pramiti* (cognition), and *pramana* (means of knowledge). The last depends on five things: *pratyaksha* (intuition), *indriya* (senses), *panchamatra* (five elements), *manasa* (mind), and *gyan* (perception).

Vaisheshik Founded by Kanada, this system relied on the text called Vaisheshikasutra, which Kanada composed. The system dwells on the particularity (*visheshatva*) of things. All objects of experience (*padarthas*) fall into six categories of substance: quality, activity, generality, particularity, inherence, nonexistence. The first three are known intuitively; the last three are known by intellectual discrimination. The system propounds nine *tatvas* (primary substances): *prithvi* (earth), *jal* (water), *agni* (fire), *vayu* (wind), *akash* (ether), *kala* (time), *desh* (space), *atma* (self), and *manas* (mind). The system posits a belief in the particularity of everything, including the self. Things are said to be made of *anu* (atoms), which are incapable of further division.

Samkhya In this system, the categories of the cosmos were reduced to basic forces called *purusha* and *prakriti*. There is a constant evolutionary change based on these two principles, and all experience is based on this duality. *Purusha* is the knowing subject, and *prakriti* is objective existence both physical and psychological. The latter is the source of the world of becoming and consists of three qualities that when unbalanced cause evolution. Yoga brings release from ego and leads to salvation. The system was founded by Kapila (flourished 550 BCE), who composed the Sankhyapravachana Sutra. The other basic text is the Sankhya Karika, by Ishwarakrishna (third century CE).

Yoga Yoga is the practical methodology for realization and salvation founded by Patanjali (second century BCE) and given a commentary by Vyasa (fourth century CE). Vachasapati Mishra wrote the Tatvavisharada in the ninth century CE. Yoga relies on Samkhya for its philosophy but accepts Ishwara or God or Brahma as the ultimate reality. The method of achieving *moksha* (liberation) has eight parts: *yama* (precepts), *niyama* (routine), *asana* (postures), *pranayama* (breath control), *pratyahara* (withdrawal), *dharana* (fixation), *dhyana* (meditation), and *samadhi* (highest consciousness). The great masters of all sects and denominations in India have used Yoga in different ways.

Purva Mimamsa This philosophy investigated the definitions of dharma in the Vedas, which are defined as having no maker (*Apaurusheya*). Mimamsa dwells on the subject of sound and meaning and the ethical code of the Vedic mantras. It accepts the idea of the self and future life. It propounds the idea that all action is done for the sake of fulfilling desires and all *yajnas* for the sake of achieving enjoyment in heaven, or *Svargamukti*. In later stages of Mimamsa, around the seventh century CE, the philosopher Prabhakara described liberation as cessation of dharma and nondharma; Kumarila (flourished 730 CE) called it freedom from pain. The system was founded around the third century BCE by Jaimini, the writer of the Mimamsa Sutra, who believed in the existence of various gods but not one supreme god. Kumarila, who wrote the Shlokavartika, argued for the necessity of the supreme god.

Vedanta Founded by Badarayana around the fifth century BCE, this system focused on the Upanishadic teachings about Brahma as opposed to the value of sacrifice (*Karmakanda*) as propagated by Purva Mimamsa. Its basic text is the Vedanta Sutra, also called the Brahma Sutra or Sharirika Sutra. The system was not popular until the seventh century, when Shankaracharya revived it. He postulated that Brahma (the ultimate) and *Jiva* or *Atma* (individual soul) are not two but one. He repudiated the subjectivism of the Buddhist sect of Yogacharas by asserting that the world changes but is not a mental fiction and is also not nonexistent (*Abhava* or *Sunya*). Brahma appears as *sansara* (the world) through *maya* (ignorance), just as a rope may appear to be a snake when it is dark. *Vidya* (understanding) through practice of Yoga brings *Moksa*, or freedom from rebirth.

The Non-Vedic Systems

Most other sects followed modified versions of tenets of the Vedic tradition. Except for the materialists, they all accepted karma theory, the existence of the soul, the essentialness of liberation, rebirth, and the moral code of Yama and Niyama.

Charvakas (Lokayatas, Jabalikas) This system of materialist philosophy is referred to only in later schools. It was probably enshrined in the Brihaspati Sutra of the sixth century BCE. It opposed ancestor worship and the concept of life after death. Perception is purely sensory and consciousness a product of chemical reactions. There is no soul or god, and salvation is an illusion. Nature is the only reality, indifferent to good and bad, which are mere social conventions.

Jainism Vardhamana Mahavira (599–527 BCE) consolidated the teachings of twenty-four previous teach-

ers in the Jain tradition. The aim of life is to attain *kaivalya* (the state of ultimate realization of selfhood) by right knowledge, faith, and action. The most distinctive feature of action is total nonviolence, or ahimsa, as living and nonliving objects have souls.

Buddhism Consolidated by Siddhartha Gautama (563–483 BCE), the aim of Buddhism is to attain nirvana (extinction or release). There are four noble truths: (1) the world is sorrow; (2) sorrow is born of desire; (3) freedom from sorrow is attained by freedom from desire; and (4) one ends desire by the eightfold path: right views, right words, right action, right living, right effort, right thinking, right resolution, and right concentration.

The Bhakti Movement

The worship of Vishnu or Vasudeva, which began around the fifth century BCE, acquired great momentum around the seventh century CE with the so-called philosophy of personal and individual *bhakti* (devotion). This sect had two broad divisions: those who worshiped God as an incarnation with human and divine attributes (*Saguna*) and those who contemplated him as the formless (*Nirguna*) source of creation, preservation, and destruction. For the former, the life deeds of incarnations like Krishna or Rama were a divine play or a *lila* that must be sung for liberation. The poetry of the saints of this sect was filled with expressions of submission to the divine, chosen as the most desirable form (*ishta*) by the devotee (*bhakta*). Singing the attributes (*gunakirtana*) of the lord was the chief mode of worship, whether done individually in isolation or in a community of the faithful. For the latter, the formless god (*Nirankar*) was contemplated by calling or singing only his name, which led to a state of yogic awareness (*samadhi*). Ramanuja, Ramananda, Kabir, Raidas, Nanak, and a host of others produced poetry that inspired the Nirguna tradition, one of the many sects of the Bhakti movement and philosophy.

Hindu Philosophy in Perspective

Hindu philosophy has adjusted well to a contemporary pluralistic world. Its major doctrines were not contradicted by modern theories of science, humanism, equality, or democracy. Modern exponents of Hinduism such as Ramakrishna, Vivekananda, Dayananda Saraswati, Sri Aurobindo, and Gandhi demonstrated that its ancient beliefs could deliver practical results in the contemporary world. The Hindus and the people of India in general have always believed that there is an underlying ultimate reality behind all beliefs and philosophical systems. This

philosophic conviction is reflected nowhere better than in the benedictory verse of the play *Mahanatakam* by the eleventh-century poet Hanuman.

The One who is worshiped as Siva by the *Saivas*, as Brahma by *Vedantis*, as Buddha by *Buddhas*, as *Karta* by *Naiyayikas* the logicians, as *Arhat* by the *Jainas*, and Karma (*yajna*) by *Mimansakas*; such a Vishnu, the lord of three worlds, may fulfill your desires.

Bharat Gupt

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HINDU VALUES India is home to more religious systems than any other Asian country, implying that it has a more varied range of ethical principles or cultural values than any other part of the continent. Hinduism itself embraces a multiplicity of beliefs, practices, and peoples that emphatically do not fall under the umbrella of one church, one pope, one liturgical system, or one hierarchy of priests or monks.

The word "Hinduism" and even the concept are English, deriving from the Persian Hindu or the Sanskrit Sindhu, names for the Indus River. Indian languages do not have a word that corresponds with *Hinduism*, only such words as dharma (social duty) and karma (fate). Cultural values are pervasive yet difficult

to pin down, at the same time a part of behavior, a part of culture, and a part of social structure (Hockings, 1988: 39–46). Moreover they are commonly specified in both sacred texts and secular proverbs.

Ethical obedience is the pathway to salvation. Life should be governed by the discharge of accumulated duties or debts. These debts are diffuse: to the gods, to the seers and sages who discovered truth, to ancestors, and to humanity at large. Debts to the gods can be discharged through sacrifice and *puja* (offering and veneration); to the ancestors by raising good, virtuous children; and to society by acts of hospitality and charity.

Hindu values fall broadly into five categories: moral values (dharma), politico-economic values or concern with worldly affairs (*artha*), hedonistic values and amorous desires (*kama*), spiritual values and deliverance (*moksa*), and absolute reality (brahman). Although categorized thus, values in actual use create a more complex picture altogether. This is readily evident from the corpuses of proverbs, each of which embodies a value: Sebastiao Dalgado (1898) arranged 223 subject headings to present 2,177 Konkani proverbs; Herman Jensen (1897) employed 352 subject headings to present 3,644 Tamil proverbs; and Paul Hockings (1988) used 393 subject headings to analyze some 1,600 Badaga proverbs and 130 other clichés. The Hindu Badagas, for example, have specific cultural values relating to such topics as respect, wealth, exertion, waste, matricide, forgiveness, subjection, and impotence. But just as the complexity of a society based on many hundreds of castes was simplified in ancient times into a model of five *varnas*, or ranked-caste categories, so too the ancient philosophers simplified the multiplicity of values expressed in proverbs and prayers into the neatly comprehensible idea of the fivefold ends of human life outlined above under the headings of dharma, *artha*, *kama*, *moksa*, and brahman.

The Hindu individual is constrained by his or her position in a caste-organized society. The caste into which he or she was born and where he or she will always remain belongs to one of four ranked *varnas* unless that individual is of the very low "untouchable" or tribal status. In that case he or she falls outside this system. The Brahmans are the highest of the four *varnas*, Brahman males traditionally function as priests, teachers, and literati. It is essential that such men and women live in accordance with their dharma and maintain their high level of purity. Kshatriyas are the second-ranking *varna*; Kshatriya males include rulers and warriors. Their duty is essentially concerned with

artha, the material interests. Next are the Vaisyas who should pursue *kama*, the hedonistic values. These three categories are considered "twice-born" because of their male initiation ceremonies. Sudras, ranked fourth and lowest, are not twice-born. Above the four *varnas* are the few renouncers who abandon the material world for the pursuit of *moksa*, which means deliverance from the cycle of rebirths (*samsara*). Release from rebirth is the highest aspiration.

Paul Hockings

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HINDUISM—INDIA Hinduism, possibly the oldest surviving religion in the world, began well over three thousand years ago in India. A product of a variety of peoples and cultures, it evolved out of the varying faiths in different regions, assimilating all the diverse cultural practices of India. Its original followers knew the faith as *Sanathana Dharma*, or "a way of life"; it was Europeans, who first encountered it being practiced on the banks of the Indus River, who called it "Hinduism," after the Persian name for the river, *Sindhu*.

Beliefs

Though Hinduism is quite complex and practiced in a variety of ways, it is based on simple tenets, which include a belief in one supreme being who is without forms or attributes; a belief that God accepts everyone's prayer directed towards every form they worship; the espousal of nonviolence (*ahimsa*); vegetarian



Figures on the frieze of a modern Hindu temple in a small village north of Mysore, India, in 1982. (SHELDAN COLLINS/CORBIS)



MAHABALIPURAM— WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Designated as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1984, this group of sanctuaries around Mahabalipuram was hewn into rock off the Coromandel coast in India by Pallava kings in the seventh and eighth centuries CE. The wide variety of temples and statues include the famous open-air relief known as the "Descent to the Ganges," sun chariot ratha temples, and even sanctuaries built into caves.

food habits (where possible); compassion to all lives; divine duty (dharma); activity without attachment (karma yoga); and devotion and surrender to God (bhakti). Hindus also believe in the indestructibility of the soul, a cycle of rebirth, and the ultimate liberation of the soul, or *moksa*.

One widespread misperception of Hinduism is that it is a polytheistic religion with pagan rituals. The reality of Hinduism is that there exists *Nirguna Brahman*, or "god without attributes," which we are unable to comprehend. Thus, God appears to us veiled in a *maya* (illusion), as *Saguna Brahman*, or "god with attributes," so that we can relate to it. As a prism of light can be broken down into colors for us to see, Brahman (the ultimate goal of all being) assumes many forms to enable people to understand it. The main three forms of Brahman (also seen spelled Brahma) are Brahma, the creator; Vishnu, the preserver; and Siva, the destroyer. Hindus may worship one form exclusively, as Vaishnavas do for Vishnu, or Saivas do for Siva, or still others do for many, even thousands, of other forms. What is most important is that people from all walks of life and all intellectual levels can worship God; thus, Hinduism espouses tolerance and the freedom to worship God in any form. This tenet of the faith is the foundation for its acceptance of other religions. Whatever form one worships, one is worshipping Brahman.

Hindus understand that in order for a being to live, it must take other lives for nourishment. However, life is put into a hierarchy of sensory perception, with humans having the most sensory perception. To Hindus, the more sensory organs a being has, the more pain it will suffer in the process of being killed. Hinduism does not have specific rules about what to eat and not to eat, but it has the goal of causing the least amount of pain possible when deciding what to consume.

Thus, it is believed to be more advisable to kill a plant than to kill an animal for food.

The ultimate goal of a Hindu is to be freed from the cycle of rebirth by *moksa*, or liberation of the soul. Hindus believe the soul is eternal, with no beginning or end. With the ending of each life, the soul leaves a body and enters another, and manifests itself within that body. One's good actions through duty (dharma), and actions having consequences (karma), determine the form of one's next life. If the good done by an individual greatly exceeds any wrongdoing, then the soul may ultimately be liberated from the cycle of rebirth and become one with God.

Development

Hinduism's evolution over time is now denoted by reference to periods that correspond with significant events in Indian history. The earliest period of Indian history is called the Vedic age, dating from roughly 1500 BCE or even earlier, to about 500 BCE. The Vedic age is subdivided by Indian historians into the ages of the Manthras, the Brahmanas, and the Upanishads, all Vedic texts. The second period, during the Maurya empire, from about 324 BCE to 200 BCE, is the age of Vedanga and the Kalpa Sutras. Then, from 200 BCE until 300 CE, around the time of the Gupta empire, is the age of the epics, primarily the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana*. The period from 300 CE to 650 CE is the age of the Puranas, Agamas, and Dharsanas, and the period ending around 1000 CE is the age of the later Puranas. The *bhakti* devotional movements started at this time and continued until the eighteenth century. The last four centuries saw the decline and then the renaissance of Hindu religious practice under the Moghul and British rules.

In the twentieth century, Hinduism has been a powerful unifying force in India. In the 1990s it emerged as a political force and was set forth by some political parties as the major unifying and distinctive element of Indian culture.

Paul Hockings

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HINDUISM—THAILAND In the Buddhist Thai kingdom, the Hindus constitute about one-tenth



Although Buddhism is the major religion across Thailand, Hindu elements are also often present. Here, cleansing water is thrown over a young man in traditional dress at the Thai Buddhist New Year's festival in 1995. (KEVIN R. MORRIS/CORBIS)

of the population. However, various aspects of Hinduism are deeply entrenched in Thai society. Although it sometimes is difficult to distinguish the Hindu elements in Thai culture, Hinduism has survived in Thailand through the concepts of royalty, festivals, music, architecture, the pantheon of Hindu deities, language, and literature.

The Hindu *dharmasastras* (religious scriptures), the concept of kingship, and brahmanical rituals have become essential features of state formation, and rulers have legitimized their position with the help of *brabmans* (priests, *phrams* in Thai). These priests perform various rituals connected with royalty. In the *rajyab-hiseka* ceremony (consecration), they invoke the blessings of Hindu deities and present royal regalia to the king, and Thai ceremonies adhere to the tenets of the Satapatha Brahmana and Aitreya Brahmana. The steed

of the Hindu God Vishnu Garuda is the royal symbol of Thailand.

The influence of Hinduism is also ingrained in popular Thai culture. Icons of Hindu gods and goddesses have been discovered in ancient excavations, and sculptures of such icons as Parvati, Hanumana, Ganesha, Vishnu, Indra, and Brahma adorn wats (temples) in Thailand. Images of Ganesha, the patron of Thai arts, are sometimes installed in newly constructed buildings. Hindu deities are worshipped along with Buddha and *phis* (spirits). Even to the present, the Thai congregate at the Erawan shrine in Bangkok to invoke Brahma.

The *Ramayana* tradition is important in Thailand. In the process of adoption, the stories of *Ramayana* have been transformed into a Thai version known as the *Ramakien*. Performing arts forms like classical dance, masked plays, theater shows, and shadow plays have continuously used the themes of this classic. The Thai features in these works are so predominant that only the origin of the *Ramakien* remains as a non-indigenous element. An admixture of Hindu and Buddhist elements exists in the popular festivals like *Lob Chingecha* (swing ceremony), *Loi Krathong* (festival of lights), *Baruna Satra* (rain festival), and *Songkran* (astrological New Year). The *brabmans* also have a role in such family ceremonies as births, deaths, purifications, and weddings. The similarities of Thai beliefs in the existence of the other world with such Hindu concepts as *savan* (paradise) and *narok* (hell) and with the Hindu names for deities (*devata*), worship (*pussa*), and God (*isuan*) point toward the cultural interaction between Thailand and India. Thai society has shown a tremendous capacity to harmonize Hindu elements and yet retain its distinct identity.

Patit Paban Mishra

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HIR RANJHA STORY The story of Hir and Ranjha is an important part of Punjabi cultural life. A

seminal part of the region's vibrant oral tradition from at least the sixteenth century, the story is also prominent in the Punjab's print culture from the mid-nineteenth century onward. Composed in many languages, among them Arabic, Hindi, Persian, Rajasthani, Sindhi, and Urdu, and famous beyond the geographical boundaries of the Punjab, the Hir Ranjha story is considered the region's premier epic romance.

The story concerns Dhido, known throughout the tale by his clan name Ranjha, the favored son of a landowner in the village of Takht Hazara (Punjab, Pakistan). Upon his father's death, Ranjha is cheated of his inheritance by his brothers and leaves home in search of a renowned beauty, Hir, a member of the prominent Sial clan and the daughter of an important landowner in the area of Jhang (Punjab, Pakistan). Upon his arrival in Jhang, Ranjha and Hir fall in love. Hir's family objects to the relationship because of Ranjha's perceived inferior social status and insists that she marry Seido of the Khera clan, a match that her family considers more suitable. Hir is forced to marry Seido, and, depending on the rendition, Hir and Ranjha are either reunited at the end of the story or die for their love. The story has three primary interpretations: as a temporal love story, as an allegorical tale

about divine love (primarily in the Sufi tradition), and as an allegory for stories of Hindu divinities.

That the story was well known in the Punjab as early as the sixteenth century is shown by its inclusion in the compositions of the Sufi poet Shah Hussein (c. 1539–1599) and the Sikh writer Bhai Gurdas Bhalla (c. 1551–1633). Although the first known full-length rendition of the Hir Ranjha story is a Persian composition by Baki Kolabi, dated about 1575, the first rendition of the entire tale in Punjabi is by Damodar, completed about 1605. After Damodar, Ahmad Gujjar composed a version in 1682, Shah Jehan Muqbal in 1746–1747, and Waris Shah in 1766–1767. Although Waris Shah's is the most acclaimed rendition of the story, it has been composed by innumerable poets in both oral and printed forms, each poet giving the story his or her own flavor. Through the early twentieth century the story was always composed in verse (in various genres). Since then the Hir Ranjha story has been adapted to other genres, such as drama and prose, while at the same time continuing to be an important idiom for poetic and cultural expression.

Farina Mir



Hiratsuka Raicho (fifth from the right) with other members of the New Woman's Association at a meeting to discuss gaining the right to vote for Japanese women. (UNDERWOOD & UNDERWOOD/CORBIS)

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HIRATSUKA RAICHO (1886–1971), Japanese writer and women's rights activist. Born Hiratsuka Haruko, the daughter of a privileged Tokyo family, Hiratsuka graduated from Japan Woman's College in 1906. The college rescinded the diploma in 1908, however, when her relationship with married writer Morita Sohei (1881–1949) became a public scandal. Her notoriety helped launch her writing career in 1911, when Hiratsuka adopted the penname Raicho and, with others, founded the all-women's journal *Seito* (Bluestockings, 1911–1916). Fearless and unconventional, *Seito* gave voice to the desires of the "new woman."

A Zen practitioner, Raicho used *Seito* to urge women to rediscover their creativity, to seek meaningful education and work, and to expand beyond the roles for women extolled by the state. Her most famous essay, the *Seito* manifesto "In the Beginning, Woman Was the Sun," imagines a primordial female courage that paradoxically transcends gender. Raicho brought this boldness into her own life, bearing two children out of wedlock with artist Okumura Hiroshi (1891–1964), who became her lifelong partner and whom she married in 1941.

In 1920 Raicho helped found the Shin Fujin Kyokai (New Woman's Association), which worked to expand women's rights to participate in political organizations and agitated for women's suffrage. From the early postwar years through the 1960s, Raicho was a leading figure in both the domestic and international women's movements for peace.

Jan Bardsley

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HIROHITO (1901–1989), Japanese emperor. On 29 April 1901, Michinomiya Hirohito was born as the first son of Japanese Crown Prince Yoshihito (later



A formal portrait of Emperor Hirohito in 1982. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

Emperor Taisho) and Princess Sadako (later Empress Teimei). The lineage of the Japanese emperor system is traced back 2,600 years and is linked with Japanese legend and mythology. Japanese history and legend defined the emperor as a descendant of the sun goddess Amaterasu.

In 1908, Hirohito entered Gakusyuin Elementary School in Tokyo and continued his special training to be emperor. In 1912, after the death of Hirohito's grandfather, Emperor Meiji, Hirohito became crown prince. In the spring of 1921, Crown Prince Hirohito went to Europe for six months, learning of freedom and modernity in European societies through his travels and studies.

Crown Prince Hirohito's reign started in November 1921 because his father, Emperor Taisho, was unable to rule due to illness. In 1924, Crown Prince Hirohito married Princess Nagako, and together they had two sons and five daughters. On 25 December 1926, with Emperor Taisho's death, Crown Prince Hirohito officially took the 124th Chrysanthemum Throne when he was twenty-five years old. Following

tradition, Hirohito's ascendance to the throne began a new period, Showa (Illustrious Peace).

Soon after the Showa period started, Japan embarked on militarism, entering a dark period of total war. In 1931, Japan invaded China after the Manchurian Incident, which led to the Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945. In December 1941, Japan entered World War II in the Pacific with the attack on Pearl Harbor. In this period, Emperor Hirohito had supreme authority as the constitutional monarch, in which position he served as the symbol of national unity for the Japanese people and military.

On 15 August 1945, Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration that ended World War II, after the United States dropped nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Under Allied occupation from 1945 to 1952, the emperor was treated as the means of achieving democracy. On 1 January 1946, Emperor Hirohito renounced his divinity under the new constitution (effective in May 1947); the role of the emperor was redefined from "a living god" to "the symbol of the state and of the unity of people." Following this, Emperor Hirohito devoted himself to Japan's postwar recovery by visiting prefectures, making personal appearances in public, and interacting with the Japanese people.

On 7 January 1989, Emperor Hirohito died in the Imperial Palace in Tokyo. This ended the Showa period, a period that saw brutal militarism, the invasion

of Asia, World War II, Allied occupation, Japan's recovery from war and poverty, and Japan's economic miracles. Japanese people in the Showa period witnessed a rapid transformation from a military nation to a democratic nation in which Emperor Hirohito took a symbolic role through a dark and prosperous period of Japanese history. The role and image of Hirohito changed over the period due to Japan's political aims and conditions. He was an absolute monarchy and "a living god" to the Japanese before and during the war, and he became a symbol of Japan after the war and was deemed a good man to lead Japan to a modern and democratic society. The emperor system (*tennou-sei*) is deeply integrated into Japanese history, society, and people. Hirohito's birthday is still a Japanese national holiday and is translated as "Green Day."

Hitomi Maeda

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HIROSHIMA (2002 est. pop. of prefecture 2.9 million). The city of Hiroshima (2002 estimated popula-



The devastation in Hiroshima after the atomic bombing of 6 August 1945. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

tion 1.1 million) is the capital of Hiroshima Prefecture, situated on Japan's island of Honshu. Today a city dedicated to peace, it was the first to be devastated by an atomic bomb. Now one of the nation's most modern urban areas, the rebuilt Hiroshima is the leading industrial center of the western Honshu region.

Hiroshima grew during the Edo period (1600/1603–1868) as a castle town around a fortress completed in 1593 by the great warrior and Japanese feudal lord Mori Terumoto. After the 1868 Meiji Restoration, the city became an important military, industrial, and transport center. In an attempt to bring World War II to an end, the atomic blast of 6 August 1945 leveled Hiroshima, eventually killing some 200,000 people. Today Hiroshima is a center for world peace. Near the blast epicenter are the Atomic Bomb Memorial Dome, Peace Memorial Park, a museum, and a cenotaph memorializing the victims. There also is a smaller town of Hiroshima outside Sapporo on Hokkaido island; it was settled in 1884 by emigrants from Hiroshima Prefecture.

Hiroshima Prefecture occupies an area of 8,467 square kilometers. Its geography features the Chugoku Mountains, southern highlands, and coastal plains. It is bordered by the Inland Sea and by Shimane, Tottori, Okayama, and Yamaguchi prefectures. Once divided into Aki and Bingo Provinces, it assumed its present name and borders in 1876. In the late twelfth century, the ruling Taira family first developed the region as a commercial and trade center for Inland Sea shipping.

Today rice, citrus fruits, cattle, chrysanthemums, and rushes for tatami mats are produced. The traditional activities of forestry, fishing, and sake brewing continue as well, as do food processing and textile weaving. Heavy industries include steel, petrochemicals, shipbuilding, and automobiles. Visitors are drawn to the island of Miyajima's Itsukushima Shrine, officially one of Japan's three most beautiful views.

E. L. S. Weber

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HITTITES The Hittite empire dominated the central plateau of Anatolia (the Asian portion of modern-day Turkey) from about 1800 BCE to 1200 BCE, and survived until about 700 BCE as a series of smaller



Remains of the Hittite presence are found at the Royal Gate of Hattusa in Bogazkoy, Turkey. (GIANNI DAGLI ORTI/CORBIS)

kingdoms based in southern Turkey and northern Syria. During its period of dominance, it was surrounded in the north by Kaska tribes, in the east by the Mitanni, and in the west by several related tribes of which little is known; on the extreme western seaboard were newly founded Mycenaean colonies.

History

The Hittites seem to have migrated into Anatolia from the Caucasus in around 2000 BCE, and achieved ascendancy over the eastern Anatolian Hurri population. By the eighteenth century BCE their king, Anitta, had conquered neighboring tribes and established a capital at Kussana, in Cappadocia. A century later they had moved the capital to Hattusa, an easily defended citadel 150 kilometers east of what is now Ankara, commanding trade routes from the Black Sea to the Cilician Gates and from the Aegean to Central Asia. Labarnas I (reigned 1680–1650 BCE) and his successors campaigned as far afield as northern Syria; in 1595 BCE Mursilis I captured Babylon from the Hammurabic dynasty, but he was murdered by a pretender to the Hittite throne.

After fifty years of dynastic chaos, the frontiers were consolidated and from the fifteenth century BCE a new dynasty used diplomacy instead of force to dominate client kingdoms. From 1450 BCE, under kings of mixed Hurrian-Hittite lineage, the kingdom again absorbed Aleppo in Syria and Arzawa in southwest Turkey. The kingdom reached its maximum extent under Suppiluliumas I (1380–1340 BCE). The widow of King Tutankhamen of Egypt was so impressed by the deeds of Suppiluliumas I that she asked for his son's hand in marriage.



HATTUSHA—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Hattusha was designated a World Heritage Site by UNESCO in 1986 because of its historical significance as the former capital of the Hittite empire and its remarkable preservation. Hattusha's ornamented Lion's Gate and the rock art of Yazilikaya still evoke images of the Hittite empire four thousand years after their construction.

In about 1300 BCE the Hittites again encountered the Egyptians, in a battle at Kadesh (Syria), which is described in the poem of the Egyptian poet Pentaus. Maneuvering over hilly ground, the Hittite king, Muwatalli, successfully launched his three-man war chariots crewed by archers at the Egyptian forces, but as the Hittites stopped to plunder, Ramses II counterattacked. The resulting stalemate was formalized in a treaty that is described both on the temple walls at Karnak in Egypt and on cuneiform tablets found at Bogazkoy. To cement the alliance, Ramses married a Hittite princess.

The aggressive Assyrians in the east and the influx of Phrygians from the Balkans led to severe pressure on the Hittite kingdom. In unexplained circumstances the capital, Hattusas, was burned in 1200 BCE. The scattered and defeated Hittites moved southeast under pressure from the Phrygians and other "sea peoples" and established new kingdoms south of the Anti-Taurus mountains, based on fortified capital cities discovered at Carchemish (Kargamis), near Gaziantep, and Karatepe, north of Adana. These minor kingdoms, which were far less disciplined and centralized than their predecessor, were eventually overrun by the Assyrians in about 700 BCE.

Discovery and Research

The Hittite civilization was discovered from hieroglyphic inscriptions identified and catalogued by Archibald Henry Sayce (1845–1933), an expert in Sumerian and Assyrian. In 1880 he postulated that an extensive civilization, the Hittites, previously only known from the Old Testament, had existed in the wide area between northern Syria and the mid-Aegean Turkish coast, with its capital at Bogazkoy. Hugo Winckler (1863–1913), an archeologist affiliated with the German Oriental Society, obtained the concession to excavate Bogazkoy, and in 1906, within a few days

of starting work, he unearthed, in the foundations of a major temple, a library of 10,000 tablets bearing cuneiform, not hieroglyphic, inscriptions. Excavations ceased during World War I, but Bedrich (or Friedrich) Hrozny (1879–1952), professor of Assyriology at the University of Vienna, and others continued to work on decipherment of the cuneiform script. In 1915 Hrozny declared that cuneiform Hittite was an Indo-European language. Based on Sumerian and Akkadian insertions into Hittite texts, scholars were able to postulate a vocabulary, which was more or less complete by 1933. From the tablets, an outline of history complete with rulers was established, although minor controversy over dates remained. The tablets also illuminate the social and legal systems; the ones describing religious ceremonies have proved more difficult to interpret. Much later, in 1947, a bilingual tablet discovered at Karatepe proved to be in Phoenician and the hieroglyphic script. The pictographs were identified as Hittite of a slightly different form to the cuneiform language; probably cuneiform Hittite was the commercial and hieroglyphic Hittite the ceremonial language.

Government

The inscriptions revealed the Hittites as a nationalistic, feudal people with a strong code of justice outlined in over two hundred laws. The priest king was supported by the *panka*, an advisory council (later dissolved); a bureaucratic class; and an underclass of slaves. Councils of elders administered distant areas. The king's duties included serving as both military leader and high priest; his campaigns were sometimes curtailed by the need to attend religious ceremonies. Women appear to have had extensive rights; the queens entered into diplomatic correspondence with foreign rulers, many priestesses are known, and rape was one of the few capital offenses under the law. Equitable laws, mainly based on restitution for wrongs by payment in money or kind, reveal an organized agricultural society whose main crops were barley, wheat, and wine-producing grapes. The wealth of the nation lay in the gold, silver (which provided a currency), and iron, which were probably traded extensively.

Religion

The Hittite religion was based on the Hurri weather god Teshub, who rode a chariot pulled by sacred bulls, and his sun-goddess wife Hebat, referred to as "Queen of the land of Hatti, queen of heaven and earth." The city of Hattusas held many major temples, cleverly constructed so that light from huge windows fell on the sacred statue; an unidentified holy city

of Arinna is also mentioned in texts. In the countryside, huge reliefs and inscriptions appear both within and outside Hittite boundaries, often near water sources. The best known religious site, Yazilikaya, 3 kilometers east of Bogazkoy, consists of two adjacent clefts in a hillside, where lines of gods and kings have been carved into the cliffs; a cult building on level ground outside provided a center of worship. This site dates from the reign of King Tudhaliyas IV (reigned 1250–1220 BCE), just before the abandonment of Bogazkoy. The Hittites augmented their pantheon with their neighbors' gods and goddesses; up to a thousand of them were worshipped in local or national festivals with blood sacrifices, or invoked in curses and prayers.

Artifacts

The Hittite culture is represented in the Museum of Anatolian Civilizations in Ankara by many bold reliefs on basalt and limestone blocks and by statues in the round. The motifs are animals (lions, sphinxes, and bulls), the royal family, and the gods. Human figures wear conical hats or helmets, kilts, and boots with turned up toes and are armed; they are usually shown in profile. The Kultepe/Assyrian type of pottery features elegant burnished monochrome pots with long spouts. The museum also houses numerous cuneiform tablets in pottery, silver, and bronze. Hittite writings describe statues made of iron, but it seems that these have not survived. The Turks, supported by the cultural ministry, ascribe great importance to Hittite civilization and in recent years the quest for objects linking the Hittites to sites all over Turkey has become something of a holy grail for Turkish archaeologists.

Kate Clow

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HIZBULLAH Hizbullah (Arabic: "army of Allah"), an Islamic militia, was founded in December 1944 by Japanese occupation authorities in Java to assist in the island's defense against an expected Allied invasion. It was formally an organ of the Japanese-sponsored central Islamic council, Masjumi or Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Indonesian

Muslims), and probably numbered about five hundred at the war's end (despite official mention of 400,000 recruits). Its units received only a little Japanese training, but provided a core for many irregular Islamic units that fought the Dutch during Java's nationalist revolution (1945–1949). The Hizbullah high command under Zainal Arifin (1909–1963) remained affiliated with the Masjumi, which had become an Islamic political party in Java, but central authorities had little control over units in the field. In 1947, the Hizbullah and other irregular forces were formally merged with the Army of the Indonesian Republic (Tentara Republik Indonesia, or TRI) to form the Indonesian National Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI), but most units retained their autonomy. The Hizbullah was especially strong in southern West Java and refused to leave their bases when the leaders of the Indonesian Republic formally relinquished West Java to the Dutch in late 1948. Some units became the basis of the armed forces of the Darul Islam rebellion, which first fought the Dutch and then the Republic in West Java from 1948 to 1963 with the aim of establishing an Indonesian Islamic state.

Robert Cribb

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HMONG Over the past two centuries, the Hmong people have migrated from the southwestern provinces of China into the foothills of northern Laos and Vietnam, parts of Myanmar (Burma), and Thailand. In China, they form approximately one-third of the minority population officially classified as Miao (a name considered distasteful to Hmong outside China), which numbers over 8 million. The Hmong in China live in remote villages scattered through the provinces of Yunnan, Sichuan, Guizhou, and Guangxi. While at times the Hmong, who are thought to have originated in eastern China, have been able to establish permanent settlements and to practice irrigated agriculture, typically they have been shifting cultivators of upland crops such as dry rice, buckwheat, millet, and maize. As pioneer shifting cultivators, they have migrated great distances from the previous locations of their villages.

History and Economic Development

Rebellious southern people called the Miao, recorded in Chinese annals as having been banished from the central plains around 2500 BCE at the founding of the Chinese state, have existed throughout Chinese history. Although the term was very generally applied to numerous southern populations by the Chinese, ancestors of the Hmong were probably included in many of these references to the Miao. With the great expansion of the Han Chinese people into southern China from the time of the Song dynasty (960–1279 CE) on, increasing pressures were placed on scarce resources of land and water, and the Hmong, together with other minority populations, were further marginalized and forced to the higher altitudes where only shifting cultivation could be practiced. Today, the greatest area of Hmong concentration in China is Wenshan autonomous district on the Vietnam border, although Bijie, in northwest Guizhou, is another area of dense Hmong settlement.

As the Hmong began to migrate into northern Indochina (now the northern parts of Vietnam and Laos) from around 1850, they found themselves inhabiting new nation-states whose borders were eventually formed under the impact of the French colonization of Indochina and the British colonization of Myanmar (then Burma). Colonial encouragement and taxation of opium production created economic improvements that helped solve the chronic shortages of staple foodstuffs and indebtedness to itinerant Chinese traders, which the Hmong had previously suffered. An integrated upland economy developed in the region, based on the cultivation of dry rice in rotation with maize and opium poppy, together with the animal husbandry of swine and poultry, some fishing, hunting of wild animals, and gathering of wild products in the forest. Opium was sold to traders in return for rice.

Hmong involvement in what soon became the global opium trade and their familiarity with remote terrains on the borders with neighboring countries brought them into strategic focus during the struggles between Communists and rightist forces that marked the Indochina wars from 1954 to 1976. Hmong mercenaries fought on both sides and suffered enormous casualties during this period.

Shortly after 1975, over 100,000 Hmong who had fled the Communist victory in Laos were resettled in third countries such as the United States, Canada, French Guyana, Argentina, Surinam, France, Australia, and New Zealand after transiting in refugee camps along the Thai border with Laos. There reportedly are now approximately 1.2 million Hmong

living outside China, with some 194,000 overseas and slightly over a million still in Southeast Asia.

Culture and Social Organization

There are two main cultural divisions among the Hmong of Southeast Asia and overseas, which are marked by strong distinctions of dialect, women's costume, domestic architecture, and ritual. These divisions are the Green and the White Hmong (*Hmoob Ntsuab* and *Hmoob Dawb*). Traditionally, Green and White Hmong had difficulties understanding each other, settled in different villages, and rarely intermarried. These distinctions remain strong today, although more intermarriage and co-residence exist than in the past. Other cultural divisions of the Hmong exist in China, such as the Hmong Pua and Hmong Xauv, and still others can be found in Southeast Asia.

All Hmong share a common language and kinship system, with twenty surname groups (*lub xeem*), which reckon descent patrilineally and have names resembling Chinese surnames. At marriage, a woman is expected to leave the household of her natal family and move to that of her husband. While free courtship is customary, the wedding is elaborately celebrated and can be a protracted business, including ceremonial presentations and wedding songs sung by go-betweens representing both parties to the marriage. At marriage, a man is expected to present to his wife's family an expensive bride-price that is traditionally paid in silver and that is said to compensate the bride's parents for their trouble in bringing her up. It may take years to amass a sufficient bride-price to marry, and a young man is often dependent on his father for this. This payment acts as a sanction against divorce, since a wife's family may be reluctant to return this payment unless it can be shown that the wife has given serious grounds for divorce. Strict monogamy is expected of a wife after marriage; a man however may take two or more wives, although this is rare.

In the village, typically located at altitudes of 900–1,500 meters, the local descent group of an exogamous patrilineage—perhaps four or five closely related families—is the main functional social unit. There are no hereditary positions of leadership, and families have considerable autonomy in deciding, for example, where to cultivate fields or whether to move from the village to a new area of cultivation. All adults are farmers, while particular adults may also specialize as blacksmiths or silversmiths, wedding go-betweens, funeral specialists, herbalists, or shamans. The most respected position is that of the shaman (*txiv neeb*). Shamans are consulted in cases of illness, mental stress, or social disturbance.

The Hmong of China and Thailand have now largely abandoned opium production. Many Hmong villages in China have managed to plant small areas of irrigated rice in a way similar to local Chinese villages. In Thailand, however, the Hmong have turned to other cash crops to replace the lucrative opium poppy, and this has led to tensions with lowland Thai, who accuse them of poisoning lowland water sources through the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides needed for these new cash crops.

The Hmong culture and social system are rich and complex. The elaborations of the wedding ceremony and the beauty of the women's intricate batik and embroidery, the festivities of the Hmong New Year (*noj peb tsaug*), the shaking of the shaman as she enters the Otherworld to rescue the lost soul of a sick person, and the long mournful chants of the Master of Death as he guides the soul of the deceased back to the village of his or her ancestors at the dawn of historical time are unique and identifying characteristics of Hmong culture.

The Hmong share with the Chinese a system of geomancy (*saib loojmem*) for the siting of villages and graves in which human residences are aligned with the natural contours of rivers and mountains.

For over a hundred years, foreign missionaries have worked among the Hmong, and many Hmong are now Protestants or Catholics, having abandoned ancestor worship, shamanism, and the rites of death. This has led to tensions between traditional and Christian Hmong.

Redefining Traditional Roles

While traditionally Hmong women have had a higher social status than Chinese women, there has been an effective muting of women in Hmong political and ritual affairs, which may have been strengthened by male control of the cash derived from opium sales. Among the overseas Hmong, significant changes have taken place in relations between the generations as well as between men and women. Overseas Hmong communities have debated the changing role of women and elders in their society, how to pay the traditional bride-price, and above all how to preserve the Hmong culture for a younger generation, many of whom show little interest in tradition.

Returning Hmong

Recently some overseas Hmong have begun to revisit their traditional locations in Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand, and even the homes of their more remote ancestors in southern China. New connections be-

tween transnational Hmong communities have been formed, aided by the use of videos and the Internet, and some global trading relations have been established along Hmong lines. It is too early to say whether these new contacts will lead to a new kind of diasporic Hmong community, or whether they represent the sentimental nostalgia of a people hopelessly divided and dispersed by the forces of modernity and change.

Nicholas Tapp

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HMONG-MIEN LANGUAGES The Hmong-Mien (also known as Miao-Yao—a term now rarely used outside of China) languages, are one of the major independent language families of Southeast Asia. The two branches of the family, Hmong (Miao) and Mien (Yao), respectively, may be described as clusters of dialects, which are scattered over a wide area of southern China and some adjacent Southeast Asian countries. Hmong dialects are spoken by approximately 5.5 million speakers; Mien speakers number approximately 2 million.

The most important variants of Hmong are Western Hmong (2 million speakers in the Chinese provinces of Guizhou, Guangxi, Sichuan, and Yunnan, as well as in northern Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos), Eastern Hmong (1.4 million speakers in Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi), Northern Hmong (750,000 speakers in Hunan Province, China), Hmong Daw, or "White Hmong" (100,000 speakers in Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam), and Hmong Njua,

or "Blue Hmong" (200,000 speakers in Laos and Thailand). Considerable numbers of White and Blue Hmong speakers live abroad, at least 70,000 of each group in the United States. The 500,000 speakers of Punu in Guangxi are officially included in the Mien (Yao) nationality but speak a Hmong language. Only a thousand persons of the approximately 350,000 that constitute the She nationality in Guangdong Province, China, speak another Hmong language, generally known as Ho-Nte.

The Mien language is more uniform. Its most important varieties are Mien proper (approximately 850,000 speakers in Guangxi, Guangdong, Yunnan, Hunan, and Guizhou; some 60,000 in Laos; and 30,000 in Thailand), Iu Mien (200,000 speakers in Guangdong), and Mun, spoken in southern China, Laos, and Vietnam.

Hmong-Mien languages are typical Southeast Asian languages, with monosyllabic words, rich systems of tones (up to eight—in some dialects of Mien, more than ten), subject-verb-object word order, etc. Typological differences within the family include the fact that words in Hmong may end only in nasal consonants or no consonant at all, whereas Mien languages mostly tolerate different consonants in this position. In Hmong, modifiers (adjectives, etc.) usually follow the noun they modify, whereas in Mien the opposite order prevails. The She language behaves, in terms of these and other typological features, like a language of the Mien group, but can nevertheless be shown to belong to the Hmong branch.


In terms of genetic relationship, the status of Hmong-Mien as a family of related languages is not in doubt, but external relationships have not been established in a satisfactory way. The formerly widespread inclusion of Hmong-Mien into the large Sino-Tibetan phylum has now generally been abandoned.

Stefan Georg

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HO CHI MINH (1890–1969), North Vietnamese president. Born on 19 May 1890 in the village of Kim Lien, in the province of Nghe An in Vietnam, Ho was originally named Nguyen Sinh Cung. At ten, his name was changed to Nguyen Tat Thanh (Nguyen Who Will Be Victorious). In 1911, he left Vietnam for France. In 1919, when U.S. president Woodrow Wilson came to France, Nguyen tried to enlist his support for Vietnamese self-determination; rebuffed, he turned to communism. He became a member of the French Communist Party in 1920 and changed his name to Nguyen Ai Quoc (Nguyen the Patriot). From 1921 to 1929, Nguyen energetically participated in the political activities of the International Communist Party and published a book entitled *Revolutionary Path* in 1927. In 1923, he went to the Soviet Union to win support for his cause among exiled Vietnamese dissidents. His travels also took him to China, Burma, and India. On 3 February 1930, with the approval of



Ho Chi Minh in 1969. (HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS)

Moscow and the support of China, Ho formed the Indochina Communist Party (later referred to as the Viet Minh) in Hong Kong.

Nguyen renamed himself again in 1940, as Ho Chi Minh (Ho Who Aspires to Enlightenment). In 1941, Ho was arrested in China on charges of being a spy for the French. In prison, Ho composed patriotic poems, which expressed his determination and the internal strength to achieve his goal of Vietnamese independence. In 1944, he returned to Vietnam, where he led resistance against both the French and the Japanese. He declared Vietnam's independence from France on 2 September 1945 and named the country the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). He served as the DRV's first president (1945–1969). The French were unwilling to accept Vietnam's independence, however, and the First Indochina War was fought from 1946 until France's decisive defeat at the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Vietnam was partitioned at the seventeenth parallel, with the DRV governing the northern portion. Ho, determined to reunite Vietnam, soon found himself fighting the United States; he died before reunification was achieved. The Vietnamese affectionately called him "Uncle Ho." Ho lived in a modest home in Hanoi until his death; that house is on display in Hanoi as part of the mausoleum built in his honor, which is visited by thousands every day. Although highly praised as an outstanding leader, he also received much criticism for his uncompromising strategies and his willingness to achieve his goals at any price.

Ha Huong

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HO CHI MINH CITY (2001 pop. 3.3 million). Located on the southern coast of Vietnam near the Mekong Delta, Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) is a bustling and fast-growing city that has a long and storied history. Bordered by the Ben Nghe Channel to the south, the Thi Nghe Channel to the north, and the

Saigon River to the east, the city has been fought over by many groups over the past two thousand years. The area was first settled in the second century BCE by the Khmer empire of Funan (second century CE–sixth century CE), which used the forested area as a trading post and called it Prei Nokor, meaning "Land of Forests." Over the next centuries the trading post attracted merchants from Japan, India, China, the Middle East, Malaysia, and Champa (now part of modern day Vietnam). Over seven centuries, Prei Nokor slowly grew into a small market town and administrative center. Earthen walls were built as protection from the occasional Cham raids on the growing city. By the fourteenth century, Prei Nokor became part of the Angkor empire of the Khmer, sister empire to the kingdom of Champa. In 1674 the Nguyen lords, rulers of southern Vietnam who had defeated the Cham, established a customs post in the city. The Vietnamese, who called the city Saigon, dug a four-mile trench in 1772 on the western edge of the city and, in effect, transferred control of Saigon from the Angkor to the Nguyen. Beginning in 1778, Cholon, the Chinese part of the city, was developed as a second commercial hub in the area. In 1789, the Nguyen moved their government base from Hue to Saigon to escape the Tay Son rebels. In 1802, with French assistance, the Nguyen, under General Nguyen Anh (reigned as emperor 1802–1820), defeated the Tay Son, reunited Vietnam, and moved the capitol back to Hue. The French, after demanding territorial concessions in Vietnam for their assistance to the Nguyen dynasty during the rebellion, attacked and seized Saigon in 1859 and made it the capital of their new colony. After defeat at the hands of the Viet Minh in 1954, the French abandoned Saigon. The city then became the capital of the new Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and remained so throughout the Second Indochinese War between the United States and the Democratic Socialist Republic of Vietnam (DSRV). By 1975, the DSRV had defeated both the Americans and the RVN; when they took over Saigon, they renamed it Ho Chi Minh City after the leader of the Vietnamese independence movement who had died in 1969. Today Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam's largest, is one of the fastest growing cities in the world, both economically and in population, and remains a city of diverse cultures and influences. The city celebrated its three-hundred-year anniversary in 1998.

Richard B. Verrone

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
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HO CHI MINH TRAIL The Ho Chi Minh Trail was a 12,000-mile network of jungle roads and trails paralleling the Annamite Cordillera used by the North Vietnamese to transport communications, supplies, and troops to South Vietnam during the Vietnam War. The North Vietnamese began using the system in the late 1950s and quickly expanded and improved the trail's infrastructure in the 1960s as its use increased. A complex communication system arose

with underground barracks, repair shops, hospitals, and supply warehouses located at strategic points along the trail. With the trail's improvements, the duration of the trip was shortened from six months to one month, but the travelers still endured dangers such as malaria and wild animals.

It was imperative that the North Vietnamese control the vicinities of the trail, including sections in Laos. The Ho Chi Minh Trail entered Laos at Mu Gia Pass in Bolikhamxai province and traveled south through Attapu province, where the trail branched into Cambodia and South Vietnam. Lao cities located on the system include Pakxong, Salavan, Xekong, and Xepon.

U.S. military aircraft bombed the districts around the trail as well as where communists were active in Laos. The bombings escalated after 1964 when Lao



This map from 1970 shows the route of the Ho Chi Minh Trail from North to South Vietnam. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

prime minister Souvanna Phouma announced his approval for U.S. armed reconnaissance flights over Laos in Operation Steel Tiger. The United States also released defoliants to expose the trail and ground troops in an effort to deter the North Vietnamese. During the Johnson administration the number of bombs dropped increased from three hundred to nine hundred a day. Despite being round-the-clock over a period of years, the bombings failed to stop the North Vietnamese from using the trail.

A major defeat for the United States and South Vietnam was Operation Lam Son 719 in 1971. The target of the operation was Xepon, a major outpost for the communists where the trail diverged into three arteries. The target was never reached, and the South Vietnamese army retreated after suffering over five thousand casualties. The U.S. lost over a hundred aircraft in this failed attempt to shut down the trail.

The effects of the bombings are still felt in Laos. Two million tons of bombs were dropped on Laos during the war, making it the most heavily bombed nation per capita. Accidents involving unexploded ordnance (UXO) occur on average on a daily basis. Teams of UXO detection and demolition specialists continue to comb the countryside in an effort to rid the country of the deadly threats, but the people of Laos will feel the impact of the bombings for decades as more explosives are unearthed.

Linda McIntosh

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HO DYNASTY CITADEL Also known as Tay Do (Capital of the West) or Thanh Nha Ho (Ho Dynasty Citadel), the Ho Dynasty Citadel is located in Tay Giai village in Hoa Binh Province, approximately 150 kilometers west of Hanoi. It was built in 1397 under the rule of Ho Quy Ly. Unlike other Vietnamese citadels, which up until that time had been built of earth, the Ho Dynasty Citadel was made of green block granite. The citadel's shape was square, with walls of 500 meters on each side. The walls were approximately five meters high and three meters thick. On each wall was a stone entrance, and the citadel it-

self was protected by deep ditches along each of its walls. The citadel did not serve a uniquely military purpose, however, for inside the enclosure the royal palace could be found. For ten years, the Ho Dynasty Citadel served as the seat of the Ho Dynasty's central government. In 1407, the citadel was abandoned and destroyed when Ho Quy Ly was captured and taken prisoner by Ming troops. The only vestiges remaining of the Ho Dynasty Citadel are its south wall and gate, and two carved stone dragons that formerly had been part of the royal palace's structure.

Micheline R. Lessard

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HO TUNG MAU (1896–1951), Vietnamese anticolonial leader. Ho Tung Mau was born in Quynh Doi village in Nghe An Province (in north-central Vietnam) in 1896. The son of a Vietnamese scholar, he obtained a classical education before becoming involved in anticolonial activities. In 1923, along with Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969) (then Nguyen Ai Quoc), Le Hong Phong (1902–1942), and three others, he co-founded the Society of Like Hearts (Tam Tam Xa), a Vietnamese anticolonial organization with anarchist leanings. In 1925 he helped found the Revolutionary Youth League (Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Manh Dong Chi Hoi). In March 1926 Ho Tung Mau joined the Chinese Communist Party and worked closely with Ho Chi Minh in China. While in China, Ho Tung Mau was arrested in an anti-Communist sweep in December 1928. He managed to escape from prison in August 1929, and in 1930 he became one of the founders of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). French police arrested him once again in China in 1931. Condemned to a life sentence, he was released from prison in 1945. Ho Tung Mau ultimately became a member of the ICP's Central Committee. He was a combat pilot and was reportedly killed in 1951 while engaging in an air attack during the Franco-Vietminh War (1946–1954).

Micheline R. Lessard

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HO XUAN HUONG (c. late 1700s–early 1800s), Vietnamese poet and feminist. Although the exact dates of Ho Xuan Huong's life are unknown, she must have lived in the late eighteenth to early nineteenth century. Being the only daughter of a high-ranking civil servant in the Late Le dynasty (1428–1788), she was well educated. She married several times, but for short spans; for some reason, all her husbands died not long after the wedding. She managed a salon frequented by poets and writers; there her talent shone in polished, elegant, but also daring and sexually evocative poems and retorts written in *nom* (Vietnamese demotic script). The following example describes falling down while coming home from school on a rainy day: "I extend my arms to see how high is the sky/ My feet slide to measure the width of the earth!" Another is a reprimand to a close friend who had become too venturesome:

Scholar, are you sober; are you drunk?
How dare you discourse about sex in the middle of
the day?
Come here! Come here so that your elder sister
may warn you:
Don't ever finger that place: it is the tiger's den!

Lam Truong Buu

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HOA HAO One of the six officially recognized religions in Vietnam, Hoa Hao is a Buddhist sect founded in 1939 by a mystic from southern Vietnam, Huynh Phu So (1919–1947), who claimed to be the apostle of a famous Buddhist monk. The religion emphasizes personal faith and simplicity of worship and, therefore, has no special places of devotion. Like other Vietnamese religions, Hoa Hao has been highly politicized. The Viet Minh, an umbrella group of communist organizations seeking to expel the French colonial administration of Indochina, considered the Hoa Hao a rival for the support of the poor peasants in the Mekong Delta in their struggle against the French. The Hoa Hao received political and military support from the Japanese during their World War II occupation of Vietnam and then fought alongside French colonial forces against the Viet Minh after political negotiations between the Viet Minh and the French broke down in 1946. As a result, the Viet Minh murdered So in April 1947.

During the U.S. War in Vietnam (1954–1975), the Hoa Hao raised an army and fought both the communist-backed guerrillas and South Vietnamese forces, but their numbers were greatly diminished in the 1950s. With the overthrow of Republic of Vietnam president Ngo Dinh Diem (1901–1963) in November 1963, the Hoa Hao revived as a political and military force in the Mekong Delta and by 1975, claimed to have one million adherents.

Following the reunification of the country in 1976, the relationship between the Hoa Hao and the victorious communist government that disarmed them, confiscated their properties, and banned the religion became tense. Because of their militant anticommunist activities and ties to foreign-based opposition groups, the Hoa Hao arguably have been the most persecuted of all Vietnam's religious groups, and thousands of members have been arrested since 1976. Hoa Hao followers continue to fight for religious freedom and autonomy from government control, including the right to ordain monks, perform rites, proselytize, and control church properties. While in May 1999 the government did allow 160 Hoa Hao delegates to hold a congress and gave the Hoa Hao official recognition, as of 2001 the government continued to limit religious autonomy. Relations between the Vietnamese government and the Hoa Hao remain tense and often deteriorate into armed clashes, such as the December 1999 confrontation between security forces and 300 followers. As of 2001, there were approximately two million adherents, roughly 1–2 percent of the Vietnamese population, though the government put the figure at 1.3 million.

Zachary Abuza

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HOAN KIEM LAKE Located in the center of the Hoan Kiem District in the Old Quarter area of Hanoi, Hoan Kiem Lake (Ho Hoan Kiem or Ho Guom) is the spiritual and social heart of the city and serves as a major gathering point during national holidays such as Vietnam National Day and major festivals such as Tet (New Year's). The small lake is called "The Lake of the Restored Sword," after the legend of Le Loi and his defeat of the Chinese. Under the

leadership of Le Loi, a wealthy landowner in the province of Thanh Hoa south of the Red River delta, a movement of national resistance started in 1418 against the Chinese occupiers. After a ten-year struggle, the Chinese were forced to evacuate Vietnam. Le Loi, who ascended the throne shortly thereafter under the name of Le Thai To, became the founder of the third great Vietnamese dynasty, the Later Le (or the Le). Legend has it that Le Loi used a magic golden sword from heaven to vanquish the Chinese invaders. While he was boating on Hoan Kiem Lake in celebration of his successful campaign, a giant tortoise rose from the water and retrieved the sword for its heavenly owner. Real turtles live in the lake and are reported to be a uniquely large species (*Rafetus swimboei*) that are surfacing for air with increasing frequency as the lake becomes more polluted.

Richard B. Verrone

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HOANG NGOC PHACH (d. 1973), Vietnamese writer. Although known as the author who introduced the romantic novel into Vietnamese literature with his work *To Tam*, Hoang Ngoc Phach's biography reads much more like a bureaucrat's than a writer's. Born into a family of scholars in Ha Tinh, Hoang studied the Confucian classics at home until the age of fifteen, when he went to Hanoi to attend a Westernized private school. In 1914 he entered the prestigious French-established high school of the Indochinese Protectorate. In 1922 he graduated from the Superior School of Education. He was appointed teacher, school principal, and superintendent of school districts by the French colonial government and, after 1945, by the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). After 1954 he joined the Publications Committee of the Ministry of Education of the DRV, where he readied for publication a great number of classical Vietnamese literary works in Hanoi. In 1959, when the Literature Institute of the Social Sciences Committee was founded, Hoang became an active member of that institute and remained there until his retirement in 1963. Hoang is the author of several books and anthologies, but the one that immortalized him was his novel *To Tam*, which he wrote in 1922 and published three years later.

Truong Buu Lam

HOAT, DOAN VIET (b. 1942), Vietnamese dissident. Since 1971, when he returned to Vietnam following the completion of his doctorate in education from Florida State University, Hoat has been a leading dissident intellectual in Vietnam. Hoat was assistant chancellor of Van Hanh University, a private Buddhist university in Saigon, where he became active in the Buddhist peace movement. On 29 August 1976, following reunification of the country and the closure of all private universities, Hoat was arrested for his "ties" to the United States and imprisoned for twelve years. Following his release on 9 February 1988 he began to coedit *Freedom Forum*, an underground newspaper, published between January and November 1990, that called for democracy, an end to the Communist Party's monopoly of power, and religious and press freedoms. He and six others were arrested on 17 November 1990 for the crime of "attempting to overthrow the people's government." Following a closed-door trial, on 29 March 1993, Hoat was sentenced to twenty years in prison. His case attracted much attention from the international human rights community, including Amnesty International and PEN, as well as the U.S. government. He was released in September 1998 in a presidential amnesty and forced into exile in the United States. He has been the recipient of numerous prizes, including the Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Award and the Golden Pen of Freedom Award.

Zachary Abuza

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HOI AN (1994 pop. 60,000). Located on the central coast of Vietnam, thirty kilometers (nineteen miles) south of Da Nang, Hoi An, or Faifo, as it was called in previous centuries, is a small, well-preserved riverside town that has a long history built from various foreign influences. From the second to the tenth century CE, the Kingdom of Champa controlled this important port city. Ensuing battles for control of the city between the Cham and the Vietnamese during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries caused Hoi An to cease its role as a major trading center on the central coast. In the sixteenth century, however, peace between the two sides enabled the city to reestablish its trading role. Ships from Asia and Europe landed here seeking, among other items, lacquer, medicinal herbs, porcelain, and silk. This trade status survived more turmoil (the city was badly damaged during the Tay

Son Rebellion in the 1770s) and traders, particularly the Hainan, Canton, Fukien, and Chaozhou Chinese, built more and more off-season homes. Ethnic Chinese make up a large portion of the present-day Hoi An. After arriving in the late 1800s, the French made Hoi An an administrative post and built a rail line to Da Nang. With the established rail link and the fact that the Thu Bon River was filling up quickly with silt and thus cutting the city's access to the sea, Da Nang eventually eclipsed Hoi An as the region's major trading port. Today Hoi An is fast becoming a major tourist destination with its preserved and varied architectural homes and buildings, clean beach, bustling market, and numerous vendors selling local wares.

Richard B. Verrone

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HOKKAIDO (2002 est. pop. 5.7 million). Hokkaido, the northernmost and second largest of Japan's four main islands (83,519 square kilometers, including the 5,010 square kilometers of the Japanese-claimed but, since 1945, Russian-occupied Southern Kuriles). Hokkaido is bordered by the Sea of Japan on the west, the Sea of Okhotsk on the northeast, and the Pacific Ocean on the south and east. The most densely populated areas are the Ishikari plain in the west and the Oshima Peninsula in the south. Seventy percent of the island is covered by mountains and forests and only 10 percent is agriculturally usable. Sapporo, with an estimated 1.8 million inhabitants (2002), is the capital of Hokkaido and its administrative center. Prehistoric relics have been found on Hokkaido, but the earliest Japanese merchant contacts with the indigenous Ainu on Ezo, as Hokkaido was called before its integration into Japan proper in 1869, date from around the twelfth century. Ainu rebellions against encroaching Japanese economic activities in the seventeenth century were suppressed. The central government organized the development of Hokkaido as a frontier region against an increasing Russian presence in the Far East, following the Meiji Restoration in 1868 until the period of the Hokkaido Colonization Office (1869–1882). At the end of the nineteenth century, American advisers exerted a strong influence on city

planning and agriculture. Hokkaido was built up as a Japanese base, mainly for food and natural resources, until the end of World War II.

Although Hokkaido gained some administrative independence in 1948 (with the Local Administrative Law), responsibility for Hokkaido's economic development remained mainly with the central government and the Hokkaido Development Agency (including ten-year development plans). From 1955, the primary sector (agriculture and natural-resources extraction) lost much of its dominant role in Hokkaido (going from 25.2 percent of the island's production in 1955 to 3.8 percent in 2000). A small manufacturing sector developed, but the most important pillar today is the private and government service sector (82 percent). At the start of the twenty-first century, Hokkaido (and, particularly, "Sapporo Valley") was trying to attract information-related industries.

Hokkaido has active intercultural contact with other northern regions in the world through the Northern Intercity Conference. Since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, relations with Russia's Far East have intensified (as shown by the 1998 Cultural and Economic Agreement with Sakhalin, the large Russian island to the north of Hokkaido).

Hokkaido's geographic isolation was greatly diminished through the construction of the Seikan Tunnel, for the railway, in 1988, which connected Hokkaido with Honshu. Hokkaido is famous for its beautiful scenery, large national parks, many ski resorts, and its distinct northern flora and fauna, and attracted 9.2 million tourists in 1998.

Wolfgang Bauer

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HOLI Holi, the festival of colors, is celebrated especially by Hindus in north, east, and western India.

Only inhabitants of the southern states of India do not mark this festival. Holi occurs on the full moon day of the month Phalguna (falling during February–March). On this day, men, women, and children of different classes and backgrounds join together in the morning and smear *gulal* (colored powder) and spray colored water on one another. Sweetmeats are communally shared. Everybody—rich and poor, powerful and dispossessed—feels equal to everyone else on this occasion.

This festival of colors has been celebrated since ancient times, with pomp and gaiety. According to the most popular story of the festival's origins, the demon-king Hiranyakashipu wanted to be regarded as God himself and set out to kill his son Prahalad, a great devotee of the god Vishnu. Vishnu, however, saved Prahalad, and Hiranyakashipu's daughter, the demon Holika, was burned to death. To celebrate this occasion, people lit bonfires on the night before the full moon.

Hrushikesh Panda

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HOLKARS The Holkars were a dynasty of Maratha rulers in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century India. Yashvantrao Holkar (or Jaswant Rao, 1776–1811) was historically the most important. He was an illegitimate son of Tukoji Holkar and a concubine, and rose to prominence in Pune (Poona) during a chaotic period. He gathered some loyal Bhil warriors and began raiding forays until he was powerful enough to seize the territories of Sindhia and challenge Kashi Rao, his own brother, whom he replaced in 1802 after conducting a war against the Peshwa and Sindhia. Then to prevent the British from entering Maratha country to reinstall the Peshwa, their sometime ally, Jaswant Rao placed an adoptive relative, Amrit Rao, on the Maratha throne at Pune.

Jaswant Rao's medieval strategy was to plunder so that war paid for war. He next declared war on the East India Company, but was beaten twice, in 1804 and 1805. Unable to form any alliances with such rulers as Sindhia, the Raja of Jodhpur, or Ranjit Singh, the Holkar ruler was obliged to sign a peace treaty with the British. This (1805) marked the end of the Second Anglo-Maratha War.

Jaswant Rao took a keen interest in the organization of his army, and conducted numerous roving campaigns which kept him in the saddle for long periods. He led a dissipated life, with heavy use of alcohol, and soon was to become insane after poisoning a nephew and his mother. After three years of insanity, Jaswant Rao died at the age of 35.

Paul Hockings

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HOMOSEXUALITY When speaking of homosexuality, one must distinguish between male homosexuality and female homosexuality, or lesbianism. Asia has a rich cultural background when it comes to male homosexuality; China and Japan offer abundant historical evidence. Research on lesbianism in Asia has only just begun, but initial results suggest that lesbianism was not uncommon. Throughout Asia, homosexuality is often confused with transvestism (wearing the clothing of the opposite sex), and gay and lesbian individuals have often presented themselves as members of the opposite sex, thereby reinforcing the confusion. This has changed in recent years, however, particularly among middle- and upper-class gay and



GAY JAPANESE COMIC BOOKS FOR THAI WOMEN

Japanese comic books with male homosexual themes have found a new audience—Thai women in Bangkok who are evidently bored with traditional male-female stories and characters. Japanese publishers estimate that Thai women make up about 80 percent of the readership in Thailand. Why women are attracted to the comic books is unclear, although conservatives complain that the comics are offensive.

Source: Pichayanund Chindahporn. (2001) "Manga Goes on a Gender-Bender." *AsiaWeek* (16 November): 16.

lesbian people. In general, gays and lesbians in Asia do not see sexuality as the main determinant of their identity.

Traditional Male Homosexuality in China

In China the oldest-known reports of male homosexuality appear in the earliest poetry anthology of the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE). In this period heterosexual marriages were frequently negotiated for other than romantic reasons, and men were free to search for satisfying sex and romantic love elsewhere, including in homosexual relationships. Homosexuality was typically structured in terms of class, with courtiers seeking the love of powerful men because of the concomitant benefits of such alliances, as in the instance of Lord Long Yang, who made elaborate efforts to prove his devotion to the king of Wei. During the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), the emperor's favorites attained enormous prominence at court, and in one instance the dying emperor Ai (reigned 6 BCE–1 CE) even gave the throne to his favorite, Don Xian. Don Xian's enemies, however, forced him to commit suicide and usurped the throne.

The first-known sources on homosexuality outside court life date from the Six Dynasties (220–589). In *Shishui xinyu* (A New Account of Tales of the World) by Liu Qing (403–444), male beauty is a major focus of attention. The Tang dynasty (618–907) provides fewer records of homosexuality at court than did earlier periods, although homosexuality was more often mentioned in literature and particularly in poetry. The first derogatory term connected with homosexuality, *jijian*, usually translated as "sodomy," surfaced during this period in the story of the male prostitute Xue Aocao.

During the Song dynasty (960–1279), homosexuality apparently continued to be more common outside court circles, and evidence for it increased. Whereas in earlier times patronage consisted of emperors and other high-placed persons bestowing presents and honors on their favorites, in the Song period this patronage took the form of straightforward prostitution in the major cities. Prostitutes rather than patrons were typically seen as passive and anally receptive, whereas in earlier times, the relationship had been one of love.

In the early twelfth century male prostitution was legally prohibited, but the law seems not to have been often enforced. The Ming dynasty (1368–1644) was a time of greater tolerance, with a flowering of literature depicting homosexuality, as ever marked by patronage relationships. During this period clashes over homosexual activity with foreigners occurred, for in-

stance in Manila, where the Spanish arrested and condemned Chinese immigrants, who protested that homosexuality was an accepted custom in their culture.

During the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), literature on homosexuality remained rich, and prostitution was common. In 1860 a Western visitor to Tianjin reported that there were thirty-five brothels and an estimated eight hundred boys engaged in prostitution. Sources of information about male prostitutes largely described actors, who were elite prostitutes. There were sodomy laws at this time, and under Manchurian influence intolerance toward homosexuality began to emerge, though the practice continued to flourish.

Traditional Male Homosexuality in Japan

In Japan, homosexuality has been related to the introduction of Buddhism. Kukai, also known as Kobo Daishi (774–835), the founder of the Japanese Shingon (True Word) sect of Buddhism, was said to have brought male homosexuality from China to Japan. Only from the tenth century, however, is there evidence of homosexual activity in Buddhist monasteries, with novices being seduced by older monks.

Male homosexuality also occurred among the samurai, especially during the Onin War (1467–1600). Male homosexuality was generally thought to be superior to heterosexuality, a view that was probably related to the defilement associated with the female body in both Buddhism and Shintoism. Moreover, love between men was practical during war campaigns, when male lovers could accompany each other.

In the Tokugawa era (1600/1603–1868), a third form of homosexuality came to the fore: that between the patrons and performers of Kabuki theater, an all-male Japanese drama form. The position of *kagama*, or Kabuki trainee, was often a guise for the practice of male prostitution. The popular *Danshoku okagami* (Great Mirror of Male Love) by Ihara Saikaku (1642–1693) provides many insights into the various forms of homosexuality in the Tokugawa period. During the Meiji period (1868–1912), Japan adopted a sodomy law based loosely on the Qing-dynasty legislation. It was, however, little enforced and soon revoked.

Traditional Male Homosexuality in Korea and Vietnam

In Korea, the institution of the *bwarang* (flower of male youth), an elite group of young warriors founded in the sixth century, emphasized such virtues as faithfulness to friends and courage in battle; it was also a seat of male homosexuality. Korea also had theater-related homosexuality, known as *namsadang*.

Little information has been published about homosexuality in Vietnam, but transsexuality and transvestism were apparently linked to shamanistic practices. Homosexuality was reported by Westerners, who reacted with outrage, as had Westerners visiting China and Japan, when they found that Vietnamese did not much object to the practice. Vietnamese legal codes do not mention homosexuality, and Vietnam did not follow the Qing dynasty in criminalizing sodomy.

Traditional Male Homosexuality in Islamic Cultures

As in East Asia, Western observers commented on the prevalence of homosexuality in Islamic cultures, and Islamic culture has a rich literary history of homosexuality. Only in recent years have Islamic people, like other East Asians, overlooked the occurrence of homosexuality. Islamic law in principle condemns homosexual activity as a form of adultery. It is not, however, seen as evil in itself. In practice, it is tolerated in most Islamic countries, as long as it takes place with discretion. Between 1979 and 1984 several men were executed in Iran for homosexual practices, but these events mark an exceptional period, when homosexuality was seen as evil in itself and as representative of Western decadence.

Traditional Male Homosexuality in India

In India the tolerance for homosexuality has been not unlike that in China and Japan. The *Kama Sutra* includes descriptions of men being fellated by eunuchs. According to Hinduism, homosexuality was less of an impediment to escaping the cycle of rebirth than was heterosexuality, although both forms of attachment had to be overcome to achieve immortality. In Indian Buddhism, however, homosexuality, like heterosexuality, was derogated to an extent. Nevertheless, love and friendship between men were considered preferable to similar relationships between men and women, and in monastic life laxity toward homosexuality sometimes existed.

So-called *bijras* (an Urdu word meaning "hermaphrodite," a person with both male and female sexual organs) were considered neither men nor women and were categorized as belonging to a third sex, with institutionalized roles as practitioners of female occupations like singers, dancers, and prostitutes. It was not uncommon for these *bijras* to have their genitalia cut off, but it is surmised that fully equipped gay men sometimes acted like *bijras* to be able to have sex with men. This does not mean, however, that there were not also many gay men who were not *bijras*.

Traditional Male Sexuality in Southeast Asia

Transvestism and homosexuality are confounded throughout Southeast Asia, where, for example, one finds the ladyboy or *katboey* of Thailand, the *waria* of Indonesia, and the *bakla* of the Philippines. These terms, rooted in local histories and cultures, refer to transgendered males (that is, males who feel feminine and dress as women), often working as prostitutes. Among these types, homosexuality is characterized by femininity, and the masculine partner, supposedly sexually active, is considered a "real" man, straight, not gay.

Female Homosexuality in Asia

The relative scarcity of information about Asian female homosexuality is partly attributable to the predominance of male researchers who have little access to places where women gather together. Islamic harems have been regarded as hotbeds of lesbian activity, but there is little proof of this notion. In Pakistan, female homosexuality has apparently met little opposition, as long as the women properly fulfill their roles of spouses and mothers. In fact a similar view can be discerned throughout Asia. Women's sexuality has not been considered as independent from men, and therefore whatever activities women engage in together are not taken very seriously by men.

Nevertheless there are depictions of women engaging in sexual activity with other women, often involving dildos (artificial penises). Examples include seventeenth-century Indian Mughal paintings and Japanese woodblock prints of the Edo era. In some of the latter, men spy on the women; the prints were probably used by men for their own pleasure and certainly represent a male viewpoint.

Traditional Female Homosexuality in China There is relatively well-documented information about women's communities in imperial China, especially in southern Guangdong. In such communities women could resist social demands that they marry, and particular economic opportunities enabled these women to live largely independently of men. This appears to have been the case in the silk industry. Women in these communities held marriage ceremonies and lived like couples. In Chinese-dominated states, including Singapore, such communities have persisted.

As early as the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), there is literary evidence of female homosexuality, including a love relationship between two slave women, as well as an empress's servant who dressed in male attire, suggesting a lesbian relationship. The famous

Qing dynasty novel *The Dream of the Red Chamber* also contains depictions of lesbian affairs.

Traditional Female Homosexuality in India In India texts that refer to female homosexuality appeared as early as 1500 BCE. In texts such as pre-Vedic hymns, dual goddesses were fused into twins, and those in female relationships were depicted as mothers, daughters, sisters, lover-maidens, and more, with clearly erotic undertones. Later, in Vedic times, heterocentrism (focus on heterosexuality) occurred in texts in which female relationships were broken up in favor of the formation of heterosexual couples.

Traditional Types of Female Homosexuality in Asia

As with male homosexuality, female homosexuality has often been confounded with transgender phenomena in Asia. In Japan for instance, the term *onabe* refers to a woman who dresses and behaves like a man. Many find employment in specific *onabe* clubs, where they entertain female clients. Most contemporary Japanese lesbian women, or *rezubian*, do not cross-dress, however.

In Indonesia, class differences seem to be expressed in various types of lesbian relationships. Butch (*sentul*)–femme (*kantil*) relationships, where butch women behave like men and femme ones like women, are more typical of poor, lower-class women. As in the case of male transgender types, the *sentul*, also known as *tomboi*, is generally seen as more lesbian than the nontransgendering *kantil*. Elite lesbians, however, have tended to align themselves with Western types of female homosexuality and have thereby found access to international networks denied to lower-class women.

Contemporary Male and Female Homosexuality in Asia

Homosexuality in Asia today continues to be associated with male as well as female transgender practices, but such viewpoints have begun to be questioned. Nowadays the words "gay" and "lesbian" are often used in place of the traditional terms, especially among highly educated people, who tend to distance themselves from the transgender implications of indigenous concepts. In Indonesia, for instance, there has been a clash between the *warias* and the gays, who see each other as rivals. The same "real men" who paid the *warias* for sex were paid by the gays to have sex. This matter has been resolved by talks between representatives of the two groups, and the conflict shows signs of dissipating, with gays adopting behavior typical of

warias by wearing drag (clothing typical of the opposite sex) and some *warias* becoming educated and thus equipped to associate with educated gays.

In China as well as Hong Kong and Taiwan, a movement has developed to accommodate this conflict between traditional and contemporary ideas of homosexuality. The common denominator used for gay men, lesbian women, transgender and transsexual people, and even sympathetic and supportive heterosexuals is *tongzhi*, which is the Chinese Communist term for "comrade." The introduction of the term *tongzhi* is a product of the wish to avoid the explicit sexual overtones of other terms for gay men and lesbian women and at the same time to create a network that overcomes the limitations of identity-oriented categories like gay and lesbian. Rather than creating a gay-straight binary, the aim is to question sexuality in general.

In other Asian countries similar attempts to circumvent the pitfalls of identity politics are occurring. Generally people seem to want to be accepted as decent citizens, without an emphasis on sexuality. In Japan there is a division between those who adopt the line of desexualization—a group that, unlike the *tongzhi* movement, does not include transgendered people, let alone heterosexuals—and those who take a more sex-positive approach, explicitly aligning themselves not only with transgendered people but also with sex workers. Members of the first group seem to have largely abandoned the idea of making an impact among Japanese lesbian and gay people and instead mostly direct their attention abroad or toward Japan's politicians and bureaucracy; the other movement is limited in number but is gaining adherents.

In most of Southeast Asia, literature on homosexuality is scarce, and, although the practice is common, it is little spoken of. The discourse of Asian values as promulgated by government leaders of Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia denies the existence of homosexuality among Asians, denouncing it as a Western perversion. Ironically this attitude seems to have arisen from an adherence to Western norms according to which homosexuality is a perversion; such norms were introduced during the colonial period and confirmed during the following period of Western cultural dominance. Contrary to the goals of Asian leaders, this denunciation of homosexuality seems to have led to its increased recognition. Gay and lesbian networks have developed throughout Asia and have contacted international organizations, such as the International Lesbian and Gay Organization. While the local branches of these organizations remain somewhat elitist, they are developing Asian perspectives of lesbian and gay

liberation and are accepting the various transgender types indigenous to their cultures, rather than simply following Western patterns.

Wim Lunsing

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HONEN (1133–1212), founder of Jodo (Japanese Pure Land) Buddhism. Honen initially studied the doctrines of the Tendai sect at Enryakuji temple on Mount Hiei near Kyoto. Dissatisfied with the political intrigues of the priests there, he became a mountain ascetic and continued his studies of Tendai teachings and those of the Nara sects. Finally, he came to the realization that few ordinary beings possess the ability to attain enlightenment through their own efforts. To the contrary, such striving is conceitedness that actually impedes emancipation. He concluded that one need only rely on Amida Buddha.

After leaving Mt. Hiei, Honen began preaching the exclusive practice of the *nembutsu*, unceasing meditation on and repeated chanting of the name Amida Buddha in order to obtain rebirth in the Pure Land. The notion that even those who did not devote their lives to Buddhist practice might achieve rebirth had great appeal among the general populace, bringing a sense of crisis to the priests of the older Buddhist sects. These sects appealed to the government to suppress the movement, and in 1207 Honen was banished to Shikoku. The banishment was lifted at the end of that year, and in 1211 Honen returned to Kyoto where he continued to propagate his ideas until his death.

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HONG KONG (2001 pop. 6.7 million). Hong Kong was part of China's Guangdong Province until it became a British colony in 1842. In 1997, Hong Kong was returned to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and is now known as the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. During its colonial era, Hong Kong became one of the most important import-export and finance economies in the Pacific region. Today, it remains a vibrant, modern Chinese city with a diverse range of cultural influences and a thriving capitalist economy.



The Dragon Statue and Hong Kong skyline from Victoria Peak in 1997. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

History

Located on the south coast of China near the mouth of the Pearl River, the area that is now known as Hong Kong comprises Hong Kong Island, Kowloon Peninsula, and the New Territories. Until the 1840s, this area was part of Xinan County in the Guangdong

Province of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). The region was populated mostly by Han Chinese and Hakka (a Chinese minority people), and the local economy was dominated by pearl fishing, salt making, incense tree cultivation, and piracy and smuggling.

The British, seeking a new location from which to maintain their lucrative opium trade with China, occupied Hong Kong Island in 1841. They were granted formal control of the island by China in 1842 through the Treaty of Nanjing, which ended the First Opium War (1839–1842), and the island became a colony on 26 June 1843. The second Opium War (1856–1860) resulted in Britain's acquisition of Kowloon Peninsula, located across the bay from Hong Kong Island, and in 1898 Britain acquired a ninety-nine-year lease on the New Territories. Britain maintained control of Hong Kong until 1997, except from 1941 to 1945, when the Japanese controlled the territory. The impending end of the lease on the New Territories led to a 1984 agreement between the British and Chinese governments for Hong Kong's return to China as an autonomous region.



Political System

Under the British, the governor, who was appointed, had executive power and was assisted by a Legislative Council, of which a small percentage was elected. This system, which was made somewhat more democratic under the leadership of Governor Chris



PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF HONG KONG

Adopted on 4 April 1990; effective since 1 July 1997.

Hong Kong has been part of the territory of China since ancient times; it was occupied by Britain after the Opium War in 1840. On 19 December 1984, the Chinese and British Governments signed the Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, affirming that the Government of the People's Republic of China will resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong with effect from 1 July 1997, thus fulfilling the long-cherished common aspiration of the Chinese people for the recovery of Hong Kong.

Upholding national unity and territorial integrity, maintaining the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, and taking account of its history and realities, the People's Republic of China has decided that upon China's resumption of the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong, a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be established in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, and that under the principle of "one country, two systems", the socialist system and policies will not be practised in Hong Kong. The basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong have been elaborated by the Chinese Government in the Sino-British Joint Declaration.

In accordance with the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, the National People's Congress hereby enacts the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, prescribing the systems to be practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, in order to ensure the implementation of the basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong Kong.

Source: International Court Network. Retrieved 8 March 2002,
from: <http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/home.html>.

Patten in the 1990s, has remained essentially intact in the post-1997 era. In March 1990, the PRC's National People's Congress approved a Basic Law, based largely on English law, that constitutes the basis for Hong Kong's current legal system. Under this system Hong Kong has an appointed chief executive who serves for five years, an appointed cabinet, and a legislature that is selected by both direct and indirect elections.

As a condition for the 1997 handover, China agreed to maintain a "one country, two systems" approach to governing Hong Kong for fifty years. Under this sys-

tem, Hong Kong is to have a high degree of political and economic autonomy from China. Its foreign and military affairs, however, have been taken over by the PRC government. In addition, Hong Kong's chief executive is appointed by the PRC.

Geography

Hong Kong has a tropical monsoon climate. It has an area of 1,097 square kilometers with 733 kilometers of coastline and a large deep-water harbor. The territory consists of a peninsula and over two hundred small islands and is mostly mountainous with a very

small percentage of arable land. The hilly terrain provides relatively little living space, and so both Hong Kong Island and Kowloon have been enlarged through land reclamation. Architecturally, Hong Kong is composed almost entirely of large office and apartment blocks. Hong Kong is connected to the rest of China by waterways, such as the Pearl River, as well as railroads and roads.

Demographics

According to Hong Kong's 2001 census, approximately 80 percent of its 6.7 million people live on 8 percent of the land, making Hong Kong one of the world's most densely populated areas. Ninety-five percent of the population is ethnically Chinese, with Filipinos, Indonesians, the British, and Indians constituting the largest other ethnic groups.

Economy

Prior to its colonization by the British, Hong Kong had long been the site of both legal and illegal trade with neighboring Asian nations, Arabs, and some Westerners. Under the British, the colony replaced Guangzhou (Canton) as the principal locus of Anglo-Chinese trade in southern China, much of which, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was based on opium. This trade was controlled by a few large trading houses, known as *hong*. Following the establishment of the PRC in 1949, Hong Kong experienced a huge influx of refugee industrialists, mostly from the Chinese industrial city of Shanghai. These industrialists, using refugee labor that continued to flow into Hong Kong through the second half of the twentieth century, turned Hong Kong into a center of manufacturing and finance. Hong Kong has limited natural resources, however, and must import most of its food and raw materials. As China increasingly opened up for trade in the 1980s and 1990s, Hong Kong's economy again became more oriented toward China.

Culture

Hong Kong's culture has been influenced by its mostly Chinese population as well as its British colonial past. Its official languages are Cantonese and English. Its population has always been mostly Chinese, and this is reflected in the cuisine, popular culture, and many aspects of the landscape. The British elite who dominated colonial Hong Kong were mostly merchants, civil servants, and missionaries. As the post-1949 Shanghai industrialists established themselves financially, however, Hong Kong's elite culture became increasingly Chinese.

Hong Kong's colonial past led it to develop differently from the rest of China, especially during the period since 1949. Unlike the rest of China, Hong Kong has a thriving, free market, capitalist economy, and the very identity of Hong Kong is rooted in that successful economy. Although the PRC has committed itself to protect Hong Kong's economic and political autonomy until 2047, what, exactly, will be the impact of Hong Kong's reintegration into China remains to be seen. Will Hong Kong remain distinct from China, or will it become just another Chinese city?

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HONG LOU MENG *Hong lou meng* (*Dream of the Red Chamber, The Story of the Stone*) is universally acclaimed as China's greatest work of fiction. It has been hugely influential ever since its appearance in the eighteenth century. A simultaneously realistic and mythical coming-of-age story of a young aristocrat named Jia Baoyu, the novel presents an encyclopedic and lyrical window onto traditional Chinese culture.

Circumscribed by a desire for a transcendent, feminized lyricism and by the need for socially embedded, masculine responsibility, Jia Baoyu's journey from childhood to adulthood probes the limits of self-realization for scions of elite families. A love triangle between Jia and two beautiful, learned, and sensitive young women, Lin Daiyu and Xue Baochai, who embody conflicting ideals of femininity, exacerbates the tensions between sense and sensibility. The story of the rivalry, friendship, and love between Jia, Lin, and Xue is set against the detailed portrayal of over four hundred characters of various social classes.

For all its panoramic scope and its wealth of erudition relating to literature, painting, philosophy, and medicine among other scholarly topics, *Hong lou meng*

is a deeply introspective and self-reflexive novel. Playing upon the conventions of Chinese historiography, fiction, poetry, and drama, the simultaneous designation of a stone as the repository of the story itself ("The Story of the Stone") and as the incarnation of Jia Baoyu ("False Precious Stone"), creates an elaborate dialectic between fictionality and reality, with one element continuously destabilizing the primacy of the other. In doing so, the novel slyly affirmed the power of fiction to represent human experience genuinely in an age that valued history as the primary vehicle of truth.

The author, Cao Xueqin (1715–1763), the impoverished and eccentric offspring of a once politically influential family, circulated the first eighty chapters in various manuscript drafts among relatives and friends. In 1791, two men published a version of 120 chapters. Cao is thought to have incorporated autobiographical elements into the text, though his authorship of the last forty chapters remains a subject of debate. Partly due to its adaptation into other popular media, including a highly successful television drama series in the 1980s in the People's Republic of China, the novel and its characters continue to be household names in many Chinese cultural contexts.

Patricia Sieber

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HONG SHEN (1894–1955), Chinese playwright and director. Hong Shen was born in China's Jiangsu Province and entered Qinghua University in 1912. Four years later, he went to the United States and studied ceramics at Ohio State University. In 1919, after the New Culture Movement started, he studied drama at Harvard University and theater performance and management at Boston Performance School. He was the first person from China to go abroad to study modern drama, which was only introduced to China at the beginning of the twentieth century.

After returning to China in 1922, Hong devoted himself to improving Chinese drama. As a director, he did not follow the traditional Chinese custom of using male actors in female roles. He also established the

modern Chinese director and rehearsal systems. Besides constructing directing theories, Hong wrote many plays. In the 1930s, as a main member of a left-wing drama organization, he wrote *Rural Trilogy*, which was composed of *Wukui Bridge*, *Fragrant Rice*, and *Dragon Pool*, and which showed the class struggle in the countryside.

Hong also played an important role in Chinese movie development. He was one of the leaders of the left-wing movie movement and wrote many movie screenplays in his life. After 1949, he became the vice chairman of the Chinese Dramatist Association and also held other leading positions in government. He died of cancer in 1955.

She Xiaojie

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HONGCUN AND XIDI In 2000 two ancient Chinese villages, Hongcun and Xidi in Anhui Province, were selected for the UNESCO World Cultural Heritage List. The villages and their relics are preserved as a national historical treasure to interpret China's feudal rural past. Founded in 1131 by the Wang family, Hongcun thrived during the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties. Xidi was built in the Northern Song dynasty (960–1126). Anhui also has a Neolithic site archaeologists hypothesized might be the origin of Chinese civilization.

Shaped like an ox, Hongcun's design emphasizes waterways. Approximately 140 historical stone buildings, courtyards, and alleys form a living museum. Lexu Hall, the Wang family ancestral temple, is located by a pond. Tourists can visit homes and purchase souvenirs related to village and family history. The village was the location for the 2000 movie *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon*.

The architectural legacy of both villages reveals intricate workmanship, especially carvings, engraved in wooden beams, depicting social activities such as the Lantern Festival. Significant stone masonry includes a memorial archway at Xidi built in 1578.

Another southern Anhui ancient village site, at Lu'an, was discovered in fall 2000. Archaeologists estimated this village existed during the Western Zhou

dynasty (1045–771 BCE). Artifacts, including human and animal skeletons and weapons, provide insight into technological developments and the community's agricultural, trading, and military concerns.

Elizabeth D. Schafer

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HONSHU (2001 est. pop.101,000). Honshu is the largest of Japan's four main islands. From northeast to southwest, Honshu is a long, narrow island, 1,500 kilometers in length and 300 kilometers in width, with an area of 230,940 square kilometers. It makes up 62 percent of the total area of the Japanese archipelago and forms the main part of the country. Honshu consists of five regions: Tohoku, Kanto, Chubu, Kinki, and Chugoku; the Fossa Magna fault line separates the northeast from the southwest.

Regional physical features and natural resources are very diversified. Honshu is predominantly mountainous (the Japanese Alps), with plains along the coasts. High peaks that exceed more than 3,000 meters are Mount Fuji (3,776 meters), Mount Shirane (3,192 meters), Mount Okuotakadake (3,190 meters), and Mount Yarigadade (3,180 meters). The mountain ranges influence the climatic differences between the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Japan. There is little rain on the Pacific Ocean coast in winter, whereas the Japan seacoast is characterized by snowy weather. The climate is temperate, and annual precipitation often exceeds 1,000 millimeters. Lake Biwa

is the largest lake on the island. In central and northern Honshu, mixed temperate forests are associated with conifers such as Japanese cypress, Japanese cedar, and pine.

Fishing is an important activity. Agriculture is regionally diversified. In the northern part of Honshu, products include apples, soybeans, cereals, and vegetables. In central Honshu, truck farming is predominant, with the production of vegetables, potatoes, and sweet potatoes. Along the Pacific and the Inland sea-coasts, the main products include wheat, sweet potatoes, barley, tobacco, and mandarin oranges.

The major economic activities and most of the population of Japan are concentrated in Honshu. The coastal areas of the Pacific Ocean and the Inland Sea, extending from southern Kanto to Yamaguchi prefecture, are the most industrialized and urbanized regions. This region includes major metropolitan areas such as Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, and the Keihanshin (Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe), where 44 percent of the population is concentrated. Together with northern Kyushu, these districts are called the Pacific coastal belt.

On the other hand, regional differences in economic growth have accentuated regional disparities, particularly on the Japan Sea side. In Hokuriku Prefecture, traditional industries and rice farming are now declining, and depopulation in the Tohoku region is the result of increasing migration of the working population toward the Pacific belt. Due to increasing urbanization, living conditions are not improving, particularly with environmental problems such as noise and pollution.

Nathalie Cavasin



SHIRAKANI-SANCHI—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Shirakani-Sanchi, in northern Honshu, is the site of the last untouched remnants of the beech forests that once covered Japan. Preserved as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1993, the forest houses many rare species and is historically significant as a glimpse at the natural forces that shaped Japan.

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HORSE, AKHAL-TEKE The Akhal-Teke horse was developed on the southern fringe of the great Kara-Kum Desert of Central Asia, in the foothills of the Kopet-Dag Mountains along the border of modern Turkmenistan with Iran. It is probably the oldest purebred horse in the world; its tall stature, golden color, and beauty were known to the ancient writers. Marco Polo noticed the popularity of Turkmen horses ("Argamaks") among the Turks. Anatomical research

shows a great similarity between the modern Akhal-Teke and the English Thoroughbred horse. Some Akhal-Teke characteristics are also recognizable in the conformation of the Syrian Arab horse. Before the Russian takeover of the Transcaspian Region in the 1880s, the nomadic Turkmens of the Teke tribe bred Akhal-Tekes for mercenary raids as well as for racing. Later, in the USSR, Akhal-Tekes suffered heavy losses from mismanagement and direct slaughter. In 1935, Akhal-Tekes were used for a famous marathon trek from Ashgabat to Moscow (around 2,500 miles).

Only about 2,000 Akhal-Tekes now exist in the world, including between 1,200 and 1,300 in now independent Turkmenistan, where the state promotes this horse as a national symbol. "If the carpet is the Turkmen's soul, the horse is his wings," says the Turkmen proverb. A millennium-old cult of the noble Akhal-Teke horse also explains the fact that Turkmens, unlike other Muslim peoples of Central Asia, never use horsemeat for food.

Victor Fet

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HORSE, KARABAIR Also known as Karabair-skaya (Russian), the Karabair is one of the most ancient horse breeds of Central Asia. In appearance the Karabair resembles the Arabian, Persian, and Turkmenian as well as the steppe horse breeds. The breed is improved through pure breeding. Karabair horses show good endurance and versatile working qualities. This breed was developed in Uzbekistan and northern Tajikistan (former Soviet republics of Central Asia) under the influence of southern and steppe breeds. It is well adapted to both saddle and harness, and has the typical build of a saddle and harness horse. The coat color is bay, chestnut, gray, or black.

The Karabair horse is distinguished by sound health and average longevity. It is a good horse for long rides. The breed consists of three intra-breed types—basic, heavy, and saddle—as well as eight sire lines and five mare families. The Karabair are currently bred in all zones of Uzbekistan; the main studs

are in the Jizak region of Uzbekistan. The Karabair performs very well in sports, mainly in the equestrian game of *kokpar* (similar to the related Afghan sport known as *buzkashi*), in which riders fight over a goat carcass.

Victor Fet

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HORSE, LOKAI The Lokai is a mixed breed from Central Asia. At 140–150 centimeters high, it is the shortest of Central Asian horse breeds. Strong and sure-footed, it is a good riding and pack horse, agile and enduring. Its coat is gray, bay, or chestnut (often with a golden tint), sometimes curled. It is an excellent riding horse, well-suited to competitive sports. The Lokai originates from the Pamir Mountains, now in Tajikistan, south of the Tian Shan range. Its name comes from the Lokai tribe of Uzbeks who, starting from the sixteenth century, improved this breed by crossing it with Akhal-Teke, Karabair, and even Arabian horses. The Lokai horse is common in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, where it is a good, tough saddle and pack pony in its native mountains, at altitudes of 2,000 to 4,000 meters. It can carry a rider eighty kilometers a day over mountain tracks at an average speed of eight or nine kilometers per hour. In a nomadic tradition, the mares are also milked. The tough and swift Lokai is famous for its use by Tajik riders in the equestrian game of *kopar* (*kokpar*) where riders fight over a goat carcass (similar to the related sport of Afghanistan known as *buzkashi*).

Victor Fet

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HORSE, PRZEWALSKI'S Przewalski's horse (*Equus przewalski*), or *takhi* in Mongolian, is the last remaining species of wild horse in the world. Przewalski's

horse stands around 1.3 meters high, has a large head, a short stocky body, and an upright mane. It has a solid tan coat with a black stripe running along its back, faint zebra stripes on its lower legs, and lighter coloring around the muzzle. Some experts argue that it resembles the common ancestor of all modern horses.

The wild horse was brought to European attention by the Russian naturalist Nikolai Michailovitch Przewalski (1839–1888) after he observed several of the species in Mongolia in 1881. Soon after his sighting, hunting pressure and competition for grazing land and water led to the horse's gradual extinction in the wild. The last reliable sighting in the wild of this horse occurred in 1969 near the Takhin Tal (Wild Horse Mountain) in Mongolia. From a population of thirty to forty Przewalski horses in zoos around the world in 1950, several hundred have now been bred in captivity. In 1992 a breeding group of Przewalski horses was introduced to Mongolia in the hope of later reintroducing the animals to the open steppe.

Daniel Hruschka

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HOSEN, IBRAHIM (1917–2001), Indonesian religious figure. Ibrahim, a son of Hosen bin Abdul Syukur, emerged as a colorful religious figure in Indonesia, with bold and unorthodox opinions. He was born in the South Sumatran town of Bengkulu to a Bugis father and a South Sumatran mother. During Ibrahim's early years, his father took the family first to Jakarta and Singapore, where he was in the retail business, and then to Lampung in South Sumatra, where he ran a religious school. Ibrahim's four-year stay in Singapore as a child and pupil at the As-Sagaf School left a strong imprint on his worldview, which tended to be tolerant, open-minded, modern, and pluralist. In 1934 he went to Java for further study of the Qur'an, Islamic law, Arabic literature, and rhetoric. According to his biographers, Ibrahim met and studied under a number of religious scholars and Hadrami (Yemeni Arab) teachers in Java.

After one year of study and travel in Java, Ibrahim returned to South Sumatra. In 1939, for the first time,

he successfully represented an established school of Islamic law in a debate, defending its stance on many social and religious issues. During the rapid political disruption in the 1940s, precipitated by the Japanese occupation of Indonesia during the Pacific War and the return of the Dutch, Ibrahim, as a religious scholar-cum-official, energetically took part in socioreligious and political activities in the region of Bengkulu, his native town. He married twice, in 1946 and again in 1948 following the death of his first wife, and had eight surviving children.

In 1955 Ibrahim went to Cairo to study at al-Azhar University. Returning to Indonesia with a degree in Islamic law in 1960, he joined the Department of Religious Affairs in Jakarta. In 1964 he was appointed rector of the newly opened State Institute of Islamic Studies in Palembang.

Following the major political changes in Indonesia in the mid-1960s in the wake of the purge of the Indonesian Communist Party and the rise to power of Suharto, Ibrahim began a major career as a national figure. In 1966 he moved to Jakarta, assuming the post of bureau chief in the Department of Religious Affairs. He continued to occupy an important post in the department until his retirement in 1982. At the same time, capitalizing on his credibility as a religious figure and official, Ibrahim won financial support from many wealthy sponsors to institute and lead two centers of higher learning for Qur'anic studies in South Jakarta, one for men, in 1971, and another for women, in 1977.

Ibrahim was appointed to the chairmanship of the Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars in 1980. Here he found an official platform from which to launch his religious views, considered by many Indonesians to be innovative but also controversial, on account of his toleration of beer drinking, bank interest, the lottery, and contraceptive devices. Although Ibrahim did not write major works detailing his jurisprudential principles, religious philosophy, or reformist ideas, he responded to the religious controversies that occupied the minds of many Indonesian Muslims.

Ibrahim's religious interpretations arose in the context of the nature of Islam in Indonesia, with its often-declared openness, moderation, tolerance, and pluralism. He responded positively to the tolerance and open-mindedness of his countrypeople, and at the same time he saw the religious justification for many practices under scrutiny, such as those mentioned. This religious predilection, not surprisingly, annoyed or even angered many religious leaders who strictly adhered to scripture. At some point, he was even

branded a religious scholar who could be hired to issue legal opinions or a religious scholar who always supported government policy.

Ibrahim himself claimed that his approach to any issue was based on the Islamic legal principle of permissibility; that is, that all matters are inherently permissible. Only when there are specific and unequivocal prohibitions in Islam does such permission end. Considering his religious and educational background, Ibrahim can be seen to belong to a scholarly tradition that tackles religious issues on the basis of Islamic jurisprudence, or a legalistic approach. All his references and quotations may be traced to earlier opinions of Muslim jurists or their equivalents. Not surprisingly, he claimed that his legal opinions were not novel, let alone un-Islamic, since his rulings were based on earlier, established scholarly opinion.

Iik A. Mansurnoor

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HOUSEHOLD RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEM—CHINA The household responsibility system has been a crucial national policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since 1978. Literally, "responsibility" means that an individual household, or a set of households, assumes the task of production for and payment to the government. As University of Hong Kong scholar Steven Cheung notes, the so-called responsibility contract is "equivalent to the granting of private property rights [sic] through a state lease of land. . . . The duration of the lease may be any number of years or, in principle, it may be in perpetuity. Ownership is not relinquished by the state, but the rights to use and to obtain income are exclusively assigned to the lessee. The right to transfer or to sell the leased resource may take the form of subletting. Various dues exacted by the state may be lumped together in the form of a fixed rent, and since this rent is paid to the state it becomes a property tax" (Cheung 1990: 22).

The household responsibility system was introduced four times in Chinese history: 1957, 1959–1961,

1964, and 1978. In its first three incarnations it was permitted only in extremely poor areas, such as the provinces of Anhui and Sichuan, where it was introduced in an attempt to rescue the provinces from their agricultural crises. A number of Chinese leaders, including Deng Zihui (1896–1972) and Liu Shaoqi (1898–1974), tried to implement the household responsibility system more extensively, but Mao Zedong (1893–1976) crushed their attempts. For instance, in 1961, the secretary of the CCP in Anhui Province tried to employ the household responsibility system throughout the province by requesting permission from the central government. His proposal, if accepted, would have meant a decentralization of power because it would have given provinces more authority to make decisions relating to provincial governance. Along with Liu, many other leaders, including Deng Zihui and Chen Yun (1905–1995), supported reform of the agricultural sector. However, Mao rejected the proposed reforms, accusing these leaders of encouraging capitalist initiatives and widening the gap between rich and poor among Chinese farmers.

Despite prohibitions at the national level, a few areas experimented with the household responsibility system. A village in Guizhou Province adopted the system secretly for more than ten years before 1978. The village did not dare to admit its practice of the official household responsibility system until the new policy was announced. Toward the end of 1978, in Feixi County and Chuxian Prefecture in Anhui Province, a small number of production teams (a communal unit) began to try the system of contracting land, other resources, and output quotas to individual households. However, the practice was restricted to the poor agricultural regions.

Zhao Ziyang (b. 1919) launched the household responsibility system as a reform in Sichuan Province in 1975, during his tenure there as general secretary of the CCP. In 1980, as Deng's protégé, Zhao was made prime minister of China. Subsequently, almost all households in China's rural areas adopted the household responsibility system as national policy by the end of 1983.

Mandatory Production Targets

Prior to 1980, Chinese farms were given mandatory production targets that extended to yields, levels of input applications, and planting techniques. Members of a production team, working under the supervision of a team leader, were credited with work points for jobs they performed. At the end of a year, net team income was first distributed among members accord-

ing to some basic needs; then the rest was distributed according to the work points that each one accumulated during that year. Work points were supposed to reflect the quality and quantity of effort that each member performed rather than the result of his or her efforts. Therefore, the work point system was not an incentive scheme.

In contrast, under the household responsibility system, land is contracted to individual households for a period of fifteen years. After fulfilling the procurement quota obligations, farmers are entitled to sell their surplus on the market or retain it for their own use. By definition, peasants become residual claimants. The marginal return on their efforts is the marginal product of their efforts. In other words, by linking rewards directly to effort, the contracting system enhanced incentives and promoted efficient production. The most conspicuous effect, however, is the impact on productivity arising from the increased incentive to work. It is estimated that total factor productivity increased 15 percent as a result of the improved incentives inherent in the household responsibility system. The household responsibility system reform was implemented in 1979 and was completed in 1984. During this period, agricultural output increased by 45 percent. About one-third of the output growth between 1979 and 1984, therefore, can be attributed to the household responsibility system reform alone.

The Key to Economic Reform

The household responsibility system symbolized the key to economic reform. Eventually, the system spread to areas other than agriculture. Whereas it took a revolution to abolish private property, the process in reverse may be done through peaceful contracting. The word "private" was scrupulously avoided until March 1988. However, as it turns out, the so-called responsibility contract, with all its modifications and refinements, is a Chinese version of the deed of trust—the right to use and develop land that one does not own outright. The contract is not in perpetuity. Individual households running their own small enterprises can now be found everywhere, and in southern China even state-owned enterprises now refuse to hire state employees; rather, they opt for contract workers. In July 1988, for instance, a Japanese firm won a public auction of land—a first for nonagricultural use in China. Importantly, for the first time since the Communist Revolution, a foreign entity had openly gained a private interest on China's soil.

The responsibility contract as applied to agriculture comes very close to what in the Western world is a

grant of private property in land. The main defect of the production system as an institution for agricultural development is its incentive structure. One of the major reasons for the success of China's economic reform today, unlike that of the former Soviet Union, is the household responsibility system. Nevertheless, the household responsibility system faces some problems, including declining arable land area, stagnating grain production, and shrinking income at the rural level. As a result, millions of peasants have migrated to cities such as Beijing and Shanghai to seek employment.

Unryu Suganuma

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HSIA DYNASTY. See **Xia Dynasty**.

HSUN-TZU. See **Xunzi**.

HU JINTAO (b. 1942), political leader of China. Born in Shanghai in December 1942, with ancestral roots in Anhui Province, Hu Jintao graduated from China's Qinghua University, Department of Irrigation Engineering, in 1965. He joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in April 1964 and became a political/ideological counselor for students while in college. After graduation, he became an engineer at

the Liujiaxia Irrigation Works in Gansu Province, northwestern China.

Chosen by Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) to be the yet-to-be-confirmed paramount leader of the so-called fourth generation of leadership of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Hu has ranked as the fifth and the youngest standing member of the seven-member Political Bureau of the CCP since 1997. His current posts include vice president of the PRC and vice president of the CCP's Military Affairs Committee. He has held the posts of head of the Chinese Communist Youth League (January 1983–July 1985), party secretary of Guizhou Province (July 1985–November 1988), and the eighth party secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region (December 1988–January 1991).

Hu is known for his deep affiliation with the Chinese Communist Youth League, his longtime supervision of the CCP's ideological work and the training of the CCP's young ideologues, and his crackdown on the Tibetans' uprising in Lhasa, Tibet's capital. He generally evades media coverage and has granted especially little access to the international media.

Wenshan Jia

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HU SHI (1891–1962), Chinese intellectual. Born in Jixi, Anhui Province, Hu Shi was China's leading liberal scholar and educator of his time. Hu laid an important foundation for the 1919 May 4th Movement with an essay published in 1917 in the Chinese journal *Xin Qing Nian* (New Youth), which advocated the avoidance of the classical language and the adoption of the vernacular in literature. *Chang Shi Ji* (The Trials), his collection of poetry published in March 1920, was the first noticeable attempt at vernacular poetry in modern China. During the May 4th period, Hu criticized Confucianism and called for individualism and women's liberation. From 1917 to 1948, Hu worked at Beijing University at intervals, serving as the chair of various departments, academic dean, dean of humanities, and university president. The framework he designed in 1922 for the Chinese school system, from primary school to college, remained in practice until the early 1950s. He died as president of the Academia Sinica in Taiwan, which position he had held since 1958.

Hu studied at Cornell (1910–1914) and Columbia (1915–1917, awarded a Ph.D. in 1927), served as China's ambassador to the United States (1938–1942), and resided in the United States from 1949 to 1958. A student of the West, he promoted Western ideas in China in an attempt to better serve the country. However, his advocacy of the total Westernization—reworded later as Internationalization—of China in his earlier years has remained controversial.

Jian-Zhong Lin

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HU YAOBANG (1915–1989), Chinese Communist Party reformer in the 1980s. Born in Hunan Province into a peasant family in 1915, Hu Yaobang joined the Red Army and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and was included in the 1934–1935 Long March. His career was closely linked with that of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997). Along with Deng, Hu was purged twice during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) and was sent into the countryside for "reeducation." He gained membership in the CCP Politburo in 1978 with Deng's support. Hu organized the rehabilitation of intellectuals disgraced during the Cultural Revolution and presided over a radical liberalization of the party structure between 1982 and 1986.

Hu supported combining economic liberalization with political liberalization. On 16 January 1987, he resigned as general secretary of the CCP after he was forced to accept responsibility for student demonstrations that occurred in December 1986. He went into seclusion, although he remained a member of the Politburo. On 15 April 1989, Hu died of a heart attack. His resignation and subsequent death dimmed the hopes of those who supported political reforms. His funeral sparked student demonstrations that ended with the Tiananmen incident in June 1989.

Elizabeth Van Wie Davis

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HUANG HAI. See Yellow Sea.

HUANG RIVER Called "China's sorrow," or Huang Ho in Chinese, the Huang (Yellow) River is the second-largest river in China, flowing 5,954 kilometers from its origins in the Bayan Harshan Mountains on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau in western China until it empties into the Bo Hai Gulf. The Huang River derives its name from the yellow color of the silt in the water. Each year, tons of silt are deposited on the riverbed, causing annual flooding. The Huang River flows east and then northeast through Qinghai, Gansu, and Ningxia Provinces and then through Inner Mongolia before turning south, forming the border of Shaanxi and Shanxi Provinces. From there, the Huang turns east through Henan and Shandong Provinces before emptying into the Bo Hai Gulf.

Throughout China's long history, the Huang River has overflowed its banks, causing extensive damage to nearby farmland and surrounding communities. Dikes have been built to stem the flooding but have to be continually rebuilt to prevent the river from overflowing its banks. The river has also changed course many times, causing untold damage. During the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), the Huang River changed its course from northern to southern Shandong Province, flooding 7,769 square kilometers of farmland. Between

1853 and 1855, the river began flowing through northern Shandong Province, destroying large areas of farmland. In modern times, General Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) ordered his troops to destroy the dikes along the river in Henan Province, causing disastrous effects, including the drowning of 1 million Chinese civilians.


The lower region of the Huang River is considered the birthplace of Chinese civilization, because archaeologists have discovered sites dating as far back as 5000 BCE and have chronicled the emergence of the Yangshao culture (5000–3000 BCE) and the Longshan culture (3000–2200 BCE) on the North China Plain along the Huang River. Since 1949, the Chinese government has accomplished many flood control and reforestation projects to conquer the capricious nature of the river.

Keith A. Leitich

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HUANG SHAN Mount Huang (Huangshan), known as the "most beautiful mountain in China," is located in the southern part of Anhui Province in eastern China. Huang Shan actually is a complex of mountains, covering 154 square kilometers (50 square miles), with seventy-seven peaks above 1,000 meters (3,280 feet). Lotus Flower, the highest peak, reaches 1,864 meters (6,116 feet) above sea level. The mountain has a complex geology but consists mainly of granite rock; the formation derives from faulting and folding processes dating back 100 million years.



HUANG SHAN—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

An important theme in sixteenth-century Chinese Shanshui art and literature, this spectacular granite mountain remains a popular subject for artists and photographers. It was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1990.

Huang Shan consists of numerous weirdly shaped rock pillars, and frequent fog and mist give the appearance of stone islands rising from a sea of fog. The area also contains waterfalls, lakes, hot springs, and pine forests. From the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) on it has assumed great importance in Chinese culture, being extolled in art and literature. Huang Shan was proclaimed a site of scenic beauty and historic interest by the Chinese government in 1982 and inscribed on the World Heritage List in 1990.

Michael Pretes

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HUANGLONGSI Huanglongsi, China, and the neighboring ravine to the north, Jiuzhaigou, are two outstanding natural resource areas on the Tibetan plateau. Both areas are national parks and have recently been designated by the United Nations as World Heritage Sites for their extraordinary natural scenery. Jiuzhaigou (Ravine of the Nine Stockade-Villages) is named after the rural Tibetan communities (*sde dgu*) that populate the area and is most notable for dramatic waterfalls and glacier-formed lakes. The limestone geology of the area, combined with hot spring algae growth, has produced an incredible range of colored waters (turquoise, green, yellow, and milky white). Formerly the domain of giant pandas, much of the area was heavily logged in the 1980s. Red pandas, golden monkeys, takins (large ruminants), and water deer are said to still populate the region, but vast areas of rhododendron, wild roses, clematis, and wild ginger are more easily found.

Yellow Dragon Temple (Chinese: Huanglongsi) is a Taoist monastery located in Sichuan Province, China, 35 kilometers from the county seat of Songpan. Because it is located so high (3,430 meters) in the Minshan mountain range, the temple was previously known as the Snow Mountain Temple (Yueshansi). The temple is situated at a pass into a forested valley surrounded by glaciated peaks (up to 5,000 meters) and dotted with over three thousand natural pools of various-colored water, from which the Tibetan name of the temple,

Gser mthso lha khang (Yellow Pool Temple), is derived. The existing structure was founded in the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and is the rear, and only surviving, of three halls built at that time.

Gray Tuttle

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HUBEI (2002 est. pop. 63.3 million). Hubei (Hubei, Hupeh), a central China province that covers an area of 185,900 square kilometers, borders on Sichuan and Shaanxi in the west, on Henan in the north, on Anhui in the east, and on Hunan and Jiangxi in the south. The province is traversed by the Chang (Yangtze) River from west to east, with the greater part of the province located north of the river. More than three-fourths of the province is hilly and mountainous, with peaks in the western parts reaching to more than 3,000 meters, while the eastern part mainly consists of low-lying plains.

The climate is subtropical, with monsoon rain in spring and summer. Summers are hot and humid; winters generally are mild. The annual average precipitation varies between 700 and 1,700 millimeters, which is the highest average in the southeast. The vast majority of Hubei's population lives in rural areas along the rivers and in the lake district in the eastern part where the capital, Wuhan (4.4 million, 1994), also is situated.

Wuhan was originally three cities separated by the Han and Chang Rivers, but these were joined by bridges in the 1950s. During the Eastern Zhou dynasty (770–221 BCE), the Hubei area was the center of the Chu kingdom, and copper mines were operating near present Daye County, not far from Wuhan. With the unification of China in 221 BCE, Hubei became part of the Chinese empire, but it was not until the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) that immigration from the north accelerated and the province became a wealthy rice-producing area. In the nineteenth century, the province suffered greatly under the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864). Cities along the Chang River were

opened for trade with the Europeans, and tea became a major commodity. The rebellion that ended the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) originated in Hubei. During the Japanese occupation of eastern China, parts of Hubei were controlled by Japanese troops, and industrial works were bombed.

Large areas of the province are well suited for agriculture; the major crops are rice, wheat, corn, sweet potatoes, cotton, and rapeseed. Products indigenous to Hubei include lacquer, tangerines, tremella, camphor trees, and various sorts of medical herbs and tea. The iron works and steel yards of Wuhan are among the largest in China, and its industry manufactures farm machines, railcars, engines, transport machinery, and so forth. In 1994 the Chinese government initiated the so-called "Three Gorges Dam," a gigantic dam to be built just west of Sandouping, located about thirty-five kilometers west of the river port of Yichang. The project is scheduled to be completed in 2009, by which time the reservoir behind the dam will extend about 500 kilometers upstream, having displaced an estimated 1.9 million people in western Hubei and the neighboring province of Sichuan.

Bent Nielsen

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HUE (2001 pop. 262,000). Located thirteen kilometers inland from the South China Sea on Vietnam's central coast and bisected by the Song Huong (Per-

fume River), Hue is regarded by many as Vietnam's artistic, spiritual, and cultural center. Hue was Vietnam's capital and the Imperial City during the Nguyen dynasty (1802–1955). Even as early as the second century BCE, Hue was home to rulers. From 111 BCE to 222 CE, the Han dynasty (206 BCE–222 CE) Chinese empire occupied Vietnam; during this time, the city (then called Tay Quyen) was headquarters for the Han army. Local chieftains captured the city in the second century CE and renamed it K'ui Sou. The Vietnamese and Cham (who ruled central Vietnam from the second to fifteenth century as the Kingdom of Champa) fought over the city between the tenth and fourteenth centuries. By the fifteenth century, the Vietnamese had captured the city and renamed it Phu Xuan.

In 1847 two French warships bombarded Tourane (Da Nang), to protest the Vietnamese treatment of French missionaries in Vietnam. The attack killed an estimated 10,000 Vietnamese civilians. Emperor Thieu Tri (ruled 1841–1847), recognizing the French technological power advantage, sued for peace, the first step down the road to the establishment of a French protectorate over the country. During the U.S. War in Vietnam, Hue was devastated by the fighting, especially during the 1968 Tet Offensive, which destroyed much of the old Imperial City and Citadel.

Hue continues to adapt itself to different times and circumstances. Today, Hue's main draw is its past. Every year thousands of visitors flock to the ancient Vietnamese capital to soak up its rich history. Elaborate tombs of emperors, ancient pagodas, outstanding cuisine, the Imperial City and Citadel, and a flourishing art business will keep Hue bustling with activity and tourists for years to come.

Richard B. Verrone

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HUI Hui is a state-recognized nationality of China that is characterized by being Muslim religiously but Chinese culturally. Alternative names include Huihui and Dongan. The Hui are among the most populous of China's minorities. The 1990 census put their population at approximately 8.6 million, third after the



HUE—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

A UNESCO World Heritage Site since 1993, Hue was the capital of Vietnam during the feudal Nguyen dynasty. All but abandoned now, the Hue monuments are a poignant reminder of imperial Vietnam.



The Great Mosque in Xi'an, one of the oldest and largest mosques in China and spiritual center for the large Hui population in the city. (CARL & ANN PURCELL/CORBIS)

Zhuang and Manchus. The Hui are also the most widely distributed of China's minorities. Although the main concentrations are in the northwest, such as in Ningxia, Gansu, and Shaanxi provinces, communities also exist in Yunnan and elsewhere, and even in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and overseas Chinese communities. Most are Chinese-speaking, retaining Arabic only to read the Qur'an.

Muslims have lived in China since the seventh century CE, notably in the southeast. But it was not until the Mongol conquest of the thirteenth century that many came, gradually becoming settlers, not immigrants, and adopting Chinese culture, speaking Chinese, and marrying Chinese women. To this day, most Hui maintain a belief in a single God, abstain from pork, practice circumcision, and attend mosques in Hui communities. Intermarriage is becoming more common, but it remains infrequent. Hui dedication to Islam is much stronger in the northwest than elsewhere. In the southeast, some people of Muslim descent regard themselves as Hui while following customs and beliefs hardly different from their Han neighbors.

The Hui Muslim tradition is Sunni, but sectarian divisions have been common historically. Relations with the Han Chinese have often been contentious. The nineteenth century saw a high point in Hui rebellions against Chinese regimes. However, since China became a republic in 1912, the Hui have generally been loyal to the Chinese state and fought for

it against foreign enemies and even against non-Hui Muslim rebels. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) Muslims were persecuted and mosques were desecrated; the Hui suffered serious religious and ethnic persecution and many hid their identity. However, the Hui remain loyal to China, showing little support for and much opposition to Muslim secession from China. Since the early 1980s, Hui ethnic consciousness has revived strongly.

A tradition of Hui Chinese-language Islamic scholarship developed in China, including in mysticism (Sufism). In addition, the Hui have contributed to such Chinese arts as the Peking Opera. Their tradition of commercial skills remains strong to this day. Over the centuries they have been sinicized, and currently few physical or nonreligious cultural characteristics distinguish them from the Han. The Hui do well socially and educationally, with literacy rates among the highest of the minorities; many urban Hui, including women, enter the professions.

Colin Mackerras

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HUK REBELLION The Hukbalahap, a Tagalog acronym for the Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (People's Anti-Japanese Army), was founded in March 1942 as the military arm of the outlawed Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), or the Communist Party of the Philippines. The Hukbalahap (or Huks) sought to defeat Japan, destroy the exploitative landholding system in Central Luzon that for decades had resulted in widespread peasant poverty, and ultimately establish a communist government. As a large and well-organized guerrilla group, the Huks inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese army, and, significantly, killed an estimated twenty thousand Filipino collaborators, class enemies, or personal rivals. When Japan surrendered, the Huks controlled many local governments in Central Luzon and had appointed governors of Pampanga and Laguna provinces.

Seven Hukbalahap-supported politicians, including Huk Supremo Luis Taruc, were elected to the Philippine Congress in 1946. Their expulsion from congress to ensure the passage of a constitutional amendment favorable to American economic interests and President Manuel Roxas's "mailed fist" policy drove the Hukbalahap underground and into armed conflict with the government. From the four Central Luzon provinces of Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, and Tarlac, the original area of "Huklandia," the Huks increased their political activities in other Luzon provinces and on the island of Panay. The name of the Hukbalahap was changed in November 1948 to Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) or the People's Liberation Army to reflect the PKP's goal of overthrowing the Philippine government.

The turning point in the Huk insurgency was President Elpidio Quirino's appointment of Ramon Magsaysay as secretary of defense in 1950 and an increase in American military assistance to the Philippines. A charismatic former guerrilla leader from Zambales province and a popular congress member with strong ties to the military, Magsaysay was given a free hand in reestablishing law and order. He reorganized the military, retiring or court-martialing corrupt and incompetent officers and soldiers, and worked to regain the confidence of the peasantry. Magsaysay pursued the Huks aggressively and took

steps to protect the peasantry from Huk terrorism. He also established the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) in December 1950 to relocate landless peasants in Hukbalahap-controlled areas to unoccupied land in Mindanao. By 1954, when Huk Supremo Taruc surrendered, the HMB was no longer a threat to the stability of the government. Although remnants of the Huks continued to operate in Central Luzon for more than a decade after Taruc's surrender, the movement was dead by 1970.

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HUMAYUN (d. 1556), Mughal ruler. Eldest of four sons, Humayun was the designated successor of Babur, ascending to the throne of the Mughal empire in December 1530 at the age of twenty-three. Humayun inherited an Indian kingdom that was riven by internal dissension and subject to external threats. He had some experience as governor of Badakshan, but as emperor proved a poor replacement to Babur.

A cultivated man, interested in mathematics and astronomy, and with considerable personal valor, Humayun lacked political astuteness. He failed to capitalize on his victories, was indecisive, prone to long bouts of indolence, and addicted to opium. His ambitious brothers were allowed to carve niches for themselves (Kamran, for instance, took control of Kabul and Punjab) and they proved fickle allies, even plotting to overthrow him.

Externally, the two biggest threats came from Bahadur Shah in Gujarat in the west and the Afghan ruler Sher Shah in Bihar in eastern India. In 1535, Humayun defeated Bahadur Shah and established control as far as Cambay on the coast. However, when he marched east to confront Sher Shah, Bahadur Shah recovered his kingdom. Sher Shah inflicted two crushing defeats on Humayun at Chausa (1539) and Kanauj (1540), forcing him into exile. Eventually the Persian emperor Shah Tahmasp helped him recover Delhi and Agra in 1555. Humayun died soon after in January 1556 following a fall in his library in Delhi.

Chandrika Kaul

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HUMOR IN CHINESE HISTORY Humor has a rich history in China. As in other cultures, comedy and humorous literature have often been criticized as immoral by somber ideologues. Nevertheless, playful writing and humorous anecdotes survive from China's earliest times and were produced throughout the imperial era (221 BCE–1912 CE). In Chinese history, humor has been used for a variety of purposes,

including entertainment, cultural criticism, personal attacks, and bolstering group solidarity against outsiders. Humor is thus important to study for a full appreciation of the complexity, tensions, and joys of Chinese life over the ages.

Zhuangzi and Confucius

The most famous and influential humorist of ancient China was the philosopher Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu, 369–286 BCE), whose writings make up one of the two primary texts of Taoism, the other being the mystical Daodejing. Zhuangzi used playful parables, parody, and clever wordplay to ridicule other

**SITCOMS COME TO CHINA**

Until the 1990s, the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) exercised tight control over the content of the Chinese television, and TV was used more as a propaganda tool than an entertainment medium. However, in the early 1990s, government subsidies of television were reduced while the number of cable TV stations increased. The government began to allow paid advertising, and marketers saw an opportunity to gain revenues by bringing a different kind of programming to China's 1 billion television viewers. Film-maker Ying Da thought the time was right to create China's own version of the American situation comedy.

Ying Da, son of the noted Chinese actor Ying Ruocheng, had studied in the United States and worked with U.S. theater and film companies. However, the inspiration for his television career came, appropriately enough, from watching episodes of "The Cosby Show" and "Cheers" during his time in the United States. In 1993, he struck a chord with the sitcom "I Love My Family," about a retired PRC official who has to adjust to the social changes in China. In the late 1990s, he had another hit in "Chinese Restaurant," about the misadventures of Chinese immigrants who make up the staff of a Chinese restaurant in Los Angeles.

Although Chinese television has come a long way, some things remain the same. The government still has ultimate control over the content of programs, so producers have to watch how certain topics are covered. For example, government overseers find it decidedly unfunny to make jokes about authority figures such as teachers or police officers. Even with some restrictions, though, sitcoms have found a happy home in China.

Marcy Ross

Source: Terry McCarthy and Jaime A. Florcruz. (1999) "Uncanned Laughter." *Time Asia* (15 November). Retrieved 14 April 2002, from: <http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/99/1115/tv.china.html>.

philosophers' belief in the power of human reason. According to Zhuangzi, people's understanding of the world is always limited by their limited perspective, just as a frog in a well cannot see more than a small patch of the sky or a sleeping man has no way of knowing that he is not the butterfly he dreams himself to be. Zhuangzi's stories have delighted generations of Chinese readers and served as models of humorous writing.

A chief target of Zhuangzi's joking was another prominent philosopher, Confucius (551–479 BCE). In contrast to Taoists like Zhuangzi, who believed in living in intuitive harmony with the natural order, Confucius promoted a strict ethical code and a hierarchical social order. Confucius is often depicted as a rather stern teacher, but there is some evidence in the conversations with his disciples recorded in the *Analects* that he too had a sense of humor. One of the most amusing images from ancient China was actually produced to illustrate the Confucian ethical principle that one should be filial to one's parents. A stone carving in the Wu Liang shrine, constructed during the second century CE, depicts the well-known story of a seventy-year-old filial son persuading his even more elderly parents that they are still young by acting like an infant.

Confucianism and Humor

Since the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), Confucianism has tended to reject humor, seeing it as incompatible with sincere devotion to ethical principles. The famous female writer Ban Zhao (c. 45–116 CE) stated that a good woman should shun jests and laughter and solemnly devote herself to serving her husband and his parents. Some Confucian scholars criticized as frivolous all humorous popular novels and plays, which were often banned by the government. Even poetry did not escape the attacks of sterner Confucian critics in the late imperial era (Ming and Qing dynasties, 1368–1912), who saw it as a waste of time that might have been better spent studying history and promoting morality.

The question of the value of humor was never definitively settled within the Confucian tradition, however, and Confucian thought continuously coexisted and interacted with other schools of thought, such as Taoism, that did encourage a humorous sensibility. Buddhism entered China during the Han dynasty, and the Chan school of Buddhism (Zen, in Japanese) made use of the "shock effect" of humorous and incongruous images to bring about enlightenment, much as Zhuangzi used humor to question rationality. The use

of humorous and incongruous images for their shock value was borrowed by poets in the Song dynasty (960–1279) and later periods.

Humor in Periods of Unrest

Advances in printing and publishing contributed to the spread of humorous literature. Two periods of political unrest and technological change in later Chinese history produced a flood of humorous writing spanning the spectrum from escapist entertainment to harsh satire: the early seventeenth century, when the Ming dynasty was in decline, and the Republican period between the fall of the Qing dynasty (1912) and the founding of the People's Republic (1949). In the earlier period, humorous and erotic novels, such as *Jinpingmei* (Golden Lotus), and comic short stories, such as those collected by Feng Menglong (1574–1646), were immensely popular. During the 1920s and 1930s, China's greatest satirist, Lu Xun (1881–1936), criticized Chinese society and politics in essays and short stories published in some of the hundreds of newspapers and literary journals that appeared in those years. Lu Xun also promoted woodblock printing and satirical cartoons that the illiterate masses could understand. In this era, the writer Lin Yutang (1895–1976) introduced the English word "humor" into the Chinese language and argued that China needed more of it.

During the era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), and particularly during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), sincere revolutionary fervor was held up by the Communist Party as the only proper attitude toward life. Humor did not entirely die out, but it was dangerous politically. In Taiwan, the Nationalist Party also clamped down on political expression, but apolitical humor was not discouraged.

Humor Themes

The themes of Chinese humor often resemble those in other parts of the world: stock characters such as the henpecked husband and the lusty widow abound in published joke books. Confucian and Buddhist institutions and thought are also popular objects of humor, especially in plays and opera plots from before the twentieth century. Residents of one part of China often make fun of those of another. However, this sort of regional humor and jokes about foreigners are not as prominent in China as humor involving ethnicity and nationality is in Europe and North America. The nature of the Chinese language, which has a relatively small number of different sounds, encourages puns and wordplay. These are particularly common in the per-

formance humor called *xiangsheng*, which resembles vaudeville dialogue.

Humor Today

The decades of the 1980s and 1990s, during which ideological orthodoxy disintegrated in both the People's Republic of China and Taiwan and the use of the Internet mushroomed, may be the beginning of another great age of humor in Chinese history. A growing appetite for humor in the People's Republic of China (PRC) has led publishers to comb traditional literature and pull out the funny bits for hot-selling anthologies. Lin Yutang's writings from the 1920s and 1930s are enjoying new popularity, and, in both Taiwan and the PRC, the television sitcom has become a well-established form.

Kristin Stapleton

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HUN SEN (b. 1952), prime minister of Cambodia. Hun Sen is the prime minister of Cambodia and has been the dominant player on the Cambodian political stage for more than fifteen years. Born at Peam Koh Sna village in Kompong Cham Province on 4 April 1952, Hun Sen attended a local primary school before attending the Lycée Indra Devi in Phnom Penh (1965–1969). In 1970, he joined the Cambodian lib-



Hun Sen (L) meets General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Le Kha Phieu in Hanoi on 14 December 1998. (AFP/CORBIS)

eration forces under the leadership of the Communists and the patronage of deposed ruler Prince Norodom Sihanouk. In 1975, as Communists troops launched their final assault on Phnom Penh, Hun Sen was being treated in a field hospital and eventually lost his left eye. In the same year, he married Bun Rany, with whom he had three sons and three daughters (one of them adopted).

Hun Sen rose through the ranks of the Khmer Rouge before eventually defecting to Vietnam. He was a leading figure in the Vietnamese-sponsored invasion that ousted the Khmer Rouge in 1979. At age twenty-seven he became the new regime's foreign minister and was appointed prime minister in 1985 at the age of thirty-three. Hun Sen was a leading figure in the negotiations that led to Cambodia's 1991 peace agreements and to the elections of 1993. After his party lost those elections, he refused to concede defeat and was appointed second prime minister. In July 1997, Hun Sen ousted First Prime Minister Ranariddh and eventually secured absolute power at the 1998 elections. A controversial figure, widely criticized for his record on human rights and his links with corrupt business persons, Hun Sen is often referred to as the "strongman" of Cambodian politics.

David M. Ayres

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HUNAN (2001 pop. 63.1 million). Located in south central China, Hunan Province covers an area of 209,773 square kilometers and is bordered by Hubei Province to the north, Guangdong and Guangxi Provinces to the south, Kiangsi Province to the east, and Sichuan Province to the west. Hunan Province lies on the fertile Hunan plain, the richest agricultural land in China. The province's summers are hot and humid; the temperature there can reach close to 38°C. Heavy rains are also common during the summer months. Hunan's capital is Changsha, which has a population of 2 million. Other major cities in Hunan Province include Hengyang, Xiangtan, and Zhuzhou.

Hunan Province has a long history and can trace its origins to the Warring States period (475–221 BCE), when it was a part of the kingdom of Zhu. Later, the region around Changsha became the center of Zhu culture. Sometime between the seventh and tenth centuries, ethnic Han Chinese began migrating to Hunan, displacing the native Miao and Yao peoples. Successive invasions by the Mongols in the thirteenth century and the Manchus in the sixteenth century drove the Miao and Yao farther south and west as Han Chinese immigrated in large numbers.

Hunan Province has long been known for its agricultural and industrial output. It is a major rice-growing region, but it also produces large amounts of citrus fruit, shellfish, sugarcane, tobacco, and tung oil seed. Hunan Province also has large deposits of non-ferrous metals, including lead, zinc, mercury, tungsten, and copper. Industrially, Hunan produces chemical fertilizers and locomotives as well as iron and steel.

Hunan has also influenced the course of modern Chinese politics. Zeng Guo-fen, who suppressed the Taiping Rebellion, was born in Hunan, as was Mao Zedong (1893–1976), chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and founder of the People's Republic of China.

Keith A. Leitich

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HUNDRED DAYS REFORM Defeat by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) greatly affected the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) government of China

and many young Chinese Confucian scholars. Some of these scholar-officials, particularly Kang Youwei (1858–1927) and Liang Qichao (1873–1929), called for dramatic changes in the structure of government, the examination system for entrance into government service, and the relationship of the government to the Chinese people, although they clothed these changes in traditional Confucian principles.

The young emperor, Guang Xu (1871–1908), was caught up in the fervor for reform and committed himself to carrying out a comprehensive reform program for approximately one hundred days, hence the phrase "Hundred Days Reform." From mid-June to mid-September 1898, the emperor issued some forty reform decrees.

The decrees called for education reform by replacing the centuries-old "eight-legged" essays with an exam more reflecting current affairs, establishing an Imperial University, and providing classes in foreign affairs and languages, economics, medicine, and the sciences. The decrees also sought changes in government, including eliminating the dual Manchu-Chinese system of control, eliminating some unneeded positions, and streamlining administration. Finally, the decrees called for government support for building railways, developing the economy, and improving the capital as well as for providing government protection of missionaries, simplifying legal codes, and preparing an annual budget. These measures were designed both to reform the government and to impress foreign powers in order to slow down the pace of foreign encroachments on Chinese sovereignty.

As one might expect, there was a backlash. The empress dowager, Cixi, allied with conservative elements in the Imperial City and across the nation and prepared a counterstroke. Rumors had floated around Beijing for days of a coup, and as the emperor slowly moved, the empress dowager and her allies moved faster. On 21 September 1898, she seized control of the emperor, announced that he was incapacitated, took over all reform documents, and seized control of the government. Many of the reformers were arrested and executed, but Kang and Liang managed to escape. The reforms were undone, and one outcome was the so-called Boxer Rebellion, which accelerated foreign encroachments on China.

Charles Dobbs

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HUNDRED FLOWERS CAMPAIGN In May 1956, Mao Zedong, the paramount leader of the People's Republic of China (PRC), announced that the Communist government would relax its strict control over freedom of thought and expression. Mao adopted the slogan of "Let a hundred flowers bloom together, let the hundred schools of thought contend" and invited intellectuals to voice criticism of party cadets and government policies. Mao intended to win over the alienated intellectuals by giving them a degree of intellectual freedom. More access to foreign publications, for example, was given to intellectuals who worked in schools, colleges, and universities, as these people were losing faith in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after the introduction of a Soviet-style education system to China starting from 1949, in which liberal arts education was discarded in favor of science and technology education.

The Hundred Flowers Campaign was not quick in taking off. On the one hand, there was resistance to criticism within the CCP. On the other hand, Chinese intellectuals were reluctant to criticize the government, fearing reprisal. It was only in the spring of 1957, after Mao's open reassurance, that members of democratic parties, writers, journalists, teachers, and professionals in China started to criticize communist rule, government policy, and party members openly. In extreme cases, wall posters appeared in public denouncing the whole communist system. Some even questioned the legitimacy of CCP rule over China. Mao and other leaders of the CCP were all shocked by the volume and intensity of the criticism.

By early July, just five weeks after the inauguration of the Hundred Flowers Campaign, a dramatic new campaign was launched by the CCP, shifting the target of criticism from the CCP to the intellectuals. Recent critics of the regime were severely criticized by party members, and about half to three-quarters of a million intellectuals were denounced or blacklisted. Some were arrested, and many were sent to the countryside to "rectify their thinking through labor." It was only in 1979, three years after the death of Mao, that Deng Xiaoping, the new leader of the CCP, restored a "decent name" to these denounced intellectuals.

Stephanie Chung

See also: **Chinese Communist Party; Deng Xiaoping; Mao Zedong**

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HUNGRY GHOST FESTIVAL After Chinese New Year, the annual Hungry Ghost Festival (*Zhong Yuan*) is perhaps the next most popular celebration among the Chinese. Celebrated for thirty days beginning on the first day of the seventh moon of the Chinese lunar calendar (usually around August), the festival has roots in Chinese forms of social life, Taoist folk religion, and Buddhism. It is believed that during this period the gates of hell (purgatory or the underworld) are thrown wide open, and ghosts—euphemistically called "good brothers"—are free to roam the realm of the living once again.

The Feast of the Wandering Souls, more commonly known as the Hungry Ghost Festival, is an inauspicious time. Hungry ghosts may prey on the living out of anger and resentment. Weddings are not held in this month, and ghost stories of mishaps and ill fortune circulate to keep the living alert. Children are particularly vulnerable, and parents take care to prevent them from swimming in the open sea or camping in forests, for example.

To appease this legion of anonymous ghosts, offerings are made outside of Chinese homes at nearby road junctions, country lanes, and open spaces, but care is also taken not to invite them into the homes. Neighborhood groups and clan and trade associations have more elaborate celebrations lasting for a few days. Temporary sheds are built in open spaces to house a



A ritual specialist jumps over a fire at the Hungry Ghost Festival held by the Chinese community in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in August 1999. (AFP/CORBIS)

number of deities. These deities are made of papier-mache and are burnt at the end of the festival. The chief of these deities—called Phor Tor Kong in Hokkien—is the keeper of purgatory, who keeps a watchful eye over the wandering ghosts. Sumptuous feasts are provided to fete both deities and ghosts. An assortment of meat dishes, rice, noodles, sweet cakes, fruits, wine, and other drinks, as well as joss sticks, paper money, and paper clothes, are laid out. Additionally, entertainment is provided in the form of traditional Chinese opera, live singing bands, and open-air film showings. Besides fulfilling ritual obligations, the Hungry Ghost Festival is occasionally used to raise funds and awareness to address concerns pertaining to the well-being of diaspora Chinese communities, particularly in areas like Chinese education, ethnicity, and culture.

Yeob Seng-Guan

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HUNZA Deep in the mountains of the Hindu Kush in present-day northern Pakistan, high above sea level, lies a valley called Hunza. The Hunza valley is surrounded by the Karakoram Mountain Range, which extends from present-day India to Pakistan and into Jammu and Kashmir; its highest peak is K2 (8,611 meters), and sixty of its peaks in all tower around 6,700 meters. The Hunza River itself lies in Jammu and Kashmir, in the area controlled by Pakistan, and flows west and then south for 193 kilometers. Though most of the Hunza valley is located in Pakistan, it crosses the borders of today's Afghanistan and China. Karimabad, a grouping of six villages, is the principal populated area in this fertile valley.

The Hunza valley is dotted with glacial lakes and rivers that form in concurrence with glacial ice flows in the mountains. Due to these glacial flows, the Hunza valley is fertile and has sustained isolated pop-

ulations of Hunza people, who speak a language unrelated to any other, throughout the centuries. As these glaciers melt, the glacial water (sometimes referred to as glacial milk due to its opaque white color from the minerals found in it) flows through the valley, and the people living in Hunza use it to irrigate their crops. The entire valley is well cultivated; every inch of arable land is put to use. Perhaps because of the mineral-rich water and fertile soil, the Hunza people are famous for their long lives, some living to be 120 years old.

Jennifer Nichols

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HUSSEIN ONN (1922–1990), prime minister of Malaysia. Hussein Onn became the third prime minister of Malaysia (1976–1981) upon the sudden demise of Abdul Razak. His renowned strength of character and impeccable integrity saw him through various challenges. Son of Onn bin Ja'afar, founder of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) party, Hussein spent his early years in the military and in World War II saw action in the Middle East. Following his discharge, he joined his father's struggle in UMNO; they both left UMNO in 1951. Hussein went to Britain to read law.

Urged by Abdul Razak, his brother-in-law, Hussein rejoined UMNO in 1968. He became minister of education (1971), deputy prime minister (1974), and prime minister. During his single-term premiership, Hussein faced severe political challenges, including pressure from right-wing elements within his own party (UMNO) over the "Harun case," divisions within the ruling coalition (which since 1971 was the Barisan Nasional [National Front], comprised of UMNO, two other major parties, and several minor parties), and a secessionist threat from the state of Sabah.

In the "Harun case," Harun bin Idris, a prominent and charismatic UMNO politician, was charged with corruption and criminal breach of trust and subsequently convicted in November 1977 to serve a two-year prison sentence. His appeal to the Privy Council was rejected; his appeal for pardon from the king of Malaysia was also turned down. The political repercussions were immense because Harun commanded mass Malay support not only from the youth but also

from the "UMNO Old Guard." Hussein as president of UMNO and prime minister withstood the pressure from Harun's partisan supporters to at least arrange a pardon. Hussein stood his ground, and Harun served out his prison sentence.

In 1976, Hussein supported Berjaya (United People's Party of Sabah) in ousting Mustapha bin Datu Harun and his United Sabah National Organization (USNO), the ruling party in Sabah since 1967. Mustapha had been accused of having secessionist tendencies—namely, the separation of Sabah from Malaysia to join with three territories of the southern Philippines—Mindanao, Palawan, and Sulu—to form a new nation.

In December 1977, the Barisan Nasional expelled a component member, the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PAS), for its recalcitrant stand over the imposition of emergency rule in the state of Kelantan following the dismissal of PAS-appointed *Mentri Besar*.

Hussein hastened implementation of the New Economic Policy (NEP), emphasizing rural development to improve the economic situation of the Malays in relation to that of other ethnic groups. At the same time, more non-Malays benefited from civil service employment and land ownership. And more safeguards were afforded to foreign investments. Nonetheless, there were worrying signs of non-Malay dissatisfaction over the pro-Malay economic and education policies of the government.

Ooi Keat Gin

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HUSSEIN, SADDAM (b. 1937), president of Iraq since 1979. Saddam Hussein presides over one of the most repressive regimes in the Middle East. He was born near Takrit, a small town on the Tigris about one hundred miles from Baghdad. In 1955, attracted by Arab nationalism, he joined the fledgling Iraqi Ba'ath Party.

In July 1958, the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown and a republic installed. In October 1959, Saddam Hussein was involved in an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the president, 'Abd al-Karim Qasim. He fled to Egypt until Qasim's overthrow in February 1963.



Saddam Hussein at a ceremony honoring military officers in Baghdad on 4 January 2000. (AFP/CORBIS)

On his return, he headed the civilian wing of the Iraqi Baath and by 1969 had become Iraq's vice president. Through the 1970s he gradually consolidated his power.

The nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company in 1972 gave the government—now equivalent to Saddam Hussein and his entourage—full control over the country's oil revenues. Saddam Hussein defeated the Kurdish opposition movement in 1975 and turned against the Communists. By the mid-1980s, most Iraqi intellectuals, and almost all Iraqi leftists, had been killed, imprisoned, or forced into exile.

In July 1979, Saddam Hussein took over the presidency and less than a year later he launched an invasion of the Islamic Republic of Iran. After initial successes, the Iraqis were driven back by Iran; the war continued for eight years, during which Iraq used chemical weapons against Iranian forces. In 1988, Saddam Hussein initiated a massive campaign against the Iraqi Kurds, known as *al-Anfal* (the spoils of war), during which at least 100,000 Kurds were captured and killed. During and after the Iran-Iraq War, a personality cult evolved around the "Great Leader."

In another bid for regional supremacy, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990. By late February 1991, however, he had negotiated a cease-fire with the multinational forces under United Nations auspices and U.S. leadership, after weeks of aerial bombardment and five days of ground war, followed by rebellions in the Kurdish North and the Shi'ite

South. Iraqi troops retreated from Kuwait, but Hussein soon regained control in southern Iraq and Kurdistan.

U.N.-imposed sanctions after the Gulf War caused the people of Iraq great suffering but hardly affected its leaders. An oil-for-food agreement, which, if adopted earlier, might have alleviated much of the malnutrition and infant mortality the country experienced, was eventually accepted in 1996. Saddam Hussein's power base is fragile, but his monopoly of the means of coercion, the fragmentation of the opposition, the absence of serious rivals, and fear of the chaos that might follow his downfall have combined to keep him in supreme power for over two decades.

Peter Sluglett

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HUYNH TAN PHAT (1913–1989), vice president of Vietnam. Huynh Tan Phat was born into a family of small landowners in 1913 in the province of Ben Tre, South Vietnam. After graduating from high school in My Tho, Phat attended the Superior School of Fine Arts in Hanoi, where he involved himself in anticolonial student organizations. Back in Saigon he opened his own architectural firm in 1940. Although a very successful architect, he devoted more of his time to political activities than to his profession. He played an important role in the August Revolution that brought independence to Vietnam in 1945. During the War with France (1946–1954) he was arrested many times by the French because he was responsible for the information and press services of the underground Vietnamese government. In 1962, he was elected to the position of vice chair of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, an organization that fought against the South Vietnam regime, assisted by the United States. In 1976, the National Assembly elected him vice president of the Socialist Republic of a reunited Vietnam. He died in 1989 at the age of seventy-six.

Truong Buu Lam

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HWANG SUN-WON (1915–2000), Korean fiction writer. Hwang was born near Pyongyang, Korea (now North Korea), and educated at Waseda University in Tokyo. He was barely in his twenties when he published two volumes of poetry. His first volume of stories appeared in 1940, and he subsequently concentrated on fiction, producing seven novels and more than a hundred stories.

In 1946 Hwang and his family moved from the Soviet-occupied northern sector of Korea to the American-occupied southern sector. He taught at Seoul High School in September of that year. Like millions of other Koreans, the Hwang family was displaced by the civil war of 1950–1953. From 1957 to 1993 Hwang taught at Kyung Hee University in Seoul.

Hwang is the author of some of the best-known stories of modern Korea, including "Pyol" (Stars, 1940), "Hak" (Cranes, 1953), and "Sonagi" (Shower, 1959), among others. He began publishing novels in the 1950s; his most important work in this genre includes *Namu tul pital e soda* (Trees on a Slope, 1960), about the effects of the civil war on three young soldiers; *Irwol* (The Sun and the Moon, 1962–1965), a portrait of an outcast man; and *Umjiginun song* (The Moving Fortress, 1968–1972), an ambitious effort to synthesize Western influence and native tradition in modern Korea.

The length of Hwang's literary career, spanning seven decades, is virtually unparalleled in Korean letters. But it is his craftsmanship that sets Hwang apart from his peers. His command of dialect, his facility with both rural and urban settings, his variety of narrative techniques, his vivid artistic imagination, his diverse constellation of characters, and his insights into human personality make Hwang at once a complete writer and one who is almost impossible to categorize.

Bruce Fulton

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HYDERABAD (2001 pop. 3.1 million). The capital of the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad lies in the eastern part of the Deccan plateau in southern India on the banks of the Musi River. Established in 1591, the city served as the capital of the Qutb Shahi dynasty and of the independent state of Hyderabad. The Qutb Shahi ruler Mohammed Quli Qutb Shah (1580–1612) founded the city of Hyderabad, and under his patronage it became the leading center of Islamic art, literature, and scholarship in southern India. He constructed the royal and ceremonial structures, which became the focal point of the city. Notable among these is a large archway, the Charminar, which stands at the junction of the four major streets of the city. During the reign of his successor, Mohammed Qutb Shah (1612–1626), work was begun on the imposing Mecca Mosque, which could accommodate nearly ten thousand people.

Hyderabad lost its independence when the Mughal empire (1526–1857) extended its rule over the Deccan. Taking advantage of the political turmoil after the death of the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb in 1707, Asaf Jah, Nizam ul Mulk (1734–1748), the Mughal viceroy in the region, declared the independent state of Hyderabad. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, the state of Hyderabad became a protected ally of the British East India Company.

The Nizams of Hyderabad concentrated on developing the city as a center of Islamic learning. The Dairatul-Maarif-it Osmania was founded in 1888 to collect and translate into Urdu rare original Arabic manuscripts. Today the Salar Jung Museum houses a large collection of Persian, Arabic, and Urdu texts amassed by the Nizams. In 1918, the Osmania University was established by Nizam Mir Usman. It was the first Indian university to use an Indian language (Urdu) as the medium of instruction. A University College for women was founded in 1926.

After India gained independence in 1947, conferences were held with the rulers of the princely states to ensure their joining the Indian Union. In September 1948, the Nizam surrendered, and the state of Hyderabad became part of the Indian nation. In 1956, the states of the Indian Union were reorganized according to language groups, and the city of Hyderabad became the capital of the newly formed state of Andhra



The Charminar, Hyderabad's best-known monument. It was built in 1591 to ward off an epidemic. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

Pradesh. Today Hyderabad is a modern city boasting several industries. It is particularly famous for its film industry and as a center of computer science and information technology.

Sanjukta Dasgupta

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HYOGO (2002 est. pop. 5.5 million). Hyogo Prefecture is situated in the western region of Japan's island of Honshu. Once mainly agricultural, it has been overtaken by industry in the south. It occupies an area

of 8,382 square kilometers. Hyogo's main geographical features include a hilly north, central mountains and highlands, and coastal plains in the south. Awajishima, the largest island in the Inland Sea, forms a partial land bridge between Honshu and Shikoku. Hyogo is bordered by the Sea of Japan, Osaka Bay, and the Inland Sea and by Kyoto, Osaka, Okayama, and Tottori prefectures. The present prefecture was formed in 1876 from the old provinces of Harima, Tajima, and Awaji and incorporated parts of the former provinces of Settsu and Tamba as well.

The prefecture's capital is Kobe, situated on Osaka Bay. A cosmopolitan port of around two million residents, including seventy thousand foreigners, Kobe is second only to Yokohama in its volume of international shipping. Operating as a China trade port since the Nara period (710–794 CE), it was little more than a cluster of fishing villages until 1858, when the Tokugawa shogunate declared it an open port. Hyogo Prefecture is a modern industrial center, specializing in ships, railway cars, iron and steel, rubber, and textiles, as well as sake and the famous beer-fed Kobe beef. The city largely has recovered from the 1995 earthquake, which killed five thousand people and destroyed one

hundred thousand structures. It is home to Kobe University, to museums displaying Chinese art and *nam-ban* (western-style) works by Japanese artists, and to a unique inventory of nineteenth-century Japanese and Victorian architecture. Hyogo's other important cities are Nishinomiya, Amagasaki, and Himeji.

Archaeological remains near the city of Akashi indicate prehistoric habitation of Hyogo. The prefecture's strategic location made it a frequent battlefield during the twelfth-century war between the Taira and Minamoto warrior clans. In the Edo period (1600/03–1868) it was divided into small domains. Hyogo's rich cultural tradition includes Bunraku theater, which originated in the folk puppet theater of Awajishima, and the Himeji castle, the most spectacular of the nation's twelve remaining feudal fortresses. Scenic areas include the Inland Sea and the San'in Coast National Park.

E. L. S. Weber

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Volume 3
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Survey of Asia's Regions and Nations



The *Encyclopedia of Modern Asia* covers thirty-three nations in depth and also the Caucasus and Siberia. We have divided Asia into five major subregions and assigned the thirty-three nations to each.

West and Southwest Asia

The West Asian nations covered in detail here are Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. Afghanistan and Pakistan form Southwest Asia, although in some classifications they are placed in Central and South Asia, respectively. Afghanistan, on the crossroads of civilizations for thousands of years, is especially difficult to classify and displays features typical of Central, West, and South Asia.

Despite diversity in language (Persian in Iran, Arabic in Iraq, Turkish in Turkey) form of government (theocracy in Iran, dictatorship in Iraq, and unstable democracy in Turkey) and international ties (Iran to the Islamic world, Iraq to the Arab Middle East, Turkey to the West), there are several sources of unity across West Asia. Perhaps the oldest is geographical location as the site of transportation routes between Europe and Central, East, and South Asia. Since ancient times, people, goods, wealth, and ideas have flowed across the region. In 2002 the flow of oil was most important, from the wells of Iran and Iraq through the pipelines of Turkey. Another source of unity is Sunni Islam, a major feature of life since the seventh century, although Iran is mainly the minority Shi'a tradition and there have long been Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian, and Baha'i minorities in the region. Diversity is also evident in the fact that Turkey is a "secular" state while Iran is a theocracy, and in the conflict between fundamentalist and mainstream Islam in all the nations.

Another important common thread is the shared historical experience of being part of the Ottoman Empire and having to cope with British and Russian designs on their territory and, more recently, American influence. And, in the twentieth century, all three nations have sought to deal with the Kurdish minority and its demands for a Kurdish state to be established on land taken from all three nations.

Unity across Afghanistan and Pakistan is created by adherence to Sunni Islam (although there is a Shi'ite minority in Afghanistan) and the prominence of the Pash-tun ethnic group in each nation. Both nations also experienced British colonialism, although the long-term British influence is more notable in Pakistan, which had been

tied to India under British rule. West Asia is the only region in the world never colonized by Britain, although some experts argue that it did experience significant British cultural influence. In all nations resistance to external control—British, Russian, or United States—is another common historical experience.

Across the region (although less so in Afghanistan) is the stark contrast between the traditional culture and the modernity of liberation from imperial rule, still not complete across the region. This contrast is apparent in clothing styles, manners, architecture, recreation, marriage practices, and many elements of daily life.

In 2002 all the nations faced a water crisis of both too little water and water pollution. They all also faced issues of economic and social development, including reducing external debt, controlling inflation, reducing unemployment, improving education and health care, and continually reacting to the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, which exacerbates many of these problems. The governments also faced the difficult task of solving these problems while resisting Americanization and also while controlling internal political unrest. Political unrest is often tied to efforts at creating democratic governments and the persistence of elite collaboration with tyrannical governments.

Central Asia

Central Asia is known by many names, including Eurasia, Middle Asia, and Inner Asia. At its core, the region is composed of five states that became independent nations following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Scholars sometimes include Afghanistan, Mongolia and the Xinjiang province of China within the label Central Asia. For this project, Central Asia is restricted to the five former Soviet countries, while Afghanistan is classified in Southwest Asia, and Mongolia and Xinjiang as part of East Asia. These states have a shared landmass of 1.5 million square miles, about one-half the size of the United States.

The region's unity comes from a shared history and religion. Central Asia saw two cultural and economic traditions blossom and intermix along the famed Silk Road: nomadic and sedentary. Nomadic herdsman, organized into kinship groupings of clans, lived beside sedentary farmers and oasis city dwellers. Four of the countries share Turkic roots, while the Tajiks are of Indo-European descent, linguistically related to the Iranians. While still recognizable today, this shared heritage has developed into distinct ethnic communities.

The peoples of Central Asia have seen centuries of invasion, notably the legendary Mongol leader Genghis Khan in the thirteenth century, the Russians in the nineteenth and the Soviets in the twentieth century. For better or worse, each invader left behind markers of their presence: the Arabs introduced Islam in the seventh century. Today Islam is the predominant religion in the region, and most Central Asians are Sunni Muslims. The Russians brought the mixed legacy of modernism, including an educated populace, alarming infant mortality rates, strong economic and political participation by women, high agricultural development, and environmental disasters such as the shrinking of the Aral Sea. It was under Russian colonialism that distinct ethno-national boundaries were created to divide the people of the region. These divisions largely shape the contemporary Central Asian landscape.

Today the five Central Asian nations face similar challenges: building robust economies, developing stable, democratic governments, and integrating themselves into the regional and international communities as independent states. They come to these challenges with varied resources: Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have rich oil reserves; several countries have extensive mineral deposits; and the Fergana Valley is but one example of the region's rich agricultural regions.

Finally, the tragic events of September 11, 2001, cast world attention on Afghanistan's neighbors in Central Asia. The "war on terrorism" forged new alliances and offered a mix of political pressure and economic support for the nations' leaders to suppress their countries' internal fundamentalist Muslim movements.

Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia is conventionally defined as that subregion of Asia consisting of the eleven nation-states of Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Myanmar is sometimes alternatively classified as part of South Asia and Vietnam as in East Asia. The region may be subdivided into Mainland Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam) and Insular Southeast Asia (Brunei, East Timor, Indonesia, Philippines, and Singapore). Malaysia is the one nation in the region that is located both on the mainland and islands, though ethnically it is more linked to the island nations of Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines.

Perhaps the key defining features for the region and those that are most widespread are the tropical monsoon climate, rich natural resources, and a way of life in rural areas based on cooperative wet-rice agriculture that goes back several thousand years. In the past unity was also created in various places by major civilizations, including those of Funan, Angkor, Pagan, Sukhothai, Majapahit, Srivijaya, Champa, Ayutthaya, and Melaka. Monarchies continue to be significant in several nation—Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand—today. Subregional unity has also been created since ancient times by the continued use of written languages, including Vietnamese, Thai, Lao, Khmer and the rich literary traditions associated with those languages.

The region can also be defined as being located between China and India and has been influenced by both, with Indian influence generally broader, deeper, and longer lasting, especially on the mainland, except for Vietnam and Singapore, where influences from China have been more important. Islamic influence is also present in all eleven of the Southeast Asian nations. Culturally, Southeast Asia is notable for the central importance of the family, religion (mainly Buddhism and Islam), and aesthetics in daily life and national consciousness.

In the post–World War II Cold War era, there was a lack of regional unity. Some nations, such as Indonesia under Sukarno, were leaders of the nonaligned nations. Countries such as Thailand and the Philippines joined the U.S. side in the Cold War by being part of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). A move toward greater unity was achieved with the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, with the founding members being Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Subsequently other Southeast Asian nations joined ASEAN (Brunei, 1984; Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam 1997; Cambodia 1999). As of 2002, communism was still the system in Laos and Vietnam and capitalism in Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, the Philippines Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Political, economic, and cultural cooperation is fostered by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), with headquarters in Jakarta, Indonesia. Economically, all the nations have attempted to move, although at different speeds and with different results, from a reliance on agriculture to an industrial or service-based economy. All nations also suffered in the Asian economic crisis beginning in July 1997.

Alongside these sources of similarity or unity that allow us to speak of Southeast Asia as a region is also considerable diversity. In the past religion, ethnicity, and diverse colonial experience (British, Dutch, French, American) were major sources of diversity. Today, the three major sources of diversity are religion, form of government, and level of economic development. Three nations (Indonesia, Malaysia,

Brunei) are predominately Islamic, five are mainly Buddhist (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar), two are mainly Christian (Philippines and East Timor), and Singapore is religiously heterogeneous. In addition, there is religious diversity within nations, as all these nations have sizeable and visible religious minorities and indigenous religions, in both traditional and syncretic forms, also remain important.

In terms of government, there is considerable variation: communism in Vietnam and Laos; state socialism in Myanmar; absolute monarchy in Brunei; evolving democracy in the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, and Indonesia; and authoritarian democracy in Malaysia and Singapore. The economic variation that exists among the nations and also across regions within nations is reflected in different levels of urbanization and economic development, with Singapore and Malaysia at one end of the spectrum and Laos and Cambodia at the other. Myanmar is economically underdeveloped, although it is urbanized, while Brunei is one of the wealthiest nations in the world but not very urbanized.

In 2002, Southeast Asia faced major environmental, political, economic, and health issues. All Southeast Asian nations suffer from serious environmental degradation, including water pollution, soil erosion, air pollution in and around cities, traffic congestion, and species extinctions. To a significant extent all these problems are the result of rapid industrial expansion and overexploitation of natural resources for international trade. The economic crisis has hampered efforts to address these issues and has threatened the economies of some nations, making them more dependent on international loans and assistance from nations such as Japan, Australia, and China. The persisting economic disparities between the rich and the poor are actually exacerbated by rapid economic growth. Related to poverty is the AIDS epidemic, which is especially serious in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Thailand and becoming more serious in Vietnam; in all these nations it associated with the commercial sex industry.

Politically, many Southeast Asian nations faced one or more threats to their stability. Political corruption, lack of transparency, and weak civic institutions are a problem to varying degrees in all the nations but are most severe in Indonesia, which faces threats to its sovereignty. Cambodia and Thailand face problems involving monarch succession, and several nations have had difficulty finding effective leaders. Myanmar's authoritarian rulers face a continual threat from the political opposition and from ethnic and religious separatists.

In addition, several nations faced continuing religious or ethnic-based conflicts that disrupt political stability and economic growth in some provinces. The major conflicts involve Muslim separatists in the southern Philippines, Muslims and Christians in some Indonesian islands and Aceh separatists in northern Sumatra, and Muslims and the Karen and other ethnic groups against the Burman government in Myanmar. Since the economic crisis of 1997, ethnic and religion-based conflict has intensified, as wealthier ethnic or religious minorities have increasingly been attacked by members of the dominant ethnic group. A related issue is the cultural and political future of indigenous peoples, including the so-called hill tribes of the mainland and horticulturalists and former hunter-gatherers of the islands.

In looking to the future, among the region's positive features are the following. First, there is Southeast Asia's strategic location between India and China, between Japan and Europe, and between Europe and Oceania. It stands in close proximity to the world's two most populous countries, China and India. Singapore, the centrally located port in Southeast Asia, is one of two major gateways to the dynamic Pacific Basin (the other is the Panama Canal). Second, there is the region's huge population and related economic market, with a total population approaching that of one half of China's. Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous nation. Third, there is enor-

mous tourist potential in sites and recreational locales such as Angkor Wat, Bali, Borobudur, Phuket, and Ha Long Bay. Fourth, there is the region's notable eclecticism in borrowing from the outside and resiliency in transcending tragedies such as experienced by Cambodia and Vietnam. Fifth, there is the region's significant economic potential: Southeast Asia may well have the world's highest-quality labor force relative to cost. And, sixth, there is the region's openness to new technologies and ideas, an important feature in the modern global community.

South Asia

South Asia is the easiest region to demarcate, as it is bounded by the Hindu Kush and Himalayan ranges to the north and the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea to the south. It contains the nation-states of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka and the more distant island nations of the Maldives and Mauritius. Myanmar and Pakistan, which are considered part of South Asia in some schemes, are here classified in Southeast Asia and Southwest Asia, respectively.

While the region is diverse economically, culturally, linguistically, and religiously, there is unity that, in some form, has existed for several thousand years. One source of unity is the historical influence of two major civilizations (Indus and Dravidian) and three major religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam). Regionally, Sikhism and Jainism have been of great importance. There is also considerable economic unity, as the majority of people continue to live by farming, with rice and especially wet-rice the primary crop. In addition, three-quarters of the people continue to live in rural, agricultural villages, although this has now become an important source of diversity, with clear distinctions between urban and rural life. A third source of unity is the caste system, which continues to define life for most people in the three mainland nations. Another source of unity is the nature and structure of society, which was heavily influenced by the several centuries of British rule. A final source of political unity in the twentieth century—although sometimes weakened by ethnic and religious differences—has been nationalism in each nation.

South Asia is diverse linguistically, ethnically, religiously, and economically. This diversity is most obvious in India, but exists in various forms in other nations, except for the isolated Maldives, which is the home of one ethnic group, the Divehi, who are Muslims and who have an economy based largely on tourism and fishing.

The dozens of languages of South Asia fall into four major families: Indo-European, Austroasiatic, Dravidian, and Tibeto-Burman and several cannot be classified at all. Because of its linguistic diversity, India is divided into "linguistic" states with Hindi and English serving as the national languages.

Hinduism is the dominant religion in South Asia, but India is the home also to Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism. India also has over 120 million Muslims and the world's largest Zoroastrian population (known in India as Parsis) and Bangladesh is a predominately Muslim nation. India also has about twenty-five million Christians and until recently India had several small but thriving Jewish communities. Nepal is mainly Hindu with a Buddhist minority, and Bhutan the reverse. Sri Lanka is mainly Theravada Buddhist with Hindu, Muslim, and Christian minorities. Mauritius, which has no indigenous population, is about 50 percent Hindu, with a large Christian and smaller Muslim and Buddhist minorities.

Linguistic and religious diversity is more than matched by social diversity. One classification suggests that the sociocultural groups of South Asia can be divided into four general and several subcategories: (1) castes (Hindu and Muslim); (2) modern urban classes (including laborers, non-Hindus, and the Westernized elite); (3) hill tribes of at least six types; and (4) peripatetics.

Economically, there are major distinctions between the rural poor and the urban middle class and elite, and also between the urban poor and urban middle class and elite. There are also significant wealth distinctions based on caste and gender, and a sizeable and wealthy Indian diaspora. There is political diversity as well, with India and Sri Lanka being democracies, Bangladesh shifting back and forth between Islamic democracy and military rule, the Maldives being an Islamic state, and Nepal and Bhutan being constitutional monarchies.

In 2002, South Asia faced several categories of issues. Among the most serious are the ongoing ethnic and religious conflicts between Muslims and Hindus in India, the conflict between the nations of Pakistan and India; the ethnic conflict between the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils in Sri Lanka; and the conflict between the Nepalese and Bhutanese in both nations. There are also various ethnic separatist movements in the region, as involving some Sikhs in India. The most threatening to order in the region and beyond is the conflict between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir region, as both have nuclear weapons and armies gathered at their respective borders.

A second serious issue is the host of related environmental problems, including pollution; limited water resources; overexploitation of natural resources; destruction and death caused by typhoons, flooding, and earthquakes; famine (less of a problem today), and epidemics of tropical and other diseases. The Maldives faces the unique problem of disappearing into the sea as global warming melts glaciers and raises the sea level. Coastal regions of Bangladesh could also suffer from this.

There are pressing social, economic, and political issues as well. Socially, there are wide and growing gaps between the rich and middle classes and the poor, who are disproportionately women and children and rural. Tribal peoples and untouchables still do not enjoy full civil rights, and women are often discriminated against, although India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh have all had women prime ministers. Economically, all the nations continue to wrestle with the issues involved in transforming themselves from mainly rural, agricultural nations to ones with strong industrial and service sectors. Politically, all still also struggle with the task of establishing strong, central governments that can control ethnic, religious, and region variation and provide services to the entire population. Despite these difficulties, there are also positive developments. India continues to benefit from the inflow of wealth earned by Indians outside India and is emerging as a major technological center. And, in Sri Lanka, an early 2002 cease-fire has led to the prospect of a series of peace negotiations in the near future..

East Asia

East Asia is defined here as the nations of Japan, South Korea, North Korea, China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. It should be noted that Taiwan is part of China although the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) differ over whether it is a province or not. The inclusion of China in East Asia is not entirely geographically and culturally valid, as parts of southern China could be classified as Southeast Asian from a geographical and cultural standpoint, while western China could be classified as Central Asian. However, there is a long tradition of classifying China as part of East Asia, and that is the approach taken here. Likewise, Mongolia is sometimes classified in Central Asia. As noted above, Siberia can be considered as forming North and Northeast Asia.

Economic, political, ideological, and social similarity across China, Korea (North and South), and Japan is the result of several thousand years of Chinese influence (at times strong, at other times weak), which has created considerable similarity on a base of pre-existing Japanese and Korean cultures and civilizations. China's influence was

greatest before the modern period and Chinese culture thus in some ways forms the core of East Asian culture and society. At the same time, it must be stressed that Chinese cultural elements merged with existing and new Korean and Japanese ones in ways that produced the unique Japanese and Korean cultures and civilizations, which deserve consideration in their own right.

Among the major cultural elements brought from China were Buddhism and Confucianism, the written language, government bureaucracy, various techniques of rice agriculture, and a patrilineal kinship system based on male dominance and male control of family resources. All of these were shaped over the centuries to fit with existing or developing forms in Korea and Japan. For example, Buddhism coexists with Shinto in Japan. In Korea, it coexists with the indigenous shamanistic religion. In China and Korea traditional folk religion remains strong, while Japan has been the home to dozens of new indigenous religions over the past 150 years.

Diversity in the region has been largely a product of continuing efforts by the Japanese and Koreans to resist Chinese influence and develop and stress Japanese and Korean culture and civilization. In the twentieth century diversity was mainly political and economic. Japanese invasions and conquests of parts of China and all of Korea beginning in the late nineteenth century led to hostile relations that had not been completely overcome in 2002.

In the post-World War II era and after, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea have been closely allied with the United States and the West; they have all developed powerful industrial and postindustrial economies. During the same period, China became a Communist state; significant ties to the West and economic development did not begin until the late 1980s. North Korea is also a Communist state; it lags behind the other nations in economic development and in recent years has not been able to produce enough food to feed its population. In 2002 China was the emerging economic power in the region, while Taiwan and South Korea hold on and Japan shows signs of serious and long-term economic decline, although it remains the second-largest (after the United States) economy in the world. Mongolia, freed from Soviet rule, is attempting to build its economy following a capitalist model.

Politically, China remains a Communist state despite significant moves toward market capitalism, North Korea is a Communist dictatorship, Japan a democracy, and South Korea and Taiwan in 1990s seem to have become relatively stable democracies following periods of authoritarian rule. Significant contact among the nations is mainly economic, as efforts at forging closer political ties remain stalled over past grievances. For example, in 2001, people in China and South Korea protested publicly about a new Japanese high school history textbook that they believed did not fully describe Japanese atrocities committed toward Chinese and Koreans before and during World War II. Japan has refused to revise the textbook. Similarly, tension remains between Mongolia and China over Mongolian fears about Chinese designs on Mongolian territory. Inner Mongolia is a province of China.

Major issues with regional and broader implications are the reunification of Taiwan and China and North and South Korea, and threat of war should reunification efforts go awry. Other major regional issues include environmental pollution, including air pollution from China that spreads east, and pollution of the Yellow Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea. A third issue is economic development and stability, and the role of each nation, and the region as a unit, in the growing global economy. A final major issue is the emergence of China as a major world political, economic, and military power at the expense of Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, and the consequences for regional political relations and stability.

Overview


As the above survey indicates, Asia is a varied and dynamic construct. To some extent the notion of Asia, as well as regions within Asia, are artificial constructs imposed by outside observers to provide some structure to a place and subject matter that might otherwise be incomprehensible. The nations of Asia have rich and deep pasts that continue to inform and shape the present—and that play a significant role in relations with other nations and regions. The nations of Asia also face considerable issues—some unique to the region, others shared by nations around the world—as well as enormous potential for future growth and development. We expect that the next edition of this encyclopedia will portray a very different Asia than does this one, but still an Asia that is in many ways in harmony with its pasts.

David Levinson (with contributions from Virginia Aksan, Edward Beauchamp, Anthony and Rebecca Bichel, Linsun Cheng, Gerald Fry, Bruce Fulton, and Paul Hockings)

Regional Maps













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IAIDO *Iaido* is a Japanese martial art that is practiced primarily for personal physical and spiritual development, but also for competition. *Iaido* is characterized by drawing a sword from the scabbard and cutting in one motion; the name means "having the presence of mind to be flexible in response to an emergency." Developed during the Tokugawa period (1600/1603–1868), when a symbol of samurai authority was the long, curved, single-edged sword, the art was perfected by Jinsuke Shinenobu (c. 1546–1621) and his students. *Iaido* practice involves drawing the sword, making the initial cut, making the finishing cuts, cleaning the blade, and sheathing the sword. Different techniques are used depending on the position of the opponent and the number of opponents. *Iaido* is generally performed alone, with the performer facing an imaginary opponent. In competitions, the performers stand side by side and their technique is rated by judges. *Iaido* is less popular than other Japanese martial arts and has been less influenced by efforts to make it an international competitive sport.

Kim Taylor

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IBARAKI (2002 est. pop. 3.1 million). Ibaraki Prefecture is situated in the central region of Japan's is-

land of Honshu, where it occupies an area of 6,095 square kilometers. Ibaraki's main geographical features are the Abukuma and Yamizo mountains in the north and the broad plains of the Kanto in the south. The prefecture is bordered by the Pacific Ocean and by Chiba, Tochigi, Saitama, and Fukushima prefectures. Once known as Hitachi Province, Ibaraki assumed its present name and borders in 1875.

The prefecture's capital is Mito, which grew around a castle erected during the Kamakura period (1185–1333) by the Daijo family. After the Battle of Sekigahara (1600), it was taken over as castle town by a son of the first Tokugawa shogun. The Tokugawa, or Edo, period (1600/1603–1868) was an era of political and cultural predominance for the Mito domain, comprised of parts of Hitachi and Shimotsuke Provinces. Its rulers founded two schools of imperial learning, the Shokokan and later the Kodokan, together known as the Mito school. In 1864, at the outset of the Mito Civil War, pro-imperial rebels led a major uprising against the Tokugawa shogunate; they were crushed, but the shogunate itself soon crumbled. The focus of present-day Mito is commercial activity, including the production of *natto* (fermented soybeans). The prefecture's other important cities are Hitachi, Tsuchiura, and Koga.

Ibaraki Prefecture has large areas of arable land, producing great quantities of vegetables, fruit, rice, and other grain primarily for the Tokyo market. Fishing remains a leading activity as well. In recent decades heavy industries from the Keihin Industrial Zone have spread into the prefecture. Among them are facilities for the manufacture and processing of electrical equipment, steel, petrochemicals, and foodstuffs.

This transformation has been accompanied by such mammoth projects as Tsukuba Academic New Town and the Kashima Coastal Industrial Region. There is also a city named Ibaraki in northern Osaka Prefecture.

E. L. S. Weber

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IBN AL-QASIM, MUHAMMAD (d. 715), Arab conqueror of Sind in India. An Arab military commander from the tribe of Thaqif, Muhammad ibn al-Qasim is famous in Islamic history as the conqueror of the western Indian province of Sind under the Umayyad dynasty (661–750). He won favor with the Umayyad governor of Iraq, al-Hajjaj, who dispatched him to Sind at the head of a military expedition between 708 and 711; Ibn al-Qasim was probably about fifteen or seventeen years old at this time.

He arrived by land in India to punish Dahir, the ruler of Sind, who had failed to curb pirates operating off the coast of his province and who were disrupting Muslim shipping. His forces conquered several Indian cities, among them the Hindu pilgrim city of Multan, and killed Dahir.

In some Arabic sources, Ibn al-Qasim is said to have accorded the Hindus the status of "protected people" (*ahl al-dhimma*). This status is traditionally reserved under Islamic law for Jews and Christians, who as kindred followers of a revealed scripture, are granted protection by the Islamic state upon payment of a poll tax. On account of this concession to the Hindus, Ibn al-Qasim is regarded by modern Muslims in particular as a paragon of religious tolerance. He is also greatly admired for his youthful military prowess. Ibn al-Qasim's career came to an abrupt end, however, with the death of al-Hajjaj in 715. Under the new administration, he was dismissed from his post and brutally put to death.

Asma Afsaruddin

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IBN BATTUTAH (1304–1368/69), Arab traveler and writer. Abu'Abd Allah Muhammad ibn'Abd Allah al-Lawati at-Tanji ibn Battutah, one of the greatest

travelers of the Middle Ages, spent thirty years visiting every Muslim country of his day and recorded in accurate detail the social and political life he observed on his journeys. Born in Tangier, a seaport in present-day Morocco in North Africa, he began to travel at the age of twenty-one years, when he made the hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca). On his way he passed through today's Egypt and Syria and returned through Iran and Iraq. On a second journey, he explored southern Arabia, East Africa, and the Persian Gulf.

Ibn Battutah next traveled north to Constantinople and crossed southern Russia, Samarqand (now in Uzbekistan), and Afghanistan to arrive in Delhi, India, around 1333. In 1342, Muhammad ibn Tughluq (c. 1290–1351), the son of the sultan of Delhi, sent him as an envoy to the Chinese emperor. Ibn Battutah reached present-day Beijing via the Maldiv Islands in the Indian Ocean, Ceylon (today's Sri Lanka), and Assam (a state in India) and from the East returned to Fes (Fez) in northern Morocco, thereby crossing half of the Earth. From Fes he went north to al-Andalus (Muslim Spain) in Europe and later traveled south across the Sahara Desert to the Sudan in north central Africa.

Although historians and geographers largely ignored his journals until the late twentieth century, Ibn Battutah is estimated to have traveled about 125,000 kilometers, much farther than Marco Polo (1254–1324) and other medieval travelers, and his observations of the countries he visited are far more detailed and accurate than those of Polo.

David Levinson

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IBN SINA (980–1037), philosopher, scientist, physician. Ibn Sina was a philosopher, scientist, and physician better known in the West as Avicenna. His full name was Abu 'Ali al-Husain ibn Sina. Ibn Sina was born in Bukhara, Uzbekistan, in 980 CE and died in Hamadan, Persia, in 1037. By age sixteen, Ibn Sina had learned all he could from his teachers and went on to complete his education at the library of the Samanid dynasty (864–999 CE) of Bukhara, to which he was granted access after curing a member of the dynasty.



IBN BATTUTAH

The markets around the Umayyad mosque in Damascus as described by Ibn Battutah:

An eastern door, the largest of the doors of the mosque, called the Jairun Door. It has a large vestibule, leading out to a vast and broad arcade, entered through a quintuple gateway [of arches] formed by six tall columns. . . . Along both sides of this arcade there are pillars upon which are supported circular passages, where the cloth-merchants amongst others have their shops; above these again are long passages in which are the shops of jewellers and booksellers and makers of admirable glassware. In the square adjoining the first door are stalls belonging to the principal legal witness, two stalls among them belonging to the Shafi-ites [a legal school] and the rest to those of various schools. In each stall there may be five or six notaries [that is, a legal witness known for honesty whose testimony would be readily accepted by an Islamic judge and employed for witnessing contracts] and the person authorized to draw up contracts of marriage on behalf of the qadi [Islamic judge]. The other notaries are scattered throughout the city. In the vicinity of these stalls is the bazaar of the stationers, who sell paper, pens and ink. In the centre of the vestibule which we have been describing there is a large circular basing, made of marble, surmounted by an unroofed cupola, which is supported by marble columns, and in the centre of the basin is a copper pipe which violently forces out water so that it rises into the air more than a man's height. They call it the Waterspout, and its aspect is striking.

Source: Ibn Battuta. (1958) *The Travels of Ibn Battuta, A.D. 1325–1354*. Translated by H.A.R. Gibb. London: Hakluyt Society, 131.

Unfortunately, he lived in very unsettled times and was never able to stay for very long in one place. Ibn Sina was actually imprisoned and forced into hiding more than once. He did enjoy two reasonably stable times at the courts of princes in Hamadan and later in Isfahan, Persia. He died accompanying the latter prince on a campaign against Hamadan.

Ibn Sina is best remembered for his two books, *Shifa* (Book of Healing) and *Qanun*. *Shifa* is a book on philosophy drawn largely from the works of Aristotle. *Qanun* is a medical text drawn mostly from the works of the ancient Greek physicians Hippocrates (c. 460–c. 377 BCE) and Galen (129–c. 199 CE). *Qanun*, however, recast their ideas along with his own observa-

tions into a highly accessible form and became the most widely used medical text in Europe and the Middle East for nearly seven hundred years.

Andrew Sharp

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ICHIKAWA FUSAE (1893–1981), leading Japanese politician, activist in Japan's women's liberation movement. Ichikawa Fusae was born in Aichi Prefecture and graduated from Aichi Women's Normal

School, after which she first pursued a career in elementary school teaching and journalism. In 1919, she entered the Yuukai, a leading labor union, and took an active part in promoting the status of women workers. In the following year, she established the New Woman's Association with the feminist Hiratsuka Rai-cho (1886–1971). Resigning from the Association in 1921, Ichikawa went to the United States for two and a half years to study women's issues.

While working for the Tokyo branch of the International Labor Organization, Ichikawa formed the League for Women's Suffrage in 1924 and worked in the popular rights movement until the dissolution of the League in 1940. During World War II, Ichikawa played a significant role in numerous activities of the suffrage movement, which faced difficult compromises with the government over wartime collaboration. After the war, she established the New Japan Women's League (changing the name to The Japanese League of Women Voters in 1950), and she devoted herself to enlightening the public about women's issues and to promoting electoral ideals and political reform. From 1953, Ichikawa was elected five times to the House of Councilors, the last time being in 1980, the year before she died.

Kyoko Murakami

IENAGA SABURO (b. 1913), Japanese historian. Born in Aichi Prefecture in 1913, Ienaga Saburo graduated from Tokyo Imperial University (now the University of Tokyo) in 1937. He began his career as a high school teacher, later moving to Tokyo University of Education and, subsequently, to Chuo University. In 1948, he was awarded the Japan Academy Prize and became professor emeritus at Tokyo University of Education.

Ienaga brought three lawsuits (1965, 1967, and 1984) against the Ministry of Education, challenging the constitutional legitimacy of the textbook-screening system to which his high school Japanese history textbooks had been subjected. These suits raised a number of fundamental issues about the powers and qualifications of government officials to make decisions on curriculum content and the extent to which those powers could be reviewed in the courts. Although Ienaga lost the first two cases in the Supreme Court, he achieved a partial victory in his third court battle in the 1997 Supreme Court decision, which ruled that government may not tamper with historical truth in textbooks. Ienaga's lawsuits have had a significant influence, not only on the administrative

procedure of the textbook-screening system, but also on diplomatic relations between Japan and its neighbors as well as on human rights issues worldwide.

Kyoko Murakami

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IGLESIA NI CHRISTO The Iglesia ni Cristo ("Church of Christ") was founded in the Philippines in 1913 by Felix Manalo (1886–1963). Manalo was raised a Roman Catholic but as a teenager was influenced by a secretive local spiritual sect, as well as by Methodist and Presbyterian churches, the Church of Christ, and Seventh-Day Adventism. Following a religious experience, he founded the Iglesia ni Cristo, which he incorporated with twelve followers in 1914. In 1922 he proclaimed that he was God's final messenger, and around 1930 he began to preach the church's most controversial claim, that Christ was not divine.

The church aggressively sought new members and after World War II expanded rapidly: it claimed 60,000 adherents in 1948 and 200,000 in 1960. The church also expanded outside the Philippines, particularly in Philippine diaspora communities in Hawaii and California. In 2002 it is second only to the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines, with 2,500 congregations in the Philippines and several hundred more overseas. Its worldwide membership is estimated at between three and six million.

In part because of its perceived anti-Christ and anti-Trinitarian doctrines, its secrecy, and its aggressive proselytizing, the church has received much attention from organizations that oppose cults. Much of what is known of the church is from what it publishes in its magazine, *Pasugo*, which began publication in 1939 and is now available in Pilipino and English.

David Levinson

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IJIME *Ijime* is considered a major social problem in Japan. Although translated as "bullying," *ijime* is really collective bullying and may include everything from name-calling to extortion or physical violence. The collective nature of *ijime* makes it difficult for adults to observe, and peer pressure silences students; most *ijime* occurs among peers. Audiences often play a significant role in promoting *ijime*.

Within Japan, popular opinion has linked *ijime* with excess academic competition and the growth of *juku* (cram schools). Academic research suggests that the contemporary characteristics of *ijime* have appeared largely since the end of the 1970s. Characteristics such as the collective nature of *ijime* and its "invisibility" to adults have been linked to school features such as high levels of social homogeneity, limited physical space, and uniformity-oriented curricular goals. Scholars have also linked some types of *ijime* to the influence of mass media and a cultural cynicism. Economic changes in society also may have weakened traditional social controls that restricted adolescent behavior in the past.

Motoko Akiba

See also: **Cram Schools**

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IKAT DYEING Lowland Lao women primarily use *ikat* dyeing to decorate their lower garment, the tube skirt (*sin*). *Ikat* patterns are created before the textile is actually woven. Either the vertical threads, the warp, or the horizontal threads, the weft, are bound by strips of plant or plastic fiber to form the patterns for a textile, and then the tied threads are dyed. The plant fiber ties are removed in stages so the threads can be dipped in subsequent dye baths until the dyeing process is complete. After the dyed threads are dry,

they are carefully woven to line up the patterns of the thread to form the cloth.

Only a few groups, such as the Tai Daeng, continue to utilize a simple warp *ikat*. Weft *ikat* is more common and is used to decorate the body of the tube skirt. The weft *ikat* patterns are dyed in rows separated by plain stripes (*sin mii khan*) or bands of supplementary patterns, or the patterns cover the entire body of the tube skirt with repetitive patterns. The origin of the patterns comes from the weaver's surrounding environment. Plant and animal motifs such as scorpions, spiders, birds, elephants, jasmine flowers, and trees or religious iconography such as mythical animals are abundant. The *naga* (or *naak*) is one mythical creature important to both Buddhist and animist beliefs and is a common image. An exception to the confinement of *ikat* to women's clothing is its use to decorate large, rectangular coffin covers. The design of the cloth is inspired by Khmer silk *ikats* and ultimately Indian *ikats* (*patolas*). The use of *ikat* dyeing by Lao women is a distinguishing characteristic of their dress and identity.

Linda McIntosh

See also: **Textiles—Laos; Women in Southeast Asia**

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IKEDA HAYATO (1899–1965), prime minister of Japan. A finance ministry bureaucrat who served as Japan's prime minister from 1960 to 1964, Ikeda is associated with the high economic growth in Japan of the 1960s, which he helped promote with his celebrated campaign for a doubling of national income in ten years.

A native of Hiroshima Prefecture, Ikeda graduated from Kyoto University in 1925, after which he worked in several prefectural tax offices. He was elected to the Lower House of the Japanese Diet (parliament) in January 1949 as a member of the Democratic Liberal Party (*Minsbu Jiyuto*). Ikeda served as vice minister of finance (1947–1948), minister of finance (1949–1952), and minister of international trade and industry (1950) under Japan's most powerful early postwar politician, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru (1878–1967). He and

Sato Eisaku constituted the core of what was known as the Yoshida school.

Ikeda served in Japan's delegation to the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951. And he played a critical role in normalizing U.S.-Japanese security relations as Yoshida's special emissary in Washington for talks with Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson over Japanese rearmament in October 1953.

Frederick R. Dickinson

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IKKYU (1394–1481), Japanese Zen monk. Born in Kyoto and reputedly the son of the emperor Go-Komatsu (1377–1433) and a noblewoman who was expelled from court by a jealous imperial consort, by the age of five, Ikkyu (also called Ikkyu Sojun) was sent to a Zen temple to be raised. Early on, he was recognized as a brilliant student, quick-witted and mischievous. Appalled at the corrupt behavior of the senior monks, he fled the temple at the age of sixteen to commence instruction under the eccentric Rinzai Zen priest Kenno Soi (d. 1415), who gave him the name Sojun. Kenno had earlier caused consternation by refusing a certificate of enlightenment, necessary for obtaining a position at a major temple. Such uncompromising behavior matched Ikku's temperament closely.

Upon the death of this master, Ikkyu continued training under Kaso Sodon (1352–1428) at a small retreat on the shores of Lake Biwa, east of the ancient capital of Kyoto. Under Kaso, Ikkyu's firmness of purpose in achieving enlightenment turned to uncompromising, righteous indignation, perhaps partly motivated by his resentment at the manner in which his mother had been banished from the court. He condemned the trivialization of Zen teaching and the indolence of pleasure-seeking priests and the general populace. Ikkyu became known for his unconventional behavior and humane character. His best-known work is *Kyounshu* (The Crazy Cloud Collection), a compilation of more than one thousand Chinese poems.

James M. Vardaman, Jr.

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IMPERIAL PALACE Located in the heart of Beijing, the Imperial Palace is the largest and best-preserved palace complex in China and the city's most famous tourist attraction. Formerly known as the Forbidden City, the palace took fifteen years to build and was home to twenty-four emperors from Yongle (1360–1424), at the start of the fifteenth century, to Pu Yi (1905–1967), the last Chinese emperor, who finally left in 1924. The complex also housed Communist leaders in Zhongnanhai, which lies a short distance to the west of Imperial Palace, and Mao Zedong proclaimed the birth of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949 from the Gate of Heavenly Peace, at the southernmost point of the complex.



A portion of the interior of the Imperial Palace or Forbidden City in Beijing. In 2001 restoration continued on the site, which became a major tourist attraction. (CHARLES & JOSETTE LENARS/CORBIS)



IMPERIAL PALACE— WORLD HERITAGE SITE

The Ming and Qing dynasties' Imperial Palace (the Forbidden City) was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1987. The nine thousand furnished rooms in the palace are an invaluable testament to the culture and civilization of imperial China.

The Imperial Palace, once banned to all commoners, covers an area of 250 acres and contains 800 buildings, all made of wood and brick, with more than nine thousand rooms. The Forbidden City was located at the center of the imperial capital and is still considered to be the heart of the modern city. Within the Imperial Palace, there is a clear progression of important buildings along its north-south axis. Beyond the Gate of Heavenly Peace lie the three grand halls of the Outer Court, in which the emperor and his officials carried out administrative and ceremonial duties, and the sumptuous Inner Court, formerly the living quarters of the emperors and their families. The Imperial Palace today houses a museum that contains a vast array of precious artifacts, including paintings, bronze artifacts, and calligraphy as well as a collection of several million official documents.

Julian Ward

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IMPERIAL RESCRIPT ON EDUCATION

The Imperial Rescript on Education (*Kyooiku Chokugo*) of 1890 is one of the most controversial documents in prewar modern Japan. It governed the basic purpose of education from its promulgation in 1890 to the end of World War II.

The modern era of Japanese education is commonly dated from 1872 with the *Gakusei* (First National Plan for Education) issued just four years after the Meiji

Restoration (1868–1912) brought to a close 350 years of the feudal Tokugawa military regime (1600/1603–1868). The *Gakusei* set up a national school system patterned after educational practices in the West. Of all the modern reforms of feudal educational patterns carried out in the 1870s and 1880s by the Japanese oligarchy, however, the most prominent was the replacement of traditional morals education based on Confucian classics from China. As the core of the curricula, Confucian teaching was overshadowed by science, mathematics, and technology imported from the West.

A controversy emerged when figures within the Imperial Household such as the Confucian scholar Motoda Nagazane (1818–1891), acting on behalf of Emperor Meiji, protested these trends. The Imperial Will on Education (*Kyooogaku Taishi*) of 1879, written by Motoda, called for education in the modern world based on the teachings from the ancient world, particularly those of the Confucian classics. *Kyooogaku Taishi* led to a confrontation between the modernizers, such as the great statesman Ito Hirobumi (1841–1909) and his political confidant Inoue Kowashi (1843–1895), along with Mori Arinori (1847–1899), first Minister of Education, pitted against conservatives like Motoda and other like-minded officials within the Imperial Household and the government, including Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo (1838–1922).

The struggles ended with a unique compromise. Inoue Kowashi, author of the first Japanese Constitution of 1889, which was patterned after the German Constitution, wrote the initial draft of the Imperial Rescript during the summer of 1890. He referred to the modern constitutional state and the necessity of abiding by the laws. Motoda, representing the Emperor, submitted revisions based on cherished Confucian concepts previously included in the 1879 Imperial Will on Education. When Inoue, the German-oriented modernist, incorporated Motoda's recommendations, an East-West compromise was achieved. The Imperial Rescript on Education combined traditional Confucian moral principles governing the relationship between the Emperor and his people with a modern sovereign state based on constitutional laws. Its purpose was to develop a spirit of nationhood and love and respect for the Imperial tradition.

With the rise of Japanese militarism in the first half of the 1900s, however, nationalists turned to the Rescript as a means to foster extreme nationalism and ultramilitarism in the name of the emperor. The Rescript became a sacred document read with great

reverence at special school meetings. The original intent of 1890 was subverted, rendering the Rescript a repressive instrument of social and political control. It was controlled by militarists and used to repress any opposition to government policy leading to World War II and the ensuing defeat of Japan. During the Occupation of Japan, American authorities abolished the Rescript as an antidemocratic document of state repression. It was replaced in 1947 by the Fundamental Law of Education, which gave the purpose of education in a democratic society as the development of the individual.

Benjamin Duke

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IMPHAL (2001 pop. 217,000). The capital of Manipur State in northeastern India, Imphal lies in a Manipur River valley at an altitude of around 792 meters. It is believed to have existed as early as the third century BCE. Imphal was the seat of the kings of Manipur before the British took control of the region in 1926. In 1944 it was the site of a decisive battle in which a British garrison held off advancing Japanese



Women in the market with their piles of textiles for sale. (LINDSAY HEBBERD/CORBIS)

troops, thereby halting the Japanese march through Myanmar (Burma) and ending Japan's attempt to invade India.

A polo field dominates the city center; the Manipuri game of *Sagol Kangjei* (*Kangjei* means a stick made of cane) is considered the original form of polo. The city is a major trade center, noted for its weaving, brassware, and bronze ware. The market of Khwairamband is run by 3,000 women. Half is devoted to textiles, including the *moirangphee*, the traditional Methei dress. (The Methei are Hindus of Mongoloid stock.) The other half of the market sells fish, vegetables, and basic provisions. The Shri Govindjee temple is an important center for Vaishnavite Hindus. Two cemeteries commemorate heroes of World War II. The Khonghampat Orchidariums feature 110 species of orchids. Nearby are zoological gardens, famous for rare indigenous brow-antlered deer.

C. Roger Davis

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INCHON (2002 est. pop. 2.4 million). Located on the northwestern coast of South Korea at the mouth of the Han River and bordering the Yellow Sea, Inchon (Inch'on) is perhaps best known as the site of General Douglas MacArthur's Inchon Landing on 15 September 1950, when U.N. troops landed behind North Korean forces, effectively cutting the North Korean army in two and reversing the tide of the Korean War.

Formerly known as Chemulpo (Chemulp'o), Inchon was founded during the Unified Shilla dynasty (668–935 CE). Throughout much of its history Inchon has played second fiddle to Seoul, its larger eastern neighbor, serving as Seoul's chief port and manufacturing base. Inchon International Airport is the Koreans' largest.

Keith Leitich

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INDIA—PROFILE (2001 pop. 1 billion). The spatial dimension of what came to be known as the Republic of India (in Sanskrit, Bharata), kept changing until it became independent on 15 August 1947. Although the concept of India as a nation-state emerged after British colonial rule, the idea of Bharata had been there from time immemorial. Deriving from

geography, history, and culture, a sense of unity has been present throughout its history. Despite the presence of diverse elements, a unifying force is present in India's literature, music, dance, art, behavioral patterns, and societal norms. The concept of *Bharatavarsha* (the idea of Bharata as a territorial entity) is a part of Indians' common psyche.





INDIA

Country name: Republic of India
Area: 3,287,590 sq km
Population: 1,029,991,145 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 1.55% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 24.28 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 8.74 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: -0.08 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio—total population: 1.07 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 63.19 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population: 62.86 years; male: 62.22 years, female: 63.53 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Sikhism, Buddhism, Jainism, Zoroastrianism (Parsi)
Major languages: Hindi, Bengali, Telugu, Marathi, Tamil, Urdu, Gujarati, Malayalam, Kannada, Oriya, Punjabi, Assamese, Kashmiri, Sindhi, Sanskrit, Hindustani, English
Literacy—total population: 52%; male: 65.5%, female: 37.7% (1995 est.)
Government type: federal republic
Capital: New Delhi
Administrative divisions: 28 states and 7 union territories
Independence: 15 August 1947 (from UK)
National holiday: Republic Day, 26 January (1950)
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal
GDP—real growth rate: 6% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita (purchasing power parity): \$2,200 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: 35% (1994 est.)
Exports: \$43.1 billion (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Imports: \$60.8 billion (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Currency: Indian rupee (INR)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Factbook* 2001.
 Retrieved 18 October 2001, from: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

Geography

The second most populous nation and the seventh largest nation in land area in the world, India covers 3,287,590 square kilometers, stretching from the Bay of Bengal in the east to the Arabian Sea in the west. It shares borders with Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar (Burma), the People's Republic of China, Nepal, and Pakistan. The Himalayas rise above peninsular India in the north, and here the three great rivers of the subcontinent—the Indus, the Ganges, and the Brahmaputra originate. The southern tip of India ends in Kanya Kumari, where the peninsula merges into the Indian Ocean. The Palk Strait and Gulf of Mannar

divide India from Sri Lanka. The terrain varies from mountains to flat river valleys. The Vindhya range of mountains divides north from south India. The alluvial plain of the Ganges in the north contains much of the country's arable land. Between Gujarat in the southwest and Delhi in the northeast lies the Aravalli range. Two mountain ranges, the Eastern and Western Ghats, border the rocky and triangular Deccan plateau in the south. The Godavari, Krishna, and Kaveri rivers flow eastward in this region. The climate of India varies according to area and elevation, but is generally tropical. Dependent on two monsoons, India's rainfall also varies from region to region.

People

India occupies about 2.4 percent of the world's land area, but 17 percent of the world's population is found here. The population has crossed the 1 billion mark. The influx of alien peoples down the centuries has resulted in a remarkable racial and cultural synthesis as well as considerable ethnic and linguistic diversity. The age-old caste system is present, although caste distinctions are gradually disappearing due to social mobility, modern perceptions, and the policy of reservation (seats reserved for admission to colleges, jobs, political offices, and so on). The scheduled castes and tribes (that is, the lower castes), which make up 16.5 percent of the total population, are coming into the mainstream.

With eighteen officially recognized languages (Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Kashmiri, Konkani, Malayalam, Manipuri, Marathi, Nepali, Oriya, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Sindhi, Tamil, Telugu, and Urdu) and sixteen hundred dialects, India is truly a Tower of Babel. Hindi is the official language and is the mother tongue of about 18 percent of the population. English enjoys an important status as an official language and the language of urban India and is used extensively in such fields as education, international business, science, medicine, information technology, and communication.

India is a nation of religious diversity. Hindus constitute 83.5 percent of the total population. India also has the second largest number of Muslims, after Indonesia. They form about 13 percent of the population. India, which does not have a state religion and professes secularism, also is home to Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, and Parsis (Zoroastrians).

Historical Overview

Human activity began in India about a half million years ago. Archaeological excavations have brought to light the urban civilization commonly referred to as the Indus Valley civilization, concentrated in India and modern-day Pakistan, during the period between 2700 and 1500 BCE. The Vedic civilization preceded the rise of cities in India. The invasion of Alexander of Macedon (356–323 BCE) in 326 BCE was followed by the Maurya empire (c. 324–c. 200 BCE), the first unified empire to cover most of present-day India and Pakistan. Asoka (d. 238 or 232 BCE) was the greatest of the Mauryan emperors. A period of chaos and foreign invasions by the Scythians, Parthians, Huns, and others followed until political stability was achieved under the Gupta dynasty (c. 320–c. 500 CE). In south India, the Pallavas and Chalukyas emerged as powerful kingdoms during the seventh century. Harsha

(606–647), Sasanka (606–637), and Pulakeshin II (609–642) carved out kingdoms in north India, Bengal, and south India, respectively, in the seventh century. In the early medieval period, spanning the eighth to fourteenth centuries, north India witnessed the coming of Islam from the northwest.

Muhammad bin Qasim (invaded Sind in 712), Mahmud of Ghazna (raided India 1000–1025), and Muhammad of Ghur (reigned 1192–1206) brought the north Indian subcontinent under their domain, and it was the establishment of the Delhi sultanate (1192–1526) that resulted in the consolidation of Muslim power. India's Muslim conquerors had been drawn to the subcontinent by the desire for territorial conquest, the lure of wealth, and religious zeal. Powerful regional kingdoms such as the Palas, Senas, Ahoms, Gangas, and Cholas rose and fell in different parts of India. The Gajapati empire of Orissa and the Vijayanagar empire of the south were able to survive until the 1560s. The Mughals (1526–1857) brought almost all of north India under their control, and Akbar (1542–1605) was one of India's greatest monarchs.

From the eighteenth century onward, the Mughal empire began to crumble. The Marathas under the intrepid leader Sivaji (1627 or 1630–1680) had already encroached on Mughal power. The coming of the Europeans as traders and later as seekers of political power sounded the final death knell. The British East India Company became the master of the subcontinent. By adroit diplomacy, warfare, and political conspiracy, the British subjugated the subcontinent. The Indian Mutiny, or the First War of Independence (1857), gave a serious jolt to the colonial power, and the administration was transferred from the East India Company to the British throne. Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi (1869–1948) used nonviolence and mass movements to shatter the foundation of Britain's Indian empire. A tenacious struggle for freedom by people of all classes, led by nationalists such as Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), Subhas Chandra Bose (1897–1945), and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (1875–1950), resulted in India's independence on 15 August 1947. However, the subcontinent was partitioned at that time between India and Pakistan.

Economy

The Indian economy, which encompasses traditional village agriculture, the use of modern technology in farming, heavy industries, and a multitude of support industries, is often seen as two entities: one rural and one urban. About 30 percent of the people live below the poverty line, and India's gross national product is \$450 billion. In terms of purchasing parity, India is the



CREATING A UNIFIED, CIVIL INDIA

One of the major problems facing India as a new nation was the tremendous ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity of its people. One attempt to create national unity amidst this diversity was a pledge to affirm India as a civilized and peaceful society. The pledge was signed by national leaders and the people of India at public meetings on 2 October 1962.

The National Integration Conference held in 1961 decided that a pledge should be taken by every adult Indian to affirm his faith in the universal principle of civilised society to resolve civil disputes by peaceful means and to abstain from resort to violence.

A campaign for such a pledge to be taken by all the people of our country will be inaugurated on the birthday of Mahatma Gandhi on October 2, 1962. The campaign will be continuous and will be carried on during all the months of the year, but the week from October 2 to 9 will be particularly devoted to it.

No person should be asked to sign the pledge unless its meaning and significance have been fully explained to and understood by him.

Emotional integration is the essence of national integration. Even with all the outward attributes of nationhood, a people would still be lacking in real national cohesion in the absence of complete emotional integration. India has always had a basic unity and a peculiar and distinctive identity and this should provide a basis for the task of national integration.

A serious obstacle to the emotional integration of our people is the resort to violence in the course of disputes arising out of regional, linguistic, religious and other similar matters. In a large country like India with its many diversities, it is but natural that differences between sections or groups of people should arise from time to time. But it is not so much the existence of such differences and disputes which endangers the integrity of the nation as the manner in which we conduct them. When brothers quarrel and settle their differences peacefully, the spirit of fraternal accord remains unbroken. Should they, however, in their quarrel become violent and strike each other, the feeling of brotherhood may come to an end. Similarly, when Indians assault or kill Indians and burn and loot in the name of caste, sect, religion, language or religion, the resulting hatred, bitterness and spirit of vengeance create a psychological estrangement which makes it difficult for people to feel that they all belong to one another as citizens of the same nation.

It was in pursuance of this line of thought that the National Integration Conference decided to launch this campaign. It is to be hoped that a countrywide campaign of this nature will create a powerful psychological climate which will help in every way in promoting national integration.

Source: Jagdish Saran Sharma. (1965) *India's Struggle for Freedom: Select Documents and Sources*. Vol. 2. Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 481–482.

world's fifth-largest economy. Agriculture employs about 70 percent of the people and contributes about 25 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). The industry and service sectors account for 30 and 45 percent of GDP, respectively.

India has seen broad-based industrial development for the last five decades. The most important crops are rice, wheat, millet, oilseeds, jute, and tea. Rubber, coffee, pepper, and sugarcane are other profitable cash crops. Foreign trade is important to India's economic development. Exports cover such items as agriculture and allied products, coffee, tea, spices, iron ore, textiles, leather, and computer software. Export earnings for 2000 were \$43.1 billion. Petroleum and its products, fertilizers, cereals, edible oils, drugs and pharmaceuticals, and precious and semiprecious stones are major items of import, with imports amounting to \$60.8 billion in 2000. The United States is India's largest trading and investment partner.

Planning is a major instrument of India's economic development. Planned economic development began in 1951 with the first five-year plan; the period 1997–2002 was covered by the ninth plan. The objectives were rapid economic growth, modernization, self-reliance, and social justice. During the 1990s, India shifted to a market-driven economy from its decades-old centralized planning model.

Culture

India's cultural richness may be seen in religion, philosophy, literature, science, music, dance, painting, and architecture. The Vedas, the Upanishads, and the *Bhagavad Gita*, ancient Hindu texts, deal with such metaphysical concepts as the doctrine of Brahma (universal self), atman (individual self), and *moksa* (liberation). India is also the birthplace of Buddhism and Jainism. With the coming of Islam, Indian culture was confronted with a new religion. However, gradually there was an attempt at rapprochement. In art and architecture, literature, and social norms, a common culture began to evolve, which contained elements of both Islam and Hinduism. The Sufi and Bhakti saints, with their simple message of egalitarianism, brought about a reconciliation of the two communities. Monuments like the Taj Mahal and the Red Fort are great contributions to Indian culture, as are the Buddhist remains at Sarnath, the sun temple of Konarak, or the Sri Minakshi temple complex at Madurai.

Contemporary Government and Politics

After independence, India continued as a dominion within the British Commonwealth until 26 January

1950, when it became a sovereign, democratic republic with a parliamentary form of government upon the promulgation of a new constitution. The president of India, elected for a five-year term, possesses full executive power, but the prime minister, who normally belongs to the majority party in the parliament and the cabinet, exercises real power.

Jawaharlal Nehru was premier from independence until his death in 1964. He espoused socialism, non-alignment, a planned economy, and industrialization. The 362 princely states, such as Hyderabad and Junagarh, merged with the Indian Union; a war occurred with Pakistan in 1948 over Kashmir; and Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated in 1948. A Chinese attack on India in 1962 resulted in a humiliating defeat for India. Another war with Pakistan occurred in 1965; in 1974 India successfully tested nuclear weapons at Pokhran. Sikh militants became active in the 1980s, and in 1984 Indira Gandhi (1917–1984), then prime minister, was assassinated by a Sikh bodyguard following her order of an attack on the Golden Temple, a sacred site for Sikhs. In the last decade of the twentieth century, the Congress Party lost its monopoly on power, and a trend to the right was visible with the emergence of the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) and the proliferation of regional parties. Relations with Pakistan took a nosedive, and again a limited war, known as the Kargil conflict, occurred in Kashmir. Militancy in Kashmir has become one of India's main problems. Eradicating poverty, maintaining steady economic growth, and fighting overpopulation remain India's other major problems.

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INDIA—ECONOMIC SYSTEM India's economy is one of the largest in the world. Converting Indian rupees to U.S. dollars at the rate of exchange in 1995, that year India ranked fifteenth in the world in total gross domestic product. When measured in purchasing power parity terms (that is, the number of rupees required to buy the same amount of goods and services in India as one dollar would buy in the United States), India's gross domestic product was the fifth highest in the world in 1995, exceeded only by the United States, China, Japan, and Germany.

However, using the conventional 1995 rate of exchange measure, India ranked 107th in the world in per capita income, with an average of \$340 per annum. That figure was a result of an average annual growth rate in the gross national product of 5.5 percent and a growth rate in per capita income of 2.2 percent from 1950 to 1995. The half-century before 1950 was a period of economic stagnation during which growth in economic output barely kept up with India's population increase. During the second half of the twentieth century India achieved significant growth and improved well-being compared with the first half. In 1995 approximately 2.5 times as many Indians produced 5 times the output of 1950, so each Indian had on average twice as many goods and services in 1995 as in 1950.



FIVE LARGEST COMPANIES IN INDIA

According to *Asia Week* the five largest companies in India are as follows:

Company	Sector	Sales (\$ millions)	Rank in Asia
Indian Oil	Oil Refining	28,504.6	34
Hindustan Petroleum	Oil Refining	10,806.6	121
Bharat Petroleum	Oil Refining	10,322.8	130
Reliance Petroleum	Oil Refining	6,889.5	192
Reliance Industries	Textiles, Chemicals	6,232.0	209

Source: "The Asia Week 1000." (2001) *Asia Week* (9 November): 112.

Despite this massive increase in overall output, in 1993 and 1994 approximately 320 million Indians, or over one-third of all the Indian people lived below a very low level of poverty, measured by their spending less than \$10 per month (at the 1995 exchange rate) for food. Also almost one-half of the entire population—male and female—are illiterate, but two-thirds of all females are, reflecting both the low levels of education throughout society and the low level of educational opportunity for women in particular. In addition many villages and urban slums lack clean water, decent sanitation, and basic health care.

India's rural population has benefited less than its urban population from the economic growth after 1950. Consequently rates of poverty, illiteracy, and poor health are higher in rural areas than in the cities. India has achieved major industrial advances since 1950. Industrial output has increased by over twenty times, and employment in the organized sector (largely industrial and government) has tripled. The share of industrial and services output in the total national income increased from about 40 percent in 1950 to over 70 percent in 1997. Yet of the more than 300 million workers in 1991, over 240 million—two-thirds of the workforce—were rural workers. India remains a mainly agricultural economy as far as its population is concerned. While farm output has exceeded population growth and the country has experienced no famines since independence, the overall well-being of its population is largely determined by the experiences of the agricultural sector.

Goals, Policies, and Problems after Independence

India's economic achievements and history have not matched the hopes of the country's political, business, and intellectual leaders at independence in 1947. Prior to independence, India's political and business leaders put forth plans that sought, as a medium-term goal of about fifteen years, to end poverty in the country. They planned to reach this goal by increasing the growth of the economy as a whole and by shifting from a predominantly agricultural economy to an industrialized one. Their anticipated result was higher incomes, which would end extreme poverty. The experiences of the 1930s depression, the wartime economic controls in the country, the apparent Soviet achievements of industrialization and military power, and the decline of world trade during the depression provided rationales for a socialist, planned economy that emphasized an industrialization policy based on import-substitution and heavy capital goods. Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi (1869–1948) urged policies to

strengthen agriculture, improve rural life, and encourage small-scale rural industrialization. Those policy directions were largely downplayed after his assassination in 1948.

The Indian constitution, written in 1950, included in its directive principles various economic and social goals. It aimed toward an equal economic and social order in which all people have a right to be educated, to work, and to receive unemployment benefits, health assistance, and disability benefits. These were not legal rights but goals. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) headed a planning commission, set up in 1950, to prepare outlines and policies for legislation to achieve those goals within the framework of a socialistic pattern of society. Indian socialism was a mixture of private property and ownership in the agricultural sector. Existing private industrial and commercial firms in large part remained private, but the government controlled the private sector and also engaged extensively in economic activities, including manufacturing, banking, and infrastructure construction. It was a mixed economy within a democratic political framework.

Under Nehru and a Congress Party government, a series of five-year plans was prepared, and policies were adopted to promote the growth of heavy industry under government ownership. The government ensured protection against imports and prohibited or tightly controlled foreign investment or ownership of industries. The aims of this industrial policy included self-sufficiency and little foreign control based on the substitution of domestic production for imports. The agricultural sector was seen essentially as a source of capital, labor, and raw materials for industrial growth. The Green Revolution of the mid-1960s introduced new, high-yield varieties of grains into India, and government policies encouraged their adoption. The results were positive for the first twenty years. Industrial and national growth did accelerate, and stimulated by the Green Revolution, agricultural output also grew substantially. Despite these positive results, poverty and inequality continued on a large scale, and by the late 1960s economic growth had slowed significantly.

The public-sector industrial firms were relatively inefficient and unprofitable. Constrained by a network of controls, they needed permission for expansion or output changes. Banks had been nationalized, and financial markets were tightly restricted. Foreign trade and investment were discouraged by high tariffs, overvalued exchange rates, and direct governmental controls. The so-called license-permit raj these controls created resulted in stagnation in terms of the quality

of goods and services produced and the introduction of new technology. Corruption increased at all levels as businesses and individuals sought the permits required for production and trading rights and access to scarce domestic goods, services, imports, foreign exchange, or credits. The bureaucracy administering the controls became a powerful political and economic force at both the national and the local levels, and various social inequalities strengthened rather than declined. While agricultural output rose, the rural sector subsidized the urban and industrial sectors. The controlled prices of farm products were substantially below world prices and the potential internal free-market prices that would have resulted if exports had been permitted freely. To balance these losses of income within the farm sector, the government subsidized below-cost prices for government-supplied electric power, for water supplies for irrigation, for fertilizer from public-sector plants, and for transportation facilities. Functioning at a loss, the public agencies supplying those infrastructure inputs could not expand to meet the growing demands of industry and urbanization. This placed a heavy burden on public utility users, which raised the costs of industrial production. It also burdened the fiscal resources of the central and state governments, which had to support the loss-incurring infrastructure enterprises with budget subsidies. It was estimated in 1997 that subsidies totaled over 15 percent of India's gross domestic product, almost equaling the tax revenues. This had been the case for many years.

These systemic problems were apparent even to the supporters of socialism and the government officials administering the economic programs. In the early 1980s the administration of Indira Gandhi (1917–1984), considering possibilities for reducing controls, set up various committees to explore particular problem areas and to recommend policies to deal with them. After Indira Gandhi was assassinated in 1984, Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991) introduced a number of reforms to reduce governmental control of industry.

The Economic Reforms of the 1980s and 1990s

The economic reforms of the 1980s reduced the controls on industry with respect to licensing, prohibitions against firms producing related products in addition to their major products, and the monopoly restrictions on large Indian firms. These first steps did not receive wide popular or political support. Nevertheless, together with good harvests and an expansionary fiscal policy, they contributed to the acceleration of industrial growth and national output in the second half of the 1980s. From 1985 to 1990,

real national income rose at its highest annual rate since independence, and industrial production rose at its highest rate since the early 1960s.

Despite this acceleration in economic growth, Rajiv Gandhi's government was defeated in the 1989 elections. The expansionary fiscal policies of Rajiv Gandhi's government also produced an inflationary price rise. India's foreign-trade position then worsened and its foreign-exchange holdings fell. These low standings forced the government to ask the World Bank for emergency aid in 1991. The government collapsed, and the elections in 1991 reinstated the Congress Party, though in a minority position. The new government—headed by Prime Minister R. V. N. Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh—quickly introduced further reforms in the financial, foreign trade and investment, and industrial sectors. The economic crisis broadened popular support for reform in general, and public and political attitudes toward the economic goals and the reform process changed strikingly. The extensive corruption of the "license-permit raj" forced public recognition of the desirability of reducing those controls not only among businesspeople but also within the Communist Party governments in West Bengal and Kerala. However, various economic groups and political parties in the governing coalition disagreed over the specific actions required, reflecting their anticipated effects on each group.

In the end the government ceased licensing for all but eight industries; granted foreign investors automatic approval for equity holdings of 51 percent in most Indian industries; lifted entirely restrictions on imports of technology; removed the priority for public-sector investment except in petroleum, infrastructure, and defense-related industries; abolished the restrictions on growth or expansion by purchase of "monopoly firms"; and ended limitations on credit to larger firms and subsidies for credit to small and medium-size firms, so credit rating and safety became the determining elements in credit availability. The government continued its review of the policy of reserving production of 851 products for small-scale firms only. These new policies were intended to encourage competition within India's industries, to provide India's firms with access to new and better technology, and to give Indian consumers access to higher-quality products than had been available in the past. The rupee was devalued to reflect internal price increases and to encourage exports. Free convertibility of foreign currency was introduced, and exporters were allowed to retain overseas earnings for six months. The new system allowed a certain amount of

foreign portfolio investment in India's security markets and in the securities of Indian firms, and permitted Indian firms to enter foreign bond markets and to borrow funds overseas. Of major importance, tariff rates were reduced from an average rate of 87 percent in 1991 to 27 percent in 1995, and the maximum rate fell from 150 percent to 50 percent. As a result India's foreign trade, particularly exports, rose significantly, as did foreign investment in India. The foreign-exchange problem that had led to the 1991 crisis ended and with it the need for assistance.

The government also reformed the financial system. Its goals were to increase the lending flexibility of banks, thereby encouraging the growth of financial markets, and to increase the transparency of the financial sector as a whole. At the same time the Reserve Bank of India established broad supervisory agencies to monitor the financial markets, in part in response to a major financial scandal in those markets. The new oversight agencies proved effective. Interestingly, India avoided the financial collapse that affected the Southeast Asian countries and Korea in the late 1990s. India's limitations on foreign exchange flows may have contributed to its immunity.

While reforms in the industrial, trade, and financial sectors have stimulated the Indian economy, further reforms in other major areas would spur further economic growth and improve the overall quality of life. One such possibility is raising the performance of the government-owned industrial enterprises. Except for the petroleum industry, most of the other public-sector firms are of low profitability and are a drain on the economy and the budget. Reform of these enterprises is difficult because of their bureaucratic management and their political connections. Also, if they are shut down in the absence of unemployment support and a retraining program for workers, unemployment is an understandable fear. Beneficial programs to assist the unemployed and to retrain workers unemployed by closures have not been developed, in part owing to fiscal problems.

In many fields India lags in technological advances. Expenditures on research and development in Indian manufacturing firms are still comparatively low overall, although in the information-technology and pharmaceutical industries such expenditures are higher. Policies to encourage relevant programs are important if Indian industry is to be competitive in the global economy.

India's inadequate and poorly performing infrastructure sectors—power, communication, transportation, and shipping—seriously hamper the economy and raise production costs. Many of these sectors are the responsibilities of the state governments, which

continue to face fiscal shortages from past inefficiencies and cost overruns. While the central government permits foreign investment in those areas, bureaucratic and political barriers in the decision-making processes discourage investment.

In agriculture, past policies and the resulting subsidization have made financial changes politically difficult and costly. Improvements in rural infrastructure, reductions of subsidies, and limiting public distribution of low-priced grains to the genuinely poor portion of the population would stimulate output growth and spread the benefits of that growth to a larger portion of the population. Improving education and making health services more accessible in rural areas, along with encouraging industries to move to rural and semirural locations, would improve the lives of the rural poor.

The Future of India's Economy

India has achieved major successes in economic policy reform, but further advances are necessary if the country is to accomplish its long-standing goals of ending poverty and ensuring social equality. With widespread agreement on the general desirability of economic reform, India's political parties have the opportunity to develop an effective program and convince the voting public of the possibilities of a better quality of life. Indian political democracy might then accomplish its long-term goals of ending poverty and significantly reducing social inequality.

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INDIA—EDUCATION SYSTEM Indian education in the modern era shows the influence of two traditions, British and native Indian. Remnants of the British education system in the modern Indian system show the durability of British influence, but while independent India has preserved much of the British educational system, "national education," initiated by Indian nationalists and reformers in the latter half of the twentieth century, has left its own legacy. It seeks to revive the glorious heritage of knowledge and culture originating in India itself.

Indian Education before British Colonization

Ancient Indian civilization required an elaborate system of education for the transmission of its cultural heritage. Scriptures of great length were not written down; instead, the text was learned by heart. Each generation of Brahmans was thoroughly trained in this way. Sanskrit words had to be pronounced faultlessly, as mistakes were believed to cause spiritual harm. The main educational institution was the *gurukul* ("family of the teacher"), a term used in ancient and medieval times, but revived by Hindu reformers in the twentieth century. Students lived with the teacher for twelve to sixteen years, joining him as young boys and leaving him as young men ready to establish a household of their own. While the boys stayed in the *gurukul*, they had to observe chastity and lead a disciplined life.

This education was available only to the higher castes, and women and the lower classes were excluded. The teachers were mostly Brahmans. In addition to religious lore, the Brahmans transmitted worldly knowledge of law, political science, mathematics, astronomy, and medicine. Brahmans also invented the zero and introduced algebra, designed calendars, and even taught martial arts. Students specialized in such subjects and continued the tradition of their teacher. With the advent of Muslim invasions of India (beginning c. 1000 CE), schools devoted to the



Indian schoolchildren and their parents in Mumbai in July 2001 protest a government decision to cut tuition grants for students attending English-language schools. (AFP/CORBIS)

Muslim tradition sprang up, and the Hindu and Muslim systems of education coexisted side by side for centuries. Interaction between the two systems of education was limited. Muslim schools taught the Qur'an and texts on science and mathematics of Arab and Persian origin. Hindu schools reflected a variety of different traditions with their specific sacred texts and specializations in astrology, astronomy, mathematics, etc.

Indian Education under the British

Under British rule (from 1858) a new system of education was introduced in India; it too was not aimed at mass education. The highest educational institution became the college. Entrance qualifications often were obtained by means of private tuition. Wealth replaced caste distinction as the key to educational success, although Brahman families with little wealth still secured education for their sons, so as to get them positions in government service. The Hindus showed greater interest in British education than did the Mus-

lims, who feared that it would affect their religion. Thomas Babington Macaulay, who served on the Supreme Council in India, wrote in his "Minute on Education" (1835) that the British should aim to educate gentlemen—Indian in blood only, British in every other respect. He also deprecated all Asian learning, although he knew little about it. At the time there was a debate in British circles in India on how to spend the limited funds available for Indian education. Those who wished to spend it on teaching of Arabic, Persian, and Sanskrit, etc. were called Orientalists; their adversaries, who favored English education, were termed Anglicists. Macaulay settled the debate in favor of the latter. Later generations of Indians, who knew more about English literature and philosophy than did the British, actually made Macaulay's words come true to such an extent that the British felt threatened. Although British civil servants in India were selected after completing their studies at Oxford or Cambridge, they often could not match the English literary erudition of the most brilliant Indians.

In 1858 three universities were established in Mumbai (Bombay), Calcutta, and Madras as examining institutions. These universities were initially not teaching institutions; rather they determined the syllabi and curricula and controlled the examinations of affiliated colleges throughout India. This standardization produced large numbers of educated Indians imbued with the same ideas and values, and able to contribute to a common discourse.

Under the British administration in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, hundreds of primary, middle, and secondary schools were established. These schools were most commonly run by Christian missionaries, who received some financial support from the provincial government. The schools were important in teaching basic literacy and numeracy.

British higher institutions focused primarily on the liberal arts, law, and medicine, with little emphasis on engineering and technology. The Victoria Jubilee Institute in Mumbai, which trained Indian spinning and weaving masters for the cotton textile industry, and a school of civil engineering at Roorkee in northern India were the only exceptions. When the great industrialist Jamsetji Nasarwanji Tata (1839–1904) donated a large sum of money for the establishment in 1907 of the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore, the British did not take kindly to the idea, believing that no one would want to employ Indian scientists. Because of the obstacles to its founding, the institute came into being only after Tata's death. It was a testament to Tata's vision, but India had very few wealthy visionaries of this kind.



FROM ENGLISH TO INDIAN LANGUAGES

Advocates of Indian independence proposed broad changes in the education system to make it relevant to life in India. One call for reform was instruction in the indigenous languages of India, the benefits of which are listed in the following extract from the *Report of the Zakir Hussain Committee* published in 1939.

The proper teaching of the mother-tongue is the foundation of all education. Without the capacity to speak effectively and to read and write correctly and lucidly, no one can develop precision of thought or clarity of ideas. Moreover, it is a means of introducing the child to the rich heritage of his people's ideas, emotions and aspirations, and can therefore be made a valuable means of social education, whilst also instilling right ethical and moral values. Also, it is a natural outlet for the expression of the child's aesthetic sense and appreciation, and if the proper approach is adopted, the study of literature becomes a source of joy and creative appreciation. More specifically, by the end of the seven years' course, the following objectives should be achieved:

1. The capacity to converse freely, naturally and confidently about the objects, people and happenings within the child's environment. This capacity should gradually develop into:
2. The capacity to speak lucidly, coherently and relevantly on any given topic of every-day interest.
3. The capacity to read silently, intelligently and with speed written passages of average difficulty. (This capacity should be developed at least to such an extent that the student may read newspapers and magazines of every-day interest.)
4. The capacity to read aloud—clearly, expressively and with enjoyment—both prose and poetry. (The student should be able to discard the usual lifeless, monotonous and bored style of reading.)
5. The capacity to use the list of contents and the index and to consult dictionaries and reference books, and generally to utilize the library as a source of information and enjoyment.
6. The capacity to write legible, correctly, and with reasonable speed.
7. The capacity to describe in writing, in a simple and clear style, every-day happenings and occurrences, *e.g.*, to make reports of meetings held in the village for some co-operative purpose.
8. The capacity to write personal letters and business communications of a simple kind.
9. An acquaintance with, and interest in, the writings of standard authors, through a study of their writings or extracts from them.

Source: Jagdish S. Sharma, ed. (1965) *India's Struggle for Freedom: Select Documents and Sources*. Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 107–108.

In the early twentieth century, two denominational universities were founded: Aligarh Muslim University in Aligarh and Banaras Hindu University in Varanasi. The secular principles of post-1947 independent India would not have permitted the establishment of such universities but, because they were founded earlier, they survived as "central universities." Their curriculums closely follow those of hundreds of other universities in India.

There were several attempts to set up national institutions of education in the twentieth century, for example, Gurukul Kangri at Haridwar and the university set up at Shantiniketan by poet and Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941). There were many varieties of "national education" that focused on indigenous rather than English traditions. For example, Gurukul Kangri intended to revive ancient Indian education by teaching Sanskrit texts whereas at Shantiniketan the emphasis was on contemporary Indian literature and art. Mohandas Gandhi sponsored a scheme of basic education closely linked to his idea of constructive work in villages. But such institutions had a basic flaw—they did not confer degrees recognized by the government and, thus, could not help people to find employment.

Education in Independent India

Independent India preserved the British educational heritage. No attempts were made to revive the initiatives of "national education." Shantiniketan survived as a central university, with government funding. The only new departure was a proliferation of engineering colleges, including the five Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT), one each in Chennai (Madras), Kanpur, Kharagpur, Mumbai (Bombay), and New Delhi. These elite institutions select their students from hundreds of thousands of applicants. Their graduates are highly qualified—about 50 percent of each class secures a job in the United States. Many of those who remain in India acquire an additional Master of Business Administration degree (MBA) so as to qualify for administrative posts in the private corporate sector, which are better paid than those in production or research and development. Management positions were more attractive because until the end of the twentieth century, Indian industry mostly worked with imported technology and therefore invested very little in research and development.

The most neglected sector of education is still primary schooling. Official statistics show about one hundred million pupils in primary schools, but there are high dropout rates. Approximately half of the popula-

tion of India is illiterate. There are frequent complaints that village schoolmasters take their jobs as sinecures and therefore do not teach regularly. This deficiency at the primary level has had serious consequences. At the end of the twentieth century, suicides occurred among peasants grieving crop losses in southern India. Not knowing to get the soil examined, they had shifted to cotton cultivation, although the soil was unsuitable. The fruition of Mohandas Gandhi's quest for combined primary and practical education at the village level is still unrealized.

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INDIA—HISTORY. See **British Indian Empire; Gupta Empire; Harappa; India—Medieval Period; Mauryan Empire; Mughal Empire; Mohenjo Daro; Paleoanthropology—South Asia; Quit India Movement; South Asia—History.**

INDIA—HUMAN RIGHTS The architects of the Indian constitution envisioned a democratic, secular polity to guarantee people's fundamental rights without distinction of caste, color, creed, religion, or sex. Fundamental rights and freedom, as incorporated in India's constitution, reflect the ethos and spirit of the charter of the United Nations, reaffirming faith in "the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women" (Levin 1996: 5). The judiciary acts as custodian to uphold these rights.

Despite built-in safeguards, violation of human rights has become common in India, often at the hands of lawmakers and law enforcers. In a tightly knit hierarchical social order reinforced by abject poverty, illiteracy, and lack of social awareness about constitutional rights, the rule of law is not strictly adhered to by law-enforcement agencies. Incurable corruption and criminalization of politics offer a fertile ground for human rights abuses by these agencies, which make an overt distinction between privileged and nonprivileged, majority and minority groups, elite and nonelite classes. A result is profound social unrest among marginalized and minority sections of society, with some even taking up arms against the state.

To deal with the increase in militancy, insurgencies, and ethnopolitical and community violence in India, state agencies often misuse laws such as the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) (TADA) Act of 1985 (now in disuse), and the Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act. These laws empower executive authorities to resort to warrantless searches, illegal detention, physical torture, harassment, and summary execution. In most cases, however, abuses happen in the name of the law without being officially sanctioned.

Most reported cases of human rights violations are custodial rapes and deaths at the hands of police. This fact has been acknowledged by India's National Human Rights Commission, established in 1993 to investigate such cases. The state authorities justify these violations on the ground that militants and insurgents indulging in indiscriminate killings of innocent people are even worse violators of human rights.

Community Violence

Community violence between Hindus and Muslims and between Hindus and Christians took an ugly turn in the Hindu-belt Indian states of Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Orissa. Extremist Hindu fundamentalist groups such as Vishva Hindu Parishad, Rashtriya Sevak Sangh, and Bajrang Dal have actively fomented violence. In violent acts against Christians, churches were damaged and burned, and Christians were physically assaulted and robbed in 1999 and 2000.

Opposition parties in parliament protested these acts, especially when the media reported in January 2000 that the Bajrang Dal was responsible for burning to death an Australian missionary, Graham Stewart Staines, and his two sons, in Orissa, where Staines had spent more than two decades serving lepers. Hindu extremist groups charged him with mass conversion of Hindus to Christianity. A judicial commission appointed by the central government to probe into the incident exonerated the Bajrang Dal, and opposition parties termed this a whitewash. Amnesty International reported that the social violence against Christians, Muslims, and *Dalits* (untouchables) was the outcome of the extreme Hindu nationalist policies espoused by the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government under A. B. Vajpayee. Caste and community violence increased, especially in the eastern Indian state of Bihar. Clashes between the Ranvir Sena (government-banned private militia of upper-caste landlords) and lower-caste minorities claimed many lives. As reported by Amnesty International on 25 January 2000, "at least twenty-two Dalit ('untouchable') men, women, and children in Bihar's Jehanabad district" were killed

by the Ranvir Sena (Human Rights Watch World Report 2000). In retaliation, the People's War Group, Maoist guerrillas, killed about three dozen upper-class people in the Jehanabad district in March 2000.

Corrective Measures

To protect human rights, the government created the National Human Rights Commission under the Protection of Human Rights Act of 1993. The commission is a statutory recommendatory and advisory body, with the powers of a civil court to summon and examine witnesses under oath. It recommends a code of conduct for state and nonstate agencies, including employers in the private sector, to prevent human rights abuses by state agencies.

Because of the commission's effective intervention, the controversial TADA Act was allowed to lapse in May 1995. The commission has also conducted numerous probes into human rights violations and compelled authorities to recognize crimes in light of its recommendations.

As an autonomous body, the commission has acquired a reputation as fair and impartial in safeguarding civil liberties. It is headed by a judicial functionary with the status of a retired Supreme Court chief justice or justices. While commenting on the state of human rights in India, the commission's chairman, Justice J. S. Verma, a retired chief justice of India, observed that although India's record of human rights is comparatively good, it is important to protect and guarantee the social and economic rights of the poor and downtrodden sections of society. In its 1998–1999 report, tabled in the Indian parliament in the winter session of December 2000, the commission expressed concern about the protection of rights of the displaced population, the Dalits, and ethnic minorities. It observed that child labor, child prostitution, and sexual harassment and violence against minorities are on the rise. The commission considered 53,711 cases and disposed of 47,061 cases in the 1999–2000 year. While looking into the plight of thousands awaiting trials in jails, the commission recommended a speedy disposal of criminal cases pending in courts.

In March 2001, the Indian government decided to set up fast-track courts in each district of the country to dispose of long-standing cases awaiting trial. According to the sixty-first report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, 25 million cases are still pending in various courts of India. In March 2001, the Supreme Court ruled that if cases are not disposed of in five years, the accused should be freed from jail.

To improve the human rights record in India, it is essential to reform the police and armed and paramilitary forces, to improve the criminal judicial system, and to educate law enforcers about preventive measures to help reduce the recurrence of custodial rapes, torture, deaths, gender violence, and atrocities against poor and minority people. Good governance is essential to achieve these goals.

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INDIA—MEDIEVAL PERIOD The medieval period (eighth–eighteenth centuries) in India is an important phase in the history of the South Asian subcontinent. Not only is it notable for cultural and political developments, but it also marked the coming of Islam and all its consequences.

Parameters of Period

In the twentieth century, the history of medieval India became the rallying point for the two-nation theory that culminated in the partition of the Indian subcontinent. The vastly differing natures of the religions, cultures, and histories of the Hindu and Muslim communities were stressed. Ancient India was identified with Hindu rule, and the medieval period was identified with Muslim rule. That characterization is simplistic, however: although the rulers of a portion of India may have been Muslim during the medieval period, at any given time many parts of India were not under Muslim rule, so that periodization according to the ruler's religion is incorrect.

The beginning date of medieval India is controversial. Historians have taken different demarcation lines—the death of Harsa in 647 CE, the invasion of Mahmud of Ghazna, the establishment of the Delhi sultanate in 1192, and so forth—as the beginning of the period. Likewise, the end of medieval times is variously given as 1707, 1739, and 1757. Here, the medieval period is considered to cover the eighth to eighteenth centuries and the area encompassed by present-day India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.

Early Medieval India

In the early medieval period, roughly the eighth to thirteenth centuries, the Indian subcontinent experienced significant change. Islam came to India through territorial conquest, the lure of wealth, and religious zeal. Muhammad bin Qasim (691–716) fulfilled the Arab dream of seizing the fabulous wealth of India when he defeated King Dahir (reigned 690–712) of Sind (Sanskrit Sindhu) in 712 CE. Qasim's conquest made possible further cultural rapprochement between the Indian subcontinent and the Arab world. Mahmud of Ghazna (971–1030) attacked North India seventeen times between 997 and 1027. His aim was not political; he was interested in amassing vast wealth from the temples of India. Muhammad of Ghuri (first invaded in 1175, d. 1206) established political control after his victory over Prithviraj Chauhan (reigned 1178–1192) in the second battle of Tarai in 1192. Muhammad controlled much of northern India and parts of Gujarat and Gwalior. The Turkish conquest from Central Asia was possible because of the internecine struggles between regional powers, the prevailing feudal system, the superior military technology of the Turks, the general detachment of the masses from the defense of the king, and the Turks' religious zeal that led to jihad.

The regional kingdoms of the Rashtrakutas (in northern Deccan, eighth–tenth centuries), Pratiharas (in eastern and central India, eighth–eleventh centuries), and Palas (in Bengal, mid-eighth–mid-twelfth centuries) also rose and fell in early medieval India. These kingdoms fought one another over the capital city of Kanauj, and their internecine struggle made them weak. The Pratihara kingdom broke into small principalities. In the eleventh century, the later Chalukyas and Senas replaced the Rashtrakutas and Palas, respectively. Meanwhile, the Rajputs (c. seventh–twelfth centuries) ruled most of the kingdoms in northern India, but their disunity prevented them from resisting aggression from the northwest. The Chola kings of south India, made wealthy through trade and commerce, were the most powerful figures

on the Indian peninsula during the ninth through twelfth centuries.

The early medieval period was also a time of agrarian expansion, with land grants to Brahmans, temples, and officials. Officials were granted revenue from land, and their salaries were generally equal to the amount of revenue collected. Their obligation was to send troops to the king. Feudalism and the emergence of hierarchical landed intermediaries made the position of the king weak. The peasants suffered from heavy taxation, the obligation to provide free labor, and indebtedness.

Urban centers began to grow during the ninth century as a result of trade and the rise of new markets. The mercantile community accumulated wealth and prospered. The Arabs, Chinese, Indians, and Southeast Asians were active in sea commerce. The eastern coast of India had a major share in trade with Southeast Asia, and Indian culture began to spread in that region.

A new social ethos was also developing in this period. Castes were changing position, and mixed castes were emerging; Indian social hierarchy was not static, as is evident from the social changes experienced in the period. Saints of south India were popularizing the Bhakti movement, with its message of personal devotion to God, among the masses. The intellectual movement of the eighth-century philosopher Sankara (c. 700–c. 750) emphasized the *advaitavada* (the doctrine of nondualism). Ramanujacharya (c. 1017–1137) called for spiritually experiencing God through intuition. Sanskrit was continuing to develop as the language of learning. The *Katha-sarita-sagara* (a collection of stories) and the *Gita Govinda* of the twelfth-century poet Jayadeva were two important Sanskrit works.

Linguistically, regional languages were beginning to develop, and Lahore was becoming an important center for Persian. The early medieval period also witnessed the development of unique regional temple architecture, such as the Brihadesvara temple at Tanjore and the gigantic Siva temple at Gangaikondacholapuram, both of which were famous Chola temples. The Sun temple of Konarka in Orissa and the Chandella temple at Khajuraho demonstrate exquisite craftsmanship.

The Delhi Sultanate of 1192–1526

The Delhi sultanate took form under Muhammad of Ghuri and Qutubuddin Aibak (reigned 1206–1210). The period between 1206 and 1290 is popularly known as the slave dynasty, although no sultan was a slave when he became ruler, and there were actually three dynasties during the period. Shamsuddin Iltutmish

(reigned 1210–1236) consolidated the sultanate in northern India. He bequeathed to his capable daughter Raziya (reigned 1236–1239) a large empire extending in the west to the Indus River. The struggle between the Delhi rulers and the Turkish nobility (the Forty, or *chahalgani*) had already started; the latter plotted against Raziya. It was Ghiyasuddin Balban (reigned 1265–1286) who destroyed the Forty; he also strengthened the army, ran an efficient spy system, suppressed revolts, and repulsed the ever-menacing Mongols.

The reign of the Khalji sultans (1290–1320) was marked by territorial expansion of the Delhi sultanate as well as the end of the Turkish monopoly of the ruling class. Jalauddin Khalji (reigned 1290–1296), the founder of the Khalji dynasty, was assassinated by his nephew and son-in-law Alauddin Khalji (reigned 1296–1316). Alauddin carved out a kingdom extending to south India and carried out market reforms by fixing the price of essential goods. Ghiyasuddin Tughluq (reigned 1320–1325), the founder of the Tughluq dynasty, was a capable ruler. His son Muhammed bin Tughluq (reigned 1325–1351) ruled over extensive territory. However, his ill-fated experiments, including moving the capital city and creation of token currency, created havoc. The process of disintegration had begun, and the reign of his successor, Firuz Tughluq (reigned 1351–1388), was followed by civil war. The sack of Delhi by the Mongol chief Timur (1336–1405) in 1398 further weakened the sultanate.

The Sayyid dynasty (1414–1451) was a mere shadow of a sultanate, and its control was confined to the Delhi region. The Lodi dynasty (1451–1526) witnessed the end of the sultanate, when Babur (1483–1530) defeated Ibrahim Lodi (reigned 1517–1526) at the first battle of Panipat in 1526. While the sultanate declined, a number of kingdoms came into existence. In eastern India, the Ilyas Sahi dynasty of Bengal arose in 1350. The powerful Gajapatis of Orissa had resisted the onslaught of the sultans. In the west, the kingdoms of Malwa and Gujarat came into existence in the fifteenth century, and in north, Kashmir in the fourteenth century. In the south, the Bhamani sultanate (1347–1527) and the Vijayanagar empire (1336–1565) emerged.

The period of the Delhi sultanate marked a new era in cultural, social, and economic history of the subcontinent. The teachings of the Sufi saints appealed to the common people, and saints' *dargah* (tombs) remain places of pilgrimage for both Muslims and Hindus in the present day. The Bhakti movement saw the emergence of Kabir (1440–1518), Nanak (1469–1539), and Caitanya (1485–1533). They preached cooperation between Hindus and Muslims, egalitarianism, and the rejection of a social system based on caste. Nanak

was the founder of Sikhism, which became an important religion after his death.

Indo-Islamic architecture, a fusion of the Hindu and Islamic styles, developed in this period. Arches, domes, and ornamentation of different kinds were main features of the style. Among the important structures built by the Delhi sultans are Qutab Minar, Siri fort, the city of Tughluqabad, Firozabad, and the tomb of Firuz. Murals, painted cloth, and Qur'anic calligraphy were landmarks in painting. Amir Khusrau (1253–1325), composer of Hindi and Persian verses, is credited with having introduced *qawwali*, different ragas, and the *khayal* form of singing. Such regional languages as Bengali, Assamese, Oriya, Punjabi, and Marathi developed. Interchange between the dialects of Hindi and the court language, Persian, resulted in the growth of Urdu.

The ruling class and nobility led a life of luxury. The ulamas (theologians) were an influential section of the population. (Indian Muslims [converted Hindus and their descendants] were disliked by the foreign Muslims, who thought themselves more pure and more strict in their adherence to the tenets of Islam.) The covering of a woman's face by a veil, or the *pardah* system, became more rigid. As non-Muslims, or *zimmi*s, Hindus had to pay a discriminatory tax known as *zajiyah*. However, the Hindu autonomous rajas lived well. The Hindus were in a dominant position regarding revenue, money lending, and agriculture.

In the early period of the sultanate, the territory was divided into units, or *iqtas*. The owners collected the revenue and defrayed the costs of their salaries. With urban expansion came the growth of a money economy and trade with West Asia, Southeast Asia, and China. Ports like Melaka and Aceh in Southeast Asia had large settlements of Indian traders. It was mainly Indian Muslim traders from Gujarat, Malabar, Tamil Nadu, and Bengal who brought a liberal brand of Islam to Southeast Asia.

The Mughal Empire of 1526–1857

In the sixteenth century, Babur laid the foundation of Mughal rule in India after defeating Ibrahim Lodi. Rana Sanga and the Afghans also lost to him in the battles of Khanwa (1527) and Ghahra (1529), respectively. His son Humayun (1508–1556) inherited the difficult task of preserving the kingdom. Sher Shah Suri (c. 1486–1545), the ambitious Afghan ruler of Bihar, defeated him at the battle of Chausa in 1539. Sher Shah's reign (1540–1545) witnessed a brilliant overhauling of the administration. Coming back from Persia, Humayun recaptured the throne of Delhi in 1555.

Akbar (1542–1605) carved out an empire bounded by Kabul in the northwest, Kashmir in the north, Bengal in the east, and beyond the Narmada River in the south. He consolidated the empire by annexation, matrimonial alliance with the Rajputs, religious tolerance, and sound administration. His broad vision, the policy of *sulh-i-kul* (universal tolerance), and his humanitarian outlook befitted his name, Akbar, which means "the Great." His son Jahangir (1569–1627) was a great dispenser of justice. Queen Nur Jahan (d. 1645), his wife, took an active interest in politics.

Shah Jahan (1592–1666), who ruled from 1628 to 1658, oversaw the Mughal empire's golden age. The last of the great Mughals, Aurangzeb (1618–1707), captured the throne by killing all his brothers and imprisoning Shah Jahan. His religious orthodoxy, wars in Deccan, and the alienation of such groups as the Sikhs, Rajputs, Marathas, and Jats marked the beginning of the end of the empire. Aurangzeb's destruction of temples might have been the result of political considerations, but it was a deviation from the policy of tolerance of his predecessors. Other factors that led to the decline of the empire after Aurangzeb included the draining of the treasury by protracted wars, crises in the bureaucracy, the decline of the army's efficiency, weak successors to Aurangzeb, and the independence of provincial governors.

After the invasion of Nadir Shah (1688–1747) in 1739, the Mughal empire remained in name only. Powerful regional kingdoms arose in this period. Sivaji (1627–1680) carved out a strong kingdom and fought relentlessly with the Mughals. Bengal, Awadh, and Hyderabad became independent. The Europeans, who had come as traders, began to interfere in states that had become independent from the Mughals. The absence of a central authority and naval technology made their task easier.

During the Mughal period, mosques, palaces, forts, and tombs expressed the rulers' relatively settled condition and the refinement of the period. The buildings of Akbar are beautiful structures, with carved and painted designs, many-sided pillars, the use of red sandstone, and so forth. The Taj Mahal, poetry in marble, stands apart for its beauty. Lavish ornamentation, use of marble, inlaid mosaic work of costly stones, engraved arches, and foliated pillar bases mark the architectural splendor of Shah Jahan's monuments. Landscape architecture as exemplified by ornamented gardens was another contribution of the Mughals. Painting reached its high-water mark under Jahangir, and Hindustani music developed.

Persian remained the court language, but Urdu was becoming popular. Regional languages were mature

with lyrical poetry. Tulsidas (1543–1623) and Surdas (1483–1563) were famous Hindi poets of the times. Saints of the Bhakti movement from this period include Dadu Dayal (1544–1603) of Gujarat and Tukaram (1607–1649) of Maharashtra. The notable Sufi saints included Sheikh Salim Chisti (sixteenth century), Sheikh Abdul Kadir (1459–1533), and Sheikh Miyan Mir (1564–1624). However, certain trends developing in Sufism led to orthodoxy. Sheikh Ahmed Sarhindi (1564–1624) called for strict adherence to the Shari‘a. The missionary activity of some Sufi saints, particularly those belonging to the Qadriya order, resulted in large-scale conversion of Hindus.

The Mughal monarchs believed they had a divine right to the throne. The administration provided stability and peace in the empire. The *mansabs* (ranks) were assigned to both civil and military officers. The holders of the ranks, or *mansabdars*, were paid either in cash or in land assigned to them (*jagirs*). Abuses crept into the system of assigning ranks during the eighteenth century.

India’s trade relationships with the outside world expanded, and Indian textiles were in great demand. Delhi, Agra, Lahore, Dhaka, Surat, and Masulipatnam flourished with the growth of urbanization. Asian merchants initially controlled a major share of trade, but from the eighteenth century onward, European shipping was in ascendance.

During the medieval period, Hindus and Muslims developed many common traits. There was fusion of the old with the new in the arts, literature, society, and religion. The composite culture that emerged, an amalgamation of different traditions, was the beginning of a national culture for India as a whole.

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INDIA—POLITICAL SYSTEM With a civilization of nearly five thousand years’ antiquity, India is continental in scale and displays a wide range of social, religious, racial, ethnic, caste, cultural, and linguistic diversity. Given this heterogeneity, the modern Indian political system has had to be a unique synthesis of diverse castes, cultures, and religions. India is by far the largest functioning democracy in the world and as such merits careful study. Of its more than 1 billion people—next in size to China—624 million are over eighteen years of age and have the right to vote. The vast majority of voters, mostly in rural areas, are illiterate or semiliterate, and women constitute half of the total electorate.

Evolutionary Process

India’s political system has evolved over the past fifty years against the background of the country’s cultural values, its long struggle for freedom from British imperialism, and the Gandhian political and economic philosophy of nonviolence, decentralization, and democratic socialism. After becoming independent on 15 August 1947, India instituted a parliamentary democracy under which the president is the constitutional head of state, while real power is vested in a prime minister and cabinet, collectively accountable to parliament. There are three main principles of the Indian political system: democracy, secularism, and federalism.

The Party System India’s multiparty political system has witnessed a proliferation of political parties. Fifty-six parties participated in the first Lok Sabha (lower house) election of 1952; now there are 200, growth partly attributable to splits within parties, and partly to narrow, personal political considerations. (Political considerations are determined mainly by immediate political gains, such as offering more seats to party candidates in local and national elections to legislative bodies at the time of seat adjustments with various political parties; and offering ministerial berths in the government or lucrative positions in government-run organizations and enterprises.) In hindsight, Indian politics has been characterized by the one-party rule of the dominant Indian National Congress under the Nehru dynasty: Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), Indira Gandhi (Nehru’s only daughter; 1917–1984), and Indira Gandhi’s son Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991). India entered the era of coalition politics following the Congress Party’s debacle in the November 1989 parliamentary elections. The Janata Party was the first non-Congress party to form the central government, in March 1977 under the leadership of Morarji Desai (1896–1995), a Gandhian and strict disciplinarian. The Desai government tried to give new direction to

Indian politics by basing it on moral values. That did not work: bickering among its coalition partners ultimately caused the fall of the Desai government in July 1979.

In the January 1980 elections, Indira Gandhi returned to power. The black days of her state of emergency rule (1975–1977) were fresh in the minds of Indians who had suffered the excesses of that time. She had failed to benefit the people and manage incremental intrastate conflicts. Her populist slogan of *garibi hatao* (eliminate poverty) rang hollow and failed to enthuse the masses.

After her assassination on 31 October 1984, her eldest son Rajiv Gandhi was sworn in as prime minister. In the 1984 elections the Congress Party again won an overwhelming majority, attributed chiefly to sympathy following Gandhi's assassination. Rajiv Gandhi, India's youngest prime minister at just over forty, had a vision of taking India into the twentieth century, making it progressive, prosperous, and powerful in the comity of nations. He advocated economic reforms to attract foreign investment and boost exports. In foreign policy, he served the country's best

interests by maintaining balanced relations with both the United States and the USSR. But his image was sullied when he was charged with involvement in kick-backs in the purchase of guns from the Swedish company Bofors. This became a major issue in the parliamentary elections of November 1989, which his party lost.

Since then, Indian politics have been generally characterized by instability. The Janata government, formed under the leadership of V. P. Singh (b. 1931) in December 1989, collapsed after a year when it lost outside support. In the May 1991 elections, the Congress Party fared better and managed to form a government under P. V. Narsimha Rao (born 1921), who completed his five-year term as prime minister. The main achievement of the Rao government was the June 1991 introduction of economic reforms intended to loosen stifling export and import restrictions, promote public-sector privatization, and encourage foreign investment. This policy of liberalization was a major departure from the "Nehruvian" model of socialist economic development. But Rao compromised his and his party's image by bribing some members of parliament to stay in power. Then in the June 1996 elections, no single political party won an absolute majority, and three central governments were formed in 1996 and 1997.

In the March 1998 elections, a coalition of about two dozen parties led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) formed the government under Atal Behari Vajpayee (b. 1924). But his government was toppled after thirteen months by a single vote during a vote of confidence in the lower house of parliament. New elections were held in September–October 1999. Again the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA), an alliance of eighteen national and regional parties, formed under the leadership of Vajpayee. The NDA government, in principle based on consensus politics, has developed a common minimum program to run the government smoothly. Its ruling partners have agreed not to abrogate Article 370 of the Indian constitution guaranteeing special status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Nor will they advocate a common civil code also applying to Indian Muslims or raise the controversial temple issue that rocked the country following the destruction of the Babri Masjid (mosque) by Hindu fundamentalists in December 1991.

The NDA government has not, however, met the expectations of the people. Law-enforcement agencies avoid acting against powerful, influential individuals, including smugglers, drug mobsters, and economic offenders, who have direct links with ruling political leaders. Bandits such as Veerappan (charged with nu-



PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

Adopted on 26 Jan 1950

We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a sovereign socialist secular democratic republic and to secure to all its citizens: justice, social, economic and political; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; equality of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the nation; in our constituent assembly this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, do hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this constitution.

Source: International Court Network.
Retrieved 8 March 2002, from:
http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/in00000_.html.

merous murders, violent gang robberies, and kidnappings) or the hard-core Hindu fundamentalist Bal Thakeray (charged with inflammatory writings against a minority religious community, leading to a massacre in Mumbai) have a free run. Poverty is still rampant, youth unrest is on the rise due to increasing unemployment, scams and scandals in public office are commonplace, and minorities suffer physical assaults by thugs from the majority community.

India has shifted from the value-based politics of 1950s and mid-1960s to the politics of sheer opportunism, characterized by a cancerous growth of communal hatred and violence, vote buying, divisions along caste and communal lines, and power-brokering, all of which contribute to moral degeneration in both the public and private lives of politicians, legislators, and party functionaries from top to bottom. Caught in decay and degeneration, the state has miserably failed to provide social security and ensure social harmony.

Democratic Decentralization of Power

Indian democracy is unique in its devolution of power to the grass roots, initiated with the introduction of the Panchayati Raj system in October 1959. Under this system, village councils (*panchayats*) comprise the smallest units of local self-government. Panchayati Raj is specifically designed to empower rural people to facilitate rapid socioeconomic development. The seventy-third amendment to India's constitution (adopted on 22 December 1992 and implemented on 24 April 1993) provides for a three-tier structure of local self-government, starting with the village at the bottom, ascending through the subdivision, to the district at the top. There is a 33 percent quota for representation of women in Panchayati Raj institutions. (Another radical initiative would establish a 33 percent quota for women members in the national and state legislatures.)

Federalism

India is a federal polity with a clear-cut division of powers between the Union and states. Despite that, center-state relations have been far from satisfactory, mainly due to the centralization of power by the Union government and to its discriminatory policies in allocating funds to states for development programs. India's northeastern states, Jammu and Kashmir in particular, have often complained that the Union government fails to address their various development and socioeconomic problems, problems resulting in large-scale violence and frustration among youths. This is a main reason why people are demanding separate state-



Indian prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee is congratulated by dignitaries including opposition leader Sonia Gandhi on 13 October 1999 before being sworn into office in New Delhi. (AFP/CORBIS)

hood: they are agitating for the devolution of more authority and administrative and financial powers from the Union government. The states themselves are also demanding more autonomy. On 25 June 2000, the Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir passed an autonomy resolution for the restoration of its pre-1953 status. The central government staunchly opposes this, fearing that it would threaten national unity; it has, however, agreed to consider a state's demand for autonomy within the framework of the constitution.

Judiciary

The judiciary is an important part of the Indian political system. It is a custodian of the constitution and has the right to review legislative enactments and executive acts. Though the Indian judiciary is independent, political considerations do influence judicial appointments, promotions, and transfers. Nonetheless, it was due to independent judicial activism that the Indian Supreme Court took action against top public functionaries—including the prime minister and top bureaucrats—who either had indulged in corrupt practices or were apathetic in the discharge of their public duties.

The major challenge before the Indian judiciary is to ensure prompt resolution of the cases piling up in the courts, sometimes for decades, to restore confidence in the efficacy of the judiciary. "Justice delayed is justice denied" aptly describes the Indian judicial system. Since the judicial process is so expensive and cumbersome, people prefer to suffer injustice rather than go to court.

Secularism

The principle of secularism in the Indian constitution requires that the state not discriminate against anyone on grounds of religion. The secular character of the Indian polity cannot be altered even through constitutional amendment. The term "secularism" was first incorporated into the preamble to the constitution through the forty-second amendment. The constitution guarantees religious minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions in accordance with their language, culture, and script.

The credibility of Indian secularism has been eroding, however, with the emergence of *Hindutva*, a narrow Hindu cultural nationalism. This has recently been promoted as the "essence" of the Indian state by a handful of self-styled representatives of Hinduism, including Bajrang Dal and Rastriya Sevak Sangh. Consequently, religious conflict between Hindus and Muslims and between Hindus and Christians is on the rise. The destruction of the Babri Masjid (a mosque said to have been constructed by the Muslim ruler Babar) in December 1991 shook the foundation of Indian secularism. Purportedly secular political parties are now exploiting the religious card as a vote-getter.

Freedom of the Media

The Indian media enjoy complete freedom in expressing their views without government interference, perhaps to the envy of some of their Western counterparts. Control exercised by media magnates does, however, largely nullify this freedom. Transparency is further eroded by the media's declining commitment to professional values: in a case recently disclosed by the Indian journalist Virendra Kapoor, some forty-odd Indian journalists "on a no-expense-spared conducted tour of Pakistan" accepted "expensive carpets and other gift items" from their Pakistani host (*Economic and Political Weekly* 5–11 August 2000: 2810). The media largely serve the interests of parties in power, who in return provide them with political patronage. As well, a coterie of pro-establishment intellectuals and top bureaucrats—some retired—who air their views in the media has gained tremendous influence, to the detriment of independent and incisive analysis of national, regional, and international issues.

India's Foreign Policy

The main plank of India's foreign policy is non-alignment. Its chief architect, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, defined this as an "independent policy," taking decisions on international and regional issues on the basis of the merits or demerits of each case. This policy was motivated by several factors, includ-

ing a desire to avoid Cold War superpower politics and alliances, and India's ambitions to play a significant independent role in world affairs. Nonalignment was pursued continuously and consistently during the Cold War era, except during the Morarji Desai government (1977–1979), which favored what it termed a "genuine nonaligned policy," implying a balanced policy not tilting in favor of either superpower. By prefixing "nonaligned policy" with the word "genuine," the Desai government claimed a major shift in India's policy of nonalignment: unlike Mrs. Gandhi's tilt toward the Soviet Union, the Desai government tilted neither in favor of Russia or the United States. Critics branded India's positive tilt toward the USSR during the regime of Mrs. Gandhi a clear departure from nonalignment. India's nonaligned ideology in general, and its tilt toward the USSR in particular, was the main source of irritation between India and the West, especially the United States.

After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, India's nonalignment underwent radical transformation. Putting aside ideology, India has gone ahead and forged a defense and strategic relationship with the United States. India not only established full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992, but has also forged close strategic and defense ties with it—unthinkable during the Cold War period. At the same time, India introduced economic reforms in 1991, giving greater weight to the economic content of its diplomacy by encouraging foreign investment, disinvestment in the public sector (privatization), and loosening of export and import restrictions to integrate its economy into the global market. India is still attempting to justify the relevance in the post-Cold War world of being a leading member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). India feels NAM can contribute to restructuring the United Nations and can help establish a nondiscriminatory trade regime while safeguarding human rights. In practice, India's nonaligned policy has lost both its ideological appeal and moral moorings.

India has been dubbed a "soft state," one vulnerable to internal and external pressures, bending its laws, rules, and regulations to political exigencies: its political system is under profound strain, as it has failed to tackle underlying caste, class, cultural, and ethno-religious tensions. That failure is likely to undermine the country's unity and integrity as well as its secular character. On the economic and foreign policy fronts, India needs to adopt a more distinct, long-term policy, as opposed to the "ad hocism" practiced today, if it wants to carve out a meaningful place in the world community.

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INDIA-MYANMAR RELATIONS Myanmar (Burma until 1989) became the second-largest member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on admission in 1997. Rich in natural resources, especially oil and gas, Myanmar could emerge as an economic leader in Asia. Moreover, its strategic importance has made India, China, and Southeast Asian nations take note of Myanmar's critical role when shaping their relations as well as Indian Ocean policies.

Historical Background

During Britain's colonial rule of India, the British considered Burma (as Myanmar was then known) an important post for monitoring activities of hostile powers such as Japan, Russia, and China. The first Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826) was the culmination of Burma's early-nineteenth-century intrusion into India. Thereafter, Britain extended colonial rule to Burma, which remained in the Empire (though administratively separate from India) from 1886 until independence in 1948. During World War II, Burma was important for both the Axis and Allied powers for purposes of defending security and strategic interests in South and Southeast Asia. The seizure of Burma by Japanese forces during World War II made it difficult for Britain to maintain administrative control over India.

Given this background, India-Myanmar relations are of special importance. The countries have close historical and cultural ties, sharing 1,643 kilometers of

common border along the Potkai Hills. They enjoyed friendly relations from 1948 to 1962, and early on India provided Rangoon (now Yangon) with military and economic assistance to fight insurgents along their common border. Prime Ministers Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) of India and U Nu of Burma (1907–unknown) were instrumental in cementing initial political and diplomatic ties between two countries.

The military regime of General Ne Win (1962–1988) and India's support for Burma's pro-democracy movement were largely responsible for the two countries' estrangement. After the September 1988 coup that brought the military junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), to power in Myanmar, the government of Rajiv Gandhi in India not only gave moral support to the restoration of democracy but also provided sanctuary to refugees. However, India gradually realized that its tough policy toward the new regime might complicate the problems of cross-border insurgency, drug trafficking, and smuggling in northeastern India. The Indian government also feared that rigid opposition to SLORC might drive Myanmar closer to China. This led New Delhi to adopt a policy of realism and pragmatism.

Policy of Engagement

In March 1993 India's foreign secretary, J. N. Dixit, visited Myanmar to hold talks with Myanmar's officials on wide-ranging issues. Talks were again held in Yangon at Myanmar's initiative in 1994. A Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation between the border authorities of both countries for maintaining border tranquillity was signed in 1994. Although India assured Yangon it would not interfere in Myanmar's domestic affairs, New Delhi openly extended moral support to Myanmar's pro-democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi. Bilateral relations deteriorated further when the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for promoting international understanding was given to Suu Kyi.

Despite such irritants, India has kept political and diplomatic channels open with Myanmar. India's foreign secretary, K. Rangunath, visited Myanmar in February 1998 to forge wider strategic cooperation on internal security and border management. He discussed several issues of mutual concern with U Khin Maung, Myanmar's deputy foreign minister, to enhance border trade between two countries. To boost momentum, a high-level India-Myanmar meeting took place in Yangon in August 2000. Under discussion was "effective border management," including steps to curb drug trafficking and smuggling. Both countries underlined the need to strengthen infrastructure and security to promote border trade.

The China Factor

China has always been key in India-Myanmar relations, due mainly to Myanmar's strategic location and to India's and China's clashing security and strategic interests. With implementation of the 1914 McMahon Line Agreement in 1918, the India-Burma northern boundary was set near the Talu Pass. China contested this when it signed the Boundary Treaty with Myanmar in October 1960, but despite Chinese opposition, India still considers the Talu Pass demarcation valid. Furthermore, India and Myanmar agreed on their land border in December 1967, with the exception of the three-way border between China, India, and Myanmar. In March 1984 both New Delhi and Rangoon successfully concluded a maritime boundary agreement.

China has begun building a naval base on Coco Island, much to India's distress. Also, China and Myanmar have agreed to establish a 30,000-square-mile offshore economic zone to facilitate exploitation of natural resources to their mutual benefit. This will, however, affect India's maritime and economic interests.

Growing Pakistan-Myanmar ties are also of concern to India. Increasing links between Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and Myanmar's intelligence agency serve Pakistani interests, as Pakistan considers Myanmar to be a safer base from which to launch militant activities in northeastern India. This rapprochement acquires added significance, since the military regimes of both Pakistan and Myanmar share common strategic perceptions and political interests. The India-Myanmar relationship presents a complex scenario, given the Sino-Myanmar, Sino-Pakistan, and Pakistan-Myanmar triangle of relations. To counter this, India is keeping tabs on developments and has launched a multipronged diplomatic effort both to engage and contain Myanmar.

India's Connection with Myanmar through ASEAN

Myanmar became a full member of ASEAN in 1997 despite American opposition; the same year, India was admitted as a full dialogue partner. ASEAN has allowed both New Delhi and Yangon to increase and expand economic, commercial, and trade ties. India will also gain greater access to ASEAN markets: India's trade volume with ASEAN member countries has increased since India joined, first as an observer in 1993 and then as a full dialogue partner. Undoubtedly, Myanmar understands that given India's industrial, technological, military, and nuclear capabilities, it is capable of influencing the politics, economy, and security of Southeast Asia. India and Myanmar now

have better opportunities collectively to address the security, defense, and strategic issues confronting Southeast Asia, since India is also a member of ASEAN's Regional Forum (ARF, established 1994).

Good India-Myanmar relations might gradually help reduce Chinese influence on Myanmar. Although China and Myanmar have drawn closer in their common goal of launching an antidemocratic movement, Myanmar does not want to remain isolated from the world and seems eager to cast off its pariah image. In pursuit of greater international ties, Myanmar's military regime has become more pragmatic. This is likely to prompt New Delhi and Yangon to cooperate in areas of mutual concern and interest, especially in the areas of cross-border insurgency, drug trafficking, and arms smuggling, threats to the security and economic interests of both countries.

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INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS With India's and Pakistan's May 1998 nuclear tests, world attention focused on South Asia. The fear was not only a regional nuclear arms race, but the effect on volatile areas such as the Middle East. The fear was well-founded, because the two nations have been at odds over Kashmir since the partitioning of the Indian subcontinent in August 1947. India and Pakistan have a history of armed conflict, having fought four major wars (1947-1948, September 1965, December 1971, and May 1999). The hostilities have cost both countries economically, physically, and psychologically without producing tangible gain. Besides Kashmir, other unresolved, long-standing bilateral problems include sovereignty over the Siachen Glacier, the Sir Creek maritime boundary, and the Tulbul Project/Wuller barrage. Many factors have contributed to this



INDIA'S EARLY VIEW ON INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

The following resolution passed by the Indian National Congress party in September 1950 sets forth several key elements in India's policy toward Pakistan, including a desire for peace and the contradictory desire to prevent peoples in India from affiliating with Pakistan.

The Jaipur Congress drew the particular attention of the country to the menace of communalism and called upon the people to put an end to all communal and separatist tendencies which had already caused grievous injury and which imperiled the hard-won freedom of the country. Anti-national and socially reactionary forces have continued to function and come in the way of India's progress.

The partition of India caused deep wounds in the political, economic and emotional life of the country. Passions were roused and many difficult problems arose, leading to continuing tension, and ill-will between India and Pakistan. These problems can only be solved satisfactorily with patience and goodwill, tolerance and firmness, keeping always in view the honour and interests of India. These interests of India, as of Pakistan, require peaceful and cooperative relations between the two countries. This Congress, therefore, commends and approves of the proposal made by the Government of Pakistan for an agreement between the two countries that all disputes should be solved by peaceful methods and without resort to armed conflict.

For this reason, among others, the Congress records approval of the Indo—Pakistan Agreement of 8th April, 1950, which represents a peaceful and effective approach to the solution of a very difficult problem and which is in keeping with the traditions and policy of the Congress. It is with this approach and in this spirit that such problems can be most effectively dealt with and can yield enduring results.

Whatever disputes and conflicts may exist now or may arise in future between India and Pakistan, they should be considered as political problems between the two countries and should be treated as such. In no event should the spirit of communalism or the misuse of religion be allowed to mar and distort the consideration of our internal problems. We cannot forsake our own policy in a spirit of retaliation. We have not only to treat our minorities with full justice and fairness, but should make them feel that they are so treated.

This Congress, therefore, declares that it is the basic policy of the nation, as reaffirmed in the Constitution, that India is a democratic State which, while honouring every faith, neither favours nor discriminates against any particular religion or its adherents, and which gives equal rights and freedom of opportunity to all communities and individuals who form the nation. It is the primary duty of every Congressman to carry this great message and to live up to it and to combat every form of communalism or separatism in India.

Source: Jagdish Saran Sharma. (1965) India's Struggle for Freedom: Select Documents and Sources. Vol. 2. Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 242–243.

antagonism, including Cold War politics, competitive geostrategic perceptions, ideological and cultural differences, and the dynamics of extraregional politics.

Kashmir

Hostility began with the breakaway of primarily Muslim Pakistan from predominantly Hindu India in 1947. It continued with Pakistani advances in the Kashmir Valley in October 1947, and its forceful occupation of Azad Kashmir—the one-third of the valley thenceforth known in India as "Pakistan-occupied Kashmir." Immediately thereafter, Hari Singh, ruler of Jammu and Kashmir States, signed an instrument of accession with India on 26 October 1947, making Kashmir into Indian territory. Pakistan has contested this on the grounds that Kashmir is a Muslim-dominated area. It has consistently demanded that the problem be resolved in accordance with the U.N. resolution of August 1948, which called for a plebiscite to determine the wishes of Kashmiri Muslims. The Indian government opposes this on the grounds that it would undermine India's basic secularism. Pakistan maintains that the Kashmir issue needs to be resolved before bilateral relations can be improved and sees resolution of the Kashmir problem as essential to ensure regional peace and stability. India insists that the Kashmir issue cannot be resolved unless Pakistan stops cross-border terrorism. These rigid postures have further deepened the estrangement.

The Cold War

Geopolitics remains key in India-Pakistan relations. Pakistan's fear of India induced it to join two U.S.-sponsored military alliances, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization, in 1954 and 1955, respectively, to bolster national security and identity vis-à-vis India. In contrast, India adopted a policy of nonalignment to avoid the superpower rivalry and concentrate scarce resources on modernization and development for the well-being of its people. New Delhi and Islamabad focused on achieving their own security and development rather than addressing common geopolitical and geostrategic issues or trying to implement a subregional security system.

During the Cold War, the United States provided massive military assistance to Islamabad to help maintain the balance of power between India and Pakistan (India being by far the larger), triggering a regional arms race in the process. India gradually came to favor the USSR, becoming its chief arms buyer. India also signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR in August 1971, to ward off Chinese or U.S. adventurism during its 1971 war with

Pakistan. The war proved costliest to Pakistan, which lost East Pakistan, the latter becoming Bangladesh. India's overt hand in the emergence of Bangladesh as a separate nation hardened Pakistani enmity.

Simla Agreement

After Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war and the surrender of its armed forces before the Indian army in Dhaka, the new capital of Bangladesh, Pakistani president Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928–1979) and Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi (1917–1984) met at Simla in northern India to discuss postwar relations. On 2 July 1972 they signed the historic Simla Accord, under which both countries committed themselves to resolve disputes, including Kashmir, through peaceful bilateral negotiation without third-party intervention. They also agreed to respect the line of control (LoC) resulting from the cease-fire of 17 December 1971 and not to attempt to alter it unilaterally.

Post-Simla Developments

The Simla Accord helped prevent the outbreak of major conflict between two countries till 1999. Despite fluctuation in their bilateral relations, New Delhi and Islamabad agreed to begin composite and integrated dialogue on eight issues during talks held by their foreign secretaries in Islamabad in June 1997. Further talks in New Delhi in November 1998 dealt with contentious bilateral issues, including Kashmir. The improvement in relations picked up momentum when the new Indian prime minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee (b. 1926), undertook a bus journey to Lahore in February 1999. He signed the Lahore Declaration



In February 2000, Indians protest what they claim is Pakistan's support for terrorism against India. (AFP/CORBIS)



UPDATE: INDIA–PAKISTAN RELATIONS WORSEN AT END OF 2001

At the close of 2001 India–Pakistan relations worsened considerably following a suicide attack on the Indian Parliament that left five terrorists and nine Indians dead. India blamed the bombing on the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, two Muslim fundamentalist groups in Pakistan that support Pakistan's claims to Kashmir. Senior Indian officials also claimed that the Pakistan government supported the attack and has long supported terrorism aimed at India. India also rejected Pakistan's offers to jointly investigate the attack and denied government involvement.

Source: Celia A. Dugger. (2001) "India Raises the Pitch in Criticism of Pakistan." *The New York Times* (18 December): A14.

with his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif (b. 1949), and they resolved to settle bilateral disputes in a friendly and peaceful manner. But the Lahore spirit quickly dissipated following the May 1999 Kargil conflict in Indian territory in the Kashmir Valley. In October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf (b. 1943) took power in Pakistan in a bloodless coup. In 2002, the United States acted as a third party to encourage dialogue between the two countries. The Vajpayee government has made it clear that it will not legitimize Pakistan's military regime.

The Nuclear Dimension

Ever since India detonated its first nuclear device in May 1974, the nuclear issue has increased the tension between New Delhi and Islamabad. In reaction to the Indian nuclear test, President Bhutto called for Pakistan to make nuclear weapons even if it had to "eat grass" to make it possible. His determination was pursued by his successors, enabling Pakistan to attain nuclear parity with India in May 1998. The United States and Japan imposed economic sanctions on India and Pakistan, refusing to lift them unless India and Pakistan sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but India and Pakistan are proceeding with missile upgrading programs. The Indian government has emphasized that unless China stops transferring sophisticated weapons, nuclear technology, and missiles to Pakistan, nuclear restraint in the region will

remain impossible. From an Indian perspective, China remains a critical factor in the India–Pakistan relationship, a view not shared by Pakistan.

Given the nuclear threat, especially in view of the unresolved Kashmir problem, India and Pakistan need to undertake a series of confidence-building measures, such as entering into arms control and no-first-use agreements, improving nuclear command-and-control systems, and undertaking risk-reduction measures. In the interest of long-term regional peace and stability, Pakistan should stop cross-border terrorism. It is equally important to encourage friendly relations by enhancing contact between the citizens of the two nations, contact that will, one hopes, reduce mutual mistrust and build friendly and harmonious relations between the former enemies.

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INDIA–SOUTHEAST ASIA RELATIONS

India had close cultural interaction with Southeast Asia from prehistoric times. In modern times there were vicissitudes in the relations, but India is striving to become a major player in the regional economy and politics.

Ancient and Medieval Periods

In the gamut of Indo-Southeast Asian relations, both Indians and Southeast Asians played an active role. In prehistoric times a land route crossed north-eastern India to Burma, China, and Thailand. Apart from movements of people and racial and linguistic affinity, trading relations also united India and



MY SON SANCTUARY

The My Son Sanctuary, a UNESCO World Heritage Site since 1999, was the capital of the Champa Kingdom, a Hindu kingdom located on what is now the coast of Vietnam. It elegantly demonstrates a common phenomenon in Asia—the blending of seemingly divergent cultures.

Southeast Asia. Archaeological excavations produced evidence of trade between the two regions in the form of shared objects of material culture.

In the Common Era trade increased with intensified sea-borne commerce. Along with traders, Brahmans or priests from India traveled to Southeast Asia and acquainted the local elite with Indian rituals, scriptures, and literature. The Brahmans became counselors in court affairs and legitimized the position of rulers by giving them an investiture ceremony and a genealogical list. Indian elements like Sanskrit language, Hindu-Buddhist cults, *Dharmasastras* (treatises dealing with statecraft and administration), and the concept of royalty became essential features of the early states of Southeast Asia.

The common people in Southeast Asia were influenced by stories from the *Mahabharata* and *Ramayana*. Indian religion and deities became popular, and Indian culture diffused throughout the indigenous societies of Southeast Asia, whose cultures were open to foreign elements.

The "Indianized" states of Southeast Asia persisted until medieval times, when the arrival of Islam in the latter part of the thirteenth century changed the situation. From Gujarat and the Coromandel coast (whose contact with Southeast Asia preceded the coming of Islam), traders responsible for the spice and pepper trade in the Mediterranean visited the region and helped to spread Islam by establishing Muslim settlements. Islam as brought to Southeast Asia by Indian Muslims differed from the orthodox Islam of Arabia. The Southeast Asians preserved some Hindu-Buddhist characteristics acquired by their contact with India, and there was no break with the pre-Islamic past.

Modern Period

In the nineteenth century Indian immigrants moved to the British colonies of Malaya, Singapore, and Burma (present-day Myanmar) to work on rubber, cof-

fee, and tea plantations as indentured laborers. Indian textile merchants and moneylenders also appeared in the French colony of Indochina. These immigrants were seen as advancing the interests of colonial masters, and a feeling of antipathy developed toward them. The Indian independence movement stimulated anti-colonial struggles in Southeast Asia. Indian personalities like Mohandas K. Gandhi (called Mahatma; 1869–1948) and Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) were much admired by Southeast Asian leaders like Sukarno of Indonesia (1901–1970), Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia (b. 1932), Aung San of Burma (1914?–1947), and Ho Chi Minh of Vietnam (1890–1969). In the framework of the freedom struggle, Indian leaders mooted the concept of "Asianism" and called on formation of a common Asian identity to oppose the West.

After independence India pursued a dynamic policy toward Southeast Asia. Acting as intermediary, India contributed to lessening tensions by hosting conferences like the Asian Relations Conference in 1947 and the Conference on Indonesia in 1949. The Bandung Conference (1955) was the high-water mark in Indian diplomacy. The prime minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), architect of basic principles of Indian foreign policy like anticolonialism and nonalignment, believed that India could play a meaningful role in the Cold War period.

However Indian relations with Southeast Asian countries lost momentum after India's humiliating defeat in the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. Closeness with the then Soviet Union resulted in the Friendship Treaty of 1971, and an inward-looking economy and deep commitment to the cause of Arabs resulted in neglect of Southeast Asia. India was viewed with suspicion after its 1974 nuclear tests. Its wholehearted support of the Indochinese Communists in the Vietnamese conflict caused other Southeast Asian countries to stand aloof. The end of the Cold War, the onset of a liberalization process, and economic imperatives improved India–Southeast Asia relations during the 1990s.

Contemporary Indian–Southeast Asian Relations

Free from ideological rhetoric and the Cold War phantom, India moved closer to Southeast Asia. The Indian prime minister visited Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, and Malaysia in the first half of the 1990s, and Southeast Asian leaders paid reciprocal visits. India became a full dialogue partner of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in December 1995 at the fifth ASEAN summit in Bangkok. India's eastward-looking policy as well as security considerations made India a member of the ASEAN organization of security concerns, the Asian

Regional Forum. There were joint naval exercises and defense cooperation.

India also tried to improve bilateral ties and increase trade with Southeast Asia. Indian companies invested in Southeast Asia, and India invited capital from the region. Whereas India's exports and imports with ASEAN in 1993–1994 were \$1.676 billion and \$1.102 billion, respectively, these increased to \$2.201 billion and \$4.949 billion, respectively, in 1999–2000. Although the trade balance is presently tilted in favor of ASEAN, military cooperation and the January 2001 agreement for cooperation in education and information technology will redress the balance to an extent.

India also took the initiative in multilateral cooperation apart from ASEAN. The Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand Economic Cooperation, or BIMSTEC, aims at close cooperation among member countries. The Mekong–Ganga Cooperation, an Indian initiative, was floated in November 2000 in Vientiane for better understanding among member countries (Cambodia, India, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam). Promotion of tourism, development of transport networks, and educational and cultural cooperation are items on the agenda.

India's size, population, ancient cultural relations, and its emigrant population in Southeast Asia, as well as its industrial base, military strength, and scientific and technical capacity make it a major force in Southeast Asia. It is likely to continue to play a dominant role in the region as the twenty-first century unfolds.

Patit Paban Mishra

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INDIA–SRI LANKA RELATIONS Sri Lanka (Ceylon until 1972), with its mixture of Buddhist and Hindu institutions, has always been Indian in culture, though its identity is distinct from its northern neighbor's. The Sinhalese language occurs only in Sri Lanka and has a distinguished literary tradition. Likewise, Theravada Buddhism remained the religion of the island, while Hinduism displaced it on the subcontinent.

From the third century BCE, Ceylon was involved in the politics of southern India for more than a millennium. Beginning in 177 BCE, it faced a succession of invaders from southern India and itself invaded mainland kingdoms as political alliances shifted, until they finally broke down in the twelfth century. In the fourteenth century, the Sinhalese kingdom moved near the coast, where the rulers, originally southern Indian traders, founded the Kotte Kingdom (1415–1580). Merchant communities moved back and forth between Ceylon and the mainland. These included Chettiar traders and bankers who traveled throughout South and Southeast Asia. Muslims came for trade and on pilgrimage to what they believe is the footprint of Adam on a mountain still called Adam's Peak.

European colonial rule (1517–1948) restrained relations between Ceylon and India. The British East India Company briefly united Ceylon with India, but in 1802 the British removed it from company control and ruled it directly as a Crown Colony. The governments of the two colonies were separate at the level of the British Parliament, sometimes leading to disagreements on trade, labor migration, navigation, and transport.

People of Indian Origin

During British colonial rule, Indians and Ceylonese were British subjects, and many Indians migrated to the island to work on plantations. Administrative separation and the British compulsion to classify their subjects, however, discouraged assimilation. Earlier migrants, such as the *karava* and *salagama* castes, who arrived before the colonial era, became fully Sinhalese; but during British rule communities of Indian origin were considered "Indian" even after generations on the island.

With British support, Chettiars eventually dominated domestic finance in Ceylon. They traded between India and Ceylon and were intermediaries between British bankers and Ceylonese clients, both as guarantors for borrowers, and as moneylenders who borrowed money from banks for relending at high interest. Since many Chettiars retained their Indian identity, their role occasioned anti-Indian animosity on the part of Ceylonese traders and planters.

Plantation workers were and are primarily of southern Indian origin. The resident labor population grew as coffee, tea, and then rubber plantations advanced across central and southwestern Ceylon. The Indian government could not insist on the protection that indentured migrants had elsewhere because they could not control emigration, due to the proximity of the

island. The Indian Emigration Act No. 7 of 1922 demanded reformed treatment of Indian immigrants on threat of prohibiting emigration altogether, a threat finally enforced in August 1939. Indian intervention resulted in improved wages, educational opportunities, housing, and health services for plantation laborers.

Tamil immigrants sought employment in other occupations in Ceylon, often in menial, low-wage occupations. Recent Indian immigrants made up about one-sixth of the population in the 1920s and 1930s—a serious concern for the indigenous population, and a matter of legitimate national interest for India. When the Great Depression struck, Sinhalese politicians condemned merchants, moneylenders, and laborers of Indian origin.

Under the Sinhalese-dominated State Council (1931–1946), voting rights of people of Indian origin were restricted. Jawaharlal Nehru (India's first prime



India has served as a temporary home for Tamil refugees fleeing the ethnic fighting in Sri Lanka. Here, a Sri Lankan Tamil family stands with their belongings on Manar Island, Sri Lanka, after their return from India. (HOWARD DAVIES/CORBIS)

minister) and D. S. Senanayake (prime minister of Ceylon, 1947–1952) met fruitlessly several times in the 1940s to settle the question of their citizenship. Ceylon finally passed three citizenship and franchise acts that effectively made people of Indian origin stateless. As recently as November 1964, only 140,185 people who had applied for citizenship by registration were granted it, while 975,000 remained stateless. That year India and Ceylon negotiated the Sirima-Shastri Pact, under which Ceylon agreed to grant citizenship to 300,000 people (later raised to 375,000) and their progeny. More than 630,000 applied, but when the pact expired in October 1981, only 162,000 people of Indian origin had been registered as Sri Lankan citizens. In the same period, 373,900 received Indian citizenship and 284,300 were repatriated to India. Legislation in the 1980s finally granted citizenship to the remainder.

Civil War

India has been active in several ways in the ethnic conflict ravaging Sri Lanka. India's responses were influenced by its own Tamil separatist movement, which waned in the 1960s, and its position after the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war as the most powerful South Asian state. After 1977, Sri Lanka abandoned neutralist foreign policy, becoming openly pro-Western when India was forging closer Soviet ties.

As violence against Tamils increased in Sri Lanka, militant separatists organized and trained in Tamil Nadu in southern India, possibly with Indian support. When civil war erupted in July 1983, more than 100,000 refugees from northern Sri Lanka fled to India. These events, and increased violence by security forces against Sri Lankan Tamils, made the crisis the major political issue in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu.

Mediation by India's central government began after July 1983, and Indian-facilitated proposals to resolve the conflict were presented to an All Party Conference that met fruitlessly throughout 1984. President Jayawardene of Sri Lanka and India's prime minister Rajiv Gandhi met in early June 1985, and the Sri Lankan government and Tamil organizations held peace talks in August at Thimpu in Bhutan, but these efforts failed too. In late 1986 talks were held in Delhi, which arrived at a proposal for devolution of power that would allow considerable autonomy at the provincial level.

After severe fighting in Jaffna in April and May 1987, India intervened directly. India wanted neither Sinhalese hegemony over the Tamil minority (unacceptable to Indian Tamils) nor the establishment of a separate state (which would encourage secessionist

movements among India's Tamil population). An agreement between the governments of Sri Lanka and India "to establish peace and normalcy in Sri Lanka" was signed on 29 July 1987. To ensure implementation, India stationed more than 60,000 troops in the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka as the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF).

By October 1987, the IPKF was waging all-out war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). IPKF maintained order in parts of northern Sri Lanka and helped conduct elections in 1988 and 1989, but withdrew in March 1990 after more than 1,200 soldiers had died. On 21 May 1991, an LTTE suicide bomber assassinated Rajiv Gandhi, who as prime minister had negotiated the peace agreement. India banned the LTTE and has not intervened since, although it opposes creation of a separate Tamil state and has been asked by some Tamils to facilitate peace talks.

India and Sri Lanka signed a Free Trade Agreement in 1998 and were working to eliminate trade restrictions in early 2000. Both nations are active in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which was established in 1985 and also includes Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal, and Pakistan. Tensions between India and Pakistan have impeded progress toward multinational cooperation, however, and the November 1999 summit was postponed indefinitely because of India's protest of the military coup in Pakistan.

Patrick Peebles

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INDIA-UNITED KINGDOM RELATIONS

Relations between India and Britain (the United Kingdom was not formed until 1801) date from the founding of the East India Company in 1600, but relations between the two as sovereign nations did not begin until India became independent in 1947. Indian independence marked the beginning of a new relationship

based on trade and cultural exchange. Today, the Indian diaspora and private business form strong links between India and the United Kingdom.

Economic Relations

The United Kingdom emerged from the World War II pessimistic as to the political and economic worth of her South Asian colonies. Disengagement of private British capital from India began in the 1930s, and India's importance as a buyer of British goods or as a destination for British investment was generally in decline in the interwar period—an effect of the worldwide Great Depression. When independence came in 1947, these processes of decolonization had already made India of little value as a business partner and too costly to maintain. Trade and investment ties between India and the United Kingdom grew still weaker in the decades that followed independence. India's external transactions shifted from the United Kingdom to the United States, Germany, the USSR, and Japan. In 1947 the United Kingdom was by far the most important supplier of machinery and intermediate goods to India; after independence, other industrial countries gradually displaced it. For its part, the British external sector was integrating more closely with Europe, and tended to disengage itself from the former colonies. The early 1990s saw some slight reintegration, however, as India's trade with the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe collapsed. The United Kingdom was among the four largest markets for India in the 1990s, and if oil imports are excluded, among its four largest sources of imports.

Economic ties have strengthened in other ways as well. The 1960s saw large-scale migration of labor to the United Kingdom from its colonies and former colonies, chiefly the West Indies and South Asia. Acute industrial labor shortages created the demand; colonial roots shaped the sources of supply. The United Kingdom was quickly becoming truly multiracial.

Political Relations

Immigration controls were halfhearted and partially effective, though they became increasingly stringent from 1973. Twenty years later, when migration from Europe had been made considerably easier than migration from the former colonies, the United Kingdom's economic realignment away from its former colonies was complete.

The United Kingdom's influence on India's international relations has declined since India's independence. Formally, this influence can be exercised through the Commonwealth of Nations, an association



HOLDING ON TO INDIA

The following statement by British Lord Linlithgow on the future of Indo-British relations was made on 18 June 1934 and published in the Report of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform (Session 1933–34). It reflects the British position of retaining control of India while affording Indians more political power.

There are moments in the affairs of nations when a way is opened for the removal of long-standing differences and misunderstandings and for the establishment between people and people of new relations more in harmony with the circumstances of the time than those which they replace. Adjustments of this order, when they involve a transference of political power, must inevitably provide a sharp test of national character; and the instinct for the time and manner of the change is the sure mark of political sagacity and experience. If there are those to whom the majestic spectacle of an Indian Empire makes so powerful an appeal that every concession appears almost as a betrayal of a trust, we would ask them to look at the other side of the picture, different indeed in content, but not less charged with realities. India also has a right to be heard before judgment is pronounced; and her plea to be allowed the opportunity of applying principles and doctrines which we ourselves have taught cannot be met by a simple traverse or by a denial of her interest in the cause.

It has seemed to some that to permit India to control her own destiny is to sever the tie which unites her to the Crown and to the United Kingdom. Never could we contemplate the rupture of that beneficent and hon-

ourable association; but we believe that a union of partners may prove an even more enduring bond. We do not deny that the creation of an Indian Empire has profoundly affected the position of the United Kingdom and has magnified its influence in the affairs of the world; but we do not think that the selfish or vainglorious element predominates in the pride which this country takes in the work accomplished. The best of those who were and are responsible for it have ever regarded themselves as the servants of India and not merely as the agents of a foreign power; nor do we forget that it could not have been carried through without the cooperation of Indian hands. It has not needed our inquiry to remind us how great a place India fills in our own history. There is no part of His Majesty's Dominions with the same power to recall memories or to stir emotions, and none with so great a succession of warriors and administrators, by the story of whose achievements our hearts are still moved, as Sir Philip Sidney by the song of Percy and Douglas, more than with a trumpet. But the whole earth is the sepulchre of famous men, and those of whom we speak are now become a part no less of India than of English history. Their arduous and patient labours founded a new and mighty State; and it is upon the foundations which they have laid that, as we hope, people of India will find political contentment as well as scope for the free and orderly growth of national life.

Source: Jagdish Saran Sharma. (1965) *India's Struggle for Freedom: Select Documents and Sources*. Vol. II. Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 219–220.

of the United Kingdom and her former colonies. London had initially hoped that creating this association would mitigate the effects of the partition of India in 1947, and keep South Asia from veering towards Communism. However, the Commonwealth has never succeeded as an effective agent of political mediation within South Asia, though it has periodically played an important role in matters of South Asian collaboration. Its potential role as an agent of dispute settle-

ment within South Asia has been eroded by several circumstances.

First, external mediation was resisted or failed in the two most critical disputes that beleaguer South Asia, namely, Kashmir and the citizenship of Sri Lankan Tamils. Second, the influence of the Soviet Union, the United States, and China on South Asian affairs steadily increased in the course of the Cold War. After 1970,

India's defense policy shifted toward the Soviet Union, partly in response to Pakistan's relations with the United States and China, and partly as an extension of stronger socialist leanings in economic ideology. The United Kingdom's membership in NATO also distanced her from India in its Cold War alignments.

The Commonwealth itself was weakened by several developments. As more Commonwealth members gained independence, the United Kingdom's informal leadership of the body, and consequently British foreign policy interests in Commonwealth affairs, tended to weaken. The United Nations and the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) became more effective, or at any rate competing, bodies for negotiation and dispute resolution. Finally, European integration and immigration controls weakened the relative importance for the United Kingdom of the poorer nations in the Commonwealth as partners in trade, investment, and labor exchange.

Despite these developments and a few points of difference in political interests and perspectives, Indo-U.K. relations have generally been cordial. The end of the Cold War and the retreat from socialist sentiments in India in the 1990s removed some of the old irritants. Though these developments also mildly revived trade and investment between the two countries, a clear realignment has yet to emerge. The United Kingdom and the Commonwealth continue to be of marginal importance in internal South Asian affairs.

Cultural ties between India and the United Kingdom, however, continue to grow. The presence in the United Kingdom of well over a million people of South Asian origin is the most important factor sustaining such exchanges. This population is now highly differentiated, though its constituent segments or communities display common patterns in how they have adapted their Indian heritage to their new home. This process of transplantation and transformation is now the subject of a large and growing body of scholarly and creative literature, of which travel, mixed identities, displacement, and nostalgia are major themes.

Tirthankar Roy

See also: Anglo-Indians; British East India Company; British Indian Empire; Immigration from South Asia; Westernization in South Asia

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INDIA–UNITED STATES RELATIONS

Relations between the United States and India since India's independence have been decidedly mixed: a former American diplomat called the countries "estranged democracies"; an Indian scholar described them as "unfriendly friends"; and one book on the relationship is subtitled *The Cold Peace*. Why have ties between the two been so fraught with tensions? Different national, regional, and global priorities, reflecting the countries' different histories, geographies, resources, societies, and cultures, explain their problematic relations.

Such differences are not unusual, and India and the United States have good relations with other countries despite such differences. They are problematic for United States–India relations because, ironically, of similarities between the two countries, such as democratic political systems, a free press, a shared language (English), and self-perception of unique importance in the world. Because India and the United States share attributes, there are expectations that they will get along; when they do not, there is puzzlement. Also, the fact that the two countries can express, and understand, their differences through public dialogue means that disputes are aired openly and passionately, with negative consequences for the relationship. Balancing unrealistic expectations against what is possible given differing priorities is a fundamental challenge for United States–India relations.

Importance of India–United States Relations

India–United States relations are important for many reasons. First, because these countries are the two largest democracies in the world, there is the expectation they share values and interests. Some argue that democracies make better and more peaceful partners in trade and diplomacy; the example of India–United States relations may be used to confirm or refute this, and the record so far is problematic. Second, since the United States is the world's strongest power, while India, though the largest democracy, is largely poor and weak, their relations highlight the challenges facing relations between developing and industrialized countries. Third, many critical issues confronting the world—including the United States—in the twenty-first century involve India. Nearly one-sixth of humanity lives in India. So whether in fighting poverty, preventing nuclear conflict, managing population growth, limiting environmental damage, or stopping drug trafficking or AIDS, relations with India figure prominently. Finally, there are immediate, concrete reasons why Indian–United States relations matter, including the presence in the United States of many



CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENTS

A shared commitment to democracy is reflected in the preambles to the United States and Indian constitutions:

From the Constitution of the United States:

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

From the Constitution of India:

We, the People of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic and to secure to all its citizens:

JUSTICE, social, economic and political;

LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship;

EQUALITY of status and of opportunity;

And to promote among them all

FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation

In Our Constituent Assembly this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, do Hereby Adopt, Enact and Give to Ourselves this Constitution.

Source: "International Constitutional Law." Retrieved 24 April 2002, from: <http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law>.

politically active Americans of Indian origin, increasing business opportunities in India, and India's growing role in Asia—a role made more critical by India's increased emphasis on political and military engagement and nuclear-weapons capability.

Recurring Issues in India–United States Relations

Four general issues that dominated relations between the two nations from India's independence to the end of the twentieth century are likely to continue to be important. First and foremost is India's neighbor Pakistan. The end of British rule led to the creation of two hostile states, India and Pakistan, which immediately fought over an area they both claimed, Kashmir. Indians believe the United States initially sided with Pakistan in the Kashmir dispute. Much

worse in Indian eyes, in 1954 the United States signed a security agreement with Pakistan to involve it in U.S. Cold War efforts to "contain" Communism. India, concerned about Pakistan, perceived the rapprochement as a direct threat and an effort to counterbalance India's superior power and resources. The first Indian prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), argued that United States–Pakistan relations would spur an arms race in the subcontinent. The next four decades saw other periods of close United States–Pakistan military and political cooperation, but in recent years India and the United States have striven to cooperate despite differences regarding Pakistan.

A second major issue involves nuclear weapons. In 1968, the United States was instrumental in negotiating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India refused to sign, complaining that it allowed five

states (the United States, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the USSR) to possess nuclear weapons legally, while other countries were barred from possessing them. India claimed this was discriminatory, calling instead for global abolition of nuclear weapons. In 1974, however, India tested a nuclear device; again in 1998 India conducted five nuclear explosions and declared itself a nuclear-weapons state. The India–United States dispute over nuclear weapons now focuses less on the NPT and more on recent U.S. requests that India sign a treaty banning further tests, negotiate to ban production of materials for nuclear weapons, ensure that India’s nuclear technology is not exported, and restrict development of ballistic missiles. The United States and India have yet to bridge their differences regarding India’s nuclear and missile programs.

A third important issue concerns aid, trade, and investment. The United States was a major bilateral and multilateral donor to India for the first three decades of their relations, and this sometimes produced friction. India often perceived political strings to be attached to the aid, while the United States complained of a lack of gratitude for and poor utilization of the aid. More seriously, until the early 1990s India had a highly regulated, inward-looking economy, and U.S. businesses had few opportunities for trade with or investment in India. Since India launched economic reforms in 1991, the situation has changed somewhat. The United States and India have expanded trade and investment, though economic interchange falls short of its potential and is considerably less than U.S. trade with and investment in China or some Southeast Asian nations. The opening of India’s economy and the development of its information-technology sector may provide the basis for a significant expansion of economic and technological cooperation. However, given the differing economic needs and power of the countries, there are still important disagreements regarding global trade rules and other issues bearing on economic relations.

A final contentious area is security and defense cooperation, which has been extremely limited. United States–Pakistan military relations meant India was not keen on dealing with the United States, and that the United States did not want to upset Pakistan by transferring certain military items to India. Until the early 1970s, India’s nonalignment policy also made it unwilling to enter into military relations with other countries. Following the establishment of close Indo-Soviet relations in 1971, the USSR became India’s principal military supplier, angering the United States, which was still involved in the Cold War. India and the United States also share few common security and strategic out-

looks that could form the basis for cooperation. India showed itself a poor counterbalance to China when it was involved in the 1962 Sino-Indian border war. India has also seen the costs and conditions attached to the U.S. transfer of weapons systems as excessive. But the end of the Cold War, changing United States–Pakistan relations, the collapse of the Soviet Union, growing Chinese power, and general improvement in India–United States relations may bring better, if still limited, prospects for defense cooperation.

United States–India relations were clearly mixed over the first five decades of Indian independence. But international changes in the 1990s, particularly in Asia, and shifts in India’s economic and foreign policies may yet provide the basis for warmer, more substantial relations. In 2001, the United States took on a peace-keeper role vis-à-vis India and Pakistan as both nations amassed forces on the border in response to Muslim terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament and Indian charges that Pakistan supported the terrorist activities.

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INDIAN OCEAN The Indian Ocean, with an area of 75 million square kilometers, is the smallest of the three oceans bounded by Africa, Asia, Australia, and the Antarctic. Nevertheless occupying a huge area, the Indian Ocean extends over some 10,000 kilometers from South Asia to the Antarctic on the one side, and from South Africa to Tasmania on the other. The Indian Ocean accommodates 15 percent of the earth’s total surface and occupies 21 percent of all ocean surfaces. While the mean depth is around 3,900 meters, its maximum depth is 7,125 meters (Java Trench). The seabed of the Indian Ocean is rather complex, with a multifold topography that includes huge basins as well as large ridges.

The vast area of the Indian Ocean is commonly divided into various sectors. The Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal are the major seas that bound the Indian peninsula, while the Lakshadweep and Andaman



Sri Lankan fishermen fishing from stilts in the Indian Ocean in 2000. (KEREN SU/CORBIS)

Seas are the minor seas around the homonymous Lakshadweep and Andaman Islands; the latter are further extended by the Nicobar Islands. The Arabian Sea is straddled by two important branches, the Gulf of Oman (elongated by the Persian Gulf) and the Gulf of Aden, which extends into the Red Sea. In 1869 the Red Sea was connected with the Mediterranean Sea by the gigantic Suez Canal, opening a new era of sea trade between Europe and Asia. The Suez Canal is still the leading shipping route between the two continents. Along its southern region the Indian Ocean is commonly called the Indian South Polar Sea, except for the Great Australian Bight that bounds South Australia. For the big islands lying opposite continental land masses, such as Madagascar, Sri Lanka, and Sumatra, the Mozambique Channel, Palk Strait, and Strait of Malacca, respectively, serve as connecting seas.

The Indian Ocean accommodates many isolated islands and island groups without hosting large island archipelagos. Apart from Madagascar and Sri Lanka, large island nations, a few small island groups are of importance, some of which have nowadays become tourist destinations. Comparably big island groups include the Comoros, Amirante, Seychelles, and Mascarene Islands (including Mauritius and Réunion), the Lakshadweep, Andaman, and Nicobar Islands as well as the Maldives, Chagos Archipelago, New Amsterdam, Saint Paul, the Kerguelles, Heard, Marion, Prince Edward, Crozet, Christmas, and Cocos Islands, all dispersed across the vast Indian Ocean.

Politically the various islands and island groups are independent small island nations or still belong to other countries. In the past all the islands were colonial outposts of various European powers, as their old colonial names still underline; they gained independence only after the Second World War (and sometimes decades later).

The Indian Ocean is divided by the equator in its northern part, and most of it is located south of the equator. As a result the climate incorporates (from north to south) the monsoon, the passates or the major air current also known as the tropical easterlies (south of the equator), and the temperate climates under the westerlies (farther south). Characteristic of all climate zones is the oceanic impact that weakens the temperature contrasts between the seasons. By nature the Indian Ocean and bounding coastal land surfaces rarely have tropical cyclones or storms, except for the Bay of Bengal and Mascarene Islands, which are irregularly visited by cyclones.

Since early times the northern Indian Ocean was heavily traveled between Arabia and India by Arabian seafarers who sailed with the seasonal monsoon winds. While in ancient times Egyptians, Arabs, and Chinese traveled the Indian Ocean, the European colonial discovery of the Indian Ocean occurred only in 1497, with the legendary expedition by Vasco da Gama, who first rounded the Cape of Good Hope to cross the Indian Ocean toward India. Traditionally the

countries bordering the northern Indian Ocean, such as Arabia, India, and the countries of Southeast Asia, were best known to the foreign sailors and merchants because of their spices, gems, gold, ivory, and other rare goods. Only since the colonial age commencing with the sixteenth century did a regular trade develop across the Indian Ocean between Europe and Asia. In modern times air travel has absorbed much of the commerce between Europe and the countries around the Indian Ocean.

Fishing is a traditional practice on the lands bordering the Indian Ocean. Nowadays, however, oil and gas are heavily exploited, and offshore wells represent valuable resources, mostly in the Persian Gulf nations of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the emirates of Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain.

Though most islands in the Indian Ocean are uninhabited, some are heavily populated, even seriously overpopulated, by native peoples. The mostly poor living conditions are based on marginal subsistence agriculture. Having limited resources for development, some islands and island groups benefit from tourism as a profitable industry; these include Mauritius and Réunion, Comoros and Seychelles, and the Maldives. All such islands are favored destinations, mostly for European tourists, who are attracted by the "exoticness," the tropical climate and sandy beaches, and superb diving conditions (in case of the Maldives, due to their nature as coral islands).

Life on all the small islands in the Indian Ocean may have a hazardous future, due to the impact of global warming, which will lead to rapidly shrinking island surfaces and result in coasts flooded and life conditions worsened by the impact of increasing hurricanes and typhoons in the region. Many instances of serious coastal erosion processes have already occurred on the islands in recent times. The Maldives are worst afflicted because most of the land surfaces of all 1,200 small islands are not higher than half a meter above sea level. If critical predictions of a sea level rise of 50 to 100 centimeters are borne out during this century, disastrous results must be expected for many millions of coastal inhabitants in South Asia, mostly in India and Bangladesh.

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INDIAN SUBCONTINENT (2001 pop. 1.4 billion). "Indian subcontinent" geographically refers to the area covering the southern section of Asia (often called South Asia), but not the Southeast Asian mainland. It comprises the vast peninsula bounded on the north by the Himalayan Ranges and projecting as a triangle in the south far into the Indian Ocean, with the Bay of Bengal lying to the east and the Arabian Sea to the west. The area is divided between five major nation-states, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, and includes as well the two small nations of Bhutan and the Maldives Republic. The total area can be estimated at 4.4 million square kilometers, or exactly 10 percent of the land surface of Asia. The latitudinal range is between the equator and 37°N, thus embracing various environments from desert to mountain, from dry plateau to humid rain forest. In 2000, the total population was about 22 percent of the world's population and 34 percent of the population of Asia. Life expectancy was then in the range of 55 to 64 years throughout most of the subcontinent.

Paul Hockings

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INDIGO An important blue dyestuff, until about 1900 indigo was obtained entirely from the plants of the genera *Indigofera* and *Isatis* but is now manufactured synthetically. Indigo plants are stiff-stemmed shrubs with pinnately compound leaves and small, reddish or reddish-yellow flowers.

The growing of indigo plants for dye was widespread, from the East Indies to the New World, although the plant originally came from India. In the sixteenth century, indigo was brought to Europe from India by Dutch, Portuguese, and English traders. During the early years of British occupation of India, natural indigo was a major export. In 1883, a German scientist, Adolf von Baeyer, elucidated its chemical structure, and indigo then was synthesized commercially.

In addition to being used as a dye, the plant has several medicinal uses. It is a stimulant, alterative (a medicine that, taken over a course of time, gradually restores health), and purgative, and also is an antiseptic and astringent. It is used particularly in the treatment of the enlargement of the liver and spleen, epilepsy, and nervous afflictions. Leaves of indigo are used in treating whooping cough, lung diseases, and kidney complaints

such as dropsy. The synthetic indigo dye is used for dyeing and printing cotton and rayon and as a pigment in paints, lacquers, and printing inks.

Sanjukta Das Gupta

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INDO-ARYAN LANGUAGES Indo-Aryan (IA) languages constitute one of the largest groups of related languages in the world, spoken by close to a billion speakers in India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. Due to migration, Indo-Aryan languages are also spoken in Fiji, Mauritius, Guyana, Trinidad, and South Africa, as well as in Britain, Canada, and the United States. Moreover there are inscriptions in Indo-Aryan languages (Sanskrit and Pali) not only on the Indian subcontinent proper and in Sri Lanka but in other areas, such as Uzbekistan and the nearby central Asian republics, Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and China; some records from around the first or second century CE have been found in Egypt.

The 1991 census of India registers native speakers of the IA languages included in the eighth schedule of the Indian constitution as follows: Asamiya (Assamese): 12,962,721; Bangla (Bengali): 69,595,738; Gujarati: 40,335,889; Hindi: 337, 272,114; Konkani: 1,760,607; Marathi: 62,481,681; Nepali: 2,076,645; Oriya: 28,061,313; Panjabi: 23,085,063; Sanskrit: 49,773; Sindhi: 1,551,384; Urdu: 43,358,978.

Census data for Kashmiri are not available for 1991; the most recent earlier count (1981) showed 33,845 speakers. (Four million is a reasonable estimate of the number of speakers, as of the early twenty-first century.) Bangla and Urdu are also the national languages of Bangladesh and Pakistan; according to the most recent estimates of speakers, there are respectively 107 million and 6,403,228. There is no accurate full count for Nepali, which is the national language of Nepal (an estimated 6 million). In addition Sinhala (Sinhalese) is an official language of Sri Lanka, with the most recent estimate being 18.5 million speakers.

Hindi is not only a co-official language of the republic of India but also a lingua franca in much of the subcontinent and a language of instruction throughout a large part of northern India, from the borders of West

Bengal to the Gujarat border. Moreover, the total count for Hindi includes speakers of languages with substantial numbers, such as Bhojpuri (23,102,050), Magahi (10,566,842), Maithili (7,766,597; concentrated in the state of Bihar), Chattisgarhi (10,595,199; in Madhya Pradesh), and various languages of Rajasthan. In all there are approximately 877 million speakers of IA languages on the subcontinent, accounting for 78.7 percent of the population. The Dravidian, Munda, and Tibeto-Burman families account for the rest.

The precise subgrouping of modern IA languages on the subcontinent has not been settled, although there are certain fairly well-defined groups. For example languages of the east, in particular Asamiya, Bangla, and Oriya, form a group characterized by features that set it apart from Hindi and other languages of the midlands; these eastern languages lack a construction called "ergative" and do not have lexical gender distinctions for nouns.

Historical Background

The history of Indo-Aryan falls into three major stages: Old, Middle, and New (or modern) Indo-Aryan. These are divisions according to linguistic characteristics only; there is evidence that languages with characteristics of one stage of development coexisted with those of earlier stages. In earliest Old Indo-Aryan (OIA) some forms have Middle Indic characteristics.

Old Indo-Aryan is represented principally by literary documents in Sanskrit (*samskṛta*—refined, adorned, purified), which is also used in inscriptions, the earliest from the first century CE. The oldest stage is attested in texts of the four Vedas. The oldest of these is the Rgveda (possibly third millennium BCE); the other Vedas are the Samaveda, Yajurveda, and Atharvaveda. There is a large body of literature, including dramas and poetry such as those composed by the poet and dramatist Kalidasa and the epics *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata*, didactic works such as the *Pancatantra* and *Hitopadesa*, and treatises on logic, medicine, and mathematics. One of the most sophisticated grammars ever produced is the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of *Pāṇini* (sixth–fifth centuries BCE), describing the OIA speech of his native area (the northwest subcontinent) as well as characteristics of earlier Vedic usage. Sanskrit is not restricted to Hindu works; Buddhist and Jain scholars used Sanskrit in original texts and commentaries. Even today Sanskrit remains a vehicle for original literature as well as technical works such as modern commentaries, and periodicals are published in Sanskrit. The language is officially recognized in the eighth schedule of the Indian constitution and is

used in daily newscasts on All India Radio. Moreover speakers report Sanskrit as their mother tongue in the census of India, and due to factors that are not yet clear, the number of speakers has increased in recent years: 2,212 and 6,106 for 1971 and 1981, respectively, and 49,736 for 1991.

Middle Indo-Aryan (MIA) languages are known from inscriptions, literary sources, and grammarians' descriptions. The earliest extant MIA documents are the inscriptions of Asoka (third century BCE), in various dialects according to areas of his empire, stretching from the extreme northwest (Shāhbazgarhī) to the south (modern Karnataka) and from the farthest reaches in the east (Kaliṅga, modern Orissa) to the west (Girnar, in modern Gujarat). Pali, the language of Theravada Buddhist works, also reflects an early MIA stage. Ardhamāgadhī is the language of the Jaina canon, and two other MIA varieties (Māhārāṣṭrī and Śaurasenī) also are used in Jaina works.

MIA languages and dialects other than Pali are known as *prākṛta* (a term opposed to *saṃskṛta*), which refers to a form of speech viewed as derived from an original source (*prakṛti*). Literary theoreticians of poetics and grammarians of Prakrits (generally composing in Sanskrit) usually consider the original in question to be Sanskrit. Another view, which is historically more justified, was also entertained—that the source of Prakrits was the unadorned speech of the people. These vernaculars varied according to region and were named accordingly. They were also associated with different groups in literary compositions. According to one division of literary usage, there are four major groups: Sanskrit, Prākṛit, Apabhraṃśa, and mixed.

New Indo-Aryan (NIA) languages, whose earliest documents date from approximately the twelfth century, include national languages, state languages in the republic of India, and languages spoken in restricted areas. The early stages of NIA were already vehicles for literary productions such as the Ramacaritamanasa of Tulsidas (1532–1623), in Avadhī, and modern languages have been the vehicles for literary works, including those of the great Bengali author and musician Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941).

Indo-Aryan is most closely affiliated with the Iranian language, with which it constitutes the Indo-Iranian subgroup of Indo-European languages. OIA and Old Iranian, represented by the Zoroastrian texts of the Avesta and the Achaemenid inscriptions in Old Persian, show phonological, grammatical, and lexical affinities that demonstrate their close affiliation. There is, in addition, a small group of languages, spoken in the Hindu Kush and subsumed under the name Nuris-

tani, whose affiliation has been the object of dispute. Most informed scholars hold that these languages represent either a distinct subgroup separate from IA and Iranian or a special area in IA that remained isolated after the main group of Indo-Aryan speakers moved south into the Punjab. The majority of informed scholars also accept that the Indo-Aryans migrated into the subcontinent. There are ongoing debates, however, concerning an alternative position: that the Indo-Aryans—and indeed the Indo-Europeans—originated on the subcontinent, from where they migrated to the Iranian territory and beyond. This controversy is connected with the interpretation of the documents of the Indus Valley civilization: Those who maintain that Indo-Aryans originated on the subcontinent view this culture, which they call the Indus-Sarasvati civilization, as Indo-Aryan. Literary and archaeological evidence is not decisive, but the linguistic evidence most plausibly supports the view that Indo-Aryans migrated into the subcontinent.

Characteristics of Indo-Aryan Languages

More than for any other group of Indo-European languages, IA inscriptional and literary evidence and descriptions by grammarians offer an extraordinarily rich picture of the earliest stages of the languages and their developments down to the present.

Phonology Two characteristic features set most IA languages apart from other Indo-European languages from very earliest times. IA languages have a contrast between unaspirated and aspirated plosives, not only in the voiceless sets (*k c t t p* versus *kh ch th th ph*, the latter with a strong puff of air), but also in the voiced sets (*g j ḍ d b* versus *gh jh ḍh dh bh*).

In addition they have a contrast between dental and retroflex consonants: dental *t th ḍ dh n s* versus retroflex *ṭ ṭh ḍ ḍh ṇ ṣ*. Dental consonants are produced with the tip of the tongue pressed against the roots of the upper teeth. A retroflex stop is produced by curling the tongue back and letting the top of the tongue make contact at the area just back of the ridge behind the upper teeth (the alveolar ridge); the retroflex *ṣ* has a similar position, but the air is allowed to escape in a continuous stream. The retroflex stops originally arose through particular developments involving inherited Indo-European terms, but their frequency and distribution doubtless increased under the influence of borrowing from other languages on the subcontinent.

MIA differs from OIA in several important respects. Two of the major differences are: 1) that in the course of historical development final consonants other than *-m* were lost; and 2) that MIA ceased to allow syllables

in which a long vowel was followed by more than one consonant. Due to subsequent developments, including the borrowing of Sanskrit words, modern Indo-Aryan has reintroduced word-final consonants and syllables of the type noted.

Grammar Old Indo-Aryan morphology and syntax were of the general type seen in other early Indo-European languages such as Greek or Latin. The nominal system (i.e., pertaining to nouns, pronouns, and adjectives) was of the inflectional type represented in these languages (e.g., Skt. *vāc-am*, *vāc-ā*; *vāc-au*, *vāg-bhāam*; *vāc-as*, *vāg-bhis*, in which a stem *vāc-/vāg-* "speech, voice" is followed by different accusative and instrumental singular, dual, and plural endings), with three numbers (singular, dual, plural) and seven syntactic cases in addition to a vocative. Nouns can have any of three genders (masculine, feminine, neuter). The pronominal system, including personal pronouns and demonstrative pronouns with three degrees of reference involving distance (e.g., nominative [nom.] singular [sg.] neuter [nt.] pronoun *idam* "this," *tad* "that," *adas* "that one yonder"), also has distinctive forms. The verb system is similar to but considerably richer than that of other ancient Indo-European languages. There is a contrast among six tense forms (present, aorist, imperfect, perfect, future, distant future), with several stem types for each, and five moods (indicative, imperative, subjunctive, optative, precativ), with different singular, dual, and plural forms. In addition a contrast between active and mediopassive forms applies throughout.

This system was considerably simplified in MIA, where case forms and stem types were reduced and the dual was eliminated. The nominal inflectional system was gradually replaced by a system involving nominals with postpositions (parallel to English prepositions). Modern languages too are predominantly of this kind, though they all show remnants of true case forms, especially in pronouns. The verbal system also gradually changed. Here again, the dual was given up. Moreover, mediopassive endings were eliminated, with the result that the contrast involving these came to depend on different stems. For example in Pali *chijja-ti* ("is cut"), the stem *chijja-* is followed by the ending *ti*, but in the Sanskrit passive *chid-ya-te*, the root *chid* is followed by the suffix *-ya-* and the mediopassive ending *te*. In addition, the various past tense forms were gradually reduced to the point that a single type, the aorist, according to Western terminology, came to predominate in early MIA. Moreover the aorist could now be formed from a present stem instead of a root, as in Old Indo-Aryan (e.g., the Pali passive aorist *chijj-im-su* "were cut down" represents a type that was not per-

missible earlier: *chijj-* of the present stem is followed by the third plural aorist ending). In the equivalent permissible OIA form *achit-s-ata*, the root *chid* (with augment *a*) is followed by the sigmatic aorist affix and the mediopassive ending *ata*. Later the single predominant finite past form also was eliminated, and past participles served as verb forms. For example where OIA could have either *agamat* (3d sg. aorist) "went, has gone," or its participial equivalent *gataḥ* (nom. sg. masc.), *gatā* (nom. sg. fem.), *gatam* (nom. sg. nt.), the participial type Pali *gato* (nom. sg. masc.), Pkt. *gao* came to be the norm.

In modern Indo-Aryan this continues to be the norm. In addition, the majority of modern languages have what is called a semiergative verb system, such that past forms of transitive verbs agree in number and gender with an object, as opposed to the agreement of such forms with subjects for intransitive verbs. The examples from Gujarati given below serve to illustrate. Numbers 1 and 2 have the third-person future form *āvśe* construed with the phrases *tamāro bbāī* and *tamārī baben*, in which the masculine and feminine possessive pronoun forms *tamāro* and *tamārī* are used with *bbāī* and *baben*. In numbers 3 and 4 the perfective verb forms *āvyo* (masc. sg.) and *āvī* agree in number and gender with the phrases *tamāro bbāī* and *tamārī baben*. Numbers 5 and 6 are like 1 and 2 except for the verb *kar-* "do" instead of *āv* "come." Numbers 7 and 8, on the other hand, differ from 3 and 4: the verb *karyuṃ* (nt. sg.) agrees here with the object *śuṃ* "what" instead of with the subject, and the phrases *tamārā bbāīte* and *tamārī babene* contain agentive forms with the postposition *-e*.

- | | | | | |
|----|----------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| 1. | <i>tamāro</i> | <i>bbāī</i> | <i>kyāre</i> | <i>āvśe</i> |
| | your | brother | when | will come |
| | "When will your brother arrive?" | | | |
| 2. | <i>tamārī</i> | <i>baben</i> | <i>kyāre</i> | <i>āvśe</i> |
| | your | sister | when | will come |
| | "When will your sister arrive?" | | | |
| 3. | <i>tamāro</i> | <i>bbāī</i> | <i>kyāre</i> | <i>āvyo</i> |
| | your | brother | when | came |
| | "When did your brother arrive?" | | | |
| 4. | <i>tamārī</i> | <i>baben</i> | <i>kyāre</i> | <i>āvī</i> |
| | your | sister | when | came |
| | "When did your sister arrive?" | | | |
| 5. | <i>tamāro</i> | <i>bbāī</i> | <i>śuṃ</i> | <i>karśe</i> |
| | your | brother | what | will do |
| | "What will your brother do?" | | | |
| 6. | <i>tamārī</i> | <i>baben</i> | <i>śuṃ</i> | <i>karśe</i> |
| | your | sister | what | will do |
| | "What will your sister do?" | | | |

7. *tamārā bhāte śum karyuṃ*
 your brother what did
 "What did your brother do?"
8. *tamārī bahene śum karyuṃ*
 your sister what did
 "What did your sister do?"

These examples also illustrate the neutral word order Subject-Object-Verb, which is prevalent in modern languages and was the norm for Indo-Aryan languages from earliest times.

Scripts

The earliest scripts used for Indo-Aryan languages are Brāhmī and Kharoṣṭhī, both used in inscriptions of Asoka, whose northwestern inscriptions are in Kharoṣṭhī. Though Kharoṣṭhī continued in use for some time, the dominant script on the subcontinent was Brāhmī, and modern Indo-Aryan scripts reflect historical developments of this script in different areas. One such script that has attained a major status is known as Devanagari. This is the officially recognized script for Hindi and is used for other Indo-Aryan languages such as Marathi and Nepali. Sanskrit texts are increasingly also written in Devanagari, although the earlier tradition of regional scripts for Sanskrit texts continues. In addition the Perso-Arabic script is used for some Indo-Aryan languages, such as Urdu, Kashmiri, and Sindhi, with diacritic modifications for representing sounds like retroflex stops, aspirates, and implosives.

George Cardona

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INDOCHINA WAR OF 1940–1941 The Japanese threat to French Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) became clear in the late 1930s, when it began its war of aggression against China in 1937 and occupied the island of Hainan in February 1939, all the more so because to the west the Japanese could

count on the support of the government of Siam. In fact, since the coup of Pibul Songgram (1897–1964), Siam had begun drawing nearer to Japan. It changed its name to Thailand, a clue to its expansionist position because "Thailand" seemed to correspond to pan-Thai ideology. Facing this double threat, the French colony organized its defense. When Europe entered into a state of war in 1939, the army in Indochina boasted ninety thousand men (fewer than fifteen thousand of them Europeans) but only mediocre equipment. It was a force to maintain colonial order, not an army formed to confront the troops of a great power such as Japan.

Japan's Demands

Since 1937 Tokyo had been criticizing Paris for permitting the resupplying of Nationalist China by the Yunnan railroad. In June 1940 Japan took advantage of France's defeat by Germany. On 19 June an ultimatum was sent to Indochina's Governor-General Georges Catroux that all transport of goods toward China must be stopped and that the Japanese must be able to verify this stoppage. Catroux yielded, in the belief that the balance of power left him no other option. The Vichy government of Philippe Pétain replaced him as leader of Indochina with Admiral Jean Decoux. The latter had to face new Japanese demands and a military convention was negotiated. Since Decoux delayed signing, the Japanese sent a new ultimatum that if the matter were not settled within three days, the Japanese would force the issue. The convention was signed on the afternoon of 22 September, just before the ultimatum. It organized and limited the stationing and passage of Japanese troops to the north of Indochina. This agreement did not prevent the Japanese Army of Canton from opening hostilities that same evening. For four days, a battle raged around the city of Lang Son. The French troops were overcome and Lang Son was taken. A landing in the region of Haiphong constituted another blow to colonial France. This time Decoux did not resist. This double humiliation did not call into question the agreement of 22 September; in theory French sovereignty over Indochina remained complete. But this Japanese eruption had struck a blow at the prestige of the colonial power.

Further Erosion of French Power

In the autumn of 1940, the French colonial government had to confront two revolts. In the north, at the Chinese border, various gangs, notably Vietnamese partisans of Prince Cuong De (1882–1951), attacked French outposts, killing isolated soldiers and local notables. Order was swiftly reestablished by the colonial

army. In the south, in Cochin China, a Communist insurrection broke out on 22 November. In Saigon the Sûreté (investigation police), forewarned, nipped the movement in the bud. But in rural areas in the west (especially in the province of My Tho), the uprising lasted several weeks. The insurgents, numbering more than ten thousand, killed about thirty Vietnamese notables. Here and there a people's regime was installed, very briefly, and land was confiscated and redistributed. The foreign legion and air corps participated in a brutal repression of the insurgents. The number of insurgents killed is not known with any certainty, but courts martial pronounced one hundred death sentences. Admiral Decoux refused to show clemency in those cases, despite a recommendation to that effect from the minister of colonies in Vichy. Added to arrests made in 1939, this repression struck a harsh blow to the PCI (Indochinese Communist Party). It was from China that its leaders, still free, continued to fight. In 1941 the border region would see the creation, around the future Ho Chi Minh (born Nguyen That Thanh, 1890–1969), of the Viet Minh, a National Front with Communist tendencies.

The End of the Conflict

The government of Thailand learned a lesson from the French difficulties. It made territorial demands, then entered into hostilities. The "war," which lasted from September 1940 to January 1941 and consisted only of skirmishes, reached its culmination in the middle of January 1941. On 16 January the French troops had to fall back when they experienced the same weaknesses they had exhibited at Lang Son, in particular the desertion of Indochinese soldiers. But on 17 January 1941, the best ships in the Thai fleet were sunk at Ko Chang, in the Gulf of Siam. Japan then imposed an armistice and its mediation. Negotiations ended in a compromise that accorded Thailand the two Lao provinces to the west of the Mekong and a third of Cambodia's territory (in short, what Siam had had to cede to Indochina at the beginning of the century). Peace was signed in Tokyo on 9 May 1941. It satisfied Thai public opinion, which had fully supported Pibul Songgram during his war against France.

The entente with Thailand was all the more useful to Japan because the latter had decided to expand toward the south rather than the north, at the expense of the colonial empires of the European powers that had been defeated or were in difficulty. The new concessions demanded by Japan in Indochina revealed this orientation. Vichy yielded. The Darlan-Kato agreements (29 July 1941) allowed Japanese troops to be stationed throughout Indochina; moreover, they in-

stituted the principle of a common defense of the colony. At the same time, Japan imposed its economic stranglehold on Indochina. Given the state of France and the situation of its forces in the Far East, this chain of concessions could have been avoided only with the intervention of some outside support, which at the time was not forthcoming.

Jacques Dalloz

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INDO-EUROPEAN LANGUAGES The Indo-European languages form the best-known, most widely spoken, and best-explored family of undoubtedly genetically related languages. Genetically related languages are demonstrably derived from a common ancestor, a "Proto-Language," which, in the case of Indo-European, is thought to have flourished during the fourth–third millennia BCE, before it split up into the daughter languages from which scholars are able to infer its existence. No theory about the area where this language may have been spoken has become generally accepted among scholars so far, but the south Russian steppes, Anatolia, or south-central Asia are most often mentioned as likely locations.

Attempts to reconstruct key aspects of the material and spiritual culture of the people who spoke Proto-Indo-European are likewise highly controversial, but the available lexical data (reconstructed words) point to a culture that already knew the most important cultural innovations (agriculture, animal husbandry) developed during the Neolithic Period.

The discovery by the Orientalists Sir William Jones and Franz Bopp around the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that most languages of Europe (the only exceptions being, among living languages, Finnish, Estonian, Hungarian, some other languages of Finno-Ugric stock, and isolated Basque) and some important languages of South and Southwest Asia are demonstrably related laid the foundation for the scholarly discipline of historical-comparative linguistics.



THE BEGINNING OF COMPARATIVE LINGUISTICS

In 1786 Sir William Jones delivered his third discourse, in which he laid the foundation for modern comparative linguistics by suggesting a close relationship between Sanskrit and the classical languages of Europe.

The *Sanskrit* language, whatever be its antiquity, is of wonderful structure; more perfect than the Greek, more copious than the Latin, and more exquisitely refined than either, yet bearing to both of them a stronger affinity, both in the roots of verbs and in the forms of grammar, than could possibly have been produced by accident; so strong indeed, that no philologer could examine them all three, without believing them to have sprung from some common source which, perhaps, no longer exists; there is a similar reason, though not quite so forcible, for supposing that both the Gothick and the Celtick, though blended with a very different idiom, had the same origin with the Sanskrit; and the old Persian might be added to the same family.

Source: Lord Teignmouth, ed. (1807) *The Collected Works of Sir William Jones*. Volumes I to XIII. London: John Stockdale and John Walker, vol. III: 34–35.

On the European continent, the members of the family are Greek, Latin, and the Romance languages (languages derived from Latin), which together with some extinct languages of ancient Italy (like Oscan and Umbrian) form the Italic branch of Indo-European; the Slavic (Russian, Polish, Czech, Serbo-Croat, Bulgarian, etc.) and Baltic languages (Lithuanian, Latvian, extinct Old Prussian), the combination of which into a Balto-Slavic branch has won some support; Armenian; Albanian; Germanic (Gothic, German, Dutch, English, the Scandinavian languages); Celtic (Irish, Welsh, Breton); and some extinct and mostly only fragmentarily attested languages like Thracian and Illyrian, both once spoken on the Balkan peninsula. In Asia, Indo-Iranian and the extinct Tocharian and Anatolian language families are members of Indo-European stock.

Anatolian Languages

After Hattushash, the capital of the Hittite (or *Nes-šan*, according to the self-designation of its people) empire (c. sixteenth–twelfth centuries BCE), was discovered in 1906 and excavated near the modern Boghazköy in central Anatolia, a hitherto unknown group of languages, clearly Indo-European, but not belonging to a well-known group, entered the roster

of Indo-European languages. These languages came to be known as the Anatolian branch of Indo-European, its members including the Hittite language itself, which together with Palaic was written in a variant of the cuneiform script; Luwian, which was partly written in this script as well and partly in a peculiar script, which is generally known as "Luwian Hieroglyphs" (but which is not to be confused with Egyptian Hieroglyphic writing); and Lydian and Lycian. (The latter two are fragmentarily attested languages of southwest Anatolia.)

Though Anatolian languages differ greatly, both in terms of structural makeup and material commonalities, from other Indo-European languages, their membership in the family has never been seriously in doubt. The theory that Proto-Anatolian was a sister to Proto-Indo-European rather than a daughter like all other branches has sometimes been popular (the "Indo-Hittite" theory). Whether the poorer morphological system of Anatolian or the more elaborate ones of Indo-Aryan and Greek, for example, more closely reflect the situation of the parent language continues to be debated.

Tocharian Languages

Like the Anatolian languages, Tocharian was unknown until the early twentieth century, when between

1908 and 1914 members of European and Japanese expeditions to Chinese Turkestan (modern Xinjiang Uygur) found documents written in a variety of the Indic Brāhmi script and in a hitherto unknown but clearly Indo-European language. The documents contain texts written in two dialects (or rather, separate languages), usually referred to as Tocharian A (or East Tocharian, Agnian) and B (West Tocharian, Kuchean), respectively. West Tocharian is generally viewed as more archaic.

Like Anatolian, Tocharian differs considerably from the better-known Indo-European languages, though less dramatically, and its status as one of the daughter languages of Proto-Indo-European has never been doubted. Some (especially morphological) phenomena of Tocharian, the easternmost Indo-European language, find their best parallels in the far West, in Celtic and Italic, but attempts to unite these languages into a single subgroup have been unsuccessful.

Indo-Iranian Languages

By far the largest and most important Indo-European branch on the Asian continent is the Indo-Iranian or Aryan group. The latter name is derived from the attested self-designation of the earliest-known speakers of these languages.

Indo-Iranian languages form an uncontroversial primary branch of Indo-European, which is further subdivided into the Indo-Aryan (or Indic) and the Iranian groups. A third group, consisting only of unwritten languages spoken in eastern Afghanistan, is the Nuristani group (formerly also known as the Kafiri languages), with languages such as Kati, Waigali, Ashkun, and Prasun.

Both Indo-Aryan and Iranian languages have been attested since at least the first millennium BCE. Old

Indian is represented by Vedic, the language of the sacred literature of Brahmanic religion, and Sanskrit, the highly normed and thus to a degree artificial language of classical Indian literature.

The various Prakrit variants, which began to be attested with the inscriptions of the Mauryan emperor Asoka (273–232 BCE), and Pali, the language of the classical Buddhist canon, form the corpus of Middle Indian. From the beginning of the second millennium CE, New Indian languages are attested. Not unlike the Romance languages, which are derived from what is commonly called Vulgar Latin, New Indian languages can be seen as continuations of a protolanguage that was close to, without being identical with, an attested language, Sanskrit, which continues to be used as a language of religion and learning.

The better-known New Indian languages include: the Hindi-Urdu dialect-cluster, Panjabi, and Gujarati as the central group; Nepali and other languages of the Pahari branch, Oriya, Bengali, and Assamese (eastern group); Marathi and Konkani (southern group); Sindhi and the Lahnda dialect-cluster (northwest group); and Sinhalese on Sri Lanka, which occupies a special position in the family. In the northwest of the Indian subcontinent, the Dardic languages were often grouped with the Nuristani languages, but nowadays they are classified as a special Indo-Aryan group, the most important member of which is Kashmiri.

Old Iranian is represented by Old Persian, the language of the Achaemenid royal inscriptions, and Avestan, in which the sacred writings of the Zoroastrian religion were composed. From the Middle Iranian period onward, the Iranian family is clearly subdivided into western and eastern branches. Western Middle Iranian languages are Middle Persian and Parthian; eastern Middle Iranian languages are Bactrian, Khotanese, Sogdian, and Chorasmian. The most important modern languages of the Iranian family are (West Iranian) Persian (Farsi, Dari, and Tajiki), Tati, Baluchi, Zaza, and numerous unwritten languages spoken in Iran, which are often erroneously classified as Persian dialects, such as Mazanderani, Gilaki, Sangesari, and many others. Modern East Iranian languages are Pashto, Ossetic, and numerous unwritten languages of the Pamir region (Tajikistan), such as Wakhi, Bartangi, Sarykoli, and many others.

Stefan Georg

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XANTHOS-LETOON— WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Designated a World Heritage Site in 1988 by UNESCO, Xanthos-Letoon was the capital of Lycia. The funeral art and inscriptions found on this site are an invaluable tool for studying early Indo-European languages.

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INDO-GANGETIC PLAIN The Indo-Gangetic Plain stretches from the Arabian Sea in the west in a broad crescent to Bangladesh, a distance of nearly 3000 kilometers, with a huge river delta at each end. The drainage basin of the Indus River covers 960,000 square kilometers, while that of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra Rivers together embraces another 1,730,000 square kilometers. Excluding the hilly borders of these catchments, one is still left with an immense alluvial plain in excess of two million sq. km., watered by numerous large rivers, and consequently of the greatest agricultural and historical importance to India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. This crescent-shaped plain was created geologically by the in-filling of a trough that lay between the ancient, northward-drifting Gondwana block and the recent uplifting Himalayan Ranges. This alluvial fill may be several thousands of meters deep. Today the Ganges carries some 900,000 tons and the Indus some 1 million tons of suspended matter daily, and the Brahmaputra yet more. As a consequence, each river terminates in a broad delta.

Historically, the plain has been the regular entry corridor for invaders and migrants pushing through the passes from Afghanistan to the northwest. Nearly all of the most defining and dramatic events in South Asian history have transpired primarily on this plain, from the growth and decline of the Indus Civilization, to the supposed "Aryan invasion," to the birth and development of early Buddhism, to the battle on the Plain of Kurukshetra that is commemorated in the *Mahabharata*, to the brilliant Mughal empire, to the Indian revolt of 1857, to the bloody splitting of Pakistan from India, and of Bangladesh from Pakistan.

Paul Hockings

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INDONESIA—PROFILE (2001 est. pop. 228.4 million). The Republic of Indonesia, with an area of 1,919,440 square kilometers, is the fourth most populous country of the world. The former Dutch colony had an advanced civilization and connections with the outside world more than two thousand years ago. The idea of the Indonesian archipelago as an entity became pronounced after the area came under the control of the Dutch East Indies in the late seventeenth century. In the twenty-first century, a common culture unifies the far-flung Indonesian archipelago.

Geography

Situated strategically between the continents of Asia and Australia, the archipelago of Indonesia is composed of approximately 17,500 islands, of which about 13,000 are inhabited, and is bounded by the South China Sea, the Celebes Sea, and the Pacific Ocean to the north and the Indian Ocean in the south. About 85 percent of the world's east-west commercial shipping passes through Indonesian waters. The country's principal islands are Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan (South Borneo), Bali, Sulawesi (Celebes), Maluku (Moluccas), and West Papua (Irian Jaya). The archipelago experiences frequent earthquakes, and it has about one hundred volcanoes. The country has the world's longest coastline (80,000 kilometers). Indonesia has a tropical climate, with temperatures hovering between 19° and 32°C, depending on the area. Some 70 percent of the country is covered by tropical rain forest, and the landscape is covered with mountain peaks, valleys, and a network of rivers. Zoologically, the country forms a connecting link between Asian and Australian faunal species. Jakarta is the capital; the other notable cities are Surabaya, Medan, and Bandung.

People

Indonesia is a country having diverse ethnic groups and languages. Migrations in different periods of history have resulted in a complex ethnic structure. The primary ethnic group is Javanese (45 percent); the others are Sundanese, 14 percent; Madurese, 7.5 percent; coastal Malays, 7.5 percent; and others, 26 percent. The Chinese constitute the majority of the non-indigenous population. The predominant religion is Islam (90 percent), and Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists constitute about 10, 2, and 1 percent of the population respectively. The island of Bali has the largest concentration of Hindus. Centuries-old indigenous religious beliefs still are prevalent.

Bahasa Indonesia, a form of Malay, is the official language. English replaced Dutch as the main Western language in the 1950s. Local languages, such as



INDONESIA

Country name: Republic of Indonesia
Area: 1,919,440 sq km
Population: 228,437,870 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 1.6% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 22.26 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 6.3 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: 0 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio: 1 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 40.91 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population: 68.27 years, male: 65.9 years, female: 70.75 years (2001 est.)
Major religion: Muslim
Major languages: Bahasa Indonesia (official, modified form of Malay), English, Dutch, local dialects, the most widely spoken of which is Javanese
Literacy—total population: 83.8%; male: 89.6%, female: 78% (1995 est.)
Government type: republic
Capital: Jakarta
Administrative divisions: 27 provinces, 2 special regions, and 1 special capital city district
Independence: 17 August 1945 (proclaimed independence; on 27 December 1949, Indonesia became legally independent from the Netherlands)
National holiday: Independence Day, 17 August (1945)
Suffrage: 17 years of age; universal; and married persons regardless of age
GDP—real growth rate: 4.8% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita (purchasing power parity): \$2,900 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: 20% (1998)
Exports: \$64.7 billion (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Imports: \$40.4 billion (c.i.f., 2000 est.)
Currency: Indonesian rupiah (IDR)


Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Book Factbook 2001*. Retrieved 5 March 2002, from: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

Javanese, are also spoken. The literacy rate, currently 83.8 percent, is high. The population growth rate is 1.63 percent. Java and Madura, which have 7 percent of country's area, contain 65 percent of the population.

History

The remains of ten-thousand-year-old *Homo sapiens* have been discovered at Wajak in East Java. Powerful kingdoms in Java, Sumatra, and Kalimantan arose from the first century CE. The greatest of the ancient Indonesian empires was the fourteenth-century Majapahit, which was based on eastern Java. Islam, which was brought by Indian traders in the late thirteenth century, became firmly entrenched in northeast Java

and north Sumatra. Indonesia fell under Dutch control in the late seventeenth century. Indonesian nationalism grew through various organizations like the Budi Utomo, Sarekat Islam, the Communist Party of Indonesia, and the Indonesian Nationalist Party. The country's notable twentieth-century leaders have included Sukarno (1901–1970), Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980), and Sutan Sjahrir (1909–1966). On 17 August 1945 the Indonesian Republic was proclaimed. It achieved independence on 27 December 1949, after winning its struggle against the Dutch. Sukarno was elected president, and Hatta became the premier. Dislocation of the economy; the revolt for autonomy by Aceh, Maluku, and North Sulawesi; and the setting



up of a rival rebel government, the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI), led to the period of Guided Democracy after 1959. Suharto (b. 1921), who succeeded Sukarno as president, instituted his New Order after an abortive Communist coup in 1965. Indonesia became a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was formed in 1967. Papua was recognized as Indonesian territory in 1963, and East Timor, a former Portuguese colony, was integrated into Indonesia in May 1976. In October 1997 an economic crisis paralyzed the country. Riots became widespread. Amid charges of corruption, Suharto stepped down in May 1998, and his vice president, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie (b. 1936), assumed the presidency. Discontent in East Timor, which had never reconciled to its incorporation into Indonesia, erupted into bitter fighting. After much bloodshed, it finally gained independence following a referendum on 30 August 1999. Calls for independence also rose in other provinces, particularly Aceh, Riau, Maluku, East Kalimantan, and Papua. Ab-

durrahman Wahid, better known as Gus Dur, became Indonesia's president in October 1999.

Economy

Indonesia is rich in natural resources, including vast supplies of rubber, timber, oil, and tin. Agriculture accounts for almost 21 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and more than 45 percent of the labor force. Crops include rice, coffee, maize, palm oil, and pepper. Industry and services make up 35 and 44 percent of GDP respectively. Liquefied natural gas, petroleum, rubber, tin, timber, and textiles are major foreign-exchange earners. Natural gas and oil are a major source of export revenue. The deposits are mainly located in Sumatra, and U.S. companies have heavily invested in these. The major imports are foodstuffs, chemicals, and machinery and equipment. Japan is Indonesia's largest trading partner.

Indonesia had one of world's fastest growing economies, with an average growth rate of 6 to 8 percent



The Welcome Statue at one of Jakarta's main roundabouts is used to display a political flag during the June 1999 election campaign. (AFP/CORBIS)

annually, until the Asian financial crisis hit the country in 1997, and its currency, the rupiah, lost 80 percent of its value. Inflation reached 77 percent in 1998. Locally produced products were hard hit. Unemployment rose to 20 million people, GDP contracted by an estimated 13.7 percent, and external debt was \$140 billion. However, the Indonesian economy improved in 1999. A tight monetary policy reduced inflation to 2 percent in 1999. The government abolished major import monopolies, expanded the privatization program, and liberalized market access. Modest economic recovery began with stabilization of exchange and interest rates. The decision of some ASEAN members in February 2001 to set up a free-trade zone in the coming year will help Indonesia's economy.

Culture

Indonesia's culture is an expression of the creative genius of a people nurtured by indigenous traditions enhanced by Hindu, Buddhist, and Islamic influences. Knowledge of navigation, wet-rice cultivation, puppet shadow theater (*wayang*), the gamelan (an orchestra

composed mainly of gongs, xylophones, and percussive metal bars), batik textile dyeing, and megalithic building traditions give evidence of a developed material culture that predates contact with Indian elements in the first century CE. The greatest representative of Javanese art and architecture is the famous Buddhist stupa of Borobudur, built c. 778–850 CE. The *Ramayana*, the great Indian epic poem, has influenced the social life of the people. Islam in Indonesia was of liberal hue, with an emphasis on pantheism and a sense of divine presence in all creation. The wood and stone carvings of Indonesia, which take their themes from Indian mythology and indigenous traditions, are highly regarded, as are Indonesian metalwork, basketry, pottery, and bead making. *Pantun*, the famous poem form of interlinking four-line stanzas, are popular in some villages. Gamelan music performs an all-pervasive role in Balinese traditions: it is played at temple offerings, when immersing the ash of a cremated body in river or seawater, when driving evil spirits away, and for street dances, bull races, and so forth. The *suling*, a bamboo flute, is very common. Such nontraditional music styles as *kroncong*, which originated in the eastern part of the country and shows Portuguese influence, and *dangdut*, of Indian influence, possess Indonesian elements. Indonesian dances take their themes from Hindu mythologies and indigenous Pandji plays. The Djanger and Legong dances from Bali, Serimpi and Bedoyo from Java, the candle-and-umbrella dance of West Sumatra, and the handkerchief dance of Ambon are famous throughout the archipelago.

Looking Ahead

The horrific violence in Maluku between Christians and Muslims, the clamor for secession by Papua and Aceh, the exodus of Muslim refugees from East Timor, and widespread riots throughout the archipelago combine to continue to threaten the stability of Indonesia. The increasing role of the military is another matter of concern, and there is a growing need for separation of the political and military agendas. For political stability, it is advisable that the ruling class look to the needs of the people and adopt some measures of decentralization for the provinces. The inherent wealth of the nation and its huge market potential should take Indonesia toward a better future.

Patit Paban Misbra

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INDONESIA—ECONOMIC SYSTEM The Indonesian economy is based on agricultural production and extraction of natural resources, especially oil, natural gas, timber, and fish. State-sponsored attempts to promote industrialization had meager results until the 1980s and received a major setback with the Asian economic crisis of 1997. Although tourism has developed as an important service industry, Indonesia remains otherwise insignificant as an exporter of services.

From Early Times to Independence

In precolonial times, the economy of the Indonesian archipelago was characterized by subsistence agriculture in most regions; the production of rice for export in areas with fertile volcanic soil and high rainfall (notably on Java, Bali, and parts of Sumatra); the cultivation of high-value spices (especially pepper, cloves, nutmeg, and cinnamon) for export to China, India, the Middle East, and Europe; and the collection of forest products (camphor, benzoin, gums, bird feathers, and fragrant woods), also for export. Especially on the coasts of the Strait of Melaka (Malacca) and on the northern coast of Java (known as the Pasisir), many cities developed as trading entrepôts, pro-

viding sophisticated services to merchants. Initially, trade within the archipelago and between the archipelago and China and India seems to have been mainly in the hands of indigenous merchants, but from about the thirteenth century, foreign traders, including Indians, Arabs, and Chinese, played an increasingly prominent role.

The European presence in the archipelago, beginning with the Portuguese capture of Melaka in 1511, appears to have inhibited indigenous trade. The Portuguese were effective tax gatherers, while the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) imposed a monopoly on trade in a wide range of lucrative commodities. These restrictions increasingly choked the economic base of the entrepôt cities, shifting the balance of power within indigenous societies away from merchants and toward those controlling agriculture.

During the seventeenth century, the VOC generally left production in the hands of indigenous growers. During the eighteenth century, however, Dutch interests shifted from high-value, low-volume spices to higher-volume, lower-priced commodities such as sugar, coffee, and indigo. The Dutch also took an increasingly interventionist role in production and began to bind indigenous labor to the land, sometimes in explicitly feudal arrangements, but more often by using the traditional authority of indigenous elites to mobilize peasant farmers for work on behalf of colonial interests. Indonesians had traditionally supplied



Terraced fields like these rice fields in Bali are common in Indonesia as they make better use of the land and conserve irrigation water. (WOLFGANG KAEHLER/CORBIS)

labor services to their rulers, and this tradition was extended to serve Dutch interests. Although there was much discussion of the possible advantage of using economic incentives rather than coercion and traditional authority to mobilize labor for plantation work, duress remained a key feature of labor control throughout the colonial period. Fees collected for licenses (generally granted to Chinese entrepreneurs) to manage toll roads, gambling establishments, and the sale of opium were major sources of state income.

From the late nineteenth century, many observers identified a sharp threefold division in the colonial economy. Large European firms, which developed rapidly after the colonial government introduced a policy of economic liberalization in 1870, dominated much of the modern, capital-intensive, export-oriented sectors of the economy. Chinese firms dominated retail trade and medium-level commerce. The indigenous peoples of the archipelago occupied only the margins of the commercial economy, being engaged mainly in agriculture and state employment. Colonial economists, notably J. H. Boeke (1884–1944), attributed this stratification primarily to cultural factors, arguing that the traditional culture of village life emphasized community obligations and discouraged capital accumulation and individual advancement.

From the late nineteenth century, population growth in Java seems to have led to a declining standard of living for most Javanese, because limited resources on the island were spread ever more thinly among its people. The colonial Ethical Policy, announced in 1901, involved an attempt to overcome this problem by agricultural intensification, emigration from the island (later called transmigration), and limited industrialization. These efforts, however, had only meager results and were largely ended by the Great Depression. The decline of infrastructure during the 1930s was exacerbated during the 1940s by the Japanese occupation (1942–1945) and the war of independence (1945–1949).

Independence

The terms of Indonesia's eventual settlement with the Dutch in 1949 left the position of Western firms intact (insofar as they had physically survived the years of warfare). Indonesia's economy in the 1950s, therefore, resembled that of the colonial era in its pronounced racial stratification and its emphasis on the export of plantation products. Except during the brief Korean War boom, however, the economy faced sluggish international commodity prices and a much-reduced political capacity to obtain cheap, partly coerced labor. Strong arguments were heard within

Indonesia that political independence had failed to end the economic dimension of colonialism and that action should be taken to restrict or dispossess Western firms. Those firms responded by steadily decapitalizing their investments in Indonesia.

Successive governments attempted to strengthen the indigenous presence in the commercial economy by awarding licenses and permits to promising indigenous entrepreneurs and by restricting the access of Chinese business owners to certain sectors of the economy. These measures largely failed to stimulate an indigenous entrepreneurial class; rather, they encouraged rent seeking on the basis of political connections. From 1950, governments also sought to establish a significant state sector in the economy, nationalizing the railways and the Java Bank, the semi-private bank of circulation in the colonial era. State enterprises were also established in shipping, air transport, and industry (textiles, cement, hardboard, automobiles, and glass). A large number of government bodies, including military units and civilian departments, maintained semiformal "economic organizations" to supplement the dwindling allocations they received from the state budget. In December 1957, all Dutch enterprises in Indonesia were nationalized, most of them being placed under military management. Many of these enterprises languished because of corruption and inexperienced management; those that succeeded did so mostly because their political or military connections enabled them to function as rent collectors rather than because they showed true entrepreneurial skill.

The failure of independence to stimulate extensive industrialization in Java exacerbated tension between Java and the so-called Outer Islands, especially after the 1955 elections gave political power in Jakarta to Java-based parties. The 1953–1955 and 1956–1957 governments of Ali Sastroamidjojo (1903–1975) imposed exchange rates that favored importers (mainly in Java) and penalized exporters (many of them in Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan). These economic tensions contributed to regional rebellions in 1956–1959.

The 1957–1965 Guided Democracy of President Sukarno (1901–1970) included a plan for rapid industrialization based on state planning and investment, but most of the planning had no grounding in economic reality, while the economy, impoverished and plagued by corruption, could not deliver the necessary tax revenues. By 1965, the central government was unable to produce a state budget, and, with recurrent expenditure being funded by printing money, serious inflation began. The infrastructure was in exceptionally poor condition, and both imports and exports stag-

nated, leading to hardship, including occasional starvation in some regions.

The New Order and After

The 1967–1998 New Order government of President Suharto (b. 1921) achieved a remarkable rehabilitation of the economy. Per capita income, which had been less than \$50 in 1966, reached \$1,155 in 1996, and Indonesia was increasingly identified as an imminent recruit to the ranks of the Asian newly industrializing countries.

The funding for this rehabilitation came from a massive exploitation of the country's (largely nonrenewable) natural resources, chiefly oil, natural gas, and timber, as well as fish, coal, bauxite, gold, copper, and other minerals. This funding through resource exploitation was augmented by extensive marshaling of foreign aid, coordinated by the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia until 1992 and thereafter by the Consultative Group for Indonesia. These sources of income enabled the government to invest heavily in infrastructure and to provide capital for state-owned industrial enterprises.

Although New Order Indonesia abandoned the officially tight economic planning of Guided Democracy, government intervention in the economy remained extensive. Management of the economy was principally in the hands of the National Development Planning Agency, whose leading figures were sometimes referred to as the "Berkeley mafia," because many of them had been trained at the University of California at Berkeley. State-owned banks dominated the financial sector.

Under Indonesia's constitution, all mineral resources belong to the state. In 1960, all concessions to foreign firms were abolished, and the exploitation of minerals was placed in the hands of state enterprises. A new foreign investment law in 1967 reopened the sector to foreign firms, and the Freeport corporation (now Freeport McMoRan) obtained especially favorable conditions for its massive gold and copper mine in western New Guinea (then called West Irian). Foreign investment in oil was permitted only on a joint-venture basis with the state oil corporation, Pertamina, though Pertamina's contribution was often no more than arranging official permits and taking a share of the production or the profits. During the 1970s, exports of liquefied natural gas took on major importance alongside oil exports. Indonesia's main reserves of oil and gas are located offshore in the South China Sea and near the Bird's Head peninsula of New Guinea, but important reserves also exist in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and the Java Sea.

Extensive exploitation of Indonesia's tropical forests began in 1968, and timber soon ranked as Indonesia's third-largest export after oil and gas. Whereas oil and gas exploitation remained under relatively close state supervision, timber licenses were widely allocated as patronage among individuals and groups close to the government. Sound regulations to ensure that the forests would be cut in keeping with a plan of sustainability were put in place, but until the 1990s, these regulations were virtually never enforced and were commonly ignored. During the 1980s, domestic and international environmentalists increasingly expressed concern over the irresponsible logging practices, and some attempts were made to punish firms that violated the regulations, but the firms targeted in this way were generally those with weak political connections. Fishing in Indonesia is also conducted largely as a mining operation with no attention to sustainability or maintenance of stocks. The large-scale granting of concessions to foreign tuna and shrimp fishing fleets began in 1987.

Active promotion of industry began in 1979 with the third five-year plan. The government played a major role in this process, both through state-owned enterprises and through joint ventures with private investors. Initially, such enterprises were commonly protected by tariffs and exclusive license systems, which tended to promote inefficiency and increase costs for other domestic producers. During the 1980s, increasing emphasis was placed on adding value to Indonesia's traditional exports. In 1985, the government banned the export of raw logs to promote local processing, especially the production of plywood. Processing plants for crumb rubber, rattan, palm oil, and petrochemicals were also established, as was a large aluminum smelter on the Asahan River in North Sumatra.



Workers at the Jakarta port of Sundakelapa unload lumber from Kalimantan, Borneo, Indonesia, in 1995. (SERGIO DORANTES/CORBIS)



FIVE LARGEST COMPANIES IN INDONESIA

According to *Asia Week* the five largest companies in Indonesia are as follows:

Company	Sector	Sales (\$ millions)	Rank in Asia
Pertamina	Oil Exploration, Refining	19,488.5	50
Astra International	Car Assembly, Trading	3,372.6	399
Per. Listrik Negara	Power Generation	2,678.4	498
Gudang Garam	Clove Cigarettes	1,776.9	743
Indah Kiat Pulp & Paper	Paper, Pulp	1,545.5	846

Source: "The Asia Week 1000." (2001) *Asia Week* (9 November): 113.

Coal production in Indonesia dramatically expanded in the 1980s, with Indonesia becoming the world's third-largest exporter. Gold production also expanded in this period, but reliable statistics on production levels are unavailable because of extensive illegal mining. Substantial volumes of tin and bauxite are also exported.

The importance of agriculture in the Indonesian economy declined steadily under the New Order. Whereas agricultural products accounted for 70 percent of total export value in 1969, that percentage had declined to 9 percent by 1983. Before the 1997 Asian crisis, agriculture as a whole employed around 40 percent of the Indonesian workforce in 1996, whereas in 1976 it had employed 61 percent.

Government intervention played a major role in transforming rice production. Rice is the major food crop and the preferred staple food of most Indonesians. It is cultivated mostly on small farms, but complex social arrangements that used to give most members of each community at least some share in the annual production have often given way to simple commercial arrangements for planting, weeding, harvesting, threshing, and milling. In the early 1960s, much of Indonesia's scarce foreign exchange went to pay for imported rice, but from the 1970s, a massive investment in irrigation, fertilizers, high-yielding rice varieties, pesticides, and agricultural advice (the so-

called Green Revolution) led to increased production, so that Indonesia achieved self-sufficiency in rice in 1984. From the late 1980s, a sophisticated Integrated Pest Management Program dramatically reduced some of the adverse ecological consequences of the early Green Revolution.

Other food crops are generally known by the name *palawija* and include maize, cassava, soybeans, and sweet potatoes. Indonesia's main cash crops are rubber, palm oil, copra, tea, coffee, sugar, cocoa, and tobacco, all of which are produced both on large-scale plantations and by smallholders, as well as teak, which is produced in long-established government-owned plantations in Java. During and after colonial times, smallholders often competed unequally with the better-connected plantations for access to processing and export facilities. In the 1980s, however, the government delivered increased assistance to smallholders, comparable to the Green Revolution facilities given to rice producers, and established a "nucleus estate and smallholder" program to give the smallholders access to plantation facilities.

From the early 1980s, tourism developed as a major industry. International tourist arrivals rose from 366,000 in 1975 to 5 million in 1996.

Controversy has repeatedly emerged over the state sponsorship of strategic industries, including nuclear power and the aerospace industry, both backed by Suharto's technology minister and eventual successor B. J. Habibie (b. 1936). These initiatives were widely criticized as wasteful prestige projects rather than as genuine contributions to industrial development. Also criticized was President Suharto's decision to grant one of his sons a license to produce a national car, which was eventually to have a local content of more than 60 percent. Although the project was seen as useful in principle, there was widespread indignation over the fact that the project received tax and tariff concessions while importing the cars fully assembled from South Korea. Suharto's children and many other relatives were involved in commercial ventures in which their connections with the government, rather than any entrepreneurial flair, appeared to be the main factor in their success.

Successive governments in Indonesia have stressed the importance of cooperatives as a just and effective form of commercial activity for local communities, but the economic performance of cooperatives has generally been disappointing.

Throughout the New Order period, licenses, patronage, and outright corruption were extensively used to channel profits into the hands of figures in and close

to the government. The fact that many of these figures were Chinese Indonesian business owners was a constant source of domestic criticism of the economic system. Much of the capital accumulated in this way, however, was productively invested in new industrial enterprises, creating a business sector that increasingly had the capacity to prosper without close government support or regulation. Nevertheless, domestic pressure and pressure from international donor countries and agencies led Indonesia to embark on a sustained deregulation of the economy from the mid-1980s. Deregulation led to strong growth in the manufacturing sector, but it contributed to the emergence of an overheated bubble economy that collapsed spectacularly in the Asian financial crisis of 1997.

The financial crisis caused serious damage to Indonesia's industrial sector, which was starved of credit and equity funds for several months, leading thousands of businesses to shut their doors and leaving hundreds of thousands of workers unemployed. Under International Monetary Fund instruction, the Habibie government established the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency in January 1998 to reorganize the banking sector and close down banks that were not viable. Lack of political will, however, meant that relatively little was achieved in restructuring. For the most part, economists have argued that the economic strategies of the Suharto era were sound and that the economic crisis was an acute response to investor disquiet over corruption and nepotism in ruling circles.

Robert Cribb

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INDONESIA—EDUCATION SYSTEM

The Indonesian educational system reflects influences from Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic, and Western educational systems introduced by foreign rulers and settlers. Hindu and Buddhist educators taught royal family members in their palaces and temples, particularly between 100 and 1500 CE. The Islamic system of education was first introduced in courts, mosques, and bazaars between the seventh and the thirteenth centuries. In the sixteenth century, European traders and colonialists—particularly the Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch—established themselves in the Indonesian archipelago and introduced their secular Western educational systems. While some signs of all these influences exist today, the Islamic and Western systems are most strongly evident.

School Systems

Traditional Islamic schools are referred to as *pesantren* in Java, *pondok* in Sumatra, *pondok-pesantren* in Sulawesi, and *dayah* in Aceh. These are managed predominantly by Muslim philanthropists or organizations. Religious students (*santri*) study classical religious books (*kitab kuning*), written mainly in Arabic by Muslim scholars. A guru (*kyai*) heads the institution and guides the teachers in these boarding schools. *Pesantren* recruit graduates from primary schools (both public and private schools run under Islamic or secular systems). Over a million students are enrolled in approximately six thousand *pesantren* operating across the country. While most *pesantren* provide secondary education only, some also offer a B.A. program as well as continuing education for adults. The teaching of Islamic sciences, Arabic, and theology in *pesantren* is done in the vernacular. Other subjects taught include English, the Indonesian language, and the Pancasila ("five principles"), a concept developed by Sukarno and others in 1945, which was adopted as the basis of the national ideology. (The five principles are belief in one God, humanitarianism, Indonesian nationalism, democracy based on deliberation, and social justice.) Most *pesantren* are affiliated with the Nahdlatul Ulama, a traditionalist socioreligious organization. The Muhammadiyah, another socioreligious organization, also has set up *pesantren*, which use more modern teaching methods than the Nahdlatul Ulama.

The modern system of education essentially is drawn from the Dutch educational system. While in power from the seventeenth to the mid twentieth century, the Dutch set up three types of schools patterned after those in the Netherlands. The Hollandsche Europeische School (HES) trained primarily European and Eurasian students, while the Hollandsche Chinese

School (HCS) system taught ethnic Chinese and other Far East Asian pupils. The third system, the *Hollandsche Indische School* (HIS), set up in the mid-nineteenth century, enrolled students from indigenous communities.

Although this system formed the basis of modern education in Indonesia, it fostered discrimination and racism in the student population, and created a breeding ground for the forces of nationalism. After Indonesia gained sovereignty in 1949, the number of educational institutions from elementary to postgraduate level increased considerably.

Most schools offer secular studies, a step encouraged by the government as a means of providing a balanced education, raising the literacy level and, hence, promoting economic development in general.

Education Units

Education is divided into two units—learning and teaching activities—and two paths—within school and out of school. In-school education is conducted in a traditional school environment through teaching and learning activities that are gradual, hierarchical, and continuous. Out-of-school education is provided outside of the formal schooling system through teaching and learning activities that are not necessarily hierarchical and continuous. Family education is regarded as an important part of the out-of-school system. Its most crucial role is generally recognized as instilling socioreligious, moral, and cultural values. The two paths both offer general, vocational, and service-related education.

Preschooling is aimed at stimulating the mental, intellectual, spiritual, and physical development of children outside the home environment. It encourages early behavioral development and discipline, through creative, innovative, and stimulating games and playtime. Play groups are available for toddlers three years old and younger. Four- to six-year-olds attend kindergarten, where the stress is on intellectual and creative stimulation as well as on the teaching of language, religion, and social skills.

Primary and junior secondary schools are grouped by the Ministry of National Education (formerly the Minister of Education and Culture) under its compulsory basic education policy. Under this policy, general education is provided for nine years (through the third year of junior high school), divided into six years for primary school and three years for lower secondary school. The curriculum covers at least thirteen subjects: Pancasila education, religious education, citizenship education, Indonesian language, reading and

writing, mathematics, introduction to science and technology, geography, national and general history, handicrafts and arts, physical education and health, drawing, and English language.

Primary school is aimed at teaching reading, writing, and arithmetic, and prepares students for lower secondary school. The latter aims at character development, building up social consciousness, civic responsibilities, and national awareness, as well as preparation for senior high school. Special schools also have been established at both levels for handicapped students. An Islamic basic education system, run parallel to this secular system, is managed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

Both systems (Islamic and secular) provide general secondary training (senior secondary levels) in two programs: academic and professional (vocational). The academic program includes the following subjects: Pancasila and education citizenship, religious education, Indonesian language and literature, national and general history, English language, physical and health education, mathematics, natural sciences, social sciences, and arts education.

Vocational secondary schools implement three-year programs according to the perceived present and future demands of the employment market. Programs include agriculture and forestry, industrial technology, business and management, community welfare, tourism, and arts and handicrafts.

Higher education is provided by public universities run by the government and by private colleges and institutes. Academies and polytechnic schools specialize in applied sciences, while colleges provide academic and professional training in one particular discipline. The Department of Religious Affairs also operates colleges in Islamic Studies. Institutes provide similar academic and professional programs as well but in a variety of related disciplines. The network of fourteen Institutes of Islamic Studies, for example, is managed by the Minister of Religious Affairs. Universities provide academic and/or professional education in diverse disciplines, including natural and social sciences and the arts. In 1994, the minister of national education established five consortia representing major universities to streamline the teaching of science and technology, social sciences, agriculture, medicine, and education.

Late-Twentieth-Century Changes in Education

The educational system in Indonesia is centralized and, while this facilitates unity and uniformity under the center (Java), it also has raised fears of contributing to the demise of local languages, customs, and values.

The renaming of the Ministry of Education and Culture to Ministry of National Education in 1999 represented a move to give greater autonomy to the regions in choice of educational systems. Local communities received a say in the running of the educational system. It was hoped this would revitalize locally managed institutions and, ultimately, contribute to overall development. How successful the country will be in implementing this ideal is, however, dependent on the participation of the local population and the successful application of the autonomy policy initiated by the government in January 2001.

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INDONESIA—HISTORY Once the seat of several Indianized Hindu and Buddhist empires, Indonesia, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, is the largest Muslim country in the world. Between the sixteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries, Indonesia was under Dutch colonial control. Independence from the Netherlands in 1949 brought about a fragile democratic system under President Sukarno (1901–1970). His government having failed to meet the challenges of governance, the country faced a long period of authoritarian rule until succeeded by a democratic government in 1998. This democratic system is still fragile, and the military continue to exercise significant influence in the political affairs of the country. Nevertheless, as a founding member of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), Indonesia plays an important role in the region. The country's situation on the trade route between Australia and Europe makes Indonesia a strategically important country.

Indonesia, the largest archipelago in the world, is a collection of more than 13,500 islands. The most populous of these are Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan (on the island of Borneo), Irian Jaya (western New Guinea), and Sulawesi. According to anthropologists, Java was home to one of the earliest hominids, *Pithecanthropus erectus* or Java man. Two major population groups in Indonesia are the Proto or Older Malays and the Younger or Deutero Malays.

Foreign Influences

For centuries, wet-rice cultivation provided the subsistence basis for the people of the islands. Then, after the second century CE, trade became an equally important factor in socioeconomic, political, religious, and cultural development. The Indonesians traded with East, South, and West Asia. From early times, India, not China, had the most cultural impact on the Indonesians. As a result, Indian Hinduism and later Buddhism found a fertile soil in Indonesia. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, most Indonesians embraced Islam, despite the arrival of the Portuguese, who attempted to convert the islanders to Christianity in the sixteenth century. The Dutch, who followed the Portuguese in the seventeenth century, were probably responsible for the small but significant minority of Christians.

Early History

In the fifth century, the disintegration of the Fulan, the first historic empire in Southeast Asia, led to the establishment of many smaller successor states in the region, such as Srivijaya on the Palembang River on Sumatra. Contact with India, which was lost when Fulan disintegrated, was renewed. The increased volume of Indian trade was one reason for Srivijaya's growth into a thriving empire during the seventh century.

The empire grew to include almost all of the Malay Peninsula and dominated both the Malacca and Sunda Straits. Srivijaya remained a major force in the region for the next six centuries. An Indianized Buddhist state, Srivijaya lavishly patronized Buddhism.

In central Java, another Buddhist state, Mataram, arose in the late seventh century. Devoted to Mahayana Buddhism, Mataram was ruled by the already established Sailendra dynasty (flourished eighth–ninth centuries). Sanjaya (flourished c. 730), the first Sailendra ruler, had been a Saivite, a devotee of the Hindu god Siva. By the middle of the eighth century, the Sailendras had become Buddhists. They built the world-famous Borobudur Buddhist monuments in central Java. In 832, when the last adult member of the Sailendra dynasty, a woman, married the ruler of a rival state, the Sailendra line ended. The queen's younger brother fled to Srivijaya, where he became the ruler.

During the eleventh century, Srivijayan commercial rivalry with the eastern Java state of Mataram and the Chola rulers of southern India became intense. After establishing good relations with the Cholas, Srivijaya turned against Mataram. Between 1006 and 1007, Srivijaya attacked and burned the Mataram capital and destroyed its fleet. Meanwhile, Srivijaya's relations



KEY EVENTS IN INDONESIA'S HISTORY

- 5th century CE** With the destruction of the Fulan empire in Southeast Asia, the Srivijaya state on Sumatra emerges as a regional power.
- 7th century** The Mataram state emerges as a regional power in central Java.
- 13th century** The Majapahit rulers in eastern Java create a vast empire in the western islands which lasts until the arrival of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century.
- 1511** The Portuguese capture Melaka.
- 1641** The Dutch take Melaka from the Portuguese and begin to extend their rule.
- 1795** The British become the dominant European power in the region and take some Dutch territory.
- 1799** The Dutch East India Company is disbanded and the Netherlands assume direct responsibility for the Dutch East Indies.
- 1830** The Dutch are reinstated in Java.
- 1920s–1930s** Indonesian nationalist organizations are repressed by the Dutch.
- 1942–1945** period of Japanese occupation.
- 1945** Indonesia declares independence with Sukarno its first leader.
- 1949** The Dutch grant Indonesia independence.
- 1955** The Bandung conference is held on Java.
- 1964** Indonesia invades Malaysia but is repulsed.
- 1967** Parliament removes Sukarno and he is replaced by Suharto.
- 1969** Tribal elders in Irian Jaya vote to become part of Indonesia.
- 1975** Indonesia annexes East Timor.
- 1984** Indonesia is a founding member of ASEAN.
- 1993** Suharto's rule becomes more repressive.
- 1997–1998** The economy declines during the Asian economic crisis.
- 1998** Suharto resigns and is replaced by B. J. Habibie.
- 1999** The East Timorese vote to become an independent nation.
- 1999** Abdurrahman Wahid is elected president and Megawati Sukarnoputri vice president.
- 2001** Wahid is removed from office and replaced with Megawati.

with the Cholas deteriorated, leading to a Chola attack in 1025. Chola forces raided the entire Sumatran coast and captured Srivijayan territories on the Malay coast, seizing the Srivijayan king. The Cholas, however, did not follow up on their victories. In 1028, Srivijaya made peace with the Mataram ruler Airlangga (991–1049?). A Chola attack nevertheless rendered a devastating blow to Srivijayan fortunes and led to civil war in Java.

Toward the end of the thirteenth century, with the help of the Mongols (who at that time ruled China), the Javanese prince Vijaya established a new capital at Majapahit in eastern Java. The Majapahit rulers claimed control over a vast area, including Bali, Macassar (modern Ujung Pandan), Singapore, Sumatra, and western Java, until after the arrival of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century.

The Portuguese in Southeast Asia

Portuguese entry into Southeast Asia followed the successful voyage of Vasco da Gama (c. 1460–1524) from Portugal to India in 1498. Hoping to monopolize the European spice trade, the Portuguese captured Melaka (or Malacca, as it has traditionally been spelled in English) in 1511 and slaughtered its Muslim inhabitants. The Portuguese attempt to dominate the spice trade led to open rivalry with the Javanese, who attacked Melaka in 1513 but suffered a defeat.

Since the Javanese were then unable to send spices to Melaka, coastal states like Madura, Tuban, Surabaya, and Demak all lost their independence to the new state of Mataram by the 1620s. Demak, a state on the east coast of Java, encouraged the people in the

area to become Muslims in an attempt to deny the Portuguese access to the region. Such was the intensity of the Javanese opposition that the Portuguese were left with no choice but to use the north Borneo straits to reach the Spice Islands (the Moluccas).

The Chinese were also unhappy with Portuguese control of Melaka because they no longer received unconditional access to the commodities they had once enjoyed. Soon the state of Aceh, on Sumatra, at the western end of the Indonesian archipelago, became the chief Muslim rival of the Portuguese. Aceh not only defeated the Portuguese efforts to capture the Sumatran ports of Pasai and Pedir but also staged several attacks on Melaka between 1537 and 1575. Nevertheless, Aceh was forced to make peace with the Portuguese in 1587.

The Dutch in Indonesia

Until the end of the sixteenth century, Spain and Portugal monopolized the Oriental spice trade. The Dutch, denied access to Oriental spices in Europe, were forced to seek supplies in the East itself. The English and Dutch worked together to drive the Portuguese out. Since the Dutch were not involved in the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) in Europe, they were free to develop their trade in the East Indies. Finally, after several attempts, the Dutch dislodged the Portuguese from Melaka, captured it in 1641, and established themselves in Java, the Moluccas, and other islands.

The Dutch and English, who traded with Bantam, a well-known pepper port in western Java, were often subjected to blackmail by both the sultans and the local Chinese. Therefore, the new Dutch governor-general, Jan Pieterszoon Coen (1587–1629), decided to build a fortified place for trade in western Java. The Dutch picked Jakarta, which they renamed Batavia.

In 1588, Mataram had annexed the port city of Demak, and the sultan converted to Islam. Sultan Agung (d. 1645) of Mataram embarked on an aggressive course of conquest and expansion. Having conquered Madura (1624) and Surabaya (1625), he turned against Batavia, but the Dutch easily defeated his forces. Mataram continued as a significant power for another half-century but never completed its expansionist program.

The Dutch did not allow Indonesian ships to use the Java straits unless they carried a Dutch company passport. Indonesian crews that refused to carry the passport were subject to execution or enslavement. Macassar, which refused to accept this Dutch demand, fell in 1667. The Buginese (of Sulawesi, Indonesia) under Aru Palakka of Bone (near the Gulf of Bone) and the forces of Ternate (an island in the Moluccas) con-

quered most of the commercially valuable islands such as Mataram (1678–1680), Bantam, and most of the eastern islands.

After 1587, Aceh had become a powerful state, whose control extended all the way from Johor in the south to Kedah and Patani in the north of Indonesia, although Melaka remained outside its control. The sultan of Aceh tried to monopolize the cloth trade and required European traders to acquire permits to trade in pepper in the Sumatran ports. Having taken Melaka with the help of Johor and Minangkabau, the Dutch turned against Aceh and stopped its attempts to monopolize trade. Nevertheless, the interior of Kalimantan (Borneo) and Sumatra remained unaffected by the Dutch. Melaka under Dutch control never regained its importance as a shipping center.

In addition to being a trading monopoly, the Dutch East India Company also exercised sweeping authority in political, military, and diplomatic matters affecting the East Indies. Its agents exercised great freedom of action in making decisions affecting the company. Jan Pieterszoon Coen is generally regarded as the "architect" of Dutch empire in the East. His ruthlessness drove out competitors, both foreign and domestic. He defeated the Portuguese and the Spanish and made it difficult for the British to operate in the region. By 1660, the Dutch could resist any aggressor.

Dutch participation in settling local disputes enabled them to bring Sumatra under control. By extending protection to several native peoples, the Dutch also gained a trade monopoly over several groups of people, although the Dutch domination of the pepper trade was neither complete nor effective. The Dutch intervened in Java when the Madurese, with the help of pirate refugees from Macassar, attacked Mataram. The Dutch sided with Mataram, and the Madurese were defeated. As a result, the Dutch received valuable territorial and commercial privileges in western Java and Mataram.

Bantam had continued to resist the Dutch, and a domestic rivalry there helped the Dutch to bring that state under control. The eldest son of the sultan, angry that he was passed over for succession, led a successful revolt with Dutch help. As a result, the Dutch received Cheribon and other territories extending to the southern parts of Java. In 1682, they received the right to trade at Bantam. The Dutch consolidated their position in Java after the death of Amangkurat II, son of Amangkurat I of Mataram and puppet ruler of Mataram, in 1705.

The Dutch introduced slavery as well as forced cultivation of coffee and sugar into Java. Corrupt

company officials and native middlemen worked together to exploit the peasants. Stingy with payments, the company forced its unscrupulous officials to resort to private trade. During the eighteenth century, the company no longer paid salaries after employees had established a sizable outside income. Shady business practices by employees finally forced the company to pay annual dividends to company shareholders from its capital reserves. By 1780, the situation grew so bad that the company began to force donations from its employees.

The Dutch had other problems as well. An epidemic of malaria in 1732 and the massacre of several thousand Chinese residents by the Dutch in 1740 were reasons for the decline of Bantam. Moreover, the Dutch were unable to suppress Buginese piracy in the Straits of Malacca and could not exercise effective control on the west coast of Sumatra or in pirate-infested Kalimantan. British ascendancy in India cost the Dutch their trade with the Coromandel coast of south-east India. The British defeat of the Netherlands in 1781 shattered the Dutch monopoly in Southeast Asia. Finally, the French conquest of the Netherlands in 1795 completed the dissolution of the Dutch East India Company in 1799. Between 1795 and 1825, Britain enjoyed a predominant commercial position in the region. In 1799, the Dutch East India Company was disbanded, and the Netherlands assumed direct responsibility for the Dutch East Indies.

England's territorial acquisitions in the region included Penang (1786), Melaka (1795), Province Wellesley (1800), and Java (1811). England also acquired Singapore (1819–1824) and territories in Burma (Myanmar). The Dutch ruler, living in exile in England (because of French occupation of his nation) authorized England to take control of overseas Dutch possessions. England agreed to restore the possession after the war. Local Dutch officials in Indonesia disliked this arrangement and continued to exercise their control in Ternate, Macassar, Palembang, and parts of Borneo. There was a temporary restoration of peace in 1802, and the English theoretically returned the territories to the Dutch. The creation of the kingdom of Holland (1806) under Louis Napoleon led to the reestablishment of English control over Dutch colonial possessions.

Thomas Stamford Raffles (1781–1826) was appointed English governor of Java. He reformed the administrative and judicial systems in Java. In Europe, the Napoleonic wars had come to a close with Napoleon's defeat and exile. Although Raffles was expected to leave Java in 1814, he remained there until 1816 hoping to convince his superiors to keep Java but

was recalled. He was then placed in temporary charge of Melaka until it was returned to the Dutch in 1818. Raffles went on to establish an entrepôt in Singapore. In 1824, the Dutch exchanged Melaka with England for Bengkulu, a pepper port.

After the Napoleonic wars, the Dutch were fully restored in Java by 1830. They introduced the culture system to maximize production and profits. The culture system, also known as the cultivation system, was introduced by Governor Vanden Bosch. Under it, Javanese cultivators were compelled to set apart one-fifth of their land for the cultivation of commercial cash crops for export. The local chiefs were used to see that the laborers met their quota. Other aspects of the system, like assignment of land, transportation, and export, were handled by the Dutch. Native middlemen cooperated with the Dutch in exploiting the people and resources. Criticism of this government-sponsored system led to its abandonment in 1848 and the reintroduction of private enterprise in agriculture. Production increased phenomenally, but the natives did not benefit from this boom. Dutch domination of the Indonesian economy was total and complete.

The Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905 and Russia's defeat at the hands of the Japanese encouraged the rise of nationalism throughout Asia, including Indonesia. Therefore, after the First World War, there were limited efforts to introduce local self-rule, such as the people's councils or *Volksraad* (1918). However, during the 1920s and 1930s, the growth of domestic radicalism met with resistance from Dutch authorities in the Netherlands as well as in Indonesia, rather than hastening the progress toward local autonomy.

A major nationalist movement of the 1920s had been Sarekat Islam ("Islamic Association"), which the Communists infiltrated. During the 1930s, the Dutch authorities turned down proposals for reform even as war broke out in Europe, and the Dutch government was forced into exile in Britain. Although the Netherlands hoped to keep Indonesia under its control indefinitely, the Japanese army was in Indonesia by 11 January 1942.

The Japanese Occupation

The Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia (1942–1945) significantly changed the region in many ways. The Dutch East Indies surrendered to the Japanese in March 1942. The Japanese released imprisoned nationalist leaders like Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta (1902–1980, leader of the Indonesian independence movement, vice president of independent Indonesia). The Japanese attempted to win over the conquered

people, and some nationalist leaders, hoping to advance the cause of Indonesian freedom, collaborated until they realized that the Japanese wanted to supplant Dutch colonialism with Japanese imperialism. The Japanese defeat of Dutch colonial rule, however, helped the growth of Indonesian nationalism.

Independence and After (1949–1965)

A few days after the Japanese surrendered on 17 August 1945, the Indonesians under Sukarno declared independence. Sukarno became the first president of the country. The Dutch were unwilling to grant independence, and, following on the heels of the British who had landed to disarm the Japanese, the Dutch returned to Indonesia. They took back much of Indonesia but could not completely crush the nationalists. With United Nations intervention, the Netherlands agreed to grant Indonesia independence on 27 December 1949.

The government under Sukarno could not handle the serious economic problems facing the country. Ethnic, religious, linguistic, and ideological divisions once kept in check by the desire to expel the Dutch reappeared shortly after independence. Revolts broke out in different parts of the country such as West Java, Kalimantan, south Sulawesi, and Sumatra. When people became disillusioned with Sukarno's leadership, he turned to a centralized system of government called guided democracy. Having dismissed the elected parliament (1960), he appointed a new one, which elected him president for life in 1963. His attempts to use the Communist partisans to shore up his support did not endear him to the army, which was anti-Communist.

Despite his poor record at home, Sukarno was influential in international relations. In 1955, he convened the first conference of twenty-four heads of state of the Afro-Asian countries at Bandung in West Java. The conference sought closer cooperation in economic, cultural, and political fields.

When the Dutch granted Indonesia its independence, their refusal to allow West New Guinea to become part of the new country was a source of conflict between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Indonesia threatened to use force to annex the contested territory. Finally The Netherlands agreed to hand over the territory to the UN for the Indonesians to administer. In a 1969 plebiscite in which around one thousand tribal elders voted, west Irians (Irian Jaya) agreed to become part of Indonesia, and the UN accepted that decision.

Irian Jaya was not the last of Indonesia's territorial problems. The creation of the new state of Malaysia,

consisting of North Kalimantan (on Borneo), Sarawak, Malaya, and Singapore, earned Indonesia's ire. It vehemently opposed the new country as a British colonialist plot against Indonesia. In 1964, Sukarno sent his forces into the new country, but the British, with the help of the Malaysians, defeated them. In 1965, protesting the election of Malaysia as a permanent member of the U.N., Indonesia resigned from the world body. In 1975, Indonesia invaded and annexed East Timor. (In 1999, under a U.N.-sponsored referendum, East Timor voted to become independent. Unwillingly, Indonesia granted independence to the Timorese, which exacerbated secessionist tendencies in places like Aceh.)

Suharto and the New Order

In October 1965, thousands of people, perhaps as many as 500,000, perished in the reprisals of a leftist coup attempt by sections of the military. The Communists were blamed, but many innocent people were caught up in the violence. People of Chinese origin suffered most. Later, in March 1967, the parliament removed Sukarno from the presidency. Suharto became the acting president and in 1968 was appointed president. He remained in that capacity until political demonstrations, combined with economic problems, riots over food, international pressure, and the insistence of the Indonesian political and military elite, forced him out of office in May 1998.

During his presidency, Suharto (b. 1921) banned the Communist Party and embarked on a program to achieve economic recovery and political stability. Under Sukarno, the country had remained poor and backward, troubled by poverty, unemployment, and spiraling inflation. Suharto led the country back to the U.N., normalized relations with Malaysia, moved



Boys in Jakarta play next to a large painting of Sukarno, the first president of Indonesia, who ruled from 1945 to 1970. (SERGIO DORANTES/CORBIS)

Indonesia closer to the West, and joined with other Southeast Asian countries to form ASEAN in 1984. The government was able to reschedule its debt payment and to secure foreign loans through a consortium of Western countries, including the United States and the Netherlands. Foreign loans and investments and improvements in agriculture helped increase rice production. However, people in the outlying islands remained impoverished, and civil and political liberties and democratic institutions became casualties of the new order.

The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the emergence of democratic governments in eastern Europe and in most Southeast Asian nations led Suharto to call for openness in his own country. Intellectuals, religious leaders, and even legislators began to air grievances long held back. The press began to report on a vast array of once forbidden subjects. The ruling dynasty and their business practices also were scrutinized. In 1993, when Suharto was reelected president for another five-year term, openness abruptly ended.

Repression, although neither massive nor widespread, continued. Reaction to it was expressed in many forms in different parts of the nation. In some places it led to Muslim-Christian clashes and to Muslim rioters burning churches in Java. Also during this period there was intense fighting between native Dayak people and the Javanese immigrants on the island of West Kalimantan. As a result, hundreds of people lost their lives. The protesters who turned against ethnic Chinese were angry about close cooperation between the military and the Chinese elite. Corruption, police brutality, and increased inequality in the distribution of wealth also caused resentment and protest.

On the political front, the rising popularity of the leader of the opposition Indonesian Democratic Party, Sukarno's daughter Megawati Sukarnoputri (b. 1947), invited the ire of Suharto. The government incited a faction of the party to conduct party elections without Megawati and expelled her from the party leadership. Megawati's supporters occupied the party office and refused to leave until she was reinstated. The military forcibly entered the party offices and evicted the occupiers, leading to the worst rioting in Jakarta's recent history.

In 1997 and 1998, Indonesia was caught up in the Asian economic crisis and faced severe economic troubles. Indonesian currency lost its value, the stock market fell, banks failed, and millions of people lost their jobs. Popular clamor for Suharto to step down reached feverish heights and led to violent protests in several major cities. In May 1998, Suharto resigned, and his

vice president, B. J. Habibie (b. 1936), became president. In the elections held in June 1999, Megawati's party received the most votes in the house of representatives.

The following October, the people's consultative assembly elected Abdurrahman Wahid (b. 1940), the leader of the National Awakening Party, president and Megawati vice president. Wahid's tenure as president was short and tumultuous, marked by religious violence, secessionist revolts, and corruption charges. In July 2001, the People's Consultative Assembly removed Wahid from power and replaced him with Megawati, signaling a return to democratic government.

The return of democracy has not solved all of Indonesia's problems. Ethnic rivalries, religious animosities, and political squabbles continue to exist. Religious intolerance in some areas caused the torching of more than three hundred churches and the death of scores of people in the 1990s alone. Separatist tendencies exist in Aceh and Irian Jaya. Globalization continues to have its impact on the Indonesian economy. The military remains an important factor in domestic politics, and democracy is still fragile.

Nevertheless, Indonesia has come a long way; its infrastructure has improved; there are now many foreign businesses and investments; and many people's lives have improved. Indonesia has managed its oil revenues sensibly and has diversified the economy, so that it is not unduly dependent on oil revenue alone. As an active member of ASEAN, the country plays a key role in maintaining regional peace and stability. Despite its emphasis on developing closer ties to China and India, Indonesia continues to maintain good relations with Europe and North America.

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INDONESIA—POLITICAL PARTIES The origin of political parties in Indonesia dates back to the preindependence days of nationalist struggle against the Netherlands, which ruled Indonesia as the Dutch East Indies from the late seventeenth century until 1942, when the Japanese invaded during World War II. The PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, or Communist Party of Indonesia) of 1920 and PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia, or Indonesian Nationalist Party, 1927) were major colonial-period parties. When Indonesia became independent in 1945, its constitution and the pluralist ideology of *Pancasila* (Five Principles, that is, nationalism, internationalism, consent, social justice, and belief in God) were accepted in principle by political parties. Personalities rather than ideology generally determine party affiliation.

Political Parties under Sukarno

Sukarno (1901–1970), Indonesia's first president, held office from 1946 to 1967. In the early years of his presidency, liberal democracy and a multiparty environment were in the ascendancy. However, political instability caused the collapse of successive cabinets during this period, although the power of the president and the military was kept in check. The PNI, the Masjumi (Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations), the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), the PKI, and the Nahdatul Ulema (a party of Muslim scholars) were the major parties of the period. Their mutual wrangling made it difficult for party coalitions to function. Bitterness and ideological appeals marked the campaigns for the first general elections of 1955. The elections witnessed a broad party alignment: PNI and PKI on one side and the Masjumi and the Socialists on the other. The PNI fought for a state based on the ideal of *Pancasila*, whereas Masjumi's call was for an Islamic state. The PNI and the Masjumi shared fifty-seven seats in the newly elected parliament; the Nahdatul held forty-five, and the PKI held thirty-nine. With strong party discipline and maneuvering, PKI was thriving. When Sukarno later announced a change to "guided democracy," political parties were suppressed, and parliamentary democracy was nearly destroyed. In 1959 the presidential form of government was adopted, and the PSI and the Masjumi were banned the following year. A presidential decree on "party simplification" allowed just ten out of twenty-five parties to continue to function. The PNI, the PKI, and the Nahdatul Ulema were among those permitted to continue. Parliament members were nominated by Sukarno, so the parties did not have much power.

Political Parties under Suharto

Suharto (b. 1921) acted as president from 1967 until 1998, when he was forced to resign. His New Or-

der policy increased the membership of the House of Representatives from 347 to 460, with the president having the right to nominate 100 (later reduced to 75) members from the armed forces (ABRI). The members of three-fifths of the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan, or MPR) were also to be selected by the president. The Golkar Party, which was composed of different groups, became the ruling party and Suharto's vehicle for holding power. Apart from Golkar, nine parties were allowed to participate in elections. In 1970 the two broad divisions of parties that were merged were the Group for Democracy and Development and the Group for Unity and Development. The 1971 elections were stage managed. The New Order was able to assure its position because opposition parties had so little power as to be almost defunct. In 1973 the opposition forces were merged into two parties: The four Islamic parties joined the Unity Development Party (PPP), and the remaining five parties joined the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). By the thwarting of the democratic process, Suharto was reelected in 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, and 1998.

Political Parties after Suharto

Since Suharto's resignation in May 1998, the office of president has been divested of much power, with a concomitant increase in the power of parliament and political parties. The earlier authoritarian regime, which ruled with government-dominated parties, has given way to a multiparty system. President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie (b. 1936), who served as president until 1999, lifted controls on political parties, and a special session of the MPR in November 1998 advanced the dates for elections to June 1999. The new laws allowed 48 out of the 150 parties that were formed since May 1998 to participate in the elections. The parties generally adhered to the principles of *Pancasila* and shared such common programs as provincial autonomy, clean administration, and elimination of corruption. The major difference between them seemed to be their attitude toward Islam. The nationalist parties clamored for a pluralist society and the Islamic parties advocated a religious framework. The PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, or Indonesian Democracy Party-Struggle) of Sukarno's daughter, Megawati Sukarnoputri (b. 1947), drew support from nationalists, liberal Muslims, and minority groups. The PDI-P promoted a pluralist Indonesia, free market, and civil-military cooperation. The PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, or National Awakening Party) epitomizing the views of Nahdatul Ulema chief Abdurrahman Wahid and its chairman, Matori Abdul Djilil, supported tolerance and

accommodation befitting a diverse country. The PKB's main support was from eastern and central Java, with a sizable rural base and close rapport with PDI-P. The Golkar, led by Akbar Tanjung, faced an uphill task of winning the elections by legitimate means, but its secular credentials and money power were plus points in its favor. The former Muhammadiyah chairman, Amien Rais, led the major Muslim party PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, or National Mandate Party). Amien, with a strong base in social and educational institutions of Muslims, advocated federalism, strong leadership, democracy, moderation, and reforms. The PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, or United Development Party) is an Islamic party chaired by Hamzah Haz. Another Islamic party, PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang, or Crescent Star Party), was established in July 1998. Its chairman, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, followed a pro-Muslim agenda. In the elections held in June 1999 for 462 seats of the House of Representatives, the PDI-P came out on top, winning 154 seats and securing 37.4 percent of the vote. Golkar came in second, with 20.9 percent of the vote and 120 seats. The breakdown for the others was PKB, 51 seats (17.4 percent); PPP, 58 seats (10.7 percent); PAN, 35 seats (7.3 percent); and, PBB 14 seats (1.8 percent). Megawati could not muster enough strength in the presidential elections of October 1999, and Wahid of the PKB became the president. Megawati was chosen as vice president.

The free and fair elections established parliamentary democracy. However, secessionist tendencies, ethnic violence, and economic problems plagued the new administration, and a day after the MPR voted to impeach Wahid in July 2001, Megawati was proclaimed president. Indonesia has democratized to a large extent and the role of political parties in the coming years will be crucial for the smooth functioning of democracy. Megawati showed political acumen after the 11 September terrorist crisis; the fundamentalists did not destabilize the nation, and nationalist parties rallied behind her. In the post-Taliban world, Indonesia can look ahead with renewed hope for a viable political process.

Patit Paban Misbra

See also: **Budi Utomo; Golkar; Indonesian Democratic Party; Indonesia—Political System; New Order; Old Order; Pancasila; Partai Persatuan Pembangunan; Sarekat Islam.**

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INDONESIA—POLITICAL SYSTEM Although there have been dramatic changes to the Indonesian political system since the fall of President Suharto (b. 1921) in May 1998, Indonesia continues to operate under the constitution first promulgated by Indonesia's founding president, Sukarno (1901–1970), in 1945. The 1945 constitution, briefly surpassed by the 1950 constitution, which established a parliamentary system, was readopted in 1959, and a presidential system was returned to Indonesia. The presidential system remains to this day. While both the constitution and the Pancasila (the state philosophy) state that Indonesia must be a democratically governed country, the interpretation of what that means has changed over time. Elections held under Suharto (who ruled from 1966 to 1998) were not open to contest in Indonesia's "guided democracy," and the incumbent always won. Now the political system is marked by open political competition between parties and a greater separation of the three main branches of government—executive, legislature, and judiciary.

The constitution defines six organs of state: the Presidency, the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, or MPR), the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, or DPR), the Supreme Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung), the State Audit Board (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan), and the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung).

Executive Branch

Under the presidential system, the head of state has the power to initiate and give final approval to legislation and to appoint the cabinet. In a time of crisis, the president also can assume control over all of the functions of state. The president is appointed for a five-year term, but is now restricted to serving no more than two terms. If the president is incapacitated or removed, he or she is automatically succeeded by the vice president. The MPR is the highest constitutional body in Indonesia and has the power to appoint and dismiss the executive (the latter with a two-thirds majority), as well as to decide amendments to the constitution (also with a two-thirds majority). Sometimes described as an "upper house," the MPR consists of 700 representatives, who are drawn from the "lower house," or DPR (500); regional representatives (135); and "functional representatives" (65) appointed by the electoral commission. The MPR must meet at least once every five



THE PANCASILA

On 1 June 1945 President Sukarno of Indonesia set forth the Pancasila (Pantja Sila), the five principles that form the ideological basis of the Indonesian state.

Now that I have dealt with the question of Freedom, and Independence, I will proceed to deal with the question of principles . . .

The First Principle, which is to be the foundation of Our State of Indonesia, is the *principle of Nationalism*. . . .

Briefly speaking, the people of Indonesia, the Indonesian nation are not the group of individuals who, having "*le désir d'être ensemble*," live in a small area like Minangkabau or Madura or Djokja or Pasundan or Makassar; no, the Indonesian people are those human beings who, according to God-ordained geo-politics, live throughout the entity of the entire archipelago of Indonesia from the northern tip of Sumatra to Papua! All, throughout the islands! Because amongst these seventy million human beings there exists already "*le désir d'être ensemble*," the "*Charactergemeinschaft*." The Indonesian nation, the people of Indonesia, the Indonesian human beings which number seventy millions who have united to become one, and form one single entity . . .

We must not only establish the State of Free Indonesia, but we should also aim at making one family out of all nations of the world. This is the Second Principle of my philosophy of State, the *Principle of Internationalism*. But when I say "internationalism," I do not mean cosmopolitanism, for this negates nationalism, denies the existence of such nations as Indonesia, Japan, Burma, England, America, and so on. Internationalism cannot flower if it is not rooted in the soil of nationalism. Nationalism cannot flower if it does not grow within the garden of internationalism. . . .

What is the Third Principle? This is the *Principle of Consent*, the *Principle of Representative Government*. We are to establish a State "all for all," "one for all, all for one," not a State for the wealthy. . . . Allah, God of the Universe,

gave us the capacity to think, so that in our daily intercourse we might constantly burnish our thoughts. Just as the pounding and husking of paddy results in our getting rice, our best food, argument and discussion in our daily intercourse results in the clarification of our thoughts.

The Fourth Principle I am proposing is the *Principle of Prosperity*, the principle: that there be no poverty in free Indonesia. . . . The democracy we are seeking is not the democracy of the west, but a politico—economic democracy, which will result in the good life and social prosperity. . . . The people know what it is not to have enough to eat nor enough to wear, and now wish to create a new world of justice in accordance with the precepts of Ratu Adil. . . .

Thus, the people's assembly to be established must not be a body for the discussion of political democracy only, but a body which is to translate into reality the two principles: *Political Justice* and *Social Justice*. . . .

The Fifth Principle should be the recognition of the *Divine Omnipotence*, the organization of Free Indonesia on the basis of *Belief in God*. . . . The Christian should worship God according to the teachings of Jesus Christ. Moslems according to the teaching of the Prophet Mohammed, Buddhists should discharge their religious rites according to their own books. . . .

Hence, if the people of Indonesia desire that the Pantja Sila I propose become a reality . . . we must not forget the condition for its realization, viz. struggle, struggle, and once again, struggle! . . . If the people of Indonesia are not united, not determined to live or die for freedom, this freedom will never come to the Indonesian people, never, until the end of time. Freedom and independence can only be won and enjoyed by a people when the soul is aflame with the determination of "MERDEKA- FREEDOM or DEATH!"

Source: Indonesian Review. (n.d.) Vol. 1, no. 1. Jakarta.



THE PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF INDONESIA

Whereas freedom is the inalienable right of all nations, colonialism must be abolished in this world as it is not in conformity with humanity and justice;

And the moment of rejoicing has arrived in the struggle of the Indonesian freedom movement to guide the people safely and well to the threshold of the independence of the state of Indonesia which shall be free, united, sovereign, just and prosperous;

By the grace of God Almighty and impelled by the noble desire to live a free national life, the people of Indonesia hereby declare their independence.

Subsequent thereto, to form a government of the state of Indonesia which shall protect all the people of Indonesia and their entire native land, and in order to improve the public welfare, to advance the intellectual life of the people and to contribute to the establishment of a world order based on freedom, abiding peace and social justice, the national independence of Indonesia shall be formulated into a constitution of the sovereign Republic of Indonesia which is based on the belief in the One and Only God, just and humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations amongst representatives and the realization of social justice for all of the people of Indonesia.

Source: Department of Information, Indonesia. Retrieved 8 March 2002, from: <http://asnic.utexas.edu/asnic/countries/indonesia/ConstIndonesia.html>.

years to appoint the president, although special sessions can be called by the DPR. Since the fall of Suharto, a precedent or convention has developed of holding an MPR session annually (known as *Sidang Tahunan*). So far those sessions have been landmark events and have typically called for the president to account for the government's actions over the past year. In the 2000 session, President Abdurrahman Wahid (b.1940) felt compelled to offer an apology to this body for the shortcomings of his administration. A "special session" of the MPR can also be called by the DPR. On 23 July 2001, a special session ended the presidency of Wahid and overwhelmingly selected his vice president, Megawati Sukarnoputri (b. 1946) to assume the role of executive. This represents a much-changed body politic from the more authoritarian days of President Suharto.

Legislative Branch

The 500-member DPR is elected by popular vote, with the exception of the sixty-eight seats reserved for army and police appointees. The DPR, largely a powerless rubber-stamping institution until 1998, has now taken a crucial role in the creation and approval of legislation. Legislation must gain DPR assent (in tandem with presidential approval), and the DPR can also initiate bills.

Indonesia's freest elections since 1955 were held in June 1999. Elections for the 462 elected seats in the DPR are regarded by observers as the most complex in the world. Indonesia operates a system of proportional representation, uniquely combining it with elements of a district system. Seats gained in the DPR are determined at the provincial, not the national, level. Thus, for electoral purposes, Indonesia is split

into component provinces. While the allocation of seats is broadly based on population numbers, the electoral law also stipulates that there must be a minimum of one seat at the rural (*kabupaten*) and city (*kotamadya*) district level. At the time of the 1999 election, Indonesia's then 27 provinces had 327 *kabupaten* and *kotamadya*. The rest of the 135 elected seats were allocated on the basis of population, to give provinces of higher population density a fairer representation—although this did not completely solve the problem. The number of seats a party receives is determined by the number of votes it obtains in each province. Once the number of DPR members for a given party is determined, based on its proportion of the vote for a given province, the central committee of that party then has the sole decision over who should be chosen to sit in the DPR.

The 1999 election was a strong endorsement for the Indonesia Democratic Party-Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan*, or PDI-P) of Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Sukarno and the current president, which gained nearly 34 percent of the vote. The Golkar Party, Suharto's party while he was president, was its nearest rival, with almost 22.5 percent of the vote. Most of the remaining seats were won by Islamic parties. Support for Megawati did not translate into gaining the presidency in 1999, as Wahid, from the small National Awakening Party, was able to coalesce with all the other parties during the 1999 MPR session to obtain the presidency. This was very controversial in Indonesia and has led to discussion on switching to a system whereby the president is directly elected by the voters.

The Judicial Branch

The judiciary, established constitutionally as a separate arm of government, was in practice unable to challenge the wishes of the Suharto regime. However, even under a democratizing Indonesia, the courts struggle to revive their reputation and free themselves from past government and corporate collusion. The final court of appeal is the Supreme Court, with High Courts in provincial capitals, and District Courts beneath that. The Indonesian legal system, largely based on an antiquated code inherited from the Dutch, is placed into four distinct juridical spheres: the general court deals with criminal and civil issues; the religious court (*pangadilan agama*) applies to all Muslims (and only Muslims) in the family matters of marriage, divorce, and inheritance; the court martial for military discipline; and the administrative court for bureaucratic issues. This formal structure exists alongside more traditional notions of legality, known as *bukum*

adat (traditional law), which varies markedly throughout Indonesia. There is no constitutional court in Indonesia, the MPR being the sole decision maker on constitutional issues.

Provincial Level

Indonesia is now formally divided into thirty-two provinces, after the creation of new provinces since the 1999 election, although a division of the old Irian Jaya Province into three provinces is not operational, so the effective number is actually thirty. Three of these provinces are given a different status under Indonesia law: the two special provinces (*daerah istimewa*) of Yogyakarta and Aceh and the capital city of Jakarta (*daerah khusus ibukota*). Below the provincial level there are now some four hundred districts. Recent plans to devolve governmental authority in such matters as schooling, health, transport, and roads, as well as in some aspects of economic planning, are centered on these districts. Indonesia has deliberately avoided any devolution of power to the thirty-two provinces on the



Students demonstrate near parliament in Jakarta in October 1999. They are calling for the military to end its involvement in Indonesian politics. (AFP/CORBIS)

grounds that this may lead to federalism—and the current government wishes to retain the unitary state structure.

Movement toward Democracy

Despite remaining based on a constitution it inherited from more authoritarian times, Indonesia has had since 1998 a genuine separation of powers, notably between the president and parliament. While Indonesia is not yet a consolidated democracy, it has democratized to a large degree. Parliament regularly critiques the president, while a newly freed media and an emerging civil society expose government to rigorous scrutiny.

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INDONESIA-MALAYSIA RELATIONS Indonesia-Malaysia relations are marked by normalized ties and general cordiality, albeit with a troubled past and some contemporary bilateral difficulties.

Natural Affinities

The majority of people in both countries are the descendants of early Austronesian peoples who have interacted with each other over maritime Southeast Asia's various trade routes since ancient times. The Malay peoples of Malaysia have close kinship, cultural, and linguistic ties with, predominantly, the Indonesian

peoples of Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and other islands. The Sumatran-based Srivijaya empire (c. eighth to c. fourteenth century) held sway over both sides of the Malacca Strait. The national languages of Malaysia and Indonesia, respectively, Malay (*Bahasa Melayu*) and Indonesian (*Bahasa Indonesia*), share a common root in the Malay tongue, and despite some divergence are still largely mutually intelligible. Indonesia by far the largest country in Southeast Asia, has a population of 220 million, while the more developed, middle-income Malaysia has a population of just over 22 million.

Postindependence Relations

Postindependence relations between Indonesia and Malaysia were immediately marked by conflict. Indonesia under founding president Sukarno (1901–1970) viewed the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia, which included Malaya, Singapore, and former British Borneo (Sarawak and Sabah) on 16 September 1963 as an extension of colonial rule. Sukarno announced that he would "crush Malaysia" and launched a military campaign in Borneo known as Konfrontasi (the Confrontation). The conflict lasted until 1965 (although formally wound down in 1966) and in the latter stages included attacks on peninsular Malaysia and Singapore. When General Suharto (b. 1921) seized effective power in Jakarta in 1965, one of his first initiatives was to bring the conflict to an end in the interests of pursuing normalized relations with Malaysia, and he generally took a less radical foreign policy path than Sukarno.

The end of Konfrontasi paved the way for the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in which Indonesia and Malaysia were founding members alongside the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Although Sukarno had pursued anticolonial policies, the Suharto regime saw Communism as the paramount threat to Indonesia, and relations with its non-Communist neighbors were seen as crucial to regional confidence and stability. The countries within ASEAN agreed to the principle of noninterference in each other's affairs and to renounce any claims to territory legally held by another member state (this was later formally adopted in ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation—TAC). Subordination to this framework effectively pacified relations between Indonesia and Malaysia, and this remains the case to this day. Indonesia, for its part, discouraged supranationalists, who had, since Indonesia's declaration of independence in 1945, promoted Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesia) that would include all Malay and related peoples. Malaysia has refused to become embroiled in

Indonesia's domestic and regional difficulties, most notably in Aceh (situated in northern Sumatra and quite close to the Malaysian peninsula), where Malaysia has continued to recognize Indonesia's state boundaries. However, given the proximity and the ties of ethnicity and sympathy of some within the Malaysian community to Aceh, stopping all lines of supply from private Malaysian channels to the Acehnese independence movement has proved difficult.

Current Tensions

The relationship since the end of Konfrontasi has been marked by a degree of rivalry and elements of bilateral tension. There is contention over the ownership of two islands near the Sabah-Kalimantan coast—Ligitan and Sipadan. Much of the border between Kalimantan and East Malaysia is also poorly demarcated, although some progress has been made to establish part of the boundary. On two occasions (1997 and 2001) in recent years, the Malaysian authorities have had to close the border with Kalimantan because of uncontrolled ethnic violence on the Indonesian side in which elements of the Dayak community (which straddles both sides of the Borneo island) have committed acts of violence against transmigrants from other parts of Indonesia.

Although many Indonesians have entered Malaysia legally, looking to undertake employment in the domestic help and service industries, the porous land and sea boundaries have seen even larger numbers of Indonesians traveling to Malaysia through unofficial channels. It is thought that around 1 million Indonesian currently reside illegally in Malaysia. Although large numbers of these people, given the racial, cultural, religious, and linguistic similarities, have integrated themselves, often through intermarriage, into almost every Malay village and community in Malaysia, there has also been some tension with the Indonesian migrants. The presence of so many Indonesians in Malaysian society in relatively peaceful times is a sobering lesson for the Malaysian authorities about the vast numbers of Indonesians that could potentially flood Malaysia if Indonesia becomes a lot more turbulent.

In recent years Malaysia's proximity to Indonesia has made it the victim of a new hazard. In 1997, out-of-control forest fires in Sumatra and Kalimantan (later proven to be the work of large Indonesian conglomerates clearing land for plantations) saw air pollution levels rise to extremely unsafe levels in Malaysia and Singapore, and to a lesser extent Thailand. President Suharto felt compelled to apologize for the fires of

1997, and yet the same problem returned in 1998, and to a lesser extent every subsequent year during the dry season. The response of Malaysia and other affected countries has been twofold. First, with other ASEAN member nations, it subjected Indonesia to heavy criticism and joined in pressuring Indonesia to implement a "zero burning policy" in the affected regions. Second, with Singapore it gave technical assistance to help monitor "hot spots" and effectively combat them.

In the past, both countries have sought regional and Third World leadership, but in quite different ways. Indonesia has been very active in Third World forums, such as the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) and G-77. While Malaysia is an aligned state (through the Five-Power Defence Arrangements, or FPDA), the current prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad (b. 1925), has been harshly critical of the West. Elements of the Indonesian government have questioned the need for Malaysia's membership in FPDA, which links Malaysia to Australia, Britain, New Zealand, and Singapore. Indonesia's long-term goal is to remove extraregional powers from the Southeast Asian region, which it considers its own backyard. Indonesia has also been far less critical than the Malaysian leadership of internationalism and of such bodies as APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation). Differences in domestic politics have also been minor irritants. While Malaysia's prime minister has been critical of Indonesia's attempt at democracy, Indonesian officials, including the president, have openly met with Malaysian opposition figures visiting Indonesia (most notably Wan Izidah, who visited Indonesia in 2000 after the imprisonment of her husband, Anwar Ibrahim). Malaysia has asked Indonesia not to become involved in its domestic politics, deeming such involvement to be undue "interference"; however, Indonesian officials do not view such involvement as undue interference given the active multiparty environment they now must negotiate in their own country. These differences, while at times presenting bilateral difficulties, have not undermined the relationship to any significant extent.

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INDONESIA-UNITED STATES RELATIONS Indonesian leadership has long held a consensus about foreign policy, conditioned by needs of the country dating from the beginning of the struggle for independence in 1945. Indonesia has sought to be active in regional affairs without getting involved in conflict among major powers. Relations between Indonesia and the United States have fluctuated with the times and have generally, though not always, been cordial.

As conflict with the Dutch continued during the revolutionary period, Indonesia developed an anti-Western attitude, seeing Asian events as a struggle against Western imperialism. The United States was generally sympathetic to the Indonesian cause, giving it *de facto* recognition on 23 April 1947. Indonesia's first president, Sukarno (1901–1970), followed a policy of nonalignment while aspiring for a larger role in international affairs; he also became aggressively opposed to the West. The United States was neutral in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict concerning the status of Irian Jaya, and late in his incumbency Sukarno became markedly anti-American.

Relations during the Suharto Era

The ascension of Suharto (b. 1921) in 1967 changed all this, and relations with the United States became warm. Indonesia was vital to U.S.-Asian security interests because of its importance as a regional power and oil-producing nation and its strategic location at the entrance of the Indian Ocean.

Though Indonesia has entered into no military alliances, it has received military assistance from the United States since 1950, with breaks in the 1965–1966 period. The military equipment grant, used for communication systems, internal security, and so forth, averaged \$13 million per year up to 1978. The



Presidents Sukarno and Kennedy at Andrews Air Force base in Maryland on 24 April 1961. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

International Military Education and Training (IMET) program trained four thousand Indonesian military personnel between 1950 and 1992. Since 1974, Indonesia has received Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits for purchasing military equipment. In the U.S. House International Relations Committee meeting of 7 May 1998, it was revealed that U.S. Special Operations Forces had trained elite Indonesian Kopassus special forces at a cost of \$3.5 million. These forces were active against the political opponents of the government.

Indonesia and the United States have been involved in various multilateral organizations promoting international peace, nuclear disarmament, and economic development. Both are members of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and Indonesia's effort to restore democracy in Cambodia and mediate in disputes concerning the South China Sea have been appreciated by the United States.

Some discord did, however, arise in bilateral relations between Jakarta and Washington in the 1990s. The United States did not support Indonesia's claim over the straits linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans and opposed Jakarta's promotion of an ASEAN nuclear-free zone. There were differences too over the issue of intellectual property rights, and under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) legislation, Indonesia was criticized for not meeting recognized labor standards. The U.S. Congress suspended IMET grants after Indonesian security forces killed East Timorese demonstrators in November 1991; these grants were partially restored in 1995. The United States also favored the peaceful resolution of the East Timor problem, and many Americans saw to it that U.S. policy toward Indonesia depended on the latter's actions in East Timor. The United States and non-governmental organizations vehemently criticized human-rights violations, and U.S. president Bill Clinton announced suspension of U.S.-Indonesian military relations on 9 September 1999. Many perceived the United States as supporting secessionist forces, and anti-American demonstrations were held.

Relations in the Post-Suharto Era

Relations improved after Abdurrahman Wahid became president and visited the United States (10–12 November 1999). President Clinton welcomed him, stressing the territorial integrity of Indonesia and the importance of building an ongoing partnership with a democratic country. The new Indonesian president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, supported the United States after the brutal events of 11 September 2001,

becoming the first Islamic leader to visit the United States and meet U.S. president George W. Bush (19 September 2001) in the wake of the attack. She was receptive to U.S. appeals for assistance in antiterrorist measures but cautioned the U.S. president against any action that could be construed as revenge against Muslims.

U.S.-Indonesian Economic Relations

The United States has long had commercial and economic interests in Indonesia, and Indonesia received \$146.3 million in economic assistance and \$377.2 million in credit from the United States between 1950 and 1961. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has given assistance in health care, family planning, rice production, and overseas training programs. It also provided financial and technical aid during the mid-1980s oil crisis. U.S. investors dominate mining and oil sector projects, and U.S. banks, service providers, and manufacturers began expanding in Indonesia after the reforms of the 1980s.

During the Asian economic crisis that began in 1997, Indonesia received aid from the United States, among other bilateral donors. The U.S. president urged Suharto in January 1998 to follow the International Monetary Fund (IMF) plan to mitigate the crisis. New schemes were launched to help Indonesia. A USAID program totaling \$520 million was directed toward economic reform and public welfare, and Indonesia received another \$450 million through other programs. USAID also made \$70 million in the form of medical supplies and small construction projects available for rural people in eastern Indonesia. U.S. technical personnel came to implement economic reforms, and USAID supported democratization and civil society development activities through non-governmental organizations. Temporary work permits were issued to Indonesian students of U.S. universities, and the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council provided financial assistance to Indonesian students so they could finish their courses. However, pouring billions of dollars of U.S. aid into Indonesia under the Suharto regime was criticized; it was felt that the beneficiaries were large corporations and members of the armed forces and Suharto's family.

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in December 1949, Indonesia and the United States have passed through phases of understanding as well as discord. Indonesia remains vitally important to U.S. interests, both as a key to Southeast Asian security and as a moderate nation with the world's largest Muslim population. U.S. economic assistance and support of In-

donesia's territorial integrity will continue to mark the relations between the two nations as primarily cordial.

Patit Paban Mishra

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INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY In 1973, the Indonesian new Order government merged all existing political parties into two: the United Development Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), which were allowed to form a kind of alibi "opposition" to Golkar (acronym for *Golongan Karya*, "functional groups"), the electoral vehicle of the government. Whereas the PPP contained four Muslim parties, the PDI incorporated the Indonesian National Party, two Christian parties, the leftist Murba, and the army-backed Association Supporting the Independence of Indonesia. The growing alienation between the then president Suharto (1921-1998) and the military over Suharto's benign attitude toward moderate strands within resurgent Islam led to Suharto's tacit support for the Christian-backed PDI, nationalist and secular in outlook, in the 1987 general elections.

In 1993, the daughter of the former president Sukarno, Megawati Sukarnoputri (b. 1947), was elected to the PDI Party chair. Her popularity led the regime to have her ousted from party leadership in 1996. This resulted in the schism between the legal PDI and the illegal Party Fighting for Indonesian Democracy (PDI-P), the latter being led by Megawati. A few months after Suharto's demise in May 1998, Megawati and her PDI-P were massively supported in a congress in Bali. Her party emerged as the winner of the general elections in June 1999. Four months later, in October, Megawati was elected as vice president of Indonesia.

Martin Ramstedt

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INDONESIAN REVOLUTION On 17 August 1945, three days after the Japanese forces occupying Indonesia had surrendered to the Allies, Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta proclaimed independence and established the Republic of Indonesia. However, it took five years of guerrilla warfare and diplomatic efforts to establish unchallenged independence.

British troops arrived in Java in September 1945, followed by the Dutch governor-general Van Mook. Dutch efforts to regain control resulted in bitter fighting and the archipelago was divided between Republican-held territory and land reoccupied by the Dutch with British help. The Republican government made diplomatic efforts, entering into the Linggarjati Agreement in November 1946. According to this agreement, ratified on 25 March 1947, the Dutch recognized Republic of Indonesia sovereignty over Java, Sumatra, and Madura, while the Republic agreed to join with the Dutch-created regional states to form the United States of Indonesia.

In July 1947, the Dutch, claiming Republican interference with rice shipments, launched a full-scale attack, the so-called first "police action." Australia and India proposed a cease-fire and the U.N. became involved. In January 1948, the Renville Agreement was signed, instituting a truce and proposing a plebiscite. The Dutch, however, blockaded Republican territory, and in December again attacked the Republic in the second "police action." The Republic's capital, Yogyakarta, was captured and Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta allowed themselves to be arrested to help galvanize world opinion. Indonesian guerrilla forces armed with primitive weapons fought bravely, and the resistance became a people's war. Even in Dutch-held territory, the colonial army was forced to retreat to urban areas. World reaction was sharp, and Indian premier Jawaharlal Nehru convened the Asian Conference on Indonesia in January 1949, urging the U.N. to intervene. The Security Council ordered an imme-

diately cease-fire, and the Dutch government, bowing to international pressure and popular resistance, entered into negotiations. The Hague Agreement of 27 December 1949 transferred sovereignty to the Indonesian Federal Government consisting of the Republic and fifteen Dutch-created states. By 17 August 1950 the, the Dutch-created states of the Federation had joined the Republic, and the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia was restored as originally proclaimed five years previously.

Adroit Republican diplomacy, internationalization of the issue, guerrilla warfare, and popular desire for independence foiled Dutch attempts to restore colonial rule. The revolution has become integral to Indonesian consciousness, and *Merdeka* (freedom) has acquired a special meaning.

Patit Paban Misbra

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INDORE (2001 pop. 1.8 million). Indore is the largest city of Madhya Pradesh state in central India. It is situated on the banks of the Saraswati and the Khan rivers and derives its name from the eighteenth-century temple of Sangamnath, or Indreshwar, located at the confluence of the two rivers.

Indore's importance developed from its location on the route the Maratha guerrilla warriors of the Deccan took to North India. The Marathas were constantly battling against the Mughal empire (1526–1857). Their army transit camps drew the local zamindars (landlords) who, attracted by trade possibilities, settled in the villages at the confluence of the Khan and Saraswati rivers. The city grew rapidly under the Holkar dynasty (1733–1818). It became the capital of the Indore state in 1818, after the British forces defeated the Holkars. Between 1948 and 1956, Indore served as the summer capital of the former Madhya Bharat state.

Indore today is the commercial capital of Madhya Pradesh. It has the fourth largest cotton textile industry in the nation. Besides iron and steel, chemicals and machinery are also manufactured here. It is also famous for its oilseed extraction industry and manufacture of confectionery, paper, machine tools and

accessories, and electronic goods. It also has one of the largest transshipment centers for truck transport.

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INDUS RIVER The 3,180 kilometer-long Indus River, anciently called the Sindhu (whence our word Hindu) and mentioned as such by Greek writers, is the major river of Pakistan, running throughout the length of the country. It begins in Tibet in the glaciers of the Kailas Range (where it is known as the Xiquan He), passing through Ladakh, Kashmir, Punjab, and Sind before emptying into the Arabian Sea in a level, muddy delta near Karachi. Although this delta is little cultivated, the broad river plain was the locus of the Indus Valley civilization (also called the Harappan or Mohenjo Daro civilization). Geological research has shown that the lower course of the river has changed often; such a change is one possible explanation for the end of that civilization.

The Himalayan sections of the river's course present some of the most impressive scenery in the world,



particularly where it cuts through the Ladakh Range about 160 kilometers above Leh. In this region the Indus derives from three tributaries coming out of the Kailas glaciers. The northernmost of these tributaries forms the road from Leh to the Jhalung goldfields, and the southern one forms the ancient trade route from Ladakh to Lhasa and on to China.

The river is navigable by small craft as far as Hyderabad in Pakistan. A modern dam at Sukkur supplies irrigation and electric power. Another vast dam is under construction at Tarbela, near Gilgit in the disputed area of Azad Kashmir. The drainage basin of the Indus has been computed at 963,400 square kilometers.

Paul Hockings

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INDUS RIVER DOLPHIN The Indus River dolphin (*Platanista minor*), known in Pakistan as the *susu*, is sometimes called the "blind dolphin" because its eyes lack lenses. This virtual blindness, scientists speculate, is due to the high silt content of its river habitat. The dolphin relies on a highly developed system of echolocation (using sound waves to locate prey) to navigate and hunt for fish.

The Indus River dolphin is a separate species from the Ganges River dolphin (*Platanista gangetica*). It is 2 to 2.5 meters long and weighs 80 to 90 kilograms. A freshwater cetacean (aquatic mammal), the dolphin is an endangered species, having a population of about 675 in the mid-1990s. The dolphin is fully protected in Pakistan; in 1974 the Indus River Dolphin Reserve was established on the Indus River from the Sukkur Barrage to the Guddu Barrage in Sind Province in Pakistan. About 500 dolphins live in Sind Province, and about 175 live in Punjab Province. Despite legal protection, since the 1930s the dolphins have been threatened by the construction of dams throughout the Indus River system, which have degraded their habitat and impeded migration. The dams have also separated the dolphins into several small groups, which threatens the genetic diversity of the population. Occasionally, the dolphins are accidentally caught in fishing nets.

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INDUSTRY—WEST ASIA Industry is a fundamental economic sector for West Asian nations (Iran, Iraq, and Turkey) nowadays. Since the end of the 1980s, the main sources of industrial growth in the region are local and foreign investments and the dynamism of the private sector. In the 1990s, industry contributed between 25 and 35 percent to the gross national product (GNP) of the West Asian nations and employed approximately 25 percent of their labor forces.

Industrial Resources

West Asia has a wide range of mineral resources. Petroleum is the most important subterranean asset, found in large amounts in Iran and Iraq. These two nations are among the main producers and exporters of oil in the world. The remaining oil reserves of Iraq and Iran are estimated at 126 and 108 billion barrels, respectively. With Russia, Iran has the world's largest reserves of natural gas. Turkey has no known

extensive petroleum resources, but it has large deposits of high-grade bituminous coal, which lies along the Black Sea coast, with Zonguldak as the chief mining center. Poor-quality coal is found in various locations in West Asia.

West Asia's ores are associated predominantly with the geologic fold of the Taurus and Elburz Mountains. Turkey and Iran have commercial quantities of chromites, West Asia's second most important mineral in world terms after petroleum. Turkish and Iranian deposits of iron, lead, zinc, and copper ores are found in various locations and have significance chiefly for their internal markets. Turkey also has rich deposits of boron salts, meerschaum, and perlite. Iran is rich in gypsum, manganese, lead, tin, and gold. Iraq's main raw materials excluding oil are phosphates and sulfur, though there are also deposits of glass sand, iron, copper, and salt. Iraqi natural sulfur reserves, at an estimated 515 million metric tons, are among the largest in the world. Clay, building stones, and limestone, suitable for cement production, are widespread in West Asia.

The agrarian sector also produces many raw materials needed in West Asia's manufacturing industry. Among the most important materials available for processing are cereals, cotton, sugar beets, olive oil, wool, skins, and hides. Generally, Turkey and Iran have more diverse agricultural bases for industrial development than does Iraq.



A marble quarry near the ancient city of Aphrodisias, Turkey, in 1984. (JONATHAN BLAIR/CORBIS)

Industrial Policies

Early efforts toward industrial development in West Asia focused on the processing of local products. Factories were initially built to produce food, beverages, textiles, and leather goods. After World War II, the emphasis switched from light to heavy industry. The main goals of the governments of Turkey, Iraq, and Iran have been to build up basic industries as a means of import substitution, and in the cases of Iran and Iraq, to develop a broader industrial base to reduce reliance on oil. In Iran, state companies dominate industry, but many new private-sector companies have been formed since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Moreover, the share of the private sector grew in the mid-1990s after approximately four hundred state-owned companies, mostly in light manufacturing, were privatized. Due to the war with Iraq (1980–1990), several major industrial schemes had to be postponed. After the end of the war, a government reconstruction program revived these projects and restored war-damaged industries. In the 1990s, the Iranian government gave priority to the development of the mining and metals processing, automotive, pharmaceuticals, and petrochemicals sectors.

During the first decades after World War II, Iraq established its basic steel and chemical industries. In the 1970s, automobile industries, as well as production of construction materials and household consumer goods, were established and expanded. Most funding, however, was directed toward petrochemicals. In the 1980s, the development of a local arms industry was the government's top priority because of the war with Iran and the arms embargo by foreign countries on both Iraq and Iran. In the 1990s, the Iraqi government gave priority to establishing downstream oil and natural gas industries (that is, industries that further process oil and natural gas). Import substitution of basic heavy goods is still an important aspect of Iraqi industrial policy.

In the early 1960s, the Turkish government introduced five-year development plans and a related annual economic program within each five-year period, which aimed to encourage industrial growth and a shift away from agriculture. In 1980, an economic stability program was adopted, followed by radical changes in the monetary, fiscal, foreign-trade, and foreign-currency exchange-rate policies. A transformation was initiated in the direction of industrialization based on exports directed to foreign markets, instead of industrialization based on substitution of imports directed to domestic markets. Free-trade zones and international fairs in the 1980s were influential in the development of Turkish industry and its integration with world markets. As a result of these efforts aimed at the

development of the industrial sector, the share of industrial products in the total exports of Turkey increased from 36 percent to 77.4 percent between 1980 and 1998. Certain problems in the performance of Turkish industry arise from the State Economic Enterprises, which are a system of public-sector companies. They are generally inefficient and add a heavy burden to the government budget deficit.

Mining Industry

Expansion of minerals production in West Asia has traditionally suffered from shortages of foreign currency for machinery and from limited technical skills. Technical cooperation and joint-venture negotiations with foreign governments and companies to develop the mining sector are important for all West Asian countries. The main minerals companies in West Asia are state owned, but governments are trying to encourage private investment in mineral exploration and production.

The main products of Turkish mining are iron ore, coal, lignite, bauxite, and copper. Turkey is also among the world's largest producers of boron and a leading exporter of chrome, meerschaum, and perlite. Other important minerals mined in Turkey are barite, mercury, and wolfram. Iraq's mining industry produces phosphates, sulfur, and building materials. Uranium is also available as a by-product of phosphates. The phosphates industry was established late, in 1982, and two towns were built, together with water-, oil- and gas-supply facilities in the sparsely populated western desert region. The Mishraq natural sulfur project near Mosul began production in 1971.

The Iranian mining industry produces iron, coal, and copper. Iran is also among the largest producers of gypsum and chrome in the world. Iran and Turkey together produce around 15 percent of the world's output of chromites each year.

Energy

In 1998, West Asia's oil-refinery capacity was above 125,000 metric tons of oil per year. Iran is the leading nation, ensuring more than half of the whole production. (See Table 1.)

The beginnings of the oil industry in West Asia date back to 1908, when petroleum was discovered on the western side of the Zagros Mountains in southwest Iran. Iranian oil facilities were quickly expanded during World War I. As important oil discoveries were made and new oil fields were brought into production during the following decades, the geographical pattern was changed, and oil was found in other areas. However, due to geological conditions, the western slopes

TABLE 1

Selected energy resource production in 1999						
(in millions of metric tons of oil equivalent)						
Country	Coal	Crude oil	Natural gas	Production of electrical energy 1997		
				Net total production (million kWh)	Conventional thermal, %	Hydroelectric, %
Iran	..	175.2	47.3	95,794	92.0	8.0
Iraq	..	125.5	..	29,561	98.0	2.0
Turkey	24.4	103, 296	61.0	39.0

SOURCE: Euromonitor (2001).

of the Zagros Mountains near the Persian Gulf are still the site of the largest Iranian oil fields. Immediately before World War II, Iranian oil production exceeded 10 million metric tons. Starting in 1943, the development of the Iranian oil industry was accelerated when more petroleum fields were connected to the Abadan refinery on the Shatt al Arab by pipelines. In the beginning of the 1950s, the oil industry experienced troubles due to political disagreements between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Iranian government. A compromise was reached in 1954, when an agreement was signed between the Iranian government and a group of oil companies generally known as the Consortium. In the Consortium were seventeen U.S., British, Dutch, and French companies.

Iran and Iraq were among the nations that established the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960. Production of oil, gas, and electricity was seriously affected by the Iran-Iraq war. In the early 1990s, Iran rebuilt its devastated oil and gas facilities, including the 628,000-barrels-per-day Abadan oil refinery and the oil installations at the Persian Gulf port of Lavan. Several petrochemical projects realized in the 1990s have transformed Iran from a major importer of petrochemicals to a net exporter. Three state companies are now responsible for the oil, gas, and petrochemicals sectors in Iran. Oil exports are crucial to the Iranian economy, providing over 90 percent of foreign-exchange earnings.

Creation of the oil industry in Iraq began later and was carried out at a slower speed than in Iran. Petroleum was first discovered in commercial quantities along the Iranian border, in 1923. An important oil discovery took place in 1927, when oil was found at Kirkuk. Subsequently, new fields have been brought into production at Mosul, Basra, Rumaila, and other places, but Kirkuk has remained the main source of Iraqi crude oil. The monopoly position of the Iraqi Petroleum Company caused some difficulties after

1952, which strongly affected the development of the oil industry. The situation was changed in the 1970s through nationalization of the northern oil fields and most of the oil facilities. The Iraqi oil sector was seriously damaged by Iranian air raids in the early 1980s. After the war, Iraq rehabilitated its oil-refining and gas industries. However, during the Persian Gulf War (1990–1991), some oil refineries, petrochemical plants, and about 90 percent of Iraq's electricity-generating and -distribution capacity were damaged by Allied air raids. During the 1990s, Iraqi oil and energy facilities were gradually repaired.

Although a leader in the total production of electricity in West Asia, Turkey usually experiences energy shortages. Additionally, Turkey is only 15 percent self-sufficient in its oil needs. Consequently, large quantities of crude oil have to be imported, mainly from OPEC countries, as well as some electricity. Contemporary Turkish energy policy is focused on ensuring reliable and sufficient supplies, broadening energy imports, and achieving greater energy efficiency. Investment in the energy sector has remained a priority. In comparison with the other two countries, Turkey has much better developed hydroelectric power. (See Table 1.) In 1998, West Asia's oil-refinery capacity was above 125,000 metric tons of oil per year. Iran leads in West Asia, accounting for more than half of West Asia's total refinery production.

Manufacturing

The beginning of West Asia's manufacturing took place in Turkey and Iran, countries with a relatively diversified resource base and large populations. Copper-smithing, carpet making, and other craft industries had developed for many centuries, until textile manufacture and food production were established during the nineteenth century, using mechanical power and machines in factories. Sustained industrial development continued in the twentieth century and acceler-

TABLE 2

Production of selected manufacturing products						
(in thousands of metric tons)						
Country	Crude steel (1997)	Sulphuric acid (1997)	Cement (1997)	Paper and paperboard (1998)	Cigarettes (in millions; 1999)	Meat (1999)
Iran	6,322	200	17,426	205	11,860	1,463
Iraq	300	..	18,000	18	5,794	106
Turkey	17,795	947	36,054	951	74,984	1,244

SOURCE: Euromonitor (2001).

ated after World War II, when a start was made on building up heavy industry. Turkey has the highest level of manufacturing development in West Asia nowadays. At the end of the 1990s, Turkish manufacturing accounted for about 80 percent of the country's total industrial production. Fourteen percent of Turkey's GDP comes from textile and apparel production, and this sector accounts for over 20 percent of manufacturing employment.

In Iran, the largest industrial conglomerate is the National Iranian Industries Organization, a state-owned group, whose companies are in nine industrial sectors: textiles, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, food, footwear and leather, electrical goods, construction, cement, and celluloid. These companies account for about 25 percent of Iran's total industrial output. In the 1980s and 1990s, West Asia's consumption of manufacturing goods fluctuated because of the war between Iraq and Iran and

the lack of foreign exchange, especially for the products of heavy industry. The major metallurgy factories are in Turkey and Iran. These countries are also the main producers of chemical products, woodworking, and food and leather products. (See Table 2.)

The reconstruction programs in Iran and Iraq have greatly increased cement requirements, but Turkey is still the main producer of cement. Contemporary West Asia's machine-building industry imports machines and spare parts, and most of its branches are heavily dependent on Western technology. Moreover, the normal running of existing machinery is often interrupted by poor servicing caused by a shortage of technicians and skilled workers. The leading producer of machinery is Turkey, whose internal market shows increasing interest in a variety of items.

The increasing local demand for cars, for example, has encouraged more foreign companies to consider



The "X7"—the first entirely Iranian-conceived automobile—on display at the Tehran International Automobile Fair in June 2001. (AFP/CORBIS)

establishing a local operation in Turkey. The number of cars assembled in Turkey increased from 31,529 in 1980 to 250,000 in 1998. The biggest car maker is TOFAS (Turk Otomobil Fabrikasi A.S). In late 1988, the largest Iranian automobile manufacturer, Iran Khodro, reverted to the private sector after having been taken over for the war effort. Both Turkey and Iran manufacture trucks, cars, vans, buses and minibuses, and appliances for household use.

Regional Disparities

West Asia is a region of grave regional disparities, to a large extent due to the pattern of industrial development. The main industrial centers are the capitals of Ankara, Tehran, and Baghdad, with their large and wealthy markets, and the major provincial towns, like Istanbul, Esfahan, and Mosul. They concentrate much of the industrial establishments and workforce, and the gap between them and the other regions is considerable. This generates the inevitable uneven development.

The future of industry in West Asia depends on several factors, mainly the economic policies of the three nations, the presence of adequate investments, both foreign and domestic, and political stability in the Middle East.

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INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY Emerging economies in Asia are experiencing dramatic changes in patterns of ownership and investments in their information technology (IT) sec-

tors. Such investments continue to revolutionize societies across political frontiers, leading to a race for a larger share of global markets.

Information technology is the various ways by which communication takes place electronically, whether for personal, corporate, or intergovernmental services. It represents convergence, which is the merging of content and carriage via multimedia channels. The Asian nations that are leading in this area are Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. China has a vast market potential and profits from the advances made by Hong Kong. Japan took the lead when the government in the 1970s declared its pursuit of a *joboka shakai* (information society) and directly encouraged the growth of its semiconductor industry competing in global markets. South Korea led with *chaebols* (large family-owned corporations) that imported IT and adjusted technology to suit its domestic market. In Singapore and Taiwan, government-led advances in IT were directed toward export-led growth. Malaysia, Indonesia, and India lagged behind because their governments lacked political vision, leadership, and funding resources at a time when the IT sector was taking off.

Information technology is important because it contributes to the growth of all other sectors in an economy. Information technology development has made the region concentrate on its competitive strengths in global markets through continued priority in investments in the IT sectors. This has resulted in the emergence of more democratic government and greater scope for entrepreneurship.

The Internet Economy and the Information Technology Sector in Asia

Asia has made strong inroads into the world Internet economy, which will top \$1 trillion by the end of 2002, as estimated by Accenture, a U.S.-based consulting firm. Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Taiwan have invested vast sums of money in teleports, cyberports, and technology parks to advance the use of the Internet and electronic commerce. South Korea takes the lead in using broadband (wider electromagnetic spectrum) technologies for faster access to the Internet and higher volumes of data exchange and storage. Japan takes the lead in the Third Generation (3G) wireless technology, which enables Internet access on cellular telephones. Internet users in Asia totaled 37 million in 2001, compared with 30 million in Europe. In Asia, digital networks redefine what kinds of infrastructure are possible under the sweeping trend of converging technologies. Both the Asian Tigers (Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) and develop-

ing nations such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand have moved to liberalize their state-owned telephone companies and introduce competition. Investments in improving access to telephones depend on the degree of liberalization as well as the willingness of the telecommunications companies to provide citizens with affordable telephone services.

E-commerce is soaring in Asia; B2B (business-to-business) transactions are expected to soar to 7.3 trillion in 2004, according to Accenture. The feverish activities of the "dot com" firms in Asia are not the full extent of the changes that the Internet is bringing to Asia. Some nations, such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong, have invested in cybercities to house IT companies.

China

China has the second-largest market in the world for telecommunications equipment. It invested \$100 billion in its ninth Five-Year Plan between 1995 and 2000 to upgrade and extend its fiber-optic land lines, with contracts awarded to Alcatel (a French firm) and to Lucent of the United States for digitized telephone exchanges. China's gross domestic product (GDP) in 2000 was \$1.08 trillion, compared with \$9.87 trillion in the United States and \$4.75 trillion in Japan. But what is more amazing is that China's IT sector was growing at 25 percent per annum, overtaking the growth of GDP of 12 percent per annum. Internet connections have been installed under the directive of the Ministry of Information Industries (MII) to cover forty-three cities that constitute the Chinapac network for data transmission. The MII is also connecting one thousand universities under CERN (China Educational Research Network) to use the Internet. Cisco Systems has the contract for the routers and Sprint for the telephone backbone. According to Minister Wu Jichuan, one more telephone company is to be developed to compete with China Telecom, which will provide services to the neglected provinces in the north. With so much liberalization and with China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in November 2001, China still has to make some drastic changes to its market economy. It must make it possible for other member nations of the WTO to reach its 1.3 billion consumers and lift some restrictions on foreign participation in its joint ventures, increasing to 33 percent and to 49 percent after three years. Even within its own domestic sector, it will have to give a larger role to its private enterprise. China's foreign trade now totals \$475 billion per year, making it the world's seventh-largest trading nation.

China manufactures and launches its own satellites. Its satellite-launch equipment, called the Long March

II and III rockets, is used for international spacecraft. China has permitted contracts with Hughes, Lockheed Martin, and Space Systems Loral for satellite equipment in the past. But when the U.S. Congress approved the Cox Commission's report (1999), all new contracts were stopped, dealing a severe blow to the U.S. satellite industry. Chinasat is a flourishing company within China. In November 2001, the MII authorized a new telecom giant called China Telecommunications Satellite Group Corporation, involving Chinasat and AP Star in Hong Kong, to serve as a telecom operator.

The wireless revolution is also overtaking China as 2 million cell phone users are being added every month, and 14 million pagers are imported each year in addition to those produced domestically. In 1994, a cell phone in China cost \$2,000, but today it costs \$200 because of economies of scale.

Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand

Malaysia's Vision 2020 program has become the linchpin for its IT sector and has helped the nation out of its financial crisis despite the capital controls instituted by Malaysia's prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad. Vision 2020 involves a \$20 billion investment in the Multimedia Super Corridor (MMSC). The corridor will include two cities based on electronic networks: Putrajaya, to house a paperless bureaucracy, and Cyberjaya, to develop convergent IT. Malaysia was the first nation to privatize its telephone authority, in 1976, and promulgated the Multimedia Communication Reform Act in 1998. The Japanese company Nippon Telephone and Telecommunications Company (NTT) invested \$2.5 billion to install ATM (asynchronous transfer mode) switches and a fiber backbone for Cyberjaya. A new broadband infrastructure has been put in place to propel Malaysia to the forefront of the region's industry and to compete with neighboring Singapore. Since privatization of its telephone company, Malaysia has spent \$4.5 billion to upgrade its fixed-line services and to install ISDN (integrated services digital network, a high-speed Internet infrastructure) to the interior of the peninsula. The teledensity rose to 19 percent, and the market for telecommunication services has been growing at 12 percent, overtaking GDP growth. Private-sector investment has been 15 percent of the total. A private company, Benariang, was given the contract to launch MEASAT (Malaysian East Asian Satellites), with the two first satellites' beam extending over Singapore and the Philippines. The third-generation satellite has a more extensive footprint, covering India and South Africa. It uses DTH (Direct to Home)

technology for its broadcasts and attracted an investment of \$1.8 billion from U.S. West in a joint venture. American computer and technology firms such as Microsoft, Sun Microsystems, and Oracle have located their subsidiaries in the Cyberjaya experiment. Japan announced an aid package of \$2.1 billion in 1999 to help Malaysia expand its semiconductor export industry.

Indonesia, despite its troubled economy, was the first Asian nation to own its own domestic satellite, called Palapa. It leased the transponders (channels) of that satellite to Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Papua New Guinea as far back as 1976 to earn revenues for several years. Even so, Indonesia has only two telephones per one hundred people despite having the fourth-largest population in the world. Indonesia's state monopoly, PT Telekom, sought a loan of \$40 million to pay for its new satellite, Telekom I, which was launched in February 1999. The total cost of the satellite was \$191 million; it was built by Lockheed Martin of the United States. It will serve Indonesia's voice and data needs for fifteen years. The best technology to link an archipelago of thirteen thousand islands has been satellite. Despite the economic malaise that hit the nation in 1997, Lockheed Martin joined a three-nation venture for a roaming access cellular system called AceS with Indonesia's Nusantara system and Jasmine International of Thailand. It will provide telephone, television, and multimedia services to all the islands. The satellite is called Garuda, and it also provides radio communication.

Thailand is also developing its telecommunications infrastructure rapidly with foreign direct investment, which increased after the partial privatization in 1995 of its telephone networks, both domestic and international. Contracts were awarded to private firms to build a 1.9-million-telephone land line throughout the nation. Telecom Asia is the biggest private company in the IT field. The goal is to build as many telephone lines in Bangkok as there are in Manhattan. The World Bank has given loans to Thailand to build public telephone booths in the rural areas of the nation. Thailand's satellite industry is entirely in the private sector, which consists of the Shinawatra Company, owned by the prime minister. Thaisat satellites supply communications throughout Thailand. The Samarat Company supplies Internet services in a joint venture with Sun Microsystems. The same company provides the Thai Tradenet, which allows foreign companies to access their subsidiaries for intranet services. As predicted by the World Bank's *Annual Development Report 1999*, IT is the driving force behind the recovery of Bangkok's economy.

Singapore and Taiwan

The economies of Singapore and Taiwan have been in the vanguard of the technology revolution, which enabled them to withstand the financial crisis in 1997–1998. Singapore prides itself in being the "Intelligent Island" of Asia. It retained the confidence of its foreign investors because of the integrity of its government system. Sing Tel is Asia's most efficient telecommunications company, with a market capitalization of \$40 billion in joint ventures in twenty-one nations. From 2000, Sing Tel opened its local and international call services to competition and provides broadband open network services to all homes and businesses. Singapore was the first nation in Asia to set up a teleport, which it set up on Batam Island in collaboration with Indonesia and Malaysia. The teleport operates like an airport with communications traffic instead of passengers. Singapore has a Tradenet system, which documents on computers all trade that passes through its busy harbor, making it the transshipment center of the Pacific. Singapore's computerized stock exchange, Simex, is linked to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange twenty-four hours a day. A national computer board has been responsible for the development of the nation's Science Park and the computer education of all its citizens, young and old.

Despite Internet content being restricted in Singapore, the government encourages the growth of "netpreneurs" and venture capitalists and discourages resellers of telecom services. DSL (digital subscriber lines, a broadband Internet infrastructure) is proliferating on the island to provide video on demand on the same platform as other telecom services. Additionally, there is Group W network services, which houses the Asia Broadcast Center with 11-meter satellite receiving dishes for incoming signals from Panamsat 2 and 4, Apstar I, and Palapa C1, which are satellites whose footprints cover the entire Pacific Rim. Its Media One service links all homes to cable television services.

Taiwan has been one of the prosperous Asian Tigers. It planned its economic growth around its export sector to build large foreign currency reserves as high as \$100 billion when the financial crisis arose in Southeast Asia in 1997. Taiwan has permitted private competition in its telephone service supplies and built a strong semiconductor industry, moving on to sophisticated computers. The nation's private sector has played a leading role in its high-tech development. Hsinchu Park is the world's third-largest technology center, making Taiwan a global leader in producing notebook computers, ahead of the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Taiwan also manufactures the lowest-priced circuit boards that go into 65 percent of

the world's computers. Acer is the largest computer manufacturer in Taiwan, selling its products in China and the rest of Asia. Asustech is another Taiwanese company. It supplies 8 percent of the world's market for motherboards for computers. On the whole, Taiwan has large investments overseas, with \$25 billion in China and \$30 billion in Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines combined.

South Korea and Japan


In contrast to Singapore, South Korea was battered by the financial crisis. Korea Telecom had already been privatized as far back as 1989 under the Telecommunications Business Law. Dacom, which was set up for data communications, is still in the private sector and competes with Korea Telecom, in which the government still has a major stake. Dacom has set up the online infrastructure for the entire nation, which stimulates the Internet economy domestically. South Korea has attained convergence in telecommunications better than any other Asian Tiger. It distinguishes between different suppliers, which converge in their operations such as networking, programming, and broadcasting. It is the Asian leader of the broadband spectrum to provide speed and volume on the Internet. The global market for Internet-ready cell phones is likely to rise to \$1 trillion in the next five years, placing South Korea in competition with Japan for the Asian market.

In Japan, the longtime monopoly of Nippon Telephone and Telecommunications (NTT) was ended by decree in December 1996, and later NTT was divided into three companies, consisting of two local exchange carriers and one long-distance carrier. Despite this decree, NTT continues to dominate the domestic market and competes with Kokusai Denshin Denwa (KDD). KDD has merged with Tokyo Telecommunications Network, which is a subsidiary of the Electric Company of Tokyo. Japan has taken the lead in wireless communications with the rollout of the new global standard called 3G (Third Generation) for its DoCoMo service, now used by 25 million Japanese. The new I-mode standard in Japan equips cell phones with cameras so that pictures taken are immediately transported on the Internet. This broadband access is thought to give the best benchmark for a nation's progress toward widespread access. South Korea still leads with 38 percent broadband access, compared with Japan's 3.4 percent.

So far, Japan has kept its telecommunications market restricted to domestic suppliers; thus in February 2001, the European Union and the United States increased their pressure on Japan to enhance competi-

tion and threatened to file a complaint to the WTO if this was not done with speed. There are an estimated 50 million Internet users in Asia, of whom 22 million are in Japan, thereby giving the advantage of a critical mass to Japanese suppliers. Fujitsu of Japan and Nokia of Finland are competing to build transmission stations around the globe for wireless telephony because it is a trillion-dollar industry. Sony of Japan is experimenting with building cell phones that will double as multimedia players.

The *Wall Street Journal* ("A Tidal Wave Sweeps Asia," 12 March 2001: 5–8) reported that "a tidal wave sweeps Asia because of the deregulation of undersea cable construction and continued leaps in fiber optic technology." Today's equipment can transmit three times more data over a given pair of fibers than could the same-priced equipment in 1999. Singapore's SEA ME WE (Southeast Asia, Middle East, Western Europe) cables, along with the PacRim cables, have linked Asia with the United States and Europe. The FLAG (Fiber Link Around the Globe) undersea cable has linked the Atlantic with the Pacific landing in Shanghai. Global Crossing Asia has completed its system linking Asia with the United States. It is equipped with an automatic backup system called a self-healing capability that reroutes data transmission if there is a break in the cable. Lack of demand perhaps led to the bankruptcy of Global Crossing, and Sing Tel and Hutchison Wahampoa considered purchasing it. In this competitive environment, Fujitsu of Japan and Alcatel of France built the Southern Cross undersea cable, which passed through Hawaii and landed in San Luis Obispo in the United States. Tyco is also a player in the Pacific, with a system called Pacific Crossing-1, connecting the United States with Japan. The principal



INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY GIANTS

Of the ten largest information equipment firms in Asia, eight are in Japan. They are Hitachi, Toshiba, Fujitsu, NEC, Mitsubishi, Canon, IBM Japan, and Ricoh. The two non-Japanese firms are Samsung Electronics in South Korea and Flextronics in Singapore.

Source: AsiaWeek (9 November 2001), 121.

owners are KDD, Marubeni of Japan, and Global Crossing. The first link came into service in 2000. It is estimated that \$36 billion will be spent on submarine cables worldwide, of which \$15 billion will be invested in trans-Pacific routes, eclipsing the investment across the Atlantic.

India

In India, the Internet is cable based and is growing rapidly. The International Data Corporation predicts that India will have 5 million Internet users by 2003, making it the fourth-largest market in Asia. Currently, 200 of the Fortune 1,000 companies outsource their requirements to India. India earns considerable foreign exchange in IT-based exports, which are expected to rise to \$50 billion by 2008. Even traditional corporations are investing in supply chain management, e-commerce, and e-business solutions. The nation's expertise in software production enables it to lead other Asian low-income nations in IT. India's National Association of Software and Service Companies estimates that India will earn \$1 billion in 2002 from its software industry.



Minister for Information Technology and Parliamentary Affairs Pramod Mahajan of India at a press conference on 8 June 2000, where he discusses plans to expand the Indian IT sector. (AFP/CORBIS)

From 1999 onward, regulations have permitted 100 percent foreign direct investment in India's IT industry but not in retail trading. India reformed its telecommunications sector in 1999 by setting up its Telecom Regulatory Authority and a new telecommunications policy to liberalize this fastest-growing sector of the economy. The monopoly carrier has been VSNL (Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd.), but the government had planned to end its monopoly in April 2002. The government has licensed nine private operators of VSAT (very small aperture terminals) to supply phone services to remote and rural areas via satellite. Even for corporate communications VSATs are used for data transmission using wideband channels. In 1999, the government appointed the Commission on Convergence of Broadcasting, Telecommunications, and Information Technologies, which recommended a regulatory body to take care of spectrum allocation disputes as well as licensing of service providers. Also, the Information Technology Act of 2000 is an important milestone in India's development because it deals with electronic transactions and protects digital signatures. It also recognizes the digital filing of government documents. In India, the slow speed of web connections hinders obtaining information on the Internet.

Bridging the Asian Digital Divide

Asia is leading the web phone race because Asian nations have the world's newest digital networks. According to author Jeremy Rifkin, only one-fifth of the world's population has access to information technology. Half the world's population has never used a telephone. Villages in India, Indonesia, and China are isolated by their lack of communications. Farmers do not know the market prices for their crops and are swindled by businesspeople who profit from their ignorance. In emergencies farmers have to walk to get help because there is no access. The Independent Commission of the International Telecommunications Union, based in Geneva, issued its *Missing Link Report* to emphasize this disparity of access to telephones in the Third World and recommended that there be a public phone booth within twenty minutes of walking in every village around the globe. However, even in the twenty-first century the link is still missing despite the advances made in information technology and growing investments by national governments to place their nations on the global information superhighway. Although the metropolitan centers in China, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines have all the sophisticated technologies, including wireless services, the remote areas of those nations are starved for access. Such disparities have led to social



OUTSOURCING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY TO ASIA

A combination of high overhead in the United States and strong cultural ties between the domestic and Asian information technology industries have led many companies to outsource labor-intensive software programming to Asia and Eastern Europe.

India has always been a major player in information technology (IT); they even make their own supercomputers for predicting monsoons. It wasn't until the Y2K bug emerged that the need for legions of cheap programmers really arose, however, and American companies began to see the potential for outsourcing overseas. After Y2K the IT service industry exploded, with American companies outsourcing everything from data entry to customer service to India and other Asian countries.

India was a natural choice for outsourcing. Many American technology companies were either created by or employ nonresident Indians (NRIs) or Indian-Americans who still have strong ties to family and friends in India. This cultural bridge combined with the vast pool of cheap, technically skilled, English-speaking engineering talent produced by India's engineering colleges creates the perfect environment for information technology.

Despite its distinct advantages for companies looking to outsource their IT services, India's volatile political climate and rampant corruption present problems. Some of the 185 Fortune 500 companies that outsource software to Asia are choosing places like Vietnam or China with more predictable politics and less corruption. Other companies that outsource their customer service are finding that their customers prefer the Americanized English of the Philippines to the British English that predominates in India, though all of these countries have their drawbacks, from censored Internet lines in China and Vietnam to Muslim militancy in the Philippines.

Despite the hiccups the IT service industry continues to grow as the software industry becomes more competitive and U.S. companies try to reduce overhead. The Asian IT service market is still in its infancy, but by 2008 industry think tank Nasscom-McKinsey predicts a \$17 billion IT service industry in India alone.

James B. McGirk

Sources: Manu Joseph. (2001) "Great Indian IT Jobs: \$20 a Month." *Wired Magazine* (24 November). Retrieved 8 April 2002, from <http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,40018,00.html>.

Tim Reason. (2001) "Small World." *CFO Magazine* (1 April) Retrieved 8 April 2002, from: <http://www.cfo.com>.

unrest and to large migrations of people from rural regions to the cities, causing congestion and ghettos even in the United States. In 1998 and 1999, the U.S. National Telecommunications and Information Admin-

istration published two reports dealing with this problem and describing the problems of drugs and crime as a consequence of the lack of access, which also hinders education and employment.

The Group of Eight (G8) ministers of affluent economies met in Okinawa, Japan, in July 2000 to deal with the differences of affordability. The G8 recognized that IT empowers, benefits, and encourages respect among global citizens. The ministers issued the Okinawa Charter on the Global Information Society and set up the Digital Opportunities Task Force. One of the major recommendations of the charter was the principle of inclusion to provide universal, affordable access to all persons everywhere at all times, to foster the free flow of information and knowledge, and to promote human development. G8 ministers vowed to exercise their leadership to optimize global networks to bridge the digital divide, to invest in people, and to promote global participation. G8's meeting in Qatar in 2002 continued its appeals to global public and private sectors to continue efforts to bridge the digital divide.

Despite the enormous growth of investments in China's IT sector, there is great disparity in wage incomes in China. Wages in Shanghai are eight times higher than the per capita GDP. Workers in the remote areas of central and western China bordering on Mongolia are deprived of links to markets in their own nation. Unequal access in China is caused by a substantial wealth gap, leading to a poverty belt stretching from Yunnan in the south to Xinjiang in the north. Wireless communications hold the potential for closing this divide, provided that the cost is subsidized. The promise of mobile communications lies in reducing the cost of laying land lines to remote and mountainous regions by national telephone companies. In nations like India and China and Indonesia, mobile networks, including satellite-based services, are being introduced. For example, people who fish in Cochin in the state of Kerala in southern India use mobile phones for access to markets. Similarly, in Bangladesh, where the per capita income is less than \$200 a year, an organization called Grameen Telecom was set up in 1997 to provide low-cost phone services to sixty-eight thousand villages. This organization is headed by women who collect the charges from users and generate revenues of \$12,000 per year per village from one of the world's poorest nations. Such services are being provided through kiosks in Africa by the International Development Research Corporation of Canada and by World Space, based in the United States. Two private companies in India have provided village phones at low cost. Escotel provides mobile phones to villages in Uttar Pradesh, and BPL provides fifteen hundred mobile phones in rural areas of Kerala to boost the fishing industry there. Likewise in Mongolia, low-cost mobile phones are provided by the government to the nomads (*ghirs*) for use in selling the cashmere wool from their herds. In China, pagers

are found to be more practical in providing access to rural residents.

Many conclusions can be drawn from the growth of IT investments in Asia. On the one hand, such investments are resulting in economic growth and greater human resources; on the other hand, they are deepening the digital divide. *The Asia Recovery Report 2001*, issued by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), indicates that poverty is declining, which may be a sign that the digital divide is being bridged. However, after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, with the slowdown in the American economy and the global recession, with the electronics sector losing profits, Asian nations are finding it difficult to compete with exports in IT-related products. The entry of China into the WTO makes the export sectors of other Asian nations more challenging. With political unrest and the war on terrorism, investor confidence in Asia will have to be restored. The ADB forecasts that income growth in Asia may rise to 5 percent in 2002. Surviving the value chain is becoming difficult for private companies in India, and even companies like Leading Edge and China dot Com in China are not reporting high profits. Depending on the political and currency stabilities in various nations, bridging the digital divide will not be the same in China as in Thailand or Indonesia. The rising tide of IT may not lift all boats at the same time, but the IT transformation holds out hope of converting the divide into a dividend for Asia.

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INLE LAKE REGION Inle Lake is the second-largest lake of Myanmar (Burma). Twenty-two kilometers (14 miles) long and up to four kilometers (2.5 miles) wide, it forms an integral part of a major water system that extends from the southern Shan Plateau to Kayah State, 110 kilometers (69 miles) to the south. It is also famous as the home of the Intha people, who practice a unique style of "leg rowing" and speak a distinctive dialect of Burmese that is similar to that of the Tavoyan people of the Tenasserim (Tanintharyi) Division in Myanmar's far south.

Other ethnic nationality peoples inhabit the lake and surrounding highland regions, including the Shan, Pao, Taungyo, Danu, and Palaung. The population around the lake is estimated at eighty thousand people dwelling in sixty-four villages. The largest of these villages is Haiya Ywa-ma, which is located halfway down the lake. Many of the lakeside houses are accessible only by boat and are built over the water on wooden stilts.

Fishing and farming have traditionally been the main occupations of local inhabitants. An unusual feature is the floating gardens, where crops such as tomatoes, potatoes, eggplants, cucumbers, and flowers are cultivated on artificial islands. Tourism has also become an important part of the local economy in recent years, encouraged by the proximity of the Shan State capital, Taunggyi, and the Heho airfield nearby. The main entry point to the lake is at Nyaung Shwe, which lies by the northern shores. In addition to weaving and silverware, a main attraction is the Phaung-Daw-Oo pagoda. The present buildings are of modern construction, but the temple houses five renowned Buddha images that, according to legend, date from the twelfth century CE. A major event is the boat festival each October.

The increasing number of visitors, however, has placed the fragile ecosystem of the lake under severe pressure. This has been exacerbated by declining water levels, caused by decades of oversilting from deforestation in the surrounding hills. As a result, more and more earth washes into the lake each rainy season. During the 1990s, various schemes were contemplated to increase environmental protection, including the banning of logging, reforestation, and the designation of nature sanctuaries to preserve the lake's endangered flora and fauna.

Martin Smith

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INNER MONGOLIA AUTONOMOUS REGION. See Nei Monggol

INONU, MUSTAFA ISMET (1884–1973), Turkish president. Ismet Inonu, the second president of Turkey, oversaw the creation of a multiparty political system. Inonu, originally known as Ismet Pasha, received a military education and served as a colonel in the Ottoman army during World War I. He became a commander on the western front during the Turkish War of Independence (1919–1923), and led Turkish forces to two major victories against the Greek army near the Anatolian town of Inonu (the origin of the name he took after the victories). Subsequently, he led the Turkish delegation in peace talks with the Allies at Lausanne in 1922–1923.

Ismet Inonu served as the Turkish Republic's first prime minister and became president following the death of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881–1938). As Turkey's national chief and permanent leader of Turkey's only party, the Republican People's Party (RPP), throughout World War II, Ismet Inonu worked to maintain Turkish nonbelligerency. In 1945 Ismet Inonu called for the creation of a multiparty system and worked to ensure its success. After the RPP lost to the Democrat Party, led by Celal Bayar (1884–1987), in the 1950 elections, Ismet Inonu remained active in politics, serving as chair of the RPP until 1972 and as prime minister from 1961 to 1965. In his memoirs Ismet Inonu wrote that his greatest achievement was the creation of the multiparty system.

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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Intellectual property, by which is meant proprietary interest in such intangible yet commercially valuable things as trademarks, technology, and entertainment content,

has proven a knotty problem in the adjustment of trade differences between East and West. Several Asian nations, most especially China, have permitted business practices that developed nations, the United States in particular, consider little better than theft. Such "piracy," as it is often called, involves using patented technology or media content without paying royalties to the patent or copyright holders. Some progress in resolving differences was made as the twenty-first century began, but substantial disagreement remains.

Development of Issue

From the nineteenth century, it has been common practice for nearly all Western nations to regard certain processes, trade symbols, and items of manufacture as a species of property, rights to which may be vested in the inventors or those to whom they assign them. The United States came somewhat late to these agreements, being notorious during the nineteenth century for allowing its citizens to freely appropriate the work of others and sell it for profit. In the twentieth century, the Soviet Union was, likewise, notorious for its refusal to honor international copyright conventions, asserting that all humankind alike was freely entitled to the full fruits of knowledge.

The question of what constitutes legally protected intellectual property became increasingly complex during the second half of the last century as human knowledge increased. In the West, the law expanded to include such innovations as genetically engineered organisms and computer software. Some of these technologies were so vital to a modern postindustrial economy that any nation-state that lacked access to them must inevitably remain relatively backward. At the same time, however, these technologies were often so extraordinarily expensive to nurture that without commercial protection for the developers, some feared that useful innovation might disappear. There is, thus, a natural conflict of interest between wealthy nations that originate new technology and possess its property rights and less-wealthy ones that feel shut out. In practice, much of this conflict occurs between the newly industrializing countries (NICs) of East Asia and the Western industrial giants—especially the United States.

This conflict of wealth is further exacerbated by Asia's colonial legacy. It is often the case that precisely those nations that hold essential intellectual property rights are the ones that formerly colonized Asian NICs. A certain postcolonial resentment only adds bitterness to these disagreements between the haves and have-nots.

India is a prime example of an Asian country with a postcolonial entitlement. With masses of impover-

ished people and relatively scant financial resources, modern India cheerfully allows its domestic pharmaceutical companies to manufacture and distribute medication developed in the West at a fraction of its usual commercial price and without a penny paid to Western patent holders. Indians cite the rampaging AIDS epidemic as sufficient justification for this practice. Why, they ask, should impoverished Indian citizens die for lack of needed drugs because of the exorbitant prices charged by Western patent holders, when a cheap, Indian-made copy can save them? Western nations, which watched India spend billions of dollars to develop nuclear arms, may retort that the problem in India is priorities, not funding.

U.S. Leadership in Protecting Rights

Regardless, the Western nations, led by the United States, have rallied to extend their concept of intellectual property throughout the world. Their overwhelming economic and technological superiority has enabled them to prevail in most, although not all, instances.

The U.S. insistence on protecting intellectual property is understandable, because it towers above all others in innovation. In 1992, for instance, an estimated 45 percent of all research and development in the world's industrialized countries occurred in the United States. By the mid-1990s, technology products constituted nearly a fifth of all U.S. exports, and the overall technological balance of trade was lopsidedly in the favor of the United States.

The United States was also peculiarly sensitive to intellectual property rights because of its vast dominance over the world entertainment market. By the 1990s, it was common for these American properties to be duplicated in Asian countries without payment of licensing fees and distributed widely via bootleg videotapes and CDs. China was a particular offender in this regard, although it was far from alone.

Ratification of TRIPS

Thus, the United States was uniquely instrumental in drawing up the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement that was ratified by most of the international community in 1994. This convention, which codifies intellectual property rights and provides enforcement mechanisms, was in large part the work of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), an office reporting directly to the president and charged with promoting U.S. commerce. The main offenders during the 1990s, in the view of the USTR, were Thailand, South Korea, Tai-

wan, India, Brazil, and the Philippines, while the People's Republic of China was in a class by itself.

Tools for enforcement of TRIPS were not lacking among the Western states, especially the United States. Access to the huge U.S. market is so vital to the NICs that U.S. threats of retaliatory tariffs were taken seriously. In addition, the United States made clear that it would block application for membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for nonmember nations, China especially, if compliance were not forthcoming. During the 1990s, pirated American CDs, movies, software, and the like, while still not difficult to obtain, became somewhat less common on the streets of such cities as Taipei and Manila.

China, however, constituted the largest obstacle to full Asian compliance with property rights as understood by the industrial West. In April 1991 the USTR targeted that country for special attention, and China quickly made certain concessions to conform its laws to international trade conventions. It did so largely because the United States threatened trade sanctions. Shortly thereafter, the Sino-U.S. dispute on intellectual property rights turned especially nasty.

By the mid-1990s, the United States was running a wide trade deficit with China in that country's favor, and loss of intellectual property rights was cited as one cause. At the same time, China was in increasingly poor odor in congressional circles because of its repressive political stance at home. In May 1996 the United States threatened especially severe trade sanctions against China but was met by retaliatory moves. While U.S. trade diplomacy had prevailed against lesser Asian nations such as South Korea, Taiwan, and even Japan, China was so large and nationalistic that it felt free to defy U.S. pressure. The United States responded more subtly by targeting especially vulnerable exporters in China's Guangdong Province, and this produced results.

Simmering Sino-U.S. Relations

The twentieth century closed with Sino-U.S. tension over intellectual property rights being just one element of an increasingly combative trade relationship between the two powers. Nevertheless, both nations were loath to escalate the dispute to an all-out trade war, and China seemed inclined to make grudgingly small, but steady, accommodation to international trade conventions in property rights. Smaller Asian nations had, likewise, begun to fall in line.

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INTERNATIONAL LABOR DAY—CHINA

The celebration of International Labor Day, 1 May, as an annual public holiday originated in North America in the 1880s. It was adopted by the ruling Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, or KMT) in China as early as the 1920s as a symbol of its willingness to bring all political groups into the fold. Following the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, 1 May assumed much greater importance and was designated by the Chinese Communist Party as a key public holiday. In the early years of the PRC, workers enjoyed a paid day off from work and, along with party leaders, attended large-scale government-sponsored parades and other festivities in urban parks and squares throughout the country.

The celebrations included cultural activities, displays of military prowess, the carrying of banners and flags extolling the value of labor, and even mass wedding ceremonies, before climaxing with raucous fireworks displays. Recently, in a society that is more pluralistic and increasingly less dominated by the Communist Party, the focus has moved away from public ceremonies and military parades. Workers have been granted a week off from work and encouraged to travel, with the dual aims of stimulating consumer spending and developing China's tourism industry.

Julian Ward

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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

The International Monetary Fund (IMF, or Fund) came into official existence on 27 December 1945, when twenty-nine countries signed its Articles of Agreement (its charter), which had been agreed upon at a conference held in Bretton Woods, (in New

Hampshire, United States), 1–22 July 1944. The IMF commenced financial operations 1 March 1947. Today the IMF has near global membership of 182 countries. The Fund employs approximately 2,700 staff members from 122 countries. The Fund is headed by a managing director, who is also chairman of an executive board of twenty-four executive directors. The five largest members—the members that make the largest contributions to the fund, namely the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and Britain—are each entitled to appoint an executive director. By tradition, the managing director is a European. Most staff members work at the Fund headquarters in Washington, D.C., though a few are assigned to small offices in Paris, Geneva, Tokyo, and at the United Nations in New York. Some represent the IMF on temporary assignment in member countries. At present about seventy of these resident representatives are assigned to sixty-four member countries.

Purpose

The purpose of the IMF as established by its charter can be summarized as follows: (1) to provide the means for consultation and collaboration between members on international monetary issues, (2) to promote exchange stability and to maintain orderly exchange arrangements among members so as to facilitate international trade, (3) to assist in the creation and expansion of markets in which members can exchange currencies without restriction, and (4) to support members that are faced with a shortage of foreign currency by making the financial resources of the IMF temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards. Under the institution's Articles of Agreement, the member countries have committed themselves to promoting global trade and deepening economic integration by maintaining a stable international monetary system. This goal is to be achieved by maintaining orderly exchange arrangements among members (in order to avoid competitive exchange depreciation) and allowing individual national currencies to be exchanged without restriction (currently only 117 members have agreed to the full convertibility of their currencies). Member countries are obligated to keep the IMF informed of any changes in their financial and monetary policies that may adversely affect fellow members' economies, and to expeditiously modify or reform national policies on the advice of the IMF in order to facilitate international trade.

In addition to supervising the international monetary system and providing financial support to member countries, the Fund also makes technical assistance available to member countries in certain specialized

areas of its competence. It runs an educational institute in Washington to train personnel, and it issues a wide range of publications relating to all aspects of international monetary matters and IMF operations.

Operations

The Fund operates much like a credit union, serving as a manager of a common pool of financial resources estimated to be over \$300 billion in 1999. This resource base allows the Fund to establish a stable value for each currency and to demonstrate confidence in members by making the general resources temporarily available to them, thus providing them with the opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive to national or international growth. The Fund's capital comes almost entirely from quota subscriptions (membership fees), assessed on the basis of each member country's economic size and the extent of current account transactions. The size of a member's official foreign currency reserves is also taken into account. As a general rule, 25 percent of quota is required to be subscribed in an international reserve currency (international reserve currencies are the euro, the U.S. dollar, the British pound sterling, and the Japanese yen). The balance can be paid in the member's own currency. The combined contributions of the members form a pool of currencies that is known as the General Resources Account. This pool of currencies comprises the core resources from which the IMF funds lending to members. As each member has a right to borrow several times the amount it has paid in as a quota subscription, quotas may not provide enough cash to meet the borrowing needs of members in a period of great economic stress. To deal with this eventuality, the IMF has had since 1962 a line of credit for its members.

Those who contribute the most to the IMF have the strongest voice in determining its policies. The United States, with the world's largest economy, contributes about 18 percent (approximately \$38 billion in 1997) of the total quota, followed by Japan and Germany, which contribute 5.67 percent each. This means that the U.S. has 18 percent of the total votes. Quotas are reviewed every five years, allowing member countries to either increase or lower their contributions. The size of quotas not only determines the voting power of the member country but also what a country can borrow in time of need. While most of the matters that go to the executive board are decided by consensus, the voting power of the individual members often provides an important backdrop to how the consensus is shaped. A simple majority of the votes is

required for most matters, but the more important policy matters must receive 85 percent of the votes—which means that the United States has a veto power by virtue of its 18 percent share of the total quota.

The two principal functions carried out by the IMF today are surveillance of the members' economic policies and provision of short-term conditional financing to members facing balance-of-payment difficulties. The scope of the surveillance is quite wide, and covers, for example, trade and investment policies, the financial sector (including the functioning of capital markets), and exchange-rate policy. The scope of surveillance has been bolstered in the wake of the Mexican peso crisis of 1995 and the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998.

Conditionality is attached to all IMF loans. This generally means that IMF financing requires the recipient country to adopt economic adjustment programs. Interest is also charged on the loans made under the IMF's standard lending facilities at a rate set to cover its costs, plus a margin to cover operating expenses. For certain other IMF loan facilities, interest surcharges or concessions apply. For example, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), established in 1987, is designed to support macroeconomic adjustment and structural reforms in low-income countries. This is a concessional facility in that the interest rate is only 0.5 percent per annum. In November 1999, the ESAF was renamed the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), and its objectives were changed to support programs to strengthen economic growth in poor countries. The PRGF loans carry an interest rate of 0.5 percent and are repayable over 10 years with a 6-year grace period on principal payments.

Besides supervising the international monetary system and providing financial support to member countries, the Fund also assists its members by making technical assistance available to member countries in certain specialized areas of its competence; by running an educational institute in Washington to train personnel; and by issuing a wide range of publications relating to all aspects of international monetary matters and IMF operations.

The IMF and the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997

The principal responsibility for dealing with the recent Asian crisis at the international level was assumed by the IMF, and the hitherto relatively unknown institution was put into the global spotlight as never before. Its every official utterance and policy move became the subject of intense public scrutiny and scathing criticism—from both the right and the left.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the IMF's record in dealing with the Asian financial crisis has been mixed.

The conditions that the IMF imposed on Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea in exchange for IMF-led rescue packages consisted of three basic components. The first concentrated on macroeconomic policy reform, in particular, the introduction of tight fiscal and monetary policy (that is, an increase in interest rates and the adoption of strict limits on the growth of the money supply), in order to produce current account surpluses and to stabilize the value of the currency by slowing currency depreciation. Policy reform also included the maintenance of high interest rates to stem (or reverse) capital outflows. It was believed that such a strategy would improve the current account and the balance of payments, halt the depreciating exchange rate, reduce money growth and inflation, and reduce the government budget deficit. The second component focused on structural reforms of the financial sector. The third consisted of nonfinancial microeconomic policies, such as the removal of trade barriers, the elimination of monopolies, enterprise reform and restructuring, creating competitive factor markets, and curtailment of government budgets—in particular, the elimination of subsidies. It was presumed that all these measures could be implemented without significantly harming the real economy.

However, the initial results of the Fund-supported programs in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand were not what had been hoped. Specifically, the programs were not successful in quickly restoring confidence. On the contrary, capital continued to exit and the currencies continued to depreciate after the IMF-supported programs had been adopted. Moreover, the economies sank deeper into recession, contrary to initial projections of only a mild slowdown. Why was this the case? Critics have asserted that the IMF's unimaginative one-model-fits-all prescriptions actually made Asia's financial turmoil worse. Suffice it to note that these issues will remain the subject for much debate for some time.

Shalendra D. Sharma

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IQBAL, MUHAMMAD (1877–1938), Poet-philosopher of Islam and Pakistan. Muhammad Iqbal, known as the poet-philosopher of Islam and Pakistan, was born on 9 November 1877, at Sialkot, India, and died at the peak of his fame on 21 April 1938, at Lahore. In Sialkot, Iqbal finished high school and then joined the Scotch Mission College, subsequently named Murray College. At this college, Iqbal completed two years of his education and then joined the Government College in Lahore, fifty miles from Sialkot. By this time, Iqbal had acquired a good education in Urdu, Arabic, and Farsi under the guidance of Sayyid Mir Hassan (1844–1929), who had been profoundly influenced by the Aligarh movement of Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan (1817–1898). Under Sayyid Mir Hassan's care, Iqbal's poetic genius blossomed early.

In May 1899, a few months after Iqbal's graduation with a master's degree in philosophy, he was appointed the Macleod-Punjab reader of Arabic at the University Oriental College of Lahore. From January 1901 to March 1904, when he resigned from the position, Iqbal taught intermittently as assistant professor of English at Islamia College and at the Government College of Lahore. In 1905, Iqbal went to Europe, where he studied in England and Germany. In London, he studied at Lincoln's Inn to qualify at the bar, and, at Trinity College of Cambridge University, he enrolled as a student of philosophy while he prepared to submit a dissertation in philosophy to Munich University. Munich University exempted him from a mandatory stay of two terms on the campus before submitting his dissertation, "The Development of Metaphysics in Persia." After his successful defense of his dissertation, Iqbal was awarded a Ph.D. degree on 4 November 1907.

Iqbal was never at home in politics, but he was invariably drawn into it. In May 1908, he joined the British Committee of the All-India Muslim League. With the exception of one brief interruption, Iqbal maintained his relationships with the All-India Muslim League all his life.

When Iqbal came back from Europe in 1908 after earning three degrees in England and Germany, he started his professional career as an attorney, professor, poet, and philosopher all at once. At length, however, the poet and philosopher won out at the expense of the attorney and professor while he continued to be partially active as a political leader. Iqbal was elected a member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly from 1926 to 1930 and soon emerged as a political thinker. In 1930, the All-India Muslim League invited him to deliver a presidential address, which became a landmark in the Muslim national movement for the creation of Pakistan.

Iqbal's philosophical and political prose works are actually few in number, most notably *The Development of Metaphysics in Iran* (1908) and *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (1930). The latter work was actually a collection of his seven lectures that he had delivered in December 1928 in Madras. The lectures are reflective of his mature philosophical and rational approach to Islam, emphasizing a responsible *ijtihad*, the right of interpreting the Qur'an and the Sunna. A third work is *Iqbal's Presidential Address to the Annual Meeting of the All-India Muslim League* (1930). This address is an extensive review of the interaction among the British, the All-India National Congress, and the All-India Muslim League from the perspective of a Muslim thinker. In it, Iqbal expounded the concept of two nations in India. This address came to be known as the origin of the idea for an independent state of Pakistan.

Iqbal composed his poetry in Persian and Urdu. His six Persian works are *Asrar-I Khudi wa Ramuz-I Bekhudi* (1915), *Payam Mashriq* (1923), *Zabur-I Ajam* (1927), *Javid-Namah* (1932), *Pas Chas Bayad Kard Ay Aqwam-I Sbarq* (1926), and *Armaghan-I Hijiz* (1938). His Urdu works, which are primarily responsible for his popularity in Pakistan as well as in India, are *Bang-I Dara* (1924), *Bal-I Jibril* (1935), and *Darb-I Kalim* (1936). Poetry, like visual art, is susceptible to varied interpretations; consequently, his admirers, relying primarily upon his poetry, have attempted to prove him a nationalist, a Muslim nationalist, a Muslim socialist, and even a secularist.

Iqbal remained a steady supporter of the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948). During 1936–1937, Iqbal wrote eight letters to Jinnah, advocating the partition of India into two nations. His presidential address of 1930 formulated the two-nation theory, which Jinnah finally accepted when he presided over the All-India Muslim League's annual meeting in Lahore in 1940 and demanded that Pakistan be created by partitioning India.

Hafeez Malik

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IRAN—PROFILE (2001 pop. 66.1 million). The Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran's official name since 1979) is a nation whose social, cultural, political, and economic affairs are conducted based on the tenets of Islam. Although this theocratic republic is still in its infancy, it has faced many challenges both internal and external. Externally, its main challenges have come from the United States and Iraq. Internally, beyond staggering inflation and high unemployment rates, it currently faces demands from a youthful population for more moderate policies.

Iran covers 1.648 million square kilometers and borders Afghanistan and Pakistan in the east, Turkey and Iraq in the west, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmen-

istan, and the Caspian Sea in the north, and the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman in the south. Its main geographic features are an interior central plateau, which is arid or semiarid in nature, and mountainous regions that include the Zagros mountain range in the west, the Elburz and Talish mountains in the north, and the mountains to the east along the border with Pakistan and Afghanistan. Its climate is as varied as its topography, with temperatures ranging from minus 26°C to 55.6°C.

Iran is one of the most populous countries in the Middle East. Most Iranians live in the northwest and by the Caspian Sea. More than 50 percent of the population lives in urban areas. Besides its capital, Tehran,



IRAN

Country name: Islamic Republic of Iran
Area: 1.648 million sq km
Population: 66,128,969 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 0.72% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 17.1 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 5.41 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: -4.51 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio—total population: 1.03 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 29.04 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population: 69.95 years, male: 68.61 years, female: 71.37 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Shi'a Islam, Sunni Islam, Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity, Baha'i
Major languages: Persian, Turkic languages, Kurdish, Luri, Balochi, Arabic, Turkish
Literacy—total population: 72.1%; male: 78.4%, female: 65.8% (1994 est.)
Government type: theocratic republic
Capital: Tehran
Administrative divisions: 28 provinces
Independence: 1 April 1979 (Islamic Republic of Iran proclaimed)
National holiday: Republic Day, 1 April (1979)
Suffrage: 15 years of age; universal
GDP—real growth rate: 3% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita (purchasing power parity): \$6,300 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: 53% (1996 est.)
Exports: \$25 billion (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Imports: \$15 billion (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Currency: Iranian rial (IRR)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Factbook* 2001. Retrieved 18 October 2001 from: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.



Iran's other cities and towns are Esfahan, Mashhad, Tabriz, Shiraz, Ahvaz, Bakhtaran, Orumiyeh, Qazvin, Kerman, Ardabil, Yazd, Karaj, Qom, Rasht, and Hamadan. Persians account for two-thirds of the population, with the remainder coming from a variety of ethnic groups (Azeri, Kurd, Lur, Baluch, Arab, Turkmen, Armenian, and Jewish). It is a young population, with 36 percent of the population below fourteen years of age and 60 percent of the population between the ages of fifteen and sixty-four. This youthful population has brought about the recent mass political shift and demand for reforms in the government from its conservative base to a more open forum.

The Birth of the Islamic Republic of Iran

When Ayatollah Khomeini (1900–1989) came to power in January 1979, he gave the job of drafting

a constitution to the provisional government and named Mehdi Bazargan (1907–1994) as the prime minister of the provisional government. In March 1979, a national referendum was conducted to determine what political system should be instituted. On the referendum day, however, the Islamic Republic was the only choice on the ballot. Reportedly, over 98 percent of the voters supported an Islamic republic, and the Islamic Republic of Iran was established on 1 April 1979.

By the end of the year, the constitution of the Islamic Republic had come into force. This document was originally drafted by the provisional government, then modified by the Assembly of Experts, and finally approved by a national referendum. This constitution made the concept of *veleyet-e-Faqih* (rule of religious jurisprudence) a political reality.

Language and Culture

Iran's official language is Persian, also known as Farsi, which is spoken by a majority of the people. Persian dialects such as Gilani and Mazandarani are also spoken throughout the country. Other regional languages found in Iran include Kurdish, Azeri, Armenian, Baloch, Luri, Arabic, and Hebrew.

Iran is a very ancient country whose history dates back to the eve of the Persian civilization and empire. Due to its colorful and rich background, it has much to offer in terms of the arts, as is evident from its architecture, paintings, and a variety of handicrafts. Moreover, Persian literature is famous for its beautiful poetry, thought-provoking stories, and epic writings.

Government

Similar to Western states, the political power of the Iranian government is horizontally divided into three branches: executive, legislative, and judiciary. Unlike the Western powers, however, the *faqih* (spiritual leader of the nation) oversees all three branches. The constitution clearly outlines the requirements for the *faqih*, including Islamic training and age. Ayatollah Khomeini was named the first *faqih* for life.

Several institutions were formed to monitor the government's conduct to make sure that it conformed to Islamic principles and laws. The three branches of government—executive, legislative, and judiciary—are monitored by religious leaders and institutions to make sure they operate according to the precepts of Islamic rule. Moreover, several of the government officials within all branches of government are clerics. One such institution is the Council of Guardians, half of whose members are appointed by the *faqih* (spiritual leader).


Ayatollah Sayed Ali Khamenei (b. 1939) is the current *faqih*. He succeeded Ayatollah Khomeini (1900–1989) in 1989. The constitution gives considerable powers to the *faqih* to ensure the government functions within Islamic law. The constitution also clarifies *faqih* selection criteria, which entails training in and experience with Islamic history, laws, and philosophy.

The current president is Muhammad Khatami (b. 1943) who was elected in 1997. He had been the minister of culture in the cabinet of the former president, Hashemi Rafsanjani (b. 1934). Khatami's election signaled the shifting of the political climate. The 2000 *majlis* (parliament) elections echoed that change: moderates and reformers overwhelmingly defeated more conservative candidates. The presidents and the *majlis* representatives are elected for four-year terms.

Religion

The constitution names the official religion in Iran as Shi'a, the branch of Islam that believes the lineage of 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, is the true succession. Approximately 93 percent of the population are Shi'ite Muslims. About 5 percent are Sunni Muslims; Sunni Muslims believe that Muhammad's disciples were his true successors. While there has been rivalry between the two sects, the government has worked to keep it to a minimum. Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians are recognized as lawful religious minorities and have their own representatives in the *majlis*. The Baha'i faith, however, is not a recognized religion, and its followers face religious restrictions and even discrimination at the hands of individuals as well as the state.

This marriage of government and religion reaches out into the society, where Islamic ways have become law. Women are required by law to completely cover their body and hair, showing only their hands and face. Men are also restricted in what parts of their body they



Iranian president Muhammad Khatami at a meeting with college students in December 1999 where he agreed that students have the right to protest government policies, but urged stability. (AFP/CORBIS)

can show in public. For example, they must wear long-sleeved shirts, buttoned up to hide any chest hair. Men and women who do not comply with this dress code may be harassed by their more religious fellow citizens and can actually be arrested and charged by officials. Also, the interaction between men and women is carefully monitored. For instance, public displays of affection are not condoned.

Education

Education is compulsory for all children from seven to thirteen years old, but it has been difficult to enforce this law in the rural areas. After the Islamic Revolution, a panel, the Cultural Revolution Headquarters, was formed to reform the educational system in accordance with Islamic values. Higher education in Iran consists of government-sponsored colleges as well as technical, vocational, and teacher-training schools.

Human Rights

By Western standards, the human rights record of Iran has been poor both before and after the revolution. After the revolution, opponents of the new regime were severely dealt with. Illegal searches and arrests as well as quick trials and executions were the norm. Nevertheless, there have been significant improvements, especially during the Khatami era. Emphasis on human rights is one of the factors leading toward change.

Freedom of expression has been a controversial issue from time to time. The media, particularly the periodicals, are given free rein except when it is believed Islamic principles are being threatened or criticized. In one international incident, Ayatollah Khomeini publicly formally condemned British writer Salman Rushdie (b. 1947) to death for his criticisms of Islam in his book *The Satanic Verses*. The freedom of the press was seriously threatened in early 2000 when several liberal newspapers were shut down by the conservative forces before the upcoming election. This was met with outcries from the people and further represents the clash that is currently taking place between the conservative and moderate elements.

Economy

The currency in Iran is the Iranian rial. Iran's gross domestic product (GDP) in 1998 was estimated at \$100.3 billion. Its main source of income is from the sales of its natural resources, particularly fossil fuels. Iran is one of the founding members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). It has worked hard to diversify its economy and has faced sev-

eral challenges, including the trade embargo imposed by the United States in 1995 and the high cost of the reconstruction program after the war with Iraq (1980–1990). Currently, pressure is mounting in the United States to lift the embargo, particularly from U.S. oil companies. For instance, it would be much cheaper to run an oil pipeline through Iran (rather than Turkey) in order to transport the oil of landlocked Central Asian states to the international market. One step has already been taken in the direction of relaxing U.S. pressure on Iran. Madeleine Albright, the U.S. secretary of state from 1993 to 2000, lifted the embargo on certain products (for example, carpets) in March 2000.

Iran and the United States

The relationship between the United States and Iran since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been strained at best. Soon after the success of the Islamic Revolution, both the Iranian and U.S. leaders demonized each other. Revolutionary Iranians claimed that the United States was pursuing a hegemonic role in the Persian Gulf region; the Americans accused Iran of sponsoring terrorism. The United States in the 1990s has been concerned about Iran achieving nuclear capability. However, toward the end of the decade there were a few signs of a thaw in relations with overtures being made by both sides, slowly and carefully. However, in 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush declared Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, to be one of the "Axis of Evil," leading to increased hostility toward the United States.

Houman A. Sadri

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IRAN—ECONOMIC SYSTEM The Iranian economic system is a combination of a centrally planned economy, public ownership of fossil-fuel and



The interior courtyard of an upper-class family's home in Na'in, Iran, in 1997. (BRIAN A. VIKANDER/C ORBIS)

other large industries, village agriculture, and small market-based ventures. The economy relies on the nation's abundant natural resources but has been negatively affected by political events such as the U.S. trade embargo of the 1990s and the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1990). The current president, Mohammed Khatami (b. 1943), is working to follow in his predecessor's footsteps with regard to economic reforms and diversification. These include decreasing the military budget and improving foreign relations. However, he has found these tasks difficult to implement because of the deeply different opinions among the political elite. Ever since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, there have been heated debates in the *majlis* (parliament) and in the Council of Guardians (an organization charged with ensuring that legislation adheres to the constitution and to Islamic law) about what direction the economy should take and which policies should be enforced.

Historical Perspective

Before World War II, agriculture was the foundation of Iranian society and economy, and the oil industry was largely in the hands of foreign interests. Not much had been developed in the manufacturing sector, with some exceptions in food processing and textiles.

After World War II some capitalistic ventures became more commonplace and the government began implementing long-term economic plans, which were

instrumental in the development of the economy. The government invested large amounts of capital in infrastructure and education, plans that were financed by the export of Iranian oil. In the early 1960s, the Western powers encouraged the shah to initiate a major reform. In response, he instituted the White Revolution program, an economic plan based on land reform and industrialization. This economic reform, however, met with widespread criticism led by Ayatollah Khomeini, who began the undercurrent that eventually led to the overthrow of the shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic.

Nevertheless, the White Revolution did succeed in raising Iran's gross national product (GNP) as well as increasing its investments in fixed capital. Metallurgical, petrochemical, and appliance businesses were developed and ultimately led to a reduction in the importance of agriculture. This industrial development led to the rapid growth of old commercial centers such as Tehran, Tabriz, Esfahan, and Abadan as well as new industrial centers like Arak, Ahvaz, Bandar-e Shah, Shiraz, and Bakhtaran.

The rapid economic achievements were halted with the advent of the 1979 Revolution. The Islamic Republic nationalized several private industries, banks, and insurance companies; skilled labor and capital fled the country. The 1979–1981 hostage crisis, in which Iranian revolutionaries seized Americans at the U.S. embassy in Tehran, seriously damaged Iranian

economic relations with the United States, and the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1990) further debilitated the national economy. Several major ports were bombed, which decreased oil revenues. Since the end of the war, Iran has diligently worked to reconstruct its devastated economy. This has been a difficult task due to declining oil revenues and growing reliance on imports. In 1993, the Iranian economy experienced a crisis over exchange rates. In 1995, President Clinton instituted a trade embargo against Iran, which caused a massive devaluation of the Iranian currency. This resulted in the Iranian government linking the value of its currency to the dollar as well as to personal attacks on private foreign-currency dealers who were thought to be cheating their fellow citizens and corrupting the economy.

Currently Iran aims to diversify its economy to make it less vulnerable to the rise and fall of the price of fossil fuels in the international markets. Since the 1991 demise of the Soviet Union, the Iranian government has hoped to capitalize on its location and emerge as the main gateway to the landlocked Caspian Sea republics. It would like to take advantage of profitable transit fees exacted on imports to and exports from these states. In this regard, the Islamic Republic has succeeded in establishing cooperative working ties with these states. At the same time, the Iranian people would like the government to do more to control the rampant inflation and unemployment rates plaguing the country.

Industries

Most of Iran's national income derives from the vast oil resources that were discovered in the southwestern part of the country in the early 1900s. They contain an estimated 48 billion barrels of petroleum, and oil comprises over 90 percent of the country's exports. A founding member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Iran is one of the largest oil producers in the world. The oil industry is run by the government-owned National Iranian Oil Company. The major refineries are located at Abadan, Tehran, Bakhtaran, and Shiraz. Abadan was the largest export-producing refinery in the world until it was damaged during the war with Iraq.

Service Industries

About half the country's GDP comes from service industries such as banks, insurance companies, restaurants, and retail shops, and from institutions such as hospitals, educational facilities, and government agencies. Almost half of all workers are employed in the service industries.

Besides oil, Iran exports carpets, hides, caviar, cotton, nuts, spices, dried fruits, and mineral ores. The nation exports a great deal of raw and semiprocessed materials and imports manufactured goods such as electrical appliances, industrial machinery, and military equipment, as well as food and medicine. Most of the trade goes through the Persian Gulf ports, with Kharg Island being the principal terminal for exporting oil. Iran's major export trading partners are Italy, Japan, Greece, France, Spain, and South Korea. Its exports were estimated at \$12.2 billion in 1998, while its imports were assessed at \$13.8 billion. Iran's major import trading partners are Germany, Italy, Japan, Belgium, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. Although the United States has extensive interests in Iranian natural resources, it is operating under the restrictions of the trade embargo imposed in 1995. In March 2000, however, certain luxury products such as caviar and carpets were removed from the embargo list to reward Iran for its changing political climate.

Transportation Buses are the main means of transportation throughout Iran, but more primitive means are still used in rural areas, such as horses, donkeys, mules, and bicycles. Rough terrain makes building modern transportation infrastructure difficult. There are 162,000 kilometers of highways in Iran, but only half of them are paved. The railway system extends over 7,286 kilometers. The Iranian railway system and airline are both owned by the government. There are approximately 288 airports in Iran, but only 110 of them have paved runways. The main international airport is located in Tehran, the nation's capital.

The merchant marine has 132 ships in its inventory in several classifications: bulk cargo, chemical tanker, combination bulk-container-liquefied gas tanker, multifunction large-load carrier, oil tanker, refrigerated cargo, roll-on/roll-off cargo, and short-sea passenger. Several ports and harbors exist on the Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf areas. Abadan, damaged in the Iran-Iraq war, is being rebuilt.

Media and Communications Regarding communications, information is disseminated through twenty-five newspapers, over three hundred magazines, two television stations, and many radio stations. In 1999, it was estimated the Iranian population owned 13 million radios and 7 million televisions. The information distributed is monitored by the government for its content in order to make sure it is not contrary to the teachings and tenets of Islam. At various times, the government has cracked down and closed the newspapers. This happened in March 2000 when conserv-

ative elements in the government felt threatened by the upcoming *majlis* elections.

There are over 9 million telephones in Iran. In 1996, twenty-five regional telecommunications authorities were set up to oversee the development of paging and cellular services and systems. There were believed to be 230,000 cell phone subscribers in 1996.

Agriculture and Fishing Iran's mountains and deserts make it hard for the country to cultivate enough land to feed its population. Only 10 percent of its land is arable. Irrigated land was estimated in 1993 at 94,000 square kilometers. Farming employs approximately 28 percent of the workforce. Most of the land is set aside to grow wheat and barley. Other crops grown are rice, cotton, corn, dates, tea, tobacco, lentils, nuts, and sugar beets. Livestock raised include cows, goats, and sheep, which provide meat and dairy products. Agriculture makes up roughly 23 percent of Iran's GDP.

Iran borders both the Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf, and has a profitable fishing industry. Sturgeon, whose eggs are processed into caviar, are the main catch for Caspian Sea fishermen. Other fish to be found in the Caspian Sea are carp, catfish, whitefish, and white salmon. Sardines, shrimp, sole, and tuna are found in the Persian Gulf.

Manufacturing, Construction, and Mining Manufacturing and the construction industry employ about one-fourth of the Iranian work force and are estimated to account for 18 percent of the GDP. The principal manufactured goods are cement, fossil-fuel products, armaments, textiles, bricks, and food items. However, Iran also manufactures tools, chemicals, leather products, copper, steel, and tobacco products. Tehran is the home of over 50 percent of the factories in Iran, followed by Esfahan and Tabriz.

Although it is an important industry, mining only employs 1 percent of Iran's workers and makes up only 9 percent of the GDP. Among minerals that Iran exploits are coal, manganese, sulfur, copper, lead, zinc, chromium, iron ore, and gemstones such as turquoise. Iranian natural gas reserves are considered the second largest in the world, approximately 15 percent of the world's reserves.

Tourism Tourism fell with the advent of the Islamic Revolution. However, it is on the rise due to the nation's changing image and political environment. Iran's ancient history and favorable exchange rate make it one of the most interesting and inexpensive places to visit. In this regard, the number of visitors to the historical cities of Esfahan, Tabriz, and Shiraz

as well as the charming coastal cities of the Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf is gradually on the rise.

Economic Indicators

Iran's GDP was estimated at \$100.3 billion in 1998. This shows a slight decrease from the year before and represents a downtrend over the previous ten years. In 1977, the GDP was \$76 billion, and in 1987 it had risen to \$137.7 billion. However, this upward swing was not to continue. The average annual growth of GDP is down from 3 percent in 1997 to 1.7 percent in 1998. The gross national product per capita in 1998 was \$1,770, with the GNP at \$109.6 billion. The GNP per capita has likewise seen a decrease in its average annual growth, actually seeing a negative growth in 1998, standing at -0.3 percent. The early 1990s witnessed a financial crisis in Iran, which led the country to reschedule \$15 billion in debt. Fluctuating oil prices dramatically affect the Iranian economy. When oil prices are high, as they were in 1996, Iran is able to make its debt service payments. But when oil prices are low, the country finds it hard to keep up with its debt service payments and is forced to decrease its imports.

The currency in Iran is the Iranian rial (IR), divided into one hundred dinars. Internationally, the IR is used for calculating figures; domestically, however, the toman (ten rials) is used. In January 1999, one U.S. dollar was worth 1,754.63 IR. However, the black market exchange rate in December 1998 was 7,000 IRs to the dollar. In 1996, it was estimated that over 53 percent of the population was below the poverty line. Despite a workforce of 15.4 million people, the country lacks highly skilled labor in terms of technology, largely because of emigration following the revolution. The unemployment rate is more than 30 percent and the inflation rate about 24 percent.

The fiscal year in Iran goes from 21 March (which is the first day of spring and the Iranian New Year) to 20 March. The budget is divided into two sections: the general budget and the development budget. For the fiscal year 1996–1997, Iran was unable to balance the budget. Revenues were \$34.6 billion, but expenditures were \$34.9 billion. Most of the revenues came from taxes and oil sales, while the expenditures were allotted mainly to education, housing, welfare, and defense. The government's main social expenditures for its growing population are medical coverage, unemployment, retirement, and veterans' benefits.

The Future

The Islamic Republic has continued the practice of the previous regime in devising five-year economic

plans. Its first plan was created with the vision of ultimately quadrupling GDP by 2003. Subsequent plans were designed to revitalize the economy by putting more emphasis on the private sector. Iran had an estimated external debt of \$21.9 billion in 1996. In 1995, it received \$116.5 million dollars in economic aid.

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IRAN—EDUCATION SYSTEM The education system of Iran was patterned on the French system and evolved during the twentieth century to its present configuration. Although some preprimary schooling is available, the first educational cycle for most students is primary school (*debestan*) beginning at age five. This is followed by a three-year middle school (*doreh-e rahanamaii*) in which students are tested and evaluated for future educational tracking and at the end of which they receive a certificate of general education. Depending on their middle school experience, they may continue to a four-year intermediate school (*dabirestan*) whose diploma entitles them to proceed to college, to a two-year vocational school, to an agricultural secondary school that awards a trade certificate, or to a four-year technical secondary school that awards a terminal second-class technician's certificate. Women who have earned a diploma may enter a two-year normal school preparing primary teachers for rural areas. Higher education is furnished by universities offering bachelor's, master's, and doctor's degrees, institutes of technology, and one-year teacher training colleges.

Traditional education in Iran was for centuries conducted in *maktabs*, private schools conducted by Muslim clergy for boys aged seven to twelve. Located in every city and virtually every village, these free schools inculcated basic literacy in Persian and Qur'anic Arabic, as well as the fundamentals of arithmetic.

Almost as numerous were the *madrasabs* (religious schools) attached to the mosques. In these, older boys

studied Arabic and Persian literature, the Qur'an, theology, philosophy, law, and other subjects suited to pursuing a religious vocation. The students who took advantage of these schools were almost always the children of the well-to-do. If their families wanted them to pursue an education broader or deeper than this curriculum provided, they were given tutors or sent abroad to study, many of them to Britain or France. In 1851, the first state-sponsored school appeared: the College of Science in Tehran, founded to provide higher studies in business, technology, and military science. Apart from some Western-style secondary schools under German, French, or English auspices, this was the only alternative to Islamic religious education until the end of the nineteenth century.

Twentieth-Century Education before the Islamic Revolution

In 1899, publicly supported elementary and secondary schools, most of them modeled after French institutions, were established in the major cities, and in 1911, the Ministry of Education was created to develop a national system of primary schools. By 1925, there were approximately 3,300 public schools enrolling over 100,000 students.

The modernization of Iran under the Pahlavi dynasty (1925–1979) demanded the creation of an educated secularized middle class with technological and commercial expertise. Although the education system was crucial to the effort, its expansion was relatively



Older men attending a literacy class in Iran. (PAUL ALMASY/CORBIS)

slow. By the 1960s, Iranian schools offered five years of primary instruction and seven years of secondary, including both terminal and college preparatory curricula. Six universities, located in Tehran, Tabriz, Esfahan, Mashhad, Shiraz, and Ahvaz, enrolled about seventeen thousand students. To accelerate the pace of education reform, Iran created in 1963 a "knowledge corps" utilizing military inductees with secondary diplomas to teach villagers to read. When the dynasty fell in 1979, enrollment in elementary schools had reached three-quarters of the elementary-age group, but high school enrollment lagged behind at less than half of the secondary-age group.

Education after the Revolution

The 1979 revolution brought to power a government of ayatollahs (religious leaders) to whom educational secularization was anathema. They purged teachers and texts that were perceived to be antireligious and introduced religious coursework into the curriculum. The university students resisted, often violently, and so universities were closed for four years while their curricula and personnel were reorganized. They reopened with much smaller student bodies. Although the postrevolutionary government has acted to counter this impact, the situation remains difficult, the problems many. At the end of the twentieth century, education spending had reached nearly 6 trillion rials, which was about 6 percent of the gross national product (GNP) and 18 percent of government expenditure (as compared with about 500 million rials or 7.5 percent of the GNP and 16 percent of government expenditure in 1980). More than 3,300 preprimary schools enrolled nearly 200,000 children. About 92 percent of the boys of elementary school age and 87 percent of the girls—nearly 10 million students—attended school; 79 percent of the boys of secondary school age and 69 percent of the girls—over 7.5 million students—attended school. Teacher-student ratios were 1 to 32 at the elementary level and 1 to 30 at the secondary level. Yet adult literacy was a disappointing 72 percent, unevenly distributed among males (78 percent) and females (66 percent). In 1997, a cross-national program testing mathematics and science ranked Iranian students thirty-eighth of forty-one nations studied in eighth-grade math performance and thirty-seventh in eighth-grade science. It ranked Iranian students twenty-fifth of twenty-six nations studied in both fourth-grade math and science. At all education levels, fewer women than men are enrolled, a disparity that is fairly constant over time. Higher education has not bounced back from its purging and reorganization under the revolution. The nation's thirty

general universities, thirty medical universities, twelve specialized universities, and two distance-learning universities enrolled only half a million students. This enrollment drop was caused largely because the secularized economic and political elites were sending their children to university abroad in increasing numbers in the 1980s, to the detriment of Iranian universities. As if this were not bad enough, the fraction of those studying abroad who elect not to return to Iran after their studies has constituted a serious brain drain that renders national development more difficult.

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IRAN—HISTORY Iranian history is inevitably linked with that of Persia. The state was not officially named Iran until the Pahlavi dynasty, which made the name change in March 1935. But Persian history goes back to ancient times and is laced with stories of foreign invasions, battles, conflict, and glory.

Ancient Times

In the 1500s BCE, nomads of Aryan descent began to move to southwest Asia, between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. This area is now known as Iran, which literally means "land of the Aryans." Two groups, Medes and Persians, settled in the northern and southern parts of the Iranian plateau, respectively. The Medes grew in power, ruling the Persians and other Indo-European peoples in the region. Cyrus the Great (c. 585–c. 529 BCE), a member of the Achaemenid Persian dynasty, ousted the Medes and founded the Achaemenid empire, which would bring glory to the Persian people. Cyrus went on to conquer Asia Minor, Palestine, Syria, and Babylonia. His son, Cambyses II (d. 522 BCE), added Egypt to their list of conquests. Darius I (550–486 BCE), also known as Darius the Great, came to power in 522 BCE. Although his attempt to conquer Greece failed, Darius earned his title for sound military and administrative practices, which allowed the Achaemenids to remain in power despite the less adept leaders who followed. Darius's son, Xerxes I (c. 519–465 BCE) also



KEY EVENTS IN IRANIAN (PERSIAN) HISTORY

- 7th–6th centuries BCE** The Medes rule the region.
- c.550 BCE–330/320 BCE** The period of the Achaemenid Persians.
- 312–64 BCE** Period of the Seleucid dynasty.
- 224/228–651 CE** Period of the Sasanid dynasty.
- 7th–10th centuries** The region is conquered and ruled by Muslim Arabs.
- 1038–1157** Period of the Seljuk dynasty.
- 13th–16th centuries** The region is ruled by the Mongols.
- 1501–1722/1736** Period of the Safavid dynasty.
- 1736** Nader Shah comes to power and extends the territory of Persia.
- 1794–1925** Period of the Qajar dynasty.
- 19th century** Persia is contested by Russia and Great Britain.
- 1906** A constitutional monarchy is created but fails to function.
- 1919** Persia becomes a British protectorate.
- 1925–1979** Period of the Pahlavi dynasty.
- 1941** Iran is invaded by British, Russian, and German forces.
- 1951** The oil industry is nationalized.
- 1979** Following the Iranian Revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran is established.
- 1980–1990** Period of Iran-Iraq War.
- 1997** Mohammed Khatami, a moderate, is elected president.
- 1998** A majority of moderates is elected to parliament.

tried and failed to conquer Greece, leaving his successors, Artaxerxes I and II, to make peace. Eventually, after uprisings and unrest had gradually undermined Achaemenid rule, the empire was conquered by Alexander of Macedon (356–323 BCE).

The Seleucids and the Sasanids Alexander hoped to fuse the Greek and Persian cultures, even ordering his soldiers to marry Iranian women. His hopes were not realized, however, as he succumbed to fever and died without naming an heir. After his death four of his generals struggled for control of his empire; one of them, Seleucus, eventually established the Seleucid dynasty (312–64 BCE). The Seleucid dynasty was ultimately brought down by the Parthians, whose control eventually extended from India to Armenia. During this time, Ardashir (reigned 224–241 CE), who claimed to be a descendant of the legendary hero Sasan, became a Parthian governor. He used this position to consolidate his power, overthrew the Parthians, and established the Sasanid dynasty (224/228–651).

The Sasanids ruled for four hundred years within the approximate boundaries of the Achaemenid empire. It was a time of renewal of Iranian traditions, as well as of large-scale improvements in agricultural and

urban development. The Sasanids proclaimed themselves *shabanshab* (king of kings) and oversaw minor rulers dispersed throughout the region. Zoroastrianism became the state religion, and priests played a major role in the government. Sasanid strength was eventually eroded by constant fighting with the Romans, who had replaced the Greeks as their main enemy. Initially, the Sasanids fought victoriously against Rome, with Shapur I (reigned 241–272), Ardashir's son and successor, at the helm. Continued fighting, however, diminished Iranian resources, and, coupled with domestic unrest, allowed the Sasanids to be conquered by the Arabs.

Arab and Mongol Conquests The Arabs invaded Persia soon after they were united under the banner of Islam, a religion to which, eventually, a majority of Iranians were converted. Even though the Arabs were clearly the ruling party, Iranians were permitted to participate in and contribute to the new government; several Iranian practices were adopted by the Arabs, and Persian continued to be spoken even though Arabic became the official language. During the 900s, the Arabs began to lose control and the region broke into factions. Eventually the Seljuks, a Turkish group led

by Toghril Beg (c. 990–1063), conquered the territory. Toghril Beg was given the title King of the East by the religious leadership. Malik Shah (1055–1092) succeeded him, bringing an era of cultural and scientific achievement to Iran. When he died the region once again split into warring dynasties.

At around this time the Mongol Genghis Khan (c. 1162–1227) began a conquering spree, starting in China and heading west, destroying everything in his path. Iran suffered tremendously: cities were decimated and populations massacred. Genghis Khan's death did little to ameliorate Iran's situation, however, as the Mongol rulers who followed were just as ruthless. One exception, Ghazan Khan (1271–1304), did allow improvements in agricultural techniques and road conditions, which favorably affected the Iranians. Eventually, fighting among Mongol tribes loosened their control over Iran and allowed the emergence of the Safavid dynasty (1501–1722/1736).

The Safavid Dynasty The Safavids rose to power in 1501 under the leadership of Ismail, who was ultimately crowned shah of Iran. Shi'a Islam, instituted as the state religion, played a central role in the governance of the state, and resources were employed to convert the Muslim population to the Shi'a sect. Striking a balance between religion and the state, as well as between the Turkic and the Iranian populations, were among the most important challenges faced by the empire. In addition, the Safavids faced enemies in the northeast and west: the Uzbeks and Ottomans, respectively. One particular confrontation had serious repercussions: In 1524, the Ottomans occupied the Safavid capital of Tabriz; although brief, the occupation called into question the divine leadership of the Safavids.

Confrontations with the Ottomans continued until the Safavids, led by Shah Abbas I (1571–1629), counteracted Ottoman encroachment. After entering into a treaty with the Ottomans, Abbas first defeated the Uzbeks, then turned on the Ottomans, achieving control over Iraq, Georgia, and parts of the Caucasus. With his external enemies in check, Abbas worked internally to centralize his power. His reign saw a gradual distance arise between state and religion, even though the shah built mosques and donated large sums to religious institutions. The shah also actively advanced trade, architecture, and the arts. He moved the capital from Tabriz to Esfahan, the latter becoming a city of beauty, equipped with mosques, palaces, schools, and a marketplace. When Abbas died, the empire spiraled downhill, and the way was opened for Afghan tribes to take control; in 1722 they brought an end to the Safavid dynasty.

The Afghans did not rule for long. They were overthrown by a chief of the Afshar tribe, Tahmasp Qoli (1688–1747), who asserted the right to do so in the name of a member of the Safavid family. Nevertheless, soon after, he claimed the power in his own right as Nader Shah (1736). He went on to conquer Afghanistan and lead successful campaigns into India. These military incursions proved taxing on the population financially and physically, however, and resulted in the death of Nader Shah at the hands of one of his own chiefs.

The Qajar Dynasty Once again, Iran erupted as petty dynasties and tribes vied for power. One tribal leader, Karim Khan Zand (c. 1705–1779), was briefly able to gain control, but when he died, chaos reigned again. Finally, Agha Muhammad Khan Qajar (1742–1797) emerged as the leader. The Qajar dynasty began in 1794, when Muhammad Qajar named himself master of the country, and ended in 1925. Qajar's successors, Fath 'Ali (reigned 1797–1834), Muhammad Shah (reigned 1834–1848), and Naser od-Din Shah (reigned 1848–1896), were able to bring some measure of stability to the country, restoring the concept of shah, which had been called into question during the Safavid era. Religion and state once again became closely associated.

Modern Period

The history of Iran in the modern era is characterized by heavy foreign involvement—first Russia and Britain, later the United States—in the economic and political affairs of the nation, which eventually led to revolution in 1979.

In the beginning of the nineteenth century, Russia and Britain began to make their presences felt. Russia wanted Iranian territory, and in two wars that ended with two treaties—the Treaty of Gulistan (1812) and the Treaty of Turkmanchai (1828)—gained land in the Caucasus region. Later in the century Russia annexed territories in Central Asia. Britain's involvement stemmed from a desire to safeguard trade routes to India. The Treaty of Paris (1857) resulted in Britain's controlling Afghanistan.

Russia and Britain were able to exert considerable control over Iranian affairs due to their superior military and technological capabilities, and Iran's lack of centralized control. During Naser od-Din Shah's reign, attempts were made to tighten administrative processes, but these failed due to jealousy and corruption. An idea began to circulate that the way to stop foreign interference was to adopt European practices, which led to the creation of a cabinet based on the European model. Foreign involvement, however, did not



The Crown Prince of Iran and Egyptian Minister of National Defense Hussein Sabry Pacha watch a military demonstration in Egypt in March, 1939. (HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS)

diminish, especially in commerce, where trade concessions were constantly given to Russia and Britain. The people protested these concessions; in one instance, under the leadership of the religious community, they forced the government to cancel a tobacco monopoly that had been awarded to Britain. The people became increasingly unhappy with the oppression, corruption, and foreign concessions, and Naser od-Din Shah was assassinated in 1896.

The Constitutional Revolution His son and successor, Mozaffar od-Din (reigned 1896–1907) ruled in the same vein that had characterized his father's later years. He relied on Russia to provide loans—money he used extravagantly and ostentatiously, which angered the populace and ultimately led to what became known as the Constitutional Revolution. Religious leaders and merchants pressured the shah to agree to a constitutional monarchy, which would operate within the framework of law, and a constitution that limited the role of the royal family and provided for an elected parliament (*majlis*) was signed on 30 December 1906. Mozaffar, however, died just five days later, and his successor, Muhammad Ali Shah, had no intention of adhering to the constitution. He started an all-out campaign to crush it, but was defeated and forced into Russian exile. Constitutional rule did not take place, however, as once again outside influences intervened.

In 1907, Russia and Britain decided to divide Iran into spheres of influence: Russia would control the north, while Britain retained control of the south and east. A neutral area was established in the center, open

to both. In a confrontation that ensued due to the hiring of a U.S. administrator, Russian troops advanced on Tehran, and the *majlis* was forced to close down and concede to Russian demands.

The Pahlavi Dynasty Iran tried to maintain its neutrality during World War I, but became the battlefield for Russian, British, and Turkish forces. The end of the war brought an increased British presence, as the Russians were otherwise preoccupied with the Bolshevik revolution. The Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 amounted to Iran becoming a British protectorate, which enraged the population. In February 1921, a military officer, Reza Khan (1878–1944), aided by the journalist Sayyid Zia od-Din Tabatabai, seized power, first becoming war minister, then prime minister, and finally, in 1925, shah. Reza Khan changed his name to Pahlavi and thus began the Pahlavi dynasty.

The shah exerted considerable military control over the country and worked at modernization: He minimized religious influences, welcomed Westernization, and instituted economic and educational reform. The shah also worked to minimize British and Russian influence by increasing trade relations with Germany—which worked against him with the outbreak of World War II. Again, Iran tried to maintain its neutrality, but to no avail. Angered at its relationship with Germany, British and Russian troops invaded Iran in 1941, and the shah relinquished the throne to his son, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1919–1980). Although Iran played a critical role in the war, providing passageway for military equipment and eventually declaring war on Germany, the presence of foreign troops did not create a feeling of camaraderie; in fact just the opposite occurred, and ultimately a nationalist movement took hold.

Several oil agreements had been signed with Britain and Russia. When it became apparent that Britain was benefiting more financially from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) than was Iran, nationalists within the *majlis*, led by Muhammad Mosaddeq (1880–1967), began pushing for the AIOC agreement to be renegotiated, and on 15 March 1951 the *majlis* passed a bill nationalizing the oil industry. When the prime minister spoke against the law, he was assassinated and replaced by Mosaddeq. Nationalization resulted in Britain taking the case to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. Economic and political turmoil ensued, and the shah forced Mosaddeq from office. His popularity, however, proved to be such that the shah was forced into exile, and Mosaddeq assumed the reigns of government. His power was short-lived, however: the United States, finding Mosaddeq too in-

flexible, supported the return of the shah through a Central Intelligence Agency operation.

With the shah's return, Iran began to experience more U.S. involvement in its economic and political affairs. The shah launched several ambitious economic plans, but it was difficult for the Iranian economy to recover from the effects of the nationalist movement. Discontent with the shah's repressive practices and reliance on the United States increased. In an effort to quell these voices the shah devised the White Revolution, an ambitious plan of economic and land reform. The land reform was not met with enthusiasm by religious leaders; neither was his decision to extend the right to vote to women. In June of 1963, Ayatollah Khomeini (c.1900–1989) began speaking out against the shah and his White Revolution. Khomeini was ultimately sent into exile, but continued to speak against the shah and question his legitimacy. The shah responded by cracking down on all opposition.

Establishment of an Islamic Republic In the late 1970s, Ayatollah Khomeini encouraged massive strikes throughout the country. In January of 1979, the shah left Iran under pretense of taking a vacation, allowing Khomeini to seize power. He immediately declared the shah's government illegitimate and instituted a provisional government, giving it the task of drafting a constitution establishing an Islamic republic in which the functions of government would be guided by the teachings of Islam. Several institutions, such as the Revolutionary Council, were created with the same thought in mind. Finally, Ayatollah Khomeini was named *faqih* (spiritual leader) for life.

Because of U.S. involvement in the area and its support for the shah, Khomeini regarded the United States as an enemy. These anti-American feelings were fueled in October 1978, when Washington allowed the shah to enter the United States for medical treatment—perceived as an attempt by the shah to gain support for his return to power. This resulted in Iranian students taking U.S. hostages at the embassy in Tehran. Eventually, the hostage crisis was peacefully resolved, but only after Iranian assets were frozen and a disastrous hostage rescue attempt by the United States. Negotiations began in earnest in September 1980, most likely because the Iranians were facing a new enemy: Iraq. Iraq invaded Iran in part because Iraq's president, Saddam Hussein (b. 1937), had territorial ambitions and in part because it feared the Iranian message of revolutionary Islam. The Iran-Iraq war was a brutal conflict that lasted eight years. Although it helped rally the Iranian people to a common cause, it had devastating effects on the economy, which

ultimately led Khomeini to agree to a cease-fire in August 1988. The ayatollah died one year later. Ali Khamenei was named his successor as *faqih* and Hashemi Rafsanjani was elected president in 1989.

The revolutionary regime is characterized by restrictive practices and strict religious requirements. The late 1990s saw a movement calling for political reform, most likely due to the largely youthful population; as a result, a moderate, Muhammed Khatami, was elected president in 1997, and *majlis* elections in 2000 resulted in the election of a majority of moderates to the parliament.

These developments have had a positive effect on the Iranian relationship with other countries, including the United States, whose ties with Tehran have remained strained since the hostage crisis. The United States, however, is still concerned with the nature of the Iranian Islamic Republic, and with the possibility that nuclear capability might fall into the hands of revolutionary Iranian leaders as a result of the 1991 demise of the Soviet Union. Despite such considerations the United States has lifted its trade embargo on certain Iranian products, and there has been considerable pressure on the U.S. government, most notably from the oil industry, to end the trade embargo altogether. The future of Washington-Tehran ties remains unclear. From a domestic perspective, however, Iran has economic and political challenges to face in the years to come as it aims to stabilize its economy and enact the political reforms for which the people are clamoring.

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IRAN—HUMAN RIGHTS The Islamic Republic of Iran was established in 1979 after a populist revolution toppled the Pahlavi monarchy. The monarchy, last headed by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1919–1980), repressed political expression and frequently violated human rights. Unfortunately,

subsequent governments of the Islamic Republic have continued this tradition.

The Islamic Republic is dominated by Muslim clergy of the Shi'a denomination. The head of state, an ayatollah (high ranking Shi'ite cleric), holds the title of Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution and has direct control of the armed forces, internal security forces, and judiciary. A popularly elected unicameral Islamic Consultative Assembly, or *majlis*, legislates, but all legislation is reviewed for adherence to Islamic and constitutional principles by an appointed Council of Guardians, which has also the power to screen and disqualify candidates for elective office.

Among the agencies responsible for internal security are the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Ministry of Interior, and the Revolutionary Guards. Paramilitary volunteer forces known as Basijis, and gangs, known as the Ansar-e Hezbollah (Helpers of the Party of God), have acted as vigilantes who intimidate citizens suspected of counterrevolutionary activities.

Despite citizen protests, the government's human-rights record has remained poor. According to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, systematic abuses have included extrajudicial killings and summary executions, disappearances, widespread use of torture and other degrading treatment, arbitrary arrest and detention, and prolonged and incommunicado detention. The judiciary lacks independence and does not ensure citizens the right of due process. The government has used the courts to stifle dissent and obstruct progress on human rights.

Recent years have witnessed an intense political struggle between Iranians favoring greater liberalization in government policies, particularly in the area of human rights, and hard-liners in the government and society, who view such reforms as threats to the survival of the Islamic republic.

Torture and Other Cruel Punishment

There have been numerous, credible reports that security forces and prison personnel torture detainees and prisoners. Some prison facilities, including Tehran's Evin prison, are notorious for the cruel and prolonged acts of torture inflicted upon the government's political opponents. Common torture methods include suspension for long periods in contorted positions, burning with cigarettes, sleep deprivation, and severe and repeated beatings with cables or other instruments on the back and on the soles of the feet. Prisoners also have reported beatings about the ears, inducing partial or complete deafness, and punching in the eyes, leading to partial or complete blindness.

Prison conditions are harsh. Some prisoners are held in solitary confinement or denied adequate food or medical care in order to force confessions. Female prisoners reportedly have been raped or otherwise tortured while in detention. Prison guards reportedly intimidate family members of detainees and torture detainees in the presence of family members. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights Special Representative for Human Rights in Iran reported receiving numerous reports of overcrowding and unrest in Iranian prisons. The authorities do not allow human-rights monitors to visit imprisoned dissidents. In August 1999, however, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami (b. 1943) publicly criticized the use of torture and defended the rights of prisoners as a legitimate concern based on "Islam and human conscience."

Harsh punishments are carried out, including stoning and flogging, which are expressly mandated by the Islamic Penal Code as appropriate punishments for adultery. According to Article 102 of the code, "the stoning of an adulterer or adulteress shall be carried out while each is placed in a hole and covered with soil, he up to his waist and she up to a line above her breasts" (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 1999).

Political Executions and Arbitrary Arrest and Detention

In November 1995 the *majlis* passed a law that criminalizes dissent and applies the death penalty to offenses such as "attempts against the security of the State, outrage against high-ranking Iranian officials, and insults against the memory of Imam Khomeini and against the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic" (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 1999). This law has been used to eliminate political dissidents.

Though the constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, these practices remain common. There is reportedly no legal time limit on incommunicado detention in jails or in local Revolutionary Guard offices. International observers believe hundreds of citizens have been imprisoned for their political beliefs.

Denial of Fair Public Trial

Trials in the Islamic Revolutionary Courts are notorious for their disregard of international standards of fairness. Pretrial detention often is prolonged, and defendants lack access to attorneys. Indictments often lack clarity and include undefined offenses such as "antirevolutionary behavior," "moral corruption," and "siding with global arrogance." Defendants do not

have the right to confront their accusers. Secret or summary trials occur. In 1992 the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights concluded that "the chronic abuses associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Courts are so numerous and so entrenched as to be beyond reform" (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 1999). As of 2000 there has been no major reform of the Revolutionary Court system.

Freedom of Speech and Press

Since the election of President Khatami in 1997 the independent press has played an increasingly important role in providing a forum for an intense debate regarding reform in the society. However, basic legal safeguards for freedom of expression are lacking, and the independent press has been subjected to arbitrary enforcement measures by elements of the government, notably the judiciary.

The 1995 Press Law prohibits the publication of material "insulting Islam and its sanctities" or "promoting subjects that might damage the foundation of the Islamic Republic." Generally prohibited topics include criticisms of the late Ayatollah Khomeini (1900–1989), direct criticism of the current Supreme Leader, questioning the tenets of certain Islamic legal principles, promotion of the views of certain dissident clerics, and promotion of rights or autonomy of ethnic minorities.

Police raid newspaper offices, and the Ansar-e Hezbollah attack the offices of liberal publications and bookstores without interference from the police or prosecution by the courts. The government directly controls and maintains a monopoly over all television and radio broadcasting facilities. Satellite dishes that receive foreign television broadcasts are forbidden, even though many wealthy citizens own them. The Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance screens books prior to publication and inspects foreign printed material prior to its distribution.

Privacy Rights and Freedom of Assembly and Association

Security forces monitor the social activities of citizens, enter homes and offices, monitor telephone conversations, and open mail without court authorization. The government restricts freedom of assembly and closely monitors funeral processions and student, labor, and Friday prayer gatherings. In July 1999 students at Tehran University who were protesting the government's closure of a prominent reform-oriented newspaper as well as proposed legislation by the *majlis* that would limit press freedoms were attacked by security forces and Ansar-e Hezbollah. At least four



Author Salman Rushdie in London on 15 March 1995 while under a death sentence issued by Iran for writings critical of Islam. (AFP/CORBIS)

students were killed and three hundred were wounded. Four student leaders were later tried and sentenced to death by a Revolutionary Court for their role in the demonstrations.

Freedom of Religion

Iran's population is 99 percent Muslim, of which 89 percent are Shi'ite and 10 percent are Sunni. Baha'i, Christian, Zoroastrian, and Jewish communities account for less than 1 percent of the population.

The Ministry of Intelligence and Security monitors religious activity closely. The Constitution declares that the official religion of Iran is Twelver sect Shi'a Islam. It accords other Islamic denominations full respect and recognizes Zoroastrians, Christians, and Jews as protected religious minorities. Religions not specifically protected under the Constitution do not enjoy freedom of religion. This situation most directly affects the nearly 350,000 followers of the Baha'i faith,

which originated in Iran during the 1840s as a reformist movement within Shi'a Islam. Political and religious authorities joined to suppress the movement and have always been hostile to it. They consider Baha'is to be apostates and claim the Baha'i faith is a counterrevolutionary sect historically linked to the shah's regime, even though the Baha'is had also faced discrimination under the shah.

The government does not ensure the right of citizens to change religions. Apostasy, specifically conversion from Islam, can be punishable by death.

Political Rights

The government represses attempts to separate state and religion or to alter the state's existing theocratic foundation. Regularly scheduled elections are held for the president, members of the *majlis*, and the Assembly of Experts. (The 86-member Assembly of Experts consists of clerics who serve an eight-year term and are chosen by popular vote from a list approved by the government. It has the power to remove the Supreme Leader.) Over 90 percent of the eligible population voted in the 1997 national election. Khatami won nearly 70 percent of the vote, with his greatest support coming from the middle class, youth, minorities, and women. The election results were not disputed, and the government does not appear to have engaged in fraud.

Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians elect deputies to specially reserved *majlis* seats. However, religious minorities are barred from holding senior government or military positions.

Rights of Women

Women are underrepresented in government. In 1999 they held 13 of 270 *majlis* seats. There were no female cabinet members. After his election, President Khatami appointed the first female vice president (for environmental protection) since the Islamic Revolution. He also appointed a woman to serve as Presidential Adviser for Women's Affairs. The Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance appointed a woman to the senior post of Deputy Minister for Legal and Parliamentary Affairs.

Women have access to primary and advanced education and work in many fields, including medicine, dentistry, journalism, and agriculture. A 1985 law instituted three months of paid maternity leave and two half-hour periods per day for nursing mothers. Pension benefits for women were established under the same law, which also decreed that companies hiring women should provide day-care facilities for their children.

The State enforces gender segregation in most public spaces, and prohibits women from mixing openly with men not related to them. Women are subject to harassment by the authorities if their dress or behavior is considered inappropriate, and may be sentenced to flogging or imprisonment for such violations.

Women have the right to divorce, alimony, and a share in the property that couples acquire during their marriage, in accordance with Islamic law. Mothers are granted custody of minor children in divorce cases in which the father is proven unfit. (Where the father is not proven unfit, custody varies case by case.) Muslim women may not marry non-Muslim men. The testimony of a woman is worth only half that of a man in court, and a married woman must obtain the written consent of her husband before traveling outside the country.

The government restricts the work of local human-rights groups. It denies the universality of human rights and does not permit international human rights NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International to establish offices or conduct regular investigative visits to Iran.

Despite the Islamic Republic's dismal human-rights record, there are some signs of improvement. In 1995 an Islamic Human-Rights Commission (IHRC) was established under the authority of the head of the judiciary, and in 1996 the government established a human-rights committee in the *majlis*. Thus far, however, these have had little impact on governmental practices.

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IRAN—POLITICAL SYSTEM Constitutionally speaking, Iran is a theocratic republic in which the state and religion are closely intertwined. The Iranian system, which is based on Islamic law, was approved by a referendum in December 1979, soon after the

success of the revolution that deposed Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1919–1980), Iran's last shah (1941–1979). Before the constitution was publicly voted on, it was first modified by the Assembly of Experts, which worked on the draft provided by the provisional government established by Ayatollah Khomeini (1900–1989). Another referendum followed ten years later added forty-five amendments to the constitution. A significant change was the removal of the role of the prime minister within the government. Another major change modified the criteria for selecting the *faqih* (spiritual leader). The criteria were revised in order to allow the Assembly of Experts to choose Ali Hussein Khamenei (b. 1939) as *faqih* when Ayatollah Khomeini died in 1989 even though Khamenei was considered relatively junior at that time (his religious title was only Hojjat al-Islam) with respect to religious scholastic requirements for the role.

Religious Oversight of the Government

The Iranian government has three branches: executive, legislative, and judiciary. However, there are several religious bodies that oversee these branches. The main religious authority is the *faqih*, who is a recognized religious scholar selected by the Assembly of Experts. The idea is that the *faqih* rules during the absence from earth of the Twelfth Imam, who, according to the main sect of Shi'a Islam, will return one day to bring salvation, peace, and prosperity to the community of believers. The *faqih's* task is to ensure that the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches comply with the tenets of Islam; thus, he is given considerable powers. For instance, he can declare war or peace based on the recommendation of the Supreme Defense Council, half of whose membership he appoints. The *faqih* commands the military and security forces of Iran. He also appoints the office of the supreme judge and chief of the general staff as well as half the members of the Guardians Council, a council that determines whether laws proposed in the *majlis* respect the tenets of Islam and are in the spirit of the constitution. In addition, the *faqih* reserves the right to question any candidate's bid for the presidency. Ayatollah Khomeini always used this right and often prevented candidates from running when he felt they had positions contrary to the ideals of the Islamic Republic. The *faqih* has the authority as well to impeach an elected president if either the supreme court or the *majlis* (parliament) finds the president shirking his responsibilities or violating the principles of Islam. This actually happened to the first elected president of the Islamic Republic, Bani Sadr. He was impeached because he constantly clashed with the prime minister of the time, Rajai.

The Assembly of Experts is another religious body that oversees the functions of the government. It is composed solely of clerics elected by the people. The first Assembly was elected in 1982, and succeeded by a second in 1990.

The Executive Branch

The president heads the executive branch of government and is elected for a four-year term. Currently, the president is Mohammed Khatami (b. 1943), whose election in 1997 marked a significant shift in the attitude of the people toward a more moderate system. He succeeded former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (b. 1934). The president has the authority to select his cabinet called the Council of Ministers, but his appointments must be approved by the *majlis* before they can take effect.

An Election Supervisory Council manages all the election procedures. Anyone fifteen and over can vote. The minimum voting age used to be twenty but was no doubt modified due to the youthful orientation of the population. Women were given the right to vote in 1963.

The Legislative Branch

Legislation is the jurisdiction of the 270 members of the *majlis*, who are elected for four-year terms. Lively debate occurs on the floor of the *majlis* as there is ample variety of opinion concerning economic, political, and social topics. Essentially there are three camps of thought nestled within the *majlis*: conservatives, radicals, and moderates.

Conservatives, mainly comprising the religious community and the bazaar merchants, closely follow the party line and tend to be xenophobic and wary of outside influences, particularly those of the West. They are also orthodox in the cultural application of Islamic principles, such as establishing a dress code for men and women and keeping a tight rein on the media and what it is allowed to depict. The conservatives were clearly setting the political agenda when the Islamic Republic was first established in 1979. The radicals (or followers of Imam Khomeini's line) make up another faction; they support programs for the disadvantaged classes of society. They favor fair methods of distribution of income as well as keeping a watchful eye on the private sector. They are more progressive in their social programs than the conservatives, but share their fear of the encroachment of Western ideals and dependency on foreign power. The radicals have long been present in the *majlis* and often debate issues of land reform and nationalization of industries.



PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

Adopted on: 24 Oct 1979

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran advances the cultural, social, political, and economic institutions of Iranian society based on Islamic principles and norms, which represent an honest aspiration of the Islamic Ummah. This aspiration was exemplified by the nature of the great Islamic Revolution of Iran, and by the course of the Muslim people's struggle, from its beginning until victory, as reflected in the decisive and forceful calls raised by all segments of the populations. Now, at the threshold of this great victory, our nation, with all its beings, seeks its fulfillment.

The basic characteristic of this revolution, which distinguishes it from other movements that have taken place in Iran during the past hundred years, is its ideological and Islamic nature. After experiencing the anti-despotic constitutional movement and the anti-colonialist movement centered on the nationalization of the oil industry, the Muslim people of Iran learned from this costly experience that the obvious and fundamental reason for the failure of those movements was their lack of an ideological basis. Although the Islamic line of thought and the direction provided by militant religious leaders played an essential role in the recent movements, nonetheless, the struggles waged in the course of those movements quickly fell into stagnation due to departure from genuine Islamic positions. Thus it was that the awakened conscience of the nation, under the leadership of Imam Khomeini, came to perceive the necessity of pursuing a genuinely Islamic and ideological line in its struggles. And this time, the militant 'ulama' of the country, who had always been in the forefront of popular movements, together with the committed writers and intellectuals, found new impetus by following his leadership.

Source: International Court Networks. Retrieved 8 March 2002, from: http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/np00000_.html.

However, their influence was the strongest during the 1980s. The radicals mainly comprise students and members of such organizations as The Bureau for the Promotion of Unity and the Young Combatant Clerics. The moderates, also known as the centrists or pragmatists, form the last major faction. They are made up of the middle class—professionals and bureaucrats—and are more open to outside ideas and to liberalization policies. They believe in coexisting peacefully in the world and are not threatened by outside influences. The moderates took center stage in the last part of the twentieth century and the begin-

ning of the twenty-first, as evidenced by Khatami's election to the presidency in 1997 and the landslide victory by the moderates in the 2000 *majlis* elections.

When the *majlis* passes a bill, it is reviewed by the Guardians Council to ensure its acceptability. The Guardians Council consists of twelve lawyers, six of whom are clerics appointed by the *faqih*, and six appointed by the High Council of the Judiciary and approved by the Assembly of Experts. The Guardians Council has often used its right to reject any bill proposed by the *majlis*, in particular bills relating to land reform and nationalization. When a bill is rejected by

the Guardians Council, it is sent back to the *majlis* for revision. In February 1988 a committee called the Committee to Determine the Expediency of the Islamic Order was formed to mediate disputes that arise between the *majlis* and the Guardians Council. This committee was legitimized by the constitution in July of 1989.

The Judiciary

The judiciary is composed of a Supreme Court, with five justices, and lower criminal and civil courts. Clerics are tried in a special clerical court; people facing charges of treason against the Islamic Republic are tried in revolutionary tribunals. Judges are required to be members of the Islamic clergy and their judicial decisions must be rooted in Islamic law. A minister of justice operates as the liaison between the three branches of government.

Freedom of the Press and Political Parties

The constitution provides for freedom of press except in cases where the press undermines Islamic ideals—a clause responsible for Iranian strained relations with the United Kingdom. Iran actually cut off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom in March 1989 because a British company published Salman Rushdie's book *The Satanic Verses*, which was perceived to be against Islamic values. It took over a year for full diplomatic relations to be reinstated.

The same criteria of adhering to Islamic values is applied with respect to the creation of political parties and associations as well as religious institutions. Islam is listed as the official religion of Iran in the constitution. The sect that is followed is Twelver Shi'a, the dominant Shi'a sect. Other Muslim sects are recognized and represented in the government. Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians have the status of lawful religious minorities. However, the Baha'is are not considered a recognized religious minority; they are not allowed representation in the *majlis* and their behavior is restricted by the government.

Iran's best-known political party was the Islamic Republican Party (IRP), which was created in 1978 and led by Ayatollah Khomeini. It was instrumental in the unfolding of the Islamic Revolution and became the ruling party after the Islamic Revolution's success. But Khomeini disbanded the IRP in June 1987 under pressure by the other political parties.

Other political parties that have played a part in Iranian history are the Liberation Movement of Iran, the Union of National Front Forces, the National Democratic Front, the Muslim People's Republican Party, the Party of the Masses, the Communist Party



Family members of dissidents on trial before Iran's Revolutionary Court in January 2002 protest political repression outside the court building. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

of Iran, the Party of the Toilers, the Kurdish Democratic Party, and the People's Mujahidin Organization of Iran. Parties may be subject to harassment if they criticize the government. For example, the Liberation Movement of Iran that was founded by Mehdi Bazargan, the first prime minister of the provisional government of the Islamic Republic, often found its offices ransacked due to its criticisms of the government, even though the government tolerated the party's existence and permitted its representation in the *majlis*. Other parties are not as fortunate. The Party of the Masses, a pro-Soviet Communist party, was banned in 1983. The Kurdish Democratic Party was prohibited in 1979. Some political parties are organized by Iranians who live abroad and are working to change the system of government. For instance, the Muslim People's Republican Party would like to see a secular government in Iran rather than a theocracy.

Other political groups are violent in nature and use terrorist tactics against the government, which in turn responds with force. Such radical groups include the People's Mujahidin Organization of Iran, Warriors of the People, the Forghan Group, and Black Wednesday. The first group originally supported the Islamic Republic and had been known for carrying out assassinations against the shah's regime and the U.S. government, but in the early 1980s a shift occurred within the organization and its members began attacking the current regime.

The recent liberalization of policies and the shift toward moderation have allowed the formation and activities of several new political parties, including Executives of Construction, Islamic Iran Solidarity Party, and the Islamic Partnership Front.

Regarding human rights, the Iranian constitution provides for the basic rights of individuals in Articles 19 through 42. But Iran is not considered a free nation by Western standards. At the start of the new republic, the revolutionary regime showed little regard for human rights. Quick trials and executions of opponents were frequent; newspapers could be closed or ransacked at a moment's notice. However, when conditions stabilized, Khomeini issued an eight-point statement, which prohibited such acts of censorship and illegal entries into homes. Although some abuses continue, conditions have significantly improved and there is a structure in place to correct the abuses. Currently, the Iranian electorate is pursuing more rights and reforms.

The Military

Iran has four military and security forces: the regular armed forces, the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards), the Basij (militia), and the police. The army, navy, and air force are the components of the regular armed forces, which were heavily purged after the revolution. The Pasdaran were created with the formation of the Islamic Republic to protect the revolution, because the Ayatollah was suspicious of the loyalty of the regular forces, which had been trained by U.S. advisers in the shah's era. The Pasdaran were largely responsible for the purging of the shah's regime as well as opponents of the new government. Both the regular armed forces and the Revolutionary Guards are responsible for defending the country if threatened by a foreign power. The Basij is called upon when the government is threatened by violence.

Local Government and the Civil Service

Iran is divided into twenty-five *ostans* (provinces). The *anjumans* (provincial councils) are slowly but surely expanding their power base. The provinces are further divided into 195 *shabrestans* (counties), then into 500 *bakhsbes* (districts), and finally into 1,581 *desbitans* (groups of villages). Respectively, each level is commanded by *ostandars*, *farmandars*, *bakhsbadars*, and *debdars*. Individual villages are run by *kakhdods* (headmen). Mayors and councils are either elected or appointed by the Ministry of Interior to run the towns and cities.

Iran has a civil service in place that still operates according to codes established in 1922 and 1966. It contains seven grade levels with fifteen in-grade steps between each grade level. To become a civil servant requires taking an entrance exam. There are over 700,000 civil servants in Iran.

The Future

The trend toward moderation demonstrated by the 2000 *majlis* elections was encouraging. Despite pre-

election crackdowns on the media, the will of the people was respected. Only time will tell how the volatility in the Middle East brought about by the U.S. responses to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks will affect Iran's political system.

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IRAN-IRAQ RELATIONS For thousands of years, the inhabitants of the neighboring areas of today's Iran and Iraq have known conflict alternating with periods of tranquillity. Both Muslim countries, Iran and Iraq share a common cultural orientation, but religious views and languages differ widely. Present-day Iranians are Shi'ite Muslims, whereas Iraqis are largely Sunni, although with a significant Shi'ite population; Persian is the official language of Iran, while Arabic is the language of Iraq, and Kurdish- and Turkish-speaking peoples also live in both countries.

Relations up to the Nineteenth Century

Boasting long histories, both these countries are strategically situated on the Persian Gulf, a position that has shaped their unique national identities. Ancient Iraq (Mesopotamia) and Iran (Persia) were home to some of the world's first great urban civilizations. After the Arab invasion of the seventh century and the replacement of Zoroastrianism by Islam, a unique blend of Persian and Arab culture united Iran and Iraq during the long rule of the Abbasid dynasty (749/750–1258) over both countries, until both were devastated by successive Mongol invasions.

The paths of Iran and Iraq then diverged. The Safavid dynasty (1501–1722/1736) in Iran encouraged the transformation of Shi'ism, its school, and its religious hierarchy into the official religion of the region. Iraq fell under the hegemony of the Ottoman empire (1453–1922), for whom Sunni orthodoxy was the imperial religion. Ottoman-Safavid rivalries erupted across the Iran-Iraq border innumerable times for several centuries.



An Iraqi honor guard marches at the tomb of the unknown soldier in Baghdad on 8 August 1999, marking the eleventh anniversary of the end of the Iran-Iraq War. (AFP/CORBIS)

Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Iran-Iraq Relations

In the nineteenth century, the territories of Iran and Iraq were the site of the great power struggle (among Britain, France, and Russia), sometimes referred to as the "Great Game" (in the Caucasus and Iran) or the "Eastern Question" (in Iraq). Anglo-Russian-Ottoman rivalries were conducted on the ground in Iran, as conflict after conflict erupted over the Caucasus and Transcaucasus territories such as Georgia, annexed by Russia in 1801. Iraq remained under Ottoman control until World War I, when it was the scene of some of the worst fighting between the British and their Arab allies and the Turks. Iran's sovereignty was theoretically guaranteed by the presence of Russian and British forces stationed there supposedly to protect the Caucasus from Ottoman-German invasion, but in reality to keep control over the oil fields.

Iraq's present boundaries were constructed by the victorious World War I allies after Faisal led an Arab revolt against the Ottomans; the British supported Faisal as king (reigned 1921–1933). Iraq remained a kingdom until after World War II, when a dictatorship disguised as a republic eventually replaced the constitutional monarchy.

In Iran Reza Shah Pahlavi (1878–1944) seized power in 1925 and was succeeded by his son Mohammad Reza Shah, who ruled until 1979. During that time, oil catapulted the Middle East into world prominence, and both Iran and Iraq tried to consolidate their

new nations through rapid economic development and attempts to unify their various peoples, an attempt that was resisted by the Kurds, an ethnic minority in both Iran and Iraq. The Kurds figure as a significant source of conflict in Iran-Iraq bilateral relations.

World War II saw increased German influence in Iran, and under Anglo-Soviet pressure Reza Shah abdicated in favor of his son Mohammad Reza. British oil interests were on the rise, and concessions were given to them in 1943, following which the Soviets asked for similar rights. Iraq was reoccupied by the British during World War II to protect British access to Iraqi oil fields. After World War II external economic pressures, especially in the competition for oil, and conflicts with ethnic minorities complicated any sense of historical unity and prevented regional cooperative development between the two neighboring states.

The Arab-Israeli war of 1973 temporarily restored Iran-Iraq bilateral relations when, in a show of anti-Zionist solidarity, the oil producing and exporting countries (OPEC) brokered a settlement between Iran and Iraq after Saddam Hussein (b. 1937), the ruler of Iraq, ordered his troops to occupy two offshore islands in the Shatt al-Arab.

The Iranian empire had begun to decay in the 1970s, and in 1979 a triumphant Ayatollah Khomeini (1900–1989) declared the new Islamic (Shi'ite) Republic of Iran, a direct threat to the Ba'ath (Socialist) Party of Saddam Hussein's secular Iraq. Hussein was

fearful of the Shi'ites who formed 51 percent of Iraq's population and whose theological seminaries had been in close contact with Khomeini.

Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1990

The roots of the Iran-Iraq War were partly planted in the question of the sovereignty of the islands in the Shatt al Arab, a waterway 193 kilometers long, flowing from the Tigris-Euphrates confluence in Iraq to the Persian Gulf near Kuwait and forming part of the Iran-Iraq border. Iraq's right to the waterway, established in 1937, was a bone of contention with Iran. Provocation had occurred in 1969 over the passage of a group of Iranian vessels flying the national flag. In 1975, after Iran-supplied weapons had allowed the Kurds in northern Iraq to revolt, Iraq agreed to recognize the Shatt al Arab as the border between the two countries if Iran agreed to stop sending weapons to the Kurds. In hopes of reversing this border agreement, with an eye on the Iranian oil fields in Khuzestan province, and also desiring to stop the threat to Iraq's secular government posed by the Islamic government of Iran, Saddam Hussein invaded Iran in 1980.

The Iran-Iraq War was a bloody conflict; it dragged on for eight years and cost a million lives. In 1980 Iraq expected an easy victory, but Iran fought back and even attempted to capture Al Basrah, Iraq's main Gulf port. Much of the time the war was a stalemate; Iran refused to surrender, but Iraq enjoyed superior military advantage and did not refrain from using gas warfare against Iranian troops. World opinion was nevertheless anti-Iranian because of the fear that an Islamic revolution would spread throughout the Middle East. This perception was shared not only by the United States, which already had a strained relationship with Iran, but also by the Arab regimes who were its allies, and by the Soviet Union.

Iraq failed in its attempts to capture the oil fields of southern Iran due to tough resistance from the Iranian army. While purges and internal strife took a toll on the Iranian army, Khomeini relied on a cadre of revolutionary guards (Pasadaran) and a massive volunteer force of young men, instant martyrs in the fight for the Iranian Islamic Revolution.

The fighting continued for eight years, in a series of offensives and counteroffensives that devastated the oil economies of both nations and wreaked havoc on a generation of young people. The conflict acquired ethnic overtones of Persian versus Arab, rather than a religious versus secular confrontation. Iraq's pipelines were damaged, and oil could be exported only through Turkey and Jordan.

By 1988 the ravaged economies of Iran and Iraq, a war-weary public, OPEC, the United States, and the Soviet Union finally combined to force both sides to the negotiating table. The efforts of the secretary-general of the United Nations resulted in a cease-fire on 20 August 1988, under the direct control of the U.N. Iran-Iraq Military Observers Group. In October 1988 Ayatollah Khomeini accepted negotiation, comparing it to drinking poison. Khomeini died in June 1989, and a new wave of enthusiasm to end the war came about. Before peace could be signed, Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait, precipitating the Persian Gulf War. The Iran-Iraq War was not settled until August 1990, when Iraq abandoned its demand to control of the Shatt al Arab, which was divided between the two countries.

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IRAN-RUSSIA RELATIONS Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Iran has become Russia's principal ally in the Middle East. The two countries have cooperated in a number of regional conflicts, and Russia is Iran's primary supplier of military equipment and nuclear technology. Both Moscow and Tehran oppose what they claim are U.S. efforts to create a unipolar world. While there are some areas of dispute between the two countries, primarily over the Caspian Sea, the durability of the relationship was underscored in November 2000, when Russia unilaterally abrogated an agreement with the United States to stop selling arms to Iran when existing contracts expired at the end of 2000.

Development of Iran-Russia Relations

Relations between Moscow and Tehran began to develop in the later part of the Gorbachev era (1985–1991). After alternately supporting first Iran and then Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1990), by July 1987 Moscow had clearly tilted toward Iran. The relationship between the two countries was solidified in June 1989 with the visit to Moscow of the Iranian president Ali Akhbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (b. 1934), when a number of agreements, including one on military cooperation, were signed. The military

agreement permitted Iran to purchase highly sophisticated military aircraft from Moscow, including MIG-29s and SU-24s.

Russian Aid to Iran

The Iranian air force had been badly affected by the eight-year war with Iraq and by U.S. refusal to supply spare parts, let alone new planes, to replace losses in the F-14s and other aircraft that the United States had sold to the regime of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, the shah of Iran (1919–1980). Soviet military equipment was badly needed. Iran's military-supply dependence on Moscow grew as a result of the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War. After that war, the United States, Iran's main enemy, became the primary military power in the Gulf. U.S. defense agreements with a number of Persian Gulf states included prepositioning arrangements for U.S. military equipment, and Saudi Arabia, Iran's most important Islamic challenger, acquired massive amounts of U.S. weaponry.

As Russia-Iran relations deepened, Moscow stepped up the quantity and quality of its arms sales, and by 1993 it had agreed to supply Iran with submarines that could be used to challenge the U.S. fleet operating in the region. Another Russian action angering the United States was the 1995 agreement to supply Iran with a nuclear reactor for the nuclear installation at Bushehr in southwest Iran. Under heavy U.S. pressure, Moscow did renege on a promise to provide a graphite reactor that could have been used to construct nuclear weapons. The Russian natural gas company, Gazprom, was also a major investor in Iran's South Pars natural-gas field, reaching an agreement to help develop the field in 1997.

Iran's Support of Russia

In addition to supplying Tehran with military equipment and nuclear reactors and investing in one of Iran's major natural gas fields, Moscow, whose position in the world had been eroding as its economy and military power weakened, found Iran to be a helpful ally in dealing with a number of sensitive Middle Eastern, Caucasian, Transcaucasian, and Central and Southwest Asian hot spots. These included Chechnya, where Iran has kept a low profile during both Russian-Chechen wars, despite the Chechen rebels' use of Islamic themes in their conflict with Russia; Tajikistan, where Iran helped Russia achieve a political settlement of the civil war, albeit a shaky one; Afghanistan, where both Russia and Iran have stood together against the Taliban; and Azerbaijan, which neither Iran, with a sizable Azeri population of its own, nor Russia wishes to see emerge as a significant economic and military



Russian and Iranian foreign ministers Igor Ivanov and Karmal Kharazi at talks on the Middle East in Damascus, Syria, in October 2000. (AFP/CORBIS)

power, particularly as it develops closer relations with the United States. Furthermore, as NATO expands eastward, many Russians have called for a closer Russia-Iran relationship as a counterbalance. Turkey is seen by many in the Russian elite as closely cooperating with its NATO allies in expanding its influence in both Transcaucasia and Central Asia—areas that Moscow regards in its own sphere of influence. Finally, Moscow also considers Tehran as an ally in resisting what both the Iranian and Russian regimes see as an attempt by the United States to create a unipolar world that it would dominate.

Problems in Russia-Iran Relations

Despite these areas of cooperation, the Russian-Iranian relationship has not been without its problems. First, with a chronically weak economy, Iran has not always been able to pay for its military and other imports from Russia and by the year 2000 had run up a trade deficit of \$2.5 billion. Second, the Bushehr nuclear-reactor project has lagged badly. The then director of Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy, Yevgeny Adamov, to spur on the project, signed an agreement with Iran in 1998 to transform Bushehr into a turnkey installation, in which Russian, not Iranian, technicians would build the project, whose completion date was set for 2003.

A third problem lay in the supply of Russian missile technology to Iran. The United States brought heavy pressure against Russia, including sanctions against Russian companies accused of supplying the technology. Iran, in the eyes of the United States, was a rogue state, and its development of the Shihab III intermediate range (1,300-kilometer) missile threatened a number of U.S. allies in the region. First Boris

Yeltsin (b. 1931) and then Vladimir Putin (b. 1952) denied that supplying missile technology was official Russian policy. Nevertheless, the missile agreement severely damaged relations with the United States, especially with the Congress, and an economically weak Russia, particularly after the economic collapse of August 1998, was hard put to deflect the U.S. pressure. The rise in oil prices in 1999 and 2000 gave Iran some breathing room and allowed funds to pay down its debt to Moscow. Nevertheless, the missile-technology issue remains a serious problem in U.S.–Russia relations, which may well affect Russian-Iranian relations as well.

A fourth area of conflict lay in the issue of developing the oil and natural-gas resources of the Caspian Sea. Moscow initially shared Iran's opposition to the division of the Caspian into national sectors for the exploitation of oil and natural gas deposits (Iran called for joint development and joint sharing of the profits on a 20 percent basis for each of the five countries bordering the Caspian). By the mid-1990s, however, Moscow had changed its position and called for limited national sectors. By 1998, it had moved further and signed an agreement with Kazakhstan on the division of the Caspian. In January 2001, Moscow signed a similar agreement with Azerbaijan. The improvement in Russian-Azeri relations displeased Iran, which, unlike the other four Caspian riparian states (Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan), had found little oil or natural gas in its small portion of the Caspian shoreline.

The Future Course of Russia-Iran Relations

A final Russian-Iranian conflict is more of a future possibility than a current problem for the relationship. It involves a rapprochement between Iran and the United States. Some Russian observers had first feared such a rapprochement following the overtures of the Iranian president Mohammed Khatami (b.1943) to the United States in late 1997, and again after the overwhelming victory of the reformers in the February 2000 Majlis (Iranian parliament) election. On both occasions, a strong counterattack by Iran's conservative forces prevented any rapprochement. Nonetheless, should a reconciliation occur, Russia and Iran would become competitors in providing export routes for Caspian oil and natural gas. The major fruits of an Iranian-American rapprochement would be the lifting of sanctions on the construction of oil and natural gas facilities in Iran, including pipelines. And Iran, as many U.S. oil executives continue to point out, is the shortest, safest, and most secure export route for Caspian oil to travel to the outside world.

In sum, Russia and Iran enjoyed a fruitful relationship in the first decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Whether the relationship will remain as close in the second decade remains to be seen.

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IRAN–UNITED STATES HOSTAGE CRISIS

On 4 November 1979, a group of Iranian students occupied the U.S. embassy compound in Tehran and took U.S. diplomats hostage. This event was a major turning point in American-Iranian relations in the period following the Iranian Revolution earlier that year. The causes of the hostage crisis are rooted in the late 1970s political environment.

Relations in the 1970s

The Islamic Revolution had heralded the end of the monarchy in Iran. The shah had left the country at the urging of the prime minister, Shapour Bakhtiar (1935–1991). This paved the way for Ayatollah Khomeini (1900–1989) to return to Iran from his exile in France and establish the Islamic Republic. Anti-American sentiments were high, encouraged by Ayatollah Khomeini, who spoke of the United States as the Great Satan and fueled people's anger at foreign intervention in Iran.

Iranian history had been replete with foreign interference in national economic and political affairs, commencing with the Russians and British and then the Americans. However, the government of the prime minister Mehdi Bazargan (1907–1994) continued to maintain a working relationship with the United States, procuring military equipment and receiving U.S. intelligence reports concerning Soviet and Iraqi activities in Iran.

In a pivotal moment in October 1979, the United States allowed the shah to enter the country to receive medical treatment. This news was received skeptically and violently by the Iranian people. They believed the shah was trying to secure American support to regain power in Iran as he had done in 1953 in an American-engineered coup. Khomeini and hundreds of thousands of Iranians, who marched in Tehran on 1

November 1979, demanded the extradition of the shah. Unfortunately for Premier Bazargan, on that very day, he was meeting with the U.S. national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in Algiers and was lambasted in the Iranian press for it.

The U.S. Embassy Takeover and Its Aftermath

Three days later, the U.S. embassy was occupied by young men who called themselves Students of the Imam Line, a reference to the ayatollah's ideas and policies. The students took sixty-six American diplomats as hostages. Bazargan tried to secure the release of the hostages, even pleading with Khomeini for his support, to no avail. Two days later, disillusioned with his powerlessness, Bazargan resigned. No one replaced him at that time. Elections were held in January 1980, and Abolhasan Bani-Sadr (b. 1931) was elected president.

Bani-Sadr also tried to resolve the hostage situation but found his efforts thwarted at every turn. In one instance, he contacted the United Nations to request that a commission be set up to investigate Iranian grievances, in return for the hostages being turned over to the Revolutionary Council as a first step toward their final release. On 23 February 1980, just one day before the UN commission was due to arrive, however, Ayatollah Khomeini vetoed this plan by proclaiming that only the *majlis* (parliament), which had yet to be elected, had the power to determine the fate of the hostages. In another instance, Bani-Sadr hoped to resolve the situation by arranging the extradition of the shah from Panama, where he had relocated after his medical treatment in the United States. However, these plans were soon foiled when the shah managed to flee to Egypt on 23 March 1980, thus avoiding extradition and dashing Bani-Sadr's hopes of ending the crisis.

Meanwhile, Washington was putting the pressure on Tehran as well. Financial restrictions were exerted on the country when President Jimmy Carter (b. 1924) froze all Iranian assets held in American banks (over \$12 billion) on 14 November 1979, soon after the hostages were taken. Then, in April 1980, President Carter authorized a risky rescue attempt, which involved landing aircraft and troops in deserts near Tabas in eastern Iran. The ambitious covert operation failed when two of the helicopters developed mechanical difficulties, leading the commander to abort the mission. A helicopter and a transport aircraft collided, causing eight American service men to die. The political fallout of this disaster operation undoubtedly cost President Carter his reelection and intensified already strained ties with Tehran, which consequently delayed the release of hostages further.

Furthermore, this failed rescue mission resulted in a purge of the Iranian military, since some revolutionary leaders suspected that military officers might have helped the Americans escape radar detection as they entered Iranian air space. Bani-Sadr was, however, powerless to stop the military purging; his effectiveness was compromised at every turn. For instance, he was forced to accept the *majlis's* choice for prime minister, Mohammad Ali Rajai (1934–1981). Major political and personality differences prevented Bani-Sadr and Rajai from working as a team in resolving the crisis.

Through a diplomat in West Germany, the Rajai government let the United States know that it was now serious about negotiations to bring about the release of the hostages. One reason for this sudden shift in the hard-liners' attitude toward negotiations was the fact that Iran found itself in an imposed war with Iraq in September 1980.

Settlement of the Hostage Crisis

Therefore, constructive negotiations began in earnest on 14 September 1980. However, the release of the hostages did not take place until 20 January 1981, which coincided with the inauguration of President Ronald Reagan (b. 1911) as president. Some believe the timing was no accident; Khomeini might not have wanted Carter to be credited with the release of the hostages. In return for the freedom of the hostages, the United States was to release the frozen Iranian funds held in American banks. Iran agreed to honor its loan commitments to the United States and to put \$1 billion aside pending the resolution of claims made against Iran by U.S. companies, to be reviewed by the International Court of Justice.



American hostages in Tehran in December 1980. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

Although the hostage crisis was settled peacefully, it served to strain Iranian relations with some other states. Some in Iran believed the settlement put Iran at a disadvantage financially and politically. In addition, it furthered antagonized the professional relations between Bani-Sadr and the Rajai government, since Bani-Sadr had been left out of the negotiations. Finally, this peaceful resolution did not, unfortunately, remove the tension and antagonism between the United States and Iran. These undercurrents have remained and are only recently ameliorating.

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IRAN–UNITED STATES RELATIONS

The relations between Iran and the United States have experienced major transformations since the Iranian revolution of 1978–1979 and the overthrow of the pro-Western monarchy in Iran. In 1953, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1919–1980) was restored to the throne (following his deposal by his popular prime minister, Muhammad Mosaddeq) by a military coup organized and funded by the United States and British intelligence agencies. The shah gradually developed close relations with the United States in political, economic, and military areas, and Iran became one of the most significant U.S. allies in the Third World.

The alliance between the two nations reached its zenith during the presidency (1969–1974) of Richard M. Nixon (1913–1994). The shah and President Nixon developed a close personal relationship. This helped cement the already close alliance between Iran and the United States, and Iran became the largest purchaser of advanced U.S. weaponry outside of the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Notwithstanding the shah's efforts to reap the benefits of his close ties with the United States, he was never able to establish legitimacy for his rule, largely due to the perception that he had become an agent of the West, promoting outside interests in the Middle East at the expense of his own nation. When

the uprising in January 1979 succeeded in forcing the shah to flee Iran, the United States, as his closest benefactor, was dealt a heavy blow.

The Hostage Crisis and Two Persian Gulf Wars

After a few months, diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran were strained beyond repair after a group of student militants stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979 and took its staff hostage. This action was ostensibly taken to protest the shah's admission to the United States for cancer treatment. The militants saw the shah's admission as yet another attempt by the United States to restore the shah to his throne after another popular uprising against his regime. The hostage crisis, which lasted 444 days, consumed President Jimmy Carter (b. 1924), who failed to gain the release of the hostages.

On 21 September 1980, in the midst of the hostage crisis, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein (b. 1937) took advantage of the widening chasm between Iran and the United States and invaded Iran, thus precipitating one of the longest and bloodiest wars of the twentieth century. The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1990) provided the United States with an opportunity to punish Iran by developing close ties with Saddam Hussein's regime. The most significant of Iraqi-U.S. ties were in the field of intelligence, where the United States provided crucial information to Iraq about Iranian troop deployments and movements and other types of satellite intelligence. The U.S. support of Saddam Hussein further strained Iran's relations with the United States.

The budding anti-Iran Arab coalition organized informally by the United States during the Iran-Iraq War was shattered after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990. With the massive deployment of U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf and the ensuing war against Iraq, Iran emerged from its regional isolation. Even the United States began sending feelers toward Iran in the hope of gaining its support in the Persian Gulf War. Although Iran did not join the coalition of nations fighting against Iraq, it did not undertake any measures to undermine the U.S.-led war efforts. A window of opportunity to improve relations between Iran and the United States had opened.

From Dual Containment to the Axis of Evil

Notwithstanding some hopeful developments in the immediate period of the Persian Gulf War, relations between the United States and Iran further deteriorated after the United States adopted its so-called dual containment policy during the first term of the presidency (1993–2001) of Bill Clinton (b. 1946). This



Iranians demonstrating outside the United States embassy in Tehran during the Islamic Revolution in 1979. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

policy was designed to isolate both Iran and Iraq, preventing economic and trade ties as well as political relations between the United States and these two nations. It also called for punishment of non-U.S. third parties that invested in the petroleum industries of the targeted nations. The policy proved to be impractical and counterproductive. Most of America's major allies expressed varying degrees of opposition to this policy, especially when it affected their commercial interests and political sovereignty. Toward the end of Clinton's presidency, it was clear that dual containment had not achieved its goal with respect to Iran. As a consequence, the Clinton administration sought to find avenues to engage the moderate elements within the Iranian government who had come to power as a result of the landslide victory of Mohammad Khatami (b. 1943), the reformist cleric who became Iran's president in 1997. Years of mistrust and political animosity between the two governments again made improvements in relations impossible.

The U.S.-led war in Afghanistan and the campaign against terrorism again presented a unique opportunity for Iran and the United States to improve their relations. After an initial period of cooperation between the two nations, their relations deteriorated when President George W. Bush (b. 1946) included Iran as a node in his "Axis of Evil" State of the Union address in January 2002. Again, America's major allies took exception to this categorization and expressed their determined policy of engaging, not isolating, Iran.

Several areas of mutual interest should create close ties between the two nations. Iran is a significant oil producer, and its location makes it a major player in the Middle East and Central Asia/Caspian basin regions. Under the right circumstances, Iran can play a major role in stabilizing Afghanistan and can contribute to the Arab-Israeli peace process. However, its divided government and internal factional disputes have prevented it from advancing its foreign policy interests. In many ways, the current stalemate between the United States and Iran benefits neither nation.

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IRAQ—PROFILE (2001 est. pop. 23.3 million). In 1916, Britain invaded the Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra; in 1921 it united these provinces and renamed the country Iraq. As a modern state, Iraq is young, but the history of the land and its people dates back more than five thousand years. From 1921 to 1932, the country was known as the Kingdom of Iraq; after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958, the official name was changed to the Republic of Iraq.

History

Here, in ancient Mesopotamia, the Sumerian civilization appeared about six thousand years ago. The lush river valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates had a plentiful water supply and allowed for the production of surplus food and the rise of city-states and kingdoms. The region of present-day Iraq was the cradle of civilization and the background against which many biblical events occurred. Some of the most notable



IRAQ

Country name: Republic of Iraq
Area: 437,072 sq km
Population: 23,331,985 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 2.84% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 34.64 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 6.21 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: 0 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio—total population: 1.02 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 60.05 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population: 66.95 years, male: 65.92 years, female: 68.03 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Shi'a Islam, Sunni Islam, Christianity
Major languages: Arabic, Kurdish, Assyrian, Armenian
Literacy—total population: 58%, male: 70.7%, female: 45% (1995 est.)
Government type: republic
Capital: Baghdad
Administrative divisions: 18 provinces
Independence: 3 October 1932 (from League of Nations mandate under British administration)
National holiday: Revolution Day, 17 July (1968)
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal
GDP—real growth rate: 15% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita (purchasing power parity): \$2,500 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: not available
Exports: \$21.8 billion (2000 est.)
Imports: \$13.8 billion (2000 est.)
Currency: Iraqi dinar (IQD)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Factbook* 2001. Retrieved 18 October 2001 from: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

rulers in this area included the Babylonian Hammurabi (reigned 1792–1750 BCE), whose law code included the *lex talionis* ("an eye for an eye") better known in biblical law; the Assyrian king Tiglath-Pileser III (reigned 745–727 BCE), who carried the Israelites off into captivity; the Chaldean king Nebuchadnezzar (c. 630–562 BCE), who completed the conquest of the Jews; and the Achaemenid Persian rulers Cyrus the Great (c. 585–c. 529 BCE) and Darius the Great (550–486 BCE).

In 637 CE, the battle of Kadisiya (Arabic al-Qadisiyah, on the Euphrates River), between the Arab Muslims led by the caliph 'Umar (586–644) and the forces of the Zoroastrian Sasanid Persian empire, marked the introduction of Islam to present-day Iraq and opened up Iran and Central Asia as well to the Muslims.

Baghdad became the capital of the Islamic Abbasid dynasty (749/750–1258), which ruled the lands from North Africa to Iran. The dynasty ended with the Mongol invasions of 1258 and the subsequent sack of Baghdad. The area was then governed by various rulers until 1534, when it became part of the Ottoman empire (1453–1922). However, for nearly six hundred years, between the collapse of the Abbasids in the thirteenth century and the final years of the Ottomans, government authority was tenuous, and the area of modern-day Iraq was, in effect, autonomous.

Beginning with its League of Nations Mandate in 1920, the British government laid out the institutional framework for Iraqi government and politics. Britain imposed a monarchy and nominated King Faisal (1885–1933) of the Hashemite family from the Hejaz



area in modern-day Saudi Arabia as the first king of Iraq. The British drew the territorial limits of Iraq with little knowledge of the natural frontiers or traditional tribal and ethnic settlements. They also had a prominent role in the writing of a constitution and the structure of the Iraqi parliament. The Iraqi state became independent in 1932, but Iraq's disconnected ethnic, religious, and tribal social groups showed little allegiance to the central government. As a result, the Iraqi government has been challenged with forging a nation-state in a land plagued by ethnic, sectarian, and tribal divisions.

Iraq became a republic after a 1958 coup of army officers under the leadership of Abdul Karim Kassem (1914–1963) overthrew and executed King Faisal II (1935–1958). Between the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 and the emergence of Saddam Hussein (b. 1937) in 1979, Iraqi history was characterized by coups, countercoups, and fierce uprisings on the part of its Kurdish minority.

Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, beginning the costly Iran-Iraq war (1980–1990). In 1990, Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait but were driven out in 1991 by an international



Oil is Iraq's major economic product. Here, a man works on the pipeline at the Dora refinery south of Baghdad in May 1999. (AFP/CORBIS)

force. The victors did not occupy Iraq, however; the regime of Saddam Hussein remained in control.

Geography

Iraq is located in Southwest Asia, at the head of the Arabian/Persian Gulf. Iraq's longest border is with Iran (1,458 kilometers), followed by those with Saudi Arabia (814 kilometers), Syria (605 kilometers), Turkey (331 kilometers), Kuwait (242 kilometers), and Jordan (181 kilometers).

Iraq's two major rivers, the Euphrates and Tigris, whose headwaters are in Turkey, converge in the southern plains of Iraq and terminate in the Shatt al Arab waterway that flows into the Persian Gulf. The country is divided into four major geographic areas: the desert in the west and southwest, rolling uplands between the upper Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, highlands in the north and northeast, and alluvial reedy marshes along the Iranian border in the south, with large flooded areas in the central and southeast sections.

The climate varies from extreme cold in the north to subtropical weather in the south and southeast. Baghdad has cool winters and hot summers. The desert region experiences cool winters with dry, hot summers. The northern mountainous regions along the Iranian and Turkish borders are characterized by cold winters with occasionally heavy snows that melt in early spring, sometimes causing extensive flooding in central and southern Iraq.

Baghdad is the capital and largest city of Iraq, followed by Basra in the south and Mosul in the north. Iraq's oil industry is concentrated in the northern city of Kirkuk, and the towns of Karbala (with the shrine of the caliph Hasan, who was murdered there in 680) and An Najaf (with the shrine of 'Ali, Muhammad's son-in-law) are pilgrimage centers for all Shi'a Muslims. There are eighteen governorates, or provinces, in Iraq, which are divided into districts and subdistricts. In the early 1970s, limited self-rule was granted to Kurds in three northern governorates officially known as autonomous regions.

Politics

Political power in Iraq is concentrated in a one-party system dominated by the president. The provisional constitution of 1968 states that the Ba'ath Party rules Iraq through the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which exercises both executive and legislative authority. The political system is designed to concentrate enormous powers in extremely few hands, with all power ultimately situated in the person of the president, who is also prime minister, chairman of the RCC, and secretary-general of the Regional Command of the Ba'ath Party. The system is a dictatorial, totalitarian state, which allows no political dissent or freedom of expression or assembly.

Economy

Oil was discovered north of Kirkuk on 15 October 1927, and the petroleum sector has dominated Iraq's

economy since the 1950s. The oil boom in the 1970s funded large-scale development projects, increased public-sector employment, and significantly improved education and health care. Because financial awards, as well as positions of high social status in the workplace, were usually based on membership in the Ba'ath Party and not on merit, the oil economy also tied increasing numbers of Iraqis to the ruling party.

Civil war with the Kurds, damage incurred during the war with Iran and the Persian Gulf War, and U.N. sanctions, coupled with economic mismanagement, led to economic disaster in the 1990s. Oil remains Iraq's main resource, but a U.N. trade embargo in 1990 halted all of Iraq's oil exports. New U.N. resolutions in effect since August 1996 have allowed Iraq to export a limited amount of oil to meet humanitarian needs.

People

Arabs form approximately 75 percent of Iraq's population, while Kurds form 20 percent; the remaining 5 percent are composed of Turkmen, Assyrians, and Armenians. Assyrians are Orthodox Christians who revolted against the Ottoman empire during World War I, after which they were later settled in Iraq with aid from the British. At least 95 percent of the Iraqi population adheres to some form of Islam. Shi'a Muslims, mostly in the south, form 65 percent of Iraq's total population; 35 percent of Iraqis are Sunni Muslims. Most Iraqi Shi'ites are Arabs, and almost all Kurds are Sunnis. Fifteen percent of the population are Sunni Arabs, but they tend to hold the highest administrative positions. Christians form the remaining 3 percent and include the Assyrians, Chaldeans (Uniat Christians who adhere to papal authority), and Armenians. Yazidis, who are of Kurdish stock, follow a syncretistic Islamic faith, and a few Jews remain in Iraq.

Arabic is the official language. It is the mother tongue of about 75 percent of the population and is understood by most others. Kurdish is spoken in Al-Sulaimaniyya, Dahuk, and Irbil governorates. Minorities speak Turkic and Armenian languages.

Culture

Iraq has for millennia attracted waves of ethnically diverse migrations due to its borders with non-Arab Turkey and Iran and because of the great agricultural potential of its river valleys. The influx of these peoples has enriched Iraqi culture but also has led to deep-seated ethnic and sectarian tensions.

Iraq's cultural zenith occurred when it was the center of the Abbasid dynasty, which created great scientific, literary, and architectural works. During the

Abbasids, *The Thousand and One Nights* (or *Arabian Nights*; in Arabic, *Alf laylab wa laylab*) emerged, a collection of fables and folk stories. In the last century, Iraq has produced some of the Arab world's best-known poets, musicians, and artists, such as the Nazim al-Ghazali and Kazem al-Saher.

Current Issues

Following the Persian Gulf War, the U.N. Security Council demanded that Iraq scrap all weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles and allow U.N. verification inspections. U.N. trade sanctions remain in effect due to incomplete Iraqi compliance with these resolutions. Iraq has had disputes with Turkey over the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers; their headwaters are in Turkey, which has its own water development plans for the rivers. Since 1991, Iraq has had to deal with resistance from Shi'ite Muslims in the south and Kurds in the north. In many areas in the north, the Kurds have established de facto independent regions, under



A team of United Nations weapons inspectors at their Baghdad compound in November 1998. (AFP/CORBIS)

the protection of U.N.-created safe havens in this area. The future of Iraq remains uncertain. The debate over an Iraqi role in the attack on the World Trade Center in New York was raised after 11 September 2001. Nevertheless, the possibility of a U.S. military strike on Iraq seems possible as Iraq has refused U.N. weapons inspectors back into Iraq after their expulsion in 1998.

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IRAQ—ECONOMIC SYSTEM The government of Iraq regards data on national economic performance as a state secret, particularly since the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1990); therefore, information on the nation's current gross domestic product (GDP), GDP growth, and inflation and unemployment rates is unavailable from the government itself. (See Table 1 for estimates from the U.S. Energy Information Agency.)

The economy of Iraq has been dominated by the oil sector since the 1950s. (Oil was discovered north of Kirkuk on 15 October 1927.) Until the imposition of United Nations sanctions beginning in 1990, most economic activities were derived from government expenditures, whose revenues came from the oil sector. Agriculture has had a minor role in Iraq's economy. Iraq's economy, infrastructure, and society, however, were devastated by its two recent wars.

During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1990), massive expenditures caused financial problems, and Iranian attacks damaged oil-export facilities. The government resorted to austerity measures and incurred massive foreign-debt payments. Iraq's estimated economic losses from the war were \$100 billion.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 (the start of the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War), and the subse-

TABLE 1

Selected estimated data showing Iraq's national economic performance for 2000 through 2002

(ID = Iraqi dinar)

Official exchange rate	U.S.\$1 = ID0.3
Unofficial exchange rate, 2001	U.S.\$1 = ID1,900
GDP, at market exchange rates, 2000	\$31.8 billion (around one-third of economic output for 1989)
Real GDP growth rate, 2001	–10%
Real GDP growth rate, 2002	15%
Inflation rate, 2001	80%
Inflation rate, 2002	50%
Major export products, 2000	Crude oil, oil products (regulated by U.N.)
Major import products, 2000	Food, medicine, consumer goods (regulated by U.N.)
Merchandise exports, 2000	\$20.6 billion
Merchandise imports, 2000	\$11.2 billion
Merchandise trade balance, 2000	\$3.3 billion
Current account balance, 2000	\$1.3 billion
Oil export revenues, total export revenues, 2001	95% or more
Total external debt, 2000	\$60 billion

SOURCE: Energy Information Agency, Washington, DC. Retrieved 13 March 2002, from: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/iraq.html>.

quent economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations, combined with damage from military action, had dire effects on the Iraqi economy. The regime of Saddam Hussein (b. 1937) survived by funding Iraq's internal-security forces and awarding scarce resources to key internal government allies, thus exacerbating the current economic situation.

Iraq's GDP fell drastically after 1991, but increases in oil production led to an estimated Iraqi real GDP growth of 18 percent in 1999 and 4 percent in 2000. Iraq's inflation is estimated at around 80 percent (down from 100 percent in 2000). Under United Nations control, its merchandise trade surplus is over \$3 billion. Iraq has a heavy debt burden, possibly as high as \$140 billion. In addition to having erratic fiscal and monetary policies, the nation has no meaningful taxation system. The dinar was valued at 1,900 per dollar on the black market, as of August 2001, compared with around 900 dinars per dollar at the beginning of 2000.

In December 1996, the United Nations oil-for-food program was implemented, ameliorating living conditions for Iraqi citizens, many of whom had to balance two to three jobs to afford basic foodstuffs. Iraq was allowed to export limited amounts of oil in exchange for food, medicine, and necessary spare parts. In December 1999, the U.N. Security Council allowed Iraq to export oil to meet its humanitarian needs. Oil exports rose to more than three-quarters of their prewar level.

Iraq's Prewar Economy

Industrial development halted after the 1958 revolution, during which the monarchy was overthrown. Socialist rhetoric, which called for nationalization of industry and redistribution of large landholdings, as well as allowed the Communist Party to operate openly in postmonarchy Iraq, scared away Iraqi private investors, and capital began leaving the nation.

After the 1968 coup of the Ba'ath Party, the government gave priority to industrial development. The Ba'ath Party, whose platform was based on Arab unity and socialism, began nationalizing many private industries. With increased oil-export revenues, the state pursued a policy of import-substitution industrialization to move the economy away from dependence on oil exports and to obtain foreign exchange. In the 1960s, investment in industry accounted for almost one-quarter of the development budget, about twice the amount spent under the monarchy in the 1950s. After 1968, the share allocated to industrial development grew to about 30 percent of development spending. With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, this share decreased to about 18 percent.

After 1968, the government used central planning to manage the national economy. Budgeting and planning became obsolete in Iraq due to the extremely high revenues accrued from the oil boom in the 1970s. As a result, the government's role shifted from the allocation of scarce resources to the distribution of wealth. Economic planning focused on subsidies and social welfare rather than on economic efficiency.

The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1990)

On the eve of the Iran-Iraq War, the petroleum sector dominated the Iraqi economy, accounting for two-thirds of GDP. The war diminished oil production, and by 1983 petroleum accounted for only one-third of GDP. The nonpetroleum sector of the economy also shrank, and real GDP dropped about 15 percent per year from 1981 to 1983.

Since economic-development planning depended on massive expenditures, the Iran-Iraq War brought central planning to a halt. The government resorted to ad hoc planning due to limited resources and deficit spending. In the late 1980s, the state relaxed its control of private-sector activities to increase domestic industrial and agricultural output. In 1987, Saddam Hussein shifted from a socialist economic ideology to a more open market, in response to the Iraq's increasing war debt.

At this time, approximately 95 percent of Iraq's exports were raw materials, primarily petroleum, while

foodstuffs made up most additional exports. Half of Iraq's imports were capital goods. Prior to the 1991 Gulf War, the government traded with Japan, Germany, Turkey, Italy, France, the former Yugoslavia, Brazil, and Britain. Kuwait was Iraq's most important Arab trading partner.

The Persian Gulf War (1990–1991) and Its Aftermath

The imposition of comprehensive U.N. sanctions in 1990 placed the Iraqi economy under siege. Rationing was introduced for foodstuffs, and large parts of the country's industrial sectors closed due to shortages of imported raw materials and spare parts. Agriculture received much greater attention than before, but although farmers were ordered to increase their acreage, they were hampered by the exodus of Egyptian farm workers and the lack of fertilizer. The overall effect of the war in Kuwait, combined with the economic sanctions, was to reduce the GDP by around 63 percent in 1991.

In theory, there have been no exports from Iraq since 1990, due to the U.N. sanctions. However, illegal exports range from \$1 to 2 billion annually, with illegal trade conducted with Turkey, Iran, and Jordan. Iraq has also smuggled crude oil and petroleum products to Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, where it was used for domestic use. According to press reports, these illegal shipments have been estimated to provide Iraq with as much as \$600 million to \$2 billion per year in illegal revenues.

During late 1995 and early 1996, with oil reserves almost exhausted, the government began to privatize state institutions and to sell state property to ameliorate the most critical economic crises—maintaining the balance of payments and dealing with accumulated debts.

As a result of the food-for-oil program under U.N. Resolution 986, implemented in December 1996, Iraq earns \$4 billion annually. Under this Resolution, Iraq can sell specified dollar amounts of crude oil over six-month periods in exchange for the purchase of humanitarian supplies. The distribution in Iraq of these supplies is under U.N. supervision. Proceeds are also used to pay compensation for Persian Gulf War victims, pipeline transit fees for Turkey, and funding for U.N. weapons-monitoring activities.

In November 2000, Saudi Arabia opened a border-crossing point with Iraq (the land border had been closed since 1990) to allow Saudi exports under the oil-for-food program. In January 2001, Iraq signed free-trade deals with Egypt and Syria, with the possibility of exporting oil via a pipeline to the Syrians.



A man works at the Kirkuk station on the Iraq-Turkey pipeline in May 1999. (AFP/CORBIS)

In February 2001, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell (b. 1937) proposed a system of smart sanctions, barring military-related items while allowing import of civilian goods. In early July 2001, the U.N. Security Council agreed to postpone indefinitely a vote on the U.S. plan, extending the oil-for-food program another five months.

Oil

Iraq's oil reserves are estimated to be between 10 and 15 percent, or 112 billion barrels, of the world's proven oil reserves, the second largest in the world (after Saudi Arabia); there are also an additional approximately 215 billion barrels of probable and possible resources. Iraq's largest active fields are Rumaila and Kirkuk, but they are troubled by problems with technical matters, export terminals, and pipelines. Although the oil sector has dominated the economy, Iraq did attempt to create a more diversified industrial infrastructure before the war.

Agriculture

One-fifth of Iraq's area consists of farmland. In the 1950s, Iraq was self-sufficient in agricultural production, but by the early 1980s, food imports made up approximately 25 percent of total imports. Iraq has the potential for agricultural growth, but restrictions on water flow, due to Syrian and Turkish dam building on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, have produced difficulties.

Natural Gas

Iraq contains proven natural gas reserves. Since most of Iraq's gas is associated with oil, progress on increasing the nation's oil output directly affects the gas

sector as well. Gas is both produced with oil and also used for reinjection for enhanced oil-recovery efforts.

Banking and Finance

Commercial banks, primarily British, emerged during the British mandate (April 1920 to October 1932), although the traditional money dealers still offered limited banking services. In 1964, all banks were nationalized and consolidated; the banking system then consisted of the Central Bank, the Rafidayn Bank, and the Agricultural, Industrial, and Real Estate banks. The Rafidayn Bank had to balance the role of a commercial bank while acting as a government intermediary in securing loans from private foreign banks. In 2001, the United Nations urged Iraqi authorities to provide more food for the civilian population and to allocate a greater part of their oil revenues to improving the health infrastructure.

Ibrahim al-Marashi

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IRAQ—EDUCATION SYSTEM Historically, Iraq's educational system was the product of a mostly urban-based community of religious scholars dedicated to instilling in its adherents the principles of the Qur'an, and the sunna (Way) of the Prophet Muhammad. Similarly, education in the shrine cities of the Shi'a sect of Islam meant passing on the corpus of law and devotional practices of the Shi'ite imams to the students of the religious schools.

In Iraqi Kurdistan (northern Iraq, home of a large population of Kurds), Kurdish *tariqas* (mystic brotherhoods) monopolized education in the countryside. There, instruction was less formal and consisted for the most part of the teachings of the Qur'an and sunna, heavily laced with the mystic nuances of a particular brotherhood, as well as the oral transmission of tribal genealogies and lore.

Up to the mid-nineteenth century, formal education in Iraq was centered on the *madrasah* (religious school). These ranged in type and sophistication from

primary-level instruction, in which young boys (and infrequently, girls) were taught the Qur'an, to the more elaborate circles of learning, which drew mature students from far and wide in a scholarly network composed of individual sheikhs (professors of law and theology) and their followers, all drawing on chains of transmission of knowledge emanating from a rich Islamic past.

Education in the Ottoman Period

Iraq's educational system was based on informal circles of learning consisting of teacher-student networks assembled in mosques or other religious centers, and constantly revitalized by the input of traveling scholars from all over the Islamic world. Education thrived on government sponsorship and, especially in the Ottoman period (1453–1922), remained tied to official patronage until the beginning of the twentieth century. Very few *ulama* (scholars of law, teachers of religion) were able to survive independently of the state, which, from the sixteenth century onward, became the main guarantor of Islamic networks of education, as well as its chief beneficiary. But changes were afoot. From the first part of the nineteenth century onward, both the structure and the systems of meaning of Iraq's education process were to suffer an eclipse, as other methods of education combined to change the worldview of Iraqis radically.

Education witnessed many changes in structure and organization throughout the nineteenth century, and much of what we now view as modern instruction had its beginnings in the later Ottoman era. A wave of military-influenced reforms occurred in the Ottoman empire; these were largely inspired by the desire to upgrade the armed forces to resist Western encroachment. Military preparatory schools were established throughout the empire, as were an Imperial Military College, School of Public Administration, School of Law, and other universities in Istanbul. Iraq came under the influence of reformist-minded *walis* (provincial governors), who oversaw the creation of the *rushdiyya-I'dadiyya* (primary and secondary) system of schools (both military and nonmilitary).

Starting in 1870, Ottoman schools were established in Baghdad; they quickly spread to other provinces. Consisting of elementary and three- and four-year secondary schools, these institutions pursued the systematic teaching of mathematics, sciences, and foreign languages. After Ottoman Turkey was defeated in World War I, the British army entered Baghdad in March 1917, ushering in a new period of educational reforms.



EDUCATION AND MODERNIZATION IN IRAQ

The following quote from Sati' al-Husary, first director general of the Ministry of Education, in 1923–1927, refers to the resistance mounted by the leadership of the religious schools or *madrasabs* to the institution of modern curricula in Iraqi schools.

But I believe that anyone who has the true interests of the people at heart would not be sorry to see these [teaching] institutions decline, for they grouped the worst hygienic conditions with the stupidest teaching methods.

Source: Hala Fattah. (2002) Personal Communication.

The Religious Legacy and an Emergent Secular Ideology

The educational system of Iraq underwent a radical change under British administration, and this change was stepped up throughout the years of the Iraqi monarchy. Because education was viewed as the mold of a new Iraqi generation, it quickly became a contested field. Sati' al-Husary (1880–1968) was a pre-eminent Arab nationalist theoretician and first director-general of education. According to his memoirs, the struggle for public education in Iraq centered on the unremitting hostility of some of the more traditionalist groups to the promotion of a secularist agenda in Iraqi schools throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Al-Husary's opponents were for the most part from the Shi'a community of Iraq; they resented the highly centralized nature of the new system of education, which favored urban centers (chiefly Baghdad) over tribal areas (which were mostly Shi'ite), and they were even less receptive to the secularist, national ideology that formed its core. To be sure, religious education throughout Iraq, not only in the Shi'ite south, suffered a grievous decline under the monarchy, as modern curricula adopted by the centralizing state made important inroads in the older, *madrasab*-style educational system.

Education during the Royalist Era

By 1950, the new educational system of Iraq had made deep strides among the population. A cornerstone of that system was free instruction at all levels,



EDUCATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS

"Before the [Iraq-Iran] war, the government had made considerable gains in lessening the extreme concentration of primary and secondary educational facilities in the main cities, notably Baghdad. Vocational education, which had been notoriously inadequate in Iraq, received considerable attention in the 1980's. The number of students in technical fields has risen threefold since 1977, to over 120,090 in 1986. The BAATH regime also seemed to have made progress since the late 1960's in reducing regional disparities . . . Baghdad was the home of most educational facilities above the secondary level, since it was the site not only of Baghdad University, which in the academic year 1983–84 . . . had 34,555 students, but also of the Foundation of Technical Institutes with 34,277 students, Mustansiriyya University with 11,686 students and the University of Technology with 7,384 students. The universities in Basra, Mosul and Irbil, taken together, enrolled 26 percent of all students in higher education in th[at] academic year."

Source: Mokless Al-Hariri. *Iraq—A Country Study*. Library of Congress. Retrieved 11 February 2002 from: <http://www.loc.gov>.

with primary school compulsory for all Iraqi children. Teacher-training institutes also developed rapidly; of six thousand primary teachers in government schools, nearly a third were women. Vocational schools also flourished. Although no university had yet emerged, many bodies of higher education existed, such as the Law School, the Engineering College, the Royal College of Medicine, and the College of Agriculture. Finally, scholarships sent young Iraqis abroad to further their academic study; on their return, some of them joined the cadre of the emerging oil industry.

Revolutionary Iraq and the Pursuit of Mass Education

The revolution of 1958, which overthrew the monarchy, accelerated changes already under way in the educational system, such as the universalization of learning for all Iraqis, no matter their background or gender. But it also added a different ideological interpretation to state curricula, by attempting to inculcate

the principles of Arab nationalism in schools. Since most education was public, with few private institutions still in operation from monarchical times (such as the famed Baghdad College, an American-administered high school run by Jesuit priests), the experiment had some success.

After the coming to power of the Ba'ath regime in 1968, however, a pronounced shift toward an Iraqi identity became manifest. As a result of this emphasis, Iraq's rich archaeological and folkloric history, as well as its store of pre-Islamic history and traditions, was incorporated into a more comprehensive educational vision. Long a bastion of Arab nationalism, Iraq's education system introduced school curricula that began to promote the notion of a particularist identity.

In the late 1970s, flush with oil, the Iraqi state aggressively pushed to promote universal literacy, claiming, by the end of the 1980s, to have reached an astounding literacy rate of 95 percent. More significantly, the Iraqi commitment to raise the literacy rate had resulted in the expansion of the educational system in the 1970s, especially in the larger cities. By the end of the Iraq-Iran War in 1988, approximately 180,000 students had entered universities or colleges. Seven institutes of higher learning, including one university of technology, had been established (increasing to eleven in the 1990s), as well as eighteen technical institutes. Because there was a need for educated university graduates, the government, despite a steady shortage of manpower in the armed forces, exempted students from military service during the Iraq-Iran war. Between 1977 and 1988, the number of technical students increased almost 300 percent.

Iraqi Education under Sanctions

During the Persian Gulf War (1990–1991), a system of United Nations–sponsored sanctions against Iraq, the most comprehensive in history, was put in place, inhibiting the state's normal economic activity and depriving its citizens of basic human needs. Because the U.N. initially banned Iraq from freely exporting its oil, state sponsorship of education was severely affected. Unable to fund schools and universities or to build new ones, Iraq was effectively hobbled, and its educational programs were arrested. Several international agencies and organizations attest to the alarming decline in the educational system of the country.

For instance, a 1996 UNESCO report speaks of a crumbling structure, with few teachers showing up to teach in primary schools (and those that did being paid derisory salaries in wildly inflated post-sanctions currency), a near-absence of reading materials, and an av-



A girl writing on the blackboard in her classroom in Iraq in 1996. (DAVID & PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS)

erage of one desk for four students. Some 40 percent of educational institutions had been destroyed or damaged, and many schools needed urgent repair. A UNICEF report in August 2000 noted that the situation had still not improved. Under the sanctions, the Iraqi government's education budget fell by 90 percent, from \$230 million to \$23 million, and as many as 83 percent of primary schools were in disrepair.

Iraqi medical education, formerly among the best in the region, continues to suffer from a physical breakdown of educational and health facilities, broken or obsolete equipment, and a dearth of the most basic medicines with which to treat patients. The facts are clear: The embargo on intellectual activity that has isolated Iraq from the outside world since 1990 is proving to be an unmitigated catastrophe for a state that devoted so much of its earlier history to making education a universal right for all Iraqis, and later boasted of having one of the best school systems in West Asia during the oil-boom days of the 1970s.

Hala Fattab

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IRAQ—HISTORY The modern nation of Iraq, established in 1932, is relatively young. But the land and its people have a history that dates back to the dawn of human civilization. Historians usually use the Greek term "Mesopotamia" to refer to the land between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers in ancient times. It was not until the late sixth or early seventh century that the Arabs came to refer to this land as "Iraq."

Ancient Mesopotamia (10,000 BCE–637 CE)

Most historians agree that agriculture, the domestication of animals, and sedentary life were first developed in the valleys of northern Mesopotamia and southern Anatolia around 10,000 BCE. This Neolithic revolution soon spread to southern Mesopotamia, where by 4000 BCE the world's first cities appeared, including Eridu, Nippur, Kish, and Uruk. The inhabitants at this time represented a variety of ethnic and linguistic groups, but those who had the most profound impact were the Sumerians and Semites. The Sumerians were responsible for the development of complex irrigation works, large temples (ziggurats), legal codes, state institutions, a sexadecimal system of calculation, and, most important of all, the world's first system of writing, known as cuneiform script. Politically, Mesopotamia was divided among a multitude of city-states whose growing competition for land and water gave rise to endemic warfare. It was not until 2350 BCE that the Semites of Akkad succeeded in unifying Mesopotamia into a single empire.

The Semites would continue to rule through a succession of expanding empires for more than fifteen hundred years. In addition to the Akkadians, these included the Amorites of Babylon, the Assyrians of Nineveh, and the Chaldeans, who reestablished the rule of Babylon. Under the Assyrians, the empire included the entire Fertile Crescent and Egypt as well as Mesopotamia, and under the Chaldeans, Babylon became one of the leading cities of the ancient world with such architectural accomplishments as the Gate of Ishtar, the Temple of Marduk, and the Hanging Gardens. In 539 BCE, Semitic overlords of Mesopotamia were removed by the Achaemenid Persians. Under their rule, Mesopotamia became part of



KEY EVENTS IN IRAQ HISTORY

- c. 10,000 BCE** Agriculture and sedentary life emerges in the region.
- c. 4000 BCE** The first cities in human history appear in the region.
- 2350 BCE** The Semites of Akkad unify Mesopotamia as a single empire.
- 539 BCE** The Persians displace the Semites as rulers.
- 330–129 BCE** Alexander of Macedon defeats the Persians and the region comes under Seleucid rule.
- 129 BCE–224 CE** During the Parthian period Greek influence continues.
- 224/228–651 CE** The region comes under the rule of the Sasanid dynasty.
- 637** The Arabs defeat the Sasanids at the Battle of al-Qadisiyah, opening the region to Muslim Arab rule.
- 749/750–1258** The region is ruled by the Muslim Abbasid dynasty.
- 762** Baghdad is founded.
- 945** Baghdad comes under the control of the Buyid dynasty.
- 1055** The region comes under Seljuk Turk rule for 50 years.
- 1258** The Mongols destroy Baghdad and the region becomes an impoverished province.
- 1508** Much of the region comes under Safavid rule.
- 1534** The region comes under the rule of the Ottoman empire.
- 1639** The Treaty of Qasr-I Shirin establishes the present-day boundary between Iraq and Iran.
- 19th century** The Ottoman empire institutes reforms and British influence increases.
- 1914–1918** During World War I, the British take Iraq.
- 1920** Iraq is made a British mandate by the League of Nations.
- 1921** The British agree to more Iraqi control and Faisal is made king.
- 1932** Iraq becomes an independent nation.
- 1936** The first of several military coups takes place.
- 1950s** The Iraqi Communist Party becomes a leader of the nationalistic movement.
- 1958** A military coup leads to a decade of political instability.
- 1963** The Ba'ath Party comes to power but is quickly pushed aside.
- 1968** The Ba'ath Party comes to power again.
- 1972–1975** Iraq nationalizes the oil industry.
- 1974** A Kurd rebellion is put down.
- 1979** Saddam Hussein comes to power.
- 1980–1990** Period of the Iran-Iraq War.
- 1990** Iraq invades Kuwait.
- 1991** In the Persian Gulf War, Iraq is driven out of Kuwait.
- 1992** International sanctions are placed on Iraq.

a vast empire stretching from Egypt and Greece in the west to northern India and central Asia to the east. The Persians brought a relatively tolerant rule, excellent administration, and the dualistic Zoroastrian religion. In 330 BCE, Persian rule was temporarily interrupted by the conquest of Alexander of Macedon (356–323 BCE). It was under his Seleucid successors

(321–129 BCE) that Greek influences spread widely. Although Greek government, religion, art, and culture existed side by side with their Mesopotamian counterparts, in time syncretism did take place. Greek influences continued well into the Parthian period (129 BCE–224 CE), which also witnessed the spread of universalist religions (Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Chris-

tianity). The Parthians were replaced by the Sasanid Persians, who inherited a destructive seesaw conflict with Rome and its successor, the Byzantine empire. The most important social changes during this period were the growth of Christianity (both Monophysites and Nestorians) and the continuous influx of Arabs from the southern deserts. In 580, the ruling family of the Arab kingdom of the Lakhmids (vassals to the Sasanids), converted to Christianity.

Early and Middle Islamic Period (637–1534)

The unification of the Arabs in Arabia under the banner of Islam was the precursor to their conquest of the Middle East and beyond. With respect to Mesopotamia, the decisive Battle of al-Qadisiyah (Kadisiya) took place in 637. Taking advantage of Sasanid exhaustion due to their wars with the Byzantines, the Muslim Arabs scored a comprehensive victory, pillaging the capital Ctesiphon in its aftermath. During the rule of ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (c. 600–661), the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad (c. 570–632) and the fourth caliph, Syria and Iraq were used as bases for rival claimants to the caliphate. After ‘Ali’s murder, however, the Umayyad clan, under the leadership of Mu‘awiyah (602?–680), gained control of the caliphate and moved the capital from Medina to Damascus. Despite being the wealthiest and most populous province, Iraq was subordinated to Syria, leading to discontent and numerous rebellions against Umayyad rule. Among the most important of these rebellions was that of Hasan (624–680), the son of ‘Ali and grandson of Muhammad, whose death in the Battle of Karbala in 680 proved to be a defining moment in the development of Shi‘a Islam. Opposition to the Umayyads culminated in 749, when they were defeated by a broad coalition led by the Abbasid family. (The Abbasid dynasty ruled from 749/750 until 1258). The Abbasid takeover represents a real social and economic revolution that transformed the Islamic world, particularly Iraq. In 762, the caliph al-Mansur (reigned 754–775) founded the new capital of Baghdad, which, during the reign (786–809) of Harun ar-Rashid (c. 763–809), became a great cosmopolitan center of economic prosperity, artistic and literary creativity, and intellectual dynamism rarely matched anywhere in medieval times.

The fault lines in this golden age began to form as early as the mid-ninth century when interdynastic feuds; regional separatism; revolts by peasants, slaves and the urban poor; and the increasing dependence on Turkish mercenaries led to economic and political decline. In 945, Baghdad came under the control of the Buyid princes. These tribal people, who originated from the Caspian Sea area, were Shi‘ites who never-

theless kept the Sunni Abbasid caliph as a figurehead. This attempt at compromise did not reduce the rising Shi‘ite-Sunni tensions, which became a feature of Buyid rule. Another feature was the fragmentation of Iraq (and much of the Islamic world) into ever smaller political entities ruled by rival princes. An apparent turn of fortunes in 1055 instigated by the return of Sunni rule under the Seljuk Turks did not last long. Seljuk power waned after only fifty years, resulting in a return to fragmentation and decline. The most terrible disaster to strike Iraq, however, came in the form of the Mongol invasion. In 1258, under Hulegu Khan (c. 1217–1265), the Mongols took Baghdad, destroyed much of the city, looted its treasures, burned its priceless libraries, and engaged in widespread massacres. Iraq was reduced to an impoverished province well into the sixteenth century, during which political fragmentation was punctuated periodically by Turkic tribal invasions, notably by Timur (1336–1405) in 1393 and 1401.

Ottoman Rule (1534–1918)

In 1508, most of Iraq came under Shi‘a Safavid rule when Shah Esma‘il (1487–1524) entered Baghdad. The Safavid hold, however, remained tenuous, and in 1514, the Ottoman sultan Selim I (1467–1520) took Mosul and northern Iraq after defeating the Safavids at the Battle of Chaldiran. In 1534, the conquest of the nation was completed when Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent (1494/1495–1566) entered Baghdad. Iraq remained part of the Ottoman empire despite numerous attempts by the Safavids and their successors to capture Baghdad and the Shi‘a holy cities of Najaf and Karbala. The only exception to this was between 1623 and 1638, when Shah ‘Abbas (1571–1629) briefly reoccupied the nation. The land was divided into the three provinces of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra. Overall conditions were improved through integration into the empire’s vast trade networks, enhanced security, and a relatively stable administration and judicial system. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, several local powers (like the Afrasiyabs in Basra, the Jalilis in Mosul, the Mutafiq tribes in the south, and the Kurdish tribes in the north) developed at the expense of central control. Still, Ottoman rule was never really threatened, particularly after the signing of the Treaty of Qasr-i Shirin with the Safavids in 1639. This treaty established the boundary between Iraq and Iran, which is virtually unchanged today.

During the eighteenth century, the Ottomans were increasingly pressed in Europe, the danger from Persia returned, and tribal raids grew bolder. This forced Istanbul to grant more autonomy to the governors of

Baghdad, who came to rely on Georgian slaves (Mamluks) as the backbone of their army. The Mamluks eventually seized control of the governorship of Baghdad, reaching the height of their autonomy by the end of the century. A temporary peace in Europe allowed the Ottomans to reestablish central control in 1831. During the mid-nineteenth century, the Ottomans embarked on a broad series of state reforms (known collectively as the *Tanzimat*), geared particularly toward greater centralization. In Iraq, the most significant reforms were put into effect by Baghdad's Governor Midhat Pasa (1869–1872), who rationalized the provincial administration and established freehold ownership of land, modern schools, a printing press, modern communications, and various urban and industrial construction projects. At this time Iraq also witnessed a qualitative rise in European (especially British) economic penetration. The growing commerce with Britain and British investments in river navigation, telegraph lines, and oil exploration aroused British imperial interests even prior to World War I.

British Rule (1918–1932)

A British expeditionary force from India was already in place to invade Iraq when the Ottoman empire made its fateful decision to join World War I on the side of Germany in November 1914. The British easily took Basra and moved north along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. After encountering some stiff resistance (notably at Al Kut), they entered Baghdad in March 1917. Mosul was not seized until after the Armistice of Moudros in 1918. Despite the claims of General Mode that they had come as liberators, the British had, according to the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, planned to divide the Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire with France. Immediately after the conquest, a British administration was set up over a bordered territory that had hitherto been socially, economically, and culturally part of the Arab Ottoman lands. In 1920, the new League of Nations awarded Britain a mandate over Iraq. Theoretically, this was to be a temporary period during which Iraq would be assisted until it could stand alone. Effectively, it was a cover for British rule over a territory deemed to be of vital interest due to its strategic location near India and its valuable oil resources.

Creating a nation in a land separated from its historic ties with Syria and Arabia and having an extremely diverse population was a challenge in its own right. But when the task was forced on a nation by an unpopular occupying power, it proved disastrous. The establishment of the mandate triggered a broad uprising in 1920, initiated by the tribes of the south. Despite a

massive British show of force, it was not put down until the following year. At the Cairo Conference of March 1921, the British agreed to loosen their direct rule over Iraq through the establishment of a king and local administration. The choice of Faisal (1885–1933), son of Sharif Husayn of Mecca (whose attempt to create a united Arab kingdom after the war was foiled by French guns at Damascus), as king proved to be acceptable to a broad segment of Iraqi notables. Although Faisal was crowned in August 1921, the nation did not achieve formal independence until 1932.

The Monarchy (1932–1958)

The independence of the new kingdom was threatened on several fronts. In addition to the ethnic, religious, regional, and tribal social divisions, which actively disrupted the formation of a cohesive nation, the integration into the international market gave rise to severe class divisions, especially in the countryside. Resentment focused on the British-Iraqi treaties that ensured a commanding role for Britain in vital areas like foreign policy, defense, and the exploitation of natural resources (especially oil). Faisal did well to balance the various conflicting interests and keep the developing anti-British movement in check. He insisted on a constitution, national referendums, and universal male suffrage. After his death in 1933, however, these tensions erupted in the form of sectarian violence, tribal uprisings, and a more militant nationalist movement. In 1936, the first military coup by General Bakr Sidqi took place, followed by others, often at the instigation of one political faction against another. Although the nation suffered from political instability, some important progress was made in areas like irrigation, oil export facilities, railroads, education, construction, and trade.

Arab nationalist officers led by Rashid Ali felt that World War II was an opportunity to disengage the nation from Britain and push for unity with Syria. In 1941, they seized power, forcing regent Abdul-Ilah and Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa'id to flee. Fearing German influence on this movement, the British occupied Baghdad and reinstated the previous government, causing further resentment. After the war, the marked increase in oil revenues did little to ease class divisions or resentment at the government's ties with Britain. During the 1950s, the Iraqi Communist Party came to play an important role in the nationalist movement, leading several mass uprisings in 1948, 1952, and 1956. The last was directed against Iraq's entry into a U.S.-British-led defense system known as the Baghdad Pact. Opposition to the monarchy was also stirred by Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–1970),

who was emerging as a symbol of Arab independence from the West.

The Republic (1958–1979)

In 1958, a group of army officers led by Brigadier Abdul Karim Kassem (1914–1963) overthrew the monarchy, declared a republic, and plunged Iraq into a decade of political instability. Initially, the takeover attracted enthusiastic popular support, particularly when the new government declared its withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, the establishment of a more independent foreign policy by having diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and the initiation of a land-reform program to reduce the power of the big landowners and aid landless peasants. In less than a year, however, the revolutionary group began to fall apart. Among the issues that threatened the new regime were Kassem's refusal to join the United Arab Republic, his claims over Kuwait, growing hostility with the oil companies, a Kurdish rebellion in the north, and a rise in authoritarianism. The Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party soon came to lead the opposition, and in 1963, Kassem was overthrown in a bloody coup that was accompanied by widespread executions and arrests, especially of Communists. The group seized power was led by 'Abdul-Salam 'Arif, a pan-Arabist army officer and an admirer of Nasser. Within a couple of months, 'Arif kicked the Ba'athists, who were blamed for most

of the repressive measures, out of his ruling coalition and began a series of nationalizations of banks and leading industries. The regime, however, never managed to gain any amount of popular legitimacy, and the fractious political atmosphere in Baghdad was accentuated by the continuing rebellion in Kurdistan and the 1967 Arab defeat at the hands of Israel. Taking advantage of the resulting unrest, the Ba'ath Party managed to rally enough support within the army to recapture power in a bloodless coup in 1968.

The new Ba'athist government was led by Colonel Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr (who assumed the presidency), Saddam Hussein (b. 1937), and a number of associates drawn mainly from their Takriti kinsmen. Although a civilian, Hussein had distinguished himself as an able party organizer and ruthless conspirator. During the next decade, he would build a powerful intelligence network and gradually assume more control at the expense of al-Bakr and the military. Mostly under his guidance, the Ba'ath Party came to dominate the military and most organizations and clubs, setting the stage for a totalitarian state. Initially, Ba'athist rule seemed focused on national unity, with an agreement on Kurdish self-rule reached in 1970 and the establishment of a National Progressive Front with the Communists and others in 1973. Between 1972 and 1975, in a highly popular move, Iraq nationalized the entire oil industry, placing huge revenues at the dis-



In a move that reduced sanctions, the U.N. Security Council voted on 31 March 2000 to allow Iraq to double expenditures on rebuilding its oil industry. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./ CORBIS)

posal of the government. These revenues were used to extend and improve various social services and significantly raise the overall standard of living. They were also used, however, to strengthen the repressive apparatus of the government, especially the army and the intelligence services. In 1974, negotiations with the Kurdish Democratic Party over implementing Kurdish self-rule broke down, and war ensued. After defeating this latest Kurdish rebellion, the government turned to harassing other opposition groups, and by 1979 the Communist Party was outlawed and most of its members arrested or exiled.

Dictatorship and War (1979–Present)

A few months after the tumultuous 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, al-Bakr relinquished power to Hussein. After executing his rivals in the Ba'athist leadership, Hussein turned to the perceived threat from revolutionary Iran. On 22 September, Iraqi forces invaded Iran, launching a destructive war. During the first year, Iraqi forces made important advances, especially in Khuzestan Province. The following year the tide had turned, and Iranian counteroffensives recaptured most territory. For the next six years, fierce fighting continued with little advantage to either side, although U.S. and French support for Iraq was beginning to have an effect. Fearing greater U.S. involvement and setbacks, Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini (1900–1989) reluctantly accepted a U.N.-brokered cease-fire. (Iraq did not officially agree to Iranian peace terms until after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990). The war did great damage to Iraq's economy, transforming it from a creditor to a nation with a debt of nearly \$100 billion. The war also assisted in the establishment of dictatorial rule through a more thorough militarization of society and the development of Hussein's personality cult. Iraq, however, continued with an ambitious armament program (including chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons), and the peace did little to resolve internal and regional tensions. Fearing opposition from the army and angered by Kuwaiti oil policies (seen as depressing prices), Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and then formally annexed it. After Iraq refused to withdraw, a 28-member coalition led by the United States (and including several Arab nations) launched an air and land war that liberated Kuwait in April 1991. The massive rebellion against Hussein's rule that followed was eventually crushed at great human cost. Iraqi infrastructure suffered massive damage during the air campaign, and the continuing U.N. economic sanctions (the most comprehensive in history) have crippled the nation. The northern Kurdish areas, with

Allied protection, have since achieved autonomy from Baghdad. Nevertheless, Hussein's hold on power appears to have actually strengthened, and recently his son has been groomed to succeed him.

Thabit Abdullah

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IRAQ—HUMAN RIGHTS Iraq is a dictatorial, totalitarian state, with all political power concentrated in a repressive one-party apparatus dominated by the president, Saddam Hussein, and the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party. The state implements systematic human-rights abuses and internal repression through a network of internal-security organizations, secret intelligence services, Ba'ath party agencies, and police, military, and militia units. The state indiscriminately conducts these human-rights abuses against all sectors of the population. Officers and officials are regularly executed for their supposed involvement in subversive political activities. The government creates ethnically homogenous zones by expelling families from their homes and forcibly deporting them to other parts of the country. Freedoms of opinion, expression, association, and assembly are forbidden.

The vast Iraqi security apparatus maintains an order of repression through widespread terror, systematic use of torture, amputations, summary executions, forced "disappearances," and arbitrary arrests and detention. As socioeconomic conditions worsen under United Nations sanctions, the state punishes those accused of economic crimes and military desertion. Freedom of the press and expression is nonexistent, and Iraq's media outlets, such as television, radio, and newspapers, are government owned. Many foreign publications are banned, as is ownership of satellite dishes, computers, and typewriters.

Background History

When the current regime took power in Iraq in a coup in July 1968, the first victims executed were the



Kurd refugees from Iraq living in tents in Turkey in 1991. (DAVID & PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS)

very military officers who had aided in the takeover. Non-Ba'athists were removed from state institutions. Even Ba'ath party members who were seen as potential rivals were executed. These practices continued throughout the 1970s, and increased when Saddam Hussein took over the presidency in 1979.

In 1971 the regime began a systematic campaign of deporting Iraqi Shi'ites and Kurdish citizens to Iran. They were accused of being Iranian, opposed to "pure Iraqi," and expelled, even though some of these families had been living in Iraq for 300 years. The campaign gathered additional momentum in the 1980s, due to the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1990). An estimated 250,000 to 300,000 people, including Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen, were deported during this period. In 1975, after the Algiers Accord with Iran ended the shah's support of the Kurds, the regime systematically targeted Kurdish citizens, forcing thousands to flee to neighboring countries. In 1978 the Iraqi state executed thousands of members of the Iraqi Communist Party.

The state has also systematically eliminated opponents, who are accused of complicity in plots against the president. Many of them have included high-ranking civilian and military officials, tribal leaders, as well as members of Saddam Hussein's own family and al-Majid clan. His two sons-in-law, Hussein Kamel and Saddam Kamel, defected to Jordan in August 1995, but returned because they believed the president's promise of a pardon. They were murdered in

a gun battle on 23 February 1996, just three days after they came back. Not only were they killed, but forty relatives, including women and children, also died. Other members of Saddam's clan were also arrested, as well as mid-level military and civilian officials, for their association with the defectors.

Religious Persecution

Although Iraq's Shi'ite Muslims constitute about half of the country's population, Iraq's government has been traditionally dominated by the country's Sunni Muslim minority. The majority of the country's Shi'ite population lives in the areas south of Baghdad, with a large concentration in the southern marshland regions near the Iranian border.

Iraqi Kurds in the north and the Iraqi Shi'ites in the south launched an armed revolt against Saddam's regime at the end of the Gulf War. Iraqi troops crushed the uprising, razing Shi'ite mosques and other Shi'ite shrines and executing thousands. Thousands of rebels and Shi'ite civilians fled into the southern marshlands between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and continued the revolt. Ayatollah Abul-Qassem al-Khoie (1889–1992), Iraq's most respected Shi'ite leader, was put under house arrest after the failed uprising, and a few years later died under mysterious circumstances during his detention. In February 1999 security forces assassinated one of the leading Shi'ite clerics, Ayatollah Mohammad Sadiq Al-Sadr.

In 1992, in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War (1990–1991), the allied forces opposed to Iraq imposed no-fly zones over both northern and southern Iraq, to deter Iraqi governmental aerial attacks on the marsh dwellers in southern Iraq and residents of northern Iraq. However, the Iraqi government conducted artillery attacks on villages in both areas, and a large-scale burning operation in the southern marshes. The government began a water-diversion project and other projects in the south, accelerating the process of large-scale environmental destruction. The army constructed canals to divert water from the wetlands, resulting in hundreds of square kilometers burned in military operations. Moreover, the diversion of supplies in the south limited the population's access to food, medicine, drinking water, and transportation.

The Assyrians, a Christian minority in Iraq, have also suffered from state-sponsored massacres from the 1930s. They have not only been targeted by the current state, but are also attacked by Kurdish groups who have traditionally been at odds with the Assyrians.

Ethnic Persecution

The regime's ethnic hostility has been directed at three main targets: Kurds, Turkmen, and Kuwaitis. The Kurds have suffered the brunt of Iraq's dismal human-rights practices. For example, as Baghdad was making advances against Iranian forces during the final years of the Iran-Iraq War, the state turned its attention to the Kurds. In 1988, the Iraqi military attacked the Kurds in a campaign Baghdad called *vAnfal*, meaning "spoils of war," based on the eighth sura, or verse, in the Qur'an. The security apparatus demolished villages, executed thousands with firing squads, buried people in mass graves, and committed other atrocities. The Iraqi military attacked the Kurds with poison gas in the town of Halabja on 16 March 1988. Delivered over a three-day period, the gas left more than 5,000 dead and 30,000 injured. The campaigns against the Kurdish people by Iraq resulted in more than 4,000 villages destroyed and as many as 250,000 Kurds reported killed.

The Turkmen are a Turkic people, primarily living in the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk and its surroundings. Not only have they been the victims of the Iraqi government's policies, but they also have come under attack from Kurdish parties who live in the same area.

Finally, six hundred Kuwaitis were taken prisoner during Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. The Kuwaiti government called for their immediate release and asked for the names of those who may have died in captivity to be revealed. Iraq disregarded the requests.

The Future

The Iraqi government continues to employ torture, summary executions of suspected opponents, forced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, and denial of the basic right of due process. Current resistance to the central government is minimal as the Kurdish opposition continues with its infighting, and most of the Shi'ite opposition is limited to hit-and-run raids launched from Iran. Many attempted coup plans devised by Sunni opponents in the government have been foiled. A sustained series of U.S. attacks in the future may unite and encourage the opposition, just as these groups launched a coordinated, albeit unsuccessful, uprising after the Gulf War.

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IRAQ—POLITICAL SYSTEM After the current government in Iraq came to power in a coup on 17 July 1968, removing 'Abdul Rahman 'Arif, another Ba'ath Party leader, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr (1914–1982) became president and Saddam Hussein (b. 1937) vice-chairman. A provisional constitution, adopted on 16 July 1970, concentrated all executive and legislative powers in the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the chairman of which was also the president of the country. Iraq's political system is divided into three mutually checking branches, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial, but in reality the executive wields complete authority over the legislature and the judiciary.

The Arab Socialist Ba'ath (Resurrection) Party is in firm control of Iraq's political system. The government, dominated by the higher echelons of the Ba'ath Party, must sanction any formal political activity. Outlawed opposition political movements include Kurdish, Shi'a, and Communist parties.

The Constitution

After the 1968 takeover, a constitution was drafted on 22 September 1968 and became effective on 16 July



A large mural featuring Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein is meant to build nationalism. (DAVID & PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS)

1970. Another constitution was drafted in 1990 but has not been adopted. The constitution states that Iraq is "a sovereign people's democratic republic" dedicated to Arab unity and socialism (Metz 1988: 177). Islam is the state religion, but freedom of religion and of religious practices is guaranteed. While both Arabic and Kurdish are official languages for administrative purposes, the constitution also states that the "national rights" of the Kurds and other minorities are to be exercised only within the framework of Iraqi unity. The 1970 constitution is officially designated as provisional, yet it has remained in force because a permanent constitution has never been promulgated.

The President and Vice President

The president is the chief executive of the RCC and serves as the commander in chief of the armed forces and the head of state. The president has authority to appoint and dismiss members of the judiciary, civil service, and military. The constitution does not stipulate the president's term of office or provide for his successor.

Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr served as the first president, from 1968 to 16 July 1979, when he resigned (whether voluntarily or involuntarily is still debated). Saddam Hussein, the former vice chairman of the RCC, assumed the presidency. Saddam Hussein's power is based on a small group of supporters, especially relatives from the Talfah family from the town of Tikrit.

He deals ruthlessly with suspected opposition to his rule, both external and from within the party. He is known for monopolizing power and promoting a cult of personality. The vice presidency is largely a ceremonial post, and the vice president is appointed or dismissed solely at the will of the president.

The Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers serves as the presidential executive arm. The council discusses presidential policies and subsequently creates specific programs based on these policies. The council's activities are closely monitored by the *diwan*, or secretariat of the presidency, from which executive orders are issued.

The Cabinet

The president convenes all cabinet sessions. The cabinet usually consists of forty members, including the president and vice president. In addition to the president and the vice president, other senior members of the RCC serve on the cabinet, often, but not always, in the positions of minister of defense, minister of foreign affairs, minister of the interior, and minister of trade. Other ministerial positions include those for agriculture, communications, culture and arts, education, finance, health, higher education, industry, information, irrigation, justice, labor, oil, planning, housing, religious trusts, and transport.

The Revolutionary Command Council

The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was first formed after the July 1968 takeover. The constitution states that the RCC is the supreme body in the state and has the authority to promulgate laws, approve the government's budget, and deal with matters of national security, such as declarations of war. The RCC can override the constitution at any time and without judicial review. All who serve in the RCC must be members of the Ba'ath Party.

The president serves as chairman of the RCC. The RCC may dismiss any of its members by a two-thirds majority vote and can send to trial any members of the council, as well as any deputy to the president or any cabinet minister. The RCC has sweeping constitutional powers. It serves a legislative role in cooperation with or independently from the National Assembly. The powers of the National Assembly are defined by the RCC. The RCC also approves government decisions on national defense and internal security, such as declarations of war and ratifications of any international treaties or agreements. The chairman presides over the RCC's closed sessions and signs all laws and decrees issued by it. The RCC supervises the operations of cabinet ministers and the institutions of the state.

State Security Apparatus

The Iraqi state relies on a network of security and intelligence agencies, which protect it from internal enemies. These agencies are coordinated through the National Security Council, chaired by the president, and include the Iraqi army, the Special Security Service, the General Intelligence Directorate (Mukhabarat), Military Intelligence, the General Security Service, and the Office of the Presidential Palace. The responsibilities of different agencies overlap, so that no agency emerges as a threat to the power of the president. The Iraqi Department of General Intelligence is the most extensive arm of the state security system.

Local Government

There are eighteen governorates, each administered by a governor appointed by the president. Each governorate is divided into districts headed by district officers, with each district divided into subdistricts, which are administered by subdistrict officers. Mayors head cities and towns, while the president appoints the mayor of Baghdad and the mayors of other important cities.

The National Assembly

The Iraqi constitution provides for an elected, unicameral National Assembly, known in Arabic as al-

Majlis al-Watani. The RCC first promulgated a draft law creating the Assembly in December 1979, and this took effect in March 1980. The first National Assembly was elected in June 1980, in the first parliamentary elections since Iraq became a republic in 1958.

The National Assembly consists of 250 members elected by secret ballot every four years. Two hundred twenty seats are elected by popular vote, and thirty seats are appointed by the president to represent the three northern provinces of Dahuk, Irbil, and Al-Sulaimaniyya, where Kurds who have demonstrated loyalty to the government are appointed as representatives. All Iraqi citizens over the age of eighteen years are eligible to vote for the candidates. There are 250 electoral districts, and one representative is elected to the Assembly from each of these constituencies.

Only members of the Ba'ath Party and pro-Ba'ath independent candidates are permitted to participate in the elections. Furthermore, a state-appointed election commission must approve the qualifications of all candidates for the Assembly. This system has maintained Ba'ath Party control over the National Assembly. To qualify as a candidate for National Assembly elections, individuals must be at least twenty-five years of age, must have Iraqi fathers and be Iraqi by birth, and must not be married to foreigners.

The National Assembly generally holds two sessions per year; the first session is held in April and May, and the second session in November and December. During these sessions, the Assembly carries out its legislative duties concurrently with the RCC. Its primary function is to ratify or reject draft laws proposed by the RCC. In addition, it has limited authority to enact laws proposed by a minimum of one-fourth of the Assembly, to ratify the budget and international treaties, and to debate domestic and international policy. However, its actual powers are restricted, and ultimate decision-making authority resides with the RCC.

The Judiciary

The RCC promulgated the laws that formed the judiciary, since the constitution guarantees an independent judiciary but has no provisions for the organization of courts. The judiciary is divided into civil, criminal, administrative, and religious affairs. The Ministry of Justice has jurisdiction over the courts, while the president appoints all judges.

Political Parties

Although the Ba'ath party is the only sanctioned political party, others have exerted an influence in the

past. Some continue to have an effect despite their outlawed status.

The Ba'ath Party Two Syrians, Michel Aflaq (1910–1989) and Salah ad Din al Bitar (1912–1980), founded the Ba'ath Party in Damascus in 1947. Several Iraqis who attended the meeting returned to Baghdad and formed the Iraqi branch of the Ba'ath.

During the 1950s, the Ba'ath was an outlawed party, and its members were subject to arrest if their identities were discovered. In the 1960s, the party was reorganized under the direction of General Bakr as secretary-general, with Saddam Hussein as his deputy. Both men were determined to bring the Ba'ath to power, and in July 1968, the Ba'ath finally staged a successful coup. After the takeover, when Bakr became president of the regime, he initiated programs aimed at the establishment of a nation based on the Ba'ath ideals of socialism and Arab unity.

The Ba'ath Party claims that about 10 percent of the population are supporters and sympathizers; of this total, full party members, or cadres, are at 0.2 percent of the population. Participation in the party is essential for social mobility.

The Ba'ath Regional Command is the party's top decision-making body, and its members are chosen by Saddam Hussein. Theoretically, the Ba'ath Regional Command makes decisions about Ba'ath Party policy based on consensus. In practice, all decisions are made by the party's secretary-general, Saddam Hussein.

The Iraqi Communist Party The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) was founded by Yusuf Salman Yusuf (1901–1949; known as Comrade Fahd, or the Leopard) in 1934. Although the ICP was legalized in 1973, the Ba'ath Party regularly suppressed it after 1963 and outlawed it altogether in 1985. The Ba'ath hierarchy had earlier perceived the ICP as a Soviet arm ready to interfere in internal affairs, but after the successful 1968 coup Ba'ath leaders joined ICP officials in calling for a reconciliation of their decade-long rivalry.

Despite several decades of arrests, imprisonments, repression, assassinations, and exile, in the late 1980s the ICP remained a credible force and a constant threat to the Ba'ath leadership. Because the ICP is a clandestine party fighting for the overthrow of the Ba'athist regime, its true membership strength may never be known.

The Shi'a Parties The religious opposition to the Ba'ath originates from the devout Shi'a population, who form the majority of Iraq's population but are excluded from positions of power. The most important

opposition party was Al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya. After the Ba'athist coup in 1968, Al-Da'wa opposed the regime's secular policies, which led to the party's state persecution. Al-Da'wa was banned in 1980, and membership in the organization was punishable by death.

All anti-Iraqi Islamic organizations, such as Al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya, moved their headquarters to Tehran. Iran set up an umbrella organization, the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI), in November 1982. It is headed by the Iraqi cleric Hujjat al-Islam Muhammad Baqir al Hakim. SAIRI subsumed Al-Da'wa and other small Shi'a groups. It still launches military raids from Iran into southern and northern Iraq.

The Kurdish Parties The Kurds have maintained a violent struggle against the central government in Baghdad almost since the founding of Iraq. The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) was formed in 1946 under the leadership of Mullah Mustalafa-al-Barzani (1904–1979), with assistance from the Soviet Union, in northern Iran. Here, a Kurdish territory, the Republic of Mahabad, was established. When the Republic was crushed by Iranian forces a few years later, the KDP moved its activities to northern Iraq. The Iraqi government then launched a military campaign against the KDP forces, which responded with guerrilla attacks on Iraqi government forces and installations with the support of Iran and the United States.

In 1975, the shah of Iran withdrew his support of the Kurds as part of the Algiers Accord (which also delineated the Shatt al Arab channel that forms the border between Iraq and Iraq) between Tehran and Baghdad, leading to divisions in the Kurdish movement. At this time, a breakaway faction emerged from the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), known as the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), under Jalal Talabani (b. 1933). The PUK engaged in low-level guerrilla activity against the Iraqi government from 1975 to 1980. The war between Iraq and Iran in 1980 gave the PUK and the KDP the opportunity to intensify their military campaigns against the Iraqi government.

Most of the rural areas in northern Iraq were under the control of the guerrillas during the Iran-Iraq war years. Since the 1991 Gulf War, all central government functions in northern Iraq have been performed by local administrators, mainly Kurds, because the state withdrew its military forces and civilian administrative personnel from the area. A regional parliament and local government administrators were elected in 1992. This parliament last met in May 1995, when fighting between the PUK and the KDP disrupted normal parliamentary activity.

Iraq Today

Iraq maintains tenuous control of northern Iraq, while a low-intensity revolt has been launched in the marshes of southern Iraq. As a response, Saddam Hussein built a series of canals to drain the marshes and contain this revolt. Saddam Hussein's popularity has diminished as Iraqis suffer from the hardships caused by the United Nations-imposed sanctions. His most loyal support comes from members of his al-Majid clan from Tikrit in northern Iraq and from the Special Republican Guard. Saddam Hussein will most likely be succeeded by one of his sons, Uday Hussein and Qusay Hussein.

Ibrahim al-Marasbi

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IRAQ-TURKEY RELATIONS Since the early twentieth century, when both Turkey and Iraq achieved independence in the aftermath of World War I, relations between the two states have been pragmatic. Given an overlapping history, complementary concerns, and sometimes conflicting values, Turkey-Iraq relations have been defined and informed by a relatively limited number of issues, each varying in significance. Some of the most important issues relate to Western interests.

Pre-World War I Relations

Prior to World War I, neither Turkey nor Iraq existed as independent states. The Ottoman empire, ruled by the Anatolian Turks, included the Arabic province of Iraq, which had been incorporated into the empire by the Ottomans in 1534. For the following four hundred years, the Turkish sultan was both

the political and spiritual ruler of the province of Iraq (the position of Islamic spiritual ruler, or caliph, having been wrested from the Mamluk regime of Syria and Egypt in 1517). Periodic attempts at rebellion in the Iraqi province failed, but over time, the slow demise of the Ottoman empire allowed Iraq greater freedom in its own affairs. World War I found the Ottomans on the side of the Germans, presenting the Western Allies with an opportunity to weaken the empire further and establish greater influence in the Middle East by supporting Arab nationalism through promises of independence. With British backing, the Arabs rebelled against the collapsing Ottoman empire, and the Middle East, Iraq included, achieved nominal independence.

Relations from World War I to the Persian Gulf War

By 1923, Turkey had also consolidated its independence, expelling foreign powers from its vastly reduced territory, but maintaining positive relations with Western states for trade and developmental purposes. In Iraq, the League of Nations Mandate of 1920 gave control of the Iraqi province to the British, to the disappointment of Iraqi nationalists. From 1920 until Iraq achieved full independence in 1932, Iraqi relations with its former Turkish rulers were guided by the British and dealt primarily with British trade interests. Two main concerns existed for the British at this time, each economic in nature and giving substantial benefits to both Turkey and Iraq. The first was the construction of a transcontinental railroad bypassing the African trade route and linking British-held Kuwait to Europe. The second was the development of the Kirkuk oil fields, discovered in northern Iraq in 1927, and the shipment of its oil to Turkey's Iskenderun Gulf.

During the 1930s, Turkey-Iraq relations were at their most cordial, with both the Hashemite king Ghazi (1912-1939) of Iraq and Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938), the founder of the modern Turkish state and its leader since 1923, continuing to maintain close relations with the British. Although there was some conflict over border issues and resource questions, the relations of both states remained relatively stable, limited, and oriented toward the West.

From the late 1930s, after the deaths of both Ataturk and Ghazi, to the 1970s, Turkey and Iraq each suffered a series of military coups alternating with democratically elected governments with strong military elements. Relations between the two states focused on issues that remained significant for the rest of the twentieth century, transcending whatever regime hap-

pened to be in power, and institutionalizing the pragmatism of their ties. At times complementary, yet often at odds, the policy concerns of the two countries formed a basic pattern of behavior that was consistent on some fronts, although not necessarily friendly, and fluid on others. Islam, water issues, and the oil trade are examples of the former, whereas relations with the West and Kurdish minority questions are examples of the latter.

The 1940s saw differences emerging in Turkey-Iraq foreign relations, with Iraq shifting support away from Europe. Iraq took part in the first Arab-Israeli war (1948) and, in the early 1950s, examined the possibility of a union between itself and Syria. Turkey opted to look in the other direction, supporting the Western states and, after its ascension to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952, placing itself firmly in the sphere of Western influence. Different foci in their extended foreign relations, however, did not preclude Iraq and Turkey from cooperating in common areas of interest. In 1955, both countries joined with Iran, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom to form the Baghdad Pact, a mutual-defense organization intended to contain the growth of Soviet influence in the region. This experiment ended when Iraq, after alienating many of its Arabic neighbors by joining the pact, found itself with a new military government and withdrew from the agreement.

The historically sensitive issue of water rights became a strong point of contention for the two countries beginning in the 1960s, when Turkey implemented a massive public-works project (the GAP project) aimed at harvesting the water from the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers through the construction of a series of dams, for irrigation and hydroelectric energy purposes. The intended level of control of common water resources by Turkey upon completion of the GAP project was unacceptable to Iraq, which remains dependent upon both rivers to supply a significant portion of its water needs.

First raised in the 1920s, the Kurdish question became a prominent concern of both Iraq and Turkey with the radicalization of a Kurdish independence movement and the formation of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in the 1970s. Operating primarily out of Turkey, the PKK's revolutionary activity was aimed at the establishment of a Kurdish state in Turkey's southeast. For Iraq, the situation was less volatile, as divisions among the Kurds in northern Iraq prevented any real challenge to Baghdad's rule. However, as the Kurdish issue was a cross-border concern, it took center stage in Turkish-Iraq relations during the 1970s and the 1980s.

The establishment of military-backed regimes in Turkey and Iraq by 1980 helped strengthen relations on several core issues, as both governments supported secularist and antiradical policies, stable borders, and closer ties with the West—needed by Iraq for its conflict with Iran (1980–1990) and by Turkey in its desire to join the European Union (EU). The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, under the orders of President Saddam Hussein (b. 1937), reversed this decades-long trend as Turkey again chose to support the West.

Post-Persian Gulf War Relations

The pragmatism of Turkish-Iraqi relations is most evident in the post-Persian Gulf War era. While Turkey gained international praise for siding against Iraq and allowing United Nations forces to fly missions from its air bases, this favor did not compensate the country for the massive disruption of the Turkish economy resulting from the imposed U.N. sanctions. From 1991 until 2001, estimates of Turkey's economic losses ran between \$30 billion and \$40 billion. As Turkey's economy steadily declined in the 1990s, the government turned a blind eye toward increased trade between its southeastern provinces and Iraq. Oil and agricultural products were actively traded between the two states in explicit violation of the U.N. sanctions. By 2000, the Turkish government had even gone so far as to tax the illegal tanker trade in oil.

Iraq, for its part, often ignored Turkey's close ties with the United States, out of the desire to maintain relations with the country that, since the 1930s, had been one of Iraq's most significant trading partners and remained one of the few outlets for Iraqi goods, legal and illegal. Iraq also generally ignored the periodic incursions into its territory by Turkish forces pursuing PKK groups, a continuing threat to Turkey, but mostly harmless to Iraq, as Kurdish factions remained disunited.

While foreign relations diverged after the Persian Gulf War, Turkey-Iraq relations have remained closely defined by parameters established decades earlier, dependent upon both local circumstances and foreign influence.

Sean M. Cox

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IRIAN JAYA (2000 est. pop. 2.2 million). Irian Jaya, the easternmost province of the Republic of Indonesia, covers 421,981 square kilometers on the western half of the island of New Guinea, nearly 55 percent of the total area of Indonesia. Irian Jaya is encircled by other islands (Dolak, Misool, Salawati, Waigeo, Biak, Yapen, and Kelopom) and is bordered by the Seram and Banda Seas to the west, the Pacific Ocean to the north, the Arafura Sea to the south, and Papua New Guinea to the east. New Guinea is the second largest island in the world, after Greenland; from west to east it measures almost 2,500 kilometers, the distance from London to Istanbul.

The most populated and cultivated parts of the island are the Paniai Lakes district and the Balam Valley to the east. The population comprises migrants from Java and indigenous people from diverse *suku* (tribes), such as the Dani of the Baliem Valley in the central highlands, the Asmat of the southern coastal region, and the Ekari of the Wissel Lakes region. The official language is Bahasa Indonesia, but at least 250 languages are spoken by the indigenous people, reflecting the isolation and small numbers of many of the tribes.

Irian Jaya is a tropical island with primeval rainforests, powerful rivers, beautiful beaches, lakes, and mountains. The highest mountain is Gunung Jayawijaya, with snowcaps covering its 5,000-meter-high peaks. The area is also rich in natural resources, including fish, timber, and precious metals. These, how-



ever, have become a source of conflict between the central government and local peoples.

After a plebiscite in 1969, Irian Jaya became an Indonesian province, with its capital at Jayapura. However, frustrated by the exploitation of their natural resources, and poor social and economic conditions (e.g., high infant and maternal mortality rates), a growing number of Irian activists, who prefer to call themselves Papuans, consider the plebiscite illegitimate, and have demanded independence.

Andi Achdian

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LORENTZ—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

The Lorentz National Park has been the largest protected region in Southeast Asia since its designation as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1999. Located at the intersection of two tectonic plates on New Guinea, the massive park is exceptionally biodiverse—including both snowcaps and a tropical marine environment.

IRIAN JAYA CONQUEST Irian Jaya, also known as Papua, has effectively been governed by Indonesia since May 1963, and its estimated 2 million inhabitants speak languages belonging to more than 200 distinct groups. The Netherlands ruled the western half of Papua island after transferring sovereignty of the rest of the archipelago to Indonesia in 1949. The Indonesian president Sukarno consistently argued that this territory was rightfully Indonesia's. The Netherlands, under U.S. pressure, finally acquiesced to Sukarno's demand, and an agreement was concluded on 15 August 1962, transferring power to the United

Nations on October 1962 and to Indonesia on 1 May 1963. The agreement stipulated that Indonesia hold an Act of Free Choice, but the 1969 plebiscite is widely regarded as fraudulent and unrepresentative (Indonesian military intelligence carefully selected 1,022 tribal leaders to endorse Indonesian rule). The U.N. "noted" the Act of Free Choice, but failed to give stronger endorsement of the heavily rigged process.

The Free Papua Movement (OPM or Organisasi Papua Merdeka) has resisted Indonesian rule since the mid-1960s (1,500 Indonesian paratroopers who entered Irian Jaya in early 1962 met stiff local resistance; 200 were either killed or went missing). Rejecting the 1969 Act of Free Choice, in 1971 the OPM announced the establishment of an independent government, and from the late 1970s to 1984 staged sustained guerrilla attacks. Indonesian armed forces broke the resistance by 1984 with advance knowledge of an attack on Jayapura. Retaliation by the Indonesian armed forces mirrored its tactics in Aceh and East Timor, and aerial bombardment affected thousands of civilians, causing them to flee into Papua New Guinea. OPM campaigns against mining operations reflect resentment over Indonesian exploitation of Irian Jaya's vast reserves of copper, gold, petroleum, and other resources. The OPM, however, suffers from serious divisions along tribal lines; as Robin Osborne argues, "For at least 20,000 years, for indigenous Melanesians of New Guinea, 'foreigners' were people of other language groups, even close neighbours" (Osborne 1986: 49).

Since the end of the Suharto era, the OPM and other independence supporters have adopted a peaceful strategy of using their new freedoms to push for recognition of Irian Jaya's distinct history. A government-sponsored conference in June 2000 backfired on Indonesia when delegates overwhelmingly resolved that West Papuan independence leaders had declared independence from the Dutch on 1 December 1961—before the transfer of power to Indonesia. (In 1961 Papuans elected to the new National Committee adopted emblems of state with Dutch approval.) The conference also concluded that this should prompt political review of Papua's status. The strategy of the independence movement is to correct "history" as the first step in reconsidering the province's future. Transmigration to Papua has been considerable, and more than 200,000 mainly Javanese settlers now live in the province, particularly in coastal areas.

Anthony L. Smith

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IRIOMOTEJIMA ISLAND (2000 est. pop. 2,000). Iriomotejima is located approximately 440 kilometers southwest of Okinawa. It is the largest island of the Yaeyama group, with an area of 289 square kilometers. Mountains average 400 meters and cover 70 percent of the island. The highest mountain is Komidake (470 meters). About 90 percent of the island is covered with tropical rain forests and mangroves flourish at the estuaries of the Urauchi and Nakama rivers. Because of repeated cases of malaria since 1637, people were forced to leave the island. The crested serpent eagle and the Iriomote wildcat are found in the island's forests. The latter, a species of mountain cat, was discovered in 1965 and was designated an endangered species by the Japanese government in 1994. The Iriomote National Park, which occupies several of the Yaeyama islands, is primarily located on Iriomotejima. The park has subtropical forests and vegetation, poisonous snakes, rare butterflies, and mangrove swamps. The island's economy depends mainly on farming and tourism, which began to flourish in the 1970s. The main agricultural products are wetland rice, sugarcane, and pineapples.

Nathalie Cavasin

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IRON TRIANGLE The Iron Triangle, about twenty miles northwest of Saigon in Vietnam, served as a base for attacks by the National Liberation Front (NLF) on the Saigon area and Tan Son Nhut Airport during the height of the American war in Vietnam (1965–1970). An area of 200 to 280 square kilometers of dense forests, its corners were the villages of Ben Suc, Ben Cat, and Cu Chi. The Triangle was also bordered by the Saigon and Thi Tinh Rivers. The area

was so called because of its shape and because it was solidly under the control of the NLF and difficult to penetrate.

Use by the Viet Minh

The area had first been used by the Viet Minh during the Franco–Viet Minh War (1946–1954), and it comprised a vast and complex system of tunnels and underground facilities, including hospitals, living quarters, meeting halls, and command posts. From the tunnels, located near Cu Chi, the NLF was able to plan strategy and could avoid capture. The 240 kilometers of tunnels and underground facilities had allowed the Viet Minh and later the NLF to survive numerous military sweeps and massive bombings of the area. Some of the underground facilities were 6–9 meters deep and some of the passageways were as narrow as 60 centimeters by 60 centimeters.

Operation Cedar Falls

By 1966, the U.S. military in southern Vietnam considered the area a threat to its operations and to the safety of Saigon, and decided to destroy the Iron Triangle (referred to as War Zone D by the U.S. forces). Operation Cedar Falls was launched in January 1967. Approximately thirty thousand American and South Vietnamese (ARVN) troops took part in the search-and-destroy operation led by General William Westmoreland, among others. The primary aim of the mission was to eliminate the NLF presence and threat in the area. American military experts claimed this would require U.S. and ARVN troops to flush out and destroy the tunnels. In addition, all non-NLF inhabitants would have to be permanently relocated, and at least four villages would have to be razed.

One of the first missions of Operation Cedar Falls was the evacuation of the village of Ben Suc. On 8 January 1967, U.S. and ARVN troops surrounded the village. The estimated 3,500 residents of the village were rounded up and interrogated. Those considered non-combatants were evacuated to a refugee camp several miles from the village. Those suspected of being NLF troops were taken in as prisoners. Once the evacuation of Ben Suc was completed, U.S. demolition teams moved in to destroy the village itself. Tractors and bulldozers were brought in by helicopters in order to clear the surrounding jungle and to raze the village. Within a few days the forest had been cleared and the houses had been destroyed. This technique was used in other surrounding villages as well.

At Cu Chi, entrances to the tunnels were exposed and special U.S. military units, known as the Tunnel

Rats, were sent in to destroy the tunnels and to capture any NLF troops in hiding. In addition the U.S. military used flooding and shelling to flush out any NLF troops in hiding. After the area had been defoliated and cleared, it was bombed and burned in order to destroy any remaining, undetected tunnels. Although considerable damage was done to the tunnels, NLF troops were quickly able to repair them and to continue to use them as protection.

Operation Cedar Falls lasted approximately eighteen days. It was followed by Operation Junction City and several others. Initially deemed a success by the U.S. military command, it failed to make the Iron Triangle safe, despite the amount of resources it received. The operation had created at least seven thousand Vietnamese refugees, resulting in stronger resentment of the U.S. presence in Vietnam.

Evaluation

Despite casualties of approximately 750 on the NLF side and 250 on the U.S. and ARVN side, there was very little fighting, as most NLF troops managed to escape and fled to sanctuaries in Cambodia. Within weeks, however, NLF activity resumed in the area. American intelligence units spotted NLF troops transporting supplies, on bicycle, toward Saigon. The NLF rebuilt camps and resumed operations. The Iron Triangle then served as the base from which the Tet Offensive was launched on Saigon (31 January 1968). The tunnels of Cu Chi were not successfully destroyed until they suffered repeated special B-52 bombings in 1970.

Micheline R. Lessard

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IRRAWADDY DIVISION (2002 est. pop. 7.2 million). The 35,138-square-kilometer territory that comprises the modern-day Irrawaddy (Ayeyarwady) Division is one of the most important political and economic regions in Myanmar (Burma). Flanked by the Arakan Yoma range in the west and the Irrawaddy River in the east, until the British annexation of Burma in the nineteenth century much of the territory consisted of wetlands and forests. Under British rule, however, large areas were cleared for paddy cultivation, leading to its preeminent position as the main rice producer in the country, a position it has retained into the twenty-first century.

The British encouraged immigration, changing the ethnic balance in an area that had previously been inhabited largely by Mons and Karens. In the 1990s, the population of the division was calculated by the government to be 5.84 million, including 1.19 million Karens, 60,000 Rakhines, and 160,000 inhabitants of other nationalities. The majority population of 4.43 million was classified as ethnic Burman. The Mon language disappeared more or less entirely in the division by the end of the twentieth century.

Many parts of the territory suffered severe disruption during World War II as well as during the insurgencies that broke out shortly after independence was granted in 1948. It was not until the 1970s that both the Karen and Communist insurgencies were suppressed throughout the division.

In the last two decades of the twentieth century, sectors of the local economy slowly revived. The capital of the division, Bassein (Patheingyi) in the western Delta region, is Myanmar's second busiest port. Other important centers are the road-rail junction towns of Henzada (Hinthada) and Myanaung, both of which lie farther north on the Irrawaddy River.

Agriculture and fisheries are the main industries. In addition to paddy and jute, crops such as pulses, groundnut, sesamum, coconut, bananas, chilli, and vegetables grow well in the alluvial soil. A variety of fish-based industries also developed. Fish-paste, dried fish, and prawns are all produced, and salt-making and fishing enterprises are located along the estuaries and Andaman seashore.

Manufacturing or heavy industries remained small-scale during the Burma Socialist Programme Party era (1962–1988), and included a jute mill at Myaungmya, a glass factory in Bassein, and the Myanaung Oil Field and Gas Turbine Power Generating Plant.

Under the State Law and Order Restoration Council government, which assumed power in 1988, major road and bridge building programs were introduced during the 1990s in an attempt to improve communications with Yangon and the rest of Myanmar. Particular emphasis was placed on expanding rice cultivation, which, it was intended, would produce an export surplus for the country, but economic progress in the division continued to be slow.

Martin Smith

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IRRAWADDY RIVER AND DELTA The Irrawaddy (Ayeyarwady) River is the major waterway of Myanmar (Burma). It originates at the confluence of two small rivers, the N'mai Kha and Mali Kha, in Kachin State and flows through the heart of the country before entering the Andaman Sea more than fourteen hundred kilometers to the south. Up to 1.6 kilometers wide in places, the river is navigable for much of its length.





NAVIGATING THE IRRAWADDY

The Irrawaddy is the major inland north-south transportation route in Myanmar. The following account describes one of two types of boats used to navigate the river in the 1800s.

Of boats there are numerous kinds, from the small canoe to the large earth-oil or rice-boat; but all have a dug-out for the foundation whilst those in use on the Irrawaddy differ considerably from those found elsewhere. The Irrawaddy boats again are of two kinds. In one the keel-piece is a single tree hollowed out and stretched by the aid of a fire when green, a complete canoe in fact. From this ribs and planking are carried up. The bow is low with beautiful hollow lines. . . .

The stern rises high above the water and below the run is drawn out fine to an edge. A high bench or platform for the steersman, elaborately carved, is an indispensable appendage. The rudder is a large paddle lashed to the larboard quarter, and having a short tiller passing athwart the steersman's bench. . . .

The mast consists of two spars, it is in fact a pair of shears bolted and lashed to two posts rising out of a keel-piece. . . .

Above the main yard the two pieces run into one forming the top-mast. Wooden rounds run as ratlines from one spar of the mast to the other, forming a ladder for going aloft. The yard is a bamboo or line of spliced bamboos of enormous length and is suspended from the masthead by numerous guys or halyards, so as to curve upwards in an inverted bow. A rope runs along this from which the huge mainsail is suspended, running on rings, like a curtain, outwards both ways from the mast. There is a small topsail of similar arrangement: the sail cloth used is a common light cotton "stuff for clothing."

Source: Gazetteer of Burma. (1893) New Delhi: Cultural Publishing House, 436-437.

Steamer service, carrying both passengers and goods, operates from the capital, Yangon (Rangoon), through Prome (Pyay) and Mandalay to Bhamo in Kachin State fourteen hundred kilometers to the north.

In its upper reaches, the river passes through mountain valleys and gorges, but beyond a major defile south of Bhamo the river begins to broaden. Here, as it crosses the Dry Zone of Myanmar, passage is seasonally interrupted by low water and shifting sandbanks. In these reaches are located the former royal capitals of Amarapura, Mandalay, Ava, Sagaing, and Pagan, testifying to the pivotal role the river has played in Myanmar's history and culture.

North of Pakokku, the Irrawaddy gains fresh impetus when it is joined by the Chindwin (Chindwin) River through a network of channels. Flowing south, the river has created a long alluvial plain during thousands of years as it passes between the Arakan Yoma and Pegu Yoma ranges. On this stretch are located the historic oil fields between Chauk and Myanaung as well as the important road-rail-river junction at Prome.

Myanaung marks the upper gateway to the Irrawaddy Delta. In these lower reaches, the Irrawaddy flows through vast flatlands, dividing and subdividing on its way, before entering the Andaman Sea through

eight major mouths. Yangon is further linked to the delta by the Twante Canal, constructed in 1883.

Amid a maze of creeks, mangrove forests, and agricultural land, road transportation is often difficult in the 33,670-square-kilometer delta region, which was largely a frontier area until British annexation in the nineteenth century. Silting and flooding remain annual problems, but the economy of this region, especially rice production, has become increasingly important to the nation over the past one hundred years. Local fishing industries are also located in several southernmost towns, such as Bassein (Pathein), Pyapon, Labutta, and Bogale.

For much of the twentieth century, the Irrawaddy was spanned only once—by the road-rail bridge at Sagaing. However, in a spate of building at the end of the 1990s, bridges were constructed at Maubin and Nyaungdon in the delta region, as well as at Prome, Chauk, and Myitkyina farther north.

Martin Smith

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IRTYSH RIVER The Irtysh River flows northwest for 4,248 kilometers (2,640 miles) through China, Kazakhstan, and Russia, and ends in western Siberia. It begins in the southwest slopes of the Chinese Altay mountain range (Xinjiang province) and it flows west into Kazak territory, where it is known as the Kara-Irtysh up to the point where it enters Lake Zaysan. Once it exits the lake, it is called Irtysh and continues its flow northwest within Kazakhstan, passing the cities of Ust'-Kamenogorsk, Semipalatinsk, and Pavlodar. A canal that was constructed in the 1960s from the Irtysh to Karaganda allows the use of the river's water for agricultural purposes in central Kazakhstan. Leaving Kazakhstan, the Irtysh river then crosses into Russia, passes the city of Omsk, and joins the Ob river.

The river is the principal source of water for almost four million Kazaks and a vital base for industry. China and Kazakhstan have been involved in discussions and

negotiations regarding the future of the river. China's plans to build a canal on the upper part of the Irtysh (called Ertis He in China) in order to divert the water flow into the Xinjiang province of western China has caused concerns in Kazakhstan. At present, an agreement has been reached that allows China to divert only 10 percent of the river's flow—about one billion cubic meters—per year until 2020.

Daphne Biliouri

ISE SHRINE Located in Mie Prefecture, the Grand Shrine of Ise (Ise Daijingu) is the most important shrine in Japan. It comprises two main shrine complexes, Naiku (the Inner Shrine), which consecrates Amaterasu, the Sun Goddess, and Geku (the Outer Shrine), which enshrines Toyouke, an agricultural deity worshiped as parent to Amaterasu, together with more than 120 subordinate shrines. Naiku enshrines *Yata-no-kagami* (the Sacred Mirror), one of the three Imperial regalia. The two main shrines, built in the *shinmei* style, with plain wood and reed-thatched roofs, are ritually rebuilt every twenty years. Each building has an adjacent alternate site, where the new building is constructed with strict attention to detail. When completed, rites are held for the transfer of the deity to the new shrine. Following further rites, the shrine on the old site is disassembled and the materials distributed to affiliated shrines around the nation.

During the Tokugawa period (1600/1603–1868), branches of this shrine throughout Japan promoted pilgrimages to Ise, and large numbers of ordinary people, representing their local devotional groups, visited the shrine as part of a once-in-a-lifetime journey away from the farms and distant towns. In an average year, pilgrims numbered between 600,000 and 700,000; in the spontaneous mass pilgrimages of 1705 and 1830, however, they numbered between two and three million.

James M. Vardaman, Jr.

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ISHIHARA SHINTARO (b. 1932), Japanese novelist and politician. Born in Kobe, Ishihara Shintaro graduated from Hitotsubashi University with a law degree in 1956. In 1954, he published his first novel, *Hai iro no kyoshitsu* (The Gray Classroom), in *Hitotsubashi Bungaku*, a literary magazine. In 1955, he won two of Japan's most prestigious literary prizes, the Bungakukai Award for New Writers and the Akutagawa Award for his novel *Taiyo no kisetsu* (Season of Violence). Other novels include *Kiretsu* (The Crevice, 1958), *Sobei no Heya* (The Punishment Room, 1956), and *Kanzennaru Yugi* (Utter Decadence, 1957). In 1968, he entered politics and won a seat as a member of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the upper house of the Japanese legislature; in 1972, he was elected to the House of Representatives. Together with Sony Corporation Chairman Morita Akio (1921–1999), he coauthored an essay "'No' to ieru Nihon" (The Japan that Can Say 'No,' 1989). After an authorized translation raised concern among members of the U.S. Congress, Morita withdrew from the project. The book was published in English in 1991 under Ishihara's name. He coauthored with Malaysia's prime minister Mahathir Mohamad (b. 1925) another essay titled "An Asia That Can Say No" (1994). In 1995, he resigned from the LDP and in 1999 was elected governor of Tokyo.

Nathalie Cavasin

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ISHIKAWA (2002 est. pop. 1.2 million). Ishikawa prefecture, in the central region of Japan's island of Honshu, combines rustic scenery with the high culture of old Japan. With an area of 4,197 square kilometers, the island has such picturesque geographical features as the Noto Peninsula and Hegurajima (Hegura Island), as well as several other small islands. Ishikawa is bordered by the Sea of Japan and Toyoma Bay and by Toyoma, Gifu, and Fukui prefectures. Ishikawa subsumed parts of the ancient provinces of Echizen, Noto, and Kaga and assumed its present name and borders in 1872.

The prefecture's capital is Kanazawa, situated on the southern plain of the Kaga region. Because it was not bombed during World War II, the city today ex-

emplifies traditional Japanese architecture. Initially a fifteenth-century Buddhist temple town of the Ikko sect, after 1580 it became the castle town of the Maeda family, patrons of scholars and artists. The traditional crafts include Kutani-ware porcelain, decorated lacquer ware, and printed silk. Visitors are drawn to the garden Kenrokuen, the Nagamachi samurai quarter, the ruins of Kanazawa Castle, and numerous temples and museums. The other important cities of the prefecture are Komatsu, Kaga, and Nanao.

The fertile Kanazawa Plain is planted in rice, and the Noto Peninsula, also the site of rice paddies, is the center of a profitable fishing industry. Apart from some textile and heavy machinery plants, there is little other industry. Tourists are attracted to the Noto Peninsula, with its scenic rocky coast and unspoiled rural ways, as well as to the regional hot-spring resorts, including Yamanaka, Yamashiro, and Awazu.

E. L. S. Weber

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ISHIM RIVER The Ishim is a Siberian river that flows through northern Kazakhstan and the southern part of central Russia, between the two great rivers Tobol and Irtysh. It rises in the Niyaz Mountains, between Qaraghandy and Astana, the new Kazakh capital, and flows west for about 500 kilometers, before suddenly curving north to join the Irtysh in the Omsk region of southern Siberia. Its total length is about 2,140 kilometers, and it waters a rather small basin (compared with other Siberian rivers), which covers only 144,000 square kilometers. The main towns irrigated by the Ishim are Astana and Petropavlovsk in Kazakhstan and Ishin city in the Tyumen' region of Russia.

The Nura River, which flows near the Ishim upstream and shares much of its underground basin, suffers from mercury pollution from former Soviet industries situated in Qaraghandy. As the Nura is an endoreic river (a river with an inward-flowing basin), a channel was built in the mid-1990s to allow it to flow into the Ishim and thus increase the available water supply. When the mercury pollution was discovered, however, the government closed the channel, despite the water shortage in Astana.

Patrick Dombrowsky

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ISKANDAR MUDA (1590–1636), ruler of Aceh. Iskandar Muda (reigned 1607–1636), with the exalted title of *mahkota alam* (crown of the universe), is considered to have been the greatest ruler of the northern Sumatran principality Aceh. A ruthless and tyrannical ruler, reputed to have murdered his way to the throne, Iskandar Muda brought Aceh to the peak of its power and territorial expansion during the first half of the seventeenth century, dominating Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula except Portuguese Melaka.

In the three-way struggle for control over the Straits of Malacca and the Malay Archipelago between the Malays of Johor, the Acehnese, and the Portuguese at Melaka, Aceh appeared to have been the most successful because of Iskandar Muda and his powerful fleet.

In 1612, the kingdom of Aru, a vassal of Johor, was seized by the Acehnese. In 1613, Batu Sawar, the capital of Johor, was sacked by Iskandar Muda, and Sultan Alauddin (reigned 1597–1612) and his entire royal court suffered the humiliation of being brought as prisoners to Aceh. Alauddin's half-brother, Abdullah (Sultan Hammat Shah), was dispatched as a vassal ruler of Johor. Iskandar Muda then dominated the peninsular Malay kingdoms of Pahang (1617), Kedah (1619), and Perak (1620). In 1629, he attacked Portuguese Melaka with two hundred ships and a force of twenty thousand but failed to breach the fortress walls. Portuguese reinforcements from Goa repelled Iskandar Muda's Acehnese forces.

Iskandar Muda died in 1636. Nonetheless, Aceh remained a preeminent power during the reign of his successor, Iskandar Thani (1636–1641), a Pahang prince, but its territorial expansion was halted.

Ooi Keat Gin

See also: Aceh Rebellion; Acehnese

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ISLAM—BRUNEI As a Malay Islamic kingdom, independent Brunei Darussalam has undergone a profound Islamization of institutions and society. The temporal leader and head of religion in Brunei, the reigning sultan, Hassanal Bolkiah (b. 1946), wields absolute power. Just as the Sunnite orthodoxy is closely invigilated in Brunei Darussalam, so too the institutions of government share many of the features of Middle Eastern dynastic rule.

The date at which Islam entered Brunei is controversial, just as the date of conversion of a pre-Islamic ruler, likely a Hinduized maharaja, is unknown. By the early sixteenth century Brunei was a Muslim state. Nevertheless, Muslim merchants, including those from China, were active in Brunei by the thirteenth century. Conversion of the largely animist peoples outside of Brunei's royal center only gained ground in the last century, a process that continues to this day through marriage or active Islamic proselytization. However, more than is officially admitted, pre-Islamic beliefs frequently coexist with more doctrinal forms and practices.

Stemming from closer links with Mecca and the influence of pan-Islamic ideas promoted by the Ottoman sultan in the nineteenth century, a more scripturalized Islam took root in Brunei that superseded informal *tariqa*, or mystical, orders. Equally, the imposition of the British Residency system in Brunei between 1906 and 1959 introduced many innovations in the application and administration of Islamic law.

But with the rising tide of the Islamic resurgence in the 1980s, the religious authorities in Brunei have determinably harnessed the oil-rich state's resources to such pro-Islamic actions as the endowment of mosques and religious schools, sponsorship of the pilgrimage, and the mainstreaming of religious education in the nation's schools and universities. By the 1990s, Islam had been elevated as the leading prop of an arcane intellectual indoctrination in official history and religion termed Malay Islam Beraja (monarch), the mastery of which has become a loyalty test for all Brunei youths. In responding to the international Islamicist challenge, Islamic conservatism in Brunei has not only touched the style and demeanor of the sultan but has also stimulated the push for the total Islamization of Brunei society. For example, Arabized script, or Jawi, and even the Arabic language have seen new life in the Brunei education curriculum in a discourse where secular and liberal have become suspect categories. Still, civil law, which is based on British precedent and lifestyle, including gender relations, is more relaxed than in Brunei's Middle



The Omar Ali Saifuddin Mosque in Bandar Seri Begawan. (CHARLES & JOSETTE LENARS/CORBIS)

Eastern counterparts. Moreover, no apparent contradiction exists between ostentatious materialism, especially on the part of the Brunei royal family, and Islamic rectitude to which the *ummat*, or community of believers, are obliged to conform.

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ISLAM—CENTRAL ASIA Islam in Central Asia is a domestic religion, an experience of Muslim life in the household. The visitor's first impression is that there are few mosques and that few women wear veils. This does not mean that Islam is weak, only that under Communist pressure Muslim life made a strategic retreat into home and neighborhood. Islam is now reemerging into the public square: new mosques are going up everywhere, often with the help of gifts from Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Islamic dress is seen again, notably among schoolgirls attending spe-

cial classes for religious instruction. Where teachers are available, even public schools are offering Arabic as a subject. Each new republic has a Muslim directorate and an Islamic training center headed by a mufti (jurist) who is approved by the government. The Islamic revival has spawned "fundamentalist" reform movements against which the post-Soviet governments are on guard, although the extent of the threat they pose is disputed.

With the exception of Persian-speaking peoples in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, the native peoples of Central Asia are Turks of nomadic origin. Some of the Turkic peoples (those now called Uzbeks and Uighurs) settled centuries ago in bazaar towns and agricultural villages, building mosques and *madrasabs* (Islamic schools). Other Turks—Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen—remained pastoral nomads into the twentieth century. For them the Muslim life has always been lived primarily in the home and by extension at the "homes"—that is, the tombs or shrines (Arabic *mazar*)—of Sufi saints called *auliye* in Kazakh, the word deriving from the Arabic *wali*, "representative of God on earth." Dotting the arid landscape, these tombs and adjacent Muslim cemeteries far outnumber mosques; it has been said that in Central Asia the *mazar* is a holier place than the mosque. Groups and individuals make *ziyarat* (pilgrimages) to these shrines in search of the *baraka* (sacred power) of the Muslim saints, of the Prophet Muhammad and his family, and ultimately of God.


Central Asians are often accused of being weak and unobservant Muslims. They seldom deny the charge, exonerating themselves by pointing to historical circumstances: "We studied in Russian schools," "Our mullahs were fools," "Our father and mother were afraid to teach us the prayers for fear of the Communist Party," and so forth. The Kazakhs and Kyrgyz have additional excuses: "We were shepherds, roaming the steppe far from town," "We never had mosques," and so forth. Russian scholars concluded that religion in Central Asia is a survival of an archaic shamanism or animism overlaid with a thin veneer of Islam. In the West, most scholars adopted this Russian conclusion because the West is fascinated by primal religion and prefers shamans to Muslims. Such stereotypes have obscured an understanding of religion in Central Asia. Even where *shari'a* (Islamic law) is poorly understood, felt to be inconvenient, or perceived as a foreign Arab culture, the popular religion of the Turkic peoples is a genuine Muslim spirituality.

Historical Background

Religions crossed paths in Central Asia. Buddhists traveled from India to China by way of Central Asia, and the Manichaean religion made a strong impact. The Zoroastrians left archaeological evidence of their place in the history of Central Asian religion. As early as the fifth century CE, there were missions of Nestorian Christianity in Central Asia. Beginning in 652, Arab armies raided Transoxiana (the part of Central Asia to the north of the Amu Dar'ya River), and its major cities fell to the Arab general Qutayba ibn Muslim in the decade after 705. Bukhara became a center of Islamic civilization in the ninth century under the Samanids from Iran, as did Kashgar in the tenth century under the Karakhanids. To the north, the Turkic Oghuz people, later known as Turkmen and Seljuks, accepted Islam in 985 in return for the right to cross the Syr Dar'ya River into Muslim Transoxiana and Iran.

The Mongol invasion that began in 1219 put all of Central Asia under non-Muslim rulers. The Mongol empire tolerated all religions, and Muslims, Christians, and Jews lived side by side in Central Asian cities. In the fourteenth century, Emir Timur (Tamerlane) made Samarqand a pearl of Islamic architecture whose reputation was known in the West; he also wiped out the last vestiges of Nestorian Christianity in Central Asia.

The ancestors of today's Uzbeks and Kazakhs were the Kipchaks of the Golden Horde, who accepted Islam in the fourteenth century after a miraculous trial of fire between a band of traveling Sufis and the court shamans of Oz Beg Khan. In 1499–1500, the Uzbek



The minaret of the Khoja Mosque in Khiva, Uzbekistan. At 45 meters, the mosque is visible from anywhere in the city and is a major symbol of Islam in the region. (CHARELS & JOSETTE LENARS/CORBIS)

ruler Muhammad Shaybani Khan conquered Transoxiana, which thus became the land of the Uzbeks, or Uzbekistan. Between the tenth and fifteenth centuries, the sedentary Turkic people in eastern Turkistan (today's Xinjiang province, northwest China) accepted Islam. Their descendants are the Uighurs. Today an underground Islamic movement struggles for the independence of Uighurstan from China.

The Islamization of Central Asia was complete in essentials by the fifteenth century. In the cities of Transoxiana and eastern Turkistan, Islam has been dominant ever since. Nomads, as always, were selective in their observance of the *shari'a*: among the Kazakhs, Islam was "*firmly*, albeit rather *superficially* established" (Akiner 1983: 301). In the eighteenth century, Russia's Catherine the Great deputized Tatar mullahs to "civilize" the Kazakhs, who, she imagined, would be more manageable subjects of the Russian empire if they were better Muslims, but this policy was

short lived. In the late nineteenth century, the Russian Orthodox Church converted small bands of Kazakhs; the mission came to little, but Muslims in Central Asia still perceive the Russians as Christian invaders of the Muslim world.

Religious Concepts

The Turks readily adopted the conceptual structure of Islam, and the vocabulary of Central Asian religion comes largely from Arabic and Persian Islamic terms. The word for "God" is Allah in Arabic and Qudai in Persian. A few concepts from Turkic sources were used to translate Islamic ideas, such as Tengri (a Turkic deity who was equated with the heavens, as an alternate name for God). Very few non-Islamic terms have survived. The word for "spirit" in the Central Asian languages (Kazakh *aruaq*) comes from Arabic (*rub*), leaving no memory of archaic Turkic words for this fundamental concept. Thorough Islamization of religious vocabulary in Central Asia belies the stereotype that its people have a shamanistic worldview.

Religious Roles

Native *bakshi* (shamans) were healers and mediums who diagnosed and cured illnesses with the aid of their helping spirits while in a state of ecstasy or trance. When Islam came, the shaman tended to become a Muslim folk healer (Arabic *tabib*, Kazakh *tauip*). A male healer is also called a mullah when he learns to recite a few verses from the Qur'an, and the Uzbek *otin* is, in effect, a female mullah and healer. The shaman had always been a quixotic and socially marginal figure and therefore was open to easy ridicule by the Communist authorities; the few shamans who survived persecution failed to pass on their methods to their skeptical modern children. The Muslim *tabib*, however, was at the center of society, survived undercover in the Muslim home and neighborhood, and is enjoying a revival today. In every Central Asian neighborhood, there are one or more *tabibs*, often women, to whom the sick can resort when modern medicine fails them.

The mystical Sufis gave Islam in Central Asia its special quality, but Sufi spirituality tended to ossify over time into mundane social forms, losing its spiritual depth. The Sufis' ascetic discipline and inner search for the love of God can be seen in early Turkic poetry such as the *Diwan-i Hikmet*, attributed to Ahmet Yasawi, a twelfth-century Sufi master (Arabic *sheikh*, Persian *pir*). Sufi movements inspired by such charismatic figures were organized later into *tariqa* (brotherhoods), the most important of which was the Naqshbandi order. There was profit to be made by the Sufi brotherhoods at the tombs of famous Sufi mas-

ters, both from Muslim pilgrims and from endowments of land, irrigation systems, and businesses that came to be attached to the shrines. Descendants of famous Sufis vied for control of the shrines of Ali in Balkh (Mazar-e Sharif) in northern Afghanistan, Zangi Baba in Shash (Tashkent), and Ahmet Yasawi in Yasi (Turkistan) in southern Kazakhstan.

The descendants of the Sufis are religious honor groups called *kboja*, a Persian word meaning "master" or "teacher" (Kazakh *qoja*, Turkish *boca*). In the Arab world, they are called *sayyid*, descendants of Ali, the fourth caliph and nephew of the Prophet Muhammad. Typically each *kboja* lineage preserves a *nasabnama* (genealogical manuscript) by which it proves its descent from Ali. The key links in these genealogies are the Sufi masters from whom a *kboja* group takes its name. Spiritual succession in Sufi communities tended to become hereditary over time; so that families claiming descent from a Sufi who had been called by the title *kboja* came to think of themselves as *kboja* bloodlines. They have a quasi-ethnic identity, calling themselves "Arabs" because of their descent from Muhammad, even though they speak no Arabic. Traditionally a Kazakh clan was the client of a *kboja* patron, who recited the Qur'an for them, taught their children, healed their diseases, prayed for rain, and so forth. Persecuted by the Communists, many *kbojas* have melted into modern society and no longer claim a religious role, but they are given the place of honor at banquets and referred to with respect because a harsh word from a *kboja* is believed to be a powerful curse. Whereas a *kboja* healer is believed to have special powers because of his or her descent from Muhammad, today's *kbojas* have only a shadowy awareness of their Sufi heritage. The social honor bestowed by descent from Muhammad has become more important to them than the spiritual values of the Sufi tradition from which they sprang.

When Russia conquered Central Asia after 1864, it brought European civilization with it, and a new elite of European-oriented Muslims emerged in Central Asian cities. This led to an Islamic renewal movement called Jadidism, which published progressive newspapers and opened "new method" schools where children were taught secular subjects as well as religious ones. The Jadidists were condemned by the *kbojas* and mullahs, who had a vested interest in the *madrasabs*, where Qur'anic recitation was the only instruction offered. The Jadidist renewal was cut short by the Communist Revolution, which had its own educational agenda and purged both the conservative mullahs and the forward-looking Jadidists. For the rest of the twentieth century, a domestic version of the Muslim life

was taught to children in the home, when religious learning was passed on at all.

Elements of Popular Religion Today

In Central Asia, memorial meals in honor of the dead are observed in the home according to the *shari'a*. An ancient pattern of ancestor veneration seems to have been at the root of funeral customs in both Arabian Islam and the Turko-Mongol tradition, so that the Turkic peoples readily adopted the Islamic funeral pattern as their own. After the death of a loved one, a feast is prepared for all the relatives and neighbors on the seventh and fortieth days after death, every Thursday between the death and the fortieth day, then on the anniversary of death. One or more mullahs recite the Qur'an (in Arabic) and add a blessing of dedication to the deceased, the family's ancestors, the prophets, and the local Sufi saints (in the vernacular language).

A related observance is that on every Thursday *qu-dayi nan* (sacred bread) is fried in oil, the aroma of which is thought to go up to the ancestor spirits. The family then dedicates the evening meal to its ancestors. Thursday is the day when the spirits are believed to leave their graves by the permission of God and return to their homes, waiting for the Qur'an to be recited and food to be dedicated in their memory. When someone in the house has a dream in which the ancestors appear, seven loaves of fried *qu-dayi nan* are distributed to neighbors, binding the Muslim neighborhood together in a common experience of the spiritual world. The woman of the household is the key person in this domestic cult of the ancestors. It is she who "emits the aroma" (Kazakh *iyis shigaradi*) of the sacred bread fried in oil, she who has her children distribute the seven loaves to the neighbors, and often she who has the dream that impels her to do so.

Pilgrimages or visits (*ziyarat*) to tombs and Sufi centers hark back to the medieval tradition of Muslim travels (Arabic *rihla*) in search of spiritual wisdom and power. The trip may be short, because almost every Central Asian town and village has a tomb or cemetery that is held in special reverence. More elaborate pilgrimages may be organized by families or by a healer with his patients. A common pattern is to prepare oneself by ritual ablutions, make a special request of God called an "intention" (*niyet*), greet the saint upon arrival at the shrine, walk around the shrine up to seven times, pay one of the shrine mullahs to recite the Qur'an and say a blessing on one's behalf, leave a monetary contribution in a box designated for votive gifts and/or make an animal sacrifice, and promise specific acts of devotion if the saint answers one's prayer.

Important Sufi tombs may be referred to as "the second Mecca," thus relating the Islamic hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) with *ziyarat* in local sacred space. It is widely believed in Central Asia that three visits to one of the major shrines is equivalent to the hajj. A visit to family graves at the local cemetery has a similar purpose, because the spirits of the Muslim dead are believed to be closer to God than are the living. In essentials, this pattern is similar to pilgrimage practices everywhere in the Muslim world, as is the funeral pattern mentioned earlier.

Personal observance of the five pillars of Islam (profession of faith, prayer five times a day, almsgiving, fasting during the holy month of Ramadan, and the hajj) is often neglected in Central Asia, but it is not absent or ignored altogether. In traditional extended families, the grandfather and grandmother are most likely to say the five daily prayers (*namaz*); the grandfather may do so at the neighborhood mosque. Although the Ramadan fast is becoming popular again, during the Soviet period it was only the elders who fasted; the Tashkent Muslim directorate, under pressure from the government, issued a *fatwa* (decree) that persons of working age need not fast.

In general this pattern persists today: elders perform the requirements of the *shari'a* vicariously, in effect, as surrogates for their family. If the grandchildren learn to say the *namaz* and recite verses of the Qur'an, it is the grandparents who teach them because the parents were the "lost generation," denied a religious upbringing in their Soviet schools. Or children may be sent to a neighborhood mullah or *otin* for Arabic lessons after school. Circumcision of boys at around the age of six years is now universal again and was widely practiced even during the Soviet period.

A standard practice of Muslim folk healers in Central Asia is the technique of diagnosing all manner of illnesses simply by taking the pulse and curing by reciting the Qur'an and breathing forcefully on the patient. The mullah or *tabib* does this to bring both the Qur'an and his or her ancestor spirits to bear on the patient's illness. Healers subscribe to the Islamic humoral theory of medicine, according to which an imbalance between hot and cold foods in the diet is the cause of disease, so that treatment often involves special diets or herbal remedies. For example, licorice root (native to the desert steppe) is chewed for stomach problems, and hummingbird nests soaked in horse fat are used to treat venereal disease. Wild rue or steppe sage (*adraspan*) is burned as incense or hung in the corner of the room to ward off evil spirits.

Representing the healer's spiritual power, the knife and whip are shamanic symbols that were long ago taken over by the Muslim healer, as was the ancient Turkic belief that each disease has a "master" (Kazakh *iye*, Uzbek *ege*) who must be overcome by the healer's spiritual energy (Kazakh *kiye*). Despite these shamanic elements, the Kazakh *tauip* today is more like the *tabib* elsewhere in the Muslim world than she is like the Siberian shaman.

Central Asian Muslims experience the spirit-world in dreams and dream-visions called *ayan*, the Arabic and Sufic word for "personal illumination." It is sought at the shrines of the Muslim saints, and someone who has neglected his or her Muslim duties will often be reminded to do so in a dream. The individual's conversion often begins with *ayan*: he or she will begin saying the five daily prayers after dreaming of the ancestor spirits. Healers say that *ayan* helps them diagnose and cure illness. Fortune-tellers called *balger* in all the Central Asian languages (Persian *pal*, divination) can see into the future when their ancestor spirits give them *ayan*. Modern folk healers influenced by Russian parapsychology and so-called New Age religion draw on the *ayan* tradition: some claim to be heirs of the shamans, and others go to Turkey and Pakistan to study Islam, claiming to be Sufis when they return.

Religion and Ethnicity

That Muslim life in Central Asia survived the political turmoil of the twentieth century is due in no small part to religious memories sacralized by Islamic landscapes, the shrines of Sufi saints, and the cemeteries of Muslim ancestors. Except for elites influenced by Communism and now by Western secularism, the Central Asian peoples have a strong sense of their Muslimness. Their Turkic ancestors have been Muslims for centuries, so that they feel their ethnic identity as a Muslim identity, believing that their blood is Muslim. Soviet policy allowed Muslim ethnic groups to become nations in the modern sense even before the breakup of the Soviet Union. Ethnic and national consciousness understood in a Muslim way has given Central Asian Muslims a revived sense of their place in the Muslim world.

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ISLAM—INDONESIA Islam has made important contributions to nation-building and socioeconomic development in Indonesia. Since the dawn of Islam in the Indonesian archipelago in the seventh century, the ulama (religious scholars) have played a significant role in the integration of its many ethnic communities. Successions of Western rulers caused various Muslim communities to band together to resist and repel the infidels (*kafir*) who, it was believed, only came to exploit the archipelago's economic resources and erode local cultural and religious values. Having been exposed to the Western way of life, twentieth-century Indonesian Muslims were acquainted with the concept of modernism, with "modern" social structures, schools, and print media. Islam became a bonding force against the imperial system, spurring communities to set aside cultural differences and work toward a common goal. Muslim organizations became keenly concerned with sociocultural, economic, and political life.

Arrival and Propagation of Islam

Three successive processes led to the Islamization of the country: the arrival of Muslim traders who prop-

agated Islam (seventh to twelfth centuries CE), the integration of foreign settlers into local communities (eleventh to twelfth centuries), and the creation of states ruled by Muslim sultans (thirteenth to seventeenth centuries). The religious landscape into which Islam came was one of indigenous beliefs: Hindu-Buddhist religions. But Islam that came through Hindu-Buddhist areas had already adapted to specific circumstances before coming to the archipelago, notably between Islamic Sufism and Hindu-Buddhist Sufism. Islam that was brought by traders whose approach was Sufistic was more tolerant; that made Islam easily welcomed. Furthermore, local traditions were soon Islamized, and Islamic teachings were localized. This made Islam in Indonesia different from Islam in other parts of the world.

Islam in Opposition to Colonialism

Since Islam was introduced by Muslim traders in the archipelago, it has been the basis for cultural integration. Several factors facilitated this integration, primary among them being internal and international trade, the preaching of religious teachers, and the use of Malay as the common language. Wandering teachers guided local sultans in the teachings of Islam. Their writings were disseminated across the country, creating an Islamic culture in the archipelago.

Dutch colonialists, who arrived in the seventeenth century, were perceived as a threat to the authority of local rulers and also affected the intellectual activities of the ulama. Islamic resistance to foreign rule became unavoidable, particularly as urbanization took place. Dutch rule began to be perceived as imperialistic exploitation and as an attempt to forcibly Westernize the country. As a result, Muslims were determined to overthrow the Dutch government. The ulama, along with students from their network of traditional religious schools (*pesantren*), rose in support of this resistance. Peasant revolts broke out across the country. Local social associations were set up, including the Islamic Trade Association (Sarekat Dagang Islam, or SDI) in 1905, which became the Islamic Association (Sarekat Islam, or SI) in 1912, the first mass organization to participate in the indigenous economy and in the struggle for independence. In its anticolonialist activities, the SI was active at various levels. It campaigned against the suppression of Indonesians, and Islamic ideology became the foundation of its political struggle.

Muslims did not concentrate solely on politics, however. They were also concerned with social issues, primarily poverty and illiteracy. The "modernist" Muhammadiyah and "traditionalist" Nahdlatul Ulama



INDONESIA: THE LARGEST MUSLIM POPULATION OF ANY NATION

The Top Ten in 2000

Nation	Muslim Population	As a Percentage of the Population
Indonesia	201 million	88%
Pakistan	140 million	97%
India	123.5 million	12%
Bangladesh	108 million	83%
Turkey	65.8 million	99%
Egypt	65.4 million	94%
Nigeria	63.3 million	50%
Iran	58.8 million	89%
China	31.8 million	2.5%
Ethiopia	30.9 million	47%

Source: CIA *World Factbook* 2000.

(NU) were active in education and social development during their establishment in 1912 and 1926, respectively.

Furthermore, the unification of Indonesian communities as a result of the Dutch colonization provided new opportunities for solidarity among ethnic and Islamic groups that had different backgrounds and politics, and adhered to different approaches and strategies. At the time, during the last days of Japanese rule in 1945, Islamic political ideology could not provide a strong enough unifying focus, and secular nationalists eventually claimed the most powerful heroes and created the most powerful myths, pushing Muslim nationalists into the background.

As a result, Muslim nationalists experienced a crucial shift in their relationship with Japanese and Dutch rulers. From a position of subordination with the Dutch to one of favor with the Japanese, the secularist nationalists took over the leadership role. Both the secular and Muslim nationalists agreed to endorse the Pancasila ("Five Principles": belief in one God, humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy, and social justice) as the basis of the new state; the Muslims believed that Pancasila was based on Islamic law. Yet the Muslim nationalists soon realized that they were in fact marginalized, their factions fragmented, while secularists were in control of the government.

This became even clearer when the government used a divide-and-rule approach in dealing with Islamic



Muslims gather at the Indonesian parliament building in Jakarta on 10 April 2000 to offer their services in a jihad against Christians in Indonesia. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

factions. Sukarno (1901–1970), the first president of Indonesia, banned the Masyumi Party, the party of the Masyumi, a modern comprehensive confederation of Islamic organizations, in the belief that it supported Darul Islam, a movement for the establishment of an Islamic state, which continued in Aceh, West Java, and South Sulawesi. Instead, he created a new idea, Nasakom, which was meant to unite nationalists, Muslims, and Communists, an idea that was tolerated by the NU but not by Masyumi members. For the next two decades, the NU established its presence in the religious ministries and bureaucracy. After the 1965 alleged coup by Communists, the NU worked with Suharto (b. 1921) to expel not only Communists, but also other radical nationalists from the political arena. After Suharto replaced Sukarno as president in 1967, the NU was amalgamated with the Development Union Party (PPP), which Suharto controlled.

During the Suharto presidency, Islamic parties, as opposed to sociocultural Islamic organizations, remained marginalized. In particular, Suharto's economic modernization of the nation created discontent among Muslims, who were wary of the possible negative effects on the community. Suharto made Pancasila mandatory for all parties, thus preventing the revival of Islamic parties because no parties were allowed to be founded on religion, including Islam. Although the NU was the first to accept, it broke away from the PPP, renounced politics, and returned to its original mission as a socioreligious organization.

In 1990, Muslims established the All-Indonesian Association for Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI). Wanting to return to the center of power, intellectuals gathered in Malang, East Java, and appointed Bacharuddin Habibie (b. 1936), a figure close to Suharto, as presi-

dent of the association. Cooperation with Suharto served the purposes of the Muslims, but Suharto's power had dwindled. After Suharto's dramatic fall from power, Habibie became president in 1998 and implemented democratic measures on behalf of the Muslim majority. He established a multiparty system, and several Islamic parties emerged, including the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, or PKB), which was founded by Abdurrahman Wahid (b.1940), leader of the NU. However, because of his closeness to Suharto and probably his non-Javanese origin, Habibie lost the 1999 presidential elections, which went to Wahid. Wahid remained in power until 23 July 2001, when the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), the highest legislature of the nation, impeached him, and his vice president, Megawati Sukarnoputri (b. 1947), from a secularist group, was elected president by members of the MPR in its special session.

To what extent the government under Megawati will address the aspirations of the Muslim majority remains to be seen. The rivalry between the secularists and the Muslims is ongoing, and Islam continues to be a decisive factor in Indonesian politics. Having contributed to the evolution of modern Indonesia, Islam remains an important actor in the social and cultural identity of the nation.

Andi Faisal Bakti

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ISLAM—MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA

Aside from Myanmar (Burma), three countries of mainland Southeast Asia have significant Muslim populations: Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

Thailand

Thailand, a country with approximately 62 million citizens, of whom 95 percent profess Theravada Bud-



THE INTERPLAY OF ISLAM AND BUDDHISM IN THAILAND

Islam is a minority religion in mainland Southeast Asia and in many communities Muslims must live alongside Buddhists, the majority religion in Thailand. The following extract pertaining to the village of Bang Chan in Central Thailand shows how the two groups differ in their spiritual approach to water.

As a symbol of water for crops, Mother Water is taken seriously by both Muslims and Buddhists, though more so by Buddhists. As a symbol of physical and ritual purity, however, Mother Water is relevant only to the Buddhists. The reason, clearly, is that the Muslims have their own, more elaborate, system of purification through ritual bathing, and this system is well integrated into their daily ritual life. Village Islam thus has, as it were, no "need" for the purificational aspect of Mother Water. This is but one more illustration of the generalization that in all instances where Islam has taken a clear doctrinal or ritual stand on some issue, syncretism with other types of belief or ritual is likely to be at a minimum. The generalization does not hold nearly so strongly in the case of Buddhism, though perhaps a better formulation would be that Buddhism less often takes a "clear" stand on an issue. Another way of stating this difference at the general level is simply to say that Islam is more "compulsive" than Buddhism.

Source: Robert B. Textor. (1973) *Roster of the Gods: An Ethnography of the Supernatural in a Thai Village*. New Haven, CT: HRAFLEX Books, 835.

dhism, has a population of about 4 million Muslims. The Muslims in Thailand make up two broad self-defined categories: Malay Muslims, who speak the Malay language and reside primarily in southern Thailand in a number of provinces bordering on Malaysia, and those who call themselves Thai Muslims and who reside in central and northern Thailand.

The majority of the Muslims in Thailand live in south Thailand. Prior to the nineteenth century, these southern Malay Islamic regions were informal tributary states tied to Thai monarchical authorities. After the nineteenth century, the Thai state began to take direct administrative control over these southern areas. The four southern provinces of Patani, Narathiwat, Satul, and Yala bordering Malaysia contain over 3 million Muslims. As in the other areas of the Malayan-Indonesia region, the form of Islam that took hold was based on the Sunni-Shafii tradition. However, since the time of its arrival, Islam has coexisted with earlier Hindu-Buddhist-animistic spiritual beliefs

and practices. In addition, both Shi'a and Sufi elements influenced local forms of the belief system in this area.

Various Thai military governments from the 1930s through the 1970s adopted assimilationist policies toward these Malay Muslim regions through "development" or socioeconomic and education programs. However, these assimilationist policies were perceived by the Muslims as Buddhist-based attempts to subvert Islamic education and political, religious, and cultural ideals. Subsequently, a number of Islamic-based factions emerged during the 1960s and 1970s in southern Thailand and became engaged in separatist activities. These insurgency movements resulted in repressive military campaigns by the Thai government. Although there have been sporadic skirmishes in the recent past, since the 1990s the Malay Muslim communities of southern Thailand have largely turned away from extremist separatist movements, though they still want to preserve their "Malayness" and Islamic identity.

Because of historical and cultural conditions, the experience of Muslims in central and northern Thailand has been much different from that of the Malay Muslims to the south. Altogether there are approximately a half-million Muslims in central and northern Thailand. Historically, these Muslims of the central and northern corridors of Thailand have migrated, either voluntarily or by force, into these regions, bringing distinctive ethnic, social, and religious conventions. Thus, these Muslim communities are much more heterogeneous than the Muslims of the south. And unlike the Islamic population in the south, these Muslims are ethnic and religious minorities residing in the centers of a predominantly Thai Buddhist cultural environment.

By far the largest group of Muslims in central Thailand, especially in the capital city of Bangkok, are descendants of peoples from the southern provinces of Thailand and parts of Malaysia. As part of the assimilationist campaigns, the Thai government relocated Malay Muslims to central Thailand. Other communities of Muslims in central Thailand, including Chams, Indonesians, and Iranians, have a long-term history that extends back into the Ayutthayan period (1351–1767). Muslims from India, present-day Pakistan, and Bangladesh, and a small number of Arabs have also settled in the Bangkok area. In North Thailand, most of the Muslims came from the Islamicized portion of China, though there are also smaller numbers of Malay and South Asian Muslim migrants.

Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos

The Muslim population and settlements in Cambodia and Vietnam are intimately related to the historical development of what was known as the Champa kingdom in mainland Southeast Asia. The kingdom of Champa lasted from the second to the seventeenth century CE and extended over the central and southern coastal regions of Vietnam. Persian and Arab Muslims traveled to Champa bringing both Shi'a and Sunni traditions to the areas. Islam began to diffuse into the Champa region during the eighth or ninth century. Most of the Cham population converted to Islam and were ruled by Muslim religious and political officials. Following its defeat by Vietnam in 1471, Champa was gradually absorbed into the Vietnam state.

The Cham Muslims of Vietnam adopted many cultural features of the Vietnamese including housing style, clothing, lunar calendar, and the Sinitic twelve-animal cycle of years.

Traditionally, the Chams of Vietnam were involved in cultivating crops such as sugarcane, maize, bananas, coconut trees, beans, and various types of chili peppers.

Unlike their patrilineal Vietnamese Buddhist neighbors, the Chams maintained matrilineal groups that were embedded within matriclans with totem-like symbols associated with the particular clan. The Cham Islamic tradition maintained in Vietnam was based on the Shi'a tradition. Along with the Shi'a tradition, other indigenous elements of animism and Hindu and Buddhist beliefs and practices were apparent among the Chams.

Continual Vietnamese state pressures for assimilation of these Muslims resulted in a considerable number of Cham refugees moving to Cambodia, establishing permanent communities in about seventy villages along or near the banks of the Mekong and Sap Rivers. By 1975, the population of Chams in Cambodia had grown to 250,000. Traditionally most of the Cambodian Cham practiced small-scale family fishing on the various rivers. They were well known for excellent construction of boats for use along the rivers, lakes, and canals in the region. The Cham refugees that settled in Cambodia maintained a very different form of the Islamic tradition from their Vietnamese counterparts. As these Cambodian Cham had had more contact with the main currents of Islam in Malaysia and Indonesian society, they gradually moved from a Shi'a to a Sunni-Shafii form of Islam. They were also influenced by Sufism as well as by Sufistic, animistic, and Hindu-Buddhist religious elements. Sufistic traditions such as saint worship and praying at the tombs of Islamic saints were imported from Malaysian Islamic precepts and practices.

As a result of French colonialism and the war in Southeast Asia, the Chams of Cambodia and Vietnam began to develop their own ethnonationalist movements. Chams began to view their ethnic and religious cultural traditions as different not only from those of Europeans and Americans but from those of Vietnamese and Cambodians as well. These ethnonationalist movements resulted in tragic episodes for the Chams. Following the victories of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and Ho Chi Minh's regime in Vietnam, the Chams were relentlessly persecuted. Active genocidal policies were directed at the Cham Muslims by the Khmer Rouge, and some 90,000 Chams were executed by the Pol Pot regime. In Vietnam, the Cham Muslims have been subjected to intensive assimilation pressures directed by state authorities.

A small community of Muslims from India and other areas of South Asia has established a mosque in the center of Vientiane, Laos. This Muslim community has intermarried with the Laotian community.

Various reformist and mild forms of Islamic fundamentalism known as *da wab* (religious awakening)

movements have influenced the Muslim populace of Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. In Southeast Asia, these current Islamic trends correspond with the global impact of new forms of media, including increases in print journalism, television, and general improvements in literacy, especially within urban centers. Some Muslims from Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam have traveled to the Middle East for work or to participate in the hajj (the pilgrimage to Mecca that every Muslim is enjoined to undertake). They have become familiar with recent Islamic theology and political thought and have introduced these ideas into Southeast Asia. In the *da'wah* movements in Southeast Asia, Muslims are called on to devote their lives to improving the social welfare of Muslims. They promote the revitalization of Islamic cultural and religious values and sponsor a variety of community-based social programs.

Raymond Scupin

See also: **Islam—Myanmar; Rohingya**

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ISLAM—MALAYSIA Islam is the official religion of Malaysia and the professed faith of half its population. Islam has played a significant role in the political and social development of Malaysia.

However, Malaysia has many ethnic cultures (Malays, Chinese, and Indians) and religious communities (Muslims, Buddhists, Confucianists, Hindus, and others). Ethnicity is often defined by religion; for example, Malays are generally considered to be Muslims. This distinction is reinforced by the constitution,

which states that Malays who forsake Islam automatically forfeit their status as Malays. Conversely, non-Malays who embrace Islam can qualify for citizenship. The upholding of Islam as the official Malay identity defines the key role the religion has come to play in every sphere of Malaysian life, in its cultural definition, economy, and politics.

Islam in Early Malay History

Islam has been a part of Malaysian history from the days of the Melaka sultanate (1400–1511). It was integrated into local culture in three major phases: the coming of Muslim traders (seventh–tenth centuries), the settlement and integration of these traders (eleventh–twelfth centuries), and the establishment of the Malay Islamic States (thirteenth–seventeenth centuries until the present).

Networks of Islamic organizations active in the peninsula began inspiring anticolonial feelings in the population. The area remained under British rule until the late nineteenth century, and the British rulers were perceived as infidels. The ulama (religious scholars) and their followers saw British representatives as agents sent to promote Christian evangelism. To prevent this domination of Malays, an Islamic identity was actively promoted. The creation of traditional religious schools (*pondoks* or *madrasabs*) was encouraged to teach the Islamic way of life. After World War II, the people of the Malayan Union strongly rejected the political entity that colonial rulers had established. The Islamic identity further brought a bonding of community leaders, which became crucial in mobilizing people against the British.

Islam's Role in Malay Independence

With the return of fresh graduates from Islamic reformist schools in the Middle East, the pace of mobilization accelerated. The issues of political independence, economic prosperity, and education were championed and disseminated in schools and the media. The first popular journal was *Al-Imam* (the Leader), initially established in Singapore in 1906 and then in Penang. Published by a reformist group later known as the Young Group (Kaum Muda), it promoted *ijtihad* (religious reasoning) and rejected religious *takhyul* (myths), *taqlid* (blind imitations), *bid'ah* (unlawful religious innovations), and *khurafat* (superstition), practices accommodated by the Old Group (Kaum Tua). The Young Group accused non-Muslim communities in urban areas of monopolizing economic resources. These reformists promoted Malay Islamic nationalism but were eventually marginalized, especially during the Japanese occupation in the Second



ISLAM IN THE MALAYSIA CONSTITUTION

The constitution of Malaysia establishes Islam as the official religion but also protects the religious freedom for all citizens.

The Constitution of Malaysia, Article number: 3

(1) Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other religions may be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation.

(2) In every State other than States not having a Ruler the position of the Ruler as the Head of the religion of Islam in his State in the manner and to the extent acknowledged and declared by the Constitution, all rights, privileges, prerogatives and powers enjoyed by him as Head of that religion, are unaffected and unimpaired; but in any acts, observance or ceremonies with respect to which the Conference of Rulers has agreed that they should extend to the Federation as a whole each of the other Rulers shall in his capacity of Head of the religion of Islam authorize the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to represent him.

(3) The Constitution of the States of Malacca, Penang, Sabah and Sarawak shall each make provision for conferring on the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall be Head of the religion of Islam in that State.

(4) Nothing in this Article derogates from any other provision of this Constitution.

(5) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall be the Head of the religion of Islam in the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur and Labuan; and for this purpose Parliament may by law make provisions for regulating Islamic religious affairs and for constituting a Council to advise the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in matters relating to the religion of Islam.

Source: International Association of Constitutional Law. Retrieved 27 February, 2002, from: www.eur.nl/frg/iacl.

World War, when both elitist and traditionalist groups suppressed them.

This discrimination was evident from the fact that when radical nationalists established the United Malays Nationalist Organization (UMNO) in 1946, and the Islamic nationalists established the Hizbul Muslimin party in 1948, the latter was banned while the former was not. The Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (Partai Islam Se-Malaysia—PAS) was created within UMNO as a defection of the ulama faction in 1951 and was recognized as a political party four years later. The idea of an independent Islamic state resurfaced, but the British rejected the notion and instead set up the independent Federation of Malaya in 1957. Al-

though Islam and Malay customs were guaranteed under the constitution, the new prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman (1903–1990), acceded to British preferences for a secular government. The PAS and other Islamic Malay groups protested against this government, and riots broke out on 13 May 1969. Five years later, the PAS forged a coalition with the government—Barisan Nasional (National Front). The government established an Islamic center within the prime minister's office as part of Islamic religious affairs.

Islamization in Malaysia


Islam has a defining role in the political system of Malaysia, at both local and national levels. The adop-

tion of the Islamic system of administration and government gave the religion an intrinsic role in all aspects of life. The government took measures toward Islamization, promoting Islamic principles in broadcasting and the print media and in public life in general. The use of Islamic references and names of former states suppressed during the colonial period was reinstated.

However, these measures were perceived as token formalities rather than a genuine attempt to practice Islamic values and teachings. Some attempts at Islamization were overzealous and merely stressed the symbolic aspect of faith. As a result, so-called Islamic organizations mushroomed professing Sufi or otherwise spiritual traditions, and *dakwah/tabligh* (propagation) movements, youth associations, and political parties arose. The Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia—ABIM), for example, works to remove misconceptions about Islam. The Islamic Republic group, along with PAS, declares the goal of establishing an Islamic state willing to channel the aspirations of Muslims and non-Muslims. Darul Arqam (the House of Arqam, in reference to one of the prophet Muhammad's companions), a controversial movement later banned by the government, made significant efforts in community-based development, which the government perceived as a potential political threat. Jamaah Tabligh (an Islamic propagation group) is more concerned with Islamic missionary work among Muslim communities: members of the group encourage piety and abide by the traditions of the prophet Muhammad.

In 1977, the PAS was forced out of the National Front coalition because of its public demand for an Islamic state and implementation of the Islamic law (*shari'a*). The PAS accused the government of insincerity in its Islamization initiatives. In 1982, Anwar Ibrahim (b. 1947), the former leader of ABIM, joined UMNO and attempted, with the support of the prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad (b. 1925), to implement Islamic principles within the administration. This heralded a new chapter in Malaysian history, with the Islamization of the administration, education system, legal system, and financial institutions. Through this policy of Islamization, Mahathir not only demonstrated his anti-Israel and pro-Palestinian feelings in his foreign policy, but was also critical of the West.

Anwar called for a stringent incorporation of Islamic ideas in the administration of the country and stressed the importance of responding to social demands. The Malaysian Reform Group (Jamaah Islam Malaysia), Darul Arqam, and ABIM also championed Islamic community development as well as people's economic wel-



The Blue and White Mosque in Shah Aslam, Selangor State, Malaysia, in 1992. (BOB KRIST/CORBIS)

fare, particularly in the fields of basic needs and education. This approach was different from that of Mahathir, who was more concerned with large-scale development projects. Islamic leaders and scholars believed that such projects were detrimental to the Muslim community, fostering bureaucratic corruption, collusion, and nepotism and endangering the environment.

The concerns of various Muslim communities have also been stressed by the Jamaah Tabligh within the *dakwah* movement during the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia that began in the 1970s. Although this group does not operate as an organization per se and is not affiliated with any political party, it has followers in urban and rural areas, inside and outside Malaysia. All followers are required to travel from mosque to mosque, from home to home, in Malaysia and overseas and give informal talks encouraging worship and a return to the holy scriptures.

The approach of Malay (and Malaysian) society to community development in the last quarter of the

twentieth century is rooted in both religious and secular ideas. While UMNO has been struggling for Malay Muslims, religious groups portray the former as narrow-minded, secular, even infidel. As a result, UMNO publicly addresses Islamic issues and portrays religious groups as fundamentalists, extremists, and fanatics. Both groups now attempt to approach Muslims and non-Muslims. The *dakwah* movement has been active in universities, where a significant proportion of faculty members belong to the movement, and it is attracting youngsters on and off campus.

During the 1990s and particularly during the 1997 economic crises in the region, the frustration over corruption, collusion, and nepotism intensified. The direct criticism of Mahathir's economic policy resulted in the sacking of Anwar from his position as deputy prime minister and minister of finance in September 1998. Although he denied all accusations, Anwar was charged, tried, and found guilty and imprisoned on charges of corruption, abuse of power, and immoral conduct.

The issue of Anwar Ibrahim has split the population along political lines—those who believe Anwar is a victim of a conspiracy, and those who support Mahathir. The former's supporters established a new coalition and a new party: the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan). This was founded by Dr. Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, Anwar's spouse, and is a coalition of reform and opposition parties, including the PAS. In 1999, Mahathir's party won the hastily arranged elections.

Future Prospects

The struggle between the Islamic and secular groups clouds the future of the country and threatens the fabric of Malaysian society. However, the importance of implementing Islamic values in government is a key factor in reaching an agreement. The reinterpretation of *shari'a* and redefinition of the concept of an Islamic state could lead the way to a healthy relationship and peace in the country.

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ISLAM—MONGOLIA Traces of Islamic culture are to be found throughout Mongolia, and Mongolians of Turkic and Muslim origin are also concentrated in Xinjiang (China) and Kazakhstan to the west and south of Mongolia. Although it is now a minority religion in Mongolia, Islam has been practiced there since at least the tenth century.

Historical Context

Although the Mongols emerged historically as a distinct group only about 1080 CE, Islam appeared in Central Asia little more than a century after the Revelation to the Prophet Muhammad, 622 CE. The Battle of Talas (751 CE) established Arab, and hence Islamic, dominance of the area south of the Syr Dar'ya (known to the Greeks as the Jaxartes River). North and east of the river, in the central Siberian steppe (present-day north Kazakhstan, south Siberia, and parts of Mongolia), lived various nomadic groups speaking Altaic languages, related to modern Mongolian and Turkish, and professing Nestorian Christianity, Manichaeism, or shamanism. The largest of these groups, the Uighurs, adopted Manichaeism as a religion in 750 CE.

The Central Asian Samanid dynasty (864–999), based in Bukhara, established Sunni Islam as the re-

gion's dominant religion, although the area remained religiously mixed, with Muslims a minority in the population of Christians, Jews, Manichaeans, and Buddhists. The Samanids attempted to spread Islam, and with it their political power, among the Christian and shamanist Turks and Mongols in the steppe. Despite this, however, and despite the strong trade links that existed between the steppe and Central Asia, Islam made little headway east of the Altay and Tian Shan Mountains, which today separate Kazakhstan from Mongolia and China. In contrast, successive waves of Turko-Mongolian peoples spread west. In 1211, Kuchlug, head of the Mongol Naiman tribe, conquered the Samanid state in Central Asia and instituted attacks on Islam.

Mongolian power reached its height under the leadership of Genghis Khan (1167–1227), who took Bukhara in 1220. Genghis Khan's conquests in China resulted in the introduction of Buddhism into the steppe, adding to the religious mix. He also initiated the custom of inviting men of all faiths to his capital of Karakorum (now in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region of China) to debate religious affairs. The purpose of this appears to have been to establish a common religious "glue" by which the various peoples of the empire could be bound together.

Genghis Khan's empire was divided after his death between his sons. In the west, where Islam was long established as the religion of both governance and learning, the so-called Golden Horde was converted to Islam under Genghis Khan's grandson, Berke (1206–1267). Later Central Asian rulers such as Timur (Tamerlane, 1336–1405) were expected to be Muslim and to be descended from Genghis Khan. In the east, where Genghis Khan was succeeded first by his son Ogodei (1185–1241), then by a grandson, Guyuk (1206–1248), and from 1248 by a second grandson, Mongke (1209–1258), the religious situation was more fluid. We know from William of Rubruk, a Western traveler to the region, that in 1253 there were two mosques in Karakorum.

On 30 May 1254, Mongke initiated a debate between a Christian (William of Rubruk), a Muslim, and a Buddhist. The aim was to establish a state religion binding the Mongolian people together. This was followed by a debate in 1255 between Buddhists and Taoists. In 1256, Mongke adopted Mahayana (Tibetan) Buddhism as the religion of the Mongolian people, although Islam survived there for some time longer. As late as 1447, the ambassador of the Oirat Mongols to the Chinese Ming court was named Muhammad.

The successors of Khubilai Khan (1215–1294) gave the leader of Mahayana Buddhism the title Dalai Lama

(most high priest). From this time on, Mongolian identity and culture were inextricably linked with Buddhism.

Adoption by Kazakhs

Islam exists in Mongolia today because of the country's Kazakh minority, which is concentrated in the west of the country. People of this minority arrived as nomads in the west of Mongolia in the 1860s in response to Russia's advance into their traditional grazing areas. Whereas the Mongolian peoples came to identify with Buddhism, Turkic peoples such as the Kazakhs adopted Islam. The process was gradual, lasting one hundred years and ending with the complete conversion of the Kazakhs during the eighteenth century. The Kazakhs' nomadic pastoral way of life had much in common with the life of the Mongols. Some people have linked the name "Kazakh" to "Cossack" (Russian *kazakh*), meaning a people beyond the bounds of urban society.

It was Sufi missionary activity from the shrine town of Yasi (in Turkistan in present-day south Kazakhstan) that brought Islam to the Kazakhs in the eighteenth century. Although Islam came late to the Kazakhs, being Muslim is important to the Kazakhs, as it distinguishes them from Buddhist Mongols, or Buriyats, and from Christian Russians and aligns them with Muslim Tatars, Uighurs, and Uzbeks. The British missionary Henry Lansdell, writing in the 1880s, noted that Kazakhs were not overly religious unless it was suggested that they were other than Muslim, at which time they became very defensive of their Muslim identity.

The exact number of Muslim Kazakhs in Mongolia is impossible to state. This is in part due to the traditionally nomadic lifestyle of these people, who prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) crossed the borders separating the Soviet Union, China, and Mongolia in response to political changes in each country. A major emigration from the Soviet Union occurred during the 1920s, and other Kazakhs came from China after China recognized Mongolian independence in 1946 and during China's Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). There also were reverse trends as the political situation in China and the Soviet Union became more favorable. It is estimated that in 1989 there were 120,500 Kazakhs resident in Mongolia, accounting for 5.9 percent of the population. Another 1989 estimate gave a Mongolian Kazakh population of 130,000, of whom 10,000 lived in the capital, Ulaanbaatar. Since 1991 the government of Kazakhstan has encouraged a "return" of the Kazakh diaspora. Perhaps 60,000 Kazakhs had left Mongolia for Kazakhstan by 1994.

Kazakhs are concentrated in the western Bayan-Olgii province bordering the Altay and Tuva Republics

of Russia, where they form around 95 percent of the population, and in the Ili-Kazakh Autonomous Province in Xinjiang (China), where they form up to 75 percent of the population.

Muslims in Mongolia suffered from religious persecution during the 1930s, but there was relatively less to destroy than was the case for Buddhists. Kazakh Islam has always been of a less formal nature than has Islam in other areas. Although all mosques were destroyed in the persecution, no more than four (one in Ulaanbaatar) existed initially. Other Muslim institutions, such as *madrasabs* (law and theology colleges), were absent (traditionally in Kazakh society, Hadith, or customary law, took precedence over *shari'ā*, or religious law). Owning a copy of the Qur'an was forbidden, but very few Kazakhs did own one. It has been estimated that at the beginning of the twentieth century, no more than one in two hundred Kazakhs could read, and traditionally the Qur'an had more the status of a talisman used for divination than of a sacred text.

Post-Communist Resurgence

It has often been said that Mongolia under Communism became one of the most completely nonreligious societies on earth. Certainly, knowledge of the formal teachings of any religion was at a very low ebb. Kazakh Islam in Mongolia had however always existed at a level of folk practice rather than formal theology. Traditional Siberian practices such as divination by means of reading horses' bones, bride-price (or to avoid bride-price, *kalym*, ritual abduction), and the role of female divines in folk medicine, which were all associated with Islam, continued.

Since the end of one-party rule in Mongolia, formal Muslim life has experienced a resurgence. In 1990 the Mongolian Muslim Society was founded in Ulaanbaatar under the leadership of the Moscow-educated former Mongolian ambassador to China, Hajji Hadiryn Sayraan. A few Mongolian Kazakhs have made pilgrimages to Mecca, at least two mosques (in Ulaanbaatar and Olgiy) have opened, and Islamic literature has entered the country from India, Pakistan, and Turkey. There has been some political agitation for guaranteed Kazakh representation at the high government level, but this is not coupled with any Islamic ideology.

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ISLAM—MYANMAR When Myanmar (Burma) became part of British India, it had possessed a Muslim community since the beginning of the early modern period (from the fourteenth century), introduced by Muslim Chinese into northeastern Myanmar and by Muslim traders from Southwest Asia and India into Arakan and Lower Myanmar. Myanmar's Muslim population remained relatively small, however, until the establishment of British rule in the nineteenth century. Increased trade and the immigration of Muslim Indian laborers into Lower Myanmar and Muslim Bengali agriculturalists into Arakan to service the growing colonial economy encouraged a rapid growth in the Muslim population, indicated partly by large mosques that were built in Myanmar's major town-ports, including Sittwe (Akyab) and Yangon (Rangoon).

The Muslims of Myanmar are divided into three groups. The first group consists of the Rohingyas, the Bengali-speaking Muslim minority of Arakan state. This group has often been forced to flee to Bangladesh, the Middle East, and Malaysia because of communal violence between Muslim and Buddhist agriculturalists and hostile government policies (many Muslims of Arakan state have been defined as foreigners by the government and thus denied citizenship).

The second group consists of mainly Urdu-speaking Muslims who are descendants of Indian immigrants of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Indian Muslims tend to be strict in their observance of Orthodox Islam. Prior to 1962, this group was the most powerful of the three Muslim groups of Myanmar. They are concentrated in the Irrawaddy Valley and Yangon, the capital of both colonial and independent Myanmar, and are close to Myanmar's chief economic and political centers. After 1962, however, many Indian Muslims joined in the general Indian exodus from Myanmar that had begun in 1948.

The third group consists of Myanmar Muslims of various Burmese ethnic groups, heavily represented in Mandalay and Upper Myanmar. These Muslims share many cultural practices with Buddhists in Myanmar. Myanmar Muslim women expect equal treatment to men, reflecting the relative independence of women in Southeast Asian societies compared with many



A refugee camp in Cox's Bazaar, Bangladesh, which houses Muslims who have fled persecution across the border in Myanmar. (LIBA TAYLOR/CORBIS)

other Asian societies (and with Muslim societies in general). *Purdah*, the custom of keeping women's faces covered, is not generally practiced. Myanmar Muslim men are also monogamous, a custom that differs from other Muslim societies. Most significantly, Muslims in Myanmar adopted certain rituals involved in *nat* (spirit) propitiation. Some religious sites in Myanmar are held in reverence by both Muslims and Buddhists, for example, the famous Buddhmokan near Sittwe (Akyab) in Arakan.

Michael Walter Charney

See also: **Bangladesh—History; Bengali Language; Buddhism, Theravada—Southeast Asia; Hindi-Urdu; India-Myanmar Relations; Malaysia—History; Myanmar—Human Rights; Spirit Cult**

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ISLAM—PHILIPPINES Muslim Filipinos (or as many prefer to be called, Philippine Muslims) represent about 4.5 percent of the Philippines population. They are concentrated in the islands of the Sulu archipelago,

western and central Mindanao, and southern Palawan, and include some thirteen ethnolinguistic groups, though four of these—Maguindanao, Maranao-Ilanun, Tausug, and Samal—account for over 90 percent of the Muslim population. As in most of Southeast Asia, they are Sunni Muslims.

Origins of Islam in the Philippines

Islam came to the Philippines in the thirteenth century, and by the middle of the fourteenth century there were settlements of Muslim Indian, Malay, and probably Arab traders and missionaries in Mindanao and Sulu and extensive commercial relations with the Islamic world to the west. The first to embrace Islam were the Tausug of the Sulu archipelago, and by the mid-fifteenth century a Sulu sultanate had been established at Buansa (Jolo) under Sultan Abu Bakr. At its peak, the Sulu sultanate extended from Basilan north to Palawan, east to the coast of Mindanao, and west to Borneo. Jolo was the center of a trading network that stretched west to Java and north to China.

In the sixteenth century, Sharif Muhammad Kabungswan arrived from Johore and established himself in the Cotabato area of southern Mindanao, providing the foundation for the Maguindanao sultanate. From the Maguindanao-Ilanun area, Islam expanded along the coast from northern Mindanao to the Gulf of Davao and inland to Lake Lanao and



Three Muslim women of Basilan Island attend Friday prayer in June 2001. (AFP/CORBIS)

Bukidnon. Also in the sixteenth century, Islam spread from Brunei to the islands of Mindoro and southern Luzon. The Philippines thus became part of the *dar-al-Islam* (international community ["household"] of Islam) in Asia.

Philippine Muslims and Colonial Forces

When the Spaniards arrived in the Philippines in 1565, they immediately came into conflict with the Moros ("Moors" or Muslims), beginning a bitter struggle for religious and commercial control in the Philippine islands that continued over some 350 years. Assisted by converted Christian *indios* (native Filipinos), the Spaniards reversed the expansion of Islam, vanquishing the Muslims from Luzon and the Visaya Islands, but they never gained effective sovereignty over Mindanao and Sulu.

When the United States took over control of the Philippines in 1898, the Moros continued to resist the foreign intrusion until a major military defeat in 1913.

Subsequently, administration of Mindanao and Sulu passed from the U.S. Army to civilian authorities. Governance of Philippine Muslims initially came under the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. Under a "policy of attraction," the U.S. administration increased expenditures on infrastructure in Muslim areas and provided scholarships for Muslims to study in Manila and the United States. Many Muslims, however, saw this as an attempt to assimilate the Moros into mainstream, predominantly Christian, Filipino society, and there were intermittent outbreaks of armed resistance. In 1946, the Philippines became independent, but there was no independence constitution, and policies essentially followed those of the Philippine Commonwealth established under U.S. rule in 1935.

Muslim Separatism

By the 1950s, increasing migration to Mindanao and consequent competition for land and political influence, combined with an Islamic resurgence reflected among other things in the proliferation of mosques and *madaris* (or *madrasabs*; Islamic schools), had brought new tensions in relations between Muslim and Christian communities. These tensions escalated during the 1960s, and in 1969 a Muslim independence movement was established. By the early 1970s, Muslim Mindanao and Sulu were in a state of armed insurgency, spearheaded by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). This group, which demanded a separate Islamic state, or Bangsa Moro (Moro nation), received financial, logistical, and diplomatic support from the international Islamic community and was granted observer status with the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The Marcos government made a number of concessions to Moro demands in the 1970s, including the codification of *shari'a* (Islamic law) for use in specific areas of jurisdiction in Muslim regions, the proclamation of Muslim holidays (proclaimed nationally but generally recognized only in Muslim areas), the revival of the historic barter trade between Malaysia and Muslim Mindanao, and the establishment of the Philippines Amanah Bank, which employed Islamic banking principles. With the signing of the Tripoli Agreement between the MNLF and the Philippine government in 1976, autonomous regions were created in western and central Mindanao and Sulu. Following the People Power Revolution of 1986, the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was established, though the MNLF refused to participate in the election that set it up. An Office of Muslim Affairs was also established within the Office of the President.

The Moro insurgency has continued, albeit on a reduced scale, since the 1970s; however, in 1996 a peace agreement signed between the MNLF and the Philippine government created a Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) in the fourteen provinces claimed for the Bangsa Moro by the MNLF and provided for a Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) with limited powers of administration in the SZOPAD. The SPCPD was to be assisted by a *Darul Iftab* (religious advisory council). The OIC, which had helped bring about the 1996 agreement, was given a specific role in supporting its implementation and helping monitor the peace process. The 1996 agreement also provided for the drafting of legislation for an expanded ARMM, to be submitted to a referendum. In August 2001, the referendum was finally held, but of the fifteen provinces and fourteen cities covered by the agreement only one province and one city voted to join the four existing provinces in the ARMM. After this, the ARMM and MNLF chairman, Nur Misuari, lost office and briefly attempted to revive the armed struggle. He was arrested in Malaysia.

Two other Muslim groups—the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which is a 1977 breakaway from the MNLF, and Abu Sayyaf, a group that has been heavily involved in kidnapping for ransom—have meanwhile continued the armed struggle for an Islamic Bangsa Moro. In 2002, peace negotiations with the MILF continued. The Ulama League of the Philippines has supported the peace process.

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ISLAM—SOUTH ASIA South Asia is home to more than 360 million Muslims, more than a third of the world's total. The majority of the populations of Pakistan and Bangladesh are Muslim (98 and 87 percent, respectively), as are 12 percent of Indians, almost all Maldivians, and tiny fractions of Sri Lankans and Nepalese.

The first Muslims to set foot in the subcontinent were Arab invaders who conquered parts of Sind and southern Punjab in 711. The Islamization process started with the establishment of the Delhi sultanate (1192–1526), a series of Turco-Afghan Muslim dynasties in Delhi. But the invaders-turned-rulers did not come to spread Islam, nor did they represent Islam's high culture. They came at the end of what was once the magnificent Abbasid caliphate (749/750–1258). The sultanate, theoretically subordinate to the Abbasids, proclaimed itself the protector and patron of Islam after the destruction of the Baghdad-based caliphate in 1258.

The Mughal dynasty (1526–1857), theoretically more secular and Indianized than the preceding sultanate, nevertheless named Muslim theologians to high government positions. Most of these rulers never identified themselves with India, despising its climate, religion, and people. But unlike Islam in Iran and the Ottoman empire (1453–1922), Indian Islam was saved from bureaucratization and state control by Indian pluralism. Most importantly, Islam came to India when the latter already possessed a developed civilization with well-structured peasant and village communities, urbanization, organized religions, and sociopolitical systems. Today, South Asia has all the principal varieties of Islam: scholasticism, Sufism (Islamic mysticism), scholastic-Sufi synthesis, Islamic modernism, and reformist or militant Islam. An appraisal of all the varieties is essential for an understanding of South Asian Islam.

Sufis and Settlers

Although the bulk of Central Asian and Iranian warriors, Sufis, and fortune-seekers settled in northwestern India and elsewhere in the region, most South Asian Muslims are descendants of local converts. Persianized Turco-Afghans and Mughals constituted the bulk of the nobility and aristocracy (*ashraf*), enjoying the lion's share of the state patronage during the Muslim rule. They not only alienated themselves from the popular culture and local traditions of the subcontinent; they also despised Hindus and the indigenous Muslims (*atraf*) as inferior. But the *ashraf* classes did not play the most decisive role in the Islamizing process. Had it been so, Delhi, Agra, and the adjoining districts in the core areas of Muslim rule would have Muslim majorities. It is interesting that peripheral eastern Bengal (Bangladesh) and western Punjab, Sind, North-Western Frontier, and Baluchistan (modern Pakistan), on the average, are more than 90 percent Muslim. During the thirteenth through sixteenth centuries, Sufis converted large sections of pre-agrar-



Muslims outside Dhaka's Baitul Mukarram National Mosque donate money to help flood victims in October 2000. (AFP/CORBIS)

ian nomads and tribal people, as yet not integrated into the Hindu community, in the areas of present-day Bangladesh and Pakistan. The Islamization process accelerated in the sixteenth century, especially in eastern Bengal, due to the state patronage of Sufis who brought the Qur'an and the plow, creating a large number of peasant adherents of Islam. It is noteworthy that Muslim masses throughout the subcontinent still nourish the culture of saint-veneration, paying homage to Sufis and their tombs.

The High Culture of Islam

Muslim rulers, elite, scholars, artisans, and artists brought elements of art and architecture, music and literature, food and attire, perfumes and jewelry, philosophy, and high culture from central Asia and Iran, including Sunni Islam and various mystic Sufi methods of meditation and prayer (*tariqas*). The Qutb Minar and Red Fort at Delhi, Agra Fort, Taj Mahal at Agra, and hundreds of beautiful buildings—mosques, palaces, tombs, and shrines—may be cited in this re-

gard. The synthesis of Indian and Middle Eastern and Central Asian philosophy, literature, art, architecture, music, and painting gave a unique Indo-Islamic character to almost every branch of human endeavor and knowledge. Islamic philosophy and culture, monotheism, and the seclusion of women, for example, affected Indian religions and belief systems. The emergence of religious reformers such as Nanak (1469–1539), the founder of Sikhism; Kabir (1440–1518), an Indian mystic revered by Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs; and Mahabir (fifteenth–sixteenth century), all of whom developed iconoclastic and monotheistic philosophies, may be attributed to the impact of Islam. Similarly, Muslim Sufis borrowed Hindu and Buddhist mystic ideas that were quite unknown in orthodox Islam. The development of the Urdu language and literature synthesizing Persian, Arabic, and Hindi literary traditions and styles, and especially the emergence of romantic Urdu love songs and poetry (*ghazal*) in northwestern India, with typical Islamic and Sufi imagery, would not have taken place without this Indo-Islamic fusion.

Major Sufi orders in India, such as the Chishti, Suhrawardi, Naqshbandi, and Qadiri, had their origins in Iran and central Asia. Many of them came along with the Muslim conquerors and some of them were themselves "warrior Sufis" who established Muslim rule by fighting local Hindu rulers, mostly in remote areas of eastern Bengal. Sufis in South Asia preached love and tolerance on the one hand, and syncretism (the fusion of multiple beliefs) and escapism on the other. While they were mainly responsible for the spread of Islam in the subcontinent, they arrived in the region after the decay of Islamic civilization had already begun in the heartland of Islam from the tenth century onward. So escapist, next-worldly, and syncretistic Islam—with Persian, Indian, Buddhist, and Hindu elements—came into being in the subcontinent. Sufis also absorbed Indian languages, music, yoga practices, and literary styles into Islamic practice. This explains why certain rituals and institutions among South Asian Muslims are unique to the region, unheard-of in the Islamic heartland.

The Power of Orthodoxy

Islam in South Asia entered a crucial phase in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, during the reigns of the Mughal emperors Akbar (1542–1605; reigned 1556–1605) and Jahangir (1569–1627; reigned 1605–1627). Orthodox Muslim scholars and Sufis campaigned against the heterodoxy practiced by Akbar and Jahangir, and especially against Deen-i-Ilahi (the Religion of God), the syncretistic religion introduced by the former. Sufis belonging to the orthodox

Naqshbandi Tariqa under the leadership of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624) confronted the Mughal court. Sirhindi despised syncretism as heresy and considered any interaction with Hindus and other non-Muslims undesirable. Jahangir arrested him only to release him later, as the Shaykh had a large number of followers in the royal court. His overwhelming influence helped Muslim scholars reestablish orthodoxy in Indian Islam. He reaffirmed the views of al-Ghazali (1058–1111), a Sufi theologian who had rejected mathematics as "intoxicating" and "un-Islamic" and Greek philosophy as "dangerous."

It would be misleading, however, to suggest that Sirhindi and his followers alone were responsible for the isolationist and backward-looking nature of South Asian Islam. If the retrogression of South Asian Muslims is imputed to Sirhindi's influence, how does one explain the state of backwardness, next-worldliness, and the lack of scientific inquiry prevalent before his time? One cannot name a single university or institution for the study of science and technology in South Asia either during the Delhi sultanate or during Mughal rule, though leaders excelled in the building of beautiful mosques, forts, shrines and tombs. Unlike the Arab and Berber rulers of Egypt, North Africa, and Spain from the ninth to thirteenth centuries, who established universities and cultivated secular scientific knowledge, South Asian Muslim rulers, nomadic invaders from Central Asia, lacked the vision, education, and skill to contribute to science and high culture. They inherited only the retrogressive culture and institutions of the already decayed and degenerate Abbasid empire. The Mongol invasion of Baghdad in 1258 merely formalized the destruction of the empire and shattered the entire Muslim world, especially the vast region between the Nile and the Ganges.

Sufism and the Sultanate

Meanwhile, Sufis had their heyday in the chaotic environment of plunder and pillage in Iraq, Iran, Central Asia, and India between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries. They preached mysticism, devotion, and escapism to large numbers of Sunni and Shi'ite devotees. Henceforth Sufism became the most important aspect of South Asian Islam. Many Sufis and most of their disciples preached syncretism, shunning the Qur'anic exhortation to learn, study, and inquire. The Delhi sultanate remained unstable due to internal dissension and external invasions. The sultans were prejudiced against Hindus and some had no qualms about destroying Hindu temples or converting them into mosques. As for the Mughals, despite their generous patronage of secular art, architecture, music, painting,

and literature—at least up to the late seventeenth century—Mughal rulers exclusively employed Islamic clergy as judges and jurists, and endowed Muslim shrines, seminaries, and mosques with land grants. Emperor Aurangzeb's reign (1658–1707) was a departure from the hitherto syncretistic and tolerant Mughal traditions. He antagonized liberal Muslims and many Hindus with his ultra-orthodoxy and the discriminatory poll tax on the majority Hindu community. Rebellions by Hindu rulers, especially in the Deccan and Maharashtra, ultimately led to the empire's decline and downfall.

Shi'ite and Shi'a Sufi Currents

Shi'ite Islam and Shi'a Sufi orders came to the subcontinent mainly from Iran after the elevation of the sect as the state religion of Iran in the early sixteenth century. Shi'ite scholars and courtiers played important roles in the Mughal courts and elsewhere in northern and southern India and Bengal. There were several Shi'ite dynasties, in Kashmir and Golconda for example, during the precolonial period. Shi'a sects represented include the Twelvers, Bohras, and Ismailis. The Ismailis, successors of the twelfth-century Assassins who in 1845 fled from Iran to India under the leadership of Aga Khan I (1800–1881), are also known as the "Aga Khani" community, renowned for their philanthropy and wealth. But South Asian history is replete with conflict between Shi'ite Muslims and Sunni Muslims. Their mutual hatred has been responsible for killings, pillage, and plunder, especially in north India and parts of Pakistan. There are followers of various Muslim sects and schools of thought, including the Ahmadiya (Qadiani), throughout the subcontinent. In the early 1970s, the Pakistani government, responding to popular demand, declared the Ahmadiya a non-Muslim minority community on the grounds that its belief system was heretical.

The Growth of British Power

The onset of the British rule did not augur well for Indian Muslims. The consequential loss of political power, jobs, and state patronage as the most favored community turned the bulk of Muslims into disgruntled and confused masses or into the sworn enemies of the British. British expansion was slow, steady, ruthless, and calculating. British occupation of Bengal, Mumbai (Bombay), and Madras by the mid-eighteenth century and other regions by the early nineteenth frightened the feeble Mughals and hundreds of other Indian rulers. By then, raids by Hindu Maratha invaders from the west were frequent. The upshot was the growth of Muslim solidarity and

militant reformist movements in British-occupied Bengal as well as in Indian-administered regions under the Mughals and some petty dynasties in north-western India.

Shah Wali Allah (1702–1762), Sirhindi's great follower from Delhi, spearheaded the introduction of the orthodox, militant Islamic revivalist "Wahhabi" movement into the subcontinent. To secure the future of Islam in the subcontinent, this well-versed theologian invited Ahmad Shah Durrani (1722?–1773) of Afghanistan to fight the Marathas. Durrani routed the vast Maratha army and saved India from the Maratha menace at the battle of Panipat (1761). Meanwhile, Sikhs, Marathas, and Afghans had been vying for the control of the moribund Mughal empire. The exit of the Marathas allowed the Sikhs to occupy the Punjab, Kashmir, and parts of the Afghan territories in the northwest. Afterwards, the Sikh persecution of Muslims led to further mobilization of Muslim militants under the leadership of Wali Allah's son and successor, Shah Abdul Aziz (1746–1824).

Rebellion and War

In the early nineteenth century Abdul Aziz declared British India "Dar-ul-Harb" (an abode of war), making it obligatory for every pious Muslim to join the holy war against the British. One of his disciples, Sayyid Ahmad Brelwi (1786–1831), organized the jihad and moved to the northwest frontier to establish an Islamic state. Thousands of Muslims joined Brelwi's jihad to fight the Sikhs and then the British. Brelwi died fighting the Sikhs. His followers later supported the Indian Mutiny of 1857–1858. In 1867, a group of Brelwi's followers established the famous Deoband Madrasah (seminary) in north India. This ultraorthodox seminary produced thousands of traditionally educated graduates, some of whom joined Gandhi in the Freedom Movement or the Muslim separatist Pakistan movement. Thousands of Deoband-style *madrasahs* have been functioning throughout the subcontinent. (Afghanistan's Taliban, militant successors of the Indian Wahhabis, were graduates of such *madrasahs* in Pakistan.)

Several other reformers, such as Titu Meer (d. 1831) near Calcutta and Shariatullah (1781–1840) in eastern Bengal, started Puritan and militant anti-British movements. While the former died fighting at the hands of British troops, the latter organized the more successful and long-lasting Faraizi movement, to establish the *faraiz*, or obligatory rituals, discard syncretism, and fight the British.

Branching Out

Soon after Brelwi's death, his supporters split into several groups. One of his disciples, Karamat Ali Jaunpuri (1800–1873), shunned militancy after 1831, promoting loyalism and advising Indian Muslims to learn English and adopt orthodoxy by discarding syncretism. His main base was rural eastern Bengal (Bangladesh). He successfully neutralized the bulk of Faraizi supporters through peaceful reformism and by synthesizing the various Sufi *tariqas* into the Tayyuni movement. His brand of Sufism is still quite popular throughout Bangladesh and parts of Assam. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817–1898), founder of the Aligarh Muslim University in north India, and Nawab Abdul Latif and Syed Ameer Ali of Bengal (d. 1928), contemporaries of Karamat Ali, were doing the same thing. Their movements ultimately promoted orthodoxy, "Islamic modernism," and separatism among Indian Muslims, who played the decisive role in the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 into Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan.

There have been scores of other Islamic movements and organizations throughout the region. The Jamaat-e Islami and the Tabligh Jamaat are the best known among them. The former has promoted a totalitarian Islamic state since 1941 and the latter Puritanism since the 1920s. The political use of Islam by civil and military dictators for the sake of legitimacy, and the mass frustration due to the failure of the welfare state in post-colonial Pakistan and Bangladesh are mainly responsible for the growth of political Islam and escapism or next-worldliness in these countries. The post-Cold War Islamic resurgence and Hindu revivalism, especially the demolition of the Babri Mosque by Hindu militants in 1992, are largely responsible for Muslim militancy in India. Last but not least, Islamic resurgence in neighboring Afghanistan under the Taliban, the terrorist attacks on America in September 2001, and the American retaliation against the Taliban regime, have had a tremendous impact on South Asian Muslims.

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ISLAM—SOUTHWEST ASIA The region now occupied by Afghanistan and Pakistan is unique in the Islamic world in the degree to which it looks both to the Middle East and to Central Asia. As a consequence of the latter connection, the region has remained orthodox, as has Muslim Central Asia itself. Although Iranicized in culture, the region is not Iranicized in religion. Shi'ites (the majority Muslim sect in Iran, though representing only 10 percent of the worldwide Islamic population) are only a small minority.

Afghanistan and Pakistan were both Buddhist prior to the appearance of Arab armies in the seventh century. They were at first comparatively untouched by the new religion of Islam. Arab armies swept through Afghanistan quickly, pressing on into Khorasan and points beyond, an expansion that culminated in the 751 Arabic victory on the Talas river against Tang China. That victory opened eastern Turkistan and even China itself to Islam. India was still only occasionally raided. Nowhere did the garrisons left behind by the Arabs, some quite large, and a scattered Islamic urban community, have much effect on the locals.


Real conversion began much later. It was long inhibited by the practice of taxing nonbelievers, turning them into a major fiscal resource of the state that would be lost if they converted. Nonbelievers, of course, had a financial interest in becoming Muslims, but their conversion was resisted by local governments. Social issues were important too. The form of Islam brought in by the Arabs was not attractive to former Buddhists. Only with the eleventh-century arrival of Sufism (mystical Islam), which offered a religious experience closer to what they were used to, and which was strongly influenced by Buddhism in any case, was real progress made.

Early Islamic States

The first important Islamic state in Afghanistan was that of the Ghaznavids (977–1187). Its appearance marked the emergence of the Turks as a major force since its ruling family was descended from Turkic military slaves. Despite this, the Ghaznavids were associated with Iranian revival rather than Turkicization and played an important role in making Islam Iranian as well as Arabic. In promoting Iranian Islamic culture, the Ghaznavids, particularly Mahmud of Ghazna (971–1030), tried to avoid the doctrinal controversies of other parts of the Islamic world.

By his time serious penetration of India had begun, largely by Turkic warriors. Going on simultaneously with an overland advance were overseas contacts following Indian Ocean trade routes. Despite these advances, India, with traditions largely alien to those of the Middle East, proved resistant to Muslim penetration. For centuries, Islamic influence remained confined to the Punjab, an area first infiltrated by the Ghaznavids, and a few trading communities. Only gradually did Islam spread more widely in north India, in part due to the active efforts of the successors of the Ghaznavids, the Ghurids (1187–1215). Throughout India, the Buddhist or formerly Buddhist areas seem to have been the most receptive to the new religion.

A major turning point in the history of the region was the coming of the Mongols followed by the emergence of various Mongol successor states, including



The octagonal tomb of of Sufi leader Sheik Rukn-i-Alam in Multan, Pakistan. The tomb was built in 1320–1324 for the father of Sultan Muhammad Tughlaq. (ROGER WOOD/CORBIS)

the Timurid and Mughal empires. The Mongols controlled Afghanistan as well as Iran, but did not invade India. They were at first little interested in Islam and it was only after the breakdown of unified Mongol empire in 1259 that Islam began to make any real headway among them. The Iranian Il-Khans (1260–1335) officially converted to Islam under Ghazan (1271–1304), and under Oljeitu (1280–1316) began the process of official patronage of Shi'a that resulted in the Shi'ite Iranian state of today. This change had little impact on Afghanistan since it was controlled by a competing khanate, that of Ca'adai (1260–1334), later a convert to Sunni Islam. Muslims in India could also remain orthodox since they were isolated from Mongol Iran under their own rulers. This included the various Delhi sultans, mostly of Turkic origin, although Iranicized, who gradually expanded their rule through much of India. Other Muslim regimes emerged there as well, including in Bengal, once a Buddhist stronghold. Throughout Muslim India, Sufism enjoyed great importance because of its ability to form a bridge between an Iranicized elite and Hindu converts.

Islam under the Mughals and the British

India's relative isolation changed radically due to the new wave of post-Mongol states. Timur (1336–1405), born a Muslim, led an invasion of India in 1398–1399, sacking Delhi and doing immense damage to local Islamic culture. The next wave was that of the Mughals, based in Afghanistan. Under Babur (1483–1530) and his successors, the Mughals became the first Islamic rulers to conquer all of India (except its extreme southern tip), although the majority of their subjects were non-Muslims.

The Mughals continued cultural patterns already established under the Delhi sultans. They promoted a court culture that was heavily Iranian but made one concession to their Turkic culture in encouraging use of the Turkic literary language of Central Asia, Chagatay, in which Babur himself wrote. More influential was their Iranian dialect, Urdu, the language of the *ordu*, or palace, now the second language of the Indian subcontinent and the official language of Pakistan. In religion they continued the toleration of almost all religious communities, even patronizing Shi'ite shrines when they could do so quietly. The Mughals were also accepting of the Hinduism of most of their subjects and of local cults combining Islam and Hindu beliefs, as long as it was done in acceptable ways. Personally, the Mughal emperors remained heavily influenced by the quiet introspection of Sufism.

The Mughal empire survived as the theoretically dominant power in India until 1858, although it no

longer controlled Afghanistan by then and had been superseded by the British in much of north India. The British continued the system that the Mughals had created in ruling India and sought also to preserve the balance between the religions achieved under them. Although there were growing tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims in India, they remained in check during almost the entire period of British rule. Once the British were gone, the bloodshed began.

The intent of Mohandas Gandhi (1869–1948) and his followers was a united India, but this had become impossible, and British India was instead partitioned between a Muslim Pakistan and a Hindu India. As these two states were set up, and populations exchanged, there was considerable violence resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths. The two states also went to war almost as soon as declared, and have engaged in several wars since. In 1956, Pakistan officially became an Islamic state and in recent years the power of Islam within it has grown. It has not, however, become fundamentalist, despite fundamentalism's growing influence.

Islam in Modern Afghanistan and Pakistan

While India was slowly moving toward religious conflict, Afghanistan was going its own way. Although Islam was certainly a factor in Afghanistan's ability to defend itself against British invasion in the nineteenth century, this was primarily a military success. Within Afghanistan, the divisions that existed were ethnic and not religious. This has changed as a consequence of decades of upheaval in the aftermath of the 1979 Soviet invasion and the failure to achieve stability following the Soviet withdrawal. Searching for a uniting ideology, many Afghans have turned to fundamentalism, resulting in the recent Taliban regime (1996–2001), which was entirely atypical of the past history of Islam in Afghanistan.

Nonetheless, how much of an aberration this episode will appear over the long term remains to be seen. The Islamic world is awash in a demographic wave of volatile young people, and until this generation grows up and quiets down there will be no peace. Playing a critical role in determining the future will be what happens in Pakistan. The government of Pervez Musharraf (b. 1943) is pro-Western, but as in most of the Islamic world, the real force is in the streets. A shift to Islamic radicalism in Pakistan would quickly find its echo in Afghanistan, which is now governed by a northern, largely Uzbek and Hazara minority, but still has a restive Pashtun majority. No one knows at this point exactly how the pieces will fall.

Paul D. Buell

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ISLAM—WEST ASIA Although people have practiced Islam in parts of West Asia (present-day Iraq, Iran, and Turkey) since its inception, different versions of the religion have been created by the region's differing cultures, language groups, and histories.

Islam was brought to modern Iraq during the reign of Abu Bakr (c. 573–634), the first successor to the

Prophet Muhammad. Abu Bakr attacked and defeated the Persians near An Najaf in southern central Iraq in 634. In 642, under the caliph 'Umar (c. 585–644), the Muslim invaders again defeated the Persians, this time at the so-called victory of victories near modern Hamadan in northwestern Iran. This defeat resulted in the destruction of the old Sasanid empire (224/228–651 CE), whose religion had been Zoroastrian.

By contrast, Islam did not become a major force in the area of present-day Turkey until 1071, when the Muslim Seljuk Turks defeated the Christian Byzantines at the battle of Manzikert. Subsequently, as the Byzantine empire shrank, Turkish Muslim power grew.

Iraq was a battleground in the disputes surrounding who would govern the community of Muslim faithful, which split Muslims into Sunni and Shi'ite sects. (Today, Sunnis account for 90 percent of the



SUPPORT FOR THE POOR

In many Islamic societies, the poor or otherwise disadvantaged are helped by taxes collected by the government and also charity given by individuals. This means that begging has a special meaning in Muslim societies.

In 1949 I was traveling by bus from Tehran to Hamadan. At a certain ford the driver stopped. A blind woman, nursing a baby, arose from a brush shelter beside the road and approached the bus. The driver passed the hat, everyone put in a coin or a bill, and he handed the collection to the poor woman, who replied with an invocation to God to bless her benefactors. The blessing was returned by the occupants of the bus, and the driver drove on. (If, in visiting an oriental city, you find yourself pestered with beggars and remark, "There ought to be an institution to take care of these people," remember that there is an institution, and an old one, the zaka. Give, in moderation as the Muslims do, and take it off your income tax.)

The zaka is not the only tax imposed in Muslim states. There is a special tax on Christians and Jews, which was abusively levied on Berber converts to Islam in the early days of the conquest of North Africa. There are also customs, gate taxes, market taxes, and other sources of revenue most of which appeared after Muhammad's death. But the zaka differs from those in that it was not originally designed to support the state, being rather a means of leveling out the income of the various elements in the community so that no one would go hungry, of financing the conversion of the heathen and of facilitating travel between the various parts of the Islamic world.

Source: Carleton S. Coon (1951) *Caravan: The Story of the Middle East*. New York: Holt, 112.

world's Muslims.) Many of the most important sites in Shi'ite history are to be found on Iraqi soil, including the site of the battle of Karbala (10 October 680), when the Prophet's grandson Hussein was killed. Shi'ites annually mark this event at the Ashura festival (10 Muharram in the Islamic calendar).

Shi'ism has also always been strong in Iran, partly because its messianic tendencies grafted relatively easily onto the base of Zoroastrian culture and partly because this border region of the early empire attracted dissidents at a time when Shi'ism was a movement of social protest almost as much as a religious. A decisive moment in Iranian religious and cultural history occurred in the early sixteenth century, when the forces of Esmā'il I (1487–1524) conquered the country. The new Safavid dynasty (1501–1722/1736) proclaimed Shi'ism the state religion. Shi'ism ceased to be a movement of social protest and was closely associated with the Safavid and later Qajar state (1784–1925).

A defining moment in Turkish Islam came with the capture of Constantinople by the Ottomans in 1453. The Ottoman empire (1453–1922), which at its height covered Southeast Europe, North Africa, and most of the Middle East, including modern Iraq, created a cultural synthesis of Turkish, Greek, Persian, and Arabic elements but was above all a Sunni state based on an ideology of universal empire. In the eighteenth century, Sultan Selim I (1467–1520) transferred the relics of the Prophet to Constantinople (modern Istanbul), and the title "caliph," implying leadership of the world Muslim community, came into use to describe the Ottoman rulers. Within the Ottoman and Persian states, the Muslim religion was the basis of all laws and of the education system. It was necessary to be Muslim to participate in government. However, during the nineteenth century, pressure from the West led to a decline in religious institutions. In 1826, the Tanzimat reforms, undertaken in the Ottoman empire to modernize society and limit the power of Muslim clerics, allowed Christians to participate in the administrative and legal systems and created state schools.

Iran also witnessed a gradual decoupling of religion and the state from the 1850s on. A gradual transfer of power from religious to secular authorities has been a recent feature of all three countries, although the 1979 Iranian revolution has challenged this trend.

Turkey

Turkey emerged as a result of a nationalist struggle that began in 1919. Ironically, modern Turkey is much more Muslim than the Ottoman provinces it replaced. Roughly 2.5 million Christians left Turkey, to

be replaced by Muslims from Europe. Turkey is now 98 percent Muslim. Estimates of the number of Shi'ites among these vary from 5 to 40 percent, a spread caused in part by widespread ignorance of the finer points of Muslim theology.

Theoretically, Turkey was to be ruled by the sultan-caliph, who based his legitimacy on his leadership of the Islamic community. However, real power lay in the hands of Turkish army officers, chief among them Mustafa Kemal (Kemal Atatürk; 1881–1938), who had seen that Islamic ideology had failed to bind the Arabs to the empire and who attributed the country's weakness to the Islamic institutions the sultan represented. A republic was proclaimed in 1923, and the following year the caliphate was abolished. Since then, Turkey has been constitutionally secular, with the army regarding itself as the guarantor of this secularity.

During the 1920s and 1930s, Atatürk drove through a program of modernization that involved assaults on Islamic institutions and traditions. Education and the courts were taken out of religious hands; pious endowments (*waqf*) were confiscated, Sufism outlawed, religious dress permitted only within the mosque, and Western dress enforced elsewhere. The government abolished the Muslim calendar, made Sunday the day of rest, and replaced Arabic with the Latin alphabet. Women were given legal equality with men. The number of mosques was reduced and the content of sermons supervised. In all, this amounted to the greatest attack on Islam anywhere outside the Soviet Union.



The Ortakoy Mosque with its towering minarets in Istanbul, Turkey. (MICHAEL NICHOLSON/CORBIS)



PILGRIMAGE AND LOCAL TRADITIONS

All Muslims adhere to the basic beliefs and practices of Islam but in many places Muslims also worship personages of regional or local significance. The Kurds of West Asia are one people who follow this practice as described in the following extract.

The typical indication of a shrine is either a low, quadrilateral, rubble wall about the grave or a cairn of stones. Those who visit the shrine with some purpose characteristically tie a piece of white rag on the end of a pole and lean the pole against the inner surface of the wall. Some shrines have bundles of these crude banners standing in them. The meaning of the rag is variable. In some cases the visitor will return and reclaim it, incorporating it in a charm, while in others it is simply the sign of a vow that the suppliant, if the shaykh buried there will bring about the desired favor, will sacrifice so many animals or give so much money to the poor. The most auspicious days, it might be noted, to visit a shrine are Wednesdays and Thursdays. The six most noted shrines near the town of Rowanduz are as follows:


1. Shaykh Piri Mawili near the village of Kani Kah. Shaykh Piri Mawili is said to have lived about two hundred years ago, "in the time of Kor Pasha."
2. Shaykh Sa'idi Galikarak near the village of Karak. The shrine is said to be very old, dating perhaps from the time of the Islamic conquest.
3. Shaykh Saran in the village of Saran itself. Shaykh Saran is said to have died about fifty years ago.
4. Shaykh Usu Shaykhan on the road to Kawlok. No one knows how old it is, but it is very ancient.
5. Shaykh Muhammad or Shaykh Balik, the second most famous shrine in the district, at Haiji Umran.
6. Shuwani Shaykh Muhammad or Shuwani Mala, The Shepherd of Shaykh Muhammad.

Source: William M. Masters. (1953) "Rowanduz: A Kurdish Administrative and Mercantile Center." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 313.

In 1925, the Naqshbandi Sufis (an order of Sufis, or Islamic mystics) led a revolt among the Kurds, a non-Turkish ethnic group present in large numbers in eastern Turkey, but the revolt was ruthlessly suppressed.

Turkey's constitution banned religious parties, but from the 1960s there began to be calls for greater recognition of religion in public life. Religious parties

have appeared by disguising their religious nature. Such parties, with messages of social justice and respect for traditional culture, have particularly appealed to recent migrants to urban areas, but they are led and often supported by the urban middle class. In part, the rise of these parties has been fed by resentment at the European Union's seeming preference for the membership claims of Christian countries over Turkey's



The leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, greets followers in Tehran in February 1979. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

long-standing application. Recently the issue of whether female university students may wear Islamic head scarves has aroused political controversy. In addition, Sufi groups have reorganized in several cities.

Iraq

As part of the Ottoman empire, Iraq experienced the modernizing trends of the Tanzimat reform. Arab nationalism, although not strong, was felt here, and neither the British nor the Turks who fought over the area in World War I could count on the support of the local population. At the time of Iraq's establishment by the British in 1921, the population was approximately 90 percent Muslim, with small Christian and Jewish communities. Roughly one-third of Iraqi Christians fled to Syria in 1933 following persecution.

Although the ratio of Shi'ites to Sunnis has been approximately 7 to 5 in Iraq, Sunnis have been politically dominant both under the British protectorate (until 1927) and subsequently. This has been particu-

larly the case since a 1968 coup brought the Ba'ath Party to power.

For much of modern Iraqi history, the state has gradually taken over services traditionally provided by religious organizations (education, welfare, justice), although Islam has never faced the outright assault it did in Turkey.

The dominance of Sunni Arabs has left Shi'ites and Kurds relatively disadvantaged. Whereas among the Kurds political discontent is expressed through nationalism, in the Arab south this is expressed via the medium of Shi'ism. This situation is heightened by the presence of the Shi'i holy cities of An Najaf and Karbala on Iraqi territory. Ironically, Iraq has given shelter to Shi'ite leaders such as the Ayatollah Khomeini (1900–1989), who opposed the government of Iran, while suppressing outspoken leaders of its own Shi'ite community.

Antistate revolts articulated via Shi'ism have periodically broken out, notably in 1979 and after the expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait in 1991. The regime's response has been both the suppression of Shi'ism and an increased Sunni religiosity on the part of political leaders.

Iran

In 1920, Iran was 95 percent Shi'i, with small Baha'i, Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian communities. Traditionally, Shi'ism had kept politics at arm's length, but Iranian religious leaders began to become politically involved toward the end of the nineteenth century, their anger directed particularly against concessions granted by the Qajar shahs to Western economic interests (especially tobacco). Whereas in Turkey the constitutional movement was secular and nationalist, in Iran opposition to the power of the ruler came from the clergy, which was closely allied with the class of small shopkeepers most economically threatened.

A declining Islamic empire was taken over by a military strong man, Reza Pahlavi (1878–1944), in 1921. Fearful of a repetition of events in Turkey, the clergy opposed the creation of a republic, and Reza was proclaimed shah. However, he rapidly introduced secularizing policies similar to those of Ataturk. His son Mohammed Reza (1919–1980), who was placed on the throne by British and American interests after a short-lived socialist experiment, continued these policies in his so-called White Revolution of 1963.

One upshot of the fall of the leftist government in 1953 was that left-wing political parties were ruthlessly suppressed. Religion was now the only means of articulating political dissent, and during the 1960s two

developments radically altered Shi'i political thought. 'Ali Shari'ati (1933–1997), the philosopher whose thought most influenced Iran's Islamic revolution, created a synthesis of Marxist sociology and Shi'i theology that for the first time provided religious justification for revolution, while the minor cleric Ruholla Khomeini, from his exile in An Najaf, Iraq, elaborated a theory of the ideal Shi'ite state.

As the shah's rule became increasingly oppressive, the urban middle class became attracted to Shari'ati's ideas. Migrants to the cities identified with Khomeini's formulation of a genuinely Shi'ite, just state untainted by foreign influences, although many senior clerics strongly disagreed with his formulation. The 1979 revolutionary slogan—Neither East nor West but Islam—expressed the anticolonial sentiment of the people, the desire for a genuinely Iranian political order, and frustration with the iniquities of the shah's regime. Popular dissatisfaction was expressed particularly toward the United States.

Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, Iran has formally been a participatory constitutional democracy. However, Khomeini's insistence that legislation be vetted by a religious council has created tensions within the state, as power is split between the presidency and the Council of (Religious) Experts. The limits of Khomeini's conception have become increasingly clear.

Present-Day Problems

In recent years, West Asian Muslims have faced similar pressures but have responded to them in a variety of ways. In Iran, Islam has become a substitute for nationalism and socialism. In Turkey, the government has, with limited success, presented nationalism as a substitute for Islam. In Iraq, where both Kurdish nationalism and Shi'i Islam could threaten the governing class, a variant of Islamic socialism has held sway since 1968. All these countries feel the twin pressures of modernization and urbanization. Whereas a small group in each country is happy with the social changes, for most the experience has been deeply unsettling. They have therefore sought support from a form of their traditional culture and have sought to expand that culture into the alien secular environment, which in all cases was imposed from above by the state.

Will Myer

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ISLAM, KAZI NAZRUL (1899–1976), Bengali poet and playwright. Kazi Nazrul Islam, known as the *bidrohi kobi* (rebel poet), was both a poet and a playwright who was deeply influenced by leftist ideology and who championed the working class. Many Bengalis consider Nazrul Islam a "nonconformist" who despite not having a formal education and not having traveled outside India acquired a worldly outlook. He took the Bengali literary world by storm with his poem *Bidrohi* (The Rebel). That poem, along with his many other patriotic poems and songs, inspired Bengalis during their struggle against the British and during the Bangladeshi war of liberation in 1971.

Nazrul Islam was born to an impoverished family in West Bengal, India. He lost his father at an early age and to support his family started working as a domestic servant and later as a baker's assistant. In 1917, at the age of eighteen, Nazrul quit high school and joined the Forty-Ninth Bengali Regiment. After the regiment was disbanded in 1919, Nazrul went to Calcutta to pursue his writing career.

Nazrul Islam is regarded as the greatest Bengali poetic force after the Nobel laureate poet Rabindranath Tagore. His chief works include *Agnibeena*, *Sbonchita*, *Dolon Champa*, and *Chayanot*. Although Nazrul's life as a poet lasted a little over twenty years, he wrote three thousand songs, twenty-one books of verses, fourteen books of songs, six novels and collections of stories, four books of essays, three plays, four books of poems and plays for children, and three books of translations of Persian poetry and Qur'anic verses. Many of his works remain uncollected in out-of-print journals and periodicals.

Tragically, Nazrul's literary career was cut short in July 1942 when he suffered a stroke and lost his speech. Within weeks his condition deteriorated further, and he lost contact with reality. He lived for another thirty-five years and died in Dhaka, Bangladesh.

Mebrin Masud-Elias

ISLAMABAD (1998 pop. 529,000). Soon after Pakistan achieved independence in 1947, the idea of the national capital of Islamabad was conceived by President Ayub Khan (1907–1974). Karachi had been contemplated as the capital because it was Pakistan's



The Parliament compound in Islamabad, which was closed off and guarded by soldiers during days of political instability in October 1999. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

commercial center, but it was not considered an appropriate administrative center. Therefore, the decision was to construct a new city at the eastern part of the Margalla Hills, which are located at the base of the Himalayas in northern Punjab region.

Islamabad, which officially became the capital of Pakistan in 1959, was designed to maximize its relationship with nature, thus adding to its natural beauty. Many streams flow through the landscape, over 6 million trees have been planted since Islamabad's inception, and, more recently, several lakes, such as Simly, Khanpur, and Rawal, have been added to the terrain.

Houman A. Sadri

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ISLAMIC BANKING Islamic banking refers to a modern banking system practiced in the Muslim world from about 1975, which pays no interest on deposits. Although the Qur'an condemns the taking of interest (*riba* in Arabic) on the grounds that it is exploitative and unjust, not all Muslim countries have instituted interest-free banking.

Today about 170 Islamic financial institutions worldwide, controlling over \$150 billion in funds, follow this procedure, particularly in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States; Iran and Sudan have recently implemented this system. Pakistan was scheduled to adopt it in 2001; in Turkey only a small minority of banks operate in this manner (3 percent of deposits nationally). In Kuwait, Morocco, and Malaysia, where Islamic banking is popular, depositors and borrowers can choose which sort of bank to patronize. Conventional banks such as Citibank also offer "Islamic services."

In countries with interest-paying and interest-free banks, Islamic banks can and do compete. Instead of paying interest on deposits and charging it on loans,



HAWALA (TRANSFERRING DEBT)

Hawala is a form of Islamic debt exchange that is used to move money around the world cheaply without attracting government notice. The system gained worldwide attention in 2001, because Hawala was thought to be one of the ways in which the terrorist attacks of 11 September were financed.

A person wishing to transfer money gives it to a Hawala broker, and the two agree on a password. The Hawala broker then contacts a Hawala agent in the recipient's country, who gives the amount of money to whoever gives him the password. No real money is transferred between the Hawala agents, who receive a small fee paid at each end. Below is one of the Islamic rules that govern Hawala.

If a debtor directs his creditor to collect his debt from the third person, and the creditor accepts the arrangement, the third person will, on completion of all the conditions to be explained later, become the debtor. Thereafter, the creditor cannot demand his debt from the first debtor.

Source: Middle East and Islamic Studies Collection, Cornell University. Retrieved 28 March 2002, from: <http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/hawdrft.htm>.

these banks seek profit- and loss-sharing arrangements with depositors and borrowers. One procedure is the *mudarabah* contract, which allows depositors to share the bank's profits rather than receive interest. Perhaps because of the frequent unfeasibility of this contractual procedure, Islamic banks make much more income from *murabaha*, a contract similar to an interest-bearing loan. A bank will, for example, buy a printing press from a client for \$20,000, but leaves it on the client's premises. The client then buys it back later for \$22,000, according to contract. The bank thus makes \$2,000 on the transaction, and the client has his printing press.

Paul Hockings

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ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE PARTY—TAJIKISTAN Despite being proscribed by the government, the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) was formed in the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic just before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The IRP emerged as an important force for democracy in 1990 and was legalized soon after Tajikistan proclaimed its independence in September 1991.

The IRP soon came into conflict with Tajikistan's ruling Communist Party, and violence erupted. After the party was banned in 1993 for attempting to establish an Islamic state in Tajikistan, the leadership fled to Iran and Afghanistan and led the formation of the United Tajikistan Opposition (UTO). Until 1996 the UTO fought against the Tajik government in a war that cost tens of thousands of lives. A peace agreement was signed in March 1997, and the IRP and other parties of the UTO returned to Tajikistan. Despite an attempt to ban religious political parties, the IRP was registered as a political party in September 1999 and unsuccessfully ran a candidate in the country's presidential elections that November. The IRP went on to win two seats in the lower house of Tajikistan's parliament in March 2000. The IRP's platform is the revival of Islamic spiritual values in politics and society.

Andrew Sharp

ISLAMIC REVOLUTION—IRAN The Islamic Revolution in Iran began simmering during the Pahlavi dynasty (1925–1979) and boiled over in 1979. It represented the discontent of both the middle class

and the lower class regarding the nation's rapid shift to secularism, its economic hardships, and the perception that foreign interests were controlling Iran.

Islam has strong roots in Iran, being introduced as a result of the Arab conquest in the seventh century. When the Islamic empire fell some two hundred years later, Islam was firmly entrenched within the communities of believers, which broke up into warring clans and dynasties. When the Safavid empire (1501–1722/1736) came to power in Persia (as Iran was known until 1935), it established Shi'a Islam (one of the sects of Islam) as the state religion while the government operated under the auspices of a monarchy. The Safavid empire came to an end with several tribes vying for power. Ultimately, the Qajars won, beginning a dynasty that would last from 1794 to 1925.

In the beginning, the Qajar dynasty respected many of the wishes of the Islamic clerics, and the clerics were able to exercise influence in government affairs. At the same time, the Qajars worked to reaffirm the concept of the shah (king) being connected to God in order to legitimize their standing and position. However, during the reign of the third Qajar monarch, changes began that undermined the authority of the clerics. Many of these changes were at least partially due to the increased pressure and influence of Britain and Russia in Iranian affairs. In the late nineteenth century, the Qajars gradually started to adopt European methods of government in an effort to strengthen their system. Inadequate funds to run the government, however, resulted in the Qajars selling economic concessions to the British and Russians. The religious community strongly voiced its opposition to this by encouraging, in one instance, a boycott of tobacco when Britain was given a tobacco monopoly. In another instance, a cleric encouraged one of his disciples to assassinate the shah.

The economic troubles and foreign manipulations led the populace to question royal authority. This resulted in the Constitutional Revolution (1906), in which proponents demanded a constitution that would limit royal powers and institute the Majlis (Parliament). Although Muzaffar al-Din Shah, the fourth Qajar monarch, signed the constitution into law, he died soon after, and his successor fought its implementation.

Britain and Russia continued to meddle in Iranian affairs; they divided the nation into spheres of influence in 1907. With the advent of World War I, Iran found itself unable to prevent the war's being played out on Iranian soil as Russian, Turkish, and British troops fought one another on Iranian territory. Soon, Russia was dealing with pressures from its own revolution. Britain seized the opportunity to increase its



A young Iranian woman carries a photo of the late Ayatollah Khomeini at the 11 February 2000 celebration of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

influence and backed the ascension to power of Reza Khan (1878–1944). Reza Khan eventually had himself crowned shah (becoming Reza Shah Pahlavi), founding the Pahlavi dynasty.

Reza Shah Targets Clerics

Reza Shah's policies were designed to decrease the clerics' power. He organized a secular school system and borrowed Western ideas and technology to modernize Iran's cities and institutions. In addition, he established laws that excluded clerics from the justice system, and he monitored the administration of licenses to seminaries. Finally, he required the populace to wear European-style clothes and opened education and the workforce to women.

Initially, such reforms were welcomed because they were seen as improving the economic conditions of the nation. However, Reza Shah's repressive policies soon caused public approval to wane. He did not tolerate opposition; he jailed opponents and religious leaders or sent them into exile, censored the press, and executed bureaucrats and tribal leaders.

When World War II started, outside events again intruded on Iran. Iran's declaration of neutrality was unacceptable to the British and Russians, who invaded Iran. This resulted in the transfer of power from Reza Shah to his son, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1918–1980). However, it took a while before the shah (as Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi was known) was in control of the nation, mainly because of the presence of foreign troops, who were also not appreciated by the masses. Premier Mohammad Mosaddeq (1880–1967) spearheaded a nationalist movement that compelled the shah to nationalize the oil companies. Eventually, popular opposition to the shah and support of

Mosaddeq led to the former's exile and the latter being left in control of the country. The shah was able to return only with the support of the United States—a fact that was not forgotten by the Iranian masses.

The shah launched several ambitious five-year economic plans that were funded by oil revenues. He was equally ambitious in containing opposition. This led to several confrontations with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1900–1989), a conservative cleric and harsh critic of the government.

In 1963, the shah arrested Khomeini after Khomeini criticized the shah and his policies. His arrest sparked riots, which the shah tried violently to suppress, resulting in many deaths. Soon, the shah was pressured by clerics to release the ayatollah, who continued to criticize the shah. Eventually, the shah exiled him; the ayatollah took refuge in Iraq and then France. In exile, the ayatollah mobilized opposition groups to organize and concentrate their criticism of the Shah. The ayatollah also further developed his concept of *veleyet-e-faqih* (rule of religious jurisprudence). This concept was significant because it would form the theoretical backbone of the new regime in Iran after the Islamic Revolution.

A booming economy and repressive social controls helped the shah maintain control. When the economy eventually declined as a result of the shah's overly ambitious programs, the country suffered runaway inflation. The result was increased opportunity for corruption and a growing gap between the rich and poor. The shah tried to correct the situation with new programs, but his efforts were seen as catering to the West and subverting Islamic values. The shah also was pressured to restrict his repressive tactics in order to placate international concern over human-rights violations.

The Revolution Arrives

Iran was now ripe for revolution, as a middle-class protest movement seeking restoration of constitutional rule swept the nation. As the movement expanded its social base, it soon proclaimed Ayatollah Khomeini its leader and an Islamic state the ideal government. In November 1978, the shah tried to hold out the olive branch by arresting several of his officers involved in repression and by releasing several political prisoners. However, it was too little, too late, and the strikes started by the opposition continued. The shah opened a dialogue with the protest movement and agreed to appoint Shapour Bakhtiar (a National Front leader) as prime minister. Bakhtiar consented to the appointment only after the shah agreed to leave the country.

The new prime minister was unable to curb the revolutionary movement, as Khomeini had already declared that nothing less than a new political system was acceptable. Despite Bakhtiar's attempts to keep him out, Khomeini returned to Iran in early 1979. Immediately, he proclaimed the government illegal and set up a provisional government with Mehdi Bazargan as its prime minister. The main task of the provisional government was to produce a constitution. After the referendum result was announced, on 1 April 1979, Khomeini declared Iran to be the Islamic Republic of Iran. His concept of *veleyet-e-faqih* had become a political reality.

Houman A. Sadri

See also: **Khomeini, Ayatollah**

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ISMAILI SECTS—CENTRAL ASIA The Ismaili sect of Shi'a Islam (Shi'a Islam itself being the minority current of Islam, accounting for only some 10 percent of the world's Muslim population) separated from the mainstream of Shi'a Islam in 765, when a minority of Shi'ites accepted Ismail, the son of the sixth Shi'ite imam, as the seventh and final imam. The Ismaili sect entered Central Asia around 1000 CE.

Ismaili Areas in Central Asia

The Ismailis of Central Asia reside mainly in the ethnolinguistic area of the Pamir and eastern Hindu Kush Mountains, including the Pamirs in present-day Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and China, Dardistan Province in Pakistan, and Nuristan Province in Afghanistan. On the fringes of this area, the Ismailis are scattered in some places in Hazarajat in central Afghanistan and in isolated pockets in the Afghan provinces of Kunar and Lagman, as well as in some small communities in Herat and among the Turkmen of Balkh. Ismaili migrants also live in Kabul, Afghanistan, and Dushanbe, Tajikistan. The center of the Afghan Ismailis is the town of Pul-i Khumri (central Afghanistan), where they dominate local economic and political life.

It is difficult to provide exact up-to-date demographic data on the Ismailis of the Tajik Pamirs, but various records indicate that in the early 1990s the population of the region reached approximately 250,000. The number of Afghan Ismailis is estimated at anywhere between 100,000 and 500,000 people, and several thousand Ismailis live in the Chinese Pamirs.

The bulk of the Pamiri and Hazara Ismailis are village dwellers, dependent for their livelihood on irrigated and usually terraced fields in the valley bottoms. Those living in Afghan cities are often engaged in commerce or in the service sector. The Tajik Ismailis have the highest ratio of high school and university graduates in all of post-Soviet Central Asia.

Ethnolinguistic Composition

The great majority of the several groups who live in the Pamirs speak different East Iranian languages. None of these is fixed in writing, and the language of culture and civilization is Tajiki (Persian). Before the late nineteenth century, the knowledge of Tajiki was confined almost exclusively to literate religious leaders.

The Ismailis of Badakhshan Province in Afghanistan refer to themselves as *panjtani* (followers of the five people of the *abl al-bayt*, or the Prophet Muhammad's family). The Hazara Ismailis of Afghanistan are known as *qayani* after the father of the current head of the Afghan Ismaili community, al-Hajj Sayyid Mansur Nadiri, Nasir-Shah Qayani. The religious beliefs of the Hazara Ismailis shape their ethnic identity: They consider themselves a distinct ethnic group within the Hazara people, who are predominantly Twelver Shi'ites (Shi'ites who accept the twelve imams, rather than the seven of the Ismaili sect) of mixed Turkic-Mongolian and Iranian origin.

Religious History

Nasir-i Khusrav (1003/1004–1072/1077) was the first Ismaili propagandist associated with the spread of Ismailism in the Pamirs; he was an important Persian writer sent on his mission to the eastern part of the Islamic world by the Fatimid (an Arab dynasty ruling in Egypt) caliph al-Mustansir (1029–1094). Khusrav is believed to have contributed significantly to the initial Islamization of the Pamirs. It is reported, however, that even three hundred years after his death the Ismaili propagandists from Khorasan in northeast Iran still encountered fire-worshippers in the Pamirs.

Due to its isolation, which lasted until the end of the nineteenth century, the Pamiri Ismaili community preserved a number of unique Ismaili manuscripts and

developed religious practices specific to their cultural and geographical identity.

Pamiri Ismailis maintained more or less regular contacts with the Ismaili imam (the Aga Khan), whose seat is in India, only during the forty-year period from the mid-1890s to 1936. The mid-1890s marked the arrival of Russian troops in the Pamirs, which brought the end of Ismaili persecution at the hands of Afghans and Bukharans. In 1936, the Soviet-Afghan border was firmly sealed, which again isolated these Ismailis.

During the 1990s, a number of programs were developed by the Aga Khan Development Network, in collaboration with the government of Tajikistan and other international agencies, to promote social and economic development in the region. The current imam, Aga Khan IV (b. 1937), paid two visits to the area in 1995 and 1998, and there is now a growing awareness of and contact with the international Ismaili community and its institutions.

Beliefs and Religious Practices

Apart from maintaining the general Ismaili tradition, the Pamiris developed their own practice of deeply venerating Nasir-i Khusrav. According to the 1944 proclamation issued by the Tajik Pamiri Ismaili authorities, the Ismailis based their understanding of religion on the *Vajb-i din*, one of Nasir-i Khusrav's treatises, which is sometimes ascribed by the Pamiri Ismailis to the teaching of al-Mustansir himself. This book is esteemed as a *maghbz-i Qur'an* (kernel of the Qur'an), in which the esoteric aspects of the Holy Book are explained.

When Pamiri Ismailis describe their faith, certain points keep recurring, namely, the doctrine of the outer (*zahir*) and the inner (*batin*) meaning of life and, in particular, of religion, which is of utmost importance. Thus, one should strive for pure sincerity and reject what is done solely for outward appearance. Therefore, righteousness and abstinence from evil thoughts and acts are more important than the ostentatious manifestations of religiosity.

Ismailis strive to attain perfection whatever their tasks in life might be, for this path leads to the cognition of God and unity with him. Participation in religious ceremonies, as well as recitation of and listening to devotional religious poetry, is considered to be an educational activity helping a human being to reach his or her real origin—God. However, humans are not the only creatures traveling along this path. Although only humans possess reason (*'aql*), the faculty that puts them closer to God than all other beings, humans and nonhumans alike strive to get closer

to their creator. However, if the lower soul (*nafs*) overwhelms a human being, he or she loses the privilege of possessing the faculty of *'aql*, or intellect, and his or her soul regresses to a lower, nonhuman state. The Pamiris have preserved pre-Islamic traditions, with a complicated system of cosmology linked to the Indo-European substratum, commonly occurring in other Iranian cultures as well.

Community Organization

The Pamiri Ismailis believe that Ismailism is the most progressive and tolerant creed in the world because it is constantly adapting itself to the needs and requirements of the time through the mediation of the current imam, who guides his followers according to the prevailing circumstances.

In daily life, community religious authorities, or *pirs* (elders, masters), and their *khalifabs* (deputies) act as agents of the imam: they give believers guidance in matters of religion and accompany people in the events of life, especially during the rites of passage. They also give general moral guidance and counsel and are sometimes believed to have healing power. In their functions, they make use of the Qur'an and the *Vajb-i din*. Every Ismaili seeks to learn from a *pir*, or, if he is inaccessible, from his deputy. Usually this relationship is passed on to succeeding generations wherever they may live.

Since the mid-1950s, due to the pressure of the Soviet authorities in the Tajik Pamirs, *khalifabs* were elected by the people of a big village or a number of small neighboring villages. Before that, the position of *khalifab* tended to be hereditary. The *pirs* were always hereditary, but from the 1890s, the period that contacts between the community and the Aga Khan were reestablished, the *pirs'* succession had to be confirmed by the Aga Khan. The *pirs* left the Tajik Pamirs for Afghanistan in the 1930s for political reasons and due to the hostile climate of Soviet antireligious politics, and then the *khalifabs* became the main spiritual authorities in the area. In Afghanistan, the traditional hierarchy and system of *pirs* and *khalifabs* are still in place.

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ISMAILI SECTS—SOUTH ASIA An important Shi'ite Muslim community, the Ismailis arose in 765 from a disagreement over the successor to the sixth imam, Ja'far al. The Ismailis chose Isma'il and then traced the imamate through Isma'il's son Muhammad and the latter's progeny. The bulk of other Shi'ites, however, eventually recognized twelve imams, descendants of Isma'il's brother Musa al-Kazim. The two main Ismaili branches are the Musta'lis (Bohras) and the Nizaris (Khojas), both in India. The Nizaris, led by the Aga Khan, also have populations in Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia, East Africa, Europe, and North America.

By the middle of the ninth century the religiopolitical message of the Ismaili *da'wa* (mission) aiming to win recognition for the Ismaili imam as the rightful interpreter of the Islamic revelation was disseminated in many regions by a network of *da'is* (missionaries). The earliest Ismaili missionaries arrived in Sind (in today's Pakistan) in 883, initiating Ismaili activities in South Asia.

By 909 the Ismailis had succeeded in installing their imam in the new Fatimid caliphate, in rivalry with the Abbasid caliphate (750–1258) established by Sunni Muslims. Around 958 an Ismaili principality was established in Sind, with its seat at Multan, where large numbers of Hindus converted to Ismailism. Ismaili rule ended in Sind in 1005, but Ismailism survived in Sind and received the protection of the ruling Sumra dynasty. The Sulayhids of Yemen, who acknowledged the suzerainty of the Ismaili Fatimid caliph-imams, played a crucial role in the renewed efforts of the Fatimids to spread the Ismaili cause in South Asia. In 1067 missionaries sent from Yemen founded a new Ismaili community in Gujarat in western India. The mission maintained close ties with Yemen, and this new Ismaili community evolved into the present Bohra community.

In 1094 the Ismaili community became divided over who would become the nineteenth imam; the two branches resulted from this division, each of which developed its own religious and literary traditions.

Musta'li Ismailis (Bohras)

The Musta'li Ismailis founded their stronghold in Yemen, where in the absence of the imams the *da'is* acted as executive heads of the *da'wa* organization and as community spiritual leaders. They were designated as *da'i mutlaq* (*da'i* with absolute authority).

The Musta'li *da'wa* in South Asia remained under the strict supervision of the *da'i* and the *da'wa* headquarters in Yemen until the second half of the sixteenth century. In South Asia the Musta'li Ismaili *da'wa* orig-

inally spread among the urban artisans and traders of Gujarat; the Hindu converts became known as Bohras.

Many were converted in Cambay, Patan, Sidhpur, and later in Ahmadabad, where the Indian headquarters of the Musta'li *da'wa* were established. Early in the sixteenth century the headship of the Musta'li Ismailis passed to an Indian from Sidhpur, and later the headquarters of this Ismaili community were transferred permanently from Yemen to Ahmadabad, where the *da'is* could generally count on the religious tolerance of the Mughal emperors. By then the Ismaili Bohras of South Asia greatly outnumbered their co-religionists in Yemen.

In 1589 a succession dispute over the position of the *da'i mutlaq* split the Musta'li Ismailis into the rival Daudi and Sulaymani branches, each of which followed a separate line of *da'is*. Subsequently the Daudi Bohras were further subdivided in India as a result of periodic challenges to the authority of their *da'i mutlaq*. In 1624 a third Bohra splinter group appeared under the name of Aliyya, a small community of 8,000 still centered in Baroda. In 1785 the headquarters of the *da'wa* organization of the Daudi Bohras were transferred to Surat, still a center of traditional Islamic and Ismaili learning for the Daudi Bohras.

The Bohras, like other Shi'ite Muslims, were periodically persecuted in South Asia, and many converted to Sunni Islam, the religion of the Muslim rulers of Gujarat and elsewhere. However, with the consolidation of British rule in India in the early nineteenth century, South Asian Ismailis were no longer subjected to official persecution. The total Daudi Bohra population of the world is currently estimated at around 700,000 persons, more than half of whom live in Gujarat. Since the 1920s Bombay has served as the permanent seat of the *da'i mutlaq* of the Daudi Bohras and the central administration of his *da'wa* organization.

The Sulaymani Ismailis, numbering around 60,000, are concentrated in northern Yemen, with only a few thousand Sulaymani Bohras living in South Asia, mainly in Mumbai (Bombay).

Nizari Ismailis (Khojas)

In the late eleventh century, the Nizari Ismailis founded and organized a state with a network of mountain strongholds in Iran and Syria, which the Mongols destroyed in 1256. In the thirteenth century or a little earlier, the Nizari Ismaili *da'wa* was introduced into the Indian subcontinent. The earliest Nizari *da'is* operating in South Asia apparently concentrated their efforts in Sind (modern-day Punjab in Pakistan), where Ismailism had persisted clandestinely

since Fatimid times. Nizari *da'is* were referred to as *pirs* in South Asia. Pir Shams al-Din is the earliest figure associated with the commencement of Nizari Ismaili activities in Sind. The Nizari *da'wa* continued to be preached secretly in Sind by descendants of Shams. By the time of Pir Sadr al-Din, a great-grandson of Pir Shams, Nizari missionaries had established their own hereditary dynasty of *pirs* in South Asia with sporadic contacts with the Nizari imams who continued to reside in Iran.

Pir Sadr al-Din consolidated and organized Nizari activities in South Asia and strengthened the Nizari Ismaili, or Khoja, community in the Indian subcontinent. His shrine is located near Ucch, south of Multan. Sadr al-Din converted many Hindus from the Lohana trading caste and gave them the title of Khoja. The specific Nizari Ismaili tradition that developed in India is sometimes referred to by the vernacular translation of the Qur'anic term *sirat al-mustaqim*, rendered as Satpanth (*sat panth*) or the "true way."

Pir Sadr al-Din was succeeded by his son Hasan Kabir al-Din, who eventually settled in Ucch, which served as the seat of Nizari Ismailism in South Asia. Pir Hasan was reportedly affiliated with the Suhrawardi Sufi order, at the time prevalent in western and northern India. Multan and Ucch in Sind, where Ismailism had become established, were also the headquarters of the Suhrawardi and Qadiri Sufi orders. In the next two or three centuries Ismailism, in its Nizari form, reemerged in the subcontinent, in forms and ideas having much in common with Sufism. The nature of this relationship is not clear, but recent research suggests that the Ismailis along with the Sufis spearheaded the spread of Islam in rural areas of India. The Ismaili heritage and contribution to Islam in South Asia are best reflected in their literary traditions, preserved and developed over centuries and aptly called *ginnan*, from the Sanskrit *jnan*, meaning reflective or contemplative knowledge.

After the death of Pir Hasan Kabir al-Din a section of the community seceded and established itself in Gujarat, becoming known as Imam Shahis. The majority continued to adhere to the authority of the Nizari imams.

Ginans and Their Historical Context With scholars' growing realization that oral and so-called popular expressions of Muslim devotion and spirituality constitute a vital component of Islamic life and practice, there is increasing interest in the texts that preserve, in local languages, the devotional spirit of Muslim mysticism in the Indian subcontinent. In the South Asian context such texts represent part of the

processes of conversion, negotiation, and transmission of established traditions of Muslim spirituality and ideas. The *ginnans* emerged in a milieu where both oral and written traditions were well established. Because of their primary role in ritual and religious life, the performative and recitative elements of such devotional expressions were much more pronounced than was the case, for instance, for Sufi poetry.

Among the Nizari Ismailis *ginnan* has come to refer to that part of their tradition whose authorship is attributed to the *pirs* who undertook conversion and preaching. It is important to distinguish the various strands making up the hagiography of the *pirs* and to isolate the elements that reflect traces of ancient tradition and form the nucleus of later narratives. These are rarely concerned with imparting objective records of the past; the true value of the *ginnan* narratives lies in their dual perspective on the tradition: one level mirroring the impact and continuing influence of the earlier *pirs* on the community's collective memory, and the other revealing the community's beliefs and understanding at various stages in its history.

Modern Period The forty-sixth Nizari Ismaili Imam Hasan Ali Shah (1817–1881), who received the honorific title of Aga Khan ("lord") from the monarch of Iran, Fath Ali Shah Qajar, emigrated from Iran to India in the 1840s and eventually settled in Bombay; he was the first Nizari Ismaili imam to live in India. Aga Khan I established elaborate headquarters and residences in Bombay, Poona, and Bangalore. As the spiritual head of a Muslim community, like other communities in British India, Aga Khan I was accorded recognition of his role in the legal framework of the empire. Aga Khan I tried to strengthen the religious identity of his followers. His successors to the Nizari Ismaili imamate adopted modernization policies and introduced new administrative and institutional frameworks for guiding the affairs of their Khoja and other Nizari followers. Sultan Muhammad Shah, Aga Khan III, the forty-eighth imam, led the Nizari Ismailis for seventy-two years (1885–1957), longer than any of his predecessors. He became well known as a Muslim reformer and statesman owing to his prominent role in Indo-Muslim and international affairs, as well as a wealthy sportsman and breeder of racehorses.

The Nizari Khojas, along with Bohras, were among the earliest Asian communities to settle in East Africa. Many from the Nizari Khoja communities of East Africa, India, and Pakistan have emigrated to Europe and North America since the 1970s. The Khojas today represent an integral part of the Nizari communities scattered in more than twenty-five countries.

They currently recognize Prince Karim Aga Khan IV as their forty-ninth imam. The present Nizari imam continued and substantially expanded the modernization policies of his grandfather and predecessor and developed new programs and institutions, including the prestigious Aga Khan award for architecture. Under the leadership of their recent imams, the South Asian and other Nizari Ismailis, numbering several millions, have entered the twenty-first century as a prosperous and progressive community with a distinct identity and a variety of regional traditions.

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ISTANBUL (2002 pop. 10.3 million). Istanbul (called Byzantium until 330 CE and Constantinople until 1930), is an ancient city in northwest Turkey that straddles Europe and Asia. Istanbul lies on both sides of the Bosphorus, a narrow, thirty-two-kilometer-long strait that separates the European and Asian parts of the city, so that the northern city is in Europe and the southern in Asia. The city was the capital of the Byzantine and Ottoman empires and also of the Turkish Republic until 1923, when the capital was moved to Ankara. Tourists, temporary workers, and transit passengers may increase the city's population to close to 12 million. Divided into twelve districts (*kazas*), Istanbul covers 240 square kilometers, three-quarters of it in Europe.

History

Istanbul is largely a product of the millennia-long interaction between Eastern Europe and Asia and thus represents a unique mixture of Eastern European and Oriental cultures. Founded by Greeks around 660 BCE, the ancient city became a strategically important seaport due to its position on the Bosphorus, which connects the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara. Emperor Constantine the Great (d. 337) selected it as the capital of the Byzantine empire in 324 and renamed it Konstantinou polis (Constantine's city) in 330.

Constantinople became the largest and most prosperous city in Europe, benefiting from its strategic location and a vibrant trade. However, the city's wealth and situation made it an attractive prize, and through the centuries it was often attacked. For instance, in 1204, during the Fourth Crusade (1202–1204), the Crusaders captured and sacked the city, causing enormous damage. The Byzantines retook it in 1251, and for many centuries, Constantinople was the spiritual and political center of the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Byzantine empire. At first, the city was situated entirely on the European side and was encircled by a wall. This ancient part of the city was home to numerous Orthodox churches, palaces, and public buildings, with some Byzantine monuments, such as the magnificent church of Hagia Sophia (Saint Sophia or Holy Wisdom, today a museum) surviving today.

In 1453 the Turks under the Ottoman sultan Mehmed II (1432–1481) captured Constantinople, and soon afterward the city became the Ottoman capital. One symbol of the city, Hagia Sophia, built by the emperor Justinian (483–565) in 532–562, was converted into a mosque in the fifteenth century. The Turkish sultans nevertheless patronized ethnic and



ISTANBUL—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Historical areas of Istanbul were designated as UNESCO World Heritage Sites in 1985 for their immense historical value, beauty, and the threat posed by increasing environmental and population pressures on the onion-domed Hagia Sophia, Hippodrome of Constantinople, and other masterpieces.



Galata Bridge and Galata Tower at the Golden Horn in northern Istanbul, in 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

religious minorities and ordered the preservation of the city's major Byzantine churches and the retention of the Orthodox patriarchate. When in 1509 a devastating earthquake damaged many parts of the city, the Ottomans had the city rebuilt, adding numerous public buildings, including magnificent mosques, palaces, public baths, and gardens. As the capital of the Ottoman empire, Constantinople became the cultural center of the Middle East and for the next four centuries influenced the cultural, political, and economic development of the region.

Constantinople experienced a new wave of significant changes during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with the *Tanzimat* (Reorganization), the Ottomans' attempt to catch up with the West and to modernize the country. Textiles, weapons, shipbuilding, and other industries proliferated in the city, and Constantinople was significantly enlarged to take in new areas south of the Bosphorus. In 1838 the first bridge was built across the Golden Horn, an inlet of the Bosphorus, which forms Istanbul's harbor. In June 1883, a railroad, the renowned *Orient Express*, first connected Constantinople with Paris via Vienna.

During the Crimean War (1853–1856), in which Turkey was allied with France and Britain against Russia, French and British troops had been quartered in Constantinople. Yet close relations with the major great European powers did not last, and attempts to reform the country's political and economic systems

met major resistance among conservative elements in Turkish society. In the early twentieth century, Turkey shifted its alliances and established close relations with Germany. The First World War left the Ottoman empire significantly weakened and unable to cope with separatist movements in its numerous provinces, combined with pressure from the European great powers, and Turkey collapsed.

At war's end in 1918, Britain, France, and Italy occupied the city until 1923, but then evacuated under pressure from the Turkish liberation movement led by Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938). In 1923, the Turkish republican government established Ankara as the capital of the secular Turkish Republic, but Constantinople (renamed Istanbul in 1930) has remained a major industrial, financial, and cultural city of the republic and by the end of the twentieth century was the largest city in Europe.

Economy and People

Istanbul is one of the most important commercial centers in Turkey and southeast Europe. Its deepwater seaport and international airport enable it to serve as a transportation and communication hub for all the Black Sea countries, including the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The city's manufacturing sector involves petrochemicals, cement, machinery, food and tobacco processing, textiles, garments, and various other goods. Tourism is another important sector of Istanbul.

bul's economy, providing not only direct employment for more than 100,000 people, but also hard-currency earnings for the city and country. The number of tourists visiting Turkey rose steadily throughout the 1980s and 1990s, reaching 10 million in 2000 (official estimate), though the number of arrivals sharply declined in 2001. Most tourists to Turkey chose Istanbul as an entry point or destination of choice.

During the second half of the twentieth century, Istanbul became the fastest-growing city in Europe; its population almost doubled from approximately 2.3 million in the 1950s to 5.5 million in 1985 and in 2000 (official estimate) doubled to 10.1 million, approximately 15 percent of Turkey's total population. Only about half of the people who live in modern Istanbul were born in the city; the rest moved there from other parts of Turkey in search of jobs and better living standards. Due to the rapid population growth, many shantytowns called *gecekondu* ("set down by night") appeared on the city's outskirts. In the 1990s, Istanbul became an important transit hub for immigrants from the Middle East, South Asia, and Northern Africa on their way to Europe. The majority of the population are Turks, although there is a sizable minority that includes Greeks, Jews, Armenians, and Albanians.

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ITO NOE (1895–1923), Japanese writer and feminist. Ito Noe achieved notoriety as a freethinker whose autobiographical writing, political associations, and unconventional love relationships epitomized the "new woman" of modern Japan. Noe initially earned attention for her contributions to *Seito* (Bluestock-

ings), a controversial feminist literary journal published from 1911 to 1916 by a small group of young Tokyo women also known as the Bluestockings. Noe joined the Bluestockings in 1912 when, as a teenager, she illegally fled from an arranged marriage in her Kyushu hometown to live with her former high school English teacher, Tsuji Jun, in Tokyo. The stories that Noe wrote about her arranged marriage and about the later failure of her love marriage to Tsuji Jun are some of her most significant contributions to *Seito*. Noe argued for women to have a choice about when to enter and when to leave a marriage. She also wrote essays championing the new woman, translated the works of Emma Goldman, and debated other Bluestockings over issues such as prostitution and charity work. She took the editorial helm of *Seito* in its last thirteen months of publication.

In 1916, Noe left Tsuji and their two children for the anarchist Osugi Sakae, winning him away from his wife and another lover. Noe bore five children with Osugi while working with him in labor organizing, writing, journal editing, and public speaking.

With Yamakawa Kikue, Noe participated in the socialist women's group Sekirankai (Red Wave Society). Both Noe and Osugi were murdered in the wave of police brutality following the great earthquake that devastated Tokyo in 1923. *The Collected Works of Ito Noe* was published in two volumes in Japanese in 1970, when the women's liberation movement renewed interest in Japanese feminist history.

Jan Bardsley

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IWASHIMIZU HACHIMAN SHRINE One of the oldest and most important Shinto shrines in Japan Iwashimizu Hachiman Shrine is located southwest of Kyoto on Mount Otokoyama. It is one of the main shrines dedicated to Hachiman, popularly viewed as the *kami* (deity) of war and learning. The shrine's main festival (and that of its numerous branch shrines throughout Japan) is on the fifteenth day of the ninth month.

The shrine was established about 859 CE by a Buddhist priest, Gyoko, and its buildings have been rebuilt several times. The current design is from 1634, when the shrine was patronized by the third shogun of the Tokugawa period (1600/1603–1868). One of

the early patrons of the shrine was Minamoto no Yoshiie (Hachiman Taro), and the shrine was a favorite of Minamoto and Ashikaga shoguns because of its association with warrior values, as well as with their clan ancestors. The shrine was patronized by the imperial house, and homage is paid there annually, in the presence of an imperial envoy, for the defeat of Taira no Masakado and Fujiwara no Sumitomo, both accused, at different times, of plotting to usurp the throne. The shrine's original association with Buddhism was severed during the campaign to expel the buddhas in the early years of the Meiji Restoration (1868–1912).

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IWATE (2002 est. pop. 1.4 million). Iwate Prefecture is situated in the northern region of Japan's island of Honshu. Once on the untamed frontier, in the early 2000s it remains a bastion of early culture. With a population of 1,418,000 residents, Iwate occupies an area of 15,278 square kilometers. Its main geographical features are the Ou and Kitakami Mountains, which enclose the river Kitakamigawa plateau. Iwate is bordered by the Pacific Ocean and by Aomori, Akita, and Miyagi Prefectures. Once known as Mutsu Province, it assumed its present name and borders in 1876.

The prefecture's capital is Morioka. Although a bustling commercial city and home to Iwate University, it retains much of the flavor of its origins as the Edo period (1600/1603–1868) castle town of the Nambu family, famous for breeding fine horses. Its attractions include the old merchant quarter, the Hachiman shrine to the god of war, and the ruins of Morioka Castle. The prefecture's other important cities are Mikayo, Hanamaki, and Ichinoseki.

Iwate has a long history. In ancient times, it was home to the aboriginal Ezo people. In the Heian period (794–1185), the Fujiwara family assumed control of the province and established a capital at Hiraizumi, which became the military, political, and cultural center of all northern Japan. The Fujiwara became wealthy from the gold found in the area and they built splendid temples and palaces. In the late Muromachi period (1333–1573), control of the province passed to the Nambu family in the north and the Date family in the south. The Tokugawa shogunate (1600/1603–

1868) oversaw the division of the area into some twenty domains.

Iwate's main agricultural activity is rice farming and livestock raising, along with lumber production and fishing. Mining makes the prefecture a leading source of iron and copper ore. A major tourist destination is Hiraizumi, today a small country town compared to its past days of splendor. Still standing are the temple known as Golden Hall (Konjikido), the first National Treasure to be so designated, and the Heian-style gardens and ruins of the Motsuji, once a complex of forty temples. Iwate's traditional crafts include the wooden folk toys known as Kokeshi dolls and Nambu cast iron made into bells, statues, and heavy kettles. The region's traditional dances include the deer dance (*shishi odori*) and sword dance (*kembai*).

E. L. S. Weber

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IZMIR (1997 pop. 2.0 million). Izmir (Smyrna), the third-largest city of Turkey and an important commercial center, is located on the Aegean coast of Anatolia, in the gulf of Izmir. Reputedly the birthplace of Homer, Izmir was an important city during the Classical Greek and Roman periods and was a provincial capital under the Byzantine empire. In 1081, it was conquered by the Seljuks, a Turkic empire that had invaded Anatolia a decade earlier. It was retaken by the Byzantines in 1097, but was lost to another principality, Aydinogullari, in 1344. The Ottomans took control of Izmir, along with the rest of Aydin territories, in 1390 under Sultan Beyazit I (reigned 1389–1402). After Beyazit's defeat by Timur (Tamerlane) at the Battle of Ankara in 1402, the Aydinogullari were able to briefly retake control, though they submitted sovereignty to the Ottomans once again in 1415.

Izmir maintained its importance throughout the Ottoman period, serving as a naval base, and has remained an important center for international trade. The city was noted for its cosmopolitanism. Its population was distinguished by ethnic and religious variety including Turkish-speaking Muslims, Ladino-speaking Jews, and Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians. In the nineteenth century Izmir was arguably the wealthiest city in the Ottoman empire. European capital promoted the development of advanced infrastructure, such as a modern port (1868), new industries, and gas streetlights (1864). Railways were built to connect



The city of Izmir, Turkey, on the Aegean Sea. (YANN ARTHUS-BERTRAND/CORBIS)

Izmir's port with its agricultural hinterland. In 1901 the German kaiser, Wilhelm II (reigned 1888–1918), donated a clock tower to the city, which today is its most famous landmark.

After the defeat of the Ottoman empire in World War I, Izmir became the center of an attempt by Greece to expand into western Anatolia. The Greek army landed in Izmir in May 1919, but this move precipitated a movement of Turkish nationalist resistance, which eventually forced the Greeks to withdraw from Izmir in 1922. As the Turkish army took control of Izmir, fires destroyed most of the city. Many non-Muslims fled with the Greek army, and the remaining Orthodox Christian population of the region was deported to Greece in the Greek-Turkish population exchanges agreed on in the treaty of Lausanne (1923).

Izmir has recovered from these traumas and is still an important trading and industrial city, with one of the highest standards of living in the country. It is home to several universities, an important archaeological museum, and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) installations.

Howard Eissenstat

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IZNIK (2002 est. pop. 21,000). Iznik, a town in northwestern Turkey on the eastern shore of Iznik Lake, is surrounded by walls with four gates. Within the town are many historic baths, mausoleums, *madrasabs* or Muslim religious schools, mosques, minarets, and imarets or inns. Notable buildings include the fourteenth-century Green Mosque and the fourth-century Saint Sophia Cathedral.

The Macedonian Greek ruler Antigonus I (382–301 BCE), once a general of Alexander of Macedon (356–323 BCE), founded the town, which he named Antigoneia, in 316 BCE. Later renamed Nicaea, the town rose to prominence during the Byzantine empire, when influential Christian ecumenical councils met there. The First Nicene Council, held in 325, put forth the Nicene Creed as the description of the persons of the Trinity and condemned Arianism, a Christian heresy that disavowed Jesus' divinity. The Second Nicene Council, in 787, rescinded the ban on the veneration of images, which had been introduced during the iconoclastic controversies of 726 and 730.

In 1078 the Seljuk Turks conquered Nicaea. The Ottoman Turks captured the town in 1331 and gave it its present name of Iznik. From the late fifteenth to the early eighteenth centuries, Iznik was a famous production center for quartz-based tiles and clay pottery.

The colorful, abstract decoration of Iznik ware was painted in blue, turquoise and purple, and red, against a white ground. Iznik's ceramics industry was revived beginning in 1985. Some residents of Iznik grow olives, grapes, tomatoes, and peaches on nearby farmland, and fishers catch crayfish from Iznik Lake. The town has many hotels, restaurants, and cafes.

Kevin Alan Brook

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IZUMO SHRINE Izumo Taisha (also known as Izumo no Oyashiro, the Grand Shrine of Izumo), one of the oldest and most influential shrines in Japan, is located in Kizuki, Shimane Prefecture, once the feudal Izumo domain. It enshrines the deity Okuninushino-mikoto, known popularly as Daikoku-sama.

Izumo Shrine is built in the archaic *taisha-zukuri* ("great-shrine building") style of shrine architecture. The present buildings date from 1744, although a major fire in 1953 necessitated some rebuilding. The main building, surmounted by a great thatched, slightly concave roof rising eighty feet above the foundation, is the largest shrine in Japan. During the month of October, by the lunar calendar, all the Shinto deities of the country are believed to depart their local shrines and gather at Izumo Taisha. Various rites are observed to welcome, honor, and later send off these deities on their return to their local shrines. This period, known throughout Japan as *kaminazuki* ("month when the gods are absent") is known at Izumo as *kamiarizuki* ("month when the gods are present").



The Great Shrine of Izumo in Shimane Prefecture, Japan. (SAKAMOTO PHOTO RESEARCH/CORBIS)

The shrine is popular among young couples for bestowing felicitous marital relations and is also thought to protect agriculture and offer good fortune.

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JADE Jade (Chinese *yù*), a dense, luminous stone of various colors including white, yellow, green, gray, mauve, and brown, has been an artistic medium from at least the fifth millennium BCE in China. The term "jade" is generally applied to two types of stones: nephrite, a crystalline calcium magnesium silicate from northeast China (Jiangsu Province) and Central Asia's Khotan and Yarkand regions, and jadeite, a green, glassy sodium aluminum silicate mineral of the pyroxene family from Myanmar (Burma). It is nephrite, however, that early Chinese artists utilized for ritual objects, personal items, and ornaments.

Prized for its innate beauty, jade came to be regarded as having moral virtues and magical properties and was believed to be the congealed semen of a celestial dragon. The Han dynasty scholar Xu Shen described jade as having five virtues: charity, epitomized by its bright warm luster; rectitude, as signified by its translucence; wisdom, as typified by its purity and penetrating sound when struck; courage, in that while it can be broken, it cannot be bent; and equity, represented by its sharp angles that injure none.

Special techniques for carving jade were devised because of jade's extreme hardness. Unlike other stones, which can be chiseled, jade must be fashioned through a laborious abrasion process utilizing drills and quartz sand. This labor-intensive process makes jade artifacts very costly. From earliest times, it seems that jade was the ultimate symbol of wealth and power. Thus, the finest workmanship and artistry were lavished on the precious stone.

The earliest artistic use of jade occurred in the Hongshan culture of the middle Huang (Yellow) River basin, Liaoning Province, dated to the fifth to fourth millen-

nia BCE. Examples of jade carvings in this period include coiled dragons, owls, turtles, and cloudlike plaques. Jades are so predominant among Hongshan artifacts that some specialists have referred to the period as the Jade Age. In tombs, jade objects were positioned on, around, and under the body of the deceased. Thus, jade was regarded as having more than social status; it had ritual and protective properties as well.

Ritual use of jade in burials continued in China through the Western Han dynasty (206 BCE–24 CE). Most notable are the full jade body suits from Lingshan, Mancheng, Hebei Province, belonging to Prince Liu Sheng and his wife Princess Dou Wan. The two royal figures were covered from head to foot in outfits made entirely of jade plaques drilled at the four corners and fastened with gold wire. It is believed that these functioned as shrouds, protecting the body from decay and from attack by evil forces.



A jade carver holds a piece of carved jade in Changchun, China. (RIC ERGENBRIGHT/CORBIS)

Jade implements were important in statecraft during the Shang and Zhou dynasties (1766–256 BCE) in that various pieces came to signify specific courtly ranks. Because jade was associated with the imperial court and with great virtue, it became likened to the Confucian ideal of the perfect gentleman (*junzi*).

From the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) on, jade was used more and more for secular items and personal adornment. By the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), the secular use of jade was widespread. Jewelry, fine vessels, and utensils, as well as objets d'art having no particular religious connotation, were crafted from jade. Decorative and functional items such as bowls, cups, dishes, ewers, vases, containers, hair ornaments, beads, and bracelets received lavish, delicate ornamentation.

After centuries of Chinese jade working, the tradition spread westward through Central Asia into India and Turkey. There are fine Mughal pieces, known as Hindustan jades, many of which are embellished with intricate designs incorporating precious gems held in place with gold filigree.

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JADIDISM The term "Jadidism" denotes a range of modernist movements that flourished among the Muslims of the Russian empire between 1880 and 1920. Beginning as a movement of religious reform, Jadidism quickly acquired broad cultural, social, and ultimately political dimensions. The movement's name came from its advocacy of the *usul-i jadid* ("the new method"), new phonetic approach to teaching the Arabic alphabet, an indication of the centrality of educational reform to Jadidism. Historians refer to the proponents of Jadidism as Jadids, although the Jadids did not usually use this term themselves.

The late nineteenth century saw the rise of modernist movements throughout the Muslim world. While they existed in markedly different political contexts, these movements shared a concern over their societies'

political and economic decline relative to Europe and a belief in the compatibility of Islam and modernity.

Jadidism originated in the intellectual ferment created in Tatar society by rapid economic change occurring in the mid-nineteenth century, including the emergence of a Tatar mercantile bourgeoisie with extensive trading networks in Russia, Siberia, and Central Asia. Religious scholars such as Abdunnasir al-Kursavi (1776–1812) and Shihabeddin al-Marjani (1818–1889) questioned the authority of traditional Islamic theology and argued for creative reinterpretation of Islam. But the efforts of the Crimean Tatar noble Ismail Bey Gaspirali (1851–1914) gave shape to Jadidism as a cultural movement. In 1883 Gaspirali received permission to publish the newspaper *Terjuman* (Interpreter) in his native Bakhchisaray. *Terjuman* became the standard bearer of Jadidism throughout the Russian empire and beyond, influencing cultural debates in the Ottoman empire as well. In 1884 Gaspirali opened the first "new method" elementary school, in which children were taught the Arabic alphabet using the new phonetic method of instruction. These schools quickly became the flagship of Jadid reform. The emphasis on enlightenment also gave rise to a boom in publishing among the Tatars, as Jadid authors wrote and translated (from Russian, French, Ottoman Turkish, and Arabic) thousands of books on various subjects.

At the turn of the twentieth century a Jadid movement emerged in Central Asia, where different social and political contexts imparted a distinct hue. The *ulama* (religious scholars) retained much greater influence in Central Asia, while the new mercantile class was much weaker. The market for publishing was also much smaller, and Central Asian Jadids were more strongly rooted in Islamic education. Nevertheless, they faced opposition from their own society as well as from a Russian state always suspicious of unofficial initiatives.

Jadidism's rhetoric of cultural reform was directed at Muslim society itself. The basic themes were enlightenment, progress, and "awakening" the nation to take its place in the modern, "civilized" world, which meant sovereign states possessing military and economic might. Given the lack of political sovereignty, however, it was up to society to lift itself up through education and disciplined effort. Jadid rhetoric was usually sharply critical of the present state of Muslim society, which the Jadids contrasted unfavorably to their own glorious past and the present of the "civilized" countries of Europe.

The single most important term in the Jadid lexicon was *taraqqi*, meaning progress. For the Jadids progress and civilization were accessible to all societies

solely through disciplined effort and enlightenment. Nothing in Islam prevented Muslims from joining the modern world; indeed, Islam enjoined disciplined effort and enlightenment on Muslims. Only a modern person equipped with knowledge "according to the needs of the age" could be a good Muslim.

The new method of teaching the alphabet marked a shift in the understanding of the purposes of literacy and, ultimately, of knowledge. Literacy for the Jadids was a functional skill with no sacral connotations. The Jadids claimed that the true meaning of Islam could be acquired through a critical reading of the scriptures without recourse to the tradition of interpretation represented by the *ulama*. This claim had radical repercussions for the authority of the *ulama*, and for Islam itself.

Jadidism would have been impossible without the advent of print. Print allowed the new intellectuals to assert their claims to interpretation to a broad audience and thus to undermine the monopoly of the *ulama* over cultural debate. At the same time, newspapers and translations into Turkic or Arabic of European works made available to the Jadids new ways of thinking about the world and their place in it, so that when they looked at their own society they did so with new eyes.

The object of Jadid reform was the *millat*, the Muslim community, which quickly acquired national and ethnic overtones and led to the rise of nationalism and political radicalism. While Gaspirali was revered as the father of Jadidism, by the time of his death younger Jadids had grown wary of his political caution and were attracted to more radical political stances. The Russian revolution of 1917 radicalized Jadidism even further, and many Jadids came to espouse both nationalist and socialist agendas as the most efficient path to enlightenment and progress.

Jadidism provides a good argument for questioning the dichotomy between Islam and modernity, since it represented both. It was rooted in a long Islamic tradition of reform, but it also shared a post-Enlightenment understanding of the world and used such aspects of modernity as the press and schooling. New economic and social forces produced alternative understandings of the world and consequently new national and religious identities.

Adeeb Khalid

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JAFFNA (2002 est. population of the peninsula 480,000). Jaffna refers to the capital city, peninsula, adjacent islands, and hinterland of the northernmost region of Sri Lanka. It has been a major avenue of trade and migration between India and Sri Lanka since prehistoric times. After the collapse of the Anuradhapura kingdom and its conquest by the Chola dynasty, the area became a homogeneous Tamil-speaking Hindu region, and the city became the capital of a Tamil kingdom that periodically waged war with the Sinhalese kingdoms to the south. The area successively fell under Portuguese (1591), Dutch (1658), and British (1795) colonial rule. In the nineteenth century, it was integrated into the British Crown Colony of Ceylon. It remained part of the unified state when the colony gained its independence in 1948. Tamil claims of discrimination in favor of the majority Sinhalese Buddhists led to a separatist movement that erupted into a bloody civil war in 1983. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) emerged as the leaders of Tamil separatism through a violent contest with other separatists. The peninsula was occupied by the Indian army in 1987. When the Indian army withdrew in 1990, the LTTE established a harsh regime. The Sri Lankan army captured Jaffna in 1995. Despite government attempts to rehabilitate the region, fighting continued throughout 2001.

Patrick Peebles

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JAHANGIR (1569–1627), Mughal emperor. Sultan Salim, who ruled northern India under the name Nuruddin Muhammad and the title Jahangir, was born



PLEASING THE EMPEROR (MUGHAL EMPEROR JAHANGIR)

"Mr Edwardes presented the Kinge [the Mughal Emperor Jahangir] a mastife, and speakinge of the dog's courage, the Kinge cawsed a younge leoparde to be brought to make tryall, which the dogge soe pinchtt, thatt fewer howres after the leoparde dyed. Synce, the Kinge of Persia, with a presentt, sent heather haulfe a dozen dogges—the Kinges cawsed boares to be brought to fight with them, puttinge two or three dogges to a boare, yet none of them seased; and rememberinge his owne dogge, sentt for him, who presently fastened on the boare, so disgraced the Persian doggs, wherewith the Kinge was exceedingly pleased."

Source: Letter from Kerridge, East India Company President at Surat (1612), as quoted in *The Sabibs* (1948), edited by Hilton Brown. London: William Hodge & Co., 158–159.

in Sikri in 1569. His mother was a Rajput princess, and his father was the great Mughal emperor Akbar (1542–1605). As a prince, Salim had sought to lead a rebellion against his father, but the two were later reconciled, and it was only with Akbar's death that Salim became emperor under the title of Jahangir (world seizer). Jahangir was fortunate in inheriting an extensive, prosperous, and politically stable empire from his father. Unfortunately, Jahangir's court was saturated with intrigue and corruption, and he faced a powerful rival in his eldest son, Prince Khusru, who was eventually subdued. His favorite wife, Noor Jahan, was the power behind the throne and placed her family members in important court positions. Her father received a title; the daughter of her brother married Prince Khurram, the eventual heir; and her daughter from her first marriage became the wife of Jahangir's youngest son, Prince Shahryar.

Western influence in India was growing, and Jahangir had contact with the Portuguese and the fledgling British East India Company. James I's ambassador, Sir Thomas Roe, was received warmly at court and managed to secure major concessions (1615–1618). Hunting and drinking were Jahangir's passions, and his rule did not leave any military or administrative landmarks. However, Jahangir was ar-

guably the greatest of all Mughal connoisseurs of the arts and a lover of beauty—both natural and artistic. He took a keen interest in commissioning jewelry, calligraphy, and manuscript illustrations.

Chandrika Kaul

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JAINISM Jainism, like Hinduism and Buddhism, is one of India's ancient, indigenous religions. The word "Jain" derives from the Sanskrit word *ji* meaning to conquer. The founder of Jainism was Vardhamana (c. 599–527 BCE), later known as Mahavira, who lived in Magadha (in present-day Bihar state). Mahavira, an



In Karhataka, India, a Jain priest stands before a figurine of Mahavira, the founder of Jainism. (CHARLES AND JOSETTE LENARS/CORBIS)



The Palitana Jain Temple in Gujarat, India, in 1987. (TIZIANA AND GIANNI BALDIZZONE/CORBIS)

unorthodox teacher, firmly opposed the prevailing religion of the day, the sacrificial Vedic religion, and the already dominant authority of the Brahman caste.

Origins and Development

Mahavira was a contemporary of Siddhartha Gautama Buddha (c. 566–486 BCE), and like the Buddha he was the son of the king of a politically powerful clan, was educated as a prince, married, and fathered a child. Despite his royal upbringing, at the age of thirty he left his home to pursue a life of asceticism in search of spiritual salvation. First he joined the Nirgranthas ("Free from Bonds") ascetic sect founded by the teacher Parshavanatha, who lived during the ninth century BCE. The Nirgranthas were later absorbed into the order Mahavira founded. Parshavanatha is remembered as the twenty-third tirthankara ("ford maker"), or enlightened teacher, and Mahavira is the twenty-fourth in this long line of realized masters who attained enlightenment (*kevalajnana*). No doubt Jain beliefs and practices originated in remote antiquity, and the Jain connection to the Nirgranthas establishes the religion as far older than Buddhism. Jain mythology has it that the first tirthankara was Rshabhanatha, whose mother Marudevi attained *kevalajnana* upon seeing her son. According to Jain beliefs, she was the first human of this world to attain liberation.

During his long search for enlightenment Mahavira realized the necessity of renouncing all attachments and possessions, including even the one garment he

wore. As a religious reformer he was critical of the Vedas and the Brahmans, seeing no relevance in the priestly class and their rites of sacrifice, particularly in the matter of freedom from the endless cycles of reincarnation and the attainment of transcendent knowledge. His teachings denied both a powerful god creator and a superhuman origin of the universe. He asserted that there was no creation per se; instead there was an unceasing evolution involving endless transmigration of souls. Upon achieving enlightenment, Mahavira spent his remaining life wandering unclothed and begging for food. According to tradition, he taught for thirty years with the patronization of kings and finally died of self-imposed starvation at the age of seventy-two.

In his teachings Mahavira stressed the need to fight passions and bodily senses to purify the soul and gain omniscience, the highest Jain goal. Many of his followers also became renouncers and abandoned worldly pleasures, renunciation being the way to conquer all passions. The body of believers was divided into two groups, the renouncers, composed of both monks and nuns, and the lay practitioners, whose position was subordinate to the renouncers. All Jains observed the three moral excellences or jewels (*triratna*), right knowledge, right intuition, and right conduct, including the practice of ahimsa (noninjury to any life-form). Lay followers were not expected to embrace the harsher requirements of the monks and nuns but were encouraged to develop twenty-one meritorious quali-

ties, among them mercy, kindness, truthfulness, humility, modesty, and limiting possessions. Those who renounced, however, embraced five principles or greater vows (*vratas*): (1) noninjury (ahimsa), (2) kindness and speaking the truth, (3) honorable conduct, (4) chastity in word and action, and (5) renunciation of worldly interests.

Beliefs and Practices

Central to Jainism is the belief in reincarnation and karma (merit and demerit). The aim of the code of conduct is to avoid accruing new negative karma while destroying old negative karma. Jainism maintains that the self is polluted by karmic particles, bits of materials generated by a person's actions that attach to the soul and consequently bind the soul to material bodies through many births. When karmic particles are wiped from the self, enlightenment is attained and the soul no longer faces material rebirth. Mortification of the flesh protects against the acquisition of new negative karma and rids the body of old negative karma. Purification requires fasting, confession, penance, reverence for superiors, service to others, meditation, study, indifference to the needs of the body, and observation of vows.

The first principle, noninjury, or ahimsa, is viewed as especially necessary to free the soul of karma. The primary ethical virtue, ahimsa is the measure by which all actions are judged. A policy of ahimsa is assiduously followed, demanding great precautions to avoid harming or killing any life-form, including insects and microbes. In Jainism a person's negative karma is increased by interference with the spiritual progress of another. Thus many Jains cover their mouths, wearing a mask or cloth (*mul-patti*), to prevent breathing in or swallowing insects. Many Jains do not eat or drink after dark to avoid inadvertent ingestion of insects. Eating meat, of course, is a violation of ahimsa, along with eating any foods that engender colonies of microbes. Not only are such foods considered unhealthy for the consumer, but also the microbes themselves are damaged by consumption. Similarly, wandering renouncers remain in one place during the monsoons, because while walking on muddy roads they might crush worms, snails, or waterborne creatures. Other renouncers refuse to travel by rail because of the possibility that the train's wheels might kill organisms on the tracks.

Sects

Disputes among Mahavira's followers led to the formation of two sects. The division, which began around the second century BCE and was finalized in the first

century CE, formed the Digambaras ("sky clad"), or naked ascetics, and the Svetambaras ("white clad"), who wear a simple white garment. The Digambaras believe nakedness is proof of the conquest of sin, asserting that sin cannot exist in the absence of shame. The Svetambaras protest that wearing a simple garment implies no shame or sin. The two sects are divided on the subject of women's enlightenment. Svetambaras assert that women can become enlightened, while Digambaras declare that only males can achieve enlightenment. Consequently women do not become naked ascetics, although according to Mahavira's teachings women are allowed to renounce the world and form orders of nuns. All renouncers are required to pluck out their hair rather than shave or cut it, hence Jains are often called hair pluckers. After twelve years of strict asceticism, a Jain renouncer may commit suicide through self-starvation.

Influence and Role in Indian Society

Jainism has existed continuously in India for 2,500 years. Jain beliefs, particularly ahimsa, have had a significant influence on India's culture. Asoka (d. c. 238), a Buddhist emperor, stressed the practice of ahimsa in his reforms. In the twentieth century Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi (1869–1948) was influenced by the concept of ahimsa when he developed his policy of nonviolent resistance in India's struggle for independence. Historically ahimsa and vegetarianism have been important in Buddhism and Hinduism. Jains also have contributed to philosophy, logic, art, architecture, mathematics, astronomy, and literature.

Jains constitute the oldest religious minority still practicing in India. The 1981 Indian census counted some 3.2 million Jains, most of whom live in urban centers in the modern states of Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and Karnataka. Traditionally the Jains have avoided farming because cultivation of the soil may accidentally kill insects and violate the ahimsa restriction. Twenty-first-century Jains are mainly bankers, jewelers, merchants, moneylenders, and industrialists. As merchants and businesspeople they are known for their honesty. Even though the Jains are a wealthy community, they seek out and support humanitarian causes to relieve suffering. They are particularly renowned for operating centers dedicated to maintaining abused and sick animals and for endowing lavish temples.

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JAIPUR (2001 est. pop. 2.3 million). The capital and largest city of Rajasthan state in northwestern India, Jaipur ("city of victory") is known as the pink city for its salmon-colored facades in the old-walled quarter. The fabled stronghold of a clan of rulers, it is today a vibrant, even tumultuous, city of wild contrasts. Jaipur was founded by the great warrior-astronomer Maharaja Jai Singh II (1693–1743). In 1728 with Mughal power receding, he decided to move from his hillside fort to a new site on the plains. Synthesizing Rajput and Mughal architectural styles, he laid out the city in rectangular blocks with surrounding walls and built a city palace and the world's largest stone observatory, all according to principles in the *Shilpa-Shastra*, a Hindu architectural treatise.

Among the city's architectural masterpieces are the Hawa Mahal ("hall of winds") palace, dedicated to the

Lord Krishna, the Jamtar Mantar observatory, and the Ram Nivas gardens with the Central Museum, zoo, and art gallery. The Rambagh Palace, former home of the Maharaja of Jaipur, is one of India's most prestigious and romantic hotels. In commerce, cottage industries such as textiles, brass, lacquer, leather work, and jewelry prevail.

C. Roger Davis

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JAKARTA (2000 pop. 8.4 million). The Indonesian metropolis of Jakarta is situated on the northwest coast of Java and covers a territory of approximately 660 square kilometers. The present Indonesian capital has a history of nearly 500 years. It sprang up around a bustling pepper-trading port called Sunda Kelapa. In 1522 the Portuguese arrived, but before long they were driven out and the city was renamed Jayakarta, meaning "victorious city." For almost 350 years it was the center of Dutch colonial rule, known



The Hawa Mahal (Hall of Winds) in Jaipur. (WILDCOUNTRY/CORBIS)

as Batavia. In 1942 the Japanese invaded Java, and Batavia's name was changed back to Jayakarta. After World War II the Dutch returned, but in 1949, when Indonesian independence was eventually achieved, Indonesians made Jakarta the capital of the new republic, abbreviating its old name.

At that time Jakarta had a population of 900,000. Today the population is over 8 million, having increased almost tenfold. The population of greater Jakarta, the city plus the surrounding districts, is about 17 million.

As Jakarta has attracted people from many other parts of Indonesia and from abroad, it is a cosmopolitan city with a culture of its own. Over the last fifteen years Jakarta has undergone great changes, but it is still a place of extremes, where wide avenues intersect with unpaved streets and modern buildings stand a few blocks from overcrowded shacks. The city is sometimes under water for days because the canals, built by the Dutch to prevent flooding in below-sea level sections, cannot hold the pouring monsoon rains.

Jakarta is the main economic center of Indonesia. Engineering is the dominant sector of Jakarta's heavy industry, including shipbuilding, transport equipment, electrical and electronics products. Manufacturing includes rubber, chemicals, paper, and timber products. Textile and food industries are well developed. Jakarta has the principal Indonesian seaport of international trade, exporting rubber, tin, coffee, palm oil, and petroleum. Jakarta's Sukarno-Hatta International Airport is the center of international air traffic in Indonesia. The Presidential Palace, the army headquarters, the National Museum, and other governmental buildings are located in Jakarta.

Dimitar L. Dimitrov

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JAKARTA RIOTS OF MAY 1998 In Indonesia, the 1998 Asian economic crisis led to soaring inflation, plummeting currency, political violence, and the downfall of President Suharto (b. 1921). Unemployment rose to 20 million (11 percent).

The consequences were catastrophic. On 12 May, the turning point came. Security forces fatally shot six

students of Trisakti University in Jakarta to bring the students under control. Crowds looted and burned the shops and residences of Chinese Indonesians, and Chinese-Indonesian women were targeted for systematic rape. There were reports of Chinese fleeing to Australia and Singapore. The mob violence resulted in over twelve hundred deaths. The Chinese were targeted by mobs because they were seen as the cause of all the problems. They dominated the corporate sector and retail trade. Indonesia had had a long history of anti-Chinese violence. The "anti-Chinese pogrom" of 1965 massacred 250,000 Chinese.

On 19 May, thousands of demonstrating students occupied the Assembly Building in Jakarta. About eighty thousand troops occupied Merdeka Square to prevent a large-scale demonstration. Meanwhile, Suharto was losing the support of Muslim leaders and his cabinet colleagues. On 21 May, he resigned.

The nation was aggrieved by the May events. The riots in Jakarta were the worst violence in Indonesia since 1965, when seven hundred thousand were killed over six months. The events of 1998 shattered the confidence of the Chinese-Indonesian community and sullied the image of Indonesia as a tolerant nation. The rule of Suharto, widely viewed as corrupt and authoritarian, was over.

Patit Paban Misbra

See also: **New Order; Suharto**

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JAMA'AT-E-ISLAMI The Jama'at-e-Islami ("Islamic party") is one of the oldest Islamist movements. It is a leading political force in Pakistan but has a more marginal presence in Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka. It treats Islam as a complete way of life that can be used as a guiding principle for all life's situations—whether on a personal level or on a national, political level—and as the only alternative to both Western liberalism and Marxism. Jama'at-e-Islami's highly structured organization has been a model for Islamist movements elsewhere in the world.

History

Jama'at, as the party is often called, was created in 1941 by Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi (1903–1979), in the trou-

bled context of preindependence India. It opposed both British colonial rule and the predominantly Hindu Indian National Congress. Opposed as well to the secular definition of Muslim nationalism put forward by the founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), Mawdudi defended the necessity of a truly Islamic state where *shari'ah* (Islamic law), interpreted in a very conservative way, would be the unique source of constitutional, penal, and family law and regulate the economic system. Jama'at also opposed religious esotericism.

Since 1947 Jama'at has been located in Lahore, Pakistan. Its leadership comes from educational and business sectors and contests the monopoly the *ulama* (religious scholars) hold over Qur'anic interpretation. It has a very small but very vocal membership (75 members in 1941; probably 15,000 in 1998); the party overall is hierarchical and disciplined. A single call from the emir, or president (Mawdudi from 1947 to 1972, Mian Tufail Muhammad from 1972 to 1987, and Qazi Husain Ahmad from 1987 to the present), mobilizes the whole party. Jama'at supervises a wide network of affiliated institutions, including relief organizations, schools, trade unions, publishing houses, and think tanks.

Goals

The aim of Jama'at is to capture power. It has put forward candidates for nearly every election; it fought for civil liberties in the mid-1950s but also collaborated with Zia's military regime in 1978. Though electorally weak (never holding more than 4 percent of the seats in Pakistan's Assembly) due to its limited social base, it keeps a strong influence. The capacity of its student wing for street mobilization is feared by Pakistani government.

Jama'at Outside of Pakistan

In Bangladesh, Jama'at was banned in 1971 for having opposed Bangladesh's drive for independence from Pakistan, but it has gained influence since 1991. In India, the Jama'at-e-Islami Hind concentrates on spreading Mawdudi's version of Islam, but in the disputed territory of Kashmir it has an important military force, Hezb-ul Mujahideen. In Great Britain, Jama'at-inspired organizations (such as the Islamic Foundation) act as a lobbying force and were prominent in the protests against the novelist Salman Rushdie when he was accused of blaspheming Islam by Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989.

Amélie Blom

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JAMI, 'ABDURRAHMAN (1414–1492), Persian poet, scholar, mystic. Mowlana Nur od-Din 'Abdurrahman ebn Ahmad Jami, a man of exceptional erudition, studied at the renowned Nizamiyya school in his native city of Herat in today's Afghanistan and later in Samarqand, where the sciences were patronized by the astronomer-prince Timurid Ulugh-Beg (ruled 1447–1449). In addition to poetry, Jami's writings included Qur'anic commentaries and prophetic traditions (hadith), Arabic grammar, music, riddles, poetics, and prosody.

A profound affinity for mysticism made Jami an early adept of the Naqshbandi Sufi order and defined his literary work. Jami was held in the highest esteem by his contemporaries: the Ottoman sultan Bayazid II (ruled 1481–1512) tried to entice him to Istanbul, and the famous Timurid minister, scholar, and benefactor Mir 'Ali Shir Nava'i (1441–1501) was a close friend who wrote his biography.

Jami's poetry was renowned for its graceful style and vivid imagery. His fame rests on three lyrical collections (divans) composed in his youth, middle age, and old age; and on the *Haft aurang* (Seven Thrones, a name of the Great Bear constellation)—a compendium of seven long narrative poems in the tradition of Nizami's and Amir Khusraw Dihlavi's *Hamsa* (Five Poems). Three of these poems—*Silsilat al-dhabab* (Chain of Gold), *Tubfat al-abrar* (Gift to the Noble Ones), and *Subhat al-abrar* (The Rosary of the Devout)—are didactic works of a theological and ethical nature, illustrated with parables and instructive anecdotes. *Salaman and Absal* (translated into English by Edward Fitzgerald in 1856), *Layla and Majnun*, and *Yusuf and Zulikha* are allegorical romances permeated with mystical sentiments. The philosophical Alexander-romance *Khivad-nama-i Sikandari* (Book of the Wisdom of Alexander) completes the cycle.

Jami's prose writings are primarily scholarly in nature, but two have earned wide popularity: the

biographical compendium of mystics *Nafabat al-uns* (Breath of Divine Intimacy) and the didactic collection of instructive anecdotes in rhymed prose *Beharistan* (*Abode of Spring*), which he modeled on Sa'di's (c. 1213–1292) *Gulistan* (Rose Garden). Jami's poetry and prose left a deep imprint on the literatures of Persia, Turkey, and Muslim India. He is considered the last great Persian author of the Classical period (tenth–fifteenth centuries).

Marta Simidchieva

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JAMMU AND KASHMIR In August 1947, the British territories on the Indian mainland and the

princely states that were part of these territories were partitioned between India, which inherited the much larger portion, and the newly created state of Pakistan. The antagonisms that had made it impossible to hold the raj as a single entity survive to the present day in the enduring enmity between India and Pakistan. The problem, which originated in the controversial manner in which the fate of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was decided, stemmed from the actions of the wealthy ruler, the maharaja Hari Singh (1895–1961), of the Dogra Hindu dynasty.

In Jammu and Kashmir, where the maharaja ruled, the bulk of the population was Muslim and generally poor. The vast majority of the princely states were absorbed into either India or Pakistan. Some rulers of large states, as in the case of Hari Singh in Jammu and Kashmir, sought an independent status, but these requests were turned down by the British. On the basis of principles applied in the other princely states in 1947–1948, Kashmir should have been part of Pakistan. Generally, geographical compulsions, such as location, and the religious profile of the state would be the operative factors. Princely states with a Hindu majority would join India, while those with a Muslim majority would join Pakistan. Hari Singh's indecision provoked a rebellion in some parts of his territories, followed by an invasion by Pathan tribesmen supported by Pakistan. Hari Singh fled to India and



AN UNFULFILLED PLAN FOR PEACE

The following statement was set forth at the fifty-seventh meeting of the Indian National Congress party in 1951. In 2002 conflict continues in Kashmir between Hindus and Muslims and Pakistani and Indian supporters of each.

In regard of Kashmir, it has been the declared policy of the Government of India, with which the Congress is in entire agreement, that the people of Kashmir themselves should mould and decide their own future. The Congress welcomed an early plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir under proper conditions which had been clearly stated by the Government of India. The Congress welcomes the constitution of a Constituent Assembly in the Kashmir State and hopes that through its labours the State will make even greater progress than it has done during the last two or three years.

Source: Jagdish Saran Sharma. (1965) *India's Struggle for Freedom: Select Documents and Sources*. Vol. II. Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 176.

sought assistance to quell the rebellion and resist the invasion. More significantly, he agreed to let his state become part of India, a controversial decision that India claimed was valid but that Pakistan rejected as spurious and unacceptable. The Hindu maharaja's decision appeared to have been made under duress. From this dubious decision stems more than fifty years of hostility and three wars between India and Pakistan over the fate of Jammu and Kashmir.

The First Indo-Pakistan War over Jammu and Kashmir

The first Indo-Pakistan war over Jammu and Kashmir took place in 1947 in the wake of the independence of the two countries. A U.N.-mediated cease-fire took effect from January 1949 through the Karachi Agreement of 27 January 1949, signed by military representatives of the two countries defining the cease-fire lines in Jammu and Kashmir. In time this line came to mark the effective limits of the sovereignty of India and Pakistan. When the territories of Jammu and Kashmir were divided between India and Pakistan along the cease-fire line, India received the Kashmir valley; Jammu and Kashmir is thus the only Muslim-majority state in the Indian Union. Since the U.N. had in 1949 prescribed a plebiscite to determine the future of Jammu and Kashmir, the division was expected to be temporary. But that plebiscite was never held.


Effects of the Division of Jammu and Kashmir

The cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir has become an extension of the international border between India and Pakistan. This leaves both India and Pakistan dissatisfied: India, as heir to the former state of the rulers of Jammu and Kashmir, insists on its rights to regions in Pakistan-controlled Azad Kashmir, to the north of Jammu and Kashmir. These territories are Swat, Gilgit, and the Northern Territories. Pakistan for its part insists on the plebiscite that was promised in 1949.

The situation became even more complicated in the early 1960s. After India's defeat at the hands of China in 1962, Pakistan signed the Sino-Pakistan agreement of 2 March 1963, setting the boundary between Pakistan-occupied Azad Kashmir and China's Xinjiang Province. Large extents of territory in Ladakh, to the east of Jammu and Kashmir, are now held by China but are claimed by India by virtue of being the heir to the rulers of Jammu and Kashmir.

The Second and Third Indo-Pakistan Wars

Two years later came the second indecisive Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir (1–23 September 1965),



which ended after a cease-fire agreement. The Tashkent Declaration of 1 January 1966, signed by the Indian and Pakistani delegates with the then Soviet prime minister Kosygin as unofficial mediator, brought the second Indo-Pakistani war to an end. The two countries reaffirmed their commitment to solving their disputes by peaceful means and agreed to revert to their positions prior to 5 August 1965. The declaration proved to be a mere temporary respite. In less than five years came the third Indo-Pakistan war in the Kashmir area, a war concurrent with the Indian intervention in East Pakistan and the successful separatist agitation that led to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971.

Talks between a triumphant Indian government and its defeated and humiliated Pakistani counterpart (28 June–2 July 1972) led to the Simla Agreement, through which both governments undertook to "respect" the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of December 1971.

Continuing Problems in Jammu and Kashmir

Following the Simla Agreement of 1972, the Jammu and Kashmir problem lost some of its salience as a territorial dispute between Pakistan and India for a decade or so. But by the mid-1980s, the policy of benign (or not so very benign) neglect that India had pursued over this issue since the early 1970s faced a

severe test in a changed situation. First, Kashmir's inhabitants experienced an upsurge of nationalism and a desire for independence from both India and Pakistan. Kashmiri dissidents were encouraged by the growing radicalization among the Punjabi Sikhs and the assassination of the Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi (1917–1984) in October 1984. Once the new radicalism took root in Kashmir, the struggle was joined by militant Islamists from outside, primarily from Afghanistan but also from other parts of the Islamic world, such as Libya and Iran, Sudan and Egypt, and Bangladesh. This process of internationalization kept Indo-Pakistan relations disturbed.

Second, the insurgents shifted their stance from a demand for Jammu and Kashmir's independence to a pro-Pakistan position. The Kashmiri Muslims, caught in a bitter conflict with Indian security forces, looked to Pakistan and beyond to Afghanistan, Iran, and the Middle East. The intervention of volunteers from these Islamic countries was encouraged and facilitated by Pakistan. Pakistan could not be expected to ignore events across the border on the basis of the Simla Agreement, an accord signed during a period of extreme weakness.

Equally important, the forces of democracy and nationalism that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist states of Central and Eastern Europe were at work in Kashmir itself. Although the Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991) adopted a more conciliatory policy in Jammu and Kashmir than had his mother, Indira Gandhi, the situation did not improve greatly. Indeed, the resort to terrorism by Kashmiri separatists led to the migration, forced or voluntary, of Hindus living in the Kashmir valley. The heavy-handed behavior of the Indian army in its response to the violence further antagonized the Kashmiris. Very soon, the Jammu and Kashmir issue returned to its pre-1972 form—an emotional factor in the domestic politics of both India and Pakistan, but especially in Pakistan. For both civilian and military leaders, Jammu and Kashmir was a useful rallying cry and a readily available issue with which to divert attention from failures in social and economic policies.

Whenever an opportunity to assert their rights presents itself, both India and Pakistan were quick to exploit it. Recently, improvements in mountain-climbing techniques have made it possible for both India and Pakistan to send troops into the remote, virtually uninhabited mountainous areas of Jammu and Kashmir, India, to the Siachen glacier, an undemarcated point on the line of control (in 1984 and thereafter), and Pakistan less successfully to the Kargil sector, across the line of control, in territory held by

India (in 1999). The result has been confrontations on the border in one of the most inaccessible regions of Jammu and Kashmir, where the soldiers are more vulnerable to the bitter cold than to the weapons used by the opposing army.

India treats the fact that Kashmir is an integral part of India as beyond debate. Any attempts by Pakistan to raise the issue at a diplomatic level are dismissed as interference with India's internal affairs. Pakistan still insists on the plebiscite as originally envisaged by the U.N. Security Council resolution of 1949. For Islamabad, Kashmir is an unresolved international dispute. Thus, the public posture of the governments of India and Pakistan on the Jammu and Kashmir issue remains unchanged. It also remains the most dangerous issue in South Asia, and one that has the potential of a nuclear conflict.

In December 2001, an attack on the Indian parliament attributed to Kashmiri separatists brought India and Pakistan to the brink of another conflict. Indian troops were massed in Kashmir on the border with Pakistan. It took several weeks before the tensions eased.

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JAPAN—PROFILE (2001 est. pop. 127 million). Japan, known as the Land of the Rising Sun, lies off the east coasts of Russia, Korea, and China. Its closest neighbor is Korea, from which it is separated by the Straits of Tsushima, a distance of about 200 kilometers. Made up of a number of islands, Japan is particularly small, being one and a half times the size of the United Kingdom.



JAPAN

Country name: Japan
Area: 377,835 sq km
Population: 126,771,662 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 0.17% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 10.04 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 8.34 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: -0 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio: 0.96 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 3.88 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population: 80.8 years; male: 77.62 years; female: 84.15 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Shinto and Buddhism
Major language: Japanese
Literacy—total population: 99% (1970 est.); male: not available; female: not available
Government type: Constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary government
Capital: Tokyo
Administrative divisions: 47 prefectures
Independence: 660 BCE (traditional founding by Emperor Jimmu)
National holiday: Birthday of Emperor Akihito, 23 December (1933)
Suffrage: 20 years of age; universal
GDP—real growth rate: 1.3% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita (purchasing power parity): \$24,900 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: Not available
Exports: \$450 billion (f.o.b., 2000)
Imports: \$355 billion (c.i.f., 2000)
Currency: Yen (JPY)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Book Factbook 2001*. Retrieved 5 March 2002, from: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

Although Japan was still an agriculture-based society in the middle of the nineteenth century, it changed, in about only sixty years, to a modern industrial nation. Today it has the world's second-largest economy, surpassed only by the United States, and enjoys one of the highest per capita incomes in the world. Its reliance on trade for wealth has led to a focus on manufacturing, and Japanese products are well known throughout the world.

Geography

Japan is made up of four main islands—Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu—along with some 7,000 smaller ones, so that altogether the island chain stretches about 3,000 kilometers from northeast to southwest. Because of its proximity to Siberia,

Hokkaido has cold winters and heavy snowfalls, while the Ryukyu islands in the south, which stretch almost to Taiwan, are subtropical.

Japan's topography is very rugged, though some areas are favorable to agriculture. The largest such area is the Kanto Plain, on which Tokyo is situated. There are two other agricultural areas—the Nobi Plain (Nagoya area) and the Kansai Plain (Osaka, Kyoto, Nara area)—but these are some ten times smaller than the Kanto Plain. About 13 percent of Japan's land surface is devoted to agriculture today.

Approximately half the country is covered by mountains, with the Hida Range running through central Japan. Many of its peaks rise more than 2,000 meters and are volcanic in origin. The best known of



An exhibit at the Tokyo Motor Show, the largest auto exhibit in the world, in October 1999. (AFP/CORBIS)

these, with a summit of some 3,800 meters, is Mount Fuji (inactive since 1707), whose almost perfect cone shape is an enduring symbol of the country.

Japan is usually thought to be a highly urbanized nation, but this is only partly true. Cities cover less than 5 percent of Japan's land area. Its largest city is the capital, Tokyo, whose population numbers nearly 8 million, and the high concentration of population around Tokyo and other populous cities leads to considerable urban sprawl. In a fifty-kilometer radius of Tokyo there are more than 30 million people, around Osaka approximately 16 million, and around Nagoya 9 million. This high level of urbanization dates from the late nineteenth century but has become especially salient since 1950.

Peoples

People first came to Japan from Korea, China, and the Pacific islands perhaps 200,000 years ago, or 600,000 years ago according to some archaeologists. The last glaciers receded about 15,000 years ago, and until that time land bridges in the north, west, and south intermittently connected Japan to the mainland. Archaeological evidence clearly shows that early waves of migrants reached the islands some 30,000 years ago and formed the Paleolithic (Old Stone Age) Japanese population. According to modern DNA analysis, the first wave of migrants came from Southeast Asia, with subsequent groups traveling from the Asian mainland. Hence, the modern Japanese are a mixture of both ethnic and racial groups, Southeast Asian and East Asian; remnants of the earlier groups, the Ainu people, today live in pockets in northern Japan. Thus the frequently heard Japanese claim that they are ethnically and racially homogeneous is not supported by the evidence.

History and Culture


The first substantial Neolithic (New Stone Age) civilization of hunters and gatherers in Japan is the Jomon (roughly 10,000–300 BCE). Although the inhabitants remained primarily hunter-gatherers, the Jomon period saw the beginning of permanent settlements and early agriculture, particularly dry rice farming.

Around 300 BCE a new wave of migrants from the mainland arrived in Japan and eventually displaced (or absorbed) the Jomon, a process that took hundreds of years. The new group brought bronze and iron technology, and the period has been named Yayoi (after an excavation site in Tokyo). The technology and artifacts are typical of Northeast Asia and include mirrors, weapons, bells, and coins brought from the mainland. During the Yayoi period (c. 300 BCE–300 CE), the introduction of wet rice agriculture had a massive impact on Japanese society, in terms of increased food production, expanded areas of settlement, and establishment of a cooperative and hierarchical social order.

Shinto, the indigenous religion of Japan, existed from the earliest settlement of the islands. With its pantheon of gods (*kami*), Shinto is animistic and is concerned with day-to-day matters such as keeping various spirits content. Although there is no substantial ethical code, the religion is grounded in a close relationship with the natural environment and communal life. As the titular head (chief priest) of this religion, the emperor still today performs ceremonies symbolic of planting and harvesting, and it is partly his place in Shintoism that has accorded him sacred status throughout Japan's history.

By the seventh century Japanese society began to be transformed through contacts with Korea and China. Among the important cultural practices borrowed from the mainland were Buddhism, Confucianism, and the concept of a strong centralized government. Borrowed, too, was the Chinese writing system, though it was modified to suit the spoken Japanese language.

Kyoto became the capital of Japan in 794, marking the beginning of a golden age in Japanese history. While Europe was just coming out of the Dark Ages, culture blossomed in Japan. Feudalism developed slowly in Japan as the centralized state under the emperor gradually lost its authority and regional groups of families, or clans, began to assert their power. This system prevailed for most of Japan's subsequent history. By 1185 the country was under the control of these warrior families, who in turn submitted to a military dictator with the title of shogun. Over the next



four hundred years, as the power of the shoguns waned, Japan broke into small feudal principalities; each was ruled by a daimyo, or feudal lord, and governed and policed by samurai warriors.

With mounting conflict among the daimyo and the various clans, Japan disintegrated into civil war by the mid-fifteenth century. In the mid-sixteenth century several powerful Japanese daimyo attempted to reunify

Japan, and the Tokugawa family eventually completed the unification by the early seventeenth century. At this time the leaders of this family, worried by both the continuing power of other regional clans and the growing Western influence (including the spread of Christianity and modern weapons) in Asia, decided to close Japan to foreigners. For more than 200 years thereafter Japan remained almost completely isolated from the rest of the world.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Japan developed many of its unique practices in government, literature, architecture, and religion, and the country remained relatively peaceful and stable. This peace was reinforced through a rigid totalitarian system of government, with the Tokugawa shoguns, based in the capital city of Edo (present-day Tokyo), as supreme leaders. As Europe and America became more insistent on trade during the mid-1850s, Japan's vulnerability to the West, because of its outdated military technology, became obvious to those who were aware of the threat, and the country was a potential target for colonization. Meanwhile, from a domestic standpoint the system of government that had worked well for some two centuries had, by the nineteenth century, become outdated and riddled with inequities.

The catalyst for change was the arrival of Commodore Matthew C. Perry (1794–1858) of the U.S. Navy, who sailed into Edo bay in 1853 and demanded that Japan open its ports to trade. The recognition of the country's vulnerability after such a long period of isolation created a tremendous drive for change in Japan. By 1868 the shogun and daimyo had handed power back to the emperor, who remained a symbol of continuity while the country went through a period of breakneck modernization.

This period, known as the Meiji Restoration, saw Japan move from a feudalistic, agricultural country to a modern, industrial one with a reasonably democratic constitution. Within sixty years Japan had electricity, railways, steamships, elections, and modern weapons. Its teachers were the major industrialized countries of the time—the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Holland.

Japan was not content to remain a student, however, and by the late nineteenth century it exercised its growing power in a war with China (1894–1895), which it won. This victory eventually brought Japan into conflict with Russia, which it defeated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. Underlying these conflicts was one of the fundamental truths about Japan—its home islands had few resources, and the

country needed to import raw materials to maintain its industrial growth. Like the other major countries of the day, Japan sought to secure needed resources and markets through colonization and conquest.

Japan, however, was not accepted by the major Western countries as an equal, and its colonization of parts of China and Korea was strenuously resisted. By the 1930s Japan was on a collision course with the West. Faced with an embargo of raw materials, especially oil, from the United States and Britain, Japan gambled on war to secure these resources from East and Southeast Asia. The result was the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 in an attempt to decimate American naval power while Japanese troops invaded Southeast Asia. Japan's leaders, however, underestimated the resolve of the United States and its allies. The result was the Pacific theater of World War II, ending with atomic bombs being dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 and Japan's subsequent unconditional surrender.

Politics and the Economy

Japan was in a shambles in late 1945. Much of its industrial base had been destroyed in the war, and it had lost the wealth of its empire. The country was occupied by the Allies under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964), whose mission was to transform Japan into a peace-loving and stable ally of the West and to ensure that the country could not again become a military threat. One of the key decisions taken in this regard was to break up the large landholdings of the rich families and turn Japan into a nation of small farmers and entrepreneurs. Another was to provide Japan with a British-type constitution that included a unique provision (Article 9) whereby the Japanese renounced war and forswore the development of a military force.

The start of the Cold War and the outbreak of war in Korea in 1950 changed matters. Japan became part of America's front-line defense against the spread of world Communism. The country received economic aid to develop its manufacturing sector to supply motor vehicles, electronic goods, and clothing to the soldiers in Korea. Japan's economy began to boom in these areas.

Although there were labor problems in the 1950s and early 1960s, by the latter date Japan had become a peaceful, industrious nation focused on economic growth. The Liberal Democratic Party came into being in 1955 and, except for a brief period out of power in 1993–1994, has dominated ever since. Although the party is stable, there are multiple factions, each with

its own leader, so that prime ministers regularly change while the same party remains in power.

The 1960s was a time of supergrowth in Japan's economy. Even faced with the "oil shocks" of the 1970s, the economy continued to grow, diversifying away from heavy industry into consumer electronics, computers, and robotics. Its trade surplus with other industrialized countries, principally the United States, led in 1985 to pressure on Japan to strengthen its currency. The result was a tremendous flow of Japanese money worldwide, as Japanese went on buying sprees. Japan seemed an unstoppable global economic power.

The massive loans made available to Japanese companies and individuals for both domestic and offshore investments led to the development of a "bubble" economy by the late 1980s. This resulted from easy credit made available by Japanese banks in the mid- to late 1980s, coupled with dramatic strengthening of the yen after 1985. Much of this money made its way into real estate speculation and the stock market, rather than productive industries. Many loans were secured by land, which led to an inflation in real estate values until Japanese land became the most expensive in the world. The stock market, too, became highly overvalued. The result, in the early 1990s, was a crash in both areas and an economic slump that continued into the twenty-first century. Japan's growth rate continues to hover around the 1 percent mark, far behind that of most other industrialized countries.

Constitutional Reforms

Constitutional reform has a long history in Japan. The principal area of debate is the nature of the country's military. Article 9 of the 1947 constitution renounces the maintenance of military forces or their use in international disputes. Today, however, Japan has the second-largest defense budget in the world after the United States as well as a well-equipped military, but avoids constitutional debate by calling the military a self-defense force. The charade has caused many in Japan to call for a change in the military's name and role.

Both the Gulf War and the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., on 11 September 2001 have put increased pressure on Japan to use its military in international conflicts. In addition, Japanese leaders have been attempting to secure a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, which would probably require a greater commitment of military forces. Nevertheless, there is a strong pacifist group in Japan, dating from 1945, which inhibits reform in this area.

Other measures for reform are concerned with the way Japan is governed. Key areas here include reducing the power of the bureaucracy and making it subservient to politicians; making elections policy-based rather than focused on personalities and pork barreling; having elections contested between at least two major political parties rather than being dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party; and deregulating and decentralizing the governing system and giving ordinary people a stronger political voice. The reform movement has generally had little success, despite some optimism in the early 1990s, and today there are few areas of significant reform.

Major Issues Today

Japan is presently faced with myriad difficulties. While its companies continue to manufacture world-class products, cracks are developing throughout its economy and society. Japan is still coping with the bursting of the bubble economy. Many companies and banks were left with massive debt, much of it hidden, and the government has been attempting to take over these loans and restore business confidence. A major problem in this regard is the close connections between politicians, bureaucrats, and major corporations and interest groups. While this was viewed as a successful system during the period of high growth, today it is seen as a major obstacle to the government's making the hard economic decisions necessary to put the economy on the road to recovery.

The social system that supported Japan's rapid economic development is also being called into question. While workers are relatively well paid, they are expected to show tremendous dedication to the workplace. Men in particular must focus their lives on their companies. Because of the highly urbanized conditions in Japan, where land continues to be expensive, working people can anticipate extremely long commuting times, substantial overtime work, and little time for their families. Such dedication (or exploitation) is increasingly being called into question, particularly when companies no longer offer workers the generous benefits and certainty of lifelong employment typical of the boom years.

Japan's economic problems are also leading to questions about the way in which its fundamental social institutions are organized. The educational system, with its emphasis on competition and rote learning, is now being viewed by many as dysfunctional. The powerful bureaucracy in Japan, the pinnacle of achievement for young Japanese, whose roots go back to the samurai and a highly regimented feudalistic society, today

often seems incapable of making effective decisions. Women, who until recently have been denied full participation in the economy, seem to be struggling to find new roles in modern Japan.

Perhaps the major issue confronting Japanese society today is its aging population. An extremely high birthrate in the late 1940s and early 1950s means that there will be massive retirements of Japanese in the first few decades of the twenty-first century, with concomitant problems of funding pensions, caring for elderly people, and possible substantial labor shortages. The aging of the population will have a massive impact on virtually every aspect of Japan's society and economy over the coming decades.

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JAPAN—ECONOMIC SYSTEM Although endowed with few natural resources, Japan has achieved a world-class standard of living following its miraculous economic recovery from World War II. At current exchange rates, Japan's per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) in 1999 was \$34,500, only slightly below that of the United States, a resource-rich country with 25 times as much land and twice the population. In 1999, Japan had only 2.1 percent of the

world's population and 0.3 percent of the world's land, but its GDP was 13.4 percent of the world total.

The postwar economic miracle was characterized by phenomenal efficiency, but also by impressive economic equality. In 1960, 76 percent of respondents to a government survey considered themselves middle class, a figure that reached 90 percent by the early 1990s. As measured by salary gaps between various categories of employees (e.g., workers and managers; middle-school and college graduates), for example, Japan has had one of the lowest levels of income inequality in the world.

A high growth rate, relatively equal distribution of income, and low unemployment are hallmarks of the Japanese development experience. So too are a low crime rate and high rates of literacy and savings. Japan leads the world in life expectancy (77 years for men and 84 years for women, estimated for 2001). Other indicators of the quality of life, however, have been less favorable. Pollution was a serious problem in the 1960s. Long commutes to work, long working hours, and few vacation days meant Japanese workers had much less leisure time than their Western counterparts. Scarce land has resulted in high land prices, cramped living conditions, limited recreational space, and narrow roads. In 1996, residential land prices in Osaka were 18.5 times higher than in New York (commercial real estate was 2.8 times higher). For example, the cost of a detached house in Tokyo was 12.9 times annual income (9.5 times in Osaka) in 1994, but only 2.9 times annual income in New York. In 1995, the average size of a Japanese house was 93.3 square meters (the U.S. 1996 house size was 177.5 square meters). Most Japanese residential property is too small for a lawn or garden. Consumer prices in Japan have been consistently high compared to other developed countries. While Japan's resource constraints make such problems difficult to surmount, steady progress has occurred in most areas (due in no small part to the long economic stagnation). After falling steadily throughout the 1990s, residential land prices ended the decade at less than half their peak (1991) value. Japan's consumers also received a break in the form of lower prices and a greater selection of products and services.

Historical Transitions

In Japan's transition from a closed, feudalistic society during the Tokugawa period (1600/1603–1868) to its modern status as a global, industrial giant, two turning points stand out: the Meiji Restoration (1868) and the Allied Occupation (1945–1952). Only



EMPLOYMENT REALITIES IN JAPAN

The "lifetime-employment" guarantee enjoyed by many Japanese workers became far less practical in the harsher economic climate in Japan in the 1990s. The following excerpts from *White Paper on Labour, 1999*, a Japanese government report, outline some of the new realities facing employers and their young and middle-aged workers.

Such factors as changes in younger people's attitudes about job changes and the growing diversity in employment patterns will have a significant impact on employment practices. Also, the continued decline in the number of children will make it difficult to fully compensate for structural changes through traditional adjustments at the labour market's entrance and exit. Instead, job changes will play a greater role than they have in the past. In addition, the lowering of the expected growth rate and the globalization of operations are likely to have the effect of weakening long-term employment practices.

Nevertheless, support for long-term employment practices currently remains high among both companies and workers. Long-term employment practices will continue to be highly effective with respect to jobs in which teamwork is important, and in relation to vocational abilities that require a buildup over time. For Japanese companies and the Japanese economy and society as a whole, it will be important to focus in particular on stabilizing and maintaining employment, thereby improving employee morale and securing the flexibility needed for corporate growth. Hasty employment adjustments could cause companies to lose credibility and make it more difficult for them to obtain required workers. . . .

In Japan, middle-aged workers have enjoyed a low unemployment rate and stable employment. Now, however, they are facing the most severe conditions ever. In order to eliminate unease about employment among middle-aged workers, it is of course important to steadily pursue improvements to employability, as well as job creation and the establishment of a labour market that facilitates reemployment. In addition to these efforts, however, there is a need for initiatives that utilize the vocational abilities that middle-aged workers have built up over time. It is also important that middle-aged workers be utilized in a way that maintains their connections to their traditional workplace or job (e.g., company or corporate group).

Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare—Japan. *White Paper on Labour, 1999*. Retrieved 17 September 2002, from: <http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/wp/wp-1/2-3-3.html>

four decades after the Meiji Restoration, Japan achieved modern economic growth and gained international respect as a leading military power. The Meiji period (1868–1912) resulted in significant economic reforms. These included the opening of the country to foreign trade and technology, privatization of land ownership, replacement of the rice tax with a mone-

tary land tax, and the introduction of a modern money and banking system.

The Occupation brought radical reforms to many institutions. The three major economic reforms were the redistribution of agricultural land, the dissolution of the *zaibatsu* (large, family-owned industrial enter-



JAPAN'S LARGEST COMPANIES

According to *Asia Week* the largest nineteen companies (on the basis of sales revenue) in Asia are Japanese firms. The top ten are as follows.

Rank	Company	Sector	Sales (\$ millions)
1	Mitsubishi	General Trading	129,862.7
2	Toyota	Cars, Trucks	124,565.5
3	Mitsui & Co.	General Trading	121,974.7
4	Itochu	General Trading	112,603.3
5	Nippon Telegraph & Telephone	Telecommunications	105,113.6
6	Sumitomo	General Trading	93,533.1
7	Marubeni	General Trading	87,564.8
8	Hitachi	Electronics, Machinery	78,101.3
9	Matsushita Electric	Appliances, Electronics	71,277.4
10	Sony	Electronics, Media	67,874.4

Source: "The Asia Week 1000." (2001) *Asia Week* (9 November): 48–91.

prises), and the legalization of trade unions and collective bargaining. In the financial sphere, Joseph M. Dodge, an American banker and Occupation adviser, introduced a number of important policy changes known as the "Dodge line." These included the imposition of a balanced budget policy, an end to inflationary financing of public financial institutions, a return of foreign trade to private enterprise, lifting of price controls, termination of production subsidies, and the unification and pegging of the exchange rate (at ¥360 to the U.S. dollar). Professor Carl Shoup, another Occupation adviser, tried to implement a unified and nonpreferential tax system but was less successful.

Japan's recovery from wartime devastation and the recession induced by Dodge-line policies received a big boost from the "special procurements" demand of the Korean War (1950–1952), followed by a long period of high and sustained economic growth. From 1955 to 1965, GNP growth (in constant prices) averaged 9.5 percent. To put this in perspective, a growth rate of 8.6 percent would result in a doubling of real income in just nine years. Amazingly, super growth continued for almost a decade more. From 1965 to 1975, real GNP growth averaged 7.9 percent while the average per-capita GNP grew at an incredible 6.5 percent. This period includes the end of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1971 (the "Nixon shock") and the first oil shock (1973–1974).

These were traumatic events for Japan's export-led and import-dependent economy. The quadrupling of oil prices provoked the first year of negative growth in the postwar period and resulted in a massive restructuring of industry, drastic energy conservation measures, and an increasing reliance on nuclear power.

Japan's economy continued to grow at a very respectable pace in the decade and a half following the first oil shock. Real GNP growth averaged 4 percent between 1975 and 1990. The floating of the yen began a long period of appreciation, from ¥272 to the U.S. dollar in 1972 to a plateau of ¥210 in 1978. A period of yen depreciation followed the second oil shock in 1979, and recovery from the oil shock brought with it large current-account surpluses. As a result, trade frictions escalated. The Plaza Accord of September 1985 sought to reverse the yen's rise and shrink Japan's burgeoning trade surplus. While modest progress was made on the trade front, yen appreciation exceeded expectations, and it rocketed to a postwar peak of ¥94 to the dollar in 1995. The yen's rise was supported by a declining real price of oil, a positive U.S.-Japan inflation gap, and ongoing trade and capital liberalization.

It was the Bank of Japan's attempt to stem the yen's ascent that created the liquidity for financing the now infamous "bubble economy." During the bubble period (1985–1990), prices of such assets as stocks, bonds, land, and collectables doubled or tripled. Bal-

ance sheets ballooned. In fiscal 1991, the seven largest banks in the world (based on assets) were Japanese. Nomura Securities became the largest security company in the world. Starting in May 1989, monetary tightening by the Bank of Japan led to the collapse of the bubble and a liquidity crunch that led to a severe and protracted banking and economic crisis. The "lost decade" of the 1990s undermined faith in the continuing viability of the postwar economic system.

Japanese Capitalism

Using the Anglo-American economic system as a point of reference, historians and social scientists have identified several distinctively Japanese institutions. With the collapse of the bubble economy, these institutions came under tremendous strain.

Three "golden treasures" characterize the traditional employment system: lifetime employment, seniority-based wages, and enterprise unionism. From the postwar period through the early 1990s, a lifetime employment guarantee was a standard feature of the implicit contract for employees of major corporations and government organizations. Smaller companies, although unable to offer the same employment security, often had a similar paternalistic attitude toward their employees. Wages in traditional organizations depended on initial entry conditions (education, gender, connections, industry, establishment size), position, and age. Typically, employees started out with salaries below market level, but received higher than market pay in later years. Some 95 percent of unions in Japan are enterprise unions (confined to the specific company for which union members work), and not organized on the basis of trade or industry as in other developed countries. Most unions belong to one of four major union federations and include both blue- and white-collar workers. In the 1990s, some economists began to see the golden treasures as golden chains, locking workers into a fixed and hierarchical system that seems increasingly ill suited for a fast-paced, flexible global economy.

Two other institutions of the traditional employment system deserve mention. One is the bonus system, whereby employees are given a lump sum payment two or three times a year. The size of the total annual bonus can be substantial, ranging from two to six times monthly base pay in normal years. A second institution is the annual "spring offensive" (*shunto*), a coordinated and ritualized bargaining campaign by individual enterprise unions.

These institutions apply only to permanent employees, however. Japanese firms also take on large

numbers of temporary employees, who receive lower pay and benefits, lack union protection, and may be laid off during business slowdowns. Women are another exception. In the traditional pattern, women work while young, but leave the work force in their twenties to marry and raise a family. A large proportion of the female work force are employed part-time, the result of the tax system, inflexible work conditions, a demanding educational system, seniority-based wages, and a host of discriminatory practices.

Industry Groupings

Historically, Japanese corporations have had strong group affiliations of various types and purposes. *Zaibatsu* were powerful family-owned holding companies that dominated the Japanese economy prior to 1945. Under Occupation reforms, the holding-company structure was forbidden and individuals were prohibited from owning more than 1 percent of the shares of a single company. New group formations, however, soon emerged following dissolution of the *zaibatsu*. Horizontal (or financial) *keiretsu* are groups of independent firms with a trading company and a main bank at their core and an informal "presidents' club" as a coordination mechanism. Three financial *keiretsu* groups (Mitsubishi, Fuyo, Sanwa, and Dai-Ichi Kangyo), postwar formations with substantial market shares but with a smaller number of affiliated firms and somewhat weaker ties. The vertical-production *keiretsu* is a manufacturer-supplier relationship in which a dominant manufacturing firm is supported by a network of subsidiaries, subcontractors, and affiliated companies. In the vertical-distribution *keiretsu*, a large manufacturing enterprise distributes its products through a network of affiliated retail stores. Still other variations on these basic group structures exist.

Keiretsu firms are held together by interlocking share ownership. Mutual shareholding prevents hostile takeovers and allows firms to honor their long-term commitments to workers. With few exceptions, board members of a Japanese corporation are senior executives of the company. There are, in fact, no corporations in Japan with a majority of outside directors. These features of the Japanese system leave individual stockholders with little influence on a company's management. The result is a form of capitalism different from that in the Anglo-Saxon world. In the Japanese firm, shareholders must take a back seat to other stakeholders. The Japanese corporation, it is often asserted, is run for the benefit of its permanent employees. In

the 1980s, this system was widely praised. Japanese capitalism was said to promote long-term planning, since, unlike their Western counterparts, Japanese managers do not have shareholders constantly breathing down their necks.

Banking and Finance

At the core of the *keiretsu* group is a main bank, which takes the lead in organizing funding for the affiliated firms. It is usually the largest holder of a firm's debt and holds up to 5 percent of its stock. This gives the bank a strong incentive to monitor the firm's activities and to provide useful information. It is in a good position to do this since it handles a disproportionate share of the firm's daily transactions. In times of financial distress, the main bank usually organizes the rescue operation. The main bank takes on many of the responsibilities that would be borne by large shareholders in the Anglo-American system.

The financial system of Japan's high-growth period (1955–1973) was characterized by highly segmented financial markets and indirect finance (i.e., borrowing through financial intermediaries). The private sector's slice of the financial pie was finely divided among a host of depository institutions, nondepository institutions, and securities-related financial institutions. Further categorization of private institutions depended on a host of characteristics (e.g., size and nature of its customers, types of products offered, maturity and structure of loans). Public financial institutions included postal savings, the trust fund bureau, two public banks, and eleven public finance corporations.

During the high-growth period, some 90 percent of investment funds were borrowed from financial institutions. Private banks dominated the system, accounting for 40 percent of total lending. Starting in the 1970s, financial liberalization began to whittle away at this "banker's kingdom." Barriers to intersector and international competition steadily eroded. Although capital markets have begun to play a more important role in industrial and public finance, depository institutions still hold a commanding position in the financial system. The main reason for this is the high proportion of private savings in deposit accounts, including the gargantuan postal savings system.

Industrial Structure

Perhaps the most dramatic change in the Japanese economy in the last century has been the shrinking of the agricultural sector. At the start of the Meiji period, Japan was an agriculture economy. The agricultural sector provided 45 percent of Japan's GDP and em-

ployed 73 percent of its labor force. By 1955, those statistics had shrunk to 21 and 39 percent, respectively. In 1998, Japan's entire primary sector (agriculture, forestry, and fisheries) accounted for only 1.7 percent of GDP and 5.3 percent of employment (with most agricultural employees being part-time farmers). Although small in size, the agricultural sector wielded considerable political power in the postwar period as a mainstay of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's support base. Its loyalty has been rewarded with generous price supports and subsidies, and large construction outlays. These and other barriers to trade have been sources of continuing international friction. Government policy has aimed at improving labor productivity by increasing the size of the average farm.

The share of the secondary sector (mining, manufacturing, and construction) in production and employment rose steadily before stabilizing in the mid-1970s. In 1998, the secondary sector accounted for 33.0 percent of GDP and 31.5 percent of employment. Manufacturing's share of GDP was 23.5 percent. In the manufacturing sector, large firms accounted for 52.2 percent of the total value of factory shipments (1998). The overwhelming number of firms in the industry (99.4 percent in 1998), however, were classified as small or medium-sized. Furthermore, small and medium-sized companies employed 74 percent of the industry's workers.

By the early 2000s, Japan had clearly entered the postindustrial stage of development. Japan's tertiary sector constituted 61.1 percent of GDP and 63.2 percent of employment (1998), and information technology had become the primary focus of its industrial policy.

Japan has often been described as having a dual economy. On one side of the divide are the large and efficient export-oriented firms—world-class corporations producing products such as automobiles, machinery, electronic goods, and semiconductors. On the other side are inefficient, domestic-oriented firms, which tend to be in such highly protected industries as agriculture, construction, and finance. Opinion is now widely shared that these inefficient sectors have been a profound drag on the economy. How to invigorate them without destroying the social compact is a great challenge.

International Economic Relations

For a resource-poor country, Japan is surprisingly little dependent on foreign trade. In 1998, the export share of GDP was 10.2 percent; import dependency was 7.4 percent. Most European countries, in contrast,

have dependency ratios over 20 percent. Japan's exports are dominated by manufactured goods; its imports are mostly primary products. Japan runs trade surpluses with most industrial countries and trade deficits with most of its primary product suppliers. The United States is Japan's biggest trade partner. In 1998, the U.S. absorbed 31 percent of Japan's exports and accounted for 24 percent of Japan's imports.

Since 1981, Japan has run continuous and generally rising trade surpluses, resulting in considerable friction, particularly with the United States. But Japan has also been active in promoting international and intraregional economic cooperation and has been the number one provider of overseas development assistance in the world. In 1998, 43.3 percent of Japanese aid went to Asia (down from a high of 98.3 percent in 1970), and the Japanese government has advocated closer and more open trading ties among Asian countries, seeking a more stable currency environment and a wider use of the yen as a settlement currency.

Social Foundations and the Neoclassical Debate

Some scholars argue that Japan's economic institutions are constructed on a fundamentally different social structure than those of Anglo-American design. The Japanese social system, in this interpretation, has feudal-period roots. It is claimed, for example, that Japanese business, government, and social institutions are patterned after the *ie* (household) or *mura* (village) concepts of social organization. In such organizations, individuals are bound together in lifelong, hierarchical relationships and, consequently, are compelled to accept group norms of behavior. In the Japanese system, social harmony and the pursuit of collective goals take precedence over individual interests. The dynamics of such organizations may well be different from those patterned on the more individual-centered Anglo-American model.

With its institutional rigidities and group dynamics, the Japanese economic system poses a challenge to neoclassical economic theory's paradigm of individual choice and its assumption that only unregulated markets deliver economically efficient outcomes. Many believe that Japan's success is an example of bureaucrat-led development—an example that has been successfully imitated by other Asian economies. The claim is that industrial and other policies, most notably those of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), helped to propel the economy onto a faster and better growth path than would have been possible in a less regulated system. Neoclassical economists find such assertions hard to accept with-

out convincing evidence that government action overcame recognized market imperfections (public goods, externalities, or Keynesian-style instabilities).

The importance of the bureaucracy in Japan's economic system cannot be lightly dismissed. The Japanese bureaucracy not only administers the nation's laws, but also drafts most of the legislation proposed in the Diet. The bureaucracy has consistently drawn top students from Japan's elite universities, and richly rewarded them. Scandals have cast light on the common business practice of showering key bureaucrats with gifts, speaker fees, and lavish entertainment. After retiring from government service, faithful bureaucrats can expect to "descend from heaven" (*amakudari*) into senior positions at private or public corporations. They may retire several times and receive generous, multiple pensions—practices one would not expect to find in a *laissez-faire* economy.

Nor is the power of the bureaucracy limited to enforcing formal laws and regulations. Japanese bureaucrats also rely on administrative guidance (*gyosei seido*), an informal request for "voluntary" compliance with government policies. The more leverage the ministries exert over targeted firms, the more effective the administrative guidance.

An example of this approach is the Bank of Japan's policy of providing periodic loan targets for commercial banks. The "window guidance" policy, which was discontinued in 1991, rested on the rewards and punishments the central bank had at its disposal. Cooperative banks could borrow money at attractive rates, and, until 1995, were guaranteed a profit on Bank of Japan borrowing, since the spread between the interbank loan rate and the central bank discount rate was always positive. Recalcitrant banks probably found the discount window closed, had trouble getting Bank of Japan approval for new branches or products, and experienced more frequent and troublesome bank inspections.

The Convoy System

The literature on Japan's political economy concentrates on industrial and trade policies, but an arguably more important set of policies deals with the regulation of finance and macroeconomic activity. In this domain, the Ministry of Finance has traditionally reigned supreme. It prepares the budgets for the national government and the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP); designs the tax system and monitors tax collections; oversees customs, tariffs, and international finance; establishes financial system policies; and licenses and supervises, with some exceptions, all of

the important financial institutions. An old exception is the postal savings system, which is regulated by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.

As part of the "big bang" reforms following the banking crisis of the 1990s, the Ministry of Finance was forced to surrender some of its licensing and supervisory powers to a new Financial Agency under the prime minister's office. In addition, the new Bank of Japan Law, which took effect in April 1998, gave the central bank considerable independence in the design and conduct of monetary policy.

Bureaucrats refer to the Japanese system of financial regulation as the "convoy system." The image conveyed is a group of carefully selected ships, tightly linked under central command, moving at nearly identical speeds through dangerous waters. The Ministry of Finance, operating through the Bank of Japan, controlled the financial spigot. Four characteristics of the traditional financial system helped the ministry maintain convoy discipline. Capital controls protected domestic markets from external competition. Administered interest rates provided the incentive structure for domestic fund competition. Market segmentation allowed more precise channeling of the flow of funds. Finally, indirect finance gave the ministry direct control over the flow of funds and indirect control, through the *keiretsu* system, over the entire economy.

Is it a coincidence that the golden age of the convoy system (1955–1971) overlapped the period of high-speed growth? Maybe not. The convoy's low interest rate policy provided an inducement to "overinvestment." Other policies, such as tax incentives and consumer lending disincentives, may have stimulated the required "oversaving." This may have led to more capital deepening and per-capita income than would have been achieved by a more market-based system.

Whether or not the convoy system stimulated faster growth, the original convoy was ill suited for the choppy seas of the 1970s. Financial liberalization resulted in a soft form of convoy regulation. The big-bang reforms were designed to create a financial structure that was free, fair, and open. Could a convoy operate under such rules? The Ministry of Finance scarcely had time to contemplate the question when the ultimate shock occurred. In 1997 the collapse of several large commercial banks and the Asian currency crisis hit the convoy like a hurricane.

Macroeconomic stabilization was a key responsibility of convoy regulators. Demand management involved manipulation of several unique tools. Japan's underdeveloped bond market meant that open market

operations could not be the primary instrument for monetary control, as in Western countries. Until the early 1990s, the Bank of Japan used discount loans and window guidance as its primary policy instruments. The primary tool for fiscal policy has been the highly flexible FILP budget. The Ministry of Finance has had enormous discretion in varying the amount of budget outlays within and between fiscal years.

The Twenty-first Century

At the start of the new millennium, Japan found itself in a very difficult economic situation. The country had endured a decade of stagnation, going back to the collapse of asset values. Commercial banks and the government were burdened with enormous debts. Unemployment rates were at postwar highs, interest rates on savings near zero, and, with a rapidly aging population, pension funds under great stress. Whether the current economic system survives is a debatable point. What should be clear, however, is that the Japanese people will not give up. They are disciplined, hard working, frugal, and adaptable, and will surmount this crisis as they have others before it.

Some observers believe that the cumulative impact of the post-bubble changes in the Japanese economy may ultimately turn out to be as profound as that of the Meiji Restoration and the Occupation. They differ as to whether Japan's political-economic structure has been undergoing a "regime shift" or simply some costly modernization around a solid institutional core. But history suggests that the system that finally emerges will be a blend of both Western and Eastern values.

James R. Rhodes

See also: **Automobile Industry; Economic Stabilization Program; Electronics Industry—Japan; Farmer's Movement; Fishing Industry—Japan; Japanese Expansion; Japanese Firms Abroad; Japanese Foreign Investments; Ringi System; Whaling—Japan**

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JAPAN—EDUCATION SYSTEM In the 1980s and 1990s, the Japanese education system received widespread international attention and praise for its accomplishments. Modern schooling was credited with contributing significantly to the country's modernization and economic development. Almost 90 percent of students graduated from high school, and the average level of student achievement was high by international standards.

While still impressive, Japan's education system is now undergoing significant changes. Underlying these changes is a shift in thinking about the purposes of education. Whereas the school system previously functioned to produce and differentiate human resources for the industrial and economic needs of postwar society, there is a growing consensus that the education system has many problems and shortcomings. The call for educational reform and the reports issued by advisory groups to the prime minister are not new to postwar Japan. There have been several series of reform debates and policy changes. The difference this time, however, is that reform debates are motivated by far-reaching social changes and a prolonged economic recession. Education for the twenty-first century must address issues such as globalization, aging and the low birth rate, technological innovations and the "information society," and the increasing diversification and internationalization of Japanese society.

Historical Background

Before a modern education system was introduced into Japan in the second half of the nineteenth century, an extensive infrastructure of schools and private academies already existed during the feudal Tokugawa



THE PRESSURE TO ACHIEVE IN JAPANESE

The following report from the Japanese newspaper *Yomiuri Shimbun* on 17 June 1951 indicates that pressure to achieve in school is not a recent development in Japan.

Every time I meet one of my parents [complains an elementary-school teacher writing in the newspaper], I hear the same complaint—"Teacher, I wish you would pile on the homework a bit more. My boy simply won't sit down and study unless he's got to." Of course one understands the sincerity of the parents' desire to do the best they can for their child. But if the child, after giving all of his brain-power to his school work, comes home only to have to start work over again, the result will be a deep dislike for study of any sort. As long as this continues, the familiar problem of the child who seriously damages his health over entrance examinations will always be with us.

Source: R. P. Dore (1967). *City Life in Japan: A Study of a Tokyo Ward*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 204.

period (1600/1603–1868). Children of aristocrats, the samurai warrior class, and urban merchants attended schools operated by and for their own respective classes. Regional government-operated fief schools prepared sons of samurai families for administrative work by training them in both military arts and Confucian studies. Commoners and farmers voluntarily attended so-called temple schools where they learned the three "Rs" and other basic skills under teachers who were not necessarily monks. Among these various schools, only the temple schools accepted females. By 1850, it was estimated that in Japan, as in leading European countries at this time, 25 percent of the population was literate.

In enacting the Education Law of 1872, the new Meiji government (1868–1912) began the task of creating a modern public-education system for all children, regardless of class. The aims of this new system were to help Japan catch up industrially with the West and to instill a sense of national, albeit emperor-centered, identity. After studying various Western school systems, the Meiji-era leaders adapted and combined aspects of several systems—the United States, France, Germany—for Japanese use and established a centralized Ministry of Education.

By 1890, the government had codified a nationalist educational philosophy in the Imperial Rescript on Education. This Rescript emphasized the Confucian values of hierarchical relationships and the pursuit of learning and morality. This philosophy persisted until Japan's defeat at the end of World War II, in 1945. During the time of the Rescript, a new Elementary School Law of 1900 established tuition-free compulsory education for four years, which was extended to six years in 1908.

Prior to and during World War II, the content of education became increasingly nationalistic and militaristic, and, therefore, reform of the education system was a priority for the U.S. Occupation authorities. The 1946 Report of the U.S. Education Mission to Japan, commissioned by the General Headquarters of the Occupation, recommended educational changes aimed at the production of citizens rather than subjects. Most of the Mission's recommendations were incorporated into the 1947 Fundamental Education Law (whose principles for education replaced those of the prewar Imperial Rescript) and into the 1947 School Education Law, which established a new school system. Respect for individual human rights, pacifism, and democracy replaced Confucian values as the guiding principles for education. The first article states: "Education shall aim at full development of personal-

ity, at rearing a people, sound in mind and body, who love truth and justice, esteem individual values, respect labor, have a deep sense of responsibility, and are imbued with an independent spirit as the builders of a peaceful state and society" (Ministry of Education, Science, Sports, and Culture 1999: 9). The new School Education Law subsequently formed a 6-3-3 school system (that is, six elementary, three lower secondary, and three upper secondary years), with coeducational nine-year compulsory schooling organized by the local boards of education under the supervision and control of the Ministry of Education.

The Formal School System

Since the peak in the population of school-age children in the mid-1980s, there has been a steady decrease in enrollment rates due to a declining birth rate. This demographic phenomenon is having a lasting effect at all levels of the school system. For example, as average class size shrinks from forty-five students to thirty-eight to thirty, classroom management and teaching methods change. Another example is the effect on educational competition, discussed below in the section on postsecondary schools.

Pre-Elementary Education Pre-elementary education is not compulsory, but a high percentage of Japanese children are enrolled. Sixty percent of all three-year-olds, 90 percent of four-year-olds, and 95 percent of five-year-olds attended either kindergarten (*yochien*) or nursery/day care centers (*hoikuen*) in 1996. Kindergartens operate under the supervision of the Ministry of Education and are usually open for about five hours a day. Day care centers are licensed by the Ministry of Welfare and are run for eight hours a day. Tuition at day care centers is adjusted to family income. Facilities, curriculum, teaching style, and activities at day care centers and kindergartens are similar. In both types of early education, the curriculum tends to be nonacademic, although pressure to become more academic is increasing among some groups. Recently, the declining population of children has forced many kindergartens to extend their hours and offer additional afternoon programs in an effort to compete with day care centers for enrollment.

Compulsory Education: Elementary and Junior High School Compulsory education in Japan begins at the age of six years, when students enter elementary school, and ends upon completion of the third year of junior high school. Less than 1 percent of primary school children and a little over 5 percent of junior high school students attend private schools. Most students, in other words, receive their nine years of

schooling in the mainstream public school system. Since the Ministry of Education determines curriculum standards, pace, and textbook content for all schools, both public and private, the degree of uniformity in educational experience is remarkable. In addition, students are not tracked by ability, and as long as they are attending classes, they are virtually assured of advancement to the next grade.

The school year begins with an opening ceremony in April and finishes with a closing ceremony in March. There is a forty-day summer vacation from mid-July to the end of August. Winter and spring vacations are fourteen days in December and March, respectively. Until recently, Japanese children attended sixty more days of school per year than American children. Half-day attendance on Saturdays is being slowly phased out by alternating six-day weeks and five-day weeks. By the year 2003, all public elementary and junior high schools will have completed the transition to a five-day school week.

The curriculum for elementary and junior high schools is also undergoing revision. By 2002, the required number of class hours for many subjects—Japanese language, social studies, mathematics, science, music, art, physical education, and special activities (assemblies, events, clubs)—was to be reduced. The thirty-five hours devoted to moral education will remain the same. Finally, integrated learning and information studies will be introduced.

With regard to cultural practices and implicit curriculum common to public schooling, coming-to-order procedures, small-group work structures, daily monitors who handle administrative tasks, and assignment of school clean-up duties are a few examples of classroom management and discipline strategies. These daily rituals are introduced to first graders and subsequently continued throughout a child's school career. Other examples are the custom of an annual visit to the home of every child by the homeroom teacher and, more generally, the cooperative relationship among home, school, and the community (including the police department). Activities such as after-school clubs or the sixth and ninth graders' three-day study trips by bus caravans to places of historical significance exemplify the emphasis on shared experiences that instill values of cooperation and awareness of group membership. What really distinguishes Japanese schooling from its Western counterparts is conventions such as these.

Upper Secondary Schools Ninety-six percent of graduates of compulsory education continue on to upper secondary schools that require tuition and textbook

fees. At this point, however, schools and curricula are no longer uniform. Through guided placement by junior high school advisers, students are directed to a school appropriate to their level, and they sit for that school's entrance examination. Since high schools tend to be ranked, the process of educational stratification begins at this stage. Entry into a particular high school is directly related to a person's future career path.

There are six types of high schools: elite academic, nonelite academic, vocational, evening, correspondence, and special education. Elite academic high schools, public and private, specialize in sending a high percentage of their graduates to the highest-ranking national and private universities. A majority of students attend nonelite academic high schools, and there is considerable diversity in terms of the percentage of graduates who proceed to universities, junior colleges, or special training schools.

There are several ways to obtain vocational or specialized training beginning at the high school level and, in some cases, continuing into postsecondary schooling. Vocational high schools, a part of the secondary school curriculum since 1893, are grouped by the Ministry of Education into the following categories: commercial, technology, domestic sciences, agriculture, medical, educational/social welfare, public health, arts and culture, and fisheries. Twenty-three percent of high school students attend specialized vocational high schools. In addition, about 31 percent of the nonelite academic high schools offer both vocational and general courses. In 1995, 4.3 percent of vocational graduates entered a four-year university, 6.6 percent joined a two-year college, and another 22.5 percent chose further education at a special training school. Approximately 60 percent obtained full-time employment.

Finally, evening and correspondence high schools, whose combined enrollment is about 4 percent of high school students, serve the needs of students who must work or, for reasons of health, cannot attend the day high schools.

Postsecondary Schooling Postsecondary institutions include 604 universities with 438 graduate programs, 588 junior colleges, 62 technical colleges, and numerous other special training and miscellaneous schools. Junior-college programs are usually two to three years in length. Technical colleges, which include courses of study corresponding to upper secondary school, have five-year programs. Depending on the course of study, special-training and miscellaneous schools' programs range in length from a few months to five years. University undergraduate-degree programs are

normally four years in length, two semesters per year. In addition, there are six-year programs in medicine, dentistry, and veterinary science. Postgraduate programs consist of two-year master's degree courses or five-year doctoral programs.

College admission rates have increased steadily throughout the postwar period, and in 1998, 55 percent of high school graduates matriculated to a university (41.6 percent) or junior college (13.4 percent). Seventy-five percent of these universities are private and educate about 73 percent of all university students. Among these, 34.9 percent of university students and 90.1 percent of junior-college students were female. Female students accounted for 24.8 percent of graduate program enrollment.

Universities are currently undergoing significant changes related to the economic recession and the declining birth rate. In the past, elite public and private universities maintained close connections to private companies, virtually ensuring the placement of their graduates. The name and reputation of the university mattered more than a student's actual skills and talents. Today, as many Japanese companies restructure and struggle to regain a competitive edge internationally, these firms have reconsidered their ties with universities. Increasingly, job candidates must demonstrate their abilities and assets to the prospective company.

By the year 2005, there is to be a place at a university for every student who wishes to attend. This means that, except for the most prestigious schools, it is the universities that are competing to recruit students rather than the students who are competing for admittance. This trend has stimulated many universities to redesign their programs to appeal to contemporary students. Faculty members, too, are under pressure to improve the educational environment through a better understanding of their students and the ways that students learn. The Central Council for Education, moreover, recently proposed a reform of the examination system that would give students choices about applying to public universities, based on the content of their future plans rather than on test scores. In addition, concerns about the financial survival of universities are inspiring many new opportunities for adult education, in the form of degree and nondegree programs.

Educational Problems and Current Educational Reforms In addition to the changes occurring at the level of postsecondary schools, cultural values about the means and goals of education are shifting away from those of the previous fifty years. Schools are said

to be too rigid, curricula too uniform, organizations too centralized, and children too stressed.

Criticisms such as these are buoyed by an intensification of problem behaviors and an increase in violent juvenile crime at younger ages. At the beginning of the 1980s, a fluctuation in school violence was followed by the identification of two new educational problems: bullying (*ijime*) and school-refusal syndrome (*tokokyobi*, a psychiatric category). While all three problems remain significant sources of research and public discussion, the more recent phenomena of collapse of order in classrooms (*gakkyu bokai*) and school nonattendance (a broad category that includes truancy) are also concerns. While statistics for school violence, bullying, and truancy have gradually risen over the last twenty years, the percentages are still low in comparison with schools in the United States.

To address these problems and other changes happening in education, such as the introduction of computers in schools, there is a growing consensus that local communities should control their own educational needs and decisions. It is also thought that more choices should be given to students, including early-graduation options. Current discussions emphasize helping all children to find and utilize their strengths in combination with teaching them how to serve the needs of their own communities and societies. Schools in the near future will have fewer children per classroom, and children will be partners in and responsible for their own learning.

Special Education Compulsory special education for blind and deaf children began in 1948. In the late 1960s, various educators and parents set up special groups to study the problems and education of children with various disabilities. The range of schools was broadened to include other disabilities with the legal enactment in 1979 of compulsory education for developmentally disabled children. There are currently 71 schools for the blind, 107 schools for the deaf, and 810 schools for students with other significant disabilities, ranging in level from preschool to upper secondary education. In addition, 43 percent of public primary schools include special-education homeroom classes for children with intellectual or physical handicaps, speech problems, or emotional disturbances.

The Teaching Profession

In the prewar period, teacher certification for primary education was controlled by normal schools that were established by the government and that had been given the mandate of training imperial servants. The postwar Fundamental Education Law, in contrast, in-

cluded the notion that teachers were servants of the whole community. To ensure diversity among those in the teaching profession, various postsecondary schools were entitled to have a teacher-education course, making their graduates eligible to apply for certification. Consequently, although still authorized by the Ministry of Education, certificates for kindergarten, elementary, and junior high schools are obtainable at teacher-training universities and teaching-certificate courses in universities and junior colleges. Teachers for upper-secondary schools must receive training at universities or graduate schools or both. In addition to graduation from a two- or four-year institute and completion of professional training courses, a four-week and two-week minimum of student teaching for elementary and secondary levels, respectively, is required.

Upon graduation, a student automatically receives a teacher's certificate from the board of education in his or her university's prefecture. Although the certificate is valid throughout Japan, the holder must also pass an examination given by the board of education in the prefecture of his or her choice. Successful applicants are hired if there is a vacancy, and since the selection examination expires after one year, unemployed applicants must reapply and repeat the examination the following year.

According to the data supplied by the Ministry of Education in 1997, 80.7 percent of primary, 88.3 percent of junior high, and 89.3 percent of high school teachers have a four-year undergraduate degree. In addition, 1 percent of elementary, 2.5 percent of junior high, and 7.8 percent of senior high school teachers have completed a master's degree. Full-time female teachers made up 61.2 percent of elementary, 40 percent of junior high, and 23 percent of high school teachers in 1997.

International Education

Internationalization and international education became serious issues in the 1980s, when economic success provoked demands for Japan to take a more active role in international affairs. One outcome was the creation in 1987 of a \$400 million annual budget for the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) program. The JET program recruits college graduates from primarily Western countries and places them in Japanese public secondary schools and local government offices in a top-down bureaucratic effort to create mass internationalization.

There are currently a number of other programs that address international educational issues. The need

for teaching the Japanese language to foreign children living in Japan and attending public schools increased by 50 percent between 1995 and 1998. Among these 17,000 children, 43.1 percent speak Portuguese as their native tongue, followed by 30.8 percent for Chinese and 10.1 percent for Spanish. The Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking children are mostly children of Japanese ancestry from Brazil and other South American countries. This influx of foreign children into the school system inspired NHK, Japan's public television station, to create a drama about the adjustment experiences of a Japanese-Brazilian girl and her classmates, and at least one public school is using this program in its moral-education classes to promote understanding of foreigners.

Aside from foreign children, Japanese children who have lived abroad with their families for a year or more experience varying degrees of difficulty when they return home. These children, known as *kikokushijo*, numbered 12,884 in 1998; 61 percent of *kikokushijo* were elementary school students. Most prefectures now have special programs to ease the reentry of these students into the Japanese cultural and educational environment.

Another aspect of international education is the variety of exchange and study-tour programs available to high school students. For example, in 1996 a total of 688 public and private high schools, with 130,669 students participating, took school trips abroad. The most popular destinations were Korea, China, the United States, and Australia. That same year, a total of 972 schools accepted a total of 1,280 foreign students for three months or more.

Adult Education and Training

Systematic educational activities outside schools, also known as social education, have been practiced and promoted in Japan since the prewar period. The idea of lifelong learning became a major campaign of the Central Council for Education in the early 1980s. While social education had been defined by and organized under the Ministry of Education at national and local levels, universities and private educational establishments also began to expand their adult-education programs independently. Adult-education programs are offered in a variety of settings, including public halls and community centers, women's education centers, museums, libraries, and for-profit institutions of adult education. There are also institutions specializing in adult education, such as the Lifelong Learning Centers operated by local boards of education and the National Training Institute of Social Education. In

addition, there are high school, university, and college extension courses, correspondence courses, and adult enrollment in higher education. Finally, the 1983 establishment of The University of the Air, which uses televised and radio-broadcast classes along with printed materials, offers anyone the opportunity to enroll in an institution of higher education.

The Japanese place a high value on education. They have referred to themselves as the society of educational credentialism. While educational achievement will remain a source of prestige in Japan, societal expectations for education are changing. Education should enhance personal fulfillment in a society that has more leisure time and an aging population. Schools should cultivate individual talents and creativity in each and every student, while also instilling in them a sense of responsibility to the larger society. It remains to be seen how Japanese educators will actually put these ideals into practice. It is clear, however, that all forms of education in Japan are undergoing diversification and localization, as well as increasing accountability and personal choice.

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JAPAN—HISTORY. See **Heian Period; Heisei Period; Jomon Period; Kamakura Period; Muromachi Period; Nara Period; Showa Period; Taisho Period; Tokugawa Period; World War II.**

JAPAN—HUMAN RIGHTS At least until the 1990s, Japan was reluctant to promote human rights in either its domestic or foreign policies, arguably because the very concept of human rights—rights possessed simply by virtue of being human, or standards of human dignity beneath which people may not permit themselves to fall—derives from a Western liberal tradition that is alien to Japan, and indeed to Asia as a whole. But many of the features of modern industrial life—the factory system, post offices, the business suit—were imported from the West, and this did not prevent their rapid assimilation into everyday Asian life. At precisely the time that Western dress and manufacturing techniques were being introduced into Japan in the 1870s and thereafter, there were many across Japan who appreciated and promoted liberal rights ideas and, inspired by them, were critical of government policy. That they did not have more influence has more to do with a deliberate government policy to prevent the free circulation of dissident ideas than an inability to understand them.

Establishment of an Independent Legal Profession

During the U.S. occupation of Japan following the end of World War II, the United States aimed to create democratic structures and eliminate the laws and practices that inhibited dissent. The postwar constitution was central to that task. Articles 10 through 40 define a set of human rights more extensive than any such document in the world did at that time. A network of locally appointed but centrally organized volunteers, the Civil Liberties Commissioners, was set up to promote the understanding of these human rights and to mediate in cases of rights infringement. Lawyers, who had previously been under the control of the Ministry of Justice, were converted into a self-governing profession within the Japan Federation of Bar Associations. Their primary duty, according to the Attorney Act of 1949, is "to protect fundamental human rights and to ensure social justice." Although the Civil Liberties

Commissioners have been unable to develop a critical role, the legal profession has been pivotal in the development of human-rights practice in Japan. Not only do lawyers publish extensively on human-rights issues, but they also are to be found actively involved in the whole range of rights-promoting activities.

Japan and the United Nations' Human-Rights Instruments

Despite a promising start with the production of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the United Nations did not approve the twin international covenants on civil and political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights until 1966. Even then they did not become effective until ratified by thirty-five nation-states, which took another ten years. Japan was not among these initial ratifiers; neither was the United States. U.S. policy toward the international promotion of human rights was made clear in the early 1950s when John Foster Dulles, secretary of state from 1952 to 1959, declared the United States to be in favor of the promotion of human rights but through "persuasion, education, and example rather than formal understandings." Throughout the postwar period, Japan's foreign policy was devised within the framework set by the United States. Reflecting this, Japan ratified the two covenants in 1979 when there was evidence of wide international acceptability and President Jimmy Carter was promoting human-rights diplomacy.

Japan has been slow to ratify many of the most important international treaties by comparison with its Asian neighbor, South Korea, and a similarly advanced industrial country, Sweden. The official explanation for this stresses that Japan takes the treaty obligations seriously and makes sure that domestic law is fully consistent with the treaty text before ratification. Nongovernmental groups such as the legal profession contest this. They argue that Japan has repeatedly sought to avoid drawing attention to its poor human-rights record. A careful examination of domestic law does not, for example, explain the long delay in ratifying the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and Japan still has not ratified the first optional protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which would permit appeals by individuals to the Human Rights Committee where domestic institutions failed to provide effective redress in cases of rights infringement by the state.

Recent Developments

It is possible to detect a change in policy in the 1990s. Not only did the government ratify the Con-

vention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), CERD, and the Convention Against Torture (CAT), but it also created a committee to produce a policy on human-rights education as part of the U.N. Decade for Human-Rights Education (1995–2004) and a committee to suggest reforms to enable more effective redress in cases of human-rights violations, both located in the prime minister's office. There have also been significant changes in Japan's policy toward *burakumin* (Japanese who face prejudice and discrimination because of supposed connections with the outcaste groups of the premodern era), Korean residents, women, and Ainu (the non-Japanese indigenous people of Hokkaido). Three factors drive this policy change. Since the early 1990s, Japan has sought a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, and the ministry of foreign affairs has been seeking to win domestic and international support for this. Second, during the 1990s the government submitted several reports to the United Nations that exposed it to international criticism and created an opportunity for domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to express their views on Japan's human-rights practices. The 1993 official report to the United Nations under the ICCPR stimulated twenty-three "counter reports" commenting on some or all of the official statement. Third, in the 1990s the indigenous NGOs sought to develop links with the international movement. Korean groups communicated with fellow Koreans in Seoul and California, Ainu groups came in touch with other "first peoples," and the Buraku Liberation League supported groups that aimed to create transnational human-rights awareness.

Could Japan take a lead in the promotion of human rights within Asia, the only region of the world with no regional framework? It has been constitutionally committed to rights for more than fifty years, and it has ratified the most important U.N. conventions and has an active human-rights NGO community. But the rest of Asia still remembers Japanese imperialism, and the periodic intemperate statements by right-wing politicians do nothing to assuage the fears of other Asian nations. Moreover, while there is increasing tolerance of groups such as the Ainu, Koreans, and immigrant workers, there is still no positive celebration of ethnic plurality. The Japanese government and society remain reluctant supporters of human rights.

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JAPAN—MONEY Money, in the classical definition, is any object that serves as a convenient means of payment or settlement. The financial assets that have been judged convenient by Japan's monetary authorities have varied over time with tastes, technology, institutions, and purpose; they have included bolts of cloth and bushels of rice. In the immediate postwar period, the most common definition of money was "cash currency in circulation" (bank notes and coins in circulation less vault cash in financial institutions). By 1955, the official definition was expanded to include "deposit money" (demand deposit minus checks and notes held at surveyed institutions). M1, or "narrow money," consists of cash currency plus deposit money. M1, which continues to be monitored by the Bank of Japan, is closely correlated with currency income and expenditure.

In 1967, recognition of the high degree of substitutability between demand and other deposits led to official recognition of "quasi money" (total deposits, less demand deposits, at surveyed institutions). Quasi money includes time deposits, deferred savings, installment savings, nonresident yen deposits, and foreign-currency deposits. M2, or "broad money," consists of M1 plus quasi money. The introduction of certificates deposit (CD) in 1979 provided another type of "near money." Since then, the most commonly used definition of money has been M2+CD.

In recent years, globalization and information technology have improved the liquidity of financial products. M3+CD has drawn increasing attention. M3 consists of M2 plus postal deposits (deposits made to savings account run by the Japanese post office), trust accounts, and deposits at various cooperative-type financial institutions. Since 1989, a variety of high liquid financial assets have been included in "broadly defined liquidity," the broadest category of official money.

Japanese money has several distinctive features. Consistent with a historical preference for cash payments, ordinary households do not use checkable deposits (deposits upon which a check can be written). Due to an efficient electronic payment system, payments by check constituted a mere 5 percent of non-cash payments in 1997. Postal savings deposits in household portfolios, are an important part of broad-

based money. In 1998, they made up 23 percent of M3+CD.

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JAPAN—POLITICAL SYSTEM Modern Japan's political system can be formally divided into three periods centering around the emperor's Charter Oath of 1868, the Meiji Constitution of 1889, and the 1947 constitution. Each of these periods was, in turn, affected by less formal political movements, the meanings of which are still being hotly debated.

The Charter Oath of 1868

In April 1868, the young Meiji emperor participated in a solemn Shinto ceremony in which he issued what is now known as the Charter Oath. This promised that deliberative councils would be established, public discussion encouraged, "evil practices of the past" ended, and knowledge sought "all over the world" so that "the foundations of imperial rule shall be strengthened." The document was intended both to reassure conservatives and to signal—particularly to the Western world—that the new leaders of the Meiji Restoration were prepared to modernize Japan. General enough to be reinterpreted as time went on, it was later cited by the Showa emperor (Hirohito, the Meiji emperor's grandson) in 1946 as a set of ideals Japan might use to recover from the war.

To help accomplish these aims, the Meiji government in its first five years ended the system of hereditary estates (or social classes), abolished feudal domains (*han*), started a modern educational system, and organized a new army based on conscription rather than hereditary warrior privilege. On the negative side, a small (approximately 1,000 families) peerage was established, a strict press law was passed in 1869, legislation regulating public meetings was enacted in 1880, and the 1887 Peace Preservation Law gave the home ministry the power to censor "dangerous thoughts." Politically, the so-called Constitution (*Seitaisbo*) of 1868 set up a Grand Council of State (*dajokan*), a term that eventually stood for a government system allegedly modeled on that of the Nara and Heian periods (710–1185). A grand minister of state



PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN

Adopted on 3 Nov 1946

We, the Japanese people, acting through our elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we should secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty all over this land, and resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution. Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people. This is a universal principle of mankind upon which this Constitution is founded. We reject and revoke all constitutions, laws, ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith.

We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression, and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.

We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations.

We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources.

Source: International Court Network. Retrieved 8 March 2002, from: http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/ja00000_.html.

(*dajo daijin*) presided over the minister of the right (*udaijin*) and the minister of the left (*sadaijin*), and various vice ministers and councilors (*sangi*) headed the various administrative departments.

The *genro*, a group of leaders of the Meiji Restoration, was set up in 1875; a seven-member cabinet was established in 1885; and a Privy Council was formed in 1888. A civil service was also started, as were law codes heavily influenced by European advisers. Lo-

cally, the government attempted to extend its authority by appointing local officials and establishing assemblies whose membership was limited to the wealthy and whose authority to bring up sticky issues was limited. While considerable progress was made toward the establishment of a more civil society, most political decisions were still made by members of the former samurai class (particularly from the Satsuma and Choshu families) who had masterminded the Meiji Restoration itself.



Protestors outside the National Diet in Tokyo in August 2000 rallying against legislation concerning the official acceptance of signs of imperial rule. (AFP/CORBIS)

All this hardly went unchallenged. In 1877 the samurai followers of Saigo Takamori (1827–1877) rose up in a revolt that was only crushed after hard fighting; ironically, Saigo's doomed stance against the Meiji government made him into one of the great heroic figures of modern Japan. Peasants also protested, many violently, against the hardships caused by a new tax system that no longer gave breaks in years of poor harvests. Most significant for our purposes, the largely rural Jiyuto (Liberal Party) of Itagaki Taisuke (1837–1919) and the largely urban Kaishinto (Progressive Party) of Okuma Shigenobu (1838–1922) were both formed to demand more constitutional government. Pressure of this sort was one of the chief reasons that the Meiji government decided to promise as early as 1881 that there would soon be a new constitution. Framed particularly by Ito Hirobumi (1841–1909), who drew heavily from German sources, the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution on 11 February 1889 marked the end of this first era of the modern Japanese state.

The Meiji Constitution of 1889

The new constitution clearly stated that Japan was to be "governed by a line of emperors unbroken for ages eternal." If his decrees were countersigned by a minister of state, the emperor had the official power to pick the prime minister, conduct foreign policy, command the military, dissolve the lower house of the

Diet (the legislature), veto legislation, issue proclamations in place of laws, and consider constitutional amendments. The emperor continued to be advised by the *genro*; the last of these, Saionji Kimmochi, was active until his death in 1940. A Privy Council of various lifetime appointments and political figures became less important as time went on, but it also was an appointive body that had the right to advise the emperor on matters of state. A prestigious and powerful bureaucracy, chosen by civil-service examinations but largely composed of officials from former samurai families, proposed legislation, carried out policy decisions, and often provided prewar political leaders. The constitution authorized legal codes and an independent judicial system, but, as Article 29 put it, the Japanese were to enjoy freedoms of speech and association "within the limits of the law." Finally, military leaders also played an important part in creating Japan's prewar governments. During the 1900–1913 and 1936–1947 periods, only active-duty generals or admirals could legally head the Ministry of Military Affairs and hence be part of the cabinet.

The Meiji Constitution also established a legislature known as the Diet. This consisted of an appointed House of Peers and an elected House of Representatives. Both houses had to approve any proposed piece of legislation, but if a new budget was not approved, the government could use the previous year's budget. While voting in the first election of 1890 was limited

to a very small number of property owners, universal suffrage for all males over twenty-five years of age was enacted by 1925. Political parties continued to be active, and in the so-called Taisho Political Crisis of 1913 these parties were even able to prevent the rather authoritarian Prime Minister Katsura Taro from using imperial edicts to build his cabinet. By 1926 Hara Takashi (Hara Kei), a commoner, had been appointed prime minister; by the 1920s, most prime ministers were appointed from one of the two major political parties.

Helped no doubt by a growing economy, foreign-policy successes, a weak Taisho emperor (the son of the Meiji emperor), and the growing popularity of liberal political ideals, commentators spoke hopefully about the changes in the formal political system apparently brought on by "Taisho Democracy." By the late 1930s, however, parliamentary democracy was in deep trouble. Politically, the Peace Preservation Law of 1887 was followed by a second, even stricter law that was passed in 1925 both to accompany the universal manhood suffrage bill and to counter what was considered to be the growing Communist threat. Economically, large numbers of Japanese (particularly tenant farmers) were doing so badly that they were naturally deeply resentful of the wealthy urban elite. Racially humiliating anti-immigration legislation passed by the United States in 1924, the collapse of the world economy that took place after the stock market crash of 1929, the high tariffs passed in the United States and elsewhere in the next few years, and the mounting opposition to Japan's military expansion all seemed to threaten Japan's existence. The police now began to arrest anyone deemed guilty of "dangerous thoughts."

Nationalist hotheads also assassinated unpopular leaders and, in February 1936, led an army rebellion that briefly occupied the center of Tokyo. With the Showa emperor too worried about the future of the throne to intervene and the various political parties apparently corrupt and fractious, many Japanese concluded that their only hope lay in allying with Germany and Italy. Even without formal changes in the political system, in other words, militarism became more popular. War followed.

The New Constitution

After Japan's defeat, major political changes took place. Between 1945 and 1952, Japan was technically ruled by SCAP, a term that stood both for "Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers" (who for most of the period was General Douglas MacArthur) and his government. Working mostly through the formal Japanese government and bureaucracy, SCAP initiated

a series of major political reforms that included the breakup of the military; a purge of top military, economic, and political leaders; a land-reform law that reduced the number of tenant farmers to perhaps 10 percent of the total farming population, legislation permitting unions to organize, an attempted breakup of some of the *zaibatsu*, or large industrial combines, and educational reforms designed to encourage liberal thinking. While not as severe as the reforms made in Germany, these various policies did try to create a more socially equal and politically aware civil society.

A new constitution lay at the center of these changes. Technically an amendment to the Meiji Constitution, this new one sprang from a draft written by SCAP officials unhappy with the more conservative proposals put forth by the Japanese government. It was promulgated in 1946 and went into effect in 1947. In this new document, the emperor was now "the symbol of the state and the sovereignty of the people . . . with whom resides sovereign power." All bodies such as the *genro* and the Privy Council were abolished, as was the peerage. At the insistence of the Japanese, the Diet—now the chief legislative body—kept the House of Councilors, half of whose members were elected every three years for a six-year term, and the House of Representatives, the members of which were to serve for no more than four years. Executive power lay in a prime minister who had to be a civilian and a member of the Diet. Like the Diet members, the prime minister and his cabinet could serve for up to four years unless (as in Great Britain) the Diet passed a no-confidence motion. An independent judiciary with the right of constitutional review and a far stronger set of human rights rounded out this new political system.

Four aspects of the new constitution were particularly striking. First, Article 14 of the new constitution explicitly outlawed discrimination not only on the basis of race, creed, social status, or family origin—this last aimed at discrimination against a racially Japanese outcaste group known as the Burakumin—but also on the basis of sex. Probably passed, ironically, in a rather sexist hope that women would be more likely to want peace than men, this amendment not only allowed women to vote for the first time, but also inspired other constitutional and legal provisions allowing them to own property, sue, hold public office, marry of their own free will, and divorce. Legislation of this sort naturally did not immediately change Japanese notions that separate, ascribed roles for women and men could be considered "equal." But there was at least substantial legal basis for women to argue that they should not be confined to the home or "office

lady" jobs. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, women were seeking (and winning) legal redress for abuses such as employment discrimination and sexual harassment.

A second important innovation was Article 9. Claiming that they were "aspiring to an international peace based on justice and order," the article went on to say that "the Japanese people forever renounce war as the sovereign right of the nation" and that "land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained." Although the origins of this article remain obscure, Article 9 made it a good deal easier for SCAP to permit the Showa emperor to stay on the throne. The article also made a profound impression on the many millions of Japanese who were reacting against the general destruction of the war and the particular horror of two atom bombs. These Japanese reacted angrily when SCAP and the Japanese government decided that the Cold War (that is, the absence of the "international peace" cited earlier) made it constitutionally possible for Japan to have a highly sophisticated "Self-Defense Force." While this Self-Defense Force is gradually becoming less contentious, the government is careful to keep the military budget at a very low percentage of the gross national product and remains hesitant about sending troops overseas to United Nations peacekeeping forces.

A third key provision was one that let the Diet set up the electoral system. The House of Councilors has traditionally had some of its seats directly elected and some filled by proportional representation. Given also that this body has more limited powers than those of the House of Representatives, this system has not caused as many problems in the House of Councilors as it has in the House of Representatives. Here a failure to adjust electoral districts to population shifts have often meant that rural votes have had as much as four times as much impact as urban ones; this surely is one reason why the conservative Liberal Democratic Party was able to monopolize political power for much of the period. Another problem has been that the so-called multimember district (in which each voter has one vote but varied numbers of candidates can get elected) has allegedly contributed to the factionalism, "money politics," and corruption scandals often found in the Japanese political system. A 1994 reform tried to solve these problems by reducing the seats in the House of Representatives to five hundred, three hundred of which were elected in single-member districts and two hundred filled proportionally from eleven different districts. Voters now got two ballots so that they could vote both for a person and by party for the proportional seats. While it remains to

be seen if these changes will radically alter Japanese politics over the long run, initially this system brought few changes to the political system.

Finally, Article 10 of the constitution left the requirements for citizenship largely up to the legislature. Given Japan's strong ethnic consciousness, this led to disputes over such things as immigration quotas, the ways in which the long-resident Korean minority in Japan has been treated, and the difficulties even foreigners who marry Japanese have had in becoming full citizens.

Assessment of the System

Japan's political system has thus been controversial. Was the rise of militarism, for example, rooted in the less-than-perfect reforms of the Meiji period, or were hostile Western policies largely to blame? Was the Showa emperor constitutionally unable to prevent militarism from taking over, or—particularly if he can be given credit for intervening to make surrender possible in August 1945—should he also be blamed for the destruction of the country? There have been equally serious debates about postwar issues such as whether the 1947 constitution was imposed by SCAP; whether Japan was, as Chalmers Johnson puts it, a "capitalist development state" in which bureaucracy too tightly controlled the economy and foreign trade; and the whole question of whether Japan's notoriously slow judicial system (trials are before judges and can take years to settle) unfairly discourages ordinary citizens from filing civil suits. These questions have, in turn, been related to a politically charged debate over whether Japan's development can serve as a successful model for a modernizing country. While the answer to these questions depends in part on one's point of view, it is at least fair to say that even if open to criticism by ideal standards, Japan's postwar political system was surely a substantial improvement upon the past.

Peter Frost

See also: **Japanese Expansion; Meiji Period; Showa Period; Taisho Period**

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JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY The Japan Communist Party (JCP) was founded 15 July 1922, with the encouragement and financial support of the Soviet Union. Throughout most of its history, the JCP has had a close ideological connection with, and taken its lead from, Moscow. Because the party has not identified with the goals and symbols of Japanese nationalism, it has been marginalized as a political force.

Historically, the JCP has been divided between advocates of peaceful coexistence and those favoring violent revolution. The latter ideology has gone out of fashion and now has few advocates. The party has vigorously opposed Japan's rearmament and its security alliance with the United States.

The JCP contests more seats in the general elections than it could possibly hope to win because it sees its mission as one of educating the public and raising political awareness. Communism has been popular among students and intellectuals, especially with respect to the peace movement.

The Japanese Communists were embarrassed first by the excesses of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) in China, then by the demise of the Soviet Union. Today, the JCP does not favor the model of the Communist state. Instead it limits its activities to speaking out on peace issues and against social inequities.

Louis D. Hayes

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JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY Despite union support and ideological flexibility, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) has never emerged as an effective political force. Founded on 28 January 1906, it was the first political party to be reestablished following World War II, but found itself ideologically divided. A leftist faction opposed the peace treaty ending the war on the grounds that it imposed on Japan an oppressive regime; also, it opposed the security alliance with the United States and Japanese rearmament. The rightist faction also opposed Japanese rearmament but favored the treaty and saw some virtue in the alliance with the U.S.

The Socialists did well in the election of 1947, but failed to win a majority. They formed a coalition government, but because Japan was experiencing serious

economic conditions at the time, they were unable to rule effectively.

In the decades that followed, the JSP was Japan's largest opposition party, but was never in a position to capture control of the government. Among other reasons, it did not run enough candidates in parliamentary elections. Even if all JSP candidates had won, they would not have constituted a majority in parliament. In 1994 the Socialists formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democratic Party. But this government lasted only one year.

The JSP draws its support from organized labor, especially the Japan Teachers Union. However, the party's political leverage is limited by the fact that unions in Japan are organized at the individual company level rather than across an entire industry. Thus fragmented, unions are difficult to mobilize effectively during electoral campaigns. Public sector unions like the Teachers Union are more aggressive than industrial unions but they are not significantly more influential.

Members of the JSP have embraced ideologies ranging from advocacy of revolutionary socialism on the model of communist China to promotion of liberal democracy and human rights. Those embracing the latter philosophy split off to form the Democratic Socialist Party in 1960. The 1966–1976 Cultural Revolution in China was an embarrassment to the JSP, and the party tried to distance itself from both the Chinese and Soviet models of government.

In the mid-1980s, the JSP attempted to broaden its popular appeal by moving closer to the middle of the ideological spectrum. It largely abandoned its socialist agenda and in 1991 changed its name in English to the Social Democratic Party. But its efforts to redefine itself as a centrist party were ineffective. The party did poorly in the 1996 and 2000 elections, and for all practical purposes ceased to be an electoral force.

Louis D. Hayes

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JAPAN-AFRICA RELATIONS For most Japanese, the image of the African continent has been that of a remote and distant land. The majority of Japanese do not know that their economy has de-

pended heavily on African natural resources. In fact, Japan's position as an economic superpower would not have been achieved without natural resources from the African countries. Before 1945, the Japanese had little interest in relations with Africa because Japan was concentrating on the West.

After 1945, however, Japan began to attend to the African continent. In order to recover from the disasters of war and to develop the national economy, the Japanese needed to develop a friendship with the Africans. Japan's African diplomacy is, however, problematic rather than easy. During the global antiapartheid movement, Japan, in contrast to other developed countries, accepted the racial policy instituted by the South African regime. As a result, many people in African countries have viewed Japanese diplomacy as supporting racism, a view that has been difficult to overcome.

Pre-World War II

Japan-Africa relations prior to World War II were characterized by a lack of interest, if not disdain. Since the Meiji restoration in 1868, Japan had concentrated on its own modernization and industrial development by seeking to learn from the West. In 1897, Tomizu Hirono (1861-1935), a professor at the University of Tokyo, advocated that Japan colonize African countries, because taking advantage of the natural resources available in Africa would create a golden era for Japan in the twentieth century. In his book *Afrika no zento* (The Future of Africa), he claimed that the African countries were as important to Japan as China was to the Asian region. No one in Japan, however, supported his view. The first official relations between Japan and Africa were initiated when Japan opened the Official African Residence in Cape Town, South Africa, in 1918. Before 1945, Japan also dispatched delegations to Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Madagascar.

Post-1945

Japan's postwar African policy was determined by the search for economic resources. In the 1950s, most African countries were still under European colonial domination. While Japan sought to learn from the West, it pursued friendship with African nations. Japanese dual diplomacy with white and black Africa since the 1950s emphasized foreign relations with sub-Saharan Africa. (See Table 1.) In September 1951, Japan signed a peace treaty in San Francisco with the allied nations of the Western bloc, including Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt, and South Africa.

It was not until African decolonization reached its peak in the 1960s that the opportunity for Japan to

TABLE 1

Japanese Embassies in Sub-Saharan Africa		
Country	Date established	Other countries served by the embassy
Ethiopia	April 1958	
Ghana	12 March 1959	
Congo (Zaire)	30 June 1960	Congo (Brazzaville), Rwanda, Burundi
Nigeria	26 December 1960	
Senegal	6 January 1962	Mali, Mauritania, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde
Ivory Coast	22 February 1964	Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin, Togo
Kenya	1 June 1964	Uganda, Seychelles, Somalia
Tanzania	18 February 1968	
Madagascar	February 1968	Comoros, Mauritius
Zambia	15 January 1970	Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland
Gabon	21 November 1972	Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome & Principe
Liberia	January 1973	Sierra Leone
Central African Rep.	25 January 1974	
Guinea	20 January 1976	
Zimbabwe	2 May 1981	Angola, Mozambique, Namibia

SOURCE: Morikawa (1997: 65).

formalize its ties with Africa fully emerged. Japan's policy of dual diplomacy was very visible in the 1960s. In 1961, the white minority regime in South Africa agreed to reconfirm the Japanese as having "honorary white" status, meaning that the Japanese could do business with South Africa and live in white residential areas. At that point, Tokyo officially announced its intention to resume diplomatic relations with Pretoria, which had been disrupted by World War II.

In the wake of Japan's recognition of South Africa in 1962, over sixty black African demonstrators were killed by white South African police in the Sharpeville massacre. There is no question that the white regime's decision to crack down on the demonstrators was bolstered by the vote of confidence represented by Japan's diplomatic decision to support South Africa at a time when South Africa was largely isolated from the industrialized world. The Japanese government, for its part, wanted to avoid criticism from black African countries rich in natural resources and so decided not to upgrade its consular office in Pretoria to the status of an embassy. For this reason, Japan reestablished a consular office rather than an embassy in Pretoria in 1961.

Despite the fact that the United Nations had moved to impose economic sanctions against South Africa in 1960, Japan continued to trade with South Africa, eager to gain access to South African uranium, man-

TABLE 2

Country with which Japan established bilateral friendship associations	Date established
Nigeria	1 February 1965
Ethiopia (Ethiopian Association of Japan)	27 April 1971
Zaire	3 June 1971
Guinea	29 May 1974
Gabon	19 March 1975
Zambia	20 December 1975
Senegal	25 February 1978
Tanzania	28 September 1978
Malawi	26 February 1983
Somalia	27 September 1983
Liberia	1 July 1984
Mali	31 July 1985
Niger	31 July 1985
Mauritius	5 December 1985
Mozambique	1 April 1986
Ghana	2 September 1987

SOURCE: Morikawa (1997: 65).

ganese, vanadium, and platinum. In the face of international objections, Japan opened a trade promotion office in Johannesburg. On 6 November 1962, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution to enforce economic sanctions against South Africa by a vote of sixty-seven in favor, sixteen opposed, and twenty-three abstentions. Japan was the only country in Asia to vote against the measure in 1962.

A significant date for Japan-Africa relations was 28 April 1964, when Japan was admitted as a full member to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In renewed efforts, Japan sought natural resources in Africa as a way to remain competitive in the postindustrial market. Membership in the OECD gave Japan greater access to international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. On 31 August 1970, Keidanren, the most powerful business organization in Japan, formed the Committee on Cooperation with Africa. The priority for both government and business in Japan was to secure natural resources in black African countries. (See Table 2.)

After the end of apartheid, Japan has continued to have good relations with South Africa and has made little effort to improve relations with other African nations. Data indicate that Japan continues to discriminate against black African countries. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japanese direct investment in South Africa in fiscal 1997 alone was around 16 billion yen, while Japanese loans to South Africa in 1996 alone totaled nearly 8 billion yen. On the other hand,

Japanese direct investment in Kenya was only 5.7 million yen (total through 1998), and in Nigeria 48 million yen (cumulative total fiscal 1951–1998).

Japan's problematic diplomacy in Africa continues in the early 2000s. The Japanese government has tried to provide more official development assistance (ODA) to African countries to soften the criticism that it focuses only on Asian nations. During 7–15 January 2001, Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori made a symbolic visit to South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria to promise to increase Japanese ODA.

Unryu Suganuma

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JAPAN-FRANCE RELATIONS Although the earliest contacts between Japan and France occurred in the late sixteenth century, prompted by the activities of Catholic missionaries, a formal bilateral relationship was not established until the signing of the treaty of friendship and trade in 1858. In the following year, the first French consul general arrived in Japan, while the first Japanese diplomatic mission reached France in 1862. In the last years of the Tokugawa regime, France sided with the shogunate and helped to lay the groundwork for Japan's modernization, notably in military matters. The Meiji Restoration of 1868, combined with the French defeat by Prussia in 1871, diminished the centrality of France as a model for Japan; nevertheless, French influence continued to be felt, for instance in legal reforms. The Tripartite Intervention that followed Japan's victory over China in 1895 soured Japanese popular sentiments toward France, but these events also indicated that Japan was becoming an imperial power on a par with France. Japan's next victory over Russia in 1905 led to the Franco-Japanese Agreement, and Japan joined the Triple Entente against Germany in World War I. From the 1920s, Indochina increasingly



Ai Sugiyama of Japan and Julie Halard-Decugis of France hold the women's doubles trophy which they won at the 2000 U.S. Open in New York City. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

became a bone of contention between the two countries as Japan sought to build up its naval forces lured by the rich natural resources of the region. Japanese troops finally entered and occupied Indochina in 1940, although the Vichyite French authority there was formally left intact until early 1945.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty revived the relations between Japan and France in 1952. In 1953, a bilateral Cultural Agreement followed. Shigeru Yoshida (1878–1967) became the first postwar Japanese prime minister to pay an official visit to France in 1954. In 1971, the Japanese emperor visited France, although the first official imperial visit did not take place until 1994. On the French side, Georges Pompidou was the first prime minister to visit Japan, in 1964, and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was the first president to do so, in 1979. Although it was never seriously threatened, the bilateral relationship went through occasional difficulties, for example when France conducted nuclear tests in the Pacific in the 1970s, and again briefly in 1995. Lacking in focus, the postwar political relationship between the two countries verged on an indifferent friendship. The economic relations between the two countries continued to be marked by small bilateral trade volumes, and mutual cultural interest was the strongest underpinning of the postwar ties. French president Jacques Chirac furthered cultural exchanges in the early 2000s.

Koichi Nakano

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JAPAN-GERMANY RELATIONS

Relations between Japan and Germany go back to the early Edo period (1600/1603–1868), when Germans in Dutch service came to Japan to work for the Dutch East India Company. The first well-documented German visitors were the physicians Engelbert Kaempfer (1651–1716) and Philipp Franz von Siebold (1796–1866) in the 1690s and the 1820s, respectively. Siebold was allowed to travel throughout Japan, in spite of the restrictive seclusion policy the Tokugawa shogunate had implemented since the 1630s. Siebold became the author of *Nippon, Archiv zur Beschreibung von Japan* (*Nippon, Archive for the Description of Japan*), one of the most valuable sources of information on Japan well into the twentieth century.

Shortly after the end of Japan's seclusion in 1855, the first German traders arrived in Japan. In 1860 Count Friedrich Albrecht zu Eulenburg came to Japan as envoy from Prussia, the most powerful of the numerous regional states in Germany. After four months of negotiations, a treaty of amity and commerce was signed in January 1861 between Prussia and Japan—one of the infamous "unequal treaties" Japan was forced into by most of Europe's powers as well as the United States.

During the Meiji period (1868–1912), many Germans came to work in Japan as advisers to the new government and contributed to the modernization of Japan, especially in the fields of medicine (Leopold Mueller, 1824–1894; Julius Scriba, 1848–1905; Erwin von Baelz, 1849–1913), law (K. F. Hermann Roesler, 1834–1894; Albert Mosse, 1846–1925), and military affairs (K. W. Jacob Meckel, 1842–1906). The Constitution of the Empire of Japan, promulgated in 1889, was greatly influenced by the German legal scholars Rudolf von Gneist and Lorenz von Stein, whom the Meiji oligarch Ito Hirobumi (1841–1909) visited in Berlin and Vienna in 1882.

Japanese-German relations cooled down at the end of the nineteenth century due to Germany's imperialist aspirations in East Asia. The frictions culminated

in 1895, when the Wilhelminian empire, together with Russia and France, prevented Japan from acquiring possessions on the Asian mainland (Triple Intervention). In World War I, Japan entered the conflict as an ally of Great Britain, France, and czarist Russia to seize the German colonial territories in Asia and the Pacific.

After World War I, cultural exchange between Japan and Germany was strengthened, but it was not until the rise of Nazism in Germany and militarism in Japan in the 1930s that political ties became closer again. Japan and Germany signed the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936 and the Tripartite Pact, which also included Italy, in 1940. However, during the following years this seemingly close alliance never brought any real cooperation.

After their defeat in World War II, both Japan and Germany were occupied. Although Japan regained its sovereignty with the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952, Germany was split into two states. The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) restored diplomatic ties with Japan in 1955, and the German Democratic Republic restored ties as late as 1973. Postwar relations between Japan and both Germanys, as well as with unified Germany after 1990, have focused on economic questions. Germany, dedicated to free trade, continues to be Japan's largest European trading partner.

Sven Saaler

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JAPAN-KOREA RELATIONS Proximity and memory are the main factors that have shaped the relations between the Japanese archipelago and the Korean peninsula. Since the dawn of history, unceasing human and material exchanges have taken place be-

tween these two neighboring areas. Many elements of Japanese culture, like rice growing, seem to have originated in Korea, and Korean immigrants played an important role in the formation of the early Japanese state. On the other hand, the Japanese were involved in internal Korean rivalries, particularly in the fourth and fifth centuries. Under the unified Korean states of Shilla (668–935) and Koryo (935?–1392), bilateral trade developed, but formal Japanese-Korean relations were established only at the beginning of the fifteenth century, with the coming to power of the shogun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu (1358–1408) in Japan, and of the Yi (Choson) dynasty (1392–1910) in Korea.

Early Relations

Those newly established formal relations put an end to the destruction Japanese pirates had wreaked on Korea during the second half of the fourteenth century. Furthermore, in 1443 the pirates lost one of their main strongholds when Korea concluded an agreement granting the So family, the lords of the island of Tsushima (part of Japan), in the Korean straits, a monopoly on the bilateral trade. This arrangement worked for 150 years, until the last decades of the sixteenth century. Then, between 1592 and 1598, the unifier of Japan, Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537–1598), twice attempted to conquer Korea. The Koreans succeeded, with Chinese help, in stopping Hideyoshi, but the country was left devastated and exhausted.

Relations between the two countries were renewed in 1607. The So family regained its commercial privileges as main partner and only intermediary. A delegation from Tsushima, the Japan House (Japanese *wakan*; Korean *waegwan*), was opened in Pusan, and Korean embassies started coming to Japan. Between 1607 and 1811, twelve embassies consisting of several hundred people came to Japan, most of them crossing the archipelago from Tsushima to the shogunal capital of Edo. Korea was one of the few countries with which Japan had formal relations during the Edo period (1600/1603–1868). These exchanges make the period remembered as a rare time of friendship between the two lands.

1876–1910: From Opening to Annexation

During the Meiji period (1868–1912), Japan became a modern state and an imperialist power. Korea was one of the victims of this success. In the aftermath of the Meiji restoration (1868), the new Japanese government tried to redefine its relations with Korea, but Korea refused to change the old order. In 1876, Japan finally succeeded in opening her neighbor and in



THE MODERNIZATION OF FISHING

The Japanese occupation of Korea affected many aspects of life, including the economy. The account below describes how the Japanese transformed fishing in the village of Sokp'o from a local activity to a major source of income for the villagers.

Until the arrival of the Japanese in 1910 (their direct influence was not really felt in the village until four or five years later) Sokp'o had no sailboats, and fishing with hook and line and with nets was carried out near the coast at a relatively primitive technological level. All equipment was manufactured locally including hooks, although iron of course was obtained elsewhere.

Large stone fish traps built where sandy beaches adjoin rock outcroppings take advantage of the great tidal range. They have been there as long as anyone can remember and have been handed down in a few families as an important source of food. In recent years the runs of mullet, shad, and corvenia along the coast that used to fill the traps periodically have dropped off sharply and some are no longer maintained. A good deal of work is required to put the stones back in place after a storm, and management and maintenance of the traps is now mainly done by the poor and the old who have no other work.

Occasionally the traps still fill up with fish, and an excited crowd quickly gathers as the desperate fish begin to mill around more and more frantically. Many of the spectators help gather the fish as the tide goes out. Any fish that jumps over the stone wall or finds a gap in the rocks belongs to whoever catches it. The owner usually distributes a good portion to relatives and others to whom he may owe favors. If the catch is unusually large, he will use part of it to pay off obligations on the spot, keep a considerable portion for himself, and turn the rest over to the village.

The inhabitants of Sokp'o bartered some of their fish during the late Yi dynasty period for food and a few manufactured goods that were brought to the coast by people from inland towns and villages. Under Japanese direction a revolution took place in fishing. A different kind of boat with sails was introduced and the villagers learned much more efficient "long line" techniques for catching ray, eel, corvenia, and croaker. They also learned various kinds of netting techniques from the Japanese, who supplied the fishermen with the necessary gear. The Japanese, in addition to building roads and a rail network, established coastal passenger and freight shipping service on a regular basis. Large city fish markets and canneries were built to handle the increased fish production. Sokp'o was too isolated to profit much from the expanded national market for fish, but trading with the immediate hinterland increased substantially.

Source: Vincent S. R. Brandt. (1971) *A Korean Village between Farm and Sea*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 60–61.



JAPAN TAKES CONTROL OF KOREA

In 1905 Japan made Korea a protectorate leading to its full annexation in 1910. The following declaration by the Japanese government of 22 November 1905 sets forth Japan's rationale for colonizing Korea.

The relations of propinquity have made it necessary for Japan to take and exercise, for reasons closely connected with her own safety and repose, a paramount interest and influence in the political and military affairs of Korea. The measures hitherto taken have been purely advisory, but the experience of recent years has demonstrated the insufficiency of measures of guidance alone. The unwise and improvident action of Korea, more especially in the domain of her international concerns, has in the past been the most fruitful source of complications. To permit the present unsatisfactory condition of things to continue unrestrained and unregulated would be to invite fresh difficulties, and Japan believes that she owes it to herself and to her desire for the general pacification of the extreme East to take the steps necessary and to put an end once and for all to this dangerous situation. Accordingly, with that object in view and in order at the same time to safeguard their own position and to promote the well-being of the Government and people of Korea, the Imperial Government have resolved to assume a more intimate and direct influence and responsibility than heretofore in the external relations of the Peninsula. The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Korea are in accord with the Imperial Government as to the absolute necessity of the measure, and the two Governments, in order to provide for the peaceful and amicable establishment of the new order of things, have concluded the accompanying compact. In bringing this agreement to the notice of the Powers having treaties with Korea, the Imperial Government declare that in assuming charge of the foreign relations of Korea and undertaking the duty of watching over the execution of the existing treaties of that country, they will see that those treaties are maintained and respected, and they also engage not to prejudice in any way the legitimate commercial and industrial interests of those Powers in Korea.

Source: John H. Maki. (1957) *Selected Documents, Far Eastern International Relations (1689–1951)*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 114.

imposing an unequal treaty, modeled on the treaties Japan itself had had to sign with the Western powers. The treaty of Kanghwa provided for the opening of three Korean ports to Japanese trade and residence and granted Japan commercial, financial, and judicial privileges. This was to be the beginning of a deepening Japanese involvement in the peninsula, which ultimately led to the annexation of Korea to Japan in 1910.

The annexation was not so much the result of a long-term policy as the outcome of the growing strategic importance of Korea for Japan. The peninsula was increasingly perceived as a vital element of Japan's security, as the archipelago's first line of defense against China and Russia. Accordingly, in the 1880s Japan tried to transform Korea into an independent and friendly state. For that purpose, Japan formed ties with Korean reformists, who saw in Japan's success a model



Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and South Korea Prime Minister Kim Jong Il during a meeting on Cheju Island, South Korea, in October 1999. They are discussing the expansion of ties between the two nations. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

for their own country, and local reforms were encouraged and supported. But these were not enough to keep the Chinese away. In 1882, the Japanese delegation in Seoul was attacked by members of the military dissatisfied with the reforms (Imo mutiny). In 1884, the local reformists attempted to seize power by force, but failed (Kapsin political coup). These two incidents provided a pretext for Chinese military interventions, until in 1885 Japan and China agreed upon a mutual troop withdrawal (Tianjin convention).

This arrangement held for a decade, until the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). A Chinese military incursion to crush a peasant uprising (Tonghak rebellion) in the south of the Korean peninsula gave the Japanese an excuse to open hostilities. Along with the fighting, pro-Japanese reformist governments were set up, which adopted radical reforms (Kabo reforms). The Japanese victory may have eliminated Chinese influence from Korea, but it did not succeed in putting the peninsula inside the Japanese sphere of influence. Russia became Japan's new rival on the peninsula.

The decade before the Russo-Japanese war (1904–1905) was marked by dramatic events, such as the assassination of the Korean queen Min (1895) by a band led by the Japanese ambassador, and by compromises such as the Nishi-Rosen agreement (1898). These understandings allowed Japan to deepen its economic penetration of the peninsula. But the Russian advance in Manchuria also increased Japanese fears and reinforced Korea's strategic value. This percep-

tion was one of the main reasons for the war Japan launched against Russia in 1904.

After the victory over Russia, Japan was free to impose her will on Korea. The Korean-Japanese Convention of 1905 gave Japan full control over Korea's foreign affairs, making the peninsula a Japanese protectorate. Korean armed resistance was unable to stop the Japanese takeover. In October 1909, the Japanese resident-general, Ito Hirobumi (1841–1909), was assassinated in Harbin in northeast China by a Korean nationalist, An Chung-gun (1879–1910). On 22 August 1910, Japan forced a treaty of annexation on Korea. The Yi dynasty came to an end, and the country lost its independence.

1910–1945: The Colonial Period

The first decade of Japanese rule was a period of organization and consolidation. The government-general was essentially a military government that mercilessly repressed all signs of opposition. The land census and reorganization of land ownership caused great dissatisfaction among the peasants. Anger burst out on 1 March 1919 (Samil independence movement). Encouraged by the democratic spirit of the aftermath of World War I, large crowds demonstrated all over the country. The protests lasted for a few months and were answered by force. But once the movement was suppressed, Japan chose to soften its policy.

The 1920s were characterized by a relaxation of Japanese control. Limited political rights were granted

to the population, and freedom of speech was expanded. These were also years of accelerated economic development. Rice production rose; roads, bridges, and railways were built; modern industries were created. Although the results were impressive, all this was done for Japanese colonial needs. For example, the quantity of Korean rice shipped to Japan grew regularly, leaving less and less rice for the local population.

After the outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese war in 1937, Korea and its population were mobilized for the Japanese war effort. Some 1.5 million Koreans were transported to Japan and forced to work there. At the same time, a policy of assimilation was enforced in Korea. Use of the Korean language was forbidden; all Koreans were forced to adopt Japanese names and to worship the Japanese emperor and gods. This was the outcome of the ideology that sustained the annexation of the peninsula and claimed that Korea was not a colony, but an inalienable part of the Japanese territory and nation. This was the reason that Koreans were also conscripted into the Japanese army. But Koreans were never granted equal-citizen rights and were subject to contempt and discrimination. Thousands of Koreans were massacred after the 1923 earthquake in Kanto, Japan, and tens of thousands of Korean women served as forced prostitutes of the imperial army.

1945–2002: Japan and the Two Koreas

On 15 August 1945, Japan surrendered, Korea regained its independence, and the country was soon divided into two separate states. The heritage of the colonial period weighed heavily on the relations between Japan and the two Koreas. The 700,000 Koreans living today in Japan are perhaps the most concrete manifestation of this heritage. On the diplomatic level, a treaty of normalization was concluded between Japan and the Republic of Korea (South Korea, ROK) in 1965. The two countries established diplomatic relations; Japan recognized the ROK government as the only lawful government on the peninsula and awarded South Korea important economic assistance, but no compensations or apologies for the colonial rule. The territorial controversy around the small island of Takeshima (Korean Tokto) in the Sea of Japan (Korean East Sea) was also left unresolved.

Although the 1965 treaty left open sensitive issues, it supplied the two countries with an agreed-on framework. Since then, economic, political, and human exchanges have deepened, and Japan-ROK relations have steadily improved. These links are reinforced by common strategic interests. Both countries are allies

of the United States and harbor large American military bases, and both are diplomatically estranged from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea, DPRK). Japan has no diplomatic relations with the DPRK, although normalization talks have been taking place intermittently since 1991.

The past still haunts relations between Japan and the Korean peninsula. North Korea wants Japan to apologize and provide compensation for the colonial period. South Korea would like to hear more explicit apologies than the "regrets" already expressed. In 2002, Japan and the ROK were to co-host the World Cup soccer tournament. Because of the sensitive nature of the relations between the two countries, the Soccer International Federation (FIFA) could not decide which one should hold the games; submitting to the historical record of colonialism, FIFA appointed both.

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JAPAN-LATIN AMERICA RELATIONS

Latin America is geographically far from Japan, and the antipodes of Japan is found off the coast of southern Brazil. Despite the distance, Japan has maintained relations with Latin American countries in terms of labor migration and economic relations since the late nineteenth century.

Japan and Latin America have strong relations based on the history of Japanese migration. Among world regions, Latin America has the largest population of overseas Japanese and descendants of Japanese. Brazil is estimated to have 1.6 million Japanese and Japanese-Brazilians, while Peru (82,000), Argentina (30,000), Mexico (20,000), Bolivia (14,000), and Paraguay (7,000) also have Japanese communities (all estimates in 2000).

Japanese Migration to Latin America

The Japanese began to migrate to Latin America in the late nineteenth century at the end of national isolation and the lift of the ban on foreign travel. The first mass migration began in the 1890s, when 132 Japanese resettled from Hawaii's sugar plantations to Guatemala. In 1897, a group of thirty-five Japanese built the Enomoto Colony in Chiapas, southern Mexico, to grow coffee; however, the enterprise eventually failed. Some ten thousand Japanese were hired as plantation and mining laborers in Mexico during the first decade of the twentieth century. Diplomatically, Japan and Mexico entered into the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation in 1888, which was the first equal treaty Japan was able to conclude with a non-Asian country. In 1899, 799 Japanese arrived at the port of Callao, Peru, as contract laborers in coastal plantations, marking the beginning of the era of migration to that country. Alberto Fujimori, who was the president of Peru from 1990 to 2000, is a son of Japanese immigrants.

Japanese migration to Brazil began in 1908 when a ship named *Kasatomaru* carried 791 Japanese to the port of Santos. They were hired as coffee plantation workers in the backcountry of Sao Paulo. After the initial contract expired, they either moved further inland to settle in Japanese enclaves or moved to Sao Paulo to engage in urban occupations as well as in farming on the urban fringe. The Brazilian government initially supported Japanese immigration to make up for a serious shortage of farm laborers, while the Japanese government assisted emigration to ease its domestic overpopulation. Japanese immigration continued until the early 1930s when it was prohibited by the Brazilian government. Under the new constitution of 1934, a quota system was introduced in accepting immigrants. This quota system appeared to resemble the Immigration Act of 1924 in the United States. Japanese immigration was prohibited partly because of an increasing number of Japanese immigrants while Brazil was suffering a labor surplus under a slow economy, and also because the Brazilian government began to encourage nationalism and disregard ethnic diversity.

Japanese migration to Latin America accelerated after Japan and the United States concluded the Gentlemen's Agreement (seven letters and memoranda between the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Japanese Foreign Minister in 1907 and 1908, under which Japan stopped issuing passports to those intending to go to the United States), and the United States enforced the 1924 Immigration Act cutting Japanese immigration. In the 1930s, however, the interest of the Japanese government shifted to Manchuria in north-eastern China, where Japanese were sent as colonists. Total Japanese migration to Latin America prior to World War II totaled 244,000. Brazil received three quarters of the total Japanese immigrants to Latin America.

Although Japanese migration to Latin America stopped during World War II, mass migration resumed in the early 1950s. Many moved away to escape Japan's postwar devastation, and the Japanese government assisted emigration. Over 90 percent of the postwar emigrants chose Latin America. While Japanese migrants in the prewar period hoped to become rich and return home in glory, those who migrated to Latin America after the war intended to settle down. High economic growth in Japan in the 1960s increased Japan's demand for labor, and the emigration boom ended.

Japanese Cultural Influence in Latin America

Japanese migrants brought Japanese culture to Latin America, most clearly in Brazil. Japanese immigrants introduced intensive farming systems and Asian crops; they also introduced the concept of agricultural cooperatives. The Agricultural Cooperative of Cotia, established by Japanese farmers in 1927, developed into one of the largest agricultural cooperatives in Brazil. Systematic missionary work by Buddhist sects and Japanese new religions also began in the postwar period, especially in the 1960s. Missionary activity not only increased the numbers of Japanese adherents but also attracted non-Japanese believers; in the early 2000s there are over thirty Japanese religious sects in Brazil.

The flow of labor migration was reversed in the 1980s, especially during the so-called bubble economy of the late 1980s, in which booming labor demands and high wages in Japan attracted foreign workers. A stagnant economy and hyperinflation in Brazil and other Latin American countries contributed to the influx of Latin Americans of Japanese descent into Japan. Immigration law permitted people of Japanese descent to stay and work legally. The money remitted from

Japan, the amount of which is unknown, appears to have helped Latin American families and the economy.

In 1998, there were approximately 1.5 million officially registered foreigners in Japan, with Brazilians accounting for 14.7 percent and Peruvians 2.7 percent. A majority of those from Latin American countries entered Japan to engage in labor; they were the descendants of Japanese immigrants. The Latin American population in Japan continues to increase both in large cities and in less populated areas where there is a demand for factory workers. Latin American culture has made inroads in Japan.

Japan's Trade Relations with Latin America

Japan and Latin America are trade partners, but the shares of Latin America in Japan's overall trade are low in comparison with Asia, North America, and Europe. Japan's exports to Latin America accounted for 4.7 percent of its total export value in 1999, while Japan's imports from Latin America accounted for 3.1 percent of its total import value. Panama, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina are Japan's five leading trade partners from Latin America.

Japan was Brazil's third-largest export partner and was the destination for 6.7 percent of Brazil's exports. Japan was also the country of origin of 6.1 percent of Brazil's imports in 1995 and ranked fourth among Brazil's import trade partners. Japan exported machinery, automobiles, and auto parts and imported iron ore, aluminum, coffee beans, steel, paper pulp, and soybeans.

Japan was Mexico's third-largest export partner; exports to Japan accounted for 1.2 percent of Mexico's total exports. Imports from Japan accounted for 5 percent of Mexico's total imports, making Japan Mexico's second-largest import partner in 1995. Japan exported machinery, auto parts, and steel and imported machinery, oil, meat, and salt.

Japan was Peru's second-largest export partner and was the destination for 9.2 percent of Peru's exports; imports from Japan accounted for 7 percent of Peru's total imports, making Japan Peru's third-largest import partner in 1995. Japan imported copper ore and fish from Chile and exported automobiles and machinery to Chile. It is clear that Japan depends on the mineral and agricultural products of Latin America.

Japanese official development assistance (ODA) to Latin American countries amounted to \$814 million in 1999, or 7.8 percent of the total. Latin American resources continue to attract Japanese investment, and

direct investment, loans, and technical assistance from Japan have facilitated development projects.

A substantial amount of Japanese direct investment and government aid were directed to Brazil in the late twentieth century. Aluminum refineries were built at the mouth of the Amazon River. Eucalyptus plantations and paper pulp production were undertaken in Minas Gerais and Espirito Santo. The Serra dos Carajas Iron Mine project in eastern Amazonia has been partly financed by Japan. Japan has also helped with the reclamation of the inland savanna called *cerrado*. The Brazilian government launched a comprehensive development plan in the 1970s, which Japanese ODA helped finance. In addition to financial assistance, Japan has provided technical assistance, and a good portion of the products of the grain and coffee produced in newly developed large-scale farming regions that Japanese ODA has helped establish has been exported to Japan.

Those Japanese immigrants who departed from the port of Kobe for Brazil in 1908 spent nearly two months at sea. It is now possible to fly from Japan to Sao Paulo via Los Angeles in twenty-four hours. The distance between Japan and Latin America has been substantially reduced and there are many opportunities for cultural exchange. People in Japan enjoy Argentina's tango and Brazil's samba. There are Latin American soccer players and managers on Japanese teams. Japan-Latin America relations continue to improve in terms of the movement of people, goods, capital, information, and ideas in the early 2000s.

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See also: **Japanese Foreign Investments**

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JAPAN–PACIFIC ISLANDS RELATIONS

The archipelago of Japan is made of more than three thousand Pacific islands. Most of them are tiny uninhabited spots of land, but they provide a sort of buffer zone between the four main Japanese islands and the non-Japanese Pacific islands. Historically, Hokkaido in the north and the Ryukyu Islands (included in Okinawa Prefecture, named for the largest of the

Ryukyus) in the south did not come under the control of the central government until the beginning of the twentieth century. This was the last step before the expansionist thrust of the early twentieth century toward the Asian mainland and the outer Pacific islands.

The great design of expanding Japanese territory and space step by step, rock by rock was inspired by the work of Japanese geographers at the beginning of the century. "South Seas fever" enflamed the national imagination and contributed to the myth that Japan could find in the South Seas islands the natural resources it lacked.

In 1917 a secret agreement between Japan and the United Kingdom, confirmed by the Treaty of Versailles (1919), provided the basis for the sharing of the German Far East possessions after World War I. In this way, Japan acquired sovereignty over the Mariana (except Guam), Marshall, and Carolina islands.

The Pacific War

During the 1920s, Japan built naval bases on the Micronesian islands for its expanding fleet, which was progressively being freed from the constraints imposed by the Washington Naval Conference of 1922. (That conference had limited the number of military vessels Japan could have.)

On 7 December 1941, Japan attacked the U.S. forces in Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. Hong Kong, Guam, Wake Island, and the Gilbert Islands were seized within a month. The Japanese built a major base in Rabaul (New Britain, Papua New Guinea), from which they launched attacks on New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. The year 1942 was decisive, with the main sea battles in the Coral Sea (4–11 May), Midway (3–7 June), and Guadalcanal (August 1942–February 1943) being won by the U.S. forces. The Pacific islands were conquered by the U.S. forces, which leapfrogged toward Japan's main islands from Bougainville (November 1943) to Iwo Jima (February 1945). After the war, Japan surrendered sovereignty over Micronesia to the United States.

Developments after World War II

After the war, Japan's energies were devoted to reconstruction and economic recovery. Japan was not part of any formal agreement between its former territories and the victorious Allied powers. The South Pacific became a U.S. lake under the ANZUS Treaty of 1952, which linked Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States set up the

South Pacific Commission in 1947 for economic cooperation among their dependent territories. The Pacific islands gradually attained independence between 1962 and 1980. Australia and New Zealand became the leading regional powers and promoted the creation of the South Pacific Forum (SPF) in 1971 as a gathering of the independent island states of the region. The SPF promoted the creation of the South Pacific nuclear-free zone in 1986 (Treaty of Rarotonga). In 2001 the forum's membership included the following: Australia, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

During the Cold War, the main manifestations of Japan's relations with Pacific islands were commercial exchanges, Japanese fishing in these islands' economic exclusive zones (EEZ), and Japanese tourists.

The Dawn of the Twenty-first Century

The end of the East-West confrontation in 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the French nuclear tests in Polynesia in 1995 dramatically changed the international role of the Pacific islands. They ceased to be pawns in a global competition and were left facing their own shortcomings and difficulties as poor, remote, and resourceless islands.

The former colonial powers have been all too happy to let Japan distribute a substantial amount of development aid to the island states. Since the 1990s, Japan has been contributing between \$150 and \$200 million annually in official development assistance (ODA) to the Pacific islands. It pursues an active bilateral diplomacy through grants (54.8 percent of ODA) and technical cooperation (33 percent) with most of them. It is also the third-largest contributor to Pacific Islands Forum activities (after Australia and New Zealand). At the end of the 1990s, Japan was the biggest bilateral aid donor to Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu and the second biggest to Fiji, the Federal States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu. Japan is also the largest export market for the SPF countries, taking more than 30 percent of their exports (in minerals, forestry, fish).

In 1997 Japan initiated regular meetings between the leaders of Japan and the South Pacific states. The second meeting was held in April 2000. Three issues were discussed at this conference: sustainable development for the Pacific islands, promoting cooperation on regional and global problems, and strengthening

Japan's partnership with the South Pacific states. At the top of the cooperation agenda on global problems are climate change and global warming, which are matters of life and death for the island states, because rising sea levels are leading to land erosion and to the disappearance of some of the islands. The Pacific island states also expect Japan to pay attention to their own preoccupations when multilateral trade rules are being discussed in other forums.

Japan's aid policy is part of its global U.N. diplomacy: in 2000 Japan gave \$3 million to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to be spent on projects for the South Pacific, including projects aimed at advancing technologies and fighting infectious diseases. Paradoxically, Japan is also using aid to the South Pacific states as a means of gaining supporting votes in the United Nations on such controversial issues as whaling, Tonga and Fiji being considered as potential pro-whaling countries, or for its bid to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council.

The geographic location of the Pacific islands also explains why Japan is paying such attention to them. First, access to the region's rich resource of tuna has been an enduring reason for Japan's aid program. Japan is constantly trying to strike a balance between its own interests and those of the Pacific island states in this regard. Second, the island states are scattered on the sea links being used by Japanese ships coming from Europe carrying nuclear waste. These trips usually cause great discontent among the nuclear-sensitive populations of the Pacific, and Japan is keen to assuage these fears. Third, Japan is also interested in taking advantage of the location of the Pacific islands near the equator. Japan's NASDA (National Space Development Agency) built a monitoring facility on Kiritimati Island in Kiribati in 1977. In 2000 NASDA was granted authorization to renovate the runway and to build ports, road, and other facilities by March 2002 and to use the runway until 2020 as part of its space program to develop a reusable spacecraft. Last, Japanese tourists account for a huge majority of the visitors to the Micronesian islands and to the French overseas territories of New Caledonia and French Polynesia.

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JAPAN-PHILIPPINES RELATIONS Japan-Philippines relations are dominated mainly by issues that relate to trade and aid, and secondarily by security issues. For the Philippines, however, economic relations with Japan have implied collaboration with the enemy, especially in the immediate aftermath of World War II, and more recently in relation to problems about the large number of Filipino workers in Japan and about the environmental damage caused by Japan's dumping of hazardous waste in the Philippines.

Relations before 1941

During the early 1900s, Japan's active expansionist policy in the Asia-Pacific region was hindered by the presence of American forces on Philippine soil and by the strong position of American business in the Philippines. Nevertheless, until 1941 the two countries developed active trade, as Japan sold its textile and industrial products in the Philippines market, while the Philippines provided abaca (Manila hemp), cotton, and other products to the Japanese. This trade was boosted by the sizable Japanese community in the Philippines, which grew in significance during the 1920s and 1930s. By the end of the 1930s, almost thirty thousand Japanese residents were living and working in the Philippines, mostly in Davao in the southern Philippines.

Relations during World War II

By 1941 Japan had begun to express its ambitions in Southeast Asia and started to occupy the region bit by bit, including the Philippines, to establish the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and to assert its dominance over the area. Japan attacked the Philippines on 8 December 1941 and quickly advanced toward major strategic points. General Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) evacuated his headquarters, Manila was declared an open city, and the Philippine president Manuel Luis Quezon y Molina (1878-1944) left for the United States to form a government in exile. In May 1942, Filipino and American forces led by General Jonathan Mayhew Wainwright (1883-1953), after a long and hard-fought defense of Bataan and Corregidor on Manila Bay, were forced to surrender. In an attempt to legitimize their occupation, the Japanese established an executive commission that included a number of influential Philippine politicians. In 1943 an independent Philippine Republic was declared, and Jose Laurel (1891-1959), a former senator and associate justice of the Commonwealth Supreme Court, became its president.

The Japanese occupation of the Philippines was one of the most depressing periods in the history of



JAPAN, EAST ASIA, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA VERSUS THE WEST

On 5 November 1943 Japan and its "allies" in Asia (the Philippines, China, Thailand, Burma, Manchukuo) issued this declaration calling for Asian unity in the face of United States and British imperialism. Harsh Japan rule of these conquered nations during World War II forestalled any chance of such cooperation after the war.

It is the basic principle for the establishment of world peace that the nations of the world have each its proper place and enjoy prosperity in common through mutual aid and assistance. The U.S.A. and the British Empire have in seeking their own prosperity oppressed other nations and peoples. Especially in East Asia they indulged in insatiable aggression and exploitation and sought to satisfy their inordinate ambition of enslaving the entire region, and finally they came to menace seriously the stability of East Asia. Herein lies the cause of the present war.

The countries of East Asia, with a view to contributing to the cause of world peace, undertake to cooperate towards prosecuting the war of Greater East Asia to a successful conclusion, liberating their region from the yoke of British-American domination and assuring their self-existence and self-defence and in constructing a Greater East Asia in accordance with the following principles:—

- I. The countries of Greater East Asia, through mutual cooperation will ensure the stability of their region and construct an order of common prosperity and well-being based upon justice.
- II. The countries of Greater East Asia will ensure the fraternity of nations in their region, by respecting one another's sovereignty and independence and practising mutual assistance and amity.
- III. The countries of Greater East Asia, by respecting one another's traditions and developing the creative faculties of each race, will enhance the culture and civilization of Greater East Asia.
- IV. The countries of Greater East Asia will endeavor to accelerate their economic development through close cooperation upon a basis of reciprocity and to promote thereby the general reciprocity of their region.
- V. The countries of Greater East Asia will cultivate friendly relations with all the countries of the world and work for the abolition of racial discrimination, the promotion of cultural intercourse, and the opening of resources throughout the world and contribute thereby to the progress of mankind.

Source: Addresses before the Assembly of Greater East Asiatic Nations. (1943) Tokyo: Ministry of Greater East Asiatic Nations, 63–65.

relations between the two countries, largely because of the atrocities Japanese troops committed against the local population, resistance groups, and prisoners of war; in addition, many Philippine women were forced to become so-called comfort women (prostitutes) for the Japanese forces. The Japanese occupation met strong opposition from major groups of Philippine society, and despite Japanese attempts to win the support of the local population and to suppress the resistance movement, Philippine guerrillas, often Communist led, never stopped their attacks against the Japanese.

Relations Immediately after World War II

After General MacArthur's U.S. troops, together with Philippine guerrillas, recaptured the Philippines and defeated the Japanese in 1945, the civil government in exile, now led by President Sergio Osmeña (1878–1961), returned to Philippine soil. With American help, Osmeña's government gradually established control over the country.

In the aftermath of the war, the issue of collaboration with the enemy became a sensitive topic in the Philippines, and almost a decade elapsed before Japan and the Philippines could restore political and economic relations. In July 1956, ratification of two important documents, the Treaty of Peace with Japan and the Reparations Agreement between Japan and the Republic of the Philippines, opened a new chapter in the history of relations between these two countries.

Relations to the Present

Significant growth in bilateral trade played a central role in the development of Japanese-Philippine relations in the postwar period, as rapid economic recovery in Japan in the 1950s and 1960s was based on the policy of export-oriented industrialization. The trade between the two countries quickly grew, and by the 1970s Japan had become one of the largest foreign investors in the Philippines. By the 1990s, Japan had also become one of the largest aid-donor countries to the Philippines. According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cumulative Japanese loans to the Philippines reached \$57.5 billion in 1999, and cumulative grants reached \$17.9 billion in the same year.

By the end of the 1990s, Japan had become the Philippines' largest trading partner, with imports from Japan—mainly of manufactured electronics, machinery, and other products—totaling \$6.13 billion in 1999 or 22.3 percent of all imports. At the same time, Japan had become the second-largest market, after the United States, for Philippine goods, with exports to Japan—mainly manufactured electronics, textiles, gar-

ments, and raw and processed agricultural products—totaling \$4.66 billion or 14.6 percent of all exports.

Likewise, the number of Filipinos living and working in Japan has steadily increased. In 1998, the Philippine embassy in Tokyo reported that of the 245,518 Filipinos in Japan, 129,053 were Filipino entrants and residents, 36,777 were entertainers, 39,268 were spouses or children of Japanese nationals, and 40,420 were overstaying Filipinos. The Philippines has benefited from the significant number of workers in Japan who send remittances back to the Philippines; from 1990 to 1999, these amounted to \$1.1 million. This amount applied only to bank-to-bank remittances and did not include remittances sent to the Philippines through other channels.

One important area of cooperation between the two countries has to do with the development of free trade in the Asia-Pacific region. The initiatives in this area include collaboration within the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation framework and initiatives in the Japan-Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Comprehensive Partnership for regional prosperity and in the ASEAN + 3 (Japan, the People's Republic of China, and the Republic of Korea).

Several negative issues, however, have received public attention and have undermined the relations between the two countries. One is the trafficking of women to Japan. A significant number of Philippine migrants have been women looking for various opportunities in Japan; however, many women have been lured to Japan with promises of high salaries or prospective marriages, but were then treated harshly or forced into prostitution. Because the Philippine public has never forgotten the Japanese treatment of the comfort women, trafficking of women receives much public attention and mass-media coverage.

The other problem relates to environmental pollution in the Philippines, as a number of Japanese companies have illegally shipped hazardous waste there.

Since 2001, security issues have also become an important subject in Japan-Philippines relations, as the Philippines faces increasing violence and militancy from rebel and secessionist movements with links to several international terrorist organizations, and as Japan's role in international security and peacekeeping is becoming more prominent. After the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, Japan and the Philippines agreed to cooperate in actions against terrorism, and Japan agreed to provide financial assistance to Philippine security and defense forces.

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JAPAN-RUSSIA RELATIONS Japan and Russia, neighbors who rank as two of the great powers of Northeast Asia, have for more than a century vied with each other for influence in Korea and China. For the past half-century, Tokyo and Moscow have also faced each other on the global stage, at times seeking leverage from their bilateral relations but more often opposing each other as part of Cold War alliances. Even today they have not "normalized" relations. Mired in a dispute over four islands known in Russia as the Southern Kuriles and in Japan as the Northern Territories, they managed to reestablish diplomatic relations in 1956 but not to sign a peace treaty or to agree on boundaries. Although they have been negotiating about both territory and large-scale economic cooperation, nationalistic attitudes in both countries have long prevented a deal.

Japanese-Russian Contacts before the 1850s

Japan and Russia first came into contact in the seventeenth century. After Russia's historic march through Siberia to the Pacific Ocean was diverted northward by China through the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, Russian military colonizers sought provisions in Japan as a means to secure their presence in the East. Earlier in the century, however, Japan had decided to seclude itself from most foreign contacts, especially from the maritime West European powers jockeying for influence. Through the first half of the

nineteenth century, Russia sought ways to pry open Japan, while Japanese through their window in Nagasaki (the one Japanese port open to certain foreign countries) heard rumors about the danger of a growing Russian presence in the North. Despite occasional contacts through shipwrecked Japanese fishermen and aggressive Russian naval vessels, a breakthrough came only after the U.S. navy opened Japan in 1853.

Nineteenth- and Early-Twentieth-Century Relations

In the 1860s, both countries began far-reaching reforms after experiencing crushing military humiliations and awakening to national weakness. In the 1890s, they continued along parallel tracks, becoming leaders in rapid modernization. Both strengthened centralization and added nationalist assertiveness to their foreign-policy agendas. With Russia's construction of the Trans-Siberian railroad and Japan's defeat of China in the 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War, the two countries confronted each other directly. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 fueled the two most powerful currents in Northeast Asia during the first half of the twentieth century: the rise of revolution in Russia after the country's defeat in World War I and the advance of colonialism in victorious Japan.

After the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and the 1919 Japanese expeditionary force to the Russian Far East, a brief interlude of the friendly relations that had existed before World War I was impossible to revive. Eager to learn from European civilization, many Japanese were nevertheless drawn to Russia through its literary classics, while the two states found a common purpose in adjacent spheres of influence in Korea and northeast China. In Japan, a newly emerging intellectual stratum gravitated toward socialism, to the growing dismay of the Japanese government.

During Russia's civil war, Japan joined other countries in sending garrisons into Russia, which were later withdrawn once the Communists were firmly in charge. Indeed, until the Soviet Union blocked militarist Japan in two battles in 1938 and 1939, it appeared likely that Japan would turn northward from its invasion of China rather than shift toward Southeast Asia in its search for oil and a secure Asian hinterland from which to contend for global dominance.

Post-World War II Relations

In 1945 as World War II came to an end, the Soviet Union scuttled the neutrality pact it had signed with Japan in 1941 and joined the United States in the last week of the war in the Pacific. Although at Yalta



JAPAN CONSOLIDATES ITS CONTROL OVER MANCHURIA

As part of its colonial expansion in the early twentieth century, Japan used agreements, treaties, and conventions as well as military rule to control territory it gained militarily and to limit the power of rival nations. The following convention concerns Manchuria, which Japan had taken from Russia.

The Imperial Government of Russia and the Imperial Government of Japan, sincerely attached to the principles established by the Convention concluded between them July 17/30, 1907, and desiring to develop the results of that convention with a view to the consolidation of peace in the Far East, have agreed to complete the said arrangements by the following agreements:

Article I. For the purpose of facilitation of the communications and developing the commerce of the nations, the two High Contracting Parties engage mutually to lend each other their friendly cooperation with a view to the improvement of their respective lines of railroad in Manchuria, and to the perfecting of the connecting service of the said railways, and to refrain from all competition unfavorable to the attainment of this result.

Article II. Each of the High Contracting Parties engages to maintain and to respect the status quo in Manchuria as it results from all the treaties, conventions or other arrangements hitherto concluded, either between Russia and Japan or between these two Powers and China. Copies of the aforesaid arrangements have been exchanged between Russia and Japan.

Article III. In case any event of such a nature as to the menace to the above-mentioned status quo should be brought about, the two High Contracting Parties will in each instance enter into communication with each other, for the purpose of agreeing upon the measures that they may judge it necessary to take for the maintenance of the said status quo.

Source: John V. A. MacMurray, ed. (1921) *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894–1919*. New York: Oxford University Press. Vol. I, 803–804.

the United States had approved the transfer of the Kurile Islands to the Soviets, along with Sakhalin Island, Moscow's occupation of the southernmost of the Kuriles, near Hokkaido, created a rallying cry for Japanese nationalists once they had regrouped under U.S. encouragement to hold the line against Communist expansionism. Japan argued that these islands were not part of the Kuriles and had never previously been under Moscow's control. Prolonged Soviet im-

prisonment and forced labor for hundreds of thousands of Japanese prisoners-of-war also started post-war relations on a negative note. Although widespread admiration for Russian literature and sympathy for socialism and the Russian-encouraged peace and neutrality movements offered opportunities for Moscow's foreign relations into the 1960s, Kremlin overoptimism about the prospects for revolution in Japan proved counterproductive.



This cartoon from 1904 or 1905 depicts Japanese troops crushing Koreans as they move toward Russia. (RYKOFF COLLECTION/CORBIS)

When in 1960 Moscow unilaterally abrogated the 1956 joint declaration that committed Moscow to return the two smallest islands nearest to Japan in the event of a peace treaty, the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan found a symbol for vigilance in international relations and for rebuilding Japan's self-defense forces. As the Japanese Left turned away from Moscow to Beijing, public opinion became intensely critical of the Soviet Union. The image of unfriendly bilateral relations and a negative national character lingered a decade after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Until Gorbachev's *glasnost*, Soviet media were filled with distorted stories about Japan—such as Japan's refusal to report the true nature of the "economic miracle," the growing influence of leftist political parties and labor unions that would soon turn Japan on a revolutionary course, and its lack of sovereignty vis-à-vis the United States. Yet from the 1970s, different images of Japan filtered through the propaganda. Its technological prowess became a reproof to the Soviet Union's failures in the new economy. Japan's success in combining rapid modernization with traditional culture appealed to intellectuals who bemoaned the loss of Russian cultural roots. In the late 1980s, those who objected to the militarization of Soviet foreign policy and the economy cited Japan's successful diplomacy and adaptation to global competition as proof that an alternative policy existed. Positive images of Japan played a role from

1988 to 1991 in fueling "new thinking" in diplomacy and domestic reform.

Despite generally cool relations in the 1960s–1980s, Moscow and Tokyo explored economic cooperation in ways that left enduring dreams. In the 1960s, Japanese companies began to invest in natural resources in eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East, assisting in the infrastructure to move coal, lumber, and other products to coastal vessels. In the mid-1970s, feasibility studies began for developing Sakhalin's offshore oil and gas deposits. After a decade of increasingly troubled relations as the Cold War intensified, Japanese local governments and business interests renewed their hopes for these projects at the end of the 1980s, embracing the concept of the Sea of Japan economic rim. Through a shift to a market economy and decentralization in Russia, many in Japan envisioned the start of regionalism in Northeast Asia, with powerful economic and even strategic consequences for their country's leadership aspirations. While Russian skeptics voiced vague hopes of joining the Asia-Pacific region through Japanese investment and trade, Japanese idealists saw the Russian Far East as one path for "reentering Asia," a popular slogan as Japan looked beyond its ties to the West after the Cold War.

Negotiations from 1986 to 2001 foundered on the territorial question, although the agenda was widening to incorporate common interests. In 1992 in secret and

in 2001 through a public declaration, Moscow made it clear that it was prepared to return the two islands closest to Hokkaido with 7 percent of the land area of the four disputed islands. It favored a deal whereby Tokyo renounced its claim to the other islands. Already in 1989 Tokyo had agreed to discuss simultaneously economic ties as well as the territorial issue; in 1998 it suggested that it would settle for "residual sovereignty," or recognition that the land belonged to Japan even if its return took a long time; and in 2000 it appeared willing to postpone negotiations over the remaining two islands while signing a peace treaty and securing the return of the closest islands. Yet leaders on both sides were not prepared to relinquish any claims. In the Tokyo declaration of 1993, the Krasnoiarsk declaration of 1997, and the Irkutsk declaration of 2001, an upbeat tone was achieved, but neither side was ready for a compromise acceptable to the other. The symbol of territorial differences overshadowed other causes of abnormal relations.

Recent Relations

In the 1990s, economic ties suffered for reasons independent of territory. The Japanese generously provided humanitarian assistance in Russia's difficult transition from 1990 to 1993 but felt that Russia was not very grateful for the aid. In 1999 in the hope of a diplomatic payoff, Tokyo positioned itself to appear more supportive than the Western countries, who had been discouraged by Russia's default in 1998; Japanese investors, however, felt cheated in joint ventures with the Russians, and trade was declining. The sale of Japanese used cars in the Russian Far East had quickly become criminalized, as had the export of crabs and other marine products to Japan. Huge profits were made on the Russian side without providing much public revenue to counter the declining standards of living and the crisis conditions in the Russian Far East. Although a fishing agreement in 1998 was aimed at ending the practice of Russian patrol vessels firing on Japanese boats allegedly poaching, and a visa-free agreement allowed the original inhabitants of the disputed islands and their heirs to cross from Hokkaido, these steps did not reduce the distrust along the border.

Interfering with bilateral relations were the difficulties that leading officials had in recognizing the significance of the other country. The Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, had long failed to recognize Japan's importance. Mikhail Gorbachev had moved more boldly in relations with other great powers; his trip to Japan was delayed until April 1991, when his standing at home did not permit compro-

mise. Boris Yeltsin had rudely canceled a trip to Japan in September 1992, and by the time he visited in October 1993 nationalism had reawakened at home. The Russian military objected to a transfer of islands, fearing the loss of the Sea of Okhotsk as a haven for its missile-launching submarines. Japanese prime ministers came and went, with few secure enough to challenge the right wing of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party, which began to consider a compromise on the islands only after it became alarmed by the rise of China and the threat of instability from North Korea. When Ryutaro Hashimoto joined Boris Yeltsin at a "no-necktie summit" in November 1997, both sides appeared to be acting boldly, but at home they actually conveyed the message that the other side was about to abandon its position.

Only when, after 11 September 2001, Vladimir Putin shifted his position to support the United States in the war against terrorism did it become possible for the Japanese leader Junichiro Koizumi to see Russia as a partner. Before then, neither side took the other seriously as a balance among the great powers.

Future Possibilities

Japanese relations with Russia have been filled with dissatisfaction. The goal of "normalization" of relations remains illusive even as the benefits of good relations between the two countries become ever clearer: (1) expansion of trade would take advantage of enormous economic complementarities, such as Russian natural resources and Japanese manufactured goods and technical know-how; (2) joint development of the Northeast Asian region would use Japanese capital to exploit vast Russian resources; (3) stabilization of security on their mutual border and throughout the region would allow each country to diminish its military burden and to lessen its concerns over the Korean peninsula; (4) leverage in great-power relations would permit each country to balance relations with the United States and China; and (5) a rapprochement would support each country's model of development and national identity, as each seeks a return to what it regards as "normal" diplomacy by solving its problems with the other.

Lately Japanese-Russian relations have operated against the backdrop of the rise of China and U.S. unipolarity. Both Russia and Japan are looking for leverage in relations with those two countries, while hoping to develop closer relations with each other. After a century of seeing each other as threatening present or future military adversaries, they have begun military exchanges with the notion that this will

be increasingly useful in the face of Chinese power. The United States has generally encouraged Japan to bolster Russia's democratization and market reforms, but as Washington has grown to doubt Moscow's commitment to those ideals, Tokyo's continued efforts at reconciliation raise some uncertainty. China stands to benefit from better Russo-Japanese relations through a quieter atmosphere in the North, so that it can concentrate on Taiwan, but it is distrustful. In 2000, the summit between North and South Korea made multilateral cooperation more essential, yet Japan's wariness about South Korea's making concessions without stopping the missile threat from North Korea differed from Russia's effort to rebuild ties with North Korea to gain leverage. Hopes for regionalism centered on development of Russian energy resources and resolution of the Korean impasse (both to be accomplished jointly with the United States and China) and on Russia's creating a sound economic and legal framework.

While at times over the past half-century leaders in the Kremlin have harbored hopes of splitting Japan from the United States, they would do well to expect only modest leverage through a more independent Japanese foreign policy in a context of economic globalization. Such leverage would give a boost to Russian aspirations for influence while not interfering with the need to combine the resources of multinational corporations for Russian development. It is up to Russia to foster an environment conducive to Japanese trust and investment.

Over more than three centuries of contact, Japanese and Russians can look back to few periods of sustained cooperation. In the second half of the nineteenth century, both nations turned to the West rather than to each other for models of change and for promising partners. In the first postwar decades, Moscow insisted that its socialist model was applicable to Japan as well as other countries. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, some in Japan proposed that Russia pay less attention to Western free-market ideals and borrow from Japan's state guidance and modified market economy. If comparisons may suggest that a shared preference for collective orientation over individualism could draw these nations together, most observers point instead to the contrasts in thinking: quality-oriented Japanese ways opposed to Russian reliance on quantity over quality; coercive top-down Russian exercise of power versus consensus building in Japanese organizations; and quiet Japanese confidence in continuities with the past unlike the frustrated Russian search for an elusive national identity. Even if the two nations need each other for stability and regional development, they are not likely to turn to each other as models.

Intense negotiations have begun to look beyond the territorial issue toward multilateral relations. Japan and Russia stand at opposite ends of Northeast Asia. Having squeezed China and Korea for many decades, they now face the challenge of economic integration through regionalism and globalization. The geographical reality is that Russia's Far East population is shrinking and now stands at barely 7 million, which Moscow cannot afford to support. Its dispersed natural resources from the northern reaches of eastern Siberia to the Sea of Okhotsk require Japanese investment for development. If Moscow and Tokyo could agree on a program for cooperation, the twenty-first century would proceed with the two sides bringing Northeast Asia together, in contrast to the past century when they split it apart.

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JAPAN-TAIWAN RELATIONS Relations between Japan and Taiwan have ranged from hostility in 1874, to colonial occupation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to the current relationship of active commercial trade and diplomacy. Since 1972, official relations have been strained by the international acceptance of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the legitimate government of China, but economic relations have continued and expanded in the face of this difficulty.

Early Contacts

The first significant contact between Japan and Taiwan came when Japan sent a force to Taiwan in 1871 to punish the Taiwanese for the murder of a group of shipwrecked sailors from the Ryukyu Islands. China's foreign ministry accepted responsibility for the actions of the Taiwanese natives and paid an indemnity. In doing so, China asserted its sovereignty over Taiwan and effectively accepted Japan's control over the Ryukyus.

Some twenty years later, following the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, China was forced to cede Taiwan and neighboring islands to Japan, and Taiwan was formally colonized as part of Japan's Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in 1923. The indigenous Taiwanese population were thus brought into the Japanese empire as subjects (not citizens) and were indoctrinated much as the Korean population was, being forced to adopt Japanese names and wear Japanese clothing. This formal colonization ended with the Japanese defeat in 1945 at the end of World War II, but rather than becoming free Taiwanese the people came under the control of the Nationalist Chinese.

Because the Nationalist Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek had participated in the Allied Cairo Conference with Franklin D. Roosevelt and Sir Winston Churchill, it fell to his forces to accept the surrender of Japanese forces on Taiwan. Thus the postwar relationship of Japan and Taiwan was between the former imperial power and the Chinese opposition, the former of which had been defeated by the United States, and the latter of which was losing its civil war against the Communists on the Asian mainland. Japan and Taiwan would be guided in the coming decades by the geopolitics between East and West and by the conflicts between Communism and capitalism, as much as by the actions and desires of their home governments.

Role of Communist China

The role of the Chinese Communists shaped Japan-Taiwan relations for the next quarter-century. To counter what it perceived as a monolithic Communist threat, the United States sought to limit the opportunities upon which Moscow or Beijing could capitalize. The U.S. decision to support Chiang over China's Communist leader Mao Zedong was a political one; during World War II the Roosevelt administration had seen fit to ally itself with another Communist (Joseph Stalin), but in the case of China, the U.S. Congress favored Chiang. In any case, following the

retreat of Chiang's forces to Taiwan in 1949, the United States pursued a policy of using its assets in the region to support the Nationalist government. One of those assets was Japan, which was still under U.S. administration at that time. Coincident with this was the need to keep Japan free from Communist influence; the fear of Communism was the dominant factor in Washington's East Asian policy.

The Truman administration (1945-1953) saw the establishment of close trade relationships between Taiwan and Japan as a means to preserve a stable, non-Communist Japan as well as to support the Japan that the United States was trying to develop. For Japan, Taiwan would be a better source of food and raw materials than other Southeast Asian nations such as Myanmar (Burma) or Malaysia. However, despite its desire to trade with Taiwan, Japan also favored ties with Communist China, which had more to offer despite the competing forms of government.

The key to Japan's willingness to trade with a Communist government lies in the Japanese business philosophy known as *seikeibunri*, a contraction for the Japanese words *seiji* (politics), *keizai* (economy), and *bunri* (separation). *Seikeibunri* provided a means of private Japanese business to continue economic ties with Taiwan when Japan and the United States wanted to do otherwise and was the basis for the continuation of these economic ties once diplomatic recognition of Taipei was abandoned. This stance, which came to be known as the Japan formula, explains a great deal of Japan's regional economic success.

The defeat of the Nationalist Chinese in 1949 seemed to the United States to be the harbinger of further Communist successes. Although the U.S. policy of "containing" Communism had called for steady pressure on the Soviet Union in the expectation that Communism would fail from its own flaws, President Harry Truman in mid-May 1950 approved an Asia policy that called for a "rollback" of Communism in China. The need for such a policy was punctuated five weeks later when the Korean War began, even as the Allied powers of World War II were negotiating a peace treaty with Japan.

Despite the Communist invasion of South Korea with its implications for other non-Communist nations in East Asia, not all of America's allies perceived the same degree of threat. In particular, Great Britain was at odds with U.S. policy regarding the two Chinas. London did not see the need for ties with the Nationalists and sought to have Taiwan ceded to the People's Republic of China; the British presence on Hong Kong may have been a motivating factor for this.

The U.S. desire for ties between Japan and Taiwan was fulfilled; by 1951 Japan and Taiwan accounted for about one-third of each other's trade. On the political side, the Japanese prime minister Yoshida Shigeru accepted the U.S. demand that Japan would not make peace with the PRC; for Yoshida, it was more valuable to end the U.S. occupation of Japan than to contest the bases of future Japanese foreign policy. Japan's acceptance of Taiwan over the PRC would contribute to the "two China" view preferred by the United States.

The Japanese position was supposedly laid out in a letter from Prime Minister Yoshida to the U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles. The "Yoshida Letter" (actually written by Dulles) accepted Nationalist rule in Taiwan and was the basis for a bilateral treaty between Tokyo and Taipei that took the place of Chiang's participation in the multilateral peace treaty with Japan. In retrospect, it shows the degree to which regional politics were at the convenience of Washington. This began to change once Japan signed the multilateral peace treaty and regained some degree of independence.

With the peace treaty signed, in 1952 Japan began unofficial trade agreements with the People's Republic of China. By 1956 Japanese trade with China exceeded that with Taiwan.

U.S.-China Policy

The U.S. commitment to Taiwan was formalized in 1954 with the Mutual Defense Treaty. This treaty called for either party to support the other in the event of an attack by hostile forces, but it did allow either side to terminate the treaty after one year's notice. Coming after the Korean War, this treaty remained in effect through the conflict in Vietnam, during which military aid to Taiwan (and other nations in the region) more than doubled.

The Vietnam War led to a change in U.S. policy that was confusing to some and outrageous to others. Despite an ongoing armed conflict with a Communist nation (North Vietnam) supported by other Communist nations (the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China), it became evident that U.S. policies seemed to be softening toward China. At the beginning of July 1971, the U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger met with Taiwan's ambassador, James Shen, to hear Taiwan's objection to the possibility of "dual representation" in the United Nations. The next day Kissinger left on a secret mission to Beijing to discuss a major change in U.S.-PRC relations. Dual representation was a political hot potato on many fronts; it

would also face objection from South Korea and West Germany, due to their Cold War divided status.

A different view was held in Japan. In January 1971 Prime Minister Sato Eisaku announced to the Japanese parliament his desire for closer ties to Beijing. When it became known that the United States was involved in normalization of relations with the PRC, the Japanese response was enthusiastic. However, Japan's minister of foreign affairs did not believe that dual representation would be possible and so advised the U.S. embassy in Tokyo. The United States still sought a means for retaining the status quo with the Nationalist government while moving toward normalizing relations with Beijing, but support for Taiwan was eroding in the United Nations.

Only ten months later, the United Nations accepted the proposal to expel Taiwan; a vote on the U.S. plan for dual representation was not taken. A month later, in February 1972, the U.S. president Richard Nixon and the PRC premier Zhou Enlai issued the Shanghai Communiqué, which in addition to denouncing hegemony in the region declared that Taiwan was an integral part of China. This seemed to be at odds with Nixon's foreign policy report of the same month, which restated the United States's "friendship, our diplomatic ties, and our defense commitment" to Taiwan.

Japan Formula

Japan formally offered diplomatic recognition to the PRC in September 1972. Japan had officially supported Taiwan as long as it was evident that the United States could prevent the PRC government from representing China in the United Nations. When it became evident that the PRC government had enough support to take over China's U.N. seat, Japan no longer supported Taiwan over the PRC. This did not mean that Japan sought to abandon Taiwan as a trading partner; it was just a formal recognition that Japan saw the People's Republic as having the advantage in any competition between the two Chinas.

That month the Japanese prime minister Tanaka Kakuei and Zhou Enlai agreed on essentially the same issues that Nixon and Zhou had. They announced work toward a peace treaty (since the People's Republic had not been a party to the multilateral treaty of 1951), and, most significant, China accepted the Japan formula, allowing continued Japanese trade with Taiwan. This Japan formula called for Japan and Taiwan to shift their relations from governmental to non-governmental organizations. Rather than relying on the familiar governmental entities like the Japanese

Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), trade between Tokyo and Taipei would be handled by such agencies as the Association of East Asian Relations in Taipei, the China External Trade Development Council, and the Japanese Interchange Association. Tokyo had too much at stake to give up its investment in Taiwan for better relations with the People's Republic. By 1972 Japan had \$500 million invested in Taiwan, and trade was running at \$800 million a year. The Japan formula provided a win-win-win situation for Japan and the two Chinas: Japan protected its investment, Taiwan got continued trade, and the People's Republic would receive Japanese credit, steel, and technology.

The importance of this Japan formula cannot be overstated, because in addition to allowing Japan to maintain economic relations with both Chinas it made the same thing possible for the United States. When the PRC paramount leader Deng Xiaoping traveled to Japan in October 1978 to sign the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, he hinted that the People's Republic would not object to a similar arrangement with the United States. This led to the eventual agreement that China would not object to continued U.S. economic, trade, and cultural relations with Taiwan, while the United States would recognize the PRC. This, of course, required that the United States withdraw from its Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan.

The U.S. decision to end the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan led Congress to pass the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979. The ending of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, foreseen for years, led to a new freedom in economic relations. The new order allowed the government in Taiwan to pursue the normal goals of diplomacy with other countries without official recognition or obligation. While lacking the diplomatic status of earlier years (and the forum of the United Nations), Taipei still had "informal offices" internationally through which it could participate in the international arena. Granted, it had to accept less-than-perfect agreements in many cases; nevertheless, it could still participate in the Olympics as "Chinese Taipei" alongside the People's Republic, and it earned membership in the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (alongside the PRC) and the Asian Development Bank.

Enhanced Japan-Taiwan Trade

The Japan formula did not hurt Taiwan's economic relations with Japan; trade continued, although much to Japan's favor. By 1980 Taiwan's trade deficit was \$3.2 billion, with a cumulative \$14.2 billion between

1972 and 1980. This imbalance led to Taiwan's embargoing Japanese goods, which resulted in a Japanese trade mission to resolve the imbalance. Japan reduced its exports to Taiwan briefly, which allowed a later increase in overall exports. This increased trade level continued until 1992.

In the early years of the Taiwan Relations Act, Taiwan and other "trading states" that had developed export-oriented economies along the Japanese model (such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia) pulled away from other developing countries and established themselves in the global market. Between 1985 and 1989, Japan's trade with Taiwan increased threefold, and trends indicated that Japan would replace the United States as Taiwan's major trading partner.

By 1992 Japan's trade with Taiwan reached \$30.7 billion (with Japan running a \$12.9 billion trade surplus). Even as the economic relations between the two nations expanded, relations between Taipei and Beijing developed as well. In 1991 Taiwan and the People's Republic engaged in \$7 billion in trade. Trade between the two Chinas grew during this decade in excess of 10 percent annually, and it stood at over \$22 billion in 1998. The lack of diplomatic ties and restraints has enabled Taiwan and its trading partners to avoid the normal barriers of international trade and has simplified technology transfer between Taiwan and its trading partners.

In 1992 the government in Taiwan changed the name of its trade offices from the Association of East Asian Relations to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office; four of these quasi-consulates are located in the Japanese cities of Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, and Fukuoka. In 1994 MITI posted a minister to Taipei to further legitimize relations. As Taiwan's economy became one of the most prosperous in East Asia, investment became more expensive. This resulted in reduced Japanese imports from and exports to Taiwan, and subsequently Japan expanded investment in the less expensive developing nations in the region, such as Malaysia and Thailand.

As the government of Taiwan has begun to push for broader acceptance as a legitimate government, it has joined many international organizations of which Japan is also a member, including the Pacific Basin Economic Council and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. Japan and Taiwan continue to attempt to resolve the trade deficit issue through annual bilateral talks and to establish direct air travel facilities for tourist travel between the two nations. By the

late 1990s, more than 1.5 million passengers and tourists made the trip annually.

Japan's economic involvement with Taiwan has contributed to the success of each and to the detriment of neither. Without the freedom to separate politics from economics, Japan would have been forced to choose sides in the competition between Taipei and Beijing, but *seikeibunri* removed that obstacle. Japan sought the greatest advantage for itself, whether that was to avoid ties with the People's Republic to accommodate the United States as Japan prepared for autonomy in 1951, to establish informal ties with the mainland while holding formal ties with Taiwan, or to reverse the arrangement and continue trade through nongovernmental agencies in Taipei.

Thomas P. Dolan

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JAPAN–UNITED KINGDOM RELATIONS

The history of relations between Japan and Great Britain can be divided into four stages: the beginning of full relations in the mid-nineteenth century, the alliance, interwar, and post–World War II.

Although the first contact between the two nations was in the early seventeenth century, full relations began in the last part of the Tokugawa period (1600/1603–1868). During the Meiji period (1868–1912), Britain played a major role in the modernization of Japan by helping in the establishment of the Japanese navy and the planning and construction of railroads and factories. Meiji leaders regarded Britain, the pioneer of the industrial revolution, as a model for modern economic and social institutions.

Meiji leaders sought treaty reform as another goal for Japan in its relations with the West. Revision of the Unequal Treaties sought to abolish foreigners' judicial and economic privileges. The Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1894 prescribed termination of extraterritoriality, provided that Japan reformed its legal institutions along Western lines. Even though Japan did not get complete tariff autonomy until 1911,

British treaties facilitated negotiations with other Western countries.

Japan and Great Britain were allies during the early twentieth century. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902–1923), directed against Russian expansion in the Far East, assisted Japan in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). It was renewed two times, which obligated Japan's participation in World War I as a British ally. After the war, the significance of the Alliance for Britain decreased, and the United States viewed Japan as a strong competitor in East Asia. At the Washington Conference (1921–1922), the United States forced Japan to end the Alliance, which was replaced by the Four Power Pact.

As Japan became an increasingly powerful nation, relations with Great Britain suffered, mainly because of political and economic disputes in Asia, especially trade disputes with China. After the Manchurian Incident of 1931, trade conflict became more intense, and at the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact of September 1940, Japan's ties with Germany and Italy strained relations further still. On 8 December 1941, Japan declared war against Great Britain and the United States, and attacked Britain's colonies in Southeast Asia.

Relations between Japan and Great Britain began to improve after World War II. Britain ratified the Multilateral Peace Treaty in 1952. In the 1960s, new trade treaties were concluded between the two countries. Exchange of royal visits in the 1970s symbolized more open communication between the two nations. Good relations continue in the early 2000s, with exchanges in every sphere.

Hirobisa Yamazaki

See also: **Heisei Period; Meiji Period; Showa Period; Taisho Period; World War II**

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JAPAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS

The relationship between Japan and the United States, which dates from the mid-nineteenth century, is complex and multifaceted. Two of its most important aspects are security and economic relations.

Relations until World War II

When Commodore Matthew Perry forced Japan to enter into trade and diplomatic relations with the West in 1853–1854, the event was a turning point in the transformation of the Japanese political system from the shogunate to the Meiji imperial system. The United States, however, paid little attention to the Asia-Pacific area until the end of World War I.

After 1918, Japan emerged as one of the five major world powers. The United States established the Washington Treaty System to restrict Japanese territorial expansion and the arms race in the Asia-Pacific area in the 1920s. This system was sustainable as long as Chinese nationalism did not become radical enough to challenge the status quo and Japan maintained its economic prosperity through cooperation with the United States. Though the U.S. immigration law of 1924 virtually prohibited Japanese immigration and damaged U.S.-Japanese relations, the spirit of cooperation and the benefit derived from the Washington Treaty System prevailed in the early 1920s.

But the Great Depression of 1929 demolished the Treaty System and precipitated Japanese military expansion into Manchuria and the Chinese mainland. In 1931 the Japanese army occupied Mukden, Manchuria (present-day Shenyang), and eventually extended its rule over all of Manchuria. The United States had no vital interest in Manchuria, and the Hoover Administration adopted a policy of nonrecognition. In the absence of strong U.S. opposition, Japan continued its expansion and established the puppet state of Manchukuo (in Chinese, Manchuguo) in 1934. In July 1937 the Japanese army advanced to the Marco Polo Bridge, beginning the full-scale Sino-Japanese war.

The United States did not intend to fight against Japan over China issues, but neither could Washington bear the prospect of the entire Asia-Pacific area under Japanese rule. In September 1940 Japan stationed its army in northern French Indochina, and in July 1941 moved into southern Indochina. The Japanese expansion in Asia, along with the expansion of Germany in Europe, would have led to a closed world, a world consisting of a series of exclusive economic blocs. In response to these developments, Washington forbade oil exports to Japan in August 1941. This prohibition significantly contributed to Japan's final



THE UNITED STATES DECLARES WAR ON JAPAN AND ENTERS WORLD WAR II

"Whereas the Imperial Government of Japan has committed unprovoked acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled, That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial Government of Japan which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and the President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial Government of Japan; and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.

Source: John M. Maki. (1957) *Selected Documents, Far Eastern International Relations (1869–1951)*. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 233.

decision to go to war against the United States and attack Pearl Harbor that December.

The Occupation Era, 1945–1952 After Japan's defeat at the end of World War II, the United States played a dominant role in carrying out the Allied Occupation policies in Japan. It first employed punitive economic policies, but later tried to establish a self-sufficient economy in Japan. In February 1949, Joseph Dodge, an American financial adviser, implemented an austerity program to balance Japan's budget. This politically unpopular austerity program was called the Dodge Line.

The Dodge Line constituted a critical turning point in the Occupation, transforming the state-managed economy into a market-oriented, export-first economy. The fate of the Dodge Line depended on the revival of Japanese foreign trade, but with a world wide depression in 1949, Japan faced a severe economic downturn. Southeast Asian countries were Japan's natural market because of their great demand for



OPENING JAPAN TO TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES

This extract from Treaty No. 19, Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1860, sets the conditions for trade between Japan and the United States.

The President of the United States of America, and His Majesty the Ty-coon of Japan, desiring to establish on firm and lasting foundations, the relations of peace and friendship now happily existing between the two Countries, and to secure the best interest of their respective Citizens and Subjects by encouraging, facilitating, and regulating their industry and trade, have resolved to conclude a Treaty of amity and commerce, for this purpose, and have therefore named, as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

The President of the United States, His Excellency Townsend Harris, Consul General of the United States of America, for the Empire of Japan, and His Majesty the Ty-coon of Japan, Their Excellencies Ino-ooye Prince of Sinano and Iwasay Prince of Hego, who, after having communicated to each other their respective Full Powers, and found them to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:

Article First. There shall henceforth be perpetual peace and friendship between the United States of America, and His Majesty the Ty-coon of Japan, and His Successors.

The President of the United States may appoint a Diplomatic Agent to reside at the City of Yedo, and Consuls or Consular Agents to reside at any or all of the Ports of Japan which are opened for American Commerce by the Treaty. The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General of the United States shall have the right to travel freely, in any part of the Empire of Japan from the time they enter on the discharge of their official duties.

The Government of Japan may appoint a Diplomatic Agent to reside at Washington and Consuls or Consular Agents, for any or all of the ports of the United States. The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General of Japan, may travel freely in any part of the United States from the time they arrive in the country.

Article Second. The President of the United States, at the request of the Japanese Government, will act as a friendly Mediator, in such matters of difference as may arise between the Government of Japan and any European Power.

The ships of war of the United States shall render friendly aid and assistance, to such Japanese vessels, as they may meet on the high seas, so far as can be done without a breach of neutrality, and all American Consuls, residing at Ports, visited by Japanese vessels shall also give them such friendly aid as may be permitted by the Laws of their respective Countries, in which they reside.

Article Third. In addition to the Ports of Simoda and Hakodate, the following Ports and Towns shall be opened on the dates respectively appended to them, that is to say:

Kanagawa, on the (4th day of July 1859) . . .

Nagasaki, on the (4th day of July 1859) . . .

Nee-e-gata [Niigata] on the (1st of January 1860) . . .

Hiogo [Hyogo] on the (1st of January 1863) . . .

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If Nee-e-gata is found to be unsuitable as a Harbour, another Port, on the West coast of Nipon, shall be selected by the two Governments in lieu thereof.

Six months after the opening of Kanagawa, the port of Simoda shall be closed as a place of residence and trade, for American Citizens.

In all the foregoing Ports and Towns, American Citizens may permanently reside, they shall have the right to lease ground, and purchase buildings thereon, and may erect dwellings and warehouses. But no fortification or place of military strength, shall be erected under the pretence of building dwellings or warehouses, and to see that this Article is observed, the Japanese authorities shall have the right to inspect from time to time any buildings, which are being erected, altered or repaired.

The place which the Americans shall occupy for their buildings, and the Harbour Regulations, shall be arranged by the American Consul, and the Authorities of each place, and if they cannot agree, the matter shall be referred to, and settled by the American Diplomatic Agent and the Japanese Government.

Source: Compilation of Treaties in Force. Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office.

industrial goods and Japan's geographical proximity. Establishing a regional economic linkage, however, required political stability in Asia. By 1949, the United States had focused its attention on bringing political stability to Southeast Asia as a prerequisite for Japanese economic recovery.

The United States also emphasized demilitarization in the early stage of the Occupation. Because this left Japan defenseless, Washington realized that to ensure Japan's security it would have to maintain military bases and armed forces there, and in 1951 signed the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty.

The United States successfully compelled Japan to accept American bases and to agree, reluctantly, to rearmament. But making military commitments is a double-edged sword, as it made the United States responsible for Japan's security. Moreover, for the Japanese retaining American bases was a sensitive issue, because they impinged on Japan's sovereignty. Consequently, the United States had to prevent the base issue from becoming the agenda of any heated debate in the Japanese Diet. Washington could not push Japan too hard concerning Japan's rearmament program since it might lead to the sensitive base issue. In short, Japan's reluctant acceptance of American bases guaranteed Japan's security while mitigating American pressure on Japan to rearm.

The Korean War, which broke out in June 1950, stimulated the Japanese economy. The Chinese Communists' intervention in the war and their military suc-

cesses increased China's prestige in Asia. With China's increasing status, the United States believed that it would be difficult to retain Japan's pro-American orientation unless it took steps to preserve its own prestige. In response to these pressures, Washington articulated its commitment to maintaining Japan's security, sanctioning the use of force if necessary. Because Japan was an unreliable former enemy, Washington could not simply count on its good will, but had to stimulate Japan's own self-interest to encourage its alignment with the West.

Japan's primary task became to determine its minimum defense contribution without jeopardizing its ties with the United States. Japan was excellent at exploiting America's Achilles' heel: it manipulated U.S. security anxieties in Japan to induce more involvement in Japan's economic recovery and security. Japan also tried to induce aid from the United States in exchange for Japan's rearmament. As a weak ally in an unstable area surrounded by two giant Communist countries, Japan found its own perceived weakness to be the best asset with which to deal with the United States.

Postoccupation Economic Relations

During the 1950s, both the American and Japanese governments tried to reduce Japan's trade deficit and integrate the Japanese economy into the Western bloc. Japan, however, could not enjoy full benefits of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) because of restrictions imposed by other member states.



Workers preparing to hang U.S. and Japanese flags on the Old Executive Office Building in Washington, D.C., in honor of the visit of Japanese prime minister Zenko Suzuki in May 1981. (WALLY MCNAMEE/CORBIS)

Moreover, the United States severely curtailed Japanese trade with China.

Four factors helped the Japanese economic development in the early postoccupation period. First, the United States tolerated Japan's restrictions on imports and foreign investments. Few American businesses regarded the Japanese market as important. Second, Washington facilitated Japanese access to the American market. Third, American military spending in Japan and other parts of Asia helped revitalize the Japanese economy. Fourth, Japan was able to concentrate on economic growth because it was not hampered by excessive defense spending. During the 1950s, the United States and Japan had trade frictions only in specific sectors, including textiles, sundries, and silverware. The American textile industry was especially hard hit by heavy importation of cheap Japanese products. In January 1956, Japan began to adopt self-imposed export restraint.

As American economic supremacy gradually declined in the late 1960s, Washington could no longer keep its domestic market open to Japanese goods. The U.S.-Japanese textile negotiations between 1969 and 1971, which were designed to restrain imports of Japanese textiles, were symbolic incidents of this era. Americans were alarmed to realize Japan had recovered from World War II so quickly and, by the early 1970s, had become competitive with U.S. industries. During the 1970s, however, the United States was primarily concerned with competition from Western Europe.

Japanese economic growth gradually slowed beginning in the mid-1980s, and the United States started to focus serious attention on Japan as an economic competitor. Washington emphasized not only reducing Japanese imports to the United States but also expanding U.S. exports to Japan. In addition, Washington focused on unfair Japanese trade practices, considering it imperative to change the Japanese domestic system. By the late 1980s, Japan had an enormous trade surplus and the United States a towering deficit. Between September 1989 and June 1990, the two countries devised the Structural Impediments Initiative as a way to mitigate trade problems. Unlike earlier trade agreements, this one dealt with structural issues instead of focusing on particular items.

Postoccupation Security Relations

The Security Treaty of 1951 had two major problems. First, it gave the United States the right to station its armies in Japan, but it did not oblige the U.S. to defend Japan or to consult with it over military operations. Second, the treaty allowed the American army to repress domestic rioting, a potential violation of Japan's sovereignty. In 1960, a new U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was concluded that abrogated the United States's right to intervene in domestic rioting and specified that the United States assumed official responsibility for Japan's defense. In turn, Japan was obligated to protect U.S. installations in Japan if they were attacked.

Japan did not become directly involved in the Vietnam War, but as a dependable ally of the United States it made significant contributions and reaped enormous economic benefits. Okinawa became a base for B-52s and a training base for U.S. Marines. America used its bases in mainland Japan for logistics, supplies, training, and rest and recreation. The U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam encouraged the United States to promote closer military cooperation with Japan. In November 1978, the United States and Japan began to review var-

ious aspects of military cooperation, such as the emergency defense legislation and logistic support.

The 1990s and Afterward

The Cold War structure and America's preeminence in the world brought stability to post-World War II U.S.-Japanese relations. The Cold War made Japan depend on the United States strategically, and America's supreme power brought both military protection and economic well-being to Japan. However, the U.S. loss of dominance in the mid-1970s and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s undermined the basis of stability in the countries' relations.

The 1990s were an unstable decade for U.S.-Japanese relations, a time during which these countries searched for a new principle to determine the orientation of their relationship.

During the 1990s, the U.S. economy revived, primarily due to the information technology (IT) revolution and the rapid development of IT-related industries, while Japan remained in deep political and economic turmoil. In July 1993, the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party, the long-term ruling party, lost its majority in the Diet, ending its thirty-eight-year rule over Japanese politics. A series of weak coalition governments followed, none bringing political stability, which contributed to Japan's economic recession. Economic crises in Southeast Asian countries in 1997 further undermined Japanese economic conditions. Currently, the world pays close attention to Japan's management of macroeconomic policy because of the negative effect of Japan's prolonged economic stagnation on the performance of the world economy, especially that of Asia.

The Japan-U.S. Framework for New Economic Partnership began in 1993 in order to redress trade imbalances. The negotiations stressed macroeconomic concerns, area-specific issues, structural problems, and a result-oriented approach. Washington demanded that Japan set the numerical target for its increase of imports, arguing that since the Japanese market was closed, the United States could not expand its exports to Japan. Japan strongly opposed this request on the grounds that it could lead to managed trade, and insisted that U.S. firms conduct more effective market research and produce goods suitable for Japanese consumers.

The gross national products (GNPs) of the United States and Japan combined constitute more than 40 percent of the world's total GNP, and their economic assistance makes up approximately 50 percent of the total amount of aid. Since U.S.-Japanese economic re-

lations will continue to have a decisive impact on the health of the global economy, the U.S.-Japan Twenty-first Century Committee was established in July 1996 as a bilateral private-sector forum for dialogue and the consideration of policy proposals. Moreover, the two nations have worked together on such global threats as the deterioration of the earth's environment, communicable diseases, natural calamities, and terrorism.

The Persian Gulf War of 1991 reaffirmed the importance of the U.S. bases in Japan. The war forced the United States to restructure its strategic policy toward Asia as a whole. In February 1995 the United States published the Nye Initiative, a report on U.S. security strategy toward East Asia and the Pacific area compiled by defense expert Joseph Nye. It claimed there were 100,000 Americans associated with the military in Asia, of whom 60,000 were in Japan. The Nye Initiative defined U.S.-Japanese relations as the most important bilateral relationship in Asia, and Japanese security as the linchpin of U.S. security policy there.

Suspicious in 1994 that North Korea was developing nuclear weapons prompted Japan to reconsider its security policies. In September 1995, the abduction and rape of a twelve-year-old Japanese girl in Okinawa by American Marines sparked renewed criticism of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. The threat of military conflicts among China, Taiwan, and the United States in 1995 and 1996 demonstrated military instability in Asia.

In April 1996, President Clinton held a summit with Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro, with security as the principal agenda. They issued new guidelines for closer U.S.-Japan military cooperation. In May 1999 the Japanese Diet passed legislation supporting the guidelines. Japan formally approved conducting military-related action outside of Japan, including rear-area logistic support but not active combat operations, to enhance its own security interests.

Japan's neighbors, especially China, are closely watching the expanding role of the U.S.-Japanese alliance in the Asia-Pacific area and worry that Japan might again become a great military power. In the post-Cold War era, Washington redefined the security treaty with Japan to maintain a military presence in Japan partly because the continuous presence of the U.S. army would curb Japan's military behavior.

The Near-Term Outlook

In 2001, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Washington to meet with President George W. Bush,

taking with him the sad statistics of the nation's economy. Japan faces the highest level of deflation since the Great Depression of the 1930s, and government debt has risen to 130 percent of the gross national product. Banks are the most important problem for Koizumi. Nonperforming loans total hundreds of billions of dollars. Koizumi openly expressed his pro-U.S. position in public, looking for outside support to implement his potentially unpopular reform agenda. President Bush, for his part, demonstrated support for Koizumi's economic reform policy. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001 further promoted military cooperation between Japan and the United States. Japanese-U.S. relations continue to be one of the most important bilateral relationships in the twenty-first century, especially in the Asia-Pacific area. The peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific area depend on Japanese-U.S. cooperation and their efforts to contain destabilizing factors in this area.

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JAPANESE EXPANSION Between 1895 and 1945, Japan built a colonial empire in East Asia and the South Pacific, exerted growing political and economic influence over areas of Asia beyond the borders of its formal colonial holdings, and eventually launched a war that extended the area of Japanese control to its greatest limits but ultimately resulted in the complete destruction of the empire.

While Japan's transition from a largely isolated country in 1853 into one of the world's major powers began with fears of being colonized, by 1905 a newly created Japanese state had successfully assumed a place alongside the Western imperialist powers. Japanese expansionism found its ultimate expression in a war to supplant Western colonial influence with a greatly enlarged Japanese colonial empire, defined as a "New Order in Asia."

Colonial Empire

Following the establishment of the Meiji government in 1868, Japan's new leaders set out to establish formally Japan's boundaries under Western international law. The 1870s and 1880s thus witnessed the integration within Japanese borders of Hokkaido and the Kurile Islands in the north, the Ogasawara Islands off the Pacific coast, and the Ryukyu Islands in the south. Also driving the government's foreign policy was a desire to revise the unequal commercial and diplomatic treaties the old Tokugawa government (1600/1603–1868) had signed under duress during the 1850s. Establishing political and economic institutions patterned on Western practice was viewed as a necessary step toward convincing signatory nations to revise relations on a basis of equality; it was also seen as indispensable to building a Japan capable of guaranteeing its own independence.

Japan's leaders also became convinced that their nation's security would be threatened if any third power gained control of the Korean peninsula. Shortly after receiving British acquiescence to renegotiate the unequal treaties, rivalry with the Chinese Qing dynasty (1644–1912) over control of Korea erupted into the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. A Japanese victory drove the Chinese out of Korea and brought Japan formal possession of Taiwan and participatory status in the unequal-treaty system that governed great-power relations with China.

The Russian presence just north of Korea in Manchuria, however, continued to concern Japanese leaders, and in 1902 Japan entered into an alliance with Great Britain directed at countering Russian influence in Northeast Asia. Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 brought control over what became known as the Guandong Leased Territory on China's Liaodong Peninsula and formal possession of southern Sakhalin. Japan's success also affirmed its status as a regional power and paved the way for the formal annexation of Korea in 1910. When Japan joined World War I as Britain's ally, it took control of Germany's colonial possessions in China and Micronesia. In 1915, the government also took an initiative known as the Twenty-One Demands to gain predominant political and economic influence over China, but this effort to exert influence beyond the formal boundaries of the new empire only provoked Chinese enmity and Western suspicions.

The Search for a New Order

After World War I, international conferences in Paris and Washington set out to revise the diplomatic practices of great-power relations and arms competition, which were viewed as central causes of the war. Open multilateral negotiations, free trade, self-determination, and arms limitation were to be the building blocks of a new order that would prevent a repeat of the Great War. Some Japanese viewed these reforms as an Anglo-American stratagem to perpetuate a status quo favoring their interests, but for the better part of the 1920s Japan was able to expand its interests on the Asian continent within the rules instituted in Paris and Washington.

Although the postwar settlement required that Japan relinquish control over former German concessions in China, the agreement also recognized the legitimacy of Japan's other colonial holdings and its control over the Guandong Leased Territory. Growing economic expansion on the continent during the 1920s further raised Japan's material stake in China's

future. Some Japanese believed that the increasingly active Chinese nationalist movement and the prospects of a unified China threatened Japan's continental position. Others, particularly in the armed forces, feared that an invigorated Soviet Union would carry Communism into Northeast Asia. Finally, during the 1930s, the widely accepted belief in Japan's rightful role as the dominant power in East Asia increasingly intertwined with Pan-Asianist ideals postulating a national mission to liberate Asia from the yoke of Western imperialism.

Japan's response to these exigencies focused first on protecting its economic and security interests in Manchuria. By the beginning of the 1930s, many Japanese became convinced that Japan's interests could be better served through direct action than by continued adherence to the precepts of cooperative diplomacy. On 18 September 1931, against a backdrop of economic depression and domestic political uncertainty, Japanese army officers conspired to solve the "Manchurian question" by staging a swift military seizure of Manchuria and presenting their government and the world with their military occupation as a fait accompli. Extremely popular with the Japanese public, the Manchurian Incident strengthened the position of those favoring an independent foreign policy and reform of Japan's domestic political order. Following the army's lead, Japan's government in 1932 established the puppet state of Manchukuo and, in the face of international criticism, withdrew from the League of Nations in February 1933.

Wartime Expansion

Whereas Japan's expansion as a colonial power and pursuit of its interests in East Asia had occurred largely according to the prevailing practices of prewar imperialism and the postwar great-power style of cooperation elucidated in the Paris and Washington treaties, during the 1930s Japan became increasingly committed to establishing hegemony in East Asia. By the end of the decade, a confluence of domestic and international factors placed Japan increasingly at odds with those Western powers concurrently opposing German expansionism in Europe.

A skirmish between Chinese and Japanese troops north of Beijing on 7 July 1937 mushroomed into a general war that thereafter shaped Japanese policy making and eventually led to war with the Anglo-American powers. In 1938, Japanese leaders redefined the war in China as a noble crusade to construct a "New Order for East Asia," thereby placing Japan in direct conflict with the interests of the British and

Americans in China. In 1940, Japan joined in the Axis Pact with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy and expanded its self-appointed mission to include incorporation of South and Southeast Asia into a Greater East Asian Coprosperity Sphere. Hostility with the Anglo-American powers grew as a result, and on 7 December 1941 Japan began the war in the Pacific with an air attack on Pearl Harbor and an assault on Western colonial holdings in East and Southeast Asia. Despite stunning initial successes, including the occupation of vast areas of the South Pacific, Japan's offensive soon stalled. The Allies' overwhelming counteroffensive culminated in 1945 with Japan's unconditional surrender and the complete collapse of both formal empire and regional hegemony.

Explaining Japanese Expansion

Explanations of Japanese expansion tend to emphasize either the international context or Japan's domestic situation. Scholars who favor the former approach stress the reactive but rational nature of Japan's search for national security during a period of rampant colonization and great-power competition. While not necessarily disputing the importance of Western imperialism, other scholars view Japanese militarism and state economic imperatives as having driven the nation's imperialist expansion. While these two interpretative themes have analogs in broadly general theories of imperialism, Japan's experience as the only Asian country to colonize other Asians is unique. Given the fact that the wars launched by Japan on the continent and in the Pacific hastened the destruction of both Japanese and Western colonialism, Japan's imperial expansion clearly possesses specific and considerable significance for the history of the twentieth century.

Roger H. Brown

See also: **Russo-Japanese War; Sino-Japanese Conflict, Second; Sino-Japanese War**

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JAPANESE FIRMS ABROAD The increasing international presence of Japanese firms beginning in the 1980s has generated a great deal of interest. At the end of the 1980s, Japanese companies made more investments abroad (in factories, banks, Hollywood picture studios, property, and hotels) than companies from any other country. While the 1990s saw a lessening of this overseas expansion, Japanese firms have become important players in the economies of North America, Europe, and mainland Asia. Indeed, their distinctive overseas behavior is due to the broader forces operating in the cultural, economic, and political environment at home.

One important factor that explains the differences between Japanese overseas operations and those of other countries is that, compared with the United States and Europe, for example, Japan is a latecomer to overseas investment. As a result of its defeat in World War II, Japan forfeited most of its foreign investments in 1946. After 1946, Japanese international economic strategy was based primarily on trade—on the development of exports and industrial self-sufficiency in raw materials for the domestic economy. Consequently, the giant Japanese trading companies (*sogo shosha*) were at the vanguard of overseas activities. Trading firms, such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, acted as marketing agents for Japanese industry (textiles and steel products) in countries in Asia, North America, and Western Europe. At the same time, these firms were also responsible for acquiring strategic suppliers of materials such as coking coal and iron ore for the major steel firms. To conduct such global trade each *sogo shosha* maintained a large worldwide network of overseas offices connected to its headquarters by a sophisticated telex and telecommunications network.

The Early Post–World War II Years

Until the late 1960s, the Japanese government's policy toward overseas operations by Japanese manufacturers was very restrictive in order to save scarce foreign exchange reserves. In addition, the relatively low domestic wage levels provided little stimulus for Japanese firms to look overseas for cheaper labor locations. As a result, Japanese manufacturing firms had a very low presence overseas throughout the 1960s. In the 1970s, however, trading houses became more in-

volved in securing strategic energy resources following the oil shocks of that decade. Moreover, as Japanese exports and wages rose, Japanese manufacturers also began to move overseas. This was either to avoid trade barriers to the rush of Japanese exports in Southeast Asia and the United States, or to take advantage of cheaper wages in neighboring South Korea and Taiwan. As Japanese trade and offshore manufacturing grew, so did the overseas activities of banking, warehousing firms, and other service companies (construction and transportation companies).

The Bubble Economy and Its Aftermath

In the 1980s, a number of developments in the Japanese economy combined to produce a dramatic takeoff in Japanese overseas production. The most important of these developments included the relaxation of Japanese government restrictions on overseas investments, the rapid increase in the value of the yen after 1985, the growing shortage (and increasing cost) of domestic labor, and a shortage of indigenous natural resources. The late 1980s also saw a spectacular rise of the Japanese stock market as well as the domestic property market, leading to sudden bloated values in corporate assets. This phenomenon was known as the bubble economy; it coincided with several years of strong balance-of-trade surpluses and very high rates of domestic savings. The net result was that Japan became the world's largest creditor and exporter of financial capital. Consequently, Japan's major banks, life insurance firms, and securities companies (stockbroking firms) also started rapidly expanding their overseas operations. Their intention was to expand their capacity to loan financial resources in the major financial markets of the world (New York and London) and invest in foreign bonds and property.

In the early 1990s, conditions dramatically altered as Japan's bubble economy burst, leading to stagnant growth at home. Since 1995, the number of overseas affiliate companies established by Japanese firms has declined. Manufacturing firms, however, have continued to search out lower-cost production locations and areas of market growth, such as Southeast Asia and China, in order to maintain their international competitiveness.

Japanese Firms in North America

During the 1990s Japanese firms were established in all parts of the world and most had a globalization strategy that connected their organizations in the three major regions. In North America as well as in the world, the United States has been consistently the

number-one country in terms of number of Japanese firms with a presence there. The growing presence of Japanese automobile firms in the United States has attracted widespread attention. The Honda Motor Company was the first Japanese automobile firm to begin producing automobiles in the United States (1982); it was followed by five other manufacturers. By the 1990s, these transplanted car assembly factories produced about 20 percent of the automobiles made in the United States. Japanese auto firms also operated in Canada (Toyota, Honda, and Suzuki), but Japan's major presence there has been in the timber and wood pulp sectors. Mexico has seen a number of electronics firms operate close to the U.S. border in special industrial zones (*maquiladoras*) aimed at exporting cheaper products and components into the lucrative U.S. market.

Japanese Firms in Europe

In Western Europe, Japanese firms have been attracted by the size of the European Union market as a whole, especially as this region moves toward fuller unity. Most investment has occurred in the United Kingdom where Japanese firms are concentrated in automobiles (Nissan and Toyota) and electronics (Sony's color television factory in South Wales), as well as chemical products. These plants not only ensure access to the United Kingdom market but also to the continental European market. General machinery firms have chosen to go to Germany, while France is host to electronics, chemical products, and food processing companies. In Spain, Japanese firms are involved in automobile assembly and parts manufacturing, while in Italy it is clothing and textile products, as well as general machinery. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, some Japanese firms have expanded into Eastern Europe, for instance in automobile assembly.

Japanese Firms in Southeast Asia

Starting in the late 1960s, Southeast Asian countries were targeted by electronics and machinery firms, and the relocation of complete production lines (video cameras, audio-visual products, and air conditioners) took place in large-scale factories aimed at worldwide as well as local markets. Around the mid-1980s, Southeast Asian countries began to be more relaxed about the operation of foreign companies in their countries; Malaysia and Thailand allowed Japanese automobile companies such as Toyota, Nissan, and Mitsubishi Motors to increase their production capacity. In the 1990s, China emerged as the most favorable investment location for Japanese firms. Although not large in value,

Japanese investment has also increased in Vietnam. Mention should also be made of the special role taken by Singapore and Hong Kong as centers for Japanese trade, banking, retailing, and service operations aimed at Southeast Asia and China, respectively.

Friction with Host Nations

In all these regions there have been two major areas of controversy arising from the way Japanese firms have conducted their business. The first concerns labor practices and the impact of so-called Japanese-style management, as well as distinctive Japanese production techniques, including lean production, just-in-time delivery of parts, and flexible manufacturing assembly lines. Most accounts have shown that these practices have not been transferred abroad without some local adaptation that reflects the sociocultural background of the host country. A second area relates to localization and the relationship between assembly plants and their components suppliers. Japanese firms at home have been accustomed to very particular kinds of business ties with their domestic suppliers and have often found it difficult to quickly increase local procurement of parts or components when overseas. The strategy of importing from existing suppliers has been under severe pressure from governments in host countries. One response has been to persuade their traditional suppliers to move overseas. This offshore transfer is raising concerns about a hollowing out of the domestic manufacturing industry. Nevertheless, most companies have maintained research and development facilities in Japan, together with the very highest technology-intensive production.

Future Directions

Despite an increasing convergence with Western corporations, Japanese firms as a group still differ in a number of significant ways from other multinationals in terms of their management style, strong links with the government, and sense of national mission. In the immediate future Asia is the preferred region for capital investment among Japanese companies. China looks particularly promising in the medium-term future, and Japanese firms expect positive changes in the business environment now that China has entered the World Trade Organization.

David W. Edgington

See also: **Quality Circles**

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JAPANESE FOREIGN INVESTMENT

A major feature of the world economy since the 1960s has been the rapid expansion of foreign direct investment (FDI). Strong world economic performance, substantial realignment of the exchange rates of major currencies, and technological developments in transportation and communication services have all contributed to unprecedented growth in FDI, particularly since the mid-1980s. The United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and other developed nations have been the main investing countries. Among these nations, the increase of Japanese FDI has been particularly high since the mid-1980s, though it has declined since the economic recession of the 1990s. With the notable exception of Japan, most of the leading investing countries are also major recipients of FDI.

The Development of Japan's FDI

The growth of Japan's role as a foreign investor has been extraordinary. With little involvement in the 1950s, Japan emerged with about 17 percent of the world's stock of foreign direct investment in the late 1980s. Total investment flows first began to gather momentum after 1965, rising from \$227 million in 1966 to a peak of \$3.49 billion by 1973. The investment boom slackened due to the oil crisis of 1973, but resumed again in 1978. After receding slightly in 1982, it rose steadily until 1985; between 1986 and 1989, it surged ahead at a rapid pace. By 1989, Japan was the single largest source of FDI, with outflows amounting to \$67 billion. This was in comparison with \$40 bil-

lion from the United States and \$35 billion from the United Kingdom.

Factors that contributed to the high investment rates in the 1980s included Japan's increasing trade surplus; the 1980 deregulation of exchange controls that paved the way for banks, financial securities companies, and institutional investors such as life insurance firms to invest abroad; and the 46 percent appreciation of the yen between 1985 and 1987. Japan's foreign investment growth has been negative in the 1990s as a result of the bursting of the bubble economy at the end of 1989 and the resulting pessimistic economic forecast.

Most of the Japanese FDI is concentrated in Southeast Asia, China, Western Europe, and the United States. In the 1960s, in order to secure a stable supply of raw materials for manufacturing, Japan invested in petroleum drilling in Indonesia, iron-ore mining in Malaysia, and copper mining in the Philippines. Beginning in 1970, Japanese FDI began to concentrate in the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) of Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and China, in manufacturing activities such as textiles and consumer electronics. Both internal factors in Japan and external factors in the Asian countries played a role in promoting Japanese FDI. An increase in the price of Japanese products, particularly labor-intensive products, resulting from rising wages and appreciation of the yen led Japanese producers to shift their production to the countries where production could be carried out at a lower cost. The abundance of quality low-wage labor, FDI promotion policies such as export processing zones, and preferential taxes attracted Japanese FDI to Asia.

FDI in Asia

In 1989, the share of Asia in overall Japanese FDI was 12.2 percent. Of that investment in Asia, the Asian NIEs, Southeast Asia, and China accounted for 98.6 percent of Japanese FDI in 1989. The largest recipients in Southeast Asia were Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore in reported value of FDI. In 1989, Japan was the largest foreign investor in all the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Between 1990 and 1995 Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand continued to attract the most FDI in Southeast Asia, ranking third, fifth, and seventh respectively in the world based on cumulative FDI. Rising wages due to the shortage of labor and rising land prices in Japan provided additional incentive for overseas production. The distinguishing feature of Japanese firms in Asia in the early 2000s

is that joint ventures between indigenous and Japanese partners are more common than in North America and Europe.

FDI in the United States

The United States accounted for 48.2 percent of Japan's overall FDI in 1989, but in the 1990s, as a result of the fall in Japan's stock and land prices, FDIs were drastically reduced. The bulk of the Japanese investment in the United States is concentrated in manufacturing, particularly in electrical machinery and transport equipment. The Japanese automobile industry has made major investments in the United States and Canada; there are several major Japanese transplant assembly facilities, as well as some 270 automotive parts suppliers. Honda was the first automotive company to produce in the United States, arriving in 1982. By 1989, Nissan, Toyota, Mazda, and Mitsubishi had factories located in rural sites in the Midwest and South. The increasing threat of U.S. import barriers precipitated a massive onrush of Japanese manufacturing FDI in the period 1978 to 1984. Along with the desire to have a production presence in the United States to ensure market access, a number of Japanese firms, particularly in areas such as chemicals, optical goods, and electronics, acquired U.S. corporations to obtain a direct channel to coveted technology. The United States offers many attractions to foreign investors, including a large and growing market, few bureaucratic restrictions and regulations that impede corporate activity, an excellent social infrastructure, low energy costs, and an educated labor force. Most state and local governments have welcomed Japanese investment and have solicited Japanese firms.

FDI in Europe

By the end of the 1980s, Europe accounted for 21 percent of the Japanese FDI. Japanese firms have invested in Europe because of trade restrictive measures. The United Kingdom was the favored FDI destination, followed by the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, and France. Switzerland and Spain also received Japanese FDI. Relatively lower wages, favorable public investment incentives, and an absence of strong local rivals in automobiles and electronics explain the attraction of Britain. France offered a central location and a large internal market. Germany offered a good industrial relations record, high labor skills, and centrality. Spain, which has a large reservoir of cheap labor, had a relatively large Japanese production presence because of its high import barrier. In Britain, the Japanese have selected peripheral regions such as Wales, Scotland, and northeast England

for locating firms. Machinery, electronics, and transport equipment dominate the FDI.

Historically, much of Japan's foreign investment has been induced by the need to avert potential market losses resulting from protectionist policies or by attempts to secure overseas raw materials. By setting up overseas plants, Japanese firms are able to retain much of their market share. Investments in low-wage countries in Asia and Latin America have helped Japan to retain the general export competitiveness of its products.

P. P. Karan

See also: Asian Economic Crisis of 1997; Japanese Firms Abroad; Quality Circles

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JAPAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCY (JICA) The Japan International Cooperation Agency (Kokusai Kyoryoku Jigyodan) is one of two Japanese governmental organizations responsible for official development assistance (ODA). The other organization was formerly the Overseas Economic Development Fund (OEDF), which merged with the Japan Export-Import Bank in October 1999 to form the new Japan Bank for International Cooperation.

JICA's roles have been to administer grant aid, to provide technical aid, and to oversee the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV, or Seinen Kaigai Kyoryokudan), the Japanese equivalent of the U.S. Peace Corps. While Japanese ODA has traditionally been loan-based in order to ensure efficient use of funds by the recipient country, by fiscal year 1995, grant aid and technical assistance were nearly equal to lending. Japan gives grant aid to the world's poorest countries, as well as for general humanitarian projects. Thus, both JICA and the JOCV are influential in least developed countries (LDCs).

JICA's technical assistance takes a variety of forms. In many cases, consultants advise governments or pub-

lic organizations in developing countries on engineering or other projects. JICA technical assistance also funds the feasibility studies that precede projects funded by either grant or loan aid.

Japan's ODA budget and policy priorities are set outside of JICA by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and the Economic Planning Agency. The varying interests of these ministries have sometimes made for a disjointed approach that emphasizes foreign policy and commercial concerns to varying degrees.

In the late 1980s, the United States pressured Japan to untie its aid for fear that U.S. firms would be excluded from lucrative Japanese aid contracts in developing countries. The result was that most of JICA's grants were officially "untied," as were all Japanese ODA loans. In other words, non-Japanese as well as Japanese firms can bid to be contractors on most Japanese aid projects. In some cases, projects are LDC-untied, which means that LDC-based firms can compete with Japanese firms for contracts, but that developed country firms cannot. Most contracts are still won by Japanese firms, however, and there remains some dispute as to whether Japanese ODA is actually untied in practice.

William W. Grimes

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JAPANESE LANGUAGE The Japanese language ranks sixth in number of speakers worldwide after Chinese, English, Russian, Hindi, and Spanish. Most Japanese speakers are located within Japan, although there are also immigrant communities in the Americas and other parts of the world where a small number of Japanese speakers can be found. As Japan is said to be a linguistically homogeneous nation, most of its approximately 127 million residents do speak Japanese. It is important to remember, however, that Japan is also home to linguistic minorities such as the Ainu, Okinawans, and permanent foreign residents.

Scholars debate the origins of the Japanese language, and arguments have been made for links to Altaic languages (such as Mongolian), Korean, Dravidian

languages (such as Tamil), Malayo-Polynesian languages, and Tibeto-Burmese. It seems probable that the Japanese language originated as a mix of languages from Central and Southeast Asia and had fully developed into a distinct language by the time of the Yayoi culture (300 BCE–300 CE).

While the Japanese use the Chinese system of writing, the Japanese language is not related to the Chinese language. The writing system was borrowed from Chinese during the fifth or sixth century, long after the development of spoken Japanese. The earliest known writings in Japanese date back to the eighth century.

Pronunciation

Japanese has five vowels (*a, i, u, e, o*), which are similar in pronunciation to the vowels of Spanish and Italian. Each vowel can also be elongated, doubling the duration of its pronunciation.

The sound system of Japanese is straightforward; there are few exceptions to established pronunciation rules, and each character in a word is pronounced. Unlike some languages, sounds are constant, and even long words can be sounded out easily. Sound units are composed of a consonant plus a vowel or a vowel alone. Only the consonant *n* can occur completely unattached to a vowel.

Japanese is a pitch-based language, unlike English, which is based on stress. Each syllable in a Japanese word is stressed equally, but the pitch of syllables rises and falls. Consequently, pronunciation of Japanese words is steady and even compared with English.

The Written Language

The literacy rate in Japan is officially reported at 99 percent of the population, which shows the emphasis placed on the written language. Japanese utilizes four distinct systems of writing: kanji, hiragana, katakana, and *romaji* (romanization). These writing systems are used together, and occasionally all four are found in a single sentence. More commonly, two or three of the systems will be used in one sentence; it is extremely uncommon to find a sentence incorporating only one writing system.

Kanji is the Japanese name for the simplified pictographs borrowed from Chinese, which represent whole words and are not phonetic. Although elements of a kanji may at times offer clues to its pronunciation, there are no foolproof ways of knowing a particular kanji's pronunciation without memorizing its reading. Altogether there are approximately 50,000 kanji, but

the Japanese government has limited to 1,945 the number necessary for daily use. Educated Japanese adults can usually recognize at least two to three thousand characters.

Kana, a term that covers both hiragana and katakana, originated from the simplification of kanji in the ninth and tenth centuries, and reflect phonological characteristics of Japanese. In other words, while kanji represent whole words, kana simply represent sounds that are combined to form words. There are forty-eight sound units that can be expressed in both hiragana and katakana. These units represent vowels, consonant-vowel combinations, and the single consonant *n*. Hiragana are a cursive style and are used mainly for verb and adjective endings and other grammatical markers. Katakana are much more angular. They are regularly used for onomatopoeias and loanwords from other languages, in a manner somewhat similar to italics in English.

The fourth writing system is the roman alphabet (*romaji*), which is used primarily for company names and in advertising. For example, the company name Sony is always written in *romaji*. There are two systems of romanization, Hepburn and Kunrei, both of which are used in Japan and overseas.

Japanese can be written either vertically or horizontally. Traditionally, Japanese was written vertically from right to left; the first page of a Japanese book would be considered the last page of a Western book. This format continues in newspapers and some books, but many magazines and books are printed horizontally from left to right.

Grammar

Japanese is a language with a flexible subject-object-verb word order. The only word order restriction is that the verb must come at the end of a sentence; otherwise, words can be randomly ordered because of the presence of conjugational suffixes and case particles that mark the function of words in a sentence.

Nouns in Japanese do not change for gender, case, or number. Verbs and adjectives in Japanese must be conjugated; verb conjugation is straightforward and there are few irregularities. There are no articles in Japanese.

An important aspect of the Japanese language is a complex system of honorific verbs. Because Japanese society is based on strict hierarchies, those hierarchies are expressed in the language. Humble verb forms are used when speakers refer to themselves, and exalted forms are used when addressing a person of higher

rank or status. Positions can be based on social status, rank, gender, age, or any combination thereof. In addition, male and female speech is differentiated, with female speech usually taking more polite forms and male speech often coming across as more direct.

The Future of Japanese

In addition to standard Japanese, based on the Tokyo dialect, there are a number of regional and local dialects of Japanese. Because mass media and compulsory education have familiarized people around the country with the standard dialect, most Japanese now speak both standard Japanese and their local dialect. The Kansai dialect, spoken in Kyoto and Osaka, is one of the most well-known dialects and is a source of pride for people from that region.

Another factor causing language change in Japan is the incorporation of a large number of loanwords. There are loanwords from a variety of languages, and since the end of World War II, the number of English loanwords has increased rapidly. Loanwords such as *apaato* (apartment), *hambaagaa* (hamburger), and *basukettobooru* (basketball) are written in katakana. The increasing number of new loanwords being used in Japanese has caused confusion among older Japanese, who worry that Japanese is losing its traditional identity.

Danielle Rocheleau

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JAPANESE SPIRIT. See **Yamato Damashii**.

JATIYA PARTY The Jatiya Party (JP, but Jatiya Dal in its original form) was founded in 1983 as a vehicle for the Bangladesh leader Hussain Muhammad Ershad (b. 1930). It attracted some members of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), who were willing to work with Ershad to maintain their political influence, as well as a few from the Awami League

for the same reason. It is a centrist party, as is the BNP, and the economic and social programs of the two parties have little difference. The difference has been the BNP's dislike of the means Ershad used to gain power.

Ershad called a parliamentary election in 1986 in which the JP won a slight majority over the Awami League, thereby dispelling claims that the election was fixed. However, the Awami League withdrew from the parliament in 1988, forcing another election in which the JP won an overwhelming majority because no other significant party contested. Since the fall of Ershad in December 1990, the party has continued to contest, finishing third in the 1991 and June 1996 elections. Following the latter, Ershad led the party into a coalition with the Awami League, but the JP has now split. The faction led by Ershad has aligned with the BNP in the opposition; the other faction remains allied with the Awami League in the government.

Craig Baxter

JATRA *Jatra* ("journey") is a theatrical form of folk opera that relies heavily on dance and music, and is prevalent in the Bengal region of eastern India and present-day Bangladesh. This theater, which is devoted to the worship of Krishna, follows the tradition of classical ancient Indian theater, in which dialogue, dance, music, and gesture are all intermixed with the mythic content. But, whereas ancient drama had a larger secular content, *jatra* was narrowed down to the philosophy of personal and individual bhakti (devotion) to Krishna or Rama as god incarnate. Watching a *jatra* play is a way symbolically to perform a spiritual journey or a pilgrimage. The term also denotes the journeying (*jatri*) or wandering players.

The wave of bhakti was generated in Bengal and Orissa in the fifteenth century by, among others, the poet Chaitanya Mahaprabhu as a mass movement. In the earliest phase, the *jatra* plays were adaptations into local vernacular of such Sanskrit-tradition plays as *Vidagdha Madhavam*, written in northern India by authors including Roop Goswami. Goswami's play, adapted as *Radhakrishna Lila Kadamba*, continues to be a significant part of the *jatra* repertoire. Devotional verses of Bengali poets such as Lochan Das (1523–1589), Jagannath Vallabh, and Jadogunananda Das (around 1607) were adapted into *jatra*. Famous performance texts such as *Kaliya Daman*, *Nimai Sanyas*, and *Chaitanya Chandrodaya Kaumudi* (1712) were com-

posed. Many *jatra* plays were about the lives of the great saints of the bhakti movement.

In the nineteenth century, *jatra* had more music than dance or gestures. The dance portions are mainly on the dalliance of Krishna with the *gopis* (village women tending cows), a standard motif. But the main emotional intensity in this theater was generated by the musical excellence of the verses used as dialogue. *Jatra*, like most medieval theater from other parts of India, made musical dialogue the most prominent feature of the performance.

The musical ensemble for *jatra* consists of the drum (*dbol*), flute, and the harmonium—an Indian version of accordion—which was introduced during the nineteenth century. The singers were dressed in long white robes and the players in a conventional dress. The manager of the performers, the *adbikari*, generally is also the trainer and chief senior artist. In the twentieth century, however, the impact of the urban theater (an Indian version of Western naturalistic art) can be seen on *jatra*. There also was an attempt to use the *jatra* form to produce modern scripts with socialist and contemporary ideologies.

Like most traditional theatrical forms, *jatra* is becoming an endangered species in the twenty-first century, as audience tastes have changed and the social demand of the times is more for lighter entertainment than for deep devotion of the religious kind.


Bharat Gupt

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JAVA (2000 pop. 120 million). The island of Java is the political and economic center of Indonesia. In conjunction with the island of Madura, usually included in its statistics, Java has a territory of 132,608 square kilometers. Java is divided into three provinces: West, Central, and East Java, and also includes two special territories: Jakarta and Yogyakarta. A volcanic mountain chain runs the length of the island. Java has over sixty volcanoes, of which more than a dozen are still active. The most important mineral resources are oil, iron ore, and salt. The climate is hot and wet, with a dry and a wet season. Natural forests have been reduced to about 3 percent of the land area. Valuable wood species are teak, coconuts, and spice trees. Endangered animal species include the gibbon, the one-horned rhinoceros, and the leopard. The main ecological problem is soil erosion.

With a density of approximately 905 people per square kilometer, Java is among the world’s most densely populated areas. The ethnic composition of the population presents three main groups, each speaking their own language: Javanese, Sundanese, and





FITTING IN—IN JAVA

Tjotjog is a key element of slametan, a system of Javanese rituals practiced by rural villagers. In the excerpt below, anthropologist Clifford Geertz explains the concept.

At the base of this often quite involved system lies one of the most fundamental Javanese metaphysical concepts: *tjotjog*. To *tjotjog* means to fit, as a key does in a lock, as an efficacious medicine does a disease, as a solution does an arithmetic problem, as a man does the woman he married (if he doesn't, they get divorced). If your opinion agrees with mine, we *tjotjog*; if the meaning of my name fits my character (and if it brings me good luck), it is said to be *tjotjog*. Tasty food, comfortable surroundings, gratifying outcomes are all *tjotjog*. In the broadest and most abstract sense two separate items *tjotjog* when their coincidence forms an aesthetic pattern. It implies a contrapuntal view of the universe in which what is important is what natural relationship the separate elements—space, time, and human motivation—have to one another, how they must be arranged in order to strike a chord and avoid a dissonance.

As in harmony, the ultimately correct relations are fixed, determinate, and knowable, and so religion, like harmony, is ultimately a science, no matter how much of an art its actual practice may be. The petungan system provides a way of stating these relationships and thus of tuning one's own actions to them, of avoiding the kind of disharmony with the general order of nature which can only bring misfortune.

Source: Clifford J. Geertz. (1964) *The Religion of Java*. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 31.

Madurese. Most of the people are Muslim but some small pockets of Hinduism still survive in East Java.

Java is one of the oldest foci of human habitation, with specimens of *Homo erectus* dating from 800,000 years ago having been discovered there. The first major principality arose around the beginning of the eighth century. Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam consecutively penetrated into Java between the first century CE and the sixteenth century. The Majapahit dynasty flourished there from the end of the thirteenth century to the sixteenth century; at its height its influence reached to Siam and Annam. By the end of the eighteenth century the entire island was under Dutch control. Today, Indonesia's three biggest cities are on Java: Jakarta (the nation's capital), Surabaya, and Bandung.

Java is one of the most fertile tropical places on earth. About 70 percent of the workforce engages in agriculture. Crops grown for domestic use include rice, maize, and cassava. A quarter of Java's land area is used for *sawah* agriculture (growing rice in flooded paddy fields). Cash commodities include rubber, coffee, tea, tobacco, and peanuts.

Dimitar L. Dimitrov

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JAVA SEA The Java Sea is 162,662 square nautical miles and is bounded by Sumatra to the west, Borneo to the north, and Java to the south. Comprising the southern extension of the Sunda Shelf of continental Southeast Asia, it is 20–60 m deep and is sheltered from waves over 1.5 m. Influenced by monsoons, its surface currents reverse seasonally, and its tides range from under 1.5 m to 3 m. Mangroves dominate the Borneo shores while limited coral reefs lie off Java's north coast.

The Java Sea is Indonesia's second largest and most important marine region. On its southern shore is the heavily populated island of Java with Indonesia's largest ports at Tanjungpriok and Surabaya. Petroleum is produced in the western Java Sea, near the southeast coast of Sumatra. Fishing is economically important, and seafood processing facilities are located at Tanjungpriok, Cirebon, Pekalongan, Semarang, Surabaya, and Banyuwangi on the north coast of Java and at Banjarmasin in South Kalimantan. It is among Indonesia's most polluted seas, and erosion is a major problem on its southern shores.

Wong Pob Pob

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JAVA WAR The Java War lasted from 1825 to 1830, overlapping the Padri War (1821–1837) on neighboring Sumatra. The war cost 200,000 Javanese lives when Java's population was only around 3 million. As in the Padri movement, Islam helped unify opposition to Dutch rule in Java.

The Dutch policy of interfering in royal palace (*kraton*) affairs directly caused this uprising. Colonial authorities passed over Prince Diponegoro of Yogyakarta (1775–1835), eldest son of the previous sultan, recognizing instead the sultan's younger brother as his successor. Diponegoro sought to regain his rightful position, as revealed to him by the sea goddess Nyai Rara Kidul in a dream, and, more

tangibly, as promised to him by Sir Thomas Raffles (1781–1826), lieutenant-governor of Java during the British interregnum. This Javanese mystical notion was combined with the prince's *pesantren* (Islamic school) education when he promoted Islam as the religion of Java by challenging the colonial unbelievers.

There was another provocation as well. The Dutch tried to restrict *kraton* wealth and power by declaring that it could not lease its land and that rentals must be repaid. A Dutch-built road from Malang to Yogyakarta was partly constructed over a sacred burial ground (the road also expedited Dutch troop movements). Diponegoro led resistance to the Dutch, assisted by the *priyayi* (aristocracy) of Yogyakarta, through a campaign of guerrilla warfare. Diponegoro was hailed as the *ratu adil* (just king) by many for whom the prince represented their anticolonial hopes. The Dutch countermeasure was to establish a series of linked forts from which effective raids were made. In 1829, Diponegoro's two most trusted advisers, Kiyayi Maja and Sentot, surrendered—a blow to the rebellion. In 1830, Diponegoro agreed to negotiations to end the conflict but refused to renounce his claim to the Yogyakarta throne. The Dutch tricked Diponegoro by falsely promising him safe conduct for the negotiations, but actually arrested him and exiled him to Makasar. While many hoped for Diponegoro's return, the Java War was the last of the *priyayi*-led rebellions; the *priyayi* were increasingly coopted by Dutch colonial authorities as agents of governance and were seen by the people as collaborators. The Dutch, in their campaign to destroy the power of the various *kratons* of Java and of traditional authorities elsewhere in the Indies, weakened the Yogyakarta sultanate by stripping away vast land holdings. However, Yogyakarta's royal family retained titular leadership of its traditional territory, and the current sultan of Yogyakarta, Hamenkubuwono X, remains the formal head of the province of Yogyakarta under a unique arrangement.

Anthony Smith

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JAVANESE Javanese is the language of the largest ethnic group of Indonesia with around 75 million speakers. It is mainly spoken in Central and East Java, as well as in northern coastal areas. Outside Java, many Javanese speakers are found in transmigration areas in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi. In Suriname (formerly Dutch Guiana, in South America) there is a Javanese immigrant community of some 60,000 descendants of indentured workers.

Javanese belongs to the Austronesian (Malayo-Polynesian) family. There is considerable dialectal variation, but the language of Central Java, more specifically the principalities of Surakarta and Yogyakarta, is commonly regarded as standard. A feature that Javanese shares with related languages such as Sundanese, Madurese, and Balinese is the possession of different speech levels or sets of vocabulary, the *ngoko-krama* phenomenon. The basic, informal level is *ngoko*, while *krama*—synonymous with politeness—is used when speaking to a social superior or a stranger. Three types of script are used for writing modern Javanese: Javanese, Perso-Arabic, and Roman script. Javanese script has evolved over more than 1,200 years and derives from an Indian script. Since World War II, however, Javanese script has rapidly given way to Roman script, which is currently the only script mastered by the majority of Javanese. Perso-Arabic script, with or without vowel diacritics, is associated with Islamic texts.

The charter of Sukabumi, dated 25 March 804 CE, marks the beginning of the Old Javanese language. The terms Old Javanese, Middle Javanese, and Modern Javanese do not reflect a neat historical succession. Old Javanese is used for all Javanese texts lacking Arabic loans or Muslim influence, whereas Middle Javanese denotes the language of Balinese *kidung* literature. In Bali, Old



Javanese dancers in traditional costume in Bandung, West Java. (LINDSAY HEBBERD/CORBIS)

Javanese remains a living tradition to the present day. The earliest documents in Modern Javanese are two manuscripts of Islamic teachings current on the north coast of Java in the sixteenth century. In the early twentieth century Indonesian nationalists decided that Malay was more suitable than Javanese for a national language, and declared it so under the name of *Bahasa Indonesia* (Indonesian language) in 1928. A process of mutual interpenetration of the two languages is still in progress.

Edwin Wieringa

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JAYAVARMAN II (c. 770–834), founder of the unified Khmer state. Jayavarman II, a mysterious figure who left no inscriptions of his own, is credited with the foundation of a unified Khmer state in what is now Cambodia. Jayavarman II was often mentioned in the inscriptions of his successors, who regarded him as the founder of what became the powerful Angkorean kingdom. Scholars have established that when he was about twenty years old, Jayavarman came from Java and declared his independence from the Javanese kingdom. His early career combined military conquests and the formation of strategic alliances in which local powers transferred some of their influence to the newcomer.

The Sdok Kak Thom inscription, incised in the eleventh century, gives the details of what would later become Jayavarman's most enduring legacy. According to the inscription, in the year 802 CE, Jayavarman initiated a ritual whereby he became a "universal monarch." The ritual celebrated the cult of the *devaraja*, or "god king," which was associated with the Hindu divinity Siva. As Siva was a creator, keeper, and destroyer of worlds, the king assumed the role of an intermediary between the cosmic world and the world of human existence. Notions of a "universal monarch" and a "god king" endured to transcend the political culture of modern Cambodia.

David M. Ayres

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JAYAVARMAN VII (1181–1220), king of Angkor. Jayavarman VII is recognized as the last great king of Angkor, the mighty kingdom that preceded modern Cambodia. A first cousin of Suryavarman II (d. 1150), who built the famed Angkor Wat, he assumed the throne at a time when the kingdom was in decline, having been invaded and overtaken in an attack by the Chams. It took four years of fighting for Jayavarman's army to drive the Chams out of Angkor. Unlike his Angkorean predecessors, who worshiped Hindu gods, Jayavarman VII was a Mahayana Buddhist. Jayavarman VII was the most prolific builder of Cambodia's Angkorean kings. He built roads that extended from the heart of his kingdom, and he built temples, hospitals, reservoirs, and rest houses. He built the walled city of Angkor Thom, with the Bayon at its center. He was also responsible for building Ta Prohm, Preah Khan, Ta Som, the Terrace of the Elephants, and Srah Srang. Much of the life, and death, of Jayavarman VII remains shrouded in mystery. It is possible that he is the leper king of Khmer oral tradition. Whatever the case, it is clear that regional power and influence of the Angkor kingdom declined after his reign.

David M. Ayres

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JESUITS IN INDIA The Society of Jesus, founded in 1540 by Saint Ignatius of Loyola (1491–1556), is a Roman Catholic religious order known worldwide for its evangelical, charitable, and educational work as well as for its concern for social issues. Members (Jesuits) are bound by vows of poverty, chastity, and apostolic labors.

Saint Francis Xavier (1506–1552) was the first Jesuit to work in India; he represented the society in Goa

on the west coast of India from 1540, where he worked among the *paravas*, a fisher caste, and made many converts. After his death his body was enshrined in the cathedral in Goa, where he is venerated by people of all faiths.

Jesuits published India's first printed book in 1556. Thomas Stephens (1549–1619), an English Jesuit stationed in Goa, wrote a Konkani grammar, a manual of Christian instruction in Konkani and Marathi, and *Kristapurana* (Christian Purana, 1615), a Marathi poem in the style of the Puranas. Roberto de Nobili (1577–1656), another linguist, wrote a Tamil catechism.

The Society of Jesus enjoyed many successes in India, but these were often tempered by momentary trials and setbacks. In 1744 Pope Benedict XIV (1675–1758) issued a papal bull suppressing the rites used by Indian converts. In 1759 the prime minister of Portugal, Marquês de Pombal (1699–1782), expelled all Jesuits from Portugal and Portuguese territories (including Goa), and in 1773 Pope Clement XIV (1705–1774) abolished the Jesuit order (it was reconstituted in 1814 by Pope Pius VII). Jesuit missionaries struggled with social issues, often involving caste. At first their evangelization targeted the lower-caste Hindus, who were known as "rice Christians" because their mass conversions were seen as tainted by desire for material comforts (such as food), but subsequent efforts, which focused on social change through education, attracted high-caste converts. By 1858 they had founded colleges in Goa, Mumbai (Bombay), Calcutta, and Cranganore. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Jesuit missions in India are engaged in educational and social programs, having established over twenty colleges, more than one hundred high schools, and several technical, labor relations, and management institutes in India.

Henry Scholberg

See also: Christianity—South Asia

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JEYARETNAM, JOSHUA BENJAMIN (b. 1926), Singapore politician. Joshua Benjamin (J. B.) Jeyaretnam was born in Sri Lanka and was educated at University College London. He was called to the bar at Gray's Inn, London, and worked in the legal service in Singapore from 1952 to 1963, later engaging in legal practice there. He entered the political scene in Singapore when he revived the Workers' Party founded by David Marshall. In the 1972 election, Jeyaretnam advocated abolishing the Internal Security Act, which allows the government to detain anyone deemed to be a threat to internal security. In 1981, he became the first opposition member in the Singapore parliament since the withdrawal of Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front) members in 1965. Lee Kuan Yew, then prime minister of Singapore, charged Jeyaretnam and his party with libel in a number of successful lawsuits. Consequently, both were burdened with a substantial debt. Jeyaretnam was returned to parliament by the constituents of Anson in the 1984 general election. In 1986 he was found guilty of making a false declaration concerning party accounts and fined S\$2,500. This led to his expulsion from parliament; he was disqualified from membership in parliament until November 1991. He was also found guilty of abuse of privilege and contempt in January 1987 and fined S\$13,000. Consequently, he was unable to participate in the August 1991 election.

Jeyaretnam contested in the 1997 general election and lost. He became one of the nominated members of parliament (NMP) because he polled one of the highest numbers of votes among the losing candidates. The prime minister and nine other ministers immediately sued him for statements he made at an election rally. The High Court's judgment on the suits by the prime minister, who was awarded S\$100,000 in damages, was delivered in September 1997. In addition, Jeyaretnam had debts totaling S\$547,508 in damages that he owed eight creditors who had sued him after they were defamed in an article in the Workers' Party publication. He lost his NMP nonconstituency seat in the parliament after a failed appeal of his bankruptcy in July 2001.

Kog Yue Choong

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JHARKHAND (2001 pop. 26.9 million). Jharkhand is a new Indian state formed in 2000 from the

southern half of the former state of Bihar. The name Jharkhand (or Jhaarkhand, Jhaakhand) has however existed since ancient times and has encompassed parts of West Bengal, Chhattisgarh, and Orissa, as well as Bihar. This area has also been called Khokhra, Nagdesh, Dasranya, and Ranchi, after the town of the same name, which is the capital of the new state. Jharkhand is administratively divided into eighteen districts. The state's area is 79,714 square kilometers. The region is mainly a hilly, forest-clad plateau lying between the basins of the Ganges, Sone, and Mahanadi Rivers. Much of the plateau is around 700 meters in elevation, though in the west it reaches 1,200 meters. The *sal* tree forests yield timber and medicinal plants, and the state is important for its coal and iron ore mines. Rice, maize, potato, pulse, and oil-seed are the main crops cultivated.

The British had little contact with this rather remote region at first, but with the decline of Maratha power early in the nineteenth century the East India Company acquired suzerainty, and in 1858 its authority was transferred to the Crown. During the British period Jharkhand was known as the Chota Nagpur (or Chutia Nagpur) division of the Bengal presidency.

This heavily forested area was populated primarily by warlike tribes who often fought against the British. The main tribal groups include Kol, Santal, Oraon, Munda, and Bhumij. Some tribes of the Jharkhand region first organized themselves collectively in 1915 for economic purposes, in a movement known since 1938 as Adivasi Mahasabha, under the leadership of Jaipal Singh. From 1947 to 2000 Jharkhand was part of the state of Bihar. The Adivasi Mahasabha, renamed the Jharkhand Party, won many seats in the Bihar Assembly in the first general election of 1952, but requests for the separation of Jharkhand from Bihar had been received as early as 1953. However, in the years that followed, the Jharkhand Party slowly lost its Assembly seats, eventually ceasing to exist as a distinct party.

Yet the quest for separate statehood was revived in 1973 with the formation of the Jhaarkhand Mukti Morcha Party (JMM), which by 1985 held thirteen seats in the Bihar Legislative Assembly. Since then JMM and other organizations have continued to gain popular support, culminating in the creation of the new state of Jharkhand in 2000.

Paul Hockings

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JHELUM RIVER The Jhelum (also Jhilmam or Bihat) River is the most westerly of the five rivers that traverse Punjab and flow into the Indus River in Pakistan. Ancient Greeks called the river Hydaspes. It arises in the Himalayas some 80 kilometers south of Srinagar, flows northwest through Srinagar and the Vale of Kashmir, and then west and south until it joins with the Chenab. The length is 725 kilometers. The river is famed for its nine old bridges. In Pakistani Punjab the Jhelum is the basis of an extensive irrigation and canal system. In 1901 the Jhelum canal colony was established, with the intention of irrigating 457,000 hectares, and it quickly brought prosperity to the settler-farmers.

Paul Hockings

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JIANG JIESHI. See **Chiang Kai-shek**.

JIANG ZEMIN (b. 1926), President of China. Born into an intellectual family in Yangzhou, Jiangsu Province, Jiang Zemin joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1946 and occupied various economics-related Communist government positions, going to Moscow for a year's study in 1955. He continued working during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). As a supporter of reform, however, he did even better after 1978, becoming mayor of Shanghai in 1985 and, in 1987, Shanghai's CCP first secretary. During the nationwide demonstrations of 1989, he was able to defuse those of Shanghai peacefully. He was chosen by Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) as CCP general secretary in June 1989 and became chairman of the Central Military Commission in November 1989. In March 1993 he became China's president, thus holding the three most senior positions in the Chinese party, military, and state.

After 1989, Jiang consolidated his power better than most observers anticipated he would. He followed reform policies, doing his best to strengthen the CCP's power and trying hard to stamp out widespread corruption within it. He played an active diplomatic role by traveling abroad many times and worked hard for China's accession to the World Trade Organization. He also aroused ire for such abuses as active suppression of the quasi-religious movement Falun Gong from mid-1999.

Colin Mackerras



Jiang Zemin arrives at Macau airport on 19 December 1999, the day Macau was transferred to Chinese rule after 400 years of Portuguese control. (AFP/CORBIS)

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JIANGSU (2000 est. pop. 74.4 million). Accounting for only 1.1 percent of China's territory, Jiangsu is the fifth most populous and the fifth most densely populated province, with a population of some 74.4 million in 2000. Located on the eastern seaboard of China, it is the most low-lying province in that nation. It borders Shandong in the north, Anhui in the west, Zhejiang in the south, and Shanghai in the southeast. Jiangsu straddles the lower course of the Changjiang (Yangzi River) and has relatively mild temperatures and abundant precipitation. Both in terms of regional cultures and environments, Jiangsu is often considered a transitional zone between north and south China. Nanjing is Jiangsu's capital and largest city.

Rapid economic growth and persistent uneven development distinguish Jiangsu from other provinces. Since the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), it has been one of the most prosperous provinces in China. Its early economic development was due in large part to an efficient water-transportation system consisting of numerous rivers and the Grand Canal as well as to sophisticated technologies in agriculture, industry, and trade. The post-Mao Zedong (1893–1976) economic reforms in China have further accelerated the growth of Jiangsu, whose gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an average rate of 15.1 percent from 1990 to 1999, compared with a national rate of 10.0 percent during the same period. In 1999 the GDP in Jiangsu was second only to Guangdong Province.

Jiangsu's recent economic growth is in no small part due to foreign investment and efforts in rural industrialization. "Open" cities and zones, such as Suzhou, Wuxi, and Kunshan, were designated to attract foreign investment. Equally important, rural industrial enterprises—often referred to as township-village enterprises (TVEs)—that benefited from the leadership or management by local government officials have fueled the economic growth of Jiangsu. The prominence of TVEs in Sunan (southern Jiangsu), which borders Shanghai and Zhejiang and is part of the agriculturally and industrially prosperous Changjiang (Yangzi River) Delta, has popularized a "Sunan model" of development emulated in other parts of China.

But perhaps the best-known story about Jiangsu is the persistent disparity between a prosperous and resource-rich Sunan and an impoverished Subei (northern Jiangsu). The gap between them is as large as that between the richest province and the poorest province in China and has widened further since the economic reforms. Though a transitional Suzhong (middle Jiangsu) seems to have emerged recently, Jiangsu remains a classic example of the simultaneous processes of economic growth and increasing spatial inequality during China's socialist transition.

C. Cindy Fan

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JIANGXI (2002 est. pop. 44.7 million). The southeastern China province of Jiangxi (Chiang-hsi,



LUSHAN—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Mount Lushan in Jiangxi was designated a World Heritage Site in 1996 for its splendid landscape and important monuments to the Buddhist, Confucian, and Taoist faiths.

Kiangsi) covers an area of 166,600 square kilometers and borders on Hunan in the west, Hubei and Anhui in the north, Zhejiang and Fujian in the east, and Guangdong in the south. Hilly and mountainous areas account for three-fourths of the area, which is traversed by rivers that flow into Lake Poyang, China's largest freshwater lake, situated in a 20,000-square-kilometer lowland area in the north of the province. While the mountains in the province rise from 1,000 to 2,000 meters, the low area in the north rarely exceeds 50 meters above sea level. The climate is subtropical, with plenty of rain, averaging 1,500 millimeters annually. This makes the province perfect for agriculture. A total of 99 percent of the population are Han Chinese. The capital, Nanchang (1.5 million, 1995), is situated in the northern lowlands.

Jiangxi remained sparsely populated until the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), when it was connected to the capital by the Grand Canal. During the Song dynasty (960–1279), Jiangxi became a center of political and cultural eminence and the resort of famous scholars, such as Zhu Xi (1130–1200). With the fall of the Song, the intellectual milieu declined, and in the following centuries the mountainous border regions became strongholds for antigovernment rebels. During the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), Jiangxi experienced peace and unprecedented wealth. This, however, was terminated with the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864). In the early 1930s, Jiangxi became the battleground between the Communists and Nationalists, and from 1938 to 1945 the province was occupied by Japan.

Since 1949 economic development has grown steadily. Rice is by far the most important crop; most areas have two crops a year and some have three. Other major agricultural products are rapeseed, peanuts, and cotton, and, with a tea planting history going back to the eighth century, Jiangxi is one of the most important tea producers in China. Jiangxi also has a large production of pork, and timber and bamboo are exported to the rest of China. Industry is concentrated in the larger cities, and products include diesel en-

gines, trucks, tractors, and aircraft. In the northeast the famous imperial kilns of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), which produce Jingdezhen porcelain, are still operating.

Bent Nielsen

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JIKEY *Jikey* is a form of Malaysian popular-music theater performed by Malay and Thai communities in the west coast border states of Kedah and Perlis. Its origins are unclear, but the genre may have developed from a form of Islamic chanting known as *dikir* or *zikir* and bears some resemblance to the Thai theatrical genre, *likay*. According to local folklore, *jikey* was introduced to the region by an Indian Muslim trader. This theory is supported by the presence of a turbaned Indian (Bengali) character, who appears at the beginning of each performance and dances, sings, and describes the plot to the audience.

Jikey is performed at night on a simple raised stage with minimal props and costume, by troupes ranging from twelve to sixteen performers, including musicians. The eclectic plots, which range from local legends and Thai folk tales to Middle Eastern tales derived from *bangsawan* theater, generally deal with the adventures of wandering royalty and frequently include ogres and clownish lower-class characters. Musical accompaniment is simple and might involve a small ensemble of *serunai* (double-reed oboe), a bossed gong, three *rebana* (frame drums), and a pair of *cerek* (wooden clappers). Other instruments may be used as available.

Like other theatrical genres of the region, *jikey* performances begin with consecration rituals (*buka panggung*), introductory musical numbers (*lagu-lagu permulaan*), and invocatory songs placating the local spirits (*bantu*). The main play introduced by the Ben-

gali character is always episodic. Each scene includes song, dance, and dialogue between the principal characters. The final scene, which begins with the performers lined up on stage to ask forgiveness of the audience for any infelicities in their performance, concludes with formal closing rituals (*tutup panggung*).

Margaret Sarkissian

See also: **Dikir Barat**

JILIN (1998 est. pop. 26 million). In many ways, Jilin Province represents a very good example of "new" China in transition. Jilin is located in northeast China and has a short border with Russia and a long border with North Korea. It is the central province of the old Manchuria, whence came the Manchu people who conquered the Chinese empire in the mid-seventeenth century and who nominally ruled China until 1911. The province's capital, Changchun (meaning eternal spring), was the capital of the Japanese puppet state of Manchuguo between 1933 and 1945.

There is something of a frontier atmosphere in this province of 187,000 square kilometers. Its population is 90 percent Han Chinese, even though before 1907 Han Chinese were not permitted to live in this outpost of empire. Thus, the vast majority of the current Chinese in Jilin are descended from settlers who moved there during the twentieth century. Much of the remaining population is Man (the original Manchurians). There is also a large Korean minority population. The people of Jilin lack the reserve of those in southern China. They are known for their openness, their hospitality, and their ability to drink copious amounts of *bai jiu* (white liquor), the spirit of choice in most of China. The climate is similar to that of the northern part of North America; that is, the winters are long and severe, with temperatures dipping to -25° and -30°C . Jilin has four quite distinct seasons.

Jilin is an agricultural province. It supplies one-sixth of China's grain needs. Corn and wheat are the mainstays, while the ever-present rice is also a staple. Jilin also has ample forest resources, and wood products are a significant export. The province is a major oil producer. Since the Japanese occupation, Jilin has always been a highly industrialized province, being a center of automobile and chemical production. And while there is still a very large state-owned sector, in recent years the provincial government has welcomed foreign private investment, specifically in the automobile industry.

Gerald Sperling

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JIN PING MEI *Jin ping mei* (Plum in a Golden Vase, The Golden Lotus) has been the most controversial Chinese novel ever since it was first published in the late Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Chronicling the rise and fall of a merchant, Ximen Qing, his wife, his five concubines, and assorted maids and prostitutes, the novel explores the corrosive effect of the "four vices" (drunkenness, lust, greed, and anger) on the social and moral fabric of society in vivid, intimate, and compelling detail. The intent and purpose of the novel's careful portrait of the pleasures, failings, and excesses of the denizens of a flourishing urban culture has elicited vastly different interpretations from changing generations of readers. The novel has been variously understood as a veiled attack on the abuses of historical elite and imperial figures, as a literary exposé of the corruption and decay of an entire age, as an exhortation toward the cultivation of Confucian sentiments such as filial piety, as a Buddhist-Taoist injunction toward renunciation of worldly desires, as a celebration of human instinct, as an alternately accurate or disparagingly misogynist representation of women, or as a literary masterpiece with few, if any, precedents in world literature.

Despite the sophistication of its narrative techniques and the punitive outcomes for excess, the novel's explicit representation of all manner of sexual practices elicited concern among paternalistic elite readers from its first appearance. At the end of the sixteenth century, a famous literary coterie, fearful that ordinary readers would be inclined to imitate rather than avoid the behavior represented in the novel, restricted circulation of the novel in manuscript form to their own circle. Upon subsequent publication under the pseudonym Lanling Xiaoxiao Sheng ("The Scoffing Gentleman of Lanling"), the novel was repeatedly proscribed in China and condemned as pornographic and, after being translated, in Europe as well. It nevertheless remained in print, albeit often in excised form.

In the wake of commercialization and the concomitant resurgence of interest in issues of gender and sexuality in the Chinese-speaking world in the 1980s, scholarly study of the novel intensified, as did interest among writers and filmmakers. Hong Kong filmmaker

Claire Law's *The Reincarnation of Golden Lotus* and Chinese dramatist Wei Minglun's *Pan Jinlian* reassessed the most reviled character of the novel, the murderously manipulative Pan Jinlian, in light of feminist sexual politics.

Patricia Sieber

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JINNAH, MOHAMMED ALI (1876–1948), Indian Muslim leader and Pakistan's first governor-general. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, a Muslim Indian politician, played the leading role in the formation of the nation of Pakistan. Born in Karachi, Jinnah initially pursued a business career in London but soon switched to studying law at Lincoln's Inn and eventually became a barrister in Mumbai (then Bombay). His



A huge portrait of Mohammad Ali Jinnah being hung for Pakistan Day on 23 March 1993. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

career in politics began when he helped Parsi Dadabhai Naoroji win a seat in the Indian legislature. He joined the Indian National Congress in 1906 and in 1913 became a member of the Muslim League, working to increase cooperation between Hindus and Muslims. Jinnah contributed significantly to drafting the Congress-League Lucknow Pact of 1916.

After World War I, the political climate in India changed when Mohandas K. Gandhi (1869–1948) joined the Congress. Jinnah viewed Gandhi's ideas about noncooperation with the British as dangerous, but, unable to prevent the Congress from heeding Gandhi's message, Jinnah left the Congress in 1919. Nevertheless, he continued his political involvement and was elected to the viceroy's legislative council in Calcutta and New Delhi as an independent Muslim member from Bombay. While in London attending the first Round Table Conference on Indian constitutional reforms, Jinnah, along with Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, attained separate provincial status for Sind, which became the only province of British India with a majority Muslim population in 1935.

Jinnah returned to India to become the permanent president of the Muslim League. Empowered by its victories, the Congress blocked League members from positions in provincial cabinets in 1937. The situation led Jinnah to garner the support of Indian Muslims to achieve the status of Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader). Three years later at the League's session in Lahore, Jinnah proposed a resolution creating a separate Muslim state, since he believed that Muslims could no longer achieve equality while remaining an ethnic minority.

From then on, Jinnah's efforts were focused on making the Lahore Resolution a reality. On 14 August 1947, Pakistan was founded following extensive and intensive negotiations with Britain, and Jinnah became its first governor-general. The next year, however, he succumbed to lung cancer and was unable to realize further his vision for Pakistan.

Houman A. Sadri

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JIT, KRISHEN (b. 1939). Malaysian theater director. The preeminent director in modern Malaysian

theater, Krishen Jit has made seminal contributions to both Malay and English-language theater in a career that spans more than three decades. Educated in the University of Malaya and a Fulbright scholar at the University of California, Berkeley, Jit began his theater career with the Malaysian Theatre Arts Group in the 1960s and was the first Malaysian actor to take a lead role in Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*, in what was then a British- and expatriate-dominated theater scene. Deeply affected by nationalist concerns following the country's 13 May 1969 race riots between Malays and ethnic Chinese, Jit broke with English-language theater. He directed exclusively for modern Malay theater until 1982. He cowrote an important nationalist manifesto for Malaysian theater for the National Cultural Congress in 1970, and was the leading theater critic until the mid-1990s.

In the 1970s, Jit eschewed naturalistic conventions and acting, and delved into experimental modes, physical theater, and contemporary reworkings of indigenous performance traditions. The performance of *Tok Perak*, a multimedia theater event, was a milestone in Malay theater in this period. Jit cofounded the Five Arts theater company, one of Malaysia's oldest professional theater and arts groups, and moved back into English-language theater. He has been involved with a more eclectic array of directorial styles within Kuala Lumpur's cosmopolitan and less nationalistic theater scene. His productions have been performed in theater festivals in Singapore, Tokyo, Cairo, and Berlin. He has also made pioneering contributions in theater education as the founding theater department chairman of the National Arts Academy as well as cofounder of the Flying Circus theater workshop in Singapore.

Mohan Ambikaibaker

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JIUZHAIYOU The mountains, rivers, and waterfalls of Jiuzhaigou, a scenic nature reserve, make it one of the most beautiful areas in the world and a major sightseeing attraction in southwestern China. It is located in the northern part of Sichuan Province, about 400 kilometers north of Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan Province.

The word "Jiuzhaigou" has an interesting meaning. In Chinese, "jiu," "zhai," and "gou" mean "nine,"

"tribe," and "gutter," respectively. Because nine Tibetan tribes live there, people began to call the area Jiuzhaigou. Because Jiuzhaigou is located in the Min Shan Mountains, it lies 2,000 meters above sea level. More than one hundred rivers, waterfalls, and lakes, covering 650 square kilometers, are found in Jiuzhaigou. About 42 percent of Jiuzhaigou is forest land. In addition, a number of endangered animals, including the panda, live in Jiuzhaigou.

Because of its natural beauty, Jiuzhaigou has been called "the fairy-tale world" of China and has often been a film location for Chinese media. About 60,000 hectares of Jiuzhaigou were designated as a natural protective area in 1978 and were registered as a UNESCO Natural World Heritage Site in 1992. Because the number of people visiting Jiuzhaigou from all over the world has increased, in July 2001 the Chinese government began limiting visitors to twelve thousand a day.

Unryu Suganuma

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JODHPUR (2001 est. pop. 846,400). Founded in 1459 by Rao Jodha, ruler of the Rathor clan of Rajputs, Jodhpur the city was the capital of the state of Marwar ("region of death") at the edge of the Thar Desert in northwestern India until 1949, when it became part of Rajasthan state. Jodhpur the state was founded about 1212; after 1561 it came under the Mughals, then the Marathas (a Hindu warrior caste) at the end of the eighteenth century, and in 1818 the British. Parts of the city are surrounded by an eighteenth-century wall. The massive hilltop fortress of Mehrangarh contains a palace and museum with a notable gem collection; it also offers a splendid view of Umaid Bhawan Palace, built of golden sandstone.

A road and rail junction, Jodhpur is an agricultural trade center and is famous for glass bangles, cutlery, dyed cloth, ivory goods, lacquers, leather goods, marble stonework, and carpet weaving. Called the blue city for the color wash of its old townhouses, it is the site of a university, the state high court, an air force college, and the University of Jodhpur medical college. Part of the 1994 film *Rudyard Kipling's Jungle Book* was shot here, and the riding britches called "jodhpurs" took their name from this city.

C. Roger Davis



The Umaid Bhawan Palace in Jodhpur. (BRIAN A. VIKANDER/CORBIS)

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JOGJAKARTA. See **Yogyakarta.**

JOHOR (2000 est. pop. of state 2.6 million; 2000 est. pop. of capital city 1 million). Johor (formerly known as Johore), a state in Malaysia, lies in the southern part of the Malay Peninsula, bordered by Indonesia on the southwest, Singapore on the south, and the Malaysian state of Melaka (formerly Malacca) on the west. Its coastline includes the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea, and the narrow Johore Strait separates it from Singapore. With a land area of 18,986 square kilometers, Johor is the fifth-largest state of the Federation of Malaysia. Johor's capital city, Johor Baharu, is located in the southeast of the state.

The sultanate of Johore was founded by the sultan Mahmud Shah (d. 1528), once the sultan of Malacca, and his son Ala'ud'din (d. c. 1564), after the Malaccan sultanate fell to the Portuguese in 1511. The area remained largely undeveloped until the nineteenth century, due to the jungle and swamp that isolated it from the rest of the Malay Peninsula. In 1819, the British leased the territory of present-day Singapore from the sultan of Johore and thereby recognized the sultanate's independence. A later sultan, Abu Bakar (1843?–1895), succeeded in keeping Johore free of British rule.

In the early twentieth century, Johore received an important boost when large rubber, coconut-palm (for producing copra), and oil-palm plantations were established and tin and bauxite were discovered in the state. In 1914, it became a British protectorate, and in 1948 it joined the Federation of Malaya. Since 1970, Johor has been one of the fastest-growing states in Malaysia; it relies on agriculture, manufacturing, tourism, and mining, and it benefits from its proximity to Singapore.

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JOMON PERIOD The Jomon is the period in Japanese prehistory between the Paleolithic and the Yayoi. Recent radiocarbon dates place the beginning of the Jomon period as early as 14,500 BCE; the period ends in the fourth century BCE except in Hokkaido, where the Epi-Jomon continued until the middle of the first millennium CE. "Jomon" in Japanese means "cord marked," and although not all Jomon pottery has this type of decoration, the beginning of the Jomon period is usually defined as coinciding with the appearance of ceramics in the islands of Japan. The economy of the Jomon period was primarily hunting, gathering, and fishing, and thus the presence of pottery but the absence of agriculture makes it difficult to fit the Jomon into the evolutionary schemes commonly used in Europe and North America. Similar foraging cultures with pottery are, however, known from mainland Northeast Asia, where they are sometimes termed Forest Neolithic.

Jomon Subphases and Variations

The Jomon is usually divided into six subphases termed Incipient, Initial, Early, Middle, Late, and Final (with a seventh, the Epi-Jomon, being found only in Hokkaido). Considering the very long duration of the Jomon period and the ecological diversity of the Japanese archipelago, it is not surprising that there is

**JAPAN—HISTORICAL PERIODS**

Jomon period (14,500–300 BCE)
 Yayoi culture (300 BCE–300 CE)
 Yamato State (300–552 CE)
 Kofun period (300–710 CE)
 Nara period (710–794 CE)
 Heian period (794–1185)
 Kamakura period (Kamakura Shogunate)
 (1185–1333)
 Muromachi period (1333–1573)
 Momoyama period (1573–1600)
 Tokugawa or Edo period (Tokugawa Shogunate)
 (1600/1603–1868)
 Meiji period (1868–1912)
 Taisho period (1912–1926)
 Showa period (1926–1989)
 Allied Occupation (1945–1952)
 Heisei period (1989–present)



An early Jomon period earthenware bowl. (SAKAMOTO PHOTO RESEARCH LABORATORY/CORBIS)

great cultural variation within the Jomon tradition. Rather than a single Jomon culture, it is more appropriate to speak of multiple Jomon cultures. These cultures were found as far north as Hokkaido but do not seem to have spread into Sakhalin until the Epi-Jomon phase. The Early Shellmound culture of the central Ryukyus probably originated in the Jomon tradition of Kyushu, but it is the most divergent of all Jomon cultures. The Sakishima islands of the southern Ryukyus were occupied by quite different cultures that appear to have their roots somewhere in Southeast Asia. The highest population densities in the Jomon period were found in central and eastern Honshu; western Japan was, in contrast, more sparsely populated. This difference is usually explained by the lower productivity of the broadleaf evergreen forests of western Japan.

Calibrated radiocarbon dates place the earliest pottery in Japan at about 14,500 BCE. Those dates make Jomon pottery the oldest in the world, but similar final Pleistocene dates have been reported from China and the Russian Far East, and it is not yet clear if Jomon ceramics developed in isolation or as part of a wider East Asian ceramic technology. Jomon pottery is not only very old but was produced in large quantities, especially in the latter half of the period. A deep cooking pot is the most common form; other vessels, such as shallow bowls and spouted "teapots," are much rarer.

Life in the Jomon Period

The diet of the Jomon peoples included a broad range of plant, animal, and marine foods. Remains of salmon bones from the Maeda Kochi site in Tokyo show that this fish was exploited from as early as the Incipient phase (14,500–8000 BCE). Shell middens are known from the Initial phase (8000–5000), and more than three thousand Jomon shell middens have been identified. These middens have produced a variety of shellfish as well as the remains of sea mammals and inshore and offshore fish. Deer and wild boar were the main terrestrial animal species exploited.

Hunting was conducted using bows and arrows as well as pit traps. The domesticated dog is present from the Initial phase and was probably also used in hunting. Nuts, roots, and berries are thought to have been the main plant foods exploited by the Jomon peoples. There is also increasing evidence that a number of plants were cultivated. These plants include hemp, *Perilla* (Japanese *shiso* and *egoma*), burdock, bottle gourd, barnyard millet (*Echinochloa utilis*), azuki and mung beans (*Vigna angularis* and *V. radiatus*), and the lacquer tree (*Rhus vernicifera*). Rice, barley, broom-corn, and foxtail millet also appear to have been cultivated by the end of the Jomon period.

The semisubterranean pit house seems to have been the basic dwelling of the Jomon period, but ethnographic parallels suggest these buildings would have only been used in the winter months. A raised-floor structure is also commonly found at Jomon sites; these are usually interpreted as storehouses. Most Jomon sites are small clusters of a few pit buildings but many very large sites are also known, especially from the Early and Middle phases. Sannai Maruyama in Aomori Prefecture, the largest Jomon site discovered so far, has produced over six hundred pit buildings, but it is not clear how many of these were occupied simultaneously.

A great variety of ritual artifacts are known from the Jomon period. These artifacts include clay figurines and masks, phallic stone rods, and highly ornate lacquer and ceramic vessels. Stone and wooden circles are also known. The two stone circles at Oyu in Akita Prefecture have diameters of 45 and 40 meters. Jomon burials are mostly simple inhumations with few grave goods. The skeletons excavated from these burials are of a so-called "Paleo-Mongoloid" type that was broadly distributed across East Asia. The strong resemblance between Jomon and Ainu skeletal morphology suggests that the latter are descended from an earlier Jomon population in northern Japan. In cultural terms, however, Ainu society as known ethnohistorically appears to have been very different from its Jomon predecessor.

The Jomon period saw long-distance exchange in obsidian, jade, amber, asphalt, pottery, and probably also in shellfish meat. Most of these exchange networks were within the Japanese archipelago, but Jomon Japan was by no means isolated from the Asian mainland. The Siberian blade-arrowhead culture reached Hokkaido in the early part of the Jomon. Other influences arrived from the Korean Peninsula and across the Japan Sea; there was probably small-scale but steady gene-flow from the continent through the Jomon period. The discovery of over a hundred dugout canoes from Jomon sites suggests that these vessels were the main method of water transportation. That the Jomon people were not confined to rivers and coasts, however, is shown by several finds, including Early Jomon remains from Hachijo Island, some 200 kilometers from Honshu.

The Jomon is perhaps the most materially affluent hunter-gatherer culture known through archaeology. It is presently unclear, however, whether that material affluence was matched by the type of complex social organization known ethnographically from the northwest coast of North America and elsewhere.

Mark Hudson

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JONES, WILLIAM (1746–1794), British orientalist. William Jones was born in London but later settled in Calcutta, India. The son of a prominent mathematician, he was educated at Harrow College and Oxford. As a young man he became highly fluent in French and Persian, and he translated a biography of the Persian emperor Nadir Shah into French. His grammar of Persian (1771) was long the standard work in the field. He is said to have known thirteen languages thoroughly and twenty-eight others fairly well.

Jones came to India as a barrister, becoming a judge in the Supreme Court of Bengal in 1783. In 1784, following similar developments in Europe, he founded the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, the oldest scholarly society on the subcontinent. He collected rare Oriental manuscripts and befriended Indian scholars. He was one of the first to demonstrate the genetic connection between Latin, Greek, and Sanskrit, a language of which he was a devoted student. He was also the first to show the origin of the Brahmi script in some early Semitic alphabets and developed the first scientific Roman orthography for Indian languages. Several of his volumes of Asiatic researches were translated into French and German. He also completed nine large volumes of a digest of Hindu and Islamic law before his early death in Calcutta. Jones was knighted for his services to scholarship and the judicature.

Paul Hockings

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JP. See **Adalet Partisi**.

JUCHE *Juche* (or *chuch'e*), the national Communist ideology of North Korea, is used to justify the personality cult of Kim Il Sung (1912–1994) and his son Kim Jong Il (b. 1942). It is the official state ideology of North Korea, as prescribed in the charter of the North Korean Workers' Party (NKWP). *Juche* (literally "subject") means thinking and acting to master the world. It is an anthropocentric ideology, based on the notion of the superiority of willpower and ideology over environmental conditions. While it is based on Marxism-Leninism, it is somewhat contradictory to Marxist analysis of the social conditioning of humankind. *Juche* and its twin notion of *chajusong* (self-determination) do not mean individualism, but a collective movement under the firm guidance of the NKWP and the leader (*suryong*).

History

Kim Il Sung first used the term *juche* in his speech "Eradicating Dogmatism and Formalism by Consolidating Juche," in December 1955. However, he later claimed to have originally developed *juche* in the 1930s, during his alleged struggle against the



A statue of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang, North Korea, in 1975. Showing loyalty to Kim was one of the elements of the collectivist *juche* ideology. (MIROSLAV ZAJIC/CORBIS)

Japanese occupation. As *juche* developed, it became an ideological and economic system underlying practically all of Kim Il Sung's and Kim Jong Il's thought. Much of this philosophy can be traced back to Stalinist and Maoist ideology, but during the ideological struggle between the Soviet Union and China in the 1960s *juche* became North Korea's "own style of socialism" (*urisik saboejuui*).

When Kim Il Sung and the NKWP took power in 1946, they introduced a system of Soviet-style Communism with the help of Russian advisers. This system included agrarian reform; nationalization of industry, banks, transportation, and communications; and modernization of North Korean society (for example, introduction of a law on equality of the sexes). After the Korean War (1950–1953), the collectivization of farming, commerce, and services completed the transition to a Soviet-style economy.

However, three problems led to the subsequent development of *juche* ideology. First, after the death of

Josef Stalin (1879–1953), the personality cult in Communist countries was increasingly criticized, and a new basis for government was needed. Second, Kim Il Sung wanted to purge various opposing factions in the NKWP. Third, the rising differences between China and the Soviet Union, the two main supporters of North Korea, had to be addressed. In this situation, Kim Il Sung proposed *juche* as an ideological system in 1955. In 1956, he extended *juche* to the economic sphere, where it meant the development of a self-reliant economy. In 1962, *juche* was interpreted as the guiding thought for military defense, and in 1966 as the principle of political independence.

These extensions reflect the policy of equidistance between the Soviet Union and China. In 1970, in the fifth NKWP meeting, *juche* was introduced as the party's guiding principle, together with Marxism-Leninism, and in 1972 it was described as the leading guideline in the new Communist constitution. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, *juche* experienced numerous variations; in the 1990s, it took the form of a careful ideological and economic opening process, in response to the economic problems experienced by North Korea in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Ideology

The ideology of *juche* is based on three axioms: economic autarky (self-sufficiency), military defense, and political independence. While reflecting the political position of North Korea between the Soviet Union and China, it also harkens back to nineteenth-century xenophobia and isolationism, the humiliation of Japanese occupation, and the threat posed by South Korea since the division. Contrary to an individualistic interpretation of the subject and the idea of self-reliance, *juche* stresses the monolithic development of the collective and the principle of the supreme leader (*suryongron*).

The ideas of suffering and revolutionary spirit that evolved from the guerrilla war against Japan in Manchuria in the 1930s are prevailing in *juche*. Often, military metaphors are used—for example, in the three forms of economic-plan fulfillment through "speedy attack," "shock attack," and "exterminatory attack."

Mass movements along the lines of Mao's Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution are important means of ideological mobilization. For Kim Jong Il, the movement of the three revolutions—the economic, technical, and cultural changes necessary for the development of North Korea—became crucial in the power transition after his father's death in 1994. Kim Jong Il also developed the Red Flag Doctrine,

based on a song allegedly sung by Kim Il Sung during the fight against the Japanese, to rally the masses to the defense of the supreme leader. After his death, Kim Il Sung was practically deified; the succession scheme is comparable to dynastic succession in pre-modern Korea.

Juche ideology is implanted in children from their early school days, but adults also have to participate in weekly sessions to learn *juche*. While *juche* is a national Communist ideology, from the beginning it was also promoted as the best Communist system the world over. Worldwide, *juche* is promoted by the Chotongpyung Liaison Committee, headquartered in Paris. Proselytizing among the Korean community in Japan is especially strong.

Economics

As an economic system, *juche* is closely related to Soviet-style central planning. Economic decisions are formulated by a State Planning Commission under the political leadership of the NKWP's Central Committee; the market role is extremely limited. Plans are formulated in a reiterative process between plants and cooperatives, local planning commissions, ministries, and the State Planning Commission, implemented by the dual administrative and party structure, and controlled by the North Korean Central Bank. Spending is highly centralized, with 85 percent of the budget on the central level and 15 percent on the local level. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, production focused on heavy industry and military and prestige goods (for example, the ubiquitous monuments for Kim Il Sung). Savings were raised mainly by socialist accumulation (forced domestic savings). Borrowing from Western countries and access to their technology in the early 1970s came to an abrupt halt with North Korea's default on its foreign debt in 1975.

Similar to Mao's strategy in China, mass movements should lead to leaps in economic development. In 1958, Kim Il Sung propagated the Flying Horse Movement (*chollima wundong*), for the systematic mobilization of labor for the development of heavy industry. In 1960, he announced the *ch'ongsan-ri* method for ideologically motivated increases in productivity, named after "on-the-spot" guidance in a collective farm in South P'yongan province. In 1961, the *taean* work system, a form of economic management by the masses under the collective guidance of the party committee, was introduced.

Results and Recent Developments

As an economic system, *juche* was disastrous. Forced industrialization, maintainable only through massive

Soviet and Chinese aid, had by the late 1960s already resulted in declining growth rates. (Reliable statistical data have not been available since 1965.) After the collapse of the Soviet Union, famine and malnourishment became chronic despite international aid. Central planning declined due to the absence of resources, and illegal private markets flourished. After 1991, North Korea began a slow ideological change. While *juche* is still proclaimed as a superior ideology, an opening process for international and South Korean capital began. China's method of introducing economic reforms without relinquishing political power is being carefully studied. Today, North Korea resembles more and more a military dictatorship, and the role of *juche* as an effective ideological tool to mobilize the masses has practically disappeared.

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JUDAISM—CHINA Chinese of the Jewish faith existed in China from the period of the first millennium. Jews of Kaifeng and Jewish sojourners in Shanghai and Harbin were practically invisible to the people of China. The former assimilated themselves into the Han population; the sojourners were isolated from most Chinese and departed after World War II. The memories of these communities are sharp among their descendants and among many scholars, however.

These scholars tend to agree that cloth traders and dyers using the Judeo-Persian written language migrated to Kaifeng at the end of the tenth century. They had arrived earlier in China overland along the Silk Road from Central and South Asia and by sea, possibly with Muslim traders. They converged on Kaifeng, the capital of the Song dynasty (960–1279), because it

was the most important commercial and intellectual center in the country.

Although they built their first synagogue in 1163 and possessed sacred texts, including several Torah scrolls, their isolation from world Jewry, their efforts to conform to Chinese culture and religious practice, and the openness of the Chinese educational and bureaucratic systems to persons of talent led to their absorption. Information about their lives and practices comes from their descendants, but mainly from the writings of seventeenth-century Christian missionaries and Arab, Chinese, and Jewish travelers and inscriptions on stone steles. The Kaifeng Jews probably never accounted for more than two thousand people at any one time.

Beginning in the 1840s, an even smaller community of Arabic-speaking Baghdad Jews arrived in Shanghai and Hong Kong from India in the wake of the British control of Hong Kong and the grant of extraterritorial rights in the five major cities, including Shanghai. Never more than about 700 in number, these Jews enjoyed great influence through trade and real estate holdings. The Sassoon and Kadoorie families and their employees led the Jewish community by offering jobs to coreligionists and supporting the synagogue and educational institutions. With the exception of Silas Aaron Hardoon, an active participant in Chinese culture and politics, the Baghdadis considered themselves temporary visitors, and they departed after World War II.

The last and largest group of Jews, twenty thousand refugees, arrived in Shanghai, where no visas were required, between 1938 and 1942; they included Russians escaping from Japanese-occupied Harbin and Germans, Austrians, and others escaping Nazi terror. After World War II, most of these sojourners departed for Israel and the United States. Today, Jews still live in Hong Kong, and because of trade and diplomatic missions enough Jews reside in Shanghai, Beijing, and Hong Kong for the observance of major Jewish holidays.

Brian Weinstein

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JUDAISM—SOUTH ASIA Judaism, a monotheistic religion with a belief in a transcendent creator of the world, is essentially different from the predominantly polytheistic, iconocentric religions of South Asia. Nevertheless, Judaism and Hinduism share points of similarity. Both possess an orthodox system of codification, embodied in the rabbinical traditions of Judaism and in the Brahmanical traditions of Hinduism. Judaism is also rooted in nonorthodox traditions, as exemplified by Hasidic and cabalistic practices, while Buddhism and Hinduism have developed tantric and devotional traditions.

Judaism was never a significant religious force in South Asia, although throughout the centuries Jews had limited contact with members of local religions. Ancient South Asian Jewish communities have been found only in India, although it is possible that Jews lived in Sri Lanka at some stage. From the nineteenth century on Jewish communities have functioned in Burma (now Myanmar), Singapore, Malaya, Hong Kong and other parts of China, Thailand, and elsewhere. Established by Jews of Iraqi origin, these communities were frequented in the second half of the twentieth century by Jews who found a temporary haven there after the Holocaust as well as by occasional Jewish and Israeli businesspeople, some of whom were transient and some of whom eventually stayed.

Historical Ties between Israel and South Asia

Linguistic evidence confirms the possibility of early commercial connections between Israel and South Asia in that the ships of King Solomon (c. tenth century BCE) transported cargo such as *kofim* (apes), *tukim* (peacocks), and *almag* (sandalwood or *valgum*), of Indian origin. Travelers' tales in the Talmud mention trade with India (*Hoddu*) and include specific Indian commodities, such as Indian ginger and iron, but they make no reference to Indian Jews. In the Book of Esther, the kingdom of King Ahasuerus (c. mid-fourth century BCE) stretched from *Hoddu*, generally accepted to be India, to *Kush*, generally accepted to be Nubia or Ethiopia.

From the ninth century CE Jewish merchants known as Radanites traded from the Middle East to South Asia and back. Documents discovered in the Cairo Genizah describe the trade in spices, pharmaceuticals, textiles, metals, gold, silver, and silks from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries between

Arabic-speaking Jews and Hindu partners. However, the evidence does not indicate that Judaism was disseminated.

In the seventeenth century Jewish merchant centers were established in Madras, Calcutta, and other places. In addition an independent Jewish traveler, Hazrat Saeed Sarmad (d. 1659), carried on trade between Armenia, Persia, and India and practiced Judaism until he renounced a materialistic life to become an Indian saint. Sarmad was executed as a heretic by the Mughal emperor of India, Aurangzeb (1762–1839).

During the nineteenth century Jewish emissaries traveled to Asia from Palestine and other Jewish centers to make contact with the Jews in far-flung places, often in the belief that the scattered Jews were members of the legendary ten lost tribes. Several emissaries stayed in India for extensive periods and were influential in bringing the practices of Asian Jewish communities in line with those of other Jews. In the twentieth century some of the visitors to Asia were Zionist emissaries, who wanted to encourage Jews all over the world to emigrate to Israel.

Jewish Communities in India

Three Indian Jewish groups, the Cochin Jews, the Bene Israel, and the Baghdadis, practice Judaism as a religion. All three groups adhere to the monotheistic nature of Judaism and observe the major festivals and commandments. The Judaism practiced in India developed several special Indian traits, however, such as eating Indian delicacies on particular festivals or the observance of specific wedding or burial customs, which reflect the influence of local customs. At times religious practices and beliefs were influenced by local Hindu, Muslim, or Christian behaviors.

The Bene Israel According to the Bene Israel tradition, the ancestors of their community were members of the lost tribes of Israel who set sail from the Kingdom of Israel to escape persecution by enemy conquerors, possibly in the year 175 BCE. Their ship capsized off the coast of Konkan near Goa in India. The survivors lost all their possessions, including their holy books. Welcomed by the local Hindus, the Jews took up the occupation of pressing vegetable oil. They were called *Shanwar telis* ("Saturday oil people") because they refrained from work on Saturday in accordance with the dictates of the Jewish religion. They remembered the Jewish prayer "Hear! O Israel" declaring monotheism; they observed some of the Jewish holidays and fasts though not all; and they

circumcised their sons as commanded by the Jewish religion. Unique customs adapted from South Asian practices characterized their Judaism, including the prewedding *mehendi* (henna body-painting) ceremony, the rites of the prophet Elijah (c. ninth century BCE), and the festival of Shila San (Festival of Stale Things) on the day after Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement), when the souls of the ancestors departed and alms were given to the poor.

From the eighteenth century on, the Bene Israel began a lengthy process of bringing their practices in line with other Jewish communities in the world. This process was aided by their contact with the British in India, a few of whom were Jewish, the resulting move to Mumbai and other cities, and access to the English language and higher education. The ultimate outcome of their identification with world Jewry was the gradual emigration of most members of the Bene Israel community to Israel during the last half of the twentieth century. During the 1960s their Judaism was questioned on halakic (Jewish legal) grounds, but the Bene Israel subsequently have been accepted as full Jews in every respect by the Israeli rabbinate. Some five thousand Bene Israel observe the Jewish religion in India, largely in the Maharashtra region, and nearly fifty thousand more live in Israel.

The Cochin Jews The Jewish settlement on the Malabar Coast is ancient. One theory holds that they arrived with King Solomon's merchants; another account, repeated in South Indian legends, claims they arrived in the first century CE, when Saint Thomas (d. 53 CE) supposedly brought Christianity to India. Records noting that the ruler Bhaskara Ravi Varman (962–1020 CE) granted seventy-two privileges to the leader of the Jews, Joseph Rabban (c. late ninth century CE), document the Jewish settlement in Kerala. In 1344 the Jews moved from Cranganore to Cochin. After Vasco da Gama (c. 1460–1524) led an expedition to India in 1497–1498, some European and other Jews settled in Cochin to become part of the Paradesi ("foreigner" in Malayalam) Jewish community. The Paradesi synagogue was established in 1568. The subgroups of Jews in Cochin did not pray in each other's synagogues, and they did not intermarry. In 1954, the Cochin Jews emigrated as a community to the new state of Israel.

The Baghdadi Jews From the eighteenth century on Jews from Baghdad and other cities in Iraq shifted their enterprises to India and other South Asian centers. Shalom Cohen (1762–1834), one of the first Jewish merchants to escape the deteriorating conditions in Iraq, settled in Calcutta in 1798. Other Iraqi Jews

followed and established thriving businesses and magnificent Jewish community structures in the East. Among them was David Sassoon (1792–1864), who arrived in Mumbai in 1832. There he established two synagogues, Knesset Eliahu and Magen David. In Calcutta several Baghdadi synagogues operated with regular schedules. The Baghdadis kept up family and trade ties with other members of their community throughout South Asia. They identified with their British rulers, so when the British raj disintegrated in Asia, most Baghdadis emigrated to England, Australia, North America, or Israel. Fewer than three hundred Jews of Iraqi descent remain in South Asia.

Jewish Manifestations

The Shinlung is the most prominent group of South Asians who, claiming descent from the lost tribes of Israel, have adopted forms of Judaism since the 1960s. Composed of Kuki and other tribes, the Shinlung group is found primarily in Mizoram and Manipur States in northeastern India, with an offshoot in Tiddim in Burma. This group, which calls itself "the Children of Menasseh," has established prayer halls and observes many Jewish practices. Over five hundred of its members have emigrated to Israel and converted to Judaism there. Groups claiming to descend from the ten lost tribes also have emerged in Andhra Pradesh and other regions of India.

Despite the relatively large numbers of Israeli and Jewish travelers visiting different locations in South Asia, no new Jewish communities have been established in South Asia. However, the Lubavitcher Hasidic movement holds an annual communal seder for Israeli and Jewish backpackers in Kathmandu, Nepal.

Shalva Weil

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JUDAISM—WEST ASIA Until the mid-twentieth century, there were Jewish communities in all the countries of the Muslim Middle East. Jews belonged to all social classes, from very poor (the vast majority) to very rich, from sophisticated professionals to illiterates and beggars, and, along another spectrum, from deeply pious and learned to secular agnostic and leftist. Although Islam encouraged converts, it did not require, let alone force, conversion. Those who wished to retain their own religion could do so, as long as they paid the *jizya*, a capitation fee for non-Muslims, which was levied on various Christian and Jewish communities.

Jews in West Asia before the Nineteenth Century

The situation of the Jews under medieval Islam compared favorably to that of the Jews in medieval Europe. Jews in the Islamic world were not outsiders; they had lived in the area long before the Muslim conquests and for the most part spoke the languages of those around them, initially Greek or Aramaic, and later Arabic, Persian, or (though to a lesser extent) Ottoman Turkish, both among themselves and with their non-Jewish neighbors. Hebrew was used only in the liturgy, and spoken or modern Hebrew is of recent origin, created by Zionist immigrants to Palestine at the end of the nineteenth century.

Although the picture has sometimes been painted in overly rosy terms, the Jews of the Middle East were rarely—certainly not until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—subject to the persecutions and expulsions experienced by their contemporaries living in various countries of Europe. In no sense did Middle Eastern Jews live in constant fear of irrational or vicious sectarian rage. Thus when the Jews and the Muslims were expelled from Spain in 1492, both communities sought refuge and found new homes in Morocco and the Ottoman empire, adding to the Jewish population of the cities of North Africa, Egypt, and further east. It is also the case that the Jewish (and Christian) populations of the Middle East, although forming distinctive communities of their own, generally shared the norms of the majority Muslim population in such spheres as moral values, notions of right conduct, food, and domestic arrangements, including the seclusion of women, at least until the 1870s.

The communities also regularly interacted with one another. In Aleppo around 1900, for example, some 7

percent of the population of the old city was Jewish. Jews formed a majority in four of the city's traditional gated city quarters (the ones closest to the synagogue), but other Jews lived next door to Christians and Muslims in a further five city quarters. Jews sued Muslims for debt in the Islamic courts and won their cases if they could prove them; as further illustration of their faith in the Islamic legal system, they regularly brought cases against each other in the same courts. In Bab Tuma, a largely Christian suburb of Damascus, Christian, Jewish, and Muslim butchers' shops still stand next to one another; because the dietary laws are more or less identical and most Middle Eastern Christians do not eat pork, members of the various religions buy meat indiscriminately from one another's shops.

Jews in West Asia from the Nineteenth Century Onward

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the situation of the minority communities underwent some significant changes, partly because one result of the Ottoman reforms (called the *Tanzimat*) was an emphasis on the equality of all Ottoman subjects, and partly because of the greater intensity of European economic penetration throughout the region. A number of prominent Baghdad Jewish families, for example, became part of a great trading diaspora stretching from Manchester and London through Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, to India, Hong Kong, and Shanghai. The major trading families included the Sassoons, Kadouries, and Gabbays, who originated in Baghdad. When their business links with India, Hong Kong, Shanghai, London, and Manchester originated, in the late nineteenth century, the family members held British passports, deriving from their residence in England, India, Hong Kong, and other British countries. Wealthier Middle Eastern Christians also sent family members abroad, both for education and as representatives of their trading houses, with the result that when it came to appointing representatives for European firms or finding individuals to assist the European consulates in their relations with the local authorities and to act as vice-consuls and honorary consuls in the Middle East, the European powers often chose local Christians or Jews. France and Britain had *consuls de carrière* (full-time members of a country's foreign service) in Aleppo, but Austria-Hungary, for instance, was represented by several generations of the Picciotto family, Jews originally from Livorno who had settled in Aleppo in the late eighteenth century. Ironically, a leading businessman, Leopold Manasci, was appointed honorary consul of Germany in Aleppo in the mid-1930s, until an inquiry into his antecedents



Family members of one of the thirteen Jews on trial for spying for Israel before the revolutionary court in Shiraz, Iran, wait outside the court. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

revealed that he was not suitable to serve as the Reich's representative in northern Syria.

In addition to this ready employment of members of the local minority communities (who were often also multilingual), a number of local Christians and Jews (although rather fewer than is often alleged) were either under the formal protection of a particular power or themselves possessed one or more European nationalities. Benefiting from a series of regulations on extraterritoriality known as the *Capitulations* (dating from the sixteenth century, originally guaranteeing non-Ottoman traders exemption from some local taxes, especially the *jizya*, and the right to be judged by their own consuls), such individuals had an edge over other local traders and businessmen, since they were not subject to the same tax regime. In the course of the nineteenth century, these arrangements occasionally aroused jealousies on the part of those who were not so well placed, and there were violent outbursts against the minority communities in Aleppo in 1850 and Damascus in 1860, often specifically targeting richer Christians and Jews.

Naturally the Jewish communities in the towns of the Middle East did not live in a vacuum. They were affected both by the various intellectual and philosophical debates among world Jewry in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and by other political trends and tendencies that had more to do with their status as citizens of a particular nation than with their religious affiliation. Jews were pioneers in modern Arabic journalism, as writers of fiction (especially in Iraq and Egypt) and also as artists, musicians, and singers throughout the Arab world until the middle of the twentieth century. Many were also highly visible in the nationalist and independence movements and were prominent in the Communist movement in various Arab countries.

A vital catalyst in the provision of modern secular education (at little or no cost) was the Alliance Israélite Universelle, founded by French Jews in Paris in 1860, which by 1900 came to control a network of about one hundred schools from Morocco to Iran, with some 26,000 pupils and a teachers' training college in Paris. French was the principal language of instruction in the Alliance schools in French North Africa, Italian in Libya, and Arabic in Iraq and Syria. In addition, Hebrew newspapers of the *Haskala*, the Jewish enlightenment (a movement that began in the mid-nineteenth century and produced Reform Judaism), were becoming available in the Arab world and in Iran. Naturally, all this had a certain secularizing effect on the Middle Eastern communities. The *responsa* (traditional question-and-answer religious writings) literature of the early twentieth century reflects some of these concerns, although Oriental rabbis rarely took up the rejectionist positions, which did not admit the validity of reformed or "uncanonical" Jewish practices (in matters like conversion and services in vernacular languages) of many of their Orthodox European contemporaries.

Of all the currents competing for the attention of world Jewry in the first half of the twentieth century, Zionism seems to have held relatively little appeal for the Jews of the eastern Arab world, Iran, and Turkey, except for a rather large exodus of Yemenis to Palestine between 1881 and 1914. Along with their Christian contemporaries, Middle Eastern Jews migrated to Alexandria, Beirut, and Cairo and to Europe, the United States, and South America. By 1914, however, there were probably only ten to twenty thousand Jews of Middle Eastern origin in the area that became Palestine; Zionism, by and large, attracted the Jews of Central and Eastern Europe. Zionist associations in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria drew only small numbers. During the Palestine General Strike in 1936, the Iraqi broadsheet *Habazbuz* produced a cartoon showing the rabbi, the priest, and the mullah shaking hands and saying, "We are all Iraqis. Let us work hard together for the good of the country." In addition, the Alliance, still a major influence in the 1920s and 1930s, was suspicious of Zionism, since the Alliance's goals were to produce well-educated Jewish citizens imbued with French culture, rather than activists for the Zionist cause.

Migrations to Israel

By the late 1960s the creation of Israel in 1948 and the Israeli wars of 1956 and 1967 had led to the departure of almost all the million or so Jews who had lived in the Arab world, Iran, and Turkey at mid-century. Most were obliged to go to Israel, but some,

especially those from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, went to France. Few of those who went to Israel would have done so of their own accord, and anecdotal and other evidence suggests that many were disappointed at the conditions they found there, particularly the disdain they endured at the hands of the European Jewish community. They generally had little choice, since they were stripped of their original nationality and their property in ways that, particularly in the cases of Iraq and Yemen, suggested an unusual degree of connivance between the Zionist authorities and the former host countries.

In the late 1940s there were about 1.1 million Jews in the Arab world, Iran, and Turkey. There are now about forty thousand: about six thousand in Morocco, twelve thousand in Iran, and nineteen thousand in Turkey, with a few hundred elderly people in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. To an important extent, the communities have reconstituted themselves and continued their traditions in Israel, but, if only in terms of cultural diversity, pluralism, and tolerance, the loss to the regions where they lived for many thousands of years is irreparable.

Peter Sluglett

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JUDO Judo is a nonaggressive Japanese martial art that developed in the late nineteenth century, split into rival approaches in the last half of the twentieth century and eventually became a global competitive sport. Judo was developed by Kano Jigoro (1860–1938) while a student at Tokyo University. He began to combine techniques from jujutsu with Western science and Asian philosophy. His goal was to produce a martial

art that would serve as a vehicle for personal growth and the advancement of Japanese society. Judo uses techniques that turn an opponent's force against him and involve throwing, groundwork, and striking techniques.

Known as the "Father of Japanese Sports," Kano was an effective promoter of judo and sports in general. Before his death, he had set the stage for the emergence of judo as an international sport and as an Olympic event, with judo first appearing on the Olympic program in 1964. However, the popularity of judo as a sport also led many practitioners to abandon Kano's original vision and transform judo into a modern sport where the focus is on competition, scoring, and standardized methods and rules. The result has been a deep division among judo practitioners between the traditionalists who favor Kano's approach and methods and the modernists who favor training geared to competition rather than personal growth.

Kevin Gray Carr

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JUJUTSU Jujutsu is a generic label for lightly armed and unarmed martial arts that emerged in Japan during the Edo period (1600/1603–1868). It is estimated that some seven hundred schools of jujutsu developed, with many based on earlier Japanese and samurai fighting techniques. Perhaps the greatest similarity shared by the schools was nevertheless a departure from the fighting techniques of the samurai—the emphasis placed on the use of motion and minimal force. Also important was the incorporation of ancient Japanese and Buddhist philosophy and the goals of mental and spiritual growth into the training and techniques of the different schools. To a significant extent, the emergence of jujutsu represented a decline and redefinition of the role of the samurai in Japanese society, with the government now controlling warfare and the merchant class increasing its influence.

In the twentieth century, the jujutsu schools declined in number and influence as the practice was suppressed by the Meiji government (1868–1912) and then resurrected as a source of nationalistic pride during World War II, which cost it favor after the war.

Today, jujutsu remains a minor martial art, with many different schools. A basic conflict between schools that favor competition and those that favor personal growth remains, with no central organization to unify the art or promote it outside Japan.

Kevin Gray Carr

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JUMNA RIVER The Jumna (or Yamuna) River rises in the Indian Himalayas in the north of Uttar Pradesh state, at the southwestern base of the Jamnotri Peaks, near the Jamnotri hot springs, at an elevation of 3,307 meters. It flows south to break through the Siwalik Hills by a gorge and out onto the Gangetic Plain at Faizabad, continuing on past Delhi, and then in a southeasterly direction past Agra to join with the Ganges River at the fort and city of Allahabad. This latter is a most sacred confluence, called *prayag*, or place of pilgrimage. Countless thousands come here to bathe and become sanctified each year.

The river's length is 1,384 kilometers, and it is the most important feeder of the Ganges. Its catchment area is estimated at 305,600 square kilometers. In its upper reaches, timber is floated down the stream, and in the lower reaches grain, cotton, and building materials are transported by barge. Near Faizabad it gives off the Eastern (constructed between 1823 and 1830) and the Western (constructed in 1350 and 1628) Jumna Canals. As a result of this loss of water, during the hot season the river itself is reduced to a mere stream above Agra. Here and elsewhere several railway bridges cross the Jumna.

Paul Hockings

JUNK The basic traditional Chinese ship style is the junk, a flexible design used in river and oceangoing vessels of various sizes. The design's predecessor seems to have been bamboo rafts, with flat ends and many internal compartments separated by bulkheads, a design that was easily adapted into a variety of easily maneuvered vessels; by the ninth century the junk was plying international waters in South and Southeast Asia. The use of multiple internal bulkheads created a series of watertight compartments that gave the junk further stability and seaworthiness. Older junks had no keels, relying on thick wales (planks) that ran



A river junk on the Chang (Yangtze) River in the Three Gorges area. (WOLFGANG KAEHLER/CORBIS)

along the sides of the vessel to provide rigidity. River junks usually had only one mast, though space was provided for oars in the forward section, with cabins and other types of superstructures always placed aft of the mast. These vessels could reach up to forty-six meters in length, though most were between eleven and thirty meters long, and were used for all kinds of transportation. In certain areas where rapids or narrow channels caused difficulties in navigation, articulated or twisted ships were built, though the basic junk design was retained.

Articulated ships could also be adapted for military use; incendiary devices placed in the forward portions of the vessel, which was brought up to an enemy position, were uncoupled and left to explode. Oceangoing junks had a design very similar to that of river junks but could reach fifty-two meters or more in length. The design of both types of junk provides for the greatest width of the ship to be at the rear, in a conscious imitation of aquatic birds. Many ships were built without the use of metal, the artisans preferring to use wooden pins. The flat-bottomed design also allowed comparatively large ships to dock in shallow waters or navigate up relatively small rivers or canals. Propulsion for Chinese vessels could be by sails or oars, or a combination of both. Evidence of the first true rudder, connected to the ship by a post and balanced on an axis, can be found on tomb models of Chinese ships from the first century CE. Junks are still commonly used today.

Paul Forage

JURCHEN JIN DYNASTY The Jurchen were a sedentary, Tungus-speaking people living in Manchuria and southeastern Siberia. In the eleventh

century there were two groups of Jurchen. One was a little-assimilated group of "raw" tribesmen living more or less the traditional life. The other was the "cooked" Jurchen, who had interacted closely with the Kitan, the dominant political group at that time in north China and rulers of the Liao dynasty (906–1125), and with the many Chinese ruled by the Kitan.

The founder of the Jurchen state, the chieftain Aguda (1068–1123) of the Wanyan clan, was primarily a ruler of the "raw" Jurchen, but he had learned how to use cavalry effectively in warfare from the Kitan. (Horsemanship and war on horseback were then not part of Jurchen native tradition but soon became an important part of Jurchen culture and the real basis of their military power.) Aguda had also learned how to form a state in the Central Asian manner, by grafting heterogeneous elements, including Kitan tribesmen dissatisfied with their own government, around a Jurchen core.

After a series of raids conducted all along Liao's western frontiers, Aguda went over to a general attack and began taking the Liao subordinate capitals one by one, sometimes with the help of the native Chinese dynasty occupying the rest of China, the Northern Song (960–1126). Aguda died before completing his conquest of Liao, but his successor Wuqimai, or Taizong (1075–1135), not only completed his task, but even began a massive invasion of Song, his former ally. It had attempted to make gains in the north as Liao had collapsed at the expense of Jin.

The decades of war that followed nearly destroyed the Song, which had to be reorganized as a new dynasty, the Southern Song (1127–1279) under a collateral branch of the old imperial line, based in the city of Hangzhou in central China. Not just the old Liao domains, which had been confined to the northeast, but the entire north came under Jin control. China was divided between two equally powerful regimes, with a third regime, that of the Xi Xia state, occupying the northwest.

Even as the wars with Song continued, internecine struggle divided the Jin elite. In order to organize its new conquests, the Jin courts of Wuqimai and his successors had adopted Chinese forms of government. Many traditional elements of Jin society failed to understand why this was necessary; they felt that their vested interests were in danger and that they faced absorption by Chinese culture. This conflict was still unresolved at the time of the Mongol invasions, which was one of the reasons why the Mongols were able to conquer Jin with relative ease, in part with some of



CHINA—HISTORICAL PERIODS

Xia dynasty (2100–1766 BCE)
 Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE)
 Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE)
 Western Zhou (1045–771 BCE)
 Eastern Zhou (771–256 BCE)
 Spring and Autumn period (221–476 BCE)
 Warring States period (476–221 BCE)
 Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE)
 Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE)
 Three Kingdoms period (220–265 CE)
 North and South Dynasties (265–589)
 Sui dynasty (589–618)
 Tang dynasty (618–907)
 Five Dynasties period (907–960)
 Song dynasty (960–1279)
 Northern Song (960–1126)
 Southern Song (1127–1279)
 Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234)
 Yuan dynasty (1234–1368)
 Ming dynasty (1368–1644)
 Qing dynasty (1644–1912)
 Republic of China (1912–1927)
 People's Republic of China (1949–present)
 Republic of China (1949–present)
 Cultural Revolution (1966–1976)

the very same tribal allies that the Jurchen had used in their own rise.

The Jurchen emperor at the time of the dynasty's first Mongol crisis was Zhangzong (1168–1208), a Sinicizer. He had begun a new war with the Southern Song in 1207 in which Jurchen cavalry had proven far less effective than in the past, indicating a weakening of a native Jurchen tribal base that was having more and more difficulty maintaining its traditional life and the cavalry forces sanctioned by Aguda as part of this traditional life. The reign of Zhangzong also witnessed growing Jin problems with its other tribal groups, principally with the Kitan of the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone. In 1207, most of the peoples involved revolted, handing what is now Inner Mongolia over to the Mongols, who used it as a base for raiding and expansion.

The response of the Jin, who had once actively intervened in the steppe and had manipulated events there in its own interests, was to build fortifications. These proved no barrier whatever to the Mongols, who began a general assault on the Jin in 1211. During the next 23 years they conquered Jin territory

piecemeal. They took the principal Jin capital of Zhongdu in 1215 and consolidated their rule in much of the north with a great deal of local help, including from Chinese warlords, the Kitan, and even Jurchen allies. The Jurchen court could only retreat to its domains along the Yellow (Huang) River, where it was able to hold out for another nineteen years thanks to Mongol preoccupation elsewhere, principally with a campaign in the west (1218–1223) and with the conquest of Xi Xia, and then an interregnum.

The end came when the Mongol khan Ogodei (1185–1241) gathered his resources and refocused Mongol attention on China. The Jin capital was then at Kaifeng. The Mongols assaulted it from several directions. The capital, swollen by refugees, was forced to extremities, and the Jin court fled south to Caizhou, where it attempted to organize further resistance. Kaifeng fell in 1233 and Caizhou in February 1234. The last Jin emperor killed himself.

Although their dynasty was at an end, the Jurchen, unlike the Tanguts of Xi Xia, who were virtually exterminated resisting the Mongols, survived and prospered. The Jurchen had their own native scripts, based loosely on Chinese, and these survived into the sixteenth century. Later the same cultural groups that had given rise to the Jurchen produced the Manchu, who had their own "raw" and "cooked" components and who also tried to combine tribal vigor with a Chinese style of government. They had even less success than the Jurchen in maintaining their ethnic identity during their reign of China, and the once large Tungus population of Manchuria is all but extinct today.

Paul D. Buell

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JUSTICE PARTY. See **Adalet Partisi.**

JUTE Jute is a fiber that is extracted from the stems of plants in the genus *Corchorus* of the *Tiliaceae* order, which includes two jute species, white jute (*C. capsularis*) and upland jute (*C. olitorus*). Jute has been cultivated in India and Bangladesh since 800 BCE, but it



A boat piled high with jute on the Hooghly River in Calcutta, India, in 1979. (SHELDAN COLLINS/CORBIS)

was not grown as a major cash crop until 1838, when Dundee, Scotland, mills developed a jute-spinning machine. Jute plants are slender-stemmed annuals that are approximately 2.5 to 3.5 meters tall. The fiber is used to manufacture cordage and coarse fabrics that are used to make heavy-duty bags and carpet backing. Jute grows in alluvial soils and can survive in heavy flooding. It will only grow in areas with high temperatures, sand or loam soils, and annual rainfall over 1,000 millimeters. Large-scale jute cultivation is virtually confined to northern and eastern Bengal, mostly in the floodplains of the Ganges and Brahmaputra Rivers. More than 97 percent of the world's jute is produced in Asia, including 65 percent in India and 28 percent in Bangladesh. The world's largest jute mill is in Bangladesh. The jute industry has been threatened for more than four decades because synthetic fibers are cheaper to produce than jute.

Michael Emch, Aliya Nabeed, and Mobammad Ali

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K2, MOUNT Mount K2 was so named in 1856 by its surveyor T. G. Montgomerie of the Survey of India, to designate it as one of the thirty-five peaks in the Karakorum range of the western Himalayas. One of its unofficial names is Mount Godwin Austen, after the British topographer who was only the second European to visit this remote and rugged area. Its other names include Qogir Feng in Chinese and Dap-song in Tibetan, and there are also several local names for the peak.

K2 is the second-highest mountain in the world, surpassed only by Mount Everest, which is also in the Himalayas. K2 rises to 8,611 meters, the highest peak in the Karakorum range. It lies athwart the borders between China and the state of Jammu and Kashmir, in an area heavily contested by India and Pakistan but now controlled by Pakistan. K2 is some 800 kilometers due north of Delhi. Although eight expeditions attempted to climb K2 between 1892 and 1954, the mountain was not ascended until 1954, when members of an Italian expedition managed to reach the peak.

Paul Hockings

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KABADDI *Kabaddi* is an Asian team sport of indeterminate origin, played extensively in the Indian subcontinent and Japan with some variation. Although it is believed to be more than four thousand years old, it has yet to establish itself as an international sport, being confined as it has been mostly to Asia.

The sport is played between two teams of twelve players each. Seven players begin the game for each team, and five players act as reserves. The *kabaddi* court measures 12.50 meters by 10 meters, divided by a line into two halves. Each team has to initiate moves of offense and defense alternately. The team who wins the toss sends into the opponents' area a "raider" who, while chanting "*kabaddi-kabaddi*" tries to touch any or all of the seven opponents. Those opponents who are touched by the raider are out of the game. The opponents try to capture the raider until the raider is out of breath and can no longer chant "*kabaddi-kabaddi*." Points are awarded on the basis of opponents touched or raiders captured. The team scoring the most points within the scheduled time (a total of forty minutes of playing time with a five-minute break) wins. Because of its low cost and rugged skills, *kabaddi* is a popular sport among the rural masses in Asia.

Ram Shankar Nanda

KABUKI Kabuki is one of two major forms of commercial theater created by actors and playwrights for audiences of urban commoners during the Edo or Tokugawa period (1600/1603–1868) in Japan.

History

In 1600, an attractive woman dancer, Okuni, captivated spectators in the capital city of Kyoto by singing sensuous love songs and acting in comic-erotic sketches. Her dance while dressed as a male samurai, called Kabuki (*kabuku*, "slanted"), was the rock or punk performance of the time. Later "ka-bu-ki" came to be written with the Japanese characters for "music-dance-acting," thus



Two Kabuki actors in the 1890s. One portrays a samurai and the other a woman. (MICHAEL MASLAN HISTORIC PHOTOGRAPHS/CORBIS)

identifying the three arts basic to Kabuki performance. Government edicts banning women and boys from the stage in 1629 and 1652, respectively, resulted in adult males taking female roles (*onnagata*, "woman's form"), a happenstance that contributed to creating Kabuki's unusual sensuous appeal.

During the Genroku era (c. 1688–1720), Sakata Tōjuro (1644–1709) created the gentle style (*wagoto*) of acting romantic leads that suited the refined tastes of Kyoto audiences. His most famous role was in *Kuruwa bunsho* (Love Letter from the Licensed Quarter, 1678), written for him by Chikamatsu Monzaemon (1653–1724). The martial spirit of the city of Edo is reflected in the masculine style of bravura acting (*aragoto*) created by Ichikawa Danjuro I (1660–1704) and his son Danjuro II (1688–1738), in plays that featured heroes of superhuman strength. Danjuro I himself wrote *Narukami* (Narukami the Thunder God, 1684) and *Shibaraku* (Wait a Moment! 1692). Danjuro II melded the Kyoto and Edo acting styles when he created the dashing hero in *Sukeroku yukari no Edo zakura* (Sukeroku: Flower of Edo, 1713). In the nineteenth century, a new form of gritty "raw domestic dramas" (*kizewamono*) reflected the declining authority of the shogunate and the disintegration of feudal morality. In *Sakura hime azuma bunsho* (The Scarlet Princess of Edo, 1813), by Tsuruya Nanboku IV (1755–1829), and *Benten kozo* (Benten the Thief, 1862), by Kawatake Mokuami (1816–1893), the leading roles were thieves and murderers drawn from society's underclass.

Characteristics

Kabuki developed over some three hundred years as a spectacular theater art for rich and poor alike. Dazzling productions in large, indoor theaters made

use of mechanical stage lifts, revolving stages, and impressive stage tricks—flying in the air, real rain, and instant costume changes. Performances began at dawn and continued until dusk. Adjoining teahouses provided tea, sake, food, and tobacco, as spectators socialized and watched the dramas unfold on stage. Six programs a year matched Japan's calendar of religious festivals. The season began in November with the important "face showing" (*kao mise*) play that introduced the theater's acting company and ended the following September with an autumn "remembrance play" (*nagori kyogen*), when spectators bid farewell to departing actors. The three plays in a program typically included a multiact history piece (*jidaimono*) that featured samurai or nobility, followed by a shorter domestic piece (*sewamono*) that dramatized the lives of commoners. A dance play accompanied by music in *nagauta*, *kiyomoto*, *tokiwazu*, or *takemoto* style followed either the first or the second play. This could be a solo dance (*shosagoto*), such as *Musume Dojo-ji* (The Maid of Dojo Temple, 1756), to show off the skills of an *onnagata* actor, or a dance drama (*buyogeki*) like the highly dramatic *Kanjincho* (The Subscription List, 1841). Some dance plays were based on fifteenth- to sixteenth-century masked Noh plays, and about one-third of the repertory was adapted from plays written for the Bunraku puppet theater, Japan's other traditional commercial theater form.

Some important themes in Kabuki plays are the moral conflict between duty (*giri*) and human compassion (*ninjo*) and the plight of lovers driven by circumstance to take their lives (*shinju*). Powerful acting techniques include a dynamic "frozen moment" pose (*mie*), leaping exit (*roppo*) along the bridgeway (*hanamichi*) from the stage through the auditorium, beautifully choreographed fights (*tate* or *tachimawari*), and musicalized speech in poetic passages written in phrases of seven and five syllables (*shichigo-cho*). The black-robed stage assistant (*koken*) of Kabuki, who assists the actor with properties and costume on stage, is known throughout the world.

In the twenty-first century, Kabuki continues to be one of Japan's most honored theater forms. Month-long programs can be seen at the Kabuki-za and the National Theater in Tokyo, the Shochiku-za in Osaka, and the Minami-za in Kyoto.

James R. Brandon

See also: **Bunraku**

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KABUL (2002 est. pop. 2.1 million). At the base of the Kabul River in Afghanistan and at the foot of the Khyber Pass in the Hindu Kush mountains lies the city of Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. For thousands of years, the country of Afghanistan has been the crossroads of commerce, immigration, and invasion for India, Iran, Pakistan, and the area now com-

prising the Central Asian countries of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. Located on the eastern edge of modern-day Afghanistan, the populated areas of the Kabul River are thought to be over 4,000 years old.

The earliest reports of a city called Kabul come in ancient Indian songs dating back to 1000 BCE. In the ancient villages that are thought to make up modern-day Kabul, there was a particularly lush oasis that traders and merchants used as a stop for their camels. Its strategic location at the base of the Khyber Pass, which leads into Pakistan, and the availability of fresh water and arable land allowed a population to grow and prosper.

The number and variety of empires that used the city to control the numerous Afghan tribes mark the history of Kabul. Alexander the Great and his Greek army took over Kabul between 330 BCE and 326 BCE during his campaigns through Central and South Asia. The Arab conquests of the seventh century CE reached as far as Kabul. In the sixteenth century, Kabul was the capital of the Mughal empire from 1504 to 1526. From 1747 until 1979, Kabul was ruled by the Durrani kings;



BEAUTIFUL KABUL

The description below from 1908 is far different than the images of Kabul 2002—which now show a city and region destroyed by over twenty years of war and political unrest.

The Kabul river basin includes the most beautiful, if not the most fertile of the romantic valleys of Afghanistan. The great affluents of the north which find their way from the springs and glens of the Hindu Kush are as full of the interest of history as they are of the charm which ever surrounds mountain-bred streams, giving life to the homes of a wild and untamed people. The valleys of Ghorband and of the Panjshir are valleys of the Hindu Kush, scooped out between the long parallel flexures which are the structural basis of the system. With Kohistani villages below and battlemented strongholds above, breaking here and there into widened spaces where the ancient terraces of modern cultivation, and thick groves of apricot and walnut trees are grouped round the base of the foothills and the walls of the scattered villages, there is no more enchanting scenery to be found in the [Swiss] Alps than in these vales.

Source: Imperial Gazetteer of India: Afghanistan and Nepal. (1908) Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 2.



Afghans in the street in front of war-damaged buildings in Kabul in 1995. (BACI/CORBIS).

in 1979 it was occupied by the Soviet Union. The city remained under nominal Soviet control until the Soviet Union withdrew its troops in 1989, leaving the city in the hands of the Mujahideen rebel forces.

Mujahideen control was short-lived, as civil war soon broke out throughout the country of Afghanistan. Various tribal groups and political parties controlled Kabul until 1996, when the city came under control of the Taliban regime. The Taliban moved the capital of Afghanistan from Kabul to Kandahar and left Kabul in shambles. The Taliban lost control of Afghanistan in December 2001 to U.S. forces, sent by the U.S. government to remove the Taliban because of the Taliban's support of Osama bin Laden, the mastermind behind the 11 September attacks in New York City and Washington, DC.

Modern-day Kabul is undergoing massive reconstruction. The interim government of Hamid Karzai has received funding to rebuild the city and reestablish Kabul as the capital of Afghanistan.

Jennifer Nichols

KABUL RIVER The Kabul is a river approximately 700 kilometers (435 miles) long running mostly through eastern Afghanistan and a short distance in northwestern Pakistan. A tributary of the Indus River, it originates in the Sanglakh mountain range west of Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. It then flows east, passing Kabul and the major cities of Jalalabad in Afghanistan and Peshawar in Pakistan. Soon thereafter it joins the Indus at Attock, not far from the Pakistani capital of Islamabad. It has several major tributaries, including the Lowgar and the Konar.

Agricultural civilizations have existed on its banks for several thousand years, and it was known as far as ancient Greece, where it was called Cophes. Alexander of Macedon had used its valley as the route for his aborted invasion of India in the fourth century BCE. In the nineteenth century major battles between the native guerrilla groups and British forces were fought along its banks, immortalized in Rudyard Kipling's poem "Ford o'Kabul River."

A hydroelectric plant was built on the river but came into disuse during the prolonged period of warfare started by the Soviet invasion in 1978. Because much of the river has been tapped for irrigation over the years, often inefficiently, due to poor infrastructure and continuing economic stagnation and warfare, much of the river west of the city of Kabul dries up in the summers. The Peshawar-Kabul highway—a major truck route between Afghanistan and Pakistan—passes through the Kabul River valley. The Kabul River is navigable by flat-bottomed light vessels downstream of Kabul city.

Mikhail S. Zeldovich

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KACHIN "Kachin" is the collective name for a related family of highland peoples who live in north-eastern Myanmar (Burma) as well as adjoining parts of China's Yunnan Province and northeast India. The Kachin language is classified as a branch of the Tibeto-Burmese linguistic group, and the Kachin people are culturally distinct from the Shan, Burman, and Chinese communities that inhabit many of the same areas.

Within Kachin state, six ethnic subgroups are regarded as the main branches of the Kachin peoples: the Jinghpaw, Maru, Lashi, Azi, Nung-Rawang, and Lisu. Elsewhere in Myanmar the Lisu are not included as Kachin. Moreover, there are significant variations in language and dialect among the different Kachin subgroups. In recent decades, this has led to the promotion of the dialect of the Jinghpaw majority as the standardized form of Kachin. The nationality term "Wunpawng" is also used by most Kachins to describe themselves.

The Kachins are thought to have been among the last migrants to arrive in present-day Myanmar, crossing the mountains from China within the past thou-



A Kachin couple in northern Myanmar in 1942. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

sand years. Today Kachin-speakers are the majority ethnic group throughout much of the Kachin state and also parts of the northern Shan state where around 100,000 Kachins live. Population statistics are disputed, with Kachin leaders claiming a Kachin population in Myanmar of around 1 million, compared with government estimates of half that number.

Until the British annexation of present-day Myanmar in the nineteenth century, most Kachins were traditional spirit-worshippers, inhabiting the higher mountain regions where they practiced swidden (slash-and-burn) agriculture. Under British rule, however, many Kachins converted to Christianity and moved down to the plains. In modern Myanmar, most Kachins are Christians, predominantly Baptists.

Traditional customs nevertheless persist in many areas, including the *manau* celebration festivals, where costumed dancers progress in snaking columns around brightly decorated spirit posts. The Kachins have also retained a determined reputation for independence and for martial abilities in conflict. These were highlighted during World War II when many Kachins, nicknamed the "Amiable Assassins," fought on the Allied side against the Japanese occupation from 1941 to 1945.

A particular characteristic of the Kachin peoples is their unique clan system, which links all subgroups and

individuals together. All Kachins have a familial tie through their clans, and there are customs prescribing which members of which clans can marry one another. The clan system was analyzed by the British anthropologist Edmund Leach, who published his famous study, *Political Systems of Highland Burma*, in 1954.

Despite the civil war that broke out in 1961, many traditional aspects of Kachin culture survived the following decades of conflict. Kachin communities, however, suffered enormous dislocation and loss of life before the 1994 cease-fire between the government and the insurgent Kachin Independence Organization.

Martin Smith

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KACHIN INDEPENDENCE ORGANIZATION Founded in February 1961, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) is the leading armed opposition force among the Kachin people in north-eastern Myanmar (Burma). An earlier Kachin uprising led by Burmese army mutineer Naw Seng in 1949 failed to find widespread support, but in the early 1960s a new generation of Kachin leaders quickly struck a popular chord.

Striking out from northern Shan State, by the mid-1960s KIO units had penetrated much of Kachin State. Fierce fighting with the Burmese army and rival Communist Party of Burma (CPB), as well as internal divisions, halted the KIO's advance. These events led to the deaths of KIO president Zau Seng and his two brothers in 1975. However, under the revived leadership of Brang Seng (1931–1994), a former high school headmaster, the KIO quickly reestablished itself as one of the most effective insurgent groups in the country, with an estimated 8,000 troops under arms.

Bolstered by control of the black market trade in jade, the KIO became a leading voice in the National Democratic Front, which it joined in 1983 following abortive peace talks with the Ne Win government. The KIO was also one of the main architects of the Democratic Alliance of Burma after the Burmese army's suppression of pro-democracy protests in 1988.

Following the CPB's collapse in 1989, however, the KIO came under increasing pressure. This was compounded by the cease-fires of local NDF allies as well as the defection of several hundred troops in Shan State who formed a rival Kachin Defense Army. Anxious to be part of political discussions within the country at large, KIO leaders agreed a cease-fire with the State Law and Order Restoration Council government in 1994 under a new strategy they termed "peace through development." In a major policy change, the KIO opened offices in the towns and began resettlement and development programs in several parts of northeastern Myanmar. Political problems, however, persisted for the KIO, partly due to the slow pace of reforms, and this saw a leadership struggle during 2001 in which the KIO president Zau Mai was replaced by another party veteran, Tu Jai.

Martin Smith

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KACHIN STATE (2002 pop. 1.3 million). Located in northeastern Myanmar (Burma), Kachin State is a land of deep mountains, forests, and rivers, as well as several areas of broad plains. Comprising eighteen townships and 699 wards or village-tracts, it is Myanmar's second largest ethnic minority state, with an area of 89,041 square kilometers. It is situated between the People's Republic of China to the east and north, Arunachal Pradesh in India to the northwest, the Sagaing Division to the west, and Shan State to the south. The capital is Myitkyina. Other important towns include Bhamo, Mohnyin, Mogaung, and Putao.

Kachin State was founded at the time of Myanmar's independence in 1948, but economic progress has been held back by ethnic and political conflict. Population statistics are disputed by the different parties,

but in the 1990s the State Law and Order Restoration Council government estimated the population at 1.08 million people, of whom over 400,000 were Kachins (including Lisus), 310,000 Burmans, and 250,000 Shans. Historically, Kachins have tended to live more in upland areas, whereas Shans and Burmans have inhabited the plains and towns. However, there has been considerable civilian dislocation since the outbreak of insurgency in the 1960s and resettlement continued at the turn of the twenty-first century. There also are small local populations of Chinese and Indians, who play an important role in business.

Agriculture is the principal occupation of most inhabitants. Paddy, sugar cane, and groundnut are all commercially grown in the valleys and plains, and there is local cultivation of various fruits as well as orchids in the hills. Illicit opium production has also been a social problem in a number of areas.

The state also contains a variety of natural resources, including gold, silver, coal, lead, iron, copper, and jade. The world-famous jade mines are located at Hpakhant in the southwest of the state. Another important resource is timber, with teak and other valuable woods growing in the deciduous and evergreen forests that cover much of the territory.

Since the 1994 cease-fire by the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), exploitation of all these resources has increased, and attempts have been made to upgrade the infrastructure of the state, which is handicapped by its distance from other markets. In the latter years of the twentieth century, the road between Myitkyina and Bhamo reopened; a bridge was constructed over the Irrawaddy River, near the capital; and various business enterprises were started, including the KIO-run sugar mill at Namti.

Economic development, however, continues to be slow. The spread of HIV/AIDS in the state became a matter of concern during the 1990s, accelerated by factors such as intravenous drug use and the rush of migrant workers to the jade mines at Hpakhant. Concerns were also expressed over a notable increase in logging as well as gold-dredging operations in the Irrawaddy River. Such extractive enterprises cause environmental degradation and put little investment into local communities.

Another field that has been targeted for economic expansion is tourism. The state is a region of unusual biodiversity, including the source of the Irrawaddy at the junctions of the Mali-Kha and N'Mai Kha rivers; the upper tributaries of the Chindwin River; Myanmar's largest lake, Indawgyi; and the country's highest mountain, Hkakabo Razi (5,881 meters). In these

regions, species such as elephant, tiger, and musk deer, although under threat, were still relatively common at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Martin Smith

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KAEMA PLATEAU The Kaema Plateau (Kaema Kowon), "the roof of Korea," stretches across north and south Hamgyong Province to the east and the provinces of North and South P'yongan to the west in North Korea. The height of the plateau ranges from 1,000 to 2,000 meters above sea level. It is the largest tableland on the Korean Peninsula, with an area comprising about 40,000 square kilometers. The plateau slants down on the side of the Amnok River (Yalu) in the northern sector and it builds a steep slope on the northern and eastern sides. The plateau stretches across several counties, including Kapsan, Changjin, and Musan, that are dissected by the tributaries of the Amnok and Tumen Rivers. Subsistence-level farming products such as foxtail millet, oats, soybeans, barnyard grass, and potatoes are produced using fire-field agriculture (slash-and-burn farming) on the west side of the plateau. Dams have been made to harness the power of the Hochon, the Changjin, and the Pujon Rivers, all of which flow northward into the Amnok River. The greatest benefit from the damming of these river basins has been the increase of hydroelectric power.

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KAESONG (1993 pop. 335,000). Kaesong is located in southern North Korea (People's Democratic Republic of Korea), 160 kilometers (100 miles) southeast of the capital city of P'yongyang and 8 kilometers (5 miles) from Panmunjom near the Demilitarized Zone. The city has been under direct administration of the



Chinese and North Korean officials at Kaesong in August 1951 where talks were held to end the Korean War. (HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS)

capital since 1955. Kaesong was the capital of the Koryo kingdom (918–1392) and an important commercial center during the Choson dynasty (1392–1910).

The city prides itself on its rich cultural heritage. Major historic sites include the Southern Gate of the Kaesong fortress built between 1009 and 1029, the Sonjuk Bridge, the Kaesong Observatory, and several temples. The site of the Songgyun Institute, once the Koryo dynasty's premier educational institution, has been transformed into the Koryo Museum, which displays many artifacts unearthed in and around Kaesong. Of the Koryo royal palace of Manwoldae, built in 918 CE and destroyed in 1361 CE, only an elevated platform and foundation stones remain.

Several royal Koryo tombs are located on the outskirts of the city, such as the tomb of King Wang Kon (918–943), the founder of the Koryo dynasty, and the tomb of the thirty-first Koryo king, Kongmin (1352–1374), and his queen. Kaesong is known for the production of ginseng and products derived from it. Other industries include textiles, food processing, and machinery.

Ariane Perrin

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KAFIRNIGAN RIVER The Kafirnigan is a river in Tajikistan and a large tributary of the Amu Dar'ya, which it joins about 36 kilometers downstream of the

confluence of the Pyandzh and Vakhsh Rivers. The Kafirnigan is 387 kilometers long with a basin area of 11,600 square kilometers. It rises in two branches from the southern slopes (partly from glaciers) of the Gissar Range and flows south through the Gissar Valley. The river is fed primarily by snow. The average annual discharge at the mouth is 156 cubic meters per second. In the lower reaches the banks are covered with reeds and *tugai* (riparian) forests.

The river's waters are used for irrigation. During the Soviet period, important irrigation development took place in the Kafirnigan River basin. Together with Uzbekistan, in 1940 Tajikistan built the large Gissar Canal, which carries water from the Dushanbe River into the basin of the Surkhandarya River (in Uzbekistan). The total irrigated area in the Kafirnigan basin is 49,000 hectares. Three of the nineteen dams (fourteen on the Amu Dar'ya) in Tajikistan are on the Kafirnigan.

Bakhitor Islamov and Sharaf Arifkhanov

KAGAWA (2002 est. pop. 1 million). Kagawa Prefecture is situated in the northeastern region of Japan's island of Shikoku, where it occupies an area of 1,883 square kilometers. Kagawa's primary geographical features are coastal lowlands in the north, the Sanuki Mountains in the south, and many small offshore islands. Kagawa is bordered by the Inland Sea and by Ehime and Tokushima Prefectures. Once known as Sanuki Province, it assumed its present name and borders in 1888.

The prefecture's capital is Takamatsu. In 1588, Ikoma Chikamasa (1526–1603) erected a castle to monitor Inland Sea maritime traffic and Takamatsu grew around this fortress. The Matsudaira family later took control of the castle town. With the initiation of a ferry route between Honshu and Shikoku, Takamatsu became the terminal, making it into the administrative and economic center of Shikoku. The completion of the bridge link to Honshu in 1988 rendered the ferry obsolete. The city manufactures machinery and processes foodstuffs, including *udon* noodles. Its more traditional crafts are lacquerware and tissue paper. Nearby is the Yashima Peninsula, a battlefield of the war between the Taira and Minamoto warrior clans in 1185. The prefecture's other important cities are Sakaide and Marugame.

Kagawa's main crop long has been rice, later supplemented by cotton, sugar, and salt, of which the prefecture once was the nation's largest source; the salt works were shut down in 1972. In the early 2000s, the

economy also depends on fruit and livestock production, along with fishing. Shipbuilding is one of the few heavy industries; there is some processing of paper, textiles, and foodstuffs. Visitors are drawn to Inland Sea National Park, and historic Kotohira Shrine is a pilgrim destination.

E. L. S. Weber

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KAGOSHIMA (2002 est. pop. 1.8 million). Kagoshima Prefecture is situated in the southern part of Japan's island of Kyushu, where it occupies an area of 9,167 square kilometers. Situated in a subtropical region, it is often swept by typhoons. Among its geographical features are the major volcanoes Kirishimayama, Kaimondake, and Sakurajima, one of the world's more active. Offshore are various islands. Kagoshima is bordered by the Pacific Ocean and the East China Sea and by Kumamoto and Miyazaki Prefectures. In 1896 it subsumed the ancient provinces of Satsuma and Osumi and assumed its present name and borders.

The prefecture's capital is Kagoshima city, situated on Kagoshima Bay. In 1602, the Shimazu family erected a castle on the site, and the city flourished. It is the birthplace of Meiji Restoration leaders Okubo Toshimichi and Saigo Takamori. Saigo later led disempowered samurai in the 1877 Satsuma Rebellion, the last armed uprising against Meiji reforms. The city was severely bombed in World War II. It is the major departure port for Okinawa and other islands and is home to Kagoshima University. It produces *tsumugi* silk fabric, woodcrafts, and foodstuffs. The prefecture's other important cities are Sendai, Kanoya, and Naze.

The prefecture has a long history, as indicated by artifacts from the Jomon (14,500 BCE–300 BCE) and Yayoi (300 BCE–300 CE) cultures. Later it was inhabited by the Kumaso and Hayato tribes. From the Heian period (794–1185), Fujiwara regent families, Buddhist temples, and Shinto shrines owned landed estates in the region. Shimazu family rule lasted until the 1868 Meiji Restoration. Westerners, including the missionary Francis Xavier, first set foot in Japan in Kagoshima in the mid-sixteenth century.

Agriculture and forestry dominate the economy. Rice, sweet potatoes, and other vegetables are the leading crops, supplemented by the specialty crops of sugar cane, tea, tobacco, and citrus fruits and by the raising

of livestock. Black Satsuma ceramics are a notable regional craft. Kirishima-Yaku National Park is popular with visitors.

E. L. S. Weber

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KAIN BATIK *Kain batik* ("cloth" in Bahasa Indonesia, *tik* from Bahasa Malaysia meaning "drops or dots") is cloth produced by a resist-dyeing technique. A resist medium, such as a combination of waxes or occasionally rice starch, is applied to cotton or silk cloth using a pen (*canting*) or a metal stamp (*cap*) to stop the penetration of dyes into the cloth in specific areas of the chosen design.

In preparation for the batik process the cloth is first carefully washed and may be soaked in vegetable oil to enhance the absorption of the dye. It is then starched so that the wax will not penetrate too deeply and pressed to give a smooth surface on which to apply the wax. A suitable resist medium, made from a combination of waxes, is then liquefied and applied to the cloth with a *canting*, a copper pen with one or several spouts, depending on the size and shape of the design. The untreated area of the cloth absorbs color in the dye bath; the waxed area remains undyed. The wax is then melted, scraped, or boiled away—an activity usually performed by men. For subsequent colors and additional design elements more wax is applied, up to four times. This style of batik is known as *kain batik tulis*. Each *kain panjang batik tulis* (a hip wrap worn by both men and women), generally 2½ by 1 meter, takes several months to create. *Kain batik tulis* was superseded in part in the mid-nineteenth century by the use of a *cap* with a waxed surface, facilitating increased production and using male labor. Special finishing treatments include gilding and glazing.

Kain batik is found in Java, southwest Sumatra, central Sulawesi, and Malaysia. Its origins are thought to be Indian; however, it may have been indigenous to Java. It is known to have been part of the court culture of central Java by the sixteenth century. Designs and colors were specific to different regions, and sumptuary laws governed the wearing of particular designs, especially in the royal courts of Yogyakarta until the early part of the twentieth century. Women still wear *kain panjang batik* throughout Southeast Asia, although silkscreen and machine prints of old and new designs are prevalent. *Kain batik* has become an icon

of Javanese culture and is used by contemporary batik artists and in contemporary fashion and the decorative arts.

Valerie Wilson Trower and Diana Collins

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KAIN SONGKET The art of *kain songket* ("brocaded cloth"), the manufacture of silk and cotton fabric brocaded with gold or silver thread, has been known throughout western Indonesia since at least the seventh century, the time of the early Buddhist and Hindu kingdoms in Sumatra, Java, and Bali. Brocade weaving was most likely introduced to the archipelago by Indian craftsmen or merchants, along with many other crafts and art forms. The most luxurious silk brocades were worn by the nobility as part of their ceremonial attire; less valuable cotton brocades were used for classical dance costumes. Brocade weaving was the prerogative of noble women. With the introduction of cheaper raw materials, however, such as rayon and artificial silk in the 1930s, brocade manufacture gradually spread to the lower socioeconomic classes. In recent decades the Indonesian government has encouraged the manufacture of traditional local products. Home production has become an important economic activity, and brocade weaving has provided a decent, if not lucrative, income for many female household members, particularly in Bali and Lombok, where *kain songket* are still worn in numerous traditional rituals. The raw materials, mainly imported from abroad, are available even in small village markets.

Martin Ramstedt

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KALIDASA (flourished fifth century CE), Indian playwright and poet. Kalidasa was the greatest poet of India's classical age, which lasted from 500 BCE to 540 CE. Despite numerous legends about him, little is known of his life. He may have been a Brahman and a devotee of Siva. He excelled in all literary genres except the novel. Tradition associates him with the semi-legendary king Vikramaditya, who is now thought to have been the great Gupta monarch Candragupta II. If correct, we have a ruling date for the king in Ujjain from 375 to 413 CE.

Kalidasa's best-known work, still sometimes performed, is the Sanskrit play *Abhijnana Shakuntala* (The Recognition of Shakuntala), which is the last of three dramas and a clever dramatization of part of the *Mahabharata*. Kalidasa's great skills in characterization, the construction of the plot and dramatic situations, and the clarity of his Sanskrit are the features that have brought praise to this love story. Kalidasa also wrote a comedy, *Malavikagnimitra*, about a king who falls in love with a maiden (despite already having a queen). Other plays included *Vikramorvasiya*, which is another love story based on a legend in the Vedas, and *Satapatha Brahmana*. Of his several poems, "Meghaduta" is one of the most fascinating in Sanskrit literature: just over a hundred verses telling of a minor folk deity who becomes separated from his master. In addition, another epic poem, *Raghuvarsha*, and several incomplete poems of Kalidasa's are extant.


Paul Hockings

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KALIMANTAN (2000 pop. 10.4 million). Kalimantan occupies the southern three-quarters of the island of Borneo in Indonesia. It is divided into four provinces: West, Central, East, and South Kalimantan. The largest ethnic groups are the Malay-Indonesians, the Chinese, and the Dayaks.

The history of Kalimantan is a patchwork of Chinese, Malayan, Hindu, Muslim, and Dutch influences. Hinduism reached Kalimantan around 400 CE, and the islands were ruled by Hindu kingdoms until, with



the introduction of Islam, several sultanates emerged in the fourteenth century. The Dutch arrived on the island in the seventeenth century, and despite both Dutch and British interests in Kalimantan, the Dutch managed to strengthen their position as the main colonial power. The Japanese occupation of the island at the beginning of World War II ended Dutch rule. In 1945, Indonesia's independence ended the Japanese occupation and created Kalimantan as an official province of Indonesia.

Approximately 60 percent of the territory is forested. Kalimantan has one of the world's richest natural environments, including more plant species than in all of Africa. The fauna consists of species such as orangutans, crocodiles, giant butterflies, and freshwater dolphins. Kalimantan also contains great reserves of mineral resources: oil, natural gas, coal, gold, and uranium. Kalimantan is the second leading oil producer in Indonesia after Sumatra. Exports include oil, coal, and plywood. The oldest inscriptions in Indonesia have been discovered in Kalimantan. They are in Sanskrit and date from the beginning of the fifth century CE.

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KALMAKANOV, BUKHARZHRAU (1693–1789), Kazakh poet. The Kazakh poet Bukharzhrau Kalmakanov (or Bukhar-zhyrau Qalmaqanuly) was active at the court of Abylay (1711–1781), the khan of the Middle Horde. As his name-element *zhyrau* signifies, he was a poet and singer (*zhyr* means "song"), but he also acted as the khan's courtier and counselor. In his poems Bukharzhrau addresses political and topical themes, praising the khan for his deeds, advising him in his wars and negotiations with his neighbors, and urging the Kerey tribe to make peace with Abylay. The genre of poetry that he favored was the *tolghau*, a didactic and meditative poem, in which the poet expresses his views on the right form of living and utters words of wisdom generally taken from oral lore (proverbs, folk aphorisms). Bukharzhrau did not compose any epics, although the term *zhyrau* came to denote the singer of epics in the Kazakh language.

Karl Reichl

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KALYM *Kalym* refers to the Central Asian tradition of the bride-price, a ransom paid by a man or his parents to the parents of the woman he chooses to marry. Payment is made after the parties negotiate an agreement in accordance with their social and financial status but before the wedding.

The custom of the *kalym* appeared in pre-Islamic times and was widely accepted and institutionalized in the Islamic period. The size of the *kalym* varies in different regions of Central Asia, and it should be distinguished from *mabr*, maintenance that the bridegroom provides for the bride, all of which remains the bride's personal and exclusive property. *Kalym* is distributed in three parts: one part to the fiancée, another part to her parents, and the third to be used by the fiancée's family for the wedding expenses.

A man from a poor family, or one who for another reason cannot pay the complete *kalym* in advance, may pay it in installments before and after the wedding. Traditionally *kalym* consisted of livestock, clothing and fabrics, and foodstuffs. In modern times the Central Asian *kalym* is usually given in the form of a cash equivalent, to hide the fact of negotiations for the *kalym* arrangement, which was legally forbidden. The practice of the *kalym* still occurs among rural Uzbeks, Turkmen, Tajiks, Karakalpaks, Kyrgyz, and other peoples of Central Asia.

Kamoludin Abdullaev

KAMA SUTRA *Kama Sutra* is a classic treatise on the science of sex. It was written by a famous Indian sage, Maharshi Vatsyayana, fifteen hundred years ago during the golden period of the Gupta dynasty. It is based on ancient Indian scriptures and treatises such as the Vedas—perhaps the world's oldest sacred text. The Vedas describe a fourfold purpose of human life—*dharma* (duty), *artha* (wealth), *kama* (pleasure), and *moksha* (liberation of the soul). Of them, *kama*, or sex, is considered indispensable for complete human self-fulfillment and happiness.

What makes Vatsyayana's *Kama Sutra* a unique work is its universal appeal and the value it places on the systematic treatment of sex both as a science and an art. It lays down scientific principles of various forms of lovemaking while fully taking the human anatomy and psychology into account. *Kama Sutra* lays out sixty-four lovemaking practices. Vatsyayana recommends maintaining absolute privacy while studying the art and practice of sex. His erotic arts are known as Panchali. A woman well versed in its sixty-four practices is known as a *ganika* (courtesan). A *ganika* is a woman much sought after by kings, the rich, and other men highly placed in society. She is compensated by generous offerings of money and precious gifts.

In *Kama Sutra*, male and female are each divided into three categories: man as rabbit, bull, and horse; woman as dove, mare, and she-elephant. The rabbit is handsome, tender, and soft-spoken. The bull is stout and well shaped, emitting semen with a salty odor; the horse is sturdy, long-faced, and sexually passionate. Similarly, the woman characterized by the dove is exceptionally beautiful, engaging, and soft-spoken; her discharges are as fragrant as the blossoming lotus. A mare woman is slim, tall, and easily seduced. She emits a fishy aroma. The she-elephant woman is fat, gluttonous, awkward in demeanor, and highly

sexed. The size of the animal is related to the size of the genitalia. Thus, a happy and harmonious sexual relationship between a man and woman depends on having compatible qualities. Otherwise, *Kama Sutra* maintains, their sexual and married life will prove disastrous.

Vatsyayana describes eight steps to achieving sexual gratification. These include embracing, kissing, scratching with fingernails, biting, caressing, reversed coitus, and oral sex. He outlines three kinds of kissing by women: limited kiss, throbbing kiss, and probing kiss; five kinds of kissing by men: straight kiss, oblique kiss, evolving kiss, pressed kiss, and hard-pressed kiss. He also recommends the use of various Ayurvedic (India's traditional science of medicine) recipes for those men and women who cannot perform sexual intercourse successfully because of physical or psychological impediments. The text is remarkable, not only for providing detailed sexology, but also for being one of the very few ancient treatises referring to the geography of India. Vatsyayana imposes a kind of geographic determinism by maintaining that women have varying sexual proclivities relative to the climate of different regions of India they are native to.

B. M. Jain

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KAMAKURA PERIOD Japan's Kamakura period (1185–1333) was the first time a truly non-aristocratic regime held sway over the nation. Toward the end of the Heian period (794–1185), two warrior clans, the Taira (or Heike) and the Minamoto (or Genji), came to have increasing power, as various aristocratic and imperial factions came to depend on them for protection. The Taira wielded great influence from 1156 until 1185, when they were defeated by the Minamoto in the Battle of Dannoura, but the more powerful they became, the more they divorced themselves from their military roots, adopting the habits and lifestyle of the court nobles. The Minamoto did not make that mistake, and their rule marked a new cultural and political age.

In 1192 Yoritomo had himself appointed Sei-itai shogun (Barbarian-quelling Generalissimo), or

shogun, by the emperor, and proceeded to establish a military government (*bakufu*) in Kamakura, some 400 kilometers away from the imperial capital in Kyoto. Minamoto control of the *bakufu* ended with Yoritomo, however: After his death, the Hojo family, natal family of Yoritomo's wife, established themselves as regents for the Minamoto shoguns, thereby usurping control.

Although the civil (imperial) government continued to exist during the Kamakura period, it was the military government that held real power in terms of land management, taxation, and policing. During the Heian period, more and more land had become exempt from taxation by the civil government; the Kamakura *bakufu* assigned a steward to all such estates and saw that the *bakufu* received a portion of the wealth from each. It also assigned constables to each estate to marshal the estate in times of conflict.

Culturally, the Kamakura period saw the flowering of popular, faith-oriented, sects of Buddhism. Pure Land Buddhism, which taught that the Western Paradise of the Buddha Amida could be attained through the recitation of the Buddha's name, became very popular as it promised relatively easy salvation for all. True Pure Land, introduced by the monk Shinran (1173–



JAPAN— HISTORICAL PERIODS

- Jomon period (14,500–300 BCE)
- Yayoi culture (300 BCE–300 CE)
- Yamato State (300–552 CE)
- Kofun period (300–710 CE)
- Nara period (710–794 CE)
- Heian period (794–1185)
- Kamakura period (Kamakura Shogunate) (1185–1333)
- Muromachi period (1333–1573)
- Momoyama period (1573–1600)
- Tokugawa or Edo period (Tokugawa Shogunate) (1600/1603–1868)
- Meiji period (1868–1912)
- Taisho period (1912–1926)
- Showa period (1926–1989)
- Allied Occupation (1945–1952)
- Heisei period (1989–present)

1262) in 1224 as an offshoot of Pure Land, simplified matters further by requiring only one such recitation, if made sincerely. The monk Nichiren (1222–1282) ascribed the same benefits to recitation of praise for the Lotus Sutra and denigrated other forms of Buddhism as false religion. Two schools of Zen Buddhism (in Chinese, Chan Buddhism), Soto and Rinzai, were also introduced during the Kamakura period and were adopted by the warrior class, who found their self-discipline and asceticism in keeping with warrior values. With Zen came the habit of drinking tea and the beginnings of the Japanese tea ceremony. In literature, war romances were popular, as were oral recitations of the *Heike monogatari* (Tale of the Heike), the story of the rise and fall of the Taira clan. The Buddhist theme of the evanescence of all things (*mujo*) permeates the tale.

Francesca Forrest

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KANAGAWA (2002 est. pop. 8.6 million). Kanagawa Prefecture is situated in the central region of Japan's island of Honshu, where it occupies an area of 2,403 square kilometers. Its main geographical features are western mountains, southeastern plains, and the rivers Sagami-gawa and Tamagawa. It is bordered by Tokyo and Sagami Bays and by Tokyo, Shizuoka, and Yamanashi Prefectures. Once known as Sagami Province, it assumed its present name in 1876 and present borders in 1893.

The prefecture's capital is Yokohama (2002 estimated population 3.5 million), beside the nation's major harbor. Yokohama was a small fishing village until 1858, when it was opened to Western ships and soon housed a residential compound of foreign diplomats and traders. In 1872, the nation's first railway linked its port to Tokyo. The 1923 earthquake leveled sixty thousand buildings and took twenty thousand lives. World War II bombing raids destroyed nearly half the city in 1945. Present-day Yokohama is at the heart of

the Keihin Industrial Zone, which extends to Tokyo. The prefecture's other important cities are Kawasaki, Yokosuka, Fujisawa, Sagami-hara, and Hiratsuka.

During the Kamakura shogunate (1185–1333), Japan's military capital was in Kamakura, along the southeastern coast. During the Edo period (1600/1603–1868), the region linked Edo (Tokyo) to the western areas of Japan. Today as a major industrial center, Kanagawa produces automobiles, steel, electric appliances, and chemicals and processes petroleum and foodstuffs. Visitors are drawn to Kamakura's historical sites and to its mammoth Buddha statue. A vacation spot popular with Tokyo residents is the Hakone region of Fuji-Hakone-Izu National Park.

E. L. S. Weber

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KANDAHAR (2002 est. pop. of city 339,000). Kandahar, in southern Afghanistan, is the country's second largest city and capital of Kandahar province. Its strategic location—especially when linked with Kabul 483 kilometers to the northeast—has contributed to its political significance in the region since antiquity. It has also been a center for local trade and a nexus in extraregional trade networks since early times. It is the largest urban center of Afghanistan's Pashto-dominated south.

According to some sources, Kandahar was a city in the Achaemenid empire from the sixth through fifth centuries BCE. Other sources trace its origins to the Greek Alexandria Arachosiorum, founded by Alexander of Macedon in the fourth century BCE—the city's name apparently deriving from the eastern variation of Alexander (Iskander). Kandahar's independence from Safavid Persia in the eighteenth century was a critical event in the eventual rise of an Afghan state. The city was Afghanistan's capital for almost three decades in the eighteenth century and was later occupied by British forces twice during nineteenth-century Anglo-Russian struggles over Eurasia.

Kandahar had well-irrigated gardens and orchards and was famous for its grapes, melons, and pomegranates, but these were made inaccessible by land mines or destroyed outright in the conflict between the Soviets and the mujahideen, Islamic guerrilla fighters during the Soviet occupation. The city is of significant strategic importance in the region due to the



KANDAHAR IN 1908

This 1908 description provides some understanding of the importance of Kandahar and of southern Afghanistan as a route for trade goods that flowed east and west across Asia.

Kandahar is one of the principal trade centers in Afghanistan. There are no manufactures or industries of any importance peculiar to the city; but long lines of bazars display goods from Great Britain, India, Russia, Persia, and Turkistan, embracing a trade area as large probably as that of any city in Asia. The customs and town dues together amount to a sum equal to the land revenue of the entire province. The Hindus are the most numerous and wealthiest merchants in Kandahar, carrying on a profitable trade in with Bombay and Sind. They import British manufactures, e.g. silks, calicos, muslins, chintzes, broadcloth, and hardware; and Indian produce, such as indigo, spices, and sugar. They export asafoetida, madder, wool, dried fruits, tobacco, silk, rosaries, etc. In 1903-4 the exports to India from Kandahar were valued at nearly 35 lakhs, and the imports at 33 lakhs.

*Source: Imperial Gazetteer of India: Afghanistan and Nepal. (1908)
Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 73.*

major airport built in the early 1970s with development funding from the United States. It remains one of the most heavily land-mined urban centers in the world and was the center of Taliban rule in the late 1990s.

Kyle Evered

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KANDY (2001 pop. 105,000). Kandy is an ancient capital city situated in the central highlands of Sri Lanka, some 120 kilometers inland by rail from the capital of Colombo. Its hilly location is 560 meters above sea level. Kandy is chiefly famous among Buddhists for the Dalada Malagawa, the Temple of the Tooth, which enshrines as a relic a purported tooth of the Buddha. There are a dozen other Buddhist temples and several Hindu ones. In the center of the town

is a beautifully placed artificial lake, constructed by the last king, Sri Vikrama Raja Singha (reigned 1798–1815), in 1806. Nearby, at Peredeniya, a fine botanical garden and the main campus of the University of Sri Lanka can be seen.

In 1472–1473, the city became the capital of a Sinhalese kingdom under Vimala Dharma (reigned 1592–



KANDY—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

The picturesque hilltop city of Kandy was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1988. The sacred city, the last capital of the Sinhalese empire that ruled for 2,500 years, remains an important destination for Buddhist pilgrims.



A row of stores on a street in Kandy, Sri Lanka. (CHARLES & JOSETTE LENARS/CORBIS)

1604). In 1763, it was occupied by the Dutch. Forty years later, the British took possession of the territory, but the garrison was subsequently massacred, and it was only in 1814–1815 that Sri Vikrama Raja Singha was defeated and dethroned. From 1815 to 1948, the kingdom formed part of the British Crown Colony of Ceylon.

A particular style of ritual dancing, called Kandyan dance or "devil dancing," has developed in this area. It is typically marked by loud drumming and stamping with the feet splayed wide apart. It is best observed during the great annual religious procession through the city, called the Perahera.

Paul Hockings

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KANG YOUWEI (1858–1927), Chinese reformer. Born in 1858 in Hainan, Guangdong Province, China, Kang Youwei was a precocious scholar who was impressed both by British-run port cities and later by the Meiji Restoration in Japan. Kang wrote directly to the Guang Xu emperor (1871–1908) in 1888 asking for a comprehensive reform to enhance China's power.

Kang then became famous as a key figure in a long-running and complex debate over the relative merits of new or old texts of Confucian classics. He rallied more than one thousand scholars who were participating in official examinations in Beijing in 1895 and petitioned the emperor to refuse the Shimonoseki Treaty that China signed with Japan after the first Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) and to carry out more radical reforms. He received his degree that year despite conservative opposition.

He then had a forum for his ideas, and he bitterly attacked the old ways in China and called for dramatic changes in the Qing dynasty's (1644–1912) system of government, all within the context of reinterpreting the Confucian classics. For a brief time, during the so-called Hundred Days Reform, the impetuous young emperor listened to Kang, but when the conservatives counterattacked, Kang had to flee China, and the pace of change thereafter overtook his once-radical ideas. Kang Youwei died in 1927.

Charles Dobbs

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The peak of Mount Kangchenjunga as seen from Darjeeling, India. (BRIAN A. VIKANDER/CORBIS)

KANGCHENJUNGA, MOUNT Mount Kangchenjunga (also Kinchenjunga), in the eastern Himalayan range, is the third-highest mountain in the world. The highest of its five peaks rises to 8,598 meters, only a few meters less than K2, also in the Himalayas. Its Tibetan name, Gangchhendzonga, means "Five treasures of the snows," in reference to its peaks, which the Sikkimese consider sacred.

The mountain rises on the Sikkim-Nepal border close to Tibet. The Zemu glacier lies on the eastern face of Kangchenjunga, or Kumbhakaran Lungur as it is called in Nepali. The mountain is best seen from the Indian hill-station of Darjeeling, making a grand spectacle on the northern horizon as it dominates all its surroundings.

Many attempts to scale Kangchenjunga from 1929 onward ended in failure and disaster. In 1955 a British expedition led by the Welsh mountaineer Charles Evans succeeded in ascending Kangchenjunga, but stopped a few meters short of the peak to honor the beliefs of the Lepcha inhabitants who consider the mountain a deity.

Paul Hockings

KANGWON PROVINCE (2002 est. combined pop. 3.2 million). Kangwon Province, one of two provinces divided between North and South Korea, is located on the central eastern coast of the Korean Penin-

sula. Its combined area is 28,050 square kilometers, with 16,898 square kilometers in the south and 11,152 square kilometers in the north. Until 1395 the province was known as Kangnung-do. It is among the least densely populated areas of Korea. The populations of Kangwon in North and South Korea are roughly 1.6 million, respectively. The capitals of Kangwon are Ch'un ch'on in the south and Wonsan in the north. Other important cities in the south include Kangnung and Wonju.

The province is widely known for its great natural beauty, especially along the coast and in the mountains. The Taebaek mountain range, the backbone of the peninsula, runs north-south along the east coast of the province, with its crest approximately 16 kilometers inland. This range is home to Mount Keumkang and Mount Sorak, two of the most scenic mountains in North and South Korea, respectively. Forest still covers 81 percent of the province.

During the World War II Japanese occupation and postwar period, the economy of southern Kangwon was based on mining, agriculture, and heavy industry. In recent years the mining industry has declined, and tourism has emerged as an important economic activity.

Brandon Palmer

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KANNO SUGA (1881–1911), Japanese political activist. Kanno Suga was born in Osaka. Her mother died when she was ten, and her father remarried a woman who was the proverbial bad stepmother to Kanno. At fifteen, Kanno was raped. She became acquainted with socialism by reading an essay defending rape victims. At seventeen, she married into a merchant family in Tokyo to escape her stepmother. She did not return to Osaka until 1902 after her stepmother had left.

Kanno began working at a newspaper and became involved in a Christian women's movement fighting the legal brothel system. When the Russo-Japanese War broke out, she joined the Christian-socialist peace movement. In 1906, she took over a newspaper in Wakayama Prefecture and began a common-law relationship with socialist Arahata Kanson (1887–1981).

After moving to Tokyo, she attended a socialist-anarchist rally where prominent movement leaders were arrested in the Red Flag Incident of June 1908. When visiting her friends in prison she was arrested. After two months she was released and became acquainted with anarchist Kotoku Shusui (1871–1911). They started the publication of an anarchist journal, which was banned by authorities. Kanno was sent back to prison. While in prison, her involvement in a plot to assassinate the emperor was uncovered. With twenty-three others, Kanno was sentenced to death, and on 24 January 1911 she was hanged.

Wim Lunsing

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KANPUR (2001 est. pop. 2.5 million). A major industrial city on the Ganges River in Uttar Pradesh State in northern India, Kanpur was called Cawnpore under British rule, from the ancient town Kanhpur ("city of the husband"), referring to the Hindu god Krishna. Acquired by the British in 1801, it grew rapidly from a village to 123,000 people by 1872 and almost two million by 1991. In the nineteenth century it hosted a large military base. Situated on major highways and railroads, it became a manufacturing center for textiles, leather goods, and ordnance, later supplemented by commerce and banking.

The city gained notoriety as the center of the Indian Mutiny or First War of Independence (1857–1858), a great uprising against British rule, in which

native forces killed and dismembered British women and children as well as soldiers. The British press used the event to illustrate the barbarity of the Indian people. Equally brutal British reprisals followed.

Kanpur boasts several colleges and technological, sugar, and textile institutes, including the Indian Institute of Technology and the National Sugar Institute. Of historical and religious importance is the Valmiki Ashram (associated with the epic poem *Ramayana*), a Hindu glass temple; the Shri Radhakrishna Temple; and museums with antiquities dating from 600 to 1600 BCE.

C. Roger Davis

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KANSAI REGION Kansai is a region in central Japan extending from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean. It includes the Kinki Region in Honshu (the prefectures of Kyoto, Osaka, Mie, Shiga, Hyogo, Nara, and Wakayama), and more broadly is extended to Fukui Prefecture and a part of Shikoku. The term "Kansai" usually connotes a cultural and historical viewpoint, whereas the Kinki Region is an administrative and geographical designation that has clearly defined boundaries. Kansai means "west of barriers" and was used in comparison to Kanto, "east of barriers." A barrier is a checkpoint or *seki* set up on the frontier between the emperor's residence and the outside world. During the Kamakura period (1185–1333), Kansai and Kanto were separated by three checkpoints, "Suzu station" (today Mie Prefecture), "Fuwa station" (Gifu Prefecture), and "Arachi station" (Fukui Prefecture).

Kansai has a rich cultural heritage and played an important role in politics, economics, and culture from ancient times. The capitals of Japan were located in Kansai, Heijo-kyo (Nara City) from 710 and Heian-kyo (Kyoto City) from 794 until the seventeenth century. Presently, Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe form the center of the Kansai Region—the second economic pole after Tokyo (in the Kanto Region).

Nathalie Cavasin

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KANTO REGION (2001 est. pop. 40.1 million). Located in the east central part of Honshu in Japan, Kanto contains the prefectures of Tokyo, Chiba, Saitama, Kanagawa, Gumma, Ibaraki, and Tochigi. It has an area of 32,421 square kilometers. It is referred to in contrast to the Kansai Region. Kanto is the most populated region and the political, economic, and cultural center of the nation. The region's core is the metropolitan area with Tokyo, Yokohama, Kawasaki, and Chiba. There are some criticisms about concentration of these different functions, and suggestions that it may be necessary to decentralize some of them to other locations in Japan for a more balanced regional development. The Japanese government has even considered transferring the capital.

The Keihin (Tokyo-Yokohama district) Industrial Area is Japan's leading commercial and industrial area. Agriculture is declining but still plays an important role in the region's economy. The Tone River has the largest basin of all Japanese rivers and is an important source of water for agriculture in the Kanto Plain as well as for urban and industrial use. Coastal fishing in the Pacific Ocean and Tokyo Bay has declined because of vastly increased catches by deep-sea fishing trawlers and also because of the pollution and land reclamation in Tokyo Bay.

Nathalie Cavasin

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KAO-HSIUNG (2002 est. pop. 1.5 million). Kao-hsiung (in Pinyin, Gaoxiong) is Taiwan's second-largest city. It is situated on the southwest coast of the island. The city was founded during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and was under Dutch occupation from 1624 to 1660. In 1863, Kao-hsiung became a treaty port for trade with the European colonial powers. During the Japanese occupation (1895–1945) of Taiwan, Kao-hsiung was transformed into a major industrial center, and the port sustained heavy damage during World War II. The port was rebuilt, and in the 1970s and 1980s it became Taiwan's single-most important seaport, covering an area of 154 square kilometers. It has shipyards, steel mills, and other heavy industry, as well as Asia's biggest oil refinery with large petrochemical industries. Thus, it is not surprising that the city is among the most heavily polluted in Taiwan. The port also has a large fleet of fishing boats, and agricultural products are exported from Kao-hsiung by ship. Kao-hsiung is of strategic importance with its big naval

base. The city enjoys equal status with Taipei and is administered directly by an executive committee (*yuan*) instead of the Taiwan provincial government. Kao-hsiung has a university and several higher education institutions and an international airport.

Bent Nielsen

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KAPITAN CINA The Kapitan Cina (Chinese captains) were Chinese individuals appointed by local native chiefs and colonial authorities in Asia to mediate with the heterogeneous migrant Chinese populace in their provinces and colonies. The honorific title conferred upon an individual the highest status of leadership of the community.

In Melaka on the Malay Peninsula, the Kapitan system was first adopted in the sixteenth century, first by the Portuguese colonizers and then by the Dutch colonizers. This system continued during British rule and was extended to the Straits Settlements (consisting of Melaka, Penang, and Singapore) and then the Malay States. However, as British power consolidated throughout the peninsula, and as more Chinese immigrants poured into the urban centers, mines, and plantations, the political power of the Kapitan system was seen as a threat to the colonial administrators. It was thus phased out, first in the Straits Settlements and then in the Malay States by the beginning of the twentieth century. It was replaced by various administrative institutions such as Chinese Advisory Boards.

The responsibilities of the Kapitan Cina included looking after the general welfare of the Chinese populace, enforcing law and order, and collecting revenue for the authorities. As Kapitan Cina, they were supposed to transcend the clan and dialect differences among the Chinese populace. In reality, however, the Kapitan Cina were appointed from the dominant dialect groups, and their interests were subsequently better looked after. Minority groups, in turn, formed their own dialect organizations to pool their resources for collective self-help.

Before their appointment as Kapitan Cina, most of these individuals were already established leaders among their Chinese dialect groups. Many were also successful *towkays* (merchant-entrepreneurs) and "rev-

enue farmers" who held monopoly rights to collect taxes on alcohol, opium, and so forth supplied to the workforce in the mines and plantations.

Neither funds nor manpower was usually extended to the Kapitan Cina by the colonial authorities in carrying out their official duties. For many Kapitan Cina, Chinese temples thus became their de facto administrative centers. Additionally, many forged close links with Chinese secret societies in order to enforce their authority and power. When secret societies were eventually banned (in 1890) by the colonial authorities, the Kapitan Cina redirected their attention to dialect organizations.

Seng-Guan Yeob

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KARABAG Karabag (Karabagh, Karabakh) is a region in southeastern Azerbaijan, between the Caucasus and Karabakh mountain ranges. The chief towns are Xankandi and Shusha. Karabag contains many mineral springs as well as substantial deposits of limestone and marble. Farming, sheep herding, and light industries are the primary economic activities. The population is approximately 76 percent Armenian with a substantial Azeri minority and smaller Russian and Kurdish communities.

The region was part of the ancient kingdom of Caucasian Albania before being taken over by Armenia in the first century CE. It was ruled by the Armenian princes of Artsakh (as vassals to various Arab regimes from the seventh century) until conquest by the Seljuks under Alp Arslan (c. 1030–1072/73). It was first called Karabag (Turkish for "Black Garden") during the rule of the Ilkhanid Mongols in the 1300s. It was fought over by Turkey and Persia (Iran) before gaining independence under the Djevanshir family in the mid-1700s. The khanate of Karabag became a vassal to Russia in 1805 and was fully incorporated in 1822. Following the establishment of the Soviet Union it was attached to Azerbaijan as the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (1923).

In the late 1980s, Armenia and Azerbaijan went to war over Karabag. By the end of 1993, Armenian forces had conquered much of the region, displacing over 1 million refugees. A cease-fire was reached with Russian aid in 1994. In 1996, the parliament of Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence, largely unrecognized by the international community. The ultimate disposition of the territory and refugees has yet to be resolved.

Brian M. Gottesman

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KARACHI (1998 pop. 9 million). Before 1725 CE, Karachi, the capital of Pakistan's Sindh Province, was just a desolate geographic region, with the waters of the Arabian Sea lapping over it on three sides. It now boasts a population of over 9 million and is a commercial and industrial center for Pakistan.

Karachi is a city of contrasts where old and new elements blend together. Bazaars reflect the heritage of trade that is at the economic foundation of this city, while a nuclear power plant and higher learning institutions denote its place in the modern era. It also is home to the largest international airport in Pakistan as well as being the chief terminal point for Pakistan's railway transportation system.

Being located on the shores of the Arabian Sea makes Karachi the ideal shipping port. As a result, about 15 billion tons of cargo come through its harbor every year. The sea and Karachi's exceptional weather of constant sunshine throughout the year also



A broad view of Karachi, Pakistan. (NIK WHEELER/CORBIS)

make available recreational and sport activities, such as sailing, yachting, and scuba diving, to its inhabitants as well as foreign tourists to the area.

Houman A. Sadri

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KARAKALPAKS The Karakalpaks (or Qaraqalpaq) are an ethnic group living mainly in the Republic of Karakalpakstan, which occupies the northwestern part of Uzbekistan, bordering Kazakhstan in the north and Turkmenistan in the southwest. There are approximately 600,000 Karakalpaks (based on a 2001 estimate), and about 95 percent of them live in Karakalpakstan. The rest live in various regions of Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. The Karakalpak language belongs to the Kipchak or Kipchak Nogay linguistic subgroup of the Central Turkic group of the Altaic language family (it is close to Kazak, with a strong Uzbek influence). Karakalpaks used the Cyrillic alphabet until 1992; however, under Uzbekistani government pressure, they changed to the Latin alphabet in the mid-1990s (the process is still incomplete due to financial restraints and other difficulties). The majority of Karakalpaks belong to the Hanafi school of Sunni Muslims, like the Kazakhs and Uzbeks. As a part of the independent republic of Uzbekistan, the Karakalpaks became independent from the Soviet Union on 1 September 1991.

Early History

The Karakalpaks have a rich history, rooted in the ancient Turkic tribal confederations in Central Asia. There are several competing schools of thought that attempt to explain the origin of the Karakalpaks. One school, which includes many Karakalpak historians, believes that their ancestors derived from the early Turks, who arrived in Central Asia between the sixth and eighth centuries, and the Oghuz and Pechenegs, who controlled the territory that is now west Kazakhstan and south-central Russia between the eighth and tenth centuries. These historians claim that the name "Karakalpak," which means "Black Hat" in Turkic, may be seen in the twelfth-century Russian chronicles in the form *Chernyi Klobuki*, which means "Black Hats" in Russian.

The opposing school argues that this similarity in terminology has no significance and that the Karakalpaks probably began to distinguish themselves from other Central Asian Turkic tribal confederations in the sixteenth century. According to this theory, after the devastating Mongol invasion of 1219–1221, which resulted in the death or disappearance of a sizable proportion of the population as well as in the destruction of a significant portion of the irrigation system that had been developed by the settled population of the Khorezm khanate, the ancestors of the Karakalpak tribes came under the Nogay Horde, which occupied territory in the Northwestern Central Asian region, including present-day Turkmenistan, western Kazakhstan, and southern Russia. Probably around the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Islam established itself among these tribes (mainly through the activities of the Sufi orders), although early contacts with the Islamic world can be traced to the tenth and eleventh centuries.

By the sixteenth century, the Karakalpaks had begun clearly to differentiate themselves from the Kazakh, Turkmen, and Uzbek tribes and their neighbors and started calling themselves the Karakalpaks. The Karakalpaks controlled the territory of the lower delta of the Syr Dar'ya River, although they frequently moved north and south of this area due to pressure from neighbors and ecological changes, such as droughts and desertification. They gradually consolidated into an amorphous tribal confederation, building their economy on trade with neighboring states, agriculture, and animal husbandry. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Karakalpaks were subjects of the Bukhara khanate (1753–1920), the Kichi Dzhuz (one of the three Kazakh tribal confederations), and the Khiva khanate (1511–1920). In the eighteenth century, there was another important change as most of the Karakalpak tribes moved to the lower delta of the Amu Dar'ya River (this territory corresponds to the present Karakalpak state).

In the early nineteenth century, declining regional trade, technological backwardness, and the Khiva khanate's inability to secure political stability led to economic depression in the area populated by the Karakalpaks. These were the main factors that led the Karakalpaks to offer no or little resistance to Russia's advancement into their land. In 1873, the Karakalpaks' territory became a protectorate of the Russian empire as Russia advanced into Turkistan. Russian rule brought some positive changes, ending the numerous conflicts and political instability in this area, although emerging Russian capitalism aggravated the economic disparities in Karakalpak society.

Soviet Rule

After the Russian empire collapsed in 1917, the Bolsheviks struggled to establish their dominance in Central Asia. They overcame the resistance of the Basmachi movement (a popular militant resistance often sponsored by the British government), and by 1920 they had established full control. In 1925, as the result of national delimitations in Central Asia, the Karakalpak Autonomous Province was established (as part of the Russian Federation), uniting most of the territory populated by the Karakalpaks into a single political entity. In March 1932, it was transformed into the Karakalpak Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (part of the Russian Federation). In December 1936, the Karakalpak Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was transferred to the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic.

Under Soviet rule, the Karakalpaks experienced major changes such as modernization, industrialization, urbanization, eradication of mass illiteracy, and establishment of a modern system of education. The Soviet authorities encouraged the creation of codified written languages, changing from the Arabic alphabet to the Roman alphabet (1928) and then to Cyrillic (1940), and promoted the development of literature, art, and science in the Karakalpak language. The literacy rate was lifted from 1.3 percent in 1926 to 98 percent in 1989; major diseases and the high child mortality rate were halted (at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Karakalpaks had been under threat of extinction due to the absence of medical services, high infant mortality, and epidemics); and a comprehensive social-welfare system was established. However, the Karakalpaks paid a heavy price for these changes, as the political opposition and pre-Soviet era intelligentsia disappeared in Stalin's brutal purges, and intensive agriculture, notably cotton growing, caused ecological disasters such as the Aral Sea's dramatic shrinkage, drinking-water pollution, and salinization of arable land.

Independence

On 1 September 1991, Uzbekistan declared its independence from the Soviet Union. In December 1991, the founding member-states of the Soviet Union signed the historic document of dissolution of the U.S.S.R. This action peacefully ended almost seventy-two years of Soviet rule. The first post-Soviet constitution of Uzbekistan granted to the Karakalpaks the status of a "sovereign republic" with its own constitution and separate judiciary, but retained Tashkent's control over defense, foreign policy, and taxation, among other issues.

Karakalpak Society

Most Karakalpaks live in predominantly rural areas and preserve many major features of their traditional life. Large families with more than four children are quite common; in 1999, the average size of a Karakalpak rural family was 6.7 people, down from 7.1 in 1989. Several generations often live in the same household or in close neighborhoods. Groups of extended families form a subclanic unit called the *kosbe*; several *kosbes* make up the *uru*. People are still expected to trace their ancestors back as many as seven generations and to know their tribal affiliation. During major events and family gatherings, the *bakbsy* (folk singers) or the *zhyrau* (storytellers) are often invited to sing the songs of heroes, the *dastans* (epics), and to play traditional musical instruments, such as the *dutar* (a two-stringed, plucked instrument), the *kobuz* (bowed instruments), and various others. Many Karakalpak families still create such craft items as homemade rugs, carpet braids (*akkur*), broad fringes (*zhanbau*), and silver jewelry.

Rafis Abazov

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KARAKALPAKSTAN—PROFILE (2002 est. pop. 1.6 million). Karakalpakstan, officially the Republic of Karakalpakstan (Qoraqalpokiston Respublikasy in Karakalpak, Karakalpakia in Russian), is an autonomous republic within the Republic of Uzbekistan in central Asia. It is bordered by Kazakhstan in the north, Turkmenistan in the southwest, and Uzbekistan in the east. It also shares with Kazakhstan the southern portion of the Aral Sea. The nation has an area of 165,600 square kilometers, and it is the largest administrative entity in the Republic of Uzbekistan, occupying almost 37 percent of its territory. Karakalpakstan's capital city, Nukus, is located in the northeast of the nation, a few kilometers from the border with Uzbekistan.

According to its constitution, Karakalpakstan has a broad autonomy in cultural, economic, and social issues, although in reality it is under strict centralized control of Uzbekistan's government.

Population

The population of Karakalpakstan is approximately 6 percent of the Uzbekistani population. It is a predominantly rural nation, with 48.4 percent of the population living in cities and towns. Nukus was home to about 254,000 people in 2002, up from 139,000 in 1985. The republic's population is young, with 37 percent below the age of fourteen and only 5 percent older than sixty-five. Karakalpakstan has a population growth rate of 1.6 percent or higher and a net migration rate of -2.18 migrants per 1,000 people. It is difficult to project the dynamics of population growth because of the remoteness of Karakalpakstan, scarce statistics, and a high infant mortality rate of more than 72 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1999. Karakalpakstan still has one of the lowest population densities in central Asia, standing at nine people per square kilometer. However, since the 1990s a number of young people have moved from rural areas to the areas around the capital in search of jobs and new opportunities.

Karakalpakstan is a multiethnic nation with a very diverse population. Karakalpaks make up approximately 32 percent of the population, Uzbeks around 30 percent, Kazakhs around 26 percent, and Turkmen around 4 percent; Russians, Tatars, Koreans, and other small groups make up the remaining 8 percent. Historically, the territory of Karakalpakstan was populated by ethnic groups of Turkic origin that migrated with their sheep and camels through the area. During Russian and Soviet rule, many Russians and people from different parts of the USSR were settled in the republic, many of them forcibly. Since 1991, the ethnic structure has changed slightly, as many urban Russians and other ethnic groups emigrated from Karakalpakstan, although the precise number is unknown.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Karakalpaks were under the threat of extinction due to diseases, a high mortality rate, and the absence of medical services. After 1920, the Soviet government invested heavily in medical services and built a number of hospitals in the republic. The Soviet government also promoted the policy of population growth. For these and other reasons, the number of Karakalpaks almost doubled between 1926 and 1970 and again from 1970 to 1989, reaching 411,870 in 1989. According to the official estimates, there were around 600,000 Karakalpaks in 2001, most of them (around 95 percent) living in the republic.

Society, Religion, and Culture

The Karakalpak language belongs to the Kipchak or Kipchak-Nogay linguistic subgroup of the Central Turkic group of the Altaic language family (it is close to Kazakh with strong Uzbek influence), and it is the official language of the nation, along with Uzbek. The majority of the population, including ethnic minorities, speaks Karakalpak and Uzbek, although during the Soviet era the Russian language was widely used in administration and education. After 1991, Turkey offered assistance to Uzbekistan, and consequently to Karakalpakstan, in shifting from the Cyrillic to Latin script (Soviet authorities initiated the shift from the Arabic alphabet to Latin in 1928 and then from Latin to Cyrillic in 1940).

The majority of Karakalpakstan's population (around 96 percent) is Muslim. The Karakalpaks embraced Islam mainly through the activities of the Sufi (Muslim mystic) orders in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, although some elements of shamanistic rituals from the pre-Islamic era may still be traced in the republic.

The people in Karakalpakstan strongly preserve major features of a traditional seminomadic society, and interethnic marriages and migration outside of the republic are still rare. Tribal affiliation still plays an important role in everyday life in Karakalpak society. Groups of extended families usually live together and form a subclanic unit called the *kosbe*; several *kosbes* make up an *uru*. Soviet modernization contributed to the preservation of these traditional structures by encouraging the Karakalpaks to settle and to join the *kolkhozy* and *sovkhozy* (state-controlled collective farms) in the 1920s and 1930s. Whole families and *kosbes* settled collectively in the same place and joined the same *kolkhozy*. Karakalpaks, especially in rural areas, continue to keep ancient secrets of their traditional arts of homemade rugs, carpet braids (*akkur*), broad fringes (*zhanbau*), and silver jewelry for family use, for dowry, and increasingly for commercial sale in the market.

Political System

The Karakalpaks are first mentioned in various sources in the sixteenth century. Their political organization resembled typical nomadic political entities, which were characterized by an absence of strong centralized political authority and rigid political organizations. The tribes and subtribal groups were governed by the *bis* or *batyrs* (representatives of tribal nobility and armed leaders). Various historical sources mention that the Karakalpaks were subjects of the Bukhara khanate in the seventeenth century and then subjects of the Kazakh khans in the eighteenth century. In the

late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Khiva khanate became increasingly active in the areas traditionally populated by the Karakalpak tribes, and by 1811 most of the Karakalpak tribes came under the rule of Khiva, in spite of their considerable resistance and uprisings. The Khiva khanate itself became a Russian protectorate in 1873. This development divided the Karakalpak tribes: those who lived on the right bank of the Amu Dar'ya River became subjects of the Russian empire, and those who lived on the left bank were still subjects of the Khiva ruler.

After the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, the Karakalpak territory on the right bank of the Amu Dar'ya was incorporated into the Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR), whereas a significant number of the Karakalpaks remained under the Khiva khanate, and later, after its abolishment, under the Khorezm People's Soviet Republic. In 1924, the TASSR government agreed to bring together the land populated by the Karakalpaks into one political entity, and in 1925 the Karakalpak Autonomous Province was established as a part of the Russian federation. This action united most of the territory populated by the Karakalpaks into a single political entity. In March 1932, the Karakalpak Autonomous Province was transformed into the Karakalpak Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (KASSR) within the Kazakh ASSR (still a part of the Russian federation). In December 1936, the KASSR was transferred to the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. Under the Soviets, there was an attempt to replace the traditional political organization of the society with a system based on political parties, parliamentary legislation, and Communist ideology. Karakalpakstan preserved its one-party political system, dominated by the Communist Party, until 1991.

On 1 September 1991, Uzbekistan declared its independence from the Soviet Union, and in December 1991 the founding republics of the Soviet Union signed a historic document mandating the peaceful and voluntary dissolution of the USSR. On 8 December 1992, Uzbekistan adopted its first post-Soviet constitution. It granted the Karakalpak ASSR the status of a "sovereign republic," its own constitution, independence in administrative issues, and a separate judiciary. This constitution was influenced by the Soviet legal tradition, especially in arranging the center-province relations and defining the terms for cultural and political autonomy. Constitutionally, Karakalpakstan, as a part of the Republic of Uzbekistan, enjoys broad autonomy in internal administrative and cultural affairs, although the conduct of foreign policy and foreign trade is firmly in the hands of the central authorities in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan. Karakalpakstan has its own gov-

ernment and, theoretically, the right to leave the Republic of Uzbekistan through national referendum, although the detailed procedure for the referendum was not established. Karakalpakstan, along with Uzbekistan, abandoned the one-party political system in 1991. At present, any political party is tolerated as long as it acts within the framework of the law, is loyal to the regime, and is officially registered by government authorities. According to official reports, at present there are several active parties in the republic. All of them are progovernment parties, approved by the Uzbekistani government, and often they act as the branches of larger Uzbekistani parties, such as the People's Democratic Party (formerly the Communist Party), Vatan Tarakiyoti (Fatherland Progress Party), Milly Tiklanish (Democratic National Rebirth Party), and others. However, tribal and ethnic political mobilization is still strong in Karakalpakstan and plays an important role in domestic politics.

Economy

Karakalpakstan has a relatively small economy due to its small size (slightly larger than the state of New York), harsh climate, small population, and extremely limited natural resources. Agriculture and agricultural-product processing are the two main sectors of the national economy. Traditionally, most of the Karakalpaks were engaged in subsistence animal husbandry, raising sheep, goats, and cattle, and a few of them were engaged in crop cultivation (mainly around the Amu Dar'ya River). Most of Karakalpakstan is dry land unsuitable for crop cultivation without substantial irrigation, although vast areas in the west and northwest of the republic could be used as pasture for sheep and goats. The areas in the south traditionally have well-established irrigation systems, and these areas produce most of the cotton and silk. The areas in the north, mainly near the Aral Sea, were affected by salinization caused by the intensive use of water from the Amu Dar'ya River for the irrigation of cotton fields in other regions of Uzbekistan. In the 1980s and 1990s, almost the entire outflow of this river was taken for irrigation, causing shrinking of the Aral Sea from 68,000 square kilometers in 1960 to 33,800 square kilometers in 1992 (the sea's volume was reduced by around 75 percent). Despite this natural disaster the republic has significant economic potential because it has unexploited natural resources, including oil and possibly minerals.

After establishing the Soviet political system in the middle of the 1920s, the Soviet authorities introduced major economic changes throughout the Soviet Union. They nationalized most businesses, banned private ownership of land, and introduced central state

planning and control over the economy. Most Karakalpaks were drawn to *kolkhozy* and were encouraged to abandon subsistence agriculture in favor of intensive agricultural production for the all-union market. Karakalpakstan significantly increased production of cotton, meat, wool, and other products for the Soviet market. Karakalpakstan established its industrial sector based mainly on agricultural-product processing. The government built new roads, electrical power stations, and new industrial enterprises. At the same time, private entrepreneurship was strongly discouraged, and cost inefficiencies and ecological downsides of large-scale production were ignored. Karakalpakstan relied heavily on subsidies from the central state budget due to price and other economic distortion and extensive centralized control.

After dissolution of the USSR, the government of Karakalpakstan, along with the government of Uzbekistan, adopted a policy of gradual change, slowly abandoning the centralized planning and easing state control over enterprises, dismantling collective farms, and privatizing most small and medium-sized enterprises. Subsidies to support local enterprises were significantly reduced, but unlike in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, they were not abandoned completely.

Karakalpakstan, along with Uzbekistan, experienced painful economic decline after independence as the Soviet market on which it had depended collapsed. It did not suffer in this regard as severely as neighboring Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan, however. Statistical data for Karakalpakstan are often unavailable, but its economic development is largely in line with Uzbekistan's as its economic policy is defined in Tashkent. According to the World Bank, Uzbekistan's agricultural sector accounts for 32.9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), with industry accounting for 24.5 percent and services 37.8 percent. Between 1989 and 1999 average annual GDP growth in Uzbekistan was negative, declining at an annual average of around 1.0 percent, with industrial production declining at an annual average of 4.0 percent and agriculture 0.2 percent.

Agriculture is not only the most important sector of Karakalpakstan's economy, but also the source of income for almost half of the population. Animal herding provides everyday food and a mode of transportation; livestock are also an important export. The Karakalpaks migrate around vast prairies and deserts raising horses, sheep, goats, cattle, and camels. In 2000, livestock numbers in Karakalpakstan reached 383,800 cattle, 466,900 sheep, and 16,800 horses. Crop cultivation (cotton, rice, corn, vegetables) in Karakalpakstan is limited due to the extremely dry continental climate and a chronic water shortage. After privatization of the large state-controlled

farms and the creation of a system of small private farming, crop production fell sharply. A combination of mismanagement and ecological disaster related to the declining level of the Aral Sea led to depression in the agricultural-product processing industries. Since 1991, many farmers have struggled to adapt to the new economic realities and have turned to a subsistence economy. In 2000, Karakalpakstan experienced its worst drought in decades, and its government requested food assistance of 80,000 metric tons of wheat and 3,000 metric tons of vegetable oil for distribution to 1.1 million people in rural regions.

The industrial sector is relatively small and includes light industry (leather goods and carpets), agricultural-product processing plants, food-processing plants, and mining. Oil, limestone, gypsum, asbestos, and marble are major natural resources of export significance. Karakalpakstan still relies largely on Russian technology in this sector of the economy, although Russian involvement began to diminish during the 1990s, and multinational corporations started to move into the mining sector.

Tourism is an underdeveloped sector of the economy, limited by lack of accommodation facilities and transport infrastructure. However, it has great potential, especially in adventure tourism, due to the fascinating history of the Silk Road and rare historical sites, including the ancient ruins of Toprak-Kala (dating to approximately the first or second century CE). The retail sector is also quite underdeveloped by Western standards and consists of numerous small shops and restaurants.

Electrical power is supplied by the Takhiatash and other electric power stations, covering the republic's needs and exporting the balance to other parts of Uzbekistan. However, due to inadequate maintenance and underinvestment, power cuts are frequent, and some remote areas still live without electricity, using instead diesel, wood, and dried cattle and camel dung as fuel. In the 1950s, a railway was built, connecting Uzbekistan with the Russian railway system via Karakalpakstan. Highways are unevenly distributed, and only 1,172 kilometers are paved, mainly in the southeastern part of the republic. In the north and northwest, horses and camels are still important modes of transportation.

Since the early 1990s, the government of Uzbekistan has been conducting a policy of economic liberalization and deregulation, encouraging the private sector and foreign investments. According to the Ministry of Macroeconomics and Statistics (MMS), the 9,069 small and medium-sized enterprises registered in Karakalpakstan in July 2000 accounted for 4.6 percent of all en-

terprises in Uzbekistan. Their total exports reached \$33,105,000 in 1999. Karakalpakstan attracted 13.8 billion sums (the currency of Uzbekistan) of investments (official exchange rate in 2000: 141.4 sums per \$1) or 9,100 sums per capita (fourth highest among regions in Uzbekistan). Karakalpakstan increasingly relies on the export of raw materials to the international market, and it is extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in world prices for its major export products—cotton and wool.


The economic changes of the 1990s, including the partial liberalization of the economy and abandonment of state guarantees of employment, hit the population of Karakalpakstan hard. According to the MMS, in Karakalpakstan the labor force stood at 484,000 in 2000, and the number of registered unemployed was around 8,700 or 2 percent. However, international assistance organizations and experts put the unemployment rate much higher, at 20–25 percent of the labor force. In 1999, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index put Uzbekistan in 106th place, behind Moldova and Cape Verde but ahead of Algeria, Vietnam, and Indonesia. According to the Uzbekistani national UNDP report, in Karakalpakstan the real GDP per capita was 42.4 percent lower than in Uzbekistan overall in 1999.

Rafis Abazov

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KARAKORAM HIGHWAY The Karakoram Highway, known to the Chinese as the Friendship Highway, is an engineering masterpiece. It is a stretch of highway that was built in the north of Pakistan, where some of the mountains extend to altitudes of seven to eight thousand meters. The Karakoram



Highway runs along the Indus River and then dips into the Gilgit and Hunza valleys, culminating in a climb of 4,800 meters to the Khunjerab Pass, which serves as a dividing line between Pakistan and China. It took twenty years to complete the highway, which began in 1966 as the brainchild of both Chinese and Pakistani engineers to facilitate trade between China and Pakistan. Several hundred people lost their lives during its construction, which involved pushing, blasting, and leveling the terrain between Islamabad and Kashgar. The highway follows the path of what was once known as the Silk Road because of the caravans that followed it with loads of silk and other valuable trade goods.

The Karakoram Highway opened in Pakistan in 1982, finally opening to travelers to and from China in 1986. Today, heavy traffic flows between Pakistan and China's Xinjiang Province. Due to the many beautiful cities and sights along the way, which include Kohistan, Gilgit, Hunza, and Skardu, the Karakoram Highway is a popular way for visitors to travel in this area.

Houman A. Sadri

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KARAKORAM MOUNTAINS The Karakoram Mountains extend 500 kilometers (310 miles) from India's Ladakh Himalaya, northwest through Pakistan to the Afghan Hindu Kush. The icy summits separate South Asia's Pakistan and part of India to the southwest from Central Asia's far western China and Tibet to the northeast. The colliding Indian Ocean and Eurasian tectonic plates have uplifted over forty peaks above 6,000 meters (20,000 feet) into numerous parallel ridges occupying 207,000 square kilometers (80,000 square miles). All four non-Himalayan 8,000-meter (26,250 feet) peaks are located here, of which K2 (8,611 meters; 28,251 feet) is second only to Mount Everest. The longest midlatitude glaciers (five exceed 48 kilometers; 30 miles) in length supply meltwater for 10 million downstream farmers along the Indus (South Asia) and Tarim (Central Asia) Rivers. The summer monsoon brings Indian Ocean moisture into the parched southern Karakoram, but high peaks create a rain shadow north of the crest where annual precipitation averages just 100 millimeters (4 inches).

Human settlement is concentrated on the moister southern slopes of the Pakistan Karakoram. The towns of Gilgit and Skardu number 40,000 people. The population in the Ladakh region of India is localized in Leh (9,000 people) and in over one hundred small villages throughout the mountains. Shi'ite Muslims predominate in Pakistan, while Tibetan Buddhists prevail in Ladakh. Minority Tajiks, Kyrgyz, and Uighurs are common in the more remote northern Karakoram. Subsistence farming and livestock raising dominate the economy. The primary crops are wheat, barley, buckwheat, corn, and potatoes. Apricots and walnuts are an important but declining food source.

Since 1975, Indian and Pakistani troops have fought on the Siachen Glacier to adjudicate their international frontier. National pride, ethnic enclaves, and the headwaters of the mighty Indus River are at stake. In 1994, the governments of China and Pakistan opened the Karakoram Highway to the public. This renewed tourism, commerce, and immigration along this ancient Silk Road artery.

Stephen F. Cunha

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The Karakoram Mountains as seen from the Dras Valley in Ladakh, northern India, in 1975. (CHARLES & JOSETTE LENARS/CORBIS)

KARAKORUM Karakorum (also known as Kharakhorin), located in Ovorhangai, Mongolia, on the Orhon River, was the thirteenth-century imperial capital of the successors of Genghis (or Chinggis) Khan. At its height, the city was a busy metropolis served by soldiers, merchants, and craftspeople, many of the latter imported from lands conquered by the Mongolian military. The ancient city, with an area of 400 meters by 400 meters, was protected from attackers by a fortified wall, and near each of the wall's four gates, four giant granite turtle sculptures were said to protect the city from a potentially more dangerous threat: periodic floods. Only one of these statues remains today. The town's most exotic monument was designed by the French sculptor Guillaume Bouchier, who lived in the twelfth century CE. The fountain he designed allegedly flowed with five different libations—honey, vodka, wine, cow's milk, and *airag* (fermented mare's milk).

Archaeological evidence from the eighth century demonstrates that Karakorum was not the first settlement on this site, neither was it the last. After being destroyed by Chinese invaders in the fourteenth century, the settlement and its building stones were recycled in 1586 to build the Erdene Zuu monastery, a Buddhist religious center. Although the ruined city was lost for several centuries, its precise location was redetermined by two Russian scholars in 1889.

Daniel Hruschka

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KARA-KUM CANAL The V. I. Lenin Kara-Kum Canal, which diverts about 40 percent of the waters of the Amu Dar'ya across the Kara-Kum Desert to southern Turkmenistan, flows for almost 800 kilometers and in 1973 irrigated 440,000 hectares of land mostly used for cotton cultivation. The canal originates at Oba, Turkmenistan, 10 kilometers from the Afghan border and 10 kilometers from Kerki. The main areas of irrigation are the Mary, Tedzhen, and Ashkhabad (Ashgabat) oases.

The canal was approved in 1947, although engineering work was not begun in earnest until 1954. The initial 400 kilometers from the Amu Dar'ya to the Merv oasis was completed in 1959. By 1960 a further 140 kilometers to the Tedzhen oasis had been built. In 1962



the canal reached Ashkhabad and in 1967 the 300-kilometer section from Tedzhen to Goek Tepe was completed. The canal ends at the Kopet Dagh Reservoir, which has a capacity of 190 million cubic meters. There are a further two reservoirs at Ashkhabad of 6 million cubic meters and 48 million cubic meters. The canal is navigable for 450 kilometers. Catfish, carp, and barbel are commercially fished from the canal's waters.

Although the canal has been described as one of the most impressive technical feats of Soviet engineering, it has been the cause of a number of environmental problems. Some estimates suggest that as much as 45 percent of the water entering the canal is lost to evaporation and seepage. These losses result in more diversion from the Amu Dar'ya and cause a major reduction in the Amu Dar'ya's flow, contributing to the disappearance of the Aral Sea. Seepage has also led to soil salinization due to a rise in the water table.

Will Myer

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KARA-KUM DESERT The Kara-Kum (Gara-gum) Desert (in Turkish *gara* means "black" and *gum* means "desert") is a large midlatitude desert occupying approximately 80 percent of the territory of the Republic of Turkmenistan and portions of southwestern Uzbekistan. Even though most of the desert is



composed of sand, sand dunes, and hard rocky surfaces (*takir* in Russian), portions have been used as pasture for camels and, during the Soviet period, as irrigated cotton acreage.

The Kara-Kum Canal, begun in 1954, runs along the southern part of the desert. It diverts water from the middle course of the Amu Dar'ya River westward, crosses the Murghab River delta in the southeastern portion of the desert, and runs along the northern foothills of the Kopet-Dag toward the Caspian Sea. It is approximately 1,400 kilometers long and provides most of the water for personal and agricultural uses in Turkmenistan.

Most of the canal is unlined, and waterlogging and soil salinization are major problems in areas of the desert around the canal because of seepage. The canal is also the greatest single contributor to the shrinking of the Aral Sea, as the canal diverts the largest amount of water among all the irrigation structures in the Aral Sea basin.

David R. Smith

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KARAOKE The word *karaoke* (literally, "empty orchestra") refers to both amplified singing to prerecorded accompaniment and the equipment designed to enable that practice. Although various claims have been made to its exact origins, most scholars agree that karaoke's birth came in the early 1970s in Japan, when

bars began to use professional recording machinery to accompany amateur singers. The tremendous popularity of karaoke throughout Japan, other areas of Asia, and many parts of the world made it a global phenomenon by the 1990s.

In Japan, karaoke's popularity stems from a long-standing tradition of amateur music-making at social gatherings. At these gatherings, singing is regarded as something both to participate in and to perform. The social etiquette surrounding karaoke in Japan emphasizes participation: all singers receive applause, but little critique. At the same time, an industry of singing lessons, amateur organizations, ranked competitions, and instructional publications and television programs emphasize song performance.

In 1978, karaoke extended from bars into homes through the development of a low-budget version called "home karaoke." This encouraged the development of karaoke as a hobby. In the meantime, karaoke equipment included an increasing number of vocal enhancers, including reverberation. The switch from audiotape to compact disc in 1983 resulted in greater ease and range of musical transposition, allowing people to sing a wider variety of songs. In the mid-1980s, videodisc and, later, laser disc use introduced video-projected images to karaoke. This shifted the experience from a strictly musical one to a visually enhanced, and some might say visually dominated, performance. In 1986, the development of karaoke "boxes" (business establishments that rent out private rooms equipped with karaoke machines) transformed commercial karaoke from a public performance into a private one. The spread of "boxes" and expansion of business into daytime hours extended karaoke beyond the late-night bar scene, into the everyday worlds of housewives, students, and even children.

In Asia, karaoke is regarded both as a local practice in the singing of local songs and as a Japanese import, especially as the manufacture of equipment, satellite broadcasting of songs, and online video networks all originate in Japan.

Christine R. Yano

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KARATE Karate is a modern Japanese martial art that developed in the early twentieth century and is based on traditional Okinawan unarmed combat techniques. Karate involves the use of punching, striking, kicking, and blocking to ward off an opponent and to counterattack. Since the founding of the Nippon Karate Kyokai (Japan Karate Association) in 1957, karate has become a popular martial art and sport around the world, with an estimated 15 million practitioners. Important in the spread of karate to the West were the Bruce Lee and other kung-fu movies and television shows of the 1970s and 1980s. Other than Lee, those responsible for the development and spread of karate are the founder, the Okinawan Gichin Funakoshi (1868–1957), who brought karate to Japan, and Matsutatsu Oyama, who brought it to the United States in 1952.

Karate is now used as a form of physical training, as a form of self-defense, and as a competitive sport and is especially popular with women. Because of its rather late development, it is not so heavily imbued with the philosophical and spiritual elements of other Asian martial arts. Nonetheless, there are distinct schools of karate and a basic division between those who prefer the traditional noncontact style and those who prefer the contact sport style.

Benny Josef Peiser

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KARBALA (2002 est. pop. 550,000). Karbala is a city in central Iraq, eighty-eight kilometers southwest of Baghdad. It is one of the holiest cities of Shi'a Islam (adherents of the Shi'a branch of Islam today account for one-tenth of the world's Muslim population) and a center of pilgrimage. Prior to their mass expulsion during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1990), people of Iranian descent constituted one-half of the city's population.

In 680 CE the plain upon which Karbala later rose was the site of a battle between the army of the Umayyad caliph (the spiritual and political leader of followers of Sunni Islam, the largest branch of Islam) and

a small band led by Husayn ibn 'Ali (c. 626–680), the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, the third imam of Twelver Shi'a Islam (the dominant sect of Shi'a Islam), and its foremost symbol of martyrdom. It is believed that after the defeat of his rebellion, Husayn's decapitated body was buried where it fell. A few years later his tomb had already become a center of pilgrimage, and by the mid-eighth century a shrine was built over it. The shrine was damaged and rebuilt several times, most notably in 1801 by desert nomads and in 1991 during Baghdad's suppression of the mass rebellion that followed the Persian Gulf War (1990–1991). Today the sanctuary surrounding the shrine, with its three minarets, gilded dome, mosque, and adjoining Shi'a college, is one of the greatest in the Islamic world. Nearby is a smaller sanctuary and shrine built for al-'Abbas, Husayn's half-brother and standard bearer. Because popular Shi'ite belief guarantees paradise to all who are buried in Karbala, the outskirts of the city are dominated by large cemeteries. To the west of the city are the ruins of al-Ukhaydir, an early Abbasid castle.

Thaabit Abdullah

KAREN Despite their large numbers, the Karen (Kayin) are one of the least documented peoples in the history of Myanmar (Burma). Even the modern Karen population figure is disputed. Karen nationalists claim a total of 7 million, whereas government statistics put the figure closer to 3 million. Part of the difference is due to the number of Buddhist Karens in the Irrawaddy Delta region who no longer speak Karen. A further factor is the diversity of Karen subgroups inhabiting different parts of the country. They share, however, many aspects of language, culture, and myth.

The Karen language displays many singular characteristics, usually being categorized on its own as a remote branch of Sino-Tibetan. Legend ascribes the migration of the Karen peoples into Burma from across the "River of Shifting Sands," identified by some Karens as the Gobi Desert. The first Karens are thought to have arrived in Upper Burma during the early centuries CE and then to have migrated southward through the Irrawaddy, Sittang, and Salween river valleys. In modern-day Myanmar, Karen-speaking peoples can be found from the Irrawaddy Delta in the west through the Pegu Yoma highlands in the center to the mountains of the Karen, Shan, and Kayah borderlands in the east. Here, in the hills above Toungoo, the greatest diversity of Karen subgroups live. An estimated 200,000 Karens also live in neighboring Thailand.



A twelve-year-old Karen boy poses with a rifle in a Karen rebel camp on 31 January 2000, the 51st anniversary of Karen Revolution Day. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

Around twenty subgroups have been identified among the Karens in Myanmar. By far the most numerous are the Pwo and Sgaw. Other large populations include the Pao (Taungthu), Kayah, and Kayan (Padaung). From these communities, four distinctive political identities emerged during the twentieth century: the mainstream Karen, the Pao, the Karenni of Kayah State, and the Kayan, who inhabit the Shan-Kayah borderlands.

Karen nationalism in its present-day forms first began during British rule. Following the inception of the Karen National Association by Christian Karens in 1881, the drive for self-determination accelerated. At the turn of the twenty-first century, perhaps only 20 percent of Karens were Christians; most Karens are Buddhists. During the colonial era, however, the British were initially perceived as protectors against historical aggression by their Burman neighbors, and many Karens joined the British army, fighting on the Allied side against the Japanese and Aung San's Burma Independence Army during World War II. Karens also achieved high office in government, notably Dr. San C. Po (1870–1946), who in the 1920s was the first to advocate the creation of an independent Karen homeland, to be known as Kawthoolei.

Po's dream, however, was never achieved, and it was not until 1952 that a much reduced Karen State was created in the Thai borderlands. Various Karen insurgencies have continued over subsequent decades, reflecting continuing demands for greater autonomy and political freedoms. Despite their long-standing sufferings in the conflict, many Karen communities, especially in the Thai borderlands, have continued to offer staunch resistance to central government control. This resulted in continuing Myanmar army of-

fensives in border areas, the displacement of many Karen villages, reports of forced labor and other human-rights abuses, and the flight of more than 100,000 Karen refugees into Thailand.

Martin Smith

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KAREN NATIONAL UNION Since its establishment in February 1947, the Karen National Union (KNU) has been the leading opposition voice among the Karen people in Myanmar (Burma). Saw Ba U Gyi and the KNU's founders were largely pro-British intellectuals who advocated legal methods to achieve self-determination for a pan-Karen state. But after boycotting the 1947 general election, the KNU became increasingly marginalized from decisions affecting the country's future.

In January 1949, against a backdrop of rising intercommunal violence, the KNU resorted to armed struggle. Joined by defectors from the Karen Rifles in the Burmese army, KNU forces seized large areas of territory, including, at one stage, Mandalay and Toungoo. Saw Ba U Gyi was killed in a 1950 ambush and the KNU was forced back from the towns, but remained the largest insurgent force in lower Burma throughout the 1950s.

A damaging ideological split occurred in 1963–1964, and KNU president Saw Hunter Thamwe and several hundred followers made a unilateral peace deal with the military government of General Ne Win, who had seized power in 1962. For the next decade, leadership of the KNU in the Irrawaddy Delta and Pegu Yoma regions was taken over by a left-wing faction, the Karen National United Party (KNUP), headed by

an ethnic Pwo Karen named Mahn Ba Zan. Meanwhile, the KNU's "Eastern Division" along the Thai border remained under the control of pro-Western nationalists, led by Bo Mya (b. 1926), a local Sgaw hill Karen. Mahn Ba Zan rejoined with Bo Mya in 1968.

After enduring repeated Burmese army offensives, the remaining KNUP/KNU forces in the Irrawaddy Delta and Pegu Yoma were destroyed by 1975, with only a few hundred soldiers escaping to KNU territory in the mountains in the east. Here, under Bo Mya's hard-line leadership, the reunited KNU flourished over a ten-year period, controlling much of the lucrative black market trade with Thailand. As a result, the KNU became the dominant force in the eleven-party National Democratic Front, which shared the KNU's headquarters at Mannerplaw. It was also into KNU territory that thousands of students and democracy activists fled after the military State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) assumed power in 1988.

During the 1990s, however, the authority of the KNU was steadily undermined. Constant Myanmar army offensives as well as cease-fires by NDF allies and defections from KNU ranks (notably by the breakaway Democratic Karen Buddhist Army) saw many KNU base areas collapse, forcing around 100,000 Karen refugees to flee into Thailand. In 1995–1996, the KNU held unsuccessful peace talks with the SLORC government, and, in 2000, Bo Mya was replaced by Padoh Ba Thin as president. But five decades after its founding, the party is struggling for its very survival.

Martin Smith

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KAREN STATE (1992 est. pop. 1.3 million). The present-day Karen (Kayin) State was created in 1952 by parliamentary legislation to a background of political controversy. A mountainous and landlocked territory covering 30,383 square kilometers, Karen State consists largely of the former Salween Division under the British Frontier Areas Administration, with the ad-

dition of the adjoining Thandaung, Paan, Hlaingbwe, Kawkareik, and Kyain districts. With a capital at the then village of Paan (Hpa-an), it probably did not include even one-quarter of the Karen population in Myanmar (Burma) at that time.

As a result, Karen nationalist demands were not met and development in Karen State has been greatly hindered by the armed conflict that has continued ever since. The 1992 population was calculated by the government at 1.26 million, of whom over 700,000 were Karens (including 70,000 Paos), 220,000 Mons, and 170,000 Burmans, as well as small numbers of Shans, Indians, and other nationalities. Demographic statistics in Karen State are unreliable, however, because of the fighting of past decades. As many as one-third of the population is internally displaced from their homes, and over one hundred thousand refugees have fled into Thailand.

The state is dominated physically by the Dawna Range, which runs along the border with Thailand, before merging with steep mountains that continue northward above the town of Papun. These mountains are flanked by the Kayah and Shan states to the east and the Mandalay and Pegu (Bago) divisions to the north and northwest. The highest peak is Nattaung, which stands at 2,623 meters.

The most important river is the Salween (Thanlwin), which runs southward through the state into the broad plains area that adjoins Mon State in the southwest. Paddy, tobacco, betel nut, rubber, sesame, groundnut, and sugar cane are the principal crops under cultivation. Natural resources include antimony, copper, tin, and iron. Over half the land area is also covered with forests, but many of the most valuable teak and other timber reserves have been depleted by the logging trade with Thailand that accelerated during the 1990s and has been little controlled.

Under the State Law and Order Restoration Council government, which assumed power in 1988, there were attempts to upgrade the roads and local infrastructure. A principal objective was to speed up communication between the nearby estuary port of Moulmein (Mawlamyine) in Mon State and Thailand in the east through the border towns of Myawaddy and Three Pagodas Pass. This latter outpost was captured from insurgent Karen National Union (KNU) control in 1990.

Economic change, however, was slow, because of the continuing fighting as well as the lack of investment and long-term planning. In the mid-1990s, Paan was opened up to foreign tourists for the first time after a cease-fire by the New Mon State Party and a breakaway from the

KNU by the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, which resettled several thousand villagers in surrounding areas. But despite its strategic position in the geopolitical region, at the beginning of the twenty-first century it seemed that progress in Karen State remained unlikely without peace and political reform.

Martin Smith

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KARIMOV, ISLAM (b. 1938), President of Uzbekistan. For over a decade, Islam Karimov has been the central figure in the politics of the Central Asian nation of Uzbekistan. Islam Karimov was born on 30 January 1938 in a town outside of Samarqand in present-day Uzbekistan. He graduated from the Polytechnic Institute in Tashkent in 1960 and worked as an engineer at the Tashkent Aviation plant from 1960 until 1966. At that point, having completed a degree program at the Institute of National Economics, Karimov took a job at the State Planning Agency (Gosplan), where he worked from 1966 to 1983. He was appointed minister of finance of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic in April 1983 and rose to the rank of



President Karimov (right) at a press conference with U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on 5 October 2001. Rumsfeld was in Uzbekistan to discuss the use of Uzbekistan territory to launch attacks against the Taliban in Afghanistan. (AFP/CORBIS)

first secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan in June of 1989. In March 1990, the Supreme Soviet elected him president, a position he carried over into the post-Soviet era.

Karimov was able to weather the breakup of the Soviet Union by declaring Uzbekistan independent in August 1991 and winning a December 1991 presidential election with 86 percent of the vote. He pushed through a referendum in March 1995 that extended his term and overwhelmingly won reelection in January 2000. In addition, by crafting a constitution that emphasized presidential authority, he has been able to maintain a tight grip on the political system of the nation. Furthermore, President Karimov has been able to thwart efforts on the part of a weak and divided opposition to seriously challenge his authority. The West has often criticized him for his nation's poor human rights record—to which he has responded that such actions are necessary to maintain stability.

Roger D. Kangas

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KARIZ IRRIGATION SYSTEM *Kariz* (also known as *kareze* or *qanat*) is an ancient underground channel irrigation system invented in Persia (Iran). It is a sloping tunnel that brings water from an underground source in a range of hills down to a dry plain at the foot of these hills. Its advantage over an open-air aqueduct is that less water is lost by evaporation on its way from the hill to the plain.

In 714 BCE, when Sargon II invaded Armenia, he saw an irrigation system not yet known in Bet-Nahrain, called by its Arabic name *qanat* or the Farsi *kariz*. He brought the secret back to Assyria. *Qanat* irrigation was then spread over the Near East, as far as North Africa, and is still used.

In Tajikistan, as early as the fourth to fifth centuries BCE, a canal was constructed in the Vakhsh River Valley, near present-day Qurghonteppa (Kurgan-Tyube), which irrigated fifty square kilometers of land. Subterranean canals and reservoirs, with containers made of copper (known as *kariz*), were extensively constructed in the northern parts of Tajikistan in the ninth and tenth centuries CE. These *kariz* carried copious sup-

plies of fresh water from the mountains to waterless plots of land, often many kilometers away. Sometimes as deep as forty meters, they were constructed underground to prevent evaporation of water as it crossed the sun-baked steppe. They were carefully engineered to bring the water to the surface at just the point it was required so that pumping was unnecessary.

In Turpan and Hami Prefectures of China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, *kariz* comprising wells connected by underground channels were known as one of the three ancient projects in China, along with the Great Wall and the (Beijing-Hangzhou) Grand Canal. Although there is plenty of rainfall on the slopes of the Tengri-Tagh Mountains, the Turpan Basin is extremely dry and blazingly hot in the summer. Taking advantage of the natural incline of the land and the rich underground water source, the people of Turpan created a unique irrigation system. During the golden age of *kariz* development, 1,700 *kariz* covering a length of 4,400 kilometers were constructed in Turpan Prefecture. At present, *kariz* are facing dropping water levels and drying. Experts are worried about the future of *kariz*, the symbol of Chinese water culture.

In the high and dry plains of Afghanistan, agriculture is often impossible without irrigation. The Afghans have put in place a system for harnessing the water: the *karez* tunnels.

Bakhtor Islamov and Sharaf Arifkhanov

KARNATAKA (2001 est. pop. 52.7 million). Karnataka, a land of natural beauty and historical monuments, is the eighth largest state in India in terms of area (191,791 square kilometers) and population. It is situated on the western edge of the Deccan plateau surrounded on three sides by the neighboring states of Goa, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala, with a coastline of approximately 300 kilometers on the western side along the Arabian sea. Karnataka got its name from a local word, *karanadu*, meaning lofty land, because it is located in a high plateau area.

Karnataka was formed in 1956 by combining territories from the erstwhile princely states of Mysore and Hyderabad and the British provinces of Bombay and Madras along with the small principality of Coorg. Originally named Mysore, it was given its present name on 1 November 1973. The state's formation marked the fulfillment of the aspirations of the Kannada-speaking people to merge in a cohesive sociopolitical unit.

The history of the area is associated with Bali and Sugreeva, characters from the popular Indian epic



PATTADAKAL—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

A UNESCO World Heritage Site since 1987, Pattadakal, located in the state of Karnataka, typifies the seventh- and eighth-century blending of artistic and architectural forms in India. Nine ornate temples and one Jain sanctuary make up the Pattadakal site in Karnataka, with the Temple of Virupaksha being the most impressive in artistic and physical scope.

Ramayana. Subsequently, the region passed under the reigns of some of the most powerful Indian dynasties, including the later Muslim and British rules. Modern Karnataka bears traces of this long history in the form of well-preserved monuments and landmarks, of which the city of Mysore presents a good sample. Belur, Hampi, and Halebid contain remains of old buildings and rock carvings. The state is now divided into twenty-seven districts and it has a bicameral legislature. The Legislative Assembly has 224 members and the Legislative Council has 75 members.

The state's capital, Bangalore, is very attractive, with wide boulevards and modern shopping malls. Famous for key educational institutes and corporate offices, Bangalore is projected as the software capital of India. Apart from the fast-growing information technology industry, it has been a producer of telephones, aircraft, watches, and machine tools. The growth of Bangalore and similar industrial centers in the state has been facilitated by the steady generation of surplus hydroelectric power.

Karnataka's mineral resources include high-grade iron ore, copper, manganese, chromite china clay, limestone, and magnesite. The Kolar gold mines are a major Indian source for the precious metal. The state has a reputation for fine ivory and sandalwood handicrafts. The economy of Karnataka is predominantly rural and agrarian. Almost half of the state's income comes from the agricultural sector, with 71 percent of workers engaged in farming activities. The state accounts for a major share of coffee, millet, oil, and silk production in India. The people of Karnataka like to eat rice, fish, and a special pudding called *bittu*. Festivals celebrated in the state include Dasehra and, in particular, the Mysore Dasehra in the month of October, which draws huge crowds.

Ram Shankar Nanda

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KARS (2002 pop. 103,000). Kars, capital of the province of Kars (2002 pop. 323,000) in eastern Turkey, lies above the Kars River in a mountain range near the Russian border. Its position on a mountain top leaves the city open to high winds; one of the coldest regions in Turkey, it is covered by snow for at least five months of the year. Kars was inhabited by the Armenians in the ninth and tenth centuries, serving as the capital of the Bagratid dynasty. When the Armenian capital was transferred to nearby Ani, Kars lost some of its importance. Kars was conquered by the Seljuks in the mid-eleventh century, the Mongols in the thirteenth, and Timur (Tamerlane) in 1387. The Ottomans took Kars in 1534, and the city was of great military importance during the Ottoman-Safavid conflicts.

The Russians gained control over Kars in 1828 and 1855, but the city was transferred back to the Turks under subsequent peace treaties. In 1878, after eight months of war, the Treaty of Berlin transferred Kars to the Russians. It remained under Russian control until the Fifteenth Army Unit commanded by Kazim Karabekir Pasha recaptured the city on 30 October 1920. Kars was officially returned to Turkey in 1921. Today the city is an active military base.

T. Isikozlu-E.F. Isikozlu

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KARSHI (1998 est. pop. 190,000). Karshi, in the southern part of the republic of Uzbekistan in Central Asia, is an ancient city on the old trade route between Afghanistan and Samarqand. Situated in a fertile oasis of the Kashka Darya River, today Karshi is the administrative center of the Qashqadaryo Province on the Afghanistan border.

The Turks founded a fort here in the fourteenth century, at a site called Naksheb or Neseef, on a caravan route from Samarkand and Bukhara to Persia and India. Karshi was part of the Bukhara khanate (chiefdom) (1583–1740) and the Bukhara emirate (princi-

pality) (1747–1920). After the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic was formed (1924), Karshi received the name Bek-Budi in 1926 and in 1937 was renamed Karshi. Until 1991 the city was the administrative center of the Kashkadarya province of Uzbekistan and became the administrative center of Qashqadaryo Province in 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Present-day Karshi is a large railway junction and gas-production center. It has cotton processing and carpet industries, major irrigation facilities, a state university, and a theater. The Kok-Gumbez Mosque was built in Karshi in the late sixteenth century.

Natalya Yu. Khan

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KARUN RIVER AND SHATT AL ARAB RIVER

The Karun River begins in the Zagros Mountains of western Iran and flows south to Iraq, where it empties into the Shatt al Arab. In Iran the Karun River extends for 720 kilometers, and by 1888 it had become a major route of foreign trade for Iran. Today it remains that country's primary inland navigation system. During World War II the construction of a rail line between the river port of Khorramshahr and the main Iranian railway system, however, caused the Karun trade route to lose its significance. Nowadays the Karun is used as a transportation corridor for oil exports and commodity imports, accessible only to shallow-draft vessels. The river also serves agricultural needs: Shushtar dam blocks the river to irrigate an area of 1,300 square kilometers. Due to its economic and strategic significance, control of the Shatt al Arab has long been contested. The earliest documented dispute was settled by a treaty signed in 1639, which was intended to establish a boundary between Iran (then Persia) and the Ottoman empire, including today's Iraq. Because of the vagueness of this and other treaties, the conflict over the Shatt al Arab has persisted. There has been continual treaty negotiation and annulment since World War I, and the increase in regional oil production in the 1960s and 1970s served to intensify the conflict. Control of the Shatt al Arab was one of the main reasons for the Iraqi invasion of Iran and the ensuing 1980–1988 war.

Payam Foroughi and Raissa Mubutdinova-Foroughi

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KAS (2000 pop. 6,500). A lively Mediterranean coastal resort town in Turkey, Kas lies between Antalya and Fethiye. The economy depends entirely on seasonal tourism and civil service jobs. The easternmost of the Greek Dodacanese Islands, Kastellorizon (or Meis, as Turks call it), is just four kilometers offshore. Like many coastal towns that had Greek populations prior to 1922 (when Greece and Turkey repatriated their respective citizens), the local populace sustains ties with offshore Greeks that began a century ago out of economic necessity. The isolated location of both Kas and Kastellorizon fostered covert friendship and an economic interdependence that continues today. Many Greek-style buildings remain.

In ancient times (1200–600 BCE), Kas was known as Antiphellus, and it prospered because of trade in timber and sponges. A small amphitheater remains from this era. During the first and second centuries BCE, Antiphellus gained prominence as a safe harbor and an important city in the Lycian federation. More recently Kas was called Andifli, but until the advent of tourism in the 1960s it remained virtually landlocked by the Taurus Mountains. With the advent of tourism in the 1960s, a coastal road was built, making the town

accessible for vehicles and ending centuries of dependence on sea trade.

The town has an abundance of pensions and hotels established by villagers who abandoned rural agriculture for tourism. But tourism has scarcely encroached on traditions like weddings, sacrifice holidays, or the custom of salting babies soon after birth, a practice believed to ward off evil.

Suzanne Swan

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KATHMANDU (2002 pop. 713,000). Built in 723 CE by King Gun Kamdev and the Newar peoples, Kathmandu, located in the southern Himalayas at an altitude of 1,220 meters (4,000 feet) near the Baghmanti and Vishumanti rivers, is the capital city of Nepal. Legend has it that the site was originally a lake that was made habitable when Manjushree cut open the channel to south Chovar and let the water flow out of the lake. The original inhabitants, the Newars, are thought to be the descendants of several different ethnic groups.

During the seventeenth century, small city-states occupied the valley, and Nepal was an important trading



Durbar Square in Kathmandu in 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

link between Tibet and the north Indian plains. The city's finest temples and palaces were built during the reign of the Malla kings in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The city-states were unified in 1768 by Gorkha King Prithvi Narayan Shah when he captured Kathmandu and made it the capital. The shah closed the borders to the country in 1816, and the country remained isolated until the mid-twentieth century.

Places of interest in Kathmandu include the Freak Street area, which also is known as Jochne, but which received the name Freak Street from the hippie culture of the 1960s and 1970s, when travelers were in search of spiritual enlightenment. Durbar Square is located in the old Kathmandu area, with numerous temples and shrines. Located there is the Kasthamandap, the oldest building in the valley, supposedly built around the twelfth century. The Great Bell to ward off evil spirits, the Taleju Temple, the Jaganath Temple, and the Kala Bhairab are also located in Durbar Square. Another area of interest is the Hanuman Dhoka (Old Royal Palace).

Stacey Fox

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KATHMANDU VALLEY (2002 est. pop. 1.5 million). The Kathmandu valley, the site of modern-day Nepal's national capital, has long been among the most important administrative, economic, agricultural, and cultural centers in the Himalayan region. Lying at an elevation of approximately 1,350 meters, the valley is located in Nepal's middle hills, surrounded by peaks averaging 2,400 meters. Known for its deep alluvial soils deposited by a long-vanished lake, the Kathmandu valley has historically been one of the most productive agricultural regions of South Asia and one of the most densely populated areas in the Himalayas.

The Kathmandu valley rose to regional prominence mainly because of its role as an important entrepôt in the trans-Himalayan trade linking the Tibetan plateau and East Asia with the civilizations of the South Asian lowlands. In the Kathmandu valley, two of the most important trade routes from Tibet converged, and principal cities emerged at key points along these ancient transit corridors. Trade brought the valley great



KATHMANDU VALLEY— WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Several religious monuments and classic royal buildings in the Kathmandu Valley were designated as World Heritage Sites in 1979 in recognition of their immense historical significance to the several cultures converging in Nepal.

wealth, making it a center for architectural, religious, and artistic achievement.

Early History

Details of the valley's prehistory remain obscure, but linguistic evidence suggests that the valley was settled by the ancestors of people who later became known as Newars. The historical record begins with Sanskrit inscriptions left by an Aryan Licchavi dynasty that occupied the valley in the fourth century CE and that ruled until the late ninth century. A range of Hindu and Buddhist sects flourished during Licchavi times, all of which benefited from royal patronage. Most of the Kathmandu valley's main religious structures are built on Licchavi foundations. Following the decline of Licchavi power, the Kathmandu valley went through several centuries of unstable political rule, punctuated by devastating raids by powers from neighboring Himalayan regions as well as from the northern Gangetic plain.

The Malla Dynasty

The next major era began in the thirteenth century, with the establishment of several lines of Hindu kings adopting the honorific title "Malla." Once again, the Kathmandu valley was the seat of a prosperous, powerful state that rebuilt religious structures, strengthened administrative systems, and patronized the arts. After 1482, the unified Malla kingdom splintered into three antagonistic ministates, based in the valley's three primary cities of Patan, Bhaktapur, and Kathmandu. During the Malla era, Sanskrit gave way to Newari, still the vernacular of the Kathmandu valley, as the language of the court. Although all of the Malla kings were devotees of the valley's principal Hindu deity, Siva Pasupati, they also continued to patronize Buddhist shrines.

From the sixteenth century onward, each of the valley's city-states became not just a walled fortress but also a center for conspicuous patronage of temples,

festivals, institutions, and artisans. Each Malla ruler sought to outdo his valley rivals in the grandeur of his palaces, religious ceremonies, temples, and public facilities such as water tanks. Almost all of the remaining traditional structures in each of the three cities' central Durbar Squares—along with the stunning examples of Newar craftsmanship in stone, metal, and wood—date from the Malla era. The art of metallurgy, already developed during Licchavi times, reached its pinnacle during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, with demand for Nepali cast bronze statuary and other ritual objects from as far away as China. But the competition that left a rich cultural legacy also served to make the Kathmandu valley desirable to outsiders and vulnerable to attack.

The Shah Kings and the Rana Era

In 1744, Prithvi Narayan Shah (1722–1775), king of Gorkha—a small hill state west of the Kathmandu valley—captured a strategic hilltop fortress guarding the northern route into the valley, thereby setting in motion a decades-long war that ended with conquest of the Kathmandu valley. Gorkhali forces encircled the valley, played one Malla king off against another, and cut off trade and supply routes; in 1768, the Gorkhali forces finally stormed Kathmandu on the night of the annual Indraajatra festival when the walls were undefended. Prithvi Narayan Shah took control of the other cities in the valley, and he (and his successors) went on to conquer large parts of the central Himalayas, thereby establishing the modern state of Nepal, with Kathmandu as its capital.

The Shah kings gradually fell under the control of other powerful families in the Gorkhali court, eventually becoming mere figureheads. In 1846, Jung Bahadur Kunwar (1817–1877) seized control of the court at Kathmandu, declared himself and his offspring to be hereditary prime ministers, and claimed the honorific title of Rana. It was during the Rana era (1846–1951) that the Kathmandu valley most clearly began to realign itself with the shifting regional political economy. After the British conquest of India was complete, Nepal found itself on the periphery of a world imperial power.

Whereas earlier artistic and architectural practices had incorporated foreign influences into local traditions, during the Rana era, elites favored the wholesale importation of European styles and lifestyles. The Ranas eagerly acquired all the accoutrements of a Western-elite lifestyle—including the enormous European-style palaces that still dot the valley—even while prohibiting commoners from any contact with foreigners or foreign goods. During the Rana era, the

gap between rulers and ruled became a chasm, severe travel restrictions were put in place, and the Kathmandu valley became virtually isolated from the rest of the world.

In 1951, Nepali nationalists overthrew the Rana regime, reinstated the Shah king, and initiated a series of experiments in democratic governance that continue to the present. Since 1951, the Kathmandu valley has become a regional center for international communications, foreign imports, and, since the 1970s, a popular tourist destination. In addition to government offices, the valley is also home to most of Nepal's institutions of higher education, international and local nongovernmental organizations, and media enterprises. Handmade carpets (developed originally in the Tibetan refugee community) and garments are the valley's main export industries. Today, the valley residents must contend with serious air- and water-pollution problems, suburban sprawl, and severely overburdened electrical, sewage, road, and water-supply systems.

Mark Liechty

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KATO TAKAAKI (1860–1926), Japanese politician. Of samurai lineage from the Owari domain (present-day Aichi Prefecture), Kato Takaaki was one of imperial Japan's ablest diplomats and most powerful champions of parliamentary government. Graduating at the top of his class from Tokyo University, Kato joined Mitsubishi Enterprises in 1881 and at age twenty-three spent two years in London studying the shipping trade. In 1887, he entered the Foreign Ministry and became Japanese minister (1894–1899), then ambassador to London (1908–1912). As foreign minister (1900–1901, 1906, 1913, 1914–1915), he was Japan's most fervent supporter of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

Kato orchestrated Japan's entrance into World War I and in 1915 presented China with a list of demands aimed at expanding Japanese continental privileges (the Twenty-One Demands). His greatest legacy, however, lies in his effort, as foreign minister, then prime minister (1924–1926), to shift the locus of policymaking from the extraconstitutional "elder statesmen" to the civilian cabinet. Under his leadership, the

Kenseikai Party (successor to the Doshikai, later renamed the Minseito) implemented universal male suffrage and army retrenchment (1925) and became the most powerful engine of social, political, and economic reform in interwar Japan.

Frederick R. Dickinson

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KAUTILYA (flourished c. 300 BCE), Indian political author. Kautilya or Canakya is usually identified as the minister of the Emperor Candragupta Maurya (321–287 BCE). However, there have been reputable scholars who dated Kautilya's major work, the *Arthashastra* (if it is his), to around 300 CE, thus making it a work of the Gupta period (c. 320–c. 500 CE) rather than a Mauryan work. The book, a manual of practical politics, has often been compared to Machiavelli's *The Prince*. It covers numerous governmental and military topics: the education and discipline of princes, the qualifications of government ministers, the different kinds of spies, the regular duties of a king, the organization and superintendence of government departments, the administration and fortification of towns, regulation of prostitution, civil law, filling the king's treasury, salaries of government servants, seven elements of kingship, six lines of policy, vices of a king, calamities and disasters affecting the state, military campaigning, guilds and corporations, how to win wars, how to become popular in a conquered country, recipes for various mixtures (though not gunpowder) that might spread disease and aid in warfare, and a final description of Kautilya's plan of the work. It is written in Sanskrit and has many obscure technical terms, though in other respects its language is clear.

Paul Hockings

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KAVERI RIVER India's Kaveri or Cauvery River, 760 kilometers long, was originally called the Daksina Ganga, or "southern Ganges," and the whole of its course is holy to Hindus. It rises in Coorg District to-

ward the southern end of the Western Ghats and flows across southern Karnataka and northern Tamil Nadu states in a southeasterly direction, to empty into the Bay of Bengal from a wide delta, which forms the richest agricultural land in Thanjavur District. Its chief mouth there, to the north, is called the Coleroon or Kolladam, and a second one to the south is Kaveri. The river is fed by a number of tributaries, including the Bavani, and is a major source of hydroelectric power.

Its drainage basin has been estimated at 71,740 square kilometers. In its tortuous course, the river creates three famous islands. One is Seringapatam, near Mysore City, the ruined capital of Tipu Sultan (1753–1799); a second is Sivasamudram, the site of an ancient city and the celebrated Falls of the Cauvery, a succession of rapids and broken cascades; and the third is Srirangam, 3 kilometers outside the city of Tiruccirappalli, the site of an important ancient temple dedicated to Vishnu. The only traditional form of navigation on the river was in basketwork coracles covered with buffalo hides. Ptolemy mentions the Kaveri River as Khaberos, and another ancient Sanskrit name was Ardhajahnvi.

Paul Hockings

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KAWABATA YASUNARI (1899–1972), Japanese novelist. Born the son of a doctor in Osaka, Japan, Kawabata Yasunari lost both parents, his grandmother with whom he lived, and a sister before he was nine, and then nursed his terminally ill grandfather. Determined early on to become a writer, Kawabata enrolled in the Japanese literature course at Tokyo Imperial University, where he came to the attention of well-known novelist Kikuchi Kan (1888–1948), who became his mentor. In the 1920s he helped to found the Shinkankaku-ha, or Neo-Sensationalist school, which went against the prevailing Realist trend in Japanese literature at that time and is characterized by unusual visual imagery and synesthesia.

Among Kawabata's most prominent works are "The Izu Dancer" ("Izu no odokiko," 1926), *Yukiguni* (*Snow Country*, 1948), *Senbazuru* (*Thousand Cranes*, 1951), *Meijin* (*The Master of Go*, 1954), and *Yama no oto* (*The Sound of the Mountain*, 1954). Kawabata constantly reworked even published pieces, later adding passages, and often leaving them incomplete. Characteristic of his works is a delicate balance between the human characters and the lyrically described natural

background into which they seem constantly on the verge of disappearing. There is little in the way of plot or structure, but instead the works move from image to image, like the art of linked verse. Throughout his works is a preoccupation with death and loneliness and what he saw as the close relationship between beauty and sadness.

In 1968, he won the Nobel Prize for Literature. In 1972, Kawabata was found dead in a gas-filled apartment near his Kamakura home. It was generally assumed that he took his own life, although some close associates held it was an accident.

James M. Vardaman, Jr.

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KAWASAKI Kawasaki is a major Japanese manufacturer of ships, locomotives, railway cars, engines, aircraft, motorbikes, and missiles. In 1878, Kawasaki Shozo (1837–1912) founded the Kawasaki organization in Tsukiji in Tokyo as a shipyard. In 1881, the Kawasaki Hyogo shipyard was established in Hyogo, and in 1896 it was merged with the Tsukiji shipyard to form the Kawasaki Shipyard Corporation. The group adopted its present name in 1939 after expanding into the manufacture of locomotives, passenger coaches, freight cars, bridge girders, steel plates, and aircraft.

Kawasaki's production of freighters during World War II was augmented after the war by production of submarines and supertankers. After World War II, Allied Occupation authorities broke up Kawasaki. In 1950, the steel-making division was incorporated separately as the Kawasaki Steel Corporation. Kawasaki Dockyard merged in 1969 with two of its previous subsidiaries, Kawasaki Rolling Stock Manufacturing and Kawasaki Aircraft, to become Kawasaki Heavy Industries, a major corporation. Kawasaki remained until the 1970s one of Japan's leading shipbuilders. The company has constantly developed new technologies through the development and production of automated ships, the development of liquid natural gas (LNG) carriers, and future-oriented marine technologies.

Nathalie Cavasin

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KAYAH STATE (2002 est. pop. 243,000). The Kayah (Karenni) State is the smallest ethnic minority state in Myanmar (Burma), but it has a unique history of independence. The inhabitants are predominantly ethnic Karen hill peoples. They take their collective name of Karenni from the largest subgroup, the Kayah, who were originally known as Karenni ("red" Karen) because of the color of their clothing. Other related subgroups include the Kayaw, Paku, Bre, Manu, and Kayan (Padaung), whose "long necked" women are famed for wearing brass coils around their necks. In valley areas, there are also many Shans, and modern-day immigration has brought in increasing numbers of Burmans and other nationalities.

The historic anomaly of the state began prior to British rule (1886–1948) when the local Karenni chieftains modeled their authority on the hereditary system of the neighboring Shan *Sawbwas* (princes). Subsequently, Karenni independence was recognized by both the British and Burman King Mindon in an 1875 treaty. As a result, the Karenni substates were never formally incorporated into British Burma.

At the British departure in 1948, the tradition of Karenni independence was recognized when the territory was granted the same political terms as Shan State with a similar right of secession after ten years. Armed conflict, however, began between the government and Karenni forces in August 1948, and this continued through the rest of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. In 1951, the territory was renamed Kayah State by the government, and in 1959 the Karenni chiefs agreed to renounce their traditional powers as rulers.

Central government authority, however, has continued to be resisted. As a result of conflict, the present-day state is one of the poorest regions in Myanmar. Adjoining Thailand, Shan State, and Karen (Kayin) State, Kayah State is a mountainous territory with an area of 11,733 square kilometers, and it has few infrastructural links with its neighbors. The state is also dissected by two powerful rivers—the Salween and the Pon—making transportation difficult in many areas.

In the 1990s, the population was estimated by the government at 210,000 inhabitants, dwelling in six townships, but there has been considerable internal displacement during the fighting of past decades. Over ten thousand refugees have fled into Thailand.

The state's main produce is paddy. Other crops are grown in a variety of lowland and upland environments, including sesame, groundnut, fruits, and vegetables. Most economic investment by the government, however, has centered on Myanmar's largest hydroelectric power station at Lawpita, which is located west of the state capital, Loikaw. There are also marble mines near Loikaw, as well as wolfram, tin, and tungsten mines at Mawchi in the south of the state. Another important natural resource, the once abundant forest reserves—containing teak, pine, and a variety of other woods—were badly depleted by overlogging during the 1990s.

Armed opposition groups have impacted day-to-day affairs in the state. The largest force, the Karenni National Progressive Party (formed 1957), agreed upon a cease-fire with the government in 1995, but this broke down shortly afterward. In contrast, in the west of the state, the 1994 cease-fires by the rival Karenni State Nationalities Liberation Front (formed 1978) and allied Kayan New Land Party (formed 1964) both endured until the end of the twentieth century. Destruction and internal displacement, however, remained on a considerable scale within the state, which, in consequence, has some of the worst health, educational, and social indicators in any part of Myanmar.

Martin Smith

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KAYSONE PHOMVIHAN (1920–1992), president of Laos. Kaysone was born in Savannakhet, the son of a Vietnamese civil servant father and Laotian mother. He studied law in Hanoi, where he became actively involved in the Viet Minh (Viet League, or fully, League for the Independence of Vietnam), an umbrella organization of Vietnamese Communists seeking independence from the French regime in In-

dochina (Laos had been a protectorate in the French Indochinese union since 1893). When the French returned to gain control of Laos following the Japanese occupation of the nation at the end of World War II, Kaysone fought to thwart their attempts but was unsuccessful.

Kaysone joined the Indochinese Communist Party in 1949 and became the defense minister of the Pathet Lao, or Lao Nation, a nationalist resistance movement. Kaysone assumed command of the Pathet Lao armed forces, precursor of the People's Liberation Army of Laos of which he later became commander, and waged guerrilla war to take control of Laos.

In 1953, Kaysone and Prince Souphanouvong (1909–1995) established northern Laos as the Pathet Lao stronghold and in 1955 formed the Lao People's Party, to which Kaysone was elected general secretary. In 1975 Kaysone became prime minister of Laos after the socialists gained control of the nation. As prime minister, he stressed the importance of leadership by the party and strict adherence to socialist doctrine. He strengthened Laotian ties with Vietnam and the Soviet Union while distancing the nation from the People's Republic of China. In the 1990s, after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Kaysone loosened restrictions on private ownership of land and the practice of Buddhism, promoted a market economy, and fostered cordial relations with China. Kaysone became president of the Lao People's Democratic Republic in 1991 and, following his death, remains revered by Lao citizens as a national hero.

Linda S. McIntosh

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KAZAK The *Kazak* was a Kazakh-language newspaper published in Orenburg, Russia, between 1913 and 1918. After 1917 it became the principal organ of the Kazakh political party and the Kazakh autonomous government Alash Orda (The Horde of Alash). It first appeared on 2 February 1913 and continued as a weekly until 1915, when it was published twice a week. The initial print run was three thousand, but by 1916 it reached eight thousand, making it the most popular prerevolutionary Kazakh periodical. Subscribers included individuals from as far away as China and

Turkey. The editorial board included Akhmet Baitursynov (1873–1937), Mirzhaqyp Dulatov (1885–1935), Alikhan Bokeikhanov (1866–1937), and other well-known Kazakh writers, poets, and scholars.

Kazak focused its editorial attention on a variety of topics. Czarist colonization policies received significant attention, as did education and land, religious, and economic issues. In addition to the editors, the writer and social activist Zhusipbek Aimauytov (1889–1931), the scholar Mukhtar Auezov (1897–1961), and the writers Saken Seifullin (1894–1938), Maghzhan Zhumabaev (1893–1938), Sabit Donentaev (1894–1933), Sultanmakhmud Toraighyrov (1893–1920), Beiimbet Mailin (1894–1938), and Mustafa Shoqaev (1890–1940), leader of the Kokand autonomous government, wrote for the paper. *Kazak* also published articles advocating female emancipation and cessation of the bride-price, including articles by Nazipa Qulzhanova (1887–1934).

Following the February 1917 Russian Revolution *Kazak* became the official organ of Alash Orda, which opposed the Bolshevik seizure of power. It continued publication until its press was destroyed during the Russian civil war in September 1918.

Steven Sabol

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KAZAKH UPLANDS The region known as the Kazakh Uplands (Qazaqtyng Usaqshoqylyghy), or Kazakh Hillocky Country, is a plateau in eastern Kazakhstan between the Turanian Lowland to the west and the Altay Mountains to the east. The Ishim River, a major tributary of the Irtysh River, originates in the Kazakh Uplands and flows northwestward into the Irtysh and then north to join the Ob River in Siberia, eventually draining into the Arctic Ocean. The Nura River also flows through the Kazakh Uplands westward as it empties into Lake Tengiz in the central portion of the region.

The Kazakh Uplands represent the gradually eroded remains of a larger mountain chain in eastern Kazakhstan. Exposed rock layers have yielded a large amount of valuable raw materials for industrial use. It has developed as an important region for heavy ind-

ustry based on large local coal and iron ore deposits. Several rare earth minerals, such as beryllium, molybdenum, antimony (used as alloys for strength and corrosion resistance), and uranium, are also found in the region. One of the largest copper deposits in the world is located near Dzhezkazgan in the western part of the Kazakh Uplands. Other large deposits of copper, lead, and zinc are found along the shoreline of Lake Balkhash in the southern part of the region.

David R. Smith

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KAZAKHS The Kazakhs are a central Asiatic Turkic people whose language belongs to the Kipchak group of the Altaic family. Most Kazakhs identify themselves as Sunni Muslims. According to a 1997 population estimate, approximately 9 million Kazakhs resided in the central Asiatic republic of Kazakhstan. In addition, there were about 1.1 million Kazakhs in China, 808,000 in Uzbekistan, 636,000 in Russia, 120,000 in Mongolia, 88,000 in Turkmenistan, 37,000 in Kyrgyzstan, 9,600 in Tajikistan, and 13,000 in other countries.

Emergence of the Kazakhs

The Kazakhs emerged as a distinctive people in the fifteenth century. At the time, different parts of present-day Kazakhstan were controlled by Mongols, Uzbeks, and other Turco-Mongolian peoples. In the mid-fifteenth century, about 200,000 Uzbeks, dissatisfied with their leader, or khan, moved from an area of present-day Uzbekistan to an area between the Chu and Talas Rivers; before this time, the ancestors of this group had been converted to Islam by Sufi mystics who had spread Islam in central Asia. These separatist Uzbeks became known as Kazakh Uzbeks or "independent Uzbeks." They adopted a nomadic pastoral way of life, in contrast to the sedentary farming of their Uzbek forebears. In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, these people, now known simply as Kazakhs, formed a confederation called the Kazakh Horde, which controlled much of the steppe region.

The Kazakh pastoral nomads dwelled year round in portable, dome-shaped tents called yurts, with felt coverings over wooden frames that could be taken apart and reassembled after a move. They migrated seasonally to find pasturage for their livestock, which included horses, sheep, goats, cattle, and camels. They



Kazakh men riding horses in 1983 near Urumqi, Xinjiang Province, China. (CARL & ANN PURCELL/CORBIS)

lived primarily off their herds and especially savored fermented mare's milk (*koumiss*) and horse flesh.

The Kazakhs originally organized themselves into hordes (*ordas*) that were subdivided into tribes, clans, and lineages. Groups at various levels in the tribal hierarchy had chiefs or khans, but only rarely were all Kazakhs, or even one of their hordes, united under a single khan. Descent and membership in lineages and clans were traced patrilineally. Lineages and clans were subdivided into smaller camping groups that consisted of several extended families each. These families usually included parents, unmarried children, and married sons and their families.

Russian and Soviet Periods

The Russian advance onto the Kazakh steppe began in the early eighteenth century, and by 1848 Russia had taken control of the area. During the nineteenth century, as part of Russia's colonization program, about 400,000 Russians flooded into Kazakhstan to convert steppe pastures into farmland. In the early twentieth century, approximately a million Slavs, Germans, Jews, and others also immigrated to the region. These immigrants crowded Kazakhs off the best pastures and watered lands, rendering many tribes destitute.

On 26 August 1920, the Soviet government established the Kirgiz Autonomous Republic, which in 1925 changed its name to Kazakh Autonomous Soviet So-

cialist Republic. From 1927, the Soviet government pursued a vigorous policy of transforming the Kazakh pastoral nomads into a sedentary population. The Soviet regime's brutal imposition of collective farming on the traditionally pastoral nomadic Kazakhs resulted in a marked decrease in the Kazakh population. Between 1926 and 1939, more than 1.5 million Kazakhs died, mostly from starvation, disease, and violence. About 300,000 Kazakhs fled to Uzbekistan, 44,000 to Turkmenistan, and thousands to China. In addition, Stalin's purges destroyed much of the Kazakh intelligentsia. Another large influx of Slavs into Kazakhstan occurred from 1954 to 1956 as a result of the Soviet so-called Virgin and Idle Lands project, which opened up the vast grasslands of northern Kazakhstan to wheat farming. The Soviet Union also located its space-launch center and a substantial part of its nuclear-weaponry and nuclear-testing sites in Kazakhstan.

Post-Soviet Period

Kazakhstan declared its independence from the Soviet Union on 16 December 1991. In the early years of independence, significant numbers of ethnic Russians left Kazakhstan by emigrating to Russia, and many diaspora Kazakhs immigrated to Kazakhstan. Even by the mid-1990s, Kazakhs made up only 45 percent of their country's total population. By 1995, Kazakhs constituted about half the population of Almaty, the country's largest city and, until 1997, its capital.

Today, about three-fifths of Kazakh families live in rural areas. Most Kazakhs are settled farmers who still recognize membership in larger kin groupings based on patrilineal descent. In Xinjiang in northwest China, many Kazakhs still follow the nomadic way of life. Urbanization in Kazakhstan has resulted more from the immigration of foreigners than from the influx of Kazakhs into the cities from the countryside.

During much of their long nomadic period, the Kazakhs' adherence to Islam remained rather lax and informal. However, some young Kazakhs had studied Islamic theology in religious schools, known as *mak-tabs* or *madrasabs*, in the larger towns and cities. Consequently, there was an Islamic intelligentsia in the urban areas before the Soviet Communists took over in the early 1920s. Thereafter, Soviet authorities actively suppressed and discouraged religious teaching and practice in Kazakhstan. Since independence, Kazakhs have enjoyed freedom of religion, and there has been a religious revival.

Urban Kazakhs of both sexes dress in modern, Western clothing, while women and some men in rural villages continue to wear traditional costume. Some Kazakhs weave traditional carpets for home use and sale, and less-Russified Kazakhs often decorate their homes with *qosbmas*, bright-colored felt rugs.

Kazakhs, probably more than any other Central Asian people, show the impact of nearly two centuries of close contact with Russians. Unlike those Central Asians to the south of them, Kazakhs look more to Russia than to Islamic countries for inspiration in the post-Soviet period. Despite this, Kazakh scholars and intellectuals are actively working to reclaim Kazakh traditions and distinctive ways of life, including the literary and spoken language of a people whose experience has been greatly influenced by Russian culture, literature, language, and thought.

Oral epics formed the main literary genre among the largely illiterate Kazakhs until the nineteenth century. In the eighteenth century, the Russians established a series of outposts along the border of the Kazakh northern steppe. As a consequence of Russian contacts, some Kazakhs added written, poetic forms to their literature. Poetry remained the primary genre until prose stories, short novels, and drama were introduced in the early twentieth century, before the end of the czarist era in 1917. Today, urban Kazakhs can enjoy modern theaters that offer Uighur, Korean, and Russian musicals, opera, ballet, and puppet performances. They also enjoy cinemas and can participate in dance ensembles and music groups.

Paul J. Magnarella

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KAZAKHSTAN—PROFILE (2001 est. pop. 16.7 million). Situated in central Asia, Kazakhstan, at 2,717,300 square kilometers, is the second largest of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the association of former Soviet states. It shares borders to the north and on the west with the Russian Federation, on the east with China, and on the south with Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The Kazakhs are the largest of the country's 126 ethnic groups, accounting for 51 percent of the population, followed by Russians (32 percent), Ukrainians (4.5 percent), Germans, Uzbeks, Tatars, and others. The relative weight of the Kazakh ethnic group has increased since the country's independence, mainly due to the emigration of non-Kazakhs and the return of many ethnic Kazakhs to the country. Historically, Kazakhstan belongs to the Turkic-speaking world.

Geography

The climate of Kazakhstan is sharply continental. Average temperature in January varies between -19° and -4°C , while the average July temperature fluctuates between 19° and 26°C .

The largest of the country's 8,500 rivers are the Ural and the Emba, which flow into the Caspian Sea; the Syr Dar'ya, which flows into the Aral Sea; and the Irtysh, Ishim, and Tobol, which all run across the republic to eventually reach the Arctic Ocean. The largest of its many lakes are the Aral Sea, Balkhash, Zaysan, Alakol, Tengiz, and Seletengiz. Kazakhstan shares the larger portion (2,340 kilometers) of the northern and half of the eastern Caspian seacoast.

Steppes comprise 26 percent of the territory of Kazakhstan. Deserts (44 percent) and semideserts (14 percent) cover 167 million hectares, and forests occupy 21 million hectares.

Resources

The country is rich in minerals. The Tengiz oil field ranks as one of the largest in the world. Kazakhstan also has the world's second-largest deposit of



KAZAKHSTAN

Country name: Republic of Kazakhstan
Area: 2,717,300 sq km
Population: 16,731,303 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 0.03% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 17.3 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 10.61 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: -6.43 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio: 0.93 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 59.17 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population: 63.29 years; male: 57.87 years; female: 68.97 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Muslim, Russian Orthodox
Major languages: Kazakh (Qazaq, state language), Russian (official, used in everyday business)
Literacy—total population: 98%; male: 99%; female: 96% (1989 est.)
Government type: Republic
Capital: Astana; the government moved from Almaty to Astana in December 1998
Administrative divisions: 14 oblystar and 3 cities
Independence: 16 December 1991 (from the Soviet Union)
National holiday: Republic Day, 25 October (1990)
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal
GDP—real growth rate: 10.5% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita (purchasing power parity): \$5,000 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: 35% (1999 est.)
Exports: \$8.8 billion (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Imports: \$6.9 billion (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Currency: Tenge (KZT)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Book Factbook 2001*. Retrieved 5 March 2002, from: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

phosphorite, and the phosphorite deposits of Zhanatas and Karatau are notable for their depth and quality. The republic is one of the greatest producers of aluminum in the world, and has an abundance of copper ore, salt, and construction materials.

Political Structure

Nursultan Nazarbayev (b. 1940) was elected president in April 1990. On 1 December 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, he was reconfirmed as president by nationwide ballot in newly independent Kazakhstan.

The constitution provides for a tripartite structure of government with power divided between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. It establishes

and sets out the powers and functions of the president, the parliament, the constitutional council, and local government and administration, and establishes an independent judicial system.

The political structure comprises the president (who is head of state); numerous presidential advisory bodies that focus on such areas as national policy, mass media, family and women, and human rights; and Parliament, consisting of the Senate and the Majlis. The republic has an array of political parties.

History

Formed from different tribes, the Kazakhs were mainly pastoral nomads until the twentieth century. Russian influence in the region began in the sixteenth



century, when Cossacks settled along the Ural River in the west of the country. In the eighteenth century the Russian government sent large numbers of Russian peasants to the Kazakh territory. In 1866 the garrison town of Verny (now Almaty) was founded under Russian administration.

During the Soviet regime, Kazakhstan became the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. The style of life changed dramatically during the period of collectivization and industrialization. Forced collectivization brought mass repression. Nearly 700,000 families died during that period.

During World War II, many people—including Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, and Tatars—were moved from the western USSR to Kazakhstan. This migration initiated the industrialization of Kazakhstan.

In the 1950s the Virgin Lands Project, designed to expand the use of Kazakhstan's vast territory, was implemented in northern Kazakhstan by the Soviet government. This brought thousands of people to Kazakhstan.

From 1959 to 1986 Dinmukhamed Kunaev (1912–1993) was first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. His rule was controversial and mixed. His achievement was the direction of a high level of cap-

ital investment to the republic, which he was able to accomplish partly because he was a close friend of Leonid Brezhnev (1906–1982). He divided managerial positions between Russians (industry) and Kazakhs (agriculture). Under Kunaev's authority the republic achieved its most prosperous results.

In 1986 Kunaev was criticized for failing to meet economic goals by Mikhail Gorbachev (b. 1931), who at that time was general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Kunaev was replaced by Gennadiy Kolbin (1927–1998), who had previously held the post of first secretary of the Communist Party in Ul'yanovsk Oblast (in Russia). Many Kazakhs disagreed with Moscow's decision and demonstrated in Almaty. As a protégé of the central administration, Kolbin tried to keep reforms in the republic moving in the same direction as in the USSR as a whole.

In 1989 Nursultan Nazarbayev was appointed first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. In March 1991 a referendum passed that favored preserving the USSR, but the coup in August destroyed any hope of saving the USSR as a country. The Republic of Kazakhstan formally became independent on 16 December 1991. It is a signatory to the agreement putting a formal end to the Soviet Union and creating the Commonwealth of Independent States.

International Organizations and International Relations

Kazakhstan has established diplomatic relations with over 120 countries. It is a full member of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Atomic Energy Agency, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Asian Development Bank, the International Finance Organization, and the Islamic Development Bank. Kazakhstan has the status of an observer with the World Trade Organization.

Yelena Kalyuzhnova

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KAZAKHSTAN—ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Before 1991 Kazakhstan was part of the Soviet economic system, and its development was defined by the Union's needs, as was the case for the economies of all the republics constituting the Soviet Union. In accordance with the Union's labor specialization, only a few sectors (perhaps even just parts of sectors) of Kazakhstan's economy were relatively developed, namely, coal-production centers in the Karaganda and Yekibastus areas, oil-production facilities at Emba, and copper mining at Balkhash and Karsakpau. For the Soviet economy Kazakhstan represented the single source of raw materials such as copper, zinc, chrome, and rare metal deposits. Kazakhstan was the second-largest oil producer in the Soviet Union, with the major oil fields of Tengiz (north Caspian Sea), Karachaganak (northwest Kazakhstan), Uzen (Manghystau region), Kumkol (central Kazakhstan), and Zhanazhol (near Aktyubinsk), as well as three major refineries.

The industrial sector was based on raw materials, but manufacturing production did not receive adequate development. Kazakhstan was heavily dependent on the other former republics of the Soviet Union, especially Russia.

From 1954 the Virgin Lands project (Northern Kazakhstan) was implemented; this project defined

Kazakhstan's role as a main producer of grain (about one-fifth of the Soviet Union's grain). Kazakhstan was to specialize in grain and other crops, such as vegetables and potatoes.

Nevertheless, under Soviet rule, Kazakhstan gained significantly in human development and social conditions: whereas before the Soviet era few people received education through the secondary-school level, nearly all people did by the end of the Soviet era, for example. Kazakhstan's industrial sector and infrastructure benefited from Soviet investments.

The New National Economy

Since independence in 1991, Kazakhstan has begun a painful economic transformation. The gross domestic product (GDP) fell almost 50 percent from 1991 to 1995. For nearly two years Kazakhstan was unable to conduct its own monetary policy, remaining in a monetary union with Russia under the supervision of the powerful Central Bank in Moscow. Price liberalization (decontrol of prices and liberalization of domestic trade) paralyzed the Kazakstani economy, and hyperinflation created a cash shortage.

On 15 November 1993 the new national currency (the tenge) was introduced, but it was rapidly devalued after three weeks. The nonconvertibility of the tenge pushed Kazakstani enterprises to pay their former union partners in hard currency (such as U.S. dollars), which caused difficulties with the calculations of the value of deliveries between enterprises. As a result barter was expanded, interenterprise arrears were increased (as enterprises were unable to pay the businesses they owed money to because they themselves were waiting for payment), and output continued to decline. The economic crisis worsened in 1994, characterized by hyperinflation and a further collapse in output in the industrial and other sectors of the economy. In 1994, only 3 percent of a total industrial decline of 28.5 percent was connected to the narrowing sales market; the other 25.5 percent resulted from financial problems. In the same year, 26 percent of the rise in Kazakstani prices was caused by interenterprise arrears: Knowing that payments owed them were not forthcoming, enterprises required eventual payment in hard currency, which kept on rising in value in comparison to the tenge, thereby generating a price increase. By the first half of 1995, more than 54 percent of the rise in Kazakstani prices was caused by interenterprise arrears. Since the end of 1994 the National Bank of Kazakhstan has adopted a tight monetary policy.

After independence, following the unraveling of its existing trade links with other former Soviet republics,

Kazakhstan began to look for new international markets. Traditionally Kazakstani exports included raw materials, light industrial goods, machinery, and chemical products. From the former Soviet Union, Kazakhstan imported machinery and metal products, oil and gas, light industrial goods, and food. In the first years of independence Kazakhstan focused on the development of the oil and gas sector, which quickly became a major export item. In 1993 the Kazakstani trade deficit reached \$615.6 million, four times higher than the previous year.

The economy needed a coherent strategy that would be able to prevent economic turmoil. The problem with all of the Kazakstani anticrisis programs of that time was the nation's unclear economic position and the absence of concrete aims for reform. The first years of the economic transition in Kazakhstan were also plagued by objective difficulties, such as the nation's dependence on members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS; the confederation of former Soviet nations) and the fact that extraction of raw materials was the dominant industrial sector.

Structural Reforms and Present Economic Performance

The Kazakstani government began privatization upon independence in 1991. The main challenge of this process was the interlocking of political and economic aspects. Privatization included three major steps: housing privatization (whereby government-owned housing was put up for sale), mass privatisation (whereby government-owned businesses were put up for sale), and privatization on the basis of individual projects. The most dominant method of privatizing state enterprises in industry, construction, transportation, and wholesale trade was the creation of joint-stock companies of both open and closed types. In some cases enterprises were purchased for speculative resale, using fluctuations in both the rate of exchange and the growing monthly rate of inflation. Corporate governance in many newly privatized enterprises remains weak. The privatization process is nearly complete; the government has now sold most of what it wanted to sell. Privatization revenue (revenue earned from the sale of state enterprises) was tenge 35.9 billion in 1999 (compared with tenge 50 billion in 1998).

The decline in output has been constant since 1991. Sectors such as chemicals, petrochemicals, food, and light industries began to disappear, and the industrial structure grew worse. From 1990 to 1997, production of various types of manufactured goods that are basic either as consumer goods or as industrial inputs were virtually eliminated. A decade of transition has elimi-

nated much of the industrial base and left an economy dependent upon the exploitation of raw materials (especially oil), agriculture, and, to a lesser extent, food processing. Far from diversifying, the economy has become more dependent upon just a few sectors. Its risk exposure has thus increased, because its terms of trade are more vulnerable to price fluctuations in global oil and raw-materials markets. In short, a decade of transition has left Kazakhstan with many of the features of a resource-dependent economy. In the raw material sectors the situation is more positive, but the Asian and Russian financial crises (1997 and 1998, respectively) pushed Kazakhstan into recession and led to massive tax losses, as enterprises that were not working or were producing very little had little revenue from which to pay taxes.

When oil prices declined dramatically in 1998, the government decided to increase its emphasis on domestic processing of the country's mineral resources and particularly to stress the importance of finished-goods exports. A new industrial policy included light and chemical industries and mechanical engineering as major priorities.

The development of the banking sector in Kazakhstan has been impressive in comparison with other countries of the former Soviet Union. The Central Bank has managed to slow inflation through tight monetary policy and has tried to supervise the work of commercial banks as well as to create some measures for stimulation of small and medium businesses, including microcredits (microloans), credits for agriculture, and so on.

The security market is still rudimentary but it is the most advanced in the Central Asian region; Kazakhstan was the first country of the former Soviet Union to issue international bonds. In 1998 Kazakhstan embraced an ambitious pension reform dominated by a mandatory, privately managed pension scheme, the results of which remain to be seen.

In the late 1990s, Kazakhstan experienced a steady decline in the standard of living and a falling birth rate. However, from the end of 1999 Kazakhstan began to move out of economic crisis. The GDP grew because of the growth of world prices for oil and nonferrous metals, the devaluation of the tenge, and bumper crops of cereals. Agriculture, which has been badly affected by privatization, is important for the future of Kazakhstan due to the nation's sociodemographic structure (43 percent of the population is located in rural areas) and national traditions (many of the peoples of Kazakhstan were formerly nomadic). The rich harvest of 1999 played a crucial role in the fact that the GDP rose by

1.7 percent. However, the Kazakstani economy remains vulnerable to commodity-price fluctuation.

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KAZAKHSTAN—EDUCATION SYSTEM

The education system in Kazakhstan was strongly influenced by the Russian and Soviet education systems. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the czarist government attempted to Westernize the Kazakh education system by sponsoring Russian-language schools and gymnasiums and encouraging the Kazakh elite to study at Russian universities. Yet a majority of ordinary people studied at local *maktabs* and *madrasabs*, where religious subjects were an important part of the curriculum. According to various estimates, at the beginning of the twentieth century the literacy rate stood at about 9 to 14 percent among the male ethnic Kazakhs and below 5 percent among the female ethnic Kazakhs. Since the early 1920s the Soviet government sponsored a free system of general and tertiary education that emphasized sciences, mathematics, and practical skills. Mass illiteracy in the republic was eradicated in the 1930s. In 1929, the alphabet of the written Kazakh language had been changed from Arabic to Latin; in 1940, it was changed from Latin to the Cyrillic script. In the 1970s and 1980s, Kazakhstan was able to maintain its literacy rate at about 98 percent, but could not catch up with the information technologies. In the 1980s, practically no schools in Kazakhstan had computers or access to computer technologies.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, there were three major changes in the education system of Kazakhstan. First, using the Kazakh language as the medium of instruction was increasingly empha-



A young boy studies in a Kazakhstan classroom in 1996. (JON SPAULL/CORBIS)

sized. Second, there were significant cuts in the state funding of education. Third, the country made several attempts to reform the education system to meet economic changes and shifting labor market demands.

The constitution of Kazakhstan (1995) stipulates that general education is mandatory and free, and that citizens have the right to receive a free tertiary education on a competitive basis. According to the constitution, the state sets uniform compulsory standards in education, as the Ministry of Education has to approve curriculum, textbooks, budgets, and so forth. This effectively put all public and privately funded education institutions under state control. Kazakh and Russian are the major languages of instruction, but the state provides support for education in other languages for ethnic minority groups (for example, Uzbeks, Germans). The constitution also stipulates separation of church and state, and no religious education is allowed in public schools.

At the age of three, children usually begin kindergarten, where they receive some basic reading and mathematics skills. At the age of seven, they begin an eleven-year compulsory education program, a primary four-year cycle, and a secondary seven-year cycle. The official figures for 1999 listed about 1,900 preschool establishments attended by 185,000 children. Approximately 8,280 elementary and secondary schools were attended by more than 3.1 million students. In addition, there were 244 specialized secondary schools (about 222,000 students), 131 gymnasiums and 85 lyceums (both are specialized elite schools), 62 evening schools, and 21 training centers. Approximately 85 percent of children of the relevant age group are enrolled in the secondary schools.

After completing secondary schooling, students may enter tertiary education institutions (universities and

institutes), which usually offer five-year programs. Most of the education at the tertiary level is conducted in Kazakh or Russian, although throughout the 1990s there were some attempts to introduce English as a medium of instruction at some universities or at least at some faculties in major universities. According to the official statistics, in 1999 there were 132 tertiary education institutions, including 59 that were state-owned, attended by approximately 260,000 students, and 73 private institutions, attended by approximately 60,000 students. Private universities and some state-owned universities charge between \$500 and \$1,000 per academic year (2000–2001 academic year estimates).

After completing a five-year program, students may apply for a three-year *aspirantura* (postgraduate studies program), which combines course work and a dissertation. Upon completion of the *aspirantura*, students get the degree of *kandidat nauk* (equivalent to a master's degree). To receive a doctorate, students must have practical experience in the field (teaching or research) and complete an additional three- to five-year program.

During the 1990s, the education system in Kazakhstan experienced a serious crisis, as state funding dwindled, along with the quality and prestige of higher education. The Kazakh government has tried to reform the education system, emphasizing computerization, supporting private investment in educational institutions, and encouraging the introduction of new courses, which are in demand in Kazakhstan. Recently, the possible introduction of a U.S.-style credit system in some private universities has been under discussion.

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KAZAKHSTAN—HISTORY The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 paved the way for the emergence of its largest Asian republic, Kazakhstan, as an independent state. Located in central Asia, early twenty-first century Kazakhstan borders Russia (north), China (east), Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan (south), and the Caspian Sea and Russia (west). It is the world's ninth largest country, with an area of 2,719,500 square kilometers and a population of about 18 million. Because it is a neighbor of two nuclear powers (China and Russia) and has substantial oil and gas reserves, Kazakhstan is a potentially significant country in world politics.

As a state with a central political system and with its current geographical and ethnic characteristics, Kazakhstan is not a very old phenomenon. Its history is mainly the history of various nomadic groups and empires that ruled the region during the last two millennia.

The Arrival of Turkic Peoples

Like the rest of central Asia, Kazakhstan today is populated mainly by Turkic speakers, but its indigenous inhabitants were Iranians. The seven-century-long migration of Turkic ethnic groups from regions of today's Mongolia and adjacent Chinese territory eventually "turkified" portions of central Asia by the thirteenth century. The nomadic Turkic peoples gradually replaced the Iranian people and populated those parts of central Asia that are now considered the nomadic regions (i.e., Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and parts of Turkmenistan). The other two current central Asian countries (Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) are considered sedentary regions as their populations are not primarily nomadic.

The seventh-century Arab invasion of central Asia introduced Islam to the region, but the nomadic population escaped the Arab occupation. The Arabs conquered only small parts of southern Kazakhstan in the eighth and ninth centuries and ruled there until the Mongols overran all of central Asia in the thirteenth century.

The Turkic Era

The Turkic era (sixth–twelfth centuries) was a period of constant fighting among various Turkic ethnic groups who contested the control of today's central Asia; as a result, different groups ruled different regions,



KEY EVENTS IN KAZAKHSTAN'S HISTORY

- 6th–12th centuries** During the Turkic era, Turkic peoples from Mongolia migrate to Central Asia and compete for land and political dominance.
- 8th–9th centuries** Islam is brought to Central Asia by Arabs.
- 9th–11th centuries** Kazakhstan is ruled by the Oghuz Turks, Kimaks, and Kipchaks.
- 1219–1221** The Mongols invade and conquer the ruling tribes and states.
- 1511–1523** The Kazakh tribes are united as a single people and a distinct Kazakh ethnic identity emerges in the region with Islam the primary religion.
- 16th century** The Kazakhs are divided into the Great Horde, Inner Horde, and Lesser Horde.
- 18th century** Mongol rule ends in Central Asia and Russian incursions begin.
- 1884** All of Kazakhstan is under Russian control.
- 1918–1920** Kazakhstan forms an independent government, which is suppressed by the Soviets.
- 1936** The Soviet Union establishes the five Central Asian republics.
- 1986** Kazakh students riot in opposition to Soviet rule and are repressed.
- 1991** Kazakhstan declares independence from the Soviet Union.
- 1996** The capital is moved from Almaty to Astana.

whose territories frequently expanded and contracted. The three Turkic groups who had a major impact on the region were the Qaznavian (Qaznavy), who established the Qaznavian dynasty; the Seljuks, who established the Seljuk dynasty; and the Khawrazmshahians, who established the Kharazmshahian dynasty.

The first khanates (kingdoms) of central Asia, which ruled over parts of today's Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, emerged under the control of various Turkic tribes in the second half of the sixth century and remained in power as loose federations of nomads until the eighth century, when the Qarluqs, another Turkic tribe, established a state in eastern Kazakhstan. This was overrun by a larger Turkic state, the Qarakhanid, whose territory included parts of eastern Kazakhstan and western China.

The Qarakhanids accepted the authority of the Arab Abbasid caliphs in Baghdad, but engaged in about a century of infighting as well as wars with the Seljuk Turks who dominated southern central Asia. The Qarakhanids' territory was gradually conquered in the 1130s by a Turkic federation of tribes from northern China, the Karakiti. From the ninth to the eleventh centuries, the Oghuz Turks governed western Kazakhstan, while the Kimak and Kipchak groups ruled over parts of its eastern region. The Karakiti state collapsed when the Mongols invaded central Asia in 1219–1221.

The Mongol Era

The thirteenth-century Mongol occupation of central Asia ended the short-lived states of the rival Turkic ethnic groups in today's Kazakhstan. The Kazakh lands became part of the Golden Horde, the western branch of the Mongol empire. Rivalry among various Mongol khans led to the division of the empire into several khanates by the early fifteenth century. Mongol rule over Kazakhstan lasted until the eighteenth century.

Kazakhstan began to emerge only in the late fifteenth century, when the Kazakhs came to be recognized as a distinct ethnic group. The majority of the tribes forming the Mongol forces were Turkic. The demise of the Mongols as an empire in the fifteenth century led to the disintegration of their forces and the rise of rivalry over territories among the Turkic tribes formerly loyal to the Mongols. Late in the fifteenth century, some of them (including the Qebchaq, Naiman, Uzun, and Dulta tribes) stationed in current Kazakhstan emerged as Khazak tribes, which were united in the early sixteenth century by Khan Kasym (reigned 1511–1518). In the sixteenth century the Kazakhs formed three hordes, or clans, with their own local states: the Great Horde in southern Kazakhstan, the Inner (Middle) Horde in north central Kazakhstan, and the Small (Lesser) Horde in western Kazakhstan. Those states

survived until their incorporation into the Russian empire in the first half of the nineteenth century.

The Russian Era

Russia gradually conquered Kazakhstan through war and diplomacy. It began seizing western Kazakh territory in the seventeenth century when the Kazakhs were focused on the threat to their east posed by the Kalmyk, a Mongol group. The Small Horde sought Russian assistance in 1730; late in the eighteenth century, Russia subjugated the remnants of the Small and Inner Hordes in the Kazakh lands neighboring today's Siberia. The Russians captured the entire Inner Horde by 1798 and dismantled the Inner and Small Hordes in 1822 and 1824, respectively. Threatened by a southern Central Asian state, the khanate of Quqon, the Great Horde requested Russian protection in the 1820s, which led to its subjugation in 1847.

Having annexed that portion of Kazakhstan that had been under the control of the three Hordes, Russia was faced with the three Central Asian khanates of Quqon, Bukhara, and Khiva. By 1884, using both warfare and diplomacy, Russia conquered and annexed all of Central Asia, including the remaining parts of Kazakhstan. During the lengthy annexation process, the administrative structure of Central Asia changed several times. In the end, the areas between Siberia and the Aral Sea and Lake Balkhash, whose main inhabitants were the Kazakh groups, were annexed as one entity, and the rest of the region was annexed as another (Turkistan). The Russians faced various unsuccessful armed uprisings by Kazakhs seeking to regain their independence in the nineteenth century.

Russian rule changed the nomadic structure and ethnic makeup of Kazakhstan. The influx of Russian settlers turned many fertile Kazakh lands into farms, resulting in limited pasture for cattle breeding, the major economic activity of the Kazakhs, and forcing them to become sedentary. The Russians also created infrastructure (for example, roads and schools) and established some industries in Kazakhstan.

The Soviet Era

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the establishment of the Soviet Union did not bring independence to Kazakhstan. The Soviet regime suppressed several antiwar, anti-Russian, anti-Soviet, and independence movements in Central Asia during the period 1917–1933, including the independent Kazakh government (1918–1920) created by a group of secular nationalists called the Alash Orda. The Soviets di-

vided and redid the region until 1936, when it finally settled on the establishment of the five so-called ethnically based republics. Henceforth Kazakhstan took its current geographical shape and borders.

The Soviet era had a major impact on the development of Kazakhstan and its ethnic makeup. Agriculture and industries were expanded significantly, but they were far less developed than in the European Soviet republics. Kazakhstan was therefore heavily dependent on those republics for agricultural and industrial products at the time of independence. The Soviet efforts to develop Kazakhstan's economy and the relocation of many industries from the European parts of the Soviet Union to Kazakhstan during World War II led to the massive migration of Russians and other Slavs to Kazakhstan. This migration made Kazakhstan the only Soviet republic where the "dominant" ethnic group (Kazakhs) was in the minority.

Kazakhstan was the Soviet republic least interested in freedom from the USSR, as reflected in its lack of a strong pro-independence movement before the fall of the Soviet Union. Soviet Secretary-General Mikhail Gorbachev's anticorruption campaign in Kazakhstan did however provoke limited anti-Soviet movements in the late 1980s. Hence the December 1986 replacement of the first secretary of Kazakhstan's Communist Party, Dinmukhamed Kunayev, an ethnic Kazakh, by Gennadiy Kolbin, an ethnic Russian from outside Kazakhstan, provoked riots (mainly by students), which Soviet forces brutally suppressed. In June 1989, Nursultan Nazarbaev, a reform-minded Kazakh, replaced Kolbin and became the president of the republic in October 1990. Nazarbaev remained a strong supporter of the Soviet Union, as he considered Soviet republics too interdependent to survive independence. He consolidated his power by winning an uncontested presidential election in December 1991, a few days before the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The Post-Soviet Era

Kazakhstan was the last Soviet republic to declare independence (15 December 1991). On 21 December, Kazakhstan and ten other former Soviet republics signed the Almaty Declaration, named after the country's capital, to create the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In 1996, Astana became the new capital of Kazakhstan.

Like other former Soviet republics in transition from a socialist economy to free enterprise, Kazakhstan has experienced a decline in industrial and agricultural production and in living standards while suffering from growing unemployment and poverty. It has gradually

shifted from its advocacy of democracy in the first years of independence to an authoritarian regime dominated by the Nazarbaev family and friends.

If developed fully, Kazakhstan's significant oil and gas reserves could help the Kazakhs address their current economic problems and build a more prosperous future. Russia's dissatisfaction with Kazakhstan's growing ties with the West, particularly the United States, and Russia's practical exclusion from the development of Kazakhstan's oil industry dominated by American oil companies could lead to serious conflicts between Kazakhstan and Russia. Accounting for about 40 percent of Kazakhstan's population, ethnic Russians have been losing to ethnic Kazakhs the preeminent social, economic, and political status they had enjoyed during the Soviet era. This situation creates the potential for Russia's manipulation of Kazakh Russian dissatisfaction to achieve its own objectives.

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KAZAKHSTAN—POLITICAL SYSTEM

Kazakhstan is a new nation, established as an independent, sovereign state only in 1991, when it emerged from the breakup of the Soviet Union. In its first decade of national independence, Kazakhstan's government demonstrated a strong commitment to establishing the foundation for an open, democratic form of government with a market-based economy. Kazakhstan won praise from the international community for this approach and for taking an unprecedented initiative in voluntarily relinquishing its status as a nuclear power. Kazakhstan's progress in the transition from a Communist-era system to a political system in accordance with international standards is significantly greater than that of its other Central Asian neighbors, which also became independent as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The political transition in Kazakhstan began as early as 1986, with the perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness) reforms introduced under Mikhail Gorbachev (b. 1931), the last Communist Party leader of the USSR. True political reform in the Soviet Union began in 1988, when Gorbachev announced at the Nineteenth Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union his intention to sponsor free elections. By December 1988, the Soviet government had adopted a new election law permitting national and republican multislate elections, the first free elections in the USSR since 1918.

In Kazakhstan's first free election in February 1990, Nursultan Nazarbaev (b. 1940)—then the first secretary of the Kazakhstan Communist Party—was elected chairman of the Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet, the Soviet-era parliament. A month later, parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan seated a new parliament. In one of its first official acts, the new parliament elected Nazarbaev president of the Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan in April 1990.

A short time later, the parliament passed the Kazakhstan Declaration of Sovereignty. Kazakhstan became a sovereign government, but remained within the USSR. As the Soviet Union began to unravel in autumn 1991, Nazarbaev scheduled a presidential election. Running without opposition, he won the election, easily becoming the country's first popularly elected president on 2 December 1991. Just two weeks later, Kazakhstan's parliament adopted the Kazakhstan Declaration of Independence. Kazakhstan became a sovereign and independent state with Nazarbaev as the head of state.

Kazakhstan under Nazarbaev

Nazarbaev was a pragmatic and forward-thinking leader. Even during the Soviet period, he had sought to move Kazakhstan's government toward a market economy and a relatively open political system. During his early years in power, legislation was adopted to promote privatization in the economy and multi-party public participation in the political system. In 1992, a new constitution was adopted. It prescribed a representative government with a separation of powers among three coequal branches of government, based on popular sovereignty through free elections.

Despite the formal descriptions of checks and balances on power, however, the president exercised a decisive voice in agenda setting, policy, budgeting, and dispute resolution. This became clear in 1993, when disputes over economic policy emerged in Kazakhstan's legislature. The legislature was internally divided and

yet, following its constitutional mandate, anxious to exercise greater control over economic issues, particularly privatization. The parliament eventually became deadlocked in a competition between those who supported Nazarbaev's market reforms and those who favored a partial restoration of the economic machinery of the Soviet period. In December 1993, a contingent of parliamentarians favoring reform voted to disband the deadlocked parliament. Nazarbaev recognized the vote immediately and, acting as head of state, dismissed the parliament and ordered that the legislative chambers be locked. With this act, Kazakhstan's Soviet-era parliament came to an end.

The election for a new parliament was held in March 1994. This new, more openly experimental deliberative body met in April 1994. The second Kazakhstani parliament quickly asserted its constitutional mandate to exercise control over legislation and the powers of the purse. A number of parliamentary committees began to exert direct influence over legislation related to privatization. Several parliamentary politicians assumed a watchdog function over the privatization process.

But the March 1994 parliamentary election had been a carefully structured process, with the most important decisions having been made during the nomination process rather than during the election itself. For these and other reasons, the election was criticized as fundamentally flawed by international election observers, particularly the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (now known as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). Several unsuccessful candidates filed court challenges to the election. A challenge lodged by one unsuccessful candidate, Tatiana Kviatkovskaia, resulted in a constitutional-court ruling in March 1995. The court, ruling in favor of the plaintiff, rather surprisingly found the entire parliamentary election to be invalid. Nazarbaev vetoed this decision, but the court then overruled his veto. Yielding to the court, Nazarbaev dismissed the parliament.

Nazarbaev took advantage of the absence of a legislature to call a referendum to extend his own term of office. He easily won a five-year extension of his mandate in a referendum of 20 April 1995. A new constitution also won popular approval by nearly 90 percent of the voters in a referendum in August 1995. This new constitution granted expanded powers to the executive branch, established a bicameral parliament, and did away with the constitutional court in favor of a constitutional council. It gave the president an unambiguous mandate to issue decrees with the force of constitutional law. Parliamentary elections took place in December 1995.

Kazakhstan's Governmental Structure

Kazakhstan's bicameral parliament consists of the Senate and the *majlis*. The upper house, the Senate, has forty-seven seats, seven of which are appointed by the president. Other senators are popularly elected, two from each of the former oblasts and the former capital of Almaty. The senators serve six-year terms. Some senate seats come up for reelection every two years. The *majlis* has sixty-seven directly elected seats and ten party-list seats for a total of seventy-seven. *Majlis* deputies are elected to five-year terms. *Majlis* elections were held in fall 1999 and were next scheduled to be held in 2004.

For most of the period of the Soviet Union's existence (1917–1991), there was only one political party in Kazakhstan, the Communist Party. Although the Communist Party was not actually referenced in the Constitutions of the USSR, the Soviet Union maintained a one-party system with the Communist Party at the focus of activity. The Party served, in the words of a political slogan of the time, as the mind, honor, and conscience of society. It did not serve as a competitor in a competition of ideas. Competition of ideas existed, but the party's job was to direct and implement rather than to debate and deliberate. The period of perestroika and political reform in Kazakhstan inaugurated a period of experimentation with political movements. Eventually, political parties in Kazakhstan were legalized. During the 1999 presidential elections, there were nine political parties registered with Kazakhstan's Ministry of Justice. The Kazakh 1995 constitution specifically legalized political parties acting within the confines of the law. However, the registration of parties is complex and highly controlled.

Kazakhstan's Political Parties

Kazakhstan's most important political parties and political movements include (1) Otan, the "Fatherland" party, formed in March 1999 as a result of the combination of the Kazakhstan Liberal Movement, the Kazakhstan People's Unity Party, the Democratic Party, and the For Kazakhstan-2030 movement; (2) the Kazakhstan People's Congress, formed in October 1991 by the leaders of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement and Aral-Asia-Kazakhstan movement, the Union of Kazakhstan Women, the Birlesu independent trade union, the Kazakh Tili society, the Association of Young Builders, and national cultural centers; (3) the Kazakhstan Civil Party, formed in November 1998; (4) the Kazakhstan People's and Cooperative Party, formed in December 1994 on the initiative of Kazakhstan cooperatives; (5) the Kazakhstan Communist Party, re-formed in September 1991 as the successor to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union;

(6) the Kazakhstan Revival Party, formed in March 1995, and the Kazakhstan Social Party, formed in September 1991 following the reformation of the Kazakhstan Communist Party; (7) the Republican Political Labor Party, formed in 1996; (8) the Kazakhstan Republican People's Party, formed in December 1998 under the leadership of the former prime minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin; (9) the Kazakhstan Agrarian Party, formed in January 1999; (10) the Alash National Party, formed in May 1999; and (11) the Justice Party, formed in January 1998.

Successes and Failures of the Political System

Kazakhstan's political system has functioned effectively in some areas. Kazakhstan established a legal foundation and regulatory system for a private economy. It introduced a national currency, the tenge, which became and has remained fully convertible. It established sound monetary and fiscal policies, particularly in taxation and spending. It actively encouraged international trade and foreign investment and established a regulatory structure for the private banking and financial sector. It turned major enterprises over to the private sector, including the majority of power-generation facilities and coal mines. It passed environmentally sound oil and gas legislation that meets international standards.

Kazakhstan's political reform has made less headway in other areas. Kazakhstan's agriculture remains without adequate investment in infrastructure such as roads, processing equipment, and farm inputs. Moreover, the banking system has virtually ignored agriculture, failing to provide much-needed credit for farm expansion. Kazakhstan adopted a private pension system, moving ahead of other former Communist countries, but the social safety net has worn thin in many areas. With a per-capita income of \$1,300, most citizens have yet to see the benefits of macroeconomic reform and the resurgence of world prices for the country's significant oil, gas, and gold deposits. There have also been declines in the health status of the people of Kazakhstan, as well as declines in benefits for senior citizens and education opportunities. Dramatic increases in infectious diseases, such as drug-resistant tuberculosis, pose serious threats. Kazakhstan has drawn significant criticism from human-rights organizations for its inability to protect individual rights, provide for free and fair elections, combat nepotism and official corruption, and guarantee fundamental freedoms such as freedom of speech, the media, and political assembly.

Gregory Gleason

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KEDAH (2002 est. pop. 1.7 million). Kedah State is situated on the northwestern coast of peninsular Malaysia and borders Thailand. The state is commonly known as the "Rice Bowl of Malaysia." Recent government initiatives, however, have sought to diversify its mainstay economic activities, particularly in the areas of industry (e.g., Kulim Technological Park) and tourism (e.g., Isles of Langkawi).

In ancient times, Kedah was a well-known destination for trade. Lively commerce between India and Kedah existed some two thousand years ago, as indicated by contemporary Indian literature. Kedah was variously known in Tamil and Sanskrit as Kadaram, Kidaram, Kalagam, and Kataha. Its fame also reached civilizations in Greece and China.

Malaysia's most extensive archaeological site is also found in the Bujang Valley (in southern Kedah) where ruins of an ancient Hindu-Buddhist kingdom were uncovered. The oldest surviving written sources, in the form of stone inscriptions, bear witness to the region as an important landfall port (at Sungei Mas), and later, as an entrepôt (at Pengkalan Bujang) between India and China from as early as the fifth century CE. Additionally, artifacts in the form of bronzeware, ceramics, amber, glass, and beads originating from China, Indochina, Thailand, West Asia, and India indicate the vitality of these commercial links. Its importance, however, waned with the founding of the Melaka sultanate and the dawning of Islam from the fifteenth century CE onward.

Seng-Guan Yeoh

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KELANTAN (1995 est. pop. 1.3 million). Kelantan, located on the northeast coast of the Malay Penin-

sula, covers an area of 14,943 square kilometers. It is an agrarian state with lush paddy fields, fishing villages, and palm-fringed beaches. Its main cash crops are paddy, rubber, tobacco, and fruits. Fishing, livestock rearing, and timber production are also important economic activities, besides its handicraft cottage industry. The population is approximately 94 percent Malay, 4.5 percent Chinese, and 0.5 percent Indian. With its predominantly Malay population, Kelantan has kept its traditional character. Kota Bharu, its capital, is a center for the arts and crafts, particularly batik and silverwork, for which the state is famous. The womenfolk in Kelantan dominate life in the markets and hawker centers while their menfolk are mainly fishermen or farmers. The Kelantanese are Malaysia's most conservative Muslims and have voted a hard-line Islamic opposition into power.

Historically, Kelantan had always been a vassal. By the fourteenth century, Kelantan was under Siamese suzerainty. At that time, it was also under the influence of the Javanese Majapahit empire. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Kelantan was sending tribute to the Melaka sultanate and its successor, Johor. Problems of leadership and internal strife were part of Kelantan's history during most of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In 1800, one local chief, Long Mohammad, proclaimed himself the first sultan of Kelantan. Upon the death of the heirless Sultan Mohammad, succession disputes again erupted. In 1909, through a treaty, Siam (Thailand) ceded its suzerainty of Kelantan, Kedah, Perlis, and Terengganu to the British. Together with Johor, these became the Unfederated Malay States. In 1948, the Unfederated Malay States became part of the Federation of Malaya. The federation gained independence from British colonial rule in 1957. Together with Sabah and Sarawak, the federation formed the country Malaysia in 1963.

Yik Koon Teh

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KEMAL, YASAR (b. 1922), Turkish novelist, journalist, short-story writer. One of Turkey's most prominent writers, Yasar Kemal draws his ideas from

Turkish folklore, cultural traditions, and everyday life. Yasar Kemal's real name is Kemal Sadik Gogceli. He was born in the small village of Hemite (Gokceli) in the province of Adana. His father, while praying in a mosque, was shot dead in front of five-year-old Kemal, and the shock caused a speech impediment until the boy was twelve. He later lost his right eye in an accident. He finished elementary school in 1938, the first person in his village to do so. Kemal moved to Adana (the provincial capital) the same year to continue his education, but had to quit to support himself before he finished the eighth grade. Between 1941 and 1946 he held menial jobs until he became a schoolteacher. During the same period he studied folklore and wrote poems, which were published in several journals.

Kemal was arrested in 1950 for contributing to the organization of a communist party and spent a year in prison. The following year he earned fame as a journalist while working in Istanbul for the newspaper *Cumhuriyet*. In 1952 Kemal married his closest companion, Thilda, the English translator of his work. He received his first journalism award in 1955 from the Society of Journalists. In the same year Kemal's novel, a tale about a bandit and a folk hero, *Ince Memed* (Memed, My Hawk), was published and immediately became a national and international success. It earned him the Valik Literature Prize for best novel of the year in Turkey and has been translated into more than twenty-six languages. Kemal's other literary honors include the French Légion d'Honneur, the Prix du Meilleur Livre Étranger, and a spot on the shortlist for the Nobel Prize in literature. In 1962 Kemal became a member of the Workers' Party of Turkey but resigned in 1969. In 1971 he was imprisoned for twenty-six days, then released without being charged. Kemal took an active role in organizing the Writers' Syndicate of Turkey in 1973 and became its first chairperson in 1974. In 1995, following the publication of an essay in the German weekly *Der Spiegel* (The Mirror), which accused the Turkish government of oppressing the Kurds in Turkey, Kemal was accused of "separatist propaganda" undermining the "indivisible integrity of the state." Himself of Kurdish descent, Kemal, however, had not advocated a separate Kurdish state.

Kemal is considered Turkey's most influential living writer, who speaks for the persecuted and dispossessed. His novels and short stories, based on epic tales, folk songs, and popular literature, poetically describe the beauty of the Cukurova plain in southern Turkey and life in the countryside and coastal villages. His works include *Ince Memed II* (*They Burn the Thistles*), the three-volume *Orta Direk* (The Wind from the

Plain), *Yer Demir Gok Bakir* (Iron Earth Copper Sky), *Olmez Otu* (The Undying Grass), and *Yilani Oldurseler* (To Crush the Serpent).

T. Isikozlu-E.F. Isikozlu

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KENDO Kendo ("way of the sword") is a Japanese martial art. It is the art and sport of sword fighting, although in its modern form the sword is actually a bamboo rod. Kendo developed more than a thousand years ago as a training technique for the samurai warrior class. After the samurai class was officially abolished in 1871, kendo began its transformation into a sport.

It was introduced into the secondary school curriculum in 1914 and became compulsory in 1931. From Japan, it spread to Korea (which Japan colonized from 1910 to 1945), where it remains popular, and to other nations in the Japanese diaspora. Kendo was employed as a hand-to-hand combat training exercise by the Japanese military before and during World War II and was banned by the occupying American officials after the war because it was believed to support Japanese militarism. It was revived in 1953, after the U.S. occupation ended, as a modern sport, and became popular with older people and women as well as young men.

Kendo contests take five minutes, with the first contestant to score two points being the winner. Points are scored by striking portions of the opponent's body with the bamboo sword. The areas on one's opponent that one must hit to score points are the head above the temple, either side of the trunk, the right forearm if the arm is at waist level, or either forearm if both hands are raised. The throat may be struck only by thrusting. The International Kendo Federation (IKF) is the sports governing body, with chapters in thirty nations.

David Levinson

KERALA (2001 pop. 31.8 million). The state of Kerala is located in southwestern India bordering the Arabian Sea. It was formed in 1956 by merging the British districts of Malabar and Calicut, the district of South Kanara, and the princely state of Travancore-Cochin. Though measuring only 38,863 square kilometers, Kerala is one of the most densely populated

regions in the world. The mountains of the Western Ghats separate this narrow strip of tropical land, where access can be gained only through mountain passes, from the rest of the Indian peninsula to the east.

Kerala differs in many ways from the rest of India. Almost the entire population speaks Malayalam, a Dravidian language with significant Sanskrit influences, Kerala being the only Indian state to speak the language. Its population of Hindus (60 percent), Muslims (20 percent), and Christians (20 percent) enjoys interreligious harmony. Christianity supposedly came to Kerala in 52 CE, with the Apostle Saint Thomas, who founded one of the earliest Christian settlements in the world here. Islam also came not by conquest but through trade from Arabia. Hinduism as practiced here exhibits rather different customs from the rest of India, such as matrilineal inheritance. Other religions in Kerala include Buddhism, Jainism, and Judaism, although most Jews have now emigrated to Israel.

Kerala's traditional association with spice production attracted traders from the early Romans to the Chinese (first through fifteenth centuries CE) to Western Europeans (from 1498 onward). Kerala developed as an important entrepôt connecting Europe, Arabia, Persia, South Asia, Indonesia, and China. The major international ports were Cochin and Calicut. The European commercial and military intervention, beginning with the Portuguese, gradually eliminated trading rivals and finally culminated in British control. The British ruled Malabar in the north and indirectly controlled the princely states of Travancore and Cochin in the south.

Modern Kerala was the first major region in the world to have a democratically elected Communist government (1957). The present ruling coalition is headed by the Communist Party of India (Marxist). Today Kerala surpasses the rest of the country in literacy, health care, population control, equitable distribution of income, and popular participation in governance. Kerala's mortality and fertility indexes surpass China and are on a par with advanced Western countries. Though the state is the most advanced in India in its social indicators, it lags behind a number of other Indian states in terms of per-capita income.

R. Gopinath

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The domed roof of the bazaar in Kerman in 1993. (K. M. WESTERMANN/CORBIS)

KERMAN (2002 est. province pop. 2.2 million; city pop. 419,000). In ancient times Kerman, a province in southeastern Iran, was known as Carmania (in Persian, "bravery and combat") and formed part of the province of Ariana in the Persian empire. The modern province has an area of about 186,000 square kilometers. The capital city, also Kerman, was founded as early as the third century CE by Ardashir I, founder of the Sasanid dynasty.

Kerman's history was violent: Arabs, Buyids, Seljuks, Turkmens, Mongols, and Persians invaded and ruled it and left their mark on the region. The Safavid ruler Ganj Ali Khan (1005–1034 CE) especially contributed to Kerman's prosperity.

Kerman borders the modern provinces of Khorasan and Yazd to the north; to the south, Hormuzgan, the Persian Gulf, and the Gulf of Oman; east, Sistan and Baluchistan; and west, Fars. Western Kerman is mountainous, while northern and eastern Kerman is desert, with little water. Its most important permanently flowing river is the Halil. To alleviate the shortage of surface water, the province developed many subterranean water canals known as *qanat*, an ancient Iranian method of groundwater use and transport; some *qanat* systems have been in use for thousands of years. Due to its aridity, Kerman has a low population density, with ten major urban areas scattered throughout the province.

The language spoken in Kerman is Persian, with provincial and local differences and expressions. Turk-

ish and Baluchi languages are also spoken by some regional nomadic tribes, who form a very small portion of the total population. Most people are Muslims, with some religious minorities such as Zoroastrians, who have been living in the area for thousands of years.

The economy of Kerman is based on agriculture and industry, as well as its rich copper mines. Agricultural products include grains, beets, henna, cumin, cotton, and citrus fruits; pistachios and dates are two of Kerman's major export items. Major nonagricultural exports are hand-woven carpets and rugs known as *gelim*. Kerman's carpets are known throughout the world for their delicacy, strength, and colors. The provincial capital, 1,060 kilometers from the Iranian capital of Tehran, is linked to it by road, rail, and air. Kerman also has good access to the Persian Gulf ports.

Payam Foroughi and Raissa Mubutdinova-Foroughi

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KEUMKANG, MOUNT Mount Keumkang (Keumkangsan, or "Diamond Mountain") is a range of spectacular peaks in Kangwon Province in eastern

North Korea. Keumkangsan includes some 12,000 individual peaks, as well as valleys and spectacular waterfalls. The highest peak within the range is Biro-bong, with a height of 1,698 meters. The range known as Manmulsan is unique in that its rugged terrain appears to change as light passes over and recedes from it. Keumkangsan is the northern extension of the Taebaek mountain range, which includes Soraksan (Mount Sorak) to the south. Like Soraksan, Keumkangsan has tremendous sentimental significance to Koreans because of its natural beauty and myths associated with it.

Keumkangsan's name is derived from a Buddhist poem that speaks of "the diamond mountain where the Bodhisattva lives." Legend holds that the region was originally controlled by nine dragons, which were defeated by the fifty-three Buddhas of the Yujeon Temple.

The region is largely undeveloped, although several archaeological and cultural sites exist there. The best-preserved of these dates from 670 CE during the Unified Shilla period (668–935 CE). In the late 1990s the region also became politically significant when the government of North Korea began to admit organized tours from South Korea. These tours were arranged by the Hyundai Corporation, which has begun economic development in North Korea.

Thomas P. Dolan

KHAI HUNG (1896–1947), Vietnamese writer. After graduating from senior high school, Tran Khanh Giu (Khai Hung) started teaching in a private institution called Thang Long School. The French authorities considered it an establishment in which liberal ideas and socialist doctrines were freely cultivated. It was there that Khai Hung made friends with patriots and writers who were to give a definite direction to the rest of his life. With a few young, politically and socially minded writers, he founded, in 1933, Tu Luc Van Doan, a literary, social, and political club. One year later, he published his first novel, *Nua chung xuan* (In Mid-Spring), followed by many more that made him into one of the most influential and popular authors of the time. In his novels, he attacked the traditional stratified society and showed the vacuity of Confucian virtues, which he felt were all there to make life miserable for everyone concerned. During this period, he was involved in many social endeavors. Finally, as the war portended drastic changes to the colony, Khai Hung launched himself into the political arena by joining the Dai Viet Party, which sought Vietnamese independence

by collaborating with Japanese occupational forces. After the war, as the Communist Party was establishing its political control over Vietnam, he sided with the rival old Nationalist Party. Early in 1947, a few months into the Franco-Vietnamese war, Khai Hung was kidnapped and assassinated by parties unknown.

Lam Truong Buu

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KHALKHA Khalkha is the official language of Mongolia and is spoken by approximately 90 percent of its population, about 2.4 million in 2000. Khalkha is actually a dialect of Mongol. In addition to Khalkha, other important Mongol dialects include Dariganga, spoken in southern Mongolia, and Chakhar, Urat, Kharchin-Tumet, Khorchin, Ujumchin, and Ordos, all spoken in Inner Mongolia. Khalkha encompasses a number of dialect variants, but differences are as minor as the differences between Khalkha and the other Mongol dialects, all of which are mutually comprehensible. The real differences are historical rather than linguistic. When Khalkha's direct connection with China ended after 1911, Russian became a dominant influence; the other languages of the Mongol group, with the exception of Dariganga, continued to be influenced by Chinese. The Mongol languages of China also continued to use the Uighur script and a spelling that is somewhat archaic and less precise but has the advantage of deemphasizing phonological variations.

Prior to 1940, Khalkha was also written with the Uighur script, but since that time a slightly modified Cyrillic script has been used that better reflects the phonological patterns of everyday speech. Since 1991, the Uighur script has made a comeback. From the standpoint of Mongolian linguistic nationalism, a general return to the Uighur script would be extremely important. All speakers of Mongol would write the same way, although terminological differences would persist.

After more than sixty years of development as a distinct literary language, Khalkha has now become a sophisticated medium of exchange and a Mongolian national language in every sense. The evolution of Khalkha has accelerated since the end of Communist rule, with the introduction of new social and economic institutions and vocabularies to support them. Whole

new sectors associated with concepts that simply did not exist in Mongolia prior to the 1990s, such as modern banking and computer science, have developed their own vocabulary. Most of the new terminology is based on Mongolian roots rather than borrowings. Nonetheless, in many highly technical areas the Mongols still have recourse to English, which has replaced Russian for them as the preferred language of international communication, at least until established Mongolian terminology has emerged.

Paul D. Buell

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KHAN, ABDUL GHAFAR (1890–1988), Pakistani politician. Abdul Ghaffar Khan played a major political role in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of the Indian British empire (now part of Pakistan). He was born in 1890 at Charsadda (NWFP) into an important Pashtun family. He became very popular among the Pashtun population there for his movement devoted to the education of the illiterate. In the 1920s he joined the Indian National Congress, leading the provincial branch of the party in the Pashtun areas. As a member of the central executive committee of the Congress, he was jailed several times by the British.

In 1947 he opposed the partition of the Indian subcontinent into two different states (Pakistan and India). After the creation of Pakistan (1947), he became a member of the Pakistani National Assembly, but was later imprisoned and then expelled (1958) from Pakistan to Afghanistan because of his nationalistic radicalism. He struggled for the survival of the traditional way of life of the Pashtuns (who are the majority ethnic group in Afghanistan) and for their political reunification in a single state, called Pashtunistan. In 1970 he returned to Pakistan, having softened his political stance. He died at Peshawar, Pakistan, on 20 January 1988.

Riccardo Redaelli

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KHAN, VILAYAT (b. 1928), Indian musician. Vilayat Khan is a well-known exponent of Indian instrumental music. His many renditions on the sitar, a stringed instrument belonging to the lute family, have earned him international recognition. Born into a family of noted musicians in 1928 in East Bengal, Vilayat Khan spent his childhood in Calcutta. He later moved to Delhi after the death of his father, Ustad Inayat Khan, in 1938. Vilayat Khan was musically inclined at a very young age and showed great promise and determination. He cut his first album at the age of eight in 1936 and developed a distinctive style of his own in the course of his musical career. Vilayat Khan's music is marked by fluidity, sweetness, and a certain impatient energy of inventiveness. He is credited with forging the *gayaki ang* style of sitar playing, identifiable by its innovative deployment of vocal technique. By reducing the number of drone strings from seven to six, he created new tunings, making the sitar more supple and versatile. This unique style opened up new possibilities in Indian instrumental music. For his distinctive contribution Vilayat Khan has earned the title *afzaab-e-sitar*, "the radiant star of the sitar." He is known for his fierce and independent spirit, having declined state awards twice. A staunch defender of the purity and continuity of multiple local traditions, the sitar maestro has called for innovative experimentation within the existing repertoire of Indian classical music in view of its marked decline in recent times.

Ram Shankar Nanda

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KHARARKHI Distilled alcoholic beverages, generically *khararkhi* ("black *arkhi*" in Mongolian), have a considerable antiquity among the Mongols and other Central Asians. In the thirteenth century they occurred in two forms: (1) various brandies and vodkas, mostly imported, judging from largely Turkic names (Mongolian *arkhi* is from Arabic via Turkic *arajhi*, meaning "properly distilled") and (2) various products of freeze distillation. In freeze distillation, a liquor is started in the normal way, and the product is then stored in an ice cellar as a semifrozen slush. Unfrozen portions are gradually ladled off and stored, yielding a concentrated drink of up to 60 proof. Most of the

freeze distillates in the Mongol court dietary *Yinshan zhenyao* (Proper and Essential Things for the Emperor's Food and Drink) were intended for medicinal use and were to be cut with water. However, straight concoctions using fruit and other fermentables served concentrated for the simple pleasure of it were in use as well, with the Arabic *sharbat* tradition embracing a similar range of fruit drinks as one influence. Certainly, in the *Yinshan zhenyao*, Mongolian native drinks have been improved with more sophisticated Arabic traditions in mind.

The Mongols continued to drink distilled alcoholic beverages after their empire. There are no further references to freeze distillation, but the method must have continued in use since it is such an obvious one and well suited to Mongolian conditions. The range of ingredients was probably less exotic. Most of the true hard liquors continued to be imported from the sedentary world, better equipped to produce them, but easily portable distillation apparatus was generally available by the fourteenth century if not much earlier, judging from Mongol-era content in the popular encyclopedia *Zhujia biyong shilei* (Things That One Must Put to Use at Home), which clearly describes portable distillation apparatus of a type easily usable by Mongols.

In the twentieth century the Mongolian hard liquor of choice has become vodka, mostly imported from Russia, but the Mongols also make their own, too (for export), primarily from local wheat. Many varieties of moonshine exist, too. Almost any liquor that can be distilled is and with far better stills than the primitive ones in use among the Mongols prior to the twentieth century.

Under traditional conditions, alcoholism was uncommon among the Mongols. Hard liquors were available only sporadically and, in the case of those locally produced, only seasonally. This situation changed for the elite during the era of empire and has changed for Mongols generally in recent times. Alcoholism, as throughout the former Soviet bloc, is now a serious problem. Given the cheapness and ready availability of *khararkhi*, it is likely to remain so.

Paul D. Buell

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KHASI Khasi (Ki Khasi or Ri Lum) is the name of a tribe inhabiting the Khasi and Jaintia Hills of Meghalaya State in northeast India. Originally from Southeast Asia, Khasis migrated to the Khasi and Jaintia Hills, establishing small chiefdoms there by the mid-sixteenth century. British expansion into Assam in the early nineteenth century exposed the Khasis to missionary activities and Western cultural influence.

Khasis speak a Mon-Khmer language of the Austro-Asiatic family. Traditionally they practiced an animistic religion focusing on propitiation of spirits by a priest (*lyngdoh*) and a female priest (*Ka-sob-blei* or *Ka-lyngdoh*). Nowadays, however, the majority (67 percent) has adopted Christianity. The Khasis are divided into exogamous clans, each tracing their descent from an ancestress (*kiaw* or grandmother). The youngest daughter inherits the ancestral property. Although many have entered other occupations, agriculture, both intensive paddy cultivation and shifting agriculture (*jbum*), is still the main economic activity.

There is much political and social turmoil among Khasis today, especially surrounding the vexatious question of political rights and limited economic opportunities in the region. Conflicts with nontribals resulted in formation of proactive groups such as the Khasi Students' Union (KSU) and the Federation of the Khasi, Jaintia, and Garo People (FKJGP). There is also increasing resentment of traditional Khasis against Christianity, giving rise to the Seng Khasi movement to preserve traditional religion.

Sanjukta Das Gupta

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KHIEU SAMPHAN (b. 1933), Cambodian political figure. Khieu Samphan was an important member of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, which ruled Cambodia between April 1975 and January 1979—a period when more than 1.5 million Cambodians lost their lives. Born the eldest son of a Kompong Cham judge in 1933, Samphan attended the Collège Norodom Sihanouk and the Lycée Sisowath. He completed his studies at the University of Paris, where he wrote a thesis about Cambodia's economic development that many later mistakenly believed was

a blueprint for the radical economic policies of the Khmer Rouge. It was during his time in Paris that Khieu Samphan became a dedicated Communist.

When he returned to Cambodia from France, Samphan taught at a private school and edited the left-wing newspaper *L'Observateur*. His writings about social justice and veiled criticisms of the injustices of the ruling regime made him a popular figure among Cambodia's students. In 1962 he was elected to Cambodia's National Assembly and was also appointed secretary of state for commerce. He was reelected in 1966, before disappearing into the maquis in 1967, fearing for his life after Sihanouk had begun to crack down heavily on Communists and suspected Communists.

Samphan occupied several important posts in the Democratic Kampuchea regime (1975–1979) and, after it was ousted by the Vietnamese, continued to represent the movement on the international stage. He played an important role in negotiating the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements, before withdrawing to the region of Cambodia's border with Thailand, where the Khmer Rouge continued its struggle against the ruling regime. Following the death of Pol Pot and the disintegration of the Khmer Rouge movement in the late 1990s, Samphan eventually surrendered to the Cambodian government. He was allowed to retire to the former Khmer Rouge stronghold of Pailin, to await a decision on whether he would be called to appear before an international genocide tribunal.

David M. Ayres

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KHILAFAT MOVEMENT The *khilafat* (caliphate) was the unique position occupied by the Muslim emperor of the Turkish (Ottoman) empire who was also the spiritual head (*khalifa* or caliph) of the Muslim community worldwide. The Khilafat Movement was a protest movement by Indian Muslims angry at the decision of the British and Allied governments after World War I to dismember the Ottoman empire and thus disperse the Islamic holy shrines and the rule of their spiritual leader, Abdul Hamid II. The Muslims had fought gallantly for the British during the war on the assurance that their religious interests would be protected, and Britain's

treatment of the Turks after their loss in the war was seen as a betrayal of this trust.

Some Muslim leaders formed themselves into a *khilafat* conference; 27 October 1919 was designated as Khilafat Day; and a joint conference was called with Hindu leaders on 23 November over which Mohandas Gandhi presided. A *khilafat* deputation to the viceroy on 19 January 1920 proved unsuccessful, and in May 1920, by the Treaty of Sevres, peace terms were formally signed, sealing the fate of the Ottoman empire. The *khilafat* leaders formally joined ranks with the Indian National Congress and adopted Gandhi's noncooperation agenda, which saw nationwide mass peaceful protests by the Indians against British rule from 1920 to 1922. Thus the *khilafat* issue served to unite the Hindus and Muslims politically in the nationalist cause. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema issued a fatwa (religious decree) advising Muslims to boycott elections under the new constitution, boycott schools and colleges, give up titles, and refuse to serve in the army. Though *khilafat* leaders like the Ali brothers—Muhammad and Shaukat—contended that all Indian Muslims were equally enraged by these developments, it is also true to argue that to an extent an emotive issue was utilized by certain Muslim organizations to further political gains and that the issue itself and the distance from India meant that few Muslims could be directly inconvenienced by Allied actions. Meanwhile Turkey itself was undergoing a revolution with the Young Turk movement capturing power, ousting Hamid and abolishing the khalifat. By the early 1920s, therefore, the movement itself had run out of steam.

Chandrika Kaul

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KHIVA, KHANATE OF The khanate of Khiva was a state centered in the basin of the Amu Dar'ya River in Central Asia from the early sixteenth century

until 1920. Khiva was a successor state of the ancient and powerful state of Khorezm, founded by two descendants of Genghis Khan. The Uzbek chieftains Ilbars and Balbars conquered Khorezm, the land south of the Aral Sea and west of the Syr Dar'ya River, plus part of Khurasan, in 1511.

During much of Khiva's early history it was embroiled in wars between its own Uzbek and Turkmen populations and with its neighbors, Iran, Bukhara, and Turkmen nomads. At the same time the khanate government went through much change. Originally the khanate was a loose confederation of independent holdings all nominally owing allegiance to a great khan. By the early seventeenth century the confederation had been replaced by a system of powerful regional governors, or *inaqs*, who vied to control the khan. These *inaqs* were drawn from a powerful aristocratic class of Uzbek families, of whom the Qongrat and Manghits were the most powerful.

Khiva was handed a series of blows in the mid-eighteenth century as the khanate of Aral seceded in the northeast and Nadir Shah of Iran conquered the nation in 1740. In 1747 Iranian domination gave way to near anarchy as wars between the Qongrat and Manghit tribes, the khanate of Aral, and other Uzbek and Turkmen tribes tore the nation apart. The khanate hit a low point in 1767 when Yomut Turkmens captured the city of Khiva.

Muhammad Amin Inaq, a member of the Qongrat tribe, reconquered Khiva from the Yomut Turkmens and established his authority over the khan. During the reigns of Muhammad Amin's successors, Eltuzer and Muhammad Rahim, the Qongrat dynasty was established as Eltuzer deposed the khan and declared himself khan in 1804. Muhammad Rahim reunited Khiva by conquering the Aral khanate and breaking the power of the other Uzbek tribes.

Khiva was soon drawn into a fatal confrontation with Russia. The two clashed as early as 1839. In 1873 an overwhelming Russian force invaded Khiva. The resulting treaty made Khiva a protectorate of the Russian empire and stripped it of some territory but left Khiva's internal affairs intact. The Russian Revolution of 1917 sparked a short-lived seizure of power by Junaid Khan. Bolshevik and Khivan forces overthrew him in 1919 and abolished the khanate in 1920.

Andrew Sharp

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KHMER The Khmer are the numerically and politically dominant ethnic group of Cambodia. They make up 90 percent of Cambodia's 12 million inhabitants, approximately 10.8 million people. Khmer also live in northeast Thailand, southern Laos, and southern Vietnam as minority groups. Khmer is also the name of the language this group speaks, a member of the Mon-Khmer group of the Austroasiatic ethnolinguistic family. The earliest-known inscription in the Khmer language is dated 612 CE. However, the Khmer did not begin to be unified as a people until the reign of the Angkorian king Jayavarman II (770–850, reigned 802–850).

Modern Khmer live much as their ancestors did. The majority of Khmer society is agrarian (85 percent), focusing on paddy rice cultivation. Prior to the twentieth century, each household practiced subsistence agriculture, using simple technology to farm. The Khmer traditionally established their villages near a water source, natural or man-made. Even today, the majority of the population inhabits one-third of Cambodia's arable land, primarily around the Tonle Sap (Great Lake), extending east and south to the Mekong River. The proximity to water also makes fish a staple of the Khmer diet.

The construction of a rural Khmer house has not changed over centuries. Khmer in rural areas continue to live in wood houses that are elevated off the ground for better air circulation and protection from wild animals and dangerous spirits.

Social Organization

Khmer society is hierarchical, traditionally divided into royalty, nobility and officials, and the peasantry. These classes continue to dominate contemporary society. Royalty was viewed as having semidivine status; officials taxed and administered the majority of society; and peasants and landless laborers cultivated the land. Merchants were traditionally excluded from this system, since local traders were either women, whose social status was defined by gender, or of a different ethnicity, such as Chinese. Brahman priests and Buddhist monks were associated with royalty and occupied a prestigious category outside society's hierarchy. Slaves were used during Angkorian times (802–1431) to work on the king's and the nobility's estates, but slaves were usually not of Khmer descent.

Hierarchical relationships continue to define day-to-day relationships among individuals. Elders are authority figures, and their status depends not only on age but sex, wealth, political position, occupation, and religious piety. Social order is dependent on respect-

ing elders and maintaining one's position in society; those positions are supported by Buddhist concepts of karma and merit. Disorder is viewed as dangerous and is exemplified by the wild jungles lurking on the edge of a village. Oral codes of conduct (*chbab*), which are based on Buddhist teachings, help maintain the moral fiber of society.

In Khmer society, many roles are determined by gender. In rural areas men are responsible for plowing the fields, caring for large animals such as water buffalo, building houses, and other work with wood, while women plant the rice fields, care for smaller livestock, care for children, weave cloth, and cook meals. Men are seen as superior to women; a husband always assumes the position of elder in relation to his wife. Men are legally heads of households and responsible for providing money for the family, but women possess a great deal of authority in managing the household and are in control of monetary matters. Outside the home, women are traders at the market and participate in agricultural work, but men do the heavy tasks.

Kinship is traced through both the mother and father, and sons and daughters possess equal inheritance rights. The society is matrifocal (focused on the bride's family) in that the groom's family must pay a bride-price to the bride's family before the marriage occurs, newlyweds reside near the bride's parents, and the groom usually works for the father-in-law. Marriages are also arranged by parents and sometimes with the assistance of a matchmaker, demonstrating the importance of the elder in decision-making processes.

Community Organization

The formal unit of social organization among the Khmer is the nuclear family, and there is little cohesion beyond the family unit. A weaker sense of kinship extends to grandparents, aunts, uncles, nephews, nieces, and first cousins. However, neighbors and relatives provide a network of cooperation if help for the construction of a house is required, for example. A patron/client relationship also exists in Khmer society to provide greater support. A patron provides monetary loans and physical protection, and in exchange the client will be politically loyal to the patron and give physical labor as requested by the patron.

Eighty-five percent of the population live in rural communities or villages. A village is defined by the presence of a Buddhist temple and a village headman, who is employed by the government. The *neak ta* cult of guardian spirits also loosely unites the village members, but solidarity among the community is weak.



A Khmer refugee from Cambodia in a refugee camp in Thailand in 1988. (DAVID & PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS)

Religion

The Khmer are Theravada Buddhists but practice a popularized form of Buddhism infused with their animist beliefs. Buddhist concepts of karma and merit heavily influence daily life, and appeasement of the multitude of spirits in the Khmer belief system is considered very important. *Neak ta* are ancestral or guardian spirits that the Khmer pay homage to in their homes, villages, and the surrounding forests.

Contemporary Khmer Society

Khmer daily life was primarily unaffected by external forces until the mid-nineteenth century, when Cambodia became a French colony. The French introduced cash crops such as rubber and changes to land ownership. Many rural Khmer lost land rights and were no longer self-sufficient, since they had to devote a portion of their land and energy to raising cash crops. World War II and the two Indochina wars disrupted Khmer life, and U.S. bombing of Cambodia in

the early 1970s devastated the lives of many people. Cambodia began to experience food shortages.

The Khmer Rouge regime (1975–1979) caused the most severe changes. The regime intended to erase all Khmer traditional institutions, such as family, religion, and hierarchical relationships. The regime was responsible for the death of 2 million people (estimates vary widely), primarily through execution and starvation. It destroyed temples and animist shrines, separated families, and emptied urban areas. The years following the removal of the Khmer Rouge from power in 1979 have returned some stability to the Khmer, but military unrest persisted into the late 1990s, despite the fact that elections were held in 1993.

More than 800,000 people fled to Thailand and Vietnam in the 1970s and early 1980s. Some of the refugees then resettled in countries such as the United States, Australia, Canada, and France. The displaced Khmer have sustained their cultural traditions in their new countries. Khmer classical dance and musical performances are common, as the younger generations are learning these classical arts. Heritage language classes also teach the generations born outside of Cambodia the native language of their parents and grandparents. Khmer community networks exist globally, and the Internet assists in the maintenance of strong links among the Khmer diaspora.

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KHMER EMPIRE With control over an area that once encompassed parts of modern Thailand, Cambodia, the Malay Peninsula, and the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Khmer empire flourished in Southeast Asia between the sixth and mid-fifteenth centuries. Arising from lands originally ruled by the

Kingdom of Chenla (550–800 CE), when Cambodia was called both Funan and Chenla, the Khmer empire reached its apex during the rules of Jayavarman II (802–850 CE), Yasovarman I (889–910 CE), Suryavarman I (1002–1049 CE), Suryavarman II (1112–1152 CE), and Jayavarman VII (1181–1201 CE).

Characterized by cultural expansion and conquest, the Khmer rulers were strongly influenced by Hindu traders from India. Jayavarman II originally established the Kingdom of Kambuja in honor of Kambu, the legendary first-century founder of the Kingdom of Funan, and the root of the current English term "Cambodia." After declaring his independence in 802 CE from the Javanese who controlled Cambodia, Jayavarman II climbed atop Phnom Kulen (Lychee Mountain) in northern Cambodia, where he proclaimed himself a *devaraja* (god-king). Identifying himself with the Hindu god Shiva, he then asserted power over rainfall and soil fertility, and began construction of a "temple mountain" to symbolize the holy mountain at the center of the universe. Both acts were to be repeated over the next four hundred years by Cambodian kings ascending the throne.

From their capital at Angkor, a city that encompassed nearly 120 square kilometers (75 square miles) of fertile plains north of the Tonle Sap (Great Lake), the Khmer leaders presided over a civilization that was one of the strongest and most advanced in the Greater Mekong subregion between the ninth and twelfth centuries. However, frequent infighting among rivals, as well as wars with Champa (a kingdom of southern Vietnam) and the Annamese of northern Vietnam left the Khmer weakened, and the empire eventually succumbed after repeated invasions by the Thais in the mid-1400s.

The longevity and success of the Khmer empire can be attributed, in part, to its location near the Tonle Sap and the major trade routes connecting the Bay of Bengal to southern China, as well as the ability of its leaders to regulate seasonal variations in the water supply through the use of huge canals and reservoirs, or *baray*. These made it possible to irrigate crops and to feed the population during the dry season. In addition, most of the Khmer kings appear to have ruled wisely, building schools, libraries, and roads that connected cities with rice-growing areas. Several rulers were also noted for their patronage of the arts.

The power of the Khmer empire is also a reflection of the artistic and religious significance of Angkor itself. Yasovarman I founded and relocated the Khmer capital from the banks of the Mekong to an island near the present-day provincial capital of Siem Reap, where it remained until 1431 CE. According to temple in-

scriptions, Yasovarman I thought so highly of his skills that it was as if he had created the arts and sciences.

Suryavarman I, known as the "King of the Just Laws," reunified and expanded the Khmer empire into Thailand and Laos. Consolidating his power by requiring all four thousand local officials to swear allegiance to him, he also continued construction of Angkor's irrigation system, building a huge *baray* near the current site of Angkor Wat. Nearly 8 kilometers long and 1.6 kilometers wide, the reservoir was capable of holding more than 567 million liters of water. Suryavarman I also made Buddhism the state religion, though people were permitted to continue worshiping Hindu gods if they wished.

Suryavarman II came to power in the twelfth century. Like Suryavarman I, he was an outsider who killed a rival in a battle for the throne. He also succeeded in uniting the kingdom through wars in Vietnam, Myanmar (Burma), and Champa. But Suryavarman II is best remembered as the king who commissioned Angkor Wat, a temple-mountain designed to represent Mount Meru, the mythical dwelling place of the Hindu kings. Characterized by extensive bas-relief statues of Khmer warriors, dancing girls, and mythological creatures from the *Ramayana*, the construction of Angkor Wat took thousands of laborers and artisans more than thirty years to build.

For much of the three decades following Suryavarman II's death, internal conflicts over succession and continuous warfare with Champa plagued the Khmer people. In 1177 CE, Angkor was captured by a Cham army and its inhabitants slaughtered. Demoralized by the loss of their capital, the Khmer empire nearly collapsed. However, Jayavarman VII, a relative of Suryavarman II and a devout Buddhist living in exile, rallied his people and not only drove the Chams out of Cambodia, but also conquered Champa and much of present-day Laos, Thailand, and Malaysia.

Jayavarman VII's reign marked the largest construction program in Cambodia's history; he built Angkor Thom as his new capital. Larger and more magnificent than the capital it replaced, Angkor Thom was surrounded by a stone wall with four-sided stone images facing in each direction. In the city's center, Jayavarman VII placed his own temple-mountain, the Bayon. One of the most photographed structures in Cambodia, the Bayon contains fifty towers of varying heights, each bearing stone faces and eyes that appear to stare straight at the viewer. Equally remarkable, the bas-relief walls depict ordinary Cambodian scenes from the twelfth century rather than the religious and royal icons depicted on every other Khmer building.

Following the capture of Angkor by a Thai army in 1431 CE, the Khmer rulers abandoned the site and relocated their capital to Phnom Penh, where it remains today. For the next four hundred years, Angkor remained buried in the jungle until it was "rediscovered" by the French explorer Henri Mouhot in the late nineteenth century. While much of the statuary and carvings have disappeared, the five towers of Angkor Wat are portrayed on the Cambodian flag, and the temple complex—the most visited tourist site in Cambodia—is considered a World Cultural Heritage site.

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See also: **Angkor Wat; Cambodia—History; Jayavarman II; Jayavarman VII; Tonle Sap**

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KHMER ROUGE The Khmer Rouge was a radical Maoist-oriented Communist party that ruled Cambodia from 17 April 1975 to 7 January 1979 and was responsible for the death of 2 million Cambodians (estimates vary widely). The Khmer Rouge had its roots in the Khmer People's Revolutionary Party, which was founded in 1951 by Vietnamese-influenced Cambodian radicals, and was renamed as the Workers' Party of Kampuchea (WPK) in 1960, as the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) in 1971, and as the Party of Democratic Kampuchea in 1982. Prince Norodom Sihanouk called this movement *les Khmers rouges* ("the red Khmers") when they attempted to end his rule in the 1960s.

A number of future leaders of the movement, including Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Thiuouunn Mumm, Thiouunn Prasith, Hou Yuon, Khieu Samphan, Khieu Thirith, and Khieu Ponnary, were radical young Cambodians who were studying in Paris in the 1950s. Many had joined both Ho Chi Minh's Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) and the French Communist Party. Returning to Cambodia, the students made contact with the Communist underground, at that time a group of approximately two thousand members of the Vietnamese-dominated ICP who were fighting the French in what is known as the first Indochinese War

(1946–1954). The movement suffered a series of setbacks during the 1953–1960 period, beginning with independence, which took away anticolonialism as their platform. Unlike their Lao and Vietnamese counterparts, Cambodian Communists did not participate in the 1954 Geneva Conference that ended the first Indochinese War. The Final Accords of the Geneva Conference called for the Viet Minh to withdraw their troops from Cambodia, and with them they took nearly one thousand Cambodian Communists, including the leader, Son Ngoc Minh, leaving a much reduced party infrastructure. Afterward Prince Sihanouk began arresting all known leftists. Pol Pot and other leftists went underground, working as teachers, bureaucrats, and journalists, while participating in clandestine party work and recruiting activities.

A Marxist-Leninist party organization was established in September 1960 to lead a Communist revolution, though Vietnamese-trained guerrilla fighters rather than the Paris-trained intellectuals dominated the leadership. The WPK had two platforms: ameliorating the country's landholding patterns, which kept the landless in a cycle of poverty and reinforced socioeconomic inequality, and continuing to wage a non-violent struggle against the government, as the WPK had almost no armaments at the time.

In 1961 Sihanouk reversed his policies and endorsed three leading leftist intellectuals (all clandestine members of the WPK) for election into Parliament. Two, Hu Nim and Khieu Samphan, became government ministers responsible for economic affairs. But the WPK continued to be an illegal organization, and Communist-led strikes and student protests caused Sihanouk to launch another crackdown. After the party's second congress, in 1963, the new leaders fled Phnom Penh to the sparsely populated northeast of the country, where they began waging a violent struggle against the government.

The WPK received little external assistance, because both Beijing and Hanoi considered Sihanouk to be too important to their own goals (he allowed the North Vietnamese to use Cambodian territory for transport, logistics, and as a staging ground for the war in South Vietnam). In 1965 Pol Pot made a secret trip to Hanoi and Beijing to request material assistance; he was told that the Cambodian revolution would have to wait so as to not distract from the ongoing revolutions in Laos and South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese began to arm the WPK in the late 1960s, but never to the Khmer Rouge's satisfaction. The movement grew steadily from a few dozen men to a several thousand-strong fighting force due to peasant dissat-

isfaction, higher taxes, and the secret American bombing campaign that began in 1969.

In April 1970 U.S. President Richard Nixon authorized the invasion of Cambodia to stop Hanoi's supply lines and eliminate Viet Cong sanctuaries. The Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge retreated westward, where they routed the Cambodian army. Responding to Communist gains, in May 1970 General Lon Nol took over power while Sihanouk was in France. Wary of Lon Nol's ties to the United States, the Chinese brokered an agreement with the Khmer Rouge leadership that made Sihanouk their titular head, greatly improving the movement's public appeal. The WPK, renamed the Communist Party of Kampuchea, made huge gains following America's withdrawal from Indochina in 1973, and their peasant-based army captured Phnom Penh on 17 April 1975.

In power, the Khmer Rouge implemented a series of radical policies. Cities were evacuated, and all citizens were forced onto massive agricultural collectives. Many irrigation works were established to facilitate rapid agricultural growth. Private plots were collectivized, private property was made illegal, the commercial and banking sectors were shut down, and private markets were abolished, because all economic functions were controlled by a central plan.

Under the Khmer Rouge, there was a wholesale slaughter of intellectuals, artisans, doctors, lawyers, any members of the former Lon Nol regime, ethnic minorities, and any other political enemies. These executions, along with famine and disease, were behind Cambodia's staggering death toll during the Khmer Rouge regime.

Any economic gains from collectivization were not shared by the population, as nearly all surpluses were exported to China to pay for armaments. The xenophobic CPK, always concerned about Vietnamese domination, became more fearful upon Hanoi's calls for the establishment of an "Indochinese Union." The Khmer Rouge resisted and even provoked Hanoi by launching a series of border attacks. Hanoi made diplomatic protests but was rebuffed by both Phnom Penh and its patron, Beijing. In 1978 Hanoi launched a punitive strike into Cambodia and quickly withdrew.

The ease with which the battle-tested Vietnamese were able to penetrate Cambodia led to a series of re-creations. Leaders from the eastern zone were summoned to Phnom Penh, where they were tortured and executed at the infamous Tuol Sleng Prison. In all, nearly one hundred thousand Khmer Rouge cadres and their families were executed at this time for treason.

The Khmer Rouge continued their attacks on Vietnam, and on 25 December 1978, after signing a mutual defense treaty with the Soviet Union, Vietnam intervened in Cambodia, driving the Khmer Rouge into enclaves along the border with Thailand. Hanoi occupied Cambodia with some one hundred thousand troops for ten years and installed a government comprising former Khmer Rouge leaders who had defected to Vietnam during the purges, as well as Cambodians who had trained in Vietnam since the 1950s.

Continuing to receive assistance from China, the Khmer Rouge regrouped near the Thai border and began an eleven-year guerrilla war. In 1982 the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) was established with the backing of China, the United States, and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The coalition government, headed by Sihanouk, included the Khmer Rouge and two non-communist guerrilla forces fighting the Vietnamese. Through the CGDK, the Khmer Rouge continued to hold Cambodia's seat in the United Nations. The well-armed Khmer Rouge fought the Vietnamese to a standstill, and in September 1989 the diplomatically isolated and financially burdened Vietnamese unilaterally withdrew. The Khmer Rouge was able to take advantage of the Cambodian government's weakness and controlled nearly one-third of the country by the time the U.N.-sponsored peace accords were signed in October 1991.

Though a signatory to the Paris Peace Accords and a member of the interim coalition government, the Khmer Rouge leadership refused to disarm or allow U.N. peacekeepers into their territory. The Khmer Rouge withdrew from the peace process and attacked U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) personnel but in the end did not disrupt the May 1993 elections or stop the \$2 billion UNTAC operation. After the elections, the coalition government of the incumbent Cambodian People's Party and the Khmer Rouge's former ally, the royalist FUNCINPEC (the French acronym for National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia), renewed their offensive against the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge, having lost much of their aid from the Chinese after the Paris Accords, were able to continue to finance their war effort through the sale of gemstones and timber from the territory they controlled. But the movement faltered as royal amnesties and war weariness led to mass defections in the 1996–1998 period. Many top leaders, such as Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, and Nuon Chea, defected to the government side. As a result of these defections and fearful of others, Pol Pot ordered the murder of

several top Khmer Rouge leaders, including Minister of Defense Son Sen. The remaining Khmer Rouge leadership then arrested Pol Pot and put him on trial, ostensibly as a bargaining chip to ensure the movement's survival. With Pol Pot's death on 15 April 1998, almost the exact anniversary of the Khmer Rouge capture of Phnom Penh, and the capture of the last remaining guerrilla leader, Ta Mok, the Khmer Rouge was no longer an effective fighting force. The government of Cambodia was under intense international pressure to turn over the former Khmer Rouge leaders to an international war crimes tribunal, but the Cambodian government refused on grounds of sovereign rights. The Cambodian government, most of whose leaders were former members of the Khmer Rouge, was concerned that they could be brought to trial as well, and hence wanted to control the scope of the trial. The United Nations was concerned that Cambodia did not have the legal capacity or expertise to try the Khmer Rouge leaders, and that the trials would be highly politicized, and entered into prolonged negotiations with the Cambodian government over establishing a tribunal in Cambodia that would include international jurists. In August 2001, the Cambodian Parliament passed a law establishing a war crimes tribunal for the remaining Khmer Rouge leadership, but it has fallen short of the law envisioned by the United Nations.

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KHMU Lao history indicates that the earliest inhabitants, predating the arrival of the Lao-Tais, were the Mon-Khmer, the Khmu being one subgroup of the Mon-Khmer peoples. Khmu belongs to the Khmuic branch of the larger Mon-Khmer line of the Austroasiatic language family. According to legend,



Khmu children in front of a thatched building in northern Laos in 1995. (BRIAN A. VIKANDER/CORBIS)

the Khmu are supposed to have come out of a certain round, red pumpkin (*ple' goek r-mwng*). This pumpkin was born to a brother-sister couple (the only survivors of a big flood). When the people came out of the hole that was pierced with a glowing branding iron, the Khmu were the first to come through that hole, before everybody else emerged from the pumpkin. Therefore, the Khmu say that they are the "people from that burned hole (*bntu' srne*)" in the pumpkin."

Today the Khmu number more than half a million people living throughout the north of Laos, particularly in the provinces of Luang Prabang, Oudomsay, and Phongsali, and in the bordering highland areas of Thailand, Vietnam, China, and Myanmar (Burma). The Khmu constitute the second-largest ethnic group in Laos after the Lao. The lowland Lao often call the Khmu the Lao Theung, which can be translated as "the Lao who live on the middle slopes of the mountains." Historical literature on Laos also knows the Khmu as Kha, a word carrying the connotation of "slave," which was used to designate other ethnic groups.

Most of the Khmu are still mountain dwellers who farm mountain fields where they plant rice, corn, cotton, vegetables, fruit, and tubers. The Khmu also depend on the upland forests for finding additional food, such as different leafy plants, mushrooms, bamboo shoots, fruits, and different types of animals and fish from mountain streams.

The Khmu, as well as other Austro-Asiatic peoples, have had a special relationship with the spirits (*broey*) of the land. This relationship was institutionalized for many centuries as Khmu holy men performed elaborate rituals to pay respect to the spirits of the land in the Luang Prabang royal courts. The Khmu have a rich and varied nonmaterial cultural heritage that is expressed in their ritual traditions, legends, and stories, which are passed down from generation to generation.

With growing population pressure in Laos, new migrants from burgeoning farm families in the lowlands are expanding into the upland areas already occupied by Mon-Khmer groups, including the Khmu. The traditional way of life of the Khmu is threatened as conflicts over land tenure occur between the migrants and the upland populations.

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KHOMEINI, AYATOLLAH (1902–1989), Islamic religious leader. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, an Islamic religious leader, was the architect of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Born to a cleric and property owner, Khomeini's name was originally Ruhollah Musawi, but he changed it to reflect his birthplace (Khomeini, a town south of Tehran). In 1920 Khomeini moved to Arak to study at a school run by Ayatollah Abd al-Karim Ha'eri. Two years later Ha'eri relocated to the Shi'ite holy city of Qom, and Khomeini followed him there. After completing his studies in ethics and spiritual philosophy, Khomeini taught Islamic philosophy and law. In 1929 he wed Khadijeh Saqafil, daughter of a well-known cleric, who bore him two sons and three daughters. Eventually his studies and publications resulted in his receiving the title of ayatollah ("likeness," or "sign," "of Allah"), one of the highest titles awarded clerics of the Shi'ite sect of Islam.

Khomeini was imprisoned in 1963 for his speeches against Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and his policies; his arrest caused major disturbances, which the shah contained with force. Under public pressure Khomeini was released to house arrest in Tehran and a year later was exiled to Turkey. Khomeini spent a year in Turkey before moving to Iraq, where there are several Shi'ite shrines. In exile he further developed the concept of *veleyet-e-faqih*, or rule of religious jurisprudence, which he had outlined in a previous work. His lectures on this subject culminated in the publication of *Hokumat-e Eslami* (Islamic Government).

In October 1978 Saddam Hussein ordered Khomeini to leave Iraq. He went to Paris to organize opposition groups against the shah and returned to Iran in January 1979, when the shah was forced to leave the country. He oversaw the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran on 11 February 1979. Ayatollah Khomeini appointed an Assembly of Experts to review and revise a draft constitution prepared by the provisional government, to reflect Khomeini's principle of *veleyet-e-faqih*.

He became Iran's first *faqih* (religious leader), a position he held until his death. His policies as *faqih* were anti-American and left little room for opposition to the regime he had established, although he tried to maintain a balance between conservative and moderate factions in Iran. Khomeini hoped to export revolutionary

Islam to other countries, but with little success. Moreover, his tenure coincided with the Iran-Iraq War, which brought enormous hardships to Iran. Khomeini's reputation rests not only on the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran but also on his challenge to the Western notion that religion and politics should be separate.

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KHON KAEN (1999 est. province pop. 1.8 million). Khon Kaen is the name given to both a city and province in northeast Thailand. The province is located 450 kilometers from Bangkok and covers an area of approximately 10,886 square kilometers. The province has twenty districts and three subdistricts. It is the center for various regional development projects, but is also a transportation hub and education center, home of Khon Kaen University, founded in 1964.

The city of Khon Kaen was originally established near Phra That Kham Kaen. These early settlements never truly developed and were abandoned several times over the course of centuries. A ruler from Suwanaphum founded the present-day city in 1789 and gave it the name Kham Kaen, later changed to Khon Kaen.

Primary recent development in the area occurred in the 1960s, concurrent with Thailand's new national role in serving the needs of the United States Air Force during the U.S. war in Vietnam. An air base was located near the city. Transportation based in Khon Kaen serves the entire region. In addition to its highway system, the city has a major airport and is a stop on the northern railway line, which runs to Nong Khai, a gateway to Laos situated on the Mekong River.

Linda Dailey Paulson

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KHOROG (2000 est. pop. 22,000). The Tajikistan town of Khorog is located at an elevation of 2,200 meters in a narrow valley at the base of the Pamir Mountains, at the confluence of the Gunt and Pyandz Rivers. Khorog is the principal administrative, commercial, and population center of the semiautonomous region of Gorno-Badakhshan in southeastern Tajikistan. For much of each year the region suffers from geographical isolation from the outside world. Winter snows block the only road connections to Osh (Kyrgyzstan) and the Tajik capital of Dushanbe. Air connections to Dushanbe are intermittent due to weather and insufficient airport instrumentation. Political tensions have closed the route south into Afghanistan. Although the rain-shadow location yields only 150 millimeters of annual precipitation, abundant irrigation from melting snow and ice in the adjacent mountains supports wheat, sunflowers, barley, and many orchard crops. A small service industry, textile and food processing factories, a hydroelectric station, and government services employ a people of Mountain Tajiks (Pamiris) and Kyrgyz ancestry. The Pamir Botanical Gardens (founded in 1951) are nearby. Since Tajik independence in 1991, persistent food shortages have plagued this isolated corner of Central Asia.

Stephen F. Cunha

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KHUBILAI KHAN (1215–1294), Mongolian ruler. Khubilai Khan (or Qubilai Qan), founder of the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), as the Mongol khanate of China became known, was the last ruler of Mongol China to be born on the steppe. The second of four sons of Tolui (c. 1190–c. 1231), who was the youngest son of Genghis Khan, he began life as just another Mongol prince, until his elder brother, Mongke (d. 1259), came to the throne. Khubilai, then in his mid-thirties, became his brother's viceroy in China, a role he performed very successfully with the help of a variety of advisers savvy in local administrative tradition. Most but not all were Chinese and most went

on to be among the founding ministers of Khubilai's new dynasty.

As Khan Mongke turned south to campaign against the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279), Khubilai went along, in part because Mongke was becoming distrustful of his brother's independent power base. During a campaign lasting several years, much of it in difficult terrain at high altitude, Khubilai advanced as far as Yunnan where he helped establish a Mongol administration under Bukharan Sayyid Adjall (1211–1279).

Khubilai Becomes Khan

The sudden death of Mongke in 1259 found Khubilai heavily involved in his campaign. Anxious to assert his own candidacy for the now vacant Mongol imperial throne, Khubilai quickly hurried north and gathered his supporters. His principal rival was his younger brother Arigboke (d. 1266), who enjoyed more support in the Mongolian world as a whole. To forestall Arigboke, Khubilai convened a rump *quriltai* (assembly) and had himself elected khan. Arigboke quickly did the same and prepared for war.

The civil war lasted more than four years and ended with Khubilai's victory thanks to his superior resources. Khubilai now had unrestricted control in Mongol China and in most of Mongolia, including the old Mongol imperial capital of Karakorum, although his rule was never unchallenged in Inner Asia.

Once free of competitors, at least in the immediate vicinity of China, Khubilai set about building up his new successor khanate of China, initially confined to the north. Although Mongolian-style administration continued to function side by side with Chinese, khanate China increasingly had a Chinese structure, on paper at least. It was also given a Chinese capital, Daidu, founded (c. 1266) by Khubilai. Although Daidu (later modern Beijing) was considered the capital, strictly speaking, the khanate of China had no single capital since the court nomadized between summer pastures in Shangdu, Khubilai's old princely headquarters, and winter pastures near Daidu.

Establishment of the Yuan Dynasty

In 1271 Khubilai took a Chinese dynastic designation, Yuan, meaning "origin." The new Yuan dynasty quickly came to rule all China with the conquest of the Southern Song in 1279, reunifying China for the first time since the early twelfth century. But the conquest of Song did not mark the end of Mongol expansion. It continued toward Japan, into Vietnam, Burma, and across the sea to Java. For the first time in its history China became a base for a most aggressive sea power.

Although Khubilai had established a "Chinese" dynasty, his new regime was strongly aware of its Central Asian roots. Not only was the ruling family and much of the military if not civilian leadership Mongolian, but Khubilai continued to employ non-Chinese of every persuasion, not just Mongols, in his government to the extent that Persian and Turkic dialects were important as court languages. He also consciously pursued a cultural policy that sought to provide something for everyone. Nowhere is this clearer than in the official court cuisine, in which Mongol soups and roast wolf were served side by side with Iraqi-Persian, Turkic, Kashmiri, and other dishes. Khubilai also had a universal script created, the aPhags-pa alphabet, to write all the languages of his empire.

Another of the Inner Asian aspects of the Mongol Yuan dynasty was religion. Although Genghis Khan had flirted with Taoists and even a Zen monk, among other religious practitioners, and Christians from the West competed for imperial attention under Mongke, Khubilai and his house became converted to the Buddhist religion—and not to any of its Chinese varieties, but to Tibetan Buddhism, which was rich in shamanic traditions close to Mongol native beliefs. Tibetan Buddhism has remained the religion of the Mongols down to the present, pointing up the importance of this conversion.

Khubilai died in 1294, at a ripe old age. No subsequent ruler of Mongol China ever rose to his stature, and decline set in after his death. But despite this decline, Khubilai remains to this day the very symbol of the Oriental potentate and of China, thanks to Marco Polo. It was the China of Khubilai that the Portuguese and other Europeans went in pursuit of in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, inaugurating the age of Western ascendancy.

Paul D. Buell

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KHUIJAND (2000 est. pop. 162,000). Khujand, on the left bank of the Syr Dar'ya River in the fertile Fergana Valley, is one of the oldest towns in Central Asia. It is the second-largest city in the republic of Tajikistan, a Central Asian state, and the administrative center of Viloyati Soghd (Soghd province) in northern Tajikistan.

Khujand was established around the fifth century BCE. In 329 BCE during his conquest of Central Asia, Alexander of Macedon founded a fortress named Alexandria Eskhat (the furthest) on the site of present-day Khujand. From the first century BCE Khujand was an important trading center on the great Silk Road, the major caravan route linking China and India with the Mediterranean, and later was part of the Bukhara (1583–1740) and Kokand (1710–1876) khanates or chiefdoms. Russia invaded the Kokand khanate in 1866, and Khujand became included in the Russian empire in 1868. From 1924 to 1929 the western part of the Fergana Valley including Khujand formed part of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, but in 1929 the region was turned over to the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1936 the city was renamed Leninabad (city of Lenin), but it regained its original name—Khujand—in 1992, after the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991. Today the city is a major industrial center, famous for silk manufacturing and decorative and applied arts.

Natalya Yu. Khan

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KHUN CHANG, KHUN PHAEN *Khun Chang, Khun Phaen* is one of the classics of Thai literature. It was written in verse during the reign of Rama II for *sepha* recitation (a method of solo recitation in which emotion is conveyed by changes in voice quality). Several different authors, each of whom was allocated various scenes, were involved in its composition, including the famous poet Sunthon Phu. The story is believed to have been based on fact. It tells of two men, the villain Khun Chang and the hero Khun Phaen, who had been childhood friends but later become bitter rivals for the love of Wan Thong. Wan Thong at different stages of the plot marries both her suitors, but when called upon to choose between them, is unable to do so and is therefore condemned to death.

Many of the convoluted twists in the plot are engineered by the protagonists' use of sorcery, while the work is also renowned for its use of images from nature in flimsily disguised passages of erotic description. A prose translation into English by H. H. Prince Prem Purachatra (Prem Chaya), *The Story of Khun Chang, Khun Phaen*, provides a good retelling of the story but conveys little of the aesthetic qualities for which Thais admire the work.

David Smyth

KHUNJERAB PASS A long, level, and open ridge at 4,700 meters that marks the frontier between China and Pakistan, the Khunjerab Pass is the continental watershed divide between the Indus River of South Asia and the internal drainage of Central Asia's Tarim Basin. The ridgeline unofficially separates the Afghan Hindu Kush from the Karakoram ranges. The pass is also the highest point on the 1,300-kilometer Karakoram Highway that connects Kashgar (Xinjiang, China) to Rawalpindi (northern Pakistan). In the local Tajik language, Khunjerab means River of Blood, after the rust-colored water that seeps from the pass. Local Pakistanis and Wakhi tribesmen simply call it "top."

The mostly paved Karakoram Highway that crosses this pass was built along an important artery of the ancient Silk Road. It has been operational since 1973 for construction workers and commerce. In May 1986, it opened to all travelers, starting a boom in tourism and Sino-Pakistani trade that continues today. The pass is normally open from 1 May until mid-November, although recurrent harsh weather, flooding, washouts, and landslides can delay travel. The broad summit area fringes the Khunjerab National Park (established in 1975), where Marco Polo sheep (*Ovis poli*) and snow leopards (*Uncia uncia*) abound. The border-post towns of Sost (in Pakistan, 96 kilometers south of the pass) and Pirali (in China, 49 kilometers north of the pass) are the customs, health, and immigration checkpoints.

Stephen F. Cumba

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KHURASAN (2002 est. pop. 6.1 million). Khurasan (translated as "sun rising") is the largest province of

Iran, occupying one-fifth of the nation's territory. Located in northeast Iran, it covers an area of 324,000 square kilometers. To its north and east, Khurasan borders Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. To the west, it shares borders with Iran's internal provinces. Its capital is the city of Mashhad. Though most of its population speaks Persian, Turkmen, Kurdish, and some local dialects are also spoken. Besides Islam, the major religion of the province, a small number of its inhabitants profess the Baha'i, Christian, and Zoroastrian faiths.

After the conquest of Iran by the invading Muslim army, many Arabs settled in Khurasan. Khurasan was the first region of today's Iran to come under attack by invading Turkic nomads. Despite the successive hegemony of central Asian Turkic dynasties, however, Khurasan preserved its language and in fact emerged as a bastion of Persian literature. Not only did the inhabitants of Khurasan not succumb to the language of the nomadic invaders, but they imposed their own tongue on them. The region could even assimilate the Turkic Ghaznavids and Seljuks (eleventh and twelfth centuries), the Timurids (fourteenth–fifteenth centuries), and the Qajars (nineteenth–twentieth centuries).

The landscape of the region is mainly mountainous and arid. There have been periodic earthquakes in Khurasan; in 1997, an earthquake killed thousands of people and destroyed many villages. Agriculture is the major contributor to the economy, producing grains, beets, saffron, cotton, fruits, and refined sugar. The province is the site of light and heavy industries as well, including textiles, carpets, turquoise, and wool. Khurasan is rich in mineral resources, such as natural gas; the largest natural gas reserves in the world are said to be located there.

At the beginning of the eighth century, Abu Muslim (728–755) from Khurasan began his campaign against the Arab Umayyad dynasty (661–750). The province contributed to the power of the caliphs of the early Abbasid dynasty (749/50–1258). In the 1150s Khurasan was devastated by the Oghuz Turks and from 1220 to 1222 by the Mughals. In 1383 Tamerlane (1336–1404), emperor of the Mughal empire, invaded the province.

Khurasan was home to Al-Ghazali (1058–1111), the renowned Islamic theologian, philosopher, and mystic. Al-Ghazali was appointed professor at Baghdad in 1091, but after a spiritual crisis in 1095 he abandoned his career to become a Sufi mystic. He is credited with attempting to reconcile mysticism with Islam. His chief work, *The Revival of the Religious Sciences*, outlines

a complete and orthodox system of the mystical attainment of unity with God.

Payam Foroughi and Raissa Mubutdinova-Foroughi

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KHUSHAL KHAN KHATAK (1613–1689), Pashtun poet-warrior. Khushal Khan Khatak, a chief of the Khataks, one of the Pashtun tribes inhabiting the North-West Frontier Province in present-day Pakistan, is best known for his poetry in Pashtun, an Iranian language. Khushal Khan also wrote prose on subjects such as religion, society, politics, Pashtun-Afghan national unity, war, love, chivalry, philosophy, and even sports and falconry. Altogether, his works make up forty thousand verses. His *Tarikh-i-Murassa* (Jewel-Studded History), which his son, Afzal Khan (d. 1748?), compiled, sheds light on events of Mughal (1526–1857) rule in India during the mid-seventeenth century.

Khushal Khan was critical of Aurangzeb Alamgir (1618–1707), a Mughal ruler and son of Shah Jahan (1592–1666), who denied him chieftainship of the Khatak tribe and appointed other Pashtun warlords as local governors. Khushal Khan was contemptuous of Aurangzeb's religious fanaticism and greed for power: Aurangzeb jailed his father and killed his brothers to gain the throne of India. Khushal Khan spent most of his lifetime fighting against the Yousazais, a pro-Mughal fellow Pashtun tribe.

Abdul Karim Khan

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KHUSRAU, AMIR (1253–1325), Indian poet. A renowned poet of medieval India, Amir Khusrau is a legendary figure in the history of Indian music, lan-

guage, and poetry. Born in the village of Patiali in north India to Amir Saifuddin, a migrant from Transoxiana (a region northeast of the Khorasan), Khusrau settled in Delhi in 1260 after the death of his father. A close confidant of Sufi saint Nizamuddin Auliya (1236–1325), he also enjoyed the patronage of the Delhi sultan Ghiyasuddin Balban and his sons.

Tubfa-tus-Sighr (Offering of a Minor), *Wastul-Hayat* (The Middle of Life), *Khamsa-e-Khusro* (Five Classical Romances), and *Nihayatul-Kamaal* (The Height of Wonders) are among his important works of poetry. His historical works such as *Khazain-ul-Futub* (The Treasures of Victories), *Tughlaq Nama* (The Book of Tughluq), *Nuh Sipibr* (The Nine Heavens), and *Duval Rani-Khizr Khan* (Romance of Duval Rani and Khizr Khan) shed light on the social and political life of north India at that time.

Khusrau's *ghazals*, or lyrical poems, became very popular, and he is credited with fusing Indian and Persian elements, which influenced subsequent developments in Indian music. His dictionary of Hindi, Persian, and Arabic, *Khaliq-e-Bari*, helped to expand the vocabulary and the development of the Urdu language. Khusrau's accomplishments as musician, singer, and composer of Hindi and Persian verses earned him the sobriquet the Parrot of India.

Patit Paban Mishra

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KHUZESTAN (2002 pop. 4.5 million). The discovery of oil at Masjed-e Soleyman in 1908 in the province of Khuzestan changed the fortunes of the region. Khuzestan lies in southwestern Iran bordering on Iraq and the Persian Gulf and occupies an extension of the Mesopotamian valley situated between the Zagros range and the sea. The province, with an area of 66,532 square kilometers, is a low alluvial plain formed by the deposits of the Karun and Karkheh rivers. Its climate is extremely hot, and rainfall is meager, but under irrigation the fertile northern and central lands produce sugarcane, dates, melons, and vegetables. Due to poor drainage, the low coastal areas in the south are covered with tidal salt marshes and mudflats.

The provincial capital Ahvaz is an important communications center: a river port on the Karun, an oil-pipelines nexus, and a link on the Trans-Iranian Railway



A water pipeline crosses over an oil pipeline and then under power lines in Khuzestan. (ROGER WOOD/CORBIS)

connecting the Persian Gulf with Tehran and the Caspian Sea. The discovery of oil in the province led to the establishment of the Abadan oil refinery south of Khorramshahr on an uninhabited island, which is now one of the world's largest oil-producing centers. The oil industry has almost recovered from the devastation of the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War. Khuzestan has the third largest oil reserves in the Middle East and the fourth largest in the world.

Marta Simidchieva

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KHWAJA MU'IN AL-DIN CHISHTI (c. 1141–1236), Muslim leader of South Asia. One of the most significant Muslim personalities in premodern South Asia was Mu'in al-Din, the eponymous "founder" of the Chishti Sufi order (the most widespread and popular Islamic mystical order in India). As with other Islamic mystics, it is hard to reconstruct a factual account of his life; most anecdotal evidence

comes from later hagiographic sources, which aimed to construct a behavioral paradigm that the Sufi community could emulate.

Mu'in al-Din did not write any books, but many statements are attributed to him in later writings. Some may reflect oral traditions linked to him. Mu'in al-Din's teachings are summarized in the following pearl about the qualities of a spiritual traveler: "generosity like the ocean, mildness like the sun, modesty like the Earth" (Lawrence 1992: 11). His disciples formed the so-called golden age of the Chishti order; his deputy, Qutb al-Din Bakhtiyar Kaki (d. 1236), established the order in Delhi and initiated Fardi al-Din Ganj-i Shakar (d. 1265), who became the master of Nizam al-Din Awliya (d. 1325).

Mu'in al-Din eventually settled in the Hindu state of Ajmer, where he died. His shrine complex established there became a major pilgrimage site, not just for Chishtis, but for Muslims from the entire subcontinent and even for Hindus. Mughal emperors often displayed their piety by undertaking pilgrimages to Mu'in al-Din's shrine. The emperor Akbar (reigned 1556–1605) is said to have walked on foot to Ajmer. In an even more fantastic account, Jahanara, Mughal princess and daughter of Shah Jahan (builder of the Taj Mahal), supposedly swept the saint's tomb with her eyelashes. The accuracy of these accounts may be questionable, but they convey the devotion to Mu'in al-Din attributed to the Mughal rulers of India.

The annual festival commemorating the death of Mu'in al-Din, called Urs (literally, "wedding night"), usually sees millions of devotees gathered in Ajmer.

Omid Safi

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KHWARIZM Since its earliest days Khwarizm was an agrarian outpost centered on an oasis and in contact with successive waves of nomadic peoples. Khwarizm is a region in central Asia extending south

of the Aral Sea along the lower Amu Dar'ya river basin and bounded by the Kara-Kum and Kyzyl-Kum deserts and the trans-Caspian steppe. The region was ancient Chorasmia, which became a satrapy of the Persian empire in the fifth century BCE.

Khwarizm's remoteness meant that local rulers were often independent of regional powers. The Afrighids (305–995) held at bay the Sasanian emperors of Persia (third–seventh centuries) and then the Arabs, until internal strife allowed the Muslim conquerors to gain political control in 712. Within a century the Afrighids had converted to Islam and continued to rule from the city of Kath. The Ma'munids (995–1017) next claimed the crown and moved the capital to their stronghold Gurganj or Urganch, on the caravan route between Siberia and the Volga steppes.

During the early centuries of Islam, Khwarizm was an important center of learning. Among the world-famous scholars who found generous patronage at the Khwarizmian court were the philosopher and physician Ibn Sina (Avicenna; d. 980) and the polyhistor al-Biruni (d. 1051), a native of Khwarizm. The Ghaznavids (977–1186), however, annexed the province and left it in charge of Turkic slave governors, thus ending the rule of local dynasties. The Seljuks (1038–1194) continued the practice of slave governors, and their appointee Anushtigin Garcha'i (c. 1077–1097) made the office hereditary. Anushtigin's descendants, the Khwarizm-shahs (c. 1077–1231), ruled a domain stretching from Afghanistan to Baghdad and south to the Persian Gulf, but they fell to the Mongols in the early 1220s.

Under the Golden Horde, Urganch became a thriving caravan trade center until Timur (Tamerlane, 1336–1405) destroyed it in 1388. A khanate established in the early sixteenth century by a new wave of Chinggizid nomads, the Uzbeks, was in constant rivalry with the Bukharan khanate and suffered many incursions by nomadic Turkmen raiders. In the nineteenth century a new dynasty of military chiefs of the Qungrat tribe held the nomads in check and vigorously resisted Russia's expansion into the area.

In 1873, however, the khanate became a Russian protectorate. The last khan was forced to abdicate in 1920, after the Bolshevik Revolution. The khanate was replaced by the short-lived Khoresmian People's Soviet Republic, which, four years later, was divided along ethnic lines between the Turkmen and Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republics. Presently the oasis is part of the Khorezm subdivision of Uzbekistan.

Marta Simidchieva

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KHYBER PASS The Khyber Pass is the northernmost strategically important mountain pass between Afghanistan and Pakistan, connecting Kabul with the historic Pakistani region of Peshawar. The pass is 56 kilometers long and some parts of it reach over 914 meters in elevation. Most of the pass can be more correctly described as a gorge formed by two rivers. Contained by sheer cliffs made mostly of limestone, the pass becomes a narrow defile as one approaches the Afghani border. A number of villages and old forts are perched on the rocks along the pass.

Traditionally, the Khyber Pass was both a crucial trading and invasion route. Persian and Macedonian armies probably followed the route in antiquity. Most recently, the pass was used and fought over by the British in the nineteenth century and the Soviet invasion forces in the 1980s.

The pass's value for trade is indicated by the presence of several market towns on the cliffs overlooking its winding road. The largest, Landi Kotal, is situated on the highest point in the pass (elevation 963 meters), where a powerful fort once stood. The pass had been used as a caravan route for thousands of years, helping tie Central Asian commercial centers of Bukhara, Samarqand, Merv (now Mary), and others with the prosperous marketplaces of the Indian subcontinent. In the fifth century BCE King Darius of Persia marched his huge army through the pass to the Indus River, probably enlarging it in the process. Future conquerors from Alexander the Great to Babur also passed through this road. In 1925 a railway was opened through the pass, featuring thirty-four tunnels and ninety-four bridges and culverts, increasing its commercial importance. There is also a fairly good hard-surface road in the pass. Today the Pakistani Khyber Agency has the authority over the pass, at least its Pakistani sector.

Mikhail Zeldovich

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
KILLING FIELDS On 17 April 1975, the first day of Year Zero, the Khmer Rouge (Cambodian Communists) overthrew the military-led government of the Khmer Republic (Cambodia) and U.S.-backed General Lon Nol (1913–1985), after a five-year civil war that left 600,000 Khmer dead. Their leader, Pol Pot (1925–1999), otherwise known as "Brother Number One," then began a reign of terror that would eventually kill perhaps as many as 2 million Cambodians (estimates vary widely) of every socioeconomic class, religious belief, and ethnic group.

In only four years, nearly 25 percent of all the people in Cambodia lost their lives in the Khmer Rouge revolution and the state-sponsored violence it perpetuated as part of a social experiment gone amok. At its peak, more than thirteen hundred persons died each day—indiscriminately killed for reasons both personal and political. Men, women, and children succumbed to horrific conditions of abuse, overwork, and starvation. An additional 200,000 persons were tortured and executed without trial, judged as "class enemies" by the Khmer Rouge.


Many of the executions occurred at Security Prison 21 (Tuol Sleng, or S21), a former high school in the capital city of Phnom Penh. Anyone accused of work-

ing for the U.S., Russian, or Vietnamese governments was summarily executed, as were civil servants and soldiers associated with the former Cambodian government, teachers, doctors, lawyers, monks, dancers, and artists—even those who wore eyeglasses were arbitrarily slain, because they were assumed to be intellectuals. Victims were warned by signs at S21 not to cry while being subjected to electric shocks and beatings, and barbed wire outside the doomed prisoners' rooms prevented escape from punishment and execution. Outside the city, the bodies were dumped into the mass graves of Choeung Ek, the Khmer Rouge extermination camp located approximately 15 kilometers southwest of Phnom Penh that came to be known for this reason as the Killing Fields. Some fourteen thousand people were killed there. By May 2000, 520 such killing fields had been uncovered throughout Cambodia, containing more than ten thousand mass graves.

Between 1975 and 1979, the Khmer Rouge effectively dismantled the country's existing economic infrastructure and depopulated every urban area. Forcibly driving the 2 million residents of Phnom Penh and other towns into the rural countryside only two days after capturing the capital, Pol Pot effectively initiated one of the most brutal and radical transformations of a society ever attempted in recorded history. Cambodian survivors today relate stories of families forcibly separated and sent to agrarian collec-



The major product of the killing fields, a pile of skulls, in a deserted school in Siem Reap, Cambodia. (MICHAEL FREEMAN/CORBIS)



tives in different parts of the country, while monks not murdered outright were forced to disrobe and to marry. Children were co-opted into spying on—and often murdering—their parents and elders. Rural youths, often illiterate, were encouraged to punish those they found lacking in revolutionary spirit, while workers—forced to work twelve to fourteen hours a day—subsisted on meager bowls of watery soup with a few grains of rice for nutrition each day.

Symbols of Cambodian society were equally disrupted. Social institutions of every kind—stores, banks, schools, hospitals, churches, even the Khmer language and currency—were purged or torn down. Nothing was sacred outside the autarkic vision of Angka, the regime's mysterious organization that claimed to have "more eyes than a pineapple" and that maintained control through a constant atmosphere of fear and uncertainty.

Pol Pot's ideological intent was to create a purely agrarian society or cooperative. Practically isolated

from the outside world, his "Democratic Kampuchea" was completely devoid of money, property, cities, all but the most primitive health care, traditional education, religion, and arts (including traditional dance and music). Pol Pot's harsh, utopian policies made the Cambodian revolution one of the most murderous in the twentieth century.

The revolution derived its energy, so the Khmer Rouge believed, from the empowerment of the rural poor, from their recent victory over the Phnom Penh military, and from what they thought was the intrinsic superiority of Cambodians to the hated Vietnamese. Pol Pot assumed that the Cambodian revolution would be swifter and more authentic than anything Vietnam could carry out, and his Chinese patrons said they agreed. By mobilizing mass resentments, as Mao Zedong had done in China, Pol Pot inspired tens of thousands of Cambodians—especially teenagers and those in their early twenties—to join in dismantling Cambodian society and liberating everyone from their past.

The methods he chose were naive, brutal, and inept. In 1976 a hastily written four-year plan sought to triple the country's agricultural production within a year—without fertilizer, modern tools, or material incentives. The plan paid no attention to Cambodia's physical geography nor did it use common sense. Already crippled by the preceding years of civil war, Cambodian farmers were expected to meet impossible quotas. Yet, Khmer Rouge workers, frightened of reprisals by their leaders if production failed to satisfy the goals, cut back the grain allotted for residents' consumption. As a consequence, tens of thousands of Cambodians starved to death, while many more collapsed from exhaustion and the absence of adequate medical equipment and care.

Sporadic violence flared between the once nominal allies, the Khmer Rouge and Vietnam, in 1977, as the former mounted occasional raids against Vietnamese villages along the border. Exasperated, Vietnam launched a full-scale war in 1978. Refused troops or assistance by the Chinese, Pol Pot's troops found themselves outgunned and outmaneuvered by the superior forces and training of the Vietnamese, who had in the preceding four decades defeated the militaries of France, the United States, and South Vietnam.

On Christmas Day, 1978, the Vietnamese entered Cambodia with more than 100,000 soldiers and ousted the Khmer Rouge regime. Pol Pot escaped to Thailand by helicopter when the Vietnamese entered Phnom Penh on 7 January 1979, leaving the city deserted. The Vietnamese quickly installed a new government, first under Heng Samrin (b. c. 1934) as president of the People's Revolutionary (Communist) Council of Kampuchea and then briefly under Prime Ministers Pen Sovann (b. 1936) and then Hun Sen (b. [officially] 1951), a former cadre in the Khmer Rouge who had fled the country in 1977 when he feared that he would be executed in S21.

After the Vietnamese liberated the Cambodian people, 600,000 Cambodians fled to Thai border camps to escape continued conflict and terror (though most have returned since the 1998 coup). Meanwhile, nearly 10 million land mines were sown throughout the countryside by opposing guerrilla groups during the late 1970s, more than one for every person in the country. As a result, though the years of genocide have effectively ended, the killing of Cambodians by Cambodians continues.

Greg Ringer

See also: **Cambodia—History; Khmer Rouge; Pol Pot**

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KIM DAE JUNG (b. 1924), president of South Korea and winner of the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize. Kim Dae Jung, a long-time opposition leader, was elected president of South Korea in December 1997. He was born on 6 January 1924 in South Cholla Province, where he attended school, eventually graduating from high school in 1943. During the Korean War (1950–1953), Kim was captured by North Korean troops and sentenced to death as a traitor because he worked for the Japanese. Kim managed to escape his captors, finding his way back to Seoul.

Kim entered politics in 1960 as an opposition member in the national assembly. Eventually, in 1971 Kim ran as the New Democratic Party's presidential candidate against sitting president Park Chung Hee (1917–1979). Kim lost to Park by a narrow margin, thereby setting the stage for his becoming a vociferous critic of the Park regime. Park considered Kim such a danger that he had him kidnapped in Japan by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency and brought back to Seoul to stand trial by a secret military court for treason. Under heavy diplomatic pressure, Park rescinded Kim's death sentence, which was later commuted to three years' imprisonment, and Kim was released from jail.



Kim Dae Jung at the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Brunei in November 2000. (AFP/CORBIS)

Following the coup that brought Chun Doo Hwan (b. 1931) to power in 1979, Kim was again arrested, jailed, and sentenced to death. Kim's sentence was again commuted, and he was allowed to leave for the United States, where he was to receive medical treatment. Kim returned to South Korea in February 1985 and again became involved in Korean politics, first as an adviser to the Council for Promotion of Democ-

racy and then as a member of the Reunification Democratic Party. Kim ran for the presidency in 1992, losing to Kim Young Sam. In 1997, he again stood as a candidate and, with support from Kim Jung Pil, leader of the opposition Democratic Republic Party, was elected president of South Korea.

Kim's election marked the first time that a peaceful transition of power took place in the South since the

formation of the Republic of Korea. Kim's presidency was marked by a historic trip to P'yongyang, capital of North Korea, in June 2000 to open North-South dialogue on the possible reunification of Korea.

Keith A. Leitich

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KIM IL SUNG (1912–1994), State leader of North Korea. The longest-serving head of state in the twentieth century, Kim Il Sung dominated North Korean politics for nearly fifty years, from his installation by Soviet occupying forces in fall 1945 until his death on 8 July 1994. Given his intense Stalinist personality cult and the extreme concentration of power under him, one could say that he *was* North Korean politics.

Born Kim Song Ju on 15 April 1912 near P'yongyang, he emigrated to Manchuria with his family in 1926. Imprisoned briefly for membership in the Communist Youth League in 1930, he joined (and some accounts claim later led) a guerrilla band fighting against the Japanese two years later. At this time, he took the nom de guerre Kim Il Sung, after an earlier

Korean guerrilla leader. He went to the Soviet Union in 1941, or earlier, receiving military and political training in Moscow, the Soviet Far East, or both.

As chairman of the Soviet-supported People's Committee of North Korea in 1945, he quickly consolidated power and became the first premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in September 1948. Eager to unify the two Koreas by force, he obtained conditional support for an invasion of South Korea from the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and the Chinese leader Mao Zedong. After nearly conquering the South, his regime was almost destroyed by an American counterattack in fall 1950, and he was saved only by Chinese military intervention. Agreeing with the Chinese to an armistice in 1953, he never accepted a divided Korea, and until his death he worked to undermine what he viewed as an illegitimate U.S.-supported government in Seoul.

During the 1950s, Kim reconsolidated power and purged Communists he viewed as loyal to Beijing or Moscow. He sought to preserve a measure of independence by carefully balancing relations with the neighboring Communist giants through a policy often called equidistance. Up through the 1970s, his government pursued high growth by means of heavy industrialization and gradual collectivization of agriculture. Even so, the North was heavily dependent on aid from and barter trade with the Soviets and Chinese. Beginning in the 1950s, Kim propounded his opaque *juche* (self-reliance) philosophy, which purported to explain Korean uniqueness and in time



North Korean officers and officials seated in front of a portrait of Kim Il Sung on 14 April 2000, the eve of his birthday, celebrated as Sung Day in North Korea. (AFP/CORBIS)

eclipsed Marxism-Leninism as the state's core ideology. North Korean society became even more regimented than its Soviet or Chinese counterparts, and over all the godlike Kim personality cult (what historian Bruce Cumings calls an extreme form of corporatism) loomed large.

Economic growth halted in the 1980s, and Kim refused to consider a reform-and-opening policy like that employed in China. With the collapse of Soviet and Chinese support in 1990, the North Korean economy gradually fell apart. In 1972, Kim had begun to retire from some of his formal positions and to groom his son Kim Jong Il (b. 1941) as his successor. The elder Kim nonetheless retained ultimate authority and oversaw the ventures that were to mark North Korea as a "rogue state": arms sales to authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, international terrorism aimed at destabilizing South Korea, and the development of long-range missiles and nuclear weapons. The latter led to Kim's final crisis in 1994, and a second Korean War was averted when Kim agreed with the former U.S. president Jimmy Carter to halt the nuclear-weapons program in exchange for moderation of international economic sanctions and talks with the United States on nuclear and other issues. Kim died of a heart attack, and his funeral was an occasion for a mass outpouring of grief from a people who had known no other leader.

Joel R. Campbell

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KIM JONG IL (b. 1941), leader of North Korea. Son of the founder of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea), Kim Jong Il was born on 16 February 1941, probably in the Soviet Far East or Manchuria, although Pyongyang (the capital of North Korea) claims he was born on the sacred Mount Paektu. As a boy, he was sent to China during the Korean War (1950–1953) and later took pilot training in East Germany. Graduating from Kim Il Sung University in 1964, he went to work in the Korean Workers' Party secretariat, where he assisted with political purges in 1967. He married in 1966, divorced in 1971, and remarried in 1973. Groomed to succeed his father from 1973, when he became the unofficial Korean Workers' Party leader (referred to as the "party center"), Kim gradually became the second most powerful figure in North Korea.

Formally acknowledged as successor in 1980, he was thenceforth known as the "Dear Leader" and was absorbed into his father's personality cult. Information about him at this time is sketchy, but he reportedly was in charge of key party and personnel decisions and directed North Korea's foreign terrorism campaign. He was said to be highly interested in new production methods and was heavily involved in labor-mobilization campaigns. Foreign news reports described him as a hard-drinking playboy, much interested in movies and fast cars. He was invariably pictured with a bouffant hairdo, wearing a jumpsuit, square glasses, and elevator shoes.

Kim took power upon his father's death in July 1994 yet curiously remained out of public view for some time. Though already nominal military leader, he did not assume any of the elder Kim's military roles until he was named secretary general of the Korean Workers' Party in October 1997. North Korea's economy



South Korean President Kim Dae Jung (L) and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il raise hands on 14 June 2000 in Pyongyang. They had just concluded a meeting which produced a joint statement of cooperation. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

virtually collapsed under his rule, and, due to floods and drought, an extended famine greatly affected many rural areas. His government admitted that several hundred thousand people died, though foreign relief agencies felt that the numbers were much higher. Kim talked often about the need for economic changes and introduced modest liberalization, yet the Stalinist structure and *juche* (self-reliance) ideology inherited from his father remained essentially intact.

Kim also continued his father's nuclear and missile development programs, but in late 1994 he agreed to give up the former in exchange for a foreign-built nuclear reactor and assented to a moratorium for the latter in 1998. He became increasingly reliant on the Korean People's Army (KPA) for political support and maintenance of public order, and most of his appearances were at KPA events. Kim surprised many observers by his ebullient reception of South Korean leader Kim Dae Jung at a Pyongyang summit in June 2000. He agreed to a second summit to be held later in Seoul, South Korea.

Joel Campbell

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KIM MYONG-SUN (1896–1951), Korean writer. Kim Myong-sun (pen name, Tansil) is considered to be Korea's first modern woman writer. Her first work, "Uisim ui sonyo" (Suspicious Girl), was published in the literary journal *Ch'ongch'un* (Youth) in 1917. The story mirrors Kim's own harsh and dismal life as the daughter of a rich man and his concubine, a former kisaeng (entertaining woman). Kim was born around 1896 in Pyongyang. After her mother died in 1907, she was raised by her stepmother. She graduated from high school in 1911 and went on to college but did not finish.

Throughout the 1920s Kim wrote many stories about love, a common literary theme of the period. Her protagonists were usually women conflicted by their love for the wrong men. Kim belonged to two important literary groups, Changjo (Creation) and Pyeho (Ruins), each centered in a literary journal of that name.

Kim wrote in every genre of literature from fiction to poetry and drama. She also acted in and starred in movies. Despite her talents, Kim lived most of her adult life in poverty. She published her last poem in 1939 and spent the remainder of her life in obscurity, disdained by Korean society for her sexually liberated lifestyle, which flouted traditional role expectations for women. She died in 1951 in a Japanese mental asylum.

Jennifer Jung-Kim

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KIM PU-SHIK (1075–1151), Korean historian and statesman. Kim Pu-shik was one of the most notable scholar-officials of Korea's Koryo dynasty (918–1392) and a figure of central importance in Korean historiography for his role as chief compiler of the *Samguk sagi* (A History of the Three Kingdoms). He came from a family of noteworthy scholar-officials of the mid-Koryo and traced his lineage back to the royal line of the Shilla kingdom (57 BCE–935 CE). Under several Koryo kings, Kim Pu-shik served key roles in the kingdom's administration, even leading a Koryo army to defeat a dynasty-threatening internal rebellion in 1136. His crowning achievement came with the compilation of the *Samguk sagi*, a history of the three kingdoms of ancient Korea (Shilla, Paekche, Koguryo), commissioned by Koryo's King Injong (1123–1146) and completed in 1145. Its importance today lies primarily in the fact that it is the oldest surviving native Korean history and the chief source for the history of the three kingdoms.

Kim Pu-shik was an unapologetically Confucian scholar, trained and nurtured in Chinese literary technique and tradition, and always espoused Korea's politically subservient role vis-à-vis China, a fact that has made him the prime target of much latter day Korean nationalist criticism. Yet Kim Pu-shik was also a practicing Buddhist, and his surviving magnum opus reveals a just pride in Korean achievements and recognition of Korea's unique cultural development.

Daniel Kane

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KIM SOWOL (1902–1934), Korean poet. Sowol (his sobriquet) Kim Chong-shik was born in Korea and attended Osan Middle School near P'yongyang in today's North Korea, a famously activist, nationalist academy. He left when the academy was closed because of its involvements in the 1 March 1919 Independence Movement and went to Seoul, following his teacher and mentor Kim Ok. Sowol became a student at the Paejae Academy in Seoul and after graduation in 1923 left for Japan, to enter Tokyo Commercial College.

Sowol soon returned to Seoul, however, and tried for a time to make his way in the literary world. With Kim Ok's help, he published poems in a number of journals, including many in *Kaebiyok* (Genesis). His single book of poems, *Chindallas kkot* (Azaleas), named for his most popular poem, came out in 1925, but he was unable to sustain himself as a writer, returned to his home area of Osan, and tried various small-scale business endeavors. He published few poems in the last years of his brief life. He died in December 1934, possibly a suicide.

Sowol's poems are noteworthy for their lyrical elegance, their folksong themes of loneliness and separation, and their stunning command of the expressive possibilities of the Korean language. While his best-known poems seem almost deliberately to overlook concerns about Korea's national identity during the Japanese colonial period, a subject that engaged many other writers, Sowol, in attending to particular place-names and to the routes or modes of transportation that connect them, seems to have addressed the subtle issue of how Korea was being remapped, reconfigured as a geographical space, by the colonial occupation and modernization.

David McCann

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KIM YOUNG-SAM (b. 1927), South Korean president. Kim Young-sam served as president of the Republic of Korea from 1993 until 1998, when he was defeated by longtime personal and political rival Kim Dae Jung. His presidency was noteworthy in two respects. Kim was the first civilian president in the post-war period, and he oversaw the first civilian transfer of power in South Korea's short history.

Kim was born in 1927 on Koje Island in South Kyongsang Province. After graduating from Seoul National University in 1952, he entered government service. His political debut came soon thereafter: he won a seat in the National Assembly in 1954 as a member of the ruling Liberal Party. Shortly after, however, Kim switched his political affiliation and defected to the opposition Democratic Party.

In 1972 Kim lost his bid to become the New Democratic Party's presidential nominee, as factionalism within the party divided support between Kim Dae Jung and himself. Although set back by his defeat, Kim became leader of the New Democratic Party in 1974, but he was expelled from the National Assembly in 1978 in the political crisis that enveloped the presidency of Park Chung Hee. Following the coup that



Kim Young-sam speaking to the media during the 1987 presidential election campaign. (DAVID & PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS)

brought Chun Doo Hwan to power, Kim was placed under house arrest until May 1983. Although banned from political activity, Kim became cochair of the Council for Promotion of Democracy in 1984 and became an adviser to the New Korea Democratic Party in 1986.

In the preceding year, Kim established a new political party, the Reunification Democratic Party, and ran as its presidential candidate against Roh Tae Woo and Kim Dae Jung. Defeated in the presidential election, Kim merged his Reunification Democratic Party with the New Democratic Republican Party to form the Democratic Liberal Party, of which he was chosen chairman.

Kim ran in and won the 1992 South Korean presidential election. Kim Young-sam's term in office can be best characterized by its cold relations with North Korea, the trials of former presidents Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, and the trial of his own son for corruption and tax evasion.

Keith Leitich

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KIM YU-SIN (595–673), general and statesman of the Shilla kingdom. Kim Yu-sin was one of the primary architects of Shilla unification of the peninsula in 676 and is still revered as one of Korea's leading historical figures and national heroes.

Kim Yu-sin was born of a Shilla aristocratic family in 595, at a time of increasing rivalry between Korea's three dominant kingdoms (Paekche in the southwest, Koguryo in the north, and Shilla in the southeast), and was brought up in the tradition of strict military and Buddhist discipline common to the youths of Shilla nobility.

For almost two centuries the three Korean kingdoms had fought an ever-shifting struggle for territory on the Korean peninsula. By the early seventh century, with China unified under the Sui (518–618) and then the Tang (618–907) dynasties, their mutual struggle intensified to one for complete peninsular hegemony. After Shilla secured an alliance with the Tang dynasty, Kim Yu-sin in 661 led Shilla forces in a combined Shilla-Tang attack upon Paekche that culminated in that kingdom's defeat. The defeat of Koguryo, again through a Shilla-Tang alliance, soon

followed in 668. The defeat of Koguryo, again through a Shilla-Tang alliance, followed in 668. Soon after these victories, however, Tang China moved to consolidate its power on the peninsula by creating Chinese protectorates of former Paekche and Koguryo territory, an event that soon led to war between Tang and Shilla. Though Kim Yu-sin would die before he could witness Korean unification with Shilla's defeat of Tang forces in 676, he is still viewed more than any other historical figure as the father of Korean unification. His tomb can still be seen in the historic city of Kyongju, the former capital of the Shilla kingdom.

Daniel C. Kane

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KINABALU, MOUNT Mount Kinabalu, the highest mountain in Southeast Asia, is located in the Crocker Range of Sabah, a Malaysian state located on the island of Borneo. At 4,101 meters the mountain is a spectacular sight, described as a rectangular indented parapet rising above the rest of the range and Sabah. Botanists and zoologists have found Mount Kinabalu to be a reservoir of plants and animals. Half of the world's genera of flowering plants are to be found on Mount Kinabalu. Among these are the world's largest flowers, the *Rafflesia*, and well over one thousand species of orchids, including the slipper orchids for which Mount Kinabalu is renowned among orchid enthusiasts. Mount Kinabalu also has the largest variety of pitcher plants in the world.

Only the upper 300 meters of the mountain are bare; the rest is covered with vegetation, the type of which varies according to the elevation. Primary rainforest below 600 meters marks the boundary of the Kinabalu State Park, which was established in 1964 and covers about 76,700 hectares. The terrain above then ranges from rich lowland dipterocarp forest to montane oak/chestnut, shrub, and conifer forests be-



Mount Kinabalu rises behind the capital city of Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia. (NIK WHEELER/CORBIS)

fore giving way to a mossy forest and finally the treeless alpine peak.

Mount Kinabalu is considered a young mountain and is actually younger than its surrounding rock. It is a great granite pluton (an intrusive body of igneous rock) that pushed its way through the Crocker Range between one and three million years ago. The rest of the range is approximately nine million years old.

The Dusun and Kadzan tribal people who live in the foothills of Mount Kinabalu hold the mountain sacred. They named it Aki Nabal, which means "the revered place of the dead." Legend has it that the name

of the mountain dates to the arrival of the Chinese in Sabah centuries ago. The word Kina is supposedly derived from the name Cina, or "China," and *balu* means "widow." A Chinese prince was believed to have climbed the mountain in search of a great pearl guarded at the summit by a dragon. According to the legend, he finds the pearl, kills the dragon, and marries a Kadzan girl but eventually leaves her and returns to China. His wife climbs to the "spirit mountain" to mourn the loss and is then turned to stone.

The first person documented to have climbed Mount Kinabalu, in 1857, was Sir Hugh Low, then a British colonial secretary stationed in Labuan. The highest peak on Kinabalu—Low's Peak—is named for him, although he never reached it. A zoologist, John Whitehead, was the first to reach the summit, in 1887.

Ooi Giok Ling



MOUNT KINABALU— WORLD HERITAGE SITE

A nature reserve designated as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2000, Kinabalu National Park on the island of Borneo in Malaysia contains an astonishing variety of flora and fauna within its mountainous tropical rain forests.

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KINKI REGION (2001 est. pop. 22.2 million). The Kinki Region is located in the western part of Central Honshu in Japan and consists of Osaka, Hyogo, Kyoto, Shiga, Mie, Wakayama, and Nara Prefectures. It has an area of 33,075 square kilometers.


Most of the region has mountainous topography, but there are numerous coastal plains on the Inland Sea, Osaka Bay, and the Kii Channel. The Kii Peninsula in the southern part has a rainy climate and is warm in winter. The northern part facing the Sea of Japan is affected by northwest winds, and the winds off the Tsushima Strait bring heavy rainfall and snow. Rice, citrus fruits, vegetables, and floricultural products are cultivated. The Hanshin Industrial Zone, in and around Osaka-Kobe, is dominated by heavy industries such as metal, machinery, chemicals, and textiles. The area is characterized by many small and medium-scale factories specializing in the production of machine parts, blankets, and footwear. Efforts have been made to promote regional development. The city of Kobe is being rebuilt after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995. In the late 1990s, the new Kansai International Airport, built in Osaka Bay, was opened. Plans also focus on new technologies through industry, government, and academic linkages in the thirty-year Kansai Science City project that started in 1987.

Nathalie Cavasin

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KIPLING, JOSEPH RUDYARD (1865–1936), British writer. Rudyard Kipling was born in Bombay, India. His parents, John Lockwood, the principal of an art school, and Alice Macdonald Kipling, sent him to England at the age of six (1871) for school where he was subjected to nightmarish treatment that left psychological scars (recalled in his novel *Stalky and Co.*, 1899). His experience at the United Services College in north Devon (1878–1882) was also unpleasant. In 1882, Kipling joined his parents in Lahore, India, where his father was curator of the museum. Seven years' experience in journalism as a reporter and editor of two Indian newspapers, the *Civil and Military Gazette* and the *Pioneer of Allahabad*, developed his superior writing skills. It also gave him a unique look at two very different societies—British colonialists and their Indian subjects, whose stories enriched his lifelong writing career. Kipling's first publication of poetry, *Departmental Ditties* (1886), met with success. His first volume of short stories, *Plain Tales from the Hills* (1887), which was followed by five more volumes (1888–1889), as well as the two *Jungle Books* (1894) and *Kim* (1901), brought him the indelible reputation of a



Rudyard Kipling in the early 1900s. (UNDERWOOD & UNDERWOOD/CORBIS)

great storyteller. Kipling won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1907, the first British writer to be so honored. He lived the last years of his life in London.

Abdul Karim Khan

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KIRKUK (2002 est. pop. 729,000). Kirkuk, a city in northern Iraq, has been occupied for thousands of years, from at least the third millennium BCE. The city is bounded by the Little Zab River to the northwest, the Jabal Hamrin to the southwest, the Diyala River to the southeast, and the Zagros Mountains to the northeast. Kirkuk is strategically located as an entry to one of the few passes through the rugged Zagros Mountains and, hence, to the Iranian plateau. Medieval Arabs knew the city as Karkhina, the name that some inhabitants still used in the late twentieth century.

The area of Kirkuk was a region of contention between the Ottomans and Safavids from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. In 1555 the Treaty of Amasya assigned it to the Ottomans, and many Kurds in the region accepted Sunni Islam. Kirkuk became an important garrison town, commercial center, and source of petroleum products for the Ottoman army. In 1926 Kirkuk was incorporated into Iraq as part of the new province of the Mosul.

From ancient times Kirkuk was known for its sulfur, bitumen, and oil (*naft*). In 1927 a huge oil gusher discovered at Baba Gurgur near Kirkuk became the largest oil field in the world until the discovery of the Gawar field in Saudi Arabia in the 1950s. Between World War I and World War II, Britain allowed U.S. oil companies to participate in exploiting the Kirkuk fields to encourage American support of British imperialism. By 1935 oil production from the Kirkuk fields had made Iraq the eighth-largest producer in the world. In 1935, 1948, and 1949, pipelines were built from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean ports of Haifa, Tripoli, and Banias. In the 1980s two more pipelines traversing Turkey were extended to Dörtyol on the Mediterranean.

After the 1958 Iraqi Revolution the government aimed to nationalize oil production, which was achieved in 1972. Although the southern Iraqi oil fields, especially Rumaila, became more important in the 1970s, Kirkuk's oil was still significant at the end of the twentieth century. Throughout the 1960s, oil revenue, largely from the Kirkuk fields, provided around 27 to 40 percent of Iraq's total national income, 50 percent of all general revenue, and 90 percent of all foreign exchange.

Kirkuk remained a district of Mosul province until 1975, when it was reorganized as one of the eighteen *mubafaza* (governorates) of Iraq. From 1975 onward the Iraq government pursued a policy of Arabizing Kirkuk and removing the Kurdish and Turkmen people who formed the bulk of the population. Some 4,000 Kurdish villages and some 400,000 Kurds, a substantial number from Kirkuk, were deported to other regions of Iraq. After the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, in the ethnic cleansing campaign called *Anfal*, 180,000 Kurds were killed. After the Gulf War in 1991 the Iraqi government heightened its ethnic cleansing practices in the Kirkuk region to ensure that the region and the oil resources remained under Iraqi control in any future settlement with the Kurdish nationalist government. That part of the Kirkuk region not under Iraqi control was held by the the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan under the leadership of Jalal Talabani, one of two main Kurdish nationalist organizations. The

partitioning of Kirkuk *mubafaza* and the allocation of its oil resources have remained unsettled disputes between the Kurds and the Iraq government since 1960.

In 1965, the population of the city of Kirkuk included 71,000 Kurds, 55,000 Turkmen, 41,000 Arabs, and several thousand Chaldeans and Nestorians. In 2000, due to massive migration, urbanization, and ethnic cleansing, it was difficult to estimate the population. Kirkuk *mubafaza* may have held 200,000 to 250,000 Turkmen, and Kirkuk city 65,000 to 75,000. The remainder of the population was Arab, due to the Arabizing policies of the Iraq government, which increased during the 1990s.

Robert Olson

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KISHI NOBUSUKE (1896–1987), prime minister of Japan. Born in Yamaguchi prefecture in November 1896 to the Sato family, Kishi was the second male in a family of ten children. During his teenage years, he was adopted into the family of his father's older brother in order to marry his cousin Yoshiko. Subsequently he took the family name Kishi.

Kishi attended Tokyo Imperial University and was offered a position on the law faculty upon graduating in 1920, but he entered the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce instead. After assignments in the United States, Europe, and China, Kishi became the minister of commerce and industry in Tojo Hideki's cabinet. For this he was purged from politics after World War II. Regaining his political rights in 1948, Kishi entered the Liberal Party in 1953 and later helped form the Democratic Party in 1954. He worked behind the scenes in a conservative merger that led to the formation of the Liberal Democratic Party in 1955.

He was elected the prime minister of Japan in February 1957 and held that post until his resignation in July 1960, following demonstrations in Tokyo against the revision of the United States–Japan Security Treaty earlier that year. In addition to securing the revision of this treaty in an effort to strengthen bilateral relations, Kishi visited some thirty countries during his time as prime minister, including two successful

visits to Southeast Asia and Oceania, the first visit of a Japanese prime minister to this region. In addition, Kishi proposed the creation of an Asian Development Bank with \$700 million in funds for Southeast Asian development, using U.S. funds and Japanese know-how. The plan did not materialize due to a lack of interest on the part of the United States and Southeast Asian countries. Although Kishi resigned as prime minister in July 1960 and officially retired from politics in 1979, he exercised behind-the-scenes influence on Liberal Democratic Party politics until his death in 1987.

Robert Eldridge

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KISHLAK The word *kishlak*, from a Turkic word meaning "winter quarters," refers to settled agricultural villages in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The *kishlak*, along with its nomadic counterpart, the *aul*, was an important social unit in Central Asia, traditionally inhabited by extended family groups.

Kishlaks are densely settled, crowding fifty or more houses into a relatively small area, a style that the Russians who came to the area called "nesting." Houses are built around courtyards that open directly onto the street, which is typically crooked. In mountainous areas *kishlaks* are often terraced. Before the Russian annexation of Central Asia, *kishlaks* were usually defended by walls, which like most of the *kishlaks'* buildings were made of mud brick. A *kishlak's* fields lie outside and around the town, and a common irrigation system is maintained for the use of everyone in the community.

Until the Soviet period *kishlaks* were administered by village elders called *aksakals*. Most *kishlaks* also housed a mullah, a Muslim cleric often called on to assist the *aksakal* in making decisions. During the Soviet period an attempt was made to replace *aksakals* with soviets of workers' deputies.

Andrew Sharp

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KISTNA RIVER Kistna or Krishna River, 1,370 kilometers long, rises in the Western Ghats of India near the town of Mahabaleshwar, only 65 kilometers from the Arabian Sea, at a source that is sacred to Hindus. The river flows eastward across southern Maharashtra, northern Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh states to empty into the Bay of Bengal through two principal mouths, after crossing a broad delta valuable for its rice agriculture. In its lower course, an important irrigation work, the Bezwada Anicut, a dam with two canals, was begun in 1852 by Sir Arthur Cotton, just below a gorge where the Kistna bursts through the Eastern Ghats and the channel is over a kilometer wide. The river's two great tributaries are the Bhima and the Tungabhadra, and the Kistna is also joined by five other important rivers. The channel is too rocky, and the stream too rapid, to allow any navigation on the Kistna. During the dry season, the depth of water may be no more than two meters. The drainage area of the Kistna covers some 245,000 square kilometers in the central Dekkan plateau.

Paul Hockings

KITES AND KITE FLYING Kites are toys that fly in the air at the end of a line, and kite flying is a popular pastime in Asia. Many kinds of kites exist, but most have light bamboo frames covered with paper or cloth and are attached to a long string held in the hand. Brightly colored and decorated, Asian kites may take the shapes of birds, insects, butterflies, or geometric forms. One of the popular Chinese kite forms is the jointed dragon.

The oldest record of a kite is from the fifth century BCE in China. Plane-surface kites were diffused into Europe in the fifteenth century, and after the sixteenth century many other kinds of kites were introduced into Europe.

In East Asia kite flying is a traditional custom with religious meaning. In Japan and Korea people fly kites during the New Year celebrations. In China the ninth day of the ninth month is a holiday honoring kites. Koreans and Chinese sometimes write words representing evils on the surfaces of kites, then they burn the kites or let them fly away in the air after the New Year. The kites are thought to carry the evils away.

Kite flying is also popular in Thailand, where in March the air is filled with a variety of kites. Historically, the people of Thailand used kites at a ceremony to hasten the end of the rainy season, believing that the wind whistling through the bamboo frames of the kites blew away rain clouds. Kite fighting has survived as one



KITES IN KOREA

This account of kite flying in Korea provides details of the activity in the late nineteenth century and also provides a glimpse into the rivalry that existed between the Koreans and Chinese.

It is customary for all classes in Korea from His Majesty, the King, down to fly kites. Women sometimes fly kites from their yards, but it is said that anyone can tell a kite flown by a woman. The owner of a kite is often considered unable to fly it, and when he goes away, another who understands kite-flying will take the reel and play it.

The Koreans say that the Chinese do not know how to fly kites, and that when a Chinaman grows tired after having sent up his kite with a heavy string, he will tie it to a tree and lie down and watch it.

The time for kite-flying is the first half of the first month. After this time, if any one should fly a kite he would be laughed at, nor will any one touch a lost kite.

On the fourteenth of the first month it is customary to write in Korean characters on kites a wish to the effect that the year's misfortunes may be carried away with them. Mothers write this for their child, with his name and date of birth. The letters are placed along bamboo frames so that they may not be seen by any one who might be tempted to pick the kite up. Boys tie a piece of sulfur paper on the string of such a kite, so that when the kite goes into the air the string will burn through and the kite fall.

Source: Stewart Culin (1895). *Korean Games with Notes on the Corresponding Games of China and Japan*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, Department of Anthropology and Paleontology, 12.

of the major sports in Thailand, and the national championships are held in Bangkok every spring. Competitors attempt to bring their opponent's kites to the ground by severing the strings to which the kites are attached. There is also a kite championship in Malaysia. Participants demonstrate the height, sound, and beauty of their kites. Malays introduced kite flying to India, where, as in Japan, it remains popular.

Hisashi Sanada



Spectators watch a gigantic kite being flown at a festival in Ahmadabad, India, in January 1994. (HANS GEORG ROTH/CORBIS)

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KIZEL IRMAK RIVER At 1,355 kilometers, the Kizel Irmak (Kizilirmak) River is the longest in Turkey. In ancient times it was called Halys, meaning "salty flowing water." It flows from the southern slopes of Kizildag east of Sivas to the southwest and then turns north through the industrial city of Kirikkale to the Kizil Irmak delta, where it empties into the Black Sea at Bafra in Samsun Province. It is fed by rain and snow. The river drains an area of 78,000 square kilometers and is dammed in four places. The river supplies farmers with rich sediment that also is used by potters in Avanos. At Kirikkale it picks up visible pollution from local industry. At the delta it forms several shallow lakes and waterways; people living in the

delta region earn money by cutting the reeds that grow there. Agriculture and fishing are also important delta activities.

David Levinson

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KOBYZ The *kobyz* (*qobyz*) is a Kazakh two-stringed, bowed instrument that is similar to a lute or fiddle. A comparable instrument is the *kiak*, familiar to the Kyrgyz; similar instruments are found among many other Central Asian peoples. The *kobyz*'s ancestry can be traced to ancient musical instruments dating back at least two thousand years. The modern *kobyz* dates from the eighth or ninth century CE. Typically, the *kobyz* is made from a single piece of wood, with a long neck and a pear-shaped body. A leather membrane covers the oblong part of the *kobyz* and is traditionally made from the skin of a camel, an animal revered throughout Central Asia. The strings and bow are made from horsehair. The instrument's body is angled, making a bridge unnecessary. It also lacks frets along the neck.

Most scholars believe that these instruments originally were plucked and that bows were used only later. Indeed, many scholars believe that bowing was developed in Central Asia. The music was played by using the fingers to shorten the strings rather than pressing them to the neck. A *kobyz* was often used by a shaman in ceremonies to fend off spirits; this practice has diminished along with shamanism among the Kazakhs. The *kobyz* is a solo instrument but is often played with accompanying vocalists.

Kazakh mythology traces the first *kobyz* to a certain Korkut, considered to be the father of Kazakh music. Korkut, a shaman in some versions, was unable to accept death and escaped from people, seeking truth and immortality in nature, only to discover that nature could not grant him eternal life. He fashioned the first *kobyz*, thus finding immortality in art and music.

Steven Sabol

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KOCHI (2002 est. pop. 800,000). Kochi Prefecture is situated in the southern region of Japan's island of Shikoku, where it occupies an area of 7,107 square kilometers. Kochi's main geographical features are the Ishizuchi Mountains, intersected by river valleys. The prefecture is bordered by the Pacific Ocean and by Ehime and Tokushima Prefectures. Once known as Tosa province, it assumed its present name in 1871 and its present borders in 1880. The capital of the prefecture is Kochi city, situated on Urado Bay.

During the Sengoku (Warring States) period (1467–1568), the Yamanouchi and Chosokabe warrior families, among others, exerted power over the province. The town then grew around a castle erected there in 1603 by Yamanouchi Kazutoyo. During the late Edo period (1600/1603–1868), samurai from Tosa were active in the pro-imperial movement to overthrow the Tokugawa shogunate.

The city has relatively little industry aside from some production of cement, chemicals, steel, and ships, together with processing of lumber, paper, and foodstuffs. Kochi Castle, the scenic Katsurahama shore, and the Tosa Shrine are among local attractions. The prefecture's other important cities are Nankoku, Tosa, and Nakamura.

In the early 2000s, the prefecture's main economic activity remains agriculture, its subtropical climate sometimes allowing two plantings of rice per year. Fishing also is important, as are the processing of paper and lumber, harvested from the region's thick forests. Kochi is famous for breeding the fighting dogs known as Tosaken. Visitors are drawn to its scenic mountains and shore, part of Ashizuri-Uwakai National Park.

E. L. S. Weber

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KODAMA YOSHIO (1911–1984), Japanese right-wing ideologist. Kodama was born in Nihonmatsu in Fukushima Prefecture and raised in Tokyo. In 1920, at the age of nineteen, Kodama went to Korea to live with relatives. There he worked industrial jobs. In

1928, he became very active in right-wing and nationalist societies. In 1932, he formed the *Dokuritsu Seinen Sha* (Independence Youth Society) in Japan, which was an ultra-right-wing youth group, and attempted to assassinate opposition cabinet ministers and Prime Minister Admiral Saito Makoto (1858–1936). Kodama was arrested and sentenced to spend three and a half years at the Fuchu Penitentiary. In 1937, he went to China and Manchuria on a fact-finding mission for the Japanese Foreign Ministry and also acted as guard and adviser to Wang Ching-wei (1883–1944), who was then chairman of the national government of China.

After resigning from his position over a disagreement with Tojo Hideki (1884–1948), Kodama returned to Shanghai as a naval air force procurement agent in order to build a network through his own agency, Kodama Kikan, for securing military materials for the Japanese war effort. During World War II, his agency bought and sold radium, cobalt, copper, and nickel, and he made a fortune. At the end of the war his industrial empire was worth \$175 million. At the age of thirty-four, he became the second wealthiest man in Japan and was promoted to rear admiral by the Japanese government. At the end of World War II, he was appointed adviser to Prime Minister Higashikuni Naruhiko (1887–1990), but in early 1946 he was listed as a Class A war criminal, a designation given only to cabinet officers, ultranationalists, and high-ranking military persons, and was sentenced to jail. He spent two years in Tokyo's Sugamo Prison before he was released in 1948.

After his release from prison, Kodama became a behind-the-scenes force in politics and used his fortune to help finance conservative parties and politicians in Japan. When, in 1955, the Liberal Party merged with the Democratic Party to form the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party), Kodama emerged as its principal spokesman. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Kodama became the most powerful figure in Japan. Then, in 1976, he was accused of involvement in the Lockheed scandal. According to his accusers, he had received about \$2.1 million in payoffs from officials of the Lockheed Corporation who were looking for advantage in the Japanese market. Lockheed had solicited Kodama's help in selling Lockheed's TriStar L1011 in Japan, which faced tough competition from Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas. Kodama suffered a stroke and died in 1984, before the trial started.

Nathalie Cavasin

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KOHIMA (2001 pop. 79,000). The capital of Nagaland State in northeastern India, Kohima was built by the British in the nineteenth century. It was the point of farthest Japanese advance into British India during World War II. Spread across a wide mountain ridge at an elevation of 1,495 meters, Kohima formed a pass through which the Japanese hoped to reach the plains of India. A war memorial, immaculate gardens, and a cemetery with twelve hundred bronze epitaphs dominate the town and commemorate the Allies who fell during the three-month Battle of Kohima, which ended in April 1944 after claiming over ten thousand lives.

Above Kohima, the old village Bara Basti—once an impregnable stronghold—boasts a wooden gate adorned with a scimitar of horns of buffalo to greet the visitor as a commemoration of the bravery of the Angami Nagas, one of the sixteen Naga tribes. A complex system of bamboo water pipes irrigates terraces growing twenty types of rice. The state museum is known for its log drum, woodcarvings, Naga jewelry, and figures displaying costumes and lifestyles of the Naga tribes, with their common love of music, dance, and pageantry.

C. Roger Davis

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KOMEITO The Komeito, or Clean Government Party, is the only party in postwar Japan with links to religion. Its sponsor, Soka Gakkai, is the laymen's affiliate of the Nichiren sect of Buddhism. Founded on 17 November 1964, it defined itself as the "party of ordinary people," oriented toward low-income groups and women.

With a basically conservative philosophy, the party stressed a commitment to fundamental values. It advocated a program of social welfare to elevate the status of those at the bottom of the social pyramid. In foreign policy, the party advocated greater Japanese involvement in the promotion of global peace. The Komeito's success at the polls was due in large measure to the

effective local organizational strength of Soka Gakkai. The Komeito came under criticism for the energetic proselytizing of Soka Gakkai, efforts that bordered on pressure and intimidation.

In 1994, the Komeito joined with a group of defectors from the Liberal Democratic Party to form the New Frontier Party. This party in turn broke up in 1997. Former Komeito members began to explore ways to revive the party, and in November 1998 they joined with the New Peace Party to form the New Komeito.

Louis D. Hayes

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KOMODO DRAGON Descended from ancestors 100 million years old, the Komodo dragon (*Varanus komooensis*) is a member of the monitor lizard genus and inhabits the Indonesian archipelago, particularly Komodo Island National Park on the island of Komodo in south-central Indonesia.

An adult male Komodo dragon is the largest lizard in the world. Three meters long, weighing 135 kilograms, and having long talons, stout body, and a long tail, the Komodo dragon is a formidable predator. Carnivorous, these lizards can swallow their prey whole; their diet includes everything from small insects and lizards to pig, goat, buffalo, horse, and even an occasional human being. Although they can run fast enough to reach speeds of 20 kilometers per hour, Komodo dragons usually lie camouflaged waiting to attack. The olfactory and Jacobson's (in the roof of the



A Komodo dragon on Komodo Island, Indonesia. (WOLFGANG KAEHLER/CORBIS)



KOMODO NATIONAL PARK— WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Komodo National Park was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1991 because the islands that form the park are the home of the Komodo dragon.

mouth) sensory organs allow the animals to detect carcasses by perpetually flicking their forked yellow tongues, which taste and smell the surrounding air.

Once thought to be poisonous, the dragons can cause fatalities only through the saliva from their bite, which may produce septicemia (from the bacteria ingested when a dragon eats carrion). A Komodo dragon can live to the age of twenty years or even longer. Unfortunately they are presently on the endangered species list.

Stacey Fox

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KOMPONG SOM BAY Chhak Kampong Saom (Kompong Som Bay) is framed by the Chuor Phnom Kravanh (Cardamon Mountains) and Chuor Phnom Damrei (Elephant Mountains) on the northeast and the Gulf of Thailand to the south and west. Famed for its tropical beaches, and site of Cambodia's only deep-water port, Kampong Saom (Sihanoukville), the bay's natural advantages include deep water inshore and a string of islands stretching offshore across the mouth of the bay, which afford a degree of protection from storms. Proximity to Phnom Penh, as well as the major trading centers of Bangkok and Singapore, also makes the bay attractive for recreation and maritime traffic.

Constructed by King Norodom Sihanouk (b. 1922) in the late 1950s, Kampong Saom gained some notoriety when the SS *Mayaguez*, a merchant ship sailing between Hong Kong, Thailand, and Singapore in support of U.S. forces in Southeast Asia, was captured one week after Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese army in May 1975. Forced into the bay by Khmer Rouge



Men fishing from small boats in Kompong Som Bay in 1996. (KEVIN R. MORRIS/CORBIS)

gunboats, the *Mayaguez* was eventually released under pressure by the U.S. and Chinese governments.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, with the assistance of the U.N. Development Program and the Asian Development Bank, efforts are underway to conserve the bay's biological diversity through the creation of ecotourism activities in Preah Sihanoukville (Ream National Park) near Sihanoukville. Such efforts are intended to mitigate the pollution and erosion associated with the port's operation and expansion.

Greg Ringer

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KONFRONTASI In the early 1960s, Indonesian president Sukarno (1901–1970) grew openly critical of the West. He viewed the 16 September 1963 establishment of the Federation of Malaysia, including Malaya, Singapore, and former British Borneo (Sarawak and Sabah), as a continuation of colonial rule. In early 1963, Sukarno launched a military campaign to "crush" Malaysia in what was known as Konfrontasi—the Confrontation. Most of the guerrilla war

happened in the rainforest of Borneo, with incursion into the Malayan peninsula in September 1964. Britain sent troops to help Malaysian forces seal the border on Borneo island, while Australia and New Zealand lent support. International condemnation forced Indonesia to abandon membership in the U.N. Sukarno's military campaign, largely intended to deflect attention from Indonesia's paralyzed economy, proved the death of Sukarno's regime. Unbeknownst to Sukarno, some leading army officers and foreign ministry bureaucrats contacted Malaysian officials in 1964 to scale down Konfrontasi. An alleged communist-led coup in September 1965, which saw the deaths of six leading generals, led to the successful counter-coup by General Suharto (b. 1921). The ensuing military assumption of power removed Sukarno and effectively ended Konfrontasi, though this was not officially announced until 1966. At the height of Konfrontasi an estimated 15,000 to 30,000 Indonesian soldiers and irregulars tried to infiltrate the porous Malaysian border, while 50,000 British personnel were stationed in the Southeast Asian theater. British troops in Borneo, assisted by Malaysian forces, were spread thinly along the border to limit incursions.

Anthony Smith

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KONG XIANGXI (1881-1967), Chinese politician. Better known to Westerners as H. H. Kong, Kong Xiangxi was born in 1881 in Taigu, Shanxi Province, China, and claimed to be a direct descendant (seventy-fifth generation) of Confucius (551-479 BCE). Educated at Oberlin College (Ohio), he also received a master's degree in economics from Yale. Kong was a loyal supporter of the Guomindang (Nationalist) government of Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) and Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975), who were his brothers-in-law. After 1928, he held various high positions in the Nationalist government, including prime minister (president of the Executive Yuan) from January 1938 to November 1939. In his long tenures as minister of finance (1933-1944) and president of the Central Bank of China, he made major reforms in China's monetary, financial, and fiscal systems. These reforms greatly benefited China's war against Japanese invasion, although they were also partially responsible for China's later hyperinflation. Criticized as the patron of widespread corruption among government officials and his family members (including his wife and children), he was removed from the Ministry of Finance in 1944 and the Central Bank of China in 1945. After the fall of the Nationalist government in 1949, Kong went to live in the United States, where he remained active in the China lobby until his death in 1967.

Jody C. Baumgartner

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KONOE FUMIMARO (1891-1945), Japanese prince and politician. Konoe Fumimaro was a prominent politician between World War I and World War II and the prime minister of three cabinets between

1937 and 1941. Born in Tokyo of imperial ancestry, he held the title of prince. In his university years, Konoe came to view international relations as a class struggle between overbearing "have" nations and grasping "have-nots." The latter group, according to Konoe's world vision, included Japan, which he believed was held in its inferior status by the major powers and their handmaiden institution, the League of Nations.

Konoe's belief that a Japanese hegemonic role in Asia was essential to keep order in the region played into the hands of the military. In 1937, while prime minister, he ushered in a full-scale war to assert Japanese mastery over China. The China Incident, as this invasion was known among Japanese, began with a skirmish with Nationalist troops outside Beijing and eventuated in the capture of China's capital, Nanjing, and coastal provinces. Konoe also initiated wartime economic and military mobilization at home. Three years later his government signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. He failed in his efforts to resolve the China Incident and to construct détente with Great Britain and the United States in the months before the Japanese invaded Pearl Harbor. When the German invasion of the Soviet Union and U.S. economic sanctions threatened his foreign agenda, Konoe resigned in October 1941 and was replaced by General Tojo Hideki (1884-1948).

In the final year of the war, Konoe engaged in maneuvering to terminate the conflict. Early in the Allied Occupation, General Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) tapped him to draft a revision of the Meiji Constitution. However, Konoe's concepts of a reformed constitution fell far short of Occupation authorities' visions. For his prewar policies, the War Crimes Tribunal indicted Konoe as a Class A war criminal. On the day he was to report to prison, he committed suicide.

Thomas W. Burkman

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KONYA (2002 pop. 696,000). Konya is the capital of the province of Konya in south-central Turkey, the country's main agricultural region. The city is sur-

rounded by fertile, well-irrigated plains, which have produced grains and cereals for millennia.

The earliest settlers were the Hittites, who called the city Kuwana; they were followed by the Phrygians who used the name Kowania. In the third century Iconium (as it was known under the Greeks) became a Hellenistic city although the Phrygian population continued to maintain its cultural identity. After having been expelled from Antioch, St. Paul and St. Barnabas delivered sermons in Iconium in 47, 50, and 53 CE, but they were not favorably received and Christianity had little impact on the local population. In Byzantine times, Iconium served as a military base, subject to frequent attacks by the Arabs. After the Seljuks defeated the Byzantines at the Battle of Manzikert (1071), Iconium became a part of the Seljuk Empire. Seljuk Sultan Kilic Arslan I (1092–1107) later moved his capital to Konya after losing Nicaea to the Byzantines during the first crusade (1097). Konya was relatively free of the constraints posed by warfare, and under Seljuk rule the city flourished. This is especially true with regard to its architecture and tile work, which display a distinctly Seljuk style and remain a major tourist attraction today. In 1313, Konya was occupied by the Karamanid dynasty and officially became part of the Ottoman empire in 1475.

Konya is also the heart of the Mevlevi Sufi sect (known as the whirling dervishes) whose founder, the poet and philosopher Jalal-al-Din Rumi (1207–1273), is buried in Mevlana Museum; his shrine is a major pilgrimage site. An annual dervish festival takes place every December.

T. Isikozlu-E. F. Isikozlu

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KOREA—HISTORY Archaeologists generally posit 30,000 to 50,000 years before the present as the date for the Korean peninsula's earliest known inhabitants. These Paleolithic (Old Stone Age) peoples—who moved into the peninsula while the glacial climate of the ice ages made Korea contiguous with central China—inhabited caves, hunted and gathered for sustenance, used crude tools fashioned from stone or wood, and knew the use of fire. From about 8000 BCE, Neolithic (New Stone Age) populations appeared in

Korea. Arriving in a series of migrations, they carried with them elements of the Siberian cultures from which they had emerged. These included shamanistic religious beliefs, communal or clan organization, and specialized pottery techniques represented by the so-called comb-pattern design. Neolithic habitations were mostly limited to coastal areas and along inland waterways.

Bronze culture arrived in Korea, probably via more advanced and Tungusic-speaking peoples who migrated into the peninsula from the northeast Asian steppe from around the eighth century BCE; around the fourth century BCE, the ancient states of Puyo and Choson appeared in the northern peninsula and in Manchuria. Rice production apparently began on the peninsula during this time. This period also saw the appearance of dolmens, imposing structures characterized by the piling of several large stones in a table-like formation, which probably served as both tombs and places of ritual.

Iron production was introduced via China around the fourth century BCE, as were elements of the advanced Chinese culture. The Chinese Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) overcame the Korean tribal states to establish a network of colonies on the Korean peninsula and in present-day Manchuria from around 100 BCE, which went far in introducing Chinese technology, wealth, and concepts of rulership into a still rather primitive Korean peninsula.

By the first century BCE, the state of Koguryo appeared, perhaps as an offshoot of the Puyo state, which had occupied large portions of northeastern Manchuria along the Sungari River as early as the fourth century BCE. South of the Han River, the so-called Three Han States emerged, tribal confederations whose exact makeup remains debated. It was from the southern Han



GOCHANG—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

The cemeteries of Gochang, Hwasun, and Gangwha in South Korea, World Heritage Sites since 2000, contain hundreds of ancient dolmens—stone slab tombs structures—that date back to the first millennium BCE.



KEY EVENTS IN KOREAN HISTORY

- c. 30,000–50,000 BCE** Humans first occupy the Korean peninsula.
- c. 8000 BCE** Neolithic peoples are living in Korea.
- 8th century BCE** Bronze Age culture is present in Korea.
- 4th century BCE** The states of Puyo and Chosen emerge in the north. Elements of Chinese culture enter Korea.
- c. 100 BCE** The Chinese Han dynasty establishes colonies in Korea.
- 18 BCE–663 CE** Period of the Paekche kingdom in the southwest.
- 37 BCE–668 CE** Period of the Koguryo kingdom in the north.
- 57 BCE–935 CE** Period of the Shilla kingdom in the southeast.
- 668 CE** The Shilla kingdom unifies the peninsula.
- c. 900 CE** The Shilla kingdom has weakened and provincial leaders have assumed control in parts of the peninsula.
- 918–1392** The period of the Koryo kingdom with Korea reunified.
- 1231** The Mongols invade Korea and Korea comes under Mongol control.
- c. 1368** Mongol rule ends with the rise of the Ming dynasty in China.
- 1392–1910** Period of the Choson dynasty.
- 1471** Confucianism is established as the ideology of the state.
- 1592** Korea is invaded by Japan and again in 1598.
- 1627** Korea is invaded by the Manchu and again in 1636 and comes under Manchu (Qing dynasty) control.
- 1860s** Peasant revolts mark the emergence of the Tonghak movement.
- 1894** Japanese and Chinese troops intervene to halt the Toghak-led revolt.
- 1876** The Treaty of Kanghwa with Japan opens up trade with the west as treaties with the United States, Britain, and France follow.
- 1905** Japan makes Korea a protectorate.
- 1910–1945** Period of Japanese rule.
- 1919** The March First Independence Movement fails to end Japanese rule.
- 1945** Korea is liberated from Japanese rule and the peninsula is divided at the thirty-eighth parallel.
- 1948** In a U.S.-backed election, Syngman Rhee is elected president of the First Republic of Korea while the People's Democratic Republic of Korea is established in the north.
- 1948–1994** Period of rule of Kim Il Sung in North Korea.
- 1950–1943** Period of the Korean War.
- 1960** Syngman Rhee's presidency ends; he is replaced by Park Chung hee in a military coup.
- 1960s** The South Korean economy begins several decades of rapid expansion.
- 1966** *Juche* ideology emerges in North Korea.
- 1970s** North Korea begins to experience economic difficulties.
- 1981** Martial law is lifted in South Korea.
- 1988** South Korea hosts the Summer Olympics.
- 1992** Kim Young Sam becomes the first civilian president since 1960 in the south.
- 1994** President Kim Il Sung of North Korea dies and is later replaced by his son, Kim Jong Il.
- 1996** South Korea experiences a major economic crisis.
- 1998** Kim Dae Jung is elected president of South Korea.
- 2000** The first meeting between the leaders of the north and south takes place in P'yongyang, North Korea.

states, however, that more centralized kingdoms eventually developed.

From about the middle of the fourth century CE, three states began to emerge as primary contestants for power on the Korean peninsula: Koguryo in the north, Paekche in the southwest, and Shilla in the southeast. Paekche is traditionally dated to 18 BCE; Shilla emerged last as the strongest among various small tribal units in the south around the fourth century CE. It was the Shilla kingdom that unified the Korean peninsula when an alliance with Tang China gave it the commanding strength needed to prevail over its rivals in 668. The northernmost stretches of the kingdom of Koguryo, however, were not annexed by Shilla but instead broke off to become the kingdom of Parhae (Chinese Bohai). Founded by remnants of the Koguryo state, Parhae persisted as an independent kingdom until its defeat by the Khitans, a northern people, in 937.

Unified Shilla (668–935)

Following Shilla's unification in 668, Korean culture entered a new stage. Buddhism, introduced into Korea during the Three Han States period, continued to be central to Shilla life, but institutional borrowing from Tang China, in the form of Confucian-inspired government administration, became more widespread. Shilla routinely sent delegates of scholars, artisans, and monks to China, bringing back Chinese learning and culture. Shilla's capital of Kyongju grew to upward of a million inhabitants, its rich cultural landscape still discernible today. This period also saw the introduction of Son (Chinese Chan, Japanese Zen) Buddhism, which gained great support among powerful provincial families.

The Shilla monarchy never succeeded in extending its control nationwide. By 750, provincial strongmen were emerging (sometimes called "castle lords"), armed with powerful private armies. By 900, the provinces, and their tax bases, had slipped from central control. The so-called successor states, Later Paekche and Later Koguryo, emerged in the provinces. It was the self-proclaimed king of Later Koguryo, Wang Kon (King T'aejo, 877–943), who was finally able to overcome his rivals and establish his new state, now shortened to Koryo, in 918. In 936, he crowned his victory, and ensured his legitimacy, by securing the abdication of Shilla's last king.

Koryo (918–1392)

Koryo (from which the English word "Korea" is derived) extended the borders of the Korean state north-

ward, farther than Shilla had been capable of doing, as far as the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, roughly to Korea's present-day borders.

The fourth king of Koryo, Kwangjong (925–975), took a momentous step when he adopted the Chinese civil service examination, which tested aspirants for government posts in the Confucian classics of Chinese tradition. In this way, Confucianism took its first sure steps toward becoming the orthodox doctrine of Korean social and government life.

Despite the increased reliance on Chinese-Confucian learning and institutions in the state bureaucracy, Buddhism retained a pivotal role in Koryo society and culture. Koryo-period Buddhist silk paintings are masterpieces of East Asian art. The entire Tripitaka (the Buddhist canon), carved into nearly 80,000 wooden tablets, was completed not once but twice; the second version survives at Haein Temple in South Korea. The Koryo period also saw the development of movable metal type, almost two centuries before its development in the West. Perhaps the crowning creative achievement of the Koryo period was the development of celadon ware, a porcelain typified by its unique blue-green hue and refined designs.

The Koryo dynasty faced a series of formidable aggressors during its 474 years in power. The first were the Khitans, the northern people who had defeated Parhae. They menaced Koryo as well, launching particularly brutal attacks in 1010 and 1018 before suffering a debilitating defeat. Only the Koryo agreement to pay tribute to another northern people, the Jurchen, prevented a similar large-scale invasion.

In 1170, aristocratic civilian rule in Korea was overthrown in a revolt by military leaders. This coup may be seen in part as a final act of open resistance against the growth of a Confucian-oriented and aristocratic officialdom, in which military figures were increasingly kept from leadership positions and high social status. The revolt may also be viewed as protest against the luxury and moral decline into which many in the military thought Koryo had sunk. In further bloodletting, another coup in 1196, led again by military elements, ensured the dictatorship of the Ch'oe house, which monopolized Koryo politics until the assassination of the last Ch'oe ruler in 1258 in the midst of the Mongol invasions.

The first in a series of Mongol invasions of Koryo came in 1231. Though the kingdom bravely resisted, it eventually surrendered to Mongol suzerainty. What ensued was a humiliating acquiescence to Mongol terms, including the intermarriage of the Koryo and Mongol ruling houses, large tribute payments, and

even Koryo's assistance in two failed Mongol attempts to subdue Japan in 1274 and 1281. It was in the midst of this Mongol dominance that the Ch'oe house and power returned to the king and his civilian ministers. Meanwhile the Mongol (Yuan) dynasty in China continued to face a series of challenges posed by a more intensive native Chinese resistance. The establishment of the Chinese Ming dynasty in 1368 soon led to the end of Mongol suzerainty in Korea as well.

It was a Koryo general, Yi Song-gye (King T'aejo, 1335–1408), who finally toppled Koryo from within, first staging a court purge and then in 1392, with the compliance of literati (members of the educated class) officials, proclaiming himself the founder and first king of the new Choson dynasty.

Choson (1392–1910)

The Choson dynasty, whose namesake was the ancient Bronze Age Korean state, was the longest lived of Korea's dynasties, ruling the country continuously until Japanese annexation in 1910. It witnessed the gradual but full implementation of Neo-Confucianism as the functioning ideology of public and private life. It also saw extreme social stratification emerge as a salient characteristic of Korean society, and factionalism become a prominent element of the nation's political landscape.

Yi Song-gye (or King T'aejo) situated the new Korean capital at Hanyang (present-day Seoul). Despite periodic turmoil in the form of succession struggles, during their first century Choson kings managed to diminish the privileged power of the aristocracy and establish Confucianism as the ruling ideology of the state, notably with the promulgation of a new national law code (the *Kyongguk taejon*) in 1471. They also succeeded in carrying out overarching land reforms that in effect nationalized land and helped set the foundation for a strong central government. The reign of King Sejong (1397–1450) stands out in particular for its cultural and institutional advancements, the most noteworthy being the development of the Korean alphabet (hangul), though it would not become widely used until the twentieth century due to the opposition of the learned aristocracy. Sejong also assembled the greatest Korean scholars of the day into the "Hall of Assembled Scholars" (*Chiphyonjon*), a sort of think tank of the era. He instituted land surveys and directed the improvement of irrigation and farming techniques that greatly increased production.

Neo-Confucian principles, while increasingly serving to order social behavior, also served to weaken the power of the Korean monarchy by making it liable to checks

and balances by literati officials. At numerous times during the Choson period, notably in the sixteenth century, this resulted in royal purges of literati officials in largely failed attempts to regain royal initiative.

In the social realm, Confucianism eventually stripped women of their power and identity outside the home, while segmenting society as a whole into a strict hierarchy of peasant, "middle people," and landed aristocrat (or *yangban*), with social mobility coming to a virtual halt. As the Choson period advanced, the rights and hereditary privileges of the *yangban* aristocracy were extended, including immunization from most taxation, all of which served to increase the burden on the peasantry and prepare the way for revolts in the nineteenth century. Buddhism during this period lost its official sanction and indeed became an all but proscribed sect.

In foreign affairs, Choson's first two centuries of peace contrasted sharply with the period of unprecedented national destruction brought on by the Japanese invasions of 1592 and 1598 and the Manchu invasions of 1627 and 1636. The Manchu attacks, preceding the ones that eventually toppled the Chinese Ming dynasty in 1644, resulted in Korean submission to the Manchu state (after 1644 the Qing dynasty).

The two centuries following the Japanese and Manchu invasions were also times of relative peace. One of the primary achievements of the period was the promulgation of a new tax system, the "Uniform Land Tax Law," which was finally instituted nationwide by 1708. By substituting a confusing array of taxes with a uniform tax based on land quality, government revenues increased and peasant tax burdens were greatly alleviated. This in turn stimulated commerce and the emergence of national markets.

Nevertheless, by mid-Choson, after centuries of aristocratic privilege, destructive factionalism, foreign invasion, and peasant misery, Korean social and political structures were under increasing strain. One response to this was the emergence of the Sirhak ("True Learning" or "Pragmatic") movement. As the name suggests, its proponents, including such scholars as Yi Ik (1681–1763) and Chong Yag-yong (1762–1836), through a wide-ranging examination of knowledge, rejection of dogma, and reliance on empirical fact, sought new approaches to Korea's ills. Though little successful in influencing policy, in their endeavors they added immeasurably to Korea's literary heritage.

A series of peasant revolts in the early nineteenth century were preludes to the rise of the Tonghak (or "Eastern Learning") movement. First appearing in the 1860s as a native religious movement combining ele-



LADY HONG (1735–1815)

Memoirist Lady Hong, also known as Lady or Princess Hyegyong, was born into a prominent *yangban* (aristocratic) family caught in the quagmire of seventeenth-century political factionalism in Korea. Her husband was Crown Prince Changhon (1735–1762, also known posthumously as Sado, meaning "mournful thoughts"), heir to the throne of King Yongjo (reigned 1700–1776). The crown prince, however, was mentally ill and grew increasingly violent. Finally, in the summer of 1762, King Yongjo ordered his son to be imprisoned in a rice chest where the young prince perished from heat and starvation. King Yongjo was succeeded by his grandson (son of Sado and Lady Hong) who became King Chongjo (reigned 1776–1800).

Lady Hong wrote four separate memoirs in 1795, 1801, 1802, and 1805. The first memoir was written to her nephew, head of the Hong family. The other three memoirs were written to her grandson, King Sunjo (reigned 1800–1834). These four works vividly depict Lady Hong's childhood and palace life, political factionalism and Catholic persecutions of the late eighteenth century, and painful recollections of her husband's fight with the demons in his mind. Through her writings, it can be seen that Lady Hong was both powerless as the widow of the ill-fated Sado, yet influential as mother and grandmother to kings.

Jennifer Jung-Kim

Source: Ja Hyun Kim Haboush, trans. (1996) *The Memoirs of Lady Hyegyong: The Autobiographical Writings of a Crown Princess of Eighteenth-Century Korea*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

ments of Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, and even Christianity, the movement soon took on antiestablishment notions, with calls for the punishment of corrupt officials, reform of tax laws, and rejection of Confucian notions of hierarchy. It was the specter of mass, Tonghak-led revolt in 1894 that initiated the intervention of Japanese and then Chinese troops, which in turn triggered the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895.

In Korea, as in other regions of the world, the coming of the Western powers marked a stark new chapter in national history. Choson Korea had for a long time maintained a policy of isolation from all but China and Japan (though it tolerated the presence of clandestine French Catholic missionaries until 1866). But as China and then Japan found themselves overwhelmed by Western pressures to open, Korea's opening too became inevitable. Despite victorious clashes with French and American forces (in 1866 and 1871), in 1876 Korea finally gave way before the pressure of

Japan, which had greatly transformed itself since its opening by the West in 1858. The Treaty of Kanghwa (1876) between Japan and Korea was soon followed by treaties of amity and commerce with the various nations of the West, including the United States (1882), Great Britain (1884), and France (1886).

Unlike Japan, which was able to summon its national will and resources to bring about rapid Western-style modernization, Korea languished. Though various attempts at reform were attempted, they ended in failure and conservative backlash. Meanwhile, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Japan, China, and Russia emerged as primary rivals over Korea. While China continued to maintain jealously its traditional relationship with Korea, with the latter as a tributary state, Russia and Japan began to entertain territorial ambitions on the peninsula. This in turn heightened the anxieties of other Western powers. But Japan's victory over China in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895)

and over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) ensured Japanese hegemony in Northeast Asia. By the early twentieth century, as Russia and China both became mired in social and political upheaval, Western nations turned a blind eye as Japan encroached ever further on Korean sovereignty. Japan made Korea a protectorate in 1905 and annexed it in 1910.

The Japanese Colonial Period (1910–1945)

Japan's colonial policy in Korea was ultimately one of assimilation—an attempt to eradicate all vestiges of Korean national identity. Though this policy waxed and waned in intensity, from shortly after annexation it was always central to Japanese planning. Ironically, this ideal of assimilation was pursued while denying Koreans the same rights and privileges as Japanese. Yet Japanese rule also constituted an era of tremendous industrial and institutional change that launched Korea decisively down the road toward modern development with a single-mindedness the Koreans themselves had been unable to achieve. Accomplishments included the construction of a national communication and transportation infrastructure, institutions of higher education, and development of important industries.

By 1910 Japanese troops had all but silenced Korean armed resistance to Japanese rule. National aspirations and frustrations continued to stew under the surface and finally erupted in the March First Independence Movement of 1919, during which a broad spectrum of Korean society rose up in massive anti-Japanese protests. Though this popular plea for independence ultimately failed, the movement did spark the emergence of Korean nationalist movements abroad, including the establishment of a Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai in April 1919 and a Korean Communist Party shortly thereafter. The 1919 independence movement also resulted in a more "enlightened" policy by the Japanese government in Korea, which for a period afterward tolerated the establishment of Korean nationalist organizations and expansion of the Korean vernacular press. This policy came to an end as Korea was increasingly industrialized and exploited to serve the Japanese war effort. From 1931 until the end of World War II, Korea was again ruled by a strict military regime with complete cultural assimilation the order of the day.

Liberation, the Korean War, and National Division

The euphoria following Japan's defeat, and Korea's liberation, in 1945 was short lived as Soviet and American policy makers opted to divide Korea under a joint protectorship. The American decision to rely heavily

on Japanese sympathizers to manage the country in the south was a source of immediate resentment.

In the north the Soviets began to groom a Communist leadership, headed by a young guerrilla leader named Kim Il Sung (Kim Il-song, 1912–1994). The cooling of U.S.-Soviet relations stalled negotiations for nationwide elections to bring an end to the protectorship, and when the Soviets refused to cooperate in a 1948 United Nations–brokered election, voting proceeded in the south alone, which thousands boycotted in protest. The winner was Syngman Rhee (Yi Sung-man, 1875–1965), a Princeton-educated conservative and lifelong friend of the United States, who was inaugurated president of the First Republic of Korea in 1948. That same year saw the formal establishment in the north of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. By the following year most Soviet and United States troops had been withdrawn.

On 25 June 1950, North Korean forces crossed the border along the thirty-eighth parallel en masse, catching both South Korean and remnant U.S. forces by surprise. In a successful appeal to the United Nations, the United States oversaw the establishment of a U.N. force with a mandate to reunify the peninsula under a single Korean government. Initial U.N. success changed abruptly in the face of massive intervention by Chinese troops, and U.N. forces were driven back to the outskirts of Seoul. A strategic stalemate, and the unwillingness of the United Nations to risk a larger conflict with China and perhaps the Soviet Union, ultimately resulted in a 1953 armistice, with Korea divided along roughly prewar lines.

Autocratic Rule and Ideological Conflict

"Autocracy" accurately describes the political situations in both North and South Korea from the Korean War until at least 1981, the year in which martial law was lifted in the south. Though this autocracy was more manifest in North Korea, following the Korean War, South Korea too was ruled by the autocratic regime of Syngman Rhee and then by a series of military governments, which took the Communist threat as primary justification for authoritarian rule.

North Korea was led by Kim Il Sung from 1948 until his death in 1994. Kim consolidated his initially tenuous hold on power through systematic purges of rival Communist factions, resulting in his rise to absolute power by 1960. From the 1960s, Kim Il Sung's rule was increasingly characterized by a cult of personality that credited him with fantastic exploits and even superhuman abilities. Closely tied to this was Kim Il Sung's appeal, notably after 1966, to *juche* ideology,

characterized by an emphasis on self-reliance and ultranationalism, which has remained to this day a salient characteristic of North Korean life and thought.

Enjoying the lion's share of mineral resources, though lacking the agricultural base of the south, North Korea during the first two decades of its existence actually surpassed the south in economic development, and perhaps only massive U.S. aid to South Korea prevented the north from renewing a military drive for reunification. The situation in the north began to deteriorate in the 1970s, however, with the steady loss of foreign aid, heavy military expenditures, booming population, and low agricultural output. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 and a series of natural disasters in the 1990s made things more critical. Massive food and medical aid, predominantly from Western nations, has helped stave off national catastrophe.

In South Korea, the Syngman Rhee presidency ended in violent student-led protests in 1960. Hopes for democratic civilian rule were soon dashed, however, when the South Korean general Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui, 1917–1979) seized power in a military coup. Park's efforts to create a centrally engineered economy were largely successful, and from the mid-1960s the South Korean economy began a long and remarkable period of growth. During the 1980s, South Korea became known as one of Asia's "tiger economies," as it surged ahead in gross national product and industrial output, far surpassing North Korea, which now languished because of poor management and a lack of capital and material support. South Korea's hosting of the 1988 Olympic Games stands out as testament to that country's tremendous economic strides. Despite the south's miraculous economic advances, however, financial crises throughout Asia, combined with structural and managerial defects in Korea's centrally engineered economy, led to a severe economic crisis in South Korea in 1996.

Economic progress in the south naturally engendered calls for political plurality. Following Park Chung Hee's assassination in 1979, control passed to another military general, Chun Doo Hwan (Chon Tu-hwan, b. 1931). In 1980, hundreds, perhaps thousands, of South Koreans died in the city of Kwangju protesting military rule. Free elections were finally held in 1987, though they still resulted in the election of a military man, Roh Tae Woo (No Tae-wu, b. 1932). It was not until 1992 that Kim Young Sam (Kim Yong-sam, b. 1927) became the first civilian president since Syngman Rhee. But in a greater test of democracy, in 1998 power transferred peacefully from Kim Young-sam to his elected successor, Kim Dae Jung (Kim Tae-jung, b. 1924).



In a move toward reunification, North and South Korean leaders Kim Jong Il and Kim Dae Jung read papers reporting on their 14 June 2000 summit meeting. (AFP/CORBIS)

North-south relations since 1953 have mostly been characterized by tense mistrust and ideological rancor. The death of Kim Il Sung and the eventual succession of his son Kim Jong Il (b. 1941) in the north, and the election of Kim Dae Jung as president in the south, marked a sea change in north-south relations, occasioned in part by Kim Dae Jung's "sunshine policy" toward North Korea, which stressed cordial relations and constructive dialogue. In June 2000, the first meeting between North and South Korean leaders occurred in the North Korean capital of P'yongyang, from where the leaders issued a joint communiqué calling for a peaceful resolution to national division.

Daniel Kane

See also: Choson Kingdom; Confucianism—Korea; Korean War; Koryo Kingdom; Kwangju Uprising; March First Independence Movement; North Korea–South Korea Relations; Parhae Kingdom; Three Kingdoms Period; Tonghak; Unified Shilla Kingdom

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KOREA BAY Korea Bay lies between the southwestern coast of North Korea's North and South P'yongan provinces and the Liaodong Peninsula of China, forming the northeast arm of the Yellow Sea. The water is shallow, and since the tidal land is wide along the shore of Korea Bay, with a big difference in the ebb and flow, there are salt fields in many places. During the wintertime, seasonal winds from the northwest have created large sand dunes on the seashore. The fishing industry in Korea Bay has not developed according to general expectations. Korean sources suggest that this is due to the unique conditions of the bay: shallow water and water temperature that is surprisingly lower than expected during cooler months. During the spring a warm current flows north past Cheju Island, causing several species of fish from Korea's Namhae (South Sea) to flourish. These include croakers, flatfish, cod, sciaenoid fish, small octopi, and crabs.

Richard D. McBride II

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KOREA INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY The Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST), known as Hanguk Kwahakweon in Korean, was one of the first modern research institutes in the developing world dedicated to industrial technology; it became a model for similar insti-

tutes in other developing countries, especially in Southeast Asia. The KIST was established in Seoul, South Korea, with a U.S. seed grant, at the behest of the South Korean president Park Chung Hee (1917–1979) and was organized to assist the nation's export drive. It has at least formal administrative independence and has conducted its work for both South Korean businesses and state-run laboratories on a contract basis.

Through the 1970s, the institute was Korea's most important research and development center and performed various industrial engineering projects under the direction of the ministry of science and technology. By the late 1980s, KIST was eclipsed by newer state-led laboratories such as the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute, and by corporate research and development, especially in electronics. Accordingly, KIST shifted to a supporting role in triad partnerships (corporate, academic, and government laboratories) or carried out specialized contract work for corporate clients. However, it was able to maintain a measure of political and research importance by playing a leadership role in the state's high-profile Group of 7 (G-7: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) industrial research projects, which were intended to elevate Korean technological advancement to the level of the most advanced industrial countries during the 1990s.

In 1981, KIST merged with the Korea Advanced Institute of Science (KAIS), a science and engineering graduate school established in 1971, to form the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST). Both institutes moved their major facilities from Seoul to the Daedok Science Town near Taejeon. KIST was split off from KAIST in 1989 to resume its strictly research role.

Joel R. Campbell

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KOREA STRAIT The Korea Strait lies between the southeast coast of Korea and the north coast of Kyushu, Japan (the southernmost island), and the southeast coast of Honshu, Japan. It connects the East China Sea (Yellow Sea) to the East Sea (Sea of Japan). At the narrowest point, the strait is 195 kilometers wide; it is generally 90 meters deep. The strait bisects the Tsushima Islands, forming a western channel commonly called the Chosen Strait and an eastern channel called the Tsushima Strait. The western channel is slightly narrower and deeper. The warm Tsushima current passes through the Korea Strait in a northerly direction.

The Korea Strait was the site of the kamikaze winds that destroyed the Mongol armada in 1281, which had been preparing to attack and invade Japan. It was also the site of the Battle of Tsushima (27–28 May 1905), which ended with the annihilation of the Russian fleet by the Japanese during the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905).

Brandon Palmer

KOREA-JAPAN TREATY OF 1965 Japanese-South Korean normalization was a five-year process that took place between 1961 and 1965. Throughout the late 1940s and the 1950s, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was governed by Syngman Rhee (1875–1965) a man who had dedicated much of his life to publicizing the illegitimacy of Japanese rule in Korea. The Park Chung Hee regime (1961–1979) was different, as it included many Koreans who had been trained by the Japanese. This change in the administration breathed life into the possibility of Japan and the ROK signing a treaty of normalization.

The United States was a leading force between the two countries, commencing negotiations to reach this goal. Friendly relations between Japan and South Korea were necessary for the economic and political strength of both states; their healthy relations would help strengthen the U.S. containment policy against the Soviet Union. The treaty, ratified on 14 August 1965, provided the ROK with both grants (\$300 million) and loans (\$200 million); another \$300 million arrived in the form of private investment.

The signing of the treaty boosted the Korean economy, but it ended the possibility of Koreans making further claims to the Japanese government for compensation. This latter concern has resurfaced in negotiations over the nature of compensation for former Korean comfort women, whom the Japanese military had forced into prostitution to serve its troops during

World War II, as well as those with the North Koreans over normalization possibilities.

Mark Caprio

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KOREAN LANGUAGE The Korean language is spoken by approximately 72 million people around the world. In addition to the 42 million people in South Korea (Republic of Korea) and 20 million in North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea; DPRK), Korean is spoken in Korean communities in China, Japan, United States, Canada, the former Soviet Union, and South America, among other places.

Origins and Development

Korean is generally said to belong to the Altaic language group of central Asia, Siberia, and Mongolia. Some linguists maintain that Korean also belongs to the larger Ural-Altaic family, which includes Hungarian and Finnish. Archaeological and anthropological evidence, as shown in similarities in shamanism, language, and archaeological remains, supports the theory that Korean civilization is linked to that of its neighbors in central Asia and Siberia.

People on the Korean peninsula spoke different languages through the Three Kingdoms period (57 BCE–667 CE) until 668 when Shilla unified the lower two-thirds of the peninsula. When the Later Three Kingdoms arose and Shilla fell in 935 to Koryo (918–1392), the northern dialect of Kaesong (also called Kaegyong; the capital of Koryo) became dominant. The language of the Choson dynasty (1392–1910) was similar to the dominant language of Kaesong.

In the early 2000s, there are two official dialects of the capitals of Seoul, South Korea, and P'yongyang, North Korea. South Koreans call their official dialect *p'yojunno* (standard language), while North Koreans call theirs *munbwao* (cultured language). The two dialects are very similar and show only minor differences, as in the use of foreign loanwords. There are also numerous regional and provincial dialects, but they are also mutually understandable.

Grammatical Features

Korean has fourteen consonants (five of which can be doubled) and ten vowels (with eleven additional

vowel combinations or diphthongs). A morpheme is the smallest distinct unit of the Korean language, similar to an English syllable. A Korean morpheme must be formed of least one consonant and one vowel, but may have one or two additional consonants at the end.

Korean sentences are verb-final and are ordered subject-object-verb (I-flower-see), whereas English is subject-verb-object (I see a/the flower). The subject or object or both may be omitted in some cases, and in others, the subject and object order may be flipped to convey a specific meaning. The most important point is that the verb is always at the end, and every sentence must have a verb, although it need not have a subject or object.

Korean lacks articles such as *a* or *the*, but there are other means of distinguishing a specific noun. For example, *ku* (that) can be used similarly to the English word *the* when referring to something that has already been introduced into the conversation.

While there is a plural noun marker (*dul*), it is often omitted. In the previous example, the listener must discern from context whether the speaker sees one flower or many flowers. Korean nouns are not masculine or feminine, as in French and Spanish. Korean also does not have specific masculine or feminine pronouns such as *he* or *she*.

The most commonly used pronouns are *I* or *we*. *You* is rarely used, as Koreans generally use the listener's name and/or title instead. Instead of *he/she/they*, a speaker might use the referent's name or title or both, or a generic phrase such as *this/that person*.

Korean is a highly agglutinative language with numerous suffixes that can be added to word stems and each other. These suffixes help clarify the meaning of a sentence. For example, markers can indicate the subject (*i/ga*), topic (*un/nun*), or object (*ul/rul*) of a sentence. The first marker in each example (*i*, *un*, *ul*) is used if the preceding morpheme ends in a consonant. If it ends in a vowel, the second marker (*ga*, *nun*, *rul*) is used. Modifiers precede the nouns they modify. For example, "the flower that is in bloom" would be expressed in Korean as "in-bloom flower."

Korean has different speech levels, specific to the relative social positions of the speaker, the subject of the sentence, and the listener. There are at least six levels of speech in contemporary Korean, but the four most commonly used levels are formal polite (deferential) style (verb stem + [*su*]*mnida*), informal polite style (verb stem + *ayo/oyo*), plain (essay) style (verb stem + [*nu*]*nda*), and casual style (verb stem + *a/o*.)

A verb stem is the root of any verb minus the *da* ending from its dictionary (infinitive) form. The use of *ayo/oyo* in the informal polite style and *a/o* in the casual style depends on the vowel harmony rule and the "bright" (*a* or the long *o*) or "dark" vowel (*u* and the short *o*) in the verb stem. Bright vowels combine with *a*, and dark vowels combine with *o*. This is called the vowel harmony rule because bright vowels complement other bright vowels.

A speaker will choose the speech level most appropriate to his or her relationship to the listener. The speaker also must consider the subject of a sentence in determining if subject honorifics are needed. For example, verbs and certain nouns must be changed to their honorific forms if the subject is older or in some other way superior to the speaker or listener.

Korean language is highly dependent on context. Because nouns and topics are often omitted, and pronouns are not commonly used, the listener must often infer the speaker's intent from nongrammatical clues such as nuance and conversation flow.

Loanwords

Korean has numerous loanwords in its vocabulary, most of which are derived from Chinese. Chinese loanwords have corresponding Chinese characters, but in many cases there are also native Korean counterparts. In recent years, there have also been many loanwords from Japanese and English as well as some European languages. Japanese and English loanwords have become common because of the economic and cultural ties among Korea, Japan, and the United States. The loanword, however, may not retain the exact meaning it had in its original language.

North Koreans do not use as many foreign loanwords because of their relative isolation from other countries. This was further enforced by the North Korean *juche* ideology, which literally means "self-reliance" and refers to the official nationalist discourse of the DPRK.

Writing Systems

Prior to the 1446 promulgation of the *bunmin chongum* (proper sounds to instruct the people), there was no native writing system. Official documents were translated into and written in classical or literary Chinese. Because of the difficulty of learning Chinese characters, literacy in Korea was generally limited to males of the upper class.

There were two native writing methods involving Chinese characters. *Idu* was a system utilized by clerks

for administrative purposes and was widely used even into the nineteenth century. In *idu*, some Chinese characters were used for their meaning while others were used to stand for Korean syntax. *Hyangch'al* was another system that used Chinese characters, but only for their phonetic value. This system was used predominantly to record literature.

Hunmin chongum was used primarily by women and commoners. Official documents continued to be written in classical Chinese and *idu*. From the 1890s, *hunmin chongum* became revitalized as the official script and is known today as hangul.

The ease of learning this phonetic script is the reason why Korean literacy is nearly 100 percent. Non-native speakers often can learn the basics of the modern Korean script in a matter of days. While Chinese characters (*hanja*) are used less and less in South Korea, and most newspapers are written in hangul, students learn 3,600 Chinese characters by the time they graduate from high school.

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KOREAN WAR The Korean War (1950–1953) was a civil struggle that originated in the division of Korea after World War II, and entered into a phase of conventional war on 25 June 1950, when North Korean forces crossed the dividing line and invaded the South. Soon the United States entered the fighting under the banner of the United Nations, along with small contingents of British, Canadian, Australian, and Turkish troops. In October 1950, Chinese forces in large numbers joined the war on the North's side. By the time a cease-fire agreement was signed on 27 July 1953, U.S. casualties were 33,629 dead and 103,284 wounded. South Korea had lost hundreds of thousands of soldiers and over a million civilian lives. Although no precise figures exist for Communist losses, North Korea suffered perhaps 3 million military and civilian casualties and the obliteration of nearly every modern building, and China lost almost 1 million soldiers. The 1953 armistice ended the fighting, but Korea remained divided for decades thereafter and subject to the possibility of a new war at any time.

The Korean War has been subject to frequent reinterpretation since it was fought in the early 1950s. For President Harry Truman (1884–1972), Korea was a

"police action" that began, in the official American view, when North Korean forces backed by the Soviet Union launched a full-scale, unprovoked invasion across the thirty-eighth parallel. By the 1960s, Westerners had renamed it "the limited war," a conflict different from the world wars in being less than a total war and in being shaped by political decisions taken in Washington: mainly the Truman-MacArthur controversy, with President Truman seeking to limit the conflict to the Korean peninsula, and General Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964) seeking to extend the war to China. Under this interpretation Korea was a success for Truman's containment policy, but a failure for MacArthur's strategy—a stalemate yielding a substitute for victory.

The Korean War after Vietnam

The U.S. war in Vietnam influenced another revision of meaning, as scholars in the 1970s increasingly came to see Korea as a civil war in which anticolonial nationalism confronted a status quo-oriented United States. Attention focused on the Korean experience of American and Soviet occupations after World War II, political and guerrilla conflicts (1945–1949) and small border wars (1949–1950), and Korea's colonial experience with Japan, during which time the military leaderships of North and South Korea were formed (northerners had been anti-Japanese guerrillas, whereas the high command of the South Korean Army had fought with Japan), with a corresponding de-emphasis on the conventional "start" of the war in June 1950, and a significant spreading of responsibility for the initiation of this war.

The Korean War Viewed from the 1980s

By the 1980s, however, Korea was "the forgotten war." Books and documentaries by that title proliferated, and the war entered an ambiguous realm: not World War II, not quite Vietnam either, more a question mark than a known quantity. Korean War veterans protested their exclusion from the American popular memory. This was also a decade of new light on the war, however, as scholars exploited reams of newly declassified documents. Most historians questioned the assumption that Joseph Stalin launched the war for his own purposes; the conventional assault in June 1950 was thought to be the idea of North Korea's Kim Il Sung (1912–1994), with perhaps more Chinese than Soviet support. The direct American role in suppressing left-wing politics in the South during its military occupation (1945–1948) was definitively proved, and captured Korean documents showed that the origins of the North Korean regime were much



U.S. marines on a road heading toward North Korea in November 1950. The mountainous terrain made movement difficult and also made soldiers in the open valleys easy targets for machine gunners in the hills. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

more complex than had been thought, with significant indigenous and Chinese influence in addition to the Soviet role. Both Korean sides were deeply implicated in the border fighting that ensued from May through December 1949. New materials showed that the American decision to march into North Korea was taken by Harry Truman, not Douglas MacArthur, under a frankly stated "rollback" doctrine; Truman also thought long and hard about extending the war to China, and sacked MacArthur in April 1951 mainly because he wanted a reliable commander in place should that happen.

New Chinese materials also showed how difficult the decision to intervene in Korea was, with Mao Zedong (1893–1976) taking the lead but also deeply conflicted. Chinese materials also depicted a combined North Korean-Chinese strategy to lure United Nations forces deep into the interior of Korea after the famous amphibious landing at Inchon, hoping to stretch supply lines and gain time for a dramatic reversal on the battlefield. That reversal came as 1950 turned into 1951, when Sino-Korean forces threw U.N. troops back well below the thirty-eighth parallel and captured Seoul again; finally, General Matthew Ridgway (1895–1993) organized a successful defense that stabilized the front

well south of the thirty-eighth parallel. U.N. forces then resumed the offensive, retaking Seoul and reestablishing a Korea divided roughly along the lines of the demilitarized zone that still exists today. Here the war could have ended, but it continued through two years of difficult peace negotiations.

The Korean War after the Cold War

The 1990s have brought new interpretations, based mostly on newly declassified Russian documentation. These materials show more involvement by Stalin than most scholars had thought in the outbreak of conventional war in June 1950, although his involvement was ambiguous and wavering. Kim Il Sung held several secret meetings with Stalin and Mao in early 1950, hoping to gain their backing for a conventional assault on the South. Stalin was reluctant and worried, but ultimately supportive; the full record of Kim's discussions with Mao remains secret, but Beijing was also supportive, particularly because Kim had been a member of the Chinese Communist Party in the 1930s and had many Chinese allies from that period. Ultimately though, the dominant impetus—and responsibility—for taking the existing conflict to the level of conventional war was North Korea's.

All these are Western views. For Koreans in North and South, the likelihood of war came with the division of the ancient integrity of the Korean nation, through the unilateral action of the American officials in mid-August 1945, to which Stalin quickly acquiesced. For the South it was a just war to recover "lost territories" in the North and to resist Soviet and Chinese expansion. For the North it was a just war to resist American imperialism and reunify the homeland. For Koreans and thirty-seven thousand American soldiers, the war still continues today through a cold peace held only by the 1953 armistice, and with a hot war an ever-present possibility, given that more than a million soldiers still confront each other along the demilitarized zone. But in June 2000, the leaders of South and North Korea met for the first time since the country was divided, and the southern leader, longtime dissident Kim Dae Jung (b. 1925), has determined to try to bring a final end to the Korean War before he leaves office in 2003.

Eventually the Korean War will be understood as one of the most destructive and one of the most important wars of the twentieth century. In the aftermath of war two Korean states competed toe-to-toe in economic development, both turning into modern industrial nations. Finally, it was this war and not World War II that established a far-flung American base structure abroad and a national security state at home, as defense spending nearly quadrupled in the last six months of 1950, reaching a peak of \$500 billion (in current dollars) that was never reached again during the Cold War. Today Koreans continue to seek reconciliation and eventual reunification of their torn nation, and Americans have a massive and expensive military-industrial complex that has lost its original *raison d'être* with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but which continues apace as the primary American legacy of the Korean War.

Bruce Cumings

See also: **Kim Il Sung; North Korea–South Korea Relations**

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KOREANS Koreans are the people of the Korean peninsula in northeast Asia. The peninsula's northern boundary is formed by the Amnok (Yalu) and Tumen Rivers, which separate Korea from the Manchurian region of the People's Republic of China. There is also a short 16-kilometer border with Russia near the city of Vladivostok along the peninsula's northeast corner.

The Korean peninsula is currently divided into the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea), which together have an area of 221,607 square kilometers, roughly the size of Great Britain. About 68 million Koreans lived in the two Koreas in 2000: 22 million in the north and 46 million in the south. Another 6 million live in other parts of the world, such as China, Japan, the United States, the former Soviet Union, and South America.

Homogeneity

Koreans pride themselves on racial homogeneity based on an assumption of shared blood, common origins, culture, and language, as well as the perceived sharing of a common history and destiny. The Chinese people form the largest ethnic minority group in Korea today. Recently, many ethnic Koreans have returned



THE CORE OF KOREAN NATIONAL CULTURE

"The great virtue which the Koreans possess is the innate respect and daily practice of the laws of human brotherhood. We have seen above how the various bodies, above all the family, form closely united corps to defend, support, second and help one another. But this sentiment of brotherhood extends well beyond the limits of kinship and association, and mutual assistance, generous hospitality toward all are distinctive traits of the national character, qualities which, it must be admitted, place the Koreans well above the peoples invaded by the egotism of our contemporary civilization."

Source: Christopher Dallet. (1954). *Traditional Korea*. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 149.



Korean officials light the torch to open the 1998 Olympic Games in Seoul, South Korea.

to Korea from such places as China's Yanbian region (in Korean, Yonbyon) in search of better lives.

Foreign invasions (Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century, Japanese invasions in 1592 and 1597, and Manchu invasions in 1627 and 1636) also contributed to this sense of racial unity. United efforts at defense helped forge a shared identity for Koreans.

Origins

The Korean Peninsula has been inhabited for half a million years, but these indigenous people are not thought to be the earliest ancestors of the Korean people. Instead, Koreans are believed to be descendants of Altaic immigrants from Central Asia who displaced the earlier residents in the Neolithic period (5500–800 BCE).

Evidence indicates that Koreans and Siberians share common roots. Based on archaeological findings of Scytho-Siberian bronze artifacts, the ancestors of the Koreans probably originated in Siberia and Central Asia, and the existence of iron implements from the same period indicates extensive exchanges with Sinitic (Chinese) iron culture. Furthermore, Korean shamanism is similar to Siberian shamanism. And while the Korean language is distinct, it is linguistically similar to other Altaic languages spoken in Mongolia, Manchuria, and Siberia.

According to the Korean foundation myth, Koreans trace their origins to the founding of Old Choson in 2333 BCE by Tangun. Tangun is said to have been the son of a deity and a female bear who became human after proving her patience and perseverance. The Tangun myth is significant because it points to non-Sinitic origins of Korean culture.

As with any culture, it is impossible to pinpoint the historical moment when a common ethnic or national

consciousness was formed. People of prehistoric times did not think in terms of a shared nationhood. Over time, linguistically and culturally disparate groups merged to share a language, culture, and polity. By the time of the kingdoms of Koguryo (37 BCE–668 CE), Paekche (18 BCE–663 CE), and early Shilla (57 BCE–668 CE), there was a clear sense of the peninsular peoples as being ethnically distinct from their Chinese neighbors. It was, however, not until the Unified Shilla kingdom (668–935) or the Koryo kingdom (918–1392) that the peninsula became unified. Unified Shilla controlled only the southern two-thirds of the peninsula, leading some to argue that the peninsula was not unified until Koryo extended the border northward. Unified Shilla, however, is to be credited with achieving linguistic, cultural, and political unity within its own borders.

Cultural Characteristics

The official adoption of Buddhism by Koguryo in 372, Paekche in 384, and Shilla in 534 helped each kingdom unite its people. Buddhism adopted some of the indigenous shamanic deities and bolstered royal authority by bestowing on kings religious and social legitimacy. There were many religious observances to ensure longevity for the king and kingdom. Religious architecture and artwork, especially sculptures and statues of the Buddha, flourished. Agricultural festivals had tremendous social, recreational, and religious importance. Today, Buddhism is still the most popular religion among South Koreans.

Confucianism is another important facet of Korean culture, past and present, in both Koreas. The Choson dynasty (1392–1910) became thoroughly Confucianized by the mid-seventeenth century (albeit a Koreanized form of Confucianism). Social order or hierarchy is a key aspect of Confucianism, characterized by patriarchy, respect for one's elders, and great value placed on education and position. These ideals are upheld in both Koreas today. For example, the symbol of the (North) Korean Worker's Party includes not only the hammer and sickle, but also the calligraphy brush, to signify the intellectual alongside the laborer and farmer. Patriarchy is embodied in North Korea's reverence for their two leaders, Kim Il Sung (1912–1994) and Kim Jong Il (b. 1941).

Nationalism is another key feature of the Korean people. In North Korea, nationalism is seen in the *juche* (self-reliance) ideology. In South Korea, there are different kinds of nationalism, such as conservative nationalism, *minjung* (people's) nationalism, and ultra-conservative nationalism. Nationalism has been a democratizing force in South Korea, advocating national autonomy and reunification. The tendency to

place nationalism above all else has upheld the interests of the elite and the state, marginalizing issues of class, gender, and region. Regionalism falls along provincial boundaries, which echo the earlier borders of Koguryo, Paekche, and Shilla. Regional discrimination was particularly prominent under the Choson dynasty and continues to be a problem today, especially in South Korea.

Koreans also share a sense of loss and longing called *han*. The loss of Korean sovereignty to Japanese colonial rule (1910–1945), the 1945 division of North and South under a Soviet-U.S joint trusteeship, the formation of separate states in 1948, and the Korean War (1950–1953) have engendered a strong sense of anxiety among Koreans. Despite recent attempts at reunification, the two Koreas remain deeply divided. For older Koreans, however, there is a strong imperative that they must see Korea reunified within their own lifetime.

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KOREANS IN CENTRAL ASIA The presence of a Korean minority in Central Asia resulted from the Stalinist ethnic purges of the 1930s, when the Soviet premier Joseph Stalin ordered the mass deportation of ethnic Koreans residing in the Vladivostok region and the Far East Maritime Province to the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Some 175,000 Soviet Koreans were forcibly removed from their homes, loaded onto railroad freight cars, and transported to Central Asia.

Following the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, Koreans had begun migrating to the Russian Far East and over time had integrated themselves into the local Soviet culture and economy. However, as tensions between the Japanese empire and the Soviet Union escalated over Manchuria and the Korean peninsula, Stalin became fearful that Koreans residing in the Russian Far East harbored pro-Japanese sympathies. Thus on 21 August 1937, he ordered the transfer of Koreans to Central Asia, and the forcible displacement occurred from September to November 1937.

During the long period of deportation, many children and elderly people died of malnutrition and disease. Scurvy, typhoid, diphtheria, dysentery, measles, and scarlet fever took the lives of those who were weak

and infirm, as families were forced to live in unsanitary conditions aboard the freight trains, with little or no food for most of the trip. On their arrival in Central Asia, regional and local governments did what they could to feed and house the Korean refugees, but many families were forced to live in warehouses, barns, mosques, and converted prisons while they struggled to build homes for themselves.

Following World War II Koreans remained in the Central Asian republics and began integrating and assimilating into Soviet society, where they soon thrived as agricultural technicians, agronomists, and managerial professionals. To this day, there are still large Korean communities in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan.

Keith Leitch

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KOREANS IN JAPAN The Koreans constitute the largest minority group in Japan. Japan annexed Korea in 1910. The 1939 National Service Draft Ordinance on the eve of World War II resulted in



A young Korean boy studying a Korean book with his instructor in Chefoo, Hokkaido, Japan, in 1990. (BOHEMIAN NOMAD PICTUREMAKERS/CORBIS)



KOREANS IN JAPAN

The integration of Koreans into Japanese society has always been a major social, economic, and political issue. The following description of Korean housing in Japan in the late nineteenth century indicates that house style was one cultural element that distinguished Koreans from Japanese.

It will be seen by these brief extracts how dissimilar the Korean house is to that of the Japanese. And this dissimilarity is fully sustained by an examination of the photographs which Mr. Lowell made in Korea, and which show among other things low stone-walled houses with square openings for windows, closed by frames partly covered with paper, the frames hung from above and opening outside, and the roof tiled; also curious thatched roofs, in which the slopes are uneven and rounding, and their ridges curiously knotted[,] differ in every respect from the many forms of thatched roof in Japan.

Source: Edward S. Morse ([1896] 1961) *Japanese Homes and Their Surroundings*. New York: Dover Publications, 345.

6 million Koreans arriving in Japan as conscripted laborers and military draftees to satisfy the manpower shortage. During the war, many Koreans also voluntarily migrated to Japan in search of better employment.

During the war, Koreans were given Japanese nationality. The introduction of the Alien Registration Order in 1952, whereby all non-Japanese were regarded as aliens, changed the status of Koreans. Since the legal process of becoming a naturalized citizen is complicated, many Koreans choose not to take up Japanese citizenship. As aliens, the Korean minority is denied many of the normal legal and social benefits enjoyed by the Japanese population.

Today approximately 687,000 Koreans live in Japan. They are slowly being Japanized, so much so that many don't speak Korean or even use their Korean name in public. Differences in status and racial prejudices have alienated the Koreans from the Japanese society at large. There are limited employment opportunities, and most Koreans hold low-paying jobs and suffer from exploitation from their Japanese employers. Some are involved in private businesses in the entertainment and service industries.

The Koreans are divided between supporters of North and South Korea. The Mindan (Association of Korean Residents in Japan) supports South Korea, and

Chongryun (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan) supports North Korea. This division has created separate education systems. As a divided community with differing goals, it is difficult for the Koreans to fight for better social and economic conditions, and difficult for the Japanese government to implement any changes.

Geetha Govindasamy

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KOREANS, OVERSEAS Some 5 million Koreans—more than 7 percent of the peninsula's population—live outside Korea. They are scattered among 140 nations, with about 93 percent living in China, the United States, Russia, and Japan. These overseas Ko-

reans fall into two categories: first-generation emigrants, who were born in Korea and are culturally and linguistically Korean; and their descendants, who are ethnically Korean but who have adapted culturally and linguistically to their local environment and often can't speak Korean.

The History of Korean Immigration

The first wave of overseas migration started in the second half of the nineteenth century and lasted until 1910. It was a large-scale movement, primarily to avoid famine and poverty. Koreans moved to Manchuria and the Russian Far East, where they pioneered wet rice farming. Another group, some seven thousand strong, went to North America as indentured laborers. Most worked on sugarcane farms in Hawaii, and some later migrated to the U.S. mainland and to Mexico and Cuba.

A second wave of several hundred Koreans left between 1910 and 1945, during Japan's colonial rule of Korea. Fleeing Japanese oppression, most moved to Manchuria and the Russian Far East. A number migrated to Japan in the hope of finding better employment, but during World War II the Japanese government conscripted laborers in Korea to work under quasi-military conditions in Japanese military industries to support the war effort.

By 1945, there were 2.4 million Koreans in Japan and more than 2 million in Manchuria. After Korea became independent, most Koreans in Japan went home, but 700,000 remain in Japan today.

The 1945–1970 period may have been the most difficult in Korea's history. The country split into North and South, and the Korean War raged from 1950 to 1953. The period from the 1950s to 1965 saw an attempt to rebuild the country, and there was little emigration. External migration was very difficult until 1965, when the U.S. immigration law was changed and many Koreans moved to America for better economic prospects. During this period Koreans had little contact with foreigners except Americans and did not consider emigration as an option.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Korea was industrializing fast, its economy was growing rapidly, and many Koreans were working overseas for Korean companies. Some decided to stay abroad to establish themselves in the developed world, particularly in the United States. A number of Korean students studying abroad also opted to stay, which caused a "brain drain" to the United States and other Western countries.

Since the early 1990s, immigration patterns have changed yet again. Korea's economy had peaked, and



A strip mall in Koreatown, Los Angeles, in 1997. (NIK WHEELER/CORBIS)

countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand attempted to attract immigrants with money or useful skills. The resulting emigration of well-educated, prosperous Koreans contrasts sharply with that of forced laborers or citizens fleeing political persecution.

Overseas Korean Communities

The largest number of overseas Koreans—2 million, or 39 percent—live in China. They are mainly concentrated near the Korean–Manchurian border, and most live in the Yenbien Korean Autonomous Prefecture of Jirin Province. Pioneer rice farmers and their descendants, they have formed communities with well-established education systems in which Korean is spoken and accepted as an official language.

The second-largest number of overseas Koreans—1.5 million, or 31 percent—live in the United States. Some are descended from of the early sugarcane

laborers, but most are post-1965 immigrants and their families. Many were highly educated, with professional careers in Korea, but were unable to overcome linguistic and cultural barriers in America and wound up running small businesses such as grocery stores and laundries. California is home to most Koreans living in the United States—Los Angeles has a sizable Koreatown—followed by New York.

With 700,000, Japan has the third-largest number of overseas Koreans—about 14 percent. Most are descendants of the immigrants who were drafted as laborers for the war industry or who came to Japan seeking better jobs. They are concentrated in the industrial Osaka area and many no longer speak Korean, although they are ethnically and culturally Korean and identify themselves as such.

The fourth-largest number of overseas Koreans—460,000, or 9 percent—are in the former Soviet Union. They are mainly the descendants of immigrants who moved to Russia's maritime province before or during the Japanese takeover of Korea. Under Stalin, these Koreans were forcibly moved to Central Asia. In an area inhabited by Turkic nomads who raised livestock, the Korean immigrants introduced wet rice farming, as they had in Manchuria. The largest number of Koreans in the former Soviet Union, about 200,000, live in Uzbekistan. The Russian Republic and Kazakhstan have 100,000 each, and the other Central Asian republics have the remaining 60,000.

The remaining 340,000 overseas Koreans—about 7 percent—are scattered among Canada (70,000), Australia (40,000), Europe (60,000), Southeast Asia (25,000), and New Zealand (almost 10,000). Koreans are generally known as hardworking people and have established themselves quickly. Their communities have introduced aspects of Korean life such as kimchi (Korea's spicy vegetable pickle) and the martial art taekwon do to their host countries and brought foreign culture back to Korea.

Hong-key Yoon

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KOROGHLI The epic of *Koroghli* is a cycle of oral epics found from the Balkans to Central Asia. The central hero of the cycle is called Koroghli (the son of the blind man) or Goroghli (the son of the grave), depending on whether it is told that the hero's father was blinded or that the hero was born in the grave after the death of his mother. In all versions the hero gathers a group of warriors around him with whom he performs various heroic exploits. In the versions collected from Turkish and Azerbaijani singers, the hero is a kind of minstrel outlaw who fights against the sultan or *padishah*. In the Central Asian versions (Turkmen, Uzbek, Karakalpak, Kazakh), Koroghli is depicted as a powerful ruler holding a splendid court with his group of brave retainers. This epic cycle is not only popular with the Turkic-speaking peoples but also with the Iranian-speaking Tajiks. In the various Turkic traditions, the epic is in a mixture of verse and prose, while in Tajik the epic is in verse. The epic cycle is thought to have originated in the sixteenth century, in connection with the Jalali movement in Turkey and Azerbaijan, directed against the Ottoman sultan and the Persian shah.

Karl Reichl

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KORYO KINGDOM A series of uprisings near the end of the ninth century led to the fragmentation of the declining Unified Shilla kingdom (668–935 CE). In the northern part of the Korean Peninsula, rebel leaders established the later Koguryo kingdom (901–918) with the aim of regaining the glory and vast ter-

ritory of the former Koguryo kingdom (37 BCE–668 CE). With Wang Kon (877–943) as Koguryo's leader, the Shilla king abdicated in 935, the later Paekche kingdom (892–936 CE) bowed to Koguryo's superior military force the following year. The peninsula was thus reunified. Wang Kon (King T'aejo, 877–943) married Shilla royalty, changed the kingdom's name to Koryo, derived from "Koguryo" and from which "Korea" derived, and became the first king of the Koryo dynasty (918–1392).

Koryo's northern border extended to the Yalu River. Across the border, the Liao kingdom of the Khitans conquered Parhae in 926 and then became a threat to Koryo. Liao attacked repeatedly until peace was achieved in 1022 without loss of territory. Domestically, Koryo began to prosper more rapidly to reach its height in the 1100s. From the outset, the government adopted Buddhism as the state religion, like Shilla before it. Temple construction flourished, as did Buddhist sculpture, painting, and wood-block printing, including the six thousand chapters of the *Tripitaka* (Three Collections). Inspired by vigorous Buddhist faith, the arts and scholarship flowered under the centralized Chinese-style government. The ceramics industry, which produced exquisite Koryo celadons, was particularly distinctive.

By the end of the twelfth century, however, Koryo's power began to wane. Powerful aristocratic clans and the military vied with the royal family for political power. In 1170, a revolt of the military leaders resulted in the complete overthrow of aristocratic rule, assumption of power by military leaders, and a puppet role for the throne. The powerful Mongols overran Liao to the north and became a threat to Koryo. Consecutive invasions forced the royal family to flee to Kanghwa Island, west of present-day Seoul. Hop-



The library at Haein-sa Temple in Taegu, South Korea, which houses the *Tripitaka*. (LEONARD DE SELVA/CORBIS)



KOREAN KINGDOMS AND DYNASTIES

Koguryo kingdom (37 BCE–668 CE)
Paekche kingdom (18 BCE–663 CE)
Shilla kingdom (57 BCE–935 CE)
Unified Shilla (668–935 CE)
Koryo kingdom (dynasty) (918–1392)
Choson dynasty or Yi dynasty (1392–1910)

ing for divine intervention, the king ordered a new set of Buddhist canon woodblocks produced to replace the *Tripitaka* destroyed by the Mongols. This extant replacement, the *Tripitaka Koreana*, consists of 81,137 wooden blocks of exquisite workmanship. By 1259, however, the Mongol conquest was complete. Under Mongol suzerainty, which lasted for a century, Koryo was stripped of its political freedom. Kings had to marry Mongol princesses, and Mongol officials supervised the activities of the Koryo government.

In the fourteenth century, rebellions broke out throughout China, and the Mongols were finally driven from power, which freed Koryo from Mongol domination. Koryo made efforts to reform its government but was stymied by opposing pro-Mongol and pro-Ming China factions. This was not the only problem to hinder Koryo recuperation. Most of the land was now in the hands of military officers and government officials favored by the Mongols. There was rising animosity between the Buddhist clergy and Confucian scholars, and highly organized Japanese marauders raided the country.

This was the situation in 1388 when the king dispatched an outstanding military general, a member of the rising new class of nobles of the pro-Ming faction, as part of an expedition of forty thousand men to attack the Ming. When this general, Yi Song-gye (1335–1408), reached the northern border, he turned his men around, marched into the undefended capital, and took control of the government. Four years later, General Yi (King T'aejo, reigned 1392–1398) ascended to the throne, ushering in the Chosun dynasty (1392–1910).

David E. Shaffer

See also: **Buddhism—Korea; Wang Kon; Yi Song-gye**

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KOTA KINABALU (2000 est. pop. 354,000). Kota Kinabalu ("fort of Kinabalu," formerly Jesselton) is a city on the northwest coast of Borneo Island; it lies between rain forest, mountains, and offshore coral reefs that are a national park. The city takes its name from the nearby Mount Kinabalu, at 4,101 meters the highest peak in the Malay Archipelago; Kinabalu means "sacred place of the dead," and the inhabitants of the region regard the heavily forested mountain as a holy site.

An important commercial, educational, and cultural center in eastern Malaysia, Kota Kinabalu is the capital of the state of Sabah, the second-largest state of the Federation of Malaysia. It is situated 1,600 kilometers east of Malaysia's capital, Kuala Lumpur, on the coast of the South China Sea.

In the nineteenth century, Kota Kinabalu was a small, sleepy town until it was destroyed by anti-British rebels led by Mat Salleh in 1897. In 1899, the British North Borneo Company established a colonial settlement and a deepwater seaport, naming it Jesselton, after Sir Charles Jessel, then a director of the British North Borneo Company. During World War II, the city was occupied by Japanese troops, but by the end of the war it was in ruins due to extensive Allied bombing.

In 1946, Jesselton replaced Sandakan as the capital of what then was British North Borneo, and in 1968 it was renamed Kota Kinabalu. Between the 1960s and 1990s, Kota Kinabalu grew significantly and became an important commercial center in Sabah state, with well-developed agriculture, furniture manufacturing, wood processing, and lately tourism. Kota Kinabalu has an international airport, which was recently modernized, and is connected with the rest of Borneo Island through a well-maintained network of highways and railroads.

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KOTO Originally used for court music (*Gagaku*) and called *gakuso*, the koto is a heterochord zither related to the Chinese *Zheng*, the Korean *Kayagum*, and the Vietnamese *Dan tranh*. Practiced as an independent genre known as *Tsukushi-goto* on Kyushu Island through the sixteenth century, the koto was popularized by Yatsushashi Kengyo (1614–1685) in seventeenth-century Kyoto. Today, the instrument is central to the *sokyoku* (koto instrumental) and *sankyoku* (chamber) repertoire maintained by two major schools, Yamada Ryu and Ikuta Ryu.

With a vaulted *kiri* (paulownia) wood sound box 180 to 190 centimeters long and 48 centimeters wide, the koto has thirteen strings of equal gauge, originally of silk but now more frequently of nylon. Movable bridges, most commonly of ivory or plastic, support the strings and determine pitch. The tunings are pentatonic (five-tone scale), covering two-and-a-half octaves. Three ivory picks (*tsume*) with leather rings are attached to the underside of the player's thumb and first two fingers of the right hand. The shape, rounded or square, indicates the school. The left hand manipulates pitch and sound quality. Innovations include a seventeen-string bass koto, *jushichi-gen*, introduced around 1920 by Michio Miyagi (1894–1956), who is therefore considered the father of modern koto.

Kevin Olafsson

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KOUTA *Kouta* (short song) is a type of Japanese vocal music, the most widely known form of which is a song accompanied by a *shamisen* (three-stringed lute) and performed by female musicians, usually geisha, at traditional, small-scale, Japanese social events. The term, however, has not always been so applied but has been used to denote a variety of other song forms throughout the history of Japanese music.

From the tenth to the twelfth centuries, *kouta* was generally used to indicate all manner of short or colloquial songs, in contrast to the longer, more formal pieces that were a common part of court rituals. By the sixteenth century, however, the term had become exclusively associated with a type of short song that used verses of four lines based around groups of five and seven syllables (7+5+7+5 / 7+7+7+7 / 7+7+7+5 / or 7+5+7+7); this is noted in several important *kouta* compilations of the period, including *Kangin shu* (1518) and *Soan Kouta shu* (late sixteenth century). By the Edo period (1603–1868), the term had evolved to include both certain types of unaccompanied folk songs and some of the *shamisen* songs common in the Kabuki theater of the time. In the Meiji period (1868–1912), the term became associated with the short *shamisen*-accompanied song that is common today. This type of *kouta*, generally one to three minutes in duration, is sung by a female vocalist in a small chamber known as an *ozashiki*; usually the singer accompanies herself on the *shamisen*. The instrument is plucked with the nails—unusual, in that most *shamisen* music calls for a special plectrum—and maintains the rhythm, above which the vocal melody provides subtle musical ornamentation to augment the seven-and-five-syllable verses. Although this type of *kouta* was primarily the cultural property of the geisha, it filtered into the public domain in the 1950s and 1960s. Today, although *kouta* does not attract the level of interest it once did, it represents a musical tradition that embodies a broad spectrum of Japanese emotions and images.

Terauchi Naoko

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KOZHIKODE. See **Calicut**.

KUALA LUMPUR (2002 pop. 1.5 million). Kuala Lumpur (or "KL," as it is commonly known) is the federal capital city of Malaysia. In comparative historical terms, Kuala Lumpur is a young city. Its genesis is traced to the middle of the nineteenth century, when a settlement of Chinese tin miners grew up on the muddy confluence of two rivers (Gombak and Klang); hence its place name: "Kuala Lumpur" means "muddy confluence." Although Malay and Sumatran



The Kuala Lumpur stock exchange in 2001. (MACDUFF EVERTON/CORBIS)

village settlements had existed in the vicinity, Kuala Lumpur's meteoric rise as a major trading center and, later, as the colonial and postcolonial capital, is attributed to a number of fortuitous factors. Among others, they include a boom in tin prices and the pioneering entrepreneurship of various individuals. In particular, Yap Ah Loy, a Hakka Chinese immigrant who had come to seek his fortune in the Malay States, is customarily credited with playing an influential role in Kuala Lumpur's formative stages. From 1868 to 1885, he ruled the town as the third Chinese *kapitan*.

In 1880, recognizing the growing commercial importance of Kuala Lumpur, the British relocated their state administrative capital 35 kilometers from Klang. In 1896, Kuala Lumpur was chosen to become the capital of the Federated Malay States (FMS) when this political unit (comprising Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang) was formed to standardize governmental policy and practice. This initiated the modernization of the town as the British put into place municipal planning practices and erected ornate administrative buildings. Following the Japanese occupation of British Malaya between 1939 and 1945, Kuala Lumpur became the capital of the Federation of Malaya created in 1948. When the country achieved political independence from Great Britain in 1957, Kuala Lumpur was the natural choice as the capital for the new nation.

It achieved city status in February 1972 and was ceded to the federal government by the Selangor state government in 1974. In the 1990s, its landscape and skyline were transformed dramatically. The enforced demolition of squatter colonies, the completion of the light rail transit system and the ring roads, and a construction boom in the property market are some of the driving forces of this transformation into a bustling metropolis. Emblematic of these changes is the Petronas Twin Towers, at 452 meters the tallest building in the world when it was completed in the late 1990s. Moreover, in keeping with city hall's efforts to project Kuala Lumpur as a recognizable world-class city, the motif of "The Garden City of Lights" pervades its official discourse and transformative activities.

Yeoh Seng-Guan

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KUBLAI KHAN. See **Khubilai Khan**.

KUCHING (2000 pop. 496,000). Kuching is today the capital city of Sarawak, Malaysia's largest state, situated on the island of Borneo. Pangiran Mahkota, a nobleman of Brunei and governor of Sarawak in the 1830s, founded the city. Pangiran Mahkota was in Kuching during the arrival of James Brooke (1803–1863), the first White Rajah of Sarawak. Kuching was formerly known as Sarawak, as it was located in the valley of the Sarawak River. The river, town, and country shared the appellation Sarawak until 1872. It is a common practice among the natives of Sarawak to name places and people after the river that flows there. Its name was changed to Kuching, after the name of a rivulet that flowed at the east end of the town before joining the Sarawak River, by Charles Brooke in 1872. The name, which means "cat" in the Malay language, is said to derive from a lychee-like fruit tree, called *mata kuching* (*Nephelium nalarensis*) that grew on the hill opposite the stream that ran there. Some sources say that the name originated from the Chinese word *gu chin* which means "harbor."

Kuching has a long history as a trading center, primarily for antimony (which in the Malay language is known as *serawak*) and jungle produce. Currently timber and petroleum are its main resources. Since 1963, when Sarawak became part of the Federation of Malaysia, Kuching has changed and developed into a modern city.

Shanthi Thambiah

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KUKAI (774–835), Japanese Buddhist monk. Kukai, also known as Kobo Daishi, was born in Shikoku; at age seventeen, he went to Kyoto to attend the university, where he studied Chinese classics. Renouncing the life of the scholar-noble, he became a mountain ascetic and eventually encountered the Great Sun Sutra, one of the central texts of Shingon esoteric Buddhism. This stimulated a desire to travel to China to study the deeper meaning of the sutra.

Sailing to China in 804, Kukai reached Chang'an, where he studied Sanskrit before approaching Huiguo, the master he had been seeking. Within three short months, Kukai received the formal transmission of the major esoteric teachings, becoming the dharma heir of Tantric Buddhism. When Kukai returned to Japan in 806, he brought translations of texts of esoteric Buddhism and the ritual implements necessary for transmission of the dharma lineage. Saicho, eventual founder of the Tendai school of Japanese Buddhism, initiated a correspondence with Kukai by asking to borrow certain texts which Kukai had copied in China.

Gaining patronage at the imperial court in Kyoto, Kukai spread the teachings of Shingon esoteric Buddhism, founded a monastic center on Mount Koya in 816, and was granted the prestigious Toji temple as headquarters for Shingon training. Credited with creating the kana syllabary, constructing various waterworks, and originating the eighty-eight-temple pilgrimage on Shikoku, as a scholar Kukai is remembered for his ten-volume *Ten Stages of the Development of the Mind*. It came to be believed that Kukai remains in eternal samadhi in the Okunoin, the inner shrine on Mount Koya.

James M. Vardaman, Jr.

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KULI, MAKTUM (1733?–1782?), Classical Turkmen poet. Maktum Kuli (Makhtumkuli, Maxtumquli, Magtymguly) is probably the most important Turkmen classical poet. He was born sometime in the fourth decade of the eighteenth century and died sometime in the ninth decade. His father was the famous poet Azadi. Maktum Kuli studied for three years in the *madrasah* of Khiva and during his life traveled widely in central Asia. The poet, who also used the pseudonym Firaqi (the separated one), left a rich body of work of over ten thousand verse lines. Many of his poems are of mystic inspiration, and a great part of his poetry is devoted to religious and moral themes (for example, the Last Judgment, mortality, the corruption of the rich and powerful, falseness, and deceit found among all walks of life). There are poems dealing with the poet's personal experiences with death (the death of his father and his sons, who died in childhood), love,

loneliness, and aging. Maktum Kuli also composed poetry on political and social issues in which he urges the Turkmen tribes to unite against the threat of subjugation emanating from the Persian shah, the khan of Khiva, and the emir of Bukhara.

Karl Reichl

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KULOB (2002 est. pop. 81,000). Kulob (Kulyab), the third-largest city in southwestern Tajikistan, lies in the mountains north of the Amu Dar'ya River. The city is situated in the Yaksu River valley, in the piedmont zone of the Khazaratish range, 200 kilometers southeast of Tajikistan's capital Dushanbe. In the thirteenth–fourteenth centuries Kulob was founded as a trading post on the caravan route linking the Hisor (Gissar) valley in southern Tajikistan with Persia. Kulob was part of the Bukhara khanate (1583–1740) and the successive Bukhara emirate (principality) (1747–1920).

In 1934, the city became the administrative center of the Kulyab province of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic (established in 1929). After the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union, the newly independent Tajikistan's southern provinces of Kulob and Qurghonteppa (Kurgan-Tyube before 1991) merged in 1992 into Khalton province, with the capital city in Qurghonteppa. Though deprived of its capital status, Kulob has remained the largest city of the province. The Kulob region was the hardest hit during the civil war in Tajikistan (1992–1997). Kulob is Tajikistan's key cotton-producing and industrial center.

Natalya Yu. Khan

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KUM RIVER At 401 kilometers, the Kum River is the third longest river in South Korea and the sixth longest on the Korean peninsula. It originates from a valley in Mount Shinmu east of the city of Chonju in north Cholla province in southwest Korea and weaves its way north into northern Chungchong province. It then arches west into south Chungchong just north of the city of Taejon and flows southwest back into north Cholla to its mouth at the city of Kunsan on the East China Sea. Its main tributaries are the Muju, Miho, Namdae, and Chongja Rivers. In 538, the Paekche kingdom (18 BCE–663 CE) established its last capital, Sabi (now Puyo), on the southern bank of the Kum River. Sabi served as the cultural center of Paekche until it fell to the Shilla kingdom. The Kum River basin is only 6,107 square kilometers but is currently home to roughly 4 million people. The river is navigable for 130 kilometers from its mouth, making it an important highway for transporting rice grown on the Honam plain. In 1980 and 1990, dams were built to control the seasonal floods.

Brandon Palmer

KUMAMOTO (2002 est. pop. 1.9 million). Kumamoto Prefecture is situated in the western region of Japan's island of Kyushu, where it occupies an area of 7,408 square kilometers. Its main geographical features are the active volcano Asosan, a generally mountainous south and northeast encircling a broad central plain, and part of the Amakusas, a group of about one hundred offshore islands. Kumamoto is bordered by the Amakusa Sea and by Fukuoka, Oita, Miyazaki, and Kagoshima Prefectures. Once known as Higo Province, it assumed its present name and borders in 1876.

The prefecture's capital is Kumamoto city, the Higo Province seat of power since the seventh century. In 1588, Kato Kiyomasa (1562–1611) was assigned to restore order after a long samurai uprising. In 1607, he completed Kumamoto Castle, one of Japan's most massive fortresses. The city later came under the control of the Hosokawa family and then was a Meiji era (1868–1912) military post. Today the city is home to Kumamoto University. The prefecture's other important cities are Yatsushiro, Arao, and Hitoyoshi.

Excavations of the prefecture's numerous ornamented tombs, similar to the wall-mural tombs of the Asian continent, indicate cultural exchanges during ancient times. During the Kofun period (300–710 CE), this was Kumaso tribe territory. Various warlords ruled from the late eighth century until the late six-

teenth century. In 1637, Kyushu's Shimbara uprising of discontented peasants and masterless samurai spread to the Amakusa Islands, a hiding place for persecuted Japanese Christians.

In present-day Kumamoto Prefecture, the primary economic activity is agriculture, with rice, vegetables, and fruit, particularly mandarin oranges, the chief crops. Also important are dairy and livestock herding, as well as forestry. The regional industrial base is relatively small. Visitors are drawn by the volcano Asosan and the coastal scenery of the Amakusa Islands.

E. L. S. Weber

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KUMAR, DILIP (b. 1922), Indian cinema actor. Yusuf Khan (screen name Dilip Kumar) was born in Peshawar. He came to Pune after a quarrel with his father and worked as an assistant in the army canteen. Devika Rani, the actress, introduced him into the world of Indian cinema. His acting career began with the movie *Jwar Bhatta* in 1944. The "tragedy king of the Hindi cinema" has left an indelible impression on the public mind for his roles in *Aan*, *Andaz*, *Dag*, *Devdas*, *Ganga Jamuna*, *Karma*, *Kobinor*, *Madbumati*, *Mughal-e-Azam*, *Naya Daur*, *Paigam*, *Ram aur Shyam*, *Saudagar*, and *Shakti*. His penetrating eyes, cultured voice, and histrionic talent have created a special niche in the annals of Indian cinema. In 1967, he married the actress Saira Banu.

He was awarded the coveted Dadasaheb Phalke award. The Pakistani government awarded him the *Nishan-e-Imitiaz*, the national award of excellence. This generated a lot of controversy because of the political animosity between India and Pakistan; Indian political parties like Shiva Sena told Kumar to return the award, but he refused. Kumar preferred to act in India and declined an offer to work in David Lean's *Lawrence of Arabia*. He has a great passion for soccer. Although Hindu communal organizations have accused him of supporting Pakistan, soft-spoken Dilip Kumar by sheer charisma and contribution to Hindi cinema has been one of India's most popular actors.

Patit Paban Mishra

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KUNAEV, DINMUKHAMED (1911–1993), Kazakh Communist leader. Born in the rural region around Alma-Ata (now Almaty), Dinmukhamed Akhmedovich Kunaev worked his way through the ranks of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CPKaz). After World War II, he assumed a leadership role in the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh Socialist Soviet Republic. In the late 1950s, Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971), the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), initiated an agricultural reform program for northern Kazakhstan. The Virgin Lands campaign, as it was called, met with some initial failures, resulting in the sacking of several top Kazakh officials. In December 1959, Kunaev was appointed first secretary of the CPKaz and placed in charge of the agricultural reform program. However, by March 1962, Kunaev was blamed for continued shortcomings and was eventually removed from office in December 1962. Khrushchev's own ouster in October 1964 gave new life to Kunaev's career, and the Kazakh was reappointed by the new general secretary, Leonid Brezhnev (1906–1982), to be the CPKaz first secretary. In the early 1970s, Kunaev was elevated to full membership in the CPSU Politburo, the primary decisionmaking organization of the Soviet Union, thus becoming one of the most powerful Central Asian figures in the Soviet Union.

With the death of Brezhnev in 1982, and the eventual accession of Mikhail Gorbachev (b. 1931) in March 1985, Kunaev's fortunes waned. Gorbachev considered Kunaev to be representative of the corrupt, ossified CPSU old guard and removed him from office in December 1986. Gorbachev replaced Kunaev with an ethnic Russian, Gennadiy Kolbin (b. 1927), prompting ethnic riots in Alma-Ata. Kolbin's eventual successor, Nursultan Nazarbaev (b. 1940), partially rehabilitated Kunaev in the early 1990s, although the elder statesman never returned to active politics again. Dinmukhamed Kunaev died in 1993, after Kazakhstan's independence.

Roger D. Kangas

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KUNANBAEV, ABAI (1845–1904), Kazakh writer, poet, lyricist, social philosopher. Born in Kazakhstan in Semey province, Abai Kunanbaev (Ibragim Qunanbaiuly) was educated at home and then sent to a *medressa* (Muslim religious school) where he learned Arabic and Persian and became acquainted with Eastern literature and poetry. His father ordered him home to train as his successor as clan chieftain, but appalled by what he regarded as his father's autocratic and brutal leadership, Kunanbaev broke with his family and at the age of twenty-eight returned to his studies in Semey city. While there, he actively participated in the city's intellectual life, studied Russian and Western classics by Pushkin, Goethe, and Byron, among others, and translated many of them for the first time into Kazakh. He also began writing poetry and prose and reinterpreted Krylov's Russian fables to suit Kazakh cultural sensibilities.

Kunanbaev's works were influenced by his belief in human reason. He was attracted to Western Enlightenment thinking and wove criticism of Kazakh culture into his works, most notably in his collection of poems called *Qarasoẓder* (often translated as the Book of Words). He criticized Russian colonial policies and encouraged his fellow Kazakhs to embrace education and literacy to escape from colonial oppression.

Most scholars consider Kunanbaev the first Kazakh to use poetry and prose to broaden the Kazakh literary milieu and to express social and political ideas designed to arouse the Kazakh nation. His writings, first published five years after his death and many times afterward, deeply influenced early-twentieth-century Kazakh activists. His life has been retold in films, operas, and novels, the best known being Auezov's *Abai zholı* (The Path of Abai).

Steven Sabol

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KUNASHIRO ISLAND (2000 est. pop. 4,100). Kunashiro Island (or Kunashir, as the Russians know it) is a long, narrow volcanic island located approximately

twenty kilometers from the eastern coast of the Japanese prefecture of Hokkaido. It is separated from this larger island by the Nemuro Kaikyo. It is 122 kilometers in length and ranges from 6.3 to 32 kilometers in width, with a total area of 1,500 square kilometers. The highest volcano is the Mont Chacha (Tiatia), which is 1,822 meters high.

The mineral deposits found on the island are tin, zinc, lead, copper, nickel, sulfur, and metallic sulfides. It has a maritime climate with an annual average temperature of 7°C. It is also characterized by abundant precipitation throughout almost the entire year, which encourages the island's rich flora. The annual average precipitation is 110 centimeters. Forestry, mainly of conifers, and mining were an important part of the island's economy until World War II. Located on the southwestern side of the island are the main fishing ports of Tomari (Golovnino) and Furukamappu (Yuzhno-Kuril'sk). The fishing products characterizing Kunashiro are green and brown kelp, salmon, trout, king crab, and scallop. Livestock farming prospered before World War II, but nowadays people do it as their second activity. The harsh weather and poor infrastructure make farming very difficult. The common practice is to cultivate small gardens for family consumption.

The Ainu people inhabited the island from the beginning of 1600s. The island was occupied by the Soviet Union in August 1945. At that time, approximately 7,000 Japanese people resided there. As of 2001, Kunashiro Island was still disputed territory, under the administration of the Russian Federation but claimed by Japan.

Nathalie Cavasin

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KUNLUN MOUNTAINS The Kunlun Mountains are a range that is about 2,300 kilometers long and that follows an east-west direction on the northwestern border of the Tibetan Plateau. The mountain

range stretches from the Pamir Highlands in Central Asia to central China, where it forks out into three ranges, the Altun Shan range, the Arkatag mountains, and the Hoh Xil mountains. The Kunlun range constitutes the border between Tibet and the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and extends into Qinghai Province. The width of the range differs in various locations but seldom exceeds 200 kilometers. The height of the mountains varies between 4,000 and 7,000 meters, and in the higher western part, where the range is composed of three parallel ridges, peaks like Kongur and Muztag reach over 7,700 meters. The southern slopes fade into the 1,500-meter lower Tibetan Plateau, while the northern slopes are extremely steep. On the Tibet-Xinjiang border, the Kunlun range has a glaciated area of about 4,000 square kilometers, and the glacial streams of the northern slopes are important for the oases in the Taklimakan desert. The area is mainly populated by pastoral nomads whose economy is based on yak, sheep, goats, and, to a lesser extent, cattle. There is only a little farming in the region.

Bent Nielsen

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KUOMINTANG. See **Guomindang.**

KURDS The Kurds are known in the West as the victims of both Saddam Hussein's oppression and the ethnic cleansing practices of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), which warred against the Partyia Kakaran Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK). The Kurds have long lived in contiguous regions that they refer to as Kurdistan, that is, "The Land of the Kurds," now largely within the confines of four Middle Eastern countries: Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. A half million Kurds also live in former countries of the Soviet Union, especially in Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The Kurds in Turkey number approximately 15 million and make up 21 percent of the population. Half of the Kurdish population lives in fourteen predominantly Kurdish provinces of the southeast; the other

half lives in the large cities of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir and in the western provinces. From 1980 to 2000, some 3 million Kurds fled from the southeast and east to the western provinces in the wake of Turkish persecution. Iran has the second-largest Kurdish population; Kurds number around six and a half million, or 10 percent of the population, and live predominantly in the provinces of West Azerbaijan, Ardalan, and Bakhtaran (formerly Kermanshah). Hundreds of thousands of Kurds also live elsewhere in Iran, especially in the cities of Tabriz, Tehran, Isfahan, and Shiraz.

In 2000, Iraq's Kurdish population was estimated at approximately 4 million, or 22 percent of the population. From 1920 to 1975, Kurds lived predominantly in the provinces of Mosul, Kirkuk, Arbil, Sulaymaniya, and Diyala. In 1975, eighteen governorates replaced the provinces, and three of them—Sulaymaniya, Dohuk, and Arbil—formed the Autonomous Kurdish Region. In 1992, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) was created. In 2000, more than a million Kurds lived in regions of Iraq outside the control of the KRG, especially in Baghdad, which had a population of a half million. In Syria more than a million Kurds live predominantly in the region along the border with Turkey. The cities of Damascus, Aleppo, Hims, and Hama all have Kurdish populations.

Language

The Kurdish language belongs to the Iranian language group and hence is part of the Indo-European family. In Turkey, Kurds speak the northwestern dialect called Kurmanji. There are also some 4 million Zazaki (Dimili) speakers; most Zazaki speakers speak Kurmanji as well. Many Kurds in Turkey speak only Turkish. In Iran, Kurds speak four Sorani subdialects. In Iraq, Kurds speak Kurmanji and subdialects of Sorani.

History

Wherever they reside in the Middle East, educated Kurds consider themselves an ancient people associated with the Urartian (thirteenth through seventh centuries BCE), Medes (625–550 BCE), and Neo-Babylonian (612–539 BCE) cultures. Many Kurds think they were ancestors of the Medes, although scholarly evidence does not support this claim. Xenophon (writing c. 401–400 BCE) first used the word *Karduchoi* to describe a people living in Bohtan, the region between Lake Van and the present-day border between Turkey and Iraq. Many scholars think the Karduchoi were ancestors of the Kurds.

Starting in the 640s, historians of the Arab conquests gave ample coverage to the Kurds and their



A Kurd woman votes in the 3 February 2000 election in the city of Suleimaniyeh in northern Iraq. (AFP/CORBIS)

dynasties, the most important of which included the Shaddids (951–1075), Hansanwayhids (959–1095), Marwanids (984–1083), Annazids (991–1117), Barrids (1101–1312), Zangids (1127–1250), Kurkbroids (1144–1232), and Ardalans (1168–1861). Salah ad-Din, the Saladin of the West, who established the Ayyubid dynasty (1169–1260), was a Kurd. Many Kurdish principalities were destroyed by the Seljuk invasions (1055–1258). During the Seljuk period the term *Kurdistan* first appeared in Arabic texts.

The Ottoman (1300–1923), Safavid (1501–1724), and Qajar (1795–1925) Periods From the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries, the Ottoman, Safavid, and Qajar empires dominated the Kurds. After the battle of Chaldiran in 1514, the Kurds and Kurdistan acted as bulwarks for the Ottomans against the Safavid Shi'is for the next four centuries. The semiautonomous Kurdish emirates in Turkey and Iraq were crushed during the Ottoman reform period (1839–1876), and the hereditary rulers (emirs, *pirs*) were replaced by religious leaders called *shaykhs*. This change resulted in a new governance in Kurdistan in which religious persons, primarily leaders of the Naqsbandi *tarikqat* (Muslim Brotherhood), exercised political authority.

Some historians consider a Naqsbandi *shaykh*, 'Ubaydallah of Nehri (d. 1883), to be the leader of the first rebellion in which Kurds demanded political autonomy. Further Kurdish attempts to gain greater political autonomy occurred in the early 1890s. Kurds participated in the ethnic cleansing of Armenians from the 1890s through the genocide of 1915, and many grew wealthy and powerful as a result of acquiring abandoned Armenian lands. After the creation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the new Turkish government left powerful Kurdish leaders (*aghbas*) in control

of much of Kurdistan in return for their loyalty to the state. Nevertheless, Kurds launched the large rebellions of Shaykh Said (1925), Ararat (1930), and Dersim (1937–1938), which were met with brutal suppression. Not until the 1980s under the banner of the PKK did the Kurds of Turkey again commence armed conflict with the state. War raged from 1984 to 2000; over forty thousand people, mostly Kurds, were killed; thirty-six hundred villages and hamlets were destroyed, and some two million Kurds were forced to flee to the large towns of Kurdistan in Turkey's eastern provinces. The capture of the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in February 1999, and his sentencing to death on 29 June, seemed to indicate that the armed conflict, at least on the PKK's part, was ending. As of 2000, however, the death sentence had not been carried out. The challenge of Kurdish nationalism remained the most significant problem confronting the Turkish state.

The Kurds in Iran

In Iran, the Kurds became increasingly separate from Kurds in the Ottoman empire after the treaty of Zuhab in 1639. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Kurds moved throughout Iran as they followed their leaders, who were dispersed by order of the ruling powers. The division and control of Kurdistan remained a central focus of the Ottomans and Iranians in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As in Turkey, Iran's main objective after 1921 was to crush ethnic groups, principally the Kurds.

The Kurds of Iran, under the leadership of Komala-e Zhian-e Kurdistan (Committee for the Resurrection of Kurdistan), with the aid of the Soviet Union, succeeded in establishing the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, which lasted from 23 December 1945 to 17 January 1946. After the Soviet Union withdrew its support, the Iranian government crushed the Republic. Nevertheless, the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad has been a symbol of hope for all Kurds who still work and fight for an independent Kurdistan.

After the assumption of power by the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, warfare continued between the Islamic Republic and the Kurds until the end of the century. From the inception of the Islamic Republic to 2000, Kurdish leaders negotiated with Tehran for political autonomy. Their efforts received a setback when the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Abulrahman Qassemou, was assassinated by Islamic Republic agents in 1989 in Vienna, where he had gone to negotiate with Islamic Republic officials. Relationships between Tehran and the Kurds soured again when Islamic Republic officials assassinated Sadegh Sharafkhani,

the leader and Secretary-General of the KDPI, and six companions in Berlin in 1992. The election of Mohammad Khatami in August 1997 resulted in promises of economic aid, but there was little movement on the Kurds' demands for political autonomy.

The Kurds in Iraq

In Iraq, the Kurds played a crucial role in the establishment of the modern state. After World War I, Kurds were a majority of the population in the province allocated to Iraq under British mandate by the 5 June 1926 treaty between Turkey, Iraq, and Britain. The British wanted to use the Kurds to control the Saudi Arabian-originated Hashemite dynasty that the British installed in Iraq in 1921 to head the Sunni Arab government in Baghdad. From 1926 to 1958, the Iraq government chafed against this arrangement. After the Iraqi revolution in 1958 through the remainder of the twentieth century, there was intermittent war between Baghdad and the Kurds.

After Shaykh Mahmud, leader of the first Kurdish rebellion, Molla Mustafa Barzani was the most important leader of the Kurdish nationalist movement in southern Kurdistan. He was leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) from its inception in the 1930s to his death on 1 March 1979. Leadership then went to Molla Mustafa's two sons, Ma'sud and Idris. After the death of Idris in 1987, Ma'sud took the reins of power and still held them in 2000.

During the 1991 Gulf War, Allied forces led by the United States created a safe haven in part of northern Iraq and extended air cover for the entire region above the thirty-sixth parallel. As a result, from 1992 onward, much of Kurdistan Iraq in the governorates of Dohuk, Arbil, and Sulaymaniya was controlled by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). After 1992, both the leaders of the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) took pains to stress that the Kurds in northern Iraq did not demand independence, but rather political autonomy in the state of Iraq. Whether the KRG in southern Kurdistan could maintain its de facto independence well into the twenty-first century remained unclear in 2000, but Kurds throughout Kurdistan and in the diaspora hoped that the Kurdish entity in southern Kurdistan and northern Iraq would mature into an independent state.

The Kurds in Syria

The international border delimited between Turkey and Syria in 1921 left several hundred thousand Kurds in Syria. From 1930 to the 1980s, Kurds, like many other ethnic groups in Syria, were beset with

many problems, which made it difficult for them to organize against the government. In the 1980s, Kurds in Syria once again began to play a major role in the Kurdish national movements. Late in 1979, just before the 1980 military coup in Turkey, Abdullah Ocalan escaped to Syria where for the next twenty years he received the support of the Syrian government and of the Kurds of Syria in his war against the Turkish government. During this period, up to 20 percent of the PKK guerrillas fighting in Turkey were Kurds from Syria. Turkey threatened to invade Syria in October 1998 if it did not evict Ocalan and 400 PKK fighters from Syria. Ocalan, as mentioned earlier, was captured in 1999. The eviction of Ocalan and the PKK from Syria reduced Syria's ability to use the PKK "card" against Turkey to compel Ankara to increase the downflow of Euphrates river water from Turkey to Syria, as did Turkey's military and intelligence alliance with Israel (officially announced in early 1996). This alliance, in turn, compelled Syria to enter into negotiations with Israel in early 2000, which demonstrated the paramount role of the Kurdish question in the pursuit of peace in the Middle East.

Robert Olson

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KURMANJAN DATKA (1811–1907), leader of the Alay mountain Kyrgyz. Kurmanjan Datka exer-

cised skilled governance and diplomacy during the turbulent period when control over the southern Kyrgyz passed from the collapsing khanate of Quqon to expanding czarist Russia. Born into an ordinary family of the Kyrgyz Mungush tribe east of Osh, Kurmanjan was strong-willed and independent. She divorced her first husband in 1832 and married Alimbek, a Quqon governor, assisting him in his work until his murder in 1861. In recognition of her influence over the Alay Kyrgyz, in 1863 the emir of Bukhara, and later Khan Khudayar of Khiva, awarded Kurmanjan the high title *dadkbwab* (Kyrgyz: *datka*).

In 1876, with the Quqon khanate fallen to Russian forces and most of the Kyrgyz withdrawn to secure mountain pastures, Kurmanjan Datka negotiated with General Skobelev for the safety of her people and persuaded the Kyrgyz to submit peacefully to Russia. Called "Queen of the Alay," she governed her people as a loyal Russian subject for another three decades and received the rank of colonel. She was a fine orator and a wise judge who was much sought after for settling disputes. Kurmanjan Datka continued to live as a nomad in the Alay mountains, riding on horseback and living in felt tents, until her death at age ninety-six. She is buried in Osh, Kyrgyzstan.

D. Prior

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KUROKAWA KISHO (b. 1934), Japanese architect. Kisho "Noriaki" Kurokawa's stature was established early. By 1959, he had published a study of industrial housing in the Soviet Union. (Over three dozen books in Japanese and a dozen in English followed.) Kurokawa became known globally the following year as one of the founders of Metabolism, a postwar movement concerned with exploiting technological advances in a new, adaptable architecture. His 1970 Nakagin Capsule Building in Tokyo confirmed him among Japan's leading architects. In the building, rooms made from shipping containers ("capsules") were attached to a fixed core and were theoretically easily removed or reconfigured.

Kurokawa's Toshiba IHI Pavilion for Expo '70, the first modern international architecture exposition held

in Asia, was one of the earliest buildings designed using computers, reflecting his ongoing fascination with technology. Throughout his career, however, he countered the rational with a love of poetry and philosophy. In the 1980s, Kurokawa brought these approaches together in his theory of Symbiosis—a postmodern challenge to all architects to look beyond Western precedents. Kurokawa has embraced regional culture over sentimental traditionalism, in projects ranging from studies of the physical character of streets to nuanced interpretations of *sukiya*, the "artless simplicity" of teahouse architecture.

Kurokawa's learned approach brought him commissions from the art world, including highly regarded museums in Hiroshima, Nagoya, Wakayama, Belgium, and Holland. The diversity of his practice is demonstrated by his proposal for revitalizing Tokyo and by his designs for ecological cities in Japan and China. The 1998 Kuala Lumpur Airport summarizes Kurokawa's strengths: finely detailed, high tech, and framing lush natural spaces.

Dana Buntrock

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KUTAHYA (2002 province pop. 714,000; 2002 city pop. 181,000). Kutahya, the capital of the province of Kutahya, on the Porsuk River in northwestern Turkey, was once the largest city of ancient Phrygia, when it was known as Cotyaeum, city of Cotys or Cybele. After the Battle of Manzikert (1071) it fell under Seljuk rule. Kutahya was later captured by the Greeks, recaptured by the Seljuk ruler Kilic Arslan II (1155–1192) in 1183, lost to the Byzantines, and retaken by the Seljuks in 1233–1234. In the fourteenth century, Kutahya was transferred to the Ottomans when Ottoman Sultan Yildirim Bayezid (1389–1402) married Dewlet Khatun, daughter of Suleyman Shah Celebi (c. 1363–1398) of the kingdom of Germiyan-oghullari. After the Mongols defeated the Ottomans in 1402, Timur (Tamerlane) made his son governor. Kutahya fell to the Karamanids in 1411 but was recaptured by the Yakub Germiyani, ruler of the Germiyan-oghullari kingdom, with help from

the Ottomans. When Yakub died in 1429, he left Kutahya to Ottoman sultan Murad II (1421–1451).

Kutahya flourished under the Ottomans. Sultan Selim I (1512–1520) brought Persian and Armenian potters from Tabriz to Kutahya after capturing Persia in 1514, and Kutahya acquired a reputation for ceramic tiles rivaling those of Iznik. Today Kutahya continues to produce ceramic tiles, which are considered its greatest tourist attraction.

T. Isikozlu–E.F. Isikozlu

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KWANGJU (1999 pop. 1.3 million). Kwangju is the capital of South Cholla Province (Cholla namdo) in southwestern Republic of Korea (South Korea). It has a total area of 744.22 square kilometers. The administratively autonomous Kwangju Metropolitan City, however, occupies only 478.37 square kilometers, with the rest of the area divided among Changsong, Tamyang, and Hwasun counties and the city of Naju.

Kwangju is located in the fertile basin of the Kungnak River (a tributary of the Yongsan River). Kwangju is also surrounded by six mountains. Populated since prehistoric times, Kwangju was a part of the Paekche (18 BCE–663 CE) and Later Paekche (892–936) kingdoms during the Three Kingdoms period. In between, it was a part of the Later Shilla Kingdom (668–892). Prior to 940, the region was also known as Mujin or Muju.

Some of the key industries based in Kwangju are telecommunications and information technology; material, electrical, biotechnology, and environmental engineering; energy; manufacturing; export; and service sectors.

Kwangju has been the site of two historic uprisings. In 1929, students rose up against the Japanese colonization of Korea (1910–1945). In 1980, civilians protested Chun Doo Hwan's 1979 coup and ensuing events, such as the imprisonment of dissident Kim Dae Jung.

Jennifer Jung-Kim

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KWANGJU UPRISING One of the darkest moments in the history of South Korea, the Kwangju Uprising has had a long-lasting impact on domestic Korean politics. What began as a mass protest by students and residents of the city of Kwangju in South Cholla Province against indiscriminate attacks by South Korean Special Armed Forces on students and bystanders led to full-scale battle between students and the Special Armed Forces units from 18 to 27 May 1980.

In the months following the assassination of President Park Chun Hee in October 1979, opposition politicians and students increasingly demanded the lifting of martial law and the setting of a date for presidential elections. As the number of student-led protests grew nationwide, Major General Chun Doo Hwan ordered the arrest of the student leaders as well as leading opposition political figures, including the "three Kims" (Kim Dae Jung, Kim Young Sam, and Kim Jong Il), instituted full martial law, and closed the National Assembly at bayonet point. The army then moved in and occupied college campuses, closing all universities.

Following the announcement of martial law, government soldiers arrested Kim Dae Jung and his closest political advisers. The news of the arrest of Kim

Dae Jung ignited student-led demonstrations in Kim's hometown of Kwangju, and as a result, clashes between students and riot police broke out. Special Armed Forces arrived to help subdue the demonstrators; however, following three days of indiscriminate attacks on protesters and residents that left hundreds either injured or dead, residents of Kwangju seized military vehicles and weapons from munitions depots and fought a pitched battle with the Special Armed Forces in the city center that left hundreds, perhaps thousands, wounded or dead. Unable to control the demonstrators, the Special Armed Forces units withdrew to the outskirts of Kwangju. The following day thirty thousand residents gathered in front of the provincial administration building to support the demands of the students that the government release those in detention, that troops withdraw from Kwangju, and that compensation be paid to the families of the dead and wounded. After a four-day standoff, the army with support of Special Armed Forces units moved back into Kwangju with tanks and percussion bombs to reimpose martial law. In the ensuing action, the remaining student demonstrators were either captured or killed.

In succeeding years citizens of Cholla Province voiced their opposition to Presidents Chun Doo Hwan and Roh



As the uprising is put down by South Korean soldiers, students are tied together and led away on 27 May 1980 in Kwangju. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

Tae Woo for their role in authorizing the attack on Kwangju and its citizens. The Korean student movement maintained a fervent anti-American bias, believing that the United States either supported or acquiesced to the massacre of students and residents of Kwangju.

Keith Leitich

See also: **Chun Doo Hwan; Kim Dae Jung; Kwangju; Roh Tae Woo**

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KYE There has long been a history of communal cooperation for mutual benefit among the villages and townships of Korea. This was once most apparent in reciprocal labor arrangements (*pumassi*) at key points

in the planting, harvesting, and kimchi-making seasons. It was also demonstrated in the organized groups of friends, family, and acquaintances who gathered together on a regular basis to share a subject of interest, invest money, or prepare for some future event such as a wedding, funeral, or parent's birthday party or funeral. These meeting groups were loosely known as *kye*. Usually such a group would designate a leader, a set number of members, and a fee payable at each meeting to cover costs and expenses. *Kye* mainly provided an essential venue for socializing and also for a limited form of social welfare, but some were set up with the aim of investing or mobilizing a large amount of capital. The most common way in which this was achieved was through the creation of a rotating credit association. Every month all the members would be expected to contribute a set amount of money or rice to the *kye*, the sum of which was given to one of the members. The *kye* would then continue until all the members had received a monthly total to spend as they chose.

In the cities and urban landscapes of modern Korea, many of the more traditional forms of social and community organization have become outdated. In



A DEATH KYE DOCUMENT

This is a translation of a death kye document of 1651 kept in Puan County in North Cholla province. It outlined the rules of a local funeral kye started in 1651.

If a member's parents die, then the other members will collect 10 hama of rice between them and give to the member.

If a member doesn't attend the regular kye meeting, he has to pay 5 dwae (4.5 kg) of rice.

The kye shall have a leader and the leadership shall rotate through the members with a new leader every year.

There will be a manager who takes care of the rice. If he is careless in his duty he will be receive 50 strokes on his buttocks with a wooden stick.

If a member creates a bad relationship with the other members he will receive 5 mal (45 kg) of rice and ejected from the kye.

If one of the member's family members die, the member will receive 1 pil of cloth.

If a member needs to discuss anything, they can discuss it with the leader and reach a decision with him about funeral arrangements, etc.

contrast, perhaps because of its flexibility and the social, economic, and networking opportunities it offers, the *kye* has both adapted and flourished during the painful upheavals of urbanization and modernization. In particular, socially premised *kye* are often portrayed as being essential for the maintenance of geographically dispersed networks of kin, friends, classmates, and business associates. The *kye* remains a fundamental and deeply embedded institution within Korean society.

David Prendergast

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KYOIKU MAMA *Kyoiku* mama (education mama) is a stereotypical term referring to Japanese mothers who go to extraordinary lengths to develop their children's aptitude (particularly boys) and place them on the best educational track directed toward entry into a top-ranked university and subsequent employment with a prestigious company. Depicted as having sacrificed both career and personal aspirations, these mothers devote themselves to their children's education, staying at home full time to make lunches, clean and mend school uniforms, and help their children prepare for the following day's lessons at school. They also arrange for supplemental lessons at cram schools or private tutoring, continually urging their children to study hard and improve their academic performance. During important examination periods, other activity in the home is kept to a minimum in order to create a quiet place to study. As children study late into the evenings, mothers prepare and deliver snacks to them to symbolically show support and mutual involvement. Ultimately, if their children do well at school, the devotion and efforts of these mothers are deemed successful. Extreme versions of this stereotype portray zealous and intensely competitive mothers preparing infant children for entrance examinations to prestigious preschools or kindergartens that offer students an inside track to an affiliated high-ranking university.

Dawn Grimes-MacLellan

See also: **Japan, Education System**

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KYONGGI PROVINCE (1999 pop. 9 million). Kyonggi Province (Kyonggido), in the northwest region of South Korea (Republic of Korea), has an area of 10,188 square kilometers. The province borders part of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) to the north and the Yellow Sea to the west. Seoul (the nation's capital) and Incheon (a port city) are both located within Kyonggi Province, but the two cities are independent administrative units and thus are autonomous from Kyonggi.

Kyonggi Province is composed of twenty-three cities and eight counties (*kun*). The region is heavily populated and industrialized because of its proximity to Seoul. The satellite cities of Songnam, Anyang, Suwon, and Puchon are also busy urban centers.

Seoul (formerly Hanyang) was the capital of the Choson dynasty (1392–1910); as a result, Kyonggi is home to many historical points of interest, such as Kanghwa Island, where the royal court fled during the Mongol invasions. Kanghwa's fortress later protected Korea's west coast from foreign incursions during the nineteenth century. Another historic site is Panmunjom, in the DMZ; since the Korean War (1950–1953), Panmunjom has been the site of ongoing negotiations and peace talks between North and South Korea.

There are also numerous ski resorts, golf courses, and fishing lakes for sports enthusiasts. The province is home to three major theme parks, including the Korean Folk Village (Minsokch'on), where visitors can observe traditional Korean folk customs.

Manufacturing, automotive parts, aircraft, electronics, medical equipment, and satellite communications are among the diverse industries in Kyonggi Province. The province is also important agriculturally, most notably for rice, fruits, beef, and poultry. Kyonggi's coastline hosts fisheries and salt production. Kyonggi is also home to many artisans who carry on centuries-old traditional methods of producing pottery; the province has abundant clay sources.


Jennifer Jung-Kim

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KYOTO (2002 est. pop. 1.5 million). Located in southern Kyoto Prefecture in central Honshu, 50 kilometers northeast of the industrial port of Osaka, Kyoto was the residence of the Japanese emperor and imperial court from 794 to 1868. Originally named Heian-kyo ("capital of tranquillity and peace"), the city was constructed in the 790s after a fire destroyed much of the former capital city at Nara. During later centuries the city was also called Saikyo ("western capital") to distinguish it from the shogun's capitals at Kamakura and Edo (Tokyo). In 1997 Kyoto's population was 1.5 million, making it the seventh-largest urban center in Japan, after Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, Nagoya, Sapporo, and Kobe.

The original plan for the city of Kyoto was, like the earlier capital at Nara, modeled after Changan—the capital of the Tang dynasty (618–907) in China. The city was laid out on a grid pattern 23.4 square kilometers in area. During the Kamakura period (1185–1333), the city lost some of its importance as political and military power shifted to the Minamoto shogun's headquarters at Kamakura. During the Muromachi period (1333–1573), Kyoto regained some of its status, as both the shogun and the emperor took up residence in the city. It was during this period that many of the city's great temples were constructed, including the Nanzenji, Kinkakuji (Temple of the Golden Pavilion), and Ginkakuji (Temple of the Silver Pavilion). With the victory of Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543–1616) at



**KYOTO—WORLD
HERITAGE SITE**

Parts of Kyoto, the capital of imperial Japan between 794 and 1868 CE, were designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1994. The development of wooden architecture and traditional gardens over one thousand years of Japanese history is vividly presented in Kyoto.

the battle of Sekigahara in 1600, the seat of political power was again moved, as the new shogun established his capital at Edo in eastern Honshu. During the Tokugawa period (1600/1603–1868), Kyoto retained some of its stature because of the presence of Nijo Castle—a temporary residence for the shogun during his visits to the imperial court and inspection tours of central Japan. The city also continued to grow as an artistic and religious center during this time.

After the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the transfer of the nation's symbolic and administrative governance to Tokyo, Kyoto was forced to remake itself, emerging as one of the most modern cities of the Meiji period (1868–1912); it claimed the first streetcars in Japan, as well as a thriving industrial quarter. Spared



The entrance to the Fushimi-Inari Shinto Shrine, one of many shrines and temples in the city of Kyoto. (DAVID SAMUEL ROBBINS/CORBIS)

by U.S. bombers during World War II, Kyoto survived the conflict to become an important center of higher education and culture, and a major transportation hub. While tourism, finance, and education are the leading industries in Kyoto, the city is also home to light industry and numerous producers of traditional Japanese products, including porcelain, textiles, and works of art. The city also boasts numerous museums, Buddhist and Shinto temples, and historic sites, making it an important center in the preservation of traditional Japanese culture.

Robert John Perrins

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KYRGYZ The Kyrgyz are a largely Muslim people of Turko-Mongol origins whose language, Kyrgyz, is a member of the central, or Kipchak, branch of the Turkic linguistic group. The Kyrgyz language is divided into northern and southern dialects, and there are also historical and cultural differences between northern and southern Kyrgyz people. In 2001, about 2.5 million Kyrgyz lived in the central Asian nation of Kyrgyzstan, although Kyrgyz also inhabit Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, northwestern China, and other nations. Traditionally pastoral nomads, some Kyrgyz live in the steppe and others live at the edges of mountains. Many other contemporary Kyrgyz are city dwellers.

History

Kyrgyz have been divided into clans for many centuries. The word "Kyrgyz" derives from the Turkic words *kyrk* (forty) and *yz* (clans). Clan membership is determined by paternal ancestry. Kyrgyz tribes settled in the area of Kyrgyzstan between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries. Some of the early Kyrgyz were traders along the Silk Road, and others were farmers and herders. Many were forced into Tajikistan by the Oirat Mongols in 1685.

The Uzbeks' khanate of Quqon ruled the Kyrgyz during much of the nineteenth century. During the

1860s, many Kyrgyz allied with the Russian empire against the khanate of Quqon. By 1876, most of the territory of present-day Kyrgyzstan had been taken by the Russian czar. Many Russians and Ukrainians came to settle in Kyrgyzstan. The new Slavic immigrants were given prime farmland at the expense of the Kyrgyz, who were driven from the lowlands into higher terrain where the land is less suitable for herding and farming. Mining and manufacturing industries also came to Kyrgyzstan during the czarist period. Some Kyrgyz migrated to Afghanistan and Tajikistan.

In 1916, the Kyrgyz revolted against Russian rule, but the Russians retaliated with great force, and many Kyrgyz fled to China to escape repression. Czarist rule came to an end in 1917, but Russian domination did not. On 14 October 1924, the Soviets created the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region, which was soon renamed the Kyrgyz Autonomous Republic. The Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic was established on 5 December 1936.

Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin (1879–1953) ordered the destruction of many animal herds and forced the Kyrgyz to collectivize their farms, which changed the Kyrgyz lifestyle from nomadic to more settled and caused widespread famine. Another consequence of Soviet rule over the Kyrgyz was the dramatic growth in literacy. Prior to 1917, most Kyrgyz schools were *madrasabs* (Islamic religious schools), and almost all Kyrgyz were illiterate. But after the founding of the Soviet Union, all religious schools were forcibly closed, and children were required to attend public schools. This led to almost universal literacy and exposed the Kyrgyz people to new ideas as the Kyrgyz became familiar with the Russian language, Cyrillic alphabet, and Russian culture.

Kyrgyzstan declared its independence on 31 August 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many Kyrgyz revived their old traditions and customs, but fluency in Russian is still prevalent. The Kyrgyz forged new ties with the outside world, including Turkey, Israel, and the United States.

Poverty increased sharply among the Kyrgyz of Kyrgyzstan during the 1990s, affecting approximately 55 percent by 2000.

Traditional Culture

Nomadic Kyrgyz traditionally lived in *yurtas*, or yurts (felt tents), and although most Kyrgyz today live in more permanent structures, *yurtas* are still used to entertain guests during special events. Kyrgyz women make felt carpets called *shyrdaks* that often decorate the *yurtas*. Some of today's Kyrgyz still live a seminomadic



The "group" nature of Kyrgyz culture is demonstrated by the large number of guests at this wedding celebration in the Alaisky region of Kyrgyzstan in 1995. (JANET WISHNETSKY/CORBIS)

lifestyle, residing in *yurtas* during the summer months and returning to their permanent houses in the autumn.

Kyrgyz are known for their hospitality, offering traveling guests samples of the rich Kyrgyz cuisine. *Kymys* (in English, koumiss), a popular Kyrgyz beverage, is fermented mare's milk. Kyrgyz also drink tea, vodka, and *bozo* (a fermented millet drink). Other components of Kyrgyz cuisine include meats (especially lamb), potatoes, bread, rice, pasta, and yogurt.

For centuries, Kyrgyz have practiced the arts of storytelling and singing, and a rich heritage of oral literature accompanied by music has developed. The primary Kyrgyz folk instrument is the *komuz*, a three-stringed lute. In the years following Kyrgyzstan's independence, the three-part epic poem *Manas* emerged as a key element of Kyrgyz literature. *Manas* was preserved over the centuries by wandering bards called *manaschi*. Several versions of *Manas* have assumed written form, and *Manas* has become a major component of modern Kyrgyz identity and government ideology. Popular pastimes among Kyrgyz men include hunting with the aid of *berkut* (steppe eagles) and playing games of skill on horseback.

The extended family remains vital to rural Kyrgyz, but for many urbanized Kyrgyz the basic family unit is the nuclear family. Kyrgyz women used to be restricted to household chores (cooking, cleaning, hosting, and raising children) and crafting but now have more career opportunities.

The practice of bride stealing, in which a woman is taken (often involuntarily) by a man to be married, was common until Soviet times and has revived in recent years among rural Kyrgyz, despite the fact that it is prohibited by Kyrgyzstani law.

Religious Beliefs

The principal religions among Kyrgyz are Islam and ancient folk beliefs, including shamanism, animism, and totemism. Islam was well established among Kyrgyz by the eighteenth century. The vast majority of modern Kyrgyz are at least nominally Sunni Muslims. Islam is practiced in a relatively pure form among the southern Kyrgyz, whereas elements of shamanism and animism still persist among the northern Kyrgyz. However, some southern Kyrgyz are practitioners of Sufism, a mystical school of Islamic thought.

Under Soviet rule, Islam was officially discouraged, and atheism was encouraged. But in the mid-1980s, Islam began to grow in popularity again, and by 2001 there were over two thousand mosques in Kyrgyzstan.

Kevin Alan Brook

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KYRGYZSTAN—PROFILE (2001 est. pop. 4.8 million). Kyrgyzstan is a mountainous, landlocked central Asian country; more than half of its land area is above 2,500 meters in elevation. Kyrgyzstan borders Kazakhstan on the north, Tajikistan on the south and west, and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China on the east. Its total area is 198,500 square kilometers. High mountains whose peaks range from 4,880 to 7,200 meters, glaciers and snow, valleys, and river basins dominate the landscape, with few lowland areas. There are several mountain rivers in Kyrgyzstan and one large lake, the

Issyk-Kul. The country has a continental climate with little rainfall and hot, dry summers and low winter temperatures. Kyrgyzstan became independent of the former Soviet Union on 31 August 1991. The country's official name is the Kyrgyz Republic and its capital is Bishkek (formerly Frunze).

History

Most scholars believe the Kyrgyz people to be of mixed Mongolian, Eastern Turkic, and Kipchak descent. The formation of the Kyrgyz as a distinct ethnic group was completed in the sixteenth century, when they started migrating to modern-day Kyrgyzstan. In the seventeenth century, the Kyrgyz territory came under the control of the Mongols until the Manchus overthrew them in 1758. In the nineteenth century, the Kyrgyz lands became part of the Quqon



KYRGYZSTAN

Country name: Kyrgyz Republic
Area: 198,500 sq km
Population: 4,753,003 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 1.44% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 26.18 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 9.13 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: -2.66 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio: 0.95 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 76.5 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population: 63.46 years, male: 59.2 years, female: 67.94 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Muslim 75%, Russian Orthodox 20%, other 5%
Major languages: Kirghiz (Kyrgyz)—official language; Russian—official language
Literacy—total population: 97%, male: 99%, female: 96% (1989 est.)
Government type: republic
Capital: Bishkek
Administrative divisions: 7 oblastlar (singular—oblast) and 1 city
Independence: 31 August 1991 (from Soviet Union)
National holiday: Independence Day, 31 August (1991)
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal
GDP—real growth rate: 5.7% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita: (purchasing power parity): \$2,700 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: 51% (1997 est.)
Exports: \$482 million (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Imports: \$579 million (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Currency: Kyrgyzstani som (KGS)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Book Factbook 2001*. Retrieved 5 March 2002, from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.



khanate, Turkic rulers of a powerful kingdom in present-day eastern Uzbekistan. When the Quqon khanate started to lose power, mostly due to expanding Russian influence, the Kyrgyz people came into contact with the Russians. The Kyrgyz territory was incorporated into the Russian empire in 1876 as part of the Quqon khanate, and the region remained under the rule of czarist Russia until the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. In 1918, the territory of the Kyrgyz was included in the Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the Russian Federation. On 14 October 1924, the Kara-Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast (political subdivision) was created within the Russian Federation; in 1925 the oblast was renamed the Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast with its capital at Bishkek. Bishkek was renamed Frunze in 1925. On 1 February 1926, the Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast was raised to the status of the Kirghiz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. On 5 December 1936, the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic was established, and Kirghizia became one of the fifteen union republics of the Soviet Union. On 15 December 1990, Kyrgyzstan declared its sovereignty.

Politics and Administration

Kyrgyzstan has six oblasts, each having its own provincial capital. In the north, there are four oblasts:

Talas (capital: Talas), Chu (capital: Bishkek), Issyk-Kul (capital: Przheval'sk), and Naryn (capital: Naryn). These four administrative regions have dominated the political life of the country during the Soviet era and after independence. In the south there are two oblasts: Osh (capital: Osh) and Jalal-Abad (capital: Jalal-Abad). These two administrative regions, dominated by the fertile lands of the Fergana Valley, were politically under represented during the Soviet era.

The president of the republic, Askar Akaev (b. 1944), was elected on 28 October 1990 and started his third term of office in October 2000. The president shapes the political life of Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan has a bicameral legislative assembly, the Zhogorku Kenesh (Supreme Council). The upper chamber is the Assembly of People's Representatives, and the lower chamber is the Legislative Assembly.

Kyrgyzstan was one of the countries of central Asia most determined to realize a successful post-Soviet transition toward a democratic political order and a market economy. During the first half of the 1990s, the republic was seen as an island of democracy, because there were several different political parties and movements, such as Ashar (Mutual Help), Asaba (Banner), Erkin Kyrgyzstan (Free Kyrgyzstan), the Kyrgyz Democratic Wing, Osh Aymagy (Osh Oblast), and

Adolat (Justice). President Akaev also adhered to economic reform guidelines established by international economic organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Akaev, who was a physicist, had never been part of the Soviet party hierarchy, and as such he was distinguished from other central Asian republican leaders. However, in the latter part of the 1990s, Akaev gradually drifted to more authoritarian policies by increasing his presidential powers and putting pressure on the opposition.

Economy

The Kyrgyz economy is primarily agricultural. The agricultural sector accounts for around 30 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and employs 40 percent of the active population. The main crops are grain (wheat, barley, maize), cotton, vegetables, fruits, tobacco, sugar, and silk. Kyrgyzstan also has the world's largest natural-growth walnut forest. In addition to crops, animal husbandry is common in Kyrgyzstan. Cattle raising and sheep and horse breeding remain key agricultural activities in all areas of the republic.

Kyrgyzstan has important reserves of various minerals such as coal, mercury, uranium, zinc, lead, gold, and antimony. It has some limited oil and natural gas as well.

Kyrgyz industry accounts for about 30 percent of GDP and employs about 30 percent of the active population. With its fast-flowing rivers, Kyrgyzstan has abundant hydroelectric power. In addition to the production of electricity, mining, engineering, metalworking, light manufacturing, food and thread, and construction are other key industries.

People

The Kyrgyz people are basically rural, with their traditional occupations of agriculture and stock breeding. About 90 percent of all Kyrgyz live in Kyrgyzstan, even though Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, China, and Afghanistan have small Kyrgyz communities. The Kyrgyz make up about 56 percent of the population of the Kyrgyz Republic, followed by Russians (18 percent), Uzbeks (13 percent), Ukrainians (2 percent), Germans (1 percent), and other smaller groups (10 percent).

Kyrgyz speak a Turkic dialect called Kipchak, which belongs to the Altaic family of languages. The Kyrgyz are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school. However, Islam came to the Kyrgyz at a relatively late date; their widespread conversion dates only from the second half of the seventeenth century. In Kyrgyz society, Islam is mixed with some of the pre-Islamic practices and beliefs of shamanism. Furthermore, loyalties at the level

of tribe and clan are still important in the private and public lives of the Kyrgyz people. There are three clan groupings, or wings, in Kyrgyzstan: the *sol* (left wing) is in the north and west; the *ong* (right wing) and *ichk-ilik* (insider) are in the north. A Kyrgyz belongs to one of these groups and then to a particular tribe.

The north-south division in the republic further distinguishes the Kyrgyz people from one another. In northern Kyrgyzstan, people are historically nomadic, more sophisticated, economically better off, less traditional, and less religious, whereas in southern Kyrgyzstan, people are sedentary and agricultural, economically poorer, more religious, and more conservative.

However, despite these differences, the Kyrgyz nevertheless consider themselves one people. This is the basic theme of the Kyrgyz oral epic *Manas*. Manas was a famous Kyrgyz warrior, and the epic tells of various Kyrgyz tribes and their survival despite numerous hardships. The *Manas* legend has been a binding force among the diverse Kyrgyz for centuries. One of the meanings of the word Kyrgyz is "forty clans," and today the forty spreading beans of the Kyrgyz flag represent these Kyrgyz clans.

Current Issues

After more than a decade of independence, Kyrgyzstan faces several economic, political, and social problems. Shortly after independence, President Akaev started implementing an economic reform program to enable transition to a market economy. He was the first Central Asian leader to break out of the ruble zone by introducing a Kyrgyz national currency, the som. Akaev started a privatization program in industry as well as in agriculture by legalizing the sale of land. However, the immediate results of these reforms were not promising. There were drastic falls in GDP and industrial and agricultural output. Inflation and unemployment increased dramatically. Corruption and crime rates rose. The sudden end to the transfers and subsidies from the budget of the Soviet Union and the collapse of inter-republican trade resulted in a sharp fall in government revenues. As a result, social services came close to breakdown. In the early 2000s, most Kyrgyz people faced the threat of real poverty.

As economic problems increased, President Akaev has become more concerned with political stability. He has increased his presidential powers and grown less tolerant of opposition groups and the media. He is also concerned about potential inter-ethnic unrest in Kyrgyzstan and about Russian emigration from the republic. The departure of Russians results in a shortage of much-needed professional and technical skills,

further complicating the economic problems. In order to prevent Russian emigration, the Kyrgyz leadership declared Russian the second state language. This official bilingualism is to remain in effect until 1 January 2005.

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KYRGYZSTAN—ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Despite nearly seventy years of Soviet industrialization Kyrgyzstan's economy remains primarily agricultural. According to World Bank statistics, agriculture contributed an estimated 44.2 percent to gross domestic product (GDP) in 1997. Grain production generally accounts for more than 50 percent of agricultural production. Other products such as hay, forage, potatoes, and vegetables are also grown, primarily in the southern regions of Osh and Jalalabad. Livestock production, which once contributed significantly to the overall agricultural output, has declined since independence, partly because of the reduction in state subsidies and partly because of unregulated sale or consumption by the rural population. Agriculture employed more than 48 percent of the labor force in 1998, although, given the mountainous topography, only 7 percent of the land is arable. Private family farms cultivated an estimated 35 percent of the arable land in 1998, while the remainder was farmed collectively in the old Soviet style. The percentage of agriculture's contribution to GDP declined 4.6 percent during the 1990–1996 period, but the agricultural sector rebounded beginning in 1997 and registered growth rates of 15 percent and 12 percent in 1996 and 1997, respectively.

Industry, Services, and Foreign Trade

Industry accounts for approximately 16 percent of GDP. Manufacturing, including food processing, textiles, machinery, and nonferrous mineral products, has remained largely stagnant since the breakup of the So-

viet Union. The sector employed an estimated 10 percent of the working population in 1997. Kyrgyzstan has considerable mineral resources, including gold, coal, tin, mercury, zinc, tungsten, and uranium. The gold deposit at Kumtor, the eighth-largest in the world, has made a sizable contribution to GDP since 1998. The construction industry also benefited from the development of the Kumtor site, but construction growth declined after the completion of projects related to the mining industry in 1997. The energy sector is dominated by the hydroelectric production for which Kyrgyzstan has an ideal topography. Oil and gas deposits are small, and the country depends on imports from Kazakhstan.

In 1997 the services sector accounted for an estimated 33 percent of GDP. The sector is the economy's second-largest employer. Foreign trade accounted for approximately 10 percent of GDP in that year.

Economic Policy

Designed to satisfy the requirements of industrial centers outside its territory, Kyrgyzstan's economy has suffered a significant decline since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The process of restructuring the economy has been slow and uneven, despite substantial financial support from Western countries and major global donor agencies such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). In 1993 President Akayev introduced an ambitious economic reform program, calling for macroeconomic stabilization, privatization, trade and price liberalization, and a new currency, the som, introduced in May. The conservative parliament opposed the program, which touched off a power struggle that led to the president's decision to disband the parliament and introduce constitutional amendments in 1994 and 1995. His victory resulted in the resumption of the economic reform program largely supported and financed by the IMF and the World Bank. Since 1995 the government has embarked on reforms of the banking sector and the tax structure and has privatized large enterprises. The reform program suffered a setback in the aftermath of the collapse of the Russian economy in 1998 and the decline in the price of gold, a major foreign-exchange earner for Kyrgyzstan.

Privatization

The privatization of the economy entered its third phase in 1998, with the aim of selling shares in large enterprises such as the Kyrgyztelecom and the energy company, Kyrgyzenergo. Although the government retains controlling stakes in these and other large enter-

prises, the entire process has yet to be completed. The first stage of privatization included small enterprises in service and retail sectors and was largely completed by 1995. The second stage, designed to sell shares of medium-sized enterprises, came to an abrupt halt in 1997, as allegations of corruption and nepotism resulted in an audit of previously privatized enterprises. The public received privatization coupons to be used toward the purchase of company shares. Unfortunately, the privatized industries have remained either stagnant or completely insolvent because the Soviet-era inter- and intra-enterprise order system has collapsed.

Fiscal Reform

Decline in output and insufficient tax revenue collection have combined to create a chronic budget deficit since independence. According to the IMF, the budget deficit was 9.9 percent of GDP in 1998 and was estimated at around 10 percent of GDP in 1999. A new three-year Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility program was signed with the IMF in February 2000. It replaced the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility program in effect since 1992 and accurately predicted a budget deficit of 7.4 percent of GDP in 2000, to be reduced to 4.6 percent by 2002. Inflation has been pegged at 20 percent, 9.9 percent, and 5.0 percent for 2000, 2001, and 2002, respectively. Thus far, the targets have not been met. Between 1994 and 1998 inflation amounted to 51.6 percent. An estimated 60 percent of government spending is devoted to social-welfare programs. The government has been planning to introduce private land ownership, but the issue has generated considerable controversy, which has delayed the process.

Real GDP declined by nearly 50 percent between 1991 and 1995. Growth returned to the economy in 1996 as a result of foreign investment projects in the mining sector and as positive agricultural growth. GDP continued to grow in 1997 but suffered a decline in 1998, achieving only 2 percent real growth. Private consumption has constituted an estimated 65 percent of GDP in recent years, but the continued economic uncertainties will adversely affect the level of consumption for some time to come. A 1997 World Bank survey revealed that an estimated 60 percent of the Kyrgyz population lives in poverty, the majority residing in the impoverished south of the republic.

External Sector

Much like the other central Asian republics, Kyrgyzstan's trade with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has declined since independence. The figure for 1998 indicated an export contraction

of nearly 30 percent in CIS trade. In dollar terms the trade with CIS members accounted for 44 percent of exports and 52 percent of imports. In 1997 many of Kyrgyzstan's exports were nonferrous metals, notably gold (36 percent), followed by electricity (14 percent), food processing (13 percent), machine construction (10 percent), and agriculture (8 percent). Oil and gas topped the import list at 25 percent, followed by machine construction (22 percent), chemical and petrochemical production (14 percent), and food processing (12 percent). The major non-CIS trading partners included China, the United States, Germany, Switzerland, and Turkey.

Kyrgyzstan has accumulated a sizable foreign debt since 1993: nearly \$1 billion in 1998, or 54 percent of GDP. In 1999 the government reallocated \$60 million to prevent a possible default on servicing its loan. More than \$600 million is owed to multilateral institutions. The government restructured its loans to Turkey and Russia in 1996 and 1998, and the EBRD allowed it to delay payments on the \$75 million partially due in 1999. To prevent further defaults, the IMF extended an additional loan of \$29 million in 1999. A total of \$99.1 million was earmarked for the three-year period from January 2000 through December 2002. Between 1992 and 1999 the World Bank disbursed an estimated \$500 million to help the republic's transition to a market economy. Foreign direct investment, which is also critical in preventing further decline of the economy, amounted to nearly \$400 million between 1993 and 1999.

The Kyrgyz national currency, the som, was the first currency to be allowed to float freely in central Asia. Since its introduction in 1993 the som experienced a steady nominal depreciation from \$1 to 4 som to \$1 to 42 som in 1999. In real terms the som lost more than 50 percent of its value by 1998. Kyrgyz foreign reserve currency has fluctuated since 1998, as the government has attempted to address its foreign debt and current account obligations. The reserves in early 1999 could cover only three months of imports. Foreign reserves amounted to \$163 million, 70 percent of which was held in dollars.

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KYRGYZSTAN—EDUCATION SYSTEM

The education system in Kyrgyzstan today is a synthesis of Soviet-type public education, Western-type private high schools and colleges, and newly emerging Muslim religious schools. The collapse of Communism and the emergence of democratization encouraged multiple forms of education, although the government plays a key role in regulating public education. The Ministry of Education is responsible for developing curriculum, setting national standards and educational policy, developing certification examinations, and awarding degrees. The ministry is divided into departments for general education, higher education, and material support. Below the ministry level, the education hierarchy includes the six provinces and the separate city of Bishkek, representatives from each of which provide input to the ministry on local conditions. The level of basic local administration is the district (*raion*); the district education officer hires faculty and appoints school inspectors and methodology specialists.

Instruction

General education has traditionally been accessible to nearly all children in Kyrgyzstan. In primary and secondary grades about 51 percent of students are female; that number increases to 55 percent in higher education, with a converse majority of males in vocational programs. There is little difference in school attendance between urban and rural areas or among the provinces. Higher education, however, became more accessible to urban and wealthy segments of the population as a consequence of independence in 1991.

In line with the reform of 1992, children start school at the age of six and are required to complete grade nine. The general education program has three stages: grades one through four, grades five through nine, and grades ten and eleven. Students completing grade nine may continue into advanced or specialized (college preparatory) secondary curricula or into a technical and vocational program. The school year is thirty-four weeks long, extending from the beginning of September until the end of May. The instruction week is twenty-five hours long for grades one through four and thirty-two hours for grades five through eleven.

In 1992 about 960,000 students were enrolled in general education courses, 42,000 in specialized secondary programs, 49,000 in vocational programs, and

58,000 in institutions of higher education. About 1,800 schools were in operation in 1992. That year Kyrgyzstan's state system had about 65,000 teachers, but an estimated 8,000 teachers resigned in 1992 alone because of poor salaries and a heavy workload that included double shifts for many. Emigration has also depleted the teaching staff. In 1993 the national pupil-teacher ratio for grades one through eleven was 14.4 to 1, slightly higher in rural areas, and considerably higher in the primary grades. The city of Bishkek, however, had a ratio of almost 19 to 1.

Despite restructuring there is a shortage of schools, and 37 percent of general education students attend schools operating in two or three shifts. Construction of new facilities has lagged behind enrollment growth, the rate of which has been nearly 3 percent per year.

General education is financed by district budgets, and college preparatory and higher education programs are financed by the national budget. For the former category of expenditures school principals negotiate their requirements with district officials, but the central government sets norms based on previous expenditures and on the relative resources of the provinces.

Curriculum

The language of instruction remains Russian, but the Kyrgyz language is becoming increasingly important as nonindigenous citizens leave the country and textbooks in Kyrgyz slowly become available. In 1992 the first major curriculum reform provided for mandatory foreign language study (English, French, or German) beginning in grade one; computer science courses in grades eight through eleven (a program hampered by lack of funds); and replacement of Soviet ideology with concepts of market economy and ethnic studies. The reformed curriculum requirements also leave room for elective courses, and instructional innovation is encouraged.

Higher Education

In 1997 Kyrgyzstan had forty-three institutions of higher learning, almost all of them located in Bishkek. Seven of the institutions were private and the remainder state funded. Approximately 4,700 faculty were employed there, of which only 150 had doctoral degrees and 1,715 were candidates, the step below the doctorate in the Soviet system, which is still used in Kyrgyzstan. The language of instruction remained predominantly Russian in the mid-1990s, although the use of Kyrgyz has increased yearly. Long-term plans call for a more Western style of university study, so that universities can begin to offer a baccalaureate degree. In 1992 President Akayev created a Slavic Uni-

versity in Bishkek to help Kyrgyzstan retain its population of educated Russians, for whom the increased "Kyrgyzzification" of education was a reason to emigrate. Because Russian students from outside the Russian Federation had lost their Soviet-era right to free education in Russian universities, Akayev hoped to provide a Russian-language institution for Russian-speaking students from all the Central Asian states.

The multicultural character of educational policy was underlined in the establishment of Bishkek Humanities University in 1994. The Humanities University has three major departments: the Department of Kyrgyz Philology with a major in Kyrgyz language and literature; the Department of Russian Philology with a major in Russian language and literature; the Department of Oriental Studies and International Relations with majors in Turkish, Korean, Japanese, Arabic, Persian, and Chinese languages; and the Department of German Philology with majors in German and English.

In 1996 the Kyrgyz Turkish Manas University was established as a sign of advancing cultural ties between predominantly Muslim Kyrgyzstan and the Muslim world. The official teaching languages of the university are Kyrgyz and Turkish. The university admitted one hundred students in the 1997–1998 academic year and five hundred students in the 2000–2001 academic year. The university is sponsored by the government of Kyrgyzstan and the Turkish National Lottery Administration. All education is free of charge, and some financial aid is provided to all students.

As soon as market reform began in Kyrgyzstan in 1992, the need for new managers with knowledge of market institutions became urgent. The government encouraged the establishment of the Bishkek International School of Management and Business, which was reorganized under the Academy of Management headed by the president of the Kyrgyz Republic on 19 March 1997. The Academy of Management is a government-sponsored university with a strong similarity to U.S. business schools that offer business training and masters of business administration degrees. At the same time it functions as the government academy, providing continuing education for government managers, as well as courses for managers and owners of private businesses.

During the transition from state socialism, the Kyrgyz education system experienced a drastic change. Ideologically there was a shift from justifying Communism and castigating capitalism to promoting market-economy ideology. Structurally there was an emergence of new forms of educational institutions. Despite the difficulties of the first years of transition

the government managed to continue educational reforms. Achievements include an increase in public expenditures for education from 4 percent of gross domestic product in 1993 to 5 percent in 1997; an increase in the enrollment ratio for all levels of education from 61 percent in 1993 to 71 percent in 1997; and an increase in the number of universities from eighteen in 1993 to forty-three in 1997. Among discouraging trends, on the other hand, was a decline in the tertiary enrollment ratio for women from 62 percent in 1993 to 51 percent in 1997.

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KYRGYZSTAN—HISTORY The ancestors of today's Kyrgyz people were nomadic pastoralists living in the upper reaches of the Yenisey River in Siberia before migrating south to the Tian Shan region around the tenth century CE. They were ruled by various Turkic peoples until 1685, when they were conquered by the Mongols, who ruled the region until 1785, when they were displaced by the Manchus. In the early nineteenth century, the territory inhabited by the Kyrgyz was under the control of the khanate of Quqon. The Russians moved into the area in the mid-nineteenth century, and by 1876, the Kyrgyz were incorporated into the Russian empire as part of Russian Turkistan. The Russian empire exercised dominance over the khanate from 1876 until the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, after which the entire Central Asian region commonly known as Turkistan was incorporated into the Soviet Union. The Kyrgyz staged major uprisings against Russian rule, but all failed, and many Kyrgyz migrated to the Pamirs and Afghanistan. In 1916, Russia's suppression of a massive Kyrgyz revolt led to many Kyrgyz deaths and a large immigration to China. In 1918, Kyrgyzstan was included in the newly created Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

The Soviet Period

In 1924, the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region was established, renamed the Kyrgyz Autonomous Republic

in 1926. The nomadic Kyrgyz tribes were forced to settle beginning in the 1920s, when the Soviets began to establish urban centers and impose agricultural collectivization. Kyrgyzstan was granted union republic status in 1936. Although some local self-rule was allowed in the 1920s, in the early 1930s, Joseph Stalin (1879–1953) launched massive purges of local cadres and cruelly collectivized the largely nomadic society.

In the Osh region, on the eastern edge of the fertile and densely populated Fergana Valley, a major ethnic conflict broke out between Kyrgyz and Uzbek residents in June 1990, leading to scores of deaths. That region, although a part of Kyrgyzstan, is populated mostly by ethnic Uzbeks. The conflict led many in Kyrgyzstan to demand the ouster of Kyrgyz Communist Party leader Absamat Masaliyev for mishandling the Osh events. When the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet convened in October 1990, a democratic bloc of deputies narrowly defeated Masaliyev's bid for the post of president, a new office created by the progressive Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev (b. 1931), and elected Askar Akaev, ending Masaliyev's career.

The Post-Soviet Period

A forty-six-year-old ethnic Kyrgyz, Akaev was a well-respected computer engineer and mathematician who was president of the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences. Because of this respect he was elected in 1989 to the newly created Soviet Congress of People's Deputies and served in its smaller Supreme Soviet legislative body. Similarly, he was elected a full member of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee in 1990, a high-ranking party post. He opposed an August 1991 coup attempt against Gorbachev by Communist reactionaries and moved after the coup's collapse to suspend Kyrgyz Communist Party activities. Afterward, the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet declared Kyrgyzstan an independent democratic state and scheduled a direct presidential election for October 1991. Akaev was overwhelmingly reaffirmed as president in this election. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in early December 1991, Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian states joined Russia and other former Soviet republics on 21 December 1991 in founding a cooperative group called the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Akaev was reelected as president in December 1995, winning 72 percent of the vote in a three-way race. Legislative elections held that same year, although marred by some irregularities, were judged by international observers to be largely free and fair. Socialist-oriented parties won the largest proportion of party-contested seats, reflecting popular discontent

with economic decline and with scandals associated with several democrats, although the Kyrgyz Communist Party also showed poorly. Ethnic Kyrgyz won most seats. Akaev criticized the electoral process, stating that he would have preferred a mixed system of voting that included party lists, a social organization list, and quotas for women and ethnic minorities, so that the legislature would be representative in its composition.

About 95 percent of voters approved a 1996 referendum on constitutional changes that gave Akaev greater powers to veto legislation, as well as the power to dissolve the legislature and appoint all ministers (except the prime minister) without legislative confirmation while making impeachment more difficult. Despite those new restrictions on its powers, in 1997–1998 the legislature showed increasing signs of independence from executive power. Moving to further weaken it, Akaev spearheaded another referendum on 17 October 1998 that further curtailed its power. The referendum also provided for private land ownership, opposed by most in the legislature, and upheld freedom of the press.

In July 1998, the Kyrgyz Constitutional Court decided that Akaev could run for a third presidential term, even though the constitution permitted only two terms, on the technicality that Akaev's October 1991 election had occurred before the enactment of the current constitution. The Central Electoral Commission reported that Akaev won 74.5 percent of 1.46 million votes cast, but many international observers reported major irregularities, including bribing of voters, governmental intimidation of voters, media bias and intimidation, ballot box stuffing, and manipulation of vote tabulations. Monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe concluded that the election represented a further setback to democratization, although it hailed the democratic sentiments of many election officials and voters as promising for the future. Feliks Kulov, a major opposition leader who had been disqualified from running because he refused to take a Kyrgyz language competency test that was required for running, was convicted of corruption by a military tribunal in January 2001 and sentenced to a seven-year prison sentence. According to many observers, the irregularities of the election and the efforts to quash the opposition mark the growing authoritarianism of Akaev's rule.

Economic and Foreign Policy

Foreign assistance has been a significant factor in Kyrgyzstan's budget. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have been major lenders to support economic reforms and stabilization; in fact,

debt servicing has become an increasing burden to the Kyrgyz state budget. The United States and other developed nations also have provided major humanitarian and economic aid. After independence, the Kyrgyz economy declined by over 50 percent of GDP until beginning to recover in the late 1990s. The Russian financial crisis and declining world gold prices harmed the Kyrgyz economy in late 1998, contributing to reduced Kyrgyz exports to Russia, increased budget deficits, and increased inflation. The economy improved somewhat in 2000. Crime and corruption are threats to economic recovery. A major fraud shook the state natural-gas company and contributed to the failure of several banks in 1999. Illegal drug production in Kyrgyzstan, and drug trafficking, particularly along routes leading from Afghanistan through Tajikistan's Gorno Badakhshan region to Kyrgyzstan's city of Osh, increasingly threaten Kyrgyzstan's legitimate economy and the rule of law. In his inauguration address on 9 December 2000, Akaev pledged to carry out a ten-year economic development program that would create a new "Silk Road" transport network linking Kyrgyzstan to the outside world, combat corruption, and raise standards of living.

Akaev's March 1999 foreign-policy concept called for close relations with ancient Silk Road route nations, including China, former Soviet republics, and Turkey, Iran, India, and Pakistan. Akaev has stressed that landlocked Kyrgyzstan must rely on its neighbors for access to world markets. Akaev has stressed close relations with Russia, hoping for economic and trade benefits and security ties to alleviate concerns about Chinese and Uzbek intentions. Akaev and Boris Yeltsin (b. 1931) signed a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty in 1992, and Akaev gave early support to the 1992 CIS Collective Security Treaty, which called for mutual military assistance in case one of the signatories is attacked. Akaev has urged that the CIS cooperate on economic and security matters. Seeking amicable ties with China, Akaev joined leaders from Russia, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan in 1996 and 1997 in signing agreements with China on demarcating and demilitarizing the former Soviet-Chinese border.

Outside Threats and Kyrgyzstan's Military

Although Akaev preferred that Kyrgyzstan not be faced with the expense of maintaining its own armed forces, he established a defense ministry and armed forces in 1992. Kyrgyzstan's armed forces numbered about ninety-two hundred ground, air force, and air defense troops in 2000. Most of the troops are ethnic Kyrgyz conscripts, although some officers are Russians. Kyrgyzstan has about three thousand border

troops. In joining NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) in June 1994, Akaev hoped that the PFP would provide aid in working out Kyrgyzstan's defense doctrine, converting defense industries, abating environmental problems, and overcoming natural disasters. Kyrgyz officers and troops frequently participate in PFP exercises.

Kyrgyzstan faced a major threat to its territorial integrity when several hundred Islamic extremist guerrillas and others invaded Kyrgyzstan in July–August 1999. The guerrillas seized hostages, including four Japanese geologists, and several Kyrgyz villages, stating that they would cease hostilities if Kyrgyzstan provided a safe haven for refugees and would release hostages if Uzbekistan released jailed extremists. The guerrillas were rumored to be seeking to create an Islamic state in south Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan. Some observers argued that the guerrillas were trying to seize major drug-trafficking routes in southern Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan called out reservists and admitted that its military was unprepared for combat. With air support from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan succeeded in forcing virtually all the guerrillas into Tajikistan. According to some observers, the guerrilla incursion indicated both links among terrorist cells in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia (Chechnya) and the weakness of Kyrgyzstan's security forces. After the incursion, Kyrgyzstan worked to upgrade its defense capabilities and stepped up its defense cooperation with Russia, the CIS, and NATO's PFP.

A reported five hundred insurgents launched another attack in early August 2000, taking foreigners hostage and causing thousands of Kyrgyz to flee the area. Uzbekistan provided air and some other support, but Kyrgyz forces were largely responsible for defeating the insurgency by late October 2000. Hailing the performance of professional (rather than conscript) troops in halting the incursion, Kyrgyzstan in early 2001 considered both downsizing the military and converting it completely to contract-based forces.

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KYRGYZSTAN—POLITICAL SYSTEM

Bordering Kazakhstan to the north, China to the east, Uzbekistan to the west, and Tajikistan to the south, Kyrgyzstan is a presidential republic that declared independence in 1991, shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Its first elected president, Askar Akayev (b. 1944), was elected by the parliament in October 1990 and then elected in nationwide elections in October 1991. He was reelected to a second term in December 1995 and to a third term in October 2000.

Background

The Kyrgyz lived a pastoral-nomadic life along the upper reaches of the Yenisey river before migrating south to the Tian Shan region around the tenth century. Ruled by various Turkic peoples until 1685, the Kyrgyz tribes came under Mongol rule until 1785, when the Manchus conquered the region from the east. In the early nineteenth century the territory inhabited by the Kyrgyz came under the control of the khanate of Kokand. The Russian empire exercised dominance over the khanate from 1876 until the October Revolution of 1917, after which the entire Central Asian region commonly known as Turkistan was eventually incorporated into the Soviet Union. In 1918 the newly created Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic included Kyrgyzstan. In 1924 the Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast (region) was established, and

two years later, it was renamed the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic.

The Kyrgyz tribes were forced to settle beginning in the 1920s, when Soviet administrative rule began to establish urban centers and impose agricultural collectivization. Subsequently, ethnic Russians dominated the government structures until the late 1950s. Not until Leonid Brezhnev headed the Soviet Union (1962–1982) did Soviet central authority finally allow an ethnic Kyrgyz elite to assume the republic's top posts. Brezhnev encouraged a patrimonial system and demanded loyalty to Moscow in exchange for partial transfer of power to local cadres. This arrangement fostered systemic corruption that still persists.

The Soviet Union's election of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 and the subsequent introduction of perestroika and glasnost allowed the emergence of informal political and social movements and organizations with various agendas. Although the Communist Party opposed these movements, it could not control the growing demand for greater political freedom or contain ethnic hostility. In 1989 one such organization, Osh Aymagi, called for the distribution of vacant land among the ethnic Kyrgyz to alleviate acute housing shortages in the southern region of Osh. Uzbek and Kyrgyz inhabitants clashed violently in disputes over land and housing, with casualties estimated at one thousand. In October 1990, two months after the Osh disturbances, the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet called for the selection of a new president to restore normalcy. Askar Akayev, a physicist by profession, replaced Abasamat Masaliyev and abolished the post of First Secretary of the Communist Party.

Akayev called for liberalization of the polity and encouraged political pluralism. Later he introduced sweeping economic reforms that accelerated the republic's transition to a market economy. In 1991 Akayev replaced the Council of Ministers with a Western-style cabinet and appointed reformist politicians. A combination of parliamentary hostility and allegations of high-level corruption led to an open confrontation between the reform-minded president and the largely Communist-oriented parliament. In 1994 a referendum led to the dissolution of the old unicameral parliament in favor of a bicameral legislature. Since 1995 Akayev has curbed the earlier press and political freedoms, forcing the opposition to limit its criticism of the government and its policies.

Constitution and Institutions

The first post-Communist constitution of Kyrgyzstan, adopted on 5 May 1993, called for the sepa-

ration of powers and a limited government. Subsequently, however, several amendments increased presidential powers to parliament's detriment. These amendments included a provision for creating a small 105-seat bicameral assembly, the Jogorku Kenesh, to replace the 313-seat Supreme Soviet. The new parliament had a permanent thirty-five-member lower house and a seventy-member People's Assembly (upper house). In October 1998 yet another referendum was held to amend the constitution to allow Akayev to stand for a third term. The voters also approved a constitutional provision calling for an increase in the representation in the lower house to sixty-seven and a reduction in the membership of the upper house to thirty-eight. These changes took effect in 1999.

Parliament members are elected for a five-year term. The president is elected directly for a five-year term with tenure in office limited to two terms. He is head of state and commander-in-chief and holds extensive executive powers. The prime minister is appointed by the president, subject to confirmation by the parliament. Although the constitution calls for an independent judicial branch, Akayev is largely in control. The president nominates appointments to the highest judicial bodies, the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the Higher Court of Arbitration. In 1996 President Akayev established the Security Council, which functions as an inner cabinet. Unlike the cabinet of ministers, this thirteen-member council is not accountable to the parliament and has become the main instrument of policy making in the republic.

The Kyrgyz political structure also allows for the establishment of a multiparty system. Since 1991 a number of political parties ranging from nationalist to social democratic and Communist have been registered by the justice ministry. However, the relative power of these parties has been significantly diminished as a result of constitutional amendments increasing the power of the executive branch. The Party of the Communists of Kyrgyzstan has been one of the largest opposition parties. The Ar-Namys (Dignity) Party, established by a presidential opponent, Felix Kulov, in 1999, has been kept under strict scrutiny and its leader jailed. Nationalist parties such as Asaba and Erkin have also been marginalized.

Regional and International Relations

Kyrgyzstan became a member of the Central Asian Union, joining Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, in January 1994. Designed to create a single economic space, the union has accomplished very little in this respect. Several perennial disputes continue to hamper efforts to bring about meaningful regional

economic reforms that would benefit each republic. Border disputes, outstanding water, gas, and electricity bills, and competition for regional leadership have driven a political wedge between the member countries. In addition to these issues, the growth of militant Muslim activities has become a source of friction between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. In the summer of 1999 a group of Uzbek Muslim activists crossed into Kyrgyzstan from Tajikistan and held several Japanese hostages for more than three months.

Kyrgyzstan's structural dependence on Russia has forced the republic to be extremely flexible in its dealing with Moscow. Akayev has signed bilateral and multilateral security treaties with Russia. In 1996 Kyrgyzstan joined a customs union treaty with Kazakstan, Russia, and Belarus, which has yet to produce positive economic results. But Kyrgyzstan's admission to the World Trade Organization in 1999—which requires strict adherence to its membership provisions—has drawn criticism from Russia, whose trade regulations do not conform to international conventions.

Kyrgyzstan has also established ties with China and is a signatory to the Shanghai Five treaty, which unites China, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. These parties signed the treaty in April 1997 as a security guarantee to reduce tensions along the old Chinese-Soviet border. To appease China, Kyrgyzstan has curbed the activities of Muslim Uighur separatists on its territory, a policy that has led to many arrests and extraditions. Xinjiang Uygur, an autonomous region in northwestern China, is home to a relatively large Uighur population, and an estimated 40,000 Uighur Chinese live in Kyrgyzstan.

At the same time, Akayev has established close ties with the European countries whose assistance has been critical in facilitating economic transition. The United States, together with major international donor agencies, has provided economic and technical assistance since 1993. Akayev has embraced the Partnership for Peace program, and Kyrgyz troops have been participating in a Central Asian peacekeeping battalion, which has held joint exercises on an annual basis since 1996.

Mehrdad Haghayeghi

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KYUSHU (2001 pop. 13.4 million). Kyushu is located at the westernmost part of the Japanese archipelago and consists of numerous islands stretching toward Taiwan to the southwest. It is made up of the prefectures of Fukuoka, Nagasaki, Saga, Kumamoto, Oita, Miyazaki, and Kagoshima. When the Kyushu region is referred to as a larger administrative unit, it includes Okinawa Prefecture and has a total area of 44,420 square kilometers. Historically, Kyushu has been the contact point between Japan and foreign culture.

The northern part of Kyushu is characterized by a coastal climate with warm temperatures and rainfall, the Inland Sea coast has a typical Inland Sea climate, and the southern part has a Pacific Ocean coastal climate. Typhoons often hit Kyushu in August and September. The geography of Kyushu is very diverse and is characterized by volcanoes, coastal plains, and hot springs. The active volcano Mount Aso (1,592 meters) in Aso Kujū National Park has the world's largest caldera, or crater. Others active volcanoes are Unzen-dake and Sakurajima. The latter is a stratovolcano composed of the peaks Kitadake (1,117 meters), Nakadake (1,060 meters), and Minamidake (1,040 meters). Most of the plateaus in southern Kyushu are covered with volcanic ash and pumice (*shirasu*). Heavy rains very often cause landslides. Agriculture on the *shirasu* is difficult because of frequent drought, so to cope with this, irrigation projects have been developed. Agriculture has become more commercialized and diversified since World War II, and the products include rice, vegetables, sweet potatoes, tobacco, mandarin oranges, tea, and strawberries, which are grown

in greenhouses. Southern Kyushu is a leading producer of beef in Japan, and fishing is important particularly on the west coast. Tourism is also an important economic activity.

Kyushu leads the nation in industrial production in many fields, accounting for almost one-third of the nation's shipbuilding, motorcycle manufacturing, and production of integrated circuits. The Kita-Kyushu Industrial Area is a major industrial area of Japan. Its development began in 1901 with the mining industry (Yawata Iron Mill); however, the iron and steel industries have since declined because of competition from China and South Korea. New industries, including electronics, precision instruments, and information and communication technologies, now account for an increasing share of this area's economic activity. When a part of Yamaguchi Prefecture is added, this region is called "Kyushu-Yamaguchi Economic Sphere." Traditional industries such as furniture making, ceramics, and distilled liquor (*shochu*) are also still important. Most of the high urban functions (information technologies, leisure activities, and international exchange) are centered in and around Fukuoka city, which had a 2001 population of 1.28 million. Secondary cities are Kitakyushu (2001 pop. 1 million), Kumamoto (2001 pop. 650,000), Kagoshima City (2001 pop. 543,000), Oita (2001 pop. 436,000), and Nagasaki (2001 pop. 421,000).

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LABU SAYONG The *labu Sayong* (water calabash) is a Malay earthenware container. It takes its shape from the gourd or starfruit and is used as a water container. The clay used for Malay pottery is a terra-cotta clay found by streams, riverbanks, and paddy fields. A potter's wheel is not used in Malay pottery making. The *labu* is coated with river silt with a high iron content, and the surface of the pottery is burnished to a smooth polish with a pebble, a technique carried out by potters at the town of Sayong on the Perak River in West Malaysia. At Sayong, a pot is placed inverted on a rack made from tree branches, with a fire pit below, and after four to five hours the pot is placed into the glowing embers. The color can range from yellowish brown to rust-red, depending on the iron content. A pot is usually decorated with foliage motifs. It was traditionally part of the paraphernalia used in rituals performed during a healing ceremony whereby the water kept in the *labu* was blessed with incantations. Traditional Malay pottery sites are found on or near ancient routes that connect the tributaries of the Perak and Pahang Rivers. One such site is Sayong.

Shanthi Thambiah

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LAC LONG QUAN (b. 2879 BCE), mythological founder of the kingdoms of Vietnam and southern



A woman making a *labu Sayong* in the village of Kepala Bendang, about 300 kilometers north of Kuala Lumpur. The vessels are the main source of income for the 500 people in the village and in 2000 sold for from \$1.30 to \$21 each. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

China. Lac Long Quan is the mythological descendant of Than Nong (Shen Nong in Chinese) and the founder of the first Vietnamese kingdom, which received the name Van Lang. His name means the dragon (*long*) king or chief (*quan*) of the Lac family or clan. According to legend, Shen Nong sent his great-great grandson, King De Minh (De Ming in Chinese), on an inspection tour of south China. Arriving at the Wu Ling Mountains in Hunan, De Minh married an immortal woman and sired several sons. Loc Tuc, one of his younger sons, ruled over the south of China under the title of King Duong Vuong. His land was called Xich Quy.

In 2879 BCE, Loc Tuc's son, Lac Long Quan, was born. He too married an immortal woman, Au Co, who gave birth to a pouch containing one hundred eggs, producing one hundred children. Legend has it that after he succeeded his father to the throne of Xich Quy, he told his wife that their marriage could not last because he was of the dragon race and therefore belonged to the water, whereas she, an immortal, belonged to the mountains. He suggested that she take fifty of their children and establish them in the mountains, while he would live on the coastal plains with the other fifty. He then sent one of his children to rule over a southern part of his kingdom, in a country called Van Lang (Vietnam). That son's descendants were known as the Hung kings. There were eighteen in all, and they ruled from approximately 2879 BCE to 258 BCE.

Truong Buu Lam

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LACQUERWARE Wares made of wood, porcelain, or metal to which lacquer has been applied are known as lacquerware. Lacquer is the sap or resin of the lacquer (*rhus verniciflua*) or varnish tree. The tree is native to central and southern China and possibly to Japan. When applied to wood, porcelain, or metal, the lacquer gives the wares a hard, smooth, transparent, and shiny surface. True or Far Eastern Asian lacquerware has been used since ancient times in China and Japan. The natural sap of the lacquer tree has been used as a protective and decorative varnish for art objects as well as those used in everyday living. The lacquer is applied in thin layers on the wooden objects or inlaid on metal wares. When solidified, lacquer also has been used as a medium for sculpture. Like porcelain, lacquerware has been much appreciated not only

in Asia but also Europe, where it has been collected since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Lacquerware includes beautifully decorated items, and many that were household utensils provided waterproof and durable service in Asian households. They would have been popular in Asia where wood was once plentiful. Wood fashioned into lacquerware provided great versatility, as evident from the wide range of objects included among the wares.

East Asian lacquer is not at all similar to the type of lacquer that is the basis of some of the varnishes used in the "japanning" of European furniture from the sixteenth century onward. There are differences in chemical composition and also sources, since the English resin lac or shellac comes from a substance deposited on trees by certain species of insects.

Two broad classes of lacquer objects are distinguished. In one category, the lacquer has been applied largely for the purposes of protection and decoration. Therefore, the lacquer application does not change the form of the objects, such as wooden chairs, so decorated. In the second category, the objects are made mostly of leather, supported by a nonlacquer core or substrate. These objects include lacquer boxes and containers. The core can be hemp cloth, wood, or metal, but it is encased in a lacquer coating thick enough to modify the form of the object. The lacquer coating gives the objects a plump, fleshy shape that can be decorated by carving or by using techniques of inlay and painting.

Lacquer objects, including all those in the second category and also those in the first category in which lacquer forms a significant part of the decoration, are works of art. Other objects, such as lacquered chopsticks, would be essentially lacquered. Lacquer as an art form developed in China. There was pictorial or surface decoration and also carving of the lacquer. After the tenth century, the techniques of *qiangjin* (engraved gold), *diaotian* (filled in), and *diaoqi* (carved lacquer) gradually evolved. Lacquer art dates from about 1600 BCE, during the Shang dynasty in China (1766–1045 BCE). Carved lacquer is a uniquely Chinese achievement. It is considered lacquer art in its pure form.

In Japan, lacquer art surface decoration is paramount. During the Nara period (710–794 CE), lacquerware with gold and silver foil inlay was produced. This was considered to have been transmitted from Tang (618–907 CE) China. *Makie* (gold or silver) lacquer is a unique and supreme achievement of Japanese decorative art. Japanese Negoro ware is also well known. These are objects with a thin layer of lacquer



LACQUERWARE

Lacquerware is an important export from some nations in Southeast Asia. The following excerpt describes in much detail how lacquerware was made for personal use in Myanmar (Burma) in the late 1800s.

Drinking cups and boxes for carrying the necessary ingredients for betel-chewing are made of lacquered-ware and are manufactured principally in Upper Burma, but they are also made to some extent in the Prome district. A box of the required size and shape is prepared of exceedingly fine bamboo wicker-work; the finer this is the more valuable is the box. On this is evenly applied a coat of dark pure vegetable oil, known as thit-tsee and obtained from the *Melanorrhoea usitatissima*, which is allowed to dry thoroughly. When it is dry a paste composed of pure sawdust, thit-tsee and rice-water is thickly and evenly laid on and when this is dry, the box is fastened to a rude lathe and carefully smoothed with a piece of silicious bamboo, which is used instead of sand-paper. The next coat consists of a paste of finely-powdered bone-ashes and thit-tsee which is allowed to dry and smoothed in the same way and the grounding is now complete. In colouring the boxes three colours only are used but of different shades. For *yellow*, yellow orpiment is carefully pounded and washed several times, being allowed to dry between washing, until a pure and impalpable powder remains, reduced three parts in bulk from the raw powder; with this is intimately mixed a small portion of a kind of tragacanth and the whole dried in the sun. This is worked with a vegetable oil called shan-tsee to the proper consistency and a little thit-tsee is added but not enough to injure the colour. For *green* finely-ground indigo is added to the orpiment in a sufficient proportion to give the required shade and the rest of the process is the same. *Red* is prepared from finely-ground vermillion mixed with a little thit-tsee and worked up with shan-tsee. A coat of the colour and shade intended for the foundation is thickly and evenly applied and when it is thoroughly dry the pattern which is to appear in the next shade or colour is engraved with a style and the colouring matter applied all over the box. When it is dry the box is placed on the lathe and the second colour removed by means of a bit of silicious bamboo so that it remains only in the lines of the engraved pattern. A similar process is followed for the different colours till the design is complete. Lastly one or two coats of a varnish of eight parts thit-tsee (wood-oil) and one part shan-tsee are applied.

Source: (1983) *Gazetteer of Burma*. (1893) New Delhi: Cultural Publishing House, 419.

that has usually worn away, leaving a surface that has the appearance of an abstract painting. In Korea, lacquer surfaces were decorated with metal foil inlay during the Unified Shilla period (668–935 CE), which was

more or less contemporary with the Tang period in China. Subsequently, Korea developed its own style of lacquerware, the finest of which appeared during the Koryo (918–1392) and early Choson (1392–1910)

periods, with fine mother-of-pearl inlay often in combination with tortoiseshell. Another area in East Asia that is well known for its tradition of fine lacquer manufacture is the Ryukyu Islands. Now part of Japan, the islands were once a kingdom, and the growth and decline of the lacquer industry actually paralleled that of the kingdom, which began in the fourteenth century and ended in 1872. Chinese lacquer techniques were a major influence on Ryukyuan lacquer objects.

Lacquerware comprised large and small objects from chopsticks, bowls, cups, and vases to coffers, bamboo baskets, and containers, as well as screens and even suits of leather armor. The lacquer vases produced in Soochow, China, resembled fine porcelain with their intricate carvings on wood stained in coral and then lacquered. These were made for the emperor during the Ch'ien Lung period (1736–1796) of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). They were among the treasures used in the summer palace. Other types of lacquerware include the Japanese ware in black and gold lacquer inlaid with gold, silver, and mother-of-pearl. Chinese and Japanese screens of lacquered, painted, and gilt wood are familiar not only in Asian homes and institutions today but also in fine arts museums. These screens are often painted by hand, sometimes by well-known artists or copyists. Korean suits of armor of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, made of gold-lacquered small plates, gilt-copper brown lacquer plates, and scarlet, are prized collectors' items.

Modern lacquerware from Japan and Korea is highly finished in appearance when compared to that still produced in China and other parts of Southeast Asia. The Straits Chinese or Peranakan society in Southeast Asia reproduced lacquered basketry, originally produced in China, for carrying special gifts offered to deities in temples or during occasions such as weddings and festivals. Lacquerware items remain important in most East and Southeast Asian households, although they tend to be more expensive than either ceramics or plastic.

Ooi Giok-Ling

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LADAKH (2001 est. pop. 118,000). Ladakh, formerly called Middle Tibet, is a mountainous district of Jammu and Kashmir that forms the northernmost area of the Indian Republic. It covers 82,665 square kilometers of very high and rugged country, and is the biggest administrative district anywhere in India. Elevations range from 3,000 to 5,000 meters. Aside from its mountains, the most important physical feature of Ladakh is the great valley of the Indus River, which crosses the entire district as it flows northwestward from its source in Tibet, thus separating the Karakoram Range from the Zaskar Range. Near Leh, the district headquarters, the Indus is 3,350 meters above sea level. The observatory at Leh is said to be the most elevated one in Asia. It records a mean annual temperature of 4.4°C, dropping in the coldest months (January and February) to about –8°C.

The culture is basically a Tibetan one, with numerous lamaistic monasteries. But while the bulk of the population are Lamaistic Buddhists, the Baltis in the west are Shi'ite Muslims. There is very little arable land, but this remote region abounds in valuable minerals: lead, gold, copper, sulfur, coal, iron, borax, gypsum, and precious stones. Ladakh has long been an area involved in trans-Himalayan trade, difficult as this is.

Paul Hockings

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LAHORE (1999 est. pop. 7 million). Lahore is the capital of the Punjab province of Pakistan and is the country's cultural and industrial center and its second-largest city. There are contrary views as to the origin of its name. According to folklore, Lahore was established by Loh, the son of Rama, the renowned hero of the Hindu epic the *Ramayana*. However, others believe it derives from the word *loh-awar*, which means a fort as strong as iron and which refers to the fort built to protect the city.

Historically, Lahore has played a significant role in the region. It has been the capital of Punjab province for almost a thousand years. The city first achieved this status during the Ghaznavid dynasty (977–1187). It continued as such under the rule of Muhammad of Ghor as well as under several sultans of Delhi. Qutb-ud-din Aibak became the first Muslim sultan in

the area after being crowned in Lahore in 1206. From 1524 to 1752, the Mughal dynasty (1526–1857) raised the level of prominence of Lahore by adding considerably to its architecture and size. Akbar (reigned 1556–1605) was responsible for overseeing the construction of the Lahore Fort, which was built over an old fort. In addition, he had a red-brick wall with twelve impressive gates constructed around the city. Shah Jahan (1592–1666) and Janghvir (reigned 1605–1627) contributed palaces, tombs, and gardens to the city landscape and enlarged the fort. The last great Mughal, Aurangzeb, had the famous monument the Badshahi Mosque built along with the Alamgiri gateway to the fort.

The eighteenth century witnessed constant invasions throughout the region, which laid Lahore open to capture by Ranjit Singh (reigned 1801–1839) in 1799. His control over Lahore afforded him the legitimacy that he needed to become emperor. Unfortunately, the Sikh era was not kind to Lahore; the existing structures were not well maintained, and few new ones were built. When the British arrived in Lahore in 1849,



The Badshahi Mosque in Lahore. (CORBIS)


**FORT AND SHALAMAR
GARDENS IN LAHORE—
WORLD HERITAGE SITE**

Shah Jahan's Mughal gardens and fort were designated UNESCO World Heritage Sites in 1981 and added to the list of World Heritage Sites in Danger in 1999 when the garden's water tanks were destroyed. It is hoped that growing international awareness will help preserve the beautiful terraced gardens and gilded marble fort.

they initially constructed practical facilities for the administration of the capital. Later, however, they worked to preserve some of the ancient structures and eventually added their own Victorian style of architecture, named Mughal-Gothic, to the city.

In 1940, Lahore was the site of a significant Muslim League session during which the Lahore Resolution was proposed. This resolution called for a separate state for the Muslim population of India, leading to the creation of Pakistan on 14 August 1947. Lahore is now a major industrial and cultural center and home to several leading institutions of higher education. Its mix of numerous styles of architecture, from ancient to modern, is a significant tourist attraction.

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LAKSAMANA *Laksamana* is a Malay honorific title given to the supreme military commander, the counterpart of the highest Malay state official, the *bendahara*. This is expressed in the saying "The *bendahara* rules the land, the *laksamana* rules the sea." Since the Malay states were generally maritime empires, the position of *laksamana* became equated with "admiral." He was the "ruler of the sea" and the "warden of the coast." It is unknown when the term first came to be used, but it probably derives from Laksmana, the name

of Rama's half-brother in the *Ramayana*. The oldest written Malay version of the Indian *Ramayana* dates from between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries. In this epic it is told that Laksamana drew a magic figure (*baris Laksamana*, i.e., "Laksamana's line") to protect Sita against the assaults of Ravana.

At the court of Perak (and perhaps also at other Malay courts) the *laksamana*, when ashore, was also in charge of the sultan's harem. During processions the *laksamana's* post was by the sultan's palanquin. When the sultan rode in state upon an elephant the *laksamana* followed, bearing the ruler's sword. Considering the *laksamana's* position and functions, it is worth noting that in the *Ramayana*, Laksamana behaves toward Rama more like a servant than a prince. In the Malay version of the *Ramayana*, Laksamana is furthermore presented as a great ascetic, which might explain why he could be entrusted with the task of looking after the sultan's harem.

According to the *Sejarah Melayu* (Malay Annals), which depicts the world of Melaka in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the association of the name with the office was fortuitous. Hang Tuah, the legendary fifteenth-century Malay hero, was always comparing himself to the epic Laksamana. In time he was nicknamed Laksamana and finally given the name as a title. This title later went to his successors with his office of warden of the coast. In the *Sejarah Melayu*, which were probably commissioned by a Melaka *bendahara*, the activities of the *bendahara* steal the spotlight from all other senior officials. The importance of the *laksamana's* office, however, cannot be ignored, because of his military prominence, commanding the *orang laut* fleets. The Orang Laut—the sea and river peoples in the western half of the Malay-Indonesian archipelago—were crucial to Melaka's security and prosperity, for they represented a strong naval power and transported sea products to Melaka's busy market. After the Portuguese conquered Melaka in 1511, the *laksamana's* position in the sultanate of Johor, Melaka's successor state, became more important than that of the *bendahara's*.

Edwin Wieringa

See also: **Bendahara**

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LAKSHADWEEP (2001 est. pop. 61,000). Lakshadweep is an Indian union territory (capital, Kavaratti) that includes the Laccadive, Minicoy, and Amindivi islands, which are scattered in the Arabian Sea some 300 kilometers off the Malabar Coast of South India. An isolated and picturesque archipelago of twelve tropical atolls and three reefs and submerged sand banks, Lakshadweep's thirty-six small islands cover a total area of only thirty-two square kilometers located between between 8° and 12°N latitude, 71° and 74°E longitude. The coral archipelago is built on the submarine Chagos Ridge, like the Maldives archipelago farther south. The Amindivi Islands occupy the northern part of Lakshadweep, the Laccadive Islands the central part, and Minicoy is the southernmost island.

Due to their exposed location, the islands were ruled by the Portuguese, Indian rajas, Tipoo sultans, and British rulers until the islands were absorbed into independent India. Ten of the islands are inhabited; island-to-island traffic is either by boat or helicopter. Though originally Hindu, the population has followed the Muslim faith since the fourteenth century. They are classified as Scheduled Tribes (ethnic subgroups who have faced discrimination and economic privations). They speak Malayalam, except on Minicoy, where they speak a Sinhalese dialect. The isolation of Lakshadweep's population has meant that they suffer from health and education deficits when compared with mainland Peninsular India. Lakshadweep is seriously overpopulated, with nearly two thousand persons per square kilometer, and this overpopulation is causing tremendous economic problems as the economy is mainly based on coconut products, fisheries, and tropical fruit and vegetable gardening, though dairies and poultry farms were established in the 1980s. Tourism was introduced in 1988 with the opening of the resort on Bingaram Island, intended to diversify the narrow and backward economy. This formerly uninhabited island is ringed by a fringed coral reef. The favorable dry and sunny tourist season is from October to April. At other times of the year, the channels between the islands are often affected by harmful currents. Heavy monsoon storms also visit the Lakshadweep islands and seas.

Manfred Domroes

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LAND MINES First identified as a humanitarian concern in Afghanistan and Cambodia in the late 1980s, land mines have become an international issue. Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Angola are the world's most seriously affected countries; other Asian countries adversely affected by land mines include Myanmar (Burma), Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Vietnam.

Land mines continue to endanger civilians long after wars end. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction was signed in Ottawa in 1997; by March 2001, 139 states had signed and 111 had ratified. Important Asian states that have not signed include Pakistan, India, and China. The treaty, negotiated outside regular disarmament forums, was an outstanding achievement, and the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and its coordinator, American activist Jody Williams (b. 1950).

Although not a subject of the convention, antivehicle land mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) are nevertheless significant threats. In Laos, and

more recently in Afghanistan, for instance, so-called bomblets—small submunitions from U.S. cluster bombs—often fail to explode after hitting the ground, posing great risk for civilians.

In addition to causing injury and death, land mines can force nomads to change their traditional migration patterns (as in Afghanistan), prevent agricultural cultivation (as in Cambodia), or block important infrastructure. In Afghanistan and Cambodia, land mines became a significant concern when repatriated refugees returned to areas with massive mine problems.

Since the late 1980s, new humanitarian projects have been designed to increase awareness of the risks associated with land mines. Unfortunately, these efforts have been less successful among populations who have lived with mines for years. In many cases, civilians will enter a minefield by compulsion, searching for basic means of survival. Although the cost is often high and progress slow, Humanitarian mine clearance operations have made a significant impact. A 1999 U.N. report states that the Afghanistan program had cleared 166 square kilometers of an identified 311-square-kilometer high-priority area. By mid-2000,



UNICEF ON LAND MINES

"Land mines pose particular dangers for children. Naturally curious, children are likely to pick up strange objects, such as the infamous toy-like 'butterfly' mines that Soviet forces spread by the millions in Afghanistan. In northern Iraq, Kurdish children have used round mines as wheels for toy trucks, while in Cambodia, children use B40 anti-personnel mines to play 'boules', notes the report."

"Land mines also have more catastrophic effects on children, whose small bodies succumb more readily to the horrific injuries mines inflict. In Cambodia, an average of 20 per cent of children injured by mines and unexploded ordnance die from their injuries. Children who manage to survive explosions are likely to be more seriously injured than adults, and often permanently disabled. Because a child's bones grow faster than the surrounding tissue, a wound may require repeated amputation and a new artificial limb as often as every six months—although the prosthesis is not likely to be available. Moreover, competing demands for scarce medical services also mean that children injured by mines seldom receive the care they deserve. Only 10–20 per cent of children disabled by mines in El Salvador receive any rehabilitative therapy."

Source: UNICEF article on the United Nations report *Impact of Armed Conflict on Children*, by Graça Machel. Retrieved 11 October 2001, from: <http://www.unicef.org/graca/mines.htm>.

however, some countries with substantial landmine or UXO problems, including Vietnam and Tajikistan, still lacked clearance capacity.

Kristian Berg Harpviken

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LANGUAGE PURIFICATION Purification is a conscious, deliberate attempt to remove from a language the elements that are borrowed from a "foreign" language or even from a dialect of the language. Borrowing and purification are products of language contact and conflict and occur on all levels of language use and structure.

Asia is an area of intensive language contact and conflict. The continent has the largest number of languages, 2,165, which constitutes 32 percent of the total 6,703 languages of the world (1996 data). In Asia, some of the world's most important classical languages—Arabic, Chinese, Persian, and Sanskrit—have strongly influenced other tongues. Although the phenomenon has occurred in premodern societies as well, purifying language from "foreignisms" has turned into "purist movements" in modern times. Thus purism is closely tied to Asia's nationalist movements from Korea in the east to Kurdistan in the west and is often a nationalist response to domination, assimilation, and "linguistic imperialism."

Purification varies in scope, forms, and intensity. For instance, while classical Tibetan and Chinese are known for their conservatism, Japanese has been more receptive to loans from diverse languages. In each language, too, purist attitudes and behaviors constitute a spectrum, ranging from "linguistic chauvinism" or "linguistic xenophobia" to moderate purges of "foreign" elements. Purist movements are, at the same time, important trends in the formation of standard national languages such as Baluchi, Korean, Mongolian, Nepali, and Tamil.

Loanwords are the main, but not only, targets of purification. Vietnamese and Korean, for example, finally discarded the Chinese writing system in the latter part of the twentieth century, while Japanese continues to use it in mixed and modified forms. In West Asia, Turkey, under the rule of nationalists, re-

placed the Arabic script with the Roman in 1928 but was less successful in its sweeping purge of Arabic and Persian loanwords. Extremist purists in Kurdish have tried to purge phonemes and letters of the alphabet that they consider to be imposed by Arabic.

Languages in all parts of Asia are experiencing increasing contact and conflict in the unceasing process of globalization, the formation of a "world linguistic order," characterized by unequal relations among languages, proliferation of new communication technologies, and ongoing ethnic, nationalist, and religious conflicts. Under these conditions, which also perpetrate "language death" and "linguicide" (the deliberate killing of a language), speakers of endangered tongues resist by various means, especially purification.

Amir Hassanpour

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LAO PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

The Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) has been the sole party governing Laos since 1975. The Laotian prince Souphanouvong (1901–1995) and Kaysone Phomvihane (1920–1992), both influenced by the Indochinese Communist Party, emerged as Laos's communist leaders and cofounded the party in 1955 as the Lao People's Party. In 1956, the party was renamed the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) and operated in secrecy. The party emerged to govern Laos when the communists took power in 1975. The LPRP is Marxist-Leninist and, like other Lao institutions, is influenced by the North Vietnamese model. The party planned to transform Lao society into a socialist one by completely eliminating traces of French colonialism and American imperialism through the leadership of the party in all aspects of society. Power was held by the small politburo of the party's central committee and a secretariat that was abolished in 1991.

The relaxation of socialist ideology began in the 1980s due to the failure of communist initiatives with *chintanakan mai* (New Economic Mechanism). *Chintanakan mai* lifted restrictions and introduced new policies such as private land ownership and a free market economy to Laos. At the fifth party congress in 1991, many party veterans such as Souphanouvong retired from the central committee, but the party re-

mained in complete power. After the death of Kaysone in 1992, leadership passed to the third most powerful man in the party, General Khamthay Siphandon, the current president. The LPRP continues to govern Laos with a membership of approximately 1.1 percent of the population.

Linda McIntosh

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LAO SHE (1899–1966), Chinese author and playwright. Lao She, pen name for Shu Qingchun, was one of modern China's most celebrated humorists; his satirical novels, short stories, and plays are highly appreciated. He is also renowned for his sympathy with the underprivileged. After graduating from Beijing Teacher's College, in 1924 he went to England, where he taught Mandarin Chinese, studied at the School of Oriental and African Studies, and was inspired by reading the novels of Charles Dickens. When he returned to China in 1930, Lao had already written three novels and had achieved a reputation as a humorous writer, and he continued to write while teaching. By his death in 1966 in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Lao had written more than twenty plays in praise of the Communist Chinese regime. Among his most famous works are the 1938 novel *Luotuo Xiangzi* (Xiangzi the Camel, also known as *Rickshaw Boy*) and the 1957 play *Chaguan* (Teahouse).

Bent Nielsen

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LAOS—PROFILE (2001 pop. 5.6 million). The landlocked and multiethnic Lao People's Democratic Republic has passed through many vicissitudes of history. It has maintained its unity and national identity in spite of foreign invasions and interference, poverty, and ideological conflict.



Geography

Situated in the northern part of the Indochinese peninsula in mainland Southeast Asia, Laos is bordered by China in the north, Myanmar (Burma) in the northwest, Thailand to the south and west, Vietnam to the east, and Cambodia to the south. It is 236,800 square kilometers in area. Some 1,835 kilometers of the Mekong river flows through it from north to south. Rugged lands, dense forests and mountainous terrain dominate most of the country. Two-thirds of the country is thick subtropical forest. Laos has a tropical monsoon climate, with a rainy season from May to October and a dry season from November to April.

People

With an average of nineteen people per square kilometer, Laos is one of the least densely populated countries in Asia. There are four broad population groupings in Laos: the Lao Lum (valley Lao, 68 percent), the Lao Theung (mountainside Lao, 22 percent), Lao Sung (mountaintop Lao, including Hmong and Yao, 9 percent), and ethnic Chinese and Vietnamese (1 percent). Diverse ethnic groups have settled in Laos in different periods of its history. The Lao Lum, originally a Tai people from southern China,



LAOS

Country name: Lao People's Democratic Republic
Area: 236,800 sq km
Population: 5,635,967 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 2.48% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 37.84 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 13.02 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio: 0.98 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 92.89 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth: total population: 53.48 years, male: 51.58 years, female: 55.44 years (2001 est.)
Major religion: Buddhist
Major languages: Lao (official), French, English, and various ethnic languages
Literacy: total population: 57%, male: 70%, female: 44% (1999 est.)
Government type: Communist state
Capital: Vientiane
Administrative divisions: 16 provinces, 1 municipality
Independence: 19 July 1949 (from France)
National holiday: Republic Day, 2 December (1975)
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal
GDP—real growth rate: 4% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita: (purchasing power parity): \$1,700 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: 46.1% (1993 est.)
Exports: \$323 million (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Imports: \$540 million (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Currency: kip (LAK)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Book Factbook 2001*. Retrieved 5 March 2002, from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>

migrated to Laos from the seventh century onwards. Belonging to the Mon-Khmer stock, the Lao Theung are the oldest inhabitants; they arrived in prehistoric times. Emigration from Laos became frequent after Laos became Communist in the latter part of 1975. At the start of the twenty-first century, 10 percent of the world's Lao population lived in Thailand, the United States, France, Canada, and Australia. About 80 percent of the population in Laos itself lived in rural areas. Lao is the nation's official language. The Marxist government sanctions Buddhism as the state religion.

History

A number of kingdoms, centered on urban settlements, arose in the beginning of the first century BCE. Parts of Laos came under the control of the Mon kingdoms of Dvaravati and Funan before the seventh century CE, but Prince Fa Ngoum (1353–1373), a Lao,

founded the first unified state, Lan Xang (land of a million elephants) in 1353. The powerful Lan Xang kingdom ruled Laos and areas of the Cambodian plateau, northeastern Thailand, and parts of Yunnan. In 1559 Laos lost control over the Vientiane region to Bayinnaung (1550–1581), the ruler of the Burmese Toungoo dynasty; the area remained under Burmese control until 1637, when the Lan Xang kingdom reasserted itself. Internal dissension and powerful neighbors brought its decline in 1713, and it splintered into the three kingdoms of Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Bassac. Laos became a French protectorate in 1893. During World War II, the Japanese took control of Laos and declared it independent; after the war, the Franco-Laotian Convention of July 1949 granted Laos internal autonomy only, leaving France in control of Laos's foreign and defense affairs. The Pathet Lao, a Communist nationalist movement, opposed the reestablishment of French con-

trol, and Laos was soon engulfed in the First Indochina War. Civil war continued through the 1960s, with the only hopes for peace pinned on the outcome of the conflict in Vietnam. On 2 December 1975, the Pathet Lao succeeded in establishing the Lao People's Democratic Republic. Suffering from the effects of three decades of war, Laos became dependent on Vietnam, with whom it signed a twenty-five-year treaty of friendship in 1977.

Toward the end of 1980s, Laos's leadership moved away from ideological rigidity and began a program of liberalizing the economy. A new liberal constitution was promulgated in August 1991, and relations with China, Thailand, the United States, and other Western countries improved. Laos became a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in July 1997. In spite of these advances, charges of human-rights violations are still made, with the allegation that the government has been responsible for the disappearance of some 300,000 people from 1975 to 2001. In March 2001, the Lao National Assembly decided to retain party chairman Khamtay Siphandone as president but made Bounngang Vorachit the premier.

Economy

The people of Laos have one of the lowest per capita incomes in the world (300 dollars), with about 46 percent of the population living below the poverty line. However, using the purchasing-power parity measure, gross domestic product per capita is estimated to be a much higher \$1,700, reflective of the relatively low cost of living in the country. About 70 percent of the people are farmers; common crops include rice, sweet potatoes, and coffee. Laos is rich in natural resources, including tin, copper, gold, lead, and timber. Its main items of export are electricity, timber and wood products, tin, textiles, and coffee, and its leading trade partners are Thailand, Vietnam, and Japan. Laos imports petroleum products, machinery and equipment, vehicles, cement, and steel. Although Asia's regional economic crisis of the mid-1990s hurt Laos, by the middle of 2000 its economy had stabilized. As a member of Mekong River Commission Council (MRCC), which Laos joined in 2001, Laos expects to boost rice production. At the start of the twenty-first century, its currency, the kip, hovered at between 7,500 and 8,000 to one U.S. dollar.

Culture

Interaction with the Khmer, Thai, and Indians has enriched the indigenous culture of Laos. Classical Lao literature, inscriptions, and language show Sanskrit and Pali influence. Themes from Indian literature are in abundance in folk songs, dramas, and theater. The



Laos is a largely rural nation. Here, men stand with their cattle in the village of Pan Phanom in Luang Prabang Province. (BOHEMIAN NOMAD PICTUREMAKERS/CORBIS)

Lao version of the *Ramayana*, the *Phra Lak Pha Lam*, reflects the environment and culture of Laos. It is a dance-drama performed to the accompaniment of Lao classical music.

Religion According to tradition, Buddhism came to Laos during the reign of the Indian emperor Asoka (reigned c. 265–238 BCE). Sculptures of Buddha in a standing position are distinctively indigenous. Lao religious life also is marked by belief in wandering spirits and souls of departed ones (*phi*).

Festivals Popular festivals include Boun Pimai, which celebrates the Lao New Year over the course of several days in April. In Luang Prabang, Boun Pimai celebrations include ablutions for Buddhist icons. Boun Bang Fai celebrates the start of the rainy season in May. At this festival, giant homemade bamboo rockets are launched skyward to summon the rains. The festival of Haw Khao Padap Din, which occurs in August, is a time to pay respects to the dead. November is the occasion of a huge festival at the temple of That Luang (the national symbol of Laos) in Vientiane. It takes place on the week of the full moon.

Music Although Laos has a long history of classical music, decades of warfare and instability have led to its decline. Folk music remains popular; the most common form of musical instrument is the *kbean*, or Lao panpipe, seven pairs of pipes made of bamboo. It provides the music for the most popular folk dance, the *Lamvong*, or Circle Dance, a folk dance in which couples move in circles.

Laos in the Twenty-first Century

In the early twenty-first century, Laos continues to move prudently from ideological orthodoxy to

economic pragmatism. There are signs of relative openness in society, although the regime still does not tolerate dissent. It is evident that the predictions of some pundits that Laos would cease to exist as a nation-state were wrong. Tentatively, Laos is moving toward a better future.

Patit Paban Mishra

See also: **Music, Folk—Laos; That Luang Festival.**

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LAOS—ECONOMIC SYSTEM Laos is one of the poorest countries in Asia. This is a result of such factors as a small population, the burden of a colonial past, and the adverse effects of geography. The socialist Pathet Lao (Lao Country party) government has opened the country to a limited form of market forces and is sustaining free-market conditions for its people, but that system has brought with it problems. For example, with a market-determined exchange rate, there was a dramatic and quite severe fall of the kip, Laos's currency, in 1998–1989.

Economic Geography of Laos

Laos is a landlocked country bordered by Vietnam to the east, China to the north, Cambodia to the south, Myanmar (Burma) to the northwest, and Thailand to the west and south. Borders are generally not firmly established and often follow geographical features; hence, cross-border movement is difficult to regulate and cross-border economic transactions may be beyond the reach of governments.

Much of the country is mountainous and heavily forested. The people are spread thinly across its extent, with only Vientiane (population of the city proper approximately 190,000) and the much smaller centers of Savannakhet, Pakse, and the ancient capital of Luang Phrabang representing major urban centers.

Transportation links are very few, although recently these have been improved. The paucity of the infrastructure makes it very difficult for central authorities to control patterns of development within regions.

There are both east-west and north-south divisions within the country. The southern regions possess the advantages of greater forest cover and of more fertile lands. They enjoy greater access to more flourishing markets based upon the exploitation of forest goods and of an agricultural surplus not available in northern provinces. Most of the population, meanwhile, is concentrated on the western border with Thailand, which is a region offering much greater opportunities for trade and communication than the eastern border with Vietnam which, while important for political reasons, remains an undeveloped zone economically. A small number of links across borders represent important nodes for development and communication. The link between the Thai town of Nong Khai and the Lao capital Vientiane, represented by the Australian-financed Friendship Bridge across the Mekong river, has become a vital conduit of commerce, and many Vientiane households routinely tune in to Thai television and radio broadcasts.

The country itself is ethnically diverse, and the principal ethnic groups are themselves composed of a variety of elements. The main ethnic groups are usually divided into three main categories, each of which has differential access to political power and economic opportunities. The most populous group are the Lao Loum (lowland Lao), who represent some 60 percent of the population; next are the Lao Thoeng (midland Lao), with 30 percent of the population; finally there are the Lao Soung (Lao of the highlands), with 10 percent of the population. Lao Soung and even Thoeng are sometimes referred to as *kha* (slaves), which is an offensive term and reflects popular public perception of them; they remain underrepresented at all governmental levels. Lao Thoeng are the oldest inhabitants of the country; they coexisted and borrowed from their Mon and Khmer neighbors. Toward the end of the first millennium CE, the Tai-speaking peoples migrated to the region and eventually enforced political superiority, forcing the Lao Thoeng upland, away from prime agricultural positions. Upland Lao have mostly migrated to Laos over the last century or so, largely from southern China and as a result of persecution of some kind or another; they wish to continue the swidden (slash-and-burn) agriculture that is their tradition. Some of these peoples have been active in growing and trafficking in opium to raise income and to sustain an armed struggle for independence. Groups such as the Hmong were involved in the Vietnam War

(1954–1975) on behalf of the United States and against the interests of the eventually victorious Pathet Lao government. Subsequently, many thousands have emigrated to the United States and elsewhere. The dispersal of an already small population has been a significant factor in the reduction of the level of human capital in the country.

Various attempts have been made by successive central administrations to bring the upland Laos and other ethnic groups into the mainstream of Lao political life—although this does not mean that upland Lao or women or other groups are appropriately represented within political life. However, as in neighboring Thailand, these attempts have been contested on the grounds that they are intended to change or damage the peoples' traditional lifestyle or otherwise infringe on their customs. That local officials are often obliged to act at a distance from central authority, with all the dangers of the potential for corruption or malfeasance that this represents, has exacerbated the situation. As in the case of the majority of mainland southeast Asia, certain remote regions are effectively under the control of unofficial local leaders who can operate beyond the reach of the law with respect to such activities as illegal logging, gambling, and cultivation of narcotics.

The Mekong river, which is a principal part of the western border of the country, represents a significant source of potential hydroelectric power and hence a stimulus to economic development. Already, a large station has been built at Nam Ngum, although the effects of the Asian financial crisis have significantly reduced demand for power regionally and so total capacity remains superfluous. Various mineral deposits have been surveyed, but these remain mostly unexploited owing to difficulties with infrastructure or else are worked only in a primitive fashion. Manufacturing is at a very low level and agriculture is primarily at the subsistence level; hence, exports are much lower than necessary imports. Foreign aid assistance represents a considerable source of income and skills within the economy.

Historical Patterns of Economic Development

Lao of the lowlands are a Tai people who began to migrate to mainland Southeast Asia, probably from southern China and northwestern Vietnam, from perhaps as early as the eighth century CE. However, evidence of settled Lao communities is sparse, and it is not until the end of the first millennium CE that evidence of settlements is unambiguous.

The Tai practiced a form of political and economic organization that emphasized the two-way connec-

tions between a prince or other official and his followers in a complex web of personal interaction and loyalties upon which geography had little bearing. In other words, the physical location of people and their leaders was of less importance than the personal, familial, or social ties which bound them together. There was little incentive therefore to attempt to delineate formal borders or to institute taxation schemes. Instead, institutions such as *corvée* labor were formalized to provide a tangible outcome to the accumulation of a surplus. Surplus labor could be used for public works, such as building temples. This system proved durable and did not change in essence until the arrival of the Europeans, when it was perverted by the French colonists who required that *corvée* labor be used to their direct benefit. The French also taxed the population. The requirement to provide both labor and taxes to rulers who seemed to provide nothing in return was met with outrage; indeed, Lao historians still have nothing good at all to say about colonization.

The period of colonization spawned and was succeeded by the spread of Communism throughout the region, and the armed struggle against the colonialists led to the intervention of other Western powers, notably the United States in its war against Vietnam and its unofficial offensives against Laos and Cambodia. Subsequently, Laos received per capita the heaviest aerial bombardment ever recorded. Ultimately, victory was achieved by the Pathet Lao, considerably supported by the Vietnamese. The Pathet Lao immediately instituted a series of revolutionary social and economic policies, including collectivization of agriculture and the abolition of many traditional practices and the much-revered lifestyle of monks. (Soon after coming to power, however, the Pathet Lao realized the necessity of embracing Buddhism, which it did.)

Contrary to the tenets of Marx, the party sought the institution of a socialist state without what had been considered to be the necessary intermediary step of capitalist development. The resources available to the Pathet Lao administration, therefore, were inadequate to rapid modernization. Given the numerous constraints and the war-weariness of the country, it is not surprising that the measures instituted were extremely difficult to enact and in some cases deeply resented. Political opposition was a part but not the whole of this. The agricultural system of rice farming, for example, is not amenable to the type of collectivized agriculture developed with a view to the very different conditions of the steppes of the Ukraine, while the demands for administrative and managerial competence necessarily enforced upon the population

were far more than they could generally accommodate. Aid from the Soviet bloc, meanwhile, was much lower than had been arriving from the Western world. Regulations on economic freedom and personal mobility persuaded many within the Chinese and Vietnamese communities within Vientiane and elsewhere to return to their homelands, taking as much capital with them as possible.

The period until 1986, when the New Economic Mechanism was announced and introduced, was therefore characterized by the inability of the government to enforce its developmental aims and subsequent disillusionment of the population. Difficulties were exacerbated by the Chinese-Vietnamese war of 1979, which forced Laos to take sides against one of its key allies and led to isolation from China.

Vietnam's *doi moi* (Renovation) economic plan (1986) and China's increasing economic liberalization under Deng Xiaoping helped to inspire a similar movement in Laos. This was formalized in the New Economic Mechanism of 1986, which aimed to provide a unique Lao solution to the problems of market development by combining a measure of economic freedom with a closed political system. This has led to improved ties with the outside world, most notably with Thailand, from which most external stimulus to growth has derived and is likely to continue to derive. Subsequently, such economic gains as have been achieved have outstripped even more the ability of the administration to deliver them equitably, and so income disparities and gender inequalities have been rising.

Economic Systems of Laos

The diversity and division within Laos have led to the development of a variety of more or less closed economic systems within and across its borders. These range from rice agriculture and some cash cropping in lowland regions, swidden (slash-and-burn) agriculture in the highlands, and some manufacturing and service activities for the small urban class. One important system that links Laos with its neighbors is border trading, which consists of numerous informal and occasionally illicit trading arrangements organized by small-scale traders particularly on the borders with southeastern China and eastern Thailand.

For those activities over which the government is able to exercise some authority, activities are regulated in accordance with specific policy goals. The further away from the center that activities take place, the less likely they are to receive government support or for the activities to support government policy. An important developmental goal for the Lao government

will be to integrate the activities of the periphery into a national economic system or systems that can provide a more equitable distribution of income and opportunities than presently exists or that is customarily provided by a market-driven system.

Constraints to Development

It is clear that the various economic systems pursued in Laos today are both inadequate to fulfill political national objectives and to compete internationally in a globalizing world. While there is plenty of advice from international bodies on how to liberalize trade, invite inward investment, and change (or "reform") government practices, there are difficulties attempting these initiatives. Difficulties include:

1. The small size and density of the population, together with the low levels of wealth, which means that there is little prospect for developing an indigenous manufacturing industry or for creating a domestic market with sufficient demand to attract foreign investment.
2. The paucity of the country's infrastructure—measured both in terms of lack of transportation links, social-welfare provision, and the ability of government to enact and enforce its policies, together with the underdeveloped nature of the human capital (that is, the low levels of education and training)—makes both the extraction of natural resources and the distribution and marketing of goods more demanding and expensive.
3. The lack of a modern business environment, including a firmly established legal framework and the presence of essential supply-chain components (for example, office supplies, market research, and advertising services, as well as skilled labor and manufacturing supplies) adds risk and delay to all business processes.

The most likely method of overcoming the problems is some form of integration with Laos's neighbors. This means setting up systems that will allow Laos to take advantage of the complementary advantages available in the region (for example, entrepreneurial competence and capital from Thailand and organized labor pools from Vietnam and China) in return to access to the resources within Laos.

Future Prospects

Future economic prospects depend to a considerable extent upon whether the states can deal with external forces and create mutually beneficial partnerships and alliances. In a market-led economy featuring openness to the world economic system, the Lao government's

relationship with significant trading partners such as Thailand and China will be of considerably more importance than the relationship with the politically important partner, Vietnam. Indeed, there is likely to be friction with Vietnam as competitiveness succeeds cooperation in relations between the two states. Laos will also need to manage its relationships with global players such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Over-precipitous opening of the economy will not benefit the Lao people, since very few will be able to secure the fruits of economic opportunities in a competitive environment. The government must continue to try to draw the country together and seek to develop its human capital while identifying and strengthening industries that might provide sustainable comparative advantage. The Seventh Congress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, which took place in March 2001, reiterated commitments to creating a market economy in Laos while giving few if any concessions to political liberalization. However, the acknowledgment of difficulties with the economic planning process and of critical lack of resources gives some support to the belief that a greater cooperative effort will be possible in the future. Identifying which officials seem set to occupy leading positions within the party remains of considerable importance since there remains little in the way of transparency or openness in political circles. While personalities continue to rank in importance with policies, prospects for the future remain needlessly clouded.

John Walsh

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LAOS—EDUCATION SYSTEM The Lao educational system has a long history, extending from early, traditional temple education to contemporary

education in the transitional economy of the Lao People's Democratic Republic. The current regime faces complex challenges in improving education in the context of the country's increased global connections and amid economic problems exacerbated by the Asian economic crisis of 1997.

Historical and Political Background

A major motif of Lao history is the country's remarkable survival as a distinct political and cultural entity despite small population and being landlocked and surrounded by large, powerful neighbors such as China, Vietnam, Thailand, and Myanmar. The original Lao kingdom that flourished between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries was known as Lan Xang (land of a million elephants). Seriously weakened in the early eighteenth century when it broke into three smaller kingdoms, Lan Xang fell into the Siamese orbit and then under French colonialism.

Traditional Temple Education

As in neighboring countries such as Thailand and Cambodia, Buddhist priests traditionally provided basic education, moral training, and the fundamentals of a literary culture to children in village temples. But given the limited roles of women in the Buddhist priesthood, this system did discriminate against women. Because education at temple schools provided preparation for becoming a monk, it was limited to males because females could not become monks. Women's education was informal in the family context for rural women or in royal compounds for elite women.

French Colonial Influence on Lao Education (1893–1975)

After Laos became a French colony in 1893, the traditional Buddhist educational system became less important as the French introduced elitist, secular French-language education oriented to the "civilizing" mission of the colonial power. In 1946, only a miniscule 2 percent of Lao school-age children were enrolled in school. The reason for the low enrollment was French unwillingness to support education in the countryside. Even after Laos gained nominal independence in 1949, the elitist, French-language educational system continued to dominate until genuine independence was finally achieved in 1975. U.S. influence during the 1954–1975 period led to considerable expansion of Lao education with the establishment of high schools, vocational schools, and teacher training institutions. Enrollments in 1971–1972 were seventeen times higher than in 1946.



EDUCATION AND NATIONALISM IN LAOS

Phoumi Vongvichit, a leading Laotian intellectual, reflects on education and nationalism in Laos.

The leading idea in my research and writing of this book *Lao Grammar* is for the grammar of Lao to belong to the nation, and to the people, and for it to be progressive, modern, and scientific. . . . Every principle, and every term used herein is intended to be simple, so that the general populace, of high or low education, may easily understand and utilize the principles and various terms in the easiest possible way.

Every country in the world has its own principles of speech and writing, its own linguistic principles which may demonstrate the style and honor of the nation, and demonstrate the cultural independence of the nation, along with independence in political, economic, and other arenas.

Source: Phoumi Vongvichit quoted in "Lao as a National Language" by N. J. Enfield. (1999) In *Laos: Culture and Society*, edited by Grant Evans. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 269–270.

Educational Reforms of the Lao PDR (1975 to Present)

The Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), established 2 December 1975, initiated three major reforms. The first was to consolidate independence and replace French schooling with a Lao-language, mass-education system. Reflecting this commitment, 1996–1997 primary school enrollments were over three times higher than in 1971–1972. Expansion was hampered, however, by a lack of qualified teachers and poor infrastructure.

The second major reform occurred in 1986 when the Lao PDR adopted a new economic policy (the New Economic Mechanism, or NEM) calling for increased use of market mechanisms in the economy and decreased state and central planning. This meant that education had to be rationalized to serve the needs of an increasingly privatized economy. This reform also permitted privatization within the education system in order to expand opportunity and reduce the financial burden on the government.

The third major reform began in 1991 and continued throughout the 1990s. In the initial stages of socialism, responsibility for education had become highly decentralized, resulting in growing regional disparities.

In 1991 education began to be recentralized, with greater authority resting with the Ministry of Education.

With the opening of the Lao economy following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Lao government actively sought international educational assistance from agencies such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and bilateral donors such as the Nordic countries and Switzerland. The country has used such external funds for enhancing physical infrastructure, developing textbooks, and providing training of educational administrators, teacher educators, and teachers for Lao nationals. Partly thanks to external assistance, Lao expenditures on education in 1996–1997 represented 2.9 percent of GDP, a figure higher than that of China, the Philippines, and Indonesia. In 1996–1997, 15.8 percent of the national budget went to education, putting Laos ahead of countries such as Malaysia, India, and Indonesia, and nearly equal to Korea.

Lao primary education currently lasts five years, followed by three years of lower secondary, three years of upper secondary, and then three to seven years of tertiary education, depending on the field. In 1995, the National University of Laos (NUOL) was established by consolidating four existing tertiary institutions.

Major Contemporary Problems Facing Lao Education

Despite the major reforms initiated during the twenty-five years of socialism, major educational problems persist. Relatively few Lao young people complete the various levels of education. For the 1996–1997 school year, 20 percent received no education at all, while only 13.9 percent completed primary education, 8.6 percent lower secondary, 4.8 percent upper secondary, and 4 percent tertiary education.

Given the country's sparsely populated remote areas and many ethnic minorities, access to education is problematic, and significant regional disparities exist. The 1995 national census indicates that 47.5 percent of the population were of diverse ethnic minorities. As a result, roughly half of those entering grade one are taught in a language that is not their native tongue.

There are also serious gender issues in Lao education, exacerbated by high fertility levels in Laos and

heavy household burdens for women and female children. The government's establishment of a special Gender and Ethnic Minorities Education Unit within the Ministry of Education reflects its concern about such access issues.

Though the Lao PDR devotes considerable funds deriving from international assistance to education, recurrent funding of education is low compared to other countries in the region. It is thus often difficult to sustain educational projects initiated with external assistance.

Since 1998 the Lao government has faced a severe economic crisis. Major inflation and a significant devaluation of the Lao kip (the nation's currency) have adversely affected the economy and the government's ability to finance improvements in education. Despite these serious problems mainly related to formal schooling, the Lao PDR excels in areas such as fostering strong moral education, quality parenting, social cohesion, and a sense of national identity. As well, the adverse effects of media are carefully controlled and restricted.

Gerald Fry



Girls practice dancing at a school in Vientiane, Laos. (NIK WHEELER/CORBIS)

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LAOS—HISTORY The modern boundaries of Laos date only from 1907, and include only a fraction of the people who have historically called themselves Lao. Throughout its history, the classical Lao kingdom of Lan Xang (fourteenth–eighteenth centuries) and its successor kingdoms covered territory that now falls within northeastern Thailand. Any history of Laos cannot avoid, therefore, including territory and people that no longer fall under the jurisdiction of modern Laos.



KEY EVENTS IN LAOS HISTORY

- 500 BCE** The culture of the Plain of Jars flourishes.
- c. 500 CE** Small Indian-influenced kingdoms emerge.
- 14th–18th centuries** Period of the Lan Xang Kingdom.
- 18th century** Lan Xang splits into three antagonistic kingdoms, which fall under Siamese domination.
- 1893** France forces Siam to cede all Lao territories east of the Mekong.
- 1907** A treaty between France and Siam establishes the present frontiers of Laos.
- 1945** The Japanese displace the French, and Laos declares its independence.
- 1946–1954** Period of the First Indochinese War.
- 1946** France regains power, the Laos government is forced into exile, and the Kingdom of Laos is established.
- 1949** Laos is granted limited independence.
- 1950** Nationalists declare the government of the Pathet Lao.
- 1953** Laos becomes an independent nation.
- 1957–1958** Laos moves toward reunification with reintegration of the two Communist provinces.
- 1959–1960** A series of coups destroys the coalition government and civil war begins.
- 1963–1973** During the Vietnam War, Laos remains a divided nation and the government is under U.S. control.
- 1975** The Lao People's Democratic Republic is formed.
- 1977** Laos signs a 25-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Vietnam.
- 1980s** Political and economic reforms encourage capitalism and open elections.
- 1994** The first bridge across the Mekong River is opened near Vientiane.
- 1997** Laos joins ASEAN.
- 1997–1998** The economy is damaged by the Asian economic crisis.

In modern Laos, lowland or ethnic Lao comprise not much more than half the population. The remainder is made up of people speaking other Tai dialects, Austroasiatic languages, Hmong-Mien, and Tibeto-Burman languages. The history of Laos, therefore, is also a history of these ethnic groups, the last two of which only began entering Laos from southern China early in the nineteenth century.

Human occupation of Laos goes back to the Stone Age. Bronze and Iron Age cultures developed both in northeast Thailand and on the Plain of Jars. The culture of the Plain of Jars flourished around 500 BCE and was characterized by massive carved stone mortuary urns, the "jars" after which the plateau is named. We know little about these people, but it is likely that they were ancestors of the Khamu, the largest Austroasiatic-speaking group in northern Laos.

The Lao Kingdom of Lan Xang Hom Khao

By the middle of the first millennium CE, small Indianized kingdoms were being established in the middle Mekong basin. Over the next few centuries, Tai-speaking peoples began spreading into northern Laos, forcefully founding their own principalities (*meuang*). In the early thirteenth century the kingdoms of the middle Mekong were absorbed into the expanding Khmer empire. Within a century, however, as Khmer power declined, larger Tai kingdoms were established. Among these was the Lao kingdom of Lan Xang Hom Khao (A Million Elephants and the White Parasol), a title signifying both military might and royal kingship.

For two centuries, Luang Prabang was the capital of the Lao kingdom. During this time, Theravada Buddhism became established as the dominant religion; it legitimized kingly rule in return for royal patronage. As Lao settlers continued migrating south, the center of population shifted. In the face of Burmese invasions in the mid-sixteenth century, King Xetathirat (1533–1571) moved the Lao capital to Viang Chan (Vientiane).

The seventeenth century marked the apogee of Lao power. The first European merchants and missionaries to reach the Lao capital left glowing reports of the wealth and pomp of the court of King Surinyavongsa (1615–1694). Already, however, the balance of power was shifting in mainland Southeast Asia to the maritime kingdoms that could benefit from increasing trade with China and the West. In the early eighteenth century, Lan Xang split into three antagonistic kingdoms, each of which soon fell under Siamese domination.

French Occupation and World War II

In 1827, King Anuvong (1767–1828), the last ruler of Vientiane, made a desperate attempt to free his kingdom from Siamese suzerainty. Bangkok's response was swift. The Lao were defeated and their capital was sacked. French explorers who reached the Lao territories in the 1860s found a beautiful but impoverished

land. It was the situation of these territories astride the Mekong that attracted the French, for they hoped the river would provide navigable access to China. That hope proved ill-founded, but the French were determined to expand their Indochina empire.

In 1893 France forced Siam to cede all Lao territories east of the Mekong. A subsequent treaty in 1907 established the present frontiers of the Lao state. As their new possession provided little economic benefit, the French allowed Laos to remain a sleepy backwater. Some ethnic minorities fought the imposition of French rule, but among the lowland Lao, nationalist feelings were slow to develop.

Laos was woken from its slumber by World War II. Siam, renamed Thailand in 1939, took advantage of French weakness to seize Lao territories west of the Mekong. In response to the pan-Thaïism emanating from Bangkok, the French deliberately encouraged Lao nationalism. When in April 1945 the Japanese overthrew the French administration, the king of Luang Prabang (1885–1959) was forced to declare the independence of Laos.

Six months later Japan surrendered. The king promptly abrogated his declaration of independence, but nationalists of the Lao Issara (Free Lao) quickly took advantage of the power vacuum to establish an independent government under the leadership of Prince Phetxarat (1890–1959). This lasted only six months before the French forcibly reoccupied Laos, forcing the Lao Issara to seek exile in Thailand. From there they waged a diplomatic and guerrilla campaign against continued French control of their homeland.

Impact of the Indochinese Wars

With the outbreak of war in Vietnam in 1946, the French recognized that some concessions to Lao aspirations were inevitable. The country was unified as the Kingdom of Laos, with the king of Luang Prabang as head of state. A constitution was drawn up, with Laos designated a member state within the French Union. Greater though still limited independence granted in 1949 was enough to convince the moderate wing of the Lao Issara led by Prince Souvanna Phouma (1901–1984) to accept an amnesty and return home to take part in the political process.

The radical wing refused an amnesty and instead joined forces with the Viet Minh, the Communist-dominated revolutionary movement fighting the French in Vietnam. In August 1950, close to the Lao-Vietnamese frontier, the radical nationalists, under the leadership of Souvanna Phouma's half brother, Prince

Souphanouvong (1909–1995), proclaimed their own government of Pathet Lao (Land of the Lao), the name by which the Lao revolutionary movement was known thereafter.

For the next four years, Laos was caught up in the First Indochinese War. At first it was relatively sheltered, as the Pathet Lao were militarily weak. In April 1953, however, Viet Minh forces struck deep into Laos, threatening the royal capital of Luang Prabang. The king refused to leave the city, and the Viet Minh eventually withdrew. As they left, they handed over large areas of northeastern Laos to the Pathet Lao. It was to prevent a second such invasion that the French established a base at Dien Bien Phu, in Vietnam. And it was the fall of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954 that ended the First Indochinese War.

In the meantime, however, France had granted full Lao independence in October 1953. Two years later, in December 1955, the Kingdom of Laos was granted full membership of the United Nations. Under the terms of the Geneva Agreements that formally concluded the First Indochinese War, the Pathet Lao were assigned two provinces in northeastern Laos as regroupment areas for their forces. These were to be reintegrated into the Kingdom through fair and free elections to be held within two years.

The process of reintegration did not, however, proceed easily. Negotiations continued throughout 1955, without success. In December, elections were held in all but the two provinces under Pathet Lao control, and Souvanna Phouma formed a new government. Immediately he entered into new negotiations with Souphanouvong with a view to accepting the Lao Patriotic Front as a legitimate political party that could take part in a coalition government of national unity. In doing so, however, he encountered concerted opposition from the United States.

By early 1956 the United States had replaced France as the dominant Western power in Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam, countries that it was determined to save from Communism. In the context of the Cold War, any government including Communists was anathema to Washington, and over the next two years the U.S. embassy in Vientiane did all in its power to torpedo Souvanna Phouma's negotiations with Souphanouvong. Souvanna pushed resolutely on, however, and on 19 November 1957, the Lao National Assembly unanimously endorsed formation of a government of national union in which the Pathet Lao were given two ministries in a cabinet of fourteen. Supplementary elections the following May gave them

representation in parliament, much to American alarm.

The immediate American response was to throw its weight behind both the political right and the Royal Lao Army (RLA). In July 1958, American aid was withheld from the coalition government. Souvanna was forced to resign, to be replaced by a more conservative leader. Negotiations to integrate two Pathet Lao battalions into the RLA meanwhile collapsed, allowing Pathet Lao troops to return to the Lao-Vietnam border area, where they could again be supplied by the North Vietnamese.

In December 1959 military strongman General Phoumi Nosavan (1920–1985) mounted a coup d'état. A military-dominated government took power and Pathet Lao members of the National Assembly were imprisoned. New elections were held, blatantly rigged to ensure that no leftist candidates were elected, even from areas under Pathet Lao control. All pretense of coalition between conservatives and Communists was at an end, and fighting recommenced.

The descent into civil war horrified many Lao. On 9 August 1960, Captain Kong Lae (b. 1934), commander of an elite paratroop battalion, staged a coup in the name of national reconciliation and neutrality. Souvanna Phouma was again named prime minister. The United States, however, threw its weight behind General Phoumi, who assembled his forces and, in the Battle of Vientiane, seized the capital. The neutralists withdrew to the Plain of Jars, where they joined forces with the Pathet Lao. The country was again divided, with two governments: one in Vientiane recognized by the West, and one on the Plain of Jars recognized by the Communist bloc.

This was the situation faced by the new administration of U.S. President John F. Kennedy in 1961. Laos, rather than Vietnam, had become the Cold War flash point in Asia. Kennedy decided to seek a political resolution of the crisis. A new international conference was convened in Geneva, which in July 1962 agreed on the neutrality of Laos and formation of a second coalition government, again with Souvanna Phouma as prime minister. But already it was too late. Political polarization had gone too far, and Laos could not avoid being dragged into the war the United States was fighting in Vietnam. Within a year the coalition had collapsed, and Lao neutrality was but a mask behind which North Vietnam and the United States fought a clandestine war in Laos.

This war was fought in two theaters. In northern Laos, particularly in the region of the Plain of Jars,

Pathet Lao forces, massively reinforced by Vietnamese "volunteers," were opposed by a secret army, trained and equipped by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. This secret army was recruited mainly from among the Hmong and other ethnic minorities and was commanded by the Hmong general Vang Pao. The second theater was the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the network of jungle tracks through southeastern Laos along which North Vietnamese troops infiltrated south to join the fighting in South Vietnam. In both areas the United States conducted a secret bombing campaign, which, by the time the war ended with the cease-fire of February 1973, left Laos the most heavily bombed country, per capita, in the history of warfare.

During the decade from 1963 to 1973, the United States ensured that Souvanna Phouma remained prime minister, while Souvanna turned a blind eye to violations of Lao neutrality. During this period, the U.S. Agency for International Development constituted what amounted to a parallel administration in Laos, while massive amounts of military and economic aid kept the country afloat. While it spared the towns along the Mekong River, the war had a devastating impact. Tens of thousands died, with casualties among the Hmong particularly high.

The Lao People's Democratic Republic

Yearlong negotiations led in 1974 to formation of a third coalition government, this time with half the ministries held by the Pathet Lao, to reflect their greater military and political strength. Like earlier coalitions, however, it lasted barely a year. Communist seizures of power in Cambodia and South Vietnam in April 1975 opened the way for the Pathet Lao to dispense with the pretense of coalition government in Laos. On 2 December 1975, the six-century-old Lao monarchy was swept aside to make way for the Lao People's Democratic Republic, but only after thousands of Royal Lao civil servants and military officers had been incarcerated in reeducation camps. Souphanuvong was named president of the new republic, but real power lay in the hands of Kaysone Phomvihane (1920–1992), secretary-general of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP), which had secretly been the guiding force behind the Pathet Lao throughout what they called their "thirty-year struggle" for power since 1945. Kaysone was half Vietnamese and enjoyed close relations with the Vietnamese Communist leadership. In 1977 Laos signed a twenty-five-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Vietnam. Relations were also close with the Soviet Union.

At first the new government instituted a hard-line policy along strict Communist lines. Economic controls were placed on the production and distribution of goods, and the government nationalized what little industry there was. Personal freedoms were curtailed and limitations placed on the practice of religion. The previous constitution and legal framework were abolished and replaced by the arbitrary rule of the LPRP and people's courts. As the bubble economy that had been maintained by American aid collapsed, and more and more people were sent off for reeducation, thousands of Lao fled across the Mekong into Thailand. Eventually some 300,000 people (10 percent of the population) fled, including many Hmong and most of the country's educated class.

Centralization of power in the upper echelon of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party and a desperate lack of qualified personnel made it difficult to administer the country efficiently. Drought and the decision to cooperatize agriculture only exacerbated the situation. Then in January 1979 Vietnamese forces occupied Cambodia, overthrowing the Khmer Rouge regime of Pol Pot, China reacted by attacking Vietnam, and Laos found itself once again embroiled in the animosities of its neighbors. Laos sided with Vietnam, making a new enemy of China and bringing an end to China's much-needed economic assistance.

In the face of a deteriorating security situation (anti-Communist Lao insurgents were operating out of Thailand and China), the Party was forced to rethink its economic policies. The agricultural cooperatization program was terminated, and the government admitted that, given the stage of Lao economic development, there was after all a place for private enterprise and initiative. Social controls were loosened, and even Party members began attending Buddhist festivals. As the economy improved and the international situation became less threatening, the Party felt secure enough to hold its Third Congress, its first since coming to power.

Reforms in both the structure of the Party and the government, including a crackdown on corruption, were followed by the decision further to reform the economy—but only after furious debate within the Party. Under what became known as the New Economic Mechanism (*chintanakan mai*), capitalist foreign investment was welcomed. Meanwhile relations were mended with Thailand and China. As the economy began moving inexorably toward a free market system, the first elections were held for the Supreme People's Assembly in March 1989. Two years later a constitution was finally promulgated and elections held for the new National Assembly in December 1992.

By this time Communism had collapsed in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and Laos could only look to Vietnam and China for political support. For desperately needed foreign aid to meet chronic deficits in both the budget and balance of payments, however, Vientiane turned to international lending institutions and Western aid donors. In the 1990s the country enthusiastically embraced regional integration. In April 1994 a first bridge across the Mekong was opened near Vientiane, road construction was stepped up, and Laos embarked on an ambitious program of hydroelectric dam construction.

All this was cut short by the Asian economic crisis of 1997–1998. Investment dried up and the Lao currency collapsed. This did not stop Laos from joining the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in July 1997, but it did lead to a slowdown of economic reform, as the more conservative military took control of the Party (following the death of Kaysone, and his replacement by General Khamtai Siphandone as Party and state president). Laos thus entered the new millennium with some trepidation, in desperate need of both economic and political reform, neither of which seemed likely.

Martin Stuart-Fox

See also: **Laos—Political System; Pathet Lao; Souphanouvong; Souvanna Phouma**

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LAOS—POLITICAL SYSTEM The major motif of Laos's political history has been the struggle



THE FOUNDING OF THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Below is the statement from the Declaration of the National Congress of People's Representatives of 2 December 1975, the day of founding of the Lao People's Democratic Republic:

This victory signifies a fundamental change in the destiny of our nation and society, opening a new era of rapid and vigorous progress of our motherhood on the road of independence, unity and prosperity, and ensuring the well-being, freedom and happiness of all the ethnic groups for all time.

Source: Kayson Phommavhane. (1981) *Revolution in Laos*. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 9.

for unity and political independence. Laos as a political identity dates back to 1353, when King Tiao Fa Ngum, a national hero, unified the country and formed the kingdom of Lan Xang (the land of a million elephants). This kingdom was a conservative, traditional monarchy for centuries, until 2 December 1975, when, after a successful revolutionary struggle, the country was transformed into the Lao People's Democratic Republic.

Pre-Colonial Laos

The major challenges facing ancient Laos were threats from its neighbors, particularly the Siamese and the Burmese. Lan Xang achieved its greatest glory under the reign of King Surinyavongsa (reigned 1683–1695). At this time, Laos controlled more territory than at any other time in its history, including what is now northern and northeastern Thailand. Following Surinyavongsa's rule, succession disputes resulted in Lan Xang's breaking up into three separate kingdoms (1707–1713). The subsequent weakness caused Laos to fall into the Siamese orbit within a century (1779).

The French Colonial Period, 1893–1949 Through actual armed confrontation between the French and the Siamese in 1893, the French gained complete control of Siamese Laos. Thus, "French Laos" became a reality in 1893 and, importantly, led to the reunification of the country.

Auguste Pavie served as France's first commissioner-general for Laos, and he was determined to "make of Laos a French country" (Stuart-Fox 1997: 23). Examples of the attempt to do this included the education of elite Lao in the French language and the mandating of French as the language of instruction in schools. French treatment of Laos could be termed adverse neglect. Both a head tax and corvée labor caused resentment among the Lao. Not surprisingly, numerous rebellions against the French ensued, resulting in the eventual formation of the Lao Issara (Lao independence) movement.

"Independence," the Neocolonial Period, and Revolutionary Struggle, 1949–1975

At the end of World War II, the French returned to the region to resume their control of Laos. On 19 July 1949, Laos became "independent" under the French Union, with French influence continuing until 1975. As the result of the Geneva Agreements, Laos in reality became a torn country, with the Pathet Lao (a Communist revolutionary movement) taking control of so-called liberated areas in the northeast of the country. Thus, Laos was drawn into the vortex of the Cold War, and civil war continued until 1975.

The Current Political System of the Lao People's Democratic Republic

The major pillars of the ideology of the victorious socialist regime were peace, independence, democracy, welfare, and unity. These are not simply slogans but fundamentally reflect the political culture of modern Laos under the leadership of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP). After assuming power, the Party even introduced a policy to reform the Lao language, to make it both easier to learn and more egalitarian, eliminating many feudalistic aspects of the language. For example, many honorific titles and status identifiers were removed.

In 1986, the Lao also moved to implement economic reforms to allow for free-market mechanisms (*chintanagan mai*). After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the loss of aid from the Eastern-bloc countries, the LPDR began to foster relations with the West, leading to considerable multilateral and bilateral assistance in the 1990s.

Nature of the Lao Power Structure and System of Governance Interestingly, it was not until 1991 that a new constitution was introduced. The national sym-

bol was at the same time changed from the hammer and sickle to the That Luang Buddhist temple, reflecting the regime's early realization that it would be pragmatic to embrace Buddhism, given the popularity of the religion among the masses.

Laos remains a one-party state but does have an elected National Assembly (formerly known as the Supreme People's Assembly). Basically, national policy is determined at Party Congresses (held every four to five years), and the National Assembly debates and discusses the laws necessary to implement those policies. The government ministries are then responsible for administering the laws. There is usually a balance in the power structure within each ministry between strategically placed Party people and technocrats, which provides a rather unusual system of checks and balances.

The Party Congress elects the Central Committee and the Politburo. The most powerful political body is the Politburo, still dominated by an older generation with revolutionary experience, but who generally have limited formal education. It has eight members, who are drawn from the Party's Central Committee, which is currently composed of forty-nine members. The members of the Politburo hold key positions in the power structure of the country. Six members of the current Politburo are generals. Their average age is approximately sixty-six.

To be elected to the National Assembly, it is not necessary to be a member of the Party. Numerous non-Party candidates are commonly elected. Elections for the National Assembly take place every five years, with the last one having been held in 1997. The National Assembly appoints the president, who in turn appoints the prime minister and cabinet.

Media (controlled by the state) discussions of politics are always dominated by the phrase *pak lae lat* (party and state). Interestingly, the word "Communist" is never used. Free expression in terms of opposition to the current one-party political system is simply not tolerated.

Lao Political Leaders General Khamtai Siphandon (b. 1924), who has been LPRP chairman since 1992, has been president of the LPDR since 1998. General Sisavat Keobounphan, prime minister since 2001, co-founded the Lao People's Army with Khamtai. Laos's most revered political figure is the late Kayson Phomvihane (1920–1992), a revolutionary hero who was the nation's major political leader (serving first as prime minister and then as president) until his death.

Local Politics and Governance Local authorities have considerable independence in decision making, and the 1991 constitution "has left governors, mayors, and district and village chiefs free to 'administer their regions and localities without any assistance from popularly elected bodies'" (Brown and Zasloff 1995: 224). Both women and minorities have served as governors.

Major Challenges Facing the Lao Polity and Party

Currently the LPRP faces some of its most serious challenges since coming to power. A major question currently being discussed internationally is how effective the Lao political system will be in dealing with the economic challenge stemming from the aftermath of the 1997 Asian economic crisis, which led the Lao currency to fall in value approximately ninefold by June 1999.

With its amalgam of socialist politics, capitalist market mechanisms, and Buddhism, Laos has a unique political system. The LPDR, with a highly favorable ratio of people to natural resources, also has the potential to become a Switzerland of Southeast Asia. To achieve such a goal, it must have inspiring political leadership. The future of the current political system depends fundamentally on the extent to which it remains faithful to its revolutionary ideals and demonstrates genuine commitment to and success in improving the welfare of the Lao people.

Gerald Fry

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LAOS-THAILAND RELATIONS The lowland peoples of Laos and Thailand are both ethnically Thai and share important cultural traits such as cooperative, wet-rice cultivation and a belief in Theravada Buddhism. The Lao and Thai languages, while different in important ways, are mutually intelligible. Since Laos became communist in 1975, however, the languages have diverged significantly. Over time the Lao Isaan language of northeast Thailand has become Thai-ized, while Lao has become more egalitarian and simplified to facilitate enhanced literacy. Approximately one-third of Thailand's current population is ethnically Lao.

At the apogee of its power in the 1600s, the Lao Kingdom of Lan Xang (land of a million elephants) controlled much of present-day northeast and northern Thailand. In the early 1700s, succession conflicts caused Lan Xang to split into three independent kingdoms. Subsequent weakness led to Laos falling under the Siamese orbit in 1779. In both 1778 and 1828, Siamese armies sacked the Lao capital, Vientiane, and during the 1778 attack they captured the precious Emerald Buddha. Also many Lao were relocated to Siam to serve as *corvée* labor. In 1893, Siam began to lose its Lao territories to the French and Laos eventually became part of colonial French Indochina.

Laos achieved independence in 1951 but was subsequently drawn into the Cold War and conflict in Vietnam. Thailand and the United States actively supported the rightist faction in Laos, while the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, and China supported the revolutionary Pathet Lao. U.S. bombers, using Thai air bases, continually bombed Laos for eight years (1965–1973), making it the most bombed country in history. The United States also paid Thai mercenaries to fight against the leftist Pathet Lao. After prolonged civil war, the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) was founded on 2 December 1975.

Relations between the Lao PDR and Thailand were tense for the next fifteen years, reflecting their Cold



The Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge crosses the Mekong River near Nong Khai, Laos. (NIK WHEELER/CORBIS)

War alignments. In early 1988, there was a three-month border war between the two countries. With the Soviet collapse and the end of major Soviet economic support, Laos liberalized its policies toward Thailand and other noncommunist countries. In the 1990s Laos-Thailand relations improved greatly, and Thailand became Laos's major economic partner, source of external investment, and also supplier of tourists. As Thai influence in Laos increased, there was considerable concern about excessive Thai cultural and linguistic influence. In this regard the Lao-Thai relationship mirrors the Canada-United States relationship.

After the Asian economic crisis, ignited by the devaluation of the Thai baht on 2 July 1997, Thai investments in Laos dropped dramatically to only 4.8 percent of total international investment (1999), and Laos increasingly turned to its socialist neighbors, China and Vietnam, for economic and political support. Both Thailand and Laos have demonstrated skill in "bamboo diplomacy"—remarkable flexibility in adjusting to complex, changing, and threatening situations—a means of preserving their cultural identities and sovereignty.

Gerald W. Fry

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LAOS-VIETNAM RELATIONS In 1479 a Vietnamese army invaded the Lao kingdom of Lan Xang and sacked its capital, Luang Prabang. Although Vietnam at times exercised political control over the Plain of Jars in the north, not until 1953 was Luang Prabang again threatened by a Vietnamese army. At that time the city was spared, and the Vietnamese had Lao allies in the form of the Pathet Lao, the Lao revolutionary movement.

Throughout the First (1946–1954) and Second (1954–1975) Indochina Wars, both the political and military wings of the Pathet Lao enjoyed close relations with their Vietnamese counterparts. Vietnamese Communists advised the fledgling secret Lao People's Party (later the Lao People's Revolutionary Party). Vietnamese "volunteers" trained, equipped, and fought



This Vietnam War liberation poster which hangs in a war museum in Laos symbolizes the strong relations between the two nations. (TIM PAGE/CORBIS)

alongside Lao People's Liberation Army forces. At the same time, right-wing elements within the royal Lao government and military developed friendly relations with the Republic of (South) Vietnam.

With the formation of the Lao People's Democratic Republic in December 1975, relations with the unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam became even closer. In July 1977 the two countries signed a twenty-five-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, under the terms of which not only did Vietnam supply Laos with economic advice and assistance but also Vietnamese troops were stationed in Laos. In fact up to fifty thousand Vietnamese troops remained in Laos until 1989, when they were withdrawn at the same time that Vietnamese forces were withdrawn from Cambodia, as a precondition for improved relations between Hanoi and Beijing.

The strength of Lao-Vietnamese relations was demonstrated in 1979 when Laos sided with Vietnam

against China in the aftermath of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. This led to difficult relations with China, which did not improve for several years. Meanwhile relations with Vietnam continued to be multifaceted, covering everything from training of party cadres and advice on economic planning to media, communications, and provision of educational materials. As between communist states, relations operated on three levels: government to government, party to party, and military to military, and in the early 1980s Laos was little more than a client state of Vietnam. What led to the loosening of the Vietnamese embrace was the need to diversify sources of foreign aid and investment, and that meant improving relations with Thailand and the West.

Close relations between Laos and Vietnam continued into the 1990s, however, based on the twin foundations of common revolutionary experience as comrades-in-arms and commitment to a common ideology. This was particularly so after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the return of Cambodia to a multi-party political system. Though Laos opened up its economy to foreign, especially Thai, investment, political and military relations with Vietnam remained paramount. For Laos the relationship reinforced regime security; for Vietnam it kept alive old ambitions to dominate Indochina.

Following the Asian economic crisis of 1997–1998, Laos again turned for assistance and advice to Vietnam. Given the dominance of the military in the upper echelons of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, relations are likely to remain close well into the new millennium.

Martin Stuart-Fox

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LAO-TAI LANGUAGE Lao is the official language of the Lao People's Democratic Republic. Lao is spoken by the political majority, the Lao Loum or

Lowland Lao, and by other ethnic groups as a second language. The Lao Loum are composed of the Tai Lao, primarily occupying river valleys, and upland Tai groups, together making up 68 percent of the 5.4 million inhabitants of Laos (1999). Other Tai groups in Laos include the Tai Lue, Tai Daeng, Tai Dam, Phu Thai, and Saek.

Lao is a monosyllabic, tonal language, and its structure is based on the initial consonant, vowel nucleus, optional final consonant, and tone. Lao has six tones: low, mid, rising, high, low falling, and high falling. Polysyllabic words found in Lao have been borrowed from Pali, Sanskrit, and French. Lao has also borrowed from Vietnamese, especially since 1975.

There are many regional dialects of Lao, such as Luang Prabang dialect, Xieng Khouang dialect, and Vientiane dialect. These regional dialects vary in phonology, tones, and vocabulary. Vientiane dialect, the language spoken in the capital, may be considered the national standard, but its use is not enforced. Lao has its own written script originating from the Khmer script, consisting of thirty-three consonants and twenty-eight vowels.

The socialist regime has attempted to standardize the written language. Phoumi Vongvichit, a Pathet Lao revolutionary and a strong supporter of Lao identity and culture, wrote the book *Lao Grammar* in 1967 prior to the revolution and influenced the standardization of Lao grammar and spelling. His work also simplified the language to facilitate literacy efforts and eliminated feudalistic aspects of the language associated with Lao royalty to affirm the revolution's egalitarianism.

Lao is a member of the Southwestern Tai language group in the Tai-Kadai ethnolinguistic family. Tai languages range west from Assam province in India, with the written Ahom language, east to Hainan Island in China, inhabited by the Li. Tai speakers are found in northern Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, Laos, northern Vietnam, and southern China. Tai-speaking peoples began to inhabit Laos and other parts of Southeast Asia a thousand years ago after migrating from the area around southern China and northern Vietnam and established autonomous political entities two hundred years later.

The Lao government claims that the country's literacy rate (reading and writing at a fourth-grade level) is 85 percent. However, other agencies, including the World Bank and UNESCO, set the adult (age fifteen and over) illiteracy rate at about 44 percent, with the male adult (age fifteen and over) illiteracy rate 30 per-

cent and the female adult illiteracy rate 50 percent. Ethnic minorities of the Lao Thoeng and Lao Soung ethnic categories experience lower literacy rates due to the lack of formal educational institutions in their villages and because they speak a different native language.

Linda McIntosh

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LAO-TZU. See **Laozi**.

LAOZI "Laozi" (c. sixth century BCE) is both the name of a philosopher and of the work attributed to him, which is also entitled *Daodejing* (in Wade-Giles, *Tao Te Ching*, meaning "The Way and Its Power"). Taoists (or Daoists) often celebrate anonymity. It may be the case that the author or authors of the *Daodejing* were able to preserve their anonymity. However, every text needs its author and every philosophical approach needs its founder, and so the name Laozi denotes the founding author of Taoism.

There is a good deal of controversy concerning whether there actually was a historical person named Laozi. When Laozi's biography was written in the *Records of the Historian (Shiji)*, the historical data concerning Laozi was already very obscure. The biography implies that Laozi may have been one of three people: Li Er, also called Li Dan; Lao Laizi; and Dan the Historian. Some ancient texts attribute sayings to a fellow known as Lao Dan that are passages found in the *Daodejing* or that reflect Taoist attitudes. Literally, "Laozi" means the "old master," and it could simply



DAODEJING

Below is the opening chapter of Laozi's *Daodejing* ("The Way and the Power").

1. The Tao that can be trodden is not the enduring and unchanging Tao. The name that can be named is not the enduring and unchanging name.
2. (Conceived of as) having no name, it is the Originator of heaven and earth; (conceived of as) having a name, it is the Mother of all things.
3. Always without desire we must be found,
If its deep mystery we would sound;
But if desire within us be,
Its outer fringe is all that we shall see.
4. Under these two aspects, it is really the same; but as development takes place, it receives the different names. Together we call them the Mystery. Where the Mystery is the deepest is the gate of all that is subtle and wonderful.

Source: Lao Tze. (1891) *Tao Te Ching*. Translation and commentary by James Legge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1.



A classic drawing of Laozi riding a sacred cow. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

be a general term for any and all old masters who taught the way of nature (*dao* in English is often seen as 'Tao'). Because the character for "master" also means "boy," when the *Daodejing* was chanted as a sacred text in the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), a legend developed that Laozi was born at the mature age of sixty, gray haired and able to speak. For the follower of temple Taoism, Laozi, or Lord Lao, is considered to be the human incarnation of the cosmic Way.

There is an old legend that Confucius went to see Laozi, but he left baffled, not being able to comprehend him. This legend has been used both to argue that Laozi must have been a historical person and that there was no such person. After reading the *Daodejing*, one might realize that the academic debates concerning the historicity of Laozi are moot. The important things to be grasped are the profound ideas expressed in the text and their affect on the development of Chinese culture, politics, art, and poetry.

The *Laozi* has been translated more often than the Bible. The phrases "A thousand mile journey begins with the first step" and "he who knows does not speak" come from the *Laozi*. The *Laozi* is clearly giving guid-

ance to a ruler and his high ministers. The text advocates a type of limited anarchy. The ruler is unknown to the masses; he does not personally undertake projects; he does not micromanage affairs. He does nothing, yet everything is completed. The *Laozi* describes the way of nature and suggests that people, especially the ruler, follow the model of nature, especially water. Water exhibits the power (*de*) of nature in that it returns (*fan*) to the source; it nourishes all things without discrimination or possessing them; it is soft, frictionless, and feminine, yet it wears down mountains. One of the most paradoxical concepts in the *Laozi* is "acting by not acting" (*wei wu wei*). If the root images of the *Laozi* are grasped, then this expression is not as paradoxical as it first seems. "Not acting" is not literally doing nothing at all, but acting naturally. It is not acting artificially in a contrived manner, but acting without resistance in a spontaneous manner.

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LAXMIBAI (d. 1858), Indian nationalist. Laxmibai—or the Rani (queen) of Jhansi, as she is also known—came to prominence in India after the British East India Company sought to consolidate its power in the mid-nineteenth century. Under the leadership of Lord Dalhousie, the company adopted a policy called the "doctrine of lapse," which allowed the British to annex an Indian state if the ruler did not have a male heir. This policy, in effect from 1848 to 1856, led to the British annexation of many Indian states. Resistance to the policy, and events surrounding the Great Mutiny of 1857, brought the Rani of Jhansi, the widow of the last ruler of the state of Jhansi, into the political spotlight. Jhansi "lapsed" to the British in 1853. In the period following this debacle, Jhansi was faced with political challenges from rival claimants to its throne, specifically the rulers of Orchha and Datia. This saga was unfolding as war continued to rage in northern and central India in late 1858. After being politically cornered, Laxmibai, together with Nana Sahib (the adopted son of Baji Rao II, the last Maratha ruler) and his artillery expert Tattia Tope, fought the British army until she was killed

while fighting on horseback. Remembered as the "Joan of India," the Rani of Jhansi remains a major figure in the pantheon of Indian nationalist icons.

Vivek Bhandari

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LE DUAN (1908–1986), Vietnamese politician and nationalist. Le Duan was born in Quang Tri province in Central Vietnam. In 1928 he joined the Revolutionary Youth League (Thanh Nien), and in 1930 he helped found the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). Following the 1931 uprisings in northern Vietnam, he was arrested and convicted of sedition. He received a twenty-year prison sentence but was pardoned and released in 1936 after the Popular Front's victory in France.

Le Duan rose in the ranks of the ICP, but he was arrested again in 1940 and sent to Poulo Condore prison (Con Dao Island) until 1945. Following his release, he briefly worked with the Ho Chi Minh government in Hanoi. In 1946 he was sent to southern Vietnam, where he became secretary of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). While in southern Vietnam, Le Duan led the Viet Minh military in its efforts against the French.



Le Duan, on the right, with Pham Van Dong, prime minister of North Vietnam, in 1969. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

In 1957 he returned to Hanoi as a prominent member of the Politburo. He became secretary-general of the Lao Dong (Workers') Party in 1959. Following Ho Chi Minh's death in 1969, Le Duan became one of the most influential members of the Lao Dong Party. He became secretary-general of Vietnam's Communist Party in 1976 and served in that position until his death in 1986.

Micheline R. Lessard

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LE DUC ANH (b. 1920), president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Le Duc Anh was born in Truong Ha, near the city of Hue in central Vietnam. He was president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) from 1992 to 1997. Le Duc Anh joined the Vietnamese revolutionary movement in 1937 and became a member of the Indochinese Communist Party in 1938. He joined the Vietnamese army in 1945 and was promoted to the position of general in 1984. He was deputy commander during military campaigns against South Vietnam in 1975. In 1978, he was field commander of the Vietnamese forces responsible for the attack on Phnom Penh in Cambodia. In 1979, he became the highest-ranking commander of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia. His political career paralleled his military career and soon after he became deputy minister of defense.


Due to his accomplishments and to the patronage of Le Duc Tho (1911–1990), Le Duc Anh was admitted to Vietnam's Politburo in 1981. He became minister of defense in 1987 and served that position until 1991. In 1992, he was elected president of Vietnam by the Vietnamese National Assembly. In 1997, months after having suffered a stroke, Le Duc Anh announced he would not be a candidate for the presidency at the Tenth National Assembly.

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LE DUC THO (1910–1990), Vietnamese revolutionary and founder of the Indochinese Communist Party. Le Duc Tho was born in Nam Ha Province in northern Vietnam. He was the son of "a French functionary" in the colonial government in Vietnam, so he probably was born into upper-middle-class status at least. He was educated in French schools before he joined the revolution against France. He became an influential member of the Lao Dong (Communist) Party Political Bureau and Secretariat, often guiding party directives, and served as the chief negotiator for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) at the Paris peace talks between the DRV and the United States from May 1968 until January 1973. Tho spent time in the French island prison of Poulo Condore in the 1930s and served as the party chief commissar for the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) southern region of Vietnam during most of the First Indochinese War (the war between Vietnam and France, 1946–1954). During the Second Indochinese War (the war be-



Le Duc Tho in Ho'Ville, Vietnam, in 1985. (TIM PAGE/CORBIS)

tween the United States and Vietnam, 1955–1975), Tho played a major role in directing the war in South Vietnam for the DRV. For his efforts in negotiating the Paris Peace Accords, Tho received, with the U.S. chief negotiator, Henry Kissinger, the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize. He refused to accept the award because the war in Vietnam continued. He returned to Vietnam to guide the final DRV push to take Saigon in 1975. After the war Tho remained an active member of the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee and also directed the Party Organization Department for the country. Tho retired from public life in 1986.

Richard B. Verrone

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LEE KUAN YEW (b. 1923), Singaporean statesman. During his tenure as prime minister of Singapore from 1959 to 1990, Lee Kuan Yew led the country's transformation into a modern, clean, green entrepot city-state with highly successful manufacturing, financial and banking, and communications sectors. Under colonial rule prior to the 1960s, Singapore was known for its considerable squalor, poverty, disease, and ignorance and had a reputation as a hotbed of communist radicalism.

Lee studied in the United Kingdom at the London School of Economics and Cambridge University, earning double first honors. Returning to Singapore, in 1954 he founded the People's Action Party to fight for Singaporean independence. In 1959, at the age of thirty-five, he became prime minister, only eleven years after taking his first degree at Cambridge.

Lee emphasized the development of Singapore as a multicultural, multiracial nation with a distinctive identity. He personally practiced this ideal, speaking six different Asian languages as well as English. He favored social engineering, social conservatism, and Asian values. A pragmatist, Lee wanted to create an effective socialism in Singapore. Noted for his corruption-free leadership, Lee was nevertheless seen by many in the West as practicing an authoritarian democracy with harassment of opposition groups and little tolerance of dissent.



Lee Kuan Yew in September 1965. (BETMANN/CORBIS)

Lee was one of the few world leaders to give up power voluntarily (in 1990), providing for a smooth succession in political leadership. He will be remembered as a transformative leader of the twentieth century who helped Singapore become one of the world's most competitive economies.

Gerald W. Fry

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LEE TENG-HUI (b. 1923), President of Taiwan. Lee Teng-hui was the first Taiwanese native to lead the government and Nationalist Party of Taiwan. Under his presidency, democracy was fully established on Taiwan. Born in 1923 when Taiwan was a Japanese colony, Lee Teng-hui received a Japanese education until the end of World War II when Taiwan returned to Chinese control. In the 1950s, Lee was among the first generation of Taiwanese students to undertake graduate studies in the United States. He alternated between studying in the United States and working

for the Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction, a combined Chinese Nationalist–American effort at land reform on Taiwan. Taiwan's land reform stressed legal procedures along with agricultural improvement projects and contrasted sharply with the Communist Party's populist, confiscatory, and often violent land reform on the Chinese mainland.

In 1968, Lee earned a Ph.D. in agricultural economics from Cornell University. Back in Taiwan he emerged as a rising Taiwanese figure in the Nationalist Party. His appointments included mayor of Taipei and governor of Taiwan and then, in 1984, vice president. Lee's elevation marked acceptance by the mainlander Nationalist Party that its future was tied to Taiwan and needed support from the Taiwanese majority. When President Chiang Ching-kuo, who did much to further Lee Teng-hui's career, died unexpectedly in January 1988, Lee succeeded him. He served as president until 2000 and earned the deep enmity of the leaders of the People's Republic of China on the mainland for his strong advocacy of Taiwan's continuing political separation from China.

Constitutionally barred from a third term as president, Lee was forced into retirement in 2000 but has remained a significant force in Taiwan's politics. His open support for Chen Shui-bian, the leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) who succeeded him as president, exacerbated his differences with the Nationalist Party's leadership. In the run-up to the 2001 parliamentary elections, the party expelled Lee from membership, and he responded by organizing a political party called the Taiwan Solidarity Union, which captured thirteen seats. So, Lee has become identified with a minority party in parliament that is sympathetic toward the DPP and its policies.

David D. Buck

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LEH (1999 est. pop. 15,000). The most northerly town in India, Leh is the capital of Ladakh district in eastern Jammu and Kashmir State. Located in the

mountainous region often called "the roof of the world," Leh was built as a terminus for caravans from Central Asia. At 3,523 meters, it is one of the highest permanently inhabited towns on earth. In the sixteenth century, King Sengge Namgyal shifted his court here to be closer to the head of the Khardung La-Karakorum corridor into China. Within a generation, the town had become one of the busiest markets on the Silk Road. In the 1920s and 1930s, the bazaar received over twelve camel trains daily. The prosperity ended with the closing of the Chinese border in the 1950s but resumed when the border was opened up to foreign tourists in 1974. In the winter, the economy is supported by military families from nearby bases, a reminder of the sensitive borders nearby. Leh is dominated by the nine-story medieval Tibetan-style palace of the Ladakhi royal family. Its Dukhar temple houses a thousand-armed image of the goddess Tara. Other notable structures include a Mughal mosque and several ancient, still-functioning Buddhist monasteries. The annual Ladakh Festival features a spectacular march of monks, troupes, and refugees, with dancing, archery, polo, concerts, ceremonies, and exhibitions.

C. Roger Davis

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LENINSHIL ZHAS The principal newspaper of the Kazakh SSR Communist Youth Union, or *Komsomol*, the *Leninsbil zhas* was published five times a week. The roots of the *Leninsbil zhas* are found in the prerevolutionary Kazakh youth organization *Birlik* (Unity) and its newspaper, *Sary arka* (often translated as "The Wide Steppe"). *Birlik* followed the editorial line of the Kazakh political party Alash Orda (The Horde of Alash [mythical founder of the Kazakh people]), which advocated greater political and cultural autonomy for Kazakhs.

Leninsbil zhas was first published on 22 March 1921 as *Zhas Alash* ("Young Alash"), with the goal of educating Kazakh young people in the virtues and attitudes sanctioned by the Communist Party and the government. On 8 February 1924 the name was changed from *Zhas Alash* to *Leninsbil zhas* to honor Vladimir Lenin and to weaken the nationalist tendencies among Kazakh intellectuals.

Numerous Kazakh writers, poets, and scholars published articles in its pages, including Akhmet Baitursynov, Saken Seifullin, Turar Ryskulov, and Mukhtar Auezov. During the 1950s many articles were devoted to the Virgin and Idle Lands program and to agricultural and industrial development in Kazakhstan. In March 1991 the newspaper's name was changed back to *Zhas Alash*, and presently it generally supports current Kazakh government policies.

Steven Sabol

LEOPARD, CLOUDED The clouded leopard (*Neofelis nebulosa*), the largest of the arboreal (tree-living) cats, inhabits the tropical forests of Southeast Asia, from Nepal to Sumatra and Borneo. Its name refers to the dark cloud-shaped markings on its golden-brown coat. Its tail is ringed with black stripes.

The head and body measure about one meter in length, and the long tail acts as an effective balancing aid. A stocky body, powerful limbs, and sharp claws make the clouded leopard an expert climber. Its primary prey is primates, which it stalks through the trees, but it also eats birds, small mammals, and fish. Its extremely long, sharp canine teeth enable the hunting of still larger game such as deer and wild pigs.

Clouded leopards are largely nocturnal. They live an average of fifteen years, and females produce litters of two to four cubs. They are considered sacred by a number of Southeast Asian peoples. Clouded leopards are an endangered species protected under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, but illegal hunting for their coats, teeth, and bones continues and deforestation is eroding their habitat. Secretive and hard to study in the wild, they have also proved difficult to breed in captivity.

Lucy D. Moss

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LEOPARD, SNOW The snow leopard or ounce inhabits the harsh, high mountain environments of Central Asia from Russia and Mongolia south to China, Tibet, and the Indian subcontinent. This includes part or all of the upper reaches of the Himalaya, Karakoram, Hindu Kush, Pamirs, Kunlun Shan, Tian Shan, Altay Shan, and Sayan Mountains. Experts place

the snow leopard in the genus *Panthera* or, citing its unique skull and vocal apparatus, classify it as the lone member of the genus *Uncia* (*Uncia uncia*).

A mature snow leopard is 2.1 meters (7 feet) long, including its 0.9-meter (3-foot) tail, which is used for balance on rocky and snowy terrains. The leopard attains a 0.6-meter (2-foot) shoulder height, weighs 20 to 40 kilograms (40 to 90 pounds), and lives for 15 to 18 years. The cubs are born two to three to a litter in early spring following an average gestation of ninety-three days, and they remain with their mothers for eighteen months. The animal's small head has tiny ears and a heavy brow. Large paws support powerful limbs that are short in relation to the body size. The rosettes and spot markings common to all leopards are more muted on the snow leopard, and its soft, woolly textured fur is 5 centimeters (2 inches) on the top and sides and up to 10 centimeters (4 inches) on the underparts of the animal. Weakly developed fibroelastic tissue in the throat prevents this cat from emitting a loud roar.

Snow leopards hunt argali, bharal, markhor, and ibex in rock outcrops, canyons, plateaus, and mountain ridge tops at heights of between 2,000 and 5,500 meters (6,500 and 18,000 feet). They also pursue numerous birds and hare along with marmots, yak, musk deer, and domestic stock. During winter they descend, with their prey, into the more protected upper margins of lowland forests.

By most estimates only five thousand snow leopards remain, although inaccessible terrain and this mammal's highly furtive character make it difficult to take an accurate census. Despite legal protection in 90 percent of its range, it remains an endangered species on *The 2000 World Conservation Union Red List of Threatened Animals*. Unless poaching for its fur and for its bones, purported to have healing powers, is halted, the snow leopard may become extinct in the wild.

Stephen Cunha

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LHASA (2000 est. pop. 400,000). Presently capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China and historically the capital of the Tibetan state, Lhasa is situated in the central Tibetan province of U on the Kyushu River at a height of 3,650 meters, with a population of about 200,000 for the central city and 400,000 for the whole municipality.

The name Lha-sa (pronounced Ha-sa) in Tibetan means divine ground, and Lhasa has always combined a religious and a political role. There are two main



Barkhor Jokhang Temple | Lhasa in July 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)



LHASA IN THE 1840s

The following description of Lhasa written by two French missionaries in the mid-nineteenth century provides a good example of Western attitudes about Asia and about Buddhism.

The morning after our arrival at Lha-Ssa, we engaged a Thibetan guide, and visited the various quarters of the city, in search of a lodging. The houses at Lha-Ssa are for the most part several stories high, terminating in a terrace slightly sloped in order to carry off water; they were whitewashed all over, except the bordering around the doors and windows, which are painted red or yellow. The reformed Buddhists are so fond of these two colours, which are, so to speak, sacred in their eyes, that they especially name them Lamanesque colours. The people of Lha-Ssa are in a habit of painting their houses once a year, so that they are always perfectly clean, and seem, in fact, just built; but the interior is by no means in harmony with the fine outside. The rooms are dirty, stinking, and encumbered with all sorts of utensils and furniture, thrown about in a most disgusting confusion. In a word, the Thibetan habitations are literally whited sepulchers; a perfect picture of Buddhism and all other false religions, which carefully cover, with certain general truths and certain moral principles, the corruption and falsehood within.

Source: Huc Evariste-Regis and Joseph Gabet. ([1851] 1987) *Travels in Tartary, Thibet, and China, 1844–1846*. New York: Dover Publications, 168–169.

phases in its existence. Lhasa was established as the capital by the first Buddhist king, Songtsen Gampo (609?–649), in the seventh century CE to house the sacred image of Buddha, or Jowo. Using geomancy, it was determined that the heart of Tibet, where the image should be kept, was in an island on a lake on the site of today's Lhasa. After subduing the local demon of the lake, a temple was built for the statue and called the Jokhang (House of the Lord Buddha). The Jokhang is to this day Lhasa's holiest shrine. The next phase was in the seventeenth century, when Lhasa was reestablished as the capital of the Dalai Lamas. The Potala Palace was built on the Marpo-Ri, or Red Hill, as the center for the joint religious and secular government of Tibet.

Around the Jokhang is the Barkhor, or circumambulation path, along which pilgrims walk or prostrate themselves. The Norbulingka, summer palace of the Dalai Lamas, lies to the west. Other sites include the

ancient Ramoche temple. The historic monasteries of Ganden, Drepung, and Sera, headquarters of the dominant Yellow Hat sect of the Dalai Lamas, are close to Lhasa and have wielded enormous influence over the town.

Since Chinese rule, modern Lhasa has expanded, dwarfing the Tibetan area, large parts of which have been knocked down. Lhasa suffered during the Tibetan uprising in 1959 and was extensively damaged during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s. In the 1980s, the Chinese started restoration work, and a Chinese city expanded in the area to house the administration and business. Today, the Tibet Heritage Fund has helped to preserve some areas of historic Lhasa around the Barkhor.

Modern Lhasa has been described variously as drab, featureless, or like a bustling frontier town. Under the Chinese plan of modernizing Tibet and developing its economy, small-scale manufacturing, beer brewing,

and now the Internet have come to the city. Lhasa's importance as a pilgrim center for Tibetans and as a tourist spot has allowed it to preserve some of its main features, while the Chinese plan for Tibet has created a completely new city. China has ambitious plans for Lhasa as part of its policy of developing the western regions of the People's Republic, including building the world's highest railroad linking Lhasa to the nearest railhead in Qinghai Province.

Michael Kowalewski

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LI BAI (701–762), Chinese poet. Li Bai, or Li Bo, also known as Taibai and style named Qinglian, is often mentioned along with Du Fu as one of the two greatest Tang dynasty (618–907) poets. Although Li's hometown is recorded as a site in present-day Jiangyou District, Sichuan Province, his ancestors were said to be merchants from Central Asia, where it appears that he was actually born.

Li Bai is known in Chinese poetic history as the "Transcendent of Poetry." This epithet captures some of Li's personal and poetic style; his preoccupation with transcendence and with supramundane realms is directly related to his close association with Taoist beliefs, practices, and practitioners. The fantasy of knight errantry forms another aspect of Li Bai's temperament and style. Upon encountering painful experiences, he turned to drinking, and his poetry is characterized by a cyclical alternation between high spirits and despondency. Enamored of hyperbole, Li wrote with an impetuous exuberance, mostly "ancient style" poems and quatrains in simple language. Li also made significant contributions to landscape poetry.

Timothy Wai Keung Chan

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LI HONGZHANG (1823–1901), Chinese official. Li Hongzhang was a leading Chinese official of the latter half of the nineteenth century. A Confucian scholar, Li served under Zeng Guofan (1811–1872) and helped suppress the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864) and Nian Rebellion (c. 1852–1868). He was appointed governor of Zhili Province and remained in that position for a quarter of a century, serving in many respects as an unofficial prime minister of China.

Li was one of the prime movers behind the flawed Self-Strengthening Movement, which was an effort by the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) to restore power to resist Western encroachments, especially after the Second Opium War. Although he recognized the need to modernize and to borrow appropriately from the West, he was not capable of accepting or instituting changes necessary to meet the challenge of late-nineteenth-century imperialism. Still, Li helped establish the Jiangnan Arsenal, the Nanjing Arsenal, the Tianjin Machine Factory, the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company, the Imperial Telegraph Bureau, and the Beiyang Fleet. Li was unable to stop Japan in the 1894–1895 conflict, although he did negotiate the peace and was responsible for the protocols that ended the western occupation of Beijing after the Boxer Rebellion (1900). He also helped accelerate the trend of power away from the capital and hence the coming warlord period of the 1920s and 1930s.

Charles Dobbs

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LI PENG (b. 1928), Chinese premier. Born in Chengdu, Sichuan Province, in October 1928, Li Peng is the orphaned son of a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) worker and was adopted by Chinese premier Zhou Enlai (1898–1976). Li was trained as a power engineer in Moscow from 1948 to 1955. After his return to China, he was the director and chief engineer



Li Peng, on a four-day visit to Kenya in November 1999, is greeted by Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi. (AFP/CORBIS)

at several power plants from 1956 to 1966 and later in various bureaucratic or party positions relating to power generation. In 1979, partly due to the backing of his stepmother, CCP Central Committee member Deng Yingchao (1904–1997), Li began a swift ascent up the hierarchy, first as deputy minister of power production (1981), then as a member of the Central Committee (1982) and vice-premier in charge of energy and communications (1983). In 1985, he became a member of the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo and in 1988 became premier, a post he held until 1998.

Li achieved his greatest notoriety during the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989. Strongly opposed to the student takeover of the square, he was seen as patronizing during meetings with student leaders and was hectored at a televised meeting with hospitalized hunger strikers. He sided with other hard-liners against Zhao Ziyang (b. 1919), who was removed as party leader. Later, news media and students frequently referred to him as the "butcher of Beijing" for being the first official to publicly support the People's Liberation Army's bloody crackdown during the night of 3–4 June.

After 1989, Li cooperated with CCP leader Jiang Zemin and economics czar Zhu Rongji to rein in China's high inflation and begin sweeping reforms of state-owned enterprises. Elected chair of the National People's Congress despite an unprecedented two hundred negative votes in 1998, Li remains an influential voice in policy making.

Joel Campbell

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LI SHIZHEN (1518–1593), Chinese physician and pharmacologist. Li Shizhen is best remembered for his *Bencao Gangmu* (Compendium of Materia Medica), one of the most frequently mentioned books in the Chinese herbal medical tradition. He was born in 1518 at the height of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644); his grandfather was an itinerant doctor and his father a traditional physician. As a result of these influences and a bout with tuberculosis when he was twenty, Li decided to become a doctor at the age of twenty-four. At the age of twenty-nine he took a position in government practicing medicine, but, having found many problems with existing herbal literature, he left this position within the year and began work on the *Bencao Gangmu*. He traveled throughout China, experimenting with various herbs, collecting local folk remedies, and consulting virtually every medical book available (over eight hundred). His fifty-two-volume book took twenty-seven years to produce and was completed in 1578. The book describes 1,892 medicines (374 of which were new) and 11,096 prescriptions. Finally published in 1596 (three years after his death), the book has been translated either whole or in part into Japanese, Latin, French, English, Russian, and German and was a standard text on Chinese herbal medicine until 1959.

Jody C. Baumgartner

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LIANG QICHAO (1873–1929), Chinese scholar and essayist. Liang Qichao was a reform-minded Chinese scholar and essayist who rose to prominence following the humiliating defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). In 1898, he was among the leading participants of the ill-fated "Hundred Days of Reform" sponsored by the progressive Guangxu emperor. Following the reactionary restoration of Empress Dowager Cixi, Liang fled to Japan, where, for the next fourteen years, he edited a series

of influential journals and wrote an impressive range of persuasive and inspiring essays and monographs. His writings at this time advocated political reform or revolution and introduced his contemporaries to Western liberalism, nationalism, and science.

In the aftermath of the Republican revolution of 1911, Liang returned to China and formed the moderate Progressive Party (Jinbudang) that contended with the ruling Guomindang in the nascent National Assembly. He twice served as a cabinet-level minister. With the onset of warlordism in 1917, Liang withdrew to a life of teaching and scholarship during which he wrote prolifically on Chinese culture, literature, and history. These later writings reflected his predominant aspiration for a new cultural synthesis in China that would combine the most worthy and enduring elements of Chinese Confucianism with the social and political principles of Western liberalism.

Michael C. Lazich

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LIAONING (2002 est. pop. 44.6 million). Liaoning Province is in the southern part of Northeast China. Bounded by the Yellow and Bo Hai Seas in the south, with a coastline 2,187 kilometers long, it has a total area of 145,900 square kilometers. Jilin Province, Inner Mongolia, and Hebei Province surround it. The Liao River, the principal waterway of the province, flows through the middle part of Liaoning from north to south. The Yalu River on the eastern fringe forms the boundary between China and North Korea. The Liaodong Peninsula juts out between the Yellow and Bo Hai Seas from the landmass. Liaoning has a zigzag coast and many rocky islands and fine natural harbors. It has a population of 40.57 million (1996). Ethnic groups living there include Man, Mongolians, Koreans, and Xibo.

Liaoning has a temperate continental monsoonal climate, with hot, rainy summers, long, cold winters with little snow; and short, windy springs. It has an average annual temperature of 6–11°C, a frost-free period of 130–180 days, and a mean annual precipitation of 400–1,000 millimeters, which decreases notably from southeast to northwest.

Liaoning grows sorghum, maize, rice, and soybeans and the cash crops of cotton, tobacco, and peanuts. It is also the major tussah-silk grower of China. The apples of southern Liaoning and the pears of western Liaoning are known throughout China. The province also produces ginseng and antlers, valuable ingredients for traditional Chinese medicine. The fishery industry is developed along the coast.

Liaoning has rich mineral resources, especially iron ore and coal mines. Fushun and Fuxin, popularly called the "coal capital" and the "coal sea," produce top-quality coal as the largest open-cast mining centers in China. With a well-grounded heavy industry, Liaoning is one of China's major industrial bases. It leads the country in the production of iron and steel, aluminum, sulfuric acid, soda ash, heavy machinery, magnesia, and talcum. With its railway mileage exceeding 4,000 kilometers of tracks, Liaoning has the densest network of rail lines in the country.

Shenyang, the provincial capital, is the largest city of Northeast China, with a population of more than 6.5 million, and is one of its economic, communications, and cultural centers. Shenyang is known throughout China for its machine-building industry.

Dalian, the most famous city in Liaoning, lies at the southern tip of the Liaodong peninsula. One of the most beautiful cities in China, it is a tourist paradise, with European-style architecture framing its skyline and miles of beaches along the oceanfront.

Di Bai

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LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY—JAPAN

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has dominated Japan's postwar politics. It was formed in 1955 when the Liberal and Democratic Parties combined. Despite its name, the LDP is a conservative party with strong ties to business. Except for a short period following World War II when the Japan Socialist Party organized a coalition government, the LDP held power until 1993, when it lost control of the lower house of the Diet, the national legislature, to a coalition of seven parties. But this setback was only temporary; the LDP regained control in 1996.

The LDP's philosophy has two key elements: a commitment to economic growth and the maintenance of good relations with the United States, including supporting the security alliance between the two countries. Under LDP leadership, Japan followed U.S. policy guidance during the Cold War. Aligning itself with the United States allowed Japan to prosper economically, but Cold-War antagonisms restricted commercial opportunities with the Soviet Union and especially with China.

The LDP has traditionally been divided into factions, usually five in number. These factions are made up of members of the Diet who are committed to following the leadership of a senior party leader. In return for their support, faction members can expect to receive substantial amounts of money from their leaders. Individual LDP Diet members use this money to maintain a local electoral organization and to do favors for constituents.

Factions govern the process whereby party leadership and important government posts are filled. Competition among factions has been intense. In fact, competition among LDP factions has been a more significant aspect of Japanese postwar politics than competition among parties has been. The leader of the most powerful faction plays an important role in the selection of the prime minister. Ministerial positions in the cabinet are allocated through a bargaining process on the basis of faction strength.

The LDP lost control of parliament in 1993, following a series of highly publicized scandals involving bribery and corruption charges against top officials in the party. The substantial weakening of the Japanese economy in the 1990s also contributed to the LDP's decline in popular support. But opposition parties had problems of their own and failed to form a cohesive alternative. The LDP regained control of the government following the 1996 election, but lacking a majority in parliament, it had to form a coalition. After the 2000 election, the LDP continued to rule through a coalition.

Louis D. Hayes

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LIGHT, FRANCIS (c. 1740–1794), British officer and founder of Penang. Francis Light started his career as a naval officer. At the age of twenty-three he

became the ship's captain for the firm Jouruain, Sullivan and De Souza in Madras. It was through this voyage that Light reached the Malay Peninsula. Light traveled extensively in the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra, learning the Malay and Siamese languages in order to conduct trade negotiations.

At the time Light was in Kedah (in the northwestern Malay Peninsula), Siam was constantly threatening it. At this time too the British East India Company (formed in 1600 for conducting spice trade with the East Indies) was interested in securing a trading port at the Eastern of Bay of Bengal. It was also the British government's interest to control the spice trade and compete with the Dutch monopoly. Light found that Penang, at that time a part of Kedah, was a sustainable port and that it would serve the British interest well.

The sultan of Kedah, who was aware that the British were in his land, asked Light if the British army would help him handle the attacks from Siam. Light used this opportunity well and signed a pact with the sultan stating that the sultan would give Penang to the British and that in return the British would protect Kedah from their vantage point in Penang, if Kedah were attacked.

On 11 August 1786, Light inaugurated Penang and named it Prince of Wales Island (however, this name was not popular), and named the new port George-town. At the time Light arrived, the population in Penang was one thousand; by 1804 it had risen to twelve thousand. The inhabitants of Penang were conducting trade with Great Britain and India, trading mainly cloth, metalware, and opium. After expending much effort in developing the state, Francis Light died in 1794.

Mala Selvaraju

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LIJIANG, OLD TOWN OF The old town of Lijiang, one of the largest traditional towns left in China, is located in the southwest of the country in the part of Yunnan Province that borders on Tibet and Sichuan. The town, at the center of Lijiang Prefecture, sits on a high plateau, just south of the 5,000-meter-high Jade Dragon Mountain. Lijiang has a long history, taking its present form in 1253, when members of Khubilai Khan's (1216–1294) Mongol army set-



LIJIANG—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

The Old Town of Lijiang, a masterwork of Chinese feudal architecture, was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1997. So intact that its intricate ancient waterworks are still in use today, the site demonstrates several centuries of different cultural influences and adaptation to the difficult mountain topography.

tled in the area. They, along with the Naxi, one of several ethnic groups that populate the region, developed the town around a market square that still exists to this day. From the 1300s until 1723, the town was gradually incorporated into the Chinese empire. As other groups, including the Tibetan and Han, came to settle in Lijiang, a distinct architectural style developed, characterized by two-story sun-baked brick and clay-tile houses with carved wooden windows. Also unique is the town's centuries-old water system, which is still in use. Lijiang's inhabitants divert streams from the mountain's glaciers into a network of swift canals that run through the town streets. In 1997, UNESCO added the old town of Lijiang to its World Heritage Site list.

Elizabeth VanderVen

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LIM CHIN SIONG (1933–1996), Singapore politician. Lim Chin Siong was a great orator in Chinese. He was one of the conveners of the People's Action Party at its founding when he was twenty-one years old. As a trade unionist, he was a charismatic leader who cared deeply for the welfare of workers.

Lim Chin Siong was involved in organizing strikes and boycotts among workers and Chinese middle-school students in the early 1950s, when Singapore was trying to break free of British colonialism. He contested the 1955 general election and was one of three

PAP members, one of whom was Lee Kuan Yew, elected into the Legislative Assembly. In 1959, when PAP came into power, he was appointed political secretary to the finance minister, Goh Keng Swee. He was sacked from his post two years later when he joined twelve PAP assemblymen to oppose the party leadership. He then became the secretary-general of the newly formed Barisan Sosialis. The PAP government accused him of being a communist "open-front" leader with links to the Malayan Communist Party and arrested him in 1963. He was placed in detention until 1969, when he decided to quit politics and resigned from the Barisan Sosialis. He went to London and stayed there for ten years before returning to Singapore, where he lived until his death.

Kog Yue Choong

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LIM CHONG EU (b. 1919), Malaysian physician and politician. Born in Penang, Malaysia, Lim Chong Eu began his career as a medical officer in the armed forces in China from 1944 to 1945. In 1946, he served as the personal physician of General Chen Cheng, chief of staff of the Chinese armed forces. Between 1946 and 1947, he lectured in English literature at the Fudan University in Shanghai.

In 1957, he returned to Malaysia to practice medicine at his father's dispensary in Penang, remaining there until 1950, and then serving from 1950 to 1951 as a medical officer in the Malayan Air Force. By 1951, he was involved in local politics and had joined the Penang Straits Settlements Council as a councillor. In the same year, he founded and served as vice-chairman of the Penang Radical Party. In 1953, he became the party's chairman but refused to defend the post in June 1954.

Instead, he joined the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), another Chinese political party. In January 1955, he was elected councillor of the Penang Straits Settlements Council for the area of Kelawai. In March 1955, he was appointed a member of the

Alliance National Council, a coalition of three political parties, each representing a racial group in Malaysia. (MCA was the party representing the Chinese.) In the same year, he became the Alliance chief whip in the federal Legislative Assembly.

Lim Chong Eu became the president of the MCA in 1958, when he defeated the incumbent, Datuk Tan Cheng Lock. Lim, however, resigned from the presidency of the MCA in 1961, when the party failed to secure from the Malay political party, the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), certain rights for the Chinese.

He then founded and became vice president of the United Democratic Party (UDP), thus assuming the position of a leader of the Chinese political opposition in Malaysia. In 1963, he became the UDP's secretary-general. He was elected as the member of Parliament for the constituency of Tanjung in the 1964 general elections and in the same year was elected assemblyman for the Penang State Legislative Assembly for the Kota seat.

In 1968, he founded and became vice president of the Gerakan Party. He was reelected to both his parliamentary and state assembly seats during the 1969 elections. The Gerakan Party subsequently joined the Barisan Nasionalis, a newly named coalition of political parties, each representing a racial group.

Datuk Lim Chong Eu was chief minister of the state of Penang, Malaysia, from 11 May 1969 until October 1990 and served as the president of the Gerakan Party in 1971. In the 1974 general elections in Malaysia, he was elected to a third term to both his parliamentary and state assembly seats. He held his seat, the constituency of Kota in the state of Penang, for three terms, during the general elections in 1978, 1982, and 1986. In the 1990 general elections, he lost the state assembly seat to the leader of an opposition party, Lim Kit Siang, of the Democratic Action Party, by 706 votes.

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LIM, SHIRLEY (b. 1944), Chinese-Malaysian writer. Shirley Lim is an award-winning Chinese-Malaysian writer who immigrated to the United States and became a prominent academic and literary figure, especially in Asian-American literary circles. Her work

examines relocation, belonging, and hybrid identity, both in the Asian and American contexts, and analyzes cross-cultural and minority gender experiences. Born in a small village in Malaysia, she overcame poverty, going on to higher education at the University of Malaya and Brandeis University. She rose to fame when her debut collection of poetry, *Crossing the Peninsula*, became Malaysia's first winner of the Commonwealth Poetry Prize in 1980. Widely anthologized for her poetry and short stories, Lim has also written a memoir, *Among the White Moonfaces*, and a novel, *Joss and Gold*. *Among the White Moonfaces* won the American Book Award in 1996, as did a feminist anthology she edited, *The Forbidden Stitch: An Asian American Women's Anthology*, in 1990. Her work has recently been included in the English Language Syllabus of the National Secondary School Curriculum in Malaysia. Lim has had a distinguished academic career in the United States and in 2002 was professor of English and Women's Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

Mohan Ambikaibaker

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LIN BIAO (1908–1971), Chinese soldier and politician. Lin Biao was among the youngest and perhaps best of the Communist generals during China's long civil war with the Nationalists (Guomindang) and the anti-Japanese resistance. Lin played a critical role in helping the forces of Mao Zedong (1893–1976) defeat the Nationalists in Manchuria and largely settle the civil war. He showed a genius for partisan warfare.

However, Lin's accomplishments were limited by periodic and severe illnesses, and he was often forced to take leave from his official duties. Still, he was, for a time, a great favorite of Mao, and after Lin became minister of defense in 1962, Mao relied on Lin to keep the army loyal and under control of the Communist Party in the period leading up to and during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Indeed, Mao named Lin as a successor, but that may have been a ploy to isolate Lin and make him more dependent on Mao's favor. Perhaps at the peak of his ascendancy, Lin ei-

ther attempted a coup d'état or merely tried to flee to save his life, and it was reported that he, his wife, and some fellow travelers died in 1971 in a plane crash while seeking sanctuary in the Soviet Union.

Charles Dobbs

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LINGAYAT The Lingayats are a Hindu sect concentrated in the state of Karnataka (a southern provincial state of India), which covers 191,773 square kilometers. The Lingayats constitute around 20 percent of the total population in that state and are also common in Bijapur, Belgaum, and Dharwar.

The Lingayats do not call themselves Hindus. They are known as Virasaivas because of their single-minded and deeply passionate devotion to Siva (a deity who is venerated both by upper- and lower-caste Hindus, as well as other marginal groups in Hindu society), manifested in a lingam, or male phallus form. Followers carry the lingam either around their necks or across their chests; children may have the image tied to one arm. The *Lingadbaranachandrika*, the religious treatise of the Lingayats, makes it compulsory for all devotees to wear a lingam on their body, even in death.

The Lingayat religious movement challenged the deep-rooted Brahmanic system on which high Hinduism or Vedic Hinduism rested. Beginning in the twelfth century as a miniscule socioreligious movement in north Karnataka and founded by a government minister named Basavanna, the religion gained momentum over a period of time throughout Karnataka.

Basavanna assimilated the tenets of dominant Saivite (Siva-worshipping) religious traditions prevalent during his time in Kashmir, Gujrat, and Tamil Nadu and transformed them so that they retained their functionality within the broad framework of Lingayat religion. The Lingayat religious doctrine emphasizes the mutual dependence between Siva and individual human beings. Siva is believed to have constituted the Parama Sakti (ultimate cosmic force), that is, Siva and the cosmic force are considered to be identical. Lingayat religious doctrine holds that prior to the creation of the cosmos, Siva was absolute self in terms of

purity, beyond space and location, beyond pattern, nameless, shapeless, and deedless.

Through this philosophy, Basavanna and other Lingayat preachers tried to combat the polytheistic forces of Brahmanic Hinduism. Basava's monotheism not only dethroned the Vedic deities (venerated by the followers of Vedic Hinduism), but also exposed the fallacies of the Brahmanic interpretations of the Hindu scriptures. Consequently, Lingayat religion favored a social order that was devoid of the caste system and social servitude. As a result, it initially countenanced the conversion of men and women from all Hindu castes, including the lowest.

The movement's egalitarianism struck at the core of the Brahmanic tradition: It disavowed caste segregation and hierarchy, the system of fourfold division of society, the multitude of gods and goddesses, ritualism, and the notions of pollution and rebirth. The Lingayat movement, however, went beyond a merely negative critique of the Brahmanic order. It developed its own opposing and parallel structures, involving reinterpretations of monotheism, the guru (spiritual teacher), the lingam, the *jangama* (itinerant priest), and *kayaka* (calling).

The Lingayat religious culture, which stresses the principles of individuality, equality, and fellowship, created a political awareness among its followers. Though the Lingayat culture was an apolitical culture in the early decades of the twentieth century, it envisaged a populist style of politics that assigned the community the role of political critic. The communitarian social outlook of the Lingayats found expression in the creation of the state of Karnataka in 1956. Because of their numbers, the Lingayats in the early 2000s decide the political fortunes of the major political parties in Karnataka.

Rajshbekhar Basu

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LINH NHAT (1905–1963), Vietnamese novelist. Linh Nhat is the pen name of Nguyen Tuong Tam, who was one of Vietnam's most prominent novelists

in the first half of the twentieth century. Born in central Vietnam in 1905, he was an ardent nationalist and in 1933 with Khai Hung (1896–1947) cofounded the Self-Strengthening Literary Group to promote Vietnamese vernacular literature. Linh wrote primarily about the plight of the urban bourgeoisie constrained by both traditional Vietnamese culture and French colonialism. His writings, critical of arranged marriages, were applauded by women's organizations. A prolific author, Linh's most famous works include *Autumn's Sunlight* (1934), *Breaking Away* (1934), *A Lonely Life* (1936), *Two Golden Afternoons* (1937), *Two Friends* (1938), *White Butterfly* (1939), *Cau Moi Hamlet* (1958), and *Thanh Thuy River* (1961). These novels were some of the first major works in vernacular Vietnamese and set the standard for the genre. During World War II, Linh had some contact with Japan; he hoped that Japan would grant Vietnam independence. Linh fled arrest by the French authorities to southern China, where he lived for more than a year. He returned to Vietnam in September 1945 with other nationalists. Although Linh was critical of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) regime, his works were banned after 1975 because of his staunch anticommunist stance. It was not until December 1987, when the Vietnam Communist Party issued Resolution Five, that writers and artists were given more intellectual freedom and bans were lifted on many literary works, including those by anticommunist writers such as Nhat Linh. Linh's works remained popular in South Vietnam.

Zachary Abuza

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LION, ASIATIC Once a symbol of royalty in West Asia, the lion was hunted and killed only by kings in ancient Mesopotamia (modern Iraq). Today the Asiatic, or Indian, lion (*Panthera leo*) is virtually extinct in Iran and Iraq but survives in the Gir Forest National Park in India. The Asiatic lion is the same species as the African lion, which includes the Cape Lion, the Masai lion, the Senegal lion, the Barbary lion, the Somali lion, and the Persian lion, *Panthera leo persica*, once native to southwestern Asia. During Pleistocene times, a million or more years ago, lions lived over much of the earth, but they disappeared from North America about ten thousand years ago, from the Balkans about two thousand years ago, and from Palestine during the Crusades. Scarcely any still exist in western Asia where they once flourished, as

they did too in central and northern India; but the Gir Forest, in Gujarat, western India, is a sanctuary created in 1913 for the protection of Indian lions. Their tourist appeal may ensure their survival here, but local herders are now their chief enemy.

Lions average 275 centimeters in length, whether in Africa or India (the largest-known Indian specimen was 292 centimeters long, the largest-known African one 323 centimeters). The male weighs up to 200 kilograms. Lions have not been domesticated except in isolated instances for circuses and film work; but the two hundred or more inhabiting Gir Forest today seem remarkably tame and tolerant of tourists. They eat large animals including cattle but are not normally manhunters unless sick.

As is the case with the African lion, the Indian female begins breeding at about three years of age; there is no particular breeding season, and she produces two or three cubs every one-and-a-half or two years, after a gestation of about 116 days. The color of the Asiatic lion's coat is the same sandy brown as that of African lions, but the male's mane tends to be a little thinner, and the coat otherwise somewhat thicker, than in the African varieties.

Paul Hockings

LITERATURE—CAMBODIA, KHMER The earliest dated stone inscription in the Khmer language, which could be regarded as the beginning of Khmer, or Cambodian, literature, is from 611 CE and was found in Takeo province. Over a thousand inscriptions in Old Khmer and Sanskrit that were produced throughout Cambodia and the former Khmer regions of northeast Thailand, southern Laos, and southern Vietnam between the seventh and fourteenth centuries survive. The Cambodian inscriptions are of great significance for general history as well as for the history of art and linguistics.

Classical Literature

The period of inscriptional literature ended after the decline of the Angkor empire in the fourteenth century. The four centuries from the abandonment of Angkor in 1432 to the establishment of the French protectorate in 1836 were considered to be the dark ages in the history of Cambodia, but it was in this period that the literary works regarded as classics appeared. Written on palm leaves, classical Khmer literature was exclusively composed in verse. Prose was not regarded as an artistic medium and was reserved

for practical documents such as legal texts and chronicles. There are more than fifteen forms of verse composition, each with its own strict rules on syllable length and internal and external rhyme schemes. As with other kinds of Khmer art, the beauty of Khmer poetry lies in the delicacy and richness of harmonious ornamentation. Several techniques, such as the use of high-style vocabulary, paired synonyms, alliteration, and assonance, must be skillfully manipulated to produce the most euphoric effect. Therefore, literary production was only in the hands of the intelligentsia, who had sound knowledge of the Khmer, Sanskrit, and Pali languages. Indian literary influence was undoubtedly very strong, but always the Khmer authors modified what they adopted to suit their own traditions and tastes.

Classical Khmer literature, which was composed by kings, court poets, and Buddhist monks, can be divided into ten categories. The most important genres include verse novels and didactic poems. The best-known and earliest verse novel is the *Reamker*, the Khmer version of the Indian epic *Ramayana*, written between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. The story of Rama, which was adapted to match the culture and beliefs of the Cambodians, has pervaded all art forms: the bas-reliefs at Angkor, the frescoes on temple walls, the shadow theater, the masked dance, and the chief repertoire of the Royal Ballet. Apart from the classical *Reamker*, popular versions of *Reamker* also exist that were recited by storytellers in public performance. The *Cbap*, or the Code of Conduct (didactic poetry written to encourage good social behavior consistent with the observance of Buddhist morality), was also highly influential. The *Cbap* has enjoyed remarkable popularity; it was constantly written, copied, and memorized from the early seventeenth century right up to the present. Two of the most famous examples are *Cbap Prob* (Code of Conduct for Men) and *Cbap Srey* (Code of Conduct for Women).

During the early eighteenth century, the *Satra Lbaeng*, verse novels recounting the Buddha's birth stories, developed. The oldest example, *Khyang Sang* (The Conch Shell), dates from 1729. Portraying the Buddhist concept of karma, many of the *Satra Lbaeng* were used by monks as texts to teach Khmer boys to read and write. Later, they came to be dramatized both in the court and the popular dance drama. A number of Khmer verse novels also draw their story lines from old local folktales and legends. A favorite with Cambodians is *Tum Teav*, the story of the ill-fated romance between Tum and Teav, based on a true love story said to have occurred in the fifteenth century. Unlike other verse novels, which are Hindu-Buddhist in their

inspiration, *Tum Teav* is almost free from supernatural and mystical elements, and ordinary Khmer life is described with striking realism.

Early-Twentieth-Century Literature

During the early part of the twentieth century, the Khmer novel emerged as a result of Western influence. The appearance of the first two novels, *Sopbat* (The Story of Sopbat) and *Tik Tonle Sap* (The Water of the Tonle Sap), during the last years of the 1930s marked a new era in the history of Khmer literature. These innovative and realistic literary works, reflecting the life of the emerging middle class, aroused considerable interest among the public. From 1940 to the end of the colonial era in 1953, more than fifty novels were published, with the main trend being toward romanticism. Many of them were created with serious social and political motives, and nationalism was the main inspiration for writers, although patriotic sentiment had to be shown in an indirect way. Among the best early novels are *Kulap Pailin* (The Rose of Pailin), *Pbka Srapon* (The Faded Flower), and *Mealea Duongjit* (The Garland of the Heart).

Postindependence Literature

After independence in 1954, the novel underwent tremendous growth and became the most popular literary genre in Cambodia. Between 1953 and 1975, almost one thousand titles were published. Love stories constituted a major portion of the postindependence novels, with the favorite theme being the arranged marriage. Another outstanding type was the historical novel; these were written mainly to cultivate a spirit of nationalism and loyalty toward the monarchy. The adventure novel, packed with exciting battles, was also very popular among the Khmer readers. The authors of these novels were heavily influenced by Western adventure novels as well as by Chinese epics and films. In the late 1950s, the social novel appeared after the government and the Association of Khmer Writers introduced literary competitions. The award-winning novels mostly dealt with such contemporary social problems as the struggle of Khmer women in modern society and the life of the urban working class. An outstanding example is *Preah Athit Thmey Reah Loe Phaendey Chab* (The New Sun Rises on the Old Land), which reflects the struggle of the working class against oppression and exploitation by urban capitalists.

Khmer Rouge and Later Periods

Khmer literature degenerated during the Khmer Rouge regime between April 1975 and January 1978.

As a result of revolutionary policies, at least 1.5 million Cambodians were killed, including a great many writers and literary scholars, as well as members of the reading public. Schools were closed, libraries were demolished, books were deliberately destroyed, and writers were not able to express their ideas and feelings. Literature, in the form of poetry and proverbs, was written to support Khmer Rouge ideology and values. After 1979, cultural and literary activity was reorganized by the government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea. Khmer poems and novels of the 1980s were written to support the socialist policy of the government and to encourage the Cambodians to participate in the work of national security and reconstruction. Their recurring themes are the tragic life during the Pol Pot years, the heroic acts of soldiers in the revolutionary army fighting against the Khmer Rouge and the noncommunist resistance factions, and Cambodian-Vietnamese friendship and solidarity. In Europe and America, Khmer refugee writers also produced novels, stories, and collections of poems with the principal theme of the dramatic events between 1975 and 1979 and their suffering and nostalgia for the homeland. From 1980 on, the horrors of the Khmer Rouge reached a much wider audience through the autobiographical accounts of survivors written in English and French. Among the first was Pin Yathay's *L'Utopie Meurtière*, published in Paris in 1980. This book is considered by general readers as well as scholars of Cambodian studies as one of the best of the survivors' accounts. Later, it came out in English under the title *Stay Alive, My Son*.

In the 1990s the Association of Khmer Writers was reestablished, and two literary competitions have been organized since 1995. Khmer fiction in this decade developed in two directions: one returning toward the novelistic tradition of the postindependence period, and the other continuing the socialist influence from the former decade.

Klairung Amratisha

See also: **Angkor Wat; Buddhism, Theravada—South-east Asia; Cambodia—History; Ramayana**

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LITERATURE—CENTRAL ASIA It is difficult to imagine Central Asia without literature. Of the epic literature and poetry produced by numerous Central Asian ethnic groups, scholars are most familiar with Turkish and Persian literature and, to a certain extent, writings and oral compositions in Arabic and Urdu. Some of the oldest forms are odes to Tengri, the predominant monotheistic belief system of the eleventh through thirteenth centuries. Next came the *chorchok* (also known as *sav*, *jir*, *dastan*), oral histories, as well as didactic stories drawn from that genre.

Poetry writing was one of the earliest pastimes in Central Asia. Folk poets still perform poetry at tea-houses, as they accompany themselves with a stringed musical instrument generally known as the *kobuz*. Other performers often join in, contesting for top honors and monetary and other awards. This music-poetic competition has always been an eagerly awaited entertainment feature at special occasions such as weddings and funerary feasts. Or a traveling minstrel may recite and act out an entire epic, such as the *Manas* (c. 995, the national epic of the Kyrgyz people, centering on a heroic figure called Manas), *Iskandarnamēh* (The Book of Alexander the Great, by the Persian poet Nezami, c. 1141–1203), or *Shah-namēh* (The Book of Kings, compiled by the Persian poet Firdawsi, c. 935–c. 1020).

Poetry Written by Rulers

From the Samanid rulers of the ninth century through the sixteenth-century rulers of the Uzbeks and Timurids, a new ruler usually issued a collection of his poems in a specially prepared volume in order to win the respect and allegiance of his subjects. This collection was duplicated by scribes and read aloud at tea-houses. The ruler's prestige was increased when people enjoyed such poetry on aesthetic grounds, an especially desirable achievement if the new ruler was establishing a dynasty to replace a previous one. *Hikmet*, by Shibani Khan (d. 1510) of the Uzbeks, is an example of such poetry written in the early sixteenth century.

Mirrors for Princes

Manuals prepared to instruct future rulers and to improve the abilities of reigning kings, termed "Mirrors for Princes," include such works as the *Kutadgu Bilig* (published in English as *Wisdom of Royal Glory*), the *Kabusnameh* (*A Mirror for Princes*, eleventh–twelfth centuries), and *Siyasatnameh* (The Book of Government). The *Kutadgu Bilig* was written by Yusuf of Balasagun and dedicated to Tavgach Bugra Khan of the Karakhanid dynasty (999–1212), in 1170. The *Kabusnameh* was produced shortly afterward as a series of admonitions from the ruler to his son and heir, detailing how to extract the most from the earthly pleasures in his realm. The *Siyasatnameh* was presented by Nizam al-Mulk (1018/19–1092), the prime minister of Alp Arslan (c. 1030–1072), the Seljuk ruler, as his testament and as a defense of his own political actions.

Dastans and Other Oral Compositions

The form of epic poem known as the *dastan* is the principal repository of the ethnic identity, history, customs, and value systems of its composers and their peoples. The events commemorated in a *dastan* may date from a very early period. For the Central Asians, the oral record, particularly as preserved in *dastans*, is an integral part of identity, historical memory, and the historical record itself. The oral tradition in Central Asia precedes the common era and has been preserved across multitudes of generations. It stands, as it always has, as the final line of defense against any attempts to dominate the Central Asians culturally or politically.

Stylistically Central Asian *dastans* differ from Islamic epic poetry, the bulk of which appeared and spread after approximately the twelfth century, and especially since the fifteenth century. In Central Asia, the tradition of expression and celebration of ancestral exploits and identity predates the use of the word *dastan*, which appears as a later borrowing into Turkic dialects.

Certainly the idea of marking important events with versified narrations or songs is not new. In fact, each significant event in the lives of Central Asians had its own type of "marker" song. The *suyunju* celebrated good news, including the birth of the *alp* (leader), especially after a tribe or individual had experienced difficulties. The *yar-yar* was sung at weddings. More than merely celebrating the union of the bride and groom, however, it also signaled the beginning of other courtships at the wedding feast. The *koshtau* was sung on the departure of the *alp* for a campaign and the *estirtu* when an *alp*'s death was announced. The *yogtau* was sung at *yog ashi*, the memorial feast (after burial) to lament the death of the *alp*.

The term *jir*, as in *batirlik jiri*, is equivalent to *dastan* and includes all these components. In most cases, the celebration of the *alp*'s tribulations and ensuing victory is referenced by the name of the *alp* only. Oghuz Khan, Manas, Koroglu, Kirk Kiz are some examples of *alps* whose exploits are recorded in epics of the same name. At other times, the term *batir* or *alp* is appended to the name of the individual thus honored: Kambar Batir, Chora Batir, Alp Er Tunga. However, despite the prevalent use of the terms *jir* and *kokcho* (still used in various portions of Central Asia), the term *dastan* is employed throughout this work when referring to this type of epic composition, in keeping with the usage of the secondary literature.

When celebrating the *alp*, the exemplary individual's attributes were always compared to natural phenomena, since he or she possessed rare qualities. Thus the *alp* can run as swift as lightning; his hair glows as bright as the sun; his body, in his prime, is as sturdy as the strongest tree; his punch is mightier than a thunderbolt. Such nature imagery draws upon the values of shamanism, the dominant belief system of Central Asian Turks prior to the arrival of Islam in the eighth century. Moreover, the use of the term *bahsi* (also *ozan*) to designate the reciter of the epic also has shamanistic connotations.

Traditionally, a *dastan* is composed by an *ozan* in order to celebrate a memorable event in the life of his people. The *ozan* will usually set the events in verse and recite them while accompanying himself on a stringed instrument. The *dastan* typically depicts the *alp* fighting against the collective enemies of his people and tribe. Under his leadership the longed-for victory is achieved. The trials and tribulations endured by this preeminent leader, though aggravated by one or more traitors, are in due course alleviated by a full supporting cast. Nor is the theme of love a stranger to the plot. Often the loved one is abducted by the enemy, only to be rescued after much searching, fighting, and sacrifice. There are attempts by the foes and the traitors to extort favors of various sorts from the lovers, but this does not deter the resolve or the eventual triumph of the principal personages. The traitors, frequently from the same tribe as the *alp*, collaborate with the enemy or abuse the trust of their people and their leaders. However, none of this prevents the inescapable success of the *alp* in the end. The traitors receive their due, being now and then executed for their sins but customarily forgiven and allowed to roam the earth in search of reconciliation between themselves and God.

Reference to similar past experiences is standard and reinforces the very important link to earlier *dastans*.

Motifs or whole episodes from earlier *dastans* may be repeated, sometimes with variations, in new *dastans*. Religious motifs emerge in descriptions of practices and beliefs. Among the Islamic practices earlier modes of worship are apparent. The narration of the *dastan*, in verse or prose, may also allude to supernatural powers.

The *dastan* travels with the Central Asians and, like its owners, it is not limited by geographic frontiers. Indeed, the idea of boundaries in the Western sense was alien to the nomadic societies of Central Asia and imposed on them late in their history. The necessity to undertake biannual migrations in search of fresh pastures for the livestock complicated the definition of a rigidly defined homeland. In the event that the heirs of a *dastan* face new threats to their freedom, the importance of the *dastan* is reinforced. Should the enemy somehow prevail, the *dastan*, by providing an unbreakable link to the past, affords the inspiration to seek independence once again.

Conversion Literature

Before the arrival of Islam in the tenth through thirteenth centuries, several dominant belief systems coexisted in Central Asia, including Tengri, Zoroastrianism, and Buddhism. Special literature was created or translated for the purpose of disseminating each newcomer religion, when it arrived. These missionary works were rendered into the Central Asian languages dominant at the time that the religion reached the region and, in some cases, were translated out of them for dissemination in other regions. For example, Buddhism made its way from India into China by way of the Uighurs, who translated sacred Buddhist texts from Sanskrit into Uighur and then into Chinese. Christianity established a small foothold in western Central Asia with the *Codex Cumanicus* (c. 1300), a Latin guide to the language of the Cumans, a people of Central Asia, which included passages from the Bible in translation.

In eastern Central Asia, the Ghaznavids (977–1187) and Karakhanids held sway as the Islamization of the region got underway. In the central area of Central Asia, the Seljuk or Oghuz Turks (1038–1157) and the Timurids (fifteenth–sixteenth centuries) were the dominant powers. The Mongol Golden Horde khanates (fourteenth–sixteenth centuries) held the northwestern region. Farther west were the Ottoman Turks (1453–1922), who were sometimes involved in Central Asian affairs. These polities and dynasties all directly or indirectly participated in the proliferation of Central Asian literary traditions.

Under these rulers, Islam popularized two new literary genres in Central Asian polities. The first dealt

with the myths associated with the conversion of Central Asian populations to Islam, and the second was concerned with the struggle of Islam against the extant belief systems in Central Asia, in the form of tales of battles during the conversion process. The Persian poet Mawlana Jalal ad-Din ar-Rumi (1207–1273) was one such figure making use of the genre. Rumi relied on his voluminous poetry to spread the word of his Sufi (Islamic mystic) sect.

Philosophy, Astronomy and Other Sciences, and Mathematics

The rulers of polities provided the patronage and favorable environment for the production of masterpieces, by which the rulers would be remembered for eternity. Therefore, regardless of the nature and objectives of the writing, Central Asians adhered to certain rules in their works. This is evident even in books not entirely devoted to belles lettres. Among them are the writings of the Turkish philosopher Abu Nasr al-Farabi (c. 878–c. 950) and the Arab historian Muhammad ibn Jarir at-Tabari (c. 839–923), who wrote in Arabic and Turkish. Their works were translated into Western languages and published from the sixteenth century on. Ulugh Beg (1394–1449), the grandson of the Turkic conqueror Timur (1336–1405), ruled Samarkand and the environs and was the author of astronomical and mathematical works that influenced European studies, when, beginning in the seventeenth century, they were translated into Latin and printed in Oxford, England.

Reportedly of Uighur descent, Mir Ali Shir Nava'i (1441–1501) was one of the premier literati and statesmen of his time. He wrote voluminously and with apparent ease in Chagatay, a Turkic dialect, and in Persian and long served as prime minister of the Timurid ruler Huseyin Baykara (reigned 1469–1506) of Herat and Khorasan. Much of his tasteful poetry remains untranslated, but among his prose works, *Mubakemat al-lughateyn* (Consideration of Two Languages) has been translated into English. Babur (1483–1530), another direct descendant of Timur, established the Mughal empire in India. He was also an accomplished author in Chagatay; his memoirs are still highly praised and regarded. Jami (1414–1492), a Persian poet and mystic, was Nava'i's friend and fellow man of letters of the period in Herat.

The Czarist Period

As Russian armies proceeded to invade Central Asia, the literature began to reflect the struggle between the invaders and the defenders. The Russian in-

vasion attempts were not always successful. In 1506, Shibani Khan of the Uzbeks sent a quatrain to Muhammed Amin, the khan of Kazan, congratulating the latter for turning back the Russian attack on Kazan. Shortly afterward, *dastans* were pressed into service as well. The 1552 variant of the Chora Batir *dastan* described the fighting over Kazan. In 1905, Ismail Gaspirali, (1851–1914), an influential Tatar journalist, wrote a poem to admonish his detractors: "If my arrow would hit the target / If my horse should win the race / Chorabatir is valiant / If my arrow could not reach its target / And my horse cannot win the race / Tell me, what could Chorabatir do?" (Paksoy 1986: 265).

The Basmachi and the Semi-Independence Period

During the nineteenth century, when the greatest portion of Central Asia fell under Russian armies, the response of the Central Asian leadership was to have medieval Central Asian literature collected and published. In 1916, the Basmachi (Turkistan National Liberation Movement) began fighting, at first spontaneously, later in a planned and coordinated manner, to construct a Turkistan polity. For a time, the movement was successful. According to Zeki Velidi Togan (1890–1970), a prime mover of the initiative, the *dastan Koroglu* not only kept morale high but also served as a role model because the historical Koroglu (sixteenth century) had fought for freedom against all odds.

When Central Asian peoples could not openly circumvent Russian censorship, they resorted to writing highly coded satire. The journal *Molla Nasreddin* is a prime example. Named after a "people's philosopher" who lived prior to the thirteenth century, it was founded by Jelil Memmedkuluzade (1866–1937) and published in Tbilisi, Tabriz, and Baku from 1906 to 1920. Exercising an enormous influence on its readership, it spawned dozens of emulators across continents. When Mikhail Gorbachev instituted perestroika, the Soviet policy of economic and governmental reform, in the mid-1980s, the journal was reprinted in Baku, as a reminder of what had gone before. Those who reprinted *Molla Nasreddin* had the same objective as its founder, Memmedkuluzade: autonomy and freedom.

The Soviet Period

When the 1917 Bolshevik revolution began, Central Asian people were endeavoring to commit their vast and ancient literature to print. After 1924, when Central Asia was divided among various Soviet Socialist Republics, the Oriental Institutes, now Sovi-

etized, worked to regain control of the process. One method they used was to collect and record on paper the oral literature as if the materials were intended for publication, but then to bury the collected manuscripts in a myriad of inaccessible archives. Some manuscripts were supposedly lost, their reciters who had carried on the oral tradition murdered. When other methods failed, the Soviet bureaucracies charged with the "management" of Central Asian literature began mounting court trials of books during 1950–1952. The court trials were designed to purge national cultures of those elements deemed incompatible with a Marxist-Leninist world view. Typically, attacks would begin with derogatory comments in a local newspaper or national newspaper. This would be picked up by the local Communist Party and then by various local, political, social, academic, or literary organizations, and finally by an organization of national standing. The culmination of the attack would be the universal condemnation of local intellectuals, who would be charged with idealizing the bourgeois-nationalist aspects of their national literature. At this time, traditional literatures of the countries of the USSR were banned. After the accession of Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971) to Communist Party leadership, the publication process resumed—but with new methods. Rather than allowing the originals to be disseminated, the Oriental Institutes insisted on issuing approved sanitized versions. Also, purported *dastans* on such themes as Ode to the Tractor and Ode to the Collective Farm were issued to replace the traditional ones.

One solution used in the 1930s to circumvent censorship was fiction literature. During the 1980s, the genre continued to survive in works like *Olmez Kayalar* (Immortal Cliffs) by Mamadali Mahmudov, *Kuyas ham Alav* (Sun Is Also Fire) by Alishir Ibadinov, *Singan Kilich* (Broken Sword) by Tolongon Kasimbekov, *Baku 1501* by Azize Caferzade, and *Altin Orda* (Golden Horde) by Ilyas Esenberlin. Despite being fiction, all these novels contain, to various degrees, footnotes with historically accurate information and provide details of how Central Asia was invaded by Russian armies. The Soviet apparatus, spearheaded by the Oriental Institutes, tried to pressure these and other authors to rewrite portions of their novels to cast the Soviet Russians in a better light. Failing that, the Soviet bureaucrats endeavored to have the authors recant their written assertions. Despite the efforts of the Soviet bureaucracies, defiant works kept appearing.

A number of authors took advantage of the Soviet state's atheism policy to disseminate views not otherwise printable. Aliser Ibadinov, in his *Kuyas ham Alav*, insisted on the necessity of remaining true to

ancestral beliefs, which predated not only Soviet ideology but also Islam. This Ibadinov accomplished by portraying how Central Asians resisted the spread of Islam.

The Post-Soviet Period

Some Central Asian authors were sent to Soviet jails simply for writing. In some cases, world attention focusing on the plight of these writers managed to get them freed. One such case involves Mamadali Mahmudov, who was imprisoned by the Uzbeks for including criticisms of the Soviet government in his writings. One of the reasons that the government was willing to free him was, perhaps, that Mahmudov was simply quoting passages from older works, such as the *Dastan Dede Korkut* (committed to paper in the sixteenth century although dating from a much earlier period). After the Uzbek Republic declared independence in the post-1991 era, Mahmudov was rewarded for his earlier work by being given the newly instituted Cholpan Prize. Named after a Central Asian author who perished in Stalin's Soviet jails, the Cholpan Prize was meant to honor Mahmudov's skill in transmitting historical documentation and narration under the guise of fiction. In 1999, Mahmudov was abducted and jailed once again. To what extent his new incarceration is due to his past sins of the Soviet period is yet to be understood. His case has been taken up by various groups and governments, including Amnesty International, Helsinki Watch, Human Rights Watch, and Digital Freedom Network.

Perhaps the ancient literature of Central Asia is continuing to serve the original intent of its creators. The following poem was printed in *Mubbir* (Tashkent, November 1982), the official organ of the Uzbek Communist Party Authors' Union. The message is still valid:

Give me a chance, my rebellious dreams
My father has erected his statue in my memory
May years and winds be rendered powerless
May his legacy not be erased from my conscience

Give me a chance, my rebellious dreams
Grant my father a holy Dastan
May years and winds be rendered powerless
May his remembrance never be allowed to fade

H. B. Paksoy

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LITERATURE—CHINA From earliest times, literature in China was considered to include philosophical and historical writing along with prose and poetry; literature was writing that met social needs or expressed one's deepest feelings, or both. Oral literary forms were often respected, and most written forms through time regularly drew material from the folk tradition; conversely, the dominant written forms helped shape the ethics and aesthetics of popular oral traditions as well.



NOBEL PRIZE FOR GAO XINGJIAN

In 2000, the Nobel Prize for Literature was awarded to Chinese writer Gao Xingjian for his novel, *Soul Mountain*. The novel, which was translated into English by Mabel Lee and published by HarperCollins, is an account in various literary forms of Gao's travels (physical, mental, and spiritual) through modern China and a less than favorable comparison with the China of the past. Gao was born in 1940 and became known in China for his writings on the Cultural Revolution, which he burned for fear of being imprisoned. After that his work was both tolerated and repressed by the government, and in 1987 he immigrated to France. His book is based in part on his travels for a year and a half through southern China.

David Levinson

Earliest Forms and Functions

China's earliest extant texts presumably reflect the spoken language of the time, but writing was increasingly reserved for the social and political elite; consequently, the language of classical literature (*wenyan*, or "cultured language") was not allowed to reflect changes as spoken language developed through time. Thus the language of formal literature became archaic and demanded extensive study for thorough comprehension. Its difficulty was enhanced by the welter of allusions to a broad range of earlier literature, which adorned the work of learned writers. Although classical Chinese literature required years to master, the preservation of a standard written language and its rich literary tradition served to link successive generations of writers and readers of diverse backgrounds throughout China and elsewhere throughout East Asia to produce what is arguably the world's richest literary tradition. Those who succeeded came to be called *wenren* (people of culture), or literati, in contrast to the bulk of the Chinese people, who could merely read practical texts or who were illiterate. The high status associated with high levels of education, like many of China's literary forms and genres, had remarkable tenacity, lasting hundreds of years until the twentieth century, when Western influences swept through Chinese culture as well as through its political system.

Dominant Literary Forms—Poetry

Unquestionably, the dominant Chinese literary form was always poetry. Among the oldest preserved writings are hymns and dances from the courts of

the Shang (1766–1045 BCE) and Zhou (1045–256 BCE) dynasties, twelfth and eleventh centuries BCE. These and folk songs make up the earliest collection assembled around 600 BCE, the *Shijing* (Classic of Poetry/Book of Songs), which was memorized by generations of budding writers for the imagery of its poems and for the moral teachings each poem was thought to embody. Most were read as oblique references to contemporary political events and social situations.

For two thousand years, this collection has been identified with the Confucian school of moralistic teaching; this poetic tradition grew up in the states of the north China plain, the Confucian homeland. By around 400 BCE, a second tradition was developing farther south, around the Chang (Yangtze) River. These poems more closely reflect religious, even ecstatic, practices and beliefs. This tradition, preserved in the collection *Chuci* (Songs of Chu), contributed a more diverse prosody as well as fantastic images and motifs to the maturing poetic tradition. Marked by a caesura in each line, this form may have influenced the development of the prosy *fu*, or rhapsody, during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE); it died out when the political power of the north became dominant.

A new form, *shi*, or lyric poetry, was to develop toward the end of four centuries of unified Han rule. Written in equal numbers of lines of five syllables (or words, in largely monosyllabic early Chinese), *shi* were often composed in couplets; later, seven-syllable lines also became common. Poems in this form served as the vehicle for the most profound philosophical speculation as well as deep emotion and even literary play.



THE CHINESE VIEW OF WESTERN APPRECIATION OF LITERATURE

The extract of text written by the Protestant missionary Mary Isabella Bryson in 1890 provides an interesting insight into the Chinese opinion of Western civilization.

But what is the business of the man who is approaching us, carrying two large deep bamboo baskets, each with a tiny flag attached to one of them bearing the legend, "Respect Printed Paper"? As he proceeds, a door here and there opens, and a manservant comes out with a waste basket, emptying its contents into the large basket carried by the collector of scraps. This man is employed by some Chinese benevolent society to go round and collect even the smallest scraps of printed paper so that they may be carried to some temple courtyard, and destroyed by fire in a furnace set apart for the purpose, for the kitchen stove would be considered too secular of a place for performing such a sacred duty. This is one of the works of merit which the Chinese believe accumulate for them a sort of balance, to be set against the sins for which they have committed when they are judged by the king of the infernal regions at the end of life.

Probably few things have contributed so much to the idea that foreigners are uncivilized barbarians as our light regard for our own printed or written paper. They see us using it in all sorts of ignominious ways. We wrap parcels in it, and frequently carelessly tread it underfoot, consequently the Chinese not unnaturally conclude that we can have nothing of the name of a language or literature, or we should not treat the printed page in so disrespectful of a manner.

Source: Mary Isabella Bryson. (1890) *Child Life in China*. London: William Clowes and Sons, Limited, 58–59.

They served as the cornerstone of virtually all writers' collected works—and reputations. The "classical" form of such poetry, *gushi*, reached maturity in the third century and was used as a vehicle for poets' most intensely felt emotions until the twentieth century. During the Tang dynasty (618–907), a highly formalized version became popular, the *lushi* (regulated poetry), written in eight lines of either five or seven syllables. Over fifty thousand *shi* are preserved from the Tang period, a high point in poetic expression; from the subsequent Song dynasty (960–1279), hundreds of thousands still exist.

China's most famous poets include three who were contemporary, Wang Wei (d. 761), Li Bai (often romanized Li Bo or Li Po, 701–762), and Du Fu (712–770), all members of the educated elite of the Tang period. Although their differences are some-

times exaggerated for the sake of contrast, each is identified with a major philosophical school of the times: Wang Wei with Buddhism, Li Bai with Taoism, and Du Fu with Confucianism. This is because many of Wang Wei's poems reflect the stillness of meditation, Li Bai's works express the mental freedom associated with philosophical Taoism, and Du Fu frequently addressed the calamities of the day, particularly the sufferings caused by the An Lushan rebellion that began in 755. In this, Du Fu was performing the duties of the faithful Confucian minister of state, although his stern advice brought him dismissal from office.

Also during the Tang, another new form of poetic expression developed in the entertainment districts of the Tang capital, the *ci*, or song lyric. Such poems had lines of irregular lengths to match melodies then pop-

ular and most frequently extolled romantic love. After the music was forgotten, poets continued to write new words, often having far more philosophical import, to these old song patterns, and they do so today. Even Mao Zedong (1893–1976) wrote his revolutionary verse to *ci* song patterns hundreds of years old.

Dominant Literary Forms—Historical Writing

Most early Chinese prose constitutes what later would be considered historical writing. Rarely is it in the form of connected accounts; instead it records facts, primarily the words and deeds of both important individuals and important groups in early Chinese society. The most famous, *Shiji* (The Historical Records), compiled by Sima Qian (145–87? BCE), is also considered a model for prose style. Its strength lies in its presentation of biographical material with an eye to demonstrating how individuals fulfilled (or failed in) social roles. This approach led, in later histories, to a tendency to type individuals at the expense of the psychological detail that might distinguish them.

Dominant Literary Forms—Philosophical Writing

Philosophical writing, especially the early canonical works of major schools, were also considered part of the literary canon. The period during which Confucius (Kong Qiu, termed Kong Fuzi or Master Kong, 551–479 BCE) lived was considered the time of the "Hundred Schools," because of the lively philosophical debates of the time, during which few schools seemed to be mutually exclusive in their ideas and texts were quoted relatively freely among them. Most philosophical writings from that time were collectively produced; identifying authorship is thus a futile effort. The most important school of thought to emerge was Confucianism. Its moral teachings and political values were adapted to fit the needs of the Han state, and its ideology, though frequently modified, remained nominally dominant until the fall of China's final dynasty, the Qing (1644–1912). The Confucian school claimed many of the writings of highest antiquity, such as ritual texts and the *Yijing* (Classic of Changes), to take the position of guardians of China's cultural traditions.

The second most important school is Taoism. An early gnomic text known as the *Laozi*, or more commonly in recent decades, the *Daodejing* (or *Tao-te ching*, The Classic of the Way and of Virtue), apparently began as an allusive treatise on proper governing, but it has often served as a source of inspiration for poets when read as a mystical text. References to such early



"IMMORTAL BY THE RIVER"

Written by Su Shi (1037–1101)

I was drinking that night on Eastern Slope,
I sobered up and got drunk again,
and when I went back it seemed about midnight.
My servant boy was snoring
it sounded like the thunder,
When I knocked at the gate, no one answered,
then I leaned on my staff
and listened to the river.

I've always resented how this body
has never been my own,
will the time ever come when I can forget
being always busy?
The night ended, the winds calmed,
the wrinkled waves grew flat,
I'll set off from here in my small boat,
on river and lakes lodge the rest of my days.

Source: Stephen Owen (1997) *Anthology of Chinese Literature, the Beginnings to 1911*.
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philosophical works recur throughout Chinese writing until the present day.

Dominant Literary Forms—Fiction

Chinese fiction began as an informal mode of philosophy, through parables and brief moralistic tales. Called *xiaoshuo* (lesser discourses), fictional narratives in the classical language served as an elegant amusement for some. But especially after vernacular-language writings developed around 1300, highly educated authors increasingly used fiction as a vehicle for social and political commentary. This is despite the conventional evaluation of fiction as less artistic than poetry, hence less worthy of serious consideration as an art form. The earliest fictional genre has been termed *zhiguai*, or "records of anomalies." These terse accounts, which began to appear around 250 CE, are generally anonymous and have been collected into a number of popular anthologies without regard to period of composition or authorship. Such anecdotes record the appearance of ghosts, uncanny events involving animals or plants, or magical objects. A subset, termed *zhiren* (records of persons), includes observations about the habits of eccentric individuals, their witty remarks, and critical evaluations of their literary and artistic skills. Later examples of the form

tend to be longer, with more fully developed plots and characterization. Nearly five hundred of the best known and finest are assembled in *Liaozhai zhiyi* (Liaozhai's Notes on Strange Matters) by Pu Songling (1640–1715). Many have to do with intrusions of the ghostly and the supernatural into the lives of lonely scholars, seemingly projecting the aspirations and fears of this group into the realm of the supernatural.

A somewhat longer fictional form, also written in the formal language, was the *chuanqi xiaoshuo*, or classical tale (literally, "transmissions of the strange"), which became popular during the Tang and subsequent Song periods. Romantic in subject matter, the best known involve romantic liaisons between young scholars and beautiful women, heroic acts of larger-than-life men and women knights-errant, and satirical attacks on contemporary figures and points of view. Justly famous is *Yingying zhuan* (The Story of Yingying) by the poet Yuan Zhen (779–831), a sad tale of unwise passion between young lovers, presumably based on personal experience.

Although material from oral traditions can be discerned in these classical-language narratives, folk literature is usually assumed to have played a larger role in the development of vernacular fiction. Professional entertainers had been active from the earliest times; through the Tang period, most were known for singing and dancing. But by the Song period, the capital was home to narrators of a variety of coherent tales, ranging in subject matter from historical and religious figures to romantic adventures of knights-errant, criminals, and illicit lovers. Literati summaries of these narrations may have circulated in written versions as book printing became increasingly common after around 1000 CE, but the earliest extant vernacular short stories date from around 1550. From that time onward, these stories, subsequently termed *buaben xiaoshuo* (oral tales fiction), became an artistic form for literati writers, whose works constitute examples of the most complicated fiction in the language.

Some of these stories take up the lives of common people during traumatic historical events such as invasions by foreign peoples; others explore the complex motivations of adulterous couples or the events leading up to heinous crimes. Feng Menglong (1574–1646), the editor of the most outstanding collection of 120 stories, described their content as most effectively limited to one individual or a single event.

The Chinese vernacular novel developed around the same time, presumably on the basis of unrefined lengthy historical narratives termed *pinghua* (plain[ly told] tales), written between around 1280 and 1450.

The first novel was *Sanguo zhi yanyi* (Romance of the Three Kingdoms), attributed to Luo Guanzhong (c. 1330–1400), although its earliest edition appeared only in 1522. It traces a terrible period during the third century when China was wracked by civil war and ultimately, but temporarily, divided into three warring states. The novel focuses on human motivations and shortcomings as one leader after another struggles to unite the country.

Within a few decades, by the middle of the sixteenth century, many other novels had appeared. Most narrated historical periods, with endless scenes of battlefield carnage and palace intrigues, focusing on the human motivations behind historical events. Others included tales of individual bandit heroes (*Shuibu zhuan*, or Outlaws of the Marsh) or adventures of a magical monkey during his quest for Buddhist scriptures (*Xiyou ji*, or Journey to the West). They were popular among the educated elite, but a genuine breakthrough in narrative writing came with the circulation, in manuscript form, of *Jin Ping Mei* (The Plum in the Golden Vase) in the late 1580s. This novel is set in the household of a wealthy merchant and explores the tortuous relationships between its male protagonist and his many wives and lovers. The work of a literatus of prodigious knowledge, it is jammed with quotations from and allusions to all forms of popular culture, songs, proverbs, jokes, and slang expressions. It is infamous for its descriptions of sexual behavior, but all are couched in flowery euphemisms.

By around 1600, a number of novel genres had appeared: romantic but artistically refined encounters between men and maids, pious tales of religious figures, fantastic journeys, and, of course, the ever-popular novelistic versions of the lives of historical figures and ruling houses. But the high point of Chinese fiction came with the development of the literati novel during the eighteenth century, the most outstanding being *Shi'tou ji* (Story of the Stone, also known as *Honglou meng*, or Dream of Red Mansions/the Red Chamber) by Cao Xueqin (1715–1764). Like other literati novelists, Cao worked on his masterpiece for several decades; indeed, he died before it was completed. Story of the Stone presents a lovingly detailed description of life in a declining but still extravagantly wealthy household, presumably based on the author's childhood experiences. It is also an engaging but ultimately tragic love story involving three cousins, a boy and two dissimilar teenage girls. But the novel's dominant theme is the disparity between appearance and reality, a theme that abounds with religious significance as various characters struggle with the competing appeals of Buddhist detachment and the realm of

emotional commitments. Other literati novels explore the frustrations of young men who aspire to the high status of the literati but who fail in the increasingly sharp competition for limited places among the political elite.

Dominant Literary Forms—Drama

Drama evolved from the religious fairs and puppet entertainments of antiquity into fully developed combinations of plot, instrumental and vocal music, acting, and physical display around 1250. The first major form was the *zaju* (variety show), of the Mongol Yuan period (1279–1368). Each play had only one singing role, and the story was presented from the perspective of this one character. Early playwrights, including Guan Hanqing, Ma Zhiyuan, and Bai Pu, rapidly developed characterization and plotting in this form, with the result that their plays later were widely read among the literati. The highlight of the form was the sequence of five plays collectively known as *Xixiang ji* (The Story of the Western Wing) by Wang Shifu (flourished 1250–1300), based on the Tang-period story *Yingying zhuan*.

Literati developed their own dramatic form during the sixteenth century, in the Ming period (1368–1644). Termed *chuanqi*, or romances, these lengthy plays interwove contrasting plots and subplots with all the major characters singing; consequently the form became known for the rich poetry of its many arias. Although many deal with romantic attachments and were based on earlier *chuanqi* classical-language tales, major plays such as *Taohua shan* (Peach Blossom Fan) by Kong Shangren (1648–1718) and *Changsheng dian* (Palace of Long Life) by Hong Sheng (1645–1704) examine the nature of love and commitment as the lovers' world collapses around them. Perhaps the most famous is *Mudan ting* (The Peony Pavilion) by Tang Xianzu (1550–1617); it questions the arbitrariness of dreams and wakefulness, even of life and death, in the face of powerful human emotions.

Modern Developments

Although traditional literature continues to be admired and to influence contemporary writers, influences from Western cultures have made a dramatic impact over the last 150 years. Twentieth-century Chinese literature is marked by experimentation in both form and content, movements that began during the waning years of the Qing period as nineteenth-century novelists turned ever more to contemporary events and social problems as subject matter. Generally considered the preeminent pioneer of China's new

literature, Lu Xun (1881–1936) brought European-style psychological realism into his explorations of contemporary social problems, beginning with his story *Kuangren riji* (Madman's Diary) in 1918. This trend for "critical realism" was followed by several decades during which China's writers were exhorted by their political leaders to become ever more instrumental in bringing about revolutionary change. One of the more successful of these writers was Ding Ling (1904–1985). Because many of her writings use a first-person narrator superficially like herself, unsophisticated male readers misconstrued her work as inappropriately subjective for wartime literature.

The death of Mao in 1976 and the increasing internationalization of Chinese culture heralded striking developments in modernist and postmodernist fiction in both the mainland and Taiwan. Among the most noteworthy writers in this category are Mo Yan (b. 1956) from northeast China, whose *Hong gaoliang jizazu* (Red Sorghum, 1988) was made into a widely heralded film, and Wang Wen-hsing (b. 1939), who grew up in Taiwan. The idiosyncratic style and vulgar expressions of his irreverent novel *Jiabian* (Family Catastrophe, 1972) outraged moralistic critics at the time, but the novel has since been heralded as a masterpiece. In marked contrast to old Chinese practice, many outstanding contemporary writers are women, including Wang Anyi (b. 1954) from Shanghai and Zhu Tianwen (b. 1956) from Taipei.

Robert E. Hegel

See also: **Chuci; Ding Ling; Drama—China; Du Fu; Four Books; Li Bai; Lu Xun; Poetry—China; Shi**

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LITERATURE—INDIA Some of the earliest literature in the world originated in India, beginning with writings in Vedic Sanskrit (an Aryan language), which may well be the oldest literature in any Indo-European language (Hittite being its only competitor for this position). Because of India's warm, damp climate and insect life, however, few existing manuscripts are as old as a thousand years; ancient literature was passed down by word of mouth and by the incredible rote learning of the Brahmans. If there was any literature in the Indus Valley earlier than that produced by the Aryan speakers, it is not known to have survived; only unreadable inscriptions (dating roughly from 2700–1500 BCE), so short that they never exceed two dozen characters, have been preserved from this time. These are presumed to be brief business documents.

The Vedas

The Rig Veda is the oldest of the four Vedas, long religious texts composed in an early form of Sanskrit around 1500–1000 BCE. It was followed by three other Vedas; taken together, these books, called the Samhitas, are something like a bible, being collections of liturgical texts of diverse origin, style, date, and authorship. The Rig Veda, the most important Veda, contains 1,028 hymns, ranging in length from just one to fifty-eight stanzas. The hymns are addressed mostly to the gods, among them the sovereign Varuna, the fire god Agni, and the warrior god Indra.

The Yajur Veda has two sections: the Black Yajur Veda with magical formulas and commentaries and the White Yajur Veda with formulas that were once part of a larger text. The Sama Veda (Book of Melodies), is the oldest text on Indian music. The last of the

Vedas, the Atharva Veda, is a collection of corrective magic. By about 500 BCE the form of these Vedic texts was essentially fixed.

The Brahmanas

The *Brahmanas* (c. 1000–800 BCE) are exegetical commentaries on the four Vedas, two for the Rig Veda, ten for the Sama, one for the Atharva, and two for the Yajur Veda. The *Brahmanas* were the first texts to justify the superior status of the priesthood in Vedic society, by placing Brahman priests above rulers and warriors. The *Brahmanas* include some texts called *Aranyakas*, ("forest texts," that is, fit for recitation in isolation), as well as the better-known Upanishads (speculations). The fourteen principal Upanishads were perhaps written during the ninth through sixth centuries BCE, the earlier ones in prose, the later ones versified, to explain the esoteric meaning of sacrifice. Additional Upanishads were written later, as condensations of religious teachings. Their total number is hence indeterminate, though it approaches two hundred.

The Tripitaka

During the fifth through third centuries BCE the Tripitaka (Three Baskets), the Buddhist canon in the Pali language (closely related to Sanskrit), was fixed for all time. It was soon to become the most influential body of literature in the eastern half of Asia and has remained so until the present day, especially in its Chinese and Japanese translations.

Secular Sanskrit Writing

The first significant secular document in Sanskrit was a linguistically sophisticated grammar by Panini, which fixed the structure of Sanskrit, in the fourth century BCE. Probably during the reign of the emperor Candragupta Maurya (d. c. 297 BCE), the text of the great epic *Mahabharata*, the world's longest poem, was established (c. 300 BCE). The *Mahabharata* contains about 100,000 distichs (two-line stanzas); it deals with a great war that possibly occurred around 900 BCE and was fought on the plain of Kurukshetra, in the Punjab. One section of the poem is particularly well known as the *Bhagavad Gita*, a debate of high moral caliber between the deities Arjuna and Krishna, which was probably inserted into the poem at a later date. Another later inclusion in the *Mahabharata* was an abridged version of the *Ramayana*.

The *Mahabharata* is made up of a number of distinct sections, incorporating tales, fables, and parables, as well as disquisitions on morals, politics, and law; in

fact it is a sort of encyclopedia. Yet the poem cannot be considered a historical document. It took hundreds of years to complete, is of unknown authorship, and in its final form probably dates to the second century CE. There are numerous later adaptations and translations of the story, in several languages, including those of Bali and Java.

The second great and lengthy Sanskrit epic, the *Ramayana*, is dated around 200 BCE and probably assumed its final form some two centuries later. Both epics must have incorporated material from extant folklore. Tradition has Valmiki as the author of the *Ramayana*, and it indeed appears more like the work of one person than does the *Mahabharata*. The *Ramayana* includes seven books, the first and last of which were later additions.

The *Ramayana* has only a handful of leading characters: Rama, who is a prince, his wife Sita, Rama's faithful half-brother Lakshmana, the Lankan demon Ravana, and Hanuman, the king of the monkeys. The characters and their moral dilemmas are richly drawn against a background of courtly life. A historical substratum of the story in the *Ramayana* may refer to the "Aryanization" (the northern cultural influence) of Central India. The poem had a wide influence on later literature, and there are versions in languages other than the original Sanskrit.

In this early era the image of the social structure of India was in a sense fixed by two books. During the late fourth century BCE, Kautilya wrote the *Arthashastra* (Treatise on the Good), which was rediscovered only in 1909 and is reminiscent of Machiavelli's *Il principe* (*The Prince*, 1513). In the second century CE came the *Manusmṛti*, a compilation of the laws of Manu, India's legendary first man. This treatise on religious law and social obligation described in detail a society, quite possibly utopian, in which there were four caste blocks or *varnas*, each of which had its own occupations, status, and religious duties. This work exercised an immeasurable influence on Indian society for the next two thousand years, and the *varna* model is still a popular image, or simplification, of Hindu caste society.

The outpouring of Sanskrit devotional literature continued with the major Puranas, eighteen in number (c. fourth century CE). Only two are of great importance, the Bhagavata Purana (some 12,000 verses in length) and the Vishnu Purana. Each Purana is a compendium of myths and legends, heroic polemics, and philosophizing, a mine of information about early Hinduism. Roughly contemporary with the main Puranas was the famous and internationally influential

anthology of anonymous fables and folktales the *Pan-catantra*, which had been translated into most western European languages by the eighteenth century.

Indian Literature in Other Languages

In the middle of the third century BCE, the first inscriptions in Tamil (a Dravidian language) in the Brahmi script appeared, and then, around 150 CE, there was established in South India the Tamil Sangam, a series of three academies of poets and philosophers, which lasted for decades. While its historicity is shrouded, the Sangam set the stage for an outpouring of medieval poetry in Tamil. Some of this was devotional, but much was secular in its appeal, including the first known works of Indian women authors.

A popular work of poetry was the *Purananuru*, an anthology of four hundred poems praising various Tamil rulers. Equally important was the *Kural*, an influential collection of moral maxims, compiled by Tiruvalluvar around the third to fourth century.

Sanskrit Plays and Novels

At about the same time as the third Tamil Sangam, Sanskrit drama flowered in northern India. In the fourth or fifth century lived the greatest of all Sanskrit poets, Kalidasa. The best-known plays that have survived from this era are *Shakuntala* and *Mṛichchakatika* (The Little Clay Cart), the former written by Kalidasa and the latter a comedy possibly written by him.

In the sixth or seventh century, Dandin's early Sanskrit novel, the *Dasakumaracarita* (Story of Ten Princes) appeared. It was a forerunner of the picaresque novel. Even earlier was a distinguished Tamil novel of epic dimensions, the *Silappadigaram* (The Stolen Anklet), by the prince Ilangovaligal (between the second and fifth centuries CE).

Medieval Indian Literature

During the Indian Middle Ages Sanskrit writings on science and philosophy flourished. There were works from the many schools of philosophy, from great mathematicians, surgeons, and astronomers. Perhaps the best known, if least scientific, work of this period was the *Kama Sutra*, a treatise on love, by Vatsyayana, who wrote it in a legal style of Sanskrit in about the third century CE, as a guide to the attainment of sexual pleasure.

The Middle Ages witnessed an outpouring of religious and philosophical literature, not just in Sanskrit, which was still the prime liturgical and scholarly language, but also in a number of regional languages.

Logic, metaphysics, devotional poetry, and commentary steadily developed.

In the period 850–1330 a new philosophical literature appeared in today's Karnataka, the *Kavirajamarga*. This was Jain literature, written in the medieval Kannada language. At the end of the twelfth century the first novel in Kannada, *Lilavati*, was written by Nemichandra. It was followed by other allegorical novels, as well as by Kesiraja's grammar of the medieval Kannada language in the thirteenth century.

Early Indian Poetry

Around 1020 CE Dravidian literature in the Telugu language appeared with the grammarian Nannaya Bhatta and the poet Nannichoda. At about the same time the Malayalam language became differentiated from Tamil. A century later the oldest known manuscript written in Bengali proclaimed the birth of that literature. Mukundaraj, who lived around the turn of the thirteenth century, was the first man to write poetry in Marathi. In the early fifteenth century two Bengali poets brought that literature into prominence: Chandidas and Vidyapati, the latter writing in Sanskrit as well as Bengali. Contemporary with them were two Telugu poets, Srinatha and Potana, as well as the best loved of the Hindi poets, Kabir (1440–1518). His was a medieval regional language closely related to Sanskrit. Although Kabir was a low-caste Hindu, he drew much of his inspiration from Sufism and criticized caste, ritualism, and idolatry.

Kabir was followed in 1540 by the first important Muslim poet of India, Mohamed of Jais (a town near today's Allahabad), who created the allegorical poem *Padmavat* in Hindi. Contemporary with Kabir was one of the greatest Indian female poets, the Rajput Mirabai, who wrote in both Hindi and Gujarati. A century before, Lalla, another female poet, had been writing in Kashmiri, while Manichand, also a woman, had written a historical novel in Gujarati. In 1574 the Hindi version of the *Ramayana*, by the poet Tulsidas (c. 1532–1623), appeared, a forerunner of numerous versions of the *Ramayana* in regional languages.

By this time there was a strong Persian cultural influence in some parts of India. A ruler of the Muslim province of Golconda (later Hyderabad), Mohammed Quli Qutub Shah, was a poet who wrote in both Persian and Urdu, which was a new dialectal form of Hindi containing much Persian vocabulary and written in an Arabic script. In later centuries Urdu poetry flourished in northern India.

In 1604 the Adi Granth, the canonical text of the Sikh religion, was established in Punjabi. Thirty years

later, also in northwestern India, appeared a work of Urdu prose, the *Sab Ras* of Vajhi. In southern parts of the subcontinent, the middle of the seventeenth century saw the writing of the Kannada poem *Rajasekhara* (1657), by Sadakshara Deva; the works of the Gujarati storyteller Premanand (1636–1734); and the influential Marathi-language poems of Tukaram (1607–1649). Another Telugu poet and bard was Tyagaraju (1767–1847), who influenced both Tamil and Malayalam verse.

Printed Indian Literature

With the arrival of the printing press in south India, Tamil literature underwent something of a renaissance. Arunachala Kavirayar (1712–1779) wrote *Rama Nataka Keerthanaigal* (The Tragedy of Rama) in 1728 (at the age of sixteen); the Italian Jesuit C. G. E. Beschi (1680–1746) wrote the Tamil poem *Tembavani* (an epic about the life of St. Joseph) in 1724 under the pen name Viramamunivar (published only in 1853). Another interesting author was the eighteenth-century "Indian Pepys," Anandaranga Pillai, a Tamil living in the French colony of Pondicherry. His fascinating and lengthy diary has been published in Tamil, French, and English.

During the eighteenth century Urdu poetry flowered at the hands of Vali, Hatim, Sauda, Inch'a, and Nazir (1740–1830). By the time of Nazir, British hegemony in India was well established, along with the spread of regional printing presses, the first modern universities, and the ever-widening influence of European literary forms, especially those in English.

Modern Novels

English influence is evident even in those writers who chose to publish works in their native languages. Bengal in particular saw a literary and intellectual renaissance in both English and Bengali, for example, in the novels of Bankim Chandra Chatterjee (1838–1894) and in the works of India's first Nobel Prize winner, the poet and dramatist Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941).

A parallel literary renaissance occurred in Hindi at the beginning of the twentieth century, with the novels of Premchand (1880–1937). Tamil novels were also written under English influence. The sources of this influence were the novels of Dickens, Thackeray, Scott, Hardy, and many others, which were widely read in India.

India was also the setting for works of British writers who visited or lived and worked in this bulwark of

the empire, such as Rudyard Kipling (1865–1936) and E. M. Forster (1879–1970), author of *A Passage to India*. In the mid-twentieth century John Masters (1914–1983) wrote a number of popular novels about the British in India; his own family had served there for five generations. By the late twentieth century British memoirs and novels set in India had become a flourishing cottage industry in the United Kingdom.

But the novel also became a domesticated form in Hindi, Urdu, Bengali, Marathi, Malayalam, and Tamil. Indian literary forms continued to be modernized throughout the twentieth century, aided by the ease of publication and the ever-increasing size of the reading public. An unexpected development was the emergence of numerous world-class, prize-winning Indian novelists writing in English, beginning with Tagore, but these authors often no longer resided in India. Kamala Markandaya and R. K. Narayan are but two of a host who write for a worldwide English readership. Preeminent today are the New York-based Salman Rushdie, originally from Bombay (author of *Midnight's Children*, 1980, and the controversial *Satanic Verses*, 1988), and the Delhi-based writer Arundhati Roy, originally from Kerala (author of *The God of Small Things*, 1997). Some of their recent novels have been translated into dozens of languages.

Oral Literatures of India

As mentioned earlier, the bulk of classical Indian literature was memorized by the Brahmans rather than recorded in written form. But India is also home to dozens of other literatures that are oral in nature and passed on from one generation to the next solely by rote learning in a local language—just as the early Sanskrit texts were. Only during the past two centuries have folklorists and other scholars, most of them Westerners, taken the trouble to record some of this literature, and coverage has hence been spotty.

This oral literature exists in a large number of languages. Collections published as texts in English translations include *Folktales of India* (1987), edited by Brenda E. F. Beck et al.; *Myths of Middle India* (1949); *Folk-Tales of Mahakoshal* (1944); *Folk-Songs of Chhattisgarh* (1944); *Folk-Songs of the Maikal Hills* (1944); *Tribal Myths of Orissa* (1954); and *Folklore of the Santal Parganas* (1909). Several long ballads, of epic proportion, have been recorded in Tamil dialects, among them the so-called bow songs of the far southern tip of India.

Paul Hockings

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LITERATURE—INDIA, TAMIL Of the four Dravidian literary languages, Tamil has the oldest recorded history. Its earliest records, inscriptions in an Asokan Brahmi script, date to around 254 BCE. Tamil literature, preserved in copper-plate inscriptions and on palm-leaf manuscripts, covers more than 2000 years. It is the only Indian language with an uninterrupted continuity between its classical and modern forms. Its vigorous literary development begins with short bardic poems about love and war. The grammar, *Tolkappiyam*, is characterized by richness and rigor in phonetics and phonology, morphology, semantics, prosody, and conventions of literary composition.

Predevotional Literature

The bardic corpus (200? BCE–250? CE) is represented by two large collections of poems in two main genres: *agam* (love poetry) and *puram* (war poetry).

The collections *Ettuttogai* (Eight Anthologies) and *Pattuppattu* (Ten Songs) are both of very high quality. The postclassical period (250–600 CE) is exemplified by the *Tirukkural* (c. fifth century), a collection of 1,330 couplets on ethical order, social activities, and pleasure, and by the *Silappadigaram* (The Stolen Anklet, fifth–sixth century), a narrative-dramatic poem ascribed to Ilangovaligal. *Silappadigaram* is a tragic story about Kannagi, a woman who proves the innocence of her husband, who has been accused of the theft of a golden anklet belonging to the queen, but only after her husband is executed. In anger, Kannagi destroys the city with fire before being taken up to heaven as a goddess.

Devotional Literature

Tamil is famous for the devotional literature of Saiva and Vaishnava poets (poets devoted to Siva and Vishnu, respectively). The two greatest Saiva poets were Appar (seventh century), also known as "The Lord of the Divine Speech," and Manikkavasagar (ninth century), whose mystical poems stress the love of the soul for God and his response with grace, as well as his immanence in all things. The lives of the sixty-three Saiva saints were told in *Periyapuranam* (The Great Purana) by Sekkilar (twelfth century) in 1,286 stanzas. Among the Vaishnava poets, the best known is the female poet Andal (eighth century), who sang about her love for and intense devotion to Krishna, an incarnation of Vishnu.

Kamban's (c. 1180–1250) magnificent poem *The Descent of Rama (Iramavataram)* in 40,000 lines is based on the Sanskrit *Ramayana*. According to many scholars, Kamban was the greatest of all Tamil poets.

Modern Literature

Modern Tamil literature may be said to begin with the first genuine novel *Kamalambal (Fatal Rumour)*, 1895 by B. R. Rajam Iyer (1872–1898), and the patriotic and lyrical poetry of S. Subrahmanya Bharati (1882–1921), the national poet of the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Contemporary Tamil writing begins in the 1930s, with 1933 representing a watershed in the development of Tamil poetry and prose. In that year, *Manikkodi* (The Jewel Banner), a literary journal that has become a legend, was founded in Madras and soon attracted the best creative writers and critics of the period.

Tamil poetry went through decisive changes after 1959, when C. S. Chellappa (b. 1912) began publishing his review *Eluttu* (Writing), which opened its pages to things new and experimental. By 1965, avant-garde

poetry, dissociated from stock phrases, traditional conventions, classical meters, and repetitive themes, was firmly established in Tamil writing, represented by poets like S. Mani (b. 1936), T. S. Venugopalan (b. 1929), S. Vaitheeswaran (b. 1935), and Shanmugan Subbiah (b. 1924).

The novels of T. Janakiraman (1921–1982) are rich, colorful, and realistic portrayals of rural life. *Amma vantal (The Sins of Appu's Mother)*, 1972 has become a classic. In honesty, courage, social involvement, realism, and skill, Rajam Krishnan (b. 1925) is a superb novelist. She is noted for her scrupulous documentation, psychological insight, realistic approach, and great thematic variety. She has published many novels, including *Kurincitten (Honey of the Kurinci Flower)*, 1953) on the life of a tribal community in the Nilgiri Hills of South India.

D. Jayakanthan (b. 1934) is in many respects the most complex and the most widely read author among Tamil prose writers. Strongly influenced by Freud and Marx, as well as by Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi, in his later writings he has become a great humanist, uncommitted to any particular ideology. The heroine of *Some People at Some Time (Cila nerankalil cila manitarkal)*, 1970 is sexually exploited by her old sadistic uncle and ostracized by society. Almost the entire work is set within her interior monologue. In her figure, Jayakanthan has created an unforgettable character—a courageous and tragic woman.

L. S. Ramamirtham (1916) is a master craftsman and unsurpassed stylist who explores character and emotion with striking and multifaceted imagery. In 140 stories and 6 novels, his major concerns are language, emotions, and Hindu religious philosophy. Similes and metaphors of startling beauty abound in his works. Among his novels, *Apita (The One Who Cannot Be Touched)*, 1970 is the Indian illustration of Goethe's "The eternal feminine raises us to spiritual heights," while *Putra (The Son)*, 1965 expresses the author's belief in the indestructible chain of all life. Among Tamil writers, Janakthan and Ramamirtham, though different in language, theme, and style, deserve highest praise.

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LITERATURE—JAPAN Japanese literature has flourished from the early eighth century to the present in a myriad of genres and styles reflecting the nation's cultural periods. The *Kojiki* (Records of Ancient Matters), the earliest Japanese text, was completed in 712. A history based on oral traditions, this work provides a justification for the supremacy of the imperial family and its right to rule and includes myths of creation documenting the foundations of the Yamato state, those clans along the Inland Sea that formed the nucleus of the early Japanese nation.

In the creation myths in *Kojiki*, the god and goddess Izanagi and Izanami describe creation in terms of the union of male and female and emphasize the importance of rituals and purity. They see humanity as part of nature and stress harmony over conflict. A second cycle of myths concerning Amaterasu, the sun goddess, and Susanoo, the storm god, describes solstice rituals and depicts an agrarian society. These myths are also political narratives reflecting a conflict between the Izumo culture on the Sea of Japan coast and the Yamato culture across the mountains from it. A parallel history, the *Nihon shoki* (Chronicles of Japan from the Earliest Times to 697 CE), compiled in 720, contains much of the same material as the *Kojiki* but is presented more formally in imitation of Chinese dynastic histories.

The *Manyoshu* and Its Poets

Within a generation of the appearance of the *Nihon shoki*, the first collection of poetry in Chinese, the *Kaifuso* (Fond Recollections of Poetry), was published in 751, and shortly thereafter, the first collection of poetry in Japanese, the *Manyoshu* (Collection of Ten Thousand Leaves), appeared around 756. The *Manyoshu* contains 4,516 poems arranged in twenty books. Drawing on ancient oral traditions of poetry, this collection is noted for the scope and variety of its verse, including poetry in the *tanka* (short song) and *choka* (long song) forms.

The first great poet of the *Manyoshu* is Nukata Okimi (c. 630–after 690). Her poem on the seasons, celebrating the primacy of autumn over spring, and her poems of love provided a model for later poets. Kakinomoto Hitomaro (flourished 685–705) wrote both public and private poetry. His public poems, such as one commemorating an imperial excursion to Yoshino, celebrated the great events of court, while his poem on separating from his wife is a masterpiece of private poetry expressing personal feelings of grief. "Dialogue on Poverty," a poem by Yamanoue Okura (660–c. 733), condemns social injustice, criticizing the

state for allowing people to live in destitution. The *Manyoshu* also contained poems written by people of the lower classes from Azuma, the eastern lands encompassing the area around present-day Tokyo. After the *Manyoshu*, poets no longer created such a wide range of poetry.

Literature in Japanese Courtly Society

The Heian period (795–1185) marks one of the richest flowerings of Japanese literature. While men generally wrote in Chinese, which was admired as the language of scholarship, women writing in Japanese created a series of masterworks. *Taketori monogatari* (The Bamboo Cutter's Tale, 909 CE) is often regarded as the grandparent of Japanese prose fiction. Other developments included poem tales (*uta monogatari*), such as *Ise monogatari* (*Tales of Ise*, probably written in several stages, the earliest versions late ninth century), which were characterized by a mixture of prose and poetry. Diary literature also became popular, beginning with *Tosa nikki* (Tosa Diary, c. 936) and including *Kagero nikki* (translated as *The Gossamer Years*) and *Izumi Shikibu nikki* (The Diary of Izumi Shikibu), both probably early eleventh century.

These developments culminated in Murasaki Shikibu's *Genji monogatari* (*Tale of Genji*, completed c. 1010), the world's first novel, often considered the finest work of Japanese literature. Composed of fifty-four chapters, this romance details the lives of three generations at court and centers on the activities of Hikaru Genji, the epitome of the Japanese courtier. The *Genji* presents a portrait of life in the Japanese court during the eleventh century, revealing the social, ethical, and aesthetic values of Japanese court society. *Eiga monogatari* (Tales of Courtly Splendor, early eleventh century) represents a genre of historical fiction.

The first decade of the tenth century saw the imperially commissioned compilation of the *Kokin waka shu* (Collection of Ancient and Modern Songs), which defined the standard for court poetry and served as a model for later imperial anthologies. Ki no Tsurayuki (d. c. 945), one of the editors, wrote a preface in Japanese, which was the earliest statement of Japanese poetics. Tsurayuki called for formality and elegance as the sine qua non of Japanese court poetry. The collection, in twenty books, has the poems arranged by topic, the greatest number being seasonal poems and love poems.

During this period a significant body of Chinese prose and poetry continued to be written. Sugawara no Michizane (845–903) brought the composition of

Chinese poetry to its peak. The collection *Wakan roei shu* (*Japanese and Chinese Poems to Sing*, 1013) and others featured a mixing of Japanese and Chinese poetic forms. In prose fiction, *Nihon ryōiki* (miraculous stories from the Japanese Buddhist tradition, which were compiled c. 822), a collection of morality tales written in Chinese, promoted Buddhism.

Literature in Japanese Warrior Society

Toward the end of the twelfth century, a bloody civil war broke out between two warrior clans, the Taira and Minamoto, bringing courtly society to an end and ushering in the warrior society of medieval Japan. The great war epic *Heike monogatari* (*Tales of the Heike*) described that war and laid the foundation for a new genre of *gunki mono* (war literature). The accounts presented in *Tales of the Heike* were originally recited by blind troubadour-priests known as *biwa hoshi*. From its opening homily, which reminds the reader of the transience and futility of human endeavor, to the concluding chapters, where Lady Kenreimon'in, the lone survivor, is left to ponder thoughts she cannot forget or bear to remember, the narrative is strongly liturgical in its rhythms.

In contrast to narratives of the great deeds of warriors are the accounts of recluses, men who chose to withdraw from worldly affairs. Faced with the brutality and violence of war, these hermits sought an alternative way of life. The most celebrated of such accounts is the essay *Hojoki* (*An Account of My Hut*, 1212), by Kamo no Chomei (1155?–1216), which describes the struggle, frustration, and pain of living in the world and contrasts that experience with the serenity of life as a hermit. More than a century later, another hermit priest, Yoshida Kenko (1283–1350), wrote *Tsurezuregusa* (translated as *Essays in Idleness*, c. 1330), describing his life of solitude and nostalgia for the lost glory of courtly society.

In poetry, the *Shin kokin waka shu* (New Collection of Ancient and Modern Songs, 1205) was compiled by Fujiwara Teika (1162–1241). This eighth imperial anthology of poetry was dedicated to the idea that old vocabulary should be used to create a new poetry, in this case characterized by elaborate poetic techniques. Reflecting an age of turbulence, poetry took on a darker tone. New aesthetic values included *sabi* (the quality of being old and tarnished) and *yugen* (the quality of mystery and depth). The *Shin kokin waka shu* collection may represent the high water mark of *tanka*, and from it emerged *renga* (linked verse).

The late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries saw the emergence of the Noh theater under the guid-

ance of Kan'ami (1333–1384) and his son Zeami (1363–1443), with the patronage of the shogun (military ruler) Ashikaga Yoshimitsu (1358–1408). Originating in festival entertainments, Noh was elevated by Kan'ami and Zeami to the epitome of aesthetic and aristocratic performance. The strong influence of Zen Buddhism can be seen in the austere quality of performance. Although the costumes are elaborate, there are few props; the tempo of the plays is slow and dignified, while the texts themselves are spare. The aesthetics of Noh harmonize the values of elegant courtly society with the values of vigorous warrior society.

Both prose and poetry continued to be written in Chinese throughout the medieval period, mostly by priests from the five great Zen temples, and their work is known collectively as *gozan bungaku* (literature of the five mountains).

Literature of Unified Japan

After centuries of warfare, Japan was unified by Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543–1616) at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and peace and national isolation ensued for two-and-a-half centuries. The work of three writers, Matsuo Basho (1644–1694), Ihara Saikaku (1642–1693), and Chikamatsu Monzaemon (1653–1724), dominated the seventeenth century.

Basho followed the poetic conventions of his day, but in his middle years he established a style of his own, elevating the seventeen-syllable form (which we know today as haiku) to the level of serious poetry. Basho's best verse is characterized by simplicity of language and engagement with nature and is significantly influenced by Zen. Basho freed poetry from unremitting elegance to celebrate rustic beauty. His many travel diaries combine prose and poetry.

Saikaku came from the merchant culture of Osaka and represented that class, which was becoming a patron of the arts. A series of fictions written during the last decade of his life established his reputation. Beginning with works depicting the lives of amorous heroes and heroines, parodying the romances of the courtly period, he moved on to more serious explorations of the concerns of the newly wealthy townspeople. His twin themes were love and money. He explored all aspects of love—romantic, commercial, homosexual, illicit, and tragic. In the area of money, he showed how the merchant makes his fortune and how he can lose it, usually by being blinded by love. In these fictions, Saikaku created a sensitive picture of urban society.

Chikamatsu was a seminal playwright for both the Kabuki (a theatrical form using male actors and com-

binning music, dance, décor, and stage effects to produce a spectacle) and Bunraku (a theatrical form where characters are represented by dolls manipulated simultaneously by as many as three men) theaters, which became the most popular forms of drama. He wrote historical plays (*jidai mono*) celebrating the exploits of the heroes of the past, as well as domestic plays (*sewamono*), based on contemporary events such as love suicides. His love-suicide plays became so popular, and so many couples were inspired by them to commit suicide, that the government banned the use of the term "love suicide" in the titles of plays. Because Tokugawa society was rigid and repressive, Chikamatsu developed the theme of the conflict between duty (*giri*) and the urge to follow one's personal feelings (*ninjo*).

Literature during the Meiji Restoration

Following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, which ended shogunal rule of Japan as well as Japan's isolation from most of the rest of the world, Japanese literature began to modernize in several stages. First, translations of Western fiction were introduced as models, works such as *Robinson Crusoe* and *Around the World in 80 Days* being among the most popular.

Tsubouchi Shoyo (1859–1935) provided the second step toward modernization by writing *Shosetsu shinzui* (The Essence of the Novel, 1885–1886), an essay analyzing Western fiction and providing a blueprint for writing works in imitation of Western fiction. In the 1880s, writers like Futabatei Shimei (1864–1909) began to employ techniques such as interior monologue and psychological realism. By the first decade of the twentieth century, romanticism was being practiced by Kunikida Doppo (1871–1908), and naturalism was advocated by Tayama Katai (1872–1930) and Shimazaki Toson (1872–1943).

The best writers, however, remained aloof from literary movements. Natsume Soseki (1867–1916) explored the concept of the self in relation to society, in works such as *Kokoro*. Mori Ogai (1862–1922) wrote historical fictions, including *Sansho Daiyu* (Sansho the Bailiff), and Nagai Kafu (1879–1959) wrote eloquent elegies on the dying culture of old Edo.

Every writer of the new age had to find a balance between the new literature and the long, proud traditions of the old. Perhaps more than anyone else, Akutagawa Ryunosuke (1892–1927) maintained this balance by mining ancient Japanese fiction and retelling its stories in a Chekhovian mode by adding a modern psychosocial aspect.

Literature in Contemporary Japan

The two great writers of the mid-twentieth century, whose careers spanned the Second World War, were Tanizaki Junichiro (1886–1965) and Kawabata Yasunari (1899–1972). In the years before the war, Tanizaki wrote a series of erotic and grotesque stories, often historical fictions, exploring perverse aspects of human psychology. Following the war came his greatest work, *Sasame yuki* (translated as *The Makioka Sisters*), an elegy on the indolent lifestyle of upper-class society in the Osaka region in the years immediately before World War II. Following the war, Tanizaki produced several studies of aging and sexuality, including *Kagi* (*The Key*) and *Futen rojin nikki* (*Diary of a Mad Old Man*). Kawabata Yasunari dabbled in modernist techniques of writing, but created a highly traditional aesthetic in works such as *Yukiguni* (*Snow Country*). Largely in recognition of his ability to convey traditional Japanese aesthetics, he was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1968.

The years following the Second World War saw a great resurgence of writing. Dazai Osamu (1909–1948) captured the despairing mood of the immediate postwar years in works such as *Shayo* (*The Setting Sun*, 1947) and *Ningen shikaku* (*No Longer Human*, 1948). Mishima Yukio (1925–1970), who came of age during the war, wrote brilliant, often troubled works such as *Kikakuji* (*Temple of the Golden Pavilion*), exploring human psychology and motivation. Although in many ways innovative as a writer, Mishima held conservative and nationalistic political views that led to his celebrated suicide in 1970. Ibuse Masuji (1898–1993), generally known as a humorist, also produced *Kuroi ame* (*Black Rain*, 1965–1966), which raised the experience of the nuclear bombing of his native Hiroshima to mythic proportions. Abe Kobo (1924–1993) claimed to reject tradition and wrote about what it meant to be modern and live in a technological world, most notably in *Suna no onna* (*Woman in the Dunes*, 1962).

Women writers have come to play an increasingly major role in the literary world. Oba Minako (b. 1930) balances both traditional and modern views, including a global perspective, by writing about her experience of living for twelve years in Sitka, Alaska. She calls into question the very definition of national literatures by creating characters and settings that are not Japanese. Feminist and gender issues also form major themes in her work. Oe Kenzaburo (b. 1935) exemplifies the liberal, socially committed writer. Whether dealing with the loss of childhood innocence in a short story, "Shi-iku" ("Prize Stock," 1959), the personal tragedy of the birth of his brain-damaged son in *Kojinteki na kaiken* (*A Personal Matter*, 1964), or his nonfiction works such

as *Hiroshima Noto* (*Hiroshima Notes*, 1964) and *Okinawa Noto* (*Okinawa Notes*, 1969), he is a writer with a social conscience and a global perspective. For this he received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1994. In recent years a new generation of writers, including Murakami Haruki (b. 1949), Yoshimoto Banana (b. 1964), and Yamada Emi (b. 1959), have challenged and enlarged the boundaries of the literary world.

Poetry began the process of modernization in 1882 with the publication of *Shintaishi sho* (*Selections of Poetry in the New Form*), a collection of nineteen poems, fourteen translated from English and five composed in Japanese in the new form—free verse. This became a model of a new form of poetry, which would be experimented with and developed through translations and original works.

The new form of poetry came into its own with the emergence of Hagiwara Sakutarō (1886–1942). His collection *Tsuki ni boeru* (*Howling at the Moon*, 1917) established his reputation, and although he often wrote in the traditional styles, Hagiwara is best known for his colloquial poetry in free verse. His poems experiment with musical rhythms and onomatopoeia. Takamura Kotarō (1883–1956) spent his youthful years in the United States, England, and France and is best known for a series of poems celebrating his love for his wife. In *Chieko sho* (translated as *Chieko's Sky*, 1941), he describes her insanity and death. Nishiwaki Junsaburo (1894–1982) is widely regarded as being responsible for both the resurgence of modern poetry and for the internationalization of the poetic perspective in the postwar years.

Traditional Japanese poetry has survived in the modern world. Surely the most popular *tanka* poet in modern times has been Ishikawa Takuboku (1886–1912), who wrote in both the traditional and free-verse styles. His reputation is based on two collections of traditional poems, *Ichiaku no suna* (*A Handful of Sand*, 1910) and *Kanashiki gangu* (*Sad Toys*, 1912). These poems, expressing immediate experiences with great emotional intensity, frequently depart from the conventions of traditional *tanka* in mood, subject, and vocabulary.

Yosano Akiko (1878–1942) represents the emergence of women in modern poetry. Her collection, *Midaregami* (*Tangled Hair*, 1901), is remarkable for its defiant sensuality, unusual syntax, irregular meter, and vocabulary that was new to *tanka* poetry. Masaoka Shiki (1867–1902) wrote both *tanka* and haiku but is known chiefly for leading a revival of Bashō's poetry and for modernizing haiku. Following Shiki, modern haiku developed in several directions, the main line

represented by the conservative ideas of Takahama Kyōshi (1874–1959) and the journal *Hototogisu*. Traditional poetry continues to thrive in Japan.

Like poetry, drama has developed in modern Japan in a broad spectrum, including traditional forms of Noh, Bunraku, and Kabuki, and also including modern Western forms of theater. The traditional forms survived the Meiji Restoration and World War II; they continue to be popular, and leading actors and playwrights in all forms have created adaptations and incorporated new material keeping these forms vital in the contemporary world. In the early years of the twentieth century, the Shingeki (new drama) movement began to create a modern theater. This movement has always struggled to maintain a balance between introducing works by Western playwrights and works by Japanese dramatists. In the early years the focus was on works by Tolstoy, Shakespeare, Ibsen, and Chekhov. In 1924, Osanai Kaoru (1881–1928) founded the Tsukiji Shogekijo, Japan's first modern theater, and concentrated on producing plays. Kishida Kunio (1890–1954) founded the Bungakuza theater, which focused on theatrical literary works. While never widely popular, Kishida's work was seminal in the creation of modern theater in Japan.

During the postwar years, Kinoshita Junji (b. 1914) wrote many plays based on traditional Japanese folktales, using language that reflected a wide range of Japanese dialects. *Yuzuru* (*Twilight Crane*, 1949) is his best-known play. Mishima Yukio, although better known as a novelist, produced works for the theater in every form from traditional Noh and Kabuki to the most contemporary forms. His work reflects a strong sense of what it means to be Japanese. In contrast, Abe Kobo has written a series of theatrical experiments focusing on movement, light, and sound while nearly eliminating dialogue. These plays depict contemporary urban society with no clue that they might be Japanese.

Japanese literature today is a remarkably rich and bewildering array of work in which all forms and genres are vigorous and which maintains traditional forms and styles while also being on the leading edge of literary development in a global sense.

Stephen W. Kobl

See also: **Haiku; Poetry—Japan**

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LITERATURE—KOREA Korean literature consists of oral literature, literature written in classical Chinese or in any of several hybrid systems employing classical Chinese, and literature written in the Korean script (hangul). Classical Chinese was the literary language of the scholar-bureaucrats who constituted the Korean elite from early times to the end of the Choson kingdom. Hangul, though promulgated in 1446, did not gain universal acceptance in Korea as a literary script until the twentieth century. Korean literature is generally divided into the following periods: Three Kingdoms (57 BCE–667 CE); Unified Shilla (667–918 CE); Koryo (918–1392); early Choson (1392–1592); later Choson (1592–1910); and modern (1910–present).

Three Kingdoms

Recorded Korean history begins with the three kingdoms of Shilla (57 BCE–935 CE), Koguryo (37 BCE–668 CE), and Paekche (18 BCE–663 CE), which together occupied the Korean peninsula and part of Manchuria. The earliest surviving examples of Korean literature in a Korean text (a handful of ancient songs attributed to Koreans appear in Chinese histories) date from the sixth century and are recorded in the *Samguk yusa* (Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms, 1285). These are the *hyangga* (native songs). This diverse group of songs includes works with oral origins as well as those composed and written down by individuals, primarily Buddhist monks and the Shilla warrior youth known as *hwarang*.

Unified Shilla

In 668 the Shilla state, for the first time in Korean history, unified the Korean peninsula under one ruling house. Over the next three centuries the *hyangga* form continued to develop. One of the best-known examples, "Ch'oyong ka" (Song of Ch'oyong, 879 CE), is a shaman chant, reflecting the influence of shamanism in Korean oral tradition and suggesting that *hyangga* represent a development of shaman chants into Buddhist invocations. Buddhism, officially recognized by Shilla in the sixth century, became the

dominant system of thought in Unified Shilla; it exercised great influence over literature and Shilla art in general.

Hanshi, poetry composed in classical Chinese and following Chinese principles of poetry, but written by Koreans, became widespread among the literati of Unified Shilla. In contrast with *hanshi*, there also existed by this time a rich oral tradition consisting of lyric folk songs, shaman chants, myths, legends, and folktales. The diverse genre of folk song comprises work songs, ceremonial songs, and, most numerous, songs both happy and sad that deal with problems encountered in daily life. Among this third group is "Ari-rang," probably Korea's best-known folk song.

Koryo

In 935 CE Wang Kon, king of the new Koryo state, extended his control over the entire peninsula, founding the Koryo Kingdom, which would survive until 1392. Koryo literature is distinguished by lyric folk songs, increased sophistication and diversity of poetry in Chinese, the prose miscellany called *shibwa*, and the appearance of *shijo*, a terse, intensely personal song that would be recorded and composed in hangul following the promulgation of that script early in the Choson kingdom.

Koryo lyric folk songs, often called *changga* (long songs) or *pyolgok* (special songs), are a diverse body of anonymous works such as Buddhist songs and shaman chants as well as songs composed by individuals. Many survived as court music but originated in orally transmitted folk songs, and thus combine folk song onomatopoeia and rhythms with refinements in diction and music.

Hanshi reached an early zenith in the works of Yi Kyu-bo (1168–1241), which achieve a consummate balance of the universal and the particular. The brevity, revelation, and self-reference of his poems characterize many other *hanshi* as well.

While poetry was the most widespread and popular form of literature, prose writing achieved popularity with the emergence of *shibwa* (talks on poetry), collections of random thoughts on life and poetry. Meant to entertain, these miscellanies combine the factuality of public records with the more poetic language of essays. A good example is *P'aban chip* (Collection for Dispelling Idleness, 1260), a posthumous compilation of works by Yi Il-lo (1152–1220). This and other collections prefigure the early Choson miscellany known as the *chapki*, which is weighted more heavily toward folktales and anecdotes.

Early Choson

Early Choson is the designation for the period extending from the founding of the Choson kingdom in 1392 to the Japanese invasions of 1592–1598. The two most important historical developments affecting early Choson literature were the promulgation of *hangul* by King Sejong in 1446 and the adoption of neo-Confucianism as the state ideology. Neo-Confucianism, with its emphasis on exemplary Chinese texts, meant that Korean literati would continue to study and use classical Chinese as a literary language. In fact, because mastery of Chinese ensured their monopoly on learning, the literati continued for the most part to write in Chinese for centuries after the creation of *hangul*. For its part, *hangul* in theory gave all Koreans a literary language of their own; in actuality, until the 1900s it was used primarily by women and commoners, most of whom were not literate in Chinese. One of the first works written in the new native script was *Yongbi och'on ka* (Songs of Dragons Flying to Heaven, 1445–1447), an *akchang* (set of lyrics and chants accompanying court music) celebrating the supposed virtues and moral authority of the Choson founders.

For recognition and advancement, Choson literati wrote in Chinese; for their own pleasure and amusement, and to express their innermost thoughts, they often wrote in Korean. Of the works they composed in *hangul*, *shijo* are the most numerous. *Shijo* were originally sung, and still are today. Three of the greatest *shijo* practitioners were Chong Ch'ol (1536–1593), Yun Son-do (1587–1671), and Kim Su-jang (1690–?).

The other major vernacular poetic tradition in Korea is the *kasa*. Appearing in the mid-1400s, *kasa* are generally longer than *shijo* and are variously narrative as well as lyrical. Chong Ch'ol, in addition to his accomplishments with *shijo*, is considered by many to have perfected the *kasa* form, as seen in his "Kwandong pyolgok" (Song of Kangwon Scenes, 1580).

Women have until recently occupied a low profile in Korean literary history. They almost certainly composed some of the traditional folk songs that have survived, and they should be credited with much of the oral tradition that is inspired by native shaman beliefs and rites (in Korea most shamans are women). But not until early Choson do we have examples of literature by identifiable women writers. In Choson times and earlier, women were discouraged from educating themselves in Chinese. And even after the creation of *hangul* gave Korean women an accessible literary language, the Confucian emphasis on women's place in the home made women reluctant to attach their name to their writings or to circulate them outside the home.

Still, a few aristocratic women such as Ho Nansorhon (1563–1589), as well as *kisaeng* (professional entertaining women) such as Hwang Chin-i (c. 1506–1544), managed to lift the veil of anonymity that for so long had shrouded premodern women's literature. These women have left us a small but eloquent body of *shijo*, *kasa*, and *hanshi*.

It is also in early Choson that we see what is often considered the first example of Korean fiction: *Kumo shinbwa* (New Stories from Golden Turtle Mountain) by Kim Shi-sup (1435–1493), consisting of five short romances written in Chinese. The aforementioned *chapki*, or literary miscellany—a collection of random writings such as character sketches, poetry criticism, anecdotes, and folktales—developed around the same time. A good example is the *P'aegwan chapki* (Storyteller's Miscellany) of O Suk-kwon (flourished 1525–1544).

Surviving examples of folk drama suggest that a rich variety of dramatic works existed by mid-Choson. The most important genre was the mask dance, a combination of song, speech, and dance that originated in local village festivals. Like much folk and oral literature elsewhere, mask dances expose the foibles of the powerful and elite, in Korea's case the aristocratic gentry known as *yangban*. Also serving as comic relief for the common people were puppet plays, which, like the mask dances, were performed in the open so as to be accessible to all.

Later Choson

From later Choson we have more writing by commoners and women and a corresponding increase in works surviving in *hangul*. It was against the background of the Japanese invasions of 1592 and 1597 and the feeble response by the Choson state that Ho Kyun (1569–1618) wrote *Hong Kil-dong chon* (Tale of Hong Kil-dong, c. 1610), usually cited as the first Korean fictional narrative written in *hangul*. A variety of fictional works in *hangul* followed, many originating in the oral tradition and most of them anonymous. By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries these works had gained widespread popularity among commoners. Some 600 fictional works in *hangul* survive. A new fictional form that appeared late in the 1700s was the *kajok sa sosol*, or family saga. These works are forerunners of the multivolume novels widely read in modern Korea.

In contrast with the variety of vernacular fiction that is solidly grounded in Korean soil are romances such as *Kuun mong* (A Nine-Cloud Dream, c. 1689) by Kim Man-jung (1637–1692), which is situated in

ninth-century Tang China. *Kuun mong* is often honored as the first Korean novel written in hangul, but evidence increasingly suggests it was written in classical Chinese and that only hangul translations have survived.

Among the comparatively small amount of later Choson fiction written in Chinese, the works of Pak Chi-won (1737–1805), a *shirbak* (practical learning) scholar, stand out. *Ho Saeng chon* (Tale of Ho Saeng) and *Yangban chon* (Tale of a *Yangban*) are penetrating satires of the *yangban* class.

Writing by women was virtually unknown outside the home, but in the mid-1900s scholars began to discover a large amount of writing in hangul by later Choson women: diaries, travelogues, memoirs, biographies, and especially long instructive *kasa* passed down from mother to daughter and kept for generations within the family. *Shijo* by *kisaeng* and other women survive as well. Also dating from this period is *Hanjungnok* (A Record of Sorrowful Days), by Princess Hyegyong (1735–1815), a series of memoirs about her long life at court.

Poetry in Chinese would be written until the fall of the kingdom in 1910, but Korean-language verse continued to be favored for its greater expressive potential. Yun Son-do and Kim Su-jang, mentioned earlier, are the great *shijo* poets of later Choson. Kim himself was not a scholar-bureaucrat of the aristocracy but a functionary, reflecting the increasing production of literature by commoners during this period. It is perhaps these commoners who authored the majority of the great number of anonymous *shijo*, almost half of all surviving *shijo*.

As with *shijo*, more *kasa* were composed by women and commoners in later Choson than in early Choson. *Kasa* composed by commoners often describe the harshness of peasant life, criticize immoral individuals (and, by implication, an unjust society), or describe relations between the sexes.

Especially popular in the oral tradition was *p'ansori*, a long narrative partly sung and partly spoken by an itinerant performer (*kwangdae*) accompanied by a lone drummer. The *p'ansori* performances, developing in the southwestern part of the peninsula in the late seventeenth century, appealed especially to commoners, who were familiar, for example, with the Hungbu and Ch'unhyang stories, which became part of the *p'ansori* repertoire. Most of the *p'ansori* works conformed outwardly to Confucian values but implicitly criticized the application of those values in real life.

The Modern Period

The development of a modern literature in Korea was conditioned by two watershed events: (1) the modernization movement that swept East Asia at the turn of the twentieth century, and (2) the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910. The modernization movement exposed young Koreans to enlightenment ideals such as literacy, education, equality, and women's rights and spurred many of them to study in Japan, where they encountered (in Japanese translation) new literary models. Annexation inspired a wave of nationalism that finally legitimized hangul as the literary language of all Koreans, and it forced Korean writers to come to grips with the necessity of preserving their own language and literature in an increasingly repressive colonial environment.

Modern Korean literature is dated by most to 1917, the date of publication of Yi Kwang-su's *Mujong* (Heartlessness). This novel is considered distinctly modern in its use of language and its psychological description. The first generation of writers of modern Korean literature were for the most part young men born around the turn of the century who had received their higher education in Japan and had there been introduced, in Japanese translation, to literature from the West. There resulted an influx of Western literary models into Korea, primarily realism in fiction and symbolism, imagism, and romanticism in poetry. The new generation of writers tended to gravitate toward literary journals (most of them short-lived) in which they published poetry, short fiction, and essays (both critical and personal, the latter form termed *sup'il*). Novels maintained the mass readership they had enjoyed since late Choson times; while novels continued to be serialized in newspapers, they were considered lowbrow entertainment by the literary elite. Important among the first generation of fiction writers were Yi Kwang-su (1892–1950?) for his enlightenment and nationalist agenda, Yom Sang-sop (1897–1963) for his psychological realism, Kim Tong-in (1900–1951) for his modernization of the Korean language and his art-for-art's-sake views, and Hyon Chin-gon (1900–1943) for his fictional slices of life of colonial Korea.

Early modern poetry is best represented by Kim Sowol (1902–1934), Chong Chi-yong (1903–?), and Han Yong-un (1879–1944). Kim (known better by his pen name, Sowol, than his given name, Chong-shik) utilized traditional Korean folk song rhythms to produce lyrics of exceptional melody. Chong Chi-yong was a master technician, drawing on both native and foreign sources for a rich bank of images in poems that are redolent of solitude, nostalgia, and nature. Han was a man of action, actively opposing the Japanese

occupation, working to reform Buddhism, and attempting to instill in his readers a sense of their cultural identity.

Proletarian literature was tolerated by the Japanese colonial authorities from the mid-1920s to 1935. This literature is cited today more for its historical interest than its literary value. Subsequently, many Korean fiction writers looked to the past or the countryside for their inspiration. A variety of new voices appeared: Hwang Sun-won (1915–2000), Korea's most accomplished short fiction writer; Kim Tong-ni (1913–1995), considered by Koreans the possessor of a uniquely Korean zeitgeist; Ch'ae Man-shik (1902–1950), a writer of wit and irony who employed a direct, conversational style; Yi T'ae-jun (1904–?), a polished stylist; Kim Yu-jong (1908–1937), who utilized an earthy, colloquial style rooted in the oral tradition; and Yi Sang (1910–1937), an avant-garde poet as well as a modernist fiction writer. Their combined efforts led in the mid- to late 1930s to an early high point in modern Korean fiction.

Korean literature after 1945 has to a large extent been conditioned by the realities of modern Korean history. Korean literati from premodern times to the present day have often felt a need to bear witness to the times, and authors from 1945 on have been no exception. The literature of the 1950s and 1960s is a good example. Reacting to the devastation inflicted on the peninsula by the Korean War (1950–1953), writers produced poems and stories portraying not just a shattered landscape but traumatized psyches and corrupted values. The stories of Son Ch'ang-sop (b. 1922) and the poems of Kim Su-yong (1921–1967) are excellent illustrations. The late 1960s and early 1970s gave voice to a new generation of writers, educated in their own language (their parents' generation had been educated in Japanese, and the literary language of their grandparents' generation was more often than not Chinese). With little or no experience of the period of Japanese occupation and exhibiting a sardonic attitude toward the authoritarian rule that marked South Korean politics from 1948 to 1987, they produced fiction and poetry that display a more free-wheeling use of language and a powerful imagination. Fiction writers Kim Sung-ok (b. 1943) and Ch'oe In-ho (b. 1945) are representative. Their contemporaries Ch'oe In-hun (b. 1936) and Yi Ch'ong-jun (b. 1939) are known for the intellectual rigor of their fiction.

The 1970s brought to the fore a collection of powerful voices that exposed the social ills attending South Korea's industrialization under President Park Chung Hee. There is no better fictional treatment of this sub-

ject than Cho Se-hui's (b. 1942) *Nanjangi ka ssoollin chagun kong* (A Little Ball Launched by a Dwarf, 1978), perhaps the most important one-volume novel of the post-1945 period. Yun Hung-gil (b. 1942) wrote of the scars of the civil war and of citizens coerced into supervising "subversive" neighbors. Hwang Sog-yong (b. 1943) wrote of itinerant construction workers, urban squatters, and refugees from North Korea. Cho Chong-nae (b. 1943), in his ten-volume novel *T'ae-baek sanmaek* (The T'aebaek Mountains, 1989), took a revisionist approach to modern Korean history. The 1970s also marked the debut of Yi Mun-yol (b. 1948), perhaps the most important Korean novelist at the century's end. Yi is concerned with retrieving Korean tradition amid the territorial division of the peninsula, the legacy of colonialism, and the challenges posed by modernization and urbanization.

Among the most important works of modern Korean fiction are the multivolume novels called *taeba sosol* (great-river fiction). These works have precedents in the family saga of premodern times and usually feature a historical background and several generations of family life. In addition to Cho Chong-nae's *T'ae-baek sanmaek*, the most important examples are *Im Kkok-jong* (1939) by Hong Myong-hui (1888–?), about a bandit leader of that name; *T'oji* (Land, 1994) by Pak Kyong-ni (b. 1927); *Chang Kil-san* (1984) by Hwang Sog-yong, also about a bandit leader thus named; and *Honpul* (Spirit Fire, 1996) by Ch'oe Myong-hui (1947–1999).

So Chong-ju, Shin Kyong-nim, Kim Chi-ha, and Ko Un stand out among poets of the post-1945 era. So (1915–2000) is Korea's most important modern poet, a master of the Korean language who mined Korean history and culture and the Buddhist worldview to produce short, revelatory lyrics and longer prose-poems, all of them inspired by native Korean tradition and, earlier in his career, French symbolism. Ko, Kim, and Shin have all exhibited a populist streak, and have incorporated the spirit of political activism in their poetry.

Modern Korean drama, like fiction and poetry, was subject to considerable Western influence early in the 1900s. Among the earliest examples of modern drama is *San twaeji* (Boar, 1926) by Kim U-jin (1897–1926). *Tomak* (Piece, 1932) by Yu Ch'i-jin (1904–1973) marked the advent of a new realist drama. Perhaps the most important contemporary playwright, O T'ae-sok (b. 1940), blends an innovative, Western-influenced style with texts drawn from Korean history and folklore recent and past. A good example is *Ch'unp'ung ui ch'o* (Ch'un-p'ung's Wife, 1975).

The most noteworthy trend in Korean literature at the end of the twentieth century is the prominence achieved by women fiction writers. Long marginalized by the overwhelmingly male literary establishment, Korean women writers, building on the pioneering efforts of writers such as Ch'oe Chong-hui (1912–1990), have since the 1970s gained both critical and commercial success through the technical and thematic innovations of Pak Wan-so (b. 1931), O Chong-hui (b. 1947), Ch'oe Yun (b. 1953), and others.

Little is known of literature produced in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). Around one hundred established writers migrated from southern Korea to what is now North Korea following Korea's liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, but their works were unavailable in the Republic of Korea (South Korea) until the democratization movement of the late 1980s in South Korea. A full account of literature in North Korea must await reunification of the Korean peninsula. In the meantime, fiction writers in South Korea have begun to chronicle the experiences of Northern defectors to the South.

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See also: **Drama—Korea; Poetry—Korea**

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LITERATURE—LAOS The emergence of traditional Lao literature began after the founding of the first Lao kingdom, known as Lan Xang (1353–1694), during which many classic works, both secular and religious, were composed. The neighboring Hindu and Buddhist cultures influenced traditional Lao literature, which was composed in a number of poetic forms.

Early Lao Literature

The early manuscripts consisted of accordion-style folded paper or palm leaves, onto which Buddhist monks engraved the text with a metal stylus. The manuscripts were stored in Buddhist temple libraries or in private homes of the elite. Today they are preserved in temples as well as in the National Library in Vientiane, Laos, the National Library in Bangkok, Thailand, and in libraries in Europe.

The temple was the center for Lao literature since both secular and religious festivals were held on temple grounds. Monks and village elders might spend several days reciting both secular and religious stories to the public at these festivals. All levels of society enjoyed traditional Lao literature in this public forum.

Secular Literature Secular literature was written in Lao script, and the content was mainly folk tales, legends, and historical annals. Secular literature began as an oral tradition, but over the years the stories and legends were recorded on paper, although the identities of the writers and the dates they wrote are unknown. For example, the legend of Khun Bhrom traces the life of Khun Bhrom, the founding father of the Lao people. Some folk stories were risqué and humorous, such as the tale of Xieng Mieng, a cunning, lazy man who loved to outwit the king; it continues to be a popular story of the Lao people. Historical records traced the founding of a kingdom, acts of a king, and major events affecting the kingdom. One example is the *Muang Phuan*, a historical record of the kingdom of the Phuan people.

Religious Literature Religious literature was based on Hindu and Buddhist works, which were transformed into Lao. Lao characters replaced the Indian characters in the stories, and the settings were changed to Laos, often near the Mekong River. Popular religious stories included the five hundred *Jataka* tales, or stories of the Buddha's previous lives. Another fifty tales of the Buddha's past lives that influenced religious Lao literature came from the literature of the Lanna kingdom (1259–1931) and indirectly from the Mon kingdom Haripunchai (660–1281), both located in present-day northern Thailand. The Vinaya and the

Abhidhamma Buddhist texts also influenced Lao religious literature.

Popular religious stories were morality tales that focused on pious deeds. This type of literature aimed to teach people how to behave and how to accept their station in Lao society and in the greater Buddhist realm. The Indian Hindu epic *Ramayana* became *Pha Lak Pha Lam* in Lao literature; it was a favorite at the Lao court (as well as the Siamese and Khmer courts) and was portrayed in classical dance performances.

After the breakup of the Laos kingdom into three small kingdoms in the seventeenth century, classic Lao literature continued to be produced until well into the nineteenth century.

Emergence of Modern Lao Literature (1893–1954)

The Siamese and then the French, who came to dominate Laos, did little to improve education or the field of literature during the nineteenth century. The French began to introduce secular education with a Western-based curriculum in Laos during the 1930s, and the first lycée (French-model high school) opened in 1947. The French system moved away from the religious nature of traditional schools and literature and focused on teaching students that they were French subjects. Lao royalty and elite usually received a Western education in France and other European nations.

Fiction was introduced during this period. The first Lao novel, published in 1944, was a detective story, *Pha Phoutthabhoop Saksit* (The Sacred Buddha Image), by Somchine Nginn. The first Lao newspapers—*Lao Nhay* and *Pathet Lao*—appeared during the 1940s, and the first Lao news agency was called Agence Lao Presse.

Modern Lao Literature (1954–1975)

After World War II, Lao literature split into two camps, reflecting the political ideologies of the royalists and the Communists. Royal Lao writers included Pakian Viravong (who wrote under the pen name of Pa Nai), Dara Viravong (Duang Champa), and Duangdueane (Dok Ket) Viravong. These writers were children of Maha Sila Viravong, the famous Lao historian. Duangdueane Viravong married Outhine Bounavong (1942–2000), another royalist writer. Writers in this camp continued to be influenced by French writers and then in the 1960s by Thai writers. In the 1970s, Maha Sila Viravong founded a magazine devoted entirely to Lao literature, *Phai Nam*.

Literature of the Communists, or the Lao Patriotic Front (*Neo Lao Hak Sat*), such as *Rains in the Jungle*, was written in traditional Lao poetic forms in an attempt to reach the common people. The Lao Patriotic Front also began to publish a report with stories written by soldiers and party members. Seri Milamay (Seriphap) was a revolutionary writer who received the Southeast Asian Writers Award for his work.

Postrevolutionary Literature (1975–Present)

Since the Communist takeover in December 1975, the government has strictly controlled Lao writers. Literary criticism is nonexistent in Laos, and anything of a critical nature is usually published anonymously in Thailand. Royalist writers spent time in reeducation camps before being allowed to continue to write for the new regime. Outhine was the first Lao writer to have his short stories published in English, and works by other writers have been translated into Thai, Russian, and Vietnamese.

Revolutionary writers still active after the revolution include Chanti Dueansavan and Sonvanthone Bouphanovong, while Saisuwan Phengphong and Bounthanong Somsaiphon are writers who became popular after the revolution. Their works have been translated into Thai.

With the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism (*Jintanakan Mai*), censorship has relaxed, but Lao literature faces many obstacles. One is the lack of funding for producing books. Printing presses are located in the nation's capital, Vientiane, and the costs of publication are high. The country's lack of infrastructure and its rugged terrain hinder efforts to send materials to all parts of the country. The inadequate number of schools affects the illiteracy rate, which in turn affects the dissemination of literature. These hindrances have, however, enabled traditional forms of Lao literature to persist. Palm-leaf manuscripts were used until the mid-twentieth century, and temples continue to be education centers for traditional Lao literature and settings for festivals where literature is still recited.

Linda S. McIntosh

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LITERATURE—MYANMAR Burmese literature falls into three periods: monarchic (until 1885), colonial (1886–1948), and postindependence (1948 to the present). Although Burma was a parliamentary democracy right after independence, most of its subsequent history has been of military rule, one-party rule, or both.

The earliest example of writing using Burmese script is probably the Prince Raja Kumar's stone inscription, written around 1112 in four languages: Pyu, spoken by a group related to the Burmese; Mon, spoken by settlers of Lower Burma; Pali, the Indian language of Theravada Buddhism; and Burmese. The Burmese alphabet in this inscription is ultimately derived from the ancient Indian Brahmi script.

Appearing later solely in the Burmese language, these inscriptions are mostly records of donations. They mention the kinds of donations, the identity of donors, the occasions, and the locations. The inscriptions end with prayers or curses, written to scare people and prevent them from destroying the donor's act of merit. At this time, there were also texts written on terra-cotta plaques and in ink on stucco. Both of these forms usually appear beneath depictions of scenes from the *Jataka* tales (Burmese *Zat*, didactic stories of the Buddha's past lives).

Although the early stone inscriptions are written in prose, verse began to replace the prose after the thirteenth century, especially in palm-leaf manuscripts and in *parabaik* (folding tablets made of paper, cloth, or metal). This resulted in the appearance of longer forms of verse, including *pyui*' (epics), *mo'kvan*' (poems on historic occasions), *yadu* (lyrical odes on the

seasons, love, and so forth), and *e' khyan*' (poems for the young princes and princesses).

At first, the writers were usually monks writing religious tales, such as the life story of the Buddha and the *Jataka* tales in *pyui*' form. Later writers wrote non-religious tales in *pyui*' form. *Mo'kvan*' , on the other hand, is a verse form that courtiers used to record and eulogize the exceptional achievements of the king. *E' khyan*' is a verse form used in composing success stories of a child's parents and grandparents; these were sung as lullabies for princes and princesses to give them confidence and encouragement. *Yadu* is the shortest verse form, the style adopted by kings, monks, and those in the palace, including laypeople. Writers used the *yadu* form to write about personal affairs, the beauty of nature, and weather. Still other verse forms include "*khyui*" (four-stanza verse), *te'thap*' (lyric of eighteen lines), *bo' lay*' (plaintive song), and *lvam*' *khyan*' (poem or song of longing), which are closely related to songs.

Verses on country life and verses composed by people in the countryside begin to appear in the seventeenth century. Padāsa Rājā (1684–1744), a minister of the king, wrote verses about the countryside in the form of *'khyan*' (classical song). Some country people themselves also wrote about village youths in the style of *auin' khyan*' (folk song) addressed to their close friends.

After 1300, prose was written on many subjects. Buddhist monk Rhan'Maha Silavamsa (1453–1518) wrote *Pārāyana vatthu* (Stories Leading to Nirvana) based on Buddhist sermons and Buddhist texts, and many narratives based on Buddhism followed. The entertaining Buddhist narrative sermons of U" Punna (1807–1867), a literary figure known for his humorous writings, allowed people to enjoy both literary style and stimulating thoughts on Buddhism. While *Pārāyana vatthu* became the basis for Buddhist narratives, Rhan'Maha Silavamsa's *Rajavan'ky U* (Famous History) became the forerunner of later Burmese historical texts.

To satisfy the Burmese readers' thirst for knowledge, expository texts also began to appear. Among those, the *Rājadhamma san'gaba* (Precepts Incumbent on a King), written by Yo" Atvan"van U" (1729–1823), was a suggestion for modern administration. Also, travelogues such as *Pūtākē Capīn' Itālyam sva' mbat'tam*" (Journal of a Trip to Portugal, Spain, and Italy) by U" Khri" (1828–1883) and *Lan'dan' sva" ne zin' bmat' tam*" (Journal of a Trip to London) by Kan" van" Man" kri" U" Kon" (1821–1908) appeared in the nineteenth century.

Rhvēton' Sīhasū (1708–1748), a palace attendant, on the other hand, wrote *Ratana' kre" mum vatthu* (Treasured Mirror Stories) purely to entertain readers. Scholars consider this original composition the first Burmese legend, since the characters in the narrative are human beings, *nats* (supernatural animist beings), and dragons.

In the later part of the monarchy, plays and dramas to be performed in the palace were written both in prose and verse. U" Kran' U (1773–1828) and U" Punna wrote plays that lasted all night—the former based on the author's own ideas and the latter on Buddhist literature.

In the mid-nineteenth century, printing technology came to Burma, and printed materials replaced palm-leaf and *parabaik* literature. Newspapers and books were published both in Lower and Upper Burma. By the time the British conquered Burma (1885), printing was already well underway.

Literature during British Colonial Rule

Under the British, the Burmese began to translate Western literature. Readers came to understand more about Western popular literature when, in 1902, U" Phui" JU translated Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* into Burmese. In 1904, James Hla Kyō (1863–1913) added his own story to sections of Alexandre Dumas's *The Count of Monte Cristo* and turned it into *Mōn' Ran' Mōn' Ma May' Ma Vatthu* (The Story of Maung Yin Maung and Ma Me Ma), which scholars consider the first modern Burmese novel.

Many other Burmese novels appeared at this time. Most were romantic with moral lessons until 1920. However, *Cabay' ban' vatthu* (Jasmine Plant Story) and *Rhve Pran n' Cui" vatthu* (The Story of Shewei Pyi So) by U" Lat' (1866–1921) were unusual in that the characters were true to life. After the anticolonialist movements in 1920, people started to write with a political or social agenda in mind.

Around 1930, university students created *khet' cam"* ("test the age") literature, whose style and topics differ from those of earlier times. Sippam Mon' Va (1899–1942) became a successful *khet' cam'* writer. Books on Western political thought published by the the Naga"nī Association, founded by young people in 1937, opened the political eyes of the Burmese.

While prose was developing, verse also bloomed. Sa khan' Kuito'mhuin'" (1875–1964) was the most famous poet of the colonial period; he wrote about Burmese culture and the fight for independence, and he encouraged anticolonialist movements. His *Le"*

khyui" kri" (Longer Four-Stanza Verse) poems followed ancient forms, but the language was closer to that of the countryside. Students from Rangoon University writing *khet' cam"* literature focused on writing in a simple style so that literature would be accessible to most people.

Burmese Literature after Independence

After independence, various literary styles appeared in response to the unstable political situation. A struggle developed between those who believed in literature for literature's sake and those who leaned toward leftist themes.

In 1962, the Revolutionary Council took power, and freedom of the press declined under the Burma Program Socialist Party. A Censorship Board was established so that literature that attacked party policy could be banned. Literary awards were presented only to authors whose topics supported party policy.

At present, the Censorship Board still controls publishing policy, but Burmese literature is alive despite the tight censorship. Authors must now write about political and social conditions indirectly to make their works acceptable to the Censorship Board, and the quality of the literature has even improved. Currently, literary criticism is playing a new role in Myanmar. Literature is now being viewed from the perspective of literary skills and values instead of from political perspectives, as before. In line with developments in world literature, the terms "modern" and "postmodern" have appeared in the Burmese literary world.

Saw Tun

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LITERATURE—PHILIPPINES Philippine literature, written in Filipino, English, Spanish, and Philippine languages (e.g., Cebuano, Ilocano, Tagalog, Hiligaynon, Pampangan, Hanunuo-Mangyan, and Bontok), has been influenced by colonization, economic and social systems, religion, and political movements. An oral tradition continues to exist through epics, riddles, poems, and legends of the country's around sixty ethnolinguistic groups, reflecting a culture linked with the Malay of Southeast Asia and the influence of Indian, Arabic, and Chinese cultures. With the colonization of the islands by Spain and the United States, Western forms such as the novel, short story, essay, and full-length play were introduced. However, resistance to colonization also produced a tradition of radical literature. Philippine literary texts have been records of everyday life, historical documents, receptacles of values, and either participants in the colonial discourses of the colonizers, or testaments to freedom and sovereignty.

Precolonial Literature (1564)

Among the literary forms during the precolonial period were riddles and proverbs, at the heart of which were the *talinghaga* (metaphor); the Hanunuo-Mangyan *ambaban* (a poetic form chanted without a predetermined musical pitch); the Tagalog poetic form *tanaga*; myths, fables, and legends; mimetic dances and rituals that at times involved a plot (for example, the *Ch'along* of the Ifugao); and epics, such as *Lam-ang* and *Labaw Donggon*. Created in communal societies, the subject matter and metaphors came from common village experiences. Literature was essential in daily life, rites of passage, and survival. Songs provided rhythm at work, rituals healed the sick, and epics validated community beliefs. Each member of the community was a poet or storyteller, and the conventions of oral literature—formulaic repetition, character stereotypes, and rhythmic devices—facilitated transmission.

The Spanish Colonial Period (1565–1897)

Literature during Spanish colonial rule consisted of both religious and secular literature, prevalent during the first two centuries, and a nineteenth century reformist and revolutionary literature that reflected the clamor for change and independence. Spanish colonial rule resulted in the establishment of a feudal system and the imposition of the Catholic religion. Religious orders monopolized printing presses; the first book, *Doctrina Cristiana* (Christian Doctrine, 1593), was published by the Dominicans. The first printed literary work in Tagalog, the poem "May bagyo ma't may

rilim" (Though There Be Storm and Darkness) was published in *Memorial de la vida Cristiana*, (1605), by friar lexicographer Francisco Blancas de San Jose. In 1704, Gaspar Aquino de Belen published "Ang mahal na passion ni Jesu Christong panginoon natin" (The Passion of Jesus Christ Our Lord), a narrative poem of the life of Christ.

Literature reaffirming religious values was dominant, including forms such as the *sinakulo*, a play on the passion of Christ, the *ejemplo*, which spoke of saints, and the *komedya*, which featured battles between Christians and Moors. Nationalist literary historians believe that these feudal and colonial discourses contributed to the country's colonization because they promoted beliefs and values such as acceptance of one's destiny, deferring to authority, superiority of the colonizer, and the supremacy of the Catholic religion over Muslim beliefs.

Spanish ballads, which inspired the *komedya*, also influenced narrative poetry, including the *awit*, with its four mono-rhyming dodecasyllabic lines, and the *korido*, with its four mono-rhyming octosyllabic lines. The most significant *awit* was "Pinagdaanang buhay ni Florante at Laura sa cahariang Albania" (The Life of Florante and Laura in Albania, 1838), by Francisco Baltazar (1788–1862). It is considered the first nationalist literary text and is known for its indictment of colonial rule, its popularity, and its skillful manipulation of language.

The growth of a nationalist consciousness resulted in literature that called for reform. Written by *ilustrados* (Filipino students in Spain), many of these works either parodied religious literature or introduced new literary forms to better articulate issues. Marcelo H. del Pilar (1850–1896) criticized religious orders using the *pasyon* and prayers, using monetary currency to describe the friar in the poem "Friar Ginoong Barya" (Hail Father Coins) a parody of "Aba Ginoong Maria" (Hail Mary, a popular prayer). National hero Jose Rizal (1861–1896) wrote the novels *Noli me tangere* (Touch Me Not, 1887), and *El filibusterismo* (The Subversive, 1891), works that portrayed Philippine society with a critical view, introduced realism, and are considered to be among the most important works in Philippine literature.

The revolutionary organization Katipunan published in its newspaper *Kalayaan* essays and poems emphasizing that the Philippines was a free land before the coming of the Spaniards, thus justifying the need for a revolution. "Ang Dapat Mabatid ng mga Tagalog" (What the Filipinos Should Know), by Andres Bonifacio (1863–1896), rallied Filipinos in the strug-

gle against Spain. The essay "Kalayaan" (Freedom), by Emilio Jacinto (1875–1899), asserts that freedom is a basic right of all human beings. Along with the revolutionary love songs of the period (*kundiman*), these anticolonial and nationalist discourses contributed to the Filipinos' struggle for independence.

The American Colonial Period (1898–1946)

Philippine independence, declared by the revolutionary government on 12 June 1898, proved to be short-lived, ending with the invasion of U.S. forces. Resistance was evident in allegorical plays known as the *drama simboliko* (symbolic drama). In *Tanikalang Guinto* (Golden Chains, 1902), by Juan Abad (1872–1932), and *Kabapon, Ngayon at Bukas* (Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 1903), by Aurelio Tolentino (1868–1915), characters represent the Motherland (Inangbayan, Pinagsakitan) and revolutionary Filipinos (Taga-ilog, K'Ulayaw, Tanggulan). In many of these allegorical plays, the lead male character, who pretends to be dead but is actually alive, represents the revolutionary forces still fighting in the mountains. The anticolonial and nationalist discourses found in drama can similarly be found in poetry, whether written in Spanish, such as the poetry of Fernando Ma Guerrero (1873–1929) or in Tagalog, such as that of Jose Corazon de Jesus (1836–1932). While there were novels that dwelled on romantic love and adventure, and were reminiscent of the *komedya*, such as *Nena at Neneng* (1903), by Valeriano Hernandez Pena (1858–1922), many novelists gave a critical portrayal of society. *Pinaglabuan* (1907), by Faustino Aguilar (1882–1995), and *Banaag at Sikat* (1903), by Lope Santos (1879–1963), focused on the exploitation of the working class and introduced socialist ideas. These novels participated in the anti-imperialist discourses of such organizations as the Union Obrero Democratico (Democratic Workers' Union)

The imposition of English as the medium of instruction resulted in the dominance of literature in English. Although Filipino writers mastered the craft of poetry and fiction using Western aesthetics, several chose to portray the countryside, thus emphasizing local color. Collections such as *How My Brother Leon Brought Home a Wife* (1941), by Manuel Arguilla (1910–1944), may have painted idyllic portraits, but the emphasis on rural life was also read by critics as a protest against the industrialization brought about by U.S. colonial rule. A pioneering novel in migrant literature was *America Is in the Heart* (1946), by Carlos Bulosan (1913–1956); it focused on racial discrimination and the exploitation of workers in the United States.

During this period magazines such as *Liwayway* (1922, Tagalog), *Bisaya* (1930, Cebuano), *Hiligaynon* (1934, Ilongo) and *Bannawag* (1934, Iloko) became the primary outlet for short stories written in indigenous languages. Literary production was influenced by market and editorial policies, resulting in many works that used formulaic plots and deus ex machina endings. However, skillfully written stories such as "Greta Garbo" (1930), by Deogracias Rosario (1894–1936), "Kung Ako'y Inanod" (If I Am Swept Away, 1907), by Marcel Navarra, and "Si Anabella," (Anabella, c. 1936–1938), by Magdalena Jalandoni, indicted the colonial way of thinking, explored psychological realism, and created complex characters.

The tension between colonial and anticolonial forces in Philippine society was echoed in literature, with the "art for art's sake" philosophy of the poet Jose Garcia Villa (1906–1997) on the one hand and the social consciousness of Salvador P. Lopez (1911–1993), as emphasized in his essay "Literature and Society," on the other. Much work during this period was both a result of and a response to U.S. colonial rule and capitalist values.

The cultural policy of the Japanese occupation (1942–1945), which encouraged Tagalog writing, resulted in a harvest of works. These were compiled in the collection *Ang 25 Pinakamabubuting Katha ng 1942* (Twenty-Five Best Stories of 1942). By following the guidelines of the policy however, many of the works focused on everyday life that seemed untouched by war. Exceptions were several stories where males were conspicuously absent or characters seemed to be waiting for loved ones, making it possible for critics to read in these stories references to the Filipino guerrillas fighting the Japanese forces. Literature, through satirical skits performed by stage actors, and poems, songs, and plays performed by the guerrillas played an important part in the anti-Japanese movement.

Contemporary Literature

Contemporary literature has been influenced by various critical theories, among them New Criticism, which emphasizes the literary work as a verbal construct, and Marxism, which produces works political in intent and content. Experimental and eccentric form and language can be found in poetry collections such as Jose Garcia Villa's *Have Come, Am Here* (1942) and *Piniling mga tula ni AGA* (Selected Works of AGA, 1965), by Alejandro G. Abadilla (1904–1969). Among the works that focused on economic and social issues were the novel *Ilaw sa bilaga* (Light from the North, 1948), by Lazaro Francisco (1898–1980), the poetry

collection *Isang dipang langit* (A Stretch of Sky, 1961), by Amado V. Hernandez (1903–1973), and the novel *Dagiti mariing iti parbangon* (Those Who Are Awakened at Dawn, 1957), by Constante Casabar (b. 1929). The production of works that were anti-imperialist and revolutionary in content, such as Hernandez's prison poems, alongside works emphasizing a revolution in form, such as the comma poems of Villa, reflected a society that, although independent since 1946, had remained feudal, economically dependent on foreign capital, and heavily influenced by U.S. culture.

The search for national identity, an upsurge of nationalism, and debates on the national language have shaped Philippine literature. This is evident in the novels of Nick Joaquin (b. 1917), Francisco Sionil Jose (b. 1924), N. V. M. Gonzalez (1917–2000), and Edgardo M. Reyes (b. 1938), and in the poetry of Rio Alma (b. 1945) and Rolando Tinio (1937–1997). While Joaquin's search for identity led him to works that glorified a past era, Reyes's work centers on the poverty that led people to migrate to the city from the countryside, and the continuing exploitation they faced in urban centers. Two landmark collections, *Mga agos sa disyerto* (Streams in the Desert, 1964) and *Sigwa* (Storm, 1972), contain works that participate in discourses on class, gender, and imperialism.

Literature from the 1980s and 1990s saw renewed interest in regional language, the publication of anthologies of feminist and gay literature (for example, *Filipina I*, 1984), and programs geared toward developing writers among peasants and workers in the hope of creating a truly national literature.

Maria Josephine Barrios, with notes from Bienvenido Lumbera

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LITERATURE—SOUTH ASIA, BENGALI

The Bengali language is as old as English, emerging from eastern dialects of Middle Indo-Aryan (standard colloquial Sanskrit, or Prakrit), sometime before 1000 CE. The earliest surviving literary texts in Old Bengali are mystic *caryapad*, "play-part" songs, dating between 1000 and 1200 CE and preserved in a single manuscript of Sanskrit commentary in the Nepal Darbar Li-

brary. These songs, composed in syllabic rhyming couplets with caesuras in mid-line, treat esoteric practices of yoga and tantrism in paradoxical, sometimes vulgar, code language. Their imagery, derived from everyday village life, is meant to reveal and conceal the inner meaning of the spiritual masters' (*acaryas*) yearnings for spiritual union and experiences in the process of attaining self-realization. These songs conclude with a signature couplet (*bbaita*) in which the poet identifies himself and comments obliquely on his theme. The *carya*-style song never disappeared entirely from Bengali folk culture.

Contemporary *baul* songs have forms and thematic concerns similar to those of *carya*-style songs. *Bauls* are members of a heterogeneous (Hindu and Muslim) syncretic sect of West Bengal and Bangladesh, originating in the sixteenth century CE, whose nondualistic beliefs and practices derive from Hindu Vaishnava, Buddhist Tantric, and Muslim Sufi teachings. The *bauls* traditionally led a wandering life, singing their distinctive devotional songs and playing folk instruments, especially at fairs and festivals, as their main source of livelihood. The *bauls* form a tolerated but marginalized subcaste in Bengali society; in the late 1900s, however, a number of the more talented and ambitious performers among them, such as Purna Chandra Das Baul, have become recording artists with international reputations. *Baul* songs have greatly influenced Bengali literary culture; Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941), Bengal's Nobel Prize winner in literature, was much affected by the songs of Lalou Fakir (d. 1890), the most celebrated *baul* of all time.

The Old and Middle Bengali Periods

Although mystic, devotional song was not always thought to possess high literary value, religious themes predominated in Bengali poetry through the Old and Middle Bengali periods (c. 950–1350 and 1350–1800 CE, respectively). Poetry predominated as there was no prose to speak of until nearly 1800. Under Hindu rulers of the Pala and Sena dynasties (eighth to twelfth centuries), Bengal developed its own schools of Vedic Sanskrit studies and Buddhist Tantrism in monasteries, temples, and other learning centers. After Turkish invaders overran the Bengali kingdom of Nadia in 1201, the Muslim *darbar* (court) established in Gaur continued to provide patronage for over 200 years to court poets of the Middle Bengali period, who composed narrative poems of the exploits of gods such as the Vedic deity, Dharma, and the competing cults of the pre-Vedic goddesses Chandi, consort of Siva, and Manasa, a daughter of Siva and queen of serpents. The most popular narrative poetic themes, however, were

from the *Ramayana*, the legends of the god Rama, rendered into Bengali by poets such as the fifteenth-century Krittivas Pandit; the epic *Mahabharata*, chanted in Bengali by professional court poets; and tales of Lord Krishna, the most remarkable version of which, the secularized Srikrishnakirtana by Chandidas, dates from about the sixteenth century. In this rendition, a dramatic series of Bengali dialogue-songs interspersed with Sanskrit verses, Krishna and his lover Radha are not divine or mythical beings but youthful villagers carrying on their illicit affair with a full range of human emotions.

Role of Chaitanya

Bengali popular imagination was galvanized by the charismatic Vaishnava revivalist Chaitanya (1486–1533) who, though he composed only one poem, the Sanskrit Siksastaka (Lesson in Eight Verses), continues to exert influence over Bengali literature to this day. Born into a learned Brahman family in Navadvip, Nadia, the boy trained as a Vedic scholar. At age twenty he took initiation from a Vaishnava teacher and was transformed into a *bhakta*, a devotional mystic, who sought union with God by identifying with Radha and singing the names of her beloved Lord Krishna. The Vaishnava revival started by Chaitanya swept through Bengal, dissolving religious and caste barriers among his followers; for three centuries poets composed *Caitanyamagal*, narrative poems recounting Chaitanya's life and teachings, as well as *kirttan*, folk-influenced lyrics celebrating the love of Radha and Krishna. The *bauls* arose in Nadia during this period as a folk outgrowth of Chaitanya's movement, and both Sufi and Vaishnava poets composed or transcribed folk versions of tales of local Muslim saints, creating legends of syncretic deities with both Hindu and Muslim names and jointly celebrated festivals.

Transition to the Modern Bengali Period

Three centuries of Muslim governance, from Delhi or through semi-independent local rulers, had already enriched Bengali literature and language through the influence of Persian and Arabic, the languages of law, administration, and Islamic cultural life. With the advent of European trade and missionary activity in the early eighteenth century, followed by printing presses and the first Bengali type fonts (designed by an officer of the British East India Company), poetry as a literary genre, widely available in inexpensive printed form, began to diverge from traditional forms of song and narrative recitation. Prose developed first through vernacular translations of catechisms and Bibles, physicians' handbooks, grammars and readers for Ben-

gali language instruction to Europeans, and legal documents translated from English for purposes of provincial governance. Bengali culture, especially in the port of Calcutta and smaller market towns, was energized by European contact; colleges and universities modeled on the British system proliferated. Intellectuals, with English or traditional Sanskrit and Persian educations, soon distinguished themselves as prose stylists and founded the first Bengali periodicals to disseminate their work and foster greater intellectual exchange and social reform. The Modern Bengali period (1800 to the present) was underway.

Notable Prose Stylists

Rammohan Roy (1772–1833), polemicist, religious reformer, translator, grammarian, and forerunner of the nineteenth-century "Bengal Renaissance," wrote essays and treatises with equal facility in Bengali and Persian. Essayist, literary scholar, and social reformer Iswarchandra Vidyasagar (1820–1891), renowned for the clarity and concision of his prose, wrote treatises that shaped laws against polygamy and in favor of widow remarriage. Devendranath Tagore (1817–1905), hailed as Maharishi (Great Sage) by the educated public, refined an epistolary style and contributed to the new periodicals impelling Bengal's literary renaissance. Innovative plays on social themes, influenced by Shakespeare as well as Sanskrit drama, were staged in private and later in public theaters in Calcutta. English literary works studied in the new colleges were translated into Bengali, and some poets, most notably Michael Madhusudhan Dutta (1824–1873), ventured to write English verse. Despite his multilingual gifts and ambition to *become* as well as write in English, Dutta's greatest poem, the *Meghnadbadh Kavya* (*Meghnad's Fall*), is in Bengali, in traditional Sanskrit epic cantos; however, its rebellious hero Meghnad, brother of Ravana, the demon defeated in the *Ramayana*, is modeled on tragic Western characters such as Homer's Achilles and Milton's Satan. Dutta's true literary revolution, though, came in his final book, with the first Bengali sonnets, a form well-suited to the language's inherent concision and ease of rhyming, and in his use of a massive, multilingual vocabulary and allusions from many literatures.

The nineteenth century also saw the first recognized literary contributions by women. East Bengali village matron Rassundari Devi (1810–?), her days spent in exhausting rounds of housework and childrearing, clandestinely taught herself to read from her sons' primers and by scratching letters on the smoke-blackened kitchen walls; her two-part autobiography, *Amir Jaban* (1876 and 1909), was an astonishing achievement of

clear, succinct narration. The first Bengali novel, *Phulmani O Karuar Bibaran* (*The Story of Phulmani and Karuna*), published in 1852, was also by a woman, Calcutta-born Hannah Catherine Mullens (1826–1861), a Christian who may have been of English descent. Bengal's first prominent prose fiction writer was Bankimchandra Chatterjee (1838–1894), who brought a lively imagination to realistic character development and an informal and often colloquial style. His best-selling novels focused on upper-middle-class Victorian-era Bengali domestic life, as well as the first stirrings of anti-British nationalism; they endure as popular classics today. The Tagore family dominated literature from the mid-1880s until the mid-twentieth century. Dwijendranath, the eccentric eldest of Devendranath Tagore's fourteen children, wrote plays and an allegorical verse fantasy, *Swapnamayi* (*The Dreamer*), which owed much to *The Faerie Queene* and *Pilgrim's Progress*. Swarnakumari Devi (1856–1932), an elder sister of Rabindranath, was one of Bengal's first renowned literary women, writing novels, dramas, and poetry, and editing *Bharati* (India), the monthly magazine started in 1877 by her elder brothers.

Rabindranath Tagore

But it is the protean genius Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) who towers over all other literary artists of the language. Musician, actor, painter, social reformer, and educator as well as writer, he produced a vast output that included some sixty collections of poetry and other works, including novels, short stories, essays, plays, dance-dramas, and songs so distinctive that the style *Rabindra-sangit* (Tagore songs) is named after him. In 1913 he received the Nobel Prize, which led to worldwide recognition for Bengali literature. Two works available in English translation are the novel *Ghare Baire* (*Home and the World*), featuring multiple first-person limited points of view, a narrative strategy new to Bengali; and the self-translated *Gitanjali* (*Song Offering*), the poetry collection that won Tagore the Nobel Prize. This volume is a free rendering, disappointingly stripped of all specific Bengali literary, historical, and mythological allusions and echoes, based on Tagore's notion of what Western readers could relate to, so that the poems read more like Emersonian transcendentalist texts than Bengali songs. But Tagore was influential in abandoning formal literary language and adopting the standard colloquial speech of real people in his writings. Most of Tagore's work has not yet been rendered into English translations that capture the originals' subtleties, but Bengalis revere him; he is the only poet who has composed the national anthems of two countries, India and Bangladesh.

Other Major Writers

After Tagore, notable writers include the immensely popular novelist Saratchandra Chattopadhyay (1876–1938); Begum Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain (1880–1932), polemicist, educator, and pioneering Muslim feminist, whose utopian short story, "Sultana's Dream" (1905), and opinion pieces collected in *Avaroddbasini* (*Secluded Women*), battled verbally against the cruelties of purdah, the oppressive seclusion of women; novelist Bibhutibhusan Bandyopadhyay (1889–1950), author of *The Apu Trilogy* (as it is called in English), which was filmed by Satyajit Ray (1920–1992), writer and cinematographer whose own father, Sukumar Raychoudhuri (1887–1923), penned *Abol-Tabol* (which roughly translates to "helter skelter"), a beloved volume of children's nonsense verse in Bengali; and the popular Calcutta novelist and short story writer Ashapura Devi (b. 1909), author of an epic trilogy beginning with *Pratham Pratiruti* (*First Promise*). Notable poets include the East Bengali modernist Jibanananda Das (1899–1954); Kazi Nazrul Islam (1899–1976), a Muslim orphan nurtured on Persian verse who went on to become poet laureate of Bangladesh; East Bengali folk poet Jasim Uddin (1903–1976); and Begum Sufia Kamal (1911–1999), poet, social reformer, and educator, whose poetry collection, *Mor Jaduder Samadhi Pare* (*Where My Darlings Lie Buried*), became the defining voice of Bangladesh's 1971 freedom struggle. Mahasweta Devi (b. 1926) has written voluminously on the struggles of eastern India's oppressed and neglected tribal peoples; her stories and novellas, translated by the postcolonial scholar Gayatri Chakravorty Spivack, have received the University of Oklahoma's prestigious Neustadt Prize. Another chronicler of the Bangladesh Liberation War was Jahanara Iman (1929–1994), whose 1971 diary-memoir, *Ekattarer Dinguli* (literally, *Days of '71*, but translated as *Of Blood and Fire*), was a best-seller in both the Bengali original and in English translation.

Since the 1947 independence and partition of India and the creation of the nation of Bangladesh in 1971, Bengali literature has more closely allied itself to Western forms, both in prose (fiction and memoir) and poetry, while West Bengali and Bangladeshi writers maintain vital contacts among themselves. Magazine and book production by the more prosperous publishers in the two major literary centers, Calcutta and Dhaka, has been computerized; there are also flourishing literary publishing ventures in Bengali expatriate communities, particularly in London and New York City.

Carolyn Wright

See also: **Bangladesh; Poetry—India**

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LITERATURE—SOUTH ASIA, SANSKRIT

Although almost entirely unknown to the average Western reader, the corpus of literary texts composed in Sanskrit constitutes one of the oldest continuing and most copious literary traditions in the world. The complete body of Sanskrit texts is of a size unparalleled, until modern times, by literature in any language except Chinese. It includes, in the broadest possible definition of "literature," all of the religious, philosophical, legal, historical, medical, inscriptional, technical, and scientific texts associated with the intellectual, theological, and political elites of South and Southeast Asia, from its beginnings in the middle of the second millennium BCE, through its period of greatest efflorescence in the sixth to thirteenth centuries, to the present. This corpus contains such relatively well-known works as the *Bhagavad Gita*, the *Kama Sutra*, the great Sanskrit epic poems the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana*, the laws of Manu, the Buddhist Lotus Sutra, and many individual works of immense size, such as the Puranas.

This entry concerns the compositions in poetry and prose that the Sanskritic tradition generally refers to generically as *kavya* or *sahitya*, writings in which the formal elements and the aesthetic response of the audience are as important as their content. This corpus is ancient, large, and still alive to some extent. It includes various genres in prose and verse, ranging from collections of short, pithy verses, or *subhashtas*, on a wide range of subjects, to lengthy narrative poems on epic, romantic, and religious themes, and a large body of plays ranging from short, one-act comic pieces to lengthy emotionally wrought dramas on various themes.

History

From a Western viewpoint the history of Sanskrit literature can be traced back to the earliest-known compositions in the language, the hymns of the Rig

Veda, which date from perhaps the middle of the second century BCE. Some of these hymns, particularly those invoking deities associated with phenomena of nature such as the dawn, the sun, or fire, are among the finest examples of religious poetry in any language. Some of the dialogue hymns and those that narrate stories have been associated by scholars with the origins of drama and the copious story collections for which Sanskrit literature is justly famous.

In the traditional Indian view, however, the Vedas, although regarded with an unparalleled reverence, are not primarily literary texts. For the majority of traditional Indian literary scholars and audiences the origin of poetry is traced to the divine inspiration of the legendary poet-seer Valmiki, who, in the wake of an intense emotional experience, composed his famous epic narrative poem the *Ramayana* in perhaps the fifth century BCE. The *Ramayana* is thus often regarded as the first true poem.

The corpus of Sanskrit literary texts begins to build in the first centuries BCE. Among the earliest are the two surviving narrative poems of the Buddhist poet Asvaghosa (flourished first–second century CE), the *Buddhacarita*, a poetic biography of the historical Buddha, and the *Saundarananda*, an account of the conversion of a prince to Buddhism, and a collection of dramas on themes drawn from Sanskrit epics and other sources attributed to the playwright Bhasa. Highly styled poetic composition is also found in Sanskrit royal inscriptions from the first centuries CE.

The Flowering of Sanskrit Literature

One of the earliest (although of uncertain date) poets of the efflorescence of Sanskrit literature, and by more or less general consensus the single greatest literary master of the Sanskrit language, is the poet and playwright Kalidasa, who is often associated with the imperial court of the Guptas, perhaps around the fifth century CE. This artist, sometimes known in modern times as "the Shakespeare of India," left four major poetic works and three dramas. Of the former, two, the *Raghuvamsa* and the *Kumarasambhava*, are considered masterpieces of the genre known as *mahakavya* or "great poems," long, multicanto narrative poems based on themes drawn from the epics and the Puranas. The first of these is a poetic rendering of the history of the great dynasts of the Raghu dynasty, including a retelling of the career of its most illustrious son, Rama. The second is an account of the courtship and marriage of the great divinity Siva and his wife, the goddess Uma or Parvati. A third piece, the *Meghaduta* or "Cloud Messenger," is an example of a

shorter genre (*khandakavya*) composed in a single poetic meter; it consists of the romantic message of a lovelorn demigod to his distant wife, which he imparts to a passing cloud. This piece is among the most imitated works of Sanskrit poetry and has inspired a whole subgenre of messenger poetry.

The dramas of Kalidasa are equally highly esteemed; one of them, *Shakuntala*, is often considered by Indian and Western critics alike to be perhaps the finest single work of the Sanskrit literary canon. This romantic play, based on an episode in the *Mahabharata*, captured the imagination of poets and scholars in late-eighteenth-century Europe and was showered with praise in a famous verse by Goethe in 1792.

Perhaps because of the genius, prolific production, and exalted reputation of Kalidasa, the genres he favored acquired considerable prestige in succeeding centuries. Thus the *mahakavya* form finds numerous exponents, some of whom established it as a major genre between the sixth and eighth centuries.

Drama, too, particularly the longer subgenres of multiact plays based on epics and invented themes, was further developed by early masters such as Bhatta Narayana (the *Venisambhara*), Shriharsha (the *Ratnavali*), and above all Bhavabhuti (the *Mahaviracarita*, the *Uttararamacarita*, and the *Malatimadbava*) during roughly the same period. Noteworthy also among the older dramas is a charming romance, the *Mrichchakatika* or "Little Clay Cart," attributed to a king Shudraka, whose date is a matter of continuing scholarly debate.

Along with the development of these verse forms (the dramas are largely verse interspersed with prose dialogue), early authors set high standards for the development of prose *kavya* in the form of lengthy narrative romances. Noteworthy here are the *Dashakumaracarita* (Adventures of the Ten Princes), by the writer and literary critic Dandin; the *Vasavadatta* of Subandhu; the historical prose poem the *Harshacarita*; and the romance the *Kadambari* of Banabhatta.

Narratives and Fables

The genres, periods, and authors of Sanskrit literature are far too numerous to summarize completely here. One important genre was the narrative tale and fable literature, which was highly developed in India and which traveled widely throughout Europe and Asia from this point of origin. Noteworthy works include the *Pancatantra*, a collection of moral beast fables; the riddling stories of the *Vetalapancavimshti*; and the great *Kathasaritsagara* (Ocean of Stories), by the eleventh-century Kashmiri poet Somadeva.

Although Sanskrit literature reached what was perhaps its pinnacle by the twelfth century CE, it by no means ended then. Poets and storytellers in many genres continued to compose abundantly in Sanskrit for many centuries afterward and continue to produce poems, stories, and plays in this ancient language down to the present day.

Robert P. Goldman

See also: **Kalidasa; Literature—India**

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LITERATURE—SRI LANKA, SINHALESE

Sinhalese literature, or literature written in Sinhala, the language of the Sinhalese people of Sri Lanka, is distinguished from literature in other modern South Asian languages by its antiquity, its historical association with Buddhism, and the pervasive influences of long colonial domination in Sri Lanka. Buddhist monasteries became the center of intellectual activity after the conversion of the Sinhalese king to Buddhism in the third century BCE and remained so until modern times. The language and its literature declined under colonial governments (1505–1948) but have revived in recent times.

Classical Sinhala

Buddhist texts in the Pali language were at first preserved orally by monks; the monks also composed commentaries on these texts, including historical records, in Sinhala. The early literature is lost, but there are references to it in Pali texts and later writing in Sinhala. The *Mahavamsa*, the great chronicle of Sinhalese kings composed in Pali in the fifth century CE, apparently drew on Sinhala commentaries. The ancient sources praised the kings' literary ability. The Pali chronicle *Culavamsa* (41: 55) describes King Moggallana II (531–551 CE) as "having poetic gifts without equal." The oldest extant prose work in Sinhala

dates to the tenth century and is attributed to King Kassapa V (913–923 CE).

The restoration of Sinhalese rule by Vijayabahu I in 1070 after Sri Lanka's conquest by invaders from South India was followed by a cultural revival. Vijayabahu himself was considered a poet and patron of literature (*Culavamsa* 60: 80). King Parakramabahu II (1236–1271), another ruler who restored order after a foreign invasion, was the author of the *Kavsilumina*, one of the great poems of the classical period. Works in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were written in an ornate style with many words and literary conventions adapted from Sanskrit in what is considered the high point of literature in Sinhala. On the other hand, Gurulugomi in the thirteenth century wrote prose literature in a "pure" form of Sinhala known as Elu and limited the use of Sanskrit and Pali loan words. Sinhala diverged from other South Asian languages in this development of prose. Buddhist monks wrote commentaries and paraphrases of doctrinal texts, historical chronicles, works on grammar and rhetoric, stories of the life of the Buddha, and many translations of Sanskrit works. In the fifteenth century Sinhalese poets wrote in a style closer to the ordinary language than earlier poets did and wrote on more secular subjects. At the end of the sixteenth century, literature flourished under the patronage of the state and Buddhist monastic orders.

Colonial Domination

All this changed after the Portuguese conquered the southwest coastal region of the island, where the Sinhalese government had its capital. The Portuguese persecuted Buddhists, destroyed monasteries and libraries, and rewarded Christian converts. Buddhist monks and laymen moved from the coastal regions to the interior. For over two hundred years a Sinhalese kingdom survived at Kandy in the hilly interior, constantly threatened by Portuguese, Dutch, and finally British conquerors. Pali and Sanskrit scholarship declined, and popular literature developed, much of it influenced by Tamil sources. At the end of the eighteenth century Buddhism and classical literary forms revived under royal patronage in the Kandyan kingdom.

In 1815, the British annexed the Kandyan kingdom, and the island was united under Christian, English-speaking rulers. The British supported Sinhalese (and Tamil) schools but only for elementary education and primarily for the purpose of encouraging conversion to Christianity. Many educated Sinhalese preferred English literature and disregarded literature in Sinhala.

Nevertheless, Sinhalese printing presses began to reprint classical works in Sinhala, works that had been

preserved in village temples on palm-leaf manuscripts, and a literary revival began. Printing also made literature available to a nonscholarly audience, and journals, pamphlets, and newspapers discussed politics and literature in Sinhala. By the late nineteenth century there were frequent controversies over literary styles. Monks and others continued to write in classical styles, whereas Pali texts and foreign literature were translated into a more popular idiom of Sinhala.

Modern fiction in Sinhala has its origins in propagandistic Christian stories in the 1870s. The first novels, often romantic fantasies or morality tales, appeared in the 1890s and became popular in the early twentieth century. Detective fiction also became popular. The most popular author was Piyadasa Sirisena (1875–1946), whose writings emphasized the destructive effects of English influence on Sinhalese culture. His counterpart in theater was the playwright John de Silva (1857–1922). Poets in the early twentieth century continued to use traditional forms until a new generation of poets called the Colombo school rejected classical poetics and themes. They introduced modern themes in poems of romantic love and social criticism, and they were in turn succeeded by writers directly influenced by contemporary Western poets.

Independent Sri Lanka

W. A. Silva (1892–1957) and other novelists attracted popular followings in the 1940s and 1950s with escapist narratives and simple plots. The greatest of Sinhalese novelists, Martin Wickramasinghe (1891–1976), initially was not popular. His *Gamperaliya* (1944) tells the story of the disintegration of village life under the impact of modern conditions. It is considered the first serious novel in Sinhala, and it contributed to raising the standards of fiction in Sinhala. Wickramasinghe was the most influential literary critic of his period.

Another writer and critic, Ediriweera Sarachandra (1914–1996), devoted himself to raising the reputation of literature in Sinhala among the English-educated elite, as well as to encouraging serious fiction in Sinhala. Studies by faculty at the University of Ceylon (established 1942) increased scholarly interest in literature in Sinhala.

Throughout much of the twentieth century, literature written in Sinhala was somewhat overshadowed by works written in English. Two outstanding and, indeed, internationally influential writers were Leonard Woolf (1880–1969), the husband of Virginia Woolf and author of a novel, *The Village in the Jungle* (1914), drawing on his experiences in the Ceylon civil service,

and Michael Ondaatje (b. 1943), a distinguished contemporary writer born in Sri Lanka who now lives in Canada.

Radical changes occurred in 1956, when Sinhala became the medium of education for most schools and universities in the nation and the Department of Cultural Affairs (which became the Ministry of Cultural Affairs in 1970) moved literature in Sinhala away from both Western influences and the classical past. Wickramasinghe emphasized traditional Sinhalese-Buddhist values in his later works; he and other writers accused Sarachchandra and others based at the universities of being too influenced by Western literature.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century literature in Sinhala has come under increased political pressure. Sarachchandra was physically assaulted by government supporters after he wrote a satire following the 1977 election that blamed the government's social and economic policies for the deterioration of cultural values. The civil war that began in 1983 has led to increased use of Sinhala in public life, but also to censorship, a surge in Sinhalese chauvinism, and violence against writers. It may be that, as in the past, literature in Sinhala flourishes in times of crisis.

Patrick Peebles

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LITERATURE—THAILAND The earliest examples of Thai (Siamese) writing are stone inscriptions dating from the thirteenth century. The most famous of these is a four-faced pillar inscribed by King Ramkhamhaeng (flourished c. 1279–c. 1317) of Sukhothai in 1292. Although the content deals with the history and social organization of the kingdom of Sukhothai, it is generally regarded as a part of Thai literary history. Another important work believed to date from this period is the *Trai Phum Phra Ruang* (The Three Worlds of Phra Ruang), a Buddhist cosmology that describes, in prose, the worlds of desire, form, and formlessness.

Classical Literature

Classical literature is written in verse and can be traced back to the Ayutthaya period (1350–1767). One

early example, believed to date from the late fifteenth century, is the historical poem *Lilit Yuan Phai* (The Defeat of the Yuans), which recounts the victory of the Ayutthaya kingdom over the northern kingdom of Lanna. More difficult to date is the epic *Lilit Phra Lor* (The Story of Prince Lor), one of the most admired works of classical literature. It tells the story of Phra Lor's love for the two daughters of a hostile neighboring ruler; their illicit meeting is discovered, and all three lovers are subsequently killed in battle. The reign of King Narai (d. 1688) was a golden period, when poetry flourished at the court, and new verse forms, involving complex rhyme schemes, emerged. His reign saw the composition of two famous works drawn from Buddhist tales, *Samutthakhot Kham Chan* (The Story of Prince Samutthakhot) and *Su'a Kho Kham Chan* (The Tiger and the Cow). Some of the masterpieces of the *nirat* genre (travel poetry), such as *Nirat Hariphunchai* and the poet Siprat's *Khlong Kam-suan*, describing his journey into exile in Nakhon Sri Thammarat, also date from this period.

After the death of King Narai, the Ayutthaya kingdom became embroiled in war with the Burmese. In 1767, the capital was overrun and razed, resulting in the loss of most of its recorded literary material. King Taksin (1734–1782) established a new Thai kingdom based at Thonburi and began the task of literary restoration, but it was only after he was overthrown and a new dynasty established at Bangkok, under King Rama I (1737–1809), that real progress was made. The only complete version of the *Ramakien* was composed during his reign, by, as was customary at the time, groups of anonymous poets working on different sections. Literary revival continued during the reign of his son, Rama II (1768–1824), with the appearance of the epic poem *Khun Chang, Khun Phaen* and various works composed for dramatic performance, such as *Sang Thong, Kraitbong*, and *Inao*, all of which take their title from the names of the main protagonists. The literary career of Sunthorn Phu (1786–1856), Thailand's most famous poet and author of several famous *nirat* poems and the lengthy poem *Phra Aphaimani*, is also associated with the reign of Rama II.

Modern Literature

King Rama III (d. 1851) showed little interest in literature, but under his successor, Rama IV (King Mongkut, 1804–1868), printing technology was introduced into the nation by Western missionaries. This, together with the emergence of a potential reading public due to the growth of the education system, had, by the latter part of the nineteenth century, created the conditions for the emergence of prose fiction.

The first novels and short stories appeared in journals such as *Lak Wittbaya*, which were edited by Western-educated Thai princes or aristocrats; the contents were often serialized translations of popular Western writers of the day, such as Marie Corelli, Charles Garvice, Sax Rohmer, Arthur Conan Doyle, and H. Rider Haggard. The first Thai novel, *Khwammaiphayabat* (Non-Vendetta), by Luang Wilatpariwat, which appeared in 1915, was a deliberate response to the translation of Marie Corelli's novel, *Vendetta*, which had appeared in *Lak Wittaya* in 1901. By the mid-1920s, there was a growing demand for original Thai stories; most popular were adventure stories, often with masked villains, and romantic stories, typically involving a poor boy-rich girl theme, in which the plot was brought to a happy conclusion by a series of improbable coincidences. Novels, both then and now, were typically serialized in a magazine first and then reprinted later as a complete volume. By the 1930s, a number of writers were beginning to look beyond providing readers with escapist entertainment and attempting to address serious social issues; two classics of the period are Siburapha's *Songkhrum Chiwit* (The War of Life), written in 1932, which dealt with poverty, inequality, and the lack of freedom of speech, and K. Surangkhanang's *Ying Khon Chua* (The Prostitute), published in 1937, which, sensationally for the time, presented the prostitute-heroine as a sympathetic and virtuous character.

In the late 1940s, a number of writers, including Siburapha, were influenced by socialist realism; for a brief period, works highlighting social injustice and criticizing an exploiting ruling class appeared. But freedom to write such works was short-lived, and many writers were either imprisoned or stopped writing during the literary "dark age" of the 1950s and 1960s. One serious writer who did manage to escape interference from the authorities was Khamsing Srinawk (Lao Khamhom); yet some of the elegantly crafted stories in his collection *Fa Bor Kan*, published in English as *The Politician and Other Stories*, are rather more subversive than they appeared at first reading.

By the late 1960s, a new generation of writers was rediscovering the political fiction of twenty years earlier; the works of Siburapha and some of his contemporaries became a model for many aspiring writers, whose work became known as "literature for life," that is, literature that was intended to create, or lead toward, a better life for the masses. Such literature flourished in student and academic circles after the overthrow of the military government in 1973, but, with its often simplistic treatment of issues, it had little broad appeal and soon disappeared. With rapid economic and social change sweeping through Thai

society in the 1980s, new and more complex themes presented themselves; in the award-winning *Kham Phiphaksa* (The Judgment, 1982), for example, Chart Korbjitti chronicles the gossip and social hypocrisy that turn a lowly villager into an outcast within his own community. As one of the nation's most successful and accomplished writers, Chart is one of the few who can make a living entirely from writing; nevertheless, with a number of literary prizes to be won each year and considerable media attention, the literary scene remains vibrant.

David Smyth

See also: **Bidyalankarana; Khun Chang, Khun Phaen; Nirat; Ramakien**

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LITERATURE—TURKEY Turkish literature is traditionally said to begin with the Kokturk inscriptions of the eighth century. Found in the region of the Orhon River in northern Mongolia, these inscriptions are the major written source for the history of all Turkic languages. Yet their influence on various national literatures in these languages can be dated only from the end of the nineteenth century, when the inscriptions were discovered.

Although today modern Turkish literature in the Republic of Turkey is considered to have developed from Ottoman Turkish literature, conceptualizing Ottoman Turkish literature as the traditional predecessor to modern Turkish literature is problematic. The influence of Ottoman Turkish literature on modern Turkish literature is overshadowed by the influence of Western literatures.

Development of Ottoman Literature

In Anatolia during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, under the patronage of several Turkish frontier states, a written language based on the Oghuz branch of Turkic languages was developed. The first written compositions in this language were Islamic treatises translated from Arabic and Persian. Under the influence of Islamic literary genres and themes,

this literary production reached its culmination in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, with the centralization of the Ottoman state. The Ottoman sultans and bureaucratic elite supported a class of learned men, most of whom were involved in writing poetry. Poets as well as prose writers were either associated with the court or were supported by other patrons who rewarded their literary accomplishments. This so-called court literature served to legitimize the claims of patrons to bravery, justice, and religious integrity. Authors of this state-sponsored literature were educated in Arabic and Persian literatures and languages and in Qur'anic and literary sciences.

During the Ottoman empire, the words for literature were *si'ir* (poetry) and *insa* (prose). Poetic genres were defined according to rhyme scheme and length. *Aruz*, a version of an Arabic metric system containing long and short syllables, was so influential in written literature that it completely displaced the older syllabic metric system typical of Turkish oral poetry. Lyric and panegyric (eulogistic) poems (*gazel* and *ka-side*, respectively) were compiled in poetry collections called *divan*. Several authors chose to display their poetic prowess by composing romances in verse (*mesnevi*) on various Islamic themes, such as Joseph and Potiphar's wife. Manuscript copies of story compilations such as *Sindbadname*, *Camasbname*, and *Forty Viziers* are also preserved in library collections.

Ottoman poetry was defined by a set of formal and thematic elements that poetically expressed a mystical understanding of life. Although on the surface the poetry may appear repetitive and lacking in originality, a closer examination of Ottoman Turkish literary production reveals a self-referential literature driven by an urge toward perfection of formal qualities. Authors composed works in competitive response to their predecessors as well as their contemporaries.

Ottoman literature existed mainly in the form of manuscripts. Ibrahim Muteferrika (1670–1745) established the first printing house (1729), but by the end of the eighteenth century it had published only seventeen books (none a work of literature). Printing developed only by the second half of the nineteenth century.

European Influence on Ottoman Literature

By the end of the eighteenth century, European influence became evident. After the observations of the great traveler Evliya Chelebi (1611–1681), the first major literary account of Europe appeared between the lines of the lyric romances, *Huban-name* and *Zenan-name* (Book of Boys and Book of Women by

Fazil-i Enderuni [d. 1810]). In the nineteenth century educational reforms in the Ottoman empire allowed several Ottoman students to study in a rapidly changing Europe. The ideals of modernization appealed to the Ottoman ruling elite, who saw them as the roots of European technical superiority. Restructuring educational institutions after European models generated a need for translations of European textbooks from European languages, primarily French and German. Along with this development, the literature of the empire gradually came under the influence of Western literary forms at the expense of Eastern forms. Throughout the nineteenth century new literary forms imported from the West and imbued with ideals such as democracy and freedom lived side by side with the classical Ottoman Turkish literary tradition, often engaging in debate with it.

In 1859 the first literary translations from French appeared: an edition of French poems and their translations, *Terceme-i Manzume* (Translations of Verse by Sinasi, 1826–1871); conversational pieces from Voltaire, Fontenelle, and Fenelon, *Muhaverat-i Hikemiyye* (Philosophical Dialogues) by Munif Pasa (1830–1910); and a version of Fenelon's *Les Aventures de Telemaque* (1699), *Terceme-i Telemak*, by Yusuf Kamil Pasa (1808–1876). These three books, which are really adaptations rather than literal translations, initiated a flurry of translations. Sinasi later published the first Turkish work for the theater, a comedy titled *Sair Evlenmesi* (*Wedding of a Poet*). The first Turkish short story, by Ahmet Mithat Efendi (1844–1912), appeared in 1870; the writer later published a series of such stories in *Letaif-i Rivayat* (The Best of the Stories, 1895). Semseddin Sami (1850–1904) wrote the first Turkish novel, *Taassuk-i Talat u Fitnat* (Love of Talat and Fitnat, 1872).

With the establishment of theater companies such as the Gedikpasa Ottoman Theater (1870), founded by an Ottoman Armenian artist, Agop Efendi (1840–1902), several dramas, mostly adaptations of Molière's plays, were staged with great success. Ahmed Vefik Pasa (1823–1891) translated sixteen plays of Molière, replacing several of his characters with Greek, Armenian, and Turkish characters.

Ahmet Mithat employed traditional minstrel storytelling techniques in his didactic fictional works emulating French novels. Other early novelists, such as Rezaizade Ekrem (1847–1914), had a more ornate style. After writing and staging the most popular political play of the period, *Vatan yabut Silistre* (The Motherland, or Silistre, 1873), Namik Kemal (1840–1888) wrote the novel *Intibah* (Awakening, 1876).

Intibab is the best example of early Turkish novels that portray social and political problems in the envelope of impossible love stories. The novelists of the period criticized the Westernization fad among elite circles and advocated a combination of Eastern and Western lifestyles in which the West represented the technical aspects of progress and development while the East represented the moral.

Later, under the influence of realist and naturalist literary movements in France, a group of authors established a movement called Edebiyat-i Cedide (New Literature, 1869–1901). The most prominent member of this movement, Halit Ziya Usaklıgil (1866–1945), wrote realist novels, perfecting the form with *Ask-i Memnu* (Forbidden Love, 1900). Even though his works followed the dictum of art for art's sake, a consciousness of decline as well as a philosophy of populism informed the thematic inclinations of poets of this movement such as Tevfik Fikret (1867–1915), who also revolutionized classical prosody through his innovations in *aruz* meter.

Gaining momentum under new parliamentary governance, nationalism as an ideology overtook the debates about Islamism and Ottomanism, further problematizing the trend toward Westernization and defining the character of modern Turkish literature. After the second parliament in 1908, a nationalist literature developed in reaction to ongoing nationalist movements among non-Muslim communities of the Ottoman empire. A group of authors based in Thessalonica published the journal *Genc Kalemler* (Young Pens, 1911). A linguistic nationalism, constructed around an idea of a Turkish Islam and an original homeland in Central Asia, was launched in this journal by authors such as Omer Seyfettin (1884–1920) and Ziya Gokalp (1875–1924). This movement was preceded by the publication of a book of poetry by Mehmet Emin Yurdakul (1864–1944), which was tellingly entitled *Türkçe Siirler* (Turkish Poems, 1899) and proposed establishing a pure Turkish language. While Ziya Gokalp was the ideological leader of the nationalist Turkish literature movement, Omer Seyfettin crafted a new Turkish discourse closer to spoken language through his short stories on nationalistic themes.

Literature under the Turkish Republic

After the establishment of the Turkish Republic (1923), Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoglu (1889–1974), Halide Edip Adivar (1884–1964), and Resat Nuri Guntekin (1889–1956) continued employing similar themes in fiction. Karaosmanoglu's *Yaban* (The Outsider, 1932), Adivar's *Sinekli Bakkal* (*The Clown and His*

Daughter, 1936), and Guntekin's *Yesil Gece* (Green Night, 1928) not only display a revolutionary break in the careers of these authors, but their texts are also symptomatic of a period of reorientation in Turkish literature. With their ideological orientation, these novels establish the major themes of modern Turkish literature until the 1950s. By then the Ottoman cultural legacy had already been defined as the "Other." During the 1940s, Sait Faik (Abasiyanik) (1907–1954) developed a straightforward language in his short stories, which focus on personalities from different subcultures in Istanbul, downplaying the national ideal as a core theme. In his short stories and novels, Sabahattin Ali (1906–1949) reflected a socialist realist depiction of Turkish society, developing a counterargument to the established nationalist discourse in his work.

Writers of nationalist literature disrupted attempts to reformulate classical poetic meter, and a set of poets hailed the syllabic meter as the national poetic meter of the Turkish Republic. Following a sentimentalist path, these poets drew on the tradition of oral folk poetry to describe the beauties of the Turkish landscape and Turkish villagers. Social themes were also handled in syllabic meter by poets such as Necip Fazıl Kısakurek (1905–1983), Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar (1901–1956), and Cahit Sitki Tarancı (1910–1956). Under the impact of Futurism (an Italian movement advocating the expression of dynamism and movement), Nazım Hikmet (Ran) (1902–1963) experimented with free verse. His socialist realist perspective on Turkish realities, as well as his experimentation with different genres that combine poetry and prose, proved to be a fountainhead for modern Turkish poetry.

Nazım Hikmet spent many years in prison as a result of his Communist philosophy, finally escaping from Turkey in 1951. Prison experiences were the fate of many thinkers, authors, and poets, mostly leftist, including the novelist Kemal Tahir (1910–1973) and the satirist Aziz Nesin (1915–1993). Such attempts by the state to suppress freedom of speech further radicalized literature.

The publication of *Garip* (The Loner, 1941), a collection of poems in free verse, defined another vein of Turkish poetry characterized by free verse, playfulness, and a populist spirit. The leader of this movement was Orhan Veli Kanık (1914–1950). Oktay Rifat (1914–1988) and Melih Cevdet Anday (b. 1915), who were also outstanding poets of this movement, subsequently focused on more esoteric themes in line with the Second New Movement. Poets of this movement, such as Ece Ayhan (b. 1931) and Edip Cansever (1928–1986), employed symbolism to express psycho-

logical states and initiated a distant relationship with Ottoman lyric poetry by drawing on its rich imagery. The stylistic and thematic characteristics of socialist realism and the Second New Movement dominated Turkish poetry.

Bizim Koy (Our Village, 1950) by Mahmut Makal (b. 1930) spurred interest in village life, portrayed in the form of a socialist realist critique of the prevalent modernist-nationalist discourse. Under the impact of the village-realism movement, several authors who had come into close contact with provincial people while in prison shifted their interest from city life—the lair of nationalist modernization—to Anatolia. In his serial novel *Ince Me* (Memed, My Hawk, 1960), the prolific author Yasar Kemal (b. 1922) created a groundbreaking Turkish narrative style that originated from oral legends.

Politically engaged authors dominated the literary scene more and more after the military coups following 1960. They searched for new techniques in realism to elucidate sociopolitical themes in their novels and poems. Attila İlhan (b. 1925) advanced a unique vocabulary of imagery in his poetry and novels, and in his serial novel *Aynanın İcindekiler* (Inside the Mirror, 1973) he wrote a history of Turkey from the second half of the nineteenth century on. Adalet Agaoglu (b. 1929) depicted the impact of social and political events of the 1960s and 1970s on individuals. Sevgi Soysal (1936–1976), like Agaoglu a woman novelist, depicted representative characters to present class conflict in cities.

This realism was countered by the monumental work of Oguz Atay (1934–1977): *Tutunamayanlar* (The Misfits, 1971) was a critique of Turkish nationalism in the form of a Joycean narrative. But the real challenge to realism appeared much later, after the 12 September 1980 military coup. As strict censorship under the military regime was abolished, new thematic trends and narrative techniques appeared. Latife Tekin (b. 1959) recounted the experience of the Turkish radical left in her novels, the first of which appeared in 1983, *Sevgili Arsiz Olum* (Dear Naughty Death). The influence of magical realism in her novels blurs didactic tendencies.

During the 1990s, while these critical perspectives continued, historical novels experienced an unprecedented revival. This trend was initiated by the publication of *Beyaz Kale* (The White Castle, 1985) and *Kara Kitap* (The Black Book, 1990), both by Orhan Pamuk (b. 1952). The new millennium has witnessed an increase in historical novels dealing mostly with the Ottoman empire, such as the latest popular novels of

Ahmet Altan (b. 1950), for example, *İsyan Günlerinde Ask* (Love in the Days of Revolt, 2001).

Diverging from the dominant tendencies of various forms of realism, Yusuf Atılgan (1921–1989) reflected the influence of existentialism in his *Aylak Adam* (Free Man, 1959), with its alternative perspective on Turkish realities. Later Bilge Karasu (1930–1995) developed his own narrative style, using a stream-of-consciousness technique. His fractured narrations reveal a concealed gay identity, while his focus on the use of language is shared, in a different form, by another author, Murathan Mungan (b. 1950). Mungan's poetry, short stories, and plays draw on legends and fairy tales of eastern Anatolia. Metin Kacan (b. 1961) also displays a sensitivity to the use of language in his *Agir Roman* (Heavy Novel 1990), specifically through the slang of communities that live on the slopes surrounding Istanbul.

Criticism in Turkish literature has developed both in academic institutions and the popular press. While academic criticism tended to neglect post-1950s literature, popular criticism focused on radical leftist literature until the 1980s. In the realm of popular criticism, the subjective approach of Nurullah Ataç (1898–1957) and the 1940s humanist criticism of Sabahattin Eyuboglu (1908–1973) come together in the highly popular works of Fethi Naci (b. 1927). Recently the English literature specialists Berna Moran (1921–1993) and Jale Parla (b. 1945) have introduced critical theoretical approaches for the evaluation of Turkish literature, and Marxist criticism continues to generate valuable analyses.

Both Ottoman and nationalist Turkish literature embraces a wide array of generic, stylistic, and thematic trends. Moreover, modern Turkish literature's dialogue with Western literary forms is enriched today by a new interest in a variety of Third World literary traditions. Turkish literature is entering a new phase. Debates on Turkish literary history, the republication of several early Republican literary works with commentaries, the compilation of various anthologies, the publication of several literary journals, an interest in pre-Republican Turkish literatures, and a considerable break with traditional Western literary influence all point to yet another period of reevaluation of a rich literary tradition.

Selim Kuru

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LITERATURE—VIETNAM Vietnamese literature refers to a body of writing that has evolved over many centuries and is linked with the history, culture, and language of the Vietnamese people. Vietnamese history is marked by long periods of domination by foreign powers; Chinese rule stretched for nearly a millennium from the second century BCE to the tenth century CE. The efforts by Vietnamese kings and lords to regain territorial integrity was partly realized in the tenth century, making the unity of Vietnam an ideal for which to fight. In the modern period, Vietnam was colonized by the French, who withdrew only in the mid-twentieth century. More recently, the Vietnam War renewed the historical experience of protracted agony for the people of Vietnam. Understandably, Vietnamese poets, scholars, and writers have sought to record the impact of this troubled legacy on the national consciousness. Vietnamese literature owes its creative impulse and continued vitality to this sense of a shared destiny in the face of interruptions and invasions. Writings originating in the Vietnamese culture are realistic, communicating the human need to participate in life despite its harshness. A similar spirit is

also evident in the folk literature of Vietnam, which is a rich storehouse of tales, proverbs, songs, and legends, providing ample evidence of the imaginative resources of the Vietnamese people.

Traditional Literature

Traditional Vietnamese literature is said to have its beginnings in the ancient period (tenth–fifteenth centuries) and to last until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The beginning of this literature was tied to the Chinese occupation of Vietnam, when poetry was the favored literary genre. Monks, kings, scholars, and civil servants were the first poets in Vietnam, and they wrote in a literary language called *Han*. While the script and style were distinctly Chinese, in subject matter and perspective the poems were Vietnamese. At the outset, the themes were religious and philosophical, written under the influence of Chan (Zen) Buddhism and Confucianism. Gradually, however, poetry came to reflect the secular and aesthetic aspects of human experience as well. Many of these early poems have been lost because of foreign invasions and (in some instances, such as after the Ming occupation of 1407–1427) a deliberate policy of destruction by the new rulers. The extant poems, however, express the transience of life and delineate themes of birth, aging, sickness, and death. There was also a strand in early poetry that depicted aspects of court life, as well as the simple joys of nature. With the assertion of a Vietnamese identity by rulers of the Ly (1010–1225), Tran (1225–1400), and Le (1427–1791) dynasties, the community life of Vietnam became the principal theme for poetic exploration, as illustrated in the life and achievement of Nguyen Trai (1380–1442). The form of the early poems mostly followed strict metrical patterns set by Chinese models and was restricted by notions of decorum deemed necessary for the practice of literary art. An interesting later development was writing in *nom* characters, a demotic version of Chinese *Han* ideograms used to transcribe Vietnamese words. This type of writing became popular as a new mode of expression and paved the way for a vibrant vernacular literature that broke away from the elitist, imitative literature written in Chinese. In time, classical works were translated into a growing corpus of *nom* literature that was diffused among different strata of Vietnamese society. Prose forms for easy communication were devised. Verse narratives, a typical Vietnamese form, became popular, culminating in *The Tale of Kieu* by Nguyen Du (1765–1820), a poem of 3,254 lines considered to be Vietnam's national epic poem. *The Tale of Kieu* occupies a unique place in Vietnamese literature. It is the tale of a young woman of noble

character who sacrifices everything out of loyalty to her family and for love. Her sufferings and resilience find an echo in every Vietnamese heart. In addition to long narratives in verse, short poems with eclectic forms were composed by poets from diverse backgrounds. A good example is the work of the woman poet Ho Xuan Huong (1768–1839), who in lines of power and beauty protested against traditional institutions.

Modern Literature

Modern Vietnamese literature was written in the wake of Vietnam's contact with the West. This contact increased after the French began their formal occupation of Vietnam toward the end of the nineteenth century. For administrative reasons, the French favored the use of *quoc ngu* (the romanized Vietnamese script), which was instrumental in spreading literacy and culture. The rise of newspapers and magazines gave a new direction to Vietnamese cultural life, and the practice of literature was no longer restricted to the learned. With the growth of an educated Vietnamese public, circulation of innovative forms such as serialized novels increased rapidly. The nationalist resistance to the colonial regime used the *quoc ngu* script and writings to further its goal of forging a distinctive Vietnamese identity. Prose became a versatile medium of political and aesthetic expression, and ideas from other cultures stimulated the native intellectual climate. Literature in *quoc ngu* signaled a break with tradition and gave rise to novelty and experimentation. New journals like *Dong Duong Tap Chi* (The Indochina Review) in 1913 and *Nam Phong* (South Wind) in 1917, which were instigated by the colonial administration, prefigured publications by nationalist and progressive intellectuals. Traditional poetry was challenged by the individualistic efforts of poets like Nguyen Khac Hieu (1888–1939), who popularized a movement for the reform of poetry that culminated in the New Poetry Movement of the 1930s. The novel and short story utilized the emergent prose medium. Ho Bieu Chanh (1884–1958) in the south and Hoang Ngoc Phach (1896–1973) in the north introduced readers to new prose fictional forms. Phach's only novel *To Tam* (Pure Heart; 1925) is regarded as the first Vietnamese novel.

Since 1975, an attempt to redefine literary practice has raised methodological questions concerning the terms "social" and "socialist" as they were used to describe the outlook of writers in their efforts to portray the traumatic experiences of the Vietnamese people. Influential writers of the period were Duong Thu Huong (b. 1947), Bao Ninh (b. 1952), Nguyen

Huy Thiep (b. 1950), and Pham Thi Hoai (b. 1960). Beginning with the innovative efforts of the Tu Luc Van Doan (Independent Literary Group) writers between 1930 and 1935 until the creative mediation of the diasporic writers of modern times, Vietnamese literature has come a long way in shaping its distinctive identity.

Ram Shankar Nanda

See also: **Chu Nom; Ho Xuan Huong; Khai Hung; Poetry—Vietnam; Tu Luc Van Doan**

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LITERATURE—WEST ASIA, PERSIAN Islamic literatures have been expressed in two languages more than others: Arabic and Persian. Persian literature flourished not just in Persia (Iran), but also in Central Asia, Turkey, Afghanistan, and South Asia. A great deal of debate surrounds the rise and nature of Persian literature in the aftermath of the Arab conquest of Persia in the seventh century. Some scholars have argued that post-Islamic Persian literature is part and parcel of the attempt of Iranians (and, subsequently, other Persian speakers) to express their own identity as non-Arabs. At least some of these early expressions are no doubt connected to protonationalist *shu'ubi* movements in the early eras of Islam. Other scholars have identified Persian literature as quintessentially mystical, epitomized in the poetry of great masters such as Rumi (c. 1207–1273) and Hafiz (d. 1389). The truth, as usual, would seem to lie in neither extreme, nor in a convenient middle point. It is true that much of classical Persian literature is characterized by a high degree of Sufi (that is, Islamic mystic) imagery. However, the origin of much Sufi imagery can be traced to regal court poetry, which was subsequently applied to lover-beloved or spiritual master-disciple relationships.

There is also some ambiguity about the origin of this new Persian literature. The thirteenth-century literary historian Muhammad 'Aufi relates that Bahram Gur, a pre-Islamic Sassanian Iranian king who flourished in the fifth century, was the first to compose Persian poetry. Earlier figures from the eleventh century (Tha'alibi and Ibn Khurdadhbih) had also claimed that Bahram Gur was the first. The accuracy of such claims may be questioned; one is on much firmer ground in tracing the blossoming of Persian literature to the Samanid dynasty (864–999 CE).

An important figure in this early stage was the poet Rudaki (d. 940). He was affiliated with the Samanid ruler Amir Nasr ibn Ahmad. The *Chahar-maqala* of Nizami Arudi (d. 1174, an important author from Samarqand) states that once when the Samanid king had taken a longer than usual excursion from the much-loved Transoxiana city of Bukhara, the courtiers pleaded with Rudaki to write a line that would move the king to return home. The result was this much-loved and oft-recited line:

The Ju-yi Muliyan we call to mind
We long for those dear friends long left behind
(Arberry 1958: 33)

Firdawsi's Book of Kings

The next grand figure of Persian literature was Firdawsi (d. 1020 or 1026), whose monumental *Shahnameh* (Book of Kings) is the quintessential recollection of pre-Islamic Persian glory. Although not a historical text per se, this text has radically shaped the way that many later Iranians have come to imagine their historical heritage. Ironically, Firdawsi did not receive the compensation he was hoping for from the Ghaznavid Sultan Mahmud. Mahmud, a Turk who had positioned himself as the defender of Sunni Islam, was not impressed by the extensive glorification of pre-Islamic (largely Zoroastrian) Persian kings. A devastated Firdawsi responded with a scathing critique of the miserly sultan. Still, history seems to have verified Firdawsi's boast that through his thirty years of toiling over the composition of the *Shahnameh*, he resurrected Persian language and literature.

After Firdawsi, Persian literatures gradually became infused with the imagery of Sufism, the mystical expression of Islam. Almost from the start, the mystics sought to express the ineffability of their spiritual experiences through the terse and often-ambiguous medium of poetry. As early texts such as the *Asrar al-tawhid*—written by Ibn Munawwar in the twelfth century about the great early Sufi Abu Sa'id ibn Abi

'l-Khayr (d. 1049)—clearly demonstrate, poetry was often recited in Sufi gatherings. There were many significant Sufi-influenced Persian writings in this period. As with Firdawsi, medieval masters find a receptive audience even in contemporary Iran. One of the identifying features of Persian literature has been its continuity, to the point that even elementary school education in Iran today includes reading poetry from a thousand years ago.

Among other great figures such as Anvari, Nizam al-Mulk, Nasir Khusrau, Sana'i, al-Ghazali, Ibn Sina, 'Attar, Nizami of Ganja, and Amir Khusrau, the next monumental figure is Sa'di (c. 1213–1292). If Firdawsi has become the identifying mark of a nationalist Iranian consciousness, Sa'di more than any other figure has contributed to the articulation of a distinctly Persian, Islamic, spiritually influenced humanistic ethic that can perhaps best be represented by the term *adab* (cultured etiquette). Sa'di's *Gulistan* (Rose Garden) and *Bustan* (Orchard) are two classics of Persian literature. The *Gulistan* in many ways has become the model of prose works that are interspersed with lines of poetry here and there. The chapters of this important text deal with kingship, Sufi teachings, virtues of silence, old age and youth, and passionate love.

Rumi the Master

Living roughly a generation after Sa'di was the most luminous of all Persian Sufi poets, Mawlana (Our Master) Jalal al-Din Muhammad Balkhi, simply called Rumi in most English sources. Had he not composed a single line of poetry, he would still be recognized as one of the most important figures of Persian culture due to his elevated rank as a much-loved Sufi exemplar whose legacy has forever shaped the spiritual lives of Muslims in Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, and South Asia. What is more relevant here is that he also composed masterful works of poetry: the *Masnavi* is perhaps the most widely read of all Persian didactic Sufi poems. His *Divan of Shams of Tabriz* contains 33,135 lines of passionate love poetry. The *Fihri ma fihri* is a prose collection of Rumi's table talks, gathered by his students. Rumi's literary output is now being transmitted to the West: in the past twenty years various translations and "versions" of Rumi's poetry have made Rumi the top-selling poet in America, according to the *Christian Science Monitor*.

Although Rumi is undoubtedly the master of explicitly Sufi poetry, the absolute pinnacle of lyric love poetry (*ghazal*) was to be achieved by Shams al-Din Hafiz, often called *Tarjuman al-asrar* (interpreter of mystical secrets) and *Lisan al-ghayb* (tongue of the un-

seen realm). Hafiz's *Divan* contains almost five hundred short love poems, often held to be the absolute finest example of Persian poetry. His poems are characterized often by a delicious ambiguity: one is never sure if the subject of the poem is a wine minstrel, a spiritual teacher, an earthly beloved, or God. Chances are that all of them are intended at the same time. Both Hafiz and his legion of admirers seem to revel in this deliberate ambiguity, which has characterized so many of the best examples of Persian literature.

No doubt some will object to such a selective reading of Persian literature that essentially stops in the fourteenth century. Much has been left out in the preceding, most of all prose works of ethics and philosophy, history, and other subjects. Also, a reading of Persian literature that ends at the fourteenth century tends to perpetuate historiographic models of a "golden age" inevitably followed by "decline," which have been so problematic in depicting many facets of Islamic society. These shortcomings are freely acknowledged. But it is no exaggeration to state that this literature, the grandest aesthetic achievement of Persian speakers, is also the single greatest contribution of Persian societies to humanity.

Omid Safi

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LIU SHAOQI (1898–1969), People's Republic of China president. Liu Shaoqi was a tragic political figure, symbolizing the political struggle occurring in China over the first fifty years of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Liu joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1921 when he was studying in Moscow. After he returned to China, he became one of the CCP leaders working underground among workers. Along with Li Lisan (1899–1967), Liu organized a strike by 400,000 workers in 1922. In 1934, Liu participated in the Long March and played an important support role for Mao Zedong (1893–1976) during the Yan'an period.

After the PRC was founded in 1949, Liu was named chairman of the National People's Congress (NPC) in 1954. In 1956, he made a bold proposal to reform the Chinese economy, a move that eventually cost him his life. Along with Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), Liu insisted that China's socialism should concentrate on increasing the productivity and development of the national economy. In 1959, Liu was promoted to the posts of president of China and chairman of the Defense Committee. He was also in charge of the daily work of the PRC and CCP before the Cultural Revolution. However, Liu began to struggle with Mao in 1960 regarding the national economic policy.

At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1967, Liu was labeled as "taking the capitalist road" and arrested. Liu was physically abused by the Red Guards (students who adulated Mao during the Cultural Revolution), kicked out of the CCP, and died in Henan Province in 1968. In February 1980, the CCP rehabilitated his name, but only after fourteen years of humiliation.

Unryu Suganuma

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LOCKHEED SCANDAL One of postwar Japan's worst political scandals broke in 1976 when it was discovered that Lockheed Aircraft had made illegal payments to airlines in Japan and other countries as a way to boost airplane sales and avoid bankruptcy. In Japan's case the scandal led to the prosecution of seventeen people for illegal activities. The money was funneled through three channels, the Marubeni Corporation (Japan's third-largest general trading company), All-Nippon Airways (ANA—Japan's major domestic airline), and Kodama. Those indicted in 1976 included Kakuei Tanaka (1918–1993), a former Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) prime minister (in office 1972–1974) and a central figure in this affair; a former secretary of Tanaka's; a former chairman of Marubeni and two of its executives.

Tanaka had influenced the Ministry of Transportation and ANA to buy Lockheed L-1001 Tri-Stars

instead of McDonnell-Douglas DC-10s, on which ANA had already taken an option. Around 1974, Tanaka was arrested for having accepted 500 million yen in bribes in violation of the Foreign Exchange Control Law. Following earlier corruption charges that involved real estate and construction companies, he resigned as prime minister in November 1974. In 1976, investigations in the Lockheed scandal revealed that through a right-wing fixer, Yoshio Kodama (1911–1984), business people and LDP leaders had received bribes.

Tanaka was convicted on 12 August 1983 by the Tokyo District Court. He was sentenced to four years in jail and fined 500 million yen, the amount of the bribe he had received. When the Tokyo High Court dismissed his appeals, he appealed to the Supreme Court, which eventually dropped his case when he died in 1993.

Miki Takeo (1907–1988) became prime minister from 1974 to 1976 and pursued the investigation into Lockheed corporate bribery, but political turmoil caused his government to fall.

The Lockheed case, the most serious scandal until the Recruit affair in 1988, revealed a side of Japanese politics and its lack of transparency that underlined the need for political reform. Japanese critics have referred to this close connection of elites formed of politicians, businessmen, and bureaucrats as "structural corruption."

Nathalie Cavasin

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LON NOL (1913–1985), leader of the Khmer Republic. Lon Nol is remembered as the leader of the Khmer Republic (1970–1975), which preceded the rule of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. He was born on 13 November 1913 in the village of Prey Chraing in Prey Veng Province, close to the Vietnamese border. Lon Nol was the son of a minor government of-



Lon Nol at Cham Car Mon palace in Phnom Penh in 1975. (FRANCOISE DE MULDER/CORBIS)

ficial, Lon Hin. After completing primary school in Cambodia, he was sent to Saigon, where he attended the Lycée Chasseloup-Laubat. He left school in 1934 and joined the Judicial Service, eventually becoming a magistrate in Siem Reap Province in northwestern Cambodia. He later transferred to the Administrative Service, taking up a post in Kompong Cham Province. Lon Nol's efficiency quickly came to the attention of his superiors, and he rapidly rose through the ranks of what was a French colonial administration.

In September 1947, Lon Nol, then the governor of Kratie Province, helped to found the Khmer Renewal Party. The party failed to win any seats in the elections of 1947, with Lon Nol placed last in polling for the seat he contested in Kompong Cham. The setback did not halt his rise through Cambodian government circles. He became police chief, transferred to the Royal Cambodian armed forces, and eventually became chief of the General Staff. He became minister of defense in October 1955.

Lon Nol's political rise accelerated sharply after the 1966 elections. A largely conservative national assembly appointed him as Cambodia's prime minister. He was remembered for his calm and quiet attitude and for the comprehensive dossiers he held on all of his friends, foes, rivals, and potential rivals. He was also remembered as a fervent Buddhist and as a devoted ally of Cambodia's national leader, Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

Along with Sihanouk's cousin, Prince Sisowath Sirikmatak, Lon Nol surprisingly led a coup against Sihanouk in March 1970, which would eventually lead to the rise of the Khmer Rouge. Lon Nol eventually became the leader of the Khmer Republic that succeeded Sihanouk's initial reign. His regime, supported by the United States, was embroiled in a bloody civil war against the local Communists, who had aligned themselves with the deposed Sihanouk and who were supported by North Vietnam and China. Lon Nol's regime was riddled with corruption. Lon Nol preferred to ignore the problem, ensconcing himself in a world of clairvoyants and mystics. In 1975, with his regime on the verge of collapse, he fled Cambodia. On 17 April 1975, as Communist soldiers marched victoriously into Cambodia's capital, Phnom Penh, Lon Nol was making a new home for himself in Hawaii. He would remain there until his death in 1985.

David M. Ayres

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LONG MARCH The Chinese Communists' six-thousand-mile journey of retreat (1934–1935) across such provinces as Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, Sichuan, and Shaanxi has been glorified by the leaders of the Communist Party of China (CCP) as the "Long March." As a result of the retreat, the Communist revolutionary base was relocated from southeast to northwest China, an area beyond the control of the Nationalist troops under Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), leader of the Guomindang (Nationalist Party). Historians have considered the march a milestone in the history of modern China—the point at which the Chinese Communist movement started to forge its own path, independent of Comintern control, and the time that Mao Zedong (1893–1976) became the undisputed leader of the CCP. (Comintern, an association of national Communist parties founded



A speaker addresses a crowd of Chinese Communists in March 1938 after they had completed the Long March. (HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS)

in 1919 for the stated purpose of promoting world revolution, actually worked like an agent of the Soviet Union to control the international Communist movement, including the CCP.)

The Formation of the Soviet in Jiangxi Province

The CCP was founded in the early 1920s. In 1924, the Guomindang agreed to form a "united front" (alliance) with the CCP in return for Soviet aid. But in 1927, after the Guomindang experienced some success in its expedition against warlords in the north, a bloody purge was carried out against all Communists in areas under the Guomindang's control. Communist movements in China were forced to go underground. In the early 1930s, there were up to fifteen Communist rural bases in south central China, but their links with the central committee of the CCP in Shanghai were shattered because of the purge. The CCP, whose leadership was dominated by a group of Moscow-trained Chinese students known as the Twenty-Eight Bolsheviks, came to rely all the more on Russia's support. In 1931, the central committee relocated from Shanghai to the Jiangxi Province (northern China) and the Chinese Communists declared the local government a soviet. Mao's influence in the Jiangxi Soviet was overshadowed by that of the Moscow-trained Chinese leaders, many of whom were adherents of the Soviet orthodoxy of revolution by urban workers. (Mao, by contrast, held that the revolution could be achieved by relying on the peasants who made up the bulk of China's population.) By redistributing and expropriating land in these soviet regions, Communist leaders enlisted support from the Chinese lower class and increased the popularity of the CCP in these regions.

Between 1930 and 1934, the Nationalists had launched a series of military encirclement campaigns against the Communists in an attempt to annihilate their bases. Using the tactics of guerrilla warfare developed by Mao Zedong, the Communists managed to fight off four campaigns, but in early 1934 the Communist central committee removed Mao from CCP leadership.

In October 1933, the Nationalists launched a fifth campaign against the Communists. With advice from German experts, Chiang Kai-shek mobilized about 700,000 men to build a series of cement blockhouses around the Communist troops. Slowly encircling the soviet areas in Jiangxi, the Nationalists enforced an economic stranglehold. About a million people died as a result of the economic blockade and the subsequent military conflicts. The Communists, using positional warfare tactics (the strategy of simple defense from

one's military bases, abandoning the former tactics of guerrilla warfare) against the better-armed Nationalist forces, suffered severe losses and were nearly crushed. By mid-1934, the Red Army was defeated. It had to move or be crushed.

The Communist Retreat, or Long March

On 15 October 1934, 86,000 Communist military personnel, as well as 30,000 Communist Party officials and civilian party members, broke through the blockade and fled westward. Along the route of retreat, core concerns were where the troops should go and who should lead the march, as the direction and leadership of the march were unclear. In the first three months of this journey of retreat, mainly under the leadership of Zhu De (1886–1976) and Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), the Communists were subjected to frequent bombardments and attacks by the Nationalist forces and suffered great losses. But on the way northwest, Mao's tactics of guerrilla warfare were gradually adopted. The demoralized Communists reached Zunyi, Guizhou Province, in early 1935, where Mao managed to gather enough support to establish his dominance in the CCP leadership. In a session lacking a quorum of the CCP Politburo (Political Bureau), Mao defeated the Soviet-trained faction and became the actual leader of the Communist Party. The era of Comintern direction of party leadership was ended.

Under Mao's leadership, the Communists proceeded toward Shaanxi. This Jiangxi contingent was later joined by the Second Front Army headed by He Long from its base in Hunan. In June 1935, the Fourth Front Army under Zhang Guodao (1897–1979), from the base in the Sichuan-Shaanxi border, also joined Mao's troop. After a bitter power struggle between Mao and Zhang, Zhang's group decided to move toward southwestern China, while Mao's troops headed toward northern Shaanxi, northwest China, where Gao Gang (1902–1955) had established another Communist base. Most of the route was mountainous, with few motor roads and little access to resources. To maintain marching speed, the Communists had to discard their heavy equipment, including medical and food supplies, along the route.

The march lasted for about a year. The Chinese Communists crossed eighteen mountain ranges and twenty-four rivers, averaging about seventeen miles a day. After a journey of about six thousand miles over mountains and dales, rivers and forests, the troops arrived at Shaanxi in October 1935, with only about eight thousand survivors. Although the Long March had set out from Jiangxi with about 100,000 followers

and had gathered many new recruits along the retreat, by the time it had reached Zunyi in January 1935, half had been lost. When these survivors finally reached Shaanxi in October 1935, only the leaders and a very small number of the troops remained, a small proportion of those who had set out from Jiangxi. Along the route of retreat, some had left to mobilize the peasantry, some had died on the way, and others had simply abandoned the endeavor.

In the middle of 1936, the remnants of several Red armies gathered in northern Shaanxi, with Yanan as their headquarters. By December 1936, the Red Army numbered about thirty thousand men. The mountains and difficult terrain made the new base secure and enabled the Red Army to reorganize its strategy against the Nationalists.

The Significance of the Long March

During the Long March, Mao Zedong secured his leadership role in the CCP. Before that, the core of the leadership had been the Twenty-Eight Bolsheviks, Soviet-trained leaders who believed that revolutions in China should be urban based and who had strong connections with the Comintern. These men regarded Mao's belief in guerrilla warfare and rural-based revolution as unorthodox. Under the military threat of the Nationalists, the Chinese Communists ignored the Soviet advisers and forged their own tactics. It was during this period that Mao started to develop his own version of Communist theory in writings and established himself as a theorist.

The rise of Mao as the CCP's new leader during the Long March brought dramatic changes in party-mobilization policy. Mao's views overrode the Soviet orthodoxy of a narrowly defined proletarian revolution and became the party's new key to establishing itself in the countryside. The Communists had gained local peasant support along the route of the March. From then on, the CCP made it a doctrine that imported Marxism was less important in China than China's own unique historical circumstances and economic situation. Mao believed that China's revolution should be guided and supported by the huge rural-based population, not the small number of working-class people in the cities.

The Long March allowed a new batch of CCP leaders to emerge on China's national political scene. Most of the later prominent leaders of the CCP, including Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969), Zhu De, and Lin Biao (1906–1971), participated in the march. After 1949, these Long March veterans became top-ranking political leaders of the People's Republic of China.

The establishment of the CCP's new territorial base in northern Shaanxi had significant implications for the second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), as well as for Nationalist-CCP relations. After arriving in Shaanxi province in late 1935, Mao and the CCP leaders found that they were surrounded by desert on the west and the Huang (Yellow) River on the east. Although the geographical environment and the absence of motor roads in northwest China made Shaanxi a defensible area, the lack of food and other resources also meant that the new base was vulnerable to Nationalists' attacks. But when the second Sino-Japanese War broke out, the northwest became an important base from which a war of resistance was organized. The Long March inspired increased Chinese nationalism that bolstered morale in the face of advancing Japanese troops, and it helped to transform and consolidate the CCP's position inside and outside China.

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LONGBOAT RACING Longboat racing is a national sport in both Thailand and Laos. Longboat races normally are held in late September through November when rivers are high. They serve as a traditional rite to mark the end of Buddhist Lent (which occurs during the rainy season). Popular Thai longboat races are held in October in Chiang Khan, Nong Khai, and Sakon Nakhon, areas along the Mekong River or its tributaries. Key longboat races also are held in Luang Prabang and Vientiane in Laos. The history of this popular sport goes back six hundred years to the Ayutthaya kingdom. Participation was considered excellent training for warriors. It was also a sign of masculinity.

The boats are made from dugout tree trunks and are quite long, accommodating up to sixty rowers seated two across. The boats are often elegantly carved, with prominent, elevated heads that are often

in the form of a *naga* (serpent). The *naga* is considered king of the river and a source of fertility. The races are thought to please the river gods and goddesses.

The races are held in any area with rivers, drawing many spectators. Prizes and trophies are given for the top-finishing boats, for the most beautiful boats, and on special occasions for beauty queens associated with the boats.

Gerald W. Fry

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LONGMEN GROTTOES Carved into limestone cliffs near Luoyang, Henan Province, China, the Longmen (Dragon Gate) Grottoes are one of China's three most important Buddhist statuary sites. More than 1,350 caves, together with more than 2,100 grottoes and niches, numerous pagodas, and thousands of inscriptions, make Longmen an important repository of Buddhist imagery and texts dating from the fifth to the twelfth century.

A colossal seventeen-meter-high image of the Buddha Vairocana (Cosmic Buddha, source of all the phenomenal universe) was carved into the cliffside in the seventh century (Tang dynasty, 618–907 CE), largely funded by the imperial family, notably Empress Wu Zetian (625–705). Two disciples, Ananda and Kasyapa, along with guardian kings on adjoining walls, flank the seated Buddha. The open niche measures over thirty meters by thirty-six meters. Other important sites

within Longmen include the Cave of Ten Thousand Buddhas (carved 680), which actually contains more than fifteen thousand small Buddha figures; the Lotus Flower Cave (527), housing the smallest Buddha images; the Medicine Prescription Cave (575), with more than 120 prescriptions for ills ranging from headaches to madness; and the Bingyang Cave (500–523), which the Emperor Xuan Wu (reigned 499–515) dedicated to his parents, recording that it took 802,336 men to complete the work. In the year 2000, UNESCO designated Longmen a World Heritage Site.

Noelle O'Connor

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LOUANGNAMTHA (2000 est. pop. 145,000). Located in the northwest corner of Laos, Louangnamtha is one of the country's sixteen provinces. Covering an area of 3,500 square miles (9,300 square kilometers), Louangnamtha is relatively small and sparsely populated. The only city in the province, Nam Tha, has just 20,000 residents but serves as the region's political and commercial center. Nearly 200 miles (320 kilometers) north of the Laotian capital, Vientiane, Louangnamtha is remote—much closer to the borders of China and Myanmar (Burma) than to the major cities of Laos. As is the case with the rest of Laos, the region's economy is primarily dependent on agriculture. However, with increasing international investment and aid coming into the country, economic diversification in Louangnamtha will likely occur.

Mountainous and forested, Louangnamtha is mostly pristine, although plans for a new "economic highway" through the region will likely change that soon. Timber operations, most owned by international companies, also pose a potential conflict between economic development and attempts to sustain natural resources.

Recently, Laos's communist government has relaxed many controls and opened up the country to tourism. Louangnamtha's rugged terrain is perfect for trekking. The region also has one of the country's few protected wildernesses, the massive Nam Ha Conservation Area. Louangnamtha offers great cultural diversity too. The so-called hill tribes, such as the Hmong, Lahu, and Akha, make up a large proportion of the region's population.

Arne Kislenko



LONGMEN GROTTOES— WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2000, the Longmen Grottoes in the Henan province of China illustrate the heights that stone-carved art reached in the Northern Wei and Tang dynasties. The Buddhist art is carved into the walls of these incredible caves.

See also: **Hmong**

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LU, MOUNT Mount Lu (Cottage Mountain), is situated in China's northern Jiangxi Province and covers an area of over 300 square kilometers. Its highest peak, Hanyangfeng, is 449 meters above sea level. To its north is the Chang (Yangtze) River and to the southeast is Lake Poyang. Over three thousand species of plants can be found on its slopes, and the mountain encompasses approximately ninety peaks.

Famed scenic areas include the Peak of the Five Old Men; the Three Step Falls, which cascades over 150 meters; Great Tianchi Lake; the Flower Path; and the Cave of the Immortals, where the mythic Lu Dongbing achieved immortality. Mount Lu also houses the White Deer Cave Academy, one of China's oldest academies, and the East Forest Monastery (fourth and fifth century) where Pure Land Buddhism is said to have originated. The Incense Burner Peak inspired the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) poet Li Bai (701–762). Guling town houses villas dating from the early twentieth century, when Mount Lu became a popular retreat for wealthy Chinese and Europeans. For hundreds of years, Mount Lu's beauty has inspired poets and painters. In 1996, it was declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site.

Noelle O'Connor

See also: **Buddhism; Chang River; Jiangxi; Li Bai; Tang Dynasty**

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LU XUN (1881–1936), Chinese writer. Lu Xun was the pen name of Zhou Shuren, a Chinese fiction

writer, essayist, poet, translator, scholar, and patron of the arts who is widely considered to be the most influential man of letters in twentieth-century China. Born in Shaoxing, Zhejiang Province, Lu Xun went to Japan in 1902 to study medicine. As his autobiographical essays claim, he left medical school in 1905 to devote himself to a spiritual healing of the nation through literature. Returning to China in 1909, Lu Xun took up work at the Ministry of Education and also taught at schools in Shaoxing, Hangzhou, and Beijing. In 1918, he published *Kuangren riji* (Diary of a Madman), celebrated as the first piece in modern Chinese vernacular.

Lu Xun's collections of fiction, *Nahan* (Outcry, also known as Call to Arms, 1923) and *Panghuang* (Wondering, 1926), include short stories such as *A Q zhengzhuan* (The True Story of Ah Q) and *Zhufu* (New Year's Sacrifice), which portray with humor and sarcasm the delusions of villagers during the upheavals of the early twentieth century. As the stories offer a poignant criticism of contemporary social mores, they have come to represent of the ideals of the May Fourth Movement, an influential trend during the 1910s and 1920s that saw a new social order. In parallel, Lu Xun experimented with other forms of writing, starting with the prose-poems in *Yecao* (Wild Grass, 1927). After 1927, he wrote mostly essays, contributing to the burgeoning of the genre in twentieth-century Chinese literature. Altogether he published sixteen volumes of essays on subjects varying from sketches of everyday life to pointed political commentary. Lu Xun also influenced the literary scene through his journal editing and prolific translations, mostly of Russian and Japanese writers.

After moving to Shanghai in 1927, he used his status to support writers and other artists. Believing in the power of visual art to carry social messages, he advanced the woodblock print movement and collaborated with his brother Zhou Zuoren in publishing art prints. Despite his concern with social issues, he remained politically unaffiliated, engaging in debates with the poet Guo Moruo to the left and the essayist Lin Yutang to the right. In 1931, however, he joined the League of Leftist Writers, a fact used a decade later by Mao Zedong (1893–1976) to posthumously declare Lu Xun as the paragon of Communist writers.

Yomi Braester

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LUANG PRABANG (2001 pop. 15,000). Surrounded by mountains on and around a peninsula between the Mekong and Nam Khan rivers, Luang Prabang is one of the most beautiful, historic, and least explored ancient capitals of Asia. Today the third or fourth biggest city in Laos, Luang Prabang was originally the center of Lane Xang ("land of a million elephants"), an empire that stretched across much of present-day Laos, northeastern Thailand, and southern China approximately 700 years ago. The name itself is taken from the Phra Bang, a golden image of the Buddha, which remains a revered object of the Lao people. Although the whereabouts of the authentic Phra Bang are a mystery, and little remains of the original city, Luang Prabang continues as a center of Lao history and culture. Renowned for its magnificent temples and the former Royal Palace, the city also boasts a unique mix of Lao and French architecture, a legacy from the country's colonial past. So rich is Luang Prabang's history that the city was designated a UNESCO World Heritage site in 1995, with 33 temples and 111 buildings protected or scheduled for restoration. Luang Prabang retains a magical, unspoiled quality. Quiet and small, with only about 15,000 residents, the city is widely regarded as the best-preserved historic town in Southeast Asia. Luang Prabang also stands as evidence of a glorious era in Laos's troubled history.

Arne Kislenko

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LUANG PRABANG—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

The town of Luang Prabang is noted for the attention given to the preservation of its many temples and other historic buildings. It was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1995.

LUCKNOW (2001 pop. 2.2 million). The capital of Uttar Pradesh, India's most populous state, Lucknow is a major commercial and cultural center 270 miles southeast of Delhi. In 1590 the Mughal emperor Akbar named it the seat of the governor of Awadh. Muslims constituted its ruling families. Modern Lucknow, known as the city of nabobs, was largely created by Oudh princes, descendants of the Persian adventurer Saadat Khan, who governed the province as a gift of the Mughal court beginning in 1732. The Mughal emperor Asaf-ud-Dawlah moved the court from Faizabad to Lucknow in 1775 and turned it into a center of Urdu poetry, courtly diction, music, and dance. The early nineteenth century saw the continued building of palaces and mosques and the cult of the sophisticated courtesan. The British annexed the area in 1856.

Today music festivals and dance made famous by the Oudh court continue in Lucknow. The city produces silver and *bidri* (ornamental metal) work and



HOUSING THE COLONEL IN LUCKNOW (OR LAKNAU)

"Colonel Martin's other residence . . . is a palace on a very extensive scale, but in which the singularity of the Colonel's taste is chiefly discernible. . . . Under the principal apartment are subterraneous rooms, intended for the hot season. This plan of living underground during the hot months being quite experimental, it would perhaps have been more reasonable to make the trial on a less expensive scale. The heat and smoke and smell, arising from the number of lamps necessary to light the dark chambers and passages, seemed alone sufficient to render the success of the scheme more than doubtful. In the middle of the largest of these dark rooms the Colonel had already raised his tomb, and the number of lights to be burned there, night and day, *for ever*, and the sum to be allotted for this purpose, were already mentioned."

Source: Thomas Twining, Travels in India, a Hundred Years Ago, with a Visit to the United States (1792), as quoted in The Sabibs (1948), edited by Hilton Brown. London: William Hodge & Co., 238.

trades in copper, brass, and cotton. It is an important rail junction with an impressive station reflecting Mughal and European influences. Also noteworthy is the Great Imambara, the tomb of the nabob Asaf-ud-Dawlah. Most residents are Hindus, but Lucknow is the principal Shi'ite Muslim center in India and still home to many Sunni Muslims.

C. Roger Davis

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LUDRUK *Ludruk* is a secular East Javanese folk-theater genre, performed by amateur and professional troupes for mass audiences. Its contemporary form began emerging in the 1930s, although evidence suggests that its roots go back several hundred years. *Ludruk* has become increasingly popular since World War II, heavily influencing many television productions.

Starting with a comic prologue, *Ludruk* consists mainly of spoken dialogue; songs and dances are performed at the opening of the performance and between the acts. *Ludruk* is usually accompanied by a gamelan—a traditional Indonesian percussion orchestra. The melodramatic stories often highlight social problems and social injustice, seen from the perspective of the masses. Clowns figure prominently; they mock the airs of social superiors and criticize their wrong behavior. Often the plot revolves around love and typically can involve the marriage of a lower-class beauty to the son of a rich man or the desperation of a youth of humble background who wins the heart of an upper-class beauty forbidden to marry him. Except for these female roles, all other women are characteristically played by men.

Martin Ramstedt

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LUNA Y NOVICIO, JUAN (1857–1899), Filipino painter and revolutionary. Juan Luna y Novicio was the older brother of Antonio Luna (1866–1899), a general of the Filipino forces during the Philippine-

American War. Juan learned the rudiments of painting under Don Agustin Saez. He became a sailor, and his sea travels inspired him to continue pursuing painting. He enrolled at the Academy of Fine Arts in Manila under the tutelage of Don Lorenzo Guerrero and further trained in Spain under Don Alejandro Vera.

In 1884, his masterpiece, *Spolarium*, won first prize at the National Exposition of Fine Arts in Madrid. His friend Dr. Jose Rizal, national hero of the Philippines after his execution in 1896, praised his success as a triumph of Filipino talent in the face of Spanish prejudice toward Filipinos. Juan created other notable paintings in the academic style such as *Daphne and Cleo*, *Death of Cleopatra*, *Las Damas Romanas* (The Roman Women), *Españas y Filipinas* (Spain and the Philippines), *Peuple et Roi* (Purple and Red), *Vanidad* (Vanity), *Inocencia* (Innocence), and *El Pacto de Sangre* (The Blood Compact).

In 1885, he moved to Paris and in the following year married a woman belonging to the prominent Pardo de Tavera family. In 1892, he was arrested for murdering his wife because of her infidelity but was eventually released on the grounds of insanity, as the judge in the case felt that because Luna was such a talented artist, it was a shame to send him to prison. In 1894, he returned to the Philippines, and two years later, he and his brother Antonio were arrested for allegedly conspiring to overthrow the colonial government. They were pardoned in 1897, and days after their release, they left for Europe.

During the Philippine-American War (1899–1901), Juan served as a diplomatic agent for Emilio Aguinaldo, the president of the fledgling Philippine Republic. While stopping at Hong Kong on his way home, he died from a heart attack and was buried there. Afterward his remains were brought to the Philippines and interred at San Agustin Church.

Aaron G. Ronquillo

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LUZON GROUP (2002 pop. of Central Luzon 85.2 million). The largest island group in the Philippine archipelago, the Luzon group includes the main island of Luzon and the island provinces of Palawan, Marinduque, Oriental and Occidental Mindoro, Batanes, Cananduanes, Masbate, and Romblon. Together, these cover more than 109,000 square kilometers.

The Luzon group is divided into five regions based on geographic location and ethnolinguistic groupings of the population. Region 1, Ilocos Region, consists of Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, and Pangasinan.

Region 2, Cagayan Valley, consists of Cagayan, Isabela, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino, and Batanes. In 1981, several provinces formerly in Regions 1 and 2 (Abra, Apayao, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga, and Mountain province) were reconstituted into the Cordillera Autonomous Region, home to indigenous ethnic groups and cultural minorities with common historical and cultural heritages.

Region 3, Central Luzon, includes Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Pampanga, Zambales, Bataan, and Bulacan. Angeles City and Olongapo City, in the provinces of Pampanga and Zambales, respectively, are independent of, although located in, those provinces.

Region 4, Southern Tagalog, consists of Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Batangas, Palawan, Oriental Mindoro, Occidental Mindoro, Marinduque, Aurora, Quezon, and Romblon.

Region 5, Bicol Region, includes Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Albay, Sorsogon, Catanduanes, and Masbate. The national capital, Manila, is located in this region, in an enclave called the National Capital Region, which itself has twelve cities and five municipalities.

Luzon has a myriad of topographical features ranging from mountain ranges to volcanoes. At 2,928 meters, Mount Pulog is the highest mountain in Luzon. Several lakes and rivers, such as Laguna Lake, the largest lake in the Philippines, as well as a few active volcanoes, notably Mount Mayon in Albay and Mount Pinatubo in Zambales, are also in Luzon. Pinatubo's eruptions in 1991 and 1992 were so powerful that volcanic material rising into the upper atmosphere was carried around the world. Aside from the vast mineral and natural resources of the Luzon group, central Luzon is also the rice bowl of the Philippines, where most of the country's rice is produced.

Luzon is populated by people of different cultural and linguistic backgrounds. Tagalog, a member of the Austronesian family, is the most widely spoken language, though each region has its own local language.



Despite the diverse population, Catholicism is the predominant religion, with a few Protestant denominations and other local religions. The Luzon group is home to one of the simplest-living ethnic groups in the Philippines, the Negritos, occupying the hinterlands, while the most modern metropolis in the country, Metro Manila, is also in Luzon.

The capital city of the Philippines, Manila was a bustling community engaged in trade prior to the arrival of the Spanish. After the Spanish established themselves in Manila in 1572, the city became a launching point for further expeditions into the rest of Luzon to spread Catholicism and Western civilization. It was also in Luzon that the revolution for Philippine independence started and where Philippine independence was proclaimed in 1898.

Aaron Ronquillo

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MACAO (2002 est. pop. 465,000). A Portuguese colonial outpost in southern China for more than four centuries (1557–1999), the territory of Macao (Macau), or as it is known in Chinese, Aomen, consists of a narrow peninsula in southern Guangdong Province and the islands of Tiapa and Coloane. In 1996 the population of Macao was 415,850. Coupled with the territory's minute size (23.5 square kilometers, or 9 square miles), this makes it one of the most densely populated places in the world.


The Portuguese name "Macao" was possibly derived from either the Ma Kwok (Cantonese) temple that has stood in the city since the fourteenth century or the Cantonese term "Ama-ngao" ("Bay of the Goddess A Ma," the patron of sailors and fishermen). The Portuguese first settled Macao in 1557 and named the site *Provação do Nome de Deos na China*, or "Settlement in the name of God in China." It is not known why the Chinese authorities allowed the Portuguese to establish a settlement. Possible explanations are that the territory was both small and not of any value and that the presence of the foreigners would facilitate trade, or that the Portuguese were being rewarded for their perceived assistance in driving off local pirates. Regardless of the reason, the territory became an important base of operations for Portuguese merchants in East Asia from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. Reporting to authorities in Goa, India, the Portuguese governor in Macao oversaw a vibrant trade with the Ming and later Qing empires, and his city was an important headquarters for the Jesuit missionary movement in East Asia.

Other European powers, particularly the Dutch, were envious of Portugal's position in Macao, and on

several occasions the colony had to defend itself from attacks launched by the Dutch East India Company. The Macao colony did provide shelter for the families of Dutch and English merchants who were involved in the China trade at Guangzhou (Canton), 100 kilometers to the north; regulations there forbade merchants from permanently residing in the city and family members from accompanying them on trading missions. With the expulsion of all foreigners (except for a small number of Dutch traders) from Japan in 1635, Macao became the center of Sino-European trade until the end of the eighteenth century.

After the Opium War of 1840 and the opening of four new ports to foreign trade, Macao's importance as a point of commerce on the China coast declined. The Portuguese, however, remained in Macao, although much of the trade with the Qing empire shifted to Hong Kong and Shanghai. In 1845 the governor of Macao, João Ferreira do Amaral, ended the established practice of paying the Chinese an annual rent of 500 silver taels and evicted Chinese customs officials from the colony. In 1887 Portugal and China signed a treaty that formally recognized Portuguese sovereignty over Macao. Although now a foreign-controlled possession on the China coast, Macao's economy and importance continued to decline with Hong Kong's growing importance. During the Pacific War, Macao enjoyed a brief revival as a safe haven due to Portuguese neutrality in the worldwide conflict.

In 1987 the governments of Portugal and the People's Republic of China concluded negotiations for the return of Macao to Chinese rule. The reversion of Macao to the "motherland" on 20 December 1999 was an important event for the Chinese leadership in



Beijing and for many Chinese. The return of the last of the foreign-controlled territories to Chinese authority—like the earlier handover of Hong Kong in 1997—ended almost two centuries of unequal treaties that were a source of humiliation for many Chinese and signified that a new and strong China had at last come of age as an equal player on the world stage. The Beijing government hopes that successes in the Hong Kong and Macao Special Administrative Regions under the "one country, two systems" banner will eventually pave the way for the reunification of Taiwan and the People's Republic of China.

Apart from trade, some light manufacturing, and the local fishing industry, the economy of the Macao Special Administration Region is dominated by tourism and gambling. In the mid-1990s the colony was plagued by violence as Chinese criminal gangs, or triads, from Hong Kong moved into Macao prior to the handover of Hong Kong. These gangs fought for control of the

colony's gambling establishments, prostitution, and drug trade. The Macao Special Administration Region continues to serve as a popular holiday destination for the residents of Hong Kong, and the former colony's economy is being more closely integrated into that of the neighboring Zhuhai Special Economic Zone.

Robert John Perrins

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MACAPAGAL, DIOSDADO (1910–1997), President of the Republic of the Philippines. Born to a poor family on 28 September 1910, Diosdado Macapagal worked his way through law school and joined the largest U.S. law firm in Manila while the Philippines was still a U.S. colony. After independence he joined the Department of Foreign Affairs, rising to the position of second secretary of the Philippine embassy in Washington, D.C. While in Washington, Macapagal conducted graduate work in economics, earning a Ph.D. in 1957. He was twice elected to the Philippine Congress, serving from 1949–1956, and was vice president from 1957–1961. According to Marcos biographer James Hamilton-Paterson, in 1961 Macapagal successfully challenged incumbent president Carlos Garcia after making a tacit agreement with Ferdinand Marcos that if elected he would only serve one term, after which he would support a Marcos candidacy. In 1965, when it became clear that Macapagal was going to renege and run for reelection, Marcos ran as the opposition candidate, easily defeating the incumbent president, who ran a poor campaign. As president, Macapagal supported land redistribution but lacked the political support to implement sweeping reform. In 1963 he proposed legislation giving the government greater power to expropriate landed estates, but members of the elite resisted the reforms, and Congress

watered down the proposal, which was inadequately funded and poorly implemented. Although considered personally honest, Macapagal's administration was tainted by corruption, and he was threatened with impeachment when he protected political allies from prosecution. Out of office, Macapagal ran as a delegate and was elected president of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Before the body was able to draft a new constitution, however, President Marcos declared martial law, rendering the convention powerless. Macapagal died in 1997, but his political legacy continues. His daughter, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, became president in February 2001 following the impeachment trial of President Joseph Estrada.

Zachary Abuza

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MACARTHUR, DOUGLAS (1880–1964), U.S. military leader. Asia was central to the career of Douglas MacArthur, one of the most celebrated, yet controversial, U.S. military leaders. He had four tours of duty in the Philippines between 1903 and 1942. A visit to military installations in eleven Asian countries in 1905–1906 as an aide to his father, Lt. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, Jr., convinced him of the importance of Asia to America's future.

Asia was the site of MacArthur's worst defeats and greatest victories. Commanding U.S. and Filipino forces, MacArthur was unable to defend the Philippines against the Japanese invasion in 1941. Ordered to Australia by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1942, he declared, "I shall return." Implementing a brilliant island-hopping strategy that avoided Japan's main forces, MacArthur made good on his promise, landing on Leyte island in October 1944.

As supreme commander of the Allied Powers in Japan, MacArthur oversaw the rebuilding of Japan and the establishment of democracy, laying the foundation for Japan to become a major industrial nation. With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, MacArthur was appointed commanding general of U.N. forces. His amphibious landing at Inchon turned the war against North Korea. MacArthur's push to the Yalu River, however, brought China into the war and led to a policy dispute with President Harry Truman. Relieved of command in April 1951, MacArthur returned to the United States to a hero's welcome.

Robert L. Youngblood

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MACAULAY, THOMAS B. (1800–1859), English politician, writer, member of the Supreme Council of India. Thomas Babington Macaulay was a precocious scholar, with an extremely retentive memory. After studying at Trinity College, Cambridge, he began training in the law, but soon abandoned his studies to concentrate on writing for periodicals, chiefly the *Edinburgh Review*. In 1830, he entered Parliament as a Whig. In 1843, he accepted a lucrative post on the Supreme Council of India to help bolster the family finances when his father's business failed. He arrived in Madras, India, in June of that year with his sister.

His period in India was notable for two things. First, he took the lead in the creation of a criminal code, which established English common law as the basis of the Indian legal system. Second, he intervened in the debate about whether public funds should be used to promote the study of English language and learning or of traditional Eastern subjects and languages. Macaulay dismissed the achievements of Indian learning and argued in his famous "Minute on Education" (1835) that universities should teach the English language, science, and Western literature in the English language. His argument prevailed and played an important part in establishing English as the official language of India.

Macaulay returned to England in 1838, never to revisit India. Although he reentered Parliament, his final years were devoted to his *History of England*, which he left unfinished at his death in 1859. He was one of the greatest essayists of nineteenth-century English literature.

Chandrika Kaul

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MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT INDUSTRY—CHINA China's machinery industry started in the 1860s with three government-sponsored military

factories. By the start of the twenty-first century, it contributed over 5 percent of world total production and ranked fifth in the world.

History of Development

By 1933 China possessed 226 machine-building plants, 63 plants for manufacturing electrical equipment, and 34 shipbuilding and locomotive repair plants, which provided 2 percent of China's total industrial gross output. In Manchuria and North China, which came under Japanese occupation between 1931 and 1940, the Japanese expanded the machinery industry substantially to support their war effort. Manchuria had a total of 968 plants in 1940. In the interior areas that remained under the control of the Nationalist government during the war with Japan, the state and private industrialists built many machine-building factories, but only 77 remained in operation by 1944.

In 1945 the Soviet army occupied Manchuria and dismantled half the machinery factories. Industrial production was further disrupted by the 1946–1949 civil war between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists. At the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the machinery industry accounted for only 2.7 percent of total gross industrial output, not much of an increase since 1933.

The industry was given high priority in the Communist government's development plans, given its importance for national defense and for the technological transformation of the national economy. With the stimulus of the Korean War (1950–1953) and the inflow of Soviet technical assistance, the industry regained 1947 levels in 1952. It was assigned 26 percent of total investment in industrial capital construction in the first five-year plan (1953–1957), or 6.9 million yuan renminbi (RMB). Imports of machinery and transport equipment were given high priority. Foreign experts were invited to China, and many Chinese technicians were sent abroad for training. A number of comprehensive institutes were established, as were several new machinery industries, including heavy machines, mining equipment, machine tools, tractors, bearings, and electric equipment.

The launching of the Great Leap Forward of 1958–1960 led to a sharp rise in quantity of machinery produced, but much of it proved unusable because quality was sacrificed in the frenzy to increase production exponentially. Imports of machinery and transportation equipment, 94 percent from Communist countries, reached a peak of \$840 million in 1960. The economic disaster of the Great Leap Forward, coupled with the withdrawal of Soviet assistance after

the open rift between China and the Soviet Union, led to years of readjustment and recovery between 1961 and 1965. While imports plunged to a low of \$100 million in 1963, the machinery industry successfully absorbed and adapted previously imported technology, and the value of its output attained 9.7 billion yuan RMB in 1965, far surpassing the level of 3.5 billion in 1957. In 1966 the industry contributed 12 percent of total gross industrial output.

The outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 disrupted scientific research, because government agencies were paralyzed and many scientists and technicians suffered persecution. But with the PRC government's seating in the United Nations in 1972 and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan and a number of Western countries thereafter, technical imports under licensing agreements from the technologically advanced capitalist economies assumed importance. In 1973 imports of machinery and transportation equipment from non-Communist countries (\$501 million, or 63 percent) first surpassed those from Communist countries (\$296 million).

The end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 and the beginning of economic reform after 1978 accelerated China's technical imports. Whereas earlier the bulk of the industry's production was geared toward the industrial and defense sectors, now much more attention was paid to its development for agricultural production and consumer goods. Emphasis shifted from import of complete sets of plants and equipment to import of single techniques, and from building new enterprises to the technical transformation of existing enterprises. In addition to licensing agreements, joint ventures, wholly foreign-owned enterprises (legal since 1980), and cooperative enterprises served to import advanced techniques. By 1996, there were nearly 5,300 officially



New red tractors at the factory in Luoyang, Henan, China. (LOWELL GEORGIA/CORBIS)

approved foreign-funded ventures, with a total direct investment of approximately \$5.5 billion.

The industry grew at an average annual rate of 16 percent from 1984 to 1989, and 24 percent from 1990 to 1995. Growth has slowed since: 10 percent in 1997 and again in 1999; 4.34 percent in 1998. With rising internal demand, an expansionary monetary policy, and the deepening reform of the state-owned enterprises, the industry is expected to expand at an annual rate of 11 percent or higher from 2000. Machinery production in 2000 rose by 14.7 percent over production in 1999.

Current Configuration

Currently, there are twelve major sectors in China's machinery industry: automotive, electrical equipment, heavy and mining machinery, petrochemical and general machinery, agricultural machinery, construction machinery, internal combustion engines, machine tools, instruments and meters, basic machinery parts, food processing and packaging machinery, and environmental protection machinery. As of 1997 there were 120,000 enterprises and 122 scientific research institutes, colleges, and universities, employing 20 million people. The Machinery Industry Bureau (formerly the Ministry of Machinery Industry) is responsible for overall planning of the modernization of the industry and for determining key areas for its improvement.

At the end of 2000, China's machinery industry contributed over 5 percent of world total production and ranked fifth in the world. Considerable technological advancement has been accomplished through imports and indigenization. Advanced manufacturing methods have been widely adopted in areas such as casting, forging, welding, heat treatment, and surface protection, while microelectronic technology has been spreading along with the Computerized Integrated Manufacturing System (CIMS).

Before 1973 machinery and equipment amounted to only 2 to 5 percent of China's total exports. China remained a net importer of machinery and equipment during the period of economic reform since 1978. A trade deficit in machinery and equipment peaked close to \$30 billion in 1993 and 1994. Imports accelerated from the mid-1980s up and exports from the early 1990s. In the late 1990s, as the industry became more sophisticated and competitive, the trade deficit dropped significantly. Exports of machinery and electronics increased by an annual rate of 32.7 percent between 1985 and 1998, from \$1.68 billion to \$66.54 billion, and assumed first place among China's lead-

ing export commodities. In 2000 total trade in machinery and electronic products, dominated by information technology products, electronics, home appliances, and complete equipment for power generation and engineering, equaled \$208.2 billion, or 43.9 percent of total foreign trade volume.

Technical Capabilities Shortfall

Technical levels in many sectors of the Chinese machinery and equipment industry remain below those of the advanced economies. The tenth five-year plan (2001–2005) aims to transform China's machinery industry from a large producer (quantitatively large but technologically not the most advanced or sophisticated) to a strong producer (state-of-the-art technology), from a large importer to a large exporter, and from an equipment department of the national economy to a sector serving the needs of both the nation and the consumers.

Robert Y. Eng

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MADHYA PRADESH (2001 est. pop. 60.4 million). Madhya Pradesh is a central Indian state (named from a Hindi translation of the old British unit called Central Provinces). It is entirely landlocked, being bounded on the south by Maharashtra, on the east by Chhattisgarh, on the north by Uttar Pradesh and on the west by Gujarat. It is virtually bisected from east to west by the Narmada River. The state was formed in 1956, and its reduced area was 273,994 square kilometers in 2000, when the eastern third of the state was sliced off to create Chhattisgarh state. The landscape consists of forested hills with extensive plateaus and steep slopes. The Vindhya and the Satpura Ranges cover much of the northern and southern parts of the state, respectively. The capital is Bhopal (2001 est. pop. 1.4 million), though the largest city is Indore (2001 est. pop. 1.6 million). Although there are numerous towns, three-quarters of the inhabitants are rural. The greatest disaster in modern times in this state was the deadly gas leak on 3 December 1984, at the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal. This killed some 2,500 residents and injured another 2,000. Most survivors have received virtually no compensation.

Madhya Pradesh was a part of the Mauryan Empire in the fourth to third centuries BCE. Later it was a part of Harsha's Empire (seventh century, and then of the Delhi Sultanate (eleventh century). In 1527 the Mughal empire extended into this area when Babur conquered Chanderi; and in the later seventeenth century, a Bhopal State was formed when the Afghan chief Dost Mohammad conquered the area. In 1817 this was annexed by the East India Company, and was administered by the British until 1947.

Cultivated crops include cotton, rice, wheat, pulses, linseed and other oilseeds, castor, soybean, millet, mustard and tobacco. The diverse industries are located mostly in the western half of the state, and include electronics, aluminum, rayon, fertilizer, petrochemicals, paper, tires and tubes, industrial gases, and cables. But the state is primarily agrarian, with low productivity.

Land use in 1991 was 43.2 percent agriculture, 30.7 percent forest, and 26.1 percent other purposes. Some 93 percent of the population are Hindus, and 86 percent speak Hindi as their first language. Tourist sites of outstanding historical importance include Sanchi, Ujjain, Gwalior, Indore, and Bhopal. The state has 448 colleges but no university of major stature.

Paul Hockings

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MADRAS (2002 est. pop. 4.3 million). Now officially Chennai, Madras is a large city on the southeast coast of India. Its name came from the Arabic *madrasa*, "a religious school," but recently the ancient Tamil name of the town (*Cennai*) has been asserted by local politicians. In the early days of its European settlement, it was known as Fort St. George, in reference to the main fortification, which still stands. In 1639 territory was given to Francis Day of the East India Company by a deputy of the Raja of Chandragiri, who was the last local representative of the foundering royal house of Vijayanagar. This grant was later confirmed afresh, in 1762, by the Nawab of Arcot (Arkattu).

From a small fort built there in 1644, the town slowly expanded as it became the most important trading center in that part of India. Among the town's more notable governors were Elihu Yale (1687–1691), who gave a small grant to found the noted American university that bears his name; Thomas Pitt (1730–1735); and Sir Thomas Munro (1820–1827). This was the first

settlement of any size belonging to the East India Company, and St. Mary's Church, built in 1678–1680, was the first English church in Asia. Even older, however, is the Roman Catholic Cathedral of San Thome, built by the Portuguese in 1547 and resting place of the mortal remains of St. Thomas. But the antiquity of the town goes back even further, for St. Thomas's Mount is mentioned by Marco Polo in the thirteenth century. According to legend, the apostle was martyred on this spot while kneeling on a stone, which now forms the altar in the cathedral. The seventeenth century Parthasarathi and Kapaleshvara Temples are the two main Hindu temples within the city.

Madras is located where the Cooum and Adyar rivers empty into the Bay of Bengal. It was the capital of Madras Presidency (at first called Carnatic, then just Madras) from early in the nineteenth century. At independence the presidency disappeared as a political unit, to be replaced by Madras Province and several other states. Today Madras is the capital of Tamil Nadu State, and its approximately 6 million people make it the fourth-largest city in India. It has many industries, several universities, and a multiplicity of government offices. It is a hub for railroad and bus transportation and has an important airport. It is also a major seaport, but this too is a twentieth-century development.

Paul Hockings

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MADRASAHS A *madrasab* is an institution of higher education where advanced Islamic sciences are taught. Distinguished from *maktab*, which is an elementary school for the study of Islamic subjects, *madrasab* is the traditional equivalent of a college. The origin of *madrasab* may be traced back to early mosques in the Muslim Middle East, where clerics performed both religious and educational duties. By the early eighth century, prominent mosques evolved into complexes that provided lodging and other services for out-of-town students interested in receiving religious instruction, in addition to providing a place of worship for the believers. *Madrasabs* were financed primarily through religious endowment land, *waqf*, which provided a steady income to subsidize clerics, students, and pay for the upkeep of the mosques and other buildings within the complex. Early *madrasabs* focused entirely on the study of the Qur'an and Hadith (Sayings of the Prophet Muhammad). This grad-

ually led to the development of the discipline of Islamic jurisprudence and four prominent legal schools of interpretation within the Sunni tradition: Maleki, Shafi'i, Hanbali, and Hanafi. With the expansion of Islamic civilization beyond the Arabian Peninsula, various *madrasabs* provided religious education following one of these traditions. In addition to classical Islamic subjects (*fiqh*), *madrasabs* also offered a number of subjects in science and philosophy.

Western colonial expansion brought about a sizable decline in the status of *madrasabs* within the Muslim world, as modern education began to replace the traditional religious schools. However, the success of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the growth of Islamic fundamentalism have brought about a partial renewal of traditional Islamic education in some parts of the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia.

Mehrdad Haghayeghi

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MADURAI (2001 est. pop. 1 million). Madurai is one of the oldest cities in India—it has a demonstra-

ble history of some twenty-five hundred years. In ancient times, it was known as Mathura, as cited in the *Mahabharata*. One of the early descriptions, in the fifth-century *Silappadigaram*, is that of its fiery destruction. The city lies in south central Tamil Nadu state on the Vaigai River.

For many centuries, the city was the capital of the Pandya kingdom. The chief attraction in the city has long been the great temple of Sri Minakshi, the "fish-eyed goddess," who is associated with fertility. The temple compound also contains the even larger shrine of her consort, Sundareshvar. Much of the temple was constructed by the ruler Tirumala Nayak (1623–1660), but parts of the interior are much older and so are some of the bronze icons they contain. Although the inside of the shrines is rather dark, the outside presents a splendid view from a number of vantage points. The outer walls form a parallelogram of 258 by 222 meters, surrounded by nine massive pyramidal gateways (*gopuram*), of which the tallest is 46.3 meters high. All are elaborately decorated with hundreds of three-dimensional human figures. Perhaps the most remarkable sight within the temple is the Hall of a Thousand Pillars (actually 997 pillars), nearly all of which differ from each other.

Today, the city does a considerable trade in tea, coffee, and cardamom, all grown on the hills to the west. Local crafts include making silk cloth, woodwork items, brassware, and muslin weaving.

Paul Hockings



The Sri Minakshi Temple, c. 2000. (CHRIS LISLE/CORBIS)

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MADURESE The Madurese originate from the 5,304 square kilometer island of Madura, which is part of Indonesia's East Java province. There are about 10 million Madurese, making them the third-largest ethnic group in Indonesia after the Javanese and the Sundanese. However, more than half of the Madurese have moved to other parts of Indonesia, particularly to mainland East Java, where they have integrated with the Javanese. The harsh, arid, and unfertile land of the island of Madura, which can only be used during the rainy season, causes the migration of the Madurese to other areas. Reports show that by 1994, only about 3 million people were left in Madura. Many have also transmigrated to areas such as Kalimantan, Sumatra, and Sulawesi.

Madurese migrants in Indonesian cities are easily identified because they stay exclusively in their own areas, maintaining their language and customs. The Madurese are Muslims and are notable in their adherence to their religious leaders or *kiyai* (Islamic clerics), who also become their informal political and social leaders. The *kiyai* have an elevated status for Madurese. The fanatical supporters from East Java province of Indonesia's former cleric president, Abdurrahman Wahid, counted Madurese in their numbers.

Madurese men are protective of their women, and should their wife or girlfriend suffer an offense from another man, then the Madurese man must settle it by *carok* (a life and death duel) using a *churit* (a 30- to 40-centimeter half-circle knife). Madurese men must master *carok* as a martial art. Those who fully master this martial art are called *orang jago* and given *blater* (brave man) status. Traditional music and dances (*remo*) are regularly held in Madurese society to formally honor members of the *blater* group.

Migrant Madurese are usually small traders. In west and central Kalimantan, their presence has created difficult relations with the local people such as the Dayak, Malay, and Chinese. There have been a number of pogroms against the Madurese, including the brutal killings in 2001 in which thousands were beheaded in Central Kalimantan province after local Dayak people accused the Madurese of taking their land and of denigrating local customs and cultures.

Abubakar Eby Hara

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MAGNETISM Among the greatest Chinese contributions to physics were the discovery of magnetism and the development of the compass. Though references to magnetism in Chinese sources do not date before the third century BCE, knowledge of the phenomenon was clearly widespread by this time, and experiments were being undertaken and documented by the first century CE. There were many early lodestone devices, such as the "south-pointing spoon" of the first century CE (which may have been invented a century earlier), and there are several intriguing references to the use of magnets to make "automatic" chess boards.

But magnetism seems to have been used predominantly in geomancy until the tenth century. Geomancy, or feng shui, was concerned with regulating human dwellings in relation to those currents of the spirit of the earth that affect people. The fact that knowledge of the compass was reserved for imperial magicians greatly restricted its spread, and it seems that for many centuries the compass served only as a tool for divination. Even when the compass passed into more general use, the primacy of canal and river traffic slowed the spread of the device to ocean-going vessels. Nevertheless, there were many adaptations and improvements in the form of compasses, which culminated in their use in navigation by the eleventh century.

Two of the most critical components in the development of the compass were the use of a needle rather than a lodestone or piece of metal and the discovery of magnetic declination (the deviation between true or geographic north and the direction that a compass needle points). The magnetization of needles was an important step in the development of the compass, because needles could float or be suspended by a thread and turn with a great degree of freedom. Also, steel holds magnetization longer than iron, and it was relatively easy at an early date to make small needles of steel; such compasses with steel needles could be used on long voyages. Steel came to China from India in the fifth century, but the Chinese quickly began to produce their own supplies. There is evidence to suggest that magnetized needles were used as early as the fourth century CE, and their superiority in the construction of compasses was quickly recognized.

The discovery of declination was also relatively early, sometime between the seventh and tenth cen-

turies. While the influence of nonscientific divinatory practices was clearly prominent in the development of the compass, much research and experimentation went into magnetism from the fifth century on.

Paul Forage

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MAGSAYSAY, RAMON (1907–1957), Filipino statesman. Ramon Magsaysay was born 31 August

1907, in Iba, Zambales Province, in the Philippines. He was educated at the University of the Philippines (1927) and later transferred to the Institute of Commerce at Jose Rizal College (1928–1932), where he was awarded a degree in commerce. When World War II erupted, Magsaysay—having taken an interest in auto mechanics—joined the motor pool of the Thirty-First Infantry Division of the Philippine Army. When the Japanese overran the nation, he helped to organize the Western Luzon Guerrilla Forces. In January 1945, Magsaysay was involved in clearing the Zambales coast of the Japanese prior to the landing of American forces.

After the war, he was appointed by the U.S. Army as military governor of Zambales, and in 1946, Major



RAMON MAGSAYSAY ON PHILIPPINES FOREIGN POLICY

In the following extract from an article written in 1956 Philippine president Ramon Magsaysay set forth the basics of Philippines foreign policy that linked Philippine interests to those of the United States.

In shaping its foreign policy the Philippines is primarily moved by three considerations: . . . first, the strengthening of our national security by suppressing subversion from within and building strength against attacks from without through participation in collective security arrangements with other free nations; second, the utilization of the machinery of our foreign relations for the promotion of our foreign trade and economic cooperation in order to strengthen our domestic economy and to contribute our share to the economic development of a free world; and third, the development of our political and cultural relations with countries of the free world with particular emphasis on our relations with our Asian neighbors through our membership in the United Nations and by participation in regional conferences, such as the Manila Conference of 1954 (SEATO) and the Asian-African Conference in Bandung (1955).

In the pursuit of our objectives and in the choice of our methods our government finds itself closely associated with the United States of America. It is an association immediately dictated by our community of objectives, the most urgent of which is the defense of our freedom against Communist aggression. But our policy of close relations with the United States is not a mere artificial creation of government policy makers, and it is not dictated exclusively by the accident of common purposes. It is the product of experience in serving the national interest.

Source: Ramon Magsaysay. (1956) "Roots of Philippine Policy." *Foreign Affairs* 35 (October): 29–30.



President Ramon Magsaysay in November 1953. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

Magsaysay was discharged from the army and was elected representative of Zambales, serving until 1950. In 1950, Magsaysay condemned his own Liberal Party for being corrupt and insisted on acceding to the demands for social and political reform that had been responsible for sparking the rebellion by the Hukbalahap (Huk), a group of peasant-rebels fighting for democratic rights throughout the nation. Magsaysay was appointed secretary of national defense in 1950, and for the next three years, with American aid, he not only cleaned up military corruption, but also launched an extensive sweep to eliminate the insurgents of the Huk rebellion. Unfortunately, many labor leaders, educators, and diplomats, along with an array of innocent people, were arrested and deprived of their rights under Magsaysay's policy.

In November 1951, Magsaysay was responsible for keeping national elections clean by deploying soldiers to oversee the election process. During the Korean War, he also sent Philippine forces to fight under the U.N. command.

Ramon Magsaysay enjoyed a reputation of being energetic and honest; as a result, he was immensely

popular with the people. On 10 November 1953, having quit the Liberal Party to join the Nacionalista Party and having U.S. support, he was elected the third president of the Philippines.

Aside from quelling the Huk rebellion, Magsaysay's presidency is remembered for the signing of the Laurel-Langley Agreement, which maintained the economic submissiveness of the Philippines to U.S. monopolies, as well as for the negotiation of the Agricultural Commodities Agreement with the United States in 1957, an accord that helped keep the nation's economy locked into a colonial pattern. Magsaysay was also responsible for establishing the Anti-Subversion Law, which limited citizens' democratic rights. Finally, he was a primary player in establishing the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Ramon Magsaysay was killed in a plane crash on 17 March 1957.

Craig Loomis

See also: **Huk Rebellion**

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MAGUEY Maguey is a crop that produces fiber for use in clothing textiles, rope, and heavy matting. The Spanish introduced the New World maguey (*Agave salmiana*, also known as agave) and the pineapple to the Philippines. Although there were small plantings throughout the country, the maguey has never flourished in the Philippines. Traditionally, a number of fiber sources have been used in the home and for the handicraft industry. Maguey produces a fiber similar to that of the abaca, the latter perhaps the most significant fiber crop grown in the Philippines.

Maguey plantings are distributed throughout most Philippine provinces, especially in those regions with pronounced dry seasons, although the plant has never developed into a major export crop. The cultivation of maguey peaked in the early twentieth century, when over 50,000 acres were planted. Farms growing maguey were usually small; most of these were on Cebu, an island in the central Philippines. Since then acreage has dropped drastically; fewer than 10,000 acres were planted in the 1960s, and by 2000 production was so insignificant that maguey was no longer reported in any official economic statistics. What lit-

tle fiber the crop does yield serves the domestic market; little goes to the export trade.

Kog Yue Choong

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MAGWE DIVISION (2002 est. pop. 4.7 million). Magwe (Magway) Division, located in the central dry zone of Myanmar (Burma), has an area of 44,820 square kilometers. The town of Magwe, 530 kilometers from the national capital of Yangon (Rangoon), is its capital. The division is bordered by Mandalay Division to the east, Sagaing Division to the north, Chin State and Rakhine State to the west, and Pegu (Bago) Division to the south. Magwe's 1993 population was comprised of 3.75 million Burmans, 90,000 Chins, and 40,000 of other ethnicities.

Magwe Division is a center for the production of edible oils from the sesamum and groundnuts grown in the region; other crops are rice, maize, cotton, pulses, and tobacco. Oil was discovered in this region, and for centuries crude earth oil was extracted from shallow wells, many held by hereditary ownership and others by royalty. The Burmah Oil Company, formed in 1886, developed mechanized drilling to exploit Magwe Division's main oil fields of Yenangyaung, Chauk, and Mann (near Minbu). Until the mid-1930s, Yenangyaung was Myanmar's foremost oil field. The division's other industrial plants include cement, fertilizer and cigarette factories, and cotton textile mills. The division's main north-south transport artery is the Irrawaddy River, together with road, rail, and air links.

Patricia M. Herbert

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MAHABHARATA The monumental Sanskrit poem the *Mababharata*, attributed to the legendary poet-seer Krsna Dvaipayana Vyasa (fifth century? BCE), although perhaps not the oldest epic poem to have survived from antiquity, is certainly the longest and undoubtedly among the most influential in the world. Its complex characters and its grim and invo-

luted plot have left a profound and indelible impression on the peoples and cultures of South and Southeast Asia for at least two millennia, influencing the arts, literature, and religious, political, and social lives of many hundreds of millions of people throughout this vast region. One section of the immense text, the *Bhagavad Gita*, has come to be regarded as a seminal text of classical Hindu ethics.

The *Mababharata*, as it has come down to us in a large number of manuscripts from virtually all the regions and in virtually all the indigenous scripts of South Asia, is a lengthy epic narrative ranging (depending on the textual version) from some 100,000 to perhaps 120,000 Sanskrit couplets, although a few passages are in prose.

The Central Narrative

At its narrative heart, the poem is a political and military history recounting the origins of the ruling family (known variously as the Bharatas, the Pauravas, and the Kurus or Kauravas) of an early Indian kingdom that appears to have flourished in central northern India in the vicinity of the modern city of Delhi, probably around the beginning of the first millennium BCE.

The story involves a bitter succession struggle between rival claimants for the ancestral throne of this kingdom and culminates in a brutal and bloody civil war that leaves most of the aristocratic characters in the epic drama dead and the world of the Bharatas in ruins. The struggle originates in a complex set of displacements and disqualifications that muddy the clear stream of dynastic succession so that the sons, respectively, of a pair of royal brothers, each of whom is forced to give up his claim to the throne, are pitted against one another in increasingly implacable rivalry and enmity.

The poem casts the struggle not only in political terms but also as a conflict over dharma, righteousness itself. The protagonists of the poem, and the parties more clearly associated with dharma, are the sons of King Pandu, known as the Pandavas. Their rivals (sometimes called the Kauravas for the sake of convenience) are their first cousins, the sons of Pandu's older brother Dhritarashtra, who had to forgo sovereignty because of congenital blindness. As a consequence of a curse, Pandu cannot father children. His five heroic sons are, however, sired by a series of powerful Vedic divinities and are therefore regarded as earthly incarnations of these gods. The eldest and heir apparent to the throne, Yudhishtira, is the incarnation of the god of righteousness, Dharma. His brothers Arjuna and Bhima are the children of, respectively, the Vedic warrior and wind gods Indra and Vayu, and the two

youngest Pandavas, Nakula and Sahadeva, are the twin sons of the twin divinities, the Asvins. Their antagonists, the sons of Dhritarashtra, are led by the eldest brother, the angry and vengeful Duryodhana, who is regarded as an incarnation of a demonic being.

The two parties are rivals from childhood, and the Pandavas must endure threats, abuse, and assassination attempts by Duryodhana and his allies. At length a seeming resolution is reached when the kingdom is divided, with Duryodhana ruling in the ancestral capital of Hastinapura, and Yudhishtira, the eldest Pandava, building a fabulous new capital city at nearby Indraprastha. This device does not, however, long appease the envy and enmity of Duryodhana. He invites Yudhishtira to a rigged gambling match where he divests him of all his property, his brothers, and their common wife, the princess Draupadi. This ultimate catastrophe is averted at the last moment through the wit of Draupadi, but as a consequence of a second round of dicing, the Pandavas are forced to withdraw in exile to the forest for a period of twelve years and spend a thirteenth year incognito. They fulfill these conditions, but Duryodhana is obdurate in his refusal to share power with them. The two sides set about securing allies and preparing for battle. Complex bonds of loyalty obligate many of the epic's most powerful and venerable figures to ally themselves reluctantly with Duryodhana; the Pandavas, through the intervention of Arjuna, the foremost hero among the five brothers, manage to secure the latter's close friend and virtual alter ego, their cousin Krishna, as a noncombatant adviser and charioteer.

The long-brewing war at last breaks out, attended by massive slaughter on both sides, but at length the Pandavas, although outmatched by Duryodhana's forces, manage to achieve a Pyrrhic victory largely by adhering to the sagacious though often ethically questionable advice of Krishna. Yudhishtira reigns disconsolately over his hard-won but devastated kingdom for some years, until he and his brothers, along with their long-suffering wife Draupadi, abandon the world and trek off into the Himalayas in an attempt to enter heaven. The four younger Pandavas and Draupadi fall dead on the path, with only the supremely righteous Yudhishtira managing to enter the heavenly realm in his earthly body. Ultimately, however, all the heroes are reunited in paradise.

Cultural Significance of the Epic

This spare narrative, central though it is to the work, does scant justice to the dense layering of meaning and richness of substance that characterize the text of the epic that has come down to us. The core narrative was

used as a frame around which was attached a huge corpus of secondary texts incorporating a considerable amount of the systematized knowledge of ancient India. This takes the form of discourses and stories placed in the mouths of various characters, detailing mythological, cosmological, historical, theological, philosophical, political, social, and scientific knowledge preserved by the culture. Thus the *Mahabharata* is not merely an exciting story of treachery, intrigue, and war but a virtual encyclopedia of ancient India.

With its concentration on and magnification of the role of Krishna, who emerges in the poem as an earthly incarnation of the supreme Lord Vishnu, the poem has become one of the major early textual sources for Vaishnavism (worship of Vishnu), one of the sectarian forms of Hinduism. The triumph and salvation of the Pandavas are represented as artifacts of their (especially Arjuna's) devotion to and faith in Krishna. The *Bhagavad Gita*, a section of the epic's sixth book in which Krishna exhorts Arjuna to fight his righteous war and reveals himself as the all-loving god, became one of the central texts of Hindu devotionalism.

Although traditional Indian culture has always been cautious about the message of the *Mahabharata*, with its focus on intrafamilial conflict, the text lies close to the heart of the tradition and powerfully influenced the social, religious, political, and artistic sensibility of South and Southeast Asian peoples for two millennia or more.

Robert P. Goldman

See also: **Ramayana**

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MAHALLA The term *mahalla* is used by Uzbeks. It originated in Arabic and translates as encampment, neighborhood, or community. The term *guzar* is often used in place of *mahalla* among the Tajiks living in Uzbekistan; the term *avlod* is used by Tajiks living in Tajikistan. There are many other variants in existence throughout the Muslim world. Familiar institutions are not uncommon internationally, but they tend

to flourish more in societies that deemphasize contractual social relations. As such they are more common in Eastern societies.

The *maballa* is a social institution, providing goods and services to its constituent members, such as tables, utensils, and other practical items. A *maballa* can also be considered a small economy of sorts because of the interactive nature of its activities. Events such as weddings, funerals, birthdays, and so on are times where gifts are exchanged among participants. Whether the gift is in the form of goods, such as food, or services, such as entertainment or religious functions, there is a constant flow of material between members. This exchange of goods and services helps reinforce the members' loyalty to their community by adding a dimension of economic necessity to the familiar basis.

Today the entire population of Uzbekistan belongs to one of the more than ten thousand *maballa*. No other institution in Uzbekistan has as much influence as the *maballa*, and as such it is the definitive social, economic, and political institution of Uzbekistan. Presently the government of Uzbekistan employs the *maballa* as part of its means of maintaining power. The *maballa* is the primary site and source of state welfare assistance, with the local leader (*bokim*) having total control over who receives what and how much. In short, *maballa* are the center of Uzbek daily and economic life. They are largely based upon kinship, but that is not as strict a designation as it once was. They represent the basic administrative division of the country and the primary vehicle for the exercise of its power. The *maballa* serve as a means of surveillance and as vehicles for the construction of national identity. *Maballa* and their members are required to participate in all national festivals and cultural celebrations. The rural *maballa* have a greater degree of control over their economic fate than their urban counterparts due to their greater distance from the central power structure.

Anthony Bichel

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MAHANADI RIVER The Mahanadi River, 89 kilometers long, is known as one of the "great rivers" of India, crossing the state of Orissa and cutting through the Eastern Ghats by way of a gorge some 50

kilometers long. The Mahanadi's catchment area is estimated at 113,440 square kilometers, and in the rainy season it carries an immense amount of water, up to 51,000 cubic meters per second at the Naraj gorge. The river rises in Raipur District of Chhattisgarh, just south of Raipur city. After flowing eastward and passing the city of Cuttack (where in the rainy season it is 3 kilometers wide), the river enters the Bay of Bengal through a number of deltaic channels and two main estuaries. In the delta region is an extensive system of irrigation canals for the cultivation of rice. From July to February the river is navigable by boats for 740 kilometers from the sea.

Paul Hockings

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MAHARASHTRA (2002 est. pop. 98.6 million). Maharashtra, the third largest state of the Indian Union in terms of area and population, lies on the west coast of India facing the Arabian Sea. The state shares its boundary with Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Goa. A 720-kilometer by 80-kilometer coastal expanse called Konkan forms a continuous band along the coast. Parallel to this runs the Western Ghats mountain range, which is flanked, on its eastern side, by the fertile plateau that forms the dominant physical environment of the state. Three major rivers—Godavari, Bhima, and Krishna (Kistna)—flow through this region.

The soil of the plateau is rich and supports the extensive cultivation of cotton, sugarcane, peanut, and tobacco along with different varieties of mangoes, grapes, oranges, and bananas. The coastal region produces rice and coconuts in abundance. The state receives its rainfall mainly from the southwest monsoon which is very active in the coastal belt, but loses its vigor once it approaches the central parts.

Maharashtra's early history stretches from the time of the Mauryan empire in the third century BCE to the reign of the Yadavas in the thirteenth century. The high point of this history comes with the rise of Sivaji in the seventeenth century, who succeeded in establishing an independent Maratha kingdom despite repeated Muslim attacks. Sivaji's successors ruled the territory with occasional reverses till the British took control of the region in early nineteenth century. At the time of independence the state was part of the

Bombay presidency under the British. It got its present identity on 1 May 1960 when all the Marathi-speaking areas from neighboring states were united to form Maharashtra. The state has thirty-three administrative districts and has a bicameral legislature. It has a representation of nineteen members in the Upper House (Rajya Sabha) and forty-eight members in the Lower House (Lok Sabha) of the Indian Parliament.

More than 60 percent of the people in Maharashtra depend on agriculture for a living. In addition to a thriving agricultural sector, Maharashtra has a well-developed industrial base. Because of its convenient location as the link between northern and southern India, it functions as a bridgehead of financial and commercial activities. Mumbai (Bombay), the capital of Maharashtra, is the business capital of India and the largest stock exchange in the country. It has a big textiles market and a busy port. Many small and medium industries have grown around the city and it showcases products from all over India. Food products, breweries, tobacco and related products, textiles, plasticware, petroleum and coal products, paper, rubber, basic chemicals and chemical products, and crude oil are some of the items manufactured and marketed from Maharashtra. Major corporate houses in India are Mumbai-based. The city is also well known for its film industry, which is the chief source of the popular Hindi cinema.

Ram Shankar Nanda

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MAHATHIR MOHAMAD (b. 1925), prime minister of Malaysia. Mahathir Bin Mohamad has significantly shaped his country's political landscape while also serving as an unofficial spokesman for the so-called Third World. Throughout his career, Mahathir has been an outspoken critic of the industrialized nations' foreign policies directed at developing nations, while espousing the virtue of Asian morals.

Mahathir was born in Alor Setar, capital of the state of Kedah in northern Malaysia. The youngest of nine children, he grew up in a stable, financially secure family, and his father held a prestigious position as schoolmaster of an English language school. He studied medicine, but his passion was politics. He joined the dominant United Malays National Organization (UMNO) party and aligned himself with the majority



Prime Minister Mahathir Bin Mohamad in Kuala Lumpur in October 2001. (AFP/CORBIS)

Malay population's needs. His book *The Malay Dilemma*, published in Singapore in 1970, which criticized the then-current Malay government, promoted a strident Malay nationalism and articulated his ideological beliefs. In the *Malay Dilemma*, Mahathir asserted that Malays were the indigenous people of Malaysia and demanded a policy of affirmative action to elevate their economic status to a level equal with the Chinese-Malaysians. At the same time, Mahathir also criticized certain Malay cultural traits and presented a theory steeped in Social Darwinism to explain the Malays' economic backwardness. Mahathir's open letter to Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman in 1969 led to his expulsion from UMNO, but by 1972 he was reinstated.

After 1972, Mahathir's political star rose rapidly. Tun Abdul Razak, the second prime minister, appointed him to a cabinet position in 1974, and he became deputy prime minister in 1976 under the third prime minister, Hussein Onn. By 1981, Mahathir had himself become prime minister. During the 1980s, Mahathir consolidated his power and became more

authoritarian by successfully staving off political opponents through arrests and detention. He also eliminated the supreme court as a source of opposition, first by altering the constitution to weaken the court's power of review and then by forcing the resignation of several high-ranking members. In the 1990s, Mahathir promoted his economic plan, *The Way Forward* or *Vision 2020*, which proclaims that Malaysia will rank as a fully developed nation by the year 2020. Mahathir's *Vision* proposed a difficult economic growth rate that Malaysia has not been able to maintain. Nevertheless, Malaysia has prospered under Mahathir and the country's economic prospects remain solid.

Allen Reichert

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MAHMUD OF GHAZNA (971?–1030), Afghan conqueror and emperor. Mahmud of Ghazna was an emperor during the Ghaznavid dynasty (977–1187) in Afghanistan. It was during his reign that the Ghaznavid dynasty amassed its greatest wealth and territory. The son of a Turkish slave who fled to Ghazni after a failed revolt against his masters, Mahmud rose to power by defeating his elder brother for control of Afghanistan and the Khorasan region of Iran. Using his military expertise, Mahmud extended his territory to the west and north of Afghanistan, as well as to the Punjab region. Mahmud led several raids into India, ransacking temples and converting the natives to Islam. With the wealth gained from his pillaging, he transformed his capital, Ghazni, into a cultural center, establishing universities and supporting scholars and poets; the well-known historians Al Biruni and Al Utbi, as well as the great poet Firdawsi (c. 935–c. 1020) were in residence at Ghazni. A devout Muslim, Muhammad also built a grand mosque. Mahmud died in 1130, after which the empire began a downward spiral until its dissolution in 1186.

Houman A. Sadri

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MAHMUD SHAH (d. 1528), sultan of Melaka. The sudden death of Sultan Alauddin Riayat Shah (reigned 1477–1488) led to the installation of Mahmud Shah, his younger son and a nephew of the influential *bendahara* (prime minister) Tun Perak, who sought to perpetuate his dominance in the royal court by promoting the more pliant of the late sultan's sons.

Mahmud (reigned 1488–1511) was neither an able nor a forceful ruler. Philandering, obstinate, and impulsive, he left the affairs of state to Tun Perak and other ministers. Mahmud's ineptness notwithstanding, Melaka remained at the peak of its power, wealth, and prestige at the beginning of the sixteenth century, which attracted the covetous attention of the Portuguese.

In facing the Portuguese challenge, Melaka lacked strong leadership and mass support. Malay-Tamil rivalry resurfaced in court with the appointment of Tun Mutahir as *bendahara* in 1500, and intrigues and conspiracies led to his execution. The foreign mercantile community that dominated Melaka's trade and commerce—and hence its wealth—followed only its self-serving economic interests. The Melakan aristocracy shared in this wealth but little trickled down to the common people.

Despite a gallant defense by Mahmud and his son Ahmad, Melaka fell to the Portuguese in August 1511. Mahmud fled, initially to Muar, then to Pahang, and finally to Bintan in 1513. Between 1515 and 1524 he launched five campaigns to recapture Melaka but failed. He died in Kampar in 1528. His surviving sons, Muzaffar and Alauddin, established the Perak sultanate and the Johor-Riau empire, respectively.

Ooi Keat Gin

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MAILIN, BEIIMBET (1894–1938), Kazakh writer. Beiimbet Mailin was not only a writer but also a poet, a dramatist, and an educator in Soviet Kazakhstan. Born in the Kustanay region (now Qostanay) of Kazakhstan to a family of poor nomads, Beiimbet Mailin began his education in local religious schools when he was seven years old. In 1913 he started teaching at the local *madrasah* (seminary) in his native village. The same year he published his first poem, *Musylmandyq belgisi* (Notes of a Muslim) and continued to teach in various *madrasahs* and in the Russian-Kazak school in Kustanay. Following the 1917 Russian Revolution he was active in the Kazakh political party *Alash Orda*. After the Bolshevik victory in the Russian Civil War, he published his first full collection of poetry in 1923, and in 1926 he became the editor of *Qazaq Adebieti* (Kazakh Literature). During the 1920s and 1930s, he published some of his best-known works, including *Kommunistka Raushan* (The Communist Raushan) and the screenplay *Amangel'dy* (For the Noted Kazak Warrior). Between 1933 and 1936 his collected works were published in four volumes.

In 1938 he was arrested during the Stalinist purges and executed. His work was rediscovered in 1957, and a new six-volume edition of his collected works appeared between 1960 and 1964.

Steven Sabol

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MAJAPAHIT Majapahit was the last medieval Hindu-Javanese empire to wield much influence in Southeast Asia. When emissaries from Mongol China appeared at Singhasari in 1289, the great warrior-king Kertanagara promptly arrested and expelled them. This provoked a punitive Chinese expedition to eastern Java in 1292; it arrived to find that Kertanagara had been killed in an uprising engineered by a prince of the displaced house of Kadiri. Kertanagara's son Vijaya was forced to flee to a village on the Brantas River named Majapahit (bitter fruit). Vijaya enlisted the support of the newly arrived Chinese forces to drive the Kadiri usurper out of Singhasari and recover the throne. He then compelled his Chinese supporters to withdraw and depart homeward.

The village of Majapahit became Vijaya's new capital. Gajah Mada was appointed prime minister in 1331, and under his direction Majapahit filled the political vacuum left by the fall of the Srivijaya empire and the dissolution of its temporary successor, Singhasari. As early as 1365, Majapahit could claim domination over most of Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula. Its hold on the latter extended as far north as Kedah, Langkasuka, and Pantai. Majapahit's influence extended to much of what now comprises Indonesia, extending to territories on the south and west coasts of Borneo, and to southern Celebes and the Moluccas. Some even claim that Majapahit power was felt as far away as the Indo-Chinese peninsula, in Siam, Cambodia, and Annam, though this is doubtful. The infiltration of Islam from the Straits of Malacca into the Southeast Asian archipelago gradually undermined the influence of Majapahit. In 1478 the Muslim coastal state of Demak invaded Majapahit itself, and by the late fifteenth century Majapahit was reduced to little more than an eastern Javanese state with a glorious past.

Kog Yue Choong

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MAK YONG If "feminism" had been a term in the Malay court four hundred years ago, Mak Yong would have been seen as a feminist dance drama. This is because, except for the comedians, all parts were played (and still are today) by young women. The dance drama was meant for entertaining female royalty (queens and princesses) in the absence of their men when the latter were away at war. The "female space" was necessary to protect these women from falling into disgrace because their concerned husbands and fathers feared that they might commit immoral activities with male performers in their absence. The presence of women only was necessary to safeguard aristocratic honor. The women were free to do and say what they wanted without being conscious of male presence.

The dance originated in Patani (south Thailand) and spread southward into Kelantan in Malaysia. Mak Yong, originally performed as soul worshipping of ancestors, combines elements of romantic drama, dance, and operatic singing. There are no written texts, and hence no two performances are ever the same. The mu-

sic that accompanies the dance is played on a *rebab* (bowed lute), *tawak-tawak* (two hanging gongs), and *gendang* (two double-headed drums). There is a marked Middle Eastern flavor in the combination of a solo voice, a chorus, and musical instruments in Mak Yong.

A *parwang* (shaman) initiates the rituals of stage opening prior to a performance. The stories performed are from the old Malay tales, all of which are original and date back to the golden age of the Malay kingdoms of great culture and power. In the past, Mak Yong was a court entertainment, and the Malay Palace was the patron. Mak Yong would be performed four or five times a week at the royal residence. Today, Mak Yong has become a traditional drama for the common people.

Nor Faridah Abdul Manaf

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MAKHAMBET UTEMISOV (1804–1846), Kazakh poet. Makhambet Utemisov (Maxambet Otemisuly) was a distinguished Kazakh poet and political activist. He is remembered for his leading part in the insurrection of the Kazakhs against the oppressive rule of the khan of the Inner Horde, Zhangir, as well as against Russian colonialism, in 1836–1837. The rebellion was crushed, and Makhambet had to flee with a price on his head. He was murdered in 1846.

Although Makhambet was sent to a Russian school in Orenburg, where he learned to read and write, his poetry stands in the tradition of oral Kazakh poetry. More than fifty poems attributed to him have been transmitted, some in writing, some orally. The first publication of one of his poems dates from 1908. Most of Makhambet's poems have a political and moral message, often protesting the unjustness of the khan's rule. In one directed against Khan Zhangir, Makhambet calls the khan a wolf, a snake, and a scorpion. A number of poems are of a warlike and heroic nature, some addressed to his companion-in-arms Isatay Taymanov. Makhambet also composed meditative poems (termed *tolghau* in Kazakh), on themes such as the decay of morals or the transience of human life.

Karl Reichl

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MAKLI HILL One of the largest necropolises in the world, with a diameter of approximately 8 kilometers, Makli Hill is supposed to be the burial place of some 125,000 Sufi saints. It is located on the outskirts of Thatta, the capital of lower Sind until the seventeenth century, in what is the southeastern province of present-day Pakistan. Legends abound about its inception, but it is generally believed that the cemetery grew around the shrine of the fourteenth-century Sufi Hamad Jamali. The tombs and gravestones spread over the cemetery are material documents marking the social and political history of Sind.

Imperial mausoleums are divided into two major groups, those from the Samma (1352–1520) and Tarkhan (1556–1592) periods. The tomb of the Samma king, Jam Nizam al-Din (reigned 1461–1509), is an impressive square structure built of sandstone and decorated with floral and geometric medallions. Similar to this is the mausoleum of Isa Khan Tarkhan II (d. 1651), a two-story stone building with majestic cupolas and balconies. In contrast to the syncretic architecture of these two monuments, which integrate Hindu and Islamic motifs, are mausoleums that clearly show the Central Asian roots of the later dynasty. An example is the tomb of Jan Beg Tarkhan (d. 1600), a typical octagonal brick structure whose dome is covered in blue and turquoise glazed tiles. Today, Makli Hill is a United Nations World Heritage Site that is visited by both pilgrims and tourists.

Kishwar Rizvi

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MALAY STATES, UNFEDERATED Located on the Malay Peninsula in Southeast Asia, the Unfederated Malay States (UMS), were Johor, Kedah, Perlis,

Kelantan, and Terengganu. The main difference between the five UMS and the four Federated Malay States (FMS) was that British control was somewhat looser in the unfederated states. While British influence extended to all of the nine Malay states, which were ruled by sultans, internal government remained largely under the control of the traditional rulers. In each state, a British adviser was responsible to the British high commissioner. The four northern states of the UMS (except for Johor) were originally under the sphere of influence of Siam (now Thailand) and were among the poorest on the peninsula. In 1909, the king of Siam signed a treaty transferring the states to British control, but the sultans refused to join the FSM for fear of losing their de facto executive power; hence they maintained a modicum of independence. Johor also remained outside the FMS because its sultan, Abu Bakar, insisted on remaining independent.

The Union of Malaya, composed of the nine states of the USM and the FSM, was set up in 1946 and became the Federation of Malaya in 1948. In 1957, it achieved independence from Britain and joined the commonwealth. The next year, the name was changed to the Federation of Malaysia.

Ho Khai Leong

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MALAY SULTANATE. See **Melaka Sultanate**.

MALAYAN EMERGENCY The Malayan Emergency was a reaction, through legal regulations, to counter the guerrilla war initiated by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), led by Chin Peng, the party's secretary general, against the British Commonwealth administration and Malay forces. The war lasted from 1948 to 1960. The decision to undertake a guerrilla war was made by the MCP in response to British proposals for the Malayan Union Constitution and the 1948 Federation of Malaya agreement, which the MCP feared would put in place a strong anticommunist central government.

Political events elsewhere, such as Mao Zedong's guerrilla tactics against Chiang Kai-shek's forces in China, Indonesia's war with the Dutch government to gain independence, and the beginning of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States, prompted the MCP to openly revolt against the British

in order to achieve independence and establish a communist Malaya. The MCP began attacking and terrorizing plantation workers and isolated estates, derailing trains, and burning workers' houses and buses. The Communists were jungle based and supported by the Chinese population, who lived mainly in cities and at the fringes of jungles. An underground organization called Min Yuen acted as a spy network and provided supplies, food, and information to the Communists.

A state of emergency was declared in parts of the states of Perak and Johore on 18 June 1948 by High Commissioner Sir Edward Gent after three British planters were found murdered in Sungai Siput, Perak. By 23 June, the whole country was in a state of emergency. The MCP, which had been legalized by the British at the end of World War II, was banned. The British also tried to thwart the Communists by establishing a national registration system. Those people without an identification card were considered illegal and were seen as Communist sympathizers. Furthermore, under the Briggs Plan (named for Sir Harold Briggs, a retired general appointed to coordinate and direct military and civilian operations during the emergency) to cut off interaction between the Min Yuen and the Chinese population of Malaya, the British resettled nearly 500,000 Chinese squatters from outlying areas to newly created and protected villages. This deprived the Communists of their supplies and information from the Chinese population. More important, the British used psychological warfare to win the "hearts and minds" of the population by seeking to unite the racially divided Malayan people to fight the Communist insurrection.

Other drastic measures taken by the British eventually cut off supplies and support to the Communists, who were trapped in the jungle and constantly hunted by British special forces. The Communists failed largely because of lack of support from the majority Malay community, who opposed the MCP due to its predominantly Chinese-based support. Eventually, the MCP tried to negotiate for peace at the Baling Talks of 1955, but the talks broke down because Chin Peng refused to dissolve the MCP. The MCP finally lost its struggle when Malaya was granted independence in 1957. The newly formed Malayan government declared the end of the emergency on 31 July 1960. The MCP surrendered on 2 December 1989 to the Malaysian government and agreed to terminate all activities.

Geetha Govindasamy

See also: **Malayan Union**

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MALAYAN PEOPLE'S ANTI-JAPANESE ARMY

The Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) was a guerrilla army that was part of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). When Japan attacked Malaya in 1941, the MPAJA was the foremost local force carrying out guerrilla attacks against the Japanese. Because the Chinese population was harshly treated during the Japanese occupation of Malaya, the MPAJA membership consisted mostly of Chinese who were anti-Japanese. From 1942 onward, following their defeat in Singapore by the Japanese, the British forces in Malaya collaborated with the MCP by providing supplies and personnel with two objectives in mind: to train and equip the MPAJA to fight the Japanese and to prepare for an eventual Allied invasion of Malaya.

Even though the MPAJA was unsuccessful in driving the Japanese out of Malaya, it gained invaluable experience in guerrilla warfare and established a basis for future resistance against the British during the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), a successful British counter, through civil, police, and military programs, to Communist insurrections. As part of the support network for independence, the fighters developed links with the rural communities on the fringes of the jungle. The MPAJA also constructed bases and hideouts in the jungle and accumulated a large quantity of weapons. When the war ended in 1945, the Japanese surrendered, and an Allied invasion of Malaya became unnecessary. In the same year, the MPAJA guerrilla fighters emerged from the jungle, and the British who returned to Malaya legalized the MCP. Unfortunately, MPAJA links with the rural community, as well as the training and weapons provided by the British, proved valuable to the MCP in fighting the British during the Malayan Emergency.

Geetha Govindasamy

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MALAYAN UNION Prior to World War II, Malaya (now Malaysia) comprised three different administrative governments: the Federated Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Pahang, and Negeri Sembilan), the Unfederated Malay States (Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, Terengganu, and Johor), and the Straits Settlements (Melaka, Penang, and Singapore). During the Japanese occupation of Malaya, British authorities prepared a plan proposing a centralized government comprising these peninsular possessions, to be known as the Malayan Union.

The official arrangement of the Malayan Union was announced in a 1946 White Paper. Under this new system the Federated and Unfederated Malay States, and Melaka and Penang, were to be centralized under a British governor. Singapore, however, because of its strategic location, rapid economic development, and large Chinese population, was to remain a separate British colony. The centralized government was to consist of a governor, a legislature, and an executive board. The position of the Malay sultans would remain, although their sovereignty would be ceded by the British. Citizenship under the scheme offered equality of rights to all irrespective of race or creed, and also allowed dual citizenship.

The plan received widespread criticism and opposition from the Malays, the sultans, and also British officers who had served in Malaya, including Frank Swettenham and Sir George Maxwell. The Malays were reluctant to share their rights and political power with other peoples, namely the Chinese and the Indians. The sultans were dissatisfied with the way Sir Harold MacMichael, the British officer in charge, handled the negotiations: the sultans were coerced, threatened, and blackmailed.

As a result of this opposition about two hundred Malays representing forty-one associations gathered in Kuala Lumpur and formed the United Malays National Organization to protest the proposed Malayan Union. As a result of their efforts and criticism at

home the British government decided to scrap the proposal, replacing it with a milder plan to form the Federation of Malaya. The new proposal was seen as more palatable because citizenship is given to immigrants who have stayed more than ten years in Malaya. Apart from that, the sultans remain as leaders of Islam and Malay society.

Mala Selvaraju

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MALAY-INDONESIAN LANGUAGE The national languages of Malaysia and Indonesia—Bahasa Malaysia and Bahasa Indonesia, respectively—are the Malay language as spoken in those countries; Malay is also spoken in Singapore and parts of the Philippines. In both Malaysia and Indonesia, knowledge of the language is necessary for gaining citizenship.

According to historical records, the rulers of the Srivijaya empire in Malaya used and popularized the Malay language in the seventh century, and it has remained the most important language of the archipelago ever since. Bahasa Malaysia and Bahasa Indonesia share common words, idioms, and roots, and both belong to the Western Malayo-Polynesian branch of Austronesian or Malayo-Polynesian, one of the world's largest language families. The Malay language is phonetic in character, with few prefixes and suffixes for verbs and nouns. It does not have gender, person, number, or tense, and verbs are not conditioned on the basis of conjugation, declension, or tense. Bahasa Malaysia and Bahasa Indonesia have been written with a common reformed spelling system since 1972.

Bahasa Malaysia

Malay as spoken in Malaysia—Bahasa Malaysia—is the national language and an important element in promoting nationalism and intracommunal harmony. Knowledge of the Malay language is essential for becoming a Malaysian citizen, and it is now the sole official language of the country. According to a census taken in 2000, in the total population of 22.3 million, Malays made up 66.1 percent, Chinese 25.3 percent, and Indians 7.4 percent. The Malaysian territories are more homogeneous than Indonesia, and Malay is used throughout the country. Although a significant number of Chinese and Indians speak other languages such

as Hakka, Mandarin Chinese, and Tamil, they have increasingly learned Bahasa Malaysia. The government of Malaysia has promoted English as a second language, and it is widely used in business and academic circles.

Britain, which ruled over the country as a colonial power, was more benevolent toward the Malays than were the Dutch toward Indonesians. The first Malay printing press was established in Malaya in 1848, and it published several works in Malay: autobiographies, studies of folk traditions, poetry, court chronicles, epics, the Qu'ran, other Islamic texts, and legal digests.

There was a resurgence of Malay nationalism during the Japanese occupation (1941–1945), when various publications in the Malay language awakened Malaysians to their subjugation and repression. Although some Malay authors of the era at first supported the Japanese occupation, they changed their emphasis after the end of the war and in 1948 founded an association, The Generation of 50, to promote the Malay language. The publication of essays, short stories, and novels analyzing issues of social concern were given prime importance at this time.

When the Federated Malay States became independent in 1957 and subsequently when the Federation of Malaysia emerged in 1963, the government declared Bahasa Malaysia the sole official language. This language is understood and spoken in all parts of the country, and no party or political group of significance questions its status in the national polity.

Bahasa Indonesia

In addition to Malay, more than 250 other languages or dialects are spoken in Indonesia; these include Acehnese, Batak, Sundanese, Javanese, Sasak, Tetum of Timor, Dayak, Minahasa, Toraja, Buginese, Halmahera, Ambonese, and Ceramese, all of which were influenced by Malay. Their vocabularies and idioms, like those of Bahasa Indonesia, have indigenized a number of words from Sanskrit, Arabic, Persian, Portuguese, Dutch, and English. The speakers of all these languages use Bahasa Indonesia as their lingua franca.

Bahasa Indonesia was systematized and organized in the twentieth century. At a youth congress held in Jakarta, Indonesia, in 1928, delegates pledged to promote Malay and to nurture it as their national language. Several political parties supported this resolution, and thereafter this language became the common medium for spreading revolutionary struggle.

The Japanese occupation actually fostered the acceptance of the Indonesian language. The conquerors banned the use of the Dutch language and ordered the

arrest of anyone speaking Dutch. The textbooks for primary and secondary education, which had previously been written exclusively in Dutch, were translated into Bahasa Indonesia. The Japanese thought that the use of the Indonesian language in schools and official proceedings would promote anti-Dutch sentiments and would aid in the eventual acceptance of the Japanese language. But the policy of replacing the Dutch language with Japanese was never carried out.

With Japanese support, scholars of the era established the Komisi Bahasa Indonesia (Commission for Indonesian Languages), which systematized the Indonesian language and published a literary magazine highlighting linguistic, cultural, and political issues. The commission simplified the spelling of words borrowed from Sanskrit, Arabic, Dutch, and English, which were pronounced and spelled differently in different parts of Indonesia.

Article 36 of the 1945 constitution of Indonesia declared Bahasa Indonesia the language of the state, although in 1959 President Sukarno (1901–1970) explained that areas of Indonesia possessing languages of their own were entitled to use them as well. Both

Presidents Sukarno and Suharto (b. 1921) nurtured the development of Bahasa Indonesia at the literary, academic, and official levels, not only as the language of Indonesians but as a bond to forge solidarity and kinship with the Malay world.

According to a 1990 census by the Central Bureau of Statistics, the use of Bahasa Indonesia falls into three categories: 15 percent use it for daily communication, 68 percent can speak it but do not use it every day, and 17 percent cannot understand it. The Indonesian government has set 2010 as the year in which all Indonesians will understand Bahasa Indonesia.

Ganganath Jha

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Volume 4
Malaysia to Portuguese in Southeast Asia

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Survey of Asia's Regions and Nations



The *Encyclopedia of Modern Asia* covers thirty-three nations in depth and also the Caucasus and Siberia. We have divided Asia into five major subregions and assigned the thirty-three nations to each.

West and Southwest Asia

The West Asian nations covered in detail here are Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. Afghanistan and Pakistan form Southwest Asia, although in some classifications they are placed in Central and South Asia, respectively. Afghanistan, on the crossroads of civilizations for thousands of years, is especially difficult to classify and displays features typical of Central, West, and South Asia.

Despite diversity in language (Persian in Iran, Arabic in Iraq, Turkish in Turkey) form of government (theocracy in Iran, dictatorship in Iraq, and unstable democracy in Turkey) and international ties (Iran to the Islamic world, Iraq to the Arab Middle East, Turkey to the West), there are several sources of unity across West Asia. Perhaps the oldest is geographical location as the site of transportation routes between Europe and Central, East, and South Asia. Since ancient times, people, goods, wealth, and ideas have flowed across the region. In 2002 the flow of oil was most important, from the wells of Iran and Iraq through the pipelines of Turkey. Another source of unity is Sunni Islam, a major feature of life since the seventh century, although Iran is mainly the minority Shi'a tradition and there have long been Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian, and Baha'i minorities in the region. Diversity is also evident in the fact that Turkey is a "secular" state while Iran is a theocracy, and in the conflict between fundamentalist and mainstream Islam in all the nations.

Another important common thread is the shared historical experience of being part of the Ottoman Empire and having to cope with British and Russian designs on their territory and, more recently, American influence. And, in the twentieth century, all three nations have sought to deal with the Kurdish minority and its demands for a Kurdish state to be established on land taken from all three nations.

Unity across Afghanistan and Pakistan is created by adherence to Sunni Islam (although there is a Shi'ite minority in Afghanistan) and the prominence of the Pash-tun ethnic group in each nation. Both nations also experienced British colonialism, although the long-term British influence is more notable in Pakistan, which had been

tied to India under British rule. West Asia is the only region in the world never colonized by Britain, although some experts argue that it did experience significant British cultural influence. In all nations resistance to external control—British, Russian, or United States—is another common historical experience.

Across the region (although less so in Afghanistan) is the stark contrast between the traditional culture and the modernity of liberation from imperial rule, still not complete across the region. This contrast is apparent in clothing styles, manners, architecture, recreation, marriage practices, and many elements of daily life.

In 2002 all the nations faced a water crisis of both too little water and water pollution. They all also faced issues of economic and social development, including reducing external debt, controlling inflation, reducing unemployment, improving education and health care, and continually reacting to the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, which exacerbates many of these problems. The governments also faced the difficult task of solving these problems while resisting Americanization and also while controlling internal political unrest. Political unrest is often tied to efforts at creating democratic governments and the persistence of elite collaboration with tyrannical governments.

Central Asia

Central Asia is known by many names, including Eurasia, Middle Asia, and Inner Asia. At its core, the region is composed of five states that became independent nations following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Scholars sometimes include Afghanistan, Mongolia and the Xinjiang province of China within the label Central Asia. For this project, Central Asia is restricted to the five former Soviet countries, while Afghanistan is classified in Southwest Asia, and Mongolia and Xinjiang as part of East Asia. These states have a shared landmass of 1.5 million square miles, about one-half the size of the United States.

The region's unity comes from a shared history and religion. Central Asia saw two cultural and economic traditions blossom and intermix along the famed Silk Road: nomadic and sedentary. Nomadic herdsman, organized into kinship groupings of clans, lived beside sedentary farmers and oasis city dwellers. Four of the countries share Turkic roots, while the Tajiks are of Indo-European descent, linguistically related to the Iranians. While still recognizable today, this shared heritage has developed into distinct ethnic communities.

The peoples of Central Asia have seen centuries of invasion, notably the legendary Mongol leader Genghis Khan in the thirteenth century, the Russians in the nineteenth and the Soviets in the twentieth century. For better or worse, each invader left behind markers of their presence: the Arabs introduced Islam in the seventh century. Today Islam is the predominant religion in the region, and most Central Asians are Sunni Muslims. The Russians brought the mixed legacy of modernism, including an educated populace, alarming infant mortality rates, strong economic and political participation by women, high agricultural development, and environmental disasters such as the shrinking of the Aral Sea. It was under Russian colonialism that distinct ethno-national boundaries were created to divide the people of the region. These divisions largely shape the contemporary Central Asian landscape.

Today the five Central Asian nations face similar challenges: building robust economies, developing stable, democratic governments, and integrating themselves into the regional and international communities as independent states. They come to these challenges with varied resources: Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have rich oil reserves; several countries have extensive mineral deposits; and the Fergana Valley is but one example of the region's rich agricultural regions.

Finally, the tragic events of September 11, 2001, cast world attention on Afghanistan's neighbors in Central Asia. The "war on terrorism" forged new alliances and offered a mix of political pressure and economic support for the nations' leaders to suppress their countries' internal fundamentalist Muslim movements.

Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia is conventionally defined as that subregion of Asia consisting of the eleven nation-states of Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Myanmar is sometimes alternatively classified as part of South Asia and Vietnam as in East Asia. The region may be subdivided into Mainland Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam) and Insular Southeast Asia (Brunei, East Timor, Indonesia, Philippines, and Singapore). Malaysia is the one nation in the region that is located both on the mainland and islands, though ethnically it is more linked to the island nations of Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines.

Perhaps the key defining features for the region and those that are most widespread are the tropical monsoon climate, rich natural resources, and a way of life in rural areas based on cooperative wet-rice agriculture that goes back several thousand years. In the past unity was also created in various places by major civilizations, including those of Funan, Angkor, Pagan, Sukhothai, Majapahit, Srivijaya, Champa, Ayutthaya, and Melaka. Monarchies continue to be significant in several nation—Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand—today. Subregional unity has also been created since ancient times by the continued use of written languages, including Vietnamese, Thai, Lao, Khmer and the rich literary traditions associated with those languages.

The region can also be defined as being located between China and India and has been influenced by both, with Indian influence generally broader, deeper, and longer lasting, especially on the mainland, except for Vietnam and Singapore, where influences from China have been more important. Islamic influence is also present in all eleven of the Southeast Asian nations. Culturally, Southeast Asia is notable for the central importance of the family, religion (mainly Buddhism and Islam), and aesthetics in daily life and national consciousness.

In the post–World War II Cold War era, there was a lack of regional unity. Some nations, such as Indonesia under Sukarno, were leaders of the nonaligned nations. Countries such as Thailand and the Philippines joined the U.S. side in the Cold War by being part of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). A move toward greater unity was achieved with the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, with the founding members being Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Subsequently other Southeast Asian nations joined ASEAN (Brunei, 1984; Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam 1997; Cambodia 1999). As of 2002, communism was still the system in Laos and Vietnam and capitalism in Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, the Philippines Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Political, economic, and cultural cooperation is fostered by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), with headquarters in Jakarta, Indonesia. Economically, all the nations have attempted to move, although at different speeds and with different results, from a reliance on agriculture to an industrial or service-based economy. All nations also suffered in the Asian economic crisis beginning in July 1997.

Alongside these sources of similarity or unity that allow us to speak of Southeast Asia as a region is also considerable diversity. In the past religion, ethnicity, and diverse colonial experience (British, Dutch, French, American) were major sources of diversity. Today, the three major sources of diversity are religion, form of government, and level of economic development. Three nations (Indonesia, Malaysia,

Brunei) are predominately Islamic, five are mainly Buddhist (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar), two are mainly Christian (Philippines and East Timor), and Singapore is religiously heterogeneous. In addition, there is religious diversity within nations, as all these nations have sizeable and visible religious minorities and indigenous religions, in both traditional and syncretic forms, also remain important.

In terms of government, there is considerable variation: communism in Vietnam and Laos; state socialism in Myanmar; absolute monarchy in Brunei; evolving democracy in the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, and Indonesia; and authoritarian democracy in Malaysia and Singapore. The economic variation that exists among the nations and also across regions within nations is reflected in different levels of urbanization and economic development, with Singapore and Malaysia at one end of the spectrum and Laos and Cambodia at the other. Myanmar is economically underdeveloped, although it is urbanized, while Brunei is one of the wealthiest nations in the world but not very urbanized.

In 2002, Southeast Asia faced major environmental, political, economic, and health issues. All Southeast Asian nations suffer from serious environmental degradation, including water pollution, soil erosion, air pollution in and around cities, traffic congestion, and species extinctions. To a significant extent all these problems are the result of rapid industrial expansion and overexploitation of natural resources for international trade. The economic crisis has hampered efforts to address these issues and has threatened the economies of some nations, making them more dependent on international loans and assistance from nations such as Japan, Australia, and China. The persisting economic disparities between the rich and the poor are actually exacerbated by rapid economic growth. Related to poverty is the AIDS epidemic, which is especially serious in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Thailand and becoming more serious in Vietnam; in all these nations it associated with the commercial sex industry.

Politically, many Southeast Asian nations faced one or more threats to their stability. Political corruption, lack of transparency, and weak civic institutions are a problem to varying degrees in all the nations but are most severe in Indonesia, which faces threats to its sovereignty. Cambodia and Thailand face problems involving monarch succession, and several nations have had difficulty finding effective leaders. Myanmar's authoritarian rulers face a continual threat from the political opposition and from ethnic and religious separatists.

In addition, several nations faced continuing religious or ethnic-based conflicts that disrupt political stability and economic growth in some provinces. The major conflicts involve Muslim separatists in the southern Philippines, Muslims and Christians in some Indonesian islands and Aceh separatists in northern Sumatra, and Muslims and the Karen and other ethnic groups against the Burman government in Myanmar. Since the economic crisis of 1997, ethnic and religion-based conflict has intensified, as wealthier ethnic or religious minorities have increasingly been attacked by members of the dominant ethnic group. A related issue is the cultural and political future of indigenous peoples, including the so-called hill tribes of the mainland and horticulturalists and former hunter-gatherers of the islands.

In looking to the future, among the region's positive features are the following. First, there is Southeast Asia's strategic location between India and China, between Japan and Europe, and between Europe and Oceania. It stands in close proximity to the world's two most populous countries, China and India. Singapore, the centrally located port in Southeast Asia, is one of two major gateways to the dynamic Pacific Basin (the other is the Panama Canal). Second, there is the region's huge population and related economic market, with a total population approaching that of one half of China's. Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous nation. Third, there is enor-

mous tourist potential in sites and recreational locales such as Angkor Wat, Bali, Borobudur, Phuket, and Ha Long Bay. Fourth, there is the region's notable eclecticism in borrowing from the outside and resiliency in transcending tragedies such as experienced by Cambodia and Vietnam. Fifth, there is the region's significant economic potential: Southeast Asia may well have the world's highest-quality labor force relative to cost. And, sixth, there is the region's openness to new technologies and ideas, an important feature in the modern global community.

South Asia

South Asia is the easiest region to demarcate, as it is bounded by the Hindu Kush and Himalayan ranges to the north and the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea to the south. It contains the nation-states of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka and the more distant island nations of the Maldives and Mauritius. Myanmar and Pakistan, which are considered part of South Asia in some schemes, are here classified in Southeast Asia and Southwest Asia, respectively.

While the region is diverse economically, culturally, linguistically, and religiously, there is unity that, in some form, has existed for several thousand years. One source of unity is the historical influence of two major civilizations (Indus and Dravidian) and three major religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam). Regionally, Sikhism and Jainism have been of great importance. There is also considerable economic unity, as the majority of people continue to live by farming, with rice and especially wet-rice the primary crop. In addition, three-quarters of the people continue to live in rural, agricultural villages, although this has now become an important source of diversity, with clear distinctions between urban and rural life. A third source of unity is the caste system, which continues to define life for most people in the three mainland nations. Another source of unity is the nature and structure of society, which was heavily influenced by the several centuries of British rule. A final source of political unity in the twentieth century—although sometimes weakened by ethnic and religious differences—has been nationalism in each nation.

South Asia is diverse linguistically, ethnically, religiously, and economically. This diversity is most obvious in India, but exists in various forms in other nations, except for the isolated Maldives, which is the home of one ethnic group, the Divehi, who are Muslims and who have an economy based largely on tourism and fishing.

The dozens of languages of South Asia fall into four major families: Indo-European, Austroasiatic, Dravidian, and Tibeto-Burman and several cannot be classified at all. Because of its linguistic diversity, India is divided into "linguistic" states with Hindi and English serving as the national languages.

Hinduism is the dominant religion in South Asia, but India is the home also to Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism. India also has over 120 million Muslims and the world's largest Zoroastrian population (known in India as Parsis) and Bangladesh is a predominately Muslim nation. India also has about twenty-five million Christians and until recently India had several small but thriving Jewish communities. Nepal is mainly Hindu with a Buddhist minority, and Bhutan the reverse. Sri Lanka is mainly Theravada Buddhist with Hindu, Muslim, and Christian minorities. Mauritius, which has no indigenous population, is about 50 percent Hindu, with a large Christian and smaller Muslim and Buddhist minorities.

Linguistic and religious diversity is more than matched by social diversity. One classification suggests that the sociocultural groups of South Asia can be divided into four general and several subcategories: (1) castes (Hindu and Muslim); (2) modern urban classes (including laborers, non-Hindus, and the Westernized elite); (3) hill tribes of at least six types; and (4) peripatetics.

Economically, there are major distinctions between the rural poor and the urban middle class and elite, and also between the urban poor and urban middle class and elite. There are also significant wealth distinctions based on caste and gender, and a sizeable and wealthy Indian diaspora. There is political diversity as well, with India and Sri Lanka being democracies, Bangladesh shifting back and forth between Islamic democracy and military rule, the Maldives being an Islamic state, and Nepal and Bhutan being constitutional monarchies.

In 2002, South Asia faced several categories of issues. Among the most serious are the ongoing ethnic and religious conflicts between Muslims and Hindus in India, the conflict between the nations of Pakistan and India; the ethnic conflict between the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils in Sri Lanka; and the conflict between the Nepalese and Bhutanese in both nations. There are also various ethnic separatist movements in the region, as involving some Sikhs in India. The most threatening to order in the region and beyond is the conflict between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir region, as both have nuclear weapons and armies gathered at their respective borders.

A second serious issue is the host of related environmental problems, including pollution; limited water resources; overexploitation of natural resources; destruction and death caused by typhoons, flooding, and earthquakes; famine (less of a problem today), and epidemics of tropical and other diseases. The Maldives faces the unique problem of disappearing into the sea as global warming melts glaciers and raises the sea level. Coastal regions of Bangladesh could also suffer from this.

There are pressing social, economic, and political issues as well. Socially, there are wide and growing gaps between the rich and middle classes and the poor, who are disproportionately women and children and rural. Tribal peoples and untouchables still do not enjoy full civil rights, and women are often discriminated against, although India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh have all had women prime ministers. Economically, all the nations continue to wrestle with the issues involved in transforming themselves from mainly rural, agricultural nations to ones with strong industrial and service sectors. Politically, all still also struggle with the task of establishing strong, central governments that can control ethnic, religious, and region variation and provide services to the entire population. Despite these difficulties, there are also positive developments. India continues to benefit from the inflow of wealth earned by Indians outside India and is emerging as a major technological center. And, in Sri Lanka, an early 2002 cease-fire has led to the prospect of a series of peace negotiations in the near future..

East Asia

East Asia is defined here as the nations of Japan, South Korea, North Korea, China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. It should be noted that Taiwan is part of China although the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) differ over whether it is a province or not. The inclusion of China in East Asia is not entirely geographically and culturally valid, as parts of southern China could be classified as Southeast Asian from a geographical and cultural standpoint, while western China could be classified as Central Asian. However, there is a long tradition of classifying China as part of East Asia, and that is the approach taken here. Likewise, Mongolia is sometimes classified in Central Asia. As noted above, Siberia can be considered as forming North and Northeast Asia.

Economic, political, ideological, and social similarity across China, Korea (North and South), and Japan is the result of several thousand years of Chinese influence (at times strong, at other times weak), which has created considerable similarity on a base of pre-existing Japanese and Korean cultures and civilizations. China's influence was

greatest before the modern period and Chinese culture thus in some ways forms the core of East Asian culture and society. At the same time, it must be stressed that Chinese cultural elements merged with existing and new Korean and Japanese ones in ways that produced the unique Japanese and Korean cultures and civilizations, which deserve consideration in their own right.

Among the major cultural elements brought from China were Buddhism and Confucianism, the written language, government bureaucracy, various techniques of rice agriculture, and a patrilineal kinship system based on male dominance and male control of family resources. All of these were shaped over the centuries to fit with existing or developing forms in Korea and Japan. For example, Buddhism coexists with Shinto in Japan. In Korea, it coexists with the indigenous shamanistic religion. In China and Korea traditional folk religion remains strong, while Japan has been the home to dozens of new indigenous religions over the past 150 years.

Diversity in the region has been largely a product of continuing efforts by the Japanese and Koreans to resist Chinese influence and develop and stress Japanese and Korean culture and civilization. In the twentieth century diversity was mainly political and economic. Japanese invasions and conquests of parts of China and all of Korea beginning in the late nineteenth century led to hostile relations that had not been completely overcome in 2002.

In the post-World War II era and after, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea have been closely allied with the United States and the West; they have all developed powerful industrial and postindustrial economies. During the same period, China became a Communist state; significant ties to the West and economic development did not begin until the late 1980s. North Korea is also a Communist state; it lags behind the other nations in economic development and in recent years has not been able to produce enough food to feed its population. In 2002 China was the emerging economic power in the region, while Taiwan and South Korea hold on and Japan shows signs of serious and long-term economic decline, although it remains the second-largest (after the United States) economy in the world. Mongolia, freed from Soviet rule, is attempting to build its economy following a capitalist model.

Politically, China remains a Communist state despite significant moves toward market capitalism, North Korea is a Communist dictatorship, Japan a democracy, and South Korea and Taiwan in 1990s seem to have become relatively stable democracies following periods of authoritarian rule. Significant contact among the nations is mainly economic, as efforts at forging closer political ties remain stalled over past grievances. For example, in 2001, people in China and South Korea protested publicly about a new Japanese high school history textbook that they believed did not fully describe Japanese atrocities committed toward Chinese and Koreans before and during World War II. Japan has refused to revise the textbook. Similarly, tension remains between Mongolia and China over Mongolian fears about Chinese designs on Mongolian territory. Inner Mongolia is a province of China.

Major issues with regional and broader implications are the reunification of Taiwan and China and North and South Korea, and threat of war should reunification efforts go awry. Other major regional issues include environmental pollution, including air pollution from China that spreads east, and pollution of the Yellow Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea. A third issue is economic development and stability, and the role of each nation, and the region as a unit, in the growing global economy. A final major issue is the emergence of China as a major world political, economic, and military power at the expense of Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, and the consequences for regional political relations and stability.

Overview


As the above survey indicates, Asia is a varied and dynamic construct. To some extent the notion of Asia, as well as regions within Asia, are artificial constructs imposed by outside observers to provide some structure to a place and subject matter that might otherwise be incomprehensible. The nations of Asia have rich and deep pasts that continue to inform and shape the present—and that play a significant role in relations with other nations and regions. The nations of Asia also face considerable issues—some unique to the region, others shared by nations around the world—as well as enormous potential for future growth and development. We expect that the next edition of this encyclopedia will portray a very different Asia than does this one, but still an Asia that is in many ways in harmony with its pasts.

David Levinson (with contributions from Virginia Aksan, Edward Beauchamp, Anthony and Rebecca Bichel, Linsun Cheng, Gerald Fry, Bruce Fulton, and Paul Hockings)

Regional Maps















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MALAYSIA-PROFILE (2001 est. pop. 22.2 million). An independent federation in Southeast Asia, Malaysia is a constitutional monarchy whose capital is Kuala Lumpur, and whose major ports are Penang city and Klang. Its total area is 329,750 square kilometers.

Malaysian Territories, Geography, and Climate

Malaysia consists of two parts: West Malaysia, also called Peninsular Malaysia or Malaya, on the Malay Peninsula, including the states of Perlis, Kedah, Pinang, Perak, Kelantan, Terengganu, Pahang, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, Melaka (Malacca), and Johor, and coextensive with the former Federation of Malaya and one federal territory, Wilayah Persekutuan, which is coextensive with the city of Kuala Lumpur; and East Malaysia, including the island states of Sabah and Sarawak (the former British colonies of North Borneo and Northwest Borneo) on the island of Borneo and two federal territories, Putrajaya and the island of Labuan. The two parts are separated by about 640 kilometers of the South China Sea.

West Malaysia borders Thailand on the north and Singapore on the south (separated by the narrow Johore Strait), with the South China Sea on the east and the Strait of Malacca and the Andaman Sea on the west. East Malaysia is bordered on the north by the South China Sea and the Sulu Sea, on the east by the Celebes Sea, and on the south and west by Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo). Along the coast in Sarawak is the independent nation of Brunei.

Both East and West Malaysia have coastal plains and narrow, steep mountains in the interiors. In Peninsular Malaysia the Main Range, or Banjaran Titiwangsa, runs from the Thai border southward to

Negeri Sembilan. The highest point is in Sabah—Mount Kinabalu (4,101 meters). The longest rivers in the country are the Rajang (approximately 760 kilometers) in Sarawak, the Kinabatangan (560 kilometers) in Sabah, and the Pahang (322 kilometers) in West Malaysia.

Lying close to the equator, Malaysia has a tropical, rainy climate with high temperatures and high humidity. Nearly three-fourths of the land area is covered with tropical rainforest. Rice cultivation is practiced throughout the country.

Ethnic Mix

West Malaysia, with more than 80 percent of the total population of Malaysia, is more densely populated than East Malaysia. Most of the population of East Malaysia is concentrated on the west coast, which is economically more developed. Of the total population, about 60 percent are of Malay or indigenous descent, over 30 percent are Chinese, and some 10 percent are Indian or Pakistani. In West Malaysia, Malays make up about one-half of the population, Chinese one-third, and Indians and Pakistanis one-tenth. In East Malaysia, the two largest groups are the Chinese and the Iban (Sea Dayaks), an indigenous people, who together make up about three-fifths of the total population. Conflict between the ethnic groups, particularly between Malays and Chinese, has played a defining role in Malaysian political history.

Religion and Language

Islam is the religion of about half the people of Malaysia and is the official religion; nearly all Malays are Muslims. The Chinese are largely Buddhist,



MALAYSIA

Area: 329,750 sq km
Population: 22,229,040 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 1.96 % (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 24.75 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 5.2 deaths /1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: 0 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio—total population: 1.01 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 20.31 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population: 71.11 years, male: 68.48 years, female: 73.92 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Islam, Buddhism, Taoism, Hinduism, Christianity, Sikhism; Shamanism is practiced in East Malaysia
Major languages: Bahasa Melayu (official), English, Chinese dialects (Cantonese, Mandarin, Hokkien, Hakka, Hainan, Foochow), Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, Panjabi, Thai
Literacy—total population: 83.5 %, male: 89.1 %, female: 78.1 % (1999 est.)
Government type: constitutional monarchy
Capital: Kuala Lumpur
Administrative divisions: 13 states and 2 federal territories
Independence: 31 August 1957 (from U.K.)
National holiday: Independence Day/Malaysia Day, 31 August (1957)
Suffrage: 21 years of age; universal
GDP—real growth rate: 8.6% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita (purchasing power parity): \$10,300 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: 6.8% (1997 est.)
Exports: \$97.9 billion (2000 est.)
Imports: \$82.6 billion (2000 est.)
Currency: ringgit (MYR)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Factbook* 2001. Retrieved 22 April 2002, from: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

Confucian, or Taoist, and the Indians are mostly Hindu. Christianity is also embraced by a small minority, and in Sabah and Sarawak the indigenous peoples generally follow traditional beliefs.


Bahasa Malaysia (Melayu), based on the Malay language, is the country's official language. Other principal languages are English, Chinese, and Tamil, an Indian language. Education is free between the ages of six and nineteen years. Primary education is provided in the four major languages, with English as the compulsory second language. Malaysia's institutions of higher education have increased to twelve in recent years. They include Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (National University of Malaysia) and the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur, Universiti Sains Malaysia

in Pulau Pinang, International Islamic University, University of Technology, and Universiti Utara.

Economy

The Malaysian economy is based principally on the production of raw materials for export, including petroleum, rubber, tin, and timber. The country also has significant textile and electronic-equipment industries. It has been one of the fastest-growing economies in Southeast Asia, largely because of its steadily expanding manufacturing, industrial, and electronic sectors, which propelled the country to an 8 to 9 percent yearly growth rate from 1987 to 1992.

During the early 1990s the Barisan government, dominated by the United Malay National Organiza-



tion and including the Malaysian Chinese Association, the Malaysian Indian Congress, and other parties representing ethnic groups, privatized large industries that had been under state control, but there were allegations of political corruption and nepotism in awarding privatization contracts. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 slowed the economic development of the country, but it quickly recovered toward the end of the 1990s as a result of the introduction of capital-control measures aimed at creating stable domestic conditions along with price stability.

The major cities on the Malay Peninsula are connected by railroads with Singapore, and an extensive road net covers the west coast, with the North-South Highway forming a main artery. The country has six international airports—Kuala Lumpur, Pulau Pinang, Kota Kinabalu, Johor Bahru (Senai), Kuching, and Tawau.

Government

Malaysia is a federal constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary democracy. The Malaysian constitution is derived from the constitution of the Federation of Malaya, which was promulgated on Merdeka (Independence) Day, 31 August 1957. The constitution of the Federation was the product of a constitutional

commission consisting of constitutional experts from Australia, India, and Pakistan. The Malaysian head of state is the king (the Yang di-Pertuan Agong), who is elected every five years by the nine hereditary rulers of Perlis, Kedah, Perak, Kelantan, Terengganu, Pahang, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, and Johor. The king appoints the cabinet, headed by the prime minister, who must be a member of the cabinet and have the confidence of the house of representatives (Dewan Ra'ayat). The prime minister is the chief executive officer of the government and has tremendous power of patronage.

The parliament has two chambers. In 2000, the house consisted of 180 members, all elected by popular vote in single-member districts. Representatives of the lower house are popularly elected for five-year terms. Legislative power is divided between the federal and state legislatures. Senators serve for six years. Two senators are elected by each state legislature, and the rest are appointed by the head of state. Malaysia has universal adult suffrage.

Political Parties

The leading national political organization of Malaysia is the National Front, a multiracial coalition of thirteen parties. Its predecessor was the Alliance Party; in one incarnation or the other it has controlled the gov-

ernment since 1957. It is dominated by the United Malay National Organization, with the Malaysian Chinese Association, GERAKAN (the Malaysian People's Movement Party), and the Malaysian Indian Congress as other major parties. Other major opposition parties include the Democratic Action Party, the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party, and the Justice Party.

Legal System and International Associations

The Malaysian legal system reflects British influence as it adheres closely to the Westminster model of the U.K. parliament. It has two houses of parliament, namely the elected House of Representatives and the appointed House of Lords. The king is the supreme head of the government, assisted by the prime minister and the cabinet ministers. The judicial system consists of lower courts at urban and rural centers, two high courts having original and appellate jurisdiction, and a supreme court. Certain civil and domestic matters are under the jurisdiction of Islamic courts.

Malaysia is a member of the United Nations and many of its specialized agencies, such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. It also has membership in the Asian Development Bank, the Commonwealth of Nations, the Five-Power Defense Arrangement, the Movement of Nonaligned Nations, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Ho Khai Leong

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MALAYSIA—ECONOMIC SYSTEM Malaysia, consisting of peninsular Malaysia (Malay Peninsula) and East Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak), came into being as a political entity in 1963. The nation has experienced various economic systems from the maritime-based trading empire of the Malay sultanate of Melaka of the fifteenth century to the mixed-market economy of the late twentieth century.

Melaka, established in the early 1400s by a Majapahit refugee prince, was a maritime-based trading power with hegemony over the Malay Peninsula and central Sumatra. The Malay-Hindu rulers of Melaka embraced Islam, which was consistent with Melaka's

role as a port serving the East-West trade then under Muslim domination that stretched from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. Melaka's control of the Malacca Strait was the key to its economy in the long-distance East-West commerce in spices from the Moluccas (Spice Islands) to Venice. Described as the emporium par excellence, Melaka functioned as an entrepôt for the products of Southeast Asia and China in exchange for manufactures from India and Europe.

Trade was the lifeblood of fifteenth-century Melaka. The sultan, at the apex of the ruling hierarchy, derived his income from trade. Commercial tribute was exacted in a number of forms, namely as import and export tax on trade goods passing through the seaport, fees paid by merchants for the license to trade in selected commodities, and harbor dues imposed on vessels passing through the Malacca Strait. Melaka's navy enforced the sultan's pretensions. Although the palace engaged to a limited extent in direct trading, commercial activities were largely in the hands of foreign merchants (Arabs and Chinese), who were accorded trading rights by the sultan in return for tribute. The sultanate ensured an environment conducive to trade by maintaining law and order, security from piracy, provision of infrastructure facilities (for example, warehouses for storage of goods), and standardization of weights and measures. Barter trading coexisted with a fairly developed monetized economy.

Paralleling Melaka, the Malay sultanate of Brunei emerged as the dominant power over the northwestern part of Borneo (present-day Sabah and Sarawak) from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century. Brunei derived its power and wealth from trade with the Malay Archipelago and southern China. The Brunei ruler, at best, had only nominal overlordship over the coastal regions, where Brunei *pangeran* (chieftains) located at river mouths controlled and exacted commercial tribute. The *pangeran* possessed little authority over the various ethnic communities, who owed allegiance to none but themselves. The indigenous peoples of the interior engaged in subsistence cultivation of hill rice and root crops complemented by hunting and gathering of jungle produce; others, like the Penan, led a nomadic existence relying exclusively on hunting and gathering. In the coastal areas, the native peoples collected sea produce and swamp sago and fished. Although certain jungle and sea produce supplied the China trade, the majority of the inhabitants lived in subsistence-farming communities.

The Coming of the Portuguese

Melaka's preeminence in trade made it a coveted possession of European imperialists. Melaka featured



FIVE LARGEST COMPANIES IN MALAYSIA

According to *Asia Week*, the five largest companies in Malaysia are the following:

Company	Sector	Sales (\$ millions)	Rank in Asia
Petroleum Nasional	Oil, Gas, Refining	19,302.9	51
Tenaga Nasional	Energy	3,610.3	368
Sime Darby	Trading, Commodities	3,147.3	426
Malaysian Airline	Air Transport	2,356.9	567
Telekom Malaysia	Telecommunications	2,319.9	579

Source: "The Asia Week 1000." (2001) *Asia Week* (9 November): 114.

prominently in Portuguese expansionist goals and subsequently fell in 1511. The Malay ruling house fled to Johor in the southern part of the peninsula and attempted in vain to recapture Melaka. The Portuguese at Melaka continued the entrepôt trade in spices and other Southeast Asian products for the European market based at Lisbon. Like their predecessor, the Portuguese acquired commercial tribute in the form of import and export tax and harbor dues from trading vessels passing the Malacca Strait.

The transformation of Melaka from a Muslim to a Catholic entrepôt center under Portuguese control witnessed a resuscitated prosperity for Brunei as some of the Muslim mercantile elite relocated their commercial operations there. Other Muslim traders moved to the northern Sumatran Muslim port of Aceh.

Meanwhile, on the Malay Peninsula there emerged Malay sovereign principalities, such as Pahang and Perak, possessing ties with the former Melakan sultanate. These were followed later by Selangor and other states. The ruling elite of the peninsular Malay states imitated Melaka's economic system, albeit on a much lesser scale, by establishing hegemony over river systems. Unlike the sultan of Melaka, who had supreme control over his chiefs, rulers of Malay states possessed little authority over territorial chiefs, who might be more powerful than the rulers themselves. The sultan and the chiefs occupied strategic positions at river mouths and confluences to tax river-based commerce. As in Melaka, commercial tribute was the main source of income for the ruling class of the Malay states.

The livelihood of the Malay peasantry revolved around the production of rice. Where flat alluvial plains were abundant in the coastal areas, permanent

sedentary wet-rice cultivation was the chief means of subsistence; in the hilly interior, cultivation of hill rice predominated. It is uncertain if land rent was imposed by Malay rulers on their *rakyat* (peasant producers); it was, however, commonplace for the ruling class to act in an arbitrary manner toward the peasantry, such as by confiscating their produce without compensation. Furthermore, the peasantry was subjected to *corvée* (*kerah*), the forced labor demanded by the palace. Owing to the rapacious character of the ruling class and *kerah*, peasant cultivation was limited to subsistence and a little surplus for exchange (rice for cloth or salt). There was no capital investment in peasant production nor innovation or technical progress.

The economic situation in the Malay States, including Melaka, did not exhibit capitalist relations of production, namely involving the exploitation of free wage labor. The existence of slavery and debt-bondsmen and *kerah* afforded the needed labor required by the ruling class and worked against the emergence of a class providing free wage labor. Although capital existed, often in its usurious form, there was little capital investment in agrarian productive activities; likewise, commercial capital was negligible until the nineteenth century.

The Coming of the Dutch and the British

Denied access to Lisbon for spices, Dutch traders ventured to the Malay Archipelago themselves. By 1641, the Dutch seized Melaka from the Portuguese and sought to impose their monopolistic trade practices in the region. Attempts to exact a monopoly over the tin trade in the western Malay states proved problematic. The main focus of Dutch mercantilist ambition, however, was to make Batavia (Jakarta) in Java, and not Melaka, the center of the spice trade. The

Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC, Dutch United East Indies Company), through force and treaty arrangements, asserted its political and economic hegemony over the entire Malay Archipelago. Meanwhile, the advent of the Spaniards in the Philippines from the mid-sixteenth century and the ascendance of the VOC in Java served to weaken Brunei's commercial and political power, which began to wane in the seventeenth century.

During the eighteenth century, individual English country traders and others associated with the English East India Company (EIC) vied against the VOC for control of the trade throughout the Malay Archipelago. EIC priorities were in the China trade. Circumstances in the last quarter of the eighteenth century—the Anglo-French struggle in India and the Anglo-Dutch rivalry in the Malay Archipelago—pressured the EIC to secure a land base on the western shores of the Malay Peninsula for naval and commercial purposes. In 1786, the EIC acquired Penang to protect British interests in the Strait of Malacca, the prime sea route to China.

Championing the principles of free trade, the British declared Penang a free port. Penang attracted Chinese merchants and European planters. Penang enjoyed moderate success as an entrepôt and port of call for the China trade. The opening of Singapore in 1819 by the EIC was an unqualified success; within a brief period, Singapore became the ultimate entrepôt port for the British in the Malay Archipelago. Both Penang and Singapore were collecting centers for Southeast Asian products for exchange in the lucrative China trade in tea and silks. Both these British free ports had a sizeable Chinese mercantile population.

Anglo-Dutch rivalry in the Malay Archipelago culminated in an agreement signed at London in 1824 that delineated spheres of influence between the British and the Dutch, with present-day Malaysia falling in the British sphere and Indonesia in the Dutch. In exchange for Bengkulu, the British acquired Melaka. In 1826, the British coordinated the administration of Penang, Melaka, and Singapore, which became the Straits Settlements that primarily served the British China trade.

Meanwhile, in the 1820s, Chinese from southwestern Borneo crossed into the mineral-rich upper Sarawak area to work the alluvial gold at and around Bau. The discovery of antimony ore in the vicinity brought Brunei's attention to the area. Forced labor was exacted from the local population to work the antimony. Disaffection with Brunei resulted in a revolt in the late 1830s. James Brooke, an English gentleman-adventurer, intervened to end the trouble. In

return the Brunei ruler proclaimed Brooke raja of Sarawak in 1841.

Tin had long been produced in small quantities in the Malay Peninsula. However, the discovery of large alluvial tin in Larut, Perak, in the late 1840s ushered in large-scale capitalist production of tin. Whereas in the past Malay chiefs relied on slaves and debt-bondsmen to undertake the mining, the chiefs now farmed out mines in return for a lump sum to Chinese entrepreneurs from the Straits Settlements, who in turn recruited labor from southern China. Chinese by the thousands entered the western Malay states of Perak, Selangor, and Sungei Ujong (later Negeri Sembilan). British capitalist investors represented through the agency houses (trading firms) in Penang and Singapore invested in tin mining owing to tin's high demand in the expanding Western tin-plating industry.

Unsettling conditions in the tin-producing Malay states throughout the 1850s and 1860s—marked by political and economic disputes among Malay chieftains, clashes between rival Chinese groups over tin concessions, and the pirate menace off the coast—combined to disrupt tin production and its trade. By the early 1870s, it became imperative on the part of the British to stabilize the troubled situation, thereby ensuring an uninterrupted supply of tin for the Western market, in which British capitalists had a substantial stake. The 1874 Pangkor Engagement opened the door for the imposition of British colonial rule over the Malay Peninsula. Pax Britannica over the Malay Peninsula was complete following the conclusion of the Anglo-Siamese treaty of 1909, which brought the northern peninsular Malay states of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Terengganu into the British colonial system.

Attempts to colonize North Borneo (Sabah) beginning in the 1850s culminated in the establishment of the British North Borneo Chartered Company (BNBCC) in 1881. Both the sultanates of Brunei and Sulu that possessed nominal sovereignty over Sabah's western and eastern parts, respectively, relinquished their rights to BNBCC.

British Malaya

Capitalist exploitation of the natural resources of British Malaya (the peninsular Malay states and the Straits Settlements) began in earnest from the last quarter of the nineteenth century and throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Tin and rubber were the main focus of the colonial economy of British Malaya, primarily fueled by British capital and immigrant (Chinese and Indian) labor. The colonial state sought to provide the necessary infrastructure, partic-

ularly in transportation (rail and road) and legislation to regulate smooth exploitation of resources aimed at facilitating maximum returns for entrepreneurs for their investments.

In the tin industry, Chinese capital and labor predominated from the mid-nineteenth century to the first decade of the twentieth century. In order to ensure success in mining ventures, Chinese capital (mainly from the Straits Settlements) utilized a variety of means for exercising control over Chinese labor through recruitment systems, kinship links, provincial connections, and operation of the powerful politico-socioeconomic organization of the *bui* (brotherhood). From the 1890s, the colonial state passed legislation (for example, in labor recruitment) to weaken the control of Chinese capital over Chinese labor and, at the same time, promoted British mining capital. By the first decade of the twentieth century, most of the surface alluvial tin deposits had been exhausted, resulting in greater financial investment for access to the deeper deposits via mechanization, namely utilizing the tin dredge. Under the circumstances and with greater resources, British capital that enjoyed support from the colonial state dominated the tin industry (mining, smelting, and trade).

Chinese miners exploited the gold fields of upper Sarawak. The Brooke government operated the Sadong collieries from the 1860s for local consumption. Owing to Brooke's pronative policies and an aversion to Western capital, only the Borneo Company Limited (BCL), a British company, was given the privilege to tap the mineral resources of the nation (antimony, mercury, and later gold). The BCL utilized new technology such as the cyanidization process for gold extraction. By the turn of the twentieth century, the BCL dominated the mining industry in upper Sarawak, whereas Anglo-Dutch Shell monopolized the petroleum industry from the time it sank Sarawak's first oil well in 1910 at Miri. Despite the Brooke government's cautionary stance toward Western capitalist ventures, the mining sector was solely controlled by British capital. The majority of the labor force in Sarawak's extractive industry was drawn from immigrant Chinese recruited from southern China.

The Rubber Industry

As in the extractive industries, British capital was favored by the colonial state in commercial agriculture in British Malaya. Several cash crops—spices, sugarcane, tapioca, and coffee—were tried during the nineteenth century, but it was rubber (*Hevea brasiliensis*) that paid handsome dividends to shareholders during its boom years early in the twentieth century. The



A fisherman and a crowded fishing boat in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia. (NIK WHEELER/CORBIS)

agency houses played a pivotal role in convincing British capital to invest in rubber during the late 1890s and early 1900s. Falling coffee prices, coupled with blight in the industry, paved the way for the emergence of rubber as the premier plantation crop. The expansion of the American auto industry during the first decade of the twentieth century dramatically pushed up the demand for plantation rubber. The colonial state again rendered almost exclusive support for British capital, which invested in thousands of acres of rubber estates. The colonial state not only improved upon the transport system already in place for the tin industry but also conveyed the best available land for rubber to British capital and invested in research to improve the rubber industry. The colonial state coordinated the recruitment of immigrant labor from southern India to offer a cheap and plentiful supply of workers for the hundreds of British-owned estates.

On a lesser scale, the rubber industry in Sabah developed along lines similar to those in British Malaya, with the company lending full support and granting privileges to British capital not unlike the preferential treatment it had accorded to European tobacco planters in the nineteenth century. In contrast, the Brooke government blocked the entry of Western capital into the state. Instead, family-owned native and Chinese rubber smallholdings were the rule, with a handful of European-owned large estates being the exception.

In addition to rubber, Sarawak exported pepper and gambier, which were grown by Chinese smallholders. Sabah was one of the major producers and exporters of tropical hardwoods, largely worked by British capital and Chinese labor.

In British Malaya, the agricultural policy of the colonial state worked against the Malay peasantry. It



WAWASAN 2020

Wawasan 2020 or Vision 2020 is the ambitious vision of Malaysia's longest-serving prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad. It was launched in 1991. Through this vision Mahathir aspires to see Malaysia an industrialized nation by the year 2020. Ideally, he wants to see Malaysia become a great country equipped to compete effectively in the information age.

One of the goals is to have Malaysia double its gross national product every ten years so that by the year 2020 Malaysia's economic output will be eight times what it was in 1990. However, the 1997 financial crisis that struck the entire Asian region, including Malaysia, could be a setback in meeting these goals.

With this vision in mind, the prime minister has launched a series of ambitious infrastructure projects to help Malaysia realize its goals. Among these are the Express Rail Link, Kuala Lumpur City Center, Kuala Lumpur International Airport (replacing the former Subang International Airport), Kuala Lumpur Sentral, Multimedia Super Corridor, Putrajaya, and many other large projects.

The vision is based on the nine challenges that are facing the nation as defined by Mahathir. They are:

[E]stablishing a united Malaysian nation with a sense of common and shared destiny. . . .

[C]reating a psychologically liberated, secure, and developed Malaysian Society with faith and confidence in itself. . . . This Malaysian Society must be distinguished by the pursuit of excellence. . . .

[F]ostering and developing a mature democratic society, practising a form of mature consensual, community-oriented Malaysian democracy that can be a model for many developing countries.

[E]stablishing a fully moral and ethical society, whose citizens are strong in religious and spiritual values and imbued with the highest of ethical standards.

[E]stablishing a mature, liberal and tolerant society in which Malaysians of all colours and creeds are free to practise and profess their customs, culture and religious beliefs and yet feeling that they belong to one nation.

[E]stablishing a scientific and progressive society, a society that is innovative and forward-looking. . . .

[E]stablishing a fully caring society and a caring culture, a social system in which society will come before self. . . .

[E]nsuring an economically just society. . . .

[E]stablishing a prosperous society, with an economy that is fully competitive, dynamic, robust and resilient. (Mahathir 2002)

Mala Selvaraju

Sources: Denison Javasooria. (1994) *Vision 2020 and Challenges Facing the Marginalized Communities in Malaya*. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Centre for Community Studies.
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was the expressed aim of the colonial state to maintain a Malay yeoman peasantry engaged in food crop (mainly rice) production to meet the consumption needs of the large and increasing immigrant labor force in the capitalist sector (mining and commercial agriculture). The goal of this policy was to minimize the outflow of foreign exchange in payment of rice and other food imports. In line with this policy, the colonial state discouraged rubber cultivation by the peas-

antry, for example, by restricting rubber cultivation on certain lands, such as Malay Reservation Land. Notwithstanding the official preference for large rubber estates managed by British capital, there emerged a considerable number of Malay smallholdings. These smallholdings suffered continuous discrimination by the pro-estate stance of the colonial state, particularly during the implementation of restriction schemes during the 1920s and 1930s.

The Effects of the Great Depression and World War II

The production and export of commodities—tin, gold, petroleum, rubber, timber—made British Malaya, Sabah, and Sarawak players in the world economy with its vicissitudes of price booms and slumps. Whereas British Malaya and Sabah, on a lesser scale, suffered severe dislocations during the Great Depression (1929–1931), Sarawak braved the depression years with minimal repercussions. British Malaya was dealt a crushing blow with the forced closing of mines and estates, widespread and massive layoffs of workers, repatriation of Indian and Chinese laborers, and bankruptcies. The extent of suffering mirrored the extent of involvement of British Malaya in the world economy. Owing to the restrictions placed by the Brooke government on large capitalist ventures and the continuous discouragement of rubber monoculture by native and Chinese smallholders, Sarawak experienced little economic dislocation. Sarawak's indigenous peoples, who had never discarded their subsistence mode of livelihood, were deprived of only the extra income derived from the sale of rubber.

The wartime economy during the three years and eight months of Japanese military occupation (1941–1945) of British Malaya, Sabah, and Sarawak was focused on food-crop production aimed at food self-sufficiency. Notwithstanding the relentless efforts largely achieved through coercion, there were widespread shortages of food, especially rice. Worst hit was the urban population, which had always relied on imported foodstuffs. Subsistence-based rural communities fared better during the occupation. The tin and rubber industries came to a halt during the war years. The Japanese managed to reactivate petroleum production at Miri despite scorched-earth tactics implemented prior to the Japanese landings. By 1944, the Japanese attained almost half the prewar output.

Malaysia after Independence

Sabah and Sarawak became British Crown colonies in 1946. In 1957, Malaya attained independence, excluding Singapore, which remained a British Crown colony. In 1963, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak joined the Federation of Malaya to form Malaysia. Two years later, Singapore seceded from Malaysia.

Malaysia's economic landscape experienced dramatic changes in the postcolonial period. The market economy of the nation at the time of independence was largely dependent on the production and export of primary commodities—tin, rubber, petroleum, and timber. At the same time, a conspicuous feature of the economy was a large concentration of indigenous peo-

ples (Malays in Peninsular Malaysia and the various native communities in Sabah and Sarawak) in the subsistence agricultural sector, with nonindigenous groups (mainly Chinese) playing pivotal roles in the modern rural and urban sectors.

Several major policy shifts were made in agricultural and industrial development during the four decades after independence. The immediate postindependence period was devoted to diversifying the agricultural and industrial bases, which during the colonial period had focused on the monoculture of rubber and the processing of raw materials for the world market. Oil palm cultivation was introduced in the early 1960s as an alternative to rubber. Growth in palm oil production was spectacular; by the mid-1990s, Malaysia accounted for half of world production. Cacao production expanded promisingly throughout the 1980s; by the early 1990s, cacao became the fourth most important agricultural commodity after palm oil, timber, and rubber. Sabah accounted for more than 86 percent of the nation's total cacao output. Whereas Sabah led in timber production and export during the colonial period, Sarawak took the lead in the 1960s. In the last quarter of the 1990s, Sarawak accounted for 36 percent of total timber production, Peninsular Malaysia 24 percent, and Sabah 20 percent.

Initially the strategy for industrial development was to promote import-substituting industrialization, which was pursued after independence until the late 1960s. Then, in the early 1970s, industrial policy was shifted to emphasize export-oriented industrialization whereby manufactures were added to the list of exports that hitherto comprised raw materials, hence broadening the ties to the world economy. During the 1980s, policy was shifted to emphasize the manufacturing sector. Consequently, by 1987, manufacturing overtook agriculture as the lead growth sector. The major manufactured exports then were electronic and electrical products, chemical products, wood-based and fabricated metal products, textiles and clothing, and transport equipment. The 1990s witnessed another reorientation in Malaysia's economy. In an effort to transform Malaysia into an industrialized nation by the year 2020, a strategic shift was undertaken to replace low-skill, low-value-added output with high-skill, high-value-added output. After the early 1970s, foreign direct investments were greatly encouraged through various incentives (free-trade zones, tax exemptions, and so on).

The extractive industries that had long relied on the tin industry shifted to petroleum and natural gas in the 1970s. Offshore oil and gas fields in Terengganu, Sabah, and Sarawak boosted the mineral sector, which

by the late 1990s accounted for 40 percent of industrial production. Tin output has steadily declined since the 1980s.

The New Economic Policy (NEP), launched in 1970, focused on two objectives. First, the NEP sought to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty, regardless of ethnicity, by increasing income levels and generating employment opportunities. Second, the NEP sought to restructure Malaysian society to correct economic imbalances between racial groups and uneven geographical development, thereby gradually eliminating the identification of race with economic function. At the end of the scheduled twenty-year period of the NEP, its achievements were encouraging. In 1991, the New Development Policy (NDP), which laid the basis of Malaysia's Vision 2020 program, was inaugurated to attain industrialized status for the nation by the year 2020. Emphasis was placed on the manufacturing sector to propel the economy forward; its share of exports was expected to increase to more than 90 percent by 2020. But the regional economic crisis of 1997–1998 has set back Vision 2020 by at least a decade.

Ooi Keat Gin

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MALAYSIA—EDUCATION SYSTEM Education and society in Malaysia, as in other nations, are inherently linked. The form of Malaysia's educational system can be traced to the era of British colonialism starting at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The impact of colonialism was twofold. First, under British rule, Malaya (Malaya was the preindependence [1957] term and Malaysia the postindependence one) developed into a multiethnic society, incorporating Chinese and Indians (brought to the colony primarily as laborers) within the indigenous Malayan society. Educational policies have since been highly influenced by this social structure. Second, Malaysia's educational system bears a heavy imprint of Britain's.

Today the Malaysian education system is a reasonably successful one, responding to the demands for equity among the different ethnic groups as well as the needs of a rapidly developing economy. The literacy rate is 84 percent, the figures for males and females being 89 percent and 79 percent, respectively. Primary school enrollment is above 90 percent for both males and females, while enrollment at the secondary level is 66 percent for females and 58 percent for males, presumably reflecting the higher labor force demands on males. At the tertiary level enrollment is 11 percent overall.

Religious education is found under the rubric "moral education," which allows for religious instruction without offending any specific ethnic group. The Malay language (Bahasa Malaysia) and English are compulsory subjects, with the latter recently receiving increasing attention. The other subjects taken at the secondary level depend on what options are chosen in addition to the usual required academic subjects—commercial studies, home science, agricultural science, and industrial arts.

Education in the Colonial Era

By the end of the colonial era in the 1950s, Malaya had four distinct educational systems. One was the English system, a result of the increasing need, from the late nineteenth century, for more English-speaking people to work in commerce and government. The other three, following the ethnic divisions in Malaya, were vernacular schools for the Malays, Chinese, and Indians. Whereas the vernacular schools provided ba-



A Muslim teacher writing in Arabic on the blackboard in a school on Pangkor Island in 1997. (EARL & NAZIMA KOWALL/CORBIS)

sic education in the Malay language or a Chinese or Indian dialect, the English system aimed at higher educational levels and was the path for upward mobility in the colony. It was not possible to attain higher education in the vernacular schools.

Education in Malaya after World War II

After World War II, British policy was oriented toward self-determination for Malaya. The primary purpose of the new educational system was to develop a common sense of identity among the peoples of Malaya with a view to furthering social stability following the granting of independence.

The Education Act of 1961 was one of compromise. Although the vernacular school system was retained, the Malay language was made compulsory as a subject and it became apparent that a long-term goal of the government was to make Malay the language of instruction for all children in Malaya—it would be the new national language (Bahasa Malaysia). In this regard, English was relegated to a secondary position for political reasons, although basic British educational structures, including the examination system, were retained.

Communal riots following the 1969 federal election led to significant social and economic changes in Malaysia, and issues related to language and education were of particular importance. Malay claims for parity became the basis for policy formulation. With regard to the medium of instruction in schools, the

minister of education announced a timetable for the progressive implementation of Bahasa Malaysia in all schools beginning in 1970 (it had become the nation's official language in 1967). This was a critical issue because, as in the past, ability in English had dominated access to higher education and therefore employment prospects and socioeconomic mobility.

The revised educational policies were set out in the New Economic Policy (NEP), the aims of which were included in the Second Malaysia Plan (SMP) of 1970–1975. The goal was to raise the socioeconomic circumstances of the Malay population and thereby dampen ethnic and racial frictions within Malaysia. An integral part of the NEP was a program designed to raise the number of *bumiputras* (meaning "sons of the soil," referring for the most part to ethnic Malays but including a small number of other indigenous groups) in the universities in Malaysia. A quota system in favor of the Malays was therefore established.

Ethnic Groups and Tertiary Places in Contemporary Context

The NEP has been quite effective at redressing the imbalances. This trend differs considerably from the trend early in the twentieth century, when non-*bumiputras* were overrepresented in the system in general, education in the English medium in particular, and later at the tertiary level (college or university level). However, the ethnic quotas—which were

adopted initially to redress Malay underrepresentation in universities and which were administered by implementing a requirement of higher entry marks for Chinese and Indians—resulted in the Malays being overrepresented in tertiary institutions.

Malaysia's educational system reflects a history of British colonialism, not only in the basic form of its structures, but also in the fact that educational policies are a response to the multiethnic society created under British colonialism. Although vernacular schools continue to function, funded primarily by private means, the educational system is dominated by publicly funded institutions in which Bahasa Malaysia is the medium of instruction. Recently there has been increased concern over the decline in the quality of students' English, and it appears that this language is enjoying a resurgence in the educational system.

The Malaysian government faces a dilemma in its policies. On the one hand, it must satisfy demands from the Malays for a greater role in the economy of the nation. To this end, the government has given this group preferential treatment in terms of access to higher education. On the other hand, if too many restrictions are placed on the other ethnic groups in terms of access to a reasonable share of the wealth of the nation, including entrance to tertiary institutions, communal tension could again build up. Moreover, non-*bumiputras* still play a dominant role in the economy of the nation. If people from this group feel that the restrictions placed on them are too great, they may emigrate, taking their skills and assets with them. Those who cannot emigrate are likely to become frustrated in the extreme. One safety valve for middle-class ethnic Chinese and Indians has been access to tertiary education in foreign branch campuses in Malaysia or educational institutions in other nations.

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MALAYSIA—HISTORY Malaysia is one of the most developed countries in Southeast Asia, surpassed in per capita income only by Singapore and the small but oil-rich sultanate of Brunei Darussalam. In developing its economy, Malaysia traditionally relied on commodity exports of rubber, tin, palm oil, and petroleum. More recently, however, it gained competitiveness in export manufactures, especially in the electronics sector. Malaysia's mines and plantations have thus been transformed into urban high-rises, industrial estates, and middle-class housing tracts.

Over the past few decades, this rapid economic development has distinguished Malaysia in the region, capturing the attention of economists seeking strategies for eradicating poverty, as well as foreign investors searching for markets. But Malaysia has also confronted—and in some measure overcome—other challenges. For example, political struggles and great social pressures have periodically tested the country's democratic procedures, first introduced during the final phase of British colonialism. Yet unlike many other former British possessions, Malaysia has managed to perpetuate at least some of its formal democratic structures, including regular elections and a reasonably competitive party system. On the social level, Malaysia has often been characterized as a "plural" or "divided" society, with ethnic rivalries forming principally between Malays and Chinese. Ethnic imbalances and resentments have been alleviated over time, however, through a program of affirmative action known as the New Economic Policy, while some sense of cross-ethnic unity has been forged through a new notion of *bangsar Malaysia* (Malaysian race).

In 1997–1998, Malaysia's record of economic development was challenged by the financial crisis that struck Asia. The government responded imaginatively, if somewhat heretically, with capital controls that enabled Malaysia to recover more rapidly than neighboring countries that conformed to the dictates of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Nonetheless, as



KEY EVENTS IN MALAYSIA'S HISTORY

- 15th century** The Melaka sultanate flourishes.
- 1511** Melaka is captured by the Portuguese, then the Dutch.
- 1824** The Dutch trade Melaka to the British, who combine it with Singapore and Penang to form the Straits Settlements.
- 1941-1945** Malaya is controlled by the Japanese.
- 1946** The United Malays National Organization is founded.
- 1957** British colonial rule ends.
- 1963** Malaya federates with Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah to form Malaysia.
- 1965** Singapore becomes an independent nation.
- 1960s** Ethnic politics emerges as a major issue.
- 1969** The riots known as the May Thirteenth incident take place.
- 1970s** The New Economic Policy is enacted.
- 1981** The government under Mahathir becomes more repressive.
- 1980s-1990s** The economy grows rapidly.
- 1997-1998** The economy falters during the Asian economic crisis.

the twenty-first century dawned, Malaysia's industrial development was once again under strain as the contraction of the global economy reduced the demand for electronics goods. At the same time, the military action against the Taliban in Afghanistan quickened the pace of Islamic resurgence; although Islamic leaders cast their renewed fervor in nonracial terms, they still threatened to rekindle social unrest.

It is these features, then, that give Malaysia greater significance on the world scene than its population suggests. It has developed rapidly over the past few decades, earning a World Bank ranking as a middle-income country. It has preserved enough democratic procedures that its politics can be understood as a stable semidemocracy. And its pluralistic society, while not having converged in tight nationalist unity, displays much tolerance and accommodation.

Colonial Legacies and Independence

In precolonial times, the societies found on what is today the west coast of peninsular Malaysia reached their apogee in the fifteenth century, forming a maritime empire known as the Melaka sultanate. In 1511, however, Melaka was captured by the Portuguese, then seized by the Dutch. In 1824, it was traded to the British, who were already established in the port cities of Singapore and Penang. During the final quarter of the nineteenth century, the British used these three coastal outposts, known collectively as the Straits Settlements, to move deeper into the peninsula, gaining

control over the tin trade (which flourished thanks in part to new food-canning technologies that had developed during the U.S. Civil War) and rubber plantations (markets for rubber latex having emerged with the introduction of the pneumatic tire). British colonialists also ranged farther afield into north Borneo, which included the territories of Sarawak, the sultanate of Brunei, and what would later be christened Sabah.

Beyond the Straits Settlements, the British practiced "indirect rule" on the peninsula, relying upon local Malay sultans and aristocrats to exercise traditional forms of authority over the indigenous population. In order to perpetuate these social patterns and the political deference they encouraged, the British insulated the indigenous community from new economic undertakings. Hence, to operate the rapidly expanding tin mines and rubber plantations, the British recruited large numbers of immigrant workers, mainly from south China and India. Although the Chinese thus entered the economy's modern sectors and occasionally amassed great personal fortunes, they were viewed as sojourners without political rights. In this way, the politically sovereign but collectively poor Malays were counterbalanced by the economically empowered but politically disenfranchised Chinese. Most Indians remained both poor and disenfranchised, subsisting as tappers on often-remote rubber plantations. Meanwhile, behind the facade of traditional Malay sovereignty and indirect rule, British civil servants administered the territory through a deeply penetra-

tive bureaucratic apparatus. And atop the labor of Chinese tin miners and artisans, British investors and managers reaped the benefits of increasingly large-scale commercial activities.

At the start of World War II, the Japanese occupied Malaya, disrupting the complex ethnic balance that had been perpetuated by the British. In particular, the Japanese encouraged the political aspirations of Malay aristocrats, who could set their sights on the bureaucratic positions opened up by the flight or internment of British officials. At the same time, the Japanese neglected the wider Malay community and harshly discriminated against the Chinese. This triggered some Chinese guerrilla resistance, fortified by ethnic resentments and Marxist ideology.

After the war the British returned, and having conceptualized Malay wartime behaviors as collaborative, proposed a new governing arrangement, known as the Malayan Union. In this scheme, the standing of Malay sultans would be sharply diminished, while the Chinese would be rewarded with full citizenship and political rights. The Malay community was soon roused from its torpor, first protesting the Malayan Union, then forming a variety of organizations that cohered in 1946 under the leadership of Dato Onn bin Jaafar (1895–1962) as the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). The British then dropped the union proposals, thereby precipitating a new militancy among the Chinese, which gained force through the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), which launched an insurgency known popularly as the Emergency.

The British responded to the Emergency with a two-track approach, first mounting a counterinsurgency that was distinguished by innovative techniques. But they sought also to forge a moderate Chinese political party, one whose leaders could compete with the MCP for Chinese loyalties and effectively interact with leaders of the UMNO. To this end the British recruited a prominent Chinese businessman, Tan Cheng Lock (1883–1960), and assisted him in forming the Malayan (later Malaysian) Chinese Association (MCA). They also convened a series of Community Liaison Committee meetings through which elite-level cooperation could be forged across ethnic lines. In this way, the British encouraged both the competitive party organizations and interpersonal restraint that would make peaceful yet meaningful elections possible.

During the 1950s, the British introduced a staggered series of electoral contests, proceeding from local to national levels. In the course of waging these contests, the UMNO and the MCA formed a winning

coalition called the Alliance. These parties also recruited a third partner, the Malayan (later Malaysian) Indian Congress. Within this coalition, UMNO remained pivotal. However, the MCA and the MIC attracted significant support from the Chinese and Indian communities, respectively, thus bolstering the Malay support won by the UMNO. The Communist insurgency subsided, democratic procedures took root, and the party system grew more firmly institutionalized, encouraging the British to decolonize Malaya in 1957. The country grew in size in 1963, when the peninsula merged with Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah, thereby transforming Malaya into Malaysia. Singapore departed from the new federation two years later, however, in somewhat acrimonious circumstances.

During the 1960s, the Alliance continued to flourish, winning parliamentary elections in 1964 and most state-level contests. However, as urbanization took place, many Malay rice farmers and fishermen gathered on the fringes of the cities, there to observe the market activities and relative prosperity of the Chinese. In these circumstances, many Malays turned gradually from UMNO to an opposition party, the more stridently ethnic Pan-Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS). Many Chinese voters, equally alienated by what they viewed as the compromising outlook of the MCA, turned to new Chinese parties in opposition, the Democratic Action Party and the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People's Movement). Thus, when general elections were held on 10 May 1969, the Alliance won at the federal level, but with a much reduced majority in parliament. It was also defeated outright in several state assemblies.

In these circumstances, the Malay community contemplated the erosion of UMNO preeminence. Many Chinese, for their part, responded by celebrating the rise of the opposition. Three days after the election, street confrontations broke out between Chinese and Malays in the capital of Kuala Lumpur; these caused significant loss of life and extensive property damage, an event that is locally recorded as the May Thirteenth incident. After diagnosing the loss of Malay support for the government and the causes of the rioting, UMNO leaders began to restructure Malaysia's democratic political system and the largely free-market economy.

The Present

In order to renew its grip on state power, the UMNO coopted PAS and Gerakan into its ruling coalition, rechristening the Alliance as the Barisan Nasional ("National Front"). In expanding its coalition, the UMNO further heightened its own standing while effectively di-



FORMING A UNIFIED MALAYA

After World War II the British resumed control in Malaya and proposed a new governing arrangement, known as the Malayan Union. The scheme included granting citizenship to residents as set forth in the 1948 Federation of Malaya Agreement below and weakening the authority of the sultans.

Agreement dated the twenty-first day of January, 1948, and made between Sir Gerard Edward James Gent . . . on behalf of His Majesty and the [nine rulers of Johore, Pahang, Negri Sembilan, Selangor, Perak, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Trengganu]:

Whereas it has been represented to His Majesty that fresh arrangements should be made for the peace, order and good government of the Malay States of Johore, Pahang, Negri Sembilan, Selangor, Perak, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu, the Settlement of Penang and the Settlement of Malacca:

And whereas His Majesty in token of the friendship he bears towards their Highnesses, the subjects of Their Highnesses, and the inhabitants of the Malay States, is pleased to make fresh arrangements as aforesaid to take effect on such day as His Majesty may, by Order in Council; appoint . . . :

And Whereas His Majesty has accordingly entered into a fresh agreement with each of Their Highnesses . . . for the purpose of ensuring that power and jurisdiction shall be exercised by Their several Highnesses in their several States and it is in each of such Agreements provided that it shall come into operation on the appointed day:

And Whereas it seems expedient to His Majesty and to Their Highnesses that the Malay States, the Settlement of Penang and the Settlement of Malacca should be forced

into a Federation with a strong central government and that there should be a common form of citizenship in the said Federation to be extended to all those who regard the said Federation or any part of it as their real home and the object of their loyalty:

And Whereas it is the desire of His Majesty and Their Highnesses that progress should be made towards eventual self-government, and, as a first step to that end, His Majesty and Their Highnesses have agreed that, as soon as circumstances and local conditions will permit, legislation should be introduced for the election of members to the several legislatures to be established pursuant to this Agreement:

Now, Therefore, it is agreed and declared as follows:

1. There shall be established a Federation comprising the Malay States, the Settlement of Penang and the Settlement of Malacca, to be known as the Federation of Malaya . . .

Provided that His Majesty and Their Highnesses the Rulers reserve to themselves the power by mutual agreement from time to time to admit within the Federation any other territory or territories as they shall see fit.

2. His Majesty shall have complete control of the defence and of all the external affairs of the Federation and undertakes to protect the Malay States from external hostile attacks, and for this and other similar purposes, His Majesty's Forces and persons authorised by or on behalf of His Majesty's Government shall at all times be allowed free access to the Malay States and to employ all necessary means of opposing such attacks.

Source: Federation of Malaya Government Gazette. (1948) Kuala Lumpur: Federal Government (5 February), vol. 1, no. 1.

minishing opposition forces. Furthermore, a series of constitutional amendments and sedition laws were passed, effectively prohibiting criticisms of the ruling coalition's policies by the opposition in parliament, while truncating civil liberties more broadly.

After Mahathir Mohamad (b. 1925) became prime minister in 1981, additional controls were incrementally imposed on free communication and assembly and were enforced through regular applications of preventive detention under the Internal Security Act, first



People march in the 31 August 1999 parade in Merdeka Square, Kuala Lumpur, marking the 42nd National Day after independence from British rule in 1957. (AFP/CORBIS)

introduced in 1960 as a way to control Communists. Indeed, amid a leadership challenge mounted from within the UMNO in 1987, Mahathir ordered the detention of over a hundred opposition leaders and members of nongovernmental organizations, an exercise known as Operation Lallang. He also brought an independent judiciary to heel, replacing many of its judges with more compliant functionaries.

The extent to which the judiciary had become subservient to the executive was made plain a decade later, during a challenge to Mahathir mounted by his deputy, Anwar Ibrahim (b. 1947). Amid the regional economic crisis of 1997–1998, forces aligned with Anwar tried to discredit Mahathir at a UMNO party assembly. In a highly publicized case that attracted the attention of legal observers from around the world, Mahathir expelled Anwar from the party and the cabinet, while his attorney-general brought charges against Anwar of corruption and sexual misconduct. Although the evidence appeared scant, Anwar was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Meanwhile, security forces suppressed a broad-based movement for political reform that had been triggered by Anwar's downfall.

The New Economic Policy

After the May Thirteenth incident, the UMNO not only consolidated its political grip, but also entered deeply into the economy in order to reenergize its sup-

port among its ethnic Malay constituencies. The UMNO introduced a series of quotas on public and private employment, the distribution of equity ownership, and the issuance of state contracts, credit, and business licenses that heavily favored the Malays. This affirmative-action program, known as the New Economic Policy (NEP), is one of the most systematic programs of cross-ethnic redistribution ever attempted.

During the 1970s, when NEP quotas were most rigorously enforced, the Chinese community grew proportionately alienated, and many people emigrated. But over time, many members of the Malay community grew sophisticated in business dealings, while a new urban Malay middle class emerged. Hence, while the NEP doubtless fueled corruption in the UMNO, spawning a series of financial abuses and scandals, it appeared to mitigate ethnic Malay resentment. In this context, many Chinese came grudgingly to recognize NEP's social benefits. Put simply, with greater equality between ethnic communities established, violence on the scale of May thirteenth has never recurred in Malaysia. Furthermore, as part of Malaysia's Vision 2020 program for full economic and social development, Mahathir heralded the formation of a new national identity, with Malays and Chinese converging as *bangsawan Malaysia*.

Greater ethnic forbearance in Malaysia was encouraged not only by redistribution, but also by Malaysia's rapid industrialization. During the 1970s, the ineffi-

ciencies associated with NEP quotas were offset by the discovery and export of natural gas. And from the late 1980s to the late 1990s, the economy grew through foreign investment in Malaysia's electronics-manufacturing sector. Indeed, Malaysia attained some of the highest growth rates in the world during this decade, helping sustain new business conglomerates, a burgeoning middle class, relative ethnic harmony, and even a new nationalist identity and pride. It was during this time that Malaysia celebrated its achievements with a number of grand projects, including the world's tallest building, the Petronas Twin Towers.

During 1997–1998, however, the economic crisis that swept Asia halted Malaysia's record of development. Unlike other national leaders, however, who turned to the IMF for support, Mahathir invoked a series of capital controls that pegged the national currency to the U.S. dollar, banned the currency's offshore trading, and blocked the repatriation of capital gains by foreign investors. Despite attracting much international criticism, these measures were cheered by local businesspeople and consumers. Moreover, they appeared to promote faster economic recovery in Malaysia than IMF strictures facilitated in neighboring countries.

Nonetheless, Malaysia, like most of Asia, was beset by new economic difficulties in 2001, with global markets for electronics exports and tourism shrinking dramatically. Unemployment increased commensurately, rekindling social pressures. However, Malaysia's new nationalist identity appeared in some degree to take hold; social tensions were manifest less in terms of renewed conflict between the Malay and Chinese communities than between UMNO members and the more stridently Islamist PAS.

William Case

See also: **Malayan Emergency; Malayan Union; Malay States, Unfederated; Melaka Sultanate; Straits Settlements**

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MALAYSIA-POLITICAL SYSTEM A former British colony, Malaysia attained independence on 31 August 1957. The nation is a federation of thirteen states, governed by a Westminster-style parliamentary system. It includes the nine states of peninsular Malaya and the two Borneo territories of Sabah and Sarawak. The population is approximately twenty-five million, 52 percent of whom are ethnic Malays, 35 percent ethnic Chinese, and 10 percent Indians.

Paramount Ruler

The head of state, the paramount ruler, is one of nine hereditary sultans who serve rotating five-year terms; he is constitutionally required to act with the advice of the prime minister. The paramount ruler is elected by the conference of rulers, which includes the nine hereditary sultans and four appointed governors and meets three to four times a year.

Parliament


There is a bicameral parliament consisting of a non-elected upper house and a popularly elected lower house. The senate, or Dewan Negara, has sixty-nine seats, forty-three of which are appointed by the paramount ruler and twenty-six by the state legislatures. The house of representatives, or Dewan Rakyat, has 193 seats; members are elected by popular vote to serve five-year terms. Malaysia has universal suffrage for all adults over twenty-one years of age. The electoral system is weighted toward the rural Malay population.

Head of Government

The head of the government is the prime minister, who is chosen from among the members of the house of representatives. Following legislative elections, the leader of the party that wins a plurality of seats in the house of representatives becomes prime minister and appoints a cabinet. The prime minister is in charge of day-to-day governance. Beneath the prime minister is a cabinet made up of the heads of all government ministries and ministerial-level commissions and bodies. The cabinet meets once a week. If the prime minister loses the confidence of parliament, he or she must resign, along with the cabinet, and ask the paramount ruler to dissolve parliament; popular elections must be held within sixty days (ninety days in Sabah and Sarawak), and a new government is formed after legislative elections are held.

National Parties and Government Stability

Malaysia has experienced relative political stability. There have been only four prime ministers since the



Demonstrators from Malaysia's opposition Parti Islam Se-Malaysia protest the United States military action in Afghanistan in Kuala Lumpur in October 2001. (AFP/CORBIS)

country's founding, the first three all scions of the sultانات. Mahathir Mohamad (b. 1925), the current prime minister, chosen in 1981, is the longest-serving premier.

The National Alliance, the grouping of the three major ethnic-based parties—the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association, and the Malaysian Indian Congress—has dominated the government since the first federal elections in 1955. As ethnic minorities, many Chinese and Indians believe that their interests are best served by working with the dominant Malay party, UMNO. Since the founding of the country, all four prime ministers have belonged to the UMNO, including the incumbent, Mahathir Mohamad.

There are several opposition political parties, including Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), an Islamic party that is the main opposition party for ethnic Malays. Although an opposition party at the federal level, PAS controls two states in northeastern Malaysia, Kelantan and Terengganu, and has succeeded in winning eth-

nic Malay support away from the UMNO. The Democratic Action Party (DAP) is modeled on Singapore's dominant party, the People's Action Party. The DAP remains dominated by ethnic Chinese and has been unable to broaden its base of support; hence it wins only a portion of the Chinese vote. The National Justice Party (NJP), founded in 1998 by the wife of the former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim, has helped to win ethnic Malay support away from the UMNO, especially from those Malays who want a more secular opposition party than PAS. In the house of representatives, the National Front coalition holds 148 of the seats; PAS has 27; DAP has 10; NJP has 5; and the Parti Bersatu Sabah has 3. Although the power of opposition parties has grown, they have been unable to forge a durable coalition to challenge the UMNO-dominated National Alliance.

Although the government has an electoral system that virtually guarantees that it gets returned to power each election because of the National Front's alliance with the three largest ethnic-based parties, it also uses a variety of authoritarian measures to keep the opposition weak. Several draconian laws were inherited from the colonial era, including the Internal Security Act (ISA), the Sedition Act, and the Official Secrets Act. Press freedoms are severely restricted as the government has the right to revoke or deny licenses to newspapers that aggravate national sensitivities or fail to serve national development goals. Journalists, editors, publishers, and printers are all punishable, and there is a lot of self-censorship. The government keeps tabs on all newspapers and maintains control over some media through direct ownership.

The ISA allows the minister of home affairs to detain anyone without trial if he or she is satisfied that such detention is necessary to prevent the person from acting in a way prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or to the maintenance of essential services. The supreme court has upheld the ISA, which however was slightly amended in 1988, so that the court can now review cases on procedural, though not factual, grounds.

The Sedition Act deters political discussion and debate on the country's most controversial issues. The Official Secrets Act is another broad British-based law that covers the publication of any information in the hands of the government, no matter how significant or widely known. This law has prevented journalists or opposition politicians from attacking the government on corruption charges.

Parliamentary rule was suspended once, following race riots in 1969 in which 169 people were killed after opposition gains at the polls. Martial law was im-

posed, and the country was ruled by decree by the National Operations Council for twenty-one months, until 1971. The government then implemented a radical affirmative-action program, the New Economic Program, designed to redistribute wealth and educational and career opportunities to the majority, but poorer, Malay community. The government believes that the dissolution of parliamentary rule and draconian laws and controls are necessary to maintain order in an ethnically divided society. But it also uses these controls to stifle opposition.

Federal System

Malaysia has a federal system of government, with thirteen states and two federal territories. On 16 September 1963, Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore were constitutionally added to Peninsular Malaya to create the Federation of Malaysia; Singapore was subsequently expelled from the Federation on 9 August 1965. On Peninsular Malaysia, all states are governed by hereditary rulers; the governors of Melaka and Penang, as well as of the two Borneo territories of Sabah and Sarawak, are appointed by the federal government. Two federal territories are directly administered by the federal government: Wilayah Persekutuan, the national capital region that includes Kuala Lumpur and the new administrative capital of Putrajaya, and the island of Labuan. The federal system is quite weak, and most decision-making power and fiscal authority reside with the central government. Although all thirteen states have their own legislatures, there is a strong bias toward the federal parliament, and the federal government is able to control most states through the allocation of resources and transfer payments. The concept of federal supremacy pervades the legislative process, and federal law always takes precedence in cases of inconsistency or conflict with state law. It is illegal for states to pass laws that undermine the authority of the federal government.

Constitutions and Judiciary

Malaysia has had two constitutions, the Independence Constitution of 1957 and a 1963 constitution that saw the incorporation of Sarawak, Sabah, and Singapore. The legal system is based on English common law. The supreme court has the right of judicial review over legislative acts at the request of the paramount ruler.

Although Malaysia inherited a British system of common law, the judicial branch has lost much of its independence from the government. Supreme Court justices are appointed by the paramount ruler on the advice of the prime minister. But in 1988, Prime Min-

ister Mahathir Mohamad took the unprecedented step of sacking the chief justice and two of his associates. Since then the court has become highly politicized and infrequently adjudicates against the interests of the government. In addition to the secular court system, Malaysia has a parallel Islamic—or *shari'ah*—court system that adjudicates matters of family law and religion.

Zachary Abuza

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MALAYSIA-EUROPE RELATIONS

In world affairs, Malaysia maintains close relations with the United States, the European Union (EU), and Japan. Malaysian relations with the European non-members of the EU are still insufficiently developed, and there is a growing need for reinforcement of these relations, especially more effective economic cooperation. Trade between non-EU European countries and Malaysia is the most dynamic feature of this relationship, which also includes cultural and scientific exchange. The EU's dialogue with Malaysia has always been an inseparable part of the EU's (and before it the European Community, or EC's) relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The EU has no bilateral cooperation agreement with Malaysia. Economic cooperation between the EU and Malaysia is carried out mainly through regional programs, both within the framework of the 1980 EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement and through other programs.

Between 1967, when ASEAN was established, and the beginning of the 1990s, there were no particular political disagreements between the EC and ASEAN. In the 1990s, however, different approaches to political and social questions—particularly human rights, trade policy, and the impact of globalization—emerged. After the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the conflicting interests of these two regions became clearer. These conflicts have been mostly ideological, rather than economic, since both regions are trying to develop their own political and ideological cultures.



The Cenotaph, a British World War I memorial in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, is a reminder of the British colonial presence in Southeast Asia. (PAUL ALMASY/CORBIS)

In 1995 the European Parliament accepted the EU's new Asian strategy, wherein the ASEAN situation was considered. With the issuance of "Creating a New Dynamic in EU-ASEAN Relations" in 1996, a renewed focus was placed on the dialogue between Europe and Malaysia. During their official visit to Malaysia in 1996, EU leaders declared that they wished to develop a more meaningful political dialogue with Malaysia through a more frequent and direct exchange of views.

Asia-Europe Institute

There were series of Asia-Europe ministerial meetings in the 1990s, in which Malaysia took part. One important result was the establishment of the Asia-Europe Institute at the University of Malaya, the main mission of which is to further the integration of the Malaysian and European economies. Other principal tasks of the institute are promotion of the exchange of information on strategic business issues, analysis of the role of European banks in Asia before and after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and comparison of the investment strategies of Asian and European banks. These tasks are undertaken in an effort to support the integration of the two financial systems.

EU-Malaysia Trade

In 1998, the EU was the third most significant export destination of Malaysian goods (behind ASEAN members and the United States), with a share of 16

percent (\$12 billion). Among EU members the main Malaysian export partners were the United Kingdom and Germany, with 4 percent and 3 percent of total exports respectively. The EU was the fourth largest source of Malaysian imports (behind ASEAN members, Japan, and the United States) with a share of 12 percent (\$7.1 billion). Among EU members the main Malaysian import partners were Germany and the United Kingdom, with 4 percent and 3 percent respectively. In 1998, Malaysia had a trade surplus of \$5.1 billion with the EU, compared to a surplus of \$250 million in 1997.

Malaysia's main exports to the EU are electronic equipment, textiles, and palm oil and palm oil products. The main imports from the EU are machinery, chemicals, and transportation equipment. Malaysia has adopted a broad range of import restrictions, especially on automobiles and heavy machinery.

EU Aid

The EU has never provided general development aid to Malaysia, but some specific activities have been funded, including forestry and pharmaceutical projects and support for refugees. European development assistance began in 1987 and for the most part has been limited to the environmental sector. The EC-Malaysia Forest Programme was agreed upon in 1992, after which several projects were implemented. The main purpose is to improve the efficiency of forest harvesting and reduce logging damage. Another aim of forestry projects is to contribute to the conservation and sustainable management of natural forests and their biological diversity. Forestry projects for Sabah, totaling \$419,000, were implemented in 1998. Total funding since 1980 for other activities amounted to nearly \$6.5 million.

Along with Singapore, Japan, the United States, and Taiwan, the EU is among the largest sources of foreign investment in Malaysia. In Sarawak, the EU is the main source of foreign investment, accounting for 30 percent of the total between 1995 and 2000. EU industrial investments in Sarawak come mainly from six countries: Netherlands (natural gas), United Kingdom (forestry and nonmetallic minerals), Germany (metals), Portugal (electronics), Finland (chemicals), and France (food manufacturing).

Anglo-Malaysian Relations

Great Britain has a special relationship with Malaysia, as it was the colonial power that controlled the Malaysian peninsula from the late eighteenth into the twentieth century. In 1786, the British acquired Penang Island, establishing a settlement called George-

town. In 1826, the British formed the Straits Settlements, a colony that included Melaka (Malacca) and the islands of Penang and Singapore. The British later colonized the interior of the Malayan peninsula when tin was discovered. By the beginning of the twentieth century, Britain had established many protectorates on the Malayan peninsula, as well as in East Malaysia (the states of Sabah and Sarawak in North Borneo). By 1914, Britain had either direct or indirect colonial control over all the lands that now comprise Malaysia. After World War II, Britain united its territories on the peninsula as the Union of Malaya (1946); Sabah and Sarawak became crown colonies. In 1948, Britain created the Federation of Malaya, which became an independent state within the Commonwealth in 1957.

Several critical issues affected Anglo-Malaysian economic and business relations in the last decades of the twentieth century. In the early 1980s, diplomatic relations deteriorated when Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia's prime minister, launched a "Buy British Last" campaign to protest skyrocketing fees for overseas students and restricted landing rights at London Heathrow airport. In 1981, "Buy British Last" became state policy, the goal of which was to decrease Malaysia's economic dependence on England. The policy was reversed later in the decade. In February 1994, Anglo-Malaysian relations were disturbed for a second time, when Malaysia's cabinet decided that British companies would be excluded from competing for any new government construction contracts. As a whole, the Malaysian relationship with Britain was cool in the 1990s, but commercial relations began to pick up in the latter half of the decade.

The Future

In the latter half of the 1990s, EU-ASEAN relations were complicated by Myanmar's joining ASEAN, as the EU looked unfavorably on Myanmar's record in supporting democracy and human rights. The future of Malaysia-Europe relations to a large extent depends on the political situation in Malaysia—in particular political stability and human rights. Street protests in the fall of 1998, calling for the resignation of Mahathir Mohamad, unsettled Malaysia's reputation as one of the most politically stable countries in Southeast Asia. By 2000, the human-rights situation in Malaysia had deteriorated, largely because of Mahathir's determination to crush his political rivals.

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MALAYSIAN CHINESE ASSOCIATION

The Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) was established on 27 February 1949 by Tan Cheng Lock (1883–1960) a legislator in the British Straits Settlement and a leader of the Chinese community. The association was founded to protect the interests of the Chinese community of the British-controlled Federation of Malaya. The British colonial authorities had imposed a state of emergency in 1948 because of an insurgency led by the Malayan Communist Party, which was dominated by ethnic Chinese, and began to deport large number of Chinese. The British established some six hundred "strategic hamlets" where other Chinese and Malays could live away from Communist-controlled zones. The MCA began by working with colonial authorities to resettle and provide humanitarian aid to refugees from the insurgency. The MCA believed that only by allying with the majority Malay population could the rights and interests of the Chinese, who comprised 27 percent of the population, be defended.

In 1952, the MCA formed an alliance with the dominant Malay political party, the United Malay National Organization (UMNO). They later allied with a third communal or ethnically based party, the Malaysian Indian Congress, to form the National Front, which since its founding in 1957 has ruled first the Federation of Malaya and then Malaysia. The MCA favored the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, but it had to compete for Chinese votes with the Singapore-based People's Action Party (PAP), led by Lee Kwan Yew (b. 1923). (Singapore was at that time part of the Federation of Malaya.) Owing to the PAP's electoral success, in 1964 Lee asked the Malaysian prime minister to drop UMNO's alliance with the MCA in favor of the PAP, but he was rebuffed. The MCA supported UMNO's decision to eject Singapore from the Federation of Malaysia in August 1965.

The MCA tacitly supported the notion of Malay dominance in government. After the race riots of 13 May 1969, the MCA supported the New Economic Program, which called for a radical redistribution of corporate wealth from Chinese ownership to Malays, as well as for an affirmative-action program in education and government that favored the Malays. The MCA is the dominant political party representing the

interests of Malaysian Chinese, and though it continues to advocate "Malaysianization" for the Chinese community, it is also the main advocate for Chinese language, education, and culture.

Zachary Abuza

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
MALDIVES PROFILE (2001 est. pop. 311,000). Nature has blessed the Maldives with a living environment of tropical atolls and coral reefs that form a highly vulnerable marine ecosystem. Located in the Indian Ocean, approximately 700 kilometers off the southern tip of India and the west coast of Sri Lanka, the whole Maldivian archipelago spreads over 1 million square kilometers, and comprises a total of 1,190 islands belonging to twenty-four distinct atolls. Arranged in a long, narrow double chain of coral atolls stretching 820 kilometers from north to south and 130 kilometers from west to east, the total island area above the sea surface covers a mere 300 square kilometers, rarely more than two meters above sea level. As a result, the Maldives face serious infrastructural, communication, and developmental problems. Extreme isolation, remoteness, and global warming threaten the existence of the Maldives.

Geologically, the double chain of atolls are the tips of two parallel submarine ridges that rise 300 to 400 meters from a flat submarine plateau. Atolls vary in shape from circular and elliptical to pear-shaped. The lagoon, 40 to 60 meters deep, located around each atoll, is encircled by a fringing reef that serves as a natural barrier, sheltering the islands against the tides and floods. Eighty percent of all the islands are lower than one meter above mean high tide level. The islands vary in shape from small sandbanks to elongated strip islands and in size from 0.5 to 2 square kilometers.

Year-round temperatures are tropical, with a daily mean at around 28°C. Precipitation is high, at around 2,000 millimeters annually, mostly occurring as heavy showers. Comparably dry months coincide with the peak season of tourist traffic from January to April. Strong monsoon winds (and storms) do not hit the Maldives, and tropical cyclones are unknown.

The Maldives were first settled in the fifth century CE by settlers from Sri Lanka and southern India. The

Dutch controlled the region in the seventeenth century, and it was a British protectorate from 1887 to 1965, when the Maldives achieved independence. In the year 2001, only 202 islands were populated, with a further 87 uninhabited islands that were converted into tourist resort islands. With a total population of approximately 311,000 people on all 202 inhabited islands, the Maldives are overpopulated. The capital, Malé, located on an island in the center of the Maldivian archipelago, holds 75,000 people on only 1.5 square kilometers—therefore, a population density of 50,000 persons per square kilometer. Nearly half the population is under fifteen years of age, causing serious challenges of education and employment. Education levels in the Maldives are for the most part high, with a literacy rate of more than 90 percent, both for males and females. Secondary and higher secondary schools are located mainly in Malé, while primary schools are found on all islands, and a free education is offered to all. The Maldives, however, lack a uni-





MALDIVES

Country name: Republic of Maldives (Dhivehi Raajjeyge Jumhooriyyaa)
Area: 300 sq km
Population: 310,764 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 3.01% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 38.15 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 8.09 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: 0 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio—total population: 1.05 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 63.72 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population: 62.56 years, male: 61.39 years, female: 63.8 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Sunni Islam
Major languages: Maldivian Dhivehi, English
Literacy—total population: 93.2%, male: 93.3%, female: 93% (1995 est.)
Government type: republic
Capital: Malé
Administrative divisions: 19 atolls and 1 other first-order administrative division
Independence: 26 July 1965 (from U.K.)
National holiday: Independence Day, 26 July (1965)
Suffrage: 21 years of age; universal
GDP—real growth rate: 7.6% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita (purchasing power parity): \$2,000 (1999 est.)
Population below poverty line: not available
Exports: \$88 million (f.o.b., 2000)
Imports: \$372 million (f.o.b., 2000)
Currency: rufiyaa (MVR)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Factbook* 2001. Retrieved 18 October 2001 from: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

versity. Major economic and employment sectors are tourism, fishery, manufacturing, and public and private services. As the coral soils are not very fertile, agriculture only plays a meager role.

Housing and urban problems seriously affect Malé. As the only urban center, Malé suffers from land shortage, traffic overcrowding, and declining freshwater quality and quantity. A large portion of Malé is reclaimed land on the reef flat; the island shores of Malé are in close proximity to the edges of the underlying reef platform. Malé is greatly burdened by a heavy migration of workers from other atolls and islands attracted by more favorable economic opportunities and better health and education services. Under the pressure of population, Malé capital was extended to the nearby former tourist island of Villingili; additionally, a new suburban town quarter is under construction

through land reclamation on the reef platform between Hulule airport island and Farukolhufushi island, formerly known as Club Med Tourist Resort island.

Interatoll and interisland traffic and transportation is handicapped by the large distances over sea and the slowness of the still prevailing traditional, albeit mechanized, Maldivian *dhoni* boats. Transportation problems represent a major constraint to equitable distribution of goods and services throughout the country. *Dhoni* craft satisfy the basic interisland trade and commerce of goods as well as of passengers. Speedboats and air taxis are in service only for quick transportation of tourists, mostly between the international airport and the tourist resort islands. Internal air transport is limited; the national carrier, Air Maldives, serves four domestic airports in addition to Hulule. Domestic air transportation is too expensive for

Maldivians, hence the continued popularity of *dhoni* sea-transport. There is a modern telecommunication network across all of the atolls and inhabited islands. Health services options are best in Malé, with outpost hospitals on several islands.

As the Maldivian islands abound in rich marine biodiversity, international tourism has become the leading component of the economy. After a mild start in 1972, tourism developed aggressively from the 1980s, under the First Tourism Master Plan. Resort islands were developed mainly in North and South Malé atolls, in close proximity to Hulule. When the Second Tourism Master Plan, valid for 1996 to 2005, came into effect, resort islands were regionally diversified to other atolls adjacent to Malé and Ari atolls, in order to spread the benefits of tourism.

Resort islands are restricted to foreign tourists only; the number of resort islands is projected to increase to more than one hundred in the early part of the twenty-first century. Tourist arrivals increased to an annual total of 465,000 in 2000. Two-thirds of all tourists come from central and western Europe; the remaining one-third comes from Asia.

Tourism development is under the strict control of the government of the Maldives, mainly to ensure a minimum impact of tourism on the marine environment and on cultural integrity. Tourism in the Maldives has an exclusive nature; this is manifested in the clublike style of most of the resort islands. Environmental problems are, in fact, the biggest threat to sustainable future development of the Maldives. Sea-level rise, due to global warming, is the one thing most seriously threatening the future of the Maldives.

Manfred Domroes

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MALDIVES-HISTORY The history of the Maldives is buried in obscurity owing to the islands' geographical isolation and their comparative insignificance throughout the centuries, even though they are strategically located along the sea routes between Europe and the Far East and were well known to ancient Arabian sailors. Significantly, the Arabs converted the people of the Maldives to Islam in 1153. Since then Islam has been the state religion. As stipulated in its constitution, each Maldivian citizen is a Muslim. The history of the Maldives under the ruling sultans is recorded continuously from 1153 to 1821 in the Maldivian *Tarikh* (a chronicle); it covers the reign of eighty-three sultans. Sultans continued to rule the Maldives until 1968, though their political power steadily diminished. The last sultan, Muhammad Fareed Didi, was a titular ruler only.

Early Visitors to the Maldives

At certain times casual visitors to the Maldives and sailors recorded valuable eyewitness accounts of the islands and their inhabitants. It is not known when the Maldives were discovered or who the first settlers were, and whether they migrated from India or Sri Lanka is disputed. Probably the oldest historical source, the work of the fourth-century classical writer Ammianus Marcellinus (320–390), carefully differentiated the islanders of the Maldives, whom he called "Divi," from the islanders of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), whom he called "Serendivi." However, the famed Maldivian "Koimala Kalo" legend of the twelfth century describes the peaceful arrival on the Maldives of Ceylonese royalty, who were invited to settle there with the consent of the friendly aboriginal community of Giravaru Island.

Brief and vague notices of the Maldives appear in writings by Ptolemy (second century) around 150 CE, Moses Chorenensis in the late fourth century, and Cosmas Indicopleustes between 530 and 550. Arab travelers recorded valuable historical accounts, among them those of Lamma Mas-Oodhi in 947, Al-Becrooni in 1030, and Al-Idrisi (1099–1186). The greatest early Arab traveler, Ibn Battutah (1304–1368/69) visited the Maldives twice: first for a year and a half, from the beginning of 1343 until middle of 1344, and again two years later for a short visit at the end of 1346. Married to several Maldivian women, he was assimilated into the indigenous society.

The Coming of the Europeans

Until the European colonial era beginning in the sixteenth century, practically all of the Indian sea trade remained in the hands of Arab traders. The early Por-

tuguese commander Afonso de Albuquerque (1453–1515) in 1510 forced the sultan of the Maldives to pay a tribute to the Indian Cannanore Raja. After two unsuccessful expeditions to the Maldives, the Portuguese in 1558 captured the capital, Malé, which they ruled for fifteen years, until expelled by a Maldivian guerilla force. The Portuguese introduced Christianity for the only time in Maldivian history. In the seventeenth century, when Dutch, British, and French vessels also competed for the Maldivian trade, the Portuguese launched two fresh, unsuccessful attacks. Several times in the middle of the century Indian rulers attacked the Maldives, particularly Malé, from the Malabar Coast. In 1752 an expedition of the raja of Cannanore conquered Malé, destroying the palace and most of the town. The Malabar rulers, supported by the Portuguese colonial power in India, constantly harassed the Maldives. Subsequently the Maldivian sultan formed an alliance with the French rulers in Pondicherry, India, to protect the Maldives.

In 1887 the Maldivian sultan formalized an alliance with the British, who ruled the neighboring country of Ceylon. While the British government promised to protect the Maldives from foreign enemies and to abstain from interfering in local administration, the sultan agreed to pay tribute to the British government. The tribute obligation was lifted in 1948, but the Maldives retained the status of British protectorate. During World War II the British built a staging post on Gan Island in the South Maldivian Addu Atoll. In 1957 the post was converted into a British Royal Air Force base, which was abandoned in 1976. In 1953 the Maldives experienced a brief seven months as a republic with Amin Didi (d. 1954) as president. Though very modern (Westernized), the people of the Maldives disagreed with his politics and banished him on 31 December 1953 to Kurumba island, where he died. In spite of his ouster, Didi is considered the father of Maldivian nationalism. In 1965 the Maldives gained independence and membership in the United Nations.

Recent History

On 11 November 1968, President Ibrahim Nasir, who had taken over government from the last sultan, Muhammad Farid Didi, that same year, declared the (second) Republic of the Maldives and promulgated a new constitution that declared the Maldives an Islamic republic and vested great power in the president. He aimed at improving the economy and promoted the Maldives as a tourist destination. The political climate became unfavorable in 1974, escalating to actual revolt. Nasir resigned and fled to Singapore amid changes of political mismanagement. In 1978 Maumoon Abdul

Gayoom (b. 1937) was elected president of the Maldives. Credited with bringing economic and social progress to the country, he has subsequently been reelected four times. The Maldives is a strong member of the Non-aligned Countries and the Small Island States.

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MALIK, ADAM (1917–1984), vice president of Indonesia. Adam Malik was Indonesia's vice president from 1978 until 1983. He also was one of Indonesia's most successful foreign ministers, a position he held during the early New Order from 1966 to 1976. He was distinguished as a shrewd diplomat, known by the nickname "mouse-deer," derived from a popular Malay fable, as well as for his diplomatic words, "everything can be managed." Born in Pematang Siantar, North Sumatra on 22 July 1917, Malik dropped out of secondary school because of his interest in political activism. At the age of twenty, he left his hometown for Batavia (Jakarta). With only one typewriter, he built the Antara News Agency, which became Indonesia's national news agency. During the struggle for independence, he was jailed several times by the Dutch. As one of the young emerging leaders in 1945, he and his friends kidnapped Sukarno (1901–1970) and forced him to declare the independence of Indonesia.

Malik served many government positions under both the Sukarno (1945–1966) and Suharto (1966–1998) regimes. Having no diplomatic background, he initially questioned Sukarno's decision to appoint him as ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1959. He nevertheless proved to be a capable diplomat, and Suharto entrusted to him the project of building a new image of Indonesia as a capitalist and pro-Western country. As foreign minister, Malik was active in reducing tensions between Indonesia and neighboring nations. He also was one of the founders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. Malik was appointed the twenty-sixth president of the U.N. General Assembly in 1971 and was a member of the Willy Brandt Commission in 1977. Prior to becoming vice president of Indonesia, Malik briefly was the Speaker of People Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) in 1977. He died on 5 September 1984.

Abubakar Eby Hara

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MALUKU (2002 est pop. 2.3 million). Maluku (Moluccas), a region of Indonesia formerly known as the Spice Islands, was once the source of cloves and nutmeg, spices highly valued for their aroma, preservative ability, and use in medicine before people learned how to cultivate the plants in other parts of the world. Maluku is a cluster of about one thousand islands totaling 74,504 square kilometers, forming part of the Malay Archipelago in eastern Indonesia near New Guinea. The region is divided into two provinces, Maluku (2002 estimated population 1.4 million), with its capital in Ambon, and North Maluku (2002 estimated population 913,000), with its capital in Ternate; other important islands in the group include Halmahera, Seram, and Buru.

Maluku lies in the transition zone between Asiatic and Australian flora and fauna and has a tropical climate. Maluku's flora include *meranti* trees and many kinds of orchids; distinctive fauna include *uscuses*, birds of paradise, wild goats, and parrots. The economy is based on subsistence agriculture, especially sago (the sago palm, producing a starch used in food), and on the export of such products as spices, cacao, coffee, coconuts, fish, and minerals. Important indigenous groups include the Ambonese.

The Portuguese reached Maluku in 1511, but the region was later colonized by the Dutch, who arrived in 1599. In recent times, there has been conflict between the large Ambonese Christian minority and the Muslim majority.

Michael Pretes

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MAMADALI MAHMUDOV (b. 1940), Uzbek writer. A prominent Uzbek writer, Mamadali Mahmudov gained literary fame in the former Soviet Union in the 1980s. In 2001, he was given the PEN/Barbara Goldsmith Award. His most famous work is the his-

torical novella *Immortal Cliffs*, which was published in 1981. It won the Cholpan Prize in 1992.

Mahmudov believes in the unity of the Central Asian Turkic people and suggests that foreign concepts, such as Islam and Russian domination, have sapped their strength. His notion of unity implies understanding the shared heritage of these people and overcoming the alien elements that have crept into Central Asian culture, especially Islam and its ensuing Arabic influences.

In his work, Mahmudov draws heavily upon the oral *dastan* (accounts) tradition of Central Asia. A repository of a tribe's historical memory, a *dastan* is composed to commemorate an event, a person, or a battle and is often used to memorialize the struggles of the Turkic people against foreign invaders. *Dastans* are recited throughout Central Asia.

With independence, Mahmudov's aggressive nationalistic stance found little favor with the newly created nation of Uzbekistan. On 19 February 1999, he was arrested by order of the Committee for National Security and disappeared into the Uzbek prison system. He was officially charged with threatening the president, Islam Abduganievich Karimov, and seeking to destroy the nation's constitutional order. His arrest followed a series of explosions in Tashkent. He was allegedly tortured and forced to sign a confession, and in August 1999, he was sentenced to fourteen years in prison. He is presently in Chirchik Prison. Organizations such as PEN have taken up his cause and are seeking his freedom.

Nirmal Dass

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MANAS EPIC Among Turkic oral traditions, that of the Kyrgyz is justly celebrated as one of the richest and finest. The main Kyrgyz epic is *Manas*, an epic cycle of monumental proportions. In this century the cycle has been recorded by a number of singers; the most famous versions are those by Saghymbay Orozbekov, Sayakbay Karalaev, and Dzhusup Mamay (from the Chinese Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region). Saghymbay's version comprises over 180,000 lines, Mamay's around 210,000 verse lines, containing eight instead of the canonical three branches of the *Manas*

cycle, and Sayakbay's version no less than 500,000 verse lines. Generally, the epic cycle has three main parts. In *Manas* proper the subject is the miraculous birth of the hero, his fight against the enemies of his tribe, in particular the Kalmucks, his marriage to Kanykey, and his eventual death through treason. In the center of the second part is Manas's son Semetey, and his grandson Seytek is the subject of the third part. The epic cycle is full of detailed descriptions and lively dialogue and is packed with heroic and sometimes also romantic action. Not without reason, it has been ranked with the Homeric epics. The epics are in verse; the meter is a verse line of seven or eight syllables; the verses are linked together by rhyme and verse-initial alliteration to form stanzas of irregular length. Kyrgyz singers, called *manaschy*, perform the epic by singing and chanting the words to a number of melodic formulas without the use of instruments. The art of singing the epic is still alive among the Kyrgyz.

Karl Reichl

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MANCHU The Manchus (or Man) are a minority people concentrated in the northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Inner Mongolia in China. In the 1990 national census, the number of Manchus in China was 9.84 million. The Manchus are descended from a group of peoples of northeast Asia collectively termed the Tungus. The Manchus also claim descent from rulers of the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1126–1234). In the late sixteenth century, the Manchu tribes were organized into a collective nation under the rule of the greatest of their chiefs, Nurhaci (1559–1626). Nurhaci's successor, Abahai (1592–1643), changed the name of his people to Manchu in order to remove the historical memory that as Jurchens they had been under Chinese rule. The Manchus continued to grow in military power in the border region northeast of the Great Wall and eventually overthrew the Ming

dynasty (1368–1644) and established China's last imperial era, the Qing, or Manchu, dynasty (1644–1912). The Manchus remained an important symbolic people in China during the twentieth century, as was demonstrated by their being named in 1912 as one of the five races that constituted the new Chinese Republic.

The Manchu language is a member of the Tungusic branch of the Altaic language family and has some structural similarities to Japanese, Korean, and Mongolian. During the Jin dynasty, Jurchen official documents were transcribed using a modified form of the Khitan script. In 1599, as part of his nation-building, Nurhaci commissioned two scholars to modify the Mongolian script in order to create a written form of the Manchu language. This form of written Manchu is called the Old Manchu script because it was further modified in the 1620s by the addition of dots and circles, which eliminated some of the linguistic ambiguities that had resulted from the first attempt to modify the Mongolian script. This new script remained the standard form of the written language throughout the Qing dynasty. Few native speakers of Manchu remain in China, although volumes of the written script are preserved as official documents of the Qing dynasty and are housed in the national archive in Beijing and provincial archives in the northeast.

Robert John Perrins

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MANCHURIA (1997 est. pop. 105 million). Manchuria, the region of northeastern China comprising the provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning (Fengtian), is referred to as Dongbei ("Northeast") in China. This Chinese terminology is part of a larger effort to distance the region's history from the colonial overtures associated with the term "Manchuria," the nomenclature of which was partly the creation of Russian and Japanese imperialists who hoped that the name would imply the region's separateness from the rest of China. Originally peopled by a number of tribal groups, the largest of whom were Mongols, Tungus,

and Manchus, Manchuria is rich in natural resources, including coal, iron, timber and forest products, furs, and ginseng. During the twentieth century, Manchuria's transportation infrastructure and industrial base were developed by foreign occupiers and later by Chinese administrators. Today the region, bordered to the southeast by Korea and to the north and northeast by Russia, is one of the most important industrial heartlands in the People's Republic of China.

The presence of Han Chinese in Manchuria can be traced back to the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) when a prefecture was established on the Liaodong Peninsula at the southernmost point of Liaoning Province. It was during the reign of the fifth Han emperor, Wu Di (reigned 140–87 BCE), that a more significant Chinese presence was established when Wu Di encouraged the settlement of Chinese both on the Liaodong Peninsula and in an area of what is today western Liaoning in order to strengthen the northern borders against the Xiongnu peoples. For much of China's imperial past, however, there was only a minimal presence of Chinese in this region that lay beyond the northeast border of the Great Wall. After their conquest of China in the mid-seventeenth century, the Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) sought to preserve Manchuria as an undeveloped ancestral homeland, and the early emperors, including Shunzhi (1638–1661), Kangxi (1654–1722), Yongzheng (1678–1735), and Qianlong (1711–1799), all issued edicts, of dubious effectiveness, forbidding the settlement of Chinese in the region.

Russian Annexation Feared

With the growing Russian presence in the Far East in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Qing emperors grew to fear Russian annexation of Manchuria more than the presence of Chinese settlers. The last of the old edicts were repealed, and northern Chinese were encouraged to settle in Manchuria. The arrival of British and French warships off the coast of southern Manchuria during the Opium Wars of the mid-nineteenth century had also alerted the Manchus that the region had strategic importance and that the development of its population and fortifications was required. These belated efforts by the Qing rulers were ineffective, and by the 1890s Manchuria was largely lost to foreign imperialists, first Russian and then Japanese.

In 1896, following the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), the Qing rulers, now more fearful of Tokyo's colonial ambitions than Russia's, granted permission to czarist Russia to build the Chinese Eastern Railway across Manchuria as a shortcut and alternative route to

the Trans-Siberian Railway. In 1898, Russia secured further concessions from a weakening Manchu court, including a twenty-five-year lease of the southern portion of the Liaodong Peninsula and the right to construct an additional southern route to the region's railway that would have the added benefit of having a year-round ice-free port as its terminus in the new leasehold. Following the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), the new Russian rights in southern Manchuria, along with the region's railway and harbors at Lushun (Port Arthur) and Dalian (Dairen in Japanese and Dalny in Russian), were transferred to Japanese control.

Manchuria as a Japanese Colony

The new Japanese governors in southern Manchuria continued to build on the original Russian plans, and their new colony blossomed during the soybean boom of the late 1910s. By the late 1920s, tension was building as Japanese colonial ambitions in Manchuria could no longer be satisfied by a small leasehold on the Liaodong Peninsula and the attempts by commanders in the local Japanese garrison force, the Guandong (Kwantung) Army, to manipulate the region's de facto ruler, the warlord Zhang Zuolin (Chang Tso-lin). On 18 September 1931, the Guandong Army launched an invasion of Manchuria. The following year, the birth of a new "independent" nation of Manchukuo ("Country of the Manchus") was proclaimed. The reality was that Manchukuo was a creation of the Japanese military and a puppet state with no real independence. Until the end of the Pacific War, Manchuria remained under Japanese occupation, supplying raw materials to the home islands and playing an important role in the creation of Japan's colonial ideology. Manchuria was viewed by many Japanese not only as a strategic buffer zone between their empire and the Soviet Union but also as a colonial frontier, even a potential utopia, awaiting the arrival of brave Japanese settlers who would develop the region's untapped potential.

Following Japan's surrender in 1945, the Russians returned to Manchuria. Having secured the restoration of Russia's former rights in the region at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 in return for a promise to enter the war against Japan, Soviet troops invaded the region in the final days of the Pacific War. Over the next couple of years, the Russians plundered the region, dismantling factories and sending them in pieces back to the Soviet Union on railcars. Because of its industrial capacity and abundant natural resources, Manchuria was a hotly contested territory during the Chinese Civil War (1947–1949) between the Communists and Nationalists.

Since the 1950s, Manchuria has been developed as China's industrial heartland. The steel mills at Anshan, the Fushun colliery, the giant factory complexes in the industrial cities of Shenyang (Mukden) and Changchun, and the commercial port of Dalian played important roles in the industrialization strategies of the Communist regime. With the move to create a market economy in China in the late 1980s and early 1990s, industrial Manchuria began to experience new challenges. Many of the inefficient state-owned enterprises either closed or severely downsized their workforces. One of the results was a high level of unemployment in a region that had traditionally been prosperous under the old state-planned economy. Decades of industrialization have also created serious environmental problems in China's Northeast, including high rates of respiratory diseases among its populace and high levels of toxins in its rivers and waterways. The former pristine reserve of the Manchus is now polluted and home to tens of millions of Han Chinese factory workers.

Robert John Perrins

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MANCHURIAN INCIDENT On 18 September 1931, the Japanese Kwantung Army (Japanese forces in Kwantung, China) claimed that Chinese bandits had blown up the main tracks of the Japanese-controlled South Manchuria Railway outside Mukden (Shenyang) in southern Manchuria. Japan had pinned much of its hopes for gaining economic self-sufficiency and being a world power on the slender thread of its control of the South Manchuria Railway.

Although Japanese trains traveled the railway soon after the "incident," Japanese forces, apparently acting without formal approval from the government in

Tokyo, used this incident as an excuse for a year-long campaign to gain control over all of Manchuria, a resource-rich Chinese province that had been the scene of increasing tension between rising Chinese and Japanese nationalisms and also between Japanese civilian and military officials in southern Manchuria and the government at home.

The Chinese government complained to the League of Nations, which appointed Lord Victor Bulwer-Lytton of England to lead a commission of inquiry. The resulting report harshly criticized the Japanese, and the Japanese government responded by withdrawing from the league.

Japan eventually sought to demonstrate the "independence" of Manchuria and established a government for what they termed Manchukuo ("Manchu country") under the last Qing (or Manchu) emperor, Henry Pu-yi, in early 1932. (The emperor had abdicated in 1912, ending the reign of the Qing dynasty over China, which it had ruled since 1644.) But despite the appointment of some Chinese officials, power clearly rested with Japanese "advisers."

Thereafter, Japan sought to force Chinese recognition of Manchukuo's independence and began a war of aggression. Throughout the 1930s, Japanese military forces took one Chinese province after another without being able to compel China to concede the independence of Manchuria. Eventually, to support this increased military commitment in China, Japan looked to widen the war into Southeast Asia and against the United States, leading to the disastrous Pacific theater of World War II.

Charles Dobbs

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MANDALAY (2002 est. pop. 1.1 million). Mandalay, located in the central dry zone of Myanmar (Burma) 620 kilometers (400 miles) north of Yangon (Rangoon), is Myanmar's second-largest city, with a population of between 653,000 and 1 million (including unregistered aliens). The sprawling city, built on a grid pattern of roads, covers an area of 25 square miles bounded on the west by the Irrawaddy River. Mandalay has lost much of its traditional char-



An elaborate Buddha statue in Kuthodaw Pagoda in Mandalay in 1992. (GEORGE W. WRIGHT/CORBIS)

acter due to devastating fires in the 1980s and massive development by Chinese entrepreneurs, the Myanmar military, and other investors following legalization of the lucrative Myanmar-China border trade in 1989. Many local residents have been forced to relocate to peripheral satellite towns. Mandalay is at the hub of a trading and communications network and, besides its river, rail, and road links, has a new international airport (inaugurated in 2000).

The last in a succession of royal capitals, Mandalay was founded in 1857 by King Mindon (1853–1878) in fulfillment of a prophecy that a great Buddhist center would be built at the foot of Mandalay Hill on the 2,400th anniversary of the Buddhist faith. Mandalay was also known by its classical name of Yatanapon (City of Gems) and Shwe-myo-daw (Golden Royal City). Mindon was renowned for his piety, and during his reign many new monasteries and temples were endowed, ancient sites restored, the Buddhist scriptures carved on 729 marble slabs, and the Fifth Buddhist Council convened. In 1885 Mandalay was occupied by the British, who deposed and exiled King Thibaw (reigned 1878–1885) to India and incorporated Upper Burma into British Burma with Rangoon as its capital.

Although Mandalay was Myanmar's capital for less than three decades, its royal past and religious patronage have ensured that it remains Myanmar's cultural heartland and a flourishing center of traditional crafts as well as an important religious center, with approxi-

mately 60 percent of the nation's Buddhist monks resident there. Mandalay Hill is a place of pilgrimage and affords a spectacular view. The royal palace and fort dominate the north of the city and occupy a perfect square, bounded by crenellated brick walls, each over a mile long and aligned with the cardinal points of the compass and encircled by wide moats. Mandalay Palace, which incorporated many carved teak structures from the old Amarapura Palace, was destroyed in the closing stages of World War II and reconstructed only in the 1990s. Part of the palace compound is occupied by army command headquarters. Besides the royal palace, Mandalay's most famous monuments include the Mahamuni (or Arakan) Temple, the Shwe-nan-daw Monastery, the Atumashi Monastery (destroyed by fire in 1890 and reconstructed in 1996), the Kutho-daw, the Kyauk-taw-gyi Temple, the Ein-daw-ya Temple, and the Shwe-in-bin Monastery.

Patricia M. Herbert

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MANDALAY DIVISION (2002 est. pop. 6.6 million). The Mandalay Division plays a pivotal role in the life of Myanmar (Burma) and accounts for approximately 15 percent of the national economy. With an area of 37,024 square kilometers (14,295 square miles), it is located on the major transport and communication crossroads between the north and south of the country. Consisting of 29 townships and 1,796 wards or village tracts, its 1992 population was calculated at 5.54 million, the majority of whom were ethnic Burmans. The political and economic hub is Mandalay, Myanmar's second largest city.

The main economy is agriculture. Lying in the dry zone, various dams and reservoirs have been constructed to promote irrigation, including thirty new such projects since 1988. The main crops are paddy rice, wheat, maize, peanut, sesame, cotton, legumes, tobacco, chili, and vegetables. A number of industries are also located within the division, including the Mandalay Brewery, textile mills at Meiktila and Paleik, and the sugar mill at Pyinmana. In addition, the division contains the important gem mines at Mogok.

Mandalay is the main tourist center. There are also the remains of other royal capitals at Amarapura, Ava (Innwa), and Pagan. Other destinations include the 4,981-foot (1,518-meter) Mount Popa, which has been a center of *nat* (spirit) worship and pilgrimage for centuries, and the former British hill station at Maymyo (Pyin Oo Lwin), which is situated on the main trade road to Shan State and China.

Martin Smith

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MANDALAY PALACE Mandalay Palace was the last Burman palace resided in by independent royalty during the latter part of the Konbaung Dynasty. Soon after Mindon (reigned 1853–1878) seized power from his brother King Pagan, in January 1857 he gave the order to move the palace from Amarapura to the new palace grounds in the new royal capital, Mandalay. The palace itself was completed and occupied in July 1858, but the outer walls were completed later.

After British conquest in 1885, the British neglected Mandalay Palace. Under Lord Curzon (viceroy 1899–1905) the largely wooden palace was declared a museum in 1901. In 1945 the palace compound was destroyed during the Allied bombardments, leaving only the outer walls in place with a few broken buildings. During the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) period it functioned as a military station. Mandalay Palace is a symbol of Burmese sovereignty in particular to the BSPP–State Law and Order Restoration Council government, which by 1989 made a decision to renovate and rebuild from scratch 89 of the originally recorded 114 buildings, with the aim of bolstering legitimacy and attracting tourists. This was completed in 1996. It is surrounded by a 7-meter wall backed by an earth rampart, and by a moat 68 meters wide and 3 meters deep.

Gustaaf Houtman

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MANDARIN The term Mandarin is generally believed to be a translation of Chinese *guanbua*—literally "official talk," which originated as a form of common language among speakers of different Chinese dialects. In linguistic terms, there are four different views of Mandarin: as a Chinese lingua franca, as Modern Standard Chinese, as a branch of the northern Chinese dialect family, and as Premodern Chinese. Each of these senses of the term Mandarin will be examined in detail.

Mandarin as a Chinese *Lingua Franca*

Mandarin is believed to have originated as a form of common language among speakers of different Chinese dialects, loosely based on some form of northern Chinese. The precise locale of this prestige northern dialect is not clear, but Beijing, Nanjing, and Luoyang are likely candidates. The Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci (1552–1610), for instance, wrote in his travel journals (1583–1610) of a spoken language called "Quonhoa," which was used throughout the empire for civil and forensic purposes. In a way, the status of *guanbua* is similar to that of the "cultivated pronunciation" of the American Atlantic states existing alongside the local vernacular, with each state having its own version—its best approximation of the prestige dialect.

Mandarin as Modern Standard Chinese

The second meaning of Mandarin focuses on the area around Beijing—the Chinese capital for the past 500 years—whose local speech presumably had a prestige that conflicted with the prestige status of the *guanbua*. By the end of the nineteenth century, the two were extremely similar, with remnants of the old *guanbua* known as the "literary stratum" of Beijing Mandarin, and the local vernacular as the "colloquial stratum." An example of differences would be the word "to learn," which is pronounced *xue* in the literary stratum, but *xiao* in colloquial Beijing. Differences exist also in vocabulary, with *guanbua* leaning towards classical Chinese and colloquial Beijing being more abundant in localisms.

From the demise of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) through to the early days of the Republican era (1912–1927), the recognition of Beijing Mandarin as a national standard took a more convoluted route. At a meeting of linguists in 1913 to decide upon the new official language, the standard of choice was not the speech of the capital, but an artificial language incorporating the maximum number of distinctions found in the major dialects, envisaged as a compromise between north and south. But it soon became clear that no one, not even the linguists themselves, could speak this linguistic Frankenstein, and the movement failed miserably. In 1920 Shiyi Zhang, a professor from Nanjing, called for replacement of the man-made standard with "the speech of Beijing locals educated to the level of secondary school." Though Zhang's proposal initially met with resistance, Beijing Mandarin gradually took over as the de facto national standard. In 1926, when the national language was revised, pronunciations were largely based on the literary readings of Beijing.

The new national language, up to this point, had been known as *guoyu*—"national language," a term borrowed from Japanese usage—and still goes by this name in Taiwan. On the mainland, however, the national language underwent a second revision in 1955, and switched to the name *Putonghua* ("commoners' language"), which is normally translated as Modern Standard Chinese. Differences between *putonghua* and *guoyu* are few, mainly in the adoption of colloquial pronunciations in the case of *putonghua* where *guoyu* retains the 1926 literary norms. A 1955 revision managed to define the nature of the national language, basing "its pronunciation on the speech of Beijing, its lexicon on the core vocabulary of Northern Chinese, and its syntax on the norms of exemplary vernacular literature" (Li 1999: 32).

Tone aside, Modern Standard Chinese contains between 398 and 419 syllables, depending on whether we are to include certain Beijing colloquialisms not

TABLE 1

Modern Standard Chinese initials				
Labial	<i>b</i> [p]	<i>p</i> [pʰ]	<i>m</i> [m]	<i>f</i> [f]
Alveolar (nonsibilant)	<i>d</i> [t]	<i>t</i> [tʰ]	<i>n</i> [n]	<i>l</i> [l]
Alveolar (sibilant)	<i>z</i> [ts]	<i>c</i> [tsʰ]	<i>s</i> [s]	
Retroflex	<i>zh</i> [tʂ]	<i>ch</i> [tʂʰ]	<i>sh</i> [ʂ]	<i>r</i> [ʐ]
Alveopalatal	<i>j</i> [tɕ]	<i>q</i> [tɕʰ]	<i>x</i> [ç]	
Velar	<i>g</i> [k]	<i>k</i> [kʰ]	<i>h</i> [x]	

part of the educated vocabulary. The syllable is traditionally analyzed into an initial consonant and a final. The possible initials and finals of Modern Standard Chinese are listed in Tables 1 and 2, given in both pinyin romanization (in italics) and the international phonetic alphabet (square brackets).

Full syllables in Modern Standard Chinese carry one of four tones, which play a role in distinguishing word meaning. (See Table 3.)

Tone 3 often rises when it occurs at the end of a sentence or utterance, and as such is sometimes referred to as the dipping tone. Grammatical particles, suffixes, and unstressed syllables in Mandarin Chinese are often stripped of their tonal value, a condition referred to as being in the neutral tone.

Regarding syntactic properties, it is worth noting that Mandarin, like most other varieties of Chinese, is relatively free of inflection—nouns generally are not marked for case, number, or gender, and verbs need not agree with the person, number, or gender of the subject or object. Therefore, much essential information is encoded in the word order of a sentence.

There is however much controversy regarding the characterization of Mandarin word order. While the simple declarative sentence in Mandarin retains the

TABLE 2

Modern Standard Chinese finals			
	<i>i</i> [i]	<i>u</i> [u]	<i>ü</i> [y]
<i>a</i> [a]	<i>ia</i> [ia]	<i>ua</i> [ua]	
<i>o</i> [o]		<i>uo</i> [uo]	
<i>e</i> [ɛ]			<i>üe</i> [yɛ]
<i>ê</i> [ɛ]	<i>ie</i> [iɛ]		
<i>ai</i> [ai]		<i>uai</i> [uai]	
<i>ei</i> [ei]		<i>uei</i> [uei]	
<i>ao</i> [ao]	<i>iao</i> [iao]		
<i>ou</i> [ou]		<i>iu</i> [iou]	
<i>an</i> [ian]	<i>ian</i> [ien]	<i>uan</i> [uan]	<i>üan</i> [yen]
<i>en</i> [ɛn]	<i>in</i> [in]	<i>un</i> [uɛn]	<i>ün</i> [yin]
<i>ang</i> [aŋ]	<i>iang</i> [iaŋ]	<i>uang</i> [uaŋ]	
<i>eng</i> [ɛŋ]	<i>ing</i> [iŋ]		
<i>ong</i> [oŋ]	<i>iong</i> [ioŋ]		
<i>er</i> [ɛr]			

TABLE 3

Tones in Modern Standard Chinese			
	Description	Contour	Example
Tone 1	high	HH	<i>mā</i> "mother"
Tone 2	rising	LH	<i>má</i> "linen"
Tone 3	low	LL	<i>ma</i> "horse"
Tone 4	falling	HL	<i>mà</i> "to scold"

(Note: H = high pitch; L = low pitch.)

Subject-Verb-Object (SVO) order of Old Chinese (600 BCE–265CE), Modern Standard Chinese contains characteristics of languages with the basic word order Subject-Object-Verb (SOV), such as the ordering of relative clauses and genitives before head nouns, the placement of aspect markers after verbs, and the presence of operations that change word order from SVO to SOV. In the early 1980s, some linguists saw this as evidence that Mandarin Chinese is in the process of switching over from SVO to SOV, most likely due to influence from the Altaic languages of northern China. But recent scholarship in language acquisition and Chinese corpus analysis point to the contrary, namely, that SOV structures in Mandarin are infrequent, marked forms that are not easily acquired by young children, and that such properties are not unusual in rigid SVO languages such as English and Biblical Hebrew. The prevailing view, for now at least, seems to be that Mandarin Chinese, like most other languages of southern and southeastern China, is a typical SVO language.

Mandarin as a Branch of Northern Chinese

In Chinese dialectology, Mandarin or *guanbua* refers to a branch of Northern Chinese, which includes dialects used throughout most of northern and southwestern China, the majority of which are descended from or have had extensive contact with the *guanbua* lingua franca. Mandarin, in this context, refers to an entire dialect family, the largest family in the Chinese branch of Sino-Tibetan in fact, in terms of both geographical distribution and number of speakers.

Within the Mandarin family, there are three main divisions comprising eight subdialects: (1) Southern Mandarin includes the Yangtze (*Jianghuai guanbua*) and Southwestern (*Xinan guanbua*) subdialects; (2) Central Mandarin includes the Central Plains (*Zhongyuan guanbua*) and Northwestern (*Lanyin guanbua*) varieties, and finally (3) Northern Mandarin includes Northeastern (*Dongbei guanbua*), North Central (*Jilu guanbua*), Peninsular (*Jiaoliao guanbua*), and Beijing Mandarin (*Beijing guanbua*).

Mandarin as Premodern Chinese

From the demise of the Tang dynasty (907) onward, the homeland of Mandarin's northern Chinese roots was successively occupied by peoples of Turkic, Mongol, and Tungus-Manchu stock. This resulted in the drastic simplification of Middle Chinese (265–1269) and produced *guanbua*, or Mandarin. Thus Mandarin, as a historical phonological entity, is synonymous with what historical lexicographers call Premodern Chinese, and refers to the language of northern China from the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) to the present day.

Historical phonologists further divide the Mandarin period into three parts: Early Mandarin (1269–1455) is typified by the opera manual *Zhongyuan yinyun* (Rhymes of the Central Plains, 1324) of Zhou Deqing (1277–1365); Middle Mandarin (1455–1795) is preserved in Chinese-Korean pedagogical texts such as *Hongmu chongyun yokhun* (Standard Rhymes of the Reign of Hongwu, Annotated and Transcribed, 1455) and *Sasong t'onghae* (Thorough Investigation of the Four Tones, 1517), as well as the *Yunlue buitong* (1642) and other Chinese rhyme manuals. Mandarin from the mid-nineteenth century to the present is considered to have changed very little, and is referred to as Modern Mandarin or Modern Chinese.

Chris Wen-Chao Li

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MANGA *Manga* are Japanese comic magazines. These large, softcover magazines printed in monochrome are by far the most broadly read literary genre in Japan. Around 2 billion copies are produced annually. Some magazines are printed in 1 million copies or more each week. Many *manga* are reprinted later in pocketbook format.

Each *manga* magazine features stories and serials of broadly the same theme: education and training, romance, action, humor, history, or even violent pornography. Characters and stories from *manga*, *anime* (animated films), and computer games are often reproduced in each other. Drawing and dialogue conventions are more complex than are generally seen in, for example, American comics: odd-shaped panels, reduction or addition of detail for emphasis, use of varied camera point of view, and mixed (Japanese/Latin) script for effect are common.

Manga artists are generally organized into schools or studios, in traditional Japanese *iemoto* pattern, where a senior or master instructs junior artists, who eventually instruct juniors of their own. Members of a studio tend to have broadly similar drawing and expressive styles.

Otaku, young Japanese males who are obsessed with *manga* and *anime*, are considered something of a social problem in Japan because they are said to develop limited and difficult social relationships.

Michael Ashkenazi

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MANGALORE (2001 pop. 399,000). Mangalore, which was earlier known as Kodial Bunder, is the headquarters of the modern district of Dakshin (south) Kannada in the Indian state of Karnataka. Located on the Arabian Sea coast at the mouths of the Netravati and Gurgur rivers, it is marked by undulating landscape with areca nut (betel palm) groves, coconut palms, and other trees. The town has a tropical climate. Tulu is the most popular language. Mangalore is believed to have derived its name from the Managaldevi Temple located there. In addition, the town has several famous pilgrim centers.

This strategic port town had strong commercial links with the Persian Gulf for many centuries, and

various powers have fought for control over it. In 1526, Mangalore was taken over by the Portuguese from its Bidanur Nayaka rulers. In 1695, the town was burned by the Arabs in retaliation for Portuguese restrictions on Arab trade. In 1763, when the Mysorean ruler Hyder Ali (1722–1782) conquered the town, he built a dockyard and an arsenal here. The town was annexed by the British in 1799. The modern port is ten kilometers north of the town, and is now India's ninth largest cargo handling port. Mangalore's economy is dominated by agricultural processing and port-related activities, and it is also the major banking center for the region. The population is about 60 percent Hindu with significant Muslim, Christian, and Jain minorities.

R. Gopinath

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MANGESHKAR, LATA (b. 1929), Indian singer. Lata Mangeshkar's mellifluous voice has enthralled millions of people for the last five decades. Born in Indore, Madhya Pradesh, India, Lata showed her talent early, acting and singing in scores of Hindi movies since childhood. *Pabli Mangalagaur*, released in 1942, was her first acting assignment. At the age of thirteen she recorded her first film song in Vasant Joglekar's *Kirti Hasaal*. Singing with equal ease in Marathi, Hindi, and Urdu, Lata performed thirty thousand solos and duets that entranced millions of people throughout the world. Purity, sharpness, clarity, and lyrical notes are hallmarks of her songs. Lata's song "Aye Mere Watan Ke Logon" (People of My Country) sung during the Sino-Indian war of 1962 aroused a patriotic fervor and brought tears to many, including the premier, Jawaharlal Nehru.

She has won many laurels during her career: a place in the *Guinness Book of Records* (for singing the most songs in twenty different languages); a platinum record for EMI London, *Padma Bhushan*, *Padma Vibhushan*; and the Dadasaheb Phalke award. In 2001, Lata won India's highest civilian award: the Bharat Ratna.

Patit Paban Mishra

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MANGROVES Mangroves are communities of plants and animals existing within swampy intertidal mudflats in the Tropics, mainly at estuaries, riverbanks, and coastal regions subject to brackish water. Asia has 46 percent of the world's mangroves.

Diverse communities are found in mangroves. Frequent inundation and continual silting make the soil soft and clayey in texture, lacking aeration. Mangrove flora are uniquely adapted to such conditions. The red mangrove (*Rhizophora mangle*) has prop roots growing from the trunk for stability and bears germinated seedlings with long radicles. The white mangrove (*Laguncularia racemosa*) develops a dense network of cable roots within the soft mud for stability. A feature of this and several other species is spongy vertical structures growing from the cable roots, protruding several centimeters above the soil surface. These breathing roots (pneumatophores) help the plants obtain air. The black mangrove (*Avicennia germinans*) achieves stability by a massive growth of knee-shaped pneumatophores around the collar of the tree.

An abundance of animal species inhabits mangroves, including mollusks, crustaceans, insects, and fish. The fauna feed on organic matter mainly derived from leaf litter. The group of crabs called sesarmids may rely on fresh mangrove leaves as a food source.

Humans also benefit from mangroves. In countries such as Bangladesh, mangroves are the main source of livelihood for coastal populations. They derive fuel, medicines, and building materials from mangrove trees. Mangroves are also reliable sources of food: fruit such as Nipah palm nuts, and crabs, prawns, snails, and bivalves are constantly harvested. The complex structure of pneumatophores and fallen branches, and the abundant detritus, make mangroves nursery grounds for commercial varieties of fish, prawns, and crabs. Mangroves also help prevent erosion of the shore or riverbanks as their dense root networks help stabilize the soil.

More than 75 percent of the coastlines of tropical and subtropical countries were once covered with mangrove forests, which help to protect the shorelines. However, it is estimated that fewer than 50 percent of these remain today. The loss of mangroves in several countries is caused largely by urbanization, land reclamation, deforestation for charcoal and timber, mounting pollution problems, as well as the recent pressure from commercial shrimp farming. Industrial shrimp aquaculture has led to the clearing of large tracts of mangrove forest in Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Pacific Islands. Furthermore, the pollution caused by organic waste from shrimp is

an additional problem. In view of the importance of mangroves, several initiatives are being implemented in several of the countries mentioned to restore degraded mangrove forests and regenerate these on new mudflats. Active research is also being conducted internationally to develop sustainable models on how to derive benefits from the mangrove forests without destroying the ecosystem.

Leo Tan and Sing Kong Lee

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MANGYSHLAK PENINSULA The Mangyshlak Peninsula (in Kazakh: Mangghystau Tubegi), is located along the western boundary of the Republic of Kazakhstan, an internal political division of the USSR until its independence in 1991. It is part of a greater political-administrative region of Kazakhstan known as the Manggystau Province (Oblysy). The peninsula extends westward into the Caspian Sea.

The Mangyshlak Peninsula is at the heart of a larger oil and gas region that Kazakhstan inherited with independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Rich in fossil fuels and other natural resources, the peninsula yielded over half the republic's oil output in the early 1990s. The peninsula sits at the southern margins of the giant Tenghiz oil field, which extends to the north. Tenghiz oil reserves have been estimated to be around 25 billion barrels, or about twice the amount of Alaska's north slope. Chevron Oil entered into a joint venture with the Kazakh government in 1992, called Tengizchevroil, to extract oil in the region. Several problems have limited the development of the field in recent years, including decreased demand by Russian Siberian refineries that imported most of the oil, and pipeline access across the borders of the Russian Federation. In addition, the high sulfur, paraffin, asphalt, and tar content of much of the oil makes it difficult (that is, more expensive) to process.

Kazakhstan also inherited the Soviet Union's only fast breeder nuclear reactor, built in 1972 and located on the Mangyshlak Peninsula near the port city of Aqtau (Shevchenko). The reactor was built mainly to desalinate brackish Caspian Sea water for both personal and industrial uses. For economic as well as security concerns, the Kazakh government shut down the reactor in 1992.

The Caspian Sea is in reality the world's largest lake, with the Volga River supplying more than 80 percent of its inflow. It has no outlet and loses water through evaporation. Regional climate changes and changes in river flow into the Caspian have caused it to rise in the latter part of the twentieth century, leading to the evacuation of small towns and villages along the coast due to flooding.

Because of its high latitude (50°N), far from the moderating influences of oceans, the peninsula experiences a very continental climate. It sits on the western margins of the dry Kazakh steppe region. Horse, sheep, and camel herding, as well as some irrigated farming, are the main occupations of the inhabitants of the peninsula.

David R. Smith

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MANHATTAN INCIDENT Thailand's *Manhattan* Incident of 1951 was the result of a bitter interservice rivalry between the more politically moderate navy and the conservative, royalist army, which was in turn tied up in the ongoing conflict between Pridi Banomyong (1900–1983) and Field Marshall Pibul Songgram (1897–1964), the leaders of Thailand's 1932 Revolution, which ended the absolute monarchy. Following World War II, Premier Pibul was forced to resign because of his alliance with the Japanese. He was replaced by the leading democrat, Pridi, who implemented sweeping constitutional changes designed to keep the military out of politics. Pridi's leftist economic reforms worried many in the army and royal family, who implicated him in the 1946 death of King Ananda. Therefore, despite his 1946 electoral victory, Pridi resigned, installing his close friend Admiral Dhamrong as premier.

In March 1947 Pibul reentered politics, resigning from the army and founding an ultranationalist party.

Dhamrong was ousted in a 7 November 1947 army coup; he and Pridi were given refuge by the navy before fleeing abroad. Pibul denied planning the coup and was immediately named chief of Thailand's armed forces; he consolidated his power by September 1948, scrapping Pridi's liberal constitution and giving the army full control over the legislature. Corrupt and authoritarian, Pibul saw his legitimacy wane.

Pridi had a lot of popular support but had already disbanded his wartime Free Thai Movement, which had been allied with the West against Pibul's pro-Japanese government. Pridi also feared the prospect of a full-scale civil war, and both the United States and Great Britain urged the navy not to participate in a civil war against the army-led government. Pridi lived in exile but remained a threat to the regime as the navy laid the groundwork for his return, and on 26 February 1949 he secretly returned to lead an abortive coup by the navy and marines that was quickly crushed, forcing Pridi back into exile.

Pibul sought to improve the economy and began to shore up his anti-Communist credentials, winning American aid. As part of the aid program, the United States provided Thailand with a dredger, the USS *Manhattan*. At the 29 June 1951 ceremony transferring the dredger to the Thai government, a naval officer forced Pibul into a naval launch at gunpoint. He was taken to the battleship *Sri Ayudhya*, where he was held.

The navy, which had been biding its time since the February 1949 coup attempt, was hoping to oust Pibul, but army, air force, and police units responded quickly and on 30 August, the air force bombed the battleship. Pibul survived, and swam ashore, and within thirty-six hours was back in full control. In total, there were some 603 civilian casualties and an untold number of military casualties. Pridi died in exile, and Pibul was ousted in a September 1957 coup by Field Marshall Sarit Dhanaret. The lasting result of the 1951 *Manhattan* Incident was that the army consolidated its political power and would continue to dominate Thai politics for decades.

Zachary Abuza

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MANIAM, K. S. (b. 1942), Malaysian writer. K. S. Maniam was born in Bedon, Kedah, Malaya. Trained as a teacher in Britain, he taught for several years in

Kedah before graduating from the University of Malaya in 1973. He is the author of some of the most significant Malaysian fiction in English. In 2000, he won the international Raja Rao Award for literature, which was conferred by the Samvad India Foundation. His novel *The Return* is considered a landmark for creating a distinctive Malaysian voice in the English language. His national award-winning short story "Haunting the Tiger" is similarly regarded as a groundbreaking piece of stylistic innovation for the genre of the Malaysian short story.

The Return has been included in the newly formed national canon of English-language writing for the national secondary schools curriculum. This inclusion is also the first official acknowledgment of contributions by Malaysian writers in languages other than the national Malay language.

Two of Maniam's plays, *The Cord* and *Sandpit*, marked the beginning of a resurgence in original Malaysian theater in English, which took off in the early 1980s. His work draws on the historical experiences of Indian-Malaysians and is concerned with the creation of new mythological and symbolic languages that integrate immigrant experiences into the multiracial national psyche of Malaysia. K. S. Maniam was associate professor of English at the University of Malaya and is now an independent writer.

Mohan Ambikaibaker

MANILA (2002 Metropolitan Manila est. pop. 10 million). Manila is the capital and the primary city of the Philippines. Manila proper (1995 population 1.6 million) is the Philippines' second-largest city after Quezon City (1995 population 2 million) in terms of population. Manila is located in southern Luzon Island on the Pasig River and Manila Bay. The Pasig River divides the city into north and south sections, with the old city, government buildings, and tourist facilities in the south and commerce, large slums, and Chinatown in the north. Present-day Manila is a major manufacturing, commercial, educational, cultural, and political center. It is a major port, the endpoint for the island's highways and railroads, and it has the nation's major airport. Major industries include processing plants for hemp and tobacco, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, steel, automobile assembly, and textiles. It also has over twenty colleges and universities and a reputation as the entertainment center of East and Southeast Asia with many restaurants, nightclubs, and theaters.

From the twelfth century, the territory that was to become Manila was a Muslim trading port with ties to



The skyline of Quezon City, Manila, in 1998. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

Brunei and Melaka to the south and west. It was conquered by the Spanish colonizer Miguel Lopez de Legazpi (c. 1510–1572) in 1571; Legazpi made it the center of Spanish colonization of the Philippines. The name Manila is a Spanish corruption of Maynilad, meaning "where the *nilad* grows." (The *nilad* is a small white flower that used to flourish on Pasig riverbanks.)

Under the Spanish, Manila became the center of education, commerce, and religion; it was administered from distant Mexico City. The Spanish actually created two cities: the Intramuros, a walled city south of the river, where the Spanish lived, and an Extramuros, outside the walls, where the Malays and Chinese lived. For two centuries it was mainly a regional trade center for the flow of goods and wealth between China and Mexico. After the Spanish developed the Philippines as an agricultural colony early in the nineteenth century, Manila became the primary trade city both for intra-island and external trade. As the major trading center, it attracted the Spanish elite and became a cosmopolitan city and the home to Spain's major educational and religious organizations in Asia. It

was this elite that played a major role in the Philippine revolution (1896–1898) and who worked with U.S. colonial officials to create an independent Philippines in 1946.

Manila was occupied by the Japanese from January 1942 until February 1945. It suffered much damage in both the Japanese assault and the American recapture, with the old city almost entirely destroyed. In 1948 Quezon City was made the national capital; Manila became the capital again in 1976. Since the end of World War II the city has been rebuilt and has experienced enormous growth.

Metropolitan Manila, or Metro Manila, is an administrative region composed of twelve cities (Quezon City, Manila, Caloocan, Makati, Pasig, Marikina, Mandaluyong, Pasay City, Muntinlupa, Paranaque, Las Pinas, and Valenzuela) and five municipalities (Taguig, Malabon, Navotas, San Juan, and Pateros). Metro Manila was created in 1975 by Ferdinand Marcos (1917–1989), the Philippines' leader from 1966 to 1986, to make coordination of regional services such as sewage disposal, garbage collection, housing, and water supply more efficient. Marcos appointed his wife, Imelda, the first governor of the district. Each of the cities and municipalities maintains its autonomy and elects its own mayor and council.

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MANILA ACTION PLAN On 24 and 25 November 1996, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) nations held their annual meeting in Manila, the Philippines. Security at the meeting was especially tight, as the host nation was undergoing considerable political unrest and it feared possible violence from Islamic fundamentalists.

The Manila meeting followed a lackluster conference in Osaka the previous year where little of substance was accomplished. Some anticipated a similar result for Manila because of differences among the member countries over tariff reductions.

The signature issue of the conference was loosening restraints on the trade in advanced technology, especially computers and communication equipment. As the world's leader in these areas, the United States pressed for liberalized trade rules. But other nations had developing industries in these market segments and were reluctant to let them fend for themselves in a brutally competitive world market. China, especially, was reluctant to go along with U.S. proposals.

Rather than let a second consecutive conference end in relative failure, President Bill Clinton proposed a compromise that set the year 2000 for the elimination of national tariffs on technology. The resulting "action agreement" was, however, nonbinding and no enforcement provision was adopted. This somewhat lame agreement was the only real item of business for the conference, which also split over the issue of human rights, with China and the United States once again in opposition.

Robert K. Whalen

MANIPUR (2001 est. pop. 2.4 million). Bordering Myanmar (Burma), Manipur is a small state in north-eastern India. The state is a rough rectangle with an area of 22,327 square kilometers. One-third of the people, living in the rugged hills, belong to twenty-nine tribes, which are part of either the Kukis or the Nagas ethnic groups. The other two-thirds of the population, in the valley, are primarily Meitei. In the 1700s Bengali influence led to the adoption of Vaishnavism by the elite. British conquest in 1891 increased the social distance between the elite and the masses. Efforts to revive Meitei culture and religious rituals and to replace Bengali with Manipuri script strongly challenged the national government and the Vaishnavite Brahmans. Resistance in the hills was violent, with a 1917 rebellion against the British and a union of Naga groups into the anti-Christian Zeliangrong movement in Nagaland (1927–1932).

During World War II Manipur was occupied by the Japanese, with 250,000 British and Indian troops trapped under siege. Since 1972 violent self-rule campaigns and a war between the Kukis and Nagas have disturbed the state. Agriculture and forestry predominate; small-scale industries produce cotton and silk textiles, milled rice, crude sugar, and wooden wares. More than 200,000 hand looms yield designed cloth in demand throughout India.

C. Roger Davis

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MANORA *Manora*, also known as *menora*, *nora chatri*, or simply *nora*, is a traditional Malaysian folkdance drama. Some scholars believe that *manora* originated in India and later spread to Java and Malaya before reaching southern Thailand. Other scholars believe that *manora* is a primitive performing art, originating in southern Thailand, and could have evolved from the ritual of propitiation of hunters. Today, *manora* is largely performed as an art form for the common people.

The word *manora* derives from the name of the heroine in the Manohra tale in Buddhist literature. There are two types of *manora*. One is performed for a specific ritual purpose (e.g., the release of a vow, or to celebrate coming of age). The other is performed purely for entertainment at weddings, fairs, or festivals. *Manora* is popular in the northern and eastern states of Malaysia (Kedah, Perlis, and Kelantan), as well as in various provinces in southern Thailand.

Manora is similar to Mak Yong, another traditional Malay dance drama. However, they are different in terms of their presentation of music and dance. The musical instruments that accompany the dancing and singing in a *manora* are much more numerous than those in Mak Yong. *Manora* is performed on a low platform with the audience sitting or standing on three sides. Mak Yong, on the other hand, is performed on the level ground and is open on all sides so that performers can sit and move freely and are visible to the audience at all times. *Manora* emphasizes the dance rather than the stories, which derive from *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata* epics. Unlike Mak Yong, all performers of *manora* are men, who cross-dress to play female roles. The language used depends upon the local dialect. In Kelantan, for example, actors use the Kelantanese dialect, while in Perlis, a mix of Thai and Perlis dialects is used. *Manora* music is adapted from Thai folk music, and instruments usually include a double-reed oboe, a pair of single-headed stick drums, cymbals, and bamboo or wooden clappers.

Nor Faridah Abdul Manaf

See also: **Mak Yong**

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MANSUR SHAH (d. 1477), Malay Melakan sultan. During Mansur Shah's reign (1459–1477), the sul-

tanate of Melaka reached the zenith of its political, territorial, and religious influence in the Malay Archipelago. Mansur succeeded his father, Muzaffar Shah (reigned 1445–1459), owing to the support of his powerful and influential uncle Tun Perak, the *bendahara* (prime minister). Throughout his reign, Mansur was assisted by Tun Perak, Tun Ali, the treasurer, and Hang Tuah, the *laksamana* (admiral).

The power and status of the sultan was consolidated due to the efforts of Tun Perak. Melaka expanded its hegemony through diplomacy, political maneuvering, religious influence, and military conquest, and Tun Perak planned and executed this expansionist policy. Eastern Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, and the Riau-Lingga archipelago submitted to Melaka. Through trade and Islamic propagation, Banda, Brunei, and the northern Javanese ports also came within Melaka's sphere of influence. Mansur's marriage to both a Chinese and a Javanese princess further strengthened relations with China and Majapahit, respectively.

The pleasure-loving Mansur was neither an efficient administrator nor an exemplary ruler. He presided over a royal court rich with ceremonies. He preferred literature and religious discourse and left state affairs to his ministers. The well-known Tuah-Jebat duel exemplified Mansur's misuse of his power as an absolute monarch. Out of blind loyalty to his ruler, the *laksamana* Tuah killed his friend, Jebat, who had revealed the monarch's injustices. The Tuah-Jebat conflict struck at the heart of the traditional Malay concepts of unquestioned loyalty and justice.

Ooi Keat Gin

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MANTO, SAADAT HASAN (1912–1955), Indian writer. Saadat Hasan Manto, the much acclaimed and controversial South Asian Muslim literary figure, was born in Sambrala, in the Ludhiana district of the Punjab. As a young man, Manto began his literary

career with an Urdu translation of Victor Hugo's *The Last Days of a Condemned Man*. Early in his career, Manto was deeply influenced by French and Russian realist writers such as Hugo, Guy de Maupassant, Anton Chekhov, and Maksim Gorki. During the 1930s, Manto was also peripherally involved with the Indian Progressive Writers Association, a literary movement committed to articulating the ideals of social uplift and justice through literature.

During his career, Manto wrote more than two hundred stories and a number of essays, film scripts, and radio plays. However, his greatest contributions to Indian literature were his mastery of the short story genre and his use of the Urdu language. Some of his well-known Urdu short stories include "Bu" ("Odor"), "Khol Do" ("Open It"), "Thanda Gosht" ("Cold Meat"), and "Toba Tek Singh," translated into English after Manto's death.

After the partition of India in 1947, Manto left his home in Mumbai (Bombay), where he had lived since 1936, and returned to Lahore, Pakistan, in January 1948. Although Manto's last years in Pakistan were filled with financial hardship, failing health, and relative obscurity, they were also witness to some of his greatest literary achievements. Manto was survived by his wife Safiyah and three daughters.

Ami P. Shah

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MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY—INDONESIA Indonesia's economic performance from 1969 to 1996 has been remarkable. From the mid-1960s to the early 1980s, gross domestic product (GDP) grew by more than 7.5 percent per annum (p.a.). After a mild economic recession due to the collapse of the price of oil in 1980–1985, the economy rebounded again and grew by 6.7 percent p.a. from the mid-1980s to 1996.

Continued economic growth transformed the structure of Indonesia's economy. In 1970, agriculture accounted for 45 percent of GDP, and manufacturing 12 percent. By 1996, agriculture had declined to 17 percent of GDP, whilst manufacturing rose to 24 percent.

Structural Transformation—Key Features of the Manufacturing Sector

Between 1970 and 1980, the manufacturing sector grew by more than 14 percent per year. However, In-

onesia was confronted with a series of problems in the 1980s, and a large decline in oil prices hurt Indonesia's balance of payments. The government then launched economic liberalization programs to increase economic efficiency, and made development of non-oil and gas exports a top priority. The impact of these measures on non-oil manufacturing exports was quite remarkable; they experienced a 57 percent growth in 1987. After experiencing slower growth in 1980–1985 (8.5 percent), the sector grew by 10.7 percent in 1985–1990 and 10.4 percent in 1990–1995.

In 1997, however, Indonesia faced a serious economic crisis. The rupiah fell to a record low of 17,000 to the dollar in January 1998, and the economy shrank by 13.2 percent. In 1998 the manufacturing sector experienced negative growth of –11.4 percent while the overall economy declined by –13.2 percent. The overall economy slightly improved in 1999, experiencing 0.2 percent growth while the manufacturing sector grew by 2.2 percent. The share of the manufacturing sector to the total GDP was relatively stable during that period, implying a stagnation in structural change in this sector.

To understand about the structure of the manufacturing sector, it is important to observe how the structural change took place within it. Food products (International Standard Industrial Classification number 31, or ISIC 31), which accounted for 47 percent of total non-oil manufacturing in 1975, had declined to 23 percent of total manufacturing by 1995. On the other hand, the share of labor-intensive industry (ISIC 32 and 39) in total manufacturing continued to rise, from 11 percent in 1975 to 19 percent of total manufacturing by 1995.

Internationally, Indonesian exports were dominated by non-oil manufacturing products, particularly after the mid-1980s. In the 1970s, manufacturing exports contributed less than 3 percent to total exports, and primary goods dominated, but by 1987 the share of manufacturing exports had surpassed that of primary exports.

Before the mid-1980s, manufacturing exports were dominated by the Agriculture Resource Intensive (ARI) group. In the 1970s, ARI exports represented 90 percent of all non-oil manufacturing exports, and Unskilled Labor-Intensive (ULI) only 5 percent. But ULI exports grew rapidly, surpassing the ARI share in 1985. That year, ULI was 44 percent of total manufacturing exports, while ARI was 42 percent. The share of ULI continued to increase, reaching 54 percent in 1992, while that of ARI continued to decline, to 25 percent. This notable performance of labor-intensive



The Arco oil company's offshore facility in the Java Sea. (HANAN ISACHAR/CORBIS)

exports can be attributed to the trade liberalization that began after 1985, which allowed Indonesia to exploit its potential comparative advantage in labor-intensive products.

Another important feature of the Indonesian manufacturing sector was the high dispersion of trade protection among the industries, particularly during the period 1975 to 1998. But trade protection in the manufacturing sector was not random. In the 1970s it was mainly influenced by national policy, such as protection for infant industries. Particularly after the mid-1980s, it was strongly influenced by crony capitalists and various interest groups.

The period since 1985 has seen outstanding performance in the Indonesian manufacturing sector. This rapid expansion can be credited to factors such as the devaluations of the rupiah in 1983 and 1986, high savings and investment rates, and economic liberalization since 1985. Indonesia's remarkable growth in the manufacturing and export sectors during the pre-crisis era and this achievement can be attributed to credible macroeconomic management, a political predisposition towards moderate inflation, and trade liberalization during the 1980s.

During the 1997 economic crisis, the share of manufacturing in the total GDP remained relatively stable. After 1998 the manufacturing sector rebounded in line with the improvement of Indonesia's economic growth.

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MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY-MALAYSIA

The manufacturing industry in Malaysia became a significant contributor to the country's economy in the postindependence period beginning in the 1960s. During the colonial period, the country had been a major producer of raw materials, namely, tin and rubber. Secondary industries then were related to tin, rubber, timber, foodstuffs, and petroleum.

Historical Overview

Tin smelting started in Kuala Lumpur in the early 1880s. In 1885, a reverberatory furnace was in operation in Telok Anson (now Telok Intan), Perak (now a state in Malaysia), for smelting low-grade ores. The Straits Trading Company erected smelting plants on Pulau Brani (c. 1887) and at Butterworth (1902) in Penang state. A Chinese-owned smelter at Datuk Keramat that started operation in 1897 was bought by the Eastern Smelting Company.

Oil was struck at Miri, Sarawak, in 1910. A Shell-owned distillation plant for crude oil at Lutong came into operation in mid-1919 to serve the needs of the

oilfields of Miri and Seria, Brunei. The Borneo Company processed gold by utilizing the cyanidation process at its plants in Bau (1899) and Bidi (1900) in Sarawak.

Some light-engineering works involved motor repairs of machinery in tin mining, irrigation, and transportation (road and rail) equipment. Service maintenance of locomotives and coaches was an industry supporting the transportation sector. The manufacture of consumer goods (soap, matches, etc.) for domestic consumption was on a very small scale. There were also indigenous handicraft and cottage industries (textiles, foodstuffs, etc.). Beginning in the 1960s concerted efforts and programs were implemented to promote and develop the manufacturing industry in the country.

Contemporary Status

The manufacturing sector is now a dynamic and flourishing component of the national economy, accounting for about one-third of the gross domestic product (GDP) as shown in Table 1.

The electrical, electronics, and machinery-products industries experienced rapid growth and expansion during the 1970s. Malaysia progressed from assembling electrical goods and machinery to manufacturing a wide range of these products by the 1980s. The electronics industry is the largest in the region, and Malaysia is the leading exporter of semiconductor components to the United States. Multinationals like Intel, AMD, Sony, Sharp, Motorola, and others are well entrenched with huge amounts of capital investments.

The Rubber Industry

Complementing its market position as the world's major producer and exporter of natural rubber, Malay-

sia also leads in the manufacture of latex goods. The manufacture of rubber-based products has attracted a constantly growing number of foreign manufacturers and investors, including Goodyear of the United States, Viking Askim of Norway, Ansell of Australia, BDF Beiersdorf AG of Germany, Pirelli of Italy, Sagami of Japan, Dongkuk Techco of South Korea, and others.

The Food Industry

The food, beverages, and tobacco industries are the province of small- and medium-scale (SMIs) establishments. Food manufacturing continues to be heavily dependent on imported inputs. Efforts are being undertaken to encourage import substitution in this sector.

The Petroleum Sector

Optimism is high for the petroleum industry and the manufacture of related products. From its beginning in Lutong in 1919, Malaysia had five oil refineries by 1998: two are owned by PETRONAS (Petroleum Nasional Berhad), the national petroleum company, two by Shell, and one by Exxon Mobil. The PETRONAS-owned Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) plant at Bintulu, Sarawak, which started operation in 1983, is the world's third-largest LNG exporter. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Bintulu Fertiliser plant, an ASEAN joint-venture project that commenced operation in 1985, is reputedly the world's largest in terms of production-train capacity. Another joint venture, the Middle Distillate Synthesis plant that converts natural gas into diesel, kerosene, solvent, and so on, is a project by PETRONAS, Shell Gas BV, Mitsubishi Corporation, and the Sarawak state government. It started production in 1993. There are also several petrochemical industries operating under PETRONAS.

Heavy Industry

The heavy-industry sector can trace its beginnings to the period of large-scale tin mining in peninsular Malaysia from the mid-nineteenth century. The manufacture of cast-iron parts for tin mines was important then. When railways were introduced, steel casting of replacement parts for locomotives and coaches was undertaken by this sector. In 1967, the country's first integrated commercial steel mill (Malayawata Steel Bhd.) was established. Foreign vehicle giants like Toyota, Honda, and Volvo have had assembly plants in Malaysia since the 1960s. Two national car projects and one national motorcycle project boosted the heavy-industry sector. Malaysia has emerged as a producer and exporter of motor vehicles since the ap-

TABLE 1

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): Sectoral Performance, 1999			
	Growth	Share of GDP	Contribution to growth
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing	4.6	9.4	10.1
Mining	-1.2	7.6	-2.3
Manufacturing	8.9	29.2	68.0
Construction	-3.6	3.7	-3.4
Services	2.4	54.6	31.3
Less imputed bank service charges	3.7	7.4	6.4
Plus import duties	21.6	2.9	12.7
GDP	4.3	100.0	100.0

SOURCE: Ministry of Finance, Malaysia (1999/2000).



A customer examines a pirated VCD copy of a Star Wars movie at a stall in Jakarta in May 1999. At the time, the government had initiated a campaign to shut down the video piracy industry. (AFP/CORBIS)

pearance of the Proton Saga (1985), Perodua Kancil (1992), and Modenas Kriss (1995). In Malaysia, Proton held more than 60 percent of the market share for automobiles throughout the 1990s.

The Chemical Industry

The chemical industry in Malaysia continues to rely on imported intermediate chemical and petrochemical products in production ranging from household items to material inputs for the rubber, palm-oil, and timber industries. The chemical-industry sector has a conspicuous foreign participation, including ICI, Unilever, Colgate Palmolive, Borden, Exxon Mobil, Shell, and Mitsubishi Chemical Industries.

The Timber, Textile, and Plastics Industries

The timber-based industries manufacture a wide range of wood products including sawn timber, plywood, prefabricated houses, doors, window frames, wall panels, fiberboard, particleboard, wood briquette, wood wool, timber moldings, veneer, and block board. Furniture and wood fixtures are produced for the domestic and foreign markets.

The textile industry focuses on textiles and yarn production and garments and knitwear that cater for local and international markets. The industry is dominated by local enterprise.

The manufacturing sector also produces plastics (containers, pipes and hoses, electrical components), precision products (surgical, dental, photographic, optical), palm oil-based products (margarines, shortenings), clay-based products (bricks, ceramic articles), and leather goods.

Industrial Organizations and Government Organs

The Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM, 1968) focuses on creating and sustaining a dynamic business environment. Its membership of more than two thousand is representative of the various sub-sectors of the Malaysian manufacturing industry. The FMM Institute of Manufacturing offers skills training. FMM operates and manages the Malaysian Product Numbering System as well as being the authorized body for issuing and endorsing certificates of origin.

The manufacturing industry in Malaysia comes under the purview of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Specifically the Industrial Policy Division and the Industries Division in MITI oversee the promotion and development of the manufacturing sector. Other related government organizations and agencies include the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (1965), Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Berhad (1960), and Malaysian Industrial Estates Sdn Bhd (1964).

In concert with the National Development Policy, the Second Outline Perspective Plan (1991–2000) and the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996–2000), the Second Industrial Master Plan (IMP2) targets the manufacturing sector as a major contributor to the national economy. The industrial sector is entrusted with the pivotal task of propelling the country toward industrialization and sustainable economic growth and development. IMP2 emphasized the strengthening of Malaysia's industrial base as well as diversifying the export of manufactured products. The promotion of foreign investment in the manufacturing sector will continue to be adopted as one of the pivotal strategies in developing and expanding the sector.

Ooi Keat Gin

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MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY-PHILIPPINES A critical goal of the Philippine economy has been an expansion of its product manufacturing base to take advantage of its labor surplus and position itself favorably in the regional economy. The Philippines is a labor-surplus country, and the government has traditionally encouraged the development of labor-intensive industries, such as textile production and the assembly of electrical and electronic equipment. However, manufacturing has made only a relatively small contribution to employment. So far, the Philippine manufacturing industry has not exhibited the same structural changes as have neighboring countries.

Historical View

The roots of modern manufacturing in the Philippines can be found in the closing years of Spanish rule in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Few industrial establishments began operations in the 1880s, and most of those that did produced food, tobacco, and beverages. Over the first four decades of the twentieth century, manufacturing developed slowly and irregularly. Industrial expansion was primarily directed to the processing of agricultural products (sugarcane and coconuts), the manufacture of apparel, and the production of ceramics, cement, glassware, and wooden and rattan furniture. During the period immediately following World War II, industrial production was geared to the domestic market, and manufacturing was assisted by high levels of protection. Protection depended initially on import quotas and foreign exchange control. Later, in the 1970s, the main forms of protection became tariffs and foreign-exchange controls administered by the Central Bank.

Much industrial growth took place in the 1950s. By 1960 manufacturing accounted for 20 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), whereas the range in the other member countries that would later join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was 9 to 13 percent. However, growth rates dropped appreciably after the late 1950s, as the main opportunities for import substitution became exhausted. The government made a mistake in not moving away from

the policy of import substitution in the 1960s. The 1970s experienced some reorientation toward exports, stimulated by the floating of the Philippines peso, the Export Incentive Act (1970), and the Export Processing Zone project (1972). However, in the beginning of the 1980s, the main thrust of industrial policy continued to be the protection of domestic manufacturing aimed at import substitution.

Since the mid-1980s, the performance of nontraditional manufactured exports has shown its growing importance to the Philippine economy. Within this category are electronics, furniture, wood products, and fashion garments, shoes, and leather goods. Most of these industries depend on imported raw materials that are assembled or fashioned in some of the Philippine special economic zones: the Bataan Free Trade Zone, Baguio, and Cebu.

Contemporary Status

Manufacturing is the second most important economic sector after services, employing 9.8 percent of the labor force and contributing 22 percent of the GDP in 1998. In the 1990s, manufacturing was the most dynamic sector in the Philippine economy. According to the Asian Development Bank, the GDP of the manufacturing sector increased by an annual average of 2.8 percent in the 1990–1997 period; manufacturing GDP declined by 1.1 percent in 1998 (as a result of the 1997 Asian financial crisis) and increased by 1.4 percent in 1999.

Manufacturing is dominated by the private sector. Firms employing over 100 workers together contribute 75 percent of the added value. Concentration is most pronounced in beverages, tobacco, cosmetics, paper and paper products, and household appliances. Many factories are licensees of foreign companies or act as subcontractors for foreign firms, turning out finished products for export from imported intermediate goods. In 1997 the most important branches of manufacturing, measured by gross value of output, were food products, machinery and transport equipment, and chemicals. (See Table 1.)

Modern manufacturing production is concentrated on processing and assembly operations of the following: food, beverages, tobacco, rubber products, textiles, clothing and footwear, pharmaceuticals, paints, plywood and veneer, paper and paper products, small appliances, and electronics. Heavy manufacturing contributes less than 40 percent of the total added value in the 1990s. It is dominated by the production of cement, glass, industrial chemicals, fertilizers, iron, steel, and copper and refined petroleum products. (See

TABLE 1

Structure of Manufacturing							
(percentage of total)							
Year	Value added in manufacturing, (in billions of dollars)	Food, beverages, and tobacco	Textiles and clothing	Machinery and transport equipment	Chemicals	Other manufacturing	
1980	8.354	30	13	12	14	31	
1997	18.333	33	9	15	13	29	

SOURCE: National Statistical Information Center (1999).

Table 2.) In the 1990s the electronics industry was the fastest growing sector not only in manufacturing but also in the Philippine economy as a whole. Exports of electronic production increased from \$3 billion in 1992 to \$20 billion in 1998; they contributed two-thirds of Philippine exports in 1998. The electronics industry is also the branch where the most employment has been gained.

Manufacturing is highly dualistic, consisting of a modern sector, which has considerable export potential, and a cottage sector, which contributes only a small amount to total added value but employs over half the manufacturing labor force.

Urban Base

The government's industrial strategy places high priority on the dispersal of manufacturing capacity

outside the capital. However, the industrial sector remains concentrated in the urban areas, especially in the metropolitan Manila region, and has only weak links to the rural economy. Over 60 percent of the manufacturing establishments are still concentrated in the Manila area and the southern Luzon region. The ability of the Philippines to reach a new level of industrial growth may depend on its achieving diversification outside urban areas.

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TABLE 2

Manufacturing—Selected Products				
(in thousands of metric tons, unless otherwise indicated)				
Product	1987	1990	1993	1996
Raw sugar	1,304	1,629	2,020	1,775
Footwear, total production, excluding rubber (in thousands of pairs)	10,600	10,000	15,000	N/A
Veneer sheets (in thousands of cubic meters)	75	49	65	82
Wrapping and packaging paper and paperboard	144	78	270	269
Nitrogenous fertilizers, total production	120	121	165	N/A
Phosphate fertilizers, total production	193	199	186	N/A
Cement	3,984	6,360	7,932	N/A
Crude steel, ingots	250	600	623	500
Copper, refined, unwrought	132.1	125.9	166.0	155.8

SOURCE: National Statistical Information Center (1999).

MAO ZEDONG (1893–1976), leader of the Chinese Communist Party and chairman of the People's Republic of China. Mao was one of the leading figures of the twentieth century. Beyond serving as the head of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), his ideas and policies served as a model for many other political leaders in the Communist world.

Mao was born in the village of Shaoshan, Xiang Tan County, Hunan Province in 1893. As a boy he resisted working on the family farm and instead sought every opportunity to obtain an education. In 1911 he joined the army and after six months service returned



Mao Zedong in a classic portrait. (ROMAN SOUMAR/CORBIS)

to his education. Six months spent reading on his own in the library proved of immense value and in 1913 he returned to formal schooling. Patriotism was perhaps the major motivating force in his life, and he saw education as a means to improve the lot of the Chinese people and the nation.

In 1919 he became involved in the May Fourth Movement (a reform movement aimed at strengthening China); through the movement he met Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, the founders (1921) of the Chinese Communist Party, of which Mao was an original member. In July 1921 he led the Hunanese delegation to the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai. Thereafter, he devoted himself to revolutionary activities mainly in Hunan and Guangzhou. At first shut out of CCP leadership by a pro-Soviet faction that favored a traditional urban proletariat revolution, Mao came to power after the Long March (1934–1935) from southeastern to northwestern China. From that time forward, Mao's vision of a peasant revolution took hold. Mao's agrarian Marxism won

the CCP the support of the people to the detriment of the Nationalists. His supremacy in the party was confirmed at the Seventh CCP Congress in April 1945, where "Mao Zedong Thought" was adopted as the official ideology. Following Japan's surrender in 1945 at the end of World War II, the CCP defeated the Nationalists in China's civil war (1945–1949).

In the first ten years after the establishment of the People's Republic (1 October 1949), Mao, as the chairman both of the government and the party, worked to unify the nation and rebuild it after decades of war. He instituted land reform and oversaw the transition to a socialist economy. However, de-Stalinization in the USSR from 1956 brought about a radical shift in Mao's thinking.

Determined to avoid what he saw as the rise of bourgeois elements in the Soviet Union, he instituted his Great Leap Forward (1958–1960), an attempt to industrialize China at the rural level. Not only was the attempt a failure, the diversion of resources from agriculture caused widespread famine. Undeterred from his vision, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966; it was an attempt to keep the CCP and society at large from restratifying, but its result was societal chaos. Nevertheless, the CCP concluded officially in 1981 that Mao's contributions to the Chinese revolution far outweighed the "gross mistakes" he committed during his final years. Mao died on 9 September 1976 and his body remains on display in Tiananmen Square in Beijing.

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MARCH FIRST INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT The March First Independence Movement (*Samil undong*) was a Korean popular movement against Japanese colonization that resulted in a Korean declaration of independence from Japan and the fostering of Korean national liberation movements worldwide.

In 1919, Korean nationalists both in Korea and living abroad were inspired by President Woodrow Wilson's concept of national self-determination for all peoples, hoping that Korea could regain its independence from Japan, which had annexed it in 1910. As a

result, nationalist Korean intellectuals planned an appeal for independence from Japan to coincide with the World War I peace negotiations at Versailles. The death of Korea's former Emperor Kojong (reigned 1864–1907) in early 1919, and his planned public funeral for March of that year, gave the opportunity for Korean nationalist leaders to express their call for independence. In March, thousands of Koreans gathered, no doubt angered by rumors of the emperor's poisoning at the hands of the Japanese. Demonstrations were also planned in regional cities.

On 1 March 1919, Korean intellectuals presented to the Japanese governor-general in Seoul a "Declaration for Korean Independence" signed by Korean religious, political, and intellectual leaders. The declaration was proclaimed publicly the same day. The independence movement that erupted in Seoul on March 1 soon spread throughout the country in the form of spontaneous demonstrations for national independence. Among the demonstrators were farmers and craftsmen, Christians and Buddhists, housewives and school children, as well as intellectual and political leaders. The Japanese authorities were caught completely off guard by the movement's scale and spontaneity and their first reaction was one of brutal repression. Throughout the year conflicts between Koreans and Japanese resulted in thousands of deaths before the Japanese authorities were able to regain control.

The movement ultimately failed to free Korea of Japanese rule. The symbolic Declaration of Independence and national show of solidarity, however, provided the needed impetus for the Korean nationalist movement, which had languished since the time of annexation. Nationalist organizations began to appear both in Korea and among Koreans overseas. The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was established in Shanghai in April 1919, and became a focal point for subsequent independence efforts. Japanese policy in Korea also changed, as the authorities relinquished their initial heavy-handedness. Greater freedom of the press and organization was allowed, which aided the development of nationalist writings in Korea. After the suppression of the movement, however, the incentive towards Korean national independence moved overseas.

Daniel C. Kane

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MARCOS, FERDINAND (1917–1989), Philippines president. Ferdinand Marcos was president of the Philippines; he was deposed and his initial successes overshadowed by his imposition of martial law, systematic human rights abuses, and massive corruption. Born on 11 September 1917 in the northern province of Ilocos Norte to a family of teachers, Marcos attended the University of the Philippines, obtaining a law degree in 1939. A year earlier, he had



Ferdinand Marcos at his inauguration in January 1966. (TED SPIEGEL/CORBIS)

been implicated in the murder of Julio Nalundasan, a congressman and political rival of his father. Marcos was imprisoned and subsequently posted bail to enable himself to take the bar examinations. He topped the exams amid allegations of cheating. He successfully defended his high scores with the university dean but months later was found guilty of murder and sentenced to imprisonment. He appealed his own case before the Supreme Court and was acquitted. During World War II, Marcos asserted that he was an anti-Japanese guerrilla, but documents appeared to show substantial collaboration with the Japanese. In 1949, Marcos successfully ran for Congress on the Liberal Party ticket, becoming the youngest member of Congress.

In 1954, Marcos married Imelda Romualdez, a beauty queen who belonged to a prominent political family in the south. They had three children. Marcos was reelected to Congress twice (1953 and 1957) and successfully ran for the Senate in 1959. In the 1961 presidential race, he supported Diosdado Macapagal, with the understanding that Macapagal would serve for only one term and would support Marcos's presidential run in 1965. When it was clear that President Macapagal was going to run for reelection, Marcos joined the rival Nacionalista Party and easily won the presidential nomination. He defeated Macapagal and became the nation's sixth postwar president. He was reelected in 1969, but, facing a constitutionally imposed term limit, he declared martial law in 1972, dismantled Congress, suspended civil and political rights, outlawed political parties, and shut down the independently owned press. In 1973, he promulgated a new constitution and rigged a nationwide referendum that allowed him to remain in office. In 1981, Marcos decided to lift martial law and call for elections. In what critics called a "cosmetic" lifting, he was reelected president for another six-year term. Two years later, he declared that congressional elections would be held in 1984. In preparation for these elections, Benigno Aquino, Marcos's long-time rival and head of the opposition party, returned from exile in 1983. He was assassinated as he was led from the plane to the airport tarmac, sparking mass unrest. In 1985, Marcos called a presidential "snap" election and was quickly challenged by Aquino's widow, Corazon Aquino. In 1986, Marcos declared himself the winner in an election fraught with voter intimidation, fraud, and violence. A popular uprising ensued, and in a clear demonstration of people power, Marcos was removed from office. He and his wife Imelda fled to Hawaii, where he died on 28 September 1989. Marcos was accused of plundering the nation's treasury of up to \$5 billion. In 1988, he, Imelda, and eight others were indicted in a U.S.

court for racketeering. To date, much of the Marcos family assets remains in family hands despite attempts by the Philippine government at recovery.

Zachary Abuza

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MARCOS, IMELDA (b. 1929), Philippine former first lady. Born on 2 July 1929 in Manila, onetime beauty queen Imelda Romualdez Marcos is best known as the spouse of Ferdinand Marcos (1917–1989), whom she married in 1954 when he was a young member of the Philippine congress. After her husband was elected president in 1965, as first lady she embarked on a beautification program for run-down Manila, commissioned orphanages, homes for the aged, and daycare centers, distributed seeds for backyard gardens, and arranged free medical care for the poor—while allegedly confiscating wealth from the rich for her personal bank accounts. In 1974, Marcos appointed her governor of Metro Manila. In 1978, after she was elected to the interim parliament, the Batasan Pambansa, she became minister of human settlements. As her husband's health deteriorated, Imelda began to run the civilian government, even campaigning for him. In 1986, when he was ousted by the People Power movement, she fled with him to Honolulu. In 1991 she returned to the Philippines and ran unsuccessfully for the presidency. In 1993, Imelda Marcos was convicted of corruption but appealed the case, which in 2002 was still pending. In 1995, she was elected to the Philippine House of Representatives. Although for a time the



Imelda Marcos, rumored to be seeking public office, at a mosque in Manila in July 2000. (AFP/CORBIS)

world's richest woman, she has been accused of helping her husband steal nearly \$5 billion, for which she faces lawsuits in the Philippines for alleged illegal money transfers and tax evasion.

Michael Haas

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MARMARA, SEA OF The Sea of Marmara, in northwest Turkey, is a small intercontinental basin that covers about 11,474 square kilometers between the Aegean Sea and the Black Sea and partly separates the Asiatic and European parts of Turkey. It is 280 kilometers long and 80 kilometers wide. On the east it is connected to the Black Sea through the Bosphorus and on the west to the Aegean through the Dardanelles.

The Sea of Marmara derives its name from the Greek word for marble (*marmaros*), which has been quarried since ancient times on the island of Marmara to the west of the Marmara Sea. Istanbul, Turkey's largest city, is situated at the entrance of the Bosphorus into the Sea of Marmara.

The Sea of Marmara has become severely contaminated due to the flow of heavily polluted Black Sea waters and the waste discharges from Istanbul. Turkish authorities and environmentalists fear further environmental degradation in the Sea of Marmara because of the increasing passage of oil tankers carrying Caspian and Central Asian oil through the Turkish straits from the Black Sea.

Earthquakes are common in the Marmara Sea area. The epicenter of the devastating earthquake of 17 August 1999, which claimed over 17,000 lives and caused widespread destruction of property, was located near Golcuk, a town near the city of Izmit at the eastern end of the Sea of Marmara.

Tozun Babcheli

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MARRIAGE AND FAMILY—CENTRAL ASIA "A person separated from the family will be eaten by wolves." This Central Asian proverb reveals much about the pervasive belief system in this region regarding the importance of families and the need for members to remain interconnected. The central imperative to preserve the family unit is also seen in various marriage practices, such as giving *kalym* (bride wealth) and dowry, bride stealing, and the appointment of guardian parents for newlyweds.

Prior to Soviet collectivization in the 1920s, the economic demands of pastoral nomadism as practiced in parts of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan required alliances among the patrilineal kinship groups to maintain grazing pastures and water rights for their horses, sheep, or cattle. Solidifying economic relationships with neighboring tribes was accomplished through arranged exogamous marriages. These agreements formed the foundation of economic relations that often lasted for several generations, since new wives had to originate from their mother's tribal group. Members of these two groups were expected to share grazing lands and to protect one another's animals from raids by neighboring tribes. Often matchmakers arranged marriages between tribal groups prior to the births of children. Families honored the agreements even in the event of the death of a husband, when the customary law of levirate required that a brother or another relative marry the widow. When a wife died, the children of that marriage remained with their father. The husband was free to remarry.

Marriage

In Central Asia the good of the family is considered a higher priority than the good of an individual, therefore traditional marriages are based more on productive relations between the families than on the bride and groom themselves. In the early twentieth century, in accordance with Islamic and customary laws, marriages typically were arranged by close relatives or a matchmaker. A girl might marry at the age of nine, and a man might have up to four wives if he could support each wife equally. The Soviet laws introduced in the 1920s prohibited girls from marrying before they were sixteen years of age and permitted men to have only one wife.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the five individual governments of Central Asia took over legal regulation of matrimonial relations. Nevertheless, the customary practices of marriage arrangements and the dowry and *kalym* traditions bestow upon the bride greater status and increased

security over official marriage registration. As a practical result the Muslim traditional marriage remains of far greater importance than the state-granted contractual marriage.

Kalym and Dowry

Giving *kalym* and dowry is among the more enduring marriage practices in spite of Soviet laws that once opposed it. In pre-Soviet times *kalym* was not only a reflection of highly developed property relations among Central Asians but also a sign of wealth, influence, and prestige. Cattle originally were central in the *kalym*, which was given to the bride's tribe instead of directly to the father of the bride. The size of the *kalym* depends to a large extent on the social and material position of the groom's family. For many families in rural regions, *kalym* consists of cash and animals (sheep or horses) as well as gifts of fabric, warm coats, hats, boots, and blankets to every member of the woman's extended family. The worth of the dowry is often based on the size of *kalym*. Since *kalym* is given at the time of engagement, it often assists the bride's family in preparing the dowry, even though the collection of a dowry begins when a female child is born.

Kalym and dowry gifts have significantly increased in value since 1991, when Soviet constraints were removed. By 1994 the wedding itself was estimated to cost between \$1,000 and \$5,000, depending on the economic status of the family. Given the low salary of the average Central Asian (\$35 per month according to 1999 figures), the costs associated with this ritual often leave a family in debt.

Bride Stealing

With the changing economic conditions, paying *kalym* to the bride's family has become excessively burdensome. Many men have chosen to "steal a bride" instead, which does not involve *kalym* and consequently costs a family much less money. Bride stealing is also an alternative when a bride's relatives are uncooperative or when the parents of both the bride and groom oppose the marriage.

In the rural regions bride stealing has long been a common feature of marriage agreements. Even though it is illegal, perpetrators are rarely brought to court since it brings only additional disgrace to the bride's family. Stolen brides are expected to capitulate so as not to shame their relatives.

Bride stealing typically occurs when a family is not able to pay the high price of *kalym*, so an agreement is made to "steal" the girl. Afterward the groom's fa-

ther asks the bride's father to pardon his son. Settlements usually include a smaller fee than would be expected with the payment of *kalym*.

Although bride stealing was illegal during the Soviet period, it nevertheless occurred, especially in the rural villages. Since 1991 the practice has experienced a resurgence. The Kyrgyz historian Anara Tabyshalieva has estimated that one in five marriages involves bride stealing and attributes the increase, especially in the cities, to people considering it a fashionable fad signifying that the bride is a good Muslim.

Guardian Parents

The practice of arranging guardian parents (*okul apa* and *okul ata* in Kyrgyz) for the newly married is highly important to Central Asian marriages. In this custom the parents of the groom arrange for an established married couple to act as sponsors, confidants, and mentors to the newlyweds. The practice reflects the societal belief that it is better for the couple to take their marital problems to someone other than their own parents. It also expresses the importance of maintaining positive relations between the families of the bride and groom.

According to the tradition, after the guardian parents have been identified it is left up to the young couple to contact them. If the new couple makes no contact, it is just a formal process, and no gifts are exchanged. But if the young couple seeks out the guardian parents, the relationship serves two aims. First, the guardian parents provide a good role model for the couple, and second, the guardian parents strengthen ties between unrelated families.

The guardian parent relationship is seldom discussed among Central Asians, as it is understood to be a private and confidential relationship. In part it is kept confidential also because it was once considered anti-communist to have guardian parents.

In summary, marriage practices in Central Asia must be considered more as building alliances between families than as creating unions of two individuals. Although formal laws regarding marriages exist, many customary regulations take precedence over the state institution of marriage. The giving of *kalym* and dowry is still paramount for forging family alliances through marriage, even though they are not legal. Similarly, the old custom of bride stealing has been rejuvenated in post-Soviet times due to the excessive costs of traditional weddings. Nevertheless, the aim remains the same, that is, to preserve the institution of marriage not only for the individuals but also for the respective

families. Therefore, the guardian parent custom plays a unique role in protecting family alliances through the preservation of the marriage.

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MARRIAGE AND FAMILY-CHINA For 2,500 years of Chinese history, through stable and relatively secure times, and through stormy catastrophic times, China's family system has provided powerful continuity in the social structure. In keeping with the precepts of Confucius (551–479 BCE), clans based on male kinship coordinated village life under the autocratic rule of China's dynasties and subordinate elites. Even today, after a century of wrenching changes and social development, China retains a family system remarkably similar to its historical pattern.

The patriarchal system was perpetuated through marriages arranged between the family of the prospective groom and a family, usually from a different village, whose daughter was a suitable bride. Marriage was so nearly universal that the vast majority of people found their social place in this family structure. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the previous century of modernization and liberation of women have still not deeply shaken China's patrilocal (brides living with the groom's family) marriage and family system in the rural areas.

The Traditional Ideal and Reality

The ideal Confucian family was an extended family consisting of three or four generations living un-

der the same or nearby roofs. Family decisions were supposed to be made by the highest-ranking male, perhaps in consultation with other male kin, and obediently followed by all others in the rigid family hierarchy under him. The result, theoretically, was family harmony and smooth functioning. Land, houses, animals, tools, furniture, and other possessions were to be held by the extended family unit. When the patriarch died or became unable to function, his sons were supposed to become the heads of their extended families, with family land and other possessions distributed among them. The practice of ancestor worship provided cultural support for this system, as reverence for dead ancestors was extended into reverence for the living older generation, especially the family patriarch. Sons were needed to lead some of the ceremonies—daughters did not qualify.

Nearly every male outranked almost every female, except that young boys had to obey adult women in the family. Females were considered perpetual outsiders, because the marriage system brought a bride from an outside family and village into her husband's village and family. Even daughters born into the extended family were seen as low-status temporary sojourners there, as they were destined to marry out.

The reality bore some resemblance to this ideal, because females and subordinate males were economically dependent on the patriarchal family. They risked social isolation and even destitution or starvation if they rebelled against the system of patriarchal controls. But China's people were not necessarily as pliant and submissive as portrayed in this harmonious ideal. Their different personalities, perspectives, and preferences naturally clashed with some of the system's expectations. Dire poverty also necessitated adjustments at odds with the prescribed scenario. Besides, demographic reality prevented the achievement of the extended family ideal most of the time. Illness was frequent and the death rate was extremely high. Data from 1929–1931 show that females and males in Chinese rural farm families had average life expectancies of only twenty-four and twenty-five years, respectively. The low average life expectancy was due in part to extremely high infant and young child mortality rates (three-fifths of children died before age five). However, even those children who were lucky enough to survive to age five could expect to live only to age thirty-eight on average. It was difficult to have both parents in a nuclear family live long enough to raise their children to adulthood. Three-generation families tended to last a short time, as death claimed the older generation and many in the younger generations. Four-generation families were very rare.



WIVES AND THEIR MOTHERS-IN-LAW

In China, and in some other East Asian societies, the most difficult relationship for a young, married woman is with her mother-in-law. This is especially the case in rural areas where a woman goes to live in the house or village of her husband. The text below outlines the difficulties faced by the young wife and also some factors that might make the situation easier.

In the household situation as Fei described it, the most difficult relationship for the young wife was that with her mother-in-law. It was taken more or less for granted that the mother-in-law was a potential enemy of the daughter-in-law, who had come as an unloved stranger into the house where the mother-in-law had been the female authority. The mother-in-law would wish to retain her authority and would seek to make the daughter-in-law subservient by constant criticizing and scolding. She also resented her daughter-in-law for breaking the singleness of her son's affectionate relationship with her. The son himself was in a difficult situation. To side with his wife in quarrel with her mother-in-law meant a quarrel against his mother, which besides being unpleasant and contrary to both his ideals and natural affection added fuel to her resentment of the daughter-in-law. Generally in the early years of the marriage he sided with his mother, which meant that his wife suffered doubly.

In cases of extreme conflict, the daughter-in-law might be repudiated, usually on the initiative of the mother-in-law, who might repudiate her against the will of her son. If she could find any recognized ground for such action, such as adultery or sterility, no compensation would be asked. Otherwise compensation, amounting to sixty or seventy yuan, had to be given to the daughter-in-law.

There were positive checks on the mother-in-law. There was, first, the positive value which the community placed on harmony between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, making it the subject of special praise. Secondly, there was the negative sanction of harmful action by the daughter-in-law. She might threaten to commit suicide. Since she would then become a spirit, able to revenge herself, the threat was usually enough to effect a reconciliation. Furthermore her brothers might seek a physical revenge, even destroying part of her husband's house. Finally a husband might decide to support his wife against his mother and the household would be divided in two.

Fei says that the extent of the disharmony which could result from conflict between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law should not be exaggerated. The danger of it, however, was great enough to influence the form of marriage.

Source: W. R. Geddes. (1963) *Peasant Life in Communist China: Monograph #6*. Ithaca, NY: Society for Applied Anthropology, 27–28.

Changes in the Twentieth Century

China entered the twentieth century with the Qing dynasty (1644–1911/12) in near collapse and colonial and imperialist powers intruding on China from all sides. In desperation, Qing government leaders and revolutionary leaders alike searched for a new path to save China from disintegration and foreign incursions. They considered importing and implementing foreign ideas and systems, such as foreign-style industrial and military production, a new form of government, such as a republic or a democracy, and modern educational systems. China's leading thinkers also noted that China's autocratic and patriarchal family and marriage system was a powerful conservative force preventing or slowing necessary change. Therefore, they adopted ideologies that would overturn China's traditional family system. In particular, Nationalist leaders and Communist leaders opposed arranged marriage and supported the concept of equality between men and women. Notably, both the Communists and the Nationalists opposed the oppressive practice of female foot binding.

Marriage From the beginning, China's Communist government was determined to overturn China's patriarchal family and marriage customs. The very first major law passed by the People's Republic of China (PRC) was the Marriage Law of 1950, which outlawed arranged marriage, child marriage, prostitution, polygamy, and concubinage; it also allowed divorce and free choice of marriage partner and set a minimum marriage age of eighteen for women and twenty for men. The government promoted the idea of male-female equality. The government also weakened the economic power of the family, especially by collectivizing agriculture under the commune system.

During the second half of the twentieth century, China's system of marriage underwent a slow transformation under the government's leadership. Ages at marriage rose slowly in the early PRC decades and rapidly in the 1970s. In 1929–1931, the average age at first marriage was 17.5 years for women and 21.3 years for men. By the late 1990s, the mean age at first marriage had risen to twenty-two for women and twenty-four for men. Some marriages in China are still arranged by the families, but the law requires that marriages be registered, and that the marrying man and woman tell the registration official that the marriage is voluntary. Some marriages today are love marriages freely chosen by the two young people. But most marriages in China are contracted through a system of introductions, in which family, friends, or colleagues introduce the potential partners and their families to one another. After a number of meetings, if the man

and woman and their parents all agree, the marriage is contracted.

Marriage in China is still essentially universal: in 1995, 99.7 percent of women aged thirty-five through thirty-nine had married, as had 95.4 percent of men in the same age bracket. The remaining single men cannot marry because of China's constant shortage of women caused by earlier female infanticide and maltreatment of girls.

The Position of Males and Females Males were traditionally so important in Chinese society and females so unimportant that many historical family genealogies recorded males only, generation after generation, entirely overlooking the female half of the family. The birth of a son was cause for rejoicing. From birth, sons were groomed for eventual dominance. If food or money for medical treatment were in short supply, these scarce commodities were directed toward the boys and men. As China's economy has industrialized, most of the nonagricultural jobs have gone to men, and the men in the family are still seen as its economic core.

China's Communist Party has worked with determination against this formidable belief system since coming to power, with significant positive results. Yet even today, most families in China, particularly rural families, believe that they must have a son. There are objective reasons, such as the lack of an old age security system in rural China. Parents feel that they require a son to take care of them when they grow old (a daughter will marry out of the family, but a son will bring in a daughter-in-law to help care for all their needs). Yet even if such practical needs can be met in other ways, the emotional preference for sons remains.

Female Infanticide Female infanticide was common in imperial times at all economic levels in society. Selective neglect of daughters also meant that they died in excess throughout childhood. In the Communist period, killing infants was outlawed. Female infanticide and maltreatment of girls gradually declined. The lowest point of female losses was reached in the 1960s and 1970s, when excess female child mortality (mortality beyond the expected rates) killed about 2 percent of girls in each birth cohort. But after the introduction of China's one-child family-planning policy in 1978–1979, excess deaths of young girls rose suddenly to 3 percent of each birth cohort. In the 1980s and 1990s, the introduction of technology that can be used for sex-selective abortion of female fetuses has led to major losses of females in utero. In 1999, there were 120 boys per hundred girls at ages 0–4, one of the worst sex imbalances in the world. Analysis of data from successive censuses of China suggests that life-threatening

discrimination against females is now mostly confined to the prenatal period and the first couple of years of life. After that, girls still experience discrimination, but the most recent data suggest that it seldom leads to death after the first two years of life.

Family Planning In the 1950s and 1960s, women in China averaged six births each. After the famine of the Great Leap Forward, China's government began to take seriously the need to slow down population growth. Cities conducted a vigorous campaign to persuade or require couples to have fewer children. Urban fertility declined to three births per woman by 1966. Then, in the early 1970s, the government waged an increasingly compulsory campaign in China's rural areas, demanding that couples cease childbearing at three births, then two births. In the late 1970s, based on population projections, the PRC government decided that the only way to stop population growth soon was to require couples all over China to stop childbearing at one child. Financial rewards were given for couples who pledged to have only one child, with special education and health benefits given to the single child. But urban and rural couples who resisted the one-child limit were penalized with fines, forced abortion, required use of an intrauterine device (IUD) after one birth, and required sterilization (usually of the wife) after two or more births. Rural fertility dropped from 6.4 births per woman in 1970 to 3.1 in 1977; meanwhile, urban fertility declined further to 1.6

births per woman. China's population growth rate was reduced from almost 3 percent per year in the late 1960s (for a population doubling time of about twenty-five years) to 1.5 percent in the 1980s (doubling time just under fifty years).

The most concentrated campaign of coercive family planning was waged in 1983, when medical teams went to the villages to carry out forced sterilizations, abortions, and IUD insertions. This led to a popular backlash, and the government lessened the coercion temporarily. Meanwhile, an associated rise in female infanticide alarmed the government. The demand for a son in rural families was so great that most provinces changed their rural family-planning policies to allow couples with a firstborn daughter to have a second child, while sticking with the one-child limit if the first child was a son.

From the 1970s on, China's family-planning policy has required couples that want a child to apply for permission to have a pregnancy and birth. If the authorities give them a "birth quota," they may proceed to have a child; otherwise they are in potentially serious political and economic trouble. For most women, insertion of an IUD is required after one birth, and a sterilization operation is required after a second birth whether the birth was allowed or not. These are "passive" forms of birth control that will stop pregnancy even if the couple actually wants a child; this is why China's government usually insists on these tech-



A family planning billboard in Chengdu in 1985. The signs reads, "Family Planning—a Basic National Policy of China." (OWEN FRANKEN/CORBIS)



GIRLS AND THE "ONE-CHILD" RULE

Between 1985 and 2000, there were approximately 24,000 adoptions of children from China—primarily girls—by families in the United States. The excerpt below attempts to explain to these young girls how their birth parents could love them yet abandon them.

Remember that China is a very old country, so some ideas have been around for thousands of years. One of those ideas is that a son should take care of his parents when they get older. You see, parents usually live with their son until they die. Of course parents love their daughters very much. But if they only have daughters, the daughters will get married and move away to live with their husbands, where they will help take care of their husband's parents.

Most people in the countryside do not have enough money to take care of themselves when they get old. So if a mother and father are allowed to have only one or two children, they feel they desperately need at least one son—someone to take care of them when they become too old to work.

But what does this have to do with you? Well, when you were born in China, you may have been born to parents who did not have a son. Your birthparents so much wanted to take care of you *and* try to give birth to a son. But having another child would break the government's rule about the number of children they could have in their family, and they would be punished. They would have to pay a very big sum of money, more money than they had. Your birthparents couldn't find a way to keep a daughter in their family and still have a son to take care of them later in life.

Source: Sara Dorow. (1997) When You Were Born in China: A Memory Book for Those Children Adopted from China. St. Paul, MN: Yeong & Yeong Book Company, 15–16.

niques. Of couples using contraception, 48 percent have one partner sterilized and 45 percent are using an IUD. In the 1990s, China's fertility level was below replacement-level fertility, at about 1.8 births per woman. Since 1998, China's population growth rate has been below 1 percent per year, which is extremely low for a developing country.

China's compulsory and often coercive family-planning program has been condemned by some international funding organizations and some governments. In response, China is conducting a high-profile pilot program in selected localities to implement a more client-friendly family-planning program. The new program gives couples more choices of birth-control techniques, but they are still not allowed to have more

children than permitted before. China remains the only country with a compulsory family-planning program.

China's low death and birth rates have had mainly good effects. Today in China, most people live to advanced years. Therefore, health and educational and other financial investments in children and adults pay off because the recipients live relatively long lives and can contribute to society. Small numbers of births combined with rising incomes means that each child can get more food, health care, education, clothing, and attention than was the case with larger families in the past. Low fertility reduces female deaths from pregnancy and childbirth; it also frees women to pursue careers and opportunities beyond childrearing. Nevertheless, compulsory family planning is harmful

to families, couples, and women in many ways. Those who love children and want another are usually prevented from having more than their assigned limit. Ubiquitous family planning clinics use either x-ray or ultrasound to inspect the abdomens of women every few months to confirm that the IUD is still in place; use of frequent x-rays may harm the women's health. Forced abortions are often in the second and third trimester, which is dangerous for the health of the mother. Even putting aside health issues, compulsory abdominal x-ray or ultrasound inspections, IUD insertions, abortions, and sterilizations are violations of women's bodies and their rights.

Almost everyone in China now marries, as in the past, and almost every couple has at least one child. This means that the family structure is very much intact, in spite of low fertility. Currently, people mostly live as part of an extended family, or a "stem" family (three generations living together, but with just one son and his wife and child or children in the household), or a nuclear family (parents and children only). Often, the families of the older parents, the sons and their spouses and children, and sometimes the married daughters in urban areas, continue to have very frequent contact even if they live in separate dwellings.

But low fertility and mortality mean that China's population is aging. In future decades, the proportion of elderly will rapidly increase; there is great concern that the smaller numbers of children and grandchildren will be unable to cope with or financially support their family elderly, and there are grave doubts about the government's ability to step into the breach.

Divorce Divorce remains rare in China. Of the population aged fifteen and older, only 1.1 percent of men and 0.7 percent of women are divorced (more divorced women than divorced men have remarried). In the leading cities, however, divorce rates are rising.

Economic Reform and the Family

Since the death of Mao Zedong (1976) and the implementation of economic reforms (started 1978), the proportion of the total population living in cities has increased from 18 percent to 36 percent. Chinese urban life has weakened the patriarchal nature of the family (partly because access to agricultural land is not a factor), raised the position of women, reduced illiteracy, and improved educational levels.

In rural China, economic reforms have renewed the power of the family, because the rights to use agricultural land, to make decisions about its use, and to sell the products for profit have reverted to the family unit from the communal "production team." In-

come and wealth once again belong to the patriarchal family unit, though the gradual shift out of agriculture gives some decision-making power to the men and women who earn outside income. Rural marriage is still usually patrilineal and patrilocal. Continuing limits on permanent migration out of the village reinforce the rural family's control over its members. While temporary migration from the village is allowed, most migrants have to assume that they cannot permanently get out of the rural areas.

Today China's strengthened rural family is, from an economic perspective, a flexible and positive force in the midst of rapid economic change. The rural family keeps its tiny pieces of arable land and farms them, but at the same time, frees up its surplus laborers to work in rural industry or services, or to migrate for work. The family diversifies its sources of income and spreads its risk across different economic sectors and into different places. It pools its resources for family goals. Meanwhile, the rural family supports its dependents—children, elderly, the unemployed and underemployed, the sick and disabled. This is important, given that there is barely any social safety net in China's vast rural areas.

The Family as a Source of Stability

China's rural families today are robust in the face of considerable uncertainty. The historic transition from agriculture into nonagricultural sectors of the economy in rural China today is happening inside the family, as it has for the last century in the rural families of the United States. The strong family is also helping urban China weather the destabilizing storms of massive layoffs of workers in state-owned industries and widespread loss of medical insurance benefits.

China's traditional marriage and family systems have been buffeted by political attacks, legal changes, communal farming, economic development, the sharply rising status of women, and foreign ideas and influences. Certain changes have been real and deep, such as the decline of arranged marriage. Within today's families, decision making is less hierarchical, and more shared and consultative, than in the past. Ancestor worship is no longer a strong belief system.

But in spite of the genuine changes that have taken place, China's patrilineal and patrilocal family remains very strong. It has survived and has experienced renewal because it works. As China tries to move toward a market economy, hundreds of millions of people have to change what they are doing to earn a living. Many tens of millions are displaced or sidelined during the transition, and the confusion and dislocation are profound. China's people need their families to fall back

on, and that is what they are doing. Family life and the institution of marriage are surprisingly strong in China today, and they show few signs of weakening.

Judith Banister

See also: **Single-Child Phenomenon; Women in China**

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MARRIAGE AND FAMILY—EAST ASIA

Until the early part of the twentieth century, marriage and the family system in East Asia (China, Japan, and Korea) followed patrilineal and patriarchal principles with some variations. In traditional East Asian families, the family head, whose position was taken by the most senior male member of the most senior generation, possessed great authority and responsibilities. He managed family property and made important decisions for family members regarding their marriages and living arrangements. He was also responsible for offering appropriate respect to the ancestors by officiating at memorial rites and making sure that descendants were produced and family traditions were preserved. The concept of family (*jia*) included the lineage that would be preserved from generation to generation. Under the traditional patrilineal family system, the daughters were normally excluded from their family of birth upon marriage.

In China, the extended family system was viewed as the ideal, whereas in Japan the stem family system prevailed. Under China's extended family system, all sons brought their brides to their parental home and lived there until the death of the parents. The brothers formed separate households after the death of their parents and, in general, inherited an equal share of



THE GENERATION GAP IN EAST ASIA

According to surveys in Japan and South Korea reported in *Asia Week*, there is a growing generation gap between adults who value tradition and serving society and their children who are most interested in their own happiness and success. In Japan, for example, 27.3 percent of teenagers wanted "to live each day happily" and only 50 percent felt responsible for looking after their elderly parents. Similarly, in South Korea, some 20 percent of youths say that they don't respect their parents. Other research suggests that the trend is not confined to East Asia as young people feel the same way in Thailand and Hong Kong. Experts say this is part of a global trend of youths wanting happiness, freedom, and wealth.

Source: Davena Mok. (2001) "What's in It for Me?" *Asia Week* (7 December): 16.

their father's property. The extended family system necessarily required large and growing landholdings or ownership of a business by the family. It is not surprising, then, that the practice of the extended family system was largely limited to upper-class Chinese.

Under the stem family system practiced in Japan, the eldest son brought the bride to his parental home and lived there while other sons established their own households upon marriage. In Japan the eldest son inherited nearly all of the father's property. Kin networks played lesser roles in the socioeconomic lives of individuals.

In Korea the residential patterns followed the stem family system. The social and economic aspects of family life, however, resembled the extended family system. The eldest son lived with the parents and enjoyed the privilege of being the designated heir of the family, but the concept of family extended beyond the "main" household where the eldest married son lived with his parents. Other married sons, who usually resided in separate houses, were under the control of their father and eldest brother and were obligated to participate in important family affairs such as memorial rites for the ancestors. Unequal division of family property was the common practice of inheritance in Korea, with the eldest son taking a larger share than other sons.



MARRIAGE, FAMILY, AND THE COMMUNITY

This extract of text from an anthropological study of a Taiwanese village makes it clear that marriage in East Asia is not just about the woman and man who are getting married. Because of the importance of kinship, family and community attitudes matter a great deal.

The preference for marriage beyond the village limits also rests on the feeling that it is not a good thing to have one's in-laws too close or to have the bride in too close proximity to her parents' home. When the two families live nearby, there is too much opportunity for bad feeling to develop between them. When the two families are in the same village, every detail of how the daughter-in-law is treated by her husband's family immediately reaches her own family, and it is far too easy for the girl to run home with complaints about every hardship, real or imaginary, in her new family. This sort of thing can easily cause interfamily conflict. In intravillage marriages in Hsin Hsing there have also been instances where a daughter-in-law has spent too much time in her old home, helping her mother instead of always being available in her husband's house to do whatever work is asked of her. Of the twelve marriages between Hsin Hsing families, relations between the two families in five cases were not considered good for a variety of reasons.

Another factor favoring marriage outside the village is the village parents' fear of gossip about the circumstances of the marriage. If both families live in Hsin Hsing village there is a good chance that the boy and girl knew each other before marriage; this in itself is considered improper, and people are very likely to say that this was a "love marriage" forced upon the two families because the young couple had been secretly seeing each other and having sexual intercourse. When one hears village discussions of marriages having taken place between Hsin Hsing villagers, one gets the idea that almost all of them have been the result of a secret love affair. Such secret affairs do usually force the two families to agree eventually to a union between the two young people. Thus, in most instances, neither the couple nor their parents will willingly discuss the reasons for an intravillage marriage. When they do, they usually say that the marriage was arranged because both families felt the boy and the girl were well suited. They feel it is necessary to defend such a marriage from the inevitable talk. Family members usually remark that they had firsthand knowledge without needing the word of a matchmaker, that the girl would be a good worker and an asset to the family. However, no matter what reasons are given, other villagers openly discuss the matter, often good-naturedly teasing those involved and making jokes about the "real" basis for the marriage.

Source: Bernard Gallin. (1966) *Hsin Hsing, Taiwan: A Chinese Village in Change*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 150.

In China and Korea, families that shared a common ancestor, that is, members of the same clan, usually lived in clusters and owned some property jointly. Villages where families from one or two clans constituted the majority of the population were common. The kin network played important roles in educating children and providing economic assistance and social welfare to its members.

Under the patrilineal family system, marriage and child rearing were regarded not only as important steps in life but as essential duties for loyal family members. At the same time, filial piety was viewed as the most important and basic human behavior. Thus, fathers were obligated to produce sons, and sons were obligated to obey fathers. When a couple failed to bear a son, one was adopted. In Korea, the adopted son had to come from the paternal kinship group of the appropriate generation. In China and Japan, adoption of the son-in-law was frequently practiced. Adoption of nonrelatives was also practiced in Japan. Moreover, even when a biological son was available, adoption of an "heir" was still possible in Japan if the head of the family so desired. Thus, in China and Korea, preservation of family lineage had to be accomplished through biological descendants, whereas in Japan it was the preservation of the social institution of the *ie* that was viewed as important.

In China and Korea, the most commonly practiced marriage pattern was for the bride and groom not to come from closely related families, and not from the same clan. In contrast, marriage between close relatives was common in Japan. The marriage process often began with the groom's parents seeking a future daughter-in-law. An intermediary, or a go-between, played a major role, especially in China and Korea, in searching for appropriate candidates and in negotiating the terms of marriage. The prospective bride and groom had no say in deciding whom they would marry. The decision was made by the head of household. A woman, in effect, "moved to her permanent family" after marriage. She would spend the rest of her life with this family, and after death she would be remembered by the descendants in this family. It was considered a great dishonor for her natal family if a married daughter was sent back to her parents' home. From an early age, women were taught to obey and serve their future husbands and parents-in-law.

Marriage was universal and early in China and Korea. Married couples, in turn, were expected to have as many children as possible and as early as possible in China and Korea. In Japan, marriage was universal but relatively late, and having many children was not emphasized. Although having many children was



A dairy farming family eating breakfast on Hokkaido in 1989. (MICHAEL S. YAMASHITA/CORBIS)

viewed as one of life's blessings, evidence indicates that married couples in historic Asian populations often practiced fertility control as a strategy for sustaining a desired living standard. Fertility control was more widespread in Japan than in China and Korea.

Sons were viewed as much more precious than daughters in China and Korea, where the continuation of the family line depended more heavily on male descendants. This attitude resulted in female infanticide and high female infant and child mortality in China and Korea, creating a shortage of adult women and leading to a large proportion of men living their entire lives as bachelors as well as to a large number of prostitutes. In Japan, due to the custom of adoption of a son-in-law or a nonrelative as heir, daughters did not suffer higher levels of infanticide or child mortality.

The rules of divorce and remarriage were different for men and women. Women were not allowed to divorce their husbands, but men could divorce (or send wives back) for reasons such as committing a crime, not bearing a son, being unfaithful, being jealous, or being too talkative. Men were allowed or even encouraged to remarry after a divorce or after the death of a spouse, but women were not allowed to remarry after divorce or widowhood. A widow would spend the rest of her life with the family of a deceased husband unless she was sent back to her parents for committing a crime such as adultery. Norms about extramarital sexual behavior also differed for men and women. It was considered natural for adult men to engage in sexual activity outside marriage, but women's sexual activity was strictly limited to within marriage.

The lives of men and women were separate both conceptually and physically. Economic and other "external" roles were reserved for men. Although wives helped their husbands in farms and family businesses,

their economic role was considered secondary; their main role was the management of housework and providing care for the elderly, men, and children. In upper-class families in East Asia, women rarely went outside their residences. Within the family, interaction among men and women was minimal. Even interaction between husbands and wives was restricted and reserved and often was subject to supervision by the members of an older generation. Men often sought sexual pleasure from concubines and female entertainers rather than from their wives.

Beginning of Changes

The family system in East Asia began to change with the modernization process in the region. Political and social reform began to take place with the Meiji Restoration (1868) in Japan, with the fall of the Qing dynasty (1911) in China, and with the Japanese occupation of Taiwan (1885) and Korea (1910). Modern education became accessible to the majority of the population, and the concept of equal individual rights became popular. Critical evaluation of the patriarchal family system began, and efforts were made to abolish parental dictation of the marriage decision, child marriage, concubinage, widespread prostitution, exclusion of women from inheritance, and unfair divorce and remarriage customs.

By the mid-twentieth century, family laws in East Asian countries took a modern form, establishing a minimum age for marriage and women's legal and economic rights. Women and men have equal legal bases for employment and inheritance of their parents' assets. The family registration system, which forms the legal basis for such rights as citizenship, however, continues to favor men over women in the inheritance of family lineage even after the latest amendment of the civil code.

Post-World War II

Further changes in marriage behavior and the family system took place after World War II. It is generally believed that the change was brought about by rapid economic development, migration, urbanization, a higher level of education, especially among women, and increased contact with the outside world. In mainland China, economic development and contact with the outside world started late, but government policies and programs played a large role in changing family lives after 1948.

Extended families disappeared, nuclear families became more common, and the kinship network weakened. The fertility level declined, marriage became late

and nonuniversal, and intergenerational relationships weakened. More women took employment outside the home, and increasing proportions of women refused to give up employment for family responsibilities. To a lesser extent, the divorce rate increased, and premarital sexual relationships became more common.

As of the late 1990s, marriage was very late in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and some urban areas in China. Furthermore, some women, especially well-educated women, were not marrying at all. For example, among thirty-five- to thirty-nine-year-old women with a college education, in Japan 11 percent were not married in 1994, and in Taiwan 14 percent were not married in 1990. Nonmarital cohabitation and childbearing, however, were rare in East Asian populations even in the late 1990s. Increasing proportions of adolescents and young adults, however, were sexually active before marriage. As of the mid-1990s, most men and a substantial proportion of women in East Asia had sexual experience before marriage. The level of premarital sexual activity was higher among men than among women. Gender differences in premarital sexual behavior and remarriage patterns reflected the influence of the patriarchal family system. Women's premarital sexual activities were closely related to marriage: most women engaged in sexual activity only with men they intended to marry. Conversely, large proportions of men engaged in sexual activity with women they did not intend to marry. The gap was often filled by commercial sex workers. Divorce increased in all East Asian populations. The pattern of remarriage after divorce or widowhood was less common among women than among men up to the mid-1990s.

In general, intergenerational ties weakened. Parents' involvement in selecting children's spouses declined dramatically. In Taiwan and Japan, only about 10 percent of marriages that took place in the 1995–1998 period were acknowledged to have been arranged. Economic dependence of elderly parents on adult children weakened, and the proportion of married adults living with their parents declined. The intergenerational residential pattern observed in the mid-1990s, however, continued to reflect patriarchal tradition: eldest sons were much more likely to live with their parents after marriage than were other sons and daughters. At the same time, changes were taking place. The proportion of elderly parents who lived with married sons who were not the eldest or with married daughters became more common, especially in Japan. Married daughters, although not living with their parents, were maintaining close relationships with natal parents.

Two aspects of intergenerational relationships, parents' devotion to and involvement in their children's ed-



THE JAPANESE HOME

Japanese homes reflect the Japanese cultural traditions of precision, detail, and craftsmanship. The following is a description of some of the design details found in Japanese homes in the late nineteenth century.

Simple and unpretending as the interior of a Japanese house appears to be, it is wonderful upon how many places in the apparently naked rooms that the ingenuity and art-taste of the cabinet-maker can be expended. Naturally, the variety of design and finish of the *tokonoma* and *chigai-dana* is unlimited save by the size of their areas; for with the sills and upright posts, the shelves and little closets, sliding-doors with their surfaces for the artists' brush, and the variety of woods employed, the artisan has a wide field in which to display his peculiar skill. The ceiling, though showing less variety in its structure, nevertheless presents a good field for decorative work, though any exploits in this direction outside the conventional form become very costly, on account of the large surface to deal with and the expensive cabinet-work required. Next to the *chigai-dana* in decorative importance (excepting of course the ceiling, which, as we have already seen, rarely departs from the almost universal character of thin boards and transverse strips), I am inclined to believe that the *ramma* receives the most attention from the designer, and requires more delicate work from the cabinet-maker. It is true that the areas to cover are small, yet the designs may be carved or latticed—geometric designs in fret-work, or perforated designs in panel—must have a strength and prominence not shown in the other interior finishings of the room.

Source: Edward S. Morse. ([1896] 1961) *Japanese Homes and Their Surroundings*. New York: Dover Publications, 168.

ucation and their support of adult children before marriage, did not change much or can even be characterized as having intensified. Parents in East Asian countries are known to have invested excessively in their children's education to the extent of affecting mothers' employment patterns in the mid-1990s. A large proportion of adult children lived with their parents and often were supported economically by their parents.

The nature of women's economic activity changed drastically with economic development in East Asia. In all of the East Asian populations, employment among single women increased substantially and by the end of 1990s had come close to being universal. Patterns of employment among married women showed substantial variations. The most traditional pattern was observed in South Korea, where the employment rate among married women was low and

most women stopped their employment at the time of marriage. Some women returned to work after they had passed the prime childbearing age, but they did so at low rates. In addition, the proportion of women working in semiprofessional, technical, or clerical occupations drastically decreased after marriage, whereas the proportion of those working in sales and service areas increased. In Japan, women's employment was disrupted by marriage and childbearing to a lesser extent than in South Korea. Married women's employment in Japan, however, continued to be affected by their husbands' income and their family situation (for instance, the presence of a preschool-aged child in the family), and not by their personal characteristics, such as their level of education. In fact, among married women, the most educated were the least likely to be employed in Japan. In Taiwan, women's employment

was minimally interrupted by marriage and childbearing. Furthermore, the employment pattern of married women was affected mostly by their own characteristics, such as their level of education. There, the most educated women were most likely to be employed even after marriage.

Current Trends

While the role of women has expanded to include employment outside the home, their role within the family sphere has not been reduced, mainly because the role of men has not changed much. In East Asia, women continue to carry most of the responsibilities of managing household affairs and providing care for the elderly, men, and children regardless of their hours of employment. Thus, married employed women often face the extreme difficulty of balancing their responsibilities at work and in the family. Many women in East Asia seem to respond to potential conflict between work and family life by postponing marriage until a very late age or by not marrying at all. Some marry but do not have any children. Surveys conducted in the mid-1990s in Japan and Korea document that single women tend to anticipate their lives changing for the worse after marriage, whereas single men tend to view their lives as not changing much after marriage.

The continuing trend toward later marriage and the increasing numbers of those who decide not to marry at all are threatening an even further decline of fertility in East Asia, as well as an ever heavier social and economic burden of caring for the elderly.

Minja Kim Choe

See also: **Marriage and Family—China; Women in Korea**

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MARRIAGE AND FAMILY—INSULAR SOUTHEAST ASIA The large number of ethnic groups in insular Southeast Asia accounts for the variety of patterns and practices relating to marriage and the family. However, intermarriage between ethnic groups means that the situation is never totally straightforward, and conceptions of kinship and behavior relating to them have always been fluid. There are also differences between urban and rural groups; economic and social development has led to more rapidly changing patterns in recent times.

Kinship Patterns

In the eastern islands of the Indonesian archipelago as well as in North Sumatra, patrilineal groups trace descent through the male line. In West Sumatra the matrilineal Minangkabau trace descent through the female line. In such unilineal descent systems, individuals belong to one kin group according to their parentage. In one or two parts of the archipelago, as in the Toraja highlands, kinship may be traced down both male and female lines, with individuals choosing the group to which they wish to belong. In a few other cases, such as the island of Savu, an individual may belong to two groups: one patrilineal and one matrilineal. However, the majority of the population of island Southeast Asia belong to ethnic groups whose kinship patterns are normally termed "cognatic," as is the case

with the Javanese, Malays, and the Filipinos. Among such groups, equal recognition is given to the relatives of both parents in deciding who are kin.

In Javanese, Malay, and Filipino societies, the core of the family unit is the conjugal couple and their children. However, the boundaries of the household are very flexible, and many others may join, either through adoption or fostering. Children may move from one household to another, often being raised by persons other than their biological parents. Members of the extended family are expected to help each other on a reciprocal basis both in everyday life and in crisis. In the Philippines, as in Malay and Javanese systems, when a man and wife marry, each becomes a part of the spouse's family, and the two families are united as kin.

A characteristic feature of many families in Southeast Asia is the importance of seniority and of siblingship. In many societies, the link between brothers and sisters is considered as important as the link between parent and child. In terms of deference and respect, age differences between family members are more important than differences in gender, with older siblings especially having responsibilities toward their younger siblings.

Courtship and Choice of Marriage Partner

Although in the past Malay, Javanese, and Minangkabau men were free to take more than one wife, this practice has become increasingly rare in Southeast Asia. Among Filipinos, marriage is strictly monogamous. Among all groups, there is usually strong pressure to marry, and widowed or divorced individuals are expected to find a new partner and marry again. Although families take a considerable interest in their children's marriage partners, children are not normally forced to marry against their will, and many find their own partners. In Malay, Javanese, and Filipino groups, courtship is generally carefully supervised, and dalliance by either sex is frowned upon. Parents in these groups are more concerned about their daughters than their sons in terms of courtship and sexual activity, and during adolescence, young people tend to go out in groups rather than as separate couples. Among the Batak of Indonesia, however, premarital chastity is not highly valued, and meetings between adolescent boys and girls are less strictly supervised.

In Java, marriages between distantly related couples are preferred. Ideally, a husband should be older than his wife, and after marriage she will address him respectfully as "older brother." In the Philippines, there is a tendency to take a partner from a similar background in terms of class, religion, and ethnic grouping.



To win favor with the ancestors, a woman makes an offering at the family shrine in Bali, Indonesia. (JACK FIELDS/CORBIS)

Unilinear groups such as the Minangkabau and the Batak have rules and prohibitions concerning the choice of marriage partner. The Minangkabau are forbidden to marry someone of their own matriline, and there is a preference for marriage within the village. In Batak society, a boy will ideally marry his mother's brother's daughter, thus reinforcing relations between the two families, and he should not marry a bride from his own lineage.

Marital Residence

Among the Javanese, Malay, and Filipinos, newly married couples may live with either set of parents but will most often live with the wife's parents initially, setting up an independent home when they have the resources, often after the birth of the first child. Family ties are important in ensuring basic security. Among Malays, there is a tendency for new homes to be established near the wife's parents, and in traditional rural contexts, clusters of related females are often found, providing a supportive network of local ties.



In accord with tradition, the families of the bride and groom negotiate the wedding arrangements on Sumba Island, Indonesia. (WOLFGANG KAEHLER/CORBIS)

In both Malay and Javanese societies, one married daughter usually remains behind to care for the parents in their old age and to take over the house after their death.

Child Rearing

Relationships between husband and wife are relatively egalitarian in most cases, with each responsible for his or her own domain. In all parts of insular Southeast Asia, generally the mother has overall responsibility for child rearing. However, because she is likely to be engaged in some sort of economic activity as well, this responsibility is likely to be shared by older siblings, aunts, uncles, and grandparents as well as between the biological parents themselves. Age commands respect, and there is an emphasis on strong sibling relationships.

Divorce

In Java, divorce is relatively rare in urban areas but common among the rural population, particularly in the early years of the marriage. In the event of divorce, traditional Javanese law provides for each spouse to retain personal property, usually property brought into the marriage. Anything acquired by the husband and wife during their marriage is divided between them, generally in a 2:1 ratio favoring the husband. These rules are flexible and depend on circumstances.

If a couple divorces, the question of the custody of children arises. Young children tend to stay with the mother, whereas older children may be allowed to choose.

The divorce rate has been high among Malays, although it has decreased in recent years. Experts have suggested that this decrease is a result of the influence of Islam, which strongly discourages divorce. As in Java, in Malaysia customary law is more likely to be invoked than Muslim law in determining how property should be divided and what arrangements will be made for the custody of children after a divorce.

In the Philippines, arrangements are relatively equitable in the division of property between the divorcing husband and wife. The mother's position is quite strong in respect of the custody of children, but she may be expected to become wholly responsible for them.

Patterns of marriage and family life in insular Southeast Asia are undergoing change. In general, there has been in recent decades a tendency toward living in smaller household units. Especially in urban areas, family planning programs have had some impact, and couples are choosing to reduce the number of births. Geographic mobility and social mobility have also contributed toward making the extended family a less central institution than before. Never-

theless, traditional patterns of family relationships continue to have a fundamental importance that permeates social intercourse.

Fiona Kerlogue

See also: Marriage and Family—Mainland Southeast Asia

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MARRIAGE AND FAMILY—MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA Practices and patterns relating to the family vary widely in mainland Southeast Asia for a number of reasons. The present population is made up of a variety of ethnic groups speaking many languages and being influenced by cultural traits introduced partly through migrations from the north in historic and prehistoric times. The cultural practices of these groups differ in many ways, and although there has been much assimilation, with war, globalization, and their effects having blurred the boundaries to some extent, there is still considerable variation in the forms and behavior relating to marriage and the family.

In terms of family structure, there is a key distinction between those groups who consider family membership in terms of descent from a common ancestor and those with a broader notion of family membership that includes relatives on both the mother's and the father's side. In general, it is chiefly the many and varied upland groups who follow the former pattern, where there are rights and obligations between lineage members that extend to fairly distant relatives. The mainly lowland Buddhist peoples who form the majority of the population of mainland Southeast Asia, such as the Tai (the ethnic group, not to be confused with Thai, the nationality), ethnic Burmese, and Khmer, fall into the latter category, and here the family is a smaller entity.

Marriage and Family Life among Burmese and Tai Peoples

Among the Burmese and the ethnic Tai (the latter group including the majority population of Laos), conception of who belongs to the family group is loose. Both the male and female lines are relevant in determining descent, so that each individual regards relatives on both his or her mother's and father's side as belonging to the same family grouping. The nuclear family is emphasized more than the extended family.

Tai marriage partners are generally chosen by the individuals themselves, subject to parental approval. Elopement to avoid parental objections is relatively common. Young Burmese are also generally allowed to find marriage partners for themselves, though this may still be supervised to some extent. Parents make arrangements for the actual marriage, so that their approval is important. As with the Tai, marriages by elopement are not uncommon because the recognition by the community that a couple are cohabiting is the chief essential in marriage, and parents tend to agree to a wedding if cohabitation is already established.

In Burmese societies, polygyny (having more than one wife) was in the past officially condoned, but in practice few men had more than one wife. Some Tai men take a "minor" wife, a practice that usually causes some distress to the first wife. For a first marriage, choice of partner is essentially voluntary for both daughters and sons among the Burmese and the Tai, though parents have always been concerned that their children should make "good" marriages, and many attempt to influence their children. However, elopement is a source of shame for parents, and they will generally fall in with the choice of their child, even if they disapprove of it, to avoid an elopement. Parents prefer their children to choose a partner who is of the same ethnic group and religion (Buddhist) and of similar or superior socioeconomic status. Ideally the husband should be a few years older than the wife, and there is a preference for a local choice. Astrological considerations are another factor, though a relatively minor one, in determining whether the choice of partner is a good one. Courtship among the Burmese is initiated by the boy, usually through a go-between. In traditional Burmese communities, courtship is strictly supervised, and sexual contact of any kind is strictly prohibited.

Tai marriages are accompanied by the payment of bride-price, that is, the parents of the groom offer property to the family of the bride. This differs from the Burmese custom, in which the groom brings with him to the marriage a "dower," that is, property from his family that is offered specifically to the couple and



CARING FOR INFANTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

"*Capturing a Cold.* Young babies are liable to become ill easily, because their bodies are still delicate. For example, they might take cold and have blocked noses so that they cannot breathe easily. If a child has these symptoms they must make a medicinal poultice to apply to the top of the head. They use onion or bulbs of sweet *pron* pounded and mixed with turmeric, red lime and liquor. They dip cotton into this medicine and form it into a flat, thin plaster, and apply this to the child's head. The juice of the pounded onions remaining from making the poultice for the head is used to apply to the bridge of the nose and to the body. This method of applying a poultice to the head and smearing the body of the child until it appears red and blotched all over is called 'capturing a cold.'"

Source: Donn V. Hart, Phya Anuman Rajadhon, and Richard J. Coughlin. (1965) *Southeast Asian Birth Customs: Three Studies in Human Reproduction*. New Haven, CT: Human Relations Area Files, Inc., 167.

over which they have control. It has been suggested that the importance of the wedding ceremony is that it is the occasion when the amount and nature of the dowry are announced. The dowry is a symbol of the girl's and her family's status, and thus the wedding is an important occasion even though a marriage can in fact be established without such a ceremony.

Young Tai couples may live with the wife's parents for a time, but they will normally hope to set up an independent household after a while, and this may be some distance away. Relationships with friends and neighbors are likely to be as important as relationships with relatives beyond the immediate family. Burmese couples are also likely to set up a new home after marriage. Again, if they do stay for a short while in the home of a parent, it is likely to be the house of the bride.

Divorce is in principle relatively easy for both husband and wife in Tai groups, as it is with the Burmese. Desertion, cruelty, a wife's adultery, and a husband's remarriage are considered proper grounds for divorce. The rate of divorce is relatively low, however. Traditionally, a spouse seeking divorce should ask the village headman, and the headman's intervention may be

one reason why, despite frequent quarreling and dissatisfaction within marriages, the actual divorce rate is low in rural areas. Divorce is in any case a difficult choice for a woman because it is often hard to obtain support for any children of the marriage. A divorce is not usually granted without the consent of both parties unless the matter is taken to court, and few women have the resources to do this. Male children of a divorced Tai couple normally stay with the mother, whereas girls stay with the father.

A Burmese man whose wife dies may be expected to marry the sister of his deceased wife; a similar situation occurs if the husband dies, though in this case the new husband may already have a wife.

Marriage and Family Life among the Khmer

It has been argued that there is a matrilineal bias in the Khmer kinship system that has been obscured by other sociopolitical factors, but the ideology of descent is clearly cognatic (bilateral, that is, descent is traced on both mother's and father's sides). For example, the spirits of the mother and father are worshiped and commemorated and are consulted at life crises. Relationships beyond the nuclear family group are not formally structured.

Most Khmer marriages are arranged by the families of the bride and groom, and it is considered the duty of parents to arrange their children's marriage. The marriage may be organized by a go-between, and in rural areas the arrangements are made while the children are quite young. The groom's family offers compensation in the form of bride-price to the bride's family for the loss of their daughter; the amount varies according to the girl's position in the family and the reputation and wealth of the family. The oldest and youngest daughters are most highly valued. In the past, it was common for the son-in-law to move in with his wife's family and to work for the father-in-law until the young couple were ready to set up a household of their own, usually near the wife's parents' home.

In rural Cambodia, widows and women without husbands for whatever reason lose status to a considerable degree and rarely participate in temple festivals and other village ceremonies. Unless they have children to support them, they are likely to live without proper means of subsistence, and because of the shame of poverty many do not participate in village decision making or public life.

Vietnamese Marriage and Family Life

The Vietnamese as a nation regard themselves as having common descent, and this means that there is

an underlying sense of brotherhood generally. However, ancestry is the key element in Vietnamese concepts of the family, with descent counted through the male line. Allegiance to one's clan is very important, and the most honored place in every home is reserved for the ancestors' altar. Traditionally it is the oldest son who presides at ceremonial rites of death and burial. In a burial procession, the eldest son walks in front of the coffin, whereas the rest follow behind it.

Vietnamese households may include three or four generations, and in rural contexts neighboring households in a village will almost certainly be made up of closely related kin. It was traditionally the pattern for the eldest son to live with his wife in his father's house, other sons settling in the vicinity with their wives. Although the pattern is changing in urban areas, these traditions are still strong. The concept of the family is thus reinforced by the presence of large numbers of kin from the same lineage living close by. Although in the modern Vietnamese family some members may move into the city a long distance away, they are likely to return at New Year's, and their shared feasting and offerings to ancestors reinforce the sense of kinship.

In Confucian models, on which the Vietnamese notions of family life were broadly based in the past, women had little status and few rights outside their relationship with their fathers, their husbands, or their sons. They had no legal right either to own personal property or to inherit anything from their parents. Marriage was arranged by the parents, often through an intermediary, who made certain that there was no existing family relationship between the man and woman. For the woman, marriage was an official transference of loyalty from her father's family to that of her husband. A wife would be expected to serve her husband and comply with his wishes absolutely. After his death her service was transferred to her eldest son.

In practice, however, the Vietnamese never followed the Confucian code strictly. For example, women in north and central Vietnam often inherited land alongside their brothers. They also took part in the administration of land held by the lineage. Only in aristocratic groups was the Confucian code adhered to rigidly. Another aspect of Vietnamese society, derived from a Chinese model, is that of polygyny and the taking of concubines. This was once common practice in Vietnam, especially among the more affluent, but it was made illegal by legislation passed in South Vietnam in 1958. Attitudes toward women and their role have changed under Communism, although within the home there are still strong echoes of such traditional values.

In South Vietnam, divorce and separation were declared illegal without government approval in 1958, whereas in the north, the right to divorce for both men and women was established under the Communist regime. However, formal channels for reconciliation were established, and couples were encouraged to settle their differences and stay together. Since unification, this has become the norm across Vietnam.

Marriage and Family Life among the Hmong

The Hmong, who live in the border areas in the north of Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos as well as in southwestern China, trace their descent from a common ancestor, and women marry into their husband's lineage. Among the Hmong there are about twenty surname groups or clans. The household may consist of just one nuclear family, but it is more likely to include three generations. The eldest male is the household head. In addition to parents and children, there may be grandparents, unmarried uncles or aunts, and widowed relatives. Adoption is also quite common. Those adopted are usually girls and almost invariably of non-Hmong origin, but they are treated as close kin.

The man and woman in Hmong couples must come from different clans. A woman may have only one husband, whereas a man may have as many wives as he can afford. However, most marriages are monogamous because only the wealthy can afford more than one wife. A first wife is the most privileged in any case and has authority over subsequent wives.

Parents may have preferences, but the Hmong are relatively free to choose their marriage partners, and premarital sex is tolerated. The Hmong New Year in December is the best opportunity for a young man to find a bride or for a couple to demonstrate their intentions toward one another. Boys must find a girl from outside their clan to marry; the ideal is for a boy to marry his father's sister's daughter or his mother's brother's daughter. This strengthens the alliance between two families who are already related. It also allows the girl to remain in contact with family and friends.

When a boy has found a girl to marry, his father has to provide bride-price to be handed to the father of the girl. The amount of this, usually a considerable sum, must be agreed to on both sides. It is traditionally paid in silver, acquired from the proceeds of as much as an entire year's opium harvest. The size of the bride-price required means that a son is dependent on his father until he is married and that his father has considerable control over his behavior. Similarly, the groom is under pressure to treat his wife

well. If he does not, the girl may return to her family, and the bride-price will be lost.

If a Hmong couple elope, the boy's father is still obliged to pay the bride-price. Sometimes the couple have children before the transfer of the bride-price, and in this event the children are deemed to belong to the bride's father's clan. The groom may be allowed to work for his father-in-law for a year or two instead of paying the bride-price, but this is regarded as demeaning for the boy, and the situation is generally avoided.

Divorce is rare among the Hmong. A man has the right to divorce if his wife misbehaves badly by becoming addicted to opium or committing adultery, and in such cases he can demand the return of the bride-price. A woman is also free to leave her husband, but unless her husband is proved guilty of cruelty her family must return the bride-price, and this would be humiliating both for her and her family. If she does decide to leave her husband, she returns to her original clan. Custody of the children normally goes to the man, but rarely, if the woman is the innocent party, she may retain custody.

If a Hmong woman is widowed, she should normally marry her husband's younger brother if he is willing (in which case no bride-price need be paid), but this rarely happens in practice, and she may marry elsewhere.

Family Life Today

Family life is still an important feature of life in mainland Southeast Asia, despite greater geographic and social mobility connected with new employment opportunities, urbanization, and global influences. For the majority, particularly those who belong to the lowland cognatic societies, the definition of the boundaries of the family is fairly loose. Even so, there is generally a strong sense of duty and obligation between members of the nuclear family. For unilineal societies, such as the Hmong and the Vietnamese, common ancestry and residence near the husband's family mean that the sense of what constitutes the family is both larger and more clearly defined. Although globalization, industrialization, and the migration associated with them have affected traditional values, fundamental structures in society have been fairly resilient, and especially in rural areas the pace of change in attitudes toward marriage and the family is still relatively slow.

Fiona Kerlogue

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MARRIAGE AND FAMILY—SOUTH ASIA

Almost every form of marriage is practiced by cultural groups in South Asia. In some districts in mountainous Himachal Pradesh, bride-capture initiates a marriage, while among the Garo in mountainous Assam, bridegroom-capture initiates a marriage. Fraternal polyandry, marriage of one wife to two or more brothers—a rare form of marriage from a worldwide perspective—occurs among some of the hill people in northwest India and among Tibetan residents in Nepal, as well as among the Todas in the Nilgiri Hills in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Nonfraternal polyandry, also rare, was found in the matrilineal caste of Nayers of Kerala and among groups in Sri Lanka. In the Jaunsar-Bawar hilly area of Uttar Pradesh is practiced what the anthropologist D. N. Majumdar called polygynandry, a simultaneous combination of polygyny (the custom of one husband married to two or more wives) and polyandry—within the same family.

About a quarter of the population of South Asia is Muslim. The Qur'an permits polygyny; a man may have as many as four wives. In practice, almost all South Asian Muslims are however monogamous, as are the vast majority of Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, Jains, and Parsis.

More than half of the people of the Indian subcontinent are peasants living on the northern riverine plains and on the Deccan plateau to the south. This account focuses on them.

Marriage and Family in the Context of the Caste System

Marriage and family in peasant South Asia should be seen in the context of the Indian caste system. "Indian" is used here rather than "Hindu" because non-Hindus—Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, even those residing in Bangladesh and Pakistan—are organized into castes (a system of ranked segments of society). An individual is born into a caste, that of his or her parents, and he or she must marry within caste—that is, castes are endogamous. Due to rigidly enforced rules of inheritance and endogamy, a caste as a lived-in institution is a set of families whose children marry only among themselves.

For example, the potters residing in perhaps fifty villages in an area, all within walking distance of one another, may form a *jati*, the term anthropologists use for the endogamous caste group. The potters of this set of fifty villages do not marry among other potters of other villages, even though outsiders may see all potters in a region as belonging to a single caste of potters—caste as an occupational specialty group.

Within a South Asian village, from one to three dozen castes may be represented. Castes are ranked, with (among Hindus) Brahmans often at the top and untouchables almost always at the bottom, and castes such as cultivators of land, merchants, various artisans, and servants between the two extremes. In some villages, there may be no untouchable castes; in some, there may be so-called tribals, who hunt, fish, or both, whom villagers may consider lower than untouchables. Families of a particular caste, almost always related through ties of blood and marriage, usually reside near one another, often in their own section of a village.

Patrilineal and Fraternal Joint Families

A widespread South Asian ideal is a patrilineal joint family—one composed of an older couple, their unmarried children, and one or more of their married sons with their wives and children. Less common is a fraternal joint family—one composed of two or more married brothers and their wives and children. While a joint family is generally the ideal, such families are usually in the minority in any count of family households in a village because of the low life expectancy for South Asians. Furthermore, due to crowding or problems in maintaining fraternal harmony, adult married brothers in most parts of South Asia usually do not continue to live together in the same house, and parents may live with only one married son at a time.

Most of South Asia emphasizes patrilineal descent, although something will be said about matrilineal peo-



A multigenerational Indian family in a small village in Rajasthan, India, c. 1996. (VINCE STREANO/CORBIS).

ple below. The north requires patrilocal residence; that is, after marriage a couple lives with the husband's relatives, usually with his parents and unmarried siblings, until crowding in the living quarters or disharmony among members of the different nuclear families prompts the decision to have a junior couple and their children move out.

The 1961 census of India showed that the highest proportions of joint families in India were found in the states of Rajasthan and in eastern Uttar Pradesh. What facilitated the high frequency of joint families in these places was the comparatively early age of marriage; several districts had unusually high proportions of married females in the five-to-nine-years age group and unusually high proportions of married males in the ten-to-fourteen-years age group. In a marriage system with very young brides and bridegrooms, a joint family is required, since a young-teenaged couple is too inexperienced to run their own economic enterprise or to rear children without help. The older couple, either the groom's parents or his older brother and his brother's wife, are both protectors and teachers of the young married couple (who in general would not cohabit before puberty).

Whether an Indian lives in a joint family or not, he or she is likely to live among many relatives. Among patrilinealists, brothers' or father's brothers' houses are likely to be next door to one another. Among the much less common matrilinealists, sisters' or mother's sisters' houses are likely to neighbor one another. It is not uncommon for an individual to be related to all the other members of his caste-chapter within a village.

Rules of family hierarchy are almost universal. Juniors should defer and show respect to seniors. Females should defer and show respect to both adult male and female members of the family, especially in their

husbands' families. A daughter-in-law must obey her mother-in-law. A son must obey his father and his elder brother. Given the emphasis on the importance of patrilineal descent, the most important duty for a newly married bride is to produce a son or sons to carry on her husband's patrilineage into the future.

Matrilineal Families

There continue to be some castes and ethnic groups that trace descent and structure of families on matrilineal lines—in Kerala and Karnataka in the southwest and in Assam and other parts of the northeast. Most famous are the Nayars of Kerala and the Naga groups of Assam.

Until about 1900, among the Nayars, adult brothers and sisters ideally resided together. The fathers of the women's children did not reside with the women, but rather with their sisters and their mother and her sisters and brothers. Many of the Nayars, until about one hundred years ago, had extensive agricultural estates with large households of matrilineally related kin. Children born to female members were raised in their mother's home with her siblings and her mother and her mother's siblings. The head of the matrilineal household was usually the eldest mother's brother or mother's mother's brother. As in patrilineal households, children had to obey their elders, but especially they had to obey the *karnavan*, the mother's brother who was head of the household.

Among matrilineal groups and even among a few patrilineal groups in south India and Sri Lanka, women inherit landed property. This is rarely the case in patrilineally oriented north India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh.

Characteristics of Marriage in Northern South Asia

Almost universally in South Asia, marriages are not romantic attachments but are arranged by the bride's and bridegroom's older male relatives—father, grandfather, uncle—although possible mates for children are often suggested by the women of a family. In much of the north, there is a rule of three- or four-*gotra* (a named patriline of fathers and children over generations, which has no function other than proscribing marriage between its members) exogamy. One inherits the name of a *gotra* from one's father. If there is a three-*gotra* rule, then a child should not marry someone with the same *gotra*, or with the *gotra* of his or her mother or of the mother's father. If there is a four-*gotra* rule, then the child is also prohibited from marrying someone in the mother's mother's *gotra*. The

French social anthropologist Louis Dumont figured out that the three- or four-*gotra* rule had the effect of prohibiting marriage between a bride and groom related to each other more closely than third cousins. The rule facilitates marriage between strangers, although strangers of the same *jati*.

In the north, there is also a rule of village exogamy. That is, marriages must take place between a couple from different villages. A bride must marry a bridegroom from her own caste, but from a *gotra* other than the three or four prohibited and from another village. The patrilocal residence rule requires that after the wedding ceremonies have taken place in her village home, she must leave to join her husband's home in another village.

North Indians tend not to have two daughters married into the same family or into the same village. In parts of Rajasthan among Hindus, and in parts of Pakistan among Muslims, however, marriages between sets of brothers and sets of sisters are preferred. Two or three brothers of one family and village marry two or three sisters of another family and village, which can be achieved while still obeying a three- or four-*gotra* rule of exogamy. Since double or triple weddings may also accompany such an arrangement, wedding expenses are less than they would be for two or three separately timed weddings. At the same time, one wedding party represents both or all three bridegrooms, thus reducing the number of guests the bride's relatives must feast and entertain at the wedding and in the future. Many Rajasthani cultivators also like the strengthening of the fraternal joint families. Not only do brothers live together in the same household and work together in the fields, but their wives are sisters, more likely to get along well than if they were strangers, and so willing to take care of each other's children, freeing one sister to gather wood or to work in the fields.

A girl should be married between the ages of twelve and twenty to a boy of fifteen to thirty years. William Crooke in the late nineteenth century and others more recently have reported that infant marriage occurred and was even preferred and esteemed in some communities in both north and south India. Nowadays most of the youngest brides—those between the ages of eight and fourteen years—are found in Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar, three north Indian states. In all these child-marriages, sexual relations between a couple do not occur until both have reached puberty. Widely in the north, there are two wedding ceremonies. In western Uttar Pradesh, for example, the first wedding ceremony is called *shadi*, the second *chala*. With rare exceptions, sexual relations between husband and wife do not take place until the bride is

mature (after first menstruation), so that she may have gone through both wedding ceremonies some time before she begins conjugal relations with her husband. In earlier decades, there may have been as many as five years between *shadi* and *chala*. A bride may be taken by the groom and his all-male party back to his village after the first wedding ceremony. During this visit, she stays with the women of her husband's family—her mother-in-law, her husband's brothers' wives, her husband's sisters—and might not see her husband at all. Then after a few days, she is taken back to her parents in her home village; she stays with her parents until the groom and his party come for the second wedding ceremony. She again goes to her husband's home and village after the second ceremony; if she is mature by now, sexual relations between husband and wife commence. If not, she again returns to her parental home until she is mature.

This scenario is still more or less accurate for the north, except for girls who have gone ahead in school. Only a minority of girls in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and the north Indian states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh go to school, even today. Probably a majority of girls in states such as Haryana and the Punjab go at least through elementary school, as do most girls living in cities. Relatively few girls go beyond fifth grade, but those who do generally have their marriages postponed until they have finished their education—whether at eighth, tenth, twelfth grade or higher. For such brides, the two wedding ceremonies may take place on the same day, since the bride is already mature and can begin married life right away. Boys' marriages similarly are usually postponed until boys have completed their education.

Much of Pakistan, Bangladesh, and northern India continues to practice purdah, the seclusion of married women. Housing arrangements separate women's quarters from men's quarters. The women of the joint family may each have a room in the ribbon of rooms around a courtyard. Men may have their own sleeping quarters in their cattle yard, clubhouse, or entryway to the women's quarters. A husband slips into his wife's room at night for sexual relations and then returns to his own quarters. The woman in a nuclear family often has a small one- or two-room house, while her husband sleeps with men in a neighborhood clubhouse.

A girl between the ages of four and thirteen years may move about freely in her parental village, but a married girl in her husband's village seldom goes out of the women's quarters, and when she does, she is carefully chaperoned. All married women cover their heads, and in the presence of men of the family older than their husband, or when they sally outside the



An Indian bride and groom at a traditional wedding ceremony in 1961. Both are adorned with garlands of flowers. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

house, they cover their faces with the outer edges of their head scarves or the borders of their saris covering their heads; some Muslim women wear *burqas* in public, long, dark coats with hoods that cover the head with attached veiling in front of the face.

Characteristics of Marriage in Southern South Asia

As one moves south to Maharashtra and beyond, one finds that with rare exceptions women no longer cover their heads, and, except for unmarried pubescent girls and young married women, females generally move about their locales outside their houses more freely than in the north.

The northern three- or four-*gotra* prohibitions in mate selection contrast with preferences for cousin marriage among most south Indian Hindus and Christians and among some Muslims of both north and south. Until about twenty years ago, south Indians, including Christians, preferred marriages between cross-cousins (a father's sister's child marrying a mother's brother's child; in other words, a marriage between children of brother and sister) or between children of a mother's younger brother and an older sister's daughter (maternal uncle-niece marriage). Among some Muslims, there is or was a preference for marriage between parallel cousins, either between the children of brothers or between the children of sisters. Imtiaz Ahmad, however, has written that most Muslims in India do not follow this rule, although it is

often followed among Muslims of the Middle East. Indian Muslims, he suggests, have been influenced by the north Indian Hindu idea that cousins are equivalent to siblings, so that cousin marriage is considered a form of incest and is avoided. Both forms of cousin-marriage, the cross-cousin marriage of the south and the parallel-cousin marriage of some Muslims, are justified by assertions that such marriages keep property within the family. South Indians tend not to have two children married to the children of the same mother's brother or father's sister.

Marriages between cross-cousins and maternal uncle and niece have become less frequent in recent decades due to at least two factors: education (parents prefer that their son marry into a wealthy stranger family rather than marrying one of his poor cross-cousins or elder sisters' daughters) and increasing awareness that marriage between close relatives is considered by Western science to be deleterious to offspring.

In south India generally, there is no rule of village exogamy, and a sizable proportion of marriages may be between bride and groom of the same village. South India differs from north India also in the equality between the two sides in a marriage. In north India, the bride's side is usually considered to be inferior to the groom's, while in south India, the two sides are more likely to be considered equal.

Weddings, Dowries, and Bride-Price

South Asians are often criticized for their elaborate and costly weddings. The bridegroom's party, until recently in the north composed entirely of male relatives and friends of the groom, comes to the bride's village and stays for three or four days, during which time the bride's family must house and feed them lavishly. In south India, the groom's party may include women, even the groom's mother, and since many couples in the south come from the same village, the burdens of entertainment may not be so heavy on the bride's people. In both north and south, relatives of the bride, such as her married sisters and mother's brothers and their families who reside in other villages, are also invited, as are members of her local caste-chapter.

In north India, the bride is also expected to bring a *dabej*, or dowry, composed in part of household goods and gifts—cooking vessels, beds and bedding, embroidered linens, toys for the children in the groom's family, saris for the women in the groom's family, her own saris, cosmetics, and silver and gold jewelry, and the gift of a finger ring for the groom. Accumulation of these dowry goods may begin as soon as a daughter is born.

Dabej may also include cash to be given by the bride's father to the groom's father. Until recent decades, only wealthy families gave cash or impressively sumptuous gifts in dowry. Most brides' families in the north bore the greater part of the expenses of the feasting and the household goods and gifts, the most onerous expense being that for the bride's jewelry. According to the Indian social anthropologist M. N. Srinivas, the giving of dowry in south India began only in the twentieth century. In south India generally, and in the mountainous parts of north India, bride-price given by the groom's people in the form of all or some of the following—food, clothing, cash, jewelry—made up most of the wedding expenses among almost all communities until recently.

Since Indian independence in 1947, there has been a considerable increase in modern education, especially for males. Many parents and elders with girls to marry off seek educated bridegrooms because they are believed to have excellent potential earning capacity. While literacy among males in India is now over 50 percent, there are still relatively few males who are well enough educated to achieve good occupations with good salaries, such as teaching, government work, or professional work. The elders in charge of arranging the marriage of a young engineer or medical doctor can demand a very large amount of cash and modern consumer goods in dowry from the bride's people—hundreds of thousands of rupees in cash, a television set, a scooter or automobile, and so on. Such elders usually also enjoy a wide choice in selecting a bride for their educated son. The parents of the bride selected may be hard pressed to provide all the items in dowry that they agree to and may postpone some payments until after the wedding. "Dowry-deaths" sometimes occur when the bridegroom's parents press the bride to persuade her parents to come up with the agreed-upon dowry payments, but they are unable to do so. The usual story is that the bride's sari caught fire in a fireplace used for cooking and she was burned to death—but in fact she has been murdered. In cities, and it is in cities that such cases may be reported to police and newspapers, some women's advocacy groups have managed to have the bride's parents-in-law prosecuted for such deaths in a few instances. With few exceptions, the elders of the educated groom can select another bride for him.

Dowry-deaths are a new phenomenon in India, just as the great increase in dowry giving is new. Both have come about with the increase in higher education for males and the consumerism that has arisen with new manufacturing and imports. It is relatively well-off middle-class people who perpetrate dowry-murders, not poor, uneducated villagers.



MATCHMAKING IN TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY INDIA

In India, it is common for young men and women or their families to place advertisements for brides and grooms in the newspaper. The ads below are excerpted from actual classifieds in the *The Tribune* of Chandigarh.

Brides Wanted

Match for Ramagarhia Sikh handsome boy Electronics and Microcomputers Engineer, senior British government executive, annual income pound 55,000. Divorced after short marriage, no children, girl should be up to 32 years from status family.

Status alliance for very handsome Brahmin boy Engineer in reputed American Delhi based company drawing 6 lakhs pa, 5'-10"/26yrs; status family—father Chief Engineer in Coal India; attractive girl preferably Computer/IIT Engineer/having professional qualification.

Wanted—dependable slim simple companion For civil engineer Doaba (Punjab) based Hindu SC boy 29, 5'8", religion/caste/horoscope/dowry no bar.

Alliance for 21, 5/11" Jak Sikh Bhuliar boy, diploma Mechanical Engineer. Rural urban property. Mediocre family.

Alliance for very handsome, fair, Canadian citizen, 29 year old, 5'6" Hindu Punjabi, BE-Mechanical Computer networking Engineer, presently engaged in computer IT consulting, boy own property in India as well as Canada. Short marriage annulled. Wanted beautiful, educated girl willing to migrate, from a well educated decent family, caste no bar, the boy will visit India in late February, 2002 for 15 days.

Grooms Wanted

Extremely beautiful, educated Canadian citizen 29 yrs, 5'8", Ramagarhia girl working at Royal Bank of Canada, looking for compatible Canadian or US born professional or well established Indian resident. Caste no bar.

Khatri Sikh parents seek USA settled well educated Medico/Computer professional match for their smart intelligent professional daughter BE, MS, Database developer, working in USA green card shortly. 31/162, highly educated liberal professional family.

Dowry-deaths are more likely to be northern events than southern, because in north India the bride and groom in an arranged marriage are commonly almost total strangers to each other, as are the two families allied by marriage. In south India, even when the bride and groom are not cross-cousins or uncle and niece, they are likely to be more distant relatives and to be acquainted with each other, at least from their childhood days, since *jatis* in south India are smaller on average than in the north, and marriages can take

place between a bride and groom from the same village. Gift giving at south Indian weddings is also more likely to be balanced between the two sides. Dowry giving is a much more recently adopted custom, among even high-ranking south Indian castes, than in the north.

As in north India, dowry is becoming more important in southern India, as educated bridegrooms are allied with brides from unrelated wealthy families. Such marriages sometimes cross *jati* lines but are in

the same occupational caste, since it may be difficult to find educated bridegrooms for educated brides.

The Logic of Arranged Marriages

Why arranged marriages? There are at least four reasons. First, ancient Hindu religious law states that a father would be punished in afterlife if he has not got his daughter married off before her first menstruation. Second, arrangement of marriages by elders ensures that marriages take place within the *jati*. The stability of the caste system depends on arranged marriage. A third practical reason in areas where village exogamy is the rule is the impossibility of children's knowing potential mates in other villages. A fourth reason is the general disapproval of self-selection of a mate, called all over South Asia a "love marriage." There is the assumption that a love marriage must have involved some kind of premarital sexual contact between the couple, which violates the requirement that a bride be a virgin at the time of her wedding, held by all religious and caste communities in South Asia. This requirement that a bride be virginal encourages Muslims and Christians to arrange marriages for their daughters at young ages and to chaperone marriageable girls carefully.

Remarriage

High-caste Hindu women generally are not allowed to marry a second time. A high-caste widow may remain in her dead husband's joint household; if she is young, she may return to her parents' or married brother's home; if she is old and has no relative whom she can reliably turn to, she may have to try to find some means to support herself. Some Hindu widows become holy women visiting pilgrimage places such as Varanasi (Benares) and Haridwar on the Ganges. Many Hindu middle and lower castes allow widows to remarry, many following the rule of junior levirate, encouraging a widow to take her husband's younger brother as a second mate. Muslim and Christian widows are allowed to remarry.

Divorce was made legal in India after independence, but it is usually said that Hindus do not allow divorce. What this means in practice is that a barren first wife (for it is almost always due to infertility that a Hindu woman is abandoned by her husband) is taken home to her parents or to her married brother and left there. Her husband never comes again to get her; he then takes another wife. The abandoned wife usually cannot remarry. Muslim family law explicitly allows men to divorce their wives. Such divorces are probably more common among urban Muslim merchants than among rural Muslims, however, and are very easily achieved.

Kinship and caste ties are strong in Indian life. One's relatives and members of one's *jati* are ready to help, and in turn, one should help them. Loyalty and duty, toward one's family especially, but also toward one's *jati*, are emphasized in child rearing. Many Western observers of Indian family life have commented on the collectivistic ethic at its core and the absence of an individualistic ethic. Indeed, what might be interpreted as healthy individualism by a person from the West maybe seen by South Asians as selfishness.

Recent Developments

There has been much movement of Indians from their villages into towns and cities, especially since the mid-nineteenth century and increasingly in the twentieth century. Studies suggest that in towns with long-settled stable populations, there were neighborhoods associated with particular castes, but in rapidly growing metropolises such as Mumbai (Bombay), Delhi, Calcutta, and Madras, people are segregated more by economic class than by caste. Wealthy people live in certain estates or "colonies," poorer people in others. Even though the caste-cum-kinship neighborhood milieu may be gone in the city, and households may be nuclear in structure—a working man plus his wife and children—urban families are often joined by other relatives, by a nephew attending school or by an elderly parent of the husband or wife. Marriages continue to be arranged by elders and arranged almost always within the *jati*. The *jati* for the city dweller may be located around his home village, or it may be merely a network of scattered families, few in his own neighborhood. If enough families of his *jati* migrated to a town or city and have been there for a few generations, a new urban *jati* may have developed.

There has been much discussion of the so-called decline in the joint family in South Asia. With the increase in average life expectancy in South Asian countries during the twentieth century, there should be more lineal joint families since there should be more grandparents available to fill joint-families' upper generations. However, there are countervailing forces, such as outmigration from rural areas to cities, plantations, and abroad. There also has been an increase in the average age of marriage for both females and males, so that there are fewer junior members to fill the middle generation in the joint family. To the extent that more children survive infancy and early childhood than in past centuries, the problem of crowding is greater. Crowding tends to force some of the component couples in a joint-family household to take their children and move elsewhere. Population pressure and the patrilineal South Asian pattern of dividing land among all

male descendants has resulted in land fragmentation and a decline in resources for people in rural areas, making it difficult to accommodate a joint family.

Pauline Kolenda

See also: **Westernization-South Asia**

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MARRIAGE AND FAMILY—WEST ASIA

Family and marriage are important in the social economy of West Asia. The dominant religion of the area is Islam, and therefore the mores that govern marriage and family life in the region are derived from, and firmly rooted in, Islamic traditions. As such, society is strictly male-dominated, with women often serving the dual roles of mother and housewife. It is not unusual to see men in public while women are seen but rarely; when women are seen, they are draped in an all-encompassing veil, for a veil is said to protect and guard the virtue of a woman.

Family Structure

A typical family in West Asia is an extended one, in that several generations of the same family live in

one abode. Generally the eldest male is the head of the household. Family life is best described as clan-nish, wherein each member works for the benefit of the whole. It is highly unusual for sons to leave their parents home and set up a household of their own. Traditionally, a son gets married and his wife comes and lives in the family home. Conversely, the girl children of the household are married off and go to live with their in-laws. This sort of familial arrangement has age-old roots in West Asia. Certainly, the extended family predates the arrival of Islam, since earlier civilizations in the area show the same pattern of family life. In modern urban West Asia (that is, in the larger cities of Turkey and Iran), however, the nuclear family is becoming more common. Most modern Turkish and many Iranian young people, while recognizing the prevalence of the traditional pattern, would resist including themselves in it.

Choice of Marriage Partners

Traditionally, marriage is arranged by the parents, with the son or the daughter having little say in the matter. The concept of young people choosing their own life partners is alien to the culture of the region. Arranged marriages tend to be based on the concept of gain, in that a marital union will further the economic or social standing of the family. Also, it is often customary that marriages are arranged within the larger family group. Thus, there are frequent consanguineous arrangements with either first or second cousins. Such practices derive from ancient concepts of blood ties and the idea that marriages must be kept within the family. No doubt such customs stem also from the need to safeguard the family's property, and are fueled by ancient notions of procreation, in which the father is deemed the full progenitor of children, with the mother contributing little other than her womb as a place for the child to grow. In this context, the question of incest cannot occur.

Women are expected to be virgins at the time of their marriages. Indeed, there are many dire consequences if an unmarried woman is not a virgin. Traditionally, the sexual life of young women is strictly controlled and the mingling of boys and girls is not encouraged.

Dowry Gifts

The bride's family provides a substantial dowry to the groom, although the groom's family also gives the bride marriage gifts. Traditionally, the dowry ensured the marriage would remain stable, since dissolution of the bond would mean the groom would have to return much of the dowry the bride brought with her.

A dowry is often a heavy responsibility for the girl's family and contributes to the common view that girls are a burden. Traditionally, girls are married off as soon as they reach puberty. Although this practice of early marriage is now abating, it persists in many areas of the region.

Widowhood and Divorce

If the husband dies at a young stage, it is not atypical for the wife, who is already living with her in-laws, to be married to one of her brothers-in-law. This levirate arrangement serves to ensure the economic well-being of the woman, since she cannot fend for herself in a traditional society and needs the umbrella of a family. Traditionally, a widow would not be accepted back into her parents' home.

Given that the larger culture of the region is Islamic, it is perfectly permissible for a man to take four wives. Indeed, it is the duty of a Muslim man to marry. Each wife has equal rights in the eyes of the law, and her children are deemed full heirs to the father's property. However, having more than one wife implies that a man is rich enough to take care of them all; polygamy is thus also a status symbol within the larger society. A man is free to divorce as many times as he chooses. A man may divorce a woman by simply stating so, four times, without witnesses, and the pronouncement becomes binding. Divorce often results when children are not produced. It is perceived that the woman is literally barren, in that the man's seed cannot grow in her womb. Such ancient notions still predominate in the region.

Pleasure Marriages

Where Shi'a Islam prevails, another marriage pattern exists. This is the "temporary" or "pleasure marriage." In such arrangements, any woman (whether a divorcee, a widow, or a virgin) may unite with a man for a clearly defined period of time (anywhere from a few hours to many years) by simply uttering a phrase of consent. This verbal contract has loose rules, takes place without witnesses, and is not officially registered, although it is fully backed by Islamic religious tradition. Once the marriage expires, according to the dictates of the preset period of time, the woman must abstain from sexual intercourse for a period of three months, in order to determine the father in case of pregnancy. If during the pleasure marriage the woman falls pregnant, the father must take charge of the child. Such marriages are becoming popular in certain parts of West Asia, because they involve less financial commitment on the part of the husband. Critics of this practice view it as little more than prostitution. How-

ever, many men and women in parts of West Asia are now involved in such marriages.

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MARSH ARABS Until the middle 1990s, when the Iraqi government began extensive drainage works that destroyed much of their traditional homeland, the Marsh Arabs inhabited much of the area extending southward from Kut on the Tigris River and Hilla on the Euphrates River, to Basra on the Shatt al- 'Arab. The area is alternately desert and marsh and originally covered 52,000 square kilometers (20,000 square miles). In the rainy season (March–July), 10,400 square kilometers (4,000 square miles) would be completely inundated; during the rest of the year the area was part marsh, part lake, and part dry land, covered with reeds and bulrushes. The inhabitants of the area, all nominally Shi'ite Muslims, were members of a number of different tribes, notably the Albu Muhammad, the Bani Lam, the Albu Salih, the Bani 'Isad, and the Bani Hashsham. Traditionally, villages were formed on small islands, with huts made of reeds; transport was by canoe or raft.

The only academic anthropological study of part of the region (published in 1962, based on research carried out in 1953) divides the inhabitants occupationally into cultivators (of rice, millet, wheat, barley, and vegetables), reed gatherers, and buffalo breeders; some of the larger tribes, especially the Albu Muhammad, had members in all three categories, buffalo breeding being the most socially prestigious. In 1947, when the population of Iraq was about 5 million, there were about 300,000 Marsh Arabs. Although the nation's population in 2001 was over 20 million, rural to urban migration has been a major feature of the last five decades, so there were probably no more than 600,000 Marsh Arabs as of 1990.

Traditionally, the marshes provided a place of refuge for those fleeing from conscription or from the tax collector. However, the system of air control introduced by the British mandatory authorities in the 1920s meant that recalcitrant tribes could be and were bombed for various acts of disobedience or for non-payment of taxes. Increasingly, the inhabitants of the rural south settled in larger villages or left the area al-



A Marsh Arab man prepares dough for baking near Nasiriya, Iraq, in 1974. (NIK WHEELER/CORBIS)

together. In the autumn of 1967, a splinter group of the Iraq Communist Party (the ICP–General Command, led by ‘Aziz al-Hajj) conducted a brief guerrilla campaign based in the marshes. After the uprisings in southern Iraq following Desert Storm in 1991, groups of rebels took refuge in the marshes, which caused the Iraqi regime to lay siege to the area. Movement in and out of the marshlands was forbidden, and two huge canals were constructed and a number of rivers diverted, deliberately draining the marshes to make them uninhabitable by their traditional population (because the water was a vital part of their way of life). Most of the population has fled to refugee camps across the Iranian border. It may be that the damage done so far is irreversible; in any case, if the new hydraulic works were to be abandoned immediately, it would take many years for the ecology of the area to recover.

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MARSHALL, DAVID (1908–1995), Singapore politician. David Marshall was born in Singapore on 12 March 1908. Educated in Singapore and London, he was called to the Singapore bar in 1938. A volunteer in World War II, he was taken prisoner in 1942 and sent to Japan; he returned to Singapore in 1946 and established his reputation as a leading criminal lawyer. His involvement in politics began in 1949, when he joined the Progressive Party. In 1954, he founded the Labour Front and became its chairman. In 1955 Singapore became a self-governing colony of the United Kingdom and an election was held; Marshall was elected chief minister when his party won ten out of twenty-five contested seats. He resigned in May 1956, after failing to secure full independence from the British government. In 1957 Marshall formed the Workers' Party, which, with Communist support, emerged as a political force in the December 1957 city council election, but then faded, except as a vehicle for winning Marshall a parliamentary seat in the 1962 Anson by-election. He resigned from the party in 1963 because of ideological differences, and returned to the practice of law. Marshall was admired for his courage and integrity, and for his willingness to stand up to

authority on issues of conscience. In 1978 he was made Singapore's ambassador to France; later his portfolio expanded to include Spain, Portugal, and Switzerland. He retired from the diplomatic corps and returned to Singapore in 1993, where he practiced law until his death in 1995.

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MARUYAMA MASAO (1914–1996), Japanese political scientist. Maruyama Masao is one of the most influential intellectuals in postwar Japan and is a representative political thinker. The son of a political journalist, he was born in Osaka Prefecture in 1914. In 1937, he graduated from the Law Faculty of Tokyo Imperial University (as the University of Tokyo was called until after World War II) and became a faculty member there. In 1950, he was appointed full professor and gave lectures on the history of political ideas in the East until his retirement in 1971.

Throughout his career, Maruyama analyzed Japan's social aspects and ideology from the perspective of democratic humanism (a philosophy promoting the worth of all people). His 1946 book *Chokokka shugi no ronri to shinri* (The Logic and Psychology of Ultrationalism) cataloged Maruyama's thoughts on the Japanese government. His analysis of the country's postwar democracy and the psychology of the Japanese imperial system revealed his criticism of Japan's system of government with an emperor as head of state. He wrote a series of other works that include the *Nihon seiji shisosho kenkyu* (Studies on the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, 1952), *Gendai seiji no shiso to kodo* (Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics, 1965–1967), and *Senbu to sengo no aida* (Between the War and Postwar Eras, 1976).

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MARXISM-SOUTH ASIA Marxist ideas have had a deep and enduring influence on political, economic, and literary thinking in South Asia, even though Communist parties have been in power in only a few regional pockets. This influence has advanced along two routes: anticolonial political movements and thoughts on economic development.

The Communist Party of India was established in 1925. From 1920, the idea of class struggle was closely linked with the nationalist movement, partly because such a connection was favored by Moscow and inspired by Lenin's thesis that imperialism was a mature stage of capitalism. Partly, it appealed to a section of nationalists disillusioned by the Indian National Congress's elite leadership. That feeling was strengthened after the sudden withdrawal of the noncooperation movement (1920–1922). This connection between class struggle and nationalism was for the Communists a source of both strength and weakness. Strength because it was expected to bring the working classes into the nationalist movement while staying at a distance from the Congress, which was seen as representing the national bourgeoisie, and weakness because it led to intellectual division. In the most famous dissent, M. N. Roy argued and almost persuaded the Comintern (the international association of Communist parties) that the two agendas, class struggle and nationalist movement, needed to be separate. Soon after, in 1926, Roy was expelled from the Comintern. The Communist Party of India, which followed Moscow closely thereafter, suffered credibility when it abruptly changed its line on anticolonial struggles after Russia entered World War II as an ally of the British.

Following India's independence from Britain (1947) and the creation of Bangladesh (1971), new national Communist parties were formed. These parties splintered for a variety of reasons: intellectual tensions arising from the appeal of Maoism and the emphasis on peasant struggles, regional tensions arising from local concerns, and political tensions concerning participation in parliamentary politics. A major development came in 1957 in Kerala when, for the first time in world history, a Communist state government was voted into power as a result of a democratic election. In the last six elections West Bengal, too, has produced Communist governments.

Before India's independence, a main current within the Indian National Congress was convinced of the need for state control of productive resources to en-

sure a more equal distribution of income and wealth. This socialist strand was inspired directly by the Soviet developmental model, with the emphasis on state ownership, redistribution, and central planning, and indirectly by classical Marxism with its accent on equity and fair distribution. Between the 1950s and the 1980s, these ideas were incorporated into India's developmental policy and philosophy and became part of an informal consensus among Indian intellectuals. Such Soviet-influenced developmental ideas were popular in greater South Asia as well. In this way, gaps were bridged between the political parties of the left and the mainstream intellectual tradition in political economy. The collapse of the Soviet Union, China's economic reforms and rapid economic growth in Southeast Asia and East Asia were some of the major forces that weakened the socialist development strategy and the link between leftist politics and policy discourse.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Marxism was on the wane both politically and intellectually. Struggles for representation and empowerment of the underprivileged carry on, but are not focused on the concerns of workers. Still, Marxism has left a deep and enduring impact on ideas about rural political change, on the trade-union movement, on historiography, and, in the cultural sphere, on theater and film.

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MARXISM-LENINISM-MAO ZEDONG THOUGHT Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought is a complex set of philosophical ideas and views, economic and historical theories and conceptions, and political doctrines, each integral part of which has its own history of emergence and development in China.

Marxism

The first Chinese to fasten their eyes on Marxism at the beginning of the twentieth century were reformers and revolutionaries. Due to their efforts, some writings of the classics of Marxism began to be translated and published in 1906. The founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in July 1921 was a landmark in the development of Marxism in China.

Since then, Marxism has been tightly connected to the CCP, and Marxism has been proclaimed the ideological basis of the party, which is engaged in the struggle for revolutionary transformation of society.

As a matter of fact, Marxism was ill-suited to this mission. The reason is that even Marxist theories about the general laws of historical development (let them be called "scientific Marxism" here) aimed in the long run to prove the inevitability of capitalist society's revolutionary transformation into a socialist society, characterized by a higher level of development, and therefore qualified as postcapitalistic in nature. As for Marxist revolutionary doctrines (let them be called "political Marxism" here), they dealt altogether with revolutionary transformation and the construction of the postcapitalist society only. But the CCP conducted its struggle in a precapitalist society and for this purpose had nothing to do with the transformation of capitalism into a "higher" stage of development. Moreover, contrary to the Chinese Communists' claims, this struggle was in essence intended not to build any "postcapitalist" society at all, but to prevent the emergence of a capitalist society. However, it is at this very point that the Chinese Communists' efforts coincided with the utopian views of political Marxism about both capitalism and socialism, which in fact neglected capitalism from the standpoint of precapitalist rather than postcapitalist society. That is why the Chinese Communists armed themselves with Marxism, using it as an ideological cover rather than an ideological basis. The CCP inherited Marxism from the Russian Bolsheviks in the form that later was proclaimed to be Leninism (the formula "Marxism-Leninism" came to usage in China only after its invention in the Soviet Union, after Lenin's death). The main feature of this form of Marxism was Lenin's representation of a struggle against capitalism from the standpoint of precapitalist society as a striving for a new, postcapitalist society. At the same time, once the Chinese Communists adopted Marxism, scientific Marxism provided a solid theoretical and methodological base for Chinese scholars who were conducting research in social sciences and humanities.

Mao Zedong Thought

Mao Zedong Thought developed in China during the second half of the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s, as Mao Zedong (1893-1976) consolidated his leadership position in the CCP. The term "Mao Zedong Thought" appeared for the first time in 1943, when it was declared to be an amalgam of Chinese Marxism-Leninism, Chinese Bolshevism, and Chinese Communism, as well as the correct road for Chinese

Communists. Mao Zedong Thought evidently referred to new policies adopted by the CCP. Their main features were revealed by Mao Zedong in his work *On New Democracy* (1940).

The new policies' cornerstone became the statement that China had not been ready for socialism. Therefore, the revolution conducted by the Chinese Communists had not been a proletarian and socialist revolution, but a bourgeois-democratic one. And it had to be guided, as before, by the CCP, not by the proletariat. The CCP was declared to be the leader of the peasantry and all the other democratic forces. The revolution was designed to establish a bourgeois-democratic regime of what was termed the "New Democracy" and to clear the way for the development of national capitalism. Therefore the Chinese Communists sought support for such a revolution not from the Soviet Union, but from the United States.

However, for quite a number of reasons, the New Democracy and the attempts to enlist the support of the United States failed. The Soviet Union remained the only potential source of external aid for the Chinese Communists. As a result, in the second half of 1948, on the eve of their victory over the Nationalist Chinese forces of the Guomindang Party, the Chinese Communists began to revise the New Democracy course and to return to orthodox Marxist lines, based on the leadership of the working class and on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and of Proletarian Internationalism. This process was finally completed after the establishment in October 1949 of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Coalescence into Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought

After independence, Marxism-Leninism regained its former dominant status. Mao Zedong Thought was subsumed into Marxism-Leninism, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought as a whole was elevated to the status of something like a state ideology. In full accordance with this ideology's demands, China was declared to be "a socialist country," and the policies of the CCP fluctuated toward what was termed "Socialist construction."

The elevation of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought to the status of an official state ideology meant that the obligation to demonstrate loyalty to this ideology, to study its doctrines, and to use its theories as a methodological basis for scholarly research of all kinds, which had earlier been imposed on party members only, was extended to the entire citizenry. In the late 1950s and the early 1960s, a new elevation of

Mao Zedong Thought set in. Once again, it became tightly connected to a fundamentally new political course. Mao Zedong's leftist conceptions of the Great Leap Forward economic movement and class struggle under socialism, of continued revolution under proletarian dictatorship, and of the Cultural Revolution formed its theoretical and ideological basis and determined its domestic policies. Its foreign policy aspects included confrontation with the Soviet Union during the late 1950s and early 1960s and improvement of China's relations with the United States and the West as a whole in the early 1970s. In 1967, Mao Zedong Thought was proclaimed to be "the perfection of Marxism-Leninism" and Mao himself to be the "Lenin of the present age."

The failure of the Cultural Revolution's domestic policies and the adoption of the Four Modernizations course in 1978 led to the restoration of the status quo in the hierarchical relations between Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. Moreover, those aspects of Mao Zedong Thought that were considered the theoretical underpinnings of the rejected policies were strongly criticized. Simultaneously, the criticism was extended to many basic nonscientific and utopian doctrines of Marxism-Leninism itself, regarding the fundamental features of capitalist and socialist societies. Also, a considerable number of scholarly inquiries were published that were designed to eliminate from Marxist scientific theories of precapitalist societies' development all of the perversions generated by Soviet interpretations of Marxism. Nevertheless, the official status of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought as the leading ideology of the state was not called into question in China.

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See also: Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution-China; Mao Zedong

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ANCIENT MERV—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

The ruins of Merv in Mary, Turkmenistan, an important city on the Silk Route, were designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1999. The exceptionally well-preserved oasis city's architecture bears witness to four millennia of trade and cultural cross-pollination through its walls.

MARY (1998 est. pop. 123,000). Mary (formerly Merv), the third-largest city in Turkmenistan, lies near the very ancient settlement of Merv; in Hindu, Parsi, and Arab tradition Merv was thought to be the site of paradise and the home of the Aryans. Mary is situated in the southeastern part of the country, in a large oasis in the Kara-Kum desert, at the intersection of the Murghab River and the Kara-Kum Canal, a 1,400-kilometer-long waterway linking the Caspian Sea and the Amu Dar'ya River.

Mary was founded in 1884 under the name of Merv during the Russian conquest of Central Asia, 30 kilometers west of the ruined ancient city of Merv, known from early times under the names of Mouru, Margush, Margiana, and Maru. After establishment of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic (1924), Merv, renamed Mary in 1937, was the administrative center of the Mary province until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Since 1991 Mary is the administrative center of the Mary province of the republic of Turkmenistan. At present it is a major railway junction and an important center for cotton growing and gas extracting. The major Shotlyk ("joy") gas field with recoverable resources of 460 billion cubic meters is located 20 kilometers west of Mary.

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MASHHAD (2000 pop. 2 million). Mashhad (Mashad, Meshed), a city in northeastern Iran in the province of Khorasan, is located in the Kashaf River

valley near the borders of Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. The city was always an important center for travelers from India and for those moving north-south. Today, Mashhad is the provincial capital and Iran's second largest city.

Mashhad was once a small village called Sanabad, twenty-five kilometers southeast of Tus, Khorasan's urban center throughout antiquity. Following the Shi'ite Imam Reza's death in 817 CE and his burial in Sanabad, however, the village became a key pilgrimage destination for Shi'ites and was eventually known as Mashhad-e Moghaddas ("place of martyrdom"), or just Mashhad. Since that time locals and notables built mosques, *madrasas*, (religious schools), libraries, and numerous other structures adjacent to Reza's tomb. The resulting religious complex is an impressive urban center and one of the holiest pilgrimage sites for Shi'ites. Today millions visit Mashhad each year as pilgrims.

After Mongol armies razed Tus in 1220, Mashhad emerged as a true city and eventual provincial capital. Though raided or seized by invading armies of Oghuz Turks, Mongols, Uzbeks, and Afghans through the centuries, Mashhad endured and grew. In 1736, Mashhad was made capital of Persia under Nadir Shah, and his tomb and museum are important monuments in the city. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Mashhad was a significant center in the Anglo-Russian struggles over Eurasia, and the shrine of Imam Reza was even bombarded by Russians in 1912. During the past two decades Mashhad has also been a major destination for thousands of Afghan refugees.

Kyle Evered

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MASKS—EAST ASIA From prehistoric to present times, masks in China, Korea, and Japan have been used in religious rites and theatrical performances. Made of varying materials and configurations, masks were often believed to have magical powers. The use of masks enabled the wearer to assume another identity, either divine, human, or animal.

Masks in China have been traced to Neolithic times (c. 5000 BCE). Copper masks were in use in the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE) and huge gilt bronze masks with protruding eyes and fantastic brow crests were found at Sanxingdui (thirteenth to tenth centuries BCE). Nuo Xi, ritual exorcisms enacted as masked dance, were performed to frighten away evil and to avoid disasters. Masked stilt dancers in Anhui province brought good fortune. The masks of Di Xi, worn atop the forehead, have stern visages, sharp features, and beards. Beijing opera, traditionally performed without masks, gave rise to renditions of *jing* (painted face) character masks. Enacting rituals and theater in the outdoors required masks to be brightly colored and exaggerated.

Korean masks owe their origins to shamanism and Buddhism, as well as to Chinese influences. The oldest known mask, from the fifth to sixth century during the Shilla kingdom (57 BCE–935 CE), is of black lacquered wood from Ho'u-chong in Kyongju Province. The Korean masked dance drama (*t'al ch'un*) was performed at the New Year and Tano Festival, which was on the fifth day of the fifth moon and which was when women washed their hair in iris and swung on swings while men participated in traditional Korean wrestling (*ssirum*) matches. Dramas were also performed on Chosuk, the seventh day of the seventh moon, a festival when ancestors were honored in order to ensure prosperity for families; women and children performed ceremonies at wells to ensure abundant water for the coming year, and books and clothing were aired in the sun. The often bawdy drama ridicules the *yangban* (landed aristocrats) and Buddhist monks. The masks, either wood, papier-mâché, or gourd, were often burned after performances, except the wooden masks of Hahoe village, which were kept in a sacred place. Guardian masks also adorned the wooden poles at the village entrances. Funeral masks (*pangsangsi*) were made of carved wood, paper, or straw, according to the status of the deceased, and were either carried in front or worn by a performer who danced in front of the procession and frightened evil from the burial site.

In Japan, early masks were used for *gagaku*, elegant ritual music brought to Japan from China or Korea in the early Nara period (710–794 CE), and *bugaku*, court dance and music also dating from the Nara period. The most renowned Japanese masks, however, are Noh masks representing gods, warriors, beautiful or aged women, and demons. Created by actor, playwright, and critic Zeami (c. 1363–c. 1443), Noh drama incorporated parts of ritual dances to form a slow-moving tragic genre. Noh mask carvers such as the Deme family of Echizen Province carefully guarded

their skills, which were passed down for over eight generations.

Noelle O'Connor

See also: **Drama-China; Drama-Japan; Drama-Korea; Noh, Kyogen**

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MASKS-INDONESIA, JAVANESE Java has a strong tradition of the cultural use of face masks. Probably ritual in origin, today they are important in many traditional styles of drama, while their carving is a major Javanese folk art

The Javanese term *topeng* (from a root meaning "to cover up") refers to all face masks, whether for performance, ceremonies, or decoration. While masks for ritual exist in other parts of Indonesia, in Java and Bali masks are principally associated with theatrical performance and are also collected as objets d'art. Javanese masks are carved from a single block of wood and then painted. Performance masks are either gripped between the performer's teeth by means of a strap attached to the inner surface, or held on with a string passing over a headdress.

Javanese masks are differentiated according to well-established types closely related to the characterization of *wayang kulit* (shadow puppets), and dance types from *wayang wong* (court ballet). Characters are either *halus* (refined), *gagah* (strong), clowns, or ogres. *Halus* character masks have pointed noses and narrow eyes, while *gagah* masks have round eyes and prominent noses. Some clown characters are represented by half masks, allowing actors wearing them to speak more freely. Female characters normally fall within the *halus* type. As with Javanese shadow puppets, there are regional variations, and details of eye shape, face color, and nose and mouth representation represent distinctions between characters.

While some craftsmen still specialize in carving and painting performance masks, many cruder masks are produced as tourist souvenirs and for interior decoration.

Masks are used in folk-theater, but their use in classical theater is now more common in Bali than in Java.

In some modern forms of dance-drama such as *sendratari* (the "Ramayana ballet" developed in the 1960s), masks are used only for nonhuman characters. Classical masked dances also exist in Java, dances such as the *klana topeng gagab*, in which a male dancer represents an ogre king. There are traditional theatrical forms (*topeng pajengan*) in which a single performer represents a number of characters by using different masks, a feat requiring dexterity and skill.

Many dancers specializing in masked performance spend considerable time with new masks, even wearing them around their houses to get the feel of the new character inhabiting the mask.

The concept of masked theater is still strong today in the work of avant-garde theater groups and choreographers, while a growing number of dealers in Indonesia and overseas provide support for the craft of mask-making.

Tim Byard-Jones

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MASSAGE-CHINA Massage is an ancient healing art in China. Archaeological studies show that as early as 2700 BCE the Chinese in the Huang (Yellow) River Valley were using massage for healing purposes. During the period of Warring States (475–221 BCE), a folk doctor, Bianqie, used massage and acupuncture successfully for a patient suffering from shock.

Methods of massage include rubbing, stroking, kneading, or tapping with the hands as well as with the healer's arm and elbow on the patient's body and extremities. The principles of massage developed alongside the essential principles of traditional Chinese medicine, that is, the theory of yin and yang, and the belief in flows of energy through the channels and the collaterals. In accord with these beliefs, massage is thought to not only heal an injury at one particular location but also to influence the entire body or other parts of the body through energy flowing through the channels and the collaterals that regulate the balance of yin and yang, correct the pathology and physiology of body fluid, *qi* (vital energy), and stimulate circulation. The effect of the manipulation is directly related to the methods used—mild or powerful manipulations, vigorous or soft performance, quick or slow frequency, direction of the force, and so forth. Currently, therapeutic massage is used in China as a conservative treat-

ment for orthopedic disorders such as frozen shoulder, lumbago, protrusion of spinal disc, and joint sprains. Chinese orthopedic surgeons do not consider therapeutic massage and surgical treatment as opposites, but as complementary treatments. Therapeutic massage, using only the doctor's hands, relieves the patient's pain and avoids the side effects of chemical agents such as repeated local injections of steroids. It can also frequently eliminate the side effects of unnecessary surgical procedures. In most Chinese hospitals today, a section of massage treatment is often affiliated with the department of physical therapy.

Chen Bao-xing and Garé LeCompte

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MAT SALLEH REBELLION The Mat Salleh Rebellion of 1894–1905 reflected the failure of the British North Borneo Chartered Company to administer British North Borneo (Sabah) after two decades and was a culmination of opposition since the 1880s.

Mat (Mohamed) Salleh (d. 1899), of mixed Bajau-Sulu heritage, was a trader and minor chief in the upper reaches of the Sugut River. A military tactician believed by the indigenous peoples to be endowed with supernatural powers and invulnerability, he utilized both Muslim and native symbols of authority (Islamic standards, flags, silk umbrellas) and commanded prestige and mystique amongst Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

The right and wrong of the conflict between Mat Salleh and the company remain obscure. Apparently an initial misunderstanding escalated into a series of attacks, followed by retribution by either side that created a hostile situation on the western coast and interior. The conflict erupted in late 1894 with the killing of two Iban traders on the Sugut River. A show of force by Mat Salleh at Buli Sim Sim, outside Sandakan, in August 1895 was followed by an attack on his village on the island of Pulo Jambongan. Salleh escaped to the village of Lingkabau and was declared an outlaw in July 1896. He sacked and burned Gaya Island, then Ambong in 1897; the company destroyed his fort at Ranau in 1898.

W. C. Cowie, managing director of the company's Court of Directors in London, felt that Governor Leicester P. Beaufort had mishandled the situation. Cowie met Mat Salleh at the town of Menggatal in April 1898 and verbally promised amnesty to him and his followers. They could reside in the Tambunan region without interference. Mat Salleh agreed but felt deceived when the written agreement refused to pardon his followers who were escaped felons. He began raiding and pillaging in the Tambunan Valley. Furthermore, a company outpost was established in the valley in June 1898, clearly breaking Cowie's pledge.

By the time a company force was sent to attack Mat Salleh's fort at Tambunan in December 1899, Cowie had given up on the whole affair. On 31 December 1899, during the siege of the fort, a chance shot hit and killed Mat Salleh. But it was another five years before the last of his henchmen were killed, surrendered, or captured.

The resistance of the people to the company was generally attributed to discontent over the introduction of taxes, including a levy on rice (a staple food) to fund railway and telegraph construction. But the lack of manpower forced the company to rely on local chieftains to collect revenue; subsequently they abused their mandate, creating dissatisfaction among the people, who readily supported Mat Salleh. The rebellion was not a unified territory-wide uprising, nor was it a nationalist-type struggle; it was a typical type of resistance to intrusion and curtailment of freedom from without.

Ooi Keat Gin

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MATARAM This great Javanese kingdom was centered in present-day Central Java in Indonesia. Its history divides into Hindu and Islamic Mataram periods, with a long interregnum between. The history of

Hindu Mataram is obscure, and this kingdom is mainly known for building numerous *candi* (temples) in Java. The earliest records of this kingdom date from 732 CE, but by the tenth century Mataram's glory faded for unknown reasons. The center of power in Java moved to the east to what eventually became several great kingdoms, most notably Majapahit.

Islamic Mataram was the last great Javanese kingdom in modern Java, lasting from 1587 until its breakup in 1745. This reborn Mataram resulted from integrating various small principalities that remained following Majapahit's fall. Its court, initially located in Kota Gede, on the outskirts of present-day Yogyakarta, moved several times in the agricultural area between Yogyakarta and Surakarta—the heartland of Javanese civilization.

Islamic Mataram actually started as a Hindu kingdom led by Panembahan (Prince) Senopati. Contacts with Islam came immediately after the court's establishment, especially with the small Islamic sultanates on Java's northern coast, which led Islamic propagation in the island. In 1641, the greatest Mataram lord, Sultan Agung, embraced Islam, making Mataram an Islamic sultanate. While pious in carrying out Muslim practices, Sultan Agung did not order the abandonment of existing Hindu practices. Islamic rituals did not replace previous traditions, but were regarded as complementary. Many attributes and rituals of the Mataram court remained, but glossed over by Islamic words and titles. Because of Mataram practice, Islam in Java was embraced in a manner syncretic with previous traditions. This still remains true.

Mataram peaked during the reigns of Sultan Agung and his successor, Amangkurat I (1645–1677). Its influence extended to all of Java, parts of Sumatra, and even present-day Malaysia. A legal code, taxation, and bureaucracy were all established at this time. While basically agricultural, Mataram traded with other kingdoms in the archipelago and with European traders—especially the Dutch East India Company—who ventured into the region.

In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, relations between Mataram and the expansionist Dutch administration grew tense. The Dutch took advantage of court sibling rivalries over the issue of succession, as conflicting noblemen each sought backing from the now-dominant Dutch. Fearing rivalry might get out of hand, the Dutch brokered a deal among the lords, which led to the disintegration of the Mataram court. Through the Treaty of Giyanti (1755), Mataram was divided into the Sunanate of Surakarta under Pakubuwono I, and the Sultanate of Yogyakarta

under Hamengkubuwono I. Later, these two kingdoms would be split again: the court of Mangkunegaran was established in Surakarta in 1757, and Pakualaman was established in Yogyakarta in 1813.

Though Mataram no longer exists, its successor courts in Yogyakarta and Surakarta remain active cultural centers, though without political or legal functions after the Republic of Indonesia was established. Mataram's legacy remains salient to this day, especially for Indonesia's political culture and bureaucracy.

Irman G. Lanti

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MATHURA (2001 est. pop. 299,000). Mathura (formerly Muttra), on the Yamuna River 155 kilometers south of Delhi, India has been a mercantile city since the fourth century BCE. It hosted Jain and Buddhist establishments and produced much Brahmanic sculpture. In Hindu mythology Mathura was founded by Satrugna, youngest brother of Rama, hero of the *Ramayana*. After 78 CE the city peaked under the Indo-Bactrian Kushan people. A Chinese pilgrim, Fa Hian, reported that in 400 CE Mathura held twenty Buddhist monasteries with a total of 3,000 monks. Its situation on a busy trade route ensured its prosperity until plunderings by the Afghan sultan Mahmud of Ghazni in 1017 and its later destruction in 1500 by Sikander Lodi, the second Lodi sultan of Delhi.

Hindu tradition stipulates that Mathura is one of seven major places of pilgrimage on the subcontinent. Believers hold that it was to rescue the throne of Mathura from usurpation by the wicked king Kamsa that Krishna, an incarnation of Vishnu, descended to earth. The focus of Krishna's story later shifted from this confrontation to his idyllic childhood in the surrounding countryside. Another major pilgrimage destination (*tirtha*) is Vrindavan, twenty kilometers upriver, where Krishna first danced his amorous musical drama (*rasa lila*) with local cowherding maidens.

In Mathura the Curzon Museum of Archaeology contains Buddhist, Jain, and Hindu artifacts, stone inscriptions, and art treasures of many dynasties.

C. Roger Davis

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
MATSUMOTO SHIGEHARU (1899–1989), Japanese journalist and internationalist. Born in Osaka Prefecture, Matsumoto Shigeharu graduated from the Tokyo Imperial University (now University of Tokyo) and then went abroad to study in the mid-1920s at Yale University in the United States and at Oxford University in England, before choosing his career as a journalist. In 1933, he was appointed bureau chief in Shanghai for the *Nihon Shimbun Rengosha* (Associated Press of Japan). During his stay in China, he built a reputation as an internationalist by making contacts with Chinese people and speaking out against Japan's military activities in China. In 1936, he garnered international attention by reporting on the kidnapping of China's president Chiang Kai-Shek. After World War II, he created an opinion journal (*Minpo*) to promote a new kind of journalism, but the journal was unsuccessful. In 1952, he established the International House of Japan, an institution that promotes international cultural exchange by hosting scholars, journalists, and opinion leaders from different countries. He published his memoirs from his time as a journalist in China in a three-volume book entitled *Shanghai jidai* (Shanghai Days). In 1979, he received the Japan Foundation Award for his outstanding contributions to cultural exchange and mutual understanding between Japan and other countries.

Nathalie Cavasin

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MAURITIUS —PROFILE (1999 est. pop. 1.15 million). Mauritius, a tiny, pear-shaped volcanic island of barely 1,865 square kilometers, lies 900 kilometers northeast of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean. Mauritius is 61 kilometers long and 47 kilometers wide, or



about the size of Connecticut plus Delaware or one-tenth the size of Wales. Mauritius is known for its vast white beaches, rugged volcanic mountains, and its large plateau at 550 to 730 meters above sea level.

The island lies 20 degrees south of the equator, just within the Tropic of Capricorn. Mauritius enjoys an equable maritime climate, tropical in summer and subtropical in winter, with an average summer temperature of 27°C and a winter temperature averaging 17°C.

The island's coastline runs over 200 kilometers and is surrounded by beautiful coral reefs, clean white sands, and clear lagoons full of tropical fish. The nearest Asian neighbor of Mauritius in the Indian Ocean is Sri Lanka: Colombo is 3,200 kilometers from Port Louis, the capital of Mauritius. Both Aden in Yemen and Cape Town in South Africa are 3,680 kilometers from Mauritius.

In addition to the island of Mauritius and the small island of Rodrigues, the state of Mauritius includes two tiny dependencies laying to the north—Agalega Islands (70 square kilometers) and the Carajoes Shoals (1.3 square kilometers), which are virtually unpopulated. There are also five small islands off the northwest coast of Mauritius, and the Chagos Archipelago

lies midway between Mauritius and Sri Lanka. This archipelago was long a dependency of Mauritius.

People

In the sixteenth century, the island was uninhabited; at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is one of the world's most densely populated countries. The capital city, Port Louis, is not particularly impressive, and, apart from some old buildings displaying features of European art and architecture, most of the buildings and roads are in a poor state. Port Louis is linked by narrow winding roads with the other towns of the island: Curepipe, Rose Hill, Mahebourg, and smaller villages such as Poste de Flacq, Poudre d'Or, and Souillac. Most of the villages on the plateau are inhabited by Indo-Mauritians, and there are a few Chinese shopkeepers as well. The Franco-Mauritians live in the towns or on large sugarcane plantations. The Chinese live mostly in the towns, and the Creoles live in Port Louis and in towns such as Beau Bassin, Quatre, Bornes, and Vacoas.

Present-day Mauritians have their origins on three continents: Europe, Asia, and Africa. The Mauritian population is composed of four ethnic groups and four

major religious groups: the Franco-Mauritians and Creoles who are Catholic; the Indian community, comprising both Muslims and Hindus; and the small Chinese community, who are either Buddhist or Catholic. All Mauritians are, in a manner of speaking, immigrants, and the Franco-Mauritians, Indo-Mauritians, and Chinese still maintain some cultural ties with their original homelands. The Creoles, however, who are descended from East African slaves brought to Mauritius, have no such ties.

The Indo-Mauritians constitute the largest ethnic group in the island. Most of them are descendants of the indentured laborers who came from various parts of India to the island between 1832 and 1855. Three-quarters of them are Hindus, while the rest are Muslims, with a very small number of Christians. The Muslims maintain their separate cultural and religious identity and have their own political organizations.

The Chinese constitute approximately 3 percent of the total population. Half of them are Catholic, while the rest are Buddhists. The majority of them live in Port Louis; a few are engaged in small-time business in the villages. Most of the older generation of Chinese were born in China. The younger generation are gradually realizing that as they cannot be a strong political force, they must depend on the good will of the government.

The island also is inhabited by people of European and African descent. Most of those of European descent, who comprise only 2 percent of the total population, have French ancestors. Very few of them are British, although Mauritius is now a member of the Commonwealth. The Creoles, the largest group within the general population, are mostly descendants of slaves who were brought to the island by the French. Until very recently, the small but powerful Franco-Mauritian elite occupied the top of the Mauritian hierarchy, followed by the light-skinned Creole professional and middle class. The Creoles, however, did not enjoy all the privileges enjoyed by the white minority. At the bottom of the society, there were the Indian laborers and dark-skinned Creoles. To a large extent, this social stratification was a result of the hierarchical organization of the sugar industry.

History

Mauritius appeared in seventh-century Arab navigational charts, so it may be presumed that Arab traders did land on the island to collect food, water, and fuel. The Portuguese also stopped in Mauritius en route from Cape Town to Goa from 1505 onward. But it was the Dutch who in 1598 claimed the island

and named it after their ruler, Prince Maurice Van Nassau. Twice the Dutch tried to establish their settlements, but they failed because of lack of food and efficient administration. Finally, in 1710, they abandoned Mauritius.

Subsequently, the French were drawn to the island. In 1715, the French East India Company claimed the island for France, and in 1721, the French established their first permanent settlement in Mauritius. In 1734, the French East India Company appointed Mahe de Labourdonnais, who had some earlier private trading experience in Pondicherry (a French colony in South India) as governor of both Bourbon and Isle de France (the French name for Mauritius). The French undertook a large-scale importation of African slaves from Madagascar and Africa to boost the sugarcane economy of the island. The governor also imported some Tamils from Pondicherry to work as artisans and domestics.

The French governor also distributed large tracts of government land freely among his relatives and close friends, who not only received the most fertile lands but also obtained free African slave labor to work on the sugar plantations established there.

The French domination in Mauritius did not last long, however. The British, realizing the strategic importance of Mauritius, decided to capture it. In 1810, while the Napoleonic wars raged in Europe, the English took over the island. The British possession was confirmed by the Treaty of Paris, which gave Britain not only Mauritius but also its dependencies, including Rodrigues and Seychelles. The British continued to import slaves. By 1833, the population of the island had reached 100,000, of which more than 70 percent were African slaves. Then, during 1834–1839, the slaves were freed by abolitionists, and were paid over 2 million pounds in compensation.

In the early decades of the nineteenth century, Indians migrated to Mauritius as indentured laborers or as free immigrants. The Indian laborers came mainly from Bihar, from Madras Presidency, and from certain parts of western India. The majority of the indentured Indian laborers, however, came from Bihar. Among them, a sizable section belonged to lower castes or were classed as untouchables by Hindu society. Since the indentured laborers mostly hailed from Bihar, Bhojpuri—a dialect of Hindi—became widely spoken in Mauritius.

Apart from the Biharis, there also was a large-scale migration of tribal peoples from the Bengal Presidency, who were popularly called the "Hillcoolies." Most of them were unskilled laborers and domestic servants, and some had no agrarian background or

knowledge of agriculture. Significantly, after the Indian Mutiny of 1857 in British India, a large number of Indian troops went to Mauritius to escape punishment and harassment at the hands of their British superiors.

Between 1837 and 1910, more than 450,000 Indians emigrated to Mauritius, and of them, 160,000 returned home to India. Interestingly, the 1974 census pointed out that 96 percent of the Indians were native-born, and they numbered 600,000 out of a total population of 850,000 (roughly 70 percent of the total population).

Agitation for Equality and Economic Improvement

The French system of indenture as it operated in Mauritius led to a bitter legacy of distrust and dislike between Franco-Mauritians, who were the plantation owners, and the Indian laborers.

The Franco-Mauritians were apprehensive about the loss of their social and economic prestige and differed with the British rulers over the issues of slavery and indenture. The colonial government also differed with the Franco-Mauritian community over Indian immigration and the treatment of Indian labor in Mauritius. In addition, the Franco-Mauritians faced a threat from the Creole elites. Ultimately, in 1886, the British Governor Sir John Pope-Hennessy, in order to restore the sociopolitical equilibrium in the island, introduced a new constitution that strengthened the power of the Franco-Mauritian and Creole elites at the expense of the Indian population.

Meanwhile, the issue of indentured labor was gaining prominence in the British official circles. Since the 1870s, individuals such as Alophe de Plevitz had been carrying out extensive campaigns pleading for certain basic rights for Indians. Those campaigns gathered momentum with the visit of Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi (1869–1948) to Mauritius in October 1901. Under Gandhi's influence, a young Indian lawyer, Manilal Maganlal Doctor, published a newspaper—*The Hindustani*—to publicize the wretched conditions of Indian laborers. In 1910, the indenture system finally came to an end.

Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, Indians tried to gain political representation in the legislature. Their efforts in most cases were thwarted by the Franco-Mauritian and Creole elites. It was not until 1926 that two Indians were elected from rural districts to the Council of Government. In the 1930s and 1940s, however, Indian candidates suffered defeats as the system of restricted franchise operated to effec-

tively prevent election of members of the majority community in the island.

The adoption of a new constitution in 1947, which stressed the creation of a legislative body and an advisory council to the governor, slowly moved Mauritius toward self-government. Indian independence in the same year acted as a catalyst for those demanding self-rule in Mauritius. Seewoosagur Ramgoolam of the Labour Party emerged as the most popular political figure in Mauritius. In 1964, he became the premier of Mauritius. On 12 March 1968, after 158 years of British rule, Mauritius became independent, and Ramgoolam became its first postindependence prime minister.

At the turn of the twenty-first century, Mauritius continues to be an independent sovereign member of the British Commonwealth. The governor-general of Mauritius, who represents the British monarch, is an Indo-Mauritian. Sugarcane cultivation still forms the backbone of the economy, but tourism is fast catching up. The economy is thriving, and there is very little political turmoil.

Rajsbekhar Basu

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MAURYAN EMPIRE (322–184 BCE). The age of the Mauryas heralded a new chapter in the history of the Indian subcontinent; the people witnessed for the first time a unified empire covering most of present-day India and Pakistan. The founder of the dynasty, Chandragupta Maurya (reigned 322–298 BCE), deposed the unpopular ruler, Dhana Nanda (reigned 334–322 BCE) of Pataliputra (now Patna), with the help of Chanakya (fourth century BCE). In 305 BCE Chandragupta Maurya defeated the Greek General Seleucus Nikator (358?–281 BCE) and became master of the trans-Indus region. Bindusara (reigned 298–273 BCE)

inherited from him not only a vast empire covering the Indo-Gangetic plains of the Ganga and Indus rivers, as well as the Deccan, but also a well-organized administrative system.

The Buddhist tradition speaks about Bindusar's successor Asoka's (reigned 273–236 BCE) cruel nature in the early part of his life and holds that this cruel nature changed under the influence of Buddhism, but most scholars regard this as mere fiction. The actual coronation of Asoka took place in the year 269 BCE, and he turned his attention toward the prosperous province of Kalinga in the eastern part of India. Asoka attacked Kalinga in 261 BCE, which resulted in the large-scale killing of about one hundred thousand people including both sides. Although Kalinga became a part of the Mauryan Empire, Asoka had a change of heart and relinquished war in favor of victory by *dhamma* (righteous path/piety). Converted to Buddhism, he convened the Third Buddhist Council in 251 BCE; sent missionaries to far-off places such as Sri Lanka, Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, central Asia, and so on; granted large endowments; built monasteries; and erected commemorative pillars and eighty-four thousand stupas. Under Asoka's patronage, Buddhism spread to Southeast Asia and the Far East.

In tune with the policy of *dhamma*, Asoka insisted on high ethical standards for his subjects and set a high ideal for himself. Asokan edicts engraved on rocks and pillars throughout his empire are living testimony to the greatness of the emperor. Here was a king who was concerned for the material and moral welfare of his subjects and said, "All men are my children." Spending substantial amounts from the royal treasury, Asoka left no stone unturned for the welfare of his subjects by his benevolent measures. As a testimony to his rule, the Indian government on 26 January 1950 adopted the four-lion capital of the Asokan pillar as its national emblem, and the wheel of *dhamma* is embedded in the center of Indian national flag.

The successors of the emperor were not worthy of Asoka and the Mauryan Empire began to disintegrate. The empire officially ended in 184 BCE, after Pushyamitra Sunga (reigned 187–151 BCE) assassinated the last Mauryan ruler, Brihadratha (d. 187 BCE).

Patit Paban Mishra

See also: **Asoka**

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MAWDUDI, ABU'L-A'LA (1903–1979), South Asian Muslim leader. Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi was the founder of the most important South Asian fundamentalist Islamic movement and a leading ideologue. Born in Hyderabad (south-central India) in 1903, he worked as a journalist before being recognized as an influential intellectual and a political leader. Before Indian independence he was opposed to the Congress Party as well as to the secularist Muslim League. Instead, he advocated the necessity of an Islamic state where *shari'a* (Islamic law), interpreted in a conservative way, would be the only source for civil, criminal, and constitutional laws. An autodidact, he contested the authority of the ulama (traditional religious scholars) by interpreting religious sources on his own, and he developed an original understanding of Islam as a complete system and the only ideological alternative to both Western liberalism and Marxism. He engaged in political activism in 1941 by creating the Jama'at-e-Islami and was its leader until 1972. In 1953 he was sentenced to death for sedition; the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment and later canceled. From 1956 to 1974 he traveled widely in the Middle East; he also visited Canada and the United States. In April 1979 he traveled to the United States, where he received medical treatment from one of his sons (a doctor) for kidney and heart problems. Although he died in the United States, he is buried in Pakistan.

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MAY 13 ETHNIC RIOTS—MALAYSIA The 13 May 1969 ethnic riots that broke out in Malaysia represented a milestone in the history of the young nation-state's ethnic relations since its independence from the British colonial government in 1957. Malaysia's population is multiethnic and includes a large Malay majority, which is mostly indigenous, and two relatively large minority ethnic groups—Chinese

and Indians—who are descended mainly from migrants from China and India. The Chinese form a larger ethnic minority than the Indians. Ethnicity has also been politicized in independent Malaysia because each ethnic group has its own political party.

During the British colonial administration, the migrant Chinese, who had been more economically successful than either the Malays or the Indians, were largely concentrated in the urbanized and developed parts of present-day Malaysia. Most Malays and Indians lived and worked in the rural agricultural sectors. After independence, the Malay political party, the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), was more powerful than other parties, in terms of its political support by the larger Malay population and its representation in the political leadership. Tensions therefore gradually developed between the politically powerful Malays and the economically successful Chinese.

In the 1969 Malaysian national elections, the national Chinese political party, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), which had won the elections in 1959 and 1964, won only thirteen of the thirty-three seats it contested. The opposition Chinese parties, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the Gerakan Rakyat, gained 26.2 percent of the total vote and twenty-five parliamentary seats, compared with 13.5 percent garnered by the MCA. The Malay national party also suffered losses because of the popularity of its major rival, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party.

With the rejection of the MCA by Chinese voters, the party decided to pull out of the government, although it remained within the Alliance Party, the coalition of the national Malay, Chinese, and Indian political parties. The withdrawal of the MCA from government led to a worsening of the tensions already created by the DAP's victory parade in the capital city of Kuala Lumpur. During a counterdemonstration organized by UMNO activists on 13 May, racial violence broke out and escalated. An estimated six thousand residents in Kuala Lumpur, which was 90 percent Chinese at the time, lost their homes and properties during the riots. Hundreds of buildings in Kuala Lumpur were razed to the ground. Although the unofficial figures and nongovernmental sources put the number of people who died in the riots in the hundreds, official figures set down the death toll at 196. Three-quarters of the casualties were reportedly Chinese.

The riots and government response showed the Chinese in Malaysia the difficulty of challenging Malay dominance, given the Malay-controlled military and police forces, which in any confrontation could impose their will on any issue of concern to the Malays.

Since 1969, there has been a gradual increase in Malay dominance and the growth of a Malay-dominated state. In 1971, the New Economic Policy was launched, which aimed at eradicating poverty and putting Malays, who make up more than half the population in Malaysia, into the mainstream of Malaysia's economic life. Preferential policies have been introduced, which have set quotas for the number of Malays to be admitted to universities as well as government and private-sector employment. At first set for twenty years, the policy was extended in 1991 for another decade.

Ooi Giok-Ling

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MAY FOURTH MOVEMENT During the 1910s and early 1920s, China was plagued by the twin forces of warlordism and imperialism. Military commanders had seized control over various sections of China, resulting in incessant fighting. Taking advantage of this situation, numerous foreign powers carved out spheres of influence up and down China's coast. Despite this chaotic environment, this period—known either as the May Fourth era or the New Culture era—was an exciting and vibrant time for Chinese intellectuals. Individuals of this time called for cultural rejuvenation and the development of a more modern worldview. Without these changes, they warned, China would not free itself from the oppressive forces of warlordism or imperialism or both. Between 1915 and 1923, "new culture" advocates from various groups scrutinized and derided many of China's literary, philosophical, and social traditions.

The Beginning of the May Fourth Era

Many scholars suggest that the May Fourth era started with the 1915 publication of the journal *Xin*

qingnian (New Youth). Edited by Chen Duxiu (1879–1942), the first issue of *Xin qingnian* called on its readers to be progressive, cosmopolitan, utilitarian, and scientific. In short, Chen asked the youth of China to overthrow the old elements of society and to bring about a national awakening. Confucianism, the preferred symbol of Chinese traditionalism, was a frequent target of the journal. With its emphasis on filial piety, ritualism, hierarchy, and orthodoxy, Confucianism was seen as antimodern and regressive. Within a few months, *Xin qingnian* became a widely read and influential publication among China's student population.

Peking University as a Center of Liberalism

In 1917, Chen was made dean of the School of Letters at Peking (Beijing) University, and the academy quickly became the focal point of what was to be the May Fourth Movement. Cai Yuanpei (1867–1940), the university president, was committed to making the school a center of academic freedom and intellectual liberalism. By the late 1910s, Peking University was a hotbed of intellectual debate involving students, faculty, and independent writers.

In addition to Chen, Cai also brought Hu Shi (1891–1962), a young literature professor, to the campus. Educated in the United States, Hu believed that literature was at the heart of China's cultural problems. With its emphasis on specialized norms, obscure vocabulary, and terse diction, the classical written language was inaccessible to all but the most educated. Hu suggested that the solution was to write in the vernacular, enabling those with a more rudimentary education to participate in China's world of letters. In the pages of *Xin qingnian*, Hu argued that writers should avoid the use of classical allusions, discard stale literary phrases, and quit imitating the ancients. Instead, he suggested that writers be true to their own feelings. Only then would they produce something with meaning and substance. This emphasis on vernacular literature, or *baibua*, led to a greater democratization of China's literary world.

Though Hu advocated *baibua* literature, its greatest practitioner was Lu Xun (1881–1936). Lu Xun was a frequent contributor to *Xin qingnian*, writing short stories designed to jolt the reading public out of its cultural complacency. One of his better-known stories of this period is "*Kuangren riji*" ("Diary of a Madman"). In the story, the protagonist repeatedly sees the words "eat people" inscribed in the margins of classical Confucian texts. Convinced that he is living in a cannibalistic society, he becomes mad with suspicion. By the end of the story, Lu Xun has satirically demon-

strated that the Confucian social order is based, figuratively if not literally, on cannibalism. By shocking his readers with such imagery, Lu Xun hoped to awaken them to the need for cultural renewal.

As with literature, intellectuals of the time called for democratization in the political arena. Democracy and science, Chen argued in the pages of *Xin qingnian*, formed the foundation of modern society. Many of China's backward practices, he claimed, could be eliminated or reformed with the assistance of De Xiansheng ("Mr. Democracy") and Sai Xiansheng ("Mr. Science"). By 1919, these and a handful of other eclectic catchphrases circulated around Peking University and, by way of *Xin qingnian*, throughout China's intellectual communities.

The May Fourth Movement and the 1919 Demonstrations

While it is difficult to mark definitively the beginning of the May Fourth era, its chronological focal point is much more precise. The May Fourth Movement refers, in its most limited sense, to the demonstrations of 4 May 1919. On that day, throngs of irate students, educators, and urban workers converged on Beijing's Tiananmen Square to protest the Paris Peace Conference ending World War I. Years earlier, in August 1914, Japan had declared war on Germany and had occupied all German-held territories in China. Since China also participated in the war against Germany, many believed China would regain control over the properties following the war. Bolstered by their faith in self-determination as championed by Woodrow Wilson, the Chinese delegates attending the conference were confident the European powers would recognize the validity of their claims. Instead, Japan's delegates unveiled a handful of treaties signed by Britain, France, and Italy recognizing Japan's demands in China.

The public reaction to the news was swift and powerful. Led by students of Peking University, concerned individuals from throughout the Beijing area congregated to denounce Japan's underhanded and aggressive maneuvers. They also demanded that China's representatives reject the resulting treaty. The crowd, which eventually numbered in the thousands, marched through the streets of Beijing until government troops restored order. Although the whole affair lasted only a few hours, historians consider this May Fourth event vitally important in the development of modern Chinese nationalism.

Despite the protesters' actions in Beijing, the peace conference concluded, and Japan retained control over the Chinese territory (though the Chinese delegation

refused to sign the treaty). The incident, however, was far from insignificant. In the days after 4 May, similar protests erupted throughout China. Furthermore, many intellectuals intensified their demands for "national salvation" through cultural reform. In many ways, the May Fourth protest symbolized the concerns of the new culture advocates, and consequently the intellectual movement that swept through China between 1915 and 1923 is often referred to as the May Fourth movement.

The Aftermath of May Fourth and the Rise of Communism

In the years after 1919, the May Fourth movement became increasingly ideological. Advocates of anarchism, socialism, syndicalism, and even pragmatism competed in the marketplace of ideas. It was also during this time that the Chinese Communist Party was formed. Organized in Shanghai during summer 1921, the Communist Party embraced the antiestablishment ideals of the May Fourth movement. Since that time, official Communist histories have portrayed the May Fourth era as a period of great patriotic fervor, the turning point between an old, bourgeois democracy and a new, proletarian democracy. Not surprisingly, 4 May is still a national holiday, and May Fourth intellectuals such as Lu Xun are considered patriotic heroes.

By the mid-1920s, China's intellectual debates had become more political and less cultural. The iconoclasm of the earlier years was replaced by new orthodoxies, as political organizations expected their members to conform to the official party line. For this reason, most historians suggest that 1923 marks the approximate end of the May Fourth era. Others, however, contend that the advocates of the movement remained active well beyond 1923. Regardless of the outcome of such debates, the May Fourth movement, with its emphasis on democracy, science, and antitraditionalism, has cast a long shadow over twentieth-century Chinese history.

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MAZAR-E SHARIF (2002 est. pop. 240,000). Mazar-e Sharif is a major city in northern Afghanistan, located about 320 kilometers northwest of the capital city of Kabul. The city was founded by pilgrims when the tomb of Ali, the brother-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad and an important figure for Shi'ite Muslims, was discovered in 1480. The tomb, which today dominates the skyline, had been buried by the residents of the Greco-Bactrian town of Balkh in 1220 to hide it from Genghis Khan's rampaging armies, and then forgotten. After the establishment of the community, pilgrimages by Shi'ite Muslims to the tomb for the New Year's celebration of Nao Roc and a brisk trade in the melons, high quality cotton, and grains grown in the fertile river plains enabled Mazar-e Sharif to become the region's largest city. In 1852 it was consolidated as part of the Afghan state, controlled at that time by the British.

Mazar-e Sharif's proximity to the border of Uzbekistan and large Uzbek minority made it irresistible to Soviet forces during the Soviet-Afghan conflict of 1979–1989. The Soviets established a military command there during their ill-fated invasion in 1979. Thousands were killed when the Taliban took control of the rebel city in 1998. In November 2001 Mazar-e Sharif was retaken by Northern Alliance troops, providing a beachhead for U.S. troops battling the Taliban.

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MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS Metrology, the science of measurement, evaluates how people assess quantities. People throughout Asia devised indigenous measurement systems or adopted foreign measurement units to describe quantities representing the



The Mazar-e Sharif mosque, purported to be the burial place of Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad. (BACI/CORBIS)

physical size, capacities, or proportion of materials or areas. Precise, reliable measurements are crucial for governmental, legal, professional, domestic, and public needs; they ensure accurate communications and quality control.

In Asian countries, various units were developed to describe length, width, distance, circumference, and thickness. Units signify the mass, weight, volume, and density of solids and liquids. Movement is measured by velocity, force, and pressure. Energy is depicted by power units. Time, temperature, and humidity measurements provide information about duration and climate. The World Meteorological Organization oversees pollution-measurement systems to evaluate Asian environmental conditions.

Traditional Units

Early Asians measured portions, magnitudes, and distances based on the adult male body, such as limb and digit lengths or the area one person could travel or work in one day. The cubit represented the measurement from the middle fingertip to the elbow, and the palm signified the width of an outstretched hand. These measurements were imprecise because of the variation of individuals' size, speed, and endurance. Traders often encountered difficulties because of cultural measurement differences, varying terms, and changing definitions for units. The catty, a unit that measured tea and rice, had numerous sizes throughout Asia.

The ancient Chinese emperors Qin Shi Huangdi (c. 259–210 BCE) and Wang Mang (45 BCE–23 CE) initiated measurement-standardization reform. Some units became obsolete as new measurements were created. Over time, most Asian countries converted local units in favor of modern measurement systems. Many Asians, however, continue to refer to traditional measurement units unique to their geographical regions.

In Singapore, Hong Kong, India, and the Philippines, both traditional (*man* and *tola*) and British (feet-pound system) units are routinely used in many herbal and pawn markets and in property management. Rural Indonesians often use traditional measurements during grain harvests. Such Korean units as *ri* (length), *kun* (weight), *mal* (volume), and *pyong* (area) are retained. Malaysian jewelry shops rely on traditional units, and buildings are measured by feet. In modern Thailand, weight is sometimes referred to by *picul* and land area as amount of *rai*.

Asian time measurements differ from other countries. In Afghanistan, India, Myanmar (Burma), Iran, French Polynesia, and Sri Lanka, time is offset by half-hour increments from other areas; thus when it is 10:30 a.m. in Thailand, it is 8 a.m. in Afghanistan. Sources do not list any time measurement units unique to Asia except that the *kalpa*, in the Hindu calendar, equals about 4.32 billion years. Also, Asian calendars are often measured by periods of time based on the reigns of emperors or leaders. Chinese years have



THE COMPLEXITY OF MEASURES

The following description of weights used in Afghanistan in the early twentieth century indicates just how complicated the issue was across much of Asia. As is the case here, there often was no central standard (or the standard was one imposed by a colonial government), and each region or city had its own system.

At Kabul: 16 *kburds* = 1 *charak*; 4 *charaks* = 1 seer (7 seers 13 ½ chittacks of British Indian weight); 6 seers = 1 *man*; 10 *mans* = 1 *kharwar* (15 maunds 27 ½ seers, British).

At Kandahar: 20 *miskals* = 1 seer (8 ⅝ *tolas* of British Indian weight); 40 seers = 1 *man* (4 seers 25 *tolas*, British); 100 *mans* = 1 *kharwar* (10 maunds 31 seers 10 *tolas*, British).

The weights used in Herat province are practically the same as at Kandahar. In Afghan-Turkistan, Kabul weights are in common use as far as Haibak; beyond that place local weights are used, which vary greatly in different districts. Those of Mazar-I-Sharif are in most general use. They are: 1 Mazar Seer = 1¼ Kabuli seers (14 British seers); 16 seers = 1 Mazar *man* (5 maunds 24 seers, British); 3 *mans* = 1 Mazar *kharwar* (16 maunds 32 seers, British).

Source: *Imperial Gazetteer of India: Afghanistan and Nepal*. (1908) Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 41–42.

names that are used in sixty-year cycles. These names have a celestial stem such as *bing* and a terrestrial branch, represented by types of animals such as the tiger, rat, dragon, and so forth.

Asian calendars reflect different measuring systems to designate year numbers, based on religious beliefs and varying annual cycles. Asian years are sometimes measured as tropical or sidereal, based on seasonal or celestial cycles. Seasons divide the year into three or fewer phases according to weather patterns of rain and heat. The dates of holidays such as Ramadan (the Islamic month of fasting), and Loy Krathong (the Thai flower boat festival) are variable because they depend on time measurement based on moon phases and periods of darkness and daylight.

The Metric System

During the twentieth century, Asian countries adopted the metric system, which aided the achievement of global measurement standardization, especially in scientific endeavors, regardless of language and cultural differences. The Philippines, Afghanistan, and Cambodia began converting in the early twentieth century. By mid-century, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Thai-

land, Indonesia, and Korea became metric. From the 1950s to the 1970s, Taiwan, India, Japan, Laos, Vietnam, Pakistan, and Singapore accepted the metric system. Myanmar is the only Asian country that has not officially adopted the metric system. The International Bureau of Weights and Measures coordinates traditional measurement systems unique to countries and cultures and national metrology institutes with international metrology standards.

Most Asian countries accept fundamental metric units including kilograms (mass), seconds (time), liters (volume), Celsius (temperature), and amperes (electromagnetic), from which other metric units were derived. Greek and Latin prefixes indicate larger and smaller quantities, which have been incorporated in the international system of units (SI) adopted in 1960 by the General Conference of Weights and Measures. All measurements are interrelated with seven base SI units: meter, kilogram, second, ampere, kelvin, candela, and mol. Because 99 percent of the world is metric, the metric system facilitates competitive trade between countries that might refuse to import goods that are not issued in metric dimensions and that are incompatible with other devices, machinery, and tools.

The CGS system used in parts of Asia refers to the measurement of small quantities by centimeters, grams, and seconds.

In 1875, a Meter Convention was held, and the Ottoman empire was one of the participants, but Turkey did not pursue metrification until a 1931 law of weights and measures initiated gradual implementation. By 1992, TUBITAK, the Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey, established the National Metrology Institute.

A 1908 Chinese imperial law recommended that traditional measures be redefined according to the metric system. Because metric terms consisted of unfamiliar words and sounds, the Chinese were reluctant to accept that system. In 1959, the metric reform of the People's Republic of China retained traditional unit names and adjusted them to metric dimensions.

An 1891 Japanese law recognized the *shaku* and *kan* as traditional length and mass measurement units, respectively, and by 1909 three measurement systems—traditional, British, and metric—were used. During the 1920s, legislation implemented plans for a single metric system. Public resistance, World War II, and the Allied occupation delayed efforts until a 1958 law. By 1981, Japan was completely metric with the exception of sake bottles, which were assessed by a traditional unit, and Japanese-style houses, which are still described by traditional dimensions.

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MECHAI VIRAVAIIDYA (b. 1941), Thai contraceptive advocate. Known as the Condom King, Mechai (meaning "victory" and later "condom" in Thai) Viravaidya is the son of physicians, his father a Thai and his mother a Scot. Born in 1941, he spent much of his early life studying in Australia. Upon his return to Thailand, Mechai worked for the National Economic Development Board, which gave him a firsthand view of serious rural poverty.

Mechai viewed Thailand's rapid population growth and pronatalist policies as a major obstacle to the nation's development. During the period 1974–1980, he launched one of the world's most dynamic and creative campaigns to promote contraceptive usage, utilizing a rice-roots approach and transforming the condom into an acceptable, clean, healthful product. Key to his campaign was the establishment of the Population and Development Association (PDA), which grew dramatically and became Thailand's largest and most influential nongovernmental organization.

In 1989, Mechai took on a new challenge: to convince the Thai government to break its silence on an emerging AIDS problem of potentially epidemic dimensions. Subsequently Mechai and PDA became a leader in promoting extensive AIDS education in Thailand.

Mechai has served in many other important capacities, including deputy minister of industry, government spokesman, governor of the Provincial Water Works, chair of the Telephone Organization of Thailand, and most recently as chairman of the troubled Krung Thai Bank. In 2000, Mechai was elected to the Senate. In recognition of his public service, Mechai in 1994 received the Magsaysay Award, considered to be the Nobel Prize of Asia, and *Asiaweek* named Mechai as one of the twenty great Asians for the period 1975–1995.

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MEDAN (2000 est. pop. 2 million) Medan is the largest city in Sumatra, which is part of the Republic of Indonesia, and is among the larger cities in Indonesia. The city is the capital of the province of North Sumatra, as well as a leading port. Its location makes it the gateway and entry point to this part of northern Sumatra from neighboring countries such as Malaysia and Singapore. Described as congested and crowded, Medan has proved to be less popular as a tourist destination than Lake Toba, which is located near the city.

The word *medan* means "battleground," and the city was the site of wars waged between the sultans of Deli and Aceh. Medan is located on the Deli Plain, and oral traditions and local writings claim that it was first ruled by generals who came from Delhi in India. The city was founded by Sultan Mahmud Perdasah Ahmad in the seventeenth century.

Beginning with a number of small villages (*kampung*) located in marshy lowlands, the city has thrived mainly because of its location on the northeast Deli coastal area, which fronted a major shipping route in the region. The coastal swamp area developed into a major plantation district, given the hot, humid climate and the fertility of the area.

The Dutch subdued the Deli Sultanate in 1872. In 1886, the Dutch colonial administration made Medan the capital of the northern Sumatra region. The success of enterprises like Deli Tobacco contributed to

the city's continuing growth, and it became incorporated as a municipality in 1909.

Medan is a business and industrial city rather than a cultural capital. With its long-standing history as a port and trading center, it has developed into a major banking and commercial capital. Many of the region's exports of petroleum and other agricultural produce, including rubber, coffee, and tobacco, pass through the port of Belawan, which lies north of Medan. The location of the city and business opportunities in Medan have attracted Indonesians of all ethnic backgrounds. The Chinese control much of the city's commerce, but there are also Javanese, Sikhs, Acehnese, Minangkabaus, and Malays, as well as Christian and Islamic Batak groups. The city is actually the hub of the Batak people (an Indonesian people not under Dutch control until the mid-nineteenth century). Essentially, some 40 percent of the city's population is not Muslim.

Due to its historical background as a Dutch colonial center, the city has old colonial buildings and living quarters in what is known as the European Town. There is also a Chinatown, but the majority of people live in crowded residential areas.

Ooi Giok Ling

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The Grand Mosque in Medan in 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

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MEDIA The media of mass communication, usually called "mass media" or "media," include newspapers, magazines, books, film, radio, television, recorded music, and the Internet. Mass communication usually involves the production of content (such as information, entertainment, or art) by an institution (such as a radio station or a publishing enterprise); this content is transmitted to large, scattered, and heterogeneous "mass" audiences who potentially may be interested in receiving it. Unlike much interpersonal communication, which is face-to-face and unfiltered, this type of communication is mediated by complex technologies of recording (for example, film or television cameras), transmitting (radio transmitters, satellites, computers), and receiving (radio sets, satellite dishes). In this way, the contemporary media are complex, technology-based economic, political, cultural, social, and ideological institutions.

Historical Context

Asia is the birthplace of the world's most important communication revolutions, including writing as well as the mechanization of writing, i.e., printing. Writing emerged some six thousand years ago in the civilization of Sumer in western Asia, while printing, paper, and ink were invented in China and Korea in the first half of the second millennium CE. Although printed books first appeared as early as the ninth century in China, the invention of printing did not immediately create mass media such as newspapers and magazines. This was due less to the nonalphabetic nature of Chinese writing than to the social and economic system of feudalism, which thrived in the absence of mass literacy.

With the rise of capitalism in Europe, the West replaced Asia as the leader in the development of communication technologies. The modern media appeared after Johannes Gutenberg printed the first book around 1455 in Germany. In contrast to East Asia, printing in Western Europe facilitated the advent of capitalist economic relations, and, within the next two centuries, contributed to the intellectual and social movement known as the Enlightenment, often seen as the turning point in the rise of modern Western society and democracy.

Colonialism and Modernization

Asia began its modern media under conditions of European colonization, when missionaries, administrators, and business interests launched commercial printing presses. The first newspapers, in European and Asian languages, appeared in the latter part of the eighteenth century and visibly expanded throughout the nineteenth. The print media, especially periodicals, soon turned into sites of rhetorical struggle between, among others, colonial powers and local independence movements, modernity and tradition, socialism and nationalism, and patriarchal power and women's movements.

Twentieth-century products of the West's Industrial Revolution, the post-print media, i.e., recorded music (gramophones), motion pictures, and radio, all arrived in Asia during colonial times. The state and private institutions adopted these media quickly, though unevenly. India emerged as one of the world's most productive centers of filmmaking, while many Asian nations did not produce any movies until the 1960s. Unlike recorded music and film, radio was monopolized by the state (under colonial rule and in the nascent independent states) for nation building and external broadcasting purposes.

Asia's media environment is, more than on any other continent, distinguished by uneven and conflicting trends of development and extreme diversity. Asia has two-thirds of the planet's population—at about 3 billion, the world's largest potential audience. It has the largest number of daily newspapers (3,536 out of the world figure of 8,896 in 1994), radio receivers (696 out of 2,183 million in 1996), and television receivers (652 out of 1,361 million in 1996). In terms of the diffusion of media, however, Asia is below the world average and lags markedly behind other continents, excepting Africa. For instance, the circulation of daily papers per thousand inhabitants in 1994 was 63—lower than 96 for the world, and much lower than 135 for America, 278 for Europe, and 214 for Oceania; however, it is higher than Africa's 17. In broadcast media, the number of television receivers per thousand inhabitants in 1996 was 187, which is considerably lower than 236 for the world, 431 for America, 442 for Europe, 421 for Oceania, but, again, higher than 50 for Africa.

The discrepancy between Asia's potential audience, the largest in the world, and its actual audience, proportionately the smallest after Africa, can be explained by the persistence of poverty, illiteracy, and state control of the media. The percentage of illiterate adults (fifteen years and over) was 74.3 in Pakistan (1981), 70.8 in Bangladesh (1981), 59.2 in India (1981), 22.2 in China (1990), and 18.5 in Indonesia (1990). In India, advanced

computer and space industries coexist with high illiteracy rates and the continuing phenomena of serfdom and even slavery. By contrast, Japan has one of the world's most developed media and communication technologies markets, full literacy, and extensive press freedoms, and Hong Kong is known as the "advertising capital" of Asia.

New Media

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the unceasing revolution in communication technologies and the globalization of media markets is reshaping Asian societies. The Internet is blurring the borders that divided the rather distinct media of the past, creating media convergence—a "hypermedia," "multimedia," or "post-mass media" era. This involves the production, transmission, and reception of diverse media content—film, radio, television, newspapers, magazines, and books—through the single medium of the Internet and the rise of multichannel satellite and cable television. Equally important is the increasing privatization of the media or "cultural industries" market and open-door policies encouraged by the West, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Many Asian states have resisted the introduction of the Internet and continue to restrict citizens' access to the medium. By 1999, however, Saudi Arabia, staunchly opposed to freedom of the press, had allowed controlled access to the Internet.

Language is an indispensable component of the life of media. Linguistically and culturally, Asia is the most diverse continent. It is the site of the world's oldest and most important classical languages and literatures (Chinese, Sanskrit, Arabic, and Persian) and the homeland of half of the twelve largest languages (Mandarin, Hindi, Arabic, Bengali, Japanese, and Malay-Indonesian). Still, it offers the most colorful linguistic map, with 2,165 (32 percent) of the world's 6,703 languages in 1996. The densely media-penetrated urban cultures of Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan coexist with the mosaic of surviving oral cultures of tribal and rural communities in other parts of the continent. The new electronic media intervene in this environment more intensively and differently than print media and allow extensive cultural and linguistic interaction. Satellite television, for instance, delivers round-the-clock programming in English and the major languages of the continent, while smaller languages, once excluded, increasingly find access to radio and television broadcasting through cable and the Internet. English-language (especially American) content was more widely disseminated at the turn of the century, but Asia's media culture has experienced both globalization and localization, homogenization and heterogenization.

Contemporary Asian economies, like their Western counterparts, are increasingly characterized as "information" or "knowledge" economies. Privately owned media are major players in the shift in economic emphasis from agriculture and industry to information. These media produce and deliver entertainment and information and by doing so create audiences, which are sold profitably to advertisers. Not surprisingly, there has been a global scramble for Asia's potentially lucrative media market. However, precapitalist relations still persist in parts of the continent, where the communications infrastructure remains underdeveloped. For instance, the number of telephone lines per hundred people in the mid-1990s was 1.1 in India and 2.9 in China, compared with the high "teledensity" of the "tiger economies" of Hong Kong (54.0), Korea (39.7), Singapore (47.3), and Taiwan (40.0). At the same time, the proliferation of pirate media and software throughout Asia has undermined the idea of copyright and intellectual property, which are central to the functioning of information economies. Some Asian states, including socialist China, Vietnam, and Laos, have promoted what are billed as free-market economic reforms, and the telecommunications and media markets were growing fast by the turn of the century. However, the gulf between "information-rich" and "information-poor" regions and countries seems to persist, if not grow, in spite of promises of prosperity generated by the information superhighway. In fact, earlier, in the 1950s, Western economists had optimistically assigned the media a prominent role in the modernization of the continent's underdeveloped economies.

The media are active participants in the political life of Asia; they have played important roles in democratic and socialist revolutions (e.g., Iran in 1906–1911 and 1977–1979; Turkey in 1908; China in 1911, 1919, and 1949; and the Philippines in 1986). By the late 1990s, many dictatorial states had initiated economic liberalization but were reluctant to tolerate media freedoms. From Korea and Singapore to Turkey and Iran, states engage in widespread censorship and commit violence against the media. However, a marginalized majority, including women, labor, rural communities, nonstate nations, ethnic, linguistic, and religious minorities, disabled people, and social movements continue to engage in democratization struggles by creating alternative, usually small-scale, media. As in the past, though much more intensively, Asia's media remain a site of struggle among the globalizing market, states, and citizens.

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MEDIA-CENTRAL ASIA The first independent television and radio stations in the five former Soviet republics in Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—appeared as early as 1991. Since their independence in the early 1990s, these nations have developed a market for independent media in contrast to the state-owned media outlets of Soviet times, which remain a major part of the media even today. Improvements in civil society and a higher demand for information after the decline of the Soviet Union led to the founding of the first independent television and radio stations, but economic hardships and governmental pressure have so far prevented the independent media from flourishing. During the late 1990s, most leaders of the Central Asian nations frequently cracked down on the media and had a tendency toward authoritarian rule to preserve their power and undermine democratic changes.

The Media in Central Asia

Television is the most important source of information for the population of Central Asia. The majority of the inhabitants receive Moscow-based stations as well as the government stations of the respective nations. Television-set ownership was high during Soviet times and has remained so ever since. Radio programming focuses more on entertainment through music than on information and therefore does not play a predominant role in the opinion-building process. Newspapers are important in the capitals and in regional centers, but their influence sharply decreases in rural areas due to the lack of a functioning infrastructure.

Countries with Partly Free Media

Although all five Central Asian nations were exposed to the same Soviet media before the collapse of the USSR, they developed in different directions in the 1990s. The most democratic nation was Kyrgyzstan under President Askar Akaev (b. 1944). As the first former Soviet republic in Central Asia to declare independence in 1991, the mountainous nation soon became a member of both the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund, thus officially joining the global community as an independent nation. Freedom of the press is guaranteed in the constitution of Kyrgyzstan, which was adopted in May 1993. The early 1990s saw an increasing number of independent media outlets, and today all seven regions of Kyrgyzstan receive information from independent television, radio stations, or both. In 1999 and especially in 2000, however, the Kyrgyz authorities started to crack down on the independent media; this campaign reached a climax during the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2000. The Vienna-based Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the largest regional security organization in the world with fifty-five participating states from Europe, Central Asia, and North America, stated in its election report that the Kyrgyz government had tried to limit coverage of opposition candidates during the election campaign by pressuring independent media and that the state media presented biased coverage of incumbents.

The Kazakh media were similarly open-minded during the early 1990s, and they remain the most professional in the whole of Central Asia. While there were only a limited number of private media outlets in Kazakhstan right after the country's independence, there are now more than seventy nongovernmental television and radio stations and more than one hundred newspapers, most of which are based in regional capitals. However, beginning in 1996, the government of Kazakhstan began placing increasingly strict regulations on media access and use. In 1999, Kazakhstan passed a law that restricts the formation and activities of television and radio stations and newspapers. A media holding led by the eldest daughter of President Nursultan Nazarbaev (b. 1940), Dariga Nazarbaeva (b. 1963), was founded in the mid-1990s and now controls a number of television and radio stations, newspapers, and production studios.

The situation of the media in Tajikistan is marked by a severe economic crisis and the repercussions of the civil war that took place in the nation in the mid-1990s. Between 1994 and 1996, more than forty journalists were killed in connection with their professional duties. What makes the situation even more complicated is that

although the Tajik government had made a commitment to freedom of speech and of the media, it was nevertheless responsible for murdering journalists between 1994 and 1996. More than twenty media outlets were closed during this time, and journalists were forced into exile. Some have still not returned, fearing persecution by the authorities in Dushanbe, Tajikistan's capital. The consequence of these incidents is a high degree of self-censorship among journalists in Tajikistan. The absence of daily newspapers in the whole nation is just one indicator of the economic and political problems that have led to a stagnation of media development in Tajikistan.

Nations with Media under Direct Censorship

The Uzbek media suffer under direct censorship that has not changed very much since Soviet times. Censors read every item, even obituaries, in all the Uzbek newspapers and may delete whatever they choose. Journalists are frequently brought to court and heavily fined; others leave the country to avoid being jailed. The Uzbek government has almost full control over the media, especially in the capital of Tashkent. There are a number of independent broadcast outlets and print media, but their influence on public opinion is very small.

The situation of the media in neighboring Turkmenistan is even worse. There are no independent media outlets, and virtually all information is filtered through the authorities in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan's capital. President Saparmurat Turkmenbashi (b. 1940) controls the nation with an iron fist and has put harsh restrictions even on access to the Internet. The three state-owned television channels are little more than state propaganda tools and rarely show anything but pictures of the president and the Turkmen countryside. Satellite dishes are still available in the capital, but experts expect the government to restrict their sale soon as well. The population of Turkmenistan is suffering under a serious information blackout, and there are no signs of a positive change in sight.

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MEDIA-CHINA The media play a pivotal role in Chinese society. Since reform and opening began in 1978, the media have evolved from a tool of Communist Party propaganda to a market-oriented vehicle for advertising. The effect on society has been to stimulate the desire for conspicuous consumption necessary to goad people into working hard to make the money necessary to enjoy the fruits of material plenty. At the same time, many Chinese critics charge that for these same reasons the media have contributed to spiritual pollution and the debasing of people's value systems. The critics hope that the media will continue to secure greater freedom from state control but that they will also act more responsibly in selecting content.

The change in Chinese media from the Maoist period (1949–1976) is striking. Only a few thousand people owned television sets in 1976, but today almost every household has at least one set. Under Mao Zedong (1893–1976), all public communication was—in principle, at least—centralized under the control of the Communist Party's Central Propaganda Department (CPD) in Beijing. The media's responsibility was to relay the CPD's heavily politicized news and cultural programs throughout the system, down to the village level, where public loudspeakers conveyed the state's message to almost every Chinese citizen. The content of the media under Mao was extremely staid. Most of it consisted of extraordinarily distorted Communist "news" and sanitized revolutionary films and music.

Chinese Media in the Period of Reform

The reformers who assumed power in 1978 believed that heavily propagandistic media content acted as a drag on China's development. They decided to pour huge funds into television while at the same time making almost all media outlets—television and radio stations, newspaper and book publishers, and film studios—responsible for their own profits and losses. This meant that the outlets would no longer receive the state subsidies that had kept them afloat in the past. On the other hand, they would be allowed for the first time to sell advertising and to use large proportions of the proceeds to improve their own personnel's living standards. The way to sell advertising was to pro-

vide viewers, listeners, and readers with the content they demanded. Only in this way could ratings and circulation be increased. As a result, beginning in the 1980s, the content of the Chinese media changed dramatically—from Communist propaganda to market-oriented glitz. It did not take long for things to get out of hand. Illegal cable television stations transmitted pirated pornography tapes from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, and the West. Factories installed illegal satellite receiving dishes so that workers could watch Hong Kong television. Journalists began selling news to advertisers so that they could make extra money. Many people in the Communist Party—as well as outside intellectuals—complained that society was awash in cultural garbage. They feared that children coming of age in such a setting would become excessively materialistic and culturally tasteless. It was good that people could now watch and read more of the things they liked, but what should be done about the fact that they liked such vulgar content? The media outlets resisted attempts to tighten central control. They were making far too much money off advertising to accept that. They also argued that China could develop economically only if its people were materialistic.

Even as media content became increasingly vulgar, except on a few occasions, the media never openly challenged the Communist Party politically. There was a tacit deal between the party and media outlets (in which the party was represented): the media would be allowed to serve up spiritual pollution to the population and make money—but only in exchange for steering firmly clear of politics. News programs were to faithfully retransmit the state's propaganda, and they were to avoid politically sensitive topics in television programs and films. For the Chinese people, only depoliticized programs would be acceptable. This prompted many Chinese critics to angrily denounce the Communist Party for pursuing a policy of stupidifying the people so that it could maintain control.

The Internet

New challenges appeared with the advent of the Internet in the late 1990s. Within just a few years tens of millions of Chinese people had Internet access—from homes, schools, offices, and Internet cafes. The Chinese state struggled to control the kinds of sites Chinese people could visit and encouraged China's own media companies to establish sites of a flashy but nonpolitical nature so that Chinese people would be less tempted to visit banned sites abroad. The state also approved message boards so that web surfers could post their own views on controversial topics—although the posts were heavily censored.

It seems unlikely that the Chinese state will succeed in its efforts to establish a great firewall around China. The technological challenges are far too daunting. It quickly became easy for Chinese web surfers to access proxy servers abroad for the purpose of visiting banned foreign sites. In fact, new sites were being added so rapidly that it was practically impossible for the government to keep its list of banned sites up to date. E-mail presented further problems because its volume increased so rapidly that the government found it impossible to monitor effectively. Naturally, the possibility—however small—of being monitored did deter many people from using the Internet or e-mail to discuss forbidden subjects. A few high-profile imprisonments of Internet activists acted as a further deterrent. Nevertheless, in absolute terms many people did use the Internet for political purposes. For example, the Falun Gong religious movement used the Internet to mobilize thousands of people to demonstrate in the face of brutal hostility by the state.

The merging of the mass media with telecommunications that the Internet exemplifies had become the single biggest challenge facing the Communist Party as it continued to try to shape the way Chinese people think. Within the next decade, up to 100 million Chinese people will enjoy access to an Internet far more developed than today's—an Internet that facilitates easy downloading of multimedia programs of all stripes, including political programs. Moreover, the continued diffusion of telephones and computers means that the Chinese people will increasingly be able to talk with each other about the things they see online. Because the state will not be able to control either the content or the conversations, its grip on the way Chinese people view the world will loosen further. This may pave the way for eventual political change of a democratic nature.

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MEDIA—INSULAR SOUTHEAST ASIA

The media in insular Southeast Asia—a regional label that generally refers to Indonesia, the Philippines,

Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and East Timor—has seen dramatic changes in recent years. Indonesia’s media has been greatly liberalized following the 1998 fall of Suharto (b. 1921), that country’s dictator of thirty-two years, while media control by the socioeconomic elite in the Philippines has been credited with a large role in the 2001 ouster of former president Joseph Estrada (b. 1937), over the objections of the more populous working classes. Strong governments in Malaysia and Singapore have, in contrast, maintained tighter control over the media, and have held onto power through the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s.

Both Indonesia and the Philippines—the region’s most populous nations—are archipelagic, meaning that they are composed of numerous islands rather than a contiguous landmass. This makes the media’s role particularly important in creating a sense of national identity among their culturally and linguistically diverse populations. Indonesia, for example, comprises more than seventeen thousand separate islands, which are home to over three hundred distinct languages and cultural groups. Whereas Singapore, a highly developed multiethnic city-state, has allowed the media marketplace to deliver ethnically and linguistically targeted products, Indonesia’s attempt to culturally bind its far-flung islands together has proved a trying task in which the government has relied heavily on media

control, propagation, and use of the national language, Bahasa Indonesia. Media of all varieties continue to play an increasingly critical role in the political, economic and cultural development of Southeast Asia.

One significant contrast between Indonesia and its neighbors in the region lies in the difference between print and broadcast; higher literacy levels, particularly in Malaysia and Singapore, but also in the Philippines, are dramatically reflected in their newspaper circulations, whereas poorer Indonesians show surprisingly high levels of television ownership despite having had only one government station broadcasting before the 1990s. Singapore’s high media consumption and infrastructure levels put it in a class with developed nations such as the United States and Japan. (See Table 1.)

Television

Indonesia did not begin television broadcasting until 1962, when then-president Sukarno (1901–1970) commissioned a station to broadcast the first Asian Games in Jakarta. In contrast to the Philippines’ rapid commercial development, Indonesia did not license commercial stations until 1989. Instead, it kept strict control of content through a single government station. In 1976 Indonesia became only the third nation to launch its own communications satellite, named Palapa, which carried the government network TVRI. Suharto’s government continued its nation-building

TABLE 1

Intraregional Comparison				
	Indonesia	Malaysia	Philippines	Singapore
Population† (in millions, 2001)	228	22	81	4
Daily newspapers (per thousand people, 1996)	24	158	79	360
Radios (per thousand people, 1997)	156	420	159	822
Radio broadcast stations† (in 1998–1999)	AM: 678, FM: 43, shortwave: 82	AM: 56, FM: 31, shortwave: 5	AM: 366, FM: 290, shortwave: 3	AM: 0, FM: 16, shortwave: 2
Television sets (per thousand people, 1998)	136	166	108	348
Television broadcast stations† (in 1998–1999)	41	27	31	6
Telephone mainlines (per thousand people, 1998)	27	198	37	562
Mobile telephones (per thousand people, 1998)	5	99	22	346
Personal computers (per thousand people, 1998)	8.2	58.6	15.1	458.4
Internet hosts (per ten thousand people, 2000)	1.00	25.43	1.58	452.3

Note: The less populated nations (Brunei and East Timor) are discussed in the final section.

SOURCES: Data drawn from the World Bank (2001) *World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty*; † Central Intelligence Agency (2000) *The World Factbook 2001*.



Indonesian Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri speaks on national television on 20 June 2001. It was the first nationwide broadcast and the speech commemorated the 100th anniversary of the birth of Sukarno, the founder of Indonesia, and Megawati's father.

project via television with a 1980s program that placed televisions and satellite dishes in remote villages throughout the nation. This was intended to promote nationalism not only through program content, but also through propagation of Bahasa Indonesia. Private television flourished in the 1990s, and in the early 2000s there were eight networks broadcasting in major cities, two of which had near-nationwide coverage.

Malaysian and Singaporean television began broadcasting in 1963, but their governments restricted private broadcasting until 1984 and 1994, respectively. Although these countries' broadcasters have yet to experience the freedom visible in post-Suharto Indonesia, they have long been allowed to exploit ethnic divisions with television stations that cater to their nations' particular linguistic and cultural groups. In Malaysia, this amounts to stations targeting Malay (TV1) and Chinese-Malaysian (TV2) audiences; in Singapore, English- and Tamil-language stations are added to the mix. Singapore is also the regional hub for U.S. cable broadcasters, including MTV, HBO,

and the Discovery Channel, who must edit their content to conform to conservative Singaporean standards. Singapore launched an international Asian news service in 1999. Malaysia's prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad (b. 1925), has been accused of controlling television broadcasts and orienting them toward the promotion of his government's point of view.

The Philippines was relatively early in starting its television industry, with the first station broadcasting by late 1953. To overcome high import taxes, the country also developed a significant domestic television manufacturing company, becoming in 1971 the third nation in the world to produce color sets. In the early 1960s, competition between Philippine stations was already strong, and the major players moved to secure their piece of the U.S. programming pie by developing exclusive relationships with the "big three" American networks. The haphazard but politically open nature of Philippine television news was brought to a sudden halt when Ferdinand Marcos (1917–1989) rose to power in 1972; within hours the military had shut down all stations that were critical of him. Although stations were later allowed to regulate their own content, their freedoms were greatly restricted and many became the mouthpieces of government propaganda. Marcos's 1986 fall from power, which was sealed by the military takeover of Manila's MBS Channel 4, returned many stations to their original owners and restored commercial competition to the industry.

Print Media

Indonesia's print media have experienced a surge since the fall of Suharto's New Order government in 1998, which brought a sudden lifting of media restrictions that had previously placed severe limits on press freedom. In the opinions of many cultural leaders, however, the surge has not been an unmitigated positive step, and has sparked an ongoing debate over how to cultivate more responsible and high-quality journalism in Indonesia. This is partly a reaction to the rise in radical and religious-oriented newspapers that have been faulted for provoking a deterioration of interethnic and interfaith relations in the predominantly Muslim nation. Nevertheless, these new freedoms have quickly led to a bold press corps that routinely questions the government and offers the sort of critical analyses that were all but unknown for more than thirty years. The most respected daily is *Kompas*, while the weekly *Tempo*—which was banned by Suharto in 1994—is highly regarded for its impartial analysis. Other major papers include *Republika*, a Muslim-themed daily, and the *Jakarta Post*, an English-language daily.



BORNEO BULLETIN

The *Borneo Bulletin* newspaper first made its appearance as an English-language newspaper on 7 November 1953. Published in Kuala Belait, Brunei, it was initially a daily, then became a weekly tabloid until August 1990. It reverted to a daily on 3 September 1990. Its coverage generally focuses on Brunei affairs as well as developments in the neighboring East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak and Kalimantan, Indonesia. There is a section in Brunei Malay. There is also a *Borneo Bulletin (Sarawak Edition)*, a weekly tabloid published since 1975 that offers greater emphasis on Sarawak and Malaysian news.

Ooi Keat Gin

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As in television broadcasting, print media in Malaysia and Singapore are largely geared toward particular ethnic readerships. Among others Malaysia's *Utusan Malaysia* caters to Malay readers, *Sin Chew Jit Pau* is the major Chinese language daily, and the *New Straits Times* caters to English speakers. In Singapore, popular newspapers include *Lianhe Wanbao* and *Shin Min Daily News*, both in Chinese; *Berita Harian*, in Malay; *Tamil Murasu* in Tamil (with a largely ethnic Indian and Sri Lankan readership); and the *Straits Times* in English, which is the language of government administration. The presses of Malaysia and Singapore are more tightly controlled by their governments than are many of their Southeast Asian neighbors. Although major media companies across the region have traditionally had strong political ties, these connections are still a powerful source of influence and censorship in both Malaysia and Singapore, both of which also maintain strict laws curtailing press freedoms. The 1999 jailing of a journalist for the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, who published an article on the growing number of lawsuits in Malaysia, shocked much of the international community.

The pre-Marcos print media in the Philippines was known for sensational and unsubstantiated reporting, but was also willing to expose corruption at the highest levels of government. As with television, Marcos reined in the press by shutting down critical news out-

lets and by supporting newspapers owned by his family or cronies. Reporting began to become more open after the 1983 assassination of his main opponent, Benigno Aquino (1932–1983), and following Marcos's 1986 ouster, government papers were confiscated and many returned to their former owners. Most influential newspapers continue to be owned by powerful elite families, and have been criticized by the international press for undue bias toward the interests of their owners. Many of the more responsible papers are in English, while sensational tabloids often use Tagalog or Cebuano languages. Major dailies include the *Manila Bulletin* and the *Inquirer*. The close historic association between the Philippines' press and elite political interests has led to widespread distrust of media among the working classes.

Internet

Although the Internet continues to make inroads in the region, infrastructure development was seriously set back by the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s, particularly in Indonesia. Singapore remains the exception to the rule in this region, with some of the highest levels of computer ownership and Internet access in the world, and has made major inroads into building a fiber-optic infrastructure that will allow widespread broadband access throughout the city-state. Nevertheless, the government has gone to great lengths to regulate access to Internet content, seeking to avert its use as a forum for political dissent.

In the region's developing nations, Internet access has become most popular among university students and young urban professionals, and has been cited (along with cell-phone messaging) as having facilitated the nationwide coordination of student protests that brought down Indonesia's Suharto. It has also given a voice to radical Islamic groups of that country, some of which have developed sophisticated, English-language websites to publicize their cause among international readers. In Malaysia, the Internet has become home to various banned print publications and government opposition groups.

The prohibitive cost of home computers compels most in the region to log on at the office, the university, or at Internet cafes. Cable Internet access has recently become available in major cities, but often suffers from low bandwidth and unstable infrastructure. It should be remembered that access to information technologies in this region remains largely a privilege of the wealthy, who comprise only a small percentage of the general population and do not necessarily share the interests of the larger populace.

Brunei and East Timor

The World Wide Web's advent in the mid-1990s gave a boost to the East Timor independence movement, thanks to numerous activist websites that helped to consolidate international opinion against Indonesia's 1975 annexation of the former Portuguese colony. Since gaining independence from Indonesia in 1999, East Timor has sought to institute a free press with the help of the United Nations, but remains in a rebuilding phase at the time of this writing.

Brunei has one Internet service provider, two television and thirteen radio stations, as well several newspapers, all of which operate under the close scrutiny of the royal family. The country also receives television transmissions from neighboring Malaysia, which are reportedly more popular than the domestic alternatives.

In this politically volatile region, the media plays a tremendously important role in the stewardship of democracy and political reform, but its history of government control remains visible and problematic. Small elites maintain disproportionate influence over major media outlets, setting the tone of public discourse and propagating wealthy, international lifestyle models among some of Asia's poorest peoples.

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MEDIA-JAPAN Japan has a highly developed media system with newspapers, magazines, books, and public and commercial television networks, as well as

mobile phone and Internet services. Japanese readers can choose from more than 120 daily newspapers. Japan's five major daily national newspapers—the *Asahi Shinbun*, the *Yomiuri Shinbun*, the *Mainichi Shinbun*, the *Nikkei Shinbun*, and the *Sankei Shinbun*—have a daily combined subscription-based circulation rate of more than 53 million copies and reach almost all of Japan's approximately 48 million households (2001 data).

Despite the extensive readership of newspapers, television is the most significant medium in Japan at the beginning of the twenty-first century. According to a 2001 survey, Japanese viewers over the age of seven years watch on average approximately three hours and forty-five minutes of television every day. Japan's public television, NHK (Nippon Hoso Kyokai, or Japan Broadcasting Corporation), has fifty-four broadcasting stations and employs more than 12,600 staff across Japan, in addition to more than twenty-five offices overseas. Japan's 127 commercial television broadcasters are organized in five major commercial networks with so-called key stations in Tokyo.

NHK provided Japan's first analog satellite television service in 1989, followed by commercial satellite television in 1997 and digital satellite broadcasting in 2000. Subscription rates to cable-television services, many of which also provide Internet access, reached a total of 18.7 million households in March 2001, with other telecommunication services such as digital terrestrial broadcasting and broadband services expected to reach a mass clientele before 2005.

The Beginnings of Modern Mass Media in Japan

The path to the development of modern mass media in Japan was paved in the early Tokugawa period (1600/1603–1869), when illustrated pamphlets, so-called *kawara-ban* ("tile block prints"), reported on the struggle between the Tokugawa clan and their opponents and the fall of Osaka Castle. For most of the following two centuries, however, *kawara-ban* were almost exclusively devoted to personal tragedies, love suicides, natural disasters, and other human-interest stories, with hardly any interest in politics.

The first modern newspaper published in Japan was the English-language paper *Nagasaki Shipping List and Advertiser* of 1861, followed a few years later by the first Japanese-language newspaper, the fortnightly *Kaigai Shinbun*. The early Meiji government (1868–1912) considered newspapers an important part of modernization and encouraged their publication and distribution. The next four decades saw the development of a varied and at times highly politicized press. Many of Japan's leading newspapers of today were

founded in the late nineteenth century, including the *Yomiuri Shinbun* (1874), the *Nihon Keizai Shinbun* (1876), and the *Osaka Asabi Shinbun* (1879).

Another Japanese media institution, the press club (*kisha kurabu*), also has its roots in the Meiji period. The first press club was founded in 1890 to cover the opening of the Diet (parliament). Today, all significant public and commercial organizations in Japan, ranging from the prime minister's office and the Bank of Japan to the municipal fire services, have an associated press club. While allowing journalists easy access to official information, the press clubs are also a major reason for the relative uniformity of the modern Japanese press, as journalists from all media outlets obtain their information from the same limited pool of informants.

Media Freedom and Censorship: From Prewar Democracy to Allied Occupation

While the late Meiji period initially saw an increase in relative journalistic autonomy, the Newspaper Law of 1909 set the trend for a more restricted press environment, which continued throughout the years of prewar democracy. The law, administered through the Home Ministry, allowed various levels of censorship. Ministry officials instructed publishers about public events, and publishers had to submit inspection copies to the ministry at the time of their circulation. The ministry could then prohibit the publication or suspend the offending newspaper. Press control was substantially tightened under military rule (1937–1945). Prepublication censorship replaced the previous system of suspending offending material, and many intellectuals and writers from the center-left were either arrested or blacklisted and banned from publishing. Another form of control was the rationing of paper, which led to a rapid drop in the number of newspapers. By 1941, only 54 of the over 1,200 newspapers that had been in circulation in 1936 had survived.

Radio broadcasting in Japan began on 22 May 1925 with a program by the Tokyo Broadcasting Station, the first commercial radio broadcaster in Japan, followed by the opening of two further commercial radio stations in Osaka and Nagoya. Independent commercial radio broadcasting did not continue for long, as the government forced the merger of the three stations in 1926 into a new broadcaster, NHK. The expansion of NHK's broadcasting network throughout Japan and the mass production of cheaper radio sets led to a rapid increase in audience numbers. NHK held a broadcasting monopoly in Japan until 1951.

From the beginning, the communications ministry imposed strict control over radio content. After the

Mukden Incident of 1931, when Japan occupied Chinese-held Manchuria, NHK radio became a significant tool for mobilization. NHK's unwavering support for the war effort ended only with Japan's surrender on 15 August 1945.

In the following years, American-led occupation forces prosecuted those media owners and newspaper journalists responsible for Japan's war propaganda and restructured NHK to foster demilitarization and democratization. However, many of those earlier removed from their positions returned to the media as America's concern moved from promoting democracy to combating Communism, a shift that occurred with the advent of the Korean War.

The Media and Politics in Contemporary Japan: The Case of Television

Japanese broadcasting laws make Japan's public broadcaster, NHK, one of the most autonomous public broadcasters in the world. The Japanese public holds NHK in high regard for its reliability and trustworthiness. However, the long incumbency of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has governed Japan almost without interruption since 1955, has led to many unofficial methods by which the LDP can exert control over the public broadcaster. NHK's annual budget must be approved by the LDP-dominated parliament. The LDP also has strong links to NHK's board of governors, which elects NHK's president, and to the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts, and Telecommunications, which oversees compliance with media laws and controls media licenses. To avoid friction with the authorities, NHK tends to shun coverage of controversial issues and presents mostly neutral and authoritative news.

Until the mid-1980s, commercial-television networks focused almost exclusively on entertainment, with little interest in news or current affairs. While entertainment in the form of popular television-drama series, variety programs, and game shows continues to dominate commercial television, all commercial stations now also broadcast regular news shows, which provide opinionated coverage of current affairs, in contrast to NHK. The surge in commercial news reporting was sparked by the success of TV Asahi's *Newsstation*, which first aired in 1985. The show's main presenter, Hiroshi Kume, combines entertainment, analysis, and in-depth news reporting in a highly popular program. In 1993, the program's critical stance on many political issues almost cost TV Asahi its broadcasting license when the LDP attributed its first defeat in a general election since 1955 to *Newsstation's* political reports. Subsequently, the amount of politi-



IRON CHEF

One of the most popular Japanese television programs of the 1990s was *Ryori no Tetsujin* (Cooking Iron Man). The show first aired on 10 October 1993 in the Kitchen Stadium of the Gourmet Academy. The shows were hosted by Takeshi Kaga, chairman of the Gourmet Academy, who introduced each week's "Iron Chef"—one of the show's "home team" of master chefs. A visiting chef competed against the show's Iron Chef to produce four or five dishes, all of which had to be based on a core ingredient unveiled at the start of the show. The dishes were then rated by a panel of experts and celebrities, and the winner declared. Camera crews and commentators followed the chefs and their assistants as they prepared the dishes in elaborate on-set kitchens. As a cultural drama, the show combined elements of samurai warrior ethos, the excesses of global materialism, and modern sports culture and drew a large audience of mainly young, affluent men. The appeal spread beyond Japan, and French and American chefs participated. The show began airing on the U.S. Food Network in July 1999 under the title *Iron Chef*, with an American version introduced later.

Source: Fuji Television, Inc. (2000) *Iron Chef: The Official Book*.
New York: Berkley Books.

cal reporting decreased until 2001, when the unprecedented popularity of the LDP prime minister Junichiro Koizumi during his first year in office created a renewed interest in political reporting with high viewer ratings for political news and talk shows.

The long incumbency of the LDP has not diminished the demand for reliable and trustworthy news media in Japan. Despite the legally established freedom of the public broadcaster and the best efforts by some journalists in commercial television, Japan's de-facto one-party government system has impeded the development of independent and serious journalism since the mid-1950s and has restrained the media's ability to provide a forum for public debate.

Barbara Gatzen

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MEDIA—MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA

The peoples of Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar (Burma until 1989), live in much poorer and less free conditions than their neighbors in Thailand. Myanmar remains under military rule, Vietnam and Laos are Communist, while Cambodia's fledgling democracy has emerged only since the 1998 United Nations-supervised elections. In each, except Cambodia, communications are under direct or indirect government control.

Neither the press nor television has significant penetration in Vietnam, Laos, or Myanmar, where both media are intended above all for regime maintenance, nor are they a significant presence in Cambodia. By contrast,

TABLE 1

Media Density in Southeast Asia					
	Vietnam	Cambodia	Laos	Myanmar	Thailand
Population (in millions)	77.5	11.8	5.1	45	61.7
Mainline telephones (1998 per thousand)	26	2	6	5	84
Cellular phones (1998 per thousand)	2	6	1	0	32
Press circulation (1996 per thousand)	4	2	4	10	63
Radios (1997 per thousand)	107	127	143	95	232
TVs (1998 per thousand)	47	123	4	7	236
Personal computers (1998 per thousand)	6	1	1	0	22
Internet hosts (1998 per 10,000)	.02	.13	0	0	6

SOURCE: World Development Report 2000/2001.

the media have been used for national development and for promoting consumerism in Thailand. (See Table 1.)

Media Density

The reasons for this underdevelopment are historical. Southeast Asia is still rebuilding after the ravages of the Vietnam War. Despite conditional moves to open their economies by Vietnam (*doi moi*) and Laos (New Economic Measures) since the late 1980s, these countries remain stagnant. Cambodia is still recovering from the Khmer Rouge, while Myanmar’s generals have kept a stranglehold on the polity and its declining economy since 1988. Thailand’s media are more fully developed and are comparable with the media in insular Southeast Asia.

The Press

Vietnam’s largest daily is the tabloid *Cong An Thanh Pho HCM* (Ho Chi Minh City Police). Other dailies include *Tuoi Tre* (Young Age) and *Lao Dong* (Labor)—youth and trade-union papers that reach wider readerships. There are also women’s papers, such as *Phu Nu Thu Do* (Hanoi) and *Phu Nu Thanh Pho HCM* (Ho Chi Minh City). There are also the Party paper *Nhan Dan* (The People), the elite intellectual paper *Dai Doan Ket* (Great Unity), and two army papers. English-language papers include the *Saigon Times Daily* since 1996 and the *Vietnam Economic Times*. There are also a French monthly and a Chinese weekly.

The press is supervised first at the national level by the Ideology Department and the Ministry of Culture and Information, then by the paper’s own internal committee. There are also provincial supervisory committees. The net effect is that the Vietnamese press—and indeed all media—are brought under the control of the Communist Party.

In contrast, Myanmar, which had a large number of papers before the 1962 coup, publishes only two

main national titles—*Myanmar Alin* and *Kyemon* (The Mirror)—two regional dailies, and the English-language daily *New Light of Myanmar*. In the year 2000, a new English-language weekly *The Myanmar Times*, started up; it focused on business news, and a Burmese-language version was added in 2001.

Cambodia has twice the population of Laos but almost ten times as many papers. Since a degree of press freedom has emerged in Cambodia, there has been a boom in the Khmer-language press. The largest is the pro-government paper *Rasmei Kampuchea*, which has some 35 percent of all advertising, followed by others such as *Koh Santepheap* and *Monearsekar Kampuchea*. A weekly *Cambodia Times* has been published in English and Khmer since 1995, rivaling the smaller *Cambodia Daily* begun three years earlier in English, Khmer, and Japanese. The Cambodian press is wildly partisan, reflecting the chaotic freedom of recent politics. The Lao press is smaller and not at all democratic. There is one main Lao-language daily, *Siang Prachachon*, and the English-language weekly *Vientiane Times*.

Thailand’s press was often censored by the army and the government until 1992, but it has since been increasingly free. Thai-language papers are dominant, with tabloids including *Thai Rath* and *Daily News*, and elite papers such as *Matichon* and *Siam Rath*. The English-language papers, the *Bangkok Post* and *The Nation*, are read by elite Thais and expatriates, but have much smaller circulations. The Thai Chinese-language papers have small readerships and are declining.

Radio and Television

With the exception of Thailand, the nations of mainland Southeast Asia have low levels of literacy. Adult illiteracy levels in Cambodia and Laos in 1998 were 61 and 54 percent, respectively. Radio is therefore still an important communication channel. In Vietnam, for example, twice-daily half-hour broadcasts are made to villages through public loudspeaker

systems. Some state channels aimed mainly at metropolitan listeners carry advertising.

The Voice of Vietnam (VOV) Radio began in 1945 and currently has five domestic and eleven overseas channels. One of the domestic services broadcasts in five minority languages, as do twenty of the sixty provincial stations. Cambodian stations are mainly in the capital of Phnom Penh, though national FM broadcasting began in 1999. Lao National Radio covers most of the country, supplemented by two Vientiane Radio stations. Broadcasting in Myanmar, where radio and television penetration is low, is controlled by the Myanmar Television and Radio Department.

Television began in Vietnam in the south in the 1960s with channels run by Royal Vietnam TV and the U.S. military. The day after the war ended in 1975, it was renamed Liberation Television, later becoming VTV (Vietnam Television). Hanoi's VTV runs VTV 1 and 2, while Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) has VTV 7, 28, and Song Be TV. There are three regional relay stations in Da Nang, Hue, and Can Tho, servicing sixty local stations. A commercial channel, VTV 3, was introduced in 1996, three years after VTV, VOV, and the Vietnam News Agency had been split from the Ministry of Culture and Information as part of *doi moi*. VTV began some satellite relay services in 1996 with twelve channels in HCMC and nine in Hanoi. While Vietnam television is tightly controlled, there are some local differences. In 1994, for example, HCMC TV refused to carry the Japanese serial *Oshin* as requested by VTV.

There are six broadcast television channels in Cambodia and three cable services, most of which are very recent. The proceedings of the National Assembly are taped for rebroadcast. Cambodia and Laos experimented with importing commercial services from Thailand from the Shinawatra group in the mid-1990s, but canceled them after disputes over their management. Laos has only one national service, Laos National TV on Channel 9, but many Laos watch the Thai programs that spill over their borders. Myanmar has two channels (Myanmar Television and Army Television) as well as satellite channels, but these are restricted to tourists and elite officials.

Television began in Thailand in 1955. Thailand now has six free-to-air channels; satellite-delivered cable-TV services were established in 1991. Thai broadcast television is almost exclusively in Thai. Foreign-program content on Thai television was an issue in the early 1990s; because of language barriers and government policy, there is little foreign programming.



High school students in Bangkok watch a video on television in 1989. (ED ECKSTEIN/CORBIS)

When U.S. or Chinese movies or Japanese cartoons are screened, they are dubbed with Thai voice-overs.

Thai broadcasting has traditionally been controlled by the army, but the degree of control has been significantly reduced since 1992. The army still runs Channel 5, which is also broadcast internationally by satellite. Thailand first allowed private broadcasting in 1996, when iTV became the first channel not owned by the state; it pioneered freer news programs, but in 2000 control of the channel went to the telecom magnate Thaksin Shinawatra, who became prime minister in January 2001.

New Media and Information Technology

Recent attempts being made to introduce the information technologies and new media that are important in Singapore and Malaysia have yet to have any significant impact in Southeast Asia. The Internet was introduced to Vietnam in December 1997, and some newspapers, such as *Nan Damb*, have developed web presences. Myanmar has no laws regarding Internet use. The Internet is mainly used by offshore critics of the regime to run critical news reports about the government (for example, *The Irrawaddy* website).

On the other hand, Malaysia and Singapore are providing significant business investment for Cambodia, Vietnam, and Myanmar in transport, leisure, and telecoms. Sweden conducted a major regional radio-improvement program for Laos between 1993 and 1995. Thai communications companies such as Shinawatra and Jasmine also have telephone investments in Laos and Cambodia, while Australia's Telstra, France's Telecom, and Japan's NTT have helped to build Vietnamese telecom services.

Some initiatives also aim at boosting regional communications. China and Thailand have joined the four

states to form a Greater Mekong Subregion Telecommunications Group, while in late 2000 an e-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed to promote e-commerce in ASEAN, in which Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar are now members. However there remain major obstacles to the success of these schemes, not least of which are the widespread bureaucratic corruption and political repression that continue.

Glen Lewis (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam) and editorial staff of Berkshire Publishing (Myanmar)

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MEDIA-SOUTH ASIA There have been profound transformations in the media landscape in recent years in the countries of South Asia. This change presents both opportunities and challenges to the countries in the region: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. These nations' reform programs and active engagement in the world economy are now paying off in terms of higher foreign investment, a fallout that is also noticeable in the media industries. However the rate of progress is far from equal in all the countries.

Radio

Until recently radio has been under state control in most South Asian countries, but it is opening up now in India. Bangladesh Betar (Radio Bangladesh) is government controlled, as is Radio Nepal, which broadcasts programs in Nepali and English to over 90 percent of the country's population.

Newspapers

Bangladesh has about forty daily newspapers, published mainly in Dhaka. Of these, *Dainik Ittefaq*, *Dainik Inquilab*, and *Dainik Janakantha* have the highest circulation. The major newspapers in Nepal include the *Gorkhapatra*, *Nepali Hindi Daily*, *Samaya*, and the *Daily News*. Sri Lanka has nine daily newspapers, the one with the largest circulation perhaps being the *Dinamina*. Over 275 daily newspapers, mainly printed in Urdu and English, are published in Pakistan, the best

selling among these being perhaps the *Daily Jang* and the *Dawn*. The major dailies are concentrated in Lahore and Karachi. Around 35,000 newspapers, 10 percent of which are dailies, are published in India. These include such English-language publications as the *Times of India*, the *Indian Express*, the *Hindu*, the *Deccan Herald*, and the *Statesman*.

Television

Since the early 1990s, there has been an exponential growth in television viewing, spurred on in part by the spread of private cable systems and television broadcasts via satellite that provides access to news, sports, and entertainment from around the globe. As satellite channels have proliferated across the South Asian subcontinent, distinct forms of localized entertainment and news channels have emerged. The entertainment channels, including the STAR TV network, have largely been dominated by the Indian film industry and its offshoots, and these continue to be popular across the subcontinent.

The South Asian countries are now at a crossroads regarding development, particularly in the field of satellite television and the information superhighway. Some of them have large numbers of technically trained, English-speaking workers, particularly India. Earlier, the major stumbling block was the lack of financial flows to sustain this market. Today, the problem is more keeping pace with developments that are taking place so rapidly worldwide and with the issues of regulatory control.

Telecommunications Infrastructure and the Internet

The South Asian region has had a telecommunications infrastructure since the mid-nineteenth century, when the British held power in the region. The Telegraph Act of 1885 still operates in many parts of the region, though it recently has been amended in India, for instance. The management of telecommunications in all the countries of South Asia began with state control. There were various reasons for this choice, chief among which were the high investment required to support the infrastructure and the desire of the government to exercise control. Rapid expansion of technology in the past two decades, however, made it possible to deliver service to more areas than ever before.

The growth of the information superhighway via the Internet has outstripped any previous information technology innovation in recent times. While its greatest advantage is that it needs no new infrastructure to get started, it does demand a complete revamping of



WHO WANTS TO BE A MILLIONAIRE IN INDIA

Kuan Banega Crorepati, India's version of *Who Wants to Be a Millionaire*, is one of the most watched television shows in the entire world, edging close to *Baywatch*'s record of 1.1 billion viewers in 142 countries. In 2000 the show had an approximate viewership of more than 100 million worldwide. *Kuan Banega Crorepati* (which translates as "who wants to be a deca-millionaire") awards its prizes in Indian rupees, worth approximately US\$219,000.

Kuan Banega Crorepati is a little different from the U.S. original—in India delighted spouses prostrate themselves in front of the host, and host Regis Philbin has been replaced by the Indian film star Amitabh Bachchan—but the agony and ecstasy of the game show remain the same.

James B. McGirk

Source: Barry Bearak. (2000) "Many, Many in India Want to Be a Millionaire." *The New York Times* (30 August). Retrieved 5 April 2002, from: <http://www.nytimes.com>.

the way the existing infrastructure of telecommunications is used. The growth of the telecommunications infrastructure in South Asia has not been demand-driven; it has been almost entirely investment-driven and dependent on the priority level possible for the allocation of funds from limited public resources. This means that the current situation in South Asia faces some major problems that limit the utility of the information superhighway. One, of course, is the cost of computer ownership; another is the cost of telecommunication access. But above all, there is limited access to the telecommunications medium itself.

India is the only country in the region with a reasonably high level of engineering hardware and software technology and state- as well as privately owned provision for international connectivity. Nepal gained access to the Internet via India's education and research network, ERNET. This limited arrangement was later routed through Singapore and Australia. Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan also have very limited international connectivity. One of the reasons for this is that those countries use a single government agency for both domestic and international services.

All the countries in the area have liberalized access to the Internet in one way or another. India for the first time set up a ministry of information and technology in the autumn of 1999. In Pakistan, the gov-

ernment has an open policy for data communications and the Internet to encourage their spread and use. Telecommunications in Bangladesh remain the responsibility of the government, whereas the Nepal Telecommunications Authority has loosened the controls placed on the private sector, with an eye toward attracting private investment. All these steps, however, have not been easy processes, facing as they do considerable resistance from the government-owned telecommunications monopolies. So, while all the countries in the South Asian region have tried to



A newsstand in Nuwara Eliya, Sri Lanka, that sells English- and Sinhalese-language newspapers. (ARVIND GARG/CORBIS)

deregulate and liberalize their data and voice services and have been encouraging private investment, this process has been unevenly implemented.

With the coming of age of new technologies in digital and electronic communications, a major upgrading of systems in the countries of South Asia is called for. The costs of online access remain extremely high, and availability of telephone lines remains very restricted. Even where telephone lines exist, poor quality and service remain stumbling blocks. The entire purpose of telecommunications needs reexamination so that maximum efficiency can be obtained for mediums of transmission, including copper cable, fiber-optic cable, terrestrial radio waves, and satellite communications.

The information superhighway has a lot to offer to the regions of South Asia, but successful utilization requires a paradigm shift in traditional funding and management models. Otherwise, new technologies in the media sphere will just continue to exacerbate the digital divide between rural and urban, non-English- and English-speaking South Asia. Private (profit-driven) agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) must be brought in as participants if benefits are to be productive for the South Asian region in any meaningful time frame.

Shoma Munshi

See also: **Cinema-South Asia**

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MEDIA-SOUTH KOREA The development of mass media in South Korea has been one of the most dramatic in Asia. Development was significantly delayed during the Japanese occupation (1910–1945) of Korea, when the media were used as the Japanese colonial government's propaganda tools, and further delayed by the Korean War (1950–1953). Since the 1950s, virtually all major changes in the structure of the media have followed a change in government. Many media scholars have attributed South Korea's media democratization to President Rho's June Declaration in 1987, which guaranteed freedom of the press in South Korea. Prior to this, the media in South Korea were under the strict control of the governments of Park Chung Hee (1961–1979) and Chun Doo Hwan (1980–1987), with each new government deciding the role and function of the media. The changes in domestic politics since 1987, however, have brought more media freedom.

Broadcast Media

Radio in Korea was introduced in 1927 by the Japanese colonial government in order to promote and disseminate its policies. Despite a poor economy and political instability, which continued until the 1950s, radio gradually attracted an audience with its news and entertainment programs. Its growing popularity also attracted commercial interest, and, as a result, both commercial and national radio coexisted until 1979. Although television was introduced in 1956, the first regular television broadcasting started in 1961 by a national broadcaster owned and operated by the state. Following this, television came to consist of both commercial and state operations (1965–1979). Then both television and radio became a monopoly of public broadcasting (1980–1990), and they are currently a duopoly of commercial and public broadcasting.

There are three major land-based broadcasters: two public broadcasters, Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) and Munhwa Broadcasting Company (MBC), and one commercial broadcaster, Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS). KBS and MBC provide television and radio (AM and FM) services through their own nationwide networks; SBS broadcasts in Seoul and surrounding areas. These major broadcasters are complemented by nine local commercial broadcasters that provide television and FM radio service in the nine largest cities in South Korea, and each of them covers its respective geographical area. Apart from national and local broadcasters that provide both television and radio services, seven broadcasters provide radio-only service. Some of them, such as BBS (Buddhist Broadcasting System), CBS (Christian Broadcasting System), and TBN (Traffic Broadcasting Network), have their own local stations in large cities. Yonhap News Agency is the only news agency in South Korea. It was established in 1981, after the merger of two major news agencies, Tongyang News Agency and Haptong News Agency.

Cable television in South Korea started in 1995 with twenty-nine channels. It is operated by three sectors: station operators, program providers, and network operators. Despite optimistic predictions, cable television in South Korea, except for a handful of channels, has undergone difficult times. This has been largely due to the government's poor management of the industry. South Korea's own broadcasting satellite was launched in 1997; however, by December 1999, satellite broadcasting in the country was yet to commence, mainly due to the absence of legal structure. With the new Broadcast Law in effect, Korea Digital Satellite Broadcasting (KDB), the sole satellite operator, started satellite broadcasting in March 2002.

Print Media

The first Korean newspaper (*Hansong Sunbo*) and magazine (*Sonyon*) appeared in 1883 and 1908, respectively. Korea had a flood of newspapers in the second half of the 1940s when the Korean government allowed all newspaper publishers to operate provided they register with the government. Under South Korea's license system, which was introduced in 1952–1953, the number of newspapers significantly dropped. Under the military regimes in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, newspaper companies were required to have a license to publish, and journalists were required to have a press card issued by the government to access government information. On the other hand, the military governments provided newspaper companies with financial benefits, such as tax exemption and pay raises, in return for positive coverage of their policies.

Newspaper companies in South Korea have been centered around Seoul. In addition to general-interest dailies, companies publish specialized newspapers, such as sports and economic/business newspapers. They also publish magazines, such as weekly and monthly news magazines and women's magazines, which target specific readers. Most of the regional newspapers, however, have been struggling to attract readers in their region, mainly due to the dominance of the large Seoul-based newspapers, such as *Choson Ilbo*, *Chungang Ilbo*, and *Tonga Ilbo*, in the regional markets.

The expansion of print media in South Korea can be attributed partly to the country's booming economy in the 1980s, which created a strong advertising market and strong revenue for the print media, and partly to the media liberalization of June 1987. Although the print media are largely free to criticize the government, some critics point out that many of the newspaper companies, to varying degrees, still operate as family businesses. This family nature, together with their strong competition to dominate the market, has been the main concern voiced by civil organizations since the end of the 1990s. South Korea's president Kim Dae Jung (b. 1925) in early 2001 ordered a tax examination, which was a serious challenge for newspapers, which had enjoyed tax exemption. The newspapers claimed that the government was trying to control the media, whereas the government maintained that all companies must abide by the Tax Law and Fair Trade Law.

Ownership

In South Korea, newspaper companies and business conglomerates were allowed to own and operate broadcasting stations in the 1960s and 1970s. The 1980 media reform, which was enforced by the Chun Doo Hwan government, prohibited private companies from providing broadcasting service. The reform also banned cross-media ownership by placing all broadcasters under the umbrella of public broadcasting and allowing only a handful of national newspapers in Seoul and just one newspaper in each of the eight provinces. This restriction, however, provided Seoul-based newspaper companies with an opportunity to expand by publishing newspapers and magazines.

Foreign ownership and foreign investment in the South Korean media were strictly prohibited until 1995, when the government partially lifted restrictions on foreign ownership of cable television. Faced with financial problems caused by the devaluation of Asian currencies against the U.S. dollar at the end of 1997, the South Korean government was forced to further deregulate industry sectors, including broadcasting. As

a result, the government opened the media industry to foreign investors, with the exception of land-based broadcasting.

State Control

The regulatory structure of media in South Korea has been characterized by a strong centralized bureaucratic-authoritarian state. Mass media have been controlled by successive military governments until the end of the 1980s. They have used explicit measures to control the media, such as direct intervention in management and personnel affairs, overt censorship, and the arrest of antigovernment journalists without warrants. Although the degree of state control over the media since then has weakened, some scholars argue that the state still controls media, broadcasting in particular, indirectly, such as by administrative guidance, which requests broadcasters' cooperation. To Western scholars, South Korea remains a conservative nation with conservative media.

State control of broadcasting in South Korea has been exercised mainly by two government ministries (the Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Communication, which were merged and renamed the Ministry of Information and Communication in 1998) and by two seemingly independent regulators: KBC (Korean Broadcasting Commission) and KCCC (Korean Cable Communications Commission). Unlike the broadcast media, the print media have been loosely regulated and encouraged to practice self-regulation.

The New Broadcast Law

South Korea is undergoing a major change in its regulatory structure of broadcasting after passage of the new Broadcast Law by the National Assembly in December 1999. The new Broadcast Law consolidates all laws relating to broadcasting, namely broadcast law and cable law. The new Broadcast Law empowers the KBC with broader structural and administrative authority. All types of broadcasting—land-based, cable, and satellite—will be placed under the control of a single regulator, the KBC. The law also empowers the KBC with ultimate licensing power, that is, to issue, cancel, and renew licenses. The law relaxes the restriction on cross-media ownership and foreign ownership by allowing newspaper companies, conglomerates, and foreign investors to own up to 33 percent of one satellite broadcasting operator.

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MEDIA—WEST ASIA West Asia—made up of the two non-Arab nations of Iran and Turkey as well as Iraq, which has a sizable non-Arab population—is home to the world's richest written traditions in extinct languages as well as living languages such as Arabic and Persian. Writing, the world's first major communication revolution, began six thousand years ago in the civilization of Sumer, which flourished in southern Iraq. Writing used diverse media, including stone, clay, metals, wood, parchment, and finally paper, which was adopted from China and later transferred to Europe.

Unlike paper, printing came to West Asia from Europe rather than China or Korea and was not welcomed by Ottoman sultans, who issued decrees in 1485 and 1515 in order to deny the Muslim population access to the technology. However, book publishing began in the eighteenth century, and by the mid-nineteenth century, the first periodicals emerged in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish. Publishing in languages used by Christian and Jewish populations had an earlier start.

Media and Modernity

The transition from a rich scribal culture to a print culture occurred under conditions of mass illiteracy, which continued until the 1970s. Unlike the West, where the rise of print media was associated with the formation of civil societies and "public spheres," in West Asia illiteracy and the persistence of tribal, nomadic, and feudal relations were not hospitable to the development of print media. Still, these media had, by the late nineteenth century, turned into sites of struggle between the Ottoman and Iranian despotic states and new social forces such as the emerging mercantile class, women, labor, the modern intelligentsia, students, peasants, nationalities, and ethnic and religious groups. The press constituted a major force of moder-

nity and played a crucial role in the democratic and anticolonial movements of the region, including Iran's Constitutional Revolution (1906–1911) and the Young Turk Revolution of Ottoman Turkey (1908). Newspapers and magazines were also a major factor in the rise of nationalism, feminism, socialism, and the modernization of linguistic and literary traditions among Arabs, Armenians, Kurds, Persians, Turks, and others.

Recorded music was introduced to the region through Western phonograph and gramophone companies in the 1910s. Cinema was also introduced through private initiatives, with early commercial screenings in 1904 (Tehran), 1905 (Istanbul), and 1909 (Baghdad); film production began in 1916 (Turkey), 1930 (Iran), and 1946 (Iraq). The medium was secular and urban, and promoted the official language and culture.

The advent of radio coincided with the rise of nationalist, secular, and modernizing regimes in Turkey (1923) and Iran (1925), which monopolized broadcasting and used it along with other media as vehicles for state- and nation-building and assimilating ethnic and national minorities. Broadcasting began in Turkey in 1927, Iraq in 1939, and Iran in 1941. In the 1950s, there were major propaganda "radio wars" between Egypt on one side and Iran, Iraq, and Turkey on the other. Clandestine and state radio stations also engaged in numerous broadcasting wars involving the Soviet Union and the nations of the region. Television broadcasting began in Iraq in 1956, Iran in 1958, and Turkey in 1968. By the latter part of the 1990s, satellite broadcasting to and from the region had visibly transformed the audiovisual culture of the region.

State Control of the Media

In Iraq, the consolidation of power by the Ba'ath Party after its 1968 coup d'état led to the strict control of the media and eventually to the elimination of private journalism. The destabilization of the Iraqi state after the Persian Gulf War (1990–1991) allowed the Kurds in the north to establish an autonomous government, where Kurdish language media flourished. In Iran, print journalism, "small media" such as cassette tapes, and "xerox literature" (oppositional leaflets and other literature printed as photocopies) played an important role in the 1978–1979 revolution against the Pahlavi monarchy (1925–1979), which was replaced by an Islamic theocracy. The Islamic republic used the media intensively to Islamize state and society.

The nations of West Asia have exercised strict control over the media. In the late 1990s, Turkey, Iran,

and Iraq ranked highest among the world's violators of press freedom. State violence against the media included assassinating, jailing, and abducting reporters and media personnel, smashing satellite dishes, arresting viewers, and attacking media outlets and institutions. Ayatollah Khomeini's 1989 *fatwa* (religious decree) authorizing the assassination of British writer Salman Rushdie for blasphemy was typical of a policy that eliminated hundreds of Iranian intellectuals, especially journalists and their publications, after 1979.

However, technophiles and technological optimists see in new technologies such as the Internet the demise of state control and the rise of a civil society that never took off in the old technopolitical order. The Turkish republic allowed private broadcasting in the early 1990s, and by the mid-1990s, the monolithic state broadcasting system found itself in an ocean of radio (over 1,200) and television (over 250) stations. Moreover, satellite television from other nations brought to audiences programs that challenge the state (for example, the Europe-based Kurdish-language channel Med-TV, later called Medya TV, and Iranian television channels from California).

Although the unprecedented growth of channels introduced diverse programming, Turkey remained the top violator of freedom of the press by the early 2000s. The media were tolerated only if they subscribed to the official ideology and politics, and the Kurdish citizens, numbering about 10 million, were denied the right to broadcast in their language. Unlike Turkey, Iraq and Iran have banned satellite dishes, although dishes continue to be used in the course of a "guerrilla war" between audiences and the police.

By 2001, access to the Internet was most extensive in Turkey, growing in Iran, and most limited in Iraq. Surveillance of the Internet was commonplace in West Asia. At the same time, satellite broadcasting and the Internet allowed round-the-clock contact between Iraq, Iran, and Turkey and the numerous diasporas formed by the refugees and emigrants from these nations.

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MEDICINE, AYURVEDIC Ayurveda is the oldest traditional system of healing in India, still widely in use today. Developed by the people of the Indo-Gangetic plain, Ayurveda was at first transmitted by verbal instruction; texts and commentaries were later written in Sanskrit. Ancient Indian medicine, like all of life in India, was interwoven with philosophy and religion. Ayurveda was and remains holistic; that is, it emphasizes keeping the entire person healthy rather than addressing specific ailments in isolation. The basic Hindu texts for Ayurveda are the four Vedas, ancient Hindu sacred texts. All four Vedas have sections dealing with healing and prevention and cure of sickness; the approach to treatment is generally one of magic or prayer to the deities of the Vedic pantheon. Later, specific tracts dealing with health and disease were compiled.

Some Problems of Chronology

The exact dates of the Ayurvedic texts are impossible to determine, except that they are known to be later in date than the four Vedas. Because early Indian texts were written on palm leaves or tree bark, they were perishable in the humid climate. Texts were often ascribed to sages or gods to establish their validity, and the authors of the Ayurvedic texts seldom clearly defined who they were and where they lived. Thus it is difficult to establish the dates of the authors' lives. Scholars estimate that the codification of Ayurveda probably occurred around the sixth century BCE. The Ayurvedas are believed to have taken their current form by the sixth or seventh century CE.

Medical Texts

Collections of texts with medical significance were known as tantras. Tantras were codified and made compact so that they were easily transmitted by verbal instruction, and instructors could easily explain the verses that students had memorized. The mainly medical *Agnivesa-tantra* and the surgical *Susbruta-tantra* were either never written down or did not survive, and are known only because they are mentioned in other texts.

In their later systematized forms the texts are known as *sambitas* (Sanskrit term for any systematically arranged collection of texts or verses that convey information). Five *sambitas* are known. The three major *sambitas*—*Charaka* (mainly internal medicine), *Susbruta* (mainly surgery), and *Astangasamgraha/Astangabrdaya* (a combination of both)—are together termed the *Brddhatrayee* (ancient triad). Their complete texts are available in a number of copies and commentaries. Two other incomplete texts, the *Bhela* and the *Kashyapa*, are available in one or two copies. The

Kashyapa sambita deals almost exclusively with pediatrics (which are dealt with less extensively in the other texts). Some doubt exists about the authenticity of a sixth and also fragmentary text—the *Harita sambita*. The *Madhavanidanam* is a text that deals specifically with the causation and diagnostic features of diseases.

Theory of Ayurvedic Medicine

Ayurveda deals with life (human and animal) in all its aspects, including areas that do not fall in the domain of Western medicine today. The Ayurvedic texts discuss dietetics, geographic pathology (disease as affected by the environment), medical ethics, the selection and teaching of medical students, and even the philosophical basis of existence.

Ayurvedic medicine was based on a theory of the balance of three essential vital forces in the individual. Somewhat similar to the Western concept of humors (a notion propounded by Hippocrates in the fifth century BCE that the human body contained four humors, or fluids, on whose equilibrium health depended), these vital forces called *Tridoshas* or "three *doshas*" are *vayu* or *vata* (loosely translated as wind), *pitta* (bile), and *kapha* or *sleshman* (mucus). The terms are conceptual and do not equate with the physical bile or mucus in a Western sense.

The balance of those vital forces gives each person his or her specific mental and physical characteristics. Imbalance—resulting in disease—arises from either congenital or inborn causes and acquired or external factors. Such external agents could be diet, addictions and habits, inappropriate foods and drinks, sexual habits, place of residence, climate, or injuries. Some diseases are also called *raktaja*—arising from impure blood—though blood is not considered a *dosha*. In the diagnosis and cure of any disease, the nature of the cause is important, as is the individual constitutional (humoral) characteristics of the patient.

The Charaka and the Susbruta The *Charaka* and the *Susbruta* are divided into a number of sections, each dealing with some special aspect of diseases and their treatment. The *Charaka sambita* supposedly contained the version of the medical teaching of Atreya Punarvasu (a mythical sage) put forward by Agnivesa (another mythical sage). The currently available text is a redaction by Dridhabala (probably ninth century CE).

In both the *Susbruta* and the *Charaka*, medicine is broadly divided into eight areas—surgery; diseases of the ears, nose, throat, and eyes; internal medicine; mental diseases; pediatrics, including pregnancy and its complications; chemicals used in treatment (which



HYMNS FOR THE DISEASE DEMON *BALASA*

The two hymns below are used by Ayurvedic healers to treat an internal disorder that results in swelling in the limbs. The healer attempts to remove the disease agent (*balasa*) by cutting it out, applying a herbal remedy, and reciting hymns.

Destroy every *balasa*, who is seated in the limbs and in the joints, the indwelling one who loosens the bones and the joints and afflicts the heart. I eradicate the *balasa* of the *balasa* victim, like the muskara (or *pusbkara*, 'lotus') [and] I cut through his link [to the body] as the root of the *urvaru*-plant (gourd).

O *balasa*, fly forth and out of here, as the very young *asumga* (-bird?), and like the annual grass, pass away without destroying [our] men.

O tree, O herb, do not let even a small bit of the red *balasa*, the *vidradha* (abscess), the *visalpaka* (swelling) remain.

O *balasa*, your two withdrawn testicles which are hidden in the armpit, I know a splendid medicine for that—*cipudru*.

We tear away the *visalpaka* (swelling) who is in the limbs, in the two ears and in the two eyes, the *vidradha* (abscess) [and] the heart-affliction; [likewise] we dispel down [and] away that unknown *yaksma*.

Source: Kenneth G. Zysk. (1993) *Religious Medicine: The Historical Evolution of Indian Medicine*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 33.

at a later time developed into an extensive treatment of chemistry, especially of metals); rejuvenation; and aphrodisiacs.

The *Charaka* and particularly the *Sushruta* also describe the selection of medical students. Students were chosen from the three highest castes, and their physical and mental attributes were carefully considered. During a ceremony with a sacrificial fire as witness, teacher and student agreed on their respective roles. The student stayed with the teacher as a member of the teacher's family through the long years of apprenticeship.

The *Charaka* and especially the *Sushruta* discuss medical ethics in addition to other topics. The dress and conduct of physicians and especially their behavior toward the women in a patient's family are clearly enunciated. Both texts insist that patients should be treated with the same care and respect that one would give one's own child, without consideration of the patient's caste or position in society. The physician is asked to cure when possible, palliate when cure cannot be achieved, but under no circumstances to attempt the impossible (thus hurting the patient.) In return, a physician becomes financially successful and is praised by the king and the community.

Sexual activity was an overt and recognized part of Ayurveda. The major texts have a section—*Vajikarana*—that deals with rejuvenation and aphrodisiacs. Books such as the *Kama sutra* (Essentials of Physical Love) and *Anangaranga* (Games of Cupid) examine the physical aspects of male and female genitals and homo- and heterosexual lovemaking in great detail, but in a clinical, not lascivious fashion.

In discussing human beings in health and illness, the *Charaka* mentions the necessity of examining the following aspects: structure, function, causation, symptoms, methods of treatment, objectives of treatment, influence of the seasons and age, capabilities of the physician, nature of the medications and appliances used in treatment, and procedures used and their sequence. Structurally, the eight sections of the *Charaka* include an introduction and general principles, causes of disease, general pathology and dietetics, development of the fetus and anatomy, diagnosis and prognosis, methods of treatment, pharmacy, and cure of diseases. All together the *Charaka* has 150 chapters of varying lengths.

The *Sushruta* has been edited, with commentary, a number of times. The earliest known text is by Dalanacharya (twelfth century CE), who states that he



An Ayurvedic physician in Bhubaneswar, India, uses a hot iron rod and fabric soaked in herbs to heal an arthritic hip. (LINDSAY HEBBERD/CORBIS)

worked on an earlier commentary by Nagarjuna. The original text is the teachings of the sage Dhanvantari collected by Sushruta. It must be mentioned, however, that Dhanvantari, Sushruta, and Nagarjuna have not been clearly established as historic personages. From internal evidence it seems that the original *Susbruta* was compiled between the late sixth and early fifth centuries BCE. The *Susbruta* has 120 chapters in sections that include general principles, origins and causes of (sixteen types of) diseases, anatomy and sites for venesection (removing parts of arteries or veins), various surgical problems such as abscesses, and rites and rituals of surgery, poisoning (including animal bites and snake venom), and an appendix that discusses diverse medical and surgical problems.

Mainly though not exclusively concerned with surgical matters, the *Susbruta* details 100 instruments of six different types (as well as the most important instrument—the surgeon's hand). Most equipment resembles surgical instruments in use today. The text discusses the operation and the pre- and postoperative phases. It de-

scribes the management of wounds and abscesses in great detail and also the choice and use of caustics, leeches, and thermal cauterization (using a heated agent to sear tissue). The surgical trainee is charged to dissect human cadavers and to practice various surgical acts on appropriate inert material such as animal carcasses or gourds before operating on human patients.

The descriptions of many operations, such as those for piles, fistulae, perianal abscesses, and bladder stones, are detailed, explicit, and anatomically accurate. Surgical treatment of head and neck conditions is extensively described, and Sushrutian plastic-surgery techniques for torn earlobes and disfigured noses were known in Europe in the early nineteenth century, as British physicians of the East India Company observed them and brought them back to the West.

The Astangahrdaya The *Astangahrdaya* has six sections—general principles, pregnancy and development of the fetus, the causes of disease and symptoms, treatment methods, the use of emetics, purgatives, and enemas, and an appendix that discusses diverse groups of diseases. Many diseases described in the Ayurveda may be clearly recognized today, though a number overlap and are ambiguous.

The Madhavanidana and the Madhavachikitsa Another important Ayurvedic author is Madhavakar (dated somewhere between the sixth through ninth centuries), who wrote two texts: *The Madhavanidana* and the *Madhavachikitsa*. The *Madhavanidana*, which is better known, describes the causes of diseases and their symptoms, complications, and prognostic characters signifying lethality. The text's sixty-six chapters are arranged differently from the *Charaka* and the *Susbruta*, even though much of the material is borrowed from them. Madhavakar adds some new disease entities and enlarges on some entities described in the *Charaka* and *Susbruta*. The *Madhavachikitsa* deals with treatment of most (but not all) of the various diseases described in the *Madhavanidanam*.

Government Provisions for Medical Practice and the Spread of Ayurvedic Medicine

Both state licensing of trained medical and surgical practitioners and specialization in particular branches of medicine existed in ancient India. The edicts of Asoka (c. 265–238 BCE) show that the state provided treatment of sick people and animals and that shelters (resembling hospitals) existed.

There are striking parallels between the Greek (Hippocratic) system and Ayurveda. The Greeks and the Indo-Gangetic Indians had extensive cross-

communication even before Alexander of Macedon's failed attempt to conquer India in 323 BCE. The diffusion of medical ideas probably went in both directions, perhaps with doctors from both Greece and India meeting in the Persian court and exchanging information; the Indian system was by no means a copy of the Greek. The monks who spread Buddhism to Southeast Asia, Sri Lanka, the East Indian islands, China, Japan, and Korea took with them the Ayurvedic medical methods (Buddhism proscribed the shedding of blood—hence surgical acts were forbidden). From the seventh century onward, emergent Islam recognized the excellence of Ayurvedic medicine. Islamic rulers had Indian physicians in their courts and had Indian texts translated into Arabic. With the Muslim conquest of northern India the two systems became even more closely associated.

Ayurveda in Modern Times

Ayurvedic medicine is still extensively practiced in India. It has changed much from its original form under the influence of later Islamic and Western medical systems. Ayurvedic treatment is less expensive and in many instances as effective as Western medical treatment. In India Ayurvedic practitioners are available in remote parts of the country, while Western-style medical doctors may not be. As a recognized medical discipline, there are national and state regulatory agencies, and a number of good Ayurvedic medical schools exist. Since India's independence, considerable efforts have gone into standardizing the medications prescribed in the Ayurveda, and the pharmacological properties of Ayurvedic medications are being scientifically studied. Ayurvedic surgery, however, has been completely lost, partly because surgery played a minor role in Islamic medicine, which was favored by the Muslim rulers of most of India from the eleventh century onward.

The details of the Hindu system of medicine are relatively little known in the Western world though interest in alternative medical therapies, including Ayurveda, is growing. Since 1997 the U.S. National Institutes of Health Office of Alternative Medicine, established by the U.S. Congress in 1992, has been studying various alternative therapies, including Ayurveda, with the intention of providing scientific evaluation of the effectiveness of the treatments.

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MEDICINE, TRADITIONAL—CENTRAL

ASIA Since the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, health care and pharmaceutical industries in the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have collapsed. The Semashko model of health organization, named after the first minister of health in Soviet Russia, featured total state authority and control; significant centralization of administration, planning, and financing; and free-of-charge medical assistance at the point of delivery. Now health care providers receive very low salaries, resulting in poor motivation and morale. Malpractice and substantial under-the-counter payments are widespread, causing public pessimism and distrust of hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies in both rural and urban settings.

With the collapse of centralized health care, citizens of the Central Asian states are increasingly turning to traditional or folk medicines to cure common colds, minor infections, and other ailments. Centers for the study and understanding of folk medicine are opening throughout Central Asia. The centers serve as teaching clinics where patients seek alternative medical treatments from folk healers and their apprentices. Sufferers also tap into Central Asia's rich medicinal texts, both modern and historical, which focus on the local flora and fauna as remedies for ills. These books are being published at increasing rates for the use of clinics or medical cooperatives in Central Asian cities.

Heritage of Central Asian Traditional Medicine

Traditional medicine in Central Asia draws on a rich and diverse heritage, bringing together spiritual and empirical elements. Bridging Europe and Asia, Central Asia has been exposed to medical knowledge from a variety of regions near and far. Closely allied with popular religious beliefs, spiritual medicine reflected both pre-Islamic shamanist traditions and Islamic practices before the Soviet period. Shamans and mullahs served as medical practitioners by fighting to expel the evil spirits that Central Asian folk believed

lay at the root of disease. Folk doctors, for their part, relied on observable phenomena and treated ailments by using locally available plant and animal products. Despite Soviet rule, knowledge accumulated over hundreds of years passed from generation to generation, enhanced by information about remedies that had met with success in China, Tibet, India, and the Near East. These studies are manifested in current remedies. Central Asians saw folk doctors not in opposition to shamans and mullahs, but as members of allied medical fields.

Animal Remedies

Before the Soviets came to power, Central Asians used not only herbs but also animals in traditional medicine. For example, to treat syphilis Kazakhs burned the entire skeleton of a wolf and ground the ashes into a powder, which was applied to the patient's sores. In cases of fever Kazakhs rubbed sheep liver on the patient's body or beat him or her with the lungs of a sheep or goat. To treat the common cold, the patient was placed in a tub filled with hot water and sheep entrails, which were supposed to promote sweating the illness out of the person's system. Central Asians treated cutaneous anthrax, a natural infectious disease characterized by skin ulcerations, by tying a string around the leg of a live frog, fastening the frog to the patient, and placing it directly on the sores. In a few minutes the frog supposedly suffocated, and its stomach turned black. The process was then repeated with four or five more frogs, after which the wound was rubbed with oil. Allegedly, after several days, the sores disappeared altogether. Bridging both the Soviet era and the present, perhaps the animal product most widely used in traditional medicine is koumiss, or fermented mare's milk. In the Central Asian nomadic cultures, koumiss is readily available as an effective measure to maintain good health and as a successful treatment for a variety of illnesses, such as alleviating colds and the flu.

Plant Remedies

Central Asian herbal medicine is allopathic, not homeopathic. Homeopathy treats diseases by using herbs that would induce in a healthy person symptoms similar to those the disorder causes in the sick person; allopathy induces effects opposed to the symptoms. Plant remedies are typically prepared by brewing a tea made from dried herbs and roots gathered in the mountains and plains. Mint is a frequently used ingredient to soothe the mouth and throat. Central Asians also distill herbs and roots in water or koumiss and distribute the result in ointment form. These herbal solutions are used to treat, among other things, fevers, diarrhea, headaches, psychological afflictions and STDs, namely

syphilis. Central Asians use strong black tea to treat headaches, a remedy that is effective because caffeine constricts blood vessels, thereby alleviating pain. For swellings, the ground roots of wild nettles are placed directly on the inflammation. A mild narcotic used to treat the common cold, *nasybai*, is administered under the tongue in a form akin to chewing tobacco. Central Asians use opium and *nasybai* as painkillers.

Government's Role in Traditional Medicine

The Central Asian governments support traditional medicine as a supplement, not a replacement, for modern medicine. Groups such as Avicenna, named after the famous Islamic medical scholar Ibn Sina (980–1037), promote clinics and publish journals on how to use traditional medicines to encourage good physical and mental health. In Central Asia's scientific laboratories, with government encouragement scientists are completing clinical trials of traditional medicinal preparations. Tinctures, ointments, granules, and powders, made from local herbal raw materials, are being developed. The new medicines include healing remedies (bentonite and iodine powder, tincture of Japanese *safara*), and antidiabetic preparations (beans and vigna granules). Central Asians also use minerals such as iodine-sulfuric powder to get rid of skin diseases. Overall, Central Asians use traditional medicines in response to their growing inability to manufacture modern pharmaceuticals.

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MEDICINE, TRADITIONAL —CHINA

Traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) has a long history. More than two thousand years ago the earliest of the extant medical classics, the *Huangdi nei jing* (Yellow Emperor's Canon of Medicine), also called the *Canon of Acupuncture*, set forth the medical knowledge of China. It would be neither astounding nor impossible to compare the ancient *Canon of Medicine* with recent works compiled in accordance with the standards of contemporary scientific medicine. In fact, we can regard contemporary medicine as inspired by the Chinese *Canon of Medicine*. While both Hippocrates and the *Canon of Medicine* represent the same monumental break from previous magical or supernatural healing systems, only the *Canon of Medicine* still holds both the prestige of antiquity and scientific interest in the world's largest health system, which serves nearly 25 percent of the world's population. The principles of TCM are still taught to students in all twenty-six colleges and thirty academies of TCM throughout China today.

The Basic Principles of TCM

The basic principles of TCM are the theory of yin and yang, the five elements, viscera, *qi* (life force), blood and body fluids, and the theory of the channels and collaterals.

A significant difference between TCM and Western medicine is the TCM mandate to focus on the entire body. A symptom expressed in one part of the body must be seen in its relationship to the whole body. While the Western physician starts with a symptom and then searches for the underlying mechanism or cause for that specific disorder, the TCM physician concentrates on the complete physiological and psychological aspects of the patient and looks for the body's pattern of disharmony to provide the basis for treatment. In terms of clinical understanding, while the Western medicine physician asks "What X is causing Y?" the TCM physician asks "What is the relationship between X and Y?"

Yin and Yang

Yin and yang were originally part of ancient Chinese philosophy: They represent the dynamic complementarity of paired opposites, such as hot and cold, dry and moist, male and female. The side of a mountain that faces the sun, for instance, is yang, and the side not facing the sun is yin. Yin and yang are embodied in every aspect of TCM's theoretical system. They are used to explain the tissues and structures, physiology, and pathology of the human body, and they also direct the clinical diagnosis and treatment.

The property, flavor, and function of Chinese medicinal herbs are summarized in the light of the yin and yang theory, which forms the basis for the clinical application of Chinese medicinal herbs. This is the reason why this theory is still taught in the colleges of TCM, even though it seems to be obsolete in comparison with the principles of Western medicine. Without a thorough understanding of the yin and yang theory, one cannot learn how to use Chinese medicinal herbs for clinical purposes correctly.

The Five Elements

Initially, the Chinese distinguished five kinds of substance in the world (wood, fire, earth, metal, and water) that were indispensable in the daily life of humankind. Subsequently, a mutual genesis and destruction relationship was theorized to explain the whole material world. The tissues and organs, as well as the emotions, of a person can be classified in the light of the theory of the five elements. For instance, the liver is wood, heart fire, spleen earth, lung metal, and kidney water. Furthermore, the seasons of the year; environmental factors such as wind, heat, dampness, dryness, and cold; color, such as blue, red, yellow, white, and black; taste, such as bitter, sour, sweet, and salty; and the orientations of east, south, west, and north can all be classified in the light of the five elements. For an example, spring is wood, summer fire, late summer earth, autumn metal, and winter water. This is the reason why an autumn wind is called the "golden wind" in Chinese.

The Viscera and Bowels

In TCM the internal organs of the human body are divided into three groups: five viscera, six bowels (that is, organs that are hollow on the inside), and extraordinary organs. The five viscera are the heart, liver, spleen, lungs, and kidneys. Their common features are to preserve the vital substances of the human body. The six bowels are the gallbladder, stomach, large intestine, small intestine, urinary bladder, and the "triple warmer" (*sanjiao*). They have the common function of transmitting and digesting water and food. The extraordinary organs are the brain, bone, bone marrow, blood vessels, gallbladder (which is both an extraordinary organ and a bowel), and in women, the uterus. Although they are also called bowels, their functions are different from those of the six bowels previously mentioned.

The term "triple warmer" is peculiar to TCM. It is a collective term for the upper, middle, and lower warmers, which together form an organ of energy



FROM TRADITIONAL TO MODERN

China's health needs are served by a mix of hospitals ranging from those that practice traditional medicine to those that practice a mix of traditional and modern to the newest that offer Western medicine in modern facilities. The desire for modern facilities is a 1990s development tied to the privatization of the Chinese economy and the presence of many Westerners in major Chinese cities. The Chinese government has been reluctant to support such ventures, but one such hospital is Beijing United Family Hospital, opened in 1997 through the efforts of Roberta Lipson, an American who has worked in China since 1979. In 2001 the hospital continues to serve mainly Westerners, but is engaged in a marketing campaign to attract young, middle-class Chinese families who can afford its services. The hospital has been allowed by the government because it hopes to learn and use the Western medical management practices used there.

Source: Yasmin Ghahremani. "China's Model Hospital." *Asia Week* (16 November): 40–41.

transfer. Generally, it is recognized that "triple warmer" is a large bowel containing all the internal organs. The triple warmer is also used to anatomically locate the body parts. The upper warmer is that portion of the body cavity above the diaphragm that houses the heart and the two lungs. The middle warmer is the portion between the diaphragm and the umbilicus that houses the spleen and the stomach. The lower warmer is the portion below the umbilicus that houses the liver, the kidneys, the urinary bladder, the intestines, and the uterus. Generally speaking, the physiological functions of the triple warmer control the activities of the *qi* of the human body.

Qi, Blood, and Body Fluids

TCM believes that the *qi*, blood, and body fluids are the basic components of the body and maintain the life activities of the human body. The energy needed by the viscera and bowels, channels and collaterals, tissues, and other organs for performing their physiological functions come from *qi*.

Qi in TCM refers both to the vital substance composing the human body and maintaining its life activities, and to the physiological functions of the viscera, bowels, and channels and collaterals. *Qi* is important for the physiological functions of these viscera and bowels. If considered within the yin and yang theory, *qi* is yang and blood is yin; blood is the physical manifestation of *qi*.

The Channels and Collaterals

"Channel" (*jing*) means "route." Channels are the main pathways running lengthwise through the body, through which *qi* flows. "Collateral" (*luo*) means "net," and the collaterals are branches of a channel in the system. The channels and collaterals are distributed over the whole body and are linked with each other and connect the superficial, interior, upper, and lower portions of the human body, making the body an organic whole.

Historic Development of TCM

The legendary Shen Nung was considered the father of agriculture and herbal therapy, and Huangdi (the mythical Yellow Emperor, who was born, according to legend, in 2704 BCE) was considered the creator of ritual and of medicine and the compiler of the *Nei jing* (Canon of Medicine). The Warring States period (475–221 BCE) saw the first corporation of doctors (*yi*) independent of priests and magicians (*wu*). This body's first known representative was Bian Que (430–350 BCE), who already knew the pulse rate as a basis for diagnosis and prognosis. The authorship of the *Nan jing* (The Classic of Difficulties) has been attributed to him.

Zhang Zhongjing, the Chinese Hippocrates, was the codifier of Chinese symptomology and therapeutics. Born in 158 BCE, in Nanyang, Henan Province, Zhang compiled an authoritative work entitled *Shanghan Lun* (Treatise on Fevers). While the Canon of

Medicine listed only twelve prescriptions and five forms of drugs (pills, powders, pellets, tinctures, and decoctions), Zhang's work listed 370 prescriptions and a greater variety of forms, including emulsions. His prescriptions for dysentery, encephalitis B, pneumonia, and hepatitis are still applicable today.

Hua Tuo (?–208 CE) was the great surgeon of the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). His most important discoveries were in the field of anesthetics and the art of abdominal section. The Chinese people also owe the practice of hydrotherapy to Hua Tuo. Ge Hong (284–364 CE) was one of Taoism's greatest alchemists and pathologists. His medical handbook covered such diverse ailments as infectious and parasitic diseases and neurological disorders. The first monograph on surgery was a modest collection of procedures by Gong Qingxuan (d. 208 CE). Early surgery focused on the treatment of carbuncles and ulcers, which upper-class patients suffered from.

State-sponsored medical schools started in China in 443 CE, but it was not until 581, at the beginning of the Sui dynasty (581–618 CE), that the government opened an Imperial Medical Academy, which was expanded in 624, during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE).

In 610 CE, Chao Yuanfang, together with others, compiled the book *Zhou bing yuan bo lun* (General Treatise on the Causes and Symptom of Diseases), which is the earliest extant classic on etiology in China. Its fifty volumes are divided into sixty-seven categories, under which are listed 1,700 syndromes. It details the pathology, signs, and symptoms of various diseases in internal medicine, surgery, gynecology, and pediatrics as well as describing diseases of the five sense organs.

Sun Simiao (581–682 CE), a famous Tang-dynasty medical man, wrote two books: *Ji bei qian jing tao fang* (Prescriptions Worth a Thousand Gold Pieces for Emergencies) and *Qian jing yao fang* (A Supplement to the Essential Prescriptions Worth a Thousand Gold Pieces). These two books deal with acupuncture and moxibustion (the use of moxa, or *Artemisia vulgaris*, as a cautery by igniting it close to the skin), diet therapy, preventative care, health preservation, and so on.

In the Song dynasty (960–1279 CE), more attention was paid to educating doctors in the principles of TCM. The Imperial Medical Bureau was set up and courses for students included "Plain Questions Classic on Medical Problems" and "Treatise on Febrile Diseases." In 1026 CE Wang Weiyi designed two life-size bronze figures and had them cast for use in teaching and in examining students learning acupuncture and moxibustion. When used for the purpose of test-

ing, the bronze figures were filled with water and coated with beeswax by the examiner ahead of time. If a candidate spotted and punctured the right acupoint, water would issue from it.

During the Jin dynasty (1125–1234) and the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), the four famous medical schools appeared, each with its own special features in the diagnosis and treatment of various disorders. They were the School of Cold and Cool, represented by Liu Wansu (1120–1200); the School of Attacking or Purg-ing, headed by Zhang Congzheng (1156–1228); the School of Injuries of the Spleen and Stomach, headed by Li Dongyuan (1180–1251); and the School of Nourishing the Earth, founded by Zhu Zhenheng (1281–1358).

The only great scientific work written in the sixteenth century uninfluenced by Western scientific thought is the *Ben cao gang mu* (Great Herbal) of Li Shizhen (1518–1593) during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). The Great Herbal listed 1,892 medicines and more than ten thousand prescriptions. It took Li twenty-seven years to accomplish and is a great contribution to the development of pharmacology both in China and throughout the world. Besides being a great pathological and therapeutic work, it is a treatise on natural history, giving a classification of mineral, vegetable, and animal products. To complete the encyclopedia, there are chapters on chemical and industrial technology and geographical, historical, dietetic, and culinary data, as well as other information. It has been translated into all the languages of East Asia and the principal Western languages.

To put these developments into historical context, Harvey published on the circulation of blood in 1682 CE but was anticipated in Europe by Servenus (1546) and others who had read the Arab studies of al-Nafis (1228). Circadian rhythms and the science of endocrinology (including hormone therapy) were discussed in the second-century BCE Chinese texts, 2,200 years before their acceptance in the West. In attempting to identify and control diabetes, the Chinese were ahead of the Europeans for nearly a thousand years, although they never connected the disease with the pancreas. Immunology developed in China in the tenth century CE, including inoculation for smallpox, which did not occur in Europe until the eighteenth century.

Wang Qingren (1768–1831 CE), a physician of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), wrote *Corrections on the Errors of Medical Works*. He corrected the errors in autopsy in ancient medical books, emphasized the importance of autopsy, and developed the theory that blood stasis would result in disease.

TCM has undergone its ups and downs in official policy over the last century. In the early years of the Republic (from 1911/1912), the emphasis officially was on Western medicine. President Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) was a Western-trained physician, and the bias of his government was definitely toward Western medicine. However, the vast majority of the Chinese people continued to go on much as they did before in seeking treatment from TCM practitioners. The birth of the People's Republic (1949) brought an official revival of TCM. Veteran TCM practitioners started producing texts under government auspices in the 1950s. By the time of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), when the official emphasis in general health care shifted from Western medicine to TCM, the body of written knowledge was sufficient to be put to work in the rapid training of "barefoot doctors" with a manual describing TCM remedies for major health situations and problems.

Contemporary Development of TCM

In the twentieth century, with the popularization of Western medicine in China, a new situation has arisen in which TCM and Western medicine are developing side by side. Chinese medical workers have come to realize that TCM and Western medicine each have their own advantages. Efforts have been made to combine the two schools and to put forward a series to assimilate the two schools in theory and practice. Much of this effort has come since the end of the Cultural Revolution, when many prominent Western medicine specialists returned from their banishment to manual labor in the countryside and were assigned to TCM institutions. Their task was to undertake basic and clinical research, using modern rigorous methods, to determine the efficacy of TCM treatments.

TCM is now developing rapidly and is widely being practiced in China. New technological devices, such as lasers, have been incorporated in 2,000-year-old methods. In 1986 the State Council of China created a State Administrative Bureau of TCM and Pharmacy. It controls TCM and Chinese medical materials, as well as the step-by-step integration of TCM and Western medicine. There are now more than 340,000 TCM doctors; 1,500 hospitals of TCM, with a total of 100,000 beds; and 26 colleges and 30 academies of TCM in China.

Chen Bao-xing and Garé LeCompte

See also: **Acupuncture; Five Phases.**

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MEDICINE, TRADITIONAL—WEST ASIA

West Asia was (and still is) a heterogeneous area in terms of topography, climate, and culture, which perhaps explains its pluralism—even syncretism—in the area of traditional medicine, on both the intellectual and practical levels. Since the middle of the seventh century CE, West Asia has been predominantly Muslim, although Anatolia, or Asia Minor, became Muslim only during the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries. However, many non-Muslims—various Christian sects, Jews, Zoroastrians, and others—have kept their original faiths. Because medicine is always associated with beliefs about God, nature, and human beings' place in the world, it is imbued with religious, cultural, and social values, and these values may differ for people of different faiths.

Since the end of the eighteenth century, major political and socioeconomic transformations have affected health care in Western Asia, and traditional medicine now occupies only a peripheral position. In the past, however, there were three main medical traditions in West Asia, each of which explained the nature of health, the causes of illness, the remedies and other curing techniques used by healers, and the proper care for sick people according to its own worldview. These three major systems were humoralistic

medicine, popular or folkloristic medicine, and religious medicine.

Humoralistic Medicine

Humoralistic medicine was the tradition that Muslim societies inherited from the past, particularly from the Greek physicians Hippocrates, the father of medicine (c. 460–c. 377 BCE), and Galen (129–c. 199 CE). This tradition was based in cities and princely courts, where it flourished under the patronage of rulers, high officials, and military dignitaries. Humoralism was based on the assumption that all things were composed of the four elements of fire, earth, air, and water. Each element embodied two of the four qualities of hot, cold, dry, and wet. The human body consisted of four fluids, or humors—blood, phlegm, black bile, and yellow bile—each corresponding to one of the elements. Humoralism stressed the importance of a strict regimen suitable for each individual's lifestyle and environment.

Hence a humoral practitioner had to examine his patient closely by checking the patient's pulse, inspecting the urine, and questioning the patient about the ailment. After diagnosing the problem, the healer would probably first prescribe a suitable diet. If a medical diet did not solve the problem, the doctor would treat the patient with a pharmacopoeia, mostly with botanical ingredients. If this harsher treatment failed, the physician would choose a still harsher course—a simple surgical procedure.

Although Muslim physicians drew on this tradition, they expanded it considerably in all branches of medicine and pharmacy. A famous representative of this school was Ibn Sina (980–1037), known in Europe as Avicenna. His *Qanun* (or Canon of Medicine), one of his almost two hundred literary works, was a standard medical text well into the eighteenth century in Asia as well as Europe.

Popular or Folkloristic Medicine

Popular or folkloristic medicine includes several systems of indigenous medicine practiced in West Asia for hundreds of years. Whereas other medical systems required would-be physicians to study written texts with teachers, to apprentice themselves to masters, or to teach themselves, folkloristic medicine was based on oral traditions and was usually taught via informal apprenticeship. In contrast to urban-based humoralism, popular medicine—though practiced in towns as well—was more common in the countryside. The therapeutical aspect of popular medicine includes practical knowledge about medical herbs and includes

procedures that may also appear in humoralism, such as bloodletting and cauterization.

Religious Medicine

Religious medicine refers to medical theory sanctioned by religious figures. Foremost in this area is prophetic medicine (in Arabic, *Tibb Nabawi*), as in Muhammad's sayings that concerned medical questions. For instance, there are aphorisms of Muhammad dealing with hygiene, with the care of a sick person and his or her family, and with recipes for treatment. For Shi'ite Muslims, the role of Muhammad as healer was less important; they invested their religious leaders (imams) with unique therapeutic skills as part of their supernatural nature and sought treatment from them.

Religious medicine also includes medical rites and practices connected with living and dead saints. Saints are often endowed with extraordinary healing powers. Religious medicine may even refer to a profound belief in the healing capacities of objects like trees, grass, stones, water, earth, tombs, oil, soil, and even saliva, urine, and the excrement of certain animals. The genre of religious medicine incorporates both magical procedures and herbal remedies familiar in humoral and folkloristic medicine as well, but unique to religious medicine is the connection of healing with religious figures, mainly dead ones.

The belief in the healing power of the saints still exists in Western Asia. Everything that comes in contact with a saint or his or her shrine may receive some of the saint's healing powers. Thus objects associated with a saint's shrine may be used for curing and protection; acts performed at a shrine may have the same beneficial effects. For instance, Palestinian Muslims believe that dates brought from Mecca cause children to speak soon and with a sweet voice.

Characteristics of the West Asian Traditional Medical System

Thus traditional West Asian medicine was decentralized; no common doctrine united all its varieties. Nevertheless there was much overlapping in theories and techniques. For example, phlebotomy (bloodletting) and cauterization (burning to destroy tissue) were popular practices among healers in all medical traditions. Cauterization was such a common technique that European travelers in the Ottoman empire commented on the phenomenon of people treating themselves, including cauterizing themselves to treat a host of problems, such as headaches, skin rashes, leprosy, abscesses, and hemorrhoids. Sometimes a practice de-

scribed in humoralistic treatises was adopted into popular medicine, but after several generations in oral and popular tradition, its roots in the learned past were forgotten.

In West Asia, traditional medicine has become marginal and is not practiced in state-run medical establishments or taught in universities. Those who aspire to a career in the medical establishment, whether at the medical, scientific, or administrative level, can achieve their aim only with knowledge and practice in Western biomedicine, which originated in Europe.

Traditional medical beliefs and practices are, however, still a living tradition in West Asia, despite the dominance of Western medicine. For example, humoralism, though marginalized, has survived; a Persian medical book of the 1950s, meant for contemporary practice, was based on Avicenna. (Humoralism is however much more alive in parts of South Asia, such as India and Pakistan, where it is widely taught and practiced under the name of *yunani tibb*, "Greek medicine.") And throughout Turkey, bazaars sell herbs for pharmaceutical purposes (drugs and poisons), as well as condiments for cooking, scents for perfume, and dyes. Furthermore, cauterization as a medical technique can still be observed in some rural regions in Turkey and the Arab world.

And in recent decades traditional medicine has enjoyed something of a revival. Disenchantment with Western values and Western medicine and the wish to defend Muslim values against Western morality have caused people to return to traditional practices, now known as complementary or alternative medicine (CAM). CAM has even won respect from advocates of biomedicine. Some hospitals try to take measures (or claim to be doing so) toward integrating aspects of CAM into the formal establishment, for instance by introducing optional CAM treatments into Western-type medical treatment.

Miri Shefer

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MEDICINE, UNANI Unani medicine, also known as *yunani tibb* or Greco-Islamic medicine, is a therapeutic system used in South and Southwest Asia that developed through the interaction of ancient Greek with some Arab and, perhaps, Ayurvedic medical and pharmaceutical principles. The origin of Greco-Islamic medicine can be traced to Hippocrates (c. 460–c. 377 BCE), Galen (129–c. 199 CE), and Ibn Sina (Avicenna, 980–1037 CE).

The Galenic Medical System

Galen (129–c.199 CE), a philosopher and physician of Pergamum, an ancient Greek kingdom in Asia Minor, was the key figure in the transmittal of the earlier ideas about the four humors—blood, mucus, yellow bile, and black bile—formulated by the Greek Hippocratic school, to medieval Arab scholars, who in turn shared their understanding with Persian and Indian physicians. In essence, one can say that the principles of Islamic medicine were totally Galen's. It was in Galen's book *On the Nature of Man* (c. 180 CE) that the theory of four humors was first laid out in logical detail. They were believed to combine with four primary qualities—warmth, cold, moisture, and dryness—and a person was healthy only if the four humors and their associated qualities were in balance. An imbalance had to be rectified through diet or drugs.

This was to become a dominant theory not only in the Muslim Middle East but also in Christian Europe, where it was accepted until the end of the Renaissance and the discoveries that followed the invention of the microscope. It was an appealing theory because it offered an apparently convincing presentation that put humanity in relation to the macrocosm. In doing so a link was made between physiology and astrology: Islam, Christianity, and medieval Judaism all taught that the universe was divinely created, had a regular procession of stars and seasons, and that this was paralleled in the divinely created human, with his regular system of four humors. Many medieval scholars in fact pointed to the parallels between the four humors, the planets, and the seasons as though there were some overarching sympathy between them. Galen's own ideas about all this were very logical—if one accepted his premises—and they were further improved on by Ibn Sina, an Islamic philosopher and scientist.

Arab and Ayurvedic Influences

Galen's teaching was summarized by Husain ibn Ishaq (809–873 CE) and was thereafter repeated by subsequent writers on Arabic medicine, thereby giving it a certain internal consistency.

More specifically,

Islamic cosmology was built up from the Ptolemaic conception of concentric spheres, the Aristotelian understanding of the elements fire, water, earth, and air, and the Plotinian view of the emanations of pure intelligences and souls. These ideas were joined in a view of nature as a hierarchy of being that could be analyzed as a series of oppositions and correspondences. Analogical reasoning treated the universe as macrocosm perfectly reflected in the human microcosm. These Greek elements were combined with intense Islamic monotheism, elements of Qur'anic cosmology, mystical practices, pilgrimage and shrine traditions, and with the Middle Eastern Hermetic or wisdom (*bikmat*) tradition.

(*Good and Good 1992: 259*)

Good and Good are not arguing

that bits and pieces of traditional Greco-Islamic medicine persist in discrete popular beliefs about sexuality or physiology or popular cures, but that for important segments of the Islamic world, the classical epistemology still provides the conditions for meaningful adherence to seemingly diverse practices and beliefs, and that a reading of medical practices from the perspective of the classical cosmology and episteme makes them comprehensible.

(*Good and Good 1992: 261*)

Nonetheless, when the Galenic medical system reached the Middle East it by no means entered a medical vacuum. The practices of the earlier Egyptians, Persians, Israelites, Romans, and others remained in use, and Bedouin folk medicine was attested to in the Qur'an too.

Seven centuries after Galen's death, the major center for the practice and development of Greco-Arab medicine was Baghdad. Medical specialists there were not unwilling to learn from India as well as ancient Greece, and indeed many had themselves come from Persia, Syria, and other countries. Even prior to the establishment of Islam, Burzuya (flourished c. 531 CE), a court physician to the Persian emperor, had visited India to study medical practice and bring back Sanskrit medical texts as well as some Indian physicians. Later, in Baghdad, an invitation was issued to a Hindu therapist known in Arabic sources as Manka to come

and treat the famed caliph Harun ar-Rashid (c. 766–809). Being successful in this, Manka made his mark on Islamic society in the famous hospital of the Barmecides and was followed by numerous other Indian medical men who worked as therapists and translators of the Sanskrit texts during their stay in Baghdad. One chief minister, Yahiya-bin-Khalid Barmaki, also sent some Arab scholars to India to learn more about the Ayurvedic system.

The Arab component in the Unani system was derived, however, from classical Greek medicine in the main, as filtered through some 500 known texts of Galen, hence the name (*Unani*, meaning "Ionian" in Arabic, came to mean "foreign" in Indian languages). It was not a case of studying under Greek masters, but rather of translating the classical Greek and Syriac texts, already many centuries old, into Arabic. This was an important activity, which employed many people in Baghdad and elsewhere.

The Unani therapist, normally a Muslim, is generally called a *bakim* (learned man), in contrast to the Hindu therapist, who is known as a *vaid*. But there are also midwives, bonesetters, people who sell herbs, and other kinds of medical specialists. Despite the wide availability of hospitals practicing scientific medicine today, the Unani system survives in some South Asian towns and in some parts of Southeast and Western Asia too. In medieval times Arab hospitals practicing this type of medicine were the best in the world.

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See also: **Medicine, Ayurvedic; Medicine, Traditional-West Asia**

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MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI (b. 1947), President of the Republic of Indonesia. Megawati Sukarnoputri is the daughter of Indonesia's founder



Megawati Sukarnoputri at a rally in February 2000 at which party members endorsed her for president. (AFP/CORBIS)

and first president, Sukarno (1901–1970), who ruled in Indonesia from 1949 to 1965. She attended two universities but never earned a degree. Though born in Java and raised as a Muslim, Megawati lived in Bali where she built up a large base of political support amongst the Hindu and Christian communities of the outer islands. Megawati became a prominent figure in Indonesia, when in 1995 she won control of the Christian-nationalist Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), one of three legal parties under the regime of Suharto (b. 1921), 1965–1998. For many years Megawati accepted the status quo imposed by Suharto's New Order regime. She started to become critical of the Suharto regime in 1994–1995, accusing it of rampant nepotism and corruption. Angered at her outspokenness, in June 1996 a government-backed faction of the PDI ousted her from the party's leadership in an extraordinary party congress. The regime's heavy-handed tactics backfired and triggered mass demonstrations in Jakarta that ultimately led to Suharto's resignation in May 1998.

Owing to her political pedigree, Megawati became a symbol of opposition to the regime. Megawati established a new party, the Indonesia Struggle for Democracy Party (PDI-P) in 1998. The party won the most seats in the June 1999 election, but did not achieve an outright majority. Megawati was outmaneuvered, and a coalition of Islamic parties instead elected Ab-

durrahman Wahid (b. 1940), a moderate Islamic cleric and the head of Indonesia's largest Muslim organization, the Nahdlatul Ulama. In a power-sharing agreement, Megawati became vice president. Following Wahid's impeachment for incompetence and economic mismanagement in August 2001, Megawati became Indonesia's fifth president. Megawati has been under attack from the Muslim-oriented parties and publicly criticized for her lack of decisive leadership in the midst of an ongoing economic crisis.

Megawati was the first Muslim leader to visit the United States following the 11 September 2001 attacks, and while she condemned all terrorist acts, she was also very critical of the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan.

Zachary Abuza

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MEGHALAYA (2001 est. pop. 2.3 million). The state of Meghalaya (Sanskrit "Abode of the Clouds"), with an area of 22,429 square kilometers, lies on a mountainous plateau of great beauty in the northeast corner of India. Meghalaya is known as home to two

of the rainiest places on earth, the towns of Cherrapunji and Mawsynram. Its hill people trace their origin to pre-Aryan times. The British largely left them alone, and the Indian constitution protected them.

Although Assamese was introduced as the official language in 1960, the predominantly Christian state of Meghalaya possesses a landscape and ethnicity strikingly different from neighboring Assam. Formerly part of Assam state, inhabitants began agitating for autonomy, which led to Meghalaya statehood in 1972. Eighty percent of the population is made up of the Khasi, Garo, and Jaintia peoples, all of whom are matrilineal and matrilocal. Most live in thousands of rural villages. The Khasis, dominating the central area of the state, belong to the Mon-Khmer linguistic group; they also share ancestry with the Mundas of north-central India and the Jaintias, in the east of the state around Jawai. The Garos are of Tibeto-Burman origin; most came by way of East Pakistan, later Bangladesh.

Farming engages 70 percent of the population. Crops include rice, millet, and corn (maize). Almost all of India's sillimanite (a source of high-grade ceramic clay) is produced in Meghalaya. The state has abundant mineral resources, mostly untapped. Industries include furniture making, iron and steel fabrication, tailoring, and knitting. The literacy rate is 49 percent, and the language of instruction is English.

Since the first appearance of Christian missionaries in 1842, the division between Christian and non-Christian has had political repercussions, with continuous episodes of violence and intrigue through the years. Yet, all united in a peaceful, successful struggle for statehood. Since 1972, however, the willingness of matrilineal people to accept outsiders has been sorely tested by migrants who came to dominate local trade and business.

Often compared to Scotland, a source of inspiration to poets and painters, Meghalaya offers an ideal retreat with sylvan surroundings, misty heights, terraced slopes, breathtaking waterfalls, and luxurious vegetation. Great stone monoliths were erected to the old kings in the Khasi and Jaintia hills, as well as in sacred forest groves.

C. Roger Davis

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MEI LANFANG (1894–1961), Chinese theatrical performer. Mei Lanfang was a Chinese theatrical performer born in Taizhou, Jiangsu Province, who achieved international recognition for his performances in women's roles. Born to a family of noted opera singers, Mei began studying at the Peking Opera when he was eight years old, making his stage debut at twelve. At the age of fourteen, he joined the Xiliancheng Opera Company and gained a national reputation after a series of performances in Shanghai and elsewhere in China. Mei introduced Peking Opera to foreign audiences when he toured Japan in 1919 and 1924, the United States in 1930, and the Soviet Union in 1932 and 1935. In 1937 he ceased performing and moved to Hong Kong after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in protest of the Japanese invasion. He later returned to China and performed in films and on stage from 1946 until his death. He played more than 100 different characters, one of the most famous being the "Flower-shattering Diva." His distinctive style of dance became known as the "Mei Lanfang School." A remarkably charismatic and modest character, he is remembered as one of the greatest performers in Chinese history.

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MEIJI PERIOD (1868–1912). Meiji, which means "enlightened rule," is the name officially bestowed upon the reign of the sixteen-year-old emperor, Mutsuhito (1852–1912), on 8 September 1868. It is customary, however, to date the Meiji period from 3 January of that year, when he proclaimed the restoration of imperial rule and the abolition of the Tokugawa *bakufu* (military government) that had governed Japan for more than 250 years.

For most of the Tokugawa period (1600/1603–1868) the emperor was a forlorn political and cultural figure, isolated in the imperial capital, Kyoto, and overshadowed by the powerful Tokugawa shogun and his advisors, who claimed to rule in the emperor's name from the castle town of Edo. As discontent with the *bakufu* grew during the eighteenth century, however, some reform-minded critics began to invoke the emperor as an alternate, indeed preeminent, source of political authority. Even so, until the mid-nineteenth century, most of these reformers assumed that revitalizing the *bakufu* was key to resolving the domestic economic and social



JAPAN-HISTORICAL PERIODS

Jomon period (14,500–300 BCE)
 Yayoi culture (300 BCE–300 CE)
 Yamato State (300–552 CE)
 Kofun period (300–710 CE)
 Nara period (710–794 CE)
 Heian period (794–1185)
 Kamakura period (Kamakura Shogunate) (1185–1333)
 Muromachi period (1333–1573)
 Momoyama period (1573–1600)
 Tokugawa or Edo period (Tokugawa Shogunate) (1600/1603–1868)
 Meiji period (1868–1912)
 Taisho period (1912–1926)
 Showa period (1926–1989)
 Allied Occupation (1945–1952)
 Heisei period (1989–present)

problems that plagued the country. It was not until the 1850s, when the *bakufu* appeared to contravene the emperor's wishes by capitulating to the unequal treaty demands put forward by the United States and other Western trading powers, that plots to topple the *bakufu* began in earnest.

The Charter Oath

The Meiji period became synonymous with the modernization of Japan long before the death of Mutsuhito (known posthumously as Emperor Meiji) brought it to a close on 30 June 1912. That characterization is still widely accepted today. However, in light of his government's response to various dilemmas that accompanied its reforms, there is less agreement over the legacy of the Meiji period for twentieth-century Japan. Some of those dilemmas may be traced back to the provisions contained in the Charter Oath of Five Articles, which the emperor issued on 6 April 1868. The purpose of this imperial declaration was to reassure both the feudal domains and the Western powers of the aims of the new government. The irony is that those who drafted the Charter Oath were in no position to state with certainty what those aims were.

To begin with, neither the composition nor the structure of the new government had been determined. And to complicate matters, the loyalists who had joined together to overthrow the Tokugawa *bakufu* in the name of the emperor were drawn from disparate groups and motivated by competing inter-

ests. They included court nobles, daimyo (clan lords) from powerful domains like Satsuma and Choshu, and lower-ranking samurai in charge of administrative and military affairs within their domains.

The future of the new government was also uncertain because it lacked any military or economic power apart from that which the domains backing it were willing to put at its disposal. Fortunately, their support was sufficient to prosecute the civil war (Boshin War) against the pro-Tokugawa resistance, elements of which held out until June 1869. Few, however, believed that this coalition would last indefinitely.

The Charter Oath can thus be seen as a response to these uncertainties. Eager to reach across the class divisions and sectional loyalties that were mainstays of the Tokugawa political economy, drafters of the Charter Oath resorted to broadly worded assurances that: all classes were to unite in promoting the nation's economy and welfare; an assembly would be established and matters of state would be decided by public discussion; all classes would be allowed to fulfill their just aspirations, so as to avoid discontent; base customs of the past would be abandoned, and all actions would conform to universally recognized principles of justice; and knowledge would be sought throughout the world to strengthen the foundations of imperial rule. The wording of the articles may have delayed, but could not prevent, clashes over differing interpretations of them and disagreements over the government's ensuing policies.

As Article One makes clear, the first order of business was to unite the people behind the new government by articulating a common national identity and sense of purpose. The biggest potential threat to government authority and national unity lay with the more than two hundred daimyo who still ruled over their own domains with the help of their samurai vassals. To set an example which they hoped others would follow, the four daimyo who had backed the overthrow of the Tokugawa *bakufu* agreed to surrender their domain registers to the Meiji emperor in 1869. (By this time, the seat of the new government had been transferred to Edo, which was renamed Tokyo, or "eastern capital.") During the next two years other daimyo followed suit. In return, the government assumed the income and debts of the domains, and granted each daimyo a guaranteed stipend and nobility status. Some former daimyo also assumed the title of governor under a new system of prefectures that was established at the same time.

Disenfranchised Samurai

The samurai below them did not fare as well. The modest stipends they had received from the daimyo

were taken over by the government. In 1873, however, the government moved to reduce this enormous drain on the treasury by taxing the stipend. Later, in August 1876, it announced that the annual stipend would be commuted to a lump sum payable in government bonds. Adding to the difficulties the samurai faced were concurrent policies that effectively stripped them of their privileged social standing. By 1872, all samurai were reclassified as either former samurai (*shizoku*) or commoners (*heimin*). The Conscription Law of 1873 meant that military service was no longer their exclusive preserve. Even their right to wear swords was abolished.

As a result of these policies, some 400,000 former samurai experienced a loss of income, employment, and dignity. While some learned to capitalize on their superior education and administrative experience to occupy prominent positions in the political, economic, and social life of Meiji Japan, others experienced only frustration. Fearing a backlash, the government adopted a variety of rehabilitation measures during the 1870s, including grants to engage in commerce or agriculture. These measures were only partially successful, however, and failed to prevent disgruntled members of the *shizoku* class from organizing against the government. Some dusted off their swords and resorted to armed conflict. Significantly, the most famous of these incidents—the Saga Rebellion of 1874 and the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877—were each led by one-time members of the Meiji government, Eto Shimpei and Saigo Takamori, respectively, who had resigned due to disagreements over the new regime's foreign policy and its treatment of the samurai. Their defeat at the hands of the better-trained and equipped conscript army marked the demise of the samurai as a hereditary military class and ruling elite.

Other former samurai mounted a more cunning assault on the government by turning Article Two of the Charter Oath to their advantage. Ironically, this campaign, too, was led by a disillusioned member of the Meiji government, Itagaki Taisuke (1837–1919), who had resigned in 1873, along with Eto and Saigo. For Itagaki, who hailed from Tosa, an additional source of frustration was the near monopoly over key government posts enjoyed by former samurai from Satsuma and Choshu, which had led the loyalist forces against the Tokugawa *bakufu*. Instead of a sword, Itagaki used the power of the pen to petition the government in 1874 for an elected assembly, thereby launching the Freedom and People's Rights Movement (*jiyu minken undo*). Over the next seven years he continued to press his case by organizing a series of political parties, culminating with the Liberal Party (Jiyuto) in 1881.

Peasants and Merchants

The nationwide prominence enjoyed by the Liberal Party and, by extension, the Freedom and People's Rights Movement as a whole, was due as much to the support of merchants, peasants, and laborers as it was to former samurai. They saw government compliance with Article Two of the Charter Oath as a way to press for compliance with Article Three. In the case of the merchant class, which had ranked at the bottom of the Tokugawa social order (below the samurai, peasants, and artisans), Article Three meant "fulfilling their just aspirations" for public recognition and for a voice in public affairs commensurate with their economic influence.

For peasants, who constituted 80 percent of the population, Article Three meant pursuing their traditional livelihoods with a minimum of government interference and exploitation. During the Tokugawa period, most land was nominally owned by the shogun or daimyo, although registered farmers did exercise certain rights over their individual plots. Peasants who worked the land normally relinquished 40 to 50 percent of their harvest as a land tax, which the daimyo used to pay the stipends of their samurai vassals and meet other expenses. However, as those expenses grew, and as more samurai and daimyo fell into debt to the rising merchant class, peasants could be forced to turn over as much as 70 percent of their crops and to endure miscellaneous taxes on doors, windows, female children, cloth, sake, and so forth. They were also called upon to provide corvée labor, and were the target of sumptuary laws exhorting them to produce more and consume less. Little wonder that in lean years peasants would petition for reductions in these obligations, or that when petitions failed, they turned to mass demonstrations and even riots. Between 1590 and 1867, there were over 2,800 peasant disturbances, most of them occurring during the latter half of the Tokugawa period. Some peasants eventually fell into debt, lost control of their land to other farmers or to absentee landlords living in rural towns, and were reduced to tenant status.

Whatever hopes the peasants might have had for a revival of benevolent rule following the Meiji Restoration were soon dampened by new demands placed upon them by the new government. Anxious to create a unified, centralized tax system that could provide a regular, stable source of revenue, the government in 1872 removed the ban on the sale, purchase, and mortgage of land. The following year it authorized a nationwide survey to determine ownership and value of land that would serve as the basis for reform of the land tax. Henceforth, the annual tax would be assessed

against the value of the land rather than the crop yield, it would be payable in cash, rather than in kind, and it would be levied on the individual landowner rather than on the village unit. The tax rate was originally set at 3 percent; later a 1 percent supplement for local government was added. The new system was greeted by violent resistance, prompting the government to reduce the rate to 2.5 percent (local supplement 0.5 percent). Even so, many farmers paid as much as one-third of their harvest in tax, and tenancy rates continued to climb, rising from 20 percent of cultivated land at the time of the Restoration to 45 percent by 1907. The land tax accounted for 80 to 90 percent of total government revenue through the 1880s, declining to 20 percent by 1902 as other sources of revenue were found.

Peasant resentment against the Meiji government was also fueled by the Conscription Law and by the Fundamental Code of Education of 1872. The former required that all men aged twenty serve in the military for three years, followed by another four years in the reserve. This robbed farm households of badly needed labor. So, in its own way, did the Fundamental Code of Education, which—for the first time in the country's history—made primary education compulsory for all boys and girls. Adding to their burden was the expectation that the costs of school construction, teachers' salaries, tuition, textbooks, and so forth would be borne by local governments and families.

The Freedom and People's Rights Movement

To these disaffected elements of Meiji society, the Freedom and People's Rights Movement provided a platform to vent their anger over the government's new laws, as well as to insist that the promises made in Articles Two and Three of the Charter Oath be extended to everyone. Ironically, the government itself helped make this grassroots campaign possible through its articulation of Articles Four and Five. On one hand, its pledge to abandon outmoded customs and embrace universally recognized principles of justice could be cited by government opponents to justify their demand for a representative assembly like those found in "civilized" Western countries. On the other hand, its exhortation to seek knowledge throughout the world, coupled with its ambitious compulsory education policies, encouraged the populace to learn from the West and gave them an essential tool, literacy, with which to do so.

Ultimately, the Freedom and People's Rights Movement did help persuade the Meiji government to issue an imperial edict, in October 1881, announcing that Japan would have a constitution before the end of the

decade. The Meiji oligarchy, however, still dominated by the Sat-Cho (Satsuma-Choshu) clique, reserved for itself the exclusive right to draft this document. It also moved to discourage further grassroots political activity. Even before the edict was issued, the government had taken steps in this direction. For example, the 1875 Libel Law and Newspaper Regulations sought to limit the role of the press in the Freedom and People's Rights Movement by stipulating harsh punishment for anyone advocating a change in government or criticizing legislation. And the Public Meetings Regulations, announced in 1880, required that political societies and public meetings be registered in advance with the police, and prohibited teachers, students, soldiers, sailors, and police officers from participating in them.

In conjunction with its promise of a constitution, the government renewed its determination to thwart further challenges to its authority. The 1881 edict carried a warning that anyone who "may advocate sudden and violent changes, thus disturbing the peace of Our realm, will fall under Our displeasure." This was followed by a series of revisions that strengthened the Public Meetings Regulations and the Newspaper Regulations. Finally, in December 1887, the government abruptly issued the Peace Preservation Ordinance that outlawed secret societies or meetings and gave the police authority to ban any mass meeting and the circulation of "dangerous" literature. The ordinance also allowed the Home Ministry to expel all those judged to be plotting or inciting a disturbance, or to be a danger to public peace, from within a seven-mile radius of the imperial palace in Tokyo, which had become a rallying point for advocates who sought to air their grievances directly before the emperor.

The Meiji Constitution

The task of drafting the new constitution was assumed by Ito Hirobumi (1841–1909), a former Choshu samurai. After examining the constitutions of different Western countries, Ito concluded that the Prussian constitution was the most appropriate model for Japan to follow. Ito's opinion was opposed by his chief rival, Okuma Shigenobu (1838–1922), a former samurai from Saga domain, who favored the British system. Okuma's ouster from the government shortly before the imperial edict promising a constitution cleared the way for Ito to proceed with the help of Prussian advisors, who were among the more than three thousand Western experts employed at different times during the Meiji period to help guide Japan's multifaceted drive to modernize.

The product of their labor, the Meiji Constitution, was formally announced on 11 February 1889. It re-

mained in effect from November 1890 through the end of World War II. Whether the Meiji Constitution represents the fulfillment, or a betrayal, of the Charter Oath that was issued two decades earlier continues to be a matter for debate. Many features of the constitution appear to mark a calculated, conservative retreat from the spirit, if not the letter, of the Charter Oath. Presented as a "gift" from the emperor to his subjects, and immune from any amendments other than those initiated by the emperor, the constitution was an important "matter of state" that was never "decided by public discussion" as provided for in Article Two of the Charter Oath. (So anxious was the government to avoid public scrutiny of the document that it suppressed all the radical journals at the time the constitution was announced and warned the rest not to comment unfavorably.) While the other component of Article Two, promising the establishment of an assembly, was provided for in the constitution, the composition and powers of that body fell short of what many in the Freedom and People's Rights Movement had demanded. Only members of the Lower House of the bicameral Diet were to be elected by popular vote. (Until the universal male suffrage law was passed by the Diet in 1925, eligibility to vote was based upon income tax rates, which favored the more affluent classes. Japanese women did not get the vote until after World War II.) Seats in the Upper House were to be appointed from members of the peerage, an institution whose very existence seems at odds with the Charter Oath's attempt to de-emphasize class distinctions. The powers of the Diet were subordinate to those of the emperor, who was declared "sacred and inviolable" and in whom was vested "the rights of sovereignty." The emperor held supreme command of the army and navy, declared war and concluded treaties, and could even issue emergency ordinances when the Diet was not in session. The Diet's influence was further circumscribed by the autonomy granted to the Cabinet, Privy Council, and the military, none of which were responsible to the Diet.

Chapter Two of the constitution, which described the rights and duties of subjects, also appears, at best, as a qualified endorsement of Article Three of the Charter Oath. Its list of rights included freedom of religious belief, freedom of expression, and the right to privacy. Yet, in each case, these rights could be limited by law.

In October 1890, the government introduced one more tool in its campaign to regulate public behavior before the constitution went into effect the following month. The Imperial Rescript on Education set forth ethical precepts that harnessed traditional Confucian



Emperor Mutsuhito, who ruled Japan from 1852 to 1912. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

virtues to the needs of the modern nation-state. In essence, it called for subordination of the individual through service and sacrifice to one's immediate family, to society at large, and ultimately, to the family-state headed by the emperor. During school ceremonies pupils were required to recite the words to the Rescript and bow before a copy of it, which hung alongside the emperor's portrait in every school.

Promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on Education marks the culmination of a conservative educational trend that began in the early 1880s, coinciding with the government's growing political conservatism. At this time, too, the school system was reorganized to better address the needs of business and industry, which the government had been promoting through slogans such as "rich country, strong military" and, more importantly, through a series of ambitious policies.

The Industrial Era

Historians remain divided over whether Japan's phenomenal record of industrialization and commercial development during the Meiji period was due more to government initiative or to private-sector support. Increasingly, they emphasize the role of the former during the years prior to 1885, and the role of the latter thereafter. The government took the lead in

developing the necessary infrastructure, including a centralized administrative apparatus with vast regulatory powers, as well as communications (postal system, telegraph), transportation (roads, railroads, shipping), and banking and finance infrastructure, and a meritocratic school system to assure a constant pool of human capital for government and industry alike. The role of government did not end there, however. It sent students abroad to acquire knowledge of key industries such as silk. It also used public funds to construct model shipbuilding facilities, cotton and silk factories, steam-powered factories for the production of glass, cement, bricks, and so forth, in order to showcase the latest Western technology and manufacturing processes. During the early 1880s, in tandem with the deflationary policies instituted by Finance Minister Matsukata Masayoshi, these model facilities were then sold off, at bargain prices, to enterprising Japanese (many with friendly ties to government officials). By this time, private entrepreneurs and private capital were primed to move aggressively into various light industries catering to the foreign and domestic markets. Many of these entrepreneurs emerged from the wealthy peasant class, whose experience in village leadership positions and in rural cottage industries dated back to the Tokugawa period.

One of the best-known success stories during this phase of Japan's industrialization is the textile industry. Silk, which had been a luxury item during the Tokugawa period, gained new importance as an export item once trade was opened with the West. The first modern silk filature was established in 1870 under the direction of a Swiss expert. The government followed two years later with its own model plant. Other plants soon followed, so that raw silk production in Japan jumped from 2.3 million pounds in 1868 to 10.2 million pounds in 1893, accounting for 42 percent of Japan's exports. By 1897, 24 percent of the world's raw silk was produced in Japan; by 1909 that figure had climbed to 34 percent. The chief market for Japanese silk was the United States, which purchased 28.6 percent of Japan's silk exports from 1907 to 1908.

The cotton-textile industry got off to a slower start due to foreign competition, but by 1899 Japan's cotton production reached 355 million pounds of yarn. By 1913 it had risen to 672 million pounds, which accounted for one-fourth of the world's cotton-yarn exports.

This growth did not come without cost or risk, however. In the short term, the rapid growth and productivity of the textile industry was achieved through the blatant exploitation of unskilled workers, mostly young, unmarried women from poor farm families,

who were compelled to work long hours in unhealthy conditions for low wages. In the longer term, Japan's growing dependence upon overseas trade made it more vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the global market, a fact that would become painfully clear in coming years and would play a part in domestic and international politics.

War with China and Russia

The principal catalyst for Japan's expansion into heavy industry was the need to equip the Japanese army and navy to fight two foreign wars within a decade. Both wars are replete with irony. Fueling Meiji Japan's drive to modernize was her determination to avoid the fate of China and other countries that had been reduced to colonial or semicolonial status by the Western powers. The unequal treaties that Japan had been obliged to sign in the 1850s, granting extraterritoriality and tariff-setting powers to the Western cosigners, served as continual reminders of what was at stake. And yet, no sooner had Japan succeeded in revising these treaties in 1894 than she attacked China, ostensibly in order to free neighboring Korea from Chinese interference. Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 not only cleared the way for Japanese influence to supplant China's on the Korean Peninsula, but established Japan as a colonial power in her own right, through the acquisition of Formosa (modern Taiwan) from China. It also set the stage for the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, which was launched in order to protect Japan's new strategic "line of advantage" through the Korean Peninsula and southern Manchuria from Russian encroachment. The Portsmouth Treaty of 1905, which ended the conflict, granted Japan southern Sakhalin Island, and, by recognizing Japan's dominant interests in Korea, paved the way for Japan's uncontested annexation of Korea in 1910. In the end, however, neither these victories, nor Japan's colonial possessions, nor her hard-won stature as a modern economic and military power, could assuage the government's preoccupation with potential threats to the nation's security, both from within and from without. Furthermore, these victories enhanced the prestige of the military and its capacity to influence foreign and domestic policy in years to come.

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See also: **Russo-Japanese War; Sino-Japanese War; Taisho Period; Tokugawa Period.**

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MEKONG PROJECT The Mekong is one of the great rivers of the world; it flows from the mountains of Tibet through China, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam. It acts as a means of

transportation and communications, provider of sustenance, and potentially as provider of hydroelectric power. Changing the nature or scale of the Mekong is likely to have a significant impact upon the lives of 200 million people. Since so much of the river basin region is undeveloped and densely forested, much of the river's course is yet to be fully mapped. It is, therefore, difficult to be certain about the economic and social impact of changes in the condition of the river.

Understanding this, regional governments have made efforts to cooperate to develop not just the Mekong River but also the riparian areas of the greater Mekong subregion, with plans encompassing the development of road and rail links, trade agreements, and human resources, as well as the physical potential of the river. The first attempt at cooperation was made in 1957, and subsequent attempts, first through the U.N. and later mostly under the auspices of the Asian Development Bank, have survived such divisive and debilitating events as the Vietnam War (1954–1975), the Communist victories in Vietnam and Laos, military coups in Thailand, the Sino-Vietnam War, and the decades-long political instability in Cambodia.

Difficulties in developing plans include not just continued political differences but also inaccessible terrain and the prevalence of illicit activities such as smuggling and drug trafficking. Nevertheless, the persistence with which discussions have continued, together with the willingness of regional partners to invest heavily in the plan, suggests that significant progress will eventually be made.

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MEKONG RIVER AND DELTA The Mekong, the twelfth longest river in the world, shapes both the land and the politics of the Greater Mekong subregion. Known as the Lancangjiang or "turbulent river" near its beginnings in China's Yunnan Province, the Mekong originates 5,467 meters high in the Himalayan ranges of the Tibetan plateau. From there, it flows 4,425 kilometers southeast through the rain forests of Xishuangbanna in China, Myanmar, Thailand, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, and Cambodia.



The Mekong River moves south past the Khone Falls on the Laos-Cambodia border. The area surrounding the Khone Falls, considered the Mekong River's most amazing natural wonder, contains some 4,000 small islands (Si Phan Don), Irrawaddy water dolphins, and giant catfish. The amazing rapids and waterfalls became an obstacle for the French whose dream it was to navigate the river, which they hoped would become the transportation gateway to China.

From the Khone Falls, the river then continues south for nearly 500 kilometers past Tonle Sap or "Great Lake," the largest freshwater lake in Southeast Asia, and moves toward Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia. At Phnom Penh, with its alternative arms, the Basak River from the south and the Tonle Sap River from the northwest, the Mekong proceeds further southeastward toward Vietnam and the Mekong Delta, a distinctly flat area also known as the Mekong Plain, before emptying into the South China Sea. In Vietnam it is known as the Cuu Long (Nine Dragons) because there the river splits into several rivers. The Tonle Sap acts as a buffer against Mekong River system floods and the source of beneficial dry-season flows. During the rainy season (July–October), the

Mekong and Basak Rivers swell with water to the point that the delta cannot handle the enormous volume. At this point, instead of overflowing their banks, the floodwaters force the Tonle Sap River to reverse its flow and to enter the Tonle Sap or Great Lake, increasing its size from approximately 2,600 square kilometers to 10,000 square kilometers, and raising the water level by an average of seven meters. When the floods subside, water begins rushing out of Tonle Sap, increasing mainstream flows by 16 percent and thus helping to reduce saltwater intrusion in the lower Mekong Delta in Vietnam. This particular trait makes the Tonle Sap River the only "river with return" in the world.

Because the Tonle Sap and the Mekong Rivers reverse direction seasonally, they are vital for Cambodia, producing 100,000 tons of fish per year and 80 percent of the protein consumed within the country. The delta is equally critical for Vietnam, enabling it to produce and harvest 14 million tons of rice each year, of which 4 million tons are exported, making Vietnam the second-largest rice-exporting country in the world. Consequently, Tonle Sap Lake and the Mekong Delta are life-supporting organs for the Cambodian and Vietnamese economies.

With a 790,000-square-kilometer catchment area, the Mekong is reputedly the world's second richest in terms of biota, carrying 475 billion cubic meters of runoff and 250 million tons of sediment each year during the monsoon season from Yunnan Province to the Mekong Delta or Cuu Long (Nine Dragons). These nutrients provide irrigation for the region's myriad rice fields and a livelihood for the approximately 60 million residents of the Mekong Basin, including almost all of the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Cambodia, one-third of Thailand, and one-fourth of Vietnam.

Primarily fishers and farmers, the inhabitants of communities along the Mekong River and Delta have survived the natural floods for thousands of years, dependent on the river and the annual flood-drought cycle for their existence. Fully aware that any change in the river flow or sediment load will trigger immediate impacts on their environment and undermine their food security, the people who live along the Mekong rely on the large volume of floodwater to leach, flush, and control acid in their soils. On the banks of the mighty Great Lake and the Tonle Sap and Mekong Rivers, the Khmer people have celebrated the changing river flow for more than two hundred years. Likewise, the residents of the lower delta have learned to tolerate the floods and appreciate the many benefits associated with the floods: the nutrient-rich sediment and the water for their paddies, and the feeding and



THE TWELFTH-LONGEST RIVER

The Mekong River is the twelfth-longest in the world and flows through six nations—China, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam—before emptying into the South China Sea.

spawning ground for their fish in the seasonally flooded forests.

In addition to the direct socioeconomic and ecological benefits to humans, the Mekong River system provides essential support for a diverse range of animals and plants. Among the endangered wildlife species that inhabit the riverine forests are leopards, tigers, and the near-extinct *ko prey* or jungle cow, which was named the national animal of Cambodia in 1963. In addition, elephants still roam the hills of the Mekong subregion, while monkeys and snakes abound in its forests and mountains. Yet, the Mekong's hydrologic cycle and ecological processes are now threatened by increasing pollution, deforestation, and several massive upstream developments, including a total of twenty-three dams between Yunnan Province and Cambodia. Among the projects already under way are a total of 37,000 megawatts of hydropower projects in China and the Lao PDR and 8,800 cubic meters of water diversions in Thailand. In 1994, the Mittaphap (Friendship) Bridge was also completed between the town of Nong Khai in northeastern Thailand and one of the outlying districts of Vientiane municipality, which includes Laos's capital city of Vientiane some twenty kilometers up the river. The first span ever constructed across the entire river, it signaled a new era of cooperation between two Mekong neighbors. Collectively, these activities are intended to use the power of the Mekong to produce energy for industry in Yunnan, to support agricultural production in northeastern Thailand, and to produce an economic windfall for the national government of Laos. Farther downstream, the inhabitants of the Mekong Delta have been promised that they will benefit from control of the floods and the possible initiation of cruise tourism between Ho Chi Minh City in southern Vietnam and Phnom Penh. Still, there is great concern that, if these development projects are completed, the vibrant Tonle Sap fisheries would be diminished, the Mekong Delta would turn into an acid plain, the groundwater would be diluted by the intrusion of salt water, and the coast would be inundated by the South China Sea. Furthermore, due to the multi-

ple uses of the Mekong, all types of waste are discharged into the water. As a consequence, the water quality has become very poor over the years, adversely affecting both the human environment and the natural. As of July 2001, however, no government agencies or international organizations have undertaken an analysis either of changes in water purity or of the cumulative effects of the proposed projects on the viability of the Mekong. There are signs, though, that the Mekong River Commission and the Asian Development Bank will do so in the near future.


Greg Ringer

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MELAKA (2002 est. pop. 635,000). The state of Melaka (or Malacca in English) is located on the southwest corner of Peninsular Malaysia. Covering some 1,600 square kilometers in area, the state is primarily low-lying with its western coastline fronting the Straits of Malacca. Its principal economic activities once revolved around agriculture and commerce, but since the late 1980s, the tourism and industrial sectors have overtaken them in importance. The Melaka State Development Corporation is the quasi-state agency tasked with developing, coordinating, and promoting industry, tourism, and housing activities in the state.

The capital of the state is also called Melaka. A historic coastal city in western Peninsular Malaysia, it is



The Red Brick Christ Church built in Melaka in 1753. (NIK WHEELER/CORBIS)

about 140 kilometers south of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia's capital. Melaka city is a major tourist attraction, which the state tourism board advertises as "the place where it all began." The city boasts of having some of the country's oldest extant heritage buildings (mosques, temples, churches, colonial buildings etc.), as well as long-standing cultural enclaves of Baba-Nyonyas (Straits-born Chinese), Chitty Melaka (Straits-born Indians), and Portuguese Eurasians.

Seng-Guan Yeoh

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MELAKA SULTANATE The history of the town of Melaka is full of the glorious past of Malaysia. Melaka probably was established in the thirteenth cen-

tury as a small fishing village occupied by the Orang Laut (seafaring Malays). Its humble existence then as a collection of mud huts and dugouts is thought to have spared it the fate of Palembang in Sumatra and Singapore in the mid-fourteenth century: both were razed and their inhabitants massacred by the Javanese kingdom of Majapahit, the greatest local power of the time.

Thus, Melaka became the refuge for people who escaped from Singapore and Palembang. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, the township that had begun as a fishing village had become a cosmopolitan trading center with a walled cluster of huts upon the hill overlooking the harbor. Currency dealt in was tin, and the trade was in tin, resin, and jungle produce. The population was little more than a few thousand. The local chief was Hindu by faith and bore the Indian title of *permaisura* (king).

According to the *Malay Annals* that chronicle the courtier version of the foundation of Melaka, the fugitive king of Singapore, Iskandar Shah, rested in the shadow of a tree at the mouth of the River Bertam. When he asked the name of the tree, he was told it was "Melaka." The king liked the name of the tree and the place and so decided to settle there. This king secured his power by paying visits to China to gain recognition and by converting to Islam. Malay tradition has chronicled the name of the first Muslim ruler of Melaka as Muhammad Shah. Another legend claims that this fugitive king from Singapore was Parameswara, one of the petty princes of a vassal state of the Majapahit empire who had thrown off his allegiance and was forced to flee. He took refuge in Singapore and subsequently assassinated the ruler. Parameswara ruled Singapore for five years before being overthrown by dissatisfied natives and forced to flee until he reached the mouth of the Melaka River.

Muhammad Shah died about 1414 CE and was succeeded by his son, Iskandar Shah. The son reigned for the next ten years and continued to visit China as well as pay tribute to the emperor. During his reign, Melaka continued to be a trading center in the region.

The line of trader princes ended with the ascension to the sultanate of Raja Kasim, who took the title of Mudzafar Shah. This first sultan stopped attending to trade, sent envoys to China, and did not go in person. Instead, he levied tolls on the trade in the port to wage war against little hamlets on the coast and eventually inland. Sultan Mudzafar Shah is believed to have conquered the territories of what are now neighboring states of Pahang, Kampar in Perak, Siak, and Indragiri. Thus was created the new Melaka. This was the golden age of the Melaka sultanate when its rulers reigned over

territories to the north, south, and east of the port of Melaka. By then, the township of Melaka had seen settlements spring up in abundance—Javanese, Tamils, and Burmese traders had all set up quarters.

Sultan Mudzafar Shah died in 1459 CE and was succeeded by his son, Raja Abdullah, who assumed the title of Sultan Mansur Shah. The reign of this ruler has been regarded as the most glorious of the Melaka sultanate because of the conquests achieved and the legendary heroes produced during this period. By 1460 CE, Melaka had been transformed from a primitive and semi-aboriginal village, when it had been a fringe of houses along the sea and riverfronts backed by orchards and rice fields. At the height of its glory in 1460, it was a bustling cosmopolitan seaport town. Chronicles describe the government as stern, severe, and corrupt. Historians describe the Melaka sultanate as a city of the strong where no weak citizen would be free. So all sought patrons, the mightier the better, in the belief that it is safer to pay blackmail to one robber than to many. Every law but one was broken daily; that one law was that no man might raise his hand against his king. Heroes of Malay chronicles belonged to this period of the Melaka sultanate, among them Hang Tuah and Hang Jebat.

The policy of war and conquest begun by Sultan Mudzafar Shah and his son, Mansur Shah, was fatal for a small trading station like Melaka because it placed severe burdens on its merchants, who had to finance the war campaigns. When the Portuguese sailed into Melaka in 1509, they found a town of foreign settlers who were willing to rise in revolt against their Malay masters. The first foray by the Portuguese was resisted by the Malays in Melaka. But the second, which was led by Viceroy d'Albuquerque in 1511, resulted in Melaka being seized by the Portuguese and the sultan fleeing to Pagoh, from which he was also forced to flee eventually. Sultan Mahmud Shah was the last of the Melaka rulers. The sultanate of Melaka, which in 1500 had ruled much of the Malay Peninsula from Kedah to Patani and the Lingga Archipelago, had lasted less than one hundred years.

Kog Yue Choong

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MENCIUS (c. 371–c. 289 BCE), Confucian philosopher. The influence of Mencius in defining ancient Confucianism is second only to that of Confucius



This classic portrait of Mencius dates to the eighteenth century. (ARCHIVO ICONOGRAFICO, S.A./CORBIS)

(551–479 BCE). The *Records of the Historian (Shiji)* of the second century BCE tells us that Meng Ke (Mencius) was from the state of Zou, which neighbored the state of Lu. He studied with a disciple of Confucius's grandson, Zisi (492–431 BCE). Like Confucius, Mencius traveled to various states looking for a worthy ruler. He held a minor post without any authority as guest minister or teacher under King Xuan of Qi (319–301 BCE). Unable to influence the political climate, he retired with Wan Zhang (flourished fourth century BCE) and other disciples to write the book of philosophy known as the *Mencius*.

The *Book of Mencius* is one of the *Four Books*. After the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), the *Mencius* eclipsed the *Xunzi*. Unlike the *Analects (Lunyu)*, the *Mencius* contains developed prose essays and detailed arguments. In keeping with most ancient Chinese texts, the *Mencius* employs arguments based on an appeal to the authority of the sage rulers of antiquity. It also makes regular use of argument by analogy.

Mencius believed that a person's moral integrity is a matter of the heart-mind (*xin*). The emphasis on the inner quality of a person's moral life marked a change from Confucius, who clearly delineated the inner from the outer. Person-to-person care or humanity (*ren*) remained the core value, the innermost quality of the heart-mind, and first among the four cardinal virtues. For Confucius, *ren* meant everything noble in the well-bred person, disinterested concern for oth-



THE WISDOM OF MENCIUS

1. Mencius said, The people are the most important element in a nation; the spirits of the land and grain are the next, the sovereign is the lightest.

2. Therefore to gain the peasantry is the way to become sovereign; to gain the sovereign is the way to become a prince of a state; to gain the prince of state is the way to become a great officer.

The Works of Mencius, Bk. VII, Pt. II, Ch. 14

Source: William H. McNeill. (1970) *Classical China*. New York: Oxford University Press, 64.

ers, and other subtle qualities. For Mencius, *ren* meant simply benevolence. According to Mencius, the other virtues such as rightness (*yi*), ritual action (*li*), and moral wisdom (*zhi*) are also qualities of one's heart-mind. In contrast to Confucius's general and vague teachings, Mencius's design for humane rulership is practical and effective. Mencius advocated abating punishments, reducing taxes, improving crop yields, and ensuring that the people are trained in moral cultivation. Mencius explicated the notion that human character is basically good, an idea that is only implied in the *Analects*.

Mencius was rediscovered in the Song dynasty (960–1279) by the Neo-Confucians, especially Zhu Xi (1130–1200). As Neo-Confucianism spread across East Asia, the Koreans and Japanese were reintroduced to Mencius's teachings. Emphasis on the inner quality of the heart-mind, the four cardinal virtues, use of education to develop a person's inner nature, and the practice of humane government are characteristics of Chinese, Korean, and Japanese Neo-Confucianism that were originally derived from the ideas of Mencius. It is not an exaggeration to say that East Asian culture was shaped by the Kong-Meng (Confucius and Mencius) teachings.

James D. Sellmann

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MENDERES, ADNAN (1899–1961), Turkish politician, prime minister. Adnan Menderes was born in Aydin in western Turkey, the son of a wealthy landowner. He entered politics in 1930, joining the Free Party, which was later shut down. Menderes then pursued his political career in the only legal party, the Republican People's Party (RPP), until his expulsion in 1945. He and three others founded the opposition Democrat Party (DP) in 1946. Due to his popularity among the masses during the time that the DP was the opposition party (1946–1950), he became prime minister in the DP's landslide victory in the 1950 elections.

Menderes criticized the RPP's statist policies and instead promised a liberal program highlighting democracy, free enterprise, and conservative values. Although he was successful in his efforts at economic and structural transformation in the early 1950s, he failed to establish a democratic atmosphere and took authoritarian measures against the opposition. Nevertheless, the DP won the 1954 and 1957 elections by an overwhelming majority, especially thanks to the peasants' alliance. After the mid-1950s, Menderes's legitimacy began to decline in the eyes of elites, and a military coup in 1960 overthrew his government. Menderes was hanged in 1961.

Yilmaz Çolak

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MENDU A form of operatic folk-drama popular in Malay-speaking Sumatra, especially in Riau Province. Obscure in origin, it is thought to have developed in the nineteenth century as an offshoot of the Malay *bangsawan*, though there are traces of Chinese influence as well. *Mendu* performances tend toward the rustic: accompanying music is usually performed on violin, gong, and drums; much of the dialogue is improvised; and the characters are largely set stereotypes. The performing area is partly covered by a temporary roof, but is otherwise left open. Comedy, which is usually rather crude, figures importantly, as does dance. The original *menu* repertory consisted of one story—the *Dewa Mendu*—though recently elements of other Indonesian epic cycles, such as the *Panji* tales and the *Ramayana*, along with Malaysian *bangsawan* plot lines, have had an impact. *Mendu* performances take place at night and sometimes last many nights in a row. With no scripts, great value is placed on the actors' ability to improvise, which is helped by the stereotyping of roles and plots.

Tim Byard-Jones

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MERSIN (2000 est. pop. 1.8 million). Mersin means "myrtle" in Turkish, and the city took its name from this tree. In 1852, when it was first incorporated, Mersin was inhabited by a cosmopolitan mixture of Turks, Greeks, and Armenians. In the 1950s it was designated as a strategic access harbor for the fertile floodplain of the Euphrates River and a transshipment point on the eastern Mediterranean. However, successive governments placed increasing emphasis on and directed capital to the GAP (Southeast Anatolian) project to harness the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and Mersin slipped into a social and economic vacuum. Too new a city to benefit from the well-structured Ottoman civic administration that gave stability to other Turkish cities and towns, Mersin easily adapted to alternative cultures. By 1999 most of the projected advantages had not come to fruition.

In 1989 the government made an effort to settle nomadic peoples from the surrounding plains (*yürüks*) in Mersin. Much of their pasture land had been reclaimed and their traditional seasonal livelihood curtailed due to ethnic clashes between Turkish government forces and rebel Kurdish insurgents. However most of the resettled population could not adapt to city life and soon found easier alternatives outside the law.

Suzanne Swan

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MIAO-CHINA The Miao (the Chinese character means "young plant"), also known as the Hmong or Meo, are an ethnic group that originated in China. This article deals only with the Miao in China, as the Miao elsewhere generally call themselves and are called Hmong. The fifth-largest ethnic group in China, the Miao numbered 7.4 million in 1990 and inhabited the southern provinces of Guizhou, Hunan, Yunnan, Sichuan, Guangxi, Hubei, and Guangdong.

Miao Language and Writing

The Miao language belongs to the Miao branch of the Miao-Yao subfamily of the Sino-Tibetan family. Due to a long history of migration and dispersed settlements in isolated mountainous areas, the language has developed into scores of dialects, many of them mutually unintelligible. Based on linguistic characteristics and extents of intelligibility, these dialects are identified in three dialect areas: the Western Hunan (or Eastern), Eastern Guizhou (or Central), and Sichuan-Guizhou-Yunnan (or Western) Dialect Areas.

The Miao language was once a spoken language with no written form. At the present time, romanized writing systems for four of the dialects are used among the Miao in China; in 1956, linguists working with native speakers created some of these systems and worked out the others by reforming the existing writing systems.

Various Miao Groups

During their long history, the Miao in different areas acquired distinct ethnic markers, visible traits that distinguished one group from another. For instance, for referential convenience, neighboring ethnic groups used the color of female costume to discriminate one subgroup of the Miao from another. Thus, those Miao in western Hunan are called Red Miao, those in south-eastern Guizhou Black Miao, and those in northwestern

Guizhou and northeastern Yunnan Big Flowery Miao. Other well-known modified names include White Miao, Small Flowery Miao, and Green or Blue Miao. As a result of the government-directed Ethnic Identification Project of the 1950s, all the subgroups living in different areas of China were granted the unified name "Miao" and became one of the fifty-six officially recognized ethnic groups in mainland China.

Many Hmong living outside China think that the appellation "Miao" carries a derogatory connotation or simply means "barbarian" in Chinese. It is true that in history all ethnic minorities were regarded as "barbarian" by Chinese speakers and that the term "Miao" was often used together with *man*, a generic term for "southern barbarians." It is also true that in some southern Chinese subdialects *miao* could be used as an adjective describing someone's stubbornness or fierceness. It is important, however, to note that the name Miao in itself is by no means derogatory. The word in Chinese means "young plant" or "offspring." As the name of an ethnic group, it existed long before the "civilized" were differentiated from the "barbarian." Miao is also a surname among the Han, the dominant ethnic group of China.

Miao Culture

The Miao have an extremely rich oral tradition, complete with mythologies, legends, ethnohistory, poems, dramas, operas, and antiphonal songs. In the copious Chinese historical literature, the recorded history of the Miao is as long as that of any other group in the Chinese world. Although written from an apparently biased perspective, Chinese literature contains useful records on Miao ethnic origin, migration, customs, social structure, economic activities, technical achievements, and relations with the state and other ethnic groups. By all accounts, the Miao are one of the few groups in human history that have demonstrated the highest level of ethnic adherence and tenacity.

The Miao have a patrilineal descent system (tracing descent through the father's line) and a patronymic linkage system (a practice in which part of the son's personal name comes from that of his father). Most young people enjoy free marriage, but arranged marriage is also practiced in some areas. Especially in western Hunan and Guizhou, cross-cousin marriage (a preferential rule requiring that one should marry one's cross-cousin—mother's brother's child or father's sister's child—if such a person is available) is popular. Levirate (the custom whereby a man marries the widow of his deceased brother) is practiced in many areas. To a lesser degree, sororate (the custom whereby, when a man's wife dies or is found barren,

her unmarried sister is given to him as a wife) is found among the Miao in Yunnan. Quite a few Miao in Guizhou also practice delayed-transfer marriage (a custom in which the newlywed bride does not live with her husband until two or three years after the wedding day). Beyond the household level, kinfolk are organized into lineages, subclans, and clans. A position in the kinship network and a role in the ritual system of ancestral worship are of utmost importance in defining the social status of a Miao.

In addition to ancestral worship, the Miao believe in animism (endowing inanimate objects and natural forces with life) and shamanism. Christianity has influenced the religious life of some Miao in Guizhou, Yunnan, and Sichuan since the nineteenth century.

Agriculture has been the traditional means of subsistence for the Miao, supplemented with fishing, hunting, and handicrafts. The Miao batik cloth, a tourist favorite, has a history of over one thousand years. Education has been rapidly developed in the Miao areas in recent decades. Today, in China as well as the Western diasporas, the Miao have their own teachers, lawyers, medical doctors, scientists, and engineers.

Chuan-kang Shih

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MID-AUTUMN FESTIVAL The fifteenth day of the eighth month of the lunar calendar is an important family reunion day for Chinese throughout the world. On that day, family members gather for the evening meal and afterward move outdoors to enjoy the full moon. The perfectly round and bright moon (*yueyuan*) signifies the complete togetherness (*tuanyuan*) of the family. Those who are away from their families during the festival feel depressed for missing such an opportunity.

Two food items are closely associated with this festival. The "moon cake" is a baked cake with a flour shell surrounding sweet bean paste stuffing. A pomelo

is a citrus fruit that ripens in southern China around mid-autumn. Both food items are round, like the moon, and further strengthen the importance of family unification.

Popular folklore holds that Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang, founder of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644 CE), invented the moon cake. According to the story, the cakes Zhu made contained a secret message encouraging the people to revolt against the occupying Mongols on the fifteenth day of the eighth month. The current festival probably derives from the harvest celebration in northern China, which later mixed with the Yao tribe's lunar New Year festival.

Huang Shu-min

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MIE (2001 est. pop. 1.9 million). Mie Prefecture is situated in the central region of Japan's island of Honshu, where it occupies an area of 5,778 square kilometers. Its primary geographical features are the Kii Peninsula, of which it is the eastern part, low mountains separating the coastal Ise Plain and the central Ueno Basin, and densely forested southern mountains. Mie is bordered by Ise Bay and the Kumano Sea, and by Wakayama, Nara, Kyoto, Shiga, Gifu, and Aichi Prefectures. Once comprising the provinces of Ise, Shima, and Iga, Mie assumed its present name and borders in 1876.

The prefecture's capital city is Tsu, formerly named Anotsu. Once a thriving port, it evolved into an Edo period (1600/1603–1868) post station town along the route to Ise Shrine, while continuing as the castle town of the Todo family. In the early 2000s, Mie is dominated by the shipbuilding, electrical machinery, and textile industries, while agriculture and fishing remain important. Its attractions include the temple Senshuji and the ruins of Tsu Castle. The prefecture's other important cities are Yokkaichi, Ise, Matsusaka, Suzuka, and Kuwana.

Prehistoric archaeological remains and many Kofun tombs indicate early settlement of Mie Prefecture.

The erection of the Ise Shrine, devoted to the mythical ancestors of the Imperial family and long the nation's principal Shinto pilgrimage destination, as early as the third century contributed to the region's rapid growth. The provinces then were ruled by a series of feudal lords.

Mie's prime agricultural land produces rice, vegetables, and fruit, along with tea and tobacco. Matsusaka produces highly prized beef, while forestry is pursued in the south. Toba, once an Ise pilgrimage port, is the site of the nation's first cultured pearl beds. The older textile and ceramics industries, along with modern heavy industries, are concentrated in the north. The prefecture's attractions include coastal Ise-Shima National Park and mountainous Yoshino-Kumano National Park. Ueno, known for its famous Iga ware ceramics, is notable as the birthplace of haiku poet Matsuo Basho (1644–1694).

E. L. S. Weber

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MILETUS Miletus, a major Greek colony in Asia Minor, was established on a site known to the Hittites as Millawanda. The city was founded as a Mycenaean (early Greek) colony on the estuary of the Maeander (now Menderes) River, south of Izmir. After the fall of ancient Ilium, or Troy, around 1200 BCE, a fresh influx of Greeks made Miletus the foremost center in Ionia. The city enjoyed four harbors, and the inhabitants grew wealthy through sea trade; the city was famed for the fine textiles produced there. As the population expanded, colonists set out from Miletus to found many new colonies, from Egypt to the Black Sea, including Byzantium (later Constantinople).

In the seventh century BCE an ancient shrine at Didyma, twenty kilometers south of Miletus, was rededicated to Apollo, and the temple, although never finished, became one of the major oracles of ancient Greece. Visitors to Didyma, as well as Miletus's economic growth, stimulated the age of Ionian enlightenment, and Miletus became a center of philosophy and learning.

Thales of Miletus (c. 625–c. 547 BCE) taught that everything was made of water. Thales' disciple, Anaximander of Miletus (610–c. 547 BCE), was said to have discovered the obliquity of the ecliptic; Anaximenes of Miletus (c. 545 BCE) thought that air was the basic element from which everything was made. Hecataeus of



The eastern analemma of the Theater of Miletus, originally built in the fourth century BCE. (ROGER WOOD/CORBIS)

Miletus (sixth–fifth centuries BCE) wrote an account of his extensive travels, which Herodotus and other Greek travelers used. The architect Hippodamus of Miletus (fifth century BCE) invented the notion of city planning and designed the first town plans based on grid patterns. Aspasia (c. 470–410 BCE) was born in Miletus but traveled to Athens, where, famed for her beauty and intelligence, she became the lover of Pericles.

The kings of neighboring Lydia had led incursions against Miletus, but the city remained free until Croesus (d. c. 546 BCE), the last king of Lydia, conquered it. When Lydia fell to the Persians in the sixth century BCE, Miletus came under Achaemenid rule, but the city led neighboring cities in the so-called Ionian revolt against Persia around 500 BCE. The Ionian cities, however, could not defeat the powerful Persians. In the conflict Miletus lost eighty ships, the city was captured and burned, and the inhabitants enslaved.

Miletus was rebuilt on a new site, but its former glory was never recaptured. Alexander of Macedon besieged Miletus in 334 BCE, and a naval blockade forced its surrender. After his death the city changed hands among his generals, passed to the cultured Attalid dynasty based in Pergamon, and then in 133 BCE, became nominally free under Rome.

The Romans rebuilt the public buildings, but the harbor silted up with malarial marshes. The abolition of the oracle in favor of Christianity in 385 CE confirmed Miletus's decline; her last famous citizen was

Isidorus, who built the great Saint Sophia cathedral in Constantinople. Under Turkish rule a caravansaray (trading inn) and a *madrasah* (religious school) temporarily revived the city.

The Site

German archaeologists have been excavating the site of Miletus for a century, and many finds are in Berlin or Istanbul. The theater, once on the water's edge, is the most striking monument, romantic when filled with wild irises in spring. The sacred way to Didyma, lined with an Ionic portico one hundred meters long, and a restored stoa, or colonnade, ran from the Lion Harbor. Places of worship included a temple to Athena (third century BCE), the Delphinion dedicated to Apollo (sixth century BCE), a synagogue from the late Roman period, two Byzantine churches (sixth century CE), and the delightfully marbled fifteenth-century mosque of Ilyas Bey in a shady grove.

Kate Clow

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MILITARY, INDONESIA Despite a credibility sullied by its close association with deposed Indonesian president Suharto (served 1966–1998), the Indonesian military continues to play a critical role in Indonesian history and sociopolitical and economic life. It traces its origins to the paramilitary forces set up by the Japanese in 1943–1945 and the Dutch colonial army. Originally known as Angkatan Bersenjata Indonesia (ABRI), the Indonesian military, which included the police, was the vanguard of the revolutionary independence struggle against the Dutch. After the downfall of the Suharto regime, ABRI was reorganized and renamed Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI). The 300,000-strong TNI still regards itself as the sole guardian and savior of Indonesian unity. Inspired by Javanese cultural nationalism, TNI remains staunchly anticommunist but has been increasingly accommodating to the rise of political Islam.

ABRI's central role hinged on *dwifungsi* (dual function), which was conceived during the political and economic turmoil and the failure of parliamentary democracy in the 1950s. Given legislative mandate in 1982, *dwifungsi* encapsulated the military's dual role as an external defense force with internal sociopolitical

roles and was given effect by its being allocated parliamentary seats. Operationally, *dwifungsi* is manifest in ABRI's territorial function (*kekaryaan*), in which active and retired officers dominate civilian administrations from provincial down to village levels. This enabled Suharto to extend his power base both laterally and vertically in the aftermath of the abortive 1965 coup, in which the Communist Party of Indonesia was implicated. *Dwifungsi* was discredited after May 1998, but TNI remains relevant in holding the fragile Indonesian state together. TNI's current parliamentary representation has been whittled to thirty-eight seats from one hundred.

Although there is strong political and societal pressure for TNI to subordinate itself to civilian control and confine itself to a purely external defense, military reforms have been tentative. Tension persists between reformists and conservatives, and the *dwifungsi*-guardian doctrinal mindsets resonate within the rank and file. The police have been separated from the military command, but the military still meets many internal security needs, especially those related to the secessionist tendencies in Aceh and West Papua. In the face of large budget cuts, the military retains significant business interests as a means of generating funds for operational needs and the welfare of the soldiers and their families. The pursuit of accountability and justice for the military's and militia groups' human rights abuses have floundered on political expediency and deal-making. The military reforms are doomed to failure unless buttressed by governmental efforts to combat pervasive corruption, decentralize power, and promote the rule of law.

The post-Suharto transition demonstrates that the Indonesian political leadership still needs TNI's support for the government to be able to assert some form of governance. TNI is the only viable institution that can restore stability across the vast multiethnic, multi-religious Indonesian archipelago and safeguard any administration. TNI will continue to remain on the political center stage, and the possibility of a resurgent military in Indonesia cannot be foreclosed.

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MIN Min is a geographic short term for Fujian Province in China. It has been used as a linguistic term by Chinese dialectologists to refer to the Min dialects for decades. Among the seven major Chinese languages (Mandarin, Wu, Yue, Gan, Hakka, Min, and Xiang), the Min dialect group is the most complicated and divergent of all. Fujian is a mountainous province with very few navigable rivers and not much arable land. The topography has contributed both to the heterogeneity of the dialects and also to migration to other parts of China and overseas.

Prior to the 1960s, when dialect data was scant, the Min dialect group was divided roughly into two subgroups: Minbei (Northern Min) and Minnan (Southern Min). Studies in the 1990s have shown that there are at least six Min subdialect groups: Mindong (Eastern Min), Minbei (Northern Min), Minzhong (Central Min), Minnan (Southern Min), Puxian, and Shaoning. (See Table 1.) Most of these subdialects are mutually unintelligible.

A Mindong Dialect: Fuzhou

The Fuzhou dialect is a characteristic Mindong dialect whose speakers number over 1 million and are found not only in Fuzhou, but also in Southeast Asian communities.

Fuzhou has fourteen initial consonants (*p, p', m, t, t', n, l, ts, ts', s, k, k', ng, x*), seven vowels (*i, u, y, a, ε, ə, o*), seven tones, and just one paired-consonant ending: *-ng/-q*. The velar nasal *ng* may occur alone and forms a syllabic nasal.

As with other Chinese dialects, the Fuzhou dialect exhibits differences in literary and colloquial readings for some lexical items, but this is true for a smaller

TABLE 1

Speakers of Min Dialect Subgroups	
Min Dialect Group	Number of Speakers
Minnan group	34.7 million
Mindong group	7.5 million
Puxian group	2.3 million
Minbei group	2.2 million
Shaoning group	745,000
Minzhong group	683,000

SOURCE: Zhang Zhensheng (1989: 54–59.)

number of lexical items than is the case in Minnan (Southern Min).

The Fuzhou dialect has a very unique sound sandhi (*sandhi* is a term used to describe changes in the sounds of adjacent words) phenomenon, which is rarely found in other Chinese dialects. In words that consist of two syllables, not only does the tone of the first syllable undergo tonal value change, but also the consonant initial of the second syllable undergoes an assimilation change according to the articulation of the coda (syllable ending) of the preceding syllable. For example, the word for "movie" is composed of two syllables. The first, *tieng*⁶, means "electric." The second, *ing*³, means "shadow." Together they create the compound word *tieng*² *nging*³, whose first-syllable tone and second-syllable consonant initial have changed.

Sometimes not only the consonants but also the main vowels of the second syllables undergo sound sandhi and become different vowels or diphthongs.

Fuzhou also shows some grammatical features that differ from Mandarin (China's national language). For example, in Fuzhou, for animal terms with a gender modifier, the gender modifier follows the head noun. That is, "male dog" is pronounced *k'eing*⁶ *xyng*³ (dog-male), while in Mandarin the gender modifier precedes the head noun: *xiong*² *gou*³ (male-dog). This feature is shared by other Min dialects and other southern Chinese dialect groups such as Yue and Hakka. Another example is the presence of a perfective aspect marker to indicate completed action. The phrase "I have seen" is in Fuzhou *nguai*³ *ou*⁶ *k'ang*² ("I have seen"), while in Mandarin it is *wo*³ *kan*⁴ *le* ("I see [*aspect*]"), where [*aspect*] is a verbal category indicating an action is viewed as completed or in progress.

A Minnan Dialect: Amoy

Native speakers of Minnan dialects are found not only in Fujian province but also in the Chinese provinces of Taiwan, Guangdong, Hainan Island, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Guangxi, and Sichuan. Overseas, Minnan speakers are also found in the Chinese communities of the Philippines, Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. There are over 30 million speakers of Minnan dialects; Amoy, which is spoken by more than 510,000 people, is representative of the group.

In every Chinese dialect, there is the phenomenon of literary and colloquial readings of characters. The Amoy dialect is well known for having the most characters with both literary and colloquial readings. The literary form is used only in reading the written language and when using a person's formal name, while

the colloquial form is used in all other oral communications. The difference between the literary and colloquial pronunciation is so great that they can be treated as two parallel phonological systems. For example, in literary Amoy the word *blood* is pronounced *biat*⁷, while in colloquial Amoy it is pronounced *bui*⁷.

Both literary and colloquial Amoy have six oral vowels (*i*, *e*, *a*, *u*, *o*, and *Ō*), but in colloquial Amoy there are an additional five nasalized vowels (*iⁿ*, *eⁿ*, *aⁿ*, *uⁿ*, *Ōⁿ*). In literary Amoy, there are sixteen consonants (*p*, *p'*, *b*, *m*, *t*, *t'*, *l*, *n*, *ts*, *ts'*, *s*, *k*, *k'*, *g*, *h*, and *ng*); colloquial Amoy has one more consonant, the glottal stop, *q*, which only occurs in syllable final position. The stops *p*, *t*, *k* and their counterpart nasals *m*, *n*, *ng* can occur both in the syllable initial and final positions, while the other consonants can only occur in initial positions. The nasals *m* and *ng* may occur alone as syllabic syllables.

Amoy dialect has seven basic tones. In both literary and colloquial Amoy, whenever a compound word or a phrase consists of two or more syllables, the syllables preceding the last one must undergo tone sandhi, except when the last syllable is an atonic (or enclitic) word. For example, the word for "soy sauce" is the combination of *tau*⁶, meaning "bean," with *iu*², meaning "oil." The compound word is pronounced *tau*⁵ *iu*².

Some of the same grammatical features that set Fuzhou apart from Mandarin are also characteristic of Amoy. For instance, like Fuzhou, Amoy's gender markers for animals follow rather than precede the animal; word order in some compound words is also reversed. For instance, in Amoy "guest" is *lang*⁶ *k'eq*⁷ (people-guest), whereas in Mandarin it is *ke*⁴ *ren*² (guest-people). Amoy also uses a perfective marker to show completed action.

A Minbei Dialect: Jian'ou

Jian'ou dialect is a representative subdialect of the Minbei (Northern Min) dialect group. It is spoken in the northern part of Fujian Province. Its native speakers number more than 437,000. It has fourteen initial consonants (*p*, *p'*, *m*, *t*, *t'*, *n*, *l*, *ts*, *ts'*, *s*, *k*, *k'*, *x*, *ng*), nine vowels (*i*, *u*, *y*, *e*, *ɛ*, *a*, *o*, *Ō*), six tones, and one consonant ending (*-ng*). Because of its adjacency to Mindong dialect area, it shares some phonological features with Fuzhou. For example, they both have rounded front vowels (*y*, *ɛ*), more diphthong main vowels, and only one nasal ending (*-ng*).

A Minzhong Dialect: Yong'an

Yong'an is a representative subdialect of the Minzhong (Central Min) dialect group, which is sur-

rounded by Minbei to its north, Mindong to its east, Minnan to its south, and Hakka dialect to its west. It possesses both Min and Hakka dialect features. Native speakers of Yong'an number around 265,000. It has sixteen initial consonants ($p, p', m, t, t', n/l, ts, ts', s, ts\check{s}, ts\check{s}', \check{s}, k, k', x, ng$), ten oral vowels ($i, \bar{i}, u, \hat{u}, y, e, \emptyset, a, o, \hat{a}$), four nasalized vowels (i^n, o^n, a^n, u^n), and six tones. It has two consonant endings, bilabial nasal $-m$ and velar nasal $-ng$. The bilabial nasal m can occur alone as a syllabic syllable.

A Puxian Dialect: Putian

Puxian dialect is spoken between Mindong and Minnan. Thus it shares some linguistic features both with Mindong and Minnan. Putian is a representative of this dialect group. Its native speakers number almost 1.5 million. It has fourteen initial consonants (p, p', m, t, t', n, l, L [voiceless l], ts, ts', k, k', h, ng), eleven vowels ($i, u, y, e, \varepsilon, \emptyset, \omega, a, o, \hat{O}, A$), and six tones. There are two consonant endings, velar nasal $-ng$ and glottal stop $-q$. The velar nasal can occur alone as a syllabic syllable. Putian has sound sandhi that is similar to Mindong and a colloquial and literary system similar to that of Minnan dialect.

A Shaoning Dialect: Shaowu

Shaoning dialect is spoken in the northwest part of Fujian Province. Shaowu is a representative of this dialect group. Its native speakers number just over 258,000. It is adjacent to Minbei to its east and Gan dialect (in Jiangxi Province) to its west, and to the area of the Hakka dialect group to its south. Its status has been a very controversial topic for years. Some scholars claim that Shaowu is a Min dialect, while others claim it is a Hakka dialect. Currently, based on the historical sound changes and dialect specific lexicon, it is considered as a hybrid dialect, a mixture of Min and Hakka-Gan. Shaowu has nineteen initial consonants ($p, p', m, f, v, t, t', n, l, ts, ts', s, ts\check{s}, ts\check{s}', \check{s}, k, k', x, ng$), eight vowels ($i, \bar{i}, u, \hat{u}, y, a, o, \ddot{e}$), and six tones. It has two consonant endings: an alveolar nasal $-n$ and velar nasal $-ng$. The velar nasal can occur alone as a syllabic syllable.

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MINARET Although the origin and early function(s) of the minaret have not been clearly identified, the structure was used as a high platform by muezzins (Muslim criers) to call worshipers to daily prayer. During the life of Muhammad (c. 570–632) worshipers at Medina were called to prayer from a rooftop, perhaps in imitation of the Jewish practice of blowing the shofar or ram's horn or the Christian practice of ringing a clapper.

Later, however, as Islamic architecture began to flourish, minarets became an integral part of the design of major mosques and were constructed at the corners of mosque courtyards or were built as free-standing towers. Apart from their use by the muezzins, minarets became convenient locators of mosques from relatively long distances, for travelers and new residents seeking places of worship.

The first minaret was said to have been constructed in Basra in present-day Iraq around 665. Later, the caliph Mu'awiyah I (c. 602–680) issued a decree for the addition of minarets to various mosques in Egypt and elsewhere in his domain. Constructed of stone, these early minarets also came to symbolize the power of the expanding Arab empire and of Islam as a religion. The Umayyad mosque in Damascus, built

between 705 and 715, is an early preserved example; the mosque was constructed over a Christian church.

Over the centuries the structural design of minarets became much more elaborate and grandiose, reaching heights of over thirty meters and more. An unusual free-standing minaret in spiral form, at Samarra in modern Iraq, was built between 848 and 852. Particularly elaborate and imposing were those built by the Ottoman sultans: the Suleimanlye mosque in Istanbul, built by the famous architect Sinan around 1550, displayed a pair of minarets with heights in excess of sixty meters.

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MINDANAO (2002 est. pop. 13.8 million). Mindanao is the second-largest island (after Luzon) in the Philippines and home to most of the Philippine Muslim population. It is located in the southern Philippines, south of the islands of Negros, Cebu, and Leyte and north of the Sulu archipelago. It covers 36,536 square miles and has a long and irregular coastline. The island is divided administratively into the northern (2002 estimated population 2.9 million), southern (5.4



million), central (2.7 million), western (3.2 million) and Muslim (2.6 million) regions. The major cities are Davao (estimated population 874,000) and Tagum (estimated population 107,000) in the south, Cagayan (estimated population 426,000) in the north, Cotabato (estimated population 171,000) in the center, and Zamboanga (estimated population 153,000) in the west. Mt. Apo, the Philippines' highest peak at 2,954 meters and an active volcano, is located on the island.

The region was first settled by peoples migrating north from what is now Indonesia and Malaysia. Islam was introduced in the fourteenth century and until the middle of the twentieth century, Muslims formed the majority of Mindanao's population. The three major Muslim ethnic groups on the island are the Maranao, Maguindanao, and Sangill. Massive migration from the north beginning early in the twentieth century and accelerating rapidly after World War II, when settlers were given free land, has made the Muslims a minority (less than 20 percent of Mindanao's total population in 2002) and the Christians (mainly Roman Catholics) the majority. The island is also home to indigenous peoples, who live in remote areas of the interior. One of these groups, the Tasaday, caused an international stir in 1971 when they were "discovered" and publicized as a lost Stone Age people, a description that proved to be less than accurate.

The Muslim peoples of Mindanao have resisted centralized control since the Spanish first colonized the islands in the sixteenth century, and their resistance continues in 2002 with some Muslim groups advocating political autonomy and others separation from the Philippines.

Mindanao came under centralized control only in the early twentieth century when American influence and financial support allowed for the creation of agricultural colonies in the interior. Settlers from the overcrowded central and northern Philippines cleared much of Mindanao's forests and transformed it to an agricultural and later an industrial region. It now houses major commercial agricultural operations, large cattle ranches, pig farms, and rice fields.

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MINERAL INDUSTRY-MALAYSIA Although Malaysia has a rich variety of mineral resources, only petroleum and tin are of any significance in terms of quality and value of reserves. Gold, coal, iron, antimony, and cinnabar (mercury) have at various periods in the past contributed to the country's economy. Prior to World War II, tin was one of the two mainstays of the economy (the other being rubber); during the postwar era, petroleum assumed prominence, particularly from the 1970s onward.

Tin

Although tin had been known and worked in peninsular Malaysia since the fifth century BCE, it was only in the nineteenth century that production and export became significant to the extent of transforming the socioeconomic landscape. The expanding tin-plate industry in Britain in the early nineteenth century increased the demand for tin, especially for the alluvial tin known as "Straits tin" then produced in peninsular Malaysia. The high demand accelerated production, which led to a reorganization of the tin industry in peninsular Malaysia from the 1820s. Malay chieftains who had in the past directly worked the deposits now leased the mines for a lump sum to Chinese merchants of Melaka and Penang. The direct participation of Chinese entrepreneurs enabled a more systematic exploitation through utilization of more advanced mining methodology and equipment coupled with a large pool of imported labor resources from the southern Chinese provinces of Guangdong and Fujian.

The Chinese dominance of the tin industry persisted from the mid-nineteenth century to the first decade of the twentieth century. The period of intensive mechanization of the industry ushered in European participation in mining and smelting that eventually eclipsed Chinese predominance by the 1930s. The introduction of the mining dredge by European enterprise from the 1910s converted the industry from a labor-intensive enterprise involving hundreds of small producers to a capital-intensive enterprise dominated by a handful of large European mining establishments. The advent of British colonial administration from the mid-1870s contributed to the development and expansion of the industry in the provision of political stability, an efficient transportation network (railway and roads), and clear-cut legislation regulating land, water supply, mining activities, and labor recruitment.

By the 1890s peninsular Malaysia exported more tin than all the other tin producers combined. Competition from Bolivia, Indonesia, Thailand, and, to a lesser extent, China and Nigeria reduced its world market share to 34 percent in the 1920s. The Great Depression of the 1930s ushered in controlled schemes (International Tin Agreement, 1931) and the creation of buffer stocks aimed at maintaining high prices. But the forced reduction in production had adverse socioeconomic implications; hundreds of thousands of Chinese mine workers were repatriated owing to cutbacks and closures of mines.

Low demand and the Allied blockade to shipping coupled with inadequate mining equipment resulted in negligible production during the Japanese occupation (1941–1945). The Korean War (1950–1953) boosted postwar revival of the tin industry. Between 1948 and 1960, a leftist-led insurgency referred to as the "Emergency" erupted in peninsular Malaysia. Despite attempts by leftist guerrillas to disrupt the country's economy through terrorism, overall the tin industry was not affected adversely. The Emergency notwithstanding, production continued to rise throughout the 1950s, overtook prewar peak levels in the early 1960s, and continued rising to the mid-1970s. But as an export commodity tin declined in its share in the Malaysian economy. From the late 1970s there was a depletion of reserves, mounting production costs, and falling world prices, resulting in drastic reductions in production. The industry suffered an irreversible setback when in 1985 the London Metal Exchange suspended all dealings in tin, thereby precipitating the collapse of the International Tin Council's buffer stock. By the 1990s, Malaysia had declined as a major tin producer and exporter; it fell behind Indonesia, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, and Australia. Established in 1953, the Tin Industry (Research and Development) Board aimed to protect and promote the general interests of the tin industry through research and development and public relations exercises. The Malaysian tin industry during the 1990s was but a shadow of the industry during its heyday more than a century earlier.

Petroleum and Natural Gas

The first oil strike in Malaysia was recorded at Miri, Sarawak, in 1910. Sarawak, then under the Brooke Raj, enjoyed this unexpected boom and petroleum became the chief export earner until 1941. Production at Miri peaked in 1929 and thereafter steadily declined. No new fields were opened until the discovery in the 1970s of oilfields offshore from Sarawak (Bintulu), Sabah (western coast), and Terengganu (Kertih and Tok Arun).



A marble quarry in Langkawi Island, Malaysia, c. 1990. (DAVE G. HOUSER/CORBIS)

Production of these oil fields throughout the 1970s and 1980s witnessed the emergence of Malaysia as a net producer of high-quality, low-sulfur petroleum that is in high demand on the world market. Large reserves of natural gas were also discovered during the 1970s in the same vicinity. Production began in the 1980s.

Petroleum Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS), the national petroleum company of Malaysia (established in 1974), is the major organization responsible to undertake and regulate the exploitation and development of oil and natural gas in the country. Exploration during the 1970s uncovered several rich oil fields as well as large areas of natural gas offshore from Sarawak, Sabah, and Terengganu. The early 1980s witnessed the exploitation of these offshore oil and gas fields. The crude oil is of high quality with low sulfur content and much demanded in the world market. Over the two decades since its inception, PETRONAS had expanded its upstream (exploration and production) activities and at the same diversified into the downstream (refining and marketing) sector, gradually carving out a name for itself in the global market as an oil and gas multinational.

Gold and Other Mining

Peninsular Malaysia has been known for its gold since the second century BCE. Gold was one factor that motivated the British to intervene in Pahang in the 1880s. Reputation notwithstanding, the only viable gold mine was located at Raub, Pahang. Production was moderate but sustained until 1941. As early as the 1820s, Chinese miners had crossed the border to Upper Sarawak from Sambas in southwest Dutch Borneo (Indonesian Kalimantan) to exploit the alluvial gold deposits in and around Bau. By the 1880s the labor-intensive mining methods of the Chinese had given way to more mechanization and the cyanidation

process (whereby cyanide was utilized to extract pure gold from the ore, producing an extraction of between 70 and 80 percent) utilized by the British-owned Borneo Company Limited (BCL). Gold production increased significantly from the late 1890s with the domination of the BCL and exports were a mainstay of the Sarawak economy until 1921. The 1920s saw the steady decline in gold production due to exhaustion of old fields and the absence of new deposits.

Sarawak coal from the Simunjan colliery in the Middle Sadong competed with gold during the 1890s as a major earner, although the former mainly sustained local needs. Coal at Labuan was a disappointment and incurred deficits. The Chartered Company of British North Borneo (Sabah) profited modestly from coal production at Tawau during the first three decades of the twentieth century. Likewise in peninsular Malaysia, the Batu Arang collieries in Selangor supplied local requirements in the prewar period. Japanese entrepreneurs worked iron ore in Terengganu and Johor until 1941 without much profitable return. An iron boom in the 1960s in Perak momentarily spurred optimism that this mineral could also provide a good source of revenue, but the boom was short lived. Small amounts of cinnabar were produced in Upper Sarawak (Tegora, Gading) from the 1860s; mercury was last exported from Sarawak in 1909. Between the 1820s and the 1880s, antimony was produced and exported from Bidi and Busau Upper Sarawak. Its exports sustained the early growth of Sarawak under Brooke rule. By the early 1920s, antimony and cinnabar ceased to be important as most of the sources were mined out.

Optimism remains in the oil and gas industry. The various ventures of PETRONAS coupled with the large reserves of petroleum and natural gas in the country offer promising prospects for this sector of the mineral industry of Malaysia. Overall in 2000 the mining sector had a workforce of some 38,000 mostly trained and skilled workers and contributed about 10 per cent to the country's gross domestic product.

Ooi Keat Gin

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MING DYNASTY The Ming dynasty (1368–1644) is the Chinese dynasty founded by Zhu Yuanzhang (temple name Taizu, reign title Hongwu; 1328–1398, reigned from 1368), the second of only two commoners to become emperor of China. Following the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), the Ming marks an era of Chinese cultural restoration. The restoration, however, was by no means a replica of earlier Han Chinese models; it signified a time of reform and redefinition. The Ming reforms, in turn, strongly influenced Chinese government and society for about six hundred years. As the last native dynasty to rule China, the Ming inspired Chinese revolutionaries at the turn of the twentieth century who overthrew the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644–1912) and founded China's first republic.

Political Changes

For the Ming founder Hongwu, the first urgent tasks were to unify the country and to consolidate his regime. During Hongwu's thirty-year reign, Ming authority was gradually extended into Outer Mongolia in the north, Guangdong and Guangxi provinces in the south, Sichuan in the west, Guizhou and Yunnan in the southwest, Hami in the northwest, and Manchuria in the northeast. By 1398, the Ming controlled the whole of modern China and had established tributary relations with neighboring regions.

To consolidate his rule, Hongwu initiated a great enterprise to restore Confucian values throughout the empire. He ordered that Chinese customs replace

Mongol practices in such social aspects as marriage, dress code, family relations, social hierarchy, and rituals. To promote the Confucian ideals, Hongwu took a particular interest in education and ordered the establishment of government and private schools throughout the empire. In terms of governmental institutions, while Hongwu followed the patterns of the Tang, the Song, and even the Yuan periods, he introduced remarkable innovations that reshaped Chinese political history. For the central government, in 1380 he abolished the Secretariat, the top echelon of the Ming bureaucracy. The emperor in effect served as his own chief minister and became directly responsible for routine government duties run by the six ministries and other offices. Meanwhile, the Chief Military Commission was divided into five coequal and uncoordinated agencies collectively called Five Chief Military Commissions. At the provincial level, in 1376 Hongwu splintered the Branch Secretariat into three coordinating agencies: administration, surveillance, and military commissions. Hongwu's autocratic nature in governing has been labeled "Ming despotism" by some historians.

The Emperor Yongle (1360–1424, reigned from 1403) relied increasingly on secretarial aides from the Hanlin Academy, which led to the establishment of a new institution, the Grand Secretariat (*neige*), under Emperor Xuande (1398–1435, reigned from 1425). Managing state affairs between the throne and the rest of the civil bureaucracy, the Grand Secretariat enhanced the efficiency of Ming government; it was formally recognized as a state institution in the late sixteenth century. Yongle also transferred the capital from Nanjing to Beijing in 1421, a move that refocused the Ming political landscape by instituting a dual-capital system. In foreign relations, the expansionist Yongle personally led five expeditions against the Mongols on the northern frontiers; on the last expedition he died. In the south, he had annexed the northern part of Vietnam (1406). Between 1405 and 1421, Yongle had launched six maritime expeditions, chiefly under the command of the Muslim eunuch admiral Zheng He (1371–1433), to demand tribute from rulers abroad.

Zheng He's first voyage included more than 27,800 men and 317 ships; his largest ships measured 400 feet long and had nine masts (by comparison, the USS *Constitution*, built almost four hundred years later, was only 204 feet long). The destinations of these voyages included the near areas of Southeast Asia and distant places such as the Indian Ocean, Arabia, and the east coast of Africa. With the death of Yongle, however, political support for these expeditions withered, and



CHINA-HISTORICAL PERIODS

Xia dynasty (2100–1766 BCE)
 Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE)
 Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE)
 Western Zhou (1045–771 BCE)
 Eastern Zhou (770–221 BCE)
 Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE)
 Warring States period (475–221 BCE)
 Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE)
 Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE)
 Three Kingdoms period (220–265 CE)
 North and South Dynasties (220–589 CE)
 Sui dynasty (581–618 CE)
 Tang dynasty (618–907 CE)
 Five Dynasties period (907–960 CE)
 Song dynasty (960–1279)
 Northern Song (960–1126)
 Southern Song (1127–1279)
 Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234)
 Yuan dynasty (1279–1368)
 Ming dynasty (1368–1644)
 Qing dynasty (1644–1912)
 Republican China (1912–1927)
 People's Republic of China (1949–present)
 Republic of China (1949–present)
 Cultural Revolution (1966–1976)

they ended. China was to lose its lead in maritime technology and trade interest to the Western powers.

For nearly a century after Yongle, although the Ming dynasty enjoyed general stability and prosperity, it was occasionally threatened by the Mongols along the northern frontiers. In 1449, during a military campaign led by the Ming eunuch Wang Zhen, Emperor Zhengtong (1427–1464) was captured and held prisoner by the Oirat (western Mongols) at Tumu, Beizhili. The Tumu incident indicated the increasing eunuch influence during mid-Ming times. Other eunuchs who dominated court affairs included Wang Zhi in the 1470s and 1480s and Liu Jin from 1505 to 1510. The Tumu incident forced the Ming to focus on defense against the Mongols, which led to the reconstruction of the Great Wall. Under Emperor Jiajing (1507–1566, reigned from 1522), who strongly patronized Taoist alchemists and withdrew from governmental affairs, the Mongols led by Altan Khan (d. 1583) constantly raided Chinese territory, and Japanese pirates attacked coastal regions.

In order to improve government efficiency and financial administration, the grand secretary Zhang

Juzheng (1525–1582) carried out a series of reforms in the late sixteenth century. He achieved several of his goals, centralizing the government, repairing the Grand Canal (a series of ancient waterways that links Beijing with Hangzhou), and limiting corrupt practices in civil-service examinations. By means of the "single whip method of taxation," he made land the single basis of tax obligations and used silver as the value base for tax assessment. After Zhang's death, the Ming government again fell into the hands of eunuchs, the most notorious of whom was Wei Zhongxian (1568–1627). When Emperor Chongzhen (1611–1644, reigned from 1627) tried to restrengthen the Ming, his dynasty was ruined by two major occurrences, peasant rebellions that started in northern Shaanxi and Manchu encroachment from the northeastern frontier. When the peasant troops led by Li Zicheng (1605–1645) entered Beijing in April 1644, the Ming emperor committed suicide. Meanwhile, Ming loyalists on the northeast frontier invited the Manchu forces to help suppress the rebels and restore the dynasty. When the Manchus entered Beijing in June, however, they seized the throne for themselves under the dynastic title of Qing.

Socioeconomic Changes

The Ming founder Hongwu envisioned a world of frugality and simplicity based on agricultural economy. He ordered the compilations of "yellow books" to register the population and "fish-scale books" to record the land. The entire population of about 60 million people was categorized into hereditary households such as peasants, soldiers, artisans, and "mean people" (slaves and prostitutes, for example). Without government permits, residents would not move freely around the country. To define women's roles, the emperor dictated the writing of the *Nujie* (Instructions for Women). At the grassroots level, Ming society was organized into communities (*lijia*), in which every 110 households formed a basic unit that was made responsible for paying taxes, maintaining order, and promoting morality. The main sources of Ming government revenue were the summer and autumn land taxes and the salt monopoly. To recover the economy devastated by famines and warfare, the early Ming government took a number of measures, including transferring population to damaged regions, reclaiming uncultivated areas, constructing irrigation networks, and afforesting the lands. Without much advancement in technology, agriculture was restored during the late fourteenth century.

By the mid-sixteenth century, while agriculture continued to serve as the backbone of the economy, some industries expanded. In the paper, ceramics, and

textile industries, small workshops grew into big enterprises, some of which employed several hundred workers. In Jiangxi, thousands of laborers worked in nearly thirty paper factories. At Jingdezhen (Jiangxi), the porcelain center with a population of 1 million, numerous porcelain kilns produced articles of fine ceramics, particularly high-quality cloisonné. Large textile workshops with more than 100,000 looms made Songjiang (Nanzhili) the big cotton-weaving center. Luxury silks were produced in Hangzhou and Suzhou, and iron factories developed at Cixian (Beizhili).

The last century of the Ming witnessed the development of a new urban and mercantile society, the so-called second commercial revolution. The expansion of transportation and communication networks created the preconditions for the growth of trade and the commercialization of the economy. The number of cities and market towns increased, and a national market emerged in which economically specialized macroregions developed. In many areas, agricultural produce became commercialized, especially the cash crops of cotton, vegetable oils, indigo, sugarcane, and tobacco. In international commerce, overseas trading links multiplied, particularly to areas in Southeast Asia such as Siam and the Philippines. In addition to Arab and Asian traders, Europeans arrived in increasing numbers at Macao and Guangzhou (Canton). From countries such as Japan and Mexico, silver flowed into China.

During the course of commercialization, society underwent dramatic changes. The gentry, the landowners with official ranks or civil-service examination degrees who were exempt from labor taxes, took advantage of the new economic opportunities and invested in commercial enterprises and money-lending activities. About 50 percent of *jinsbi*, holders of the highest degree in the civil-service examination system, came from families who had never previously produced such a degree holder, which indicates that the Ming period saw a high level of upward social mobility.

The early Ming hereditary household division began to break up by the first half of the fifteenth century. Merchants gradually enjoyed more and more power and social respectability and often formed close political and economic alliances with scholar-officials. By participating in rural handicraft industries and commercial activities, tenants gained greater freedom from landlord domination; they expressed their dissatisfaction with landlord control through a series of rent revolts. By the late Ming, with the breakdown of the *lijia* system and ineffective government, lineages—social groups that descended from a common ancestor and possessed shared assets—grew stronger, taking care of local affairs.

The introduction of new crops such as peanut, maize, and sweet potato from the Americas led to rapid population growth, which rose to about 150 million toward the end of the dynasty. Women continued to play strong roles both at the imperial court and in ordinary families. While women in general were subordinated to men, many sought their own career opportunities. Instead of being oppressed or silenced, for instance, literate gentrywomen in south China created their own culture by way of reading, writing, teaching, publishing, and forming their own communities.

Cultural and Intellectual Changes

In Ming times, the Neo-Confucianism of the great Song thinker Zhu Xi was fully prescribed as the state orthodoxy. In 1382, Hongwu revived the civil-service examinations, taking Zhu Xi's commentaries as the standard interpretations of the Confucian classics. In 1415, Yongle published *Wujing Sishu daquan* (The Great Compendium of the Five Classics and Four Books) and *Xing li daquan* (The Great Compendium of the Philosophy of Human Nature), which served as the basis for classical studies and continued to be used until the beginning of the eighteenth century. The official ideology, however, was often challenged by other thinkers, the most famous of whom was Wang Shouren (also known as Wang Yangming, 1472–1528). Wang denied the external principle (*li*) of Zhu Xi and argued that principle could be discovered only in one's mind-and-heart. He also advocated the unity of action and innate moral knowledge, or *liangzhi*, the original goodness that should be cultivated so as to achieve sagehood. Wang's teachings strongly influenced philosophical schools in the Ming and those in Japan and Korea. Wang Gen (1483–1541), one of Wang Shouren's followers, founded the Taizhou school of philosophy and preached to the masses that common people's daily necessities were where the Way lay. Another radical philosopher, Li Zhi (1527–1602), attacked traditional morality and extended Wang Shouren's individualism to defend selfishness.

Along with the progress in printing and publishing, popular culture flourished during the Ming. The long novels *Shuibu zhuan* (The Water Margins, fourteenth century), *Sanguozhi yanyi* (The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, 1522), *Xiyouji* (Journey to the West, 1592), and *Jing ping mei* (The Golden Lotus, 1617) mark a milestone in Chinese literary history. Large short-story collections emerged in the late Ming, including *Sanyan* (Three Collections of Stories, 1620–1627) and *Paian jingqi* (Tales That Make One Exclaim in Surprise and Strike the Table, 1628, 1632). More than three hundred different genres of opera developed,

which combined drama, music, dance forms, singing, and gorgeous costumes and appealed to both elite and nonelite audiences. Some twelve hundred titles, such as the masterpiece *Mudan ting* (The Peony Pavilion, 1598), are still known.

Ming prosperity was also reflected in the proliferation of practical knowledge and scholarship. Under the imperial patronage, the 11,095-volume *Yongle da-dian* (Yongle Encyclopedia), the largest imperial encyclopedia ever compiled, was completed in 1407. In private academies and individual studies, scholars produced huge anthologies of independent books and collections of artifact illustrations. The dictionary *Zibui* (Collection of Characters) by Mei Yingzuo (d. 1615) for the first time classified Chinese characters under 214 radicals (distinctive elements of characters that, in combination, form a complete character), a system that has remained in use up to the present. The imperial prince Zhu Zaiyu (d. 1611), who concentrated on studies of mathematics and musicology, became the first person in the world to formulate the equal temperament in music. Song Yingxing's *Tiangong kaiwu* (The Creations of Nature and Humans, 1637) provided the most comprehensive information on industrial and agricultural technology. Li Shizhen, after sixteen years of arduous work, completed the *Bencao gangmu* (Compendium of Materia Medica, 1602), which contained notes on nearly two thousand medicinal plants and over eleven thousand prescriptions and mentioned for the first time a method of inoculation to prevent smallpox. Having made seventeen trips throughout China in more than twenty years, Xu Hongzu finished his monumental *Xu Xiake youji* (The Travel Diaries of Xu Xiake, 1641), which not only recorded China's geographical features and social customs but for the first time in the world documented karst landforms.

During the Ming, the Chinese increasingly interacted with Europeans, who first appeared in China in 1514. The Europeans came to China not only to trade but also to convert the local people to Catholicism. The Italian Jesuit Matteo Ricci (Li Madou, 1552–1610) was the most successful missionary in China. After he entered Guangdong in 1583, Ricci began his efforts by accommodating to Chinese culture, including speaking Chinese, studying Confucian classics, and wearing Chinese clothes—first Buddhist robes and then a Confucian gown. He also gained trust by introducing Western scientific and technical knowledge and such mechanical curiosities as clocks. By the time of his death in 1610, despite the resistance of some Chinese who accused Christians of corrupting Chinese beliefs and causing political disorder, Jesuit communities were established in many cities, including

Beijing, and missionaries served at the imperial court as mathematicians, astronomers, cartographers, interpreters, painters, and musicians. Among the 2,500 Chinese converts, the most famous were three literati: Xu Guangqi (1562–1633), Li Zhizao (d. 1630), and Yang Tingyun (1557–1627). These scholar-officials, together with the missionaries, wrote treatises on Christianity; translated European manuals on mathematics, astronomy, geography, and hydraulics; and established new calendars.

The Ming achievements, including political institutions, economic mechanisms, philosophy, science and technology, and material culture, not only left a strong legacy for future China but also made a powerful impact on other East Asian countries. By the time the Ming fell, however, China's leadership in the world was soon to be challenged by the West.

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MINOBE TATSUKICHI (1873–1948), Japanese constitutional scholar. Minobe Tatsukichi was born in Hyogo Prefecture of Japan in 1873. After graduation from the Department of Law of Tokyo Imperial University in 1897, he entered the Home Ministry. From 1899 to 1902, he studied comparative legal systems in Europe, mainly in Germany. In 1902, he was appointed professor at Tokyo Imperial University and lectured on administrative and constitutional law until his retirement in 1934. He was elected to the House of Counselors of Japan in 1918. Minobe had a liberal interpretation of the Meiji Constitution. He called for party cabinets, universal suffrage, and expansion of civil liberties. He advocated the "emperor as organ of the state" theory (*Tenno kikan setsu*), which divided experts on constitutional law of Japan. His theories in the 1930s came under criticism from ultranationalists and militarists, and in 1935 his books on constitutions

were banned until the end of World War II. Under nationalistic pressure, he was forced to resign from the House of Peers, to which he had been appointed in 1932. He died in 1948. Among his writings are the *Kempe Satsuyo* (Outline of the Constitution, 1923) and the *Nihonkoku Kempe Genron* (Principles of the Japanese Constitution, 1946). Minobe's eldest son, Ryo-kichi, has been governor of Tokyo.

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MITTAPHAP BRIDGE The first bridge ever built across the lower reaches of the Mekong River, the Mittaphap (Friendship) Bridge connects Thailand and Laos. Since Laos is a landlocked nation, the bridge is particularly strategic in helping link it to key Thai Pacific ports. The building of the bridge was a joint venture among the governments of Laos, Thailand, and Australia, with the Australian government funding (A\$40 million) the construction of the bridge, which was completed in April 1994. This infrastructure project was an important signal of Australian commitment to the Lao PDR, strengthening Laos's linkages to the market economies of Southeast Asia. A new project will build a rail passage on the bridge to link directly the Lao and Thai capitals.

To celebrate the opening of the bridge, the Thai king came to the Lao PDR, the first time the Thai monarch had left the Kingdom in some thirty years. The bridge is symbolic of growing economic ties between Thailand and Laos.

Private automobiles were initially banned from using the bridge. The bridge is primarily for truck and bus traffic. The rationale for this policy was to prevent a flood of Thai private vehicles from entering the Lao capital of Vientiane, causing potential pollution, congestion, and accidents. More recently this policy has been relaxed and private automobiles can use the bridge, though some red tape and fees are necessary to obtain a border pass for a private vehicle.

Gerald W. Fry

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MIYAGI (2002 est. pop. 2.4 million). Miyagi Prefecture is situated in the northern region of Japan's island of Honshu, where it occupies an area of 7,292 square kilometers. Its primary geographical features are the Ou Mountains in the west, an eastern coastal plain, and the Abukuma and Kitakami rivers (in Japanese, Abukumagawa and Kitakamigawa). Miyagi is bordered by the Pacific Ocean and by Iwate, Fukushima, Akita, and Yamagata prefectures. Once part of Mutsu Province, it assumed its present name in 1872 and its present borders in 1876.

Various archaeological remains indicate early habitation of the region. During the Heian period (794–1185), Mutsu Province was ruled by the northern Fujiwara family as a virtually independent kingdom. Later rulers included a series of warlords and the Date family in the Edo period (1600/1603–1868).

The prefecture's capital is Sendai, the northeast's largest city and its cultural, economic and political heart. It grew around Sendai Castle, erected in 1601 by Date Masamune (1567–1636). As the core of Sendai Industrial Zone in the early 2000s, the city supports printing plants and the processors of petrochemicals and foodstuffs. Its cultural amenities include Tohoku University, the Osaki Hachiman Shrine, and the Tanabata Festival. The prefecture's other important cities are Kesenuma, Ishinomaki, Furukawa, and Shiogama.

Home to one of Japan's leading fisheries, Miyagi produces large amounts of mackerel, tuna, and sardines. Agriculture, mainly rice farming, continues as a primary economic activity. The region's industries include pulp and paper processors, and metal and machinery fabricators. Visitors are drawn to one of the vistas known throughout Japan as one of the nation's three most famous: the panorama of Matsushima Bay with some 250 small islands with pine trees and irregularly shaped rocks. Other destinations are Rikuchu Coast National Park and various hot spring resorts, including Narugo, Togatta, and Sakunami.

E. L. S. Weber

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MIYAZAKI (2002 est. pop. 1.2 million). Miyazaki Prefecture is situated in the southeast of Japan's island of Kyushu, where it occupies an area of 7,735 square kilometers. Miyazaki's primary geographical features are the northern Kyushu Mountains and the southern Wanitsuka Mountains, the central coastal Miyazaki Plain, and numerous rivers. It is bordered by the Pacific Ocean and by Oita, Kagoshima, and Kumamoto prefectures. Once known as Hyuga Province, it assumed its present name in 1873 and its present borders in 1883.

The prefecture's capital is Miyazaki city, along the Hyuga Sea. It includes the island of Aoshima, to which it is connected at low tide. Once a farming village, it flourished after being declared the capital in 1873. In the early 2000s, it is home to Miyazaki University, along with various museums. Aoshima is habitat to some 230 species of subtropical plants. The prefecture's other important cities are Miyakonojo, Nobeoka, and Hyuga.

Hundreds of fifth- and sixth-century burial mounds, along with their clay *haniwa* (burial mound) figures, indicate the region was the site of a flourishing early civilization. Ruled for centuries by a series of feudal warlords, it was divided into smaller domains during the Edo period (1600/1603–1868), with the Tokugawa shoguns controlling some parts directly.

Agriculture is the main economic activity. The region produces rice and sweet potatoes, along with mandarin oranges, other fruit, vegetables, and dairy goods for export to other areas of Japan. Miyazaki is relatively undeveloped in industry, although its hydroelectric plants provide power to northern Kyushu. Visitors are drawn by the scenic coastline and mountains, especially in Kirishima-Yaku National Park.

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MIZORAM (2001 est. pop. 891,000). A state in northeastern India established in 1987, Mizoram ("land of the highlanders") extends southward to cover an area of 21,081 square kilometers, squeezed between Bangladesh and Myanmar (Burma) and bounded by Tripura, Manipur, and Assam. It was organized to meet the aspirations of the Mizo (Lushai) people, whose secessionist insurgency was not quelled with status as a union territory beginning in 1972.

The Mizos are an egalitarian people without gender or class distinctions, proud of *Tlawmgaihna*, their code of hospitality. The Mizos migrated to this region in the eighteenth century from the Chin hills in Myanmar. The British brought the area under their control in 1891. Almost 95 percent of the people are Christian; whitewashed Christian churches cross the landscape. Only a few animists remain, along with some Buddhists.

When Mizoram's main species of bamboo bloom, they attract hordes of rats that devour crops and bring famine. In 1959 apparent government disregard of this natural crisis called *mautam* sparked the Mizo Famine Front, which became the Mizo National Front (MNF). For some twenty years, the MNF functioned as an armed guerrilla group fighting for secession and independence from an Indian administration viewed as inept and uncaring. In 1967 the government's heavy-handed response to the MNF—rounding up Mizos into guarded villages—only boosted support for the MNF and propelled secessionist fervor that led to statehood. The years following Mizoram statehood in 1987 have been peaceful.

C. Roger Davis

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MOERDANI, LEONARDUS BENJAMIN

(b. 1932), Indonesian military and political figure. Leonardus Benjamin (Benny) Moerdani was the Indonesian Military Commander from 1983 to 1988 and the second most powerful person in the 1980s in Indonesia after Suharto, who ruled from 1966 to 1998. His position as a trusted adviser to Suharto ended in tension because of Moerdani's criticisms of the business interest of Suharto's family in the early 1990s. Born on 2 October 1932 in Cepu, Central Java, Moerdani joined the student army and was wounded in the war of Indonesian independence (1945–1949). His involvement in operations against separatist movements in the 1950s, in "freeing" Irian Barat (West Papua) from the Dutch in 1962, and in the *Konfrontasi* with Malaysia (1963–1966) formed his perception about the importance of Indonesian unity in the face of radical movements. Like many Indonesian officers, Moerdani got his military training—including some in intelligence—in the United States, in 1960–1961.

In the 1970s, together with Lieutenant General Ali Murtopo (1924–1984), Moerdani helped Suharto to

maintain political stability in Indonesia. Moerdani proposed a "defense-in-depth" concept, which was a comprehensive defense strategy including physical, ideological, mental, and sociocultural aspects, rather than relying solely on military development. The ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asia Nations) region was seen as a belt of strategic stability. Moerdani played a significant role in advising Suharto to take over East Timor in 1975. After holding many intelligence posts, Moerdani became the Indonesian military's supreme commander from 1983 until 1988, when he was made minister of defense and security. He retired in March 1993.

Abubakar Eby Hara

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MOGAO CAVES The Mogao Caves of China, 492 of which are preserved, were dug in the sandstone cliffs outside the city of Dunhuang, in today's Gansu Province, from 366 CE to the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). An oasis in a desert, where travelers on the Silk

MOGAO CAVES-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1987, the Mogao Caves are a cultural and artistic testament to a thousand years of Buddhism and the influence of the nearby Silk Route.

Road stopped to resupply and to rest, Dunhuang served as a workshop for over a thousand years for Chinese and Central Asian arts to mix. As a result, some of the most brilliant artistic creations in Chinese art history, such as the Flying Apsara Musicians, were born in these caves. Of the more than two thousand colorful statues and over forty-five thousand square meters of murals, most depict Buddhist history, legends, and ways of life in China as the nation was interacting via the Silk Road with Central Asia and beyond. Today, Dunhuang is an important center for the study of Buddhism, Buddhist arts, and the Silk Road.

In 1900, a Taoist monk, Wang Yuanlu (d. 1931), discovered in a sealed cave over fifty thousand pieces of paintings and handwritten texts dated from the fourth to the fourteenth centuries. The texts were written mainly in Chinese or Tibetan, but some were



The "herd of antelopes" painting in the Mogao Caves near Dunhuang, China. (PIERRE COLOMBEL/CORBIS)

also written in Sanskrit and in a half dozen other languages. Besides a large number of works on Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism, the texts also contain historical records, accounting books, court records, literary works, and works on geography, astrology, medicine, mathematics, and so on. These texts, encyclopedic in their scope, provide an unusual source for the study of Chinese religions, history, literature, arts, and daily life. As part of his efforts to raise money to rebuild a nearby monastery, which he renamed Sanqinggong (the Taoist Trinity Palace), Wang sold some of his discoveries to smugglers from Britain, Japan, France, the United States, and Russia. Between 1907 and 1925, Dunhuang witnessed an exodus of some of its most valued relics, which are today still held in Britain, India, France, Russia, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Turkey, Japan, the United States, and Korea. The Museum of Dunhuang Hidden Library, located in Sanqinggong, has been open since May 2000 to tell the story of the Dunhuang treasures. The Mogao Caves are a UNESCO World Natural and Cultural Heritage Site.

Jian-Zhong Lin

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MOHAMAD, GOENAWAN (b. 1941), Indonesian poet and journalist. Goenawan Mohamad became one of Indonesia's most important poets and a tireless fighter for press freedom. Born 1941 in Batang, Central Java, he was educated locally before he moved to Jakarta, where he studied psychology and philosophy, and began writing for the literary magazine *Sastra* (Literature). In 1967, he helped to establish the daily newspaper *Harian Kami* (Our Daily), and in 1970 the weekly newsmagazine *Expres*, but within a year had been dismissed for his criticism of the government.

In 1971, Mohamad became founder and editor of *Tempo*, Indonesia's most respected newsmagazine. After the Suharto government banned *Tempo* in 1994, he continued to fight for a free and independent press by forming the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI) and founding the Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information (ISAI). With Suharto resigning in 1998, Mohamad together with a group of journalists relaunched *Tempo*, intending to hold the new government accountable for its actions.

Mohamad is one of Indonesia's most prominent essayists. He has written about identity and change, democracy and freedom, and the meaning of history. In addition to numerous essays, he has published several volumes of poetry. In 1992, Mohamad was named recipient of the distinguished Harvard Nieman Fellowship and, in 1993, was presented the first Professor Teeuw Award. In 1998, he was awarded the International Press Freedom Award.

Frank Feulner

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MOHENJO-DARO Mohenjo-Daro is an archaeological site in the Larkana District of Sind, in southern Pakistan. Although objects of the prehistoric copper-age civilization known as the Harappan or Indus Civilization had previously been found on the surface near Harappa and by R. D. Banerji at Mohenjo-Daro, it was only with the thorough excavation of Mohenjo-Daro by Sir John Marshall in 1926–1931 that the full dimensions of this civilization began to be recognized. There were numerous levels of occupation at the site, spanning the entire period from about 2700 to 1500 BCE. Its population has been estimated at 35,000. Characteristic features of the civilization known first from this excavation were the practice of city planning, to provide a grid of straight streets and lanes, the ex-



MOHENJO-DARO—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Included on the UNESCO World Heritage List since 1980, the archaeological site where Mohenjo-Daro—one of the first Indus Valley cities—was discovered has great historical significance. This mud-brick third-millennia BCE city is considered one of the cradles of civilization.

istence of a citadel presumably for the commanders or rulers, use of a large public bath that may well be the prototype of Hindu temple tanks, and a high standard of public hygiene expressed materially in covered drains, latrines in private houses, and a judicious use of public space. Opinion varies as to how the city met its end: Increased salinity of its fields, and a move of the Indus River away from the site, have been proposed as the reasons.

Paul Hockings

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MON The Mon are descendants of one of the oldest civilizations in southeast Asia. An ethnolinguistic branch of the Mon-Khmer peoples, Mon settlers once inhabited wide areas of lower Myanmar (Burma) and central Thailand from the early centuries CE. The Mon population in Thailand, however, is today much reduced to around 80,000 inhabitants, and it is only in Myanmar that Mon culture has strongly survived.

Both Theravada Buddhism and writing were introduced to Myanmar and Southeast Asia by the early Mons. Settling in the Tenasserim coastal region and the Irrawaddy, Sittang, and Salween river deltas, their communities dominated the surrounding plains for over a thousand years. The traditional Mon emblem, the *hamsa* or sacred goose, can still be found displayed in pagodas and settlements throughout the region, testifying to earlier cultural links with India, where the *hamsa* is the mythical mount of Brahma. Ethnic Burmans, too, who first began to migrate into the area after the ninth century CE, called the Mon "Talaing," which is believed to refer to a site in eastern India.

In the eleventh century, the Mon principalities at Thaton and Pegu (Hamsawati, Bago) were overrun by Burman rulers who subsequently assimilated many aspects of Mon learning and culture. Following the fall of Pagan to the Mongols in 1287, however, the independent Mon kingdoms revived. A long power struggle then continued between various Mon and Burman rulers until 1757, when the Burman king Alaungpaya (reigned 1752–1760) quashed the last great Mon rebellion, led by Smin Dhaw, at Pegu.

Under British influence and rule (1824–1948), Mon culture declined rapidly, hastened by immigration and assimilation by ethnic majority Burmans. It was only in southeastern Myanmar, in rural districts around Thaton, Moulmein (Mawlamyine), Thanbyuzayat, Ye, and the Thai border, that Mon was still widely spoken. In modern-day Myanmar, although many citizens still claim Mon ancestry, the number of Mon speakers probably does not exceed one million in the whole country.

At Myanmar's independence in 1948, a Mon nationalist movement took up arms, working closely with Karen insurgent forces in neighboring areas. In 1959, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) was formed by the veteran nationalist leader Nai Shwe Kyin, and this party continued armed struggle even after a Mon State was eventually demarcated in 1974, within the union, on the country's political map.

In 1988, the NMSP received a major boost when hundreds of students joined the party after the suppression of pro-democracy protests by the Burmese army. Mon candidates were also elected in the 1990 general election and, during the following decade, there was an upsurge of interest in Mon culture and language, which was supported by Buddhist monks. Fierce fighting broke out with the Burmese army, in which many Mon villagers were displaced from their homes before the NMSP agreed to a cease-fire with the State Law and Order Restoration Council government in 1995 and set up offices in the towns. In a change of policy, the NMSP pledged to promote the Mon cause through aboveground means. However political problems persisted, and the NMSP and Mon nationalist movement were also weakened by internal splits.

Martin Smith

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MON STATE (1992 est. pop. 2.1 million). A Mon State was created on the modern political map of Myanmar (Burma) for the first time in 1974, during the rule of the Burma Socialist Program Party. Previously, there had been no political recognition, as such, in modern history of the Mon people who once predominated throughout much of southern Burma and neighboring Thailand. An elongated territory in shape, the Mon State covers 12,297 square kilometers (4,748 square miles) in area and extends for 320 kilometers (200 miles) down the Andaman shoreline. The coastal region on the west of the state is characterized by wetlands, islands, and creeks, while the interior consists mostly of hills and forests. To the north lies the Pegu (Bago) Division, to the south lies the Tenasserim (Tanintharyi) Division, and to the east lies the Karen (Kayin) State, with which local politics and business are closely interlinked.

The capital of the state is Moulmein (Mawlamyine), which is Myanmar's third largest city. Located on the Salween River estuary, it was an important seaport and administrative center under British rule (1826–1948). However, its commercial role declined under the isolationist policies of General Ne Win's (b. 1911) Burma Socialist Program Party between 1962 and 1988. Other important towns in the state include Kyaikto, Bilin, Thaton, Mudon, Thanbyuzayat, and Ye, all of which lie along the main road and rail links running parallel to the coast.

The ethnic composition of the state reflects its location on the gateway between central and southeast Myanmar. Exact statistics are disputed, but in the 1990s the population was estimated by the government at just over 2 million, of whom 780,000 were classified as ethnic Mons, 760,000 as Burmans (including Tavoyans), over 300,000 as Karens (including 60,000 Paos), and the rest as a variety of nationalities, including Indians and Chinese who inhabit the main urban areas.

Historically, the state has been the main producer of rubber in Myanmar. Other important crops are rice, groundnuts, pulses, sugarcane, coconuts, betel nuts, durians, mangosteens, and other fruits that grow abundantly in the tropical climate. The major manufacturing plant is the Sittang Pulp and Paper Mill. There also is a sugar mill at Bilin, rubber factory at Thanbyuzayat, and smaller textile and ceramics industries in the state.

Following the 1995 ceasefire by the military government with the armed opposition New Mon State Party, various plans were mooted to develop the territory, parts of which were opened up to tourists. In ad-

dition to Moulmein, destinations include the ancient towns of Thaton and Martaban as well as the famed Kyaiktiyo pagoda, which is perched on a mountain outcrop in the north of the state. Various bridge- and road-building projects were also introduced to try to improve infrastructural links with adjoining states and divisions as well as with Thailand. In addition, local and Thai fishing concessions were increased in the Andaman Sea, leading to fears of depletion of a once plentiful resource through overfishing. During 1999–2002, sporadic fighting also occurred with government forces in southern parts of the state where Karen and Mon dissident groups were still active, leading to continuing Burmese army operations in rural areas.

Martin Smith

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MONG TAI ARMY The Mong Tai Army ("Shan Land" army) was a Shan (Tai) insurgent force brought together in the mid-1980s by the controversial ethnic minority leader Khun Sa (Chan Shi-fu). Doubts have often been raised about his true motivations. An ethnic Shan-Chinese from Loimaw (Myanmar/Burma), Khun Sa (b. 1934) first entered the complex world of Shan narco-politics in the early 1960s. Like a number of insurgent leaders at that time, he briefly crossed over to the government side in 1965 to form a local home-guard militia of a kind then used by the Burmese army, and which were known in Burmese as "Ka Kwe Ye." Subsequently, his involvement in narcotics came to international attention in 1967 when his Loimaw militia fought a fierce battle with Chinese Guomindang troops along the Shan-Lao-Thai borderline for control of the Golden Triangle opium trade. Like the Guomindang, Khun Sa's force survived through anti-communist credentials and black market dealings with influential figures in Shan State and neighboring countries, especially Thailand.

In 1970 Khun Sa was arrested by the Burmese army. However, he was quietly released in 1976 after the kidnapping of two Russian doctors by his followers. He

then rebuilt his force, renamed the Shan United Army, from a new stronghold at Ban Hin Taek on the Thai side of the border. In 1982, the SUA was forcibly ousted by the Thai army, which was responding to international criticisms, but Khun Sa was able to reestablish his networks inside Shan State by seizing territory from rival Pao, Lahu, and other insurgent forces.

In 1984, Khun Sa appeared to gain new credibility when he formed the Tailand (or Shanland) Revolutionary Council in alliance with the Shan United Revolutionary Army, headed by Gon Jerng (Mo Heing), and also breakaway units from another Shan insurgent force, the Shan State Army. For a brief period, Khun Sa prospered. The armed wing of this new alliance, known as the Mong Tai Army (MTA), grew into a well-armed force, 15,000 strong, which, on Khun Sa's own admittance, was largely financed from the opium trade.

Following the assumption of power in Burma by the State Law and Order Restoration Council in 1988, the MTA for the first time began to fight pitched battles with the Burmese army as well as the newly formed United Wa State Party, which tried to enter MTA territory in the east.

Controversy, however, was never far away. Eventually, in failing health and wanted in the United States on drug trafficking charges, Khun Sa surrendered to the Burmese army in January 1996 at his headquarters in Homong. This precipitated the MTA's collapse. Most of the MTA troops laid down their arms and went back to their villages, but around 3,000 refused, resurrecting the former Shan United Revolutionary Army (subsequently known as Shan State Army [South]) in southwestern Shan State. Khun Sa, meanwhile, went into retirement in Yangon, where his family engaged in business.

Martin Smith

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MONGKUT, KING (1804–1868), Ruler of Thailand. King Mongkut (reigned 1851–1868) of Thailand is remembered for his policies of modernization and

for preserving his country's independence. He was the son of King Rama II (reigned 1809–1824). Mongkut donned the garb of a Buddhist monk at the age of nineteen and led the life of an ascetic until his coronation. He devoted his time to studying Western science and humanities as well as to studying Buddhism. Well-versed in European affairs, he learned Latin and English. He ascended the throne in 1851 as Rama IV after the death of his half brother Rama III (reigned 1824–1851).

In 1855, he signed an unequal treaty of friendship and commerce with Britain, followed by similar treaties with France, the United States, Prussia, Portugal, and other nations. The unequal treaties provided the Europeans with most favored nation status; they limited Thai tariff control; and they allowed extraterritoriality, which meant that foreigners were not subject to Thai laws and enjoyed special privileges. Thailand also surrendered its claim on parts of Cambodia to the east of the Mekong River to France in 1867.



An undated portrait of Mongkut when he was Crown Prince of Siam (Thailand). (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

By relating to Britain and France and playing them off against each other, Mongkut retained the country's independence from colonialism. He initiated reforms in education and health, encouraging medical work of missionaries, teaching his sons English and liberal arts, establishing a royal mint, relaxing court rituals, and publishing an official gazette. He also established the Buddhist sect called *dharmayutika*, which rationalized Buddhism and remains the center of Thai Buddhism. Anna Leonowens was the English governess of his children, whose story is told in the movie *The King and I*, which is still banned in Thailand for distorting Thai history and patronizing Mongkut to the point of ridicule. The motion picture *Anna and the King* (1999) generated further controversy in Thailand. The Thai Censor Board ruled that Thais should not see the movie, which misrepresents the monarchy and exaggerates the extent of impact of Anna on Mongkut. An avid astronomer, Mongkut invited the courtiers and foreign community to Thailand to observe the solar eclipse in 1868 in malaria-infested Sam Roi Yod. Stricken with the disease, he died soon afterward.

Patit Paban Mishra

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MONGOL EMPIRE During the thirteenth century, the Mongols created a vast empire that covered Central Asia, China, and much of the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Their armies threatened Japan, Southeast Asia, and Central Europe. Mongol military strength was based on the extraordinary mobility of their horsemen, tight military discipline, excellent communications, and the ruthlessness and superior leadership of Genghis Khan and others. Under the Mongols, much of Eurasia was united under a single government that encouraged trade and communications to an unprecedented degree. The Mongol empire, however, was relatively short-lived. In the 1260s, the realm split into four subempires in China, Central Asia, Russia, and Persia.

Genghis Khan

The emergence of the Mongols as a great power stemmed initially from the rise of Temujin (c. 1162–

1227) as a war leader. Temujin's charismatic personality and his reputation for treating his followers justly enabled him to create an army that first established his dominance among the Mongols then won him victory after victory over neighboring tribes, notably the Keraites and the Naimans. By 1206, his dominance over the Inner Asian nomadic tribes was complete and he took the title Genghis ("Ocean" or "Universal") Khan.

Genghis Khan then demanded tribute from settled kingdoms to the south and west, and he sent armies to subdue those rulers who refused to submit. Mongol troops attacked the states of Jin and Xi Xia in what is now China, capturing Khanbalig (now Beijing) in 1215. The Uighur state of Kara Kitai fell in 1218. In that year, the ruler of Khorezm refused to punish a local governor who had executed all the members of a Mongol diplomatic delegation on suspicion of espionage. Mongols armies attacked Khorezm in 1219 and took a terrible revenge for the diplomatic incident, systematically destroying the kingdom's cities and massacring their inhabitants. The campaign reached as far as northern India and southern Russia and concluded only in 1222.

Genghis Khan's military success rested partly on the traditional skills of the Mongols in horsemanship and archery, but the Mongol armies were consistently innovative, developing new techniques to cope with siege warfare and warfare in mountainous or swampy country. Mongol generals were willing to recruit troops from among subject peoples, especially the Turkic peoples of Central Asia, and to learn new techniques from their enemies. Rapid communications across long distances enabled Mongol armies to coordinate their movements, while a system of whistling arrows facilitated communications during the turmoil of battle. Genghis Khan also paid great attention to cultivating the loyalty of his followers. He was generous in recognizing and rewarding those who supported him capably, and he promoted his followers largely according to their loyalty and ability. On the other hand, he was ruthless in suppressing disloyalty. After the subject king of Xi Xia refused to join the campaign against Khorezm, Genghis Khan launched a campaign against his kingdom that resulted in Xi Xia's complete destruction.

The existence of a single empire, administered from Karakorum in northern Mongolia and stretching from the Pacific Ocean to the Black Sea, facilitated trade between East Asia and the West enormously and contributed to prosperity well beyond the Mongol territories. With trade, too, came the easier movement of religious ideas and culture. In contrast with many other empires, the Mongol empire tolerated all religious beliefs and practices.

Conquests Following the Death of Genghis Khan

When Genghis Khan died in 1227, his empire was divided between his four sons. The eldest son, Jochi (1180–1227), received the lands far to the west in Russia while Ogodei (1186–1241) and Chagatai (d. 1241) obtained the lands in Persia and Central Asia. In Mongolian tradition, the youngest son should be the "keeper of the hearth" and inherit his father's home, so Genghis Khan's youngest, Tolui (1190–1232), received Mongolia proper and the Mongol realm in northern China. In 1229, Ogodei was elected Great Khan to replace Genghis Khan. The military campaigns of expansion continued.

In 1229, Mongol armies attacked the Persians and Cumans (Kipchaks) in the west and began a campaign of expansion that spread first to Georgia and Armenia and then to Russia. Moscow fell in 1238 and Kiev in 1240. In April 1241, the divided Mongol army defeated both the combined forces of the German and Polish aristocracy at Liegnitz and the Hungarian army at Mohi. The lumbering European knights in their heavy armor proved to be no match for the mobile, lightly armed Mongol forces. The invaders seemed likely to sweep through Europe, but Ogodei's death in 1241 obliged the Mongol armies to return home to take part in the election of a new Great Khan.

Meanwhile Tolui had destroyed the northern Chinese state of Jin in a campaign from 1230 to 1234. His successors attacked the Southern Song empire in 1237, beginning a protracted military campaign that ended only in 1279. In order to encircle the Song forces, Mongol armies captured the Southeast Asian kingdom known now as Nanzhao in modern Yunnan in 1253 and invaded Vietnam in 1257.

Khubilai Khan and the Establishment of the Chinese Yuan Dynasty

The campaign against the Song was led by Khubilai Khan (1215–1294), a grandson of Genghis Khan who declared himself Great Khan in 1260 and set up a new capital at Shangdu (Xanadu) in today's Inner Mongolia. Khubilai's claim to be Great Khan was not accepted by other Mongol leaders, however, and from 1260, the four subempires established on the death of Genghis Khan effectively became independent of each other. The Il-khans in Persia did continue to acknowledge Khubilai Khan as great khan, and this is the origin of their name: *Il* meaning "lesser" or "subordinate." Khubilai Khan later moved his capital from Shangdu and to Khanbalig, and he made increasing use of Chinese officials and administrative structures in rul-

ing China. In 1271, he adopted the Chinese name Yuan for his dynasty. Khubilai also sent armies by sea to conquer Japan (1274, 1281), Champa (1281), and Java (1292), but all these expeditions failed because of difficult climatic conditions and effective local resistance.

The Golden Horde

Far to the west in Russia, the descendants of Jochi controlled an area stretching from Lake Balkhash and the Aral Sea to the lower reaches of the Volga River, and collected tribute from the petty Russian states further north. The wealth of their capital on the Volga, Sarai, led them to be called the "Golden Horde." During the second half of the thirteenth century, most of these Mongols converted to Islam. Their power fragmented and declined during the fourteenth century with the rise of Christian Muscovy and Lithuania, and their influence in Russia ended in 1480. The last major khanates, Kazan, east of Moscow, and Astrakhan, in southeast Russia near the Caspian Sea, fell to Ivan IV in 1552 and 1556.

The Il-Khans

The Mongol presence in the Middle East was more unstable. In 1258, Mongol armies under the Il-Khan Hulegu, an elder brother of Khubilai, captured Baghdad, the political center of the Muslim world, but they were decisively defeated by Muslim Mamluk forces from Egypt at Ayn Jalut in Palestine in 1260. From its base on the Iranian plateau, the Il-khanate became deeply involved in the complex religious politics of the Middle East, generally siding with local Christian states against the Muslims and even fighting the Muslim Golden Horde. The Il-Khan Mahmud Ghazan (1271–1304) converted to Islam in the late thirteenth century and named himself sultan, but the Il-khanate collapsed in the middle of the fourteenth century.

The Chagatai Khanate

The khanate of Chagatai in Central Asia prospered initially, but the great trading cities of the south, Samarqand and Bukhara, grew more independent. Samarqand revolted in 1356 and became the capital of Timur (Tamerlane) in the fourteenth century. Mongol rulers of Chagatai khanate were increasingly displaced by a Turkic military elite. By the second half of the fourteenth century, the Chagatai khanate had disintegrated into several rival states.

Legacy of the Mongol Empire

Although the Mongol conquests were enormously destructive, Mongol rule was generally benevolent,

supporting trade, efficient administration, and freedom of religion. The empire fragmented because of rivalry between the descendants of Genghis Khan and then declined as Mongol rulers absorbed the local cultures they had conquered. Even in the twenty-first century, memories of the Mongol conquests influenced Russian and Chinese perceptions of national security and provided the main imagery for Mongol national identity.

Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb

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MONGOLIA PROFILE (2001 pop. 2.7 million). Mongolia refers to the region in east central Asia where Mongolian ethnic groups rose to power in the thirteenth century. Today it includes the independent Republic of Mongolia (formerly Outer Mongolia), the Chinese autonomous region of Nei Monggol (formerly Inner Mongolia), and the Tuva Republic of Russia (once part of Outer Mongolia). Genghis Khan (c. 1162–1227), the first ruler of the Mongols, unified rival groups under his leadership to form an empire, which his successors expanded to cover the territory from China to eastern Europe.

The Mongol empire was short lived, however, and collapsed largely because of internal struggles late in the thirteenth century. It was replaced successively by kingdoms ruled by Genghis Khan's successors; by the kingdom of the Turkic Timur (1336–1405) in western Asia; by the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) of China; and finally by the Manchus (Qing dynasty, 1644–1912) of China. China maintained control over Mongolia until 1911, when part of Outer Mongolia broke away to form Tannu Tuva (which eventually became part of the Soviet Union until 1991, then the Tuva Republic within Russia, and finally a republic of the Russian Federation); Russia helped the rest of Outer Mongolia become independent from China in the same year. The region fell under Chinese rule again under treaties of 1913 and 1915.

The Soviet army helped expel the Chinese in 1921, after which the Mongolian People's Republic was formed; the same region became simply Mongolia in 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nei

Monggol (Inner Mongolia) became an autonomous region of China after World War II.

Geography and Natural Resources

Mongolia is a landlocked state with an area of 1.565 million square kilometers; it is the seventeenth-largest state in the world. It is situated between Russia in the north and China in the south. Mongolia has mountain ranges in the west, plains or grasslands in most parts of the south and east, and the Gobi Desert in the southeast. Rivers are mainly in the north. The Selenge River drains into Lake Baikal in Russia. Only 1 percent of Mongolia is arable land. Ten percent is forest and woodland, 79 percent meadows and pastures, and the remaining part semidesert. However, Mongolia is considered the largest source of undeveloped natural resources in the world; these resources include oil, coal, copper, molybdenum, tungsten, phosphate, tin, nickel, zinc, wolfram, fluorspar, and gold.

People

The population of Mongolia is 90 percent Mongol, 4 percent Kazakh, 2 percent Chinese, 2 percent Russian, and 2 percent other (including the pastoral Turkic-speaking Muslim people who live in extreme western Mongolia). In 1586, Tibetan Buddhism became the Mongolian state religion. Today, 94 percent of Mongolians practice Tibetan Buddhism, and 6 percent practice Islam or shamanism. The 1992 constitution provides for the separation of church and state. Christian missionaries have emerged in Mongolia in recent years.

Administration

Mongolia has three municipalities—Ulaanbaatar (the capital), Darhan, and Erdenet—and eighteen provinces (*aymags*), which are subdivided into 334 districts or counties (*suums*).

History

In 1206, Temujin, the chief of a Mongol tribe, united all eighty-one rival groups and was crowned as Genghis Khan ("universal ruler"). The Mongolian empire achieved its conquests of one-third of the known world with an invincible combination of Mongolian cavalry and recruited foot soldiers, using novel methods of military strategy and battle tactics and with superior weapons. Mongols controlled Russia during the period of the Golden Horde (1240–1480) and ruled China during the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). In 1368, the Chinese established the Ming dynasty and drove the Mongols from today's Beijing to the north.



During the next two centuries, Sino-Mongolian relations alternated between war and trade. Under the Manchu rule of the Qing dynasty, Mongolia became part of China (1691–1911). When the Qing dynasty was overthrown by the Chinese, Mongolia declared independence. The national government of Republican China (1912–1917) claimed Mongolia as Chinese territory and launched a military expedition that occupied Mongolia for three years (1919–1921).

With the support of the Soviet Union, Mongolia declared its independence on 13 March 1921 and declared the People's Republic of Mongolia on 24 November 1924, but China did not recognize the new state. A thirty-year Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Soviet Union and China was signed on 15 August 1945, which stipulated that China must grant Mongolia a plebiscite to decide the question of independence. The result of the plebiscite, held on 20 October 1945, was a 100-percent vote for independence; China recognized the independence of Mongolia on 5 January 1946, dependent on the Soviet Union's obligation in the 1945 Treaty to recognize

the national government of Republican China as the only legal government of China. However, when the People's Republic of China was established on 1 October 1949, the Soviet Union extended it diplomatic recognition, terminating its diplomatic relations with Republican China the following day.

Republican China appealed the Soviet violation of the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty to the United Nations (U.N.), which adopted a resolution stating that the USSR had failed to fulfill its 1945 Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with Republican China. Based on the U.N. resolution, Republican China voided the treaty and, therefore, the independence of Mongolia. The Republic of China (Taiwan) still claims Mongolia as Chinese territory. The People's Republic of China, on the other hand, recognized Mongolia's independence on 14 February 1950 without any conditions.

Political Development

The political development of modern Mongolia since 1924 can be divided into three periods. During 1924–1989, Mongolia was under the control of the



MONGOLIA

Country name: Mongolia
Area: 1.565 million sq km
Population: 2,654,999 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 1.47% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 21.8 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 7.1 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: 0 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio: 1 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 53.5 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population: 64.26 years, male: 62.14 years, female: 66.5 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Tibetan Buddhist Lamaism; Islam (primarily in the southwest), Shamanism, and Christianity
Major languages: Khalkha (Mongol), Turkic, Russian
Literacy—total population: 97%, male: 98%, female: 97.5% (2000)
Government type: parliamentary
Capital: Ulaanbaatar
Administrative divisions: 18 provinces and 3 municipalities
Independence: 11 July 1921 (from China)
National holiday: Independence Day/Revolution Day, 11 July (1921)
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal
GDP—real growth rate: -1% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita: (purchasing power parity): \$1,780 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: 40% (2000 est.)
Exports: \$454.3 million (f.o.b., 1999)
Imports: \$510.7 million (c.i.f., 1999)
Currency: togrog/tugrik (MNT)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Book Factbook 2001*. Retrieved 5th March 2002, from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

Soviet Union, on which it modeled its political and economic systems. It was under Communist party control and followed the Soviet Union's guidance in foreign policy.

During 1989–1991, Mongolia, reflecting changes in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev (b. 1931), changed from strict Communist rule to a more liberal Communist regime and then to a total withdrawal from Communism. During 1990–1992, Mongolia instituted political reforms to move from a single-party to a multiparty system and to hold elections for legislature and president.

After the adoption and implementation of a new constitution on 12 February 1992, Mongolia entered an era of democracy. The Communist label of "Peo-

ple's" was dropped from the state's name, which became simply "Mongolia." Single-party rule ended, and numerous parties emerged. The first Mongolian legislature, the State Great Hural (parliament), was elected by popular vote on 8 June 1992. Among the seventy-six members, seventy-one were members of the Mongolia People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP; the former Communist Party), and the others were from minority parties. On 6 June 1993, the first presidential election was held, by popular vote rather than by the legislature as before. Before the adoption of the 1992 constitution, the president had been Parisalmaagiyn Orchirbat (b. 1942), a member of MPRP. However, in the 1993 presidential election, MPRP did not nominate the incumbent. Orchirbat was elected as a nominee of an opposition party. In June 1997,

Natsagiin Bagabandi (b. 1950) was elected president with a 60.8 percent popular vote for a four-year term of office, and four years later was reelected for a second term.

State Structure

The highest organ of state power is the State Great Hural, which is vested with supreme legislative power. It is unicameral and consists of seventy-six members, elected for a term of four years. The parliament has the exclusive right to enact laws or make amendments to them; to determine the basis of the state's domestic and foreign policies; to pass laws recognizing the full powers of the president after his or her election, and to relieve or remove the president; to appoint, replace, or remove the prime minister and members of the government; and to define the state's financial, credit, tax, and monetary policies, among other duties.

The president is the head of state and the embodiment of the unity of the people. The president enjoys such prerogatives as the veto, partial or whole, of laws and other decisions adopted by the parliament. The veto may be overridden by a two-thirds vote of parliament members present and voting. The president nominates to the parliament the candidate for prime minister, in consultation with the majority party or parties in the parliament, and proposes to the parliament to dissolve the government. The president heads the National Security Council of Mongolia and is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

External Relations and National Security

When Mongolia served as a buffer state between China and Russia during the Cold War, the country participated in the defense system of the Warsaw-Pact states by acting as the eastern frontier. When Soviet troops withdrew from Mongolia, the country adopted a neutral, nonaligned, non-nuclear stance. Mongolia has developed a balanced relationship with its two neighbors, Russia and China. This is, on the one hand, made possible through the cessation of military confrontation between both neighbors as well as their refraining from striving for military influence in Mongolia. On the other hand, Mongolia is not only bound to seek influential partners in the Asia-Pacific region but also determined to develop a strategy serving the country as well as fostering regional security and stability. Mongolia signed treaties of friendly relations and cooperation with the Russian Federation in January 1993 and with China in April 1994.

In developing its relations with other countries, Mongolia has conducted foreign policy based on uni-

versally recognized principles and norms of international law as defined in the U.N. charter, including mutual respect for one another's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of frontiers; right of self-determination; noninterference in internal affairs; nonuse of force and settlement of disputes by peaceful means; respect for human rights and freedoms; and mutually beneficial cooperation.

Mongolia does not interfere in the disputes between its two neighboring countries unless the disputes affect Mongolia's national interests. Mongolia refrains from joining any military alliance or grouping, does not allow its territory or airspace to be used against any other country, and does not permit the stationing of foreign troops or weapons, including nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction, in its territory.

Mongolia has supported the development of nuclear-weapons-free zones and initiated and successfully created such a zone in Mongolia itself, as declared by parliamentary resolution in 1992. This resolution was supported by the entire nonaligned movement (114 members) and the U.N. Security Council, and was adopted as a resolution of the U.N. General Assembly. Mongolia is now a member of thirty-one international organizations, including the World Trade Organization, INTERPOL, and the World Health Organization.

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MONGOLIA—ECONOMIC SYSTEM Like most developing countries, Mongolia has two economies. There is a traditional one, consisting of what Mongols have practiced for centuries. There is also a modern one that is primarily for export.

The Traditional Economy

Mongolia's traditional economy is based on animal husbandry, with the mixture of animals herded varying from one part of Mongolia to another. Sheep, herded from horseback, are found everywhere and are almost always mixed with goats. Cattle are herded in the north while camels are found in the northwest, west, and in the Gobi Desert. Since natural fodder, the basis of most Mongolian herding, is limited, continual movement of herds is usually necessary. Various patterns of movement exist, most commonly from low ground in the spring to high ground in summer and then back again in the autumn. Movement along rivers follows this pattern. Where there is little high ground, principally in the Gobi, movement is circular. Most movement takes place during spring and autumn, while summer and particularly winter pastures tend to be stationary. Traditionally, winter campgrounds were out in the steppe, but in the twentieth century, they moved adjacent to the suburbs of numerous small settlements in the Gobi and elsewhere. This affords a more comfortable life for the herdsmen and their families, possible access to stored fodder during the most difficult times, and a more or less regular exposure of their children to formal education during at least part of the year.

Mongolian sheep are not large, usually about a meal's worth for a large family (and there is little means for storing more meat than that). Their wool is largely worthless for commercial purposes. Better varieties of sheep with better wool were introduced during the Communist era (1921–1989), but herding them has not always proven practical under Mongolian conditions, where special feeds required by some breeds are rarely available, and where long, lush wool is likely to end up entangling the sheep in thorny desert vegetation. What wool there is goes mostly for clothing and for felt that is used as the outer covering of Mongol housing, known as *ger* (yurts). Mongols do not weave as a rule, although there is some card weaving of belt fittings for *ger*, and there has been a carpet industry for several decades. Sheep hides are used locally for clothing and have been exported, but the external market for them is limited since most production is of poor quality. In addition to their meat, ewes produce milk, usually consumed in fermented form. Most of the milk is consumed locally.

The products of the goat are similar to those of the sheep except that goats tend to be larger and produce cashmere, once a major Mongolian export but less so after the late-twentieth-century collapse in world prices. Camel down is exported by Mongols, while camel meat is eaten locally, although camels are gen-

erally too valuable to slaughter as food. Both camel and mare's milk are fermented into beverages. The latter, known in English as koumiss, is the preferred Mongolian beverage, while the former is also happily consumed wherever it is available. Neither product is exported. Among Mongolia's livestock, cattle are probably the most valuable for export, but most are raised in geographically limited areas of Mongolia, where rain is sufficient and grass is lush enough to support the cattle. Beef has become an export of growing importance in the last ten years, while leather and cow hides have been important exports since the 1930s. Cow's milk is used like other livestock milks, mostly in fermented forms. Beef is a common food only in areas where cattle are raised.

Thus, except for a small number of products for which there is a demand and which Mongolia can produce for export, the country's traditional economy is largely for subsistence. Mongolia's traditional economy also suffers from its vulnerability to natural disasters such as winter storms when the ground freezes solid and the livestock cannot eat plants under the snow, which can reduce herds to minimal levels almost overnight, and the continued problem of disease epidemics. When livestock numbers plummet, the effect ripples through the rest of the economy and can quickly counterbalance economic gains achieved in more modern sectors. Before the heavy losses of the winter of 1999–2000, Mongolia had almost 33 million head of livestock, mostly sheep (14.6 million) and goats (11.0 million) but also cattle (3.7 million) and horses (3.0 million), as well as a much smaller number of camels (356,400).

Agriculture is practiced to a limited extent in Mongolia, focusing principally on wheat and potatoes, along with a few hardy vegetables. There is some irrigation, but by and large the climate limits agricultural production and soils are usually not rich enough to sustain high yields. In part this is a reflection of severe environmental damage dating back to the Communist era, when production was stressed regardless of the environmental cost.

The Modern Economy and Its Limits

Most important within Mongolia's modern economy is a large mining sector, and since Mongolia has substantial mineral resources, most still unexploited, this sector will continue to grow. There is also a manufacturing sector, mostly based in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia's capital, producing both for increasingly sophisticated domestic consumption and for export. In addition, there is a large trade and services sector that includes a well-established tourism industry, big-game

hunting services for foreigners, and site services for filmmakers.

Mongolia's modern economy faces severe restrictions, the most important one being an inadequate transportation network. The main railroad, less than 2,000 kilometers long, runs north-south, from Russia to China. There are branches to the Nalayh coal fields and into north central Mongolia and the Erdenet mining region. There are railroads in eastern Mongolia, but most are narrow-gauge and were created to support long-gone Soviet forces. Upkeep is poor. They are linked only to Russia's railroads, and not to Mongolia's other rail lines. The modern highway system, consisting of only 1,300 kilometers, is even more limited than rail lines, and new construction is minimal.

Mongolia's modern economic sector must have access to world markets to prosper, but because of poor transportation, development is more or less limited to the north-south rail corridor, its few branches, and a few other points hooked into the Russian road net. The principal areas covered are Bayan-Olgii *aimag* (province) and parts of eastern Mongolia. Elsewhere, there are only dirt roads at best; at worst, areas are accessible only by horse or camel or by all-terrain vehicle.

Given Mongolia's limited population and resources, these transportation problems will persist indefinitely. As a consequence, most of Mongolia's mineral riches will remain inaccessible. The most important of these resources, mined at some two hundred locations, are coal, copper, gold (3,473 kilograms of the latter were mined during the first six months of 2000), molybdenum, tin, tungsten, and fluor spar. In the 1990s, production of petroleum and diamonds also began. Also present and sometimes exploited in small quantities are phosphates, nickel, zinc, wolfram, uranium, iron, and silver. Most of the minerals mined are also processed in Mongolia; mineral processing constitutes a major portion of the country's heavy industry. Copper, molybdenum, and fluor spar together account for 60 percent of Mongolia's export income.

After a number of late-twentieth-century shocks, above all the sudden end of Soviet aid (equal to 30 percent of Mongolia's gross national product) in 1990, Mongolia's economy has been stabilizing. That in large part is thanks to international help, including aid from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, which have played an active role not only in financing Mongolian development but in regularizing the Mongolian banking system and bringing it up to international standards. The old, traditional economy

remains weak, but with improvements in Mongolia's infrastructure, exports should grow. That will enhance Mongolia's ability to survive hard times such as the difficult 1999–2000 winter, which resulted in outright starvation in some parts of the country.

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MONGOLIA—EDUCATION SYSTEM In the past one hundred years, Mongolia's education system has changed in tandem with its dramatic social and political transformations. At the beginning of the twentieth century, a Buddhist theocracy governed what is now Mongolia, and consequently most formal education took place in a system of monasteries that covered Mongolia's territory. These centers of learning not only provided basic religious training, but also offered higher education in topics as diverse as logic, medicine, and the arts. Though sophisticated, the education system was not universal, and no more than 10 percent of the adult population achieved literacy.

This situation changed in the 1920s, when a new one-party government with close ties to the Soviet Union took control of the country. This new government gradually dismantled the religious monastery system and instituted its own system of universal education based on a Russian model. The model excelled in many respects.

In 1989, however, the situation changed again, when the Mongolian government shifted to a multi-party system, loosened its economic ties with Russia, and began the transition to a market economy. These changes had immediate effects on the existing school system, although by 1990, Mongolia could boast a highly educated public with an adult literacy rate of 96 percent. Educational funding has been cut, attendance levels have decreased, and in response to the perceived decline in the quality of public schools, private schools have begun to emerge as educational options. Through these various political changes, Mongolian educational systems have had to overcome common obstacles—a substantial mobile pastoralist population, a transportation system depending on unpaved roads, and the lowest population density on the planet—to reach the minds of individual Mongolians.

Prerevolutionary Education

At the beginning of the twentieth century, a Tibetan Buddhist theocracy had governed the territory of Mongolia for nearly three hundred years. By 1900, nearly 1,700 monasteries checkered Mongolia's territory and served as clinics, courts, markets, centers for the arts, and schools for the local population. Novice monks were trained in the basics of Buddhist religion, while a few select students advanced to higher degrees in the educational system. Generally, the largest monasteries contained four academic colleges—Buddhist studies and debate, Buddhist tantra (study of a difficult regime of psychophysical exercises meant to speed the practitioner to a perfected state of a Buddha), Tibetan medical science, and Buddhist astrology, which included subjects such as divination, mathematics, and rhetoric. Depending on the discipline, a student might require twenty years to attain the highest degree.

Although nearly one in five Mongolians was counted as a monk in 1921, many Mongolians did not pass through monastery schools. In larger settlements, the government established schools that trained youth to enter the country's small secular bureaucracy. In western Mongolia, for example, a school was established in 1761 to train pupils in the Mongolian, Manchu, and Tibetan languages. In addition to formal schooling, a great deal of education took place in the home and community. Children learned the knowledge necessary for herding from their parents, and occasionally parents invited monks to their home to read scriptures and teach their children short lessons. In addition, skilled craftspeople passed the knowledge of blacksmithing, woodworking, felting, and folk medicine to apprentices outside the monastery system.

The Push for Universal Education

Although the formal education system in prerevolutionary times managed to educate advanced Buddhist scholars and bureaucrats, only a small proportion of the population learned how to read. In the 1920s, this situation began to change as a new one-party secular government supported largely by the nascent Soviet Union pushed to modernize the country according to the Soviet model. Along with this modernization effort came the goal of universal education. By 1934, the government had built fifty-nine state elementary schools, and five years later, the number of state primary schools had grown to ninety-three. Communities and parents, fearing the loss of educational opportunities with the dissolution of the monastic system, had also established more than one hundred voluntary schools, which were taken over by the state in

1939. Still, according to the scholar Charles Bawden (1968: 380), by 1940, only 11 percent of children were being taught in schools of any sort, and the literacy rate for individuals eight years and over was no more than 20 percent.

While the government was building state schools and working toward higher literacy rates, it was also dismantling monasteries; after a series of purges in the 1930s, nearly all monasteries had been abandoned or destroyed. Throughout the middle of the twentieth century, the Mongolian government continued to promote basic literacy. By 1965, all Mongolians were guaranteed four years of education, and the eight-year general-education and labor-polytechnic school system proposed in the same year eventually led to eight years of free education for all Mongolians.

In the 1940s, Mongolia's government began to complement its secondary school network with a system of higher education. In 1942, the Mongolian State University was established in the capital city of Ulaanbaatar as the state's first nationally funded institute for higher education. It was modeled after universities in Russia and had three departments—pedagogy, medicine, and veterinary medicine. Within a decade, the university was establishing semiautonomous research teaching institutes—the State Pedagogical Institute in 1951, the Agricultural Institute in 1958, and the Medical Institute in 1961. During this time, Mongolia began to form academic exchanges with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, and many Mongolians began to travel to Moscow and eastern Europe for advanced training in the arts and sciences.

Education Today

By 1990, the state schools offered ten years of free education throughout the Mongolian countryside. To fulfill the goal of education for all, children of nomadic families were sent to central settlements and provided with free boarding. Although most education took place in the Mongolian language, Russian was generally required as a second language, and several prestigious schools in larger cities conducted classes exclusively in Russian. After secondary school, students who passed admissions exams were granted free access to higher education in Ulaanbaatar or several other Mongolian cities. The best students were given the option of continuing their studies in the Soviet Union or in other cooperating countries in Europe.

Several indicators attest to the quality and coverage that the Mongolian education system had attained by 1990. Primary school enrollment was nearly universal at 98 percent, while 85 percent of students pro-

gressed to secondary school and 15 percent to higher education. Due to this high degree of coverage, the adult literacy rate had reached 96 percent. In 1989, there were 615 state schools, and 14.5 percent of pupils, mostly from herding families, lived in dormitory accommodations.

As Mongolia's economy worsened in the 1990s, the education system experienced several difficulties. Government budget constraints led to decreased funding for schools, while increased fuel costs took money away from teaching to the necessary task of heating classrooms in winter. Attendance has fallen, especially in the countryside, where families frequently keep their children at home to help with herding. To compensate for reduced budgets for higher education, a student fee structure was introduced in 1993, whereby student-paid tuition was expected to cover the full cost of teachers' salaries. Many students who would have had free higher education before 1993 are now unable to pay the tuition for a bachelor's degree. Meanwhile, in 1991, the Mongolian parliament authorized the first private higher-education institutions, which by 1997 had enrolled about 30 percent of the country's 36,000 full-time college students. Despite these changes, many Mongolians still maintain a deep respect and concern for education and will probably work to maintain the advances they achieved in the last century.

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MONGOLIA—HISTORY Mongolia has two histories, one before the Mongols emerged as a distinct people, and one after. Before the Mongols, the area of today's Mongolia was host to a variety of cultures, some directly ancestral to the Mongols, some not. They included hunter-gatherers, farmers, even fishermen, and from the second half of the first millennium BCE, various groups of pastoral nomads. Such groups introduced those cultural elements that were to typify the area subsequently: an extremely mobile way of life based on the horse; extensive herding, usually of sheep, but also of goats, cattle, and later, camels; the *ger* (yurt),

the basis of steppe mobility; and probably koumiss drinking and much of the shared intellectual culture of the area as well. Most famous among the pastoral groups were the Xiongnu, competitors of the Chinese Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE); the Xianbei, proto-Mongols and very active in China; the Rouran, with whom the European Avars may be connected; and various Turkic-speaking groups from whom the Mongols borrowed much, including their script.

The Mongols as such first appeared in the ninth century CE, initially under the control of others, including the Khitan, founders of the Liao dynasty (907–1125), and the Jurchen, the Tungus-speaking successors to the Liao and founders of the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234). Although sedentary, the Jurchen followed the example of the Khitan in maintaining a presence deep into the steppe, using steppe groups as allies.

Among them seems to have been the young Mongol chieftain Temujin (c. 1162–1227), later Genghis Khan. In his time the Mongols, confined to an area consisting of modern central and eastern Mongolia and adjacent parts of Siberia, were divided into competing herding units of varying sizes. These herding units, in turn, were loosely associated with one another through elite kinship links and were identified with peoples and even confederations, all with hereditary leaderships. Other than this, higher political organization was entirely lacking, thus the importance of the military organization imposed on the Mongols by the Jurchen Jin dynasty.

After an inauspicious start (his father, a minor chieftain, was poisoned, and Temujin's mother and siblings were abandoned on the steppe), Temujin gradually gained power, at first with the support only of his father-in-law, then as an ally of the Jurchen Jin dynasty, and finally on his own, at last uniting most of the steppe under his banner. In recognition of this fact he was elected Genghis Khan (Universal Khan) by his supporters in 1206, marking the formal beginning of the Mongolian empire.

The Growth of the Mongol Empire

Mongol expansion had begun even before, in 1205, with raids on the Xi Xia kingdom. By 1209, Mongol scouts had penetrated today's northern Kazakhstan and Turkistan, subduing the Uighurs. Raids began on Jurchen Jin China in 1211, and by 1214 the Mongols were powerful enough to besiege the Jin capital, Zhongdu, near the site of modern Beijing. Alarmed by this advance, the Jin court fled south in 1215, leaving its capital and much of northern China to the Mongols. Expansion westward began shortly thereafter,



KEY EVENTS IN MONGOLIA'S HISTORY

- 9th century CE** The Mongols first appear as a distinct people.
- 1206** Genghis Khan unites Mongol tribes, marking the beginning of the Mongolian empire.
- 1223** Mongol expansion has reached Russia.
- 1229-1241** During the reign of Ogodei the empire expands farther into China and west into Europe.
- 1259** The empire is racked by civil war with the empire divided among several rulers.
- 1279-1368** The Mongol Yuan dynasty rules in China.
- 14th-16th century** The Mongolian dark age of internal chaos and invasion from Siberia.
- 1578** Mongolia emerges from the dark age with the restoration of Buddhism.
- 1644-1911** The Qing (Manchu) dynasty in China extends its control into Mongolia.
- 1911-1921** Mongolia is saved from virtual extinction by the fall of the Manchus in China and it declares independence.
- 1924** Mongolia comes under Soviet control.
- 1920s-1930s** Mongolia is transformed into a Soviet republic.
- 1992** With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Mongolia becomes an independent nation.
- 1990s** Mongolia receives much financial investment from the West.
- 2000** Reformed Communists are victorious in national elections.

initially directed at what is now Chinese Turkistan, and then at western Turkistan and Khwarizm. The Khwarizm empire collapsed almost overnight in the face of a determined Mongol onslaught. The Mongols continued on into Iran and in 1223 appeared in Russia for the first time. The foundations of a world empire had been laid.

Genghis Khan died in 1227 after completing the conquest of the Xi Xia kingdom. After a short interregnum, his second son, Ogodei (1185–1241), was elected khan in 1229. Ogodei continued his father's work both in China, where he completed the conquest of the Jin in 1234 and began Mongol attacks on the Song dynasty, and in the west. Under Ogodei, Mongol armies conquered Russia and advanced to the suburbs of Vienna.

After Ogodei's death in 1241 came another interregnum, after which his son Guyuk (reigned 1245–1247) was elected his successor. But Guyuk did not long survive his accession, probably succumbing to poison. After yet another interregnum, during which intense political maneuvering delayed election of a new khan for some years, Mongke (reigned 1251–

1259), the eldest son of Genghis Khan's youngest son, came to the throne.

By this time, internal political pressures were tearing the Mongolian empire apart. Guyuk, for example, appears to have been on the verge of open warfare with Batu (d. 1255?), the son of Genghis Khan's eldest son and ruler of the Golden Horde in Russia. Mongke, who enjoyed Batu's support, unleashed a great purge against the house of Ogodei that further exacerbated tensions.

In spite of these tensions, Mongke was able to consolidate his power and continue Mongolian expansion. With the help of his younger brother, Khubilai (1215–1294), he strengthened Mongol rule in north China and began an advance to outflank the Song. Mongke sent his younger brother, Hule'u (d. 1265), to Iran to continue the advance into the Middle East. Batu continued to rule in Russia, while the descendants of another son of Genghis Khan held much of western Turkistan.

Under Mongke, Mongolia was a hotbed of international exchange centered on the new Mongolian capital of Karakorum. Numerous descriptions of the city survive, thanks to its many foreign visitors. Perhaps the

most famous descriptions are those of Mongke's great hall for feasting and drinking, with its semiautomated beverage fountain, set to spout various fermented beverages at the sound of a trumpet. Visitors from France rubbed elbows with Chinese, Tibetans, Persians, Khwarizmians, Uighurs, and of course Mongols.

Decline, Renewal, and Decline

The death of Mongke in 1259 unleashed a civil war. Khubilai eventually won, but his election as khan was recognized outside China and Mongolia only by Hule'u in Iran. The Golden Horde now went its own way and even fought a war with Mongol Iran. Another claimant to universal rule soon emerged in the form of Khaidu (d. 1303), a descendent of Ogodei, who waged war against Khubilai and his house for many decades. Also splitting the Mongols was the conversion of those in the east to Buddhism and almost all others to Islam.

Khubilai continued to assert his control over Mongolia, but his power base was in China, not Mongolia, which increasingly became a backwater. Mongolia had already been depopulated by the very process of expansion. Increasingly, the Mongols living there became impoverished, and later Mongol rulers in China even had to buy back Mongol slaves from Chinese and other owners.

When the Mongol Yuan dynasty of China fell in 1368, the ruling house sought to return to the steppe with its remaining supporters, but many had to stay behind because they were cut off by Chinese rebels. Although the so-called Northern Yuan put up a serious resistance, Mongolia could no longer support conquest or even a court. The area quickly fell into a chaotic Mongolian dark age that persisted until the sixteenth century. Much of Mongolia itself came under the rule of Oirat invaders from Siberia. Only on the fringes of the steppe, in what is now Inner Mongolia, did Mongolian literacy and Buddhism continue to exist.

Mongolian recovery is traditionally dated to the invitation extended by Altan Khan (1507–1583) in 1578 to the head of the Tibetan dGe-Lugs-pa Buddhist order to come to Mongolia and restore Buddhism. Altan Khan granted the Tibetan prelate the title Dalai Lama and recognized his superior religious authority. In exchange, Altan Khan became the secular protector of the religion, thereby reestablishing a relationship that had once existed under Khubilai between the khan and the Sa-sKya bLa-ma aPhags-pa (1235–1280), Khubilai's principal Tibetan ally and religious co-head of state.

Mongolia continued to flourish for most of the next century and was able to field armies that threatened even China. During this period, a Mongolian literary golden age emerged, and a restored Buddhism once again became the dominant religion of Mongolia. The many new monasteries that arose often served the role of urban centers in traditionally nomadic Mongolia; this was true of the cluster of monasteries and temples that grew into the current capital of Ulaanbaatar.

In Mongolia, the dominant ethnic group was the Khalkha. Other groups of Mongols lived in what is now Inner Mongolia and in that portion of Siberia later known as Buryatia. Therefore, Mongolians lived over a far larger area in the seventeenth century than they had five hundred years before. In addition, a large part of the West, principally northern Turkistan and south Russia to the Volga, had been conquered by the descendants of the Oirat, the Dzungars, and other Western Mongols.

The era of Mongol renewal came to an end in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries as the Manchus (founders of the Chinese Qing dynasty, 1644–1911) extended their influence to Mongolia. Mongolia was more effectively conquered by the Manchus than by any previous conquerors, thanks to the Manchu use of firearms, mostly traditional Chinese but including some supplied by the Jesuits.

Although the Buddhist religion of Mongolia was protected by the Manchus, who also respected the authority of the Dalai Lama, the Mongols completely lost their independence and freedom. Mongolia's problems worsened considerably with the appearance of Chinese colonists in the nineteenth century along with growing Russian influence. Mongolia's population was impoverished, diseased, and in decline, with little hope for the future. Only the collapse of Manchu rule in China in 1911 saved Mongolia.

The Communist and Post-Communist Periods

Mongolia was among various parts of the former Qing empire declaring independence in 1911, but not all of Mongolia could be united under the Autonomous Regime that followed, since Inner Mongolia and the Ordos desert region remained under Chinese control, while the Russians continued to hold sway over Buryatia. Between 1911 and 1921 Mongolia was technically a republic, but was actually under the close control of the Jebtsun Damba Khutukhtu of Urga (Ulaanbaatar), Mongolia's principal incarnating lama. When his regime proved unable to resist the forces of Chinese warlords and White Russian armies, the new Soviet regime of Russia sponsored an uprising by a

small group of revolutionaries, including Sukhebaatar (1893–1923), later a national hero. The rebels took advantage of popular discontent with the White Russians and others to establish a Communist regime, at first theoretically still subject to the authority of the still popular Jebtsun Damba Khutukhtu, but after his death in 1924 subject only to the orders of the Comintern.

The seventy years of Communist rule were difficult times for Mongolia, but they brought gains as well. The principal difficulties resulted from the so-called leftist deviations of the late 1920s and 1930s that attempted to impose collectivization and that led to rebellion in Mongolia, as in the Soviet Union itself. At one point, the Mongolian Communist regime had all but lost control of the country and had to have its power reestablished with Soviet military help. The Communist regime in Mongolia was also threatened by events in Inner Mongolia, where the Japanese sponsored a limited Inner Mongolian autonomy under nationalist leader Teh Wang, who could present himself as an alternative to Moscow.

On the credit side, the Communist government built up Mongolia's infrastructure, including its first railways and modern highways, the first widespread system of public schools in Mongolian history, as well as a modern but limited health care system. Under the Mongolian dictator Marshal Horloogiyn Choybalsan (1895–1952), the steep decline in Mongolia's living conditions and population was finally arrested. Under Choybalsan's successor Yumjaagiyn Tsedenbel (1916–1991), who held power until 1984, a certain amount of prosperity was achieved. Mongolia, however, was still forced to subordinate its interests to those of Soviet Russia as when, during and before World War II, the Mongols actively fought against the Japanese.

The era of perestroika, followed by the fall of Communism in Mongolia, has meant very rapid change, not all of it favorable for the Mongols. Since the late 1980s, Mongolia has been increasingly on its own economically and has not always been able to cope under this circumstance. Under Communism, the Soviet Union supplied goods at low cost, albeit of poor quality, in exchange for Mongolian minerals and food. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, these goods have had to be bought elsewhere with scarce hard currency. Mongolia's difficulty has been that its traditional exports, such as mutton, are not in great demand, while on the other hand the nation must import much of its food, most industrial goods, and all of its technology. This situation began to change in the late 1990s, after a decade of intensive Western capital investment in Mongolia, much of it

sponsored by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which has created new or modernized sources of hard-currency income. Mongolia has also established new industries to reduce its dependence upon foreign sources of manufacture and raw materials. The Mongols have even begun producing and refining oil.

Problems remain, however, and the vast livestock losses of the winter of 1999–2000 have shown the continued weakness of the traditional economy upon which most Mongol income is still based. Mongolia also lacks the highly skilled experts needed to make its new economy work well, although the demographic flood (baby boom) of the Tsedenbel years has now translated into a potentially large labor force for the future. Barring a Chinese invasion, which could happen because Beijing has never reconciled itself to the "loss" of Mongolia, Mongolia's future seems bright, even under the reformed Communists reelected in a landslide in the elections of 2000. More clouded is the fate of those Mongols living outside Mongolia, but relations with the Buryats, with whom the Mongols share a strong Lamaist tradition, remain strong, and the collapse of the Russian Federation seems a strong possibility, in which case the Buryats might federate with Mongolia.

Perhaps the best sign of a potentially bright future for Mongolia is its return to the most important cultural values of the past. Not only is Buddhism undergoing a major revival, along with associated elements of Tibetan culture, once so important for the Mongols, but even shamans are practicing openly once again. In 2000, the president of Kalmykia came to Ulaanbaatar to participate in an official offering to the spirit of Genghis Khan. Since he is the one universal Mongolian symbol, such a celebration clearly marks the intention of the Mongols to reclaim their nationalism and past heritage.

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MONGOLIA—HUMAN RIGHTS Despite the association of Mongolia with its formidable thirteenth leader, Ghengis Khan, citizens of modern Mongolia are not subject to wild military excesses. But while Mongolia's record on traditional civil and political rights is impressive, widespread poverty, inadequate health care, the collapse of education, unemployment, and other shortcomings in the area of socioeconomic rights represent challenges.

The U.S. Department of State, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) have been closely involved with human rights issues in Mongolia. These issues include civil and political, socioeconomic, and religious rights, along with rights of minorities, women, children, prisoners, and refugees. Touching upon the subject of refugees necessitates a

brief digression into an area of serious concern: the human rights situation in Inner Mongolia, the half of Mongolia that remains an "autonomous" province in China. Inner Mongolia is home to an estimated 3 million Mongols, more than the 2.3 million of "Outer" Mongolia, the independent and sovereign country known as Mongolia.

International Assessment of Mongolia's Human Rights Situation

Amnesty International has three primary concerns in Mongolia: (1) the application of the death penalty; (2) the death of prisoners by starvation, according to reports from the period 1995–1997; and (3) the failure to allow conscientious objectors, primarily Buddhist monks, either exemption from the compulsory one year of military service required of males from ages eighteen to twenty-six or alternative civilian service. The U.S. Department of State's reports on human rights from 1996 through 1999 list the following concerns: (1) poor prison conditions, with improvements after a prison reform program introduced in 1997, and credible reports of police and prison brutality; (2) the unsolved murder of the minister for infrastructure, a leader of the 1990 democratic movement, which may have been politically motivated; (3) allegations of court corruption hindering the ability to receive a fair trial; (4) attempts, albeit limited, by the government to manipulate the media; (5) violence against women and the existence of homeless street children, with a progressive decrease in the latter but an increase in the former, with evidence of sex trafficking.

The UNHCHR has been involved in human rights projects in Mongolia since 1991. According to the UNHCHR, problems include rights violations in the penal system, poverty, the decreasing quantity and quality of basic social services, increasing gender disparities, the existence of street children, and the threat of HIV-AIDS.

In compliance with international human rights law, Mongolia, like all other states that are party to international law, periodically reports to the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. On 31 March 2000, the committee at its sixty-eighth session recommended—concerning article 40 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—that Mongolia clarify domestic law to ensure that the covenant shall have precedence over domestic law. Also, the committee requested more information on the status of women, trafficking in women, prisoners, and any potential threats to the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. In addition, the committee urged Mongolia to



PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF 1992-MONGOLIA

The issue of human rights was in the forefront of the Constitution of 1992.

We, the people of Mongolia:

Strengthening the independence and sovereignty of the nation,
Cherishing human rights and freedoms, justice, and national unity,
Inheriting the traditions of national statehood, history, and culture,
Respecting the accomplishments of human civilization,
And aspiring toward the supreme objective of building a
humane, civil and democratic society in the country

Hereby proclaim the Constitution of Mongolia.

Source: International Constitutional Law. Retrieved 11 March
2002, from: <http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law>.

abolish the death penalty and improve prison conditions. The 17 March 1999 meeting of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination considered Mongolia's compliance with the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The committee remained concerned about street children and rural health care. In addition, the committee noted that, in the early 1990s, reports had circulated of Chinese citizens being expelled from Mongolia, but that the situation had "stabilized." Although the U.N. considered these expulsions racial discrimination, the Chinese citizens at issue may have been ethnic Mongols from Inner Mongolia. In this case, these "forced expulsions" may represent forced repatriation of Inner Mongols. Forced repatriation of Inner Mongolian refugees would represent a serious violation of human rights.

Human Rights Provisions in Mongolian Law

The Mongolian government has made a clear commitment to human rights, unlike any other former Soviet republic or Soviet bloc country. The Mongolian constitution, adopted in January 1992, upholds universal human rights principles and provides for special protection of human rights standards. The UNHCHR reports that the constitution "has integrated international human-rights standards and is key to the promotion and protection of human rights in the country" (UNHCHR 1998: 2). The Mongolian government is

characterized by separate legislative, judiciary, and executive powers. Both the U.S. Department of State and the UNHCHR's 1998 Memorandum of Understanding document in detail the Mongolian government's structural commitments to human rights. The Mongolian parliament has a Human Rights Committee. A draft law for the establishment of a national commission on human rights was under parliamentary review in 2001. Beginning in 1994, legislative reform and restructuring of the independent judiciary was carried out with the technical assistance of the UNHCHR. This included, but was not limited to, reform of the criminal code and a national program for human rights education. Regarding freedom of the media and of speech, Mongolia had over 940 registered newspapers, 195 magazines, and twenty-two registered political parties in 2000. Despite the criticism it has received for upholding the death penalty, Mongolia has reduced the number of capital crimes from eighteen in 1994 to four in 2000. Finally, Mongolia has ratified almost all of the significant international human rights instruments, with the notable exception of the 1951 Status on the Convention of Refugees.

Inner Mongolia

Grave human rights violations exist to the south of Mongolia among the ethnic Mongolian population living under Chinese rule in the so-called Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR), also referred to as

Southern Mongolia. Recent Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports dealing with Mongolia actually relate largely to the Chinese government crackdown that has persisted over the decades on ethnic Mongolians in Inner Mongolia. Mongols in China have suffered severe human rights violations for decades. Some of the more brutal episodes occurred during the Hundred Flowers Bloom campaign of 1957, the Han assimilation movements of 1958–1960 and 1966–1976, the Great Leap Forward of 1959–1965, and the Cultural Revolution of the 1970s. Estimates of the overall ethnic minority death toll in China are as high as 6.2 million. The Great Leap Forward in Inner Mongolia brought not only massive human rights violations but also intensive desertification, an ecological disaster. The Chinese government continues to employ a planned policy of assimilation in Inner Mongolia by relocating Han Chinese there to dilute the minority population. Escapees from Inner Mongolia have set up an Inner Mongolian League for the Defense of Human Rights, with chapters in the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France.

Outlook for the Future

Civil and political human rights problems in Mongolia are no greater than those in the United States, where domestic violence, child abuse, the application of the death penalty, and problems with police violence, among other things, commonly raise accusations by other nations of human rights violations. However, spiraling levels of socioeconomic collapse, correlated to increased levels of foreign assistance, hold the potential to damage Mongolia's hitherto outstanding record. A corporate-governmental human rights partnership, the so-called "fourth generation" of human rights, has the potential to help Mongolia become a successful model for twenty-first-century human rights protection and promotion.

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MONGOLIA—POLITICAL SYSTEM Mongolia has a rich history of state development. By 1203 Genghis Khan (1162–1227) had united nomadic tribes in Central Asia and established a Mongolian empire that extended from the Yellow Sea to the Mediterranean. To administer this empire, he and his successors created an effective working governmental structure, which dealt with key issues such as war and peace, administration, taxes, and trade, civil, and criminal matters. Despite this administrative tradition, Mongolia's modern political system has changed dramatically.

Following a peaceful democratic revolution in 1989, Mongolia adopted its fourth constitution (1992), under which the government is based on the principle of separation of powers. The major three branches of government, both centrally and locally, are the legislature, executive, and judiciary. Political parties are key players in the governance of country.

Legislature: State Great Hural

Mongolia's parliament is called the State Great Hural (SGH); it passes laws and sends them to the president, who may sign them into law or veto them



CONSTITUTION OF 1992-MONGOLIA

Mongolia's 1992 Constitution is the nation's fourth, the successor to the Constitutions of 1924, 1940, and 1960, which were enacted in the Communist period from 1921–1989. The Constitution, adopted by the 12th People's Great Hural (Ih Hural) in January 1992, rejected Communism and embraced a hybrid form of parliamentary and representative democracy. It is commonly called the "democratic" Constitution.

Legislative power is assigned to a seventy-six-member multiparty, single-chambered Parliament (Ih Hural). Representatives are chosen for four-year terms through direct free elections. It established a Prime Minister who selects a cabinet, the members of which must be approved by the Parliament, and a President, also elected to a four-year term, who is head of state. It created an independent judiciary with a Supreme Court and a Constitutional Court empowered to supervise implementation of the Constitution, solve disputes, and guarantee the strict observance of the Constitution.

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Source: Alan J. K. Sanders. (1996) *Historical Dictionary of Mongolia*. London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc.

within ten days. The president's veto can be overridden by a two-thirds vote of members of the SGH. The SGH establishes ministries and agencies, appoints and removes the prime minister and other ministers, approves the state budget for all government institutions, and certifies presidential elections. It is authorized to ratify and reject international agreements, establish and sever diplomatic relations with foreign states, determine the basis of the domestic and foreign policies of the state, hold national referendums, and declare a state of emergency or a state of war. The current SGH, the third since the 1992 Constitution, was elected in July 2000. The public elects the members of the SGH by direct vote for four-year terms. It has one chamber, with seventy-six members, and it holds spring and autumn sessions, each for seventy-five days.

Executive: President and Government

The president, who is elected to a four-year term by direct and secret ballot, must be a Mongolian native citizen, at least forty-five years of age, and with permanent residency in Mongolia of at least five years. The Constitution limits presidents to two terms in office. A political party that has a seat in the SGH has the authority to nominate candidates. The Constitution did not provide for a vice president. In the absence of the president,

the speaker of the SGH presides. Constitutional law professionals consider the presidency in Mongolia to be a weak and ceremonial institution. However, the Constitution does give the president the power to veto a law or act passed by the SGH as well as the right to appeal legislative decisions to the Constitutional Court, the power to nominate the prime minister for appointment by the SGH, the power to grant pardons, and the power to appoint and recall heads of plenipotentiary missions to foreign countries. The president also functions as the commander in chief of the armed forces and has the sole power to appoint all judges. In 1999 the president rejected the nominee for the chief judgeship and months later approved another candidate.

The SGH appoints all government ministers; they serve four-year terms and report to the legislature. The SGH is empowered to recall the prime minister, which results in the resignation of the entire cabinet. The president nominates only the prime minister, who proposes all other ministers. Therefore, the government is more dependent on the SGH than on the president. The Constitution did not provide the government an effective mechanism for interaction with the SGH, however. In disagreements between the legislature and executive, the president can use his veto power. This power is not as effective as in the United States, how-

ever, because a veto is possible only if the president and prime minister are from one political party and have reached agreement on the disputed issue. There are eleven ministries, but each government is authorized to form its own structure.

Judiciary: Supreme Court and Constitutional Court

Judicial power is divided between the Supreme and Constitutional Courts, two independent bodies that have different jurisdictions and play different roles. The Constitution says judges shall be independent and laws are supreme, and no one, including the president, members of the SGH, or the government, may interfere with the judicial power. The president appoints all judges. The Constitution does not provide a fixed term for judges or establish impeachment procedures. The Supreme Court lacks the power of judicial review, and on 25 April 2000 the United Nations Human Rights Committee requested that Mongolia provide more information on independence and impartiality of the judiciary and due process of law. The Supreme Court is struggling to attain judicial independence, and the courts are slowly moving toward reform.

The courts' jurisdiction is limited to hearing ordinary criminal, civil, and administrative cases. There are thirty-nine trial and twenty-two appeals courts and one Supreme Court. Seventeen of a total of 360 judges sit on the Supreme Court, which has criminal and civil divisions. The Supreme Court makes formal interpretation of all laws, except the Constitution. Its opinions are binding and final. While judges hold office, their party membership is suspended.

The Constitutional Court is the only institution authorized to handle constitutional matters. The SGH appoints nine members of the court for six-year terms. The court members elect its chairman. The court acts independently, confronting laws and acts passed by legislature, and settling disagreements between government institutions. In November 2000 the Constitutional Court ruled that the First Amendment to the Constitution (allowing a member of parliament to hold two positions in government at the same time), which the State Great Hural passed in December 1999 was unconstitutional because it violated an amendment procedure provided in the Constitution. The legislature, the government, and some people were not happy with this opinion, but they abided by the ruling.

Local Government

There are twenty two *aimags* (rural provinces) in Mongolia. The government appoints the mayor of

each *aimag*, who functions as its chief executive. The Citizens Representative Hural, elected by the local people, supervises the mayor. Each *aimag* has a local court. Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia's capital, has its own governing body headed by the city's mayor.

Political Parties

There are twenty-one registered political parties in Mongolia. Only three major parties, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP), the Mongolian National Democratic Party (MNDP), and the Mongolian Social Democratic Party (MSDP), play key roles. The MPRP, the former Communist party, ruled the nation for seventy years in a one-party system until 1989. The MPRP's leaders state that the party has been reformed and is now committed to social-democratic principles. The MNDP and MSDP are young, influential democratic parties. They created the Democratic Coalition to run for the 1996 parliamentary elections and won the majority of seats in the legislature. However, this coalition failed to keep the confidence of people during its four years in power, and the public favored the MPRP in the parliamentary elections in July 2000.

Mongolia's Political Achievement

The most important achievement for Mongolia in last ten years has been that, despite some internal controversies between the government branches, it has been able to institute and develop a democratic form of government with the essential attributes of checks and balances. Each branch acts independently, but overlapping powers enable each to contribute to the nation's successful transition from a centralized economy to a free market economy and from one-party dictatorship system to a multiparty system and democracy. Even though different political parties have gained majorities in the legislature, over the years the government has retained its leadership and strong commitment to democracy and human rights in Mongolia.

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MONGOLIA-CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONS Ever since Russia pushed into the Far East and China extended its domination north of the Great Wall, Mongolia has been one arena of the "Great Game" in the struggle for empire between Russia and China. The Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu (1874–1924), Mongolia's leader at the time, characterized Mongolia's geopolitical position as a "critical condition, like piled up eggs, in the midst of neighboring nations." Russians have historically regarded Mongolia as a buffer state, while the Chinese have viewed Mongolia as historically part of China. After the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1911, Mongolia asserted, and has since preserved, its independence as a nation in the midst of two hegemonic powers. Russian policy initially sought to preserve Mongolian autonomy from China but did not support Mongolian independence, in order to maintain Russia-China relations and not alarm Japan. After 1917 the Soviet Union did eventually support Mongolian independence but was not firm in this support. China, however, persistently attempted to absorb Mongolia into the new Chinese nation-state.

The 1911 Chinese Revolution and Mongolian Independence

Following the October 1911 Chinese revolution, the Mongolians declared independence in December 1911 and proclaimed the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu leader of an independent Mongolian nation. Mongolia had enjoyed a special relationship with the Manchu court, and the Mongolians believed that Mongolia was not an integral part of China. At the time, the Chinese maintained that Mongolia was an integral part of China, but it did not have the military strength to force the integration of Mongolia into the new Chinese republic.

Within Russia's czarist government, policy toward Mongolia was also being debated. Russia had not recognized Mongolia's independence, but it was providing Urga, as the Mongolian capital, Ulaanbaatar, then was called, significant political, financial, and military support. In Russo-Japanese negotiations as early as 1907, the Russians considered dividing Mongolia into

outer and inner zones, with Russian and Japanese spheres of influence respectively. The period from 1911 to 1915 was one in which Russia, Mongolia, and China engaged in convoluted negotiations, including frequent secret bilateral talks, and military posturing that eventually led to a June 1915 tripartite agreement that afforded the broadest possible "autonomy" for outer Mongolia at the time and paved the way for its eventual total independence from China. The agreements included provisions on trade, taxes, and other matters but no boundary agreement. However, a neutral zone between outer and inner Mongolia was established.

Following the 1917 Russian Revolution, China rejected the tripartite agreement, and under pressure from Beijing, the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu petitioned for the abolition of Mongolia's autonomy in November 1919, with which China gladly complied. The reassertion of Chinese control did not last long, however. Mongolia became a battlefield in the Russian civil war and the White Russians drove the Chinese from Urga in 1921—only to be defeated themselves at the hands of the Bolsheviks.

Establishment of the Mongolian People's Republic

With the blessings of the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu and the support of the Soviet Union, Mongolian revolutionaries established a Marxist regime in Urga in 1921. But the Soviet Union, like czarist Russia, still viewed Mongolia as a bargaining chip in its relations with China. In May 1924 the Soviet Union recognized China's "full sovereignty" over outer Mongolia. However, a month later, following the death of the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu, Mongolia declared its independence as the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). China's internal problems prevented it from reasserting control; the most it could do was protest the Soviet-Mongolian agreements.

Mongolian independence was bolstered two decades later at the Yalta Conference when the Allies agreed that the status quo in Mongolia be preserved following the war. Following a plebiscite in Mongolia that overwhelmingly supported independence, the Nationalist Chinese government grudgingly agreed to recognize Mongolia's independence in 1946.

Communist China's Quest for Influence

Chinese Communists were also reluctant to acknowledge Mongolian independence and harbored irredentist sentiments. While in Moscow in February 1950, Chinese leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976) raised

the issue with Stalin. Although Mao expressed his desire for the eventual "reunion" of Mongolia with China, he did not allow his irredentist dreams to prevent the conclusion of a Sino-Soviet treaty. The MPR and the Soviet Union were apprehensive about China's ambitions in Mongolia and insisted on a Chinese declaration acknowledging Mongolian independence.

Despite that declaration, China raised the issue again in October 1954 during the first trip of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971) to China after the death of Joseph Stalin. Under intense pressure from Mao, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) reluctantly broached the issue with Khrushchev. Khrushchev, according to his memoirs, declined to speak for Mongolia but did not voice strong opposition. Although the Soviets may have refused to reconsider the status of the MPR, subsequent developments in Russian-Mongolian-Chinese tripartite relations give credence to suggestions that the Soviets acquiesced to China's demand to assume a dominant role in Mongolia.

As Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated in the late 1950s, Soviet complacency over Chinese ambitions in Mongolia turned to alarm. The Soviets responded to the Chinese challenge. Mongolia was caught in the middle of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Ulaanbaatar's initial wish was to remain neutral, and a high-level official commented that the dispute would not influence Mongolia's relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) or the Soviet Union. But its precarious geopolitical circumstances made it impossible to remain neutral for long. Following the open split between the USSR and PRC after the October 1961 Twenty-second Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Congress, Mongolia adopted a pro-Soviet position. In June 1962 Mongolia was the first Asian state to become a full member of the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). This was a clear indication that the MPR had decided to closely cooperate with the USSR to the exclusion of China.

Beijing appealed to Mongolian nationalism in its bid to gain influence in Ulaanbaatar. During the commemoration of the 800th anniversary of Genghis Khan's birth in 1962, the Mongolians dedicated a statue at a location believed to be his birthplace. The PRC also celebrated the event and supported the MPR festivities. Beijing, with both nationalistic and racist overtones, portrayed Genghis Khan as a positive "cultural force." Not surprisingly, the Soviets criticized the celebrations. They characterized Genghis Khan as a reactionary "who had overrun, looted, and burned most of what was then Russia" and said his "bloody invasions" were a "great historical tragedy."

The Present Situation

On 16 December 1962, China announced that MPR leader Tsedenbal (1916–1991) would travel to Beijing to sign an agreement to settle the boundary. After demarcating the boundary, a treaty was signed in Ulaanbaatar on 2 July 1964. This boundary agreement closed a long chapter in Sino-Mongolian relations. Despite the boundary treaty, China and Mongolia remain extremely sensitive about their historical relationship. The triangular Mongolian-Russian-Chinese relationship is entering a new period of flux and possible instability. Democratic Mongolia could emerge as the focal point for a reinvigorated pan-Mongolian nationalism that would surely alarm Russia and China. Russia also needs Mongolia as a buffer state to shield it from an awakening Chinese dragon that is becoming an economic and military power. And apparently the legacy of the Chinese empire lingers in the minds of Chinese. In 1992 China's State Security Ministry revived the specter of Chinese irredentism when it issued a statement saying that: "As of now, the Mongolian region comprises three parts that belong to three countries"—the Russian regions of Tuva and Buryatia, Mongolia, and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region—but "the Mongolian region has from ancient times been Chinese territory."

Eric Hyer

See also: Great Game; Mongol Empire; Trans-Mongolian Railway

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MONGOLIA-SOVIET UNION RELATIONS The Soviet Union's relations with Mongolia, from the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, were driven by

the Kremlin's perceived need to secure its eastern borders against military aggression by Japan before World War II and by Maoist China afterward. To this end, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin (1879–1953) used Mongolia as a pseudo-independent buffer state that could be manipulated from the Kremlin. Using methods similar to those used in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union conducted secret diplomacy with China to assure the Kremlin a monopoly of influence in Mongolia. A secondary motivating force was the promotion of international communism, but in Mongolia's case, ideology was wielded to exert economic pressure to achieve a military-strategic goal.

Mongolia, wedged between the Soviet and Chinese giants, sought (at times unsuccessfully) to maintain its independence from both. The Mongolians had enjoyed good relations with czarist governments for a century and saw the Russians as friends who could protect them from the Chinese. The collapse of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) in China enabled Mongolia to achieve autonomy after nearly three centuries of Chinese rule. A new theocratic government headed by the Bogdo Khan—the eighth Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu, or "living Buddha"—proved itself too weak to govern, and in 1921 two groups of revolutionists, one headed by Dagsomyn Bodoo (1895–1922) and the other by Soliyn Danzan (1884–1924), joined forces to form the Mongolian People's Party and a provisional government.

The revolutionaries were confronted on the one hand by Chinese troops attempting to annul Mongolian autonomy and on the other by White Russian (anti-Communist) forces whom the Red Army had forced out of Siberia. The White Russians gained temporary acceptance by dispersing the Chinese, but they antagonized the Mongolians by committing even worse atrocities.

The Mongolian revolutionaries, sympathetic with the new Communist ideology and desperate to rid themselves of the marauding White Russians, sent seven of their more prominent members to the city of Irkutsk, which was close to the Mongolian border, to seek Soviet military and financial assistance. They sought not only military aid but also assistance in areas covering even the most basic governmental functions.

During the coming two decades these seven members figured prominently in Mongolian political affairs. Besides Bodoo and Danzan, the more noteworthy were Horloogiyn Choybalsan (1895–1952) and Namdini Sukhe Baatar (1893–1923). Choybalsan would eventually become the Stalinist dictator of a communist Mongolia. Sukhe Baatar, who had received Russian military training, would die an early and mys-

terious death but would be elevated to the position of a godlike national hero.

The Advent of Soviet Advisers

Soviet and Comintern (Communist International) advisers who accompanied the Red Army included many ethnic Mongolian Buryats from the Soviet Autonomous Republic of Buryatia who spoke both Russian and Mongolian and were generally better educated than their Kalkha Mongolian counterparts. Quickly inserting themselves at virtually every level of the new Mongolian government, they used their influence to make it a carbon copy of Moscow's Bolshevik regime. The most insidious of these institutional transplants was the Mongolian KGB, installed in the Ministry of Internal Security, which became as pervasive in Mongolian life as the Soviet KGB was in the USSR. Soon the advisers had assumed so many responsibilities that it became painfully evident that the Mongolians had lost control.

Among the Mongolians themselves there were many differences. Under Bodoo's leadership, an "Oath of Accord" was reached in July 1921 that provided for a parliamentary regime under a limited monarchy. Bogdo Khan became titular head of state, and Bodoo became prime minister and foreign minister.

Danzan's group accepted the limited monarchy, but conflicts ensued over organizational methods and economic development strategies. Bodoo and Danzan were both patriotic leaders who wanted relations with the Soviets but also wanted national independence. Without Soviet interference the Mongolians might have been able to work out their differences, but that did not happen.

At the time, Japan was flexing its newfound muscle in nearby Manchuria. In China, Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) and Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) were trying to eliminate warlordism and establish control under the Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party). One objective was restoration of Chinese rule in Mongolia. Stalin assured the Mongolians that the USSR would protect their borders against foreign aggression, but his price was a government responsive to control from Moscow. To achieve this, his agents exploited the Mongolian disagreements by sowing discord, intrigue, and suspicion, including false accusations of spying for foreign powers, especially Japan.

Bodoo, aged twenty-seven, and twelve of his associates, unwilling to go along with the Kremlin's policies, were accused of counterrevolutionary activities, tortured into falsified confessions by Soviet KGB agents, and shot without a trial.

Mongolia's Conversion to a Communist Government

In March 1924, the Bogdo Khan died unexpectedly. Just how and why have never been established, but the Soviets took the opportunity to pressure the Great Hural (Mongolia's national legislature) into declaring Mongolia a Soviet-style republic. In August of that year, the Mongolian People's Party held its Third National Congress. Danzan was elected chairman. In the course of the discussions he asserted that Mongolia should retain its independence from the Soviet Union and asked for a significant reduction of Soviet advisers. He had previously antagonized Choybalsan, then head of the Revolutionary Youth League, by opposing the excessive powers exercised by that group. At the request of El'bekdorji Rinchino (1885–1937), the Buryat Comintern representative, Choybalsan summoned the league's death squad. Members of the squad dragged Danzan out of the meeting and shot him on the spot.

During the remainder of the Third National Congress no Mongolian raised his voice against the Russians. The Congress adopted the Soviet-mandated noncapitalist path to development, declared Mongolia to be a people's republic, and established a single-party system called the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP), which would be the Kremlin's weapon in conducting its dictatorial policy in Mongolia.

The Mongolians, intimidated but not completely cowed, saw they had little choice but to go along with the Kremlin's policies. They were forced to cut off all foreign commercial ties except with the Soviet Union. Mongolian students who had been sent to Western Europe were brought home, and anyone wanting to study abroad had to do so in the Soviet Union. Later, Mongolia's ancient script was abandoned in favor of the Cyrillic alphabet, cutting off the nation's ties with the past.

In 1929, MPRP leftists with their Comintern advisers, determined to push ahead in converting Mongolia into a socialist state, gave Choybalsan responsibility for collectivizing Mongolia's livestock industry. He went at it with a vengeance, confiscating the property of monasteries and temples and expropriating the possessions of high seculars, known as feudals. It was an utter disaster. For centuries, nomadic Mongolian herders had moved their cattle, horses, and sheep as necessary for grazing. Collectivization reduced livestock herds by a third and brought untold misery to Mongolian herdsman, who revolted. Red Army troops who had ostensibly been withdrawn in 1925 had to be brought back to quell the revolt. This

time the troops stayed on. Stalin told Soviet representatives in Mongolia to blame the revolt on Chinese spies and shoot those who continued to resist. In 1932, the MPRP conceded that collectivization had failed and called it off. Choybalsan, MPRP leftists, and Soviet advisers found scapegoats for their own mistakes among rightists, who paid with their lives.

Attacks on Religion

Moscow was determined to beef up the Mongolian army so it could play a greater part in the nation's role as a buffer state. However, a high percentage of young Mongolian males traditionally joined religious orders, where they were exempt from military service. With the growing threat of a Japanese invasion, outlawing religion and shutting down the monasteries were ways to provide men for Mongolia's armed forces. Moscow ordered a brutal religious crackdown. At first Mongolians, who held great reverence for their lamas (Buddhist monks), resisted Soviet pressure; but eventually through persistent, vitriolic antireligious campaigns, the Soviets won out. Tens of thousands of lamas were either shot or escaped into exile in Inner Mongolia. Their monasteries were demolished or devastated.

The Soviets saw this antireligious policy vindicated in July 1939 when the Japanese attempted to invade Mongolia at Nomonkhan on the Khalkhiin River. The Japanese aim was the establishment of an anti-Soviet state that would include Inner and Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Autonomous Republic of Buryatia. The invaders were defeated with great losses by combined Russian and Mongolian forces under Marshal Georgy Zhukov (1896–1974). In 1941, a truce defined the Mongolian border with Manchuria. Rather than attempt another invasion, the Japanese turned their attention toward the Pacific.

Mongolia under Choybalsan

Efforts by Mongolian leaders to resist Soviet control of the nation's internal and external affairs invariably ended up in personal disaster. In 1936, Prime Minister Peljidiyn Genden (1895–1937), who had gotten into an argument with Stalin about Communist treatment of the lamas, was given a year's vacation, then arrested, convicted of treason by a Soviet court, and shot the same day. Of the seven revolutionaries who had originally arranged for Soviet assistance in getting rid of the White Russians, all except Choybalsan met their fate in a similar fashion. Leaders were summoned to Moscow for consultation only to be poisoned en route or imprisoned, condemned to death by the Soviet judiciary, and shot. Post-Soviet figures indicate that thirty-two of Mongolia's political leaders

were executed in Moscow. Virtually all have since been exonerated of any crime and rehabilitated.

Choybalsan was educated at a school for Russian translators, studied at a military academy in Moscow, and spoke fluent Russian. During a conference in Moscow in the early 1930s, he seems to have caught Stalin's eye and moved steadily upward in the Mongolian hierarchy. In the process he played a suspicious role in a number of fabricated political affairs that resulted in mass executions of more than 10 percent of Mongolia's population of 900,000.

It was evident that Stalin had found his man in Choybalsan, one prepared to follow orders without question and wipe out all opposition. With Stalin's assistance, Choybalsan moved swiftly up the political ladder, each rung marked by execution of his rivals. In 1939, he became prime minister, created his own Stalinist cult of personality, and reigned supreme over Mongolia for the remainder of his life.

With Choybalsan in power, Soviet control of Mongolia was consolidated. Mongolia supported the USSR throughout World War II, providing the Red Army with livestock, raw materials, food, and clothing. Mongolia did not enter World War II as a combatant until the very end, when it served the Soviet Union as a base to move swiftly against the Japanese in Manchuria and to capitalize on Japan's defeat.

On 5 January 1946, China recognized Mongolian independence with the existing boundaries, thus fulfilling Moscow's goal of an independent buffer state under its complete control. After the Communist takeover in China in 1949, a brief period of Moscow-Beijing cooperation brought thousands of Chinese workers to Mongolia for construction projects. With the Sino-Soviet split, however, the workers were sent home. As the Sino-Soviet split grew, Mongolia became an armed camp with Chinese and Soviet troops poised against each other along the Sino-Mongolian border, where they remained until the Sino-Soviet rapprochement in the mid-1980s.

In 1952, Choybalsan died in Moscow of liver cancer. He was succeeded by his secretary, Yumjaagiyn Tsendenbal (1916–1991), who continued the close relationship with the Soviet Union. In 1962, Mongolia joined COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) and was integrated into the Soviet economic-political-strategic system. Under Tsendenbal, however, Mongolia's economy stagnated; in 1984, at the behest of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he was ousted from his position as MPRP secretary general and replaced by Prime Minister Jambyn Batmon (1926–1997), a Moscow-trained economist.

In 1989, after conversations with Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev (b. 1931), Batmon introduced the concept of perestroika (openness) to Mongolia, bringing into the open a deluge of MPRP falsifications that had occurred during the Choybalsan and Tsendenbal regimes. Concurrently, the USSR, on the verge of collapse itself, cut off all economic support to Mongolia and withdrew the last remaining Soviet troops.

Relations between Russia and Mongolia after the Collapse of the Soviet Union

In 1990, a group of fewer than twenty young Mongolian intellectuals led a democratic revolution that brought about free elections and voted out a Communist government for the first time in history, thus casting off the Soviet yoke that had held the country in bondage for seventy years. In 1992, a new, fully democratic constitution went into effect.

In its newfound independence, Mongolia has joined the world's market economy; sympathetic foreign nations (including the United States) and nongovernmental organizations such as the Asia Foundation in San Francisco are lending a hand to help build democratic institutions. An ardent desire to embrace the West has united Mongolians.

Although the overall Soviet presence in Mongolia was distinctly negative, there were positive aspects, especially in raising the literacy rate to 90 percent from 10 percent in the early 1920s. As Mongolian Professor Shagdariin Sandag (Sandag and Kendall 2000: xvii) wrote:

The Kremlin's expansionist policies also brought to Mongolia many Soviet specialists—medical doctors, scientists and ordinary Russians—who worked honestly and hard to introduce modern methods into our society. If their achievements were limited it was through no fault of their own but because of the comparative backwardness of Soviet technology and hegemonic Kremlin policy.

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MONGOLIAN LANGUAGES The Mongolian (or Mongolic) languages form a group of genetically related languages, spoken mostly in Mongolia, northern China, and some regions of Russia.

The family is generally subdivided into three groups—Central (or Eastern), Northern, and Western Mongolian. Some languages, especially those spoken in China, are commonly referred to as "isolated" within the family, though their taxonomic subdivision continues to be debated.

Central Mongolian

The most important language of the Central or Eastern Mongolian group is the official language of the Republic of Mongolia, generally called Mongolian (also known as Khalkha, after the prestige dialect; other important dialects in Outer Mongolia are Dari-ganga and Ujumuchin). It is spoken by 2.5 million people and written in Cyrillic script, although attempts to revert to the traditional Uighur script continue in

Outer Mongolia. In the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, the language has always been written in the Uighur script, and the linguistic norm is largely based on the Chakhar dialect. Other important dialects of Inner Mongolia include Kharchin, Khorchin, Urat, and the somewhat divergent Ordos dialect, which is sometimes treated as a separate East Mongolian language.

Western and Northern Mongolian

In 1648, the Buddhist cleric Jaya Pandita developed the *todo üseg* ("clear script"), a modification of the Uighur script designed to write Oirat, or Western Mongolian. Oirat dialects are still spoken in western Mongolia and Xinjiang. In Russia, the Kalmyk language has around 130,000 speakers in the Kalmyk Republic on the lower Volga. The Northern Mongolian group is formed by Buryat and its dialects and is spoken in the Buryat Republic in Southern Siberia, where it has around 300,000 speakers and a Cyrillic-based written language.

Mongolian Languages in China

Dagur (about 40,000 speakers) is spoken in the Chinese province of Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, and an enclave in Xinjiang, where Dagurs were relocated in the eighteenth century. Another language of the Chinese northeast is Khamnigan, spoken in the



THE MONGOLIAN LANGUAGE THROUGH TIME

The following extracts trace the Mongolian language through time, telling the story of Chinggis (Genghis) Khan's birth in (1) the thirteenth-century Chinese-script version of the *Secret History of the Mongols*, (2) the Uighur-script chronicle *Altan Tobci* ("Golden Summary"), written by *Lubsandanjin* in 1655, and (3) a translation of the *Secret History* into modern Cyrillic-script Khalkha.

- (1) Onan-nu deli'ün boldaq-a бүкүй-түр жөб тенде цинггис-қahan төрежү'үй; төрекүй-түр бара'un qar-tur-ıyan sı'a-yin tedüi nödüñ qatqun төрежү'үй.
- (2) Onan-u deligün-boldag-a бүкүй-түр (. . .) Cinggis qagan töröbe; törökүй-түр-ıyen baragun gar-tur-ıyan shagay-yin tedüi qara nöjin-i adqun töröbe.
- (3) Onony Delüün boldog gedeg gazar Chingis xaanyg törүүлzhee. Chingis törөxdöö baruun gart shagayn chinee nözh atgan, törzhee.

Translation of (1): "When they were in Deli'ün boldaq, on the river Onan, Chinggis Khan was born; when he was born, he held a clump of blood, the size of a knuckle, in his right hand."

Source: Stefan Georg

Hulun Buir region of Inner Mongolia. Dagur and Khamnigan are probably the two most archaic modern languages of the family. A number of Mongolian languages are spoken in the Qinghai-Gansu border region. The language of the Tu nationality, formerly referred to as Monguor, is now separated into its two major variants, Huzhu Mongghul and Minhe Mangghuer. The Tu nationality numbers approximately 150,000 people. Baoan (Bonan) has around 10,000 speakers in Gansu, and Dongxiang, more properly Santa, also in Gansu, has 240,000 speakers. Along with Turkic and Tibetan-speaking groups, the linguistically complex group of the Yugur, also known as Sir-a (or yellow) Yugur, includes around 1,500 speakers of a Mongolian language, Jegün (Eastern) Yugur. In some remote pockets of northwestern Afghanistan, the Moghol language survived well into the twentieth century, but nothing is known about its fate after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

For Huzhu Mongghul, Dongxiang, and Dagur, Latin-script-based orthographies have been developed and introduced into national schools. Written Mongolian, the language of most Mongolian documents before the twentieth century, is generally viewed as close, but certainly not identical, to the common ancestor of all these languages, Proto-Mongolian. The first Written Mongolian documents date from the thirteenth century. Though the very first undoubtedly Mongolian text is a short inscription in Uighur script dating from 1227, the better part of early Mongolian writing has come down to us in different scripts. The longest of these early documents is *Monggol-un ni'uca tobciyan* (Secret History of the Mongols). A dynastic history of the descendants of Genghis Khan with elements reminiscent of epic poetry, it is only preserved in Chinese characters, designed to be read according to their phonetic values. Another important Sino-Mongolian document is the Mongolian part of the *Hua-i I-yu*, a Sino-Xenic glossary compiled in 1389.

In 1269, the Yuan emperor Khubilai Khan ordered the Buddhist cleric hPhags-Pa (1235–1280) to design a universal script for all languages of the empire. This so-called quadratic script (*dörbeljin üseg*), based on the Tibetan script, was short-lived, but some Mongolian documents written in it survive. A few Mongolian documents have been written in Arabic script, and some Mongolian words are preserved in Armenian and Georgian medieval documents. Because the language of the Sino-Mongolian and quadratic-script documents shows some peculiarities, which are already to be taken as secondary developments when confronted with more conservative Uighur-script Mongolian, the

earliest written documents are often, somewhat paradoxically, said to be written in Middle Mongolian.

From the fourteenth century onward, the written medium for Mongolian is almost exclusively the vertical script, which was originally adopted from the Turkic-speaking Uighurs. After the seventeenth-century conversion of the Mongols to Tibetan Buddhism, a vast amount of canonical Buddhist literature was translated from Tibetan into Mongolian; the language of these translations is generally referred to as Classical Mongolian.

The Khitan confederation, masters of the Liao dynasty in northern China (907–1125), probably spoke an early variant of Mongolian. The highly complex script they used has not been fully deciphered, but based on Khitan glosses in Chinese texts, the Mongolian character of their language seems reasonably clear.

Characteristics of Mongolian Languages

Modern Mongolian languages show all the typological traits that are generally taken as typical for the so-called Altaic languages: vowel harmony; verb-final word order; postpositions; exclusively suffixing, agglutinative morphology; and subordination by nominalization. On the whole, the family is typologically quite homogeneous. Among the more visible differences between them are the different ways the languages treat the problem of verbal concord. While the Central Mongolian languages do not show any verbal concord, the peripheral Northern and Western Mongolian languages (e.g. Kalmyk and Buryat), have developed a system of differentiating subject person by developing verbal suffixes from subject pronouns. Mongghul, Mangghuer, and Baoan have copied an intricate system of concord from Tibetan, which, together with numerous other features of their sound-structure, makes these southernmost Mongolian languages the least typical representatives of the family.

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MONGOLIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY The Mongolian Social Democratic Party (MSDP) developed out of the Mongolian Social Democratic Movement (MSDM) led by R. Gonchigdorj (later vice president of Mongolia) at the end of the Communist era in Mongolia (1989). The party assumed legal status in May 1990, and Bat-Erdeniyn Batbayar was elected chairman. The MSDP is a consultative member of the Socialist International, an international federation of communist parties. It joined the coalition of democratic forces in the July 1990 elections and won 4 of the then 430 seats in the parliament. The MSDM and MSDP merged in September 1991. During the 1990s the party's platform represented western European-style social democracy and neutrality.

In the June 1996 elections, the MSDP joined in a coalition with the Mongolian National Democratic Party (MNDP) to form the Democratic Union. It won an upset victory by capturing fifty of seventy-six seats in the revamped parliament and formed the first non-Communist government in Mongolia in seventy-five years. During its four-year tenure, the Union attempted to carry out a detailed plan for radical democratic reform and privatization of the remaining large state enterprises. However, the collapse of the traditional export market, corruption, and political splintering within the Democratic Union led to four years of political instability and four Union prime ministers. In July 2000 the union decisively lost to the former communist party, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP). In response to this defeat, on 6 December 2000, the MSDP, led by Batbayar, merged with five other political parties, including the MNDP, to form the Mongolian Democratic Party.

Alicia J. Campi

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MONGOLIAN WRESTLING. See **Buh**.

MONGOLS The Mongols first appear in Chinese sources at the end of the Tang dynasty (618–907), but must have been a linguistically distinct people long before then, since the Mongolian language—actually a set of closely related dialects—had already had a long history by the time it was first written down in the thirteenth century. It is a branch of the Altaic family

and is related to the Turkic and Tungus languages and more distantly to Korean and Japanese. Its closest ancient relatives, including Kitan, are all now extinct.

At the time that they were first noticed by the Chinese, the Mongols lived somewhat to the north of the present territories of the Mongols in what is now Mongol Buriyatia, around Lake Baikal. Other Mongols today live throughout the territories of the Mongolian People's Republic, in Inner Mongolia (part of China), in Manchuria, and in various northern Chinese provinces, including Qinghai and Xinjiang, and along the lower Volga, where they took up residence in the eighteenth century. Recent migrations of Mongols have been to South Korea, where there are now 17,000, mostly illegal, and as far afield as Israel.

Traditional Mongol Life

By the time of Temüjin (d. 1227), the later Genghis Khan, the Mongols had moved considerably to the south and were centered about the Onon and Kerlen rivers, in what is now the north-central part of the Mongolian People's Republic. Although it has been suggested that they were originally hunters and gatherers, they were, by this time, full pastoral nomads. Their way of life, based upon sheep, goats, a few cattle, and occasionally camels, herded from horseback, involved movement in a set pattern, usually from low-lying areas in the spring to mountain pastures in the summer, and then back to the low-lying pastures in the autumn and for the winter months. A variation was movement along river valleys, from upstream as the year grew warmer, and then the return in the autumn. Later, as the Mongols moved into arid regions in the south, another pattern developed of circular movement over essentially flat terrain, to prevent exhaustion of limited local fodder and water resources. The products of this life were some meat, a relatively rare food, and dairy products, eaten in a fermented form by preference. This monotonous diet could be supplemented by game and by gathered foods. There was also some fishing. Herds also produced hides and wool and hair for felting and rope making. There was no weaving.

The early Mongols lived in tents called *ger* (yurts), comprising a wooden latticework, usually with a wooden door and sometimes a wooden base, over which layers of felt, waterproofed with various substances, including animal and dairy-product fats, were thrown for protection from the weather. A smoke hole at the top could be closed when required. Generally, these tents were taken down or put up at each campsite and were intended to be highly mobile. Sometimes



A Mongol woman and her son ride a horse on the grassy plain of Mongolia in the early 1960s. (DEAN CONGER/CORBIS)

they were left mounted permanently on carts, some quite large; these carts also had square cabs in which Mongols could live. They also sometimes lived in smaller, temporary tents, but *ger* were the norm.

In addition to animals and tents, also a key part of Mongol nomadic life were articles of daily life, including wooden cradles, large wooden stirring spoons, equipment for processing hides, horse and ox harness, and lassos on poles for capturing horses. Mongol clothing was most commonly of trade textiles (woven cloth obtained through trade), with fur linings and various stuffing, but could also be furs or even felt, as needed. Boots were pressed felt or leather. The traditional robe, or *deel*, buttoned to the left and was held together below by a leather belt with various trappings. Hats were usually of fur with earmuffs attached. For warfare an armor was made, both for men and horses, by stitching hardened leather plates onto a leather or quilted base. Metal was rarely used, except for helmets. The preferred weapon was the compound bow, and occasionally the lance, but some Mongols used swords as well.

Mongol Expansion and Empire

In the early thirteenth century there were less than a million Mongols. They were characterized by a high birth rate, and as conditions improved, a low death rate. This meant that they were capable of expanding their numbers rapidly as new nomadic territories became available. This is what happened, and the wars of Genghis Khan and his successors were as much migrations as they were conquests. The Mongols poured into what is now Inner Mongolia as the conquest of China proceeded. They also moved west into Turkistan, and even into Iran and Azerbaijan. In most of these areas, Mongols amalgamated with other nomadic groups already present, a process complete by the late thirteenth century, when the Mongols disappeared as an ethnic group in the west, although Mongolian dynasties continued to rule there. In the east it was generally the Mongols who did the absorbing, principally of local Kitan tribesmen, and Inner Mongolia, first invaded by the Mongols in the early thirteenth century, has remained at least partially Mongolian since.

Later Mongols penetrated other parts of China, including Yunnan, then outlying territory, and placed small garrisons throughout the former Song domains conquered in 1279. Most of these garrisons were lost in 1368 when Toghlan Timur (reigned 1333–1370), the last Mongol emperor of the successor khanate of China, went back to the steppe, where he died two years later.

The years of empire (in Mongolia, from 1206 to 1370) were a demographic disaster for the Mongols. Although they had gained Inner Mongolia, Mongolia had become depleted of Mongols due to migration, wars in Central Asia, and a general impoverishment of an exhausted Mongolian homeland that led to Mongols even being sold as slaves to repay Chinese debtors. Into this vacuum came a Siberian branch of the Mongols, the Oirat, who had only recently become full nomads. The Oirat raided the Chinese Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and at one point captured the emperor. Elsewhere, on the fringes of the steppe, other Mongol groups, led by members of the house of Genghis Khan, alternatively fought and allied with the Chinese. Most of these groups came under the control of China's Manchu-ruled Qing dynasty (1644–1912), which also conquered most of Mongolia in the late seventeenth century. Only various groups of Oirats living in the far west remained outside China's control, and with these the Qing waged a long series of wars. The Qing subdued most of them in the eighteenth century and forced others to migrate, ultimately to the Volga, where they became the modern

Kalmyks. The Mongols of Siberia, in the meantime, had come under Russian control.

In the nineteenth century, Mongolia was thrown open to the Chinese subjects of the Manchu, who used their clout to reduce most Mongols to utter poverty. By this time the Mongols had been reconverted to Tibetan Buddhism. (The first conversion had occurred during Mongol rule of China, 1279–1368.) This conversion led to the appearance of a religious feudalism paralleling the traditional feudalism of the secular princes supported by the Manchu. The effective head of Mongolia at the time was the Urga Hutughtu, or incarnating Lama of Urga, as the present-day Ulaanbaatar was then known.

The Mongols in the Nineteenth Century

During the nineteenth century Mongolian life remained much as it had been in the era of Genghis Khan and after, except that Mongolia was now dotted with monastic communities that provided the semblance of an urban—or at least town—life, with attendant commercial and manufacturing activities. The religious community also contributed to Mongolia educationally, giving rise to a relatively high literacy rate. Buddhism brought with it the Tibetan language, which not only brought Mongolia into contact with Tibet, the origins of its Buddhism, but with the literary and cultural traditions of India, since most of the great Indian classics had been translated into Tibetan and thus became accessible to educated Mongols. Mongolia, as a consequence, has its own Indian-based medical system that is quite unlike that of China and a literature that is, even today, heavily influenced by Sanskrit classics.

Another of the differences between Mongolian life in the nineteenth century and earlier centuries was the habit of tea drinking. Tea had appeared earlier, but did not catch on until the fourteenth century at the earliest, since which time it has become a national way of life. Mongolian tea is made by long boiling of a pressed brick of tea in milk, to produce a very strong tea but one in which the tannin is counteracted by the milk, making the beverage more drinkable. The Mongols also adopted *tsampa* from the Tibetans. To make *tsampa*, barley or other grains are put into hot buttered tea to combine breakfast and beverage. In the nineteenth century Mongolia also gained access to more distilled alcoholic beverages. Distilled alcoholic drinks had been well known to the elite in the fourteenth century, but the period after empire saw a proliferation of portable distillation equipment. Consequently, almost everyone had some access to distilled liquors, although koumiss, fermented mare's milk or camel milk, re-

mained the beverage of choice. Nineteenth-century Mongols also seem to have had access to a wider range of textiles, thanks to Chinese merchants, and metal implements of everyday life became ubiquitous in the period too, thanks to the same source, although the Tibetans produced such things too.

The Mongols in the Twentieth Century

As the Qing dynasty collapsed in 1911, the Mongols of Outer Mongolia, as it was called by the Qing government, declared their independence, ultimately coming under Soviet control (1921–1991). At first Soviet rule constituted another era of demographic disaster, thanks to Mongolian revolutions against their rule, forced collectivization, and the suppression of Buddhism. Venereal disease and alcoholism were also problems. The Mongols appeared to be becoming extinct, but by the 1950s the population had stabilized, and in the 1960s and 1970s truly rapid growth began. The Mongols of Inner Mongolia also went into decline about the same time, for some of the same reasons. Inner Mongolia was heavily penetrated by Chinese merchants who were anxious to exploit the Mongols and who were followed by Chinese settlers, who deprived the Mongols of the pastures they needed to live. Inner Mongolia also had its own "feudalists," both secular and religious. The region played an important role in China's warlord era of the 1920s and 1930s (stretching into the 1940s in places) and was of interest to the Japanese. Japanese alliances with Mongol princes later created major problems for local Mongols when the Chinese began reasserting their power.

Other Mongols, principally those in Russia, enjoyed a somewhat better life but were heavily pressured to assimilate, which had the opposite effect of causing them to reassert their ethnic identity. Among the Buriyats, for example, shamanism, which was nearly extinct in the mid-nineteenth century, underwent a major revival despite Soviet-era persecution. The revival continues even now.

The Mongols in the Twenty-first Century

Today, the single largest group of Mongols is found in the Mongolian People's Republic, where the demographic decline of the early Soviet period has long been reversed. There are more Mongols there today than at any time in their history, more than 2.4 million, according to a 2001 estimate. No longer are the Mongols totally an agrarian people, living a traditional nomadic life. At least half the country now is involved in industry, particularly mineral extraction, including oil, and for the first time in its history, Mongolia has its own large urban conglomerate, Ulaanbaatar. It had

an estimated population of 782,000 in early 2001, but the actual figure is considerably larger when the capital's floating population is counted in. Although the other major centers, Darhan and Erdenet, are much smaller (populations under 100,000, although growing), these are still huge urban complexes by the standards of interior Central Asia and Mongolia.

Elsewhere it is hard to get a fix on numbers of Mongols. As recently as 1992, a total of 3.6 million Mongols was claimed for Inner Mongolia, but most are highly assimilated and Mongol in name only. Probably less than half speak Mongolian at all. Hundreds of thousands of Mongols are claimed by the Chinese for Manchuria and other parts of China but most are even more assimilated than those of Inner Mongolia. Probably there are not more than 2 million Mongols in China, with mother tongue being the distinguishing criterion.

The same problems arise in estimating the number of Buriyats and Kalmyks. There are an estimated 350,000 Buriyats living in the Russian Buriyat Republic, about 35 percent of its total population. A few more Buriyats live in adjacent regions of Russia as well. Kalmyks number perhaps 150,000, about 45 percent of the population of the Kalmyk Republic on the lower Volga. The language retention rate in Russia is probably higher than in China, but the same forces of assimilation apply. Nowhere but in the Mongolian People's Republic are the Mongols a majority.

A major issue separating the Mongolian groups is script. The Mongols of the Mongolian People's Republic use the Cyrillic script, with a few extra letters, as do the Buriyats and Kalmyks, with variations. By contrast, the Mongols of China still use the vertical Uighur script, which is highly ambiguous and uses an archaic spelling that was out of date when the script was first adapted to write Mongolian in the thirteenth century. Although the Mongolian script is used as a second script by other Mongolian groups, written language is a major dividing force between the former Outer and Inner Mongolia. In addition, while the Buriyats and Kalmyks have actively sought to promote Mongolian unity by establishing contacts amongst themselves and with the People's Republic, this path is largely closed to the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, who are jealously guarded by the Chinese to prevent the development of Mongolian nationalism there. It exists nonetheless.

Thus, as a conservative estimate, there are at least 4 million Mongols in the world today. The most important Mongolian language is Mongolian, of which Khalkha, the official language of the Mongolian Peo-

ple's Republic, spoken as a native language by at least 89 percent of its population, is its most important representative. Most other Mongolian languages are dialects of Mongolian, including Chakhar, and Horchin, spoken in Inner Mongolia and other places in China. Differences are small.

Elsewhere, Buriyat, which exists in several dialects, is its own language, although still relatively close to Mongolian, as is Kalmyk, thanks to the presence in Mongolia of other Western Mongolian or Oirat groups that maintain a close connection with Khalkha. The differences between the Mongolian languages are principally in loan words, Buriyat and Kalmyk having more Turkic or, in the case of Buriyat, Siberian vocabulary. Both languages share a Tibetan Buddhist influence with the other Mongolian languages and dialects and, in the case of Khalkha, the other People's Republic languages, Buriyat and Kalmyk, substantial Russian influence. In Inner Mongolia the major foreign influence is Chinese.

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MONGOOSE The mongoose is a small carnivorous mammal belonging to the family Herpestidae and is native to Asia, Africa, and southern Europe. In Asia it is found across the Indian subcontinent and from southern China to Polynesia. There are more than thirty species of mongoose, differing in size, behavior, and habitat. Most widespread are the Indian gray, or common, mongoose (*Herpestes edwardsi*), immortalized in Rudyard Kipling's *Jungle Book* tale "Riki-Tikki-Tavi," and the small Indian mongoose (*Herpestes auaropunctatus*). Among the rarer mongooses is the crab-eating mongoose (*Herpestes urva*), which is found in Taiwan.

Mongoose are sleek, furry animals, varying in coloring from gray through brown to black. They have a long body and tail, short legs, small round ears, and sharp teeth and claws. They typically measure about two feet in length; however, the crab-eating mongoose measures over three feet. Mongooses live in burrows, are territorial, and frequently solitary. They live to about ten years of age and produce litters of one to four young.

Fierce predators, mongooses will attack and kill large venomous snakes such as the cobra, succeeding due to their remarkable speed and agility and thick protective fur. They are not immune to snake venom, but may be resistant to it. In Asia, mongooses' greatest enemies are snakes, but they are also hunted by birds of prey and larger mammals. Mongooses also hunt small rodents, birds, and reptiles and forage for insects, eggs, and fruit. Mongooses are easily tamed, and their usefulness in keeping houses free from vermin means that they are often kept as pets.

In order to control rats, mongooses have been introduced to areas such as Hawaii and the Caribbean, where they have few natural predators. However, they are destructive to poultry and native bird life and are often considered a pest.

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MON-KHMER LANGUAGES Mon-Khmer is a language family of mainland Southeast Asia that includes the national languages Cambodian (Khmer) and Vietnamese and more than a hundred minority languages spoken in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar (Burma), India, and China.

In the past some Mon-Khmer languages were more important than they are today. For example, in the first century CE the Khmer and the Mon had substantial kingdoms that covered much of what is today Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos as well as Cambodia. Today Mon is only spoken by minorities in Thailand and Myanmar, and is no longer an important written language. Khmer remains the written standard in Cambodia, surviving as the national language.

Many lesser-known Mon-Khmer languages have never been written down, while for some of these languages writing systems have been developed, but are not in widespread use. An exception is Khasi, spoken in Assam (Maghalay State, India) by several hundred thousand people, where a written standard enjoys everyday use.

Being generally dominated by other cultures, Mon-Khmer speakers are commonly multilingual in their

own and neighboring or national languages. As such they tend to borrow a lot of words and even grammar. The most extreme example of this is possibly Vietnamese, which was under strong Chinese influence for over a thousand years. The Chinese component in Vietnamese is so great that it is not unusual for more than half of the words in a Vietnamese text to be of Chinese origin. The resemblance to Chinese is further heightened by the historical shift toward monosyllabic word structure and the use of tones.

Typical Mon-Khmer languages are characterized by subject-verb-object word order, by simple word shape with fixed word-final stress, no tones, extensive use of prefixes and infixes but not suffixes, noun classifiers, and serial verb construction.

While the word structures can be very simple, the sound systems can be rather complicated. Normally there are both voiced and voiceless consonants, including partly voiceless nasals, liquids (*r* and *l* sounds), and glides (*w* and *y*). Consonants may also have a laryngeal setting, which may be realized as a glottalized or creaky voice. The vowel inventories are among the largest in the world—most having distinctively short and long vowels and diphthonged vowels. Some even have a "register" distinction between plain and breathy or creaky vowels. In this way some Mon-Khmer languages have developed more than thirty or even forty distinct vowels.

Despite these structural similarities, Mon-Khmer languages vary considerably in their lexicons, so that even simple equivalent sentences are made with very different sounding words, e.g.,

	"Where are you going?"			
Chrau	bi:	ma:j	sa:ʔ	
Jruq	ɬ:j	saw	ma:	reʔ
Khmer	lo:k	tow	na:	
Vietnamese	ʔaŋ	di	děw	děj
Khmu	jěʔ	jðh	móh	
Mlabri	meh	ɟak	ginɛŋ	
	"I am very sick"			
Chrau	ʔa:ŋ	ji:	maʔ	
Jruq	ʔaj	jiʔ	ʔmat	ʔma:t
Khmer	kɲom	ci:	nah	
Vietnamese	toˊi	bi	laˊm	
Khmu	ʔoˊʔ	ʔaˊh	saŋcuˊʔ	saŋkɪˊ:n
Mlabri	ʔoh	cʰoʔ	re:w	

The term Mon-Khmer is sometimes used interchangeably with Austroasiatic. More usually Mon-Khmer is used by specialists to refer to a subgrouping

of Austroasiatic languages. The common view regards Austroasiatic as consisting of two branches, Munda languages (spoken in India) and Mon-Khmer languages, consisting of at least ten subbranches. However, the question of whether there really is a Mon-Khmer family, as opposed to Austroasiatic, and what languages belong in it, is far from clear, and views changed many times in the course of the twentieth century. In 1926 Prater Wilhelm Schmidt suggested the following:

Austroasiatic

- 1) Malaccan (Aslian)
- 2) Central (Khasi, Palaung-Wa, Nicobar)
- 3) Mon-Khmer (Mon, Khmer, Bahnar, Jakun) and Munda
- 4) Chamic

At the time the position of Vietnamese was disputed, with some scholars preferring to classify it with Chinese and Thai, due to the presence of tones. In 1942 Thomas Sebeok suggested the grouping of all of the above languages, except for Munda, in one Mon-Khmer family, establishing the view that has dominated thinking until the present day.

In several papers in the early 1950s, André-Georges Haudricourt showed that Vietnamese developed tones independently and is related to Cambodian rather than Chinese or Thai. At about the same time it also became apparent that the Chamic languages of Vietnam are rather closely related to Malay, and therefore are classified as Austronesian rather than Mon-Khmer. The confusion had arisen because Chamic languages had been in intimate contact with Mon-Khmer languages such as Bahnar and Katu for such a long time that they had borrowed many words and even changed the form of Malay words to resemble Mon-Khmer words.

In the 1960s David Thomas and Robert Headley applied statistical methods to new data, classifying the Pearic, Khmer, Bahnaric, Katuic, Khumic, Monic, Palaungic, Khasi, and Viet-Muong as Mon-Khmer.

Thomas and Headley did not include Nicobarese or Aslian languages in their Mon-Khmer classification. In 1974 Gérard Diffloth suggested the division of these nine groups, plus Nicobarese and Aslian, into three branches based on apparent lexical innovations:

North Mon-Khmer

- Khmuic
- Palaungic
- Khasi

East Mon-Khmer

- Khmeric

- Pearic
- Bahnaric
- Katuic
- Viet-Muong

South Mon-Khmer

- Nicobaric
- Aslian
- Monic

More recently Iliia Peiros, using statistical methods, found no basis for a distinction between Mon-Khmer and Austroasiatic, and proposed the following six branches (without considering Nicobarese):

Central

- Bahnaric
- Katuic
- Aslian
- Monic

Vietic

Northern

- Palaung-Wa
- Khmuic

Khmer

Khasi

Munda

Today many Mon-Khmer languages are endangered; that is, they have fewer than two thousand speakers and are no longer being spoken by the youngest generation, who learn only national languages in school. This is a direct consequence of economic development and globalization, as swidden farming (shifting cultivation of the forest) is being replaced by sedentary farming of cash crops. Fortunately there are various field linguists working to record and preserve these endangered languages before it is too late.

Paul Sidwell and Pascale Jacq

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MONSOONS Derived from the Arabic word *mausim* ("season"), monsoons refer to markedly seasonal winds. The Southeast Asian monsoons are part of the Asian monsoon and are characteristically seasonal with local variations due to the influence of islands and geographic relief of the continent. They



MONSOONS, DEATH, AND DISEASE

In villages in South Asia the monsoon is the source of water for the crops but, whether it arrives on time or late or not at all, it is also a source of disease and death, as indicated by this account from a missionary among the Tamil people in South India in the late nineteenth century.

A monsoon that fails to arrive or comes late results, surely and inevitably, in the most dreadful famine, especially in the higher regions not touched by the rivers, which are altogether dependent on the northeast monsoon. This happened, for example, in 1877 where in the district of the small kingdom of Mysore north of Koimbatour, in a six-month period, 150,000 cattle and sheep succumbed for lack of fodder. . . . An official from Mysore who did all he could to prevent famine in his district . . . wrote at the time: "In this *taluk* of my district 1500 persons died last month, and in the last few days I saw what I had never seen before, moving skeletons, skeletons too weak to walk or even speak, and human corpses lying by the wayside eaten away by dogs."

The more indigent natives find the arrival of the monsoon and the temperature change less agreeable than do the Europeans living in the country. Because of their scant clothing and the poor state of their dwellings which give them little protection against inclement weather, they are obliged to suffer a great deal from bad weather, and actually the death rate among them is greater in November than in any other month. One therefore never hears the gruesome sound of the long death-horns more often, never are the devil's temples, large and small, decorated as they are in the "calamity month" as November is called, when in the villages of the pariahs [untouchables] the piled-up refuse starts to ferment, making them centers of epidemics.

Source: Hans Gehring. (1899) *South India: The Tamil People and Their Country*. Gütersloh, Germany: Druck und Verlag von C. Bertelsmann, 28–29, 31.

have a significant impact on the region's human life and economic activities.

Seasonality

The northeast monsoon occurs from about December to March, starting as a cold and dry continental air mass moving in Asia. It picks up moisture over the South China Sea, bringing rain to the coastal areas of Vietnam, the eastern side of the Malay Peninsula, and large parts of Indonesia. The southwest monsoon, from June to September, is a continuation of the southeasterly wind from the southern hemisphere. In east Java this is usually called the east monsoon or dry monsoon, as it brings rather dry air masses but also rain to almost all parts of the Philippines and the Myanmar/Burma-Thai west coast and decreases toward the interior. Nearer to the equator, the two monsoons are very similar.

March-May and September-November are the intermonsoon periods, when winds are variable and weak, and rainfall is influenced by local factors. The large number of islands, the relief, and exposure to the prevailing wind create a large variety of local climates. Local land or sea breezes may reinforce or detract from prevailing winds, leading to increased rainfall on the windward side and increased sea surface roughness.

Impacts

Early traders from Arabia, India, China, and Europe learned to use the monsoons for navigation in their quest for and trade in spices. Seafaring people in the region today employ the winds extensively. For example, sea Bajaus off southeastern Sabah navigate and fish according to an annual succession of four major wind seasons, which correspond roughly to the monsoon seasons. The seasonality of the monsoons plays an essential role in agriculture. The onset of rainfall is crucial for agricultural production, but water control is necessary, especially for growing rice in irrigated fields. The dry period is ideal for crop ripening, and a prolonged rainy period reduces the yield or quality of crops.

In recent years the Asian monsoon system seems related to sea surface temperature anomalies in the Pacific Ocean (a phenomenon called El Niño Southern Oscillation). El Niño events or warmer-than-usual sea temperatures in the Pacific Ocean are associated with drier-than-usual conditions and resulting increased forest fires in Southeast Asia; these can pose a serious problem for agricultural production and food security.

Wong Poh Poh

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MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REFORMS

The 1919 Constitutional Act introduced into India by Edwin Montagu, who served as secretary of state for India from 1917 to 1922, and Lord Chelmsford, who served as viceroy in India from 1916 to 1921, was popularly known as the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. These reforms were part of a due process of a constitutional revision instituted ten years after the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909. However, they were rendered more urgent by India's unprecedented support for England during World War I and the growing demands for political reform being made by Indian nationalists.

One of Montagu's first acts as secretary of state was to make a clear statement of the government's position on increasing the presence of Indians in every branch of the administration and gradually developing India toward self-government within the British empire, a position that had broad cross-party support and that had been drafted by the former viceroy, Lord Curzon. In the winter of 1917–1918, Montagu undertook an extensive tour of India to ascertain public opinion at first hand and to formulate with Chelmsford a concrete scheme for constitutional reform.

The resulting Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918 formed the basis of the Government of India Act of 1919. This introduced a system known as dyarchy, or dual government, under which there was to be a devolution of power and responsibility in the executive and legislative spheres to Indian administrators elected on a restricted franchise at the provincial level. Subjects "transferred" to Indian ministers included education, agriculture, and local self-government, although a series of "reserved" subjects, such as irrigation, police, the press, finance, and justice, were retained under British control. Reserve powers were also vested in the governors and the viceroy, and the central government retained its overriding powers. Although the reforms received only a lukewarm reception and fell short of Indian nationalist demands, they did represent a major landmark on the road to the complete devolution of constitutional power by the British in India.

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MORI ARINORI (1847–1889), Meiji government official, reformer. A prominent Meiji government official and outspoken reformer, Mori Arinori (also Mori Yurei) remains as controversial among today's historians as he was in his own day. Born in Kagoshima to a Satsuma samurai family on 23 August 1847, Mori spent nearly a quarter of his life as a resident in the West. His time in the West was divided into three periods: 1865–1868, when he studied in Europe and sojourned in America (where he became associated with Thomas Lake Harris's religious community, Brotherhood of the New Life); 1871–1873 as *chargé d'affaires* in Washington, DC; and 1880–1884 as minister to Great Britain. During this period, his reputation as a *Nihon no unda seiyojin* (a Westerner born of Japan) was spawned by his precocious proposal in 1869 to abolish sword-wearing, which briefly forced him out of the government; by his proposal in 1873 to adopt the English language in place of Japanese; by the Meiji Six Society (Meirokusha), which he helped organize in 1873 to promote Western-inspired "civilization and enlightenment" through monthly lecture meetings and a published journal; and by his first marriage to Hirose Tsuneko, daughter of a Shizuoka samurai family, in a Western-style civil ceremony in 1875.

After sixteen years in the Foreign Ministry, Mori was appointed minister of education in 1885. Some historians and critics view Mori's reorganization of the school system, his expansion of the Ministry of Education's role in producing and inspecting textbooks, and his introduction of military drill (*heishiki taiso*) into the curriculum as catalysts for a host of educational problems in twentieth-century Japan: elitism, credentialism, bureaucracy, militarism, and cultural nationalism.

Mori's reputation as a cultural iconoclast may have contributed to his untimely death by a knife-wielding assassin on 11 February 1889, who alleged that Mori had desecrated the sacred Grand Shrine of Ise during an official visit there in December 1887.

Mark Lincicome

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MORI OGAI (1862–1922), Japanese physician and novelist. Intellectual giant and Renaissance man of the Meiji era (1868–1912), Ogai was born Mori Rintaro in Tsuwano (present-day Shimane Prefecture). He excelled in both the arts and sciences as a medical scientist, linguist, translator, critic, and historian. After graduating from medical school, he joined the army and was sent to Germany, where he studied between 1884 and 1888. Ogai served as surgeon general to the Japanese army and continued a productive literary career to the end. Immediately upon returning to Japan, he published an anthology of lyric poetry, *Omokage* (Vestiges, 1889) and his own literary journal. Early novellas such as *Maibime* (Dancing Girl, 1890) show an idealistic romanticism and elements of his own experience in Germany. *Gan* (Wild Goose, 1911–1913), a romantic tale of unrequited love, remains one of the author's most popular works. In his middle period, following the death of Emperor Meiji, he turned to the past and produced many historical works, both fictional and biographical. His late period yielded biographies of doctors of the Edo period. Some of his masterful translations include Andersen's *Improvisatoren*, Goethe's *Faust*, Ibsen's *Ghosts* and *A Doll's House*, Shakespeare's *Macbeth*, and hundreds more.

William Ridgeway

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MORLEY-MINTO REFORMS The Indian Councils Act of 1909 also bears the name of the Morley-Minto Reforms after the leading imperial administrators who formulated them—John Morley, the Liberal British secretary of state, and Lord Minto, the Conservative British viceroy to India. However, the application of the reforms was short-lived, since they were considerably overhauled by the Montagu-Chelmsford Report in 1918.

The main features of the reforms included the first formal introduction of the principle of elections to government councils on a very restricted franchise (with details to be worked out in provinces and localities); an increase in additional nonofficial members in the Imperial Legislative Council from sixteen to sixty, with the retention of the official majority; a small increase in powers of discussing the budget; and special provision for the representation of professional classes, the landholders, the Muslims, and European and Indian commerce in elected assemblies. The nomination of an Indian to the Viceroy's Council as well as to the Council of India was also included. (The first appointments—of Ashutosh Mukherjee and S. H. Bilgrami, respectively—proved short-lived.) The scheme of separate electorates for Muslims was a major concession to increasingly vocal demands by the Muslim League. This basis of election on religious grounds was severely criticized by Indian politicians as further evidence of a British policy of divide and rule and as being abhorrent to the principles of parliamentary democracy.

Chandrika Kaul

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MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was formed in the Philippines in 1977 as a breakaway from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Its leader, Hashim Salamat, at the time accused MNLF chairman Nur Misuari of autocratic leadership, Communist sympathies, and corruption. A bid by Salamat to gain recognition from the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) for the MILF as the leading Moro organization failed. When in 1986–1987 the Philippine government negotiated with the MNLF over the creation of an Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), the MILF was not a party to the talks, and again in the 1990s it did not participate in the negotiations that culminated in the 1996 Peace Agreement. The MILF thus became the leader of the armed struggle for a separate Moro nation. Under the Ramos and Estrada presidencies several attempts were made to negotiate with the MILF, and there appears to have been a tacit acceptance of the MILF's spheres of influence around its headquarters, Camp Abubakr, and other bases in western Mindanao. In 2000, however, a series of clashes between the MILF

and government forces resulted in President Estrada's declaring "all-out war" on the MILF. The Armed Forces of the Philippines subsequently overran the MILF bases and a number of MILF fighters reportedly surrendered. In 2001, under the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, new attempts to negotiate a peace settlement appeared to be achieving some success, notably in August 2001 with the signing of the Kuala Lumpur Agreement on the Guidelines for the Implementation of the Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the MILF.

Ronald J. May

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MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was created around 1971 from a group of young Philippine Muslims who had undergone guerrilla training in Malaysia. It became the leading political organization in the Muslim insurgency against the Philippine government. The MNLF, under the leadership of Nur Misuari, demanded a separate *Bangsa* Moro (Moro nation) in the traditional Muslim heartland of Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan and also opposed traditional feudal structures within Philippine Muslim society. It had a military wing, the Bangsa Moro Army (BMA). The MNLF gained the support of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and financial backing from Libya and other Islamic countries.

In 1976, the MNLF signed a cease-fire and an agreement with the Philippine government in Tripoli, Libya. Under the Tripoli Agreement, the Philippine government accepted thirteen provinces in Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan as a prospective area of Muslim autonomy. Attempts to implement the agreement broke down, however, when the Philippine government insisted on a plebiscite on the autonomy arrangements in the thirteen provinces (only five of which had a Muslim majority by the 1970s), and each side accused the other of cease-fire violations.

In 1977, splits occurred within the MNLF over issues of strategy, personality, and ideological orientation; the splits also followed major ethnolinguistic



An MNLF soldier awaits orders on Jolo Island in the southern Philippines in May 2000. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

divisions in Philippine Muslim society. While Misuari remained as the recognized leader of the MNLF, a faction led by Hashim Salamat, a religious leader from Maguindanao, broke away to form the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and a second, predominantly Maranao, faction led by Dimas Pundato formed the MNLF-Reformist Group.

The armed conflict was scaled down by the late 1970s, following the splits in the movement and with a number of MNLF fighters surrendering to the government under amnesty programs. In 1986, talks initiated between the incoming president, Corazon Aquino, and Misuari culminated in provisions in the 1987 constitution for an Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Disputes again arose over the issue of a referendum to determine which provinces and cities would join the ARMM; the MNLF boycotted the poll, and Misuari returned overseas. In 1992, however, negotiations were revived under President Fidel Ramos, and in 1996, with the mediation of the OIC, a peace agreement was signed between the MNLF and the Philippine government. It provided for the creation of a Special Zone of Peace and Development in the (now) fourteen provinces and nine cities specified in the Tripoli Agreement, and for a Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development, with limited autonomous powers, headed by Misuari. Provision was also made for the integration of former BMA fighters into the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Constabulary. Misuari was elected governor of the ARMM in 1996. The breakaway MILF, however, continued the insurgency. In August 2001, there were reports of a rapprochement between the MNLF and the MILF, but there were also factional cleavages within the MNLF, notably in August 2001 with the signing of the Kuala Lumpur Agreement on the Guidelines for the Imple-

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Ronald J. May

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MOSO The Moso, also known as the Mosuo, Na, or Naze, are a Chinese minority ethnic group living on the border of the southwestern provinces of Yunnan and Sichuan. No census data of the Moso are published as they are officially classified as a subgroup of the Naxi, a large ethnic minority in China. The Moso population is estimated to be around forty thousand.

The Moso practice matrilineal descent (tracing descent through the mother's line) and have a unique visiting sexual system called *tisese* and grand households that usually do not consist of a husband and a wife. Women, not men, are at the center of Moso culture.

Tisese ("walking back and forth") among the Moso differs from marriage in that it is noncontractual, nonobligatory, and nonexclusive. Commonly, the two partners in a *tisese* relationship work and consume in their own matrilineal households, respectively (or separately). The man visits the woman in the evening, stays with her overnight, and goes back to his mother's household the next morning. Children born to such a union belong to the household in which they were born, usually the mother's household. Because Moso culture has been changing rapidly in recent decades, the nonexclusive and nonobligatory features of *tisese* are disappearing.

Chuan-kang Shib

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MOSUL (2002 pop. 1.7 million). Mosul, the second-largest city in modern Iraq, is located on the west bank of the Tigris River opposite the ruins of ancient Nineveh, a capital of the Assyrian empire. Mosul came under Sasanid rule in the second century CE, when it was the site of an important bishopric. Incorporated into the Muslim empire in 641, it became a garrison town and subsequently a provincial capital under the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties (seventh–thirteenth centuries). It was generally spared the devastation the Mongols visited on many neighboring cities in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Unlike most other Iraqi cities, much of Mosul's historic center remains intact.

Medieval travelers praised the beauty of the city and the fertility of its surroundings; most of its buildings were constructed of stone, and it had a thriving market center and many baths and mosques. The city was incorporated into the Ottoman empire in 1535, although



HATRA-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Hatra, a major citadel in the ancient Parthian empire, was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1985. Hatra—southwest of Mosul, Iraq—combined Greco-Roman architecture with Eastern influences in its temples and fended off two Roman invasions in 116 and 198 CE.

it was ruled almost continuously by a local family, the Jalilis, for much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In late Ottoman times there were substantial Christian and Jewish communities in the city.

Mosul's commercial importance ("muslin" is a corruption of the city's name) began to wane with the decline of the overland trade routes following the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, and with the city's incorporation into the modern state of Iraq in 1920 and its general subordination to the new capital, Baghdad. Located close to Iraq's northern oil fields, Mosul is the largest city in the region with important textile, cement, and food-processing industries.

Peter Sluglett



The ruins of an Assyrian temple dating to the eighth century BCE unearthed 35 kilometers south of Mosul by archaeologists. (AFP/CORBIS)

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MOTHERLAND. See **Turkey-Political System.**

MOTOORI NORINAGA (1730–1801), Japanese scholar. Considered one of Japan's greatest scholars, Motoori Norinaga was born in Ise Province near the Grand Shrine of Ise. In 1752, he went to Kyoto to study Chinese classics and medicine, and during this time he read classical literary works from the Heian period. Toward the end of his studies, he published *Asbiwake obune*, in which he set forth his theory of classical *waka* (Japanese poems in thirty-one syllables). Returning to Ise in 1757, he established himself as a physician and also commenced a series of lectures on *Genji monogatari* (*The Tale of Genji*), *Tosa Diary*, and the *Manyoshu* (*Collection of Ten Thousand Leaves*). He subsequently published *Shibun yoryo*, a study of *Genji monogatari*, and *Isonokami sasamegoto*, a study of *waka*. In both works his interpretations focused on *mono no aware* (sensitivity to the transience of things). In Kyoto, Norinaga had become familiar with the works of *kokugaku* (national learning) movement founder Keichu (1640–1701). The *kokugaku* movement studied ancient Japanese texts in order to rediscover the native values of Japan prior to the introduction of Buddhism and Confucianism from China. It was not until he returned to Matsuzaka that Motoori became acquainted with the erudite *kokugaku* scholar Kamo no Mabuchi (1697–1769). A single meeting with him convinced Motoori that it was essential to study the earliest of the Japanese classics, the *Kojiki* (Record of Ancient Matters, c. 712). He then turned his attention to philology, Japanese mythology, and political philosophy. In 1796, he published an exhaustive interpretation of *Genji monogatari* and, in 1798, completed his lifework, *Kojiki den*, a comprehensive study of the *Kojiki*. Motoori's writings had significant impact on later generations of scholars in terms of methodology and nationalistic ideology.

James M. Vardaman, Jr.

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MOULMEIN (1995 pop. 250,000). Moulmein is an important port city in southeastern Myanmar (Burma). It is located at the mouth of the Salween River on the Bay of Martaban. The name "Moulmein" is a Western colonial version of the indigenous name for the town (pronounced Mow-la-myine), and since 1989 "Mawlamyaing" (sometimes "Mawlamyine") has officially replaced the colonial version. Moulmein is one of Myanmar's largest cities with about a quarter of a million people, largely of Mon heritage.

As an independent state, Moulmein was a tributary of the Thai kingdom of Ayutthaya from the fourteenth century until 1765, when it fell under Burmese control. The British took Moulmein as part of the province of Tenasserim in the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826), and from 1827 until 1852 Moulmein was the colonial capital of the British province of Tenasserim. After 1852, Moulmein remained the administrative center of Amherst District and Tenasserim Division for the remainder of British rule. Under British rule, the extraction of timber from the area's substantial teak reserves and the local shipbuilding industry helped to turn the town of Moulmein into an important port for the eastern Bay of Bengal. Today, Moulmein is the capital of Mon State.

Michael Walter Charney

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MOUNTAINEERING There are more mountains in Asia than in any other continent. Mountains form a backbone to Asia, snaking across the continent from the mountains of eastern Turkey and the Caucasus lying on the border between Europe and Asia, through Iran and Iraq to Afghanistan where they divide at the Hindu Kush. To the north, the link extends through the Pamirs, Tian Shan, and the Altai Mountains, through Mongolia, to divide again, ending at the Kamchatka and Korean peninsulas and offshore in the Japanese Alps. To the south, the



MOUNTAINEERING—TWO VIEWS

Tourists who climb the mountains of the Himalayas describe the mountains as beautiful, awesome, breathtaking, and mysterious. The Sherpa people who live there and often serve as guides have a much different view.

Although it is the environment of the Khumbu that attracts Western tourists, their perception of that environment, ironically, is fundamentally incompatible with that of the Sherpas. The most general Sherpa term for beautiful (*lemu*) can apply to the physical features as well as the personal qualities of human beings, both men and women. It can also apply to inanimate objects and to the environment as a whole. But while a field or forest might be *lemu*, the giant snow peaks towering in every direction over Khumbu are never considered *lemu*. Their lack of color (their whiteness) is seen as uninteresting (though religiously significant)—not a surprising judgment in view of the Sherpa preference for vivid colors evident in such disparate contexts as religious paintings and women's aprons. A snow peak elsewhere might be admired for its shape, and Pertemba, one of the foremost Sherpa sardars of his time, says that one of the pleasures he derives from climbing is the beauty of the different views from high on a mountain. But generally familiarity has bred indifference rather than awe, and the shape of the Khumbu snow and ice peaks is just too boring to be considered *lemu*. Even the dramatic setting of Tengboche Monastery is said to have been selected without regard to its beauty. It was chosen by name, sight unseen, because the footprints of Lama Sangwa Dorje, a seminal figure in Sherpa history who was born about 350 years ago, had been embedded in rock when he stopped there.

Source: James F. Fisher. (1990) *Sherpas: Reflections on Change on Himalayan Nepal*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 127–129.

chain extends through the Karakoram and the high Himalayas before fanning out into China, Myanmar, and the Malay Peninsula, and offshore into Sumatra.

Mountaineering as we know it, involving adventure, conquest, and recorded ascents, is usually considered to be a Western development, coming to Asia during the period of late colonialism in the latter part of the nineteenth century. There were earlier ascents of sacred mountains, however, and it should not be assumed that only late Victorians had a spirit of adventure. All first ascents should be noted as first recorded ascents.

Present-day mountaineering in Asia may range from rock climbing in Hong Kong and Vietnam, to tourist ascents of Mt. Fuji in Japan, to pilgrimages that complete the circuit of Kailas in Tibet, to archaeological ascents of Mount Ararat in Turkey. But the main focus is on the Karakoram and Himalayas,

and especially on the fourteen peaks that exceed 8,000 meters in height. After the Caucasus, these mountains became the prime focus of exploration by mountaineers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Several peaks up to 7,000 meters received their first recorded ascents during this period of exploration and discovery of the highest mountains in the world.

Between the two World Wars, national expeditions from Western nations focused on making the first ascents of these mountains, with the Germans concentrating on Nanga Parbat (8,126 meters) and the British on Everest (also known as Chomolungma or Sagarmatha, 8,848 meters). These national expeditions continued after World War II, with technological developments resulting from war leading to the first successes—Annapurna (8,078 meters) by the French in 1950; Nanga Parbat by the Germans and Everest by the British, both in 1953; K2 (the second highest



A climber on Passu Glacier in Passu, Hunza, Pakistan, in 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

mountain in the world, 8,611 meters) by the Italians in 1954; and Kanchenjunga (the third highest mountain in the world, 8,586 meters) by the British in 1955.

National expeditions continued for the remainder of the twentieth century, with particular emphasis by nations wishing to join the Everest club. The character of Himalayan mountaineering began to change once the major peaks had all received first ascents, and smaller self-contained expeditions that explored alternative routes to the summits became more common. Since the 1980s and 1990s, commercial or charitable interests have sponsored an increasing number of Himalayan mountaineering expeditions.

Although Asians have probably always climbed their own mountains, Western-style recorded ascents have been carried out by Indians and Pakistanis. Mountaineering is well established in Japan and Korea, and the Sherpa people of Nepal are guides to the world's highest mountains.

Peter Donnelly

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MOXIBUSTION Moxibustion, as an ancient healing art of traditional Chinese medicine (TCM), cannot be separated from acupuncture. By definition, moxibustion means the use of *moxa* (a Japanese term for *Artemisia vulgaris*) as a cauterium by igniting it close to the skin. *Moxa* is a soft, woolly mass prepared from the young leaves of various wormwoods of Eastern Asia, called *Artemisia argyl*, or Chinese mugwort leaf (*Artemisia folium*).

Moxibustion treatment is performed with *moxa* rolls or sticks, which, after being ignited, can be held by the doctor's hand at a distance of three centimeters or so away from the selected acupuncture points for ten to fifteen minutes, resulting in a *moxa* cauterization effect. Moxibustion, therefore, can also be defined as burning herbs to stimulate the acupuncture points. With special indications such as acute abdominal pain due to cold, facial muscle atrophy of unknown etiology, and so forth, a thin, small slice of ginger as an insulator can be put at the site of the acupoint between the ignited *moxa* roll and the skin. The patient may feel a sense of heat at the acupoint. Alternatively, the patient may be given acupuncture first, and then



A traditional Chinese doctor applies suction glasses to the back of a patient in Taipei, Taiwan. (NIK WHEELER/CORBIS)

the *moxa* rolls cut into small cylinders are ignited and applied to the ends of the acupuncture needles. The theory and principles of channels and collaterals must be first learned to master the art of both moxibustion and acupuncture.

The concept of administering moxibustion (or moxibustion plus acupuncture) is based on providing heat stimulation at the acupuncture points along the channels and collaterals. The effects are twofold. One is local hyperthermia therapy, and the other is the effect on remote organs along the channels and collaterals. The selection of the moxibustion and acupoints is done according to the indications of the special disorder.

Today, moxibustion and acupuncture are practiced in departments of TCM or, in many Chinese hospitals, by integrating TCM with Western medicine. Study has concluded that serious or severe adverse events are rare in the standard practice of moxibustion and acupuncture.

Chen Bao-xing and Garé LeCompte

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MOZI (flourished 479–438 BCE), Chinese philosopher. Master Mo (Mozi) may have been a native of the state of either Song or Lu in China. He was a high official in Song. Because he is believed to have been an artisan and because of the practical nature of his philosophy and the many images and analogies drawn from the technical crafts, it is believed that Mozi came from the lower classes. King Hui of Chu (488–432 BCE) refused to grant Mozi an audience supposedly because of his low status. Some claim that Mozi studied Confucius's teachings when he was young; his essays clearly attack the major tenants of Confucianism. Ancient texts do not present Mozi in debate with Confucian scholars; rather he debated with the artisan Gongshu Ban regarding his wall-scaling ladder. Mozi convinced the king of Chu not to employ the ladder militarily against Song, which represents his values of loving everybody and defending the underdog.

The text of Mozi clearly and sharply attacked Confucian values. Mozi and his followers opposed the extravagant use of music and rituals. They especially opposed elaborate funeral ceremonies that were an important part of Confucian ancestor veneration. The Mohists advocated a utilitarian approach and rejected elaborate court music, ritual, and funerals because state resources were wasted on these activities when those resources could benefit the people. They also repudiated offensive warfare. Mozi rejected the Confucian concept of *ming* (destiny), and his text makes no mention of the aristocratic Confucian distinction between the "prince of virtue" or gentleman and the "petty person." Mozi especially spurned the Confucian clan value of graded love, advocating *jianai* (love for everyone). His idea of love for everyone was possibly derived from the Confucian ideal of *shu* (empathy). Love for everyone is based on treating other states, families, and persons as if they were one's own. Mozi's idea of love for everyone is not correctly translated as universal love because *jian* implies "for each," not "for all," and love in this context is moral concern, not deep emotional affection. Mozi considered con-

cern for everyone to be the unifying principle of morality. For later Mohists, love for everyone entailed a notion of moral equality but not social equality.

During the fourth and third centuries BCE the Mohist school was well organized under a grand master. By the end of that period the school split into three sects that denounced each other as heretics. The three sects differed in interpretation of the teachings of Mozi. There were the purists, the compromisers, and the reactionaries. Mohists who took office were expected to donate funds to the organization, and the grand master could remove them from office. The sects taught ten basic principles contained in the ten core essays of the Mozi, namely, Elevation of the Worthy; Conforming Upwards; Concern for Everyone; Rejection of Aggression; Thrift in Utilization; Thrift in Funerals; Heaven's Intent; Elucidating Ghosts; Rejection of Music; and Rejection of Destiny. Many chapters have three versions, which are probably derived from the three sects.

Mohist doctrines were new. So they had to argue on their own behalf, which began systematic debate in ancient China. The expressions "to argue out alternatives" and "to distinguish" or "rational discourse" are first used in the Mozi. The Mozi also proposes that the correctness of an idea does not depend on the person who thought it. Where the Confucians expect thinkers to both talk about and exemplify the way, Mohists discuss ideas based on their own merits regardless of who presents them.

Mozi delineated three criteria to evaluate arguments: the roots, evidence, and use. A position is accepted if one can trace its roots to practices of the ancient sages. It is assented to if it is in accord with the understanding of the masses and if, when applied in the administration of the state or in punishing of wrongdoers, it brings benefit to the people. The practical and utilitarian focus of Mozi's philosophy is notable. Mozi is unique among ancient moralists in the belief that if an idea or practice has been handed down from the ancient sages but does not benefit the people, then he rejects it. Utilitarianism is the basis of many of his criticisms of Confucianism.

James D. Sellmann

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MUANG *Muang* (also *mong*, *meng*, *muang*, *muong*, *meuang*) is a key concept of sociopolitical organization and interpretation of the universe in Tai societies; that is, in societies in which a language in the Tai language family is spoken. The term *muang* is known in all Tai languages and can refer to:

1. a municipality that is a political and ritual center;
2. a sociopolitical unit ("small state" or "chiefdom") consolidated from a number of *baan* (village communities), with an economy based on wet-rice production using the *muang-fuai* (canal-weir) irrigation system;
3. a larger political unit that integrated traditional forms of *muang* administration and the Indian mandala concept of the centralized state (concentration of political, religious and spiritual power in the center, which is the seat of a sacred ruler known as *devaraja*), such as the Tai Buddhist kingdoms of Sukhothai (thirteenth–fourteenth century), Laan Naa (thirteenth–twentieth century), Laan Saang (fourteenth–seventeenth century), Ayutthaya (fourteenth–eighteenth century), and modern nation states; and
4. the traditional Tai understanding of the universe, which consists of numbers of *muang* of worldly as well as supernatural and heavenly nature, all underlying a specific cosmic order or universal law, which determines human ritual life, customary law, the moral order, and behavior.

History

Pre-Buddhist Tai societies were organized principally in so-called *baan-muang* systems. *Baan* (a group of extended families) often but not necessarily were bound together by kinship relations. A *baan* occupied a certain territory (*din baan*) that traditionally included cultivated land, sacred forests, wild forests, and watercourses. Because they were wet-rice-growing societies, Tai *baan* could not have sustained themselves in

isolation: the water irrigation necessary for wet-rice cultivation demanded the cooperation of several *baan* communities in the same watershed area. The cooperation of *baan* in irrigation groups probably was the primary reason for founding *muang*, that is, a group of several *baan* managing one common irrigation system, and generally worshiping the same territorial guardian spirit and spirit of the main weir.

Wyatt observes that the *muang* was the primary unit of social and political organization above the village level. He says, "When it is used in ancient chronicles to refer to a principality, it can mean both the town located at the hub of a network of interrelated villages and also the totality of town and villages which was ruled by a single *chau*, 'lord'" (Wyatt 1984: 7).

The inner structure of a *muang* was characterized by a decentralized administration and a hierarchical order, at the top of which was *muang luang*, the municipality in which the *chau muang* ("chief/lord of the *muang*") resided. The *chau* fulfilled not only the function of a political leader but also the role of the head of administration, and, in time of war, he or she had to organize mutual defense. For this protection, the *baan* rendered labor service or paid quantities of local produce in return. This was a mutually beneficial relationship, supported by the belief that the *chau* was provided with sacred power from the *muang* ancestors. The *chau* did not, however, have the status of a *devaraja* (god-king), a concept that was introduced only with the process of Indianization in the eleventh to fourteenth century, and his power was not that of an absolute monarch. Besides the *chau*, there existed a council of elders elected by several *baan*. This council made decisions regarding irrigation and administration, as well as regarding legal and religious affairs.

The political structure of *muang* has led scholars such as Bruneau to characterize it as rural democracy. Furthermore, the traditional Tai *muang* accommodated the non-Tai populace without affecting those groups' traditional community structure, and established diplomatic and tributary relationships with neighboring states (Khmer, Mon, Vietnamese, Chinese) to maintain inner stability as well as a political balance with external powers.

On the economic front, the *muang* could mobilize manpower efficiently in a large region, which ensured economic stability. There were enough natural resources and technologies were not so highly developed; therefore manpower was most important for economic stability. The economic surplus was mainly used for ritual purposes and the maintenance of friendly relationships with neighboring powers; it was

also invested in articles of value, such as gold, silver, precious stones, and in the establishment of communal utilities. The surplus generally was not, however, used for building ritual-political prestige objects, as it was the case in the Khmer and Mon empires.

From *Muang* to Mandala

Under the influence of the Indianized Mon and Khmer, the Tai *chau muang* adopted not only Buddhism but also Indian concepts of the state, such as the mandala concept. They sought to make their *muang* into Buddhist kingdoms (*raja-anachak*) by unifying a number of *muang* with which they had kinship or friendly relations, or by occupying and subjugating weaker *muang*. The strength of the early Tai kingdoms that appeared suddenly in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries probably can be explained through the integration of the traditional practice of decentralized administration and the Indian ideology of the centralized state. In other words, the ruler formally had the status of a *devaraja*, but, in practice, the several *muang* forming a kingdom were relatively autonomous in inner affairs and in maintaining relations with other *muang*. Except for Ayutthaya and the later Siam, where the *muang* administration system was radically transformed into the *sakdina* system (classification of the society according to the possession of rice fields), the practice of integrating both the traditional *muang* administration and the mandala ideology of the centralized state was preserved among the Tai peoples until the beginning of European colonization in the nineteenth century.

Oliver Raendchen

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MUAY THAI Thai boxing (*muay Thai*) or kickboxing, as it is widely known outside Asia, is one of the several Asian martial arts that in the twentieth century enjoyed considerable popularity in the West. Thai boxing is believed to have developed in medieval Thailand, a time when wars between rival states were waged with bow and arrow, swords, pikes, and hand-to-hand combat involving the arms and legs, knees and elbows. Kickboxing was a component of military training and gained prominence during the reign of King Naresuan in 1560 CE. According to legend, Naresuan was taken prisoner during one of the many wars with neighboring Burma. He was given the opportunity to win his freedom by defeating Burma's best warriors in hand-to-hand combat. Using Thai boxing, he easily defeated all his opponents and was set free. Upon returning to Thailand, he established Thai boxing (then called Siamese boxing) as the national sport.

Thai boxing reached its greatest popularity in the eighteenth century during the reign of Pra Chao Sua when participants came from a broad spectrum of social classes and it was a regular form of entertainment featured at festivals.

In the twentieth century, the rules and equipment were systematized, arenas were built in every province, and the sport has been promoted as a Thai national treasure and then exported to many other nations. Kickboxing is now popular internationally and there are national associations in the United States and Canada and many European nations. In its modern form, the sport is much like boxing, except that the feet and legs may be used as weapons. In Thailand, there are fifteen weight categories ranging from mini-flyweight (48 kilograms or less) to heavyweight (80 kilograms or more). While the sport originally required the use of bare or leather- or hemp-covered knuckles, participants now use regulation-weight boxing gloves but remain barefoot.

Muay Thai bouts take place in a raised square ring with a canvas surface and four ropes along each side. In addition to the boxers and the referee in the ring, at ringside are the handlers, judges, medical personnel, a timekeeper, a mediator, and other officials. Boxers wear red or blue boxing shorts and gloves. A sacred cord known as a *mongkol* may be worn around the head only during the prefight ritual, while amulets may be wrapped around biceps or waist if completely covered by cloth. In traditional matches, boxers pay respect to their teachers through a prayer ritual accompanied by Thai musical instruments: the *pi* (Java pipe), *glawng chana* (drum), and *ching* (cymbals). These instruments are also played during the bout but not during the rest periods. A bout lasts no more than five rounds, each three minutes long, with a two-minute rest period between rounds. The objective is to hit or kick one's opponent with the hand, foot, knee, or elbow so as to injure him, knock him out, or win points from the referee and judges. A bout is won by knockout, technical knockout, decision, or foul and can also end in a draw.

There are two major muay Thai venues in Bangkok (Ratchadamnoen Stadium and Lumpini Stadium) and one in Samut Prakarn (Sam Rong Stadium) and smaller stadiums in every province, with bouts two or three nights a week.



Thai boxers in the early 1970s. (HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS)

Related to muay Thai is the martial art of *krabi-krabong*, which is based on the use of swords, spears, and axes. Unlike muay Thai, it has not emerged as a modern sport but instead has become a form of performance ritual in which participants act out a script accompanied by traditional Thai music.

David Levinson


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MUGHAL EMPIRE The Mughal empire (also known as the Moghul, Mongol, or Mongolian empire) was a large empire of the Indian subcontinent, controlled by a Muslim dynasty of central Asian origin from 1526 to 1857. It included, at its peak, much of present-day Pakistan, parts of Afghanistan, and most of northern, eastern, and central India.

It was established by Babur—Zahir-ud-Din Muhammad—(1483–1530), a descendant of the Turkic conqueror Timur (Tamerlane) and of Chagatai, second son of the Mongol ruler Chinggis Khan; hence the association with the Mongols. Babur's successor Humayun—Nasin-ud-Din Muhammad—(1508–1556)



QUTB MINAR-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

The construction of this minaret in Delhi, India, began in 1193 and symbolized the dominance of the new Mughal empire over the last Hindu armies. A staggering 72.5-meters high, the Qutb Minar and its surrounding buildings—Mughal masterpieces in their own right—were designated a World Heritage Site in 1993.

ruled briefly (1530–1543, 1555–1556) before facing Sher Shah's revolt and then living in exile in Safavid Iran for twelve years. The brief reestablishment of Mughal power on his return was abruptly halted by his death in 1556. The empire's high point came during the rule of Akbar—Abu-ul-Fath Jalal-ud-Din Muhammad Akbar—(1542–1605), who transformed the kingdom into a vast empire stretching from Kabul to the Deccan. Imperial administrative reforms and artistic patronage continued under his successors Jahangir (1569–1627) and Shah Jahan (1592–1666). The rule of the next successor, Aurangzeb—Alamgir or Muhi-ed-Din Muhammad—(1618–1707), however, was marked by a significant increase in Islamic orthodoxy, causing a substantial decline in artistic production and patronage. In contrast to the consolidated nature of the ear-



A mosque in Lahore, Pakistan, built during the Mughal empire. (CHRISTINE OSBORNE/CORBIS)



FATEHPUR-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Fatehpur Sikri in Agra, India, became a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1986. It was built as a capital city for the Mughal empire and contains the enormous Jama Masjid Mosque. Occupied for only ten years, this architectural gem was abandoned when the city ran out of water.

lier period, political instability and disintegration characterized the rule of the later Mughals until the empire finally dissolved in 1857. Factions such as the Hyderabad Nizams, and the Nawabs of Murshidabad and Lucknow, began gradually to break away. The Marathas made significant inroads in the region of Central India, while the British expanded their holdings in Bengal. Finally, the Sikhs emerged as a major militant force in Punjab. The biggest blow to the empire came with Nadir Shah's attack on the Mughal capital at Shahjahanbad (modern-day Delhi) in 1739. Not only did this result in rampant destruction and loss of life, it also put an end to the political and cultural dominance of the Mughals over India. The empire survived in a much-reduced form until the Indian Revolt of 1857, when the last Mughal emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar (1775–1862), was captured by the British and exiled in Rangoon, Burma.

Manu Sobti

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MUHAJIR *Muhajir* is an Arabic term designating a person who has gone on a hajj (the pilgrimage to Mecca, which is mandatory for all Muslims at least once in their lifetime). This term also gained a political overtone when it was applied to the millions of Muslim migrants who crossed the border into Pakistan from India in 1947. The British created Pakistan

in 1947 as a homeland for Indian Muslims by separating parts of the Punjab and the Sind from India. This led to much bloodshed on both sides as Hindus and Muslims clashed in communal riots.

These migrants, or *muhajirs*, have faced constant discrimination from those who are native to the region and did not need to migrate. This ill will has led to frequent violent outbursts between *muhajirs* and non-*muhajirs*, with outright rioting in Sind Province in 1986–1987, when the *muhajir* political party, the MQM (Muhajir Qawmi Mahaz, the Muhajir's People Movement), gained political prominence. The MQM, under its leader Altaf Hussain, sought equal employment opportunities for people of *muhajir* descent. The political weight of the MQM was felt in the 1988 elections when it became the third-largest party in the Pakistani Assembly. The tensions continued until 1992, when the army moved to crush the MQM. The result was that the entire *muhajir* community bore the brunt of this violence because it was deemed guilty by association. From 1985 onward, the *muhajir* identity was politicized.

Nirmal Dass

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MUHAJIR QAWMI MOVEMENT The Muhajir Qawmi Movement (MQM), an immigrant-rights organization, is based in Karachi, Pakistan, where the *muhajirs*, or immigrants, mostly Urdu speaking, came from India as a consequence of the partition of the subcontinent on 14–15 August 1947. In 1984, they started a *qawmi*, or national movement, for more political autonomy and economic opportunities in response to what they perceived as a continuous pattern of discrimination. The national government believed these demands were at the expense of the other ethnic groups such as the Punjabis, Pathans, and Baluchis, and, especially, the Sindis, of Sind Province, the capital of which is Karachi. Violence between ethnic and Sunni-Shi'a sectarian groups has plagued Karachi ever since. Pakistan military and rangers have been fighting the MQM armed activists, with drive-by shootings, execution-style murders, counter killings, and torture during police custody alleged by both sides. The government of Pakistan accuses India of supporting the MQM. Several attempts at resolving the worsening situation have failed. On 27 July

1997, the Muhajir Qawmi Movement was reorganized and transformed into the Mutthida Quami ("united national") Movement, with the same initials, under the new leadership of Altaf Hussain. Hussain, who is wanted in Pakistan under criminal charges, lives in exile in England, where he received British citizenship in February 2001.

Abdul Karim Khan

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MUHAMMADIYAH The Muhammadiyah was established on 18 November 1912 in Yogyakarta, Java, Indonesia, by K. H. Ahmad Dahlan (1868–1923), as a socioreligious organization aimed at adapting Islamic teachings to modern life. It is considered the largest educational and social movement in Southeast Asia. It is said to be inspired by the Egyptian reform movement of Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905), which professed a rational approach to Islamization. Its activities are multifaceted, encompassing religious education, social welfare (running of orphanages and hospitals), and promotion of economic development.

From the Muhammadiyah perspective, Islamic ideology advocates the abolition of TBC: *Tachyul* (myths), *Bid'ah* (religious innovations), and *Churafat* (superstitions). According to the Muhammadiyah's teachings, TBC, also the acronym for tuberculosis, needs to be eradicated like the deadly disease. Relics of local pre-Islamic religious practices and the weakening of "pure" Islamic values are perceived as obstacles to progress.

The Muhammadiyah, like the Christian missionaries before it, considered education as the way to progress. It set up modern schools to teach Dutch, English, and the sciences. The organization runs over a thousand schools from kindergarten to university level, across Indonesia.

The organization was criticized by radical Indonesian nationalists for accepting government funding for its schools, and for alleged cooperation with the Dutch colonial rulers. As well, as a "modernist" organization, the Muhammadiyah is persistently challenged by the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), a "traditional" socioreligious organization in Indonesia. The Muhammadiyah publishes many educational books and other publications.

It has set up hospitals, clinics, maternity centers, and nursing schools in major cities, towns, and rural areas. It has autonomous wings for youth, for school and university students, and for women. The latter, the 'Aisyiyah, is the largest Muslim women's organization in the world. The Muhammadiyah also runs poorhouses, labor unions, cooperatives, and factories. It is praised for efficiency, leadership, and good management. Many of its organizers and members are volunteers as well as donors.

The Muhammadiyah claims 30 million followers, including sympathizers, mainly from middle-class and urban backgrounds. It has branches and followers in other Southeast Asian countries, making it one of the few transnational movements in the region. The Muhammadiyah has been compared by many to the Protestant movement. Its former head, Dr. M. Amien Rais, president of the Muhammadiyah-supported National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional), was chosen in October 1999 to be speaker of the People's Consultative Assembly (Majlis Permusyawaratan Rakyat), the highest state political institution in Indonesia.

Andi Faisal Bakti

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MUJAHIDEEN The word "mujahideen" is Arabic for "warriors of god," or "holy warriors," which is the term most recently applied to the Afghani Muslim militia. In the 1980s the mujahideen were organized in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Members were mostly drawn from tribes and villagers. Reportedly, many mujahideen members were among those Afghans who lost family and friends during the Soviet invasion. However, the mujahideen also included some Muslim foreign forces who stood alongside Afghans in the struggle against atheist Communist Russians. The mujahideen were mainly organized by tribal leaders, al-

though the leadership also included some people from the cities.

During the decade between 1979 and 1989, the mujahideen were able to challenge the Soviet army despite their limited forces, which were estimated at between 80,000 and 150,000. This resistance group received military support from both American and Pakistani secret intelligence agencies and financial assistance from the United States and Saudi Arabia, both of which hoped to destabilize Soviet influence in the region and contain Communism. Against all odds, the mujahideen were victorious, and Afghanistan was proclaimed an Islamic state in April 1992. Once the war was over, however, conflicts developed among the various factions of the mujahideen, creating an explosive political environment in Afghanistan, and the mujahideen's activities spilled over into other areas of the Central Asian region.

Houman A. Sadri

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MULTAN (1998 pop. 1.2 million). A major city in Pakistan, Multan serves as the commercial and cultural center for southern Punjab Province. It was first mentioned in written sources as the place (identified as Malli) where Alexander (d. 323 BCE) was grievously injured during his campaigns in India. Multan was the site of an important Hindu temple at the time of the Arab Muslim invasion in 712 and gained significance as a commercial and administrative hub in subsequent centuries. Muslim rulers left the temple intact (and benefited from its revenues) until approximately the eleventh century. The city was a major western outpost during the Delhi Sultanate and Mughal periods (thirteenth to eighteenth centuries), though it was subject to invasions from the west. The Sikhs under Ranjit Singh (reigned 1801–1839) captured the city in 1818 but lost it to the expanding British Indian em-

pire in 1848. Since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, Multan has been an important commercial market for crops such as cotton, wheat, and mangoes, and the city's hospitals, university, and medical college serve as a resource for the surrounding region.

Multan was one of the earliest centers of Islamic culture in India. Baha' al-Din Zakariyya (d. 1262 or 1267), whose mausoleum lies in the inner city, established the Suhrawardi Sufi order from his seat in Multan. The city was also host to important Ismaili missionaries in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, including Pir Shams al-Din Sabzavari (d. c. 1300), whose tomb is still an important site. The tomb of Shah Rukn al-Din 'Alam (built c. 1315) is the finest example of local architecture and was originally built by the king for himself. Multan is famous today for its distinctive blue and white tilework and handicrafts made with camel skin. The city is also the literary and cultural center for people speaking Punjab's Siraiki dialect.

Shabzad Bashir

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MUMBAI (2002 est. pop. 12.1 million). Bombay, renamed Mumbai in June 1981, is on the western coast of India. Endowed with a natural harbor and a wide bay facing Africa and East Asia, the city is partly on Bombay Island and other smaller islands in the harbor (originally seven main islands comprised Bombay; in 1784 these were merged through land reclamation), and the archipelago is a natural shipping and trading center. Around the third century BCE, fishermen living here worshiped the goddess Mumba Devi, after whom the city is named.

From the ninth to thirteenth centuries, the Arabian Sea (the part of the Indian Ocean between Arabia and India) played an integral role in world commerce, and heavy freight traffic occurred between Aden, Calicut, Cambay, and cities on the west coast of Africa. The caves of Elephanta (a small island in the harbor) and part of the Walkeshwar temple complex that was built at this time indicate that Elephanta belonged to the



BOMBAY IN THE 1800s

"Every family visiting Bombay, must feel the great inconvenience of there being neither a hotel, or other place of public accommodation, at which they can put up, in the event of their not possessing an acquaintance, whose hospitality they may venture to claim; and this position, however awkward and perplexing, is one in which individuals are commonly placed, who have long been residents at a distance from the Presidency. The Victoria Hotel solicits the patronage of travellers; but, as it is situated in the very dirtiest and very narrowest street of the fort, the additional annoyances of flights of mosquitoes, a billiard table, a coffee and a tap room, place it without the pale of respectable support. The Sanitarium affords shelter to invalids, and is delightfully situated, where the smooth sands and fine sea-breeze render it a tempting locality for the convalescent; but the rooms are far too small for family accommodation. In this dilemma, visitors usually pitch tents on the esplanade; and if in the hot season, cause them to be *chuppered in*, as the phrase is, or a false roof erected with bamboos and date leaves, to secure them equally from the intense heat of the mid-day sun, and the evil effects of the evening dews."

Source: Mrs. Thomas Postans. (1839) *Western India in 1838*, as quoted in *The Sahibs* (1948), edited by Hilton Brown. London: William Hodge & Co., 79–80.

Silhara dynasty, ruled by the sultan of Gujarat in western India. The mosque in Mahim in the northern part of Bombay also dates to this period.

In 1534, Bahadur Shah of Gujarat was forced to cede the islands of Bombay to the Portuguese. Saint Andrew's church in Bandra, a suburb of modern Mumbai, dates from this period. In 1661, Catherine of Braganza (1638–1705) brought the islands to Charles II (1630–1685) of England as part of her dowry. The British East

India Company received them from the crown in 1668, built the city, and moved its main holdings to Bombay from Surat, a city to its north. Gerald Aungier (d. c. 1677), the second governor of the city (1672–1675), capitalized on the Mughal empire's lack of interest in developing its naval strength and developed the islands into a center of commerce. Skilled workers and traders—Parsis (Zoroastrians), Bhoras (a branch of the Ismaili sect of Shi'a Islam), Jews, and *baniyas* (a Hindu merchant caste) from Surat and Diu, northwest of Bombay—migrated to Bombay. The population increased from 10,000 in 1661 to an unprecedented 60,000 in 1675. The influx of skilled workers continued with the migration of goldsmiths, ironsmiths, and weavers who came from Gujarat. The Hornby Vellard refers to the landmass created by the merging of the seven islands of Bombay. The Mahim Causeway (1845) was another British engineering feat. In 1853, a thirty-five-kilometer-long railway line between Thana, a suburb of the city, and Bombay was inaugurated, the first of its kind in India, and in 1854 the first cotton mill was founded, drawing large-scale migration of Marathi workers from south-central India.

After the First War of Indian Independence in 1857, Bombay came under the control of the crown, as the East India Company was accused of misman-



ELEPHANTA CAVES—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1987, the "city of caves" is home to many fabulous bas-relief limestone carvings dedicated to the Hindu god Siva. The Elephanta Caves are located on a small island just off the Indian city of Mumbai.

agement. Increased commercial enterprise necessitated improved communication within the country, and imperial Bombay evolved in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Bombay played a key role in the Indian independence movement. The business capital of India and the nerve center of India's economy, Mumbai today boasts the largest and busiest port of India and has the country's largest stock exchange, the third largest in the world. The gigantic Indian film industry, Bollywood, is located in Mumbai and churns out hundreds of Hindi films yearly.

Kokila Ravi

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MUNDA LANGUAGES Munda languages, which belong to the Austroasiatic language group, are spoken by about 9 million people in northern and central India. Friedrich von Max Müller (1823–1900) first clearly distinguished the family from the Dravidian language family. Some scholars divide the languages into two subfamilies: the North Munda (spoken in the Chota Nagpur plateau of Jharkhand, Orissa, and Bengal), including Santali, Korku, Mundari, Bhumij, and Ho; and the South Munda (spoken in central Orissa and along the border between Andhra Pradesh and Orissa). South Munda is further divided into Central Munda, including Kharia and Juang, and Koraput Munda, including Gutob, Remo, Savara, Juray, and Gorum.

North Munda languages, the more important of the two groups, are spoken by about nine-tenths of Munda speakers. Of these, Santali is the chief language. The Mundari and Ho languages rank next in the number of speakers, followed by Korku and Soara. The remaining Munda languages are spoken by small isolated groups and are little known.

General Characteristics

The Munda languages are polysyllabic and differ from other Austroasiatic languages in their word formation and sentence structure. The structure of the Munda languages is quite different from that of any language in the Indo-European group. In many ways it is simpler and calls for far less memory than Indo-European languages do.

Munda languages characteristically have three numbers (singular, dual, and plural), two classes (animate and inanimate) for nouns, and the use of either suffixes or auxiliaries for indicating tenses of verb forms. Munda languages possess nothing corresponding to the cases of direct and indirect objects. These relations find their expression in the verb.

In Munda sound systems, consonant sequences are infrequent, except in the middle of a word. Hard and soft consonants are freely used, and both classes can be aspirated. Another characteristic feature of the Munda languages is the presence of semiconsonants. Except in Korku, in which syllables show a distinction between high and low tone, accent is even in the Munda languages. Words are formed from bases or other words through reduplication or by adding affixes. The most important method of modifying a root is by the insertion of infixes. The Munda languages possess a rich stock of words denoting individual things and ideas but are poor in general and abstract terms.

Santali

Santali is the most important of the Munda languages. Santali is spoken over a vast region extending from the south of Bhagalpur and Monghyr in Bihar to Birbhum and west of Burdwan in West Bengal; almost the whole of Bankura; western Midnapore; the greater part of Mayurbhanj and northeast of Keonjhar in Orissa; and Seraikela, Kharsawan, Manbhum, and the Sonthal Parganas in Jharkhand. There are further scattered settlements in the southwest of Murshidabad; in the central part of Twenty-Four Parganas; in the jungles of south Dinajpur; and in the adjoining tracts of Malda, Rajshahi, Bogra, and southwest Rangpur. However, Santali is the principal language only in the Santal Parganas. Elsewhere minor Munda languages coexist with Santali.

Santali has only two dialects, Karmali and Mahle, and these do not differ much from the standard form of speech. The language, particularly the vocabulary, has been to an extent influenced by neighboring Aryan languages, notably Hindi, Bengali, and Oriya. The purest form of Santali is spoken in the north, especially in the Santal Parganas and in Manbhum. The dialect

spoken in Midnapore, Balasore, and Singhbhum is more mixed and shows evidence of Aryan influence.

Santali has a richly developed system of vowels, which are long as well as short. A set of Santali vowels called neutral is apparently due to the influence of an *i* or *u* in the preceding or following syllable. There is a tendency to make the sound of vowels in consecutive syllables approach each other. Santali possesses the same set of consonants as Hindi: four gutturals, four palatals (consonants formed with the front of the tongue behind the lowered tip near or behind the hard palate), four dentals (consonants articulated with the tip or blade of the tongue against or near the upper front teeth), and four labials (consonants that derive their tones by the impact of air current on the lip), with the corresponding nasals (consonants uttered through the nose with the mouth passage occluded). In addition to the sounds *y*, *r*, *l*, *v*, *w*, *s*, and *h*, there are four semiconsonants *k'*, *ch'*, *t'*, *p'*, during the plosion of which contact is released before the breath comes out, and in this way an abrupt sound is produced.

Santali makes use of numerous affixes of various kinds: prefixes, infixes, and suffixes. Most of them play a role in what corresponds to the inflectional system of Indo-European languages. An infix *-k'* is used to form intensives from verbs. Distributives are formed from some numerals beginning with vowels. An infix *-p-* is used to form collective nouns and reciprocal verbs. It is thus added to *manjhi* (headman) to form the collective *mapanjhi* (a group of village headmen). Similarly, the infix *-n-* is used to form collective numerals and *-t-* to form nouns from verbs.

In Santali every word can perform the function of a verb, and every verb form can, according to circumstances, be considered a noun, adjective, or verb. The relation of one verb to another in a sentence is indicated by means of particles, the original meaning of which can no longer be ascertained.

There are two classes of nouns in Santali, one denoting animate objects and the other all inanimate objects. Gender plays no role in the inflexion of nouns but is indicated by using different words or by prefixing certain words meaning male and female. There are three numbers: singular, dual, and plural. The suffix of the dual is *-kin* and that of the plural *-ko*. The suffix of the plural, however, is often dispensed with, and the base is used as a collective singular. Real cases, which denote the relation of the noun to the verb, do not exist in Santali. The verb indicates direct and indirect objects, and there is therefore no dative or accusative case. Local and causal relations are indicated by means of postpositions rather than by prepositions.

Adjectives do not change for gender and number. It is often simply a matter of convenience which word is considered a noun and which an adjective. Postpositions after the compared noun are used to indicate comparisons. Pronouns are, generally speaking, inflected like nouns in number and case. Personal pronouns have separate forms for dual and plural. The first-person pronoun, moreover, has two forms each in the dual and the plural, one excluding and one including the person addressed. Demonstrative pronouns are used as personal pronouns of the third person. There is also a pronoun meaning "self," which can be considered a third-person personal pronoun. There are no honorific pronouns; most people are addressed with the pronoun *am* (thou).

Santali possesses a rich variety of demonstrative pronouns, which have different forms according to whether they refer to animate or inanimate objects. The former group ends in *i* (singular), *kin* (dual number), and *ko* (plural) when referring to inanimate objects. When referring to animate objects, the pronoun ends in *a* (singular), *akin* (dual), and *ako* (plural). Thus, "this animal" translates as *nui* and "this thing" as *noa*. There are no relative pronouns; verbal adjectives are used instead.

The verb is the most characteristic feature of Santali grammar. Various tenses are formed by agglutination, that is, by suffixing certain elements to the unchanged root. To indicate that an action has really taken place, the categorical *a* is added to the root. This changes the inflectional base to a finite tense. A verb's indirect or direct object is indicated by means of pronominal infixes. Santali verbs have separate forms for active voice, passive or direct middle voice, and indirect middle voice. The root of the verb remains unchanged through all tenses. It can be modified in two ways to form the base of a separate conjugation. These two forms are conjugated throughout all tenses. The root can simply be repeated, the resulting double base denoting repeated or intensified action. Thus, *dal* ("strike") means "strike repeatedly or hard" as *dal-dal*. If the verb begins with a vowel, the infix *k'* is used instead of reduplication.

Verbs do not change according to person. For animates, the person of the subject is indicated through pronominal suffixes, which are added to the word immediately preceding the verb. If a sentence consists of only a verb, the suffix is added after the categorical *a*. Suffixes of times have two forms, one denoting active and the other passive and middle. The former ends in *t'* and the latter in *n*. Actions in the past are denoted by two infixes, *-ke* and *-le*. The former is used only in the active voice with a direct object. The infix *-le* de-

notes an action performed in the more remote past. It is used both in the active voice with a direct object and in the passive. Compound tenses are formed by inserting auxiliaries between the inflectional base and *a*. Usually the negative particle is a prefix *ban*. In the case of pronominal suffixes the final *n* is dropped.

Mundari

Mundari is the language spoken by the Munda tribe concentrated in the southern and western parts of the Ranchi district, Palamau, and southeast Hazaribagh, all in the state of Jharkhand in India. Mundari is also spoken along with Ho in north Singhbhum and in the Bamra and Sambalpur districts in Orissa and the neighboring districts of Madhya Pradesh. Emigrants, moreover, have carried the language to districts of Bengal and Assam. In Mundari there are a great number of Aryan roots, many belonging to Sanskrit and other related Indian languages.

Mundari and Santali have much in common. The laws of harmonic sequence are the same in Mundari as in Santali. In the pronunciation of semiconsonants there appears to be a tendency to exhale the current of air through the nose instead of through the mouth. In pronouncing the dental semiconsonants a greater part of the tongue strikes against the palate in Mundari than in Santali. The semiconsonants have the same tendency to develop into soft consonants in both languages.

Genders and numbers are the same in Mundari and Santali. However, in Sambalpur and Bamra, where the Aryan influence is the strongest, the dual and the plural are sometimes confused. The case suffixes, again, are mainly the same in both languages. Outside the Ranchi district the Aryan suffix *-ke* is often used for the dative and accusative. In Mundari, adjectives usually end in *-n* (*bugi-n* = good). Personal pronouns are similar to Santali forms, though Mundari does not seem to possess the rich variety of demonstrative pronouns that Santali has.

The inflection of verbs is mainly the same as in Santali, and the pronominal infixes play the same role. The categorical *a* is dropped after the pronominal infix *-ak'*. The pronominal infixes too have the same role in Mundari and Santali, and the conjugational bases are similarly formed.

There are, however, certain differences between the Mundari and Santali languages. Usually the future and past tenses of reservative (continuative) forms begin with *t* in Mundari, whereas in Santali they begin with *k*. Although the perfect is formed as in Santali, the infixes of the direct and indirect objects are not distinguished. In Mundari, the negative particles are *ka* and *alo*.

An interesting characteristic of Mundari is the use of distinct words for forms or modes of activity, which are denoted in other languages by a single common verb or abstract noun.

Ho

Ho is spoken by the people of the Ho tribe in Singhbhum, Kharsawan, and Seraikela districts of Jharkhand and the adjoining districts of Mayurbhanj, Keonjhar, and Gangpur in Orissa.

In common with other Munda languages, Ho also has unchangeable primary roots, which can be used for nouns, verbs, or adjectives. There are three numbers, singular, dual, and plural. Ho makes a distinction between animate and inanimate beings. There is no declension of nouns, the root remains static, and various postpositions are affixed in cases where in some other language the nouns would be declined. Nouns can be formed from roots that have a primary verb function by adding the nominalizing infix, *-n-*. An *-n-* is infix after the first vowel of a word, and the vowel then is repeated. Nouns can also be formed from participial forms and adjectival roots.

The Ho language so closely resembles the Mundari language that these two languages can practically be considered dialects of the same language rather than two separate languages. Nevertheless, many hundreds of words in Ho are not used in Mundari and vice versa. Moreover, although both languages may contain the same word, its meaning may vary in nuance. To some extent, the Ho spoken in the northern part of Singhbhum more closely resembles Mundari than the Ho spoken in Kolhan, the central part of Singhbhum.

An important difference between the two languages is the treatment of the hard *r*. It is retained in Mundari, but dropped in Ho. Thus, the Mundari *kora* (a boy) becomes *koa* in Ho. While semiconsonants are treated as in Mundari, the final *t'* of verbal tenses becomes *d*, or it is retained by sounding very weakly. Ho nasalizes the vowel in some Mundari words ending in the letter *l* or *r*. Because Ho words can never have *h* in the middle of a word, words that have an *h* in the middle in Mundari drop the *h* in Ho, and the adjoining vowels form one vowel. Thus, *sabatim* ("endure" or "persevere") in Munda is *satin* in Ho.

Relationship to Other Languages

Several Aryanized tribes in northern India are believed to have spoken a dialect of Munda. Traces of the old Munda element are still extant in some Tibeto-Burmese dialects spoken in the Himalayas. In India proper, the Munda languages form an isolated

philological group. It is surmised that Munda languages were once widely spoken in central India and probably also in the Gangetic valley.

While it is no longer possible to determine the extent to which Munda languages influenced the other linguistic families of India, scholars have pointed to the existence of a Munda element in Dravidian grammar. Around one hundred Sanskrit and Prakrit words have been shown to be derived from the Proto-Munda branch of the Austroasiatic source. The term "Proto-Munda" indicates that the Munda languages had departed considerably from the Austroasiatic language type as early as the Vedic period (seventh–fifth centuries BCE) in a process of Dravidization of the Munda tongues. A considerable amount (say some 40 percent) of the New Indo-Aryan vocabulary is borrowed from Munda, either via Sanskrit (and Prakrit), or via Prakrit alone, or directly from Munda; wide-branched and seemingly native word-families of South Dravidian are of Proto-Munda origin.

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
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MURASAKI SHIKIBU (973?–1014?), Japanese writer. Murasaki Shikibu wrote the undisputed masterpiece of Japanese literature *Genji monogatari* (*The Tale of Genji*, 1001?–1014?). This monumental prose work, interspersed with 795 short poems, takes place at the imperial court. Although much of the author's life remains a mystery, some facts can be gleaned from remarks by her contemporaries, her memoirs (c. 1010), and her poetry collection (1014?). The author's actual name is unknown. "Murasaki Shikibu" is a sobriquet made from "Murasaki," the name of the favorite wife of the eponymous hero of *Genji*, and "Shikibu," an office once held by her father Fujiwara Tametoki (945–1020) and her brother Nobunori (980?–1011). Although Murasaki Shikibu came from the powerful northern branch of the Fujiwara clan, her lineage had fallen to the level of provincial governor. As a writer she followed the path of her paternal relatives, many of whom were distinguished poets.

In 998, Murasaki married Fujiwara Nobutaka (950?–1001), a second cousin. She bore him one daughter, Kenshi (999–1083). Murasaki began writing soon after her husband's unexpected death in 1001. Her genius was immediately recognized, and she was summoned to the imperial court as a tutor to Empress Shoshi (Joto Mon'in, 988–1074), daughter of the brilliant statesman Fujiwara Michinaga (966–1027).

Doris G. Barga



The illustrated diary of Lady Murasaki dating to c. 1185–1333. (SAKAMOTO PHOTO RESEARCH LABORATORY/CORBIS)

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MURGAB RIVER The Murgab River (also called the Murghob or Murghab in Tajik) is 978 kilometers long with a basin area of around 50,000 square kilometers. The river, which forms a part of the Afghanistan-Turkmenistan border, flows from the mountains of northeast Afghanistan through a narrow valley between the Bandi-Turkistan and Safad-Koh ranges into Turkmenistan's Merv oasis, then disappears in the Kara Kum desert. The river's highest flow is from March to July, as snow melts in the high mountains of Afghanistan, and its lowest in November and December.

The Murgab is one of the most important sources of drinking and irrigation water for southern Turkmenistan. Great cities flourished along the river for centuries. Merv (ancient Margiana), one of the oldest ancient cities in Central Asia, is situated on the Murgab in the large oasis of the Kara Kum desert. Probably founded in the third century BCE, the city became an important regional economic and trading center. From 1118 to 1157 it was the capital of the Seljuk empire. During the Soviet era six reservoirs were built on Turkmenistan's part of the Murgab River, and water was excessively used for irrigation of cotton fields. The overexploitation of the water resources in this extremely dry region led to salinization of some areas around the Murgab in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1990s the situation became even worse when southern Turkmenistan experienced several years of severe drought. There were reports that the river completely dried out and water shortage affected many districts of Turkmenistan.

Rafis Abazov

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MUROMACHI PERIOD The Muromachi period (1333–1573) in Japanese history was named after the location in northeastern Kyoto of the offices of the military government, or shogunate, of the Ashikaga line of the warrior rulers (shoguns). The shogunate was founded in 1336 by Ashikaga Takauji (1303–1358) after the overthrow of the Kamakura shogunate in 1333 and the failure of a brief attempt by Emperor Godaigo (1228–1339) to revive direct imperial rule between the years 1333 and 1336.

The Muromachi period (also known as the Ashikaga period) was one of the most tumultuous ages in the history of Japan. The Ashikaga shoguns, at their peak in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, controlled only a part of Japan. During the last hundred years of Muromachi, also known as the Sengoku

**JAPAN HISTORICAL PERIODS**

- Jomon period (14,500–300 BCE)
- Yayoi culture (300 BCE–300 CE)
- Yamato State (300–552 CE)
- Kofun period (300–710 CE)
- Nara period (710–794 CE)
- Heian period (794–1185)
- Kamakura period (Kamakura Shogunate)
(1185–1333)
- Muromachi period (1333–1573)
- Momoyama period (1573–1600)
- Tokugawa or Edo period (Tokugawa Shogunate)
(1600/1603–1868)
- Meiji period (1868–1912)
- Taisho period (1912–1926)
- Showa period (1926–1989)
- Allied Occupation (1945–1952)
- Heisei period (1989–present)



Temple of Ginkaku-ji, the Silver Pavilion, in Kyoto. (ARCHIVO ICONOGRAFICO S.A./CORBIS)

age, Japan had no effective central government. Emperors had long been figureheads, and the Ashikaga shogunate controlled little more than Kyoto and its environs. Toward the end of the Muromachi period, however, independent territorial domains ruled by warrior chieftains called daimyo appeared throughout the country, and from about 1560 on, these domains were unified by a series of warlords whose triumphs led finally to two and a half centuries of peace under the Tokugawa shogunate (1600/1603–1868).

Although much of the Muromachi period was unquestionably a dark age, it was also a time of cultural achievement. Pure Land (Jodo) and Zen Buddhism flourished, and arts such as Noh drama, tea ceremony, monochrome ink painting, landscape dry gardening, and flower arrangement were primarily the products of Muromachi culture. While the Ashikaga shoguns were generally ineffective rulers, collectively they were superb patrons of the arts. The patronage derived in part from sending missions to China that returned to Japan with vital ideas in philosophy and religion, new styles of art, and countless objects of art and craft. Through the patronage of the Ashikaga shoguns, China exerted great influence over the shaping of Muromachi culture.

The Muromachi period is also remembered as the time when Europeans first visited Japan. Portuguese traders arrived in 1543 and were followed in the ensuing half-century by the Spanish, Dutch, and English. The Catholic countries Portugal and Spain also brought Christian missionaries, who launched vigorous campaigns to convert the Japanese. Eventually, Japan rejected Christianity and in the early seventeenth century commenced a persecution against the foreign religion that was a major factor in shaping the policy of national seclusion by the Tokugawa shogunate from the 1630s.

Paul Varley

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MUSHARRAF, PERVEZ (b. 1943), president of Pakistan. Pervez Musharraf was born in Delhi on 11 August 1943. Following the founding of Pakistan in 1947, his family moved to Karachi. His father was a career diplomat and his mother, a homemaker, also worked for the International Labour Organization. He was educated at Christian schools in Pakistan and Turkey, where he lived from 1949 to 1956 when his father was stationed there. Following graduation from the Pakistani Military Academy in 1961, he pursued a career in the army, serving as a commando and in various staff and instructional positions. In 1998 he was promoted to the rank of general and appointed chief of army staff. The following year he was appointed chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee.

In October 1999, following a disagreement with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (b. 1949) over Sharif's policies, Musharraf seized power in a bloodless coup and on 12 October had himself appointed chief executive of Pakistan. On 20 June 2001 he appointed himself president of Pakistan. He continued to hold his previous posts of chief of army staff and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. Although his taking of power disrupted the movement toward democracy in Pakistan, Musharraf promised a return to civilian rule in October 2002. He is viewed by other world leaders as a moderate, and following the 11 September terrorist attack on the United States became a strong ally of the United States. Despite criticism in Pakistan, he assisted the United States in the invasion of neighboring Afghanistan and cracked down on Muslim terrorists in Pakistan.

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MUSIC-BANGLADESH Before the end of British rule in India in 1947, the land that is now Bangladesh formed an eastern subdivision of the region known as Bengal. Consequently Bangladeshis and their West Bengali neighbors in India share most of their cultural heritage, language, and ancient history.

In 1947 western Bengal, with its majority population of Hindus, became part of India, while eastern Bengal, with its largely Muslim population, became the eastern "wing" of the nation of Pakistan. In 1971 Bangladesh (Bengal-land) became independent from Pakistan. In the twenty-first century Bangladeshi culture continued to be predominantly Islamic, but its roots remained embedded in its Hindu and Buddhist past.

Ancient Song Forms

Although no transcriptions exist of Bengali music prior to the nineteenth century it is possible to delineate particular forms of vocal music from the texts of ancient Bengali poems and from melodies preserved through oral transmission. Twelfth-century Buddhist poems called *charya-giti* (religious observance songs) and the thirteenth-century *Gitagovinda* (Songs of the Cowherder), a cycle of songs by the poet Jayadeva, bear the names of the specific melodic modes assigned to each song. Hindu and Buddhist kings in Bengal commissioned poets to compose *raso*, epic poems, in their honor, which were chanted by the poet-composers themselves. These royal patrons also commissioned poets to render into Bengali verse the great Sanskrit epics from Indo-Aryan literature, such as the *Mahabharata*, the *Ramayana*, and other *mahakabya* ("great poems"). The poetic meter employed in the Bengali versions of these epics is reflected in present-day Bengali folk ballads. By analogy, it is likely that the melodies of ballads heard in the twenty-first century are descendants of *raso* and *mahakabya* minstrel songs.

By the sixteenth century the flowering of various Hindu and Islamic cults, each possessing its own kind of songs, had enriched Bengali music. The Hindu Vaishnava sect developed *kirtan* (songs of praise) that focused on the god Krishna. During Turkic and Mughal rule Muslim Sufi missionaries from the Middle East introduced their genres of spiritual songs. By the eighteenth century mendicant minstrels called Bauls combined Vaishnava and Sufi themes with their own spiritual ones. Other Bengali cults composed ballads honoring the exploits of local deities and hero-saints.

Classical Forms

South Asian musicologists generally divide Indian music into classical (or art) and folk forms. Indian classical music developed prior to Sarangadeva's thirteenth-century treatise *Sangita-ratnakara* (The Music Mine of Jewels), in which over two hundred melodic models called ragas (coloring agents) are identified by name. During Mughal rule the raga system of Indian music developed fully.

Indian classical music is primarily a solo improvisation based on a specific raga chosen from the several hundreds passed down from master musicians to their disciples. The composer-soloist generally begins with a melodic improvisation in free rhythm called an *alap* (conversation) followed by an improvisation structured to fit a particular *tala* (rhythmic pattern) selected from over one hundred types.

Folk Forms

Bangladeshi folk music belongs to the region's agrarian communities, whose education was acquired mainly through oral transmission, especially through songs. The three main branches of Bangladeshi folk songs are described below.

Mystical Songs The mystical texts of the Vaishnava, Sufi, and other Bengali sects comprise the most melodically arresting Bangladeshi folk songs. These are sung informally in family or neighborhood gatherings or more formally as part of religious festivals or ceremonies. Their poetry generally expresses a longing for union with a divine being, often portrayed as the longing of Radha for the god Krishna. Popular songs include the ecstatic songs of Bauls and Sufi *darbesh* (dervishes), the Muslim *murshidi* and *marfati* (spiritual guides) songs, and the fluid melodies of *bhatiali* (boat rowers' songs) and *bhaowaiya* (cart drivers' songs).

Minstrels who perform mystical songs often begin with a few short phrases in the *alap* form before embarking on the main verses. The melodies of mystical songs encompass and sometimes surpass a tonal range of an octave. Set to lively rhythmic beats, they trace a graceful contour.

Narrative Songs In Bengal, especially during the nineteenth century, lengthy narrative songs, variously known as *panchali* (narratives), *punthigan* (manuscript songs), and *palagan* (drama songs) among other classifications, flourished in the countryside as mass entertainment. They are similar in structure to Bengali literary epics, and their performance requires a talented minstrel called a *bayati* (verse maker) or *mulgayen* (chief singer) trained as a master poet-composer.

Epic ballads glorifying local deities and hero-saints are known as *vijay* (triumph songs), *mangala* (blessing songs), and *ghazigan* (warrior-saint songs). *Jarigan* (songs of grief) comprise a treasury of dramatic stories based on Muslim lore performed by a *bayati* with a chorus of *dobar* (refrain singers) and an instrumental ensemble. Audiences numbering in the thousands once attended sessions of *kabigan* (poet songs), competitions in extempore singing about epic or topical

themes. The melodies of these narrative songs are characteristically syllabic (one tone per syllable) to render the text clearly, but expert minstrels often dramatize their singing with melodic elaboration, departing freely from the verbal structure of the text.

Occasional Songs Many Bangladeshi folk songs are associated with particular social occasions or occupations. These include cradle songs; satires performed at weddings; seasonal songs; melodies to accompany harvesting, house construction, and boat racing; and the songs of snake charmers, dirges, and many others. Rural theatrical productions called *jatra* include popular song and dance music or pieces composed for a particular drama. Some occasional songs may be accompanied by group dancing, especially in Bangladeshi tribal communities. The melodies of occasional songs tend to be syllabic, lending themselves to congregational as well as solo singing.

Semiclassical Forms

Many Bangladeshi rural songs are so poetically and musically sophisticated that they transcend the folk category. In addition, a large number of Bangladeshi songs display a strong affinity to classical raga music yet are too verse-bound to allow the improvisational scope of classical music. Therefore an intermediary semiclassical category of Bengali music encompasses the large number of Bangladeshi musical compositions that straddle the folk and classical categories.

For example, *kirtan* songs, such as composed by the Vaishnava saint Sri Krishna Caitanya (Chaitanya) (1486–1533), employ classical raga melodies, *tala* rhythmic patterns, and the *dhruvad* (fixed verse) configuration of South Indian classical compositions. The aesthetic refinement of mystical songs by such famous Baul minstrels as Lalan Shah (c. 1792–c. 1890) place them in the semiclassical category. Likewise, Hindu hymns called *bhajans* (devotional songs), Persian-style love songs called *ghazal*, and Sufi spiritual songs called *qawwali* are semiclassical by virtue of the poetic and musical artistry required for their performance.

During the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century Bengali urban poet-composers, such as Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) and Qazi Nazrul Islam (1899–1976), composed songs in their own personal styles that innovatively blended Bengali classical, folk, and "modern" influences. Learning to sing *rabindra-sangit* (Rabindranath Tagore songs) or *nazrul-git* (Nazrul Islam songs) is part of a young Bangladeshi's formal education, and these songs usually appear in the programs of Bangladeshi state or social functions.

New Trends

During the twentieth century, music from around the world affected traditional forms of Bangladeshi music and influenced the development of new forms. By the 1960s Bangladeshi instrumental ensembles included such nontraditional instruments as saxophones and Hawaiian-style guitars. Electric guitars became popular, and commercial recordings and films included electronically modulated music.

By the twenty-first century, simple harmonization often accompanied song melodies, especially in film songs and urban versions of folksongs. However, pure melody continues to be the main component of Bangladeshi musical expression. The melodies of Bangladeshi folksongs, especially Baul, *bhatiyali*, and *bhaowaiya* songs, remain sources of inspiration for classical compositions and popular songs.

Mary Frances Dunham

See also: **Bhakti; Jatra; Music-India**

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MUSIC-CENTRAL ASIA Central Asian music, that is, the music of the former Soviet states of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan, is based on the interaction of nomadic and sedentary cultures and on the blending of the region's Persian and Turkic cultures and languages. Central Asian music has close links with the music of

the bordering regions of northern Afghanistan and Xinjiang (an autonomous region in western China) and more broadly with the music of Iran, Azerbaijan, and Turkey.

The construction of national musical canons, begun in the early twentieth century under the Soviets and continuing in the new Central Asian states today, cuts across a complex historical picture of exchange, coexistence, and blending. For example, Jewish professional musicians (Uzbek *sazande*) of Bukhara in Uzbekistan used to sing bilingual Tajik-Uzbek love songs (*ghazal*). These Jewish musicians have now largely emigrated to Israel or the United States.

In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries conservatory-trained professional musicians in Central Asian towns and cities largely replaced musicians who trained by apprenticing to a master (*ustad*), but the practice of handing on musical skills in the family continues. The use of written scores has partly supplanted the old system of oral transmission. Probably the most numerous professional musicians today are the wedding singers and pop singers, whose cassette recordings now enliven the teahouses and restaurants of Central Asian towns, formerly contexts for live musical performances.

Performances of Folk Music

Along with informal gatherings (*gap* in Tajik and Uzbek, *mesbrep* in Uighur) where music is commonly played for entertainment, weddings are perhaps the major contexts for musical performance throughout Central Asia. Singers and instrumentalists are employed to play a range of music from classical to popular songs at wedding banquets, while kettledrum-and-shawm bands (*nagbra-sunay*) escort the groom on his way to fetch the bride. These bands also play at religious festivals, especially Qurban and the end of Ramadan. In Sunni Central Asia there is little concern about the Islamic proscriptions against music common elsewhere in the Islamic world; indeed, music is an integral part of religious life and is thought to form a link between the sacred and the secular.

Storytellers sing tales from the Qur'an during Ramadan and on pilgrimages (*mazar*). Musicians may also be mullahs or wandering holy men (*ashiq*). Sufi influence in particular pervades music and thought. Music is found in the chants (*ziker*) and sometimes in the instrumental music of Sufi ceremonies. In the nineteenth-century *Tarikhi Muziqiyun* (History of Musicians) by Mujiz, one of the few surviving historical documents on Central Asian music, stories linking music and ecstatic trance abound. In the tale of

the master musician Balkhi, for example, a nightingale perched on Balkhi's *tanbur* (long-necked lute) as he sang, and the people at the festival shouted, wept, and rolled about.

Maqam

Song lyrics are also deeply imbued with Sufi thought, especially in *maqam*, the most prestigious genre of Central Asian music. In Central Asia, the term *maqam* refers to a series of large-scale musical suites, including sung poetry, popular stories, and dance music. As with songs and instrumental pieces, *maqam* are associated with specific regions; there are, for example, the Bukharan Shashmaqam, the Khokand Chaharmaqam, and the Kashgar Muqam. A scholarly debate has raged over whether Central Asian *maqam* are a local variation of a Near Eastern form (as evidenced by the Arab-Persian terminology associated with them) or the continuation of ancient Central Asian traditions carried to the Chinese imperial court and thence to Japan. It is probably more helpful to think of Central Asian *maqam* as arising from a fusion of these two sources.

Each instrumental or vocal piece in a *maqam* derives from a rhythm (*usul*), which is marked by the frame drum; "limping" irregular rhythms (*aksak/lang*) are common. Pieces with the same names appear in different *maqam*, but their melodies vary depending on the modal characteristics of each *maqam*; thus the term *maqam* in Central Asia to some extent denotes the idea of mode, as it does in Arab-Turkish traditions.

Much use is made of ornamentation, shifting, or leaning on the notes to produce subtle effects. Central Asian *maqam* have not traditionally been improvised in performance, but are rather precomposed; that is, a personal interpretation is developed and fixed in memory.

Many instruments are used for playing *maqam*, especially the long-necked lutes, such as the *tanbur* with three metal strings. The bowed lute (*sato/satar*), with up to twelve sympathetic strings, is particularly linked to *maqam*; thought of as a noble instrument, it is often played by older men. The frame drum (*dayera dap*) is also an important instrument for *maqam*, as it forms the rhythmic basis; often associated with women and religious beggars, it is sometimes thought to have magical powers. The Kashgar *rawap* is a small lute with five metal strings. A virtuosic instrument, it is usually found in an accompanying role, as is the *ghijak* spike fiddle with its four metal strings, related to the Iranian *kemenche*, but now tuned to resemble the violin. The *dutar* lute, strung with two silk strings, is the most

common instrument among the Uzbeks and Uighurs, found in almost every home and played by men, women, and children alike, often to accompany songs.

Nomadic Peoples

Among the nomadic peoples of the region, the main musicians are poet-bards, like the Kazak *akbun* or the Uzbek *bakhsbi*. Among some peoples a special class of bards sing long, heroic epic tales, such as the Kyrgyz *Manas* epic. There is a great deal of interchange between these bards and the shamanic ritual healers who are still common across the region. Bards are often said to learn their epics from spirits in their dreams, and their performances are also thought to have healing powers. The bards usually accompany themselves on plucked lutes (like the *dombra*) or fiddles (such as the three-stringed *qobuz*).

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MUSIC—CHINA In Chinese music, a great deal of variety is achieved on the basis of a small musical repertoire through variation techniques. Metric variation is common in instrumental and opera music, whereby a skeletal melody is augmented or diminished metrically and performed with an accordingly greater or lesser degree of ornamentation.

China's diverse musical traditions and regional styles should be seen as part of the wider picture of music in Asia. Although politically part of China, Tibet and Xinjiang lie outside the scope of this entry, but their music was influential. Many instruments and

musical genres, like the drum and shawm (a woodwind instrument) bands (*guchui*), the *pipa* (a four-string plucked lute), and the *yangqin* (a hammer dulcimer) were brought to China from the Near East and Central Asia. In turn, Chinese music has influenced the music of Japan and Korea.

Much Chinese music is linked to ritual contexts, from the Confucian rituals of the imperial court to those of village weddings, funerals, and festivals. This ritual basis shaped the aesthetics of Chinese music, whose emphasis on harmony, restraint, and conformity to tradition is linked to the need for correct, nondeviating observance of ritual. Variation and reinterpretation of existing melodies are prized over creation of the new. However, there are also dynamic, extrovert traditions, especially in northern China.

Characteristics of Chinese Music and Chinese Musicians

Chinese music is divided into fine (*xi*) and coarse (*cu*), civil (*wen*) and martial (*wu*) music. Professional musicians in China, like the drum and shawm bands or the opera troupes, were traditionally low class and disdained, whereas the gentleman amateur musician had much higher status. Likewise it was considered shameful for women to play music in public; few traditional genres are performed by women, though some are valued, like the southern narrative song genre of *nanguan*.

The ritual music of the imperial court was imbued with complex Confucian theories that linked musical sound to the stability of the empire and the turning of the seasons. This music was lost at the beginning of the twentieth century with the abdication of the last emperor, but court entertainment music has been partially preserved in the beautiful instrumental traditions of Buddhist temples and village ritual ensembles.

More widespread are the amateur silk and bamboo instrumental ensembles often found in urban tea-houses. They are named for the silk strings of the *erhu* (a two-stringed fiddle) and *sanxian* (a three-stringed lute) and the bamboo of the *dizi* (a transverse flute). Percussion ensembles of gongs, cymbals, and drum are also widespread, as are the drum and shawm bands. Each region has its own repertoire and style.

Musical Notation and Meter

The most common traditional musical notation (*gongchepu*) uses symbols based on the heptatonic (seven-tone) scale. Although Chinese music is basically pentatonic (five tones), the neutral fourth and seventh of the scale are used as passing notes and for modulation. Notation serves as a basic guide, recording only

the skeletal notes (*guganyin*) of a melody. In performance, this skeleton is fleshed out by adding decoration (*jiabua*). Each musical instrument ornaments the skeletal notes in its own way, creating a delicate variety of sounds.

Meter is marked by *banyan* (beats and "eyes," or rests), based on the beats of the *ban* (wood clappers). Many of these skeletal melodies are drawn from a stock of labeled (titled) melodies (*qupai*), found in varying forms in instrumental music and narrative song and opera genres across China. The titles or labels of these melodies are drawn from the Song dynasty (960–1279) poetry of the ninth and tenth centuries, and the melodies themselves can be traced back to the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368).

Opera

Labeled melodies also make up an important part of the opera repertoire. We may think of a musical spectrum ranging from solo narrative songs, accompanied by percussion or *saxian* lute, to the high opera forms, such as those of the Beijing Opera. There are numerous regional styles, but they all draw on the same stock of melodies and stories taken from popular novels.

Traditionally, all-male professional troupes performed at rural temple fairs or public theaters in towns. In more complex genres, stock characters are used, with fixed conventions of costume and makeup, such as the painted faces of the warrior (*bualian*), clown (*chou*), and woman warrior (*wudan*). Labeled melodies are adapted to fit the words of the arias, which are interspersed with heightened speech. A drummer serves as conductor, directing the actors' movements and leading a percussion ensemble that accompanies the dramatic action. Set percussion patterns represent different characters and different dramatic situations.

Folk Songs

A separate vocal genre is that of rural folk songs, often called mountain songs (*shan'ge*). Again there is great regional variation; folk song is strongly tied to locality. The most beautiful are thought to be the songs of northwest China, especially the bitter songs (*suanqu'r*) of the boat pullers on the Huang (Yellow) River and the camel drivers on the Silk Road.

Big folk-song festivals are held in the northwest, linked to the temple fairs, where men and women gather in groups to sing improvised, often crude sexual lyrics. Such occasions lie outside the normally strict Confucian morality of village life.

Guqin Music

Another unique musical tradition is that of the *guqin* (a seven-stringed zither). This instrument—the ancient, indigenous gentleman-scholar's zither, played for personal refinement and meditation—has come to be emblematic of Chinese music. Its tunes are thought to be programmatic (they describe a scene or story), and much traditional literature is devoted to tales of disciples who perfectly understood the mood and images their master's playing evoked. The *guqin* has its own special complex notation, and its performance traditionally involves an element of historical research: interpretation and reworking of centuries-old scores and their commentaries, themselves based on still earlier notations.

Modernization and Westernization of Music

All of these traditional genres still thrive in contemporary China, but Chinese music also underwent much change in the twentieth century in terms of modernization and Westernization, through the introduction of new instruments, theories, and attitudes and the implementation of a musical schooling system and professional troupes and orchestras.

The Communist revolution in 1949 brought with it attacks on traditional culture along with extensive reworking of folk music to produce revolutionary folk songs and model operas (*yangbanxi*), which the Communist cultural authorities use to instruct people through revolutionary models. After the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, the loosening of social controls in the 1980s brought about a great revival of traditional music alongside its old ritual contexts. It has also permitted the swift rise of a big pop- and rock-music industry promoted on television and through the ubiquitous karaoke bars. Several modern Chinese composers have also achieved international recognition with works that draw in part on Chinese traditions.

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MUSIC—EAST ASIA, RYUKYUAN The Ryukyu Islands, the largest of which is Okinawa, form the long archipelago situated to the south of the Japanese mainland. Until the late nineteenth century this group of islands was an independent kingdom that maintained strong links with both China and Japan. This unique environment allowed the arts of the kingdom, especially music, to develop in a special way, incorporating traditional Chinese and Japanese elements. Some of the plots of formal Ryukyuan drama are influenced by Noh, a traditional form of Japanese dance-drama.

Essentially, the music of the Ryukyu chain can be divided into two broad categories: court and folk music. With court music, the primary form is further divided into formal songs accompanied by the music of a *sanshin* (three-stringed lute with snakeskin) and dance repertoire. The dance category itself is further divided into subcategories in terms of style (for the old, for the young, for men, for women) and folk derivation. Court music and dance have also been adopted into a formal drama type, known as *kumiodori*, in which song, music, and dance are integrated into a carefully structured artistic framework.

Over the centuries, Ryukyuan folk song and dance have been adapted to different circumstances and evolved into a variety of styles—religious rituals, secular entertainment, love songs, lullabies, epic poem-songs, and the like—which do not necessarily incorporate the *sanshin*. Ryukyuan classical music is still listened to and performed by a large number of people in Okinawa. In addition, it has been accepted widely in mainland Japan as a kind of exotic music since the 1980s. Based on traditional elements, a new style of Okinawan pop music, enjoyed by Okinawans and mainland Japanese, has been created by younger generations of Okinawans.

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MUSIC—INDIA Indian music is one of the dominant forms of Asian music. Its influence extends beyond the subcontinent into China and the Far East and through Iran, Iraq, and Turkey to Greece. It preserves the oldest tradition of playing a monophonic melodic line untouched by the use of vertical harmony and tempered scale. It has an extremely complicated and varied system of rhythmic cycles, and it is based on the ancient concept that the human voice is the foremost expression of musical emotion, and therefore all instruments should imitate and accompany the voice. Consequently, lyrics and literary content are preserved as a major feature of the music; however, there is not a written notational score to be followed while performing. Except for the lyrics, most of the structure and score of the music is created by the performer during performance, along certain traditionally accepted norms.

Historical-Cultural Roots

The earliest-known Indian music consists of Vedic mantras or chants (of the first millennium BCE, or even earlier), in ancient Sanskrit verses, employed in the religious rites of sacrifice offered to the gods. These chants were tritonal in the Rig Veda but later employed seven notes in descending order in the Sama Veda. Descriptions of nonritual music of that time do not survive, but some later texts—for example, the *Nardiyashiksha*—do clarify the differences between Vedic chants and non-Vedic music.

A more detailed description of secular music is found, in the classical period, in the great work of theater theory, the *Natya sastra* (fifth century BCE), by Bharata Muni. This work contains an extensive musical account of the grammar and practice of Indian music that prevailed in ancient India until

medieval times. Music is called *gandbarva* in the *Natyasastra*, after the region of Gandhara (modern Kandahar in Afghanistan), which is believed to have been a great center of music in the past. In the *Natyasastra*, certain celestial musicians were called Gandharvas. It has been suggested that the Greek *Kentauros* ("centaur"), also adept in the arts, is a version of the Gandharva, indicating old musical links between Greek Ionia and western India.

During the age of the formulation of the *Natyasastra*, certain melodic tunes, called the *jatis*, were in vogue throughout India. *Jatis* were used to formulate scale-groups (*gramas*), scales (*murcchanas*), notes (*svaras*), and note intervals or microtones (*sbrutis*). The Indian septet was not made up of tetrachords as was the Greek septet, but instead consisted of two trichords. *Shadja*, *rishabha*, and *gandhara* made up one trichord, while *pancama*, *dbaivata*, and *nishada* made up the other. The trichords were placed on either side of the middle note, called *madhyama*. In short signs, or symbols that denote the name of a note by the first two letters of the full name of the note (for example, *sa* used to denote *sadja*), the notes could be indicated as: *sa, ri, ga, ma, pa, dba, ni*.

A sequence of any seven notes was called a *murcchana*. Unlike present-day universal practice, the first note of the septet (or scale) was not always the tonic, that is, *sa* or "do." Any note of a *murcchana* could be the tonic. In their so-called natural positions in a septet, *shadja* and *madhyama* made a consonance of a fourth, as did *madhyama* and *nishada*. *Shadja* and *pancama* made a consonance of a fifth. This septet also was the first *murcchana* of the *shadjagrama*. By placing the tonic on one note at a time, that is, for the first *murcchana* at *sa*, for the second at *ri*, and so on, seven *murcchanas* could be obtained. This scale-group was called the *shadjagrama* and its seven pure *murcchanas*.

The other generic scale, called the *madhyamagrama*, was formulated in the following manner: in the fourth *murcchana* of the *shadjagrama*—that is, the scale *ma, pa, dba, ni, sa, ri, ga*—an alteration was made. A consonance of a fourth was created between *pa* and *ri* (which means that *pa* was lowered slightly, by a diesis [Pythagorean]), thus changing the scale. Then seven *murcchanas* were obtained by placing the tonic on each of the seven notes. Thus, the scale-group of the *madhyamagrama* and its seven pure *murcchanas* had a consonance of a fifth between *pa* and *ri* notes. In other words, all scales that had a consonance of a fifth between *sa* and *pa* were categorized in the *shadjagrama*, and all scales in which there was a consonance of a fifth between *pa* and *ri* were categorized in the *ma-*

dbhyamagrama. *Sadjagrama* contained seven *jatis*—namely, *shadji*, *arshabbi*, *dbaivati*, *naisadi*, *sadjodicyava*, *sadjakaisiki*, and *shadjamadhya*. *Madhyamagrama* contained eleven *jatis*—namely, *gandhari*, *madhyama*, *gandbarodicyava*, *pancami*, *gandbarapancami*, *raktagandhari*, *madhyam-odicyava*, *nandayanti*, *andhri*, *karmaravi*, and *kaisiki*.

All the prevalent tunes of the times—that is, the *jatis*—were put into either *grama*, and, by further flattening or sharpening of *ga* and *ni* more variations were made. The *Natyasastra* has classified eighteen *jatis*, seven as pure and eleven as hybrid. The pure could make 146 modified forms. The hybrid also had many variations. A third *grama*, called *gandbarvagrama*, was said to have gone out of use very early.

It should be noted that there was no concept of a fixed pitch for the notes in ancient India, and this is still the case in present-day Indian music. The tonic shifts from one note to another to create a different *murcchana*, but the actual tuning of the harp, which always accompanies the singer, is not altered so drastically.

The fundamental concepts needed to expand on a melodic structure were well formulated by the time of the *Natyasastra*, and they continue to be practiced, albeit with a change of names. The ten characteristics of a *jati* that gave shape to its presentation continued to do so in a raga in modern times. *Amsba* was the most dominating note of the melody and also was the tonic. *Graba* was the note with which an exposition was begun, and *nyasa* was the note to which the performer returned each time on the completion of a melodic phrase. *Apanyasa* was the note that was auxiliary to *nyasa*. *Tara* was the upper register and *mandra* the lower. When only six of the seven notes of the scale were used for a melody, this was called *shadava*, and when five notes were used, it was called *audava*. Abundant usage of certain notes was called *babutva*, and sparing usage was *alpatva*. Nowadays, *amsba*, *graba*, *nyasa*, and *apanyasa* are practiced, but vernacular terms are used.

From the descriptions of these and related concepts, it seems that the *jatis* were sung pretty much as the ragas are in modern times. The preliminary wordless expansion of the melody, called *alapana*, was made by the singer or player, and then compositions to the accompaniment of the drums were rendered. The embellishments were also similar to those used at present. There is, however, no clear indication that any instrument or set of voices produced the tonic and its consonant as a constant drone in the way that the modern tamboura (a lutelike instrument) does for Indian music at the beginning of the twenty-first century.



HARMONIUM

Originally of European origin, the harmonium (*peti*, or *baja*), began to be implemented into Indian music during the nineteenth century. The overall shape of the instrument is that of a box. Running along the top of the box is a row of keys, or *chabi*, similar to that of a piano. An instrument without a keyboard but similar to a harmonium is called a *surpeti* and is used to generate an underlying drone. Inside the harmonium is a flat wooden reed board with several holes, although there are styles where the board is not flat. The instrument can have up to three banks of reeds, in which case it is called a triple-reed harmonium. Reeds of brass cover these holes. The reeds vibrate as air passes over them, and this air is forced through the instrument when the musician pumps the bellows. The external bellows are worked by the musician, who pumps air into the internal bellows, which acts as a reservoir for the air pushing against a spring and forcing the air over the reeds. The control of the airflow through various reed chambers is managed by main stops. Drone stops control the flow of the air over the unkeyed reeds.

Stacey Fox

Another distinct feature of Indian musical theory, the relationship between melodies and emotions like fear, pity, courage, erotic desire, and so on, also was postulated in this period of the compilation of the *Natya sastra*. Specific notes were believed to arouse specific emotions, and a system of their use in melodies was explained in the *Natya sastra*.

In ancient times, the analysis of notes and their intervals was facilitated by harps (*vimas*). The system of Vedic chants was kept insulated from the musical system of *gramas* and *jatis*, and no interaction was allowed between the two. No Vedic verse would be sung in a secular scale; neither would a non-Vedic text be sung in the Vedic tones. This separation was maintained until the final decade of the twentieth century. The *gandharva* system was used for all spiritual, ritual, liturgical, theatrical, aesthetic, and social needs, and a wide variety of instruments (strings, pipes, drums, and cymbals) were used.

Secular Uses of Music

In addition to its use in ritual practices, music was used widely in ancient Indian theater, dance, and poetic compositions, in many languages. Besides Sanskrit, a large number of languages—among them, Pali, Magadhi, Avanti, Shaurseni, and Tamil—were used for all these purposes. A variety of songs (*gitas*, *prabandhas*) from throughout the country are recorded in

literary works dating from 500 BCE to 900 CE. All ancient string instruments were harplike, similar to the kithara. The zither also was known but was used very sparingly. From the second century CE, records show that music acquired a central place in the temples and monasteries, or ashrams. Music also was patronized at the royal courts and the numerous courtesan houses.

By the sixth century CE, the older system of *gramajati* expanded into a system of mixing scales to create melodies, called the *grama-ragas* and *bhasba-ragas*. The ancient *jatis* came to be reserved for more esoteric music for spiritual worship, of which not many examples survive. After a few centuries, the ragas emerged as basic scales, without the *gramas* and *murchhana* classifications.

Medieval Transition

With the Turkic invasion of India (early twelfth century) and the establishment of Islamic governments in most parts of the country, a major change in the performing arts occurred. As a consequence of the puritanical denunciation of music by the Islamic clergy, music was patronized by royalty only as a deviation from Islamic beliefs. Indian dancing and its music, which were either temple worship or theatrical repertoire (mostly centered on Hindu myths) had neither any place in the royal courts nor could be funded by the Islamic rulers, who often were fanatic iconoclasts. The fury of

temple destruction that raged for nearly four centuries in most parts of India (except in the far south) rendered homeless all the arts supported at temple complexes, theaters, and courtesan houses. Only the concert repertoire of vocal and instrumental music, presented largely as chamber music, could be patronized by those rulers who could afford to disregard the censure of their clergy. This was the genre of music that survived and even flourished and that drew performers of other genres. It also was a point of contact with musicians from Iran and other Southwest Asian nations. In addition to the royal courts, Indian musicians found the many sects (*silsilas*) of Sufi saints and their camps (*dargahs*) to be sites where music was valued as a legitimate method of worship. But such places, although they could furnish an audience, provided less material patronage. Vernacular songs for ecstatic dancing (*samah*) and in praise of the Prophet and his sayings (*qawali*) were cultivated and acquired great popularity.

Indian musicians thus turned in a big way to the Hindu monastic centers (ashrams) of saints and mendicants, usually located outside towns and villages. For the average Hindu devotee, ashrams were replacements for the great temple complexes as spaces of spiritual, cultural, and aesthetic activity. The music that developed there, however, was largely devotional, hymnal, and otherworldly and supported the great flowering of devotional poetry in the vernacular. In northern India, earlier vernacular compositions, called *prabandhas*, first were replaced by new compositions in Brijbhasha Hindi, called *dbruvapadas*, and, later, by *kbayals*, *thum-ris*, *dadras*, and so on. In the south, devotional vernacular compositions also were abundant and were known as *kritis*, *varnams*, *pallavis*, *javalis*, and so on. They all are in praise of the gods—such as Krishna, Rama, Siva, and Devi—and the power of Nada (sound as a cosmic principle) and yogic consciousness. This music that was cultivated in the ashrams was also patronized at both Islamic and Hindu royal courts.

Around the fourteenth century, a major shift occurred in the musical grammar of India. The *grama-murcchana* system, which defined the shifting of the tonic from one note to another, was abandoned, and a new system evolved, which was called the *mela*. In this system, the tonic was fixed on the first note of the septet, the *sa*. Instead of allowing a modification in the position of all seven notes, as in the earlier system, five notes were added to the septet—that is, flat *ri*, sharp *ga*, sharp *ma*, flat *dha*, and sharp *ni*—to make a series of twelve notes. *Sa* and *pa*, a consonance of a fifth, were unchanging notes. This is first stated by Lochana in the *Ragatarangini* (c. fifteenth century CE). The development of fretted zithers and the impact of the Persian *maqam* system (a

system of scales in which seven sharp and five flat notes made a sequence of twelve notes in a given octave) is said to be the major cause of this change. The *mela* system is called *thaat* in northern India.

Around the same time, Indian music acquired some diverse and distinctive characteristics, exemplified in a division between north and south. In the north, most lyrics for classical music were composed in Brijbhasha Hindi; in the south, they were composed in Telugu. Differences in stylistic renderings, names of the ragas, beats, use of instruments, nature of embellishments, methods of training, and modes of performance also contributed to the different identities. Northern music (also called Hindustani) still concentrates on the expansion of the melodic structure through *alapana* and improvisation, a progression of rhythm from slow to fast, and the work of the lead performer. Its compositions are also on erotic themes, descriptive of seasonal and natural beauty, in addition to hymnal themes. Southern music (also called Karnataka) has reduced *alapana*, better preserved lyrical composition, dominance of the middle beat, emphasis on group work, and greater rhythmic variety. The content of Karnataka lyrics is nearly always religious. *Malkaus*, *Todi*, *Kalyana*, *Jaijairwanti*, *Bibag*, and *Piloo* are some of the popular Hindustani ragas, and *Kalyani*, *Hindolam*, *Sauviri*, *Malayamarutam*, and *Bhoop* are some of the Karnataka ones.

Music in India at the End of the Twentieth Century

The variety of music performed in India is still staggeringly large. From the thousands-of-years-old chanting of the Sanskrit mantras of the four Vedas to the latest film-hit songs, there are tribal and ritual songs of marriage, birth, naming, clothing, bathing, leaving home, and death, in dozens of languages and dialects across the subcontinent. The traditions of Hindustani and Karnataka are moving closer toward a healthy interchange. For three decades after independence from British rule (1947), classical music was a major source of encouraging national pride both at home and abroad.

In spite of its archaic features, Indian music has adapted with ease to modern technical innovations, from the microphone to the microchip, without adversely altering any of its content. The technological revolution actually helped spread music within India and throughout the world and helped it influence the music of many other nations.

The process of notating and printing lyrics, historically orally handed down, began in the early twentieth century. This was followed by performances of folk and

classical music in modern concert halls and on the radio. Artists recorded works on gramophone records as early as in the West. The Indian film industry consolidated the immense variety of music from all parts of India and transmitted it to the global listener. Through films, Indian music is a major influence on countries and regions such as Iran, Iraq, Turkey, the Persian Gulf, and the states of Central Asia. In spite of the emergence of global pop, Indian music has succeeded in maintaining its very distinct identity and independence from Western music. Its classical performers have taken it live to all corners of the world, and recordings can be found increasingly in private collections.

Bharat Gupt

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MUSIC-INDIA, DEVOTIONAL "Devotional music" is a term used most frequently for the religious music of Hinduism and any other religion of Asian origin. Christianity and Islam also have developed some indigenous traditions of spiritual music, but as Hinduism (or the Vedic religion, as it is sometimes called) has a vast ambit of ritualistic prayer, nearly all devotional music currently prevalent in India is nurtured under its impact.

In India, the intense personal relationship of the individual devotee to God has been a major philosophy of liberation for fifteen hundred years. In this system of belief, God may be imagined as a lover, mother, child, master, or friend, and devotion to God in any of these forms should be expressed as a song. Use of poetry, music, and dance has been considered one of the most natural methods of worship in sanctuaries, temples, and personal idolatry. The code of ethics called the Yajnavalkya Smriti (from approximately the third century BCE) states, "One who knows the secrets of the harp, of musical scales like jatis, their micro-tonal tones and of rhythms, walks along the path of



Monks use cymbals and chant in prayer at a Buddhist temple in Swayambhunath, Nepal. (EARL & NAZIMA KOWALL/CORBIS)

liberation." Censure and suspicion of music as an instigator of base desires and, hence, ungodly have hardly ever been the view of any sect of Indian origin.

The hymns of the Rig Veda (scholars date these either from the fifth or second millennium BCE) for the Vedic gods like Indra, Agni, Varuna, and Mitra are the earliest extant example of devotional music. These were fine poetry recited with to three tones. But the Samavedic tradition, which was called *gana* (song), expanded the number of notes used to seven, thereby utilizing a musical scale. It also is known that sometimes harps were employed for accompaniment. The nature of this devotion was more communal than individual.

In the post-Vedic phase, most evident from the third century BCE, hymns in classical Sanskrit and other vernaculars were composed for gods like Shiva, Vasudeva, Parvati, Brahma, and Kamadeva and sung in temples, theaters, and in social rituals. The great temple complexes that were built from the second century BCE to the sixteenth century CE maintained a big retinue of dancers and musicians who performed several times in a day before the deity. Often composer-poets also were employed to make new compositions for the musicians.

Even the nonidolatrous sects like Buddhism and Jainism, while avoiding the personal praise of Buddha or Mahavira as God, nevertheless developed a devotional music that consisted of intricate chants and mantras with which their caves and monasteries resounded. Buddhist chants such as "Buddham Sharanam Gacchami" were modeled after the three-tone Rig Vedic chants.

The great age of devotional music in India, however, began around the seventh century, with the so-called philosophy of personal and individual *bhakti*

(devotion). This sect had two broad divisions: those who worshiped God as incarnation and those who contemplated on him as the formless source of creation, preservation, and destruction. For the former, the life deeds of incarnations like Krishna or Rama were a *lila* (divine play), to be sung for liberation. The saint poets of this sect—Jayadeva, Surdas, Tulsidas, Mira, Rasakhan, Kamban, Potanna, Tyagaraja, and many others—always set their poetry to music. Singing was the chief mode of worship whether done individually in isolation or in community of the faithful. For the latter, the formless God was to be contemplated by calling/singing his name. Music was the most desirable means of devotion during this phase of religious approach, which lasted for eight centuries. Traditional music of India bears the stamp of this great religious movement to this day.

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MUSIC—INDONESIA The thousands of islands in Indonesia have been home to its mainly Malayo-Polynesian ethnic groups and musical practices since prehistoric times. The broadly similar musical instruments, performance practices, and music-generating concepts throughout the archipelago are partly due to use of the Malay lingua franca and constant sea and land contact over the millennia.

Culturally, the ethnic groups can be classified as uplanders and lowlanders. Uplanders (for example, the Torajans of South Sulawesi, the Dani in Papua, and the Batak, Kerinci, and Basemah of the mountainous backbone of Sumatra) speak diverse local languages and are mostly nomadic or seminomadic hunters and gatherers who adhere to ancestral and nature-venerating (animist) beliefs and practices, or, from the seventeenth century, to a blend of Christianity and animism. Each performs ritual-associated songs (for healing, lamenting, soothing, war making, celebrating life events, and so forth) and self-expressive songs (for example, for love, courting, raising one's morale while in the forest), often playing portable musical instruments (for example, flutes, Jew's harps, and drums).

Lowlanders, who are mainly Muslim wet-rice farmers, gardeners, and fishers, have a great trading and

seafaring culture. Each group has its own instrumental ensembles and vocal styles, and many have their own music-theatrical traditions. Examples include Javanese *wayang* (shadow puppet theater), magical songs, such as solo *kapri* songs of coastal northwestern Sumatra, and many Muslim-associated forms. Some minority Chinese, Arab, Indian, and other immigrant communities practice musical forms from their cultural heritage or practice syncretic forms. As the reliefs on the eighth-century Buddhist Borobudur and the ninth-century Hindu Prambanan temples in lowland Java indicate, musical ensembles comprising gongs, drums, xylophones, and flutes already existed during the period 400–900 CE; their aesthetic remains Hindu-Buddhist. In southern Sumatra, the Srivijaya empire (flourished from the seventh through the eighth centuries) brought Buddhism to various areas, whereas in central Java the Majapahit empire (1200–1500) continued the Hindu tradition, giving way from around the 1400s to Islam, with communities in Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan, the Moluccas, and beyond being governed by sultanates. The main surviving musical expressions of Hinduism today are the gamelan (Indonesian percussion orchestra) ensembles and vocal music of Java, West Java, and Bali. Associated with Hindu-Balinese religious functions and theater forms, the latter have been performed for centuries at temple festivals, street processions, cremations, and other life-event ceremonies.

Music and the Natural Environment

That music everywhere reflects the natural environment is widely apparent, as in Javanese *gara-gara* gamelan music, which depicts natural turbulences during the middle section of the Javanese *wayang* or *wayang orang* (human theater) night. The materials of which the puppets, theatrical properties, and musical instruments are made—mainly leather, bronze, iron, wood, and bamboo—are determined by local flora, fauna, and metals, while traditional farming and socioreligious practices provide the contexts for their artistic usage. Bronze, known to have been made in mainland Southeast Asia from about 3000 BCE, was brought to Indonesia during the period 300–200 BCE; remnants of bronze Dong-son era (400 BCE–200 CE) "kettledrums" have been found in Java, Sumatra, and the Moluccas. Around 200–100 BCE, bronze gongs are thought to have been made in Java and other islands, ranging from large hanging gongs to gong chimes and bronze metallophones. Gongs of various alloys and sizes are still made, for example, for iron gamelans in central Java and for the brass *talempong* (gong chime and drum) ensembles used in Minangkabau (on the

western coast of the central portion of Sumatra). Varieties of bamboo and wood found ubiquitously are used to make tuned slabs of keys for trough, leg, and frame xylophones and many kinds of plucked lutes, flutes, oboes, mouth organs, board and tube zithers, Jew's harps, bullroarers, slit drums, shaken idiophones (an instrument that is naturally sonorous and that may be shaken, struck, plucked, or rubbed), and stamping poles. Conical, truncated conical, cylindrical, hour-glass-shaped, and other shaped wooden drums with buffalo or goat skins occur in many sizes, producing various drum timbres when beaten with hands, fingers, or sticks.

Ensemble Music

Ensembles minimally comprise drums, gongs, and an optional melodic instrument or voice. The gamelans of Java and Bali combine various sizes of drums, gongs, metallophones, xylophones, cymbals, zithers, plucked lutes, bowed strings, and solo or group vocal parts, or both. Textures usually comprise layers of musical parts (stratification), each performed idiomatically for the particular instrument or human voice and combining to produce composite rhythms and melodies in binary meter by sharing (interlocking, or colotomic) parts. Mostly tuned in pentatonic (five-tone) *slendro* and heptatonic (seven-tone) *pelog* occurring in several modes (*patbet*) (Javanese terms), they feature (1) a rhythmic, tempo-controlling drumming part, (2) a repeated fixed melody at walking pace on the slab metallophones, (3) slower-moving interlocking parts on the hanging and horizontal bossed gongs, and (4) more densely ornamented parts on the gong chimes, softer metallophones, spike fiddle, flute, and vocal parts. Interlocking also governs the practice of many other ensembles, including *gender wayang* quartets in a Balinese shadow play, the long wooden pole-beating on stones in Minangkabau, and the thunderous *gordang sembilan* (nine-drum ensemble) played with gongs, cymbals, and oboe in Mandailing (just above Minangkabau on Sumatra). In addition, strict- or free-meter narrative story-telling, histories, or genealogies, with or without instrumental accompaniment, are performed, as are ritual songs of love and courting, laments, lullabies, magical shamans' songs, songs for and by children, and work songs.

Popular Music

Kroncong music (which originated via sixteenth-century contact with Portuguese traders and features vocal soloists, string instruments, and flute) and *orkes Melayu* ("Malay band," which originated in the early twentieth century and includes vocalists, strings or har-

monium, and drums) still accompany couples dancing and also serve as progenitors of modern popular forms. Thus *dangdut*, Indonesia's main contribution to the world's popular music from the 1970s, developed from *orkes Melayu*, combining Indonesian texts and styles with electrified Western rock and pop and featuring a distinctive rhythm often heard in Indian film music. Other popular forms adopted since the introduction of radio, television, and cassette technology and consumed by all social classes contribute to the lucrative domestic and foreign commodity industry, including the indigenous Sundanese popular genre *jaipegan* (with a female singer-dancer and small gamelan) and various fusions of regional and Western popular elements that express youthful rebellion, social criticism, and love themes. Meanwhile, from the 1970s, avant-garde composers created new music, largely based on traditional forms, for specialized audiences.

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MUSIC-JAPAN Japan's long history of cultural influence from the continent, alternating with independent development and adaptation to suit indigenous aesthetics, has resulted in a rich and varied



A drummer in traditional costume plays the kakko, a drum beaten with two sticks to keep time, which leads other instruments. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

musical culture reflecting the country's geographical location at the terminus of the Silk Road.

Several major characteristics typify the traditional music of Japan, many of which are common to other countries in Asia. With the exception of gagaku (court music), traditional music is monophonic, focusing on subtleties of tone, timbre, and rhythm rather than on harmony. Melody is based on the twelve-tone unequal-tempered tone system, within which three types of scales can be identified: two five-tone scales, used in koto, *shamisen*, and folk music; a seven-tone scale, used in gagaku; and a tone system based on the tetrachord, used in *shomyo* (Buddhist chanting) and Noh drama. Melodic line is often based on the arrangement of recognizable melodic patterns. The range of timbre in traditional music is narrow, limited to plucked strings, bamboo wind instruments, and barrel and hourglass drums of differing sizes. Consequently, subtleties of timbre among Japanese instruments are highly refined. Each musical genre has developed its own notation system, with little overlap. As in many other Asian countries, much of Japanese music has been created in combination with literature, theater, and dance.

Gagaku

Gagaku, literally "elegant music," is the oldest surviving musical form in Japan. Gagaku refers to purely instrumental music as well as to music that accompanies the court dance called *bugaku*. Originally imported from

Korea, China, and China's various vassal states during the Nara period (710–794), gagaku was fostered by the imperial court and served as ceremonial music at rituals and festivals and as a pastime for aristocratic nobles. It reached its peak of popularity in the tenth century, but lost favor in the Kamakura period (1185–1333), when the power and prestige of the court aristocracy waned in favor of the new, rising military class.

By the beginning of the Tokugawa period (1600/1603–1868), only fragmentary gagaku groups remained. The first shogun, Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543–1616), consolidated the remaining gagaku ensembles into two groups, thus maintaining the tradition, though with a limited repertory. In 1955, gagaku was designated an important national treasure by the Japanese government.

Both music and dance gagaku are divided into compositions of the left (Chinese, Indian, and Japanese origin) and right (Korean or Manchurian origin); there are slight variations in the instrumental ensembles for each side. Though the ensemble consists of strings, percussion, and winds, these areas of sound remain distinct, with the winds (*bichiriki*, *ryuteki*) serving as the melodic instruments, and the stringed instruments (*gakuso*, *biwa*) and drums marking time units with stereotyped patterns.

Biwa Music

With the rise of the military class in the late twelfth century, the *biwa*, a four-stringed lute plucked with a

large plectrum, was used by blind musicians to accompany tales of the rise and fall of great warriors of the Heike clan. Though poetry had long been sung in court-music traditions, this new *biwa* music marked the beginning of a narrative musical tradition. The idea of narrative music was important in the development of Noh theater in the fourteenth century, as well as in developments in *shamisen* music beginning in the sixteenth century.

Noh Music

Noh music consists of solo speech and singing by actors, unison singing by a chorus of seven to ten, and an instrumental ensemble. The transverse bamboo flute (*nokan*) plays melodies independent of the vocal line, while the rhythm of the percussive instruments—shoulder drum (*kotsuzumi*), hip drum (*otsuzumi*), and stick drum (*taiko*)—is based on an eight-beat structure matched to the text in one of several clearly defined rhythmic modes. The tone system of Noh, which was influenced by the *shomyo* Buddhist chant, is constructed around three main nuclear tones: high, middle, and low, each separated by an interval of a perfect fourth, with additional important tones a perfect fifth above the high tone and a perfect fourth below the low tone.

Shamisen Music

As urban centers grew in the Tokugawa period, commercial theatrical forms and musical forms within the lively licensed quarters (where theaters and houses of prostitution were permitted) rapidly developed. Central to these developments was the *shamisen*, a three-stringed banjolike lute descended from the Chinese *sanzian*. It first arrived in Japan via the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) around 1562 and underwent several transformations, including the addition of *sawari*, a buzzing sound incorporated into the vibration of the first (lowest) string, and the borrowing of the large plectrum used to play the *biwa*.

Over the next three centuries, various genres of *shamisen* music developed: the heavy-sounding narrative of *gidayu* in puppet drama (Bunraku); lyrical *nagauta* in Kabuki (traditional dramas with dance and singing); and the versatile narrative genres of *tokiwazu-bushi*, *kiyomoto-bushi*, *kato-bushi*, *shinnai-bushi*, and others, which were heard in the licensed districts as well as on the Kabuki stage. Each genre is distinguished by subtle differences in timbre, achieved by varying the body size of the *shamisen*, thickness of the neck and strings, height of the bridge; size, composition, and attack of the plectrum; pitch range of the vocal line, and stereotyped patterns of the instrumental and vocal lines.

Koto Music

During this same period, new styles of music developed for the koto, a thirteen-string zither originally found in the gagaku ensemble. Yatsunashi Kengyo (1614–1685), and later Ikuta Kengyo (1656–1715), created new tunings, solo compositions for koto, and compositions for *sankyoku*, a trio consisting of koto, *shamisen*, and *shakubachi* (a long end-blown bamboo flute).

Influences of Western Music

The Meiji period (1868–1912) was a time of rapid modernization, with overwhelming influence from the West. Education policies emphasized the need to study Western music. The imperial army and navy had military bands that performed the first public concerts, introducing popular Western music and in turn greatly influencing the popular songs of Japan. Christian hymns brought by missionaries shaped the composition of children's songs taught as part of the new elementary school music curriculum. The Tokyo Music School (now Tokyo University of Fine Arts and Music), established in 1887, offered the first Western music conservatory training in Japan. Composers such as Miyage Michio (1895–1956) introduced the diachronic scale to koto music and fused Western and Japanese music traditions in orchestral compositions for thirteen-string and newly designed seventeen-string bass koto. One of Miyage's most famous compositions, *Haru no Umi* (The Spring Sea, 1929) remains a perennial favorite at New Year's time.

Music in Japan Today

Today Japan boasts over twenty professional symphony orchestras and has nurtured internationally known talents such as Toru Takemitsu (1930–1996), a composer of more than one hundred works for piano and chamber and symphony orchestra, and Seiji Ozawa (b. 1935), conductor of the Boston Symphony for nearly thirty years. One notable phenomenon that spread from Japan throughout Asia, Europe, and the Americas is the popular pastime of singing karaoke, literally "empty" (*kara*) "orchestra" (*oke*, in abbreviated form). Urban areas also boast hundreds of pop, rock, blues, jazz, and world beat bands that play in countless bars and "live houses" throughout the cities.

For many Japanese, Western music—classical and popular—is more familiar than are traditional Japanese music genres. Music education policies, a legacy of the Meiji period, include Western music in school curricula, but place traditional musical genres outside the formal education system, to be sustained by an apprentice system. Nevertheless, all of these musical worlds thrive side by side, and on any given day in

Japan one may experience everything from ancient gagaku to modern electronic music.

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MUSIC—KOREA On the surface, Korean musical culture shares many similarities with the musical cultures of China and Japan. The evidence includes notations, instruments, repertory, and so on. However, certain deep underlying aesthetic concepts distinguish Korean traditional music from its neighbors. The personal performance style, which incorporates a high degree of individualistic and creative variation and improvisation, sometimes beyond all prediction and anticipation, has resulted in a musical environment in which individual creativity, not rigid imitation, is the norm. Adherence to a standardized performance practice was not a convention in Korean traditional music. The resultant differences from such a diverse performance practice have often given rise to arguments regarding the authenticity of the performance. This kind of musical discourse further strengthens the notion that the open-ended nature of musical style is indeed an important characteristic of Korean music. It has brought about a rich variety of styles. The continuity of traditional musical practice in contemporary society is apparent in the realm of neotraditional music and popular song. However, the overwhelming influence of Western music, the impact of cultural policy-making, and the desire for globalization are all detrimental influences on Korean traditional music and musical aesthetics.

Historical Situation

The music history of Korea up to the early twentieth century is characterized by gradual evolution over time rather than by drastic reform in the process of transmission. Most of the long-lasting indigenous repertoires have been transmitted and preserved without pronounced reform, although many of their origins are unknown. Imported repertoires, mostly from

China, existed alongside indigenous music without either repertory influencing the other significantly. This is true to such a degree that some repertoires and instruments that have been lost in China, such as Chinese court ritual music and court banquet music (which were introduced into Korea in the twelfth century), are still being performed in Korea. It is also interesting to note the respect with which the Korean court treated the instruments used in Chinese court ritual music: These instruments were never secularized or modified in Korea, while some of them became folk instruments in China.

Contemporary Situation

The present musical landscape in South Korea is diverse and lively. While other countries lament the loss of their traditional music, in South Korea concert halls hosting traditional music performances are usually packed. Ever since the introduction of Western classical music to Korea in the late nineteenth century, Korean traditional music has been identified as *kugak* ("national music"), reserving the term *umak* ("music") or *yangak* ("Western music") for Western classical music.

Traditional Instruments

Korean musical instruments have two distinctive characteristics: the ability to produce pitch variants during performance and the ability to produce a some-



A group of traveling musicians with drums and tambourines in central Korea in 1946. (HORACE BRISTOL/CORBIS)

what raspy, buzzing, or rattling sound quality. Thus, the *komungo* (plucked zither), *haegum* (two-stringed fiddle), *p'iri* (reed pipe), and *taegum* (large flute) play important roles in traditional music. Such Chinese instruments as the *ajaeng* (bowed zither) satisfied these requirements and were adopted for indigenous music with slight modification. Even some major indigenous instruments such as the *komungo* and *taegum* have gone through a certain degree of modification to emphasize the foregoing requisite qualities. Conversely, instruments with fixed tuning such as the *yanggum* (dulcimer), or with a polished sound such as the *tanso* (short vertical flute) are not considered important in Korean traditional music.

Characteristics of Korean Music

The most important aspect of style in Korean music is flexibility, which permits personal deviation, variation, and improvisation during performance. The extent to which improvisation is taken depends on the performer and ranges from a mere ornamental deviation, as often occurs in court music, to full-blown improvisation, as occurs in such folk forms as *sinawi* (improvised instrumental ensemble), *sanjo* (solo instrumental music), and *p'ansori* (one-person musical story-telling). These three genres all originated in the southern part of Korea, and their history is related to shaman rituals of the region. Together with the *samul-nori*-type of music, the post-1970 percussion quartet utilizing folk rhythms, they are the most popular folk music in South Korea today.

The improvisational aspects of the *sanjo* have gradually been disappearing with the constraints of modern performance, however. For example, the limited duration of performance in the mass media and the teaching of *sanjo* from transcription since the 1960s have contributed to a decline in improvisation in *sanjo*. Teaching from transcription in particular has led to standardization of this once flexible style of music.

The texture of Korean music is basically monophonic, and most ensemble music is organized lineally. Unlike in Western music, in which the sound is formed by the vertical build-up of harmony, in Korean ensemble music each part is supposed to be heard individually. Sometimes, the parts may take off in quite different directions momentarily, resulting in melodic contrasts, and then meet at the same melodic line.

Most of the rhythms of Korean traditional music are based on triple time, or groups of three beats. The characteristic detail of Korean triple time is that the third beat is either articulated or accented, drawing more attention than the first beat. Duple time does

exist in traditional music, but it is very rare. In folk music duple meter is always combined with triple meter, forming a lengthy asymmetric rhythm. Asymmetric rhythms abound in regional *p'ungmul* (rural outdoor band music and dance) and shamanic ritual music. The length of these rhythms or rhythmic cycles may range from five beats (duple plus triple) to as long as thirty-six beats. When the rhythm is actually played by drums or gongs, the details of strokes vary considerably for each repetition to suit the melodic rhythm or to express rhythmic virtuosity.

Lee Byongwon

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MUSIC—LAOS, FOLK Legends state that the origin of Lao folk music comes from nature, such as the wind blowing through bamboo groves and the melodic songs of birds. Lao folk music is based on a tempered heptatonic scale, or a division of the octave into seven equal parts. It is also polyphonic and has been influenced by the music traditions of the Khmer kingdoms of Cambodia. Dancing (*fawn*) usually accompanies the playing of folk music at festivals or ceremonies.

The *khaen* is the foundation of Lao folk music. The *khaen* is an open reed instrument made from two rows of eight to nine hollow bamboo pipes held together in a wood support. Each pipe contains a metal reed. The *khaen* can be played as a solo instrument but usually serves as an accompaniment to folk songs called *lam*. The subjects of the folk songs are love and courtship, religious themes, and adventurous tales and legends. There are approximately twenty schools of *lam* folk music—classified by their geographical origins—such as Lam Saravan, Lam Siphandone, Lam Khon Savan, Lam Mahaxay, Lam Ban Sok, and Lam Muang Luang. Subject matter, the number of singers, and poetic form are the basis for other *lam* classifications. The style of the folk music also depends on whether the *khaen* is played alone or with other instruments such as the *pin*, a two- or three-stringed instrument played like a mandolin, or *saw*, a type of fiddle.



Women with traditional musical instruments in Vientiane, Laos. (NIK WHEELER/CORBIS)

An expert *khaen* player is a *maw khaen*, and an expert folk singer is called a *maw lam*. Both men and women can be expert singers and usually sing in pairs (*lam kbu*) at important events such as festivals. Lao folk singing requires improvisation since each singer attempts to outwit the other in songs of courtship, for example. The singers' improvisation must follow rules of versification and the general tempo of the music. The singing jousts continue late into the night and may last for hours. Both the *maw lam* and *maw khaen* also perform at weddings and other festive occasions. A folk music performance is a community event, uniting village members in a relaxed atmosphere.

The popularity of the *khaen* and folk music in general has decreased due to exposure to other forms of entertainment such as television and radio. Music of both Lao and Thai pop bands using electrical instruments is available throughout the country. However, the Lao government has named the *khaen* the national musical instrument. Lao expatriates living in the United States and France, for example, continue the tradition of *khaen* playing and folk singing. Nouthong Phimivi-

layphone is a *khaen* player producing Lao folk music in France for an international audience. Lao folk music presently coexists with other types of music and will persevere due to its importance to Lao identity and ideas of nationhood. A Lao proverb states that a Lao person eats sticky rice and fermented fish and plays the *khaen*.

Linda McIntosh

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MUSIC—TURKEY Turkish music has several distinctive styles, some of which originated as early as Ottoman times. During the Ottoman empire (1453–1922), there were two categories of music: court and folk. Today, traditional court music is commonly called Turkish classical music or Turkish art music. This tradition reflects combinations of Turkish, Arabic, Persian, and Byzantine styles and motifs, and it developed a rich repertoire during the centuries of Ottoman rule. Sultans brought popular musicians and composers from all over the world to their courts, where they were employed as state musicians. Schools in the palace were also devoted to training musicians. Turkish classical music incorporates a wide array of musical instruments, most commonly Turkish varieties of lutes, woodwinds, flutes, violins, and zithers.

Turkish folk music, originally village music, includes dance tunes, folk songs, even lullabies. Each region of Turkey has its distinctive musical styles and instruments. The most commonly used folk music instruments include drum, shawm, *saz* (a long-necked lute), vase drum, reed pipe, and flute.

In addition to these two traditional styles, contemporary Turkish music includes both new musical genres and subgenres of traditional Turkish classical and folk traditions. Among these new forms is *fasil* music, a nightclub version of classical Turkish music with distinctive forms, styles, instruments, and atmosphere. *Fasil* music is heavily influenced by Gypsy/Roma musical traditions. Among its best-known performers are Mustafa Kandirali and Kadri Sencalar.

Another new musical category is Turkish popular music, which combines Turkish folk songs, Arabic music, and other styles. Due to its resemblance to Arabic



Man playing the *saz* near Kusadasi, Turkey. (WOLFGANG KAEHLER/CORBIS)

music, some people call it "arabesk." The main lyrical themes of Turkish popular music are complaints about life and expressions of remorse and loneliness. This genre, which emerged in the 1960s, a period of rapid urbanization and mass migration in Turkey, conveys popular sentiments about adjustments to big-city life and shared disappointments. Ibrahim Tatlıses, Ferdi Tayfur, and Orhan Gencebay are the most prominent musicians in this category.

Like popular music, another new type, Turkish protest music, also employs folk music forms. Its lyrics, deriving from ordinary people's struggles, are heavily politicized. The best-known protest music singers are Ahmet Kaya and Zulfu Livaneli.

Turkish music also includes less commonly practiced musical traditions, such as Sufi music and Janissary music. Sufi music is mostly associated with followers of both the Mevlevi (whirling dervishes) and Bektashi orders of Sufism. Janissary music is the historic military music used by Ottoman armies, which influenced some European composers.

Styles of Western music have also been influential in contemporary Turkish society. During the early years of the Turkish republic, Western music gained recognition as the state encouraged its appreciation over Turkish classical music, which was regarded as distinctly Ottoman. Western styles continue to play important roles in current Turkish pop music.

Emine O. Evered

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MUSIC—WEST ASIA The territories of West Asia share a centuries-old history that expresses itself in the traditional music of the region, in voice and instrumental forms. Amateur musicians are often found playing at social gatherings and communal gathering places (*mudhifs*).

Song

Song is used at celebratory social festivals as well as at funerals, where it is used to mourn the dead. Sung plays known as *ta'ziyah* and *rowzeh* are based on the life of the Shi'ite martyr Imam Husayn and his family and are performed throughout Iran. In *ta'ziyah* plays, singing is used by the good characters only; the evil characters do not sing their lines. The *rowzeh* is performed by a special singer at devotional gatherings and is an extended poetic narrative. Work songs are used to motivate and add interest to fishing, hunting, and farming, and there are even songs for exercise workouts.

In Arabic vocal music the text is strongly related to the music. One of the oldest traditions is that of the *qasida*. In classical vocal form it utilizes sung poetry or

a classical ode. Frequently there can be more than one hundred lines to the poem. The folk version of this form is also called *qasida*, but the language used in the text is more colloquial. The *qasida* is one of three vocal poetic styles of the Iraqi *maqam*. The other two are the *takbims* and *mawwal* (also known as *zheiri*). Iranian poetic singing often uses text from Firdawsi's *Shahnameh* ("Book of Kings").

Sufi Music

There are various Sufi (Islamic mystic) sects throughout West Asia. *Tasavvuf* (Sufi) music is music composed as part of the Sufi searching and celebration of the unification of existence. Images of whirling dervishes of the Mawlawi order (Mevlevi in Turkish, named for their founder Mawlana Rumi), with their camel hair hats and white wool robes flowing as they spin to achieve connection with God and the universe, come to mind as one listens to the otherworldly mystical sounds of Sufi music. Various instrumental combinations are used along with the voice in *tasavvuf* music. The *ney* (flute) is the most common instrument used, along with the *kudum*, a double drum played with two sticks.


Qur'anic Recitation

Due to the overwhelming influence of Islam in West Asia, Islamic religious chanting is part of the daily lifestyle. *Qira'a* (qur'anic recitation) differs from the *maqam* style of singing. Religious chanting performed in mosques is not considered to be singing. Often performed as a solo, the aim of the chanting is not to create beautiful music, but to focus the worshippers on the words of the *Qur'an*.

Frame Drums

Many of the instruments found in West Asia have common origins. Nowhere is this more obvious than with percussion instruments, the most common being the frame-drum family.

Frame drums are among the most prevalent instruments in West Asia. The *tar*, *duff*, and *bandir* are the most common names for such drums. The frame itself is of a circular shape, commonly made out of wood with a goat- or calfskin stretched across one side of the frame. The percussionist utilizes the whole surface of the membrane stretched across the frame of the drum. Finger snaps, strokes, and palms are used to produce various tones and textures from the membrane. In some instances jingles and beads may be added to the frame to produce extra sound when the instrument is struck.



An orchestra drummer at a wrestling tournament in Finike, Turkey, in 1999. (NIK WHEELER/CORBIS)

The *darbukka* is a vase-shaped drum made from clay, wood, or metal, with a single goat- or calfskin head at the top of the vase shape. The *darbukka* has a much higher pitch than the *tar*. Like the frame drum, palms and fingers are used to produce sound. Tones may also be raised and lowered by placing one hand inside the drum and moving it back and forth across the length of the instrument while the player uses the other hand to strike the membrane. The third most common type of drum, the *darwul*, *tabl*, or *tabl baladi*, is a double-headed wooden cylindrical drum that is struck with beaters. This instrument hangs from the percussionist's shoulder by a strap and uses muted and open strokes.

The kettledrums of today's contemporary symphony orchestras can trace their roots back to the *tasat* or *naqqarat*. A pair of drums, one large and one smaller, were mounted on either side of a camel and were struck with a beater during long pilgrimages.

Many contemporary hand drums manufactured today use a synthetic fiber for the head in place of

traditional animal skins. This limits the effect of climate changes on the drum head during performance. Often metallic cymbals are added to the percussion playing, including *sunuj* or *sajat*, finger cymbals used by dancers, and *kasat*, cymbals used in religious rituals, including those of the dervishes in Turkey. The Turkish Janissary band crescent, a long pole with various jingles, nicknamed "jingling Johnny," was integrated into Western European music by composers such as Mozart, Beethoven, and Berlioz.

Blown Instruments

Another very common instrument found throughout West Asia is the *ney*. An end-blown flute, the *ney* is made from wood or bamboo, with contemporary versions crafted from copper or PVC pipe. Wind instruments that require a reed to produce sound include the shawm, *zurna*, *ghatya*, and *zamr*, the latter three known as double-reed instruments. Single-reed instruments with two pipes are the *jift*, *zummara*, and *mijwiz*. Also double-piped is the *duzele* or *qoosbmeh*, a double clarinet. The *jirba* or *hibban* is West Asia's version of bagpipes. The *masbura*, a single-reed, double pipe, produces a drone as well as melodic tones. The *karna* is a trumpetlike instrument that has a long wooden body with a detachable lower section made of brass or copper.

Stringed Instruments

Used to accompany the voices of poets, the *rabab* or *rehab* is a one-stringed, bowed instrument shaped like a box guitar. The frame is made of wood covered with animal skin front and back, with the one string made from horsehair. Three to four strings are incorporated on the *kamancheh*, or spike fiddle, which is also bowed. There are also many lutelike instruments, including the *ud* and the long-necked *tanbur* and *saz*. The *santur* is a dulcimer-style instrument played with soft felt and wood hammers. A harp-style instrument used in coffee houses and to accompany dances is the *simsimiyah* or *tunbur*.

Contemporary West Asian Music

Especially in Turkey, the music scene since the 1960s has seen the emergence of polyphonic music in the compositions of artists such as Kamran Ince, Aydin Esen, and Fazil Say. Their works combine traditional Turkish music with Western musical approaches, including pop and jazz. In addition, Western pop music is especially popular with young people.

Stacey Fox

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MUSLIM LAW. See **Shari'a**.

MUSLIM LEAGUE As a political association representing Muslims in India, the Muslim League's origins can be traced to such organizations as the Muhammedan Association (1856), the Muhammedan Literary Society (1863), the All India Muhammedan Education Conference (1886), and the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental Defense Association (1893). On 1 October 1906, thirty-five leading Muslims, headed by the Aga Khan, called on the British viceroy in India, Lord Minto, in Simla with a petition emphasizing the distinctiveness of the Muslims as a community and requesting special reservations in constitutional and economic terms. The Simla Deputation formed the basis of the Muslim League Party, which was formed on 30 December 1906. Its professed aims were to promote loyalty to the British government among Muslims, to protect and advance political rights and interests of the Muslims and represent their interests to the government, and to prevent the growth of hostility among Muslims toward other communities in India.

In practice, the League and the Indian National Congress Party cooperated fitfully—most dramatically between 1916 and 1922. But for the most part, its activities involved an increasing separation of interests, with the interwar years seeing a major increase in communal violence in the subcontinent. The league had to compete with other Muslim parties, and its claims to represent all Indian Muslims were not borne out at elections until 1937. Its fortunes, however, were dramatically transformed from the late 1930s under the leadership of Mohammed Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), and it won the greatest share of Muslim votes during elections to the Indian legislatures in 1946. Under Jinnah, the league successfully secured the formation of the separate Islamic state of Pakistan on 14 August 1947, after the British partitioned India along religious lines.

Chandrika Kaul

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A SEPARATE HOMELAND FOR MUSLIMS IN SOUTH ASIA

At the March 1940 meeting of the Muslim League in Lahore, League leader Ali Jinnah issued a statement demanding a separate homeland for Muslims. The opening of the statement below establishes the large-scale presence of Muslims in parts of India.

As far as our internal position is concerned we have also been examining it and, you know, there are several schemes which have been sent by various well-informed constitutionalists and others who take interest in the problem of India's future constitution, and we have also appointed a sub-committee to examine the details of the schemes that have come in so far. But one thing is quite clear. It has always been taken for granted mistakenly that the Mussulmans are a Minority and of course we have got used to it for such a long time that these settled notions sometimes are very difficult to remove. The Mussulmans are not a Minority. The Mussulmans are a nation by any definition. The British and particularly the Congress proceed on the basis, 'Well, you are a Minority after all, what do you want?' 'What else do the Minorities want?' Just as Baba Rajendra Prasad said. But surely the Mussulmans are not a Minority. We find that even according to the British map of India we occupy large parts of this country, where the Mussulmans are in a majority—such as Benga, the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan.

Source: Jagdish Saran Sharma. (1965) *India's Struggle for Freedom: Select Documents and Sources*. Vol. 2. Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 521–522.

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MUSLIM PEOPLES IN CHINA Islam appeared in China simultaneous with the seventh-century advance of Muslim armies into Central Asia and has flourished there since. Initially, Islamic communities were concentrated in the large Chinese cities of the interior that were connected to the Silk Road. Soon Islamic communities also appeared in the maritime communities of the southeast and south as Muslim traders replaced non-Muslim Persians and others who had long frequented the route. By Song-dynasty times (960–1279), a few Middle Eastern families who had settled along the route had become so powerful that virtually the entire Song overseas trading system was in their hands.

This influence continued under the Mongols, who encouraged Muslim migration. Among the new areas opened to Muslim influence by the Mongols was Yunnan Province, where Muslim influence remains strong (and Mongols continue to live). The Mongol court itself was also heavily Islamicized, with Persian possibly spoken as widely as Mongolian. Evidence of the extent of Islamic influence is the many Iraqi, Persian, and Uighur dishes of the Mongol imperial dietary *Yinshan zhengyao* ("Proper and Essential Things for the Emperor's Food and Drink"). "Muslim" recipes are found in other sources as well, indicating popularity outside court circles. Mongol court medicine was also heavily Islamicized with what was apparently its own school of Islamic medicine, as witnessed by the surviving chapters of the encyclopedic *Huibui yaofang* (Muslim Medicinal Recipes), which was unique in its Arabic-script entries.



ARE CHINESE MUSLIMS CLEANER?

This extract from an early-twentieth-century traveler's report contains a persistent stereotype about Muslim and the Chinese—that Muslims in China are cleaner than the Chinese. Even in modern-day tour books, there is the advice that Muslim restaurants in China are cleaner than Chinese ones.

It is recognized that a Mohammedan [Muslim] Chinese is cleaner than a pagan Chinese. Even with a Mohammedan Chinese, however, cleanliness has nothing to do with godliness—only with churchliness. Now it is one of the sundering differences between the Asiatic and the European. If a man says to you, 'Of course his house (or his tent) is cleaner than mine; he is a Mohammedan,' you know that you are indisputably listening to an Asiatic. It does not matter what type of Asiatic he may be or what kind of European you are; the broad difference is there. Only the Asiatic is inherently unable to detect that different ways of life are admirable or imitable or attainable in different degrees. His way of life is to him something to be accepted.

Source: Owen Lattimore. (1929) *The Desert Road to Tirkestan*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 225.

Large Muslim populations persisted in China after Yuan-dynasty times (1279–1368) and continued to flourish. One famous Ming-dynasty Muslim was Admiral Ma Zhenghe (1371–1433), the great explorer. During Qing-dynasty times (1644–1912), Chinese Muslims became famous because of the large-scale "Muslim" rebellions in Yunnan, Turkistan, and the Chinese northwest. Repercussions from these uprisings continue into the twenty-first century. Today, Huihui (Muslim) populations exist throughout China, where they constitute a large minority. Their numbers continue to grow, as does their influence on Chinese society. Among China's Muslims, the Uighurs of Turkistan are a particular problem for the current Chinese regime, in large part because the Uighurs do not consider themselves Chinese and look more to Turkic Central Asia than to China. Although the primary issue is political and not religious, religious influences from the outside in an era of Muslim renaissance cannot help but create new feelings of solidarity with Muslims everywhere, not just those in China.

Paul D. Buell

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MUSLIM RELIGIOUS BOARD OF CENTRAL ASIA

Established by Stalin as one of the four Spiritual Directorates to oversee religious affairs in the Soviet Union, the Muslim Religious Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan began its activities in 1941. Stalin's decision to establish these religious institutions was motivated by the need to generate support for his war efforts and thereby to increase the country's military might in the face of advancing German forces during World War II.

The first Muslim clergy to lead the resumption of religious activities under the auspices of the Soviet authority in Central Asia were Ishon Babakhan Ibn al-Majid Khan and Zia al-din Babakhanov. Appointed mufti and vice-chairman of the Board, both men were instrumental in keeping Soviet leaders informed of the extent of religious activities in the region. After the war and as the status of the Soviet Union rose around the globe, Stalin chose to use the Spiritual Direc-

torates as a foreign-policy tool to establish closer ties with the Middle Eastern countries.

In the 1960s and 1970s under the direct supervision of the Board, a limited public theological training was resumed in Central Asia, and students were dispatched to receive religious training in selected Islamic countries. The Board's headquarters were in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, but each Central Asian republic was assigned a mufti or *kazi* to monitor the activities of Muslims.

With the breakup of the Soviet Union and the perceived threat of an Islamic revival, Kazakhstan became the first republic in Central Asia to withdraw from the Board and to establish an independent directorate. Later other republics followed suit, and the Board was fully dismantled in 1994.

Mehrdad Haghayeghi

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MUSLIM SAINTS In Islam, saints are men and women whose perceived close relationship with God endows them with charismatic powers and makes them intercessors between ordinary human beings and the divine. Most commonly known as friends (*awliya*?, singular: *wali*) of God, Muslim saints acquire their designation through either genealogical distinction or social processes in which they become renowned as bearers of spiritual power (*baraka*), which they can use to grant wishes and alleviate suffering. There is no formal process of sanctification in Islam, and most of the celebrated saints acquired their reputations from their activities during their lifetimes or posthumously through the development of literary and popular hagiographic traditions. The characteristics ascribed to saints and the historical evolution of hagiographic traditions vary widely between Muslim societies and sects, though the phenomenon as a whole is nearly ubiquitous in Islamic religious life throughout Asia and beyond.

Shi'ite Saints

Foremost among saints known for their genealogical charisma are descendants of the Prophet Muham-


mad, particularly those accepted as imams or holy men by the various Shi'ite sects. The imams' spiritual properties are seen as deriving from their ancestry, linking them to Muhammad through his daughter Fatimah. Over the course of history, significant population centers have sprung up around the shrines of these saints, including the city of Najaf in southern Iraq, which contains the shrine of the first imam 'Ali (d. 661), and the Iranian cities of Mashhad and Qom, centered around the shrines of the eighth imam, 'Ali ar-Rida (d. 818), and his sister Fatimah Ma'sumeh (d. c. 815), respectively. Numerous other shrines of the imams' relatives are to be found throughout areas in which the majority of the population are Twelver Shi'a (that is, they venerate twelve historical imams); these shrines serve as focal points of local religious practice. Similarly, members of another branch of Shi'a Islam venerate separate lines of imams as saints, with the Nizari subsect carrying the tradition to the current living imam, the Agha Khan.

Sufi Saints

Considerably more numerous than the Shi'ite saints are those Sufis whom multitudes of Muslims regard as saints because of their reputations as spiritual guides, workers of miracles, and important historical figures in the establishment of Islamic communities. Most of these saints belong to the Sunni sect of Islam. The first Sufis seen as saints by later generations lived as early as the eighth century, though Sufism became the predominant religious paradigm throughout Islamic lands only in the later medieval period, 1300–1700.

Sufi practice most often centers around religious guides (*shaykh/pir*), who interpret their devotees' spiritual experiences and initiate them into religious paths by teaching specific liturgical practices (*dhikr*, or "recollection" of God's name). Such guides occur at all levels in society, becoming acknowledged as saints in small groups, in particular localities, or across regions. Saints' reputations depend on their perceived mastery of esoteric knowledge, which allows them to apprehend matters through extrasensory means and to grant material and spiritual benefits such as cures for illnesses and progress on the spiritual path. Miraculous deeds and knowledge of the unseen spiritual world are particular markers of saintly status as witnessed in both the reputations of local saints and the hagiographies of the most famous.

Along with their personal capabilities, Sufi saints often derive their legitimacy through initiation into voluntary sociointellectual associations known as Sufi orders (*turuq*, singular: *tariqa*), which are based on chains of transmission of religious knowledge going



Devotees of the Muslim saint Hazrat Shah Abdul Latif Barri Imam dance at his shrine on the outskirts of Islamabad, Pakistan, in May 2001. (AFP/CORBIS)

back to earlier famous saints and great Islamic figures such as Muhammad and 'Ali. Most prominent among such orders in Islamic Asia are Naqshbandiyya, Qadiriyya, Chishtiyya, Suhrawardiyya, Kubrawiyya, and Bektashiyya. There are numerous other orders and suborders named after earlier saints, including antinomian groups (groups that reject established morality) such as the Qalandars and Haydaris, who deliberately flaunt conventional norms such as the prohibition on intoxicants as a way of showing complete rejection of ordinary social life and total devotion to God. Amid all the variety of traditions and behavior, the efficacy of Sufi saints' powers depends on their perceived closeness to God, encapsulated in the concepts of passing away (*fana*) from their confined earthly existence and subsisting (*baqa*) in divine reality. The saints are earthly mediators of God's powers and are seen by their devotees as indispensable intermediaries without whom the cosmos would cease to function normally.

Social, Political, and Economic Roles

In addition to having spiritual significance, saints, their shrines, and their genealogical and pedagogical lineages have played crucial roles in the development of Islamic social history. Throughout Asia, "natural"

communities, such as tribes and castes, often trace their conversion to Islam to the proselytization and miraculous works of Sufi saints. Actual events associated with such conversions are usually embellished into elaborate hagiographies in which particular saints may become the center of communal identity. Hagiographic traditions are, therefore, major sources for the social history of Islamic communities throughout Asia.

Shrines of important saints also act as stimuli for economic activity in various regions, and most major cities in Central and Southern Asia with large Muslim populations fall under the spiritual domain of patron saints, whose presence continues to be felt long after their death through the powers of their monuments and the activities of their descendants and disciples. Examples of such powerful saints' monuments include the shrine complexes of Ahmad Yasawi (Kazakhstan), Baha al-Din Naqshband (Uzbekistan), Data Ganj Bakhsh (Pakistan), Nizam al-Din Awliya and Muin al-Din Chishti (India), and Jatal al-Din Rumi and Haji Bektash Vali (Turkey).

The social significance of sanctification of space is evident also in cases where saints' posthumous presence can be "discovered" through spiritual auguries at crucial historical moments to legitimate sociopolitical activity. The most famous examples of this pattern are

the discovery of the grave of Muhammad's companion Abu Ayyub Ansari (Turkish: Eyup) in Istanbul at the time of the Ottoman conquest of the city in 1453, and the development of the city of Mazar-e Sharif in northern Afghanistan after the alleged discovery of the grave of 'Ali at the site in 1480. Because of their role in social and economic life, saints and their descendants have in the past also exercised considerable political influence by becoming the spiritual patrons of ruling dynasties. The Iranian Safavid dynasty (1501–1722) was a saintly lineage that transformed itself into a ruling house. In modern times, descendants of powerful saintly lineages, such as the Pir Pagaros of Sind, Pakistan, have exercised considerable political influence at the national level, either directly or through their disciples.

To understand the religious and social spheres of life in Islamic communities in Asia, one must understand Muslim saints and their followers. Local traditions and patterns of historical development should be given careful consideration when drawing conclusions about the roles ascribed to dead or living saints in any particular region. However, at the most general level, for Muslims, saints are the extraordinary beings who convey sacred power between the divine realm and earthly human existence.

Shahzad Bashir

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MUSLIMS, SHI'ITE Shi'ite Muslims make up the second largest sect of the Islamic community after the Sunni Muslims, and they are the predominant Muslim population in Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iraq, and Iran. There are also significant Shi'ite minorities in India and Pakistan and in several Arab states. Today there are approximately one hundred million Shi'ites worldwide; they account for approximately 10 percent of the world's Muslim population.

Emergence of the Shi'ite Community

When the Prophet Muhammad died in 632 CE, the Muslim community erupted into disputes about his successor. Soon a split occurred over the criteria for the legitimate ruler. A powerful coalition of leaders chose Abu Bakr, one of Muhammad's uncles and disciples, as caliph or successor, against the objections of those who believed Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, should have been chosen. The former are known as Sunni Muslims, while the latter are known as Shi'ite Muslims.

Abu Bakr was succeeded by 'Umar and then by 'Uthman. When 'Uthman was assassinated, 'Ali was finally made caliph, but a relative of 'Uthman, Mu'awiya, who was also the governor of Damascus and one of the last companions of Muhammad, contested his rule, charging that 'Ali had been responsible for 'Uthman's death. The ensuing conflict ended with a truce of sorts; Mu'awiya ruled in Syria, Egypt, and

northern Mesopotamia, and Ali ruled over the Arabian Peninsula and the east. When 'Ali was assassinated in 661, Mu'awiya quickly seized control of 'Ali's region, naming his family, the Umayyads, the ruling family. The Umayyad dynasty ruled the Islamic world from 661 to 750.

'Ali and His Descendants in Shi'ite Belief

The Shi'ite Muslims believed that 'Ali was the first imam (spiritual leader) and that his descendants were the only rightful leaders of the Islamic community. They considered imams spiritual and physical beings with the duty and right to rule the community after the Prophet. 'Ali's son Hasan became the second imam, and Hasan's brother Husayn became the third imam when Hasan was poisoned in 670. Ten years later Husayn and most of his family were killed by the Umayyads, leaving only his son Zayn al 'Abidin to carry on as the fourth imam. Zayn al 'Abidin's son Yahya became the fifth imam. The attack on Husayn and his family outraged the public, already tired of many policies of the Umayyads. Eventually, in 750, the Umayyads were replaced by the Abbasids, a Hashimite family that was a branch of the Prophet's own clan. During the Abbasid era (750–1258) the Shi'ites grew in number, since they were not systematically persecuted.

Seveners and Twelvers Sects in Shi'ite Belief

Ja'far al-Sadiq was the sixth imam, and he had two sons, Isma'il and Musa. Once again, a dispute over leadership occurred among Muslims, but this time among the Shi'ite Muslims. Isma'il was initially named to succeed Ja'far, who later named Musa as successor. However, one group of people followed Isma'il, believed him to be seventh imam, and thought that the line of imams ended with him. These Shi'ite Muslims are called the Seveners or Ismailis.

Others, however, believed Musa was the seventh imam and followed his lineage until the twelfth imam, Madhi, who disappeared as a child in the city of Samarra in 873; this disappearance is also referred to as an occultation or absenting from the earth. According to the Twelvers sect of Shi'ite Muslims, the rulers of Islam must reign in the name of the twelfth imam, Madhi, the one who vanished. This sect is known as Twelvers because it honors the twelve imams.

The Twelvers believe that Mahdi will return one day to bring salvation and a new era of peace and prosperity to the world. The sect of Seveners also believes in the imam's returning to usher in a new era of peace and prosperity, except that the imam will be Isma'il.

For both sects the ideal government is run by clerics well versed in Islamic law and philosophy. Originally this idea was interpreted to mean that Islamic religious leaders would play a role in guiding and advising governments to adhere to Islamic principles. Over the years, however, others decided that Islamic religious leaders should actually run the government. The concept of *vilayet-i faqih*, or the rule of religious jurisprudence, was fully articulated and explained by Ayatollah Khomeini (1900–1989) in his book *Hukkkumet-i Islami* (Islamic Government), and he preached these views to the masses. *Vilayet-i faqih* was finally made a political reality when Ayatollah Khomeini proclaimed Iran an Islamic republic in 1979.

Spread of Shi'ism

By the end of the ninth century Shi'ite believers grew in number. The Seveners were strong in North Africa due to the affiliation of the Fatimid dynasty (909–1171), which ruled not only in North Africa but also in Egypt, Syria, and Hijaz. The Fatimids had hoped to firmly establish their religion in Egypt, but met with little success as the Sunni Muslims there resisted strongly. In another part of the Islamic community, the Buyid dynasty (c. 945–1055) subscribed to the teachings of the Twelvers. This dynasty was unable to convert most of its subjects, but helped spread Shi'ism by protecting its followers and commemorating Husayn's murder.

The Twelvers received a tremendous boost when the Safavid dynasty (1502–1736) of Iran named Shi'ism its state religion. By the time the Safavid dynasty fell, most Iranians had converted to Shi'ism, which is still their belief today.

Shi'ite clerics are trained in Islamic seminaries. Qum and Mashhad in Iran are currently prominent centers of Shi'ite teaching. A cleric's standing in the Islamic community is determined by his religious education and how he applies his knowledge to his people and to the government. The highest level of acclaim to be achieved is considered to be the title "ayatollah." Those clerics who do not achieve such prominence either teach the message of Islam to villagers or serve in an administrative capacity at mosques or seminaries.

Houman A. Sadri

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MUSLIMS, SUNNI Sunni Islam is practiced by the majority (90 percent) of Muslims, with large communities in western Asia, the Indian subcontinent, the Caucasus, Central Asia, China, and Southeast Asia. The word "Sunni" derives from the Arabic word "Sunnah," which generally means "customary practices" and refers to the oral traditions (hadiths) of what the Prophet Muhammad said or did. Sunni Muslims regard these traditions and the Qur'an as forming the basis of their religious knowledge. The Sunnis are distinguished from the Shi'ites, the partisans of Muhammad's son-in-law, 'Ali.

The experience of Sunni Muslims in Asia during the modern period has largely depended on how these groups have responded to the twin forces of European colonial and Asian territorial expansion and the emergence of modernity. Each of these forces has influenced the organizational structure of Sunni communities, reshaped the theological goals of Sunni Islam, and influenced the role that Sunni Islam plays in modern national identities and political movements. The position of Sunni Muslim women in Asia varies according to several regional and political factors.

Western Asia

In western Asia, Sunni Muslims are predominantly Arab and live in Iraq, Israel, and the borders of former British Mandate Palestine (1923–1948), Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the states of the Persian Gulf region. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, some Arabs called for a revival of Sunni Islamic thought as a response to the penetration of European culture and its increasing political influence in the region. They advocated returning to the fundamental sources of their faith, the Qur'an and the early traditions, and abolishing popular religious practices, such as the ritual visitation to saints' tombs. This reform movement would inspire other Sunni communities throughout Asia, particularly those that came under European colonial rule.

After World War I, Britain and France occupied the region and founded many of the modern Arab nations, although these nations did not achieve independence until after World War II. Although many of these nations stress an Arab cultural identity, Islam continues to serve as a powerful idiom for nationalist

rhetoric and as an alternative to state ideology, as the increasing influence of Islamic groups in contemporary politics attests. Whereas some nations, such as Syria, Iraq, and Jordan, have adopted secular penal and civilian legal codes to work alongside Islamic law, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait continue to impose strict versions of Islam in law and government.

Indian Subcontinent

Sunni Muslims form the majority of the population in Pakistan and Bangladesh and comprise a large minority in India. After the breakup of the Islamic Mughal empire and the imposition of British rule in India in the nineteenth century, Sunni theologians and intellectuals in India adopted the reform ideals emerging from the Arab lands, believing that religious revivalism could help their communities confront British colonialism.

Eventually, the British encouraged the Sunni Muslim community of India to identify itself as a group distinct from the larger Hindu population, which led to calls for the creation of a separate Muslim state. Pakistan emerged as a state in 1947 for the Muslims of India, and although it has remained heavily Islamic in national character, it is not officially a Muslim nation. The eastern part of Pakistan, Bangladesh, was established as a separate nation in 1972 and remains a secular nation more focused on national than Islamic identity. In India, communal hostilities continue to mar relations between Sunnis, Shi'ites, and Hindus.

Central Asia, the Caucasus, and China

Sunni Muslims in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and China live within the former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, as well as in Afghanistan and China. By the late nineteenth century, most Muslims in these regions had come under either Russian or Chinese rule. Because these areas are contiguous to the imperial homeland of Russia and China, a unique problem emerged; some Muslims became a minority population who had to defend against assimilation into the culture of the ruling powers.

The czarist Russian empire coopted local religious leaders like the ulama (scholars of Islam) to govern these areas, even though most Muslims favored the spiritual leadership of Sufis (Muslim mystics). Performing ritual pilgrimages and attending Sufi celebrations became expressions of Sunni Muslim opposition to Russian, and later Soviet, rule. In the post-Soviet era, Sunni Islamic groups compete for power with large non-Sunni populations, such as Russians,

Shi'ites, Armenian Christians, and various Turkic groups.

Two groups represent the divergent experiences of Sunni Muslims in China. The Hui in Han Province speak Chinese but observe most Islamic practices, whereas nonassimilated Inner Asian people, such as the Kazakhs and the Uighurs, speak Turkic languages and maintain a distinctive non-Chinese identity.

Southeast Asia

In Malaya and Indonesia, Sunni Muslim populations faced the same difficulties that colonialism posed to Muslims in other parts of Asia. By the mid-nineteenth century, Holland and Britain had established their imperial rule in Southeast Asia. Islamic revivalism quickly emerged as a powerful ideological force against European colonialism, and by the 1920s the port towns of Java, Malaya, and Sumatra acted as centers of Islamic activism and reservoirs of Islamic modernist thought emanating from other parts of the Muslim world.

Indonesia achieved independence in 1945. Although not officially proclaimed an Islamic nation, it is nonetheless the world's most populous Islamic nation. The Ministry of Religion regulates Islamic education and courts. Malaya became independent in 1957; it maintains strong central control over the administration of religious affairs, a system introduced during British rule.

Women

The position of Sunni Muslim women in modern Asian societies depends on such factors as the nations in which they reside, their socioeconomic positions, and the degree of formal education that they hold. Whereas women in Yemen and Afghanistan have difficulty pursuing activities outside the household, women in Jordan, Syria, and Pakistan remain active in the public sphere and have fought for political and legal changes, although the rise of militant and conservative Islamic groups hinders these advancements. Many women traditionally professed their faith by attending religious festivals, visiting the tombs of saints, and praying at shrines, although the imposition of modern state control over religious life has curtailed these practices.

Sunni Muslims have been forced to reformulate their beliefs to meet the challenges posed by the expansion of European and Asian nations. Religious revivalism evolved as a response to these challenges of the modern age, but the greatest legacy of this history may have been the control that hierarchical religious

authorities (that is, ulama) and state forces acquired over religious affairs.

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MUTINY, INDIAN. The Mutiny or Sepoy rebellion (1857–1858), or, as it is often referred to in contemporary India or Pakistan, the War for Independence, changed the shape of the British empire. Before the Mutiny, British India was ruled through a chartered business corporation, the East India Company, under the fiction that they were the proxies of native princes. After the struggle, that fiction was laid to rest.

The Rebellion

The thirteen-month rebellion traditionally has been blamed on the East India Company army's issue of the Enfield rifle. To load the gun, the Sepoys—Indian soldiers in the British army—had to bite off the ends of a lubricated cartridge. The soldiers felt they were greased with beef and swine fat—anathema to Hindu and Muslim alike. But most contemporary historians now feel this was only one of many causes.

It probably was more important that the state of Oudh, from which many of the native soldiers derived, had recently been annexed by the British. This produced political resentments among the Indian soldiers. Furthermore, in consolidating the British supremacy in India, the company forced a radical and rapid Westernization on traditional society that was a major cause of the troubles.

The Mutiny broke out first in the Bengal army. At Meerut, several Sepoys received severe punishment for refusing to use the Enfield cartridge in April 1857. In reaction, native soldiers began to shoot their European officers, after which the mutineers marched on Delhi, at that time bereft of English defenders. The local Indian troops joined the insurgents in restoring the aged Mughal emperor Bahadur Shah II (1775–1862) to the throne of his ancestors.

Europeans and Indian Christians were butchered—some quite horribly. But company troops also committed atrocities. Disturbances also spread to Cawnpore

and Lucknow. When the British retook these cities, the punishment also was severe for the perpetrators.

Aftermath

After the Mutiny, British India became a Crown possession, and Victoria was granted the title of Queen Empress of India. Military and civil reorganization was instituted. The British army came to depend heavily on their loyal native troops—especially the Sikhs and the Gurkhas. India was governed by parliamentary law, directly from London. Within India, a more professional civil service developed, which became one of the best in the world. Governmental sponsorship of Westernization slowed down. The Indian middle classes realized a violent revolution was not viable. This influenced the tactics of the later Indian Nationalist struggle.

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MYANMAR PROFILE (2000 est. pop. 41.7 million). Myanmar, officially the Union of Myanmar (also known as Burma), is located in Southeast Asia, bordered by Bangladesh on the west, India on the northwest, China on the northeast, and Laos and Thailand on the east. The country has a land area of 678,500 square kilometers, and it is the second largest country in area in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), after Indonesia.

Climate and Topography

Myanmar's landscape is diverse. It includes mountain ranges in the north, northeast, and northwest; large hilly plateaus and river valleys in the central regions; and twisted coasts with numerous river deltas and small islands in the south and southwest. Most of the country lies in the tropics, with temperatures reaching 38° C between May and October and falling to 20° C between December and February.

Population

Myanmar is a predominantly rural country, with only around 28 percent of the population living in cities and towns, up from 19 percent in 1960. The country's capital, Yangon (Rangoon), is home to about 4 million people (2001), up from approximately 2.5 million in 1983. The country's population is relatively young, with 30 percent below the age of fourteen and only 5 percent older than sixty-five. At present, Myanmar has one of Southeast Asia's lowest population growth rates—.64 percent—and a net annual migration rate of –1.85 migrants per 1,000 people.

It is very difficult to project the dynamics of population growth because of Myanmar's international isolation, high emigration rate, and very high infant mortality rate of 75.3 deaths per 1,000 live births (2000). Myanmar's officials estimate that current population





MYANMAR (BURMA)

Country name: Union of Myanmar (Union of Burma)
Area: 678,500 sq km
Population: 41,734,853 (July 2000 est.)
Population growth rate: 0.64% (2000 est.)
Birth rate: 20.61 births/1,000 population (2000 est.)
Death rate: 12.35 deaths/1,000 population (2000 est.)
Net migration rate: -1.85 migrants/1,000 population (2000 est.)
Sex ratio, total population: 0.99 males/female (2000 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 75.3 deaths/1,000 live births (2002 est.)
Life expectancy at birth, total population: 54.91 years; male, 53.6 years; female, 56.29 years (2000 est.)
Major religions: Buddhism, Christianity, Islam
Major languages: Burmese
Literacy, total population: 83.1%; male, 88.7%; female, 77.7% (1995 est.)
Government type: military regime
Capital: Yangon (Rangoon)
Administrative divisions: 7 divisions and 7 states
Independence: 4 January 1948 (from U.K.)
National holiday: Independence Day, 4 January (1948)
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal
GDP—real growth rate: 4.6% (1999 est.)
GDP—per capita (purchasing power parity): \$1,200 (1999 est.)
Population below poverty line: 23% (1997 est.)
Exports: \$1.2 billion (1998)
Imports: \$2.5 billion (1998)
Currency: kyat (K)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Book Factbook* 2001.
 Retrieved 5 March 2002, from: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

might double within the next forty years. Myanmar has one of the lowest population densities among the member nations of ASEAN, standing at 61 people per square kilometer. However, the areas around the three major cities of Yangon, Mandalay, and Moulmein are overcrowded, with large numbers of young people arriving from rural areas in search of jobs and new opportunities.

Myanmar is a multiethnic country with a very diverse population. Burmans make up 68 percent of the population, Shans make up 9 percent, Karen 7 percent, Rakhine 4 percent, Chinese 3 percent, Mon 2 percent, Indians 2 percent, and various other small groups make up the remaining 7 percent. Historically, the country brought together different ethnic groups, including small tribal groups on its border with Thailand and Laos. During British rule (1885–1948), many

Indian and Chinese immigrants settled in the country. During the twentieth century, the ethnic structure remained relatively stable, although many urban Indians and Chinese left Myanmar at the outbreak of World War II; many also left in the 1960s. Due to harsh economic conditions in the 1980s and 1990s, many people left Myanmar for neighboring countries, either temporarily or permanently but often illegally, in search of jobs and better living prospects. According to an Economic Intelligence Unit report, there are an estimated 1 million illegal migrant workers in Thailand, the majority of them from Myanmar.

The Burmese language (the country's officials call it the Myanmar language), which belongs to the Sino-Tibetan group of languages, is the official language of the state. It is spoken by the majority of the population. Around 15 percent of the population speak Shan



MYANMA(R)-BAMA(R) RENAMING

Burmans constitute a majority and have dominated the military and the civil service since national independence. In English, "Burman" has mostly been used in reference to the dominant ethnic group (though at times confusingly it has also been used to mean "all the indigenous inhabitants of Burma together with permanent residents of alien origin who have come to regard themselves as natives of the country" Furnivall 1957:11). On 18 June 1989, not tolerating "foreign" pronunciation, the SLORC [State Law and Order Restoration Council] announced the Adaptation of Expressions Law, substituting references to "Burman" in non-Burmese languages with "Bama(r)," and "Burmese" and "Burma" with "Myanma(r)," thus enforcing ethnic referencing for the country in its own mother tongue upon foreign languages, effectively making "Burman," "Burmese" and "Burma" redundant.

Though in doing so it hopes to clarify the distinction between the dominant ethnic group and the nation-state, it has in fact made the situation more complicated. In the 1930s, the Thahkins used Bama(r), not Myanma(r), as a term for the country as a whole, including the Burmans, and it continues to be used in this way in the Burmese language even today.

Also, it makes little sense to redefine Bama(r) as a limited ethnic category while the mother tongue should be designated as Myanma(r). Bama(r) and Myanma(r) overlap in meaning to such an extent even today, as evident from most Burmese dictionaries, that this change has not put non-Burman ethnic groups at ease. Unlike Indonesia, where the national language is not tied to the native language of the dominant ethnic group, the Myanma(r) language is closely tied to ethnic identity of the Bama(r) native speakers.

Furthermore, imposition upon minority groups of Burmanized terminology of the country, but more particularly of the way many of their own ethnic place-names were changed without consultation (the law renamed ethnic place-names according to Burmese pronunciation also, but the Committee deciding upon the renaming contained no representatives from the ethnic groups).

Though the usage implemented by this law was accepted by the United Nations and is now in everyday use throughout Asia, in Europe and in the USA "Myanma(r)" has not gained widespread acceptance and "Burma"/"Burmese" continue to be widely preferred. To compound confusion, "Burmese" is also rarely used in English in the sense of "Burman," i.e., as an ethnic or racial term (e.g., Furnivall 1957:11). But such confusion is no different from the Burmese language itself, where Myanma(r) continues to be referred to in formal or literary reference to Bama(r) ("Burman"), suggesting a less impartial idea of the country and ethnicity than the authorities put forth.

Gustaaf Houtman

Source: J. S. Furnivall. (1957) An Introduction to the Political Economy of Burma. 3rd ed. Rangoon, Burma: People's Literature Committee & House.

and Karen. English is spoken mainly in large cities and among most educated social groups.

Around 89 percent of the population are Buddhists. The remaining 11 percent are Muslims, Christians, and animists. Some of the indigenous people in the hill areas, who followed various types of shamanistic rituals in the precolonial era, were converted to Christianity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Political History

The first unified Burma state was established in the middle of the eleventh century at Pagan in upper Burma. It was conquered by the Mongols under Kublai Khan at the end of the thirteenth century. A new dynasty emerged in the sixteenth century in central Burma. During the 1600s and 1700s, the Burmese were increasingly involved in trade, including rice, tea, and opium, with British, Dutch, and French merchants.

Burma (the name was changed to Myanmar in 1989) came under British control in 1886 after three Anglo-Burmese wars. The British moved the capital from Mandalay to Rangoon (now Yangon), which became one of the largest ports in Burma. The British struggled to retain control over the country during World War II, and it became a battlefield for the Allies and the Japanese army. In 1945 Japan was defeated, but the Burmese demanded independence. Under the leadership of the popular leaders Aung San (1914?–1947) and U Nu (1907–1995), the pro-independence Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League won the April 1947 elections. Burma declared its independence from British rule on 4 January 1948, forming the Union of Burma. The first constitution was adopted in 1948; however, the civil government was overthrown by the military in 1962. In 1974, a new constitution was adopted that significantly changed many ideas of the previous constitution and declared the country a one-party socialist state. The Lanzin Party (Burma Socialist Programme Party) introduced the so-called Burmese Way to Socialism, based on a mixture of Buddhism, Marxism, nationalism, and political isolation.

Military rule was undermined by widespread dissatisfaction with poverty and economic mismanagement, leading finally to mass protests. In March 1988, widespread demonstrations began in the capital, Yangon. In August 1988, government troops used force and opened fire against demonstrators, killing thousands of civilians. After some changes in the military junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was formed, abandoning the one-party system and promising free, multiparty elections. In May 1990, the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Aung

San Suu Kyi (the daughter of Aung San; b. 1945), won the general elections for the Pyithu Hluttaw (Parliament) by a landslide, but the junta refused to accept the results. Many opposition pro-democracy leaders were arrested or isolated under house arrest. In 1997, the SLORC was dissolved and replaced by the State Peace and Development Council, which promised to produce a new constitution. In the first years of the twenty-first century, the military junta faced growing pressure from the pro-democracy political parties, led by the NLD, from political groups in exile, from various ethnic groups and their armed units, and increasingly from the international community.

Economy

Myanmar experienced slow economic growth after World War II, as political instability and military coups negatively affected the country's economic development. Agriculture is the main pillar of the economy: peasants cultivate rice, corn, peanuts, tobacco, oilseeds, and sugarcane. During the second half of the twentieth century, Myanmar became the world's largest source of illicit opium. According to the World Bank, the agricultural sector contributes about 53 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and provides employment for 65 percent of the workforce; services contribute around 25 percent; and industry contributes 10 percent, providing employment for 10 percent of the workforce (1998). According to the World Bank, between 1989 and 1999, the average annual GDP growth was around 6 percent, with industrial production growing at an annual average of almost 10 percent and exports of goods and services at an annual average of 8 percent, albeit from a very low base. From 1962 until 1988, the government enforced centralized control over all the sectors of economy, nationalizing most large- and medium-sized enterprises. Since the late 1980s, the Myanmar government has been conducting a policy of economic liberalization and deregulation, encouraging the private sector and foreign investments. However, these efforts were undermined by the international boycott due to the poor human rights record in the country. Myanmar remains one of the world's poorest countries, with an estimated purchasing power parity at around \$1,200. In 2000, the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index put Myanmar in 125th place, behind Gabon and Morocco but ahead of Iraq and Lesotho.

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MYANMAR—ECONOMIC SYSTEM Reflecting both its history as an exporter of raw agricultural produce and as a country that has for decades isolated itself from the world economy, the economy of Myanmar (Burma before 1989) is largely agricultural. After the seventeenth century and prior to British colonial rule, rice exports were usually forbidden by the Burmese royal court due to fears of chronic domestic famine. Some rice exports were allowed in the early nineteenth century in an effort to gain firearms and Indian textiles. In general, however, Burma's strong early modern domestic economy was self-sufficient in textiles, ceramics, and other goods. Upper Burma, the chief rice-cultivation center of the country, remained Burma's demographic and economic center.

British expansion in Burma changed the overall Burmese economy. After the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826), the British opened up the province of Arakan (now Rakhine) to rice merchants, and rice exports increased so rapidly that by the late 1850s Akyab (now Sittwe), the chief port of Arakan, was the world's foremost rice-exporting port. Increased agricultural cultivation and the emergent colonial port economy at Akyab led the British to encourage large-scale labor immigration from northeastern India. Tenasserim, meanwhile, depended more upon teak logging, shipbuilding, and tin mining. After the Second Anglo-Burmese War (1852), the British annexed Burma's chief port, Rangoon (now Yangon), and the

whole of sparsely populated but fertile lower Burma. Rangoon soon overshadowed Akyab as a rice-export center, and large-scale Indian and Chinese immigration turned Rangoon into a city where the immigrant population formed the majority. Indians and Chinese became the commercial middlemen of colonial Burma, dominating steam mills and urban businesses, as well as the sources of credit to Burma's poor agriculturists. The quickly expanding colonial economy led to large-scale immigration into the south from the neighboring kingdom of Burma in the north, especially into agricultural areas. British economic development was focused on timber extraction and rice agriculture.

Starting at the beginning of World War II, Burma began a long trek toward impoverishment. Small-scale industrial enterprises and Burma's transportation infrastructure were destroyed in the war, especially by the British in their flight from the Japanese. Ethnic hostilities directed by poor Burmese toward Indian moneylenders and Chinese commercial elites also fundamentally disrupted the colonial economy. The Burmese independence struggle that began before Japanese occupiers left Burma at the close of World War II left little time for economic revitalization.

Independent Burma to 1993

In the early 1950s, Burma benefited from soaring demand for its rice exports due to the Korean War. Afterward, growing ethnic rebellions and a Communist insurgency destabilized the government and the economy and led to the seizure of power by the military in 1962. Economic decline followed.

Under the regime of Ne Win (b. 1911), from 1962 to 1988, Burma followed the "Burmese Way to Socialism." Industries, both domestic- and foreign owned, were nationalized. Industrial development was directed to reduce expensive foreign imports by manufacturing goods at home. These were state enterprises, owned by the Burmese government, and included automotive and tractor-assembly plants, ceramic and glass factories, and electric-appliance assembly plants. In a political move directed at those among the country's middle and upper classes who were opposed to the regime, Ne Win invalidated a range of large-denomination Burmese banknotes, suddenly impoverishing many of Burma's wealthiest consumers.

Burma's severe economic problems provided the context for the pro-democracy student riots in 1988 and the end of the Ne Win regime. From 1988 until 1993, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) regime sought to reverse Myanmar's economic troubles and began limited economic liberalization policies. In

December 1988, the SLORC also established a secure legal basis for foreign investment with a new investment law, derived from the commercial law of the British colonial period in Burma. Although the SLORC was replaced by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in November 1997, this was essentially a name change accompanied by a reshuffling of ministers, and little real change has taken place in economic policies (or in government policies in general).

Myanmar's Agricultural Sector

Myanmar's agricultural sector (including fishing, forestry, and animal husbandry) employs about 63 percent of the country's labor force and makes up 60 percent of the country's economy (2000–2001). Myanmar's chief agricultural products include rice, corn, oilseed, legumes, and sugar. The government officially owns all land and forcibly procures a portion of paddy rice at an artificially low price (as low as one-fifth of the market price) as an unofficial tax. Recently this policy has been extended to other crops, including beans and legumes, in an effort to gain foreign-exchange earnings.

From 1962, when the military regime took over, until 1992, rice exports steadily dropped, especially in the period after 1987–1988. From 1992 to 1993, the SLORC regime was able to achieve an increase in rice exports due to expansion of supply. This was achieved by the introduction of multiple cropping (up to three crops per year), introduced to rural farmers by government specialists. Moderate increases in yield and in area under cultivation, as well as private efforts to use pumped water during the dry season, have also aided this growth. Paddy cultivation has been supplemented by the extension of bean and legume crops by the government to increase export earnings.

Industry and Raw Materials

Compared with most Asian countries, contemporary Myanmar has a very underdeveloped industrial sector. The industrial sector accounts for only about 10–11 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP; manufacturing produced 8.8 percent of the GDP in 1991–1992), far below many other countries in Southeast Asia, and this sector employs only about 10 percent of Myanmar's labor force. Eighty-five percent of Myanmar's industrial output is devoted to food and beverage processing, and only 10 percent is focused on manufacturing. As a result, Myanmar has to import most manufactured goods. Myanmar's chief industries are devoted to the processing of agricultural products and raw materials (wood, copper, iron, tin, and tungsten) and the production of fertilizer, footwear, pharmaceuticals, and textiles.

A major transition has begun in the industrial sector since the 1980s. During the Ne Win period, for example, consumer demand for small manufactured goods was met by the emergence of cottage industries. Due to the growth of a large black market and cheap supplies of these goods from neighboring countries, including China, India, and Thailand, the survival of these cottage industries is increasingly threatened. Under the SLORC, however, economic liberalization and the encouragement of foreign investment, including special privileges, led to moderate foreign investment in Myanmar's industrial sector, although that sector is still dominated by mismanaged and inefficient state industries originally established under the Ne Win regime. Pressure from foreign imports, including the black market, downsizing due to reduced availability of hard foreign currency (and thus inability to purchase expensive foreign raw materials), and the weight of an inefficient labor force continue to plague the government-owned portion of the industrial sector under the SPDC.

Myanmar's raw-materials production includes the extraction of natural fuels, precious metals, and minerals. In 1993–1994, Myanmar produced approximately 689 million liters of petroleum, 138 million liters of natural gas, 29 thousand metric tons of coal, and smaller amounts of lead, silver, and tin. Oil, silver, minerals, paraffin wax, and gems figure prominently as exports. Mining, however, produces only a fraction of the country's GDP (just over 1 percent in 2000–2001).

Foreign Trade, Investment, Loans, and the Black Market

Myanmar's chief exports and imports continue to be dominated by inefficient state-run enterprises, despite limited privatization under the SLORC/SPDC regime. Myanmar's largest exports, such as rice and teak, remain government monopolies. In addition to rice and teak (the latter is exported almost exclusively to the rest of Asia), limited supplies of rubber are also exported. In the 1990s, the government also successfully promoted exports of beans and legumes, the latter largely derived from state requisitioning from rural farmers. Myanmar's exports go mainly to India, Singapore, China (including Hong Kong), Thailand, and Japan. In 1993–1994, 241,000 metric tons of Myanmar's largest export, rice, was distributed as follows: Africa, 34,000 metric tons; Sri Lanka, 32,000 metric tons; Singapore, 13,000 metric tons; Western Europe, 10,000 metric tons; India, 3,000 metric tons; the Middle East, 2,000 metric tons; and the rest of the world, 146,000 metric tons.

Weak domestic economic development requires Myanmar to import substantially. Myanmar's chief imports include construction materials, food products, and machinery. Myanmar's imports come chiefly from Singapore, Japan, China (including Hong Kong), Thailand, and Malaysia.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Myanmar is guided by a new investment law and is overseen by the Myanmar Investment Commission. By the beginning of 1997, Myanmar had 244 approved FDI projects worth just over \$6 billion, although only a quarter of these projects actually reached fruition. The largest sources of FDI were, in order, Great Britain, Singapore, Thailand, France, the United States, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Japan and were largely directed into oil and gas extraction and the hotel and tourism industry. Although the military regime hoped that increased support for tourism would help raise hard foreign-currency earnings, successful campaigning on the part of antigovernment groups for a tourist boycott of Myanmar has kept tourism at a minimal level.

Low FDI (relative to countries in comparable stages of development) is due directly and indirectly to Myanmar's government policies. The invalidation of the 1990 elections, the suppression of the National League for Democracy (NLD), the NLD's calls for an end to foreign investment to force the regime to come to the bargaining table, and reports of various other human-rights abuses (including torture of political opponents and forced unpaid labor of rural peasants on government transportation projects) have led many foreign governments and international bodies to initiate economic sanctions against the country. Myanmar's policies regarding foreign investment are also at fault, especially regulations that require foreign companies to partner with investors in Myanmar, with the domestic share calculated at an exorbitantly high rate of exchange. The generally poor, underdeveloped economy also offers little attraction for foreign investment except for raw materials such as oil, teak, and agricultural produce. Heavy foreign investment in hotels, restaurants, and other aspects of the tourist industry in Myanmar has also not provided the expected profits, and many large hotels experience very low occupancy levels.

A poorly run economy, low foreign-exchange earnings, and high military spending have resulted in large government deficits that have led to heavy foreign borrowing. Myanmar's case became so severe that in 1995 Japan, one of Myanmar's largest foreign lenders, changed its loans to Myanmar into grants. Myanmar has fallen seriously behind on its International Monetary Fund repayments and has stopped making pay-

ments on multilateral loans altogether. Loans from Thailand, China, and private lenders await repayment from the profits gained by a new gas pipeline.

Remittances by nationals working abroad keep a large supply of foreign exchange coming into Myanmar. There are from 800,000 to 1 million Burmese who work legally and illegally in Thailand, ten to twenty thousand in Singapore, forty thousand Burmese registered seamen, and Burmese abroad elsewhere.

The black market, including illegal imports and exports, private trading, private currency exchange, and the drug trade, may equal or exceed the formal economy in size. Myanmar is the world's largest producer of opium used illicitly. Some of the items exported illegally from Myanmar include jade and gems, animals, rice, and teak. Furthermore, irregular amounts of palm-leaf manuscripts, Buddha images, and other cultural items forbidden for export by the government also support the black market.

Communication, Transportation, and Education Infrastructure

Myanmar's communications sector, which is controlled by the government, is among the least developed in the world. In addition to government restrictions on access to fax machines, computer modems, and satellite dishes and prohibition of private access to the Internet, Myanmar possesses few telephones. In 1995, the whole country had only about 190,000 telephones (140,000 in 1993) for a population estimated at 52 million (2002 est.).

The poor state of Myanmar's transportation infrastructure is a major inhibitor to economic development. In 1996–1997, the transportation sector accounted for only 4 percent of the country's GDP and about 4 percent of employment. Road mileage has grown at a snail's pace, from 22,934 kilometers of roads in 1984 to 26,434 kilometers in 1993, even though the number of cars in Myanmar during the same period doubled from about 1 million in 1984 to just below 2 million in 1993. Myanmar has only about 0.11 kilometers of roads per square mile. Although railway mileage has increased over the same decade at a rate of 3.4 percent per year, aging rolling stock is causing a net decline in use. In 1986, for example, the country had 4,437 kilometers of railways, which increased to 4,966 kilometers by 1993. During the same period, the number of locomotives declined from 384 in 1986 to only 311 by 1993. Public works and transportation systems are notorious for being developed now with the use of armed-forces labor and forced labor of villagers. Gasoline is rationed, with a daily limit of several liters.



A man crosses a bridge over a rice field in Myanmar in 1996. (RICHARD BICKEL/CORBIS)

One of the biggest problems facing the Myanmar economy is the impact of poor education policies, including reduction in government spending on education, extremely low matriculation rates, and the repeated closure of universities for years at a time from a fear of student activism. The government's claimed national literacy rate of 80 percent is questionable. Although most children attend primary school until the age of ten years, most also drop out of school before entering the fifth grade. Some major reasons for this include, in rural areas, the low school to village ratio (about one school per twenty-five villages in some areas) and thus low teacher to student ratios and, in urban areas, rising school fees and other costs related to attending school. The quality and supply of instructional materials are also extremely limited. Government spending on education as a percentage of the GDP has dropped each year since a peak in 1990–1991.

After student demonstrations in 1996 and again in August 1998 on the tenth anniversary of the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, the government kept the universities in Myanmar closed until very recently. Current government efforts have been directed at shifting technical training to regional campuses and severely reducing the scope and enrollment at the University of Yangon in an effort to reduce the potential for student political activities. This is creating a serious shortage in professionals and technicians necessary to develop the economy. In recognition of this, the government has

recently begun to decentralize technical and college education, in order to remove students from the locale of the central government by shifting them to various outlying technical colleges, such as that in Sittwe.

Chief Hindrances to Economic Growth

A major hindrance to economic growth is high military spending. Security problems facing the nation in the past, such as the armed rebellion of the Communist Party of Burma (1948–1989), independent drug-lord armies, and ethnic insurgencies, have largely been eliminated today. Defense spending has increased, however, to maintain stability after the regime invalidated the democratic elections of 1990, which it lost. Military spending has increased to about a third of government spending (31.6 percent in 1997–1998). Myanmar yearly runs a serious fiscal deficit. Increasing the money supply to meet this deficit has resulted in a high rate of inflation of 20–50 percent per year. Although income has also increased, real income growth for everyone has not kept pace with inflation, and thus the average citizen is getting poorer.

Despite significant economic liberalization after the imposition of the SLORC government, holdovers from the socialist policies of the Ne Win regime continue to monopolize most (especially heavy) industries and chief exports (especially rice) and dominate key sectors of the economy under the SPDC.

Michael Walter Charney

See also: **Communist Party of Burma; Myanmar-History; Myanmar-Human Rights; Myanmar-Political System; Ne Win, U; Rakhine State; State Law and Order Restoration Council-Myanmar**

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MYANMAR-EDUCATION SYSTEM The Burmese have always had a great respect for education and a relatively high literacy rate. However, there are serious deficiencies in the education system deriving from the years of isolation during the period of Ne Win's military socialist rule (1962–1988) and, since then, from the repeated closure of schools and universities by the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (renamed State Peace and Development Council in 1997; SLORC/SPDC). Decades of military rule and a preoccupation with curbing dissent have resulted in a tightly controlled education system with teachers and students required to sign declarations of noninvolvement in politics to the government and kept under close surveillance by military intelligence.

Structure

Myanmar's (Burma's) educational system is supervised and coordinated by the Myanmar Education Committee set up in 1991 and headed by Secretary-One of the State Peace and Development Council, which requires the Ministry of Education to implement policies set by the state. The Ministry of Education is made up of the Minister's Office and five departments: Higher Education, Basic Education, Myanmar Language Commission, Myanmar Board of Examinations, and Myanmar Educational Research Bureau. The Minister's Office supervises the implementation of educational programs and is responsible for fiscal planning within the ministry. The Department of Higher Education is responsible for universities and colleges, and several affiliated bodies (among them the universities' central library, the Historical Research Institute, the universities' press, and the translations and publications departments). Yangon Institute of Technology (founded 1964), the Mandalay Institute of Technology (1991), the Yangon Institute of Computer Science and Technology (1971), and the Mandalay Institute of Computer Science and Technology (1997) became part of a Department of Advanced Science and Technology, under a new Ministry of Science and Technology that took over responsibility for the former Department of Technical, Agricultural, and Vocational Education from the Ministry of Education. Forestry, agriculture, and veterinary science institutes are located at Yezin in central Myanmar. The Ministry of Health is responsible for medical education at institutes of medicine, dentistry, and nursing. Military medical and engineering universities and schools for military personnel are run by the Ministry of Defence.

Historical Perspective

Education in the precolonial period was largely confined to Buddhist monastic schools, which taught reading, writing, and arithmetic and, through recitation and instruction in Buddhist texts, imparted the essential principles of the Buddhist religion and ethics that inform much of Burmese culture and society. This system ensured a high literacy rate for Burmese Buddhist boys who, to this day, nearly all enter the monastery as novice monks at some time between the ages of seven and sixteen. Education for girls in the precolonial period was much more limited, but some private lay schools existed to supplement monastic education. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries some Burmese monarchs, perceiving the need for training in secular and practical skills, allowed Catholic and other Christian missionaries to establish a small number of schools.

However, it was only after the British annexation of Arakan and Tenasserim in 1826 that Christian mission schools became firmly established, with the American Baptist Missionary Society becoming most active, particularly among the Karen. In 1852, Lower Burma came under British rule, and at first attempts were made to introduce a more modern and practical curriculum through the existing monastic schools. An Education Syndicate was set up in 1881 to regulate the curriculum and standard of instruction.

Under British colonial rule a secular form of education was introduced to Burma in the nineteenth century. By the early 1900s, lay schools began to outnumber monastery schools, and three types of schools, differentiated according to the language of instruction, had evolved: vernacular schools that taught in Burmese (or one of the recognized minority languages), bilingual Anglo-vernacular schools, and English (missionary, private, and government) schools. The majority of the population attended vernacular schools, but education in Anglo-vernacular and English schools was highly prized as a means of gaining employment in the colonial administration. Higher educational opportunities were extremely limited. Before 1920 there were only two colleges in Burma, Rangoon College, founded in 1880 (renamed Government College in 1904), and Baptist College, founded by the American Baptist Mission in 1894 (renamed Judson College in 1918, and University College in 1920). Both were affiliated with Calcutta University and by 1920, when the two colleges became the nucleus of the new University of Rangoon, only about 400 Burmese had attained an Indian degree. In 1930 Rangoon's Teachers' Training College and Medical College became constituent colleges of the University of Rangoon, as did the Agricultural College and Research Institute at Mandalay in 1938. Mandalay's Intermediate College, founded in 1925, was raised to degree status in 1948 and became a separate university only in 1958.

The University of Rangoon, as originally conceived, was regarded by Burmese nationalists as imperialist and elitist, open only to the most affluent and privileged. Its foundation on 1 December 1920 provoked a mass student boycott that attracted much popular support and inaugurated student involvement in national politics—a link of lasting significance in the history of Burma's struggle for independence from colonial rule and, later, in the democracy movement since 1988. The university boycott of 1920 (commemorated as National Day) gave birth to the national education movement that established a (short-lived) independent national college and more than a hundred national schools that made education more ac-

cessible and promoted patriotism. The 1930s saw the rise of the Do Bama Asiayone ("We Burmans" Association), which attracted radical young students who turned the Rangoon University Students' Union into a highly politicized body that organized student strikes in 1936 and 1938.

Independent Burma

Since independence in 1948, efforts were made to improve access to basic education and to centralize control of the education system. In 1952, U Nu's government launched an ambitious educational plan that aimed to provide free education in state schools from primary to university level, introduced more technical and practical subjects to middle and high schools and, in order to support Burmese as the medium of instruction, sought to provide modern textbooks in the vernacular. English remained the medium of instruction in private schools and at the university level. Following Ne Win's military coup in 1962, all schools were nationalized, universities and colleges placed under direct government control, and the students' union building was dynamited by the army. The educational system was reorganized to give priority to the inculcation of socialist values and to the teaching of science. Burmese was made the medium of instruction at all levels, including university. Although many new schools were opened in the socialist period and vigorous illiteracy eradication programs undertaken, educational standards declined and social inequalities increased. Middle-school examinations at age fourteen separated students into sciences and arts streams, while school-leaving examinations at age sixteen determined which subjects could be studied at university, with places in medical school reserved for those with the highest pass marks, down through a descending scale that ranked arts subjects lowest. A further form of discrimination barred many of Indian and Chinese origin from studying medicine and technical subjects at university. Indigenous minority peoples had limited resources. Student demonstrations in the 1970s prompted the authorities to decentralize university education by establishing seventeen regional colleges and, in 1974–1976, "distance learning" programs. English language skills, taught from age ten onward, declined greatly in the socialist period, and disadvantaged students at the university level (where English was reintroduced as the medium of instruction in 1981). In urban areas, private tuition classes proliferated. Families of students sent abroad as state scholars had to act as guarantors, paying huge financial penalties if the student failed to return to Burma. In 1986–1987, 41 percent of higher education enrollment



Children, some dressed in army clothing, learning Chinese at a school in the Golden Triangle region of Myanmar. (CHRISTOPHE LOVINY/CORBIS)

was in correspondence courses. More recently, decentralized and distance education has greatly increased.

Outlook

Since 1962, the Burmese education system has suffered from underinvestment and the subordination of educational standards and academic freedom to political indoctrination, rigorous control, and corruption. This process has greatly intensified since 1988 under the military regime of SLORC/SPDC. In 1990–1992 the Ministry of Education, in conjunction with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNESCO, conducted an education sector survey with the objective of identifying education needs and goals. In 2000–2001 a Four Year Plan for Promotion of Education was launched to improve the "efficiency of the basic education sector." A 1995 UNICEF report noted that 39 percent of children never enrolled in primary school, that 34 percent dropped out, and that of the 27 percent who completed primary education, less than 2 percent completed secondary education. Myanmar continues to devote a disproportionately high amount of public expenditure to the armed forces, with low allocations (1.1 percent of GDP in 1995) going to education.

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MYANMAR-FOREIGN RELATIONS

The physical geography of Myanmar (as Burma has been known since 1989) has played an important role in the history of its foreign relations. Dividing western and central Myanmar is the Arakan Yoma mountain range, which meant that until 1785 there were essentially two "Burmas," each with its own sphere of foreign relations. The Irrawaddy Valley, for example, has with a few exceptions maintained chiefly overland relations with bordering Thailand in the east, China in the north, the numerous small Shan states between, and Assam and Manipur to the northwest. Arakan (now Rakhine), however, had few overland relations, and its long coastline meant that its foreign relations, historically, have been maritime ones, with eastern Bengal (today Bangladesh) in the north, India in the west, and Sri Lanka to the southwest. The Arakan Yoma was a barrier to Arakan's relationship with the Irrawaddy Valley, and thus relationships between the two Burmas were minimal except during a few important episodes discussed below. Furthermore, for much of its precolonial history, the Irrawaddy Valley itself was divided into numerous Burmese, Mon, Shan, and other kingdoms that maintained a myriad of interstate relationships.

The Burmese perceived the world as a series of circles with the king at the center and rings of decreasingly powerful rulers, attracted into orbit by the central ruler's superior store of charismatic power, around that center. In precolonial Burmese perceptions, political borders were not hard, fixed, and absolute, but soft, flexible, and relative. (This perception would later bring the Burmese to blows with the British.)

In practice, the rulers of this system were bonded by intermarriages. Burmese foreign relations typically involved the presentation of the daughters or sisters of vassal rulers to the king or the exchange of high-ranking princesses with other important kings, the exchange of presents, and, depending upon the kind of relationship (overlord-vassal), the exchange of royal

regalia. These relationships frequently soured when the overlord appeared weak or a vassal did not send tribute. Sometimes, as in the case of Imtaw Syan in 1165, a foreign ruler might dispatch assassins to kill a Burmese ruler who had offended him.

Early Period (to 1751)

Although Chinese accounts of Burma in the eighth century indicate foreign political interactions, reliable records of Burma's foreign relations emerge in the Pagan period (eleventh–thirteenth centuries), during which time Burma maintained significant relationships with courts in Sri Lanka and China. Much of the relationship with Sri Lanka, a Theravada Buddhist country like Burma, was religious in nature. In the mid-twelfth century, however, increasingly powerful Pagan made a bid to take control of the northern Kra Isthmus and thus deny Sri Lanka access to Cambodian trade, which Pagan wanted for itself. Although Sri Lankan chronicles claimed that Sri Lanka conquered Pagan in retaliation, it is clear only that a pro-Sri Lankan faction emerged in the Pagan royal court. Sri Lankan political influence thereafter became an important characteristic of Pagan.

The exact nature of Burma's relationship with China during this period is unclear, as Burma and China were separated by the enigmatic Tai kingdom of Nanchao. In the late thirteenth century, however, China and Burma came into direct relations, due to the Mongol conquest of China and the Mongol-established Yuan dynasty that ruled over China in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In 1253, the Mongols took Nanchao and demanded that Burma become tributary but were refused; in 1277, the Yuan defeated the Burmese in battle but then withdrew; in 1283, Yuan armies took Bhamo in northeastern Burma; and in 1287, Yuan armies took the capital of Pagan itself, playing a significant role in the demise of the Pagan state in the decades thereafter. After 1298, the so-called three Shan brothers, who in reality were apparently of uncertain ethnicity, led Burma's early post-Pagan states. In 1301, they successfully resisted another invasion of Burma by China. Subsequently, the three brothers entered into tributary relationships with China, thereby gaining Chinese recognition and discouraging the involvement of China in Burma's affairs. Although Chinese overlordship was directly imposed over upper Burma again in the mid-fifteenth century, the interest of China's Ming dynasty (1368–1644) in Burma was short-lived.

The western Burmese state of Arakan (now Rakhine), politically separate from the kingdom of

Pagan, maintained a separate sphere of foreign relations. Unlike Pagan, Arakan's relationships were chiefly with India, and there appears to have been no interaction with China, of whose tributary system Arakan was not a part. As a result of its presence on the Bay of Bengal and simultaneous interaction with Muslim, Hindu, and Theravada Buddhist courts, cultural influences, political institutions, and representations, Arakan's economic relationships differed substantially from those of Pagan and the successor states of Sagaing, Pinya, and Inwa in the Irrawaddy Valley. On the one hand, Arakanese rulers adopted Islamic titles and coinage and catered to Muslim merchants. Evidence also suggests that Arakan was part of Bengal's tributary system in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. On the other hand, Arakan maintained long-term exchanges of Buddhist monks and texts with Sri Lanka. Relations between Arakan and Inwa were assuaged in the mid-fifteenth century during a meeting between the Inwa and Arakanese kings in which they agreed that each should rule one side of the Arakan Yoma mountains separating western and central Burma.

Burma's foreign relations became more far-flung in the sixteenth century. During this century, the First Toungoo dynasty established a vast Burmese empire by devouring the various independent Burmese states that had emerged with the decline of Pagan and by then moving to conquer most of Lan Xang (Laos) and Siam (Thailand). These campaigns were made possible by the growth of maritime trade connections, many of which were with the Muslim trading world and the Portuguese. Both of these sources also supplied First Toungoo dynastic rulers with firearms and introduced a gunpowder revolution to Burmese warfare. The First Toungoo empire, however, stretched too far and too quickly for Burma's resources and declined rapidly in the 1590s, followed by the political redisintegration of Burma.

Arakanese expansion took advantage of the First Toungoo dynasty's misfortunes and not only helped to destroy the capital of Pegu in 1599, but also took control of lower Burma (1599–1603), isolating the restored kingdom of Inwa from maritime commerce and foreign relationships. Portuguese blockades (1603–1617) of the lower Burmese and Arakanese coasts, however, encouraged Arakan's rapid decline, and Inwa once again regained access to the maritime world.

The Restored Toungoo dynasty (1597–1752) experienced a relatively unbroken era of peaceful relations with its neighbors. In 1635, this dynasty, which had reestablished itself at Pegu, withdrew its capital

back to Inwa, suggesting the growing prosperity of upper Burma's domestic economy over the course of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Especially important was the growing trade interaction with China, in which political reconsolidation and long-term stability under the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) encouraged increasing trade between China and Burma. The revival of Asian maritime trade in the eighteenth century, and the arrival of British and French traders, bringing supplies of ships, arms, and munitions to the lower Burmese coasts, appears to have played a role in stimulating the Mon rebellion (1740–1759) that brought the demise of the Restored Toungoo dynasty, marked by the Mon sacking of Inwa in 1752.

Konbaung Dynasty and British Burma (1752–1947)

Burmese foreign relations under the kings of the Konbaung dynasty (1752–1886) were marked by arrogance on the part of Burmese kings, especially Alaungpaya (1714–1760, reigned 1752–1760), who once boasted that he might conquer England. Konbaung rulers faced serious challenges in their relationships mainly with the Qing dynasty of China. Numerous invasions (1765–1769) by Chinese armies were met by strong Burmese resistance and Chinese defeat. By the end of the eighteenth century, however, as is clear from Michael Symes's account of his 1798 visit to the Burmese regime, the Chinese and the Burmese were on very good terms and shared an intimacy that the British lacked in their relations with the Burmese court. Special Burmese ministers also catered to the needs of the Chinese living in Burma, and some Burmese ministers in the royal court were known for their fluency in Chinese.

The Burmese brought much of Siam under their control, temporarily, again in 1766, after their destruction of the Siamese capital of Ayutthaya. Konbaung expansionism, however, also brought Burma into hostile relations with British power, which itself was expanding in Bengal and the Strait of Malacca in the late eighteenth century. In the 1780s, Konbaung armies, on the pretext of protecting the Buddhist religion, invaded and annexed Assam and Arakan. From 1785, Burma shared a political frontier with British possessions. Disagreements over what political borders meant emerged two decades later. An Arakanese rebel, Chan Byan, took advantage of the British presence to launch attacks into Burmese Arakan from British India. Burmese punitive missions likewise crossed into British territory to capture the rebels, violating British understandings of territorial sovereignty. During the First Anglo-Burmese War

(1824–1826) that followed, the Burmese were soundly defeated, and in the Treaty of Yandabo (1826) that brought the war to a close, Burma surrendered the provinces of Assam, Arakan, and Tenasserim, all of which were annexed by the British. Another war in 1852, the Second Anglo-Burmese War, led to the transfer of all of lower Burma to the British.

The heyday of late Konbaung foreign relations came with the rule of Mindon Min (1814–1878) after the Second Anglo-Burmese War. Likened to the visionary and capable Thai ruler Mongkut (1804–1868), Mindon Min embarked on an ambitious campaign to advance Burma militarily, technologically, and politically (in terms of foreign relations). Dozens of European specialists in all areas of administration and technology were hired to accomplish these goals. Mindon Min also tried, but failed, to prevent Britain from choking off Burma's access to the outside world. He sought to accomplish this by establishing good foreign relations with rival European and other powers, sending diplomatic missions to the United States, Italy, France, and China. From 1852 until 1885, however, while upper Burma became impoverished, British Burma, in command of the fertile lower delta and thousands of Burmese immigrants, prospered. Ultimately, independent Burma was brought to an end by the annexation of upper Burma by the British in the Third Anglo-Burmese War (1885).

Prior to the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific, Japanese military planners had gathered thirty student leaders, known popularly as the Thirty Comrades, from the anticolonial Thakin movement of the 1930s and trained them militarily on Hainan. In 1942, when Japanese armies occupied British Burma, they were accompanied by the Thirty Comrades, with Aung San (1914?–1947) as the head of the Burma Independence Army. In 1942, in order to enhance local support for the Japanese army and to help slow the return of Allied forces, Japan sponsored the Provisional Government of Baw Maw, which in 1943 became "independent" and declared itself an ally of Japan. In 1943, a Burma National Army was established under Aung San. In 1944, as Japan seemed destined to lose the war, this army joined the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, founded by Aung San and Than Tun (1911–1968), and turned against the Japanese on 28 March 1945.

Having mobilized Burmese nationalists and armed them, British rule could enjoy only a brief and superficial return from 1945 until 1947, during which period it became clear that Britain's days in Burma were over. Although the independence leader and his



THE TREATY OF YANDABO

During the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826) the Burmese were soundly defeated and in the Treaty of Yandabo of 1826 extracted below, Burma surrendered the provinces of Assam, Arakan, and Tenasserim to the British.

Article I. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the honourable Company on the one part, and His Majesty the King of Ava on the other.

Article II. His Majesty the King of Ava renounces all claims upon and will abstain from all future interference with, the principality of Assam and its dependencies, and also with the contiguous petty states of Cachar and Iyntia. With regard to Munnipore, it is stipulated that, should Gumbheer Singh desire to return to that country, he shall be recognized by the King of Ava as Rajah thereof.

Article III. To prevent all future disputes respecting the boundary line between the two great nations, the British government will retain the conquered provinces of Arracan, Ramree, Cheduba and Sandowey, and His Majesty the King of Ava cedes all right thereto. The Annonpeeteetonmien, or Arracan mountains, (known in Arracan by the name of Yeornabourg or Pokhengloun Range) will henceforth form the boundary between the two great nations on that side. Any doubts regarding the said line of demarcation will be settled by commissioners appointed by the respective governments for that purpose, such commissioners from both powers to be of suitable and corresponding rank.

Article IV. His Majesty the King of Ava cedes to the British government the conquered provinces of Yeh, Tavoy and Mergui and Tenasserim, with the islands and dependencies thereto appertaining taking the Saluen [Salween] river as the line of demarcation on that frontier. Any doubts regarding their boundaries will be settled as specified in the concluding part of Article III.

Article V. In proof of the sincere disposition of the Burmese government to maintain the relations of peace and amity between the two nations, and as part indemnification to the British government for the expenses of the war, His Majesty the King of Ava agrees to pay the sum of one *crore* [10,000,000] of rupies.

Source: George F. de Martens. (1828) *Nouveau Recueil de Traites . . . des Puissances et Etats de l'Europe depuis 1808 jusqu'a Present*. Gottingen, Germany: n.p., 894.

cabinet were assassinated in 1947, Burma was granted independence in 1948.

Contemporary Period (1948 to the Present)

In the overall context of the Cold War, Burma's foreign relationships began to change in the early

1950s because of changes in the international market for Burma's chief export, rice. Burma had been, under colonial rule, the world's largest exporter of rice. During the Korean War, the demand for Burmese rice, and the price made for it, underwent a tremendous but short-lived boom. When the fighting in Ko-

rea stopped, Asia's former purchasers of Burmese rice had already begun to replace Burmese imports with homegrown varieties or with accelerating U.S. rice exports. Burma was thus forced to turn to the Soviet Union and China, both of which began to supply aid and began to buy up Burmese rice. This led to Burma's realignment not to the Sino-Soviet bloc per se, but to a neutral position between it and the United States.

After independence, Burma's internal problems overshadowed foreign relations for almost fifteen years. First, Karen, Arakanese, Mon, Shan, and other separatist groups contributed to domestic political instability. Second, in 1950, Chinese nationalist armies, cut off from escape to Taiwan by Communist forces, crossed the border and remained in northeastern Burma during the following decades, taking control of parts of local opium production and trade and ruling as warlords in areas inside the Burmese border. Third, from 1948 until the late 1980s, Communist bloc countries sponsored a significant Communist insurgency, also strongest in border areas. All of these developments proved too much for the government of U Nu (1907–1995), then in power. By the end of 1958, U Nu's civilian government permitted the Burmese military to take control of the country temporarily to prevent political fragmentation (1958–1960); permanent military rule was established in a coup in 1962.

Military rule in Burma has been the chief factor isolating Burma politically and economically from the outside world. Despite significant foreign aid from countries such as Japan, the regime of Ne Win (b. 1911) proved unable to modernize the Burmese economy. Ultimately, Ne Win's regime was replaced by the State Law and Order Restoration Council in 1988, as a result of an economic crisis and massive student protests. The new military regime refused to surrender the government to the National League for Democracy (NLD), which in 1990 won elections by a landslide. For this reason and in response to the military's violent suppression of student protests, the regime grew even more isolated from the rest of the world, becoming the target of international sanctions led by the United States.

Since the mid-1990s, Myanmar has begun to take a more aggressive role in regaining access to the outside world and has been supported by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), an organization that Myanmar joined in 1997. At the same time, the collapse of the insurgency led by the Communist Party of Burma in the late 1980s made it easier for Myanmar to interact more with China. China is now one of Myanmar's most significant trading partners, and it appears that China has a growing military influence in



Exiled Myanmar women protest outside the Myanmar embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, on 19 June 1999, to mark the "Women of Burma Day" and to call for democratic rule in Myanmar. (AFP/CORBIS)

the country, becoming a major source of munitions and weaponry for the Burmese military. Despite U.S.-led sanctions, the government has also cooperated with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, as Myanmar's drug trade was a major source of revenue for some of Myanmar's insurgencies. Meanwhile, Burmese antigovernment groups abroad have successfully maintained pressure on local and national governments and business groups to support sanctions and to keep up awareness of continued military rule and the government's prevention of the NLD from taking power. Alongside the support for a boycott of Myanmar among antigovernment groups and Western regimes, encouraged by Aung San Suu Kyi, many Asian states, particularly those of ASEAN, have favored a policy of constructive engagement, in which slow change in Myanmar would be encouraged through stronger ties and interactions with the outside world.

Foreign Relations in the Twenty-first Century

It is difficult to speculate on the future of Myanmar's foreign relations. There have been indications, however, that the military regime is willing to form a new government with some role for Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. Should this occur, it would probably soften the stance of many Western states and open the doors further for a stronger role for Myanmar in ASEAN and in a relationship with Japan. Such a development would help balance the increasing Chinese influence in Myanmar.

Michael Walter Charney

See also: **Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League—Myanmar; Communist Party of Burma; Myanmar—Human Rights; Ne Win, U; Nu, U; Pagan; Pegu;**

Rakhine State; Rohingya; State Law and Order Restoration Council-Myanmar

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MYANMAR—HISTORY Myanmar (Burma) has been the home of some of the most powerful Southeast Asian states. Prior to 1000 CE, the lands that would become Myanmar were populated by the Mon people, who migrated westward from the Mekong Valley into

southeastern Burma, and the Pyu, a Tibeto-Burman-speaking people, who entered upper Burma in the later centuries of the first millennium BCE, although neither group established large-scale unified kingdoms. Both the Pyu and the Mon were Buddhists, and early Chinese records suggest that their major settlements centered on large images of the Buddha. Important Pyu city-states included Beikthano, Halin, and Sriksetra, while important Mon city-states included Thaton, which survived until 1058.

In the first half of the ninth century, the Nanchao kingdom exerted some influence over upper Burma, but Nanchao influence declined from the 860s. In the ninth century, the Burmans, whose origins are obscure, appeared and came to dominate both the Irrawaddy Valley and northern Arakan (now Rakhine) by the tenth century.

Classical Period

Classical Burmese civilization was centered chiefly at Pagan. In the eleventh century, Pagan emerged under Anawrahta (reigned 1044–1077) and Kyanzitha (reigned 1084–1112) as a major kingdom based upon irrigated wet-rice agriculture in the dry middle zone of Burma. Territorially, these kings unified under their rule the entire Irrawaddy Valley from the Shan Hills to the Bay of Bengal in the south and possibly the Arakan littoral to the west of the Arakan Yoma mountain range.

Pagan society was Theravada Buddhist, and its economy depended upon the emergence of Buddhist religious institutions to which landholding elites and the king donated land and wealth in the hope of accumulating merit. Pagan kings, whose role in relation to the Buddhist *sasana* (religion) was reflected in the place of Thakya (king of the *nats* and the Burmese version of Hinduism's Indra) as protector of Buddhism, were the guardians and chief patrons of the Buddhist religion in Pagan society. Land and slaves donated to the *sangha* (Buddhist monkhood) and monastic estates were tax-free and granted in perpetuity (so long as the monastery in question was not deemed corrupt). Also during the Pagan period, religious inscriptions underwent a transition from the Mon to the Burmese language, indicating the cultural ascendance of the Burmans.

Pagan declined and fell in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries due to long-term and short-term crises. The internal mechanism of Pagan society and economy—for example, tax-free land donations to the Buddhist monkhood—gradually robbed the state of taxable agricultural lands, its chief resource base. Although Pagan rulers could theoretically have de-



KEY EVENTS IN MYANMAR HISTORY

- c. 1000 CE** Myanmar is home to the Mon and Pyu peoples.
- 9th century** The Burmans appear and dominate the Irrawaddy Valley.
- 11th–14th centuries** Period of classical Burmese civilization centered at Pagan.
- 14th century** Pagan declines and new centers of power are located at Pinya, Sagaing, and Ava.
- 1531–1599** First Toungoo dynasty reunites the Irrawaddy Valley.
- 1597–1752** Restored Toungoo dynasty again reunites the Irrawaddy Valley.
- 1752–1885** Period of the Konbaung dynasty and Burmese expansion.
- 1824–1826** First Anglo-Burmese War.
- 1852** Second Anglo-Burmese War.
- 1885** Third Anglo-Burmese War.
- 1900s** Early in century, Burmese nationalism emerges.
- 1920–1921** Students hold a politically motivated strike.
- 1930–1931** The Saya Sun Rebellion.
- 1936** Students strike against British rule.
- 1937** Burma is separated from India.
- 1942–1945** Period of Japanese occupation.
- 1948** Burma becomes independent.
- 1962** A military coup places Ne Win in power.
- 1974** A new constitution formally ends military rule, but the military and its allies remain in power.
- 1988–1989** The military government severely represses and public protests, establishes SLORC and imprisons opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.
- 1990** The government ignores election victory by the opposition National League for Democracy.
- 1995** Aung San Suu Kyi is released from house arrest.

clared the *sangha* corrupt and thereby regathered the donated land, such an action was difficult in practice, due to collusion between powerful elites and monastic establishments. As a result, as monastic estates became resource-rich, kings became resource-poor, effectively reducing the ability of the court to hold the kingdom together and to defend it against external enemies. As for the additional short-term causes of Pagan's collapse, colonial historiography pointed to a supposed sack of the city of Pagan in 1287 by Mongol-led Chinese armies and to the usurpation of power in upper Burma afterward by the three so-called Shan brothers. Recent research, however, has questioned whether Pagan actually did decline as early as is supposed, whether the Chinese actually sacked the town, and whether the "three Shan brothers" were Shan, although neither the colonial nor the revisionist arguments are completely supported by clear evidence. It is certain, however, that by the mid-fourteenth century new political and economic centers had emerged

in upper Burma at Pinya, Sagaing, and Ava (founded in 1364) and that Pagan had ceased to be the epicenter of Burmese civilization and power. Furthermore, what had been the mighty kingdom of Pagan was in disarray outside upper Burma as well: a Mon kingdom reemerged at Martaban in 1287, and lower Burma broke away, isolating upper Burma from the sea. The kingdom of Arakan may have broken away as early as the 1240s.

Early Modern Period

The growth in maritime-trade revenues in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and improvements in firearm technologies (including the replacement of Muslim Indian firearms by Portuguese weaponry and mercenaries in the sixteenth century) aided emergent kingdoms in coastal Burma (and elsewhere in Asia) vis-à-vis interior areas with little or no access to the sea. As a result, the First Toungoo dynasty (1531–1599) in

lower Burma succeeded in reunifying the Irrawaddy Valley under one kingdom based at Pegu and bringing Thailand and areas of Laos under Burmese rule. This dynasty collapsed almost as quickly as it emerged, however, as continual warfare had drained lower Burma of its manpower reserves, resulting in the rebellion of outlying political centers and the siege and fall of the capital of Pegu in 1598–1599.

The Restored Toungoo dynasty (1597–1752), based at Ava after 1635, succeeded the First Toungoo dynasty and brought the Irrawaddy Valley under its control. Under this dynasty, Burmese literature and historiography blossomed, resulting in the great chronicle composed by U Kala in the 1710s. Economic problems, however, brought a rebellion in lower Burma in 1740, which resulted in a new emergent kingdom centered at Pegu and the fall of the capital of Ava in 1752. Although this conflict (1740–1756) has been portrayed both in contemporaneous accounts and in some secondary literature as an ethnic struggle between Burmans in the north and Mon in the south, this view is probably too simplistic; members of both ethnic groups fought on both sides. After the capture of the Avan court, a local official's son, Alaungpaya (1714–1760), led a counter-rebellion that resulted in the fall of Pegu, the establishment of the Konbaung dynasty (1752–1885), and the conquest again of Thailand (1767) under one of Alaungpaya's successors. Under King Bodawpaya (reigned 1782–1819), Arakan (1785) and Assam (1812) were also brought under Burmese rule.

Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries

The Konbaung dynasty declined in the nineteenth century for a number of reasons. Overexpansion into Arakan and Assam brought new troubles, especially on the part of local rebels. Economic factors also played a substantial role. Immediate troubles, however, resulted from border disagreements with the British in Bengal. Cultural differences in the understandings of territorial borders and national sovereignty resulted in the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826), which the Burmese lost. By the Treaty of Yandabo (1826), Burma signed away the provinces of Arakan, Assam, and Tenasserim to British rule. Further misunderstandings resulted in the Second Anglo-Burmese War (1852) and in the annexation by the British of the whole of lower Burma, cutting upper Burma off from access to the sea.

In the midst of the problems with the British, the rise of the reform-minded king Mindon Min (1814–1878) led to a new approach to the encroaching West. Mindon Min wholeheartedly embraced Western technologies and Western-trained personnel and instigated serious economic reforms and institutional

changes. The Third Anglo-Burmese War (1885) resulted in the deposition of King Thibaw (reigned 1878–1885), the last Burmese king, and the annexation of upper Burma by the British. Indigenous resistance to the imposition of British rule continued until the mid-1890s.

Under British rule, Burma was a province of India until 1937, when the Government of Burma Act of 1935 separated Burma from India. Under the terms of this act, the Burmese in 1936 elected a parliament that from March 1937 partly administered most of Burma, while ethnic minority areas, termed Scheduled Areas, were administered by a British governor. The British governor also remained in control of Burma's external relations, its defense, and monetary policies.

Colonial Burma developed a colonial export economy largely based upon the export of rice and teak. During colonial rule, Burma emerged as the world's largest rice exporter. Colonial ports grew rapidly and became the chief political and economic centers of the country, especially Rangoon (now Yangon), which had served as the colonial capital since the 1850s. The monetization of the economy and the commercialization of rural social relations led to dependence upon agricultural loans and Chettyar (Indian) moneylenders and Chinese merchants. Immigrant Indian labor also filled many of Burma's major cities; in the nineteenth century, the Burmese were a minority in the city of Rangoon.

The dissolution of the Buddhist monarchy, the immigration of large numbers of Muslim agriculturalists to Arakan and Muslim Indian laborers to lower Burma, and a colonial regime that tended to favor Muslims as a minority in Burma caused friction between Buddhist and Muslim communities in Burma. The appearance of mutually antagonistic literature, including a book by the Muslim writer Shwe Hpi critical of the Buddhist religion, helped spark violence, including the anti-Indian riots of 1938. Furthermore, the land crisis, in which Chittagonian immigrants and Arakanese migrants competed for agricultural land in Arakan, and the emergence of religious communalism as a major factor in rural solidarity and collective action, drew clearer lines between Buddhists and Muslims in Burma.

In addition to religious communal violence, Burmese attempts to promote Buddhism as Burma's religion nurtured the beginnings of the nationalist movement in Burma. In 1906, the Young Men's Buddhist Association was founded in Rangoon. Another organization, the All Burma Council of Young Monks Association, acted as a cover for some who became monks to engage in political activities without the in-



MOVING TOWARD AN INDEPENDENT BURMA

On 22 December 1932 the Burma Legislative Council passed the following resolution advocating policies that would lead to separation from India and which were based on the emerging Burmese nationalism of the time.

(1) That this council opposes the separation of Burma from India on the basis of the Constitution for a separated Burma outlined in the statement of the Prime Minister made at the Burma Round Table Conference on the 12th January, 1932.

(2) That this Council emphatically opposes the unconditional and permanent federation of Burma with India.

(3) This Council will continue to oppose the separation of Burma from India until Burma is granted a Constitution on the following basis:

(a) The future Constitution of Burma shall provide for the immediate transfer to popular control of at least the same measure of responsibility and the same subjects and powers as will be transferred to popular control in the Indian Federation, both at the Centre and in the Provinces.

(b) The subjects and powers reserved to the Governor shall be only for a period of transition and such Reserved powers shall be framed and exercised in accordance with recognized constitutional practice and shall in no way prejudice the advance of Burma through the new Constitution to full responsibility for her own Government within a reasonable period and the new Constitution for Burma shall further prescribe the manner in which or the time when the said Reserved subjects and powers are to be transferred to popular control on the basis of full responsibility.

In the event of failure to obtain a definite pronouncement from His Majesty's Government that Burma, if and when separated from India,

will be granted the aforesaid Constitution, this Council proposes that Burma shall enter the Indian Federation with at least the following terms:

(a) Burma shall have the right to secede from the Indian Federation which it may exercise through its Legislature.

(b) There shall be such financial adjustments between Burma and India as may be required by Burma's peculiar local conditions and other circumstances.

(c) The division of central and provincial subjects in the proposed Indian Federation shall be reconsidered with reference to Burma with a view to provincialization of additional subjects, special regard being had to Burma's geographical position and its peculiar needs and conditions, and further Burma shall be afforded all necessary facilities for acquiring administrative experience and knowledge of the Reserved and Federal subjects.

That in view of the statement made by the Hon'ble Leader of the House on the 16th December 1932, in paragraph 3 of the passage explaining the position of His Majesty's Government that His Majesty's Government have always contemplated that an opportunity should be given to representatives of Burma to express further views on the provisions of the Constitution outlined before they are finally enacted, this Council expresses its deep satisfaction and gratitude and urges that a conference will be called at an early date for the purpose of determining the future constitution of Burma either as a separate unit on the aforesaid basis or as a unit in the Indian Federation with the aforesaid terms.

Source: Jagdish Saran Sharma. (1965) *India's Struggle for Freedom: Select Documents and Sources*. Vol. II. Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 214–215.

terference of the police, because monks were, by their vows, not to involve themselves in politics.

University students provided some of the early leadership for the nationalist movement. Their first strike (1920–1921) was held at the University of Ran-

goon. Many of these students demanded to be referred to as *thakin*, the Burmese word for "master," to stress that they considered themselves the equals of the British colonialists. In 1935, the Thakins organized a political party called the Dobama Asiayone or We

Burmans Society by uniting two smaller Thakin political organizations formed in 1930–1931. In 1936, a more serious strike in Rangoon University and in the schools was led by Thakin Aung San (1914?–1947), the president of the All Burma Student Movement.

The 1930s also witnessed other approaches to Burmese nationalism, including that of Saya San, a charismatic ex-monk. He led a rebellion known as the Saya San Rebellion (1930–1931), which drew upon traditional Burmese political culture and attempted to establish Saya San as king of Burma in December 1930. The British military police quickly captured and destroyed the jungle capital and throne of the would-be kingdom, apprehending Saya San in August 1931; resistance continued until April 1932, when the last of the major contingents of rebels was suppressed. Defended by the famous anti-British Mon lawyer Ba Maw (1893–1977), Saya San was convicted of treason and executed on 28 November 1931.

World War II and Independence

Burmese nationalists were frustrated by 1940 and sought foreign help, including a secret but failed trip to China by Thakin Aung San (general secretary to the Dobama Asiayone in the late 1930s), to gain the help of the Chinese Communist Party. A better opportunity emerged in December 1941 with Japanese invasions of European colonies in Southeast Asia. Prior to their invasion of Burma, the Japanese gathered thirty Thakins (the "Thirty Comrades"), gave them military training on Hainan Island, and used them as the core of the Burma Independence Army that aided in the invasion of Burma in 1942. The Japanese occupied Burma from 1942 until 1945.

The Japanese invasion and occupation had an enormous negative impact upon the Burmese economy well into the postwar period. Many members of the commercial elites, including British, Chinese, and Indians, fled or were forced out of Burma in advance of the Japanese arrival. Furthermore, in order to deny resources to the Japanese, the British destroyed much of Burma's transportation infrastructure (and thus economic infrastructure in an export-based economy), including the steamships of the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company, which were scuttled. Allied bombing and combat within Burma also caused much destruction.

A Japanese puppet regime declared independence under Ba Maw in August 1943, but had little popular support. Resistance to the Japanese was led toward the end of the war by the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), which was founded in August 1944. In March 1945, when Japan appeared certain to lose

the war, the AFPFL, led by Aung San, launched a rebellion against the Japanese.

After the surrender of Japanese forces in August 1945, Aung San and the AFPFL resisted the reintroduction of British colonial rule, and in January 1947, Aung San and the British signed an agreement on the transfer of power in Burma. On 19 July 1947, Aung San and some of the ministers of the interim government were gunned down by assassins. Aung San was succeeded by a fellow AFPFL leader, Thakin U Nu (1907–1995). Finally, on 4 January 1948, Burma declared its independence from British rule.

U Nu's government, which led the Union of Burma throughout most of the first fifteen years of Burma's independence, faced continual problems with which it was largely unable to cope. A Communist insurgency, separatist movements, and a bid by Karen nationalists to seize lower Burma led to U Nu's resignation in 1958 and the request for the army's commander-in-chief, Ne Win (b. 1911), to establish a caretaker military regime. Elections held in 1960 returned U Nu and his party back to power, but continued ethnic hostilities led to a military coup in 1962 led by Ne Win.

The Ne Win regime legitimated military rule as an indigenous alternative to the problems of Western parliamentary democracy. Ne Win's "Burmese Way to Socialism" was institutionalized by the 1964 establishment of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) as the sole legal political party in Burma. A new constitution and elections in 1974 formally ended military rule, but the military and connected elites retained *de facto* control.

Under military rule, economic mismanagement and corruption were rife and resulted in the reversal of Burma's economic development. Burma went from being the world's largest exporter of rice to being an importer of rice. In 1987, the United Nations declared Burma one of the world's least developed nations. In the same year, demonetization without compensation, including the invalidation of all large-*kyat* banknotes, eliminated the savings of Burma's upper and middle classes.

The year 1988 witnessed a series of crises for the military regime. Following Ne Win's formal resignation as chairman of the BSPP on 23 July 1988, a pro-democracy movement was sparked, leading to a mass uprising on 8 August 1988 (known as 8-8-88) in Rangoon. It soon spread to other areas of the country. A military crackdown led to the killing of thousands of Burmese. Aung San Suu Kyi (b. 1945), the daughter of Aung San, came to the forefront of the pro-democracy movement and called for the establishment of a de-

mocratic government. Unable to stem opposition, the military launched a coup on 18 September 1988, declaring the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), imposing martial law, and placing Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest in July 1989. The new regime also changed the country's anglicized place-names to new ones that more closely followed indigenous pronunciations, substituting Myanmar for Burma, Yangon for Rangoon, Bago for Pegu, and so on. (Many foreigners and Burmese refugees, however, do not recognize the new names.) The overly confident SLORC allowed parliamentary elections in May 1990, although after the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by the detained Aung San Suu Kyi, won over 80 percent of the seats, the election results were ignored.

The military's suppression of the NLD was followed by international sanctions against the military regime and the award of the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize to Aung San Suu Kyi. In order to change its image, the military reshuffled its government, changed its name from State Law and Order Restoration Council to State Peace and Development Council, and officially released Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest on 10 July 1995, although her activities in Myanmar are severely restricted by the government. These cosmetic changes, however, have not reversed negative international reactions to the junta's activities.

Michael Walter Charney

See also: **Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League—Myanmar; Aung San; Aung San Suu Kyi; Burma Independence Army; National League for Democracy—Myanmar; Ne Win, U; Nu, U; State Law and Order Restoration Council—Myanmar; Thakins**

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MYANMAR—HUMAN RIGHTS

Since Myanmar's independence from Great Britain in 1948 (at which time Myanmar was still known as Burma), the issue of human rights has become one of the most contentious in its modern-day politics and evolution. Many of the most serious human-rights violations—notably extrajudicial executions and the forced relocation of civilian populations—have developed against the backdrop of the country's long-standing insurgencies. Reflecting this legacy, at the beginning of the twenty-first century Myanmar remained one of the most militarized countries in Asia. Under the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), Myanmar entered its fifth decade of military rule, over twenty ethnic opposition groups maintained arms and territory, and, despite a growing number of cease-fires, fighting was continuing in several border areas.

Such conflict and loss of life highlighted the long-standing impasse in Myanmar's politics. But by the 1990s, concern over human-rights abuses and the scale of humanitarian suffering had also spread to the international stage. In particular, great hopes of peaceful transition had been engendered by the landslide victory of Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) in the 1990 general election, Myanmar's first in three decades. However, the new century began with the reform process still deadlocked and an estimated 1,800 political prisoners held in the country's jails. This led to frequent condemnations of human-rights abuses in Myanmar by Amnesty International and

other international organizations as well as critical investigations of governmental practices by both the International Labor Organization (ILO) and United Nations (U.N.) Commission on Human Rights.

Human Rights from 1948 to 1988

During the democratic era (1948–1962), in contrast, the country had enjoyed the reputation for one of the most free presses in Asia. Despite the country-wide insurgencies, there was relative freedom of movement and expression, and parliamentary elections were held on three occasions (in 1950, 1955, and 1960). It was nevertheless during the parliamentary era that a number of restrictive practices were first introduced, including the 1950 Emergency Provisions Act, which provides long jail terms for anyone suspected of circulating reports "disloyal to the state."

Many of these restrictions were widely used during General Ne Win's "Military Caretaker" administration (1958–1960), during which time a number of newspapers were shut down and many civilians detained for alleged pro-Communist or proinsurgent sympathies. The climate of repression escalated under Ne Win's Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) government (1962–1988). Following the 1962 coup, Prime Minister U Nu and hundreds of political, ethnic, and trade union leaders were detained as Ne Win set about imposing a one-party system of government. The new intolerance was demonstrated in July 1962 when protests were ended at Rangoon University by troops blowing up the student union building. At least sixteen demonstrators were killed and many more wounded.

The sovereignty of the BSPP in a one-party state was enshrined in the 1974 constitution (Article 11), and this was backed up by a series of new laws controlling many aspects of national life. The most frequently invoked of these were the 1962 Printers and Publishers Registration Law and the 1975 State Protection Law. In addition, certain rights to freedom of association, expression, and religion were permitted under the constitution, but it was cautioned that they must not be "contrary to the interests of the working people and socialism."

Governed by such regulations, for twenty-six years the country disappeared from the outside world under a security blanket. Independent trade unions and media were banned, and restrictions were imposed on Buddhist monks, Christian churches, and other non-governmental groups. Particular grievances were felt in many ethnic minority communities where the "Burmese Way to Socialism" was widely perceived as

a cloak for "Burmanization" (policies favoring the Burman ethnic group). Publication in ethnic minority languages was curtailed by censorship boards, and the teaching of minority languages virtually disappeared from schools. Even the learning of English was restricted by the BSPP until the early 1980s.

However, it was in Burma's war zones that many of the most serious abuses against the United Nations Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights continued to occur. Summary arrests, torture, and extrajudicial executions were reported on all sides as military operations were intensified against a variety of political and ethnic insurgent groups. Under the BSPP, there was a marked toughening in tactics. Especially notorious were forced labor and the "Four Cuts" campaign, a counterinsurgency operation first introduced in the Irrawaddy Delta region in the 1960s under which large areas were declared "free fire" zones; in effect, villagers must move or risk being shot on sight. Subsequently, this tactic was employed in many other parts of the country, internally displacing hundreds of thousands of civilians in what the government called its version of "people's war."

Human Rights from 1988 to the Present

With Ne Win's resignation and the collapse of the BSPP, a new era of military government began in 1988 under the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and its successor, the SPDC. Several thousand lives are reported to have been lost (if war-zone casualties are included) in the political violence and repression of that year, which witnessed Ne Win loyalists suppressing mass pro-democracy demonstrations across the country.

Upon assuming power, military officers promised to usher in a new system of "open door" and "multi-party democracy" once law and order had been restored. In line with these objectives, the 1990 general election was held, which was won by the NLD. In addition, in 1989 the military government introduced a new cease-fire policy that gathered momentum over the next decade to include the majority of armed ethnic opposition forces in the country.

Nevertheless, domestic and international concerns over the human-rights situation only continued to grow. After the NLD's landslide victory in the election, the SLORC-SPDC did not hand over power. Ruling through an amalgam of existing laws and new martial-law decrees, they cast the security net even wider. Among the most commonly employed laws restricting freedom of expression and movement were the 1908 Unlawful Association Act, the 1950 Emergency



STUDENTS FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM

In Myanmar, students have been in the forefront of the movement for democracy. The following poem is from a collection published as *Battle for Peace* by the Revolutionary Students (Burma) in 1992.

The Hands of History
 (Never think of drifting downstream,
 But always determined to go upstream,
 To break free.
 As true youths,
 Our spirits are as high as the sky.
 We'll march on boldly,
 Along the rough and thorny road.)
 Don't let your smile go,
 Holding hand in hand together,
 Let us be united.
 There will never be a permanent defeat.
 For the blood in our hearts
 Is still radiantly red.
 Our hands that make the history
 Are ready for the sake of freedom.
 At this moment of our lifetime,
 Students, let us be united.

Provisions Law, the 1962 Printers and Publishers Law, and the 1975 State Protection Law as well as SLORC Order 2/88 under which public meetings of more than five people were banned. A new Computer Science and Development Law in 1996 also provided jail terms for anyone using modems without permission.

In the process of this clampdown, thousands of citizens were detained, including over 100 members of parliament-elect, and Aung San Suu Kyi, who was held under house arrest between 1989 and 1995. Many prodemocracy activists also received long prison terms, including the student leader Min Ko Naing, the comedians Zargana and U Pa Pa Lay, and the women writers Ma Thida and Daw San San Nweh. At least twenty political prisoners were also reported by Amnesty International to have died in jail, including Maung Thawka, chairman of Burma's Writers Association, and U Maung Ko, the NLD workers' leader.

In the ethnic war zones, meanwhile, the loss of life largely ended in areas where cease-fires had been agreed, and greater freedom of movement was allowed. In other areas, fighting still continued, with ongoing reports of extrajudicial executions, forced relocations, and the flight of refugees into neighboring Thailand, India, and Bangladesh. As in other parts

of the country, a particular issue of human-rights controversy was the use of forced labor by government troops, especially for construction and the portering of goods.

Concerned by such reports and the continuing political detentions, the international community has kept the pressure on Myanmar to engage in human-rights reform. Generally, Western governments and campaign groups have followed tactics of boycotts and isolation of the military government, while neighboring Asian governments have preferred talking with the regime in a policy known as "constructive engagement." In particular, a U.N. special rapporteur on human rights to Myanmar was appointed in 1992; the rapporteur continued to produce annual reports documenting the human-rights situation, and in 2000 the International Labor Organization (ILO) called for sanctions to be considered, the first time it had called for such actions against a member state.

In consequence, human rights became a major issue in discussions of political reform in Myanmar. Although the deadlock remained, there was evidence that such pressures did produce some results as the 1990s progressed. Under the SLORC-SPDC government, the Geneva Conventions and the U.N. Convention on

the Rights of the Child were ratified, and greater access was allowed to international aid organizations. In 1999, the International Committee of the Red Cross was permitted to begin visiting political prisoners, and the following year human-rights training classes for government officials began under Australian sponsorship. In 2001, the ILO also gained permission to begin an in-country investigation into labor practices, subsequently producing a critical report.

However, for most observers, the question remained whether such measures were translated into real human-rights protection in the field. After 1992, martial law was lifted, but the universities continued to be closed at the first sign of protest (including 1996–2000), while mass roundups of NLD supporters occurred on several occasions in the late 1990s to prevent party meetings. As a result, many leading democracy activists remained in jail or detention.

Only in 2001 were there indications of a change in atmosphere as the dialogue between Aung San Suu Kyi and SPDC officials increased. Release of political prisoners was begun, including Daw San San Nweh, U Pa Pa Lay, and the veteran Rakhine leader and MP-elect, Saw Mra Aung. A go-between in these talks was Razali Ismail, the special representative of the U.N. secretary-general, who had been mandated to encourage "tripartite" dialogue between the three main groups in Burmese politics: the military government, the NLD, and the diverse ethnic minority groups.

The outcome remains uncertain, but it is now widely accepted that the issue of human-rights reform is critical if Myanmar's long-standing political crisis is to be resolved.

Martin Smith

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MYANMAR-POLITICAL SYSTEM The political system of Myanmar (Burma until 1989) has been in a state of continual change since precolonial times. From the eleventh century CE until the British annexation during the nineteenth century, power in lowland areas was concentrated in city kingdoms presided over by various ethnic Burman, Mon, Shan, and Rakhine monarchs and their royal courts. Among the most famous were Pegu, Pagan, Ava, Shwebo, Mandalay, and Mrohaung (Mrauk-U). These principalities were often polyethnic and often shared many aspects of Buddhist tradition and belief. But the rulers and cultures generally retained distinctive characteristics of the Burman, Mon, Shan, or Rakhine peoples who predominated in different areas.

These four ethnic families formed large communities, mostly practicing wet-rice cultivation in the plains. Across the centuries, bitter wars of conquest occurred as dynasties rose and fell, leaving a legacy of conflict in Myanmar's ethno-political traditions that has never been fully addressed. In particular, it was three great Burman monarchs, Anawrahta (d. 1077), Bayinnaung (d. 1581), and Alaungpaya (1714–1760), living seven hundred years apart, who extended central authority to borders approximating those of modern Myanmar.

Meanwhile, in the vast horseshoe of mountains that surrounds the Irrawaddy plains, very different forms of political governance evolved. Until the British annexation in the nineteenth century, such peoples as the Chin, Kachin, Karen, and Wa were mostly animists or traditional spirit-worshippers, practicing swidden (slash-and-burn) dry-rice cultivation and living in small settlements. Here political life was mostly organized at the village or village circle level under traditional rulers. Intervillage raiding was a common feature of life in the hills. But, although chiefs often paid tribute to rulers of the lowland kingdoms, most communities remained largely independent of any central authority.

Such differences between lowland and highland peoples were amplified under British colonial rule. In 1886, the Burman monarchy was abolished and the nation incorporated as a province of the British Indian empire, from which it was separated only in 1937. In the meantime, a two-tier system of administration was built for the country: Ministerial Burma, inhabited largely by the Burman majority, and the Frontier Areas, where most ethnic minority groups live. In Ministerial Burma, a degree of democratic home rule was introduced in the 1920s as well as reserved seats in Parliament for certain ethnic groups, including the Karen, Indians, and Chinese. By contrast, in the Fron-

tier Areas the British governor maintained overall control, but local authority was left in the hands of traditional rulers.

The result was that two different administrative systems emerged, reflecting a diversity of political cultures and values. Economic life was equally distinct, and only at independence in 1948 was an attempt made to forge the nation into a new political union on the basis of equal rights for all.

The Postindependence Era

Since independence from Great Britain, Myanmar has struggled to achieve a stable political identity. There have been three major political eras, each significantly different.

The first era was the democratic period from 1948 to 1962. Although the term "federal" was not actually used, the first constitution (1947) was federal in intention. Reflecting ethnic differences, the country was to have a bicameral legislature, with both a 125-seat Chamber of Nationalities and a 250-seat Chamber of Deputies. However, there were many inconsistencies. Only four ethnic groups were granted nationality states: the Kachin, Karen, Shan, and Karenni, the latter two of which were left under the authority of their traditional *sawbwas* (princes) and granted the additional right of secession after a ten-year period. The Chin, in contrast, were accorded only a Special Division, whereas such ethnic groups as the Rakhine, Mon, and Pao were given no political recognition at all.

Dissatisfaction was not confined to ethnic groups. The Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) government of Prime Minister U Nu (1907–1995) was also challenged by the insurrection of the Communist Party of Burma after March 1948. As a result, the era of parliamentary government was characterized by insurgency and political violence. Democratic institutions, including a free press, trade unions, and independent judiciary, did appear to take root, but the politics of government in Rangoon (now Yangon) was frequently dominated by factionalism within the ruling AFPFL, which won both the general elections in 1951–1952 and 1955. Significantly, too, despite the socialist leanings of the AFPFL, principal political opposition in parliament also came from pro-Marxist organizations, notably the Burma Workers and Peasants Party.

During 1958–1960, democratic government was briefly suspended during the emergency "Military Caretaker" administration of the armed forces chief, General Ne Win (b. 1911). Parliamentary rule was restored following the 1960 election, which was again won by U Nu. However, in March 1962, against a back-

drop of continuing political and ethnic uncertainty, Ne Win seized power in a military coup. The short-lived era of democracy was brought to an abrupt halt.

Ne Win's military government (1962–1988) marked the second major era in modern Burmese politics. Initially ruling through a military revolutionary council and network of local security and administrative councils, the government was superseded by the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), of which Ne Win was appointed chairman. This, however, never disguised the underlying character of military rule. The ideology of Ne Win's "Burmese Way to Socialism" was detailed in a brief 1963 book, *The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment*, which was an idiosyncratic blend of Buddhist, Marxist, and nationalist principles. It was never elaborated on.

One-Party State

Under Ne Win's rule, Burma became a one-party state. Independent parties, trade unions, and media organizations were closed, opponents imprisoned, the economy nationalized, and virtually all foreign visitors, including business people and missionaries, expelled as the country retreated from world affairs for a quarter of a century.

In 1974, a new constitution was introduced after a much-disputed national referendum. A new symmetry was created on Burma's political map by the demarcation of seven "divisions," dominated by the Burman majority, and seven ethnic minority "states." A national People's Assembly was also created and efforts made to form mass workers' and peasants' bodies to support the BSPP. However, virtually all senior posts in government were held by serving or retired military officers, so it is doubtful how far the BSPP government was ever truly established. Underground revolt continued throughout Ne Win's rule. Worker and student protests in the cities in the mid-1970s were quickly crushed, but in the borderlands such well-armed groups as the Communist Party of Burma, Karen National Union (KNU), and Kachin Independence Organization remained highly active, administering large territories of their own. Even deposed Prime Minister U Nu took up arms for a brief period in the late 1960s through the creation of the insurgent Parliamentary Democracy Party, which allied with the KNU and other ethnic opposition groups.

In 1988, Ne Win resigned and the BSPP collapsed during the nation's short-lived "democracy summer." This heralded the third major political era in the country's politics. Repeating a twentieth-century pattern, students and Buddhist monks again played a leading



MYANMAR—THE TRUTH

The following two extracts provide very different takes on the human rights situation in Myanmar. The first is an analysis of the announcements issued by the National League for Democracy by the Office of Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defense of Myanmar. The second is a report by Amnesty International.

The Truth

An analysis of the Announcements Issued by the National League for Democracy

The National League for Democracy has issued many announcements alleging that the government has been violating human rights in the country. It has been sending announcements to foreign embassies and broadcasting stations such as VOA [Voice of America], BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation], RFA [Radio Free Asia?], etc.

These announcements were not issued with the honest aim of submitting constructive suggestions to the government. The announcements are based on false news and utilized as tools to attack the government politically by exaggerating the weaknesses of some local authorities in the execution of their duties in the remote areas.

Most of the facts of the NLD announcements are found to be based, not on actual incidents after a systematic inquiry, but on rumors and reports of some NLD members. The NLD is issuing such random announcements with no credibility. It sends these false reports to foreign governments as to the world at large via powerful broadcasting stations. As a result, the Government's admirable and noteworthy endeavors for developing the country have been greatly misunderstood by governments and people of some nations, and our country has been wrongly assumed to be a nation with poor human rights norms and practices.

Source: Consulate of Myanmar in Hong Kong. Retrieved 8 March 2002, from: <http://www.myanmar-information.net/truth/truth-1.pdf>.

Torture has become an institution in Myanmar, used throughout the country on a regular basis, Amnesty International said today in a new report. Police and the army continue to use torture to extract information, punish, humiliate and control the population.

"Torture is employed as an instrument by the authorities to keep the population living in a state of fear," the organization said.

The victims of torture in Myanmar are political activists, criminal prisoners and members of ethnic minorities. Torture has been reported for over four decades yet the methods of torture have remained constant.

Torture techniques include: the "iron road," rolling an iron up and down the shins until the skin peels off; "the helicopter," being suspended from the ceiling and spun around while being beaten; "*Taik Peik*," spending weeks or months in tiny brick cells with little air or light; "*ponsan*," being forced to maintain difficult positions for prolonged periods.

Political prisoners, believed to number around 1,700, are at risk of torture during the initial phases of detention. Activists from the National League for Democracy (NLD), the party which overwhelmingly won the 1990 elections, are frequently the targets of torture and ill-treatment. Hundreds of its members are imprisoned and tens of thousands have been forced to resign from the party.

Student activists who have been at the forefront of the pro-democracy movement are also often tortured in detention. Freedom of expression and assembly is almost completely denied to all.

One 23-year-old former political activist was arrested twice during the 1990s, the first time when he was just 14. After his second arrest he was forced to stand on his tiptoes with a pin under his heel and kneel on sharp stones for prolonged periods. At Military Intelligence 12 headquarters he was also subjected to the "*ponsan*" technique. He told Amnesty International

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that he was interrogated non-stop by rotating teams of Military Intelligence personnel. He said "MI quarrelled amongst themselves—they were afraid I was going to die on them."

Hundreds, perhaps thousands of criminal prisoners have died in labour camps where they are forced to work under torturous conditions building roads and breaking up stones. The authorities openly admit that "the debt of crime will be repaid with sweat."

Members of ethnic groups such as the Shan, Karen and Karenni, who live in areas of conflict, are seized, interrogated and tortured to extract information on the whereabouts of armed ethnic minority groups. Men, women and children also face torture when they are taken by the Myanmar Army and forced to carry heavy supplies as porters for days or weeks at a time or forced to work on construction projects such as roads, railways and dams.

A Karenni Christian farmer from Kayah state was arrested by the army and accused of working for an armed opposition group after a battle in February 2000. He reported; "Three soldiers beat me with rifle butts on my head and punched my face. I got cut on my head and blood was running down from my nose. When I fell down, they kicked me with military boots. My hearing is still bad . . ." He was forced to accompany troops as a guide for one

week during which time he was beaten every day with sticks and tied with a rope. He finally escaped, and after returning to his village he hid with his family in the jungle for two weeks before fleeing to Thailand.

Women who are taken as porters are vulnerable to rape by soldiers. Amnesty International was told about the rape and murder of a 12-year-old girl, Naw Po Thu, in October 1998. She was allegedly raped by a major and managed to escape, but was recaptured, raped again and then shot dead through the vagina. The major gave the girl's family one sack of rice, a measure of sugar, a tin of condensed milk and a small amount of money as compensation. "Torture is used in a variety of settings in Myanmar but the objectives are always the same—repression and control," the organization said.

The military government denies torture exists, stating that it is illegal in domestic law. Amnesty International urges the Myanmar government to issue clear orders to all security forces to adhere to this law and immediately stop the practice of torture. It should also investigate all allegations of torture, bring perpetrators to justice, and prohibit incommunicado detention which facilitates the practice.

Source: Amnesty International. Retrieved 8 March 2002, from: <http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/ASA160262000?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES\MYANMAR>.

role in organizing popular protests. However, in September 1988, following the suppression of prodemocracy demonstrations, governmental power was reassumed by Ne Win loyalists under a new name: the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). In November 1997, the SLORC was renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), but it remained essentially a military government, headed by leading officers, including Generals Than Shwe, Maung Aye, and Khin Nyunt.

Unlike the BSPP, the SLORC/SPDC never announced a political manifesto of intentions other than to act as an interim government during a period of transition to a so-called open-door, market-oriented, and multiparty democracy. In line with these statements, democratic political parties were initially permitted to form, and in 1990 a general election was held

and overwhelmingly won by the National League for Democracy (NLD) and twenty-six other parties, most of which represented ethnic groups. The military government's favored party, the National Unity Party, which had succeeded the BSPP, won just ten seats. The SLORC/SPDC, however, never accepted the result as a vote for government and continued to arrest opposition leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi (b. 1945), the daughter of the nationalist leader Aung San, who was held under house arrest during 1989–1995.

Instead of transferring power, the Myanmar armed forces continued to govern under existing laws as well as martial-law decrees through a nationwide system of local military-dominated councils that echoed the security and administrative councils of the BSPP era. Claiming legitimacy through its national security role, the SLORC/SPDC defined national politics as the his-



This Myanmar government billboard in Nyaunhwe in 1996 seeks to promote national unity by proclaiming "Love Your Motherland, Respect the Law" in Burmese and English. (RICHARD BICKEL/CORBIS)

toric duty of the Myanmar armed forces, as opposed to the so-called party politics of opposition groups. The SLORC/SPDC also introduced a number of policy changes from the BSPP era, including declaring cease-fires with armed ethnic opposition groups and ending Myanmar's international isolation. In particular, in 1997 Myanmar joined the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN), allying with member states such as Thailand and the Philippines, which had already undergone transition from military to democratic rule.

The reform process, however, remained deadlocked. In 1993, the SLORC created a hand-picked national convention that began drawing up the nation's new constitution. As its first guiding principle, the leading role of the Myanmar armed forces in national political life had to be endorsed. Moreover, although the creation of new self-administered zones was promised for ethnic groups such as the Wa, Naga, and Pao, the intention to continue military dominance in political structures remained clear.

A new People's Assembly (*bluttaw*) would be established with two chambers: a House of Representatives elected on a population basis and a House of Nationalities, representing the states and divisions. But 25 percent of seats in both bodies would have to be reserved for military candidates. Myanmar's future president would also have to have military experience,

and the determination to continue military government was signaled by the 1993 formation of the mass Union Solidarity and Development Association, which many observers expected would be converted into a political party.

In late 2000, secret talks began between the SPDC and NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who was under virtual house arrest. These talks continued intermittently into 2002 and were encouraged by Razali Ismail, the special representative of the U.N. secretary-general, who also met with ethnic minority leaders in a bid to encourage "tripartite" dialogue between the military government, NLD, and ethnic nationality groups. But political reform and transition still appeared to be a long-term process.

Martin Smith

See also: **Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League—Myanmar; Communist Party of Burma; Kachin Independence Organization; Karen National Union; National League for Democracy—Myanmar; Ne Win, U; Nu, U**

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MYSORE (2001 est. pop. 742,000). Mysore, which is the headquarters of Mysore district in the state of Karnataka, is one of the key cities in South India. The city is approximately 140 kilometers from the state capital, Bangalore. Known for its pleasant climate

throughout the year, Mysore is famous for its distinctive history and culture. The city derives its name from the mythic episode of the killing of the buffalo-headed demon, Mahishasura, by the royal deity of Mysore province, Chamundeshwari. The temple that is dedicated to the deity sits atop the Chamundi Hill and is an important landmark of the city.

Historically, Mysore has been associated with some of the most important ruling dynasties of India, from the Gangas in the fourth century CE to the Wodeyars of the British era in the nineteenth century. Because of the sustained interest of the Wodeyar kings in art, music, architecture, education, and business, Mysore became a hub of cultural and commercial activities in the south. To this day, it retains its reputation as a place providing fine specimens of silk, sandalwood, and oil. The many palaces dotting the city, chief among which is Mysore Palace, lend an Old World charm to the area. For a ten-day period every year during September and October, the city celebrates the Dasehra Festival, which celebrates the victory of good over evil, with unflinching zeal and splendor. Unlike other Indian cities, which have fallen into routine decay, Mysore still exudes a quaint charm.

Ram Shankar Nanda

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NABIEV, RAKHMION (1930–1993), Tajik politician. Rakhmon Nabiev led the Tajikistan Soviet Socialist Republic from 1982 to 1985 as the First Secretary of the Communist Party, and in 1991 he became the first president of independent Tajikistan. Born in Shaihburchan (a remote northern province of the republic) in 1930, Nabiev was appointed chairman of the Tajikistan Council of Ministers in 1973. He assumed leadership of the country in 1982 but in 1986 was unexpectedly removed from his post.

In 1991 on the eve of the Soviet Union's dissolution, Nabiev was invited to become the chairman of the Tajikistani Parliament. In November 1991 as a Communist candidate he won the first presidential election in the history of Tajikistan, contesting a representative of the united front of democratic and Islamic opposition. Nabiev belonged to the cohort of leaders who rose to power mainly because of their faithful support of Soviet policies. His own policies as president led to a devastating seven-year civil war and to the rise of regionalism; he failed to relinquish his Communist ideology, to comprehend the importance of nationalism and Islamic symbols in post-Soviet state building, and to abandon his reliance on regional patronage rather than on the policy of national reconciliation. He was forced to resign at gunpoint in September 1992 and died at his home from a heart attack in April 1993.

Rafis Abazov

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NAGALAND (2001 est. pop. 2 million). Since 1963 a state in India's northeastern corner bordering Myanmar (Burma), Nagaland has an area of 15,579 square kilometers and is inhabited by sixteen major and twenty minor ethnic groups, all called Nagas. Most are fiercely independent, each with their own dialect, customs, and culture; most live in politically sensitive areas all but closed to foreigners, in the starkly remote terrain of villages high on the mountain ridges of the Naga Hills, at the extremity of the subcontinent. Only in reaction to external encroachment—by the British, Christians, Japanese, the Indian government—did the Nagas gain a sense of common identity. After Indian independence in 1947, the Nagas did not wish to join the Indian Union, but in 1960 an agreement led to statehood. In 1975 Nagaland agreed to accept the Indian constitution and surrender arms, but clashes continued, and in 1995 India declared Nagaland a disturbed area. In 1997 a cease-fire agreement was announced, but conflict continues.

Rice is cultivated on terraced fields. Nearly all villages are electrified. Industrialization is in its infancy. Weaving is traditional among women. War dances in colorful costumes form the distinctive art of Nagaland at festivals, marriages, and harvests.

C. Roger Davis

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NAGANO (2002 est. pop. 2.2 million). Nagano Prefecture is situated in the central region of Japan's island of Honshu, where it occupies an area of 13,585 square kilometers. Its primary geographical features are the Hida, Kiso, Akaishi, and Mikuni mountain ranges. Among its many rivers are the Chikumagawa, Himekawa, Kisogawa, and Tenryugawa. Landlocked Nagano is bordered by Niigata, Gumma, Saitama, Yamanashi, Shizuoka, Aichi, Gifu, and Toyama prefectures. Once known as Shinano Province, it assumed its present name in 1871 and its present borders in 1876.

The prefecture's capital is Nagano city in the north. It was founded in the Kamakura period (1185–1333) as the Buddhist temple town of Zenkoji; today its temple complex remains one of the nation's most popular Buddhist pilgrimage sites. During the Edo period (1600/1603–1868), Nagano city evolved into a market center and a highway post station. Today it is home to Shinshu University and to such commercial enterprises as printers, publishers, electrical machinery manufacturers, and food processors. As host of the XVIII Winter Olympics in 1998, the city was connected by bullet train to Tokyo. The prefecture's other important cities are Matsumoto, Ueda, and Iida.

Historically, the region was at the crossroads of several primary routes between western and eastern Honshu. Various warrior clans, including the Uesugi and Takeda, ruled the province for centuries. During the Edo period, it was divided into many small domains.

Once a center of silk production, the prefecture remains a major source of rice, apples, yams, and dairy products. Its larger and more recent industries are metals processing, machinery fabrication, and wood-working. Visitors are drawn to Matsumoto, gateway to the Japan Alps, one-time Nara period (710–794 CE) provincial capital, and the site of Matsumoto castle, built in 1597. Other attractions are the scenic mountains and lakes, located in four national and three quasi-national parks.

E. L. S. Weber

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NAGARJUNA (flourished c. 150–250 CE), Buddhist philosopher. Nagarjuna, whose influence persists

in modern-day Buddhism, is thought to have been born to a Brahman family in India. Although he is a historical figure, details of his life are drawn primarily from legends. It is generally believed that his parents urged him to go on a pilgrimage, and that he then made his way to the famous Buddhist university of Nalanda, where a monk urged him to adopt the monastic life.

According to one legend, the boy Nagarjuna, after studying the four Vedas (the earliest Hindu scriptures), took to worldly pleasures. He mastered the technique of making himself invisible and frequently broke into peoples' homes. Eventually, his offenses were discovered, and he nearly had to atone for them with his life. Subsequently, he became a devout Buddhist and an adept of Buddhist philosophy.

Nagarjuna's ethical system, popularly known as Madhyamika (The Middle Way), attempted to dispel erroneous interpretations of Buddhist doctrine relating to the philosophical concept of reality. His dialectic approach, which takes a middle course, led to the theory of *sunyata*, or Emptiness. This theory holds that all things are nonessential by nature. Furthermore, Nagarjuna's philosophical precept of *pratityasamutpada*, or dependent origination, emphasizes that devoid of their inherent qualities, all things are interdependent. Nagarjuna believed that everything was formed of one substance.

Nagarjuna's philosophy represented neither an orthodox expression of early Buddhism nor a total negation of it. Without conforming stringently to the original tenets of Buddhism, Nagarjuna proceeded exclusively from the principles established in the Buddhist canon and arrived at unique conclusions based on a deductive method that the founder of Buddhism would have approved of.

Nagarjuna also pioneered the renaissance of Sanskrit learning among Indian Buddhists. At the same time, he can be credited with refining the analytical method of inquiry developed by the historical Buddha. Thus, Nagarjuna's intellectual feats assume a significance as profound as the doctrine propounded by Buddha himself.

Rajsekhar Basu

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NAGAS The Nagas (with an estimated population of 3.5 million in 2000) are a group of tribes inhabiting Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, and Nagaland states in northeast India and neighboring areas of Myanmar (Burma). The 1971 census conducted by the Republic of India identified sixteen major Naga communities, namely the Angami, Ao, Chakhesang, Chang, Chirr, Khiamngan, Konyak, Lohta, Makware, Phom, Rengma, Sangtam, Sema, Tikhir, Yimchunger, and Zeliang. Of Mongoloid stock, Nagas probably migrated to northeast India from central China. Every Naga tribe speaks its own language, and sixty spoken dialects have been identified. All Naga languages belong to the Tibeto-Burmese branch of the Sino-Tibetan language family.

Naga tribes have their own distinctive shawls. The older people of some communities of eastern Nagaland have elaborate tattoo marks. Among different Naga tribes, the forms of government, polity, and modes of law enforcement vary. Southern Nagas, such as Angami and Chakhesang, still practice tribal democracy at the village level, while despotic chieftainship prevails among the Konyak and the Sema.

Nagas traditionally believed in a benevolent female Supreme Creator, Kenopfu. Significant religious functionaries included the *kemovo*, who directed public ceremonies, and the *zbevo*, who performed personal rituals. Nagas today are overwhelmingly Christians (92.97 percent in the 1981 census). The American Baptist mission has been particularly active in the region since the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, Nagas continue to observe traditional life-cycle rituals, cosmological dogma, and tribal religious beliefs.

Literacy among Nagas is higher than other tribal groups in India and varies between 45.58 percent (according to the 1981 census) among Angamis and 64.10 percent among Aos. They practice shifting cultivation (*jhum*) and terraced agriculture, growing crops both for trade and their own consumption. With education, many have taken to trade, government services, and other professions.

Traditional village councils continue to play a crucial role in their social life. Tribal polity and chieftainship have not been disturbed to any great extent. Postindependence statutory *panchayats* (councils) generally deal with development activities. The Village Development Board (VDB) conducts the development process at the grassroots level.

At India's independence in 1947, the Nagas were unwilling to accept New Delhi's rule and demanded

independence. In 1955 the Naga secessionist movement developed and was suppressed by the Indian security forces. The creation of Nagaland as a fully fledged state of the Indian Union in 1963 failed to meet the demands of the extremists, and the dream of independence persists. Recently, several insurgent groups have coordinated their activities under the banner of the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), and sporadic acts of violence continue.

Sanjukta Das Gupta

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NAGASAKI (2001 est. pop. 430,000). Nagasaki is a seaport town on the west coast of Kyushu, Japan. Originally a tiny fishing village, Nagasaki first gained prominence with the establishment of its port by the Portuguese in 1571. It served as an active entrepôt of foreign trade and a haven for Christians until *bakufu* (shogunate) policies placed restrictive controls on trade and virtually eliminated Christianity. During the Edo period (1600/1603–1868), Nagasaki became Japan's primary source of contact with the outside world through its Chinese and Dutch settlements—the latter situated on the man-made island of Dejima in Nagasaki Harbor. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Nagasaki was designated one of Japan's foreign settlements and its streets were crowded with Western sailors, merchants, and missionaries. Nagasaki began to lose its international importance after the Russo-Japanese War and did not reenter the world stage until the catastrophic atomic bombing of the city by American military forces on 9 August 1945, in which more than 75,000 residents were killed.

Today, Mitsubishi Shipyards provides the principal economic impetus for Nagasaki. The city also relies heavily on tourism, and major tourist sites include Chinese temples and stone bridges, the Suwa Shrine (the home of the annual Kunchi Festival), Siebold Museum, Oura Catholic Church, Glover Garden, Dejima Museum, Monument of the Twenty-Six Saints, Urakami Cathedral, the Peace Park, and the Atomic Bomb Museum.

Lane R. Earns



The Nagasaki Gas Works in August 1949, four years after the city was devastated by a United States atomic bomb, effectively ending World War II. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

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NAGAUTA *Nagauta* (long poems or songs) is the dominant musical form for the Kabuki theatre and depicts the various poetic descriptions of the dance and scenes. The early dances of Kabuki were accompanied by *kouta* (short songs). *Nagauta* developed during the Genroku period (1688–1703) and was further refined with the introduction of highly skilled shamisen players. In 1727, in Edo (the old name for Tokyo), a style called Edo *Nagauta* was born. These pieces were composed of short lyrical sections strung together. *Nagauta* further developed with the addition of other forms and instruments in later periods. This layering of genres and instruments makes *nagauta* a highly refined and versatile form. While *nagauta* is vital to Kabuki, it stands on its own as a musical genre and is well suited

to independent performances. The main line of *nagauta* performers began with Kineya Rokuzaemon; it is now in its fifteenth generation.

Nagauta is categorized in five forms: Noh, which draws upon sophisticated structures found within Noh plays as far back as the fourteenth century; *kumiuta*, which developed from the tradition of grouping together a series of poems set to music, popular in the late seventeenth century; joruri, which was influenced by *gidayubushi* narrative recitation of the joruri (Bunraku) puppet theatre; Kabuki music, which is suitable accompaniment for dancing; and mixed forms, which contain an assortment of dance borrowed from the other forms.

Nagauta is a lyrical form that consists of four to nine singers, four to nine shamisen, and a Noh ensemble (one to three hip drums, one stick drum, and one flute). As an orchestra, the ensemble is called the *shibyoshi* (four rhythms). The *nagauta* ensemble is most often associated with the *geza* room. When the *nagauta* shamisen play from the *geza* alone, it is called *aikata*; when accompanied by singing, it is called *ainote*. There are also a number of other instruments played in the *geza*; the number and variety depend on

the play being performed. The *nagauta* ensemble may also appear onstage and is then called the *debayashigata*. *Nagauta* musicians and singers sit on a special platform called the *hinadan*. The *geza* ensemble (*hayashigata*) sit on a step below the *hinadan*.

Stacey Fox

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NAHDLATUL ULAMA Established in 1926 in Surabaya, Indonesia, by K. H. Muhammad Hasyim Asy'ari (1871–1947), the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) is one of the largest socioreligious organizations in the country. It aims at promoting solidarity between traditionalist *ulama* (religious scholars) and their followers from all four classical schools of law of Sunni Islam, particularly the Shafi'i school. Its activities focus on ideology, education, social services, and politics.

Ideologically, NU members see themselves as "people who follow Muhammad's traditions and the Sunni community" (*abl al-sunnah wa'l jama'ah*). The stronghold of the NU lies in rural areas, particularly in East Java, as well as in traditional schools (*pesantren*), where students are taught classical Arabic texts supervised by a *kyai* (religious teacher). The NU owns over six thousand schools, mosques, orphanages, poorhouses, farmer unions, and merchant unions, as well as small industries.

The NU has been politically active since the national struggle leading to Indonesia's independence. It encouraged Indonesian participation in politics under the Dutch rule. During the Japanese occupation, it became a tool for mass mobilization. As a member of Masyumi (Majlis Syura Muslimin Indonesia, a modern comprehensive confederation of Islamic organiza-

tions), the NU vowed to wage a holy war, under Japanese guidance, against the Allied forces.

In 1952, the NU became an independent political party rejecting the secularly educated leadership of the Masyumi. In the 1955 elections, the NU received unexpected popular support. While the NU joined other parties in striving for an Islamic state, it was the first Islamic organization to adhere to Suharto's imposition of the Pancasila (five principles), with belief in one God cited as the first principle. Because the NU has changed its position on the Masyumi and other confederations of Islamic organizations a number of times, the NU has been accused of being opportunistic.

The grandson of the founder of NU, Abdurrahman Wahid (b. 1940), himself the founder of the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa—PKB) within the NU, became the first democratically elected Indonesian president (October 1999). The NU claims a membership of 35 million in Indonesia's volatile multicultural society. The organization faces the challenge of protecting the country's unitary ruling system (which might, however, accentuate nationalism) while promoting democracy (which might encourage community revivalism). While Wahid's philosophy has elements of democracy, his actions reflect a Javanese ideal.

Andi Faisal Bakti

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NAKASONE YASUHIRO (b. 1918), prime minister of Japan. Probably Japan's best-known politician internationally, Nakasone Yasuhiro was prime minister from November 1982 until November 1987. Most famous for his nationalist and neoconservative views,

Nakasone formed a close friendship with foreign leaders, in particular Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, sharing their interest in privatization and small government. As prime minister, Nakasone sought to strengthen the U.S.-Japan security relationship and Japan's role in it, both politically and militarily, at one point proclaiming Japan to be an "unsinkable aircraft carrier."

Nakasone was born in May 1918 in Gunma Prefecture, the second son of six children. Graduating from the political science department of Tokyo Imperial University in 1941, Nakasone entered the Ministry of Home Affairs that April and shortly thereafter was assigned to the navy as a paymaster, serving in Taiwan and elsewhere.

After the war, Nakasone resigned from the ministry and was elected to the Diet in 1947 on the Democratic Party ticket. Nakasone ran on an anti-Allied Occupation policy platform. He believed that the reforms of occupational policy undermined traditional Japanese society. Since then, the high-profile Nakasone was elected in every election, despite the fact that his election district, which included a former and future prime minister, was considered one of the most competitive. Nakasone, who served in numerous cabinets and party positions, attempted to break many taboos while in office, such as revising the constitution, urging compulsory use of the Hinomaru flag and *Kimi Ga Yo* anthem in schools, and making official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine for war dead, angering in particular Korea and China.

Robert D. Eldridge

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NAKHON RATCHASIMA (2002 pop. 210,000). Nakhon Ratchasima city, also known as Khorat, is situated in northeastern Thailand 177 kilometers north of Bangkok. It is located in the second largest province in the nation. Nakhon Ratchasima is the provincial capital and the most affluent city in the region. The city is located on the Mun River and is near the mountain pass connecting this region with the central plains of Thailand.

Established in the seventeenth century, near the ruins of the ancient Khmer dynasty (c. eleventh century), the city was formed by the combining of the settlements of Sema and Khorakpura. The remains of the old city can be seen today in its walls, gates, and moat. It was in 1890 that the city began a period of rapid growth with construction of a rail line from Bangkok. During the U.S. war in Vietnam, Nakhon Ratchasima's Royal Thai Air Force Base served as an operations center for the U.S. military.

Today Nakhon Ratchasima is considered the center of the Khorat Plateau, with government, the provincial economy, and transportation based there. The region is known for copper, livestock, rice, maize, and tobacco. The city remains a rail hub, since the line from Bangkok splits here with lines to Ubon Ratchatani and Nong Khai.

Linda Dailey Paulson

NAKTONG RIVER AND DELTA The Naktong River drains one-fourth of South Korea. Its headwaters lie near Hambeck Mountain at Taebeck City, Kangwon Province, and the river flows across the Southern Plain to the Korea Strait (South Sea). It is the longest river in South Korea, at 523 kilometers (325 miles). The Naktong River has created many deltas. Offshore, Eulsook Island attracts thousands of migratory birds, in addition to resident sea and river birds, because it provides wetland, fish, and grains. Many Korean poets and writers consider the island the most beautiful nature conservancy area in Korea and East Asia. Another delta is the Kimhae Plain, whose rich farmlands made the Kaya civilization (42–562 CE) possible.

During the Korean War (1950–1953) the Naktong River was a bloody boundary of confrontation. U.S. and Allied troops stopped the deepest North Korean Communist advance at the Naktong River at Taegu. North Korea succeeded in crossing the river on 6 August 1950. But U.S. Marines and Army infantrymen counterattacked and prevented a general breakthrough.

Urbanization, industrial development, and population growth along the Naktong River have made water quantity and water quality troublesome since the 1970s. In the 1980s, Dusan Electronics' accidental release of phenol into the river was the first industrial pollution crisis in South Korea. This event helped awaken people to the state of the river. Drinking water in Pusan, the second most populous city in South

Korea located at the mouth of the Nakdong River, is in short supply in the dry season. Upstream and downstream cooperation in water resources management was seriously discussed in 2000. Control of point and nonpoint sources of water pollutants has been devised, and a buffer zone between the river and human settlements has been legislated. Sophisticated wastewater treatment systems in urban and rural areas have been installed.

Yearn Hong Choi

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NAMP'Ō (2001 est. pop. 645,000). Namp'ŏ (Chin-nampo) is a major port and industrial city on the west coast of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). The city is 55 kilometers southwest of Pyongyang and 8 kilometers inland from the sea.

The major industries of Namp'ŏ are steel production, shipbuilding, and farm vehicle production. In 1995, Namp'ŏ became the site of some of the first joint economic ventures between North and South Korea. These ventures were the production of clothing for export.

Namp'ŏ has extensive port facilities, which were augmented in the 1980s by construction of the West Sea Barrage, an 8-kilometer dam that stretches across the Taedong River. This dam, built between 1981 and 1986, includes three locks capable of lifting ships of up to 50,000 tons. It has created a freshwater lake that reaches Namp'ŏ, ending the tidal surge that once disrupted river activities. However, the damming of the river has also led to higher levels of pollution in the river because industrial pollutants are no longer carried out to sea. In 2000, a ten-lane highway between Namp'ŏ and Pyongyang was completed.

Thomas P. Dolan

NAN HAI. See **South China Sea.**

NANGNIM RANGE Mt. Nangnim (Nangnim-san) lies between Huich'on-gun in North P'yongan Province and Yongwon-gun in South P'yongan Province in North Korea. The mountain is 2,184 meters in height. It is the central and highest peak of the Nangnim mountain range that, along with such mountains as Mt. Maengbu, Wagal Peak, and Huisaek Peak, forms the border between the Kwanbuk Area, the land "north of the passes," and the Kwanso Area, the land "west of the passes." The Nangnim mountain range trends north-south and constitutes the border between North P'yongan Province and South Hamgyong Province. The range has an average height of 1,500 meters and stretches for 250 kilometers. The southern edge of the mountain range connects with the Myohyang mountain range that bends into a southwesterly direction.

Richard D. McBride II

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NANJING (1997 pop. 2.7 million). The capital of Jiangsu Province in central eastern China, metropolitan Nanjing (Nanking) had a population in 1997 of 5.3 million and the city proper 2.7 million. The city's name, which translates as "southern capital," denotes the important role that it has played in Chinese history. Located on the southern bank of the Chang (Yangtze) River, Nanjing was the capital of the kingdom of Wu (220-280) and several other small local dynasties between the third and sixth centuries, before becoming the capital of the Ming dynasty between 1368 and 1421. The third Ming emperor, Yung Lo (reigned 1403-1424), moved the capital to Beijing, the "northern capital," in the early 1420s.

Nanjing continued to play an important role in the economy and administration of the lower Chang River region during the later Ming and Qing dynasties due to its proximity to both the major river of central China and the Grand Canal that linked the southern region of the empire to the administrative north. During the Taiping rebellion of the mid-nineteenth century, Nanjing rose to prominence as the rebels' capital between 1853 and 1864.

Following the October 1911 revolution, the new president, Sun Yat-sen, proclaimed the birth of the new Republic of China in Nanjing. The city again became the nation's capital under Chiang Kai-shek's

Guomindang between 1927 and 1937. It was captured by the Japanese army in December 1937, which ushered in one of the worst atrocities of the Pacific War, the "Rape of Nanjing." The victorious Japanese armies embarked on an orgy of raping and killing the local civilian population. By the time order was restored six weeks later, between 100,000 and 250,000 Chinese had been killed.

Since the Communist victory in 1949, the city's industrial base has developed to include not only its traditional textile manufacturing, but also iron and steel mills, porcelain manufacturing, and light machinery. The city continues to be an important regional administrative center and transportation hub.

Robert John Perrins

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NANJING MASSACRE The Nanjing Massacre (also known as the Nanking Massacre) refers to the war crimes perpetrated by Japanese troops during their invasion and occupation of Nanjing, China, from December 1937 to February 1938. These crimes included the execution and murder of more than 200,000 defenseless and unarmed Chinese soldiers and civilians, the widespread rape and torture of reportedly about 20,000 women and girls, the dismembering of human bodies—both male and female—and the widespread slaughter of domestic and farm animals. The massacre was not limited to Nanjing, which was then the capital of the Republic of China, but encompassed the line of march of the Japanese general Matsui Iwane's Tenth Army and the Shanghai Expeditionary Force from Hangzhou—the landing site—through Shanghai and into Nanjing.

The bloodletting was contained only after the establishment of the Japanese puppet government of Nanjing in late March 1938. General Matsui was found guilty of committing crimes against humanity by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal and was sentenced to hanging.

Although the massacre was well reported by the English-language press, its memory was obscured for some years by the refusal of the Japanese government to admit to the crimes and by the failure of the Chinese government to raise the issue internationally. It was not until the 1980s that the Chinese began a serious study of the massacre. After painstaking research of burial records, documents, and interviews, it was concluded that the event took the lives of nearly 300,000. This figure is significantly larger than the estimate of 200,000 given by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal.

Corroboration of these numbers is important because the nationalist movement in Japan is trying to deny the legitimacy of the tribunal. For them, the war was a patriotic and just struggle against Western domination. The Chinese confirm and exaggerate the tribunal's findings with the political intent of convincing Asians that Japan has been and still is a threat to Asian nations. The massacre has inspired artistic representations by both Chinese and Japanese artists, and the International Committee to Study the Nanjing Massacre has commissioned a symphonic requiem entitled *Hun Qiao* (The Bridge of Spirits) to honor and memorialize the victims. The search for the truth and meaningfulness of this massacre will be discussed and remembered in various ways for many decades.

Richard C. Kagan

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NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY Nanyang Technological University (NTU) of Singapore has its origin in the former Nanyang Technological Institute (NTI), which was set up in August 1981 to provide tertiary education and research in engineering and technology. NTU was established by an act of Parliament on 1 July 1991 when NTI was renamed NTU and empowered to award its own degrees. Its campus is located at the former Nanyang University at Jurong in the western part of the island nation. Nanyang University was founded by the late rubber tycoon and community leader Tan Lark Sye in

1955, and it was merged with the University of Singapore to become the National University of Singapore in 1980.

NTU admitted its first class of students in July 1982. The university is moving rapidly into programs in computer science, computer engineering, software engineering, and systems engineering. Currently the university offers eighteen master's degree programs in engineering, computer science, and technical management via telecommunications technologies.

There have been calls from alumni of Nanyang University to restore the university's former name, but official resistance has been strong. Although new graduates have no memories of the past, graduates are stepping up efforts to restore the glories of the former university.

Khai Leong Ho

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NAQSH, JAMIL (b. 1939), Pakistani artist. Jamil Naqsh is known for his romantic compositions of women and pigeons. Born in Kairana, India, he fled to Peshawar, Pakistan, during the Indian partition and then moved to Lahore. At the National College of Art in Lahore, Jamil Naqsh studied painting with the noted miniaturist Ustad Mohammad Sharif, but left after two years without receiving his degree. In 1962, Naqsh held his first exhibition, at the Pakistan Arts Council in Lahore, soon after which he moved to Karachi. Supplementing his income by working in advertising agencies, the artist continued to produce meticulously drafted and beautifully balanced paintings, in both oils and watercolors. In 1989, Naqsh received the President's Pride of Performance Award in recognition of his artistic contributions.

Jamil Naqsh's representations of women alternate between realism and abstraction, in both face and figure. His paintings are either straightforward depictions, or fragmented collages, of the human figure. Although other motifs such as horses and babies appear in his work, Naqsh's women seem the core of his artistic inspiration. Nonetheless, in 1996 Jamil Naqsh exhibited a series of calligraphic works called *Modern Manuscripts*, his interpretation of Arabic script. That

year a group of patrons inaugurated the Jamil Naqsh Foundation in Karachi.

Kishwar Rizvi

NAQSHBANDIYA This Sufi order of Islam derives its name from Muhammad b. Muhammad Baha al-Din al-Naqshband (1318–1389), a Tajik from Central Asia. Sufism is the mystical expression of Islam that emphasized above all abstemiousness and self-discipline for the individual. However, the Naqshbandi tradition itself does not regard Baha al-Din as the founder of this Central Asian Sufi order (*tariqa*). The chain of masters (*silsilat al-tarbiya*) begins rather with Abu Ya'qub Yusuf al-Hamadhani, a Central Asian mystic who died in Merv in 1140. His spiritual successor (*khalifa*), 'Abd al-Khaliq al-Ghujawani (d. 1220), is responsible for giving this order its specific cast, including the emphasis on silent remembrance of God (*dhikr kbafi*). Baha al-Din is the seventh in this series of masters; he is regarded as the patron saint of the city of Bukhara, seat of a once-powerful Islamic kingdom in present-day Uzbekistan. His mausoleum there has become one of the most important Sufi places of pilgrimage.

With their emphasis on silent rather than vocal *dhikr*, Naqshbandi practices stress quiet, spiritual communion with the divine and inner discipline of the adherent, rather than external, showy rites. The early Naqshbandiya, in accordance with this emphasis on silent *dhikr*, eschewed the music and dance (*sama'*) that accompany Sufi practices in some orders, as well as the adoption of distinctive attire and the performance of miraculous feats (*karamat*). The Naqshbandiya are also known for their adherence to the *shari'a*, the religious law of Islam, and for their distinctive Sunni sympathies.

From Central Asia, the Naqshbandi *tariqa* spread to practically all parts of the Turkish world and the Caucasus by the fifteenth century. Its Sunni allegiance attracted the support of the Ottoman Turks; many Naqshbandis began to migrate from Central Asia to Istanbul and other places and established a number of *tekkes* (Sufi lodges) there. Naqshbandi Sufism also made significant inroads among Kurds and South Asians. By the eighteenth century, the Mujaddadi order of the Naqshbandiya, established by Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624) of India, had spread to Ottoman Turkey and the Balkans. In the nineteenth century, Mawlana Khalid Baghdadi (d. 1827), a Kurd, established the Khalidi branch of the Naqshbandi order, which shortly thereafter became the principal *tariqa* in

Central Asia and much of Ottoman Turkey as well. In addition to these areas, the Naqshbandi order at the present time also has small pockets of adherents in some parts of the Arab world, Europe, and North America.

Asma Afsaruddin

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NARA (2002 est. pop. 1.5 million). Nara Prefecture is situated in the central region of Japan's island of Honshu. Once the cultural and political heart of ancient Japan, it occupies an area of 3,692 square kilometers. Its primary geographical features are the Ikoma, Kongo, and Kii Mountains; the Yamato Kogen Highland; and the Nara Basin. Its main rivers are the Yoshinogawa, Yamatogawa, and Totsukawa. It is bordered by Kyoto, Mie, Osaka, and Wakayama prefectures. Once known as Yamato Province, it assumed its present name and borders in 1887.

The prefecture's capital is Nara city, named Heijokyo in the Nara period (710–794), when it became Japan's first permanent capital. Designed according to Chinese precepts, it hosted the first great flowering of Japanese literature and art. The imperial court sponsored the spread of Buddhism, and, although the capital moved in 794 to Heian-kyo, some of the world's finest Buddhist monuments remain in Nara.

Archaeological remains of the Jomon (10,000 BCE–300 BCE) and Yayoi (300 BCE–300 CE) cultures



NARA-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

A UNESCO World Heritage Site since 1998, Nara's Shinto shrines and archaeological site give an unparalleled glimpse into life in eighth-century CE feudal Japan.

indicate that agriculture arrived in Nara Prefecture two thousand years ago. Today the leading crops are rice, vegetables, tea, and persimmons, and forestry remains important. Its traditional products include woodwork, lacquerware, *sumi* (india ink), calligraphy brushes, *washi* paper, and *somen* noodles. More recent industry is devoted to plastics, rubber, electrical machinery, and spinning. The region's attractions, aside from Nara city's historical sites, include the nearby Buddhist temples of Horyuji, Yakushiji, and Toshodaiji. Visitors also are drawn to Yoshino-Kumano National Park.

E. L. S. Weber

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NARA PERIOD During the Nara period (710–794), the Japanese imperial central government was unified, strengthened, and developed through religious ritual and the importation of Chinese bureaucratic methods. Drawing from classical Chinese texts, the penal and administrative codes known collectively as *ritsuryo* allowed the central government to control the capital and outlying districts through taxation and a network of officials. This period is named after its capital city of Nara, occupied in 710, which was planned and built according to Chinese architectural principles.

Central authority was further legitimized through Japan's two major religions. Shinto, the native religion, traced the imperial lineage back to the sun goddess Amaterasu. This occurred prior to the Nara period when Amaterasu was adopted as the founding spiritual ancestor of the imperial Yamato clan. During this same earlier period, the sun goddess was also accorded a higher rank than the spiritual ancestors, or *kami*, of all the other Japanese clans. This spiritual shift was gradual, and as Shinto became supported by the state the rulers, in turn, helped shape Shinto beliefs to provide a historic legitimacy to the imperial line.

But it was Buddhism, imported through China and Korea, that received the blessings and support of the state. In part, Buddhist teachings were promoted because they were seen to protect and serve the welfare of the state, and Buddhist priests received official positions and political influence. Just as important, temple building was undertaken with great fervor. The most impressive of these temples is the Todaiji, completed in 752, which houses the massive Universal Buddha Rushana.



JAPAN HISTORICAL PERIODS

Jomon culture (10,000–300 BCE)
 Yayoi culture (300 BCE–300 CE)
 Yamato State (300–552 CE)
 Kofun period (300–710 CE)
 Nara period (710–794 CE)
 Heian period (794–1185)
 Kamakura period (Kamakura Shogunate)
 (1185–1333)
 Muromachi period (1333–1573)
 Momoyama period (1573–1600)
 Tokugawa or Edo period (Tokugawa Shogunate)
 (1600/1603–1868)
 Meiji period (1868–1912)
 Taisho period (1912–1926)
 Showa period (1926–1989)
 Allied occupation (1945–1952)
 Heisei period (1989–present)

In addition to these architectural endeavors are the important literary contributions of the Nara period. The first official anthology of poetry, the *Man'yōshū* (Collection of Ten Thousand Leaves, c. 759), dates from this period. Two grand imperial histories were also written. The *Kojiki* (Record of Ancient Matters, c. 712) details ancient history and origin myths, while the *Nihon shoki* (Chronicle of Japan, 720) is generally concerned with more current imperial succession and historic accounts.

The conclusion of the Nara period was marked by an imperial decision to abandon the capital at Nara in favor of constructing a new capital at Heian-kyo, modern-day Kyoto. A motivating factor for this move was probably the growing power and influence of the Buddhist clergy.

While Shinto and Buddhism have generally coexisted in Japan, a notable challenge to the imperial line, often referred to as the Dokyo Incident, arose from a member of the Buddhist clergy. Dokyo (d. 772) was an ambitious priest who gained favor with the female emperor Koken (later called Shotoku, 718–770); he was given titles suggesting that he might succeed Shotoku after her death. Although this immediate crisis of succession passed with little incident, it marked a clear challenge to imperial legitimacy.

Allen Reichert

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NARANTSATSRALT, JANLAVYN (b. 1957), former prime minister of Mongolia. Janlavyn Narantsatsralt was born in 1957 in Ulziit somon, Dundgobi Province, Mongolia. After graduating from secondary school there in 1975, he studied in Moscow at the Land Management Institute from 1975 to 1981, obtaining a diploma as a land management engineer/economist. He graduated from the Moscow Administrative Management Institute in 1985. Narantsatsralt also received a master's degree from the Mongolian National University, where he studied land management, in 1992.

In the 1980s, Narantsatsralt worked as chief engineer in the Land Management Institute and from 1989 to 1991 as a research worker at the Mongolian Institute of Land Policy in Ulaanbaatar, the Mongolian capital. In 1991, he became head of Ulaanbaatar's city management and planning department and later served as a city council member, head of the land bureau, and general director of the Institute of Land Policy. A member of the Mongolian National Democratic Party (MNDP), he was elected mayor of Ulaanbaatar in November 1996. After the dismissal of two democratic coalition prime ministers stemming from political in-fighting and rumors of corruption, Narantsatsralt was chosen as a compromise figure by coalition members to become prime minister in December 1998. His candidacy was approved by Mongolian president Bagbandi of the rival Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP), which led to Narantsatsralt's installation as the country's nineteenth prime minister since independence in 1911. However, he could only maintain support within the shattered coalition until August 1999, when he lost a vote of confidence. In the July 2000 parliamentary elections, Narantsatsralt was one of only four democratic coalition candidates to win seats in the seventy-six-member Mongolian parliament during the MPRP landslide. Thus, his position as a leader within the democratic coalition movement grew in stature, leading

to his election in December 2000 as deputy head of a new party, the Mongolian Democratic Party.

Alicia J. Campi

NARAYAN, R. K. (1906–2001), Indian novelist. Rasipuram Krishnaswami Narayan (professionally R. K. Narayan) was one of India's leading novelists throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. He was born of Tamil Brahman parents in Madras in 1906, but long lived in Mysore City, Karnataka. It is in the latter area that all of his delightful English-language novels are set. His work has been more widely published outside India than that of any of his Indian contemporaries (with the possible exceptions of Salman Rushdie and Arundhati Roy). In the early stages of his career, his work was championed by the British novelist Graham Greene. That such an internationally visible writer should only be known for such highly localized novels (most of them are set in the one fictional Mysorean village of Malgudi) is remarkable. The general tone in all his novels is one of wry humor, as in *The Guide* (1958), which shows up the tragicomic aspects of the modern Indian penchant for half-baked metaphysics. His first novel was *Swami and Friends* (1935), and several others of note are *The Man-Eater of Malgudi* (1962), *The Financial Expert*, *The Bachelor of Arts*, *Waiting for the Mahatma*, and *Mr. Sampath*. In addition, Narayan wrote an autobiography, *My Days* (1974), and produced a shortened English prose version of the Mahabharata (1972).

Paul Hockings

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NARMADA DAM CONTROVERSY India's Narmada Valley Project (NVP) involves the construction of 31 major, 135 medium, and 3,000 minor dams on the Narmada River and its tributaries. First proposed in 1946, the NVP covers the Narmada River watershed in the western Indian states of Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, and Maharashtra. Construction began in 1978, when the Narmada Dam Dispute Tribunal approved a plan resolving water-sharing disputes among these states. The project was to be funded with World Bank assistance, but in 1993, after the World Bank issued a highly critical report, the government of India renounced the loan, refusing to accept any more money from the bank. The controversy has cen-

tered on the Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) in Gujarat and the Narmada Sagar Project (NSP) in Madhya Pradesh. Led by two nongovernmental organizations, ARCH-Vahini and Narmada Bachao Andolan, opponents of the dams have charged that more than one hundred thousand villagers would be displaced by the dams despite rehabilitation plans, which they characterize as wholly inadequate. In addition the opponents question the absence of mandatory environmental impact studies at the time of construction.

Opponents of the dams have staged numerous large-scale protests in New Delhi and at the dam sites, thereby gaining international attention. After preliminary court rulings in 1995 and 1998, construction on the dams was delayed pending the Indian Supreme Court's final decision on the suits against the dams.

Eric A. Strahorn

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NARMADA RIVER Narmada (or Narbada, sometimes Nerbudda) River, 1,290 kilometers long, was mentioned by Ptolemy as the Namados. Ancient Sanskrit names for the river included Reva, Samodbhava, and Mekalasuta. Traditionally, the Narmada River formed the boundary between the Dekkan Plateau and what was known as Hindustan, the North Indian plains. It rises in western India in the Maikala Range, on Amarkantak Hill, very close to the source of the Mahanadi, and is the only major Indian river to flow westward into the Arabian Sea, meeting it at Broach (or Bharuch) after crossing all of Madhya Pradesh state and flowing in a straight course between the Satpura and Vindhya Ranges to the Gulf of Khambhai, in eastern Gujarat State.

Navigation is confined to the lower 100 kilometers, and the river has not been used for irrigation purposes. In 1978 a controversial project was launched in the face of massive opposition, to dam the river just inside

Gujarat State, by drowning hundreds of villages in the state of Madhya Pradesh and displacing several million people, thereby creating a new source of power for Gujarat's industries and of irrigation for area farmers. Amid much criticism of the project, the government of India halted the dam construction in 1995. A ruling in 2000 by the Supreme Court of India allowed the project to move forward; however, the public debate over building the dam remains heated.

Paul Hockings

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NATAKA *Nataka* was one of the ten genres performed in ancient Indian theater. These ten genres were called the *dasarupakas* (the ten forms) and were *nataka*, *prakarana*, *samavakara*, *dima*, *vyayoga*, *ihamriga*, *utsristikakanka*, *prabasana*, *bhana*, and *vithi*. *Nataka* was the most prominent of these, so much so that by modern times the term *nataka* has come to be used for all drama rather than a particular genre.

The primary and most comprehensive text of the ancient Indian dramatic theory, the *Natya Sastra* (c. 450 BCE), describes the ten genres in ample details that have been repeated with minor additions by literary theorists through the ages. These genres, however, can be divided into two groups, one for erotic themes and the other for conflicts. In the first group, some genres, such as the *nataka* and *prakarana*, were meant to depict sensitive and profound love, whereas others, such as *prabasana* and *bhana*, were meant to depict crude sexuality, often making such plays bawdy and satirical. The conflict plays could also be subdivided into two categories. Genres like *samavakara*, *ihamriga*, and *dima* showed divine combats, whereas *vyayoga* and *utsristikakanka* showed human duels. But *nataka* was the most complete of them all because it dealt with the psychological probings of humans in love and despair.

Nataka dramas were designed to be based on well-known stories from the ancient tales of royal families. The dramas could not be about a contemporary patron, though the playwrights adjusted the ancient tales to reflect their own times. The wealth of royalty, their erotic exploits, and the ensuing cycle of pleasure and suffering were fully depicted. As a result, the *natakas* describe ancient Indian royal lifestyles. The ancient audience looked not so much for new events in the

plot as for improvisation in characters and performance style. The hero in *nataka* drama either belonged to a royal family or was a king himself. His love affairs (with royal women only) thus always had a significant political fallout. A typical example of this motif comes from the play *Svapnavasavadattam* (The Dream of Vasavadatta) by Bhasa (flourished second or third century CE). Here the king, Udayan, is led to believe that his beloved wife, Vasavadatta, has died in a fire and that freed of his excessive preoccupation with his love he can work to consolidate his kingdom and defeat his enemies. After the task of political stability is achieved, the wife is brought back, but in the meantime he is made to marry the daughter of an ally. Both women accept the outcome with grace and magnanimity. Strange as it may seem today, not only is the principle of harmonious polygamy affirmed but also a psychological exploration of the hero's profound love for Vasavadatta is combined with examination of a marriage of convenience for social utility. Usually the *nataka* had a happy ending in the sense that it ended with the union of lovers, but to call it a comedy would be a mistake because prolonged separation and suffering were essential. The final union itself was not a triumph of passion but rather an affirmation of just desire unified with public good. Sometimes the final union was only for social benefit, such as to provide an heir to the throne.

Heroes and Heroines

The protagonist in the *nataka* always had an elevated character and was often a connoisseur of the arts. His love was expressed in refined dialogue, both prose and poetry, and his longings through conventional use on stage of songs and paintings. Patience, magnanimity, and gravity of purpose were musts for all heroes and heroines. A supernatural episode was also necessary as part of the plot to indicate the interest of the gods in human affairs and to raise the element of wonder in the play. For example, in *Abhijnanasakuntalam* (The Ring of Sakuntala), a famous play by Kalidasa (flourished fifth century), when the heroine Sakuntala is turned away by the king Dusyanta, she disappears in a whirl of light and is transported far away by her divine mother to the retreat of a sage teacher.

The *nataka* relied heavily upon the presence of a jester (*vidusaka*), a distinctive feature of ancient theater. The role of the *vidusaka* is rooted in the precept of the *Natya Sastra* that "laughter arises best in an erotic situation." The *vidusaka* was a humorous foil to the moody, melancholic, or impractical longings of the royal hero. But above all, this jester belonged to the tradition of Indian theater that consciously ridiculed

the pretensions and hypocrisy of the upper classes, intellectual elite, Brahmans, pundits, scholars, and ascetics. Whereas the dramatic genre called *prahasana* perfected vitriolic satire, *nataka* took the middle way of milder ridicule. The typical *vidusaka* in the *natakas* was a bosom friend and not a paid court jester. He was usually depicted as a distorted figure, an ugly-faced, dirty-looking, bald Brahman who walked like a crane, looked up and down, and ogled stupidly. He spoke rubbish, ridiculed the hero, or made vulgar comments. In most plays, he was shown as a slothful, sleepy glutton. He never spoke Sanskrit but rather the common language, called *avantika*. In short, he was a caricature of the alert, grave, and scholarly Brahman. But genuine affection and absolute faithfulness to the hero were his most endearing qualities.

A *nataka* consisted of five to ten acts and sometimes contained a subplot that extended its length. It was also recommended that in a *nataka* there should be no more than four to five players at a time on stage. This restriction was imposed to allow the dramatist to concentrate on the characters and their dramatic development. To create memorable and special characters was the dramatist's main challenge. For example, improving upon the story of Sakuntala as found in the epic *Mahabharata*, Kalidasa made his heroine capable of much greater suffering and sacrifice.

Dance and Music

The *nataka* was to be performed with plenty of dance and music, which the other nine dramatic genres used sparingly. For this reason, as compared with modern naturalistic theater of the European kind, the progress of the ancient *nataka* was slow. If an injunction regarding an act in the *Natya Sastra* is taken to mean "to be performed in one day" and not to mean "depiction of the actions of one day," then the playing time for a single act was supposed to be one day. If so, then a single play that nowadays takes only three hours would have taken five to ten days to be performed.

The *nataka* was intended to display all the essential features of the ancient art of theatrical representation, in which were employed not only the verbal medium of dialogue but also gestural communication through highly complicated body language (*angika abhinaya*), subtle facial expressions, and elaborate costumes. The aim was to create an intense aesthetic experience for the audience through a variety of dramatic emotions that transported the audience to the state of delight and special taste called *rasa*.

With the decline of ancient theater from the eleventh century onward, the *nataka*, like the other

nine genres, fell into disuse. In modern times, with the revival of drama, it has been revived as a cross between traditional and modern realistic drama.

Bharat Gupt

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NATION-RELIGION-MONARCH *Chat-Sasana-Phramabakasat* (Thai for Nation-Religion-Monarch) is a metaphor for national integration and national identity in Thailand. This trinitarian phrase was introduced by King Vajiravudh (Rama VI), who ruled Siam from 1910 to 1925. The trinity Nation-Religion-Monarch was the foundation of Vajiravudh's nationalistic ideas, which were a central theme in Thai politics during that time. Due to the increasing influence of the British and French colonial powers in Southeast Asia and the losses of large territories east of the Mekong that Siam had occupied and controlled until 1893, there was an urgent need to create an ideological basis for unifying the several ethnic groups forming the population of the modern Thai nation-state, in which the ethnic Thai (Siamese)—though forming the political elite—in fact were a minority of only about 25 percent. The other ethnic groups were the Lao in the Northeast (a great number of whom were forced by the Siamese government to resettle from the east bank to the west bank of the Mekong River during the nineteenth century), the Muang or Yuan and the Lu in the North, Malay-speaking groups in the South, Chinese and Vietnamese immigrants, and other ethnic groups of the Tibeto-Burman and Mon-Khmer language families.

Nation-Religion-Monarch was a "trinitarian mystery in which all three elements were inextricably bound together. . . . Allegiance to any one of the three meant loyalty to all three, disloyalty or disobedience or disrespect toward one meant disrespect toward all" (Wyatt 1984: 229). Vajiravudh, who had been educated in England at Sandhurst Military Academy and Oxford University, established a governmental program that was essentially one of Westernization, and his nationalism was a Western import founded on the Hobbesian theory of man being in need of leadership, though traditional Thai values such as loyalty to Buddhism, love for the monarchy, and cultural pride were integrated therein. Historically, the trinity of Buddhism, kingship, and the people was a general concept of the "Buddhist Kingdom" (Tambiah 1978: 111). Vajiravudh himself had published a number of essays, newspaper articles, plays, songs, and poems to make his version of the trinity and his understanding of the nation popular. The idea of Nation-Religion-Monarch also was a central motto for the paramilitary Wild Tiger Corps and the Thai Boy Scout movement, which were created by Vajiravudh. Each of the three elements of the trinity, which commonly are called the "three holy pillars of the Thai state," has a broader meaning that can best be explained only against the background of traditional Thai society and history.

***Chat* (Nation)**

The term *chat*—from the Sanskrit *jati*, meaning a "lifespan" or "circle of rebirths"—traditionally was known to Thai people as "common ancestry" or "common origin." As part of the trinity, the meaning of *chat* was extended to include "nation." In Vajiravudh's works the definition of *chat* started with family line or caste, and went on to a group of people who had originally been relatives and lived together in one place. Herewith, Vajiravudh referred to the supposed common ancestorship of the Tai peoples. The term "Tai" (etymologically meaning "man" or "mankind" in Proto-Tai) was transformed into Thai (by replacing the unaspirated initial consonant of "Tai" with the aspirated consonant beginning the word "Thai"), a term that more and more replaced the name Siamese (Tai Sayam), and then was defined to mean "free." Vajiravudh created the name Thailand ("land of the free"), emphasizing the Siamese success in maintaining independence from European colonialism.

Chat in the context of the trinity is a term having an ethnic as well as a political-historical and cultural dimension. It first refers to the T(h)ai as an ethnic group, but also to Thai citizenship. The term also includes historical aspects, especially the continuity of

Thai history and civilization, which were traced 6,000 years back to the Altai, and which reached a first political climax in the kingdom of Nanchao before the first great Tai kingdoms (Muang Mao, Lanna, Sukhothai, Lan Sang, and Ayutthaya) were founded in Southeast Asia. Culturally, *chat* stresses the freedom-loving character of the Thai, as well as common values and sociocultural patterns of all T(h)ai peoples. In addition, the use of a national language—Central Thai—was emphasized. After the 1932 revolution, in which the absolute monarchy was abolished and replaced by a constitutional monarchy, many writings added loyalty to democracy and democratic values when defining the term *chat*.

***Sasana* (Religion)**

Sasana is used synonymously for Theravada Buddhism, the official state religion of Thailand. Buddhism was probably the most important factor supporting the national integration of different groups of the Tai language family, which all followed the same religion. From the thirteenth century on, Theravada Buddhism was favored by the Thai, Lao, and Yuan kings as a means of increasing royal virtue and public welfare and as a way of adding miraculous power to the state. Vajiravudh broadened the meaning of Buddhism and identified it with patriotism and political morality. He continued the reforms of Buddhism and especially of Buddhist education that began with the religious reforms of his predecessors, Mongkut and Chulalongkorn.

The person to be credited with the creation of what today is termed "Thai Buddhism" was Vajiravudh's uncle, Prince Vajiranana, who was Sangharaja (head of the *sangha*, or Buddhist monastic community) from 1910 to 1921, and who worked toward bringing monks of different traditions into a unified national *sangha* in which the reformed Theravada tradition was to be practiced and communicated to the laity in the form of a national institution. The state-controlled *sangha* played an important role in general education, especially in mediating Central Thai as a national language and in communicating Siamese history as a national history that was tied up with Buddhism. Another important function of the *sangha* was (and is) to legitimate the sociopolitical status of the monarch, who was always seen as the protector of *sasana*.

***Pbramabakasat* (Monarch)**

Traditionally, the king in Buddhist Tai societies was seen as *dharmaraja* (righteous ruler) and *chakravartin* (wheel-rolling emperor), which meant that he

was not only a political but also a religious and moral leader of the people. The king was said to be the patron and supporter of the Buddhist religion, and religion in turn was understood as the special treasure of the kingdom and a marker of its legitimacy. The king was provided with Buddhist symbols that were thought to give the king sacred power.

Vajiravudh's concept of kingship was based on these traditional foundations. He saw kingship as natural to Siam and essential to Siam's progress. Siam's success and continuity in history and its independence from colonial powers were interpreted as the results of wise royal leadership and diplomacy. However, though the emphasis was on traditional values, Vajiravudh also developed new ideas that would promote the monarch as the embodiment of the nation. He presented himself no longer as *devaraja* (god-king) but as a "citizen king" by abandoning certain forms of etiquette and privileges that had underpinned the formal sacredness of the monarch. His new type of kingship, which was emulated by subsequent kings—most notably by the present king, Bhumibol Adulyadej—was characterized by a close linkage between the monarch and the people (nation).

Despite the dissenting voices of some Marxist scholars, who assert that Vajiravudh's nationalism was a "*sakdina* nationalism" (feudal nationalism) that aimed at continuing the old structures of sociopolitical organization and securing for the king the status of absolute monarch, the concept of Nation-Religion-Monarch continues in contemporary Thai politics. Even today, the inseparability of the monarchy from the nation is stressed.

Jana Raendchen and Oliver Raendchen

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NATIONAL DAY—CHINA By the autumn of 1949, the Chinese civil war was drawing to a close, the People's Liberation Army of the Chinese Communist Party having defeated the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975). On 1 October 1949 Mao Zedong (1893–1976) stood on the Gate of Heavenly Peace in Tiananmen Square in Beijing to announce the founding of the People's Republic of China. This date subsequently was declared National Day and since then has been a hugely significant date in China's calendar, the celebrations often coinciding with the launch of major new political campaigns. Until the advent of the reform and opening up of China in 1978, military parades in Beijing and other cities took center stage. Although the emphasis of the National Day festival has now shifted toward the holding of civil events, the military played an important role in the lavish fiftieth anniversary celebrations of 1999, which were notable not simply for their extravagance but also for the massive disruption to life in Beijing caused by the extensive security precautions. The National Day festivities now stretch to a weeklong holiday, during which the country's most popular tourist sites are at their busiest.

Julian Ward

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NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM During the U.S. War in Vietnam (also known as the Second Indochinese War), in a major move to overthrow the

U.S.-backed Saigon regime in South Vietnam and establish Communist rule throughout the country, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) leadership established the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) on 20 December 1960 in Tay Ninh Province. After six years of trying to unify the country through political means, the Vietnamese Communist Party (Lao Dong Party) had concluded that armed violence was the best way to do so.

The NFLSV, usually known as the National Liberation Front (NLF), was typical of most Communist-front organizations. It drew its membership from the South Vietnamese who were anti-Diem—or opposed South Vietnam's government—and anti-American, including Communists and non-Communists alike. For example, Nguyen Huu Tho (1910–1994), a supposed non-Communist, presided over the Communist Party-dominated NLF.

The NLF, known as the Viet Cong by its enemies, was perceived by U.S. policymakers as a purely Hanoi-directed movement. These policymakers argued that if the flow of supplies and troops to the NLF was halted, the southern revolution would die and the Diem regime would remain safe, justifying American involvement in the conflict. Others argued that the conflict in the south was a locally based insurgency and that the NLF was a southern organization that had risen organically from the people opposed to Diem.

Throughout the war the NLF staged assaults through its military arm, the People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF), on U.S. and ARVN (Army of the Republic of South Vietnam) forces. The most dramatic of these assaults was the 1968 Tet Offensive. Beginning in 1968, the NFLSV sent representatives to the Paris peace talks, and it played a major role in forming the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG), the government-in-waiting during the later stages of the war. At the war's end, only a few NFLSV representatives were incorporated into the new national government of South Vietnam.

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NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY-MYANMAR

The National League for Democracy (NLD) was Myanmar's (Burma's) leading political party during the 1990 elections. It won a landslide victory in the May 1990 elections, the first to be held for thirty years: of the 485 seats, the NLD won 396 (82 percent), the army-backed National Unity Party 10 (2 percent), and others 79 (16 percent). The party was founded on 24 September 1988 by retired Brigadier-General Aung Gyi (chair), retired General Tin Oo (vice chair), and Aung San Suu Kyi (general secretary) in response to the injustices they felt the army was committing against the Burmese people. A systematic campaign against the NLD was initiated before the elections. The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) imprisoned Tin Oo, placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest, and generally harassed NLD members. SLORC anticipated during the elections that if they would not win, the results would probably be a draw and disagreement would arise among party leaders, in which case there would be a role for the military. They were greatly disappointed with the results.

SLORC refused to convene the parliament and nullified the elections with the excuse that it would not accept an interim government under the 1947 constitution. Legally, parliament would have had to be convened by 27 July 1990, within sixty days of the elections. In anticipation, SLORC issued on 27 July its notorious Notification No. 1/90, stating that only SLORC has the right to exercise legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and that it would not accept a government formed under an interim constitution. The constitution became an excuse for not handing over the reins of government. The Gandhi Hall declaration, resulting from a meeting on 28–29 July 1990 of elected members and the NLD executive committee, called for the authorities to transfer power to the NLD under the 1948 revised constitution before 30 September 1990. At a meeting of 500 elected members of parliament in Mandalay on 29 September, seven were elected to map the action program to implement the Gandhi Hall declaration, resulting in a resolution on 1 October to establish a government in liberated areas inside Burma if necessary. Under severe repression and with the future for democratic government bleak, many members of parliament were forced to escape to the Thai border. Failing to take

the reins of government, NLD elected representatives formed the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) in Manerplaw (just inside Myanmar on the Thai border) on 18 December 1990. Manerplaw was destroyed a few years later by SLORC, forcing the NCGUB to move inside Thailand. Headed by Dr. Sein Lwin, NCGUB today represents elected government in exile.

In January 1993, the authorities in Myanmar announced a national convention to draft the new constitution. In 1995, after Aung San Suu Kyi's release from house arrest, the NLD demanded to be fully included in the constitution drafting process. SLORC refused and the NLD set out to draft its own constitution, to which the authorities responded by promulgating Law No. 5/96, prohibiting everyone including NLD members and elected representatives from drafting, debating, or even discussing a future constitution outside the national convention.

The NLD has shown considerable ingenuity to survive. U Kyi Maung took over temporary leadership of the NLD to lead the party to electoral victory in 1990 after Aung San Suu Kyi, U Tin Oo, and other senior colleagues had been arrested. U Kyi Maung became vice chair in 1992 but eventually resigned in 1997. Aung Shwe took over as NLD chair in the context of party reorganization in 1992.

In the wake of negotiations that began in October 2000 between General Khin Nyunt and Aung San Suu Kyi, the government-controlled media toned down their criticisms of the NLD, prisoners were released, and the NLD was once again permitted to put up signboards above its offices. This is a hopeful sign, but observers express considerable caution over it.

Gustaaf Houtman

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NATIONAL MINORITIES—CHINA A 2000 census in China revealed that 106 million people in that country, or about 8.41 percent of the total population, belonged to an ethnic minority. Thus, China is a multiethnic state. The areas populated by the fifty-five national minorities make up about 60 percent of the total Chinese territory, although in most areas the Han Chinese are in the majority. In 1990 the largest minority, the Zhuang, numbered almost 15.5 million people, and the smallest minority, the Lhoba in Tibet, only twenty-three hundred. (See Table 1.)

Except for the Hui, all these nationalities have their own languages, but most Manchu and She (not included in Table 1) use Chinese. Until the late 1940s, nineteen groups still used their own writing. Since the 1950s, new scripts based on the Latin alphabet were created by the Chinese government.

Traditional Perceptions

Against the background of more than two thousand years of Chinese culture, during most of which time a central power held sway, traditional perceptions have shaped the government's conduct toward other people (minorities) and the expectations about how those minorities must behave toward the central power. Imperial China saw itself as the cultural center of the world and its culture as the culture of humanity. The existence of various peoples living in distinct settlement areas was accepted; but heaven had entrusted only one group with rule over the entire human race. This group—the Han Chinese—was considered to inhabit the center of the world, or the Middle Kingdom (Zhongguo), and its emperors were "Sons of Heaven." The Han Chinese, who were farmers, were contemptuous of the non-Chinese peoples around them, who were hunters and gatherers or nomads and were thought to be culturally and technologically inferior.

Confucianism, for centuries the Chinese state ideology, enshrined this contempt of the "barbarians." According to the historian Sima Qian (145?–86? BCE), the barbarians were ignorant of *li*, the proper rules of life, and of *yi*, the duties of life. The Chinese thus understood difference as ignorance of the social structure of relations and of the Confucian rites. They concluded that barbarians were unable to control their emotions, tended to give way to their feelings, and behaved like wild animals.

Nevertheless, Confucianism did not propose annihilating these people; instead, the non-Chinese had to subordinate themselves to the emperor's power and allow themselves to be integrated into Chinese society in a nonviolent fashion. This traditional attitude has

TABLE 1

Chinese Language Groups and Nationalities with More Than 1 Million Population in 1990 Census		
Language Group	Nationality	Number of People (in millions)
1. Han Chinese		1,042.5
2. Sino-Thai		
	Zhuang	15.4
	Bouyei	2.5
	Dong	2.5
	Dai	1.0
3. Tibeto-Burmese		
	Yi	6.6
	Tujia	5.7
	Tibetan	4.6
	Bai	1.6
	Hani	1.3
4. Miao-Yao		
	Miao	7.4
	Yao	2.1
5. Turkish		
	Uygur	7.2
	Kazakh	1.1
6. Mongolian		
	Mongol	4.8
7. Tungusic		
	Manchu	9.8
8. Korean		1.9
9. Other		
	Hui	8.6

Note: Nationalities with populations under 1 million people are not included.

SOURCE: China Statistics Press (2001: 93).

weakened since the mid-nineteenth century, partly through Western influence and penetration, but its basic ideas have by no means disappeared.

Nationalities Policies

During the initial years following the foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, for the first time in Chinese history the existence of separate nations in the country was acknowledged without reservation. However, incipient steps in the early 1950s toward legal and de facto equality for all later fell victim to the radical political experiments of Mao Zedong (1893–1976). Proliferating incursions into the territory of non-Han peoples and radical interference with their social structures provoked vehement opposition on the part of those peoples, starting even in the 1950s. In some cases, the minorities in the border regions escaped the oppression emanating from Beijing by mass exodus over the borders.

It was during the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960) that a deliberate policy of forced assimilation was first

pursued. This policy of absorbing the nationalities into Chinese society brought compulsory restrictions or even bans on the use of national languages, the cultivation of national literatures, and the practice of national rites, customs, and religions; the government used force to eliminate the social structures of the minorities. Not only in Tibet, but also in numerous other regions inhabited by non-Han peoples, popular unrest, culminating in armed uprisings, was quashed by the military. Finally, the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) brought with it the most extreme form of forced assimilation: physical destruction and cultural annihilation. For all non-Han peoples, even today, this traumatic experience is remembered as the most severe national oppression.

Regional Autonomy

At the beginning of the 1980s, the Chinese leadership saw itself forced to formulate a more moderate policy because of discontent in non-Han areas. The results of the Cultural Revolution had made it clear that the integration of non-Han people had to be achieved, not through force, but through measures that were based on a broad consensus. The constitution of 1982 revalorized the minorities correspondingly, and a 1984 Autonomy Law formally extended to them the widest-reaching freedoms since the founding of the People's Republic.

Central government decisions and directives that did not correspond to the concrete conditions of an autonomous region no longer had to be carried out (but only if the central government agreed); the leading cadres were supposed to come from the autonomous nationalities; the autonomous areas received a larger catalog of rights in respect to planning, economic development, protection, and exploitation of their resources, foreign trade, education, finance, public health, and other sectors.

Most clauses of the Autonomy Law, however, are so vaguely worded that they cannot be implemented on their own. The Autonomy Law makes no reference to an effective system for protecting the autonomy of minorities, and there are no legal measures for implementing the law. The new law did not answer the calls of many minority leaders for broader autonomy. Particularly among the larger nationalities, younger people became radicalized because they no longer expected Beijing to offer any solutions to their problems. In the early 1980s, the non-Han peoples had looked to Beijing, which promised much but had given little.

Growing Lines of Conflict and Prospects

Percentage increases in the economic and educational spheres and the regrating of certain freedoms in the cultural sector ignored the basic problem that the minorities and their cultural identities took second place to the interests of the Han Chinese because of the government's attempts to make the economy roughly equal for all groups ("development") and because of the increasing Sinitization of culture. Despite the government's reform policies, the gap in development between the autonomous regions of the non-Han peoples and the Han regions increased. Of the official number of 80 million people living below the poverty line in China in the mid-1990s, about 64 million, or 80 percent, lived in minority areas. Although considerable materials flowed from the center to the minority areas, nearly half of the counties classified as "poor" lie in national minority areas.

Of course, the central government was not solely responsible for this situation. Some ethnic areas are remote regions of refuge, into which non-Han peoples have had to flee before the Han expansion in recent centuries. But it is also clear that since the founding of the People's Republic, no development policy suited to these areas has ever been followed. The reform policies have visibly diminished state oversight, but this has brought no advantages to the minority areas. According to Chinese reports, the center and the provinces have not given many autonomous areas enough credit, subsidies, foreign exchange, and materials.

Hand in hand with dissatisfaction over economic and social deterioration and backwardness goes dissatisfaction over immigration, which is making local nationalities into minorities in their own areas, along with dissatisfaction with constant bureaucratic interference in religious and cultural life, as well as the decades-long destruction of nature and the environment. A new flood of Han Chinese moved into the autonomous regions in recent years; enterprises were established using cheap local resources to produce products that were "exported" to Han areas. But these enterprises brought nothing useful to the local population, only environmental pollution, deforestation, destruction of the landscape, and illnesses.

The increasing consciousness of national identity, especially among the more numerous peoples, expresses itself, among other ways, in rising religiosity. In Tibet the monasteries became the center of resistance because the danger that threatens Tibetan culture is felt most strongly there. In Muslim areas (there may be about 17 million Muslims in China), Islam radicalized itself.

Fundamentalist influences from Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and the new states in Central Asia did not remain without influence. It is not impossible that if the central power weakens, nationalist movements of smaller nationalities will arise, as was the case in the former Soviet Union.

China has promoted some affirmative policies toward non-Han nationalities: recognition of the existence of different ethnic groups, prohibition of discrimination, special laws for minorities in the 1950s and 1980s, aid to minority areas, guarantees of special representation, special benefits in regard to population policy and university entrance examinations, freedom to choose ethnic identity. But the future of minorities in China may be affected not only by positive policies but also by policies and actions that generate conflicts and affect stability.

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NATIONAL PEACEKEEPING COUNCIL—THAILAND

The National Peacekeeping Council (NPC) was the military junta headed by General Suchinda Kraprayoon, who briefly administered Thailand following the 23 February 1991 coup that ousted Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan. Although the military claims to have staged the coup for the public good in order to stem the rampant corruption of the Chatichai government, the military leadership was concerned about its declining political role in governing. The NPC disbanded parliament and imposed restrictions on the media, but it allowed political parties to continue operating and pledged to restore democracy. The NPC appointed the re-

spected bureaucrat and former businessman Anand Panyarachun interim premier until a new constitution was promulgated.

The NPC's new constitution gave the military substantial political power, including control over the senate and a provision for the appointment of an unelected premier. Despite a pledge to restore politics to civilians, the military established a political party, the Samakkee Tham (United in Virtue). After their candidate was accused by the United States of drug trafficking, coup leader Suchinda successfully contested the March 1992 election. Suchinda became prime minister on 7 April 1992, infuriating students and the middle class, which had been hit hard by the economic repercussions of the coup. After the military brutally crushed demonstrations, Suchinda was forced to resign on 24 May 1992.

Zachary Abuza

See also: **Thailand-Political Parties; Thailand-Political System.**

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NATIONAL TAIWAN UNIVERSITY The National Taiwan University is the oldest and the most prestigious university in Taiwan. Its antecedent was the Taihoku (Taipei) Imperial University, founded by the Japanese colonial government in 1928. When the Taihoku University was first established, it had only two colleges with sixty students. It was then expanded to include five colleges with 382 students before the end of World War II.

Following Taiwan's retrocession to Chinese sovereignty in 1945, the Nationalist government resumed the administration of the Taihoku University and renamed it National Taiwan University. Dr. Lo Tsung-lo, a Japan-trained botanist, was appointed by the

Ministry of Education as the first president. In the 2000 academic year, the university had in total ten colleges and eighty departments and graduate institutes with a student body of more than 27,000.

Over the past seventy years, the National Taiwan University produced many prominent people in various fields. In political circles, since the 1990s, its graduates gradually replaced politicians trained by universities in the Chinese mainland before 1949 and occupied most of the minister-level positions within the government.

Chang Jui-te

NATIONAL UNITY PARTY—MYANMAR

The National Unity Party (NUP) of Myanmar (Burma) is the successor to the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) of General Ne Win, which collapsed during the 1988 pro-democracy protests. Although publicized as a change in political direction, the NUP inherited much of its membership and infrastructure from the defunct BSPP. Its leadership consisted of former BSPP functionaries and retired military officers, including the party's founding chairman, U Tha Kyaw.

The NUP was promoted by the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in the run-up to the 1990 general election, which it clearly expected the party to win. In the event, the NUP won only ten seats, although its supporters argued that this was an unfair showing for 25 percent of the nationwide vote. Subsequently, NUP officials began attending sessions of the SLORC-convened National Convention, which was assigned the task of drawing up Myanmar's new constitution.

However, after 1993 the role of the NUP appeared to be superseded by the formation of another new body, the Union Solidarity and Development Association. A mass organization with more than 5 million members, the USDA was more often publicized in the state-controlled media than the NUP to try and demonstrate civilian support for the military government. Such moves suggested that the NUP had failed to establish itself as the political face of the Burmese armed forces in the post-BSPP era.

Martin Smith

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NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE

National University of Singapore (NUS) is a multidisciplinary, publicly funded university. It is Singapore's oldest, biggest, and most comprehensive tertiary educational institution. Its roots go back to 1905, when Singapore's first medical school was established. Its lineage of predecessor institutions includes the University of Malaya (Singapore), Raffles College, the University of Singapore, and Nanyang University. NUS was inaugurated after the University of Singapore merged with Nanyang University.

From the initial seven, the student enrollment at the turn of the century was more than 30,000 undergraduate and graduate students. English being the medium of instruction, more than 20 percent of NUS students come from outside Singapore.

Located on 150 hectares of undulating green on Singapore's west coast, NUS offers courses in business, computing, dentistry, engineering, the humanities, law, medicine, and sciences. NUS is also actively engaged in research and development activities. Collaboration with national research institutes and industry enriches its research culture. With its extensive student and alumni base, NUS graduates have made their mark in all sectors of Singapore's government, economy, and society.

Chiu-Ai Ngooi

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NATSAGDORJ, DASHDORJIYN (1906–1937), Mongolian writer, poet, playwright. Dashdorjiyn Natsagdorj, considered one of the founding fathers of modern Mongolian literature, was born in Tov Province of an impoverished noble family and, due to an absence of formalized education in Mongolia, received much of his early education from a tutor. By 1923, Natsagdorj was a member of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, through which he participated in revolutionary activities as well as in the first theatrical group in Ulaanbaatar, for which he

wrote plays and songs. Between 1925 and 1929 Natsagdorj studied in Soviet Russia and Germany. After returning to Mongolia in 1929, he worked for the Mongolian Committee of Science, where his activities included historical research and translating, but he also contributed to Mongolian theater as a playwright.

The 1930s were difficult for Natsagdorj. In 1932, Communist writers accused him of nationalist leanings because his writings emphasized themes of patriotism rather than identifying with the international proletariat, and he was subsequently imprisoned for six months. Then his wife, Pagmadulma, and daughter, Anandaa-Shirii, were sent to Leningrad in 1935 under mysterious circumstances. For the remaining two years of his life, Natsagdorj was deeply depressed. Although reflecting a different era, his opera *Uchirtay Gurvan Tolgoy* (Three Sad Hills) and famous poem "Minii Nutag" (My Homeland) form the cornerstones of modern Mongolian literature.

Timothy M. May

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NATSUME SOSEKI (1867–1916), novelist and scholar. Natsume Soseki was born in Tokyo under the name of Natsume Kinosuke but adopted the pseudonym Natsume Soseki as a writer. Soseki and Mori Rintaro (1862–1922), who wrote under the pen name of Mori Ogai, are widely regarded as the twin titans of modern Japanese literature. Soseki was sent to England as a government student in 1900 and returned to Japan in 1903 to replace Lafcadio Hearn (1850–1904) as lecturer in English Literature at Tokyo Imperial University (now University of Tokyo). With his first novel, *Wagabai wa neko de aru* (I Am a Cat, 1905–1906), a satire on par with Laurence Sterne's *Tristram Shandy*, Soseki made his mark and quickly established himself as a novelist. This work was closely followed by his 1906 works, *Botchan* (Little Master) and *Kusamakura* (Grass Pillow), which was translated and published as *The Three-Cornered World*. He quit teaching in 1907 and joined the newspaper *Asabi shimbun*, in which his next ten novels were serialized, approximately one each year. His later novels, in contrast to his humorous early works, reveal profound psychological insight.

Plagued by deteriorating health and poor marital relations, in his later works Soseki probed the alienation and isolation of the modern intellectual. His final and unfinished novel, *Meian* (Light and Darkness, 1916), the literary critic Eto Jun called one of the few Japanese modern novels that deserves the name of a true modern novel. It shows the possibilities of the Meiji period novel for sharp social commentary.

William Ridgeway

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NAVA'I , MIR 'ALI SHIR (1441–1501), Uzbekistan poet and cultural and political figure. Mir 'Ali Shir Nava'i (also Navoi, Nawa'i) was born in Herat into a family of scribes and literati; there he became a school companion of Sultan Husayn Bayqara. The young 'Ali Shir left Herat and studied at Samarqand amid political instabilities. Returning in 1469 with the accession of Sultan Husayn, he passed the rest of his life in the Sultan's service, despite periods of disfavor. He had the rank of amir (mir) and held some offices briefly, but in general he avoided official positions. His personal intimacy with Sultan Husayn gave him extraordinary powers, as when he governed Herat in the sultan's absence.

Nava'i's greatest legacy is in the sphere of culture. He is credited with perfecting Chagatay Turkic as a literary language. His influence as a patron of literature, science, architecture, painting, calligraphy, and music was a vital catalyst in the cultural efflorescence of late-fifteenth-century Herat. A pupil of Naqshbandi Sufism under his friend, the mystic savant Jami (1414–1492), Nava'i used his wealth to endow about 370 mosques, *madrasabs* (Islamic seminaries), and other pious institutions. Nava'i has been revered by Islamic Turkic peoples; the State Library and other institutions in Uzbekistan bear his name.

D. Prior

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NAW ROOZ. See **No-ruz.**

NAZARBAEV, NURSULTAN (b. 1940), president of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Nursultan Nazarbaev was born in the town of Chemolgan. He joined the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CPKaz) in 1962 while he was studying at the Karaganda (Qaraghandy) Metallurgical Combine in Kazakhstan. Rising through the CPKaz party ranks, Nazarbaev eventually became the first secretary of the Karaganda Oblast (Region) CPKaz Committee. In 1984, he assumed the position of chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, and, in 1989, first secretary of the CPKaz. In 1990, he was elected president of the Kazakh Socialist Soviet Republic, a position he held when Kazakhstan became an independent republic in December 1991.

Since independence, Nursultan Nazarbaev has maintained his hold on power. A referendum on 30 April 1995 extended his tenure as president until the year 2000. Calling an early election, he won a seven-year term in 10 January 1999 by 82 percent of the vote, with his main rival, Serikbolsyn Abdildin, receiving only 12 percent.

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Nazarbaev has expanded his presidential powers by decree. He can appoint and dismiss the cabinet and regional officials, dissolve parliament, call referenda, and initiate constitutional amendments. Western governments have been critical of his authoritarian tendencies and human-rights record. However, the energy wealth of Kazakhstan, as well as its strategic location (south of Russia and west of China), ensures that the country will remain of some importance in international affairs.

Roger D. Kangas

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NE WIN, U (b. 1911), dictator of Myanmar. U Ne Win ruled Myanmar (Burma) from 1962, when he took power in a military coup, until his resignation as chairman of the single ruling party, the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), in July 1988. He is best known for his abolition and suppression of democratic institutions and for undermining the principle of an independent judiciary, culminating in his consolidation of the legislature, executive, and judiciary in 1972.

Known from youth as Shu Maung, he attended University College in Rangoon (now Yangon) from 1929 to 1931, hoping to study medicine. However, uninspired by university life, he failed his exams and did not finish his degree. Supporting the Ba Sein-Tun Oke Thahkin, a right-wing political faction, he ended up opposing more radical university students such as U Nu and Aung San. Among the Thirty Comrades sent to Japan for military training, Shu Maung took the nom de guerre Bo Ne Win on 26 December 1941 at the founding of the Burma Independence Army before it marched into Burma.

At national independence Ne Win served as second commander in chief of the army. He was briefly deputy



General Ne Win U at Arlington National Cemetery in Washington, D.C., in September 1966. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

prime minister and minister of defense and home affairs (1949–1950). When ethnic insurgency became severe, Ne Win was promoted to chief of the army, and, in 1958, he was asked to serve as prime minister in the caretaker government. He stood down after the 1960 elections returned U Nu to power.

On 2 March 1962, Ne Win carried out a coup d'état: he imprisoned U Nu and established the Revolutionary Council, whose original members (excepting one civilian) were drawn from the armed forces. He advocated the "Burmese Way to Socialism," which brought Burma into isolation, supervised by the BSPP, which Ne Win founded in 1962. Forgoing democratic elections and relying on army support, he occupied the most important positions of government and state between 1962 and 1988—chairman of the Revolutionary Council (until 1974) and subsequently president (until 1981, when he relinquished the office to San Yu), chairman of the BSPP (from 1962), and chairman of the BSPP Executive Committee. By his complete control and use of the army, he was able to maintain his control until 1988. Still, his government was plagued by administrative inefficiency.

The gradual decline in the Burmese economy eventually caused Ne Win to devalue the kyat in November 1985 and again in September 1987, which wiped out the savings of the poor. This resulted in major protests and the reassertion of demands for democratic reforms. At an Extraordinary Party Congress in July 1988, Ne Win announced his resignation and called for multiparty elections. Though the May 1990 elections resulted in a landslide victory for the National League for Democracy, power was not transferred, and army personnel with close personal ties to Ne Win continued to hold power in the State Law and Order Restoration Council and subsequent State Peace and Development Council regimes.

Gustaaf Houtman

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NEEDHAM, JOSEPH (1900–1995), British expert on Chinese science. Joseph Needham was a prolific twentieth-century writer on Chinese science and technology. He was born in London into a middle-class intellectual family. Educated at the University of Cambridge in England, Needham was already an embryologist of some distinction in 1937, when his interests in the history of science and Chinese civilization prompted his study of Mandarin Chinese. War in Asia took him to China in 1943 to work with Chinese scientists and learn more about China's remarkable scientific traditions.

After returning to Cambridge in 1948, Needham began writing *Science and Civilization in China*, a complete exploration of China's scientific and technological past. At first, Needham thought that his survey might be no more than 800 pages, but he later expanded the work to seven volumes embracing all aspects of Chinese physics, mathematics, chemistry, astronomy, agriculture, and engineering. As he investigated each tradition, Needham uncovered more and more evidence of Chinese contributions in these fields. Joined in his effort by leading Chinese, European, and American experts, *Science and Civilization in China* now includes seventeen volumes with a dozen more in preparation.

Joseph Needham's interest in the history of Chinese science stimulated many Asian scholars to explore and document their own scientific past. The founding of several prominent research institutes and museums in China, Japan, and Korea devoted to Asian science, technology, and medicine are due in part to Needham's enthusiasm and encouragement.

Paul Forage

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NEGERI SEMBILAN (2002 est. pop. 874,700). Negeri Sembilan is a state on the west coast of Malaysia. The term "Negeri Sembilan," which means

"Nine States" in Malay, historically refers to nine districts or small chieftaincies under the suzerainty of the sultan of Johor from around 1640 to 1760. Negeri Sembilan covers an area of 6,643 square kilometers and has a population approaching 880,000: 53 percent Malay, 30 percent Chinese, 16 percent Indian, and 1 percent other. Its capital is Seremban. Port Dickson, which lies in the district of Pantai Laut, is well known for its beaches and resorts. The features that distinguish Negeri Sembilan from the other states in Malaysia are its architecture—the buffalo horn-shaped roof peaks—and its matrilineal system (*adat perpatih*), both being legacies of the Minangkabau people.

Historically, the Minangkabau people were from Sumatra. In the eighteenth century, they were attracted to the gold districts of Pahang State and the valleys of what was later known as Negeri Sembilan. When they came, they brought their unique matrilineal system. The coming of the Bugis, a seafaring race, in the early eighteenth century contributed to a decline of Malay power, and the control of the Johor sultanate became less and less effective. The Minangkabau population was reluctant to offer allegiance to the Bugis. The Negeri Sembilan chiefs asked the sultan of Johor to let them have a prince to govern the country and drive out the enemy, but the sultan would not give them a prince. With permission from the sultan of Johor, the chiefs referred to the Minangkabaus in Sumatra. The sultan in Minangkabau gave them one of his sons, Raja Melewar, who became the first *yang di-pertuan besar*, or *yamtuan besar* (ruler), in 1773.

In the 1820s, there were five claimants to the Negeri Sembilan throne. Civil wars led to British intervention in 1874. Before the 1870s, Britain had a policy of noninvolvement in the affairs of the Malay states, although it had extensive trading interests there. In 1895, a British resident, Martin Lister, was appointed for the whole of Negeri Sembilan. The role of the resident was to advise the sultan on how to improve the administration of his state. Although the resident was to have no executive powers, his advice had to be sought and acted upon in all matters other than those relating to Malay religion and customs. It was a system used to exercise British influence over the Malay states. The three general aims were the establishment of law and order, the centralized collection of revenue, and the development of the resources of the states. Lister died in 1897 and was succeeded by E. W. Birch, who effected the union of the Negeri Sembilan states and ended the civil war by the election of Tengku Muhammad as the *yang di-pertuan besar* of the whole state.

In 1896, Negeri Sembilan, together with the states of Selangor, Perak, and Pahang, formed the Federated Malay States. In 1948, the Federated Malay States became part of the Federation of Malaya. The federation gained independence from British colonial rule in 1957. Together with Sabah and Sarawak, the federation formed Malaysia in 1963.

Yik Koon Teh


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NEHRU, JAWAHARLAL (1889–1964), Indian politician. Jawaharlal Nehru was born 14 November 1889 in Allahabad. His father Motilal Nehru (1861–1931) was a rich lawyer who sent him to England in 1905 for an elite education at Harrow, Cambridge, and London. He returned to India in 1912 and practiced law. In 1917, he joined the Home Rule League.

After the Amritsar massacre in 1919, Nehru was a close associate of Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948) in the Indian National Congress (INC). Nehru was influenced by Marxist ideas and was cofounder of the Indian branch of the League against Imperialism. Ideologically, he differed from Gandhi in many ways, but Gandhi sponsored him twice for the presidency of the INC in 1929 and 1936, as Gandhi was aware of Nehru's influence on the younger generation.

Nehru's autobiography, published in London in 1936, was widely appreciated as a moving document of the Indian freedom struggle. In August 1946 the Viceroy of India appointed him interim prime minister. He continued as prime minister of independent India. As a passionate parliamentarian, he laid the foundations of India's democracy. Under his leadership the INC won the general elections of 1952, 1957, and 1962. The INC retained a "centrist" position profiting from the polarization of incompatible opposition



Jawaharlal Nehru in the 1940s. (CORBIS)

parties. The Planning Commission, with the prime minister as ex-officio chairman, was established by cabinet resolution in 1950. The Five Year Plans inaugurated by Nehru in this capacity stressed rapid industrialization based on public-sector enterprises. He advocated a "socialist pattern of society" and insisted that the state should control the "commanding heights of the economy."

In his foreign policy Nehru supported both the idea of Afro-Asian solidarity (Bandung Conference, 1955) and the movement of nonaligned nations (Belgrade Conference, 1961). He first met Egyptian prime minister Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–1970) and Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) in 1954 and joined with them in sponsoring the nonaligned movement. In spite of his commitment to this movement, he also cultivated good relations with the Soviet Union, whose economic achievements he had admired since visiting it for the first time in 1927. He also thought of Communist China as an anti-imperialist power and hoped for peaceful coexistence with it. This hope was shattered by the border war of October 1962 when Chinese troops invaded India. His health broke down after this experience, and he died in May 1964.

Dietmar Rothermund



NEHRU MOVES FOR INDEPENDENCE

At the Indian National Congress in Madras in 1927, Jawaharlal Nehru offered the "Independence Resolution."

It is my high privilege to place before you the resolution on Independence (Cheers).

The resolution reads thus:

The Congress declares the goal of the Indian people to be complete national independence.

I do not think I can describe this resolution in any better language than that used by the distinguished Ex-President of the Congress, Dr. Annie Besant, in an interview which she gave immediately after the Subject Committee had accepted this resolution. She said that it was a dignified and clear statement of India's goal (Cheers).

No special remarks are necessary from me in commending this resolution for your acceptance specially after the almost complete unanimity with which the Subject Committee approved of it. But I wish to explain very clearly one or two points connected with this resolution. The first thing is that this resolution although it makes clear the goal does not change the present creed of the Congress. If you pass this resolution you declare by a majority. I hope by an overwhelming majority that the Congress is to-day for complete independence. Nonetheless you have the doors of the Congress open to such persons as may not approve of this goal as they perhaps are satisfied with a lesser or a smaller goal. I think that although the door of the Congress is open, there should be no doubt if you approve of this resolution then everybody must say that the majority of the Congressmen today demand

complete independence for the country. Now this resolution as placed before you is a very short and simple one. In the Subject Committee the resolution as you may know because the proceedings are quite public was slightly longer and more complicated. But ultimately it was changed to this present formula and this formula was adopted.

I wish to make it clear to you that the adoption of this formula does not in any way change the spirit or the meaning of the resolution. It means what it says. It means complete independence. It means control of the defense forces of the country. It means control over the financial and economic policy of the country. It means control over the relations with the foreign countries. (Hear, Hear). Without these things independence would be a travesty and camouflage.

Thirdly I wish to point out to you lest there be any mistake that this goal which I hope you will adopt today is the immediate goal and not a goal of the far distant future (Cheers). Whether we achieve it today or tomorrow, a year hence or 10 years hence I cannot say. That depends on your strength and the strength of the country.

May I in conclusion express my heartfelt gratitude that the Congress is about to adopt the goal worthy of our country's high destiny and hope that this goal may be reached in the near future (Cheers).

(He then explained the resolution in Hindi.)

Source: Jagdish Saran Sharma. (1965) *India's Struggle for Freedom: Select Documents and Sources*. Vol. II. Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 276–277.

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NEHRU, MOTILAL (1861–1931), Indian politician and nationalist. Motilal Nehru was the father of the first prime minister of independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru. Born in Agra, in north India, in 1861, Motilal was descended from a family of high-caste

Kashmiri Brahmans. He established a legal practice in Allahabad, becoming one of the highest paid and most successful lawyers in India. A product of Western education, he was strong willed, with a steely individualism, widely traveled, and English in manners, dress, and temperament. He took a keen interest in liberal politics and was an outspoken member of the Indian National Congress Party. His interest in Indian nationalism deepened over time and, under the influence of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948) and his own son, he began to wear traditional Indian clothes. He married twice and had two daughters in addition to his son Jawaharlal.

Nehru took an active part in espousing a strategy of moderation and cooperation with the British regime at the provincial legislative level to achieve constitutional advance, and he played an important role in brokering amity between Hindus and Muslims through the political cooperation of the Congress and the Muslim League embodied in the Lucknow Pact of 1916. He was elected president of the Congress in 1919 and was a member of the Congress Inquiry Committee that investigated the 1919 Amritsar massacre. In 1920 he was general secretary of the Congress, and during the Non-Cooperation Movement (1920–1922), he was imprisoned for six months. Along with C. R. Das, he set up the Swaraj (self-rule) Party in March 1923, which contested the elections to the new legislatures in November of that year, and as a result Motilal won a seat in the Central Legislative Assembly. He believed in the efficacy of working from within the system to further nationalist demands. Elected president of the Congress again in 1928, he formulated the Nehru Report, which was endorsed by the Congress as the formal demand for dominion status with full self-government, giving Britain one year in which to respond before the declaration of a demand for full independence would be made. Though India's independence was to come in 1947, actions of men like Motilal Nehru paved the way for the education of his fellow citizens in the workings of parliamentary government.

Chandrika Kaul

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NEI MONGGOL (1996 pop. 23.6 million). Bordering on the Mongolian People's Republic and Russia in the north, Nei Monggol, or Inner Mongolia, is

China's northern frontier. It is an oblong strip of land, extending from northeast to southwest, with an area of 1.2 million square kilometers. Internally, it borders on Gansu, Ningxia, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang Provinces. It is home to the Mongolian, Han, Hui, Manchu, Daur, and Ewenki peoples.

Nei Monggol, with a temperate continental monsoonal climate, has a cold, long winter with frequent blizzards and a warm, short summer. With its vast stretch of grasslands, it is a major stockbreeding center known for its Sanhe horses, Sanhe oxen, and fine wool sheep. Daxinganling Forest, in Nei Monggol's northeast sector, makes up one-sixth of China's total forest reserve. Apart from wheat, naked oats, millet, sorghum, maize, and rice, a wide range of cash crops is grown, including soybeans, linseed, rapeseed, castor oil plants, and sugar beets. Inner Mongolia holds first place in the country in rare earth metals and niobium and natural soda reserves and second place in coal reserves.

Huhehaote, capital of Nei Monggol, is an ancient city that is located north of the Great Wall. Baotou, another major city in the region, is one of China's major iron- and steel-producing centers.

Di Bai

NEO-CONFUCIANISM "Neo-Confucianism" is the Western term given to a major phase in the development and reformulation of Confucianism beginning in eleventh-century Song-dynasty China. It brought a revival of classical Confucian values, texts, concepts, and practices that were clothed in new language and given new interpretations, reflecting the changed social and cultural conditions of the Song. At the same time, it responded to the philosophical and religious challenges that came from Buddhism and Taoism in the postclassical age of the Zhou and Han dynasties (eleventh century BCE–third century CE).

Many of the contributions of this Confucian revival were summed up, synthesized, and systematized by the late-Song scholar, philosopher, and teacher Zhu Xi (1130–1200), whose teachings and texts became so dominant in East Asia that it was primarily Zhu's "learning" that came later to be identified as Neo-Confucianism. Earlier this teaching had been known variously as the Learning of the Way (*dao xue*), the Learning of the Sages (*sheng xue*), the Learning of Principle (*li xue*), the Learning of Human Nature and Principle (*xingli xue*), and the Learning of the Mind-and-Heart (*xin xue*). Each of these names referred to

an important aspect of the larger, multifaceted learning that inspired and informed a whole new cultural era in East Asia. Subsequently, this learning came to stand for the established tradition in East Asia, and to twentieth-century modernizers it represented the stolid past from which they sought to break.

Zhu Xi and the Origins of Neo-Confucianism in China

At its inception Neo-Confucianism arose from a renewed concern for civil government as opposed to warlordism in the late ninth and early tenth centuries. It aimed to achieve "Great Peace and Order" (Taiping) through the establishment of civilized institutions. The pervasive ideal of public service at this stage was expressed by the Song statesman Fan Zhongyan (989–1052) in his characterization of the Confucian ideal of the noble person as "first in worrying about the world's worries and last in enjoying its pleasures" (de Bary and Bloom 1999: 596). Fan, using the rulership ideal of the Confucian thinker Mencius, expressed the kind of active solicitude a king should have placing the welfare of his people first in contrast to the Buddhist bodhisattva who first sought the peace of Nirvana before returning to share it with others.

Along with attempting reforms in the political economy and education, Fan invited the scholar-teacher Hu Yuan (993–1059) to court. Hu Yuan was an educator who emphasized both the principles of classical Confucianism and their practical implementation through specialized studies in law, mathematics, military arts, and water control. Many of Fan Zhongyan's reformist ideals, especially in education and the civil service, were carried forward by the statesman Wang Anshi (1021–1086), who emphasized strong government intervention in the economy and an active development policy to achieve a kind of welfare state. Wang's measures, which claimed the sanction of the Confucian classics, especially the *Zhou li* (Institutes of Zhou), were nevertheless called "New Laws" because of their innovative character. These policies reflected the pervasive spirit of innovation and adaptation in those times, which also fostered and stimulated new philosophical formulations.

In response to the radical challenge of Mahayana Buddhism, several philosophical speculations, which later became incorporated in Zhu Xi's system, aimed to provide a better metaphysical foundation for the new civil order. In contrast to the Buddhist view of impermanence and the insubstantiality of all things, Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073), basing his philosophy on the *Yi jing* (Classic of Changes), characterized the Way



MOUNT WUYI-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Mount Wuyi in southeast China was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1999 for the outstanding natural beauty and biodiversity of the Nine Bend River, and the cultural and historic importance of its many monasteries. The concentration of religious study and practice in the area led to the Neo-Confucian movement in the eleventh century.

(*dao*) as a vital process of creation and re-creation, in which change is marked by growth and renewal, not constant negation. This Way he saw not only as non-finite and limitless (*wuji*) but also as a route toward the perfecting of the natures of all things (*taiji*). As an alternative to realizing an ineffable Buddhahood, Zhou proposed the cultivation of sagehood—the perfecting of a spirituality based on human moral and intellectual values.

Another Song thinker whose ideas were incorporated in Zhu Xi's later synthesis was Zhang Zai (1020–1077), who affirmed the psychophysical substance (*qi*) as the vital force in all things and, in his *Xi ming* (Western Inscription), advocated an ethical cultivation aimed at achieving unity with all creation. Two other Song thinkers, Cheng Hao (1032–1085) and Cheng Yi (1033–1077), pursued the idea of cultivating sagehood to achieve the "Humaneness which forms one body with Heaven and Earth and all things" (de Bary and Bloom 1999: 694). The Cheng brothers saw the "one body" as a compound of *qi* and a generic and genetic principle (*li*) inherent in all things, which formed an inner and innate principle for growth. Principle, understood in a moral and rational sense, was to be dealt with in both its unity and diversity. Humaneness stood for the underlying empathetic attraction among all things, while the practice of humaneness was differentiated according to the specific relations of things, such as filiality in relation to parents or rightness in relation to rulers.

Zhu Xi anthologized these and other ideas of his predecessors in a manual of self-cultivation entitled *Jinsi-lu*, which can be translated as both "A Record of Recent Thought" and "Thinking about Things Near-at-Hand." He also wrote commentaries on key classic texts—the *Da Xue* (Great Learning), the *Analects* of Confucius, the text of *Mencius*, and the *Chong yong*



WANG YANG-MING ON INSANITY

There are cases when people see their fathers, sons, or brothers falling into a deep abyss and getting drowned. They cry, crawl, go naked and barefooted, stumble and fall. They hang onto dangerous cliffs and go down to save them. Some gentlemen who see them behave like this talk, laugh, or bow ceremoniously to one another by their side. They consider them to be insane because they have discarded etiquette and taken off their clothing, and because they cry, stumble, and fall as they do. . . . In the case of fathers, sons, and brothers, because of love one will surely feel an ache in his head and a pain in his heart, run desperately until he has lost his breath, and crawl to save them. He even ignores the danger of drowning himself. How much more will he ignore being ridiculed as insane! And how much more will he fail to worry about whether people believe him or not! Alas! It is all right if people say that I am insane. The minds of all people are the same as mine. There are people who are insane. How can I not be so? There are people who have lost their minds. How can I not lose mine?

Source: Chan, tsit-Wing, trans. (1963) *Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings of Wang Yang-ming*. Section 181. New York: Columbia University Press.

(Doctrine of the Mean)—thereafter called the Four Books. The *Chong yong* and the *Da Xue* were chapters excerpted from the classical *Li ji* (Record of Rites). In his important prefaces to these two works, Zhu stressed the need for universal schooling and individual cultivation as the basis for all governance and public morality, combining intellectual investigation with moral judgment to arrive at a state of empathetic understanding of others and of all things. In his preface to the *Chong yong*, he spoke of the succession to or repossession of the Way of the Sages as based on both surviving classic texts and the recognition of basic principles in those texts by informed and insightful minds—emphasizing both textual evidence and public discourse—in contrast to private experience tacitly communicated from mind to mind through Chan (Zen) lineages. Zhu also advocated a method of self-examination and self-control, known as the Method of the Mind, which encouraged the exercise of proper value judgment as the way to achieve unity with others and

indeed with all things sharing in the universality of principle and common psychophysical substance.

Further in pursuit of the educational ideal at the core of his philosophy, Zhu prepared another anthology, *Xiao Xue* (The Elementary Learning), which dealt with self-development and with the training of the young in the home and in social relations. *Xiao Xue* and the Four Books became standard texts in the Neo-Confucian curriculum, along with *Zhu Xi jiali* (The Family Ritual of Zhu Xi), Zhu's guide to family rituals simplified from the more complex and demanding rituals found in the ritual classics.

Through these new versions of old texts, Zhu reshaped and repackaged the classical Confucian tradition in a form that could be easily diffused through the new media of printed books (printing having come into wide use in the Song dynasty). In addition, Zhu, as a local official, promulgated guidelines for local schools and academies, for the organization of com-

munity compact organizations, and for community granaries. These institutions, in adapted form, became models for village life in much of East Asia. Even his lectures to the emperor on the classics became a standard practice and genre in the courts of China and Korea. Neo-Confucianism as it took shape in the hands of Zhu Xi was not only a systematic philosophy but also a comprehensive social and cultural program.

Since Zhu Xi in his own time was often at odds with the powers at court and his teachings were condemned as heterodox, the successful propagation of his ideas depended upon the independent efforts of his followers in local schools and academies. In the late thirteenth century, the Mongol emperor Kublai Khan (1215–1294) recognized the wide acceptance of Zhu's teachings among Confucian scholars, and he authorized them for official instruction in state schools. Zhu's texts became the basis of the Chinese civil-service examinations in 1314–1315, and they remained such until 1905. Meanwhile, Korean scholars at the Yuan-dynasty (1279–1368) court in China took these teachings back to Korea, where, under the Choson dynasty (1392–1910) they became the official state teaching and the principal form of learning in local academies sponsored by the *yangban* aristocracy.

Apart from its official uses, Neo-Confucianism emphasized scholarly study through broad learning (*boxue*) that was also called discursive learning (*jiangxue*) in lecture and discussion format. It also aimed at learning for oneself and self-cultivation through such practices as quiet sitting. Quiet sitting, though obviously influenced by Chan Buddhist meditation, stressed moral self-examination and cultivation of a spiritual state in which one experienced a sense of unity with Heaven, Earth, and all things.

The degree to which Neo-Confucians engaged in such spiritual exercises or devoted themselves instead to scholarly study or public service varied from school to school and scholar to scholar. Many scholars combined interior reflection with active public engagement. Others, recoiling from prevailing misrule, sought to disengage from official service altogether, so as to nourish and preserve their moral integrity and purity in relative isolation. Hence different strains of thought developed within the same Neo-Confucian frame of reference.

Neo-Confucianism during the Ming and Qing Dynasties

In the Ming dynasty, Wang Yang-ming (1472–1529) focused on the inner springs of moral sensibility to enliven a teaching that he saw as, by that time,

too routinized in conduct and too given to book learning and literary embellishments. He encouraged a natural, spontaneous response to the moral promptings of the heart-and-mind (which he called "innate knowledge or knowing"). His contemporary and critic Luo Qinshun (1465–1547) tried to restore the balance in favor of objective learning and normative standards less given to subjective interpretation. Subsequently, the Donglin school also reacted against the moral relativism the more subjective wings of the Wang Yang-ming school seemed to fall into, but the attempt to rescue the late Ming dynasty from a decline in both intellectual and moral standards did not prevent the fall of the dynasty to the Manchus, who, after their conquest of China, promptly reaffirmed Zhu Xi's teachings as orthodox.

During the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), with Zhu Xi's texts established in the civil-service examinations and Neo-Confucian scholarship actively promoted by the Manchu rulers, the official scene was largely dominated by Neo-Confucianism. On the level of independent scholarly research, however, the resolution of contested philosophical issues brought increasing critical scrutiny of the classics as the basis for authoritative judgments on matters of authenticity and orthodoxy. The school of evidential learning, developed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, excelled in textual criticism that advanced this critical scrutiny. Gu Yanwu (1613–1682) is generally regarded as the leading figure of evidential learning.

This Qing-era critical reexamination also extended to some of the metaphysical elements in Zhu Xi's philosophy of human nature, and the moralistic rigor of the early Zhu Xi school gave way to a view more accepting, and less restrictive of, human desire. Yet the basic curriculum in most schools, whether official or unofficial, remained the texts edited and interpreted by Zhu Xi. The terms of educated discourse and the general frame of intellectual reference, even among his critics, remained within the orbit of Zhu Xi's thought into the late nineteenth century. Also, since Zhu had given much attention to the reform of political and social institutions, the kind of historical scholarship and encyclopedic learning he encouraged continued to manifest itself in statecraft studies, increasingly critical of many dynastic institutions, a critical stance that would have a bearing on the readiness of Qing scholars later to consider new alternatives to established institutions and corrupt practices.

Neo-Confucianism in Korea and Japan

This same wide spectrum of Neo-Confucian activity was to be found in the Choson dynasty in Korea.

The new teaching had already found its way to Korea under the previous Koryo dynasty (918–1392), long dominated by Buddhism, and it inspired a new generation of scholars who subsequently installed Neo-Confucianism as the official ideology of the new Choson regime, incorporating many of its key institutions in a new constitutional order.

Leading Neo-Confucian scholars of this period included Yi Toegye (1502–1570), who emphasized self-cultivation through the inculcation of reverence as a basic virtue and quiet sitting as a form of personal praxis. At the same time, Toegye presented a broad range of scholarly studies similar to those of Zhu Xi and became the paragon of Zhu Xi learning in Korea.

Shortly after Toegye, Yi Yulgok (1536–1584), following the emphasis on empirical studies in the Neo-Confucian line of Luo Qinshun, greatly expanded the range of practical studies in the Zhu Xi school and laid the groundwork for the flowering of *silhak*, or "substantial learning" (also known as "practical learning"), which in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries showed an interest in the Western studies made available through Jesuit missionaries in Beijing. Throughout this period, the Neo-Confucian texts and curriculum remained standard in Korean education and provided the terms of educated discourse.

Chinese Song-dynasty literature, and with it the texts of Zhu Xi, became available in Japan through Japanese Zen monks traveling and trading in China during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. For the most part, however, the study of Zhu's works had a low priority until, in the late sixteenth century, the process of Japan's unification and contacts with Korean scholarship gave a new impetus to Neo-Confucian studies, which had a direct relevance to the establishment of a new social order.

Ex-Zen monks like Fujiwara Seika (1561–1619), Hayashi Razan (1583–1657), and Yamazaki Ansai (1618–1682) were prominent among those who promoted Neo-Confucian studies. Razan established his own school under the patronage of Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543–1616), founder of the new Tokugawa shogunate, and Razan's successors enjoyed the hereditary patronage of the shoguns down until the end of the Tokugawa period in 1868, though they did not necessarily keep to a strict Zhu Xi orthodoxy.

Indeed, there was no institution in Tokugawa Japan equivalent to the civil bureaucracies and examination systems in China and Korea that could serve as a standard of official orthodoxy. Instead there was a variety of independent schools exhibiting different lines of study and teaching. Yamazaki Ansai emphasized cul-

ture of the mind-and-heart with close adherence to Zhu Xi and the practice of quiet sitting. Kaibara Ekken (1630–1714) popularized Neo-Confucian ethics as shared among different classes and status functions, but he also engaged in a range of empirical, scientific studies of nature. The Mito school emphasized dynastic history and the Confucian concept of loyalty. Townspeople in Osaka supported a local school, the Kaitokudo, teaching Neo-Confucian ethics in a form oriented to the educational level of the merchant class.

Eventually, scholars began to challenge some Song-era developments of Neo-Confucianism as manifestations of the subversive influence of Buddhism rather than true innovations of original Confucian ideals. Yamaga Soko (1622–1685), a military instructor of the samurai class, deplored the contemplative and quietistic tendencies of Song Neo-Confucianism, especially quiet sitting, as unsuited to the life of the samurai. Ito Jinsai (1627–1705) taught a fundamentalist brand of Confucianism, emphasizing the virtue of humaneness as found in the texts of Confucius and Mencius. Ogyu Sorai (1666–1728) insisted that Confucianism could be understood only in the total context of early Chinese history and society shown in the whole corpus of the Chinese classics and that it was applicable to Japan only in the context of Japanese institutions and their historical development. Each of these forms of Confucian revisionism put forward rival claims to a fundamentalism based on new, "literal" readings of classic texts in a contemporary setting; each also was reenacting the origins of Neo-Confucian revisionism in the Song.

Independent schools continued to proliferate in the late Tokugawa period, producing a wide variety of scholarship, some of it oriented toward Japanese tradition and some toward Western learning. Until the imperial restoration and renovation of the Meiji period (1868–1911), the basic texts used in most schools tended to be based on the Neo-Confucian curriculum set by Zhu Xi. Into the late nineteenth century, the intellectual and moral formation of most educated East Asians continued to be based on this Neo-Confucian discourse. Simply put, this common teaching focused on self-cultivation in a social context, with emphasis on the individual development of moral, rational, and affective nature so that the mind-and-heart entered empathetically, through shared principles and practical action, into "one body" with Heaven and Earth and all creation.

Wm. Theodore de Bary

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NEPAL—PROFILE (2001 est. pop. 25.3 million). The kingdom of Nepal is a landlocked nation, 140,800 square kilometers in area, surrounded by the Tibetan region of China to the north and India to the east, west, and south. Its capital is Kathmandu. Agriculture is its mainstay, employing over 80 percent of the population although accounting for less than 47 percent of the gross domestic product. The mountainous nature of the nation allows for only about 20 percent of the total land area to be cultivated and also provides the government of Nepal with many challenges in pro-


viding basic infrastructure and services to its people. Population pressures on the land have led to deforestation and erosion of soils, causing landslides. With 42 percent of its population living below the poverty line, Nepal is among the poorest and least-developed nations of the world.

Geography

Nepal contains eight of the world's fourteen peaks that are over 8,000 meters in height, the most famous and tallest being Mount Everest (Sagarmatha) at 8,848 meters. Nepal has seventy-five administrative districts and can be divided into three geographical regions.

1. Terai region: This is a fertile plain found along the southern portion of Nepal bordering India. It constitutes close to 23 percent of the nation's area; 40 percent of the Terai region is under cultivation. The subtropical climate and fertile soil make it the grain belt of Nepal. Population pressure and declining productivity of agriculture in the hills have led to migration to the Terai, increasing its population, which as of 1991 constituted 46.7 percent of the total population.

2. Hill region: This is an area ranging in altitude from 610 meters to 4,877 meters, constituting





NEPAL

Country name: Kingdom of Nepal
Area: 140,800 sq km
Population: 25,284,463 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 2.32% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 33.4 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 10.22 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio: 1.05 males/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 74.14 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population: 58.22 years; male, 58.65 years; female, 57.77 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam
Major languages: Nepali (official; spoken by 90% of the population), about a dozen other languages and about 30 major dialects; many in government and business also speak English
English literacy—total population: 27.5%; male, 40.9%; female, 14% (1995 est.)
Government type: parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy
Capital: Kathmandu
Administrative divisions: 14 zones
Independence: 1768 (unified by Prithvi Narayan Shah)
National holiday: Birthday of King Gyanendra, 7 July (1946)
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal
GDP—real growth rate: 3.7% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita (purchasing power parity): \$1,360 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: 42% (FY95/96 est.)
Exports: \$485 million (f.o.b., 1998), but does not include unrecorded border trade with India
Imports: \$1.2 billion (f.o.b., 1998)
Currency: Nepalese rupee (NPR)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Book Factbook* 2001. Retrieved 5th March, 2002 from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

42 percent of the total area but of which only 10 percent is cultivable. The terraced slopes used for farming are a major feature of this region.

3. Mountain region: This area ranges from 4,877 meters to 8,848 meters in altitude, covering one-third of Nepal's area; only 2 percent of the mountain region is cultivable. Due to the high altitude and colder climate, it is sparsely populated and contains a mere 7.3 percent of the total population. The people of this region make a living through raising sheep and yaks, which provide milk, meat, hides, and wool. While the slopes are difficult to cultivate, some of the valleys can support

agriculture. Tourism (trekking and mountaineering) is also a growing industry that helps to support the population in this region.

The main crops grown in Nepal are rice, maize, wheat, barley, millet, buckwheat, and a variety of vegetables. The major cash crops are potatoes, oilseed, sugarcane, jute, and tobacco.

People

Nepal is a multiethnic Hindu society, although the majority practices a mixture of Hinduism and Buddhism. Nepali is the official language, but Newari is

widespread; many groups have their own languages and customs. Ethnic groups can be divided according to the following language groups:

1. Indo-Aryan language group
 - a. Nepali—Brahman, Chhetri, Khas, Thakuri, Kami, Sarki, Damai
 - b. Northern Indian (Terai)—Maithali, Bhojpuri, Tharu, Awadi, Rajbanshi
2. Tibeto-Burman language group
 - a. Tibeto-Burman—Tamang, Newari, Rai, Limbu, Magar, Gurung, Thakali, Sunuwar
 - b. Tibetan—Sherpa, Bhote (Humli, Jumli, etc.)

History

Nepal's history is ancient, but it did not attain unity until 1768, when the Gurkhas, under the leadership of Prithvi Narayan Shah (reigned 1742–1775), were able to capture the Kathmandu Valley, which they used as their capital and base of operations. During the period of Gurkha ascendancy, infighting among aristocratic families was intense; it culminated with one family achieving supremacy by monopolizing the post of prime minister, which became hereditary, and controlling the monarchy by arranging marriages between the royal family and itself. The family took the name Rana (a term signifying strength in battle). The Ranas were supported by the British colonial government in India; they kept the nation independent and isolated from the world until after Indian independence, when the monarchy was reinstated and the *panchayat* system of village government was introduced. The system was multitiered, from the village to the national level, and, in theory, decentralized. In fact, rule was authoritarian and centralized until King Birendra (1945–2001) came to the throne in 1972. The *panchayat* system was dismantled in 1990, but Nepal's bicameral parliamentary system is encountering difficulties in meeting the challenges of fostering Nepal's economic development.

In 1996, inefficient governance and intensifying corruption opened the door for the creation of a Maoist insurgency, which poses a threat to the developing democracy, making the life of citizens uncertain.

In the midst of this uncertainty, on 1 June 2001, ten royal family members, including King Birendra and Queen Aishworya, were killed during dinner in Narayanhiti Royal Palace at Kathmandu. Crown Prince Dipendra (1972–2001) opened fire on his family, allegedly over a dispute with his parents about his choice of a bride, and then shot himself. Prince Dipendra did not die immediately and was declared king the next day,

under the regency of King Birendra's younger brother Gyanendra (b. 1946). Gyanendra became king upon the death of Prince Dipendra. It was later found that the crown prince had been under the influence of alcohol and narcotics and had used weapons that he had procured from sources in the army for his gun collection.

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
NEPAL—ECONOMIC SYSTEM In 1951, when the 104-year feudalistic Rana oligarchy came to an end, the Nepal economy was in terrible condition. The revenue base was so narrow, due to the absence of major industries and related infrastructures, that paying for even basic expenditures was impossible. In 1956, under the guidance of the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific, Nepal initiated five-year economic plans, which became the focus of the economic system. Development efforts are undertaken on the basis of planned projects. Certain sectors, such as infrastructure and agriculture, are given priority, with the bulk of such expenditures being met by foreign aid in the form of grants and loans.

National Budget

During the autocratic *panchayat* period (1960–1990), the tax base was broadened and revenue was increased. However, national expenditures also increased constantly, and thus the negative balance of the budget widened every year. Foreign aid balanced this deficit and helped to meet development expenditures from the late 1970s. Income from foreign aid often exceeded tax revenues. Despite efforts to develop a market economy after democratization in 1990, the absence of major industry inhibited growth of the fragile revenue base. This, together with a decrease in the grant component of foreign aid, has created a major economic challenge.

Industry

Agriculture is the main industry, absorbing over 90 percent of the labor force between 1951 and 1981 and



Potters display their goods in Potter's Square in Bhaktapur, Nepal, in 1997. (MICHAEL FREEMAN/CORBIS)

80 percent thereafter. In spite of this, agriculture is predominantly subsistence in nature and is the sole source of food for many, with the major food crops being rice, wheat, barley, buckwheat, millet, maize, potatoes and other vegetables, and spices. To some extent it also provides raw materials (jute, tobacco, sugarcane, oilseeds, and cotton) for domestic agricultural industries. However, geographical and other natural constraints coupled with a lack of agricultural infrastructure have prevented agricultural growth since the 1950s, and its share in the gross domestic product has been constantly decreasing.

Nepal began to industrialize during the 1950s by building mills and factories to process jute, rice, oilseed, cotton, and tobacco and to produce sugar, matchsticks, and agricultural tools. Manufacturing industries such as cement, steel, leather, plywood, carpets and other textiles, alcohol, and tea were added in the 1970s. All these industries utilized foreign technologies to provide import substitutes and promote the use of local resources. In the 1980s these industries were reinforced in order to produce export-oriented goods. The carpet industry, later joined by the garment industry, took the lead role in exporting products. However, the use of child labor and environmentally unfriendly dyes made Nepali exports less popular in the 1990s, and the country is now trying hard to overcome these problems. The manufacturing sector as a whole increased its share of gross domes-

tic product from a few percentage points in the early 1970s to 10 percent in the late 1990s.

The service industry, inextricably linked to tourism and comprising trade (primarily merchandise), hotels, and restaurants, has also grown constantly, expanding its share of GDP to more than 10 percent. Tourism, especially trekking and mountaineering, is providing much of Nepal's needed hard currency. The construction, transportation, communication, finance, and social-welfare sectors are growing relative to economic development as a whole. However, utilities (electricity, gas, drinking water) are increasing only at nominal rates and are confined to urbanized and tourist areas. The mining industry, perhaps due to the fragile nature of the geologically young Himalayas, is almost nonexistent. Efforts are being made, with bilateral and international cooperation, to use the potential of hydroelectric power generation.

International Trade

Originally, international trade was conducted solely with India, heavily favoring the latter's trade balance. Whereas the exports from Nepal are crude agricultural (including forestry) products, imports from India consist of manufactured consumer goods, intermediate inputs and machines for Nepal's infant industries, and service goods catering to the demands of tourists and the well-to-do. Trade diversification

began in the late 1960s when Nepal started importing consumer goods from other countries, such as China and Japan, and started exporting agricultural products to Singapore and African countries. The volume of trade and the number of trading countries increased further after the 1970s with the import of various goods from different countries, often in line with the aid received from those countries. This period also witnessed a growth in exports of Nepalese carpets, garments, and other locally produced goods to Germany, other European Community countries, and the United States. The lion's share of trade is still with India, with the trade balance persistently against Nepal. The Nepalese economy is virtually dependent upon Indian policies and economic conditions.

The 1999 trade deficit with India was greater than the total of earnings from tourists, foreign aid, peace-keeping operations, Gurkhas serving as British and Indian soldiers, and remittances paid to Nepali migrant laborers in other countries. However, in the same year, Nepal had high proportions of gross capital formation (20 percent) and gross domestic savings (10 percent) to GDP (296.5 billion Nepali rupees, equal to approximately 4.8 billion dollars), and it is hoped that the economy will improve in the near future. Much is expected of the sectors of agriculture, tourism, and hydroelectric power generation.

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NEPAL—EDUCATION SYSTEM Nepal is a landlocked country, situated amid the Himalaya Mountains and surrounded by India in the east, west, and south and by China in the north. Civilization has flourished here under Buddhism since the sixth century BCE, in the Kathmandu Valley where the capital city is located. Buddhism was born in present-day Nepal: Its founder, Siddhartha Gautama (c. 563–c. 483 BCE) the Buddha or Enlightened One, was born here in present-day Rummidei.



A teacher conducts class in a school in Solu Khumbu, Nepal, in 1996. (ALISON WRIGHT/CORBIS)

Modern Education in Nepal

Modern education development began in Nepal in 1959, with the dawn of democratic government. Before that, education had been the exclusive prerogative of the ruling elite, while the rest of the population remained largely illiterate. At the start of the modern era, education was available only to the sons of the aristocracy. There were eleven secondary schools in the country, and the literacy rate was below 1 percent. Girls rarely received formal education.

The goal of primary education is to teach children reading, writing, and arithmetic. Secondary education stresses character formation to prepare students to enter higher education. The objective of education is to produce the personnel required for national development.

Primary school begins at six years of age in Grade 1; secondary education consists of lower secondary, Grades 6 and 7, and secondary, Grades 8 to 10. District-level examinations are conducted at the end of primary as well as lower secondary education.

Tribhuvan University provides a two-year proficiency certificate, two-year bachelor's degrees, two-year master's degrees, and doctoral programs in various institutes. Thirty-six privately run liberal arts and commercial colleges offer certificate courses accepted by the university.

Administration of Education

The Ministry of Education is responsible for the administration and supervision of school-level education. Tribhuvan University controls higher education. The Ministry has three divisions: general administration, educational administration, and the program and planning section, each headed by joint secretaries.

Under the Ministry of Education, there are five regional directorates and seventy-five district education offices with which some four hundred school supervisors are affiliated. The schools are controlled by management committees.

Recent Developments in Education

Since education is fundamental to national development, the Ministry of Education formed the Department of Education, which started operations in 2000, with the vital role of providing equal access to education, making quality reforms, improving internal and external efficiency, and making education a development-friendly venture.

For basic and primary education, programs include improvement of access to primary education, school management, and upgrading of teachers' standards at primary level. For increasing women's access to education, programs include increasing female enrollment, encouraging greater numbers of educated women to go into teaching as a profession, increasing the completion rate of primary education of female students, and providing scholarships to female students of various levels. For improving literacy, a campaign has been instituted to eliminate illiteracy.

For improvement in the quality of education, nine primary teacher-training centers have been established under the Primary Education Development Project for developing teaching skills and improving school management. For the development of skilled manpower, the Council for Technical Education and Vocational Training has conducted regular training for basic- and medium-level personnel. For improvement of higher education, the curriculum, textbooks, and education system have been modified. In line with international standards, Tribhuvan University has upgraded the bachelor course from two years to three since the 1997 academic year.

For increasing the number of institutes for higher education, initiatives have been taken to open universities in the five development regions of the country. Similarly, efforts for setting up technical universities, such as the University of Agriculture and Forestry, are also under way.

In the academic year 1999–2000, the total number of schools in the kingdom of Nepal at primary and secondary levels was recorded at 37,397, with the total number of students being 5,286,039 and 142,617, respectively.

By the academic year 2000–2001, 516 schools and institutions were affiliated with the Higher Secondary

Education Board. The total number of students enrolled in the higher secondary education system (Grades 11 and 12) in the 1999–2000 academic year was 42,306. There are now five universities in operation, namely, Tribhuvan University, Mahendra Sanskrit University, Kathmandu University, Eastern Regional University, and Pokhara University. In 2000, sixty-one campuses directly under Tribhuvan University and 158 private campuses affiliated with it were in operation. The total number of students at all campuses of the university was estimated at 153,527.

Teh-Kuang Chang

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NEPAL-HISTORY The kingdom of Nepal occupies 140,800 square kilometers of the central mountainous area between the Himalayan crest and the plains of northern India. Not until the late eighteenth century did a unified political and social system emerge in this rugged region. Historically the name Nepal referred to the Kathmandu Valley in the midmontane region, and only in the early nineteenth century was the name applied to the entire country, when the Shah dynasty consolidated the various principalities into a kingdom in the period from 1769 to 1850.

Geophysically Nepal is divided into numerous small, isolated valleys and hills by three ranges running east-west and four major river systems running north-south from the Himalayan crest to the plains. These physical divisions resulted in a strong sense of ethnicity and regionalism that still pervades Nepali society despite the nominally highly centralized polity that emerged under the Shah dynasty and subsequent governments.

Early History

The Kathmandu Valley figures prominently in several ancient Hindu and Buddhist classics going back more than two millennia. Southern Nepal was the birthplace of Siddhartha Gautama (c. 563–483 BCE), known as the Buddha, and thus had a close relationship with the Buddhist sociopolitical system that dominated much of northern India. In the fourth century BCE the Buddha's disciples built several shrines in the valley as well as on Nepal's border with India.

A coherent political system emerged in Kathmandu only in the fourth century CE, when a Hindu Indian dynasty, the Licchavi, established control over the valley, but its authority never extended over most of the hill areas of Nepal. From then on, high-caste Hindu kings ruling over the valley never could extend their territory over the largely non-Hindu, non-Indian tribal communities in the sub-Himalayan region. By 500 CE Nepal's population consisted primarily of tribal communities that had migrated to Nepal from Tibet, China, Southeast Asia, and northeastern India. By 800 CE Nepal was a composite of numerous small ethnic communities scattered throughout the hill area. The most prominent of these was the Newar community, the indigenous community in the Kathmandu Valley, which played an influential role in the social history and economy of Nepal. The Newars developed the trade route from India through Kathmandu to Tibet,



Offerings at Boudanath Stupa in May 1996 for the holiday of Buddha Jayanti, the triple anniversary of the Buddha's birth, enlightenment, and death. (MACDUFF EVERTON/CORBIS)

in the process changing the valley from a remote backwater into the major intellectual and commercial center between south and central Asia.

The Muslim invasions of India in the eleventh century led to major changes in Nepal's population, at least at the elite level, and in the political system. Many high-caste Hindu families in northern India fled to the western hill areas in Nepal, where they gradually established political control. By 1200 over fifty small hill principalities were ruled by these high-caste émigré families. As a result, most of the western Nepal hill areas were effectively Hinduized in sociopolitical terms while retaining a broad range of Buddhist and animist beliefs. This was evident in the *Muluki aims* (legal codes) imposed by some Hindu rulers, which were carefully moderated to include traditional tribal practices.

In the mid-eighteenth century the Shah family dynasty emerged in the western principality of Gurkha. In 1769 Prithvi Narayan Shah (1730–1775) launched a



KEY EVENTS IN NEPAL'S HISTORY

- c. 566 BCE** The Buddha is born in southern Nepal.
- 4th century CE** The Indian Licchavi dynasty establishes control over the Kathmandu Valley.
- 800** The Newars are the most prominent of the ethnic groups which inhabit the region.
- 1200** High-caste Hindu families who had fled the Muslim invasion of India rule over 50 hill principalities in Nepal.
- 1769–1800** The modern Kingdom of Nepal emerges when the principalities are unified by the Shah dynasty.
- 1850** The Rana elite family attains the dominant position in the government.
- 1950** The Ranas are overthrown.
- 1959** A new constitution is promulgated and elections held.
- 1960** King Mahendra dismisses the newly elected government.
- 1962** King Mahendra abolishes the constitution and establishes a monarchy.
- 1980** A national referendum abolishes political parties.
- 1990** Political protests lead to the revival of political parties and a new constitution is drafted.
- 2001** The royal family is massacred by a prince who then kills himself.

vigorous campaign to conquer the Kathmandu Valley. After succeeding, he moved his capital from Gurkha to Kathmandu, brought the India-Kathmandu-Tibet trade route under his control, and gradually extended his power over most of the other hill principalities in western Nepal as well as over the tribal communities in eastern Nepal. By 1800 the Shah dynasty ruled the entire hill area of present-day Nepal as well as some of the adjacent areas in India, Sikkim, and Kumaon.

The Shah dynasty extended its authority by concluding agreements with local leaders in the western hills and with ethnic groups in the east. Regional communities vowed allegiance to the ruler but retained broad self-governing powers. The elite families that came to Kathmandu with the ruler became factionalized by 1800, however, and were involved in internal government conflicts. The king was technically an absolute monarch but in fact had to work with both the Kathmandu elite families and the political leadership in the hill areas. The elite families were dedicated to preserving their families'

political and social status, and concepts of nationalism never were an important political factor.

The Rana System

A modified political system emerged in Nepal after 1850 when one elite family, the Ranas, attained a dominant position in the government. Because most other elite leaders had died in a massacre organized by the Ranas, the Ranas managed to relegate the Shah family to the status of a nominal ruling family with no role in the governance of the country, while the Ranas became perpetual prime ministers with broad authoritarian powers.

The Ranas introduced a new system for selecting the head of state, whereby the eldest male in the various branches of the Rana family was elected prime minister. While conspiracies and attempted coups were as much a part of the history of the Rana period as they had been in pre-1850 Nepal, they did not seriously threaten the regime. Only when, in the early 20th century, subunits of the Rana family began struggling among themselves was the system itself endangered. The Rana period saw the gradual institutionalization of government and administrative functions on a national basis, with periodic revisions of the national legal code, reforms in land tenure and taxation systems, and the gradual extension of the authority of the center over the former principalities and hill ethnic communities.

The Rana family controlled Nepal's army through appointments of commanding officers throughout the country. Any rival or elite family or faction was vigorously suppressed, but some members of these rival families were also absorbed into the Rana bureaucracy. The Ranas discouraged the spread of education and thus perpetuated the illiteracy and ignorance of most hill people. Finally, the dynasty maintained a close relationship with the British imperial government in India, allowing the recruitment of many Nepalis into the Gurkha units of the British Indian Army. Their policies worked well for almost one hundred years, until 1945, but began to fall apart in the post-World War II period. The Ranas were overthrown in 1950. After continuing political turmoil in the country, a constitution was agreed upon in 1959, and this led to general elections. However, King Mahendra (1920–1972) remained opposed to parliamentary government, and so in 1960 he dismissed the elected government and in 1962 abolished the constitution. A new one was promulgated that established the monarch as the real authority in Nepal. Mahendra was succeeded by his son Birendra (1945–2001). A national referendum in 1980 supported the idea of a nonparty parliamentary system, and political parties were sidelined. In 1990, how-

ever, a coalition of opposition parties demanded political reforms, and strikes and other civil action forced the king to lift the ban on political parties.

At the end of 1990 a new constitution was drafted; it provided for a constitutional monarchy and a multiparty political system. The new government had to struggle with economic stagnation, ecological degradation, political turmoil occasioned by splits in various parties, and a Maoist revolutionary movement.

Then in 2001 came the staggering massacre of the royal family, when a prince opened fire with a machine-gun on them because they were opposing his marriage to a commoner. The prince then committed suicide, the woman in question fled to India, and an uncle of the king, Gyanendra (b. 1947), became the new king of Nepal.

Leo Rose

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NEPAL—POLITICAL SYSTEM In the late eighteenth century, the expansion of the Shah dynasty from the hill principality of Gurkha into a large and very diverse nation-state in the central Himalayas with its capital at Kathmandu was the decisive factor in the political development of Nepal. The Shah family rarely exercised effective authority over the many small principalities, Kathmandu-based aristocratic families, and tribal ethnic elites in the hill areas, but there was a central system of government in which the various factions could negotiate and interact. But by 1850 one aristocratic family, the Ranas, emerged as the dominant power in Nepal through its status as the hereditary prime minister under a royal ordinance. The Shah kings retained their royal status but were effectively kept out of governmental functions and were isolated from the political process.



Political rivals for the office of Premier Sher Bahadur and Shushi Koirala in Kathmandu in July 2001. Bahadur won the election. (AFP/CORBIS)

The Rana regime lasted for one century, 1850 to 1950, but some developments in the post-World War II period in South Asia undermined the Rana regime both internally and externally. First, the British Indian Empire that had strongly supported the Ranas ceased to exist in 1947. The new independent Indian government, dominated by the Indian Congress Party, had mixed views on Nepal but generally tended to support Nepal's anti-Rana political parties. Second, a large Nepali migrant community had emerged in northern India with both elite and hill tribal migrants, and these provided the social base for the Nepali Congress Party and other anti-Rana political factions that had their organizational base in India but that gradually extended their activities into Nepal. More divisive, perhaps, were the structural divisions in the contending factions within the Rana family, some of whom sought refuge in India and then established close working relations with the more radical Nepali political parties. Moreover, the Shah ruler, King Tribhuvan (d. 1956), assumed a more public anti-Rana position and, with Indian assistance, moved from Kathmandu to New Delhi, where he developed a close relationship with the Indian government and the various revolutionary Nepali organizations in India.

Serious negotiations between the Ranas, King Tribhuvan, the Nepali Congress, and the Indian government commenced in New Delhi in late 1950, leading to an agreement in 1951 under which the Rana prime minister retained his post but with greatly reduced powers. King Tribhuvan regained royal powers



PREAMBLE TO NEPALESE CONSTITUTION

Adopted 9 Nov 1990

Whereas, We are convinced that the source of sovereign authority of the independent and sovereign Nepal is inherent in the people, and, therefore, We have, from time to time, made known our desire to conduct the government of the country in consonance with the popular will; and Whereas, in keeping with the desire of the Nepalese people expressed through the recent people's movement to bring about constitutional changes, we are further inspired by the objective of securing to the Nepalese people social, political and economic justice long into the future; and Whereas, it is expedient to promulgate and enforce this Constitution, made with the widest possible participation of the Nepalese people, to guarantee basic human rights to every citizen of Nepal; and also to consolidate Adult Franchise, the Parliamentary System of Government, Constitutional Monarchy and the System of Multi Party Democracy by promoting amongst the people of Nepal the spirit of fraternity and the bond of unity on the basis of liberty and equality; and also to establish an independent and competent system of justice with a view to transforming the concept of the Rule of Law into a living reality: Now, Therefore, keeping in view the desire of the people that the State authority and sovereign powers shall, after the commencement of this Constitution, be exercised in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, I, *King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva*, by virtue of the State authority as exercised by Us, do hereby promulgate and enforce this *Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal* on the recommendation and advice, and with the consent of the Council of Ministers.

Source: International Court Network. Retrieved 8 March 2002, from: http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/np00000_.html.

and assumed a significant role in the political process. The Nepali Congress emerged as the leading Nepali political faction on the popular level.

The Rana system officially ended in 1951, but it took nearly a decade for a viable alternative system to emerge. King Tribhuvan usually worked closely with the Nepali Congress in an effort to democratize politics in Nepal, but with his death in 1956 the new Shah ruler, King Mahendra (d. 1972) followed a very different path, carefully exploiting the serious divisions within the political parties. Parliamentary elections were held in 1961, and the Nepali Congress gained a majority and formed the first party government. Mahendra then used the broad emergency powers granted to the king in the constitution to dismiss the Congress

government and imprison many of the party's leaders, and assumed authoritarian powers that he hoped to make permanent.

For over ten years (1961 to 1972) Mahendra's authoritarian system was the *panchayat* polity, whose objective was the creation of a decentralized administrative system in the districts and villages. But it never really worked, and Nepal was once again as centralized and authoritarian as it had been under the Rana rulers.

With King Mahendra's death in 1972 his son Birendra came to the throne. Educated abroad, Birendra held views on political objectives and on the process of governing that were very different from those of his father, but Mahendra's bureaucratic elite system was

so firmly in place that Birendra faced major obstacles in his efforts to introduce some basic reforms. With the emergence of a much-strengthened Nepali Congress Party, and working with the moderate branch of the Nepal Communist Party (NCP), the United Marxist Leftists (UML) launched a major campaign throughout the country in 1989–1990 directed at the overthrow of the *panchayat* system. King Birendra finally reached an agreement with the party leaders, and a new democratic governmental system was established under the 1991 constitution.

A Constitutional Monarchy-At Last

With the broad-based agreement in late 1989 between King Birendra and the NCP-UML coalition, the stage was set for the introduction of a democratic constitutional monarchy. An NCP leader, K. P. Bhattarai, became the interim prime minister until the elections were held. Some feared that the king would not accept this major diminution of his status and power, but in the 1990s Birendra carefully followed the principles of a constitutional monarchy.

In mid-1991, political party leaders wrote a new constitution, under which elections were held a few months later. The NCP won a majority of the parliamentary seats and formed a new government. Bhattarai was shunted aside and G. P. Koirala was asked to form the government, in which most of the ministers were drawn from the hills and terai constituencies.

The Koirala government held office until mid-1994, when further divisions within the party organization led Koirala to resign and call for elections in November 1994. The NCP did poorly in the election, while the UML won a plurality of seats. The UML formed the government, but it lasted only until September 1995, when a censure motion was passed against it by parliament. A three-party coalition assumed office, led by S. P. Deuba, and lasted until March 1997. A new two-party coalition headed by L. B. Chand, the leader of one faction of the Rashtriya Prajantar Party (RPP), was formed with the support of the UML. But Chand resigned on 4 October 1997, and politics remained turbulent for the rest of the 1990s.

All political parties accept the concept of a democratic parliamentary system and constitutional monarchy. The one exception is the ultraradical Maoist wing of the Communist movement in Nepal, which has a base in several western hill districts. The Maoists demand the replacement of the monarchy by a people's republic and do not participate in elections. Their relations with the other parties are hostile and even the UML is denounced as "too conservative." In 1996 the Maoists launched a violent insurrection against the

government and the parties. The Maoists, however, lack a substantial support base even in the districts in which they are based, and they also lack external support, even from China, the land of Mao. The Maoists have been a divisive factor in Nepali politics on occasion, but by late 1999 there was broad agreement among the other parties on the need to bring them under control.

In the elections in May 1999 the NCP won a majority (111 of 205 seats), while the UML won 71 seats. The thirty-six other parties won only twenty-three seats and were relegated to the sidelines. Since between them the NCP and the UML hold most of the 205 seats in parliament, some form of two-party system may finally emerge in Nepal. Whether the murder of the royal family by a disaffected prince in 2001 spelled the end of the monarchy remains to be seen.

Leo Rose

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NESIN, AZIZ (1915–1995), Turkish writer. Aziz Nesin (Mustafa Nusret Nesin), one of the most important authors and satirists in modern Turkish literature, had a gift for observing the ridiculous in human relationships. His writings exposed intolerance, absurdity, cruelty, and stupidity in all situations of human life and among all types of people.

He was born at Heybeli Ada in Istanbul and lost his mother at an early age. After completing Dar-ul Safaka, a high school for orphans where English was the language of instruction, he entered a military boarding school, which he described as the only institution where poor, penniless children could study free of charge.

He started writing while he was in the army under the alias Aziz Nesin, his father's name. In 1944 he was

discharged for allegations of misusing his authority and sentenced to three months' imprisonment. He published *Marko Pasa*, a weekly satirical paper, which survived several closings during its five-year existence because Nesin modified the paper's name ("Marko Pasa" is a nominative idiom referring to someone who listens to other people's complaints and problems—"Tell your troubles to Marko Pasa," people often say.) Nesin was finally imprisoned for five and a half years for his writings. He wrote for different magazines and newspapers under more than a hundred assumed names to evade censorship.

His decision to translate and publish parts of Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses* in Turkish drew the anger of Islamic fundamentalists who attempted to kill him in 1993 during the annual commemoration of the death of a sixteenth-century Alevi folk hero in the city of Sivas. Although he escaped, the arson attack at his hotel killed thirty-seven writers, poets, and intellectuals.

In 1972 he founded the Nesin Trust for orphans and transferred all of his copyrights and most of his royalties to it. The foundation, which began operating in 1982, provides education and shelter to four poor children each year until they complete high school or acquire a vocation.

Nesin published over one hundred novels, short stories, and plays. His writings have been translated into twenty-three languages, and his plays have been performed in seven countries. A multiple award winner in various international humor contests, Nesin was elected a member of the PEN Club by Germany in 1985. He died of a heart attack at the age of eighty during a book-signing tour in Cesme, Turkey.

H. Ayla Kiliç

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NESIN, MUSTAFA NUSRET. See **Nesin, Aziz.**

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies (Nederlands[ch] Oost-Indie) was the colony covering much of present-day Indonesia. Until the late 1700s, the East Indies Company (VOC)

represented Dutch authority in Asia. Headquartered in Batavia (now Jakarta), the VOC had posts and territories that stretched from South Africa to Japan. The Netherlands Indies arose when the Dutch government acquired VOC possessions in 1795 and the bankrupt company's charter lapsed in 1800. The Dutch lost their Asian territories outside the Indonesian archipelago, especially during the Napoleonic Wars, and from 1824 their sphere of influence was confined to present-day Indonesia. In 1830, the Dutch ruled only Java and parts of Sumatra and other islands; they gradually conquered or incorporated the remainder of the archipelago, especially in the 1870–1911 period.

Batavia remained the colony's administrative center, with a governor-general ruling on behalf of the Dutch state. The archipelago was divided into *gewesten* (provinces), generally headed by residents. The lower levels of administration were largely indigenous, either consisting of coopted local elites, such as the *bupati* (regents) on Java, or *zelfbesturen* (native states) with limited autonomy. Nineteenth-century colonial policy was aimed at enriching the Dutch, first through forced cultivation (the Cultivation System—*Cultuurstelsel*), and from 1870 by the Liberal Policy that opened the economy to private enterprise. The 1901 Ethical Policy aimed also to improve local living standards and make education more widely available.

In the twentieth century, the Netherlands Indies gradually became constitutionally distinct from the Netherlands. The Volksraad (People's Council), elected by restricted franchise and with limited legislative powers, was created in 1918; in 1922, the Indies became a *rijksdeel* (part of the realm), formally on par with the Netherlands. There were, however, no official plans for eventual independence or autonomy, despite the demands of a nationalist movement.

The Japanese conquered most of the Indies in 1942, and a colonial government-in-exile was established in Australia. On 6/7 December 1942 (6 December in the Netherlands, 7 December in Indonesia), Queen Wilhelmina promised postwar reforms, but after the 1945 Indonesian revolution the Dutch were able to recover only part of the Indies. The Dutch sought to retain influence by creating a federal system, including the nationalist Indonesian Republic, but military and diplomatic pressure forced them to transfer sovereignty to independent Indonesia in December 1949.

Robert Cribb

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NEW ECONOMIC MECHANISM. See **Chintanakan mai**.

NEW ECONOMIC POLICY—MALAYSIA

The New Economic Policy (NEP) of Malaysia was a set of government actions introduced in 1970 to promote the interests of ethnic Malaysians (*bumiputras*, or "sons of the soil") over those of the nation's other two large ethnic groups: the Chinese and the Indians. The NEP was introduced in the wake of fear over a Communist uprising and widespread ethnic tension that threatened the nation. It aimed to bring social stability by reducing overall poverty and strengthening the economic and social positions of *bumiputras* over the other two groups. This aim has broadly been achieved, and the NEP should therefore be considered a success, even though it has been criticized.

Historical Context

Like many other Southeast Asian nations, Malaysia historically had a comparatively low population density, partly as a result of inaccessible terrain. When the nation was colonized by the British in the late eighteenth century, the labor force was not sufficient for the large-scale processing and manufacturing activities planned to exploit the rich natural resources. Specifically, large-scale tin mining for the canning industry and cultivating rubber trees for the tire industry required larger labor pools. The British imported workers from India to meet the needs of the rubber industry and introduced modern technology to be used by Chinese migrants in the tin mines. This also helped prevent economic power falling into the hands of indigenous people and hence reduced the chance of organized resistance to colonization. Migration from China had been a long-term phenomenon, and trading networks had been established since at least the fifteenth century. Activities supporting these industries, such as retailing and wholesaling, therefore also tended to fall into Indian or Chinese hands. This situation led to the relative impoverishment of the more numerous *bumiputras* and their marginalization in economic terms as they remained largely in rural occupations.

After the Japanese occupation during World War II demonstrated that the European powers were not irresistible, opposition to the colonists grew, and new British settlement plans in 1946 and 1948 were

strongly resisted. At the same time, a Communist insurrection, led mainly by Chinese, threatened the security of Malaysia, and the British took strong steps to end it, including the resettlement of 500,000 Chinese in villages that the British controlled. Violence broke out sporadically in subsequent years. When independence was finally granted in 1967, therefore, it was against a background of ethnic tension and division, with both Chinese and *bumiputras* feeling threatened. Tensions were worsened by the creation and strengthening of political parties almost wholly along ethnic lines—a situation that persists.

Riots continued after independence; in 1968 two hundred people were killed in Kuala Lumpur in incidents sparked by fears of excessive ethnic Chinese wealth and power. These incidents convinced the ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO) that action was necessary not just to settle the emergency but also to institute social and economic reform to prevent a repeat. This is the context in which the NEP was created.

The New Economic Policy

The NEP consisted of a series of linked measures with two specific objectives: reduction of the absolute poverty of the *bumiputras* and an increase in their participation in the economic system. A principal measure to achieve these objectives was the forcible restructuring of corporate equity; that is, overseas firms were required to divest part of their ownership to *bumiputra* interests, primarily through trust companies set up for that purpose. The aim was to achieve 30 percent of corporate ownership by *bumiputras*, 40 percent by other Malaysians, and 30 percent by others. In other words, both Chinese Malaysians and overseas investors were obliged to cede control of parts of their firms to the government-controlled *bumiputra* nominees. The Malaysian government has often intervened in the economy in this way, and although economic success has followed, international investors have lower levels of confidence that their interests will be respected.

At the same time, incentives were offered to *bumiputra* companies to establish themselves and to invest. Preferential opportunities were also provided to *bumiputras* for higher education and for other forms of personal and professional development.

The NEP was put into effect through successive Five-Year Plans, which began with specific goals of redistribution and which gradually adopted goals of growth more generally. The NEP was introduced with a lifetime of twenty years, and, by 1990, when it was replaced by the National Development Plan and other

policies, the government had become concerned with more sophisticated maneuvering of an economy engaged in the struggle to be competitive on a global scale and with the needs of a developing, mixed export-led economy in which industry had succeeded agriculture as the main activity.

Assessment

The NEP was an affirmative action plan, and so assessments of its success or failure are subject to the arguments that affect affirmative action programs generally. In its own terms, the NEP was successful: poverty in Malaysia was reduced from 49 percent at the policy's inception to 9 percent at its conclusion in 1990. Many indicators demonstrate that *bumiputras* have a much greater share of the national wealth and are taking more active senior administrative and executive roles. However, many international businesses complain that *bumiputra* nominees are underqualified and lack motivation. Further, it is clear that inequality of income and opportunities within the ethnic Malay community has increased substantially and that this factor is now one of the most divisive in the nation. This inequality is manifested in the apparently disproportionate access to benefits obtained by a small group associated with the UMNO government—in other words, cronyism. Additionally, in the comparable case of Indonesia, poverty rates were reduced by a greater extent without affirmative action, although it is true that ethnic relations there (as was revealed in the aftermath of the 1997–1998 currency crisis) are still fractured below the surface.

However, the NEP assisted in shaping a modern multicultural society that has achieved splendid rates of economic growth since the early 1970s, even if political development has not fully kept pace. It avoided large-scale outbreaks of ethnic rioting and has retained a considerable degree of economic sovereignty.

John Walsh

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NEW ECONOMIC ZONES—VIETNAM

After the Communist takeover in South Vietnam in May 1975, the Communist government established

New Economic Zones (NEZs). Ostensibly this action was taken to alleviate overcrowding in the cities, whose population swelled with refugees fleeing the war, but the NEZs were inextricably intertwined with the notion of reeducation camps. Although there was no revolutionary reign of terror following the Communist takeover in the south, up to a half-million people, mainly members or supporters of the anti-Communist Republic of Vietnam regime or the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, went through short-term reeducation, while up to 100,000 people were sentenced to long-term reeducation. The reeducation camp programs ran parallel to those of the NEZs.

Though nominally voluntary, hundreds of thousands of people, especially urbanites suspected of disloyalty to the new regime as well as political and common prisoners, were sent to a series of remote camps along Vietnam's isolated border region. There they were subjected to harsh physical labor, including land reclamation and agriculture work, because the zones were supposed to be self-sufficient. Although the zones were hypothetically established before people were sent there, with rudimentary infrastructure, tools, seeds for crops, pumps, and farm equipment, in reality few NEZs were prepared for the influx of urbanites, and the living conditions were exceptionally harsh. The camps had woefully poor infrastructure, including minimal health services and other social programs. The internees were also forced to undergo political indoctrination classes. Unprepared and unskilled at making a living in the harsh rural interior, a large number of urbanites fled Vietnam in what became known as the exodus of the boat people.

Beyond the intent of political reeducation, there was a strong economic rationale for the camps as well. Some 3 million unemployed people lived in urban areas in 1975, and there were huge colonies of squatters' camps on the outskirts of cities, whose infrastructure was crumbling under the extreme demographic pressure. The party's long-term solution was to relocate large numbers of people, including over 1 million from Saigon alone, to the underpopulated regions in the countryside.

NEZs were also part of the Communist government's plan to socialize the southern economy and to serve as district-level agricultural and administrative centers. Increasing food production was one of the government's most essential tasks. To this end, the regime implemented the collectivization of agriculture. The government hoped to achieve the breakdown of private plots and the establishment of communes that could reap economies of scale to increase yields and garner efficiencies by the state's monopolizing trade

and commerce. Yet the rapid transformation of the southern economy caused massive dislocations and food shortages, which put more pressure on increasing the NEZs' output. Although the policy of establishing NEZs was abandoned, the government of Vietnam still encourages settlement in remote border areas.

Zachary Abuza

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NEW ORDER General Suharto emerged from the turmoil of the abortive 30 September 1965 coup in Indonesia as the ascendant political player in that country, and he gradually instituted what came to be known as the New Order (Orde Baru). After effectively deposing Sukarno in March 1966, Suharto firmly established his regime, officially being installed as Indonesia's second president in March 1968. His main policies comprised depoliticizing Indonesian society, the dual function (*dwifungsi*) of the military, and economic development. Conducive foreign policy helped restore sociopolitical stability: Indonesia ended its confrontation with Malaysia, rejoined the U.N., and was influential in creating the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967.

Depoliticization essentially meant the purge of Communism and any criticism of the new regime, accompanied by a reduction of the number of political parties to three in 1973: the United Development Party (PPP), the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), and the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (GOLKAR)—an allegedly nonpartisan, government-supported organization representing various segments of the nation. Restoration of "social harmony" heavily relied on the dual function of the military, which enabled its members to hold both legislative and executive positions within the political system.

Economic development was facilitated by the foreign investment law of 1967, which attracted foreign investment and aid. The resultant increase in manufacturing and oil and gas production led to the emergence of a middle class increasingly dedicated to conspicuous consumption. The mid-1980s decline in oil prices prompted a shift from oil and commodity exports to the export of manufactured goods and the promotion of tourism.

The government's successful attempts to distribute development more evenly across the archipelago

helped abate the separatist feelings of the 1950s. Opposition to Jakarta, however, never fully subsided in Irian Jaya, Aceh, or East Timor (the latter was forcefully integrated into Indonesia in 1975–1976). The country achieved recognition as a developing-world leader and major regional player.

When, in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, economic activity collapsed, sociopolitical stability deteriorated and with it the legitimacy of the New Order government. Unremitting demonstrations against Suharto's "crony capitalism" prompted his resignation in May 1998. Resurgent political Islam has partially filled the ensuing ideological vacuum.

Martin Ramstedt

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NEW RICH From the early 1960s until mid-1997, several nations in East and Southeast Asia, including South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong, experienced rapid economic growth. They had embarked on industrialization only after World War II, hence they were called newly industrializing economies (NIEs). The relentless industrialization was driven by the state under what could be called authoritarian or semidemocratic governments, with the exception of Hong Kong, then a British colony. These economies were followed by similar developments in Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia in the 1970s and 1980s. The often double-digit annual growth rates were so impressive that the World Bank hailed the entire development process as the "Asian miracle." But economic growth came abruptly to a halt in early 1997 as a result of a currency crisis in Thailand, which quickly spread throughout the nations in East and Southeast Asia, at least slowing the rapid growth of the previous thirty-five years.

By then the phenomenal economic growth had spawned a new middle class of entrepreneurs of small- and medium-sized enterprises, state bureaucrats, managers of transnational corporations, and other professionals who, in aggregate, constitute what is now known as Asia's "new rich." The influence of this emergent class in the cultural sphere, both high and



A textile company executive talks on his cellular phone next to his 1930 Citroen in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. (DAVID & PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS)

popular cultures, has significantly changed the everyday life of fellow citizens beyond their own ranks.

Cultures and Lifestyles

The most obvious measure of the new rich is the rapid improvements of their material life and expansion of their culture of consumerism. Homes and bodies are the two spheres of consumption that stand out as emblems of success.

As necessary shelter, the home is a consumer good. However, its size, design, and location are features that signify publicly the economic position, and hence status, of the owner's family. A "typical" design of a new rich home is likely to be a pastiche of design elements borrowed from different architectural traditions: roof of blue Chinese or Japanese tiles, stunted classical Roman or Greek columns, Spanish arched windows combined with elements of local tradition. If the owner is Chinese, the home might be built with due consideration to the dictates of geomancy (feng shui). Such displays of "taste" and "cultivation" often offend those with deeper appreciation of specific aesthetic traditions, namely those born into established wealth.

The home is also a piece of real estate, thus an investment. It is often yet another avenue of earning income or accumulating capital for the new rich. In almost all East and Southeast Asian cities, investment in houses, condominiums, and even commercial properties is com-

mon among the new rich. This is especially so in island states such as Singapore and Hong Kong, where land is scarce and limited, causing condominium prices to escalate quickly when the economy is booming. Capital gains from buying and selling of houses outstrip salaries from any forms of employment. The huge borrowing, by both individuals and developers, to invest in the inflated real estate sector gave rise to an "asset bubble" economy, which imploded during the regional crisis, burdening the banks in the region with huge nonperforming loans that caused some to go bankrupt. By the time the economic crisis subsided in mid-1999, every city in the region was dotted with incomplete high-rise buildings waiting for better times.

For the younger professionals and children of new rich parents, bodily adornment is the primary modality for consumption: They wear "designer" clothes and accessories, see and are seen in discos, and eat foreign food in restaurants and wine bars. These are often habits picked up from education abroad. Such highly visible consumption has given rise to public reprobation of the young as being "Westernized" and "decadent" by parents and other moral gatekeepers, including government officials. Older new rich individuals appear to have forgotten their own symbolic consumption.

Politics of the New Rich

The historical conditions from which Asia's new rich emerged are very different from those that gave

rise to the bourgeoisie in nineteenth-century Europe. Europe's bourgeoisie came into their own wealth and status independently of the state. They were thus able to play a decisive role in the democratization of European nations. Asia's new rich generally grew out of their respective states' drive for industrial economic growth; thus they are beholden to the state. Consequently, their political stance toward authoritarianism or democracy is ambivalent and varies from nation to nation.

In South Korea in 1987 and Thailand in 1992, for example, the new rich played a decisive role in the political struggles and eventual removal of the respective military regimes. However, in both these instances, greater democratization did not result immediately. It was not until the 1997 regional economic crisis that democratization pressure intensified. In contrast, semidemocratic regimes such as the single-party-dominant states of Singapore and Malaysia continue to be well supported by a majority of the new rich. In general, it may be said that while the new rich would like to have greater political democratization, they are equally, if not more, concerned with the maintenance of social and political peace so as to further their own interests. Ironically, their consumption interests often unwittingly drive them to greater politicization in the cultural spheres; for example, interest in theater and movies requires them to challenge censorship laws and practices. However, such politicization need not necessarily, if ever, lead to challenging the incumbent political elite for state power.

The political ambivalence of Asia's new rich is partly the consequence of its loose social composition, with members occupying different positions in the society and economy, from managers of the state and transnational corporations to owners of small enterprises and independent professionals. Unifying them is their desire to continue to enjoy their enhanced material life, and that desire can lead them to be politically conservative in the face of less-than-democratic regimes.

Chua Beng-Huat

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NEW YEAR. See **Chinese New Year; No-ruz; Tet.**

NEW ZEALAND-ASIA RELATIONS Asia, particularly East Asia, has recently become one of New Zealand's most important focuses of trade and diplomatic relationships. This international tie is bound to become even more important in the future. The Asia that New Zealanders generally refer to includes the area from the Indian subcontinent to the Japanese archipelago but excludes Russian Siberia. This region covers the vast area of diverse environmental conditions and the wide range of linguistic, ethnic, and cultural characteristics found in East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia.

Before the arrival of European settlers in New Zealand, the indigenous Maori people apparently had no contact with Asia. It is generally accepted that Polynesians, of whom the Maori represent one subgroup, migrated from Southeast Asia to the islands of the Pacific; the Maori may have arrived in New Zealand around 800 CE. During the nineteenth century, early European settlers (mainly British) in New Zealand had little interest in or contact with Asia other than the importing of tea from China.

In the twenty-first century, New Zealand's relationship with Asia is concentrated on East Asian countries: Japan, Korea, and China, including Hong Kong and Taiwan. Contrasting geographical locations and industrial characteristics of East Asia and New Zealand complement each other. Industrialized East Asia is a good market for New Zealand's agricultural products (which, since New Zealand is in the Southern Hemisphere, can be supplied during East Asia's off season), and New Zealand, for its part, imports diverse manufactured goods from East Asia at relatively low prices. Presently, New Zealand is eager to foster close relationships with Asia based on trade, immigration, and tourism, because much of New Zealand's commodity exports depend on the East Asian market conditions. This enthusiasm is demonstrated in the New Zealand government's launching of the Asia 2000 Foundation as an arm of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 1994. The foundation aims to improve New Zealanders' awareness of Asia and to build beneficial relationships with Asia through making grants and engaging in other business, educational, and cultural activities.

In recent years, there have been dramatic changes in New Zealand's trade, immigration, and diplomatic relationships with Asia.

Trade

In the early to mid-twentieth century, Britain was the guaranteed market for almost all of New Zealand's commodities, at one stage taking more than 90 percent of

New Zealand's exports. New Zealand could rely on her "mother country" and did not have to be concerned with the rest of the world. However, ever since Britain joined the European Community in 1973, New Zealand's exports to Britain have declined. While Britain took 36 percent of New Zealand's exports in 1970, it took only 14 percent in 1980. From 1973, New Zealand realized it could no longer expect Britain to continue to be its principal and guaranteed market and was forced to take an independent road. It therefore looked to formerly unfamiliar parts of the world to set up new diplomatic posts and find new trading partners. At this juncture, New Zealand began to pay special attention to Asia, especially Japan and other East Asian countries. However, replacing Britain's role with another single country was neither desirable nor possible; neither Japan nor the United States was willing to be a guaranteed market for New Zealand in the way that Britain was.

During the 1980s, Britain's role in New Zealand's overseas trade dropped even further, so that in 1985 it imported a mere 9 percent of New Zealand's exports, dropping to become New Zealand's fourth largest market, after Australia, Japan, and the United States. At the same time, New Zealand's exports to East Asia (especially Japan and Korea) were increasing fast. New Zealand's exports to Britain dropped to only 6 or 7 percent in the 1990s, while Japan came to take between 15 and 18 percent of New Zealand's exports from 1985 onward. Japan has been New Zealand's second largest export market since 1970. The most common imports by the Japanese are meat, aluminum, wool, dairy products, and forestry products.

Over the last decade, the South Korean market has grown dramatically to become New Zealand's fifth largest market. New Zealand's exports to Korea grew from a mere NZ\$1.6 million in 1970 to more than a billion New Zealand dollars in 1996, which accounted for slightly over 5 percent of New Zealand's exports. These exports consisted of mainly meat, wool, deer antler velvet, and forest products.

China became New Zealand's sixth largest market in 1998–1999, importing NZ\$625 million in goods. Closely following China were Hong Kong (NZ\$602 million) and Taiwan (NZ\$580 million), which ranked as New Zealand's eighth- and ninth-largest export markets in 1998–1999. In total, about 30 percent of New Zealand's exports are currently absorbed by the East Asian market.

In return, New Zealand imports mostly manufactured goods from these East Asian countries. From Japan and Korea, cars and electronic goods are among the main import items, while electronic goods and

computers are imported from Taiwan and Hong Kong and various manufactured goods, including textiles and toys, are imported from China.

The main trading countries from Southeast Asia, which makes up about 8 percent of the market for New Zealand's exports, are Malaysia and Singapore. New Zealand's trade relationships with the remaining parts of Asia are only modest.

Immigration

The earliest emigrants from Asia to New Zealand were the Chinese laborers who worked in the Otago gold mines and who numbered more than five thousand by the 1870s. The Chinese were initially welcomed but soon came to experience immigration restrictions and discrimination, which resulted in the majority of these laborers leaving New Zealand. Most present-day Chinese–New Zealanders are recent immigrants. In 1986, New Zealand changed its immigration policy, and Asians didn't face more restrictions than Europeans did.

According to the 1986 New Zealand census, at that time there were about fifty-five thousand Asians, and these identified themselves as mostly Chinese or Indians. However, by the next census in 1991, the Asian population had jumped to ninety-nine thousand, with a much more diverse national background. The adoption of business migration and the general points system (which assesses immigration applicants by awarding them points based on such factors as educational and professional qualifications, work experience, and age) in November 1991 resulted in a dramatic increase of Asian immigration to New Zealand, and the total Asian population reached 140,000 in 1996. By allowing business migration, New Zealand hoped to attract wealthy Asians who would invest funds in New Zealand, thereby boosting the economy.

When the recent immigrants came in the 1990s, they experienced some discrimination by the New Zealanders of European origin, who were rather taken aback by the sudden influx of Asians they thought had arrived to stay. But many of the immigrants, especially those with marketable skills and good financial support, have moved on to a third country, seeking jobs in Australia, the United States, and Canada, or going back to their countries of origin. Nevertheless, emigration from Asia has become an important element in New Zealand-Asia relationships.

Diplomatic Relations

In 1998 New Zealand had fourteen diplomatic and consular posts in Asian countries, and the number of

diplomatic representatives in those posts is increasing. This trend closely reflects the strengthening of trade and immigration ties more than political, security, or other bilateral interests. New Zealand has diplomatic posts in Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing, Hong Kong, Hanoi, Manila, Jakarta, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, and New Delhi.


New Zealand has been active in Asian international organizations. New Zealand is an original dialogue partner of ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and participates in the ASEAN Regional Forum to discuss and cooperate in regional security issues. New Zealand is also a founding member of the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) forum, and in September 1999 New Zealand hosted a meeting of APEC leaders at Auckland. As New Zealand looks to the future, it increasingly aligns itself with Asia; indeed, in 1996, Prime Minister Jim Bolger even called New Zealand a part of Asia.

Hong-key Yoon

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NGO DINH DIEM (1901–1963), first president of the first Republic of Vietnam. Born of a well-known Catholic family of central Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem (pronounced N-go Dinh Ziem) pursued a Westernized education that, in his time, still preserved some values of the traditional Confucian system. It prepared him for a brilliant career in the royal government of Vietnam, in which he rose to the level of provincial governor at the age of twenty-eight. His career took an advantageous turn in 1933, when the young emperor Bao Dai offered him the position of minister of the interior in the first cabinet of his reign. Following some difference of opinion with either the emperor or



President Ngo Dinh Diem at his desk in Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City) in February 1958. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

his close collaborators, Diem handed in his resignation a few days later, whereon he was stripped of all his functions and honorific distinctions. Subsequently, the court gave back his medals, without, however, reintegrating him into the government.

Diem acquired a reputation of independence, honesty, and integrity, which increased further when, in 1945, he refused to collaborate with the first government of independent Vietnam headed by Ho Chi Minh because he accused the Communists of the murder of one of his brothers. Diem's hopes of playing a role in public affairs on the side of the French-sponsored anticommunist factions were totally dashed in 1949 when the French chose his nemesis, the former emperor Bao Dai, as the head of the State of Vietnam they built up as the rival to Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). Disheartened, Ngo Dinh Diem went on a world tour, which ultimately landed him in the United States.

Meanwhile, the State of Vietnam did not live up to expectations: Its government was corrupt to the core, its attraction as a "nationalist" substitute to the DRV was limited, and the war turned from bad to worse. Then followed Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva Conference. The United States put intense pressure on France and Bao Dai to give Diem a chance. He was then appointed prime minister of the State of Vietnam; his government was presented on 7 July 1954, a mere two weeks before the Geneva Accords divided

Vietnam into two temporary administrative zones. With U.S. aid, Diem firmly intended to delete the word "temporary" from the Accords.

After securing total control of the army, Diem unleashed it against the political factions that had been the loyal supporters of Bao Dai: the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen. He then turned against Bao Dai by organizing a plebiscite in which the people had to choose between Bao Dai and Diem as chief of state. Diem got more than 90 percent of the votes. On 25 October 1955, Diem created the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and proclaimed himself its first president. A period of authoritarian government ensued, and as popular support dwindled, Diem relied more and more on members of his own family. His terror campaign against suspected Communists and his dictatorial rule alienated even noncommunist dissidents, who, in 1960, with the assistance of the DRV, formed the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF), the aim of which was the overthrow of Diem's republic and the reunification of Vietnam. The United States stayed firmly behind the Diem regime, which it hoped to make into a bastion of resistance against the expansion of Communism. But in 1963, on a trivial government interdiction against flying the Buddhist flag during the celebration of Buddha's birthday, the Buddhist hierarchy led the Buddhist community of Vietnam in an unprecedented revolt against the Diem government, whom the rebels accused of discrimination and excessive repression. The open Buddhist rebellion combined with the military attacks mounted by the NLF rendered Ngo Dinh Diem's government completely inoperative; the war against Communist subversion in South Vietnam suffered intolerable setbacks.

Washington then allowed the army to mount a coup against Diem on 1 November 1963; the next day, Diem and one of his brothers were killed. Thus ended the first Republic of Vietnam. The people who lived through it used only one short expression to describe it: "What a pity!" They felt that Diem was an honest and strong leader, the only one—compared with his successors—able to resist the interference of foreign powers, despite his connections with his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu and his wife. He appeared to have all the objective conditions to build up a viable alternative to the DRV, but many think he squandered them by a wrong assessment of the needs of his people.

Truong Buu Lam

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NGO DINH NHU (1910–1963), Vietnamese politician. Younger brother of Ngo Dinh Diem (1901–1963), the first president of South Vietnam, and husband of Madame Nhu (b. 1924, formerly Tran Le Xuan), Ngo Dinh Nhu served as an agent against French rule in Vietnam and later at the side of his brother after Diem was elected president in 1955. Known as an exceptional organizer and a poor administrator, Nhu began his national political life in 1953 in Saigon, organizing demonstrations against the Communists and the French and planning the overthrow of the regime of Emperor Bao Dai (1913–1997). He organized the National Union for Independence and Peace, and, with the support of the Binh Xuyen gang of river pirates and the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious sects, attempted a premature ouster of Bao Dai that failed. Nhu then organized, in 1954, a coalition called the Front for National Salvation, made up of the political-religious sects, the Catholics, the Dai Viet, and other nationalist groups, which intended to solidify his brother's ascent to the head of a new government while also publicly denouncing the Communists.

In June 1954, in the face of Nhu and Diem's activity, Bao Dai invited Diem to form a new government as prime minister. After his brother was in power, Nhu organized the Revolutionary Personalist Labor Party, an organization made up of small covert security, political, and labor groups that reported on opponents of the Diem regime. Along with Diem, he moved to consolidate power by crushing all opposition, including his former supporters, the Binh Xuyen and the religious sects. While this process was under way, Nhu masterminded the plan to gain the final removal of Bao Dai. He organized a group (the General Assembly of Democratic and Revolutionary Forces of the Nation) in April 1955 to demonstrate against the emperor and call for his abdication. In the wake of this movement, Diem was able to call for national elections to determine the new government, elections which he rigged with Nhu's assistance, and easily won. Again, the brothers attempted to further consolidate power and crush all opposition. The corruption and brutality of the brothers' regime, coupled with the inflammatory statements made by Madame Nhu, eventually caught up with them and led to a 1 November 1963 coup, unopposed by the United States, that saw both Nhu and Diem assassinated.

Richard B. Verrone

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NGUYEN CAO KY (b. 1930), Vietnamese political leader. Nguyen Cao Ky was born in Son Tay Province, northwest of Hanoi, in 1930. In 1950 he was drafted into the Vietnamese National Army. He rose to the rank of lieutenant, and in 1953 he volunteered for pilot training. He trained in Algeria and France and graduated in 1954. He eventually was promoted to lieutenant general in the South Vietnamese Air Force.

Ky participated in the 1964 coup that ousted Duong Van Minh from power, and served as prime minister of the Republic of Vietnam between 1965 and 1967. While prime minister, Ky lost much support when he ordered severe repression of Buddhists, whom he believed to be Communist allies. In April 1966, with the help of General William Westmoreland, he led two Army of the Republic of Vietnam battalions against what he believed were Buddhist bases in Da Nang. His actions against the Buddhists led to numerous protests in southern Vietnamese cities.



Premier Nguyen Cao Ky in February 1966. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

Following the 1967 elections, Nguyen Cao Ky became vice president of South Vietnam. In the 1971 elections he chose not to run against Nguyen Van Thieu. He then faded from the political scene. Despite a public promise never to leave Vietnam, he fled to the United States in April 1975.

Micheline R. Lessard

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NGUYEN DU (1765–1820), Vietnamese poet. Nguyen Du was a Vietnamese poet and minor court official, widely regarded as the greatest writer in vernacular Vietnamese. Du's epic narrative poem *The Tale of Kieu* is considered the preeminent work of classical Vietnamese literature, and its characters and language have left a profound mark on Vietnamese society and culture. Born to a family of scholars in the northern province of Ha Tinh, Nguyen Du grew up in a time of enormous political and social turmoil during the final years of the Late Le dynasty (1428–1788). When armies of the Tay Son rebellion (1778–1802) overthrew the Le, he, like many other loyal scholars, went into hiding rather than serve the new regime. When the Tay Son were themselves overthrown by the Nguyen dynasty (1802–1955), Du reluctantly lent his support to the new regime serving in a number of minor court positions. In 1813, he accompanied an imperial embassy to the Chinese court, and while there he may have found the literary inspiration for his masterwork.

In *The Tale of Kieu*, Nguyen Du skillfully combined the Vietnamese vernacular with the six-eight rhythm of folk poetry to rework a seventeenth-century Chinese tale into the great Vietnamese epic. *The Tale of Kieu* weaves together a series of encounters involving archetypal characters of Du's age—the filial daughter (Kieu), corrupt officials, pious Buddhist nuns, heroic rebel leaders, and traitorous mandarins—reflecting the social and political turmoil of his time, as well as his own personal tribulations. The work also highlights the plight and status of women in Vietnamese society, and Nguyen Du lauds Kieu's resilience in the face of immense hardships. In addition to *The Tale of Kieu*, Du also produced a substantial body of shorter poetry in both Vietnamese and classical Chinese, including the noted "Funeral Oration

to the Ten Types of Wandering Souls," an elegy to the dead of the Tay Son–Nguyen wars.

George E. Dutton

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NGUYEN GIA THIEU (1741–1798), Vietnamese poet. Nguyen Gia Thieu is considered one of Vietnam's foremost classical poets. He was born in Lieu Ngan village in Bac Ninh Province in northern Vietnam of aristocratic parents. His father was Nguyen Gia Cu, also known as the Marquis Dat Vu, and his mother was Princess Quynh Lien. He began his classical studies at the age of five at the Trinh Palace. He worked for a time, though without much enthusiasm, in the Vietnamese civil service, and in 1782 he was made commander of the Hung Hoa troops. Nguyen Gia Thieu chose not to pursue a military career, however, and he retreated to a quiet house in Hanoi (then Thang Long), where he engaged in spiritual study and practices. He was particularly interested in Buddhism and Taoism and both philosophies influenced his poetry. In 1786 he was captured by the Tay Son rebels when they took control of Hanoi. In order not to serve the rebels he feigned insanity. He left a considerable body of poetry in both Chinese and Chu Nom. His most celebrated work is *Cung Oan Ngam Khuc* (sometimes translated as "Lament inside a Harem"), a poem depicting the fate of a beautiful woman living in a royal harem.

Micheline R. Lessard

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NGUYEN THI MINH KHAI (1910–1941), Vietnamese revolutionary. Nguyen Thi Minh Khai was a leading Vietnamese revolutionary and was rumored to

be the wife of Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969). Born in 1910, she attended school in Vinh, where she stood out for her anti-French activism. In 1927, she was recruited into the Tan Viet Party and was quickly promoted through the ranks. Anticipating arrest, she fled to Hong Kong in 1930, where she worked as Ho Chi Minh's assistant in the Comintern's Southern Bureau. She was an alternate to the October 1930 plenary conference that saw the founding of the Indochina Communist Party (ICP). Ho requested permission from the Comintern to marry her, but before a marriage could take place, British police arrested Nguyen on 29 April 1931 on suspicion of involvement in subversive activities. After her release in 1934, she returned to Hong Kong to resume party work and was a member of an ICP delegation to the Comintern's seventh congress in 1935, where she spoke about the exploitation of women in Asia and their revolutionary potential. She returned to Vietnam in 1937 and worked clandestinely in Saigon with Le Hong Phong, whom she later married. Following the ICP leadership's retreat to China in 1940, Khai and her sister, Nguyen Thi Quang Thai, the first wife of Vo Nguyen Giap (one of Ho Chi Minh's closest associates, the founder of the Viet Minh armed forces and minister of defense for the ICP), were ordered to remain in Vietnam to serve as liaisons. Khai was arrested by the French in July 1940. Following interrogation and torture, she was executed on 25 April 1941.

Zachary Abuza

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NGUYEN VAN THIEU (b. 1923), president of the Republic of Vietnam (1967–1975). A career military officer, Nguyen Van Thieu graduated from Vietnam's National Military Academy in 1949 and the Command and General Staff Office at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1957.

Thieu participated in the November 1963 coup that brought down President Ngo Dinh Diem (1901–1963) and served briefly as deputy premier before becoming chief of state in the government of Nguyen Cao Ky (b. 1930) from 1965 to 1967. Thieu defeated Ky in the 1967 presidential election and consolidated political power in the post of the presidency. In a power-sharing arrangement, Ky remained premier, though the post was stripped of much of its power. Ky also became Thieu's vice-presidential running mate. Thieu



Nguyen Van Thieu in 1969. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

failed to broaden his base of popular support, especially in the countryside, where he was unable to implement meaningful land reform, while urbanites were frustrated by his repression and widespread corruption, and hence he had to rely on an enlarged military to consolidate his power. In 1971, Thieu disqualified his election challengers, including his vice president, Nguyen Cao Ky, while disastrous 1971–1972 offensives against the North Vietnamese during the Vietnam War (1954–1975) weakened his regime.

Because Thieu was unwilling to negotiate with North Vietnam, which demanded his resignation, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger began meeting secretly with representatives from North Vietnam. Upset with the draft peace agreement, Thieu made twenty-six changes but signed under intense U.S. pressure. Thieu tried to consolidate power after the Paris Peace Accords and went on the offensive, but his forces were no match for the North Vietnamese troops, who occupied much of South Vietnam. On 21 April 1975, days before the Communists took control, Thieu resigned and fled Vietnam; he lives in exile in America.

Zachary Abuza

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NHU, MADAME NGO DINH (b. 1924), sister-in-law of President Ngo Dinh Diem. Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu, a notorious and feared member of South Vietnam's presidential family (1955–1963), was born Tran Le Xuan in 1924 to a wealthy family that served the French colonial administration. She married Ngo Dinh Nhu (1910–1963), brother of Ngo Dinh Diem (1901–1963), in 1943 and, upon the latter's ascension to the presidency of South Vietnam (RVN) in 1955, moved into the presidential palace in Saigon with her husband. Because Diem was unmarried, Madame Nhu effectively became the RVN's First Lady and acted as official hostess of the presidential palace. With Diem's office came benefits for the family: Madame Nhu's father served as ambassador to the United States, her mother became an observer at the United Nations, and two of her uncles served as cabinet members. She was criticized for her



Madame Nhu in Washington, D.C., in October 1963. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

arrogance, caustic remarks, insensitivity, and intolerance. Lashing out at anyone critical of the Diem regime, Madame Nhu was nicknamed "Dragon Lady." For example, when she found out that U.S. Ambassador General J. Lawton Collins (1896–1987) encouraged Diem to oust her, she blamed the United States for assisting factions that sought to topple the Diem government. When Buddhist monks, whom she once called "hooligans in robes" (Karnow 1991: 312), protested the Diem regime through self-immolation, she referred to the protests as "barbecues" and offered to supply gasoline for future demonstrations. While in power, the Catholic Nhu called herself a feminist and formed the Women's Solidarity Movement, yet she issued decrees banning dance, divorce, contraceptives, beauty contests, fortune-telling, gambling, adultery, prostitution, and certain hairdos and music. Her outspokenness against protestors in 1963 helped turn the Kennedy administration against the Diem regime, which in turn led to the coup that toppled the government, resulting in the deaths of her brother-in-law and husband in November of that year.

Richard B. Verrone

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NICHIREN (1222–1282), Japanese Buddhist reformer. Nichiren, a medieval Japanese Buddhist teacher, is regarded as the founder of the Hokke (Lotus) or Nichiren sect. He had entered a monastery in 1233 and then based himself in Kamakura, near Yokohama, preaching among Japan's eastern warriors. Trained in Tendai teachings of the Lotus Sutra and in esoteric Buddhism, Nichiren sought the authentic teachings of the Buddha, taught exclusive faith in the Lotus Sutra as the true Buddhism, and advocated the practice of chanting its *daimoku* or title in the formula, *Namu-myoho-renge-kyo*.

His early writings criticized Pure Land doctrines of otherworldly salvation; later, he also criticized Zen and other Buddhist traditions, asserting that only the Lotus Sutra offered immediate access to Buddhahood in that era. Nichiren saw disasters, including famines, epidemics, and Mongol invasion attempts, as due to collective rejection of the Lotus in favor of "inferior"

teachings; spreading faith in the Lotus, however, would bring peace to the land. He incurred persecution, including two sentences of exile, for his attacks on the Buddhist establishment and its patrons in government, but he believed that worldly authority must be defied when it contravened Buddhist truth.

Nichiren's ideal of realizing the Buddha land in the present world has inspired modern followers, who have assimilated it to numerous political and humanitarian agendas. Today nearly forty religious organizations claim association with him, including traditional sects and new religions.

Jacqueline I. Stone

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NIHONGA *Nibonga* (Japanese-style painting) was practiced beginning in the mid-Meiji period (1868–1912) and combines aspects of Western painting such as shading and perspective with traditional Japanese techniques. In 1884, Ernest Fenollosa (1853–1908), an American who taught philosophy and political economy at Tokyo University and the author of the first English-language work on Japanese art (*Epochs of Chinese and Japanese Art*), along with Okakura Kakuzo (1862–1913), founded the Kangakai (Painting Appreciation Society) to promote traditional Japanese arts. Together, they also established the Tokyo School of Fine Arts, where Japanese-style painting was taught. Fenollosa left Japan for the United States in 1890, and Okakura continued as director until his resignation in 1898, when he went on to found the Japan Fine Arts Academy.

Two artists of the Kangakai were Kano Hogai (1828–1888) and Hashimoto Gaho (1835–1908). Meiji values strongly promoted Western ideals, which created a difficult environment for traditional artists. Such was the case with Hogai, who had great talent and strong connections to the Kano school of painting, but had to resort to means other than painting to make a living. In 1884, Fenollosa had seen his work and asked Hogai to join the Kangakai, where he spent the last years of his life successfully combining Japanese and Western elements in his work. Gaho's situa-

tion was similar. After finding it difficult to make a living through his art, Gaho came to the Kangakai at Fenollosa's request, later becoming an instructor of painting at the Tokyo School of Fine Arts and the Japan Fine Arts Academy. Through these appointments, Gaho was able to teach the next generation of Japanese-style painters.

Of Gaho's students, three were particularly important in transmitting *nibonga* ideals of combining elements of Western and Japanese painting: Yokoyama Taikan (1868–1958), Shimomura Kanzan (1873–1930), and Hishida Shunso (1874–1911). All studied together at the Tokyo School of Fine Arts, and all left the school with Okakura to join him at the Japan Fine Arts Academy.

In 1906, the Japan Fine Arts Academy experienced financial difficulties that forced it to be moved from Tokyo to the fishing village of Izura. Despite the Academy's remote location, students remained loyal; following Okakura's death in 1913, it was reorganized under Yokoyama and Shimomura and remains an active institution, holding annual exhibitions of its students' work.

Today, *nibonga* enjoys renewed popularity. Redefined to meet the demands of a twenty-first-century audience, *nibonga* encompasses broader subject matter and styles to include both the traditional and the avant-garde. Higashiyama Kaii (b. 1908) is considered Japan's premier twentieth-century *nibonga* artist. Among his many important commissions are his screens for the Toshodaiji in Nara, a project he began in 1971 and completed in 1982. Characterized by their striking blue-green color, these paintings represent the pinnacle of modern *nibonga* art.

Catherine Pagani

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NIIGATA (2002 est. pop. 2.5 million). Niigata Prefecture is situated in the central region of Japan's island of Honshu, where it occupies an area of 12,579 square kilometers. Its primary geographical features are a mountainous terrain, central plateaus, a coastal plain, and the offshore island of Sado, one of Japan's largest. Niigata is bordered by the Sea of Japan and by Yamagata, Fukushima, Gumma, Nagano, and Toyama prefectures. It assumed its present name in

1871, subsuming the provinces of Echigo and Sado; its present borders were fixed in 1886.

The prefecture's capital is Niigata city, the largest along the Sea of Japan. A leading Edo-period (1600/1603–1868) port, the city was declared an international port in 1858. Home to Niigata University, it is a major industrial center as well. The prefecture's other important cities are Nagaoka, Joetsu, Sanjo, and Kashiwazaki.

In ancient times, Niigata Prefecture was home to the aboriginal Ezo people, whom government soldiers eventually conquered and forced northward. During the Heian period (794–1185), the Uesugi and other warrior families controlled Echigo, which was divided into many domains during the Edo period. At the same time, the Tokugawa shogunate assumed direct control of Sado, where rich lodes of gold and silver had been discovered. Forced labor was used to work the mines, which provided a major source of revenue to the government. Today Sado's unique folk culture of music, dance, Noh drama, and Bun'ya puppet drama makes the island a popular destination.

Niigata Prefecture possesses the nation's largest oil and natural gas reserves. Its heavy industry ranges from petroleum refining to machinery and chemical production. A major rice grower, the prefecture also has flourishing sake brewing, textile, and woodworking companies.

E. L. S. Weber

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NIKKYOSO Nikkyoso is the abbreviated name of Nihon Kyoshokuin Kumiai (Japan Teachers' Union). It was formed in 1947, and in its early days the vast majority of school teachers in Japan were participating members. During the 1950s and 1960s, Nikkyoso's left-wing leadership had a confrontational relationship with the Japanese government. The union opposed the government's efforts to reverse some of the democratic reforms introduced during the Allied occupation (1945–1952). Bitter disputes were fought over the issues of central government control of textbooks, the curriculum, and teacher training and assessment. During this time, Nikkyoso was closely allied with other public sector unions and the Japanese Socialist Party.

By the 1980s, Nikkyoso faced a crisis brought about by declining membership and internal divisions over

policy. In 1989, a serious split took place that involved one-third of the members leaving the union and forming a new teachers' union called Zenkyo. After this split, Nikkyoso went on to revise its educational and political policy with a view to working with the government rather than opposing it. Zenkyo, on the other hand, was determined to continue the left-wing struggle against the government and the education bureaucracy.

Robert Aspinall

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NILGIRI DISTRICT (2001 pop. 765,000). Nilgiri district is an administrative district of 2,549 square kilometers, the most northwesterly district in Tamil Nadu State, India. The area lies at the juncture of the Eastern and the Western Ghats, about 425 kilometers west of Madras City (or Chennai). Two-thirds of the district is a high mountain plateau; one-third is the much lower Wainad Plateau. The highest point in the district is Doddabetta Peak, 2,637 meters in elevation.

The district headquarters is the well-known resort of Ootacamund. Nilgiri district is home to well over a dozen tribal groups, most found only in this area and most having their own distinctive Dravidian language. These groups include the Todas, Kotas, Badagas, Pannias, four tribes of Irulas, and seven tribes of Kurumbas. The cultures and economies of these indigenous groups are very distinct and form the basis for complex symbiotic exchange relationships. The district is chiefly important for its exports of tea, but coffee, rubber, cardamom, potatoes, and cabbages are also prominent exports, as is hydroelectric power generated through numerous man-made dams.

Paul Hockings

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NINGKAN, STEPHEN KALONG (1920–1997), first chief minister of the East Malaysian state of Sarawak. Stephen Kalong Ningkan served as first chief

minister of the East Malaysian state of Sarawak between July 1963 and September 1966. Prior to Sarawak's joining the union of Malaya, Singapore, and North Borneo to form the Federation of Malaysia, Sarawak was a British colony. Born in Sarawak of Iban and Chinese ancestry, Ningkan is probably best known for triggering a constitutional crisis when he refused to vacate his office after being dismissed by the Sarawakian governor. Ningkan, as leader of the Council Negri (the state legislature), had purportedly ceased to command the confidence of the majority of the council. With the backing of the federal government in Kuala Lumpur, the governor proceeded to appoint a new chief minister. Ningkan's refusal to vacate his office, resulting in a constitutional impasse that was perceived to threaten the fragile unity of Malaysia, aroused a vigorous reaction from the federal government.

On 14 September 1966, Yang di-Pertuan Agong, Malaysia's head of state, proclaimed a state of emergency in Sarawak on the basis that its security was threatened by the constitutional crisis. Under emergency rule, Parliament was legislatively enabled to exercise further powers, effectively governing Sarawak from the federal capital. Ningkan appealed his dismissal all the way to the Privy Council in London, Malaysia's then final appellate court, but lost his appeal for a declaration that he was still chief minister of Sarawak. A firm believer that Sarawakians were entitled to have full citizenship rights and to participate in Malaysia's national development on a par with the Malays on the Malaya Peninsula, Ningkan slipped into political oblivion after his removal from office.

The constitutional crisis that Ningkan was embroiled in should be seen in the light of the volatile political matrix in Malaysia then. After Malaysia was created through the union of Malaya and Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak on 16 September 1963, communal tension rose over the core identity of Malaysia. The politically convenient union was short-lived and Singapore left the federation on 9 August 1965. At the federal level, there was concern that Sarawak and Sabah might follow Singapore and secede from Malaysia. The removal of Ningkan, albeit by constitutional means, was an attempt by the federal government in Kuala Lumpur to exercise indirect control by aligning East Malaysian political parties with the United Malays National Organization–dominated coalition at the center.

Eugene K. B. Tan

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NINGXIA (2002 est. pop. 5.9 million). Ningxia, with the official name of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, is located in northwest China and covers an area of 51,800 square kilometers. Ningxia borders on Gansu in the east, south, and west; on Mongolia in the north; and on Inner Mongolia and Shaanxi in the east. It is traversed by the Huang (Yellow) River, which in the middle of the region changes its west–east course and runs north. The larger part of the region consists of loess plateau and its altitude averages 1,000 meters above sea level. The majority of the region's 5.2 million (1996) people live in the fertile Huang River Valley, which lies sheltered by the Helan Mountains. The capital of Yinchuan (population of 559,000 in 1996) is also situated in the valley.

The Ningxia region was carved out of Gansu Province and was accorded provincial status from 1928 to 1954, when it reverted to Gansu, but in 1958 several Hui autonomous districts were combined into one independent region, which is divided into sixteen counties and one banner, the Alashan East Banner, home of a Mongol minority people. The 1.8 million Hui—Chinese Moslems—are concentrated in and around the capital, while several other minority groups are scattered around the region. Irrigated fields along the 320-kilometer-long south to north river valley produce wheat, rice, sugar beets, vegetables, and fruit, and animal husbandry is dominated by sheep. Industries are concentrated around Yinchuan and the second largest city, Shizuishan.

Bent Nielsen

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NINOY. See **Aquino, Benigno.**

NIRAT *Nirat* is a type of Thai poem, often written in *kblong* meter, in which traditionally the poet de-

scribes his separation from either a loved one or a familiar place. Typically, sights and sounds on the poet's journey will remind him of the girl he has left behind and evoke a sense of melancholy, which is then expressed through clever punning on the names of places or meanings of the names of places that he passes through.

Famous *nirat* poems include *Kblong Nirat Hari-phunchai*, composed in the sixteenth century, in which the poet Si Thep describes his journey from Chiang Mai to Hariphunchai in Lamphun, and *Kblong Kam-suan*, in which the poet Si Prat describes his journey from Ayutthaya to exile in Nakhon Si Thammarat. The most famous of all *nirat* poets is Sunthorn Phu (1786–1855), who broadened the thematic scope of the genre beyond the conventional theme of separation and love-longing, by including reflective, humorous, and philosophical passages. With increasing travel abroad in the nineteenth century, *nirat* poems often became "travel poems," recording the poet's impressions of foreign lands. Particularly famous is *Nirat London* by Mom Rachothai, the interpreter with the Thai mission sent to the court of Queen Victoria in 1857. In this poem, the poet mentions the English ports of Dover and Portsmouth and describes in detail the material sophistication of mid-nineteenth-century Britain, court manners, functions at Windsor Castle, and Queen Victoria herself. Although the *nirat* poem became less popular during the twentieth century, competitions are held to encourage its survival, and prominent poets still occasionally turn their hand to it.

David Smyth

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NISHIDA KITARO (1870–1945), Japanese philosopher. Japan's most important philosopher of the modern period, Nishida Kitaro was born near Kanazawa in Ishikawa Prefecture and attended Tokyo Imperial University as a student in philosophy. Along with being an excellent student, he intermittently practiced Zen meditation. Graduating in 1884, he returned to Kanazawa, where he grew up, and taught German, mathematics, and philosophy.

Appointed lecturer at Kyoto Imperial University in 1909, Nishida composed the philosophical essays that

were published in 1911 as *Zen no kenkyu* (A Study of Good). In this work, Nishida reflected on the nature of Japanese culture within a Western rational framework. His belief in the need to achieve a transcendent state detached from worldly concerns was presented as his philosophy of "pure experience." The book became a bestseller, and Nishida subsequently was awarded a doctorate, appointed full professor, and given tenure. In *Geijutsu to dotoku* (Art and Morality, 1923), Nishida studied moral will and the beautiful as artistic intuition, focusing attention on the experimental ground from which the creativity of the artist and moral decisions of the self arise. In later works, he investigated Japanese culture, the notion of Buddhist "nothingness," and fundamental principles necessary for bridging Eastern and Western ways of thinking. Throughout his philosophy, Buddhism and traditional Eastern concepts remain dominant, yet his efforts to bring Western and Japanese concepts together in a logical framework have had a major impact on Japanese intellectual circles.

Despite bouts of ill health and a series of deaths in the family, Nishida remained at Kyoto University until his retirement, when he moved to Kamakura.

James M. Vardaman, Jr.

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NITOBE INAZO (1862–1933), educator, writer, public servant. Nitobe Inazo was Japan's best known twentieth-century internationalist. Born in Morioka in northern Japan, he studied at the most prestigious institutions: Sapporo Agricultural College and the University of Tokyo in Japan, Johns Hopkins University in the United States, and several German universities. While abroad, he married Mary Elkington, a Quaker from Philadelphia, and for the rest of his life he remained a steadfast Quaker.

The list of Nitobe's posts constitutes a who's who of elite organizations. Among other positions, he was headmaster of Tokyo's First Higher School (1906–1913), professor at the University of Tokyo (1913–1918), president of Tokyo Women's College

(1918–1923), undersecretary general of the League of Nations (1920–1926), a member of the Diet's House of Peers (1926–1933), and Japanese chair of the Institute of Pacific Relations (1929–1933).

His sixteen volumes of writings (a third of them in English) focused on internationalism and ethical development, as well as his technical specialties: agricultural economics and colonial policy. He was acclaimed internationally for *Bushido: The Soul of Japan*, a favorite of U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt, which analyzed the ethical foundations of Japan's modern successes. His best-known work in Japanese, *Sbuyo* (Self-cultivation), was reprinted 140 times.

Nitobe's reputation as a pacifist was damaged at the beginning of the 1930s when, in a series of lectures abroad, he tried to explain Japan's expansion into Manchuria. Until the end of his life, however, he defended internationalism and Quaker pacifism.

James L. Huffman

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NIXON SHOCK In a move that astonished the world, in July 1971 President Nixon announced his intent to visit the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1972 and hence initiate the normalization of Sino-American relations. Japan, the United States's closest ally in East Asia, was not informed about Nixon's trip prior to its announcement. This situation became known in Japan as the first Nixon "shock," or *shokku*. The ostensible motivation behind Nixon's action was not to isolate Japan, but to warm relations with the PRC, within the context of the bipolar U.S.-USSR Cold War struggle. In Japan, Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, who was given no advance notice of the U.S. policy change vis-à-vis China, privately suggested that the United States was being insensitive to Japan's security position in Asia. Moreover, it seemed to the Japanese public that the United States was, at worse, retreating from its security commitments to Japan or, at best, exploiting the comfortable relationship between the two countries to the point of ignoring Japan's security needs.

The second Nixon *shokku* was the U.S. president's statement that initiated the end of the gold standard, one of the mainstays of the post-World War II world

economy. In August 1971 Nixon announced that the United States would no longer exchange dollars for gold. This and related steps denoted the start of a floating exchange rate system by 1973. Nixon also put in place a 10 percent surcharge on all imports. Both moves were designed to improve the position of American exporters who were disadvantaged by an overvalued dollar. Japan, with its high dependence on the U.S. market, suffered more than other U.S. trading partners as the yen appreciated in value, making Japanese products more expensive in the United States and other markets.

Nixon's rapprochement with China and the unilateral termination of the fixed-exchange rate system, coupled with the high cost to Japanese exporters of the new trade policy, raised serious questions about the American commitment to Japan. In large part, Japan's shock with the moves by Nixon was based on the fact that Japanese leaders were not consulted.

Jonathan R. Strand

See also: **Japan-U.S. Relations**; **Sato Eisaku**

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NIYAZOV, SAPARMURAT (b. 1940), president of Turkmenistan. Born in 1940 in Ashgabat, Saparmurat Niyazov trained as an engineer and rose through the Communist Party ranks, becoming first secretary in 1985. When Turkmenistan gained independence in 1991, he became its president. Occupying his country's highest office since 1985, he is the longest continuously serving leader in the former Soviet Union.

Niyazov claims credit for winning international recognition of his country's neutral status and maintaining internal stability. His economic program is based on plans to export Turkmenistan's natural gas reserves (fourth largest in the world), although he has not resolved the problem of transporting the gas to countries that can pay for it. Meanwhile, his failure to launch market reforms has led the International Monetary Fund to pull out and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to threaten a cutoff of lending.

The pace of political reform is even less encouraging. Despite formal adherence to the Helsinki Final

Act, Niyazov has stifled social initiative and all individual liberties, isolating his desert kingdom while becoming a virtual demigod and the focus of a Stalinist personality cult in the tightly controlled media. Niyazov has taken the appellation "Turkmenbashi" (Leader of the Turkmen), in apparent imitation of Ataturk, and locales, factories, and institutions bear his name. The rubber-stamp People's Council in December 1999 authorized him, as the country's first president, to rule indefinitely. In May 2001, the World Humanitarian Turkmen Association bestowed on Niyazov the title "Turkmenbashi the Great." Niyazov has also released a virtual bible (the *Rukhname*), which he intends to be the moral guide for his countrymen, thus becoming their spiritual as well as secular leader.

Under Niyazov, political institutions have been stunted. Turkmenistan is the last one-party state in the former Soviet bloc. All elections have been farces; no dissent or opposition is tolerated, and schoolchildren must daily recite a poem that includes the line: "At the moment of my betrayal of my motherland, of her sacred banner, of my president, let my breath stop." Turkmen authorities have also targeted religious communities, demolishing a Hare Krishna temple and Seventh-Day Adventist Church in Ashgabat in November 1999 (only Sunni Islam and Russian Orthodoxy are registered).

In 2001, Niyazov isolated Turkmenistan and its people even farther from the rest of the modern world, closing opera and ballet houses and cutting education. Foreigners who want to marry Turkmen citizens must now pay the state \$50,000. Niyazov has allowed no potential successor to come to the fore. His style of leadership involves frequent dismissals of ministers and other appointees, often followed by their public humiliation. Foreign dignitaries relate that Niyazov degrades his officials in the presence of visiting delegations. In November 2001, a wave of defections of former high-level officials signaled the first serious rift within Niyazov's elite. Perhaps fearing a coup attempt, Niyazov in March 2002 launched a purge of the security ministries, on which he has hitherto relied.

The international community has come to see Niyazov as an unpredictable megalomaniac who will not allow any reform or tolerate any opinion other than his own. His control of the political system and its coercive apparatus makes unlikely his removal from power, unless discontented underlings conspire successfully to oust him. It is widely assumed that only Saparmurat Niyazov's death will usher in a new era in Turkmenistan.

Michael Ochs

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NIZAM AD-DIN AWLIYA' (1238–1325), Muslim saint of India. Nizam ad-Din Awliya'—whose real name was Muhammad bin Ahmad bin 'Ali al-Bukhari al-Bada'uni—was born at Bada'un, India, to a Turkish family who had migrated from Bukhara in today's Uzbekistan. He is one of the most venerated Muslim saints of the Indian subcontinent, his popularity reflected by the Arabic appellative Sultan al-Awliya' (King of the Saints), generally used by Muslims in referring to him.

After having received a traditional education in Arabic and Islamic studies, he went first to Delhi and then in 1257 to Ajudhan (a town on the river Satlej, an affluent of the Indus River), joining the Sufi Chishti (the most influential and popular Indian Islamic mystical order of the time) community led by the Sufi sheikh (master) Farid ad-Din Ganj-i Shakar (d. 1265). Nizam ad-Din soon became his favored disciple, and in 1258 Shakar nominated him as his *khalifa* (spiritual successor), sending him back to Delhi. He settled in the adjacent village of Ghiyaspur and established a Sufi community, which attracted followers from all the social strata, as Nizam ad-Din gained a remarkable reputation among and influence over Indian Muslims. He did not confine his teachings to mysticism but rather also focused on *tafsir* (commentary on the Qur'an), *hadith* (traditions), and literature. Some of his preachings—known as *malzumat*—were written down by his disciples and collected in the work *Fawa'id al-fu'ad* (Things Useful for the Heart), compiled by the poet Hasan Sijzi. Nizam ad-Din's *malzumat* thus became an important vehicle for the diffusion of mystical thought and practices throughout India. Cornerstones of his thought—in accordance with Chishti ideology—were the concepts of *wahdat al-mujud* (unity of being), the rejection of all material attractions, and nonviolence.

Amir-i Khosraw (1253–1325), generally considered the greatest poet of Delhi, was among his disciples. According to popular legend, he became a poet when Nizam ad-Din placed some of his saliva on Amir's tongue; certainly his poems reflect Amir's veneration for his master, and they contributed to the popularity of the saint.

In 1325, Nizam ad-Din died at Ghiyaspur. His tomb rapidly became a shrine for Muslims of the Indian subcontinent; on the anniversary of his death devotees crowd into the tomb and pray to the saint, asking for favors and his intercession.

Riccardo Redaelli

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NOBI *Nobi* were the slaves of premodern Korea. Male slaves (*no*) and female slaves (*pi*) were owned, traded, and inherited, but a distinct feature of Korean slavery was that slaves could own property, including other slaves. The origin of this institution is obscure, but during the Koryo dynasty (918–1392) private estates and slave cultivators increased. During the Choson dynasty (1392–1910) about 30 percent of the population were slaves.

A distinct social status group in which membership was hereditary, *nobi* were divided into public and private slaves. Public slaves (*kong nobi*) were kept in temples, government offices, schools, and posting stations; private slaves (*sa nobi*) were divided into domestic servants and outside resident slaves (*oego nobi*) who worked on distant land owned by the master. The relationship of the latter group to the master was similar to one of tenants to a landlord.

Intermarriage of slaves and commoners was common. According to law, for most of the Choson dynasty the status of the mother decided her children's status, but in practice, if either parent was a slave, the children became slaves as well. The *nobi* population was also perpetuated by poor peasants who sold themselves into slavery. In 1801, public slavery was abolished; in 1886, slave status was abrogated; and in 1894, private slavery was outlawed.

Anders Karlsson

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NOER, ARIFIN C. (1941–1995), Indonesian playwright, actor, stage director, film director. Born 10 March 1941 in Cirebon, West Java, Arifin is one of a group of modern Indonesian dramatists who present social problems on stage in a variety of dramatic guises. Aside from traditional Indonesian theater, his main influences are Ionesco and Brecht. The influence of traditional Indonesian forms is apparent in his blending of dramatic action with music. Arifin presented most of his works with the theater company Teater Kecil (Small Theater). His most frequently performed work is *Sumur Tanpa Dasar* (The Bottomless Well), first produced in 1964, which blends techniques drawn from theater of the absurd and traditional Indonesian theater, with a strong element of Islamic morality. When the actor, writer, and director W. S. Rendra returned from studying in the United States in 1968, Arifin acted for a time in Rendra's company, and later works show the influence of Rendra's minimalism. Also a celebrated director, he made six films between 1977 and 1991, the best-known of which is *Taksi*. He died 28 May 1995.

Tim Byard-Jones

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NOH-KYOGEN Noh is a highly refined Japanese theater form combining drama, dance, music, and poetry. In the latter half of the fourteenth century, the actor and playwright Kanze Kan'ami Kiyotsugu (1333–1384) and his son, Kanze Zeami Motokiyo (1363–1433), moved Noh beyond its popular roots, incorporating the aesthetics of the military elite who patronized the art. This father and son team is responsible for many of the approximately 250 plays in the active repertory today. Plays are in one or two acts, and generally focus on an event in the life of one (usually masked) main character (*shite*), frequently a historical or legendary figure. A secondary character



A Noh mask of noble beauty. (HORACE BRISTOL/CORBIS)

(*waki*), often a traveling priest, serves as a catalyst for the *shite* to reveal his or her story. A seven- to ten-member chorus, seated on the left side of the stage, chants narrative sections and takes over the lines of the *shite* and *waki* at emotional peaks. The actors are male; masks and costumes indicate the sex, age, and mental state of the character being portrayed.

Many Noh plays include an interlude, performed by a *kyogen* actor (*kyogen* are comic spoken dialogue plays, performed between Noh plays or independently), which provides background information or summarizes the action of the play in colloquial language. A musical ensemble sits upstage center and accompanies the entire play.

There are 257 *kyogen* plays in the active repertory. They feature stock characters such as masters and conniving servants, tricksters and country bumpkins, inept warrior priests, overbearing wives, humorous demons, and felicitous deities. Unlike the highly literary scripted Noh plays, for hundreds of years *kyogen* plays were improvised based on skeletal outlines; they only began to be written down in the seventeenth century.

Noh and *kyogen* also have many things in common. Both are performed on a Noh stage—a long passage-way (*hashigakari*) connecting to a main stage area that is approximately five square meters. The rear wall of the roofed stage depicts a large pine tree, and massive earthenware jars beneath the raised wooden floor am-

plify sound. A limited number of types of costume pieces, silk in Noh and linen in *kyogen*, are combined in different ways for various characters. Scenery is not used, as setting is created by the words or actions of the actors, and use of props is minimal. Both forms have been passed down from father to son for over six hundred years, are maintained by several important families, and remain vibrant forms of theater today.

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
NOMADIC PASTORALISM—CENTRAL ASIA From around 800 BCE until the sixteenth century, nomadic pastoralists ruled the steppes (grassy plains) that stretch north of the Black Sea, across Kazakhstan, and into the Tian Shan and Altay Mountains of western China, western Mongolia, and southern Siberia. Sometimes called mobile herders, these groups did not, as often believed, freely move when

and where they liked. Instead, they followed a yearly route between summer and winter pastures, riding on horseback and driving wagons and carts, moving their vast herds as the seasons dictated. Although some herders did live in villages or towns during the winter, nomadic pastoralism implies a way of life without permanent housing; generally the herders lived in tents or even houses carried on wagons. They were expert horsemen; in some ethnic groups, women rode and fought alongside the men, for mobile herding encouraged an aggressive way of life.

Most pastoralists depended not only on their herds but on booty and tribute that they plundered from surrounding settled folk. City dwellers often considered these people troublesome barbarians or even a threat to civilization, although those who never came in contact with these groups often saw them as enjoying a simple, noble life untouched by corruption and decadence. Remnants of nomadic pastoralism can still be found today in Mongolia and western China.

Definition of Nomadic Pastoralism

Horses had probably been domesticated on the steppes around the beginning of the first millennium BCE, and, thereafter, people began to ride horses while herding their animals. This way of life probably combined pastoralism—herding animals—and farming on the Black Sea steppes, and in the steppes to the east the use of horses allowed herders to enlarge their herds



A Kyrgyz family outside its yurt in Djety Oguz, Kyrgyzstan, in 1995. (JANET WISHNETSKY/CORBIS)

by pasturing them over larger areas than would be the case if animals and men traveled on foot and then returned to their homes each evening.

The steppe inhabitants became mobile herders from about the ninth century BCE, tending horses, sheep, goats, camels, or yaks (in the higher elevations), depending on the geographic area, and moving seasonally between pastures, sometimes visiting low-lying pastures in winter and mountainous areas in summer or moving between northerly and southerly regions of the steppes as the seasons changed. They probably depended to a certain extent on neighboring settled groups for agricultural products and wealth in the form of tribute, but this lifestyle was primarily mobile.

Modern nomads today follow a circuitous yearly route, nomadizing from spring to summer to fall pastures while living in portable housing, called yurts (Turkish) or *gers* (Mongolian), and wintering in permanent housing in sheltered river valleys or, in the mountains, below south-facing stone escarpments that absorb and radiate solar heat.

Early Evidence of Nomadic Pastoralism

The Greek historian Herodotus (c. 484–430/420 BCE) chronicled the Scythians, who interacted with the Greeks in the northern Black Sea region, and the Sauromatians, whom he described as descendants of the Amazons and Scythians living on the steppes east of the Scythians. Persian and Chinese Han-dynasty historians provided information on the Saka, the name the Persians used in the fifth century BCE to refer to most of the nomadic groups living to the north of the Persian empire, on the steppes from the Aral Sea to Siberia. These steppe nomads spoke Indo-Iranian languages and were of European type or mixed European-Asiatic type.

Aside from written testimony of the civilized folk around them, these nomads are known from their rich tombs of their chieftains, elaborately constructed, topped by high earthen mounds, and filled with weapons, jewelry, and horse trappings often decorated with gold and silver. The decoration is in the so-called animal style: figures of deer, birds of prey, felines, and other animals.

In the Altay Mountains of Siberia, the fifth- and fourth-century BCE frozen tombs at Pazyryk and Ukok were preserved for more than two thousand years through freezing of the contents after robbers had dug into the graves. Archaeologists discovered sacrificial horses with colorful saddles and bridles, elaborately decorated felt textiles, carved wooden animal figures

that had once been overlaid with gold, and embalmed remains of high-ranking personages, some of whom had been tattooed with animal figures. The burials had been robbed of their precious metals; the artifacts that remained suggested that nomadic rulers had accumulated wealth in the form of gifts from settled people and from caravan traders who wanted to appease these fierce warriors. Burial artifacts also indicated that, in addition to chieftains, other high-status pastoral nomads included warriors, priestesses, and warrior priestesses.

Nomads of the Early Middle Ages

Around the third century BCE, powerful confederacies of nomads arose in the eastern steppes. These included the Xiongnu (who caused the Chinese to build the Great Wall of China), and the Yueh Chih. They forced the Saka and other tribes westward and into northern Afghanistan. Simultaneously, the various groups of Sarmatians (descendants of the earlier Sauromatians), who were concentrated on the steppes north of the Aral Sea, also began expanding westward, displacing the Scythians who had dominated the Black Sea steppes. The Sarmatians were known to Greek and Roman sources as raiders and traders; they pillaged settled folk and extracted tribute from caravans that now plied the great Silk Road from Europe to China. Many Sarmatians became mercenary soldiers for the Roman armies; one group of 5,500 was ordered to Britain in the second century CE to guard Hadrian's Wall, where they lived out their years.

The Turks

In the sixth century CE, a mighty political confederacy of Turkic-speaking pastoral nomads arose in the central Altay Mountains. Throughout Eurasia, they marked their burials with commemorative sculptures, and portraits of male warriors and females of high status. Extending the Silk Road, the Turkic nomads traded with the Chinese Tang dynasty (618–907) as well as with Byzantium and the merchants of present-day Iran. Eventually, they spread across Eurasia, and today Turkic-speaking people are the dominant populations in many regions of Eurasia, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, and modern Turkey.

Genghis Khan and the Mongol Empire

One of the most renowned Central Asian nomads of all time was no doubt Genghis Khan (c. 1162–1227). Born Temujin in Mongolia and possessed of courage, charisma, and iron discipline, he united the Mongol

and Turkic tribes into a vast and well-organized confederacy before he began his horrific and bloody conquest to expand Mongol lands. After his death, his descendants continued the Mongol expansion, and, by 1240, had captured Russia. Before long, the Mongols were menacing eastern Europe and arousing fears that they would overrun the Western world. Writings of papal emissaries, royal embassies from France and China, and traders such as Marco Polo (1254–1324) have revealed much about these pastoral nomads, as well as about Westerners' attitudes toward these threatening hordes.

Despite the efforts of foreign missionaries, many elements of shamanism and animism, the original beliefs of the nomads, remained in the Buddhism that was formally adopted as the official Mongol religion during the reign (1251–1259) of Genghis Khan's grandson Mongke at his capital Karakorum and south-central Mongolia.

Genghis Khan's heirs included Mongke, who consolidated the Mongol empire; Khubilai (1215–1294), who established the Mongol-ruled Yuan dynasty in China (1279–1368); Hulegu (c. 1217–1265), who founded the Il-Khanate in Iran; and Batu (d. 1255), who was great khan of the Golden Horde in the territory of present-day Russia. The latter nomadic confederacy was established along the lower Volga River and eventually controlled east–west trade through Central Asia as well as trade with the Vikings who came down the Volga from Scandinavia seeking silver coinage. Little is known of the White Horde further to the west, but it is thought that from its headquarters in Moldova, the Black Plague spread to Europe. After much internal strife over Christianity, shamanism, and Islam, Khan Berke (d. 1267) of the Golden Horde, a confederacy of many tribes, adopted Islam, which remains today the principal religion of the Central Asian Turkic-speaking nomads.

The Mongols remained a force to be reckoned with at least until the sixteenth century, although their empire began to disintegrate during the fifteenth century, partly because the Russian grand dukes battled to free Russia from their overlords. Russian tribute to the Mongols ended in 1480, but not until the sixteenth century was Russia completely free from Mongol overlordship.

Early Modern Pastoral Nomads

Descending from the groups that were successors to the Mongol empire, the Kyrgyz-Kazakhs, as the Kazakhs were known in early Russian texts, were divided into three hordes (Great, Little, and Middle)

and nomadized from the Volga River eastward through present-day Kazakhstan in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During the Russian expansion under Peter the Great and subsequent Russian czars, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Kazakhs, Naiman, Kyrgyz, and other pastoral nomads were pitted against one another and were frequently displaced. Some took their herds to the Tian Shan range in western China. Others migrated into the Dzungar Basin in present-day Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in western China, but soon Dzungarian nomads began to confiscate their pastures, forcing them to migrate into western Mongolia, where they petitioned the Mongol government for grazing rights in Bayan Olgii *aimag* (province). Mongols in the Chinese Tian Shan migrated west of the Caspian Sea to form the republic of Kalmykia, although some later returned to the mountainous pastures, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, where they remain today, subsequent to their deportation to Siberia during the regime of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin (1879–1953).

Twentieth-Century Nomads under the Soviets

Although imperial Russian expansion had previously created major problems between nomadic tribes, it was Khrushchev's mandate in the 1950s to cultivate the "Virgin Lands" that brought Russian settlers eastward, expanding into the nomads' grazing lands. Sovietization produced a much more violent change. The Soviets forced the pastoralists to abandon their lifestyle and form collective farms, although some managed to nomadize for part of the year. During this period, thousands of native inhabitants of the steppes starved; others migrated into western China, while others eventually became agriculturists.

Pastoral Nomadism Today

In the late twentieth century, only pockets of pastoral Kazakhs and Mongol nomads remained in the Altay Mountains and the Chinese Tian Shan and across Mongolia, living in yurts and *gers* while nomadizing much as the early nomads did 2,500 years ago. Following the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, thousands of nomadic Mongolian Kazakhs joined their compatriots on collective farms in Kazakhstan, although subsequently a great portion of these returned to Mongolia, preferring pastoral nomadism to agriculture.

Pastoral nomadism as an economic lifestyle, today, as always, is extremely tenuous and has become more fragile as urban migrations and international diaspo-

ras, particularly among the younger generations, have further reduced the population of herders. Equally grim is the threat from severe and extremely varying climatic conditions—summer droughts leaving the pastures barren, bitterly cold winds, tremendous summer hailstorms, and deep snows concealing winter grasses—which can cause near-total annihilation of the herds. Without animals, a nomadic pastoral economy must vanish, and with it is lost all traces of the distinctive traits of nomadic culture.

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NOMADIC PASTORALISM-SOUTH ASIA

Nomadic pastoralism is an economic activity whereby a society that derives its livelihood from herding domesticated animals undertakes seasonal migrations to provide water and pasture for its livestock. Such groups generally occupy lands that are unsuitable for settled agriculture. Thus, in South Asia, nomadic pastoralists are found mainly in the higher foothills of the Himalayas and in the arid hills, plains, and deserts of the subcontinent's northwestern region.

The groups in the Himalayas practice a form of nomadism known as transhumance. The Bhotiya, for example, a people of Tibetan descent found from Ladakh to Bhutan, spend the summer high in the mountains,

in villages situated at an elevation between 3,500 and 4,500 meters. They keep goats, cattle, and yak (a bovine adapted to high altitudes). With the onset of winter, the Bhotiya and their herds descend to villages in the lower valleys where they live until the snows melt and they can return to their summer pastures. The Gujars of Kashmir and the Gaddi of Himachal Pradesh have similar patterns of transhumance.

Pastoralist groups in the northwestern areas of South Asia follow a lifestyle more typical of traditional nomads. They herd goats, sheep, camels, and cattle, following well-defined seasonal migration routes in search of grazing and water. They use the products of their animals (wool, meat, milk, hides) for their own consumption as well as to trade for food and other goods they do not produce themselves. The Rabari, sheepherders of Rajasthan and Gujarat; the Gadariya; and the Dhangar are among the nomadic pastoralists of northwestern India. (Other nomads of this area, the Lohars, are unusual in that they are ironworkers rather than pastoralists.)

The Baluchi of western Pakistan represent an extension of the nomadic pastoralism of Central Asia into South Asia. Though historically, culturally, and linguistically related to the peoples located to their west, they find themselves situated within Pakistan's national borders. The Baluchi have resisted, sometimes by force, government attempts to integrate them into modern Pakistani society.

Nomadic pastoralists in South Asia are, in general, seminomadic rather than true nomads, most living in villages for part of the year. They also have well-developed economic and social relationships with surrounding agricultural peoples. Although precise numbers are not readily available, nomadic and seminomadic peoples amount to less than 1 percent of the total population of South Asia. These numbers are steadily declining as nomadic pastoralists face social, environmental, economic, and political pressures to abandon their traditional ways of life.

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See also: **Himalaya Range**

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THE SEARCH FOR PASTURAGE

The Sherpa people of Nepal are one of the nomadic, or seminomadic peoples, of the mountains of South Asia. As described below, they must move in order to find pastures for their cattle.

Periodic movements from pasture to pasture are an essential element of the Sherpas' cattle economy. Their extent and range, however, varies with the size of herds. The owner of a small herd may base his yak for five months in the year on the main village, move with his animals to higher pastures for another five months and spend perhaps two months at one or two *gunsa*-settlements. A man owning thirty or more yak, on the other hand, may keep them only one month out of twelve in the main village, and take them even during part of the winter to some high *yorsa*-settlements.

This system can be demonstrated by tracing the annual movements of the herds of two men of Khumjung: Dorje Ngungdu, who in 1957 owned 8 female yak and 1 bull, and Ang Tandin, who owned 2 male and 32 female yak, 1 female cross-breed and 1 bull.

Dorje Ngungdu kept his cattle in Khumjung from November until March, and during that time the animals grazed as long as possible on the surrounding slopes, and from December onwards were fed on hay and the dried stalks of buckwheat stored in Khumjung. In April his son took the herd to Chermalung, a site near some caves half-way between Teshinga and Lapharma. Dorje Ngungdu had a store of hay in Lapharma, which was then still under snow, and he hired men to carry some of this hay to Chermalung to supplement the meagre food found on the pastures which had only just emerged from that grip of winter. In May the yak were driven to Lapharma, where there was

even less grazing, but where they were fed on the hay stored in Dorje's house. By the beginning of June new grass sprouted on the pastures near Khumjung and Dorje's herd, like those of other villagers, was brought down and kept at various *resa*-camps above Teshinga and Khumjung.

In July, however, all cattle had to leave the hill-slopes close to the area of cultivation, and part of Dorje's family moved with the yak to their *yorsa*-settlement at Lapharma, where by that time the pastures were covered by a carpet of luscious grass and flowers. After a few weeks herdsmen and herd moved further up to the settlement of Macherma. There Dorje Ngungdu and five other families celebrated the *Yer-chang* rite, which is designed to ensure the well-being of the herds. During the first part of September the yak remained at Macherma, and the grass on the walled-in meadows was cut and dried. When the hay had been safely stored, the herd was driven down to Lapharma and haymaking began there.

Two members of the family stayed with the yak at Lapharma until the middle of October. By that time the harvest in Teshinga had been completed and the cattle could be moved down to this *gunsa*-settlement. In its vicinity there was still ample grazing and when, at the end of October, Khumjung was reopened to the cattle, Dorje brought his yak back to the village, kept them at night in a harvested field next to his house and during the day let them graze on the hill-slopes above the village.

Source: Christoph von Fürer-Haimendorf. (1975) *Himalayan Traders: Life in Highland Nepal*. London: John Murray, 52–53.

NORODOM RANARIDDH. See **Ranariddh, Norodom.**

NORODOM SIHANOUK. See **Sihanouk, Norodom.**

NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAN ECONOMIC VENTURES For almost four decades following the June 1950 outbreak of the Korean War, commercial contacts between the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) were es-

entially nonexistent—in fact, purchase of North Korean merchandise was a punishable offense under South Korean security laws. But in October 1988, as part of his strategy of *Nordpolitik*, ROK president Roh Tae Woo unilaterally sanctioned the exchange of commodities between South and North. The following month, the first legal inter-Korean commercial transaction was effected: an import into Pusan of 40 kilograms of North Korean clams (routed via Japan). Though the two states remained (and still remain) formally at war, inter-Korean trade thereby commenced.

According to statistics compiled by the ROK's Ministry of Unification, the cumulative turnover for inter-Korean economic transactions between early 1989 and year-end 2000 exceeded \$2.5 billion. Official numbers on inter-Korean trade must be used with some care, however. Seoul maintains that its commerce with the North is domestic rather than international in nature, and thus the ROK does not tabulate that trade in accordance with conventional international trade schema.

By Seoul's reckoning, inter-Korean economic transactions have included nearly \$500 million in officially designated "noncommercial exchanges": concessional resource transfers from Seoul to Pyongyang for purposes both humanitarian (e.g., food and medicine for famine relief) and political (e.g., heavy fuel oil and components for light-water nuclear reactors under terms of the October 1994 Washington-Pyongyang "Agreed Framework"). Of the roughly \$2 billion in ostensibly commercial transactions, the great preponderance (about \$1.6 billion) constituted South Korean purchases of North Korean goods: principally, metals (gold, zinc, iron, copper, lead) and agricultural products, and, increasingly, "processing on commission" work for textiles and electronics. (The latter trade, which entails North Korean import, assembly, and re-export of semifinished South Korean wares on consignment, registered a cumulative total of about \$500 million for the years 1992–2000.)

Though the absolute volumes of goods and services exchanged between the two Koreas to date remain rather modest, they figure prominently in Pyongyang's overall trade profile, owing to the DPRK's relatively limited exposure to international trade and finance. Depending upon exactly how one counts, South Korea is currently either North Korea's third-largest trade partner, or possibly even its second largest (after only China).

Up to now, South Korea's *chaebol* (family-controlled business conglomerates) have been the major actors attempting to stimulate North–South

commerce. In late 1998, the Hyundai *chaebol* signed an unprecedented six-year, \$932-million deal with Pyongyang for permission to ferry South Korean tourists to North Korea's scenic Kumgang Mountain region. This landmark venture, however, was a financial disaster: by early 2001, the Hyundai subsidiary responsible for the project announced it could not continue to meet its scheduled payments to the DPRK.

In sharp contradistinction to the cross-Strait trade in divided China (which has generally been quite lucrative for Taiwanese entrepreneurs operating in China), doing business with the North has so far apparently been unprofitable for most South Korean concerns. The problems encountered by South Korean companies have been both practical (such as the pervasive lack of familiarity in the DPRK with standard market procedures) and ideological (such as Pyongyang's professed determination to shield its socialist society against capitalist "cultural and ideological infiltration"). In November 2000, following the historic June 2000 Pyongyang summit between ROK president Kim Dae Jung and DPRK National Defense Commission chairman Kim Jong Il, North and South Korea initialed four sets of agreements to facilitate inter-Korean business (on investment protection, prevention of double taxation, clearing settlement, and dispute settlement procedures). If actually implemented, such measures would be a step toward a more attractive inter-Korean "business climate."

In theory, increased economic integration could offer great benefits to both Koreas—and could facilitate the transition to an ultimate reunification. As of midyear 2001, South Korean *chaebol* were drafting ambitious plans for mammoth inter-Korean ventures; Hyundai, for example, had signed an agreement to develop a 3.3-million-square-meter industrial complex near the DPRK city of Kaesong. Whether these plans will remain on paper only or, alternatively, will presage a further upswing of North–South ventures remains to be seen, but it seems safe to predict that the future of inter-Korean commerce will be strongly influenced by the degree to which Pyongyang acquiesces in the creation of a more attractive business environment within the DPRK.

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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AND TURKEY Cooperation between the United States and the USSR during World War II came to an end soon after the war's end in 1945. The presence of Soviet armies in the center of Europe and Communist infiltration into "popular front" governments brought Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia within the sphere of Soviet domination.

The West's fear of German power remained even after military victory, but fear of Communism and the intentions of the Soviet Union quickly became more pressing. Turkey had stayed clear of the war, and its territory was not occupied. But soon after the war ended in Europe, the Soviet government cancelled its nonaggression treaty with Turkey on 19 March 1945, demanded joint defense of the Dardanelles, and extended territorial claims toward three Turkish provinces. Highly alerted, Turkey moved closer to the West.

The Formation of NATO and Turkey's Early Rejections

Relations between the USSR and the West steadily worsened, and on 12 March 1947, U.S. President Harry Truman (1884–1972) made a speech in which he announced the policy of the United States to support "the free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure" and extended \$400 million in aid to the Greek and Turkish governments to help them resist international Communism. Turkey cordially welcomed the so-called Truman Doctrine, but the \$100 million allocated as Turkey's share was not enough to deter the Soviet threat.

In the meantime, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom met in



A Greek soldier participating in a NATO military exercise in Turkey in October 2000. It was the first time in 78 years that Greek soldiers had operated in Turkey. (AFP/CORBIS)

Brussels on 17 March 1948 to sign the Brussels Treaty, by which they pledged themselves to build a common defense system. It soon became apparent, however, that support by other Western states, especially the United States, was necessary in the face of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington on 4 April 1949, by the Brussels Treaty powers and Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, and the United States. The new treaty formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which basically aimed to collectively defend its members against armed aggression. There was no mention of the Soviet Union, but it was obvious that the treaty was mainly motivated by the Soviet threat.

The Turkish government was disappointed that Turkey was not invited to the alliance. But the Truman administration tended to see Turkey as part of the Middle East rather than Europe, and the United Kingdom advanced the idea that, rather than join NATO, Turkey should take part in a British-led Middle Eastern or Mediterranean defense system. Nevertheless, Turkey applied for NATO membership on 11 May 1950, and was rejected. Its second application came just after the outbreak of the Korean War. In parallel with its decision to dispatch 4,500 soldiers to Korea to fight under the U.N. command, Turkey applied once more for NATO membership, on 1 August 1950. Although NATO rejected this application, too, a radical change in U.S. strategy toward European defense occurred beginning in 1951. Dwight Eisenhower (1890–1969), Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), attached great importance to anti-Soviet nations in southern Europe to repel possible Soviet aggression and lobbied President Truman for Turkish and Greek membership. Accordingly, in September 1951 NATO invited both nations to join, and in February 1952, Turkey and Greece became NATO members.

Turkey in NATO

After joining NATO, three-quarters of Turkey's land forces were reserved for NATO purposes under the commander-in-chief of Allied forces, southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), based in Naples, and the air force and navy were assigned to SACEUR. Under a series of agreements with NATO and the United States, important military facilities were built in Turkey, including air bases in Incirlik, Karamursel, Cigli, and Diyarbakir, and radar stations on the Black Sea coast. By an agreement in 1957, the U.S. Air Force stationed tactical nuclear weapons at NATO bases in Turkey. The number of U.S. military personnel in

Turkish territory reached twenty-four thousand in the early 1970s, turning Turkey into "an unsinkable aircraft carrier" for NATO.

Starting in the mid-1960s, a number of substantial developments internationally and in Turkish-American relations deeply affected the Turkish public's views of foreign policy and Turkey's presence in NATO. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and its repercussions; a letter from U.S. President Lyndon Johnson (1908–1973) to Premier Ismet Inonu, with which he prevented a Turkish operation in Cyprus in 1964; U.S. pressure on Turkey to stop its poppy cultivation and the "opium poppy crisis" during 1968–1974; concerns about American Peace Corps activities during the 1960s; and a U.S. arms embargo on Turkey between 1975 and 1978 were decisive developments in Turkish-American relations. However, none of these developments caused a radical change in the Turkish government's approach to NATO, and Turkey remained a member.

Turkey and NATO in the Post-Cold War Era

After the Cold War ended with the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, Turkey supported new strategic concepts of NATO and its enlargement. Turkey also took an active role in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) initiative, which was introduced at the 1994 Brussels summit. The partnership of twenty-seven nations, including former Warsaw Pact (Soviet bloc) members, was designed to expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin NATO. Turkey contributed to the program by establishing a PFP training center in Ankara.

In 1992, NATO began to give support to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and to the U.N. in peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia. It implemented maritime and air operations in order to maintain the U.N. Security Council's resolutions in the region. After the Dayton Agreement of 1995, NATO continued to give air observation support to the U.N.

In 1998 and 1999, NATO once more engaged in the issue of the former Yugoslavia. In order to deter Serbian forces from occupying Kosovo, contrary to the U.N. Security Council's decisions, NATO conducted heavy air strikes on major Yugoslavian targets, including the capital, Belgrade. This operation, which was implemented without a U.N. Security Council resolution, was highly criticized by Russia, China, and

some other nations. Turkey actively participated in both the Yugoslavia and Kosovo operations and dispatched military troops to the region to implement peacekeeping missions under the U.N. resolutions.

Mustafa Aydin and Cagri Erhan

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NORTH CHOLLA PROVINCE (1999 est. pop. 2 million). Located in the southwest region of South Korea (Republic of Korea), North Cholla Province (Chollab pukdo) has an area of 8,058 square kilometers. The province's six cities are Chonju (the provincial capital), Chongju, Kunsan, Iri, Kimje, and Namwon. There are also eight counties (*kun*) within the province.

Paekche (18–663 CE), one of the original Three Kingdoms subsumed by Shilla (57–935 CE) and resurrected as Later Paekche (892–936 CE) before its surrender to Koryo (918–1392 CE), was located in the present-day Cholla and Ch'ungch'ong Provinces.

North and South Cholla provinces, collectively called the Honam region, have a rich cultural heritage of folk music and dance. There are numerous Buddhist temples, including the Songgwang temple. Mount Chiri is shared by both North and South Cholla, as well as neighboring North Kyongsang Province.

The fertile soils and comparatively gentle topography enable the region to supply much of the nation's grains and cereals such as rice, barley, and beans. There are fisheries on the coastal region, and the

province also has mining operations in gold, silver, lime, and coal. North Cholla is home to many industries, which produce chemicals, paper goods, textiles, apparel, machinery, electronics, and automobiles. The region is also known for its ceramics and pottery.

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NORTH CH'UNGCH'ONG PROVINCE

(2000 est. pop. 1.5 million). North Ch'ungch'ong province (Ch'ungch'ong pukdo), in the central region of South Korea (Republic of Korea), has an area of 7,433 square kilometers. The provincial capital is at Ch'ongju, and the other cities in the province are Ch'ungju and Chech'on. There are also eight counties (*kun*).

Present-day North Ch'ungch'ong had been divided among the Three Kingdoms; Paekche (18–663 CE) was located in modern-day Ch'ongju and Poun, while Shilla (57–935 CE) controlled the south, and Koguryo (37 BCE–668 CE) occupied the northeast. Paekche, however, encompassed all of North Ch'ungch'ong from the fourth century until it fell to Shilla in 663.

The region is highly industrialized; its products include chemicals, machinery, electronics, cement, foodstuffs, textiles, and clothing, as well as ceramics and pottery. North Ch'ungch'ong is ideal for agriculture because of the fertile soil provided by the Han and Kum rivers and their numerous tributaries and basins. Primary agricultural products include rice, barley, apples, pears, grapes, red pepper, garlic, ginseng, and tobacco. The province is quite mountainous and is a source for gold, iron, lime, and coal.

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NORTH CYPRUS, TURKISH REPUBLIC OF (1998 est. pop. 188,000). The Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC) is a self-proclaimed po-

litical entity located in the northern part of the island of Cyprus in the eastern Mediterranean. The republic, with an area of 3,355 square kilometers, has not been recognized by any nation except Turkey. The official language is Turkish, and the capital is Lefkosa, also known as Nicosia; the population includes Turkish settlers, a military contingent, and a small number of Greek natives. Although there is no official religion, more than 98 percent of the population identify themselves as Muslims, with Maronites (Syriac Christians) and Orthodox Greeks making up less than 2 percent.

The island of Cyprus has an exceptionally rich history; its first agricultural settlements were as early as 2700 BCE. Cyprus was then dominated in succession by the Egyptians, Phoenicians, Persians, Greeks (the name "Cyprus" is derived from the Greek word for copper), Romans, and Byzantines. The island frequently changed hands in the Middle Ages, boasting such temporary masters as Richard the Lionhearted of England. Venice controlled it for more than a hundred years, losing it to the Ottomans in 1570. Britain began to encroach on Cyprus in the nineteenth century and annexed it outright when the Ottoman empire entered World War I as a German ally.

Cyprus achieved independence from Britain in 1960. Ethnic tensions began to escalate in 1963 as the Greek Cypriot majority clashed with the Turkish minority. Following a Greek nationalist coup attempt in 1974, Turkey launched a military intervention, occupying the northern part of the island. In 1975 self-rule was proclaimed in the north, but only on 15 November 1983 was independence officially proclaimed and the TRNC created. The Greek Cypriots continue to control most of the island and are the only internationally recognized government. Turkey still maintains about 30,000 ground troops in the TRNC, backed by Turkish artillery and local military units. Although a number of attempts have been made by the international community at reconciliation and reunification of the island, little progress has been achieved to date.

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a semipresidential democracy, with a president as head of state and a council of ministers composed of a prime minister and ten cabinet members. The current president is Rauf R. Denktash. The legislative power is vested in a unicameral legislative assembly of fifty deputies, elected for a period of five years through universal suffrage. The judiciary is set up as a separate branch.

During the first decade of independence, the TRNC suffered from economic underdevelopment. In

the 1970s and 1980s the economy managed a modest recovery, with the gross domestic product growing by 20 percent between 1977 and 1984, although it remains far behind Greek Cyprus. Significant efforts were made to develop manufacturing and tourism, but agriculture remains the dominant sector of the economy and the main export. Turkey and the United Kingdom are the TRNC's most important trading partners, and the republic continues to run a trading deficit. The Turkish lira is legal tender.

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NORTH HAMGYONG PROVINCE (2002 est. pop. 2.6 million). North Hamgyong Province (Hamgyong pukdo) is located in the northeast corner of North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea). To the north, it borders the Tumen (Tuman) River separating the eastern half of the Korean Peninsula from China (People's Republic of China). North Hamgyong lies on the Sea of Japan. The province also shares a short 16.5-kilometer border with Russia near the city of Vladivostok. It has an area of 18,558 square kilometers.

The provincial capital is at the port city of Ch'ongjin, and the other cities are Kimch'aek, Najin, and Hoeryong. Najin, however, is an autonomous administrative unit and an economic enterprise zone that is independent of the province. There are also thirteen counties (*kun*). Because of its isolated location, the region is not heavily industrialized or agricultural.

About 80 percent of the province is mountainous, accounting for the rich flora and fauna and high average elevation. The Hamgyong mountain range is 340 kilometers long with 7 mountains with peaks higher than 2,000 meters. The province is also the coldest of all the Korean provinces, with the first frost arriving in early October and the snows lasting through late April or early May.

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NORTH HWANGHAE PROVINCE (2002 est. pop. 1.8 million). North Hwanghae Province (Hwanghae pukdo) lies between South Hwanghae and Kangwon Provinces in North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea). The province's southern border is located partly along the DMZ (demilitarized zone) separating the two Koreas.

North Hwanghae Province is 8,154 square kilometers. The provincial capital is at Sariwon, and the only other city in the province is Songnim. There are fourteen counties (*kun*).

Although the province is said to be mountainous, the region does not have a high average elevation. The highest peak is Mount Haram, with an elevation of 1,485 meters. Only about 1.5 percent of the terrain is higher than 1,000 meters above sea level, and 91.1 percent of the land is below 500 meters in elevation. There are three mountain ranges.

The key manufacturing sectors are smelting, iron-works, cement, and textiles. The main agricultural products are fruits, tobacco, cotton, peanuts, sesame, and mint. There is also an abundance of minerals such as gold, silver, lead, zinc, molybdenum, nickel, and cobalt. Granite, marble, and coal are plentiful as well.

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NORTH KOREA PROFILE (2001 est. pop. 22 million). The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is located in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula. It is bordered on the north by China and Russia, and below the thirty-eighth parallel by the Republic of Korea; east and west it borders the sea. Its total area, 120,540 square kilometers, accounts for 55 percent of the Korean Peninsula. It is slightly smaller than the state of Mississippi. Because 80 percent of the country is mountainous—in contrast to the south, the peninsula's agricultural center—the North Korean economy is primarily industrial, including manufacturing, mining, hydroelectric production, and metallurgy.



A large bronze statue of Kim Il Sung, the founder of North Korea, in central P'yongyang in 2000. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

Its primary rivers, the Yalu and Tumen, are both located in the extreme north. P'yongyang, the capital city, is home to 10 percent of North Korea's population.

Political System

Since its inception in 1948 the DPRK has been governed by a socialist regime headed by the Kim family. Kim Il Sung (1912–1994), secretary general of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP), remained the country's only political leader until his death. By the 1980s, however, he had begun grooming the nation to accept his son as his successor, and within three years of his father's death Kim Jong Il (b. 1941) had succeeded in assuming the three important positions once held by the elder Kim: secretary general of the KWP, head of state, and commander of the armed forces.


University of Chicago professor Bruce Cumings describes the North Korean domestic political structure as "socialist corporatism," a system anchored by

three pillars: hierarchy, organic connection (internal connection, the connection with Korean virtue), and family. The core political thought of this corporatism is *juche*, a concept that translates as "self-reliance." In the minds of the North Korean government, *juche* legitimizes the policies of the KWP, especially in relation to South Korea: whereas the latter lacks *juche*, and must rely on a foreign military to maintain its political position, North Korea, having liberated itself from foreign troops in 1958, sees itself as self-reliant, and thus the legitimate political power on the Korean Peninsula.

Within the framework of DPRK foreign relations, *juche* was first practiced to play the Soviet-Chinese rift to North Korea's political and economic advantage. The North Korean government skillfully avoided choosing sides in the conflict, instead securing economic and strategic assistance from both countries. More recently *juche* is apparent in the DPRK's efforts to secure nuclear and missile technology. This technology provides the DPRK with an energy supply, weapons for security, trade items for hard currency, and chips for bargaining.

Economy

Since its inception the North Korean economy has been driven by a series of long-term (five- to ten-year)





NORTH KOREA

Country name: Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Area: 120,540 sq km
Population: 21,968,228 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 1.22% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 19.1 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 6.92 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio—total population: 0.94 males/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 23.55 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population: 71.02 years; male, 68.04 years; female, 74.15 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Buddhism, Confucianism, Christianity, syncretic Chondogyo (Religion of the Heavenly Way)
Major language: Korean
Literacy—total population: 99%; male, 99%; female, 99% (1990 est.)
Government type: authoritarian socialist; one-man dictatorship
Capital: P'yongyang
Administrative divisions: 9 provinces and 3 special cities
Independence: 15 August 1945 (from Japan)
National holiday: Founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 9 September (1948)
Suffrage: 17 years of age; universal
GDP—real growth rate: -3% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita (purchasing power parity): \$1,000 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: not available
Exports: \$520 million (f.o.b., 1999 est.)
Imports: \$960 million (c.i.f., 1999 est.)
Currency: North Korean won (KPW)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Factbook* 2001.
 Retrieved 18 October 2001, from:
<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

plans. Until recently the system generally prohibited market-driven economic activity, save for allowing people to sell small amounts of produce from their private plots. Throughout this early period the North Korean government depended on Soviet, Chinese, and (to a much lesser extent) Eastern European assistance for its economic growth. The cheap oil provided by the Soviet Union, in particular, was essential for North Korean economic development. Economic assistance—much less than the United States provided South Korea—helped the DPRK outperform the Republic of Korea in economic production, at least through the early 1970s.

North Korea recovered from the destruction of the Korean War at a faster pace than did its southern neighbor; by the end of the 1950s it had surpassed the industrial and agricultural levels attained before the war. The first three-year plan started just before the Korean War ended; it was succeeded by a series of five-, seven-, and ten-year plans. In 1956 the government felt confident enough in the state's economic circumstances to initiate the *cho'llima* ("flying horse") movement, an effort designed to encourage North Korean workers to make the "superhuman effort" required to rebuild the country without relying on external assistance, according to Suh Dae-Sook (1988).

The fragility of this economic system became evident soon after the United States began to seek amicable relations with the Soviet Union and China. North Korea remained economically strong only as long as the socialist economic network offered preferential prices. The North Korean economy weakened even further in the 1980s when the Soviet Union and China began to demand hard currency in exchange for their products. The end of the Cold War improved relations between the two Communist giants and South Korea, effectively ending much of North Korean economic activity with its traditional allies. In the 1990s flooding exacerbated systemic problems of energy procurement and food distribution, leaving the country's economy in shambles and its people starving.

The DPRK has attempted to cure its economic deficiencies in a number of ways. Since the 1980s it has attempted to attract foreign currency through arms exports, in particular through missile sales to Middle Eastern states such as Syria and Iran. In 1991 it established a special economic zone in the northern area of Rajin-Songbong to encourage foreign investment. More recently the government has relaxed restrictions on private enterprise. Recent trips to China by Kim Jong Il have led some to speculate that the North Korean leader is considering adopting policies similar to those enacted by the Chinese to breathe fresh life into his country's ailing economy.

Culture

North Korea is populated by one of the most homogeneous peoples in the world, unified by language and neo-Confucian ideology, and fortified by what some have called a Kim cult, or Kim Il Sungism. Kim Il Sung's name is used for the national university, national museums, and other public institutions; his face appears throughout the country on murals and monuments. Important landmarks in the former North Korean leader's life, such as his place of birth, serve as the country's national shrines. The general's battles with the Japanese during the period of occupation are legendary; the stories are kept alive in North Korean music, poetry, and national histories.

Current Issues

The 1990s have seen the DPRK struggling to forge congenial relations with its traditional enemies while maintaining state sovereignty. Harsh economic times have forced the state to compromise its position by accepting aid from hostile states, including the Republic of Korea, the United States, and Japan. The development of nuclear and missile technology, while

posing a threat to its neighbors, succeeded in bringing the United States to the negotiating table during the Clinton administration. The George W. Bush administration has been less willing to negotiate, however, insisting that North Korea demonstrate efforts to comply with U.S. demands for weapons reduction and verification before agreeing to discuss other issues, such as the DPRK's removal from terrorist lists and a bilateral treaty of normalization.

A trend toward improved relations with the Republic of Korea peaked in June 2000 at the summit held in P'yongyang between Kim Jong Il and South Korea's president, Kim Dae Jung (b. 1925). Since then progress has stalled for a number of reasons, most importantly the Bush administration's hard-line position on negotiations, and Kim Jong Il's apparent reluctance to visit Seoul. Areas that have drawn the two sides to meet include the possibility of reuniting family members separated since the end of the Korean War, and the creation of transportation and communication links across the demilitarized zone.

Internationally, the DPRK has recently secured ties with many European Union states, as well as with countries in East Asia. Relations with Russia and China have strengthened as well, particularly in response to U.S. actions, such as the missile defense program, that allegedly threaten the interests of the three states. Attempts to initiate a DPRK-Japan dialogue have ended with little success, efforts bottlenecked by Japan's colonial legacy and Japan's disapproval of DPRK intrusions on its sovereignty that include the kidnapping of its citizens and a missile firing over its territory.

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NORTH KOREA—ECONOMIC SYSTEM

North Korea occupies about 55 percent of the total land area of the Korean Peninsula—about 123,000 square kilometers. Only 20 percent of North Korea's land is arable, however, and a generally harsh climate restricts the production of arable farming to one crop per year. Most farms are cooperatively owned by each village cooperative unit and small, with an average size

of under 2 hectares in the late 1990s. As a result of a sizable loss in population resulting from the Korean War (1950–1953) and from migration to the South, combined with a low fertility rate, North Korea has been a relatively labor-scarce economy; the current population is estimated at around 22 million. The maintenance of a large armed force (with more than 1 million members) has exacerbated the shortage of civilian labor. As a result, the armed forces have frequently been mobilized for work on civilian projects. The labor force in 2000 was estimated at 13 million, of whom some 30 percent were employed in primary industry.

Central Planning

Since the establishment of the North Korean state in 1948, its economic policy has been grounded principally on Karl Marx's hypothesis that the structure of social relations in the economic subsystem exerts a powerful influence upon the subsystems of law, opinion, politics, and ideology. In practice, North Korea's economy has been more centralized, more controlled, and more ideologically orthodox and monocratic than those of any of the world's other socialist states. With its autarchic command and rationing system, the North Korean economy has put great emphasis on social equity and welfare, with equal distribution of food and clothing, free medical care and education from kindergarten to college, and child care provisions.

The means of production are socially owned, and most economic actors are mostly motivated toward political and social objectives. Allowable economic actions are in the hands of the top planning authority, the State Planning Commission, which is entrusted with the formulation, execution, and control of economic plans and policies for the Workers' Party in North Korea, and which behaves in accordance with given resource constraints. The top planning authority, the leader Kim Jong Il, decides which economic actions are allowable and orders the subauthority and the people to undertake them in accordance with the given guidelines. Thus, the market is largely irrelevant in both production and distribution decision making.

The central plan specifies a large number of value aggregates (income and specific quantities of products targeted for accomplishment during a planning period specified in the central plan) and physical inputs and outputs in the economy; in this system, money plays only a passive, accounting role. The structure of the plan is strictly hierarchical, so that the lower levels are formally subordinated to those above. The plans are enforced by rationing the means of production (ma-



North Korea continues to rely on outside aid to feed its population. Here, a woman cuts noodles at a factory sponsored by the World Vision humanitarian organization in November 2000. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

terials, labor, and capital), by rationing goods and services, and through the administrative allocation of labor and job targets. By and large, competition is limited to efforts at plan fulfillment and overfulfillment, except for a small (legal, semilegal, and illegal) private market for some farm products and services. All enterprises are state owned, but farmers are allowed to own or dispose of the products of small areas of land adjacent to farmhouses, though the land itself is not private.

The top decision makers or party authorities ration outputs to the needy. Usually priorities of goods distribution go to defense, education, medical care, and consumption, in that order. The share allocated for final household consumption is always marginal, as long as the economy is constrained by severe shortages of food and other necessary goods. The North Korean State Planning Commission has developed its own material incentive systems, which are coupled with basic wages, bonuses, and awards of medals as means of encouraging the fulfillment or overfulfillment of obligatory plan targets, usually defined in percentage growth rates of physical quantities. These incentive systems seemed workable until the mid-1970s, but since then they have broken down, because workers have become unwilling to pursue the goal of overfulfillment. They realize that production levels in one period are the basis for targets in the next period. Unless the rewards and bonuses are large enough to compensate for their increased toil, workers have little reason to increase their efforts. In addition, workers tend

to meet only the quantity target without caring about improving the quality of their work.

North Korea's Economic Stagnation during the 1990s

Since 1990, when the Soviet Union began to dissolve, the North Korean economy has shrunk. Continuing bad weather conditions as well as severe energy shortages severely damaged North Korea's agriculture and industrial activities during the 1990s. Per capita gross national income (GNI) dropped from \$1,142 in 1990 to \$573 in 1998; in 1999, the GNI was \$714 and in 2000 \$757.

After persistent reports of food-supply problems and rationing for several years, North Korea officially acknowledged that, as a result of damage caused in 1995 and 1996 by the heaviest floods of the century, the country faced serious food shortages. In an unprecedented move that indicated the severity of the situation, North Korea requested and received assistance from various international organizations, developed countries, and South Korea. Prolonged drought in 1997 and floods in 1998 further exacerbated the situation, and millions of North Koreans were threatened by starvation. During the last years of the 1990s, the North Korean populace marginally survived only with humanitarian food aid from South Korea and Western countries. South Korea alone provided North Korea with 150,000 tons of rice in 1995 and 500,000 tons of rice and corn from 1998 to 2000 to mitigate the food crisis.

North Korea's Turnaround

In 1999, the North Korean economy showed a positive growth rate for the first time in ten years. Its gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate was about 6 percent in 1999, a little more than 1 percent in 2000, and an estimated below 1 percent in 2001. North Korea in recent years has also concentrated on land rearrangement and farming improvement programs. It has encouraged farmers to engage in fish farming and to breed grass-eating animals such as rabbits and goats that need no grain fodder, and it has encouraged farm cooperatives and workers to expand the area devoted to potatoes. As a result, grain production increased in 1999 by 40 percent over the previous year to approximately 4 million tons (unpolished basis). Yet North Korea still needed about an additional 1 million tons of food aid from outside to adequately meet its demand in the year 2000.

Energy shortages as well as food shortages have been a drag on the growth of the North Korean econ-

omy. Coal output dropped from 33 million metric tons in 1990 to about 19 million metric tons in 1998 due to resource depletion and aged equipment. Electric power output also decreased from about 28 billion kilowatt hours in 1990 to 17 billion kilowatt hours in 1998, while crude oil imports shrank from under 3 million metric tons to 500,000 metric tons during the same period. The growth in the North Korean economy in 1999 and 2000 can be attributed to support from the international community, an increase in grain production, and an improvement in energy supply.

Designating 1999 as the "epochal turning point for constructing a strong, great nation," North Korea achieved a 6 percent annual rate of growth. In 1999, the manufacturing sector grew by almost 9 percent (heavy industry by almost 12 percent and light industry by over 2 percent) as compared with the 3 percent shrinkage of the previous year. The increased supply of energy and raw materials from overseas aid contributed largely to this higher growth. Electricity, gas, and drinking water supply increased by almost 7 percent due to renovation and repair of production facilities (contrasting with the 9 percent decline of the previous year). Thermal electricity and hydroelectricity generation grew by almost 23 percent and less than 1 percent, respectively. The general and housing construction sector grew by 24 percent as compared with an 11 percent decline in 1998. In the service sector, wholesale and retail services rose by 10 percent, transportation by almost 8 percent, and food and lodging by close to 16 percent—but the overall service-sector growth was down almost 2 percent due to a large reduction in administrative services. In 2000, North Korea recorded a less than -2 percent growth in the agriculture and fishery sectors, almost 6 percent growth in mining, and under 1 percent in manufacturing. The overall GDP demonstrated more than 2 percent positive growth following the over 6 percent breaking rate in 1999.

Trade

North Korea's trade declined sharply in 1998, but in 1999 it is estimated to have reached \$1.5 billion, a slight increase (\$400 million) from the previous year. Trade with Asian states such as China, Japan, Hong Kong, India, and Singapore is increasing, and trade volume with South Korea in 1999 amounted to \$333 million (North Korea's imports were \$212 million and exports were \$122 million), the largest two-way volume since 1989, when indirect trade between the South and North first began. During the first half of 2000, trade with South Korea reached \$203 million, compared with \$165 million during the correspond-

ing period the previous year. In 1999, total trade with South Korea amounted to \$333 million; this figure grew by almost 28 percent to \$425 million in 2000. Under Kim Jong Il's guidance, North Korea is retaining its socialist system domestically, but it is cautiously opening the external doors wider, especially with its peninsular partner. At home, North Korea is likely to continue its efforts to raise food production, especially of potatoes and animal protein, while placing renewed emphasis on energy and heavy industry. Externally, it will step up efforts to attract more humanitarian food and medical supplies from the outside world.

North Korea is intent on luring overseas investors as well as South Korean enterprises by offering special economic zones and other attractive incentives. The question is how the regime will successfully isolate the special economic zones so as to shield its own population from capitalist influences. Nevertheless, North Korea is recognizing the need for change, since its earlier strategy of keeping up military tensions in order to extort concessions from the United States, Japan, and South Korea has reached the end of its usefulness. Further signs of this new policy stance were apparent both just before and after the June 2000 P'yongyang summit between North Korea's Kim Jong Il and South Korea's Kim Dae Jung. North Korea grew more eager to discuss establishing diplomatic relations with Italy, Australia, Canada, Sweden, Germany, England, Japan, the United States, and others—in sharp contrast to its policy position before the mid-1990s.

North Korea's Opening Door

In his publication of June 1995 entitled "Giving Priority to Ideological Work Is Essential for the Accomplishment of the Socialist Cause," Kim Jong Il strongly defended socialist ownership and the consolidation and development of a socialist economic system embodying the *juche* (self-reliance) idea, emphatically rejecting the introduction of capitalist methods. But since taking formal command of both the military and the party in September 1998, Kim Jong Il has embarked on a multifaceted transformation of North Korea's economic system and policies, moving gradually toward an open-door policy. This new policy will be a difficult one to reverse. If it works out smoothly and does not face any serious internal resistance, the North Korean economy is expected to continue growing and begin to reduce the serious shortages of basic necessities.

Of course, to revive its economy, North Korea urgently needs to expand economic ties with Western

countries as well as South Korea. Internally, the most urgent tasks are expanding land-transport networks and easing energy shortages. If the capacity utilization ratio of North Korea's industries and its energy generation facilities are increased to about the 50 percent level from the current level of 20 to 30 percent, the cost of investment in necessities and fertilizer production would be halved, and the expanded production would significantly ease shortages of food and foreign exchange. North Korea must also overcome persistent shortages in skilled labor, modern equipment, and technology, as well as low levels of investment in infrastructure.

After the Kim-Kim P'yongyang summit of June 2000, the two Koreas agreed to facilitate mutual trade and exchange. As North Korea moves from isolation to engagement, it will attract increasing investment from South Korea and Western countries.

Hurdles to Overcome

A shortage of modern equipment and vehicles and an insufficient energy supply and infrastructure are the main problems facing both land and marine transport. Lacking any known deposits of petroleum and relying increasingly on coal—the production of which has been static—for energy, North Korea has been unable to achieve consistent industrial expansion. In addition, its limited foreign-exchange earnings and relatively small trade volume, the legacy of its long-standing self-reliance policy, have hampered the import of oil and other necessary goods. These are the areas the North Korean regime needs to focus on while it continues to pursue its new open-door policy and begins to introduce market economic factors into its hitherto-isolated socialistic economy.

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See also: **Food Crisis—North Korea; Juche; Kim Il Sung; Kim Jong Il**

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NORTH KOREA—EDUCATION SYSTEM

North Korea's P'yongyang regime has been single-mindedly dedicated to transforming society, nature, and human beings; the efforts to accomplish these three are known as the three great revolutions. The educational system is charged with the responsibility for *kyoyuk* (instruction in scientific knowledge and technical skills) and *kyoyang* (indoctrination), which transforms North Korean citizens, young and old, male and female, into loyal Communists. The Communist ideology that undergirds the educational theory and practice of transforming human beings from birth to death is articulated in Kim Il Sung's treatise "A Thesis on the Socialist Pedagogy," published 5 September 1977.

Compulsory Education

The present educational system in North Korea has gone through five separate revisions. It now maintains an eleven-year universal, free, and compulsory school system, followed by a higher educational system that covers diverse areas of study and varies in the number of years it requires. The primary and secondary school system starts with one year of kindergarten schooling followed by four years of primary education. This is done at *Inmin hakkyo*, or the people's school. A six-year course of secondary schooling follows, and the institution responsible for this education is called *Kodung chungbakkyo* or the higher middle school. All children in North Korea have the same opportunities for education from kindergarten to higher middle school, but the quality of schooling they receive varies greatly.

Generally speaking, children in P'yongyang have access to the best education available in North Korea. The capital of North Korea is a city where only people chosen for their loyalty to the regime are allowed to live. Provincial cities tend to have better schools than do the agricultural and industrial cooperatives to which North Korean citizens are assigned to work and live. The recent economic hardship in North Korea, however, worked havoc on almost every aspect of education: textbooks and notebooks are said not to be readily available, and children in rural areas lack pencils.

Higher Education

There are different types of higher education. First, there are three major universities: Kim Il Sung Uni-

versity, Kim Ch'aek Technical University, and Koryo Sungkyunkwan University. But in the true sense of the word, there is only one university in North Korea: Kim Il Sung University. It is the only academic institution in the country offering a variety of programs comparable to those of Western universities. The number of years required for graduation is between four and six, depending on the field of study.

Second, there are colleges that instruct students in specialized areas of study such as light industry, chemical engineering, electrical engineering, architectural engineering, transportation, international relations, People's economy, foreign languages, medicine, pharmacy, and horticulture. These colleges generally have a four-year course of study, although some require five years for graduation.

Third, there are teacher-training institutions that are divided into levels. There are *kyowon taebak*, three-year institutions in which elementary schoolteachers are trained, and *sapom taebak*, four-year institutions in which teachers of higher middle school are trained.

Fourth, there are colleges established at various industrial, agricultural, and fishery plants where workers can receive their higher education. These are known as factory colleges, agricultural colleges, and fishery colleges. Besides these institutions of higher learning, there are also technical high schools that offer a three-year course of study in various fields such as automation, printing, railroading, commerce, and building materials.

Students are normally admitted into major colleges and universities primarily on the basis of their *songbun*, or class background (whether one was born into a landlord family, a tenant family, a family that collaborated with Japanese colonialists, or a family who fled to South Korea before or during the Korean War; family background also depends on the degree of loyalty one shows in speech, work, and life attitudes) and *tangsong*, or party loyalty rather than on their academic merits. Students are recommended for higher education by their secondary school principals and teachers, and students with undesirable class background or low party loyalty are usually not given recommendations for further education. Those failing to advance to higher education are given an opportunity to join the military, and those who fail to do so are then assigned to various workplaces such as collective farms or mines. In North Korea today, one's class background and party loyalty are the two most crucial factors that determine one's success.

Hyung-chan Kim

See also: **Three Revolutions Movement**

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NORTH KOREA—HUMAN RIGHTS The state of North Korea is likely the worst abuser of human rights in the world today. Like that of his father before him, the regime of Kim Jong Il is a dictatorship that employs widespread fear and repression to control its people.

North Korea is also arguably the world's most restricted and isolated country, and thus it is extremely difficult for the international community to assess its current human-rights situation. The government has allowed a handful of aid workers, religious groups, and some journalists to visit in recent years, but what they are permitted to see is restricted. Although in many cases confirmation is not possible, a wide spectrum of grave human-rights abuses in North Korea has been reported by defectors, refugees, intelligence communities, humanitarian-aid workers, and international nongovernmental organizations.

Abuse of Civil and Political Rights

The North Korean constitution protects many human rights, but this means little in practice. North Koreans are denied freedom of speech, the media, religion, movement, assembly, petition, emigration, and association. They do not have the right to peace-

fully change their government. Foreign travel is prohibited for nearly all. Workers' rights are not observed, and only government-controlled unions are allowed. The government regularly mobilizes the population for compulsory labor projects in construction. In August of 1997, North Korea became the only country that has ever attempted to withdraw from a key human-rights treaty, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

The North Korean government also denies civil liberties to foreigners within its borders. Thousands of North Koreans who had Japanese nationality and citizenship voluntarily returned to North Korea in the 1960s and 1970s but are now denied home visits to Japan, despite North Korean government assurances to the contrary. Hundreds of South Koreans, mostly prisoners of war, are thought to be held in unacknowledged detention.

The North Korean government subjects its population to intensive ideological indoctrination and rigid controls in order to promote monolithic unity and loyalty to the state. The cult of personality for "Dear Leader" Kim Jong Il and his family as well as the semi-mystical ideology of *juche*, or national self-reliance, is systematically fostered through the media, educational institutes, worker and neighborhood associations, and staged marches and rallies. The government has classified the population into groups according to family background and allegiance to the state. One-third of all North Koreans are characterized as "hostile" to the regime and thus face discrimination in access to social services. Tens of thousands of people, including those with perceived disloyalty or physical disabilities, have been forcibly relocated from the capital to the countryside. The state controls all social and cultural aspects of life, permitting only activities that support its goals. It engages in strict censorship and monitors correspondence and telephones. There is a highly organized and pervasive system of informers. Little information reaches North Koreans from the outside world without government consent.

North Korea's judiciary is tightly controlled as well. According to defector and press accounts, the security forces engage in arbitrary detentions, extrajudicial killings, disappearances, public executions, and executions of political prisoners. Capital punishment and seizure of all assets is applicable to those who attempt defection, criticize the regime, listen to foreign broadcasts, write or possess "reactionary" printed matter or letters, or engage in "counterrevolutionary crimes."

Those accused of political offenses can also be sentenced, without due process, to reeducation through

labor. Credible but unconfirmed reports suggest that North Korea has imprisoned about 150,000–200,000 people in twelve camps in remote areas. The vast majority of the inmates are reportedly family members of the accused who are guilty by association in the eyes of the state. According to escapee accounts, prisoners are held incommunicado and forced to work for seventeen hours per day. They are denied access to medical services and the right to marry or have children. They are allowed only the barest means of subsistence and are subject to severe mistreatment, including beatings, torture, and public executions. Some human-rights groups estimate that 400,000 North Koreans have already died in such camps.

In the North Korean–run work settlements in the far eastern area of Russia near the border, Amnesty International has documented abuses among the six thousand North Koreans working there. These include harsh living conditions and brutal disciplinary measures, such as physical abuse and torture. North Korea has also established work camps for homeless and orphaned children.

Economic and Social Rights Abuse, Famine, and Displacement

North Korea's government-controlled economy has been in crisis since the fall of the Soviet bloc in 1991, which ended Soviet and Chinese concessional trade and assistance to the country. The failure of collectivist agricultural policies and poor harvests due to bad weather during the 1990s have exacerbated negative growth rates. Widespread starvation has set in, and people have been forced to flee their homes. Petty corruption is thriving, and the nation's medical system has collapsed. Food, clothing, and energy are rationed. Despite this, the regime continues to spend approximately 25 percent of GDP on defense and armaments.

In the wake of massive floods in August 1995, reports of people driven to cannibalism leaked out of the closed state. The North Korean government appealed to the international community for assistance, and relief has since been forthcoming. However, it is estimated by humanitarian agencies that 2 to 3 million people may have died in North Korea of starvation and famine-related illnesses from 1994 to 1998. Acute food shortages continue. Some humanitarian groups have withdrawn from North Korea because they were denied access to affected populations. They have also reported that food is being unfairly distributed along lines of loyalty to the regime.

North Korean guest workers in Russia are overstaying in the country illegally rather than return to their famine-stricken homeland. Having surrendered their passports and identification papers to North Korean border guards upon entry to Russia, such workers face hardships due to lack of identification. In search of food, hundreds of thousands of North Koreans are illegally crossing the mountainous border into China. Those who are caught by the authorities of both countries reportedly have their belongings confiscated and are beaten, detained, and later sent to "9-27" camps in North Korea. Established by decree on 27 September 1997 to address the problem of internal displacement resulting from the famine, such camps may hold as many as hundreds of thousands of North Koreans annually. The conditions are reportedly deplorable, with no heat in freezing temperatures, poor sanitation, inadequate food, infectious disease, and high death rates. Detainees are eventually forcibly returned to their villages.

Response to Human-Rights Abuse in North Korea

The North Korean government asserts that human rights are "fully ensured." Violations are "unthinkable," and such allegations are regarded as propaganda forwarded by South Korea and its allies. International and regional human-rights and humanitarian groups stress the need for North Korea to open itself up to visits by independent monitoring groups and improve human-rights practices. Government responses to North Korea's dismal human-rights record have been overshadowed by regional security concerns, such as North Korea's nuclear threat.

The South Korean, Japanese, and U.S. governments have all adopted policies of limited engagement in efforts to coax North Korea into the fold of the international community. Supporters of such a policy argue that without first gaining some leverage in this regard, the international community is unlikely in the long run to be able to influence better respect for human-rights practices in what is viewed as a rogue state. Critics of this approach charge that it only prolongs the life of the oppressive regime, which will never change its draconian practices. They argue that a more direct focus on human-rights concerns in diplomatic efforts toward North Korea is imperative and could even hasten the demise of the dictatorship.

North Korea currently appears to be expanding its official state contacts and, for the first time in more than ten years, in 2000 it submitted an implementation report on the ICCPR to the United Nations.

However, there are unfortunately no signs that the government is improving conditions for its people. In fact, the ongoing restrictions on access and information continues to give rise to concerns that the population is vulnerable to hidden human-rights violations.

Catherine Moller

See also: **Food Crisis—North Korea; Juche**

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NORTH KOREA—POLITICAL SYSTEM

Following most of the political systems in Communist countries, North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK) adopted the party-dominated structure. At a glance, the North Korean political system resembles the separation of powers in Western democratic countries: a Cabinet, Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), and a Court are the institutions of the state. But all of the political institutions, including the military and auxiliary organizations, were at first

under the tight control of the single mass party, the Korean Workers Party (KWP). Full-time party cadres and organizations take positions in various levels of the institutions of state and exercise power in the name of the party's guidance. The constitution of North Korea reads "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea functions in all aspects of affairs under the leadership of the Korean Workers Party" (Article 11).

Kim Il Sung (1912–1994) and his son Kim Jong Il (b. 1941) have ruled the party. The party has dominated society, but father and son have exercised absolute power in the party. Since the death of Kim Il Sung, the party's role has been subordinated to that of the military. Now the junior Kim rules the society through the military as well as through the party.

Consolidation of Kim Il Sung's Power

Even though the Communist movement in Korea may date back to the 1920s, the history of the KWP began with the power competition between Kim Il Sung's faction and other Communist factions right after the end of Japanese colonial rule in August 1945. Kim's major competitors were a Soviet faction and a Yan'an faction with Chinese training. A Seoul-based Communist faction joined the competition after it escaped the control of the U.S. Army military government (1945–1948) in the southern part of Korea. Kim's faction won out before the start of the Korean War in June 1950 and completely dominated the KWP by the mid-1950s.

Kim's win may be attributed to the assistance of the Soviet army at the initial stage of the power competi-



U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright with Kim Young Nam, president of North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly, during her trip to North Korea in October 2000. (AFP/CORBIS)



PREFACE TO THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (NORTH KOREA)

Adopted: 1 September 1998

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a socialist fatherland of Juche which embodies the idea of and guidance by the great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung is the founder of the DPRK and the socialist Korea.

Comrade Kim Il Sung founded the immortal Juche idea, organized and guided an anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle under its banner, created revolutionary tradition, attained the historical cause of the national liberation, and founded the DPRK, built up a solid basis of construction of a sovereign and independent state in the fields of politics, economy, culture and military, and founded the DPRK.

Comrade Kim Il Sung put forward an independent revolutionary line, wisely guided the social revolution and construction at various levels, strengthened and developed the Republic into a people-centered socialist country and a socialist state of independence, self-sustenance, and self-defense.

Comrade Kim Il Sung clarified the fundamental principle of State building and activities, established the most superior state social system and political method, and social management system and method, and provided a firm basis for the prosperous and powerful socialist fatherland and the continuation of the task of completing the Juche revolutionary cause.

Comrade Kim Il Sung regarded believing in the people as in heaven as his motto, was always with the people, devoted his whole life to them, took care of and guided them with a noble politics of benevolence, and turned the whole society into one big and united family.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung is the sun of the nation and the lodestar of the reunification of the fatherland. Comrade Kim Il Sung set the reunification of the country as the nation's supreme task, and devoted all his work and endeavors entirely to its realization.

Comrade Kim Il Sung, while turning the Republic into a mighty fortress for national reunification, indicated fundamental principles and methods for national reunification, developed the national reunification movement into a pan-national movement, and opened up a way for that cause, to be attained by the united strength of the entire nation.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung made clear the fundamental idea of the Republic's external policy, expanded and developed diplomatic relations on this basis, and heightened the international prestige of the Republic. Comrade Kim Il Sung as a veteran world political leader, hewed out a new era of independence, vigorously worked for the reinforcement and development of the socialist movement and the nonaligned movement, and for world peace and friendship between peoples, and made an immortal contribution to the mankind's independent cause.

Comrade Kim Il Sung was a genius ideological theoretician and a genius art leader, an ever-victorious, iron-willed brilliant commander, a great revolutionary and politician, and a great human being. Comrade Kim Il Sung's great idea and achievements in leadership are the eternal treasures of the nation and a fundamental guarantee for the prosperity and efflorescence of the DPRK.

The DPRK and the entire Korean people will uphold the great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung as the eternal President of the Republic, defend and carry forward his ideas and exploits and complete the Juche revolution under the leadership of the Workers' Party of Korea.

The DPRK Socialist Constitution is a Kim Il Sung constitution which legally embodies Comrade Kim Il Sung's Juche state construction ideology and achievements.

Source: The People's Korea: DPRK Socialist Constitution. Retrieved 8 March 2002, from: http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/dprk_constitution/category33.htm.

tion, rather than the aid of the Soviet faction, which consisted of ideologues of the second generation of Korean immigrants, who had no connection to the Soviet military. The Soviet army, originally deployed to disarm the defeated Japanese troops, disarmed the Yan'an faction's anti-Japanese forces when the latter entered Korea. It is noteworthy, however, that Kim's advantage did not necessarily guarantee his hegemonic role in the party. In order to pave the way for socialist transformation politics—such as land reform and nationalization of major industries—before the launch of the DPRK in 1948, Kim's faction had to rely upon a coalition with the Soviet and Yan'an factions. Moreover, in order to extend the organizational base at the local level, the faction asked for the assistance of the Soviet army's advisory group as well as the indigenous Communists.

Kim was able to achieve supreme power during the Korean War (1950–1953). Before the war broke out, the Communist faction from the South asserted that South Koreans would massively support the North Korean army's marching into Seoul to subvert the South Korean government. That turned out not to be the case, however, and thus members of the Seoul-based Communist faction were purged from the KWP. Kim's attack on his rivals was highlighted at the August Factional Incident in 1956, in which he expelled several high officials of the Soviet and Yan'an factions from the party. The Soviet and Yan'an factions maintained that the party had to give priority to agriculture and light industry because of the sharp shortage of food and daily consumer goods, whereas Kim stressed heavy industry, saying that its development would boost the economy in general. Kim not only took advantage of this conflict to eliminate his opponents and to consolidate his power in the party, he also succeeded in implementing the development strategy of "heavy industry first, followed by light industry and agriculture." The supremacy of Kim's power in the party gradually developed into a personality cult and dictatorship during the 1960s.

Emergence of Kim Jong Il

According to the KWP Act, the party is organized under the principle of democratic centralism, through which cadres of lower party units select members of higher offices, who then make the decisions that determine the roles and procedures of the lower level. Formally, the highest authority in the party should be the party congress, whose functions are taken over by the party central committee when it is in recess. Informally, however, the Organization Department in the secretariat has maintained power to supervise sys-

tematically and inspect the operation of the KWP as a whole.

The tradition of the Organization Department's predominant role began when the current leader, Kim Jong Il, emerged as de facto successor to his father in 1973. At that time, the junior Kim became a secretary in charge of the Organization Department as well as of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation. On the one hand, by utilizing the Department of Propaganda and Agitation, he became the only authoritative interpreter of Juche, the official ideology of self-reliance, and proclaimed "Kimilsung-ism" to promote his father's personality cult. On the other hand, with the Organization Department he came to be deeply involved in the personnel affairs of the Cabinet and military as well as of party cadres. He also transformed the department into his personal power base by requiring all the documents and reports made by other departments to pass through the Organization Department before being implemented as policies.

Strengthening of the KWP in general and the predominant role of the Organization Department in particular resulted in the concentration of power within the party, but also in the pervasiveness of Kim Jong Il's influence on every aspect of society. As a move to ensure power succession to himself, the junior Kim proclaimed Ten Principles for the Establishment of the Monolithic Idea to induce subordination to Kim Il Sung's absolute authority. As the principles became the standard by which the loyalty of the party cadres and members was tested, the North Korean political system became even more strictly controlled. The ten principles are as follows: (1) fight at the risk of one's life for the dissemination of Kim Il Sung's revolutionary idea, (2) serve Kim with highest loyalty, (3) respect Kim's authority without question, (4) believe in Kim's revolutionary idea and his instructions, (5) maintain the principle of unconditionality in implementing Kim's instructions, (6) strengthen the ideological unity and revolutionary integrity centered around Kim, (7) follow and learn from Kim's Communist dignity, revolutionary work style, and mass line, (8) keep Kim's political life in one's heart and recompense him with strong trust for his high political integrity and concern, (9) establish strong organizational discipline following Kim's monolithic guidance, and (10) succeed and complete Kim's revolutionary works from generation to generation. It is notable that of these principles, the tenth suggested the political succession from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il. That is, the junior Kim presented the disciplinary principles so as to enhance his own authority as well as the personality cult around his father.

The New Constitution

With the death of Kim Il Sung in July 1994, Kim Jong Il succeeded at once. The junior Kim has taken tight control of the military, a potential arbiter in the process of power transition, since the early 1990s, when he monopolized core offices dealing with the armed forces. He was appointed Supreme Commander of the People's Army in 1991, Marshal of the Republic in 1992, and Chairman of the National Defense Committee (NDC) in 1993. He did not have to exercise power over the military through the institutional mechanisms of the KWP. He gave orders and instructions to the armed forces directly and could divide and rule the two power-base institutions, the military and the party. The military swore a loyalty oath to the junior Kim as soon as Kim Il Sung died.

It should be noted that the junior Kim's formal succession was not completed until September 1998, when the Supreme People's Assembly amended the constitution. Most observers of North Korea expected that he would take the office of state president, but this did not happen. Instead, under the new constitution, in which there is no presidency, he appointed himself chairman of the NDC again, which was strengthened in its status and function.

According to the new constitution, power is formally divided into three institutions: the NDC, Presidium of the SPA, and Cabinet. When Kim Il Sung was named eternal president of the DPRK, the office of state president was abolished in the new constitution of 1998. Since 1998, the chairman of the SPA represents the state and performs ceremonial functions in foreign affairs, whereas the SPA in general operates as a legislative body. In the absence of a state president, the chairman of the NDC is the highest post. The Cabinet is expected to play a more active role in internal affairs such as economy and administration.

Under the new constitution, the NDC's role and status were strengthened. The NDC is defined as the highest guiding organ of the military and the managing organ of military matters. As chairman of the NDC, Kim Jong Il is in firm control of all the armed forces, including not only the regular army, navy, and air force but also the border control force and the worker-farmer's corps. Furthermore, the chairman of the NDC is in charge of all political and economic matters as well. In this regard, Kim is the true head of state, while the head of the SPA has a more ceremonial role.

Given this authority structure, the constitutional change implies several points. First, by naming his father the eternal president, Kim Jong Il intended to ex-

tend Kim Il Sung's charisma and legitimacy as the founding father of the DPRK. Second, Kim Jong Il was able deliberately to avoid the burdens of being the formal head of state: meeting with foreign diplomats and public appearances, which he has seldom liked. Third, he has also avoided responsibility for North Korea's economic devastation by providing the Cabinet and local government with more formal authority in economic affairs than before, while keeping actual power over domestic and foreign affairs.

Kim Jong Il's era under the new constitution is one in which the relationship between party and military have been restructured. Since Kim Il Sung's death, the junior Kim has ruled North Korea with the title of Supreme Commander of the People's Army. The status of the military has been enhanced to the point that it appears to dominate the North Korean political system. All the social sectors have been forced to demonstrate military spirit and adopt military methods. To resort to military leadership necessarily brings a change in the relationship between party and military. The change is best reflected in an editorial of the party organ, *Rodong Shinmun*, on 16 February 1997: "If it were not for the People's Army, our people, our state, and our party could not exist."

Whereas the Leninist tradition is that the Communist Party guides the military, in North Korea the KWP no longer exercises absolute control over the People's Army, nor is the military under the party's bureaucratic guidance. The political officers in charge of party work still remain in the military to promote loyalty to Kim Jong Il among the men, but their function does not depend upon the party's guidance. In a closed-session speech delivered to high-ranking party officials in December 1996, Kim Jong Il was quoted as saying that the party's morale was so degraded that party cadres would benefit from getting an ideological education from the political officers of the military.

Meanwhile, the new constitution has given the Cabinet more responsibility and power to run the crippled economy. Now the Cabinet has the right to supervise and control local governments and local economies. With the adoption of the new constitution, the old tradition that a local party secretary simultaneously held the office of head of local government is no longer the case. Accordingly, the local government comes to be relatively independent of the local party, particularly in economic affairs, and it is under the control of the Cabinet in the hierarchical sense.

It is also notable that the local government's relative independence from the local party has not brought any significant change in the overall relationship be-

tween party and government. The relationship is still often compared to the relationship between the man steering a boat and the man rowing it. The party steers the government, which does the rowing. Even though the party's influence has lessened in recent years, especially in military affairs, it still guides the government. There are two reasons for that. On the one hand, the ruling elite in North Korea attributes the demise of the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe to the failure of the party's dominance of society. They also emphasize the significance of the party's tight control over other segments of society. On the other hand, most of Kim Jong Il's supporters are in the party, and the party at large is his most loyal supporter. Furthermore, Kim Jong Il himself started his career as a party cadre, and his power succession began within the structure of the party. Therefore, the fact that the government gained in status in the new constitution does not affect the guiding role of the party over the government.

Sung Chull Kim

See also: **Juche; Kim Il Sung; Kim Jong Il**

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NORTH KOREA-SOUTH KOREA RELATIONS The division of the Korean Peninsula into North and South is a legacy of the Japanese occupation that began before annexation in 1910 and ended in 1945 with the reoccupation of the peninsula by Soviet troops in the north and U.S. troops in the south. Officially, the solidification of the division of the Korean Peninsula occurred in 1948 after elections were held in the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the majority of the foreign troops returned home. Since that time the two Koreas have fought one major bloody war (1950–1953) and have engaged in numerous confrontations along the thirty-eighth parallel. On occasion they have also approached the negotiating table with hopes of putting an end to the conflict while setting the groundwork for the establishment of amica-



A Korean man, who had fled to the south from the north during the Korean War, hands South Korean president Kim Dae Jung a family picture prior to Kim's departure for North Korea to engage in cooperation talks in June 2000. (AFP/CORBIS)

ble relations leading to eventual reunification. Since 1988, there has been trade between the two Koreas.

The Division of Korea

The Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai was a weak coalition of Korean refugees who had fled Japan-controlled Korea over the initial decade of Japanese rule. It was formed in 1919 and lasted until the end of World War II. While some members of this group believed Korea's independence would best be secured through diplomacy with the West, others felt the necessity of military force to drive the Japanese from the peninsula. The group split, with the former faction making its way to the United States and the latter primarily to the Soviet Far East and Manchuria. At the end of World War II, the respective groups rode in on the coattails of the occupation forces, the Soviets supporting Kim Il Sung (1912–1994) and the military faction, and the United States supporting Syngman Rhee (1875–1965) and the diplomacy faction.

The decision to divide the peninsula into two regions was hastily made on the evening of 10 August, less than a week before the Japanese surrender. Dean Rusk, a major in the U.S. military who later served in several cabinets in the United States, and Colonel Charles H. Bonesteel, another American who was later commander of American forces in the ROK, who were entrusted with determining the line of division, chose the thirty-eighth parallel, giving the United States control of Seoul, the capital. This division was accepted and respected by Moscow. Both sides believed

the division would last until peninsular elections could be held and the country returned to independence. But North–South politics, supported by Cold War ideological differences, cemented the division between the two states, preventing the realization of elections at a national level.

The Korean War Era

Relations between the two sides were never good, with both the United States and the Soviet Union installing leaders generally friendly toward their respective ideologies, leaders who grew increasingly negative toward the other. Even though history tells us that war officially broke out on 25 June 1950, border clashes had been occurring since 1949. Other confrontations in the southern half of the peninsula, which included peasant rebellions and guerrilla warfare, demonstrated opposition first to U.S. occupation of the country and later to the conservative rule of Syngman Rhee. To the north, the Communist regime apparently enjoyed better success in repressing opposition forces. The Korean War lasted until 1953, with the ROK being rescued by a U.S.-directed United Nations force and the DPRK by the Communist regime in mainland China. The latter's participation came primarily as a result of threats by U.S. commander Douglas MacArthur to carry the war into Chinese territory. The war left heavy material damage to both sides and caused millions of deaths and family displacements. In 1953 the Armistice Agreement ended the hot war but wrapped the relations of the two countries in a Cold War atmosphere.

Other Confrontations

Since 1953 there have been numerous hostile and confrontational incidents instigated from both sides of the thirty-eighth parallel. The North Koreans were accused of initiating an attack on the South Korean presidential mansion in 1968, of attempting to sneak spies into the south using a submarine in 1996, and of instigating battle along a disputed water boundary in the West Sea in 1999. Team Spirit and other military games conducted by the South Korean and U.S. forces are viewed by the DPRK as intimidation ploys. Since the mid-1950s the North Koreans have also felt threatened by the cache of nuclear weapons stored in South Korea, as well as by U.S. threats to use the weapons, primarily during the Korean War.

Movement toward Reunification

But there have been signs of reconciliation. In 1972, for example, the inter-Korean Red Cross met at the

demilitarized zone (DMZ) town of Panmunjom. These talks resulted in the composition of the Joint North–South Communique of 4 July, which stated the aspiration of the two Koreas to seek unification without the help of a third party. In 1994, Korean president Kim Young Sam agreed to meet with North Korean leader Kim Il Sung. However, the latter Kim's untimely death put an end to those plans. With the North's nuclear program apparently frozen since 1994, the two sides have engaged in productive discussion to resolve their differences. This discussion paved the way for the North–South summit that took place in P'yongyang in June 2000. Since then, however, Kim Jong Il's refusal to visit Seoul and less amicable relations between the U.S. and the DPRK have frozen the progress made during the 1990s.

Over this time several scenarios for Korean unification have been proposed. No one predicts the course of unification to be free of confusion or even violence. Pessimists envision either the total economic and political collapse of the DPRK, or a desperate military attempt at unification by the North, bringing about its eventual absorption by the South. Either scenario predicts economic chaos throughout the Northeast Asian region as well as a massive refugee movement from the North to either the ROK or to a third country, possibly Japan or the United States. The problems associated with these scenarios, and the recent economic difficulties experienced by the ROK, have caused some to consider "soft landing" scenarios in which the economic health of the DPRK is strengthened to prepare it for its inevitable absorption by the South. A third option has been put forth by both the North and the South from the early 1970s: that of a one-country, two-system confederation arrangement in which the two states would gradually begin to work together toward a unification conducted upon more equal terms. Few, if any, see Korean unification as occurring suddenly, as it did in Germany, but rather as a gradual process.

Mark E. Caprio

See also: **Korean War; North and South Korean Economic Ventures**

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NORTH KOREA-UNITED STATES RELATIONS Interaction between the Democratic Republic of North Korea (DPRK) and the United States has long been filled with animosity, tension, and confrontation. In 2002 there are no official diplomatic relations between these two countries.

The DPRK's version of Korean history depicts Americans as the root cause for the division of the Korean Peninsula along the thirty-eighth parallel in 1948. Communist North Korea maintains that the United States, with United Nations backing, illegally helped in establishing an opposing Republic of Korea (ROK) government in the south of the peninsula. During the height of the Cold War, North Korea accused the United States of turning South Korea into an American colony in order to strengthen its influence and colonize the whole of the Korean Peninsula.

When the United States provided weapons and training for the South Korean Army in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the DPRK condemned the Americans for initiating the Korean War (1950–1953) between North and South Korea. In the aftermath of the war, the U.S.–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty of 1965, which protects the ROK from any aggressive moves from the North, as well as positioning 37,000 U.S. troops in various military bases in South Korea, led North Korea to perceive the United States as the foremost threat to its survival and security. Repeatedly North Korea has demanded that the United States withdraw its troops from South Korean soil because it sees American security commitments to the ROK as the main stumbling block in achieving the reunification of the Korean Peninsula.

Relations between P'yongyang and Washington further deteriorated when, in 1968, North Korea captured the USS *Pueblo*, a U.S. intelligence ship, claiming the Americans were spying around its coast. In another incident, DPRK soldiers killed several American soldiers with axes at the border village of Panmunjom in 1976. In the 1990s, a new pattern emerged in P'yongyang's relations with Washington whereby North Korea now used its nuclear capabilities as a bargaining chip in gaining economic assistance from the United States. In return for freezing its reactors that are capable of manufacturing weapons-grade plutonium, the United States agreed to furnish the DPRK with two light-water nuclear reactors and heavy oil.

But the American policy of simultaneously imposing economic and trade sanctions and labeling the DPRK as a "rogue state" hampered efforts at reconciliation. There was marked progress when Jo

Myong-rok, second in command after Kim Jong Il, made a landmark visit to Washington in October 2000 to attempt a rapprochement with the United States. Shortly thereafter, Secretary of State Madeline Albright from the Clinton administration visited P'yongyang. However, North Korea believes that the George W. Bush Republican leadership in Washington that took office in 2001, which has blacklisted it as a terrorist-supporting country (part of the "axis of evil"), and uses the label to justify its plans for a missile defense system, will isolate the DPRK from the rest of the world. In the 2002 climate, chances for normalizing relations between the two countries were practically nonexistent.

Geetha Govindasamy

See also: **North Korea–Political System; North Korea–South Korea Relations**

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NORTH KYONGSANG PROVINCE (2000 pop. 2.8 million). North Kyongsang Province (Kyongsang pukto) is located in South Korea in the southeastern region of the Korean Peninsula. It contains the major urban center of Taegu, with a population of 2.5 million, and the important cultural area of Kyongju, the capital of the Shilla kingdom (57 BCE–935 CE). It is bordered by the Sobaek Mountains to the north and west, South Kyongsang Province to the south, and the Sea of Japan (East Sea) to the east. Due to the rugged topography of the surrounding mountains, subareas within the region share cultural traits, such as a dialect and customs, which are quite different from those of outlying regions. Both Kyongsang provinces are also known as *Yongnam* ("south of the mountain passes"), attesting to the historical importance that mountains have played in fostering regional characteristics.

North Kyongsang Province has a large industrial agglomeration, due mainly to heavy investments in the region by the South Korean government since the 1960s. Steel, shipbuilding, automobile, and petrochemical factories are concentrated along the southeast coast beginning in P'ohang and extending into South Kyongsang Province. The northwestern part of the province also has two major clusters of industries around Taegu and Kumi, which specialize in textiles and electronics.

North Kyongsang Province boasts two Buddhist sites, Pulguk Monastery and the Sokkuram Grotto, both constructed between 751 and 775 CE, which have been named as cultural sites on the UNESCO World Heritage List. It also preserves a regional version of the mask dance at Hahoe Village, near Andong, called the *Hahoe Pyolsin kut*, which was performed during village festivals on the second day of the first moon according to the lunar calendar.

Richard D. McBride II

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NORTH P'YONGAN PROVINCE (2002 est. pop. 3.1 million). North P'yongan Province (P'yongan pukto), located in northwestern North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), has an area of 12,383 square kilometers. The province borders the Yalu (Amnok) River separating North Korea and China (People's Republic of China). It also faces the Yellow Sea to the west.

The provincial capital is at Sinuiju, which is close to the mouth of the Yalu River and the border with China. In the first half of the twentieth century, Sinuiju was an important connection point for trains connecting Korea and Manchuria. Sinuiju and Kusong are the two designated cities, and there are twenty-three counties (*kun*).

The region is highly industrialized because of its location and abundance of hydroelectric power. Arms, machinery, textiles, clothing, footwear, foodstuffs, and daily necessities are some of the key manufactured goods. Rice, corn, beans, livestock, fruits, and sericul-

ture make up the predominant agricultural sectors. The province's location on the Yellow Sea also enables deep-sea and coastal fishing.

North P'yongan Province is noted as well for its beautiful landscape of mountains, waterfalls, and caves. The area also has many historical points of interest, such as Buddhist temples.

Jennifer Jung-Kim

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NORTHERN EXPEDITION The Northern Expedition (1926–1928) was the major military effort by the Chinese Nationalist regime under Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi; 1887–1975) to move north from Guangdong in southeast China in July 1926 to unify the country under the Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party) and to end the power of the warlords that so weakened and divided China.

The campaign reflected at least initially the Nationalist-Communist alliance; Communist cadres preceded the advance of Nationalist armed forces and thereby helped in building popular support among peasants and workers. However, bribery was also used to convince local warlords to accept nominal Nationalist control of much of China.

There were some successes. Within several weeks after its start in June 1926, the National Revolutionary Army seized Changsha, the capital of Hunan Province in central China, and the great port area of Wuhan on the Chang (Yangtze) River in September, Fuzhou in southeastern China in December, and Shanghai and Nanjing the following March, by which time Chiang's forces controlled much of central China.

The Nationalist movement was divided into right and left wings, and the left wing—both the Nationalist and Communist followers—settled into Wuhan, one of the great industrial areas in largely agrarian China, while the right wing of the Guomindang moved to the more strategic lower Chang area and the Nanjing-Shanghai axis.

Soon after capturing Shanghai, in April 1927, Chiang turned on the Communist movement and with the assistance of foreign forces and the Shanghai underworld destroyed the so-called urban Communists in a

reign of terror, ending the alliance and forcing the surviving Communist cadres to flee with Mao Zedong to Jiangxi Province in the southeastern countryside; here they regrouped and later began their Long March in 1934.

One outcome of the Northern Expedition was the decimation of the power of the urban and Soviet-allied Chinese Communist movement and its transformation to a more agrarian-based Marxist movement under the leadership of Mao Zedong and his colleagues. Other significant results were the strengthening of Chiang's leadership, the continuing power of warlords to influence government actions, a decision by Japan to invade the divided China, and later ties between the Nationalists and Western nations.

Charles Dobbs

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NORTHERN TERRITORIES (2001 est. pop. 29,000). The Northern Territories are a group of islands in the Kurile chain north of the Japanese island of Hokkaido. Historically the islands and the island of Sakhalin have been claimed by both Russia and Japan. In 1855, the two nations agreed that the two largest islands in the Kuriles, Kunashiri and Etorofu, belonged to Japan and that Sakhalin would be shared. In 1875, it was agreed that all the Kuriles belonged to Japan and that Sakhalin belonged to Russia. Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) resulted in Japan acquiring the southern portion of Sakhalin Island (south of 50 degrees north latitude) through the Treaty of Portsmouth.

Russia, and then the Soviet Union, long sought to reacquire the islands, and the Kuriles were promised to Joseph Stalin at the 1945 Yalta Conference. In the 1951 peace treaty signed by Japan and the Allies (with the exception of the Soviet Union), Japan renounced any claim to Sakhalin or the Kuriles. However, because Japan and the Soviet Union never concluded a peace treaty, the issue of rightful control of the islands continues to be a sticking point. The islands are currently inhabited by Russians and ethnic Koreans brought there during the Japanese occupation of Korea.

Thomas P. Dolan

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NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE—SARHAD (2002 est. pop. 19.5 million). The smallest province (74,522 square kilometers) of the federal state of Pakistan, North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) by its very name reveals its geographical position. The region is surrounded by Afghanistan to the west and north, the Pakistani provinces of Baluchistan to the south and Punjab to the east, and the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, contested with India, to the northeast.

The NWFP's terrain is characterized by harsh mountain ranges, high plains bounded by stony hills, and narrow mountain passes, such as the famous Khyber Pass, a gateway between India and Afghanistan. The great Hindu Kush range crosses the region; its highest peak is the Tirich Mir (7,690 meters). The main rivers are the Kabul, which flows from east to west, the Kunar, Kandia, Kurram, Gumal, and Swat. The vale of Swat is considered one of the most beautiful valleys in the country, with historical-period architecture and earlier archaeological remains dating back to 3000 BCE.

The heart of the province is the large and fertile vale of Peshawar, which was once the center of the Gandhara kingdom (sixth century BCE–tenth century CE), a civilization of the Indian subcontinent. The city of Peshawar, founded 2,000 years ago, is the present capital of the province and the main urban center of the region. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1988), the city hosted crowds of Afghan refugees and became the headquarters of the mujahideen (Islamic warriors), a group fighting against the Red Army, and the Communist government of Kabul.

Islam was effectively brought to the region by the Turkic dynasty of the Ghaznavids at the end of the tenth century. From then on, the region passed successively to Ghurid, Afghan, Mughal, Pashtun, and Sikh rule. The British occupied the NWFP in 1849 following the Second Sikh War and strongly fortified it, since they considered this region a strategic pillar for the defense of their empire in India. Nevertheless, they always faced problems in keeping the NWFP under control, especially in the so-called tribal areas. There, fierce Pashtun tribes (called Pathan by the British) strenuously fought against the British Army to maintain their autonomy and their traditional laws. After the Partition of India in 1947, the NWFP joined

the new state of Pakistan, the special status of the Pashtun tribal areas remaining unchanged.

The ethnic group of the Pashtun, divided into many tribes, clans, and subsections, represents the overwhelming majority of the population, which is mostly rural (79 percent of the total population, according to 1999 estimates), except for the area of Peshawar.

Riccardo Redaelli

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NO-RUZ No-ruz (also, Nau rooz, Noruz, Now ruz; new day) is a Persian expression referring to the Persian New Year. It takes place on the first day of spring (21 March) and heralds the beginning of thirteen days of celebration. A few weeks before No-ruz, Iranians commonly do spring cleaning in their homes in preparation for the arrival of the New Year. Picnics are a common tradition on the thirteenth day. In addition, people take to the streets to participate in celebrations by playing drums and singing songs. Some also dress up in brightly colored satin outfits and wear makeup, to portray Haji Firuz (bards). The frequent themes during No-ruz celebrations are good and evil or death and rebirth.

An elaborate dinner takes place on No-ruz. Usually, a traditional centerpiece, called the *haft-sin* (seven esses), is placed on the dinner table. The seven esses refer to the seven items in the arrangement that all begin with the letter *s* in the Persian language and which can include sumac (a spice), *serkeh* (vinegar), *samanu* (wheat pudding), *sabzi* (greens), *sonbol* (hyacinth), *senjed* (a type of Iranian fruit), *sekeh* (coin), *sib* (apple), and *sir* (garlic). These items are offered as symbols to bring good luck and prosperity in the coming year.

Houman A. Sadri

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NOW RUZ. See **No-ruz**.

NU SHOOTING Nu shooting is a form of archery indigenous to southwestern China and associated with the non-Han Nu ethnic minorities of the region. It is distinguished from other forms of archery by the use of a wooden bow and arrow and bamboo arrowheads. The Chinese government promotes Nu shooting as an authentic "minority sport" and organizes tournaments where challengers shoot at targets from various distances, horseback, and standing and kneeling positions.

David Levinson

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NU, U (1907–1995), Myanmar political figure and writer. Myanmar (Burmese) leader U Nu, born in Wakema, Myaungma District, in 1907, received a B.A. from Rangoon University in 1929. He became headmaster and later superintendent at Pantanaw High School and worked briefly under U Thant (1909–1974), who later became UN secretary-general. He completed a law degree at Rangoon University in 1935. In the same year he was elected president of the newly established Rangoon University Student Union. His expulsion from the university jointly with nationalist leader Aung San (1915–1947) gave the impetus for the 1936 university strikes and marked the beginning of his political career. Aung San convinced him to join the Burmese nationalist movement the Dobama in 1938, where they were both elevated to the executive committee, causing a rift among the membership. He became known as Thakin Nu at that time. Outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 spurred renewed demands for national independence, and U Nu's involvement caused him to be sentenced to two years in prison on 15 July 1940. During his imprisonment, he wrote a number of plays. Freed in the wake of the Japanese invasion of Burma on 9 December 1941, he subsequently became general secretary of the

united Dobama-Sinyetha Party and served in Ba Maw's (1893–1977) government under the Japanese as minister of foreign affairs (1943) and as minister of information (1944).

After Aung San's assassination in 1947, U Nu was invited to be chair of the Anti-Fascist Peoples' Freedom League (AFPFL), the dominant party in the country. On 17 October 1947, he concluded the Nu-Attlee agreement on Burma's national independence and became Burma's first prime minister on 4 January 1948 at national independence, serving until 1962 with brief interludes in the 1956–1957 period to reorganize the AFPFL. He became leader of the "Clean" AFPFL faction in 1958. Between 1958 and 1960, he invited a "caretaker" government headed by General Ne Win to deal with the nation's security issues. U Nu won the office again in the 1960 election and declared Buddhism the national religion in the same year, which caused considerable opposition among non-Buddhists. As prime minister, U Nu failed to address politically ethnic and Communist insurgency, and he overemphasized Buddhism (the grounds for his electoral appeal) as a solution to national unity at the expense of a more inclusive approach to religions in general.

Ne Win's 1962 military coup put an end to electoral government and U Nu's role within it. He placed U Nu in prison. After his release on 27 October 1966, U Nu left the country in February 1969, and at a news conference that was held in London on 27 August 1969 he declared himself to be the "legal prime minister" of Burma. Subsequently, he was based in Bangkok, where he tried to organize Burmese resistance in the Thai-Burma border region. However, he left Thailand for India in June 1973. Under an amnesty declared by the Council of State (by Ne Win), U Nu returned to Burma on 29 July 1980, where he became a monk for a while and where he got involved in Buddhist missionary work, including the Burma Pitaka Association, which he founded. He again proclaimed himself to be the legal prime minister and declared an interim government on 9 September 1988, but this met with little or no support. His time as a politician had by then ended. For refusing to disband his "government," U Nu was put under house arrest on 29 December 1989 but was released on 23 April 1992. He died in Rangoon on 14 February 1995.

U Nu is remembered for his interest in Buddhism and in literature and translation. He set up the Nagan book club in 1939, which translated major political tracts for the Burmese readership. Also, between 1954 and 1955 he initiated the Sixth Buddhist San-

gayana (Sixth Buddhist Synod), only the second to be held in Burmese history, to ensure the purity of the Buddhist canon.

Gustaaf Houtman

See also: **Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League—Myanmar; Aung San; Myanmar—History; Myanmar—Political System; Ne Win, U**

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NUCLEAR ALLERGY Japan is often described as having an "allergy" to anything even remotely related to nuclear weapons. This allergy sometimes extends to nonmilitary uses of nuclear technology. Even so, the Japanese government has actively pursued nuclear power as a source of energy, despite public reservations stemming from Japan's history as the only country to experience the hostile use of nuclear weapons. The collective social and psychological scare left by the U.S. decision to use atomic bombs at the end of World War II has had lasting political implications.

The nuclear allergy toward weapons became institutionalized in 1967 when the then–prime minister Sato Eisaku delineated Japan's three nonnuclear principles. First, Sato pledged that Japan would not produce nuclear weapons. Second, Japan would not possess nuclear weapons in its self-defense arsenal. Finally, Japan would not permit other countries, notably the United States, to have nuclear weapons on Japanese soil. These principles were partially responsible for

Sato's sharing the 1974 Nobel Peace Prize. The third principle, it turns out, was not met, as the United States did at times transport and store nuclear weapons on Japanese soil, apparently without the Japanese government's knowledge. Furthermore, the nonnuclear stance was an easy foreign policy position to adopt, since Japan was under the American nuclear umbrella. Nevertheless, the anti-nuclear weapons stance has been a mainstay of Japanese foreign policy.

It is worth noting that while the Japanese public and government may be allergic to nuclear weapons there is an uneasy yet substantial role for nuclear *power* in Japan. Japan's penchant for nuclear power results in part from the long-held view of the country as a small island devoid of natural resources and in need of energy self-sufficiency. Moreover, the 1973 oil shock taught the Japanese government that the country was too sensitive to disruptions in fossil fuel supplies and hence that it should increase domestic electricity-generating capacity. The net result is Japan's uncomfortable embrace of nuclear power while it rejects nuclear weapons.

Jonathan R. Strand

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NUCLEAR ARMS Emerging strategic trends indicate that the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region is becoming more complex and uncertain, with the gradual diffusion of power and proliferation of nuclear and ballistic-missile capabilities. The Asia-Pacific region is now home to the largest number of states possessing nuclear weapons (NWS) in the world. In addition to the two nuclear superpowers—Russia and the United States—China, India, and Pakistan possess sizable nuclear arsenals. Australia, Japan, and South Korea enjoy the protection of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence umbrella and either have some American nuclear weapons deployed on their territory or provide special facilities to the nuclear-armed U.S. forces. Several East Asian countries can assemble nuclear devices on short notice—Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan. In Southwest Asia, Iran is believed to be working on nuclear weapons and missile programs. While the

threat of a global nuclear Armageddon has receded, there is now a real danger that nuclear weapons will be used in regional conflicts, by terrorist groups, by separatist forces seeking independence, or by rival factions in a coup d'état, perhaps accidentally, due to weak command and control systems.

The nuclear proliferation that occurred after the Cold War shows that international nonproliferation measures cannot prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in regions where heavily armed and often antagonistic neighbors confront each other, as in the case of the two Koreas, China and Taiwan, China and India, or India and Pakistan. Proliferation is closely related to the security dilemma rooted in the belief held by many in the three divided Asian countries of Korea, China, and India that the possession of such weapons is essential to their very survival and long-term security. Such an attitude does not portend well for the future of the global nuclear nonproliferation (NNP) regime.

The Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

The global NNP regime is an outgrowth of steps taken during the second half of the twentieth century to halt the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. Several key components of the NNP regime include the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), founded in 1957; the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty banning the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space, or underwater; the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was extended indefinitely in 1995; the London-based Nuclear Suppliers' Group, formed in 1974, which requires IAEA safeguards on all of its participants' nuclear exports; the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime aimed at halting the proliferation of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and other unmanned delivery systems; the 1995 Wassenaar Arrangement (a successor to the Cold War era's COCOM, or Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls) covering conventional weapons and dual-use exports; the Zangger Committee, which regulates nuclear-related exports; and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT—yet to come into force), which constrains all states from conducting nuclear tests (but allows computer-simulated, zero-yield, and subcritical tests). In addition the nuclear weapons-free zones (NWFZs) in Latin America (including the Argentine-Brazilian bilateral arrangement), the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, and Africa have further strengthened the NNP regime. In 1997 the five Central Asian states issued the Tashkent statement, which proposed an NWFZ in that area.



POLICY AND REALITY IN NUCLEAR SOUTH ASIA

The following text is from a resolution passed by the All India Congress Committee in November 1963. Despite the support for a ban on nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan each had substantial arsenals as of 2002, and the region remained, in the view of many experts, a likely scene for regional nuclear war.

The Committee welcomes the recent Nuclear Test Ban Agreement. This has provided a beginning, however small, in lowering world tensions and given some hope of wider and more significant relaxations which can lead to the ultimate ending of the cold war. This Agreement is a limited one and by itself does not ensure peace. Nevertheless, the Agreement repudiates the cold war attitude and approach and has been recognised as a beginning and reversal of the cold war approach. It is, therefore, to be welcomed. The Committee hopes that this approach will be continued and the Agreement will be followed by a halt in the armament race, particularly in nuclear arms, and that the manufacture, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons or traffic in them will be prohibited by international agreement.

Source: Jagdish Saran Sharma. (1965) *India's Struggle for Freedom: Select Documents and Sources*. Vol. II. Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 211.

The overall record of the global NNP regime has been a mixture of success and failure. On the positive side, five decades of international efforts at curbing the spread of nuclear weapons created a political and normative climate in which no state can easily declare its nuclear intentions. The unsuitability of nuclear weapons in most military situations may also render them inappropriate for use in many conflicts. In recent years a number of nuclear-capable states— notably Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and the former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—have agreed to abandon or dismantle their nuclear weapons capabilities. With the exception of only four countries in the world—Israel, India, Pakistan, and Cuba—all countries have acceded to the NPT, making it the most extensive multilateral control measure regulating nuclear arms. In this sense the regime has been fairly successful.

On the negative side, the campaign for nuclear disarmament appears to be faltering just when success seemed at hand. Since the mid-1980s attempts at nuclear disarmament have been seriously undermined by developments such as the emergence of new suppliers of nuclear technology (notably China), growing trade

in delivery systems, and an increase in the number of threshold or new NWSs. When they exploded ten nuclear bombs during two weeks in May 1998, India and Pakistan not only fundamentally altered the Asian nuclear balance of power but also demonstrated that nuclear might represents, as Samuel P. Huntington foresaw in *The Clash of Civilizations* (1996: 192), "the central phenomenon of the slow but ineluctable diffusion of power in a multicivilizational world." Apart from the five declared NWSs (the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China) and two new self-declared NWSs (India and Pakistan), several other nations (Israel, Japan, North Korea, Taiwan, and Iran) are widely believed to have made significant progress toward acquiring nuclear weapons capability. Many signatories to nonproliferation treaties retain an interest in joining the exclusive nuclear club: for example Iraq and North Korea maintained clandestine nuclear weapons programs that were exposed following the 1991 Persian Gulf War and in 1994, respectively. The degree to which a small country like North Korea manipulated major powers with its "nuclear/missile card" was not lost on the Taiwanese, who argue that Taiwan should have its own nuclear weapons program to counter forcible reunification

with mainland China. Vietnam also seems keen to acquire nuclear and missile technology.

China bears a great deal of responsibility for recent nuclear proliferation in Asia, in view of the assistance it provided to the nuclear and missile programs of Pakistan and North Korea to countervail its Asian strategic rivals, India and Japan. Beijing's proliferation activities helped create the contexts in which India decided to unveil its nuclear weapons and Japan decided to opt for the U.S.-backed Theater Missile Defenses in East Asia. (Theater Missile Defenses are aimed at erecting a defense shield to protect the U.S. forces and bases in the Asia-Pacific region from long-range ballistic missile attacks from enemy forces—rogue states and nonstate actors, such as al-Qaeda.) Though some countries helped by China—Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa—eventually renounced their nuclear weapons programs, others (for example, Iran) continue to pose formidable challenges to the nonproliferation regime. For their part the five acknowledged NWSs continue technological and research efforts to update their weapons capacities, reaffirming the stance that their possession of such weapons is necessary for strategic deterrence, balance, and national security. Nuclear weapons have obviously not lost their value as instruments of power.

Nuclear Arsenals

Much like the United States and Russia, China possesses a complete triad of ground-, sea-, and air-based nuclear deterrents. Unlike Moscow's and Washington's arsenals of about 3,000 warheads each, however, Beijing possesses roughly 450 to 500 nuclear warheads, making it the third-largest NWS. The nuclear arsenals of the United States, Russia, and China include strategic bombers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, modern short-range and long-range (intermediate and intercontinental) ballistic missiles armed with miniaturized multiple independent reentry vehicles, tactical nuclear weapons, neutron bombs, and advanced command, control, communications, computer processing, and intelligence. The nuclear arsenals of new entrants to the nuclear club are much smaller. India is estimated to have 70 to 100 nuclear warheads and Pakistan 30 to 50 warheads, and their delivery systems consist of short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and fighter aircraft such as the Mirage 2000, Jaguars, and F-16s.

North Korea's nuclear arsenal is the subject of much debate and speculation; it probably does not exceed five to seven nuclear bombs. South Korea operates many nuclear power reactors and possesses the

technical capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons if it decides to do so. Should the United States reduce its military commitment to South Korea's defense, or if relations with North Korea deteriorate badly, South Korea might reconsider its nuclear options. On the other hand Seoul could inherit North Korea's nuclear weapons capabilities following the reunification of the two Koreas—a prospect that would cause anxiety in Japan. Japan has a sizable plutonium stockpile, missile capability, and a modern and highly capable self-defense force, as well as an extensive nuclear power industry; furthermore the country is building large-scale reprocessing facilities to extract weapons-grade plutonium from spent reactor fuel.

Nuclear Strategies

The United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have reaffirmed the centrality of nuclear weapons in their military doctrine and collective security strategy. The nuclear strategies of both Washington and Moscow do not rule out the use of nuclear weapons to counter nonnuclear threats to their security. At the beginning of the twenty-first century Chinese nuclear strategy shifted from one of "minimum deterrence" to one of "limited deterrence." In effect Beijing now seeks to deter the use of conventional, tactical, and long-range strategic nuclear weapons by the enemy and to control escalation in the event of a nuclear confrontation. Under a "limited deterrence" doctrine, China would have to acquire capability to target the enemy's forces as well as cities, which would require increased accuracy and expanded deployments. For their part India and Pakistan claim to adhere to a "credible minimum deterrence" posture. China and India are the only nuclear powers to adopt a policy of "no first use" (NFU); that is, they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons but will launch a second-strike counterattack if nuclear weapons are used against them. The value of an NFU pledge in crisis situations, however, remains to be tested. During the 1996 Taiwan missile crisis China's NFU commitment did not stop it from issuing to the United States a nuclear threat to the effect that Washington valued Los Angeles and San Francisco more than Taipei. The Bush administration is contemplating the resumption of nuclear testing even as it has announced plans to cut down the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

Future Uncertain

The momentous political changes and the global nuclear balance of power since the end of the Cold War have thrown up both challenges and opportuni-

ties for the global nonproliferation regime. The Cold War may have terminated, but the same is not true for regional conflicts. As the twenty-first century dawned, many circumstances increased the relevance of nuclear weapons as a strategic equalizer for second-tier NWSs like China and possibly as a hedge against great-power intervention for nonnuclear countries: the lessons learned in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo military operations; the overarching military dominance of the United States, driven by the ongoing information technology-based revolution in military affairs; the relative cheapness of nuclear deterrents compared with modern conventional weaponry; the relatively easy access to nuclear technology and fissile material; and the new U.S. focus on building national and theater missile defenses. For example, the coalition of international forces led by the United States might not have launched the Persian Gulf War if Iraq had been bristling with nukes. North Korea might not have been rewarded with diplomatic and financial inducements, including billions of dollars in fuel and food aid, had it possessed nuclear capability.

The nuclear dimension in twenty-first-century Asia will not only grow more complex and potentially troublesome but also may become difficult to manage. In asymmetric conflicts, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction will indeed become the "poor man's nukes." Reversal of the nuclear arms reductions mandated by the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), amendment or reinterpretation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to permit the deployment of national and theater missile defenses by the United States, or both actions, would increase Russia's and China's strategic vulnerability. Such actions could ignite another nuclear arms race among the United States, Russia, and China; could force India and perhaps Japan to expand their nuclear arsenals; and could motivate threshold states and nuclear aspirants to pursue nuclear weapons programs. In the worst-case scenario many nations might reverse previous commitments to forgo the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Signing the NPT or CTBT is by no means a guarantee that a country has no nuclear ambitions. As the number of new and potential nuclear states grows around China's borders, Beijing is likely to increase its arsenal. Indeed China's modernization of its nuclear force may become a determining factor in shaping the second nuclear age in the twenty-first century. A nuclear weapons convention based on the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention may offer one solution, but none of the permanent members of the United Nations Security

Council is contemplating the idea of dismantling its nuclear weapons.

The Asia-Pacific area is gradually moving toward multiple nuclear-deterrence games, multiple nuclear balances of power. Conceivably the future will present many heretofore unknown situations: for example (1) a new global nuclear balance of power (China-United States-Russia); (2) new regional nuclear balances (China and India, India and Pakistan, Israel and Iran); (3) the dangers of nuclear gang-up (China and Pakistan versus India, Pakistan and Iran versus India); (4) nuclear ambiguity (the Korean Peninsula); and (5) nuclear anonymity (Japan, Taiwan). Sudden, unexpected nuclear crises could emerge between China and the United States, North Korea and Japan, China and India, and India and Pakistan.

J. Mohan Malik

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NUKUS (2002 pop. 254,000). Nukus became the capital of the Karakalpak Autonomous Republic in Uzbekistan in 1939. Located in southwestern Uzbekistan, Nukus lies at the head of the Amu Dar'ya River delta. The population consists mostly of Turkic-speaking Karakalpaks ("black hat people"), Uzbeks, and Turkmen. Culturally Karakalpaks are more closely related to Kazakhs than to Uzbeks. Historically they have been successively dominated by aggressive Kazakhs, area chieftains, and Russia. Under Soviet rule the Karakalpaks progressed through various stages of nationhood, and the region became the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan in 1936, at which time Nukus became a city.

Today Nukus's autonomy as the capital is shaky. The city is isolated, poor, desolate, unhealthy, windy, and subject to frequent sandstorms (in which envi-

ronmental pollutants become airborne). Its unhealthy condition reflects a regional catastrophe: to irrigate crops, water has long been diverted from the Amu Dar'ya, causing severe shrinkage of the Aral Sea for a distance of some 100 kilometers to the north, as well as harsh environmental pollution. In the late 1980s people left the surrounding countryside and moved to Nukus, which became the fastest-growing city in Uzbekistan.

Nukus is home to Nukus State University, the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, and the Igor Savitsky Art Gallery, containing works by artists whom Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin banished to Nukus in the 1930s. Before the Soviet Union's collapse illegal chemical weapons were developed in the city, and its economy was then much healthier. Today Nukus is a center for such products as cotton, rice, alfalfa, footwear, and furniture.

Gary Mason Church

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NUR JEHAN (1925–2000), South Asian singer. A singer of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, Nur Jehan was a symbol of beauty and sensuousness for five decades. Born in the village of Damsel in Pakistan, she began her singing career at the age of five on a stage in Calcutta (Kolkata) and acted in a Punjabi movie at the age of nine. Her first film, *Umeed* (Hope), was made in 1941 and she migrated to Pakistan six years afterward. She achieved fame with the films *Chaudhri* (Village Chief), in Punjabi, and *Kbandaan* (Family), in Urdu. Her dramatic talent, charming face, and resonant voice made her the heartthrob of South Asia.

Nur Jehan had remarkable stamina and could sing for hours. Her personal life was equally colorful. She was involved with such figures as Hassan Rizvi, Ejaz Durrani, and Yusuf Khan. Her death on 23 December 2000, after a protracted illness, created a void that will be difficult to fill. Future generations will continue to enjoy her films, such as *Bari Maa* (Elder Mother), *Dost* (Friend), *Anomal Gharri* (Priceless Time), *Koel* (Cuckoo), *Lal Haveli* (Red Palace), *Mirza-Sabiban* (Sir), *Gaon Ki Ghorri* (Village Damsel), and *Jugnu* (Glow Warm), and will be captivated by her mellifluous voice.

Patit Paban Misbra

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NUR MISUARI (b. 1940), Philippine Muslim political leader. Nuruladji Misuari is the founding chairman of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and was, from 1996 to 2001, governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). He is a Tausug Muslim from Mindanao-Sulu. While at the University of the Philippines in the 1960s, Misuari became a founding member of the Leftist Kabataan Makabayan and, in 1967, established the Muslim National League and edited its paper, *Philippine Muslim News*. He was subsequently one of a group of young Philippine Muslims who undertook guerrilla training in Malaysia and returned to Mindanao-Sulu to form the MNLF, which from the early 1970s led the Muslim insurgency against the Marcos government. From the mid-1970s, he was based overseas.

Following a split in the MNLF in 1977, Misuari was recognized as leader of the dominant Moro faction by both the Organization of Islamic Conference and the Philippine government, who continued to negotiate with him for a settlement of the armed conflict in the southern Philippines. In 1986, he returned to the Philippines at the invitation of President Aquino but did not accept proposed autonomy arrangements and again left for overseas. In 1996, Misuari signed a Peace Agreement with the Ramos administration and returned to the Philippines, where he became head of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), established under the 1996 agreement, and was elected governor of the ARMM, created under the 1987 constitution.

In 1999, Misuari survived a challenge to his leadership of the ARMM from within the MNLF and his term as governor was extended. But in August 2001, his position was again challenged by a faction identifying itself as the Executive Council of the Fifteen, and in the ARMM elections of November that year, following a disappointing, though predictable, vote against expansion of the ARMM, the ruling national coalition did not back Misuari's candidacy. Misuari boycotted the elections and attacked government troops in northwest Mindanao. He was subsequently arrested in Malaysia.

Ronald J. May

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NURBAKHSHIYA Nurbakhshiya refers to a distinctive Muslim religious group that originated in late medieval Central Asia and Iran and currently survives in the form of small communities in Baltistan, Pakistan, and Ladakh, India. Both these regions are part of the territory of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, contested between Pakistan and India since 1947. The group owes its name to Sayyid Muhammad Nurbakhsh (d. 1464), who proclaimed himself the Mahdi (Muslim messiah) in Khuttalan (present-day Tajikistan) in 1423 and spent his life trying to propagate his mission.

A significant community of Nurbakhshis survived him in Iran, from where the movement was transferred first to the Timurid court of Husayn Bayqara in Herat, Afghanistan, and then to Kashmir, India, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Under the leadership of Shams al-Din 'Iraqi (d. 1526), the Nurbakhshis were a major religious faction vying for political as well as cultural dominance at the time of Mughal expansion into Kashmir in the sixteenth century. They lost their struggle, however, and were heavily persecuted by the Turko-Mongol general Mirza Haydar Dughlat (d. 1551), who forced members of the community to seek refuge in the remote mountainous region of Baltistan. The modern Nurbakhshi community derives from the transplantation of the tradition to Baltistan.

Contemporary Nurbakhshis constitute a minority in both Baltistan and Ladakh, where the majority of the population is Twelver Shi'i Muslim (adherents of a sect that believes in the succession of twelve distinct imams or leaders after the prophet Muhammad's death) in the former and Buddhist in the latter region. The Nurbakhshis were subjected to a campaign of "normalization" through conversion by Twelver Shi'i and Sunni Muslims throughout the twentieth century, and the community is now divided into numerous factions. One subgroup, which calls itself Sufiyya Nurbakhshiya, favors retaining a distinct sectarian identity, while a significant proportion of the remaining population has shifted to a closer identification with Twelver Shi'ism. The latter group calls itself Imamiyya Nurbakhshiya and now includes Pir Shams al-Din Sayyid Muhammad Shah Nurani, the hereditary religious leader of the community, who resides in Kiris, Baltistan. The Sufiyya Nurbakhshiya has pursued an active publishing program in the past few decades, including, most notably, the serial *Nava-yi sufiyya* ("The Sufi Voice," issued from Islamabad) and various books in Urdu by Ghulam Hasan Nurbakhshi.

The Nurbakhshiya's religious perspective attempts to subvert Islamic sectarian differences by proposing an overarching religious system based on the theories

and practices of Sufism. Nurbakhsh's own works were directed toward dissolving sectarian boundaries, though the Iranian Sufi tradition linked to him after the sixteenth century identified itself as Twelver Shi'i due to the effects of the religious policy of the Safavid dynasty (1501–1722). Some Nurbakhshis of Pakistan continue the antisectarian stance today by presenting their version of Islam as an antidote to the violent Sunni-Shi'i confrontation that has plagued the country since the 1980s.

Shahzad Bashir

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NUSA TENGGARA Nusa Tenggara is a chain of medium-sized and small islands in the southeastern part of Indonesia, also known in English as the Lesser Sunda Islands. Bordered by Bali to the west, East Timor to the east, and Australia to the south, the region is divided into two administrative and cultural units: the provinces of West Nusa Tenggara and East Nusa Tenggara. The topographical conditions vary from mostly lush land in the western islands to arid savanna in the eastern ones. These islands are also marked by a chain of active and nonactive volcanoes, which extends from the northern part of Sumatra to the south and east across Java. Among the important volcanoes in this part of Indonesia are Mount Rinjani on the island of Lombok, Mount Tambora on the island of Sumbawa, both in West Nusa Tenggara, and Mount Kelimutu with its fabled three-colored lake on the island of Flores in East Nusa Tenggara.

West Nusa Tenggara Province consists of two main islands, Lombok and Sumbawa, and hundreds of small islands around them. Its population in 2000 was 3.8 million people. The capital of the province is Mataram on Lombok Island. There are four main ethnic groups in this province. The Balinese from the neighboring

island of Bali are Hindu. The largest ethnic group is the Sasak, living mostly on Lombok, while the other two, the Samawa and the Bima, are on Sumbawa Island. These last three ethnic groups make up more than 90 percent of the population of the province and are predominantly Muslims.

The neighboring East Nusa Tenggara Province consists of three main islands, Flores, Timor (the western side), and Sumba, as well as more than five hundred small islands, roughly half of which are yet to be named. One of these islands, Komodo, is the only site in the world where the giant monitor lizard, known as the Komodo dragon, can be found. The province's capital city is Kupang in the western part of Timor Island. East Nusa Tenggara is the driest province in Indonesia, with average rainfall of only 500–2,000 millimeters per year. While Muslims predominate in West Nusa Tenggara and most of the rest of Indonesia, East Nusa Tenggara's 4 million people (2000 census) are predominantly Catholics (56 percent) and Protestants (35 percent). Muslims are a relatively small minority in the province, with 8 percent of the population. The relatively high proportion of Catholics in this province is mostly due to the influence of the Portuguese, who had in the past established a strong presence in this area and in neighboring East Timor.

Irman G. Lanti

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NUSRAT FATEH ALI KHAN (1948–1997), *Qawwali* singer. Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan, the internationally acclaimed *qawwali* (a South Asian devotional musical tradition that is over six hundred years old), singer, was born in Faisalabad, Pakistan, into a prominent lineage of Sufi singers. *Qawwali* is traditionally performed at a *dargah* (Sufi shrine) and incorporates in its structure the classical forms of *raag* ("melody") and *taal* ("rhythm"). Lyrically *qawwali* draws from the compositions of medieval South Asian mystical poets and employs metaphorical language and symbolic imagery to illustrate the pain of separation from God and the ecstasy of reunion. Nusrat's *qawwali* music appealed to diverse cultural and linguistic groups throughout the Indian subcontinent and featured Sufi compositions from a wide array of languages, including Persian, Arabic, Punjabi, Urdu, Hindi, Braj, and Rajasthani. His mesmerizing voice often sent his audience into a musical trance and earned him the esteemed title *Shahen-Shah* ("the king of kings"). Nusrat's worldwide fame eventually increased due to his eclectic collaborations with popular musicians (Peter Gabriel, Eddie Vedder, Bally Sagoo) and his unique contributions to film scores (*Last Temptation of Christ*, *Dead Man Walking*, *Bandit Queen*). He died on 16 August 1997 in London, England, from kidney failure complications.

Varun Soni

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OCHIRBAT, PUNSALMAAGIYN (b. 1942), President of Mongolia. Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat was the first democratically elected president of Mongolia. Born in Zavhan Province, Mongolia, he was educated first in Ulaanbaatar and later earned advanced degrees in mining engineering in the Soviet Union. In 1966, Ochirbat began his career as an adviser in Mongolia's Ministry of Industry. Ten years later, he was appointed minister of fuel, power industry, and geology.

In 1976, Ochirbat also served as a deputy in the People's Great Assembly, Mongolia's parliament. Upon the resignation of former Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) leader Jambyn Batmonkh (b. 1926), Ochirbat was designated head of state in March 1990.

After the collapse of communism, the 1992 constitution changed the name of the country from the Mongolian People's Republic to Mongolia and called for new presidential elections to take place in 1993. Ochirbat ran for election against the MPRP candidate, Lodongiyn Tudev, under the banner of two democratic parties, the Mongolian National Democratic Party and the Mongolian Social Democratic Party. Ochirbat won this first democratic election in Mongolia with 57.8 percent of the vote, thus becoming the country's first president. However, he failed to win the election in 1997, losing to Natsagiin Bagabandi.

Timothy May

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OCTOBER 6 CRISIS–THAILAND The catalyst for the dramatic October 1976 political confrontation was the return to Thailand in mid-September of former Field Marshall Thanom Kitikachorn as a Buddhist monk, ostensibly to earn merit for his ailing ninety-one-year-old father. Thanom had been ousted in an October 1973 student uprising. Thanom's return led to student-led demonstrations calling for his expulsion from Thailand. Two political activists distributing anti-Thanom leaflets were found hung, which precipitated the political drama that followed. Students were convinced that police were involved in the hangings. As part of their demonstration, students organized a mock hanging of those lynched. Photos of the mock hanging were published on the front pages of several major newspapers. One of the student actors showed a remarkable resemblance to the crown prince of Thailand. The political right interpreted this as the student left insulting the revered institution of the monarchy. Whether the photos might have been intentionally doctored as a political "dirty trick" remains an unresolved issue.

In response to the alleged mock hanging of the crown prince, police and right-wing activists surrounded Thammasat University, where approximately two thousand demonstrators had spent the night. At 7:30 A.M. on 6 October, hundreds of police, including special riot squads and border patrol units, followed by right-wing groups such as the Red Guard, stormed the campus in response to an alleged firing of heavy weapons from within the campus. By noon, nearly all

the students had been flushed from the buildings. Approximately 1,700 students were arrested for *lèse majesté*. It is estimated that approximately thirty students were killed and one hundred injured in the assault.

After the assault on Thammasat, later in the day, the military seized control of the government and called itself the Administrative Reform Council. Thus, Thailand's three-year experiment with democracy came to a crashing halt, and the 6 October coup ushered in Thailand's most repressive regime of the modern era.

To understand the trauma and tragedy of 6 October, it is critically important to understand the local regional context. Only the year before, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia all had become Communist, with Pol Pot leading the latter nation into the horror of the killing fields. The monarchy was abolished in both Laos and Cambodia. Thus, the Thai right was paranoid about the growing influence of the left in Thailand. In a real irony of history, this dramatic shift to the right in Thai politics occurred on the very same day that the Gang of Four was arrested in China.


Gerald W. Fry

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OE KENZABURO (b. 1935), Japanese novelist, nonfiction essayist, and winner of the 1994 Nobel Prize for literature. Oe Kenzaburo is known throughout the world by translations of his work as a weaver of historical, mythical, and sexually grotesque novels and in Japan for his notoriously impenetrable wordplay and solipsistic tales. Oe was born on the southwestern island of Shikoku and took the position of posing moral and stylistic challenges to the status quo of the metropolis, a position that became more and more tenuous as his stature in the literary world continued to rise.

Among the last generation of children to be educated under the wartime imperial regime, in the postwar period Oe studied French existentialist literature at Tokyo University. His morbid stories of students



Oe Kenzaburo in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in June 2000 to receive an honorary doctorate from Harvard University. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

working grotesque jobs dealing with human and canine corpses in order to earn enough money to study won him early recognition for bringing European-style angst to the circumstances of postwar Japan.

In 1958, he was awarded the Akutagawa Literary Prize for his novella *Shiiku* (The Catch), the tale of a young boy's realization that both godlike figures in his life, the black American paratrooper stranded in his village and the emperor, are mortals. After the experiences of both the death threats he received in response to his "Sebunchin" (*Seventeen*, 1960), a story based on two actual assassinations by seventeen-year-old students, and the birth of his son, who was diagnosed with a brain hernia, as fictionalized in *Kojintekina taiken* (A Personal Matter, 1964), Oe's work assumed a more humanistic tone. His reflections on the survivors of the atomic bomb, *Hiroshima nooto* (Hiroshima Notes, 1965), and his epic novel of an antihero encountering his mythical and historical family roots, *Man'en gannen no futtoboru* (Football in the First Years of Man'en, 1967, translated as *The Silent Cry*), incorporated homages to William Butler Yeats, William Blake, and Dante Alighieri.

Arguing that he was a pacifist and a democrat, Oe refused the Emperor's Order of Culture within months of receiving the Nobel Prize. His more recent trilogy, *Moegaru midori no ki* (Burning Green Tree), is an amalgam of *Until the 'Savior' Gets Socked* (1993), *Vacillating* (1994), and *On the Day of Grandeur* (1995) that combines themes of a vanishing mythic order on the periphery of modernized Japan with an existential interrogation of ethics through the depiction of everyday life.

J. Abel

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OGASAWARA The Ogasawara (or Bonin) Islands lie between the Japanese mainland and the Marianas in the North Pacific. The first known inhabitants were a tiny group of American, European, and Pacific Islander settlers who arrived on the main island of Chichijima in 1830. Others soon followed, creating an ethnically and linguistically diverse community in which English (probably a pidgin variety) became the language of communication. In the 1870s, Japan proclaimed ownership of the islands, naturalizing the inhabitants and promoting Japanese settlement. The original settlers became increasingly incorporated into Japanese society but sustained a separate identity through their maintenance of English and Christianity.

Toward the end of World War II, the entire civilian population was evacuated to mainland Japan. Following the war, the U.S. Navy established a base on the islands, allowing only those islanders of non-Japanese heritage (commonly called "Westerners") to return. For a quarter century, these Bonin Islanders worked and studied in an English-speaking environment. During this period, the navy severely restricted movement to and from the islands and secretly stored nuclear missiles there. In 1968, the United States abruptly returned the islands to Japan. Many displaced prewar families returned to their birthplace, along with new migrants from the Japanese mainland. At the end of the twentieth century, the islands have been largely culturally and linguistically incorporated into Japan, although many descendants of the original settlers remain.

Daniel Long

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OH SADAHARU (b. 1940), Japanese baseball player. Oh hit 868 home runs during a 22-year career with the Yomiuri Giants from 1959 to 1980. Born in Tokyo, Oh joined the Giants in 1959 out of Waseda Jitsugyo High School. Originally a pitcher, he was switched to first base because of his hitting prowess and was noted for his famous "flamingo" hitting style. He won fifteen home run crowns, two triple crowns, and was a nine-time MVP and gold-glove winner as well as an eighteen-time all-star. He led the Giants to nine straight Japan Series championships in the 1960s and 1970s, and passed Henry (Hank) Aaron as world record holder for home runs on 3 September 1977. By the time he retired in 1980, he had passed Aaron's mark by a remarkable 113 home runs. Nevertheless, as the son of a Chinese father and Japanese mother, Oh suffered discrimination throughout his life and career because of his mixed ancestry. Since his retirement, Oh has stayed in the game as a manager, first with the Giants and later with the Fukuoka Daiei Hawks. He was elected into the Japanese baseball hall of fame in 1994, his first year of eligibility.

Todd S. Munson

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OIL AND MINERAL INDUSTRIES—CENTRAL ASIA The five Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) are considered emerging oil- and mineral-exporting markets by much of the international business and policy communities. Oil in Kazakhstan, gas in Turkmenistan, and mineral wealth in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and even Tajikistan have prompted significant investment in the region in the hope of realizing great profits. However, transportation and geopolitical obstacles stand in the way of the successful exploitation of these resources.

Kazakhstan

As the leading oil-producing state in Central Asia, Kazakhstan has been a much-courted country for oil field rights and pipeline routes. Proven oil reserves are between 10.0 and 17.6 billion barrels, with "potential" reserves more than three to four times as much. Gas reserves are a modest 1.8 trillion cubic meters. These reserves are located largely in the western portion of the country and offshore in the Kazakh sector of the Caspian Sea. Specifically the Tengiz (onshore) and Kashagan (offshore) oil fields are of great importance to Kazakhstan, as is the Karachaganak field for both oil and gas. Currently there are three refineries in the country—Pavlodar, Atyrau, and Shymkent—and there is a pressing need to export unrefined oil to other countries to gain foreign currency.

Mineral deposits, on the other hand, are located in the central and eastern parts of the country and include major deposits of coal, iron ore, manganese, chrome ore, nickel, cobalt, copper, molybdenum, lead, zinc, bauxite, gold, and uranium. The coal deposits in the northern regions are critical for local energy needs and for southern Russia.

Turkmenistan

In contrast to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan has a wealth of gas deposits and not much oil. At present proven reserves are 2.7 to 4.3 trillion cubic meters of gas and only 1.7 billion barrels of oil both onshore and offshore. The gas fields are located in a stretch of territory running due west of Ashgabat to the region around the port city of Turkmenbashi. Off the Turkmenistan coast of the Caspian Sea lie considerable deposits, the ownership of which is currently disputed by Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. Turkmenbashi is developing into a major transit hub for natural gas, and it is hoped that the country will export gas via multiple routes through Russia, Iran, and across the Caspian. In the oil sector there are refineries in Chardzhou and Turkmenbashi, which currently process much of the oil extracted. Mineral deposits are minimal, with some coal located in the western portion of the country.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan's oil and gas deposits are enough to make the country self-sufficient and allow it to export modest amounts to regional markets. There are 0.6 billion barrels of oil and between 2.1 and 2.5 trillion cubic meters of gas of proven reserves. Uzbekistan's three oil refineries are located in the cities of Fergana and Bukhara and the area of Alty-Arik. Well-established pipelines for natural gas cover much of the Central Asian region.

Uzbekistan is a country with significant mineral wealth. Among the most important mineral deposits found in the country are coal, gold, uranium, silver, copper, lead, zinc, tungsten, and molybdenum, located in the central (Navoi) and eastern (Fergana) regions of the country. While most of the mining sector is state run, some foreign companies are involved in joint ventures, including Newmont Mining, which is currently operating in Navoi.

Tajikistan

Tajikistan has minimal oil and gas deposits, with less than 10 million barrels of oil and 5.6 billion cubic meters of gas. While there are claims of more significant finds, these have not as yet been verified. Tajikistan must rely on Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan for oil and gas, as well as for refining the modest amount of oil and gas extracted in the country.

Mineral deposits are more significant, with large areas of the eastern part of the country—the Pamir range—still unexplored. Tajikistan is endowed with significant strategic minerals, such as uranium, mercury, brown coal, lead, zinc, antimony, and tungsten. During the Soviet period these resources were critical to Tajikistan's nuclear program. The Tajik government sees the economic benefit of using these resources as export commodities in the future.

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan has less than 10 million barrels of oil and less than 5.6 billion cubic meters of gas of proven reserves, much like Tajikistan. While Kyrgyzstan must rely on oil and gas imports from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, it does have a small oil refinery in Jalal-Abad, which addresses local needs in that district. However, unlike Tajikistan, there is no claim to greater fossil-fuel wealth, and the country is trying to use hydropower in lieu of importing oil and gas from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

Mineral deposits are almost the country's only resource. There are significant deposits of gold and rare-earth metals, coal, nepheline, mercury, bismuth, lead, and zinc. Gold is abundant in the high mountain ranges that make up nearly 45 percent of the country's terrain. The Canadian mining company Camoco is involved in a major joint-venture operation in the Kumtor mining region, which has gold and strategic minerals.

Obstacles Facing the Oil and Mineral Industries

The obstacles to realizing this Central Asian oil and mineral wealth are daunting. The first is the interna-

tional market and oil prices. As long as oil prices remain relatively high, companies find it profitable to exploit the reserves in the region. Given that it costs an additional \$2 to \$4 per barrel to transport oil from Central Asia above what it costs to transport oil from almost any other place in the world, companies may balk at relying on the region for primary supplies. Mineral prices have been unusually low in the 1990s and the early 2000s, especially in the gold and silver markets, which translates into weak profits for companies operating in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

A second obstacle is the transportation routing. Oil pipelines through Russia, China, Iran, the South Caucasus, and into Turkey and even Afghanistan have been proposed but not built. The politicking alone takes considerable time and has, in the case of the Afghan gas pipeline route, ultimately thwarted efforts to construct anything. At present the major pipeline options include the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which runs through southern Russia and onward to the port of Novorossiysk, where it is shipped through the Black Sea and the Bosphorus. A rival route is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which when completed will carry oil and gas across the southern Caucasus and eastern Turkey to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, Turkey. This project is supported by the U.S. government, among others. Lesser projects include a pipeline into Iran that would join the existing Iranian network that runs to the Persian Gulf and a pipeline from western Kazakhstan to western China (Xinjiang Province) and onward to the eastern portion of China and possibly Japan. Functioning at present are the CPC and a modest pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan, to Supsa, Georgia, which transports Kazakh oil that is barged across the Caspian Sea to Baku.

A third obstacle to the oil and mineral industries is the lack of reliable rule of law in the region. While international companies may be willing to operate in countries in which their assets are not always protected by local law, the situation in the Central Asian states is ultimately detrimental to foreign investment. Of major concern for foreign investors is the high level of corruption. Often finders' fees must be paid to government officials to gain the rights to certain properties—and even these deals can be renegotiated at later dates. Given that generational leadership changes are anticipated in each Central Asian country over the next decade or two, there is a serious question about the abilities of succeeding governments to carry on positive relations with foreign oil and mineral companies. Corruption at lower levels is also endemic, especially when dealing with contractors and suppliers for build-

ing materials and support structures for oil and gas fields and mines.

Central Asia is endowed with significant oil and mineral wealth, but the concomitant problems most likely mean that the profit potential will remain unrealized or at best have a modest impact on the economies.

Roger D. Kangas

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OIL INDUSTRY—WEST ASIA The countries of the Persian Gulf region sit atop 65 percent of the world's total oil reserves, and Western Asia's critical importance to the world oil market is obvious. Iraq has 11 percent of world oil reserves, and Iran has 9 percent. In 2000, all Persian Gulf producers accounted for nearly 28 percent of the world's total oil production, and most observers expect this share to rise in the future. Turkey does not have major oil reserves or production but serves as an important transit route for Iraqi oil exports and potentially for exports from Azerbaijan and Central Asia. Besides being important to the world oil market, the oil industries of most Persian Gulf countries make up a disproportionate share of their economies and are the main sources of hard-currency inflows and government revenues.

Iran

The British initially developed Iran's oil industry in the early 1900s. The first drilling concession was awarded to a British subject, William Knox D'Arcy, in 1901, and the first major discovery of oil in commercial quantities occurred in May 1908. From this discovery was born the Anglo-Persian (later Anglo-Iranian) Oil Company, which built the initial pipeline and refining

infrastructure needed to make use of the oil and acquired a tanker fleet for overseas distribution.

Foreign control of Iran's oil industry generated much resentment, and for several decades Iranian leaders struggled to gain greater control and more equitable distribution of revenues. In November 1932, Shah Reza Pahlavi announced his intention to terminate the Anglo-Persian oil concession. After five months of negotiations, a new agreement was signed in April 1933, providing a guaranteed minimum royalty level independent of world oil prices and a partial "Persianization" of the company's workforce.

Tensions over royalties mounted again in the years following the Second World War, and in 1951 the newly appointed prime minister, Mohammed Mosaddeq, announced that Anglo-Iranian Oil would be nationalized. Britain imposed an embargo on Iranian oil, and Mosaddeq was deposed in August 1953, in a coup backed by Britain and the United States. Afterward a consortium dominated by Anglo-Iranian, but also including Royal Dutch Shell and a number of U.S. companies, was formed to manage oil production in Iran. Iran's National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) nominally owned the oil reserves, but real control rested with the foreign firms. Power gradually shifted toward NIOC, however, and by 1973 Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi had instituted a system in which NIOC was recognized as the operator of Iran's oil industry, with the foreign firms functioning as service contractors. Iran was a founding member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and while it did not side with Arab members during their oil embargo of 1973–1974, it did make production cuts in the mid-1970s to help the cartel sustain high prices.

In the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979, which overthrew the shah and brought to power a government dominated by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, most foreign firms withdrew from Iran, and the country's oil exports experienced a dramatic decline. This second "oil shock" contributed to a rapid rise in world oil prices, which in turn had negative effects on the world's developed economies. Iran's oil production gradually recovered during the 1980s, when some foreign firms returned and local expertise became more available, but the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988 led to attacks on tankers and on Iran's main oil-export terminal at Khark Island.

By 2000, Iran's oil production had reached 3.7 million barrels per day (bbl/d), still far below the 6 million bbl/d peak it had reached in 1974 but well above the 1.4 million bbl/d low point it reached in 1981, after the revolution. Iran is expected to continue ex-

panding its production and is again courting investment by foreign oil companies. The country's constitution forbids foreign ownership of oil reserves, so that these investments take the form of "buyback" contacts, which guarantee the foreign partner a set rate of financial returns.

Iraq

The first discovery of commercial quantities of oil in Iraq took place in October 1927, but the country had long been thought to hold major oil reserves due to oil seepages at ground level and other geological clues. The Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), which was British led but included American and French firms among its owners, carried out the early development of the oil industry in Iraq.

As with other Persian Gulf oil producers, foreign control of the industry eventually led to local resentment and calls for nationalization. In the wake of a rising tide of Arab nationalism in the late 1950s, the Iraqi monarchy and the government of the prime minister Nuri as-Said were overthrown by a military coup in July 1958. The new government of Abdul Karim Kassem modified the terms of the IPC concession, eliminating over 99 percent of the land area it covered and allowing IPC to retain only the immediate locations of currently operating production facilities. The IPC consortium continued to produce oil, but it drastically curtailed investment in production capacity. As a result, Iraq's oil production increased only slightly during the 1960s, a period when world demand was surging and Iran and Saudi Arabia saw rapid increases in production. Iraq completely nationalized IPC in 1972, during a period when major oil producers worldwide were ending foreign control of their oil industries.

Since then, developments in Iraq's oil industry have been dominated by politics, and Iraq has failed to attain its full potential as an oil producer. After strong production increases in the late 1970s, Iraqi crude oil production peaked at slightly less than 3.5 million bbl/d in 1979. Saddam Hussein's decision to launch a war against Iran in September 1980, however, resulted in chaos in the Iraqi oil industry, and production fell to 1 million bbl/d in 1981. Combined with developments in Iran, this drop in production led to the highest oil prices ever, adjusted for inflation. From 1984 onward, production began to recover and reached 2.9 million bbl/d by 1989.

After Iraq's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, however, the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on Iraq, which prohibited oil exports. Production plummeted to only 305,000 bbl/d in 1991. In

May 1996, under pressure from humanitarian organizations, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution allowing Iraq to begin limited oil sales. The Oil for Food program has since been expanded, and restrictions on export volumes have been removed, but revenues are still routed through an escrow account controlled by the United Nations. In 2000, Iraq's oil production had rebounded to nearly 2.6 million bbl/d. In addition to the Oil for Food program sales, Iraq is known to smuggle out substantial quantities of crude oil and petroleum products in violation of sanctions.

Turkey

Turkey does not have substantial oil reserves, but it is important as a transit route between oil producers in the Middle East and Central Asia and consumers in Europe. Turkish crude oil production in 2000 was slightly under 59,000 bbl/d. Much of Iraq's crude oil exports crosses Turkey via a pipeline from northern Iraq to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. A proposed pipeline would also link oil fields near Baku in Azerbaijan with the Ceyhan export terminal and might carry crude oil from Kazakhstan to the Mediterranean as well. In addition to pipelines, some oil is exported from the Black Sea region by tanker via the Bosphorus Straits.

Greg Priddy

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OITA (2002 est. pop. 1.2 million). Oita Prefecture is situated in the northeast of Japan's island of Kyushu, where it occupies an area of 6,338 square kilometers. Oita's primary geographical features are the Kyushu Mountains, a volcanic chain, and coastal plains. Oita is bordered by the Inland Sea and by Miyazaki, Kumamoto, and Fukuoka prefectures. Once known as Toyo Province and later divided into Buzen and

Bungo, it assumed its present name in 1871 and its present borders in 1876.

The prefecture's capital is Oita city, situated on Beppu Bay. A provincial government seat in ancient times, Oita in the early 2000s is an important transport center and industrial zone with plants for processing oil, metals, and chemicals, as well as wood pulp and foodstuffs. The prefecture's other important cities are Beppu, Nakatsu, Hita, and Saiki.

Archeological artifacts of the Jomon (10,000 BCE–300 BCE) and Yayoi (300 BCE–300 CE) cultures indicate early cultivation of the region. The primary economic activity remains agriculture, mainly rice, vegetables, mandarin oranges, and loquats, along with the breeding of cattle. Fishery and forestry flourish as well. Visitors are drawn to hot spring resorts and to the ancient rock-carved Buddhist sculptures in the Kunisaki and Usuki areas. Mountainous and coastal scenic destinations range from Aso Kuju National Park to the Inland Sea National Park.

E. L. S. Weber

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OKAYAMA (2002 est. pop. 2 million). Okayama Prefecture is situated in the western region of Japan's island of Honshu, where it occupies an area of 7,092 square kilometers. Okayama's primary geographical features are a mountainous north, the central highland Kibi Kogen, and the coastal plains, along with reclaimed land in Kojima Bay. The main rivers are the Yoshigawa, Asahigawa, and Takahashigawa. Okayama is bordered by the Inland Sea and by Tottori, Hyogo, and Hiroshima prefectures. Once divided into Bizen, Bitchu, and Mimasaka provinces, Okayama Prefecture assumed its present name in 1871 and its present borders in 1876.

The prefecture's capital is Okayama city, which evolved from a settlement around Okayama Castle, completed in 1573. It is home to Okayama University, noted for an active foreign exchange program that enrolls students from twenty-five countries. Among the city's historic sites are the 1686 garden Korakuen and the Orient Bijutsukan, one of the nation's first museums to focus on Asian and Middle Eastern art. The city's industrial base includes chemicals, rubber, textiles, and agricultural machinery fabrication. The prefecture's other important cities are Kurashiki, Tsuyama, and Tamano.

Okayama's history dates back to the Yayoi culture (300 BCE–300 CE), as indicated by archaeological excavations. The region was ruled by a series of Ikeda family warlords until the end of the Edo period (1600/1603–1868).

In the early 2000s, the prefecture continues to produce rice, tobacco, *igusa* fiber for tatami mats, and fruit, including hothouse grapes and peaches. Recent decades have seen the rise of the steel and petrochemical industries. A leading attraction is Kurashiki with its distinctive architecture, traditional merchant quarter, and folk art museums.

E. L. S. Weber

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OKINAWA (2001 est. pop. 1.15 million). Okinawa is the largest island of Japan's Ryukyu Islands, which make up the southern half of the Nansei Islands, lying between Kyushu, Japan, and Taiwan. Approximately 50 inhabited islands and 110 uninhabited ones make up the Ryukyu Islands, which are further divided into three groups: the Okinawa Islands, the Miyako Islands to the south, and the Yaeyama Islands in the



OKINAWA AND JAPAN

This description of Okinawa from the late nineteenth century suggests that it was seen as a cultural backwater to Japan.

The streets in the towns present a most desolate appearance. On each side of these is a blank stone wall of about ten or twelve feet high, with openings in them here and there sufficiently wide to admit of access to the houses which are behind. Every house is surrounded by a wall, and from the street they convey the impression of being prisons rather than ordinary dwellings.

Source: Edward S. Morse ([1896] 1961) *Japanese Homes and Their Surroundings*, New York: Dover Publications, 341.



GUSUKU SITES OF THE RYUKYU KINGDOM-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

The Ryukyu Islands just off of Okinawa, Japan, were designated a World Heritage Site by UNESCO in 2000. The ruined castles and cities of the Ryukyu kingdom graphically illustrate the extensive contacts that the society had with nearby cultures and its unusual religion.

far south. The main island of Okinawa is 1,286 square kilometers in area and 105 kilometers in length, running north to south, and is subtropical in climate. Okinawa's largest city, Naha, is the capital of Okinawa Prefecture, which has a population of 1.31 million (1.15 million of whom live on the main island).

Historically, the Ryukyu Islands were the domain of the Ryukyu kingdom, created in 1429 when the Sho dynasty was formed after unifying the islands. The second Sho dynasty was founded in 1470 and lasted for four centuries, although it continued the custom (begun in 1372) of sending tributary missions to China to legitimize its rule and to gain trade benefits. In 1609, the Satsuma clan of Kyushu invaded the Ryukyu Islands and took the king hostage. He eventually agreed to sign a treaty that preserved the Ryukyu kingdom's nominal independence but in fact placed the islands under Satsuma's control. This relationship was concealed from China in order for Satsuma to continue to benefit from the kingdom's trade relations with China. This period of "dual subordination" ended officially in 1879, when the islands became an administrative part of modern Japan as Okinawa Prefecture. Toward the end of World War II, on 1 April 1945, the main island of Okinawa was invaded by U.S. forces preparing to attack mainland Japan. Okinawa continued under U.S. military control until 1972, when administrative rights over the Ryukyu Islands were returned to Japan. Representative of the strategic importance of the islands, the agreement allowed for U.S. forces to continue to be stationed on bases in Okinawa after reversion.

The bases have been both a source of friction, due to the disruption in the daily lives of the local residents, and a source of income for the prefecture due to the base-related income, rental fees, and compensation paid by the national government. Currently, U.S. facilities occupy close to 19 percent of the main

island, although the U.S. and Japanese governments have been attempting to consolidate and reduce the presence.

The subtropical climate of Okinawa allows it to grow pineapples, sugarcane, sweet potatoes, orchids, and other plants for sale in mainland Japan. Likewise, its rich culture, rhythmic music and dance, and beautiful seas and shorelines make it attractive to tourists, although high domestic airfares have made other destinations, including those abroad, comparatively cheaper.

Robert D. Eldridge

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OLD ORDER The designation "Old Order" refers to the rule of Indonesia's first president, Sukarno (1901-1970), consisting of two phases: (1) parliamentary democracy (1950-1959) and (2) "Guided Democracy" (1959-1965). Sukarno's priorities were to maintain national unity and to boost the development of a national identity in the face of continuous Islamist and secular separatist rebellion. In 1957, Sukarno began to propose an alternative form of government, stating that parliamentary democracy was not conducive to achieving national unity. The final implementation of what Sukarno termed Guided Democracy, blending the three ideologies dominant in Indonesia (nationalism, Islam, and communism), in 1959 invested him with strong executive powers.

After the success of the Bandung Conference in 1955, Sukarno increasingly aspired to Third World leadership. In 1962, he succeeded in wrenching Irian Barat from the Dutch. In January 1965 he initiated Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations after his opposition to the international recognition of Malaysia had failed. His autocratic manner, his failure to solve the nation's economic problems, and his continuous support for the Indonesian Communist Party in spite of growing criticism on the part of the armed forces and Muslim factions led to his final downfall shortly after the abortive coup d'état of 30 September 1965.

Martin Ramstedt

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OLYMPICS No Asian athletes competed in Athens when the Olympic Games were revived in 1896, but an Indian athlete and an Iranian athlete may have competed at the second modern Olympic Games in Paris in 1900. In 1908, Turkey's Selim Sirry Bey became the first Asian member of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Japan's Kano Jigoro, the inventor of judo, followed in 1909. Three years later, Japan's National Olympic Committee (NOC), headed by Kano, was the first Asian NOC to be recognized by the IOC. Two Japanese runners competed in the 1912 games (in Stockholm), the first Asian athletes whose Olympic participation can be documented.

India's D. J. Tata joined the IOC in 1920, but, with the exception of numerous victories in field hockey, few South Asian athletes have been Olympic victors. Although C. T. Wang became an IOC member in 1922, no Chinese athlete competed until 1932. That year, Liu Changchun was joined in Los Angeles by an 8-man Philippine team, a 16-man Indian team, and a Japanese team that numbered 101 men and 16 women. In the many early Olympics in which Turkish and Iranian athletes competed, their best performances were usually in weightlifting and wrestling, two sports practiced in traditional Turkish and Iranian "houses of strength."

At Los Angeles in 1932, Japanese swimmers stunned the athletic world by winning four gold, two silver, and five bronze medals. Japan's track-and-field athletes, who had also begun to win medals at the 1932 games, competed strongly in the 1936 games in Berlin, where Korea's Sohn Kee-Chung, competing as a member of the Japanese team, won the marathon.

At the 1936 games, the IOC voted to hold the next Olympics in Tokyo, but these games were doomed by Japan's 1937 invasion of China. Japan's military government concluded that scarce resources were better spent on weaponry than on sports facilities. When the games were revived in 1948, Japan, having lost the Pacific part of World War II, was not among the thirteen Asian nations that sent three hundred men and one woman to London.

Asians on USSR Team

By 1952, a number of Asian men and women competed as members of the USSR's first Olympic team, but the world's most populous nation was represented by the Republic of China (ROC), established on Taiwan, rather than by the People's Republic of China (PRC), which had controlled the mainland since the Chinese civil war ended in 1949. Although the IOC had invited a team from the PRC to participate in Helsinki, the team arrived after the games had begun. The PRC refused to compete in Melbourne in 1956 after the IOC rejected the PRC's demand that the ROC's athletes be barred from the games. The PRC boycotted the Olympics from 1960 (Rome) through 1980 (Moscow).

In the course of its protracted conflict with the IOC, the PRC had an ally in Indonesia, which had joined the Olympics in 1952 (after achieving independence from the Netherlands). In 1963, Indonesia's dictator, Sukarno, refused to invite the ROC to the IOC-patronized Asian Games in Jakarta. When the IOC responded by suspending the Indonesian NOC, Sukarno, with strong support from the PRC and North Korea, launched a rival to the Olympic Games, the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO), which attracted forty-eight mostly Asian and African teams to Jakarta. GANEFO sank into oblivion after the IOC decided, in 1964, to forgive a more or less repentant Indonesian NOC. The IOC, however, banned individual athletes from the 1964 Olympics if they had competed in GANEFO. Angered by this ban, North Korea boycotted the 1964 games in Tokyo.

The IOC was more tolerant of Israel's exclusion from the Asian Games and from the IOC-patronized Mediterranean Games (which began in 1951). The IOC reclassified Israel as a European nation. Since 1996, the IOC has allowed Palestine to compete as an Asian nation, but Israel continues to be classified as European.

The 1964 games were the first to be held in Asia. As a favor to the Japanese hosts, the IOC voted to include judo among its "sports obligatoires." Ironically, in the open class, Japan's Kaminago Akio was upset by Anton Geesink of the Netherlands. There was compensation. The Japanese women's volleyball team, "the Witches of the East," overcame an 8-14 last-set deficit and upset the favored USSR team. These games, beautifully documented in filmmaker Ichikawa Kon's *Olympics*, were the zenith in Japan's Olympic trajectory. With sixteen gold, five silver, and eight bronze medals, the hosts were third in the unofficial standings.

Japanese sports administrators had another moment of glory in 1972 when the Winter Olympics were

held in Hokkaido. Eight years later, Japan's NOC was coerced by its own government to comply with demands issued from Washington. In order to protest the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan, the United States insisted that Japan boycott the 1980 Olympics, which were held in Moscow. The Japanese were joined in this boycott by Iran, Pakistan, and a number of other Islamic nations motivated more by religious solidarity than by Cold War politics. North Korea participated in the USSR-led tit-for-tat boycott of the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles.

North Korean Boycott

North Korea also boycotted the 1988 Olympics in Seoul, the second summer games to be held in Asia. The motive for this boycott was the IOC's refusal to allow North Korea to host more than four sports at the 1988 games. North Korea rejected the IOC's offer of archery and table tennis, along with some of the cycling and soccer competitions. At Seoul, the host team shocked the Japanese by winning six of judo's eight weight classes.

In the course of the next twelve years, at Barcelona (1992), Atlanta (1996), and Sydney (2000), the PRC finally surpassed Japan as Asia's dominant Olympic power. At Barcelona, Chinese athletes earned sixteen gold medals, more than the combined total of all the other Asian teams. At Atlanta, the number of Asian NOCs rose as a result of the IOC's acceptance of teams from Kazakhstan and other nations that had been part of the USSR. Despite the increased number of Asian opponents, the Chinese won twenty-eight gold medals, whereas the combined total won by other Asian athletes was a meager twelve. Another sign of the PRC's dominance was the decision of the IOC, in 2001, to accept Beijing's bid to host the 2008 Olympics.

Speed skaters from the PRC won that nation's first Winter Olympics medals in 1992, but, at the close of the twentieth century, Japan remained the only Asian nation with a significant presence at the winter games. Japanese speed skaters, figure skaters, and skiers did well at Albertville (1992) and Lillehammer (1994). On their home snow and ice at Nagano (1998), Japanese winter athletes were even more successful. Among the most memorable images of the Nagano games was that of ski jumper Harada Masahiko leaning forward and soaring 137 meters to secure the gold medal that his mistimed jump had cost him four years earlier at Lillehammer.

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OMAR, MULLAH MUHAMMAD (b. 1959), Taliban leader and ruler of Afghanistan. Mullah Muhammad Omar, member of the Pashtun ethnic group, is the leader of the Taliban, formerly the ruling group in Afghanistan. His experiences are both military and religious. Before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, he was head of a *madrassa* (Islamic religious school). During the jihad (holy war) against Soviet power, he was a mujahideen (guerrilla fighter) and commander in Kandahar Province, the Taliban stronghold in the southern part of the country. Following the Soviet defeat, Omar eventually returned to his religious role and currently holds the supreme religious title of Amir Al-Mu'minin (Leader of the Faithful). Until 2001, he was also the ultimate political authority in Afghanistan.

Under Omar's leadership since the mid-1990s, Afghanistan suffered from Taliban oppression. Focusing on internal affairs, Omar led the Taliban to reject unstable civil law in favor of an idiosyncratic interpretation of Islamic *shari'a* law. Taliban rule was perceived by the international community, and by many Afghans, as harsh, severe, and indifferent to human rights, particularly in the case of women. Through the Taliban Office of the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, women were denied the right to freedom of expression, movement, education, employment, health care, and religious expression. The most visible sign of their oppression was the mandatory enforcement of the *chaadaree* or *burqa*, a full-body covering.

Omar's alignment with the renegade Osama bin Laden and his terrorist group made him an adversary of the coalition of Western forces supporting the Afghan groups that defeated the Taliban in 2001.

M. Catherine Daly

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ONN BIN JAAFAR' (IC BIN) (1895–1962), Malaysian politician. As a young man, Jaafar supported a single Malay nation, composed of the territories of

present-day Malaysia and Indonesia, though he later distanced himself from that position. Jaafar joined the British colonial civil service and rose to the post of chief minister, the highest office in the local government of a constituent state of Malaysia.

Following World War II, a unified Malay opposition led by Jaafar confronted the British, who expected to reassert their colonial authority. In March 1946, Jaafar convened the All Malaya Congress in Kuala Lumpur. Two hundred delegates, representing forty-one Malay organizations, attended. The congress supported the formation of a single Malay political association, and Jaafar founded the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) in May 1946, becoming its president. Jaafar, however, split with UMNO's leadership over the issue of race. Jaafar envisioned UMNO being a multiethnic party that included representatives from the country's Indian and Chinese communities, who made up more than one-third of the population. In 1950, the UMNO membership rejected Jaafar's proposal, opting for the continuation of communal parties based along racial/ethnic lines. In 1951, Jaafar left UMNO and founded the multiethnic Independence of Malaya Party (IMP). The IMP never won a large base of popular support or was able to challenge the UMNO-led coalition's monopoly on power.

Jaafar was succeeded by Tunku Abdul Rahman (1903–1990), who negotiated independence and the establishment of the Federation of Malaya on 31 August 1957, becoming the nation's first prime minister. Jaafar was the father of Tun Hussein bin Dato Onn (1922–1990), who served as Malaysia's third prime minister from 1976 to 1981.

Zachary Abuza

OOTACAMUND (2001 est. pop. 94,000). Ud-hagamandalam (Ootacamund, Ooty) is a town and district headquarters in the Nilgiri Hills of Tamil Nadu State, India. It was founded by John Sullivan (1788–1855) in 1821. The average elevation is about 2,200 meters, but the town is surrounded by hills reaching as high as 2,636 meters.

Ootacamund was the first Indian "hill station," a health haven for European residents. It was for many years the summer headquarters of the Madras government, and, after Independence in 1947, it developed a strong tourist economy, catering especially to middle-class Indians. It is noted for the 155-year-old Botanical Gardens, Government House, and the artificial Ooty Lake, which John Sullivan created by damming a small valley. Aside from tourism, the main



THE VICEROY OF INDIA ON OOTACAMUND IN 1877

"For the first time I have seen Ootacamund. *Having* seen it, I affirm it to be a paradise, and declare without hesitation that in every particular it far surpasses all that its most enthusiastic admirers and devoted lovers have said to us about it. The afternoon was rainy and the road muddy, but such beautiful *English* rain, such delicious *English* mud. Imagine Hertfordshire lanes, Devonshire downs, Westmoreland lakes, Scotch trout streams and Lusitanian views!"

Source: Lord Lytton, Viceroy of India, [Letter] (1877), as quoted in *The Sabibs* (1948), edited by Hilton Brown. London: William Hodge & Co., 27.

industry is the production of raw film stock at a modern factory that the government created to employ local college graduates.

The town has bus and rail connections with all parts of southern India, but there is no local airport because there is no flat land. Coimbatore, 80 kilometers away, has the nearest airport.

The original inhabitants of Ootacamund were Todas, a few dozen of whom still live there in three small hamlets. The town's name comes from their language: it means "one-stone hamlet." Today the town's population consists mainly of Tamilian and Kanarese immigrants as well as urban members of the local Badaga agricultural community.

Paul Hockings

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OPEN DOOR POLICY The United States initially formed its Open Door policy to trade and relations with China in 1899, when Japan and the European nations were debating the division of China. Secretary of State John Hay issued the first Open Door notes in September to Great Britain, Germany, and

Russia, and in November to Japan, Italy, and France. The ultimate historical significance of U.S. Open Door policy was that it was the first step toward the transformation of international relations in China from European to American principles. According to the European principle, each power tries to acquire an exclusive sphere of interest, inheriting the accompanying administrative responsibilities. The American principle sought cooperation among the major nations to "develop" China through informal means, leaving the heavy burden of administrative responsibilities to China.

Core Demands

Hay made one short-term and four long-term core demands. First, in reaction to the rapidly changing situation in China, he sought to secure immediate equal treatment in trade and navigation in China, especially in the so-called sphere of interest. Second, maintaining China's administrative integrity was a long-term objective. Washington intended to enjoy the maximum benefits from free trade without shouldering costly administrative responsibility. Third, Hay addressed China's administrative reform as another long-term objective because the weak central government could not control local antiforeign upheavals, which precipitated direct intervention from European powers. Fourth, the United States pursued cooperation among the powers in China. Concerted action was necessary to prevent the traditional Chinese diplomacy of playing one power off against another. Finally, Hay sought to give international legitimacy to the Open Door policy by requesting that all the international powers state in writing that they would observe the basic ideas of the Open Door policy.

Each power reluctantly agreed to accept the notes on the condition that the other powers did the same. All the powers eventually recognized the principle of the Open Door policy in China, and in March 1900, Hay regarded each power's response to the Open Door notes as "final and definitive." Facing the Boxer Rebellion, the United States issued the second Open Door notes in July 1900, but the basic objectives remained the same. The United States had taken the first step toward establishing the American principle as a mode of international relations in China.

Yone Sugita

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OPERA-VIETNAM Called *hat tuong* in northern Vietnam and *hat boi* in southern Vietnam, Vietnamese opera is considered the classical operatic theater of Vietnam. *Hat boi* translates as "song and gesture," emphasizing the prominence of singing and acting in this highly stylized and refined performance art.

Various similarities to Chinese opera are obvious, although the degree of Chinese influence on the artistic development of Vietnamese opera is disputed. However, due to the proximity of the two nations and centuries of political and cultural influences from China, significant parallels in performance conventions and play content can be observed today. The first documented contact dates from the thirteenth century. In 1285, a Chinese opera troupe was captured by the Vietnamese army and subsequently engaged to teach its art to Vietnamese court performers under Emperor Tran Nhan Tong (1258–1308). In subsequent centuries, Vietnamese opera solidified as classical court entertainment, reaching its artistic zenith during the nineteenth century under the Nguyen dynasty (1802–1955). Two emperors especially supported the development of court opera: Gia Long (1762–1820), who had a permanent opera stage built in his palace; and his son, Emperor Minh Mang (1792–1841), who repeatedly invited Chinese performers to train his court troupe.

Clear similarities to Chinese opera can be seen in the division of plays into martial and civil categories, in the division of the characters into specific role types, in costuming, and in the use of highly stylized makeup for painted face characters. Staging conventions are also similar to Chinese opera: plays are performed on a basically bare stage with a painted backdrop and with a table and two chairs placed center stage. The most obvious differences can be found in the distinctly Vietnamese interpretation of the Chinese story material, the addition of indigenous historical and fictional tales, the use of the Vietnamese language, and the integration of a unique musical style originating from Champa, an early Hinduized kingdom in southern Vietnam. The orchestra, led by the lead drummer, consists of percussion instruments such as several



A performer in a classic opera applies her makeup at the Dao Tan Theater in Qui Nhon. (PAPILLO/CORBIS)

drums, clappers, gongs, and cymbals and melodic instruments consisting of a two-stringed fiddle, flute, lute, and a reed oboe. Another clear distinction is the absence of the use of "water-sleeves," a prominent feature in Chinese opera. Also, contrary to the practice of male actors portraying female characters in traditional Chinese opera, Vietnamese opera has always had female actors portray female characters.

After 1945, court support for Vietnamese opera collapsed. However, a few commercial troupes are still performing today. The Vietnamese government is promoting this classical art form, which, despite strong Chinese influences, has developed into a uniquely Vietnamese cultural treasure.

Kirstin A. Pauka

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OPIUM The sap of the poppy plant *Papaver somniferum* was used as a medicinal in China as early as the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE). By 1700 it was being smoked or eaten recreationally in Java, and the habit



A farmer cutting an opium poppy head in north Thailand. (MICHAEL FREEMAN/CORBIS)

spread throughout Asia. Opium became a very important part of Asia's political economy by 1800. After World War II, nonmedical opiate use became completely illegal throughout Asia, although illicit use and production remained important in some areas. India is currently the world's leading producer of licit opium derivatives.

The British and Dutch East India companies were important early producers and distributors of opium, and opium profits were crucial to the British and Dutch empires. Opium use was usually associated with the Chinese, and it spread rapidly in Chinese overseas communities and China proper after 1800. The India-China opium trade was one of the most lucrative trades of the nineteenth century. The Chinese government attempted to stop imports of Indian opium (and outflows of Chinese silver) in the First Opium War. After its defeat in this war, China became the center of the international trade. By 1906, China was consuming 22,000 tons of opium a year, much of it domestic, but also importing opium from India, Persia, and Turkey. The colonial states of Southeast Asia also consumed a lot of Indian and Persian opium, usually distributed by state monopolies. British India, the main supplier, exported more than 6,000 tons of opium a year in the late 1800s.

As the medical profession began to claim that opium was an individual and societal danger in the late nineteenth century, the European empires were increasingly pressured to end their involvement in the trade. The evolution of modern nationalism in China and elsewhere also led to campaigns to end the trade. By 1900, most Asian states had begun exercising closer control to increase revenue, and most announced plans to gradually eliminate opium sales. The 1912 Hague and 1925 Geneva conventions formally limited the international flow of opium. Japan expanded its opium sales to fi-

nance its takeover of Manchuria and later the invasion of China, but major states limited or even reduced their involvement in opium sales. None of the colonial opium monopolies continued after World War II. Despite this, much opium is still produced, especially in the "Golden Triangle" of northern Thailand and Myanmar (Burma), and its sale and export have remained important both to criminals and to minor state formations such as the regime of Khun Sha in Myanmar.

Alan Baumler

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OPIUM WAR The First Opium War (1839–1842) was the beginning of active foreign aggression against China. The war began over Chinese attempts to prohibit British importation of opium. After China's defeat, the opium trade continued, but China also lost Hong Kong and was forced to open treaty ports to foreign trade and to accept the unequal treaties, which limited China's control over its foreign affairs.

Opium imports became a serious concern for the Qing dynasty court in the 1820s, as the court was worried about the effects of opium smoking on officials and soldiers and the supposed drain of silver out of the country. In the 1830s, a debate took place over whether these problems were best dealt with by legalizing and regulating opium or by prohibiting it. Prohibition won, and Lin Zexu was sent to Guangzhou (known popularly by its English name, Canton) to bring about the end of the trade.

The British in Canton were already unhappy that the Chinese government forbade them to trade in other ports, forced them to trade with a group of monopoly merchants (the Cohong) in Canton, and forbade the trade in opium, forcing the British to smuggle it or forgo the enormous profits it brought. British merchants were also unhappy at being subjected to Chinese law, which they regarded as barbaric. The McCartney mission of 1793 and the Amhurst mission of 1816 were intended to win the British full access to Chinese markets and European-style diplomatic relations with China, but both were failures.

Lin Zexu seized and destroyed the British opium at Canton and demanded that foreign merchants pledge not to import opium again. The British took these actions to be justification for war and sent a naval and military force from India. Fighting began in June of 1840. British strategy was to seize the island of Zhoushan, near the mouth of the Chang (Yangtze), and then sail north to Tianjin and demand payment for the seized opium and a complete revision of the relationship between the two countries. The British easily defeated all the Chinese naval and land forces they faced. The Qing court was eventually forced to agree to the Treaty of Nanjing. The Second Opium War 1856–1858 (also called the Arrow War) resulted in the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin, which further opened China to foreign penetration. These treaties were the foundation of the system of unequal treaties that would govern China's relations with the imperialist powers until World War II. The opium trade continued and grew, and the political and economic dislocations caused by the war and the treaty were key causes of the Taiping Rebellion, which lasted from 1851 to 1864.

Alan Baumler

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ORAL (2002 est. pop. 185,000). A city located in north central Kazakhstan on the Ural River, Oral currently serves as the administrative center of the Batys Qazagstan Oblasy (West Kazakhstan Province). Founded in the first half of the seventeenth century, the city was called Yaitski Gorodok (Ural City), and the Ural River was known as the Yaits. It served as the headquarters for the Yaits Cossacks. Yaitski Gorodok was a center of the rebellion led by Stenka Razin (d. 1671), a Cossack who fomented revolt (1667–1671) until captured by the Russian czarist army and executed.

Less than a century later, the town and the Yaits Cossacks were heavily involved in the rebellion led by the cossack Emelyan Pugachov (1726–1775) in 1773–1774 against Catherine II (1729–1796); he too was captured in 1774 and executed. In 1775, the Yaits Cossacks lost all autonomy, and the city, the Cossacks, and the river all had their names changed (the city to Uralsk, the river and Cossacks to Ural) to discourage people from thinking about the uprising.

From 1775 until 1917, Uralsk was assigned to different provinces and regions but remained part of the Russian empire and an important regional center. During the Russian Revolution, it was captured by Red Army troops in July 1919. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the government of Kazakhstan renamed Uralsk and its surrounding oblast. Oral today remains an important city in sparsely inhabited western Kazakhstan.

Andrew Sharp

ORANG ASLI The Orang Asli ("indigenous or native people") are the indigenous population of the Malay peninsula. There were three waves of Orang Asli immigration onto the Malay Peninsula. The Orang Asli Negritos were the first and now inhabit the most geographically isolated area: the dense forests of the northern half of the peninsula. Although their origins are unclear, it is thought they came from the Andaman Islands about 10,000 years ago. Numbering around 2,000, they are the most physically distinctive of the Orang Asli, being short and dark with frizzy hair. Traditionally, they lead a nomadic lifestyle, gathering roots and fruits and killing birds and small animals with darts from blowpipes. Larger animals, such as deer and wild pigs, are caught in traps or snares. All game, irrespective of who catches it, is shared among the members of the group.

The Senoi, considered to be the second major influx of Orang Asli, arrived on the peninsula around 6,000–8,000 years ago. Now numbering about 35,000, they are found in the central mountains of Malaysia, in the states of Perak, Pahang, and Selangor. On the whole they are smaller than Malays and have broad faces, prominent cheekbones, and wavy hair. They speak a language related to that of the Mon-Khmer people. The Senoi never put their dwellings near trees because of the danger of collapse during thunderstorms, of which they have an extraordinary fear, and which they believe are a punishment sent by the spirits of ancestral deities for sinning on earth. The Senoi are traditionally shifting cultivators, slashing and burning the forest to clear fields, and moving on to new areas only when the soil is exhausted. The Senoi commonly burn a house after a death occurs in it; today this is probably the only reason for leaving an area and setting up a home elsewhere. Destroying the house frightens the spirit, and by moving elsewhere they leave it behind. Spirits of the dead are greatly feared by the Senoi, and burial grounds are always situated across a river from the village, since the spirits, they believe, find it difficult to cross water.



Orang Asli men in Malaysia inspecting their blowguns. (FARRELL GREHAN/CORBIS)

The Semelai subgroup of Orang Asli, who came to the peninsula about 4,000 years ago, are considered the earliest precursors of the Malays. Numbering about 25,000, and living mainly in the southern states, these are the Orang Asli who have integrated most with the Malays; the majority speak standard Malay, have Malay names, and follow a Malay lifestyle, without, however, being Muslim or considering themselves Malays. One exception is the 2,000 or so Orang Laut (sea people) from the state of Johor, who have been Muslim for centuries.

Because of contact with modern society, some Orang Asli have become unwilling to continue their traditional lifestyles. Many, however, are apparently not benefiting from this contact and instead are losing the traditional skills and knowledge that have for so long maintained them. Education, although available, shows no sign of helping the younger generation bridge the gap. Many Orang Asli children are reluctant to leave their villages in order to attend secondary schools, where they believe other races look down on them.

Kog Yue Choong

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ORANGUTAN The orangutan (*Pongo pygmaeus*), whose name means "Man of the Woods" in Malay, is divided into two subspecies, one inhabiting the island of Sumatra and the other Borneo. This highly endangered primate is one of four still-existing species of great apes. The species is sexually dimorphic (occurring in two forms, one male and one female), with adult females averaging 45 kilograms and males 90 kilograms in weight. Height ranges between 1.2 and 1.6 meters when standing on both feet. The orangutan has dark skin but is covered with long orange hair, except on the face.

These diurnal (active in the daytime) apes are widely dispersed in the primary rainforest, where they eat fruits, leaves, bark, rotten wood, insects, and occasionally bird eggs. Females and young live mainly in the trees, traveling primarily by arm swinging, while the larger males more frequently forage and move, using all four limbs, on the forest floor. They build individual sleeping nests high in the trees at night, although juveniles and infants sleep with their mothers.

Females become sexually mature at about twelve years and have infants that weigh about 1.5 kilograms after nine months' gestation. The infants are carried and nursed for four to five years, and the interval between births is from five to eight years. Juveniles are dependent for protection and guidance in foraging on their mothers until they are eight or nine years old, when as subadults they leave their mothers for longer periods and interact with other subadults. Males do not mature until they are sixteen to twenty years old, when they must find or fight for a territory overlapping the ranges of several females. They defend this territory by calling loudly every day (long calls), which notifies other males to avoid them and attracts sexually receptive females. Lifespan is up to forty years.

Anne Zeller

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ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES Before the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was established in 1960, international oil companies with concessions in the Middle Eastern oil countries controlled crude-oil prices and thus the amounts paid to the oil-producing countries; when the price of oil fell because supply exceeded demand, payments to the oil countries dropped as well. OPEC was organized as a voluntary intergovernmental organization whose basic aims are to coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its member countries and to safeguard their interests. OPEC links countries whose main source of export earnings is petroleum.

To achieve their aims OPEC countries use various means, such as setting crude-oil prices according to world demand, imposing an overall production ceiling, and allocating production quotas. OPEC has also sometimes used oil as a political tool.

Formation and Membership

OPEC was established in Baghdad, Iraq, in September 1960. The organization was formed by five founding members: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. In the 1960s five more countries became members: Qatar (1961), Indonesia (1962), Libya (1962), Abu Dhabi (1967), and Algeria (1969). In 1974 the United Arab Emirates, of which Abu Dhabi is the dominant member, took Abu Dhabi's place. The membership was raised to thirteen with the admission of Nigeria (1971), Ecuador (1973), and Gabon (1975). Two countries withdrew in the 1990s: Ecuador (1992) and Gabon (1996).

Organizational Structure

OPEC's headquarters are in Vienna, Austria. The organizational structure includes several bodies. The Conference, which consists of high-ranking representatives of the member countries, is OPEC's "supreme authority." Meeting at least twice a year, the Conference formulates general policies for OPEC, decides on new members, considers and approves the budget, and appoints the secretary-general.

The OPEC secretariat is directed by the board of governors and run by the secretary-general and by various bodies, including the Ministerial Monitoring Committee and the Economic Commission. The main functions of the secretariat include (1) collecting information and studying and reviewing all matters of common interest relating to the petroleum industry; (2) making studies and preparing proposals whenever requested by the board of governors;

and (3) implementing the decisions taken by the Conference.

The board of governors directs the management of OPEC's affairs. It is charged with implementing the decisions of the Conference and drawing up the annual budget. The Ministerial Monitoring Committee ensures the stability of the world petroleum market by monitoring price evolution and preparing long-term strategies. The Committee is normally convened four times a year.

Oil and Gas Resources and Current Oil Production

Estimates of OPEC's oil and gas resources are made at regular intervals. At the end of the 1990s OPEC-member countries controlled unique oil and gas reserves. OPEC countries possess more than 75 percent of the world's known reserves of crude petroleum and about 44 percent of the world's known resources of natural gas. OPEC produces about 40 percent of the world's crude oil and about 14 percent of the world's natural gas. OPEC's oil exports represent about 60 percent of all oil traded internationally. Eighty-five percent of OPEC's total oil and 79 percent of its total gas reserves are concentrated in Asian OPEC countries (that is, OPEC member countries other than Venezuela, Libya, Nigeria, and Algeria).

The main producers are the Asian countries in the Persian Gulf region, which are especially rich in oil: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait together contain more than 40 percent of the world's oil reserves. Saudi Arabia and Iran could probably sustain current production levels into the second half of the twenty-first century; current production levels in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait may be sustainable into the twenty-second century.

Major Events in OPEC History

The first OPEC Conference was held in Baghdad in September 1960. The conference agreed to limit annual growth in output to secure adequate prices in 1965. The tax levied by OPEC members on the income of the petroleum companies was raised to 55 percent in 1970. In 1973 the Arab oil-exporting nations imposed an embargo on the United States and the Netherlands and increased prices to America's Western European allies because of their support of Israel in the Yom Kippur War. As a result, the price of crude oil quadrupled from \$3 in October 1973 to \$12 per barrel in January 1974. The Arab nations lifted the embargo in March 1974, after a proposal for an Israeli withdrawal from captured Syrian territory.

The OPEC Fund for International Development was created in 1976. The main goal of this financial institution is to help low-income countries in pursuit of their social and economic advancement. All developing countries, with the exception of OPEC member states, are in principle eligible for assistance.

The Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War led to another increase in crude oil prices, which more than doubled from \$14 in 1978 to \$35 per barrel in 1981. In 1982, for the first time in OPEC's history, the member countries agreed to defend the Organization's price structure by imposing an overall production ceiling of 18 million barrels per day. During the first half of 1986 petroleum prices dropped to below \$10 per barrel, probably because some OPEC members ignored the production ceiling.

In August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait. After the United Nations imposed an international embargo on petroleum exports from both countries, the price of crude oil instantly increased to \$25 per barrel. During the 1990s the price continued to fluctuate and reached its lowest level of \$9.90 per barrel in February 1999. Following an OPEC agreement from 23 March 1999 to cut oil production by 1.7 million barrels per day, the price of crude oil rebounded sharply. During 1999, 2000, and the first eight months of 2001 they were high, especially in late 2000 when the price of crude oil was above \$30 per barrel. Prices fell sharply in late September and October 2001, due to economic recession in the United States and some other countries.

Different political and economic forces are shaping the future of OPEC. In the global context the demand for oil will continue to rise, unless a cheap alternative source of energy is discovered. Thus OPEC could maintain or even increase its role on the world oil market, especially taking into consideration the lack of major oil finds in the last twenty years. From the other side, OPEC member nations often pursue their own interests, and compliance with OPEC decisions is limited to circumstances when the interests of all member nations converge.

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ORIENTAL ORTHODOX CHURCH The Oriental Orthodox Church is a group of distinct churches that have their origins in the Middle East. The term is used to avoid confusion with the Eastern Orthodox Church. Oriental Orthodox Churches include the Syrian Orthodox Church (also known as the Jacobite Church), the Armenian Gregorian Apostolic Orthodox Church, and, outside Asia, the Coptic (Egyptian) Orthodox Church, of which the Ethiopian Orthodox Church is a branch. These churches resemble the Eastern Orthodox Church in liturgy and structure, but they reject the findings of the Council of Chalcedon (451 CE), which defined Christian orthodoxy. For this reason they are also known as the non-Chalcedonian churches. Specifically, these churches reject the teaching that Christ is "of like nature" (Greek *homoiousion*) with God the Father, asserting instead that he is "of the same nature" (*homoousion*). From this precept they take the name Monophysite (one body).

The Syrian Orthodox Church was persecuted as heretical under the Byzantine empire, but under Islamic rule it attained the status of "protected community" (*dhimmi*). Today its members account for approximately 10–12 percent of the population of Syria. A tiny community survives in southeast Turkey, where it is subject to pressures of assimilation and emigration. The patriarch of the church, formerly resident at the monastery of Deir az-Zaffaran near Mardin in Turkey, now lives in Damascus, Syria. An ancient Syrian Orthodox community, tracing its origin to the mission of the Apostle Thomas, exists in Karnataka State, India. The church also exists in émigré communities in Africa, the Americas, Australia, and Europe. The church uses Syriac, an ancient Semitic language closely related to biblical Aramaic, as its liturgical language, although 99 percent of its followers are Arabic speakers.

The Armenians claim to have been the first people to have adopted Christianity as a state religion, the ancient Armenian state having been outside the Byzantine empire. Ninety percent of Armenians worldwide belong to the Armenian Orthodox Church, and there is a strong identification between the membership of the Armenian church and the Armenian nation. The church is held to have been the preserver of Armenian identity against Muslim Turks and Iranians. As such, the Soviet authorities permitted the church's leader, the catholicos, to remain in his traditional seat of Echmiadzin af-

ter the Soviet takeover of Armenia. This legitimized the USSR as the protector of the Armenian nation after the genocide of 1915 (which Turkey denies) in which the large Armenian population of eastern Anatolia was either massacred or forced across the desert to Syria, where large Armenian communities of Anatolian origin remain. Outside Armenia itself, diaspora communities are to be found across the Middle East, especially in Iran, Syria, and Israel/Palestine.

Both the Syrian and Armenian Churches have so-called Uniate branches in communion with the Roman Catholic Church. Two other Uniate churches originated as non-Chalcedonian churches. These are the Maronite Church, the dominant Christian confession in Lebanon, and the Nestorian, or Assyrian, Church, with its leadership in Baghdad, Iraq, and followers in Iran, Turkey, and Syria, where many adherents fled after persecution in Iraq in the early twentieth century.

Will Myer

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ORIENTALISM Orientalism refers to two intellectual trends in the West: the appearance or deliberate cultivation in literature and art of stylistic and aesthetic traits reminiscent of Asian cultures, which began in eighteenth-century Europe; and, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the scholarly study of premodern Asia, especially philology (the study of language and linguistics) and other text-based pursuits, by Europeans and Americans. The fields of anthropology, sociology, and cultural, political, and economic history, insofar as they address Asia, have since been called Orientalist as well.

The First Orientalists

The earliest Orientalists, mostly trained in the Greco-Roman classics, were interested in recovering ancient texts, often seeing this as a way to open a window onto the origins of culture, which was itself a ma-

ior preoccupation in the nineteenth century. Scholars studied the relationships between ancient languages and cultures and focused attention on religious and legal texts. John Selden (1584–1654), an English legal antiquarian and politician, became a recognized authority on Near Eastern polytheism and Jewish law. The German biblical scholar Johann Gottfried Eichhorn (1752–1827) challenged pious traditions by showing the common origins of the Bible and other Semitic texts. A. H. Anquetil-Duperron (1731–1805), a French scholar, brought Zoroastrian manuscripts to France in the early 1760s. Eugène Burnouf (1801–1852), the son of a French classicist, published works on the Pali language of the Theravada Buddhists, on Zoroastrian liturgy in the Avesta, and on Sanskrit mythological texts, for which he was appointed professor of the Sanskrit language at the Collège de France (1832–1852).

Orientalists as Diplomats and Administrators in Asia

Some of the first Orientalists got their start accompanying diplomatic missions to Asia. Antoine Galland (1646–1715), a French scholar who accompanied the French ambassador to Constantinople in 1670–1675, studied Arabic, Persian, and Turkish there. He later published *Mille et une nuits*, the first translation of *Arabian Nights' Entertainments* into a European language, as well as French translations of collections of Indian fables and the Qur'an. Likewise, Heinrich Julius Klaproth (1783–1835), a German who had taken part in a Russian visit to China in 1805, published a two-volume ethnographic and linguistic study of the Caucasus.

In other cases, Orientalists went to Asia as army officers or colonial administrators. Sir William Jones (1746–1794), an English scholar and translator of Greek, Latin, Arabic, and Persian who became a British supreme-court judge in Calcutta, undertook the study of Sanskrit to compile an authoritative digest of Hindu law that might be used in the courts. He founded the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1784, and in his presidential discourse of 1786 he was the first to propose that Sanskrit and Greek shared a common ancestry, to which most other languages of Europe also belonged. Another example is Sir Henry Rawlinson (1810–1895), a British army officer assigned in 1833 to reorganize the army of the shah of Iran. He deciphered and wrote a linguistic analysis of the Old Persian section of the cuneiform inscription of Darius the Great at Bisitun, Iran (1837, 1846–1851), which paved the way for the decipherment of the Mesopotamian cuneiform script.

Orientalists as Public Intellectuals

By the late nineteenth century, some Orientalists had become celebrities and public intellectuals. The controversial British explorer and polymath Sir Richard Burton (1821–1890) captivated the reading public with prolific accounts of his adventures in Asia and Africa; he also produced thirty volumes of translations from numerous languages, including *The Arabian Nights* (sixteen volumes, 1885–1888) and the *Kama Sutra*, a Sanskrit treatise on the erotic arts (1883). Burton also wrote one of the first ethnological treatises, *Sind, and the Races That Inhabit the Valley of the Indus* (1851).

Equally famous, at least in learned circles, was Friedrich Max Müller (1823–1900), often called the founder of the field of comparative religion. German-born, he became a professor at Oxford University; he established his reputation with his edition of the Rig Veda, the oldest extant Sanskrit work, and with his influential essays on comparative mythology, religion, and linguistics. The fifty-one-volume series of translations that he edited, *Sacred Books of the East* (1879–1910), helped win acceptance for the idea that non-Western traditions could be viewed as religions comparable to Christianity or Judaism, each with a body of scriptures.

Since the end of the colonial era, philological studies have continued, although they have lost much of the prestige they had in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For the most part, interest (and funding) has shifted to political science, social anthropology, and the history of the last few centuries.

Said's Critique

In 1978, Edward Said (b. 1935), a professor of English and comparative literature at Columbia University and a Palestinian by birth, wrote a book called *Orientalism* in which he criticized the conceptual foundations and principal methods of such scholarship. Said's approach was shaped by the writings of the French post-structuralist philosopher Michel Foucault (1926–1984) and the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937). From Foucault he took the notion of discourse theory and the insight that the production and possession of knowledge are sources of power. But he objected to the diffuseness of Foucault's conception of power and appealed to Gramsci's hegemony theory (which argues that elite social groups use cultural institutions, such as schools, parties, and the media, rather than naked force, to secure and extend their dominance, so that this dominance seems natural and appropriate).

Analyzing British, French, and American writing on the Arab societies of North Africa and the Middle East,

Said argued that Western scholars systematically misunderstood and misrepresented these societies, due largely to the nature of their relationship to them (one of cultural superiority and imperial dominance). His conclusions have subsequently been extended to apply to Western scholarship on Asia in general. At the same time, his study extended its purview beyond scholarly works to include journalism, travel writing, and other types of literature, so that "Orientalism" as he defined it is in fact the sum of all Western literary and artistic expressions relating to Asia.

Said traced the roots of modern Orientalism back to ancient Greek depictions of the East and outlined its later development by *littérateurs* (Dante Alighieri, 1265–1321; Geoffrey Chaucer, 1342–1400; William Shakespeare, 1564–1616). According to him, the Orientalist vision of the East was well established as a literary trope long before the colonialist period; he claimed in fact that "colonial rule was justified in advance by Orientalism, rather than after the fact" (Said 1978: 39).

Beginning with the Egyptian expedition of Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821), "the Orientalist's special expertise was put directly to functional colonial use" (Said 1978: 80). For Said, the work of Sir William Jones exemplifies the double task of Orientalism: to describe, tabulate, analyze, and codify the Orient "scientifically," always in comparison with the Occident; and to use the knowledge thus generated to master and rule the Orientals. Thus Jones attempted to codify and apply in the courts a traditional Hindu law based on Sanskrit texts, as part of the East India Company's policy of governing Indians by their own codes.

Said argued that, although Orientalism adopts the posture of an objective scientific pursuit, it has from the first been motivated and sustained by a political purpose: the governance of colonial territories. Imperial administrators like Lord Curzon (1859–1925), viceroy of India, acknowledged that knowledge of the culture and sensibilities of the people of the East were indispensable for securing colonial dominance. With the end of the European empires and a decline in the popularity of philology, Said argued, the Orientalist enterprise increasingly took a new form: area-studies fields, which created expertise to be made available to governments and policy-making institutions.

Said argued that Orientalism helped the West to construct an image of itself by projecting every trait opposite to that of the West's onto the screen of a backward and decadent Orient. He made this argument by psychologizing the West's relationship to the East as self to "other." The Oriental was reduced to a

stereotype, springing from the notion that it is possible to define the essential nature of Arabs or Muslims. Orientals, he claimed, are routinely characterized as sensuous, childlike, irrational, mendacious, and culturally passive and static. Such traits are supposedly exemplified in the person of the "Oriental despot," whose state is said to be the characteristic political institution of the East. Defining the Orient in this way provided a rationale for Western imperialism and colonialism: the destiny of Western power is to introduce reason and order into the Orient.

Said's critique of Orientalism became one of the most important foundations for what has been called colonial-discourse theory or, more broadly, postcolonial studies (the study of the relationships between European nations and the societies they formerly colonized). Another notable ramification of this field is subaltern studies, an approach to Indian history led by the Indian historian Ranajit Guha (b. 1923) and inspired by the work of Gramsci, which aims to write the history of subaltern peoples by recovering their own voices and agency. These approaches share a recognition that knowledge is intertwined with the exercise of power, as well as a postmodernist skepticism of all claims to objectivity.

Criticisms

Although widely praised in literary critical circles from the start, Said's book has been criticized from a variety of angles. First, representatives of Asian studies in a wide range of disciplines sharply objected to the suggestion that they were willfully or unwittingly complicit in their governments' programs for colonization and for political and economic domination, even in the postcolonial era. Philologists, for example, insisted that their painstaking analyses of ancient texts were only distantly related to any political agenda. Many objected to the suggestion that the field as a whole displays cynicism and bad faith. It has been observed that Said essentialized the Orientalist and elided all differences of approach or discipline. He made little distinction between eighteenth- and nineteenth-century views of the East and those of his scholarly contemporaries.

Furthermore, it can be pointed out that the charges laid at the door of Orientalists and of Westerners in general apply also to Asians and to people everywhere. Jones, for instance, is faulted for "an irresistible impulse always to codify, to subdue the infinite variety of the Orient to 'a complete digest'" (Said 1978: 78), but the Sanskrit legal works he consulted were deliberate codifications already, designed by Brahman

scholars to consolidate and extend their own authority. Said's fallacy, by this reasoning, is to demonize Europeans in particular for behaving as the privileged and powerful do everywhere; indeed, the colonized of modern times were often the colonizers of earlier eras and produced "Orientalisms" of their own. Moreover, many critics note that scholarship on Asia is no longer in the hands of Westerners alone, and that the academic climate has changed considerably, partly in response to the arguments of Said.

On the other hand, criticisms also emerged from the vanguard of literary, social, and political theorists. Notable among these are Dennis Porter (b. 1933) and Aijaz Ahmad (b. 1945). Porter, a literary critic interested in travel writing, found Said's literary analysis too blunt: his sources (said Porter) are inadequately historicized, and literary texts are not treated any differently than are obviously ideological texts. Porter pointed to the fact that aesthetic products follow more than simply ideological imperatives. At the heart of this problem, Porter saw an incompatibility between Foucault's discourse theory and Gramsci's understanding of hegemony.

Aijaz Ahmad, an Indian Marxist critic, objected to Said's acceptance of the Nietzschean tenet that all communication is distorting and all truths illusory, an article of faith in late-twentieth-century French cultural criticism. This claim, which Ahmad called irrational and antihuman, allowed Said to dispense with considerations of class, gender, and even historical process. Ahmad also noted the totalizing character of Said's Orientalism. All other forms of oppression are subordinated to Orientalism, and all Westerners and everything they have said and done are by definition Orientalist. Ahmad alleged that this formulation of oppression was particularly well received in the United States by mostly male Third World immigrant scholars of upper-class background who were not moved by theories of class-based and gender-based oppression, and who could represent themselves as oppressed despite the fact that people of their social class often benefited from the colonial order.

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ORIGAMI Origami means literally "folded paper," from the Japanese words *ori* (to fold) and *kami* (paper). In the sixth century, the Chinese introduced this art to Japan, where it developed its characteristic subtlety, refinement, and restraint. Origami is ingenious in its use of simple creases to capture the essence of a subject. Purists feel that a single sheet of paper should only be folded with no cutting while others find this rule too limiting.

In the Heian period (794–1185), owing to the high cost of paper, origami was a pastime of the nobility; by the Muromachi period (1333–1573), paper became more available and origami's popularity grew. The Tokugawa period (1600/1603–1868) saw the publication of the earliest texts on origami: the *Sembazuru orikata* (Folding a Thousand Cranes, 1797), which showed how to fold a series of connected cranes from a single sheet of paper; and the *Kan no mado* (Window on Mid-Winter, 1845), the first comprehensive collection of directions.

The well-known paper crane (*tsuru*) has its origins in the Tokugawa period and is still a popular symbol. The crane carries with it auspicious messages for long life and good fortune. A chain of one thousand cranes strung together represents both good health and peace, as found draped over the memorial statue in the Hiroshima Peace Park of Sadako Sasaki (1943–1955), the young girl who died of leukemia as a result of her exposure to radiation from the atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. Following the practice of folding one thousand cranes to have a wish granted, Sadako began to fold her cranes in the hope of getting well. When she realized that this particular wish was not to be, she instead wished for a peaceful world. She continued until she died, eventually folding 1,500 cranes.

Catherine Paganì

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ORISSA (2001 est. pop. 36.7 million). The state of Orissa, with an area of 155,707 square kilometers, is situated on the southeastern part of India. It is surrounded by the states of Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, and Chattisgarh and the Bay of Bengal. Bhubaneswar is

the capital city. Located in the tropical zone, the state has an average rainfall of 150 centimeters. The longest earthen dam in the world, the Hirakud Dam, is located in Orissa on the Mahanadi River.

A place of cultural synthesis and racial amalgamation, Orissa has a long tradition of maritime, commercial, and cultural contact with Southeast Asia. Its territory once extended from the Ganges River in the north to the Godavari River in the south. Its decline began in the middle of the sixteenth century, when parts of it were annexed by neighboring powers. It became a separate province on 1 April 1936.

The majority of the people are Hindus and speak the Oriya language. Tribal peoples constitute 22 percent of the population, one of the largest concentrations in India. Some 87 percent of the population is settled in rural areas. There are only 124 urban units, and only eight cities have a population of more than 100,000.

About 73 percent of the people are dependent on farming. Rice, pulses, oilseed, jute, coconuts, turmeric, and sugarcane are some of the important crops. The manufactured products of the state are textiles, paper, leather goods, cement, and steel. In spite of abundance of natural resources such as iron, coal, zinc, and forest goods, poverty is widespread. Orissa has the highest percentage of people in India (48.6 percent) living below the poverty line. The average annual income is only about \$100. The literacy rate is 49.1 percent. Natural calamities such as drought, cyclones, heat waves, and floods are recurring features.

The poverty of the state contrasts with its rich cultural traditions. The magnificent temples of Konark, Lingaraj, and Jagannatha show that Orissan artists have remarkable dexterity in creating objects of art. The appliquéd handicrafts, elegant *sambalpuri* clothes, silver filigree works, *patachitra* (cloth painting), and stone sculptures produced in the state are widely acclaimed.

Patit Paban Mishra

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ORİYAS The Oriyas live mainly in the province of Orissa in eastern India, which became a state on 1 April 1936. The bordering states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chaatisgarh, and West Bengal have been influenced

by different cultural traditions and have produced a unique Oriya culture. Forging a link between north and south India, the Oriyas have had a long experience of commercial, cultural, and military expansion. The Oriyas belong mainly to proto-Australoid and western brachycephalic stock and speak the Oriya language. With some twenty-two million speakers, Oriya is a direct descendent of Magadhi and its script a derivative of Bengali.

The Orissan empire once stretched from the Ganga River in the north to the Godavari River in the south. Maritime activities of the Oriyas made them a prosperous people, who contributed to the cultural rapprochement between India and Southeast Asia. The Oriyas are mostly Hindus, though a strong tribal influence can be found in their religion; they have built the magnificent temples of Konark, Lingaraj, and Jagannatha. Beautifully woven *samblapuri* clothes, silver filigree works, and *Odissi* dance are examples of Oriya artistry. The settlement pattern of the people is mainly rural, and agriculture is the main occupation.

Patit Paban Mishra

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OSAKA (2002 est. prefectural pop. 8.9 million). Osaka is Japan's second city of commerce, industry, and trade. Situated in central Honshu Island on Osaka Bay along the Inland Sea, the city is at the heart of the Hanshin Industrial Zone. The city proper (2002 estimated population 2.6 million) consists of twenty-six wards. It is the capital of Osaka Prefecture.

From the fourth to sixth centuries CE, Osaka, then known as Naniwa, lay close to the developing Yamato state, which eventually became Japan. Its port a conduit for culture from China, Naniwa itself was an imperial capital several times before the 710 founding of Nara as Japan's first permanent capital. In 1586, the city returned to prominence when national unifier Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537–1598) erected Osaka Castle. With the defeat of his son in 1615, power shifted to Edo (present-day Tokyo). In the following centuries, Osaka flourished as a trade center. Its wealthy merchant class patronized the arts, fostering the development of Kabuki and of Bunraku puppet theater.

World War II bombing destroyed most of Osaka's traditional wooden buildings and many transport

canals. The rebuilt city became a base for modern heavy industry. Today visitors are drawn to the replica of Osaka Castle, the Sumiyoshi Matsuri (a festival), and the various historic museums, Buddhist temples, and Shinto shrines.

Osaka Prefecture occupies an area of 1,869 square kilometers. It is bordered by Osaka Bay, and by Kyoto, Nara, Wakayama, and Hyogo prefectures. Once divided into Settsu, Kawachi, and Izumi provinces, it assumed its present name and borders in 1887. Today over two-thirds of the prefecture's industry is devoted to heavy manufacturing and chemicals; the newer factory complexes occupy land reclaimed from Osaka Bay. Visitors are drawn to the area's national parks and to Expo Memorial Park, built for Osaka's Expo '70 international exposition.

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OSAKA ACTION PLAN On 18–19 November 1995, the eighteen-member Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) held its annual meeting in Osaka, Japan, and produced the largely ineffective Osaka Action Plan. While some substantive measures were adopted, this economic summit conference accomplished little beyond reiterating the more comprehensive agreement reached the year before in Bogor, Indonesia.

The relatively scanty result of the Osaka Conference was due, in part, to a split in the APEC membership. The United States was the most prominent of several countries that pressed for a strict commitment to liberalized Asian trade, enforceable by reference to unequivocal trade rules. Japan, in concert with like-minded nations, was reluctant to hurry the liberalization process and preferred more ambiguous enforcement with greater national flexibility. On the whole, the Japanese position prevailed.

The Bogor Declaration, which had set 2010 as the year for free commercial intercourse among developed economies and 2020 for less-developed nations, was repromulgated at Osaka. This second declaration at Osaka was less substantive and was restricted largely to lofty-sounding sentiments. For instance, the members pledged "to ensure the transparency of their laws, regulations, and administrative procedures affecting

the flow of goods, services, and capital among APEC economies" ("Regional Affairs" 1995: 40829). Liberalization of trade was, in a few areas, moved slightly ahead of schedule. Otherwise, the Osaka Declaration was largely humdrum. While U.S. president Bill Clinton had attended the Bogor Conference, the American government merely sent its secretary of state, Warren Christopher, to Osaka.

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OSH (2000 est. pop. 300,000). Between 2,500 and 3,000 years old, Osh is one of Central Asia's oldest settlements. Largely rebuilt during the twentieth century, it is located in southwestern Kyrgyzstan near the Uzbekistan border in the eastern section of the Fergana Valley. Its name has been known since at least the ninth century and is thought to have originated with an Iranian people known as the Ush, who used to live in the area. As early as the eighth century, Osh was a silk-production center along the Silk Road, and it remained a major trade post until the fifteenth century.

In the city's center is one of Central Asia's most sacred sites: a hill called Takht-i-Suleyman (Solomon's Throne), where the Prophet Muhammad is thought to have prayed and where Muslim pilgrims began visiting in the tenth century. Although Osh is an important Kyrgyzstan center, its population is mostly Uzbek. Consequently, ethnic discord has existed since Soviet dictator Stalin's rule and erupted into violence in 1990 when Uzbeks and Kyrgyz fought over land and water supplies and three hundred to one thousand were killed. Kyrgyz city government also oversees Uzbek-dominated local business. Osh has two universities, a sanatorium, and an airport. Economic activity has been aided by beneficial reforms and consists of the Jayma bazaar; opium and silk trade; sheep grazing; mining of zinc, lead, and coal; food processing; and the production of silk, cotton, and wool.

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OTTOMAN EMPIRE The Ottoman empire expanded from a small territory near Constantinople to capture the remnant of the Byzantine empire in the late thirteenth century, reviving many of its institutions and synthesizing an elaborate, centralized Sunni Islamic state. Suleyman the Magnificent (1494–1566) ruled the empire at its greatest extent; at that time it reached from the Near East west to the Balkans and south to North Africa. Although the empire began to slowly shrink after Suleyman, it persisted until overthrown in the early twentieth century.

Rise of Ottomans

Before the fourteenth century the Turkish tribe of Osman (from which "Ottoman" is derived) migrated westward to the Byzantine border and intermarried into the Byzantine royal family. Expansion began with Murad I (1326–1389), who made the Byzantine emperor a vassal, conquered parts of the Balkans, and routed the Serbs (1389). Bayezid (1360–1424), the first Ottoman ruler to assume the title of sultan, continued the advance but ended his life as a captive of Timur (Tamerlane), the Turkic conqueror who campaigned through much of Central and Western Asia.

Imperial Expansion

After dynastic civil war, the austere and determined Mehmed II the Conqueror (1432–1481), often considered the real founder of the empire, introduced European artillery expertise and dragged his newly built fleet across the headland of Pera (modern Beyoglu, European Turkey north of the Golden Horn) into the enclosed waters of the Golden Horn, an inlet of the Bosphorus, to assault simultaneously the seaward and landward walls of Constantinople and to capture the city. He renamed it Istanbul and turned Hagia Sophia into a mosque.

Selim the Grim (1470–1520) created an Ottoman navy, which successfully countered the Venetians and captured Mesopotamia, Syria, and Egypt from the Mamluk sultans, thereby acquiring the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Suleyman the Magnificent, whose reign represented the flowering of Ottoman culture, presided over the apogee of Ottoman importance and expansionism. He advanced into Europe and conquered the Hungarians (1526) but unsuccessfully besieged Vienna (1529) and Malta (1565). During Suleyman's reign the empire rimmed the whole eastern Mediterranean from the Persian Gulf to Hungary; it encompassed self-governing minorities of various



An illustration of an Ottoman sultan in ceremonial garb. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

Muslim sects, as well as Armenian, Syrian, Coptic, and Greek Christians, Jews, and Yezidis (fire worshippers).

Ottoman naval expansion confronted Venice; defeated at Lepanto (1571), the fleet was rebuilt in a few months, but land wars with Persia (1575–1624) went badly due to mass desertions caused by the devaluation of the currency and hence underpayment of troops as Mexican silver flooded Europe. Viziers of the Koprulu

family restored internal and naval peace, but after the defeat at Vienna (1683), Mustafa II (1664–1703) was forced to deal with foreign powers as equals in the Treaty of Carlowitz (1699), and some Balkan lands were lost.

Later History

Until the reforms of Mahmud II (1785–1839), weak sultans could not control the military or update its

weaponry; from 1774 onward, the empire lost territory to expansionist Russia, nationalist movements, and rebellious governors. Protection and loans from Britain and France kept the empire alive long enough to become an ally of Germany in World War I.

Nationalist movements began in imitation of the French Revolution; Greece rebelled in 1821, and France, England, and Russia forced Mahmud II to accept Greek independence through the terms of the Treaty of Adrianople (1829). The Janissaries, an Ottoman military elite, had become rebellious Praetorian guards, responsible for deposing five sultans, until Mahmud II eliminated them and introduced far-ranging religious, legal, and military reforms.

Abdulhamid II (1842–1918) introduced the first constitution (1876) but later suspended it (1878) and ruled through autocratic despotism enforced by secret police. His reign saw the Armenian massacres (1895–1896). The rise of the Young Turk nationalist society, in response to the sultan's autocracy, caused him to reinstate the constitution in 1908.

Taking advantage of Ottoman military and administrative reorganization, a Russian aggressive move in 1826 enabled the Egyptian Pasa Mehmet, in a bid for independence, to strike northward through Palestine and Syria to central Anatolia. The British fleet ensured a reversion almost to the status quo, but the Ottoman empire's weakness was evident. Russia used religion to foment discontent among Orthodox Christian Ottoman subjects; Russia's massive defeat in the Crimean War (1854–1856) did not deter the Russian invasion of Ottoman Bulgaria in 1877. By the terms of the Conference of Berlin (1878), the Ottomans lost more territory: Romania and Bulgaria became independent, and Bosnia and Herzegovina went to Austria.

Britain moved in to guarantee the empire's borders in exchange for Cyprus and occupied Egypt to suppress nationalist unrest and maintain the route to India (1882). Uneasy peace ensued until eventually the Young Turk movement deposed the sultan and imposed constitutional government under the military triumvirate of Talat Pasa, Cemal Pasa, and Enver Pasa (1908). The Young Turks, crushing all opposition, disastrously led the empire on the losing side in the Balkan wars and World War I. Following the War of Independence (1919–1922), the new republican government, under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), abolished the sultanate on 1 November 1922.

Character of the Ottoman State

The Ottoman state was organized around the idea of Islamic conquest of Christian states, and its mili-

tary was based on a unique slave army called the *devshirme*. Christian boys were converted to Islam and educated for the select Janissary forces and for the civil service. Military fief holders (*sipahi*) served as cavalry in exchange for the revenue of their estates. After Süleyman, overpopulation, currency devaluation, and tribalism began to fragment the state.

During the early reigns, monopolies of silks, cottons, and metals brought prosperity, but the empire failed to enter an industrial age, relying on favorable tariffs to encourage imports and exports and, in the nineteenth century, on foreign contractors for the construction of railways and telegraph systems. Massive overspending, largely on trappings of royalty, led to debt restructuring and put large parts of the taxation system in foreign hands (1881).

Despite their belief in the mission of Islamic conquest of Christian states, the Ottomans adopted an enlightened policy of encouraging the coexistence of *millet*s (self-governing communities of coreligionists) in the state. Each *millet's* religious leader administered his community's legal and educational systems and collected a capitation tax for the Ottoman government in lieu of military service. Many Christian churches continued in use, although construction of new ones was forbidden until the nineteenth century. Forced population movements created enclaves of skilled Christian craftspeople, especially until the sixteenth century; it was Ottoman policy to move captured people in accordance with the political and economic needs of the empire.

Islam in the Ottoman Empire

From 1517, when the Ottomans conquered Mecca and Medina, the sultan was also nominally caliph, or leader of the faithful, and the Ottoman empire acquired theoretical leadership privileges over all Sunni Muslim states. The ulama, or religious hierarchy of mullahs, supported the sultan by validating his actions under Islamic law. Religious charitable foundations (*vakif*) provided mosques, schools, and hospital complexes supported by an income from trade. Pan Islamism as an ideology was not actively promoted until the time of Abdulhamid II; this movement, along with the Greek War of Independence, missionary activity, discriminatory taxes favoring Christians, and concessions made by the Tanzimat (reform) movement, led to Muslim resentment against Christian minorities.

Ottoman Culture

Ottoman art ignored the Muslim prohibition against depicting the human form and continued the Persian tradition of miniature painting and the Seljuk tradition

of pottery and tile decoration. The imperial mosques, built by the famous architect Sinan (1489–1588), set the standard for later Turkish religious architecture. Sinan's mosques, finished with marble, Iznik tiles, and carving, and filled with rare carpets, are as impressive as Hagia Sophia; later Ottoman palaces were Victorian Gothic fantasies in white marble and glass set in tulip-filled gardens. Poetry was based on Persian models; the court spoke and wrote Arabic, Persian, Greek, and Turkish. The language of officialdom was Ottoman Turkish.

Impact of Ottoman Rule

The Ottoman empire united under one banner and under a fair system of government the rival monotheistic religions and many Indo-European and Turkish ethnic groups in an impressive and unequalled example of tolerance. Although it had been eroded by Russian and European aggression, at its end the empire included Syria and Arabia, present-day Libya and Rhodes, and parts of the Balkans. The last parliament of the Ottoman administration (1909) included 147 Turks, 60 Arabs, 27 Albanians, 26 Greeks, 14 Armenians, 10 Slavs, and 2 Jews. Foreign pressures and promotion of nationalist prejudices eroded the basis of this society; loss of this cultural diversity has proved to be a tragic legacy for modern Turkey's culture and economy.

Kate Clow

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OVERSEAS ECONOMIC COOPERATION FUND The Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF; in Japanese, Kaigai Keizai Kyoryoku Kikin) was Japan's primary bilateral official development assistance (ODA) loan facility. It was established in 1961 as a public agency (*tokusbu bojin*) under the formal supervision of the Economic Planning Agency. In 1999, it was consolidated with the Japan Export-Import Bank to form the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). At its inception, the OECF was intended to promote the development of new sources of raw materials for Japan by extending project loans to Japanese firms and taking equity positions in their resource development projects. In 1965, the task of giving ODA loans to developing country governments was added to the original OECF mandate.

Financed mainly by Japan's so-called second budget, the OECF grew to be the single largest source of bilateral ODA in the world, providing some 40 percent of Japan's \$15 billion in ODA spending in 1999. Its consolidation with the Japan Export-Import Bank was the result of administrative reform efforts to streamline government by reducing the number of government agencies and corporations. Folding OECF into JBIC is expected to weaken Japan's ability to manage its ODA as a distinctive policy area with special needs, but it should improve its ability to coordinate its ODA lending with other forms of development finance.

David Arase

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OZAL, TURGUT (1927–1993), Turkish politician. Turgut Ozal was one of the most controversial political leaders in Turkey. He was born in Malatya, a southeastern province of Turkey; his father was a minor bureaucrat and his mother an elementary school teacher. Ozal studied at the Istanbul Technical University on a government scholarship. After graduation, he worked at the Electrical Power Resources Survey and Development Administration and was then sent to the United States for further training.

On his return he worked at the State Planning Organization (SPO) in lieu of mandatory military service and in 1996 became the head of the SPO. Following the Turkish army's 1971 military intervention into the government, Ozal left Turkey for a position with the World Bank. He returned to Turkey in 1973 to work in the private sector.

His first political encounter was with the National Salvation Party. He was defeated as a parliamentary candidate from the Izmir district in the 1977 general election. In the Justice Party minority government of 1980, Ozal was appointed acting head of the State Planning Organization and minister of state in charge of economic affairs. He implemented the 24 January measures, which promoted less governmental control over the economy, devaluation of the Turkish currency, reform of the taxation system, liberalization of interest rates, and price increases.

Following the 1980 military intervention, the junta leaders appointed Ozal deputy prime minister re-

sponsible for the economy. He resigned from this post in 1982 due to the failure of his free-market policies, especially the liberation of interest rates, which led to the so-called banker scandal. The collapse of the system of independent money brokers, whereby individuals collected money at enormously high interest rates, caused thousands of people to lose their savings.

Ozal returned to politics in the 1983 general election. The military junta allowed only three parties to participate, one of them being Ozal's Motherland Party, which won 45 percent of the vote. Ozal's tenure as prime minister lasted ninety-six months. In 1989, after Kenan Evren's term of presidency ended, Ozal was elected the eighth president of the Turkish Republic. During his presidency he expanded the powers of his office to give the president greater authority

in domestic and foreign policy. He held this post until his death in April 1993.

Ozal was a conservative and a defender of the free-market economic model that favored minimal state intervention in the economy. Privatization was a main element of his platform. While some praised him as a champion of freedom, his critics argued that he allowed the police and security forces to disregard human rights and turned a blind eye to bribes and corruption.

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PACHINKO Along remote paddies and in the heart of Tokyo, neon lights pulse. Inside, day and night, thousands test their luck and skill at what could be called Japan's national pastime: pachinko.

Pachinko is an electric pinball game modeled after American mechanical versions from the early 1900s. In those mechanical models, players physically flipped a switch to propel small steel balls upward. The balls bounced off pins before falling into slots. A winning slot would produce more balls for play. A losing slot would swallow up the balls until the player had none left. Today's electric-powered models add more lights and flash and allow players to simply hold a knob steady in order to shoot the steel balls. Otherwise, however, pachinko rules remain the same.

Pachinko machines first found their way to Japan in the cosmopolitan years of the 1920s. However, because Western-inspired activities were increasingly discouraged during the war years of the next two decades, the game fell out of favor. In the postwar years, however, the populace craved new leisure activities. The first commercial pachinko parlor was opened in Nagoya in 1948. From there, parlors spread rapidly around the nation. Today, pachinko parlors can be found even in remote rural villages, and it is estimated that as many as one-quarter of the population ventures into the ear-shattering din of pachinko parlors at least occasionally. Particularly avid players dedicate their time to pachinko parlors as they would to a job. However, although the payoffs can be great, so can the losses.

Technically, gambling for cash payoffs is illegal. Players awarded bucket loads of winning pachinko balls take their winnings to a counter inside the par-

lor and receive small gifts such as chocolate bars or imitation gold bullion. It is commonly understood, however, that at a nearby offsite location, players can exchange their winning trinkets for real cash. As such, the pachinko industry is, in reality, a flourishing illegality mostly overlooked by law enforcement. Underworld connections to certain pachinko chains and illegal tax dodges have also brought disrepute to the business end of pachinko. Further, as in other gambling industries, pachinko has its fair share of addiction. It is clear from its ubiquitous presence, however, that pachinko remains a popular leisure activity in Japan, enjoyed by young and old, men and women, and persons from all walks of life.

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PACIFIC OCEAN The Pacific Ocean is the world's largest body of water, occupying almost one-third of the Earth's surface. It is about 155.5 million square kilometers (60 million square miles) in area, with a coastline of 135,663 kilometers (84,300 miles). It contains about 25,000 islands, most of them south

of the equator. The ocean's average depth is 4,270 meters (14,000 feet); water temperature varies from freezing to about 29°C (84°F). The Pacific Ocean influences the climate of the surrounding land; much of Pacific Asia lies in the monsoon region and has distinct rainy and dry seasons. Tropical cyclones, or typhoons, are common. The Pacific Ocean's greatest resource is its fish (more than 60 percent of the world's fish catch); other important resources include petroleum, natural gas, minerals, and pearls. The eighteen members of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, an association of Pacific Rim nations, represent over half the world's gross national product, and trade among them represents more than 40 percent of world trade. Major Asian Pacific ports include Bangkok, Hong Kong, Kaohsiung, Manila, Pusan, Shanghai, Singapore, Vladivostok, and Yokohama. Contemporary issues in the Pacific include concerns over pollution and endangered marine animals, and disputes over fishing and territorial claims.

Michael Pretes

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PACIFIC RIM The region of land that surrounds the Pacific Ocean is called the Pacific Rim and includes more than thirty nations in Asia, Oceania, and North and South America. About 2.5 billion people live in this region, which is four-tenths of the population of the world, and the total gross domestic product in this region, which includes the two economic superpowers (the United States and Japan), accounted for 56 percent of the world gross domestic product in 1996. Now, economic growth in developing Asian nations is making the rest of the world pay more attention to this region, and this attention has led to a large-scale economic forum, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which includes most of the nations of the Pacific Rim.

Furthermore, with the strengthening trend of bilateral trade and investment in this region, the term "Pacific Rim" no longer represents solely the geography of a region. In the period 1981–1983, 60 percent of all exports from APEC member nations were to the other APEC member nations. This figure increased to 69 percent in 1991–1993 and 71 percent in 1997. As for imports, they also increased, from 61 percent in

1981–1983 to 71 percent in 1991–1993 to 72 percent in 1997.

However, the continuing change in the balance of power between the United States and China and the increasing independence of Southeast Asian nations from the United States have led to less regional integration among North and South America, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia. This situation was accelerated by U.S. policies implemented during the Asian economic crisis in the late 1990s.

The emergence of the Pacific Rim as a major economic region represents a major shift in the world's regional power distribution. In the twentieth century, economic and political power resided in the nations on or near the Atlantic Ocean—Great Britain, the United States, France, and Germany. Earlier, economic power had been concentrated in Europe. The unification of Europe as the European Union is, in part, an effort to compete with Asia and the Pacific Rim.

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PADRI WAR The Padri (or Paderi) War lasted from 1821 to 1837 and arose from a movement among the Minangkabau people of the central western coast of Sumatra both to purify Islamic practice and resist colonial rule. The Minangkabau social structure was matrilineal and highly decentralized. Their official ruler, the raja of Pagaruyung, had only nominal authority, while village chiefs (*pangbulu*) held real power. In the early nineteenth century, Minangkabau believers returning from the hajj pilgrimage to Mecca brought back ideas of purifying the Islamic faith of their people. This involved eschewing traditional syncretic folk beliefs, gambling, drinking, and drug taking, and seeking to end their matrilineal traditions. The name of the movement was derived from Pedir, from where the pilgrims set sail for Arabia. The movement declared a jihad (holy war), and its followers imitated the purification movement of the Wahhabi of Arabia by wearing white robes and turbans. Poorer people were attracted to the movement, and as it acquired strength, political power resulted through influence on local village leaders. In particular, fines

were levied for breaking the prohibitions of Islam. The new movement began to clash with the *pangbulu*; even the raja was endangered, and most of the royal family was murdered in 1815.

While the British interregnum in the Dutch East Indies, under Sir Stamford Raffles, tolerated the movement, the Dutch return to Sumatra in 1819 altered the situation. The traditional leaders aligned themselves with the Dutch after war broke out in February 1821; however, they lost legitimacy in the eyes of the Minangkabau for this alliance—disastrous for their long-term survival. While Dutch troops were able to control the Padri movement, they refused to reinstate the displaced Minangkabau raja, establishing a Dutch regency instead. Inevitably this created more sympathy for the Padri movement, as some traditional leaders reconciled with Islamic forces. This allowed the Padri leader, Tuanku Imam Bonjol, to resist the Dutch in the city of Bonjol for fifteen years. The Dutch reached an understanding with Bonjol in order to conclude another war (1825–1830) on nearby Java. The final siege of Bonjol lasted months, due to the ferocious resistance of the residents. With the city of Bonjol destroyed and Iman Bonjol exiled elsewhere in the Indies, sporadic warfare occurred in the mountains for years afterwards. The Padri War is a classic case of how the Dutch exploited intracommunity divisions gradually to assume control of the entire archipelago.

Anthony L. Smith

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PAGAN The city of Pagan (also spelled Bagan), the first capital of the Burman kings, is situated in central Burma (now Myanmar) in a sharp bend of the Irrawaddy River. The city was also known as Arimaddanapura, "the city that is a crusher of enemies," in the Pali language. Containing more than five thousand stupas and temples, the city is evidence of the architectural skill and religious worship of the Burmese. Pagan was founded in 849 BCE and became the capital of the Pagan dynasty (1044–1300) under King Anawrahta (1044–1077), during whose reign most construction took place. Pagan achieved its power by combining Burman military might, Mon architectural and artisan skills, and Indian Brahman political influ-

ence and by consolidating Theravada Buddhism with indigenous *nat* (spirit) worship. The largest and most important structures include the Mingalazedi (Blessing Stupa), Ananda Paya, and the Shwesandaw Paya. The city went into decline around 1234 under a series of weak kings. Mongol invasions from the north around 1287 led to the further decline of the city and its virtual abandonment. An earthquake in 1975 caused major damage to many of Pagan's structures, but restoration work has been largely successful in maintaining the city. Pagan is now the most visited tourist site in Myanmar.

Michael Pretes

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PAGODAS, BURMESE Myanmar (Burma) has thousands of religious structures—pagodas, temples, monasteries, ordination halls, nunneries, and rest-houses. Many are of great antiquity; in Pagan, the ancient capital, no less than 2,217 religious structures are to be found in a sixteen-square-mile area. The most sacred of these, and the most subject to pilgrimage, are undoubtedly pagodas. Pagodas are technically better known as stupas, cone-shaped monumental structures built in memory of Buddha and often enshrining relics alleged to be of the Buddha himself or sacred images of him. In Burmese, pagodas are closely identified with the Buddha; the term is the same for both—*hpaya*. Unlike the temple, which usually has interior space, the pagoda consists mostly of a solid monument with little or no usable interior space. It is commonly surrounded, however, by ample platform space for worship and many ancillary buildings. The Shwezigon Pagoda in Pagan is where Anawrahta placed the thirty-seven spirits (*nat*) at the foot of the pagoda, turning them into a coherent cult that defers to the Buddha. The Shwedagon Pagoda, north of Yangon (formerly Rangoon), is one of the largest and tallest pagodas in the world, and it attracts large numbers of pilgrims. Pagodas, and control over them, are deeply political—freedom fighters, such as Aung San (1915–1947) and his daughter Aung San Suu Kyi (b. 1945), gave their speeches there, and most kings and politicians of renown in Myanmar have built pagodas or have aspired to do so. It is assumed that the building of a



Personal deities and pagodas at the Shwedagon Pagoda in Yangon in 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

pagoda would establish the builder on the path to *nibbana* (nirvana).

Gustaaf Houtman

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PAHANG (2002 est. pop. 1.3 million). Pahang, the largest state in Malaysia, is located in the east coast region. It covers an area of 35,965 square kilometers and has a population of approximately 1.3 million—74 percent Malay, 19 percent Chinese, 6 percent Indian, and 1 percent others. Kuantan, the state capital, is both a commercial center and a popular seaside resort. Gu-

nung Tahan, the highest peak in the Malay Peninsula, forms a natural divider between east and west Pahang. Pahang is rich in natural resources, and two-thirds of the state are covered by rich tropical forest.

Pahang had always been a vassal until the end of the nineteenth century. As early as 1275, Java claimed Pahang as one of her dependencies. It paid tribute to Siam in the fourteenth century and Melaka in the 1450s. It came under the direct rule of the Johor sultanate in 1641 for two centuries. In 1858, the death of the *bendahara* (chief minister) Ali of Pahang resulted in a five-year civil war between his two sons that ended when the youngest, Wan Ahmad, declared himself *bendahara* in 1863. He assumed the title of sultan in 1881.

British intervention in the Malay States began around the 1870s. By 1887, Sultan Ahmad was persuaded to accept a British consul general, Sir Hugh Clifford. However, the atmosphere in Pahang grew tense between the British and the Malays. In 1888, the killing of a British Chinese subject compelled the sultan to accept a British resident. The role of the resident was to advise the sultan on how to improve the administration of his state. Although the resident was to have no executive powers, his advice had to be sought and implemented on all questions other than those touching on Malay religion and custom. It was a system used to exercise British influence over the Malay States. The three general aims were the establishment of law and order, the centralized collection of revenue, and the development of the resources of the states.

However, disputes and rebellions against the British, which became known as the Pahang War, dragged on until 1895, when Clifford forced the rebels to Kelantan, where they were eventually arrested. In 1896, Pahang became one of the Federated Malay States, along with Perak, Selangor, and Negeri Sembilan. In 1948, the Federated Malay States became part of the Federation of Malaya. The federation gained independence from British colonial rule in 1957. Together with Sabah and Sarawak, the federation formed Malaysia in 1963.

Yik Koon Teh

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PAHARI The Pahari, an ethnic group in northern South Asia numbering about 17 million, are culturally and linguistically distinct from their neighbors to the north and south. They live in a crescent-shaped area of the lower Himalayas extending from Kashmir to central Nepal and bordered on the south by the Indo-Gangetic Plain. They speak Pahari, an Indo-European language, which differs in dialect from east to west.

The Pahari live near water sources in small villages of around three hundred people. Men build and maintain the rows of rectangular, multistory houses of stone and adobe with traditional, ornately carved doors and appointments. They also maintain the livestock, which live on the ground floor of houses, near the kitchen and central living area. Hillsides are terraced and irrigated for agriculture, the Pahari's main economic activity. Wheat and barley are grown in the spring, and millet, maize, lentils, vegetables, and wet and dry rice are grown in the fall. Secondary income comes from the sale of buffalo- and cattle-milk products to neighboring populations as well as the sale of ginger, apricots, apples, and opium.

Pahari social organization is based on a hierarchical, male-centered, in-marrying caste system. Of the three caste categories (varnas) with descending orders of ritual purity in India—the Brahmans (priestly castes), the Kshatriya (royal, administrative, and warrior castes), and the Achut (performers of the most polluting tasks)—about 75 to 90 percent of the Pahari are Kshatriya. The Brahmans and Kshatriya own most of the land, and the low castes are their landless bonded labor. Only heads of high-caste households sit on village councils. These councils rule on matters of policy and social control. They also adjudicate cases of low-caste dispute and infraction. Commonly, punishment is violent physical sanction.

The governments of Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and Nepal allow elected Paharis to sit on governmental committees that deal with official matters. The Achut caste and women have seats reserved for them on these councils. Pahari women are active in economic and religious activities and in social relationships within villages. They work in agriculture, prepare all food, and handle household duties.

Marriage takes place near the time of puberty, with a bride-price paid to the bride's family. Men are allowed to take more than one wife, although this option is practically open only to wealthy men. Women can divorce their husbands, although a woman must return the bride-price and forfeit her children to her husband. Children are raised together, despite sex, in a permissive, relaxed, and primarily female environment. At the age of eight, male children transfer to male care. High-caste boys are the only Pahari children who receive formal education.

Although overwhelmingly Hindu, Pahari religious traditions reflect their alpine existence. The Pahari virtually ignore Hindu dietary restrictions (except for the ban on beef), a number of great deities, most purity rituals, and caste-based restrictions on women. Animal sacrifice is still practiced, and Brahman priests, shamans, diviners, exorcists, and curers of either sex are all active in Pahari villages. Medicine incorporates herbal and ritual specialists, Ayurvedic medicine, and Western science to battle illness and disease. Nevertheless, the mortality rate (especially among infants) is extremely high.

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PAHLAVI DYNASTY The reign of the Pahlavi dynasty (1925–1979) was a crucial and transitional period in Iranian history that began with Reza Shah Pahlavi (1878–1944) and ended with his son, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1919–1980). For Iran, this was a time of rapid Westernization, secularization, and foreign influence, all of which ultimately contributed to the government's demise. Many of the sweeping changes introduced by the Pahlavis were unacceptable to the population, particularly to the religious community, and after the fall of the dynasty a conservative backlash erased most of the Pahlavi achievements.

Reza Shah Pahlavi

Known as Reza Khan, Reza Shah Pahlavi rose to power through the military, where he followed in the footsteps of his father, also a military officer. Reza Khan attained the position of colonel when he became



Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and Queen Saroya in Tehran in July 1951. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

commander of the elite Cossack Brigade. In February 1921, with the support of Britain, Reza Khan's forces marched into the capital and pressured the ruler of that time, Ahmad Shah Qajar, to appoint Sayyid Zia ad Din Tabatabai premier. Later Reza Khan was himself appointed premier after serving as defense minister. Due to his military victories Reza Khan was initially popular with the people, and as a result the *Majlis* (Parliament) eventually removed Qajar from power and named Reza Khan first regent (October 1925). Within two months he had been declared *shah-en-shah* (king of kings) of Iran. In spring 1925 Reza Shah chose Pahlavi (the name of the Middle Persian language used in the seventh century, particularly in Zoroastrian texts) as his family name. With this symbolic gesture he began the Pahlavi dynasty, representing Persian rule over the Persian people after many centuries of foreign dynasties.

During his reign Reza Shah worked to modernize Iran and to strengthen its economy and transportation system by using the funds generated by oil revenues. He increased revenues by raising tariffs on imports, revoking the economic concessions previously given to European countries, and in 1932 insisting that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company increase oil royalties to

Iran and decrease the company's concessionaire area by 80 percent. He created a national civil service and a police force and built 22,400 kilometers of roads as well as the Trans-Iranian Railway. This improvement in the transportation infrastructure was intended to strengthen the economy by fostering industrialization.

In terms of the cultural and religious environment of Iran's society, Reza Shah swung the pendulum from Islamic traditions to secularism. He reduced the number of clerics in the *Majlis* from 40 percent to zero over the course of elections. He increased the powers of the secular state courts while diminishing those of the Islamic law courts. In an effort to homogenize the diverse population, he instituted a law requiring all men to wear Western-style clothes, and he required all public places and educational organizations to be opened to women. As might be expected, these rapidly introduced Westernizing policies were not welcomed by the religious community.

Events outside the country led Reza Shah to hand over control to his son in 1941. Reza Shah had begun to disrupt Britain's and Russia's political and economic hold on Iran by building ties to Germany in the 1930s. He declared Iran a neutral country when World War

II broke out, because Germany had become a major Iranian trade partner by that time. This neutrality, however, was not respected by Britain and Russia, whose troops invaded Iran in August 1941 on five fronts. Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in favor of his oldest son, Mohammad Reza, who came to power on 16 September 1941. Reza Shah left Iran for Mauritius and ultimately for South Africa, where he died in 1944.

Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi

Although his father had relinquished the throne, his son held power mainly due to the presence of British and Russian troops in Iran. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, known as "the Shah," was forced to permit the foreign troops to use Iranian territory as needed during World War II while the Shah worked to gain support from his people, including the disaffected clerics who had disliked his father's secular policies. When the war ended, first the British and then the Soviet troops withdrew from Iran in 1946. The latter forces, however, left the monarch to deal with Russian-incited and -supported uprisings in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. The goal of both uprisings was to establish political autonomy for the rebels, but successful containment of these rebellions at last established the Shah's control over all of Iran.

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi ruled as an absolute dictator, partly in response to an attempt on his life in February 1949. The rapid movement toward modernization that he fostered, along with his powerful security buildup, his authoritarian rule, the growing distance between rich and poor, and opposition by the religious community led to his eventual overthrow.

A showdown with Iran's premier, Mohammad Mosaddeq (1880–1967), compelled the Shah to nationalize the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951. In 1953, further disputes with Mosaddeq forced the Shah to flee to Rome, but the United States and Great Britain used the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the British MI6 to bring about a pro-Shah coup. With Mosaddeq overthrown, the Shah returned to Iran.

Previously Russia and Britain had been the main outsiders involved in the power struggles in Iran, but the United States became the dominant actor in the region following the 1953 coup. The Shah encouraged this influence by brokering several economic and political deals with the United States. The National Iranian Oil Company gave U.S. companies a contract to run Iran's petroleum industry. Iran joined the pro-Western Baghdad Pact in 1955 and agreed to adhere to the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957. To silence in-

ternal opposition, the Shah created the Savak (*Sazman-e Amniyat Va Ittilaat-e Keshvar*—Organization of National Security and Intelligence), a secret security and intelligence force with strong connections to the CIA and to Israel's Mossad. In 1962, the Shah instituted a major land reform by allotting peasants land formerly in private hands; in 1951, he had begun to turn royal lands over to small farmers. Nevertheless the lives of most people did not benefit from the Shah's innovations; such luxuries as electricity and access to adequate health care were not available to them.

The U.S. influence in Iranian affairs created resentment and opposition. The Shah decided to dissolve the *Majlis* so that he could rule by decree and avoid opposition to his policies, an act that further alienated the population. In early 1963, the Shah introduced an economic and social program called the White Revolution, which apparently received 91 percent approval, mainly because the regime had ruthlessly quashed the opposition. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1900?–1989) was particularly vocal in his objection to this program and was arrested as a result. The Shah had to use excessive force to quell riots that broke out in protest to the ayatollah's imprisonment, but this action caused a worldwide reaction. Human-rights organizations and Western governments pressured the Shah to adhere to democratic principles. When the Shah loosened his iron fist, the ayatollah's supporters regained strength, and the monarch exiled Khomeini.

Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and Iran grew increasingly important as the Middle East oil-producing countries made themselves felt internationally. As Iran's stature grew internationally, opposition to the Shah by the religious conservatives also grew. With Iran's oil revenues, the Shah launched ambitious economic five-year plans for rapid economic development in the agricultural and industrial sectors. Rapid growth, however, also resulted in housing shortages, inflation, pollution, and corruption; the distance between the wealthy few, including the Shah and his family, who enjoyed a luxurious lifestyle, and the rest of the population grew greater. In the 1970s, the religious opposition managed to infiltrate the military and to bring the oil industry to a standstill through massive strikes. The Shah finally tried to placate the opposition by appointing one of their own, Shahpur Bakhtiar, as prime minister, but this effort was seen as too little too late.

Under the guise of taking a vacation in Egypt, the Shah left Iran on 16 January 1979. Soon after, Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran and established the Islamic Republic regime. The Pahlavi dynasty came to an end, along with a 2,500-year-old tradition of

monarchy in Iran. The ayatollah insisted on extraditing the Shah, who had secretly entered the United States for medical treatment, but the United States denied his demand. Escalating hostility between the two countries led to the taking of hostages in the U.S. embassy in Tehran. In early 1980, after months of traveling from country to country in search of a place to stay, the Shah went to Cairo at the invitation of the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and died soon after.

Houman A. Sadri

See also: **Islamic Revolution**

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PAIK, NAM JUNE (b. 1932), Korean-born artist. Nam June Paik is recognized worldwide as the father of video art. He has produced a large number of video art works using television as a creative medium and diverting it from its conventional position and connotation.

Paik lived in Germany in the early 1960s and was an important member of the post-neo-Dada collective Fluxus. He was inspired by the Fluxus group's concert-based style, where different elements are referred to, including sounds, objects, and objects that produce sound. Through his own avant-garde works, Paik devoted himself to breaking down the barriers between high art and pop culture and to linking the world of art, media, technology, pop culture, and the avant-garde.

In 1963, Paik produced his first musical and video work, using a revolutionary way of electromagnetically deforming pictures. He was also the first artist to take advantage of Sony's portable video kit, the "portapak," with which he filmed Pope Paul VI's 1964 visit to New York. Paik showed the recording the same evening at the Café à Gogo. Paik's work calls into question the communication codes of a society accustomed to the institutional style of television and suggested an alternative type of television. In 1977, he conducted experiments with satellite transmission and sculpted constructions with stacked TV monitors that formed a monumental pyramid, a robot, and an aquarium. One of his impressive cybernetic installation works is

The More the Better, produced in 1988, a media tower composed of 1,003 TV monitors, for the Seoul Olympic Games. The provocative and prophetic style of Paik's video installation has contributed to the creation and development of a new trend in postmodern art around the world.

Seong-Sook Yim

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PAINTING-CHINA In Chinese culture, painting joins poetry and calligraphy as one of the "three perfections" of the scholar-gentleman. These three art forms use essentially the same materials: ink, brush, and silk or paper and depend on line to give expression to ideas. Of these materials, the brush is of greatest importance, particularly in painting and calligraphy, where the quality of the line is essential. The brush's flexibility, thickness, and readiness to absorb the ink contribute to the great variety of strokes an artist can achieve.

Early Chinese Painting

Evidence of painting in China appears as early as the Neolithic age in the swirling abstract patterns found on Yangshao painted pottery. In the Shang (1766–1045 BCE) and Zhou (1045–256 BCE) dynasties, bronze decor offers information on the further development of pictorial art. These images and patterns were symbolic and were thought to carry special powers. It was at this time that wall paintings were also produced. Though the archaeological remains are few and fragmentary, early texts confirm that surfaces were covered in painted designs. Painting was found in other media as well: During the Warring States period (475–221 BCE), painted lacquers and silks, especially those found in tombs from the state of Chu, reflect the energy devoted to the development of regional artistic styles.

Han Dynasty

During the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), painting in China came into its own. The Han inherited the practice of painting murals from its predecessors in the Warring States (475–221 BCE) and Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE). Owing to the increasing influence of

Confucian thought, the subjects of Han painting included models of proper moral and social behavior. Unfortunately, much of what is known about painting is found only in written records: extant visual evidence of painting is provided by the stone reliefs, tomb murals, pictorial clay tiles, painted lacquer, and only a few paintings on silk. Among the most important finds are the paintings from the tombs at Mawangdui in Changsha, Hunan. The well-known T-shaped silk banner shows images from Chinese mythology as well as from the realm of humans.

Stone and clay tile reliefs, though different from paintings, give a more complete sense of the Han dynasty use of pictorial space. Confucian themes, interest in the afterlife, and human activity are found on the incised, stamped, or molded tomb decorations. These, in conjunction with the fragmentary paintings found on tomb walls, show the Han artisan's ability to depict receding space and the interest in observing from nature.

North and South Dynasties Period

The earliest known Chinese painting masters come from the period following the collapse of the Han. It is also a period of the first treatises on painting and calligraphy. The earliest and most influential is Xie He's (c. 500–c. 535) *Six Canons of Painting*, a work that outlines early painting theory. While little painting remains from this period (owing largely to political and social upheaval), the fragments and copies of works tell of a strong interest in Confucian subjects. One such work, attributed to Gu Kaizhi (c. 344–c. 406), is the handscroll *Admonitions of the Instructress to the Ladies of the Palace*. Rendered in ink and color on silk, this work combines image and text to offer rules for proper behavior. The figures are of central importance, showing great mastery of fluttering robes and drapery. But other important pictorial works are not paintings at all. The engraved stone sarcophagus illustrating tales of filial piety, now in the Nelson-Atkins Museum of Art in Kansas City, Missouri, and dating to the sixth century, not only details the Confucian theme of respect for elders but also shows the beginning of landscape elements in art and a growing confidence in depicting space.

Buddhism, introduced during the Han dynasty, began to flourish during the North and South dynasties (220–589 CE). The greatest wealth of wall paintings is found at the Buddhist cave-temple site of Dunhuang, on the eastern edge of the Gobi desert. Activity at Dunhuang began in the fourth century and continued over several hundred years; the paintings here combine Chinese and Central Asian elements and are characterized by a vitality unequaled in early Chinese art.

Sui and Tang Dynasties

China was reunited after centuries of disunion under the rulers of the short-lived Sui dynasty (581–618 CE). While the period lasted only thirty-seven years, its chief role was to set the stage for the succeeding Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), China's most glorious and cosmopolitan period, when painting achieved great heights.

During the Tang, the first imperial painting academy was established at the court. This academy attracted many notable artists, such as Yan Lide (d. 656) and his brother, Yan Liben (d. 673); Wu Daozi (flourished 720–760), the great master of the monochrome technique; Li Sixun (651–716) and his son Li Zhadao (c. 675–741), famous for their colorful landscapes in the "blue-and-gold" style; and the well-known horse painter Han Gan (flourished 742–756). Few paintings that can be firmly attributed to these artists have survived, but there are enough extant examples to give a sense of the overall character of their work. Yan Lide and Yan Liben, for example, epitomize early Tang figure painting. Here, the figures were first outlined in black, and the colors were then filled in, using some shading. Wu Daozi created a monochromatic technique known as *baimiao*, or "white line," which focused on calligraphic line. This simple style would influence later landscape artists and contrasted sharply with the strongly colored and more complex landscape paintings of Li Sixun and Li Zhaodao. The poet and painter Wang Wei (699–759) is associated with the creation of the true monochrome landscape painting, where the focus was not on a narrative but rather on nature.

Wall paintings were an important medium for Tang painters. Painting continued at Dunhuang, and these paintings offer insight into the richness of Tang culture and society through the themes, styles, and extent of foreign influence found in these works. Other important extant Tang wall paintings are found in tombs. Three well-known and fine examples come from the tombs of members of the Tang imperial family, constructed in 706. The walls are covered with paintings of hunting, polo, ceremonial processions, and a variety of auspicious symbols, showing the grace and elegance of Tang figure painting as a whole.

Five Dynasties Period and Song Dynasty

The Song Dynasty (960–1279) was a period of great intellectual and artistic attainments as well as one of political decline. The abundant leisure and patronage necessary for the arts, combined with the rise of Neo-Confucianism, created the intellectual and artistic environment in which landscape painting reached its zenith. Song paintings provided the models that would inspire artists into the Qing dynasty (1644–1912).

The most characteristic style of landscape painting of the Northern Song period (960–1126) is the monumental landscape, in which artists broke free from any Tang influence and created a style that was purely of the Song dynasty. The early masters of this style are Li Cheng (919?–967?) and Fan Kuan (flourished c. 990–1030). Their works, and those of their followers, embody the realism and rationalism characteristic of this period. Depth and distance are achieved with mists and towering mountains, detailed foregrounds of rocks, and aged, weathered trees. This style reached a climax under Li Cheng's student, Guo Xi (c. 1020–c. 1090). His masterwork, *Early Spring*, stands out as one of the most important works in the history of Chinese painting. Near the end of the Northern Song dynasty, the monumental landscapes were scaled down into small scenic views. Through the use of mists and bird's-eye perspectives, these paintings were softer and more poetic in feeling, as embodied in the work of Mi Fu (1051–1107) and his son, Mi Youren (1072–1151).

During the Northern Song, China's first important painting academy came into existence, formed under the Huizong emperor (1082–1135) in the twelfth century. Here, artists were encouraged to paint in a more literal style that went beyond mere technical performance to capture the subject, usually birds and flowers. Huizong himself was a gifted painter and calligrapher in his own right as well as an important collector and connoisseur, and several of his works are extant. Unfortunately, Huizong's skills did not extend to military matters; he was captured by the invading Jin armies in 1126 and died in prison. However, the newly established Southern Song dynasty (1126–1279) continued Huizong's so-called "academy style" in the new capital of Hangzhou.

The early years of the Southern Song academy featured artists who had worked previously in the north, including bird-and-flower painters and landscapists. However, painting also experienced its own developments, seen in the work of landscape painters Ma Yuan (flourished c. 1190–c. 1225) and Xia Gui (c. 1180–1230), who created the Ma-Xia style. In these works, the artist focused on a particular view of the natural world and made dramatic use of empty space by eliminating some detail and highlighting the extremes of foreground and distance.

Also working at this time were the Chan Buddhist painter-priests who enjoyed more spontaneity with their brush and ink in capturing the essence of their subjects, as embodied in the work of Muqi (c. early thirteenth century–after 1279).

Yuan Dynasty

The Mongol conquests of the Southern Song empire in the fourteenth century devastated the Chinese. Although the Mongols were able to employ some Chinese scholars at their court, most refused to serve these "barbarian" rulers and dedicated themselves instead to poetry, painting, and calligraphy. Because of this, the short-lived Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) saw an incredible development in the arts and produced some of China's greatest masters.

One artist who was criticized for serving the Mongols was Zhao Mengfu (1254–1322). A descendant of the Song imperial line, Zhao took a post in the Yuan bureaucracy and distinguished himself as a painter of great repute. His finely colored handscroll, *Autumn Colors on the Qiao and Hua Mountains*, with its competent and varied, interwoven and textured brush strokes, stands as one of the great paintings of this period.

Near the end of the Yuan dynasty, the artist's studio became a focal point for the gathering of amateur literati artists (*wenren*) for whom painting was not a means of livelihood, as it was for professional painters, but was done for enjoyment and personal expression. The most famous of these Yuan literati painters is a group known as the Four Great Masters: Huang Gongwang (1269–1354), Wu Zhen (1280–1354), Ni Zan (1301–1374), and Wang Meng (1308–1385). These men refused to serve the Mongol bureaucracy and emphasized an art-for-art's-sake attitude. They preferred landscapes to other subjects and worked with ink on paper; the purity and sharpness of these media highlighted their careful, almost calligraphic, brushwork. They worked in a variety of styles, making reference to earlier artists, and their theories of painting were extremely influential to later artists.

Ming Dynasty

By the mid-fourteenth century, the Mongols were driven out and China was once again ruled by the Chinese under the emperors of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). With this new rule came the strong desire to return to Chinese traditions and eliminate any memory of "barbarian" rule.

Painting tended to be rather conservative, because artists looked to the past and emulated the styles of the old masters of the Tang and the Song dynasties. The distinctions between the amateur and professional painters continued in the two principal schools: the Zhe school, named for the southeastern Chinese province of Zhejiang and consisting of professional and court painters; and the Wu school, named after the Wu district near Suzhou, where many of the scholar-painters

lived. The more conservative trend in the Ming is seen in the works of the artists associated with the Zhe school. These painters looked to Ma Yuan and Xia Gui of the Song dynasty as their source of inspiration and had a strong influence on later artists. One of the most famous practitioners of this school is Dai Jin (1388–1462), whose role in its development was so central that the school's name comes from Dai's home province. The Wu school artists, whose leading masters were Shen Zhou (1427–1509) and Wen Zhengming (1470–1559), looked to the paintings of the Four Great Masters of the Yuan dynasty for inspiration. However, it was not always easy to maintain the distinctions between the professional painters working in the styles of the Song dynasty and the amateurs who based their work on the artists of the Yuan dynasty, as seen in the works of three mid-Ming masters Zhou Chen (d. c. 1536), Tang Yin (1470–1523), and Qiu Ying (flourished c. 1522–1552), who worked in a variety of styles and were tremendously influential.

By the late sixteenth century, new impetus in the arts was provided by the theorist and painter Dong Qichang (1555–1636). In looking at the division between northern and southern schools of Chan Buddhism that began in the Tang dynasty, Dong felt that painting could similarly be divided into two schools that could also be traced back to the Tang. The Northern school was based on the colored landscape style of Li Zhaodao and included Song artists Ma Yuan and Xia Gui. The Southern school began with Wang Wei and included among its practitioners the Four Great Masters of the Yuan. Dong's theory was particularly influential with the orthodox artists of the early Qing dynasty and has provided food for thought for centuries of art historians.

Qing Dynasty

The Qing dynasty, under the rule of the Manchus, saw the high point of the classical traditional in painting. During this period, there were two basic trends: a conservative continuation of late Ming style, based on the writings of Dong Qichang; and an original, innovative trend that was not based on any one particular school.

The conservative style is best seen in the works of the Four Wangs: Wang Shimin (1592–1680), Wang Jian (1598–1677), Wang Hui (1632–1717), and Wang Yuanqi (1642–1715). The most traditional of the group was the earliest, Wang Shimin, who assimilated Song and Yuan styles; the most original was Wang Yuanqi, who is closer to the individualists than the others in his group.

In contrast were the individualist painters. Some, like their predecessors in the Yuan dynasty, did not want to serve under a foreign rule and retired from official life to paint and write poetry. Zhu Da (also called Bada Shanren, 1626–1705) is known primarily for his abbreviated style, capturing his subjects with a minimum of well-placed and spontaneous brush strokes. The monk-painter Kuncan (also called Shiqi, 1612–1673) produced more complex paintings of varied and textured strokes than Zhu Da and made effective use of color. Yuanji (also called Shitao and Daoji, 1642–1707) made use of much deeper color, bold washes, and elegant detail in his paintings. One of the most forceful of the individualists was Gong Xian (c. 1619–1689), whose style is characterized by rich velvety ink and gloomy, somber landscapes. The work of the monk-painter from south China, Hongren (1610–1664), in contrast, features spare landscapes composed of refined and simple brushstrokes first seen in the work of Ni Zan of the Yuan dynasty.

The presence of European artists in the eighteenth century influenced painting at the Qing court. The Italian Jesuit Giuseppe Castiglione (Lang Shining, 1688–1766) spent many years in Beijing and combined Western realism with Chinese conventions. His work, while greatly admired by the Qing rulers, was little appreciated by the Chinese literati.

However, the political turmoil of the twentieth century—led by the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911 and followed by the May Fourth Movement of 1919, the War of Resistance against Japan of 1937–1945, the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, and the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976—redefined Chinese art. Traditional literati painting faced opposition as artists began to look outside China for inspiration. Artists who advocated the reform of traditional painting in the early part of the twentieth century included Chen Shuren (1883–1949) and the brothers Gao Jianfu (1879–1951) and Gao Qifeng (1889–1933), all members of the Lingnan School in Guangzhou. Gao Jianfu had considerable influence on a young Xu Beihong (1895–1953), the best-known artist to blend French academic and Chinese styles. In contrast, Lin Fengmian (1900–1991), another modern master, was heavily influenced by the postimpressionists and fauvists.

With the establishment of the PRC in 1949, art became a tool for the ideologies of the Communist Party and reflected Marxist views on class, as outlined in Mao Zedong's "Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Art and Literature" of 1942. According to Mao, art should serve the masses and further the revolutionary cause. Mao's Cultural Revolution created further upheaval.

Artists faced persecution, and many were sent to the countryside to be "reeducated" and to learn from the peasants. Art at this time was symbolic of party policy and was produced on a huge scale for wide distribution, as evidenced in the two- and three-dimensional portraits of Mao that appeared throughout China at this time. Following Mao's death in 1976, which marked the end of the Cultural Revolution, came a general relaxation of government control in the arts and an openness to Western modernism that was embraced by China's young artists. Although Western styles continue to be influential, Chinese painters are also looking to their own long artistic tradition to create works that are a synthesis of China's deeply rooted culture with current international styles and techniques.

Catherine Pagani

See also: **Calligraphy-China**

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PAINTING-JAPAN The earliest surviving paintings in Japan date from the Kofun period (300–710 CE), when large tomb mounds (*kofun*) were constructed for all classes of society and ornamented with various painted designs. Distinctive among them is the black-and-red wall painting found in the mid-Kofun Takehara Tomb in Fukuoka, which contains among its elements a red-spotted animal, a horse and groom, and a boat with waves, all flanked by two standing fans. The recently excavated Takamatsu Tomb of the late seventh century, near Asuka, contains a set of wall paintings that are evidence of contact between China and Japan. The complex imagery in yellow, blue, red, orange, and green covers three walls (the south wall was damaged in the past by pillagers) and the ceiling, and includes mythological beasts, the constellations, and groups of men and women arranged according to Chinese principles of yin and yang.

Late Kofun (552–710 CE) and Nara (710–794 CE) Periods

In the sixth century, Japan established close cultural ties with China and Korea. Buddhism appeared at this time, imported from China via Korea, bringing with it elements of Chinese culture including artistic styles and subject matter. The Tamamushi Shrine, named for the wings of the jade beetle (*tamamushi*) that were once used to adorn the piece, dates from the Asuka period (552–645 CE). Its three-dimensional model of a Buddhist temple is evidence not only of Buddhist architecture in Japan but also contains the only extant paintings from the period, found on the four sides of its lacquered wood base. Worshipers would have circumambulated it in the same manner they did a Buddhist stupa: walking clockwise around the shrine and viewing the images as an aid to meditation and as a method of learning about Buddhist beliefs. It is found today at the temple complex of Horyuji. Horyuji holds some of the best examples of painting from the Hakuho period (645–710 CE); these are strongly related to Chinese paintings of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE). Originally adorning the walls of the *kondo* (main worship hall), these early eighth-century paintings of enthroned Buddhas in their paradises were heavily damaged by fire in 1949.

The Tang influence carried into the Nara period. A set of folding screen panels of the mid-eighth century in the Todaiji temple complex show beautiful, full-figured, elegant women, each underneath a tree, in the Tang style. A new painting format, the narrative handscroll (*emakimono*) also emerged at this time. The *E inga kyo* (Sutra of Cause and Effect) is the first extant example of the *emakimono*, which would become a major Japanese painting format in centuries to come.

Heian Period (794–1185)

During the Heian period, the wealthy nobility refined court culture, with a resulting rise in the secular arts, and an emphasis on native Japanese styles. Chinese models continued to be adapted in the early Heian period. During this period, the esoteric schools of Shingon and Tendai Buddhism were introduced from China. The complex ideas and rituals associated with the Shingon sect took form in mandala paintings, which are abstractions of the spiritual universe. The believer focused on these images and through meditation learned to re-create the elements of the paintings in his or her own mind. Now in the Kyoogokokuji, the oldest mandala paintings in Japan are the *Taizokai* (Womb World) and the *Kongokai* (Diamond World), done in color on silk; they are thought to be ninth-century copies of Chinese originals.

There was also a rise in the worship of Amida Buddha and the belief in rebirth in Amida's Western Paradise. Paintings depicted *raigo*, the glorious ceremony when Amida, accompanied by attendant bodhisattvas, welcomed the deceased into his paradise.

In the later Heian period, the nobility's interest in Japanese literature and art resulted in the conscious decision to move away from Chinese models. This was especially true in secular painting, in which there was more freedom of expression. The terms *kara-e*, Chinese pictures, and *yamato-e*, referring to Japanese scenes and subjects, came into use at this time and reached a pinnacle in the eleventh century. One of the most striking examples of Japanese aesthetics and themes is found in the extant illustrations from the twelfth-century scrolls depicting the *Genji monogatari* (*The Tale of Genji*). One of only four sets of *emakimono* to survive from the late Heian period, the *Genji* images show two painting conventions that are purely Japanese: roofless architecture (blown-off roof) that allows the viewer to peer down on the activity taking place inside structures, and the minimal facial details, called "line for eye and hook for nose."

Early Feudal Period (1185–1573)

The surface tranquility of the Heian period was shattered by the Gempei wars (1180–1185), which ushered in an era of conflict and military dominance. Buddhism underwent changes as well, including the popular acceptance of Pure Land Buddhism, and the introduction from China of Zen Buddhism.

The thirteenth century witnessed a strong interest in *emakimono*. The diary of Murasaki Shikibu (*Murasaki Shikibu nikki*), the author of *Genji Monogatari*, chronicled life at court; it inspired an *emakimono* whose surviving images tell of the nobility's interest in the past.

The interest in history is also revealed in another *emakimono*, *Heike monogatari emaki* (Scroll of the Tale of the Heike, second half of the thirteenth century), which tells of a conflict in 1160 between the rival Minamoto and Taira clans. One of the most dramatic scenes in Japanese painting is the burning of the retired emperor's Sanjo Palace. This long section features flames and warriors, as well as servants fleeing and ladies of the palace flinging themselves down a well to avoid the rampaging warriors.

Pure Land Buddhism addressed the pessimistic mood brought about by the horrors of war by encouraging the notion that through devotion to Amida Buddha, one could achieve enlightenment. As Amida became the central focus of worship, the mandala and *raigo* paintings acquired new imagery focusing pri-


marily on the Western Paradise. One such work is the thirteenth-century *Taima Mandara*. Based on an eighth-century tapestry version, the mandala depicts Amida's paradise in great detail and its borders provide visual references to key religious concepts.

The years of the Gempei wars had an effect on the development of gruesome paintings known as *rokudoe* that depicted the different levels of rebirth: the realms of unenlightened beings, humans, animals, fighting demons, starving ghosts, and beings in hell. While these realms had been described in Heian-period texts, the nobility had chosen to believe that they would be reborn into a paradise. The pessimism caused by the horrors of war gave the impression in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries that one could just as easily be reborn into one of the six realms instead. Three sets of *emakimono* graphically illustrate possible fates: the *Yamai no soshi* (Notebook of Illnesses), the *Jigoku zoshi* (Hell Scrolls), and the *Gaki zoshi* (Scroll of Hungry Ghosts).

The introduction at the end of the twelfth century of Zen Buddhism (Chan in Chinese, from the Sanskrit *dhyana*, meaning meditation) had a profound effect on Japanese culture. Different types of Zen painting developed and subjects included famous Zen practitioners, Buddhist deities, and landscapes. Some artists were priest-painters, such as the versatile artist Kichizan Mincho (1352–1431), who worked in color on silk, as well as ink on paper, and painted a variety of themes. The Zen style of monochrome ink painting is best exemplified by Kao Ninga (mid-fourteenth century), who depicted his subjects with quick, spontaneous brushstrokes of varying thickness and tone. The greatest of the Zen painters, however, is Sesshu Toyo (1420–1506), whose characteristic landscapes utilize the *haboku* (broken-ink technique), in which the artist appears to have splashed the ink on the paper. Another Zen subject is the *koan* (mental puzzle), used to aid in achieving enlightenment. A painting by Josetsu (a fourteenth- or early-fifteenth-century priest), *Catching a Catfish with a Gourd*, illustrates the problem of catching a wriggling fish with an unlikely object. Zen monochrome ink paintings, such as those mentioned here, have their roots in Chinese painting of the Song dynasty (960–1279), as exemplified in the works of the Chan Buddhist artist Mu Qi (late thirteenth century).

Momoyama Period (1573–1600)

The ten-year Onin War that began in 1467 devastated the capital and brought a period of political and social instability that was felt for nearly one hundred years. In the end, a new elite emerged consisting of feudal lords who controlled domains and acted as



Bamboo and Poppies, a screen painting by Kano Shigenobu, c. 1625. (SEATTLE ART MUSEUM/ CORBIS)

advisers to the shogun. The painting of this period reflects this change: during the first phase, the art is exuberant; in the second half of the Momoyama period, there is a return to earlier styles.

Painting in the first phase of the early sixteenth century is characterized by the lavish use of gold leaf and strong colors in striking patterns on *fusuma* (sliding-door panels) and *byōbu* (folding screens). The second phase began in the late sixteenth century, when art showed an interest in traditions of the past, particularly *yamato-e* themes. This trend was led by the wealthy merchant class, which became interested in cultural pursuits such as literature and the tea ceremony.

Practitioners of the first style often were members of the Kano school, especially the father-and-son artists Kano Eitoku (1543–1590), who used gold leaf and brilliant colors on grounds, and Kano Mitsunobu (1565?–1608), who at the death of his father became the head of the Kano school in Kyoto. Other artists developed their own individual style from Eitoku's aesthetic, including the painter Hasegawa Tohaku (1539–1610). Tohaku used color and detail to great effect and was influenced by the brightly colored, decorative screens of the Kano school; however, he also looked to earlier monochrome ink styles of the Zen tradition. Sotatsu (1600–1640) is best known for reviving *yamato-e* painting by incorporating classical themes in his work.

Genre painting was another major development in Momoyama art and continued into the seventeenth century, when it inspired the subjects of mass-produced woodblock prints. An interest in the activities of commoners first found expression in paintings showing bird's-eye views of the area in and around Kyoto. As this interest developed, the subjects became

more intimate and featured groups of figures engaged in leisure activities such as reading and playing music.

Edo Period (1600/1603–1868)

The Edo period began when Tokugawa Ieyasu became the ruler of Japan; it was a time of peace brought about by strict government controls. The arts commissioned by the ruling military class of this period show conservatism through the patronage of Kano school artists, who worked in traditional themes. Kano Tanyu (1602–1674), grandson of Kano Eitoku, carried the work of his family into the seventeenth century. Toward the end of the seventeenth century, however, the wealth of the rising merchant class (*chonin*) had a pronounced influence on the arts. Merchants wanted art to reflect their own surroundings—teahouses, the theater, and female entertainers.

One departure from the conservatism that marks this period is the development of Rinpa painting, which had its origins in the work of Sotatsu in the Momoyama period. The school was named for Ogata Korin (1658–1716), the school's most famous practitioner (the last syllable of the artist's name was combined with the term for "school," *pa*), and favorite subjects included themes from literature, such as *The Tale of Genji*, as well as flowers of the four seasons. Korin continued the decorative style of Sotatsu and created simplified, rhythmic, and bold designs using flat blocks of color against gold backgrounds.

Edo-period art was also inspired by works of Western artists. Called first *yofuga*, and later *yoga*, this style of painting used Western and Japanese materials and was characterized by its emphasis on perspective, shading, and realism. *Yofuga* was popularized by Hiraga Gennai

(1728–1779), who learned Dutch in Nagasaki, where the European traders resided. Gennai passed his ideas to his best student, Shiba Kokan (1738–1818), who worked at perfecting his command of Western artistic techniques.

Zen painting and calligraphy continued, but as Buddhism in general played less of a role in the everyday life of the Japanese people, these works of art, known as *zenga*, were produced by and for Zen masters to be used as visual aids for meditation. Landscapes were no longer the primary subject; instead, artists focused on the *koan* as a teaching tool. The most influential of these painters was Hakuin Ekaku (1685–1768), whose distinctive work includes the single character *mu* (nothingness) and an illustration of his own *koan*, the sound of one hand clapping.

Bunjinga (literati painting), also called *nanga* (southern painting, from its roots in China's Southern Song dynasty), the art of the literati, also found expression in the Edo period. The idea of freedom of expression was introduced from China in the seventeenth century and stressed that the arts of painting and calligraphy were the pursuits of the true scholar-gentleman. *Bunjinga* artists included Ike Taiga (1723–1776), Yosa Buson (1716–1783), Okada Beisanjin (1744–1820), Uragami Gyokudo (1745–1820), and Tani Buncho (1763–1840). These works varied widely in both style and content, from landscapes in ink and color on paper to strongly colored and intricately detailed bird-and-flower paintings on silk.

The Early Modern Period

The Tokugawa shogunate fell in 1868, ushering in the Meiji Restoration (1868–1912) and the beginning of Japan's modern period. The early years of the Meiji were devoted to rapid Westernization, and Western experts, including artists and architects, were brought to Japan to teach at the Technical Fine Arts School, where *yoga* was studied under the direction of Antonio Fontanesi (1818–1881), a follower of the Barbizon school. The brown and gold palette of the Barbizon school, however, clashed with the soft purples and blues of the Impressionists, which were brought to Japan by students who had spent time in Paris, including Kuroda Seiki (1866–1924).

In the 1880s, a backlash against things Western resulted in the promotion of Japan's own artistic traditions. Ernest Fenollosa (1853–1908), an American and a strong advocate for Japanese art, encouraged the study of traditional arts by establishing the Kangakai (Painting Appreciation Society), whose artists sought a balance between traditional art and new painting styles. Painters Kano Hōgai (1828–1888) and Hashi-

moto Gaho (1835–1908) were the first practitioners, and their ideals were transmitted to the next generation and into the twentieth century.

Catherine Pagani

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PAINTING—KOREA Korean painting has developed continuously from ancient times to today. Accepting foreign art trends selectively, Korean artists greatly influenced the development of ancient Japanese painting and have cultivated their own independent painting style and aesthetic sense.

Korean painting was first produced in the period of the three kingdoms: Koguryo (37 BCE–668 CE), Paekche (18 BCE–663 CE), and Shilla (57 BCE–935 CE). Despite their close interrelationship, the painting styles of each kingdom were distinct: Koguryo painting was noted for its energetic style, Paekche for its elegance, and Shilla for its speculative and meticulous subjects, as shown in *Heavenly Horse*, a painting of a white horse excavated from a tumulus built in the fifth to sixth century ce. After Shilla's unification of the Korean Peninsula in 668, popular subjects included portraits of royal courtiers, blue-green landscapes, and religious themes. Buddhism, the state religion, provided abundantly elaborate subjects for paintings. During the Koryo kingdom (918–1392), Buddhist art flourished with a greater variety of subject matter and painting styles. Two typical works from this period are *Avalokitesvara Holding a Willow Branch* and *Frontispiece for Avatamsaka Sutra*. The former is a graceful and colorful image on silk of the bodhisattva of compassion, featuring delicately rendered transparent drapery and a subtle suggestion of movement; the latter's elegant style reveals the influence of Mahayana Buddhism among the aristocracy. Artists of that time painted not only for practical purposes but also for aesthetic appreciation and spiritual cultivation.

Choson-Dynasty Painters

During the Choson dynasty (1392–1910), distinguished scholar-painters and talented painters from



Landscape with Two Men on a Boat by Cho Suk Jin in the late nineteenth century. (SEATTLE ART MUSEUM/CORBIS)

the Royal Academy of Painting, or Tohwaso, developed a firm Korean tradition of painting based on actual Korean scenes as opposed to the stylized landscapes of Chinese Song dynasty (960–1279) painting traditions, using more advanced techniques for composition, brushwork, and treatment of space. Despite the pervasive influence of the Chinese Southern Song (1126–1279) school style, Korean painters invented their own techniques and expressed their own style. The paintings of An Kyon (b. 1499) and Prince Anp'yong (1418–1453), which depicted trees, flowers, and animals, played a vital role in the development of ink painting in Japan. Chong Son (1676–1759) and his followers, meanwhile, developed their own style of true-view landscape painting by sketching actual local scenes and portraying actual landscapes. *Diamond Mountains* and *Clearing after Rain on Mount Inwang* exemplify this new style, which reflected indigenous self-awareness and interest in Korean culture, appealing specifically to Koreans. The creative and realistic interpretation of nature, as well as the refined brushwork and coloring techniques, heavily influenced the folk paintings of future generations.

Kim Hong-do (b. 1745) and Sin Yoon-bok (b. 1758) were outstanding painters who expressed their national awareness by depicting scenes of Korean daily life with humor and affection. Their works are true examples of genre painting. Kim Hong-do and his followers painted in a realistic style humorous scenes from everyday life of the common folk in typical Korean costume, as exemplified in *Village School*, *Blacksmiths*, and *Threshing*. Sin Yoon-bok chose as subjects members of the

aristocracy rather commoners, even though he shared an interest in painting Korean daily life in the manner of Kim Hong-do and his followers. Sin's genre paintings, such as *Amusement by the Lotus Pond*, depicted for the first time intimate romantic scenes of noblemen and courtesans, subject matter considered unvirtuous by the conservative Confucian society.

From 1850 to 1910, the final decades of the Choson dynasty, realistic landscape and genre paintings revealing unique Korean characteristics declined, giving way to the Ch'usa school style, which advocated an intellectual and spiritual approach to painting using simple and condensed brushwork but also incorporating a new ornamental and semicursive calligraphic style. Kim Chong-hi (1786–1865) and his followers developed the Ch'usa school, producing prolific ink brush works and calligraphy. *Orchid* and *Landscape in Winter* demonstrate the economy with which scholar-painters of the literati conveyed a heightened sense of spirituality.

During these years, several social and political upheavals caused a decline in Korean painting. Chang Sung-op (1843–1897) stood out in this period of relative artistic stagnation. He depicted a wide range of subjects, using powerful brushwork and vivid coloring; his works exercised an influence over modern Korean painting. During this period, Jesuit missionaries also brought the Western painting techniques of shading and perspective to Korea, although they remained far from prevalent.

Painting in the Twentieth Century

The traditional styles of Korean painting deteriorated drastically during the Japanese colonial regime (1910–1945) because the Japanese government enforced brutal policies aimed at obliterating Korean cultural identity. Traditional Korean painting was deliberately excluded from all academic studies. However, in 1918, Korean artists founded the Calligraphy and Painting Society, whose members organized nationalistic art survival movements through fifteen annual exhibitions. After Korea's liberation from Japan in 1945, the Korean painting tradition was revived. Artists developed new painting styles, mainly owing to the National Art Exhibition, which was established with the sponsorship of the Korean government. The annual exhibition gave promising young artists the opportunity to show their works. Also, several universities founded colleges of fine arts so that a new generation of artists could receive an appropriate education. But these efforts were suspended during the Korean War (1950–1953). In spite of hardships, many artists continued their work or study abroad. Some imitated modern abstract art; others simply depicted



A traditional Korean painter demonstrating his skills at a folk festival at the Korean Folk Village near Suweon, South Korea. (ROBERT HOLMES/CORBIS)

their tragic experiences and the horrors of war in a realistic style. Yi Chung-sop (1916–1956) is one of the academic realist artists who painted the suffering, poverty, and anguish of this period. He expressed his despair and depression by using distorted figures and violent brush strokes in paintings such as *A White Ox*. According to many critics, the cows frequently portrayed in Yi's sketches and paintings symbolize an imaginary utopia for the Korean people. Until the mid-1960s, many painters belonging to the Contemporary Artist Society also expressed their nihilist frustration and deep emotional scars caused by war by pursuing the so-called informal art movement, whose paintings were characterized by intense brushwork and irrational geometric abstraction, as in *Painting No. 1* by Pak So-bo.

Synthesizing Old and New

Since the 1970s, Korean artists have maintained active contact with Western modern art. Korean artists have participated in international exhibitions abroad and in internationally publicized art exhibitions in Korea. They have introduced such diverse art movements as pop art, neo Dada, performance art, hyperrealism, environment art, and conceptual art. However, other artists have kept alive their distinctive Korean cultural identity, expressing inner spirituality and longing for the past in an era of information technology in contemporary paintings that use neutral monochromatic coloring and techniques of tonal variation in light or dense ink quality, as exemplified, respectively, in *Joint 83-07* by Ha Jong-hyon and *Trees* by Song Su-nam.

Seong-Sook Yim

See also: **Calligraphy-Korea**

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PAINTING-SOUTH ASIA The earliest remaining examples of painting in South Asia are Buddhist cave murals such as those in the monasteries at Ajanta in India. Here, two phases of painting, corresponding to the two phases of active patronage, may be distinguished, the earlier from the first century BCE and the later from the fifth century CE. The themes depicted are mainly stories from the *Jatakas* and scenes from the life of the Buddha. The murals are made with mineral colors on a specially plastered surface and, particularly in the later phase, are characterized by hieratic scaling (the size of figures often increasing with their spiritual importance), Buddha and Bodhisattvas shown in formal poses and with iconographically determined physiognomy, and others depicted more realistically. Elements of three-dimensional modeling and perspective are mixed in with two-dimensional "flat" figuring introducing elements of realism in representations in which narrative interest clearly takes precedence over natural illusion.

Following Ajanta, few other fragmentary murals in cave or temple settings remain from medieval times; nor are there any extant examples of manuscript painting from before the eleventh century. Buddhist and Jain palm-leaf manuscripts exist from the eleventh century, showing illustrations of religious texts. These texts were venerated as sacred objects and offered as religious donations by patrons.

Extant eleventh- and twelfth-century Buddhist palm-leaf manuscripts come largely from regions in eastern India that were under the Pala kings, and they often have iconic scenes from the life of the Buddha on the inner surfaces of the wooden boards that bind the palm leaves and act as dividing elements between spaces in the text. Hieratic scaling and static figural postures executed using a rhythmic outline and filled in with flat, opaque mineral colors characterize the painting style.

The Jain manuscripts were mostly produced in the Gujarat region of western India. By the last quarter of the fourteenth century, the preferred medium for Jain manuscripts changed from palm leaf to paper, and the elongated palm-leaf format was gradually replaced by a rectangular form more suited to larger illustrations. The most popular of the illustrated Jain texts is a



Ajanta Cave 26: Stupa within nave shows several elements of early (fifth-century) Buddhist art in India. (GIAN BERTO VANNI/CORBIS)

history of the Tirthankaras (a succession of twenty-four exemplary enlightened saviors of Jainism) known as the *Kalpa sutra*. A limited but bold color scheme is used, and flattened figures with rhythmic outlines as in the Buddhist tradition are shown. There is no attempt to depict spatial depth. A characteristic of the figures is their invariable presentation in profile with a protruding invisible eye.

The oldest extant illustrated Hindu manuscripts date to the second half of the fifteenth century and resemble Jain illustrations in their conventions. Hindu myths and epics from the Puranas and *Itihasas* had by this time become standardized and pervasive in popular South Asian culture, and illustrations of episodes from some of these sources are common. From the early sixteenth century, a bold shift appears in this tradition, with the image gaining priority over the text. The by now standard rectangular form of the page is mostly occupied by the pictorial representation, with an abbreviated textual description in the upper margin and the extended text on the obverse of the page. This tradition made its appearance in Rajasthan and the western Gangetic kingdoms of northern India and

is presumed to have had royal and other wealthy patronage. The contemporaneous rising popularity of medieval Vaishnavism, with its use of an erotic symbolism to describe the mystical pastimes of Krishna, must have played its part in fueling this production. The incorporation of a Vaishnavite mystical context into literary and courtly amorous narratives characterizes this painting tradition and initiates a thematic stream that continues through the history of South Asian painting. This tradition is named after one of its earliest manuscripts, the *Chaurapanchasika*, which is fifty stanzas about the poet's secret tryst with a princess on the eve of his execution. Other popular manuscripts from this tradition include the tenth chapter of the *Bhagavat purana*, dealing with the pastimes of Krishna, particularly his dalliances; the *Gita govinda*, a twelfth-century Sanskrit text from Bengal, also dealing with the loves of Krishna; the *Rasamanjari* (Inflorescence of Romantic Moods); the *Rasikapriya* (Connoisseur of Romance); and the *Ragamala* (Garland of Musical Modes). Although these paintings attempt a depiction of spatial depth, they are essentially flat, with stylized figures shown in static profile, making hieratic gestures in starkly simplified color planes. This painterly aesthetic, commonly known as the Rajput style, remained a viable South Asian idiom of painting, reasserting itself in various times and places throughout history.

The sixteenth century also witnessed the hegemonic rule of the Mughals in northern South Asia, resulting in a new school of painting, known commonly as Mughal painting. This school traces its roots to the mid-sixteenth-century rule of the second Mughal emperor, Humayun (1505–1556), who brought two master painters from the court of Tabriz, Abdus Samad and Mir Sayyid Ali, to found his atelier at Delhi in 1555. Within a year, Humayun died from an accidental fall and was succeeded by his son, Akbar (1542–1605), who had an abiding passion in the arts of painting and storytelling. Akbar quickly built up his father's atelier. Akbar's earliest commission was the illustration of the *Tutinama* (Tales of the Parrot), which utilized a large number of artists recruited from existing South Asian painting traditions working under the direction of the Persian masters, resulting in a distinctive hybrid style and aesthetic. Mixed perspective, structured visibility of interiors, and natural elements such as mountains and trees are taken from Persian prototypes; hieratic patterning, bold coloring, and narrative arrangements are reminiscent of indigenous traditions. A crowded swirl of highly individualized figure types laid out in a space divided using natural devices to give a sense of depth, a varied subtlety of coloring,

and a judicious introduction of three-dimensional modeling to heighten the illusion of reality are innovations of the early Mughal style.

In the mid-sixteenth century, the Jesuits introduced Renaissance naturalism to Akbar's court. Space and volume began to be defined by light and shade. Aerial perspective was introduced, as well as atmospheric effects to depict spatial recession.

These techniques continued to gain prominence in paintings from the courts of Akbar's successors. The Mughal atelier remained as prolific under Akbar's son, Jahangir (1569–1627), although the thematic interest shifted from dynamic narrative episodes to carefully attentive portraiture, scenes of psychological interest, and detailed—albeit stylized—studies of flowers and animals. Although the Mughal atelier continued during the reign of Jahangir's son and successor, Shah Jahan (1592–1666), it seemed to lose its vitality and inventiveness; the paintings of this period are marked by a courtly stiffness and formalism and lack the boldness of color or composition of either Rajput paintings or earlier Mughal work. The Mughal atelier



A Mughal period eighteenth-century painting, *Prince on a Brown Horse*. (BURSTEIN COLLECTION/CORBIS)

largely dispersed during the reign of the Islamic puritan Aurangzeb (1618–1707), the son and successor of Shah Jahan.

In the Deccan kingdoms of central India, small Islamic states had established themselves since the fourteenth century and developed independent cultural traditions. Among these, the most important were the kingdoms of Golconda and Bijapur, which remained independent until late in Aurangzeb's reign. With cultural roots in Persia and Turkey, these kingdoms developed their own painting traditions, known as the Deccani style, marked by rich coloration dominated by lavender, gold, and green, a jeweler's eye for decorative pattern, and mystical or fantastic stylizations.

In the late seventeenth century, after the dispersal of artists from Aurangzeb's court, further assimilation of Mughal thematic and stylistic idioms continued in the Hindu Rajput states. The earlier predominance of Hindu religious themes was complemented by formalized portraiture of the maharaja (prince), seen in court or in gardens or terraces with attendants, or in equestrian and hunting scenes. These scenes and some Mughal stylistic elements were mostly incorporated into flat decorative "Rajput" compositions in courts such as those of Kota and Mewar. The Bikaner paintings of this period, by contrast, show a much closer affinity to the naturalism of the Mughal style while making use of the decorative patterning and mystical palette of the Deccan courts. A highly accomplished and original Bikaner artist of this period, comparable to any contemporary Mughal artist, was Ruknuddin.

In Basholi in the Punjab Hills, however, reaction against the Mughal style spawned a powerful and vibrant style of painting. Religious texts were the main sources of inspiration; portraiture was restricted to iconic profiles of the seated maharaja. This style influenced painting in other hill states, such as Bahu, Chamba, Mankot, and Guler, and remained popular through the first quarter of the eighteenth century.

The Mughal court saw a brief and brilliant revival during the reign of Aurangzeb's grandson, Muhammad Shah (reigned 1719–1748). The idealized moody romanticism of the paintings produced under him, depicting courtly love and characterized by naturalistic atmospheric effects, carried over once more to inspire two of the finest and most charismatic schools of late Rajput and Pahari painting, those of Kishangarh and Kangra, respectively.

In the mid-eighteenth century, a fruitful collaboration between Raja Savant Singh (reigned 1748–1757) of the Rajput state of Kishangarh and the two master artists of his court, Bhavani Das and Nihal Chand,



The Kishangarh painting *A Love Scene* from the nineteenth century. (BURSTEIN COLLECTION/CORBIS)

both originally from Delhi, led to the formation of a distinctive style of painting. Extending the moody romanticism of the late Mughal court, Kishangarh painting of this period produced a large corpus of highly stylized depictions of the romantic fantasies of its patron with his court singer, Bani Thani, translated into images of Krishna and Radha, respectively. A surreal mysticism pushes amorous fantasy to the borders of the supernatural in these paintings.

A similar effect, using different means and developing a different and more refined aesthetic, appears in the mid-eighteenth century in the northern hill states of Guler, Jasrota, and Kangra, and is attributed to the efforts of two artist brothers, Manaku and Nainsukh, and their students. Nainsukh's work in the court of Raja Balwant Singh of Jasrota, can be said to originate the highly prized late Kangra school. The thematic mainstay of this school is the love of Radha and Krishna, stylistically raised to a high pitch of mystical evocation.

From the mid-eighteenth century, the British presence in South Asia exerted a powerful influence on courtly taste, pushing it toward photorealism. The advent of photography itself in the mid-nineteenth century contributed in no small measure to this change. Indigenous artists trained in earlier courtly styles now adapted their work to imitate the camera. Whereas some of these artists continued serving native patrons, particularly through portraiture, several were em-

ployed by the British to record scenes of South Asian life: its landscapes, flora, and fauna. The work of these artists forms a body known as the Company School. Added to this transformation in traditional painting is the work of European painters in South Asia as well as that of an educated urban class of native painters, tutored in European styles of painting.

Around the beginning of the twentieth century, a challenge and reaction to this trend was initiated by the Calcutta artist Abanindranath Tagore and his students as part of a nationalistic rethinking of identity. Artists of this Bengal School fashioned a distinctive style affiliated with pan-Asianism and an international antimaterialism, integrating elements of Rajput, Mughal, Japanese, and Pre-Raphaelite styles. From the second quarter of the twentieth century, international modernism increasingly influenced South Asian art, opening up a variety of creative adaptations. Today, the contemporary art scene in South Asia is among the most vibrant and prolific in the world, with increasing numbers of artists making bold forays into individualized modes of expression suited to the social, cultural, and local contexts of the subcontinent.

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PAK KYUNG-RI (b. 1926), Korean novelist. Pak Kyung-ri was born in the coastal city of Ch'ungmu in South Kyungsang Province. She started her career as a writer in the mid-1950s, with the publication of such short stories as "Kyesan" (Calculation) and "Hukhuk paekpaek" (Black and White) in *Hyondae munbak* (Contemporary Literature), one of the most prestigious South Korean literary journals. The two novels that followed in the early 1960s made her famous and established her as a prominent Korean novelist: *Kim yakkuk ui ttal tul* (Pharmacist Kim's Daughters) is a

saga of sisters born to middle-class parents in a small southern coastal city; *Shijang kwa chonjang* (Marketplace and Battlefield) is a novel depicting the Korean War and how it completely destroys one happy middle-class family.

Pak wrote *T'oji* (Land) from 1969 to 1994 as a series in *Hyondae munbak*, and it was later published as a novel in sixteen volumes. It describes a family starting from the last period of the Choson dynasty in the nineteenth century through Japanese colonial rule, the liberation in 1945, the division of the nation by the United States and the Soviet Union, and the Korean War. It is a story of one family encompassing three generations, as well as a political, social, cultural, and economic history of modern Korea. Pak's novels have been translated into English, French, and German.

Choi Yearn Hong

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PAKISTAN PROFILE (2001 est. pop. 144.6 million). The country of Pakistan, located in the northwest corner of the Indian subcontinent, is officially named the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. It was



The multistory buildings in Karachi reflect the rapid urbanization Pakistan has experienced in recent years. (STAFFAN WIDSTRAND/CORBIS)



created on 14 August 1947 out of Muslim-majority territories in the northeast and northwest parts of British India. Initially consisting of two parts separated by approximately 1,600 kilometers of Indian territory, Pakistan split in 1971 when the eastern half seceded and became the Republic of Bangladesh.

Pakistan today consists of four provinces: Baluchistan, the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), the Punjab, and Sind. The federal capital, Islamabad, is a separate administrative unit and lies in the north-central part of the country. There are also two federally administered agencies, Gilgit and Baltistan, and a protected quasi-autonomous state, Azad (Free) Kashmir. The latter, annexed by Pakistan in the 1948 war with India, has its own government, although it remains under the protection and direct control of Pakistan.

While Pakistan's area is only the thirty-second largest in the world (making up around 0.7 percent of the earth's landmass), its population is widely assumed to be the world's seventh largest, though controversy surrounds the exact figures. The United Nations Development Programme estimated Pakistan's population at about 148 million in 1998; Pakistan's census conducted that same year, held after a contentious seventeen-year hiatus due to fears that a census could accentuate disputes between ethnic and sectarian groups, reported the country's population to be 130 million.

Geography

Nestled between India to the east, China to the northeast, Afghanistan to the northwest, Iran to the west, and the Arabian Sea to the south, Pakistan lies amid



PAKISTAN

Country name: Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Area: 803,940 sq km
Population: 144,616,639 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 2.11% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 31.21 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 9.26 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: -0.84 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio—total population: 1.05 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 80.5 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population: 61.45 years, male: 60.61 years, female: 62.32 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Sunni Islam, Shi'a Islam, Christianity, Hinduism
Major languages: Punjabi, Sindhi, Siraiki, Pashtu, Urdu (official), Balochi, Hindko, Brahui, English (official), Burushaski
Literacy—total population: 42.7%, male; 55.3%, female: 29% (1998)
Government type: federal republic
Capital: Islamabad
Administrative divisions: 4 provinces, 1 territory, 1 capital territory
Independence: 14 August 1947 (from UK)
National holiday: Republic Day, 23 March (1956) (proclamation of the republic)
Suffrage: 21 years of age, universal
GDP—real growth rate: 4.8% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita (purchasing power parity): \$2,000 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: 40% (2000 est.)
Exports: \$8.6 billion (f.o.b., FY99/00)
Imports: \$9.6 billion (f.o.b., FY99/00)
Currency: Pakistani rupee (PKR)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Factbook 2001*.

Retrieved 18 October 2001, from:

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formidable neighbors. Its climate is generally arid, characterized by little rainfall, hot summers, cool or cold winters, and wide climactic variations between extremes of temperature at given locations: at one end, the warm, humid coastal area along the Arabian Sea, and at the other, the frozen, snow-covered, relatively inaccessible ridges of the Karakoram Range and other mountains in the far north. Less than a fifth of Pakistan's land area has the potential for intensive agricultural use. Nearly all of the cultivable land is actively under cultivation, though outputs are low by world standards.

The northern highlands region features some of the most rugged and famous mountains in the world, including the world's second-highest peak, K-2. Some

of this region had once been part of the old Silk Road trading system that traversed Central Asia more than a thousand years ago, while other parts had been essentially cut off from the outside world because of the craggy and difficult terrain.

The Indus River plain consists of two major subdivisions corresponding roughly to the provinces of Punjab and Sind, which combine to be Pakistan's breadbasket. "Punjab" means the confluence of five rivers: the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, and Sutlej. The British attempted to harness the power of Punjab's rivers in the late nineteenth century by establishing an irrigation system in the southern part of the province, facilitating the emergence of intensive cultivation despite arid conditions.

The Baluchistan plateau, spotted with seismic fault lines, hosts an austere, dry terrain that has been compared to the surface of the moon. It has the lowest population density rates in the country.

Politics and Economics

Pakistan is constitutionally a parliamentary republic, though it has been ruled by military governments for much of its history. While the head of state is the president, the prime minister usually wields greater political influence. Three parallel legal systems exist: civil, religious, and military. The Council of Islamic Ideology, a constitutionally mandated organ, ensures that the country has no laws that are contradictory to the tenets of Islam.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), credited as the country's founder, or Quaid-e-azam, died shortly after Pakistan's creation in September 1948. His Muslim League, which led Pakistan's independence movement, was unable to transform itself into a national, consensual political party. In October 1951, the assassination of Jinnah's political successor, Liaquat Ali Khan (1895–1951), further plunged the country into a crisis of civilian leadership at the national level, from which it has yet to recover completely.

Pakistan has had five periods of military rule: 1958–1969, led by Field Marshal Ayub Khan (1907–1974); 1969–1972, led by General A. M. Yahya Khan (1917–1980); 1977–1988, led by General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq (1924–1988); and 1999–present, led by General Pervez Musharraf (b. 1943). A civilian, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928–1979), oversaw a democratic interregnum from the last four months of Yahya Khan's martial rule until 1977. Between 1988 and 1999, eight different civilian governments headed the country as the Pakistan People's Party of Benazir Bhutto (b. 1953) jockeyed for national political power with the Pakistan Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif (b. 1949). Following his assumption of the office of chief executive in October 1999, Pervez Musharraf brought charges of massive corruption against both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif and has barred them from contesting national elections ever again.

Feudal, paternalistic relations continue to dominate political processes, especially in rural areas. Access to resources, services, jobs, state functionaries, and other benefits is mediated through powerful, influential patrons who, in most instances, are men.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Pakistan's economy was constantly undergoing economic restructuring, albeit unsuccessfully, as far as bringing about

viable reforms. The hyperinflation and economic stagnation that hit Pakistan's economy in late 1996 contributed to lowering people's already weak purchasing power; morale was further lowered as the government was forced to introduce austerity measures to prevent the economy from going into default. By the mid-1990s, debt servicing was twice as much as combined public spending in health and education.

Pakistan's low human-development position underscores what the political and economic turmoil of the past two decades has wrought. Adult literacy in 1998 was a dismal 44 percent (female adult literacy was even worse, 29 percent); Pakistan has one of the highest percentages of underweight children under the age of five years in the world (38 percent); and 44 percent of the population does not have access to proper sanitation. Runaway population growth rates in Pakistan threaten to reverse whatever gains have been made in the economic arena. The average gross national product growth rate was only marginally higher than the average population growth rate in the 1990s.

Separatist movements and ethnic crises have plagued Pakistan since its inception. At independence, many people feared that Pakistan might cease to exist; East Pakistan's secession in 1971—aided by India—further aggravated that anxiety. In the 1990s, separatist movements had been largely replaced by growing sectarian terrorism.

Society

Language remains an important marker of ethnic identity in Pakistan. Urdu (Pakistan's national language), Punjabi, and Sindhi, the most commonly spoken languages, as well as most of the more than twenty other languages in the country, belong to the Indo-Aryan branch of the Indo-European language family. Most of the remaining languages are related to early Dravidian.

Muslims make up 98 percent of Pakistan's population, with Shi'ites constituting roughly 12 to 15 percent of all Muslims. Minorities include Christians, Hindus, and Zoroastrians.

Pakistani social life revolves around family and the honor of women. A family's traditions have considerable bearing on its members, influencing perceptions of proper gender roles, occupational choices, whether to pursue an education, and alliances with others. Large extended families of the past provided ample opportunity for socialization, sustenance, protection, and regulation. Isolated individuals living apart from relatives remain uncommon; even male workers who

have migrated to cities generally live with a relative or a friend of a relative. Children live with their parents until marriage; sons and their families—except in the most congested urban areas in the country—tend to live with their parents for their entire lives.

While distinctions based on *qaum* (tribe) remain significant social markers in the Punjab, particularly in rural areas, they have nowhere near the authority that tribal affiliation holds in the NWFP and Baluchistan. In the latter areas, patrilineally related lineages are the most significant bonds, with vendettas and feuds an intrinsic feature of social relations. Being irredentists (tribal members who recognize no legitimate authority other than that of their immediate tribal leader), Pakhtuns (the dominant ethnic group in the NWFP) and Baluchis (the dominant ethnic group in Baluchistan Province) have traditionally acknowledged only the legitimacy of their own groups' leaders.

In Sind, socioeconomic ties traditionally revolved around a few large dominant *waderas*, or landholding families. The remainder of people lived in persistent poverty. After independence, the millions of Hindus and Sikhs who left for India were replaced by roughly 7 million *muhajirs* (Muslims who fled from India to Pakistan at the time of partition in 1947), many of whom settled in the city of Karachi. Generally better educated than most native Sindhis, the refugees filled a vacuum in the province's commercial life and later provided the sociopolitical basis of the Muhajir Qaumi Movement, a political movement.

Urbanization has been occurring at an unprecedented rate in Pakistan, and 35 percent of Pakistanis now live in cities. Over half of all urban residents live in cities of more than a million people. Karachi and Lahore, the two largest cities, have estimated populations of 10 to 12 million and 7 to 8 million, respectively. The traditional hold—both economic and political—that local landlords enjoy in rural areas, especially in Punjab and Sind, virtually ensures the continuation of limited socioeconomic opportunities and mobility, which in turn are the greatest reasons for migration to urban areas.

Karachi has come to house the poorest slums in the country, particularly in the working-class neighborhoods of Orangi and Korangi. It has been ravaged by violence in the 1990s as contending ethnic groups vied to solidify their local power and control. Since the eruption of the civil war in Afghanistan, the city of Karachi had also become a destination point for a new kind of immigrant, refugees from Afghanistan escaping the turmoil in that country and the poverty and

dependency of the refugee camps in NWFP and Baluchistan.

Pakistan was suddenly thrust to the center of the global political arena in the days following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. As it had been a frontline state in the U.S. proxy war against the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan, it now became a frontline state in the war against global terrorism, particularly against the Taliban-led government of Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization. With Pakistan's unwavering support, military action succeeded in overthrowing the regime in Afghanistan in December 2001, and a new government has begun to take shape.

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PAKISTAN—ECONOMIC SYSTEM In August 1947, the partition of British India into the nations of India and Pakistan produced economic as well as political divisions. Britain had administered its Indian empire as a single economic unit. The partition not only caused population dislocations but also dissolved the integrated economy, and the greatest costs of this economic dislocation fell on Pakistan.

Early Stages of Pakistan's Economy

At independence Pakistan's basic physical infrastructure was extremely limited. It had only one seaport, Karachi. In Pakistan's eastern province, East Bengal, there were no port facilities. During the British period East Bengal's exports and imports had moved



In reaction to economic instability in 2001, customers of Pakistan's industrial bank seek to withdraw their funds. (AFP/CORBIS)

through the Indian port of Calcutta. Rail transport was almost nonexistent in East Pakistan and in the western provinces, and the railways ran from the interior to Karachi but not between the provinces. The world's largest irrigation system, developed by the British, was bifurcated due to the division of Punjab Province between India (which received the eastern portion) and Pakistan (which received the western portion).

Pakistan's private sector consisted of a small-scale trading class. Government services were also limited because few senior civil servants had opted for Pakistan. In short, Pakistan "was not only politically, socially, and administratively backward compared to the rest of India but was, economically, also the poorest part of the British Indian Empire" (Burki 1999: 95). The economy of the new nation was rural, with three-fourths of its gross domestic product (GDP) contributed by the agricultural sector. By 1949–1950 agriculture accounted for 53 percent of the GDP, while the services sector accounted for 39 percent. Industry was a low 8 percent of GDP.

Development of the Economic System

Pakistan's economic development began with government efforts to deal with refugee resettlement. The partition of British India had caused massive population movements, with Hindus and Sikhs leaving the

western provinces of Pakistan to move to India and Muslims leaving India to settle in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh (in particular, Karachi) in Pakistan. The transfer of people numbered in the millions. Refugee relief became the first economic development problem confronting the government. Large-scale famine was avoided, and people were resettled.

Without a sizable business community, Pakistan filled the economic void through five-year planning and development of a public-enterprise sector. The first five-year plan, 1955–1960, did not meet its ambitious targets. The GNP growth rate for the decade of the 1950s was about 2.7 percent, while the population growth rate for the same period was approximately 1.8 percent.

The decade of the 1960s saw an improved GNP growth rate of about 6.8 percent, with a population growth rate of 2.8 percent. The government of Pakistan, headed by President Muhammed Ayub Khan, proclaimed the 1960s as the decade of development, and Pakistan was viewed by many as an economic model for other economically less developed countries to follow. The 1960s saw public enterprises playing an even larger role in the economy than in the 1950s.

Ayub's government also encouraged the growth of the private sector through incentives to family-

controlled Pakistani businesses. In 1968, however, this strategy was criticized as promoting income inequalities, and Ayub's patronage of the so-called Twenty-Two Families (families engaged in business or industry, who had prospered from government concessions) was charged with creating and not alleviating poverty in the country.

With the transfer of power from military leadership to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in December 1971, Pakistan's economic development switched gears. One target of Bhutto's wrath was the industrial families who had benefited from the Ayub regime and who were thus, by Bhutto's reasoning, enemies of his government. Beginning on 2 January 1972, just thirteen days after he became president, Bhutto nationalized thirty-one banks and large-scale industrial enterprises, and on 19 March 1972, he nationalized life insurance companies.

In engaging in this nationalization program, Bhutto discouraged domestic investment and increased the government's role in the economy. Each private unit nationalized became a public enterprise. By 1977 the government controlled all domestic banking (90 percent of the finance sector), 90 percent of the energy sector (electricity, gas, and oil), 11 percent of the industrial and manufacturing sector, 50 percent of the transportation and communications sector (with monopolies in air, rail, and shipping as well as telecommunications), and 70 percent of the mining sector.

An economic event that began in the 1970s had a positive impact on Pakistan's economy: the migration of Pakistani workers from the Middle East and South Asia to the oil-rich countries of the Gulf region. Over the next several decades, millions of Pakistanis worked in the Gulf states and sent home remittances. Worker remittances formed the single largest source of foreign exchange in Pakistan for several years. However, the decade of the 1970s witnessed a slowdown in economic growth (4.6 percent) and an increase in population growth rate (3.5 percent).

By the early 1980s individual countries and the international assistance community (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, in particular) had become disenchanted with government involvement in the economy and with public enterprises. The assistance agencies began to pressure nations such as Pakistan to disinvest and privatize their public-enterprise sectors. Pakistan initially resisted pressures to privatize. Because Pakistan was playing a central role as a conduit of arms and supplies to resistance groups fighting Russian troops in Afghanistan, Pakistan government officials thought Pakistan might be immune to such pressure.

Because Pakistan was a frontline state in the Afghanistan conflict, countries providing foreign assistance did not pressure Pakistan to make economic reforms to liberalize the economy, for fear that Pakistan would no longer support the resistance movements. Foreign aid continued to flow into Pakistan during the 1980s, helping to substitute for Pakistan's inability to tax its own citizens to further its economic development. The government of Pakistan could not tax its own citizens because of political pressure from elite groups, such as large landowners, whose income from agriculture was exempt from taxation.

As a result of massive amounts of foreign assistance and remittances from its overseas workers, the GNP in the 1980s grew at more than 6.0 percent, while population growth continued around 3.0 percent per annum. This rate of economic growth did not continue in the 1990s. On 1 October 1990, President George Bush suspended economic and military aid to Pakistan, based on new information concerning Pakistan's nuclear program, thus making Pakistan the first victim of the so-called Pressler Amendment to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act. The Pressler Amendment prohibited the United States from providing economic and technical assistance to nations that were developing nuclear weapons capabilities. By this time, Pakistan was no longer a frontline state because the Soviet Union had withdrawn its troops from Afghanistan. Pakistan lost more than \$500 million in capital flow from the United States in 1990–1991.

During the 1990s, Pakistan's economy grew on average around 3 percent per annum. Domestic savings and investment declined. The most recent data show that exports dropped by 10 percent, the national debt rose to \$70 billion, which is equivalent to Pakistan's annual GDP, and its foreign exchange reserves could cover only about six weeks of imports.

Past Accomplishments and Future Prospects

Over the past five decades Pakistan's economy has moved away from agriculture to services and industry. Today the service sector accounts for 50 percent of GDP, while agriculture (at 26 percent) and industry (at 24 percent) follow. Although some attempts were made in the 1990s to liberalize the economy through limited government disinvestment and privatization, the government is still the main economic policymaker and manager of the economy.

Agenda items for economic reform in Pakistan might include maximizing domestic savings and aligning foreign inflows (foreign assistance and remittances, for example) with productive investment requirements

to promote economic growth and poverty reduction. As a result of Pakistan's help in U.S. efforts to dismantle the terrorist network of Osama bin Laden by destroying the Taliban's control of Afghanistan, the economic sanctions imposed by the United States on Pakistan after Pakistan detonated its nuclear device were lifted in 2001. In addition, Pakistan will again receive U.S. economic and technical assistance. Such external assistance will have a positive impact on the economy.

Robert Laporte, Jr.


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PAKISTAN—EDUCATION SYSTEM The educational system of Pakistan is among the least-developed in the world. The system was based on the British colonial educational system, which lasted until 1947. In that year, Pakistan gained independence as a result of the partition of the Indian subcontinent into the states of India and Pakistan. The colonial system was elitist; it was meant to educate a small portion of the population to run the government. Despite changes since independence, the Pakistani educational system has retained its colonial elitist character, a factor preventing the eradication of illiteracy.

Structure

The educational system in Pakistan is divided into five major levels. The pre-university education consists of four levels: the primary level (grades one to five), the middle level (grades six to eight), the high level (grades nine and ten, culminating in matriculation), and the intermediate level (grades eleven and twelve, leading to a diploma in arts or science). There is also a university level, which leads to undergraduate and graduate degrees.



A teacher takes advantage of the warm weather and teaches the class outdoors in Hunza. (CHRISTINE OSBORNE/CORBIS)

The Pakistani educational system is highly centralized. The Ministry of Education is in charge of coordinating all institutions involved in academic and technical education, up to the intermediate level. For education programs above that level, there is a government-designated university in each of four Pakistani provinces of Sind, Punjab, Baluchistan, and the North West Frontier. These universities are responsible for coordinating instruction and examinations of all post-secondary institutions in their respective province. Apart from the Ministry of Education, other ministries may oversee certain degree programs of relevance to their activities.

Private and nonprofit schools and universities have begun to appear in Pakistan. These include the Lahore University of Management Sciences and the Aga Khan Medical University in Karachi. As privately funded universities, they provide an opportunity for higher education for a small percentage of people who do not have a chance to pursue their studies at pub-

licly funded universities, which have limited annual admissions.

Performance

Despite the intentions of the Pakistani government, the educational system has failed to eradicate illiteracy in the post-independence era. It has also failed to train an adequate number of professionals to meet the needs of the country in different fields, which has been a major hindrance to the nation's economic development. The government-implemented reforms of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s did not address these deficiencies. By and large, they focused on replacing English, the colonial language of education, with Urdu, the language of most Pakistanis. The reforms of the 1970s also led to the nationalization of schools.

Facing the continued shortcomings of the educational system, the Pakistani government implemented new reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These took the form of three major initiatives. The government privatized the schools nationalized in the 1970s. It also reversed the process of promoting Urdu as the language of education and encouraged a return to English language in the elite private schools. Finally, the government emphasized Pakistani studies and Islamic studies as two major fields in the curriculum. This was a shift from colonial education's emphasis on British history and English culture and literature.

The reforms of the post-independence era have improved the educational system and have increased the number of literate Pakistanis, but there are still basic shortcomings. Educational funding is low, and there is little political will to make improvements. In the 1999–2000 school year, government spending on education was about \$1.8 billion, equal to 2.1 percent of Pakistan's gross national product (GNP). This amount represents a decrease from the period 1995–1997, when government expenditure on education equaled 2.7 percent of GNP, which itself was an insignificant figure for a country of approximately 144 million (2001 estimate), whose population is increasing at the annual rate of 2.4 percent.

Pakistan's expenditure on education is even significantly lower than that of India, a nation more or less at the same developmental level, with a much larger population and a heavier financial burden. During the period 1995–1997, India's expenditure on education was 3.2 percent of its GNP. In short, Pakistan's expenditure on education is not enough to meet the growing demand for educational services for the nation's increasing young population.

According to official statistics, the Pakistani literacy rate was 47 percent in 2000. This rate may be exaggerated, as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) statistics for 1998 suggest a literacy rate of 44 percent. According to the UNDP statistics for 1998, India's literacy rate was 55.7 percent, far above that of Pakistan.

The Pakistani educational system has demonstrated a discriminatory trend against women. This bias is evident in the pattern of literacy, which shows a strong correlation between gender and literacy rates. The illiteracy rate is very high among Pakistani women of all age groups. In 1998, the adult illiteracy rates were 42 percent for males and 71.1 percent for females. In the same year, the illiteracy rate for male youth and female youth was 25 and 53 percent, respectively. This gender-based discriminatory trend in education has contributed to the persistence of illiteracy and to a chronic shortage of educated people and has had a major impact on the continued underdevelopment of Pakistan.

Future Trends

The education system of Pakistan has been unable to meet the educational requirements of the Pakistanis. The system needs massive investment to increase the number of educational institutions and to train and recruit adequate numbers of educators at all levels. The Pakistani government has limited financial resources, which are inadequate to meet all of its needs. Added to large defense expenditures justified by the unstable relations between India and Pakistan, rampant corruption and a huge foreign debt (about \$33 billion in 1998) further reduce the available resources for educational purposes. Unless the deteriorating Pakistani economy improves, there is little, if any, hope for a significant qualitative and quantitative change in Pakistan's educational system in the foreseeable future.

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PAKISTAN-HISTORY Pakistan's history is often said to begin with the Arab invasion of the region of today's Sind in 611 BCE, but the territory of Sind had been mentioned earlier in Vedic literature. The nation of Pakistan was established on 14 August 1947 at the termination of the British Indian empire. The term *Pakistan* (pure land) alphabetically represents the Muslim majority areas of prepartition India: *P* for Punjab, *A* for Afghani regions (North West Frontier Province), *K* for Kashmir, *IS* for Indus-Sind, and *TAN* for Baluchistan. Bengal—a portion of which is present-day Bangladesh—was not originally included but was added by the British before partition.

Background

Joint expressions of Indian nationalism by Hindus and Muslims under the All India National Congress became ineffective after 1906, when the Indian nationalist movement was bifurcated on the basis of the Two-Nation theory, which said that British India should be partitioned into two nations on the basis of religion: one nation for Hindus and one for Muslims. From that point forward, both communities began to represent their constituencies with different platforms. Contrary to the popular notion that Pakistan origi-

nated for religious reasons, Pakistani nationalism derived from the nineteenth-century Muslim linguistic nationalism ignited by the replacement of Persian by English as the official language of the region. The linguistic factor inherent in the Hindu-Muslim conflict over the status of Hindi (spoken by more Hindus) and Urdu (spoken by more Muslims) as national languages is also salient to the Two-Nation Theory. Such differences led to separate political representation when the All India Muslim League was established under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948).

The idea of creating several independent Muslim states in Muslim-majority areas under British rule had already emerged, and the Muslim League formally adopted this position at the Lahore Convention (1940). Later, in the Pakistan Resolution, the Muslim League demanded a single Muslim state. To legitimize the Muslim League's demand, the legislative assembly of the Muslim-majority province of Sind was the first to pass a resolution in 1945 to support the idea of new Muslim states. After some regional adjustments, such as the division of Bengal and Punjab provinces, and despite reservations on the part of some conservative Hindu and Muslim groups, the British government acceded to the Muslim demand for a separate Muslim polity.

The new Islamic Republic of Pakistan was divided in two parts: East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (now Pakistan), separated by 1600 kilometers of Indian territory. East Pakistan included the East



Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf and Egyptian foreign minister Ahmed Maher, in Islamabad, November 2001, discuss the U.S. attack on the Taliban in Afghanistan. (AFP/CORBIS)



As part of the political instability that has marked Pakistan's leadership in recent years, protestors march in October 1999 following a bloodless coup by General Pervez Musharraf. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

Bengal province, and West Pakistan included Sind, West Punjab (including the Sindhu-Sagar Siraiki belt), Baluchistan, and the North West Frontier Province regions. Jinnah, as the first governor-general, deemphasized the religious nature of the new state in favor of secularism in the first session of the Pakistan Legislative Assembly. However, the postindependence emphasis on Islamic ideology as an integrative force binding together a multiethnic and multicultural country into a single nation-state did help to keep the country united.

The political and constitutional history of Pakistan has been somewhat unsteady. Pakistan has been ruled for more years by military than civilian governments and since independence has seen at least three major constitutions: 1956, 1962, and 1973. The 1973 constitution has been subjected to several suspensions and amendments under military rule. The goal of permanent democratization is reflected in the political party processes, although a decade (1989–1999) of civilian rule led to speculation that the Pakistani political culture requires a form of controlled democracy paving the road toward full-fledged future democracy. In addition, some problems originating in the partition, such as the dispute with India over Kashmir, have dominated the political and regional agendas.

Postindependence

Amid the postpartition migration of Muslims to Pakistan and Hindus to India, and with the Kashmir conflict simmering, a power struggle between Pakistan's landed aristocracy, immigrant leadership, and



TAKHT-I BAHI-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

One of the first World Heritage Sites to be so designated by UNESCO (1980), Takht-I-Bahi is an ancient hilltop Buddhist monastery near the citadel of Sahir-I-Bahol in Pakistan. The monastery has survived relatively intact since the first century CE.

business groups, which began with the death of Jinnah, led to chaos and the assassination of the first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan (1895–1951). Although the government attempted to build new infrastructure, organize the bureaucracy and armed forces, and settle the issues of refugees versus natives, all these problems, along with limited state resources, limited Pakistan's reasonably fast progress toward economic and social development. Political differences among the provinces, particularly between East Pakistan and West Punjab province, the latter of which had a disproportionately large representation in the armed forces, created a political imbalance and led to the dismissal of Bengali leaders from the government and similar problems in other provinces. Threatened by the high demographic representation of East Pakistan in the government, the powerful West Punjabi governor, Ghulam Muhammad, on his own initiative amalgamated all four Pakistani provinces into a "One Unit" scheme (1955). On the surface, the West Punjabi establishment temporarily managed an artificial balance between East and West Pakistan, but the unpopular action ignited feelings of deprivation and generated subnationalist movements. The instability in East and West Pakistan ultimately led to civil war and the founding of Bangladesh in 1973.

Ayub Khan and the Post-Ayub Era

In October 1958, General Mohammad Ayub Khan (1907–1974), the commander in chief of the armed forces, suspended the 1956 constitution and took over the government. The coup d'état was carried out in time to prevent a probable vote in the Pakistan Legislative Assembly against the unpopular One Unit scheme in West Pakistan. Ayub Khan prolonged his rule for ten years. He introduced a new constitution in 1962, focusing on basic democracy, an indirect form of representation through officials elected at the village level, who voted for assembly members and also served as an electoral college for presidential elections.



KEY EVENTS IN MODERN PAKISTAN HISTORY

- 1906** The Two-Nation Theory becomes the dominant nationalistic agenda of Muslims in South Asia.
- 1940** At the Lahore Convention, support is given to the idea of Muslim states in Muslim areas of British rule.
- 1945** The legislature in Sind Province passes legislation supporting the creation of Muslim states.
- 1947** Pakistan becomes an independent nation.
- 1951** Liaqat Ali Khan, the first prime minister, is assassinated.
- 1955** The four West Pakistan provinces are united under the One Unit Scheme.
- 1958–1965** Period of rule of General Mohammad Ayub Khan, who comes to power in a military coup.
- 1965** Pakistan loses the first Indo-Pakistan War.
- 1969** National elections are held, followed by political instability.
- 1970** Pakistan loses the second Indo-Pakistan War.
- 1971–1977** During the rule of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto stability is restored.
- 1973** Civil war results in East Pakistan becoming the independent nation of Bangladesh.
- 1977–1987** Bhutto is overthrown by Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, whose regime is marked by political repression.
- 1988** The Pakistan People's Party comes to power through elections.
- 1990–1999** Period of political instability with several changes in leadership.
- 1999** General Pervez Musharraf comes to power in a military coup.
- 2001** Pakistan supports the United States in its attack on Afghanistan.

Despite some important achievements in agriculture and industry, Ayub Khan was compelled to resign over the outcome of the India-Pakistan war (1965) while celebrating a decade of development achievements. Ayub's successor, General Yahya Khan, consented to political reform. He abolished the One Unit plan and held national elections in 1969. Two major political parties, the Awami League in East Pakistan and the Pakistan People's Party in West Pakistan, emerged with an overwhelming majority vote in their respective constituencies. The neoneationalist positions taken in the aftermath of elections in East and West Pakistan and disagreements over the formula for the transfer of power apparently led Yahya Khan to delay and postpone the transfer of political power to the newly elected leaders. The ensuing political riots, military response, and a civil war in East Pakistan graduated into another Indo-Pakistan war (1970), contributing to the fall of Dhaka (December 1970) and the creation of the Republic of Bangladesh.

Yahya Khan handed over the presidency of the rest of Pakistan to the West Pakistani populist leader Zul-

fiqar Ali Bhutto (1928–1979), chairman of the Pakistan People's Party. The Bhutto period (December 1971–July 1977) has been credited with achieving much desired stability and political reforms. However in July 1977, amid political crises created by the religious right, Bhutto was overthrown by General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq (1924–1988), who later brought Bhutto to trial on questionable charges and sentenced him to death. Zia justified the military takeover and the abrogation of the constitution on the grounds that it was necessary for the Islamization of Pakistan. The Zia regime has been characterized as the most repressive in Pakistan's history. His mysterious death in an airplane crash (1987) led to increasing democratization as political repression was eased.

The Post-Zia Period

The elections of 1988 produced a victory for the Pakistan People's Party, with Benazir Bhutto (b. 1953) as the new prime minister. The Benazir government, however, was dismissed on corruption and mismanagement charges within eighteen months. Despite her

political comeback in 1993, the prevailing mismanagement and corruption, as well as the intolerant attitude of the political opposition, led to her second dismissal. Her political rival and successor after each dismissal, Nawaz Sharif, also faced similar charges and a similar fate. By 1996, Benazir's Pakistan People's Party was defeated by the Muslim League and could not form a government even at the provincial level.

In October 1999, the chief of the Pakistan armed forces, General Pervez Musharraf, overthrew the Nawaz Sharif government. The Pakistani courts found both Benazir and Nawaz guilty of mismanagement and corruption, although both leaders have disputed the verdicts. Benazir remains in exile to avoid jail, while Nawaz faces additional charges. The new president, General Musharraf, has been advised by the Supreme Court of Pakistan to introduce economic and political reforms and elections to transfer political power to the democratically elected representatives by 2003. In 2001, he sided with the United States and supported its war on terrorism and invasion of Afghanistan while also cracking down on alleged extremists in Pakistan.

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PAKISTAN-HUMAN RIGHTS The state of Pakistan was created in 1947 as a homeland for Muslims. The result was mass rioting as people were displaced and forced to flee from their ancestral homes: Hindus and Sikhs fled to India from Pakistan, and many Muslims came to Pakistan from India. From its very inception, Pakistan was a Muslim state, in which non-Muslims had either been killed or forcibly expelled and their property seized. Given this background, civil- and human-rights abuses are not unexpected in Pakistan.

In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted by the United Nations in 1948, great importance is placed on a person's right to life, liberty, and personal security. Although Pakistan has agreed with the UDHR, within an Islamic context there is abuse of human rights, especially of women, religious minorities, and children living in poverty.

Women and Human Rights in Pakistan

To Western eyes, women in Pakistan are treated as second-class citizens. Thus, a man can freely kill his wife if he considers that her words or actions have dishonored him or his family. According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), roughly 80 to 90 percent of women encounter domestic violence, which is socially tolerated because of the Islamic culture of male dominance over women. If a woman files a charge of rape, she herself faces being charged with adultery, according to the Hudood ordinances (laws that seek to harmonize the penal code with Islamic teaching). If a woman fails to prove that she did not consent to the sexual attack, she can be flogged or even publicly stoned, according to the law. Disproving consent, and therefore proving rape, can be difficult for women, since females or non-Muslims cannot be brought forward to testify; neither have any rights in an Islamic court. Added to this is the fact that police often rape women in custody.

Honor killings are also common in Pakistan. For example, in 1997 two hundred fifty women were burned alive because they dishonored their husbands, but only six husbands were arrested. Men are rarely if ever brought to justice, since numerous loopholes in the law make prosecution next to impossible. In 2000, there were eight hundred reported honor killings of women.

According to the U.S. State Department, Pakistan is a major player in the trafficking of women, most of whom end up in Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates, where they are kept as sex slaves or house slaves.

Children and Human Rights in Pakistan

Children from poor families are also harshly treated, and their plight is completely ignored in Pakistan, according to the Commission of Inquiry for Women created by the U.S. State Department. They are frequently kidnapped or sold into slavery (bonded labor) or prostitution by their parents. Since there are no statutory-rape charges in Pakistan, girls sold into prostitution can be charged for adultery under the Hudood ordinances. Children, like women, suffer because the few laws that exist for their protection are rarely enforced.

It is also common to find children in the correctional system. Since there is no separate system for juvenile offenders, children are placed in the general prison population, where they are brutalized and abused by prisoners and guards. Such treatment violates the U.N. Conventions on the Rights of the Child. However, there is no legal will to ensure the protection of children.

According to the U.S. State Department, young boys are sold to the United Arab Emirates, where they are used as camel jockeys and are poorly fed, so that they do not gain weight.

Religious Minorities and Human Rights in Pakistan

Although Pakistan is largely Muslim, there are small pockets of Hindus, Sikhs, and Christians. It is often the practice that non-Muslims cannot own food stores, food-vending facilities, or restaurants; at times, they cannot frequent such establishments, the belief being that the touch of a nonbeliever defiles a Muslim.

This intolerant attitude in society has also found its way into the legal system in the shape of blasphemy laws, which have been created to punish blasphemers: those who defile the name of the prophet Muhammad are to be put to death; those who desecrate the Qur'an are to be imprisoned for life; and those who insult another person's religious beliefs may be imprisoned for up to ten years. According to the Human Rights Watch World Report of 1999, these laws are used to persecute non-Muslims and those deemed as non-Muslims (such as members of the Ahmadiya sect of Islam). As well, Muslims use these laws to settle scores or as a tool for intimidation. Those charged with blasphemy are in danger of being killed by lynch mobs, with the police merely standing by.

In 1999, a Christian man named Ayub Masih was sentenced to death for speaking favorably of Salman Rushdie's novel *The Satanic Verses*. Ayub Masih was shot in court by one of the men who brought the charge against him. Although Ayub Masih survived the attack, his assailant was not charged. In protest, the bishop of Faisalabad, a city in the Punjab, publicly committed suicide. The bishop's sacrifice accomplished nothing, since non-Muslims are still persecuted by way of these laws.

The Ahmadiyas, a Sufi-Muslim sect, have been completely disenfranchised in Pakistan. They have legally been declared non-Muslims and are forbidden to use Muslim forms and places of worship. In 1994 and again in 1992, the government of Pakistan issued a special ordinance in which Ahmadiyas were declared

non-Muslims. They were charged with posing as Muslims in order to undermine the orthodox version of the faith. Ahmadiya mosques are routinely attacked, and people of the congregation murdered with impunity, since the police do little to interfere. Ahmadiyas are denied burial in Muslim cemeteries, and those already buried there are exhumed. The concept behind this action is again that of ritual pollution.

The police are often corrupt; they can arbitrarily arrest and detain citizens, and people in custody have reported abuses and attacks by the police. Aside from abusing prisoners, police routinely carry out extrajudicial killings of alleged criminals. These killings are reported to the press as "encounters" and always take place at night, in deserted areas, where there can be no eyewitnesses. The scenario is generally the same: the alleged criminals were being transported when friends of the criminals attacked the convoy in an attempt to free them; in the crossfire, all the prisoners were killed. Human-rights activists judge these encounters to be faked, nothing more than murder by the police. In 2000, there were 271 reported extrajudicial killings by the police. Various human-rights groups are actively seeking to change the status quo in Pakistan.

Nirmal Dass

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PAKISTAN—POLITICAL SYSTEM The Islamic Republic of Pakistan was declared an independent and sovereign nation on 14 August 1947, when the British transferred political power to Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948) and his supporters in the Muslim League. The new nation was carved from areas of the former British Indian empire and included the provinces of Punjab, Sind, North West Frontier, and Baluchistan in the west and East Bengal in the east. Separating the western and eastern provinces were more than sixteen hundred kilometers of Indian territory.

As the first Islamic republic to be created, Pakistan, it was hoped, would become a homeland for Muslims on the Indian subcontinent. The intention of Pakistan's new leadership was to establish a parliamentary political system using the Westminster model of British parliamentary democracy as the template, with government authority vested in a legislature, an executive composed of a cabinet headed by a prime minister, and cabinet members drawn from the legislature. Recognizing the ethnic and linguistic diversity of its population, Pakistan's leaders envisioned a federal system of government whereby the central and provincial governments had both independent and shared powers.

Development of the Political System

On taking the oath of office as governor-general of the new republic, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (known to his followers as the *Quaid-e-Azam* or "Great Leader") appointed his lieutenant in the Muslim League, Nawabzada Liaquat Khan, as prime minister.

The First Decade, 1947-1958 Jinnah continued the viceregal system that the British had used to govern Pakistan as a colonial possession. Under this system, the governor-general dealt directly with senior civil servants, bypassing the civilian politicians who held ministerial positions. After Jinnah's death on 11 September 1948, Liaquat remained in the post of prime minister until his assassination on 16 October 1951. The power struggle between the offices of governor-general and prime minister then came to the fore, and this conflict has continued to reemerge throughout Pakistan's existence.

At independence, Pakistan had no constitution. The laws that substituted for a constitution were the Government of India Act of 1935 and the Independence of India Act of 1947, both enacted during the British colonial period. It was not until 23 March 1956 that Pakistan's first constitution was promulgated. The 1956 constitution maintained Pakistan's federal system, created a National Assembly, and changed the title of governor-general to president. Under the new constitution, the four western provinces were formed into one unit as West Pakistan, and East Bengal became the province of East Pakistan (the future Bangladesh).

The Ayub Khan Era, 1958-1969 Before elections could be held for a National Assembly and the two provincial assemblies, President Iskander Mirza abrogated the 1956 constitution on 7 October 1958, and General Muhammad Ayub Khan (1907-1970), commander in chief of the Pakistani army, was appointed chief martial-law administrator. In less than a month,



In Karachi, members of the Jama'at-e-Islami party protest the Indian occupation of Kashmir on 2 June 1999. (AFP/CORBIS)

Ayub removed Iskander Mirza as president and assumed total power on 28 October 1958. Thus Pakistan experienced its first military coup. Ayub appointed a commission to draft a second constitution that created a strong presidential political system. In the new constitution, the president has supreme power; the National Assembly rubber-stamps presidential decisions; the elections of the president and the members of national and provincial assemblies are indirect.

From independence and throughout the decades of the 1950s and 1960s, the people of Pakistan played almost no role in the governance of their country. Until 1971, the political elite, which included the Muslim League and the civil and the military services, governed with a heavy hand. No national elections based on universal suffrage (one person, one vote) were held. The military and civil services, created by the British, had changed little since independence. Although Ayub held indirect elections for the office of president and the national and provincial assemblies, the electorate was a group of eighty thousand so-called basic democrats, who were indirectly elected.

The Yahya Khan Interlude, 1969-1971 Ayub ruled Pakistan from 28 October 1958 until 25 March 1969, when General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan (1917-1982), the commander in chief of the Pakistani army, forced him from office in Pakistan's second military coup. Yahya Khan then assumed the title of president and almost immediately abolished the 1962 constitution; eliminated the one-unit plan; reestablished the four provinces as separate political entities; and called for the National Assembly to be directly elected by the people. After its election, the National Assembly was charged to draft a third constitution. On 7 December 1970, Pakistan's first elections based on



PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN

Adopted 12th April 1973

Whereas sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone, and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust;

And whereas it is the will of the people of Pakistan to establish an order:

Wherein the State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people;

Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed;

Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah;

Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to profess and practise their religions and develop their cultures;

Wherein the territories now included in or in accession with Pakistan and such other territories as may hereafter be included in or accede to Pakistan shall form a Federation wherein the units will be autonomous with such boundaries and limitations on their powers and authority as may be prescribed;

Therein shall be guaranteed fundamental rights, including equality of status, of opportunity and before law, social, economic and political justice, and freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association, subject to law and public morality;

Wherein adequate provision shall be made to safeguard the legitimate interests of minorities and backward and depressed classes;

Wherein the independence of the judiciary shall be fully secured;

Wherein the integrity of the territories of the Federation, its independence and all its rights, including its sovereign rights on land, sea and air, shall be safeguarded;

So that the people of Pakistan may prosper and attain their rightful and honoured place amongst the nations of the World and make their full contribution towards international peace and progress and happiness of humanity:

Now, therefore, we, the people of Pakistan, Cognisant of our responsibility before Almighty Allah and men;

Congnisant of the sacrifices made by the people in the cause of Pakistan;

Faithful to the declaration made by the Founder of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, that Pakistan would be a democratic State based on Islamic principles of social justice;

Dedicated to the preservation of democracy achieved by the unremitting struggle of the people against oppression and tyranny;

Inspired by the resolve to protect our national and political unity and solidarity by creating an egalitarian society through a new order;

Do hereby, through our representatives in the National Assembly, adopt, enact and give to ourselves, this Constitution.

Source: Pakistani.org: "The Web for Pakistanis." Retrieved 8 March 2002, from: <http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/preamble.html>.

universal suffrage were held. However, the results of the 1970 election were annulled due to the civil war that broke out on 25 March 1971. That conflict ended with the bifurcation of the nation and the creation of Bangladesh on 17 December 1971.

The Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Period, 1971–1977 Following the surrender of ninety thousand Pakistani troops in East Pakistan to the Indian army, President Muhammad Yahya Khan removed himself from office and appointed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928–1979) as

president. Bhutto's claim to national leadership was based on the results of the 1970 election, in which his party, the People's Party of Pakistan, won a majority of the seats in the four western provinces. One of his first acts as president was to remove or retire a number of Pakistani army generals to prevent another coup from taking place. Another of his immediate tasks was to convene the National Assembly (based also on the results of the 1970 election) to draft a third constitution for Pakistan. On 14 August 1973, the 1973 constitution went into effect. This constitution established a parliamentary system with the prime minister as the most important and powerful political official. The presidency was relegated to a largely symbolic office. Bhutto stepped down as president and assumed the office of prime minister. The third constitution also changed the title of the heads of the military branches from "commander" to "chief of staff," and the prime minister became the commander in chief of Pakistan's armed forces. This step was seen as an attempt to negate the power of the military. Bhutto also sought to reduce the power of the civil service by enacting a civil-service reform law coupled with a purge of approximately four thousand senior civil servants.

The Zia-ul-Haq Period, 1977-1988 By 1977, Bhutto was seeking continued legitimacy for his rule through national and provincial elections. When the results were announced, the opposition parties charged fraud and held street demonstrations that led to confrontations with the military. On 7 July 1977, Bhutto's appointee as chief of the army staff, General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq (1924-1988), led the third military coup, suspended the 1973 constitution, dismissed the national and provincial assemblies, incarcerated Bhutto and members of the opposition, banned political parties, placed the country under martial law, and assumed the title of chief martial-law administrator.

During his eleven years of power, Zia ruled the country through the civil service and later through his handpicked politicians. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for conspiracy in the murder of a political opponent, and on 4 April 1979, Bhutto was executed. Zia initiated a program called Islamization, intended to neutralize the Muslim fundamentalist activists. He added amendments to the 1973 constitution that strengthened the role of the president (Zia assumed that title on 16 September 1978) and created a second legislative branch, the Senate, as a counterweight to the National Assembly. In 1985, Zia held nonpartisan elections for the national and provincial assemblies and shortly afterward revived the 1973 constitution as amended by him. He lifted the country-wide martial law on 30 December 1985.

The Post-Zia Period, 1988-Present

Zia died in the crash of a Pakistani air force C-130 military transport aircraft on 17 August 1988. The chairman of the senate, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, as acting president, called for elections, and elections for the national and provincial assemblies (on a partisan basis) were held in mid-November 1988. The People's Party of Pakistan (led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's daughter, Benazir) won a plurality of seats in the National Assembly and was asked by Ghulam Ishaq Khan to form a government. Thus after eleven years of military rule, civilians, selected through an electoral process based on universal suffrage, would again attempt to govern.

The political leadership structure created by Zia revolved around three power centers: the president, the prime minister, and the chief of the army staff. This troika, as it is referred to in Pakistan, was required to work together to be effective. Unfortunately conflict rather than cooperation marked the years of civilian governance following Zia's death. From 2 December 1988 to 12 October 1999, prime ministers were dismissed by presidents three times (August 1990, April 1993, and November 1996) and once by the chief of the army staff (October 1999). Neither Benazir Bhutto (prime minister from December 1988 to August 1990 and again from October 1993 to November 1996) nor Muhammad Nawaz Sharif (leader of the Muslim League and prime minister from November 1990 to April 1993 and again from February 1997 to October 1999) completed the terms for which they were elected. During his last term as prime minister, Nawaz pushed through legislation that eliminated the power of the president to dismiss elected governments and to appoint chiefs of staff of the armed forces, legally removing one leg (the president's) from the three-legged "power stool." He also attempted to place the chief of the army staff under the control of the prime minister, thus concentrating power into one position. In the manner of his military predecessor, Zia-ul-Haq, General Pervez Musharraf (b. 1943) assumed the title of chief executive after the 11 October 1999 coup and initiated an accountability process whereby Nawaz Sharif was convicted of hijacking and terrorism by an antiterrorism court and sentenced to life imprisonment. Furthermore, General Musharraf publicly vowed (on 7 February 2000) that power would never again be transferred to either Nawaz Sharif or Benazir Bhutto and stated that it would take five to ten years to "set things right in the country."

Pakistan has experienced over twenty-five years of governance by military leadership and only fifteen years of governance by democratically elected civilian

leadership. Political power is concentrated in the central government, and the civil service plays a major role in the governance of the country. The outlook for a restoration of civilian-led government based on periodic democratic elections appears dim. General Musharraf has incarcerated some Islamists and prohibited others from staging protests against Pakistan's involvement in the elimination of the Taliban as the controlling power in Afghanistan and against the coalition and U.S. efforts to eliminate the terrorist group headed by Osama bin Laden.

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PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) was founded by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928–1979), former foreign and prime minister and first PPP chairman, in December 1967 to launch a political movement that successfully led to the resignation of President Ayub Khan in 1969 and to national elections in 1970. Although the PPP is not a leftist party, its manifesto emphasized nationalizing banks, industries, insurance companies, schools, and colleges and promised land reform combining Islamic and mild socialist values to represent the PPP's diverse constituencies. The populist PPP won several elections, in 1970, 1977, 1988, and 1997. After the East Pakistan debacle (1971), Bhutto ruled residuary Pakistan as president and later as prime minister. PPP rule during the 1971–1977 period has been credited with the maintenance of relative stability in Pakistan. After the military takeover of 1977 that enforced Islamization, particularly after the controversial hanging of Bhutto in 1979, the PPP was severely repressed.

Since 1979, the PPP has been headed by Bhutto's wife, Nusrat Bhutto, and daughter, Benazir Bhutto (b.

1953). The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy brought the PPP back in power twice, in 1988 and 1993, with Benazir Bhutto as prime minister, only to be dismissed in 1990 and 1996, respectively. Since 1997, the PPP has been an opposition movement. Following her 1999 conviction for corruption, Benazir Bhutto has lived in exile, and the PPP, despite relative popularity, has experienced organizational problems.

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PAKUALAMAN In eastern Yogyakarta city lies the well-preserved Pakualaman Palace, home of the Pakualaman principality. The four palaces—namely Yogyakarta, Pakualaman, Surakarta, and Mangkunegaran—in the Yogyakarta and Surakarta regions each represent a different past political entity, but all are descendants of the Javanese Mataram kingdom.

Pakualaman itself is a relatively new principality, created by British Lieutenant-Governor Sir Thomas Raffles on becoming aware of correspondence between the royal households of Yogyakarta and Surakarta proposing they jointly oust the British from Java. In 1812 Raffles marched on the Yogyakarta *kraton* (palace) and its sultan, Hamengkubuwono II. British troops looted the *kraton*, destroying its archives and cultural treasures. The sultan's brother and former confidante, Natakusuma, who assisted the British, was rewarded with a territory of 4,000 households carved from Yogyakarta. Natakusuma took the title Paku Alam and is described in historical accounts as very savvy. He and his supporters adopted European manners and dressed in British cavalry uniforms for formal occasions (Carey 1992: 20), thus gaining greater access to Raffles' court. Paku Alam offered priceless Javanese artifacts to Raffles, well known for his interest in maritime Southeast Asia. Paku Alam is also thought to have informed the British of an alliance between Yogyakarta and Surakarta. While Paku Alam's independent territory was established in June

1812, the agreement was not formally sealed until 17 March 1813 when the Contract and Engagement between Britain and Paku Alam was signed (Carey 1992: 14). Contention with the British arose in October 1812, when Paku Alam attempted to claim more lands; Sepoy troops of the British garrison blocked further enlargement.

During World War II Paku Alam IIX forged an agreement with the Sultanate of Yogyakarta to accept a subordinate role to the main *kraton*. Both the sultan and Paku Alam supported the independence struggle led by Sukarno against the Dutch (1945–1949). In recognition of this, Yogyakarta retains a special status whereby the sultan of Yogyakarta is the provincial governor. In the interregnum after the death of Hamengkubuwono IX, Paku Alam IIX was appointed interim governor.

While most people living in the Yogyakarta area give their allegiance to the city's sultan, the principedom of Pakualaman has found a niche in promoting Javanese culture. Paku Alam and his immediate descendents (Paku Alam II and Paku Alam III) were all gifted in architecture, culture, and literature and did much to restore Javanese high culture in the Yogyakarta region after British destruction of the Yogyakarta *kraton*. The palace itself remains a repository of Javanese culture with displays of architecture, antiques, regular performances of Javanese gamelan orchestra, and other cultural arts.

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PALAUNG STATE LIBERATION PARTY

The Palaung State Liberation Party is an armed opposition movement among the Palaung (Ta-ang) people of the Shan State of Myanmar (Burma). Related to the Wa, the Palaung and their villages are found in a number of districts in the state. The main military activities, however, have been centered in the northern mountains between Namhsan, Namkham, and the tea-growing valleys of the former Tawngpeng substate. In these areas a Palaung *sawbwa* (prince) traditionally ruled.

Palaung culture and politics have always been linked with wider developments in the Shan state. Like the Shans, most Palaungs are Buddhists. In 1963 the first Palaung insurgent group, the Palaung National Force (PNF), was established under the Shan State Army before setting out on its own three years later. In 1968 a damaging split occurred between PNF troops led by Kham Thaug and those headed by three sons of the last Tawngpeng *sawbwa*. Kham Thaug's troops came out on top, after which the surviving son, Chao Nor Far, merged his remaining soldiers with the Shan United Revolutionary Army based in the south of the state.

In 1976 the PNF was reconstituted as the Palaung State Liberation Party (PSLP) and joined the National Democratic Front. Kham Thaug died in 1979 from battle wounds, but the PSLP worked closely with the Kachin Independence Organization and the SSA and grew into an effective military force during the 1980s, with an estimated one thousand soldiers under arms.

In 1991 the PSLP was one of the first NDF groups to agree to a cease-fire with the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) government. Under the leadership of Aik Mone, the PSLP embarked on a number of peace and development schemes in its territory, designated as Shan State Special Region 7, with the expectation that this would eventually become a Palaung autonomous region in the country's future constitution.

Martin Smith

See also: Ethnic Nationalism and Armed Conflict—Myanmar; Kachin Independence Organization; Myanmar—History; Myanmar—Political System; Shan State; State Law and Order Restoration Council—Myanmar; United Wa State Party

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PALEOANTHROPOLOGY—CENTRAL

ASIA Central Asia, covering the territories of present-day Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, was home to numerous prehistoric cultures. Their development was characterized by three main stages: a food collection economy of the Stone

Age (c. 800,000–6000 BCE), a food production economy of early agricultural communities (c. 6000 BCE), and more highly developed proto-urban civilizations in southern Central Asia (5000–2000 BCE) and more archaic stockbreeding cultures in the northern part of the region (4000–1000 BCE). (A proto-urban civilization is at an early developmental stage of urban civilization characterized mainly by the presence of large, dense settlements and the differentiation of the population into specialized occupational groups.) The rate of progress was mainly influenced by environmental conditions. Archaeological excavations in Central Asia reveal a wide range of localities, dated back to all the Stone Age subdivisions—the Paleolithic (Old Stone Age), Mesolithic (Middle Stone Age), and Neolithic (New Stone Age)—as well as to the Bronze Age.

Paleolithic (c. 800,000–10,000 BCE)

Occasional dissociated (unrelated) Lower Paleolithic (c. 800,000–100,000 BCE) implements have been found in the mountainous eastern part of Central Asia. These were a crudely made core (a piece of obsidian or stone from which flakes have been struck to make implements) and a primitive axe from the lower terrace of the Vakhsh River in northern Tajikistan, as well as stone flint workings from the Kuldara site in southern Tajikistan and the On-Archa site in the Tian Shan range in Kyrgyzstan. Similar finds were made near the port of Turkmenbashi in Turkmenistan, and in southern Kazakhstan at the Borikazgan, Tanirkazgan, Shabakty, Akkol-1, and Kazangap sites.

The most ancient Central Asian human remains (c. 650,000–600,000 BCE), along with a great variety of pebble tools, were excavated at the Sel-Ungur site in the Fergana Valley. The recovered artifacts were crudely made chopping tools, nondescript cleavers, amorphous cores, and triangular and oval hand axes. Lower Paleolithic multilayer sites (c. 200,000 BCE) were discovered in Uzbekistan, near its capital Tashkent (the Kulbulak site), and in southern Tajikistan (Karatau-1 and Lakhuti-1). Both culturally and historically, the Central Asian pebble cultures are connected with the pebble-tool zone in Southeast Asia and the northern part of the Indian subcontinent.

During the Middle Paleolithic (c. 100,000–40,000 BCE) a cold and humid climate, together with an abundance of water, vegetation, and fauna species, made Central Asia a favorable human environment. Hundreds of Middle Paleolithic sites have been discovered throughout Central Asia. The most remarkable discovery was made in the Teshik-Tash cave of the Baisantau Mountains in southern Uzbekistan. Aside

from a considerable quantity of stone workings and burnt animal bones, the well-preserved skull and skeleton of a Neanderthal boy were recovered. The burial site, surrounded by wild goat horns, suggests the existence of primitive beliefs (because a funeral ritual had been observed) in Central Asia during the Middle Paleolithic.

Central Asian localities dating from the Upper Paleolithic (c. 40,000–10,000 BCE) are less numerous. In Upper Paleolithic cultures, a flint industry (frequently repeated microliths of a particular material or function) was predominant. Microliths are small (1–5 centimeters) stone tools, mainly thin blades with sharp cutting edges, usually geometric in shape. One of the earliest sites of the period was excavated near Turkmenbashi, where a great number of prismoid (in the form of a prism) cores were found. One of the best-studied Upper Paleolithic sites in Central Asia is the Samarqand campsite, which has three cultural layers. Other major Upper Paleolithic sites are Kapchigai and Hoji Gor in the Fergana Valley, Uchtut and Ijont in the Zeravshan Valley, Kulbulak, near Tashkent, Uzbekistan, and Shugnou and Yakshi in the Pamir Mountains in Tajikistan. The Yakshi site, at 2,000 meters above sea level, is one the highest known Paleolithic sites.

Mesolithic (c. 10,000–6,000 BCE)

The majority of the Mesolithic cultures in Central Asia developed a distinct blade-type industry, microlithic techniques, and tools of geometric shapes. Mesolithic cultures were found in the Caspian region, western Tajikistan, the Fergana Valley, and the eastern Pamir Mountains.

The Caspian group is the best studied and comprises the lower layers of the caves of Jebel and Dam-Dam-Chashma in the Balkhan Mountains, as well as the Kailiu Grotto in western Turkmenistan. Among the artifacts excavated were flint piercers, pointed scrapers, backed blades, and lunates (crescent-shaped flints with their inner edges untrimmed and the thick, rounded edges having small chips removed; used as arrowheads). The main activities of the eastern Caspian Mesolithic tribes were hunting and fishing. Cattle breeding had already begun, but due to the desert conditions, domesticated animals were not a major food source during the Mesolithic.

The sites in western Tajikistan are located along freshwater sources, mainly tributaries of the Amu Dar'ya River. One of the earliest of these is Kui Bulein, where blades with blunted edges, points (flint implements in the form of blunt darts, pointed at one end and oval or flat at the other), and geometric imple-

ments were found. Symmetrical trapezoids and a small lunate were recovered at the Chi-Chor-Chashma site. A cultural layer has not been preserved at either site; both are most likely the remains of temporary camps used by hunters.

The Fergana Valley group includes both open sites and caves. The Obi-Shir and Tash-Kumir caves yielded flint implements, distinguished by their large size, while the majority of the Fergana artifacts are markedly microlithic. A similar culture, with a wide use of microblades, was discovered in northern Afghanistan.

The culture of the eastern Pamirs comprises approximately twenty localities, including two large open sites—Karatumshuk and Oshkhona—which were summer campsites for roving hunters. The flint industry of this culture is distinctive. Crudely made discoid cores, scrapers, backed blades, arrowheads, and pebble choppers, retaining superficially archaic forms, are distinctly related to the Late Paleolithic of the Siberian-Mongolian tradition. Rock paintings of typical hunting scenes, executed in red ochre mixed with animal fat, were discovered in the Shakty cave.

Neolithic And Aeneolithic Cultures (6000-2500 BCE)

The shift to a production economy during the Neolithic period (a global phenomenon known as the Neolithic revolution) led to profound changes in human society. The transition, which began with the domestication of animals and cultivation of plants, gradually diminished the importance of hunting, fishing, and plant gathering. With the introduction of copper and bronze, a higher level of productivity was reached. Wide use of firing furnaces and the potter's wheel, a greater variety of sophisticated tools, and stone and ceramic seals (devices for impressing characteristic marks into a soft surface to indicate ownership or authenticity) point to the establishment of a proto-urban civilization with crafts and incipient trade, which had been already separated from plant cultivation and stockbreeding.

The Djeitun culture (6000 BCE), located in the Kara Kum Desert of southern Turkmenistan and adjacent districts of Iran, is the earliest known agricultural civilization in Central Asia. Djeitun artifacts include microlithic flint geometric tools, polished flat discs of irregular shape, sandstone querns (handmills for grinding grain), pestles, mortars, and flat-bottomed clay pots made without the use of a wheel and decorated with simple painted patterns. All the sites (approximately twenty) were small villages, the largest of

which—Chopan-depe—occupied an area of two hectares. The settlements consisted of one-room houses built of cylindrical clay bricks. Owing to the dry climate, primitive forms of irrigation, such as spring and summer flooding, were used. The Djeitun had domesticated sheep and goats, although hunting was still an important element of their everyday life.

Unlike Djeitun agrarians, Neolithic inhabitants of the Caspian area in Turkmenistan were fishermen and hunters. The main sites are the upper layers of the caves of Dam-Dam-Chashma and Jebel (5000—4000 BCE), where hand made round-based pottery with incised decoration, as well as notched blades, scrapers, trapezoids, and arrowheads, were excavated. Other sites in northern Turkmenistan are located east of the Caspian Sea (Hoja Su, Chagmak, and Janak) and in the Greater Balkhan Desert (Bash Kariz and Tash Arvat).

The largest Neolithic culture in the Khorezm area, along the lower Amu Dar'ya, is the Kelteminar (c. 5000–3000 BCE); the earliest occupation site is Janbas-kala-4, in the Kyzyl Kum Desert. The Kelteminar artifacts include richly decorated round-based pots (early Kelteminar) and less decorated globular vessels with flat bases (late Kelteminar). The Kelteminar's main activities were fishing, hunting, food gathering, and incipient stock breeding.

The Neolithic culture of Djeitun in southern Turkmenistan was followed by a number of more developed Aeneolithic (transitional between Neolithic and Bronze Age) cultures, characterized by the use of copper. Excavations at the Anau mounds brought to light pottery, distinguished by its ample sand admixture, polished clay, and skilled firing. These are thin-walled, elegantly shaped vessels, mainly drinking bowls with concave bases. Other major Aeneolithic complexes in southern Turkmenistan, including the Chakmakli, Govich-depe, Koushut, and Monjukli sites, yielded pottery painted with rhomboids flanked by two triangles.

The lowest three cultural layers (5000–3000 BCE) of the major Aeneolithic-Bronze Namazga culture, located along the foothills of the Kopet Dag Mountains in Turkmenistan, marked the further growth of a food production economy, which resulted in a number of large agricultural settlements, where stock breeding almost totally replaced hunting. Weaving, as indicated by a large number of excavated baked-clay spindle whorls, was well developed. The largest settlements are Beurme, Karantki, and Tokai of the western zone, Kara-depe and Namazga-depe of the central zone, Chaachi-Sai and Meana-Sai of the eastern zone, and the Geoksyur Oasis north of the Kopet Dag. By the middle of the third millennium BCE, the Namazga-

depe irrigation system was improved by the introduction of dykes, dams, and canals. Decorated pottery and figurines were far more sophisticated.

Sarazm, along the Zeravshan River in Tajikistan, near the Uzbek border, revealed totally unexpected urban settlements with painted pottery, giving evidence of direct contact with Baluchistan, Pakistan, in the early Aeneolithic period (c. 3000 BCE). These settlements were unexpected because the area had not been known for its developed urban settlements dated back as early as 3000 BCE.

The Neolithic Hissar culture in the mountainous eastern area of Central Asia is characterized by crude pebble tools. The main sites—Kun Bulien, Tutkaul, and Seyed, in southern Tajikistan—are located near sources of fresh water. The Hissar artifacts include arrowheads, polished axes, mortars and granite querns, bone piercers, and handmade point-based vessels (meant not to be stood on the flat end but rather to be dug into the earth) with textile impressions. The main occupations of the Hissar people were hunting, food gathering, agriculture, and stock breeding.

Bronze Age (2500-1000 BCE)

In Central Asia bronze replaced copper at the beginning of the third millennium BCE. Productive forms of economy further evolved that led to the appearance of larger proto-urban settlements with multiroom houses, defensive walls, and craftsmen's quarters.

The majority of Central Asian Early Bronze settlements (2500–2000 BCE) have been discovered in southern Turkmenistan. The largest sites are Ak-depe, Namazga-4, Altyn-depe, and Ulug-depe. Excavations at the best-studied site (Altyn-depe) yielded the remains of a 2-meter-thick fortification wall with towers, four collective funeral chambers, and ten building complexes. The typical pottery is a wheel-made red burnished ware with black spots. The few metal articles discovered include a vessel, makeup sticks with thickened ends, a spiral-headed pin, chisels, earrings, and punches (tools, usually short metal rods, variously shaped at one end for different uses). Cattle breeding continued to play a significant role. Two- and four-wheeled vehicles, most likely drawn by Bactrian camels, were used.

The most important Middle Bronze Age centers (2000–1600 BCE) in southern Turkmenistan were the urban settlements of Namazga-depe and Altyn-depe, where differences in social status of the inhabitants is evident in domestic architecture and funeral remains. A cult complex at Altyn-depe, built with one-meter thick

blocks, suggests separation of a priestly class. Craft specialization is evident from the remains of mass-produced standardized, but elegant, pottery. Fields were artificially irrigated, although by less advanced techniques than those in use at the time in Mesopotamia.

The Late Bronze period (1500–1000 BCE) in southern Turkmenistan is characterized by the collapse of the major urban settlements in the piedmont zone (at the foot of mountains) and an overall decline in known settled areas. There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon, the most probable of which are environmental degradation and mass tribal migrations. Excavation sites at the Sumbar cemetery, the Namazga "tower," Tekkem-depe, Ulug-depe, and elsewhere have yielded bronze weapons, such as ribbed arrow and lance heads with new types of ornamentation. In Turkmenistan, Bronze Age sites also have been found in the Kelleli, Gonur, Auchin, Togolok, and Takhirbai Oases in Merv, along the Murgab River.

The Bronze Age in Khorezm, along the lowermost course of the Amu Dar'ya, is represented by the Tazabagyab culture (second millennium BCE), considered a southwestern extension of the Andronovo culture, spread into the neighboring steppe zone. The largest and best-studied Tazabagyab site is Kokcha-3, where a collective burial tomb has been excavated. The pottery items were cooking pots decorated with triangles. Bronze articles included awls, pendants, and bracelets.

Bronze Age sites in southern Uzbekistan have been recovered at four oases along the Surkhandarya River, and near minor streams emerging from the Baisuntau Mountains. Larger sites are Sapalli-tepe, Djarkutan, Buston, Bandikhan-1, Molali, and Buirachi-tepe. The most completely studied site, Sapalli-tepe, is remarkable for its planned architecture and rich and fairly well-preserved graves. The Bronze Age sites in this part of Central Asia do not appear to be as developed or densely occupied as the agricultural oases in Turkmenistan.

In northwestern Afghanistan, the Harappan civilization flourished in the small urban site of Shortughai, an advanced post on the Indus River, from 2600 to 1600 BCE. The post was started partly for the exploitation of lapis lazuli.

The Bronze Age along the lower Zeravshan River is represented by the Zamanbaba cemetery and settlement, comprising several oval earthen huts. The ceramics excavated were mostly hand made egg-shaped vessels with rounded or pointed bases and holes along the rim. Other artifacts include feeding troughs, cross-shaped beads, cylindrical clay pinheads, and metal mirrors. The Zamanbaba people were agriculturists and stockbreeders.

Along the middle section of the Zeravshan, the urban site of Sarazm declined, with evidence of intrusion from the neighboring Andronovo steppe culture.

The Fergana Valley had an established agricultural and stockbreeding economy, visibly influenced by the pastoral farming tribes of the neighboring steppe. The Kayrakkum culture spread over the western Fergana Valley, on the left bank of the Syr Dar'ya River. The Kayrakkum were farmers, stockbreeders, fishermen, and hunters. The proximity of copper ore deposits facilitated the development of a distinguished bronze industry and made mining an important part of the Kayrakkum economy as well.

The other Bronze Age culture discovered in the Fergana Valley is the Chust. The larger settlements are Dalverzin and Ashkal-tepe, although there were also smaller ones—Chust and Dekhkan. The inhabitants engaged in farming and stockbreeding; weaving was also of great importance. Among the implements discovered were bronze sickles, chisels, knives, awls, and needles; weapons included arrowheads and spearheads; some horse harness equipment was also found. Chust pottery was made without the use of the potter's wheel. Thin-walled tableware, covered with red and black patterns, is very similar to that of southern Turkmenistan.

Assessment

The prehistoric development of human society in Central Asia proved the successive passage from a food collection to food production economy. The shift to agriculture and stockbreeding in Central Asia (the Neolithic revolution) made the rate of development and cultural differentiation between the southwestern and northeastern extremities of the region increasingly tense. Agrarian oases of Djeitun, Altyn-depe, and Namazga in southern Turkmenistan were almost a millennium ahead of the more archaic cultures of Khorezm, Fergana, and Hissar. Nevertheless, by the beginning of the first millennium BCE, when major urban settlements in southern Turkmenistan declined, their cultural achievements had been diffused farther northeastward into regions where farming had been at a very primitive level, or almost totally unknown. The intensified contacts between the Central Asian cultures, which led to their distinct drawing together, were further enhanced during the Iron Age, when recorded history began.

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PALEOANTHROPOLOGY—EAST ASIA

In East Asia, the study of human origins and evolution, now known as paleoanthropology, began in 1923, with the discovery of Peking Man in a cave in China. The discoveries there followed on discoveries of early fossilized hominid remains in Java in the 1890s; similar discoveries were also being made during the 1920s and 1930s in Africa.

The First Discoveries

When Otto Zdansky, an Austrian geologist, discovered a worn and fossilized molar tooth at Zhoukoudian, forty-eight kilometers southwest of Beijing



DISCOVERY OF PEKING MAN— WORLD HERITAGE SITE

The site of the discovery of the Peking Man, located 42 kilometers southwest of Beijing, was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1987. The remains, dating from 18,000 to 11,000 BCE, are essential to understanding the prehistory of Asian societies.



PALEOANTHROPOLOGY—EAST ASIA

This is a description of the Cherchen Man, the most famous of the 3,000 year-old Caucasoid mummies found at Ürümqi, a stop along the ancient Silk Road. The desiccated corpses and their burial clothing and tapestries survived surprisingly well, giving archeologists clues to the genetic makeup and cultural origins of the mysterious mummies.

His face is at rest, eyes closed and sunken, lips slightly parted; his hands lie in his lap, while his knees and head are tilted up—like a man who has just drifted off to sleep in a hammock. Visitors tend to tiptoe and lower their voices. A two inch beard covers his face, and his light brown hair has been twisted—plied from two strands, not braided from three—into two queues that hang halfway down to his chest. Here and there white hairs glint among the yellow-brown betraying his age—somewhere past fifty. He would have been an imposing figure in life, for he once stood six feet six inches tall.

Bright ocher-yellow face paint curls across his temple, sprouting short rats on its outer cheek and reversing its curl as it meanders down to the flatland of his cheek before climbing across the great ridge of his nose—not a low bridged Asian nose but a veritable Sierra Nevada of a nose—to the far side. . . .

Passing from the face, one's eye jumps between the violently colored leggings and the purply-red brown two-piece suit that covers most of the man's body. Originally the man wore soft white deerskin boots to above his knees—the left one is still there. But the right one has torn away, revealing horizontal stripes of gaudy red, yellow, and blue that put Ronald McDonald in the shade. . . .

And his suit? By way of decoration on the plain-weave fabric, the tailor of the Cherchen Man's suit whipped bright red yarn as a sort of piping over the seams of both the shirt body and around the neck and front opening of the shirt. It produces a very subtle but very effective ornamentation—subtle because the piping is so fine and because its bright red color rests against the purply-red background. . . . Holding the man's shirtfront together is a waist cord plaited from yarns of five different colours: bright red, dark purply brown, blue, green, and yellow.

Source: Elizabeth Wayland Barber (1999) *The Mummies of Ürümqi*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 26–27.

(Peking), he recognized the similarities between it and the molar teeth of living people. The limestone deposits at Zhoukoudian also contained the remains of extinct mammal species, however, so that Zdansky realized that the humanlike tooth was extremely old. Subsequent work at Zhoukoudian between 1927 and 1937 by European, North American, and Chinese

scholars, including Johan Anderson, Davidson Black, Pei Wenzhong, and Franz Weidenreich, confirmed the age and importance of the cave deposits at Zhoukoudian. By 1937 the fragmentary remains of at least thirteen skeletons of *Homo erectus* (an extinct relative of modern humans, who lived between 1.6 million and 200,000 years ago) had been recovered, along with

broken mammal bones and associated cultural remains, such as stone tools. It is now known that the layers containing these fossil bones date to between 400,000 and 250,000 years before the present. (These layers at Zhoukoudian have been dated by using uranium series dating of bone, electron spin resonance of dental enamel, paleomagnetic sequences of sediments, and other methods. The results are reasonably consistent with the hominid fossils between 400,000 [bottom] and 250,000 [top] years ago.)

Later Excavations at the Peking Man Site

The archaeological deposits at Zhoukoudian became known as the "Peking Man" site. In one of the greatest scientific tragedies of the twentieth century, all the Zhoukoudian fossils discovered before World War II were lost during an attempt to send them to the United States after the Japanese army invaded China. Fortunately the German anatomist Franz Weidenreich had made detailed casts of the bones, and in association with his monographs, these enabled continued study of the fossils after they were lost.

After World War II, the Institute of Paleontology and Paleoanthropology in Beijing continued excavations at the Peking Man site and at other sections of the former cave complex. Between 1949 and 1966, five teeth, pieces of a tibia and humerus, and fragments of a skull and mandible were recovered.

Chinese archaeologists have identified thirteen layers in the excavated deposits at Zhoukoudian. *Homo erectus* remains and stone artifacts have been reported from Layers 3 to 9, with evidence of fire claimed for Layers 3, 4, 6, and 10. As well as *Homo erectus* fossil bones, the remains of more than ninety other mammal species have been recovered from the Peking Man site. These mammals included giant deer, hyena, saber-toothed cat, and horse. While some of these bones may be remains of *Homo erectus* meals, the majority are probably the result of carnivore activity in the caves.

Long-established interpretations of the excavated materials from the Peking Man site, including the evidence for fire, hearths, and stone- and bone-artifact manufacture, were challenged by Louis Binford (an American archaeologist) and his coworkers in the mid-1980s. They argued that natural processes rather than *Homo erectus* activity produced the ashlike deposits in the cave, and they claimed that many of the broken bones and stones were not artifacts. This opinion is generally accepted by North American and Western European scholars, although there is some resistance among Chinese scholars.

Homo erectus: Who, When, and Where?

At present the oldest reliably dated examples of *Homo erectus* remains come from the East African Rift Valley and are approximately 1.6 million years old. *Homo erectus* people appear to have evolved in Africa and then gradually spread through the tropical Old World (that is, the Eurasian landmass), reaching Java in Indonesia 800,000 years ago. The earliest *Homo erectus* examples from East Asia are those at the Chinese sites of Gongwangling and Chenjiawo in Shaanxi province in east-central China, dated to between 700,000 and 500,000 years ago. These dates are older than the Peking Man site (400,000 to 250,000 years ago). Pat Shipmann (an American archaeologist and science journalist specializing in interpreting faunal remains from archaeological sites) and others have argued that *Homo erectus* people were able to move out of Africa because hunting furnished more of their food than was the case with earlier human ancestors such as *Australopithecus*, who lived from around 5.3 million to around 1.6 million years ago. Those who depended on plant foods were limited in their movements by the often-restricted distributions of some preferred food-plant species.

Although *Homo erectus* people are known primarily from fragments of skull and jaw and isolated teeth, the discovery of more complete skeletal remains in East Africa has enabled a more thorough understanding of their appearance. At least in East Africa, they appear to have been as tall as modern people living in the same region. They had very long limbs and linearly shaped bodies, common among human populations living in hot climates today.

Much less is known about their East Asian descendants, but those who lived in the colder parts of their range probably were shorter and more robust than their African ancestors. While their body size was similar to modern humans, on average *Homo erectus* people had smaller braincases, larger teeth, and facial skeletons with heavier bones than *Homo sapiens* (the present human species). Above their eyes, a shelf of bone called a brow ridge projected; their foreheads receded; and their skulls were longer and generally flatter in shape. Areas of muscle attachment on the skull and other parts of the skeleton were more developed than in modern humans.

The Origins of Modern People in East Asia

At the time the initial discoveries were being made at the Peking Man site, the remains of other potential human ancestors had already been found in Java, Europe, and Africa. Franz Weidenreich noticed that

there were anatomical differences between the fossil remains from different regions. His explanation of these physical differences linked variations among living people with geographic variations in the past. *Homo erectus* had spread over a large geographic area and had adapted to different regional environmental conditions. Variations in geographic adaptations, low population densities, limited interbreeding, and potential cultural differences between populations might have given rise to regional differences in physical appearance and physiology among ancient people. Weidenreich thought that these same factors were the origin of the geographic variations evident in human populations today. Furthermore he argued that anatomical features in modern East Asians were also present in Zhoukoudian *Homo erectus*. For Weidenreich this indicated that Peking Man was the direct ancestor of living Chinese people.

During the last twenty years, a protracted debate has been waged about the relationship of *Homo erectus* to modern humans, based on the analysis of genetic information in living populations, the recovery of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) from Neanderthal remains (Neanderthals, another extinct human species, date from approximately 100,000 to 35,000 years ago) and more recent fossils, and the comparison of the anatomical features in skeletal remains from different geographic areas. Most recently the comparison of Y chromosome and mitochondrial DNA information from living people with mitochondrial DNA from three northern European Neanderthal skeletons, and the appearance of early modern *Homo sapiens* skeletons in Africa, has indicated that *Homo erectus* is probably not a direct ancestor of our species. Our species appears to have evolved in Africa approximately 100,000 years ago and then moved out of Africa and displaced other species, including the Neanderthals. These anatomically modern humans reached Europe approximately 35,000 years ago and Australia at least 40,000 years ago.

There are now many *Homo erectus* and early *Homo sapiens* archaeological sites in East Asia, with the majority in eastern China. Unfortunately there is a gap in both the skeletal and archeological records between the first definitely modern people from sites like the Upper Cave at Zhoukoudian (not to be confused with the Peking Man site at Zhoukoudian), dated to between 20,000 and 15,000 years ago, and "archaic" *Homo sapiens* remains at sites like Dali and Mapa in China, which are between 300,000 and 100,000 years in age.

Clearly, however, people with East Asian facial features were not present in China before the Neolithic

period, 10,000 to 7,000 years ago. (Modern Asian people have distinctive facial skeletons: for example, broad, flat cheekbones. Similar facial skeletons are common in the late Neolithic period from 8,000 years ago, but are not present in China before this time.) This finding supports the Y chromosome and mitochondrial DNA data obtained from modern populations, which indicate a recent African origin for all modern humans, and which exclude East Asian *Homo erectus* as an ancestor of living East Asians. East Asian people probably originated during a rapid expansion of Neolithic agriculturalists in the Chinese river valleys around 8,000 years ago.

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PALEOANTHROPOLOGY—SOUTH ASIA

The scientific study of prehistoric human populations is called paleoanthropology. Paleoanthropologists examine human remains (including skeletons, of which some are fossilized) and archeological evidence of artifacts (including stone tools and other manufactured products of an extinct culture) in order to reconstruct lifeways of extinct populations for whom no written records may exist. Collaborating with paleoanthropologists are geologists and ecologists, who observe climatic and terrestrial changes; molecular biologists, who seek to reconstruct genetic relationships between ancient populations by DNA analysis; and geochronologists, who are able to determine the antiquity of skeletal and cultural remains through a variety of physical and biochemical techniques.

Human Settlement of the Indian Subcontinent

The scientific study of the archeology, skeletal biology, and ancient ecological settings of the prehistoric peoples of southern Asia (India, Pakistan, Sri

Lanka, Nepal, and the borderlands of these modern nations) reveals that humans inhabited this part of the world as early as 2 million years ago. This date falls within the Pliocene geological epoch that began about 5.2 million years ago. The fossil remains of the manufacturers of the crude chipped pebble tools discovered in geological deposits of this antiquity in the northwestern region of the Indian subcontinent have not been found. Until their skeletal remains are recovered, their genus and species identification within the human evolutionary tree remains uncertain. But the evidence of human occupation in South Asia from the archeological record left by later peoples, who achieved the making of technologically more advanced stone tools, is well established. At several archeological sites human skeletal remains have been unearthed and studied, including specimens from the Pleistocene epoch (popularly known as the Ice Age) that succeeded the Pliocene about 1.7 million years ago.

The stone implements are classified into prehistoric traditions according to their styles, raw materials, datable antiquity, and associated artifacts and traces of culturally distinctive lifeways. Succeeding the earliest chipped pebble tools, or "chopper-chopping tools," are the stone hand axes and cleavers of the Acheulian tradition of the Early and Middle Pleistocene geological subepochs (beginning about 1.4 million years ago and 780,000 years ago, respectively). From the Late Pleistocene subepoch (beginning about 130,000 years ago), one finds stone tools of the Mousterian (retouched flake tools) and Levalloisian (prepared-core flake tools) technological traditions. Blade and burin (bevel-pointed) tools appear in archeological sites dated to around 40,000 ago. All of these stone tool industries are included in a technological category called Paleolithic, or Old Stone Age. They are succeeded by the manufacture of small flake tools called microliths, which appear as early as 35,000 years ago in Sri Lanka and some 11,000 years ago in India and Pakistan, hence falling within the Late Pleistocene subepoch and the succeeding Holocene (also called the Recent, or Present Interglacial) epoch. Microlithic tools abound in post-Paleolithic, or Mesolithic, archeological sites throughout the Indian subcontinent.

The Socioeconomic Transition to Food Production

Paleolithic technological developments were followed by the domestication of plants and animals, which initiated both pastoralism and the establishment of sedentary life in villages, as well as development of new technologies, a cultural transition that has been called Neolithic (New Stone Age). By 7000 BCE, farm-

ing and herding practices were established in the northwestern sector of the Indian subcontinent; these gave rise to urban life by the end of the fourth millennium. Copper and bronze tools and weapons supplemented stone implements, hence these cultures have been assigned to a Bronze Age.

Among the advanced urban societies of this period were the Harappan (or Indus) civilization, located along the banks of the Indus river and its tributaries. From 3000 to 1700 BCE, this complex culture expanded over an immense domain from western Iran to the Himalaya mountains, the Punjab, southward to Gujarat in western India and the Ganges valley of north central India. Elements of the Harappan legacy survived among simpler food-producing village populations who used copper and bronze and who manufactured exquisite ceramics, but who did not continue the practices of a written script, grid-pattern streets indicative of carefully controlled city planning, standardized weights and measures, extensive trade contacts with the civilizations of Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, and other features of their Harappan predecessors. The post-Harappan tradition has been called the Chalcolithic (Copper) Age.

Agriculture and herding did not diffuse to central and southern India until after 2500 BCE, and there is no evidence of a Neolithic phase in Sri Lanka. Iron technology spread into these Indian regions after 1100 BCE. Many of the Iron Age villages erected large, upright standing stones, set up large boulders in circles or alignments, and built dolmens and stone-lined burial chambers covered with capstones. The Indian Iron Age is sometimes referred to as the Megalithic Age because of these giant stone monuments. This final era of South Asian prehistory survived in some localities until 50 CE. Even today, megalith building continues among some tribal populations. The Indian Iron Age ended with the dawn of the Indian early historic period, which emerged in the Ganges valley by the sixth century BCE, when the classical Buddhist, Hindu, and Jain religious and cultural traditions were established.

Research Methods

South Asian paleoanthropology includes the research of anthropologists concerned with the biological features of ancient peoples whose skeletal remains are preserved at the sites of these prehistoric cultural traditions. This record contains information that cannot be derived from other kinds of scientific investigations. Paleoanthropologists examine skeletal remains in order to determine the sex and age of the person at

time of death. They observe evidence of trauma and disease from markers on bones and teeth, reconstruct living statures, analyze specific markers of occupational stress, note rates of growth and development, and establish the ancestral affinities of skeletal subjects. An individual skeleton or a cemetery series may reveal genetic affinities to other prehistoric groups or to living populations. The paleoanthropologist acquires these data from interpretations of measurements taken on bones and teeth with precision instruments and analysis of X-rays. Recorded are size, shape, and specific skeletal and dental traits, some of which are genetically inherited; others are due to cultural variables of habitual activities such as spear throwing, squatting as a resting posture, or bending over a metate (stone mortar) to mill coarse foods with a hand-held grinding stone. Paleoanthropologists collaborate with archeologists, paleoecologists, and geologists to reconstruct profiles of how the ancient peoples of South Asia evolved, adapted to different and changing ecological settings, and acquired their biological diversity.

South Asian Paleolithic Lifeways

South Asian peoples of the Paleolithic and Mesolithic tradition were hunter-gatherers who occupied natural caves and rock shelters but also settled along the banks of watercourses. The Narmada River is one of India's major waterways; its source is in the Himalaya Mountains and it flows across the north and central regions of India to empty into the Arabian Sea. Along the middle course of the Narmada Valley, near Hathnora village, the incomplete cranium of a late Middle Pleistocene human was found in 1982 by the geologist Arun Sonakia. In the vicinity of this fossil were stone tools of the Acheulian tradition and animal remains dated to 400,000–200,000 years ago. Examination of this fossil, called Narmada Man (though more likely a female than a male), indicates that it was an early member of our own species, *Homo sapiens*, but a number of its anatomical traits do not allow its classification with anatomically modern *Homo sapiens*. It therefore is identified as an anatomically archaic *Homo sapiens* (a taxonomic group to which some paleoanthropologists give the name *Homo heidelbergensis*).

In other parts of Asia the Acheulian tradition is associated with earlier members of the human family called *Homo erectus* (formerly called by the genus name *Pithecanthropus* and known popularly as the ape man). Evolving in Africa some 1.8 million years ago, *Homo erectus* migrated into Asia some 400,000 years later. Places of settlement and manufacturing sites are marked by tools of the Acheulian tradition that supplemented the older chopper-chopping tools as far

eastward as northeastern India and Burma. The chopper-chopping tool tradition continued into East and Southeast Asia. The absence of Acheulian tools in these regions, even at localities where *Homo erectus* fossils have been found in China and Java, may be related to the timing of the diffusion of the Acheulian tradition out of Africa. That is, *Homo erectus* was already settled in Asia before Acheulian tools had been invented in Africa. In South Asia, tools of the Acheulian tradition were found at Hathnora in association with the human remains. The latter is identified as an anatomically archaic *Homo sapiens* rather than as *Homo erectus* because of its large cranial capacity, values obtained from cranial measurements, the formation and size of its brow ridges, and the thickness of the bones of the cranial vault. Some anatomical features of earlier humans are present, however. This picture may change if future discoveries turn up a *Homo erectus* fossil, but the present evidence demonstrates that the Acheulian tradition was practiced by more than one ancient species of humankind. Claims of finding ancestral human fossils from other localities within the Indian subcontinent, some of which were said to be of greater antiquity than the Narmada specimen, have not withstood scientific verification, but the prospect of discovery of additional Pleistocene fossils that are genuine and properly dated are excellent.

Biological Diversity and Change

Among Late Pleistocene fossils of the human family are those from northeastern Afghanistan's Moustertian (Middle Paleolithic) cave site of Darra-i-Kur, found in 1966, and a relatively large number of skeletons from the Sri Lankan cave sites of Fa Hien, Bata-domba Lena, and Beli Lena Kitulgala, recovered in the 1970s. Microlithic tools are found with human skeletal remains in all of these Late Pleistocene to Middle Holocene sites as well as at several open-air burial and habitation sites. These and other archeological sites on the island have been assigned by some paleoanthropologists to a Mesolithic cultural tradition. Taken collectively, the Sri Lankan skeletons are all anatomically *Homo sapiens*, but they exhibit a high degree of muscular-skeletal robusticity (stoutly structured bones of the upper and lower extremities upon which muscular attachments are prominent, and pronounced development of cranial features such as brow ridges and bony attachments of the muscles of the neck). Molar and premolar teeth are large and the occlusal surfaces are heavily abraded.

There are other sites of microlith users who survived by hunting and gathering on the Indian mainland, some with human skeletons, as at Langhnaj in

Gujarat, Bagor in Rajasthan, and on the Gangetic plain at Sarai Nahar Rai, Mahadaha, and Damdama. Burials from the last three localities have yielded some forty or more skeletons. Although taller in stature than the Sri Lankan prehistoric people, these hunter-gatherers exhibit many of the same features of pronounced muscular-skeletal robusticity and large premolar and molar teeth. Although originally dated to the end of the Pleistocene, the Gangetic sites are now believed to have been inhabited as late as the third millennium BCE. Trade with sedentary village farmers and pastoralists occupying fertile valleys and plains may have taken place in this era, as at Langhnaj, where a copper knife of Harappan craftsmanship was recovered in the grave of one of the skeletons. As food-producing farmers and herders of the Neolithic tradition displaced the hunter-gatherers across much of the Indian subcontinent, the latter populations retreated to regions of relative isolation, some surviving as tribal groups to the present day.

Evolutionary Adaptations

In biology, evolution involves genetic changes in populations of living organisms from generation to generation. The fossil record of plants and animals, including humans, testifies to the fact that ancestral species differ anatomically from descendant species over the passage of time. The paleoanthropologist wants to know the origin, antiquity, and adaptive responses that account for anatomical diversity in different prehistoric human populations, including the role cultural behavior has played. Scientific studies of the ancient South Asian archeological and skeletal records and the reconstruction of different and changing environments leads to some of the following conclusions.

There is a trend toward reduction of muscular-skeletal robusticity and tooth size initiated by the socioeconomic transition from full-time hunting and gathering to domestication of plants and animals. Populations with the longest histories of farming and pastoral practices exhibit more gracile (slender) skeletal features than those encountered in populations where nature selected for more robust skeletal structures adaptive to a life of hunting large game and nomadic movement over extensive geographic territories. That is, the adaptive advantages of more powerful body structures among hunter-gatherer bands were not relevant to the sedentary food-producing lifeway, hence natural selection was "relaxed" and individuals with more gracile body builds were not at a disadvantage in their survival and opportunity to leave offspring with those adaptive traits. Also, certain cultural prac-

tices involving more complex technologies, trade contacts, and exploitation of a greater range of food resources contributed to those anatomical changes. Similar trends are found in other prehistoric populations outside of the Indian subcontinent.

As South Asia's prehistoric village communities increased in size and expanded into urban centers, as seen in the Bronze Age cities of the Harappan civilization and many centuries later in the Ganges Valley, health and rates of growth and development changed. Vectors of infectious diseases found a higher density of hosts in towns and cities than among nomadic hunting and gathering bands. Diseases such as tuberculosis, anemia, and dental caries (cavities), which leave characteristic markers on bones and teeth, may be diagnosed by paleoanthropologists. Other pathological conditions identifiable in a skeletal record are osteoarthritis and congenital conditions of abnormal growth and development. For example, it has been demonstrated that male infants were preferred over female infants among the Harappans since the female teeth bear markers of inadequate nutrition and higher incidences of episodes of interrupted growth. Among other physical changes related to cultural factors are the higher incidence of fractures of the skull in ancient village and urban site specimens than in those from hunting and foraging populations, the latter exhibiting higher frequencies of healed breaks of the bones of the lower limbs and torso. These differences may be related to trauma from interpersonal violence in the heavily populated towns and cities and to accidental incidences in the more dangerous and challenging life of nomadic hunter-gatherers. Changes in occlusal dental wear are often dramatic: the hunter-gatherers' severely worn teeth with their low frequencies of caries contrast remarkably with those of sedentary long-time food producers, whose teeth show less attrition but an increase in the number of pathological conditions, some of which are related to methods of food preparation and a high-carbohydrate diet.

All native South Asian populations existing today are genetically related to the ancient aboriginal peoples of this part of the world, although there has been some admixture with foreign populations coming from other parts of Asia, Europe, Arabia, and Africa. Certain prehistoric skeletal series are indicative of biological relationships to living populations of the subcontinent, while others appear to have no known descendants. Genetic affinities are of interest to paleoanthropologists, and from available evidence they do not perceive any mass migrations of peoples pouring into South Asia from some undefined place of origin in Central Asia, Africa, or elsewhere. This is a signif-

icant fact since there is a vast literature written by South Asian and Western historians about sudden demographic changes, in particular about the so-called Aryan invasion of India.

While it is true that the languages of Indo-Aryan or Indo-European stock are prevalent in Pakistan, northern India, and southern Sri Lanka, and that southern India is populated by speakers of two completely different linguistic stocks called Dravidian and Munda (also known as Australasian), the linguistic record is not concordant in any obvious way with the biological traits of prehistoric peoples in this part of the world. Attempts have been made to relate South Asian languages of these linguistic families to genetic affinities and theories of mass migrations, but these must be recognized as elements of cultural mythologies that bear political and religious considerations far removed from the data of paleoanthropological research.

Approaches to Paleoanthropological Research in South Asia

Paleoanthropology was conceived in South Asia as a synthesis of Western concepts of social progress, linear time, the Biblical creation story in Genesis, and the "noble savage" with Indian ideas about science and philosophy originating in the oral traditions that became the written Sanskrit and Pali literature of the Vedic texts. This synthesis continued during the several centuries of British colonial influence in India, and there was a reciprocal exchange of theories about human origins, antiquity, and humanity's place in nature with respect to the prehistory of the subcontinent. The myth of the Aryan conquest of this part of the world is one result of this synthesis. It is a unique intellectual development in paleoanthropology that has no counterpart in the paleoanthropological studies of other regions.

Another remarkable feature of South Asian paleoanthropology is that only a small number of native and foreign investigators are responsible for the considerable amount of research achieved by the close of the twentieth century. The contrast with the progress of paleoanthropology in Africa, North and South America, and Europe is striking. This difference in historical development may be due to several factors: the recognition that our earliest ancestors did not evolve in the Siwalik Hills of the Himalaya region, as had once been considered possible because of discoveries of fossil apes in this region; the fact that this part of the world did not yield any fossil remains of Pleistocene human ancestors until recently; and the policies of the governments of South Asian nations to provide minimal support for paleoanthropological re-

search, preferring an investment in the biological anthropology of living populations. Nevertheless, the advancement of paleoanthropology in southern Asia has been remarkable in establishing a model for future research projects here and in other parts of the world. The employment of new analytical methods now available through achievements in computer science and the use of complex statistical methods hitherto impossible are solving questions of genetic affinities, biology, and lifeways of the earlier people of the subcontinent.

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PALEOANTHROPOLOGY-SOUTHEAST ASIA

In 1887, the Dutch anatomist Eugene Dubois (1858-1940) left the Netherlands for Sumatra in search of the missing link in the chain of human evolution. Dubois had been stimulated by the pioneering research on human evolution by Charles Darwin and Ernst Haeckel. A disciple of Haeckel, Dubois believed that the remote common ancestor of apes and humans had lived in Southeast Asia, rather than Africa, which was Darwin's choice. After failing to find fossil evidence in Sumatra, Dubois commenced fieldwork on the banks of the Solo River, near Trinil in central eastern Java in 1890. The following year his field team unearthed the fossilized skullcap of a primate that eventually became known as *Homo erectus*. In 1892, a short distance from the site of the original discovery, a complete human femur was also excavated. Although there has been considerable debate about the association between the skullcap and femur, Dubois believed the two bones to be from the same species. Dubois thought the small-brained biped more like an ape than a human and initially gave it the name *Anthropithecus erectus* ("erect manlike ape"), which he later changed to *Pithecanthropus erectus* ("erect ape-man").



SANGIRAN-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

A UNESCO World Heritage Site since 1996, the Sangiran Early Man site in Indonesia is one of the most important paleoanthropological sites in the world. Since the first hominid fossils were discovered at Sangiran in 1936, half of all hominid skeletons in the entire world have been found here.

Dubois was never comfortable with the notion that the Trinil fossils were closely related to *Homo sapiens*, and while his discoveries were widely applauded, his interpretation of their significance was not. The importance of *Pithecanthropus*, now *Homo erectus*, was reinforced by the more substantial discoveries at the "Peking Man" site, near Beijing, China, in the 1920s. Not only were a larger number of human-like fossils recovered, but stone tools and what was thought to be evidence of the use of fire were present as well. Particularly as a result of this cultural evidence, the scientific community became increasingly committed to thinking of *Homo erectus* as a direct ancestor of *Homo sapiens*. Unfortunately, until his death Dubois remained dismissive of the importance of the Chinese discoveries and the generally accepted view of the evolutionary position of his Trinil *Pithecanthropus*.

The next major discovery in Southeast Asia was also in Java. The Dutch Geological Survey conducted an excavation on the bank of the Solo River, near Ngandong, between 1931 and 1937. A large quantity of Pleistocene Age (1.8 million to 10,000 years ago) faunal remains were recovered, as well as parts of twelve *Homo erectus* skulls. While many paleoanthropologists have worked with the Ngandong fossils, the most notable are probably Ralph von Koenigswald and Franz Weidenreich. The major difficulty with Ngandong, and also with the majority of other Javan *Homo erectus* sites, is that it has proved extremely difficult to determine their exact age. Most of the bones at these sites have been transported by water; that is, the bones were not found where the animals died and may have been deposited and redeposited more than once. Stratigraphic relationships within the sites are also often complex, and while there may be volcanic sediments that can be dated using the potassium-argon method (K/Ar dating), the relationship of the fossils to the dated sediment is often questionable. While there is a broad consensus that *Homo erectus* was in Java between 800,000 and 300,000 years ago, there are also claims for dates as early as 1.8 million years, from Modjokerto in Java, and 100,000 years, from Ngandong.

***Homo erectus*: Who, When, and Where?**

During the Pleistocene, global climates fluctuated and sometimes dropped an average of 5°C for periods of several thousand years, so that for some thousand-year periods, the temperature was on average 5° cooler than the average for the same areas today; the temperature then rose to modern averages before falling again, in roughly ten-thousand-year intervals. (This pattern was apparently more noticeable in the Northern Hemisphere, but the effect on sea levels was

global.) These fluctuations resulted in the formation of very large glaciers in the Northern Hemisphere, spread of the Arctic and Antarctic ice sheets, and sea levels falling by as much as 100 meters. With major falls in sea level, many of the Southeast Asian islands were joined together, and Java was connected to the Asian mainland. This enabled the migration of terrestrial mammals, including *Homo erectus*, to Java, but it was probably difficult for mammals that could neither swim nor survive on rafts to progress further to the east.

Changes in climate would also have had a dramatic impact on vegetation, particularly on the distribution of rain forests and open woodland. This is important as it is usually argued that the food resources utilized by our prehistoric relatives would have been much more plentiful in open woodland habitats. Evidence of Pleistocene vegetation changes in Java is present in the mammal species preserved in fossil sites. For example, there were periods when orangutans, a rain-forest-dependent species, were common and others when they were not. If open woodlands and grasslands were the dominant vegetation types in Java during periods of low sea level, this would have enabled a more rapid colonization by *Homo erectus*. The proliferation of rain forests would have presented a serious challenge, and in combination with the tectonically active nature of Java, may have resulted in the extinction of *Homo erectus* in this part of the world.

The only reasonably complete skeleton of *Homo erectus* was recovered from the western shore of Lake Turkana, in the East African Rift Valley. This skeleton and other examples of *Homo erectus* from East Africa, China, and Java highlight the similarities to and differences from modern humans. They also demonstrate that there were geographic differences in the appearance of *Homo erectus*, and perhaps major cultural differences as well. In Africa and the Old World as far east as India, Early and Middle Pleistocene (1.8 million to 300,000 years ago) archaeological sites are

characterized by a high proportion of bifacially flaked stone tools (tools flaked on both sides, as opposed to unifacial flaking). These tools, which are part of the Acheulian tradition (culture of populations in areas where this tool-making tradition flourished—Africa, Europe, India—first appearing around 1.5 million years ago in Africa), are uncommon in East Asia, and very few convincing stone tools of any type have been found at the Javan *Homo erectus* sites.

The Origins of Modern People in Southeast Asia

Fossil remains of *Homo erectus* have now been recovered from six separate sites in Java, with recent discoveries reported in Sambungmachan and Sangiran. In comparison with *Homo erectus* from Africa and China, the Javan skulls are longer and broader, with larger teeth, more projecting facial skeletons, more pronounced areas of muscle attachment, and a brow ridge that forms a straight bar rather than an arch over each eye. On average the examples of *Homo erectus* from Ngandong have a larger braincase volume than those from Trinil and Sangiran. This may be indicative of an evolutionary trend toward gradually increasing brain size in *Homo erectus*, as there is some evidence that the Ngandong fossils are newer than those discovered in Sangiran. Some researchers have seen this as evidence of a transition toward the modern human condition. Importantly, however, in Southeast Asia as well as on the Asian mainland, there is a substantial chronological gap between the known *Homo erectus* sites and the first evidence of *Homo sapiens*.

In Southeast Asia the earliest examples of *Homo sapiens* come from Niah Cave in Sarawak and Wadjak in Java. Unfortunately, there is some uncertainty over the age of the skeletons from these sites. Wadjak was excavated by Eugene Dubois in the 1890s, well before the development of modern archaeological dating methods. While Dubois thought Wadjak dated to the Pleistocene (older than 10,000 years), accelerator mass spectrometry (AMS) radiocarbon dating suggests an age of only 6,000 years. There is charcoal from Niah Cave radiocarbon-dated to approximately 40,000 years, but the association of the charcoal with the human skeleton is uncertain. Irrespective of the age of these sites, the appearance of modern humans in Australia by at least 40,000 years suggests that humans were present in Southeast Asia at the same time: there is no other way to reach Australia, even with a maximum fall in sea level during the Pleistocene.

The relationship between these modern people and earlier *Homo erectus* has been the subject of some de-

bate. At least one researcher has argued for an evolutionary sequence linking Trinil, Ngandong, Wadjak, and Niah. This places *Homo erectus* as the direct biological ancestor of the first modern humans in the region. However, evidence from early human fossils from Africa and genetic evidence from living people makes this scenario unlikely. It is most probable that several waves of culturally and biologically different people passed through Southeast Asia over the last 40,000 years, and that these people subsequently colonized Australia, Melanesia, and the Pacific.

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PALI CANON Pali is the archaic Prakrit language in which the Theravada canonical texts were orally transmitted from the time of the Buddha's death (486 BCE) until they were first written down in Sri Lanka by Sinhala monastic scribes around 100 BCE in the form of the Pali Canon. Related to Magadhi, Pali was probably spoken in central India during the Buddha's time. This would mean that Buddhist teachings were transmitted orally in Pali for more than three centuries before they were written down in the form we now know.

Together with the ancient commentaries, the Pali Canon constitutes the complete body of classical Theravada texts. It exists in various scripts as a large body of literature, amounting to many thousands of printed pages when translated into English. The Pali Canon, or *Tipitaka* (Three Baskets), is made up of three separate sections: the regulations of monastic life (Vinaya), the sermons of the Buddha (Sutta), and Buddhist philosophy (Abhidhamma). The Vinaya Pitaka is composed of injunctions by the Buddha against certain kinds of conduct. It imposes restraints on physical and verbal action of the ordained monks (*bhikkhu*)

and female monks (*bbikkhuni*) and deals with transgressions of discipline. The Sutta Pitaka includes all discourses delivered by the Buddha in their entirety. These do not just concern the monastic community and are widely cited for their relevance also to the laity and are studied by them. Every *sutta* begins with "Evam me sutam" ("Thus have I heard"). The Abhidhamma Pitaka is the collection of classified and tabulated doctrines of the Buddha in terms of their ultimate and most abstract meanings.

If it were not for the concern with purity, the Pali Canon would not have been transmitted as accurately as it was from one generation to the next. This has been an extremely important factor within the monastic community through intergenerational transmission between monks. Royalty also expressed concern for the purity of the Tipitaka. For example, Burmese kings reinscribed the Tipitaka at the beginning of their reign. Also, external threats in particular motivated kings and politicians to take action to preserve the purity of the scriptures. Thus, in Burmese history, the only two Sangayanas were held at the beginning of the colonial period (King Mindon's Fourth Synod) and at the end (the Fifth Synod, held by Prime Minister U Nu), suggesting an urgent need to purify scriptures while under threat of external invasion.

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PALM-LEAF MANUSCRIPTS Societies in much of Southeast Asia, particularly Laos, and India used leaves of a type of palm tree, *bai lan*, as writing material. The leaves are cut into rectangular strips, and then a metal stylus is used to etch the text onto the leaves. In Lao manuscripts, rubber oil is rubbed into the engraving to darken the text on both sides of the leaf, and each side contains four lines of text. One book contains twenty sheets bound together. A typical story needs approximately five bundles, while an important epic such as the Lao *Ramayana*, *Phra Lak Phra Lam*, may require forty to fifty bundles. Each bundle is protected by a textile woven for this specific purpose. The manuscripts primarily documented religious stories, history annals, and, later, classical literature. Religious manuscripts included the Buddha's teachings, *Traipitika* (*Tipitaka*), and *jataka* tales, the lives of the Bud-

dha. Classical literature reached its height in the sixteenth century and included legends, historical events, and *jataka* tales adapted to include Lao settings and characters. Buddhist monks created the manuscripts, and temple libraries housed the manuscripts. Palm-leaf manuscripts are still kept in temple libraries as well as in museums in Laos, Thailand, France, and the United States.

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PAMIR PEOPLES The Pamirs (Mountain Tajiks) dwell in a high-altitude, mountainous knot located mostly in Tajikistan, on the disputed frontiers of Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, and the former Soviet Union. Within Tajikistan and these neighboring political states, the mountains are home to six million Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and numerous other ethnic groups (Uygurs, Kazakhs, Russians, Jews, and Wahkis). The name Pamir Peoples, however, normally applies only to those Tajiks who live east of the Pamir crest in the Gorno-Badakshan Autonomous Oblast (GBO), a poor, sparsely populated, and semiautonomous administrative unit with little political influence (not to be confused with the even poorer Badakshan Province in adjacent northeast Afghanistan).

Tajiks descend from the old pre-Turkic Iranian population and are one of the most ancient ethnic groups in Central Asia. Their language belongs to the Iranian branch of the Indo-European family and is a dialect of Persian. Persians first settled this region in 500 CE and were eventually absorbed into the Sasanid dynasty (224/228–651 CE). A succession of Arabs, neighboring Uzbeks, and Afghans overwhelmed them between 500 to 1400 CE. During this time, they developed a sedentary agricultural lifeway, the only Central Asians that were not primarily animal herders. Initially, Tajik indicated all "settled people" but evolved to distinguish the Iranian (Tajik) from Turkic (other Central Asian) subjects of the Arab empire that stretched from North Africa to Central Asia. Western penetration began in the late 1700s and for



A man on a horse below Mustagh Ata mountain in the Pamirs in western China. (GALEN ROWELL/CORBIS)

the next two hundred years, imperial Britain, czarist Russia, and China played the great game of political and military maneuvering for control of Central Asia. The struggle ended in the 1890s with Russian ascendancy of the Pamir. Through eons of political change in Badakshan, the Pamir became a cultural refuge where ancient habits and beliefs persevered.

In the early 2000s, five million ethnic Tajiks live mostly in Tajikistan as two distinct cultural groups: the majority lowland Tajiks of western Tajikistan, and the minority Mountain Tajiks who settle the deep canyons of the eastern Pamir and the north bank of the Pianj River (which later becomes the Amu Darya/Oxus). Interspersed with and included among Mountain Tajiks are six Pamiri clans (Iagnob, Iazgulem, Rushan, Shuganan, Vakhani, and Vanch) of almost pure ancient Iranian heritage. Collectively, they number 170,000 people and use Mountain Tajik, Pamirian (*pomir*), or Badakshani to describe their ethnicity. Relative to lowland Tajiks they are of fairer skin and taller. They follow Ismaili and Zoroastrian religious beliefs, while the western Tajiks are predominantly Sunni Muslims.

GBAO is an enclosed geographical dead end. Political restraints forbid travel into adjacent China and Afghanistan all year, and from October to March winter snows block the road to western Tajikistan. There

is intermittent winter road access to Kyrgyzstan (Osh), but for the most part, GBAO is totally isolated for the six to seven winter months each year. Farming (wheat, barley, maize, apples, pears, walnuts, and apricots), animal husbandry (sheep and goats), mining of piezoelectric quartz for jewelry, and the production of woolen products (socks and scarves) are the main economic pursuits.

Following Tajik independence in 1991, sharply reduced subsidies from Moscow triggered acute shortages of food, medical supplies, and fuel. The education and agricultural sectors also declined precipitously so that this region is among the poorest in the former Soviet Union. The recent Tajik peace accords, a new road project between China and Eastern Tajikistan, and direct aid from the nongovernmental Aga Khan Foundation should provide some immediate relief and promote long-term economic development.


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PAMIR RANGE The Pamirs form a complex mountain knot where the Hindu Kush, Karakoram, Alayskiy, Tian Shan, and Kunlun Shan converge. This "Roof of the World" results from the colliding Eurasian and Indian Ocean tectonic plates. The echelon grouping of ranges extends 135,000 square kilometers and reaches above 7,000 meters on three summits. Peak Communism (7,495 meters) was the highest mountain in the former Soviet Union. The 75-kilometer-long Fedchenko Glacier is one of the largest between Alaska and Antarctica.

Intercepted moisture from the Gulf of Arabia and the Mediterranean Sea sustains the Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya Rivers, Central Asia's lifelines and principal tributaries to the Aral Sea. The snow leopard (*Panthera uncia*), Asiatic brown bear (*Ursus arctos isabellinus*), and Marco Polo sheep (*Ovis poli*) thrive in the upper elevations, while riparian birch forests and juniper stands provide vital habitat for numerous other species.



IT'S COLD AT THE TOP OF THE WORLD

This nineteenth century traveler's account makes it very clear just how cold it can get in the Pamir mountains at night and how hot during the day.

The cold is still intense and on the increase, the thermometer *inside* our akoi's going down to zero every night, while the one hanging on the outside of the akoi averages about six or seven below. We find it very difficult to keep warm, and begin to fear that we shall lose some of our horses, as they are all loose on the hill and, having no horse-clothing, they must suffer badly at nights.

The extraordinary part of this climate lies in the fact that the colder it gets at nights the warmer it is in the daytime. Since the thermometer has taken to going down below zero at night, it has also registered maximum temperatures of 100 to 106 in the sun's rays during the daytime, consequently the snows have been melting fast on the hills, and we have had no fresh snow-storms for some time. Had it not been for this, my last wounded *Ovis Poli* would never have been found. Yesterday a poor little half-frozen martin flew into Robert's akoi, and it perched there on a rope that is stretched across the inside, but whether it will live or not is a question, as there are no flies at this altitude or at this season for it to eat.

Source: The Earl of Dunmore. (1894) *The Pamirs; Being a Narrative of a Year's Expedition on Horseback through Kashmir, Western Tibet, Chinese Tartary, and Russian Central Asia*. London: John Murray, 124–125.

Since antiquity, warring factions have prized the Pamir Range for its strategic location between mountain and desert, ocean and interior. Approximately 90 percent of the Pamirs lie within the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast of Tajikistan, while Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and China claim the periphery. Camel caravans traversed here between the tenth and nineteenth centuries.

The region remains a veritable ethnolinguistic museum. The Tajiks of Iranian heritage grow potatoes and wheat on river terraces in the western Pamirs. Pamirians (Mountain Tajiks) cultivate wheat, fruit, and nuts in the more arid canyons of the eastern mountains. Both groups lead goats and sheep to high pastures in the summer. Further east, the nomadic Kyrgyz of Mongol ancestry herd yaks in the shadow of the eastern Pamir Mountains and adjacent Pamir Plateau.

During the nineteenth century "Great Game," imperial Great Britain, czarist Russia, and China coveted the Pamirs to protect their adjacent colonial interests. The Soviets gained control until their empire dissolved in 1991, although their rule still infiltrates every facet of Central Asian economy, society, and political life. Long-suppressed ethno-religious fervor erupted into civil war just six months after independence. The conflict still simmers between periods of fragile peace accords brokered by the United Nations and Russia.

Stephen F. Cunha

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PAMUK, ORHAN (b. 1952), Turkish novelist. Orhan Pamuk is a popular literary figure in Turkey. Born in Istanbul, he studied architecture and journalism and began writing in 1974. His first novel, *Cevdet Bey ve Oğulları* (Cevdet Bey and Sons) was published in 1982, after an eight-year search for a publisher, and gained him national recognition. Following *Sessiz Ev* (The House of Silence, 1982) and *Beyaz Kale* (1985; English translation *The White Castle*, 1991), his 1990 landmark novel *Kara Kitap* (The Black Book, 1994) has become one of the most controversial works in Turkish literature and extended his recognition to international circles. His following novels, *Yeni Hayat* (1994; *The New Life*, 1997), *Benim Adım Kırmızı* (1998; *My*

Name Is Red, 2001), and *Kar* (Snow, 2001) are best-sellers in Turkey. His works have been translated into many languages and have received many awards.

Orhan Pamuk's writing fueled the discussion on postmodernism in Turkish literature. His style of using religious and historical themes in postmodernist forms drew criticism from both traditional intellectuals for exploiting the past and postmodernist intellectuals for being too populist. His unconventional use of the language has drawn much criticism from traditional literary circles. With all his work, the controversy around it, and its commercial success, Orhan Pamuk is a reflection of post-1980 Turkey's social transformation.

Mujdat Pakkan and Nazan Haydari

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PANCASILA The Pancasila, or Five Pillars, contained in the preamble of the Indonesian constitution, have formed the foundation on which the Indonesian state ideology has been based since its independence. They comprise (1) belief in one God, (2) just and civilized humanitarianism, (3) national unity, (4) democracy based on the wise guidance of representative consultation, and (5) social justice. They were originally formulated by the eminent leader of the Indonesian independence movement, Sukarno, who for the first time publicly proclaimed them in his speech to the Preparatory Committee for the Independence of Indonesia on 1 June 1945 (celebrated in Indonesia as the "Birth of the Pancasila"). Designed to integrate Western democratic, nationalist, modernist Islamic, communist, and indigenous ideas on political organization, the Pancasila made Indonesia a religious state, albeit not an Islamic theocracy. Religion had been put forward as the first and foremost principle in order to appease the radical Muslims among the delegates of the Preparatory Committee, who had drafted a provision ("Jakarta Charter"), demanding the implementation of the *shari'a* (Islamic law) as the sole juridical guideline for all Indonesian Muslims. This had, however, been rejected by the majority of delegates. When Indonesia finally acquired full independence as a unitary nation-

state in 1950, a provisional constitution was drafted that ratified the Pancasila as state ideology.

In 1955, the Constituent Assembly was formed in order to pass the final constitution of the Indonesian state. The issue of an Islamic state was again brought up, underpinned by the Darul Islam rebellion in various parts of the country. In 1959, Sukarno dissolved the Constituent Assembly, which had still not arrived at a conclusion, and reinstalled the constitution of 1945 as the only valid constitution of Indonesia. At the same time, on the basis of the Pancasila, he proclaimed his concept of "guided democracy," which had by now acquired a more authoritarian notion boosting the autocratic position of the president (i.e., Sukarno). This notion was taken over and reinforced under Suharto's "New Order" regime. In 1975, he decreed that the Pancasila were to be introduced into the curriculum of all educational institutions in order to forestall the intrusion of socially destabilizing ideologies. His P4 decree of 1978 and his decree of 1985, which established the Pancasila as the sole ideological foundation of all social, religious, and political organizations, were geared to boost the realization of the Pancasila society. Thus entwined with Suharto's New Order ideology, the Pancasila experienced a crisis of legitimacy after Suharto had to step down in May 1998.

Martin Ramstedt

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PANDA The panda, or giant panda (*Ailuropoda melanoleuca*), is a bearlike animal native to China. The Chinese name is *da xiong mao* (great bear cat). Pandas are black and white in color, and adults are normally 160–180 centimeters in length and 85–110 kilograms in weight. Their scientific classification, as either members of the bear or raccoon family, is still dis-



A young panda sitting in a patch of wildflowers in Sichuan, China. (KEREN SU/CORBIS)

puted. Pandas live in cool, wet bamboo forests between 1,200 and 3,400 meters above sea level. Their diet consists almost entirely of bamboo leaves, stems, and shoots; they occasionally eat other plants and even meat. Pandas are found in six isolated mountain ranges in central China, in the provinces of Shaanxi, Gansu, and Sichuan. Pandas were mentioned in Chinese texts more than two thousand years ago, but they first became known to Western science only in 1869. Today there are an estimated six hundred to one thousand pandas in the wild, but they are greatly endangered because of dwindling habitat, largely due to logging and forest clearance. Pandas, because of their rarity and distinctive appearance, have long been considered a Chinese cultural treasure and symbol.

Michael Pretes

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PANDIT Pandit is a category of Brahmins in India who are religious teachers (from the Sanskrit *pandita*, a learned man). In particular, they are people skilled in the literature of Sanskrit and in Hindu law, religion, and philosophy. Until 1862 the East India Company maintained a person known as the pundit (pandit) of the Supreme Court, whose job was to inform the English judges on points of Hindu law.

The pandits of Kashmir are one well-studied example of this widespread category, also known throughout northwestern India as Saraswat Brahmins.

They take their name from the former Saraswati River, now lost in the Thar Desert, or else from the goddess Saraswati, to whom they are devoted. The pandits of Kashmir, however, are primarily farmers, growing wheat, maize, paddy, fruits, and vegetables. Other occupations include shop keeping and the civil service. Pandits form scarcely 4 percent of the mainly Muslim population of the state of Kashmir and Jammu. They are the descendants of a handful of Brahman families who survived the arrival of Islam and Sufism in the mid-fourteenth century. It was only in the eighteenth century that they took on the semiofficial designation of pandit under the relatively tolerant Mughal emperors, under whose rule Kashmir fell.

Pandits follow a nondualistic school of philosophy known as Kashmiri Saivism. In the twentieth century, the best-known family of Kashmiri pandits was that of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, his only daughter, who both became prime ministers of India.

Paul Hockings

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PANDYA Pandya was an Indian dynasty ruling much of the southern Tamil-speaking area in ancient times. The dynasty was first mentioned in the fourth century BCE by the Sanskrit grammarian Katyayana and rose to influence in the sixth century CE. The earliest Pandyan king to whom a definite name and date can be ascribed is Nedum-Chelivan, in the second century CE. Ancient writers repeatedly refer to the wealth of the kingdom, which had an extensive trade network reaching overseas. As the kingdom expanded, however, this led to clashes with several neighboring powers, including the Cholas, Kongu, the Pallavas, and the Chalukyas. The Pandyas were defeated and eclipsed by the Chola empire, but as this power began to decline in the thirteenth century, the Pandyas again emerged. Their territory was roughly that of the modern districts of Madurai, Tirunavelli, and Kanyakumari, and their capital was at Madurai. The dynasty was probably matrilineal, like that more recently in the royal house of Travancore. Marco Polo twice visited the Pandya kingdom, in 1288 and 1293, and was much impressed. In 1310 the eunuch general of the Delhi sultan, Malik Kafur, raided and brought an abrupt end to the Pandya dynasty. Thereafter, they were no more than local chieftains, retaining some land near Madurai.

Paul Hockings

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PANGKOR TREATY The Pangkor Treaty (1874) set the stage for the establishment of British colonial rule in the Malay States (present-day peninsular Malaysia). Under terms of the treaty, the chieftains acknowledged the ascension of Abdullah (reigned 1874–1875), one of several claimants to the Perak sultanate. Abdullah, in turn, accepted the appointment of a British officer to be known as the resident, whose advice had to be sought and acted upon in all matters except those relating to Malay customs and practices and the Islamic religion. Sir Andrew Clarke, governor of the Straits Settlements (1873–1875), initiated the meeting that resulted in this treaty.

A combination of economic, geopolitical, and humanitarian considerations prompted the British to seek the Pangkor Treaty. Tin production and trade had been disrupted by a chaotic state of affairs in the western Malay States—caused by disputes among warring chiefs over control of tin fields—and by rivalries between Chinese organizations in the tin industry and piracy in the Strait of Malacca. Tin, by the last quarter of the nineteenth century, had become increasingly important owing to the expanding tinsplate industry. The British also feared that rival European powers Germany and France might take advantage of the anarchy in the peninsular Malay States to establish hegemony. Undoubtedly there was widespread suffering due to the troubles, but humanitarian considerations were at best secondary to the economic and geopolitical considerations.

Although under instructions to study the situation and report on the steps to be taken, Clarke decided instead that action was warranted. Armed with a letter dated 30 December 1873 by Abdullah, who appealed to Clarke to mediate and expressed willingness to receive a British resident, Clarke convened a meeting at Pangkor in mid-January 1874. Rival Chinese mining factions were also invited to negotiate an amicable settlement.

Clarke's treaty was endorsed by British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli's Conservative government (1874–1880). Similar treaties were contracted with other peninsular Malay States: Selangor (February 1874), Sungai Ujong (December 1874), and Pahang (August 1888).

The Pangkor Treaty was a watershed in the history of Malaysia. It initiated a British forward movement

into the Malay Peninsula, and by introducing the British resident system, it implemented British indirect rule, thereby setting the stage for the economic exploitation of the Malay States that subsequently brought about a plural society.

Ooi Keat Gin

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PANINI (c. 520–460 BCE), Sanskrit grammarian. There is controversy regarding the dates of Panini, but most scholars believe that he lived in the fifth century BCE. He was born in Shalatura, near Attock in present-day Pakistan.

Panini's magnum opus, *Astadhyayi*, consists of four thousand sutras or Vedic precepts divided into eight chapters. It deals with the rules of Sanskrit grammar and systemizes such basic elements as nouns, verbs, and sentence structure. *Astadhyayi* covers phonetics, phonology, and morphology, making it a source text for Indian linguistics.

The *Astadhyayi* also gives insight into the religious and social development of the period. For instance, reference to bhakti (religious devotion) can be found in the discussion of the word Vasudevaka. (The word is a name for a person whose religious devotion is focused on Vasudeva.) There are also references to different categories of lowly born people, such as *aniravasita* (those living within society) and *niravasita* (those living outside society), and Panini also mentions women students pursuing Vedic knowledge.

His scientific study of grammar made Panini one of the luminaries in Sanskrit language. Some have seen *Astadhyayi* as a precursor of modern formal language theory. Panini's work systematizing the grammar of Sanskrit in *Astadhyayi* kept the Sanskrit language largely unchanged for about two millennia. He himself died after being attacked by a lion.

Patit Paban Mishra

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PANJABI Panjabi (or Punjabi) is an Indo-Aryan language spoken in a contiguous region in northwestern India and northeastern Pakistan. In India, it is one of the recognized national languages and the official state language of Punjab. Approximately 2.79 percent of the population of India, estimated in March 2001 at over one billion, are Panjabi speakers, yielding approximately 28 million speakers. In Pakistan, 48 percent of the population (estimated at 142,392,000) speak Panjabi, giving around 72 million speakers. Panjabi speakers also live in North America, Europe, East Asia, and East Africa.

The main dialect clusters are those of eastern Punjab, the central dialect (Majhi), and western varieties in Pakistan that constitute a complex dialect continuum. Older literature refers to western varieties of Panjabi as Lahnda or Lahndi.

In India, Panjabi is written in the Gurmukhi script, traditionally attributed to Guru Angad (1504–1552 CE), but with earlier roots; in Pakistan it is written in the Urdu script. Important figures in Panjabi literature include Sheikh (Baba) Farid (1173–1265), the Sikh Gurus, and the Sufi poets Shah Husain (1538–1601) and Bulleh Shah (1680–1758). The folk romance (*qissa*) *Hir-Ranjha* of Waris Shah (1735–1790?) is the best known Panjabi work of the eighteenth century. Eminent contemporary literary figures in India are Mohan Singh 'Mahir' (1905–1978) and Amrita Pritam (b. 1917). In Pakistan, Shafqat Tanveer Mirza (b. 1932), and Nasreen Anjum Bhatti (b. 1948) are important.

Linguistic Summary

In the Panjabi consonant system, voiced-voiceless, aspirated-unaspirated, and dental-retroflex oppositions are phonological. In the vowel system, nasalization and three phonemic tones are distinctive.

Nouns distinguish number (singular and plural) and gender (masculine and feminine). Some nouns bear a characteristic mark of gender.

Basic verb forms are constructed on the stem, the imperfective participle, or the perfective participle. Panjabi is a split-ergative language, in which perfective tenses of transitive verbs agree with an unmarked direct object (not with the subject). The normal word order in a sentence is subject, object, verb.

Elena Bashir

See also: **Indo-Aryan Languages**

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PAN-PHILIPPINE HIGHWAY The Pan-Philippine Highway, sometimes known as the Maharlika Highway, is a 2,500-kilometer (1,550-mile) network of sealed roads, expressways, interchanges, bridges, and ferry services that links the main islands of the Philippine archipelago: Luzon, the Visayas, and Mindanao. The transport development program was proposed in 1965 and was supported by loans and grants from foreign-aid institutions, including the World Bank. It was a major achievement in road construction, and government planners believed that the Pan-Philippine Highway, in conjunction with other road construction, would stimulate agricultural production by reducing transportation costs, encourage social and economic development outside the major urban centers, and expand industrial production for domestic and foreign markets. Rebuilt and improved in 1997 with assistance from the Japanese government, the highway was dubbed the Philippine-Japan Friendship Highway. A campaign to encourage domestic tourism launched in 1998 by the Department of Tourism saw twenty-six sections of the highway in Luzon and seven areas in the Visayas, Mindanao, and the Bicol region designated as Scenic Highways with developed amenities for travelers and tourists.

Daniel Oakman

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P'ANSORI The Korean performance technique *p'ansori* (from *p'an*, meaning "performance," "performance space," or "event," and *sori*, meaning "sound," "voice," or "singing") features solo story-singing (*sori*) alternated with spoken passages (*aniri*). The earliest known records of its performance date to about three

centuries ago in the southwestern provinces of the Korean Peninsula. *P'ansori* was designated in 1963 as Korea's Intangible Cultural Asset (Muhyong munhwajae) No. 5, and select singers as its "Preservers" (Poyuja). In *p'ansori*, a singer stands on a straw mat, and the drummer is seated to the left of the singer with a drum (*puk*); during the performance, the drummer and members of the audience freely utter stylized cries of encouragement (*ch'uimsae*), which blend rhythmically with the singing. The early singers emerged among the male performing artists (*kwangdae*), whose performance function included musical accompaniment for the regional shamanic ritual (*kut*). In the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, women began to participate in *p'ansori*. Additionally, in the nineteenth century, as a consequence of royal and aristocratic patronage, *p'ansori* narratives became selected and the lyrics refined. *P'ansori* appealed to both upper and lower classes.

Today, five narratives (*obat'ang*) are practiced, and they are believed to uphold the five Neo-Confucian cardinal virtues: *Ch'unbyang ka* (The Song of Ch'unhyang), for wifely chastity; *Shim Ch'ongga* (The Song of Shim Ch'ong), for filial piety; *Hungboga* (The Song of Hungbo), for sibling order; *Sugungga* (The Song of the Underwater Palace), for royalty; and *Chokpyokka* (The Song of the Red Cliff), for gentlemanly faith. *P'ansori* singing utilizes several rhythmic cycles (*changdan*): *chinyang* (slow six beats), *semach'i* (faster *chinyang*), *chungmori* (medium twelve beats), *chungjungmori* (faster twelve beats), *chajinmori* (syncopated four beats), *hwimori* (fast four beats), *onmori* (ten beats asymmetrically split), and *tanmori* (medium six beats, the first half of *chungmori*).

Chan Park

PAO NATIONAL ORGANIZATION The Pao National Organization (PNO) is the main armed opposition force among the Pao (Pa-oh, Taungthu) people in rural districts around Taunggyi in southwestern Shan State in Myanmar (Burma). Pao nationalists took up arms with the Karens, to whom they are related, in 1949 shortly after Burma's independence. More than 100,000 Paos inhabit rural districts of the Karen and Mon States. Militant Pao nationalism, however, has mostly been expressed within the context of Shan State, where more than 500,000 Paos live. Most Paos are Buddhists.

During the 1950s, the main drive of the Pao movement was against the traditional rule of the Shan *sarwbwas* (princes). In 1958, some 1,300 Pao guerrillas laid

down their weapons under the "arms for democracy" program of Prime Minister U Nu. One year later, the *sawbwa* system was abolished.

Following the 1962 coup of General Ne Win, however, the Pao armed movement quickly revived under a new name, the Shan State Nationalities Liberation Organization (SSNLO). In 1973, an ideological split occurred between the SSNLO supporters of Tha Kalei, who allied himself with the Communist Party of Burma, and a pro-federalist movement led by the veteran politician "Thaton" Hla Pe (1910–1975). Following Hla Pe's death, leadership was taken over by a former Buddhist monk, Aung Kham Hti, who reestablished the PNO in 1976 and joined the National Democratic Front.

Sporadic fighting continued between the two factions until 1989 when Buddhist monks brokered peace talks. The following year, above-ground Pao candidates won three seats in the 1990 general election, precipitating another reorientation in Pao politics. In 1991, the PNO arranged a cease-fire with the State Law and Order Restoration Council government, followed in 1994 by the SSNLO. A Pao self-administered region was promised in the cease-fire areas designated as Southern Shan State Special Region 6, and both Pao forces opened offices in the towns to embark on a variety of social and development programs.

Martin Smith

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PAPER CRAFTS AND ARTS-KOREA The first form of paper in Korea appeared in the Three Kingdoms period (57 BCE–668 CE) and was made from pulp of hemp or ramie. Papermaking became an important industry with the invention of mulberry paper in the Koryo period (918–1392).

Koreans have had a long tradition of paper crafts, making products ranging from kites, flowers, fans, pouches, and boxes to larger items like chests and desks. Sliding doors were covered with paper, and floors were covered in layers of paper and varnish. In the early Choson period (1392–1910), a specially treated paper was used to make armor that was waterproof, warm, and resilient to attack.

Paper crafts are functional and also utilitarian in their use of scrap or used paper. They are also beautiful with their bright dyes and geometric patterns or flora and fauna motifs. One traditional paper craft technique uses layers of paper pasted together and shaped to form pouches, small baskets, and masks. Bamboo or wooden frames provide additional support for larger items. Kitchen items like bowls are made by using bits of paper soaked in water, then crushed and mixed with glue. A third technique weaves paper cords to make shoes, jars, and baskets. Varnish is used as a waterproof sealant.

Jennifer Jung-Kim

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PARACEL ISLANDS are a small group of about fifteen to thirty low coral islands and reefs located in the potentially oil-rich South China Sea about 280 kilometers southeast of Hainan Island, or about one-third of the way from central Vietnam to the northern Philippines. Stimulated by the strategic location and the possibility of nearby off shore oil deposits, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, and Vietnam all lay claim to all or part of the Paracels Islands. The United Nations Law of the Sea provides for peaceful resolution of disputed seabed territory. The Paracels fall under U.N. jurisdiction in regard to such disputes between China, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The islands were originally part of Vietnam and then part of French Indochina until World War II, when they were occupied by the Japanese. After the war, they passed briefly to China in 1945 (when an airfield was constructed), and then to the Republic of Vietnam. The Republic of Vietnam occupied the islands until 1974, when China seized them by force. The Paracel Islands have a total coastline distance of about 518 kilometers, have a high point of fourteen meters, have a tropical climate, have no natural resources (though their economic zone includes oil and natural gas deposits) or arable land, and are most susceptible to typhoons as their biggest natural hazard.

Richard B. Verrone

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PARHAE KINGDOM The kingdom of Parhae (698–926) rose from the ashes of the Korean Koguryo kingdom and as a revival of it. Following the collapse of Koguryo at the hands of Tang China, which had allied itself with Shilla, enabling that kingdom to unify most of the Korean Peninsula, many of the Tang's Koguryo prisoners of war were relocated in south-western Manchuria. Rebellion broke out in the area, and former Koguryo general Tae Cho-yong and his followers seized control, migrated northwest to the Jilin area, and consolidated their power. These followers consisted of much of the former Koguryo aristocracy, who clearly believed that they had revived the former state. Tae proclaimed himself king and was recognized as ruler of the state of Chin by the Tang in 698. In 713, Chin was renamed Parhae. At its height in the ninth century under King Son (known as Tae Insu; reigned 818–830), Parhae stretched from the northern provinces of present-day Korea to encompass the whole of northeastern Manchuria and the Liaodong Peninsula. It had a largely agriculture-based economy that traded cereal grains and handcrafted products, mainly with Tang China.

Parhae's prosperity reached its height in the first half of the ninth century during the reign of King Son. By this time, the kingdom regained much of the former Koguryo territory, except that in eastern Manchuria and south of Pyongyang. Both Parhae and Shilla established peaceful diplomatic relations with Tang China and began to assimilate Tang culture and institutions, which allowed their cultures to flourish.

By the late ninth century, the political confusion and violence that was to lead to the downfall of the Tang dynasty was also adversely affecting Parhae. The strengthening Khitan tribe conquered Parhae in 926 and would go on to dominate much of northern China and Manchuria. On the Korean Peninsula, the Koryo kingdom (918–1392) replaced Shilla, and many of the Parhae ruling class, who were descendants of the Koguryo people, moved south to join the newly formed dynasty of Koryo.

David E. Shaffer

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PARK CHUNG HEE (1917–1979), Third president of the Republic of Korea. Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui) gained political control of South Korea through a military coup on 16 May 1961. He first ruled through a military junta called the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, before winning the 1963 presidential elections (thereby establishing the Third Republic). He was reelected in 1967, 1971, 1972 (when the Fourth Republic was founded through the *Yushin* constitutional reforms, formulated to allow Park to remain in power), and 1978.

Park's political longevity was derived from institutional, social, and international support as well as from South Korea's economic development in the 1970s, hostilities between North and South Korea, and Cold War politics. Park was assassinated on 26 October 1979 by Kim Jae Kyu (1926–1980), an old friend of Park and at that time the head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency.

Park was born near Taegu in North Kyongsang province in present-day South Korea. He was educated in the Manchukuo Military Academy and the Japanese Imperial Military Academy and served in the Japanese army. After World War II, Park received advanced training at the Korean Military Academy and in the U.S. Army. Rising through the ranks, Park was a major general at the time of the 1961 military coup. Park's rule was noted for his acceptance of a police state and his use of military strength, as well as economic growth.

Jennifer Jung-Kim



President Park Chung Hee relaxing in May 1967 in Seoul. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

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PARSI The Parsis, numbering no more than eighty thousand, are a cultural and religious community centered in Mumbai (Bombay) but also living in some towns and villages of Gujarat State. Originally from Persia, they sought refuge from Islam at Sanjan on the west coast of India in (traditionally) 716 CE. Their identity hinges on their practice of Zoroastrianism, one of the world's monotheistic religions. The prophet Zoroaster's (Zarathushtra, c. 628–c. 551 BCE) teachings were preserved in the Avesta, a fragmentary compilation of praise and prayers to Ahuramazda and various guardians of the universe. Zoroastrianism includes the belief in two contending principles of Ahuramazda the good and Ahriman the evil, with men being soldiers in the army of Ahuramazda, and the worship of fire, in the home as well as in fire temples, as a symbol of life. There is a hereditary priesthood. The major life cycle ritual is the *Navjot*, an initiation ceremony for both sexes around the age of seven. The Parsis of India still expose corpses to birds of prey in stone structures known as towers of silence. Parsis have a 365-day calendar and celebrate communal feasts known as *Ghambars*, originally tied to the agricultural cycle. There is a strict rule of endogamy, and children of non-Parsi fathers were once denied Parsi status.

Although they began as an agrarian people, the Parsis moved into many other professions, especially under British rule when they accepted modern education. They contributed outstanding members to education, arts, sciences, jurisprudence, finance, politics, and the Indian civil service, out of all proportion to their numbers. Their most enduring efforts, however, have been in entrepreneurship. In the early twentieth century, individual Parsis built empires in shipbuilding, textiles, iron and steel works, banking, and overseas trade. The community has a well-deserved reputation for philanthropy, including endowing fire temples and schools and funds for the welfare of their community.

Since the 1950s many younger, well-educated, professional Parsis have emigrated, and sizable groups live in Canada, the United States, Australia, and Britain. Parsis tend to form social and religious organizations to keep alive as many cultural traditions as possible. Because exogamy is more common among the offspring of the emigrants, children of mixed marriages are now accepted into the community. The greatest

challenge facing the Parsis is a precipitous decline in numbers. Due to late marriages, low birthrates, and high economic expectations of the young, demographers have predicted that the Parsis will die out well before the end of the twenty-first century if current trends persist.

W. D. Merchant

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PARTAI KEBANGKITAN BANGSA The Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party, PKB) emerged as one of the more serious contenders among the many political parties that sprang up in Indonesia after the fall of President Suharto in May 1998. Established on 23 July 1998, PKB was inspired by the secular and liberal outlook of Abdurrahman Wahid (b. 1940), the leader of the traditionalist Muslim organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and one of the cofounders of PKB. Because Wahid was suffering from the effects of a stroke, PKB was chaired by Matori Abdul Djilil. Due to its loyalty to the Pancasila, the five principles of the state philosophy as contained in the preamble of the Indonesian constitution of 1945, PKB could not mobilize the Islamist base of the 35-million-member NU. Thus it faced strong competition from other Muslim parties, such as the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Unification and Development Party, PPP), Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party, PAN), and others. PKB, however, formed a coalition with Megawati Sukarnoputri's secular Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Fighting Party for Indonesian Democracy, PDI-P). In the general elections of June 1999, PKB ranked as the fourth-strongest party, behind PDI-P, Golongan Karya (Functional Groups [the former government party under Suharto], Golkar), and PPP. Shortly before the presidential elections of October 1999, PKB unexpectedly joined the Islamic Central Axis alliance under the leadership of the PPP, which proposed Wahid as its presidential candidate. Competing against Megawati, Wahid won the election, while Megawati became his vice president.

Martin Ramstedt

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PARTAI PERSATUAN PEMBANGUNAN

In 1973, the Indonesian New Order government of Suharto merged all existing political parties into two parties—the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI; Indonesian Democratic Party) and the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP; United Development Party)—in order to minimize real opposition from popular political agencies such as the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI; Indonesian National Party) or the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The resultant "opposition parties" PDI and PPP served more as an alibi for the supposedly democratic New Order government, which appeared to tolerate a multiparty system, than as forums for true opposition. Through intimidation, violence, and election fraud, Suharto ensured that open support for these parties on the part of the masses remained small. Hence, the hegemony of the government party Golongan Karya (Golkar) was never threatened, and in effect Suharto did sponsor a one-party system.

Whereas the Christian-backed PDI had a nationalist and secular agenda, the PPP had a strong Islamic profile, having incorporated the four Muslim parties Nahdlatul Ulama, Parmusi, Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (PERTI), and Partai Sarekat Islam. It was, however, weakened by deep internal divides due to the divergent political orientations of its members. Under heavy state pressure, the PPP replaced Islam with the Pancasila (the five principles of the Indonesian state philosophy, consisting of belief in one God, humanity, national unity, democracy, and social justice) as its sole ideological fundament in 1984. In protest, the Nahdlatul Ulama withdrew from the party, while many other members shifted their loyalty to Golkar. Nevertheless, the PPP remained the sole political forum for Muslim interests until the fall of Suharto in May 1998. In the ensuing reformation era, it enhanced its Islamic profile, thereby gaining in influence, and formed the Central Axis (Poros Tengah) alliance with other emerging Muslim parties. As the leader of this Islamic alliance, which unexpectedly proposed Abdurrahman Wahid (b. 1940) as candidate for the presidential election of October 1999, the PPP helped to

prevent Megawati Sukarnoputri, the candidate of the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, winner of the June general elections, from winning the election.

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PARTI RAKYAT BRUNEI Parti Rakyat Brunei is a political party established in Brunei in 1956 and modeled on Malaya's left-leaning Parti Rakyat Malaya. Independence for Brunei, a British protectorate since 1888, was its main agenda. Although it did not favor dissolution of the sultanate, the PRB wanted national leadership to shift from the palace to the *rakyat* (people) through democratization in the government.

The PRB rejected the notion of membership in federation with Malaysia, proposed by Malaya's Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra al-Haj in 1961, believing that entry into Malaysia would dash all hopes of a revival of Brunei hegemony and would result in the loss of Brunei's unique identity. At the time, the PRB's membership of 26,000 people represented more than a quarter of Brunei's population; nevertheless, the government of Brunei favored federation with Malaysia. On 5 December 1962, the PRB submitted a motion demanding Sarawak and British North Borneo be returned to Brunei, that a federation of the three British Borneo territories be created, that Brunei reject entry into Malaysia, and that Brunei become independent in 1963. The motion was rejected, and the PRB launched a coup that it had originally planned for April or May of 1963. British forces quashed the rebellion, and Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III of Brunei declared a state of emergency and outlawed the PRB. Some 3,000 PRB participants in the revolt were captured; others fled abroad. A. M. Azahari (Sheikh Ahmad Azahari bin

Sheikh Mahmud, b. 1929), leader of the PRB, was in Manila when the revolt occurred; he sought refuge in Jakarta.

On 13 July 1973 PRB detainees who had refused to renounce the party staged a dramatic escape and reconstituted the party in exile. In December, an Ad Hoc Committee for the Independence of Brunei was established in Kuala Lumpur. Subsequently on 7 May 1974, the PRB was formally reactivated with the naming of an executive committee with Azahari as president.

Throughout the 1970s the PRB actively garnered moral and material support from various quarters, including the United Nations, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The PRB's perseverance resulted in a U.N. resolution on Brunei (13 November 1975) that established principles of succession and legitimacy that any government established in Brunei should meet. However, despite Brunei's independence from Britain on 31 December 1983, the PRB continued to be outlawed, and several detainees remained in custody. PRB leaders remained in exile. The PRB is now dormant, and its political future is uncertain.

Ooi Keat Gin

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PASHTO Pashto, or Pakhto, is a language that has its origins in the northeastern group of the Iranian languages; it is considered the language of the Pashtun people. It is believed that at least 10 million people speak Pashto. Not only is it one of the official languages spoken in Afghanistan (Dari is the other official language), but other communities, such as the people in the North West Frontier and Baluchistan provinces of Pakistan, speak it as well.

Several Pashto dialects exist, the main ones being the western or southwestern and the eastern or northeastern. The former is often referenced as Pashto, while the latter is called Pakhto. One of the differences

between the two dialects is that the speakers use different symbols or letters to represent the same sound. To compensate for these differences and thus create a sense of unity among the speakers of Pashto, completely separate letters were devised to replace those that caused the confusion. Current deviations of written Pashto occur between the Pashto written in Afghanistan and that in Pakistan. Pakistani people are rarely taught Pashto in school, so that the Pakistani Pashto-speaking population tends to spell phonetically.

Some historical accounts state that Pashto first appeared in written form in a work by Bayazid Ansari (c. 1525–c. 1581), an Afghan religious leader who declared that he had received divine instruction to write his work in Pashto. Ansari's work is believed to be the earliest existing written piece in Pashto.

Houman A. Sadri

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PASHTUN Pashtun (Pakhtun, Pushtoon) refers to the predominant ethnic group of Afghanistan, which has for centuries represented the political and military elite. Before the eighteenth century, the Pashtans were also known as Afghans, but with the creation of modern Afghanistan in 1747, that name came to identify any person born in the country and lost its distinctive ethnic connotation. The difference between the words "Pashtun" and "Pakhtun" is purely phonetic. The term "Pathan" is less accurate; adopted by the English during the colonial period, it is still in use in the present state of Pakistan to identify the Pashtun people who have settled within Pakistan's borders.

Pashtun origins are still disputed. Though Pashtun traditions claim a Jewish origin—the common tribal ancestor being Afghana, a grandson of King Saul of Israel—the language belongs to the Indo-European stock. Between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Pashtun extended their influence over the Afghan region, migrating also toward the western borders of the Indian subcontinent. In 1747, the Ghilzays, a powerful Pashtun tribe with many subdivisions, invaded the Persian empire, putting an end to the Safavid dy-



Pashtun soldiers in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in December 2001. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

nasty (1501–1722/1736). Also in 1747, the Pashtun Abd'ali commander, Ahmad Shah (1722—1773), established himself as first amir (king) of Afghanistan, and the Abd'alīs became the predominant tribe of the country. Thereafter, the Abd'alīs were known as Durranīs, from Ahmad Shah's appellative *Durr-i Durran* (Pearl of Pearls).

The Pashtun traditionally have a strong and distinctive tribal structure, organized into tribal subsections (tribes, clans, subclans) according to the male bloodline descent from an eponymous ancestor. The two main groups of tribes are the Durranīs, who held the principal political positions, and the Ghilzays, but there are at least sixty tribes of different importance and size. The powerful nomadic traditions and close links with the practice of transhumance and animal husbandry gave them great mobility over, and knowledge of, the harsh Afghan territory, enhancing their warfaring attitudes against any external aggression. Indeed, Pashtun have always been attracted to the military life, while blood feuds and disputes are even today a characteristic of inter- and intratribal relations.

These warrior traditions have been "codified" in the Pakhtunwali, the unwritten code observed by Pashtun warriors to preserve their honor. Basic elements of this code are hospitality, the blood feud, the right/duty of asylum, and the defense of the honor of the women of

one's own tribal subsection. From a religious point of view, Pashtun are Sunni Muslims.

In 1999, Pashtun in Afghanistan were estimated to be almost 10 million (38 percent of the total population), settled mainly in the Kabul area, in Kandahar, and along the eastern borders. In Pakistan, there were around 15 to 16 million Pashtun, concentrated in North West Province and Baluchistan.

Riccardo Redaelli

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PASHTUNWALI Pashtunwali is the Pashtun code of life. The Pashtun, speaking an east Iranian dialect called Pashto, live on both sides of the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Although predominantly Muslim, the Pashtun live according to a cultural code, Pashtunwali, which demands courage, hospitality (e.g., giving shelter to anyone who seeks protection), and revenge—unless the aggressor seeks public pardon. Pashtunwali, however, never forgives

shame-causing crimes, especially those involving a woman's honor. Pashtun society is well known for its generations-long cycles of revenge murder. Conflict resolution in the case of murder involves public pardon, forgiveness, the ceding of land, or the giving in marriage of a woman from the aggressor's family to a member of the aggrieved family. Pashtunwali is driven by *nang* (honor) and *tor* (shame). As a compendium of cultural customs, Pashtunwali guides a Pashtun's every public behavior and action. Sometimes its many expectations make it difficult for even the staunchest Pashtun to live by the letter and spirit of the Pashtunwali code. "To be a Pashtun is a curse," says a Pashto proverb, "but not to be a Pashtun is a shame."

Abdul Karim Khan

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PATHET LAO The Pathet Lao has been the predominant twentieth-century revolutionary movement in Laos. The literal meaning of Pathet Lao is Lao nation, Lao country, or land of the Lao, reflective of its strong nationalistic orientation.

The Pathet Lao originated from the Vietnamese communists' resistance in 1945 to the return of French colonial rule. The actual first use of the term occurred in 1950 in a special manifesto issued by the Congress of the Free Laos Front organized by Lao radical leaders opposed to the French and their colonial rule. The emergence of the Pathet Lao as a separate political force resulted from the split within the Lao Issara (Lao independence movement) in March of 1949. In 1949 an accommodation was reached between the center-right of the former Lao Issara movement and the French, resulting in the neocolonial rule opposed by the Pathet Lao and its leaders.

The major leaders of the Pathet Lao were Kaysone Phomvihane, Prince Souphanouvong (the "Red Prince"), and Nouhak Phoumsavan. All three of these leaders had close ties to Vietnam. Among them, Kaysone is clearly considered the revolutionary nationalist hero of Laos.

After the Geneva Conference in 1954, Laos was split into two zones, with the Pathet Lao dominant in the northeastern areas of Sam Neua and Phong Saly.

They referred to their areas as liberated zones. They continued their revolutionary struggle against the French and later American-influenced neocolonial regimes. Eventually, through armed revolutionary struggle, the Pathet Lao achieved power in the latter part of 1975, and the Lao People's Democratic Republic was declared on 2 December 1975.

The formal party structure of the Pathet Lao was the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP), established in 1955 as the clandestine core organization within the Neo Lao Hak Sat (Lao Patriotic Front), which continues to rule Laos at the present time, and is normally simply referred to simply as the Party. The future of the LPRP fundamentally depends on the extent to which it remains faithful to the revolutionary ideals of the Pathet Lao and demonstrates genuine commitment to and success in improving the welfare of the Lao people.

Gerald W. Fry

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PATNA (2001 est. pop. 1.4 million). Patna (ancient Pataliputra) is the capital of Bihar State in northern India, 300 miles northwest of Calcutta on the south bank of the Ganges. The river is triple its usual width here and is crossed by the Mahatma Gandhi Seti, one of the largest bridges in the world.

Kunika Ajatasatru, second in the line of Magadh kings and heir of King Bimbisara, the philosopher-king of Kashi, ascended the throne of Magadh in 493 BCE. He fortified the small village of Pataligrama, which later came to be known as Pataliputra. The city was established by Ajatasatru's son Udayi to fulfill the Buddha's prophecy of a great city on that site. It was the capital of the Mauryan and Gupta empires and one of the subcontinent's most important cities for nearly a thousand years. The first Mauryan emperor, Chandragupta (d. c. 297 BCE), expanded his domain to the Indus; his grand-

son Asoka (d. c. 238 BCE) extended it further. The city declined under medieval feudalism, until the sultanate revival in the sixteenth century under the rule of Mughal emperor Sher Shah. The English and Dutch East India Companies established factories in 1640 and 1666. The English began governing in 1766 and made Patna a provincial capital in 1912.

The symbol of the city is the beehive-shaped Golghar, a granary built in 1786. The Har Mandir Sahib shrine commemorates the Sikh guru Gobind Singh (1666–1708). In his honor the old quarter of the city is called Patna Sahib.

Roger Davis

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PDP. See **Phalang Dharma Party**.

PEGU (2002 est. pop. 228,100). Pegu (Bago), located on the banks of the Pegu (Bago) River, eighty kilometers northeast of Yangon (Rangoon), is the third-largest city in Myanmar (Burma). It is the capital of Pegu (Bago) Division, which has a population of 4.85 million (1997 est.) and is a major agricultural and rice-producing region. Its road and rail links are to be augmented by the new Hanthawaddy International Airport (scheduled for completion in 2004).

Pegu has an ancient history and was once known as Hamsavati (Hanthawadi), after the mythical bird associated with the city's founding. From 1365 to 1539 Pegu was the capital of the independent Mon kingdom of Lower Burma, whose rulers included King Razadarit (1385–1423), Queen Shin Sawbu (1453–1472), and King Dhammazedi (1472–1492). Fifteenth- and sixteenth-century European travelers left accounts of Pegu's splendor and prosperity. From 1539 to 1599 it was the capital of a united Burmese kingdom (the first Toungoo dynasty) until besieged and sacked by Arakanese invaders. Thereafter, years of warfare and the silting of its river port contributed to Pegu's decline and depopulation. In 1635, King Thalun abandoned Pegu altogether, transferring the capital to Ava in Upper Burma. Although resurgent Mon forces conquered Ava in 1752, their victory was short-lived. Any hopes for the restoration of the old

Mon kingdom of Pegu were quashed by the rise of King Alaungpaya, founder of the Konbaung dynasty, who conquered and sacked Pegu in 1757. Pegu was annexed by the British in 1852 and developed into a major administrative and trading center for agricultural and forest products.

Pegu's most notable Buddhist monuments are Shwe-maw-daw Temple, Kalyani Thein (Ordination Hall, rebuilt in 1954 on the site of the 1476 original), the Shwe-thalyaung reclining Buddha image, and the four-faced Kyaik-pun image. In the 1990s, an ancient palace site was excavated and the palace of King Bayinnaung (1551–1581) lavishly reconstructed.

Patricia M. Herbert

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PEKING UNIVERSITY Peking University is the oldest and best comprehensive university in China. It was founded in December 1898 under the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) and was originally named the Metropolitan University. After the Republic of China was established, the university changed its name to Peking University in May 1912, and it retained this name after the People's Republic of China was established on 1 October 1949.

Peking University has a liberal tradition of academic freedom. In 1919 it played a leading role in the May Fourth intellectual and social movement and became a center for the Chinese new culture movement to adopt a popular speaking language instead of that of the traditional classic literature. Marxism in China was first developed at Peking University by Professors Chen Duxiu (1889–1942), Li Dazhao (1889–1927), and Mao Zedong (1893–1976), who then worked in the university's library.

When the Japanese invaded China in World War II, the university was moved to Kunming, Yunnan Province. When the university moved back to Beijing in 1946, it consisted of six colleges with a total of 3,000 students. Enrollment increased to 10,671 students in 1952 but declined during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976).

In 2001 Peking University is a comprehensive university, offering five fields of study: humanities, social sciences, science, medicine and information, and en-

gineering. With a total enrollment of 36,982 students, it has 16 colleges, 19 departments, 80 undergraduate programs, 177 masters programs, and 155 doctoral programs. At present, it also has 98 research institutes and 126 research centers.

The presidents of Peking University have been well-known scholars, including Yan Fu, the most famous Chinese translator of Western classics to Chinese; Cai Yuanpei, the famous educator; Hu Shi, the philosopher and author; and Ma Yinchu, the economist.

Chang Teb-Kuang

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PENANG (1995 est. pop. 1.2 million). Penang or Pulau Pinang ("Betel Nut Island" in Malay) is located in northwestern peninsular Malaysia. Today the "Pearl of the Orient" comprises the island of Penang and Seberang Perai (formerly Province Wellesley), a narrow strip on the peninsular Malaysian mainland. These are separated by a channel and linked by the Penang Bridge and a twenty-four-hour ferry service. The population is approximately 38 percent Malay, 50 percent Chinese, and 11 percent Indian. The capital of Penang is Georgetown, the seat of administration and the state's commercial hub. Penang is well known for its golden beaches.

Before 1786, Penang was part of the Kedah state. Kedah paid tribute in the form of "golden flowers" to its powerful neighbor, Siam, and was also in constant danger of a Bugis invasion from the south. The history of modern Penang began in 1786, when Englishman Francis Light persuaded the sultan of Kedah to lease Penang to the British East India Company in return for protection against the Bugis and Siamese.

After it became obvious that the British had no intention of fulfilling the agreement, the sultan of Kedah assembled a fleet to recapture Penang but was defeated. A treaty was signed to confirm the British occupation of Penang. The island was originally named Prince of Wales Island and later renamed Georgetown after King George III. In 1800, the Sultan of Kedah

ceded a strip of land on the mainland, which Francis Light named Province Wellesley after Colonel Arthur Wellesley, then governor of India. In 1826, Penang formed part of the Straits Settlement with Melaka and Singapore. It became a major trading center. In 1948, it became one of the states of the Federation of Malaya. The federation gained independence from the Britain in 1957. Together with Sabah and Sarawak, the federation formed Malaysia in 1963.

Yik Koon The

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PENINSULAR THAILAND Like an elephant's trunk, peninsular Thailand stretches roughly 800 kilometers south of the capital, Bangkok, to the Malaysian border. Wedged between the Gulf of Thailand in the east and Myanmar (Burma) and the Andaman Sea in the west, the peninsula is only about 234 kilometers wide at its widest, narrowing in parts to only about 30 kilometers. However, peninsular or southern Thailand also encompasses a number of islands off both coasts.

One of the country's most interesting regions, the peninsula plays a vital role in the economic and cultural makeup of Thailand. Distinct from the rest of the country, the four southernmost provinces of peninsular Thailand are closely linked to the Malay culture of Malaysia and Indonesia. While representing only about 5 percent of the total Thai population, Muslims are predominant in the peninsula. So too is an ethnic Chinese population that adds to the region's cultural and linguistic diversity. Even the Thai spoken in the south is distinct; it is often referred to as *paasaa paak tai*, or "language of the south."

Although peninsular Thailand is largely rural, several metropolitan centers exist. The biggest, Hat Yai, has a population of around 200,000, making it one of the larger cities in the country and a vibrant commercial center. Other cities include the fishing port of Songkhia and the major tourist center of Phuket. The split between rural and urban in the region reflects the cultural diversity as well, with the Chinese dominating the large towns and cities and the Muslim Thais inhabiting the countryside.

This diversity has, however, been problematic for Thailand. Historically, rebellions and strong separatist feelings have distanced the region from the rest of the country. A Communist insurgency during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s was based in peninsular Thailand (as well as in the northeast) and was closely associated with the Chinese population. Armed revolts in the area have long since ended, and in fact the region has become a stronghold for a major national political organization, the Democratic Party. Peninsular Thailand has however retained much of its uniqueness, and differences with the government in Bangkok are not uncommon.

With access to the seas, fishing is a major industry in peninsular Thailand. In fact, the region is one of the most important fishing centers in Southeast Asia. Large rubber plantations and a variety of agricultural and mining interests also contribute to the local economy. Unlike other regions of the country, which frequently endure droughts, peninsular Thailand has a high and consistent amount of rainfall, enriching its agricultural prosperity. Tourism is one of the largest industries in the area as well, particularly on resort islands such as Phuket and Koh Samui. Thailand's largest island, Phuket, is also its richest province. Noted for its diverse peoples, spectacular scenery, and resource wealth, the peninsula offers much to the cultural and economic fabric of Thailand.

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PEOPLE POWER MOVEMENT People Power Movement refers to the popular uprising that ousted Philippine president Ferdinand E. Marcos in February 1986. Also known as the EDSA Revolution, the uprising was in reaction to the massive fraud and violence unleashed by the government to ensure that Marcos and vice presidential candidate Arturo To-

lentino would win the so-called snap elections that Marcos had called earlier that month. The opposition ticket was headed by Corazon Aquino, wife of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, who was assassinated in 1983 by elements of the Philippine military as he debarked his plane at the Manila International Airport (since renamed Ninoy Aquino International Airport). Many believed that Aquino and her running mate, Salvador Laurel, would have won had the elections been fair and honest. Massive demonstrations were held in front of Malacanang (the presidential palace) and two military camps located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). The peaceful uprising became a model for other countries wishing to change their government without resort to a military coup or a bloody revolution.

Josie Hernandez de Leon

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PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM The People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) is the Vietnamese armed forces. It includes the army, the navy, the air force, and several paramilitary units. It was created in May 1945 during a conference of the Indochinese Communist Party, and it consisted of the union of a number of revolutionary forces, such as the Armed Propaganda Brigades and the Viet Minh. Originally called the Vietnamese Liberation Army, it became known as the PAVN following the 1954 Geneva Agreements at the end of the war with France (French, or First, Indochina War; 1946–1954). The PAVN received world recognition at the time because the Geneva Agreements stipulated that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) could keep its existing armed forces. PAVN troops were divided into three broad categories: the PAVN Regular Force (the army, navy, and air force), the Regional Force (infantry units located in distinct areas), and the Militia Self-Defense Force (local troops organized at the village or city level).

The PAVN fought against Japanese occupation forces in 1945, against French forces during the war with France, and against American and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces during the Vietnam War (Second Indochina War; 1954–1975). Following the reunification of Vietnam in 1975, the PAVN was called upon to participate in the nation's



CHAIRMAN MAO ON THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

The Three Main Rules of Discipline are as follows:

- Obey orders in all your actions
- Do not take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses.
- Turn in everything captured.

The Eight Points for Attention are as follows:

- Speak politely.
- Pay fairly for what you buy.
- Return everything you borrow.
- Pay for anything you damage.
- Do not hit or swear at people.
- Do not damage crops.
- Do not take liberties with women.
- Do not ill-treat captives.

Source: Mao Zedong (1976) Quotations from Chairman Mao Tsetung. Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 256–257.

postwar reconstruction. A number of troops were demobilized and transformed into economic development units. This proved to be short-lived because in 1978, PAVN troops participated in a military intervention of Cambodia and remained in that nation for ten years. In 1979, the PAVN defended Vietnam's northern border against the threat of Chinese attack and invasion.

Over the years, with military and material assistance from the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, the PAVN evolved from a poorly equipped guerrilla army to a modern, more conventional military force. Presently, the PAVN boasts an estimated 1.5 million troops, and an estimated 13 million Vietnamese men and women can be mobilized if necessary. The PAVN operates under the direction of a number of Vietnamese governmental and Communist Party institutions: the National Assembly, the Ministry of Defense, the National Defense Council, the Politburo, and the Central Military Party Committee. In addition, a few members of the PAVN's high command often serve on governmental and party committees.

Micheline R. Lessard

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PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the collective name for the ground, air, naval, and strategic forces of the Communist Chinese military. The current PLA is one of the largest military forces in the world. Its army, which numbers more than three million, is the largest in the world. It also has a fairly sizeable navy and air force, and its nuclear forces, while small compared to those of the United States and Russia, rank as the fourth largest. However, many of its weapons and equipment are antiquated and limited in their ability to project military force beyond China's borders.

The origins of the PLA date back to 1 August 1927, when the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was established by the Chinese Communists to fight a guerrilla war against the Nationalist (Guomindang) forces led by Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975). During the Maoist period (1949–1976), the PLA was trans-

formed from a loosely organized guerrilla army into a professional fighting force closely resembling the Soviet model, although there was always some tension between those who favored further professionalization and those who wanted the PLA to remain a revolutionary organization.

The PLA has historically been deeply involved with the governance of the country, although it has always remained subordinate to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule. Top party leaders, including Mao Zedong (1893–1976) and Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), have historically had extensive experience in, and connections with, the Red Army. The PLA forms one of the three pillars of power in the Chinese Communist political system, alongside the CCP and the Chinese state or government. It enjoys equal rank with the State Council, the highest governmental body, and answers only to the Military Affairs Commission of the CCP. It is the Communist Party, in other words, and not the government that commands the PLA. In fact, party control over the PLA has been so important that the only official position held by Deng Xiaoping, China's preeminent leader during the 1980s, was chairman of the Military Affairs Commission. Another indication of the PLA's involvement in domestic affairs is that it runs a vast network of military industries and trans-

portation links that accounts for a significant part of the nation's economic output. During the 1980s and 1990s, China's leaders have sought to further professionalize and modernize the PLA in an effort to disentangle it from domestic affairs and redirect its mission toward external security.

Shawn Shieh

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PERAK (2002 est. pop. 2.1 million). Perak, which in the Malay language means "silver," covers an area of 21,005 square kilometers on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula and has a population of more than 2 million—48 percent Malay, 36 percent Chinese, 14 percent Indian, and 2 percent others. Ipoh, its capital, has become one of the largest cities in Malaysia. Its rich deposit of tin was its major trade until the tin slump of 1983. Perak managed to restructure its economy to focus on industry, business, and investment.

The origin of the present sultanate can be traced to the Melaka sultanate. The last sultan of Melaka was Sultan Mahmud (d. 1528), who reigned from 1488 to 1511. In 1511, Melaka was captured by the Portuguese. Sultan Mahmud fled to Johor. He was succeeded by his younger son, Alauddin, who became the sultan of Johor. Mahmud's eldest son, Muzaffar Shah, set out for Perak and established his court there. He became the first sultan of Perak in about 1529.

Perak, with its rich tin deposits, had attracted constant threats to its sovereignty, starting with the Acehnese in the sixteenth century. After 1641, the Dutch attempted to establish a monopoly over the tin trade but without great success. In the eighteenth century, threats came from the Bugis in the south and the Siamese in the north.

The growing importance of tin ore on the world market led to an influx of Chinese miners into the tin fields of Larut. In the 1860s and 1870s, factional feuds among the Chinese miners and disputes over succession to the throne led to British intervention under the Pangkor Treaty in 1874. Before the 1870s, the

British had a policy of noninvolvement in the affairs of the Malay States, although Britain had extensive trading business there. British intervention settled the dispute among the Chinese miners, and the Pangkor Treaty recognized Abdullah as the sultan of Perak (reigned 1874–1875). A British resident, James Wheeler Woodford Birch, was also appointed to Perak. The role of the resident was to advise the sultan on how to improve the administration of his state. Although the resident was to have no executive powers, his advice was to be sought and followed on all questions other than those touching on Malay religion and custom. It was a system used to exercise British influence over the Malay States. The three general aims were the establishment of law and order, the centralized collection of revenue, and the development of the resources of the states.

However, opposition from the Perak chiefs resulted in the assassination of Birch in 1875. Under Sir Hugh Low from 1877 to 1889, Perak became a model for the development of the British resident system. In 1896, Perak, together with Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, and Pahang, formed the Federated Malay States. In 1948, the Federated Malay States became part of the Federation of Malaya. The federation gained independence from British colonial rule in 1957. Together with Sabah and Sarawak, the federation formed Malaysia in 1963.

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PERANAKAN The word "Peranakan" is Malay for someone who is "local born" of mixed ancestry, but it is now almost exclusively used to refer to the Chinese community. Chinese Peranakan communities emerged in Java (and to a lesser extent in southern Sumatra and coastal Kalimantan) during the eigh-

teenth century and functioned as a merchant class under the Dutch authorities. The Chinese settlers, invariably male, married local women, forming a mixed community that then remained apart from indigenous society. While earlier Chinese migrants, starting with the Mongol incursions of the late 1200s, had been absorbed into the local population, the Peranakan communities remained distinct but adopted aspects of Javanese society.

The Peranakan communities adopted the Malay language, mixing in elements of Javanese, Sundanese, and their native Hokkien. Their cuisine was a mixture of Chinese and Javanese cooking, although with elements unknown in either culture, while their traditional clothing was also unique. Traditionally, they preferred the Chinese style of housing. Peranakan culture formed a "third," or "intermediary," culture in the sense that it combined Chinese and Indonesian elements but also included unique customs. What continued to separate the Peranakan—and mark them as Chinese to the indigenous peoples of Java—was their nonconversion to Islam (unlike earlier Chinese settlers); thus they remained Buddhist and/or Confucian or became Christian in some cases. By the early nineteenth century, the arrival of women with a more diverse group of Chinese migrants from Hokkien-, Hakka-, and Cantonese-speaking areas created a new type of settler community, which the Indonesians called Totok (pure blood). The Peranakan communi-

ties have tended, over time, to merge with the Totok communities through intermarriage, thus blurring the boundaries.

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PERGAMON The ancient city of Pergamon, located on the site of the present-day city of Bergama in Izmir, Turkey, flourished in the third and second centuries BCE. It allied itself with Rome and after becoming Roman in 133 BCE was known as Pergamum.

The kingdom of Pergamon surrendered to Alexander of Macedon in 334 BCE and after Alexander's death in 323 BCE was claimed by Lysimachus, one of Alexander's generals, in 301 BCE. Lysimachus used the acropolis of Pergamon to guard his riches. Philetaerus, at first an ally of Lysimachus, changed sides and supported Seleucus I, another of Alexander's generals, a tactic that won him the rulership of Pergamon. Phile-



The ruins of the Temple of Trajan at the site of an ancient Greek city in Pergamon, c. 1997. (RICHARD T. NOWITZ/CORBIS)

taerus ruled over the kingdom from 282 to 263 BCE; his successor, his nephew Eumenes I, governed until 241 BCE and left a wealthy kingdom to his cousin Attalus I, founder of the Attalid dynasty that controlled the city-state until 133 BCE.

Attalus (reigned 241–197 BCE) enlarged the kingdom to include Bythnia, Lydia, Cappadocia, and land as far away as Antalya; conquered the invading Gauls and the Seleucid king Antiochus III; and allied the kingdom with Rome. Attalus founded a library in the well-fortified, magnificently constructed city, which became a major literary center in Asia Minor as well as a center of Hellenistic sculpture.

Eumenes II, Attalus's son, expanded the kingdom still further and developed the library to challenge the library of Alexandria. The immense altar of Zeus, a masterpiece of Hellenistic architecture and sculpture constructed in Eumenes II's reign, is decorated around the base with a heroic frieze almost 120 meters long, depicting the battle of Gods and Giants; a smaller frieze celebrating the founding of Pergamon adorns the main colonnaded court. The dramatic conflicts of the figures on the large frieze suggest the power and divinity inherent in nature, which Greeks saw as their gods.

Pergamon continued to prosper, but Attalos III, the last ruler of the dynasty, had no heirs and at his death bequeathed his kingdom to Rome. Pergamon became Pergamum, the first Roman-ruled possession in Asia Minor and capital of the Roman province of Asia.

Ancient Monuments of Pergamon

The city was founded on a steep acropolis and expanded under later kings and the Romans to the plain below; it varies in altitude from 60 to 335 meters. On the oldest part of the site, the acropolis, stand temples to Athena, the altar dedicated to Zeus and probably to all the gods, royal palaces designed to glorify the Hellenistic rulers, and a *heroon*, or shrine to a hero, where the Attalid dynasty was worshiped. The library, which attracted distinguished scholars, included books written on parchment—specially treated skins of young animals, particularly sheep, calf, or goat (from the Greek *pergamene*, "of Pergamum"; Pergamon was famed for its fine parchment). In 40 BCE Mark Antony sent some of the 200,000 books to Cleopatra to restock the library of Alexandria after a disastrous fire.

Below the original walls and rising above the temple of Dionysus, the huge Greek theater was partly cut into natural rock; there were eighty rows in the *cavea*, or circle of seats, and two *diazomas*, horizontal passages that allowed people to cross the seating area. A

huge gymnasium, with divisions for teaching infant, junior, and senior boys, included baths supplied through clay pipes. From the second century BCE, aqueducts made of earthenware pipes were constructed to supply drinking water; that from the spring at Madradag Hill was made up of 240,000 separate clay pipes. Later a pressurized lead-piped system and an eighty-kilometer-long Roman aqueduct led to cisterns and holding tanks.

The Romans added a temple dedicated to the imperial cult and a Serapeion, the temple of an Egyptian deity worshiped in the Greco-Roman world. The Serapeion, 260 by 100 meters, was built of red brick and had ducted sacred pools. A sacred way led to a temple of Asklepios, the Greek god of medicine; his temple functioned as a sort of hospital, where the god appeared to patients in dreams, offering diagnosis and cures.

Later Pergamum

The Greek physician Galen (129–c. 199 CE) was born in Pergamum and ministered to the gladiators there. From 161 Galen was in Rome, at the court of Marcus Aurelius, and then was physician to the Roman emperor Commodus. Galen's writings formed the basis of Greco-Roman and Arabic medicine. Pergamum was also an early center of Christianity and the seat of one of the seven churches of Asia, founded by Saint Paul. The city continued as a commercial center during the Byzantine and Ottoman empires.

Discovery

The ancient ruins of Pergamon, which surround the modern city of Bergama, were rediscovered in 1868 by a railway engineer, Carl Humann, who found fragments of the sculptures of the Zeus altar. From 1878 on, the immense altar was excavated under the sponsorship of the Prussian government, and the remains were taken to Berlin and installed in the Pergamon Museum, where they may be seen today. Despite this loss, ancient Pergamon is still a magnificent Hellenistic city whose sights attract numerous visitors.

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PERIPATETICS The people whom anthropologists commonly call peripatetics (from the Greek

peripatetikos, meaning to walk up and down, discoursing while walking) are known in South and West Asia by a variety of terms, among them Gypsies, Lambadis, and Banjaras. They consist of innumerable small, nomadic groups, often no more than one extended family in size, who move through the countryside performing a wide range of tasks. Many of these occupations have given rise to the particular name of a group, like the Banjaras, carriers of rice and salt. The peripatetics fill an economic niche wherever they go. Some perform a variety of services through the distribution of minor products, such as trinkets, forest produce, or magical amulets. Others are religious mendicants who give the faithful the opportunity of acquiring merit by feeding these beggars. Yet others are street beggars or fortune-tellers of a more secular nature. Many groups are involved in performances, from displaying wild animals or performing acrobatic feats to clairvoyance and prostitution.

In South Asia the great majority of peripatetics are Hindu, but some are Muslim or Sikh, and others may claim to be Christian. In every case the nomadism of these people is distinct from the purposive nomadism of transhumant pastoralists like the Gujjars, who move their herds over a fixed route every year to find better pasture. Nonetheless some peripatetics have herds, usually of camels, goats, or pigs, which have their own niche in the landscape.

There are no reliable census figures for such people, and they tend to keep their distance from all kinds of officials, especially the police. There may be some 10 million in South Asia, but there is no source against which to check this figure.

The subculture of peripatetics has its economic specializations, but in other respects it is consonant with that of other castes in the area where the group resides. In the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, for example, the peripatetics normally speak Telugu like everyone else, but they may use additional languages if they move much outside that state. Some groups have their own "secret" languages or dialects. Their worship is commonly like that of neighboring Hindu castes. Their marriage preferences are usually similar to those of other castes in the area as well.

Paul Hockings

PERLIS (2002 est. pop. 209,000). At 759 square kilometers, Perlis is the smallest state in Malaysia. It lies in the northwestern corner of the Malay Peninsula and borders Thailand to the north and the Strait

of Malacca to the west. Perlis was originally part of the state of Kedah, which lies to its south. However, the Thais decided to create another vassal principality when they conquered Kedah in 1821, and thus Perlis was formed. Perlis was later transferred to the British under the Treaty of Bangkok (1909). During the Japanese occupation of British Malaya from 1941 to 1945, Perlis, together with the states of Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu, was ceded to Thailand. After the war, Perlis became a member of the Federation of Malaya (1948) and, subsequently, a constituent state of independent Malaysia (1957).

The state's major land use is in agriculture (predominantly rice, sugarcane, and rubber). Mining, quarrying, and harvesting forestry products continue to be important economic activities as well. Since the 1970s, however, medium-scale manufacturing has assumed an increasing share of the state's gross domestic product.

Seng-Guan Yeoh

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PERSEPOLIS (literally "City of the Persians" in Greek) was one of the most important capitals of ancient Persia. While the exact date of its foundation is not known, it appears to have become prominent at the death in 522 BCE of Cambyses II, the son and successor of Cyrus the Great (c. 585–c. 529), when it replaced Pasargadae as the capital of the empire. It was called Parsa by the Persians and functioned as the principal royal residence of the Achaemenid kings. It is assumed that Darius I (550–486 BCE), who succeeded Cambyses II, began work on the main platform of the complex and its structures between 518 and 516 BCE, visualizing Persepolis as the grand focus of his vast empire. Additional monuments were then added to the city's infrastructure in the reigns of Xerxes I (c. 519–465 BCE) and Artaxerxes I (d. 425 BCE). This great prosperity lasted only two hundred years, and the city was plundered and burned by Alexander of Macedon in 330 BCE following his historic victory over the Persian armies. After its massive destruction, Persepolis was eventually abandoned and lay in ruins through the successive dynasties that controlled Persia until 1620, when its site was first identified.



PERSEPOLIS-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

The ruins of the ancient capital of the Achaemenid empire were designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1979. Persepolis' monumental historical importance and its surprisingly well-preserved remains make it a highly significant archeological site.

Investigating the Ruins of Persepolis

In the following centuries, Persepolis and its impressive ruins were the focus of numerous historical and travel accounts. While these observations were condensed and published by George N. Curzon in *Persia and the Persian Question* in 1892, scientific research and examination of the site was not undertaken until the 1930s. Ernst Herzfeld became the first field director of the Oriental Institute's Persepolis Expeditions in 1931. Between 1931 and 1934, he excavated the grand eastern stairway of the Apadana (the royal reception hall), the smaller stairs of the Council Chamber, and the Harem of Xerxes on the Persepolis terrace. Erich F. Schmidt took charge in 1934 and continued the excavations of the complex until the end of 1939, when the onset of the war in Europe put an end to archaeological work in Iran.

Since the early excavations under Herzfeld had mainly uncovered palaces, until the first quarter of the twentieth century Persepolis was believed to consist largely of palaces of the Achaemenid sovereigns and their annexes and gardens. However, the later excavations, between 1934 and 1939, revealed several additional structures on the high terrace. These included an entrance hall, the few remaining columns of the Apadana, the ruins of Darius' small residence (the Tachara), those of the palace of Xerxes (the Hadish), and the ruins of a structure identified as the Harem. There was, in addition, a second reception hall, known as the Hall of a Hundred Columns, and the "Unfinished Gate." It was believed by scholars that the citadel and the royal treasury were on the mountain called Kuh-i Rahmat, and that the town itself was situated at Istakhr, about six kilometers away.

By the 1960s, several scholars had reexamined the excavations and concluded that palace structures were only part of the large ensemble of buildings. Furthermore, even the functions assigned to some of the struc-

tures were inaccurate. The royal Harem, for example, was a double line of enormous halls with no external openings or open spaces, and organized around a long central corridor. It was evidently closer in its form and organization to a large group of vaulted halls, marked on the ground by multiple bases of stone columns, indicating storage structures or elaborate warehouses. It was therefore highly likely that these buildings housed the extensive royal treasuries of the Achaemenid kings, truly a fitting function for this grand showcase of the empire. The vast storerooms were in turn enclosed by elaborate military quarters and a few palaces. The "royal towns" of which the historians spoke lay at the foot of the terrace on the level of the plain, protected by a double wall and a moat.

The Structure of Ancient Cities

The remains of Persepolis provide scholars with important evidence on the form and layout of cities in ancient Persia. Its layout and monuments coincide with the depictions of cities and military camps on surviving wall panels, such as those at Sennacherib's palace city at Nineveh—the cult center of Ishtar between 704 and 681 BCE. Those wall panels mainly described scenes of war, defeat, and the conquest of enemies; cities and urban foundations were here always represented as circular, oval structures with strong walls and defensive bastions. In addition, a moat usually surrounded the entire city, so that the attacking armies were either inside or outside this defensive barrier. Significantly, within the urban walls there also appeared the horizontal road connecting the longer axis of the oval enclosure created by the city walls. Prominent buildings, in addition to numerous tentlike structures, filled up the rest of the space.

Based on these reconstructions of Parthian and Sasanian cities, it is therefore likely that the terrace at Persepolis—the raised, protected eminence within its citadel—was the center of an immense urban region, stretching for several miles across the plain. This urban district of dense population was criss-crossed by a large network of irrigation canals. Furthermore, main streets radiated from the central citadel, dividing the city into sectors and delineating the various areas of this region. It is evident that cities such as Persepolis, including its extant remains and legendary accounts, were important sources of emulation for the creation of urban centers by civilizations of the Near and Middle East, Central Asia, and the Indian subcontinent.

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PERSIAN is the official language of Iran, a country historically known as Persia in Western literature. Persian, called Farsi in Iran, is the native language of over half of the present-day population of 70 million, as well as the medium for instruction, education, mass media, business, and administration among the different ethnic and linguistic communities throughout the country.

Persian is also spoken as a first language by some people in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and India. In Afghanistan it is called Dari and with another Iranian language, Pashto, has official status. In Tajikistan, where Persian is the national language, it is called Tajiki.

Persian, Dari, and Tajiki differ from one another in vocabulary, pronunciation of some phonemes, and certain grammatical features, but the speakers of these languages can understand one another and can share the rich Persian literary and cultural heritage.

Iran is a country of considerable language diversity. Apart from Persian, there are other Iranian languages such as Kurdish, Baluchi, and Lori, not to mention non-Iranian (Azeri, Armenian, Arabic) languages spoken by members of various ethnic and religious minorities. Persian shows considerable dialectal variation; people in various parts of Iran speak their own dialects, such as Shirazi, Isfahani, Mashhadi, and Tehrani. The dialect of Tehran, the capital city, is considered the standard contemporary dialect of Persian.

Historical Development

Persian belongs to the Iranian branch of the Indo-Iranian language family, a major subgroup of the Indo-European languages. On the basis of structural as well as historical characteristics, the ancient Iranian languages are classified into two genetically related groups: Western and Eastern.

The Western group consists of Old Persian and Median, whereas the Eastern group includes Scythian

and Avestan. Old Persian is assumed to be the ancestor of Middle Persian, which in turn is the ancestor of Modern Persian. The historical development of Persian began as early as the sixth to third centuries BCE, when Old Persian was the official language of the Achaemenid empire (c. 559–c. 530 BCE). The Achaemenid dynasty developed a sophisticated culture, reflected in the cuneiform inscriptions of the kings, such as those discovered in the remains of the royal palaces at Persepolis in southern Iran and on the vast carved monument of Darius the Great at Bisitun in western Iran. (The Bisitun trilingual cuneiform inscriptions provided the key to translating Babylonian and Assyrian cuneiform, undertaken by the British officer Sir Henry Rawlinson in the 1840s.) The Persian cuneiform inscriptions, despite representing a limited corpus of roughly six hundred words, indicate that Old Persian, unlike Middle and Modern Persian, was a highly inflected language with seven cases, three genders, and singular, plural, and dual forms.

Middle Persian, called also Pahlavi, is the language spoken in southwestern Iran from the collapse of the Achaemenid empire to the ninth century CE, during the Islamic period. This language served as the official administrative and literary language of Iran under the rule of the Sasanid dynasty (224–651). A great body of literature and an abundance of material have been preserved in Middle Persian. This language was written in the Pahlavi script, an adaptation of the Aramaic script.

Middle Persian and Modern Persian overlapped, the emergence of Modern Persian coinciding with the Arab conquest of Iran and the conversion of the Iranians to Islam in the seventh century. The oldest records of this language date from the tenth century. Modern Persian is a modified evolutionary form of Middle Persian. Both languages are analytic and are similar in terms of syntactic and morphological characteristics. ("Analytic" means that syntactic relationships are represented by the use of uninflected function words instead of inflections. Inflectionally, both Middle and Modern Persian are much simpler than Old Persian, which was a synthetic or highly inflected language.) Modern Persian first flourished in the eastern and northern regions of Iran and has remained the official language of Iran from the tenth century to the present time.

Linguistic and Literary Characteristics

The modern post-Islamic period in the history of Persian is characterized by the language's strong tendency toward a simplified morphological and syntactic system as compared with Old Persian. During the mod-

ern period the Persian vocabulary has been affected by other Iranian and non-Iranian languages. Arabic had the greatest influence on the Persian language, since it was the cultural language of the Islamic world. The slow but constant penetration of thousands of Arabic words into Persian enriched the vocabulary and changed the phonemic and syntactic character of the language to some extent. It also led to the gradual introduction of Arabic script for writing Persian. Arabic was a simpler script than the complicated Middle Persian Pahlavi script. The Arabic alphabet was gradually modified to suit the Persian phonetic system. Four consonants (*p*, *č*, *ž*, and *g*) were added to the alphabet to represent Persian sounds absent in Arabic. Although the Arabic words that entered the Persian lexicon retain their original orthography (spelling), the pronunciation of some was adapted in accordance with the Persian phonetic structure.


Modern Persian literature has existed for at least one thousand years and has been considered by thinkers such as Goethe one of four main bodies of world literature. Among the treasury of works written in Persian by historians, philosophers, and poets, two noteworthy examples are the national epic poem the *Shahnameh* (Book of Kings), written by Firdawsi (c. 935–c. 1020) of Tus approximately one thousand years ago, and the mystical poems of Rumi (Jalal ad-Din ar-Rumi, c. 1207–1273) of Balkh, written about seven hundred years ago.

Shabla Raghibdoust

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PERSIAN GULF The Persian Gulf links the Middle Eastern countries with the rest of the world, which accounts for its strategic importance in modern times. It is an arm of the Arabian Sea 885 kilometers long and 322 kilometers in maximum width; its area is 229,992 square kilometers and the average depth is 100 meters. The Persian Gulf lies between the Arabian Peninsula in the south and west and Iran in the north and northeast and is connected with the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman through the Straits of



Hormuz. In addition to Iran along its entire northern shore, the countries bordering the Persian Gulf include Iraq at its northwestern tip and Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman along its southeastern terminus at the Strait of Hormuz.

Since ancient times, the Persian Gulf linked the peoples of the Middle East with India in particular and the Indian Ocean region in general. During the Abbasid caliphate (750–1258), vessels from India, Africa, and the Far East regularly called at the port of Basra at the northwestern point of the gulf. Westerners began frequenting its waters in the sixteenth century: first the Portuguese, then the Dutch, English, French, and Americans.

Before the discovery of oil the most important commodities of the region were pearls and dates. The majority of the inhabitants, who in early modern times were predominantly Arabs even along the Persian shore, lived mainly through nomadic herding, fishing, and occasionally piracy.

Traditional pearl fishing began to decline after the introduction of cultivated pearls in the 1930s, and oil soon came to dominate the region's economic activities. Both land and offshore oil fields have been discovered, and today the Persian Gulf region accounts for approximately two-thirds of the world's oil reserves

and one-third of the world's natural gas reserves. The region also currently accounts for nearly one-fourth of the world's oil production, and the traditional lateen-rigged sailing vessels have now been largely replaced by the constant traffic of large tankers.

The strategic importance of Persian Gulf resources has figured prominently in a number of recent border conflicts and policy disputes with major international involvement. While none of the states in the area remained immune from these conflicts, the most important ones have been the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) and the Gulf War between Iraq and the United Nations over Kuwait in 1991.

Oil wealth transformed the lives of the inhabitants, offering many of them employment in modern industries, improved health care, universal education, and modern means of communication. Traditional Islamic and tribal values continue to play an important role, though there are wide differences between the countries of the region in this regard. In some countries women have recently enjoyed greater employment opportunities and some social freedoms.

Thabit Abdullah

PERSIAN GULF WAR In March 1975, after years of more or less overt hostility, Iran and Iraq signed what appeared to be a comprehensive settlement of their differences, the Algiers Agreement. Under terms of the agreement, Iran undertook to cease supporting the Iraqi Kurds in their struggle against the Iraqi government. The agreement also promised a permanent resolution of the disputed border between the two nations, notably in the Shatt al Arab waterway, where it was agreed that it should follow the lowest or median point, the *thalweg*. For a few years, Baghdad and Tehran enjoyed a friendly relationship that was unprecedented, shattered only by the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy and the installation of the Islamic republic in 1979. Tensions mounted throughout 1979 and the first half of 1980, eventually leading to Iraqi president Saddam Hussein (b. 1937) ceremonially tearing up a copy of the Algiers Agreement on Iraqi television and setting in motion a war against Iran in September 1980.

The ten-year war that followed was both extremely costly and almost completely pointless. The bulk of the Iraqi Shi'ite population stood on the side of their nation rather than on the side of Shi'a Islam (the form of Islam that predominates in Iran). The human and economic costs of the war were staggering. Western



A U. S. tank in the desert in Kuwait with oil wells burning in the background in March 1991. (DAVID & PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS)

sources estimate nearly 400,000 dead, roughly one-quarter Iraqi and three-quarters Iranian, and perhaps 750,000 wounded, with costs of \$452.6 billion for Iraq and \$644.3 billion for Iran.

In the course of the war, Iraq contracted substantial debts, both to its rich neighbors and to various G7 (Group of Seven economic summit) nations. Although no serious pressure was exerted upon Iraq to repay these debts, their extent in August 1988, when Iran and Iraq agreed to a cease-fire, certainly complicated the transition from a war to a peace economy. Another far-reaching consequence of the war was that Iraq emerged as a substantial military power. In 1979–1980, the Iraqi armed forces numbered 190,000 men; by 1987–1988, this number had more than quintupled, to around 1 million. In addition, Iraq had built up an important armaments industry whose products included a surface-to-surface missile based on the Soviet Scud. By 1989–1990, the scale of military production was beginning to give rise to serious international concern; it was widely known that Iraq was manufacturing chemical weapons and sophisticated missiles and was not far from acquiring the means to produce nuclear weapons. The essential components of all these were provided by firms in western Europe and the United States.

Iraq from 1988 to 1990

Although Iraq's economic situation after the war was certainly bad, it could not be described as desperate, given the nation's substantial oil reserves. But, although the reconstruction of the cities, the infrastructure, and industry was certainly an important goal, only \$2.5 billion per year was allocated to reconstruction during the period 1988–1989, whereas \$5 billion a year was allocated to rearmament. Hence the

desperateness of Iraq's financial position was more an expression of Saddam Hussein's priorities than an objective fact.

At the same time, the efforts that were made to restructure the economy led to steep price rises and a rise in the cost of living generally; inflation was estimated at 45 percent for 1990, hitting those on fixed incomes hardest. This produced a deep sense of dislocation and discontent among wide sections of the population who had grown used to the state providing them with secure employment and subsidizing most essential items of consumption throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

Early in 1990, a combination of factors enabled Saddam Hussein to project himself as "embattled" once more. In February the Middle East division of Human Rights Watch (a nongovernmental organization dedicated to combating abuses of human rights) published a scathing denunciation of Iraq's human-rights record; in March, the Western media widely condemned Iraq's execution of a British journalist on charges of espionage; in April, a scandal erupted over the so-called Iraq supergun (a device that was to be capable of firing artillery over thousands of miles) and later over the discovery of essential parts for nuclear weapons in the baggage of Iraqi travelers passing through London's Heathrow Airport. In the spring of 1990, Iraqi officials lobbied Persian Gulf rulers to lower their oil production and also to push up oil prices to around \$20 a barrel.

Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait

At the same time, Saddam Hussein was determined to provide Iraq with access to a deep-water anchorage on the gulf as an alternative to the port of Umm Qasr. He was casting his eyes on the Kuwaiti islands of Bubyah and Warba, which would provide an alternative harbor. In the spring of 1990, he demanded access to the islands and resuscitated Iraq's claim to that part of the Rumaila oilfield that ran across northern Kuwait and southern Iraq. He also castigated Kuwait for allegedly having the temerity to demand repayment of some of Iraq's debts and for having been instrumental in the campaign to keep oil prices low. At the end of July 1990, part of the Iraqi army was sent to the border, and on 2 August, when Kuwait refused to give in to these demands, Iraq invaded, and subsequently annexed, Kuwait.

Reaction to the invasion was swift. The United Nations Security Council passed a number of resolutions condemning Iraq; on 7 August, President George H. W. Bush ordered an immediate airlift of American

troops to Saudi Arabia to defend it from possible Iraqi attack. Arab and Asian workers began to pour out of Kuwait across Iraq toward the Jordanian border, where they were crossing at the rate of ten thousand to fifteen thousand a day during August and September.

During the next few weeks, Iraqi troops killed large numbers of Kuwaitis; they also rounded up all Iraqis in Kuwait (many of whom were political refugees) and took them into custody. Several thousand Kuwaitis were arrested; many have not been seen since. Hospitals and other public buildings were stripped of their equipment, and looting of property and attacks on civilians became commonplace. The price of oil rose steadily, from about \$20 per barrel before the invasion began to above \$40 by mid-September 1990; neither Iraq nor Kuwait was exporting oil.

A number of individuals and groups made attempts at mediation; meanwhile, Saddam Hussein began to talk in terms of "linkage" with the Palestinian issue, to assert that Iraq would withdraw from Kuwait if Israel withdrew from the Occupied Territories. On 15 August, Iraq accepted Iran's peace terms for the Iran-Iraq War unconditionally, restoring the status quo in the Shatt al Arab waterway to what it had been under the Algiers Agreement of March 1975. At the end of November, the United Nations issued Resolution 678, which authorized member nations to use all necessary means to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait if it had not done so by 15 January 1991.

Counterattacks by the Anti-Iraq Coalition

During the autumn of 1990, the United States put together an anti-Iraq coalition of some thirty nations, including Egypt and Syria, almost all of which sent token detachments to Saudi Arabia. In the end the coalition partners mustered half a million troops. When Saddam Hussein failed to respond to the ultimatum in Resolution 678, the United States and its allies began to bomb various targets in Iraq on 17 January 1991, causing large numbers of civilian deaths and considerable damage to the nation's infrastructure. Iraq retaliated by launching Scud missiles at targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia. After five weeks of bombing, a ground offensive, called Desert Storm, was launched on 24 February, ending with the rout and destruction of much of the regular Iraqi army on 27 February, when a cease-fire was declared. Iraqi troops had been driven out of Kuwait the previous day.

Analysis and Consequences of the Persian Gulf War

The decision to invade Kuwait probably had three principal roots: first, Saddam Hussein's almost patho-

logical ambition and his desire to carve out a major leadership role for himself within the Arab world; second, the fact that he had created an enormous military machine that could not easily be run down; and third, the sense that the great changes taking place in eastern Europe would mean that the world balance of power had shifted decisively in favor of the United States and that neither he nor "the Arab masses" could continue to rely upon the Soviet Union and its allies.

For Iraq and Kuwait, the invasion and the war (the period between 2 August 1990 and 27 February 1991) resulted in at least 100,000 deaths among both military and civilian populations and 300,000 wounded. As many as 2.5 million people were displaced (in the sense of being forced to leave, or leaving, their homes and places of work). Over \$170 billion in property and infrastructure damage was caused in Iraq and perhaps \$60 billion worth in Kuwait, excluding the environmental harm caused by Iraq's sabotaging over seven hundred Kuwaiti oil wells. Of course, given that the cease-fire after the war with Iran was only a little over two years old in August 1990, the effect of this additional self-inflicted wound on an already ailing Iraqi economy was even more damaging than these figures suggest.

Peter Sluglett

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PERSIAN MINIATURE PAINTING The art of Persian miniature emerged as a means of illustrating books, usually accompanying works of poetry. Persian miniatures evolved in Iran during the rule of the Turkic Seljuk dynasty (1038–1157 CE). Miniatures in this period were characterized by ornamentally posed figures with almond eyes and round faces against a background of deep tones. The miniatures in this period were relatively crude but served as a model for later forms.

With the Mongol invasions and the rule of their successors, the Il-Khans (1256–1336 CE), the art of

miniature developed rapidly in Iran. The Il-Khans adapted to Iranian culture and, wanting to imitate the previous rulers, maintained the services of notable artists. This period of miniatures witnessed the use of landscapes and the introduction of Mongol warriors.

The Il-Khans were succeeded by the rule of Timur and his Tartar hordes (1370–1405 CE). Under the rule of the Timurid dynasty, miniatures and bookmaking arts entered a new level of sophistication. During this era, a bookmaking academy was established in Herat. Here, Bihzad, considered the greatest miniaturist in Persian art, began his career. The *nasta'liq* script, a highly decorative writing that emerged in Herat, accompanied miniatures in this period.

The fourth period of miniature art began with the Safavid dynasty (1501–1722/1736 CE) that emerged in Tabriz, in northern Iran. In this period, miniature paintings evolved as a court art, portraying the shahs and his princes. Outdoor life was another theme during this period, characterized mostly by hunting themes. Miniatures were painted on palm leaves or canvas until the introduction of paper in Iran in the beginning of the sixteenth century. The traditional technique of painting miniatures begins with outlining the drawing in black and painting the colors into the outlined areas.

During the reign of Shah Abbas the Great (1587–1629 CE), the Safavid capital moved from Tabriz to Isfahan, inaugurating a new era in miniature painting. The most prominent artist during this period was Riza Abbasi, who initiated a new school in miniature painting, where the figures displayed a closer likeness to ordinary people. The Persian miniatures spread to the neighboring Ottoman and Mughal empires, as Iranian artists founded schools.

The art of Persian miniature declined with the rise of the Turkic Qajar dynasty (1794–1925 CE) in Iran. During this period, European cultural influences were already making themselves felt in the region. The schools of Persian miniature painting closed during this era and the masters of this art eventually died, taking their skills with them. Persian miniature in the modern era usually consists of skillful copies of the works of the Timurid and Safavid eras.

Ibrahim Marashi

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PERSIANS Persians are people of Indo-European or Aryan origin that moved to the Iranian plateau from the east. The word "Persian" comes from the Persian word Parsa (its Arabic form is Fars), which referred to people from the region in the south of Iran. The majority of the Iranian people are of Persian ethnic background (over half of the population). Persians have experienced a history replete with foreign invasions, battles, and conquests, and have also contributed to the development of world science, art, and literature.

During the first millennium BCE, the Persians arrived in the southern and central area of Iran from the Caucasus region; they established themselves there by the seventh century BCE. Most likely, they had left their original lands because of overgrazing, overpopulation, and conflicts. A seventh-century BCE ruler was Hakamanish, known in Greek as Achaemenes. Hakamanish was the ancestor of Cyrus the Great (c. 585–c. 529 BCE), the founder of the Achaemenid empire. Through conquest, Cyrus the Great extended the Persian empire until it included Asia Minor and Babylonia; later he extended it east into Afghanistan and west as far as the Danube River.

Early Persian Dynasties and the Coming of Islam

Alexander of Macedon (356–323 BCE) defeated the Achaemenid empire in 330 BCE. Alexander the Great aimed to integrate the Greek and Persian cultures; to that end, in 324 BCE he ordered his officers and ten thousand soldiers to take Persian women as their brides. After the death of Alexander, the Seleucids and Parthians ruled the territory of the Persians. In 224 Ardeshir (reigned 224–241 CE) ousted the last of the Parthian kings and founded the Persian Sasanid dynasty (224–651 CE).

The Sasanid dynasty consolidated power and was able to achieve control over an area about the same size as that achieved under the Achaemenids. Culturally, they worked to remove Greek influences and to reinforce Persian ones. They established Zoroastrianism as the state religion.

Constant warfare with the Byzantines coupled with economic hardship opened the door for invasion. Eventually, fatal invasion came from the least likely place: Arabia. The Arab tribes had become united under the banner of Islam and mastered the use of light armored cavalry, a new style of warfare. In battles, they surprised the Persian heavy armed forces with their lightning-speed, hit-and-run attacks. The Arabs defeated the Persians, captured almost the entire territory of the empire, and incorporated Persia into the



MEIDAN EMAN-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Designated by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site in 1979, Meidan Eman is a labyrinthine network of mosques and arcades in Iran and a superb example of life in seventeenth-century Persia.

Islamic empire. The vast majority of Persians were gradually converted to Islam. Having no experience in running a large state, the Arabs adopted many Persian administrative and ceremonial practices. Moreover, although Arabic was the official language, Persian continued to be spoken throughout the region.

Persian History from the Mongols to the Pahlavis

In time, several dynasties of Persian descent emerged to revitalize Persian traditions. No one dynasty was able to achieve control over the entire territory of the former Persian empires, and the rivalry among them made it easy for the Mongols to conquer them early in the thirteenth century. The Mongol invasion had a devastating effect on the Persian population and infrastructure. Eventually, an Iranian dynasty, the Safavid dynasty (1501–1722) was established; it was followed by a number of smaller dynasties until the Qajar dynasty (1794–1925) came to power. The Qajars were of Turkic origin but were culturally Persianized. Persia's last dynasty was that of the Pahlavis, Reza Shah (1878–1944) and his son, Muhammad Reza Shah (1919–1980).

The Persian Cultural Legacy

The Persian empire was at its heyday during the Achaemenids. Politically, the Achaemenids organized their empire into provinces that were governed by satraps, who were appointed by the king. The satraps were given plenty of leeway in terms of governing their areas. Generally, the Persians were tolerant of the laws and customs of the people they conquered, and were in fact influenced by them. This live-and-let-live policy also fit with how the Persians perceived society, which they believed began with the family and worked upward to the nation-state. As long as the masses remained loyal, the rulers were not concerned with how the people behaved individually.

The Persian economy was sustained by agriculture, although craftsmanship and commerce were also important to its development. Under Darius the Great (550–486 BCE), the Persians gained a universal legal system upon which much of Iranian law is based. Darius the Great also incorporated gold and silver as the monetary systems of exchange.

There were generally four classes of people in ancient Persian society: priests, warriors, scribes, and an artisan-peasant class. The style recognized today as Persian, an eclectic synthesis of the styles of the peoples the Persians conquered, combined with native styles, is visible in Persepolis, which Darius the Great had made his capital. The pavilions and columned halls of Persepolis are Persian trademarks. The reliefs at Persepolis also demonstrate the Persian style with flair. Instead of telling a story, as Egyptian and Assyrian reliefs do, the Persian reliefs paint a picture of happy subjects paying tribute to their king and perhaps demonstrate the Persian policy of tolerance as revered by the masses and the artistic community.

Houman A. Sadri

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PESHAWAR (1998 est. pop. 998,000). Peshawar is an ancient city in Pakistan. It was established more than two thousand years ago by the Kushan kings of Gandhara. Since that time, it has changed names as often as it has rulers. Once known as the Lotus Land, City of Flowers, and the City of Grains, it was finally named Peshawar (the Place at the Frontier) by the Mughal emperor Akbar (reigned 1556–1605).

During the Kushan kings' rule in Peshawar, the city was an important Buddhist center and served as a pilgrimage site. After the worldwide decline of Buddhism, however, Peshawar lost its prestige and had little significance until the Mughal emperor Zahir-ud-din Muhammad (Babur) conquered South Asia in 1526 and built a fort there in 1530. His grandson not only renamed the city but also enhanced the existing bazaars and urban structures. The city received a further boost during the succeeding reign of Sher Shah (reigned 1540–1545), who decided to construct the Delhi-to-Kabul Shahi Road through the Khyber Pass. The lat-

ter serves as the western border of Pakistan. This road facilitated trade to Peshawar and its vicinity.

Today the city is well known for its extensive bazaars, which offer all types of handicrafts. One of the most famous bazaars is the Qissa Khwani (Storytelling) Bazaar, which still has many teahouses that honor the traditional profession of storytelling. In these teahouses, both tourists and the local people enjoy the artistic performance of storytellers recounting a variety of stories from epic sagas to romantic tales.

In the international scene, Peshawar's artistic merits have often been overshadowed by its military significance and affairs. As the city is a bridge between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it consequently provides Islamabad with economic, political, and security challenges as well as opportunities in relation to Afghan affairs. During the 1980s, it was the home base for the mujahideen, the Afghan guerrilla group that challenged the Russian-backed Afghan government and Soviet troops.

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PESTA MENUAI Sabah, an East Malaysian state that occupies the northwest tip of the island of Borneo, celebrates Pesta Menuai (Harvesting Festival) each May to mark the end of the rice-harvesting season. In the local Sabahan language of Kadazandusun this festival is called Tadau Kaamatan.

Pesta Menuai is celebrated to offer thanks to the gods for a bountiful harvest and to ask for their blessings for the coming season. The Kadazandusun people include the Unduk Ngadau Beauty Pageant as part of their Tadau Kaamatan. The celebration is in praise of the legendary Huminodun, who was a willing sacrifice for the sake of her father, and Unduk Ngadau is in praise of Huminodun's eternal youth and total beauty of heart, mind, and body. For those who are

no longer involved in agriculture or have embraced nonanimistic religions, the festival is an occasion to renew friendships, have family reunions, and perform filial duties. It is celebrated with a feast of food and merrymaking not only in the villages but also in the towns. Open houses are held wherein friends and relatives are served traditional food.

Shantbi Thambiab

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PETRONAS TOWERS The eighty-eight-story, 451.9-meter-tall Petronas twin towers in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, became the tallest buildings in the world when completed in 1996, replacing Chicago's Sears Tower, which had held the record since 1974. Designed by the American architect Cesar Pelli (b. 1926), each of the steel-clad towers is topped by a functionless spire, suggesting that their record-breaking height was not accidental. The two towers are joined by a 58.4-meter skybridge at the forty-first and forty-second stories, 170 meters above street level. Together, they form part of a larger development, the Kuala Lumpur City Centre (KLCC).

The towers are located at the northwest corner of KLCC, which is a northeastward expansion of Kuala Lumpur's main commercial district, the so-called Golden Triangle area, occupying the site of the former colonial racecourse. Piling and foundation work for the towers commenced in 1993 and experienced some difficulties owing to the limestone geology of the area. Rival Japanese- and South Korean-led consortia were responsible for construction of one tower each, the Japanese eventually winning the "race to the top" in April 1996. One tower is occupied by the national oil company, Petronas, whose name the towers bear. Multinational companies occupy the remaining space.

Timothy G. Bunnell

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PETROPAVLOVSK (2000 pop. 200,000). Formerly called Kyzldzhar (Kyzyl-Dzhar), Petropavlovsk was founded in 1752 as a fort on a caravan route between Turkistan and western China and renamed for Saints Peter (Russian Pëtr) and Paul (Russian Pavl) in association with a church dedication. The city is located in northern Kazakhstan in the Virgin Lands Region (an uncultivated area extending from the Volga River to northern Kazakhstan and western Siberia that the Khrushchev regime attempted to cultivate from 1953, the project abandoned by 1970), west of Omsk and on the Ishim River.

As a fort Petropavlovsk expanded Russian settlement southward into the lands of the Kazakh nomads. It was a major trading post between Turkistan and western China for silk, carpets, and skins. By the time of the Russian Revolution in 1917, the city was a primary trading center between Russia and Central Asia. Petropavlovsk lies at the intersection of the Trans-Siberian and Trans-Kazakhstan railroads that transport coal, lumber, grain, and meats.

The city's industry began to develop in the late 1800s and strengthened during and after World War II. Before the Soviet Union's collapse Petropavlovsk's economic base was founded on four important defense factories. In the late 1990s that foundation became a Turkish-funded pasta plant. The city also produces grain, clothing, diesel engines, electrical insulation, timber, small motors, agricultural machinery, wood pulp, leather, and felt. Petropavlovsk has a teacher-training school, theater, and television station. It is a relaxed city with many Russians in the population, giving the city a strong Siberian character.

Gary Mason Church

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PHALANG DHARMA PARTY Thailand's Phalang Dharma Party (PDP; pronounced "palang tam") was established on 9 June 1988 through the leadership of Chamlong Srimuang. Also, as its name (Moral Force Party) connotes, the party was established as a new kind of clean party that would not succumb to the money politics that has plagued Thailand for decades. Its members and candidates for parliament were to be individuals of high moral character. The party grew out of the informal Ruam Phalang (Collective Force) group and the Santi Asoke Buddhist

TABLE 1

Performance of the Phalang Dharma Party in Thai National Elections.		
Election	Number of seats won	Percentage of total seats won
July 1988	14	3.9
March 1992	41	11.4
September 1992	47	13.1
July 1995	23	5.9
November 1996	1	0.3
January 2001	1	0.2

movement, which calls for a more authentic commitment to the original ideals of Buddhism.

The dramatic ebb and flow of Phalang Dharma's strength is directly linked to that of its founder, Chamlong Srimuang (b. 1935), the former governor of Bangkok and major general and Young Turk in the Thai military. Given his strong commitment to Buddhism, he is sometimes referred to as "half monk, half man" and is extremely modest in his personal lifestyle. The original problem of the party was that its strength was primarily in Bangkok. Though it expanded its support in the countryside, a major political confrontation that turned violent in Bangkok in May 1992 led to controversy and began to erode support for Chamlong and his party. Chamlong was the primary leader of a people-power movement opposing General Suchinda's (b. 1933) assumption of the prime ministership without being an elected member of parliament. There was considerable criticism of Chamlong from Thais, who accused him of sacrificing lives in the military suppression of the Bangkok demonstrations to pursue his own personal political agenda.

In the September 1992 national election, support for the party in Bangkok began to erode. In January 1993, Chamlong stepped down as leader of the party; he was replaced by a business tycoon, Boonchu Rojanastien. As more and more businesspeople became involved with the party, its initial idealism was severely eroded. The party also unwisely joined an unpopular coalition government in 1995. In the November 1996 election, the party won only one seat. In the January 2001 national election, there were 128 Phalang Dharma candidates but only one was elected. Phalang Dharma had lost its influence in Thai politics.

Gerald W. Fry

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PHAN BOI CHAU (1867–1940), Vietnamese scholar. Phan Boi Chau was an anticolonial leader, and is often referred to as Vietnam's first modern nationalist. Phan began working against French colonialism in 1903. He initially advocated the reformation of the Vietnamese monarchy based on the Japanese Meiji model. Phan later discarded the idea of a reformed monarchy after observing in Canton the results of the successful 1911 nationalist revolution in China under Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) and the Guomindang (Kuomintang). He then began a political crusade to create a Vietnamese democratic republic. To this end, he founded an exile regime in China, the Vietnam Restoration Society (Viet Nam Quang Phuc Hoi), and appointed Cuong De (1882–1951) as president and himself as vice president. This organization inspired increased underground resistance against the French in Vietnam, especially between 1912 and 1918. In 1925 French officials captured Phan in Shanghai and, after a brief trial, sentenced him to life in prison in Hanoi for his anticolonial activities. He eventually died under house arrest in Hue in 1940.

Vietnamese nationalists later reported that Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969) and his associate Lam Duc Tho sold information on Phan's locale to French officials that led to his arrest. After Lam publicly disclosed this in late 1945 and thus betrayed Phan, considered by the Vietnamese an anti-French hero, he was executed in front of his home by the Viet Minh.

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PHIEU LE KHA (b. 1932), General secretary of the Vietnam Communist Party. Born in Thanh Hoa Province in 1932, Phieu Le Kha joined the Communist Party in 1949 and became a political officer in the Vietnam People's Army (VPA). He served during both the anti-French and anti-U.S. wars and later as the deputy political commissar of several military regions

before becoming the chief political commissar and deputy commander of Vietnam's forces in Cambodia in the mid-1980s. His military career culminated in 1991 when he became head of the VPA's General Political Department, the top Communist Party official in the military. Lieutenant General Phieu joined the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) Central Committee at the third plenum in June 1992, and his promotion through the party hierarchy was swift. He became a member of the Central Committee's secretariat in 1992 and of the Politburo in January 1994. At the Eighth VCP Congress in June 1996 he was elected to the Politburo's standing committee, a five-person board that deals with the day-to-day running of the country. At the Central Committee's fourth plenum, on 26 December 1997, he was elected VCP general secretary. Additionally, since 1992 he has served as a deputy to the National Assembly, the country's parliament. Phieu is an ideological conservative who has sought to limit the pace and scope of the economic reform program, known as *doi moi*, and has called for vigilance against corruption, Western democratic influences, and threats to undermine the VCP's monopoly of power through "peaceful evolution."

Zachary Abuza

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PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENT CHURCH

The Philippine Independent Church (PIC) was founded in August 1902 by the Filipino journalist and modern reformer Isabelo de los Reyes. It is also known as Iglesia Filipina Independiente or the Aglipayan Church, after its first bishop, Gregorio Aglipay y Labayan (1860–1940), an excommunicated Catholic priest and supporter of Philippine independence. Aglipay led the church from 1902 until his death and, having failed to win acceptance from the Vatican, aligned it with Unitarian Church. The new church was in part a reaction to the restricted role for native Filipino clergy in the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines and was also, in part, an expression of Filipino nationalism and resistance to American control. The church is led by a supreme bishop (*obispo maximo*) who is elected by a general assembly of lay and clerical delegates. Since 1999 the supreme bishop has been the Rev. Thomas A. Millamena. PIC is a member of the World Council of Churches and has ties with Old Catholic churches in Europe and the Anglican and Episcopal churches. Its clergy is trained at Saint An-

drew's Theological Seminary, which serves the PIC and the Episcopal Church in the Philippines.

After attracting about 25 percent of the Philippine population soon after it was formed, the membership declined and the church was damaged by conflict among different factions and disputes over how far church doctrine should deviate from Roman Catholicism. After Aglipay's death in 1940 the church moved away from Unitarianism, and in 2002 PIC doctrine and practice is in general accord with the Episcopal Church. The church membership in the 1990s is estimated at between 2.5 and 4.5 million.

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See also: **Catholicism, Roman-Philippines**

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PHILIPPINE LANGUAGES About 110 distinct Philippine languages are spoken in the Philippines, an archipelago off the southeastern coast of mainland China, by 73 million Filipinos. The Philippine languages belong to the Western Malayo-Polynesian branch of the Austronesian language family, whose members include languages spoken in areas as far north as Hawaii and as far south as New Zealand, covering the area from Easter Island in South America to Madagascar off the coast of Africa. Within the language family, the Philippine languages are most closely related to the languages of Kalimantan, Sumatra, and Sulawesi in Indonesia; Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia; and the Malagasy language in Madagascar.

Subgroupings

The Philippine languages are generally classified into three large subgroups, namely: (1) the Northern Philippine languages, spoken by a number of ethnolinguistic groups in the northern and central Luzon regions; (2) the Meso-Philippine languages, spoken by a large number of ethnolinguistic groups, more widely dispersed in the vast area from central to southern Luzon, parts of Mindoro and Palawan, the Visayan Islands, and parts of Mindanao; and (3) the Southern Philippine languages, spoken in parts of Zamboanga, Lanao, and Maguindanao. A number of languages belong to smaller subgroups: (4) the Ivatan languages, spoken on the northernmost islands of Batanes and Babuyan; (5) the Sama languages, spoken in the southern parts of Zamboanga and the islands of Sulu, Tawi-

tawi, and Basilan; (6) the South Mindanao languages, spoken in parts of Davao, South Cotabato, and Maguindanao; and (7) Sangil, spoken in Balut and the Sarangani Islands of Davao del Sur.

Sound System

The majority of the Philippine languages have the following consonants:

Place/ manner of articulation	Bilabial	Dental	Velar	Palatal	Glottal
Stops	p, b	t, d	k, g		q
Fricatives		s			h
Nasals	m	n	ng		
Tap		r			
Lateral		l			
Glide	w			y	

The *q* sound is the glottal stop. It is the sound that occurs between the two syllables of the English expression "Uh-oh!" Initial *p*, *t*, and *k* are not aspirated; that is, they are produced with no puff of air coming out of the mouth. The *ng* sound is like that of the final sound in the word "sing." In Philippine languages, it can be found in the word-initial, medial, and final positions. The *l* sound is articulated with the tongue flat from the tip to the back, with the tongue tip touching the back of the upper teeth. The *r* sound is produced with the tongue tip quickly tapping the upper gum ridge. All the other consonants are produced like the corresponding English sounds. A minority of languages have the sounds *f*, *v*, *ch*, *j*, and *z* in addition to the consonants listed above.

Many Philippine languages have a three-vowel system, others have a four-vowel system, a number have five vowels, and a small number have more than five. The most common vowel systems are as follows:

Three-Vowel System

Tongue position during articulation	Front	Central	Back
High	i		u
Mid			
Low		a	

Four-Vowel System

	Front	Central	Back
High	i		u
Mid		ə	
Low		a	

Five-Vowel System

	Front	Central	Back
High	i		u
Mid	e		o
Low		a	

The *i* sound is like the *i* in the word "marine." The *u* sound is like *oo* in "moon." The *a* sound is like *a* in "father." The *e* sound is like *e* in the word "bed." The *o* sound is like the *o* in "fork." The *ə* sound, or schwa, as it is commonly called by language scholars, is like the *e* in the word "father."

Word Formation

The most productive way of forming new words is through affixation. Most words are made up of affixes and roots. The roots are substantive, verbal, and adjectival in meaning, and the affixes indicate such things as aspect, focus, and mode. The specific meaning of a word is determined by the particular combination of the root and its affix.

For example, the Cebuano root *tuon* (study) may denote the variations in meaning depending on the affix added.

<i>magtuon</i> (v.)	to study
<i>makatuon</i> (v.)	be able to study
<i>makigtuon</i> (v.)	to study with someone
<i>hinuon</i> (adj.)	studious
<i>tun-anan</i> (n.)	place for studying

Reduplication or repetition of a word or part of a word is another productive way of forming new words in Philippine languages. It is used extensively to indicate information such as noncompleted action, intensity, plurality, and restriction.

The following are Ilokano examples:

<i>kaan</i> (v.)	eat
<i>mangantu</i> (v.)	will eat
<i>mangan</i> (v.)	to eat
<i>mangmangan</i> (v.)	is eating
<i>napintas</i> (adj.)	beautiful
<i>napipintas</i> (adj.)	beautiful (plural)
<i>nakapinpintas</i> (adj.)	very beautiful

Most roots may be verbalized, that is, used as verbs, by attaching a verbal affix to them. The examples here are from Kapampangan:

<i>asan</i> (n.)	fish
<i>Mangasan</i>	to go fishing
<i>malan</i> (n.)	dress

<i>Magmalan</i>	to dress up
<i>pagal</i> (adj.)	tired
<i>mepagal</i> (v.)	to become tired
<i>maragul</i> (adj.)	big
<i>magmaragul</i> (v.)	to be proud
<i>bigla</i> (adv.)	suddenly
<i>Mebigla</i>	to be surprised

Word Order

The basic word order in Philippine languages is predicate or comment followed by the subject or topic. The predicate can be a verb phrase, a noun phrase, an adjective phrase, or a prepositional phrase. The subject is a noun phrase that is in focus.

An important feature of Philippine languages is commonly called focus. Focus is the grammatical relation between the verb and a particular verbal complement marked by the topic marker. This complement is referred to as the topic. The meaning relationship of the topic to the verb (actor, goal, beneficiary, etc.) is indicated by the verbal affix.

The following are examples from Tagalog. The noun in focus is underlined.

Bumili ang bata ng mangga sa tindahan para sa nanay niya.

"The child bought some mangoes at the store for his mother."

Binili ng bata ang mangga sa tindahan para sa nanay niya.

"The child bought some mangoes at the store for his mother."

Binilhan ng bata ng mangga para sa nanay niya ang tindahan.

"The child bought some mangoes at the store for his mother."

Ibinili ng bata ng mangga sa tindahan ang nanay niya.

"The child bought some mangoes at the store for his mother."

Orthography

The major languages and a number of minority languages are written with the Roman alphabet, which was first introduced by the Spanish Catholic missionaries who came to the islands in the late sixteenth cen-

tury. The major languages and some minority languages have extensive written literature. Before the colonization of the Philippines by the Spaniards, these languages had a writing system based on a syllabary that was probably of Indian origin. The syllabary consisted of seventeen symbols, three for vowels and the rest for consonants.

Major Languages and Common Regional Languages

Of the 110 languages spoken on the islands, 8 are considered major languages, each with at least two million native speakers. These are Cebuano (15.2 million), Tagalog (14.9 million), Ilocano (8 million), Hiligaynon (7 million), Bicol (3.6 million), Waray (3 million), Kapampangan (2 million), and Pangasinan (2 million) (1993–1995 data). Ilokano, Kapampangan, and Pangasinan belong to the Northern Philippine subgroup. The rest of the major languages belong to the Meso-Philippine subgroup. The other languages, with less than 2 million speakers each, are considered minor languages.

There are three common regional languages or *lingua francas*, languages used for everyday communication by speakers of different languages. These are Ilokano in northern and most of central Luzon, Tagalog in southern and parts of central Luzon, and Cebuano in the Visayas and Mindanao.

Filipino

Filipino is the Tagalog-based national language and one of two official languages of the country—the other being English. Following the mandate of the 1935 constitution, President Manuel Quezon proclaimed Tagalog as the basis of the national language in 1937. To free the national language from its ethnic ties and therefore to facilitate its acceptance, Tagalog was renamed Pilipino in 1959. However, the 1973 constitution rescinded the choice of Tagalog (Pilipino) as the basis of the national language. It stipulated that the National Assembly was to take steps toward the formation of a genuine national language to be called Filipino, which would incorporate elements from various Philippine languages. As predicted by Philippine language experts, after the 1987 constitutional deliberations, Pilipino was renamed Filipino and is characterized by an openness to borrowings from the other Philippine languages as well as from English, Spanish, and other foreign languages.

The 1980 Philippine census indicated that close to 75 percent of the population speaks a variety of Filipino. According to 1999 research data, there are ap-

proximately 57 million speakers of Filipino, including non-native speakers.

Filipino, like a number of other Philippine languages, has been influenced, principally in vocabulary, by the languages with which it has come into contact: Sanskrit (through Malay), Arabic, Chinese, English, and Spanish. It is still borrowing many terms from English. It is spoken as the mother tongue in the following Philippine provinces: Bataan, Batangas, Bulacan, Cavite, Laguna, Marinduque, Nueva Ecija, Occidental Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro, Quezon, and Rizal.

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PHILIPPINE SEA The Philippine Sea is a section of the western Pacific Ocean, located to the east and north of the Philippines. It occupies a total area of around 5,726,000 square kilometers (2,700,000

square miles), or around 2.7 percent of the Pacific Ocean, stretching approximately 2,900 kilometers (1,800 miles) north-south and 2,300 kilometers (1,500 miles) east-west. The Philippine islands of Luzon, Samar, and Mindanao form the sea's southwest boundaries; Palau, Yap, and Ulithi form its southeast perimeter; the Mariana Islands, including Guam (U.S.), Saipan, and Tinian, mark its eastern limits; the Bonin and Volcano Islands lie to the northeast; Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu (Japan) bound it to the north; Okinawa's Ryukyu Islands (Japan) lie to the northwest; and Taiwan is to the west.

The deepest area of the sea is the Philippine Trench, at around 10,497 meters (34,438 feet), making it one of the world's deepest trenches. There are numerous seamounts, many of them volcanic mounts, rising from the sea floor and capped with corals. The warm Pacific North Equatorial Current flows across the southern part of the sea, making the Philippine Sea a great fishing ground. However, many typhoons originate in the sea and are particularly devastating in September and October.

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PHILIPPINES-PROFILE (2001 est. population 82.8 million). The Philippines is an archipelago, a group of 7,100 islands spread out over 800,000 square kilometers of ocean. The population is concentrated on eleven major islands, conveniently grouped into three: Luzon in the north is the largest, the smaller masses in the central region constitute the Visayan Islands, and in the south lies the second-largest island, Mindanao. Approximately 80 kilometers north of Luzon is Taiwan, 1,200 kilometers to the west is Vietnam, and some 7,700 kilometers across the wide expanse of the Pacific Ocean to the east lies Hawaii.

Volcanic eruptions formed the Philippine archipelago eons ago. This origin accounts for its irregular coastline, terrain, and climate. Periodic eruptions of its twenty active volcanoes, notably Pinatubo and Mayon, affect the varied tropical climate and environment. The temperature averages 27°C in the plains and 18°C in the mountains. The highest point is volcanic Mount Apo in Mindanao (2,954 meters). Parts of Manila, its capital and largest city, are below sea level and flood in heavy rainfall.



People

During Spain's 300-plus-year colonization of the country (1521–1898), the term "Filipino" originally identified a person of Spanish descent born in the Philippines. In the eighteenth century the term applied to Christianized Malays, the dominant ethnic group, distinguishing them from the aboriginal Aetas, a pygmy people living in the Mount Pinatubo area, and other minorities, such as the Ifugaos in the north, that did not convert to Christianity. Today the term qualifies groups, made distinct either by religion, ethnicity, or language; Muslim and Christian Filipino, for example, are religious categories, while American, Chinese and Indian Filipino are ethnic labels. The ethnic label also applies to mestizo (children of mixed ancestry) offspring. As mandated by the 1987 constitution, which restored democracy in the Philippines after a period of dictatorship, Filipino is now also the name of the official language. Based on Tagalog, it draws its vocabulary from seventy or more indigenous

languages and may in time evolve as an authentic national language. In the meantime English is still widely used in education, government, and commerce.

The Spanish colonizers who came to the Philippines in the sixteenth century did not find a unified country. Three factors figured in the fragmentation: geography, ethnicity, and language. The sea was a natural divider for the islands of the archipelago. The mostly Malay settlers split between those that stayed in the plains and valleys and those who lived in the mountains, away from contact with the colonizers; these people did not become Christians. The Malays living in the lowlands lived in separate communities, each ruled by a *datu* (headman), while those in the highlands banded as tribes.

From the second to the ninth centuries CE, trade between the Philippines and other Asian countries flourished. Sailors and merchants from China and India stayed and to this day own the stores that sell canned goods, textiles, and appliances in towns and cities. Arab traders came in the middle of the thirteenth century and brought goods from Europe, but in the early fifteenth century they also brought Islam. The religion took hold in Mindanao and Sulu, islands close to Indonesia, which had already become Islamic. Given the predominant Malay stock of the people of both countries, the Filipinos and Indonesians are blood relations. The Muslims in Sulu and Mindanao, who evolved a more complex culture than the inhabitants of the other islands, were split into many ethnic groups but were united by Islam. They were ruled by numerous sultanates, also separated by sea and terrain. The Spanish, who attempted to subdue this region in the sixteenth century, referred to the Muslim



VIGAN-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

A UNESCO World Heritage Site since 1999, Vigan is a small sixteenth-century Spanish colonial town in the Philippines. Bearing witness to the considerable impact that European colonialism had on Philippine life, Vigan is unique in that it has retained its original planning and survived relatively intact.



PHILIPPINES

Country name: Republic of the Philippines
Area: 300,000 sq km
Population: 82,841,518 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 2.03% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 27.37 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 6.04 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: -1.01 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio: 0.99 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 28.7 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population: 67.8 years, male: 64.96 years, female: 70.79 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Roman Catholic, Protestant, Muslim
Major languages: two official languages—Filipino (based on Tagalog) and English; eight major dialects—Tagalog, Cebuano, Ilocano, Hiligaynon or Ilonggo, Bicol, Waray, Kapampangan, and Pangasinan
Literacy—total population: 94.6%, male: 95%, female: 94.3% (1995 est.)
Government type: republic
Capital: Manila
Administrative divisions: 73 provinces and 61 chartered cities
Independence: 4 July 1946 (from United States)
National holiday: Independence Day (from Spain), 12 June (1898); note: 12 June 1898 is the date of independence from Spain, 4 July 1946 is the date of independence from the United States
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal
GDP—real growth rate: 3.6% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita: (purchasing power parity): \$3,800 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: 41% (1997 est.)
Exports: \$38 billion (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Imports: \$35 billion (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Currency: Philippine peso (PHP)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Book Factbook 2001*. Retrieved 5 March 2002, from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

population as "Moros," or Moors. Their fight with these Muslims was an extension of the war against the Moors that they waged in Spain. Neither the Spanish nor the Americans who followed them were able to control the Moros successfully. This historical fact is celebrated in Moro ballads that also extol ritual suicide and jihad, or attack against infidels or Christians.

Christianity in the Philippines

The Philippines is the only Christian nation in Southeast Asia. Spanish friars brought Roman Catholicism with them in 1521, and American missionaries introduced Protestant Christianity in 1899. The Genesis

story in the Bible parallels native myths of creation and belief in a supreme being, and facilitated the work of converting the people to Christianity.

For the majority of the Philippines' population, the Christian outlook eases the pain of their poverty. Christianity gives them hope and reinforces the coping mechanisms they have developed, such as *babala na* (come what may), *pakikisama* (a sense of deep camaraderie), and *utang na loob* (a feeling of gratitude for acts of kindness). *Babala na* complements the Christian virtue of hope and engenders either fatalism or a certainty of arriving at the Promised Land. *Pakikisama* works with Christian charity to heighten a sense of

community and belonging. *Utang na loob*, alongside religious faith, takes on a peculiar notion of sin: not only does it violate a commandment; it is also an act of ingratitude against God.

Economy

The Philippine economy depends primarily on its agricultural and natural resources. It involves cultivating the crops, such as rice and sweet potatoes, needed to feed its rapidly increasing population, and exporting products such as lumber and fish to help pay for its imports. The manufacturing of such products as textiles and chemicals also helps maintain the balance of trade. The Philippines spends more on imports than it earns from exports of crops, minerals, and forest resources, however, an imbalance that has necessitated borrowing from the World Bank International Monetary Fund and reliance on foreign aid from countries such as Japan and the United States. Paying off the interest on these debts reduces revenues available for health, education, and welfare, the effect of which is revealed in the huge gap between the rich and poor, dramatized by the urban landscape of Manila, where squatters' shanties thrive alongside condominiums and high-rises. Estimates suggest that 70 percent of the Philippine population of nearly 80 million is poor.

A 1992 report by the U.S. embassy in Manila describes the Philippine economy as "stagnant" and "import-dependent and import-subsisting." It is a sad assessment that a country so rich in natural resources imports chickens and beef for fast-food franchises such as Kentucky Fried Chicken and McDonald's, and lumber for its custom-built houses. Several factors account for this stagnant economy, foremost among them the national government, which is perceived as weak, ineffectual, and slow to institute social and economic reform.

Colonial and Postcolonial History

The explorer Ferdinand Magellan arrived in the Philippines in 1521; he claimed the islands for Spain, following an "I was here first" policy that ran contrary to the treaty agreed upon by two superpowers of the sixteenth century, Spain and Portugal. To keep peace between the two neighboring countries, the Spanish pope had drawn an imaginary line through the globe and given to Spain all colonizable lands to the west and to Portugal the lands to the east. According to the pope's demarcation, Portugal should have colonized the Philippines, as it did Formosa (now Taiwan), which lies directly north.

In 1565 Miguel Lopez de Legazpi arrived from the Spanish colony of Acapulco and conquered the islands in earnest. The Spanish religious aim—converting the natives to Christianity—made them different from other European colonizers. Augustinian, Dominican, and Franciscan friars pursued this goal with zeal, learning the native languages, the better to spread the Word of God. In the process they enriched the vocabulary of each language; this achievement is recorded in the pamphlets and books the friars wrote, the first printed as early as 1593. Although praised for their work in lexicography, the Spanish are faulted for destroying the written culture of prehistoric Filipinos, which used an alphabet of three vowels and fourteen consonants. However, the oral literature has survived, preserved by tribes that were either not conquered or lived in mountainous regions inaccessible to the colonizers.

Spanish colonization was not total, but Spain installed a government that organized villages for tax purposes and control by appointed leaders, and created a class of property owners that evolved into the landed elite of today.

U.S. colonization began when its forces destroyed the Spanish fleet on Manila Bay on 1 May 1898 and later staged a mock land battle against Spanish soldiers. War against Spain had indeed been declared, but this prearranged victory in Manila and the subsequent payment of \$20 million to Spain robbed Philippine revolutionaries of the opportunity to savor the independence that the leader Emilio Aguinaldo had declared on 12 June 1898. Filipinos staunchly resisted the U.S. takeover, and although U.S. officials declared their "insurrection" defeated in 1902, in fact it lasted for three more years. In the end, however, the Philippines became a U.S. colony.

U.S. colonizers attempted to restructure Philippine society. They introduced town government programs and educational theories based on U.S. models, but many of the policies failed. They did, however, succeed in making English the medium of instruction in public schools, and the Philippines became the third-largest English-speaking country in the world, after the United States and England.

The United States swelled the ranks of the landed elite by selling large tracts of real estate to wealthy Chinese and mestizos. Promising independence, in 1934 the United States allowed elections that enabled educated members of this class to participate in running the colonial government. Although the United States believed it was establishing a Philippine democracy, in retrospect, the system allowed the wealthy to dominate the country.

The Philippines finally was granted independence on 4 July 1946, almost a year after the end of World War II. Manuel A. Roxas became the first president. He and subsequent presidents were drawn from the ranks of the Philippines elite, and the majority of the population saw little social change during the decades that followed.

The Future In the twenty-first century, two forces are competing to shape the country's future: non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the New People's Army (NPA). NGOs (some 58,000 were registered in 1993) are working peacefully to promote the interests of farmers, the poor, women, and indigenous peoples. The NPA hopes to achieve the same goal with arms. It does not, however, have a broad national front or coalition (unlike, for instance, the Sandinistas, who successfully took control of Nicaragua in 1979), but it is active in all of the nation's seventy-three provinces. It gets political support and medical supplies from sympathizers in Europe, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Latin America. In the late 1980s North Korea was a likely source of arms. While NGOs attempt to work with the system, the NPA hopes to destroy it, seeking a victory similar to Mao Zedong's in China or Ho Chi Minh's in Vietnam. The NGOs are regarded as either optimistic or opportunistic and the NPA as one of the few remaining viable Communist insurgencies in the world today.

Recent events have conspired against the NPA. After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks that destroyed the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, the United States launched a war against terrorism. Upon invitation from the Philippine government, the U.S. military promised \$100 million in aid and 30,000 machine guns to help quell terrorism there. This action is in the tradition of U.S. intervention, which put down the Huk Communist insurgency in the 1950s, propped up the Marcos dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s, and aided the beleaguered Corazon Aquino regime when rebels in the military staged coups. What this new U.S. military presence portends is still uncertain.

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PHILIPPINES—ECONOMIC SYSTEM Before the Spanish colonization of the Philippines, which began in the sixteenth century, the Philippines had never been ruled by a single state, though a sultan state was established in the Sulu archipelago of the southern Philippines around the mid-fifteenth century under Islamic influence. Some historians say that if the Spanish conquest had been delayed for half a century, Luzon and Visayan islands (in the northern and central Philippines) might also have been placed under the influence of Islamic culture.

At the time of the Spanish conquest, a hamlet or village (*barangay*) served as the basic community unit for the inhabitants in most of the Philippine islands. *Barangays* were usually located near seashores, riversides, or lakefronts. *Barangay* inhabitants supported themselves through various economic activities, such as slash-and-burn farming, lowland cultivation, fishing, and trading. Each *barangay* consisted of thirty to one hundred households, headed by a chieftain (*datu*).



Despite the growth of industry, agriculture remains a major component of the Philippine economy. Here, a worker hauls 50-kilogram bags of raw sugar on the docks in Bacolod, Negrosuain, in January 1996. (PAUL A. SOUDERS/CORBIS)

The community was composed of four different social groups: (1) the *datu* and his family; (2) the *timagua*, relatives of the *datu* or descendants of a previous *datu*; (3) the *aliping namamahay*, people who had their own house and a piece of land and had an obligation to give part of their products and their service to the *datu*; and (4) the *aliping saguiguilir*, the people who lived in the *datu*'s household, rendering various services for him. Most of the *aliping saguiguilir* were captives, criminals, or debtors.

In some cases, several *barangays* composed a unified larger village with several hundred households or more. In other areas, several independent *barangays* organized a kind of federation as an early stage of regional political unity. Domestic commerce among *barangays* and inter-island trading were observed. With goods for barter, boats sailed from Luzon to Visayan and Mindanao islands. Trade was also con-

ducted with other Asian countries such as China, Japan, Siam, Cambodia, Borneo, Sumatra, and Java.

The *Encomienda*, Galleon Trade, and Economic Reform under Spain

At the onset of colonization, Spain introduced the *encomienda* system to govern the inhabitants of the islands. Under the *encomienda* system, the Spanish crown vested in its military officers as a reward for conquest the right to govern the inhabitants, to collect taxes, and to require them to provide unpaid labor. The Spaniards given *encomiendas* were called *encomenderos*. They accepted their obligations to protect the inhabitants, to support evangelization by Catholic priests, and to defend their jurisdictions from outside aggression. However, most of the *encomenderos* abused their rights, tyrannized the people, and did not help the priests convert the population to the Catholic faith. Catholic priests repeatedly petitioned the Spanish crown to stop the abuses of the *encomenderos*, but in vain.

However, the *encomiendas* were hereditary only for two or three generations and had to be returned to the Crown afterward. With the difficulty of collecting taxes, the *encomienda* system gradually became unpopular, even among *encomenderos*; it began to decline in the mid-seventeenth century and disappeared by the end of the eighteenth century.

Agriculture and commerce in the Philippine islands did not undergo radical changes for the local population during the Spanish colonization that lasted from the mid-sixteenth century to the mid-eighteenth century. This was because Spain maintained the Philippine colony financially, relying heavily on the galleon trade. Large galleons transported goods between Manila and Acapulco, Mexico. In this trading system, Manila served as an entrepôt between China and Mexico, sending Chinese goods such as silk or porcelain to Acapulco in exchange for Mexican silver. This trade was administered by the Philippine colonial government and handled exclusively by the Spaniards in Manila. It brought an enormous amount of tariff income to the colonial government as well as wealth to the Spaniards.

While the Philippines was tied to Mexico through the galleon trade, the colonial government received a subsidy called the *situado* from Mexico. This system was created at the end of the sixteenth century to address the serious financial deficit run up by Philippine colonial government because of heavy military expenditures. With Mexico's independence from Spain in 1812, both the galleon trade and the *situado* were abolished.



FIVE LARGEST COMPANIES IN THE PHILIPPINES

According to *Asia Week*, the five largest companies in the Philippines are as follows.

Company	Sector	Sales (\$ in millions)	Rank in Asia
Manila Electric	Energy	2,422.1	551
National Power	Energy	2,265.6	598
San Miguel	Beer, Food Packaging	2,007.3	673
Petron	Oil Refining	1,990.6	679
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum	Oil Refining	1,891.5	709

Source: "The Asia Week 1000." (2001) *Asia Week* (9 November): 114.

The British occupation of Manila in 1762–1764 marked a watershed in Spanish colonial policy toward the Philippines. With the rise of British influence in Asia, the Philippine colonial government emphasized the need to exploit natural resources and to develop agriculture as well as trade and commerce. In 1779 Governor-General José Basco y Vargas formulated a general economic plan aimed at financial self-sufficiency and diversification of foreign trade in the Philippines. In 1781 he founded the Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País (Economic Society of Friends of the Country) to promote the cultivation of new agricultural products such as coffee, sugar, Manila hemp (*abaca*), pepper, and others. Then in 1782 the tobacco monopoly was introduced, and in 1785 the Real Compañía de Filipinas (Royal Company of the Philippines) was established, following the examples of the British and Dutch East India Companies.

The aim of the tobacco monopoly was to develop tobacco cultivation and export to provide new income to the government. The government first designated Manila and several provinces in the Central Luzon Plain as tobacco-planting areas. The plantations in these areas failed, and in the early nineteenth century tobacco planting was transferred to the Cagayan valley in northern Luzon. The tobacco monopoly was abolished in the early 1880s, in response to rampant graft and corruption among local officials and government agents and destitution among the general public in tobacco-planting areas. For its part, the Real Compañía de Filipinas had already suffered heavy losses by the end of the eighteenth century and was abolished in 1834. Although its aim had been to en-

courage direct trade between Spain and the Philippines or other Asian countries, it had passively waited for other European ships to bring commodities to Manila. In addition, it faced the objections of Manila's galleon traders, whose interests were threatened by its existence.

The Rise and Expansion of the Export Economy

The abolition of the Real Compañía de Filipinas marked the end of the Spanish monopoly on foreign trade with the Philippines. In 1834, Spain officially opened Manila to the world market; in 1855, Iloilo, Sual, and Zamboanga; Cebu in 1860; and Legaspi and Tacloban in 1873. The opening of ports to foreign trade stimulated the Philippine economy in the late nineteenth century. The production of Manila hemp, sugar, and tobacco as export crops grew rapidly, while cotton textiles were massively imported. Britain was the major trade partner in both exports and imports throughout the late nineteenth century; the United States played an important role only for exports (particularly Manila hemp); Hong Kong and Singapore also played important roles as entrepôts for the Philippine-British trade.

The rise of the export crop economy changed the socioeconomic structure of the Philippines. With the importation of foreign textiles, the indigenous textile industry declined. Rice was imported mainly from Saigon from the 1870s. Foreign firms, particularly British and American agency houses, served as merchant banks extending credit facilities for the production of export crops. Chinese merchants appeared in

various regions of the country, engaging in commercial activities and extending loans to small cultivators. Large estates called haciendas emerged; the Catholic Church, Spaniards, and Spanish and Chinese mestizos (children of intermarriage between foreigners and indigenous people) accumulated wealth as large landlords, while massive numbers of inhabitants were reduced to the status of sharecroppers (*kasamas*). Particularly in several provinces near Manila, religious orders owned vast tracts of land. For example, in Cavite Province in southern Luzon, religious orders controlled one-third of the agricultural lands at the end of the nineteenth century. These so-called friar lands became a hotbed for Filipino uprisings for independence from Spain at the century's end.

Through the Philippine independence struggle against Spain (1896–1898) and the Philippine-American War (1899–1902), the Philippines changed its colonial master from Spain to the United States. By the mid-1920s the United States had become a major trading partner of the Philippines, which exported agricultural products such as sugar, coconut products (copra and coconut oil), Manila hemp, and tobacco, while importing cotton textiles, iron, steel, and other manufactured products. Japan became another important trade partner from the 1920s. The Philippines exported Manila hemp to Japan and imported cotton goods from it. Most of the Manila hemp exported to Japan was produced on Japanese plantations in Davao, Mindanao Island. It was said that by the outbreak of the Pacific War approximately 20,000 Japanese lived in Davao, composing the largest Japanese population in Southeast Asia.

With the expansion of the export economy of the Philippines, the United States invested in sugar and coconut processing and in public utilities (railroads and electricity production and distribution). However, by the late 1930s the level of Filipino investment exceeded that of the United States in sugar manufacturing, mining, and forestry. In general, the Philippines was not considered a profitable market for U.S. investors for two reasons. First, under the Public Land Act of 1903, purchase of public lands was limited to 16 hectares for American individuals and 1,024 hectares for American private corporations. Second, the Jones Law was enacted in 1916, providing for the future independence of the Philippines. This discouraged further U.S. investments in the Philippines. The relatively small share of investments was also visible in banking and financing. It was not the U.S. banking sector but the Philippine National Bank, a semigovernmental bank, that provided massive loans for the export sector, thereby

being instrumental in developing the processing sector of agricultural export products.

Indeed, in spite of those limitations and detrimental factors, Americans actively maintained their interests in various sectors of the Philippine economy. Chinese merchants continued to keep their influential positions in commercial sectors in various local areas, as in other Southeast Asian countries. Nevertheless, it is important to note here that the Filipino landed elite also strengthened their economic base during the American colonial period. These were landlords in rice lands, sugar lands, or coconut plantations, who owned from one hundred hectares to several thousand hectares or even more in rare cases. Most of them were descendants of Spanish or Chinese mestizos who emerged as landlords in the late nineteenth century. They increased their landholdings, and some of them initiated investments in sugar manufacturing. As the Philippine economy was restructured in the U.S. trade sphere, privileged Filipino landlords and entrepreneurs stabilized their prominent economic status and functioned as an oligarchy as the gap widened between the rich and the poor.

Industrialization and Its Aftermath

The outbreak of the World War II in the Pacific in 1941 changed the fate of the Philippines. Under the Japanese occupation the Philippine economy was totally destroyed. Throughout the American period, the Philippines had imported rice mainly from French Indochina, and under the Japanese occupation food shortages became a serious problem. The Japanese military administration planned to exploit various mineral resources and to convert sugar fields into cotton lands, but these initiatives failed due to anti-Japanese guerrilla activities. When the war was over in 1945, the Philippine economy remained at a standstill and had to be restored from the devastation caused by the war and occupation. The restructuring of the Philippine economy after independence in 1946 encompassed three main tasks: (1) building multilateral trade relations, (2) solving agrarian unrest, and (3) initiating industrialization for economic growth.

The path of multilateral trade relations did not immediately open after independence. This was because of the prolonged preferential trade relations with the United States under the Bell Trade Act of 1946, and later the Laurel-Langley Agreement of 1955, which finally expired in 1974. For over two decades the Philippines maintained bilateral trade relations with the United States, with sugar and coconut oil as major export commodities. In the late 1970s Philippine

trade with Japan expanded, ranking second after trade with the United States in total trade in the 1980s and 1990s. And since the 1980s Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Malaysia have emerged as important trade partners of the Philippines.

Large landholdings and tenancy caused agrarian unrest after independence. It was particularly so in the Central Luzon Plain in the early 1950s with the peasant uprising called the Huk Movement. However, the agrarian reform programs in the 1950s and 1960s were very limited in their aims and scope. In 1972 President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law and implemented agrarian reforms in rice- and corn-growing areas in the name of building the "New Society."

Indeed, it was under the Marcos regime that the colonial structure of the Philippine economy was gradually transformed. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Philippines, like other Southeast Asian countries, took import substitution (encouraging industries to produce manufactured goods for the domestic market, thereby reducing imports) as the basic principle of industrialization, aiming to strengthen the manufacturing sector for the domestic market. In the 1970s, on the other hand, emphasis was given to export-oriented industrialization, under the liberalization of foreign investments. From the late 1970s, exports of electronics and garments rapidly increased, exceeding those of coconut oil and sugar by the early 1980s. In the political turmoil of the 1980s, however, the economy of the Philippines stagnated under the load of swelling foreign debts, mismanagement of giant corporations, and increasing unemployment. In 1987 a new agrarian reform law was enacted under the government of Corazon Aquino; it broadened the Marcos reforms to include all agricultural lands. Under the agrarian reform programs, the traditional sharecropping system almost disappeared in rice lands; however, the discrepancy among peasants and landless rural workers widened because lands were given to former tenants but not to rural workers. On the other hand, in the newly covered areas of agrarian reform such as sugar and coconut lands, rural workers are among the beneficiaries for land transfers, but due to resistance from landlords, the agrarian reform has not been effectively implemented. In the 1990s, the Philippines' economic growth lagged behind that of other nations in the region, and the government has made efforts to catch up economically with them. Diversification of export industries, while tackling the serious poverty problems, will be an important economic strategy for the Philippines in the years to come.

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PHILIPPINES-EDUCATION SYSTEM The modern education system in the Philippines has been strongly influenced by the colonial past and by a strong government lead in raising standards of education during the 1980s and 1990s. In terms of primary and secondary school enrollment, the Philippines traditionally was considered among the top countries in Southeast Asia. The country established a relatively strong education system to meet the demands of its young and rapidly growing population and of the rapidly growing national economy.

Education in the Sixteenth through Nineteenth Centuries

During the precolonial era, many Philippine traders used Arabic script in daily life, and some historical evidence suggests that many urban settlers could read and write. With Spanish colonization and the arrival of Spanish missionaries in the early sixteenth century, the education system in the Philippines developed under a strongly Spanish influence. Missionaries established and ran a number of religious schools, and in the early seventeenth century the first Western-style higher education institutions were established to meet the commercial and administrative needs of the colony. In 1611 the Spanish opened Santo Tomas College, which attained university status in 1644, becoming the oldest university in the Philippines and one of



A police officer guards children at an elementary school in the southern Philippines in June 2000. Fighting between Muslim separatists and government forces have raised fears about the children's safety. (AFP/CORBIS)

the oldest in the region. During the Spanish era, however, education was a privilege of the upper class, rich individuals, and the nobility.

Education from 1899 to 1946

With U.S. occupation of the Philippines in 1899, the situation changed dramatically. In 1900 the new colonial administration introduced universal primary education, making the Philippines one of the first countries in Asia to adopt such an educational regime. This contributed to a rapid rise in the number of public and private primary schools as well as higher-education institutions. Importantly, the Philippines had more private higher institutions than public universities in the 1930s. According to various estimates, the literacy rate doubled, from around 25 to 30 percent at the beginning of the twentieth century to

around 50 percent in the 1930s, but there was a huge regional disparity in school admissions, and the government was too slow to move toward eliminating mass illiteracy. World War II halted social and economic development in the Philippines archipelago, as it brought large-scale destruction during the Japanese occupation and the United States–led liberation of the country in 1945.

Education after Independence

The Philippines became an independent republic in 1946, and the new government launched a series of national development plans in the field of education, with the target of total elimination of illiteracy in the country. Between 1946 and 2001, primary school enrollments rose from 4 million to 12.8 million, while secondary school enrollments rose from 0.5 to 5.4 million. By the late 1990s, more than 95 percent of primary school–age children were enrolled in public or private schools, and the Philippines became one of the highest-ranked nations in Asia in terms of school enrollments. The adult literacy rate reached 94.8 percent; it was even higher in the major urban areas of Luzon Island, but lower in many areas of Mindanao Island and the Eastern Visayan.

General primary education is mandatory and free, and citizens have the right to receive free tertiary education on a competitive basis. The Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports regulates the national system of education and sets the national standards. Filipino and English are the two major languages of instruction, but the state provides support for education in the languages of other ethnic groups, including ethnic minority groups. The major problems in relation to providing quality education are the scattered nature of the Philippine archipelago; the presence of cultural minority (including Muslim) groups and small indigenous groups, speaking eight major Philippine languages and several minor languages; and the escalation of conflict in the southern Philippines in the late 1990s.

Primary and Secondary Education Presently, children at the age of six begin a four-year compulsory primary education program; for the first two years, the vernacular language used in the school's locality is the auxiliary medium of instruction, but only as a means of facilitating the students' understanding of concepts in either English or Filipino. At the age of ten, children enroll in a two-year intermediate education program, and at the age of twelve, they enter a four-year secondary education program. On completion of secondary school, pupils receive a high school diploma.



EDUCATION IN THE PHILIPPINES—PAST AND PRESENT

The modern Philippines education system is based on the United States model with a clear separation of church and state. But it was not always that way. During the period of Spanish rule, Roman Catholic teachings were an important part of the curriculum.

Regulations Prescribed by the Decree of 1863 for Primary Schools.

The teaching in the schools for natives shall comprise:

- (1) The Christian doctrine and principles of morality and sacred history.
- (2) Reading.
- (3) Writing.
- (4) Practical teaching of the Castilian language.
- (5) Principles of arithmetic including the four rules for integers, common fractions, decimals, and denominate numbers, with principles of the decimal metric system, and its equivalents in the usual weights and measures.
- (6) Principles of general geography and Spanish history.
- (7) Principles of practical agriculture, with application to the products of the country.
- (8) Rules of courtesy.
- (9) Vocal music.

The primary teaching of girls will include all the above except Nos. 6 and 7, and the needlework suitable to their sex. (Art. 1)

Primary instruction is obligatory for all the natives between the ages of 7 and 12. The teacher shall have especial care that the scholars have practical exercise in speaking the Castilian language. Primary instruction shall be free for children whose parents are not

known to be wealthy. Paper, copybooks, ink, and pens, will be free to all the children. (Art. 2, 3, and 4)

The parish priest shall direct the teaching of Christian doctrine and morality. (Art. 6)

The Christian doctrine shall be taught by the catechism which is in use, and approved by ecclesiastical authorities. For reading, the syllabary prescribed by the superior civil governor, the Catechism of Astete, and the Catechism of Fleuri, shall be used. For writing, the *Muestras de caracter Espanol* by Iturzaeta shall be used. (Art. 7)

Teachers of *entrada* shall receive from 8 to 12 pesos per month; those of *ascenso*, from 12 to 15; those of *termino* of the second grade from 15 to 20. In addition teachers shall enjoy the following advantages:

- (1) A dwelling apartment for themselves and family in the schoolhouse, or reimbursement if they rent one.
- (2) The fees paid by well-to-do children.
- (3) The privileges and exemptions and pension mentioned in Arts. 12, 13, and 14 of the Royal decree. (Arts. 23 and 24)

Women teachers for girls must be at least 25 years old, and shall possess the other qualifications that are demanded from the male teachers. They shall receive monthly pay of 8 pesos if they have a certificate, and 6 if the contrary be true, and all the fees of wealthy girls. They shall also have the right to live in the school, and in case they do not live there, to a reimbursement to pay their rent. (Arts. 26, 28)

Source: Emma H. Blair and James Robertson, eds. (1903–1909) *The Philippine Islands*. Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark, Co., 46: 81.

There are several compulsory subjects, including English, Filipino, mathematics, practical arts, science, social studies, youth development training, and citizens' army training.

According to official figures, in 1997 there were 6,362 pre-primary educational establishments, attended by 452,000 children, with 9,644 teachers. Approximately 37,640 primary schools, with 342,000 teachers, provided education for 12 million pupils, and 5,880 secondary schools with 154,700 teachers provided education for approximately 5 million students. The official statistics state that the Philippines achieved 100 percent enrollment of relevant age-group children at primary schools.

Tertiary Education After completing secondary school, students may continue their education at a non-university-level institution (i.e., technical or vocational) or at a university. As a prerequisite for university entry, secondary school graduates must take the National Secondary Aptitude Test. Most education programs at tertiary level are conducted in Filipino and English; students are required to take three courses in Filipino and three in English as part of the general education curriculum during their first two years. Students must study for four years and acquire between 120 and 190 credits to obtain a bachelor's degree.

Students may continue their education at a post-graduate level, but to do so they must achieve at least the score of 85 or a B grade at the bachelor's level. A master's degree takes between two and four years of study. Alternatively, students may undertake diploma or certificate courses of various durations. Upon completion of their master's degree, students may enter a three- to four-year doctorate program, which combines course work and a dissertation.

Official figures for 1997 listed approximately sixty universities throughout the Philippines, both private and publicly owned, which were attended by approximately 260,000 students, and seventy-three private institutions, attended by approximately two million students. Private universities charge between \$1,500 and \$5,000 per academic year (1999–2000 academic-year estimates). Traditionally, a large number of middle-class and upper-middle-class families send their children to study at various universities abroad, with the United States and Canada the most popular destinations. However, many students (estimated at 12–18 percent) choose to remain in their host countries upon completing their education.

During the 1990s, there was serious concern about the quality of the education system in the Philippines

and about regional disparities in educational services. There is a high percentage of dropouts from intermediate and secondary schools. Some problems were related to limited government expenditure on education. According to the United Nations Development Report (2000), between 1985 and 1997 the government significantly increased its expenditure on education—from 10,500 million to 100,000 million pesos (or from 1.94 percent to 4.0 percent of gross national product). However, this increase was offset by the rapidly growing population (36.87 percent of the population is below the age of fourteen, according to 2002 estimates) and by inflation.

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PHILIPPINES-HISTORY The Philippines is a multiethnic and multireligious nation. The major groups are the majority Christian Filipinos, Muslim Filipinos who live mainly on Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago in the south, and indigenous peoples in mountainous regions. The islands have been occupied for about 30,000 years and have been part of the world economy since the beginning of Spanish colonial rule in 1571. Philippine history can be divided into six periods: ancient and precolonial, Spanish colonial period (1571–1898), Philippine revolution (1896–1902), American colonial period (1898–1946), Japanese occupation (1941–1945), independence (1946–present).

Ancient and Precolonial Periods

The Philippine islands were first occupied by humans from about 30,000 to 25,000 years ago by people from mainland Southeast Asia. These people were hunter-gatherers and are the ancestors of the modern Philippine population group known as Negritos for their physical appearance, thought to resemble that of



KEY EVENTS IN PHILIPPINE HISTORY

- c. 30,000 BCE** First human occupation of the islands
- c. 3,000 BCE** Malays from Southeast Asia settle on the islands.
- 14th century CE** Islam arrives in the southern islands from Borneo.
- 1521** Ferdinand Magellan arrives and dies in the Philippines.
- 1571** Miguel Lopez de Legazpi establishes Manila as the Spanish capital.
- 1600** Much of the Philippines is under Spanish colonial rule.
- 1650s** The *encomienda* system begins to decline.
- 1762–1764** The British occupy Manila.
- 1780s** The economy is reformed to stress agriculture and export.
- 1834** Manila is opened to the world market.
- 1880–1895** The propaganda movement agitates for political reform.
- 1896–1898** The Philippine revolution ends Spanish rule.
- 1898** Through the Treaty of Paris the United States gains control of the Philippines from Spain.
- 1899–1902** The Philippine–American War begins the era of American rule.
- 1916** The United States grants the Philippines more political autonomy.
- 1934–1935** A commonwealth government is instituted.
- 1942–1945** The Philippines is occupied by Japan.
- 1944** The American re-occupation of the islands begins.
- 1946** The Philippines becomes an independent nation.
- 1942** The Huk rebellion begins on Luzon and lasts into the 1950s.
- 1960s** Anti-American movements develop.
- 1969** The Moro National Liberation Front is founded on Mindanao.
- 1972** President Ferdinand Marcos declares martial law which lasts until 1981.
- 1983** Opposition leader Benigno Aquino is assassinated.
- 1986** Corazon Aquino is elected president. Marcos flees the country.
- 2001** Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo becomes president.

Africans. There is no evidence that they migrated from Africa, as suggested in some popular accounts. The Negritos today are a threatened population of about 15,000 who are being rapidly assimilated into the general population.

Beginning in about 3,000 BCE heavier migration began as a succession of Malays from Borneo, Sumatra, and mainland Southeast Asia arrived and established communities on the coasts and along rivers. The typical community (*barangay*) had from thirty to a hundred families and was headed by a chieftain. They subsisted through hunting, gathering, fishing, slash-and-burn agriculture, and trading. There were also several larger settlements, such as the one at the site of Manila, which served as trading centers with China, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Some communities at times came under the control or influence of Southeast Asian states, the most important being the Majapahit empire of Java in the thirteenth century.

Islam arrived in the southernmost islands in the fourteenth century via Arab traders from Borneo. It then spread northward and at the time of Spanish arrival in the sixteenth century was taking hold in the central islands and the northern island of Luzon. At that time the peoples of the southern island of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago were mainly Muslim.

Spanish Colonial Period

In 1521 Ferdinand Magellan (1480–1521) a Portuguese navigator sailing for Spain, reached the islands. Magellan died there in battle in April of the same year, but survivors brought word of the islands back to Spain. In 1565 Miguel López de Legazpi (c. 1510–1572) established the first Spanish settlement (San Miguel, on Cebu), and in 1571 he founded Manila on Luzon. The islands were named for King Philip II of Spain. The colony was considered a province of New Spain and was administered from Mexico City.



MAGELLAN'S ARRIVAL IN THE PHILIPPINES

The Philippines were colonized by Spain following Magellan's arrival in the islands in 1521. The following extract from the account of the voyage kept by Magellan's companion Antonio Pigafetta tells of their arrival and first impressions.

Arrival at the Philippines

At dawn on Saturday, March 16, 1521, we came upon a high land at a distance of three hundred *leguas* from the islands of Latrioni, and island named Zamal (Samar). The following day the captain-general desired to land on another island which was uninhabited and lay to the right of the above mentioned island in order to be more secure and get water and have some rest. He had two tents set up on the shore for the sick and had a sow killed for them. On Monday afternoon, March 18, we saw a boat coming toward us with nine men in it. Therefore, the captain-general ordered that no one should move or say a word without his permission. When those men reached the shore, their chief went immediately to the captain-general giving signs of joy because of our arrival. Five of the most ornately adorned of them remained with us, while the rest went to get some others who were fishing, and so that all came. The captain-general seeing that they were reasonable men, ordered food to be set before them, and gave them red caps, mirrors, combs, bells, ivory, bocasine, and other things. When they saw the captain's courtesy, they presented fish, a jar of palm wine, which they call *uraca* (i.e. arrack), figs more than one *palmo* long (i.e. bananas), and others which were smaller and more delicate, and two cocoanuts. They had nothing else then, but made us signs with their hands that they would bring *umay* or rice, and cocoanuts and many other articles of food within four days. . . .

Those people became very familiar with us. They told us many things, their names and those of some of the islands that could be seen from that place. Their own island was called Zuluán and it is not very large. We took great pleasure with them, for they were very pleasant and conversable. In order to show them

greater honor, the captain-general took them to his ship and showed them all his merchandise—cloves, cinnamon, pepper, ginger, nutmeg, mace, gold, and all things in the ship. He had some mortars fired for them, whereas they exhibited great fear, and tried to jump out of the ship. They made signs to us that the above said articles grew in that place where we were going. When they were about to retire they took their leave very gracefully and neatly, saying that they would return according to their promise. The island where we were is called Humunu; but inasmuch as we found two springs there of the clearest water, we called it *Acquada da li buoni Segnialli* (i.e. the Watering place of good Signs) for there were the first signs of gold which we found in those districts. We found a great quantity of white coral there, and large trees with fruits a trifle smaller than the almond and resembling pine seeds. There are also many palms, some of them good and others bad. There are many islands in that district, and therefore we called them the archipelago of San Lazaros, as they were discovered on the Sabbath of St. Lazarus. They lie in X degrees of latitude toward the Arctic pole, and in a longitude of one hundred and sixty one degrees from the line of demarcation.

At noon on Friday, March 22, those men came as they had promised us in two boats with cocoanuts, sweet oranges, a jar of palm-wine, and a cock, in order to show us that there were fowls in that district. They exhibited great signs of pleasure at seeing us. We purchased all those articles from them. Their seignior was an old man who was painted (i.e. tattooed). He wore two gold earrings (*schione*) in his ears, and the others many gold armlets on their arms and kerchiefs about their heads. We stayed there one week, and during that time our captain went ashore daily to visit the sick, and every morning gave them cocoanut water from his own hand, which comforted them greatly. These are people living near that island who have holes in their ears so large that they can pass their arms through them. Those people

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are *caphri*, that is to say heathen. They go naked with a cloth woven from the bark of a tree about their privies except for some of the chiefs who wear cotton cloth embroidered with silk at the ends by means of a needle. They anoint themselves with cocoanut and with bean-seed oil, as a protection against sun and

wind. They have very black hair that falls to the waist, and use daggers, knives, and spears ornamented with gold, large shields, fascines, javelins, and fishing nets that resemble *rizali*, and their boats are like ours.

Source: Emma H. Blair and James Robertson, eds. (1903–1909) *The Philippine Islands*. Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark, Co., I: 97.

The Spanish called the Muslims Moros (after the Moors, or North African Muslims, who had ruled Spain), considered them enemies, and initiated a campaign to eradicate Islam from the islands that has continued in various forms into the twenty-first century. By the end of the sixteenth century, most regions except for parts of Muslim Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago were under Spanish control.

Spain governed the colony under the *encomienda* system, under which Spanish settlers colonized the land for the crown and were given the right to collect taxes and exploit the labor of the indigenous Filipinos. The crown also supported Catholic missionaries, who converted many Filipinos but did not allow the establishment of a native clergy.

By the middle of the seventeenth century, complaints about abuses of the *encomienda* system as well as difficulties encountered in collecting taxes caused it to be abandoned and replaced with a new system based on local rule. Indigenous leaders were placed in charge and allowed to collect taxes and own land, with the Spanish governor-generals having considerable power over local and regional affairs. Also enjoying considerable power were the village priests, who, as the only people in the villages who spoke both Spanish and the indigenous languages, served as intermediaries between the colonists and the colonized. The new system created local elites of native Filipinos and also created an ethos of local rule that continues to the present. Economically, the colony served as a trading post, with Manila the main port, for silk and porcelain from China and silver from Mexico. Many of the traders were Chinese, who retain that role in the modern Philippines, although the products are now different.

Spanish control was at times under threat from the Portuguese, Dutch, English (who occupied Manila from 1762–1764), Chinese, and the Filipinos themselves. These threats led the Spanish colonial government to reform the economy, switching from a focus

on trade to a strong agricultural base. Reforms began late in the century and included the growing of agricultural products such as coffee, sugar, and Manila hemp (abaca); the tobacco monopoly, which began in 1782; and the founding of the Real Compañía de Filipinas (Royal Company of the Philippines) in 1785. In 1834, Manila was opened to the world market, followed by several other ports over the next fifty years. The new trade opportunities stimulated the agricultural sector, and hemp, sugar, and tobacco became major exports while cotton textiles were imported. Britain was the major trade partner.

The new economy produced a new socioeconomic order with British banks, Chinese merchants, and much of the land owned by wealthy Spaniards, Spanish and Chinese mestizos, and the Catholic Church. Most Filipinos were poor peasants working land owned by others. This new order set the stage for the Philippine Revolution of 1896–1902, which was marked by peasant revolts, resentment of Church wealth, and the support of a small but active group of Filipino intellectuals.

Philippine Revolution

The Philippine Revolution entailed the struggle for independence from Spain from 1896 to 1898 and the Philippine-American War from 1899 to 1902.

Philippine nationalism emerged in the mid-nineteenth century. An early issue was Church discrimination against indigenous secular priests, who were forced to leave their parishes. Spanish colonial officials oppressed the movement, and arrested and executed the leaders (Mariano Gomez, José Burgos, and Jacinto Zamora) in 1872. This movement was followed by the propaganda movement (1880–1895), led by Filipino intellectuals who had been educated in Europe, such as José Rizal (1861–1896) and Marcelo H. Del Pilar (1850–1896). They protested the mistreatment of the Filipinos and called for basic humanitarian reforms, and while the movement was repressed and



A PRIMER FOR PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE

The following text written by Philippine patriot Andres Bonifacio is one of several written to prepare the Philippine people for revolution against Spain.

Of old, previous to the arrival of the Spaniards, these Islands were governed by our own compatriots who were then living in the greatest abundance and prosperity. These maintained good relations with their neighbors, especially with the Japanese, and traded with them in commodities of all sorts. The result was that wealth and good customs were a common patrimony; young and old, the women included, knew how to read and write, using their own alphabet. But the Spaniards came, with the pretense of peace. The persons then governed us flattered by their honeyed tempting words, allowed themselves to be deceived by their offers to guide us on the paths of wisdom and increased prosperity. They were, however, obliged to comply with the ritualistic customs of the islanders, to give binding force to their compacts by means of an oath of peace, which consisted in taking a small quantity of blood from the veins of the contracting parties and then drinking the blood so mixed, as evidence that they were to be absolutely true and loyal to their allies. This was called the Pact of Blood (which was included) between King Sikatuna and the representative of the King of Spain, Legazpi.

Since then, for over 300 years, we have been supplying (the wants) of the race of Legazpi with largesse and have enriched them with abundance, despite the hunger that we ourselves have suffered. We have wasted our wealth and blood and even given our lives in their defence; we have even fought our compatriots who could not willingly submit to their yoke; we have combated the Chinese and the Dutch who attempted to wrest these Islands from them.

Now after all this, what comfort or liberal concession have they bestowed upon us in exchange for all our sacrifices? How have they kept the contract, the cause, precisely of our sacrifices? Our munificence they have re-

warded with treachery, and far from guiding us on the path of knowledge, they have blinded us and contaminated us with their infamous procedure. They have endeavored to make us abandon our good customs; they have initiated us in a false belief and have dragged the honor of the people into the mire. And if we dare beg for a scrap of love, they give us banishment instead and tear us away from our beloved children, our wives, and our old parents. Every sigh that we utter they brand as a sin and immediately punish it with implacable ferocity.

Now nothing is to be seen of popular tranquility, now our peace is constantly being disturbed by incessant rumors of complaints and prayers, of the wailing and grief of orphans, widows, and parents of countrymen, ours whom the dominator has wronged; of the tears of mothers whose sons have been put to death; of the wail of tender children whom cruelty has made orphans, and each tear is like a drop of molten lead that lacerated our suffering wounded heart; now they tighten more and more the links of the chains of vassalage that dishonor every man of integrity. What, then, must we do? The sun of reason that shines in the East clearly shows into our eyes which, alas! have been blinded so long, the way we must follow; by its light we can see the death-dealing claws in the outstretched hands of the malevolent. Reason tells us that we can not expect anything but suffering upon suffering, treachery upon treachery, contempt upon contempt, and tyranny upon tyranny. Reason tells us that we must not waste our time waiting in vain for promises of felicity that will never come, that will never materialize. Reason tells us that we must rely upon ourselves alone and never entrust our rights to life to anybody. Reason teaches us to be united in sentiment, thought, and purpose, so that we may acquire the strength necessary to crush the evil that is affecting our people.

It is time that the light of truth should shine; time that we should show determination, honor, shame and mutual cooperation. The

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time is come now to diffuse the gospel that shall tear the tough web obscuring our intellect, and that the islanders should see whence come their misfortunes. Now it will be made evident that every step we are taking is on the unstable ground, on the brink of a horrible abyss of death, dug by our wily enemy.

Therefore, oh my compatriots! let us scatter the mist that befores our intellect and let us consecrate all our force to the good cause, in the ultimate prosperity, so anxiously desired by us, of the land of our birth.

Source: Nicolas Zafra. (1967) *Philippine History through Selected Sources*. Quezon City, Philippines. Alemar-Phoenix Publishing House, 212–213.

failed to produce reforms, it did succeed in developing a national consciousness among Filipinos.

Rizal published two political novels, *Noli Me Tangere* (Touch Me Not) in 1887 and *El Filibusterismo* (The Rebel) in 1891, in which he described vividly the oppression of Spanish colonial rule and the role of the priests. He returned to Manila and organized La Liga Filipina (The Philippine League), a secret society, on 3 July 1892. He was arrested on 6 July and exiled to Mindanao. Some members of La Liga Filipina, including Andres Bonifacio (1863–1897) founded another secret society, Kataastaasang Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Honorable Society of the Sons of the Country), or Katipunan for short, on 7 July and called for an armed revolution. On 30 August 1896 the Philippine revolution broke out in Manila and gathered strength following the execution of Rizal on 30 December. However, the revolution went awry when the leadership shifted to Emilio Aguinaldo (1869–1964), municipal mayor of Kawit, Cavite (1894–1897), in May 1897. On 12 June 1898 Aguinaldo declared independence.

At this point the United States intervened, and the Philippines was bought by the United States from Spain in the Treaty of Paris on 10 December 1898. The revolutionary government established the República Filipina (Philippine Republic) on 23 January 1899 and promulgated a constitution, but the Philippine-American War broke out on 4 February 1899, less than two weeks later, and Aguinaldo was captured on 23 March 1901. Although on 4 July 1902 the United States declared control of the Philippines, resistance continued until 1910. About 500,000 Filipinos were killed during the revolution. The United States also occupied Muslim areas in the south, and Sultan Jamal ul Kiram II (d. 1936) of Sulu surrendered under the Carpenter Agreement in 1915.

American Period

The Philippine Organic Act of 1 July 1902 provided the framework for the new colonial government. American rule introduced a modern secular educational system (1901), separation of church and state, a legislative assembly (1907) and a party system. The municipal governments were still administered by Filipino local leaders, and wholesale and retail trade was controlled by ethnic Chinese. American colonial policy toward the Philippines varied depending on whether the Republican or Democratic Party was in power, with the Democrats generally favoring more autonomy for the Philippines. For example, from 1913–1921, when the U.S. president was a Democrat, the Filipinization program was initiated, and Filipinos held a majority of the civil-service positions. In 1916 the Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Act) granted more autonomy to the Filipinos. The Philippine Independence Act (Tydings-McDuffie Law) was enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1934, and in 1935 a commonwealth government was instituted. Full independence was planned for 1946.

The United States could not take full economic control of the Philippines until 1909, as the Treaty of Paris provided for a ten-year period during which Spanish ships and goods could enter the Philippines on the same terms as American ships and goods. In 1909 the U.S. Congress passed the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act, which permitted free entry of all Philippine products except rice, sugar, and tobacco. These exceptions were abolished by the Underwood-Simmons Act in 1913. Under free-trade relations, the Philippine economy grew rapidly, as products such as sugar and Manila hemp were exported to the United States and American manufactured products imported. In the 1930s, the United States took about 80 percent of the Philippines' total exports and accounted for about 65 percent of its total imports.

Japanese Occupation

The Japanese invaded the Philippines on 8 December 1941, occupied Manila on 2 January 1942, and established a military administration the following day. Retreating American and Filipino forces surrendered on Corregidor and Bataan. Japanese occupation was harsh, and many Filipinos lacked the basic necessities of life (many starved), were forced to perform labor, were tortured, and suffered the plundering of their homes and communities. This deprivation of human rights continues to inform Filipino views of Japan and the Japanese. Filipino resistance was centered in central Luzon and communists played a leading role. In 1944 U.S. forces aided by Filipino guerrillas reoccupied the islands. The Battle of Leyte Gulf, the largest naval battle in history, was a major defeat for the Japanese and eased the way for the American re-occupying forces. Nonetheless, fighting was fierce, and the Japanese forces did not surrender until 3 September 1945. The Philippine government estimated that more than one million Filipinos were wounded or killed during the occupation.

The Independent Philippines

When the Philippines became an independent nation on 4 July 1946, it was in much worse condition than it had been before World War II. Rehabilitation was accomplished largely through a series of treaties with and support provided by the United States: The Treaty of General Relations, the Philippine Trade Act Agreement (Bell Trade Agreement), and the Military Bases Agreement. The trade agreement provided for reciprocal free trade until 1954, after which there would be gradual imposition of duties on specific products until 1973. The Military Bases Agreement provided for the use of twenty-three military and naval bases by the United States, originally for ninety-nine years. The Mutual Defense Treaty (Mutual Defense Pact) signed on 30 August 1951 provided for mutual aid in an external attack.

The Philippines' dependence on the United States led to the rise of antigovernment and anti-imperialism movements, the most important of which was the Hukbalahap (Huk) movement. The Huk movement began in 1942 in central Luzon; its full name was Hukbo ng Bayan Lapan sa Hapon (People's Army against the Japanese). The movement was led by the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (the old Communist Party of the Philippines, formed in the 1930s). After the war, the Huks were disappointed with the Philippines' dependence on the United States and the oligarchy of Filipino landlords. They changed the full name to Hukbong Mapagpalaya nang Bayan (People's

Liberation Army) and started a peasant revolt, demanding equitable distribution of the land and harvest. They nearly captured Manila in 1950. Their leader surrendered in 1954, but the movement continued its activities into the 1970s. Successive presidents launched land-reform programs to maintain social stability, but tenant farmers were dissatisfied with those watered-down bills.

Anti-American nationalism movements led by urban laborers, students, and intellectuals gained power in the 1960s. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) refounded in 1968, adopted the tenets of Maoism. The New People's Army (NPA) was organized as the military arm of the CPP in 1969. In the south, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was formed in 1969; it demanded independence for Muslim-dominated areas. Meanwhile economic conditions worsened due to inflation and unemployment.

President Ferdinand Marcos (1916–1989) declared martial law in 1972. The military arrested several thousand people including opposition politicians, journalists, student leaders, intellectuals, and labor union leaders. Martial law was lifted in 1981, but after opposition leader Benigno Aquino, Jr. (1932–1983) was assassinated at Manila International Airport in 1983, many more Filipinos joined the protest movement against Marcos's dictatorship. In the election of 1986 Corazon Cojuangco Aquino (b. 1933), widow of Benigno, was elected president, and Marcos and his family went into exile in Hawaii.

In 2001 Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (b. 1947) was sworn in as the new president of the Philippines. She came to power through a peaceful "People Power" movement that led to the resignation of President Joseph Estrada (b. 1937) over charges of corruption and cronyism. The Philippines restored democracy for a second time, but economic reform and continuing resistance from Muslims in the south remain serious issues.

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PHILIPPINES—HUMAN RIGHTS The present Philippine constitution (1987) adopts a broad definition of human rights that includes not only civil and political rights but also economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as the rights of special groups such as women, the disabled, and indigenous cultural communities. It guarantees its citizens certain basic rights, such as the right to free speech, association, and religion. In addition, the Philippine constitution prohibits the use of torture, force, and secret detention for those accused. The constitution also directs the state to enact laws that protect and enhance the rights of all people to human dignity, that reduce inequalities, and that support diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.

The Philippines' National Commission on Human Rights (NCHR) was one of the first such agencies in Asia. Its primary task is to investigate complaints of human-rights violations. On the international level, the Philippines is a signatory to the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights and has acceded to several important U.N. covenants and protocols on human rights, most notably the International Covenant and Optional Protocol on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights. In 1996, activists from academia, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the NCHR formed the Working Group which has been pursuing the creation of a regional human-rights organization within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Despite these initiatives, however, violations of human rights continue across the country. These violations are monitored by organizations such as Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP), the Philippine Association of Human Rights Advocates, and Amnesty International Philippines.

Civil and Political Rights

The constitution of 1987, written under the administration (1986–1992) of President Corazon Aquino



In October 2000, Filipinos in Hong Kong, where they number about 160,000, protest the rule of Philippine president Joseph Estrada, which they claim is corrupt and violates Filipino human rights. (AFP/CORBIS)

(b. 1933), provided legal and institutional guarantees for the protection of human rights. It was a response to the political and economic excesses of the regime of Ferdinand Marcos (1917–1989), who controlled the Philippines from 1966 to 1986; those excesses included arbitrary arrests and detentions of citizens, extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and kidnappings, as well as widespread poverty, hunger, and malnutrition. Nevertheless, human-rights abuses have continued to be a serious problem in the post-Marcos years, especially among Philippine military and paramilitary groups and the Philippine police. Reports of human-rights violations have consistently followed Philippine military operations conducted against Muslim secessionist groups and criminal gangs in Mindanao. These have included indiscriminate bombardment of numerous Muslim villages and towns, mass displacements of as many as 200,000 people from their homes, killings, and disappearances. Arbitrary arrests and torture have been regularly resorted to as a means of extracting information regarding these secessionist groups and criminal gangs.

Aside from government forces, insurgent groups such as the New People's Army (NPA) and extremist Islamic groups such as the Abu Sayyaf have also been implicated in human-rights violations. The NPA does not refrain from using children as armed combatants and noncombatants, committing extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, torture, and detentions. The Abu Sayyaf has committed acts of murder, beheadings, torture, kidnapping, and rape.

The Rights of Prisoners Although every accused is guaranteed a fair and speedy trial, the court system, with its poorly paid and overburdened judges and prosecutors, has remained susceptible to corruption and to the influence of the wealthy and powerful. With regard to the rights of prisoners against physical and psy-

chological maltreatment and degrading punishment, recent reports from human-rights organizations draw an alarming picture. Philippine prisons often hold three times as many prisoners as they were designed for. Sometimes women and children are put together with male prisoners, which leads to rape and physical abuse. Prisoners are forced to live in inhumane conditions not only because of the density of the prison population, but also because of the lack of sanitary facilities and maintenance. In 2000, human-rights groups reported that sanitary facilities were insufficient, that there were not enough dispensers of clean water, and that in some cases prisoners had to endure knee-high waters after strong rains. Many prisoners suffer from health problems such as tuberculosis and other diseases.

The Death Penalty In 1998, then-President Joseph Estrada (b. 1937) reintroduced the death penalty, despite strong opposition from human-rights organizations. In 2000, the death penalty was suspended in observance of the Catholic Church's Jubilee Year. Of the roughly 1,500 people due to be executed, most came from the poorest sectors of society and could not afford the services of legal counsel. There is a move in the Philippine Senate to abolish the death penalty. The House appears to be divided on the issue, but President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (b. 1947) and the powerful Roman Catholic Church support the Senate move to review the controversial legislation.

The Right to Vote Philippine citizens living abroad, numbering around 5–6 million in 2000, pay taxes that constitute a sizable portion of the national income but are effectively disenfranchised because the government has not yet passed a law allowing absentee voting as required by the constitution.

Looking to the Future

Since 1987 important steps have been taken to improve the human-rights situation in the Philippines. At midyear 2000, there were more than 14,000 local human-rights officers nationwide. However, the examples above illustrate that there is still a long way to go to reach the goals proudly set in the constitution. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo faces enormous tasks. The further improvement of the human-rights situation in the Philippines depends on the strengthening of the judicial system, the establishment of an absentee voting system, the successful fight against corruption, and the reconsideration of the death penalty. Moreover, as a signatory to the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the country needs to strengthen the economy, fight poverty, bridge the gap between the rich and the poor, and provide a peaceful solution to

the problems of Muslims in Mindanao and other minority groups in the archipelago. At the very least, the Philippines needs to curb the strong political influence of the Philippine military in Philippine society.

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PHILIPPINES—POLITICAL SYSTEM Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as the new president of the Philippines on 20 January 2001. Her assumption of power resulted from a peaceful demonstration of "People Power," which forced the resignation of President Joseph Estrada over charges of corruption and cronyism. This is the second time in postwar Philippine politics that a president has been replaced through populist action. The first time was in February 1986, when Corazon Aquino became president after a mass outpouring of popular support for her against then-President Ferdinand Marcos. Although formal institutions exist providing a mechanism for change of government, it appears that when these institutions impede what people perceive as good governance, they are willing to explore other avenues.

Formal Structure of Government

From the time when the Philippines declared itself a sovereign state in 1898, the nation has had four major constitutions: the 1899 constitution, which established the first republic in Asia; the 1935 constitution, which served as the basic law during the period of self-government while the Philippines was still under

American rule and after it became independent in 1946; the 1973 constitution, which allowed Ferdinand Marcos to continue to hold office as president; and the 1987 constitution, upon which the present government is based, which essentially restored institutions and processes dismantled by Marcos during his regime. The 1987 constitution describes the Philippine political system as republican and democratic. It is a unitary system in that power resides in a central authority, and whatever power lower levels of government possess has been delegated to them either by Congress or through executive orders. The formal political structure of the Philippines is patterned on that of the United States, in which the president wields executive power, Congress formulates laws, and an independent judiciary ensures that laws are uniformly upheld.

The Executive Branch As chief executive, the president has the power to execute laws. The president is assisted by a cabinet, which currently comprises twenty-three departments. Among the more important departments are Foreign Affairs, National Defense, Finance, Interior and Local Government, Justice, and Trade and Industry. Both president and vice president are elected at large for a six-year term with no possibility of reelection. This means that the president and vice president could belong to different political parties. The vice president succeeds the president in case of death, resignation, or incapacity. In some instances, the vice president is assigned a government portfolio; Vice President Teofisto Guingona is concurrently serving as secretary of foreign affairs. Controversies regarding the results of the election of president and vice president are decided by the Supreme Court.

The Legislative Branch The Philippine Congress is a bicameral body, the upper house being the Senate and the lower house being the House of Representatives. These two houses possess equal power, although budgetary bills must originate in the lower house, while treaty ratification rests exclusively with the upper house.

With only twenty-four seats, the Philippine Senate is one of the smallest upper chambers among countries with bicameral legislatures. Its members are nationally elected for six-year terms on a staggered basis, twelve senators being elected every three years. Senators may serve for a maximum of two terms or twelve consecutive years. In the May 2001 elections, thirteen Senate seats were contested. The extra seat became vacant when Senator Guingona assumed the vice presidency, which became vacant when Macapagal-Arroyo took over as president. Guingona, who was nominated by Macapagal-Arroyo to succeed her, had been Senate minority leader.

The constitution states that the House shall comprise not over 250 members, apportioned by area and population, and that party-list representatives shall not exceed 20 percent of the total members. Members are elected for three-year terms and can serve for a maximum of three consecutive terms. The House of Representatives is presided over by a speaker.

Both the Senate and the House of Representatives have working committees organized according to sectoral or functional interests. These committees conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and call upon government officials and the private sector, including concerned citizens, to appear before them. Senators and representatives can file bills on almost any subject for legislation, but the Senate is traditionally expected to file bills of national import; the House of Representatives, on the other hand, generally concentrates on constituent concerns.

Congress also functions as the sole judge regarding any election contest that pertains to its members. For the Senate, there is the Senate Electoral Tribunal, which is composed of three justices of the Supreme Court and six senators chosen on the basis of proportional representation from parties represented in the Senate; for the House, there is the House Electoral Tribunal, which is composed of three justices of the Supreme Court and six representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from parties of organizations registered under the party-list system.

Congress, through the Commission on Appointments, also confirms (or rejects, as the case may be) presidential appointments for heads of executive departments, ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or navy captain, and officials of constitutional bodies such as the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. The Commission on Appointments is chaired by the president of the senate, with twenty-four members, twelve of whom are senators and twelve of whom are representatives.

The Judiciary Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and in the lower courts. Members of the judiciary are chosen by the president from a list of nominees provided by the Judicial and Bar Council, a constitutional body composed of representatives from the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, the legal profession, and the private sector. Once appointed, judges have secure tenure and can serve until the age of seventy or until they become incapacitated.

Constitutional Commissions The constitution also provides for independent constitutional commissions, namely, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. The Civil Service Commission administers the civil service, comprising all governmental agencies, including corporations that are owned or controlled by the government. The Commission on Elections administers all laws relating to conducting an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall. It has jurisdiction over contested elections of officials other than members of Congress, the president, and the vice president. The Commission on Audit examines, audits, and settles all accounts pertaining to government revenues and expenditures. The members of these commissions are appointed by the president subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Congress. They have a term of seven years without reappointment.

Local Governments The lowest political unit in the Philippines is the *barangay* (village). The *barangay* is administered by a council headed by a *punong barangay* (chairperson). Several *barangays* make up a city or municipality. A *barangay* consists of at least two thousand residents for municipalities and five thousand for cities. A province consists of municipalities and sometimes what are called component cities. Other cities are run independently of the province and have their own charters. There are also subnational administrative units composed of several provinces linked by common characteristics such as ethnicity or language. At all these levels, officials are elected by their constituencies.

People Power

In addition to these formal structures, structures such as the media and nongovernmental organizations allow people active involvement in national affairs. Unique to Philippine democracy is the concept of "People Power," a mass movement that at critical times is crucial in the political process, specifically, in deciding who should be president. In the case of Corazon Aquino, the people determined that the 1986 election was neither fair nor free. They staged massive demonstrations until Ferdinand Marcos was deposed. In the case of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the people determined that Joseph Estrada was inept and corrupt and unfit to be president. Again, massive demonstrations were staged until Estrada was forced from office. The jury is still out as to whether this method of changing governments will become a more frequent occurrence in Philippine politics.

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PHILIPPINES-UNITED STATES RELATIONS U.S. business connections to Spain's Asian colony *Las Islas Filipinas* ("the Philippine Islands") emerged before the Spanish-American War of 1898 swamped the Philippine Revolution. Since 1898, however, relations between the two nations have included warfare, colonial rule, and an evolving bilateral relationship between unequally matched partners.

Armed conflict (1898–1902) marked the first phase of this unequal relationship. An administratively diverse colonial period (1902–1946) ensued. This led to increasing autonomy for the Filipino elite, divided loyalties during World War II, and a brief return to U.S.-supervised self-rule after Japan's defeat. A diverse period of constitutional independence followed during the next six decades.

From the Revolutionary Malolos Republic Through World War II

The *Kataastaasan Kagalanggalang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan* ("Highest and Most Honorable Society of the Country's Offspring") movement launched the Philippine Revolution of 23 August 1896 and led the struggle for independence. That movement was overtaken by the Spanish-American War of 1898. During September 1898–January 1899, Filipino delegates in Malolos ratified President Emilio Aguinaldo's 12 June 1898 Declaration of Independence and ratified a *Constitución Política* ("Political Constitution"). The Malolos Republic is also called the First Philippine Republic.

On 4 February 1899, fighting broke out between U.S. infantry and Filipino soldiers. Against harsh domestic dissent by Americans such as Grover Cleveland and Samuel Clemens in the Anti-Imperialist League, Presidents William McKinley (served 1897–1901) and Theodore Roosevelt (served 1901–1909) dismissively characterized the war as an insurrection. And on 8 September 1902, the Civil Commission declared that peace existed in the Philippine Islands, although armed resistance continued. Asia's first constitutional republic became the United States' first Asian colony, rearranging the Asia-Pacific imperial checkerboard. U.S. tutelage pleased many in the wealthy, educated class of Filipinos. More than most of their European counterparts in Asia, U.S. colonialists integrated the social and economic elite into colonial administration. Except in



PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE

The following text highlights some steps agreed to by the United States and the Philippines designed to move the Philippines to United States Commonwealth status in 1936.

Section 1. The Philippines Legislature is hereby authorized to provide for the election of delegates to a constitutional convention, which shall meet in the hall of the house of representatives in the capital of the Philippine Islands, at such time as the Philippine Legislature may fix, but not later than October 1, 1934, to formulate and draft a constitution for the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands, subject to the conditions and qualifications prescribed in this Act. . . .

Section 2. (a) The constitution formulated and drafted shall be republican in form, shall contain a bill of rights, and shall, either as a part thereof or in an ordinance appended thereto, contain provisions to the effect that, pending the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippine Islands:

- (1) All citizens of the Philippine Islands shall owe allegiance to the United States.
- (2) Every officer of the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands shall, before entering upon the discharge of his duties, take and subscribe an oath of office, declaring, among other things, that he recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of and will maintain true faith and allegiance to the United States.
- (3) Absolute toleration of religious sentiment shall be secured and no inhabitant or religious organization shall be molested in person or property on account of religious belief or mode of worship.
- (4) Property owned by the United States, cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
- (5) Trade relations between the Philippine Islands and the United States shall be upon the basis prescribed in section 6.

(6) The public debt of the Philippine Islands and its subordinate branches shall not exceed limits now or hereafter fixed by the Congress of the United States; and no loans shall be contracted in foreign countries without the approval of the President of the United States.

(7) The debts, liabilities, and obligations of the present Philippines government, its Provinces, municipalities, and instrumentalities, valid and subsisting at the time of the adoption of the constitution, shall be assumed and paid by the new government.

(8) Provision shall be made for the establishment and maintenance of an adequate system of public schools, primarily conducted in the English language.

(9) Acts affecting currency, coinage, imports, exports, and immigration shall not become law until approved by the President of the United States.

(10) Foreign affairs shall be under the direct supervision and control of the United States.

(11) All acts passed by the Legislature of the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands shall be reported to the Congress of the United States.

(12) The Philippine Islands recognizes the right of the United States to expropriate property for public uses, to maintain military and other reservations and armed forces in the Philippines, and, under order of the President, to call into service of such armed forces all military forces organized by the Philippine government.

(13) The decisions of the courts of the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States. . . .

(14) The United States may, by Presidential proclamation, exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands and for the maintenance of the government as provided in the constitution thereof, and for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty and for the discharge of government

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obligations under and in accordance with the provisions of the constitution.

(15) The authority of the United States High Commissioner to the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands, as provided in this Act, shall be recognized.

(16) Citizens and corporations of the United States shall enjoy in the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands all the civil rights of the citizens and corporations, respectively, thereof.

Source: Nicholas Zafra. (1967) *Philippine History through Selected Sources*. Alemar, AZ: Phoenix Publishing House, 309.

education and foreign policy, the United States yielded administrative control of the Philippines to the *ilustrados* ("enlightened ones"), as the elite were called. Key U.S. statutes were the Philippine Bill of 1 July 1902 (which provided for an elected assembly while the upper house members appointed by the U.S. President) and the Jones Law (which pledged to give the Philippines independence after a stable government was in place). The United States directly conducted all foreign relations affecting its Southeast Asian colony.

An unusual bloc of U.S. idealists, protectionists, and racists supported independence for the Philippines. Responding to the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934, Filipino delegates to the 1934–1935 Convention instituted a form of presidentialism for the preindependence Commonwealth and future Third Republic that was more centralized than that of the United States.

Japan was the third colonial power to rule the Philippines in less than fifty years, invading and quickly defeating the United States. The Filipino elite responded in disarray. In the face of Japan's advances, a refugee cohort fled to Washington, D.C. Remaining in the Philippines, Japan-educated José P. Laurel, Sr., led legislators elected in November 1941 and others to collaborate in the Japan-sponsored Second Republic (1943–1945). In the countryside, guerrillas also were divided. Nonetheless, intense resistance from the mainly Filipino United States Armed Forces in the Far East and other guerrillas fighting under socialist and Communist leadership shocked the Japanese. Once U.S. forces had been defeated, the Japanese hoped to be greeted as leaders of a pan-Asian campaign against Caucasian colonial powers and underestimated the power of the promise of independence the United States had already made to Filipinos.

Although Japan only offered a fictive independence, the Second Republic provided useful training for future leaders of the successor Third Republic (1946–1972). For example, Laurel's minister of foreign affairs was Claro M. Recto, later a senator and seminal critic of U.S. neocolonialism. Laurel is cred-

ited with thwarting a Japanese plan to conscript all young Filipino men into the Japanese Imperial Army. At least 500,000 war deaths occurred during U.S. bombing campaigns from October 1944 to April 1945, along with considerable destruction of roads, buildings, and livestock.

The Post-World War II Era

Before constitutional independence devolved on the Philippines, it joined in cofounding the United Nations. However, the Philippines' early admission to the United Nations was partly a response to the Japan-sponsored Second Republic and part of a United States–United Kingdom trade-off with the Soviet Union's Josef Stalin (1879–1953). The Soviet leader insisted that certain satellite Soviet republics be admitted, and the Philippines was admitted in exchange. In its first decade, the Philippines' delegation to the United Nations acted in concert with the United States.

On 4 July 1946, the Philippines became an independent nation, with President Manuel Roxas (served 1946–1948) of the Commonwealth becoming the first president of the Third Republic. Roxas, ten senatorial candidates on his party's ticket, and six cabinet members had collaborated with Japan. As the United States and Soviet Union increasingly confronted one another through proxy military conflicts in Asia and elsewhere, Cold War politics dominated the first four and a half decades of Philippines-U.S. relations.

During 1946–1947, the Bell Trade Act and the Tydings Rehabilitation Act gave the United States unusual trade and investment advantages. Token World War II-related damages payments from the United States at the rate of twelve cents on the dollar were made in exchange for a plebiscite ratifying a humiliating "Parity Amendment," which treated U.S. investors the same as Filipinos.

The Bell Trade Act of 1947 and the 1955 Laurel-Langley amendments diverted the Philippines from industrialization based on import substitution. Exports to the



THE END OF THE PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC

The following oath of allegiance to the sovereignty of the United States by Philippine president Emilio Aguinaldo on 1 April 1901 marked the end of the Philippine Republic and the beginning of U.S. control, which ended in 1946.

The effects of the war which only recently have come to my knowledge have fully convinced me that complete termination of hostilities and the establishment of lasting peace are not only desirable but absolutely essential to the welfare of the Philippines.

The Filipinos were never depressed because of the weakness of their forces, nor did they feel discouraged. Courageously they launched themselves into every undertaking which called forth strength and fortitude. However, the time has come when they find themselves faced by an irresistible force which, while impeding their progress, nevertheless enlightens their minds, pointing out to them another path, the cause of peace which the majority of their countrymen have gladly embraced, confident that, under the protection of the American people, they would obtain all the liberties

promised to them and which they are even now beginning to enjoy.

The country clearly wants peace. Let it be so. Enough of blood, tears and desolation! These desires can not be ignored by those who are still in arms but whose firm resolve is none other than to serve the country whose will is now unmistakable.

Now that I have come to know this will, I respect and obey it. And, after mature deliberation, I make it known to the world that I can not be deaf to the voice of a people longing for peace nor to the cries of thousands of families anxiously awaiting the freedom magnanimously promised to their beloved ones by the North American Nation.

In recognizing and accepting the sovereignty of the United States, as I now do without any reservation, I believe I am serving you, my Country. May happiness be ever yours.

Source: Nicolas Zafra. (1967) *Philippine History through Selected Sources*. Quezon City, Philippines: Alemar-Phoenix Publishing House, 256.

United States, 59.9 percent of all exports from the Philippines in 1946, fell to a 28.5 percent share in 1975, the first year after the Laurel-Langley Agreement expired. In the same thirty-one-year period, the share of imports from the United States fell from 87.0 percent to 21.8 percent.

In early 1947, twenty-three U.S. military establishments were scattered throughout the archipelago. Under economic duress as a result of damages incurred during World War II, the Philippines endorsed a ninety-nine-year Military Bases Agreement (1947–2046). The administration of President Ferdinand Edralin Marcos (served 1965–1986) reduced this span. The 1966 Narciso Ramos-Dean Rusk executive agreement allowed an optional twelve-month phase-out period beginning as early as 1991. The bases continue to provide the United States with opportunities for ongoing and easy access to and influence with key officers in the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Earlier, the bases had facilitated U.S. participation in the multilateral colonial suppression of China's Boxer Rebellion (1900) and in the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War of 1918–1922. Needless to say, the

availability of military bases to the United States in postindependence Philippines generated resentment in other newly independent Asian countries. The Philippines supported the U.S.-led United Nations forces with four battalion combat teams in the Korean War (1950–1953) underwritten by U.S. mutual security funds. There was another downside: U.S. bases made the Philippines a target for Soviet missiles.

In seven major Asian capitals where the Philippines had no diplomats until 1955, the United States represented its former colony, and at least as late as 1964, Filipino diplomats in three Asian countries relied on U.S. embassies to transmit cables to Manila.

Claims that the Philippines was a U.S. puppet need to be case-specific. Such claims need to distinguish between views shared by ruling groups in the two countries and evidence of heavy-handed pressure that might have forced the Philippines to act in a way it might otherwise have avoided. For example, the Philippines under President Elpidio Quirino (served 1948–1953) refused to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty, later

negotiating a separate settlement with Japan. President Diosdado Macapagal (served 1961–1965) disturbed U.S. President John F. Kennedy (served 1961–1963) by reviving a longstanding claim to Sabah (North Borneo) when Malaya was about to become Malaysia. And just because the United States benefited from the military bases is not sufficient evidence to prove that presidents of the Philippines felt threatened by foreign invasion. Rather, presidents of the Philippines often exploited U.S. desires to extract concessions. This point need not be conflated with arguable assertions that Filipinos benefited from those concessions. Nonetheless, relations were close. However, Filipinos increasingly accepted the need for *isang malayang patakaranang panlabas* ("independent foreign policy").

The Philippines-United States Military Assistance Agreement of 20 March 1947 established a joint U.S. military assistance group. Extended indefinitely in 1953, it directed a civil war against the *Hukbong Magsapalaya ng Bayan* ("National Liberation Army"), a leftist agrarian social movement. The agreement made the armed forces of the Philippines dependent on the United States as a source for arms and munitions even if other foreign equipment was more reasonably priced.

The Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 30 August 1951 remained in force fifty years later. Contrary to the hopes of disappointed Filipino politicians, this agreement did not elicit a U.S. commitment to defend the Philippines in conflicts over the Spratly Islands and other disputed islands in the South China Sea.

The Philippines signed the South East Asia Collective Defense Treaty ("Manila Pact"), its controversial protocol (on Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam), and the Pacific Charter with the United States and other allies on 8 September 1954. The Philippines participated in the follow-up 23–25 February 1955 Bangkok Conference to organize the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). A desire for greater respect from independent Asian countries left the Philippines increasingly disillusioned with SEATO (1955–1976).

Implementing memoranda from the U.S. National Security Council in 1949 and 1954, officials in the Departments of State and Defense joined with other members of the executive branch, congressional representatives, journalists, and academics in promoting regional cooperation among anticommunist Southeast Asian governments. That sustained encouragement reinforced the views of presidents and diplomats of the Philippines who cofounded the Association of South-East Asia (ASA), South East Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SEAARC) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the 1960s.

Having criticized President Macapagal for considering a U.S. request to send Filipino troops to the Vietnam War, newly elected President Ferdinand Edralin Marcos outmaneuvered his congressional opponents and sent an engineering battalion to Vietnam. That contingent included West Point graduate and future President Fidel V. Ramos (served 1992–1998). Later, U.S. Congressional investigations revealed that, in exchange, Marcos wangled secret concessions from U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson (1963–1969) to help construct schoolhouses and roads throughout the Philippines. These facilitated Marcos's reelection in 1969. Naval and air bases provided key logistical support for U.S. bombing in Vietnam—a source of criticism during Marcos's two elected terms of office. Marcos's tolerance of U.S. military facilities made his martial law regime tolerable to four U.S. presidents from 1972 to 1986.

The Marcos regime collapsed in the face of a failed February 1986 "snap election," vote fraud, boycotts, a military revolt led by Ramos, and internationally televised reporting of a massive civilian protest. President Corazon Cojuangco Aquino (served 1986–1992) promised the United States Congress that the Philippines would pay foreign debts owed to U.S. banks, even though those questionable Marcos-era loans sapped the economy. Despite a long personal friendship with Marcos and open misgivings about Aquino, U.S. President Ronald W. Reagan (served 1981–1989) endorsed her role in redemocratizing the Philippines.

Aquino's arguable electoral legitimacy left her vulnerable in the face of substantive and procedural foreign affairs-related resolutions at the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Aquino needed an overwhelming "yes" vote in the February 1987 constitutional plebiscite and, therefore, resigned herself to amendments that would limit her ability to extend the Military Bases Agreement. During an attempted 1989 coup d'état against Aquino, her indebtedness to the United States was highlighted when fighter jets from U.S. bases buzzed rebel positions. Later, U.S. naval and air facilities provided key logistical support for U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf War. Further, the presence of nuclear weapons—neither admitted nor denied by the United States—posed concomitant dangers of accidental explosion and other types of radiation and toxic-waste clean-up hazards. To the chagrin of the GABRIELA federation of women's organizations, antinuclear groups, the National Democratic Front, and conservative Filipino nationalists, U.S. bases encouraged local prostitution under the euphemistic guise of rest and recreation. Supported by the Anti-Bases Movement in the twilight of the Cold War, the Senate rebuffed Aquino, rejecting an extension of the Military

Bases Agreement on 16 September 1991. This led to a phase-out of U.S. military presence in the Philippines by December 1992.

By the early 1990s, new annual foreign direct investment from South Korea, Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan exceeded that from the United States. Following the 1992 shutdown of the naval facility at Subic Bay and the advent of the North American Free Trade Agreement, new political, economic, and cultural pressures shaped relations between Washington and Manila.

In the late 1990s, unfinished business from that era included unpaid World War II veterans benefits, paternity suits initiated in U.S. federal district courts on behalf of Amerasian children, and toxic-waste clean-up issues at former military base sites.

During the twentieth century, Filipinos became intimately familiar with American popular culture. But continuing eastward across the Pacific, the culture of the Filipino diaspora (immigrants and their descendants) changed the United States. In the 1990s, voters twice elected Benjamin J. Cayetano, son of an immigrant Filipino waiter, as governor of Hawaii. By 1992, Philippine languages collectively had become the second-fastest-growing second-language group spoken in homes throughout the United States. And by June 2001, Filipinos in the United States numbered over 2 million.

Summary and Prospects

Colonialism and Cold War priorities dominated Philippines-U.S. relations from the late nineteenth century until the early 1990s. Despite its claims of enlightened rule, the United States took advantage of the unequal relationship. Weakened by World War II, the Philippines' constitutional independence was attenuated for over a decade by neocolonial political, military, and economic measures. Other Asian countries often felt that the Philippines toed the U.S. line too closely, particularly in its inability to pursue alternatives other than those promoted by the United States. The U.S. military occupied or traveled through the archipelago's land, waters, and airspace from 1898 to 1992, except for thirty months during World War II, but the relationship between the United States and Philippines also made possible the migration of large numbers of Filipinos into the United States.

It was expected that the period after 1992 would open a new chapter in bilateral relations. However, a 1998 Philippines-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) allowed U.S. forces to return to the Philippines,

albeit not permanently. In the twenty-first century, the United States remains the most important bilateral partner of the Philippines but is no longer as overwhelmingly dominant as it once was. On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty in 2001, Philippines president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and U.S. president George W. Bush renewed their commitment to the United States-Philippines alliance. Whether or not this new century will result in a more egalitarian relationship between the United States and the Philippines remains to be seen.

Both the VFA and the MDT served as the rationale for the presence in 2002 of U.S. troops in the southern Philippines, where they engaged in a military operation together with the Philippines' armed forces to flush out elements of the Abu Sayyaf, a terrorist organization in Muslim Mindanao. While the Cold War has ended, U.S. priorities still frame U.S.-Philippines relations. As of 2002, that priority has become the war on terrorism.

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PHNOM PENH (1998 est. pop. 862,000). Phnom Penh is the capital and largest city in Cambodia. It originally was called Chadomukh (Four Faces) and later was renamed Phnom Penh (Phnom means hill, on which an wealthy woman, named Penh, had a Buddhist sanctuary built). Though the founding dates back to 1434, the city's real development started only after King Norodom of Cambodia left his residence in Udon in 1866 to set up a new capital. King Norodom signed a protectorate treaty with France and during the next fifty years the population of the city increased to about seventy thousand inhabitants. The original, one-street settlement along the Tonle Sap River expanded on a square layout. Swampy areas were gradually filled in, and in 1914 a grid scheme of streets west of old Phnom Penh formed the new city. In the following years, this urban terrain was enlarged farther west and northwest. With the modernization came drinking water, a sewage system, electrical power plants, and facilities for a large river port. From 1935 onward, a central market and the railway station were opened and a technical college and museums were built and enlarged. In 1953, the year of the official independence of Cambodia, Phnom Penh had about 350,000 inhabitants.

Even if the traditional royal, Buddhist, and commercial foci were still concentrated in the heart of the city, the colonial influence was clearly reflected in the newly allocated functions associated with French power, and in the "quartiers" that originated from the astute use of Western town planning concepts. With its large tree-lined boulevards and public gardens, Phnom Penh had the flair of a French provincial city with a tropical climate and a multiethnic population.

During the Vietnam War, South Vietnamese troops and U.S. bombers invaded Cambodia, and more than 750,000 refugees settled in Phnom Penh. When the Communist Khmer Rouge took control of Cambodia in 1975, all city dwellers were forced to move into the countryside. Phnom Penh remained a ghost town for nearly four years. After the Vietnamese intervention in 1979, a rapid repopulation took place, as not only former inhabitants but also rural people flooded in, drawn by the possibility of better income than could be made in the provinces. Today Phnom Penh still suffers from its difficult past, but as the home of nearly a million inhabitants and all central state offices and functions, including the impressive royal palace, the parliament, and the national museum, as well as schools through university level, the international airport, and textile and agricultural industries, it once again is the undisputed capital and prime city of Cambodia.

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PHNOM PENH EVACUATION On 17 April 1975 the five-year civil war between Cambodia's ruling regime and a Communist insurgency finally ended. To many commentators, the Communist victory had been inevitable. Disciplined and ruthless, the Communists (popularly known as the Khmer Rouge, or Red Khmer) had quickly gained the ascendancy against the army of the corruption-riddled Khmer Republic when the civil war began in 1970. While the Republican cause was prolonged by the military support of the United States, the victorious march of Communist troops into Phnom Penh in April 1975 surprised few observers. Over the week following their victory, before the new regime closed its doors and veiled Cambodia in a shroud of secrecy, the world was given a glimpse of the terror that Cambodia's new rulers would unleash on the unsuspecting Cambodian people.

The decision to evacuate Phnom Penh had been made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party in February 1975. When the Communist troops finally arrived in the city, many were still unaware of the decision. While troops from the Communists' southwest and northern zones appeared to be aware of the order to evacuate the city, many troops from the east had no idea of the plans of their superiors. Many of the regime's survivors who lived in Phnom Penh at the time have recalled that their first contact with the Communist soldiers involved no calls for evacuation. Others were immediately ordered, often at gunpoint, to leave the city. Over the next few days, the evacuation order became clear. The entire population of Phnom Penh, swelled to overflowing because of the influx of internally displaced persons during the fighting, was ordered to move to the countryside. There were to be no exceptions—the elderly, women with babies, even hospital patients, were forced to join the exodus.

Historians and analysts have long speculated about the reasons behind the evacuation. It has been argued that the evacuation of the cities was ordered as a solution to a looming food crisis, to prevent a possible epidemic of disease, or to forestall and negate any possible resistance. It seems clear, however, that the rationale

for ordering the evacuation was, simply, that it suited the ideological agenda of Cambodia's new rulers. Cities were representations of capital, Western ideas and thinking, Western institutions, the exploitation of the poor, and corruption. In a society that was to be built upon the notion of absolute equality, there remained little room for highly populated urban centers.

David M. Ayres

See also: Khmer Rouge; Killing Fields

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PHRA PATHOM CHEDI The largest and probably earliest Buddhist monument of Thailand, situated about 56 kilometers southwest of Bangkok in the town of Nakhon Pathom, formerly Nakhon Chaisri. The name of the monument, translated as "The First Holy Stupa," originates from Sanskrit (*brāh pathama cetiya*). Nakhon Pathom is one of the oldest settlements of Thailand, dating back to around 150 BCE, as proved by the stone "wheels of law" (*dharmacakra*) and "Buddha's footprints" found at the *chedi*. The first original structure that is now inside the *chedi* was 39 meters high and built in the style of the great stupa at Sanchi under the leadership of Indian missionary monks. The indigenous Mon population was converted to Buddhism as is proved by inscriptions in archaic Mon language. The *chedi* is considered sacred since it is said to contain relics of the Gautama Buddha. The monument was built over and restored several times, and the present monument, 120 meters in height, is the 1853 realization of King Mongkut, Rama IV (1851–1868).

The monument is part of a Buddhist monastery, which is a center of Dhamma or dharma-related activities in Thailand. Phra Pathom Chedi becomes a place of pilgrimage every year in November, when festive ceremonies are carried out to pay homage to the *chedi* and to the Buddha and his teachings.

Jana Raendchen

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PHUKET (2002 pop 246,000). The granite island of Phuket is the largest island in the nation of Thailand. It is located in southwest Thailand off the western Malay Peninsula in the Andaman Sea. The island was known as Ujong Salang (Cape Salang) to the Malays and was called Junkceylon by Europeans, possibly a corruption of Ptolemy's name for a cape passed on the way to the Malay Peninsula, "Jang Si Lang." Along with Penang (Malaysia) and Medan (Indonesia), Phuket is part of the northern growth triangle.

The name also refers to the seaport town of Phuket, located at the southern end of this island, as well as to its provincial name. It is a principal port for the nation and the provincial capital. The port typically draws shipping traffic from the Indian Ocean.

Phuket's earliest inhabitants may have been the Chao Lam, or "sea gypsies," a short-statured people who traveled the coastal regions by boat. Indian immigrants settled all along its coast in the fourth century CE, flourishing there through the thirteenth century, when Tai rule was first extended to Phuket. European trade in the area began in the seventeenth century. The Burmese, who had destroyed the Tai kingdom of Ayutthaya in 1769, turned their attention to Phuket in 1785 but were successfully repulsed. From then on, Phuket was largely in Siam's sphere of influence, although Europeans retained trading concessions on the island. Phuket did not become a province of Thailand until 1933.

The Sarasin Bridge connects the island to the mainland. Most residents are Thai. Other ethnic groups represented on the island include Muslim Malays; Chao Lam (people of the sea); Chinese; expatriates from Australia, New Zealand, and Canada; and residents of Indian and Arabic descent.

The Chinese mined tin on Phuket for centuries. Demand for the mineral is in decline, and with concerns about the adverse impact of mining on aquatic life such as coral reefs, local officials are attempting to convert the mining sites. These sites are reportedly being transformed to provide more tourist facilities such as resort hotels and golf courses.

Other commerce on Phuket includes trade in rubber and charcoal; there is also fishing and agriculture. Major crops include coconuts, pineapples, bananas, cashews, and rice. Although farming is important to the local economy, land is being taken out of production and developed to accommodate continued growth.

In the 1980s, improvements were made throughout the city so that Phuket could be internationally marketed as a tourist destination. Commercial attractions including shops for arts and crafts, restaurants, and the like have been added. Phuket is known as the Pearl of the South for its natural attractions such as Phra Taew National Park and its waterscapes that entice vacationing scuba divers. The island is also considered one of the world's top beach resorts.

Linda Dailey Paulson

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PHUMISAK, CHIT (1930–1966), Thai historian and philologist. Chit Phumisak, a well-known scholarly writer and intellectual, analyzed Thai society and history from a Marxist perspective, and his ideas became a basis for Marxism-oriented ideological changes of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) after 1976, when state anticommunist propaganda reached a climax under the military regime of Thanin Kraivichian.

Chit Phumisak was born on 25 September 1930 in Prachinburi Province into the family of an excise official. He was forced to change his given name, Somchit, to Chit (to indicate male gender clearly) when Field Marshal Phibul Songkram became prime minister for a second time in 1948.

While still a student of philology at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok (1950–1956), Phumisak worked as literary critic, essayist, and poet for newspapers and journals such as *Thai Mai*, *Phim Thai*, and *San Seri*. After graduating, he became a reader at Pethburi Teacher's College. The essentially antinationalist, progressive, Marxism-oriented works that he wrote until 1957, especially his *Chommaa sakkinaa Thai* (The Face of Thai Feudalism), were interpreted by the Sarit Thanarat regime as direct threats against the Thai state.

For criticizing the military government, Phumisak was imprisoned from 1958 to 1964, together with many other intellectuals. During that time he translated Maxim Gorki's *Mother* and Premchand's *Godana* into Thai, and he wrote one of his most important works, *Khwaampenmaa khoong kham Sayaam, Thai, Lao lae Khoom* (The Origins of the Terms Siam, Thai, Lao and Khom), which could be published only after his death.

After his release from prison, Phumisak joined the CPT and went to northeast Thailand (Isan) to participate in the Communist insurgency. He died in an armed struggle in Sakhon Nakhon Province on 5 May 1966.

Chit Phumisak's works, including the poems and songs he had written under the pseudonyms Kawi Kanmuang and Kawi Srisayam, were reissued in high numbers after the 14 October 1973 peaceful student uprising. After 1976 Phumisak became an iconic figure for the Marxist wing of the CPT, which was formed mainly by Thai intellectuals.

Jana Raendchen

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PHYA THAKSIN (reigned c. 1767–1782), liberator of Siam. After the Burmese devastation of Ayutthaya in April 1767, it was the half-Chinese General Phya Taksin, the governor of Tak province and later king of Siam (present-day Thailand), who restored the pride of Siam. He, along with five hundred soldiers, left the doomed capital and reached the safe sanctuary of the eastern shore of the Gulf of Siam. With an expanded army of five thousand, he established himself as king of Siam in the town of Thonburi, which became the new capital. The Chinese from his paternal home, Chaozhu, supplied the labor force and building material he used to build his new capital.

Taksin endeavored to rally the Siamese people. He brought central and border provinces under Thonburi.

His army repelled Burmese attacks in 1773 and 1776. Vietnamese influence over Cambodia diminished temporarily and was replaced by Siamese influence over the country after Taksin installed his puppet Ang Nhon as ruler of Cambodia in 1771. The kingdom of Luang Prabang became an ally to Siam in 1774, throwing off the Burmese domination established with the help of the kingdom of Vientiane in 1771. In turn Vientiane, whose ruler defied Taksin by maintaining an alliance with Siam's enemy Burma, was occupied by Siam in 1778. The famous Emerald Buddha, in Vientiane's possession since 1564, was brought to Bangkok at that time.

A patron of arts and literature, Taksin was also a devout Buddhist. Toward the end of his life he claimed mystical powers and sainthood and was accused of insanity. The hostility of Buddhist monks toward Taksin's demand of obeisance led to his downfall and imprisonment. His bravery as the liberator of Thailand earned him the epithet "the Great."

Patit Paban Mishra

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PIBUL SONGGRAM (1897–1964), prime minister of Thailand. Born Plaek Khittasangkha, Pibul Songgram received French military training and rose from humble origins to become a second-echelon leader of the military coup that established a constitutional monarchy in 1932. In 1933, he participated in the ouster of Prime Minister Phya Manopakam and was involved in suppressing Prince Boworadet's royalist, antigovernment rebellion. He became minister of defense in 1934 and prime minister in 1938. In 1939, as part of his modernity platform, he changed the name of the country from Siam to Thailand (later naming himself field marshal). Pibul held the post of prime minister longer than any other leader in Thailand.

In June 1940, after France fell to Nazi Germany, Pibul aligned Thailand with Japan to avoid a destructive takeover by Japan and to regain territory lost to French colonialism. In 1944 he resigned as prime minister to make way for a noncollaborationist government to deal with the victorious Allied powers. Although he was arrested for war crimes by his successor, Kowit Aphaiwong, charges were later dropped.

In 1947, Pibul led a coup against Kowit, and in 1948 he again became prime minister. With the military rent with factions, he survived attempted coups in 1949 and 1951. In 1952, after new elections under a revised constitution that assigned more than one hundred parliamentary seats to unelected military officers, he appointed a cabinet that favored one of the factions; in 1957 that faction won parliamentary elections amid charges of vote rigging. In 1958, Pibul's government was toppled in a military coup led by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, the leader of the other faction. Pibul then fled into exile and died in Japan.

Michael Haas

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PIG In the wild, pigs (also called hogs or swine) are native to most regions of the earth except Australasia and Antarctica. The pig belongs to the family of Suidae, nonruminant ungulates, and are hoofed herbivorous mammals. They prefer boggy, wooded country. Families with up to twelve piglets scavenge together, using their sensitive snouts to root up food.

The commonest species of pig, *Sus scrofa*, was native to Europe, North Africa, and the western half of Asia. This species became one of the earliest domesticates and today is found wherever farmers live, except in Islamic countries.

Easily tamed, wild boars and sows were domesticated in western Asia during the Neolithic period, in the seventh millennium BCE. Pigs are the only farm animals that eat whatever humans do; they can also scavenge a wide variety of foods. Not only do they give valuable meat and fat and reproduce easily, but their bristles and manure are valuable. Their milk is not used.

The Chinese pig was also domesticated in the Neolithic period, either from *S. leucomystax*, a species of white-whiskered swine native to China, Taiwan, and Japan, or from the East Indian wild boar (*S. vittatus*). Chinese domestic stock was introduced to Europe and interbred with the European pig.

Pork is widely esteemed in the cuisine of most countries, especially in East Asia, except among Jews, Sikhs, and Muslims, groups that consider its flesh defiling. Buddhists and upper-caste Hindus also do not eat pork or any kind of flesh.

Paul Hockings

PILGRIMAGE-SOUTH ASIA Pilgrimage is the practice of journeying to sites where religious pow-



A pilgrim prepares to bathe in the sacred waters of the Hooghly River at Sagar, India. (EYE UBIQUITOUS/CORBIS)

ers, knowledge, or experiences are deemed especially accessible. Such journeys are increasingly popular throughout South Asia, facilitated by ever-improving transportation. Every major South Asian religious tradition has its sacred geography, chartered in myth, oral traditions, and history. Movement over actual kilometers, whether five or five hundred, is critical to pilgrimage, for what is important is not just visiting a sacred place but leaving home. At the level of folk religion or popular practice and belief, religious journeys for South Asian Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, Muslims, and Sikhs have much in common. Christians in the subcontinent also have important pilgrimage traditions, but they are not covered in this article. Sacred places offer travelers physically and aesthetically potent experiences, from climbing hills to partaking of blessed meals or hearing devotional readings and musical performances.

Power originating in one sacred place may be transferred to another site. For example, the Buddha is said to have attained enlightenment under a particular tree

in northeastern India. According to legend, over two thousand years ago a branch from this tree was miraculously established at the Buddhist temple complex of Anuradhapura, in Sri Lanka, and its worship has continued through the centuries. In Nepal, the land of the Buddha's birth, many replicas of major Indian temples offer Nepalese Buddhist pilgrims blessings equal to those available in the original sites. Similar collapses of space are common in Hindu ideas about sacred centers.

Hindu Pilgrimage

The Hindu practice of pilgrimage is rooted in ancient scriptural charters. According to textual scholars, the earliest reference to Hindu pilgrimage is in the Rig Veda (c. 1000 BCE), in which the "wanderer" is praised. Numerous later texts, including the epic *Mahabharata* (c. 300 BCE) and several of the mythological Puranas (c. 300–750 CE) elaborate on the capacities of particular sacred sites to grant boons, including health, wealth, progeny, and deliverance after death. Texts enjoin Hindu pilgrims to perform rites on behalf of ancestors and recently deceased kin. Sanskrit sources as well as devotional literature in regional vernacular languages praise certain places and their miraculous capacities.

The Sanskrit and Hindi word for a pilgrimage center is *tirtha*, literally a river ford or crossing place. The concept of a ford is associated with pilgrimage centers not simply because many are on riverbanks but because they are metaphorically places for transition, either to the other side of particular worldly troubles or beyond the endless cycle of birth and death.

The institution of pilgrimage is an integrating force among the linguistically and culturally diverse Hindu peoples of the Indian subcontinent. The four places (*car dham*) are a widely recognized set of sacred centers in the four cardinal directions: Kedarnath in the north, Dvarka in the west, Puri in the east, and Rameswaram in the south. A pilgrim who visits all four circumambulates India. Other important Hindu pilgrimage centers include Haridwar, Gaya, Prayag, Varanasi, and Vrindavan in northern India and Cidambaram, Madurai, Sabari Malai, and Tirupati in southern India. Most pilgrimage centers hold periodic religious fairs called *melas* to mark auspicious astrological moments or important anniversaries.

Buddhist and Jain Pilgrimage

During the period 566–486 BCE, two new schools of religious teachings, Buddhism and Jainism, emerged in India. Each was founded by an individual teacher, and in each, pilgrimage centers commemorate the life



CAPE COMORIN

Cape Comorin (or Kanyakumari) is a headland marking the southernmost point of the Indian Peninsula, and a place highly sacred to Hindus as a pilgrimage site where "three seas" meet, or where the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal merge with the Indian Ocean. It is also the only place in India where the sun rises in the sea and sets in the sea. The headland is a circular low sandy point, though the Western Ghats terminate only two kilometers away.

There is a town here (population 25,000 in 2001) and an important temple. The place is famed in Hindu mythology and is especially associated with Kumari or Kanniyammal, the "virgin goddess." In front of her temple is a rocky pool where pilgrims bathe. There are also popular memorials to Swami Vivekananda and Mohandas K. Gandhi.

Paul Hockings

of the founder, as well as later important leaders and holy persons. Buddhist and Jain pilgrimage centers exist throughout India, and major Buddhist shrines flourish in Nepal and Sri Lanka. Whereas many Buddhist shrines developed around putative relics of the Buddha's body, Jains have no reverence for physical remains.

The best-known Buddhist pilgrimage centers in India are associated with important events in the Buddha's life. Two of these are Bodhi Gaya in Bihar, northeast India, where the Buddha is said to have achieved enlightenment under the *bodhi* (enlightenment) tree, and Sarnath in Uttar Pradesh, India, where he preached his first sermon. Notably both sites are on the outskirts of more ancient Hindu places of pilgrimage, Gaya and Varanasi. Distinctive to Jain shrines are the somewhat abstract stone images, often beautifully sculpted, of *tirthankaras* (Jain teachers).

Islamic Shrines

A strong Islamic presence on the Indian subcontinent dates back to the eighth century CE. In South Asia as elsewhere, Muslims have for centuries practiced shrine pilgrimage known as *ziyarat* or visiting. Muslim shrines usually develop around saints' tombs. However, the custom of visiting a saint begins during



THE MYSTICAL PULL OF THE GANGES

"I think I now behold the group we formed [on the banks of the Hugly]—the white dresses of the ladies, making them to look like spirits walking in a garden, and honest Augustus, with his *solah topee*, looking down on his shoes, and saying agreeable things: the shadows of evening closing around us; the huge fox bats sailing heavily overhead; the river spreading its broad surface before us; the boats moving across it afar, their oars dabbling as it were in quicksilver; the mists rising slowly from neighbouring groves, and then the stilly tranquil hour, broken only by the splash of passing oars, the sound of a distant gong, or the far-off music of a marriage ceremony, or the hum and drumming of the bazaar—those drowsy sounds of an Indian eve. It was a bit of still life to be ever remembered."

Source: Francis J. Bellew. (1843) *Memoirs of a Griffin or a Cadet's First Year in India*, as quoted in *The Sahibs* (1948), edited by Hilton Brown. London: William Hodge & Co., 125.

the saint's lifetime, when a particular holy person gains a reputation for teaching, healing, and miracles. The more celebrated Islamic shrines develop into large complexes called *dargahs* (palaces or royal courts).

Tombs of the Chishti Sufi saints, who flourished during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in India, stand out as places of pan-Islamic pilgrimage significance. The *dargah* of Mu'innuddin Chishti in Ajmer, Rajasthan, India, where the Mughal emperor Akbar (1542–1605) made annual pilgrimages, is generally accepted as the most important and is revered by Hindus as well as Muslims. Muslim shrines celebrate annual festivals known as *'urs*, which are similar to Hindu *melas*.

Sikh Shrines

The founder of the Sikh religion, Guru Nanak (1469–1539), spoke against pilgrimage, calling it a superficial practice. Nonetheless, a strong tradition of visiting places sacred to their own history exists among Sikhs. Sikh shrines are often associated with the ten Sikh gurus' lives and travels. They are called *gurdwaras* (the dwelling places of the gurus). Most celebrated is the Darbar Sahib (reverenced court), known in Eng-

lish as the Golden Temple, in Amritsar, Punjab, India. Among their unique features, the *gurdwaras* enshrine Sikhism's sacred book, the Guru Granth Sahib, and house the *langar* or pilgrims' kitchen, where the needy receive free food.

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PILIPINO. See **Philippine Languages.**

PINGYAO, ANCIENT CITY OF UNESCO listed China's ancient city of Pingyao, located in Shanxi Province, as a site on its World Heritage List in 1997. Pingyao dates to the Western Zhou dynasty (1045–771 BCE) and is one of China's premier examples of an ancient city. The impressive city wall, measuring 6,163 meters and renovated in 1370, still encloses streets, shops, temples, government offices, and residences from the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties. Mingqing Street, the commercial center of old Pingyao, is lined with well-preserved stores from the two dynasties. Cultural relics in the area date as far back as the Tang (618–907 CE) and Song (960–1279) dynasties. The Shuanglin Temple, first built in 571, contains more than 2,000 colored clay figurines representing the craftsmanship of ancient China. In addition to its cultural importance, Pingyao also holds commercial distinction. Pingyao merchants often conducted their business in other provinces, while maintaining their Pingyao identity. The mobility and native ties of the merchants contributed to their developing China's first remittance firms, or banks, turning Pingyao into a financial center in the nineteenth century. Wealthy merchants, in turn, built magnificent residences, adding to the city's architectural and cultural wealth.

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PIRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA Piracy has been a feature of maritime Southeast Asia since it was first navigated. In 414 CE, a Chinese traveler, Fah Hsien, noted the perils of piracy in Southeast Asia (Miller 1970: 14). In ancient times, Southeast Asian kingdoms commonly used piratical violence to compete with one another. The trading empire of Srivijaya (established around 682 CE) was destroyed in this way by the Javanese kingdom Majapahit.

Piracy was a disruptive factor in the trading routes to India and China and came to be a major nuisance to the colonial powers on their arrival in the region. In earlier colonial times many acts of piracy enjoyed official sanction from sultans, princes, and aristocrats of the region. Some small kingdoms in Southeast Asia used pirates to plunder ships and coastal villages as a source of illegal revenue. Determining the identity of the pirates was difficult as established villages could resort to piracy to supplement income from other commercial activities such as fishing, farming, or trading.

From the point of view of the peoples of Southeast Asia, growing European incursions into their seas and lands represented subjugation, thus what constituted piracy could be said to be relative. The vessels of colonial nations were also known to engage in acts of piracy against each other and indigenous boats. Before the overall problem was brought under control in the latter half of the nineteenth century, local pirate fleets, sometimes consisting of thousands of men, could be used to devastating effect against colonial shipping. Using small ships (*perahu*) in hit-and-run raids, the pirates could easily hide in the myriad of bays, rivers, mangrove swamps, and forests. The problem areas were the Malay Peninsula, the Sekrang and Sarebus Rivers of Borneo, the Sulu Islands, and Mindanao. These pirates were feared for their ruthlessness (those from the South Philippines were infamous for their love of hand-to-hand combat) and accounts exist of their barbarity, which were taken from the few survivors. Many captives, whether from Europe or Southeast Asia, if not tortured and killed, were sold into slavery.

But considerable opposition was to come from the well-armed vessels of the colonial powers. The British, Dutch, and Spanish navies were only able to break the pirate threat by seeking out their inland bases. The British Royal Navy decided to destroy piracy on the high seas and put considerable effort into locating and eliminating pirates in many places around the world—even sailing up rivers or traveling deep inland. The advent of the steam warship made pursuit far easier regardless of wind direction, which was a considerable advantage over the small sailing craft of the Southeast Asian pirates. However, piracy has never disappeared from Southeast Asia. It enjoyed a revival in the chaotic aftermath of World War II but was under relative control again within the next few decades. Even so, the region remains the most dangerous area for piracy. Of 1,243 cases of reported piracy worldwide in 1998 (and there are many unreported cases), nearly half—579—occurred in Southeast Asia.

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PKB. See **Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa**.

PLAIN OF JARS Like Easter Island with its strange, huge carved-stone figures, the Plain of Jars in northern Laos, amid the mountains of the Annamese Cordillera, is full of mystery. What people carved the huge stone jars and when? How did they transport the stone from the quarry to the plain? What purpose did the jars serve?

Tran Ninh is the Vietnamese name for the Plain of Jars; Thong Hai Hin is its name in the Lao language. The jars range from one to three meters in height and weigh six hundred kilograms on average. More than three hundred lie across the plain. According to local legends, the jars were the leftovers of an enormous

banquet celebrating the victory of a sixth-century ruler, but archaeologists believe that the jars are as old as fifteen hundred to two thousand years and thus much earlier than the mythical banquet.

In the 1930s, a French archaeologist, Madeleine Colani, studied the jars and excavated the earth around them. She found the remains of stone, glass, and clay beads, shells, bronze bracelets, and bronze and iron tools possibly used to carve the jars, which she thought were about two thousand years old. Colani presumed that the jewelry had originally been burial gifts for the deceased whose cremated remains had rested inside the jars. When exploring a large cave near the Plain of Jars, Colani found traces of heavy burning on one wall and suggested that the cremations had occurred there.

Colani connected the Plain of Jars with two other sites: one in the North Cachar Hills of northeastern India some one thousand kilometers to the northwest, where roughly similar stone jars containing bones had been discovered in 1928, and the other at Sa Huynh south of Da Nang in Vietnam, where similar jars holding some human remains had been buried in the sand along the South China Sea. Colani then concluded that these three jar locations marked an ancient caravan route, perhaps traveled by traders of salt, from the coast of Vietnam through Tran Ninh all the way to India. Most scholars agree with Colani's dating of the jars somewhere between 500 BCE and 100 CE, although her reconstruction of the historical context must remain speculative until more complete evidence emerges.

History of the Plain of Jars Region

By 100 CE, along the coasts and river valleys of Southeast Asia, Indian-inspired cultures had begun to develop; the kingdoms of Angkor, Champa, and Pagan, in today's Cambodia, Vietnam, and Myanmar (Burma), flourished, but the first kingdom in present-day Laos arose only in 1353. By this late date, the inhabitants of Laos would have had no knowledge of the people who made the stone jars lying about the plain near the first capital city of Luang Prabang.

Today the official Lao name of the region is the province of Xieng Khuang, which is populated mainly by Lao Phuan, Khmu (belonging to the Mon-Khmer language family), and Hmong (belonging to the Sino-Tibetan language family) ethnic groups. The Plain of Jars was the center of the Lao kingdom of Muang Phuan, which was incorporated as a tributary state into the Lao kingdom of Lan Xang ("land of a million elephants") in the fourteenth century. The Phuan (also Lao Phuan or Tai Phuan) are an ethnic group be-

longing to the Tai language family, linguistically and culturally closely related to the Lao of the Mekong Valley. From 1434, Muang Phuan paid tribute to Hanoi and was called Tran Ninh Prefecture by the Vietnamese.

The attempt to absorb the region into the Vietnamese state met with strong opposition, which resulted in the Vietnamese invasion of Lan Xang in 1478. After this, Muang Phuan had to pay tribute to both Hanoi and Lan Xang until the division of Lan Xang in the early eighteenth century, when Muang Phuan fell increasingly under Vietnamese influence.

In the 1830s, the region came under Siamese control, and many Phuan families were forced to resettle west of the Mekong Delta (today's Thailand). In 1893, according to the Franco-Siamese Treaty, Muang Phuan became part of French Laos.

The region around the Plain of Jars has thus seen centuries of warfare as armies of the Southeast Asian kingdoms fought for power in the area, but the most intense combat occurred from the mid-1960s until the early 1970s, after the region had fallen to combined Neutralist and Pathet Lao (Communist) forces in 1960. The plain was heavily bombed; American aircraft jettisoned their undropped bombs when they returned from raids on North Vietnam, and Pathet Lao and U.S.-backed troops fought here. Yet, amazingly, recent visitors to the Plain of Jars have confirmed that the jars survived largely intact, perhaps deliberately spared by the various armies who fought there.

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PLAZA ACCORD In September 1985, the Group of Five, or G-5, countries—the United States, Japan,

the United Kingdom, Germany, and France—meeting at the Plaza Hotel in New York announced the signing of the Plaza Accord. One main purpose of this agreement was to lower the value of the dollar vis-à-vis the yen. At the time, Japan had a large trade surplus with the United States. It was thought that by weakening the dollar and strengthening the yen American exports would be cheaper and hence sell more in Japan and elsewhere. More important, as a result of the strengthening of the yen, Japanese exports would be more expensive and hence sell less in the United States.

The Plaza Accord was the result of several rounds of secret negotiations among the G-5 earlier in 1985. The group set aside around \$18 billion to intervene in global markets to weaken the dollar and, it was thought, improve the export position of American corporations. In an almost unprecedented example of policy coordination, the yen rose in value from around 240 to the dollar to about 200 by the end of 1985. By 1987, it had doubled in value vis-à-vis the dollar. It seemed that the G-5's intervention in the market had worked. But the effect on the U.S. trade deficit was minimal. Thus, while the Plaza Accord marked an important milestone in G-5 cooperation, it did not improve the U.S. trade balance.

There are two primary reasons that strengthening the yen did not lead to a reduction in the U.S. trade deficit. First, Japanese corporations cut prices to compensate partially for the increase in the yen's value. This, along with an interest-rate cut by the Bank of Japan, provided breathing room for Japanese firms. Second, many Japanese corporations began to export production to other areas of Asia and to the United States itself. Japanese firms already had ties with firms in other Asian countries, but the price pressures of a strong yen following the Plaza Accord led to deepening regional integration. Products that were previously exported from Japan were now being exported to the United States from other countries and therefore were counted not as Japanese exports but as Malaysian, Thai, or another country's exports.

Jonathan R. Strand

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PLOWING RITUAL—VIETNAM In feudal Vietnam, from the eleventh to the nineteenth centuries, the king had absolute control of the land, the people, and the spirits. While not divine, he stood between the people and heaven, and among the most important of his symbolic roles was to serve as the high priest of agriculture.

In 987 CE, King Le Dao Hanh carried out for the first time the annual rite of plowing a small plot of rice paddy land set aside for the purpose of ensuring that the Vietnamese people had enough to eat. The king first made an offering to the God of Agriculture, known to the Vietnamese as Than Nong (the spirit of agriculture), and to the legendary Chinese emperor Shen Nung, who was credited with introducing agriculture to both the Chinese and the Vietnamese. Then the king himself plowed a few furrows of land. The rice crop from this land was later used by the king for making ceremonial offerings.

In 1038, during the Ly dynasty (1010–1225), court officials asked the king if it was proper for him to perform such a menial task. The king responded by asking where he would get proper rice for his ritual needs and how he could set an example for his people if he did not plow the consecrated royal fields. He then plowed three furrows of land with his own hands.

In 1048, two altars were constructed, one to the God of Earth (Xa) and the other to the God of Cereals (Tac). At the start of each of the four seasons of the year, offerings were made to these two gods, who came to symbolize not only agricultural fertility but the nation itself. The king's role as a national high priest of agriculture in Vietnam would continue for a thousand years with only minor variations.

Toward the end of the dynastic period in Vietnam, the king ceased to perform the plowing ceremony himself as had his predecessors. Instead, he assigned a high-ranking official to perform the plowing on his behalf. The king's representative would plow exactly nine furrows in the consecrated fields in the middle of the night on the twelfth day of the fifth lunar month. Subsequent work in this field would be carried out by local farmers. When the last king of Vietnam renounced the throne in 1945, all such rituals, like the kingship itself, came to an end.

Neil Jamieson

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POETRY-CHINA During the high tide of their "literary revolution" of the 1920s, China's poets experimented widely with European images, rhythms, and literary trends. The strongest influence initially was that of romanticism, as seen in the work of Guo Moruo (1892–1978); during the 1930s younger poets were more attracted by imagism and symbolism. Although the extended war with Japan (1937–1945) and subsequent civil strife brought attention to China's rich body of traditional folksongs as the vehicle for new, patriotic content, postwar poets produced a remarkable body of modernist verse. This tradition was later continued on Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s. In the People's Republic, leftist political movements enforced the production of verse simple enough to be appreciated by unlettered farmers and workers, but this provoked a strenuous reaction after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. Within a few years *menglong* (misty) poets appeared; in marked contrast to their predecessors, who produced public poetry, these younger poets developed very personal styles and levels of significance. By the end of the century, China's poets were freely experimenting with a variety of styles, influenced both by twentieth-century trends abroad and their own literary heritage.

Throughout the twentieth century many readers felt that these engagements with other literatures were less than successful, in some cases reflecting the cadences of other languages more than of Chinese. Twentieth-century poets had generally written free verse in colloquial language; this was a dramatic shift from the indigenous poetic tradition in which verse was carefully structured in a few conventional forms. Similarly, the diction of classical verse was rich and seldom utilized true spoken language. Poetry had for three thousand years been the vehicle for the highest levels of literary art; to memorize large numbers of poems was necessary if one was to be considered learned. Even today students learn selected works of major historical poets for recitation. Consequently, the past still exerts its influence on writers of the twenty-first century, despite its associations with old China's political elite.

The Roots of Chinese Poetry

China's earliest poetry was compiled into the *Shijing* (most often called The Book of Songs in English), by Confucius (551–479 BCE) some would argue. Certainly it has regularly been considered a source for proper moral conduct as well as of inspiration for later writers. Its imagery is rich, and its range of subjects very broad, from the founding myths of the royal house through the banquets of the nobility to the daily cares

and joys of the common people. Some of these short poems seem very much like folk songs; their immediacy has moved readers through the ages. A second major collection appeared about six hundred years later; named *Chuci* (Songs of the South), it preserved poetry generally associated with the lands south of the Chang (Yangtze) River. The older stratum of the text is associated with the court minister Qu Yuan (fourth–third centuries BCE). Exiled due to the slander of jealous rivals, he wrote of his loyalty and longing for recognition in the form of a very lengthy allegory. Other poems in the collection are about Qu Yuan, and some of the more interesting clearly refer to religious rituals of the period, using rhythms quite different from those of the northern tradition.

Traditional Forms: *Fu*, *Sbi*, and *Ci*

Inspired, most likely, by the long compositions in the *Chuci*, poets of China's first great dynasty, the Han (206 BCE–220 CE), compiled lengthy *fu* (rhyme prose or rhapsodies) that incorporated lush descriptions of objects, buildings, landscapes, human activities such as hunting, and even emotional states in alternating prose and rhymed verse. The greatest of these writers was Sima Xiangru (179–118 BCE), who recounted the pleasures of his king; other Han writers such as Yang Xiong (53 BCE–18 CE) insisted that *fu* should serve to criticize excesses, not to encourage them.

Fu were meant to be read aloud; their varying cadences, alliteration, and complex rhyming schemes were designed to delight the ear. Virtually all other Chinese poetry was lyrical, often intended literally to be sung. By the end of the Han dynasty, writers drew on the subjects of folk songs, love, separation, and death to begin a new tradition of occasional verse that continues to this day. These poems, called generally *sbi* (lyrical verse), have lines of all the same length; the most common form is the five-syllable line, which in monosyllabic Chinese originally meant five-word lines. *Sbi* poems were often written in couplets, with the second lines of all the couplets rhyming with one another. Most are relatively short. During the Tang period (618–907), strictly regulated verse forms developed; these, called *jinti sbi* (modern-style verse), prescribed even the tonal patterns of syllables in each line. These "modern" forms were generally either four or eight lines in length and were written alongside the freer, earlier *gushi* (ancient style) forms. Both forms continued to be written through the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) periods.

A new form, the *ci*, or song lyric, developed among Tang-period entertainers in response to popular mu-

sic imported from Central Asia. Instead of all lines having the same length, these new poems were written to fit the varying lines of Central Asian melodies. Later, when the music had been forgotten, poets (even those of the twentieth century, such as Mao Zedong) would "fill in" the patterns of line length, tonal sequence, and rhyme scheme found in early poems written to fit these named, but lost, melodies. From the late Tang onward, poets generally composed *ci* that fit those original patterns, although there were efforts to update the melodies used for writing new song lyrics during the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) and subsequent dynasties as arias, for the theater became the primary venue for sung verse. Some poets viewed the *ci* as inadequate for serious composition, but for others, the full range of poetic topics was written into both *shi* and *ci*. Poetry in the *ci* form reached its first peak of development during the Song period (960–1279) and its second during the seventeenth century in the hands of Ming poets, such as Chen Zilong (1608–1647), and Qing poets, including the Manchu writer Nalan Xingde (1655–1685).

Major Poets

China's great poets are legion, but those of the Tang dynasty are generally considered the best. The great triad of Du Fu (712–770), Li Bai (or Li Bo, 701–762), and Wang Wei (d. 761) are considered to embody the teachings of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, respectively. Other poets brought a very personal voice to their poems, such as the reclusive Tao Qian (365–427) and the failed statesman Su Shi (Su Dongpo, 1037–1101). Many were exceptionally capable craftsmen, but China's literary history is crowded by people who dashed off poems to commemorate special occasions (banquets, birthdays, leave-taking). And although most of the best-known poets were men, China produced a striking number of distinguished women poets. Perhaps the most famous is Li Qingzhao (1084?–c. 1151) who, widowed early from her constant literary companion, left a legacy of haunting poems of love and loss. The Ming and Qing periods produced literary societies of women whose many members often never met but who maintained long correspondences in verse as the vehicle to convey their deepest feelings.

Themes

Certainly a large percentage of Chinese poetry has been devoted to love, given the system of arranged marriages that persisted for so many centuries. But poems in China have conveyed the most profound as well as the most lighthearted of emotions, have cap-



TAO QIAN, TROUBLED POET

Surely the best-loved early Chinese poet now is Tao Qian (365–427). After a fitful career in the bureaucracy, Tao retired to live as a farmer. Many of his poems, such as the one below, seem to celebrate the simple life, but others hint darkly at hunger, frustration, even despair at his situation in life.

Poems After Drinking Wine, No. 5

I built my hut beside a traveled road
 Yet hear no noise of passing carts and horses.
 You would like to know how it is done?
 With the mind detached, one's place becomes
 remote.
 Picking chrysanthemums by the eastern hedge
 I catch sight of the distant southern hills:
 The mountain air is lovely as the sun sets
 And flocks of flying birds return together.
 In these things is a fundamental truth
 I would like to tell, but lack the words.

Robert E. Hegel

Source: James Hightower, trans. (1977)
The Poetry of Tao Ch'ien. Oxford:
 Oxford University Press, 130.

tured the daily lives and aspirations of so many, and have narrated significant (and insignificant) events over more than two millennia. There are no better examples of this range of experience than the poems of Song-period poets Su Shi and Mei Yaochen (1002–1060). Religious thoughts have motivated many poets, but because there is no fundamental dichotomy between religious and secular lives, the world is present even in religious poetry—see, for example, poems by painters Wang Wei ("Twenty Views of Wangquan") and Shen Zhou (1427–1509). So, too, is wine, the favored companion for versification. Li Bai is especially known for his wine poems ("Bring the Wine"), while his contemporary Du Fu wrote many that describe people's suffering in times of war and famine ("The Old Man With No Family to Take Leave Of").

Not only has poetry been the greatest of Chinese art forms, but it has also been one of the clearest mirrors for reflecting the experience of this major segment of humanity over an enormous span of time. Enormous numbers of poems survive: over fifty thou-

sand from the Tang period alone, along with hundreds of thousands from later periods.

Robert E. Hegel

See also: **Chuci; Ci; Du Fu; Guo Moruo; Li Bai; Literature—China; *Quan Tasngshi*; Shi; *Shijing***

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POETRY—INDIA Indian poetry has come a long way from the earliest period of sacred writings, love lyrics, and court poetry. Beginning in the Rig Vedic period, around 1500 BCE, classical poetry continued until the middle of the ninth century CE. Sanskrit epics, like the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana*, and the works of Kalidas dominated the scene. Ilanko Adigal (ninth century CE) wrote epics in Tamil. The following period saw the birth of modern Indian languages,

and poetry was characterized by a drift from classical languages, the introduction of bhakti (devotional) poetry, the growth of Perso-Arabic literature, and the development of Urdu.

Poetic Traditions

Western models greatly influenced Indian poetry at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Realism, social awareness, concern for the downtrodden, anti-colonial sentiments, and Western philosophy inspired Indian poets. A sense of unity, which derives from geographical, historical, ritualistic, and behavioral patterns, is present throughout the history of the Indian people. The concept of *Bharatavarsa* is a part of the common psyche of Indians, and this is reflected in the literature. India, that is, Bharata, existed as an entity from time immemorial. The image of India was not so much a territorial unit as one referring to history, culture, mythology, tradition. Although they may be subdivided into different groups, Indians form one community, and their poetry reflects their common hopes and aspirations.

The Nineteenth Century

The year 1800 is regarded as a landmark in the history of Indian literary activities. Although the printing press appeared in the mid-sixteenth century in Goa, the establishment of the Serampore Mission Press in 1800 ushered in a new era of communication. The traditions of manuscript and scribal writings ended. Works in Hindi, Bengali, Gujarati, Oriya, and other modern Indian languages were published. The printed script and new literary forms like the ode and sonnet stimulated the growth of a new kind of poetry, but a longing for Indian classical literature and society continued.

The creation of modern Indian poetry was slow, and there was no uniformity of pattern. Poetry in Bengali and Marathi took the lead, while poetry in languages like Hindi, Oriya, Kannada, Telugu, and Assamese lagged behind. The influence of classical and medieval poetry continued in places where English education was not an influence.

Michael Madhusudan Dutt (1827–1873) brought about significant changes in Bengali poetry by adopting new poetic forms, yet his magnum opus *Meghnadbadha* (Killing of Meghanad) was based on a story from the *Ramayana*. Altaf Husain Hali (1837–1914) broke away from the convention of *ghazal* (songs), and his *Madd-wa-Jazr-e-Islam* (Ebb and Flow of Islam) reflected resurgent Islam. Bharatendu Harishchandra (1846–1884), Lakshminath Bazbarua (1868–1938),

Radhanath Ray (1848–1908), Lachman Raina Bulbul (1812–1884), Rajaraja Varma (1863–1918), and other writers broke new grounds in Hindi, Gujrati, Assamese, Oriya, Telegu, Tamil, Marathi, Kashmiri, and Malayam.

The Twentieth Century

The poetry of the twentieth century dealt with disillusionment with British rule, the struggle for freedom, the trauma of partition, and the glorification of the past. Poets also concerned themselves with the rural-urban dichotomy, East-West relations, social problems, Marxism, existentialism, the shift from liberal humanism to feminism, a fresh approach to sexuality and morality, and a concern for the underprivileged of society. Poetry became the instrument of momentous social, political, and economic change. New poetic forms and styles were discovered to delineate changing ideologies.

The towering figure of Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) dominated the literary scene. His spirit of reason and freedom found expression in the *Gitanjali* (Offering of Songs), for which he received the Nobel Prize in 1913. He represented the new spirit of the country and made a strong impact on both Bengali and non-Bengali poetry. The imagery of Jibanananda Das (1899–1954) and psychological probing in the poetry of Buddhadeva Bose (1908–1974) also added new dimensions to Bengali poetry. Chaoba Singh (1896–1951), Lamabam Kamal Singh (1899–1935), and Anganghal Singh (1892–1944) set new trends in Manipuri poetry. Romanticism, nationalism, and mysticism marked Assamese poetry. Mysticisim, nationalism, and concern for the downtrodden distinguished the writings of the woman poet Kuntala Kumari Sabat (1900–1938), who wrote in Oriya.

Patriotic fervor characterized the poetry of Subramania Bharati (1882–1921), the greatest poet in modern Tamil, whose *Kuyil Pattu* (Song of the Cuckoo, 1912) is a noted work. Bharatidasan (1891–1964) was the author of *Kudumba Vilakku* (The Light of the Home). The free verse of Balvantrai Kalyanrai Thakore (1869–1952) and the modernity of Umashankar Joshi (1911–1988) set trends in Gujrati poetry. The new poetry in Marathi began with the *Kabi Kavita* of B. S. Mardhekar (1909–1956). Namdev Dhasal (b. 1946) wrote about the Dalit (untouchables).

Samad Mir (1894–1959) continued the Sufi mystic tradition in Kashmiri poetry in the twentieth century. The psyche of a woman confined by orthodoxy and the trauma of partition is superbly depicted in the writings of the Punjabi poet Amtira Pritam (b. 1917).

Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) was the greatest Urdu poet of the Indian subcontinent in modern times. Left-leaning ideology is marked in the poetry of other Urdu poets such as Faiz Ahmad Faiz (1911–1984), Jan Nishar Akhtar (1914–1979), and Ali Sardar Jafri (1913). Romanticism, or *Chayavad*, became the hallmark of Hindi poetry, evident in the writings of Suryakant Tripathi (1899–1961), Sumitranandan Pant (1900–1977), Jaishankar Prasad (1889–1937), Mahadevi Verma (1907–1987), and others. Sachchidananda Hirananda Vatsyayana (1911–1987) triggered the new trend in Hindi poetry known as *Nai Kavita* (new poetry movement), known earlier as *prayogvad*, which searched for new values. Raghuvir Sahay (1929–1990) dealt with the problems of women with a rare sensitivity. Sri Aurobindo (1872–1950), Sarojini Naidu (1879–1949), Nissim Ezekiel (b. 1924), A. K. Ramanujan (1929–1993), Kamala Das (1934), Dom Moraes (b. 1938), and Vikram Seth (b. 1952) are among India's poets writing in English.

Modern Indian poetry found its place in world literature by adopting new styles, keeping in tune with various contemporary trends, portraying the problems of society, and retaining its own uniqueness. An emphasis on realism and concern for individuals are hallmarks of Indian poetry. Although Indian poets write in many different languages, poetry, like other art, is a unifying force. Indian poetry expresses shared Indian feelings and ideas.

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See also: **Literature, Bengali; Literature—India; Literature, Sanskrit**

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POETRY—IRAQ One way of dealing with Iraqi poetry is to speak of it in terms of both history and cultural dynamics. Premodern poetry (1258–1920) begins with the invasion of Baghdad by the Mongols. The era of postindependence poetry starts with the end of British colonial rule in 1920. The modern era finds its origins in the free verse poets of the 1940s.

Premodern Poetry

After the fall of Baghdad to the Mongol Hulagu Khan, who ransacked the Muslim capital in 1258, Iraqi literature suffered greatly until the late nineteenth century. Aside from Safi al-Deen al-Hilli (d. 1349), there were no major figures before the late emergence of ‘Abd al-Ghaffar al-Akhras (1804–1874), Musa al-Talaqani (1814–1880), Haydar al-Hilli (Hillah, 1827–1887), ‘Abd al-Ghani Jamil (1780–1863), and, a little later, Muhammad Sa‘id al-Habubi (d. 1915).

With the exception of the latter, the tendency among the premodern poets is toward classical themes and techniques of poetry. They wrote panegyrics, elegies, and satire along with poetry of wit and religious benedictions. Their contribution lies, however, in bringing back to the desolate cultural scene some exuberance and life, endowing it not only with rhetorical embellishments and poetic resonance but also with some politics of engagement. Haydar al-Hilli built on tradition, but he paved the way for further innovation. ‘Abd al-Ghani Jamil, on the other hand, voiced political opposition against foreign occupation and misuse of people, their lands, and resources. He targeted the Ottomans, and his poetry offers a political record of the struggle for national independence. Yet the real contribution to innovation came from the faqih (theologian) and sheikh Muhammad Sa‘id al-Habubi. He practiced every mode of poetry and wrote elegant and secular *murwashshabat* (strophic songs in colloquial language) on wine and love, which surprised his students at the religious schools and made many speculate on the sheikh’s career. Witty and eloquent, the sheikh made it clear that he wrote within a convention irrespective of moral constraints. He wrote no political verse despite the fact that he led, in 1914, an army of followers against the British forces near the Shu‘ayiba, south of Iraq, where he was wounded and later died.

Postindependence Poetry

Muhammad Sa‘id al-Habubi’s poetic practice within a new understanding of the sacred and the profane can serve as a bridge to the second or postindependence stage in Iraqi poetry. This is marked by an upsurge of national poetics and free manipulation of

themes and techniques that only fall short of the culminating innovative stance of the late 1940s, usually associated with the free-verse movement. The known figures of the national period were also poets of major caliber in the history of Iraqi cultural life.

Living through the disintegration of the Ottoman empire and the British occupation after the World War I, these poets were aware of their national agenda. Their registers vary, but all responded to the spirit of the times as well as the national needs and aspirations of the Iraqis. They were a postwar generation, but they were also strongly committed to national issues. Thus, Ma‘ruf al-Rusafi (1875–1945) was opposed to the British and to the so-called independence mandated by the British (1920–1958). He defied the installation of a king brought from outside the country and wrote openly in that direction. He called for freedom of expression, parliamentary elections, and genuine democracy. Gertrude Bell, the British press secretary in Baghdad, censored his poetry, but he continued writing in defiance of the British and their puppet regime. His themes and concerns touch also on emancipation of women, equal opportunities for all, and reform at large.

His counterpart was Jamil Sidqi al-Zahawi (1863–1936), whose concerns were mainly social and scientific. He thought of poetry as an appropriate medium for the discussion of scientific discovery, biological evolution, and other issues, which had never been thought of as poetic subjects. He practiced strophic poetry, and although he believed strongly in the need to go beyond classical tenets of composition, his poetry never went beyond classical meters and their variants.

Both Ali al-Sharqi (1890–1964) and Ahmed al-Safi al-Najafi (1897–1977) brought a new spirit to Iraqi poetry. The latter was no less committed to national issues than his immediate predecessor al-Rusafi, but his poetry speaks more of exile, nostalgia, and love. Al-Sharqi brought into Iraqi poetry refined elegance and smooth eloquence and is more tuned to modernism. He was distinguished, too, for his urban sensibility that goes beyond the limitations of oratory and classical composition. But the whole postindependence poetry movement is culminated in Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri (1900/1903–1997). Writing and reciting poetry in the classical mode, and attuned to experimentation in images, al-Jawahiri fits well, nevertheless, in the early Iraqi style of Abu al-Tayyib al-Mutanabbi (d. 965). Al-Jawahiri’s political concerns involved him in a struggle not only against the British and their puppet regime but also against national regimes since 1958. His political career and his poetics endear him to a large audience in Iraq

and the Arab world. But his poetry is known for its variety, as he treads in love, wine, nostalgia, and exile. Indeed, al-Jawahiri posed a real challenge to the innovators of the free-verse movement, for his spontaneity and eloquence could not be challenged or surpassed.

Modern Poetry

The free-verse movement of the late 1940s, which spanned the Arab world, has its originators in Iraq. Nazik al-Mala'ikah (b. 1923) was the pioneer, as she explains in her book *Qadaya al-Shi'r al-Mu'asir* (Issues in Contemporary Poetry).

In pace with the Arab world's complex postwar situation, poets recognized the limits of conventional poetics. On the other hand, they were in touch with Anglo-American and Russian culture. The modernist trend worldwide drew attention to their ancient culture with its regeneration myths. Poets like Badr Shakir al-Sayyab (1926–1964), 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Bayati (1926–1999), and Nazik al-Mala'ikah practiced new forms and delved into new and surprising themes. Poets like Hussein Mardan (1927–1972) might flout tradition and morality in a Baudelairean fashion, celebrating vagrancy and vice, but others had agendas of great political and social commitment. The regeneration myth received attention in the 1950s, but disillusionment in the 1960s drove poets to identify with Christ, Islamic martyrs, and exiles and victims of repression and occupation. Poetry since the 1960s tends to manage its lineage through textual affiliation with forebears in a poetic tradition that goes back to the tenth century. There is a selective engagement with the works of the past, which are drawn on to help the poet find a sense of identity. The issue at hand is to come out with a stratagem that identifies the new poet's position obliquely, while examining tradition with a critical and discriminating sense. The outcome brings the past and the present in focus, with the new poet creating from the voices of the past a unified new voice and perspective.

Mushin Jassim al-Musawi

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POETRY JAPAN According to legend, the first poem in Japan was spoken by the god Susanoo no

Mikoto when he built his palace in the land of Izumo. In his preface to the *Kokinwakashu* (c. 905), the first imperial anthology of poetry written in Japanese, the poet Ki no Tsurayuki (d. c. 945) also dates poetry to the age of the gods. This essay emphasizes written poetry and covers primitive song, court poetry, renga and haikai, and modern verse.

Primitive Song

In the early eighth century Japanese primitive songs were taken down from the words of reciters (*kataribe*) and also preserved as prayers in Shinto ceremonies. The earliest songs have no fixed prosody, that is, no set number of syllables and no regular alternation of long and short lines. These songs celebrate the daily lives of the early Japanese and reflect themes of love, work, awe and respect for nature, victory in battle, reverence, and praise.

One of the earliest written sources of Japanese song is the *Kojiki* (Record of Ancient Matters, c. 712). The *Kojiki* was compiled and presented to the Empress Gemmei (reigned 707–715) by O no Yasumaro (d. 723) in the Nara period (710–794). Although the *Kojiki* was commissioned to give the imperial house added legitimacy in an account of its divine origins, it also preserves a number of *uta* (poems or songs), mostly on the theme of love.

Japanese primitive song also was preserved in the form of ancient ritual prayers (*norito-goto*), divinely imparted magic words spoken in a sacred place. Primitive *norito* were thought to have been the words of the Shinto gods and spirits (*kami*). With the development of court ritual, however, they became prayers from men spoken in worship of the gods, that is, as prayers of petition, mystical and powerful incantations, and blessings to insure longevity.

By the mid-seventh century, Japanese poetry had come to be composed in a pattern of alternating five- and seven-syllable phrases. In the seventh and eighth centuries, the two major forms of verse were the *choka* or *nagauta* (long poem) and the *tanka* (short poem), both of which were considered to be *waka* ("Japanese" poetry as distinct from Chinese poetry). The *choka* was made up of an indefinite number of pairs of five- and seven-syllable lines, ending with an additional seven-syllable line, while the *tanka* had just thirty-one syllables in the pattern 5-7-5-7-7. In later ages the word *waka* was used to denote this form only, for the *choka*, although well represented in the oldest extant poetry anthology, the *Man'yoshu* (c. 759), waned during the Nara period, leaving *tanka* the normative form of Japanese verse.

Court Poetry

In the late ninth century Emperor Daigo (reigned 897–930 CE) ordered four poets, including Ki no Tsurayuki, to compile the *Kokinwakashū* (Collection of Ancient and Modern Poems), or *Kokinshū*. In his preface, Tsurayuki wrote what is regarded as the first statement on poetics in Japanese literature: A good poem should achieve a balance between *kotoba* (words) and *kokoro* (heart), a critical standard representing an ideal of balance between content and form that was borrowed from the Chinese *Shijing* (Classic of Poetry, eighth–sixth centuries BCE). In the Heian period (794–1185) all refined people wrote poetry; indeed, it was a major mode of discourse. Tsurayuki and the other compilers of the *Kokinshū* lauded a style of poetry characterized by elegance and refined diction—a style that remained popular into the late twelfth century. The aesthetic ideals of the period included *aware* (sensitivity to the sadness of things), *miyabi* (courtliness), and *en* (luxuriant beauty).

Poetry was composed for formal occasions, such as for court observances and poetry matches, but poems were also exchanged informally between acquaintances, and an exchange of poems was a requisite of courtship. As men and women seldom saw each other face to face, poems passed to one another by intermediaries served as a way to become acquainted. Once an affair was embarked upon, poems were used to seek and give reassurance, to berate the beloved for his or her fickleness, and to express sorrow and regret when the affair drew to a close. Female poets were as highly regarded as male poets during this era; among the most famous are Izumi Shikibu (975?–1035?), Akazome Emon (flourished 976–1041), Murasaki Shikibu (d. 1014?), and Sei Shonagon (965?–1017?).

Near the end of Heian period (794–1185) *shakkyōka*, or Buddhist poetry, came to be accepted as an official theme of court poetry. *Shakkyōka* are based on the sutras, texts, doctrines, ceremonies, and rituals of Buddhism. Buddhist thought and practice permeated the lives of Heian aristocrats and deeply influenced court ritual and observance as well as the writing of poems. Buddhist monks and nuns sought to define the relationship between *waka* composition and religious life. A reconciliation between the way of poetry (*kado*) and the way of Buddhism (*butsudo*) was found in the idea of *kechien*, a force to which a person is connected and which will bring about his or her enlightenment. Thus the proximity of one's poetry to the teachings of the Buddha was thought to create a connection between poet, poetry, and Buddhism. *Shakkyōka* sequences are found primarily in the imperial anthologies of poetry dating from the *Gosbuisshū*

(1086) through the *Shinkokinshū* (1216), and in private and personal anthologies of the Heian and Kamakura (1185–1333) periods.

Renga and Haikai

Renga, or linked verse, were known even in the days of the *Kojiki*, when two people would participate in the creation of one *tanka*, one person composing the first seventeen-syllable *kami no ku* (the 5-7-5 portion), and the other composing the remaining fourteen-syllable *shimo no ku* (the 7-7 portion). From the end of the twelfth century it became a popular pastime for groups of people to compose extended *renga* (5-7-5, 7-7, 5-7-5, 7-7, and on and on), and during the fourteenth century the form became highly refined, governed by increasingly complicated rules regarding subject matter and vocabulary. Among the most famous *renga* masters were the monks Shinkei (1406–1475) and Sogi (1421–1502).

In response to the high seriousness of *renga*, *haikai* *no renga*, or *haikai*, developed: its form was the same, but the subject matter was much broader, including not only such elegant topics as the moon and cherry blossoms but also everyday inconveniences such as fleas and lice.

In both *renga* and *haikai*, the opening verse, or *hokku* (first verse), was especially important. The undisputed master of the *hokku* is Matsuo Bashō (1644–1694). In the modern era, the poet Masaoka Shiki (1867–1902) coined the term "haiku" to refer to verses composed in this form (5-7-5) but abandoned the linked verse concept as outdated; the word haiku was then applied retroactively to the *hokku* of Bashō.

In his poetry, Bashō is less concerned with what people are doing and feeling than with the world of nature as it reflects the nature of truth. He attempts to penetrate the essence of a thing, a practice central to Chan/Zen Buddhism. These elements are clear in the following *hokku* from Bashō's travel diary *Oku no Hosomichi* (*The Narrow Road to the Deep North*).

Silence—
the cicada sound
penetrates the rocks.

(Translation by Lea Millay)

Other poets known for their composition of *hokku* are Yosa Buson (1716–1783) and Kobayashi Issa (1763–1827).

Modern Poetry

With the opening of Japan to the West in the 1850s, and increased contact after the Meiji Restoration of

1868, Japanese poets became exposed to the poetic traditions of Europe. In response to that exposure, literary critics began to call for similar poetry in Japanese. The first collection of modern poetry, *Shintaishi-sho* (Selection of Poems in the New Style), was published in 1882. As the *shintaishi* developed into *gendaishi* (modern-style verse) over the next several decades it was particularly influenced by the French symbolists and made use of vernacular Japanese (traditional poetry was still composed in classical Japanese, which the spoken language had long since grown away from).

Not all the poets of the Meiji period (1868–1912) embraced Western influence. Some poets, such as Masaoka Shiki and Yosano Akiko (1878–1942) sought successfully to revitalize traditional Japanese verse forms. *Waka* saw a further spectacular resurgence of popularity in the 1980s, when Tawara Machi (b. 1963), a schoolteacher in her twenties, published *Sarada Kinenbi* (Salad Anniversary), an anthology of *waka* that mixed classical locutions and modern situations to express the age-old themes of lost love and regret. Like generations of Japanese poets before her, Tawara Machi creates slender verses that have a powerful effect completely disproportional to their length.

S. Lea Millay

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POETRY—KOREA The history of poetry in Korea is long and varied, with different genres prevailing in the different political and cultural periods. Throughout much of Korea's history, writers of poetry tended to be of the aristocratic class, government officials for whom the ability to write poetry was an indication of their upbringing and their ability to serve their nation well. Folk beliefs, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Western thought have all, in turn, exerted a strong influence on Korean poetry.

Korean traditional poetry on the whole can be characterized as being centered on the self, through which the reader can relate to his or her own experiences and proceed to discover their universality. Because of its Buddhist and Confucian underpinnings, Korean poetry tended to be transcendent, seeking the ultimate in freedom, liberation, and wisdom. The subject matter tended to be concrete objects or events—a gnarled pine, spring rain, night on the river—and written spontaneously. Traditional poetry also tended to be related to nature and to deal with it conceptually. With roots reaching back to ancient animism, something in nature was not viewed merely as a physical object but rather as a medium through which a universal essence could be captured. This romance with nature remains embodied in the poetry of today.

Poetry in Chinese

The oldest form of poetry written in Korea and that with the greatest longevity is *hanshi* (poems in Chinese). *Hanshi* dates back to at least the Three Kingdoms period (first century BCE–seventh century CE) when King Yuri (reigned 19 BCE–18 CE) of the Koguryo kingdom (37 BCE–668 CE) is recorded as having written such poems, and the genre survived into the early twentieth century. As the Korean language at the time had no script of its own, Chinese characters as well as Chinese syntax was employed in writing *hanshi*, as it was for Korean in general. Unlike its

Chinese cousin, which consisted of five or seven characters per foot, Korean *hanshi* generally consisted of four. As only the upper class was schooled in Chinese characters and the art of writing them with ink brushes, *hanshi* and all other types of early Korean poetry did not reach beyond the aristocracy. The rich content of *hanshi* was recited by chanting, and common subjects were scenic views, love, and loyalty as well as self-reflection and self-ridicule.

Shilla Poetry

The first uniquely Korean poetic form to appear was the *hyangga* songs of the Shilla period (57 BCE–935 CE). Two dozen remaining works from the mid-sixth to late ninth centuries are four-line, eight-line, and ten-line poems. The four-line poems tend to resemble folk ballads, whereas the ten-line poems have a more highly developed structure of three parts of four, four, and two lines. The extant eight- and ten-line *hyangga* were composed for memorial and other ceremonial use. They were written by Buddhist priests and by warriors of the elite *hwarang* youth troops and were sung instead of merely recited. Contributing to the distinctness of *hyangga* is that while they were written in Chinese characters, at times the characters were employed only for their meaning, being pronounced instead with the synonymous native Korean word. At other times, characters are used merely for their pronunciation, their original meaning discarded to substitute for Korean syntactic particles and connectives. Unlike *hanshi*, which was written in Chinese syntax, *hyangga* was sung purely in the Korean language of the period.

Koryo Songs

Koryo kayo (Koryo songs) gradually replaced *hyangga* as the Koryo dynasty (918–1392) took over rule from Shilla. Also referred to as *changga* (long songs), they differed from *hyangga* in that they were longer, with a freer, less disciplined form, and were daringly direct in nature. *Koryo kayo* were transmitted orally throughout the entirety of the Koryo period, not written down until well into the fifteenth century. A new poetic form was introduced into the later *Koryo kayo* of the thirteenth through sixteenth centuries that became known as *pyolgok* (special tunes). The extended form of *pyolgok* consisted of numerous stanzas, and they were referred to as *kyonggi* songs. They were based on the Chinese characters and Chinese classics of the aristocracy and reflected Confucian thought. The short-form *pyolgok*, on the other hand, structure the entire piece into a single stanza. Disparagingly referred to as *sogyo* (commoner's ditty) by the aristocratic class for not

conforming to their Confucian norms, they nevertheless contained a subtlety and delicacy to their lyrics.

Choson Verse

The creation of a phonetic alphabet for Korean in 1446 signaled a boon for the writing of poetry in the Choson dynasty (1392–1910). Although *shijo* (tunes of the times) had their beginnings in the late Koryo period, it was in the fifteenth century that the genre began to flourish and did so for five hundred years. These short, witty epigrams expressing a single thought or observation became the first truly Korean vernacular verse and had a greater influence on modern poetic form than any other Korean verse form. The basic form of *shijo*, *pyong-shijo*, consists of three lines of fourteen to sixteen syllables with each line divided into four feet of three to four syllables each. The two variations of the basic form are *os-shiji*, which has a slightly extended first or second line, and *sasol-shijo*, in which the first two lines are highly extended and the third line less so.

Characteristic of classical *shijo* is a sensibility expressed through the simplicity of unadorned emotion. They deal with a wide range of subjects including love, sorrow, the virtue of a life of hardship, the delights of nature, and human existence. The first of the great *shijo* poets, the controversial bureaucrat Chong Chol (1536–1593), expresses great sensitivity and a desire for self-perfection in *Rain on a Lotus Leaf*:

A sudden shower
spatters a lotus leaf,
But I cannot find
the track of water.
I wish my heart was like that leaf,
that nothing ever stained it.

(O'Rourke 1982: 21)

Characteristic of modern *shijo* is that each work is titled, they are relatively free in form and quite commonly break the rules of versification, they are intended to be read as opposed to listened to, and they favor the use of sensitive expression and metaphor.

With the appearance of the Korean alphabet, a new vernacular verse genre, *kasa*, emerged. Like the *Koryo kayo* before it, a *kasa* was meant to be sung. It has the form of four feet per line with three or four syllables to each line and no limit on the number of lines. *Kasa* can be characterized as a hybrid of musical verse and prose, as an essay set to rhythm. During the early part of the Choson period, *kasa*, like concurrently popular *shijo*, was written by aristocrats, but in the later Choson period,

commoners began to compose *kasa* and it was enjoyed by both classes. Recurring *kasa* themes include contemplation of nature for spiritual enlightenment, gentlemanly virtues, and the metaphor of male-female love to express the sovereign-subject loyalty relationship. The *kasa* of the late Choson period tended to be longer in length and more prosaic in nature.

Modern Poetry

The opening of Korea at the end of the Choson period saw an influx of Western ideas that had enormous ramifications for all aspects of society and culture, including the formation of a new and modern poetry. Both the adoption of free verse and the reconstruction of the traditional folk ballad, especially by Kim Sowol (1902–1934), set the foundations for modern Korean poetry in the 1930s. The poetry of the late 1920s and early 1930s, led by Chong Chi-yong (b. 1903), was steeped in imagery, representing Korea's first experimentation with modernism. The poetry of the late 1930s and early 1940s, the harshest years of the Japanese colonial period (1910–1945), captured the emotions of the people in their plight. Yun Tong-ju (1917–1945) succinctly captures this in *The Sorrowful Race*:

White towels are wrapped around black heads,
White rubber shoes are hung on rough feet.

White blouses and skirts cloak sorrowful frames,
And white belts tightly tie gaunt waists.

(Shaffer 1999: 26)

After liberation in 1945 and the ravages of the Korean War (1950–1953), much of the most acclaimed poetry has dealt with the excesses of political power and the plight of the oppressed. Most noted for their works in this area are Shin Kyoung-rim (b. 1936), Ko Un (b. 1933), and Kim Chi-ha (b. 1941). Probably most highly regarded of Korean's modern poets is the prolific So Chong-ju (1915–2000), who took Korean myth, legend, and historical anecdote and crafted them into masterpieces. While the popularity of poetry seems on the wane in much of the world, it enjoys great popularity among the people of Korea.

David E. Shaffer

See also: **Literature—Korea; So Chong-ju; Yi Kyu-bo; Yun Son-do**

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POETRY—PHILIPPINES

The history of Philippine poetry can be described in four major literary periods: precolonial (before 1521), Spanish colonial (1521–1898), U.S. colonial (1898–1946), and contemporary (1946–present). A strong indigenous oral tradition is interwoven with the Spanish and U.S. colonial influences of culture and language. Poetry has been written in Tagalog (the national language) and in the eighty-seven regional dialects, as well as in the Castilian Spanish of Miguel de Cervantes and Lope de Vega and the American English of Walt Whitman and Mark Twain.

Precolonial Poetry

An indigenous oral tradition of *bugtong* (riddles) and *sawikain* (proverbs) played a central part of community life in villages of precolonial Philippines. Short four-line poems called *tanaga* evolved from this oral tradition. Each line contained seven or eight syllables, and at the heart of the poem was a cryptic metaphor called a *talingbaga*. Popular folk musical verse was divided into several categories: the *diona*, *talindao*, and *ait* (songs sung at home); *indolanin* and *dolayanin* (street songs); *hila*, *soliranin*, and *manigpasin* (rowing songs); *boloborlo* and *oyayi* (cradle songs); *ombayi* (songs of sadness); *omiguig* (songs of tenderness); *tagumpay* (triumphant songs); *dopayanin* (boat songs); *biliriao* (drinking songs); and *diona* (wedding songs). Through

these verses the local history, politics, and culture were passed from generation to generation. The most skilled poets would memorize epic cycles that took two to four days to recite during all-night dramatic performances. Two examples of precolonial epics that survive today are *Biag ni Lam-ang* (Legend of Lam-ang) in Ilocano (a northern Luzon dialect) and *Ibalon* in Bicol (a southern Luzon dialect).

Poetry in the Spanish Colonial Period

With the arrival of the Spanish colonizers Ferdinand Magellan (1521) and Miguel Lopez de Legazpi (1571) came priests and their tradition of European Catholicism. *Satanas* (Satan) first appeared in Tagalog poetry, and the Christian themes of sin, guilt, and retribution became central concerns of the native population. In 1610, Tomas Pinpin, a Filipino poet working for the Dominican printing press in Bataan (a town outside Manila), wrote a book entitled *Librong Pagaaralan nang manga Tagalog nang Uicang Castila* (A Book in Which Tagalogs May Study the Spanish Language). In this book Pinpin inserted six *awit* that had alternating Spanish and Tagalog lines. This type of bilingual poetry was written by a group called the Ladino Poets.

Metrical romances called *awit* or *korido* were also popular with the literary crowds. The most influential Tagalog romance of the period was the politically cryptic *Florante at Laura* (Florante and Laura; 1838), written by Francisco Baltazar, also known as Balagtas (1788–1862). The first book of poetry written in Spanish by a Filipino was *Sampaguitas y Poesias Varias* (Sampaguitas and Other Poems; 1880) by Pedro Paterno (1858–1911), which was printed in Spain. Paterno, Marcelo H. Del Pilar (1850–1896), Jose Rizal (1861–1896), and Isabelo De Los Reyes (1864–1918) were literary and political figures called *Ilustrados* (enlightened ones) who were living in Madrid and working to attain political freedom for the natives back in the Philippines. The first Filipino female poet to attain outside recognition was Leona Florentino (1849–1884), whose poems were exhibited in the Exposition Filipina in 1887 in Madrid and in the 1889 Exposition Internationale in Paris.

Poetry in the U.S. Colonial Period

In 1898, the U.S. president William McKinley (1843–1901) announced that it was the United States' moral duty to take possession of the Philippine Islands because the Filipinos had to be civilized, educated, and Christianized. After U.S. soldiers "pacified" the native population during the Philippine-American War (1899–1902), thousands of U.S. teachers were sent throughout the archipelago to teach the Filipinos the

English language. In just a few years, English became the privileged form of expression for poets, prose writers, and dramatists.

The earliest Filipino poems written in English were published in 1905 in Berkeley, California, in *The Filipino Students' Magazine*, which was edited by *pensionados* (Philippine-American government scholars). The first book of poetry written in English, *Azucena* (1925) by Marcelo De Gracia Concepcion (1895–1954), was published in the United States by G. P. Putnam's Sons. The most influential Filipino poet, Jose Garcia Villa (1908–1997), lived most of his adult life in New York City. His books are *Have Come, Am Here* (Viking Press, 1942), *Volume Two* (New Directions, 1949), and *Selected Poems and New* (McDowell, Obolensky, 1958). Another early immigrant Filipino poet was Carlos Bulosan (1911–1956), who published political poems in American magazines like *The New Yorker*, *Poetry* (edited by Harriet Monroe) and *Saturday Evening Post*. In Manila in 1940, the Commonwealth Literary Prize in English poetry was given to Rafael Zulueta Da Costa (1915–1990) for *Like the Molave and Other Poems*. Native themes were well represented by such local poets as Fernando Ma Guerrero (1873–1929), Lope K. Santos (1879–1965), Jose Corazon De Jesus (1896–1932), Amado V. Hernandez (1903–1970), Alejandro G. Abadilla (1904–1969), Angela Manalang Gloria (1907–1999), and Trinidad Tarrosa Subido (1912–1993).

Contemporary Poetry

The declaration of formal independence from the United States on 4 July 1946 brought a sense of a new beginning to the people and poets of the Philippines. A generation of poets who studied at the famed Iowa Writer's Workshop at the University of Iowa in the 1950s—Bienvenido N. Santos (1911–1996), Ricaredo Demetillo (1920–1998), Dominador I. Ilio (b. 1913), and Edith Tiempo (b. 1919)—came back to the Philippines with the literary ideals of the American New Criticism. The 1970s and 1980s proved to be a politically aware era for Filipino poets, who were writing under the censorship of the dictatorial regime of Ferdinand Marcos (1965–1986). As a reaction to the 1983 assassination of Benigno Aquino, Jr., a leading anti-Marcos politician, several poets formed a literary organization called PLAC (Philippine Literary Arts Council) to protest the abuses of the government. One of its leading founders was Alfred A. Yuson (b. 1945), whose neorealist books of poems are *Dream of Knives* (1986) and *Trading in Mermaids* (1993). Current trends in Filipino poetry are best exemplified by the pyrotechnic imagination of Eileen R. Tabios (b. 1960), whose book of poetry *Beyond Life Sentences* (1998) won

the National Book Award given by the Manila Book Critics Circle. Her poems incorporate the American precision of Marianne Moore, the experimental *joie de vivre* of Paul Valéry, and the imagistic intensity of Pablo Neruda.

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POETRY—VIETNAM Chinese chronicles trace the mythic origin of the Vietnamese to a union between a dragon king from the watery south and an immortal fairy queen from the mountainous north some four thousand years ago. Vietnam's history of poetic activity may be as ancient, based on the rich musicality of the Vietnamese language with its six tones and an age-old love of folk song that endures in modern Vietnamese culture. By the end of the tenth century CE, literary intelligentsia influenced by Chinese poetics developed a written poetic tradition in *chu Han* (Chinese script). By the fifteenth century, a demotic form of Vietnamese writing known as *chu nom*, or *nom*, became popular, fostering poetic license to alter strict Chinese metrical patterns to suit Vietnamese language and folk song forms. *Chu Han* and *nom* poems persisted until French colonization (1859–1945), when *quoc ngu* (romanized Vietnamese) gradually superseded these two scripts. *Quoc ngu* eventually enabled many poets, who had also become enamored of French romanticism, to discard any restrictive residue of Chinese poetics and create new experimental forms of poetry. During the thirty years of struggle for independence (1945–1975), poets split over ideological differences as the country became divided into North and South. After reunification in 1975, poets and writers were strongly encouraged to compose verse in *quoc ngu* with themes complementary to socialist realism. In the early 2000s, poetic freedom of expression remains somewhat circumscribed in Vietnam.

Folk Songs (*ca-dao*)

Vietnam's rich oral tradition of folk poetry, *ca-dao* (unaccompanied songs), is the lyrical expression of peasants and village folk. While most *ca-dao* were orally transmitted over generations, it is possible that literati who remained close to rural life composed *ca-dao* anonymously. Sometimes bawdy in content, often playful and irreverent, these folk songs ironically reflect social inequities and the vicissitudes of life, village customs and mores, romantic love, and the splendor of Vietnam's landscape. Since folk songs are closely attuned to Vietnamese tastes and feelings, they are even used in schools for teaching children geography, history, and other subjects. Parts of well-known folk songs also can be included in more formal poems. The importance of *ca-dao* in Vietnamese culture was recognized by Nguyen Van-Ngoc, who compiled the first systematic collection, *Tuc-ngu phong-dao* (Proverbs and Folk songs) in 1928.

Folk songs are found in a wide range of forms, from two-syllable to six- and eight-syllable verse using both medial and final rhymes, and rules for tone harmony give the verse a musical quality. The most popular form is *luc-bat* (six-eight) meter in which the first line has six syllables and the second line eight syllables. These couplets can be expanded into long verse narratives (*truyen nom*), as in *The Tale of Kieu*. *Luc-bat* couplets and narrative verse alike follow a rhyme scheme such that the final syllable of the first line rhymes with the sixth syllable of the second line, and the eighth syllable (the final syllable) of the second line rhymes with the sixth syllable of the third line, and so forth.

Traditional Poetry (*tho cu*)

Vietnam was essentially a province of China from 111 BCE to 939 CE. By the end of the tenth century, the art of composing classical Chinese verse became one of the most highly regarded activities of the Vietnamese literati. Ultimately, the Ly dynasty (1009–1225) officially mandated that classical Chinese be used for education and governmental business. By adopting China's Neo-Confucian traditions, the Ly monarchs may have hoped to forestall further Chinese domination. These adopted Chinese traditions included the Song dynasty (960–1267)–style civil-service examinations, requiring knowledge of Chinese poetry and the ability to compose it. Once integrated into the civil-service examination system, verse writing in classical Chinese became a major concern of Vietnamese scholars, a concern that persisted until the traditional examination system was abolished in 1918.

Chinese classical poetry was governed by strict rules prescribing the number of lines, tone harmony,

rhyming patterns, and parallelism of words, phrases, and sentences. It was typically based upon Chinese Tang-dynasty (618–907 CE) metrical rules for seven-syllable octets. The popular *bat cu* form has eight lines, each consisting of seven monosyllabic words. The caesura is always after the fourth word. The tone of each word is fixed and the rhyme is the same pattern throughout the poem. The first two lines form an introduction, the last two a conclusion. The subject matter, imagery, and language of classical verse also were formalized, circumscribing the poet's ability to express much spontaneous emotion. Nevertheless, some Vietnamese scholar-poets developed this Chinese style of traditional poetry into their own distinctive genre by incorporating indigenous imagery and imparting a dynamic quality to their poems.

Some of the first recorded classical poems in Chinese were by Vietnamese Buddhist monks and reflect religious themes, such as the transitory nature of the world and the aesthetics of solitude. Poems by the literati, such as Truong Han-Sieu (d. 1354), and Chu (Van) An (1292–1370), explored a variety of subjects, including patriotism, the importance of moral virtues, filial piety and loyalty to the king, and the joys and sorrows of life, including romantic love. During the Late Le dynasty (1428–1788) this genre was promoted by the poet-monarch Le Thanh-Tong (1460–1497), who established the Tao Dan group, which was known for developing a new style of classical poetry (*vinh-su*) to praise historical events. Both monks and scholars continued to use classical Chinese for regulated verse and prose, but by the Early Le dynasty (980–1009) they may also have written in *nom* to compose eight-line stanzas or long narratives in the native *luc-bat* meter or its variants.

Chu Nom ("southern writing"), or *Nom* is the term for native or demotic characters created from the Chinese ideographs. *Nom* graphs were used for their phonetic and semantic value; sometimes they were used only as indicators of the semantic meaning of a Vietnamese word or its pronunciation. This novel script may have been created by the time Sino-Vietnamese pronunciation became established, around the eleventh century. It was already widely used under the Tran dynasty (1225–1400). Very little Vietnamese *nom* poetry has survived from prior to the time of Nguyen Trai (1388–1442), who edited some important *nom* texts, including *Quoc-am thi-tap* (Collected Poems in National Language). During the Tran and Late Le dynasties, writers in *nom* wrote reflective poems about the intrigues and artificiality of court life, or eulogies on nature in which a sense of peace and authenticity was sought.

Verse in *nom* achieved its height in the eighteenth century. The most popular of the *nom* narratives is *The Tale of Kieu* (*Truyen Kieu* or *Kim Van Kieu*), by Nguyen Du (1765–1820). It is a romantic tale of tragic karmic consequences, admired for its pathos and lyrical beauty. Other well-known long lyrical poems from this period include *Cung oan ngam khuc* (A Royal Concubine's Complaint) by On Nhu Hau (1741–1798), lamenting the fate of a beautiful concubine trapped in a restrictive palace culture, and *Chinh-phu ngam* (Lament of a Warrior's Bride) by the female poet Doan Thi-Diem (1705–1746), depicting the tragedy of a forlorn wife waiting in vain for her husband to return from war.

Both *chu Han* and *nom* were utilized by some poets well into the twentieth century, but ultimately they were superseded by the popularity of poetry in *quoc ngu* (romanized script). Classical poets like Nguyen Khuyen (1835–1909) and Tran Te Xuong (1870–1907), who lived at the end of the nineteenth century, were sad to see their traditional world disintegrate as rapid changes wrought by French occupation transformed Vietnamese society. During this era the poets Nguyen Dinh-Chieu (1822–1888) and Bui Huu-Nghia (1807–1872) wrote patriotic verse in resistance to French colonization, and the scholar and poet Phan Chau-Trinh (1872–1926) was imprisoned for this patriotism. Chu Manh Trinh (1862–1905) and Duong Khue (1839–1902) wrote defeatist verse, while Tran Te-Xuong (1870–1907) created satirical poetry about corrupt bureaucrats. Other poets simply retired in disgust from colonial office to live a reclusive existence.

Modern Poetry

The establishment of the French presence in Vietnam by the end of the nineteenth century caused both economic and social upheavals. During the colonial period (1862–1945), books in Chinese were gradually superseded by those in *nom* and then in *quoc ngu*, codified by a Jesuit missionary, Alexandre de Rhodes (1591–1660), in 1651. This vernacular script was used predominantly in Catholic circles until colonial bureaucrats promoted it to the non-Catholic press and encouraged French colonials living in Vietnam to read Vietnamese in *quoc ngu*. After 1920, the explosion of *quoc ngu* newspapers provided a popular venue for the publication of a new type of Vietnamese poetry.

By 1932 a new type of verse launched by the poet Phan Khoi (1887–1958)—inspired by French romanticism, realism, and the alienation caused by a rapidly changing colonial society—became progressively more important. This New Poetry (*tho moi*), popularized by

Nguyen Khac-Hieu (1888–1939), was written without restrictions on rhyming pattern, line length, or emotional expression. From 1932 to 1940, the New Poetry movement revolved around young poets following master poet The-Lu (1906–1989), assisted by the literary group Tu-Luc Van Doan ("Self-Reliance") and their periodical titled *Phong-boa*, which published the poems. These young poets, from the urban middle class, reflected a sense of failed individualism, melancholy, and alienation as second-class colonial citizens in their own country. During the 1930s, they became preoccupied with an important debate about the use of poetry: the "art for art's sake" or "art for the sake of life" controversy. French influence was strongest in the south, where poets completely rejected rhyme for assonance and adopted new techniques, such as enjambement, alliteration, and caesura. Some poets continued to write in the classical forms as well.

From 1940, poets drifted in different ideological directions as nationalism developed in reaction to the colonial policies of the Vichy regime in France and the subsequent defeat of Japan in World War II. Some accomplished poets, such as Huy-Can (b. 1919), and To-Huu (b. 1920), became deeply involved in the quest for independence. Poets in the north, who had been part of the New Poetry movement in the 1930s, shifted from a 1930s style of romantic, alienated individualism or a 1940s style of rural realism to a more ideologically relevant socialist realism. Xuan Dieu (1917–1985) and like-minded northern poets became involved in the Literary Association for National Salvation and used poetry to reform the thoughts of local soldiers and cadres. Meanwhile, poets in the south retained more French influence and continued to write free verse dealing with a wider spectrum of subjects and experimental forms. Ideological differences were exacerbated by the partition of Vietnam at the seventeenth parallel in 1954.

Following the partition, there were two distinct directions for poetry: socialist realism in the north and the deepening development of New Poetry in the south. Northern poets who continued to protest against the ideological direction of socialist realism were soon silenced by the political dictum of "art for the sake of life," while poets in the south remained adamant about "art for the sake of art." Northern poet Che Lan-Vien (1920–1988) wrote unsympathetically of an unreformed northern poet shipped off to a work camp: "What good is all that futile verse that flows like water / And does not serve the people so much as a single bowl of rice?" (translated by Neil Jamieson).

Many poets in the south, such as Thanh Tm Tuyen (b. 1936) and Nguyen Sa (b. 1930), who had fled the

north in their childhood, continued to develop the New Poetry style. Female poets such as Nguyen Thi Hoang (b. 1939) became more prominent during the 1960s. She wrote of the pain and conflict of Saigon's youth in a poem titled "Confession" (1963): "my misery knows no bounds. / Night after night I strain to listen to the vespers / While agonizing over a hundred lonely griefs" (translation by Nguyen Dinh Tuyen). During the 1960s and 1970s, as the entire country became progressively engulfed in a bitter civil war with American involvement, poets on both sides took the tragedy of war as the subject of their poetry.

When Vietnam was reunified under Communist control in 1975, southern poetry written between 1954 and 1975 was harshly suppressed. Poets in the former Republic of Vietnam fled the country, unwilling to be restricted to writing in a style of socialist realism. Those who could not escape were sent to reeducation camps. In reaction to his forced imprisonment, Ha Thuc Sinh penned the following lines: "Do not die, Poetry / When I need you so much! / Be like a sharp knife / That I may yet have a weapon to fight the enemy" (translated by James Banerian).

Vietnamese poetry in the early 2000s is a highly regarded genre. Bookstalls selling miniature pocket-size collections of both traditional and modern poetry can be found along the bustling roads of any major city. Poetry continues to be published in journals and newspapers by poets usually aligned with specific writers' associations situated in Hanoi, Hue, or Ho Chi Minh City. Poems continue to be recited at gatherings of friends, and folk songs continue to be sung by peasants for their pleasure. After so many years of writing in the style of socialist realism, poets may enjoy a wider but still limited freedom of expression with the new *doi moi* (renovation) policy implemented in 1986.

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See also: Chu Nom; Ho Xuan Huong; Literature—Vietnam; Tu Luc Van Doan; Sino-Vietnamese Culture

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POJAGI *Pojagi*, or *po*, are Korean cloths (most often silk or ramie) used to cover, store, or carry items. They range in size, color, and design depending on function. Most commonly, they are square or rectangular so the opposite corners can be tied together to hold their contents securely.

Pojagi have long been a part of Korean culture but flourished in the Choson dynasty (1392–1910). They are still prevalent today for formal gift-giving, storage, and as a practical alternative to shopping bags in an environmentally conscious society. Some of the most common forms of *pojagi* are the table *po* (*sangpo*) to cover food, blanket *po* (*ibulpo*) to store bedding, and everyday *pojagi* to carry items.

Most *pojagi* are of patchwork design, allowing for thrifty use of fabric remnants, and are also highly artistic in their use of color and design. They often incorporate bright colors and geometric patterns. There are embroidered *pojagi* (*supo*) bearing floral motifs for more formal uses.

The *pojagi* for wedding rituals are double-faced in blue and red, the two traditional wedding colors. Two varieties include the bridal chest *po* (*hampo*) and ceremonial present *po* (*yedanpo*) to wrap gifts between the bride and groom's families, respectively.

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POL POT (1925–1998), leader of Khmer Rouge guerrillas of Cambodia. Saloth Sar, as Pol Pot was originally named, lived comfortably as a child with his father (a prosperous landowner), along with his brother, sister, and female cousin, under the protection of King Sisowath and King Monivong of Cambodia. For a time Saloth Sar lived in the royal palace, where he witnessed the feudalistic practices, including his sister and cousin's becoming royal consorts, experiences that might have affected his later political thinking.

Because of his family's status, Saloth Sar attended several French-language schools (a privilege afforded few Cambodians) but failed to earn a high school diploma. He subsequently lived in a Buddhist monastery as a novice monk for a few months.

In 1949 Saloth Sar's fluency in French and his family's political connections earned him a scholarship to study in France, but there he neglected academics to study left-wing politics. As a result, he was forced to return to Cambodia when he failed his exams, shortly after joining the French Communist Party in 1952. Before returning, however, he spent time in Yugoslavia working in a labor battalion.

After Cambodia's independence Saloth Sar led a double life, teaching in a private school in Phnom Penh (1954–1963) and commanding the country's Communist Party. In 1965 he visited China and was inspired by the Cultural Revolution, which he saw as a meaningful revolutionary model. Supported by Chinese officials, he returned to Cambodia and spent the



One of the few photos of Pol Pot hangs in the Tuoi Sieng Museum in Phnom Penh, which had been a Khmer Rouge prison and torture center. (PABLO SAN JUAN/CORBIS)

next four years refining the radically utopian ideology he was to practice as Pol Pot.

After Cambodia's ruler Prince Norodom Sihanouk was overthrown in a pro-American coup in 1970, the Khmer Rouge (Cambodian Reds, or Communists)—a term the prince derisively applied to Pol Pot's rebels—waged guerrilla warfare against the Cambodian army. Intensive U.S. bombing of the Cambodian countryside no doubt increased the popularity of the Khmer Rouge. Eventually occupying the capital of Phnom Penh in April 1975, the guerrillas forced the city's 2 million residents—and those of other towns—into the countryside within two days to work in agricultural communes. During the next four years, nearly 2 million people were murdered or died horribly from overwork, disease, or starvation, as Pol Pot brutally took Cambodia back to "Year Zero," in the process destroying the country's economy and society.

In 1979 the Vietnamese entered Cambodia and drove the Khmer Rouge from power, but for nearly two decades Pol Pot and his army hid in the jungles of Thailand and northern Cambodia and terrorized the Vietnamese-dominated Cambodian government and the local population. Soldiers led by Ta Mok, his former comrade, arrested Pol Pot in 1997 after he had ordered some subordinates killed. On 15 April 1998, while listening to the Voice of America, Pol Pot learned that Ta Mok intended to deliver him to an international tribunal for trial. Before midnight he was dead, allegedly from heart failure, though some suspect suicide or even murder.

Greg Ringer

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POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, UNOFFICIAL—CHINA

When individuals or groups become active in the family, at work, and in clubs, the economy, or politics in order to achieve or influence certain aims in public life, such actions can be called political participation. China's traditional political culture allowed the vast majority of the population only a small degree of formal participation. Confucianism defined duties (to the ruler, to the state, to the family), but no rights. Independent political institutions and parallel power structures were always suppressed. One exception was the concept of the Mandate of Heaven, which permitted people to rebel in order to depose an incompetent ruler, should the state be in political, economic, and social decline. Locally, self-governing villages and communities enjoyed a relatively large degree of autonomy. Clans, kinship groups, secret societies, temple organizations, guilds, and regional groupings organized their own social spheres. Also, the assertion of interests against those

of state and bureaucracy happened informally through connections, corruption, negotiation, and strategy.

Political Participation before 1949

Toward the end of the empire (1912) and during the republic (1912–1927), the basis for a legal system with laws and law courts began to develop, and political parties, professional organizations, literary and artistic circles, and mass media emerged. At the beginning of the 1930s, there were attempts to introduce general elections for the offices of heads of villages or communities. The strengthening of authoritarian structures between 1912 and 1949 limited the development of a civil society largely autonomous of the state, which could have led to democratic forms of participation.

Communist Control of Political Participation

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) initially allowed alternative forms of political participation in the regions it controlled. After the founding of the People's Republic (1949), however, the CCP monopolized political and public life. Calls for freedom of speech and participation in politics were soon put to an end (for example, Mao Zedong's Hundred Flowers Campaign, a brief period of open criticism of the government, which was ended in 1957). As obvious dissatisfaction with the CCP and its structures became apparent, critics were arrested as right-wingers and punished. From then on, such movements were subject to stronger political and ideological control.

Mao's "mass line" was supposed to be the central instrument for the articulation of people's interests and participation in society. In theory it involved consultations between the population (mainly farmers) and functionaries, with the aim of adapting the party's politics to the actual situation. However, the decisive partner in these consultation processes was always the CCP, which gathered and then interpreted the opinion of the masses according to its own aims and ideas. It sought the people's support, not their participation.

The CCP launched political campaigns in which the masses were to be mobilized to help reach economic or political aims. Divergent opinions or new forms of organizations were tolerated only as long as they echoed the aims of the dominant opinion in the political elite. Mass mobilization was carried out by the party leadership and was supervised by the political elite. The participation mechanisms promoted by the CCP (criticism and self-criticism, wall news sheets, ideological study groups) tended to become ritualized and were more a means of social control than of fostering political participation.

Political Participation in the Era of Reform

Social pluralization in the course of China's reform policies since 1979 has opened up possibilities for more social involvement. New and existing social groups that were not represented in the CCP (private entrepreneurs, professional groups, migrant workers, ethnic minorities, and religious groups) have sought economic, social, and political participation and the creation of channels for the expression and pursuit of their interests. This is true for both formal and informal structures. Formal participation can take place both in the CCP and outside it: in the mass organizations (unions, Communist Youth League, Women's Federation, People's Militia), in the so-called Political Consultative Conferences, in non-Communist parties, and in many new associations and clubs. Such associations articulate interests; that is, they produce social input that influences political decision-making processes. The increasing separation between the public and private spheres and the state's retreat from many areas of society give these associations more room to maneuver, widen their autonomy, and create and articulate a social counterweight to state actions, all of which provide more space for direct participation. This is also true for elections at county, township, or village level, which were institutionalized and subject to new laws in the first half of the 1980s. Particularly at village level, the village-leadership elections may lead to a type of grassroots democracy, although until now these elections have often taken place in only modified or limited form.

Informal Political Participation

At the informal level, the creation or use of *guanxi* ("personal connections") can be used to influence decisions or push interests. *Guanxi* function through networks, patronage, bribes and other forms of corruption, and nepotism. They are a permissible means of seeking compromises and negotiating interests as long as they do not disrupt the political framework set up by the CCP. The informal level also includes illegal forms of political participation, such as organizing illegal demonstrations or strikes, refusing to pay taxes, or forming illegal interest groups (trade unions, secret societies, underground churches, regional groups).

Additionally, a kind of regionalism is developing in the form of increased regional and local autonomy based on economic practices. In areas with strong local economies, local interests are prioritized over state interests. Communities report lower than actual profits in order to pay fewer taxes and use the money for local development, or they turn to protectionism (im-

port or export bans for products to or from other provinces) to safeguard their own markets. This regional autonomy can also include negotiating how much income tax must be passed on to the central government, developing independent foreign trade in goods and currency, or deviating from central policies. These phenomena are a kind of regional participation, because they lead to more involvement in decisions in the interests of the region or the community, even if they are in the form of deviation from official policies.

Such informal patterns make it clear that participation and decision-making structures in China cannot be explained by the analysis of formal channels only. Where there are few opportunities for formal participation, informal means of advancing particular interests also exist.

In order to implement its policies and widen its popular support, the CCP has been trying to include more people and groups in discussion and consultation processes. Interest groups, which had not been integrated into existing structures or which were outside official discourse, have furthered this attempt to widen participation. The discourse is limited in the sense that those involved have to accept the political system and the leadership of the CCP. However, groups that in the past had no means of expressing their needs and desires now have the opportunity to articulate their interests.

Collective Action by Social Groups

China's peasant population has made use of specific forms of protest behavior that are highly effective. Protest activities include supplying falsified (reduced) harvest figures; claiming that the amount of cultivable land is less than it really is and that income is lower than it really is; giving the worst-quality products to the state; refusing to cooperate with state directives; engaging in tax evasion, negligence, and theft or destruction of state property; and organizing informal interest groups. This kind of everyday resistance, which can be seen as political participation and articulation of interests by the weakest in society, can in the long term lead to political changes because of its high social and economic costs. In societies where there is no other way to express dissatisfaction, such behavior is the peasants' only means of resistance.

One example of such collective action was taken at the end of the 1970s. Due to stagnation and poverty, farmers in poor areas spontaneously began to divide collectively held land among themselves and to return to family-run farming. The economic success of these measures led to the CCP's approving them as "agri-

cultural reform," which was then implemented across the whole country. In this case, collective action initiated political change. It provided the solution for economic difficulties and was therefore approved by members of the Party leadership.

Finally, at the level of the individual, means of political participation include *guanxi* networks and bribery. Gift giving, hospitality, bonuses, and "donations" from entrepreneurs to functionaries are all means by which individuals attempt to gain a voice in political decision making.

Although direct participation in Chinese power structures is still dependent on membership in the CCP, political power and political influence do not stem only from membership in the party. Today China's people have more and more opportunity to voice their interests and to participate in the political life of the nation outside the CCP and formal structures.

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See also: **Guanxi; Social Associations—China**

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POLO, MARCO (1254–1324), Venetian trader and explorer. Marco Polo, born into a Venetian trading family with Eurasian connections, went along with family members overland to Mongol China, where he spent some seventeen years (1275–1292) and may have held some official position. He traveled extensively (mostly by sea), and finally returned to Italy in 1295. Shortly thereafter, while a prisoner of war of the Genoese, he dictated his memoirs to a fellow prisoner who also happened to be a writer of romances, and who may have embellished what he heard considerably. There also exist several alternative versions in a variety of languages (the original was in Old French), which vary considerably in detail and in overall coverage. In any case, the memoirs were an immediate sensation, and few books have been more translated or have had as great an impact upon the European imagination as have Marco Polo's travels.

Marco Polo's Impressions of Mongol China

During Marco Polo's time, most of Eurasia was divided up among various competing khanates, successors to a unified Mongol empire. The largest was Mongol China, which included a substantial part of Central Asia as well as what is now China. Marco Polo's account naturally contains extensive information about it since he spent most of his time there. What most impressed him, besides daily life at the exotic court of Kubilai Khan (1215–1294), was the sheer wealth of much of the society that he saw. He makes this clear in his description of the former Song dynasty capital

of Hangzhou (called Kinsay, from a Song term designating its status as a "temporary" capital after the Song loss of northern China). According to Marco, the sheer well-being of the inhabitants and level of economic activity there—in its many markets, for example, frequented daily by more people than lived in any Italian city—was almost beyond belief. It was Marco Polo's descriptions of the wealth of the East, above all, that drew European attentions during the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Age of Exploration, when Marco Polo's book was required reading for anyone interested in the East, including Columbus.

Marco Polo's Other Travels

In addition to China, Marco or his family visited the other khanates of the Mongolian world, including the Golden Horde, which ruled Russia, the Russian steppe, the Volga basin, and associated areas; the Il-Khanate of Iran, through which young Marco traveled on the way to China and by which he returned; and the domains of the Chagatai house in Turkistan, also crossed during Polo's outbound journey. He also heard of, or personally touched on, a great many other areas as well. For example, in some official capacity, he not only visited southwest China and Yunnan, an area which had only recently been made a part of China by Mongol conquest, but also Burma, invaded several times by the Mongols. He left behind as a result a valuable first-hand account that is the earliest detailed European notice of the area. He was also the first European writer to mention Japan, although he did not visit it. Before



A miniature painting from Maudeville's *Book of Marvels* shows Marco Polo before Kubilai Khan. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

returning to Europe, Marco Polo not only visited Manzi, or south China, but also sailed through insular southeast Asia, including Java, the Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf, then made a final return lap through Il-Khanate domains, the empire of Trebizond (on the southeastern shores of the Black Sea), and Byzantium.

Legend and Folklore in Marco Polo's Memoirs

In addition to providing often quite accurate factual information about the countries that he visited, Marco Polo's memoirs are a treasure trove of legend. They speak at length of Prester John, the supposed Christian king of the East whose realm was a primary target of early explorers in later centuries. He also repeats many interesting travelers' tales about various superstitions associated with the deserts of Central Asia. There is, for example, the Island of Women, one of a pair of mythical islands divided by sex, or the Dry Tree that had stood since ancient times in an immense plain. Some of the travelers' tales, like that of the Dry Tree, were of great antiquity and for that reason are of great interest to folklorists.

In all of this, perhaps the most valuable information of all is Marco Polo's independent testimony on how Mongol China actually worked. Like the Persian historian Rashid ad-Din (1247–1318), he describes a regime more Mongolian than Chinese, one in which Khubilai and his court moved with the seasons in the traditional Mongolian way and engaged in typical Mongolian occupations while doing so, including much-loved hunting.

Marco Polo and Revisionist History

Marco Polo's descriptions of China and other parts have always seemed a little larger than life to some, and of late there has been a major effort to discredit him. Marco Polo's book does have its problems, but this effort is largely based upon a misappraisal of the environment he describes. It was not very Chinese, but if Marco preserves a Turkic nickname for a Chinese city, this was because he lived in a heavily Turkicized environment. Similarly, if he was thinking in Persian much of the time, this is also only to be expected given the dominance of Persian culture at the Mongol court.

Paul D. Buell

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POLONNARUVA Polonnaruwa was an ancient Sri Lankan capital that became a residence of Ceylon's kings in the fourth century CE and flourished owing to its proximity to the Mahaweli River and its location on the route to southern Sri Lanka, east of the central highlands. It became a second capital in the eighth century and succeeded Anuradhapura as the sole capital after the destruction of that city in 993. The invading Cholas made Polonnaruwa their capital, as did the Sinhalese who overthrew them. The city reached its height under King Parakramabahu I (reigned 1153–1186), who built a walled city containing extensive gardens, monastic and temple complexes, and many monuments in brick and stone, all watered by a vast man-made lake. It was deserted in the thirteenth century after a series of invasions and the spread of malaria drove the political centers to the coasts. The ruins of monuments built by the Cholas and Parakramabahu I are well preserved. A modern town arose in the twentieth century after the restoration of the ancient irrigation reservoirs and the suppression of malaria. It has become a major tourist destination and in 1982 was named to the UNESCO World Heritage List.

Patrick Peebles

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PONDICHERRY (2001 pop. 808,000). The union territory of Pondicherry consists of the former French settlements of Pondicherry, Karaikal, Mahe, and Yanam, which lie scattered in South India. These were transferred to the Indian Union in 1954. The capital, Pondicherry, lies on the southeastern coast of India. It is bounded on the east by the Bay of Bengal and on the other three sides by the state of Tamil Nadu. Karaikal is situated on the east coast, about 150 kilometers south of Pondicherry. Mahe lies on the west-

ern coast and is surrounded by the state of Kerala, while Yanam is situated on the East Godavari district of Andhra Pradesh.

Nearly 45 percent of the people in Pondicherry are engaged in agriculture. Food crops include rice, millet, and pulses, while sugarcane, peanuts, and cotton are the major cash crops. Modern industries have also come up in Pondicherry. The principal industries include textiles, computers, electronic goods, biopolymers, pharmaceuticals, leather goods, and a range of consumer products.

The capital Pondicherry had been the headquarters of the French colonies in India since the seventeenth century and has a rich French cultural heritage. The French Boulevard Town, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, and Auroville Museum are some places of interest to tourists.

Sanjukta Das Gupta

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PORCELAIN—EAST ASIA Porcelain (ceramic ware made with kaolin, a fine white clay) was first made in China around 850 CE during the Tang dynasty (618–907). An Islamic traveler who had visited China in 851 described clay vessels that looked to him like glass. There is available evidence that fine white stoneware (pottery made from high-firing clay other than kaolin) was being made in China as long ago as 1400 BCE, and Chinese potters appear to have been acquainted with kaolin in the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). The forerunner of the modern-day porcelain was not made until the Tang dynasty, several centuries later. This Tang-dynasty porcelain is known as hard-paste or true porcelain. It was produced by mixing kaolin, which is formed by the decay of feldspar, a chief constituent of granite, together with petuntse, a form of feldspar found only in China. Kaolin is the essential ingredient for the manufacture of porcelain. It is found throughout the world and known for its white firing characteristics (that is, the fact that the finished product appears white rather than gray or brown or rust-colored) and high fusion temperature (that is, the high heat required to turn the constituent ingredients into porcelain). Chemically, kaolin comprises kaolinite, muscovite, quartz, feldspar, and anastase. Kaolin and petuntse are fused together by firing in a kiln, first at 980°C, then dipped in glaze and refired at a higher

temperature of about 1300°C. Petuntse is responsible for binding the clay particles together and giving porcelain its translucency. The high temperatures used in the firings in the kiln vitrify the ceramic body; that is, they give it its glassy characteristics.

Some of the most beautiful Chinese porcelain wares were made during the Song dynasty (960–1279), including eggshell porcelain, which was thinner and more translucent than previously manufactured porcelain. Ding ware, which was produced in northeastern China, has a molded design which is emphasized by its typical ivory-colored glaze. There were two other types of porcelain that were produced during the Song dynasty, although slightly later. These were the Longchuan and Jingbai wares. The Longchuan wares were near-white ceramic bodies under a bluish-green translucent glaze (celadon) reminiscent of green jade, a favorite stone among the Chinese. This ware showed to great advantage the incised or molded decoration of the period. Jingbai ware, made in Jiangxi (which eventually became the center of Chinese porcelain manufacture), was delicately formed. It was distinguished by a pale blue glaze with decorations of incised flowers and foliage.

Porcelain was not widely made in China until the Yuan dynasty (1297–1368). It was also only at this time that the Chinese started to use a kaolin-based compound to produce a material that when fired in the kiln at very high temperatures turned both white and translucent.

The Spread of Porcelain to Europe

Porcelain's origins in China led to it being called "china." China was first brought to Europe in the twelfth century; Portuguese traders began importing it in the sixteenth. Sometime between then and the beginnings of porcelain manufacture in Europe in the late eighteenth century, the Portuguese introduced the name "porcelain." Today, the terms *china* and *porcelain* are used interchangeably. The only clear effort to delineate between china and porcelain is to use *china* to refer to figurines and items for use with meals. Porcelain, on the other hand, is taken to be a broader term that has been applied to a wider range of products. So reference is made to a tea set that is made from either china or porcelain, but the material used to make a toilet is porcelain.

The Chinese technique for manufacturing porcelain remained a secret. During the medieval period, Europeans, whose appetite for the aesthetic beauty of kaolin clay seemed insatiable, tried experimenting with various materials in the hope of discovering the Chinese formula; it was not discovered until the early

eighteenth century. In the meantime, China exported its porcelain wares, especially its blue and white ware (porcelain decorated with cobalt-blue designs under a clear glaze) in ever increasing quantities, beginning in the sixteenth century. Such exports were conducted largely through the British and Dutch East India Companies. By 1700, there was a vast trade in porcelain. The wares of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) were particularly prized.

Ming-Dynasty and Qing-Dynasty Ware

Ming potters paid more attention to painted designs and less to the forms of the wares. There was great success with the production of the blue and white wares. During the reign (1505–1521) of the Zhengde emperor (1491–1521), wares with a yellow ground were made when the art of fusing enamels or colored glass onto the surface of the glaze was perfected.

The well-known center for porcelain manufacture, Jingdezhen (in Jiangxi), reached its peak during the reign of the great Qing emperor Kangxi (1654–1722, reigned 1661–1722). This center produced numerous wares for the use of the court as well as large quantities of porcelain to satisfy the demands of the European market. Wares of exceptional beauty would be produced to commemorate the birthdays of emperors. Especially popular during the reign of Kangxi was *famille verte*, wares in which various shades of green predominate. Then a black enamel background was used, giving rise to the name *famille noire* and later the *famille rose* that included a range of rose pink enamels. These wares were popular during the reign (1726–1795) of the Qianlong emperor (1711–1795), the grandson of the Kangxi emperor. Most of the enamel was then added in Guangzhou (Canton), which was the primary trading port.

Japanese Porcelain

True porcelain was made in Japan only after the early part of the seventeenth century. Only then were the necessary clay materials discovered in Hizen. The Japanese used a purple-toned underglaze blue (that is, a blue underglaze design) on a grayish-colored ceramic body. The later wares from Japan that were popular in Europe were painted in rich vermilion and other colors and decorated with a profusion of flowers together with gilding. This decorative style was known as Imari, which was the name of the seaport from which these porcelains from Arita were being shipped.

Some of the finest porcelain created in Japan is decorated in Kakiemon style. This style is named after a family of potters in Arita who were credited with having introduced, during the middle of the seventeenth

century, the use of enamel painting in soft reds, greenish-blue, turquoise, yellow, and the occasional underglaze blue.

Korean Porcelain

Much early Korean porcelain, such as that of the twelfth century, has been found to be so like the Chinese Ding ware that it is difficult to distinguish. Collectors consider Korean wares far more delicate and elegant than the Chinese, at least in the forms. The techniques for making Korean celadon (manufactured during the Koryo dynasty, 918–1392) were later lost, but recent research has come close to discovering the lost techniques.

Ooi Giok Ling

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POROS (c. fourth century BCE), ruler in the Punjab. Poros is the classical Greek name of a ruler in the Punjab (northwestern India) who was also called Parvataka. His kingdom lay between the Jhelum and the Chenab Rivers. In 326 BCE, instead of submitting to Alexander of Macedon as his neighbors in Taxila had, Poros fought a remarkable battle, which Alexander found to be one of the toughest he had ever undertaken. The Punjabi's strategy was to form a square with his slow-moving infantry, longbow archers, and war elephants. However, his forces were no match for the faster and more mobile Greek cavalry, especially as Alexander had trained his troops to counter elephants. Though he was wounded and beaten, Poros did not flee from the battlefield. Alexander was so impressed with the king's personality that he befriended Poros and reinstated him in his kingdom, perhaps even increasing its territory. After Alexander departed from India, the Punjab was liberated from the Greek thrall by Chandragupta Maurya. Poros's role in the liberation is unknown.

Paul Hockings

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PORTUGUESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA In the fifteenth century, Spain and Portugal, as both formal allies and trading rivals, began to circumnavigate

the globe to seek out new lands to expand trading networks and to spread Catholicism. A papal edict of 1493 divided the "New World" (or non-European world) between Spain and Portugal. This edict had assumed that the world was flat, but the circumnavigation of the globe by Ferdinand Magellan (c. 1480–1521) in 1521 led to the 1529 Treaty of Saragossa to divide Asia. The treaty gave the Spanish a free hand in the Philippines, while the Portuguese had sole rights to the islands that now form Indonesia.

Growth of Portuguese Control

Arab traders dominated the lucrative trade from the spice-producing islands of what is now Indonesia. Portugal, a small and somewhat poor nation, excelled at seafaring. The skilled Portuguese navigator Vasco da Gama (c. 1460–1524) arrived on India's southwest coast, at Calicut (Calcutta), in 1498. Da Gama was followed by Afonso de Albuquerque (1453–1515), appointed viceroy of India in 1509, who established a number of imperial possessions for Portugal. The Portuguese established a series of strategic ports and small territories in western Africa, Arabia, and southern and eastern Asia to control the trading routes to the Spice Islands of what is now Indonesia. The aim of the Portuguese was to secure key ports rather than to conquer territory. By the sixteenth century the Portuguese sphere of influence included African, Arabian, and South Asian ports as well as North Sumatra, Melaka, Bantam (West Java), Manado (North Sulawesi, Indonesia), parts of Maluku, Ambon, and the island of Timor in maritime Southeast Asia, and Macao and Taiwan in East Asia. Trading posts were also set up, with permission from local potentates, in Ayutthaya (a kingdom in what is now Thailand), Cambodia, and Myanmar (Burma). A crucial event was the capture of Melaka, the strategic Malayan trading city that lies on the all-important Strait of Malacca, in 1511. Control of Melaka gave Lisbon a monopoly on the spice trade to Europe. When Albuquerque finally captured it, his troops slaughtered the local Muslim population, while the sultan fled to Johor, where he rallied his forces for a counterattack. Until the arrival of the Spanish in the Philippines in 1564, the Portuguese were without European rivals in the region.

Portugal used a series of "factories" (handling posts) to process the raw commodities and used naval power to dominate the trading routes, although they never gained complete hegemony. However, the spice was tremendously lucrative, with the value of the trade in the sixteenth century being worth several times the entire revenue collected in Portugal itself. The Portuguese discovered that there was little that Southeast

Asians wished to buy from Europe, but there were commodities they wanted from elsewhere. Thus the trading network that linked the various parts of Africa, Arabia, and Asia enriched the Portuguese middlemen, who took the profits back to Portugal: ivory and gold from Africa, textiles from India, spice from Indonesia, and manufactured goods from China.

Limitations and Decline of Portuguese Control

The spread of Portuguese religion and culture was, on the whole, far less successful. The rough and often violent behavior of the Portuguese sojourners left a very poor impression on the peoples of Southeast Asia, vast numbers of whom had adopted the Islam of Arab and Indian traders. The peoples of the Malay Peninsula and the Spice Islands favored trading with their coreligionists in the Middle East. For the Portuguese forces, occupation of their Southeast Asian possessions was hazardous, with fifteen major assaults by sultans in Johor, Aceh, and Java between 1513 and 1616. The Portuguese had also adopted the regular tactic of piracy against Muslim vessels, in the name of Christianity, which helped to undermine any pretensions to legitimacy they might have had. Opposition to the Portuguese solidified the power of emerging sultanates of neighboring areas that, hitherto, had only nominal control over the people in whose name they governed. The Portuguese also began to suffer severe domestic problems, in part because of the tremendous loss of men in the colonies due to conflict, piracy, and disease. The Dutch, on their arrival in the region in the seventeenth century, were able to displace the Portuguese in their key strongholds, notably by conquering Melaka in 1641. The Portuguese withdrew gradually from almost all of their ports but were able to hold the eastern part of Timor, creating the separate territory of East Timor.

One Portuguese legacy was the adoption of new words into Bahasa (Malay), particularly for new technologies of the time, which are still in use to this day. There is a smattering of Portuguese surnames around Southeast Asia, particularly in Melaka, denoting the descendants of marriages between Portuguese sailors and local women, which were quite common in colonial times.

Anthony L. Smith

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Volume 5
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Survey of Asia's Regions and Nations



The *Encyclopedia of Modern Asia* covers thirty-three nations in depth and also the Caucasus and Siberia. We have divided Asia into five major subregions and assigned the thirty-three nations to each.

West and Southwest Asia

The West Asian nations covered in detail here are Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. Afghanistan and Pakistan form Southwest Asia, although in some classifications they are placed in Central and South Asia, respectively. Afghanistan, on the crossroads of civilizations for thousands of years, is especially difficult to classify and displays features typical of Central, West, and South Asia.

Despite diversity in language (Persian in Iran, Arabic in Iraq, Turkish in Turkey) form of government (theocracy in Iran, dictatorship in Iraq, and unstable democracy in Turkey) and international ties (Iran to the Islamic world, Iraq to the Arab Middle East, Turkey to the West), there are several sources of unity across West Asia. Perhaps the oldest is geographical location as the site of transportation routes between Europe and Central, East, and South Asia. Since ancient times, people, goods, wealth, and ideas have flowed across the region. In 2002 the flow of oil was most important, from the wells of Iran and Iraq through the pipelines of Turkey. Another source of unity is Sunni Islam, a major feature of life since the seventh century, although Iran is mainly the minority Shi'a tradition and there have long been Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian, and Baha'i minorities in the region. Diversity is also evident in the fact that Turkey is a "secular" state while Iran is a theocracy, and in the conflict between fundamentalist and mainstream Islam in all the nations.

Another important common thread is the shared historical experience of being part of the Ottoman Empire and having to cope with British and Russian designs on their territory and, more recently, American influence. And, in the twentieth century, all three nations have sought to deal with the Kurdish minority and its demands for a Kurdish state to be established on land taken from all three nations.

Unity across Afghanistan and Pakistan is created by adherence to Sunni Islam (although there is a Shi'ite minority in Afghanistan) and the prominence of the Pash-tun ethnic group in each nation. Both nations also experienced British colonialism, although the long-term British influence is more notable in Pakistan, which had been

tied to India under British rule. West Asia is the only region in the world never colonized by Britain, although some experts argue that it did experience significant British cultural influence. In all nations resistance to external control—British, Russian, or United States—is another common historical experience.

Across the region (although less so in Afghanistan) is the stark contrast between the traditional culture and the modernity of liberation from imperial rule, still not complete across the region. This contrast is apparent in clothing styles, manners, architecture, recreation, marriage practices, and many elements of daily life.

In 2002 all the nations faced a water crisis of both too little water and water pollution. They all also faced issues of economic and social development, including reducing external debt, controlling inflation, reducing unemployment, improving education and health care, and continually reacting to the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, which exacerbates many of these problems. The governments also faced the difficult task of solving these problems while resisting Americanization and also while controlling internal political unrest. Political unrest is often tied to efforts at creating democratic governments and the persistence of elite collaboration with tyrannical governments.

Central Asia

Central Asia is known by many names, including Eurasia, Middle Asia, and Inner Asia. At its core, the region is composed of five states that became independent nations following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Scholars sometimes include Afghanistan, Mongolia and the Xinjiang province of China within the label Central Asia. For this project, Central Asia is restricted to the five former Soviet countries, while Afghanistan is classified in Southwest Asia, and Mongolia and Xinjiang as part of East Asia. These states have a shared landmass of 1.5 million square miles, about one-half the size of the United States.

The region's unity comes from a shared history and religion. Central Asia saw two cultural and economic traditions blossom and intermix along the famed Silk Road: nomadic and sedentary. Nomadic herdsman, organized into kinship groupings of clans, lived beside sedentary farmers and oasis city dwellers. Four of the countries share Turkic roots, while the Tajiks are of Indo-European descent, linguistically related to the Iranians. While still recognizable today, this shared heritage has developed into distinct ethnic communities.

The peoples of Central Asia have seen centuries of invasion, notably the legendary Mongol leader Genghis Khan in the thirteenth century, the Russians in the nineteenth and the Soviets in the twentieth century. For better or worse, each invader left behind markers of their presence: the Arabs introduced Islam in the seventh century. Today Islam is the predominant religion in the region, and most Central Asians are Sunni Muslims. The Russians brought the mixed legacy of modernism, including an educated populace, alarming infant mortality rates, strong economic and political participation by women, high agricultural development, and environmental disasters such as the shrinking of the Aral Sea. It was under Russian colonialism that distinct ethno-national boundaries were created to divide the people of the region. These divisions largely shape the contemporary Central Asian landscape.

Today the five Central Asian nations face similar challenges: building robust economies, developing stable, democratic governments, and integrating themselves into the regional and international communities as independent states. They come to these challenges with varied resources: Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have rich oil reserves; several countries have extensive mineral deposits; and the Fergana Valley is but one example of the region's rich agricultural regions.

Finally, the tragic events of September 11, 2001, cast world attention on Afghanistan's neighbors in Central Asia. The "war on terrorism" forged new alliances and offered a mix of political pressure and economic support for the nations' leaders to suppress their countries' internal fundamentalist Muslim movements.

Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia is conventionally defined as that subregion of Asia consisting of the eleven nation-states of Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Myanmar is sometimes alternatively classified as part of South Asia and Vietnam as in East Asia. The region may be subdivided into Mainland Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam) and Insular Southeast Asia (Brunei, East Timor, Indonesia, Philippines, and Singapore). Malaysia is the one nation in the region that is located both on the mainland and islands, though ethnically it is more linked to the island nations of Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines.

Perhaps the key defining features for the region and those that are most widespread are the tropical monsoon climate, rich natural resources, and a way of life in rural areas based on cooperative wet-rice agriculture that goes back several thousand years. In the past unity was also created in various places by major civilizations, including those of Funan, Angkor, Pagan, Sukhothai, Majapahit, Srivijaya, Champa, Ayutthaya, and Melaka. Monarchies continue to be significant in several nation—Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand—today. Subregional unity has also been created since ancient times by the continued use of written languages, including Vietnamese, Thai, Lao, Khmer and the rich literary traditions associated with those languages.

The region can also be defined as being located between China and India and has been influenced by both, with Indian influence generally broader, deeper, and longer lasting, especially on the mainland, except for Vietnam and Singapore, where influences from China have been more important. Islamic influence is also present in all eleven of the Southeast Asian nations. Culturally, Southeast Asia is notable for the central importance of the family, religion (mainly Buddhism and Islam), and aesthetics in daily life and national consciousness.

In the post–World War II Cold War era, there was a lack of regional unity. Some nations, such as Indonesia under Sukarno, were leaders of the nonaligned nations. Countries such as Thailand and the Philippines joined the U.S. side in the Cold War by being part of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). A move toward greater unity was achieved with the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, with the founding members being Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Subsequently other Southeast Asian nations joined ASEAN (Brunei, 1984; Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam 1997; Cambodia 1999). As of 2002, communism was still the system in Laos and Vietnam and capitalism in Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, the Philippines Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Political, economic, and cultural cooperation is fostered by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), with headquarters in Jakarta, Indonesia. Economically, all the nations have attempted to move, although at different speeds and with different results, from a reliance on agriculture to an industrial or service-based economy. All nations also suffered in the Asian economic crisis beginning in July 1997.

Alongside these sources of similarity or unity that allow us to speak of Southeast Asia as a region is also considerable diversity. In the past religion, ethnicity, and diverse colonial experience (British, Dutch, French, American) were major sources of diversity. Today, the three major sources of diversity are religion, form of government, and level of economic development. Three nations (Indonesia, Malaysia,

Brunei) are predominately Islamic, five are mainly Buddhist (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar), two are mainly Christian (Philippines and East Timor), and Singapore is religiously heterogeneous. In addition, there is religious diversity within nations, as all these nations have sizeable and visible religious minorities and indigenous religions, in both traditional and syncretic forms, also remain important.

In terms of government, there is considerable variation: communism in Vietnam and Laos; state socialism in Myanmar; absolute monarchy in Brunei; evolving democracy in the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, and Indonesia; and authoritarian democracy in Malaysia and Singapore. The economic variation that exists among the nations and also across regions within nations is reflected in different levels of urbanization and economic development, with Singapore and Malaysia at one end of the spectrum and Laos and Cambodia at the other. Myanmar is economically underdeveloped, although it is urbanized, while Brunei is one of the wealthiest nations in the world but not very urbanized.

In 2002, Southeast Asia faced major environmental, political, economic, and health issues. All Southeast Asian nations suffer from serious environmental degradation, including water pollution, soil erosion, air pollution in and around cities, traffic congestion, and species extinctions. To a significant extent all these problems are the result of rapid industrial expansion and overexploitation of natural resources for international trade. The economic crisis has hampered efforts to address these issues and has threatened the economies of some nations, making them more dependent on international loans and assistance from nations such as Japan, Australia, and China. The persisting economic disparities between the rich and the poor are actually exacerbated by rapid economic growth. Related to poverty is the AIDS epidemic, which is especially serious in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Thailand and becoming more serious in Vietnam; in all these nations it associated with the commercial sex industry.

Politically, many Southeast Asian nations faced one or more threats to their stability. Political corruption, lack of transparency, and weak civic institutions are a problem to varying degrees in all the nations but are most severe in Indonesia, which faces threats to its sovereignty. Cambodia and Thailand face problems involving monarch succession, and several nations have had difficulty finding effective leaders. Myanmar's authoritarian rulers face a continual threat from the political opposition and from ethnic and religious separatists.

In addition, several nations faced continuing religious or ethnic-based conflicts that disrupt political stability and economic growth in some provinces. The major conflicts involve Muslim separatists in the southern Philippines, Muslims and Christians in some Indonesian islands and Aceh separatists in northern Sumatra, and Muslims and the Karen and other ethnic groups against the Burman government in Myanmar. Since the economic crisis of 1997, ethnic and religion-based conflict has intensified, as wealthier ethnic or religious minorities have increasingly been attacked by members of the dominant ethnic group. A related issue is the cultural and political future of indigenous peoples, including the so-called hill tribes of the mainland and horticulturalists and former hunter-gatherers of the islands.

In looking to the future, among the region's positive features are the following. First, there is Southeast Asia's strategic location between India and China, between Japan and Europe, and between Europe and Oceania. It stands in close proximity to the world's two most populous countries, China and India. Singapore, the centrally located port in Southeast Asia, is one of two major gateways to the dynamic Pacific Basin (the other is the Panama Canal). Second, there is the region's huge population and related economic market, with a total population approaching that of one half of China's. Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous nation. Third, there is enor-

mous tourist potential in sites and recreational locales such as Angkor Wat, Bali, Borobudur, Phuket, and Ha Long Bay. Fourth, there is the region's notable eclecticism in borrowing from the outside and resiliency in transcending tragedies such as experienced by Cambodia and Vietnam. Fifth, there is the region's significant economic potential: Southeast Asia may well have the world's highest-quality labor force relative to cost. And, sixth, there is the region's openness to new technologies and ideas, an important feature in the modern global community.

South Asia

South Asia is the easiest region to demarcate, as it is bounded by the Hindu Kush and Himalayan ranges to the north and the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea to the south. It contains the nation-states of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka and the more distant island nations of the Maldives and Mauritius. Myanmar and Pakistan, which are considered part of South Asia in some schemes, are here classified in Southeast Asia and Southwest Asia, respectively.

While the region is diverse economically, culturally, linguistically, and religiously, there is unity that, in some form, has existed for several thousand years. One source of unity is the historical influence of two major civilizations (Indus and Dravidian) and three major religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam). Regionally, Sikhism and Jainism have been of great importance. There is also considerable economic unity, as the majority of people continue to live by farming, with rice and especially wet-rice the primary crop. In addition, three-quarters of the people continue to live in rural, agricultural villages, although this has now become an important source of diversity, with clear distinctions between urban and rural life. A third source of unity is the caste system, which continues to define life for most people in the three mainland nations. Another source of unity is the nature and structure of society, which was heavily influenced by the several centuries of British rule. A final source of political unity in the twentieth century—although sometimes weakened by ethnic and religious differences—has been nationalism in each nation.

South Asia is diverse linguistically, ethnically, religiously, and economically. This diversity is most obvious in India, but exists in various forms in other nations, except for the isolated Maldives, which is the home of one ethnic group, the Divehi, who are Muslims and who have an economy based largely on tourism and fishing.

The dozens of languages of South Asia fall into four major families: Indo-European, Austroasiatic, Dravidian, and Tibeto-Burman and several cannot be classified at all. Because of its linguistic diversity, India is divided into "linguistic" states with Hindi and English serving as the national languages.

Hinduism is the dominant religion in South Asia, but India is the home also to Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism. India also has over 120 million Muslims and the world's largest Zoroastrian population (known in India as Parsis) and Bangladesh is a predominately Muslim nation. India also has about twenty-five million Christians and until recently India had several small but thriving Jewish communities. Nepal is mainly Hindu with a Buddhist minority, and Bhutan the reverse. Sri Lanka is mainly Theravada Buddhist with Hindu, Muslim, and Christian minorities. Mauritius, which has no indigenous population, is about 50 percent Hindu, with a large Christian and smaller Muslim and Buddhist minorities.

Linguistic and religious diversity is more than matched by social diversity. One classification suggests that the sociocultural groups of South Asia can be divided into four general and several subcategories: (1) castes (Hindu and Muslim); (2) modern urban classes (including laborers, non-Hindus, and the Westernized elite); (3) hill tribes of at least six types; and (4) peripatetics.

Economically, there are major distinctions between the rural poor and the urban middle class and elite, and also between the urban poor and urban middle class and elite. There are also significant wealth distinctions based on caste and gender, and a sizeable and wealthy Indian diaspora. There is political diversity as well, with India and Sri Lanka being democracies, Bangladesh shifting back and forth between Islamic democracy and military rule, the Maldives being an Islamic state, and Nepal and Bhutan being constitutional monarchies.

In 2002, South Asia faced several categories of issues. Among the most serious are the ongoing ethnic and religious conflicts between Muslims and Hindus in India, the conflict between the nations of Pakistan and India; the ethnic conflict between the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils in Sri Lanka; and the conflict between the Nepalese and Bhutanese in both nations. There are also various ethnic separatist movements in the region, as involving some Sikhs in India. The most threatening to order in the region and beyond is the conflict between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir region, as both have nuclear weapons and armies gathered at their respective borders.

A second serious issue is the host of related environmental problems, including pollution; limited water resources; overexploitation of natural resources; destruction and death caused by typhoons, flooding, and earthquakes; famine (less of a problem today), and epidemics of tropical and other diseases. The Maldives faces the unique problem of disappearing into the sea as global warming melts glaciers and raises the sea level. Coastal regions of Bangladesh could also suffer from this.

There are pressing social, economic, and political issues as well. Socially, there are wide and growing gaps between the rich and middle classes and the poor, who are disproportionately women and children and rural. Tribal peoples and untouchables still do not enjoy full civil rights, and women are often discriminated against, although India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh have all had women prime ministers. Economically, all the nations continue to wrestle with the issues involved in transforming themselves from mainly rural, agricultural nations to ones with strong industrial and service sectors. Politically, all still also struggle with the task of establishing strong, central governments that can control ethnic, religious, and region variation and provide services to the entire population. Despite these difficulties, there are also positive developments. India continues to benefit from the inflow of wealth earned by Indians outside India and is emerging as a major technological center. And, in Sri Lanka, an early 2002 cease-fire has led to the prospect of a series of peace negotiations in the near future..

East Asia

East Asia is defined here as the nations of Japan, South Korea, North Korea, China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. It should be noted that Taiwan is part of China although the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) differ over whether it is a province or not. The inclusion of China in East Asia is not entirely geographically and culturally valid, as parts of southern China could be classified as Southeast Asian from a geographical and cultural standpoint, while western China could be classified as Central Asian. However, there is a long tradition of classifying China as part of East Asia, and that is the approach taken here. Likewise, Mongolia is sometimes classified in Central Asia. As noted above, Siberia can be considered as forming North and Northeast Asia.

Economic, political, ideological, and social similarity across China, Korea (North and South), and Japan is the result of several thousand years of Chinese influence (at times strong, at other times weak), which has created considerable similarity on a base of pre-existing Japanese and Korean cultures and civilizations. China's influence was

greatest before the modern period and Chinese culture thus in some ways forms the core of East Asian culture and society. At the same time, it must be stressed that Chinese cultural elements merged with existing and new Korean and Japanese ones in ways that produced the unique Japanese and Korean cultures and civilizations, which deserve consideration in their own right.

Among the major cultural elements brought from China were Buddhism and Confucianism, the written language, government bureaucracy, various techniques of rice agriculture, and a patrilineal kinship system based on male dominance and male control of family resources. All of these were shaped over the centuries to fit with existing or developing forms in Korea and Japan. For example, Buddhism coexists with Shinto in Japan. In Korea, it coexists with the indigenous shamanistic religion. In China and Korea traditional folk religion remains strong, while Japan has been the home to dozens of new indigenous religions over the past 150 years.

Diversity in the region has been largely a product of continuing efforts by the Japanese and Koreans to resist Chinese influence and develop and stress Japanese and Korean culture and civilization. In the twentieth century diversity was mainly political and economic. Japanese invasions and conquests of parts of China and all of Korea beginning in the late nineteenth century led to hostile relations that had not been completely overcome in 2002.

In the post-World War II era and after, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea have been closely allied with the United States and the West; they have all developed powerful industrial and postindustrial economies. During the same period, China became a Communist state; significant ties to the West and economic development did not begin until the late 1980s. North Korea is also a Communist state; it lags behind the other nations in economic development and in recent years has not been able to produce enough food to feed its population. In 2002 China was the emerging economic power in the region, while Taiwan and South Korea hold on and Japan shows signs of serious and long-term economic decline, although it remains the second-largest (after the United States) economy in the world. Mongolia, freed from Soviet rule, is attempting to build its economy following a capitalist model.

Politically, China remains a Communist state despite significant moves toward market capitalism, North Korea is a Communist dictatorship, Japan a democracy, and South Korea and Taiwan in 1990s seem to have become relatively stable democracies following periods of authoritarian rule. Significant contact among the nations is mainly economic, as efforts at forging closer political ties remain stalled over past grievances. For example, in 2001, people in China and South Korea protested publicly about a new Japanese high school history textbook that they believed did not fully describe Japanese atrocities committed toward Chinese and Koreans before and during World War II. Japan has refused to revise the textbook. Similarly, tension remains between Mongolia and China over Mongolian fears about Chinese designs on Mongolian territory. Inner Mongolia is a province of China.

Major issues with regional and broader implications are the reunification of Taiwan and China and North and South Korea, and threat of war should reunification efforts go awry. Other major regional issues include environmental pollution, including air pollution from China that spreads east, and pollution of the Yellow Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea. A third issue is economic development and stability, and the role of each nation, and the region as a unit, in the growing global economy. A final major issue is the emergence of China as a major world political, economic, and military power at the expense of Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, and the consequences for regional political relations and stability.

Overview


As the above survey indicates, Asia is a varied and dynamic construct. To some extent the notion of Asia, as well as regions within Asia, are artificial constructs imposed by outside observers to provide some structure to a place and subject matter that might otherwise be incomprehensible. The nations of Asia have rich and deep pasts that continue to inform and shape the present—and that play a significant role in relations with other nations and regions. The nations of Asia also face considerable issues—some unique to the region, others shared by nations around the world—as well as enormous potential for future growth and development. We expect that the next edition of this encyclopedia will portray a very different Asia than does this one, but still an Asia that is in many ways in harmony with its pasts.

David Levinson (with contributions from Virginia Aksan, Edward Beauchamp, Anthony and Rebecca Bichel, Linsun Cheng, Gerald Fry, Bruce Fulton, and Paul Hockings)

Regional Maps













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POSSESSION Possession refers to some of the fierce dances still practiced today in India, mainly in the Kerala region, called Thirai Attam and Teyyam. The spirit supposedly possessing the dancer is that of a hero, not a demon, and the term "devil dancing" used by Western anthropologists conveys a false image. In popular imagination this hero has been accorded a kind of godhood through local worship, and through the performance his blessings are sought as a means of receiving personal cures and for general well-being.

The word *teyyam* is derived from the Sanskrit *devam* (god), which indicates that the spirit being placated is not evil. The confusion may have arisen because the dancer is dressed in a horrifying costume. The actor (*kolam*) wears a huge headdress, sometimes with two skulls as ear covers; he is bare chested, his arms are loaded with bangles, and he wears many necklaces and a wide skirt with painted snakes. A cobra is painted on his chest, a huge halo from the head to the hips emphasizes his figure, and he wields a scimitar with consummate skill. There are some three hundred Teyyams, each telling a different story about a hero.

In Kerala the custom of raising stones in honor of great warriors was practiced as early as the second century CE. Later in makeshift temples (*sthanams*) for these heroes, the sword or other weapon was kept on a wooden stool. No daily ceremony is performed in these temples, which still exist today, but an annual Teyyam dance funded by the community is held for the hero.

The performance sometimes begins with preliminary dances and often, but not always, the sacrifice of a cock. After putting on his costume, the performer invokes the spirit (*bhootam*) of the hero and is slowly

possessed by it. Finally he dances in great frenzy for hours. When the divine force subsides and he is calm, he is considered to be the holy embodiment of divinity. He goes into the temple, brings out some turmeric with rice, and distributes it to the participating audience and devotees, personally giving blessings to each of them.

The Teyyams are still popular in Kerala, where they are patronized not only by the rural population but also by urban and educated people.

Bharat Gupt

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POTALA PALACE A huge structure that dominates the Tibetan capital of Lhasa, Potala Palace has been the home of Tibet's Dalai Lamas since 1642, when the unfinished building was consecrated. It was built by the great fifth Dalai Lama, Ngawang Lozang Gyamtsho (1617–1682), to represent the cosmic mountain abode of the bodhisattva of compassion, Chenrezi, who is believed to dwell on Potala Mountain in south India and to be embodied in the Dalai Lamas. The Red Hill, 130 meters above Lhasa and already sacred to Chenrezi, was chosen as the site. The



POTALA PALACE—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

The winter palace of the Dalai Lama since the seventh century, Potala Palace in Lhasa was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1994, 2000, and 2001. The palace complex stands as a symbol of Tibetan Buddhism.

Potala was also built as a fortress, thus expressing its dual religious and political function. So important was this palace that the death of the Dalai Lama was kept secret for twelve years so that it could be finished without political interference. The Dalai Lamas are interred in sepulchers in the palace.

The Potala consists of a huge central keep painted maroon, the religious color, surrounded by a white palace, representing the secular. This creates an effect of wings, so that the whole edifice, with its golden roofs, seems to soar. There are two thousand rooms, numerous temples and shrines, and the private rooms of the Dalai Lamas, now open to tourists. UNESCO has declared Potala a World Heritage Site. China claims it has spent some \$6.7 million between 1989 and 1994 on extensive renovation work on the palace.

Michael Kowalewski

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PPP. See **Partai Persatuan Pembangunan**.

PRABANG The Prabang is a Buddha image revered by the Lao nation. The Prabang is 76.2 centimeters (30 inches) tall and is an image of Buddha standing in the "no fear" stance. Legend states that the Prabang originated in Sri Lanka and was taken to the Khmer kingdom Angkor. King Fa Ngoum (1316–1374), the

founder of the Kingdom of Lan Xang, used the Prabang to legitimize his rule as a righteous Buddhist monarch by taking the image to Vientiane in the 1350s. Vixun (reigned 1501–1520), a great patron of Buddhism, moved the Prabang from Vientiane to Xiang Dong Xiang Thong (Luang Prabang) and began the royal cult of worshiping the image. The image presided over religious and political ceremonies conducted by Lao monarchs. When King Setthathirat (1534–1571) moved the capital of the Kingdom of Lan Xang from Xiang Dong Xiang Thong to Vientiane, he left the Prabang image and renamed the city Luang Prabang in honor of the icon and ordered the construction of Vat Xieng Thong to house the Prabang. During the Siamese invasion of 1778–1779, the Siamese took the Prabang and Emerald Buddha images to Bangkok to symbolize the Lao kingdom's loss of independence and power. During the reign of the Siamese king Mongkut, the Prabang was returned to King Chantararat in 1867. The Prabang presently resides in the Royal Palace Museum of Luang Prabang.

Linda S. McIntosh

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PRAKARANA *Prakarana* drama is one of the ten dramatic genres of classical Indian theater; indeed, it was one of the two main types, the other being *nataka* drama. *Nataka* dramas took their plots from the great epics (the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*); their principle characters were gods or kings. *Prakarana* drama, on the other hand, has been called social drama; its plots came from tales, and its protagonists were not royalty, but—though this was not explicitly said—members of the sophisticated urban elite: merchants and learned brahmins.

Differences between Nataka and Prakarana Drama

Unlike *nataka* drama, *prakarana* drama had a large number of characters. In addition to the protagonist, minor characters such as servants, pimps, small traders, courtesans, and servant women were given important roles. The episodes of the play centered on a household and the city; unlike in *nataka* drama, there was no travel to heaven or the underworld, or even to other regions of India.

Modesty and restraint were uncompromisingly demanded from the performers by ancient law-makers.

The *prakarana* was supposed to be the ideal family show, revealing life in all its aspects, but viewed decorously.

As with the *nataka*, this dramatic form took love stories for its plots, but unlike the *nataka*, *prakarana* often had a courtesan as the heroine. It must be remembered that in ancient India prostitution was not only a legitimate part of the social order, the fulfillment of sexual desire outside the marital bond with women of pleasure was coveted for personal well-being and prized as a mark of social status. It could be justly considered as a part of one of the four aims (*puruṣārthas*) of life, namely, the fulfillment of desires (*kama*). Ideally, to elevate it from the purely physical level, sexuality was to be embellished with fine arts like dancing, music, poetry and painting in which all the courtesans of the higher ranks were adept. As a social norm, it was obligatory for the courtesans and their visitors to patronize and support the arts. Given those facts, wherever there was genuine affection between the customer and the courtesan (which was not uncommon), the result was a near tragic situation, as it was neither easy nor practical to convert the bond into a respectable marriage. Given this historical background, the *prakarana* should be seen as a natural representation of mainstream ancient urban life rather than as a fanciful dramatic set-up.

The Little Clay Cart

Mricchakatika (The Little Clay Cart), attributed to Shudraka, a king who lived sometime between the third and tenth centuries, is the most famous *prakarana* drama. It demonstrates the conventions of the form.

Vasantasena, the richest courtesan of the city Ujjaini, is fascinated by the personal accomplishments and the great magnanimity of Charudatta, a famous merchant whose charity has reduced him to bankruptcy. As the play opens, she is seen running in the dark night to escape the clutches of Sansthanaka, the cruel brother-in-law of the king. She accidentally enters the house of Charudatta, in whose custody she leaves her jewelry before being escorted home. The jewels are stolen at night by Sharvilaka, who needs money to free his beloved Madanika, a slave of Vasantasena. While receiving the jewels as slave price, Vasantasena recognizes them as her own and realizes that Charudatta has been robbed. She frees Madanika and marries her to Sharvilaka but the couple are separated immediately as Sharvilaka is called upon to free his friend Aryaka from the prison of the unjust king.

On learning of the theft, to save her husband's honor, Charudatta's wife Dhuta sends Vasantasena her

own necklace to replace what has been stolen. Charudatta sends along a letter in which he claims that he had lost Vasantasena's jewelry in a gambling bout and as compensation is sending this necklace. An overwhelmed Vasantasena visits Charudatta at home and tells him about the theft. The lovers enjoy the cooling summer rain and Vasantasena, accepted by the whole household, spends the night there. In the morning she sends back the necklace of Dhuta, but Dhuta does not accept it, saying that her husband is her best jewel. In the meantime, Vasantasena sees Dhuta's little son crying because he must play with a clay cart while the neighbor child plays with a golden cart. Moved by Charudatta's fall in the fortunes, Vasantasena gives the child the necklace so that he can get a golden cart.

The lovers plan to spend a day together, but by a mistake Vasantasena boards the wrong carriage and is accosted by Sansthanaka. When Vasantasena rebuffs him, Sansthanaka becomes enraged and strangles her. He then accuses Charudatta of murdering Vasantasena for jewelry. Charudatta is tried, and as jewels are found on his friend, he is condemned to death. A shattered Dhuta decides to immolate herself. Meanwhile Vasantasena is revived by a Buddhist monk and taken to the magistrates. Charudatta is saved at the last moment and united with both Dhuta and Vasantasena. Sansthanaka is caught but saved from execution by a forgiving Charudatta. A new ruler, who has just deposed the old king, confers the status of a lawful wife on Vasantasena and the play ends with a benediction.

This *prakarana* emphasizes that good action and purity of heart can reverse all ill fortune. Vasantasena is the opposite of the average courtesans, who love for money, and Charudatta is the opposite of the common merchants, who hide wealth. They both bring about a change of heart in many who come in contact with them, and the power of their selflessness even brings about a change in government.

Prakarana Drama in Context

The *prakarana*, like *nataka*, was done with plenty of dance, music, and elaborate gestures reflecting a full range of subtle emotions with postures, movements, and facial expressions. It was meant to be a fine combination of speech, gesture, dance, music, stage conventions, and symbols used in a highly embellished manner. *Prakarana* drama had five to ten acts, and used many different languages. Ancient Indian drama, so often wrongly called Sanskrit drama, was actually a multilingual theater; Sanskrit was spoken only by educated and rich male characters and did not account

for more than 30 percent of its total speech text. Most of the songs, not written by the dramatist but added by the producer, were in vernacular tongues. The *prakarana* specialized even more than the *nataka* in multilingual expression as it had a larger caste. It was the best mirror of ancient society.

By the end of the eleventh century, when ancient theater disintegrated, *prakarana* had become extinct, as the ancient life and ideals it portrayed was either disrupted or transformed. The advent of Islamic rule meant the end of prostitution as a social institution managed by the state, and the patronage of painting, dance, and music as combined with public sexuality was unthinkable. The new theater, which centered around religious devotion, was too otherworldly an environment for *prakarana*.

Bharat Gupt

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PRAMBANAN HINDU Prambanan is a village near Yogyakarta, Java that has lent its name to the largest Hindu temple complex in Indonesia, built in the ninth and tenth centuries CE. An inscription from the site dates to 856 CE, mentioning a royal funeral in which the deceased shivaitic king of Central Java was united with Siva. The largest temple (47 meters high), probably the tomb of the king, has four inner chambers containing statues of Siva Mahadeva, Siva Mahaguru, Ganesha, and Durga. The reliefs on the inner side of the temple's balustrade depict episodes from the *Ramayana*. Its story is continued in the reliefs on the balustrade of the smaller Brahma temple, south of the Siva temple. The Brahma temple has only one chamber with a statue showing Brahma as a manifestation of Siva. The Vishnu temple north of the Siva temple is encircled by a relief depicting episodes from the *Krishnayana*. The statue in this temple represents

Vishnu also as an aspect of Siva. The three opposite temples originally housed the statues of the deities' vehicles. Today, only that of Siva can still be seen. The restoration of the main temples was completed between 1951 and the mid-1990s.

Martin Ramstedt

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PRAMOEDYA ANANTA TOER (b. 1925), Indonesian novelist. Born in Blora, Central Java, on 6 February 1925, Pramoedya first built a reputation as a writer during the struggle for Indonesian independence (1945–1949), writing *Perburuan (The Fugitive)* while imprisoned by the Dutch (1947–1949). In the 1950s he was active in teaching, writing, and journalism, and was connected to the Communist-linked Lekra (Institute of People's Culture), though not a member of the Party itself. After the anti-Communist purge in 1965, Pramoedya was incarcerated in the Buru Island prison camp. There he began telling stories to fellow inmates, stories that formed the basis of the tetralogy of novels: *Bumi Manusia (This Earth of Mankind)*, *Anak Semua Bangsa (Child of All Nations)*, *Jejak Langkah (Footsteps)*, and *Rumah Kaca (House of Glass)*. The first two were published on Pramoedya's release in 1980, briefly becoming best-sellers before being banned for promoting Communism. During the 1980s and 1990s he lived mainly under house arrest in Jakarta, being released only after Suharto's fall. Pramoedya's novels combine deep knowledge of Indonesia's history and culture with passionate concern for its people.

Tim Byard-Jones

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PREMCHAND (1880–1936), Hindi and Urdu writer. Premchand is the pen name of Dhanpat Rai Srivastana, who was born on 31 July 1880 in the village of Lamahi near Varanasi (Benares), India. Rai Srivastana was not good at his studies and could not pass the matriculation examination. After the death of his father, he became a schoolteacher in 1899 with a salary of eighteen rupees per month. He began his literary career and wrote under the pen name Premchand. In 1907, he published short stories in Urdu but switched to Hindi eight years afterward. In 1916, he published his first short story in Hindi, *Panch Parameswar* (Five Gods).

During the period between 1917 and 1936, Premchand dominated the Hindi literary scene with his stories and novels. His works reflected contemporary social and political realities in India at the time. Sympathizing with the downtrodden, he wrote powerful and gripping stories and novels about social inequality, poverty of the peasants, and exploitation of women. He was influenced by Gandhian ideals and even joined the noncooperation movement. The novel *Godan* (Gift of a Cow) is a vivid account of a helpless peasant, exploitation by landlords, and problems of untouchability. *Gaban* (Misappropriation) is about the destruction of a family caused by the materialism of a female member. He wrote 250 short stories and eleven novels. Some of his important novels are *Premashrama* (Hermitage of Love, 1918), *Rangabbumi* (Theater, 1925), and *Karmabbumi* (Workplace, 1932). He died on 8 October 1936.

Patit Paban Mishra

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PRIBUMI *Pribumi* (literally "offspring of the soil") is an Indonesian term referring to people considered as natives of the country, belonging to various ethnic groups in the archipelago. As a sociodemographic category, it refers to the Dutch colonial policy of differentiating three classes of people—Europeans, Asian migrants (primarily ethnic Chinese), and *pribumi* (*inlander* in Dutch).

Pribumi and the Malaysian term *bumiputra* have equivalent meaning. However, in Malaysia, the *bumiputra* make up only just over half of the country's population, whereas the *pribumi* are around 95 percent of Indonesia's 220 million inhabitants; only about 5

percent of the population are considered as non-*pribumi*, mainly people of Chinese descent.

Also unlike Malaysia, where the *bumiputra* are largely Malay Muslims (as well as several ethnic minorities indigenous to the states of Sabah and Sarawak on Borneo island, many of whom are non-Muslims), in Indonesia the *pribumi* are not associated with any specific ethnic group or religion. Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world, and close to 90 percent of its population profess Islam as their religion. Yet there are regions and ethnic groups, mostly in the eastern part of the archipelago, in which people of other faiths are in the majority. For instance, the areas of southern Maluku and Irian Jaya (the western half of New Guinea island) are predominantly Protestant; the province of East Nusa Tenggara is predominantly Catholic; and Bali is home to Indonesian Hindus. Despite the differences in religious beliefs compared with the Muslim majority, they are also considered *pribumi*.

Similar to the *bumiputra* in Malaysia, the *pribumi* are mainly a socioeconomic category, especially in terms of true economic disparity. Although only a small percentage of the total population of Indonesia, the non-*pribumi*, especially the ethnic Chinese, control much of the country's economic activities, primarily in the manufacturing, financial, and trading sectors. As a result, the non-*pribumi* are perceived as an affluent class, while the *pribumi* are economically disadvantaged.

On the other hand, the Indonesian state has an unofficial discriminatory policy toward non-*pribumi*. Hurdles discourage them from entering public civil or military services and state universities. In the past, many of them were even persuaded to change their names from mainly Chinese to *pribumi* ones, so that they might be more readily assimilated with the *pribumi*.

There have been efforts to ameliorate the tense *pribumi*–non-*pribumi* relationship in Indonesia. On the economic front, to bridge the gap between the poorer *pribumi* and the more affluent non-*pribumi*, some have suggested the idea of developing a people's economy, more or less inspired by the perceived success of Malaysia's New Economic Policy. This economy would direct state resources toward helping small and medium enterprises as well as cooperatives owned overwhelmingly by *pribumi* entrepreneurs.

On the social side, people have suggested allowing the non-*pribumi* access to public services, including political posts. This proposed policy would aim at off-

setting the non-*pribumi* preoccupation with economic-related activities while fostering greater social integration.

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PRIDI BANOMYONG (1900–1983), Thai political and intellectual figure. Pridi Banomyong (Luang Pradit Manutham) is one of Thailand's most prominent and influential political and intellectual figures of the twentieth century. While studying on a king's scholarship in France, in February 1927 he and six colleagues founded the People's Party with the objective of overthrowing Siam's absolute monarchy. Following the revolution of 24 June 1932, which trans-

formed Siam into a constitutional monarchy, he became one of Siam's leading political figures.

Among his many diverse roles were minister of the interior (1934), minister of foreign affairs (1937), regent (1941–1945), secret leader of the resistance movement against the Japanese occupation (1941–1945), senior statesman (1945), and prime minister (1946). His intellectual influences included the founding of Thammasat University (1934) and extensive publications dealing primarily with political economy and including a novel and film, *The King of the White Elephant*.

Over time, considerable controversy arose concerning Pridi and his vision for the future of Thailand. He was falsely accused of being a communist and wanting to transform Thailand into a republic. The mysterious death of King Rama VIII in June 1946, while Pridi was prime minister, led to never-substantiated accusations against him. Eventually he was forced into lifelong exile in China (1949–1970) and France (1970–1983). In Pridi's honor a statute was built at Thammasat University (1984) and a Pridi Banomyong Foundation (1983) and a Pridi Banomyong Institute (1995) were created.

Pridi was included in UNESCO's list of Great Personalities and Historic Events for the year 2000, and this year was declared by UNESCO as the centennial of Pridi. Also, the Université Paris (1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) in 2000 celebrated the centenary of Pridi and honored him as "one of the great constitutionalists of the twentieth century," comparing him to such figures as Rousseau, Montesquieu, and de Tocqueville.

Gerald W. Fry



PRIDI BANOMYONG ON THE THAI CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

"The constitutional system has been established as a democratic system which respects a human being as a human being, which respects the Thainess (*khwam pen Thai*) of the Siamese people as free (*thai*) people and not as slaves, which accepts that sovereignty comes from the Siamese people, and which has the king as the head of state whom we respect and revere. . . ."

Source: Radio speech delivered by Pridi on 27 June 1936 on the fourth anniversary of the constitutional system.

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PRINTING AND PAPERMAKING Printing and papermaking were two key Chinese inventions that created two different communications revolutions in the premodern world, one in Asia and the other in Europe, by permitting the rapid transmission of information and ideas.

The Invention of Paper

The invention of paper is attributed to a court official of the Han dynasty. In 105 CE, the eunuch Cai Lun (d. 121) presented the Han emperor with a new writing material. With the rise of the first Chinese empire (the Qin dynasty, 221–206 BCE) came a rise in the imperial bureaucracy and an increasingly urgent need for new writing materials and methods of record keeping. The earliest Chinese records (sixteenth–eleventh centuries BCE) were etched on tortoise shells and animal bones. Later, these cumbersome materials were gradually replaced with wooden tablets and strips of bamboo. Though less costly, imperial record keeping generated hundreds of pounds of records on these materials. Though the inventor of paper remains anonymous, Chinese archaeologists in 1957 dated the earliest known sample of paper found in China to 49 BCE, over 150 years before Cai Lun's presentation.

This early sample of paper shares basic features of manufacture with today's machine-made paper. Early papermakers macerated old rope ends, rags, and fishing nets in water to free the component vegetable fibers, then sifted the solution with a screen to form thin sheets of matted fibers. They could leave the wet sheets to dry on the screen or place them on another drying surface. What distinguishes paper formed this way from the papyrus of the ancient Egyptians is this process of separating and reforming vegetable fibers into a single sheet (papyrus, by comparison, is simply pithed and flattened to create a writing surface). Once dry, the fibers in paper form chemical bonds and create a strong but light writing surface.

By the fourth century, paper had replaced wood and bamboo strips as the writing material of choice, and by the sixth century, Chinese papermakers had learned how to extract vegetable fiber from the bark of the mulberry tree, one of the best sources of paper fiber. Mulberry bark is still favored by fine papermakers in China, Korea, and Japan today because of its strength and beauty.

In papermaking, the longer the length of the fibers, the stronger the paper. As a result, much of the subsequent history of papermaking in Asia has been the development of techniques that preserve fiber length. To ensure the even distribution of the paper fibers,

papermakers learned to add a starch solution to the pulp to suspend the fibers.

Stamps and Rubbings

Having produced an inexpensive, light medium on which to write, the Chinese next searched for a way to mass-produce text and images, primarily for religious reasons. In the eighth century, devout Buddhists sought to spread their religion by producing thousands of copies of the Buddha's word and image. One early technique was to produce a stamp with an image carved in relief on its surface. Once inked with a combination of black soot and oil, the stamp could be pressed onto a sheet of paper, sparing the patron the cost of reproducing the image by hand. This technique was fine for relatively small images but larger and more complex images and texts were much more difficult.

Another technique frequently used by government artisans was making rubbings from stone stele. Though not as fast as stamping, rubbings could be taken from large surfaces with complex engravings. To make a rubbing, the artisan would take a moist sheet of fine paper and place it onto the surface of the text- or image-bearing stone stele or tablet. When the paper adhered to the surface of the stele, the artisan carefully pressed some of the moist paper into the crevices of the stele or tablet with a pad. Then the artisan would take another pad, this time inked with water and black soot, and pad the ink onto the surface paper. The pad would not touch the paper the artisan had pressed into the engraving. When the paper was dry, the artisan would peel the inked sheet off the stone, revealing a copy of the engraving in white on a black background. The rubbing technique is still valued for its precision and aesthetic quality, and it is used to duplicate images of fine calligraphy for Chinese art collectors.

By the eighth century, all the prerequisites for printing were in place. With stamps and rubbings, artisans knew how to take prints from both relief and engraved images. Stamps could replicate small images quickly, and rubbings could reproduce large, detailed images, albeit slowly. Neither method could satisfy the increasing demand in Chinese society for more books. Buddhists, Taoists, and Confucians all sought to produce more copies of their canonical texts for an increasingly literate public. Sometime in the eighth century, an artisan thought of combining the advantages of stamps and rubbings by making woodblock prints.

Woodblock Printing

Xylography, or woodblock printing, is both a simple and sophisticated technique for printing, unrivaled un-

til the advent of machine printing presses in the nineteenth century. Three skilled artisans are needed to prepare a page of text for xylographic printing. First, a calligrapher writes the text to be printed on a thin sheet of paper, using black ink. Next, a woodcarver takes the sheet of paper and turns it over, pasting the face of the sheet onto a foot-long block of fruit wood. Once the sheet has dried onto the block, the carver can see the characters in reverse through the back of the paper. The carver then carefully cuts into the wood and removes white background, leaving the characters in relief. Once the remaining paper is rubbed off, the block is ready for printing. A printmaker inks the block with an ink pad, inking only the raised characters, then lays a thin sheet of paper on top. The printmaker presses the sheet of paper onto the characters to take an impression. A skilled printmaker can make two or three impressions a minute this way. This technique was used to make the world's earliest extant printed book, the Buddhist Diamond Sutra, which is dated 868 CE.

The printing press was not invented in China because the xylographic process has no use for it. The critical technical requirement for Chinese printing is strong, thin paper, already perfected with the development of strong mulberry papers in the sixth century. By the twelfth century, Europeans learned to make paper from the Arabs, who had captured some Chinese papermakers in a battle at Samarqand five centuries earlier. European papers however, are much thicker, especially papers made from macerated cotton rags. European printmakers needed a great deal more pressure to take a relief impression with these thick papers and required massive presses. Another important difference between European and Chinese printmaking is the composition of the printing surface. In Asia, a single woodblock was the preferred medium because the aesthetics and complexity of Chinese characters can be easily captured by a skilled calligrapher. Some Chinese printers experimented with movable type—tiny relief blocks of each character—but the capital investment required to produce and maintain the thousands of tiny blocks of type needed for Chinese printing was greater than the cost of a few skilled calligraphers and woodblock engravers who could set up shop anywhere and begin producing printed books on demand.

The World's First Print Culture

The nature of the communications revolution brought on by the development of inexpensive book production is still debated. In China, wide access to a large number of texts whose cost was less than one tenth that of books a few centuries earlier reinforced

the education and examination system as a vehicle for recruiting talent from a much wider portion of the population than had been previously possible. This correlation between printing and the examination system is supported by the fact that those areas in China that produced 84 percent of the successful examination candidates also produced 90 percent of China's printed books.

While there was a dramatic reduction in the cost of books in China, there was also an explosion of printing for profit. By the eleventh century, xylographic printing was already a mature technology, and had created the world's first print culture in China. New literary genres emerged, such as storybooks, aimed at a popular as well as an elite audience. Popular *shanshu*, or "morality books," were also aimed at the newly created mass audience. The sheer volume and variety of publications for popular consumption prompted the Chinese government to censor, prohibit, or monopolize the printing of various materials, especially those works, like the dynastic histories, which could be a source of intelligence if exported. However, the fact that these prohibitions were repeatedly issued indicates that the government had very little real impact on the commercial trade. Printing technology was well established even among the seminomadic empires to the north. The Chinese government found it necessary to establish strict prohibitions on the import of books from these rival states.

The expansion of critical scholarship based on the easy circulation of the printed word is another important feature of print culture. Not only were more people reading books in the eleventh century, the social elites who were already literate were reading more books and comparing a greater diversity of ideas. While we might expect the Chinese imperial library to have a large collection, by the twelfth century government holdings were rivaled by private libraries sometimes containing more than a million volumes.

Easy access to books allowed writers and scholars to compare ideas and generate new ones with greater facility. When writing new books, Chinese writers could draw upon a wider variety of books and challenge old ideas. In his memoirs, the eleventh-century Song scholar-scientist Shen Gua, made over 250 citations to a wide variety of works that were available to him, sometimes using those works to support his conclusions, at other times challenging his sources. When he finished his memoirs in the 1080s, they were printed and sold to his peers and other aspiring members of Song society. This highlights another important aspect of print culture: Not only could people now

compare and challenge older ideas, their own ideas could be easily published and disseminated, adding to the intensity of public debate and discussion. The creation of a larger and more critical reading public outside the auspices of government agencies was a key Chinese development of the eleventh century.

Paul Forage

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PRIVATIZATION—CHINA China has a long and rich history of private enterprise during the time of the dynasties. By the early part of the twentieth century, however, Chinese private industry had become foreign dominated. Most firms were small, with less than five hundred employees, and produced consumer goods, such as textiles, cigarettes, and flour, owing to the exclusive concessions on manufactured and processed goods ceded to the Western powers under military coercion. In short, the lion's share of the financial benefit of Chinese private industry did not accrue to the Chinese themselves.

As for private agriculture, most peasants subsisted on tiny tracts of land (in the 1930s, 73 percent of peasants owned one hectare of land or less), and a relatively very small number of people owned large pieces of land (in the 1930s, 0.015 percent of rural residents owned 66 hectares or more), which were parceled up and leased to the landless. Here again, the Chinese experience of private ownership was not one of general prosperity.

After the Chinese Communist victory in 1949, the new rulers did not immediately forsake private ownership. Agricultural land was not organized into communes but rather redistributed (in 1950 71.74 percent of peasants owned more than one hectare). State-owned enterprises were quickly formed, accounting for 34.7 percent of gross value of industrial output (GVIO) in 1949, but private firms continued to function, accounting for 55.8 percent of GVIO in 1949. Therefore, in retrospect the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and the involvement of the United States and China as the two principal combatants was extremely detrimental to Chinese economic development. China had just emerged from a century of civil

war and internecine conflict (prolonged by repeated interventions by the Western powers), not to mention resisting the Japanese invasion during World War II. Any lingering goodwill toward the West and tolerance of or interest in the Western economic perspective completely dissipated.

Convinced that a larger future armed conflict with the United States was imminent, private enterprises were eliminated, foreign commercial banks were expelled from the country, and agriculture was communalized to produce the massive volumes of grain judged necessary to see the country through the coming struggle. The country converted completely to a Soviet-style planned economy, which made it terribly vulnerable to mismanagement at the top. Mao Zedong initiated the Great Leap Forward in 1958 to catch up to first the United Kingdom and eventually the United States in steel production, and over the ensuing few years this manic pursuit combined with unfavorable dry weather led to a plunge in grain production and disruption in grain distribution. An estimated 20 to 35 million Chinese starved to death. For this debacle, Mao was isolated within the central leadership. Mao's countermove against his rivals took the form of the Cultural Revolution, which caused economic and technological stagnation from 1966 to 1976.

The Reform Era

The death of Mao and the demise of the surviving radical leftists within the central leadership in the late 1970s finally provided an opportunity for positive change. In 1978, the least productive households of a commune in Anhui Province were given responsibility by local authorities for their own incomes in the hope that they would at least attain self-sufficiency. The dramatic gains in productivity prompted expansion of the experiment to the entire commune. To avoid accountability, the central leadership officially banned the leasing of land for private use, but in practical terms it did nothing to curb the experiment. The greater diffusion of the model to other communes progressed rapidly, spreading largely spontaneously to encompass the entire country and to nearly totally dismantle the commune system within five years.

While short of privatization, a nationwide system was established in which peasants enjoyed the right to long-term, renewable lease agreements with the state for the use of their land. Moreover, peasant families could pass land tenure rights down to their children. The liberalization of prices and crop determination progressed haltingly throughout the next two decades. Nevertheless, the foundations of the privatization of

agricultural production had been laid. The reform of industry proved a much more difficult proposition.

Early Efforts to Reform State-Owned Enterprises

Privatization in the contemporary sense of transition economics refers to the legal transfer of ownership within state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to private entities. In the Chinese context, privatization refers mainly to the partial transfer of SOE ownership to private entities and the separation of management, even while still affiliated with the state, from state agencies. It also refers to the growth "from scratch" of the sector of entirely private firms.

The latter has been slow. Openly and officially private or "individual" firms in China tend to be small in size. Their numbers reached nearly 8 million in 1993 but declined to around 6 million after 1995 due to various factors including the paucity of credit accessible to private firms and the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Within the sector of township and village enterprises (TVEs), there are an unknown number of discreetly or secretly private firms.

The crux of privatization in China lies within the sector of the SOEs, which dominate heavy industry and have long been renowned for extreme inefficiency. By the early 1990s, enterprise money losses and non-performing bank loans were threatening the continued stable development of nearly every province. A finance-department survey conducted in Liaoning Province indicated that 70 percent of the province's firms had hidden losses, which were on average 1.4 times greater than profits. By 2001, official publicized estimates of unpaid SOE debt reached \$218 billion or 27 percent of total bank lending. Most Western analysts pegged the actual figures at double these values or more. Ernst & Young estimated a total of \$480 billion in unpaid SOE debts for 2001 or 44 percent of the national economy's \$1.08 trillion output of that year. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Chinese central leadership started trying to reform SOEs almost from the outset of economic liberalization in 1978. At the same time, the government's long-standing political and philosophical aversion to private ownership of property affected the nature of reform efforts and arguably limited their impact.

The first four mainstream reform programs (1987–1993) were completely divorced from the factor of ownership. Instead, they focused on such issues as worker wage reform, managerial autonomy, and enterprise taxation. The naïveté of these schemes invariably resulted in questionable efficiency gains, if not

losses. For example, at the inception of the reform era the "floating wages" system made workers' total compensation variable and heavily dependent upon bonuses linked to output. But the bonus policy also fostered counterproductive tendencies, as vividly illustrated by the 1980 case of a chemical fertilizer plant that increased its output—but at the price of higher production costs and a loss of profits.

The Emergence of Shareholding Systems

With very limited access to credit from state-owned banks and encouraged by official decrees supporting peasant investment in enterprises, rural TVEs started selling shares to workers and local residents in the early 1980s. This development proved fortuitous for the state sector, mired as it was in ineffectual reform efforts. By 1986, Premier Zhao Ziyang (b. 1919) was ordering an expansion of stock capitalization, and by 1988, there were about 3,880 shareholding enterprises (SHEs) in both the rural and urban sectors. Stocks issued by most reform enterprises entitled holders to interest, dividends, a share of profits, or a combination of these. Shares could be traded within the firm, but their principal value never changed. In a modest number of cases (sixty firms in 1988), shares could be publicly traded at prices determined by the market.

The demise of Zhao in the wake of the Tiananmen insurrection (1989) resulted in a temporary contraction of the experiment he had championed, but by this point the concept had gripped the public's imagination. Between December 1990 and July 1991, stock exchanges opened in Shanghai and Shenzhen (servicing a combined total of eighty-nine firms), and the number of SHEs rapidly mushroomed to nearly 11,500 in 1993 and 50,000 in 1995.

What had in the 1980s been a more or less spontaneous movement came under official guidance in the 1990s. The issuance of publicly traded stock was limited to firms in the vicinities of Shanghai and Shenzhen. The China Securities Regulatory Commission was established in 1992 to oversee public trading, and legislation was passed in 1994 to standardize all the country's SHEs. As with the peasant land reforms, central edicts were not enforced to allow for what were essentially a variety of different experimental models for reform and privatization.

When in that same year the state initiated its fifth round of enterprise reform, it did so by corporatizing one hundred major SOEs. Most of these experimental firms became limited-liability companies (LLCs), which were still fully held by state-owned investment entities, but a few became SHEs, which were required

to be no more than 35 percent state held. Due to the predominance of LLCs, which mainly granted firms a right to a greater share of profits retained after taxes (as in earlier reforms), employees concentrated on maximizing sales and income distribution, with far less regard for costs since firms were not yet made accountable for unpaid debts.

Perhaps due in part to this setback, Zhu Rongji (b. 1928), the central leadership's preeminent economic reformer and then-vice-premier (current premier), announced in 1997 that loss-making SOEs could be bought out by publicly listed firms, signaling the ascendance of the shareholding system over corporatization. This move paved the way for the Fifteenth Chinese Communist Party Congress in September 1998, during which the shareholding system was officially endorsed as the country's main strategy for SOE reform. Moreover, the Congress vowed that, while state control was to be maintained over large SOEs, small and medium firms might travel truly independent trajectories.

Between 1990 and 1999, China's SOEs and collective firms lost thirty-five jobs while her private sector gained 60 million jobs. By 2001, 35 percent of firms were private in designation, 25 percent were still state owned, and 40 percent were of a hybrid, collective nature. Encouraging initial results from privatization have motivated the central leadership to move in previously unthinkable directions. In 2001, the state contracted with a consortium led by Morgan Stanley to recover what it could of the bad loans of 254 debt-stricken firms with a face value of \$1.3 billion. The state also announced that it would reduce by 10 percent its holdings in firms listed on China's stock markets, and in July 2001, on the eightieth anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, its chairman and the country's president, Jiang Zemin, called on the Party to allow business executives and entrepreneurs to join the ranks of the party, which would presumably make it easier for private firms to compete for loans, contracts, and licenses. Bankruptcies, accounted for under law but hitherto very rare, have been allowed to take place. In 2001, 1,504 bankruptcies and mergers were officially approved. Finally, in 2002 twenty-eight cities held auctions to sell off the assets of failed SOEs.

Greater China refers to China proper along with China's special economic region, comprising Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. It is ironic that while the smaller economic "tigers" of Greater China have had recent problems stemming from the Confucian social order—strict social hierarchy and cronyism—it may be mainland China, with the shattering experi-

ences of the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward, that ultimately proves to have the social impetus to undertake profound change.

Be that as it may, reform is not without its perils. It has been estimated that in the first decade of the twenty-first century, 10 million jobs will be eliminated annually while only 7 million will be created to replace them every year. The current official urban jobless rate is 3.6 percent, but economists estimate a rate of 15 percent nationally and 25 percent in the industrial cities of the northeast. Not surprisingly, labor unrest has been on the rise over recent years. In July 1997, 4,000 silk workers in Mianyang, Sichuan, demonstrated when their plants were shut down. In August 2000, workers fearful of losing their jobs in a Tianjin foreign joint venture took three expatriate managers, including one American, hostage for several days. In March 2002, tens of thousands of workers in Daqing, Fushun, and Liaoyang in the northeast protested layoffs and unpaid unemployment benefits. In its quest for long-term change, China may have to weather short-term political instability.

Freedom for Smaller Firms

Originally, only firms with 75 percent state ownership were allowed to be listed on either of China's stock exchanges, but in seeming recognition of the growing private stake in numerous firms throughout the country, this requirement was relaxed to 51 percent. Similarly, for large SOEs (those with more than \$61 million in sales and assets) in general, the state settled the aforementioned 35 percent stake, provided it was the largest shareholder. Needless to say, many investors, especially foreign ones, still found this arrangement unsatisfactory, since potential managerial interference by the state remained an issue.

As for the small firms, the sell-off has been impressive. According to the State Economic and Trade Commission, ultraconservative Liaoning Province had by November 1998 already sold 60 percent of its small and medium SOEs, while coastal and southern provinces had sold nearly all of theirs. Local officials became so frantic to sell assets that at least \$12 billion in bad enterprise loans had been written off by summer 1998, prompting the central government to issue orders demanding a curtailment.

Firms have found buyers in other companies, private individuals, and foreign investors. In many areas, firms seem mostly to be going to their own managers and workers. For example, in Zhucheng, Shandong Province, all of the city's 248 SOEs were 100 percent bought out by employees. In Leshan, Sichuan

Province, about 320 of its 400 small SOEs were sold, with 80 percent of these going to employees.

In stark contrast to a few years ago when potential foreign investors found plants and equipment with asking prices far in excess of market value, recent buyers have often discovered exceptional bargains. Interestingly, foreign investors are currently tending to look elsewhere in Asia, such as Thailand and Korea, where assets are similarly cheap, past buyouts have already proved profitable, the culture is more Westernized, and the legal system more mature and therefore reliable.

Fully privatized SOEs often if not usually face the same stark problem long encountered by the millions of small private shops and restaurants throughout China, namely, limited access to investment funds from state-owned banks and credit institutions. This situation may correct itself as bank reform proceeds and truly commercial banks, including branches of foreign ones, expand to meet the growing private demand for credit.

Township and Village Enterprises

Township and village enterprises (TVEs), which are officially collective enterprises with various types and degrees of community affiliation but in actuality also include some fully private firms, had been the virtual engine of China's economic miracle. Between 1978 and 1994, the nonstate sector's share of industrial output increased from 22 to 66 percent, with TVEs and other collective-type enterprises accounting for 62 percent of this output (calculations based on values given in *China Statistical Yearbook 1995*). By 1995, TVEs enjoyed \$76 billion in exports, or 50 percent of the national total (calculations based on values given in *China Statistical Yearbook 1999* and *China Agricultural Yearbook 1996*).

Since the mid 1990s, however, ever-increasing domestic competition for all market niches and a slight slackening in the growth rate of domestic household consumption have combined to dampen TVE expansion. In 1997 and 1998, for example, collective sector growth attained only 10.2 and 9.1 percent, respectively, down from 20.9 percent in 1996 and a high of 35 percent in 1993 (values from *China Statistical Yearbook 1999*). Consequently, more and more TVEs are being sold to individuals and wholly private entities.

Also, TVEs in general have vigorously pursued the stock capitalization that they initiated almost two decades earlier. In 1991, the Chinese rural sector had a negligible number of stock cooperatives; two years

later, there were 1.3 million. In many if not most joint-stock TVEs, 70 to 80 percent of shares seem to be retained by the firms or local governments, while the rest of the shares are distributed or sold to employees, community residents, and other shareholding entities.

A rapid decrease in the total number of TVEs from 22 million firms engaging 128.6 million employees in 1995 to 9 million firms with 91.6 million employees in 1997 reflects a decline in business (due in part to the shrinking market for regional exports during the outset of the Asian financial crisis) as well as substantial conversion to pure private ownership (values from *China Statistical Yearbook 1999*). The number of rural unemployed reached 130 million in 1997, and the tide of peasant laborers flooding urban labor markets in search of livelihood is rising. Hence, the success or failure of rural privatization and TVE shareholding-system reform may help determine the continued political stability of the nation into the inaugural decade of the new century.

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PRIYAYI *Priyayi* refers to members of the Javanese aristocracy whom the Dutch employed as salaried colonial administrators in their Indonesian provinces. Following an anticolonial rebellion led by the *priyayi* from 1825 to 1830, the Dutch abandoned their antifeudal policies, intended to strip the *priyayi* of their power, and used the native elite as colonial administrators in the countryside. The relationship between Dutch colonial officials and the *priyayi* was symbiotic. On the one hand, the status-obsessed aristocrats were humiliated by their inability to prevent the Dutch conquest of Java, but on the other hand, their colonial masters gave them high status and special legal rights, including the right not to appear before native law courts, in return for their role in administering the colony.

The Dutch left daily governmental affairs in the hands of the *priyayi*, who were responsible for tax collection, policing, justice, and public works. The Dutch also tried to consolidate responsibility for local religious affairs under the *priyayi* and tended to see nationalist challenges to their control in the form of Islamic movements that attacked the official Islam controlled by the *priyayi*. The *priyayi* did not see themselves as collaborators with the Dutch or as traitors to their compatriots, but rather as defenders of the traditional order, respectful of the hierarchical Javanese culture, religion, and power structure. There were many levels of *priyayi*, from *pangreh pradjja*, who served as local administrators, to the highest level, the *bupati*, appointed by the Dutch to administer an entire region.

Priyayi gained financially from their positions until the late nineteenth century, when the government began to promote large-scale economic enterprises and state-owned monopolies. As the *priyayi* lost their traditional base of support, the wealthy landowners, they had to rely more on official Dutch largesse. Attempts to professionalize the civil service were made between 1900 and 1910, when a series of reforms to train the *pangreh pradjja* were implemented. These reforms included educational requirements to reduce hereditary aspects of the position. The reforms, however, were

implemented slowly so as to not antagonize the *priyayi*, especially as nationalist sentiments were beginning to increase.

The Dutch were afraid of antagonizing the *priyayi* for fear that they could use their traditional status to lead or give weight to an anticolonial nationalist movement. Yet as a result of the reforms, by 1910–1915, the *priyayi* had lost nearly all of their special legal and social status and had become mere civil servants, part of a large centralized bureaucracy. Culturally conservative and insular, the *priyayi* were unable to modernize and become a force in the nationalist struggle.

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PROTESTANT FUNDAMENTALISM—SOUTHEAST ASIA

The greatest religious influences in Southeast Asia (except for the Philippines) are Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam. Religious fundamentalism in Southeast Asia is generally associated with these three faiths, and even in the Philippines—the only Christian nation in Asia—religious fundamentalism is usually ascribed to Islamic zealots in the archipelago's southern region. However, a Protestant fundamentalist dynamism is spreading throughout Southeast Asia.

The origins of Protestant fundamentalism are rooted in Western religious movements of the nineteenth century. During that era, some Christian leaders created a theology that emphasized human potential and the use of reason to decipher every portion of the Bible. They created this theology in response to the rise of liberal theology, Darwinism, and the premium placed on science. Fundamentalists concluded that the world was on the precipice of God's wrath but that Christians would be taken out of the world (an event called the rapture) prior to a great tribulation. Three implications of this theology are a literal interpretation of the Bible, the short-term goal of gaining converts before the end of the world, and a conscious withdrawal from popular society and culture. This withdrawal from the world distinguished these fundamentalists, and by the beginning of the twentieth century, mainstream Protestant denominations distanced themselves from them. Protestant fundamentalism reached full development by the 1920s, and it has remained a religious force since that time.

Protestant Fundamentalism and Missionary Activity

Missionary activity is central to fundamentalists for two reasons. First, they teach that individuals are converted by saying a prayer in which the individuals acknowledge that they believe in Jesus Christ as their personal savior. The key, therefore, is to give all people an opportunity to choose whether they want to be saved (that is, to embrace the fundamentalists' brand of Christianity) or not. Second, fundamentalists emphasize missionary activity because they assume that these are the last days, that the great tribulation—when God's grace is removed from the earth—is imminent. Desperate times call for desperate measures, and so their missionary programs are pragmatic, with an eye on the clock.

Protestant fundamentalism's influence in pre-World War II Southeast Asia was minimal. In fact, during the first half of the twentieth century fundamentalists retreated into what Professor George Marsden, the Francis A. McAnaney professor of history at the University of Notre Dame, terms a subculture. Their social atrophy during the Great Depression was in response to the increased prejudice against the "nonrational" arguments that conservative Christians were making against antibiblical scientific conclusions. In those crisis years, it was difficult for the fundamentalists to expend resources on missionary endeavors.

Although the preponderance of Protestant fundamentalist activity in Asia took place after 1945, a few fundamentalist missionaries sought to spread their message throughout Southeast Asia prior to World War II. The work of Adoniram Judson (1788–1850) in Myanmar (at that time Burma) is a case in point. Since World War II, however, thousands of fundamentalist missionaries and indigenous pastors have established congregations, mission agencies, and Bible training centers in Southeast Asia. Whether one travels to the most remote regions of the Philippines or the northern section of Thailand, the landscape is dotted with Baptist Bible Church buildings. During the 1990s, fundamentalist churches were established in Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos—nations that were once closed to Christian missionary activity.

Fundamentalists' intense proselytizing in Southeast Asia is attributable to historical realities. Western influence in Southeast Asia, whether superficial or entrenched, is tied to the colonial era. Western imperial powers incorporated all of Southeast Asia, except for Thailand, into their growing empires. Catholic and Protestant missionaries propagated their faith through-

out the region. Although this initial Christian evangelization did not have a fundamentalist theology, it did prepare Southeast Asia for a more radical Christianity. Indeed, many independent Baptists now gather converts from the Catholic Church and from liberal Protestant denominations.

A Policy of Separatism

A major tenet of fundamentalist theology is the belief that true Christians must not become entangled in popular society and culture. In Southeast Asia this means that fundamentalists do not participate in animism-based rituals, non-Christian religious celebrations, or any social gathering that does not have conservative Christian overtones. In Thailand, Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia—where Buddhism is the state religion—the implication of Christian fundamentalist separatism affects every area of social interaction. In the predominately Islamic nations of Brunei, Malaysia, and Indonesia, conservative Christians are a subculture and societal pariahs who gladly accept the persecution that is promised to all who truly follow the teachings of Jesus. Even in the Christian Philippines, a distinction is made between fundamentalists and Catholic or other Protestant citizens. The separation between these groups is based on the fundamentalists' claim that anyone who follows religious tradition rather than the Bible is not a Christian. Consequently, Filipino fundamentalists refuse to participate in celebrations such as a town's annual *fiesta* celebrating the town's patron saint.

Southeast Asian communities are noted for their intense kinship loyalty and the emphasis placed on communal behavior. Yet, fundamentalism stresses the primacy of individual spirituality. Some observers, then, might be astonished to see that there are thousands of fundamentalist congregations throughout Southeast Asia. What would possess individuals to make such a radical step and depart from tradition and culture? The answer to this question is multifaceted, rooted in three aspects of fundamentalist doctrine: the explanation for current suffering, the guarantee of a glorious future, and the personal aspect of this conservative community.

As an anti-intellectual movement, fundamentalism in Southeast Asia does not attract the professional elite. Demographically, the economic lower class fills the conservative Christian congregations. A dominant theme in the preaching to these believers, then, is that their poverty and persecution in this life are due to the wickedness of this world and the rule of the devil. The focus of the fundamentalist message is on the brevity

of this life and the imminent return of Christ, so adherents are encouraged to hold on for just a while; soon their suffering will be turned to joy.

Fundamentalist Motivation

Another motivation for conversion is the biblical promise that in the end, the last will be first and the first will be last. Fundamentalists proudly hold to the literal translation of the Bible; therefore, they promise that all believers will receive a mansion and walk on streets of gold when they get to heaven. It takes only a prayer to secure eternal riches. Pastors and missionaries tell their followers that although every true believer must wear the badge of an antisocial religious fanatic, this brief humiliation will result in eternal rewards.

Finally, in a region where monks, priests, nuns, and imams must minister to millions of people, religious relations can feel impersonal. Many Southeast Asians claim that their spiritual needs are not met because of the volume of people that their spiritual leaders must minister to. Fundamentalists, on the other hand, emphasize the duty of pastors to visit all their church members and to create a community in which accountability, emotional and financial support, and a close-knit subculture are nurtured. So long as poverty and alienation from mainstream religious traditions remain the experience of many Southeast Asians, the Protestant fundamentalist denominations will continue to win converts.

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PUI SI While the term *puisi* can mean any poetry in traditional Indonesian forms, such as the Malay *pantun*, the term commonly refers to modern Indonesian poetry, especially since the 1928 Youth Conference, which declared Indonesian to be the national language. Poets from the 1930s onward—most particularly after independence—intended to create a new form of poetic expression to form part of the national culture of the new state. They rejected traditional poetic forms, such as *pantun* and metrical Javanese verse forms, and adopted a much freer approach to verse structure. Traditional Indonesian, Buddhist, Hindu, Islamic, and Western literature influenced other aspects of the work of this new school of poets. Major themes in modern Indonesian poetry include Indonesia's place in the world, Indonesians' reactions to other cultures, and the place of tradition in modern culture; leading poets have often commented on politics in their works. Chairil Anwar (1922–1949) was dominant early on, while notable later poets include W. S. Rendra (b. 1936) and Sitor Situmorang (1948–1993).

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See also: **Rendra, W. S.**

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PUNE (2001 pop. 2.5 million). The eighth-ranking industrial metropolis of India, Pune is located at the confluence of the Mutha and Mula rivers in the state of Maharashtra. Between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, Pune (or Poona) served as the capital and headquarters of the mighty Maratha empire under the Peshwas. The British defeated the Maratha Confederacy in 1818 and incorporated it within their empire. The rest of the nineteenth century witnessed a few minor uprisings in and around Pune, but the city was an important military station, and the British retained their supremacy until the transfer of power in 1947.

Pune today is a modern city, one of the fastest-growing industrial and business areas of India, with a number of well-known corporate houses. It is the cultural capital of Maharashtra state and is famed as an educational center as well. Under British rule, many colleges were established in Pune—Deccan College, the College of Engineering, and Ferguson College. Today there is a university and a number of educational institutions. The Film and Television Institute



ENJOYING THE PUNE SEASON

"It was not till June that it was really fashionable to be in Poona. . . . This was the Poona Season. Everyone in Bombay who was anyone came up to Poona for week-ends during the Season, or, in the case of wealthy merchants, rented bungalows for the Season and installed their wives there to avoid the tiresome climate of Bombay during the monsoon. . . . The correspondents of Bombay newspapers kept their reader informed about the trend of fashion in the ball-room or on the croquet-lawn. New-comers to the Poona Season were warned not to "do too much", and above all not to eat too many mangoes, which in the first half of the June are most luscious and enticing. Too many mangoes gave one diarrhea, or a it was carefully called "Poonaitis". . . . While the ladies drove to the Gymkhana soon after tea, the gentleman drove there straight from office so as to be able to put in a full hour or two hours at tennis or croquet. Many of the ladies played croquet too, but others preferred to sit on basket chairs in the veranda and sew. . . . They would visit the Club Library, but would be unlikely to find any books there. . . . No one under the rank of a Collector's wife had a hope of securing one except by luck. So they would content themselves with gossip about the last ball at Government House, the delinquencies of their servants and the health of their children. And indeed what else should they talk about? There were no theatres or cinemas and only an occasional concert. . . . Their children rolled and crawled and played on the lawn that was of almost English thickness and was bordered by the banks of many-coloured cannas for which Poona was justly famous and by the blue-grey shrubs of sensitive plants. . . . There were a few English and Eurasian nurses and these kept rigidly to themselves sewing like their mistresses and nodding together over the events at the Sergeants' Dance on Saturday night—those dances at [which] the girl's reputation was gone if she were not returned to her parents by her partner as soon as each dance was over."

Source: Charles Kincaid. (1938) *British Social Life in India (1608–1937)*. London: Routledge.

of India, which offers training in all branches of the film industry, is located in Pune. The headquarters of the Southern Command of the Indian Army and an air base of the Indian Air Force are also located here.

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PUNJAB Literally the land of the "five rivers" from the Persian words *panj* (five) and *ab* (water), the name "Panjab" (Punjab in English) identifies a large alluvial

plain in the northwestern part of the Indian subcontinent, defined by the basin of the Indus River. All the five rivers of its name—the Beas, Chinab, Jhelum, Ravi, and Satlej—are tributaries of the Indus. Historically, the region of Punjab overran its geographic borders including, before the Partition of 1947, areas such as the district of Dera Ghazi Khan, portions of the Sirhind, and the Sind-Sagar Doab.

Most of the region is characterized by a flat plain sloping gradually from northeast toward the southwest, following the direction of the rivers. Due to its subtropical inland position, its climate is continental and semiarid, with marked variations of temperature between winter and the hot season.

At present divided between the rival states of Pakistan and India, this fertile region (once called the "granary of the Raj") has always been of crucial importance in the history of the Indian subcontinent because of its richness and its location and because Punjab has been the cradle of several civilizations.

From Ancient Periods to the Creation of the Mughal Empire

During the third millennium BCE, the Indus Valley became the cradle of an advanced urban civilization, generally called the Indus civilization or Harappan empire, from the name of an ancient city in Punjab, largely excavated since 1920, together with its "twin city" of Mohenjo Daro in Sind. From about 2500 to 1600 BCE, this civilization built up a large empire stretching from Punjab and Sind to Baluchistan and Rajasthan, having strong commercial ties with both East and West. Recent archaeological and historical research has largely undermined the old theory that held that the Harappa and Mohenjo Daro civilization was brought to an end by Aryan invasions (c. 1700–1500 BCE). More probably, natural catastrophes and changes in the course of the Indus were the major reasons for its decline. However, the Aryan peoples effectively settled in the region around the midway point of the first millennium BCE, imposing their own civilization on the area.

In historic times (c. 518 BCE), Punjab became part of the Achaemenid empire (559–330 BCE), when the Persian Emperor Darius I conquered the region of Gandhara, whose capital was Taxila, near Islamabad, the present capital of Pakistan. In 326, Alexander of Macedon (356–323 BCE) marched through Punjab in his attempt to conquer India, when the mutiny of his troops obliged him to withdraw. King Candragupta I (d. 297 BCE), the founder of the Maurya dynasty, soon afterward incorporated the Punjab into his empire. After some centuries the region became part of the territories under the control of the Gupta dynasty (320–c. 550 CE).

In 713 CE, the Arab commander Muhammad ibn Qasim captured Sind and the rich city of Multan, the main urban center of southwest Punjab, while east Punjab remained subjected to Hindu kingdoms. Only at the beginning of the eleventh century was the region completely subjected to Muslim power, represented by the Turk dynasty of the Ghaznavids (977–1186), who moved from the Afghan region. In 1186 CE, Muhammad Ghuri (d. 1206) conquered Punjab, which became on his death a province of the sultanate of Delhi until the rising of Mughal power during the sixteenth century.

From the Mughals to the British Empire

In 1526, the Afghan dynasty of the Lodis was defeated at Panipat by Zahir-ud-din Muhammad (Babur, 1483–1530), a commander of Turkish-Mongol origins, and the founder of the great Mughal dynasty (1526–1858). Within a few years, Babur was able to create a large empire over the northern territories of the Indian subcontinent, Punjab included. During the reign of Akbar the Great (1542–1605), the territories of Punjab were divided among the *subas* (provinces) of Delhi, Multan, and Lahore, considered the prominent city of the region. Under Mughal power, the region enjoyed a long period of economic prosperity, artistic and architectural enrichment, and political stability.

However, during the first half of the eighteenth century, the declining Mughal power was unable to defend northwest India from the raids and attacks coming from Afghanistan. In 1747, Lahore itself fell under control of Ahmad Shah Durrani (1722–1773), the first emir of Afghanistan. His ephemeral empire over Punjab was challenged by the growing power of the Sikhs, a militant religious sect. Although disastrously defeated by Ahmad Shah in 1762, the Sikhs rapidly recovered their military force, challenging the power of both the Hindu confederation of the Marathas in north central India and the Afghans to the west.

When the former were crushed by the rising British power and the latter weakened by their intertribal feuds, the Sikhs emerged as the main political and military power in Punjab, especially under Ranjit Singh (1781–1839), the so-called Lion of Punjab. His army of 100,000 men—called *khalsa* (the army of the pure)—represented a powerful challenge even for the British, who entered into treaty relations with Singh in 1809. After his death, however, internal rivalries among the numerous heirs and antagonists for the throne shattered Sikh unity and worsened relations with the British. Two bloody wars broke out in 1845–1846 and in 1848–1849; British victories over the Sikhs led to their annexation of Punjab in 1849.

Under British rule, Punjab rapidly became the main recruitment center for the India Army. The British supported the expansion of irrigated agriculture as a means of social and political stability, since this policy favored landlords and rural traditional authorities. With the gradual introduction of some sort of representation through assemblies and councils (for example, the Provincial Assembly created in 1937), the British colonial administration left the urban, more politicized communities almost deprived of power and political representation, allocating to the rural elite an exaggerated level of political visibility.

Until World War II, the main political party was therefore the Unionist Party, strongly linked with Muslim and Hindu landowners. With the outbreak of the conflict and the signals of an end to British rule over India, however, the Muslim League of Mohammed Ali Jinnah (1876–1948)—who championed the idea of a separate state, named Pakistan, for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent—became the main party. Similarly to the rest of the country, the end of the British period saw the outbreak of ethnic and religious violence among the different local communities of Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs—the latter suffered (in percentage terms) the highest casualties.

On 15 August 1947, the Partition of the Indian subcontinent created two states: India and Pakistan. Punjab was divided between them.

The Contemporary Period

According to the so-called 3 June plan for the partition of the Indian territories, Punjab was divided between Pakistan and India, with a boundary line that crossed the region between the cities of Amritsar (in India) and Lahore (in Pakistan). Dominant cultural-religious communities present at that time in Punjab were the Muslims and the Hindus; there was a small Christian Punjabi community, too. But the real peculiarity of the region was the presence of the Sikhs, a syncretistic sect founded at the beginning of the sixteenth century. During the eighteenth century they became a military power, conquering Kashmir and Punjab. Defeated by the British (1845–1849), the Sikhs remained an important minority, separated by both the Muslims and the Hindus. The only possibility for them was to migrate from the territories given to Pakistan toward the new Indian state of Punjab (in 1981 they represented more than 60 percent of the total population).

In Pakistan, Punjab represents the second-largest province (about 205,000 square kilometers), but it is the most densely populated, with more than 50 percent of the total population and also the more industrialized, though agriculture is still the first source of income. At present, the population is almost completely Muslim. The Punjabi are the political, administrative, and military elite of the country, a predominance that has negatively affected their relations with the other Pakistani ethnic groups (Sindhi, Baluchi, Pashtun/Pathans, Bengali until 1971) during these decades.

Inside the Indian Union, the region of Punjab (about 100,000 square kilometers) has seen several administrative reorganizations, which have attempted to

divide it according to cultural and linguistic differences. Besides the state of Punjab (where the majority of the Sikhs are settled), the states of Haryana (Hindi-speaking) and mountainous Himachal Pradesh have been created within the region.

Riccardo Redaelli

See also: **Sikhism; Sind; Sindhi**

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PUNJABI. See **Panjabi**.

PUPPETRY, WATER Vietnamese water puppets, in Vietnamese *mua roi nuoc* (puppets that dance on water), have a long and unique history. The earliest reference to the water puppets is on a stele commemorating King Ly Nan Thong found in Nam Ha province (1121 CE). Both north and central Vietnam were centers for water puppetry, in villages as well as in the courts. The art of water puppetry reached its apex in the eighteenth century. Troupes were composed of families who passed down special techniques from father to son, and most troupes had strong clan alliances. Until recently, women were not taught the manipulation of the puppets.

The puppet shows are performed by a group of puppeteers who stand waist high in water behind a bamboo screen. The water is the stage floor. The puppets range in height from 60 to 90 centimeters and are attached to floats on long bamboo poles from 3.6 to 4.6 meters in length manipulated by the puppeteers. The floats have rudders to change direction and long lines used to activate the puppets' bodies. Several people may manipulate one puppet.

The puppets are made of polychromatic fig wood, which is lightweight and easily carved. The theater consists of the manipulation area in which the puppeteers operate; the stage, or water surface on which the dramas unfold; and the seating for the audience. The stage setting is a traditional Vietnamese house with a red curved roof. Ripples, waves, tidal waves, and reflections on the water are incorporated into the dramas. The puppets may also dive in and out of the water and, in the case of dragons, often spout smoke and breath fire.

Musical accompaniment traditionally consisted of drums, cymbals, and gongs, with the drumbeats augmenting the mood of the drama. Modern troupes include stringed instruments, flutes, and bowed instruments. Singers behind the bamboo stage curtain produce the voices of the puppets. The performances include traditional folktales, historical drama, supernatural stories, and amusing genre scenes of daily life. A comic character, Chu Teu, announces the program and opens the performance. The folk scenes include water-buffalo fights and peasants fishing, in which the fish is often the victor. Water-puppet theater went into a decline until the mid-twentieth century, when government funding revived it. Currently the Hoan Kiem lake is the main center for Hanoi's water puppets, and several troupes tour internationally, including the renowned Thang Long troupe.

Noelle O'Connor

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PURI (2001 pop. 1.3 million). One of the four holiest cities in India, Puri lies on the east coast of the state of Orissa and is the abode of the Hindu God Jagannath, the Lord of the Universe. Puri is also known as Sri Purusottama Dham or Martya Vaikuntha, "the abode of Lord Vishnu on Earth," and Purusottama Kshetra, "the abode of the supreme being." This seaside town revolves around the Jagannath Temple, where Lord Jagannath is enshrined with his sister Subhadra and his brother Balabhadra.

The Jagannath Temple was built in the twelfth century by King Choda Ganga Deva (reigned 1077–1146) of the Ganga dynasty (1028–1434/1435) to commemorate the shifting of his capital from south to central Orissa. More than six thousand men are employed by the temple to perform its functions and rituals. The

Ratha Yatra, or the Chariot Festival, commemorating the journey of Lord Krishna from Gokul to Mathura, takes place every June or July. The images of Lord Jagannath and his siblings are taken out in immense chariots (or *raths*), each supported by sixteen wheels and drawn by thousands of devotees, to the Gundicha Mandir, or Garden House. There, the images reside for a week and are brought back to the temple after ritual purification. Puri is also the administrative headquarters of the Puri district and a bustling holiday resort; its fine beach attracts a large number of tourists.

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PUSAN (2002 pop. 4.1 million). Located at the southeastern corner of the Korean Peninsula, Pusan is the second-largest city in South Korea (after Seoul) and is South Korea's major international seaport. Like Seoul, it is a "special" (partly autonomous) city.

Due to its location and its deep harbor, Pusan has long been the main port of trade between Japan and Korea and has been a focal point of Korean-Japanese tensions. Pusan was opened to Japanese merchants in 1443 when King T'aejong (1397–1450) confirmed a trade treaty with Japan. In the sixteenth century, the Japanese established a small enclave in Pusan. In 1592 and again in 1596, Admiral Hideyoshi (1537–1598) used Pusan as the embarking point for the Japanese invasion of the Korean Peninsula. In 1876, Pusan was a point of conflict between Japan and Korea when Japanese marines battled with local Korean troops.

Pusan was officially opened to foreigners as a treaty port under the Kanghai Treaty of 1883, and by the end of the nineteenth century, Japan had begun to build a railway to link Seoul with Pusan. During the Korean War, Pusan gained fame as where American and South Korean troops held the "Pusan Perimeter," a line 80 kilometers wide and 160 kilometers deep on the southeastern tip of the Korean Peninsula against the advancing North Korean Army. Today, Pusan is a leading industrial and manufacturing center and is best known for its ironworks, railway yards, and shipping industries. For three decades it enjoyed a reputation as a boomtown, which attracted many wealthy and educated young people. The economic downturn of the late 1990s slowed but did not halt the city's growth.

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PUTONGHUA. See **Mandarin**.

PYONGYANG (1999 pop. 3 million). Pyongyang is the capital city of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). It is situated south of South P'yongan Province in an alluvial plain on the lower reaches of the Taedong River. Pyongyang consists of sixteen administrative districts. The city was completely destroyed during the Korean War (1950–1953) and has been rebuilt into a modern city with large avenues and parks and a two-line subway.

Pyongyang became the last capital of the Koguryo kingdom (37 BCE–668 CE) in 427 CE. Several tombs

and monuments from this period still dot the vicinity of the city. It was the western capital of the Koryo kingdom (918–1392). Several private Western-style schools were founded in Pyongyang before the demise of the Choson dynasty (1392–1910), among them the Sungsil School (1897) and the Sungui Girls' School (1903).

The city features many monuments, such as the Grand Monument on Mansu Hill and the Tower of the Juche Idea. Among its historical sites are the Eastern and Western Gates of the old walled city, the Ryongwang Pavilion, and the Sungnyong (1429) and Sungin (1325) temples. Major educational establishments include Kim Il-Sung University, the People's Palace of Culture, and the Grand People's Study House. The city is also an important center for the textile, food, chemical, and heavy equipment industries.

Adriane Perrin



QADIRIYA Qadiriya refers to a Sufi *tariqa* (mystic way or order) named after ‘Abd al-Qadir ibn Abi Salih Jangidost al-Jilani (1077–1166), born in the province of Jilan in Persia, a stronghold of Hanbalism (the Sunni school of law attributed to Ahmad ibn Hanbal [d. 855] and known for its conservative orientation) in the eleventh century. At first ‘Abd al-Qadir’s education in Baghdad, where he arrived in 1095, was fairly conventional; he was trained to be a lawyer (*faqih*) in the Hanbali school and appears to have showed no inclination for mysticism. ‘Abd al-Qadir then received training from the Sufi master Abu ‘l-Khayr Hammad al-Dabbas (d. 1131), as a consequence of which he adopted an austere lifestyle, practiced night vigils, and is said to have wandered off in the deserts of Iraq without provisions.

Yet in his lifetime ‘Abd al-Qadir achieved renown not as a Sufi master but rather as a gifted Hanbali preacher. Although he became the principal of a Hanbali *madrasah* (religious school) and its attached *ribat* (Sufi hospice) in Baghdad around 1133, he seems not to have developed a Sufi following, as no Sufi appears to have claimed to be ‘Abd al-Qadir’s follower.

After his death, however, in 1166, his *khirqah* (the mystic’s patched cloak) was, according to one biographer, bestowed on someone, which signified the official transfer of his authority. The Qadiriya order then began to spread, due to the efforts of two of his sons, ‘Abd al-Razzaq (d. 1206) and Abd al-‘Aziz (d. 1205), who promoted their father’s *tariqa* or way. Little evidence, however, suggests that ‘Abd al-Qadir himself had bequeathed a complete system of Sufi thought and practice or that the Qadiri *tariqa* had become widespread before the fifteenth century. In Baghdad, ‘Abd

al-Qadir’s mausoleum became the site of a local Qadiri order; there were other Qadiri centers in Iraq and Syria by the beginning of the fourteenth century.

Through time, a system of beliefs and practices identifiable as that of the Qadiriya emerged; the first Qadiri *zawiya* (conventicle) in Damascus was established in the early fifteenth century. ‘Abd al-Qadir’s fame as a mystic grew in this period, although the *tariqa* itself never became as popular the Naqshbandiyya and the Suhrawardiyya Sufi orders in general. The spread of the Qadiriya was limited in India, Egypt, and the Hejaz (western Saudi Arabia). In the first half of the seventeenth century, the Qadiri order was introduced into Istanbul by Isma‘il Rumi (d. 1631 or 1643), who founded a *khanaqah* (Sufi center) there and established over forty Sufi lodges (*tekkes*). In North Africa, the form of Qadiriya known as Jilaliyya is centered on cultic reverence for the *tariqa*’s founder.

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QAJAR DYNASTY The Qajar dynasty in Persia (present-day Iran) spanned 130 years, beginning with Agha Mohammad Qajar in 1795 and ending with Ahmad Shah in 1925. It was a period in Persian history

that saw substantial British and Russian regional influences that eventually created a backlash over time in the form of the Constitutional Revolution.

The Qajar Dynasty Comes to Power

Before the establishment of the Qajar dynasty, Persia was in a state of chaos following the demise of the Safavid empire (1501–1722/1736) as power struggles intensified among several tribes (Qajars, Zands, Afshers, and others). In 1794, Agha Mohammad Qajar (1742–1797) was able to eventually defeat the last Zand ruler and proclaim himself shah (king) of the country. However, his reign did not last long, as he was murdered just a year later during a second trip to Georgia. He was succeeded by his nephew Fath Ali Shah.

Fath Ali Shah ruled for thirty-seven years and was able to bring certain measures of stability to the country. Nonetheless, this was the era when Britain and Russia began to encroach on the regional political scene. Persia lost two wars to Russia, resulting in two treaties (the Treaty of Gulistan in 1812 and the Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828) that relinquished substantial territory in the Caucasus to Russia. Furthermore, Britain kept Persia from exercising its authority in Afghanistan. Finally, both Russia and Britain were able to obtain favorable trading agreements. In fact, their influence was so great that they were able to name Fath's successor in 1834. Fath's grandson Mohammad Ali took the reins and governed for fourteen years until he died in 1848. As his grandfather had done, he emphasized the supremacy of the monarch's respect for the divine Islamic order and continued the consolidation of power.

Consequences of European Influence

Naser al-Din Shah succeeded Mohammad Ali in 1848 and reigned for forty-eight years. He faced growing European influence, which was difficult to combat due to the weakness of the Persian government. Government revenues were so low that they could not cover the lavish expenditures of the royal court, a situation that led the ruling class to accept bribes from outside power sources in exchange for favors that were contrary to national interests. The prime minister, Mirza Taqi Khan Amir Kabir, tried to correct this situation by taking measures to centralize power. He also created new offices, reformed the tax system, and established a chain of command within the bureaucracy and provinces. Unfortunately, his efforts were halted due to jealousy and fear of his growing popularity and power. He was fired and ultimately assassinated in 1851.

Closer association with European powers also had another impact. It led to the emergence of reformists



Ahmad Shah, the last ruler of the Qajar dynasty, in c. 1909. (HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS)

such as Malkam Khan, who advocated that Persia could be strengthened politically and economically if it emulated and mastered the European methods. This line of thinking led to the creation of a cabinet modeled after those found in Europe.

Meanwhile, financial difficulties compelled Naser al-Din Shah to give lucrative concessions to both Britain and Russia. In 1890, the monarch gave Britain a monopoly on the tobacco trade in the country, and this turned out to be the straw that broke the camel's back. Upset with the constant submission to outside interests, the entire nation boycotted tobacco, which forced the shah to revoke the monopoly concession. However, this was not enough to appease the people, who continued to oppose the monarch's policies. Finally, he was assassinated in 1896 at the alleged urging of the well-known Islamic leader Jama al-Din al-

Afghani. Soon, Naser al-Din Shah's son Muzaffar al-Din was proclaimed king.

The Constitution of 1906

Muzaffar al-Din Shah was often physically ill and was politically unable to reverse the tide of political and economic turmoil that had begun during his father's reign. On the contrary, he exacerbated the situation by his extravagant expenditures. He received two major loans from Russia, which he promptly spent on luxury items, including a trip to Europe. Meanwhile, masses of Persians were suffering from inflation and mounting poverty. This caused the populace to question, criticize, and finally revolt against the monarchy. Strikes took place all over, and religious services were withheld in protest. The monarch was unable to receive assistance from Russia, which was dealing with its own internal strife. Therefore, he had no choice but to promise the people a constitution. Soon they formed an assembly, composed of Qajar princes, merchants, religious leaders, artists, and landowners, to write a constitution, which was completed in the fall of 1906. Muzaffar al-Din Shah signed it on 30 December and died just days later. This constitution limited the powers of the royal family and supplanted it with the Majlis (Parliament) and a cabinet whose members had to be approved by the Majlis.

This constitution, however, faced challenges before it became a reality. After Muzaffar al-Din Shah's death, his successor, Mohammad Ali Shah, was able to garner Russian support and close down the Majlis. This started a prolonged struggle between the monarch and supporters of the constitution. Eventually, the supporters of the constitution were able to raise armies to march on Tehran and overthrow the new king, who was exiled to Russia. His eleven-year-old son, Ahmad Shah, was chosen as the shah, and the Majlis was repaired of the damages incurred in the military struggle. The country was in a vulnerable position, which the deposed king tried unsuccessfully to exploit in 1911.

The new constitutional system did not survive. Under the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement, Britain and Russia split the country into spheres of influence: Russia took the northern part of Persia, while Britain took the south and east. Faced with financial ruin, the Majlis had hired Morgan Shuster, an American administrator, to help put their finances in order. Both the Persian elite and the Russians criticized his hiring. The latter did not appreciate tax collectors approaching them in their sphere of influence. In fact, Russia demanded Shuster be fired. When the Majlis refused, Russian troops shut it down and with this action destroyed any hope for a constitutionally based system.

World War I and Its Aftermath

Ahmad Shah was powerless against the British and Russian influence. In 1914, World War I started, and the Qajar monarch had no choice but to remain neutral. This, however, was not enough to keep Persia secure. British, Ottoman, and Russian armies fought on Persian soil and brought death and destruction to innocent Persian civilians; the war also gave the local population the opportunity to rise up against the Qajar monarch. At the end of World War I, Russia had its own revolution to contend with and was unable to maintain its influence in Persia. This provided the British with an opportunity to bring an order in their own favor. They supported Reza Khan (Reza Shah Pahlavi, 1878–1944) in a coup against Ahmad Shah. Reza Khan became the defense minister first, then prime minister, and ultimately the first shah of the Pahlavi dynasty, which formally ended Qajar rule.

Houman A. Sadri

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QI BAISHI (1864–1957), Chinese painter. Qi Baishi (original name Qi Huang; numerous art names), the most famous painter of China's Republican period (1912–1949), developed an expressive style of brushwork that captured the essential qualities of a wide range of subjects. Born in Hunan Province to a peasant family, Qi Baishi continually sought self-betterment in a class-conscious society. Despite having little education, he rose from lowly carpenter's apprentice to acceptance by the elite. He learned the art of woodcarving and improved his designs by studying the famous *Mustard Seed Garden Painting Manual*. He then began artisan painting. Various scholars recognized his talents and taught him, successively, the traditional *gongbi* (meticulous) style of brushwork for portraiture, flowers and birds, and landscape. He also learned seal carving, calligraphy, and poetry, skills that granted him entry to the literati class and for which he later became famous.

In 1902 Qi Baishi began traveling outside Hunan and in 1917, fleeing civil disorder at home, he made

Beijing his residence. There he mastered the literati mode of *xieyi* (expressive) brushwork and developed a personal style. His closely observed, ordinary subjects were limned in vigorous lines and bright hues, the latter an innovation in literati painting. After 1949 the Chinese government granted him numerous honorary titles, including First Peoples Artist and chairman of the Chinese Artists' Association.

Iris Wachs

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QIBILAI QAN. See **Khubilai Khan.**

QIGONG *Qigong* refers to Chinese mental and physical exercises that cultivate *qi* (*ch'i*). Daoist in origin and often associated with healing, longevity, and enlightenment, these practices increase suppleness, develop relaxation, and improve circulation while expanding awareness of body, mind, and environment. A *qigong* exercise involves controlled breathing, relaxation, and calm and careful focus of attention.

Qigong is a combination of two Chinese characters. The second, the "gong," refers to work or merit. The "qi," however, is more difficult. *Qi* is understood to be ever changing and ever flowing, a force at work in nature and society as well as in the human body. Tangible expressions of *qi* in the body include respiration, circulation of the blood, and sexual energy. Less obvious manifestations include the circulation of *qi* itself along channels independent of the circulatory and nervous systems, called meridians.

While the exercises known today as *qigong* are ancient, traceable at least to texts found in Han period tombs from 2,000 years ago, the term itself is relatively recent, not seen before the Ming period (1368–1644). Furthermore, before 1900, knowledge and dissemination of such exercises extended to a relative few, who received training through traditional lineage holders. (In educational contexts that emphasize the personal transmission of knowledge from master to disciple, a lineage holder is someone who has received transmission from a recognized master and is sanctioned by that master to impart instruction.) Only in the 1980s was *qigong* popularized to become the widespread form of exercise it is today.

Qigong is generally practiced to increase martial ability and to improve health. It can be divided between *qigong* for oneself and for others. Practiced for oneself, *qigong* can be done at rest or while moving. *Taijiquan*, a martial art and health exercise, is a dynamic *qigong* exercise done for oneself. Laying on of hands, massage, and acupuncture are forms of *qigong* practiced for others.

Qigong stands at the nexus between science and religion in modern societies. Questions about its uses, effects, and reality persist. As the number of *qigong* practitioners increases worldwide and its principles are incorporated in new contexts, it remains to be seen whether the claims for its salutary effects will be balanced by a body of evidence accepted by a wider scientific community.

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QIN DYNASTY Although lasting for only fifteen years, the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) brought centralized administration to China and introduced a model of government that Chinese emperors followed until the abdication of the emperor of China's final dynasty, the Qing, in 1912. The very name of China was probably derived from the name "Qin" (pronounced "chin"). Unfortunately, the accomplishments of the Qin rulers were achieved by harsh, ruthless, totalitarian acts that hastened the dynasty's untimely demise.

The Rise to Power of the Qin Dynasty

Living in the present-day province of Shaanxi among various nomadic tribes in the far west of ancient China, the people of the Qin dynasty had long proved to be fierce warriors. Their weapons industry was aided by a wealth of iron ore found in their region. After the collapse of the Western Zhou dynasty

(1045–771 BCE), the state of Qin emerged as one of many small states that sprang up in the absence of a strong ruling house. The Qin began to rise to prominence during the Warring States period (475–221 BCE), when Shang Yang (d. 338 BCE), a scholar and politician, set about reforming the Qin state. He moved the Qin capital to Xianyang (located near the modern city of Xian), abolished feudalism, gave land to the peasants, taxed them, and introduced a law code that favored no one class. To replace the feudal aristocracy that he had abolished, he set up a central government to administer the country. In the bureaucracy, official positions were designated according to a reward system, rather than being inherited as earlier. *Fajia* (Legalism), a philosophy that emphasized that rulers should have absolute power and that they should govern with the help of a strict law code, pervaded Shang Yang's ideas about government.

The Rise and Fall of the Qin Dynasty

Although because they had absorbed various Central Asian invaders into their state the Qin were viewed as too barbaric to pose a serious threat to the other states, from 230 to 221 BCE, the Qin successively conquered these states of the Eastern Zhou (770–221 BCE) confederacy. By 221 BCE, with a final military victory over the Zhou, the Qin had unified all the states of the feudal Zhou rule. Zheng, the Qin king (c. 259–210 BCE) proclaimed himself Shi Huangdi ("first sovereign emperor") and assumed control over the empire.

Upon his death in 210 BCE, court intrigues, primarily involving a eunuch, Zhao Gao, and an adviser, Li Si, tricked the heir apparent into committing suicide, and the title of emperor was conferred on a younger son, then known as the Second Emperor (reigned 210–207 BCE), who ended his own turbulent reign by also taking his life. Rule then passed to a young boy, known only as the child-emperor. Although the boy surrendered to the usurping Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) leaders at Xianyang, he was killed and his capital destroyed, bringing the rule of the Qin to an end in 206 BCE, fifteen years after its inception.

Changes Introduced by Zheng

Once in power, Zheng initiated sweeping changes, following the philosophical tenets of Legalism as modeled by Shang Yang, to consolidate and support Qin authority. (Some aspects of Confucianism, such as the importance of filial duty and ancestor worship, were still emphasized during the Qin dynasty.) Zheng divided the land into units administered by a highly centralized bureaucracy, applied a rigorous penal code,



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 Western Zhou (1045–771 BCE)
 Eastern Zhou (770–221 BCE)
 Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE)
 Warring States period (475–221 BCE)
 Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE)
 Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE)
 Three Kingdoms period (220–265 CE)
 North and South dynasties (220–589 CE)
 Sui dyansty (581–618 CE)
 Tang dynasty (618–907 CE)
 Five Dynasties period (907–960 CE)
 Song dynasty (960–1279)
 Northern Song (960–1126)
 Southern Song (1127–1279)
 Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234)
 Yuan dynasty (1279–1368)
 Ming dynasty (1368–1644)
 Qing dynasty (1644–1912)
 Republican China (1912–1927)
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 Republic of China (1949–present)
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and relocated the Zhou aristocratic families to the capital of Xianyang, where they could be closely watched in grand mansions built for the purpose.

Zheng also standardized weights, currency, and measures; set cart-wheel measurements, had a national system of highways and a canal system built; constructed monumental palaces; and reformed the writing system, which had gradually become more regional, by creating a new script called *xiao zhuān tǐ* ("small seal script") to be used throughout his empire. To form a defense against troublesome nomads from Central Asia such as the Xiongnu, vast numbers of peasant laborers were conscripted to construct a walled fortification; subsequent emperors added to this construction, which eventually become known the Great Wall.

To ensure his life after death, Zheng provided himself with a huge tomb complex; that complex has not yet been explored. In 1974, however, archaeologists did unearth a remarkable army of thousands of life-size terra-cotta figures, the army who would protect him in the next life. Each figure was represented wearing the costume and carrying the weapons that were

appropriate for his branch of service, be it infantry, cavalry, or chariot driver, and each figure's face was individually modeled as if copying a real person. Armed crossbows were set within the chambers to guard against invaders.

Oppression during Zheng's Rule

The reign of Zheng lasted for eleven of the fifteen years of this dynasty, and most of the achievements, and crimes, of the Qin refer to acts perpetuated by the First Emperor. The massive undertakings credited to him were achieved in only a few years' time, at the cost of harsh, repressive laws regulating his subjects. Overworked peasants not only served as agricultural workers, but also doubled as soldiers and as builders of the immense projects undertaken by the Qin ruler. Prison sentences and maiming punishments were commonly handed out to dissenters or to those unlucky enough to gain the emperor's disapproval. Zheng reportedly executed officials who were late to their assigned tasks, even if their tardiness resulted from weather conditions that made traveling impossible. He also created enemies among the aristocrats who in the new meritocracy were no longer entitled to inherited court office.

Fearing the power of intellectual debate, in 213 BCE Zheng ordered that all texts, except for those on the subjects of divination, medicine, forestry, and agriculture, be burned, aside from a single copy of each, which was held in the imperial library (itself burned to the ground by the invading Han forces in 206 BCE). To end dissension in his court, he ordered the execution of 460 scholars (Han writers claimed he had them buried alive, but this is supported by no other extant evidence). Fearing a popular uprising because the people were well armed, having fought for centuries against neighboring states and nomadic invaders, the First Emperor confiscated weapons, melting them down to supply bronze for ritual vessels and musical bells.

Obsessed with attaining eternal life, Zheng sent thousands of youths to search for the islands of immortality, called Peng Lai, rumored to exist in the mythical Eastern Sea. Some believe that this expedition resulted in the settling of Japan by the youths, who never returned to their homeland. He claimed as one of his ancestors Huang Di ("Yellow Emperor"), the semimythic founder of the ancient Chinese people, who reputedly never died but instead rose to *tian* (heaven) in a chariot drawn by dragons.

Within his palace, the emperor employed alchemists to seek the secret to eternal life. An extensive network of tunnels connecting his palaces was constructed on

the advice of one of these shamans, and the emperor was said to have moved throughout the network, sleeping in different places each evening as a further deterrent to harm; his occupancy was kept secret, with death as the punishment for anyone who revealed his whereabouts. He undertook long journeys to the mountains, where he practiced sacrificial rituals for the same purpose of gaining immortality. Traveling to Mount Tai, he staged the sacrifices known as *feng* and *shan* also in hopes of warding off death. Ironically, Zheng died when returning from one of these immortality-seeking expeditions. Not surprisingly, after he died, civil unrest led to an uprising that the ineffectual Second Emperor and subsequent Child-Emperor were helpless to abate.

Nevertheless, the Qin rulers created the nation of central authority that the Han dynasty inherited. While adjusting its boundaries according to ever-changing political and social factors, this nation has continued until today as the land and population now called China, giving its centrally unified regions the claim of being the longest-lasting nation on Earth.

Dallas L. McCurley

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QIN TOMB The mausoleum of the "First Qin Emperor" Ying Zheng, also known as Qin Shi Huang (259–210 BCE), was built over a period of thirty-seven years with as many as 720,000 workers involved. Situated at the foot of Mount Lishan, 35 kilometers east of Xi'an, the mausoleum consists of an inner city that was 1,355 meters long and 580 meters wide and an outer city that was 2,165 meters long and 940 meters wide.

Excavation of the central tomb has not yet begun, but since 1974 archaeologists have been unearthing a subterranean army of thousands of life-size terra-cotta warriors and horses, guarding access to the main tomb. Each figure is a faithful representation of a distinctive

individual. The mausoleum continues to turn up surprising discoveries as archaeologists work patiently on the site. An excavation in 2000 unearthed what probably represented the Supreme Court in the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE), adding a civilian dimension to the burial that had been regarded as all military.

The magnificent mausoleum bespeaks the power and achievements of the First Qin Emperor, who unified China for the first time in its history, standardized weights and measurements, the monetary system, and the written language, and linked sections of the existing walls to form what is known as the Great Wall. The mausoleum came onto the UNESCO World Heritage List in 1987.

Jian-Zhong Lin

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QING DYNASTY Founded by the Manchus in 1644, the Qing was the last imperial dynasty to rule China. It built the largest consolidated empire in China's history and witnessed tremendous achievements in governmental administration, economic expansion, regional integration, and intellectual exploration. The dynasty lasted 268 years until it was overthrown by the Republican revolution of 1911; the last emperor abdicated in 1912.

Political Changes

The Manchu were descendants of the Jurchen tribes who controlled north China as the Jin dynasty (1125–1234). Unified under their leader Nurhachi (1559–1626), the Jurchen tribes were organized into large feudal and military units called banners. In 1616, using the Chinese political term *tianming* (Mandate of Heaven) as his reign title, Nurhachi established a dynasty that he called the Hou (Later) Jin. While continuing to imitate Chinese institutions, Nurhachi's successor Hongtaiji (or Abahai; 1592–1643) changed the name of his people from Jurchen to Manchu in 1635 and the dynastic name from Hou Jin to Qing the next year.

Under the new emperor Shunzhi (1638–1661, reigned 1644–1661), who was guided by his uncle, the imperial regent Dorgon (1612–1650), the Manchu entered Beijing in 1644 and crushed the rebellion that



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had already overthrown the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). During the course of their conquest, the Qing crushed the Southern Ming resistance and recruited the Chinese elite into the Manchu regime. While they tried to repress antforeign sentiment among the Han Chinese, the Qing established an empire on the Chinese model, which included Confucianism as the state orthodoxy, governmental institutions such as the Grand Secretariat and six ministries, and the Ming taxation system. The Qing government was essentially a Manchu-Chinese dyarchy, in which offices were held by equal numbers of Manchu and Chinese who worked side by side.

During the reigns of emperors Kangxi (1654–1722, reigned 1662–1722), Yongzheng (1678–1735, reigned 1723–1735), and Qianlong (1711–1799, reigned 1735–1795), the Qing reached its apogee of power and prosperity and established the most extensive empire of the world. In addition to China proper, it subjugated Taiwan (1683), Outer Mongolia (1690s), Tibet (1720), and Xinjiang (1759). Beyond the Chinese empire, the Qing strengthened the tributary relationship with neighboring countries, including today's Myanmar

(Burma), Annam (in present-day Vietnam), and Korea. In governing the country, these emperors worked hard to be exemplary Confucian rulers. Meanwhile, imperial authority was more and more concentrated through institutions such as the Grand Council (1729), which enabled the emperor to direct and deal with all important government matters efficiently. The minority regions were brought into the provincial administrative system, making them more closely controlled by the central government. In foreign trade, the emperor Qianlong inherited the Chinese tradition of restricting foreign contacts, and in 1760 he established the "Canton system," which confined foreign commerce to Guangdong (Canton).

After the first Opium War (1839–1842), a treaty port system was established in the coastal cities; it gave foreign imperialist powers political, economic, and legal privileges in Chinese ports. During the 1850s, the Qing also had to deal with large-scale popular uprisings, including the Nian Rebellion (1853–1868) in the east, the Muslim rebellion (1855–1873) in Yunnan, and the Taiping rebellion (1851–1864) across the empire. Although these rebellions did not destroy the Qing dynasty, they led to the shift of power from the Manchu central government to members of the provincial Chinese elite, such as Zeng Guofan (1811–1872), who rallied their own regional armies to defeat the peasant rebels.

In order to revive the dynasty, the Qing instituted a series of modernization programs, the *yangwu yundong* ("self-strengthening movement"), during the reigns of Tongzhi (1856–1875, reigned 1862–1874) and Guangxu (1871–1908, reigned 1875–1908), who were both directed by Tongzhi's mother, Ci Xi (1835–1898), behind a silk screen at court. Under the principle of *zhongxue weiti, xixue weiyong* (Chinese learning as the essence and Western learning as practical use), modern industrial development, led by the high-ranking officer Li Hongzhang (1823–1901), included building arsenals, machine factories, schools, railways, shipyards, telegraph lines, postal services, and a modern army, navy, and press.

While the self-strengthening movement made some progress in modernizing the nation, it did not make the dynasty strong enough to fight off imperialist encroachments. In the Sino-French War of 1884–1885, China lost Vietnam. In 1887, China officially ceded Macao to Portugal. During the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, Japan defeated China and forced it to recognize Korean independence and to cede Taiwan to Japan. Consequently foreign powers started scrambling for concessions (areas of land that were leased in perpetuity by foreign governments) in China.

Responding to the danger of partition, Chinese from various social strata launched new social movements. In 1898, during the so-called Hundred Days of Reform, a group of intellectuals persuaded Emperor Guangxu to call for changes in education, political administration, industry and commerce, and foreign relations. The reform movement, however, produced no practical results because it was opposed by the powerful and conservative Empress Dowager Ci Xi.

Meanwhile, the foreign advances in north China aroused a furious antiforeign uprising, the Boxer Rebellion (1900). In the late 1890s, a secret society called the Boxers United in Righteousness directed its wrath against Christian converts and foreign establishments such as churches, railways, and mines, which the society blamed for the miserable changes in people's lives. In 1900, when the Qing court began to support them, the Boxers attacked the foreign legations in Beijing. This popular movement was put down by a military alliance of eight countries, which forced the Qing to pay a huge indemnity and to accept the establishment of foreign military guards in Beijing. In order to preserve its commercial interests in China, the United States announced the Open Door policy and requested that all countries agree not to deny others access to their spheres of influence. China's territorial integration was maintained due to mutual restraint among the powers.

Foreign aggressions and the Qing's failure to deal with the crises stimulated Han-Chinese nationalism. Zou Rong's *Geming jun* (The Revolutionary Army, 1903) called on the Chinese to reject the Manchu yoke and seize their own destiny. The nationalists led by Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), a Chinese commoner who had received a Western education in Hawaii and Hong Kong, looked to political revolution to solve China's problems. Under his "Three Principles of the People"—nationalism, democracy, and people's livelihood—Sun undertook the mobilization of various groups, such as secret-society members and overseas students. In 1905, he combined his revolutionary organization with other radical groups and founded the *Tongmeng hui* (Revolutionary Alliance) in Japan, which guided the revolutionary activities in China.

During the first decade of the twentieth century, the Qing court engaged in more radical reforms in order to save the dynasty. In 1905, the age-old civil-service examination system was abolished. Thousands of Chinese students were sent to study abroad. The government was structured and legal institutions were modified along modern lines. In 1908, the court issued the *Xianfa dagang* (Outline of Constitution), which for the first time introduced constitutional monarchy to China and defined the "rights and responsibilities" of



OPENING CHINA TO THE WEST

Following the Opium War, China's ports were opened to western nations. This extract is from the 1844 Treaty of Peace, Amity, and Commerce, which opened ports to the United States.

The United States of America and the Ta Tsing Empire, desiring to establish firm, lasting, and sincere friendship between the two nations, have resolved to fix, in a manner clear and positive, by means of a treaty or general convention of peace, amity, and commerce, the rules which shall in the future be mutually observed in the intercourse of their respective countries:

For which most desirable object the President of the United States has conferred full powers on their Commissioner, Caleb Cushing, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States to China; and the August Sovereign of the Ta Tsing Empire on his Minister and Commissioner Extraordinary Tsiyeng, of the Imperial House, a Vice Guardian of the Heir Apparent, Governor General of the Two Kwangs, and Superintendent General of the Trade and foreign intercourse of the five ports.

And the said Commissioners, after having exchanged their said full powers, and duly considered the premises, having agreed to the following articles:

Article I. There shall be a perfect, permanent, and universal peace and a sincere and cordial amity, between the United States of America on the one part, and the Ta Tsing Empire on the other part, and between their people respectively, without exception of persons or places.

Article II. Citizens of the United States resorting to China for the purposes of commerce

will pay the duties of import and export prescribed in the tariff, which is fixed by and made a part of this treaty. They shall, in no case, be subject to other or higher duties than are or shall be required of the people of any nation whatever. Fees and charges of every sort are wholly abolished, and officers of the revenue, who may be guilty of exaction, shall be punished according to the laws of China. If the Chinese Government desire to modify, in any respect, the said tariff, such modification shall be made only in consultation with Consuls or other functionaries thereto duly authorized in behalf of the United States, and with consent thereof. And if additional advantages or privileges, of whatever description, be conceded hereafter by China to any other nation, the United States, and the citizens thereof, shall be entitled thereupon to a complete, equal and impartial participation in the same.

Article III. The citizens of the United States are permitted to frequent the five ports of Kwang-chow, Amoy, Fuchow, Ningpo and Shanghai, and reside with their families, and trade there, and to proceed at pleasure with their vessels and merchandise to and from any foreign port and either of the said five ports to any other of them. But said vessels shall not lawfully enter the other ports of China, nor carry on a clandestine or fraudulent trade along the coasts thereof. And any vessel belonging to a citizen of the United States which violates the provision, shall, with her cargo, be subject to confiscation by the Chinese Government.

Source: Treaties and Conventions Concluded between the United States of America and Other Powers since July 4, 1776. (1899) Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

the people. The Qing court also opened provincial assemblies in 1909 and a consultative national assembly in 1910. But the eleventh-hour reform efforts did not satisfy the revolutionaries. The 1911 Revolution resulted in the founding of a new government—the Republic of China. The last emperor of the Qing, Xuantong (1906–1967, reigned 1909–1912), formally

abdicated on 12 February 1912. The imperial system officially came to a close in China.

Socioeconomic Changes

By creating a multiethnic empire, the Qing brought significant changes to the Chinese social landscape. In the vast Inner Asian regions of Mongolia, Xinjiang,

and Tibet, a number of different peoples were incorporated into the Chinese territory, but they enjoyed considerable political and cultural autonomy. In particular, the Qing sought to preserve their ethnic identity as Manchu. Manchu were urged to retain the skills in archery and horsemanship; the Chinese practice of foot binding was prohibited among Manchu women; intermarriage between Manchu and Chinese was banned; Manchuria was maintained as a homeland base to which the Han Chinese were forbidden from migrating; the native Manchu civil-military units, the banners, were kept intact and stationed separately from the Chinese at garrisons across the empire; members of the ruling elite were encouraged to receive Manchu-style education, particularly mastery of the Manchu language; and Manchu were granted preferential political, legal, and social treatment. In addition, all Han Chinese males were forced to shave the front of their hair and wear a braid in the back, a Manchu style that signified political loyalty. Meanwhile, to build a "Confucian" empire, the Manchu conquerors, deliberately or unconsciously, undertook a systematic policy of sinicization, adopting Chinese values, institutions, cultural practices, and social customs. The Qing witnessed an intensive cultural integration of different peoples.

Despite macroregional diversity, the traditional economy thrived under the Qing. By the late eighteenth century, agricultural production was increased because of the spread of better seeds and fertilizers, enlarged land areas, improved techniques, and cultivation of new crops native to the Americas. Government tax policy facilitated agricultural development. In 1713, the emperor Kangxi froze the number of taxpaying adults, permanently exempting the increased population from taxation; Yongzhen instituted a fiscal reform in which taxes were based on land and collected in silver; this benefited poor peasant farmers. The industries that flourished included textiles, porcelain, paper, sugar, mining, and metalworking. Commercialization continued its course. Efficient transport networks and marketing mechanisms such as a banking system promoted domestic trade and developed an empirewide market. China traded with Japan, Southeast Asia, Europe, and the Americas, and foreign trade expanded rapidly in China's favor. China's explosion in population, which grew from 150 million at the beginning of the dynasty to 360 million in the early 1800s, in part reflected the prosperity of the most dynamic economy in the preindustrial world (though that same population explosion also caused tremendous social stresses).

The foreign encroachments following the Opium War changed the Qing economic and social structures,

especially in the coastal areas. Enormous war indemnities drained the resources of the dynasty. Foreigners held the post of inspector-general of the Maritime Customs Service and served as commissioners of customs across the empire. Powerful foreign factories, railways, and banks dominated the Qing's incipient modern industry and commerce. Foreign concessions in the treaty ports built up independent foreign communities within Qing society. Yet, along with the introduction of foreign values and technology, the late Qing started China's own modern enterprises, operated by either the government or private entrepreneurs. Despite tremendous difficulties, progress was made in armaments, shipping, textiles, communications, mining, machinery, and banking. While industrialization started to transform business patterns along the coast, the traditional sector retained its dominance in the interior.

Along with the emergence of a modern economy, the late-Qing social order changed dramatically. Cosmopolitan cities developed. Shanghai grew into the largest city in China and an economic center in East Asia. In the treaty ports, Chinese commercial bourgeoisie—either entrepreneurs or compradores (merchants working for foreign firms)—became influenced by foreigners, embracing Western modes of life and ideas. Western-style education, both at home and abroad, trained a new class of people who confronted the old educated elite. Laborers who migrated overseas built up foreign economic and social connections. The first group of Chinese proletariat appeared in mines, railways, docks, and factories of the industrial centers. A new type of army, equipped and trained along Western lines, began to play an important role in Qing political life. Some "new women," as represented by the revolutionary Qiu Jin (1875–1907), unbound their feet, joined sisterhoods, and obtained education—by 1909, there were thirteen thousand girls attending schools in China and several hundred studying overseas. These new social elements, joined by the dispossessed peasants from the countryside, became more and more alienated from the old order and finally toppled the Qing regime.

Cultural and Intellectual Changes

The Qing was a period of cultural flowering and intellectual searching. In the early Qing, when the Manchu endeavored to reconstruct the world order, they declared Neo-Confucianism the state orthodoxy. In order to control intellectuals and the spread of knowledge, the state sponsored enormous literary projects, including the *Gujin tushu jicheng* (Synthesis of Books and Illustrations Past and Present, 1726–1728)

and *Siku quanshu* (Complete Library of the Four Treasuries, 1772–1782). Partly due to the government's repressive policy, a great many scholars devoted themselves to the laborious literary work known as the "evidential research movement," which contributed immensely to critical studies of Chinese history, philosophy, and philology. Beyond government control, nonofficial thinkers, such as Huang Zongxi (1610–1695), Gu Yanwu (1613–1682), and Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692), searched for new meanings of life. Literary works such as *Liaozhai zhiyi* (Strange Tales from a Chinese Studio) by Pu Songling (1640–1715), *Rulin waishi* (The Scholars) by Wu Jingzi (1701–1754), and *Honglou meng* (*Dream of the Red Chamber*) by Cao Xueqin (1715–1763) incisively and vividly exposed social problems with outstanding artistry.

European missionaries continued to work at the imperial court and in the provinces. During Kangxi's reign, the Jesuits' accommodating interpretation of Confucianism was attacked by such European orders as the Dominicans and the Franciscans. In a struggle known as the Chinese Rites Controversy, Catholic authorities in Rome rejected the Jesuit approach in 1704; Kangxi, enraged by European interference, expelled a number of missionaries who were intolerant of Chinese culture. During the nineteenth century, Protestant missionaries brought Western values, science, technology, medicine, and education to China. By the end of the century, there were about 750 Catholic and 1,300 Protestant missionaries in China, who converted about 200,000 Chinese. The missionary efforts from time to time encountered native antiforeign sentiment, as demonstrated in the Tianjin Massacre of 1870 and the Boxer Rebellion, which hindered the missionaries from making greater achievements.

Foreign aggression after the Opium War forced the Chinese political and intellectual elite to turn to the West for plans to enrich the country and strengthen the military. Wei Yuan (1794–1856), in his famous *Haiguo tuzhi* (Illustrated Treatise on Overseas Countries), suggested using the foreigners' own techniques to overcome them. The Qing self-strengthening movement brought in Western values as well as modern science and technology. Yan Fu (1853–1921), a Qing student who studied naval science in England, translated influential works by Darwin, Huxley, Spencer, and Adam Smith. Modern nationalism as promoted by Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionary followers became a powerful weapon that eventually destroyed the old imperial order.

The Qing dynasty holds a significant position in China's history. Despite difficulties and disasters, the

Qing left distinctive territorial, political, demographic, economic, and intellectual legacies for present-day China.

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QINGHAI (2002 pop. 5.3 million). A remote province in western China, Qinghai (Blue Sea) has a population that includes Han Chinese and Tibetans, as well as Mongols and Kazakh, Hui, Salar, and Tu minorities. The capital Xining (Western Peace) has a population of 1 million. Qinghai is the fourth-largest official province in China, having six autonomous prefectures, thirty counties, and seven autonomous counties spread across 721,000 square kilometers.

Bordering Sichuan (northeast), Tibet (southwest), Xinjiang (northwest), and Gansu (northeast), Qinghai encompasses part of the Qinghai-Tibetan plateau averaging over 4,000 meters above sea level, the world's largest and highest plateau. From Qinghai arise three of Asia's major rivers, the Chang (Yangtze), Huanghe, and Mekong. Qinghai Lake (Koko Nor in Mongolian) is China's largest inland lake. Over 105 kilometers long, the turquoise lake is 3,205 meters above sea level. Its brackish waters host Niao Dao (Bird Island) sanctuary, where thousands of waterfowl congregate, including the rare black-necked crane. The Tsaidam (Mongolian for salt marsh) Basin of central Qinghai has an area of 240,926 square kilometers. Part salt marsh, part desert and rich in minerals, coal, and oil, the area is of increasing interest for the exploitation of natural resources. Native fauna include wild yak, Przewalski's horse, blue sheep, wolf, and a wide variety of birds. The saltwater-drinking camel, newly discovered in 2001, also inhabits part of Qinghai.

Qinghai's harsh climate has an average winter temperature of -15°C and an annual rainfall of 25 to 51 centimeters. The east produces spring wheat, highland barley, peas, potatoes, and rapeseed. The vast grasslands of the west are suitable for herding yaks, horses, sheep, and goats. Other products include wool, animal skins, oil, natural gas, common salt, and minerals. Per capita income is small. China's main nuclear facility and waste site are in Haiyan, by Qinghai Lake. Qinghai is known as "China's Siberia" due to the huge population of prisoners sent there from the rest of the nation to work in the prison factories.

Once part of Tibet (Amdo), Qinghai came under Mongol rule during the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), becoming part of Gansu Province. About 20 kilometers southwest of Xining at Huangcheng is the famous Taer monastery, home of the reformer of Tibetan Buddhism Tsong-kha-pa (fifteenth century). After 1724, the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) continued to rule Qinghai, then called Koko Nor. In 1928, Qinghai became an official province of China, including autonomous districts for Tibetans, Chinese Muslims, and Kazakh and Mongol minorities.

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QINGKE Having a multiplicity of meanings in Chinese culture, the term *qingke* (guest hospitality) refers both to an overt strategy employed in *guanxi* (interpersonal relationships) management and, more generally, to the entertainment of guests. The former sense denotes a mundane social phenomenon, while the latter has positive connotations that evoke the notions of pride, group identity and superior warm feelings, personal flavor, and hospitality that the Chinese associate with their culture.

Invitations

Literally, *qingke* signifies either an invitation or a polite overture of goodwill. An offer to *qingke* can be an expression of the acceptance of the responsibilities associated with the role of host ("I will entertain you") or can simply be a gesture employed to maintain harmonious social relations ("We should get together sometime"). Although occasionally there is difficulty in assessing whether such statements are genuine in-

vitations, contextual cues such as specific times and locations inform listeners. As a genuine invitation, *qingke* is a display of hospitality, warmheartedness, and a desire to deepen the bonds of the relationship.

Entertainment of Guests

Among the multitude of occasions associated with *qingke* are tea dates, trips to the movies, holidays, festivals, weddings, birthdays, promotions, seeing someone off or welcoming someone back from a journey, requesting assistance, conducting social transactions, and maintaining *guanxi*. The nature of *qingke* activities is dictated by the closeness of the relationships among participants, with a major distinction being made between in-groups and out-groups. Frequently occurring in private, in-group events tend to be more relaxed, are often held because something good has happened to the host, and are focused on the exchange of feelings. The more formal out-group occasions take place in public settings, are characterized by stricter adherence to codes of etiquette, involve large amounts of resources, and are frequently motivated by personal gain.

Tradition of Proper Etiquette

As early as the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE), the *Book of Rites* recorded in extensive detail that social activity among virtuous men was governed by strict codes of protocol and that without an understanding of ritual and etiquette, one could not become a functional member of society. Culturally defined norms of etiquette have since delineated an intricate web of social roles, spelled out responsibilities associated with those roles, and shaped public behavior and hospitality in China.

As China moves into the twenty-first century and social relationships continue to deepen in complexity, acknowledging hierarchy, knowing one's place in the social dynamic, reciprocating, exchanging *ganqing* (feelings), and maintaining social harmony are still behaviors recognized and maintained through the Chinese system of etiquette. These behaviors constitute a large part of the repertoire of skills that socially competent Chinese draw on to manage interpersonal relationships and are, therefore, an integral part of hospitality.

Regional Variations

Due to its vast size and enormous population, contemporary China is characterized by tremendous cultural variation and regional diversity. The degree to which traditional protocol in the entertainment of guests is adhered to in developed urban centers such as Beijing and Shanghai varies drastically from that

found in conservative rural areas such as Shandong and much of inland China. Moreover, China is made up of numerous ethnic and cultural subgroups that often maintain distinct social practices. Although notions of what is involved in hospitality differ across region and subculture, most Chinese share an intense pride in their complex systems of etiquette and hospitality. This pride is reflected in the use of such phrases as *liy-izhibang* (nation of ritual and etiquette) to refer to China.

Private Contexts

Invitations to attend private homes signify the trust and closeness assigned to a relationship. Hosts expend tremendous time and energy cleaning, cooking, and preparing food and spirits before the arrival of guests. However, these *qingke* events are relatively relaxed because they occur in the private setting of the home and involve small numbers of intimate friends and family. As a result, private events are normally focused on strengthening existing bonds.

After greeting guests, primary hosts, often men, begin with a period of *banxuan* (small talk) that may take place on a couch in a sitting room. While one host, usually the lady of the house, prepares the meal, a second host offers tea, cigarettes, fruit, and candy between assisting in the preparation of the food. Although more relaxed than public banquets, private meals proceed in a similarly prescribed manner. After the meal is completed, hosts escort guests from the eating area to a more comfortable setting to relax, chat, smoke, eat fruit, or sing karaoke. *Qingke* events end with hosts seeing guests off while urging them to stay longer and to visit again.

Public Contexts

In the public arena, *qingke* may be realized as an invitation to attend a movie with a friend on the least formal level or as an invitation to a banquet that takes place in a large hotel or restaurant on the most formal level. Informal *qingke* events are viewed simply as opportunities for friends to spend time together chatting, eating, or doing something interesting.

Formal banquets, on the other hand, are large-scale cultural performances involving vast quantities of food and drink, which serve as the primary venue for both social interaction and *guanxi* maintenance. Banquets, a microcosm of Chinese society, are conducted with particular emphasis placed on conforming to the proper norms of etiquette, with themes of modesty, sincerity, and mutual respect framing behavior. Because many Chinese organizations exhausted signifi-

cant amounts of public resources to finance extravagant banquets during the 1980s and 1990s, banquets and the notion of *qingke* are sometimes associated with waste and corruption.

Hosting

During formal *qingke* occasions, hosts are subdivided into primary hosts, assistant hosts, and escorts, while guests are hierarchically differentiated as main and secondary guests. Participants must conduct the ritual behaviors and fulfill the responsibilities associated with the roles they are assigned. The standard rule that underlies all hospitality events is *ke sui zhu bian* ("guests follow the host's wishes").

Thus, hosting involves a significant burden of responsibility and affords enormous interactional power. Hosts are responsible for arranging a suitable location, sufficient food and spirits, an interesting and harmonious group of guests, transportation, seating assignments, and entertainment. Hosts also have the duty to maintain the hierarchy of the event, create a festive atmosphere, lead conversation, maintain harmony, facilitate the exchange of feelings, and ensure a pleasant experience for every guest.

Hosts often feel obligated to spend prodigious amounts of time planning the event, preparing the site, and learning guests' tastes before the event. In addition to bearing all costs, hosts arrange everything and accompany guests at all times, a practice many Western visitors to China find stifling. They arrive early, welcome guests, lead toasts, order dishes, issue self-deprecating remarks, serve food, pour drinks, and control every aspect of the interaction. Hosts often make offers with particular vigor, because the default assumption is that guests will politely decline offers of hospitality even if they plan to accept.

Centrality of *Qingke*

In Chinese culture, where strict norms of etiquette dictate public interaction, human relationships are emphasized, and a balanced social ledger is the ideal, *qingke* events hold special significance. Entertaining guests is a skill that plays a vital role in social, political, and economic life. With varying degrees of frequency and formality, *qingke* is used as a tactic in the flow of social capital, a mechanism in the exchange of feelings, a means of displaying status, a key to accessing the group, a strategy for managing social relationships, an instrument of reciprocity, and a method for balancing social harmony.

Eric Todd Shepherd

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QINGMING Qingming is the second-most-important seasonal festival, after the Lunar New Year, involving ancestral veneration in China. The term literally means clear and transparent, or brightness, implying the arrival of spring, after the dark and cold winter.

Traditional Chinese earth tombs were built above ground and were shaped like round mounds (in southern China) or triangular pyramids (in northern China). Rainfall often washed away part of the soil and defaced the desired smooth surface. Wild grass and small trees also sometimes grew on the tombs. On Qingming day, 5 or 6 April in the Western calendar, offspring of the departed ancestor gather around the tomb in the morning to trim the outgrown vegetation and repair its cracks. They lay sacrifices in front of the tomb, including half-cooked food in dishes (such as a whole chicken, a slice of pork, and fried fish, rice cakes, and fruits) and alcoholic drinks in glasses. Firecrackers are lit to ward off evil spirits, and incense is burned to invite the ancestor's spirit to return for the meal.

The offspring take turns to pray (from the most senior ones to the least senior in terms of generation) by kowtowing in front of the tombs. Then they burn square-shaped ritual paper money for the departed ancestor. After that, they place another kind of ritual paper money, in elongated rectangular shape, either white or yellow in color, above the tomb.

Even though Qingming was recorded as a major seasonal node (one of twenty-four in the traditional Chinese calendar) before the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), there was no indication of tomb-sweeping rituals in that period. Scholars suggest that this was probably an incorporation of two distinct customs. The first one was a Yao tribal custom of spring worship in southern and southwestern China. This Yao festival worships dead females along the riverside on the third day of the third month of the lunar year, which falls approximately a half month after the spring equinox. The second custom was borrowed from nomadic Turks from Central Asia, who celebrated the

beginning of the spring season with field outings and picnics. Confucian scholars incorporated these two festivals into an ancestral rite to commemorate the dead on the day of Qingming.

Huang Shu-min

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QINLING RANGE The Qinling mountain range runs 1,500 kilometers from the borders of Gansu and Qinghai provinces in the west to the middle of Henan Province in the east. In China the term particularly refers to the section located in Shaanxi Province in central China. The peaks reach 2,000–3,000 meters, the highest being Mount Taibai (3,767 meters), located about 100 kilometers west of Xi'an. The steep northern slopes of the range overlook the Wei River valley and separate the southern part of the province from the rest. The range also constitutes a natural border between north and south China, featuring dry temperate climate in the north and humid subtropic climate in the south. There are only four passes crossing the range, so the mountains have also served as a natural defense against nomadic invasions from the north. In 1998 the construction of a double-track railway tunnel through the mountains was begun. The Qinling Mountains cover more than 50,000 square kilometers and are home to a great variety of wildlife and endangered species. Some 200 giant pandas, about one-fifth of the total population, live in nature reserves in the mountains, and more than 3,000 rare plants have been observed. The region is sparsely populated, and the main sources of income are forestry and some coal mining.

Bent Nielsen

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QIU JIN (1875–1907), Chinese revolutionary and advocate of women's rights. Qiu Jin (Ch'iu Chin) was

born into a well-to-do family in China's Shaoxing, Zhejiang Province. She received a good education, but at the age of twenty-one she was forced into a marriage arranged by her parents. Qiu Jin had two children before she left her family behind in 1904 and went to Japan, where she studied and was influenced by Western ideas. Having returned to Zhejiang in 1906, she founded *Zhongguo Nubao* (Chinese Women's Journal) in Shanghai. In the articles she wrote for the magazine, she condemned such practices as arranged marriages and foot binding and called for equal rights and modern education for women. In her outward appearance and activities, such as martial arts and horse riding, she was often at odds with her community. She joined Sun Yat-sen's (1866–1925) revolutionary organization and supported anti-Manchu movements, and together with a male cousin, Xu Xilin, she coordinated several secret societies and planned a rebellion. In July 1907 both Xu and Qiu Jin were arrested and executed before the plans were carried out. Qiu Jin became a martyr and a symbol of a true heroine in the fight against the Manchu government.

Bent Nielsen

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QOM (2001 pop. 873,000). Approximately 130 kilometers south of Tehran, Qom is situated in a semiarid interior basin of central Iran along the Qom River, which flows down from the Zagros Mountains, through Qom, and into the large Darya-e Namak salt marsh to the city's east. Qom is bordered to the east by the western edge of the Dasht-e Kavir (Great Salt Desert). The city depends on both ground and subterranean water sources, the latter derived from channels known as *qanats*; its history has included significant incidents of water shortage and drought.

The vicinity of present-day Qom has been settled since early antiquity, and it is cited by many authorities as among the oldest sites of inhabitation in Iran. The city's earliest manifestation was reportedly razed amid Alexander of Macedon's fourth century BCE advance, and it was not truly restored until the late fifth century CE during the Sasanid dynasty (224–228–651 CE). It was a regional center of Zoroastrianism prior to its incorporation into the Islamic world. Thereafter, Qom emerged as a center of Iranian Shi'ism in the seventh century and continues as such into the present.



Minarets surround the golden-tiled dome of a mosque in Qom. (CORBIS)

sent. In 816, Fatima, the sister of Reza the Eighth Imam, died and was buried in Qom; a shrine was erected, and the city began to develop as a major Shi'ite pilgrimage site. Qom remained a religious center even when the wider region was subjugated by invading Turkic and other armies, although some destruction did occur. Its prominence as a theological center inspired the gradual development of a holy precinct in Qom through the construction of additional mosques, shrines, *madrasabs* (religious schools), and other religious infrastructure usually endowed by notables over the following centuries; most notable is the golden-domed shrine that covers Fatima's tomb.

While Mashhad is regarded as the holiest of cities in historic Persia and contemporary Iran, Qom has been the principal seat of both the country's *ulama* (religious leadership) and Islamic education for centuries, albeit with some marginal periods of relative inactivity. As such, it is not only noted for its mosques, *madrasabs* (in fact, the largest *madrasab* in Iran is located in Qom), and libraries, but Qom also stands out as a historic political rival of Tehran and its secular rulers. This was particularly true during the Qajar (1794–1925) and Pahlavi (1925–1979) dynasties, and it was in this context in Qom that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was educated and came to prominence in Iran. Qom was the location of prominent anti-Pahlavi riots during the revolution. Since the formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, it has retained its theological significance, and many clerical politicians commute regularly between Qom and Tehran.

Levels of food production in the vicinity of Qom have historically been marginal. However, the city has been able to thrive—although fitfully at times—due to industries other than just those oriented around religion and pilgrimage, including food and cotton processing, the production of ceramics, glasses, and tiles, the weaving of textiles—especially carpets—and facilities ancillary to the production of petroleum and chemicals. Although there have been discoveries of both of oil and natural gas in the immediate vicinity, issues of quality and accessibility have largely prevented subsequent development on a significant scale. Qom's recent development has been associated with its location in a dynamic transportation corridor including highways, railways, and pipelines from Tehran in the north, through Qom, toward other cities in the south. The related expansion in infrastructure and linkages with other areas have led to dramatic increases in the city's population over the past decades, from 637,700 in 1985 to 873,300 in 2001.

Kyle T. Evered

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QUALITY CIRCLES The term quality circles refers to small groups of line employees (usually ten or fewer) who meet periodically outside of regular work hours to discuss ways to improve the quality of products they produce and the efficiency and effectiveness of the production processes they oversee. Although nominally voluntary, supervisors typically initiate quality circles, and attendance is considered by employees as a required part of their jobs. Proponents consider quality circles an effective way to foster a sense of involvement and to effectively harness the knowledge and expertise of lower-ranking workers. According to a 1994 Japanese Ministry of Labor report, 70 percent of Japanese firms with over five thousand workers and 61 percent of firms with one to five thousand employees have established groups of this kind.

The inspiration for the development of quality circles is attributed to American advisers W. Edwards Deming and Joseph Juran, who were brought to Japan under U.S. sponsorship in the early 1950s to help Japanese industry address rampant quality problems. The American statistical quality control techniques

that were introduced at this time were then adapted to the Japanese context during the late 1950s and early 1960s as part of the Total Quality Control (TQC) movement promoted throughout Japanese industry by the Union of Japanese Scientists and Engineers (JUSE) with government backing. What was distinctive about the JUSE's effort was its emphasis on moving responsibility for quality control out of the exclusive ken of specialized staff employees to include rank-and-file line workers. Quality circles first emerged in the early 1960s as study groups devoted to discussing JUSE publications. The JUSE subsequently established regional quality circle promotion offices and held quality circle conventions and other gatherings. A primary motivation on the part of Japanese managers in encouraging quality circles was the fear that Japanese manufacturers would lose out to foreign competition as Japanese trade rules were liberalized. There was also a concern about radicalism and alienation among younger workers.

Quality circles were considered one of the secrets of Japanese industrial success during the 1980s boom in foreign interest in Japanese management techniques. Japanese firms introduced quality circles in their overseas subsidiaries, and they have been an important component in the Japanese government's international technical cooperation programs. The Singaporean government has gone so far as to establish an award for the country's most outstanding quality circles.

Lonny E. Carlile

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QUAN TANGSHI The *Quan Tangshi* (Complete Tang Poems) is the most complete collection of Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) and Five Dynasties (907–960 CE) verse. It consists of 900 fascicles, with 48,900 works by more than 2,200 writers.

The compilation of the *Quan Tangshi* was ordered by Emperor Kangxi (reigned 1661–1722) of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). Pang Dingqiu was appointed editor-in-chief, and Cao Yin (1658–1712) was in charge

of organizing and publishing the project, which began in the spring of 1705 and was completed in the autumn of 1706. The relative completeness of the *Quan Tangshi* was the result of its incorporation of the efforts of a long lineage of previous collectors. Its basic framework was drawn from a compilation by Ji Zhenyi (b. 1630) under the same title; this, in turn, was based on a collection by Qian Qianyi (1582–1664), who himself had drawn heavily from Wu Guan's (c. 1571) *Tangshi ji* (Records of Tang Poetry), itself an expanded version of Ji Yougong's (flourished 1121–1161) *Tangshi jishi* (Events of Tang Poetry). Furthermore, the *Quan Tangshi* absorbed all 1,033 fascicles of poems in Hu Zhenheng's (1569–1644/45) *Tangyin tongqian* (Comprehensive Booktags of Tang Sounds). The works appearing in the *Quan Tangshi* are divided according to a fourfold periodization of Tang poetry into "Early," "High," "Mid," and "Late" periods, a schema first suggested by Yan Yu (c. 1230) in his *Canglang shibua* (Canglang Remarks on Poetry), which, though problematic, has long been followed in anthologies and in scholarship on the subject. Writers are arranged according to year of birth or, if that is unknown, the year in which they passed the *jinsbi* (presented scholar) examination. Short biographical sketches appear at the head of each writer's collected poems.

The *Quan Tangshi* has been criticized for certain shortcomings. First, it is, in fact, far from complete. Tang poems discovered in the Dunhuang caves at the turn of the twentieth century were, of course, unknown to its editors; certain poems and fragments quoted in other sources were overlooked as well. Another recurrent problem arises from the abundance of incorrect or overlapping attributions, and other works are out of sequence. Finally, no source references are given.

In the pursuit of a truly complete collection of Tang poetry, studies on commentary, supplements, collation, and other critical issues concerning the *Quan Tangshi* have been published. These works will eventually contribute to the updated version of the *Quan Tangshi* now being compiled.

Timothy Wai Keung Chan

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QUEMOY AND MATSU (1990 est. pop. 43,000). The islands of Quemoy and Matsu are part of a group of fifteen islands that are located in the Min River estuary about twelve kilometers off the coast of Fujian Province in China. The two islands, which were occupied by the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang) forces during the Nationalist evacuation of the mainland in 1949, belong to Taiwan. The larger island is Quemoy (also known as Kinmen, Chin-men, or Jinmen), which covers an area of 132 square kilometers, while the smaller island of Matsu (also known as Ma-tsu or Mazu) covers only 12 square kilometers. The heavily fortified islands became the focus of political crises between the People's Republic of China (PRC), which controls the remaining thirteen islands in the group, and the Republic of China on Taiwan, 210 kilometers to the east. Today, agriculture is the main occupation on Quemoy, and the islands have a population of about 43,000 (1990).

Historically, the islands have served as refuges for people fleeing wars on the mainland or as shelter for pirates. The famous pirate Cheng Cheng-kung (Koxinga) fought the Manchus and the Dutch from his stronghold on Quemoy. Following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the United States's Seventh Fleet was placed in the Taiwan Straits to prevent the Nationalists and the Communists from attacking each other. Having just been elected U.S. president, Dwight D. Eisenhower withdrew the fleet in February 1953, and in August 1954 the Nationalist government in Taiwan moved 58,000 soldiers to Quemoy and 15,000 to Matsu. In September the two islands came under heavy bombardment from mainland forces, and the fighting spread to other islands in the East China Sea. In the early months of 1955, the fighting further escalated and involved coastal ports on the mainland. In the United States, nuclear strikes against the PRC were considered, but this was opposed by leading European members of NATO. In April 1955 the PRC offered to negotiate a ceasefire, and the bombardment of the islands stopped on 1 May 1955.

In 1958 the crisis flared up again, and the islands were shelled once more. This time the United States extended its mutual security pact with Taiwan to include Quemoy and Matsu and once again deployed the Seventh Fleet to the area. It has been proposed that the reason large numbers of native Taiwanese soldiers were sent to the two islands was to prevent them from staging an armed rebellion in Taiwan. The island of Quemoy has now been opened to tourism.

Bent Nielsen

QUIT INDIA MOVEMENT The Quit India movement was the most militant of the mass movements led by the Indian National Congress (INC) against British rule, 1942–1943. The defeat of the European powers in Southeast Asia during World War II destroyed British prestige and revealed the hollowness of British military superiority. The pressure placed on the Indian economy by the war created great hardships for the population, leading to food shortages and directly to the terrible Bengal famine (1943). Repeated British attempts at formulating a constitutional settlement between the Congress and the Muslim League had been unsuccessful, most recently with the failure of the Cripps Mission (1942). In the summer of 1942, Mohandas K. Gandhi had urged the British to leave India to God or anarchy, and the Quit India resolution was passed by the Congress in Mumbai (Bombay) on 8 August 1942, with the leaders calling upon all Indians to protest against British rule on nonviolent lines.

The British, faced with the strains of the war and the prospect of a Japanese invasion through Myanmar (Burma), responded with immediate and sustained suppression, including mass arrests, brutal punishments, machine gun fire from the air, and preemptive attacks against suspected rebels. The INC leaders were arrested almost immediately in the early morning of 9 August. However, this was followed by a largely spontaneous popular outbreak that far exceeded the expectations of even the Congress.

Three broad phases can be distinguished. The first was predominantly urban and violent, consisting of strikes and clashes with police, and was quickly suppressed. From mid-August the center of protest moved to the rural areas with peasant rebellions being fanned by militant student leadership. From the end of September 1942 there was an outbreak of terrorism led by educated youths against imperial signs of oppression, such as police stations and communications. This was the longest phase, which continued into 1943.

There was considerable regional variation. Punjab, North West Frontier Province, Madras, and Kerala remained relatively quiet, whereas Bihar, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Eastern United Provinces, Manipur, and Orissa witnessed "really formidable mass rebellion" (Sarkar 1983: 399). Among the princely states only Mysore was affected to any significant extent. Muslims as a whole remained indifferent, and there were no major communal incidents. There was also relatively little social and class conflict. The main social groups involved included labor in the early phase. Middle-class student protest played a prominent role,

and in particular mass rebellion among the peasantry was important.

Chandrika Kaul

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QUQON, KHANATE OF The khanate of Quqon (Kokand) was a state centered in the Fergana Valley from the early eighteenth century until its absorption into the Russian empire in 1876. The Fergana Valley had been an economically important part of Central Asia for generations, but had never been the center of its own state until the foundation of the khanate of Quqon.

The khanate of Quqon was founded by Shahruxh biy, the chief of the Ming Uzbeks, when he carved a small independent principality (c. 1700) from the lands of the emirate of Bukhara. He chose the village of Quqon as his capital and built a citadel there.

Quqon remained a small principality confined to the western and central Fergana Valley until sometime around 1798. Alim biy (reigned 1800–1809), the eighth ruler of Quqon, formed a mercenary army and subjugated the rest of the Fergana Valley. Upon his consolidation of power, Alim took the title Khan.

Quqon expanded swiftly over the next forty years. Alim, his brother Omar (reigned 1809–1822), and Omar's successor Madali (reigned 1822–1840) added the cities of Khojend (present-day Khudzhand), Tashkent, Karategin, Darvaz, Kulob, and Alai to the khanate.

The reigns of Omar and Madali coincided with a time of rapid expansion of the economy that saw the Fergana Valley become the center of Central Asia's cotton and silk industries. Unfortunately Madali antagonized his people with his cruelty and corruption. Quqon's neighbor Bukhara took advantage of the unrest and invaded in 1842.

A popular uprising drove the Bukharans out quickly. In the aftermath of the invasion Quqon was torn by internal conflicts between sedentary Turkic and Iranian peoples and the nomadic Kipchak Turks. Kazakh rebellions, dynastic conflicts, and continuing conflicts with Bukhara also plagued Quqon.

Quqon's fate was sealed by Russia's interest in Central Asia. Russia began moving into the area around 1850 and in 1864 captured Tashkent. Soon after, Russia captured the important city of Khojend. In 1868 Khudoyar Khan signed a commercial convention with Russia that granted them a number of concessions. The Khan's seeming favor towards Russia antagonized many elements in Quqonian society and an anti-Russian uprising broke out that deposed the khan. The Russians moved in and put down the rebellion. Unrest continued and Russia invaded in 1876 and absorbed Quqon into the Russian empire as the Fergana Oblast in February 1876.

Andrew Sharp

QURGHONTEPPA (2002 est. pop. 62,000). Qurghonteppa is the fourth-largest city in the republic of Tajikistan in Central Asia and the administra-

tive center of Khalton Province. The city is situated in the southwestern part of the country, in the Vakhsh River valley, 100 kilometers south of the capital city, Dushanbe. Founded in the seventeenth century as a trading post, Qurghonteppa was part of the Bukhara khanate (1583–1740) and the Bukhara emirate (1747–1920). The city was the administrative center of Kurgan-Tyube Province of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic (established in 1929) and, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, was renamed Qurghonteppa in 1993. The city became the administrative center of Khalton Province as a result of the merger of the former Kurgan-Tyube and Kulob Provinces. Qurghonteppa and Kulob were the hardest-hit regions during the civil war in Tajikistan (1992–1997).

The city is the center of Tajikistan's main farming area and has food- and cotton-processing plants. Ajina-tepe, the remains of an ancient Buddhist temple and monastery of the seventh to eighth centuries CE, is 12 kilometers northeast of Qurghonteppa.

Natalya Yu. Khan

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RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND CONTAMINATION—CENTRAL ASIA Various aspects of nuclear energy research, nuclear fuel processing, and weapons production took place in every republic of the former Soviet Union. In the Central Asian republics, areas of radioactive contamination are widespread.

By far the worst situation exists at the former nuclear-weapons test site west of Semey (formerly Semipalatinsk), in Kazakhstan. At this test site 1.8 million hectares in area, 456 nuclear explosions, including many atmospheric ones, were conducted between 1949 and 1989. The new Kazakhstan government closed this test site in 1991.

As a result of some of the atmospheric tests, fallout traveled far beyond the test site. Tests revealed that 14 percent of the region's inhabitants received elevated radiation doses from the explosions. Farther downwind, measurable fallout from tests was detected in the adjacent Altay Kray (Altay Territory) on twenty-two different occasions. During the 1960s, about 38,000 curies of radioactive strontium and 50,000 curies of cesium entered the Irtysh River in Kazakhstan.

An estimated one million people inhabit areas contaminated by this testing. International Atomic Energy Agency specialists examined the area in 1994 and concluded that while most of the test site presented no health risk to local populations, portions should remain off limits to human occupancy. Bradley (1997: 512) stated that 72,000 hectares are too contaminated for human use.

Many other potential sources of radioactive contamination exist in Central Asia, though none as serious as the Semipalatinsk test site. Four of the five republics

(excepting Turkmenistan) either produced or processed uranium ore, collectively providing the majority of the Soviet Union's output. Several of these mines and milling plants were shut down following independence in 1991. A major fuel-processing facility also existed at Oskemen (formerly Ust'-Kamenogorsk). Radioactive waste storage sites occur in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.

The USSR's first commercial breeder reactor (which can process plutonium) was completed in 1972 at Aqtai (formerly Shevchenko) on Kazakhstan's Caspian Sea coast. It provides electricity and desalinizes saltwater for local use and is the only commercial nuclear reactor in Central Asia. It is under the control of Kazakhstan's Atomic Energy Agency.

The first "peaceful atom" subsurface nuclear detonation in the USSR occurred in Kazakhstan in 1965, creating a large crater called Lake Chagan. Contamination levels here required the site to be closed to the public. Numerous other underground tests were conducted in Kazakhstan and a few in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Varying amounts of low-level radiation were released by these tests.

During the Cold War, a number of intercontinental-ballistic-missile complexes were constructed in Kazakhstan; all have now been deactivated and the warheads sent to Russia for disassembly.

Philip R. Pryde

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RAFFLES, THOMAS STAMFORD (1781–1826), British colonial official in Malaya. Thomas Stamford Raffles, the son of an English sea captain, was born in Jamaica in 1781. In 1795 he went to work for the British East India Company. In 1805 he went to Penang (part of present-day Malaysia); he was made

lieutenant-governor of Java in 1811 after the British defeated the Dutch and French there. He published a *History of Java* in 1817, the same year he was knighted and became lieutenant-governor of Benkulen (present-day Bengkulu, on the southwest coast of Sumatra).

Although he viewed Malay society as corrupt and backward, he also appreciated much of the culture and his career was marked by major reforms in colonial administration. He ended slavery, established schools, tried to distribute some wealth to the Malays, and sought to weaken the power of Malay rulers. He also did much to strengthen English and weaken Dutch influence in the region. He is credited with making British policy in its Asian colonies more humanitarian, but was criticized for often acting with-



RAFFLES' TREATY

On 6 February 1819 Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles acquired the island of Singapore for Great Britain. The basic parties to the agreement and conditions are set forth in the first two articles of the treaty provided below.

Treaty of Friendship and Alliance concluded between the Honourable Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, Lieutenant-Governor of Fort Marlborough and its dependencies, Agent to the Most Noble Francis, Marquis of Hastings, Governor-General of India, &c, &c, &c., for the Honourable English East India Company, on the one part, and their Highness Sultan Hussain Mahummed Shah, Sultan of Johore, and Datoos Tumungong Sri Maharajah Abdul-Rahman, Chief of Singapore and its dependencies, on the other part.

ARTICLE 1. The preliminary Articles of Agreement entered into on the 30th of January 1819, by the Honourable Sir Stamford Raffles, on the part of the English East India Company and by Datoos Tumungong Sri Maharajah Abdul-Rahman, Chief of Singapore and its dependencies for himself and for Sultan Hussain Mahummed Shah, Sultan of Johore, are hereby entirely approved, ratified and confirmed by His Highness, the aforesaid Sultan Mahummed Shah.

ARTICLE 2. In furtherance of the objects contemplated in the said Preliminary Agreement, and in compensation of any and all the advantages which may be foregone now or hereafter by High Highness Sultan Hussain Mahummed Shah, Sultan of Johore, in consequence of the stipulations of this Treaty, the Honourable English East India Company agree and engage to pay to his aforesaid Highness the sum of Spanish Dollars five thousand annually, for, and during the time that the said Company may, by virtue of this Treaty, maintain a factory or factories on any part of His Highness' hereditary dominions, and the said Company further agree to afford their protection to His Highness aforesaid as long as he may continue to reside in the immediate vicinity of the places subject to their authority. It is however clearly explained to and understood by His Highness, that the English Government, in entering into this Alliance, and in thus engaging to afford protection to His Highness, is to be considered in no way bound to interfere with the internal politics of his States, or engaged to assert or maintain the authority of His Highness by force of arms.

Source: William George Maxwell and W. S. Gibson, eds. (1924) *Treaties and Engagements Affecting the Malay States and Borneo*. London: Truscott, 19.

out official approval. He is perhaps best known for founding Singapore (1819), one of the acts he took without receiving permission from superiors. Always interested in zoology, Raffles also founded the London Zoo in 1826.

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RAGA The raga is the basic ingredient of Indian classical music. In simplest terms, it can be defined as a combination of notes in an octave, expressing a distinct "melody type." Different ragas consist of different note combinations. In southern India, the raga is characterized by the *mela* system—the 72-scale system in which each scale consists of seven notes in ascent and descent—and hence has stayed relatively stable over time. In northern India, influenced by Persian music, the tradition of performance more than Sanskrit musical theory has served to shape the raga.

The performance of Indian classical music consists of an exploration of the raga. The larger objective of the music is to generate an emotional response in the audience. In premodern texts of musical theory the intended emotional effects of ragas tended to be precisely indicated. The *ragamala* group of paintings provides visual icons of these conventional moods. In modern rendition, musicians frequently break with these conventions and interpret ragas differently.

The major Sanskrit treatises on Indian musical theory and performance include the *Natya Sastra* (Theory of Dance) of Bharata, of indeterminate date, *Sangitaratnakara* (The Essence of Music) of Sarangadeva, about the thirteenth century, and a series of works between the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries that built upon Sarangadeva's work, but developed the raga repertoire. The distinction between south and north Indian music became gradually articulated in these works.

The inspiration for ragas has come not only from classical musical theory but also from folk songs and ballads, court poetry, and devotional songs. In more recent times, with technology bringing different musical traditions into closer proximity, there has been an exchange of ideas between southern and northern Indian music and between Indian and Western music.

Tirthankar Roy

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RAHMAN, A. R. (b. 1966), Indian film-music composer. Allah Rakha Rahman is considered to be the most innovative Indian film-music composer of his generation. He was born A. S. Dileep Kumar in Madras, India, to a musically talented family. Rahman's music lessons began at the age of four. When his father died, Rahman, at the age of eleven, dropped out of school and joined a musical troupe as a keyboard player to support his family. In 1988 Rahman converted to Islam under the spiritual influence of Sheik Abdul Quadir Jeelani, a *pir* (holy man), who was thought to have cured Rahman's sister of a mysterious illness.

Rahman's talent earned him a scholarship to the Trinity College of Music at Oxford University. In 1987 Rahman started composing jingles for commercials, which brought him to the attention of Maniratnam, a radical young filmmaker from Tamil Nadu, who signed Rahman for his next film *Roja*, the score for which won every conceivable award in India in 1992. Rahman continued to compose innumerable musical scores for Indian blockbuster films and to generate astounding record sales. He received the prestigious Padma Shri Award, the highest honor for an Indian civilian, in 2000.

Mebrin Masud-Elias

RAHMAN, MUJIBUR (1920–1975), founding father of Bangladesh. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is considered the founding father of Bangladesh. When Pakistan achieved its independence from Great Britain in 1947, it was composed of two distinct geographical regions, East Pakistan and West Pakistan. The economic and political powers distributed between the two regions were unequal; West Pakistan clearly wielded more power. Consequently, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, a Bengali leader, formed an opposition party called the Awami League to resolve this power imbalance. In 1970, the Awami League won the majority of seats in the Pakistani general elections. Instead of awarding Sheikh Mujibur Rahman an appropriate leadership position such as premier, however, the West Pakistan political elite had him imprisoned. On 26 March 1971, the Awami League proclaimed the independence of East Pakistan, which was renamed Bangladesh. This move initiated a nine-month civil war between East and West Pakistan that led to the independence of



Sheikh Rahman waves on his return to Bangladesh on 10 January 1972. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

Bangladesh on 17 December 1971, with the military support of India.

In January 1972, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was released from prison and became the first prime minister of Bangladesh. During his rule, Bangladesh was besieged by famine, natural disasters, and political unrest. In early 1975, the Constitution was modified to confer all executive powers to the president. Therefore, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman resigned as prime minister and became president. In this position, he proclaimed Bangladesh a one-party state and dismissed all other political parties. In August 1975, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was killed during a military coup, which also resulted in the death of fifteen of his family members.

Houman A. Sadri

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RAHMAN, ZIAUR (1935–1981), president of Bangladesh. Ziaur Rahman was commissioned in the Pakistan army in 1953 and was a major in Chittagong when Bangladesh's war of independence began in 1971. He led a force against Pakistan and continued in the Bangladesh army, becoming chief of staff in 1975 after the assassination of Mujibur Rahman (1920–1975; first prime minister of Bangladesh). Rahman's career had not prospered under Mujibur Rahman, presumably as the result of the latter's annoyance with Ziaur Rahman's proclamation of independence on 27 March 1971, which did not mention Mujibur Rahman.

Ziaur Rahman became deputy chief martial law administrator in November 1975, chief martial law administrator in November 1976, and in April 1977 he assumed the presidency. In his steps to restore democracy, he was elected president in 1978, ended martial law in 1979, and conducted parliamentary elections in the same year. In these elections, a party formed to support him, which became the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), won the majority of the seats. Rahman was assassinated in a failed coup attempt on 30 May 1981.

Rahman's nineteen-point program had been aimed at economic development and was well on the road to success at his death. He had taken the lead in forming the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation. After his death, following another period of military-dominated rule under H. M. Ershad, parliamentary elections in 1991 returned the BNP to power under the prime minister Begum Khaleda Zia (b. 1945), Ziaur Rahman's widow.

Craig Baxter

RAHMAT ALI, CHAUDURI (1897–1951), one of the founders of Pakistan. An Indian Muslim, Chauduri Rahmat Ali worked for the creation of Pakistan ("Land of the Pure") a word he coined to refer to the northwestern Muslim majority provinces of British India, i.e., Punjab, Afghan (North-West Frontier Province), Kashmir, Sind, and Baluchistan.

Rahmat Ali graduated from Islamia College, University of the Punjab, Lahore (1918), and Cambridge

University (1941). While studying at Cambridge in the 1930s, Rahmat Ali befriended members of the Khyber Union, a London debating society and sociopolitical group of Pathan and other Indian Muslim students in England. His ideas of Muslim separatism were stimulated by his association with the Khyber Union, and in 1933 he wrote a historic pamphlet, *Now or Never*, that justified the creation of a separate country to save the Muslim minority from Hindu majority rule in India. His other pamphlets on Muslims' rights and their need for Pakistan were: *What Does the Pakistan National Movement Stand For?* (1933); *The Millat of Islam and the Menace of Indianism* (1941); and *Pakistan: The Fatherland of the Pak Nation* (1947). But soon after the establishment of Pakistan on 14 August 1947, Rahmat Ali developed differences with the country's new leaders and left Pakistan for Cambridge, England, where he died in February 1951.

Abdul Karim Khan

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RAIPUR (2002 est. pop. 617,000). Raipur is the capital of the new state of Chhattisgarh, created in 2000 from territory formerly in the state of Madhya Pradesh. The city, which is also the headquarters of the Raipur district, was founded in the fourteenth century by the by Rai Brahma Deo, ruler of the Ratunpur dynasty. The city is situated on a plateau some 300 meters in elevation, not far from the Mahanadi River, and some 290 kilometers east of the city of Nagpur. Much of the surrounding forested countryside is occupied by the Gond and Halba tribes. The town is home to ruins of an immense fort built by Bhubaneswar Singh (a local king) in 1460, with old Hindu temples and many rather more recent man-made ponds, some of them very scenic.

The modern town of Raipur was laid out by the British in 1830; it featured a wide central street flanked by houses with balconies and elaborately carved pillars. There is a fine collection of eighth- to ninth-century Indian sculptures in the Mahant Ghasidas Memorial Museum. The 1968 Nobel Laureate geneticist Har Gobind Khorana (b. 1922) was born in Raipur. The local university was established in 1963. Iron ore is common in the region, and the principal local crop is rice.

Paul Hockings

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RAIS, MOHAMMAD AMIEN (b. 1944), Indonesian political figure. Mohammad Amien Rais was a prominent politician and one of the leading figures in the 1998 movement that toppled Indonesian President Suharto on 21 May 1998. He was born in Solo, Central Java, on 26 April 1944. He came from a modernist Muslim (Muhammadiyah) background and was educated in Islamic schools before attending Indonesian and overseas universities. After finishing his master's degree at Notre Dame University, Indiana, and his Ph.D. in political science at the University of Chicago, Rais established a reputation as a dedicated lecturer and a preacher in Friday prayer services while present at the Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta. He became politically active after joining the Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Organization (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia or ICMI) and soon became a vocal critic of Suharto. Rais was elected as the chairman of the social-religious organization Muhammadiyah from 1994 to 1998. Muhammadiyah is the second largest Muslim organization in Indonesia after the traditional Muslim organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).

As an academic turned politician, Rais was notable for his tough critiques against his political opponents. He espoused eradicating corruption, collusion, and nepotism, rampant during the Suharto government. These open criticisms gained significant support from young and urban Indonesians, and became the rallying point in undermining Suharto's government. After the fall of Suharto, Rais left Muhammadiyah to lead his newly formed party, the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanah Nasional or PAN) in 1988. His party contested the June 1999 general election and he also was nominated as a presidential candidate. He was disappointed, however, when his party gained only 7 percent of the national vote. He nevertheless was chosen as the speaker of MPR (Upper House) in October 1999 and through political maneuvering forged a "middle axis" of Muslim parties into a coalition to choose Abdurrahman Wahid as the fourth Indonesian president on 21 October 1999. Rais grew disappointed with Wahid's performance as president and was a leading figure in Wahid's impeachment during the MPR special session on 21–23 July 2001.

Abubakar E. Hara

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RAJAGOPALACHARI, CHAKRAVARTI

(1870–1972), Indian political leader. Known to the Indian people as "Rajaji," Chakravarti Rajagopalachari was a prominent freedom fighter and leading politician from 1919 to the late 1960s. He was born a Brahman in Salem, Tamil Nadu, in 1870 and later practiced law there. He first met Mohandas K. Gandhi (1869–1948) in Madras in 1919 and then joined his noncooperation campaign in 1920. Later on, Gandhi's son Devdas married Rajaji's daughter. The bond between Rajaji and Gandhi always remained strong, even when they differed on certain political issues. Rajaji was twice chief minister of the erstwhile Madras Presidency: 1937–1939 and 1952–1954. After independence, he had first been governor of West Bengal (1947–1950) and then the first Indian governor-general (1950–1952) of independent India. He was critical of Jawaharlal Nehru's (1889–1964) policies, particularly after the Congress Party adopted a more radical leftist program in 1955.



Rajagopalachari in c. 1948. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

Rajaji then became a cofounder of the Swatantra Party in 1959, which scored good results in the elections of 1962 and thus forced Nehru to desist from this program. Once Nehru's Congress Party gave up its leftist agenda, the Swatantra Party was made superfluous and faded away before Rajaji's death in 1972.

Dietmar Rothermund

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RAJASTHAN (2002 est. pop. 57.6 million). Home of the inhospitable Thar Desert and with an overall arid climate, site of nuclear tests, and defender of a politically sensitive border with Pakistan, Rajasthan is nonetheless regarded as the major tourist destination in India. India's second-largest state, Rajasthan ("abode of the rajas") is an amalgam of nineteen princely states and three chiefdoms in an area with evidence of continuous human habitation for 100,000 years. Exotic palaces, forts, and temples; the holy lake and camel fair at Pushkar; the golden city of Jaisalmer; the glorious palaces of Udaipur; the pink city of Jaipur, capital of Rajasthan; and the blue city of Jodhpur all hold historic and contemporary appeal, reflecting heroic battles and artistic deeds.

The Rajput rulers appeared in the ninth century, reputed descendants of fifth- and sixth-century Huns, and by the eleventh century had carved out numerous principalities. The Mughal emperor Akbar (1542–1605) subjugated the Rajasthan rulers beginning in 1562; in the eighteenth century, the Mughals lost control and the Rajput chieftains consolidated their kingdoms, retaining elegance and ceremony in vital centers of art.

From 1817 to 1823, the rulers accepted British suzerainty in return for internal control of their states, and Rajputana, as it was known under the British, became the center for princely India, the two-fifths of the subcontinent left in the hands of Indian rulers. Following India's independence in 1947, the Rajputs gradually accepted uniform administration, education, and representative government.

Two trade routes gave Rajasthan great importance in Indian history. One led from Agra through Marwar (Jodhpur) to the port of Surat in Mumbai (Bombay). The other led across the Thar Desert to Jaisalmer and thence to the Indus River. Southeast of the Aravallis mountain range, the soil is fertile. Since the 1950s, irrigation has increased the production of millet, maize, wheat, barley, rice, and cotton. Leading industries and

resources are textiles, chemicals, precision instruments, lead and zinc, emeralds, garnets, and silver.

Nationwide religious events, local folk heroes, and village deities provide frequent occasions for festivals featuring dazzling costumes and ornaments and vigorous dancing and singing to the music of pipes, drums, and stringed instruments. Dances include the *geer*, *gloomar*, and *panihari* for women, and the *kacchi ghor*, in which males ride dummy horses. Hindus and Muslims join in one another's festivals. The state boasts a rich literary tradition, famous pilgrim centers, and universities at Jaipur, Udaipur, Jodhpur, Ajmer, and Kota.

C. Roger Davis

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RAJKOT (2001 est. pop. 654,000). Rajkot is a city in Gujarat state, India. It was once the capital of the princely state of Rajkot, and is now the headquarters of Rajkot District. It is located in the middle of the peninsula of Kathiawar, some 70 kilometers from the Gulf of Kachchh. The town is bisected by the Aji River. Its most notable institution is Rajkumar College, which was founded in 1870 for the education of the sons of local chiefs and princes, and was modeled by its founder, Col. R. H. Keatinge, on Eton College. Mahatma Gandhi was educated in Rajkot at the Alfred High School (founded in 1875).

Paul Hockings

RAJPUT Rajput is a category of Indian warrior castes that is widespread across northwestern India, some neighboring Himalayan valleys, the Ganges

plains, and Madhya Pradesh. Following India's independence in 1947, twenty-three small Rajput states that had formed Rajputana were consolidated into the state of Rajasthan. The great majority of Rajputs are Hindus who assign themselves to the Kshatriya caste (an upper caste assigned to governing and military occupations), but well over a million are Muslims. Their Kshatriya status was acknowledged by all Indians because they formed most of the fighting, landowning, and ruling caste categories, including among their number many lesser kings and princes. In the early 2000s, landowning is their major occupation.

Traditional Rajput society was characterized by its many hierarchically ranked clans and lineages: 103 clans were well known. There were other rankings based on regional location, the degree of centralized political control, and the practice of hypergamy (marriage into a higher caste or social group). In modern times, formerly dependent castes have sought political and economic independence from their Rajput overlords or landlords, and the power of the latter has correspondingly declined. Even so, the glorious military past of the Rajputs is not forgotten, and many men still find a place for themselves in the Indian army.

Rajput royal courts were centers of literate culture, where the visual arts as well as Sanskrit and Hindi literature and drama flourished for centuries. The princes were great builders of forts, palaces, and shrines, most of which are still standing.

Paul Hockings

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RAKHINE STATE (2002 est. pop. 3.0 million). Rakhine (formerly Arakan) State is located in western Myanmar (Burma), bounded by Bangladesh to the northwest; Chin State to the north; the Irrawaddy, Magwe, and Pegu Divisions to the east; and the Bay of Bengal to the west and the south. Rakhine State has an area of 36,778 square kilometers (14,200 square miles). The capital and chief port is Sittwe (formerly known as Akyab), located at the mouth of the Kaladan River. Rakhine's other chief towns include Kyaukpyu and Sandoway. Rakhine's main rivers include the Kaladan, the Mayu, and the Lemro. Rakhine State's economy chiefly depends on wet-rice agriculture.

Generally, the residents of Rakhine State speak Burmese, although many also speak Bengali or other languages. The population consists mainly of the Arakanese and the Rohingyas, although the current anti-Muslim policies of the regime make it difficult to ascertain the exact percentage of their overall representation in the population. Smaller ethnic groups include the Burmans and the Chins. The majority of Arakanese are Buddhists, while the Rohingyas are mostly Muslims.

The Arakan Yoma mountain range has kept the Burmese-speaking peoples of Rakhine and the Irrawaddy Valley politically and sometimes culturally divided. The existence of a low population base and extensive reserves of fertile land has had two effects on the history of Rakhine State. First, the former Arakanese kingdoms were raiding states; that is, they depended for their prosperity on captive labor groups drawn from Bengal in the north and hill tribes and Burmese from the east. In order to do so, the Arakanese kings built powerful fleets and armies, strengthened by hired mercenaries from India and, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Portugal. Second, when the British acquired Arakan from the Burmese after the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826), attempts to develop a colonial export economy focused here on rice and led to the opening of settlements by thousands of Muslim Bengali agriculturalists, highlighting an Islamization of Rakhine that has led to communal opposition by some Arakanese Buddhists.

Despite Arakan's early economic promise—for a brief period in the 1840s and 1850s Sittwe (Akyab), Arakan's capital, was the world's largest rice-exporting port—the British acquisition of Lower Burma and the port of Rangoon (Yangon) as a result of the Second Anglo-Burmese War (1852) led to Arakan's economic stagnation in the shadow of prosperous Lower Burma.

The Arakanese have indicated desires for autonomy from the Burmese government from the beginning of the independence period (from 1948 to the present). Under the military government, however, anti-Muslim repression has encouraged feelings of solidarity between Rakhine's Buddhist majority and the staunchly Buddhist military regime, confusing the lines of political and religious communal loyalties.

Michael W. Charney

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RAKHMONOV, IMOMALI (b. 1952), president of the Republic of Tajikistan. Imomali Rakhmonov was born on 5 October 1952 in the village of Dangara, in the Kulyab region of Tajikistan. He received a degree in economics from Tajik State University and worked in various technical jobs throughout much of his career. He also rose through the ranks of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) apparatus. After Tajikistan's independence in 1991, he became the chair of the Kulyab Region Supreme Soviet. As a result of a political crisis in 1992, which saw the resignation of President Rakhmon Nabiyeu in September of that year, Rakhmonov assumed the position of chair of the Tajik Supreme Assembly (Supreme Soviet) on 19 November 1992. He won his first presidential election on 6 November 1994 and was reelected on 6 November 1999. Rakhmonov received 58 percent of the vote in the 1994 contest (against Abdumalik Abdullajonov's 42 percent) and received a resounding 96 percent in the second. His opponent, Davlat Usmonov, won only 4 percent of the vote. Rakhmonov is currently serving a seven-year term and will not face another election until 2006.

Rakhmonov has remained in office by successfully controlling the various factions within the government, by agreeing to a limited power-sharing agreement with the United Tajik Opposition, and by appealing to a popular sentiment that a strong leader is needed in this time of transition. His call to recognize the historic legacy of the Samanid and Sogdian dynasties for the modern Tajik state has also struck a positive chord in the country. However, he still must contend with internal factions, threats of assassination (including a 1997 attempt on his life), and concerns about foreign incursions, especially from Afghanistan.

Roger D. Kangas

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RAMA V. See **Chulalongkorn, King.**

RAMA KHAMHENG (1239–1298), Thai monarch. Rama Khamheng or Rama the Great was one of the greatest Siamese monarchs. The third son of Indraditya of Sukhothai ascended the throne in 1275 and at the time of his death left a vast empire. His domain in the north extended up to Luang Prabang and Nakhorn Sri Thammarat in the south. He subjugated substantial parts of the lower Me Nam, the upper Mekong, and the lower Salween valleys. His friendly relations with China assured the stability of his kingdom. In 1317, he visited Beijing and brought Chinese potters back with him, establishing a ceramic industry that was economically important for long time.

Many important facets of Siamese culture developed under Rama Khamheng's reign. The Mons, Khmers, Indians, and Sri Lankans had close cultural contact with Sukhothai. The Sri Lankan variety of Buddhism (Theravada Buddhism, also known as Lankavong) became predominant in Thailand. In continuity with the indigenous Siamese tradition of worshiping spirits, Rama Khamheng continued to make offerings to Phra Khamphung, the spirit deity located on a hill south of Sukhothai, even after adopting Theravada Buddhism, thus merging the two religious traditions.

Rama Khamheng was the originator of Thai script. His famous inscription dated 1292 and written in the new script bears testimony to the prosperous kingdom of Sukhothai. The reign of Rama Khamheng, the warrior and benevolent monarch, is aptly recalled as the golden age in Thai history.

Patit Paban Mishra

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RAMA TIBODI I (1312–1369), founder of Ayutthaya. In 1350 CE Rama Tibodi I (U Thong) founded the kingdom of Ayutthaya in central Siam (present-day Thailand), which dominated Siamese power and culture for four centuries. The adventurous Rama Tibodi, who had matrimonial alliances with royalty in the Siamese cities of Lop Buri and Suphan Buri, occupied Mon Lavo, subjugated the Sukhothai kingdom, and established a new city. He named it Ayutthaya after the capital of Rama, the hero of the *Ramayana*, one of two ancient South Asian epics (the *Mahabharata* being the other) influencing Theravada Buddhism and culture in Southeast Asia for ages. In 1350, he was crowned as Rama Tibodi.

From a modest settlement of teakwood houses, Ayutthaya became the center of imperial grandeur.

Rama Tibodi extended his domain to the lower Chao Phraya River, the Gulf of Martaban, and the Malay Peninsula. He exerted pressure against the kingdom of Angkor and subdued it in 1369. He had to suppress frequent rebellions in Chiang Mai and Sukhothai. Comprised of self-governing principalities, the kingdom had to be held together by the monarch's sagacity and vigilance. Rama Tibodi had to buttress his authority and legitimize his claims by following the practice of Indian kings, who declared themselves to be the *devaraja* or divine king.

The laws promulgated by Rama Tibodi continued in principle for six centuries. A combination of indigenous practices and Indian legal concepts, this legal system exhibits characteristics of the society of that time. Rama Tibodi embraced Theravada Buddhism as the state religion in 1360 and is known as the first king of Thailand.

Patit Paban Mishra

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RAMACHANDRAN, MARUDUR GOPALAMENON

(c. 1912–1987), Tamil film star and politician. Marudur Gopalamenon Ramachandran was a superstar in Tamil films from about 1950 to 1978. After that he moved into state politics to become the chief minister of Tamil Nadu state in southeast India for three terms. MGR, as he is popularly known, was born in Kandy, Sri Lanka, possibly in 1912. Supposedly, his father died as he was born, and so the poor family moved to Tamil Nadu at that time. He joined a theatrical group in Madurai at the age of six. His first film was *Sati Leelavathi* (1936). From then on he starred in dozens of other movies, usually playing the underdog oppressed by upper-caste or wealthy villains. Repeatedly, he is seen dispensing justice and well-merited violence, winning access to young women and to education. He also directed three films.

When C. N. Annadurai, the founder of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) Party, died in 1969, MGR set up a rival political party, renamed in 1977 the All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam

(AIA-DMK), which then won state elections in alliance with the national Congress Party of Indira Gandhi (1917–1984). AIA-DMK never became a force outside Tamil Nadu. While serving as chief minister, MGR died in office. His funeral procession was attended by two million people and was broadcast live on television. Almost immediately, his mistress, Jayaram Jayalalitha (b. 1948), was appointed the chief minister. (She was elected to another term in 1991.) A temple was built in the city of Madras in Tamil Nadu state in which MGR's image was enshrined as the deity.

Paul Hockings

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RAMAKIEN The *Ramakien* is the Thai version of the Indian literary epic the *Ramayana*. Essentially, the story portrays the abduction of Rama's wife, Sita, to Langka by the demon king Thotsakan and her subsequent rescue by Rama and a monkey army led by Hanuman. The Thai version has been adapted to a Thai setting and differs from the Indian original in a number of episodes.

The only complete version of the story is one sponsored by King Rama I (1737–1809) written in *klon*—a four-line verse form—as an accompanying narration for *khon*, masked drama performances. It is an enormously long work, running to nearly three thousand pages in a recent printed edition, although only certain scenes are ever performed. Other versions include a shorter one written by Rama II (1768–1824), a version based on the Sanskrit original by Rama VI (1881–1925), and episodes attributed to Rama IV (1804–1868).

The *Ramakien* is much more than a literary classic, and its influence is evident in many facets of everyday life in Thailand. Apart from the dramatic arts, it provides an important source of inspiration in the visual arts, ranging from the famous series of bas reliefs recounting the story at Wat Phra Chetuphon (Wat Po) temple in Bangkok to the representation of characters in advertisements, tattoos, textbook covers, and tourist souvenirs. The designation of monarchs of the Bangkok dynasty by the title *rama*, thereby linking the king with the victorious hero, is a further example of the way the epic has filtered into everyday consciousness.

David Smyth

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RAMAKRISHNA (1836–1886), Hindu religious leader. Ramakrishna, or more fully Swami Ramakrishna Paramahansa, was from Dakshineswar in Bengal, eastern India. A year after his early death a dozen of his disciples, led by Swami Vivekananda, formed a monastic order and mission in his name. They took monastic vows and pledged to spread the philosophy of Ramakrishna, who had found "divinity in humanity," and, consequently, in service to it. Ramakrishna maintained that all religions equally point the way to God and sanctioned the worship of images, viewing them all as different forms of one God. Conceptually he thus was a monotheist as well as a Vedantist (following the Vedanta system of Hindu philosophy). His mission idealized Hinduism and opposed Western materialism. Ramakrishna's bequest was a curious mix of modern and traditional ideas. His mission approved of polytheism and idol worship, yet it attracted a number of young Bengali revolutionaries, including B. C. Pal and Sister Nivedita. Inspired by Vivekananda's call for patriotism, they engaged in anarchic activities.

Ramakrishna contributed much to the development of a Hindu national consciousness. By the later twentieth century the mission had more than one hundred branches, operating not only in India but in the United States, Britain, Fiji, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Singapore, France, Switzerland, and Argentina.

Paul Hockings

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RAMANUJA (1017–1137), Bhakti saint and philosopher. Ramanujacharya tried to bring about a rapprochement between the Vedanta philosophy based on metaphysics and the tradition of bhakti (devotion). He was born in India near Chennai at Perumbudur in 1017 CE. His parents were Kesava Somayaji and Kantimathi. Well versed in the Vedic texts, Ramanuja began to interpret them, much to the consternation of his teacher, Yadavaprakasha, a proponent of Advaita philosophy. The activities of Ramanuja centered around Vaishnavite temples at Srirangam. Tanjama, his wife, had left him by this time.

Ramanuja renounced the world, and he was referred to as "Prince of Ascetics."

Ramanuja established a *math* (monastery) near the temple of Srirangam. People belonging to all social levels came to him. According to tradition, he lived to the age of 120. Striking a balance between bhakti and Hindu metaphysics, Ramanuja believed in salvation through devotion. The God of Ramanuja was full of devotion and love. His philosophy of Visistadvaita (qualified nondualism) advocated spiritual experience of God through intuition. *Sbribhasya* (Commentary on the *Brahma Sutra*), *Vedanta Sara* (essence of Vedanta), *Vedanta Sangraha* (Résumé of Vedanta), and *Vedanta Deepa* (Light of Vedanta) were some of his important works. His ideas were carried to centers of learning in India, and latter-day bhakti saints were greatly influenced by him.

Patit Paban Mishra

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RAMAYANA The great Sanskrit epic poem, the *Ramayana*, attributed to the legendary poet-sage Valmiki, appears to have been largely composed during the first half of the first millennium BCE. Since that time, it has firmly established itself as one of the most enduring, widely diffused, and popular narratives in all of human history. In innumerable folk, literary, dramatic, painted, sculpted, cinematic, and video representations in virtually all of the regions of South and Southeast Asia, it has made a profound impact on the aesthetic, social, political, and religious lives of many hundreds of millions of people.

The Framing Story

The narrative of the tragic and heroic life of Rama, a legendary prince and later king of the ancient north Indian country of Kosala is significantly framed in the *Valmiki Ramayana* by the tale of the poem's composition. The legendary sage Valmiki—who is said to have created the world's first true poetry in a spontaneous utterance motivated by his compassion for the mate of a bird struck down by a hunter—is commissioned by the creator divinity Brahma to compose the world's first poem about the career of the righteous King

Rama. The poet does so, and teaches the poem to Lava and Kusa, disciples of his who, unbeknownst to their father, are the twin sons of Rama by his banished wife Sita who has borne them in the sage's hermitage. Thus, the *Ramayana* has attained the reputation as the first example of—and, in fact, the inspiration for—poetry in the Indian tradition.

Rama and His Brothers

In the opening chapters of the poem, we learn that Rama is no ordinary prince but in fact an earthly manifestation of the supreme divinity Vishnu Narayana. The god, as the story makes clear, has—in response to an appeal by the lesser divinities—agreed to take on human form in order to rid the world of an otherwise invincible and tyrannical demon, the mighty *rakshasa* (demon) lord Ravana, who is invulnerable to all supernatural beings. The god infuses his divine essence into a food, which is to be shared among the three wives of the great but childless king Dasaratha of Kosala. When this is accomplished, the eldest queen, Kausalya, gives birth to a splendid son, Rama; the king's middle wife, Kaikeyi, bears the prince Bharata; and the youngest wife, Sumitra, delivers the heroic twins Laksmana and Satrugna.

Rama is outstanding among the four brothers for his beauty, courage, intelligence, and righteousness. In his youth, he goes on a journey with a powerful sage in order to protect the latter's sacrifices from the depredations of the demons. During this journey, he participates in a contest of strength for the hand of the beautiful princess Sita of the neighboring kingdom of Mithila, a woman who as an infant had emerged from the bosom of the earth goddess herself. Unique in his



PRAMBANAN TEMPLE COMPOUNDS—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1991, Prambanan's massive Siva complex in Indonesia consists of three sets of temples. One set graphically illustrates the epic *Ramayana*; another is dedicated to the Hindu divinities (Siva, Vishnu, and Rama); and the third represents the animals that serve them.

power to wield a mighty divine bow, Rama wins Sita and the two fall deeply in love.

Rama's Banishment and Sita's Abduction

The happy couple settles in to life in the Kosalan capital of Ayodhya and the aged king decides to consecrate Rama as prince regent and retire to a life of contemplation. On the eve of his consecration, however, a serving woman of Dasaratha's middle and most deeply beloved queen, Kaikeyi, persuades her mistress that the succession of Rama, which Kaikeyi had at first welcomed, will have disastrous consequences for her and her son Bharata. She also reminds the queen that the king had promised long ago to grant the queen some boons (requests or favors) and tells her that she can now have them granted to her political advantage. Using her boons and exploiting the king's unwavering adherence to his given word, Kaikeyi succeeds in banishing Rama to the wilderness for a period of fourteen years. Bharata is consecrated as prince regent in Rama's place. Rama receives the stunning news of his reversal of fortune with extraordinary equanimity and he sets out uncomplainingly for the forest accompanied only by his beloved wife Sita and his devoted younger brother Lakshmana. Bharata, who had been away from the capital during these events, returns to find his brother banished and his father dead from grief. He rejects his mother's scheme and sets out to persuade Rama to return and rule. Rama refuses to violate his father's command and Bharata returns to Ayodhya, governing as a kind of steward in anticipation of his brother's return from exile.

The idyllic life of Rama and Sita in the forest is disastrously interrupted when the former arouses the wrath of the demon king and the latter his desire. Using his shape-shifting power, Ravana manages to abduct Sita in the absence of Rama and Lakshmana and carry her off to his island fortress of Lanka. There she is held prisoner and given a year in which to choose either marriage to the demon or death at his hands.

At first despondent over the loss of Sita, Rama recovers his resolve and sets out to recover her. He forms a pact with the banished king of the monkeys, Sugriva, and the monkey armies scour the world for the lost princess. Eventually the heroic monkey Hanuman locates her and reassures her, showing her Rama's signet ring.

The Rescue of Sita and Thereafter

Rama and the monkeys build a bridge across the ocean and lay siege to Ravana's citadel. After a protracted war, Rama slays Ravana on the battlefield and

recovers Sita. The long-suffering princess must pass through a fire ordeal to publicly prove her chastity before she is reunited with Rama, and the two return to Ayodhya, where Rama is at long last consecrated as king. At length, after hearing of rumors concerning Sita's fidelity when in captivity, Rama resolves to banish her, although she is pregnant. She is sheltered in the hermitage of the sage Valmiki, the author of the poem, where she bears Rama's twins, the epic bards Lava and Kusa. After the twins perform the poem for the king, Valmiki brings Sita back to Rama and attests to her virtue. Rama agrees to take her back, but she calls on her mother the earth to take her if she has been true to her husband. She disappears into the earth, leaving Rama desolate. He continues to rule righteously until he is reminded that the purpose for which he incarnated has been accomplished. Rama then enters the Sarayu River at Ayodhya, followed by all the inhabitants of the city, and ascends to heaven to resume his place in heaven as the great lord Vishnu.

The Enduring *Ramayana*

In the nearly three thousand years since its composition, the poem has undergone a truly extraordinary number of reworkings in every major language and every significant indigenous religious tradition of the vast, rich, and diverse cultural domains of South and Southeast Asia. In one form or another, the text has been widely available and continually in use by countless hundreds of millions of people for as long or longer than virtually any non-Indian text still known and read by a mass audience.

Robert P. Goldman

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RAMOS, FIDEL (b. 1928), president of the Republic of the Philippines. Born on 18 March 1928, the son of the Philippine minister of foreign affairs, Fidel Ramos was a career military officer. He graduated from U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, in 1950, earned a master's degree in civil engineering from the University of Illinois in 1951, and



Former president Fidel Ramos at a news conference in Manila in January 2002. (AFP/CORBIS)

served in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. A cousin of Ferdinand Marcos, Ramos served as chief of the Philippine Constabulary, director-general of the civilian Integrated National Police, and deputy chief of staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines throughout the martial law era. He became chief of staff and a four-star general in 1986.

Despite his close ties to Marcos, Ramos joined the opposition and was instrumental in forcing Marcos from power on 25 February 1986. President Corazon Aquino had some misgivings about Ramos, who had previously ordered the arrest of her husband Benigno Aquino, yet she immediately appointed Ramos chief of the armed forces of the Philippines. Aquino increasingly came to rely on Ramos, who proved his loyalty by putting down several coup attempts. In 1988, Aquino appointed Ramos secretary of national defense, replacing a Marcos cabinet holdover, Juan Ponce Enrile. Ramos used his position to launch a successful presidential bid, running as a candidate for the Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD) party. In 1992, Ramos was elected as the twelfth president of the Republic of the Philippines.

The Ramos presidency was a period of political and economic stability. He negotiated peace in 1995 with the largest Muslim separatist group, defeated the communist insurgency, successfully liberalized the economy, and attracted much foreign investment. Ramos

proposed amending the constitution to allow a second term but met with considerable opposition; his vice president, Joseph Estrada, succeeded him. Ramos played a major role both in persuading the military to withdraw their support for Estrada following his impeachment trial and corruption scandal and in installing of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as president in February 2001. As of 2002, Ramos held the post of chairman of the Ramos Peace and Development Foundation, an influential think tank in Manila, and was serving on many corporate and foundation boards.

Zachary Abuza

RAMOS-HORTA, JOSÉ (b. 1946), East Timorese political activist. José Ramos-Horta became known as the internationally recognized spokesperson for an independent East Timor and as the recipient of the 1996 Nobel peace prize. He was born on 26 December 1946 in Dili, the capital of East Timor, the son of a Timorese mother and Portuguese father, and was educated in a local Catholic mission school.

At the age of twenty-four, Ramos-Horta became active in the Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT), the predecessor of the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretelin). Working as a radio and television journalist, he was appointed secretary for external affairs and information for the pro-independence parties. After Fretelin had unilaterally declared the independence of East Timor in 1975, Ramos-Horta was elected to represent East Timor overseas and left the island just three days before Indonesian troops invaded.

Ramos-Horta became the permanent representative of Fretelin to the United Nations from 1976 until 1989, and since then he has been a tireless advocate for a free and independent East Timor. He studied international law at The Hague Academy of International Law and completed a master's degree in Peace Studies at Antioch University in 1984. His dedication to the defense of human rights led him to set up the Diplomacy Training Programme at the University of New South Wales in Sydney for the purpose of training indigenous peoples, minorities, and activists from the Asia Pacific Region.

In 1994, as part of an ongoing dialogue under the auspices of the U.N., Ramos-Horta met with Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, the first public meeting between an Indonesian government official and leaders of East Timor since Indonesia's invasion of the territory. He was elected vice president of the National Council of the Timorese Resistance (CNRT) in 1998

and functioned as the personal representative of Xanana Gusmão, the president of the CNRT, during the time the latter was imprisoned by the Indonesian government.

For his work on behalf of the people of East Timor, José Ramos-Horta was awarded, together with his countryman Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, the 1996 Nobel peace prize. The Oslo committee in its laudation considered him the leading international spokesman for East Timor since 1975. After the U.N. consultation on the future of East Timor in 1999, Ramos-Horta continued in his role as an international mediator to promote the development of East Timor.

Frank Feulner

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RANA The Ranas were a powerful family that became the effective rulers of the Himalayan kingdom of Nepal from 1846 to 1951. They rose to prominence in the nineteenth century under Jang Bahadur Kunwar (1817–1877), who ruthlessly eliminated his rivals to put an end to decades of bitter factional strife within the kingdom's ruling elite. In 1846 Jang Bahadur assumed the office of prime minister to become the most powerful man in Nepal. Jang also added the name Rana to his family name, claiming descent from the Ranas of Chittor, one of the most prominent warrior aristocracies of north India. From this time onward, until their downfall in 1951 and despite rifts within their ranks, the Ranas occupied the highest military and administrative offices in Nepal, which included hereditary succession to the office of the prime minister. The Ranas were careful not to overthrow the Shah kings of Nepal, whom they reduced to the status of mere figureheads.

Rana rule was notable for a number of reasons. By concentrating power in their hands, they restored political stability to a kingdom whose ruling elite had long been deeply divided. Other notable achievements included an increase in the area under cultivation, expansion of the country's administrative machinery, the introduction of a uniform law code, and the abolition of social practices such as slavery and sati (widow burning). In foreign affairs, they followed a policy of loyal but cautious friendship with the British, who were then emerging as the preeminent colonial power in South

Asia. Thus, while they willingly provided trained soldiers and military recruits to assist Britain's imperial designs, they denied the British free access to Nepal. This policy not only preserved Nepal's independence in South Asia, but also led to the restoration of territories that were earlier lost to the British after the Anglo-Nepal War of 1814–1816. The British, through the Anglo-Nepal Treaty of 1923, officially recognized Nepal's special status as an independent kingdom in South Asia.

Despite these achievements, Rana rule was on the whole extremely conservative and self-serving in character. Rana families accumulated huge personal fortunes, filled the military and administration with their own supporters, and tolerated no dissent. At the same time, they made every effort to preserve the status quo. The privileges enjoyed by traditional rural elites were never encroached upon. Even the uniform legal code introduced in 1854 sanctioned social inequality as it was based on an elaborate scheme of caste discrimination. Under Rana rule, no efforts were made to develop basic infrastructure such as hospitals, educational institutions, electricity, and all-weather roads. Trade, production, and industrial development also remained depressed.

The Ranas were toppled from power in 1951 by a popular Nepali nationalist movement that restored the authority of the Shah kings. Rana rule left behind a mixed legacy. While the Ranas succeeded in preserving Nepal's independence from foreign rule, their failure to modernize their country has left it in a severely disadvantaged position in the modern world.

Bernardo A. Michael

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RANARIDDH, PRINCE NORODOM (b. 1944), president of the National Assembly of Cambodia. Prince Norodom Ranariddh, a son of King Sihanouk, was born in Phnom Penh in January 1944. After completing secondary school in Cambodia, he received a law degree in France and later taught university courses in law and political sociology. Ranariddh rose to political prominence in Cambodia in 1989 as secretary-general of the National United

Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Co-operative Cambodia, known by its French acronym as FUNCINPEC, which at the time was one of two non-Communist armed groups allied with the Khmer Rouge against the Vietnamese-backed People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). He retained leadership in 1992 when FUNCINPEC became a political party.

During the United Nations–sponsored election of 1993, Ranariddh, as president of FUNCINPEC, advocated the return of Sihanouk, negotiating peace with the Khmer Rouge, ending illegal Vietnamese immigration, and replacing corruption with political openness and economic prosperity. FUNCINPEC won a plurality of the votes, 45 percent compared to 38.6 percent for the CPP (Cambodian People's Party). The CPP refused to acknowledge the results and threatened to secede with the eastern provinces and renew civil war. Sihanouk then brokered a power-sharing agreement whereby Ranariddh became first prime minister and Hun Sen became second prime minister.

Under this arrangement, parallel systems existed throughout all levels of government. FUNCINPEC and CPP were not so much political parties as factions, with Ranariddh and Hun Sen each controlling their own army and police. The CPP, however, retained control of the infrastructure.

The coalition came to an end with the political instability of 5–6 July 1997, which included two days of street fighting in Phnom Penh. An estimated one hundred people were killed, including top FUNCINPEC military advisers. Ranariddh was forced into exile and was replaced as first prime minister by Foreign Minister Ung Huot of FUNCINPEC.

Ranariddh returned to Cambodia in the spring of 1998 under protection of the United Nations. In the election of July 1998, FUNCINPEC received 30 percent of the vote, but the CPP did not receive enough votes to form a government without a coalition. Both FUNCINPEC and the Sam Rainsy Party contested the election results, and demonstrators filled the streets of Phnom Penh in the month after the election. In November, after meetings with the King Sihanouk, FUNCINPEC agreed to join a coalition with the CPP, and a new government was formed. Prince Ranariddh has been president of the National Assembly since that time.

Jeanne Morel

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RANDAI *Randai* is a form of traditional theater originating in what is now West Sumatra, Indonesia, home of the Minangkabau people. *Randai* consists of a number of actors who act their roles in full costume in the center of a ring of chorus members. The chorus squats during each scene, but rises to sing and dance when the actors leave the ring between scenes. The dance of the chorus members derives from the traditional martial arts of the Minangkabau and presents stylized versions of offensive and defensive moves. The costumes of the chorus are similar to those traditionally worn in the martial arts. The music for *randai*, which is played on drums, bamboo flutes, and other instruments, employs traditional melodies that may be characteristic of specific regions, but the lyrics of which are frequently variable. Many *randai* stories come from the *kaba*—the traditional cycle of semi-historical legends of the Minangkabau—but modern stories are sometimes presented as well. While men traditionally acted all roles, some *randai* groups now include women.

Rebecca Fanany

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RANGOON. See **Yangon**.

RANN OF KACHCHH The Rann of Kachchh (Cutch, or Kutch) is the name of a great low-lying salt marsh on the coast of the western Indian state of Gujarat, lying between the Gulf of Kachchh and the India/Pakistan border. Flanked by the Arabian Sea on the west, the higher part of the District of Kachchh on the south, and merging imperceptibly with the Thar Desert to the north and east, the Rann has long served as a corridor between Gujarat and Sind (now in Pakistan). It covers an area of about 20,700 square kilometers, stretching over 400 kilometers from east to west, and perhaps 200 kilometers from north to south. From May to October it is flooded with salt water that enters from both the Gulf of Kachchh and

the Gulf of Cambay (or Khambhat), the two gulfs actually uniting during the monsoon, when the Rann becomes nearly impassable except perhaps on foot. In July the temperature averages over 30° C. By December the Rann becomes quite dry, and the ground hard. To the southeast of the Rann, and immediately east of the Kachchh District, is a smaller area called the Little Rann, also a salt marsh. Because of its peculiar geography the Rann is quite unsuited to agriculture but is an important source of salt. Aside from camel trains that may often be seen here, the distinctive local animal is the wild ass, found only in this part of India (*Equus hemionus kbur*; there is a Wild Ass Sanctuary in the Little Rann). The chief town of the district, Bhuj, which lies just to the south of the Rann, was largely destroyed by a devastating earthquake in 2001. Previous earthquakes, for example in 1819, have altered the geography of the Rann significantly.

Paul Hockings

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RAO, RAJA (b. 1909), Indian novelist. Raja Rao was born in Hassan, a provincial town of Karnataka, India. He graduated from the University of Madras and continued his studies at Montpellier and the Sorbonne. His remarkable literary reputation is based mainly on three novels, though he did write some short stories, too. He has lived for much of his life in the West, and has been married to two Western women. His long novel, *The Serpent and the Rope* (1960), about an Indian student married to a Frenchwoman, shows his deep understanding of French history and medieval Christian philosophy. His first novel, *Kanthapura* (1938), on the other hand, is set in his home state of Mysore and is a fine depiction of an Indian village and the impact of Gandhian teaching on its people. In 1988 Raja Rao became the tenth recipient of the prestigious Neustadt International Prize for Literature. In the late twentieth century he taught philosophy in several American and French universities.

Paul Hockings

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RASA *Rasa*, the final outcome of the various constituents of an artistic or theatrical performance, has

been a central concept in Indian art and aesthetics from ancient times. It is enshrined in the Indian theory of aesthetic pleasure the same way that the "pleasure proper to art" (*oikia hedone*) and catharsis of Aristotle are in the Greek and European tradition.

From Vedic literature (1200 BCE or earlier) to classical Sanskrit usage (500 BCE to 1000 CE), *rasa* has had two primary meanings. Literally it means sap, juice, or fluid. The secondary meaning is extract. In the terminology of Ayurveda, the ancient Indian medicine, *rasa* was used to denote the vital juice that the digestive system extracts from food to be converted into blood, flesh, bones, marrow, fat, and sperm. The *Natya Sashtra* of Bharata (second century CE), the primary text of the theory of performing and plastic arts, also uses the word in the sense of extract.

Classifying Emotions

To understand *rasa*, it is important to look at the theory of aesthetic expression as formulated in ancient India. It was postulated that while thoughts, or intellectual concepts, may vary or differ with time, emotional states are an unchanging part of human nature. Emotions, or *bhavas*, freshly felt in new situations and ideas, remain the same in terms of emotional content. They can thus be classified as permanent categories. Bharata divides them into three groups: *sthaiyi* (dominant), *vyabhicari* (transient), and *satvika* (psychosomatic). Certain emotions by their very nature are more deeply seated in the human heart. Therefore, they can be expanded upon for a longer time in dramatic action or poetic imagination. These dominant (*sthaiyi*) ones are categorized as eight in number: *rati*, or intense pleasure (sexual or otherwise); *hasya*, or humor; *shoka*, or grief; *krodha*, or anger; *utsaha*, or confidence; *bhaya*, or fear; *jugupsa*, or revulsion; and finally *vismaya*, or wonder.

There are thirty-six transient, or *vyabhicari*, emotional states, including *nirveda* (dejection), *glani* (guilt), *asuya* (envy), *mada* (intoxication), *shrama* (fatigue), *lasya* (indolence), *dainya* (obsequiousness), *cinta* (worry), *moha* (fondness), and so on. *Satvika* or psychosomatic states include the face turning pale with fear and the choking of the voice with fear and excitement.

The Communication of Emotion

The other part of this theory is that the emotions are communicated through certain channels to the audience or the receivers. The actors and stage decor (or words and musical notes) are the instruments of carrying and are called *vibhavas*; gestures indicative of emotional states are named *anubhavas*. The commu-

nication of emotion takes place through the *vibhavas* and *anubhavas*. The presumption here is that art is essentially a transfer of emotional message between two human or anthropomorphic agencies. It is not between formless Nature, Divinity, or Universe on one side and humanity on the other. Also all art is presumed to be narrative and praxic, not merely an emotional experience of the artist. A special combination of the actions, gestures, and feelings on the stage (or their description in words or song) results in *rasa*. To translate the famous text:

By a union of *vibhava*, *anubhava*, and *vyabhcari* there is emergence of *rasa*. Is there any example? It is thus. Just as in (eating) a mixture of various foods, spices and herbs, there is the emergence of *rasa*, similarly, in (watching) a union of various *bhavas*, there is emergence of *rasa*. Just as by mixing sugar and such edibles with foods, spices, and herbs, the six *rasas* (sweet, sour, bitter, pungent, salt, and astringent) are tasted, similarly, by combining with different *bhavas*, the *sthayi bhavas* are transformed into the state of *rasa*. What thing is this *rasa*? That which is capable of being tasted is *rasa*. How is *rasa* tasted? When appreciative gourmets eat foods laced with seasonings and taste *rasa* (the six *rasas*, sweet, bitter, etc.) they experience joy; in the same way appreciative spectators taste *sthayi bhavas* laced with verbal, gestural, and *satvika* enactments of various emotions and thus experience joy.

(Bharata Muni, *Natyasastra*, Chapter 6)

The dominant emotions, such as sexual passion, fear, anger, disgust, and humor are transformed into *rasa* when they are mixed with transitory emotions like dejection, guilt, doubt, and intoxication. This occurs when they are communicated through verbal and physical acting. On this primary enunciation of Bharata, there have been innumerable commentaries over the ages. They all attempt to make a close analysis of what exactly is the cause of *rasa* emergence. There are some basic questions that have occupied the analysts. Who experiences *rasa*? The poet, the actor, the spectator, or all of them together? Is the experience of all these people the same, or does each have his own distinctive experience? How long does *rasa* last? Does it change the inner psyche of the spectator? And so on.

Not only in the areas of performing art but in music, painting, sculpture, and poetry, the *rasa* concept has remained central through the ages. Even after the advent of modern art forms like the novel and realistic theater, creation of emotional arousal through art and the consequent experience of *rasa* has been greatly valued. Throughout the ages, *rasa* has also been thought

to complement and promote other pleasures or life whether secular or spiritual. It has thus reconciled art with commerce, sensuality, ethics, and renunciation.

Bharat Gupt

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RASHIDOV, SHAROF RASHIDOVICH

(1917–1983), Uzbek politician and writer. Sharof Rashidovich Rashidov led the Uzbekistan Soviet Socialist Republic from 1959 until 1983 as the first secretary of the Communist Party. He was a member of the Soviet Politburo, the highest policy-making institution in the Soviet Union (USSR). Born in Dzizak (then a small town in central Uzbekistan) in 1917, he spent most of his career in the Communist Party apparatus. From 1947 to 1950 he worked as editor of the leading national newspaper, *Kizil Uzbekiston*, and from 1950 to 1959 was chairman of the Supreme Soviet (the parliament of Uzbekistan), before being appointed as the first secretary of the ruling party in 1959. As one of the most influential politicians in the USSR, he played an important role in managing the modernization of Uzbekistan.

As a member of the Soviet Politburo, Rashidov influenced major decisions concerning Soviet Central

Asia, measuring modernization purely in terms of state-led industrialization and social construction of the Soviet identity (as reflected in his writing). His political legacy is controversial. On the one hand, he managed to attract huge investments into Uzbekistan's industrial and agricultural sector, while resisting a policy of Russification and attempting instead to consolidate Uzbek national awareness. On the other hand, patronage and corruption flourished under his leadership, and excessive exploitation of the arable land and natural resources led to ecological disasters in many areas of the republic.

After his unexpected death in October 1983, the Soviet government launched a major investigation of economic mismanagement and funds embezzlement, purging thousands of Rashidov's supporters. (This was also known as the "Uzbek affair," or the "cotton affair.") After Uzbekistan gained independence in 1991, the Uzbek leadership rehabilitated Rashidov's reputation, making him a national hero and a symbol of national pride, alongside medieval heroes such as Tamerlane (1336–1405) and Babur (1483–1530), in an attempt to consolidate the Uzbek people's sense of national identity.

Rafis Abazov

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RAVI RIVER The Ravi River is one of five rivers in the northwestern region of India that give the Punjab ("five rivers") province its name. It rises in the southeast of the Pir Panjal Range in the Himalayas and to the south of Srinagar in the state of Himachal Pradesh. After flowing southwest along the India-Pakistan border, it enters Pakistan just to the northeast of Lahore and then proceeds past that city in a southwesterly direction, midway between and parallel to the Sutlej and the Chenab Rivers. After a course of some 765 kilometers, it falls into the Chenab River 53 kilometers north-northeast of the Pakistani city of Multan. Some 60 kilometers southwest of Lahore is the Baloki Barrage, part of an extensive irrigation sys-

tem on the Punjabi plain, which drains away much of the Ravi's water.

Paul Hockings

RAY, SATYAJIT (1921–1992), Indian filmmaker. One of the most prominent figures in the history of cultural production in India, Satyajit Ray is best known in international circles for his films. A cursory glance at his oeuvre, however, shows that he was not only a filmmaker but also a designer, illustrator, music composer, and creative writer. Born on 2 May 1921 in Calcutta, Ray was raised in a distinguished family of artists and intellectuals. In 1955, he gained worldwide acclaim for his debut film, *Pather Panchali* (The Song of the Little Road). Soon after, he made a sequel, *Aparajito* (The Unvanquished, 1957), and, in 1959, he produced *Apur Sansar* (The World of Apu), completing the Apu trilogy. Ray sought to carve a new space for cinema in India, one that was attentive to the specificity of film as an artistic medium, and one that eschewed the song-and-dance routines and formulaic stories found in the dominant commercial cinema. Ray, with his peers Ritwik Ghatak and Mrinal Sen, is credited with the development of "art cinema" in India. In 1992, Ray received both the Bharat-Ratna, the highest honor given by the Indian state, and an Academy Award for lifetime achievement in filmmaking. He died on 23 April 1992.

Monika Mehta

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RAZIYYA (d. 1240), Delhi sultanate ruler. Daughter of Shams-ud-din Iltutmish, who ruled Delhi for a quarter of a century, Sultana Raziyya was the third major ruler of the Delhi sultanate (1192–1526). After the brief and ineffectual rule of her brother, whom she toppled, Raziyya ascended to the throne in 1236. In doing so, she inherited the most powerful state in northern India. During her four-year reign, a period of relative peace, she dispensed with the veil and thus provoked the ire of Muslim orthodoxy. Perhaps more controversial was her decision to appoint Jamal-ud-din Yakut, an "Abyssinian" who was probably once an African slave, as her "personal attendant." In 1240, while she was dashing across the Punjab to quell a revolt in Bhatinda, Raziyya was captured and deposed by a Turkish junta, the Mamluks, or "the Forty," as

they were also called. While in their custody, she managed to win the backing of one of her captors, whom she subsequently married and with whose help she marched on Delhi. Their army was soundly defeated, and Raziyya was killed in October 1240. Thus ended the reign of the only Muslim woman ever to rule on Indian soil.

Vivek Bhandari

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RECRUIT SCANDAL The Recruit scandal lifted the lid on the shockingly pervasive corruption in Japanese politics and caused a profound loss of public confidence in Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) rule. It came to light when a local newspaper reported that some of Japan's leading politicians and bureaucrats had received gifts of stock in a company called Recruit Cosmos in return for eased regulatory supervision of this firm's parent company.

In the 1980s, the Recruit Company was a relatively new firm that specialized in selling employment information to young job seekers through magazines. When the Labor Ministry threatened closer supervision of its business, Recruit president Ezoe Hiromasa took the countermeasure of bribing seventeen elected officials, using shares of pre-issue stock in Recruit Cosmos, a subsidiary involved in real estate. The value of this stock multiplied when it was subsequently listed on the stock exchange in 1986. Ezoe also was a generous contributor to the fund-raising efforts of political leaders, distributing about \$10 million to nearly fifty Diet members. Virtually all the leading members of the LDP, including former prime minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, then-prime minister Takeshita Noboru, then-finance minister Miyazawa Kiichi, and LDP secretary-general Abe Shintaro received secret gifts from Ezoe.

Even more shocking to the Japanese public was the revelation that the system of corruption under LDP rule had spread to include top bureaucrats and opposition party members who previously were thought to be relatively honest and untainted. The administrative vice-ministers of the Labor Ministry and the Education Ministry were both arrested, as was the former chairman of Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT). In addition, the leaders of the Democratic Socialist Party of Japan (DSP) and the Clean Government Party (Komeito) were forced to resign in

disgrace. In all, some twenty individuals were arrested in this scandal, and after the suicide of his secretary, Prime Minister Takeshita along with four of his cabinet members were forced to resign.

The Recruit scandal, combined with an unpopular 3 percent consumption tax introduced by Takeshita and a sex scandal involving his successor as prime minister, Uno Sosuke, caused the LDP to lose its majority in the upper house in the 1989 election. It also upset the internal factional dynamics of the LDP, leading to its loss of power in 1993. The scandal provoked widespread demands for new leadership, political reform, and higher ethical standards in government that would set the agenda for Japanese politics in the 1990s and beyond.

David Arase

See also: **Liberal Democratic Party—Japan**

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RED GUARD ORGANIZATIONS An important factor in the Cultural Revolution, particularly from 1966 to 1968, the Red Guards were groups formed from junior and senior high school students and university students, who made it their cause to be the personal guards of Mao Zedong (1893–1976) and of the socialist revolution. First formed on 29 May 1966 at the Quinhua University Middle School in Beijing as a reaction to the criticism of Mao in the play *Hai Rui* (Dismissed from Office) by the historian Wu Han, the group used slogans and demonstrations to express disapproval of its schools and faculty. Using the organization as a powerful tool in his political struggle with his rivals in the Communist Party and the government, Mao gave his blessing to the Red Guards by sending them a personal letter praising their activities and by reviewing almost 10 million Red Guards in six gigantic rallies in Beijing during late 1966. Encouraged by Mao, the Red Guards organizations quickly spread to other schools and universities in Beijing and then to the rest of the country.

The activities of the Red Guards, which centered on a personal glorification of Mao and an aggressive push against foreign or traditional culture, were focused by Mao's campaign to destroy the "Four Olds": old thought, old culture, old customs, and old prac-



Red Guards carrying a portrait of Mao and red flags march through the streets of Beijing in 1967. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

tices. The campaign began in late 1966, and the activities were largely those of the Red Guards. Mao's campaign was a personal attack on the "Four Olds," and the Red Guards implemented certain physical measures based on Mao's philosophies. These took the form of renaming streets, attacking foreign fashions and hairstyles, and attempting to redirect traffic after determining that the color red should signify "go." Such tactics turned violent, as Red Guards began torturing and killing people with "bad class backgrounds," destroying stores selling luxury goods, burning theater and opera props, smashing Confucian tombstones, and ransacking cultural treasures such as the Ming portion of the Great Wall, Han dynasty archaeological sites, and religious sites like mosques and Buddhist monasteries. Only direct action by the Central Committee prevented the Red Guards from storming the Imperial City.

By 1967, the Red Guards had splintered into factions violently contesting one another's loyalty and commitment, while continuing to arrest, torture, and harass those they saw as threats to the revolution, including translators, scholars, and military officials. The Red Guards confiscated jewelry, gold, and valuable real estate, while destroying art collections and priceless records. Faced with the horde of Red Guards, the government took the first step in halting their activities in March 1967 by ordering them to cease national networking and travel. In 1968, the army was sent into schools and universities to restore order and to control the Red Guards.

Although deeply committed to Mao and the revolution, the Red Guards built nothing new, while they terrorized China for more than two years, in the name of tearing down the old. Too dangerous to be allowed


to continue, the Red Guard organizations, which mobilized hundreds of thousands of Chinese students, had to be stopped with official force and ceased to be an important part of the Cultural Revolution.

Margaret Sankey

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RED RIVER AND DELTA The Red River (Song Hong), beginning in China's Yunnan province and flowing through northern Vietnam, runs about 1,200 kilometers to where it empties into the Gulf of Tonkin and the South China Sea. The river system is composed of two main tributaries, the Song Lo (Lo River, or Clear River) and the Song Da (Da River, or Black River), and has a large delta. The Red River delta is a triangular region of 3,000 square kilometers. The Red River has a high water volume of 500 million cubic meters per second and may increase as much as sixty times that amount at the peak of the rainy season. The river area and delta are subject to frequent flooding because the delta is no more than three meters above sea level. Flood control has been a part of the delta's history for centuries. The Viet-



namese have built, with much success, numerous dikes and a system of canals in order to attempt to contain the river and to irrigate the agriculturally rich delta region. The successful dike and canal system has enabled the Vietnamese to produce rice in mass quantities, making Vietnam one of the world's leading rice exporters. The delta was once an inlet of the Gulf of Tonkin, but, over millennia, it has been filled in by the large alluvial deposits of the rivers that make up the system and advances one hundred meters into the gulf annually.

For centuries the Red River and its delta have provided a means of transportation for the many people living nearby and have significantly aided commerce in the region. In fact, though smaller than the Mekong Delta to the south, the Red River delta is more intensely developed and populated. The delta region is the ancestral home of the ethnic Vietnamese and accounted for nearly 80 percent of the industry and 70 percent of the agriculture of North Vietnam before 1975. Today, the Red River and its delta remain Vietnam's most densely settled region, accounting for at least 80 percent of the population of northern Vietnam. The capital of Vietnam, Hanoi, and the industrial port city Haiphong are the two major population centers located on the Red River.

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REFAH AND FAZILET PARTIES During the 1990s Refah was the fastest-growing political party in Turkey; when it was closed down in 1998, the Fazilet party took its place. In 1983 the Refah (Welfare) party was founded and headed by the leader of political Islam in Turkey, Necmettin Erbakan (b. 1926). It replaced the National Salvation party, which, after serving in different coalition governments during the 1970s, was closed down in 1980 by the military regime that suspended parliamentary politics. Starting with a 4.4 percent vote in 1984, Refah steadily increased its showing and multiplied its vote nearly five times in twelve years. Refah alarmed the secular establishment of Turkey by achieving a big leap of popularity, first in the municipal elections of 1994, with 19 percent of all votes nationwide and the mayors' seats in both Istanbul and Ankara (the two largest

cities in the country), and then in the general elections of 1995, when it won a plurality with 21.4 percent of the national vote.

Refah briefly led a coalition government (June 1996–July 1997) with the right-wing True Path party before military pressure forced it out of power. In early 1998 the Constitutional Court closed down Refah for violating the principle of secularism and banned its leader, Erbakan, from politics for five years. Refah was immediately replaced by the Fazilet (Virtue) party, which inherited Refah's political cadres and parliamentary seats but was more circumspect and eager to distance itself from Refah's legacy. Fazilet, too, was closed down by the Constitutional Court in June 2001, leading to the split of the movement into two separate political parties.

Refah owed its ascendance to the crisis of mainstream politics in Turkey, and the party reflected the decline of the state ideology, Kemalism, which had directed the Turkish project of Westernization. Challenging the basic pro-Western orientation of this ideology and radically opposing the status quo, Refah's Islamist themes appealed to a wide range of disaffected social segments. Refah confounded the left-right division by leading a multiclass political movement that sought changes in lifestyle, culture, and ideology. The party cut through class divisions by uniting, around a common Islamic identity, elements from all classes who were marginalized in relation to the politics and ideology of the Kemalist state. Party members found in Refah an alternative identity around which to build networks of solidarity.

Turkish Islamism's social base was traditionally among the small-scale, provincial businesspeople. Refah expanded this base to win the support of both the impoverished working-class population in big cities, left unprotected by the now-defunct welfare state, and of upwardly mobile people seeking opportunities and acceptance. The latter included new and currently marginal, but rapidly growing, export-oriented sectors of the capitalist class and some ideologically marginal but highly vocal members of the young professional middle class, including students. Refah's political Islam, then, was not a traditionalist relic and did not originate from a backward-looking position.

Refah's closure caused political Islam to recast itself in Turkey. Fazilet, Refah's immediate successor, shed the radical elements of Refah's political ideology and claimed to be the champion of human rights and democracy. Yet both Refah and Fazilet shared the same exclusionary approach to political rights that were demanded for members and supporters but de-

nied to the opposition and detractors. Neither Refah nor Fazilet were capable of developing an inclusive politics or a language for expanding political freedoms; instead both parties focused on capturing the institutions of state power through political ploys.

Haldun Gulalp

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REFUGEES—SOUTH ASIA The South Asian subcontinent is ringed by four countries with such poor civil-rights records—Afghanistan, Tibet, Myanmar (Burma), and Sri Lanka—that during the 1990s refugees poured from these countries into neighboring nations. At the end of 2000 the U.N. High Commission on Refugees estimated that 3,573,682 Afghans had fled Taliban rule, the Islamic fundamentalist organization that seized full control in 1998 and barred women from work or education outside the home. Afghans sought refuge beyond Afghan borders—1,482,000 to Iran, 2,000,000 to Pakistan, with small numbers going to India, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Saudi Arabia.

After China overran Tibet in 1959, imposing martial law and forcing Tibet's spiritual leader the Dalai Lama into exile in India, many Tibetans fled the country—some to Canada and the United States, others to Nepal and India. (The Dalai Lama now resides in Dharmasala in northern India.) By the late 1990s, it was estimated that more than 120,000 Tibetans were in exile.

When the military regime known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) replaced the constitutional government in Myanmar (Burma), violently quelling student protests and placing Nobel Prize winner and nationalist Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest, this prompted a sizable Burmese exodus to northeast India and Bangladesh, with still other refugees going to Thailand.

Sri Lanka has virtually no foreign refugees, but many Sri Lankan Tamilians currently live in south India, mainly in the state of Tamil Nadu, where because of increasing tensions between Muslim Tamils and the Sinhalese Buddhist majority, a civil war has erupted with Tamil militants fighting the central government, endeavoring to create their own state. As a result, some thousands of Tamils have fled the country and now live in Europe.

In addition to political strife, climatic conditions may cause people to leave their homelands. For example, if global warming continues to raise sea levels in the future, all the inhabitants of the Maldives Republic, with its many low-lying islands, will be forced to flee, probably to neighboring Sri Lanka.

At the end of 1998 sub-Himalayan areas also held numerous refugees: As the result of Bhutan engaging in "ethnic purification," Bhutanese refugees (generally of Nepali ethnicity) numbered 100,000 in Nepal and 15,000 in India. During the 1973 Bangladesh war of independence many Bihari Muslims were displaced and sought to reestablish themselves in Pakistan.

Indians, Pakistanis, and Sri Lankans number several millions in the present-day populations of Canada, Australia, the United States, Germany, South Africa, and Britain, but in these cases they were "economic migrants" rather than refugees. This diaspora continues, as criminals smuggle in desperate South Asian men, whose families will pay large sums to get a relative working in the West.

Paul Hockings

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REFUGEES—SOUTHEAST ASIA In the mid-1970s, Southeast Asia was a major source of refugee movement in the world, arising from armed conflict and political and social upheavals following the Communist victories in Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos. Over the next two decades, more than 3 million people in this region fled from their homes. The Cold War climate encouraged flight from Communist countries and supported a policy of permanent resettlement in non-Communist countries. Cold War politics saw the conventional definition of the refugee, as enshrined in the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, focus on fundamental individual political and civil rights that Western governments held were violated in Communist countries. The 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol define a refugee as a person who has physically crossed into a neighboring country because of a fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, or membership in a certain group.

The Southeast Asian refugee crisis led to the single largest resettlement program including those Asian countries of first asylum, which provided temporary

protection, and the industrialized states that offered permanent new homes to more than 2.5 million refugees. To date, it remains one of the most comprehensive and costly refugee programs ever organized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

History

The first wave of Vietnamese refugees in Southeast Asia was between 1946 and 1948. During this period, some fifty thousand Vietnamese, primarily from the north, along with a few thousand who had been long-term residents of Laos or Cambodia, fled to Thailand (then Siam) to escape the fighting between the French and the Vietnamese nationalists in the First Indochina War. After the French withdrawal in 1954, internal conflict erupted in the newly independent states of Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos. The Geneva Accords of 1954 temporarily partitioned Vietnam at the seventeenth parallel pending a nationwide election to decide on one government to reunify the country. This political division saw over 1 million refugees move from northern to southern areas. The U.S. war in Vietnam (1954–1975) resulted in more refugees.

The Cambodian civil war (1970–1975) between the U.S.-backed Khmer Republic and the Vietnamese- and Chinese-supported Khmer Rouge regime, and the related massive U.S. bombing of the Cambodian countryside, left 500,000 dead and uprooted 2 million people. Political developments from 1975 caused even greater flows of refugees, which posed enormous humanitarian and security problems for the countries in the region. In 1975, the Khmer Rouge victory on 17 April saw several thousand Cambodians escape to Thailand; almost all foreigners were expelled from the country, including 170,000–270,000 ethnic Vietnamese. Cambodian refugees significantly increased in number after Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia at the end of 1978, and after the Khmer Rouge regime was subsequently overthrown, as approximately 140,000 refugees crossed into Thailand.

In Vietnam, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops seized control in Saigon and reunified the country on 30 April 1975. After the collapse of the Saigon government, only a relatively small number of people, mainly ethnic Chinese, fled Vietnam between 1975 and 1978. In 1978 when the first cases of Vietnamese boat people began arriving in Southeast Asia, the flow of Vietnamese refugees increased.

Refugee movements also continued following the Communist victory in Laos in 1975. The vast majority of the 54,000 Lao refugees to flee to Thailand were members of the Hmong (Mong), a highland-dwelling ethnic minority. The Hmong had reason to fear persecution as they had assisted U.S. attempts to stop the North Vietnamese troops from using the Ho Chi Minh Trail during the Vietnam War. From 1975 to 1995, some 360,000 refugees had arrived in Thai camps.

International Response

Fearing that the boat people would pose economic, social, and political problems, countries in the region that were not signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol began pushing refugees and their boats back to sea. International concern over the plight of the boat people led to the convening of the first International Conference on Indochinese Refugees in 1979. This saw the Vietnamese government agree to allow people to leave the country to seek asylum under the Orderly Departure Program (ODP), and the regional countries agreed to provide temporary protection on the basis that the West was committed to resettling the refugees.

The presence of refugee camps in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, and the continuing outflow of large numbers of refugees from Vietnam and Laos a decade later despite political stabilization, decreased regional and international support for the program. Asylum nations claimed that many boat people were no longer escaping persecution; instead they were escaping poverty. The second International Conference on Indochinese Refugees in 1989, recognizing the need for a new solution, adopted a Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA). The objective of the CPA was twofold: to reduce the flow of economic migrants and to assist in the return to their country of origin of those found not to be refugees.

The CPA represented a turning point in the attitudes of states toward resettlement as a solution to the refugee crisis. With the end of the Cold War, the West was no longer prepared to support a policy of group recognition of refugees or their blanket resettlement. The CPA determined that those arriving in refugee camps in most countries after 14 March 1989 should be screened to determine their status. The CPA has successfully stopped the Southeast Asian refugee flow and has repatriated 109,000 of those who remained in UNHCR refugee camps throughout Southeast Asia. In late 1998, the UNHCR considerably reduced its activities in the region.

Contemporary Movements

More than half a century after the adoption of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, refugee protection is under threat. Traditional asylum states have become more concerned about controlling migration movements than with providing protection to persecuted people. At the same time, it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish among the reasons that motivate people to migrate and flee from their homes.

The UNHCR estimates that there are currently close to 22 million refugees and other persons of concern in the world, more than 8 million of whom are in Asia. While refugee numbers have substantially declined, developments within Southeast Asia have continued to generate refugee flows. In 1999, an estimated 250,000 East Timorese fled or were forcibly moved to West Timor during the violence that ensued after the pro-independence referendum. By September 2001, about 80,000 remained in West Timor.

Since February 2001, the Vietnamese government's alleged repression of the indigenous Hmong people from the country's central highlands, following protests for land-tenure rights, religious freedom, and independence, has seen more than 1,500 Hmong flee to Cambodia. The Cambodian government initially granted more than 900 refugees temporary asylum but in March 2002 announced its intention to cease protecting and providing temporary asylum for newly arriving Hmong. In a more positive move, the Cambodian government has given authorization for Hmong refugees to be processed for resettlement to the United States. In another development, the Thai government, which has traditionally been generous with refugees from Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar (Burma), has forcibly repatriated a number of ethnic Burmese refugees.

More than two decades since the Southeast Asian exodus, the refugee problem has shifted to elsewhere in the region. According to the *Human Rights Watch World Report 2002*, there are currently 850,000 to 1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Indonesia, 600,000 to 1 million IDPs in Myanmar, 200,000 Burmese refugees in Thailand, and 120,000 in Bangladesh.

In the current post-Cold War political climate, government and public attitudes have hardened toward potential asylum seekers. Increased flows of refugees in the world due to continuing civil and ethnic conflicts and human-rights abuses are perceived as threats to the security, identity, and social cohesion of states. This attitude has resulted in many traditional asylum states abrogating their obligations under the Refugee Convention, as refugees and their resettlement are increasingly seen as

an unwanted burden on limited resources. It has also led to the redefinition of who qualifies for legitimate refugee status, as well as legitimate means of flight and entry.

Thuy Do

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RELIGION, FOLK—CHINA In China, major religions such as Taoism, Buddhism, and state religion, or Confucianism, were never powerful or popular enough to displace the communal religion of the people. They have had to be satisfied with sharing the spiritual loyalties of the people with community and family-based religious observances. There is no question that they have been successful in infusing the communal religion with certain of their doctrines and traditions. The Buddhist vision of Hell and the afterlife, for example, became the commonly accepted vision among all Chinese. Confucian morality became the morality of the common people. The Taoist pantheon fused with the pantheon of communal religion, and Taoist priests were able to establish themselves as the ritual specialists of choice for both the common people and the state. But the masses of the Chinese people, the vast majority of whom lived in small rural villages, always remained faithful to their local gods. Only under the most dire circumstances, when famine, military unrest, or natural disaster destroyed their villages and livelihoods, did they voluntarily throw their support be-



FOLK TALES IN CHINA

Folktales are an important component of folk religions, as folk religions do not have written texts. This tale from China is about the important matter of ancestry, in this tale about the ancestry of the barber trade.

April 14 in the old calendar is the birthday of Lü Tung-pin, and all barbers in the country sacrifice to him on that day. The custom originated in the Ming Dynasty.

The first emperor, Chu Hung-wu, had a scalp disease. Every day he sent for a new barber to come to the palace and shave him, but none of them could do it without hurting him. He had innumerable barbers executed for their failure.

All the barbers in the land were in a desperate state, not knowing what to do. They sent a plea up to heaven; when the Jade emperor received it, he sent Lü Tung-pin down to earth. Lü Ting-pin changed into a barber, turned his magic sword into a razor and went to the palace. After he had shaved Hung-wu, not only did the emperor feel no pain, but his disease caused him no more trouble.

At first the barbers marveled at the cure, but gradually they all learned that the man who had shaved the emperor was the envoy of heaven, Lü Tung-pin. They thanked him again and again, and gave him the post of deity of hairdressers.

Ever since, Lü Tung-pin has been worshipped by every barber and is considered the ancestor of the trade.

Source: Wolfram Eberhard. (1965) *Folktales of China*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 40.

hind charismatic religious leaders who promised to lead them out of their misery and into some divine utopia.

Because China is such a vast country with many regional variations, it is extremely difficult to give an accurate account of the general characteristics of the communal religion. Only the fact that Chinese culture was remarkably integrated despite regional differences makes it reasonable to even attempt to do so. Ironically, the fact that the major religious traditions worked hard to infiltrate the religion of the people also means that many unifying features exist from one region to another.

Characteristics of Popular Religion

To the common people of traditional China, as for those in most premodern societies, the natural world was animated by a great number of unseen forces and beings. The focus of popular religion was always on seeking the assistance of those forces in protecting the

social and economic interests of the local community. Certain divinities were identified as being primarily responsible for maintaining order in the unseen world just as certain authority figures were charged with ensuring the smooth functioning of the material world. One of the most striking features of the Chinese vision of the realm of the gods is the manner in which the gods were believed to operate through a centralized bureaucratic government, which was undeniably patterned after the imperial government of traditional China. The means of communicating with the gods also replicated the means of dealing with officials of the imperial government. Requests were made via formally worded memorials, and sacrifices were conceived of as being similar to official banquets at which local people entertained visiting government representatives.

A curious but significant aspect of the relationship between humans and gods in China was the fact that

the gods were assumed to be subject to human authority, or at least that they existed in a relationship of mutual obligation with humans. Not only priests of various affiliations, but also government officials could issue orders to the officials of the unseen world. They could promote or demote those holding position in the divine bureaucracy. They could also order punishment for spirits who had not fulfilled their correct roles. The official titles carried by certain prominent gods were often determined by the imperial government in recognition of service to humans. The idea that gods could be given orders by humans is something quite foreign to the Judeo-Christian tradition, which assumes an all-powerful god who controls all aspects of human endeavor. To a certain extent it also explains why religious institutions in China never achieved the same power as they did in the West.

In any village or city of medieval China it would have been possible to find many temples, large and small, which housed gods who were believed to possess special powers. They might be thought to protect against natural disaster, cure illnesses, assist women in childbirth, or save sailors at sea. Sometimes there were legends to explain how a god had acquired his or her powers, sometimes there were not. The temples of these gods were maintained by the surrounding community and for the most part there would have been no full-time priest in residence. When the occasion called for it, certain members of the community would preside over ceremonies. For the more important rituals, Taoist priests with specialized knowledge of ritual procedure would be invited. In other cases, the local magistrate would be the master of ceremonies. The state had since very early times maintained a religious presence in the local communities by charging their local representatives with the duty of conducting sacrifices and rituals of various sorts, especially those directed toward the control of the forces of nature. Sacrifices begging for rain or seeking to end pestilence were commonly carried out by government officials.

One of the most characteristic tendencies of Chinese folk religion was the deification of real historical personalities. This usually occurred on a local level, but in some cases the popularity of such a figure might spread to other areas, or even become a national phenomenon. Very often those deified were cultural heroes, people who had distinguished themselves for their moral strength or military prowess. The process of deification was very much like the canonization of saints by the Catholic church. The major difference was that in China no central authority had control over who should and should not be deified. The imperial government in theory held that authority, and con-

stantly tried to enshrine those whom it felt embodied values it wished to promote. In the vast majority of cases, however, it was the general acceptance of the people themselves that determined the survival and popularity of a given cult. If the people did not feel that the god was effective in helping them, his or her temple fell into disrepair in a relatively short time.

The God of the Soil

One of the most widely dispersed and oldest divinities in China is the God of the Soil (Tudi gong). Virtually every village and urban neighborhood in traditional China recognized a god of the soil. He was the protector of not only the people of the community, but also of their livelihoods. In very ancient China there were also gods who specifically protected the crops that the people grew, but as Chinese social structure changed, these gods were usually displaced by the more versatile God of the Soil. Generally speaking, worship of the God of the Soil was done by the community as a whole, and not by individuals. Worship was carried out in times of crisis, but also on special days, such as the god's birthday. On these latter occasions lavish offerings of food and drink, as well as music and dance, were made and a generally festive atmosphere prevailed. Such occasions were a natural opportunity for the members of the community to mix with each other informally, lifting the spirits of all those involved.

The City God

Another god found in many Chinese communities is the City God (Chenghuang). City God temples are still found in Chinese cities where traditional religion is still practiced. Often one city will have several city gods who are distributed among its different wards. Cults of the City God are not as old as those of the God of the Soil. They begin to appear more and more widely in the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) and Song dynasty (960–1279). It is natural to assume that their popularity was related to the increased urbanization of those periods, but the cult is quite probably of Indian origin. City gods have a somewhat different role to play in the community than do gods of the soil. While they too have an important function in protecting the area under their control from disaster, and in bolstering its prosperity, they are more concerned with the souls of the departed and other ghostly presences. Another point of dissimilarity is in the fact that city gods are considered to be appointed to their positions. If they did not carry out their duties properly, they could be relieved of their posts and replaced. City gods are generally housed in impressive urban temples that can serve as community centers as well as religious insti-

tutions, very much as the plazas in front of certain European cathedrals served as meeting places for the citizens of the city.

Family-Based Religion

The Chinese family had been a center of ritual activity since ancient times. However, the nature of family religion changed significantly over time as Confucianism seeped slowly down through the social scale from the nobility to the common people. Confucianism brought normative, or universal, values to the common people of all regions of China, providing them with standard rituals and standard ethics. This was particularly so in the case of the cult of the ancestors. Although ancestor worship appears very early on in China, formal and ideological aspects of such things as funerals, weddings, and posthumous rites became steadily more imbued with Confucianism. With the triumph of Neo-Confucianism among the literati of the Song dynasty and the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), this process was accelerated. Yet even today we can observe that there remains considerable regional diversity in such rites.

The Chinese traditionally held the belief that human destiny was not determined by effort alone. It was necessary to enlist the help of superhuman agencies to assist in protecting and bringing prosperity. The closest, most obvious place to look for such assistance was among one's ancestors. The ancestors were very much considered part of the family as a whole. They had moved on to a different level of existence and had special needs, but they were dealt with as if their interest in family affairs remained as strong as when they had lived.

Rituals for the ancestors were aimed at making their afterlife as comfortable as possible. Some were also intended to assist their passage through otherworldly purgatories in which their past conduct was judged by divine authorities. It was believed that only if the ancestors were free from the clutches of hellish officials and materially well-attended to would they give their protection and help to living members of the family. This meant that altars were maintained in every household. Tablets with the names of the ancestors were placed there, along with offerings of food and drink. On special occasions more elaborate rites were enacted before those altars, at the graveside, or at a temple. On such occasions more lavish offerings were also provided. Paper money was burned in the belief that it would be transformed and conveyed to those in the afterlife. Anyone who visits a country where traditional Chinese religion is still practiced will note small metal containers filled with ashes on the sidewalks in front



TOMBS OF THE MING AND QING DYNASTIES— WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Aside from their immense historical value, the Ming and Qing dynasty imperial tombs are the very embodiments of the design principles of the Chinese art of geomancy (feng shui). The tombs were designated as UNESCO World Heritage Sites in 2000.

of people's houses and businesses. These are for the sole purpose of burning money for the ancestors of the family. Paper money is burned on a number of occasions during the year, especially at New Year's, the grave-sweeping festival (Qingming), and on death anniversaries.

The ancestors were not the only spiritual presence in the Chinese household. Gods and spirits were believed to inhabit strategic locations inside and out. The most important of these was no doubt the God of the Stove (Zaoshen). His dominion over the fire and the food-preparation area of the home guaranteed his prestige. The God of the Stove was responsible for watching over the activities of the family and for reporting those activities to the gods in the heavens. His yearly ascent to make his report was believed to take place shortly before New Year's. The family prepared a feast to send him off and tried to ensure that he would make only favorable comments about them.

Most houses would also have an altar to the God of the Soil placed close to the ground. He would be charged with protecting the family against evil spiritual influences. Door gods, whose images were painted on or beside entrance ways, protected against the entry of undesirable spirits and ghosts. Statues of the God of Wealth, the Buddhist Goddess of Mercy (Guanyin), and other popular divinities became common in the late imperial age. The help and protection of these gods was considered essential to the preservation and prosperity of the family.

Shamanism in Chinese Religion

Shamanism is a form of religion that focuses on direct means of contacting the world of spirits. It is the main religious and cultural tradition in many preliterate cultures. The shaman is a person, either male or female, who has undergone a radical initiation into the means of communicating with the spirits. The shaman

is known primarily as one who can gain temporary release from their physical body and travel to the realms of the spirits. There he (or she, since in many cultures the shaman is a woman) can speak with the spirits and request their assistance in human affairs. Alternatively, shamans can vacate their bodies and allow spirits to make use of their voices to speak with humans. One of the most important roles of the shaman is to cure illness. Both spiritual and medical means are employed to this end. Often it is necessary to exorcise evil influences, and the shaman is an expert at this task. In preliterate cultures the shaman is also the person who learns and teaches the history of the tribe in which he or she serves. He or she is the storyteller and historian who allows people to learn from their past.

In China, although purely shamanic religion has not been practiced since prehistoric times, shamanic elements have always been a central in religious practice. The kings of the Xia (2100–1766 BCE) and Shang (1766–1045 BCE) periods relied on the services of priests capable of contacting the spirits to plan their every move. Among the people, mediums who could enter a trance and allow spirits to speak through their mouths, or write with their hands have been a basic part of village religion right up the present day. Despite the fact that spirit mediumship played a major role in the government of early China, representatives of later governments, as well as of the major religions, were always suspicious of the practice and sought to suppress it. This was because a medium capable of receiving information from the highest level of heavenly government could potentially challenge the legitimacy of earthly government, or religious authority—a dangerous thing in the eyes of those authorities. Despite official disapproval, however, techniques of shamanic trance and mediumship have always been a basic part Chinese folk religion.

Ledgers of Merit and Demerit

The role of religion is not primarily to provide moral and ethical guidance. However, moral behavior is often seen as a prerequisite to the achievement of spiritual goals. As societies become more sophisticated they require better explanations of the existence of evil. People want to believe that there are mechanisms or agencies that provide ultimate recompense to those who have been wronged, and punishment for those who have wronged. In Chinese religion it is believed that there are gods whose main activity is keeping track of the deeds of humans. At death, the deceased individual is brought before a tribunal of spirit-officials for judgment. Since the Chinese adopted the Buddhist concept of rebirth, it is often a case of determining not

only which punishments or rewards to mete out, but also how long these will last before rebirth occurs. Living descendants can modify the sentence by undertaking certain ritual activities, such as reciting scriptures and employing priests to intercede on behalf of the departed souls.

In China, beginning in the third century CE, if not before, another variation on this theme of morality and retribution came into play. This was the practice of maintaining one's own personal record of good and evil deeds. The fourth century Taoist text *Baopu zi* by Ge Hong (c. 280–343) details how it was necessary to do a specific number of good deeds in order to proceed with the quest of immortality. Evil deeds were marked off against the total of good deeds at a high rate. Divine authorities ultimately verify the correctness and validity of these records. This belief continued to gain popularity, until by the late Song dynasty we find scriptures that give detailed information on which sorts of deeds count for how many points, and how many points are required to achieve a given reward.

By the Ming dynasty the practice of recording one's own merits and demerits had become even more widespread and formalized. Registers for keeping track of merit and demerit points were being published commercially and by religious establishments. Belief in the validity of the practice had also spread from Taoism and popular religion to Buddhism and Confucianism. Well-known Confucian officials and Buddhist priests were actively keeping their own records, and writing about the subject. One would expect that the understanding of what constituted good and evil could vary depending on the main affinity of the writer. In fact, by the late Ming, moral principles from all sources had become thoroughly mixed and universalized. This mixing and unifying of moral values is once again symptomatic of the strong forces of integration at work in the realm of religion and philosophy in late imperial China.

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See also: **Buddhism—China; Confucianism—China; Taoism**

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
RELIGION, FOLK—JAPAN *Minkan shinko*, literally "popular beliefs," refers to the vast array of folk beliefs, customs, and rituals that make up what can be called Japanese folk religion and that play an important role in Japanese daily life. Indeed, especially in rural areas of the country, such as the Tohoku, or northern Honshu, Sado Island, and the mountainous regions that border the Sea of Japan, these beliefs and practices still manifest themselves in a wide variety of contexts, from planting and harvesting rice to building boats and houses, caring for sick people, getting married, celebrating the New Year, and coping with earthquakes, typhoons, volcanic eruptions, and other disasters. And even in modern, high-tech urban Japan, folk religious beliefs remain important, as evidenced by the continuing popularity of *uranai*, or folk divination.

It is impossible to separate many concrete manifestations of Japanese folk religious practices from those related to the two major established religions, Buddhism and Shinto, but unlike these religions, folk religious practices have no clear-cut doctrine, written texts, or priesthood; they rely heavily on oral transmission. They are also highly variable, and each region of the country has a wealth of unique traditions.

Seasonal Rituals

Many *minkan shinko* rituals are connected with the seasonal cycle. The most important of these occurs during *oshogatsu matsuri*, or the New Year festival, which, since 1872 has taken place during the first three days of January. Traditionally, a house will be thoroughly cleaned to rid it of the previous year's impurities. Great care is taken to adorn the home with a variety of sacred objects signifying purity, renewal, and good fortune. A straw rope (*shimenawa*) indicating that the house has been purified is tied above the main entrance, and pine cones are placed on either side of the gate, symbolizing the new life that will shortly appear. The first visitor, the first food eaten, even the first dream of the new year all have ritual significance.

One of the most ubiquitous customs associated with the new year is the pounding of rice into *mochi*, or rice cakes, which are placed on small household altars and topped by a *mikan*, or mandarin orange, symbolizing the rebirth of the sun. The occasion is also marked by



A man dressed as a samurai warrior hits a kagami-michi rice cake with a mallet at the 2000 Kagami Biraki festival in Tokyo. It is a traditional New Year's celebration to mark the cleaning and purification of weapons and armor, a practice that dates to the fifteenth century. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

the consumption of special foods, including a special soup made from pounded rice and vegetables called *ozoni*, and a form of sake, or rice wine, drunk only during the New Year's festival. While all of these customs have links to both Shinto and Buddhism, they vary considerably from region to region and have no canonical forms.

Other important folk-religious holidays include *Setsubun* (3 February), in which beans are thrown into the four corners of a room to insure good luck while chanting *Oni wa soto, fuku wa uchi!* ("Out with the demons, good luck to the house!"); *Hina matsuri*, or the Doll Festival (5 February), when young girls set up displays of traditional dolls arranged in the form of the imperial court; Children's Day (5 May; formerly called Boys' Day), when paper carp, or *koi nobori*, are flown to symbolize the presence of young males in a household; and *Obon* (from mid-August to early September), when every neighborhood or village honors the souls of the dead by cleaning graves and many perform a special dance known as the *Bon odori* or *Obon*

odori. *Obon* is basically a Buddhist celebration, but it is so encrusted with local beliefs and practices that it can legitimately be conceived of as a folk holiday.

Rites of Passage

Life-cycle rituals, or rites of passage, also play an important role in Japanese folk religion, marking major points of transition from the cradle to the grave. Many of these rituals relate to the two main religions, but they also contain a great many folk-ritual features. *Miyamairi*, or the first visit of a baby to a nearby Shinto shrine, occurs thirty and thirty-three days after birth for boys and girls, respectively, and includes offerings of sake and beans to the local *kami* (spirit or god). *Shichi-go-san*, or the "Seven-Five-Three" ceremony (15 November), is for children who have recently turned three, five, and seven. They visit the local shrine with their parents, are purified, and later receive a bag of sweets and a toy or two. Coming of age, at twenty, is celebrated on 15 January. A public official addresses the new young adults at the shrine, usually with remarks about their new rights and duties; the girls present are usually dressed in fancy long-sleeved kimonos. Finally, *kanreki* celebrates having reached one's sixty-first birthday. The person so honored dons red garments symbolic of childhood; indeed, the symbolism of the *kanreki* is expressed in the name of the celebration, which can be translated "return of the calendar" (i.e., the traditional sixty-year Chinese cycle).

Another extremely important rite of passage, of course, is marriage. It would be impossible here to describe all the folk elements in Japanese marriage, which is almost always celebrated in a Shinto context, though rarely at a shrine. Today, the vast majority of Japanese marriages are celebrated in hotels or special "wedding palaces." The central element of the ritual is an exchange of sake between the bride and groom. But almost every item of clothing worn by the bride has an important symbolism. The most striking of these is the *tsunokakushi*, or "horn-hider," which forms part of her headdress and serves to hide the so-called horns of jealousy and other potentially "demonic" characteristics which might impede her obedience to her husband.

Uranai

An additional feature of Japanese folk religion that deserves mention is *uranai*, or folk divination. In early fall, tiny tables illuminated by small lanterns dot the streets of Tokyo and other big cities, manned by fortune-tellers practicing one or another variety of divination. Japanese *uranai* includes a great many specific

techniques, most of which are rooted in the ancient Chinese *Yi jing* (Classic of Changes), and based on its eight well-known trigrams. *Ekikyo*, as the *Yi jing* is called in Japanese, is generally performed by professional diviners who employ the traditional Chinese method, which includes the use of yarrow stalks.

In recent years almost every conceivable basis for foretelling the future has been drawn upon, including blood types. That is, types A, B, O, or AB, as well as Rh+ and Rh-, are believed by some diviners to have specific implications for a person's fortune. Although this form of *uranai* is still in its infancy, it underscores the extent to which Japanese folk religion has been able to absorb beliefs and practices from a wide variety of sources, from ancient China to modern biological science.

C. Scott Littleton

See also: **Buddhism—Japan; Shinto**

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RELIGIONS, NEW—JAPAN The term "new religions" refers to religions that have been founded within approximately the last two centuries and are considered to be outside the mainstream formally organized religions, specifically Buddhism and Shinto. The Japanese term *shin shukyo* ("new religion"), and the less common *shinko shukyo* ("newly-arisen religion"), came into use in the 1950s.

Classifications and Common Characteristics

Scholars often categorize these religious groups according to the period in which they emerged or expanded and the predominant religious traditions they reflect. The first group was founded in the nineteenth century, the second from the late nineteenth century to World War I, and the third from the end of World War I to the present. Some scholars suggest a fourth designation of "new New Religions" (*shin shin shukyo*) for those founded after World War II, especially during the 1970s and 1980s. It is important to point out, however, that the majority of these movements are not fundamentally or radically new. Regarding the latest "wave" of new religions, Reader (1991: 195), for example, comments, "[T]hey appear, in the midst of a rapidly technologising, modernising and internationalising society, to express anti-modern and Japanocentric sentiments, focusing on miracles, spirit possession and a view of causation that is rooted very firmly in the Japanese folk tradition." One factor differentiating them from the mainstream of religious thought and activity is their independence from government, state, and social norms.

A second common characteristic is that rather than taking a radical departure in content, their newness comes from their innovative approach, interpretation, and methodology. For example, they may claim to have discovered a new truth in the old tradition, one that has not been recognized before, and to have found a way to make that truth available for the benefit of all who believe. In most cases, this involves spiritual healing following the discoveries made by a charismatic founder.

A third element in many new religions is the binding together of solutions to *byoki naoshi* (physical healing), *kokoro naoshi* (spiritual healing) and the goal of *yo naoshi* (world renewal). Most claim that such problems as illness and misfortune have spiritual causes, and that through their newly discovered methods, individuals can identify and eventually eradicate the source of their suffering. They offer the hope that each person can overcome his or her problems, and thereafter help solve the problems of the world at large. To a large extent this is done through participation in some form of small group in which members share, discuss, and suggest solutions to other members' problems.

Japanese tradition includes the formal religions (*ki-sei shukyo*) Shinto and Buddhism and influential but rarely organized Confucianism and Taoism. In addition, there is a broad, unsystematized body of beliefs and practices that can be called popular religion or even folk religion. Those movements which Earhart (1989) views as evolving from the general background

of Japanese religion may include the worship of nature and holy persons (whether they be deities or respected religious leaders), devotion to family and country, stress on sincerity and self-reflection, self-cultivation and dedication to hard work.

In many cases, new religions in this last category incorporate elements from Buddhism, Shinto, and popular religion. Gedatsu-kai (founded in 1929 by Eizo Okano), for example, combines all of these elements by encouraging worship before the Buddhist-style altar, worship before the Shinto-style altar, veneration of deities and ancestors, family values, the ethical value of self-reflection, patriotic spirit, and appreciation of the benefits of nature. The beliefs and practices are traditional, but the modification and reconstruction make them into a new whole, and this is typical of most new religions.

Although Shinto, Buddhism, and popular religion account for the clear majority of influences, certain Christianity-related movements also belong among the New Religions. Groups such as Mukyokai (the Non-Church movement, founded 1901 by Uchimura Kanzo) claim only that they are Japanese expressions of Christianity, but others, like Iesu no Mitama Kyokai (Spirit of Jesus Church, founded by Murai Jun in 1941), make exclusivistic claims to having discovered the truth of Christianity prior to distortion by Hellenistic influences and Western church history.

Membership

It is often suggested that new religions flourish during times of social crisis and unrest, such as the transition from Tokugawa rule to the restoration of imperial rule in the Meiji Restoration (1868), the poverty and economic depression of the late 1920s, and the traumatic period following the devastations of World War II. In his 1989 study of Gedatsu-kai, H. Byron Earhart cogently argues that attributing such growth entirely to the social milieu is inadequate and that one ought to interpret the formation of such new religions through a more balanced view of social conditions, religious history, and personal innovation. Social disruption and personal anxiety may well be important factors, but Earhart refers to them as "precipitating" factors (236), essential for triggering the timing of a movement's appearance and growth, but not sufficient for beginning the movement or establishing its primary teachings. The influence of religious history, in the same way, is insufficient to stimulate the formation of a new religion. The weakening of established religious traditions and practices may well leave a void to be filled, but on the other hand these preexisting elements are vital to the constitution of new

movements through the innovations of the founder. In sum, the social climate helps precipitate, religious factors help enable, and the founder helps innovate—all three factors must be taken into account.

Reflecting the establishment view of the newcomers, until recently the media and academics tended to view the new religions as peddling false ideas and superstitions to a gullible, undereducated, alienated underclass. More balanced contemporary research, however, indicates that those who join these various new movements today are slightly better educated than the average Japanese, to a large degree have white-collar jobs, and are somewhat conservative politically.

Shinto-Related Religions

Largest of the Shinto-related new religions is Tenri-kyo (Religion of Heavenly Origin), which in 1990 had a membership of 1.8 million. (All movement membership figures herein are taken from Mullins, Shimazono, and Swanson's 1993 *Religion and Society in Modern Japan: Selected Readings*). Tenri-kyo was founded in 1838 by Nakayama Miki (1798–1887), a farmer's wife who began to have revelatory experiences. During a shamanistic rite, she received healing gifts and revelatory scriptures while possessed by the deity Tenri-O-no-mikoto (Lord of Heavenly Reason). Originally classified as an actual Shinto sect, in 1970 it was reclassified by the government among "Other Religions" because it had come to see itself as having a mission that extended beyond Japan.

Now emphasizing "The Path to the Joyous Life," members seek to rid themselves of evil thoughts and purify themselves in order to lead a balanced, harmonious life, hence approaching the perfect divine kingdom when humanity will live in union with the deity.

Other Shinto-related movements, and their founding dates include Kurozumi-kyo (1814, named after its founder, Kurozumi Munetada), Konko-kyo (1859), Omoto (1899), and Honmichi (1913).

Buddhist-Related Religions

Buddhist-related new religions notably focus on Nichiren (a Japanese Buddhist sect dating to the mid-thirteenth century and focused exclusively on the Lotus Sutra), the Lotus Sutra, and ancestors. They focus less on *kami* (deities of Shinto tradition) and more on the divinities of Buddhist tradition. A typical example of how newer movements have drawn on traditional Buddhism is the memorial rituals that Reiyukai (Society of Friends of the Spirits, 3.2 million members in 1990) holds for the dead. Founder Kubo Kakutarō

(1892–1944) saw veneration of the ancestors as essential to social harmony and national salvation.

Soka Gakkai (Value Creation Society) was founded in 1930 by Makiguchi Tsunesaburo (1871–1944), an educator who wrote about "value-creating education," and his follower Toda Josei (1900–1958) and is closely associated with Nichiren Buddhism. Makiguchi was imprisoned during World War II for encouraging his followers not to purchase Shinto amulets; he died while incarcerated. Toda was also imprisoned, and following release at the end of the war, he began to build a highly organized movement. The group's aggressiveness and its declared aim of uniting religion and politics led to much criticism, but it succeeded in creating the political party Komeito (Clean Government Party) in 1964.

The movement is currently under the leadership of Ikeda Daisaku (b. 1928), and under his leadership it has become less militant, severed official ties with Komeito, and separated entirely from the organized priesthood of Nichiren Shoshu (the official name for the Nichiren sect). Soka Gakkai's two central aims are to realize personal happiness through lay practice of Nichiren Buddhism and achieve a peaceful world through the application of Buddhism to culture and education. As is typical of many of the larger movements, the group operates schools, publishes several weekly and monthly magazines, and, beginning in the mid-1960s, established branches in many nations overseas. In 1990, the group had a membership of 17.7 million.

Other Buddhist-related movements (with founding date and membership in 1990) include Rissho Koseikai (Society for Establishing Righteousness and Friendly Relations, founded 1938; 6.3 million members), Perfect Liberty Kyodan (founded 1925; 1.3 million members), Seicho-no-ie (House of Growth, founded 1930; 838,496 members), Sekai Kyusei-kyo (World Salvation Religion, founded 1935; 835,756 members), Byakko Shinko-kai (White Light Association, founded 1951; 500,000 members), and Kofuku-no-Kagaku (Institute for Research in Human Happiness, founded 1986; 13,300 members).

Several additional movements are worth a brief mention for different reasons. Agon-shu (membership of 206,606 in 1990), was founded in 1954 by Kiriya Seiyo (b. 1921), who suffered a childhood of poverty and a series of business failures that eventually landed him in prison for tax offenses. In despair, he attempted to hang himself, only to find on the overhead beam a copy of a Buddhist text elucidating the compassion of the Buddha Kannon. Believing that Kannon had directly interceded to save him, he studied the work diligently and came to the conclusion that his earlier

misfortunes were the result of karmic pollution, some of which he had inherited from his ancestors.

Meditation and esoteric practices, he claimed, could transform the suffering of the spirits of the dead and allow them to become Buddhas. The movement is now well-known for an elaborate, well-attended Star Festival, during which pyres of sticks, upon which are written prayers for the ancestors and personal prayers, are burned in a rite of purification.

Shukyo Mahikari (Religion of True Light), currently divided into two splinter groups with a combined membership of about 600,000 in 1990, was founded by Okada Yoshikazu in 1959. This movement is centered on a purification ritual that is held to heal both physically and mentally, through the transmission of the True Light (Mahikari) through the palm of the hand of an initiate. Mahikari is based on a syncretism of Shinto, Buddhism, and Shamanistic elements, with stress on the first in its emphasis on purity. "The Light can be used to purify not only people, but also food, rivers, animals, trees, cities, houses, etc. It may serve to prevent calamities as well as recover from them." (Clarke and Somers 1994: 92). The Buddhist influence appears in Mahikari's emphasis on karma carried over from previous lives and from one's ancestors, which is seen as the root of all disease and misfortune. The shamanistic factor is the contention that the majority of all diseases and misfortunes result from spirit possession by an ancestor who must be suitably pacified. There is another important influence from Christianity, from which Mahikari has borrowed themes, teachings, and the figure of Jesus Christ. According to Mahikari's teachings, Jesus traveled through India and China to Japan, practiced with mountain ascetics there, returned to Judea to teach, was sentenced to death, but was voluntarily replaced on the cross by his brother. Jesus then traveled to Europe, Asia, and the Americas before returning to Japan, where he lived until his death at the age of over one hundred.

Aum Shinri-kyo was founded by Matsumoto Chizuo (b. 1955; later known as Asahara Shoko), who was born almost totally blind. Matsumoto was sent to a boarding school for the blind, where he lived until moving to Tokyo to work as an acupuncturist while waiting to take the examinations to enter Tokyo University. Failing in the exam, in despondence about his role in the world, he began to study the teachings of Agon-shu. Eventually turning away from Agon-shu, he founded what later became Aum Shinri-kyo (Aum Supreme Truth Sect) in 1984, proclaiming himself a messianic leader appointed by the Hindu deity Siva to create a perfect society that would be composed of all

those who followed his teachings, methods, and example. Gradually his ideas about overcoming the physical barriers to immortality evolved into a justification of using destruction and violence as means of salvation. The result of this was widely reported. Beyond the public's revulsion as a result of the group's sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subways in March 1995, several murders, abductions, and a long list of other crimes, these incidents generated considerable fear and suspicion of other new religions. Believers in other movements became quick to distance themselves from the mindless fanaticism and violent methods of the Aum cultists.

New Religions Abroad

While some movements have restricted their activities to Japan, others have established missionary activities abroad, primarily to the Americas. Peter Clarke notes that there are over thirty such religions in Brazil alone, where there are an estimated 1.3 million people of Japanese descent. Mahikari has established itself on the Caribbean islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe and adapted to local conditions to the degree that its Japanese character is considerably obscured. Movements are also active in other nations of South, Central, and North America as well as South and Southeast Asia and Africa. Soka Gakkai is the largest of the group in Europe, followed by Mahikari.

Success outside of Japan has reflected a willingness to adapt to local customs and traditional views. Tenri-kyo, for example, was established in Brazil, Hawaii, and the mainland United States in the 1930s but failed to make significant inroads, especially outside the community of Japanese immigrants and their descendants. Yet in Korea, where it has local leadership and liturgy in Korean, it has been highly successful.

Overview

The new religious movements are clearly manifestations of a religious feeling, whether motivated by a quest for the irrational, a distrust of science, or a need for spirituality that goes beyond the monotony of everyday life. The fact that they continue to appear and that some experience considerable growth is indicative of the fact that traditional religious paths have not addressed all the spiritual needs of the Japanese people. The new movements do this with vigor and enthusiasm that often seems lacking in the more restrained established religions. The new movements have to a considerable extent built on the traditional religiosity of Japan—including Buddhist, Shintoist, Taoist, Confucianist, and folk religious elements—adopting what is appealing and infusing the new

composites with new interpretations, rituals, approaches and promises. Among the traditional elements, almost all groups emphasize the importance of one's ancestors. When neglected, these ancestors may become potential causes of misfortune, but when properly venerated they become sources of benevolence.

Most groups seek to provide members with the benefits of this world, including success, peace of mind, and happiness. They tend to feature deep personal experience that may be linked to a miraculous cure of a physical illness or sudden awareness of how to cope with a debilitating personal problem.

While it may be said that some of these movements are quasi-religious and make claims that are beyond the bounds of probability, one should not lump them all together, nor should one dismiss the valuable lessons taught by certain groups merely because some of their occult practices may seem dubious at best. Whatever the appeal, an estimated 10 to 20 percent of the Japanese people belong to such movements.

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RELIGIONS, NEW—KOREA The first indigenous organized religion in Korea originated on 5 April 1860, when Ch'oe Che-u (1824–1864) began having visions in which the Lord of Heaven told him

that he had been selected to save humanity. Ch'oe Che-u's Tonghak (Eastern Learning) religion, now known as Ch'ondogyo (Religion of the Heavenly Way), was but the first of dozens of religions that have been generated by the inroads of Christianity, the trauma of Japanese colonial rule, and the rapid urbanization and industrialization that dramatically transformed Korea in the second half of the twentieth century.

These new religions can be classified into five categories. The first category includes Ch'ondogyo and those religions derived from it that worship the deity with whom Ch'oe Che-u is said to have spoken and that ground their doctrines and practices in a twenty-one-syllable incantation that Ch'oe Che-u revealed. The second category includes Chongsan'gyo and the dozens of related religions such as Chungsando (The Chungsan Way) and Taesun Chillohoe (The Society for the Truth of Kang Chungsan), which view Ch'oe as a prophet who prepared the way for the advent of Kang Chung-san (1871–1909). Members of the Chongsan family of religions believe that Kang is the Lord on High and that he descended to earth and took human form in order to establish the Rites of Cosmic Renewal, which will assist humanity in the transition from the current age of discord and injustice to the coming age of cosmic harmony.

The third category of new religions in Korea worships Tan'gun, the legendary first ancestor of the Korean people. Taejonggyo (The Religion of the Grand Progenitor), founded in 1909, is the most prominent example of this category of religions, which urges Koreans to reject foreign gods in favor of one of the most illustrious of their own ancestors, who, they believe, established a powerful Korean kingdom five thousand years ago. Worshipers of Tan'gun believe that he is part of the Divine Trinity of three persons (Creator, Teacher, and Ruler) in one God.

In addition to new religions with indigenous roots, there are two other categories of new religions: modifications of Buddhism and modifications of Christianity. Won Buddhism is the best-known Buddhist new religion in Korea. Founded in 1916, it represents a modernized urban approach to Buddhism. The Unification Church, based on the belief of its founder, Sun Myong Moon (b. 1920), that he is the messiah sent to complete the mission that Jesus began, is the best-known new Korean religion with Christian origins.

Don Baker

See also: **Ch'ondogyo; Taejonggyo; Tonghak; Unification Church**

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RELIGIOUS SELF-MORTIFICATION

Avoidance of pain is assumed to be an instinctive human drive, yet religious self-mortification involves deliberate self-infliction of physical pain during a culturally sanctioned, often annual, ritual or festival. In South and Southeast Asia in particular, self-mortification has undergone a dramatic revival. Usually, rituals involve either self-administered beatings and intentional bloodletting (Muslim and Christian self-flagellation) or piercing the face and body (Hindu and Buddhist rites). To an observer, self-mortification appears to be painful and injurious. To a ritual participant, the primary objective is to achieve analgesia or absence of pain: not simply to control or even conquer pain, but to feel its absence as a transcendent spiritual experience.

Origins and History

Religious self-mortification is a complex phenomenon that has been differently understood and enacted across time and space. In Mesoamerica, the ancient Maya performed elaborate bloodletting rituals during the late preclassic period (200 BCE onward). In India, sadhus, holy men outside the Hindu caste system, cultivated acts of self-mortification, such as fasting, staring at the sun, and burial alive, as part of an ascetic lifestyle for millennia. Native American Indians hung from hooks (inserted in the chest or back) during Sun Dances to expedite a vision quest, while Shi'ite Muslims in Iran and Pakistan have long commemorated the assassination of Husayn, the grandson of Muhammad, with acts of *matam*, ritual mortification, especially scourging, as mourning or condolence.

No single definition of religious self-mortification can encompass the contested and contingent meanings underlying each historical and cultural performance. The English term "mortification," for example, has Christian origins and exegesis: "mortificare" derives from ecclesiastical Latin, "to put to death," a reference to the crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth. In early Christianity, mortification of the flesh involved subjugation of the penitential body by discipline or denial as a vicarious imitation of the Passion of Christ. Yet religious self-mortification had been practiced in different parts of the world prior to the birth of Jesus and evolved in

a variety of manifestations independent of Christianity. Past and present, each of these theological traditions has approached self-mortification differently: the purpose of the act and its myriad meanings, the role of pain and bloodshed during performance, as well as the type of religious body (subjugated, empowered, or invulnerable) that must be physically and symbolically prepared in order to receive divine blessing.

Decline and Revival

The revival of religious self-mortification in Asia represents a new chapter in the history of human ideas about pain. Prior to the Asian renaissance, self-mortification had suffered a serious decline, almost to the point of extinction in the West. This was not a natural atrophy, but derived from a conscious intent to suppress and eradicate the custom. During the Enlightenment, emerging ideas about rationality, civilization, and what it means to be human transformed the ways Europeans imagined pain, especially self-inflicted pain. Pain was no longer considered useful or transformational. Consequently, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries marked the decline of religious self-mortification throughout the West and its colonies. Christian self-flagellation was not only banned in Europe, but also in the Hispanic Philippines and Mexico. British colonial authorities in India prohibited hook-swinging festivals, while government officials in the United States forbade self-mortification at Sun Dances. Despite the fact that pain was voluntarily self-inflicted in a religious context by actors who insisted that performance was not painful, ritual mortification was condemned as irrational, barbaric, and inhuman. Pain embodied negativity, and religious "self-torture" was perceived as morally unjustifiable.

However, not only did religious self-mortification survive Western disapprobation, in postcolonial Asia the practice has undergone a striking revival, especially in and around maritime Southeast Asia. This revival took place synchronously throughout the mid- to late twentieth century in both capital cities and rural provinces. It transcended cultural and religious boundaries, embracing localized and syncretic versions of Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam, as well as Chinese popular religion. While it is impossible to estimate the number of (predominantly male) ritual actors, the visible resurgence of participants, the vast audiences, the rapacious international media attention, the promotion of religious self-mortification festivals by state departments of tourism, the declaration of public holidays, the new ritual regulations, even the sponsorship of multinational corporations—all testify to the magnitude of the revival, as well as its ongoing

commercialization and appropriation as a spectacle of cultural exoticism.

South and Southeast Asia

In South and Southeast Asia alone, a host of countries have been involved in the revival. In the Philippines, Catholic rituals of self-flagellation and crucifixion (by nailing) are performed during Holy Week. In India, Malaysia, and Singapore, the Tamil Hindu festival of Thaipusam involves *kavadi* (wooden arch) carrying and body piercing. In Thailand, Chinese Thai Buddhists perform increasingly ostentatious corporeal piercing at the Vegetarian Festival. In Taiwan and Singapore, Chinese spirit-mediums also practice ritual piercing. In Indonesia, certain Sufi Muslim rituals require self-stabbing and piercing. In Sri Lanka, the Kataragama festival now attracts Sinhalese Buddhists and Tamil Hindus, who perform various types of self-mortification, including hook-hanging.

Rationale

Why is religious self-mortification undergoing a revival? Why in Asia? Why at this moment in history? The withdrawal of colonial powers from Southeast Asia created a space for indigenous renegotiation and reaffirmation of cultural and ethnic identity. Significantly, Thailand, which was not colonized, joined the revival later (in the 1980s), influenced partly by ritual events in Malaysia. However, the colonized countries of mainland Southeast Asia have not participated, nor have East Asian countries such as Korea and China, or Japan, despite a tradition of asceticism.

To what extent has ritual participation been truly voluntary? Almost always it has been the poorer members of society who sought alternative ways to make suffering sufferable and to symbolically contest and mitigate status hierarchy. By achieving analgesia during ritual performance, sometimes via altered states of consciousness, evidence of divine contact is demonstrated and rewarded with assurances of guidance, protection, and blessing. This ritual empowerment of the powerless is often contracted under vow as a repeated act of supplication or thanksgiving for a sick family member. (The rituals are not penitential, even in the Catholic Philippines.) Indigenous healers, who are often at the heart of the revival, have also sought to access sacred powers released via divine communion. For these healers, ritual self-mortification represented a new medium to acquire, test, and replenish esoteric potency, a traditional foundation for political leadership in Southeast Asia.

At the dawn of the twenty-first century in Asia, the revival of religious self-mortification is far from over.

When ritually self-inflicted, physical pain has a sacred, if not transformational purpose.

Nicholas H. Barker

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REMITTANCES In the field of international labor migration, a distinction usually is made between two types of financial flow from emigrants to the country of origin. Unrequited transfers, whether for consumption or for investment, are termed "remittances," while repatriated deposits are seen as "capital inflows." This article treats both types of inflows as remittances. Compared to the size of the Indian national economy, these remittances are small, but as a source of foreign exchange, they are significant for the national exchequer. The Reserve Bank of India manipulates the interest rate

for its Non-Resident Indian (NRI) bank deposits to encourage the flow of foreign currency into India.

The indentured emigrants of the nineteenth century who went to far-flung British colonies earned meager wages and could not afford regular contact with India. However, the Punjabis who went as sojourners to North America in the early twentieth century did remit much of their wages back to India. Throughout the years the emigrants who serve the overseas Indian populations as merchants and traders have contributed to India's economy through the import and export of their goods and services.

Postindependence emigrants who sent remittances to India tended to be of two kinds, those who were highly skilled and settled permanently in the more industrialized countries like the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and Australia; and those who were unskilled or semiskilled and traveled on a temporary basis to the countries of the Middle East. Remittances to India from the Middle East experienced a spectacular rise in the 1970s, fueled by the oil boom. Subsequently remittances stabilized at an average of US\$2–2.5 billion per annum. Indians who succeeded abroad invested their earnings in a variety of industrial ventures in the Indian market, especially following the economic liberalization of the 1990s. Indians also invested in real estate. Entire colonies in Indian metropolitan areas were developed for NRI retirement.

In addition Indians abroad transfer technology back to India; finance charitable institutions, such as schools and hospitals; and volunteer their expertise in the fields of science and medicine. The information technology revolution of the 1990s especially benefited Indians abroad and made Indian Americans in Silicon Valley millionaires. These "software barons," driven by a sense of gratitude and obligation to India and its educational institutions that made it possible for them to attain such professional and financial pinnacles, donate millions of dollars to Indian engineering and scientific institutions. Social causes, such as raising AIDS awareness, helping women in distress, and promoting sustainable development in rural sectors, find favor with Indians abroad. At times of crisis, such as war or famine, or when natural disasters, such as earthquakes and cyclones, strike, Indians abroad rally to the aid of India.

Their motives range from assuaging guilt for leaving the motherland to sheer joy and satisfaction in sharing newfound wealth with the less fortunate. Whatever their reasons, Indians have maintained economic ties with their homeland throughout centuries and generations of living abroad.

Padma Rangaswamy

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RENDRA, W. S. (b. 1936), Indonesian poet, playwright, actor, director. Born in Solo, Central Java, in 1936, Rendra was influenced by naturalism, the movement of realism in art and literature, as is evident in plays such as *Bunga Semerah Darah* (A Blood-Red Flower). He was also a director. In the 1960s he spent time in the United States where he was influenced by avant-garde experimental theater. Returning to Indonesia in 1967, Rendra founded Bengkel Teater Yogya (Yogyakarta Theater Workshop). This group pioneered a style of experimental theater known as *Teater Mini Kata* (Minimal Word Theater), in which monotonous sounds, rhythmic movement, and choreography were prominent. In the 1970s he became more political in works such as *Perjuangan Suku Naga* (The Struggle of the Naga Tribe) and *Mastodon dan Burung Condor* (Mastodon and Condor), and in translations of ancient Greek plays such as Sophocles' *Antigone*. These works were also presented by the Yogyakarta Theater Workshop. Rendra is commanding and charismatic as an actor or in poetry readings and was among the more outspoken supporters of reform at the time of President Suharto's fall in 1998. His work is often underpinned by a powerful sense of social justice and a desire to use theater as a force for change.

Tim Byard-Jones

RENOVATION POLICY. See **Doi Moi**.

REPELITA Repelita—an acronym from Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Five Year Development Plan), and a pun on *pelita* (lamp, or light)—was the planning unit adopted by New Order Indonesia to coordinate the country's "accelerated modernization."

Indonesia's planned economy declined seriously under President Sukarno's Guided Democracy, and recovery became a central aim of General Suharto's New Order government from 1967 on. Although the New Order partly deregulated the economy, creating opportunities for foreign investment, economic policymakers

in the National Planning Board (BAPPENAS) remained committed to planning, making strategic direct public-sector investments and channeling private-sector investment.

Repelita I (1969–1974) focused on meeting basic needs and providing a framework for growth by stressing agricultural and infrastructure development. It was 66 percent financed by foreign aid, mainly through the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI). Repelita II (1974–1979) continued emphasizing agriculture and infrastructure, but sought also to stimulate development outside the densely populated islands of Java, Bali, and Madura. Funded 35 percent by foreign aid, it heavily subsidized transmigration from these islands to other regions. Repelita III (1979–1984) emphasized industrialization, especially the development of labor-intensive, export-oriented manufactures, as well as agricultural and forest products and non-oil-gas minerals. Repelita IV (1984–1989) continued stressing these new exports and emphasized the creation of employment and the introduction of advanced industrial technology industry. In 1987, the value of oil and gas exports was first surpassed by the value of other exports. Repelita V (1989–1994) again emphasized infrastructure—especially transport, communications, and electric power—as well as education, but paid the greatest attention to manufacturing, which in 1991 surpassed agriculture as the largest economic sector.

These five plans constituted Indonesia's First 25-Year Long-Term Development Period, and their results were impressive: the plans achieved annual growth rates of 8.6 percent, 7.7 percent, 5.7 percent, 5.2 percent, and 8.3 percent respectively. Thanks to revenues from oil, gas, timber, and other products there was steady reduction in the proportion of expenditure provided by foreign aid (25 percent in Repelita V). Indonesia achieved self-sufficiency in rice production and was widely seen as a future economic giant.

Repelita VI (1994–1999) also emphasized manufacturing and initially appeared to be continuing the success of earlier plans, achieving 7.8 percent average annual growth in its first three years. The plan ceased to be relevant with the onset of the Asian economic crisis in 1997.

Robert Cribb

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REPUBLICAN CHINA During a few brief weeks in the fall of 1911, the hollow shell of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) disintegrated. Shortly afterward, on 1 January 1912, Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) and his fellow revolutionaries proclaimed the founding of the Republic of China. China's last emperor had no choice but to abdicate the throne. Thus, in a matter of weeks, two millennia of dynastic rule ended and the Republican era began.

Early Republic and Warlordism, 1912–1928

The revolution of 1911 began on 10 October with an accidental explosion in the revolutionary headquarters at Hankou. Hankou soon fell to supporters of the republicans, starting a revolutionary wave that quickly spread throughout the country. On 29 December 1911, Sun Yat-sen—the "father of the revolution"—was elected provisional president of the new republic. Despite this auspicious beginning, the young republic soon encountered troubles. While Sun enjoyed respect and admiration, he lacked military might. To remedy this problem, he sought the support of a former Qing general, Yuan Shikai (1859–1916). Yuan accepted Sun's offer of the presidency in exchange for his military assistance. Known for his opportunism, Yuan quickly betrayed the revolution by disbanding the parliament and calling for a new constitution. Additionally, he declared Sun's revolutionary party illegal, forcing Sun to flee into exile. In 1915 Yuan brazenly assembled a special "representative assembly," which voted unanimously to make Yuan emperor. China's various provincial assemblies denounced the action. Yuan's "reign" was cut short less than three months later, when a rebellion against this monarchic scheme in the southern provinces broke out, and Yuan died in the summer of 1916. Yuan's death did not bring about the reconstitution of the republican government because Sun still lacked the military force necessary to control national affairs. Regional military commanders exploited this weakness, choosing to expand their own local power at the expense of national solidarity. For the next decade, China fell into a state of perpetual chaos, as various warlords attempted to take control of the capital city of Beijing.

During this period of chaos and instability, Sun retreated to his home province and reorganized his political party, the Guomindang (Kuomintang, or Nationalists). He also established a military academy to train loyal troops. The head of this academy, a young soldier named Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), quickly rose in power and influence. Concurrent with his political and military reorganization, Sun turned to the Soviet Union and the fledgling Chinese Communist

Party for support. Forming a "united front" in 1923, the Guomindang and the Communists vowed to rid China of warlords and to establish a stable government.

Following the death of Sun in 1925, Chiang became the preeminent leader of the Guomindang. In 1926 he launched the Northern Expedition, a military campaign to unite the entire country under Guomindang rule. At roughly the same time, he denounced continued cooperation with the Communists. After brutally suppressing Shanghai's labor movement, Chiang sought to destroy all traces of the Chinese Communist Party. Some Communists went underground, while others, led by Mao Zedong (1893–1976), retreated into the mountainous countryside to establish the Jiangxi Soviet. By 1928 Chiang had succeeded in either eliminating or undermining both the warlords and the Communists.

Republican Decade, 1928–1937

Having established control, Chiang and his associates were finally able to implement the republican ideas of Sun. Following Sun's plans, the country entered a period of "party tutelage." Accordingly, the party created democratic organizations but suspended popular elections. Historians refer to this decade of tutelage, between 1928 and 1937, as the Republican Decade. From their capital in Nanjing, Guomindang leaders set out to strengthen China both domestically and internationally. The government took control of four national banks and introduced monetary reform to modernize China's financial system and promote modern industrial development. Simultaneously, the Ministry of Education created or reorganized twenty-two universities, while the Ministry of Transportation extended railways, opened new highways, and created domestic airline routes. To complement these domestic achievements, Chiang's ministers attempted to improve China's position within the international community. By 1931 they had regained China's tariff autonomy and had revoked many foreign concessions. As such, the government brought closure to a century of humiliation at the hands of Western powers.

Despite the improvements in education, finance, and communications, most individuals saw very little change in their daily lives. Land reform and rent reduction would have greatly benefited the peasantry, which comprised 80 percent of the population, but the Guomindang neglected these tasks, choosing instead to focus on the needs of the urban middle class. Consequently, many peasants looked instead to the Communists for relief. In the early 1930s, Chiang continued his campaign against the Chinese Communist Party, forcing it to abandon its Jiangxi Soviet in 1934. After



CHINA—HISTORICAL PERIODS

Xia dynasty (2100–1766 BCE)
 Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE)
 Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE)
 Western Zhou (1045–771 BCE)
 Eastern Zhou (770–221 BCE)
 Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE)
 Warring States period (475–221 BCE)
 Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE)
 Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE)
 Three Kingdoms period (220–265 CE)
 North and South dynasties (220–589 CE)
 Sui dyansty (581–618 CE)
 Tang dynasty (618–907 CE)
 Five Dynasties period (907–960 CE)
 Song dynasty (960–1279)
 Northern Song (960–1126)
 Southern Song (1126–1279)
 Jurchen Jin dynasty (1126–1234)
 Yuan dynasty (1279–1368)
 Ming dynasty (1368–1644)
 Qing dynasty (1644–1912)
 Republican China (1912–1927)
 People's Republic of China (1949–present)
 Republic of China (1949–present)
 Cultural Revolution (1966–1976)

its famous Long March, the Communist Party established a new soviet in the northwest city of Yan'an, where Mao and his followers continued to push forward their program of rural reform.

Guomindang relations with Japan also deteriorated throughout the Republican decade. Following a questionable railroad explosion in 1931, the Japanese military invaded the northeast region of Manchuria. Though the League of Nations condemned the invasion, Tokyo refused to surrender control of the region, creating a puppet regime instead. While many individuals hoped the Guomindang would check Japanese aggression, Chiang chose to ignore Japan and concentrate his military forces against the Yan'an Communists.

War with Japan and the Communists, 1937–1949

By 1937, war with Japan appeared inevitable. When Chiang reluctantly agreed to cooperate with the Communist Party and confront Japanese troops, Japan launched a complete invasion of the Chinese heartland.

Though Japan succeeded in gaining control over much of the coast and the major cities, it could not force Chiang to surrender. Instead, the Guomindang continued its westward retreat, establishing a new capital in the remote city of Chongqing. Those cities that fell to Japan experienced incredible destruction and loss of life. In Nanjing, Japanese troops murdered, raped, and tortured the civilian population, killing as many as 300,000 people (though the Japanese government and military dispute this figure). For the Guomindang, the war was disastrous. Continual fighting destroyed Chiang's best military troops and bankrupted his government. Government ministers responded by printing more money, but the resulting inflation devastated China's middle class and eroded Chiang's primary base of support. By the war's end, many Chinese had lost faith in the Guomindang regime. Furthermore, the surviving troops were demoralized, discouraged, and ripe for rebellion.

With their common enemy gone, the Guomindang and Communists were able to devote their full energies to fighting each other. Although Chiang's troops greatly outnumbered Mao's, the war quickly turned in the Communists' favor. In 1949 Chiang retreated to the island province of Taiwan, taking with him two million of his faithful supporters. Mao's Communists, lacking the military equipment to invade Taiwan, chose instead to wait for a more fortuitous opportunity to wrap up the campaign and eliminate the remaining Guomindang forces. On 1 October 1949, the Communist Party leaders stood atop the last emperor's palace and declared the founding of the People's Republic of China. For his part, Chiang established the government of the Republic of China in exile, hoping to one day retake the mainland.

Republic of China on Taiwan

Since 1949 the Republic of China has continued to exist on Taiwan. Under Guomindang control, Taiwan has grown to become a major economic force in Asia and the world. Relations between Taiwan and the mainland remain tense, with the mainland government insisting on the eventual reunification of the two entities. In Taiwan, pro-independence forces have grown in strength, challenging the very existence of the Republic of China. Whatever Taiwan's future holds, the republican ideals of the Guomindang have left an indelible mark on twentieth-century China.

David L. Kenley

See also: **Chinese Communist Party; Guomindang; Northern Expedition; Sino-Japanese Conflict, Second.**

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REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY—TURKEY

Founded in 1922 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), the Republican People's Party (RPP) was the ruling party of the Turkish Republic from 1923 to 1950 and held power in coalition governments in the 1960s and 1970s. After the military coup of 1980, all political parties were banned, but the Republican People's Party was reestablished in 1992.

During the Turkish War of Independence (1919–1923) the Grand National Assembly in Ankara opposed the Allied occupation and the Ottoman government, and this opposition united former members of the Committee of Union and Progress, which held power in the Ottoman government from 1912 to 1918, and the nationalist landowning and religious elites. Hoping to gain more support and to bring more discipline to the Assembly, Atatürk, the leader of the nationalist forces, organized his supporters into the Republican People's Party. With the exception of the Progressive Republican Party (1924–1925) and the Free Party (1930), the RPP was Turkey's sole party until 1945, when a multiparty system came into being.

In 1931 an RPP congress enunciated a program of reform with six points: nationalism, republicanism, secularism, populism, reformism, and statism. These became known as the six arrows of Kemalism, an ideological justification for legal, political, economic, and social reforms aimed at modernizing and Westernizing the Turkish state and society. Party leaders, including Atatürk, the prime minister İsmet İnönü (1884–1973), and the general secretary Recep Peker (1888–1950), saw the role of the RPP as one of educating the new Turkish Republic and envisioned a prolonged period of single-party rule.

Following Ataturk's death in November 1938, a special RPP congress named Ataturk "eternal chief" of the party and resolved that his reforms would forever be the party's guiding principle. Ismet Inonu was named permanent leader of the RPP. In 1945 responding to demands for change, Inonu called for the creation of a multiparty system. In the 1950 election the RPP lost by a landslide to the Democrat Party, which had been formed by Celal Bayar (1884–1987) and other former members of the RPP in 1946.

Out of power throughout the 1950s, the RPP regained power after the military coup in 1960, joining a series of coalition governments. In 1972 Bulent Ecevit launched a successful challenge to the leadership of Inonu and then led the RPP in a series of coalition governments during the 1970s.

After the military took power in 1980, all parties were shut down, and all active politicians were banned from politics. Three new center-left parties, the People's Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the Democratic Left Party, put forth programs similar to that of the RPP. In 1992 the old parties were allowed to be reestablished, and the RPP reemerged, led by Deniz Baykal. Throughout the 1990s the RPP won around 20 percent of the popular vote and joined coalitions with other center-left parties.

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REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION OF 1911 By the end of the nineteenth century, nearly every political and intellectual leader in China saw the need for change. Some, such as Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), felt that rather than reforming the imperial system, China needed a thoroughgoing revolution. Consequently he called for the formation of a new republic based on his "Three Principles of the People," namely nationalism, democracy, and socialism (often translated as "people's livelihood").

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Sun and his fellow revolutionaries (organized as the Tongmeng Hui, or Revolutionary Alliance) traveled throughout the country promoting their republican form of government. Sun's actions led to his political exile, yet his followers succeeded in infiltrat-

ing the military and spreading Sun's revolutionary ideals. On 9 October 1911 an accidental explosion rocked the revolutionaries' secret headquarters in Hankou. Police raided the building, discovering a stash of weapons and membership rolls. Knowing the rolls had revealed their identity, those soldiers loyal to Sun quickly mutinied. By the afternoon of 10 October, they had captured the entire city. Over the next several weeks, province after province declared its independence from Beijing. Sun, who had been in the United States at the time of the initial explosion, returned to China and on 29 December 1911 was elected provisional president of the Republic of China. The court was helpless as events spiraled out of its control. As a result, the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) unceremoniously abdicated the throne, bringing to an end more than two millennia of imperial rule.

The early years of the Republic were fraught with confusion and civil war, leading many historians to question the leadership abilities of Sun and the conclusiveness of his revolution. Though the leaders of 1911 failed immediately to create a stable and lasting government system, they did succeed in toppling the imperial system and establishing Asia's first republic. For this reason, 10 October was celebrated as National Day (Double Tenth) in China until 1949 and continues to be celebrated on Taiwan today. With the perspective of a century, the events of 1911 appear quite revolutionary.

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RESIDENT SYSTEM The British introduced the Resident System in Malaya through the Pangkor Engagement, a treaty between the British and local sultans under which the British appointed a resident to assist each local sultan. The first state to get a resident was Perak (1874), followed by Selangor (1874), Negeri Sembilan (1874), and Pahang (1888). These four states were later called the Federated Malay States (FMS).

According to the Pangkor Engagement, each resident was to advise the sultan on all administrative matters except those pertaining to Malayan religion and custom, but in practice the resident ruled.

The resident system had weaknesses. First, there weren't enough British officers to administer it, and few of these officers could converse in the native language. Second, there was already a hierarchy in the states. Third, religious matters could be separated from politics, but custom was strong. Revenues collected were the personal income of the sultan and his chiefs. To implement a new taxation system was a violation of custom. Indeed, J. W. W Birch, the first British resident (1874–1875), was murdered as he tried to interfere with custom in Perak. His lack of respect and understanding of Malayan custom, language, and religion caused his administration to fail.

The resident system, however, was administered well in Selangor and Negeri Sembilan by Sir Hugh Low and Martin Lister, respectively. They did not attempt to interfere with Malayan custom. The economy developed as railroads were built, making the production of tin easier, and as state councils were set up to discuss policy matters in order to gain the confidence of the Malayan people through their chiefs. Underdeveloped Pahang, too, benefited from the revenue brought in by the system, although it did not receive a resident until 1888.

By the 1880s the British ruled all the states in the Malay Peninsula. The states that the British obtained from Siamese rule—Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Trengganu—were called the Unfederated Malay States (UMS), and an adviser was placed in each of these states. Thus, the British used the Resident System to spread their influence across the Malay Peninsula.

Mala Selvaraju

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RÉUNION ISLAND (1999 est. pop. 706,000). Réunion Island, in the Indian Ocean, was known as Bourbon during the nineteenth century. Elliptic in shape, it is 2,512 square kilometers in area. It is a French Overseas Territory, and its president is, consequently, the president of France. The capital is St. Denis (est. pop. 125,000). The status of Réunion was changed in 1946 from a colony to a department of France. It is administered by the prefect of St. Denis.



There is a locally elected general council and four district councils covering twenty-four communes. The educational curriculum is the same as in France.

The island was first colonized by the Compagnie des Indes in the seventeenth century. The major industry is sugar growing; minor products include coffee, potatoes, maize, and cocoa. One fifth of the population is descended from indentured laborers—Malabars—brought in from South India in the nineteenth century to work on the plantations. The rest of the population is Chinese, Indian, and European.

The island has 2,709 kilometers of roads but no railroads. There is an anthropology institute, and a university (with 3,340 students in 1989). There are a number of sugar factories and rum distilleries.

Paul Hockings

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REVOLT OF THE SHORT HAIR The Revolt of the Short Hair was a part of the modernization movement that was advocated by a group of Vietnamese Confucian scholars. In 1907 they founded a private school called the Dong Kinh Nghia Thuc (Tonkin Free School) on the model of the Japanese Keio Gijuku Daigaku. This school aimed at fostering the study of Western sciences, because its founders felt

that the French-established educational system neglected such studies in favor of the humanities. Surprisingly enough, for those Confucian scholars, modernization meant first Westernization and then rejection of Confucianism and, by extension, of anything Chinese. They wanted to emulate France in order to fight against French colonialism. Students attending the Dong Kinh Nghia Thuc were urged to wear their hair short so that they could look like Frenchmen, and to cut off their long hair, because it had been the Chinese invaders who forced Vietnamese men to wear their hair long and tied in a bun. Thus, the proponents of the movement aimed at severing Vietnam from any cultural values, including Confucian ones, that the Chinese had inculcated in the Vietnamese.

It was indeed a revolutionary suggestion. For the traditional Vietnamese, hair has the same significance as the head, and the head corresponds to a symbolic altar where the ancestors are worshiped. To cut one's hair is, therefore, a sacrilegious act, equivalent to a repudiation of everything worth living for. Some early opponents of the French invasion went as far as asking: What is the meaning of life when you have to share their wine and nibble their bread? What is the meaning of life when you must cut your hair and shave your beard? Yet the movement that promoted the cutting of hair was a successful one, and in the large body of literature created by the Dong Kinh Nghia Thuc, a dozen short and easy-to-remember popular songs are found. However, the cutting off of hair may not have represented such a trauma after all, because the Vietnamese must have been quite familiar with Buddhist monks and nuns who had to shave off their hair before entering the monastery. However, the Dong Kinh Nghia Thuc was short lived: the French colonial authorities closed down all their schools less than a year after their establishment. The Revolt of the Short Hair, however, survived, and, in the late 1920s, those from both town and city were amused whenever they encountered a man who wore his hair in a chignon at the back of his head.

Truong Buu Lam

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REVOLUTIONARY YOUTH LEAGUE OF VIETNAM

In 1925, Vietnamese revolutionary leader Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969) formed the Revolu-

tionary Youth League (Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Menh Dong Chi Hoi) as an organization that would begin the process of concentrating the Vietnamese people on the goal of overthrowing the colonial government of the French. Within the Youth League, Ho formed an inner communist group, the Communist Youth League (Thanh Nien Cong San Doan), which served to introduce communist theory to the Vietnamese independence movement, mainly through the secretly distributed journal *Thanh Nien*. In February 1930 the Revolutionary Youth League became Vietnam's communist party after the founding conference of the first Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), held in 1929 in Hanoi. In 1941, the Revolutionary Youth League, the ICP, factions of the Vietnam Nationalist Party, and the New Vietnam Party were formed into a united front organization called the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi, the League for the Independence of Vietnam, better known more by its more common name, the Viet Minh.

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RHEE, SYNGMAN (1875–1965), first president of South Korea. Syngman Rhee (Yi Sung-man) was the first president of South Korea from 1948 until 1960. Rhee was born on 26 April 1875 in Hwangwae Province to an aristocratic family. Rhee was educated in both the Confucian classics as well as at a Methodist missionary school. By the time Rhee had reached his teens, he was an ardent nationalist advocating Korean independence. Rhee was arrested for his membership in the Independence Club and was jailed for six years. Upon his release, Rhee left for the United States, where he studied at Harvard and at Princeton, where he earned a doctorate in 1910.

While in the United States, Rhee was elected president of the Korean Provisional Government (in exile in Shanghai) and served as its representative in Washington, DC. He returned to Korea on 16 October 1945, following the cessation of fighting, and called



President Syngman Rhee displays the Korean flag at his headquarters in July 1950. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

for immediate independence. Rhee held elections in the south and was elected president of the Republic of Korea (ROK).

On 25 June 1950 North Korea launched an attack over the thirty-eighth parallel, forcing Rhee and his government to retreat to Pusan. For the duration of the Korean War, Rhee tried to sabotage armistice negotiations, hoping to reunify the Korean peninsula by force under his rule. To this end, Rhee threatened to withdraw South Korean troops from United Nations command. Rhee then ordered the release of 25,000 prisoners of war not scheduled for repatriation and summarily conscripted them into South Korean army. His relationship with the United States can be characterized as difficult, as he sought to reunify Korea by military means, while the United States preferred a negotiated settlement. Domestically, Rhee intimidated political opponents and threatened to disband the National Assembly.

Rhee remained president following the Korean War, but in 1960 student-led demonstrations forced his resignation. For all Rhee had done, he failed to meet the peoples' expectations for modernization and economic development. The highlights of Rhee's career include the U.S.-ROK mutual security treaty, which secured long-term economic aid to Korea as well as rebuilding the South Korean military.

Keith Leitich

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RHINOCEROS, ASIATIC Three distinct species of rhinoceros, large herbivorous mammals with a horn or horns on the snout, live in Asia. The great Indian one-horned rhinoceros (*Rhinoceros unicornis*) is the only one still living in the Indian states of Assam and West Bengal and in the Himalayan kingdom of Nepal (today numbering perhaps 1,500 animals). This species was illustrated on seals discovered from the Indus Valley culture that flourished four millennia ago; the animal was known as far west as Peshawar in today's Pakistan in the sixteenth century, and as far east as Myanmar (Burma) in the nineteenth century.

The smaller one-horned, or Javan, rhinoceros (*R. sondaicus*) once lived from Bengal eastward through Myanmar and Malaysia as far as Java, Sumatra, and Borneo, and in China during the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE). The Asiatic two-horned rhinoceros (*Didermocerus sumatrensis*), the smallest of the three species, once inhabited the same range, except for Java.

About 1.6 million to ten thousand years ago, a now-extinct genus of rhinoceros lived in regions of Europe, Asia, and North Africa—the woolly rhinoceros, a massive creature with two large horns and a thick coat of hair. About 5 million years ago, there were several other Indian species, known today only from their fossils, such as *R. sivalensis* and *R. paleoindicus*. Still earlier, from 30 to 16.6 million years ago, the areas of today's Pakistan and Mongolia were home to the largest land mammal ever to live, the Indricotherium, a genus related to the rhinoceros. It was almost six meters high at the shoulder, eight meters long, and weighed about thirty tons, more than four times the weight of an elephant.

The largest of the modern Asian species, the Indian rhinoceros, can be as tall as 186 centimeters at the shoulders in the male; the average height is 170 centimeters. Males weigh up to 2,070 kilograms, and females about 1,600 kilograms. The skin is thick, folded, and gray in color. The distinctive horn or horns are made of keratinized skin, a matted hairlike material with no bony substructure, which grows back if cut off. The magical properties of these horns have long made these animals the object of hunting, and a creature that



CHITWAN NATIONAL PARK— WORLD HERITAGE SITE

One of the last homes of the exceedingly rare Asiatic rhinoceros, the royal Chitwan National Park was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1984. Probably the last unpopulated tract of the Terai region, Chitwan is also home to the Bengal tiger.

once roamed from present-day England and France through India to China is now in danger of extinction.

The rhinoceros lives in swampy, forested areas and has never been domesticated. It feeds on shrubs and tree leaves. It is either solitary or lives in pairs; the female produces only one young at each pregnancy. Although its eyesight is poor, it has a keen sense of smell. The Asiatic rhinoceros does not use the horn to attack, but fights with its sharp lower tusks. The rhinoceros can live for half a century; but the Javan and Sumatran species are in peril of extinction from hunters and the Chinese market in aphrodisiacs.

Paul Hockings

RIANTIARNO, NANO (b. 1949), Indonesian playwright, actor, stage director. One of Indonesia's leading playwrights and cultural figures, Nano Riantiarno was born in 1949. He began as a dramatist in the realist tradition, writing plays such as *Pelangi* (Rainbow) and *Cermin* (Mirror), which deal with domestic problems. He was influenced by the German playwright Bertolt Brecht, whose *Threepenny Opera* he adapted as *Opera Ikan Asin*. Riantiarno's most celebrated plays are *Bom Waktu* (Time Bomb) and *Opera Kecoa* (Cockroach Opera). These works are infused with a strong sense of social justice and deal with Jakarta's underclass of prostitutes, beggars, and thieves. Riantiarno is also the director of one of Indonesia's leading theater companies, *Teater Koma*, which he founded in 1977 with his wife, Ratna.

Tim Byard-Jones

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RICCI, MATTEO (1522–1610), Jesuit missionary to China. Matteo Ricci, known to the Chinese as Li Madou, was born in Italy and entered the Jesuit order in 1571, at the age of nineteen. After studying at Jesuit seminaries in Florence and Rome, he traveled to Lisbon to take up the study of Portuguese, presumably with the intention of joining the Portuguese mission in Asia. In 1578 Ricci departed Lisbon for Goa where he taught for four years. He finally arrived in Macao in 1582.

Ricci was an impressive figure of a man, both visually and intellectually. He was tall, and strong with curly black hair and blue eyes. He was well-versed in such sciences as mathematics and astronomy and had a talent for learning languages. He put this latter ability to work in Macao as he began his study of both modern and classical Chinese. He studied the Confucian classics in order to understand the intellectual background of his future social contacts. Ricci moved onto Chinese soil in 1583, establishing a mission in a small city in Guangzhou (Canton) Province. He and his fellow priests tried to engage the local gentry by sharing with them some of the latest scientific and technological information from Europe. The Chinese were especially interested in mathematics, astronomy and geography. Devices such as prisms, clocks, and astronomical instruments were also popular. Having piqued the curiosity of the gentry, the priests would attempt to discuss philosophy and religion.

Reaction to the Jesuits was mixed, but through hard work Ricci managed to develop a network of contacts among powerful officials and eventually gained entry to the imperial court in Beijing. In 1601 he made a present of two clocks and a clavichord to the emperor. He was rewarded with a scholar's stipend. Some later Jesuits were given actual positions at the courts. However, those positions, and Ricci's own success, were almost entirely based on their mastery of scientific and technological skills. Ricci collaborated with a Chinese convert to translate several classical works on geometry by Euclid. His treatise on geography was also very popular. He also wrote several treatises on religious topics, but these were considerably less successful.

In the end Matteo Ricci and the Jesuits did experience some modest progress in finding Chinese converts for the Christian church. Their mission was not more successful primarily because the Chinese already possessed a strong socioreligious tradition that had taken shape over the course of thousands of years. Ricci went so far as to lead a Jesuit campaign to have the Roman Catholic church declare native Chinese rituals to be fundamentally nonreligious, and symbolic in nature. This would have allowed for the conversion of Chinese

without requiring them to give up their own religious practices. In the end, the Vatican rejected the arguments of the Jesuits in favor of a less compromising position. This effectively spelled the end of this era of Christian missionary work in China. Ricci died in 1610 and was buried outside of Beijing. His grave was restored in 1980.

Terence Russell

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RICE AND RICE AGRICULTURE Rice is Asia's most important food crop, and Asian rice production and consumption account for over 90 percent of the world total. About two-thirds of Asian caloric consumption comes from cereals: about 40 percent of that comes from rice, while 15 percent more is from wheat. Rice and wheat are also the major prestige grains. In areas where rice is the dominant crop, it is almost always symbolic of food and well-being in general. In Japan, the word *gohan* means both rice and meal; major deities are associated with rice, and national festivals mark the times of planting, transplanting, and harvest. In southern and eastern India, no meal would be considered complete without rice, even if it also included bread made of some other grain. All over India, a paste of crushed cooked rice and turmeric is the quintessential material for marking a *tilak*—the mark made on one's forehead in ceremonies seeking a good beginning, such as weddings.

Rice itself is, however, generally not deified, just as bread is not in the West. Although local deities associated with rice or rice fields are widely reported, the ceremonies associated with them are better understood as ways to take recognized oaths regarding farming arrangements than worship as such.

Rice yield has commonly been used to assess land, and taxes have been levied in rice. Maintaining stable rice prices has been a major concern of government policy for virtually all of recorded history. In recent decades, the improvement of rice production has been a major focus of international development agencies and governments throughout Asia.

Origins and Ecology

Rice is unique among the major cereal crops in its ability to grow in standing water. It is therefore uniquely



THE RICE MEASURE

"The measure is generally made from willow wood and is a simple square; it has many symbolic uses."

"The peck measure holds ten catties of rice; is a symbol of full measure of justice, mercy and virtue, which should be the right of all, irrespective of station."

"The Chinese say that rice is the staff of life, therefore the rice measure is the measure of life."

Source: T. Harry. (1942) *Chinese Symbols and Superstitions*. South Pasadena, CA: P. D. and Ione Perkins, 56

adapted to the periodic heavy flooding that often accompanies Asian monsoons.

Worldwide, there are two domesticated species—*Oryza sativa* and *O. glabberima*—and about twenty-six wild species. *O. sativa* evolved in Asia and is divided into two subspecies: *indica*, which is more prominent in South Asia, and *japonica*, which dominates in East Asia. Both subspecies are now distributed worldwide. *O. glabberima* is indigenous to West Africa and is still localized there. Both domestic species appear to have the same wild ancestor, commonly thought to be *O. rufipogon*, an inhabitant of ponds and flooded ditches.

The main differences between the *indica* and *japonica* subspecies is that the former has a taller growth habit and produces long, thin grains that are separate when cooked. With *japonica*, the grains are shorter and wider, tending to be stickier when cooked, and the plants are shorter stemmed. There is, however, much variation within both groups. The differences involve taste and texture, yield, whether the rice is "floating" or not, the length of time to maturity, and whether the growth cycle is photoperiod-sensitive or not. "Floating" means that the stems tend to lengthen as water depth increases, preventing the plant from drowning in deep water (some floating rice varieties can grow to heights of several meters). Photoperiod sensitivity is the tendency for the time of maturation to be controlled by the length of the day.

It is most likely that *O. sativa* was domesticated from its wild ancestor at several places and at several times. The most likely zone of domestication extends from the upper Ganges and Brahmaputra valleys, across

northern Burma and Thailand, and across southern China. It seems probable that *indica-japonica* differentiation occurred in different niches in the eastern Himalayas and into mountainous Southeast Asia, with *japonica* varieties emerging in lowlands and *indica* in uplands. Such differentiation is found in the area today, and the indigenous *aus* and *aman* varieties that are commonly grown as a first and following crop in Bangladesh appear in many characteristics to be midway between the two subspecies.


The earliest evidence of domestication appears to be from China, where carbonized *japonica* grains dating from about 7000 BCE have been found mixed with *O. rufipogon* in the Hemedu site in the lower Chang (Yangze) river valley. In South Asia, the earliest evidence is from Lothal and Rangpur in Gujarat, dating from 4300 and 4000 BCE, respectively. From Southeast Asia, the oldest evidence comes from Nok Tha in Thailand, dating from 5500 BCE. From its origin points, rice has steadily spread north and south through the wetter areas of monsoon Asia, mainly replacing taro-based cultivation systems, such as survive in Papua New Guinea.

Rice and wheat are complementary rather than competitive. Wheat does better in cooler weather, and some wheats have a chilling or freezing requirement before they will form grain, while frost inhibits or kills rice. Rice is, therefore, generally a tropical- and temperate-climate crop, while wheat is a temperate- and cold-climate crop. In areas where both can grow, rice is consistently a summer crop and wheat a winter crop.

Rice is grown in four major ways: in shifting swiddens, on rain-fed dryland like other cereals, in rain-fed flooded fields, and in irrigated flooded fields. Since archaeological evidence of rice consists mainly of carbonized grains or grain-impressions on pottery, it is not known whether rice was originally domesticated as a dryland or wetland crop. While rice yields well without flooding, providing the soil remains moist, under such conditions it is less resistant to weeds than other cereals. Flooding controls weeds and provides an environment in which certain waterweeds (notably *Azolla*), blue-green algae, and bacteria supply necessary nitrogen on a sustained basis. Over recent history, flooded cultivation has been consistently more important, and this importance continues to increase.

Different modes of cultivation dominate in different regions. In South Asia, rice cultivation depends entirely on irrigation in Pakistan and from a third to a half on irrigation in India. Although India still has a few pockets of shifting cultivation and some dryland farming along the edges of the mountains, most rice

farming is in flooded fields in the high rainfall zones along the western Ghats, in the lower Ganges and Brahmaputra valleys, and in the Himalayas to their north. Rice land in Nepal is about 21 percent irrigated, the rest being rain fed, with spectacular terraced fields on the steep Himalayan slopes. In Bangladesh, the crop is watered by the annual floods of the summer monsoon season, and floating rices of comparatively low yield are often grown. The winter is nearly rainless, but in recent years extensive cultivation of a winter rice crop has been introduced by using high-yielding varieties irrigated with pumped water or planted in areas that remain wet because they are at sea level. Sri Lanka is geographically divided into wet and dry zones. The former is the mountainous two-thirds of the island, which receives heavy rain in the summer monsoon; here rice is generally grown in the lower parts of mountain valleys, in terraced fields watered by direct rain and small rain-fed streams. The dry zone is an area of ancient large-scale reservoir and canal systems, abandoned in the thirteenth century, which have recently been largely restored. Rice fields in this area are



Terraced rice paddies in Tampaksiring, Bali, Indonesia, in 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)



THE COMPLEXITIES OF RICE

While people in the Western world usually think of rice as either white or brown or long- or short-grained, the matter of classifying types of rice is much more complicated for people who grow rice and consume it everyday. The following text details how Malay farmers classify the varieties of rice they grow and eat.

Pegasi farmers use a number of easily recognizable characters to distinguish between cultivators . . . Special importance is given to the hardness or texture of the grain, since this determines its use. There are 23 cultivators in the common category of *gangs*a or *padi biasa* ("common rice"), which have hard starchy grains that are dry and "fluffy" when cooked. These are frequently referred to as "vitreous" in English because the uncooked grain is translucent; or as "common" because these are the most widely cultivated on a worldwide basis. Rice varieties of the vitreous type are the major food grown, eaten and, when necessary, purchased by Pegasi households (the per capita consumption for adults being about 278 pounds per year).

There are 18 cultivars in the category called *pulut* ("sticky"), having soft grains that become sticky and clump together when cooked. In the past, these were only required in small quantities for consumption during special ceremonies, for making rice starch cosmetic and medicinal preparations, and for making the traditional snack foods and cakes. In recent years *pulut* rices have commanded a premium price in local market towns, since they symbolize high status and are desired by urbanized Malaysians. While Pegasi growers formerly considered *pulut* only a minor, locally consumed crop, they are increasingly aware of the cash crop capabilities of these varieties.

The final eight cultivars are called *lembut* ("soft"), described by informants as so soft and almost gelatinous when cooked that the label "viscous" is perhaps appropriate. *Pulut* and *lembut* have not been distinguished as separate categories by western rice specialists. The *lembut* cultivars are pounded into flour and used for making a special class of cakes and pastries,

though unlike the cakes that require *pulut* rice flour, informants say that in most cases imported wheat flour is an acceptable and cheap substitute for *lembut* flour. In 1976 there was little local interest in the *lembut* group, as evidenced by the fact that only a couple of households planted small plots to three types.

Color is another important character, and while almost any part of the rice plant can be pigmented, it is specifically the color of the husk and the pericarp or outer layers of the kernel that merit significant cultural attention. Colors noted are *puteh* ("white"), *kuning* ("yellow to light brown"), *meraab* ("dark brown to red"). A color term is often part of the cultivar name, and it serves to distinguish closely related cultivars, such as *mele kuning* and *mele merah*. Some have fanciful names which are indicative of color, such as the *gangs*a with red-brown husks called *darab belut* ("swamp-eel blood") and the *gangs*a with black husks called *ekar musang* ("civit cat tail").

Other terms are descriptive of husk color patterns, such as *choring* which describes splotches and stripes of red and white on a *serendab*, and *bunga machang* ("machang flower") glutinous rice which to the local eye resembles the striking red and white flower of the *machang* variety of mango.

While vitreous rice may have husks of any color, the pericarps are always white. This is probably a local cultural preference, since colored vitreous rices are common elsewhere (e.g., in Sarawak and the Philippines from personal observation). When buying "food" rice, Pahang people demand white polished rice types, and they boast about the whiteness of the rices they grow themselves.

The attitude towards color in glutinous rices is quite different, with the full range of colors being in demand. Each type and color of the glutinous rice has specific ritual uses, or is required when making special confections and cakes.

Growers frequently distinguish cultivars according to their size and shape of the grain.

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Terms describing size and shape include: *panjang* ("long"), *pendik* ("short"), *gemuk* ("fat") and *bulat* ("round").

Source: Donald H. Lambert (1985) *Swamp Rice Farming: The Indigenous Pabang Malay Agricultural System*. Boulder, CO, and London: Westview Press, 55–58.

irrigated by a combination of large government canals and village-level, rain-fed storage tanks closely akin to those in southern India.

Southeast Asian countries—mainly Burma, Thailand, and Vietnam—are traditional rice exporters. Like Bangladesh, they have large areas of rice irrigated by rainfall and by inundation as the monsoon-fed rivers rise out of their banks. Unlike Bangladesh, their production has historically been relatively high and their costs relatively low. The Philippines has a combination of large river plains now watered by a combination of canals, flooding, and rainfall, and mountain systems like those of Sri Lanka. Indonesia is similar, with ancient, extensive, and extremely well-managed indigenous systems, on Bali, in particular, watered by locally managed channels from rain-fed mountain-top reservoirs.

In East Asia, rice cultivation is mostly irrigated. In China and Korea, it is more than 91 percent irrigated, while in Japan it is entirely irrigated, although this is mainly in river valleys that have always been naturally wet and subject to flooding. Rice cultivation is commonly combined with fish- or shrimp-raising. Chinese, Korean, and Japanese irrigation systems are recognized as very efficiently managed.

Farm-Level Management

Rice production requires complex social discipline. Throughout Asia, this has consistently involved social systems with strong independent family units operating in the context of close interfamily cooperation at several higher levels. Rice has been essentially a crop of family farmers with small, intensively cultivated holdings that have not lent themselves to mechanization or economies of scale. Most Asian rice farms are three hectares or less, and a very large part of their output is either consumed on the farm or paid out in local wages.

As a rule, family farmers everywhere try to organize their cropping so as to avoid sharp peaks in labor demand that require the heavy use of hired labor. Usually this done by planting several crops each season with different planting, weeding, and harvest times. The ecology of rice militates against this. It precludes other crops, because very few can grow in the condi-

tions rice requires, and a common system of water management requires rice fields to be located side by side over large areas so that water can flow through them. Consequently, a given block of farmers often plants the same rice varieties at substantially the same times. This necessarily means that the labor requirements all tend to peak at about the same time, creating intense local labor shortages. The result is that in rice-growing areas an extremely large portion of the population is made up of non-landowning agricultural laborers; they are, however, exceptionally well organized, and their wages are usually relatively high. Alternatively, in East Asia, particularly in Japan where rural labor has become extremely scarce, it is common to replace wage labor with agreements for cooperative labor exchange among landowners, who work in teams on one another's fields.

The high labor demand is mainly for four sets of operations: weeding if the fields are not flooded, transplanting of seedlings if fields are flooded, harvest, and threshing and milling. Transplanting must be done in a short period, because if seedlings are too young they are unlikely to survive, and if they are too mature yields will decline. It is most commonly done by teams of women. Harvesting is most commonly done by hired labor of both sexes, since this is the period of greatest labor scarcity. Payment to the team may be anywhere from a tenth to a sixth of the crop.

Threshing and milling are more difficult with rice, as the husks cling to the individual rice grains more tightly than do other grains. The husks must be removed in a further operation after the grain is separated from the stalk, leaving brown rice. Brown rice is superior in nutrient content to white (milled) rice, but the bran layer that gives it its color contains oils that decompose within a few weeks, spoiling the grain. For long-term storage, unless it is possible to dry the paddy to about 14 percent moisture content, this layer must be removed by milling. In some areas, the rice is also parboiled. Milling was formerly done by pounding the unhusked rice in wooden mortars, usually by the women of a household. Now it is often mechanized. Rice husks are commonly used for fuel and as an abrasive. The bran is a high-quality livestock feed, while the straw is used for fodder, fuel, basketry, and thatch.

Social Implications

In general, interhousehold cooperative arrangements involved in rice production have two major functions: securing resources as needed and managing infrastructure. There are two main patterns.

In areas where rice land makes up only part of total village lands, there is commonly a village reservoir or other water source. The rice lands are those below the reservoir, while higher ground is used for complementary crops. In this case, cooperative arrangements include provisions for maintaining the irrigation infrastructure and distributing the water and also very often for reducing rice plantings in years of low water in such a way as to assure that all those with a right to the water get the use of a proportional section of the land.

In areas where large irrigation systems completely surround whole villages, especially where water flows from one farmer's fields to another's, there must be complex agreements on cropping and water flows below the outlets, as well as on taking turns accessing water from the channels. In East Asia, these arrangements are mainly under farmer control. In South Asia, the larger channels are always controlled by national or provincial officials; farmer responsibility begins at the level of the minor watercourse only, and coordination between the two levels is often poor. In the Philippines, systems were initially built and run as in South Asia. In 1976, however, the National Irrigation Authority nearly went bankrupt. Since then, it has reorganized in such a way as to allow local-level officials to make binding arrangements for construction and management with farmers, which allows the farmers to control what is done and how it is to be paid for, and this system has been a great success.

The Future

Asian rice production has so far kept pace with increases in population. This is mainly because of the expansion of irrigation and national and international research programs that have introduced new varieties with higher yields, faster maturation, and greater responsiveness to fertilizer inputs. Expanded irrigation and faster maturation allow farmers to go from one crop per year to two or even three. Until recently, intensification and greater areas planted in rice have been the major sources of increased production. Further gains, however, will have to come more from increased yields.

In the twentieth century, total Asian rice production increased from about 49.38 million metric tons in 1911 to over 322 million metric tons in 1980 and

about 540 million metric tons in 1999. Average yields increased from 1.78 metric tons per hectare in 1930 to 2.55 tons in 1980 and over 3.9 tons in 1999. Yet much more is needed: malnutrition is still endemic, poverty is an important constraint on food intake, and population is still increasing. Hope lies in the fact that rice yields, along with yields of other grains, can rise well above present levels. This has often been demonstrated experimentally, but more important it is also evident in the great variations in productivity within and between countries, ranging from 1.7 tons/hectare in Cambodia through 2.92 in India to 6.3 in China and 6.8 in the Republic of Korea. While some of these differences may reflect natural conditions, the more likely explanation lies in farmers' differing access to resources, and this can readily be improved.

Murray J. Leaf

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RINGI SYSTEM The *ringi* system is a collective process of decision making by circular letter (*ringisho*) that is known to be specific to large bureaucratic organizations and companies in Japan. The *ringi* system of sharing authority is a practice that dates back to the Tokugawa shogunate during the Edo period (1600/1603–1868). A proposal is initiated at the middle or lower level of management. It then takes the form of a written proposal that is circulated among the interested parties through the organizational hierarchies, as well as at the divisional and corporate levels for consultation, comment, and approval. After each individual involved has signified agreement by stamping a personal seal (*hanko*) on the document, it is returned to the original person in charge for implementation. From this process, a final decision emerges that will be enacted by the authority of the organization or

company. This process is called *ringiseido* (request for decision system), which emphasizes the importance the Japanese place on group decisions. In negotiations, it means that the confidence of the entire group will have to be reached. In the end, the decision can be implemented quickly and with full cooperation because it already has unanimous support.

This practice of sharing the responsibility for decision making that emphasizes group consensus is time consuming and explains why the negotiating process takes so long. The reason is that a great deal of informal discussion will have taken place before the *ringisho* is even drawn up. This informal decision-making stage in a Japanese organization is called *nemawashi* (prior consultation). When used together, the *nemawashi* and *ringi* systems ensure that corporate management at both horizontal and verticals level are kept completely informed.

A basic condition for implementing the *ringi* system effectively is the necessity for each individual involved to have shared understanding and values. The *ringi* system, however, has been criticized. Consensus-based decision making does not clarify with whom the responsibility rests. Accountability for actions and decisions is diffused, which protects an individual from being criticized for proposals that are ill-advised. In situations where a quick decision is desirable, Western-style decision making involving top-level management has been adopted. More and more, in order to accelerate the speed of the *ringi* process and to eliminate bureaucracy, some companies are simplifying the

procedure by the use of in-house communication networks, including intranets.

Nathalie Cavasin

See also: **Quality Circles**

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RIZAL, JOSÉ (1861–1896), Filipino physician, writer, patriot. José Rizal was born in Calamba, Laguna Province, Philippines, on 19 June 1861, to a well-to-do landowner and sugar planter family. Rizal obtained a bachelor of arts degree in 1877 at the Jesuit Ateneo Municipal school in Manila and in 1882 left for Spain to enter the Central University of Madrid, where he studied medicine and philosophy.

In Spain, he committed himself to the reform of Spanish rule in the Philippines. Rizal insisted that it was the religious institutions, specifically the Franciscan, Augustinian, and Dominican friars, that had a stranglehold on the politics and economy of the Philippines. He continued his graduate studies in Paris and Heidelberg and in 1886 published his novel *Noli Me Tangere* (Touch Me Not), which reflected the suffering that his fellow citizens had had to endure under the years of Spanish domination. His book was



Monument dedicated to the execution of José Rizal in José Rizal Park, Manila, in 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)



JOSÉ RIZAL'S FINAL MESSAGE

Philippine patriot José Rizal was executed by the Spanish on 30 December 1896. On the night before his execution he smuggled the following poem—a classic statement in Philippine history—in a small alcohol lamp from his prison cell to his sister.

Farewell, dear fatherland, clime of the sun caress'd,
 Pearl of the Orient seas, our Eden lost!
 Gladly now I give to thee this faded life's best,
 And were it brighter, fresh, or more blest,
 Still would I give it thee, nor count the cost.
 On the field of battle, 'mid the frenzy of fight
 Others have given their lives, without doubt or heed;
 The place matters not—cypress or laurel or lily white,
 Scaffold or open plain, combat or martyrdom's plight,
 'Tis ever the same, to serve our home and country's
 need.

I die just when I see the dawn break,
 Through the gloom of night, to herald the day;
 And if color is lacking my blood thou shalt take,
 Pour'd out at need for thy dear sake,
 To dye with its crimson the waking ray.
 My dreams, when life first opened to me,
 My dreams, when the hope of youth beat high,
 Were to see thy lov'd face, O gem of the Orient sea,
 From gloom and grief, from care and sorrow free;
 No blush on thy brow, no tear in thine eye.
 Dream of my life, my living and burning desire;
 All hail; cries the soul that is now to take flight;
 All hail! And sweet it is for thee to expire;
 To die for thy sake, that thou may's't aspire;
 And sleep in thy bosom eternity's long night.
 If over my grave some day thou seest grow,
 In the grassy sod, a humbled flower,
 Draw it to thy lips and kiss my soul so,
 While I feel on my brow in the cold tomb below,
 The touch of thy tenderness, thy breath's warm
 power.

Let the moon beam over me soft and serene,
 Let the dawn shed over me its radiant flashes,
 Let the wind with sad lament over me keen;
 And if on my cross a bird should be seen,

Let it trill there its hymn of peace to my ashes.
 Let the sun draw vapors up the sky,
 And heavenward in purity bear my tardy protest;
 Let some kind soul o'er my untimely fate sigh,
 And in the still evening a prayer be lifted on high
 From thee, O my country, that in God I may rest . . .
 Pray for all those that hapless have died,
 For all who have suffered the unmeasur'd plain;
 For our mothers that bitterly their woes have cried;
 For widows and orphans, for captives by torture tried;
 And then for thyself that redemption thou may's't gain.
 And when the dark night wraps the graveyard around,
 With only the dead in their vigil to see;
 Break not my repose or the mystery profound,
 And perchance thou may's't hear a sad hymn resound;
 'Tis I, O my country, raising a song unto thee.
 When even my grave is remembered no more,
 Unmark'd by never a cross nor a stone;
 Let the plow sweep through it, the spade turn it o'er,
 That my ashes may carpet thy earthly floor,
 Before into nothingness at last they are blown.
 Then will oblivion bring me no care,
 As over thy vales and plains I sweep,
 Throbbing and cleansed in thy space and air,
 With color and light, with song and lament I fare,
 Ever repeating the faith that I keep.
 My Fatherland adored, that sadness to my sorrow lends,
 Beloved Filipinas, hear now my last good bye!
 I give thee all, parents and kindred and friends;
 For I go where no slave before the oppressor bends,
 Where faith can never kill, and God reigns e'er on
 high!
 Farewell to you all, from my soul torn away,
 Friends of my childhood in the home dispossessed!
 Give thanks that I rest from the wearisome day!
 Farewell to thee, too, sweet friend that lightened my
 way;
 Beloved creatures all, farewell! In death there is rest!

Source: Jaime C. DeVeyra. (1946) *El Ultimo Adios de Rizal*. Manila, Philippines: Bureau of Printing. Translated into English by Charles Derbyshire.

banned in the Philippines. He went on to become a leading spokesman for the Philippine reform movement, writing articles for the Filipino propaganda newspaper *La Solidaridad* in Barcelona. Key among Rizal's political goals were that the Philippines become a province of Spain, that Spanish friars be replaced by Filipino priests, and that both Filipinos and Spaniards be given equal rights and freedoms in the Philippines.

In 1887, Rizal returned to the Philippines but quickly returned to Europe because he believed his prolonged presence would serve only to endanger his family and relatives. In 1891, he wrote another book, *El Filibusterismo* (The Subversive), which centered on the abuses of the friars in his nation, especially the way they dealt with the landowners, of which Rizal's family was one. Among other things, this book predicted the outbreak of a mass peasant revolution in the Philippines.

After practicing medicine for a short time in Hong Kong, Rizal, against the advice of his parents and friends, returned to the Philippines in 1892 and founded a nonviolent reform society, La Liga Filipina (Philippine League), in Manila and was arrested and deported to Dapitan, Mindanao, in July 1892. For four years he remained in exile, practicing medicine, building a school, planning town improvements, and continuing his writing. In 1896, the Katipunan, a nationalist secret society, launched a revolt against Spain. Although Rizal was in no way affiliated with the society, he was arrested, returned to Manila, falsely tried for treason and complicity with the revolution, and found guilty. On the eve of his execution, confined to Fort Santiago, Rizal wrote *Mi Ultimo Adios* (My Last Farewell). On 30 December 1896, José Rizal was publicly executed by a firing squad in Manila. To this day, José Rizal is celebrated as a national hero in the Philippines. His death inspired Filipino revolutionaries to continue their struggle for independence from Spain.

Craig Loomis

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RIZE (2002 pop. 82,000). Rize, the largest Turkish town east of Trabzon on the Black Sea coast, is the capital of Rize Province (2002 pop. 363,300) and the center of Turkish tea cultivation. Its ancient name was Rhizaion; a fortress east of the modern town was built

by the Byzantine emperor Justinian along the frontier with Persia. This fortress was rebuilt and expanded by the Grand Comneni of Trebizond.

Rize has been the home of Persian Armenians, Georgians, Pontic Greeks, and settlers from the European lands of the Ottoman empire, such as Rumeli, Bosnia, and Morea, who were granted lands by Mehmet the Conqueror. In the sixteenth century the majority of the population was Christian, with many villages having Greek names. Rize follows the traditional Black Sea non-nucleated settlement pattern of villages and neighborhoods spread out over a large area outside the city center.

Local production, aside from tea, includes citrus and other fruits, nuts, corn, small-scale boats, and a local specialty textile called *pesbtemal*, a kind of striped linen, which has been in constant production since the Comnenian period and was exported to Baghdad and Egypt during Ottoman times. Tea was introduced in the 1920s, and Rize tea is the main Turkish domestic tea.

Sylvia Wing Önder

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ROH TAE WOO (b. 1932), president of South Korea. Roh Tae Woo was president of South Korea from 1988 to 1993. Roh was born in Talsong, near Taegu, in North Kyongsang Province, the son of a minor local official. He joined the South Korean Army in 1951 and soon after attended the Korean Military Academy. While there, Roh met fellow classmate Chun Doo Hwan. He graduated in 1955, whereupon he received his commission in the South Korean Army as a second lieutenant.

During his career in the military Roh attended the U.S. Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and graduated from the South Korean War College in 1968. Roh served with South Korean forces in Vietnam during the Vietnam War (1954–1975). He was eventually promoted to the rank of brigadier general. Roh helped engineer the coup d'état that brought Chun Doo Hwan to power in December 1979 and succeeded Chun as commander of the Defense Security Command. Roh retired from the army to become minister of state for political and security affairs. He

held various governmental posts and as minister of sport was instrumental in bringing the Olympics to Seoul in 1988.

Roh succeeded Chun Doo Hwan as president in the first peaceful transfer of power in South Korean history. Roh was elected president in 1988 and served until 1993, when he did not stand for reelection. He instituted political and economic reforms, including more local autonomy, more freedom of the press, and more influence for labor unions, and in 1991 saw that South Korea was accepted into the United Nations.

In 1995–1996, Roh and Chun were found guilty of treason, mutiny, and corruption in what was treated in South Korea as the trial of the century. The trial stemmed from charges that the men had stashed enormous slush funds while in office and from their roles in the Kwangju massacre by the military in 1980. Roh and Chun claimed that the trial was politically motivated. Roh was sentenced to 22.5 years in prison and fined \$350 million. In 2002, an appeals court reduced the sentence to seventeen years.

Keith Leitich

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ROHINGYA The Rohingyas are the Muslim minority of the Rakhine (formerly Arakan) State of Myanmar (Burma); although they number in the hundreds of thousands, available statistics are unreliable. Traditions hold that the Rohingyas have been settled in Rakhine since the seventh century, although strong evidence of their presence in Rakhine exists only from the fifteenth century. The Rohingyas are the descendants of Muslim traders from Persia and India, Muslim refugees from the Middle East and Bengal, and indigenous Arakanese converts to Islam.

Generally, tensions between the Rohingyas and the Buddhist Arakanese date from the nineteenth century, under colonial rule, when colonial efforts to define these communities and to identify shared religious sites on an either-or basis and a land crisis brought these two communities into conflict. The emergence of Rohingya and Buddhist Arakanese communalism

led to bloody confrontations in the twentieth century. Under Burma's military regime, efforts by the government to suppress the Muslim community, including denial of citizenship, forcible seizure of land, and violent intimidation forced hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas to seek refuge in neighboring (and Muslim) Bangladesh. Unable to shoulder the burden of so many refugees, poverty-stricken Bangladesh has, through agreements made with Myanmar, encouraged and often forced the majority of Rohingya refugees to return to Rakhine. Many other Rohingya refugees remain, however, scattered throughout the Middle East, Malaysia, and the United States. In order to reduce Muslim claims to heritage in Rakhine, some Buddhist Arakanese have made efforts to eradicate evidence of the antiquity of Rohingya settlement in Rakhine.

Michael W. Charney

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ROHTAS FORT Built as a strategic northwestern outpost and named after a similar stronghold in Bihar, India, Rohtas Fort is located about 100 kilometers south of Islamabad, the capital of modern Pakistan, off the Grand Trunk Road. Sher Shah Suri (reigned 1539–1545), an Indian-born Pashtun whose rule marked an interregnum in the Mughal control of India, ordered the construction of both the fort and the road. The site was strategic in that it was located at the northwestern frontier of the empire, and was meant as a stronghold against local tribesmen as well as against the armies of the recently defeated Mughal



RHOTAS FORT—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Rohtas Fort was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1997. Because of its towering battlements, massive walls, and strategic placement, the fort—built by Sher Shah Suri after a major victory—has never been taken in an assault and has survived centuries of war unscathed.

king. Work on Rohtas Fort began around 1540 and continued for ten years, so that the fort was not completed until after the death of Sher Shah.

Rohtas Fort has a perimeter of 5 kilometers; ten gates punctuate the wall. The fort is built of gray ashlar masonry, and the exterior wall is in places 10 to 13 meters thick and 10 to 16 meters high. The ceremonial main entrance is through the majestic Sohal Gate. In addition the fort contains large, arcaded wells with underground chambers. The primary citadel area, located on high ground in the northwest quadrant of the fortress, consists of an imperial mosque as well as the residential palace of the Mughal governor, Raja Man Singh. Rohtas Fort is an important example of sixteenth-century fortress building in the Indian subcontinent.

Kishwar Rizvi

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ROMANIZATION SYSTEMS, CHINESE

Because the Chinese do not use the Roman (Latin) alphabet to record their language, if it is to be written in the Roman alphabet it must be transliterated, or romanized. This is true whenever one wants to represent in the Roman alphabet a language that uses another script, whether the other script uses an alphabet (as do Arabic and Russian), a syllabary (as does Japanese), or ideographic characters, such as Chinese.

Chinese Characters

The Chinese developed *hanzi* (Chinese characters) to represent words, concepts, or ideas. The earliest attested Chinese characters, found on bones used for divination that date to the second millennium BCE, imitated the objects they represented (that is, the character for "eye" would look something like an eye). More complicated characters were formed by joining two or more visual shapes, by using certain shapes to symbolize concepts, and by the development of standard elements that could indicate pronunciation or some aspect of meaning (for example, the element meaning "tree" will occur in the characters for any number of specific types of tree, such as pine or plum).

Chinese characters have allowed people speaking widely varying Chinese dialects (so different, in fact, as to be more like separate languages) to communi-

cate with each other. Because Chinese is a language with many homophones (words with different meanings but the same pronunciation), it is useful to have a system of writing that distinguishes between homophones visually, as Chinese characters do. This is especially true when the way in which words are pronounced differs so markedly from region to region.

Wade-Giles and Pinyin

Therefore it is perhaps no surprise that it was the foreign missionaries, diplomats, and merchants who first attempted to use alphabets to represent Chinese sounds. Jesuit missionaries, active in China in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, introduced phonetic scripts based on the Roman alphabet. In 1867, British diplomat Thomas F. Wade (1818–1895) devised a phonetic script system based on Mandarin, one of the major Chinese dialects. Forty-five years later, in 1912, the Wade system was modified by H. A. Giles (1845–1935), an English scholar of Chinese. This modification was called the Wade-Giles system, and it has been in use for almost a century.

In 1918, the Chinese themselves developed a phonetic alphabet, called *zhuyin zimu* ("national phonetic alphabet"), using portions of characters to represent sounds. Realizing the importance of using the Roman alphabet, in 1828 the Chinese government promulgated a second form of phonetic script, *guoyu lomazi* ("national romanized writing"), which used the Roman alphabet along with special markers to indicate tones. However, neither the *zhuyin zimu* nor the *guoyu lomazi* succeeded in replacing Chinese characters. The *Zhuyin zimu* failed to become popular among foreigners, and the latter failed partially due to its clumsy tone symbols.

In the meantime, influenced by the Soviet approach to the problem of illiteracy, a group of Chinese residing in the Soviet Union (with help from Moscow), started the "Latinization of Chinese" movement. The features of pinyin romanization that make it most mysterious to English speakers (its use of *q* for the *ch* sound in the English word *church*, or its use of *x* for the palatal spirant represented in Wade-Giles by *hs*) came about because the system was based on Russian methods of romanizing Cyrillic—and those were the letters the Russians used for the equivalent sounds in Russian.

One of the most prominent early leaders of the movement was Qu Qiubai (1899–1935), who published a pamphlet entitled "Chinese Latinized Alphabet" in 1930. The final version of Qu's system used only those letters appearing on regular typewriters. It grouped syllables together as words and omitted sym-



CHINESE ROMANIZATION SYSTEMS

Depending on when a Chinese place became well known, the romanization of its name that seems most familiar may vary. Old historical cities such as Canton and Nanking may seem unfamiliar, especially to older readers, when they are romanized Guangzhou or Nanjing. China's capital is one exception: once universally known to English speakers as Peking, it is now equally or better known as Beijing. On the other hand, a modern industrial powerhouse such as Shenzhen would be unfamiliar if it were romanized Shen-chen. Below is a table of some well-known Chinese place names under three different systems of romanization.

Pinyin	Wade-Giles	Chinese Post Office System
Beijing	Pei-ching	Peking
Guangzhou	Kuang-chou	Canton
Nanjing	Nan-ching	Nanking
Shanghai	Shang-hai	Shanghai
Sichuan	Szechuan	Szechwan
Suzhou	Su-chou	Soochow
Tianjin	T'ien-chin	Tientsin
Xi'an	Hsi-an	Sian
Xinjiang	Hsin-chiang	Sinkiang

bols representing tones. This system covered Mandarin only; Qu suggested that different systems for other dialects or minority languages be developed.

Qu's system was introduced to China in 1931, with a notion that eventually the Chinese characters would be replaced by this romanization system. But advocates of *guoyu lomazi* criticized the new system, especially for its lack of tone marks. Many left-wing writers, including Lu Xun, Guo Moruo, Mao Dun, and Ba Jin, favored the new system, although Soviet support for this movement disappeared from 1939, when the Soviet Union abandoned the Roman alphabet in favor of Cyrillic script.

The new system was called *xin wenzi* (new script) or *ladinghua xin wenzi* (latinized new script). During the period of the Second World War (1939–1945), petitions were made by advocates of *xin wenzi*, but these were not given much attention either by the Nationalists or by the Chinese Communists. In 1958 the *xin wenzi* was replaced by pinyin (*pinyin* in Chinese means "to spell phonetically"), a modification of Qu's system. Pinyin was adopted by the United Nations in 1977. It has gradually increased in popularity outside China,

where it allows a standardization in romanizing Chinese (previously German, French, and English transliteration systems all romanized Chinese in accordance with how the Roman alphabet is pronounced in those languages—which made them differ from one another).

Pinyin, like Wade-Giles, is based on Mandarin. Characteristic of Mandarin is that the distinction between *b* and *p*, *d* and *t*, and *g* and *k* is one of aspiration versus non-aspiration, not voiced versus voiceless pronunciation. Wade-Giles represents the distinction with a mark indicating aspiration: the *b* sound is represented with a *p*, while the *p* sound is represented with a *p'*. In pinyin, by contrast, the *b* sound is represented with a *b* and the *p* with a *p*. Similarly, in Wade-Giles the *d* sound is represented with a *t*, while the *t* sound is represented with a *t'*. In pinyin, the *d* sound is represented with a *d* and the *t* with a *t*.

Both pinyin and Wade-Giles are limited in that they were not designed to represent the speech of some of the other Chinese languages and dialects. Also, neither system represents tones. There are only four tones in Mandarin, but there are nine in Yue, another dialect. In the future, it is possible that different

spelling systems for other Chinese languages and dialects will be developed and that symbols for tones and other linguistic features may also be developed.

Other Romanization Systems

Other methods of romanizing Chinese include the early-twentieth-century Chinese Post Office System, which gave the world the romanizations Peking and Nanking for the cities known in pinyin as Beijing and Nanjing (in Wade-Giles they would be Pei-ching and Nan-ching, respectively). *Tongyong* pinyin is a romanization system based on Wade-Giles that used in Taiwan, where, nevertheless, there is growing use of *Hanyu* pinyin, the pinyin used in the rest of China. (In 1999, the government of Taiwan announced that street signs would be romanized in *Hanyu* pinyin). The Yale system, created in 1948, was used in the United States as a teaching tool. *Gwoyueu romatzyh* (National Romanization) was created in 1928. It indicates differences in tone with different spellings and has also been popular as a teaching tool in the United States. It also enjoys some use on Taiwan, where a simplified version was promulgated in the 1980s.

*John Young and the editorial staff of
Berkshire Publishing Group*

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ROMANIZATION SYSTEMS, KOREAN

The two main romanization systems (that is, systems for writing Korean using the roman alphabet) for the Korean language are the McCune-Reischauer (MR) system and the Ministry of Education (ME) system.

McCune-Reischauer System

The McCune-Reischauer system is the most widely used romanization system for the Korean language. (See Tables 1 and 2.) Designed in 1939 by George S. McCune (1908–1948), an American missionary and principal of the P’yŏngyang Sungsil School, and Edwin O. Reischauer (1910–1990), then a graduate student of Japanese history at Harvard University, the MR

TABLE 1

McCune-Reischauer Consonants					
Korean spelling	ㄱ	ㄷ	ㅂ	ㅈ	ㅅ
MR system	k, g (ng)	t, d (n)	p, b (m)	ch, j (t, n)	s, sh (n)
Korean spelling	ㅋ	ㅌ	ㅍ	ㅊ	ㅆ
MR system	k' (k, ng)	t' (t, n)	p' (p, m)	ch' (t, n)	h (n)
Korean spelling	ㄲ	ㄸ	ㅃ	ㅆ	
MR system	kk (k, ng)	tt (t, n)	pp (p, m)	tch, (t, n)	ss (t, n)
Korean spelling	ㄴ	ㅁ	ㅇ	ㄹ	
MR system	n (l)	m	zero, ng	l, r (n)	

Notes for consonants:
 1. *G, d, b, and j* are used for ㄱ, ㄷ, ㅂ, and ㅈ, respectively, between two voiced sounds as pronounced.
 2. The apostrophe (') indicates aspiration (extra puff of air coming out of the mouth).
 3. Double consonants (*kk, tt, pp, tch, and ss*) are glottalized sounds. For the doubling of *ch*, *tch* is used instead of *chch*.
 4. The symbols in parentheses are not specified in the system but would be used in some contexts due to pronunciation variation in Korean words.
 5. Actual pronunciation of some symbols: *ng* [ŋ] as in the English word *sing*, *ch* [tʃ] as in *church*, *sh* [ʃ] as in *she*, and *r* [r] as in *water*.
 6. *Sh* is used when the following vowel is *wi*, that is, *shwi*; otherwise, *s* is used.
 7. ㅇ in Korean has a sound value [ŋ] only in syllable-final position. Therefore, no symbol is used for ㅇ in syllable-initial position.
 8. As for ㄹ, *r* is used between two vowels as well as at the beginning of a word.

romanization system is used in nearly all the references to Korean words in international society, including, maps, documents, and scholarly writings on Korea.

Sometimes the MR system uses different alphabet letters for the same Korean consonant spelling because it

TABLE 2

McCune-Reischauer Vowels				
Korean spelling	ㅏ	ㅑ	ㅓ	ㅕ
MR system	a	ae	ya	yae
Korean spelling	ㅗ	ㅛ	ㅜ	ㅠ
MR system	o	e	yŏ	ye
Korean spelling	ㅜ	ㅡ	ㅝ	ㅟ
MR system	o	wa	wae	oe
Korean spelling	ㅜ	ㅟ	ㅞ	ㅠ
MR system	u	wŏ	we	wi
Korean spelling	ㅡ	ㅣ	ㅝ	
MR system	ü	i	üi	

Notes for vowels:
 1. A breve (˘) indicates a lip spreading of the pronunciation of the corresponding alphabet without it.
 2. Actual pronunciation of some symbols: *ae* is pronounced [æ] as in the English word *at* and *oe* as [ø] or [œ], as in the French words *bleu* or *oef*.

aims to transcribe the actual pronunciation of Korean words, not the standard Korean spelling. For example, *banguk* ("Korea") contains two syllables, the second of which means "nation." The same syllable would be transcribed differently for the word *kukpo* ("national treasure"). The variation is due to a sound variation rule in Korean by which stop consonants (*p*, *t*, *k*, and *ts*) become voiced between two voiced sounds; that is, *b*, *d*, *g*, and *j*, respectively. For another example, the first syllable of the name Silla (57 BCE–935 CE), one of the three ancient kingdoms that existed on the Korean peninsula, means "new" and would be romanized as *sin* in other contexts, such as in the name Sinchon (a district in Seoul), because *n* is pronounced as *l* before another *l*.

Ministry of Education System

In 1984, the Ministry of Education (ME) Romanization system was promulgated in order to unify all the different romanization systems that had been used to represent the Korean language using the Roman alphabet. The 1984 ME system was the official romanization system of the Korean government until 30 June 2000. A newly revised romanization system was promulgated 1 July 2000 by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT) as the official romanization system of the Korean government. To allow for complete transition, the complete replacement of the 1984 ME system with the newly revised MCT system is set for 31 December 2005.

The 1984 ME system is almost identical to the McCune-Reischauer system except that *wŏ* in the McCune-Reischauer system is transcribed in the 1984 ME system as *wo*, without the diacritic marker. The diacritic marker is unnecessary because there is no sequence of *w* and *o* in Korean. Therefore, Wŏnju (a city name) in the McCune-Reischauer system would be transcribed Wonju in the 1984 ME system.

Another difference between the McCune-Reischauer system and the 1984 ME system is the way in which the two systems use *sb*. In the 1984 ME system, *sb* is used only before *wi*, but not before *i*. Therefore, Silla in the McCune-Reischauer system is transcribed as Shilla in the 1984 ME system. Like the McCune-Reischauer system, the 1984 ME system transcribes the actual pronunciation of Korean words, not the standard Korean spellings.

The new MCT romanization system, promulgated in 2000, is drastically different from the 1984 ME system. (See Tables 3 and 4 for comparison.)

There are some notable differences between the 1984 ME system and the new system:

1. To facilitate computerization, the proposed system uses no diacritic devices (e.g., breve \sim and

TABLE 3

Consonants in Ministry of Education (ME) System and in the New (MCT) System					
Korean spelling	ㄱ	ㄷ	ㅂ	ㅈ	ㅅ
1984 ME system	k, g (ng)	t, d (n)	p, b (m)	ch, j (t, n)	s, sh (n)
2000 MCT system	g, k (ng)	d, t (n)	b, p (m)	j (t, n)	s (n)
Korean spelling	ㅋ	ㅌ	ㅍ	ㅊ	ㅎ
1984 ME system	k', (k, ng)	t' (t, n)	p' (p, m)	ch' (t, n)	h (n)
2000 MCT system	k (ng)	t (n)	p(m)	ch (t, n)	h (n)
Korean spelling	ㄲ	ㄸ	ㅃ	ㅆ	ㅄ
1984 ME system	kk (k, ng)	tt (t, n)	pp (p, m)	tch (t, n)	ss (t, n)
2000 MCT system	gg(k, ng)	dd (t, n)	bb (p, m)	jj (t, n)	ss (t, n)
Korean spelling	ㄴ	ㄹ	ㅇ	ㄹ	
1984 ME system	n (l)	m	zero, ng	l, r (n)	
2000 MCT system	n (l)	m	zero, ng	l, r (n)	

Notes for consonants are the same as for Table 1, except that the double consonants for the new system are *gg*, *dd*, *bb*, *jj*, and *ss*.

apostrophe ’). Therefore, the vowels ö (ㅜ) and ü (ㅡ) in the 1984 ME system are transcribed as *eo* and *eu*, respectively, in the new system, except for the vowel ㅜ, which is transcribed as *ui*, not *eui*, in the new system. For consonants, aspirated stops would be represented with plain *k*, *t*, *p*, and *ch*. For example, Ch’unch’ŏn (a city name) in the ME system is transcribed Chuncheon in the new system.

2. In the 1984 ME system, ㄱ, ㄷ, ㅂ, and ㅈ are represented with letters for voiceless sounds *k*, *t*, *p*, and *ch*, and symbols for the voiced sounds *g*, *d*, *g*, and *j* are used only between two voiced sounds. In the new system, those Korean letters are represented with *g*, *d*, *g*, and *j*, under the assumption that voiced letters would bring about pronunciation closer to Korean pronunciation to Korean people’s ears, and *k*, *t*, and *p* are used only before another consonant or at the end of a word. For example, Pusan and Kwangju (both city names) in the 1984 ME system are transcribed as Busan and Gwangju in the new system. The glottalized consonants *kk*, *tt*, *pp*, and *tch* in 1984 ME system are represented with *gg*, *dd*, *bb*, and *jj* in the new system.

3. For ㅅ, the new system uses only *s*, ignoring the variation between *s* and *sb* regardless of the following vowel.

Hyo Sang Lee

TABLE 4

Vowels in the 1984 Ministry of Education and in the New (MCT) system					
Korean spelling	ㅏ	ㅑ	ㅓ	ㅕ	
1984 ME system	a	ae	ya	yae	
2000 MCT system	a	ae	ya	yae	
Korean spelling	ㅓ	ㅕ	ㅗ	ㅛ	
1984 ME system	ō	e	yō	ye	
2000 MCT system	eo	e	yeo	ye	
Korean spelling	ㅜ	ㅠ	ㅡ	ㅣ	ㅝ
1984 ME system	o	wa	wae	oe	yo
2000 MCT system	o	wa	wae	oe	yo
Korean spelling	ㅜ	ㅠ	ㅗ	ㅛ	ㅠ
1984 ME system	u	wo	we	wi	yu
2000 MCT system	u	weo	we	wi	yu
Korean spelling	ㅡ	ㅣ	ㅟ		
1984 ME system	ū	i	ūi		
2000 MCT system	eu	i	ui		

Notes for vowels are the same as for Table 2.

ROMULO, CARLOS PEÑA (1899–1985), Philippine author, educator, soldier, diplomat. Born 14 January 1899 in Manila, Carlos Peña Romulo was educated at the University of the Philippines and Columbia University in New York. He went on to become publisher and editor of the *Philippines Herald* (1933–1941) and in 1941 was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for a series of articles on the political and military situation in the Far East. With the outbreak of World War II, Romulo joined General Douglas MacArthur's staff as a press relations officer; by war's end he held the rank of brigadier general. After the war, he acted as a Philippine delegate to the U.N. organization conference in San Francisco. From 1946–1954 he was the Philippine ambassador to the U.N.; in 1949 he became the first Asian president of the U.N. General Assembly. Romulo was secretary of foreign affairs for the Philippines (1950–1951) and went on to become ambassador to the United States (1952–1953). After serving as president of the University of the Philippines and secretary of education between 1963 and 1968, he again served as secretary of foreign affairs, this time under President Ferdinand Marcos (1969–1984).

Aside from Romulo's many governmental duties, he continued to write. Some of his well-known works are *I Saw the Fall of the Philippines* (1942), *Mother America* (1943), *My Brother Americans* (1945), *I See the Philippines Rise* (1946), *The Magsaysay Story* (1956), *I Walked with Heroes* (1961), and *Identity and Change* (1965).

Craig Loomis

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ROMUSHA The term *romusha*, literally a person (*sha*) on labor (*ro*) duty (*mu*), was widely used in Southeast Asia by Japanese occupying forces during World War II. Avoiding the pejorative term "coolie," Japanese authorities embarked on an intensive scheme of labor recruitment under the *romu* banner. Conceptions of local autarky and the requirements of the war effort heightened the need for labor, which was mobilized by the offer of wages, deception, and force.

At present, the term *romusha* is generally used to refer to forced labor in Indonesia, because of the exceptional intensity of Japanese labor mobilization there. In all areas of the Indonesian archipelago, but most intensively on Java, men were conscripted for labor on plantations, docks, and mines, and for the construction of defense works, railroads, and airstrips. Treatment was without exception harsh, and many died of exhaustion, inadequate medical treatment, and starvation. Most laborers were employed in areas close to their home villages, but about 225,000 Javanese *romusha* were shipped to other parts of the archipelago, and 69,000 elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

All countries of Southeast Asia under Japanese rule had their share of forced-labor conscription, with similar patterns of recruitment and employment at military constructions sites. One infamous site was the Burma-Thailand Railway, which was constructed by Allied prisoners of war and Asian *romusha* between November 1942 and October 1943. About 75,000 laborers were recruited in Malaya, from among Indian (Tamil) plantation laborers, but also from Malay villages. On the Burma side, some 85,000 Burmese laborers were employed, while laborers were also recruited in Thailand. The death rate of Asian laborers on the railroad was more than 35 percent.

Remco Raben

ROY, RAMMOHAN (1772–1833), Indian religious and social reformer. Rammohan Roy was among the foremost religious and social reformers of modern India. Born in an orthodox Hindu family of Calcutta, Roy's education and early travels exposed him to a wide variety of cultural and religious experiences. Between 1786 and 1803, Roy received intensive training in Arabic and Persian from scholars based in the north Indian city of Patna, traveled with a group of Tibetan monks, learned English, and studied Hindu philosophy in Varanasi (Benares). That exposure to the world, his love for books, and his reflections on Hinduism led him as a young man to question the orthodoxy in his own background. It seemed to him that the spirit of the Vedas and the Upanishads—freedom of thought and respect for human dignity—was lost in the mire of rituals that later typified Hinduism. This was to be a central tenet in his beliefs and one that he earnestly wrote on in later life. Religious decadence and social repression thus became connected in his ideas.

While briefly in service of the East India Company (1809–1814), he studied European history and culture and was deeply influenced by the pursuit of freedom and equality in postrevolutionary Europe. After 1814, he devoted himself to popularizing his ideas and putting them in practice, often attracting fierce resistance from influential contemporaries, such as Radhakanta Deb, a powerful landlord and leader of a group of orthodox Hindus. Among his best-remembered contributions are his critical support for laws prohibiting the burning of widows (1829); advocacy of liberal ideals of education; foundation of the Brahma Samaj (1828), a religious order based on Vedic faith; support for Indian participation in the colonial bureaucracy; and popularization of the written version of his own language, Bengali. Roy died during a trip to England and Wales to plead a case of the Mughal emperor. Bristol, where he died, has a memorial and a statue of Roy.

Tirthankar Roy

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ROYAL UNIVERSITY OF PHNOM PENH

The Royal University of Phnom Penh (UPP) was first established in 1960 as a result of the efforts of Prince Sihanouk (now King Sihanouk) to modernize Cambodia and focus on education. Built with money largely donated by the French, the Royal University was one of Cambodia's first institutions of higher education and

played a significant role in educating Cambodia's urban population before the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge period (1975–1979). The university was closed during this turbulent time and remained vacant until the early 1990s, when efforts were made to reestablish the institution. The university was officially reopened in 1998.

The current university consists of faculties of letters and human sciences and of science. Majors include Khmer literature, geography, psychology, philosophy, sociology, and history. In addition, students may major in mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, or computer science. There also is a master's program in education.

The total enrollment of approximately four thousand includes both Cambodians and a small number of international students, with more than 250 faculty and staff members. In 1997 the university opened the Hun Sen Library, the first modern library of its kind to be opened in Cambodia for over seven decades.

John D'Amicantonio

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RUBAB *Rubab*, an Arabic term, is widely used throughout the Islamic world to denote a bowed lute. It is usually played on the knees with the bow held from underneath. *Rubabs* are of two main types: fiddles with wooden, pear-shaped bodies and spike fiddles, in which a single spike, or neck, holding the string or strings and piercing the resounding chamber, emerges from the other end. The first type is found in North Africa and is popular in Morocco. In Turkey instruments carved from a single piece of wood with a sound table of skin were called *rubab* in the seventeenth century. They are now known as *kamance*. The Indian *sarod* is also related to it. It usually has more strings than the African instruments.

Some spike fiddles, such as the quadrangular *rubab* of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq appear to have evolved from frame drums. Its body is a wooden frame with a belly and back of skin. Originally plucked, it later became a bowed instrument. A second type of spike fiddle has a hemispherical body of carved wood, usually gourd or coconut, covered with a skin belly. It is widely found over a large area from North Africa to Southeast Asia and the Far East. In Java it is known as the *rebab*, which has an important melodic role in the gamelan orchestra.

Sanjukta Das Gupta

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RUBBER INDUSTRY The rubber industry in Asia today consists primarily of the cultivation of *Hevea brasiliensis* in various countries, primarily Indonesia and Malaysia, and the export of raw rubber and manufactured rubber products throughout the world. The industry owes its existence to Western imperialism, which developed rubber cultivation in subject territories until rubber became a prime reason for continued European political dominance in the Far East. In the process, the industry helped to change radically the economic and social dynamics of indigenous rubber-producing societies and even their ethnic composition. The rubber industry was, as well, at least partially responsible for embroiling the peoples who cultivated the source plants in the catastrophic Japanese invasions of their native lands during World War II.

Rubber is a manufactured product, the raw material for which has traditionally consisted of fluids obtained from various tropical plants. (Much modern "rubber" is, in fact, chemically synthesized and independent of Asian sources and so not relevant here.) Europeans first encountered rubberlike products during the fifteenth century when Iberian explorers came into contact with indigenous peoples in today's Latin America who used gum to fashion various domestic items. A simple process of slashing certain trees and shrubs and collecting the resulting fluid gathered the gum itself. This gum, in turn, when diluted with water and strained will congeal at room temperature into a soft, malleable lump. This remains the basic method to this day.

Rubber was something of an oddity in European culture until it began to be used early in the nineteenth



Women processing rubber in a rubber factory in Malaya in about 1950. (HORACE BRISTOL/CORBIS)

century to waterproof fabric. Demand soared when, at midcentury, various processes—vulcanization, most especially—were discovered that overcame its cold-weather brittleness and allowed it to be conveniently worked. Rubber quickly became a constituent part of the industrial world with the bulk of it supplied from the regions around the Amazon River in South America.

The development of the automobile created an insatiable demand for rubber. Tires were the prime use for the substance, but it was utilized widely throughout industry and quickly became, along with such raw materials as oil and tin, one of the key strategic needs of any developed economy. In wartime, it was absolutely essential.

The Amazon basin, Brazil primarily, was unable to satisfy the world's increased demand for rubber. As inhabitants of an independent country (as opposed to a colony), the population of Brazil could not simply be commanded to produce the product. Innumerable individual entrepreneurs, acting on the most primitive level, tapped the forest trees and brought raw rubber to market. This scattered production system, combined with geographical barriers, restrained the industry's growth despite booming demand. All of this set the stage for Asia's emergence as a prime source.

Asia's Emergence as a Rubber-Producing Area

The climate of various Asian colonies, particularly the Dutch East Indies (present-day Indonesia) and the



THE RUBBER INDUSTRY— PROFITABLE FOR WHOM?

The rubber industry is closely associated with the colonial exploitation of natural resources in Southeast Asia. As this report about Malay agriculture makes clear, rubber exploitation was not necessarily a profitable activity for the Malays.

While Pegasi informants report that most households began planting rubber just after the 1925 flood, it was many years before rubber sales became a major means of earning cash. Pegasi villagers, attracted by the high rubber price of 1910 (see Appendix G), saw this as a new and easy way to make money. However the lack of suitable land, scarcity of planting materials, and limited knowledge slowed adoption of the new crop. Moreover, the first harvests in the Pegasi occurred at a time when rubber prices continued low for almost 10 years. Informants say that their first sales in 1932 brought only three dollars per *pikul* with total earnings each month at only two or three dollars per household. By 1934 the price paid to Pegasi village was five to eight dollars per *pikul*; and the few households with plantings of an acre or more earned five to ten dollars each month. However, it was not until 1939, when rubber sold at \$20 per *pikul*, that prices reached a level high enough for rubber gardening to become a major means of supporting a household.

Source: Donald H. Lambert (1985) *Swamp Rice Farming: The Indigenous Pabang Malay Agricultural System*. Boulder, CO, and London: Westview Press, 23.

Malay States (present-day Malaysia), was ideal for growing *Hevea brasiliensis*. There was a large indigenous settled population that could be recruited to cultivate the labor-intensive plant in orderly plantation style. The political control exerted by colonial occupiers over the local population almost guaranteed a reliable and servile workforce.

Rubber production in Asia grew at an astonishing rate during the first decades of the twentieth century. In 1936, researchers wrote: "Malaya and its neighboring islands today dominate a production stretched to so vast a figure that little more than two decades ago it would have been regarded as a fantasy" (Wolf and Wolf 1936: 152). In the mid-1930s, rubber production reached 1,019,000 tons annually, with 467,000 tons extracted from the Malay States and 380,000 from the Dutch East Indies. French Indochina (present-day Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) and India contributed small shares as well, whereas Brazil's production was by now almost insignificant.

Consequences of the Growth of the Rubber Industry

Western-supervised rubber cultivation profoundly changed the indigenous Asian cultures. This was especially true in Malaya, where the very ethnic composition changed—with cultural complications and animosities that continue to this day. The British colonizers, used to dealing with docile, English-speaking Indian labor, imported huge numbers of workers from the Indian subcontinent until these constituted nearly 10 percent of the local population. Native Malays, who regarded them as so many cat's-paws of the colonizers, resented the imported workers.

The rubber trade changed local societies in other ways. In Borneo, for example, the local, essentially mercantilist, economy in various luxury goods, such as native gold products, fine woods, or exotic animals, was increasingly supplanted by a "peripheral" economy oriented away from local demand and toward far-off Europe, with its appetite for rubber. This disrupted, and

even destroyed, local native industries, such as gold working and wood carving, along with the social infrastructure these had created. Similar social disruption accompanied the introduction of the plantation system into other regions.

The native populations were exploited wherever the rubber culture spread. Rubber production is labor intensive, as are all plantation economies, and requires countless individuals to tend the plants, tap them one by one for their gum, and then bring the raw material to a collection point. In some colonies, a state of virtual peonage was created to ensure a steady supply of cheap, tractable labor. Throughout Asia, labor contracts were drawn up in such a way that the locals were kept in a state of virtually continuous debt and so tied to the land. Such time-honored techniques as the "company store" kept local populations in enforced servitude. With near-total political control, European colonial masters were able to squelch labor unrest.

Some semblance of the rule of law existed in the British colonies. But in the Dutch and French possessions, the political situation of the labor force was little better than submission to tyranny. Contract labor was moved in bulk and kept in draconian conditions. Medical care and child care was virtually nonexistent. Among the Vietnamese laborers a popular song ran: "What a mistake to enter the rubber lands/Like life imprisonment without a jail" (Tran 1985: 28).

Independence and After

Imperial Japan was attracted especially by the easily accessible Malayan rubber culture. The brilliant Japanese campaign over the winter of 1941–1942 temporarily expelled the British from their Malayan colony. The Dutch were likewise quickly expelled from the East Indies. The Japanese proved every bit as ruthless in exploiting the local populations in order to secure strategically vital rubber, with economic and social results similar to that of European exploitation.

The European colonial empires in Asia survived the Japanese surrender in 1945 for only a few years, and by 1955 the prime rubber-producing Asian countries—Malaya, Indonesia, the Indochinese nations, and India—were independent. Overseas investment in the area continued to be of prime importance, especially from Great Britain, but during the second half of the twentieth century these Asian economies matured, albeit at varying rates, and control passed increasingly into local hands. Domestic manufacturing rose in importance, and the Far Eastern countries increasingly participated in a global economy.

Today, rubber remains a prime Asian resource but has declined in relative importance. Increasingly, rubber is shipped from Asia in the form of tires, latex gloves, gaskets, and other rubber-based finished products that require advanced technology. The plantation system remains an economical mode of production but without the peonage system of colonial times.

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RUBBER INDUSTRY—MALAYSIA Rubber (*Hevea brasiliensis* species) as a commercial crop had contributed immensely to the Malaysian economy since the late 1890s and remained the predominant export crop until the early 1980s. Peninsular Malaysia is particularly ideal for rubber owing to the soil, terrain, and climatic conditions.

While rubber prices steadily appreciated in the 1890s, coffee prices had tumbled due to Brazilian overproduction. Disease almost crippled the coffee industry of peninsular Malaysia and coffee planters were in need of substitutes to cut losses. Rubber came upon the scene and within a decade became the chief export crop.

Breakthrough discoveries and inventions were important early boosts to the industry. But the phenomenal upswing in world rubber prices during the first decade of the twentieth century spurred by the automobile industry of the United States was the greatest motivation for the rapid growth and spectacular expansion of the rubber industry of peninsular Malaysia. A rubber "fever" spread throughout peninsular Malaysia where estates and smallholdings covered the western coast from Perak to Johor, southern Kedah and central Pahang, and the western coast of Sabah.

In Sarawak Chinese smallholdings predominate in the Lower Rejang. Within a decade (1897–1907), the area under rubber in peninsular Malaysia jumped from 140 hectares to over 51,000 hectares.

European agency houses (commercial firms) of Singapore and Penang were instrumental in convincing British capital to finance large-scale plantation enterprise by floating public companies in Britain. A cheap and plentiful supply of labor came from South India. By 1930 the European-dominated plantation sector accounted for 60 percent and the remainder by Malay and Chinese smallholdings.

By 1919 peninsular Malaysia accounted for half of the total world rubber supply. Overproduction created a slump in prices in the 1920s. Prices drastically plummeted during the world depression (1929–1931). Restriction schemes were implemented to control production in order to maintain high prices, but the schemes favored the large estates and discriminated against smallholdings in terms of under assessment and inability to benefit from replanting.

The Japanese occupation (1941–1945) witnessed the cutting down of millions of rubber trees for food crop production that was the priority of the Japanese military authorities. After World War II the Malaysian rubber industry faced competition from synthetic rubber that was developed in the United States during the war years. Nonetheless the postwar years witnessed a dramatic rise in rubber prices due to stockpiling by the United States and the Korean War (1950–1953).

Following independence in 1957, the Malaysian rubber industry focused on three objectives: maintaining Malaysia's leading position as the largest producer and exporter of natural rubber, restructuring the industry to allow greater local participation in estate ownership and production, and ensuring fairer treatment of the smallholding sector. Numerous government agencies were set up to realize these objectives, for example Rubber Research Institute of Malaysia (RRIM), and Rubber Industry Smallholders' Development Authority (RISDA).

Ooi Keat Gin

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RUDAKI (c. 859–940/941), first of the great classical Persian poets. The talents of Abu 'Abdollah Ja'far ibn Mohammad, known as Rudaki, were not limited to poetry; he was also a gifted singer and musician. E. G. Browne (1811–1926), in his *Literary History of Persia*, called him "peerless among the Arabs and the Persians" and the "Sultan of poets." Rudaki was extremely prolific: He supposedly composed about 100,000 couplets, although because most of his *divan* (collection of poems) are lost, only about 1,000 are known today. As court poet of Nasr ibn Ahmad (914–943), he seems to have followed the Ismai'ili Shi'i faith of his Samanid patron. Rudaki was famed for his mastery of the *qasida* (an elegaic ode of between 60 and 100 lines) and the *ghazal* (a shorter lyrical love poem). He also composed *Kalilah wa Dimnah*, based on the well-known Indian Bidpai tales. Rudaki's writings marked the emerging genre of Persian poetry, which other figures such as Anvari, Firdawsi, Attar, Sa'di, Rumi, Nizami, and Jami continued for centuries. While Persian poetry later became suffused with mystical themes, in Rudaki's time the dominant theme was the praising of rulers.

Omid Safi

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RUIZ, SAINT LORENZO (c. 1600–1637), Filipino martyr. Lorenzo Ruiz was born in the district of Binondo in Manila, Philippines, around 1600 to a Christian Chinese father and a Filipina native mother. He grew up around the church and served as an acolyte during mass. He was married, had three children, and was a member of the Confraternity of the Holy Rosary.

In 1636, authorities sought Ruiz for his alleged involvement in a murder. Fearing he would be given a death sentence and believing he did not commit the crime, Ruiz decided, with the help of his priest friends,

to join a missionary group leaving for Japan. In 1636, he secretly left the Philippines with the missionaries, and he served as a lay worker, assisting the missionaries as they spread the word of God covertly because Christianity was banned in Japan at the time. Ruiz and his companions were eventually arrested in Okinawa and imprisoned in Kyushu. In prison they endured torture intended to force them to renounce their faith. In 1637, Ruiz was put before a tribunal and given one last chance to renounce his faith under penalty of death. He sealed his fate by saying, "I'll never recant because I am a Christian and I shall die for God. If I were to live a thousand lives, I would give them all up" (Villaroel 1987: 108). On 27 September 1637, Ruiz and his companions were taken to a hill near Nagasaki and were hung upside down in a pit for three days. He died of suffocation and was burned along with the others; their ashes were scattered at sea. In 1981 Pope John Paul II beatified Ruiz and fifteen of his companion martyrs in a ceremony in Manila, and in 1989 Ruiz was canonized along with his companion martyrs at St. Peter's Basilica in Rome, making him the first Filipino saint.

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RUKUNEGARA The Rukunegara (Nationhood) is the national pledge of Malaysia. Introduced in 1971 as a result of the riots of 13 May 1969 caused by ethnic tensions, the Rukunegara consists of five principles, which act as the pillars of the national philosophy. The Rukunegara was formulated in an attempt to base national unity on certain concepts that are acceptable to all citizens, regardless of ethnic or religious differences. The Rukunegara is usually pledged in school assemblies, at formal gatherings, and on nationally celebrated occasions.

The Rukunegara is formulated as follows:

Our Nation, Malaysia, is dedicated to achieving a greater unity for all her peoples; to maintaining a democratic way of life; to creating a just society in which the wealth of the nation shall be equitably distributed; to ensuring a liberal approach to her rich and diverse cultural traditions; and to building a progressive society which shall be oriented to modern science and technology.

We, her peoples, pledge our united efforts to attain these ends guided by these principles: belief in God, loyalty to king and country, upholding the constitution, rule of law; good behavior and morality.

In the first principle the word "God" is used instead of "Allah"; since the majority of Malaysians are Muslim, this implies a respect for other religious beliefs. The second principle expresses the respect due the king as the country's ruler. The third principle expresses the respect due the constitution as Malaysia's highest law. The fourth principle emphasizes the supremacy of the rule of law. The fifth principle recognizes Malaysia's multiethnic society and expresses the idea that mutual respect between ethnic groups is necessary in order to achieve national unity.

The Rukunegara was also formulated to unite the citizens of Malaysia, who had previously been divided under the British "divide and rule" policy. Under colonial administration, the three main races (Malays, Chinese, and Indians) had been segregated and oppressed, a strategy the British hoped would avoid any interaction that might undermine their rule. The Rukunegara is also intended to accelerate the national development into a more progressive society.

Mala Selvaraju

RURAL WORKERS, SURPLUS—CHINA

Surplus labor refers to the existence of human resources that are potentially capable of productive effort but are unused or underused. This condition often results in underemployment or disguised unemployment. A large supply of labor in rural areas, in excess of the quantity demanded, is a problem shared by many developing countries. Estimates of surplus rural workers in China were in the range of 100 to 200 million, or up to one-sixth of the nation's population, in the mid-1990s.

The sheer size of surplus rural workers in China is rooted in age-old traditions of family-centered agriculture and high fertility. Traditional agriculture in China is intensive and relies heavily on family labor, motivating for thousands of years rural households to desire many children. This pronatalist philosophy was sustained during the Communist collective period (1953–1978), when the burden of provision in the countryside was shifted from the family to the commune. High population growth further worsened the already low ratio of cultivable land to person, which decreased from about one-half an acre in the late 1940s to one-fourth of an acre in the late 1970s. Prohibited from leaving the coun-

tryside, the rural surplus labor was hidden as redundant and underemployed workers in communes.

Meanwhile, agricultural productivity increased steadily and especially since the economic reforms that began in 1978. More extensive use of mechanization and inputs that improve yield, such as chemical fertilizers and pesticides, as well as the implementation of the "household responsibility system" that induces rural households to maximize output, further aggravated the surplus in rural labor. The government was compelled to invent ways to absorb the surplus, which became a major force of social and economic change in China during the past two decades and more.

Absorption of surplus rural workers has been experienced both in situ and via migration. The *litu bu lixiang* (leaving the land but not the village) strategy involves shifting surplus labor from agriculture to rural industrial enterprises, commonly known as township-village enterprises (TVEs), near the home village. At the same time, relaxation of migration control by the government unleashed millions of rural workers to migrate to work in towns and cities, a strategy known as *litu you lixiang* (leaving the land and the village). These migrants constitute the "floating population" that flood cities and towns and have become a timely supply of labor for China's industrial and services development. But their large numbers and willingness to work for low wages and in poor conditions have subjected them to exploitation that is especially rampant in foreign-invested enterprises.

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RUSSIANS IN CENTRAL ASIA The Russian empire conquered Central Asia between 1865 and 1876. For the next forty years most Russians who lived in Turkestan (as it was called until 1924) were soldiers, merchants, or government officials and their families. The first large wave of Russian settlers came only after the Trans-Siberian and related railways were built in the 1890s; by 1916 over one million Russian and Ukrainian farmers had arrived, concentrated in the northeastern steppe lands.

The Soviet Period

After the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 Turkestan experienced several years of war and famine, but Russian rule continued. The new Communist government sent hundreds of Russian workers to Central Asia to construct a revolutionary Soviet society. In principle these Russian Communists were supposed to learn Central Asian languages; in reality most refused and lived separately from Central Asians. Russians dominated the most technically skilled jobs, running factories and collective farms, and held final political authority.

By the 1930s the Russian language had become the language of government and higher education throughout the U.S.S.R., and Russians felt no need to learn native languages. Russians were concentrated in the capital cities of the five republics (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan), with access to Russian newspapers and television, while the majority of the native population lived in rural areas. In 1959 Russians made up an average of 18.5 percent of the population in the southern republics and 43 percent of the population in Kazakhstan, living much the same way as did Russians in Moscow.

The Russians' position in Central Asia began to crumble in the late 1980s, under Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of glasnost (openness). Central Asian writers and political dissidents felt free to express their discontent with Russian cultural and political dominance, to the dismay of the Russian population. Ordinary Central Asians became increasingly rude or occasionally violent in daily dealings with Russians. Russians had begun migrating from Central Asia in the 1970s; the trend accelerated in the 1980s. (See Table 1.)

After the Soviet Collapse

When the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991, leaders of the newly independent republics made it clear to Russians that they and their skills were welcome to

TABLE 1

Russians as a Percentage of the Central Asian Population			
Republic	1959 %	1992 %	2000 %
Kazakhstan	43	36	34.7
Uzbekistan	14	8	5.5
Turkmenistan	17	10	6.7
Kyrgyzstan	30	21	18
Tajikistan	13	8	3.5

SOURCE: Derived from Haghayeghi (1995: 202–206) and CIA *World Factbook 2000*.

stay. However, civil war in Tajikistan drove most Russians to emigrate. In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan the restoration of native languages and increasing national chauvinism made life uncomfortable for Russians. These two regimes also banned Russian-language television and most Russian newspapers in the mid-1990s, on the grounds that these media were too politically liberal. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan had more open and democratic governments until the late 1990s; Kazakhstan also retained Russian as an official language. For these reasons the latter republics have seen the least outmigration. However, it appears likely that the Russian population in Central Asia will continue to dwindle.

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RUSSIANS IN MONGOLIA A Russian presence in Mongolia dates to the appearance of Russians in those portions of Siberia adjacent to territories occupied by Mongols in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At that time Mongolia was coming under the control of the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644–1911), and Russia was attempting to forestall a Manchu presence anywhere near its frontiers and protect its long-range economic interests in an area increasingly penetrated by Russian trappers and traders. Ultimately a series of treaties was signed, the first treaties ever drawn up between China and a foreign power with both parties on an equal footing. The treaties set more or less the present frontiers between China and Russia except for what was formerly Tannu-Tuva (now Tuva), which remained part of Mongolia for the time being.

Despite these treaties, Russian penetration of Mongolia continued, and the Mongolian peoples themselves became bones of contention between the two Asian powers. For example, western Mongolian Junggars, then the dominant steppe group, moved back and forth across the loosely guarded frontier to resist mil-

itary pressure from one side or the other. Later, Russian Old Believers settled in Mongolia to escape religious persecution by Czar Peter and his successors who sought to modernize Russian Orthodoxy at the expense of this primitivist religious minority. The descendants of these refugees have remained in Mongolia down to the present day.

With the weakening of Qing power in the nineteenth century, Russian pressures on Mongolia increased. These pressures came from the Russians themselves, primarily traders and also explorers, and from Russian surrogates including the Siberian Buryats, a Mongolian people living on both sides of Lake Baikal who were highly Russified. By this time, Russia had become the first country in Europe to develop a large-scale Mongolian studies program and in the 1840s had produced the first multilingual Mongolian dictionary. This program gave Russia an enormous advantage in dealing with Mongolia and the Mongols.

During the Mongol autonomous period (1911–1921), Russia was not only well represented in Mongolia through its merchants, diplomats, explorers, and agitators but also increasingly in a position to serve as an alternative to Chinese influence. Mongolia proved unable to resist direct foreign intervention, at first by Chinese, then by White Russians, and the new Soviet regime was quick to offer its services.

Between 1920 and 1921, Mongolian forces organized by the Soviets were finally able to defeat the White Russian general Ungern-Sternberg (shot 1921) and drove out the occupying Chinese as well. A People's Republic was established in 1924.

The period of paramount Russian influence in Mongolia, not only in politics, but also in language and manners, sometimes enforced by Red Army bayonets, lasted until 1991 and the Soviet collapse. Since then, Russian influence has fast receded, and American (and other) influence has taken its place. Mongolia's native Russians, of course, still remain, and relations with the Buryats in the Russian Republic continue to be strong. Nowadays the Buryats are also rediscovering their Mongolness.

Paul Buell

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RUSSIFICATION AND SOVIETIZATION—CENTRAL ASIA After capturing Kazan in 1552, the Russians, under Czar Ivan IV (1530–1584), took several hundred years to assimilate the Muslim lands of Central Asia. Before the nineteenth century, Central Asia was partly ruled by the Muslim khanates of Bukhara, Khiva, and Quqon (Kokand) and partly by uncontrolled and warring nomad tribes: Turkic- and Persian-speaking ethnic groups such as the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, and Tajiks. Between 1730 and 1855, Russian troops had gradually moved south, conquering northern Central Asia and part of the Kazakh-occupied steppe. This conquest was consolidated with the surrender of Shymkent in present-day Kazakhstan to the east of the Syr Dar'ya River in 1855 under Czar Alexander II (1818–1881) and his son Czar Alexander III (1845–1894) and came to an end with the subjugation of the Pamir Mountains region north of present-day Afghanistan in 1896 as the result of a Russo-British agreement. In 1865, under Alexander II, the Russian province of Turkistan was established, and the earlier system of independent khanates was gradually demolished: Bukhara in 1868, Khiva in 1873, and Quqon in 1875–1876. Following the battle of Geok-Tepe in present-day Turkmenistan in 1881, the Russians, under Alexander III, also annexed the lands of the Turkmen tribes to the czarist empire.

During the final stages of Russian expansion into Central Asia, diplomatic and economic domination dramatically increased, but interethnic conflicts and political rivalries in the region were so deeply rooted that the full implications of the Russian incursion were overlooked by those involved in local power struggles. To consolidate their military domination, the Russians employed various means, ranging from genocide, colonial protection, linguistic assimilation, and territorial incorporation.

Genocide was committed against the Turkmen in 1881 in the course of Russian efforts to annex the Transcaspian region. Colonial protection was imposed on the khanate of Bukhara in 1868 according to the terms of a peace treaty resulting from the khanate's defeat by the Russian commander General Kaufman. Linguistic assimilation was initiated in Tashkent in the last decades of the nineteenth century through mass Russian immigration to the region. The Pamirs were enclosed in 1896.

The Expansion of the Russian Empire

Following the czarist annexation of Central Asia, the area east of the Caspian Sea was divided into the Ural, Turgai, and Transcaspian governments-general of the

steppe provinces, the government-general of Turkistan, the emirate of Bukhara, and the khanate of Khiva. To avoid a possible military confrontation with the British, the Russians decided to leave Bukhara as a protectorate enjoying autonomy in its internal affairs.

The Russians' economic penetration in the region, which eventually fashioned Central Asia into a monocultural economy producing solely cotton, had far-reaching social implications. A new propertied middle class of local people benefited directly from the economic transformations, and a new salaried middle class came into existence to function as the local officeholders of non-key positions in the local administration. The new colonial administration weakened local ethnic groups by encouraging ethnic animosity among them. Russian was introduced as the official language, and educational institutions were founded to educate the local elites, whose aspirations and values were directly influenced by the Russian style of life.

The Aftermath of the Russian Revolution

When the turmoil of the Russian Revolution of 1917 reached Central Asia, most Muslims were separated not only from the recently arrived Russians but also from their own fellow coreligionists in Central Asia. Only a few circles of intellectuals in big cities, which transcended ancestral tribal loyalties and linguistic divergences, were interested in a greater Muslim community.

The Bolsheviks' first task in Central Asia in October 1917 was to secure the territories inherited from the czarist empire. While calling for national self-determination, the Bolsheviks embarked on a military campaign to crush any resistance to the Sovietization of the region. Launching an air raid on Bukhara in 1920, the Bolsheviks inaugurated a decade-long war against the local resistance, mainly the Basmachis, a movement of Central Asians opposed to the Bolsheviks. Meanwhile to enforce total authority on the southern frontiers, the new regime annulled all earlier territorial entities and redrew the map of Central Asia according to its long-term strategic needs.

In April 1924, the Central Asian Bureau (Sredazburo) of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party voted to partition the czarist administrative province of Turkistan. Subsequently, a process of administrative realignment of Central Asia began, which was finally completed in 1936. According to the new legislation, all of Central Asia was administratively divided into three organizational categories: autonomous republics (separate national states within Soviet socialist republics), autonomous

regions (autonomous regional administrations formed in a national territory or autonomous republic because of its national composition or ethnic way of life), and national territories (the fifteen constituent Soviet socialist republics). By adopting a policy of governmental administration based on ethnicity, the Bolsheviks initially divided Central Asia into three national-territorial entities for Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Turkmen.

However, to avoid any revival of the former territorial solidarity, the Soviets offered the heartland of former Turkistan to the Uzbeks, extending from Osh at the eastern edge of the Fergana Valley to Khiva and Khwarizm in the west, and from Tashkent in the north to Zarafshan and Termiz near the northern border of Afghanistan, including the three former khanates of Bukhara, Quqon, and Khiva. The new demarcation, however, left the other major ethnic groups like the Tajiks and the Kyrgyz with a strong sense of betrayal. Fearful of the escalation of national sentiment among the Tajiks, who spoke Persian, the language of neighboring Iran and Afghanistan, the Soviets recognized the Tajiks and the Kyrgyz as the other two major ethnic groups in the region. They thus concluded their territorial realignment by allocating administrative territory to these ethnic groups.

The Creation of the Central Asian Republics

Subsequently, five republics were formed in the Central Asian region; each supposedly accommodated a titular (dominant) ethnic group after whom the republic was named. These groups were the Kazakhs, the Kyrgyz, the Tajiks, the Uzbeks, and the Turkmen. However, in the new partition, efforts were made to ensure that none of the new republics was politically or economically capable of seceding from the rest of the union. For example, in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the road linking the capital cities and some provinces passed through the neighboring republics.

Following this engineered partition, a new project for the homogenization of each Central Asian republic was initiated. To enhance this project, a process of nativization began, whereby the dominant ethnic group gained access to high positions in the local administration. Although it was possible for the so-called recognized ethnic minorities to enjoy cultural freedom, it soon became clear that if one wished to advance one's career it was necessary to adopt the ways of the dominant ethnic group. Ethnic cultural distinctiveness was gradually constructed and Sovietized, and members of the titular *nomenklatura* (elite) were encouraged to advance the particular interests of their republic. Likewise, the Soviet policy of registering nationality at the republic level, in people's internal pass-

ports, tended to encourage members of nontitular ethnic groups to declare themselves as members of the titular group in official documents, for the sake of advancement in the government apparatus.

In the centralized government of the U.S.S.R., the party-state system monopolized the key command positions throughout the Soviet Union and denied access to these positions to almost all non-Russians. High-ranking administrators formed the privileged core of a transethnic population not belonging to any particular local ethnic group. Even at the republic level, native Russians without exception filled the positions of deputy or first secretary of the Communist Party.

The Soviet Person (*Sovetskii Chelovek* in Russian) was the ideological embodiment of this transethnic party system. The Soviet Person's identity was grounded in a sense of loyalty to the Soviet Union; absolute loyalty to Moscow predominated over loyalty to any constituent republic.

However, in the republics, a concealed ethnic nationalism gradually developed, not only among each dominant group, but also among ethnic minorities. Ethnic nationalism among minority ethnic groups fostered interests different from those of the dominant ethnic group. This ethnic nationalism in the Central Asian republics was the direct outcome of the Soviet Union having created the republics along ethnic lines. When the Soviets attempted to link each ethnic group to its own state, in the drive to achieve social homogeneity and political cohesion, they denied the smaller ethnic groups in each republic equal rights. By constructing constituent republics along ethnic lines but then applying elitist and centralizing policies and ideals (such as the ideal of the Soviet Person and Soviet state patriotism), in the end the government unwittingly stimulated ethnic nationalism as a form of resistance.

Complicating the matter was the fact that the imposed territorial borders never adequately corresponded to the cultural groupings. While the titular nationalities in each republic enjoyed preferential treatment and tended to make up the local administrative hierarchy, the ethnic minorities strove to consolidate their presence in particular sectors of the administration, especially those more strictly controlled by the Russians, by practicing nepotism.

Linguistic Sovietization

In an additional attempt to make a clear break with the past and to stifle any call for unity among people who shared a common language and culture and yet lived under different national flags, the Soviet authorities in the early days of their rule launched a

widespread linguistic refashioning project in Central Asia. The Sovietization of the languages in Central Asia was initiated under the authority of Russian Orientalists working at institutions inherited from the Russian empire, such as the Academy of Sciences in Leningrad (St. Petersburg) and Moscow. The chief aim of this project was to form national languages based on spoken dialects and to introduce these languages as the written as well as literary languages. Accordingly, each republic would have a national language different from the languages spoken or written by members of the same ethnic or linguistic group who lived outside the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Russian language was disseminated as the only lingua franca welding the entire Soviet Union together.

The first attempt to create a national language occurred in 1923, when a new language called the Uzbek language was developed; this was close to Kipchak, a Turkic tongue. However, the Soviet social linguists soon became alarmed that the new language might bring Turkic people together, and thus another version of the Uzbek language was introduced in 1929. This version was based on the Tashkent dialect. In October 1924, the Uzbekistan Soviet Socialist Republic was formally established, with Uzbek as its national language. Consequently, Uzbek cultural institutions launched a new campaign to foster national homogeneity based on the introduction of the new language throughout Uzbekistan. In bilingual or multilingual regions of Uzbekistan, although the inhabitants had the right to use their own languages for teaching in elementary schools, ethnic minorities were denied a fair share of the republic's financial revenues.

At the same time, the eastern provinces of the old khanate of Bukhara were renamed the Autonomous Region of Tajikistan, with Tajik as the national language, a new name for the Persian language spoken in present-day Iran and Afghanistan. Based on different local dialects and some grammatical modifications, the Tajik language was invented by Soviet social linguists as a written literary language for Tajikistan. In 1929, Tajikistan's status was elevated from an autonomous region attached to Uzbekistan to a Soviet Socialist Republic. The village of Dushanbe, with a population of forty-seven families, was honored as the capital of the new republic, while Samarqand and Bukhara, with their significant Persian-speaking populations, were left in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan.

The invention of national languages led to the creation of modern Kyrgyz and Turkmen in 1924 and Karakalpak in 1925. To break all links with the past, the Arabic alphabet used for all national languages was

changed in 1929 to Latin and in 1940 to Cyrillic. By then, the Soviet territorial state building in Central Asia was finally concluded, with the five Soviet Socialist Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan being established, along with the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan and the Autonomous Province of Gorno-Badakhshan in Tajikistan.

Other Sovietization Projects in Central Asia

Along with territorial state building and language policies, the Soviet regime implemented a wide range of projects for social engineering in Central Asia. In the 1930s, the Bolsheviks instigated a policy of forced sedentarization of nomadic people and mass collectivization of agricultural lands into the collective farming units known in Russian as *kolkhoz* (collective farm) and *sovkhos* (soviet farm). Forced migration and population dislocation were the result of this project, which was nevertheless expected to build a more homogeneous Soviet society.

Because the Bolsheviks' ultimate aspiration was to create a universal, common working-class culture, they considered the promotion of national cultures as a transitional trend, guiding the Soviet society toward the final phase of communism. To observe this transformation, egalitarian ideology was conceived as an indisputable part of all national cultures. Folk music and literature were revised, and national histories were rewritten accordingly. Moreover, to propagate the new (Soviet) culture throughout the society—especially in rural areas—along with local Communist Party groups, various mass-pressure groups, such as the Communist Youth, or Komsomol, were founded. These organizations were charged to eliminate all the old institutions and beliefs that obstructed the new revolutionary tasks. Nonetheless, religious faith soon became an obstacle to Sovietization.

Soviet Attitudes to Islam in Central Asia

Following the fall of Bukhara in 1920, the Bolsheviks accelerated their anti-Islamic campaign in Central Asia. In its earliest stage, this campaign was coupled with the crusade against the Basmachis. Later, in harmony with the anti-Christian indoctrination occurring throughout the rest of the Soviet Union, the Bolsheviks launched a massive assault against Islam. Besides prohibiting Islamic institutions' interference in the country's education and judicial life, a widespread cultural offensive against the practice of Islam was initiated by the government. In this new campaign, traditional Islamic customs, such as pilgrimages

to shrines, praying at mosques, polygamy, and veiling, were the first targets. Within a few years, almost all holy shrines in Central Asia were closed down, and the number of mosques dropped dramatically. For instance, in the city of Khudzhand (former Khojend) in northern Tajikistan, the total number of mosques was drastically reduced from 451 to 1.

The campaign for abandoning the veil in Muslim areas of the Soviet Union, which began in 1927, had a twofold purpose. It was designed not only to jeopardize an old Islamic custom but also to destroy the traditional Islamic family by dragging women into the labor market. Judicial changes in 1927 facilitated this process. First the system of law courts was changed, and a year later the penal code was modified. Meanwhile, all remaining religious courts were abolished, and the old, official Islam was gradually manipulated and transformed into a new, legal, Soviet Islam. This was a private form of Islam, devoid of social aspects. Finally, the only remnants of traditional Islam for the newborn Soviet Person to identify himself or herself with were circumcision, not eating pork, religious marriage, and religious burial. Therefore, for the majority of Soviet Central Asians, the conventional boundary between private and public spaces was refigured. Marxist mentality prevailed over every aspect of public life in the Soviet Union; however, it failed to penetrate into the realm of a contemporary Muslim's private life.

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RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (1904–1905). Japan's use of Western-style military organization and armaments to triumph over Russia in 1905 was a turning point in relations between Asia and the West, in part because it was seen by many as a race war or a clash of civilizations. This allegation was denied by Japanese leaders, including Prime Minister General Katsura Taro, who admitted at the war's outset that Japan could never conquer Russia or force it to pay an indemnity for Japan's war expenses. They also knew that Japan's economic future was dependent on Western markets and the vast loans needed to fight the war could be obtained only in London and New York. Japan's military successes, however, were celebrated by anticolonial leaders from Asia to Africa; even Christian nationalist statesman Yun Chiho in Korea, who knew that a Japanese victory would endanger his country, still welcomed the humbling of Western arrogance. This revolution in Asian confidence made Japan feared in North America and Australasia; new defense policies were created in both these regions against the perceived threat of Japanese invasion. By 1907, there was already talk of a coming war between Japan and the United States. As Japan became the target of Western suspicion, its own nationalist ideology increasingly stressed the Russo-Japanese war as a triumph of a uniquely Japanese spirit. In this way, Japan also ended up viewing the war in racial terms.

The direct regional significance of the war was that Japan became a continental power in Asia, at the expense of China and Korea. In the peace treaty of September 1905, negotiated at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Russia conceded Japan's special interest in Korea and also transferred to Japan its territorial concessions, which included rail and mines in southern Manchuria (northeast China). To protect these rights, Japan stationed troops in Manchuria that were to be the vanguard of further military expansion in the 1930s. In November 1905, Japan also intimidated the Korean government into signing a protectorate treaty whereby a Japanese resident-general in Seoul took charge of Korea's foreign relations and increasingly of its domestic politics. In 1910 Japan annexed Korea outright; it remained part of Japan's empire until the end of World War II.

Hostilities

The cause of the Russo-Japanese War was Japan's sense of insecurity. Japanese leaders feared that Korea could be used as a platform from which to attack Japan, as in the thirteenth-century Mongol invasion. Russian expansion in Manchuria in the 1890s, and its ongoing construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, were

viewed in Tokyo as a threat to Korea. Japan attempted negotiations through 1903, with a view to trading spheres of influence (Russia to dominate Manchuria, Japan to dominate Korea). When negotiations failed, Japan attacked Russian vessels in the region in February 1904 without first declaring war. Japan was to do the same thing at Pearl Harbor in 1941, but in 1904, this covert action was applauded by its British ally. Initial land battles in Korea were easily won by the Japanese as Russian forces retreated to consolidate. The major conflicts were at Port Arthur (Lushun), where the Japanese forces under General Nogi Maresuke were held for five months and suffered enormous casualties. At the battle of Mukden in March 1905, approximately half a million Russian and Japanese troops fought in the biggest land battle before 1914. Shortly thereafter, the Japanese navy under Admiral Togo Heihachiro destroyed the exhausted Russian Baltic fleet at the battle of Tsushima. Although Japan appeared to have won every engagement, it had been forced to mobilize over one million men and had lost 81,000 (over six times the total figure for its 1894–1895 war with China), along with 381,000 sick and wounded. The losses in men and money actually crippled Japan and the government hurriedly accepted the peace treaty of September 1905, despite anger among the Japanese public at its terms.

Wartime Japan

The common wisdom has long been that the Japanese public demanded war with Russia (in revenge for Russia's diplomatic obstruction of Japan in its earlier war with China) and unhesitatingly supported the war effort. More recent scholarship, however, has revised this impression. There was broad wartime resentment in Japan at the rising number of mass funerals, the higher wartime taxes, and the length of the war. This was Japan's first war to be seen in moving pictures, yet audiences varied in their responses: some war movies and newsreels were very popular; others, especially those with fraudulent advertising, were scorned. Many people did respond to the recurring campaigns for war donations, often conducted by patriotic women's groups, but there was also a backlash as the demands continued. In this sense, there was a divergence between the public (propaganda) face of Japan accepted by the West, and the actuality of a Japanese public in-

creasingly tired of the war. Public support of the military in Japan was always conditional, based on a balance between costs and rewards. One result of this was a growing fear among army commanders after 1905 of socialism among new conscripts. At the time, however, the socialist movement in Japan remained largely intellectual and peripheral. The major public protest at the war's end, the Hibiya riots in central Tokyo, are usually regarded as an ultranationalist demonstration insisting the war be reopened so that Japan might improve its meager rewards. These riots had no lasting impact on Japanese military or diplomatic policies or on the domestic polity; the changeover of cabinets from General Katsura to the head of the largest political party, the Seiyukai, had been agreed long before the war's end. Where the war did influence post-1905 politics was in civil-military relations. The huge debt burden of the war prevented the army from obtaining the extra forces some of its leaders felt essential to defend Japan's new position in Asia, and it was to clash with an alliance of the navy and the Seiyukai in the constitutional crisis of 1912–1913. This clash was to influence attitudes between politicians and the army until 1945.

Stewart Lone

See also: **Sino-Japanese War**

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RYUKYU ISLANDS. See **Okinawa.**



SABAH (2000 est. pop. 2.4 million). Sabah is a Malaysian state on the northern part of the island of Borneo, bordered by Indonesia in the south, Sarawak in the west, and the Philippines in the east. Its coastline includes the South China Sea, the Sulu Sea, and the Celebes (Sulawesi) Sea. Once known as British North Borneo, Sabah has a land area of 73,619 square kilometers (28,400 square miles) and is the second-largest state of the Federation of Malaysia, with almost 22 percent of its territory and 12 percent of its population. Sabah's capital city, Kota Kinabalu (formerly Jesselton), is located in the northwest of the state. The capital's population was 354,100 in 2000, up from 209,200 in 1991.

According to historical records, the area of what is now Sabah was under control of the sultans of Brunei before the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In the early eighteenth century some of its coastal areas were ruled by the sultans of Sulu. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the power of the Brunei sultanate was weakened by internal political instability and rivalry between traditional rulers. In 1877 Baron Von Overbeck and Alfred Dent leased 28,000 square miles of territory from the sultans of Brunei and Sulu. In 1882 the British North Borneo Chartered Company was established, and in 1884 it named Sandakan city the capital of British North Borneo, which became a British protectorate in 1888. However, from 1942 to 1945 most of Sabah was occupied by the Japanese Imperial Army. In 1946 Sabah became a British crown colony. In 1963 it gained independence from Britain and joined Malaysia.

Agriculture, forestry, tourism, and mining are the main sectors of the Sabah economy. Traditionally,

Sabah exported rubber, copra, and timber, but since the 1980s crude oil has become one of the most important export items. In the 1990s the state attempted to diversify its economy, attracting manufacturing and services, especially tourism. Due to ecological concerns, the export of timber was banned by the state government in 1994, but the tropical rain forest is still under heavy exploitation for domestic needs. Oil palm was introduced in the 1960s and has become an important crop.

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SABAH DISPUTE The Sabah Dispute was a twenty-five-year territorial wrangle between the Republic of the Philippines and the Federation of Malaysia over territory in the northern part of the island of Borneo. The Philippines' claim was based on a historical family linkage between the sultan of Brunei, who in the seventeenth century ceded Sabah to his relative the sultan of Sulu, which is now part of the Philippines. In 1798 the territory was leased to the British North Borneo Company and brought under direct British control in 1946. Malaysia contends that the territory was purchased by the British North Borneo Company.

The dispute over Sabah was directly linked to the formation of the Malaysian state. On 31 August 1957 the Federation of Malaya was established on the Malay Peninsula, while Britain kept Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei, and British North Borneo (Sabah) outside the federation. On 12 May 1961 the Malay prime minister Tunku Abdul Rahman proposed the founding of the Federation of Malaysia—the political union of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah. The proposal was well received in peninsular Malaya and Singapore but was less popular in the three Borneo territories. For Malaya, union with Singapore alone was unacceptable because it would make the Chinese the majority ethnic group; including the Borneo territories would keep ethnic Chinese in the minority. Following a September 1962 referendum, an Anglo-Malay commission reported that a majority of the population was in favor of integration.

The proposal infuriated the Philippines, which formally laid claim to Sabah in June 1962 and tacitly allied itself with Indonesia, whose president Sukarno began a low-intensity conflict with Malaya known as *Konfrontasi* in January 1963. Philippine president Diosdado Macapagal proposed the establishment of a Greater Malay Confederation that would include Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines in the place of the Federation of Malaysia, but the proposal was quickly rejected.

Although Brunei opted to remain outside the Union, on 16 September 1963 Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore were constitutionally added to peninsular Malaya to create the Federation of Malaysia. As a result, the Philippines severed diplomatic relations with Malaysia in 1963. They were not reestablished until June 1966, after Ferdinand Marcos was elected president. Ties with Indonesia were also restored after Sukarno was ousted in a military coup led by General Suharto, who wanted to mend relations with his neighbors. In August 1967 the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established. Yet in September 1968, the Philippine Congress published maps showing Sabah as part of the Philippines, causing Malaysia to sever ties until December 1969.

Tensions flared again in the early 1970s when the largest Muslim separatist group in the Philippines, the Moro National Liberation Front, began to receive material support from the Sabah chief minister, Tun Mustapha. Only after his electoral defeat in 1976 did Malaysian aid to the Philippine rebels cease and bilateral relations begin to improve.

Philippine president Marcos indicated at the second ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur in August 1977

that the Philippines would take steps to waive the claim to Sabah, though no formal action was taken. His successor, President Corazon Aquino, submitted legislation to the Philippine congress in November 1987 to formally withdraw the territorial claim, though the congress did not act on the legislation. The 1987 constitution, however, does not include Sabah in its definition of Philippine territory.

Zachary Abuza

See also: **Konfrontasi**

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SABRI BROTHERS The Sabri Brothers are a Pakistani *qawwali* (Sufi devotional music) group founded by brothers Haji Ghulam Farid Sabri (1930–1994) and Haji Maqbool Ahmed Sabri (b. 1945). Descended from a line of *qawwali* singers in northern India, the Sabri family moved to Karachi, Pakistan, at the time of partition in 1947. Ghulam Farid Sabri and Maqbool Sabri began recording together in the late 1950s. In the 1980s the ensemble gained international recognition as one of the greatest exponents of modern *qawwali* originality and innovation. Praised by *qawwali* practitioners throughout the subcontinent, their recordings have received wide recognition for their artful composition and arrangement, varied patterns of linguistic incorporation, and expansive modes of instrumentation. The song "Tajdar-e-Haram," for example, includes refrain phrases in Urdu and verses that incorporate Hindi and Farsi, while "O Mustafa" features Middle Eastern drumbeats that enhance its Arabian quality. The Sabri Brothers also offer a distinctive musical delivery: Ghulam Farid Sabri's deep and powerful voice complements the lighter, more melodious tones of Maqbool Sabri. Although the personnel has changed over the years, the Sabri Brothers have offered a consistently high standard of performance. Since the death of Ghulam Farid Sabri, Maqbool Sabri has continued to perform and record with other members of the Sabri family.

Haley Duschinski

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SADAEJUUI Literally translatable as "serving the great-ism" (or in some sources, "toadyism"), the term *sadaejui* has a decisively pejorative meaning to modern Koreans, north and south. It has served throughout the twentieth century as a wake-up call to national energies, and has figured as one of the central "terms of engagement" in the ideological and propaganda wars between North and South Korea, and within South Korea itself, since national division in 1948.

The term *sadaejui* is one born of the twentieth century, but it has its roots in the much older concept of *sadae*, "to serve the great" (*juui* being a modern addition, translatable as "ism"). In the traditional moral and political worldview of East Asia the concept of *sadae* was in no way pejorative. It described the natural relationship between the lesser and the greater, based upon Confucian teachings, that kept the universe in moral and political working order. It was perhaps most clearly articulated by the fourth century BCE Confucian sage Mencius, who said that only by serving the greater state could the lesser both preserve itself and keep the way of heaven. In traditional times, this meant for Korea a symbolic deference to China as its moral superior, and its emperor as the bestower of the mandate to rule. This symbolic relationship of deference, best manifested in the biannual tribute missions Korea sent to China, was in many ways just that—symbolic. Korea continued to preserve its internal sovereignty. This deference to China, however, was also clearly seen in the cultural realm, with the Korean aristocracy emulating Chinese arts and literature as well as Neo-Confucian thought, particularly during the Choson period (1392–1910).

With the troubled path Korea has tread since opening to the outside world in 1876, and the concomitant rise of Korean nationalism, this tradition of *sadae* came to be seen as highly deleterious to the independent development of Korean institutions, culture, and character. This became a particular critique of such nationalist historians as Sin Ch'ae-ho (1880–1936) and Ch'oe Nam-son (1890–1957). It was viewed as a primary cause for what some saw as a Korean predilection for emulating and relying upon the powerful, and a corresponding lack of originality or independent spirit. This in turn was seen as a central contributor to Korea's eventual domination by foreign powers in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and its colonization by Japan from 1905 to 1945. North Korea

continues to accuse South Korea of *sadaejui* in what it sees as that state's overreliance upon the United States. The political reality of national division, coupled with a historical legacy of colonization, has assured a particular potency to the term *sadaejui* in all aspects of Korean society.

Daniel C. Kane

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SADEQUAIN (1930–1987), Pakistani artist. Sadequain's paintings, in media ranging from oils to felt markers, are evidence of his skillful draftsmanship and imaginative visual vocabulary. Sadequain was born in Amroha, India, to a family of Qu'ran scribes, and moved to Karachi, Pakistan, in the early 1950s.

The civic activism that was a hallmark of Sadequain's art arose during his early experience of painting nationalistic, anti-British slogans in Delhi on the eve of the Indian partition. His politically charged canvases found a responsive audience among 1960s intellectuals, both in Pakistan and abroad.

Sadequain's personal iconography was a complex merging of Hindu and Muslim ideology, using Eastern and Western artistic traditions, such as figurative art and calligraphy. His human figures, often self-portraits, are rendered abstractly as thorny cacti. Sadequain also wrote poetry and illustrated poems of reformist Pakistani thinkers like Faiz Ahmad Faiz (1911–1984).

His large-scale murals are in a socialist vein, such as the *Saga of Labor* (1967), installed at the Mangla Dam power plant, which depicts human struggle. His last, incomplete project was a series of murals inside Frere Hall in Karachi, where he died.

Kishwar Rizvi

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SADO ISLAND (2001 pop. 73,000). Japan's fifth-largest island, Sado (Sadogashima), is located in the Sea of Japan, 35 kilometers from the city of Niigata in Honshu. The island is 853 square kilometers. Begin-

ning in the Nara period (710–794), Sado was an independent province. From the mid-twelfth to the sixteenth century, it was a site of exile for political prisoners. During the Edo period (1600/1603–1868), Sado became a prison colony and came under direct control of the shogunate, which started gold and silver mines there. Today, it is administratively a part of Niigata Prefecture.

Sado, a mountainous island, is formed of three regions. In the northwest the Osada Mountains have the highest peak, Mount Kinpoku (1,172 meters). The southern part is formed by the Kosado Mountains, which average between 500 and 640 meters in height. The Kuninaka Plain, which runs from the northeast to the southwest, has 80 percent of the island's population, mostly in the cities of Ryotsu, Kanai, Sawata, Hatano, Itano, and Mano. The climate is mild, with an annual average temperature of 13° C. Japanese plum trees and mandarin orange trees grow on the island. The main products include rice, squid, oysters, and seaweed. The island is home to the Toki, the Japanese crested ibis (*Nipponia nippon*), an endangered species.

Nathalie Cavasin

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SAEK Saek is a member of the Tai family of languages, which are spoken across a wide area of northern Southeast Asia, from northern Vietnam and Southern China in the east to Assam in the west. The family includes Thai and Lao, the national languages of Thailand and Laos, as well as dozens of languages with speakers varying in numbers from a few thousand to several million.

The Saek people are believed to have originated in Vietnam and to have migrated into Laos and Thailand at least two hundred years ago. Today, Saek is spoken in Muang, Na Wa, and Si Songkhram districts of Nakhon Phanom Province in northeast Thailand near the border with Laos, and also on the opposite side of the Mekong River in Laos itself. There are no reliable statistics about the size of the Saek-speaking population, but one estimate puts it at thousands rather than tens of thousands. Schliesinger reports an estimated total population of Saek to be about 25,000 including both those in Laos and Thailand. The 1995 official Lao census placed the number of Saek at 2,745.

In culture, Saek people are indistinguishable from other Thai and Lao people in northeast Thailand and adjacent Laos. Most Saek speakers in Thailand speak not only their own language but also the local northeastern Thai dialect and standard central Thai. The future of the language is precarious. Thirty years ago it was noted that children understood the Saek spoken by their parents and grandparents yet usually answered in Isan (Thailand) or Lao (Laos) when spoken to. Since then, increasing migration to urban areas in search of a better life, and marriage outside the Saek-speaking community, have taken a further toll.

Saek is of particular interest to scholars interested in the history of the Thai language, because its differences from other Tai languages in Thailand set it apart. This is because it belongs to the northern branch of Tai languages, spoken mainly in southern China, unlike the majority of Tai languages in Thailand and Laos, which belong to the southwestern branch of the family.

Although Saek does not differ from Thai in syntax, the languages are not mutually intelligible. Saek has six tones and a vowel system similar to Thai, but a number of initial consonant clusters that are so strange to average Standard Thai speakers' ears that, on hearing Saek spoken, they will often assume that the language must be Cambodian.

For linguists perhaps the most curious feature of the Saek sound system is the final *l*, which is not found in any other Tai language. Possible theories are that it is evidence of contact with Mon-Khmer languages, such as Cambodian, which do have final *l*, that it is preserving an otherwise lost feature of Proto-Tai, the parent language of all present-day Tai languages, or that it reflects some wider affiliation between the Tai and Malayo-Polynesian languages. This, and the more general question of how and why Saek came to be separated from other northern Tai languages, still remain to be answered.

David Smyth

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SAGA (2002 est. pop. 878,000). Saga Prefecture is situated in the northwest of Japan's island of Kyushu, where it occupies an area of 2,440 square kilometers. Saga's primary geographical features are the Sefuri Mountains and the southern Saga Plain. Saga is bordered by the Genkai and Ariake Seas, and by Fukuoka and Nagasaki prefectures. Once known as Hizen Province, it assumed its present name and borders in 1883.

The original province was ruled by a series of warlords until Nabeshima Naoshige (1538–1618) was granted sovereignty. Nabeshima participated in the invasions of Korea that Japan's paramount warlord, Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1535–1596), launched in 1592 and 1597, and returned to his province with captive Korean potters. The discovery of kaolin clay near Arita fueled Japan's porcelain industry, and the Korean potters began to make export wares to replace those from Ming dynasty China. The Nabeshima family continued its rule through the Edo period (1600/1603–1868).

The prefecture's capital is Saga city. Originating as an Edo period castle town, in the early 2000s, it is a market and distribution center for local agricultural goods such as rice, vegetables, mandarin oranges, and dairy products. It also is the site of industrial facilities for brewing, foodstuff processing, textiles, and paper manufacture. The prefecture's other important cities are Karatsu, Arita, Imari, and Tosu.

In recent times, Saga was a productive coal mining region, though many of the mines now are closed. Its waters are the site of prolific fisheries, pearl beds, and of *nori* (edible seaweed) production in the Ariake Sea. Karatsu, once a thriving port for trade with China, has long been noted for its elegant pottery, made since the pre-Korean pottery era. Other attractions include the scenic Genkai Sea shoreline with its nearby coastal pine forest, the nation's foremost sylvan preserve.

E. L. S. Weber

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SAGAING DIVISION (2002 pop. est. 5.6 million). The Sagaing Division is the largest of the modern political divisions in Myanmar (Burma). It has an

area of 94,622 square kilometers, and is situated between the Indian border to the north, Chin State to the west, Kachin and Shan states to the east and northeast, and Magwe and Mandalay divisions to the south.

It is a territory of geographic and ethnic diversity. The population consists mainly of ethnic Burmans, but there also are substantial communities of Shans, Chins, Nagas, and Kachins, especially in the northern hills. The Academy for the Development of National Groups, established by the Burma Socialist Program Party in 1965 to promote national unity, is located at Ywathitkyi within the division.

The main economy of the territory, which consists of thirty-eight townships and nearly two thousand wards and village-tracts, is agriculture. The division is the main producer of wheat, pulses, and sunflowers in Myanmar. Other important crops include paddy rice, groundnuts, cotton, and tobacco, and timber, including teak, is the most valuable natural resource. There also are substantial copper deposits in Salingyi township, west of the Chindwin (Chindwin) River.

After Burma's independence in 1948, the development of the division was held back by armed conflict. The capital is the former royal capital of Sagaing, 24 kilometers downstream from Mandalay on the Irrawaddy River. It remains a major center for Buddhist pilgrimage. Another former capital was located at Shwebo farther north. In contrast, the other major town in the division, Monywa, was little more than a village until the twentieth century. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it was the main commercial gateway to the Chindwin valley.

Under the State Law and Order Restoration Council (1988–1997) and successor State Peace and Development Council, Monywa and the western region of the division were scheduled for economic expansion. Major resettlement and road-building programs were to link up through the Kale-Kabaw valley to the Indian border at Tamu. Similar plans were mooted for the Khamti region and the historic Ledo Road in the far north.

Government authority, however, continued to be challenged in the latter decades of the twentieth century by ethnic Naga, Kachin, and Chin opposition groups in several frontier regions. The creation of a Naga "self-administered zone" was considered for inclusion in Myanmar's future constitution and a ceasefire agreed with the Kachin Independence Organization in 1994, but substantive reforms were not yet completed by the end of the twentieth century.

The division contains several areas of rare natural biodiversity. These include the Naga Hills of the

Paktai Range and the Htamanthi reserve, which lies between the Uru and Chindwin rivers. This was designated as a wildlife sanctuary in 1974.

Martin Smith

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SAI BABA, SATYA (b. 1926), Indian spiritual leader. Sai Baba is a twentieth-century Indian spiritual leader whose mission is to bring peace to India and the world. He was born at sunrise on 23 November 1926 in Puttaparthi, a village near Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, South India. Sai Baba is the third child of Pedda Venkappa Raju and Easwaramma. He was given the name Sathyanarayan (*sathya*, "truth"; *Narayan*, "God residing in our hearts") and began performing miracles at the age of eight. He is considered to be the reincarnation of Shirdi Sai Baba, saint and mystic, who died in 1918 and foretold of Sai Baba's birth. On 23 May 1940, at the age of fourteen, he renounced his familial ties and proclaimed his mission to restore truth, love, harmony, and righteousness in a discordant world. He is considered a *purna* (full) avatar (God in human form, after the Indian doctrine of divine incarnation). He claims both divine and human consciousness. Sai Baba has said that he will live until the age of 95, in 2021.

His name evokes his mission: Satya (unchanging truth), Sai (true mother or the female aspect of the universe), Baba (true father or the male aspect of the universe), and he is Anandaswarupa (the nature of bliss, unconditional love). Advocating a life of frugality and emphasizing the sanctity of work, he does not aim to convert, proclaiming that all religions are his. Sai Baba says that there is only one caste—of humanity; only one language—of the heart; only one religion—of love; and only one God—who is omnipresent. His followers come from all over the world and number more than 50 million in sixty countries. He has initiated

large-scale social and educational programs based on spiritual lines, including more than 10,000 *bal vikas* (kindergartens) and *seva dals* (volunteers trained to serve). His main ashram (retreat, hermitage) is located in Puttaparthi and is called Prashanti Nilayam (Abode of Great Peace). Other institutions include an ashram on the grounds of his residence in Brindavan, his college at Whitefield near Bangalore, and more than 3,500 Sai centers in India and elsewhere.

Chandrika Kaul

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SAICHO (767–822 CE), Japanese Buddhist monk. Born Mitsu no Obito Hirono in Japan's Omi Province, east of Mount Hiei, Saicho was the son of a devout Buddhist. After following the normal path to ordination as a priest, Saicho took to a small hermitage on Mount Hiei outside Heiankyo (Kyoto), where he meditated on the impermanence of existence and the Tiantai Buddhist doctrines of China, especially the notion that all beings have the potential for Buddhahood.

When the emperor moved the capital to Heiankyo in 794, Saicho was appointed to serve at court. In 804, Saicho set forth on one of the four diplomatic ships sailing to China. There he studied under two of the leading dharma heirs of the Tiantai sect. After spending eight months studying and copying sutras, he received dharma transmission and returned to Japan with 230 Buddhist texts.

In 806, Saicho founded the Tendai school of Buddhism, the Japanese branch of the Chinese Tiantai sect. At the monastery of Enryakuji on Mount Hiei, Saicho commenced lectures concerning such works as the *Lotus Sutra*. Out of these discussions of Buddhist teachings came a comprehensive school of Buddhist studies. Saicho sought out the younger Kukai and requested instruction in the esoteric texts Kukai had copied while in China. Among other reforms, Saicho advocated an end to government control over ordination, an autonomy that was not granted until after his death.

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SAILENDRA A powerful ancient dynasty in maritime Southeast Asia, especially in Java and Sumatra, Sailendra dominated Java from about 760 to 860 CE. This dynasty was credited with building a large Buddhist stupa, Borobudur, in the Kedu plain of present-day Central Java. Unlike later predominantly Hindu and then Muslim Javanese dynasties, Sailendra was Mahayana Buddhist.

In the mid-ninth century, Sailendra rule in Java was challenged by an expanding Hindu dynasty that later established the Mataram kingdom. The Sailendra were forced to leave Java for Sumatra, where they had good relations with the powerful Srivijaya kingdom. Sharing the same religion, Srivijaya's ruler accorded the Sailendra the utmost respect, and efforts were made to unite the courts through intermarriage.

The Sailendra found good fortune in Sumatra. They not only received refuge from Srivijaya, but the courts effectively merged into the Sailendra identity, perpetuating this heritage until the kingdom's eleventh-century demise.

Irman G. Lanti

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SAINT PAUL (d. c. 62–68 CE), early Christian saint, apostle to Gentiles. Saint Paul converted the Jews and Christians of the Roman empire to Christianity from about 40 to 64 CE. He undertook three missionary journeys in Asia Minor and Greece and traveled to Rome to appeal his death sentence. His efforts resulted in the expansion of the Church to include Gentile converts based in southern Asia Minor, Greece, and Rome, thus changing the nature of the Church members from the original congregants of Jewish Christians. He probably died for his beliefs in Rome. His conversion and mission are described in the Bible in both the Acts of the Apostles (written by Luke) and Paul's own letters to the churches.

Paul (or Saul) was born in Tarsus, in today's Turkey, and was trained as a rabbi and a tent maker. Educated in Jerusalem as a strict Pharisee, he purged heresy from the Jewish faith by persecuting the followers of Jesus. Later he had a mystical experience, a vision of Jesus on the road to Damascus, which completely recast his beliefs. He became a leading member of the Church in Antioch, the second Christian community after Jerusalem.

As a church official, Paul, with Barnabas, made the first journey to Cyprus, Antalya, Perge, Antioch in Pisidia, Iconium (now Konya), Lystra, and Derbe, founding churches along the way, and returning by the same route. The message that Jesus was the Messiah promised by God to the prophets was adapted for Gentile consumption to proclaim Jesus as son of a self-evident supreme deity who provided eternal life for his believers. Paul's Christianity diverged from Jesus' message of righteous behavior within Jewish law. On his return, Paul and Peter (then primate of Antioch) obtained permission from the Church in Jerusalem to admit uncircumcised Gentiles to the Church, which thus lost its Jewish links.

Paul revisited his congregations in Asia Minor and continued to Troas, Philippi, Thessalonica, Athens, and Corinth. Returning, he paused at Ephesus and Caesarea en route to Antioch. On the third journey, a reprise of the second, he spent three years in Ephesus, where the most important letters were written and funds were collected to support Jewish Christians in Jerusalem. His preaching provoked an attack from worshippers of Artemis, one of several attacks on his person.

Back in Jerusalem, Paul was attacked by "Jews of Asia," imprisoned for two years, and tried by successive Roman governors of Caesarea; appealing (as a Roman citizen) to the emperor, he spent two years in Rome under house arrest. According to the Palestinian historian Eusebius (c. 260–c. 339), Paul was beheaded during Nero's persecutions of 64 CE.

Paul was the best known and hardest working of the Christian fathers; Christianity in Jerusalem almost perished in the Jewish revolt of 70 CE and was kept alive largely by Paul's beleaguered communities of Gentile converts.

Kate Clow

SAIONJI KINMOCHI (1849–1940), Japanese leader. Descended from the most influential imperial court family, the Fujiwara, Saionji is known as the "last genro" for his behind-the-scenes leadership as Japan's

last active surviving elder statesman after the death of Prince Yamagata Aritomo in 1922. A native of Kyoto, Saionji, at age eighteen, served as imperial representative in battles waged by the new government against northern enemies after the fall of the Tokugawa shogunate in 1867. He helped found Meiji Law School in 1880 (later Meiji University) and was president of the liberal newspaper *Toyo jiyu shinbun* (Oriental Free Press) in 1881. Saionji's political appointments included minister of education (1894–1896; 1898), acting minister of foreign affairs (1895–1896), vice president of the House of Peers (1893–1894), president of the Privy Council (1900–1903), president of the Seiyukai political party (1903–1914), and prime minister (1906–1908; 1911–1912).

Saionji studied law in France (1871–1880), was a member of Ito Hirobumi's entourage investigating European constitutions (1882), Japan's minister to Austria (1885–1887) and Germany (1887–1891), and Japanese plenipotentiary to the Versailles Peace Conference (1919). As principal power broker in Tokyo (1922–1936), his efforts on behalf of representative government and cooperative relations with Britain and the United States were exceeded only by his passion for protecting the throne.

Frederick R. Dickinson

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SAITAMA (2002 est. pop. 7.2 million). Saitama Prefecture is situated in the central region of Japan's island of Honshu. One of the nation's leading agricultural areas, it occupies an area of 3,799 square kilometers. Saitama's primary geographical features are the fertile Kanto Plain and several Kanto Mountain peaks in the west. The main rivers are the Tonegawa and the Arakawa. Saitama is bordered by Gumma, Tochigi, Ibaraki, Chiba, Tokyo, Yamanashi, and Nagano prefectures. Once part of Musashi Province, it assumed its present name and borders in 1876.

Many archaeological excavations from the Jomon (10,000 BCE–300 BCE) and Yayoi (300 BCE–300 CE) cultures indicate early agriculture in the region. Musashi Province was ruled from the twelfth century on by the

Minamoto, Hojo, Uesugi, and Later Hogo warlord families. During the Edo period (1600/1603–1868), the Tokugawa shogunate administered the area directly.

The prefecture's capital city is Urawa. In the early 2000s, it is a residential suburb of Tokyo with numerous apartment complexes and factories for the processing of foodstuffs and metals, and for the production of machinery. During the Edo period, Urawa was a post station town. The prefecture's other important cities are Kawaguchi, Omiya, Kawagoe, and Tokorozawa.

Saitama Prefecture continues to grow food (mainly rice and vegetables) and raises livestock for the Tokyo market. Recent decades have seen the rapid growth of industries related to chemicals and metals processing. A historic attraction is Kawagoe, a one-time castle town known as "little Edo" for its traditional merchant quarter. Visitors also are drawn to Chichibu-Tama National Park.

E. L. S. Weber

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SALOTH SAR. See **Pol Pot**.

SALT TAX Salt is exuded in perspiration and other body excretions and must be replaced; therefore salt is absolutely necessary for human beings. Salt is also useful for preserving and flavoring food, but it is not evenly distributed throughout the world. For these reasons, most governments have seen salt as a suitable commodity to tax. Since salt in excess is unpleasant, consumption by the rich does not much exceed that of the poor, and thus a tax on salt is fundamentally a poll tax.

China

China has a long history of taxing salt. The large volumes of fresh water discharged by the major rivers make salt extraction from the diluted sea difficult. Over two millennia ago, salt was pumped from subterranean brine pools and then evaporated. These wells became controlled by the Chinese Board of Revenue. By 900 CE the salt tax became the most important item of government revenue. This situation continued until China's administrative collapse in the seventeenth century and was revived in the early twentieth century, under foreign pressure, to repay foreign

loans. In general, although burdensome to poor people, the Chinese salt taxes were not high. Typically it took two days of a peasant's wages to meet the family's salt needs for a year.

India

India also has a long history of salt taxation. Chandragupta, who ruled much of India from 324 to 301 BCE, imposed a salt tax. The Mughals taxed salt from the sixteenth century until they were usurped by the British. Generally the tax was relatively low.

In 1765 severe taxation of salt in India was initiated by Robert Clive, governor of Bengal, as a private monopoly. In 1780 Warren Hastings, governor-general, brought the tax under government control. Thereafter successive administrators consolidated tax collection and expanded the tax base as the British spread across India.

Before the level of salt taxation was almost equalized across British India in 1879, it was much higher in the Bengal presidency than in Madras or Mumbai (Bombay). At the beginning it cost a peasant about two months' wages to provide yearly salt for his family; by 1879 it was nearer one month's wages. To stop untaxed salt coming in from the princely states, Bengal was enclosed by a customs line 4,030 kilometers (2,500 miles) long, much of it formed by an impenetrable thorn hedge.

After 1879 until the end of British rule, wage inflation gradually eroded the severity of the salt tax. Nevertheless in 1930 Mahatma Gandhi protested against the unjust tax. He and his followers marched to the sea to illegally gather salt. This and their subsequent imprisonment were key episodes in the fight for independence, when the salt tax was abolished.

Roy Moxham

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SALWEEN RIVER The Salween (Thanlwin) River is one of the major waterways of Myanmar (Burma). Entering northeastern Myanmar from China's Yunnan Province, it flows southward through the mountain valleys of Shan, Kayah, and Karen (Kayin) States before reaching the Gulf of Martaban in Mon State. Although it is locally navigable, it is too hazardous in many areas, with deep ravines and plunging rapids,

to allow navigation for any extended length. The only exception is the lower reaches in Karen and Mon States, where timber and other goods are transported.

In these lowland areas, the state capitals of Moulmein (Mawlamyine) and Paan (Hpa-an) are located along its banks, but there are few other settlements of any size along the rest of its 1,600-kilometer course. There are bridges across the Salween near Paan as well as at Takaw and Kunlong in Shan State. Other bridges were planned during the 1990s, but most crossings of the river are only by local ferries.

There have also been plans in recent decades for hydroelectric dams at various locations along the river, but many of these areas have been affected by insurgencies. In the late 1990s, there were reports of detailed discussions, involving various international interests, about building a dam in southern Shan State, but this project continued to be criticized by opposition groups.

Martin Smith

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SAM RAINSY (b. 1949), Cambodian opposition leader. Sam Rainsy was born in Phnom Penh, the son of Sam Sary, deputy prime minister in Prince Sihanouk's government. He moved to France in 1965, where he received degrees in business, accounting, economics, and political science. He returned to Cambodia in 1992 and worked for the Cambodian political party known as FUNCINPEC in the U.N.-sponsored election of 1993.

In 1993 Sam Rainsy was named minister of finance for FUNCINPEC. He was an outspoken critic of government corruption, the two prime ministers, and his own party's policies. He was removed from office in October 1994, expelled from FUNCINPEC in May 1995, and forced out of Parliament the following month. He filed a complaint in a Phnom Penh court, but the court declined to take the case. His dismissal was interpreted by some not only as a means to silence him, but also as an act of political intimidation against future challengers.

From that time, he became a force for the opposition. Sam Rainsy has been successful in tailoring his image to the international community. He travels

widely, speaks English and French, and uses the language of anticorruption and democracy. In his appeals to Cambodian people, however, he often uses anti-Vietnamese rhetoric.

In 1996 Sam Rainsy and the Khmer Nation Party were instrumental in the formation of the first labor union under the new government, the Free Trade Union of Khmer Workers (FTUKW). The FTUKW supported garment workers in and around Phnom Penh. They organized work stoppages and demonstrations, often with Sam Rainsy playing a prominent role.

On 30 March 1997 a grenade attack on a peaceful demonstration outside the National Assembly killed thirty people. Sam Rainsy was at the demonstration but was not injured. It is commonly believed that he was the intended target. No charges were ever filed.

He founded the Sam Rainsy Party in 1995 and became its president. In the election of July 1998, the party won 14 percent of the vote. Initially both the Sam Rainsy Party and FUNCINPEC contested the vote, but in November 1998, FUNCINPEC and the CPP agreed to form a coalition government. The Sam Rainsy Party became the sole opposition in the National Assembly. As a member of Parliament, Sam Rainsy remains an outspoken critic of the government.

Jeanne Morel

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SAMARQAND (2002 pop. 373,000). Samarqand in Uzbekistan is one of the world's oldest extant cities, and is Central Asia's most senior urban setting. Narrow streets wind through the old quarter of Samarqand. The historic heart of Samarqand is the Registan, an open square dominated by three great *madrasabs*, or Islamic colleges. Visitors can see the mausoleum of the Turkic conqueror Timur (1336–1405), an octagonal structure with a fluted dome, azure in color, with sixty-four separate ribs. Other important buildings include the Bibi Khanum Mosque, with its turquoise cupola, erected by Timur to the memory of his favorite wife, Saray Mulk Khanum. The city also houses other magnificent mosques, mausoleums, and the ruins of the observatory of Ulug Beg (d. 1449).



SAMARQAND—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Samarqand was designated a UNESCO World Heritage site in 2001 because of its importance in the development of Islamic architecture and its role in the development of urban life in Central Asia.

Built on the site of Afrosiab, which dated from the third or fourth millennium BCE, Samarqand was first known to the ancient Greeks as Maracanda. Today visitors can see ruins of the old settlement north of the present city. The chief city of Sogdiana, on the ancient trade route between the Middle East and China, Samarqand was conquered in 329 BCE by Alexander of Macedon. Based on its location, it became a meeting point of Western and Chinese culture.

The Arabs took Samarqand in the eighth century, and it flourished as a trade center on the route between Baghdad and China. In the ninth and tenth centuries, as capital of the Abbasid dynasty in Central Asia, Samarqand emerged as a center of Islamic civilization. Samarqand continued to prosper under the Samanid dynasty of Khorasan (874–999) and under the subsequent rule of the Seljuks and of the shahs of Khwarizm.

In 1220, Genghis Khan captured and devastated the city. Timur revived the city in the fourteenth century, naming it capital of his empire and raising it to its greatest heights with his architectural achievements. Samarqand eventually became part of the emirate of Bukhara and fell to Russian troops in 1868. In 1925,



The marketplace is a standard element of life in many Central Asian cities. Here, a baker sells loaves of bread at the Bibi Bazaar market in Samarqand. (DAVID SAMUEL ROBBINS/CORBIS)

Samarqand became the capital of the Uzbek SSR, but in 1930 it was replaced by the more modern Tashkent.

In the twenty-first century Samarqand remains an industrial city with tea, wine, textiles, fertilizer, and motor-vehicle parts its primary products. It is also a major tourist attraction, with points of interest being the Registan, Bibi Khanum Mosque, Shahr-i-Zindah (street of tombs), Guri Amir Mausoleum (the tomb of Timur and his sons and grandsons), Ulug Beg's observatory, and the streets of the old city.

Rebecca M. Bichel

SAMSUN (2002 est. pop. 377,000). Samsun is the capital of Turkey's Samsun Province and is located on the Black Sea coast between the Kizil Irmak and Yesil Irmak Rivers. Originally called Amisus, it was ruled by the Greeks in the seventh century BCE and later came under Roman and Byzantine influence. The Seljuks gained control of the city in the eleventh century CE. Under Seljuk rule, the Genoese enjoyed trading privileges that continued until Samsun fell to the Ottoman sultan Bayezid I (1389–1402) in 1393. In protest, the Genoese chose to burn down the city rather than leave it to the Ottomans. This fire, as well as subsequent fires, account for the lack of surviving ancient monuments. According to the famous Turkish traveler Katip Celebi, in the seventeenth century there were four mosques, a few shop-lined streets, and a bathhouse in the town. Celebi does not mention any commercial activity. By the early nineteenth century, Samsun became an important trade center, and by the mid-nineteenth century, there was a covered market and a khan (rest house). The population in 1860, a combination of Turk, Armenian, and Greek inhabitants, was recorded at six thousand and grew to sixteen thousand by 1890.

After the end of World War I, the area saw tension between the Greeks and the Turks. On 19 May 1919 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), the founder of the Turkish Republic, landed at Samsun. He immediately began organizing the national resistance army (which he was originally sent to disband) that would eventually overthrow the sultanate and lead to the foundation of the republic in 1923. After the declaration of the Turkish Republic, 19 May was proclaimed a national holiday in honor of sports and the nation's youth.

The Samsun region was known for tobacco and hemp growing in Ottoman times (hemp was used to make rope for the army), and these continue to be its chief exports. The port of Samsun continues to be

used, as it was in its early trading days, for agricultural imports and exports; tourism is not a major industry.

T. Isikozlu-E.F. Isikozlu

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SAN FRANCISCO PEACE TREATY The San Francisco Peace Treaty, officially known as the Treaty of Peace with Japan, was signed on 8 September 1951 at the Opera House in San Francisco and brought an end to the state of war between Japan and forty-eight of the fifty-one nations in attendance at the conference. Symbolic of the Cold War divisions at the time, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia did not sign, and neither the Republic of China nor the People's Republic of China was invited (although Japan later agreed to establish a separate treaty with the Republic of China to ensure ratification by the U.S. Senate). The United States took the initiative in the peace settlement, and as a result, the peace treaty, comprised of eighteen sections and thirty articles, was relatively generous and nonpunitive in nature. The treaty itself was drafted by U.S. special emissary John Foster Dulles and his State Department assistants, who consulted with each of the Allied countries and Japan on its contents. The treaty went into effect on 28 April 1952, at which time the U.S.-led Allied Occupation of Japan (which officially began on 2 September 1945 with Japan's signing of the Instrument of Surrender) ended.

Robert D. Eldridge

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SANA'I (d. 1131), Persian poet. Sana'i (Abu al-Majd Majdud ibn Adam) flourished in the region encompassing present-day Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. His early work was probably panegyric poetry in praise of secular rulers. Legendary accounts depicting his conversion from a courtly life to a pious one, while doubtful, contributed to the notion of Sana'i as a mystical poet, earning him the later honorific *bakim* (sage). His most influential poem, the *Hadiqat al-baqiqa* (Garden of Spiritual Reality), was the first major mystical Persian work using rhyming couplets, *masnavi*. The

masnavi pattern influenced later mystical Muslim (Sufi) poets, especially the thirteenth-century masters Attar and Rumi. Less widely read, but perhaps of higher literary quality, is Sana'i's *Divan*.

Omid Safi

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SANDIWARA *Sandiwara* refers to a variety of regional popular forms of theater in Indonesia. *Sandiwara* is based on older forms of *tonil* (theater) from the Dutch colonial period; its name was changed during the Japanese occupation because of official Japanese linguistic policy prohibiting the use of the Dutch language. Among the Sundanese ethnic group of West Java, *sandiwara* refers to an urban popular theater in which costumed actors dramatize stories through Sundanese language, singing, and dance. In its heyday (1940s–1970s), performances took place in permanent theater buildings where audiences paid a small admission fee. The proscenium stage was fitted with curtains and painted backdrops depicting different scenes (for example, inner palace, outer palace, village, forest, and so on). Electric lighting illuminated the stage in the darkened auditorium.

The form is similar to *bangsawan* (Malaysia) and *kethoprak* (central Java). Using a scenario, actors improvise dialogue, elaborating stories and jokes relevant to the social issues of the day. Plays (*lakon*) are based on local histories and tales from the *wayang* theater, as well as romances and modern life. In contrast to stylized *wayang* theater, *sandiwara* emphasizes more realistic vocal inflections, movements, and acting. Comic sketches play an important role. Gamelan accompanies Sundanese dances as well as interlude songs featuring female singers interspersed throughout a performance. In the Sundanese region, *sandiwara* is rarely performed nowadays, although a few troupes still exist. Audiences in the Cirebon cultural area of coastal West Java still enjoy this form of theater. In addition to being commercial theater, *sandiwara* was also a popular form of radio broadcast. The radio version of *sandiwara*, however, is not generically related to the theatrical form of the same name.

Andrew Weintraub

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SANKARA (c. 788–820 CE), Brahman philosopher. Sankara (commonly called Sankaracarya) was born in Kaladi, Kerala, southern India, in about 788 CE. The most important of this philosopher's many works is the *Brahmasutra Bhasya*, a masterpiece of logical analysis and graceful Sanskritic style. It has acquired many commentaries by later authors. Sankara himself wrote commentaries on the principal Upanishads and on the Brahma Sutra and *Bhagavad Gita*. It was in these that he developed his doctrine of monism (*advaita*), his lasting contribution to Indian philosophies. He traveled all over India explaining the idea of monism, a metaphysical view that there is only one form of reality, called Brahman (not the same word as the Brahman, which denotes a member of the priestly castes). The apparent plurality of things and persons in the observable world is the result of cosmic ignorance (Maya), which hides the underlying unity of Brahman. All selves are basically identical, since in essence they are one with Brahman.

Although he died fairly young, the fruit of Sankara's missionary travels demonstrated that he was a great organizer, who established famous monasteries in India at Sringeri in Karnataka, Puri in Orissa, Dwaraka in Gujarat, and Badrinath in the Himalayan foothills. The influence of these religious centers has been immeasurable, and they are still flourishing. In the twentieth century, the Advaita School was revived as Vedantic Hinduism and developed a worldwide following.

Paul Hockings

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SANKARACHARYA. See **Sankara**.

SANSKRIT The earliest traces of Sanskrit, an Indo-Aryan language that is part of the larger family of Indo-European languages, occur in the hymns of the Rig Veda (the earliest Hindu sacred writings), which may have been composed as early as the second millennium BCE. By the second century BCE, Sanskrit had become the medium of many religious and philosophical texts on the Indian subcontinent and in Sri Lanka. From the fourth to thirteenth centuries CE, the role of Sanskrit as a language appropriate for the expression of sacred material greatly expanded not only throughout the Indian subcontinent, but also to large parts of mainland and insular Southeast Asia. It thus became the language of scholars across a region that connected a wide spectrum of cultures, a phenomenon that has recently been termed the Sanskrit cosmopolis.

Sanskrit grammar was reputedly first codified by Panini, an Indian grammarian who flourished around 400 BCE. Nouns and pronouns are declined in the nominative, vocative, accusative, instrumental, dative, ablative, genitive, and locative cases. Along with singular and plural forms, Sanskrit also recognizes a dual. The verb forms distinguish seven moods: present, imperfect, aorist (indefinite), imperative, perfect, future, and conditional. A marked phenomenon in Sanskrit is sandhi: many vowels or consonants slurring together to form different phonemes.

Sanskrit was the medium in which many Indian religious, philosophical, and literary texts were transmitted. Written in Sanskrit, the great Indian epics of the *Mahabharata* and *Ramayana* became known in many Southeast Asian courts where they were recited and performed, inspiring local artists with their narratives, rich imagery, and symbolism. Also, the cosmology of the Puranas (religious texts of the Hindus, dating from the third century CE, with eternal cycles of 4,320,000,000 years) was transmitted to Southeast Asia in Sanskrit. Until Theravada Buddhism, with its use of the Pali language, gained the upper hand during the eleventh and twelfth centuries CE, many Mahayana Buddhist texts also were transmitted in Sanskrit.

From the seventh century onward, religious and political texts appeared in both Sanskrit and vernacular languages, and gradually the role of Sanskrit diminished in favor of local forms of speech. On the Indian subcontinent, Sanskrit continues to be used as a sacred language. In the early twenty-first century, Sanskrit has gained new support as an aspect of Indian nationalism.

B. J. Terwiel

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SANSKRITIZATION The Indian sociologist M. N. Srinivas coined the term "Sanskritization" to identify a dominant strand of Indian society and culture, characterized by "the process by which a low caste or tribe or other group takes over the customs, ritual, beliefs, ideology, and style of life of a high and in particular a twice-born (*dwija*) caste" (1989: 56). Sanskritization has been widely interpreted as representing a form of social mobility. By pointing out that Sanskritization legitimizes upward social mobility, Srinivas questioned the widespread view of Indian society as a rigid hierarchy preventing social mobility. Noting that the concept has more than mere structural relevance, Srinivas regarded Sanskritization as the thread connecting local cults, values and beliefs, sectarian deities, and deities specific to a particular caste or region with the values, beliefs, rituals, gods, and mythologies of Sanskritic Hinduism. He associated the ideology underlying *varnashramadharma* (the scheme of division of society into ranked *varnas* and the scheme of different stages in the life of a human being) and ideas such as dharma (morality and moral order), karma (the idea that one's actions in this existence have consequences in one's next life), samsara (the cycle of birth and death), *moksha* (release from the cycle of birth and death), bhakti (devotion), *papa* (sin), and *punya* (religious merit acquired through good action) with Sanskritic Hinduism.

Sanskritization as a Structural Process

Sociologists studying Indian society have commented extensively on the concept of Sanskritization, especially as it refers to an important aspect of social structural. Viewed in the social context, Sanskritization provides a culturally specific instance of the model of reference-group behavior, which Robert Merton expounded. Merton's model holds that those who want to enhance their social status seek to emulate the lifestyles of groups called reference groups, those who enjoy a superior social status.

In India any of the *dwija* castes may be reference groups for members of castes lower in the hierarchy. A "second birth" is conferred on male members of *dwija* castes in an *upanayana* (initiation) ceremony,

which allows participants the right to don the sacred thread (worn on the shoulder) and perform rituals of *sandhya vandana* at sunrise and sunset every day. Because of their ritual entitlement, *dwija* castes are considered pure, but there is a rank order of purity among these castes, legitimized by the *purusha sukta* hymn of the Hindu *Dharma Shastra* (Law Book). This myth sanctifies the four-tiered *varna* scheme that provides the model of caste division.

According to myth, the Brahman emerges from the mouth of Purusha, the primordial being, and hence embodies maximum purity. The Brahman is associated with learning and knowledge and enjoys highest ritual status. The Kshatriya, who emerges from the shoulders of Purusha, is ranked after the Brahman. The Kshatriya *varna* is associated with the exercise of power and the use of arms to protect a person's subjects and to conquer enemies. The Vaisya, who emerges from the thighs of the Purusha, is ranked below the Kshatriya and is associated with trade and commerce. The Brahman, Kshatriya, and Vaisya form the *dwija* category of castes and are ranked above the Sudra, who emerges from the legs of Purusha. The Sudra is considered impure, and so he is required to serve others.

The *Dharma Shastra* delineates the hierarchy in caste society and ensures its immutability by prescribing severe punishments for breach of codes resulting in mixing of castes. Thus, if a Brahman woman marries a man of a lower *varna*, the couple is banished to the social fringes to live as Chandalas in crematoriums and burial grounds. Chandala is among the lowest untouchable castes. Because Chandalas deal with dead bodies, which are associated with extreme pollution in Hinduism, they suffer the social disability of untouchability in caste society.

Because knowledge of the Vedas or sacred texts is the exclusive preserve of Brahmans, scriptures prescribe pouring molten lead into the ears of a Sudra who as much as hears the recitation of these holy texts. No wonder Indologists have regarded the caste system as a rigid, closed scheme of stratification.

There is no scope for Sanskritization in Hindu society if it works according to the prescriptions and sanctions of the *Dharma Shastra*. By identifying the process of Sanskritization, Srinivas not only noted the disjuncture between the theory of caste and its practice but also indirectly showed the hold that the values and beliefs propagated by the scriptures exercised on Hindu society. He pointed out that in practice the caste system is more open than the texts suggest. The *varna* scheme provides only a reference framework for intercaste relationships and relevant rules of conduct.

In practice, castes appear as *jatis*. A *jati* is an endogamous group confined to a geographic region, speaking the local dialect or language, and sharing many local beliefs, customs, and practices. There are more than five thousand *jati* groups in Indian society, in contrast to the four *varnas* of the scriptures. Localized *jatis* link themselves to the *varna* scheme by claiming to belong to one or another *varna* and by appropriating its ritual status. Many *jatis* may fuse into a megacaste, spread across several regions of India; in other cases a *jati* may break up into smaller groups. Thus, the caste system has considerable fluidity.

Models of Sanskritization

The *jati* system makes caste hierarchy fuzzy. Disputes about ranking are especially intense when closely ranked *jatis* live together in one locality. Local interpretations, interpolations, and amendments of scriptures and local caste Puranas (sacred writings), and genealogies of various *jatis* add to the fuzziness. Thus, contests over ranking are endemic to the caste system, and here Sanskritization makes a crucial difference.

Usually the established Brahman caste in a locality or a locally dominant caste claiming *dwija* status provides a model for other local castes. The Brahmanical model of Sanskritization emphasizes vegetarianism and avoidance of items of non-*satvic* (impure) diet such as onions and garlic and of alcoholic beverages; it also emphasizes the observance of festivals and rituals associated with this caste. Adoption of Vedic rituals in the worship of local deities, construction of mythologies to establish a relationship between local deities and gods of the Hindu pantheon, adoption of local Brahmanical codes for the treatment of married and unmarried women and widows—these are prominent features of this model of Sanskritization.

If the locally dominant caste claims Kshatriya status, the local lifestyle offers a model that may allow eating meat and even drinking alcoholic beverages. This model emphasizes power and patronage; a patron must be wise and generous to clients to command their loyalty and respect. Honor and prestige of family, lineage, clan, or caste become overriding considerations, and men belonging to these castes have impressive mustaches, wear elaborate turbans, clothing, and jewelry, and speak in a loud voice to command attention. A popular strategy in claiming Kshatriya status is to trace ancestry to mythological heroes of the *Mahabharata* and *Ramayana*. Because women symbolize the family and *jati's* status and prestige, they are subject to severe restrictions. As *jati* members acquire economic or political prosperity and want to enhance their caste ranking, they withdraw

their women from extramural labor. They may also impose on women the custom of purdah, which requires women to cover their heads, especially before elders and strangers. Even in their homes, women's movements are restricted.

Srinivas thought that the Kshatriya model of Sanskritization is prominent in north India, whereas the Brahmanical model is common in the south. He believed it possible to identify a Vaisya model of Sanskritization as well, especially where merchant castes were prosperous and enjoyed great prestige, as in Rajasthan, Gujarat, and Punjab.

Among Vaisya castes, the Bania lifestyle is marked by piety and pragmatism. Banias are vegetarians and teetotalers; they are frugal and keep meticulous accounts even within the family. This latter characteristic has added to the caste's prosperity. In emergencies Banias are assured of help from their kin network. In Rajasthan, Gujarat, and Punjab, Banias are bulwarks of Hinduism; they donate generously to the construction of temples, hospitals, and hospices for humans as well as animals. More than the Brahmans, Banias have been leaders in protecting the cow, a sacred animal among the Hindus. Some Banias may adopt the Kshatriya model to gain social prestige. In the past, Banias occasionally convinced rulers to give them the title of rajas and the associated political privileges. Srinivas noted that upward mobility through Sanskritization was dominant in both British and pre-British India. He also thought that pre-British India enjoyed favorable human-to-land ratios, allowing castes to move from a region, resettle in a virgin area, and claim superior caste status. Through Sanskritization, ethnic groups on the fringes of caste society may acquire caste characteristics, so that Sanskritization played a cohesive role by allowing ethnic groups to be drawn in the fold of the caste system.

Cultural Aspects of Sanskritization

Srinivas pointed out the role of Sanskritization in India's struggle for freedom. Political leaders could mobilize support by invoking Hindu notions and images, whereby the nation was seen as *Bharat Mata* (Mother India), chained by the British regime. Gandhi contributed a unique interpretation of the Hindu idea of bhakti (devotion), ahimsa (nonviolence), karma, and dharma, to mobilize the masses.

Criticisms of Srinivas's Theories

Critics have pointed out that Sanskritization also expressed protest against and defiance of upper-caste norms. If caste members who were prohibited from

wearing the sacred thread now deliberately flaunt it, they are debunking Brahmanical norms rather than conceding superiority to the Brahmans. If members of formerly untouchable castes wear leather sandals and prominent mustaches, they are openly defying caste codes.

The growth of the Dalit movement in the last several decades has also led to a critique of Sanskritization. The Dalits (the oppressed)—a term that now generally refers to former untouchables—have claimed that Sanskritization perpetuates upper-caste, if not Brahmanical, hegemony. If the Dalits are seen as merely aping upper-caste lifestyles, Sanskritization denies the cultural autonomy of Dalits and other Sudra castes.

Kanch Illiah has sharply differentiated the culture of the Dalits and that of upper-caste Hindus. According to him, notions of purity and impurity so strong among upper castes are not critical for Dalits. Illiah viewed Dalit culture as community centered, unlike the individualistic upper-caste culture. Dalit culture emphasizes sharing resources and communal festivities. Dalit women enjoy greater freedom than upper-caste women; they can easily divorce and remarry, even if they are widows. Dalit religious attitudes are worldly and pragmatic, unlike the ritualistic and otherworldly orientation of upper-caste religion. Dalits have no professional priests, and they value manual labor and productive work, unlike members of upper castes, who consider working with their hands defiling and degrading.

Illiah's criticism of Sanskritization extends to its tacit support of the movement to make the culture and ideology of Sanskritic Hinduism dominant in India. He saw Sanskritization as an intellectual attempt to appropriate indigenous non-Sanskritic cultures and to present them as inferior to Sanskritic Hinduism.

Changing Forms of Sanskritization

Despite these criticisms, Sanskritization seems not to have weakened in contemporary India. New strains have emerged to assert the identities of low-ranking castes. Even now members of prosperous and powerful low-ranking castes build temples for Hindu gods. Although the radical anticaste ideology of B. R. Ambedkar, a Dalit leader and intellectual, has spread rapidly among the Dalits, Sanskritization also continues among them. For example, when the Dalits opposed the participation of their women in the nude worship of the goddess Renuka in north Karnataka, they invoked upper-caste ideas of women's respectability. Despite their commitment to the Ambedkar legacy, upwardly mobile Dalits observe many upper-caste customs, such as the practice of dowry, which has replaced the Dalit tradition of bride price.

A militant and virulent form of Sanskritization is evident in India today. The Bharatiya Janata Party's movement professing *Hindutva* ideology (an ideology maintaining and promoting Hindu traditions and heritage) is another example. *Hindu Rashtra* (Hindu nation), a movement supported by militant organizations, aimed to build a temple for Rama by "liberating" his sacred birthplace from the Muslim Babri mosque that was built above it. In 1992, a massive demonstration in Ayodhya, the city of Rama, went out of control as rampaging mobs scaled the mosque's walls and destroyed it. A severe Muslim backlash and widespread Hindu-Muslim riots followed.

Many participants in this movement belong to upwardly mobile "backward castes," a term referring to castes in the hazy zone between ritually polluting and pure castes. This movement also shows that *dwija* castes are no longer role models. Now people who belong to backward castes want to emulate Sadhus and Sanyasins (renouncers), gurus, godmen, and godwomen. Leaders of this movement are propagators of militant Hinduism. They reject Brahmanical hegemony and the "tolerant" model of Hinduism, which they see as acquiescing to anti-Hindu forces. This militancy seeks to rectify perceived injustices that Muslims and Christians perpetrated on Hindus, and to mold India into a strong Hindu Rashtra (Hindu nation).

Politicized Sanskritization no longer brings about positional changes in the caste hierarchy in an accommodative fashion. Instead it amplifies antagonisms based on religion. Far from playing a cohesive role, the new Sanskritizations act as a divisive force threatening to rupture the secular social fabric of India.

M. N. Panini

See also: **Hindu Nationalism**

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SANTAL The Santal (Santhal, Saonta, Saonthal, Saunta) are the largest tribal population in South Asia. They are found in Assam, northeastern Bangladesh, the Terai region of Nepal, and Bihar, West Bengal,

and Orissa states in India. "Santal" is their common name; however, traditionally they refer to themselves as *Hor hopon ko* (human children) and *Hor ko* (men). A census in 1995 counted approximately 5.1 million speakers of Santal (an Austroasiatic language of the Munda family) in India, where the Santal are the largest tribal group. They are also the largest ethnic minority in Bangladesh, second in number only to the Bengali majority. Norwegian missionaries introduced writing in the late nineteenth century, so Santali literature uses Roman characters. More recently, the Santal use the Devanagari alphabet.

Santal villages typically number from four hundred to one thousand inhabitants. In larger urban areas, Santal prefer to live in the tribal or low-caste quarters. Houses are sturdy mud structures, often decorated with floral designs. Inside, there are at least two rooms: one for the ancestors and a granary protected by them. Located at the center of the house is a post (*khunti*) to which sacrifices are made upon building the house. It stands as a ritual center. Household units include the nuclear family and the sons and their wives. Adulthood is attained when boys are initiated at age eight or ten, when a maternal uncle brands their forearms with the five tribal marks. Muslim or Hindu specialists tattoo the girls at age fourteen, following the first menstruation ceremony. Grandparents are important in the cultural education of children. Modern education is not readily available to Santal children in outlying areas.

The Santal grow several varieties of wet rice in terraced fields or in irrigated fields. Leguminous vegetables, fruit, mustard, groundnuts, cotton, and tobacco are also important crops. As well, the Santal keep domesticated animals for products and food. Most of these activities are subsistence based; however, the Santal will barter or sell these goods at tribal markets in times of surplus. The marketing of agricultural and craft (basketwork, weaving, and leafwork) products is dominated by women, whereas men tend to handle the goats and cattle. Many Santal work as migrant workers on plantations and in mines and industries. Women commonly work as seasonal migrant workers in construction or mining. A small number of the educated elite serve as lawyers, doctors, politicians, and, for women, nurses, among other white-collar careers.

Santal are divided into 12 clans and 164 subclans, which are trace descent through the father and do not intermarry. There are considerable differences in the wealth and status of the clans and subclans. Senior members of local clans, religious specialists and, more recently, political leaders are sources of authority and

have great status. At the village level, the headless village assembly is the most important political institution. At the intervillage level, the *pargana* (like a petty king) presides over the tribal court.

Many Santal are Hindu; some practice a tribal religion that features a supreme deity as well as lesser spirits that are generally benevolent. Some have also converted to Christianity. Village priests and their wives represent the original Santal couple and oversee festivals and annual ceremonies; they also perform religious duties within the village. The Santal healer and diviner (*ojha*) is responsible for folk and spiritual medical practices, although modern medicine is used as a backup on occasion.

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SANTRI *Santri* (Malay from Tamil, "trainee religious scholar") is a term popularized by the anthropologist Clifford Geertz to describe orthodox Javanese Muslims in contrast with the heterodox *abangan*. The distinguishing feature of *santri* was their adherence to the Five Pillars of Islam—the confession of faith, regular daily prayer and attendance at the mosque on Friday, fasting during Ramadan (Puasa), pilgrimage to Mecca if possible, and payment of *zakat*, a religious tax on behalf of the poor. As *abangan* means "red," *santri* are sometimes described as *putihan* (white).

Islam penetrated Java gradually over several centuries, and many Javanese considered themselves Muslim while maintaining some beliefs from earlier religions. Sufi practice was especially tolerant of mystical elements from Hinduism and Buddhism and there emerged a complex continuum from entirely non-Islamic belief through beliefs influenced by Islam and thinly Islamic beliefs to various degrees of orthodoxy.

This continuum split into increasingly opposing camps in the early twentieth century with the emergence of modern political and religious associations in Indonesia. The Sarekat Islam (founded in 1909), the Muhammadiyah (1912), and the Nahdlatul Ulama (1926) were all formed partly to promote particular

views within orthodox Islam, but their existence tended to crystallize Islamic orthodoxy as a distinct stream (*aliran*) within Javanese political and social life. The *abangan*, by contrast, were represented by a series of explicitly secular parties, notable the prewar and postwar Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) and, from the late 1950s, the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI). Antagonism between *santri* and *abangan* was partly doctrinal (*santri* saw *abangan* as impious), partly cultural (*santri* saw *abangan* as dangerous practitioners of witchcraft), and partly class-based (large landholders and moneylenders in villages were often *santri*). Many *santri* therefore took part in the massacre of Indonesian Communists in 1965–1966.

The term *santri* is sometimes applied to orthodox Muslims from any part of Indonesia. There is a growing tendency, however, to use it only for the so-called traditionalist Muslims of Java. Traditionalists differ from modernists in placing much greater emphasis on the authority of local teachers (*kiai*) and scholars (*ulama*), generally based in *pesantren* (Islamic residential schools, especially in East Java), and proportionately less emphasis on global Islamic solidarity or on direct Qur'anic exegesis. Many such *santri* include in their beliefs *abangan* elements such as the *slametan* (ritual communal feast) and an awareness of spirits and magic.

Robert Cribb

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SAPPORO (2002 est. pop. 1.8 million). Sapporo is the capital city of Hokkaido, Japan's northernmost island. It is situated in the southwestern Ishikari Plain, which is one of the island's most productive agricultural areas. Sapporo's site originally was that of an Ainu village. The Ainu, most of whom live in Hokkaido, are an ethnically distinct indigenous people related to the ancient peoples of Siberia. The Meiji government established the Hokkaido Colonization Office in 1869, after changing the island's name from Ezo to Hokkaido. Charged with the island's administration and development, the office stripped the Ainu of their land and fishing and hunting rights.

The office brought in foreign advisers and founded Sapporo Agricultural College, which later became Hokkaido University. Some of these Westerners assisted with laying out the new capital of Sapporo on a grid system, with wide avenues and parks. Here the

colonization office promoted the resettlement of unemployed samurai and others from the southern islands.

The office was closed in 1882 after a political scandal over the sale of its assets. In the same year, Hokkaido was divided into the three prefectures of Sapporo, Hakodate, and Namuro. Four years later these were done away with, and Hokkaido was reorganized as a single entity with a prefectural form of government in Sapporo, its administrative center.

After World War II, Sapporo developed into an important commercial and industrial city. The Tohoya mines of its western region produce zinc and lead. Its construction and machinery repair industries are supplemented by printing and food-processing plants, including those brewing Sapporo's noted beer. In February 1972, Sapporo hosted the eleventh Winter Olympic Games, the first to take place at an Asian site.

Visitors are drawn to the Hokkaido University campus and botanical gardens, Nakajima Park, Maruyama Zoological Gardens, and the Jozankei hot spring resort in scenic Hohei Gorge.

E. L. S. Weber

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SARANGI The *sarangi* is a bowed string instrument used to play Hindustani classical music of north India. The name "*sarangi*" goes back to the eleventh century, but the *sarangi* in use today developed at a later date. Initially used to accompany singers and dancers, the *sarangi* also became a solo instrument by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The main instrumental repertoire is based on song-tunes. The very expressive, heartfelt sound of the *sarangi* might be compared with the human voice. Most *sarangi* players are often singers themselves.

The *sarangi* is manufactured from one piece of wood, with an obvious three-part construction: an almost rectangular sound box with concave sides covered in skin; a comparatively small, hollowed, thick neck, open at the back; and a peg box (containing movable pegs used for tuning) with a small decorative opening just above the nut (a fret on the upper neck). There are three gut melodic strings (c', g, c); a fourth, made of brass and with alternative tuning, is often added. These strings are fastened at the top to the pegs and at the bottom to the inferior string holder. Eleven to thirty metal sympathetic strings are attached to side pegs located on the

neck. Melodic strings are stopped by placing one's fingernails at the side of the strings, often by touching the strings with the soft skin above the nails. This unique technique is akin to that of playing the Kazakh bowed string instrument the *qobyz*, as well as the Cretan *lyra* and the Bulgarian *gadulka*. Bows are made of rosewood or ebony, and the bowstring is of horsehair.

Less elaborate *sarangi*, often without sympathetic strings, are found in northern and northwestern India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The term "*sarangi*" is also used for a number of folk fiddles of South Asia and is sometimes applied to another kind of folk fiddle, for instance, the *sarinda*.

Aygul Malkeyeva

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SARAWAK (2000 pop. 2 million). Situated in the northwest coast of the island of Borneo, Sarawak is the largest state in Malaysia and has a land area of 124,449 square kilometers. Its population is divided among thirty distinct ethnic groups. Most of these peoples, the





GUNUNG MULU NATIONAL PARK—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Gunung Mulu National Park on the Malaysian side of Borneo (the state of Sarawak) was designated a World Heritage Site in 2000. The park contains many natural wonders including the world's most cavernous mountain (some of which remains unexplored), millions of bats and swiftlets, and an abundance of different plant and animal species.

ancestors of whom emerged about 2000 BCE, are collectively referred to as Dayaks, and include the Ibans, Bidayuh, Kenyah, Kayan, Punan, Kelabit, Penan, and others. Malays and, later, Chinese, who arrived from about the mid-eighteenth century, constitute a large percentage of the coastal and urban population.

Sarawak, which formed a province of the Brunei Sultanate, began its history as an independent entity when the English adventurer James Brooke was granted the cession of territory between Tanjung Datu at the western tip of the state and the Samarahan River in the east of the Samaharan Division in 1841 in return for his services in helping Raja Muda Hassim of Brunei put down a riot in the province. Sarawak's colonial status came to an end with the proposal to form Malaysia in 1961, which the state joined on 16 September 1963. Sarawak's major sectors of economy are mining, agriculture, and forestry. Although its economy is expanding, Sarawak remains the least urbanized state in Malaysia. Sarawak is popularly known as "the land of the hornbill" in tribute to the majestic bird found there.

Shanthi Thambiah

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SARDIS Sardis, once the terminus of the Persian royal road from Susa (in modern Iran), was an ancient city in today's Turkey, famed as the capital of the king-

dom of Lydia. The city is situated on the Sart River (the ancient Pactolus), 90 kilometers inland along the road from Izmir. Hittite records show that King Tudhaliyas IV campaigned against the Assuwa in this area in the late second millennium BCE; pottery remains indicate that the Greeks captured Sardis at the time of the siege of Troy (c. 1200 BCE); the first ruling dynasty of the region claimed descent from Herakles.

Gyges (c. 680–652 BCE), of a Lydian tribe called the Mermnadae, murdered his predecessor and married the queen of the region of Sardis; the oracle at Delphi supported the usurper but predicted that the descendants of Herakles would be revenged. Gyges and his successor kings of Lydia minted the world's first coins, of gold stamped with a lion's head, exploiting the gold washed down by the Pactolus River. Commanding the road system and thus trade, Lydia expanded by capturing Ionian cities on the coast.

King Croesus (reigned 560–546 BCE) made peace with the Ionians and defeated the Cimmerians, nomads from the north, to reach a common frontier with Persia on the Halys River. Lydia blossomed under Croesus, and when the oracle at Delphi ambiguously advised the king that if he attacked the Persians he would destroy a great empire, Croesus invaded Persia. His invasion was quickly routed, and Cyrus, the Persian ruler, besieged and captured Sardis; Croesus's own empire, not that of the Persians, had been destroyed.

The Persian satrap of Lydia was unable to prevent Sardis from being burned during the Ionian revolt (499–494 BCE), but the kingdom was peacefully ceded to Alexander of Macedon after the battle of Granicus (334 BCE). After Alexander's death Sardis fell to the Seleucids.

In 189 BCE the battle of Magnesia was fought nearby, and the Pergamene kings ended Seleucid rule in Asia Minor. From 133 BCE Sardis fell under Roman rule; trade prospered; the population grew to 100,000, with a high Jewish and Christian element guaranteed by Imperial decree; and the city became the seat of one of the seven churches of Asia Minor, persisting in importance during the Byzantine era. Timur (Tamerlane) finally destroyed Sardis in 1402 CE.

The most striking feature of the extensive site is the steep acropolis with the ruins of the palace of Croesus, but most ruins are on low ground near the river. In 1910–1914, a Princeton University archaeological expedition excavated the huge temple of Artemis; work continued in the 1950s, and parts of the temple have been reerected. Other excavations have revealed the riverside site of the gold refinery with a shrine to

Cybele. A huge Roman civic center, currently under reconstruction, was erected after an earthquake in 17 CE and includes a gymnasium with baths surrounding a marble court. Rows of shops and a synagogue line a main street due north of a residential area.

Tumuli, or burial mounds, heaped above the tombs of the Lydian kings have been identified three kilometers east of the site in an area known as Bin Tepe (1,000 hills); the largest is the tomb of King Alyattes. The grave goods in the huge tumuli were raided long ago.

Kate Clow

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SAREKAT ISLAM The Sarekat Islam ("Islamic Association"), the first political party with Indonesian-nationalist leanings in the Netherlands' Indies, evolved out of an Islamic trade association, Sarekat Dagang Islam, which was founded in 1905 with the goal of advancing the interests of Muslim merchants over those of their Chinese competitors. In 1912 it was reorganized as Sarekat Islam (SI) by Omar Said Tjokroaminoto (1882–1935), with the much broader goal of improving the general welfare and religious life of its members. Aligning itself with the international socialist movement, SI began to demand self-government for the Dutch colony in 1916. Infiltration by Communists into SI led to a power struggle with its religious leaders, and the party split in 1921. The left wing formed the "red SI," which later became the Sarekat Rakjat ("People's Association"), an organ of the Indonesian Communist Party. Although considerably weakened by the split, SI, which now called itself Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, survived until 1973, when it was coercively incorporated into the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan by the Suharto regime. After the fall of Suharto in May 1998, the ensuing democratization of Indonesia brought about the reemergence of many political parties. The Sarekat Islam reemerged as two distinct political parties, Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia and Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia 1905.

Martin Ramstedt

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SAREZ LAKE Sarez Lake in the southeastern Pamir Mountains of Tajikistan is the largest natural sediment reservoir in Central Asia. Located east of the Pamir crest in the semiautonomous Gorno-Badakhshan region, the lake formed when a 1911 tremor shook loose 6 billion metric tons of debris, damming the Murgab River. The Usoi Dam—named after the village it buried—is the highest dam, natural or man-made, on Earth. The water level rose 240 meters (787 feet) in three years and inundated 60 kilometers (37 miles) before filtration through a subterranean outlet reestablished the river. The current estimated lake area is 2 square kilometers (.7 square miles), with a maximum height above the original valley floor of 500–700 meters (1,640–2,300 feet). The lake level currently rises up to 20 centimeters (8 inches) annually.

Failure of the Usoi Dam is a potential cataclysmic disaster that would alter the economy and sociopolitical environment of Tajikistan. In a worst-case scenario that assumes collapse of the dam, a catastrophic outburst flood from Sarez Lake would destroy the villages and infrastructure in the Amu Dar'ya basin between the lake and the Aral Sea. The size and complexity of this problem will also almost certainly require financial and technical assistance from the international community. Close monitoring and an early warning system appear the most likely precautionary measures because increasing the stability of the dam is too costly. At stake are many lives, national pride, future economic development, and significant freshwater resources.

Stephen F. Cunha

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SARIT THANARAT (1909–1963), Thai prime minister. Sarit Thanarat graduated from the military



Sarit Thanarat with Robert F. Kennedy in Bangkok in February 1962. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

academy of Chula Chom Klao in 1929. He was an efficient and ambitious army officer. Commander of the First Division stationed in Bangkok, Sarit supported military dictator Pibul Songgram (ruled 1948–1957). Sarit served as defense minister and commander in chief from 1947 to 1957. He engineered a nonviolent coup that deposed the government of Pibul in 1957. Following a year of the caretaker government, in October 1958 Sarit declared himself the prime minister of Thailand. Sarit proceeded to rule the country with an iron hand, banning opposition parties and newspapers and suspending constitutional amendments, while simultaneously seeking to stamp out Thailand's opium trade, end police corruption, and battle organized crime.

Sarit tried to build up traditional Thai values. Promotion of Buddhism and cultivation of the monarchy were the main features of his policies. Sarit cleverly utilized the monarchy both to enhance his own legitimacy and to strengthen the institution of the monarchy itself. Sarit collaborated closely with the United States to contain communism in Southeast Asia. Bilateral relations between Thailand and the United States were further strengthened by the Rusk-Thanat Agreement of 1962, which represented an American guarantee of Thai security. Sarit supported the right-

ists in Laos in their fight against the Communist-oriented leftist organization Pathet Lao. His economic policies resulted in U.S. and Japanese investment, rise of a new wealthy class due to land speculation, and sustained economic growth of 5 percent per year. The legacy of Sarit after his death in 1963 was Thai involvement in the Vietnam War and the establishment of development-oriented technocratic agencies.

Patit Paban Mishra

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SARNATH Sarnath, 10 kilometers north of Varanasi (Benares) in Uttar Pradesh State, India, is the site of the deer park (still extant) where Siddhartha Gautama the Buddha (c. 566–486 BCE) preached his first sermon nearly 2,500 years ago. The message he revealed there formed the basis for the entire future development of Buddhism, hence its and Sarnath's tremendous importance. In Sarnath, Buddha also established the order of monks, the Sangha, which is today the world's oldest still-functioning association. Dhamekh Stupa, a Buddhist shrine constructed in the fifth and sixth centuries CE, marks the spot where this sermon was supposed to have been given. Other important monuments are five monasteries; a column erected by the Emperor Asoka (reigned c. 273–232 BCE), with an inscription threatening dissident monks; the main shrine (third century BCE and fifth century CE) and the Dharmarajika Stupa (attributed to Asoka, but enlarged until the twelfth century). A modern addition is the superb Archaeological Museum nearby. It contains the famed lion capital, which has become a symbol of modern India.

Paul Hockings

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SAROD A stringed instrument from northern India that is three to three and a half feet long. The instrument has a round head, with a resonating chamber made of teak wood and a parchment or skin belly soundboard that is attached to a triangular neck and fingerboard. The fingerboard has a thin polished metal sheet covering and is fretless, allowing the player to execute *meends*, or sliding of the pitch. The modern sarod has twenty to twenty-five metal strings; fifteen *tarab* (sympathetic) strings; four main strings; three *chikari* (*jhala*), raised strings that provide a rhythmic drone; and three *thaat* strings that are tuned to the raga that is being played. The instrument is played with a plectrum, fashioned from coconut shell, in the right hand, while the left hand is used on the upper neck of the instrument. The sarod has its origins in Indian and Afghan lutes, and, more particularly, the *rebab* of the Middle East. It also was developed from the *sursringar* and *veena* stringed instruments. The present form of the sarod developed in the nineteenth century. The word sarod is linked to the Sankrit *shorode* (good noise), the Persian *sarrod* (melody), and Arabic *sabrood* (music) as well as to the word *swarode* (music) from Bengal.

Stacey Fox

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SARYSHAGAN Saryshagan, a town in eastern Kazakhstan, was chosen as the site of a ballistic missile test range during the Cold War. It is located on the southwestern shore of Lake Balkhash, in the province of Qaraghandy, one thousand miles downrange from the launching site of Kapustin Yar and remote yet accessible from the Trans-Siberian Railway. Saryshagan has been a testing range and research facility since the mid-1950s; the United States learned of it only in 1958. During a series of atmospheric nuclear tests in the years 1961–1962, several nuclear weapons were detonated directly above Saryshagan. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has maintained control of the facility, conducting missile tests as late as 1999. However, negotiations are ongoing to turn control of the Saryshagan range over to the government of Kazakhstan.

Andrew Sharp

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SASAGAWA RYOICHI (1899–1995), Japanese right-wing leader and postwar businessman. In 1931, Sasagawa took leadership of the Kokusui Taishuto (National Essence Mass Party). In 1933, with other party members, he secretly carried out a plan to assassinate the politician Wakatsuki Reijiro (1866–1949). During the national *kokutai* ("polity") clarification campaign (1935–1936), this same group was engaged in a campaign of terror against the scholar Minobe Tatsukichi (1873–1948). After Japan's surrender to the Allied Forces, Sasagawa reorganized his National Essence Party into a new right-wing organization; both the old and the new party were outlawed. In 1945, he was arrested as a Class A war criminal and spent three years in Sugamo Prison. After his release, Sasagawa became an adviser to Zen-Nippon Aikokusha Dantai Kaigi (National Council of Patriotic Societies). Beginning in 1951, he was engaged in the motorboat racing business. He established the Japan Motorboat Racing Association and, in 1962, became chairman of the newly created Japan Shipbuilding Industry Foundation. In 1986, he established the Sasagawa Peace Foundation, the funding for which comes from motorboat racing revenues. He was twice decorated by the Showa emperor (1926–1989), first with the First Order of the Sacred Treasure in 1978, and then with the First Order of Merit with the Grand Cordon on the Rising Sun in 1987.

Nathalie Cavasin

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SATI Sati (suttee) is the practice of a wife burning herself to death on the funeral pyre of her husband. The custom is linked to Hindu India but throughout history has also been reported elsewhere, from ancient Egypt and Greece to pre-Christian northern Europe. Within Hinduism, sati is not a required act; it is considered to be voluntary. Despite considerable popular interest outside India, sati has always been quite rare and generally confined to northern India and especially Rajasthan. Prior to its being banned by India's British colonial rulers in 1829, only several hundred cases were reported each year. Since then, few cases have been reported, although several drew media attention in the 1990s.

The origins and reasons for sati are unclear and subject to dispute among scholars. Evidently, it is a product of Hinduism, as the practice is mentioned and tales

of sati are set forth in early Hindu sources. The first documented case occurred in 908 CE. The custom was noted by several early travelers to India including the Portuguese trader Barbosa in 1510 and the Italian Pietro Della Valle in 1623. While sati was never required of widows, such behavior was considered prestigious, and a woman who committed sati was seen as brave and self-sacrificing. Furthermore, the act was thought to bring salvation to her deceased husband and to release herself and her family from the cycle of death and rebirth.

Sati was most common among the Rajput warrior caste in northern India. About forty cases have been reported since 1947, and twenty-eight of them have been in Rajasthan. The reasons for the association of sati with the Rajputs is unclear, although some experts believe that it reflects the value they place on bravery and self-sacrifice. It is also true that the frequency of sati has varied over time in India, with more cases reported during times of social unrest. From the viewpoint of feminist scholars, it represents the traditional repression of women in Hindu India as well as the difficult lives often facing widows.

Sati was banned by the British in 1829, with the support of the anti-Hindu Brahmo Samaj movement. However, it was not until after independence in 1947 that the practice almost completely disappeared. Since then, there have been a few reported cases, with perhaps the sati of Roop Kanwar in Rajasthan in 1987 drawing the most attention. She was an educated eighteen year old married to her husband for only a few months when he died. There were charges that she was coerced or forced to commit sati by Hindu traditionalists in the village, and the incident was cited by some as evidence of the continuing repression of women in India. In 1996 the Indian Court acquitted those accused of assisting her and ruled that sati was a Hindu social tradition.

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SATO EISAKU (1901–1975), prime minister of Japan. Sato Eisaku was prime minister of Japan from November 1964—following Ikeda Hayato's sudden resignation for health reasons—until July 1972, making him the longest-serving premier in the country's history. During his tenure, Sato realized the normalization of relations with South Korea in 1965 and the return



Prime Minister Sato in San Francisco in November 1969 following talks with U.S. President Richard Nixon. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

of Ogasawara in 1968 and Okinawa in 1972, issues that had been pending since the 1952 peace treaty. In 1967 he announced Japan's three non-nuclear principles, for which he received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974. Domestically, however, Sato was unpopular due to problems of pollution and overcrowding, as well as his support of America's involvement in the Vietnam War.

The younger brother of Kishi Nobusuke, Sato was born in Yamaguchi Prefecture in 1901, making him the first postwar prime minister born in the twentieth century. After graduating from Tokyo Imperial University in 1924, Sato joined the ministry of railways, rising to vice minister. In 1948 he was made cabinet secretary in the second Yoshida cabinet, and in 1949 successfully ran for the Diet.

In early 1954, his career was tainted when he was reported to have taken bribes in the Shipbuilding Scandal, but he was saved by the intervention of the prime minister and later served in several cabinets.

Sato was known for his skilled management of people, balancing of factions, and his "wait and see" style of politics.

Robert Eldridge

SATPURA RANGE The Satpura Range is a mountain range running east-west across the southwestern part of Madhya Pradesh State of India, but reaching westward through southern Gujarat almost to Broach and the Gulf of Khambhat, and eastward into the new state of Chhattisgarh. It takes its name from the small town of Satpura. The range is at most 150 kilometers wide and approximately 1,000 kilometers in length, but not very high: The eastern peak of Amarkantak, in Bilaspur District, reaches 1,092 meters. It has Hindu temples and waterfalls, and one basin near a temple is considered to be the source of the Narmada River. East of this point there are a few higher peaks, the highest being Dhokgarh, and the Satpuras merge into the Maikala and Hazaribagh Ranges.

The westerly part of the range forms the divide between the valleys of the Tapti and Narmada Rivers. In this area is a small hill station, Pachchmarhi, at about 1,150 meters. East of Khandwa, an important junction town, the Satpuras are here called the Mahadeo Hills, and further east they open up to form a broader plateau, the Chhindwara Plateau, which lies between Nagpur and Jabalpur cities. Though most of the Satpura Range falls within Madhya Pradesh, it effectively forms the border between that state and northwestern Maharashtra. Geologically, in the west the Satpuras are a steep-sided Deccan lava block. More easterly stretches are a great window of Archaean and Middle Gondwana rocks, plateaus formed from thick masses of red sandstone.

Paul Hockings

SATYAGRAHA Mohandas K. Gandhi (1869–1948) devised a system of civil disobedience called satyagraha (from the Sanskrit *satya*, meaning "truth," and *agraha*, meaning "persistence") in 1894, during his stay in South Africa. At that time, Indian residents and indentured laborers suffered many indignities at the hands of the white authorities there, and Gandhi, a lawyer, sought to improve conditions for Indians. Satyagraha involved the application of soul-force, which was based on truth and nonviolence, to remove these grievances.

After he returned to India, Gandhi led his distinctive, nonviolent protests against the excesses of British

rule in India, beginning in 1920. In its initial stages, satyagraha involved noncooperation, but later it took on tones of civil disobedience. This style of passive resistance was ultimately successful, because it put the use of force by the police and others in authority against these resisters in such a bad light. Satyagraha was thus a major factor in the march toward Indian independence in 1947. Later the method was adopted by Martin Luther King (1929–1968) for the civil-rights movement in the United States

Paul Hockings

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SAYYID AHMAD KHAN (1817–1898), Indian Muslim educator. Often given the honorific title of Sir Sayyid, Ahmad Khan is probably the most famous Indian Muslim educator. Since the seventeenth century, his family had been closely connected with the Mughal emperors, holding important positions in the Indian Muslim administration. However, in 1838, on the death of his father, who received an allowance from the Mughal court, Ahmad Khan's family faced financial difficulties, which forced him to enter the service of the East India Company. Starting as a simple clerk in the Delhi court of justice, within a few years he attained the rank of *munsif* ("subjudge").

While he held this position, Ahmad Khan studied education, religion, history, archaeology, and politics. In 1847, he published the famous *Athar al-sanadid* (Monuments of the Great). Between 1858 and 1861, he wrote two pamphlets about the so-called Great Mutiny, the 1857 insurrection against British rule in India, during which he had remained loyal to the East India Company. In these pamphlets—which influenced the subsequent policy of the colonial British government—he analyzed the reasons for the insurrection, blaming both Indians and British.

Ahmad Khan's most significant achievements were in the field of education. During the 1850s and 1860s, he established schools and a scientific society to diffuse the Urdu and English languages. After a visit to England in 1869–1870, in 1878 he established Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College, modeled after the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge. Established in Aligarh, it was elevated to university rank in 1920 and became the most famous and innovative Muslim educational institution of the Indian subcontinent. In the meantime, he had launched an influential journal,

Tabdhib al-Akblaq (Social Reform), and established the All-India Muhammadan Educational Conference to diffuse modern sciences and knowledge and to reform traditional Muslim religious ideas, harmonizing them with Western thought.

His attempts to demonstrate the conformity of modern sciences and doctrine with the principles of Islamic faith provoked harsh reactions from the traditional *ulama* and *faqih* (experts of religious law); their reactions were particularly violent against his demythologizing approach to the Qur'an and his "rationalistic" approach toward religion.

Loyal to his view of peaceful coexistence of Hindus, Indian Muslims, and the British, Ahmad Khan opposed the Indian National Congress and its political ideas. He argued that for Muslims of the Indian subcontinent, education was more important and effective than politics.

Riccardo Redaelli

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SCIENCE. See **Abacus; Gunpowder and Rocketry; High-Technology Industry—Asia; Intellectual Property—Asia; Korea Institute of Science and Technology; Magnetism; Science Towns—Korea; Science, Traditional—China.**

SCIENCE TOWNS—KOREA *Yeongu danji* are South Korean science towns, also known as science parks. Such parks can be either private undertakings, as in Silicon Valley in the United States, or public undertakings and generally have four major sets of political and economic objectives: (1) forge links among universities, private industrial enterprises' research, and industrial production operations, and state-run research and development facilities to gain synergistic effects through frequent contact; (2) promote knowledge-based businesses in high technology and new ("sunrise") industries; (3) facilitate the transfer of technology from research and development to production operations and encourage corporate start-ups, spin-off companies, new corporate divisions, and "incubator" companies where researchers gain experience before launching their own

enterprises; and (4) pursue a grab bag of state policy goals, such as promoting export industries and boosting economic development in laggard regions.

South Korea's Taedok Science Town (TST) was established in Taejon by the Ministry of Science and Technology in 1973 to concentrate state-run laboratories and to provide a conducive site for corporate research and development. Due to the energy crisis and budgetary problems late in the Fourth Republic (1972–1980), major construction was delayed until the 1980s. TST was not formally dedicated until 1992, and major corporate research did not begin until 1994. The Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Korea's premier technical institute, has its main campus in TST. The LG Group's biotechnology research since the mid-1990s has been centered at TST. During the 1980s, the government decided to establish a science town in each of the major regions of Korea, but currently only the small Kwangju Science Town in South Cholla Province has been opened.

Joel R. Campbell

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SCIENCE, TRADITIONAL—CHINA As elsewhere in the premodern world, scientific thought in China emerged with early attempts to think about the natural world systematically and abstractly. One of the earliest approaches to organize the natural and phenomenological world is found in the ancient divination text known today as the *Book of Changes* (*Yijing*). Although popular writers today find antecedents for many modern scientific ideas in this ancient text, to early Chinese science and many other areas of Chinese philosophy, the *Book of Changes* offered a way of organizing and classifying natural phenomena—the first step in any scientific tradition. As many of the terms used in this system of classification came from ancient mystical traditions of shamanism and divination, assigning them strict definitions is particularly for Western students of Chinese science and life. The

terms "yin and yang," *wu xing*, and *qi* have been the subject of a great deal of debate in the vain quest for precise Western equivalents. The fact that these terms are still used in schools of traditional medicine in China today, however, testifies to their usefulness in Chinese science.

From these beginnings, four kinds of organizing principles emerged to form the basis of all premodern Chinese scientific thought: Heaven and Man, yin-yang duality, the *wu xing* or Five Phases, and *qi*.

Heaven and Man

The relationship between Heaven and Man is central in Chinese scientific thought and is expressed in several different ways. In Chinese astronomy and astrology, man is not only part of the natural world, but heaven above also reflects and responds to the human world below. The second-century BCE *fenshu* (field allocation theory maps) divided the heavens first into political regions in the human world and then into specific agencies within the imperial government. Particular constellations corresponded to specific government ministries, and the unpredicted appearance of an object in a ministry's constellation was seen as an ominous sign.

Chinese medicine interprets the relationship between nature and man in terms of microcosm and macrocosm. The human body could be interpreted as both a natural world in miniature and an integral part of a larger natural world. As a result, ailments and disease are diagnosed as either dysfunctional imbalances within the microcosm of the human body itself or imbalances between the body and the external world.

Yin and Yang

"Yin" and "yang" are early terms used in Chinese thought used to express the basic duality of all phenomena. The earliest examples can be found in the *Book of Changes*, and some writers maintain that conscious expression of the notion of polar dualities can be found in the art of the Shang dynasty. The terms "yin" and "yang" are used to express the observation that many things have a dual nature: there is both dark and light, cold and hot, female and male. The Chinese characters for yin and yang literally describe the shaded and illuminated sides of a hill. In medicine the terms are most frequently used as adjectives, qualifying things based on their observed qualities, such as yang *qi* or yin *qi*.

The Five Phases

The Five Phases (*wu xing*) are used in Chinese science to further describe and classify phenomena, especially processes. An emphasis on process and

interaction is one of the distinguishing characteristics of Chinese science and medicine. While much of early Western medicine stressed the mechanical relationships of body parts and organs, Chinese medicine looked at how the many characteristics of the body and nature interacted and sought ways to describe and classify these interactions and processes. Often confused with the Aristotelian "elements," the Five Phases in China are the metal phase, wood phase, water phase, fire phase, and earth phase. The word *xing*, translated here as "phase," means "to do or act, action, activity." These five phases or activities of *qi* are often used to explain cyclical transformations found in medicine and elsewhere.

Qi and the Five Phases

Qi is the most important term in Chinese science and one of the most difficult to translate. Most scholars today choose not to translate or interpret the term, but some of the better Western equivalents for the term *qi* include "matter-energy" or "vital energy or substance." Nathan Sivin explains that *qi* is simultaneously "what makes things happen in stuff" and "stuff in which things happen." *Qi* can either take form and become visible and substantial or be an agent that activates processes and influences their development. As a result, the concept of *qi* is central in Chinese medicine. *Qi* circulates throughout the body as a kind of vital energy, but unlike blood it has no substance. Instead *qi* activates and influences how the blood and organs function. Often *qi* is beneficial, but sometimes *qi*, particularly from some outside source, can upset the balance within the body to create some form of ailment. The responsibility of the Chinese doctor is to diagnose this imbalance and take corrective measures.

The Five Phases describe five aspects of *qi* and their cyclical relationship. The wood phase does not describe the texture of *qi*, but *qi* that is growing and developing a certain potential. When it moves on to the next phase, fire, it realizes this potential and becomes active. The fundamental sequence of the Five Phases is sometimes called the cycle of mutual production. The order of cycle is based on early empirical observations, but in practice its use is much more theoretical. When wood is burned it produces fire; fire produces ash (earth); ores from the earth become metal; water condenses on cold metal; and wood can grow with water. The logic behind this sequence is more mnemonic than practical. What was important for the Chinese scientist or doctor was the relationship between the different aspects of *qi*.

All these basic concepts, yin and yang, the Five Phases, and *qi* can be combined to build a complex the-

oretical structure for the patterns and relationships Chinese scientists and doctors found in nature. One important point to note is that even though Chinese thinkers confronted the same physical universe—human bodies in China differ in only superficial ways from bodies elsewhere in the world—Chinese science and medicine developed a unique theoretical structure for understanding the phenomena found in the universe, a system of understanding that Chinese scientists employed and refined for almost two thousand years.


Paul Forage

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SCULPTURE—SOUTH ASIA The beginnings of South Asian sculpture may be found in the early Indus-Sarasvati civilization of the second millennium BCE. The mature phase of this civilization (2500–1700 BCE) carries evidence of a high level of technical knowledge and skill but, curiously, a lack of large structures, such as temples or palaces, or monumental sculpture. From its ruins, small figurines in stone or cast bronze or copper have been recovered, as have terra-cotta animals and female figures, the last presumed to be cultic objects. A large number of steatite (soapstone) seals with impressions of bovine unicorns, buffaloes, bulls, tigers, rhinoceroses, and composite animal figures and some enigmatic human forms, surmised to have commercial or ritual uses, have been recovered.

Little material evidence has been found from the period intervening between the Indus Valley civilization and the Maurya empire of the third century BCE. The reasons for this absence are unclear, but the use of perishable materials of construction and strictures on representation are possible explanations. Vedic rit-




A stone relief of footprints on a pillar at the Great Stupa of Asoka in Sanchi, India. (ADAM WOOLFITT/CORBIS)

ual culture is presumed to have been established around 1500 BCE, followed by the contemplative esotericism of the Upanishads (Vedic speculative texts) around 800 BCE and the birth of Buddhism and Jainism in the sixth century BCE.

Stone Monuments

In 326 BCE, Alexander of Macedon's incursion into the northwest border of the South Asian subcontinent, part of his conquest of the extensive Achaemenid Persian empire of Darius III, created a political vacuum that was swiftly filled by the first Mauryan king, Chandragupta (reigned c. 322–c. 298 BCE). Chandragupta Maurya's imperial ambitions were styled after those of Darius and Alexander, and to his successor Asoka is attributed the Persian practice of building stone monuments and the incorporation of Achaemenid and Hellenistic motifs and devices in his structures. In 265 BCE Asoka (reigned c. 273–232 BCE) embraced Buddhism and proceeded to mark numerous prominent pilgrimage routes and Buddhist centers throughout his vast



A sculpture from the eleventh century in India showing Siva appearing out of the linga. (GIAN BERTO VANNI/CORBIS)

empire with tall polished stone pillars inscribed with edicts expounding the Buddhist law of righteousness. Though this practice and the literary style of the inscribed proclamations are reminiscent of an Achaemenid device for establishing the law of the emperor, the custom also extends an ancient indigenous Vedic tradition of the cosmic pillar, Skambha.

Asoka's pillars are topped by a capital with an inverted lotus base, which supports a circular abacus carved with four royal animals and four wheels, on which stands a quartet of stylized addorsed (back-to-back) lions, supporting on their heads an enormous wheel representing the Buddhist law (*dharmacakra*). The stylized lions are again derived from Achaemenid sources. Achaemenid and Hellenistic decorative motifs, such as rosettes, palmettes, spirals, and reel-and-bead patterns, also appear in other structural remains from Asoka's time, attesting to the cosmopolitan nature of his court and its culture.

Other monuments attributed to Asoka's patronage include Buddhist stupas, or relic-mounds, and rock-


cut caves, serving as shelters for itinerant renunciants, both of which remained important settings for sculpture for a thousand or more years. Asoka's monuments were created in sandstone and finished to a high polish, a technique that was lost to South Asia after Mauryan times.

A number of massive frontal stone sculptures depicting male and female figures (*yakshas* and *yakshinis*, respectively) also remain from Mauryan times. These are representations of supernatural elementals that had been in popular propitiatory worship for protection, fertility, or wealth. These beings, as well as gods of the Vedic pantheon, became assimilated into early Buddhism and soon reappeared iconically as Buddhist threshold deities, protectors of devotees, bestowers of auspiciousness, and servants of the Buddha.

Monastic Monuments

The Mauryan dynasty lasted barely fifty years after the death of Asoka and was followed by the Brahmanical Shunga dynasty (c. 185–73 BCE) in northern South Asia. Buddhist lay patronage, however, had developed a strong foundation, and monastic monuments continued to flourish during the second century BCE. Typical examples of the sculpture of this period are found among the remains of the stupa of Bharhut. The circular stone railing (*vedika*) enclosing the stupa has carved roundels on its horizontal and vertical elements, often elaborated into ornate lotuses. Some of these contain carvings of human heads or animals at their center, and some are filled in with narrative scenes from the life of the Buddha or episodes from tales of his past lives as told in the *jataka* texts. At this stage, Buddha's figure is never depicted and is represented by symbols such as the Bodhi tree, the Wheel of the Law, or a stupa, according to narrative context. The relief carving is shallow and frontal and harks back to a tradition of carving in wood. On the vertical entrance posts of the *vedika* are chiseled large figures of *yakshas* and *yakshinis*, standing on animal or dwarf mounts. The *yakshas* are shown with their hands folded (*anjali mudra*) in a gesture of self-offering, while the *yakshinis* pose angularly with one leg bent outward and a hand raised to hold a fruiting bough. Such *yakshinis* are known as *shalabhanjikas*, fertility figures believed to cause trees to blossom at their touch, now emblems of creativity and auspiciousness at the service of the Buddha and the Buddhist community.

This post-Mauryan Buddhist relief tradition reaches its full maturity around the first century BCE, as evidenced in the gateways (*torana*) of the Mayastupa (Great Stupa) at Sanchi. This stupa, at the center of a monastic complex, was established by Asoka and fur-



Sculptured gate of the Great Stupa in Sanchi, India. (ARCHIVO ICONOGRAFIC, S.A./CORBIS)

ther enlarged during Shunga times. Around 100 BCE, four great gateways were provided at the cardinal entrances to this stupa. The horizontal and vertical elements of these gateways carry carvings thematically similar to those at Bharhut. However, these carvings demonstrate much greater assurance: The narrative arrangements, particularly on the extended horizontal architraves, show a refined clarity of form, a varied mobility of posture, and a judicious use of devices to enhance the sense of depth where necessary. Large and powerful figures of elephants, lions, or dwarfs are deeply carved out on the vertical pillars and seem to support the upper portions. But perhaps the most perfect realizations on these gates are the *shalabhanjikas*, now almost disengaged from the stone, the rhythmic swing of their voluptuous forms naturalistically posed against the fruiting branches. The perfect combination of ecstatic sensuousness and contemplative repose in these figures becomes one of the aesthetic ideals of South Asian sculpture, seeking fulfillment in different forms through history.

Figurative Depictions

Around the beginning of the Christian era, the Kushan dynasty (78–200 CE), originating in the borderlands of Central Asia and China, established itself

as the imperial power in northern South Asia. The most famous king of this dynasty was Kanishka (c. 120–160 CE). It is around this time that the first figural depictions of the Buddha make their appearance, almost simultaneously in the northwest province of Gandhara and the Gangetic metropolis of Mathura. Reasons for this iconic appearance are unknown but may be related to doctrinal shifts in Buddhism from the more austere Theravada toward the devotionism of Mahayana, with its emphasis on worship and its expanded pantheon of bodhisattvas. A consistent iconography finds expression in both the Gandhara and Mathura Buddha images, though they are stylistically divergent. The Gandhara Buddha is modeled after a Greco-Roman Apollonian prototype, while the Mathura figure derives from indigenous *yaksha* traditions. In both cases, the Buddha is draped in monastic robes (*sanghati*), has a halo behind his head, and is shown with a cranial protuberance (*ushnisha*) symbolizing transcendental knowledge, and with a whorl of hair between the eyebrows (*urna*). He is seated in meditation or standing erect with his right hand raised in a gesture of bestowing fearlessness (*abhaya mudra*).

But whereas a predominant naturalism marks the features and costuming of the Gandhara figure, the Mathura image is characterized by its simplified



A statue of the river goddess Ganga in Kathmandu, Nepal. (MICHAEL FREEMAN/CORBIS)

rounded features—its see-through draping and its monumentality and physical tension projecting power. Bodhisattva figures in the characteristic styles of Gandhara and Mathura also appear at this time, wearing regal accouterments and carrying their distinctive attributes—Maitreya with his water pot, Vajrapani with the thunderbolt, Padmapani with his lotus and the seated Buddha in his headdress.

The Kushan period also yields the earliest Brahmanical images in stone, representing the three major cults of Hindu worship—Siva in the form of the phallus, or lingam, symbolizing infinite creative potential; Vishnu as the deity of universal protection, related to the Vedic solar godhead; and the Mother Goddess, particularly in her form as Durga, the destroyer of evil. Other prominent Brahmanical deities represented include Surya and Skanda.

Emergence of Classical Style

During the fourth century, a new Hindu imperial dynasty established itself in northern South Asia. Its

reign, patronage, and courtly culture are credited with the development of the classical style in South Asian art. This was the Gupta dynasty (c. 320–c. 500 CE), whose most famous king was Candra Gupta II (c. 375–415 CE). During this period, the major center for the production of Buddha images in the east shifted from Mathura to Sarnath, and the Kushana Buddhas were replaced stylistically by a type characterized by its idealized soft modeling and the self-absorbed tranquillity of its features. A standardization and compaction of iconic elements and a vocabulary of distinctive hand gestures (mudras) marking special occasions accompany these images. Bodhisattvas, *yakshas*, *nagas* (mythical snake deities), and their consorts all undergo a similar elaboration and stylistic change, the Buddha and several bodhisattvas also appearing in bronze casting.

A proliferation of Hindu deities, organized spatially in integrated contexts of ritual worship, was produced in this period. Initially, the sites for these reliefs were niches in cave-temples, but the stand-alone Hindu temple in stone also evolved at this time and henceforth became the setting for sculpture. The Guptas being followers of Vishnu, images of this deity and his incarnations (avatars), particularly the boar (*varaha*), lion-man (*narasimha*), and dwarf (*vamana*), find frequent representation. An increased emphasis on goddesses and other female images also occurred at this time. Apart from Durga, the Seven Mothers (Saptamatrika) were often depicted, as were the river goddesses Ganga and Jamuna. By the sixth century, Buddhism also witnessed the apotheosis of feminine power, in the form of Tara, the consort of the bodhisattva Avalokiteshvara.

A developed Saivite iconography, depicting mythical episodes connected with Siva and his consort Parvati, also found expression in sites of worship by cults such as the Pashupatas. Images of Ganesha, Skanda, Parvati, and Ganga were given prominence here along with Siva's bull mount, Nandi, his dwarf-retinue of the *ganas*, and several other gods and goddesses. Saivite cultic placement consigned the abstract phallic icon of Siva to the sanctum, faced from the entrance of the temple by Nandi, and surrounded along a clockwise circumambulatory path (*pradakshinapath*) by niches sheltering other gods and goddesses and scenes showing the pastimes of Siva. An image of Ganesha invariably initiated this procession, and Skanda or Durga often concluded it.

Stylistically, all these figures evolved an aesthetic by the end of the fifth century that shared the monumental repose of the Gupta Buddha but integrated this

with a power of massiveness and restrained ecstatic delight. Contemporaneously, in the Deccan, a related but more voluptuous aesthetic developed in Buddhist and Hindu figural expression, under the patronage of the powerful Vakatakas, related by marriage to the Guptas. Examples of the full fruition of the Vakataka Buddhist style are evident at the cave excavations at Ajanta, while the early excavations at nearby Ellora or at the island of Elephanta, datable to the early sixth century, show examples of Deccan Saivite sculpture of this period at its ripeness.

Temple Imagery: A New Fluidity

Though the stand-alone Hindu stone temple first appeared in South Asia under the Guptas, it evolved into maturity in the sixth century under the Western Chalukyans in the southern Deccan and through the seventh century in southern India under the Pallavas. Sculpture during this period continued to develop local variants of the Gupta iconography and style, but there was also a marked tendency in these southern centers toward an infusion of greater plastic dynamism into the figures. A fine example of this may be observed in a seventh-century panel depicting Durga battling the buffalo demon Pallava Mamallapuram. The iconic stillness and massiveness of Gupta deities is here replaced by dramatic interest and a capture of power in motion. Subsequent sculpture in South India continued to develop in fluidity, reaching perhaps the zenith of its integration of stillness and movement in the tenth-century image of the dancing Siva, Nataraja, developed in south India under Chola (c. 850–1200) patronage.

From the tenth to the twelfth centuries, South Asian sculptors evolved such consummate skill and facility in carving that sculpture during this period



Reclining Buddha in the Ajanta Caves, Maharashtra, India. (LINDSAY HEBBERD/CORBIS)

spills out of the measured enclosure of niches and dominates the temple surface. Khajuraho under the Chandella kings, Orissa under the Gangas, and the Hoysala kingdom of the southern Deccan bear witness to this trend, where temple architecture adapted itself to accommodate a prolific presentation of imagery. The temple, as an integral whole, projects the impression of the mighty immobile cosmic Mount Meru, which contains the multitudinous, varied activity of the world at its base. The sculpted forms of deities and celestial denizens stand or interact in various fluid postures, expressing the ecstatic repose of transcendental action. In the case of Orissa and Khajuraho, a strong erotic element also finds expression, indicating the prominent presence of Tantric cults. This high achievement of the successful marriage of static soaring temple forms and teeming mobile surfaces marks the final creative outburst of the South Asian tradition in sculpture.

Buddhism withdrew from India by the thirteenth century, and gradual Islamic dominance of northern South Asia from the twelfth century inhibited the production of large-scale Hindu temple environments. The Vijayanagara kingdom of the south and other pockets that offered resistance to Muslim conquest managed to continue the tradition until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but with a progressive diminution of ideational creativity.

Debashish Banerji

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SEHWAN (2002 pop. 38,000). The city of Sehwan, Pakistan, is located in the lower Indus valley, 135 kilometers from the city of Hyderabad. Sehwan is one of the oldest settlements in the region and was once protected by a large fort whose remains exist to the north of the city. La'l Shahbaz Qalandar, a Sufi mystic who emigrated from Sistan in Iran in the mid-thirteenth century, is buried here. His 'urs (wedding) ceremony is celebrated from the eighteenth through the twentieth day of the month of Shaban. The shrine is famous for the *dhammal* (ritual dancing) that takes place every evening and involves the beating of vast drums.

The shrine of La'l Shahbaz Qalandar, which is on the site of an old Shiva sanctuary, was originally built in 1356 by the Indian monarch Feroz Shah Tughlaq (reigned 1351–1388) and has since been renovated many times. In the 1970s the prime minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928–1979), built a new entrance to the south, which is marked by a pair of gold doors presented by Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1919–1980), the shah of Iran. The main entrance is through a monumental portal that is covered in blue and white tiles and has corner minarets. The arcaded courtyard leads into a domed enclosure under which the saint is buried.

Kisbwar Rizvi

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SEIFULLIN, SADUAKAS (1894–1938), Kazakh writer, poet, editor, dramatist. Saduakas Seifullin was born to a poor nomadic family in Karaganda. Initially educated in his native village, in 1908 he was sent by his parents to study at the Russian-Kazakh school in Akmolinsk. Between 1913 and 1916 he attended school at the Omsk Teachers' Seminary, where he helped create the youth groups Birlik (Unity) and Zhas Kazak (Young Kazakh). Following the February Revolution, he participated in numerous revolutionary activities, joining the Bolsheviks in February 1918. In June 1918 he was arrested by political opponents but avoided execution and eventually escaped. He was elected to the Kazakh Party central committee, and from 1925 to 1937 he was the editor of the party's newspaper, *Engbekshi Kazak* (Kazakh Worker). In addition, he taught for many years at the Kazakh State Pedagogic Institute in Almaty and helped edit the literary journal *Adebiet maidany* (Literary Front). He published numerous poems and prose during these

years, including the collection of poems *Asau tulpar* (Irritable Steed), considered by many scholars to be the first work to employ Soviet-style realism and motifs in the Kazakh language. He is best known, however, for his 1926 semiautobiographical novel *Ternisty put'* (The Difficult Path, published in Kazakh as *Tar zbol taighaq kesbu* [Narrow Road, Unsteady to Cross]), based on his exploits during the revolutionary years. It describes his arrest, imprisonment on the "death train," escape, and subsequent political activities during the Russian civil war. Despite being honored by the Soviet government with the Order of Workers of the Red Banner, in 1938 he was arrested at the height of the Stalinist purges and executed. On 23 March 1957 he was rehabilitated.

Steven Sabol

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SEJONG, KING (1397–1450), Choson dynasty ruler. King Sejong was the fourth king of the Choson dynasty (1392–1910) of Korea. He is remembered for his contributions to Korean culture, such as establishing the Hall of Worthies (Chiphyonjon), a group of scholars in the king's employment. King Sejong assigned these scholars the task of inventing a native writing system to replace literary Chinese as the official writing system and may have personally participated in this effort. This new script was promulgated in 1446 as *Hunmin chongum* (Proper Sounds to Instruct the People) and developed into the modern Korean alphabet/syllabary known as hangul. King Sejong had hoped to enable the masses to become literate and toward that end also commissioned many classics and Buddhist texts to be translated into the native script. But because literati shunned the new writing system, it was used mostly by upper-class women and commoners of both sexes.

King Sejong's other cultural accomplishments included the commissioning of numerous histories such as *Koryo sa* (History of Koryo), annals, geographies, and manuals. He was also a patron of the arts and sciences, promoting advances in agriculture, astronomy,

meteorology, medicine, movable type, and military technology. King Sejong also reformed government and defended Choson against Japanese pirate raids. Because of these varied accomplishments, he is considered one of Korea's most important kings.

Jennifer Jung-Kim

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SELF-CENSORSHIP Self-censorship (also called autocensorship or internal censorship) is the conscious suppression of one's ability, right, or freedom to express oneself. Individuals, groups, organizations, or institutions may deliberately withhold or suppress their ideas, emotions, opinions, values, information, or intentions, which they consider to be in conflict with their own interests or those of others.

While self-censorship is usually deliberate, it is often not voluntary. In Asia, for instance, state dictator-

ship imposes considerable self-policing on individuals and institutions. By contrast, in Western democracies, the market and its profit-making imperatives play a prominent role in both censorship and the self-regulation of expression. Even when freedom of expression is guaranteed in constitutions and laws of a country (e.g., Japan after the end of the Allied Occupation in 1952), there are codes that protect morality and censor obscenity and, by doing so, impose self-censorship.

Many proverbs in Asian languages warn people of the dangers of unrestrained expression; for instance, "The red tongue lets the green head be chopped off" (Persian); "He who speaks truth is kicked out of nine towns" (Turkish); "Mouths are to eat with, not to speak with" (Japanese). In spite of these warnings, there is considerable resistance against self-censorship. Figurative language, humor, jokes, cartoons, rumors, and gossip are some of the vehicles the public and the mass media use to express ideas that may otherwise be violently repressed.

Amir Hassanpour

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SELF-STRENGTHENING MOVEMENT

(1861–c. 1895). The self-strengthening movement, which began in 1861, was an effort by the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) of China to restore power to resist Western encroachments, especially after the Second Opium War, which resulted in the burning and looting of the Summer Palace in Beijing by British and French forces.

The goal of the movement was to employ Western technology while retaining traditional Chinese values to meet the new imperialist threat. It was assumed that China could adopt technology and not the values and philosophies that produced that technology. Thus, from 1861 until 1895, the Qing government and various provincial officials launched a series of projects, including creating Zongli Yamen (a foreign affairs office), establishing the Jiangnan Arsenal, the Fuzhou Dockyard, the Nanjing Arsenal, and the Tianjin Machine Factory, sending Chinese students to the United States, and constructing the Beiyang Fleet. The series of projects clearly centered on a program of military modernization initially and subsequently on an effort at economic self-strengthening, all designed to improve the nation's position vis-à-vis the imperialist powers.



DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS

"The censorship process [in Indonesia] begins with the first script, most of whose contents are scratched out and amended. Then the script is returned. And so it goes on, back and forth, until the final product becomes celluloid—and then it's censored again so it can be distributed. In my own case, I sometimes wondered whether the final product was really my own film. . . . Producers and script writers know that films that reflect social realities are going to be cut so they practise a lot of self-censorship. Over the years that pressure builds up, with the result that many of our directors—including me—have lost their creativity."

Source: Sophan Sophiaan. (1997) "Death by a Thousand Cuts." *Index on Censorship*. Vol. 26, no. 2: 73.

The time period of the movement roughly approximates that of the Meiji Restoration in Japan, and it is instructive to note differences. Japanese leaders were more willing to throw off the past, change the structure of government and the structure of society because of the powerful desire to resist imperialist encroachments. By contrast, Chinese leaders were unwilling to change dramatically the system of government or the social hierarchy and thus truly struggled at the margins. China's defeat by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) exposed the weaknesses of the nearly four-decades-long self-strengthening movement.

Charles Dobbs

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SEMIPALATINSK MOVEMENT The Semipalatinsk movement, officially known as the Nevada-Semipalatinsk-Mururoa International Movement to Halt Nuclear Weapons Testing, was the first Soviet antinuclear movement organized in 1989. It is credited with closing the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in the former Soviet Union. Created in the then Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan and named after the main nuclear test sites in the United States of America (Nevada), the Soviet Union (Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan), and French Polynesia (Mururoa Atoll), the movement galvanized large public support, halting eleven of eighteen planned Soviet nuclear tests in 1989 and eventually forcing the closure of the Semipalatinsk site in August 1991.

The movement's leader, Olzhas Suleimenov, a Kazakh poet and politician, was motivated by the devastating environmental and health damage caused by the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster in Ukraine and Belarus and the potentially similar harm being caused by nuclear tests in Kazakhstan. Despite the dangerous effects of nuclear testing, little information was available to the general public within the closed political system of the Soviet Union. However, as the system gradually began to open in the 1980s under then party secretary-general Mikhail Gorbachev, information became more available, prompting protests.

The origins of the movement lay in a televised speech made by Suleimenov in February 1989, during which he jettisoned a scripted poetry reading in favor

of releasing information on the detrimental effects of nuclear testing and asked for an immediate public demonstration in Almaty, Kazakhstan. After the success of the first demonstration, further street protests were organized in cities across the USSR, including Moscow, demanding an end to nuclear testing. The movement quickly gathered mass support, claiming membership of several hundred thousand members.

While the movement's main objective was a closure of the test site in Kazakhstan, it also pressed for a parallel closure of the Nevada test site in the United States. Other goals included protection of human rights, protection and regeneration of the environment, and the prohibition of production and storage of nuclear weapons, radioactive and poisonous waste, and other weapons of mass destruction. There were cooperative projects between Nevada-Semipalatinsk and several other organizations around the world, and international branches of the movement itself were founded in the United States, Germany, Turkey, and Mongolia.

The movement's main activities ceased soon after the August 1991 decision to halt nuclear tests conducted at Semipalatinsk. A total of 498 nuclear tests were conducted on the site between 1949 and 1991. The movement subsequently turned its attention toward both the end of world nuclear tests and aid to the citizens of Kazakhstan affected by the four decades of nuclear testing. The former leader, Suleimenov, is an ambassador for the now-independent Republic of Kazakhstan.

Carter Johnson

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SENDAI (2000 est. pop. 1 million). Sendai is the capital of Miyagi Prefecture and the largest city in northeast Japan. The city extends from the Pacific coast on the east to the mountainous border of Yamagata Prefecture on the west. Founded as a castle town in 1601, it lies at the foot of Aoba Castle, constructed by Date Masamune (1567–1636), a feudal lord who gained sway over most of the Tohoku region.

Quickly becoming the administrative, economic, educational, and cultural center of the region, Sendai is the major metropolis of the northern five prefectures of Honshu. The center of the city was completely destroyed during World War II, although the Osaki Hachiman Shrine and Toshogu Shrine survived. While retaining the original attractiveness of its tree-lined boulevards and the natural environment of the Hirose River, Sendai is convenient and modern. Connected domestically by air and Shinkansen (superexpress train) and internally by a new subway system, the city ranks high nationally in terms of quality of life. The site of the prestigious national Tohoku University and a large number of private colleges and universities, Sendai is referred to as an "academic city." Regional offices of major government agencies and banking and trading companies are located here. Commercial activities center on petrochemicals and marine and agricultural products. Sendai draws tourists especially for the elaborate decorations of the Tanabata Festival, 6 to 8 August.

James M. Vardaman, Jr.

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SEOUL (1999 pop. 10.3 million). Seoul, the capital of South Korea (Republic of Korea), has an area of 605 square kilometers and is one of the most densely populated cities in the world. Archaeological remains indicate that people inhabited the Seoul region at least as far back as the Neolithic period, although it is likely that prehistoric settlement dates back to Paleolithic times. Throughout history, the region has had numerous names. It was known as Hansong, the capital of the Paekche kingdom (18 BCE–663 CE); Hanyang during the Unified Shilla period (668–935 CE); and Yangju and Hanyang during the Koryo period (918–1392). With the establishment of the Choson dynasty (1392–1910), King T'aejo moved the capital from Kaegyong (present-day Kaesong) to Hanyang in 1394. The region was also called Hansong, and to ensure auspiciousness and longevity for the new Choson kingdom, the city was carefully planned according to geomantic principles, which dictate the proper placement of man-made structures among natural surroundings. An 18-kilometer wall was built to surround the new capital, but the city was ravaged by the Hideyoshi and Manchu invasions of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and gradually rebuilt by the eighteenth century. The capital grew rapidly



Seoul is a city that many people compare to New York City, a view supported by this 1990 photo of large, modern buildings in downtown Seoul. (BOHEMIAN NOMAD PICTUREMAKERS/CORBIS)

from the late nineteenth century with the introduction of modern transportation and communication systems.

Under Japanese occupation (1910–1945), the city was called Kyongsong and downgraded from capital status because of the loss of Korean national sovereignty. In 1945, the city's capital status was restored and the city was renamed Seoul, meaning "nation's capital." Seoul twice fell to North Korean forces during the Korean War (1950–1953). The capital has undergone rapid urbanization in the postwar decades, especially with the industrialization of the 1970s and infrastructural improvements of the 1980s in anticipation of the 1988 Seoul Olympics.

The city has grown vastly beyond its original walls and today has 25 autonomous districts (*ku*) and 522 wards (*dong*). The Han River divides the city into nearly equal northern and southern sections. The city also has eight mountains, the most visible being Mount

Nam in the center of the city. In 1949, Seoul was designated as a "special city" and became administratively independent from surrounding Kyonggi Province. Kyonggi Province and Seoul's satellite cities make the Seoul metropolitan area the nation's center of politics, economy, and culture.

Jennifer Jung-Kim

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SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY Seoul National University (SNU) is a major institute of higher education in South Korea, recruiting the best high school graduates in the nation. Various ranking indexes have placed the university first among universities in Korea and fortieth in the world for 2001.

SNU was established as the first national government-funded university in modern Korea in 1946. As of 2000, the total student enrollment is 12,882: 20,470 at the undergraduate level and 9,412 at the graduate level. Women students constitute 41 percent of the total number. The faculty numbers 1,891. In recent years, SNU has made efforts to internationalize its programs to attract foreign students. Currently about six hundred foreign students from fifty-two countries enroll in various academic programs.

For the bachelor's degree, a four-year residence is required. Medical and dental students are required to spend two additional years for premedical and pre-dental education, respectively. Both master's and doctoral programs have a two-year residence requirement. The academic year starting March 1 consists of two semesters: spring semester from March through mid-June and fall semester from September through mid-December. Admission is given only for the spring semester.

SNU offers programs for bachelor's, master's, and doctorate degrees at sixteen colleges as well as four graduate schools covering almost every academic and professional area, including public health, environmental studies, and international area studies. Especially strong fields are law, business administration, medicine, and engineering, which has expanded tremendously since 1980. SNU also includes the International Vaccine Institute, a United Nations-related

research center established in 1999. SNU graduates play leading roles in various fields in Korean society, especially in government, large enterprises, and law.

Like most universities in Korea, restructuring has been underway at SNU since the early 1990s. Matters in dispute are the reorganization of academic structure and evaluation of faculty members.

Kim Shinil

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SEPAK TAKRAW Sepak takraw is the official, international name for the Southeast Asian sport in which teams compete by moving a small ball back and forth over a net without using their hands or arms. The name is derived from *sepak* which means "kick" in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore and *takraw* which means "ball" or "woven ball" in Thailand. The sport is the modern, competitive version of an ancient Southeast Asian game in which participants stand in a circle and keep the ball in the air, using only their feet, legs, and bodies. It is popular in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Myanmar, Vietnam, the Philippines, southern China, and more recently, in the West. The game is called *sepak*, *takraw*, *sepak takraw*, *sepak raga*, *sipa*, *ching long*, *kator*, and *tago*, depending on the nation. The sport of sepak takraw was first included in the Asian Games in 1990 as a men's sport; a women's event was added in 1998. The governing body for the sport, the International Sepak Takraw Federation, is working to have it accepted as an Olympic sport.

The origin of the game is unclear. A similar game was played in Japan and south-central China over a thousand years ago, but it is likely that the games played in Southeast Asia developed indigenously, and likely in more than one place, anywhere from five hundred to a thousand years ago. The game emerged as a village recreational activity in which boys or men stood in a circle and kicked a woven rattan ball to one another while attempting to keep it from touching the ground. Other varieties of the game include kicking the ball into a hoop, racing while keeping the ball in the air, and keeping as many balls in the air as possible at one time. The modern game is similar to volleyball, with a rectangular court and net, teams of three players each, formal rules, three hits per side, 15-point



Thai and Brunei players compete in takraw at the Southeast Asian Games in Brunei in August 1999. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

games, and a two-out-of-three set format. Modern balls are made out of plastic rather than the traditional rattan, to maintain uniformity in size, shape, and weight.

Supporters believe it only a matter of time before sepak takraw is accepted as an international sport beyond Southeast Asia. It is a source of considerable pride in Southeast Asia, and debates continue—especially between Malaysia and Thailand—over which nation can claim ownership of the sport.

David Levinson

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SERALIN, MUKHAMMEDZHAN (1872–1929), Kazakh educator, poet, writer, publisher, social activist. Mukhammedzhan Seralin was born in 1872 in Kustanay uezd (Kustanay region), Turgai oblast. His father, Seraly, was a well-known *aqyn*, or poet-bard, who died at the age of forty, when Seralin was only three years old. His father left the family in financial debt but with a rich legacy of music and poetry. Seralin's mother was related to a wealthy Tatar merchant, Mollakhmet Iaushev, who provided her family some financial and material support. When Seralin was eight years old, he was enrolled in the local *madrasab* (Muslim school) in Troitsk, considered the best school for Kazakhs in the oblast. He studied there from 1880 until 1887.

Seralin was influenced by the writings of many Tatar reformers, in particular Shihabeddin Merjani (1815–1889), a nineteenth-century intellectual who urged his fellow Tatars to take pride in their national heritage. Seralin was deeply influenced by the Muslim reform movement Jadidism (*usul-u-jadid*, new method), devoted to secular education among the Muslims of czarist Russia. In 1891 he undertook his own "to the people" mission and traveled to a small *aul* (small nomadic unit) situated on the shore of the Aral Sea, teaching there for several years. While there he completed his first collection of poems, *Top zharghan* (often translated as "Worthless Horse"). It was initially rejected by the government's censor but was allowed to appear in print in 1903. Also in 1903 he published his second work, *Gulka-shima*, a collection of poetry based upon traditional themes. While *Top zharghan* dealt with a historical topic, his second collection of poems focused on a contemporary issue that concerned many Muslims throughout the Russian empire: the question of *qalyng* (bride price). Written in 1901, it depicts a cruel system that forced young girls to marry against their will. Seralin believed it was a harmful custom that must cease.

In 1905 Seralin was involved in various undertakings related to the revolution, helping to form the Kustanai branch of the Russian Social Democratic Revolutionary Party. In 1911 he realized his long-held dream to publish a Kazakh-language periodical, *Ai qap*, which was one of the most influential prerevolutionary Kazakh periodicals. The journal published domestic and foreign news, editorials and readers' letters, scholarly articles, book reviews, feuilleton, and poetry. It ceased publication in 1915. Following the 1917 Russian Revolution, Seralin became active in the Bolshevik Party. In 1919 he was made a member of the Bolsheviks' Kazakh Revolutionary Committee and selected to the editorial board of the Bolsheviks' new newspaper in the steppe, *Ushqyn* (The Spark). In the 1920s Seralin served in many capacities in the Soviet

government, in particular as the editor of a regional newspaper, *Aul*, and on educational committees. He was so active that by 1924 there were thirty villages in Kazakhstan named for Seralin. In 1925 poor health made him retire from active service, and he returned to his birthplace. He died in 1929.

Steven Sabol

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SERICULTURE—CHINA Although its exact origins are unknown, experts agree that sericulture (the production of raw silk from silkworms) began in China about 2500 BCE. Chinese mythology supports this view. In one popular myth, the empress of one of the legendary emperors is credited with the intensification of mulberry tree cultivation, the breeding and raising of silkworms, and the invention of the loom in 2640 BCE. This myth is important because it gives public recognition to the major role women played in silk production and processing.

Silk production was an important part of the rural economy, and over the centuries many technical advances speeded up the production of silk thread, though weaving remained time-consuming and difficult until the advent of mechanized looms in the twentieth century. Though silk was primarily produced in rural areas, it was usually woven in urban centers for the imperial court or wealthy city dwellers, and a great deal of raw silk cloth was paid as taxes to the central government.

Silk production spread from China to India in about 140 BCE and a few centuries later to Japan. It spread to Europe in about 550 CE, when two Persian monks were asked by the Byzantine emperor Justinian I to smuggle silkworms from China. Silk was such an important product in ancient times that the major trade route between East Asia, West Asia, and Europe was called the Silk Road. The Chinese traded silk for wool, gold, and silver. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, China remains the world's major producer of

silk, producing about 80 percent of the world's silk each year. However, the development of synthetic fibers such as rayon (which went into production in 1910) and nylon (which went into production at the end of the 1930s) has diminished the demand for silk clothing. Silk continues to be, as it was in ancient times, a luxury item, and it is no longer a major export for China.

The Silkworm

Silk production is largely determined by the life cycle of the silkworm (*Bombyx mori*). Silkworm caterpillars hatch from eggs and require large quantities of mulberry leaves for food to reach full growth. This growth period lasts thirty-four or thirty-five days and is interrupted by several dormant periods. At the end of this stage of their cycle, the caterpillars spin cocoons of a single strand of silk thread that can be from six hundred to nine hundred meters long.

Under natural conditions, uncontrolled by human beings, the adult moths would then emerge from the cocoons and reproduce. In terms of silk production, however, the emergence of the moth from the cocoon is a disaster: the emerging moth breaks the silk strand and renders it virtually useless for cloth production. Most moths are killed while still in the cocoon, with only a few allowed to reach maturity for breeding purposes.

The Mulberry Tree

Most phases of the silkworm's life cycle can be controlled by the careful regulation of mulberry leaves (the silkworm's sole food) and temperature. From an early period, mulberry trees were planted in orchards and new varieties were developed. By the twelfth century, the most crucial development had occurred, with the perfection of a technique for grafting a particularly leafy variety of tree onto the hardier trunk of a separate variety. Agricultural treatises of the twelfth century describe the technique and recommend that silk producers everywhere adopt it. The use of these grafts permitted two crops of leaves a year in the central region of China and three in the southern regions.

Controlling the Process

Providing the worms with leaves was always of great importance, and in the fifth century a technique was devised to regulate the hatching time of the eggs to coincide with maximum leaf production. The eggs were bathed in cold water to lower their temperature and delay hatching, often for as long as twenty-one days. The addition of periods of warming and cooling in the thirteenth century improved the technique, with



SERICULTURE IN BURMA

Although sericulture is most closely associated with China, it was and is found in neighboring nations as well. The following firsthand account describes traditional silk breeding as it was carried out in Burma (now Myanmar) in the late 1800s.

Neither the worm nor the mulberry are indigenous to the province but were, most probably, imported from China by the valley of the Irrawaddy and not across the hills from India. The Burmese mulberry, which has not been identified by any competent botanist but which has been pronounced not to be the *Morus Indica*, is a thin, lanky shrub throwing out several vertical shoots from near the ground and growing to a height of eight or ten feet. It will not flower and is therefore propagated by cuttings. After about three years a plantation ceases to bear good and succulent leaves and is then abandoned or the plants are uprooted. . . . Should the mulberry leaves fail the larvae are fed the *Brousonettia papyrifera*, but then the silk produced is comparatively worthless. The silk is of a very rough and inferior description but well suited for the silks made on the ordinary loom of the country.

All the processes of breeding the worm and winding the silk are carried on in the ordinary smoke-begrimed and dirty bamboo houses of the people. . . . When the moths have laid their eggs, which takes about a day, they are wrapped up and left to themselves. In about eight days the larvae appear and the cloth being opened are swept with a feather on to a tray. The produce of one circular cartoon will, when the worms are full-grown, more than fill a large tray two or three feet in diameter. About twelve hours after they are hatched the worms are fed with finely-

chopped pieces of the tenderest mulberry leaves and are so fed for four or five days, when they shed their skins. After this change they require plenty of strong leaves and beyond being supplied with food, they receive little or no care. . . . After thirty days the larvae, which have then molted four times, are ready to spin their cocoons. The ripe ones are picked out by hand and thrown in heaps into a small tray called a "cocooning tray." This is three or four feet in diameter and within it is a ribbon of plaited bamboo, a couple of inches wide, wound round and round in a spiral with its edge on the tray. The larvae are taken in handfuls and scattered [on] the tray with as little care as if they were so many grains of corn. They attach their cocoons, which are completed in 24 hours, to the spiral. The cocoons are torn off the plaited bamboo ribbon and thrown into baskets and two or three days later are placed in a pot to simmer in water over a slow fire. Above the pot are placed a pair of cross-sticks from which a bamboo reel is suspended and beside the pot is a wooden cylinder turning on a pivot. Some filaments of silk are caught and drawn out of the pot, run over the bamboo reel and fastened to the cylinder. The reeler with an iron fork in one hand and handle of the cylinder in the other keeps catching up the filaments in the pot with the fork and reeling them on to the cylinder. The thread produced is coarse and dirty and mixed with bits of pupae and other refuse all of which go with the silk on to the cylinder. When the silk is exhausted from the pot the larvae are taken out and fried in oil for the dinner of the household.

Source: Gazetteer of Burma. (1893) New Delhi: Cultural Publishing House, 412–414.

the added advantage that eggs containing weak or malformed worms could not survive the temperature changes. Once the eggs hatched, it was best to have the worms grow as quickly as possible, so various methods of warming the growing sheds were devised. In the sixth century fires of manure were generally used, though they sometimes produced unwanted smoke. By the twelfth century small portable stoves

had been developed that warmed the shed without producing smoke; these could be moved out if necessary. Large-scale operations often had large fire pits in the growing sheds; fires would be lit five to seven days before the eggs hatched and left to warm the sheds during the growth phase of the worms. With the use of these methods, the growth phase of the worms could be reduced to twenty-nine to thirty days.



A woman in Chengdu, China, separates larvae from the silk cocoons, an early step in the process that produces silk. (TOM NEBBIA/CORBIS)

Silk Thread

Reeling the silk fibers into thread was preferable while the moths were still alive in the cocoons, since it produced a higher quality of silk, but this was impracticable because it was such a labor-intensive process. Since most silk thread was produced by small rural operations without large workforces, the moths were killed before they damaged the cocoons. Three techniques in common use were leaving the cocoons out in the sun, salting them, and steaming them in ovens. By the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when mass production was introduced, steaming became the most common method for killing the moths.

The reeling procedure involves unraveling the cocoons and twisting several fibers together to form a thread, then winding the thread onto a reel. This can be done by hand, but by the late eleventh century, a treadle-operated reeling frame had been invented that allowed one person to reel large quantities of yarn relatively quickly. The design of the frame incorporated detailed knowledge of the qualities of silk. The cocoons were placed in a basin of heated water because water loosened the fiber in the cocoons, the heat caused the fibers to move and twist of their own accord, and the motion of the water caused the threads to be more rounded. Despite this technical advance, silk reeling required constant labor once it was begun and was difficult and time-consuming.

Weaving

Weaving was less amenable to improvements. The reeled yarn had to be made into the warp and weft by a spindle wheel, and preparation could often take days. Weaving even plain silk required two people to operate the loom, and if elaborate patterns or designs were to be added, the production of even small amounts of

cloth could take days or weeks. Early silk weaving operations were controlled by weaving families who worked from their own homes, and many of the practices involved were passed down for thousands of years with relatively little change. Technological innovation in silk production reached its height during the Song dynasty (960–1279), but it was not until the founding of the first modern silk-weaving factory in 1905, in Hangzhou, that the silk industry was further transformed.

After the silk cloth was woven, it could be left raw or it could be "finished" by being boiled in a solution of ash, steeped overnight in soap, and rinsed to make it softer. Many peasants produced silk to pay taxes and so left the cloth raw.

Silk in Chinese Society

Although there was much rural production of silk, complicated designs were usually woven in urban workshops or imperial factories, which produced elaborate luxury goods for the imperial court, aristocrats, or wealthy city dwellers. Silk was a prestigious commodity, and it was jealously guarded by the imperial court, which often stockpiled bolts of silk in preference to precious metals. During the Song period, when the imperial government was threatened by foreign invasion, silk was an important diplomatic tool, with millions of bolts paid in tribute throughout the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Silk was also used by the rulers to reward outstanding acts, to give relief to victims of disasters, and to pay government officials.

Use of silk in everyday dress was sharply regulated by sumptuary law. Laws were also enacted against the use of gold thread, garments of certain colors, "foreign" styles of dress, and silk embellished, with certain patterns reserved for the court. Though penalties such as jail sentences and caning were prescribed, these laws seem to have been generally ignored by anyone wealthy enough to afford luxury items. Enemies of the Chinese were also familiar with the prestige attached to clothing, because they often requested certain grades of silk cloth with decorations reserved for the imperial family as tribute.

Paul Forage

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SESHI CUSTOMS The most important of Korea's annual (*sesbi*) customs have origins that date back millennia and are observed according to the oriental lunar calendar. They have traditionally combined ancestral homage, family gatherings, and entertainment.

The lunar calendar begins with Sol, lunar New Year's Day, and its ancestral rites, ceremonial bows, and traditional foods. This follows immediately after Sottal, the last lunar month of the year, in which preparations for an auspicious new year are made. Traditionally, Sol is only the beginning of the New Year's festivities, which stretch from the new moon on Sol to the full moon of Taeborum, fifteen days later. During this interval, farmers' bands play door-to-door, kites are flown, and the stubbles of rice paddies are set ablaze to ensure an auspicious new year. On the evening of Taeborum, children twirl tin cans of bright coal, representing full moon circles. In the past, village stone and torch fights were also engaged in by young men, with a year of good fortune secured by the winning village.

On the full moon of the eighth lunar month, the Harvest Moon Festival, Ch'usok, is celebrated. This day is equal in importance to Sol for observing ancestral rites and family reunions. Observances at ancestral tombs are made on Hanshik, 105 days after the winter solstice. The late spring celebration of Tano, the fifth day of the fifth lunar month, traditionally included important ancestral veneration rites but today is filled with gaiety and entertainment.

Buddha's birthday is celebrated in Korea on the eighth day of the fourth lunar month (usually in May) and is known as the Feast of the Lanterns. Long rows of lanterns line the way to Buddhist temples, where elaborate and solemn rituals are held; temple courtyards are filled with hanging lanterns, each accompanied by an individual supplication. The day also includes the ceremonial release of fish into streams and dancing around stone pagodas on temple grounds.

Sambok is collectively the three hottest days of summer, Ch'obok, Chungbok, and Malbok, designated as the first, middle, and last day of summer heat and occurring ten to twenty days apart. On these days it has long been the tradition to have chicken or dog soup to restore health and fight off the effects of the overbearing summer heat.

Ch'ilsok, the seventh day of the seventh lunar month, falls in late summer. On this day summer

clothes were traditionally washed and dried in the sun and maidens looked to the stars to pray for improved weaving skills. Ch'ilsok is closely associated with a folk tale of a herd boy and his love, a weaving girl, who were banished to opposite ends of the heavens by her father and only allowed to meet on this day. It is said that on this day no magpies or crows can be seen, as they have left to form a bird-bridge over the Milky Way for the two lovers. Rain on Ch'ilsok is said to be the tears of joy shed by the two on the occasion of their annual meeting.

The winter solstice, Tongji, was traditionally a day to drive off evil spirits with porridge. The porridge, made of red beans (*p'at*), was first offered to the ancestors and then sprinkled on the house and courtyard to dispel evil spirits, who were thought to fear the color red. The red porridge was then eaten, as it still often is today.

David E. Shaffer

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SETOUCHI REGION The Setouchi Region encompasses the coasts of the Inland Sea (Seto Naikai) in the southern part of the Chugoku Region and the northern part of the Shikoku Region in Japan. The Inland Sea includes between 700 and 800 islands, the largest being Awajima, scattered over an area of 9,500 square kilometers. Numerous islands have been designated as Inland Sea National Park. The climate is mild all year and favors the production of mandarin oranges. From the Edo period (1600–1603–1868), the fishing industry has been important. The cultivation of red algae, oysters, yellowtails, sea bream, and prawns is economically vibrant.

Since the end of World War II, with rapid industrialization and population growth, the Setouchi Region has become one of Japan's major industrial areas with petrochemicals, steel, shipbuilding, and automobile manufacturing. The recently constructed multiple bridges connecting Honshu and Shikoku have facilitated access and regional change. In the 1990s, this area produced over 8 percent of Japan's industrial output. The Inland Sea is now suffering pollution by

industrial and urban wastes. Many efforts are oriented toward the conservation of the marine environment.

Nathalie Cavasin

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SETTAI *Settai* (or *tsukiai*), business entertainment, refers to outings initiated by a company or business for the purpose of bringing workers together in a setting different from formal work. Work-related outings are a common practice in Japan and occur across the spectrum of blue-collar to white-collar labor. *Settai* is institutionalized in larger, corporate enterprises (pharmaceutical companies and investment banks) where higher-ranked, white-collar workers (particularly male) are expected to entertain and be entertained on a regular basis. Such outings can take place at an array of places—golf courses, restaurants, hostess clubs, bars—and are intended to bond workers both to one another and to the company itself. The relations served by *settai* can be either intracompany (employees from one department and their boss) or intercompany (one company entertaining a client to either solicit or acknowledge their business). The agenda of *settai* is to play (*asobi*). In addition, there is the expectation that to remain a good and loyal worker one should routinely go out with one's coworkers. Under the influence of alcohol or sharing recreation like karaoke or golf, it is thought that people get to know and trust one another. It is widely believed that such *ningenkankei* ("interpersonal relations") fuel and sustain the workplace.

Anne Allison

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SETTHATHIRAT (1534–1571), Lao monarch. Setthathirat (Xetthathirat) ruled the Lao kingdom of Lan Xang from 1548 to 1571. He was born in Xieng Dong Xieng Thong (Luang Prabang). His father, Phothisarat, placed him on the throne of the Lanna kingdom in 1546. Accompanied by the image of the Emerald Buddha, a Buddha image originally from Sri Lanka and the symbolic spiritual protector of the Lanna kingdom, Setthathirat returned to Lan Xang in 1547 to rule both that kingdom and Lanna after Pho-

thisarat's accidental death. He formed an alliance with the Ayutthaya kingdom to fight the Burmese, after losing Chiang Mai, the capital of Lanna, to them in the 1550s. In 1560 he moved the capital from Xiang Dong Xiang Thong to Viang Chang (present-day Vientiane) to defend against Burmese invasion. When he abandoned his former capital for the more strategically located Viang Chang, Setthathirat left behind the Prabang image, the Buddha image the founder of Lan Xang Fa Ngoum used to legitimize his reign by using it as the spiritual protector of Lan Xang, but initiated the construction of Vat Xiang Thong temple complex to house it. He then renamed Xiang Dong Xiang Thong to Luang Prabang in honor of the sacred image. Setthathirat took the Emerald Buddha to Viang Chang, however, and undertook the construction of Vat Pha Keo to enshrine it. He also erected Phathat Luang stupa, or shrine, in Viang Chang on the grounds of a religious complex housing a relic of Buddha. Setthathirat repelled Burmese invasions of his kingdom in 1570. He died in 1571 after an unsuccessful attempt to invade Angkor, the Khmer kingdom of present-day Cambodia. He never returned to Viang Chang.

Linda McIntosh

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SHAANXI (1996 est. pop. 34.6 million). The northern Chinese province of Shaanxi (Shensi, Shanxi) borders on Gansu and Ningxia in the west; on Inner Mongolia in the west; on Shanxi, Henan, and Hubei, following the course of the Huang (Yellow) River, in the east; and on Sichuan in the south. Covering an area of 205,000 square kilometers, Shaanxi is geographically divided into a large northern and a much smaller southern part by the Qinling mountain range. The northern region is high, eroded loess plateau about 1,000 meters above sea level. This is a fertile, but dry, steppe with temperate climate and an annual precipitation of 300–500 millimeters. South of the Qinling the climate is subtropical, with annual rainfall of 750–1,000 millimeters. All of Shaanxi has a continental climate, with monsoon rain from July to September. The capital is Xi'an (1996 pop. 3.03 million), which is situated in the valley between the Wei River and the Qinling range. Shaanxi is divided into eight regions and ninety-three counties.

The Wei River valley was inhabited by settled peasants before 5,000 BCE, and it was the homeland of the

Zhou people who overthrew the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE) and founded the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE). The capitals of the Qin (221–206 BCE), Han (206 BCE–220 CE), Tang (618–907), and some minor dynasties were located in the vicinity of modern Xi'an. Following the downfall of the Tang, the capitals of the succeeding dynasties were established in eastern China, and Shaanxi lost its importance as a political center and declined, becoming one of the most destitute areas in China.

Rebellions, famine, and civil war have caused havoc in the province well into the twentieth century. In 1935, following the Long March, the Chinese Communist Party established its headquarters in Yan'an on the northern plateau, from where they fought the Japanese occupying forces from 1937 to 1945.

The majority of the population lives in the valleys of the Wei and Han Rivers, and the most important agricultural products are wheat, millet, rice, and tubers, but rape, tobacco, and soybeans also account for a considerable part of the agricultural economy. Sheep breeding is important on the northern plateau, and south of the Qinling range corn, beans, fruits (especially apples), tea, and medical herbs are grown. Industry, which is concentrated along the Wei River, has a relatively high output of light industrial products such as cloth, sewing machines, TV sets, and watches, but heavy industry is also significant.

Bent Nielsen

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SHADOW PLAYS AND PUPPETRY Two classical accounts indicate that puppets, or at least animated figures, were used in China as early as the first half of the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). Documents record both wooden puppets, "mechanisms of motion" that were made to dance on top of a wall as a military strategy, and shadows staged by a shaman, which mimicked the form and movements of the emperor's favorite concubine to convince the emperor that she had returned from the dead.

By the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), the budding institution of puppetry included a puppet character named Official Guo or Baldy Guo who was often employed as a comic master of ceremonies in theatrical skits. During the Song (960–1279), puppet theater (*kuileixi* or *mu'ou ju*) was popular both on the street and in the courts. Song dynasty puppet types included "stick-heads" (*zhangtou kuilei*), marionettes (*xuansi kuilei*), water puppets (*shui kuilei*), and a form of puppets activated by gunpowder (*yaofa kuilei*).

Chinese puppets have generally displayed the same song and dance skills as human performers, often sharing the same repertoire and being similarly accompanied by small musical ensembles. This similarity is likely due to the fact that the same governmental offices managed human and puppet troupes throughout their early development in the Tang and Song dynasties. A simpler form of presentation (*biandanxi*, "shoulder-pole theater") was also practiced by roving puppeteers who carried all the materials necessary for performances in round bags attached to shoulder poles.

Continuing as a popular folk form in later dynasties, puppets have secured a place in both religious and entertainment activities. In addition to marionette and shadow puppets, glove puppetry (*budaixi* or *zhangzhongxi*, "palm theater") also flourished as an amusement in the southern regions of the Chinese mainland and in Taiwan. Today, in primarily rural southern areas of mainland China, and especially in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, where they are featured during celebrations such as the Hungry Ghost Festival, puppets are still essential elements of religious events.

Shadow theater (*yingxi* or *piyingxi*, "skin-shadow theater") flowered during the Song dynasty, when shadow shows were commonly presented as part of holiday events. *Yingxi* became a frequent attraction in the quarters of the Mongol troops occupying northern China during the Yuan (1279–1368 CE); these conquering armies then carried it throughout the empire and into Central Asia. Shadow plays continued to increase in popularity so that during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644 CE) more than forty troupes of *yingxi* players existed in Beijing alone. During the eighteenth century, shadow theater spread to Europe via missionaries who returned to France and publicized the *ombres chinoises*.

Materials for the traditional puppets vary by region; northwest China companies use puppet figures made from colored strips of buffalo hide, while donkey hide is used in the Hebei shadow puppets. Additionally, some forms now feature paper or hand shadow plays. In each case, the puppeteer (usually alone) narrates and

sings while manipulating the foot-high figurines attached to sticks. A small musical ensemble customarily accompanies the action. Torches or electric lights are used to project the silhouettes onto a white screen. Unfortunately, various forms of *yingxi*, such as the renowned lantern shadow theater (*dengyingxi*) of Chengdu, are now on the verge of extinction.

Dallas L. McCurley

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SHAH JAHAN (1592–1666), Mughal emperor. The third son of Jahangir, Shah Jahan ascended the throne of the Mughal empire in February 1628 following bloody battles with his brothers, and remained throughout his reign a ruthless monarch. The *Padshahnama*, written by Abdul Hamid Lahawri, chronicles his reign of thirty-one years.

Shah Jahan's reign saw the empire reach new heights of magnificence. He amassed bullion, which financed his architectural projects in Delhi and Agra, including the Taj Mahal, a marble mausoleum commemorating his beloved wife Mumtaz Mahal. The empire was simultaneously being torn apart by political infighting and internecine quarrels. The economic foundations of the country were undermined by heavy taxation, which contributed to the outbreak of appalling famines, such as that in Gujarat (1630–1631). He persecuted the Jesuits, and in 1632 ordered the destruction of all recently built Hindu temples. His move into the Deccan after 1630 saw early (albeit temporary) successes in the conquest of Bijapur, Golconda, and Ahmednagar. He also moved against the Portuguese, destroying their settlement in Hugli (1631). Shah Jahan spent the last eight years of his life in Agra Fort, where he was imprisoned by his son Aurangzeb, and it was there that he died in 1666 at the age of seventy-five.

Chaudrika Kaul

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SHAH, LALON (1774–1890), Baul singer of Bengal. A wandering ascetic who infused his songs with a strong mixture of Sufi and Hindu mystical thought, Fakir Lalon Shah is considered the greatest Baul singer in Bengal, a former Indian province now divided between India and Bangladesh. Bauls are a sect of wandering mystics who do not adhere to any organized religion, and as such they can be either Hindu or Muslim.

The Baul tradition, a blend of Sufism and Hinduism, is centuries old in Bengal. Bauls are itinerant beggars who sing of humans' desire for union with the divine. They often play a simple one-stringed instrument to accompany their singing. The Bauls' message is iconoclastic, in that they deny all traditional religious authority and strongly condemn rituals, caste, and priests.

Lalon Shah's name as well blends the typically Hindu—Lalon—with the typically Muslim—Shah. His title "Fakir" designates a wandering Muslim ascetic. Typical of Baul thought, Lalon Shah's songs glorify human beings, wherein the divine is said to dwell. Therefore, it is pointless to look for God in places of worship, or in rituals, or in holy books. God, for the Bauls, is immediate and immanent; he is as close as the human heart. Lalon Shah sings of innate human goodness. For him, practices, cultures, outlooks, attitudes, prejudices, religions, beliefs that divide humanity are an evil to be expunged. In Lalon Shah's vision, as expressed in his songs, people should love their fellow human beings regardless of race, color, creed, or sect. His shrine is at Chheuria, in Kushtia Province in Bangladesh. It is visited by both Hindus and Muslims.

Nirmal Dass

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SHAH, MIHR ALI (1859–1937), Sufi saint. An important Sufi (Islamic mystic) saint who advocated a strong personal relationship with God, Mihr Ali Shah believed that the divine was immediately knowable

through praise and righteous living. He was a distant descendant of Abdul Qadir Jilani (d. c. 1166), the Persian Sufi master, whose shrine is in Baghdad.

Mihr Ali Shah was born in Rawalpindi, in the Punjab, now in Pakistan. He traveled extensively, spreading the word of Islam among various people, preaching through his songs, which are written in an immediately accessible idiom; he composed both in Persian and Punjabi. His message is one of humility, open-heartedness, and rejection of pride and worldly love. For Mihr Ali Shah, God is not known by way of distinction, but by universality. In this way, he criticized the pervading caste prejudices that affected much of society in India in his day. He also suggested that God could not be known through rituals and religious practices, but only through utter devotion. It was in his lifetime that he was given the title *pir*, religious master.

After his death, he was buried in the village of Golra Sharif, located a few miles from Islamabad, Pakistan. Only in recent years was a mausoleum constructed over his grave, and the village of Golra Sharif acquired greater prominence.

Nirmal Dass

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SHAH, WARIS (c. 1710–1780), Punjabi literary figure. Renowned for his contributions to Punjabi literature, Waris Shah created a version of the tale of Hir and Ranjha that is popular to this day and considered by many the Punjab's greatest literary epic. Little concrete evidence is available about Waris Shah's life. He was probably born in Jandiala Sher Khan, a village in Punjab's Sheikhpura district, today in Pakistan. Waris Shah belonged to a respected family that claimed descent from the prophet Muhammad. After early education at a local mosque, he went to Kasur, Pakistan, a contemporary center of learning near Lahore, and then to Pakpattan, Pakistan, an important site in Sufi Islam. Shah died in his natal village where his tomb is located and where an annual festival is held in his name.

Hir Waris Shah, completed in 1767, is Shah's only literary composition. It is a story of carnal love, which many interpret as an allegory of love for the divine. Shah's text also includes much description of customs and practices in the Punjab, leading some literary crit-

ics to call his *Hir* an encyclopedia of contemporary life in the Punjab.

Farina Mir

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SHAHBAZ QALANDAR LAL (1177–1274), patron saint of Sind. Shahbaz Lal is the honorific title of Sheikh Osman Marvandi, the patron saint of Sind province in Pakistan. He was born in Marwand, Afghanistan, and was initiated into mystic Sufi thought by his father, who was a wandering dervish (member of a Muslim religious order who practices exercises that lead to a trance state). At the age of twenty, Shahbaz Lal was initiated into the Qalandar order of Sufis, who believe in the ecstatic expression of love for God and who are known for their whirling dances to the heady beat of drums, which often cause them to go into a trance.

It is said that he wandered across Western Asia and eventually came to Sind province, settling in the town of Sehwan. Here he received the title "Shahbaz Lal," where "Shahbaz" (falcon) signified the holy man's free spirit, and "Lal" (red) described the color of his robes. In Indian culture, red is the color that brides wear, and Shahbaz thereby signaled his "marriage" to God. He was also known as the intoxicated mendicant, forever drunk with knowledge of the divine.

By the time he died, his fame had spread throughout the Sind as well as the Punjab. Many of his poems still survive and are sung at his shrine, which was built around his grave in 1354. To this day, his shrine is visited by thousands of pilgrims, both Muslim and Hindu, during the annual three-day religious festival that marks the anniversary of his death.

Nirmal Dass

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SHAHNAMEH EPIC The *Shahnameh*, or *Book of Kings*, by the Persian poet Abu al-Qasim Firdawsī, is Iran's national epic and one of the great epics of

world literature. Abu al-Qasim (who used the pen name Firdawsi) was born around 920 CE near Tus in northeastern Iran into a family of small landowners. He died about 1020 or 1025.

With more than 50,000 couplets, Firdawsi's epic is of monumental size. It treats the mostly legendary history of Iran from the creation of the world and the reign of mythical kings to the end of the Sassanian dynasty and the Arab conquest of Iran in the first half of the seventh century.

The *Shahnameh* is based both on written records, among them an unfinished epic by the poet Daqiqi, and on oral tradition. The best-known episode of the epic is the tragic fight between Rostam, one of the epic's major legendary heroes, and his son Sohrab. After Firdawsi completed the revised version around 1010, he presented his work to his ruler, Mahmud of Ghazna. But the latter remunerated the poet in such a miserly way that Firdawsi wrote bitter satires against the sultan.

Karl Reichl

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SHAKUHACHI The shakuhachi is a Japanese vertical bamboo flute with a notched mouthpiece, four finger holes in front, and one hole in back. Traditionally, the flute is made from a stalk of mandrake bamboo severed at the root, which becomes the bell of the instrument. The bamboo is hollowed, the holes bored, the instrument divided into two parts for easy storage and transport, and the inside lacquered.

The word "shakuhachi" comes from the standard size of the instrument, which is one *shaku* and eight (*bachi*) *sun* long (about 54 centimeters), but shakuhachi also come in other sizes, each of which is tuned to a different key. Performers use various techniques, including half-holing, cross-holing, glissandos, flutter tonguing, and chin and neck movements, to produce a wide range of pitches and timbres.

In the seventh century, the ancestor of the shakuhachi, a slender, Chinese six-holed flute, was intro-

duced into Japan, but it was several centuries later that the instrument evolved into its present form. In the seventeenth century, the Fuke sect of Zen Buddhism began to use shakuhachi performance as a form of meditation, thus associating the instrument with Zen philosophy and the itinerant Fuke monks called *ko-muso* ("monks of emptiness and nothingness"). Recent centuries have seen the development of various schools of shakuhachi performance, including the widespread Kinko and Tozan schools.

The shakuhachi has a large repertoire, including *honkyoku* (solo pieces), *min'yo* (folk music), and *sankyoku* (chamber music performed with koto and *shamisen*). Recently, the shakuhachi has also been used for contemporary and jazz compositions.

Jeffrey Angles

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SHAMANISM Shamanism is a vocation, social role, and ritual cosmos recognizable over a vast geographical range from the Arctic and boreal forests, to the Central Asian steppes, East Asia, the Himalayas, South Asia, and the tropical rainforest cultures of Southeast Asia.

North Asia is the locus classicus of shamanism (the word "shaman" is derived from the Siberian Evenk word "*saman*"). Although shamanism is not considered by most scholars to be a religion per se, it plays a central role in small hunting and reindeer herding cultures such as those of the Selkups, Khanti, Evens, and Evenks of Siberia. For the western Siberian Buryat, shamanism is intimately tied to the welfare of the clan, whereas for the Buryat east of Lake Baikal, shamanism plays an inferior role to Buddhism. In northern Nepal, Gurung shamanism stands opposed to neighboring Tibetan Buddhist morality, whereas in Tuva, shamans and Buddhist lamas are often seen as complementary ritual specialists. Farther west, in Uzbekistan, shamanism also plays a complementary role within Islamic cultures. In Malaysia, shamanism is the

central religious activity of many Orang Asli (Aboriginal) cultures such as that of the Temoq. The relation between shamanism and other religions is highly variable, but in almost all cases, shamanism is under the hegemonic pressure of polities that subscribe to universal religions or globalizing economic ideologies.

Principal Features

Shamanism, despite some controversy, can be identified by the following features.

1. The shaman's mode of supernatural action, such as magical flight to upper or lower spirit realms, is integral to the ideational and moral order of the world within which people live their daily lives.
2. The shaman is a person who acts as an intermediary between the supernatural and the community and who may take on one or more roles of healer, hunting magician, diviner, psychopomp, and sacrificer.
3. The shaman is inspired by his or her spirits, who provide protection and guidance and who often play a significant part in the shaman's arduous initiation.
4. The shaman enters into ecstatic trance states to establish relations with supernatural powers.

The Evenk Shaman's Séance

The Evenks inhabit the Siberian taiga. The shaman specializes in rites such as the *kamlanye* for healing and the *shingkelevun*, in which the shaman travels to his clan's spirit-mistress of the taiga in the upper world and petitions her to release greater numbers of game animals.

The *kamlanye* healing rite takes place, in severe cases of illness, in a specially constructed tent called a *shevenchedek*. The tent symbolizes the middle earth (*dulyu*) between the upper world (*ugu*) and lower world (*kbergu*), and also stands for an island in the mythical clan-river running from the upper to the lower world. The tent contains wooden carvings of ancestors, and guardian spirits such as loons, ducks, geese, and elk. There are also carvings of watchman-spirits who guard against agents sent by hostile shamans in other communities.

A larch tree (*turu*), symbolizing the world tree, is placed in the center of the tent with its top protruding through the smoke hole. The *turu* is the shaman's ladder for ascending into the upper world.

A couple of days before the performance, and while the special tent is being constructed, the shaman, while



A Yenesei Ostyak shaman in traditional dress in northern Siberia. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

fasting and excessively smoking, sends his *khargi* (animal double soul) to the underworld to consult with his shaman ancestors about the upcoming rite.

On the eve of the *kamlanye* rite the shaman makes a loon's cry, signaling his kinsmen to assemble inside the tent. When the shaman is seated, the entrance is sealed by spirit-watchman figurines, and the shaman's assistant passes him his ritual coat, gloves, and drum. The drum is not only a musical instrument, but also the shaman's vehicle, imaged as a boat or deer. The shaman then begins drumming and singing, calling on his spirit-helpers to fight the disease-spirit afflicting the patient. With loud and fast drumming, and singing replete with animal sounds, the shaman sends his *khargi* to the lower world to discover the cause of the illness. Reaching a crescendo, the shaman, foaming at the mouth, collapses on the mat and lies silent while his *khargi* travels the lower world. Gradually the shaman begins to sing, at first in quiet muffled tones, and then more loudly as he returns with knowledge of the affliction.

Moving through a series of therapeutic strategies, the shaman finally tries to induce the disease-spirit to



THE SPIRITS OF A SHAMAN

The following extracts are from the songs of a Tuvinian shaman:

My spirits move with a rush,
 They whisper (my spirits).
 My *aza* (i.e., demon) with forked tongue,
 None can outtalk his tongue.
 Without disturbing the peaceful sleep of little children,
 Do not frighten the livestock.

Soaring headlong,
 With writing in the wing,
 With a cipher in the feathers,
 Having sat in the red blood,
 Having flown in the sky,
 My lean black raven,
 Soaring, turning (in the air),
 My hungry black raven,
 Emissary (messenger) of the white and black (drums) . . .

Source: Nikolai Alekseevich Alekseev. (1990) "Shamanism among the Turkic Peoples of Siberia." In *Shamanism: Soviet Studies of Traditional Religion in Siberia and Central Asia*, edited by Marjorie Mandelstam Balzer. New York and London: M. E. Sharpe, 73–74.

enter the body of a reindeer, which is then quickly sacrificed to entrap it. The strategy fails in this performance, so heavy pressure is applied through invective and ridicule. Finally, the shaman is able to extract the disease-spirit, and with the help of a familiar spirit, cast it into the abyss of the world of the dead.

At the end of the rite the shaman takes the patient's soul and climbs the *turu* to the upper world and gives the soul to a higher deity for safekeeping. He finishes the rite with divinatory services to individual kinsmen using his rattle and scapulamancy, the latter being the art of foretelling events by the examination of cracks in a burned reindeer shoulder blade.

Temoq Shaman's Séance

The Temoq are Aslian-speaking hunters, gatherers, horticulturalists, and forest-product collectors living in lowland tropical rain forest in Pahang, Malaysia. At the beginning of the Mountain Journey (Teng Bnum) séance, the shaman (*puiyang*) calls his familiar and guardian spirits to assemble and lead the entourage into the night sky. Clambering up the World Cloud-Mountain, the shaman takes on the garb of his familiar and guardian spirits to cross dangerous chasms

and safely navigate obstacles. For long journeys, carved bees' nests and models of bearded pigs and tigers are ensouled and accompany the shaman to the earth's farthest reaches.

The shaman's entourage of Tiger Cat, Wreathed Hornbills, and Malayan Sun Bear is led by beautifully warbling White-Rumped Shama birds and swarms of droning bees. The shaman may visit more than one hundred celestial regions associated with natural species, meteorological phenomena, and ancestors, over several consecutive nights. Normally, the shaman focuses on six or seven regions during a night's performance, which ends with the bathing and purifying of the patient's soul in the cool, misty, pandanus-fringed waters of the celestial pool where resides the shaman's tutelary spirit Puteri Bungsu.

To the accompaniment of intense drumming and singing, the shaman moves back and forth between the inner recesses of the patient's body and the far outer reaches of the stone-vaulted, snake-encircled cosmos. Overwhelmed by the visionary earth, the shaman drifts into deep ecstasy, his voice becoming blurred and soft, and he must periodically struggle back, signified by sudden bursts of loud singing, to achieve the healing

purpose of the rite. The shaman's séance is invariably a communal event; male drummers facilitate the shaman's journey, and female assistants fashion the shaman's costume and whisk, and tend the censer.

Meanwhile, the ritual house, imaged as a microcosm with incense cloud-mountains, beautiful music, and sonorous singing, lulls the disease-spirit into a state of ecstasy. The shaman beguiles it into leaving the patient's body, and he lustrates the patient with cooling decoctions to neutralize the disease-spirit's toxins. After extraction the weakened disease-spirit is sent back to its source in the black scudding clouds.

Sometimes colorful spirit houses, rafts, and canoes lit by candles are used to entice disease-spirits out of patients with the promise of an exquisite abode. After launching on a stream or placement in the forest, the spirit abodes rapidly deteriorate and fall apart.

Shamanism Today

Shamanism is typically the religious and spiritual focus of peoples occupying the periphery of dominant cultural and political systems. In Malaysia, for example, the incursion of universal religions, supported by the government in the case of Islam, has had little impact on Orang Asli shamanism and religion. In contrast, the height of Soviet repression saw intense persecution, imprisonment, and the deaths of numerous shamans who were seen as reactionary obstacles to Sovietization and state hegemony.

Today, shamanism is ascendant in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The empowering fusion of shamanism and ethnicity in such newly emerged republics as Tuva and Khakassia and the transformation of shamanic rites and themes into theatrical genres performed at folk festivals throughout the world, bode well for an ancient spirituality that speaks directly to critical issues facing the world.

Evenk and Temoq shamans, like shamans everywhere, play an important role in the health and welfare of individuals and their communities. Increasingly, shamanism is also playing a key role in the reemergent ethnicities shaping the cultural and political landscape of Asia.

Peter Frederick Laird

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SHAMANISM—MONGOLIA Prior to the mass conversion to Buddhism in the sixteenth century, the Mongols were primarily shamanistic. Although Nestorian Christianity (a sect of Christianity that spread through Asia in the first millennium CE) could be found throughout Mongolia, the converts were mainly among the elites, not among the common people. Furthermore, Nestorian Christianity died out in Mongolia in the fifteenth century. The vast majority of people in Mongolia, however, subscribed to the amorphous belief system known as shamanism.

The Spirit World

Mongolian shamanism posited an afterlife that was identical to the present. Upon death, one was usually buried with one's possessions, including animals, in order to have them in the afterlife. Just as in this world, the transcendent world (afterlife) possessed a hierarchy. Thus if one was a khan or prince in the human world, this status would be retained in the afterlife.

The spirit world could interact with the human world and were generally viewed as neither good nor evil. There was also a supreme being, the *Koke Mongke Tengri*, or Eternal Blue Sky. *Tengri* translates from Mongolian as heaven, sky, or god. There were other *tengris* and powerful spirit beings, but the *Koke Mongke Tengri* presided as the chief spiritual being. An earth goddess also existed, known as *Etuken*, but she played a less significant role than *Koke Mongke Tengri*. The shamanistic Mongols did not possess a single concept for the soul; for them, the soul appeared in three basic forms. The first was the "bone" *hunebun*, which, as



A shaman shrine erected in the desert of Inner Mongolia. (KEREN SU/CORBIS)

the name suggests, resided in the bone. The second soul was the "flesh" *hunehun*, which resided in the flesh or blood. The final soul was the *sulde* or shadow/ghost, a flesh soul that continued to exist after the death of the person to which it was attached. In an ordinary person, the flesh soul passed away with the decomposition of the body. In the case of a powerful person such as Genghis Khan, however, the flesh soul could continue on as a *sulde*. The bone *hunehun* could live on as it died only when the pelvic bone, in which it resided, was shattered. The bone *hunehun* could become vengeful and give nightmares to disrespectful people. The bone *hunehun* remained in the area of the body.

While a person was alive, the flesh soul could vacate the body by flying out of the nose during sleep. In this case, the person became sick, suffered from bizarre nightmares, and lost energy. The bone soul could escape if a person suffered a broken bone. The flesh soul could also be captured, and magicians existed who could capture souls.

Although the spirit world was, as a rule, neutral toward the living, if one transgressed against a spirit the spirit would seek retribution. Therefore, an intermediary was needed to communicate with and propitiate the spirits. This individual was the shaman (*boge*) or shamaness (*idughan*). In addition to their roles as intermediaries with the spirit world, shamans also acted as doctors for both physical and spiritual ailments and played important roles in communal gatherings.

Healing Ceremonies

Because illness was caused by the soul wandering away from the body, the only way to cure the afflicted individual was to retrieve the soul. If the soul had not wandered far, it could be retrieved with the *sasalga* or sprinkling rite. The shaman sprinkled wine, koumiss (fermented mare's milk), or vodka toward the smoke hole of the tent while ringing a bell or cracking a whip. Then the patient would drink a bowl of the same substance. The ceremony ended and the soul would have been restored. The elders then took food and distributed it among the people.

If the soul had traveled a great distance, then the shaman had to retrieve it. Occasionally, the soul even reached *Erlik Khan* or the God of Death. The shaman would first have the sick person's tent made attractive to the soul by placing in the open personal possessions of the patient and gathering the patient's friends. The patient also dressed in his or her best clothes and lights were placed so the soul could find its way back. The shaman then requested the assistance of the *zayan* and *ezen*.

The *zayan* were a special set of spirits who had suffered a terrible death; they included suicides, those who had died as children, and those who had suffered emotional deaths, dying while frightened, under extreme stress, or violent deaths, dying from torture but not in battle or from illness. These spirits could be very cruel, as they were filled with suffering and frustration. How-

ever, if the shaman could control them, they could help locate the lost soul. The *ezen* were lords in the spiritual world, possessed great power, and commonly received requests for assistance. The *udkba* or helping spirit also assisted the shaman. The *udkba* was the spirit of the shaman's family. Soul retrieval was a difficult process. The shaman, through ecstatic techniques consisting of chanting and drumming, entered a trance. During the trance, the shaman or *boge* sprinkled koumiss or vodka toward the smoke hole of the *ger* (tent), while he rang a bell or cracked a whip. The "patient" also drank from a bowl. Through this the *boge* ventured into the spirit world and searched for the lost soul. If successful in finding the soul, the shaman would retrieve it, heal the person, and awaken from the trance. Every time the shaman encountered a spirit or being who assisted him or her, the shaman would have to pay that spirit or being. Naturally, this could become expensive. The patient and family supplied the shaman with the appropriate funds, either as paper money or bronze coins.

A more serious rite was the *khyryk* rite, which was performed if the spirit was no longer in this world. Essentially the *khyryk* was an exorcism. The sick person was placed outside the yurt or tent by a bonfire. The shaman burned the scapula bone of a sheep and read the cracks in the bone in order to find the guilty spirit. The shaman then drank wine, koumiss, or vodka while chanting. The shaman often swayed, and approached and retreated from the fire as if he were driving something out of it. Eventually the shaman collapsed in an ecstatic trance. Once the shaman regained consciousness, a sheep was cooked. While the sheep was being cooked, the shaman drank koumiss for the spirits and shared the alcohol with the patient and then the elders. Once the mutton was ready, part of the meat was thrown into the fire as a sacrifice. All participants in the rite ate the remainder while the bones were burned in the bonfire.

Specialists

In addition to the shaman, there were several other spirit-world specialists. The *dallachi* or *dallalga* was a scapulamancer, or one who could tell the future by examining the cracks in burned sheep scapula bones. Another diviner was the *togelechi*, who worked with a variety of objects, including coins and arrows.

Among healers, there was the *domchi*, who was thought to be a sorcerer or healer, perhaps even a traditional shaman. Another healer or doctor was the *emchi*. A final specialist who appears frequently in medieval sources was the *yadchi*, who possessed the ability to summon rain- or hailstorms through the use of special stones.

Although mass conversions to Buddhism took place in the sixteenth century, shamanism never completely disappeared. Instead, Buddhism in Mongolia took on some aspects of shamanism. Even today, one may find a *boge* in Mongolia.

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SHAMISEN The *shamisen* (in English, samisen) is a three-stringed, fretless, lute instrument from Japan played by using a plectrum (*bachi*) to strike the strings. The overall shape is like the banjo; the neck and frame are made from red sandalwood or mulberry and the sides of the body are covered by calfskin. The pegs can be ebony, ivory, or plastic, with twisted silk or synthetic tetron material for the strings. The instrument was imported from China through Okinawa and into Japan in the sixteenth century and was firmly established by the Edo period (1600/1603–1868).

The word *shamisen* is from the Chinese *sansxian* (three strings). The instrument has a distinct sound called *sawari*, caused by the resonance of the bass string against a metal plate that is adjusted using the *azuma-zawari*, a screw on the back of the neck. The three standard types of tuning are the *hon-chosbi* (original, a third and fifth), *niagari* (raise the second, a fifth and fourth), and the *sansagari* (lower the third, two fourths). Originally used by folk musicians and professional geishas, the instrument made its way into the concert hall during the nineteenth century. The *shamisen* is used to accompany Kabuki, *nagauta* (epic songs), *min'yo* (folk songs), and Bunraku plays.

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SHAN The Shan are an ethnic group in Southeast Asia belonging to the Tai-Kadai language family. "Shan" is probably a Chinese designation for this eth-

nic Tai group. They call themselves Tai, Tai Luang ("luang" meaning "greater" or "main"), or Tai Mao [Luang] (according to their ancient capital Muang Mao). They were generally called Tai Yai by the Siamese ("yai" also meaning "greater"). The Shan live mainly in the Shan states of Myanmar (Burma), where they have a population of 3.2 million. Other Shan live in southern China and as political refugees in Thailand, Europe, and the United States.

Culturally, the Shan are closely related to the Lao, the Lue, and the Khon Muang (or Yuan). Like these ethnic groups, the Shan profess Theravada Buddhism as well as traditional ancestor and spirit cults. Traditionally, the main economic product was rice, but also important were vegetables and fruits, animal breeding (cattle, buffalo, pigs, chickens, elephants), silk, and cotton and handicrafts such as weaving, silverwork, woodcarving, and *Hsa* paper production. The region of the Shan states also ranks among the world's highest in opium production. After the military coup of 1962, when the Union of Burma was brought under a military regime, the sociopolitical and economic structures of the Shan changed radically.

History

The Shan, who migrated to the southwest from southern China (Nanchao) probably before the tenth or twelfth century, founded the Mao Luang kingdom in the early thirteenth century as the result of a forced unification of numerous small Shan states (*muang* or *mong*). The Mao Luang kingdom maintained considerable power until it was challenged by the Burmese in 1604 after the kingdom had been weakened during a long series of wars with China. However, only some of the many Shan principalities came under Burmese control; others continued to exist as independent or semi-independent Shan states (*mong Tai*).

During the colonial period, the Shan aristocracy negotiated protectorate agreements with the British and in 1922 founded the Federated Shan States. During World War II, the Shan states came under Japanese occupation. In 1947, the Shan rulers signed the Panglong Agreement, by which the Shan states officially became part of the Union of Burma for a trial period of ten years. The Panglong Agreement was the cornerstone of the Union of Burma, and the Shan prince Chao Shwe Thaik became provisional president. After that period, according to the agreement, they should have been free to secede, but they were hindered when the military under the Burman General Ne Win took power in 1958. With the military coup in 1962, a great part of the leading Shan aristocracy was arrested or assassinated, and the Shan states finally came under full control of the

military government, which to date is being opposed by a Shan armed resistance.

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SHAN STATE (1990 est. pop. 4.25 million). The Shan State in northeastern Burma is the country's largest ethnic minority state. A highland plateau covering 156,000 square kilometers, it is home to a diversity of peoples with strong traditions of local independence. This is reflected in the state's turbulent history.

No accurate ethnic census has ever been taken, but in the 1990s the population was estimated by the government at 4.25 million, of whom 1.64 million were majority Shans (Tais), 450,000 Paos, 400,000 Palaungs and Was, 170,000 Lahus, 100,000 Kachins, and 100,000 Akhas. Other substantial populations include Burman, Kokang, Danu, Intha, Lisu, and Kayan.

In precolonial history, the state consisted of a loose political system of over forty substates ruled by local *sawbwas* (princes), who were recognized by the British in the process of annexation in the late nineteenth century. Some of these valley kingdoms had histories dating back to at least the fourteenth century CE, when Shan rulers had vied with Burmans and Mons for control over central Burma. In contrast, in mountain areas many of the minority peoples, such as the Wa and Lahu, continued lives that were little touched by the outside world until well into the twentieth century.

At Burma's independence in 1948, the Federated Shan States (established in 1922), which had been under British administration, were reconstituted as a single state with the right of secession after a ten-year period. However, armed conflicts broke out within two years of the British departure, and these have continued through the long years since.

A major factor in this destabilization was the late-1949 invasion by Guomindang remnants from China. Insurgency then escalated from the early 1960s when General Ne Win seized power to prevent Shan and other ethnic minority leaders from attempting to renegotiate nationality rights. Up to a dozen minority armies operated in the state, and descended into full-scale civil war in 1968 when the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) invaded the eastern borderlands with the military backing of China. Only after the CPB's collapse in 1989 did peace return to a number of war-afflicted regions under the cease-fire policy of the State Law and Order Restoration Council government. The situation, however, remained complex and unstable in many areas.

Decades of conflict have taken a serious toll on human lives and development. Agriculture is the main economy, with crops such as paddy rice, wheat, cotton, pulses, tobacco, and groundnuts all being grown. Varieties of fruit, vegetables, and tea are also produced in the mountain climate. However, it is opium and heroin production for which the state is internationally notorious. During the early 1990s, Shan State was reputedly the world's largest illicit producer.

The state also contains valuable natural resources, including silver, lead, zinc, copper, antimony, and precious stones. The Namtu-Bawdwin mines are the largest mineral enterprise. There is also potential for power generation along the Salween (Thanlwin) River as well as tourism in the Inle Lake region. However infrastructural links remain poor, and road journeys between the state capital Taunggyi and other key towns, such as Kengtung and Lashio, are long and often interrupted.

Only during the 1990s were efforts begun by both the government and cease-fire groups to upgrade the local economy. Trade links to central Burma, as well as neighboring China and Thailand, were the major priority. But the people of the state continued to face a daunting array of social problems, and the spread of HIV/AIDS has been another cause of concern.

Martin Smith

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SHAN STATE ARMY The Shan State Army (SSA) is historically the most influential of the various armed movements promoting the Shan (Tai) cause of greater autonomy and political rights for the Shan State in Myanmar (Burma). It was formed in 1964 by the alliance of three existing ethnic Shan nationalist forces. Popular with students and intellectuals, the SSA was quickly able to establish base areas from north to south across the state under such youthful leaders as Khun Kya Nu, Sai Myint Aung, and Chao Tzang Yawngwe. In 1971 the SSA was further strengthened by the establishment of a political wing, the Shan State Progress Party.

The SSA, however, faced considerable obstacles in maintaining its authority. Frequent Burmese army offensives as well as rivalries with other insurgent groups all undermined its position. Several of its opponents were involved in narcotics trafficking, and in the 1970s this led the SSA to coordinate an unsuccessful attempt to gain control of the opium trade for preemptive sale to international antinarcotics agencies.

Subsequently, the party was weakened by the loss of key leaders and a damaging split that saw its northern forces ally with the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), while the southern SSA worked with the ethnic minority National Democratic Front. In 1989 the northern SSA followed the CPB mutineers in signing a cease-fire with Myanmar's military State Law and Order Restoration Council. This faction then began a development program in its territory designated as Shan State Special Region 3. In the south meanwhile, following the 1996 surrender of Khun Sa's Mong Tai Army, SSA remnants joined together with other Shan nationalists, headed by Yord Serk, to form a new force known as the SSA (South), which in the year 2002 was still fighting against Myanmar's military government.

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SHANDONG (2000 est. pop. 90.79 million). Shandong is a large, densely populated Chinese northern coast province on the Shandong Peninsula, which separates the Bohai Gulf from the Yellow Sea. Bordered on the northwest by Hebei Province, on the southwest by Henan Province, and on the south by Anhui and Jiangsu Provinces, Shandong Province is about the size of Mexico both in terms of land area and population. It covers about 153,300 square kilometers, and its population density of 579.5 persons per square kilometer makes it second only to its neighboring province of Henan in Chinese provincial population. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, emigrants from the crowded province became a major source of the present population of China's northeast (Manchuria).

Historically, the Grand Canal traversed the province, bearing grain and other trade to Beijing from the lower Changjiang (Yangtze River) valley, but today this commercial route is of no importance. Shandong's dominant geographic feature is the Huang (Yellow) River that now crosses the North China Plain to empty into the Bohai Gulf near the large Shengli (Victory) oil field. Before 1950, the Huang River floods caused great suffering, but these have posed no threat in the past half century, because flood control projects and water diversions have shrunk the river's flow.

Shandong was home to several Neolithic cultures that made up parts of ancient Chinese culture. In the Zhou period (1045–256 BCE), modern Shandong encompassed several important states, including the powerful state of Qi and the smaller state of Lu, closely associated with the Zhou ruling house and its traditions. The ancient philosophers Confucius (551–479 BCE) and Mencius (371–289 BCE) both lived in what is now southern Shandong. Mount Tai in the central mountains has been a major north China religious site from prehistoric times down to the present. The Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901) began in Shandong as attacks on Chinese Christians and foreign missionaries, but in 1900 it shifted its center northward to the Beijing-

Tianjin area. German imperialism created the port of Qingdao and Shandong's first railroad after 1898; Japan took over German interests in 1915 during World War I and remained the dominant foreign presence there until 1945.

Agriculturally, Shandong produces wheat, cotton, and sorghum. Its richest land and largest cities run from Jinan, the provincial capital, eastward through Weifang to Qingdao. Shandong's peninsula has good ports at Qingdao, Yantai, and Weihai. These have grown rapidly since 1978, when Communist leader Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) started China's reform era. In the decade before the 1997 Asian economic crisis, South Korean interests invested heavily in Shandong.

David D. Buck

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SHANG DYNASTY The Shang (1766–1045 BCE) is the earliest Chinese dynasty for which any significant archaeological documentation exists, placing it at the historical forefront of the Chinese cultural sphere. It is true that evidence of a prior dynasty, known in legend as the Xia (2100–1766 BCE), may soon be confirmed by ongoing archaeological studies of the settlement at Erlitou (which presently is considered to be either pre- or early Shang), or through new discoveries at other sites. Traditional Chinese historiography suggests that thirty kings ascended to the Shang throne through the rather complicated system of determining social status through ancestral connections. The first of these was said to have been named Cheng Tang (Tang the Successful; reigned 1766–1754?).

Writing

Extant written records dating from the Shang itself cover only the reigns of the last nine kings (Wu Ding, said to have reigned 1198–1189 BCE, through to Di Xin, who died around 1045 BCE), and it is of this later

period that one can speak with some authority. The oldest form of writing from this period exists as brief inscriptions on bronze ritual vessels (*jīn wén*) or as oracle-bone inscriptions (*jiā gu wén*), which were either the shells of turtles or scapulas of oxen on which questions concerning divinatory or ceremonial matters were "answered" in the cracks appearing when the materials were heated. The language of the inscriptions is an early form of written Chinese.

State and Religious Ritual

One of the most important characteristics of the Shang, as it appears from the surviving traces of their civilization, is that the basis of the empire's governance was a comprehensive combination of religious ceremony and state ritual. At least by the end of the dynasty, the king, as the sole interpreter of the oracle-bone messages, acted as head shaman. The importance of the king's religious obligations may account for the many moves that appear to have been made in the location of the capital city. The king was said to have regularly marked and claimed his empire by performing ceremonial acts at sacred mountains located at the four cardinal directions on the boundaries of his realm. It is likely that he moved the center of government as he traveled. In addition, the political authority of the ruler was reaffirmed in the state worship of the royal ancestral line. The Shang ancestors, in return, were believed to have used their otherworldly positions to ensure an orderly and beneficial influence on the state. The interrelationship between political governance and ancestor worship served to perpetuate Shang rule. Rulers acquired legitimacy from their genealogical charter, and the Shang was ratified as a ruling house.

The pervasiveness of ritual in court life is well documented in the area of Anyang in northern Henan Province, settled during the reign of Wu Ding and therefore considered the final stage in Shang development. Especially at the royal residence, enormous tombs evidence the practice of human and animal sacrifice, the ritual burial of chariots, and the ceremonial use of vessels and oracle bones. To assist in providing ceremonial materials, the central court assumed control of natural resources. Mining became a particularly important industry; Chinese casting techniques, unmatched in the rest of the world, made possible the production of large and complex items. A bronze foundry used to cast ritual items and covering 10,000 square meters was discovered at the Miaopubei site, south of Anyang.

Urban and Rural Development

Palaces and temples have also been tentatively identified (on the basis of size) near Anyang at the Xiao-



CHINA—HISTORICAL PERIODS

Xia dynasty (2100–1766 BCE)
 Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE)
 Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE)
 Western Zhou (1045–771 BCE)
 Eastern Zhou (770–221 BCE)
 Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE)
 Warring States period (475–221 BCE)
 Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE)
 Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE)
 Three Kingdoms period (220–265 CE)
 North and South dynasties (220–589 CE)
 Sui dynasty (581–618 CE)
 Tang dynasty (618–907 CE)
 Five Dynasties period (907–960 CE)
 Song dynasty (960–1279)
 Northern Song (960–1126)
 Southern Song (1127–1279)
 Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234)
 Yuan dynasty (1279–1368)
 Ming dynasty (1368–1644)
 Qing dynasty (1644–1912)
 Republican China (1912–1927)
 People's Republic of China (1949–present)
 Republic of China (1949–present)
 Cultural Revolution (1966–1976)

tun compound. Another settlement yielding archaeological finds of primary importance is that of Zhengzhou, situated directly beneath the modern city of the same name in central Henan Province. Artifacts from Zhengzhou predate those from Anyang, and therefore the Zhengzhou developments are felt to represent a middle period of Shang development. Urban populations would have been engaged for the most part in the concerns of the state, including enterprises such as metallurgy, as well as in running or providing support services for the offices of the court. The rural populations, primarily engaged in the farming of millet, also served the Shang state. Often the agricultural lands are referred to as the "king's land" or the "Shang's land," indicating that a significant portion of the crops was intended for collection by the state.

The extent of Shang influence is astounding. Over five hundred sites that were culturally (although not necessarily politically) Shang have been found in Henan, Hebei, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Anhui, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hubei, Jiangxi, Hunan, Sichuan, Inner Mongolia, and Liaoning Provinces (an area covering much of present day China). Remnants of Shang

culture have even been discovered among the artifacts of cultures that were distinctively non-Shang.

Geographic and Historical Influences

The Shang means of ruling the many scattered cultures under its influence was essentially that of an aristocratically configured feudalism based on clan birthright, perpetuated in the cult worship of royal Shang ancestors. Advanced techniques of metallurgy also aided Shang control, because military might allowed the Shang to maintain authority and prevail in the frequent wars against neighboring tribes, and especially against members of the Qiang tribal clan, who were often the victims of Shang sacrificial practices. Alliances between the Shang core authority and other clans were in a constant state of flux, and the true area through which the king and his retinue could travel safely was limited to the heartland of the Shang state in northern and eastern Henan and western Shandong. The population of the Shang is, as of yet, inestimable.

The fall of the Shang at the hands of a neighboring clan-state, the Zhou (1045–256 BCE) did not cut short the dynasty's influence on subsequent mainstream Chinese development. The Zhou, and to an extent successive dynasties, perpetuated the legacy of the Shang through continuing practices of ancestor worship, a patrimonial system of inheriting political status, an elaborate burial ritual, divination as a primary means of state advisement, and writing.

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See also: **Zhou Dynasty**

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SHANGHAI (2002 est. pop. 9 million). China's leading port city since the late nineteenth century, Shanghai is located in Jiangsu Province on the Huangpu tributary near the mouth of the Chang (Yangtze) River in central China. Along with the im-

portant role that it plays in the national transportation network, Shanghai is a major financial and industrial city, with hundreds of modern factories situated in its Pudong region—a special economic zone that has been developed since the opening of China in the 1980s.

Shanghai has long been a major commercial and transportation center in China since the Song (960–1279) and Yuan (1279–1368) dynasties and during the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties emerged as an important location in China's cotton industry. During the seventeenth century, a hundred years before the arrival of the Europeans, Shanghai was already one of the Qing dynasty's largest cities and an important port for both domestic and coastal trade.

Shanghai as a Western Trade Port

Under the conditions of the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing (Nanking) that concluded the First Opium War, Shanghai was opened, along with four other Chinese ports, to foreign trade and residence. The foreign presence in Shanghai grew throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century as British, American, French, Japanese, and other Western traders and adventurers moved to the city to engage in commerce. The foreign community in Shanghai resided in two settlements, the French Concession and the larger International Settlement, both of which were set apart from the Chinese city. Under the terms of the unequal treaties that were imposed on China in the nineteenth century, the foreign population was self-governed by a Municipal Council and a Mixed Court. The city's famous Bund along the Huangpu River was dominated by examples of European colonial architecture that housed foreign banks, trading houses, and consulates. The foreign community in Shanghai also constructed a horse-racing track, cricket field, and other facilities for its recreation during this period. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Shanghai was the center of foreign culture and commerce in China.

Shanghai under the Nationalists

As a bustling port and industrial city, Shanghai had a large working-class population during the early twentieth century, and this class played an important role in the development of both trade unions and political ideologies in modern China. The city's foreign concessions unwittingly provided sanctuary to many early socialist and communist leaders. During this period, resentment against foreign imperialism in China grew and boiled over on 30 May 1925, when tens of thousands of students and workers held a major protest in the city's International Settlement. Dissatisfaction with the state of the nation continued to grow among

Shanghai's population, and in March 1927, the city's General Labor Union, under the direction of the Chinese Communist Party, launched a general strike that was brutally suppressed by the army of Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) on its return from the Northern Expedition, a campaign against warlords in the north.

As the city emerged as China's leading port, a new class of Chinese entrepreneurs developed, a group often referred to as the comprador class. These merchants acted as both middle persons in the trade between China and foreigners and as an emerging native community of entrepreneurs and business people. The Chinese merchant community in Shanghai was extremely powerful and dominated local politics in the city's chambers of commerce and native place associations. Shanghai's Chinese bankers and industrialists were an important source of revenue for Chiang Kai-shek's Guomindang (Nationalist) government during the 1920s and 1930s. During the Nanjing Decade (1927–1937), Shanghai's businesses were heavily taxed by the new national government. In the early twentieth century, another group also wielded influence in the city—the triads, or criminal gangs. The triads profited by controlling Shanghai's lucrative drug and prostitution trades and by blackmailing local Chinese business leaders.

Shanghai was captured by the Japanese army after a bloody battle in the fall of 1937 and was occupied until Japan's defeat in August 1945. After the Communist victory in 1949, many of the city's bourgeoisie, however, fled the port and relocated to Hong Kong and Taiwan, helping to spur the economic development of both locations. During the first few decades of Communist rule, Shanghai was viewed with distrust by the new regime because the city was seen as not only a former center of foreign imperialism, but also home to middle-class values. Despite being tainted by its capitalist past, Shanghai continued to serve as a major source of tax revenue for the new Communist government and as a key industrial city in central China.

Shanghai since 1980

In the 1980s, with the opening of China, Shanghai was reborn and quickly resumed its role as the nation's premier port and point of contact with the outside world. Shanghai's industrial quarter attracted foreign investors who developed modern factories in the city. Chinese entrepreneurs helped to revitalize Shanghai's economy, making it one of the success stories of the post-Mao era and home to bustling financial and commercial enterprises. An important component of Shanghai's growth since the early 1990s has been the development of the Pudong New Area—a 100-square

kilometer development zone that is home to a new international airport, deep-water harbor, and modern industrial and high-technology parks. In 1990, Pudong's local gross domestic product (GDP) was 6 billion renminbi (RMB), a figure that was dwarfed by the 2000 GDP figure of 92 billion RMB. Since the 1980s, Shanghai's industrial base has been diversified from the emphasis on heavy industries (steel and petrochemical) that dominated during the Communist era, to new, "cleaner" industries that emphasize light manufacturing, including textiles and electronic goods. Shanghai remains China's leading banking and financial center and an important site of foreign investment.

Robert John Perrins

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SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (also known as the Shanghai Forum or the Shanghai Five) was established by five nations, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, during the gathering of the heads of state in Shanghai in April 1996. It was the first large-scale cooperation initiative since the China-Soviet split in the 1960s. The main purpose was the resolution of disputed territorial issues, demilitarization of the borders, and removing the last vestiges of the Cold War-era confrontation. Additionally, the members sought to boost economic cooperation, the movement of investment between these neighboring countries, and encourage trade, especially border trade.

During their first meetings in 1996 and 1997, the Shanghai Five members signed agreements on borders and on demilitarization. These fundamentally important documents endorsed resolution of the long-standing disputes that existed between the USSR (and later the Confederation of Independent States, or CIS) on one hand and the People's Republic of China on the other, which had led to several military conflicts in the past.

After the delimitation of the borders and resolving the disputed territorial issues, the Shanghai Five turned to other problems of mutual importance such as terrorism, the growing militancy of opposition groups, and separatism. During the meeting in Almaty in July 1998, the members decided to initiate annual summits. In August 1999 during the summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, the Shanghai Five members issued the so-called Bishkek Statement, expressing their desire to tackle "international terrorism, illegal dealing in drugs and narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, illegal immigration and other forms of cross-border crimes," setting up a joint consultative group and launching military cooperation. Another outcome was the establishment of an Anti-Terrorist Center in Bishkek.

In June 2001 the Shanghai Five decided to relaunch the organization as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in response to the increasing marginalization of Russia in the international arena and China's worries about the prospects of the United States-dominated unilateral world order. The SCO members emphasized military cooperation against terrorism, and promotion of economic development and trade. In addition, China and Russia stressed their support for a "multipolar world," and a new world order based on "democratic, fair, and rational" principles. The SCO members also agreed to extend the cooperation into new fields, such as cultural issues, ecological problems, and disaster relief. They also declared the organization open to new members. During the 2001 summit, Uzbekistan officially joined as the sixth full member.

Rafis Abazov

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SHANGHAI PUDONG NEW AREA A stroll along the famous stretch of river called the Bund in Shanghai, China, is a stroll between two different periods of time. On the Shanghai side of the Huangpu River are the grand Western-style buildings built mostly in the 1910s and 1920s. Across the river, in what used to be rural marsh, farmland, shabby housing, and run-down factories, is the 350-square-kilometer Special Economic Zone called the Pudong New Area.

A ten-year building boom in the 1990s shaped the Pudong skyline with nearly 300 financial and commercial towers, hotels, and apartments. Some of these many buildings can be seen from the Bund. The first to catch the eye is the gigantic and visually challenging 468-meter Oriental Pearl TV Tower. It includes eleven spheres of various sizes, located at different points along the tower. In the distance, the Jinmao Building rises to 88 floors, the top part of which, not apparent to the viewer, is a five-star hotel. Situated in the foreground on the riverfront is a long, low-level building with a huge dome on each side. This is the Shanghai International Convention Center.

In the 1990s Pudong was the fastest growing urban area in the world. It is likely that the overall pace of development will continue until at least 2010. Construction in Pudong continues to involve massive infrastructure and housing development and the provision of production, office, and warehousing space on an unprecedented scale. Shanghai planners have long considered the development prospects of Pudong, recognizing that the Huangpu River represents a formidable transportation barrier. The construction of several major bridges, tunnels, and a subway system in the 1990s supplemented earlier cross-river tunnel and ferry connections. This has considerably improved accessibility, though congestion is still severe at peak periods. A subway will eventually connect the huge new international airport in Pudong to the financial and cultural centers of Shanghai.

A Special Economic Zone

The Pudong New Area was designated an "open" area in 1990 by the Chinese government. This initiative stimulated Shanghai's economic restructuring after years of neglect. It also reaffirmed the central government's commitment to economic reform and foreign investment. The leasing and ownership of buildings, restricted elsewhere in China at the time, would largely be market based. In addition, foreign investment would be allowed in financial services, retailing, and infrastructure development, notably roads, subways, and airports.

Pudong is divided into four functional development zones: Lujiazui finance and trade zone, Zhangjiang high-tech development park, Jinqiao export processing area, and Waigaoqiao free-trade zone. The financial center is home to the Shanghai Stock Exchange, domestic and international banking, investment houses, other businesses, and major accounting and consulting firms. High technology in particular is encouraged. The high-tech development park is to become the Silicon Valley of China. It will be the site for education, research, development and high-tech incubation. Export processing is facilitated in the Waigaoqiao free-trade zone by a shipping port and bonded storage. Manufacturing enterprises from all over the world are represented in the Pudong area.

In setting up offices ahead of China's entry into the World Trade Organization, many foreign firms have made considerable investments in Pudong. They have also had to weather the real estate bubble of the mid-1990s and its subsequent collapse, compounded in part by the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Rents that peaked in 1995 declined 75 percent by 1999. As a consequence, Pudong was left with tremendous overcapacity in commercial rental space. Vacancy rates varied from 40 to 70 percent of capacity between 1996 and 2000. This made the rental market for foreign businesses difficult in that period. Low rents are attractive because they reduce overhead costs. However, the prospect of locating in a building with few or no tenants raised questions about the real market for commercial space and the viability of business operations in this location. Efforts to control the building boom in the late 1990s may reduce the excess capacity and increase investor confidence.

Environment and Development

Known as the "dragon's head," the Pudong New Area is not just a financial center for Shanghai. It also is one of several developments in the Chang (Yangtze) River Basin (population 400 million) designed to integrate China into the global economy in the twenty-first century. The pressures to create economic wealth from this region have profound social and environmental implications. The challenge in many respects will be to avoid the worst excesses of urban and industrial development, particularly unsustainable transportation, energy, and manufacturing production processes.

Control over development and integration of the two regional areas, the older Shanghai Puxi area of 12.7 million people and the new Pudong area of 1.5 million people, is gradually shifting from the central government to the Shanghai municipal government. The matter of policy and administrative control may

become increasingly important as Shanghai struggles with economic, social, and environmental pressures brought on by economic reforms.

Among the many environmental problems are air and water pollution. Smoggy days are a consequence of coal-fired power plants and emissions from automobiles. Water pollution has typically been the result of inadequate controls, addressed in part with new water treatment plants in Pudong. A longer-term issue, one that will be important to the next generation, is the rise in sea level. Climate change models suggest that the level of the East China Sea could rise by 50 to 70 centimeters by 2050, exposing Shanghai, and especially Pudong, to flooding.

Regarding social issues, city planners may have to deal with the problems caused by growing income disparity, a result of economic reform. China is facing problems such as unemployment that did not exist under central planning. The new Shanghai will increasingly have disparities in wage income between urban and rural residents and even among urban residents. A key focus of city planners is job creation in the financial-services and high-technology industries. There is every reason to believe that the new Shanghai will rival Hong Kong and Taiwan as a leading financial and commercial center by 2010.

Robert Gale

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SHANXI (1997 est. pop. 31.4 million). The northern China province of Shanxi borders on Shaanxi Province on the west, Nei Monggol Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolia) on the north, Hebei Province on the east, and Henan Province on the south. Shanxi covers an area of 156,300 square kilometers of highly eroded plateau at an altitude of about 1,000 meters above sea level. On the western, northern, and eastern fringe, mountains rise from 500 to 2,000 meters above the plateau. The Huang (Yellow) River constitutes parts of the border to Hebei and Henan. Sheltered from winds from the ocean by the eastern mountains, Shanxi has a typical continental climate, with cold winters and dry summers, and an annual precipitation of 400 to 650 millimeters, which makes

irrigation necessary. The capital of Taiyuan (estimated population of 1.9 million as of 1997) is situated in the center of the Shanxi, which is divided into six regions and one hundred counties.

Shanxi was inhabited by farmers as early as 5000 BCE, and during the Western Zhou dynasty (1045–771 BCE), the state of Jin was established in the area. After the unification of China in 221 BCE, Shanxi often came into play as a crucial part in the Chinese empire’s defense against nomad invasions. Both the Northern Wei (386–534 CE) and the Tang (618–907 CE) dynasties were established from Shanxi, but when succeeding dynasties set up their capitals in eastern China, the area declined into a poverty-stricken region ruled by warlords or nomad chiefs. Shanxi was occupied by Japanese forces from 1937 to 1945.

The province is sparsely populated in the northwestern mountainous parts where sheep, cattle, and other livestock are raised. In the agricultural areas, relatively little wheat and rice is grown, the major products being millet, soybeans, and potatoes. Other main crops are cotton, sugar beets, tobacco, fruit, and vegetables. Shanxi has the largest known deposits of coal in China, accounting for one-third of the total. The coal is of high quality and the fields cover an area of 57,100 square kilometers and are easily mined near the surface. Other natural resources in significant amounts include iron ore, copper, and gypsum. The industry is concentrated around Taiyuan and Datong in the north. The coal industry is, of course, by far the most important, but important industrial products also include locomotives, automobiles, and tractors. The light industry produces consumer goods such as watches, television sets, and washing and sewing machines. Shanxi is home for the famous Yungang grottoes from the Northern Wei dynasty, containing fifty-three caves with about 51,000 statues of various Buddhist deities.

Bent Nielsen

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SHARI‘A Many pious Muslims believe that one of the most remarkable and valuable features of their re-

ligion is the comprehensive and dynamic nature of its legal system. Islamic religious law is an elaborate and vigorous system that has been evolving from the time of the Prophet Muhammad (c. 570–632), the founder of Islam, until the present, and continues to be taken very seriously by a large number of Muslims, who use its rules and values as guiding principles in their lives. This system of law is called *shari‘a*, a word that literally means "path to water." This meaning shows how Muslims see *shari‘a* not only as something that is essential to life but also as a very obvious path, because in a desert nothing is more obvious to the residents than the path to a reliable source of water.

Qur’anic Law

Muslims believe Islamic law to be the collected prescriptions dictated by God for the running of the universe. This law is revealed by God in the Qur’an, which provides some very clear rules on issues as diverse as how to perform acts of worship, what not to eat, and how to distribute inheritance property. However, the Qur’an does not provide clear rules for all of the innumerable situations encountered in the course of human life. During Muhammad’s lifetime, that level of detail was not thought necessary, because the Islamic community had the living example of the Prophet to follow.

The generations immediately after the death of Muhammad also did not see any problem with the fact that the Qur’an did not provide a comprehensive list of laws, because the memory of Muhammad was very much alive in the community, and people felt they had a good idea of what Muhammad would have done in any given situation. However, as generations passed and the Islamic community spread to new cultures and was faced with new situations, it became more and more difficult to use the practices of Muhammad as they were remembered by the community to guide all aspects of life. It therefore became necessary to develop a system by which laws could be developed to deal with new situations. This system is called *fiqh*, and is believed to have four principles called *usul al-fiqh* (principles of jurisprudence).

Principles of Jurisprudence

The primary source of Islamic law is the Qur’an. Rules and precepts that are clearly stated in the Qur’an are not open to debate and must be accepted as is. This is the first principle of jurisprudence. For example, since the Qur’an explicitly forbids the eating of pork, Muslims who are observant of *shari‘a* need look no further for rules concerning whether or not they should eat pork.


If the Qur’an does not provide clear rules concerning a question of law, then one looks to the example of the Prophet, otherwise referred to as his sunna (the second rule of jurisprudence). Sunna, often translated as "tradition," is the way Muhammad lived his life. This is preserved as living sunna in the practices of a virtuous Islamic community, and as recorded sunna in the anecdotes concerning Muhammad’s actions, which are known as hadith. The concept of sunna is complicated and open to interpretation, since the vast number of individual hadith accounts sometimes contradict each other; furthermore, the concept of living tradition can cause conflict because not everyone agrees on which traditions of a society are in keeping with what Muhammad would have done and which of them are innovations.

From the ninth century onward, Muslim jurists have attempted to balance Qur’an and sunna and have tried to derive laws from these sources that can then be applied to new situations. This normally involves reasoning by analogy (the third principle of jurisprudence) and consensus of the community (the fourth).

Islamic Legal Schools

Sunni Muslim jurists belong to four schools, which differ in whether or not they trust more in the textual sources of Qur’an and hadith or in the human ability to reason by analogy. These schools are called the Maliki, Hanbali, Hanafi, and Shafi‘i. The Maliki school is traditionally strongest in North Africa and considers the living sunna of the community to be more reliable than human reason. The Hanbali school is strongest in Saudi Arabia; it has historically given a great deal of weight to the literal interpretation of written texts, so much so that some Hanbali scholars insisted that an unreliable hadith should be preferred over a strong example of reasoning by analogy. The Shafi‘i school resembled the Hanbali school in relying on hadith in preference to the living sunna, although Shafi‘i scholars accept analogical reasoning when there is no clear guidance from the Qur’an or hadith. The Hanafi school is notable for accepting personal opinion in matters of law if there is no precedent on which to rely.

The Shafi‘i and Hanafi schools together account for the majority of Sunni Muslims and have a wide distribution, the Shafi‘i school being more popular among the Arabs of the Middle East and in Indonesia, and the Hanafi school being more accepted in South and Central Asia and in Turkey. The Hanafi school has had a wider distribution since the sixteenth century, but before that the Shafi‘i school was the most influential legal tradition in the Islamic world. Among Shi‘ite Muslims, one important legal school was the



Narinder Bhatia of Faridabad, India, holds up what may be the world’s smallest Qur’an. Owned by his father, the book measures 15x20x10 mm and contains 572 pages. (AFP/CORBIS)

Ja‘fari school. It was established by Nadir Shah (1688–1747), the Iranian conqueror, in an attempt to heal the schism between Shi‘ite and Sunni Islam. However, the positions adopted by the new school proved unacceptable to Shi‘ites and Sunnis alike, and it failed.

Because the Hanafi and Shafi‘i schools use the principle of reasoning by analogy to a much greater degree than do the Hanbali and Maliki schools, many people see these schools as being better able to adapt to new circumstances. The process of using reasoning by analogy to come up with new laws for new circumstances is called *ijtihad*, and someone who is qualified to engage in this form of independent reasoning is called a Mujtahid. Mujtahid is not normally a formal title given by a ruler or government, but is bestowed by the local Islamic community in recognition of a religious scholar’s reputation for learning and good character.

Muftis and Fatwas

A mufti is a highly respected legal authority who obtains his title by virtue of achieving a reputation

among the local populace as a good, reliable scholar. The mufti's legal opinion is called a *fatwa*. In theory, the mufti's opinion is binding on the person who poses the legal question to the mufti. In practice, people frequently ignore the mufti's opinion if it displeases them, largely because there is no institution that enforces the decision of the mufti.

Jamal Elias

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SHARIATI, ALI (1933–1977), Iranian Islamic intellectual. Ali Shariati was an Iranian Islamic intellectual whose writings and teachings contributed to the growth of revolutionary Islam in Iran. He was born in the village of Mazinan. Soon after, he moved with his family to Mashhad. His father was Mohammad Taqi Shariati, a reformist Muslim cleric. After high school, Ali Shariati studied at a teachers training college and later began teaching in elementary schools in the area. During the oil nationalization movement, Shariati supported Prime Minister Muhammad Musaddeq; he was arrested and held in jail. After his release Shariati studied Arabic and French at Mashhad University while continuing his teaching duties. In 1959 he was awarded a scholarship to study sociology and Islamic studies at the University of Paris. It was in France that he came into contact with the scholars and intellectuals who shaped his thinking on sociology, religion, revolution, and imperialism. He earned a doctorate in sociology and theology in 1964. Upon his return to Iran he was arrested and jailed on suspicion of being a subversive. He was released six months later and went back to teaching at village schools. Soon after, Shariati began teaching at Mashhad University. He was eventually fired and moved to Tehran, where he began lecturing at Husseini Ershad, a socioreligious educational association organized by the liberation movement. He spoke in favor of mass political participation and against the regime of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. The government shut down Husseini Ershad in the early 1970s. Shariati was arrested, and his writings banned. Three years later he was released to house arrest. In 1977 he received government permission to travel to Britain, where he died in Southampton on 19 June 1977

of an apparent heart attack; there was suspicion that the Iranian secret police was involved in his death. He was buried in Damascus.

Shariati further developed the lines of thinking on Islam by presenting the religion as modernizing and revolutionary rather than conservative and fatalistic. Furthermore, he explained the ideological position of Islam as a moderate one between socialism and capitalism. His lectures were very popular and were published in fifty volumes. One of Shariati's best-known works in the West is *On the Sociology of Islam*, translated into English by Hamid Algar. Although his writings and teachings provided the undercurrent for the Iranian Revolution in 1979, he has been denounced for his anticlerical message in the years since the revolution.

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SHATT AL ARAB RIVER. See **Karun River.**

SHEEP, KARAKUL Karakul sheep, also known as Russian, Astrakhan, or Bukhara sheep, are medium-sized, fat-tailed, and one of the earliest domesticated sheep breeds of Central or West Asian origin. They are raised mainly for the lustrous black, curly pelt of very young lambs, called Persian lamb (once popular in expensive coats) and are also a source of milk, meat, tallow, and wool. Mature Karakul sheep have so-called carpet wool, a mixture of coarse and fine fibers fifteen to twenty-five centimeters long that produces a superior carpet yarn. This is the wool from which the art of felting evolved. Native flocks exhibit wide variations in type and color, with significant differences from other breeds of sheep. Their broad, fat tail is a fat storage organ, a source of nourishment, similar in function to the camel's hump.

Archaeologists have discovered Persian lambskin dating back to 1400 BCE, and carvings of a distinct Karakul type have been found on ancient Babylonian temples. The name originates from a village in the Amu Dar'ya River valley (now Uzbekistan). Native to

this desert land, the Karakul sheep are adapted to harsh environment (shortage of vegetation and water, and extreme high and low temperatures). Large flocks are found in Central Asia and South Africa.

Victor Fet

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SHEEP, MARCO POLO Marco Polo sheep (*vis poli*), the largest living wild sheep, are a subspecies of the once vast Argali (*Ovis ammon*) herds that ranged from Mongolia to Afghanistan. Today, these ungulates roam the Eastern Pamir Mountains and Pamir Plateau of Tajikistan, and in smaller numbers the neighboring Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan, northern Pakistan (especially within Khunjerab National Park), and in China's eastern Xinjiang Province. Unlike most wild sheep, they favor open basins instead of rocky crags. They use their powerful bodies to outrun predatory snow leopards and wolves. The common name honors the legendary thirteenth-century Venetian traveler who noted the Central Asian practice of stacking sheep horns to demarcate travel routes across the Pamir Plateau.

Larger males measure 1.3 meters (4 feet) high at the shoulders, and weight 140 kilograms (300 pounds). The ram horns curl 1.8 meters (6 feet) or more in length and are prized by trophy hunters. Normally, a single lamb is born after a 150-day gestation and lives 6–7 years. Soviet-era travel restrictions protected this species in much of its range until the 1990s. Today foreign sport hunters, locals seeking meat, and poaching for body parts (used in Chinese potions) are depleting *Ovis poli* throughout its range.

Stephen F. Cunha

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SHEHNAI The *shebnai* is a North Indian wind instrument now familiar in the performance of classical music but originally associated with ceremonial occasions. It is a double-reed instrument with a wood body

and brass bell and has six to eight holes. The *shebnai* is accompanied by a second *shebnai* that plays the first note of the octave. Percussion is provided by a small drum called a *tikara* and not ordinarily by the more standard *tabla*. The *shebnai* team used to be known as *raushanchauki* or *nababat* in northern India. Like its southern counterpart, the *nadaswaram*, the *shebnai* was a feature of festivals, celebrations, temples, and royal courts. The contents of the music associated with such specific occasions came from Indian classical music but not in its most skilled or refined form. The traditional use of the *shebnai* has not completely disappeared, but its reputation greatly increased in the late twentieth century due to a few musician families, two of them hailing from Benares (Varanasi), who succeeded in establishing the *shebnai* in the concert hall. The greatest living exponent of classical *shebnai*, Bismillah Khan (b. 1908), belongs to one of the Benares families.

Tirthankar Roy

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SHEN CONGWEN (1902–1988), twentieth-century Chinese writer. Born in Phoenix Town Village, Hunan Province, Shen briefly attended primary school and then went to a military training camp to carry on the family tradition of soldiering. Shen began writing after witnessing the horrors associated with military campaigns. At age twenty, he went to Peking, became coeditor of the journal *Modern Critic*, and gradually gained recognition for his literary talents. Shen worked in many genres including poetry, novels, and essays but was best known for short stories and novellas, including "Three Men and a Girl," "The Lovers," and "Gazing at Rainbows." Like his contemporaries, Shen was influenced by Western writers such as Maupassant, Chekhov, and Joyce. Later, he moved to Shanghai where he continued to write. Shen's main sources of inspiration were the Chinese countryside, military life, and the Miao minority ethnic group of Hunan. In 1949, Shen's productive streak ended after the Communists took power. The Chinese Communist party labeled Shen a conservative and banned his books. For several decades, Shen ceased to write fiction and instead studied porcelain making and the history of Chinese costume. In the 1980s, already an old man, Shen wrote again, enjoying a resurgence in popularity, until his death in 1988.

Elizabeth VanderVen

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SHENZHEN SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE

Shenzhen is a city in the south of China's Guangdong province. It borders Hong Kong and the Pearl River, with an area of 2020 square kilometers, 327.5 square kilometers of which have been designed as a special economic zone (SEZ) since 1979. Shenzhen was only one of four SEZs established to carry out experiments with greater economic freedom. But the transformation of the former rural community into a major export center is the showcase of economic reforms in post-Mao China and has attracted worldwide attention, especially from developing countries.

Historical Background and Foundation of Shenzhen SEZ

Since the 1960s, so-called export processing zones (EPZs) have been established in various parts of the world with the goal of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and promoting industrialization. While Latin America's experience with EPZs has been mixed, such East Asian countries as South Korea and Taiwan have made their EPZs centers of export-driven growth.

Until the end of the Maoist era (1976), the People's Republic of China followed a strategy of development that was diametrically opposed to that of EPZs. The open-treaty ports of the nineteenth century, which had to accept free trade as a result of unequal treaties with the Western powers and Japan, were symbols of national decay. Therefore, Communist China followed a policy of self-sufficiency and isolation. However, China's Great Leap Forward program in the 1950s and its Cultural Revolution in the 1960s resulted in economic and political catastrophe.

After the death of Mao Zedong and the arrest of the "Gang of Four," his hard-line supporters, in 1978, the new leadership under Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) changed China's economic-development strategy. In July 1979, Guangdong and Fujian provinces were granted the right to carry out economic experiments, and four SEZs were set up: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou of Guangdong province, and Xiamen of Fujian province. Later, in 1988, the island of Hainan became the fifth SEZ. All of these regions were coastal,

rich in labor, and located close to the successful market economies of Hong Kong and Taiwan. The economic opening of these regions was intended to promote growth and exports, but the possibility of growing economic ties with Hong Kong and Taiwan was also seen as facilitating eventual reunification.

Development of Shenzhen SEZ

The newly established town of Shenzhen had originally been a county called Baoan, whose residents earned their living mainly from fishing. When Shenzhen city was established in 1979, it had 314,000 inhabitants. In 2000, it was a town of around 4 million inhabitants. The development of Shenzhen SEZ can be divided into four phases. The first phase, lasting from 1979 to 1984, saw the establishment of some legal preconditions for the existence of a special economic regime in the SEZ, but only slow changes in



Shenzhen was the first place in China designated as a special economic zone. The designation in 1980 turned what was once a town into a modern city. (JOSEPH SOHM; CHROMOSOHM INC./CORBIS)

economic activity. In 1984, Deng Ziaoping set up an economic framework for the SEZs as "windows to technology, management, knowledge, and foreign policies," opening a second phase in the institution of preconditions for growth. The inflow of foreign capital, mainly from Hong Kong, slowly accelerated from the mid-1980s, but production processes, contrary to expectations, were mostly characterized by low-technology intensity and were based on the comparative advantage of Shenzhen's low labor costs. Twice, in 1985 and after the events on Tiananmen Square in 1989, the SEZs were criticized by conservative Communist Party leaders.

In the early 1990s, the third phase of development began. During this takeoff period, foreign companies from all over the world rushed in, and by 1997, fifty-one of the world's top five hundred enterprises had taken root in Shenzhen. The export volume of Shenzhen increased to around one-seventh of China's total (\$26 billion in 1998). Deng's much-publicized trip to Shenzhen in 1992 helped gain the trust of domestic and foreign investors. The technology intensity of production also increased, and in 1998 more than 35 percent of Shenzhen's production was in the high- and new-technology sectors.

The fourth phase of development began with the challenge of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and China's preparation for entry in the World Trade Organization (WTO). This will bring a major redirection of economic activities in Shenzhen SEZ. While competition in the domestic market will be tougher due to market entry of new competitors and more domestic competition, the WTO accession in 2001 opens the world market even wider for Chinese exports.

Characteristics and Economic Effects of SEZs

When the EPZs were first established in various parts of the world, they were delineated as areas to provide procedural and operational ease for producers and to offer tax holidays, tax reductions, and duty-free import of capital goods and raw materials for export manufacture. This policy was designed to attract FDI, generate employment, earn foreign exchange, and eventually link the less-developed hinterland and facilitate technology transfer and transfer of modern-management practice. Infrastructure in the EPZs was limited to industrial estate development.

The Chinese SEZs, by contrast, additionally focused on the provision of supportive infrastructure such as housing, airports, roads, ports, telecommunications, electricity, and transportation. Also, the reform activities expanded to include agriculture,

commerce, development of the financial sector, including the opening of a stock exchange, tourism and the service sector, and increasingly since the mid-1990s, privatization of state-owned enterprises and housing. This expansion enabled Shenzhen SEZ to escape from the fate of many EPZs, which attracted only labor-intensive, low-technology production processes with few possibilities for economic development of the hinterland. Since a general liberalization of the Chinese economy was not possible because of political considerations, the SEZs served as a model for the reform of the rest of the economy in a politically closely controlled area. This indirect effect of the SEZs as models for the economy is as important as the direct effect of attraction of FDI and the transfer of technology and modern management practices.

Future of Shenzhen SEZ

Shenzhen SEZ not only became one of the centers of export, technology, and economic reform in China, but it was also gradually able to cope with such early problems as growing inequality, the fate of migrant workers, and environmental degradation. Shenzhen was awarded the first urban planning award in China by the International Architecture Association.

As China moves through the early years of the twenty-first century, however, the economic position of Shenzhen SEZ must be redirected. Labor costs are increasing, and firms are migrating to cheaper locations. The mushrooming of SEZs and the introduction of open ports and special zones for technological development as well as general economic reforms in China make competition for FDI harder. In the future, the upgrading of production and infrastructure, especially in areas such as education, will be crucial for Shenzhen SEZ.

Bernhard Seliger

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SHI The *shi* is China's classic lyric form. The early poetry anthology and Confucian classic *Shijing* (Classic of Poetry), compiled during the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE), contained poems with four-character rhymed lines, the earliest sort of *shi*. Although composed on nonpolitical topics, the poems of the *Shijing* were believed to contain messages on good governance and the well-run state, and poetry from the Zhou dynasty forward was seen as, among other things, a vehicle for criticizing and reforming the state. Because a main characteristic of *shi* is indirection and allusion, meanings other than the readily apparent surface meaning were sought for and identified.

During the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) *shi* with either five- or seven-character lines developed. This style of *shi*, like the *shi* of the *Shijing*, featured grammatical parallelism and rhymed lines. Melancholy themes were popular; this tendency carried over into the Six Dynasties period (c. 222–589), when it became a conventionalized stance. The poetry of Tao Qian (365–427) stands out during this period; his poems on turning away from officialdom and embracing the joys of drink and the life of the gentleman farmer were models for later disaffected bureaucrats.

The *shi* form developed further in the Tang dynasty, with *lushi* ("regulated verse"—*shi* whose tonal pattern and rhyme scheme were closely dictated) and *jueju* ("broken-off lines"), an exceptionally short form of just four lines. In contradistinction, the older styles of *shi* came to be called *gushi* ("old-style verse"). The great poets of the Tang include Li Bo (701–772), who preferred *gushi*, and Du Fu (712–770), who wrote *lushi* and was admired by later generations for his realism and his choice of mundane subjects, which had earlier been thought inappropriate for poetry. The *shi* of Wang Wei (699–759), another great poet of the Tang, are informed by Buddhist sensibilities and a deep appreciation for landscape (Wang Wei was also a celebrated painter).

Shi continued as a major poetic form in subsequent eras and even into modern times, but with the compositions of the Tang, the form is considered to have reached its high point.

Francesca Forrest

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SHIBUSAWA EIICHI (1840–1931), father of modern Japanese business. Born in 1840 to the family of a textile merchant, Shibusawa Eiichi is considered a father of modern Japanese business. He was opposed to the Tokugawa family then in power, but his hopes of helping to bring down the Tokugawa regime (1600–1603–1868) were never realized. Shibusawa later accompanied a Tokugawa prince to Europe and nearly accompanied him into exile. As a person with experience abroad and training in Western ideas, Shibusawa became a member of the powerful Home Ministry under the Meiji government (1868–1912). In the Home Ministry he helped draft modern banking laws. Later Shibusawa resigned from the government to help found and run more than one hundred joint stock companies, including the first commercially successful cotton-spinning mill.

Shibusawa also made his mark in his efforts to apply Confucian ideas to business. Working both through schools he helped to found and through a society of followers, Ryumonsha (Dragon Gate Society), Shibusawa argued for a business ideology based on service to Japan which downplayed profit. Following his own philosophy, Shibusawa made a far smaller fortune from his many enterprises than one would expect. His efforts helped to create a banking system for Japan and an environment for business.

David W. Blaylock

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SHIGA (2002 est. pop. 1.4 million). Shiga Prefecture is situated in the central region of Japan's island of Honshu, where it occupies an area of 4,016 square kilometers. Shiga's primary geographical feature is the nation's largest freshwater body, Lake Biwa, located in a basin ringed by mountains. Biwa is divided into the deeper North Lake and the shallow South Lake.

Shiga is bordered by Kyoto, Mie, Gifu, and Fukui prefectures. Once known as Omi Province, it assumed its present name and borders in 1881.

The prefecture's capital city is Otsu, situated on Lake Biwa's southwest shore. Emperor Tenji established his palace and capital there in 667. After Tenji's death in 672, the capital was moved to Asuka. In later centuries Otsu flourished as a lake port and a highway post station during the Edo period (1600/1603–1868). In 1891, an assassination attempt was made on Russian Crown Prince Nicholas (later Czar Nicholas II) while he was visiting Otsu. In recent decades, Otsu has become the heart of the industrial zone south of Lake Biwa that abuts the Kyoto–Osaka metropolitan area. The prefecture's other important cities are Hikone, Nagahama, Kusatsu, and Omi Hachiman.

Ruled by a series of feudal warlords and often a strategic battlefield, the province came under the control of Oda Nobunaga (1534–1582), who in 1579 built a mountaintop castle in Azuchi to defend Kyoto. During the Edo period, most of the region was ruled by the Ii family from their castle town of Hikone.

Rice remains the prefecture's main agricultural product, while Lake Biwa is the source of various kinds of freshwater fish and also the site of pearl culture. Water from the lake is used for drinking, irrigation, and industry, both locally and in Kyoto, by way of the Biwako canal. Shiga's industries include textiles, electrical goods, chemicals, and transport machinery. Visitors are drawn to Lake Biwa, the Enryakuji Buddhist temple complex on Mount Hiei, Otsu's Hie Shrine and Buddhist temples, and the Edo-period merchant quarters in Omi Hachiman.

E. L. S. Weber

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SHIGA SHIGETAKA (1863–1927), Japanese journalist and educator. A journalist and a professor of geography at Waseda University, Tokyo, Shiga was also a world traveler, and an advocate of emigration to Hawaii, California, and other destinations. In the late 1880s, schools of thought such as Shiga's Seikyosha (Society for Education and Politics) dominated the debates over the course Japan should take. Shiga advocated preservation of Japanese cultural identity (*kokusui shugi*) in the face of increasing internal and external pressures toward modernization. *Ni-*

honjin (Japanese), a fortnightly magazine, became a mouthpiece for the Seikyosha members. Shiga's major works are *Nan'yo jiji* (Current Affairs in the South Seas, 1887) and *Nihon fukeiron* (Japanese Landscape, 1894), best-sellers in the 1880s and 1890s, respectively, the latter still in print.

Shiga was also concerned about educating for a "new" Japan, especially following the promulgation of *Kyoiku chokugo* (The Imperial Rescript on Education, 1890), which called for people's obedience to the state. Shiga believed that education should be free from the state control and provide international perspectives for Japanese in Japan and overseas; it was vital to promote geography through journalism and educational institutions as a way of understanding the contemporary world.

Masako Gavin

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SHIJING *Shijing*, literally "classic of poetry," is the first collection of poetry in Chinese history and remains the most prestigious. The *Shijing's* status as a classic is partly related to the legend attributing its compilation to Confucius (551–479 BCE), who was said to have selected its 305 poems from a base of 3,000. The reliability of this legend is rather uncertain; what the textual evidence does clearly show is that Confucius highly respected the *Shijing*, used it in his teaching, and commented on it.

The compilation of the *Shijing* has also been credited to officials dispatched by the central government to various regions to collect poems in order to observe local customs and people's lives and thereby improve the government. In the Western Han period (206 BCE–8 CE) when Emperor Wu (reigned 104–87 BCE) legitimized the school of Confucianism, the *Shi* became one of the Five Classics included in the curriculum of the national academy and was thereafter called *Shijing*.

The attribution and dating of the *Shijing* poems are uncertain. The works roughly date from the Early Western Zhou dynasty (eleventh century BCE) to the middle of the Spring and Autumn period (seventh century BCE). The traditional classification of the *Shijing* involves the Six Principles, which fall into two types. The first three principles denote three genres, namely,

feng, ya, and song, or "air," "elegancia," and "hymn." *Feng*, also known as *guofeng* (airs of states), are folk songs from fifteen states. These songs, numbering 160 titles and making the major part of the *Shijing*, skillfully describe common people's lives. The 105 *ya* titles are divided into "greater *ya*" and "lesser *ya*." The former includes poems on court life, banquet scenes, harvest celebrations, and also epiclike verse on the Zhou ancestors. The lesser *ya* depict army life and the grievances of lower officials. Collected from three regions, Zhou, Lu, and Shang, the *song* include hymns sung at ceremonious occasions. The latter three principles refer to three rhetorical devices, namely *fu*, *bi*, and *xing*. The first means "elaboration," a plain narrative or descriptive mode of writing. *Bi* is "comparison," or analogy. *Xing*, referring to "arousing," is loosely understood as "metaphor."

A considerable number of the *Shijing* poems provide aesthetic pleasure and valuable information about the time. They profoundly influenced later Chinese literature. During the Han, most poems were given allegorical readings and were treated as political satires or ethical lessons. There were four major schools of such interpretation: Qi, Lu, Han, and Mao. The last one later assumed orthodoxy in the exegeses of the classic, and for this reason the *Shijing* is also called *Maoshi* (Poetry of the Mao School).

Timothy Wei Keung Chan

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SHIKOKU (2001 pop. 4.2 million). Shikoku is located in the southwest part of the Japanese archipelago, facing the Seto Inland Sea between Honshu and Kyushu. It is the smallest of Japan's four main islands, with an area of 18,808 square kilometers. It is divided into four prefectures: Kagawa, Tokushima, Kochi, and Ehime. In the past, each prefecture's capital was built around a castle and therefore known as a "castle town" (*Joka-machi*). The cities of Matsuyama (2001 pop. 472,000) and Takamatsu (2001 pop. 333,000) are the largest on the island. The northern part of Shikoku has mild winters and long dry summers and is little affected by the wind. The southern part of the island, which is influenced by the Pacific Ocean, is warmer

and wetter. Here average temperature ranges from 14° C to 16° C. The island is mountainous including high peaks such as Mount Ishizuchi (1,982 meters) in Ehime and Mount Tsurugi (1,955 meters) in Tokushima. The Shikoku Karst, a limestone plateau with an elevation of 1,400 meters, runs along the borders of Ehime and Kochi Prefectures.

It is this range of elevation of Shikoku that has limited agricultural conditions, habitation, and communication. For a very long time, Shikoku was isolated from the rest of Japan, and it was last of the main islands to be linked by bridge to the main island Honshu. The 1988 completion of the Seto Ohashi Bridge, a high-speed transportation system, has contributed to the development of industry in the north of Shikoku. Seto Ohashi, a series of six bridges using five small islands, links Kojima in Okayama and Sakaide in Kagawa. At 12.6 kilometers in length, it represents the world's longest roadway and railway formed by a bridge. Other bridges connected to Honshu are the Naruto, Akashi, and Kanmon bridges. They are expected to attract further industrial development to Shikoku.

The main industries in the northern and western parts of Shikoku are metallurgy, machinery, pulp and paper, textiles, heavy chemicals, and oil refineries. Projects in Ehime and Kagawa Prefectures are currently focused on research and development in advanced technology industries and various development schemes are being implemented. Agricultural products include rice, vegetables, mandarin oranges, persimmons, and tea. Forestry is important, and the fishing industry includes cultured pearls. In recent years tourism has increased.

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SHILLONG (2001 pop. 133,000). Capital of the state of Meghalaya ("abode of the clouds") in north-eastern India, Shillong was the capital of Assam state from 1874 until 1972. Named for nearby Shillong Peak, the area of rolling hills and elegant pines veiled in clouds (altitude 1,520 meters) became known as the "Scotland of the East" under the British, who built it on the site of a thousand-year-old Khasi settlement. An earthquake destroyed the city in 1897. It was entirely rebuilt and became an important trade center

for agricultural products, as well as a military base and appealing summer resort with championship golf course and polo ground.

Spread on hills covered with Victorian bungalows and churches, Shillong abounds in waterfalls. Crinoline Falls, Beadon Falls, Bishop Falls, Elephant Falls, Ward's Lake and gardens, Lady Hyari Park and mini zoo, and the Butterfly Museum are popular. Pineapple and betel plantations lie nearby. Research stations include dairy farms and fruit- and silkworm-growing institutions. The Police Bazaar deals in cane furniture, handicrafts, shawls, and textiles; the Bara Bazaar offers produce and provisions, with some jewelry and handicrafts. Migration has caused social unrest, with the native Khasi population reacting unfavorably to the arrival of Bengalis and others.

C. Roger Davis

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SHIMANE (2002 est. pop. 753,000). Shimane Prefecture is situated in the western region of Japan's island of Honshu, it occupies an area of 6,629 square kilometers. Shimane's primary geographical features are a mountainous terrain, coastal plains, and the offshore Oki Islands. Shimane is bordered by the Sea of Japan, and by Tottori, Hiroshima, and Yamaguchi prefectures. Once divided into Izumo, Iwami, and Oki provinces, it assumed its present name and borders in 1881.

According to legend, Izumo Province once was an ancient religious and political center rivaling Nara. In feudal times the region was ruled successively by the Sasaki, Yamana, Kyogoku, and Amako warrior families, and later by the Matsudaira. The Oki Islands once were a refuge for elite political exiles such as Emperor Godaigo (1288–1339), who opposed the Kamakura shogunate.

The prefecture's capital city is Matsue, situated along Lake Shinji. In the Edo period (1600/1603–1868), Matsue was a castle town ruled by the Matsudaira family. In the early 2000s, it is part of Nakaumi New Industrial City, with factories producing machinery and textiles. The prefecture's other important cities are Hamada, Izumo, and Masuda.

The main economic activities are rice agriculture, fishing, and molybdenum mining, as well as wood-

working and the production of farm tools. On the Oki Islands livestock and horses are raised. Pilgrims are drawn in great numbers to the venerable Izumo shrine, a focus of the Shinto creation story. The shrine rituals include the performance of the Izumo Kagura, a series of dances depicting Shinto myths. Other popular destinations are the Oki Islands and Daisen-Oki National Park on the Shimane Peninsula around Mount Sambe (Sambesan).

E. L. S. Weber

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SHIMAZAKI TOSON (1872–1943), poet and novelist. Shimazaki Toson is the pen name of Shimazaki Haruki. Born in Magome in Nagano Prefecture, Toson worked as a teacher before turning exclusively to writing. Early in his career, Toson wrote "new style poetry," a romantic strain of poetry longer and freer than traditional Japanese verse. Many literary historians consider his anthology *Wakanashu* (Collection of Young Leaves, 1897) one of the earliest works of modern poetry in Japan. Nonetheless, Toson is best remembered as the foremost novelist of Japanese Naturalism, a movement that aspired to depict the human condition with scientific precision. Toson's first novel, *Hakai* (The Broken Commandment, 1906) displays an unprecedented attention to psychological detail and represents a milestone in the development of the modern Japanese novel. It also is one of the first novels to depict the difficult lives of the *burakumin*, a caste of social outcasts relegated to the edge of Japanese society.

Toson drew upon his own experiences and those of his family in later work. *Haru* (Spring, 1908) was based upon his experiences as a young writer. In *Ie* (The Family, 1910–1911), Toson depicted the decline of two families, one much like his own. *Shinsei* (New Life, 1918–1919) describes the tortured emotions of a protagonist, who like Toson, had an affair with his niece, and *Yoake Mae* (Before the Dawn, 1929–1935) is a reworking of Toson's father's experiences in the tumultuous Meiji era. A 1981 Japanese edition of Toson's complete works contains twelve volumes.

Jeffrey Angles

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SHIN SAIMDANG (1504–1551), Korean painter and poet. Shin (pen name Saimdang) was from a *yangban* (aristocratic) family and her father was a high-ranking scholar-official in Kangwon Province. From a young age, she was taught literary Chinese and Confucian classics, rare even for aristocratic daughters. Shin was skilled at painting, calligraphy, poetry, and embroidery. She learned to paint by imitating the style of An Kyon, considered one of the three masters of Choson-period painting of the mid-fifteenth century. She eventually developed her own unique style of painting, readily recognized for its natural motifs such as flowers, grapes, and insects. Her paintings are noted for their simplicity and realistic depiction. Only two of her poems, both written in literary Chinese, are extant today. Both poems depict her longing for her aged mother and natal home.

Shin's husband was Yi Won-su, a government official. She provided her husband with much guidance in his professional dealings. Although Shin was praised as an exemplary daughter, wife, daughter-in-law, and mother, she is most famous for being the mother of Yi I (1536–1584, pen name Yulgok). Yulgok was one of the two most preeminent scholars of Korean neo-Confucianism.

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SHINRAN (1173–1262), Japanese Buddhist philosopher. Entering the monastic life as a child, Shinran served as a menial monk at the Enryakuji, a center of Tendai (in Chinese, Tiantai) Buddhist teaching near the summit of Mount Hiei, located northeast of Kyoto. Distressed by his inability to overcome desires and attachments, he was deeply moved by the teachings of Honen of the Jodo (Pure Land) sect and in 1201 became a disciple. When Honen was banished for his antiestablishment ideas, Shinran was also im-

plicated and banished to the area that is now Japan's Niigata Prefecture.

Pardoned four years later, Shinran migrated to the Kanto area of eastern Japan and resumed preaching the absolute power of the Buddha Amida through the incantation of the *nembutsu*, the name of the Buddha Amida. Following the death of Honen, Shinran was forced to grapple with his doubts and problems on his own. In the monumental *Teaching, Practice, Faith, Attainment*, he describes the three stages of conversion and concludes that faith, bestowed by the grace of the Buddha Amida, is all that is necessary for attaining rebirth in the Pure Land.

Developing Honen's teachings, he founded Jodo Shinshu (True Pure Land Faith) as an offshoot of Jodo Buddhism. Whereas Jodo Buddhism had held that chanting Amida's name could bring salvation, in Jodo Shinshu a single recitation, if made with true faith, was enough for salvation. Shinran also defended the Buddhist clergy's abandonment of celibacy and the prohibition against eating meat.

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SHINTO Shinto is one of the two major religions of Japan, with adherents numbering between 40 and 85 percent of a population of 124 million. The disparity in numbers arises from two sources. Many Japanese adhere to both Shinto and Buddhism; and statistical studies are unable to identify clearly what is meant by "adherent" or "member." Shinto has often been defined as "the way of life of the Japanese people," and many of its ideas and practices (such as social hierarchies, feelings of cultural unity, the importance of the family, and ideas about pollution) persist as nonreligious elements of Japanese culture.

History

Indigenous beliefs focusing on purification and veneration of powerful natural phenomena—mountains, waterfalls, and spiritual beings—were current in all communities in pre-state Japan. The rulers of the Yamato state, which eventually subjugated all of the Japanese islands, worshiped a tutelary solar deity. As

the Yamato state expanded, it had to accommodate the deities of other states it brought under its control. Thus a nascent pantheon emerged, probably by the fifth century CE, distinguishing between "heavenly" deities (essentially, the tutelary deities of the Yamato, such as Amaterasu Omikami) and "terrestrial" deities (essentially, deities such as Okuni-nushi, of formerly powerful subjugated regions).

With the arrival of Buddhism, the accommodationist policies of Yamato religion were further tested. Introduced in about 538 CE from Korea, Buddhism was strongly opposed by a coalition headed by the Mononobe military and the Nakatomi priestly families, who saw their privileges, partly or largely resting on their claims of descent from heavenly deities, challenged. The Mononobe were defeated in battle by the Soga, an offshoot of the ruling house, in 587. The Soga, presumably anxious to strengthen imperial dominance on the Chinese model at the expense of the Yamato noble houses, proceeded to promote the cause of Buddhism, which was more monolithic and potentially more nationalistic than native beliefs. Under this pressure, the native beliefs were systematized and gradually assumed the label of "Shinto" (Way of the Gods), in contrast to "Butsudo" (Way of the Buddha[s]).

Between the eighth and eighteenth centuries, Shinto and Buddhism merged at many levels, Shinto often playing a subordinate role in ritual and political importance. Exceptions were the strong role of some shrines associated with the imperial family, for example, Ise Jingu on the Kii Peninsula, and others, more independent, for example, Izumo Taisha, north of modern Kyoto, which had been the main shrine of the Izumo state before its subjugation by the Yamato.

In the eighteenth century, intellectual ferment in Japan led to skepticism and questioning of the Confucian bases of the shogunal government. An emerging ideological movement, Kokugaku (School of National Learning), laid the intellectual foundations for the separation of Shinto and Buddhism. Scholars such as Arai Hakuseki (1657–1725) and particularly Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801) argued that Japan's origins and the authority of government rested with the unique nature of its history and myths, as recorded in two books, the *Kojiki* (Record of Ancient Matters, compiled c. 712 CE) and the *Nihon Shoki* (Chronicles of Japan, compiled c. 720).

By 1873, after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Shinto was seen by many in government as the pure essence of the Japanese people, particularly since it seemed to support Japanese nationalism and resistance to the encroachment of foreign ideas brought about by Japan's



ITSUKUSHIMA—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

The Japanese island of Itsukushima and its Shinto shrines were designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1996. The Shinto have considered the island to be sacred since at least the sixth century CE.

opening to the world (1856) and the end of its political isolation. That year saw the *butsume haikshaku* ("Throwing out the Buddhas"), in which Shinto was forcefully separated by government edict from Buddhism, which was identified with foreign ideas. Clergy were obligated to declare themselves either Shinto or Buddhist, and Buddhist images and rituals were removed from the grounds of Shinto shrines. Those shrines came under the authority of the Department of Shinto Affairs and became an element in the creation of the Japanese uniqueness myth and of Japanese militarism. Shinto priests became government officials. Subsequently, the government attempted to "rationalize" Shinto practice. Priests were required to be licensed; shrines were formally ranked according to historical, political, and financial criteria; and many small hamlet and neighborhood shrines were (often forcibly) joined, particularly during the shrine-amalgamation period (1908–1912).

The last historical phase of Shinto occurred with the American Occupation (1945–1950). Following the Shinto Directive issued by the occupation authorities in December 1945, religion was detached from government, and the ordinances that supported and controlled Shinto shrines were removed. Shrines are currently supported mainly by *kifu* (donations and benefices). Most shrines are owned by public religious associations or neighborhood/hamlet associations, though ownership by individuals, families, or limited religious associations is not unknown.

Ritual and Beliefs

Shinto is a ritual-centered religion. With the exception of some central concepts, dogma plays a small part. Several early books—the *Kojiki* and *Nihon Shoki* are the most prominent—are important sources of ideas, but do not have the authority or stature of canonical texts such as the Bible in Christianity. Both of these works are of similar scope, providing cosmological and foundation myths, in slightly different versions. They

detail the creation of the Earth, the birth and positions of the heavenly and earthly *kami* (deities), records of culture heroes, and brief annals of the first emperors.

The two main ideological elements in Shinto are *hare-ke* (purity-pollution) and *kami*, which may be translated as "deity" or "holy." In Shinto ideology, all beings share to varying degrees in purity and pollution, with the *kami* having the greatest purity. Certain actions are inherently polluting (for example, bloodshed), others inherently purifying (for example, lustration). Morality, in the form of sincerity, concern for the group and family, and avoidance of polluting actions, flows from these two major concepts.

Kami include humanlike divine beings of greater or lesser power, headed by Amaterasu Omikami, the clan deity of the imperial house, and first among equals in the Japanese pantheon. Other notable *kami* include Hachiman (*kami* of war and learning), Okuni-nushi (*kami* of the land), and Inari (*kami* of material wealth, prosperity, and grain). A large number of other *kami* are worshiped at one or more shrines. Nonhuman *kami* include dragons, snake-beings, mountains, and waterfalls. The Japanese often refer to "the eight million *kami*" as an indication of the very large number and dynamic nature of the pantheon. All of these *kami* fall into a number of categories, which include well-known and widely worshiped ones such as Inari, deified historical figures, syncretic Shinto-Buddhist deities, and also the *yaoyorozu-no-kami* (eight million deities), who are often unnamed, or barely known, and are worshiped only by specific individuals, families, or single shrines. The heavenly *kami* are noted as such in the *Kojiki* and *Nihon Shoki*. The earthly *kami* are noted in these works as well, and both make clear the subordination of the earthly *kami* to heavenly authority.

Though *kami* are generally well disposed toward humankind, they can be sources of calamities inflicted on the world, usually in response to violations of purity. Such *tatarigami* (malevolent *kami*) are often viewed as negative aspects of otherwise benign *kami*. An individual is free to worship any single deity or combination of deities; major deities such as Amaterasu Omikami are not necessarily worshiped by all people, but may even be included in the *yaoyorozu* category by an individual or a congregation.

Rituals are designed to purify as well as to solicit the positive inclination of the *kami* by prayer and offerings. Thus most Shinto rituals can be divided into four elements: *barai* (purification by the sprinkling of water and salt or by sparking flint and steel); *norito* (the recitation of praises of and invitation to the *kami*); *tamagushi boten* (the offering of sanctified evergreen

branches tied with flax and white paper, along with other pure gifts, to the *kami*); and *naorai* (entertainment for the visiting *kami* and feasting, in which participants share a meal in the presence of the *kami*). Any of these elements may be abbreviated, extended, or elaborated upon. The degree to which they differ from year to year, ritual to ritual, or one place to another depends on economic, social, and personal factors.

Most Shinto rituals take place either in the home or the *jinja* (shrine). Traditionally, homes in Japan would have a small replica of a shrine (*kamidana*) set up in a niche near the ceiling, beside the main pillar (*daikoku-bashira*) of the house. These *kamidana* were supposed to be cleaned daily, and offerings of water, wine, food, and salt placed before them. The miniature shrines held talismans from the shrines(s) that the household supported or had visited. The *kamidana* would be purified annually by the priest of the supported shrine. In modern Japan, few houses have the space for a *kamidana*, and the practice of maintaining one is declining.

Shrines may be of any size (from shoebox size to complexes with halls, courtyards, and several attached buildings), are preferably placed in wooded groves on hills, and are built according to one of several architectural conventions. They are marked by the presence of a square archway with a double crossbeam called a *torii*. *Torii* styles conventionally fit the design of the shrine, and certain designs are associated with particular *kami*. The main halls of shrines hold objects of veneration (*shintai*) associated with the *kami*, which may be stones, items of use (such as a writing brush), or a statue. Many of these are hidden in elaborate boxes and wrappings. Rituals and festive events take place inside a shrine hall, if large enough, or before the shrine. Many modern shrines in urban environments are placed at the top of multistoried buildings.

Most shrines will hold an annual main ritual, normally accompanied by a popular *matsuri* (festival). Rituals for minor festivals may take place at other times in the calendar. There are no nationally recognized calendrical festivals, though many shrines throughout Japan are open on New Year's Eve and New Year's Day, as well as for the children's festival *Shichi-go-san* (15 November). Major festivals at most shrines are composed of a ritual conducted by a priest in the presence of representatives of the community or owners and a parade during which some object representing the *kami*—a *mikoshi* (palanquin in the shape of a miniature shrine), a riderless horse, a straw figure, or even a rice bale—is paraded through the streets. These wholly ritual activities are usually embedded in a pop-



THE FUKKOO KYOODAN SECT OF SHINTO

Listed below are the basic principles of the Fukkoo Kyoodan (The Light of Happiness) Sect of Shinto:

1. To believe in a God, the creator of the universe and all living things, who is absolute and eternal and indestructible, and the guiding principle of the human spirit. To reject all false beliefs in superstition, spiritualism and prophecy.
2. To inflict no harm physical or spiritual, on oneself or on others; to reject revenge and to love one's neighbour.
3. Not to desire the possessions of others.
4. To eschew lewdness.
5. To avoid falsehood.
6. To reflect constantly on thought, word and deed, that they may always accord with the dictates of conscience.

As methods of carrying out these principles,

A. To take deep breaths every morning, and thus compose the body and spirit.

B. By contemplation to strive to realize the state of *sammai* (samadhi, trance), and to practice a transcendently religious life.

Source: R. P. Dore. (1967) *City Life in Japan: A Study of a Tokyo Ward*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 354.

ular, often raucous street festival and fair. Some *matsuri* have become international tourist attractions.

Shrines—with or without a priest in attendance—are often visited by passersby, who perform an abbreviated ritual of washing, announcing their presence by ringing a bell and clapping hands twice, praying, and offering a coin at an offertory box. At other times, groups of individuals may request a special ritual with one or more priests. Weddings, which used to be private functions, are now often performed in large shrines, some of which have made wedding ceremonies a mainstay of their finances. Shrines are supported by these ritual activities, as well as by donations in money, in kind, or in income-producing land.

Priests also conduct rituals either to ward off *tatarigami* (malevolent *kami*) or to ensure success, peace, health, and so on. Owners of particular enterprises (for example, buses) might request such a purification ritual, individually or collectively.

Organization

In traditional Japan, most communities worshiped one or more *kami* at a local shrine. *Ujiko* (family ritual associations) of several families would also worship *kami* at shrines constructed for the purpose. *Ko* (ritual associations) and occupational associations might erect a shrine for the worship of a particular deity. Since World War II, there has been somewhat of a resurgence in the construction of shrines. Many that were delegitimized during the shrine-consolidation period have been reestablished, and some new ones have been built. There has been a general movement away from ownership by family groups to ownership by neighborhood associations, community organizations, and even commercial firms.

Shrines are normally maintained by one or more groups that own or financially subscribe to the premises. These maintenance arrangements are often complex and differ widely from one shrine to another.



A Shinto priest and followers bathe in ice-cold water at Teppozu Shrine in Tokyo in January 1999 to cleanse their bodies and souls. (AFP/CORBIS)

Rituals are normally conducted by one or more *kannushi* (priests) who are ritual specialists (as in Protestantism and Islam), not consecrated prelates (as in Catholicism). A layperson who knows the proper ritual forms may conduct rituals if the "congregation" agrees. There are a small number of female priests. *Kannushi* of small shrines normally service a number of shrines in the same area. Large shrines are served by several priests who fulfill ritual and administrative duties and by *miko* (shrine maidens) who perform ritual dances and minor administrative duties. Ranks are denoted by the color of the split skirts worn by priests on a daily basis—purple for chief priests, pastel blue or green for ordinary priests, and red for *miko*—and by the elaboration of robes and different types of headgear worn while conducting rituals.

Larger shrines—usually those with an ancient recorded provenance—may be members of one or another of the shrine associations, the largest of which, Jinja Honcho, encompasses about 80 percent of the ten thousand or so shrines listed in the prewar government register. About an additional fifty thousand unlisted shrines throughout Japan are not registered. These shrine associations act as pressure and mobilization groups; they also train and certify priests. Jinja Honcho, for instance, is closely associated with Kokugakuin University, which trains Shinto priests. Smaller shrines may be associated in looser local support networks.

Kannushi often inherit their position. They are expected to serve a period of apprenticeship at some well-known shrine, after which they return to their home shrine or remain as qualified priests where they can find work. With the exception of those who serve at large and prosperous shrines, many priests have difficulty supporting themselves and often work at other jobs as well. Since the 1950s, Jinja Honcho and other shrine associations have made efforts to have all priests university trained or at least to have them participate in training seminars and courses.

Current Shinto

Many authors have divided Shinto into four broad classes: Kokka Shinto (National Shinto), the official dogma perpetuated by the government between the Meiji Restoration and the end of World War II; Jinja Shinto (Shrine Shinto), the practice of Shinto in "officially recognized" (by Jinja Honcho or some similar organization) shrines; Kyoha Shinto (Sect Shinto), the ritual practices, organizations, and shrines that elected not to enter the national system during the separation from Buddhism and the shrine-consolidation periods; and Minzoku Shinto (Folk Shinto), an ill-defined residual category embracing common national and local rituals and beliefs prevalent throughout the population, as well as rituals and practices at "unofficial" shrines not belonging to any of the other categories.

A fifth category, Imperial Shinto, refers to rituals prescribed for the emperor, including those performed at Ise Jingu.

This analytical separation clearly represents more the political stand of its presenters and authors than the reality of Shinto as a religion, in which all of these categories blend imperceptibly into one another. In practice, Shinto's rather loose dogma allows for multiple interpretations of ritual and belief, and these often coexist within the same community. Moreover, there is constant dynamic movement as rituals are renewed, learned, and transmitted between shrines and practitioners. Perhaps the only constant is that the richer and more famous a shrine is, the more it is likely to claim its orthodoxy and the ancient origins of its rituals and traditions.

Shinto has been tainted by its support of Japan's imperial and colonialist past during and before World War II. This is particularly notable in the controversy surrounding Yasukuni Jinja, the shrine dedicated to Japan's war dead. Visits to this shrine by government officials have been controversial because of an item in the constitution forbidding government support of religious bodies—a clause right-wing Japanese feel is an attack on Shinto, and left-wing Japanese feel is a protection against government interference in religious affairs.

Shinto has proved itself a dynamic, flexible religious system with the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances, including processes of modernity. A great many Japanese continue to deny that they are at all religious, while performing Shinto rituals at shrines or at home.

Michael Ashkenazi

See also: **Religion, Folk—Japan**

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SHIPBUILDING SCANDAL The Shipbuilding Scandal marked the end of post-Occupation Japanese politics dominated by Yoshida Shigeru and the beginning of serious efforts to consolidate conservative elements into a single hegemonic party. In 1953 leading Japanese shipbuilding firms collaborated to bribe the government into revising a law to increase government shipbuilding subsidies. The desired revision was enacted in August 1953 but the presidents of Japan's major shipbuilders, along with several Diet members and bureaucrats, were arrested on corruption charges the following spring. Further investigations implicated top officials, including key lieutenants of Premier Yoshida Shigeru such as Sato Eisaku, the Jiyuto (Liberal Party) secretary-general. In April, when the public prosecutor's office moved to arrest Sato, Justice Minister Inukai Takeru ordered the withdrawal of the indictment, an extraordinary move supposedly ordered by Premier Yoshida Shigeru. His attitude toward this scandal was revealed in his comment that "party government would come to an end if it abided by the Political Funds Control Law."

This scandal accelerated a general decline of support for Yoshida and affected members of his party. The result was a decision by the Diet's lower house audit committee to investigate Yoshida's role in the scandal. In September 1954, when he refused to obey a formal summons, the audit committee passed a motion of censure. At the same time, conservative nationalists led by Hatoyama Ichiro and Kishi Nobusuke banded together to form an anti-Yoshida party and force him into retirement. This group became known as the Japan Democratic Party (Nihon Minshuto) and was inaugurated in November. As the fratricidal conflict developed between pro- and anti-Yoshida conservatives, the Japanese business community, led by the Keidanren (The Federation of Economic Organizations), the voice of Japanese industry, began to call for conservative unity under new leadership, if necessary. In December, the day before a scheduled no-confidence vote in the Diet, Yoshida's cabinet members resigned. Hatoyama then took over as premier, and Yoshida retired from politics. Another result of the Shipbuilding Scandal was Japanese big business organizations' pledge to create large new legal political funding mechanisms. Big business hoped to persuade conservative politicians to merge and thereby secure a stable conservative majority in the Diet. The Nihon

Minshuto and the Jiyuto merged the following year to form the Liberal Democratic Party, which subsequently ruled Japan uninterruptedly until 1993.

David Arase

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SHIRAZ (2002 pop. 1.2 million). Located at the western edge of a sizable valley at the southern end of the Zagros Mountains in southwestern Iran, the city of Shiraz benefited historically as the ideal point between the Persian Gulf coast and cities located farther inland on the Iranian plateau. Except for rare but notable instances of flooding—especially in the seventeenth century—extreme aridity has made past and present settlement dependent upon underground aquifers accessed by *qanats* (channels) for water supplies. Nonetheless the area is distinguished agriculturally, both for its famed gardens and historic vineyards, which are noted for the famed Shiraz grape.

The area around Shiraz has been settled since at least the Achaemenian period (559–330 BCE). However, it only began to develop as a city under the Sasanians (224–651 CE), and only flourished with the late-seventh-century Arab-Islamic advance into Persia, when the city became the staging area for further conquests. Shiraz became the provincial capital of Fars in 693 CE and continues as such today. By the twelfth century the city was emerging as a major center for the arts, handicrafts, and commerce. The city avoided severe hardships amid invasions by Mongol and Turkic armies in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries through the rapid surrender of the city by its leaders. During the brief Zand dynasty (1750–1794) Shiraz enjoyed the benefits of being the national capital.

Shiraz's greatest achievements are in the wider realm of the arts. Although famed for its traditions of building and landscape architecture, styles of painting (especially the Shiraz school of miniatures), ceramics, tiles, and textiles, Shiraz is most often regarded as the center of Persian language and literature. Much of this renown can be attributed to the literary achievements of two poets: Sa'di (1184–1292) and Hafez (c. 1320–1389), master of the *ghazal*, a lyric poetry written in Arabic and Persian. Closely related to its literary fame, the city is also highly regarded for its traditions in cal-



The mausoleum of the poet Hafez in Shiraz. (K. M. WESTERMANN/CORBIS)

igraphy. Prior to a wider adoption of printing presses, Shiraz was a major center for the production of high quality manuscripts that circulated throughout the Islamic world as late as the seventeenth and even into the eighteenth centuries.

Today, Shiraz's vitality is still based heavily on its artistic traditions. The mausoleums that enshrine the tombs of the poets Hafez and Sa'di continue to be major attractions, and the city's university is highly regarded in Iran and beyond. The production of handwoven carpets, miniature paintings, and works of inlaid wood are major handicraft industries. Key modern industries include food processing, tile and cement production, chemical and pharmaceutical factories, and textile mills. As with other Iranian cities, Shiraz has seen dynamic population growth over the past decades, from 416,408 in 1976 to 1,053,025 in 1996.

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SHIZUOKA (2002 est. pop. 3.8 million). Shizuoka Prefecture is situated in the central region of Japan's island of Honshu, where it occupies an area of 7,773 square kilometers. Part of Mount Fuji is located in Shizuoka, whose other primary geographical features are generally mountainous terrain and the Izu Peninsula. The main rivers are the Fujikawa, Abekawa, Oigawa, and Tenryugawa. The prefecture is bordered by the Pacific Ocean, and by Yamanashi, Nagano, and Kanagawa prefectures. Once divided into Suruga, Totomi, and Izu provinces, it assumed its present name in 1876 and its present borders in 1878.

The Toro archaeological excavation of late Yayoi culture (100–300 CE) artifacts indicates early habitation of the region. In feudal times, the provinces were ruled by a series of powerful warrior families, including the Hojo and the Tokugawa.

The prefecture's capital is Shizuoka city, situated on Suruga Bay. It came to prominence when Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542–1616), the founder of the Tokugawa shogunate, which ruled Japan during the Edo period (1600/1603–1868), retired there to Sumpu Castle, built in 1589. During the Edo period, it flourished as a Tokaido highway post station and as a regional market for textiles, looms, paper, wooden clogs, sewing boxes, and lacquerware. In the early 2000s, it is home to Shizuoka University. The prefecture's other important cities are Hamamatsu, Numazu, Shimizu, and Fuji.

Shizuoka Prefecture is noted for its green tea, mandarin oranges, strawberries, and Japanese horseradish (*wasabi*). Also productive are the forestry industry and fisheries. Lake Hamana is the site of the culture of eels, soft-shelled turtles, oysters, prawns, and edible seaweed. The former castle town of Hamamatsu today is headquarters of Yamaha, which makes quality musical instruments. The Yamaha Motor Company in Iwata produces motorcycles, car engines, air conditioners, and industrial robots. The main tourist attractions are Mount Fuji, Fuji-Hakone-Izu National Park, and the region's hot spring resorts.

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SHOWA DENKO SCANDAL In June 1948, the president of the Showa Denko Company was arrested for passing bribes to government officials in an effort to gain government-financed loans. Later, the arrest of Deputy Prime Minister Suehiro Nishio, who was implicated in the scandal, caused the fall of the government led by Ashida Hitoshi (March–October 1948). Shortly thereafter Ashida himself was indicted and arrested. Of the sixty-four individuals arrested in this scandal, however, only two lesser figures were ever found guilty. Nevertheless, the event changed the course of postwar Japanese politics and foreign policy.

This scandal removed the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) from power and effectively changed the direction of its postwar development. In the first election held under the new postwar constitution, the JSP became the single largest party in the key lower house of the Diet. Control of the government then changed from the conservative Liberal Party (Jiyuto) led by Yoshida Shigeru to the JSP led by Katayama Tetsu and Nishio Suehiro in coalition with the conservative Democratic Party (Minshuto) led by Ashida. The Katayama government (May 1947–March 1948) was brought down by a legislative failure, but the JSP remained in power as a junior partner of the Minshuto in the next government under Ashida. In this period the JSP was willing to work with conservative parties due to the leadership of Katayama and Nishio. But the Showa Denko Scandal torpedoed the JSP–Minshuto coalition, tarnished the JSP's image, and discredited Katayama and Nishio's leadership. In the next general election both lost their Diet seats amid a resounding JSP electoral defeat. Thereafter the left-wing vision of the JSP as an opposition party valuing ideology above power gained ascendancy within the party.

This scandal also weakened the Jiyuto's main conservative rival, the Minshuto. Yoshida was then able to regain the premiership, which he held until 1954. In these years, Yoshida set a course for postwar Japan by negotiating the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the United States–Japan Security Treaty, and he created a cohort of political protégés that included future prime ministers such as Ikeda Hayato, Sato Eisaku, and Miyazawa Kiichi who would carry on his conservative internationalist vision of postwar Japan.

Finally, the Showa Denko scandal affected Occupation policy in Japan. The scandal broke as the so-called "reverse course" in U.S. Occupation policy was being deliberated. The government section (GS) of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) viewed Yoshida's disdain of democracy with concern, and it supported the JSP's participation in government as a healthy democratic development. In

contrast, SCAP's intelligence section (G2) gave more weight to U.S. Cold War interests than to democratization. The G2 used allegations stemming from this scandal to investigate whether key members of GS had accepted bribes from Japanese sources. These allegations reduced GS influence over Occupation policy, and SCAP then firmly backed the conservative but pro-United States Yoshida.

David Arase

See also: **Japan Socialist Party**

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SHOWA PERIOD Showa is the name given to the reign of the Japanese emperor commonly known as Hirohito (1901–1989). Lasting sixty-three years (1926–1989), the Showa period was not only one of the longest imperial reigns in Japanese and world history but also one of the most dramatic. War and peace, devastation and prosperity, authoritarianism and democracy all fit into the puzzle of Showa. Showa still elicits mixed emotions, divided loyalties, and political controversy. To think about modern Japanese history is ultimately to confront the meaning of this period.

The years 1926 and 1989 do not mark obvious turning points. Hirohito became de facto emperor in 1920 as regent for his ailing father, the Taisho emperor (1879–1926, reigned 1912–1926). The grand ceremony for Hirohito's enthronement came in 1928, a year remembered more for persecution of Communists and other leftists. At the closing end, historians see 1991, a year of economic crisis, as the sharp break from the mood of the late Showa period. In between, Hirohito never provided charismatic leadership, despite the potent cult of emperor worship that rose up around him. His intervention in national events occurred infrequently, and for the last forty years, he was politically insignificant. The most important year of his reign was 1945, the year of Japan's surrender at the end of the Pacific phase of World War II (1937–1945). That year split Showa into two distinct eras.

Hirohito's importance as a symbol, by contrast, cannot be overstated. In early years, his subjects learned to view him as the supreme repository of all values, the transcendent object of national loyalty and

devotion. In later years, his grandfatherly image mirrored Japan's role as a pacifist state. His presence provided a sense of continuity over a period of dramatic political, economic, and social change. Many historians argue that, despite the sense of two Showas, continuity in individuals, attitudes, social practices, and the system of imperial rule itself unites the period.

Democracy, Fascism, and War, 1925–1945

By the early 1920s, Japan emerged as a full-fledged member of the international community. Although its economy only ranked twelfth globally in per capita income, the foundations of a modern industrial economy had been laid in the preceding fifty years. Through treaties and wars, the country had acquired a level of prestige in international politics. In social and political affairs, Japan was changing rapidly as well. One event that symbolized the mood of the early Showa period was a 1925 law giving the right to vote to all males over the age of twenty-five. The law captured a democratic spirit borne of new prosperity in urban centers, expanding educational opportunities, rising literacy, and mass consumerism. These changes indicated that Japan was becoming more like other modern nations. At an international level, this mood was reflected by a spirit of cooperation between Japan and the other Western powers, especially in coping with the political instability of China.

There were definite limits on this democracy, however. Women had no right to vote. Their educational opportunities were far fewer than those for men, and many women lived as virtual slaves in factories and brothels. A pervasive ideology saw women as second-class subjects of the emperor. Their main purpose in life was seen as bearing children and raising them as his loyal soldiers. Women's lives, however, were changing too. New jobs as teachers, store clerks, and café waitresses created new opportunities for women. A vigorous publishing industry rose up to appeal to women who had acquired an independent income or control over household budgets. Women were becoming the principle consumers in an expanding consumer society.

Other limits on democracy loomed ominously over the early Showa period. Under the Meiji Constitution (1890–1945), the emperor was "sacred and inviolable." In his person, he embodied the sovereign authority of the government. In practice, political authority was divided among many governing bodies, only one of which, the lower house of the Diet (parliament), was a democratic institution. A hereditary aristocracy dominated the upper house of the Diet and held many influential posts in the government. The military as-

serted considerable influence in the political system and declared its autonomy from civilian authority.

This system of contending democratic, autocratic, and militarist elements could function effectively if a broad consensus over national goals existed. Although democratic forces were poised to claim ascendancy over others, society experienced political and economic challenges over which no consensus could be achieved easily. A bank panic in 1927, the global economic depression of 1929, and political revolution in China played into the hands of those who opposed the democratic trends, the system of international cooperation, and ultimately the transformation of Japan into a modern consumer society.

In 1931, a group of army officers stationed in southern Manchuria (northeast China) initiated a conspiracy to invade China and create a new Japanese colony. Civilian leaders opposed such actions as a violation of international treaties, but they were overruled by the military and a surge in the popularity of war. A reign of terror ensued at home during which right-wing organizations assassinated political leaders, menaced dissenting voices, and demanded ideological conformity. This war on democracy and internationalism culminated in the 26 February (1936) Incident. This coup sought to install Hirohito as a quasi religious dictator. Hirohito and leading generals opposed the coup, and it was suppressed. Nevertheless, the event propelled Japan toward further restrictions on democratic freedoms, greater authoritarian policies, harsher patriotic indoctrination, and further conflict with the United States and other Western powers.

After 1936, Japanese leaders struggled in vain to assert coherence over national goals and actions. Full-scale war broke out between Japan and China in July 1937. Branches of the military jockeyed among each other, seeking to define national priorities. Reform-minded bureaucrats promoted a reorganized economy and social order. Radical visionaries called for a new alliance among Asians against Western imperialism. This whirlwind would have overtaxed even a good leader. No supreme leader, including the emperor, emerged to unify the government in this time of self-made crisis. Instead, Japanese diplomacy operated without a clear aim, buffeted by events in Europe and eliciting strong opposition from Western states. The brutality of the war in China and Japan's alliances with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy hardened Western resolve to oppose Japanese actions in the Pacific. In the end, Japanese leaders could only agree on the foolish decision to attack the United States, hoping with one blow to clarify political options, resolve economic contradictions of its war in China, and escape its diplo-



JAPAN—HISTORICAL PERIODS

Jomon period (14,500–300 BCE)
 Yayoi culture (300 BCE–300 CE)
 Yamato State (300–552 CE)
 Kofun period (300–710 CE)
 Nara period (710–794 CE)
 Heian period (794–1185)
 Kamakura period (Kamakura Shogunate) (1185–1333)
 Muromachi period (1333–1573)
 Momoyama period (1573–1600)
 Tokugawa or Edo period (Tokugawa Shogunate) (1600/1603–1868)
 Meiji period (1868–1912)
 Taisho period (1912–1926)
 Showa period (1926–1989)
 Allied Occupation (1945–1952)
 Heisei period (1989–present)

matic straightjacket. The fateful Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (7 December 1941) did none of these things. The subsequent war with the United States and its allies (1941–1945) led to unspeakable suffering for many Asians, including Japanese. It destroyed the political and social systems Japan's leaders had fought to preserve, brought ruin to the economy, and cost the country its independence.

Occupation and the New Japan, 1945–1955

In 1945 Japan was a devastated and occupied country. A decade later it reemerged as an independent state within an U.S.-led order of capitalist states. This rapid transformation was the product of the unusual circumstances of the U.S. occupation and the global rivalry called the Cold War (1948–1989). The Allied Occupation began with the goals of democratization, decentralization, and demilitarization, enacted through firm, but rarely punitive, policies. Some military and civilian leaders were executed as war criminals, and leading figures throughout society were purged from public positions. The occupation not only refused to hold Hirohito accountable, but also rehabilitated him as the symbol of a new democratic state. This decision has been the subject of intense controversy ever since. The United States imposed a new constitution that vested sovereignty in the people, guaranteed civil rights, abolished the aristocracy, and stripped Japan of autonomy as a military power. The constitution's guarantee of the civil rights of women is more explicit than any found in the U.S. Constitu-

tion, and its famous Article 9, which abjures war as an instrument of national policy, is unique among the world's constitutions. The military lost its preeminent role in Japanese life. Other important steps in democratization included reform of rural landholdings and new freedoms for labor unions.

After 1947, a third goal of the occupation, reintegration, emerged. Some Japanese and Americans believed that the earliest years of the Showa period had demonstrated the potential for civilian rule in Japan. Moderate politicians, bureaucrats, intellectuals, and businesspeople would serve as pillars of democracy at home and peaceful partners in the world economy. The election of many women legislators in the first postwar elections committed them to the new peace state. Reintegration was not driven by solely altruistic motives, and many viewed it as a reversal of earlier policies. The specter of an ideological conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union shaped the course of the occupation and derailed some democratic reforms. This proved especially true after the Chinese Revolution of 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War (1950–1953). Eager to ensure Japan's dependability as an anti-Communist ally in Asia, staunch anti-Communist leaders found favor with the occupation, while leftists and labor radicals were purged from the government. Japan became a base for U.S. operations in Korea, and the U.S. presence poured cash into the struggling Japanese economy. Eager for Japan to defend itself, the United States encouraged growth of a national defense force.

Reintegration was achieved in concrete terms through the Treaty of San Francisco (1951), which ended the Allied Occupation in 1952 and restored Japan's political independence. Japan's entry into the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1955 realized the goal of integrating Japan into a U.S.-led system of free trade.

Growth in a Cold War World, 1955–1973

Postwar Japan was born as a coalescence of renewed commitments to democracy, a drive toward reintegration with the world community, and an East Asia fractured by U.S.-Soviet rivalry. The primary beneficiaries of this formula became Japan's export industries. Favorable currency exchange rates gave Japanese manufactures easy access to the large U.S. market. In these years, Japan's economy grew at a breathtaking double-digit pace. The incomes of Japan's consumers grew dramatically as well, with the refrigerator, the automatic clothes washer, and the color television becoming new measures of success in Japan. In the 1960s, few households owned a refrigerator or washer; the

color television was a new consumer item. By the early 1970s, nearly every Japanese household had all three.

These symbols of progress could not mask the concessions made to breakneck growth. The great successes of the steel and chemical industries brought pollution to the national stage. Public outcry eventually forced the government to confront the fouled waterways, concrete beaches, and poisonous air that had also become symbols of the new Japan. The problems of public accountability in government were felt in many areas. While the post-Allied Occupation years had seen the rise of diverse political movements, by 1955 moderate and conservative parties consolidated into one political party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which ruled for the remainder of the Showa period. Many LDP politicians had strong links to wartime politics, most notably Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, in office from 1986 to 1987, whom the Allied Occupation had deemed a "class A" war criminal. The LDP pursued closer relations with the United States, culminating in the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Pact that effectively made the countries partners in regional defense. The prospects of the long-term hosting of U.S. military bases, continued growth of Japan's self-defense force, and undemocratic speed with which Kishi pushed such measures through the Diet elicited mass protests. Protesters wondered how such a military alliance could be seen as consistent with Article 9 and Japan's commitment to peace.

By the early 1970s, the United States proved no longer willing to support Japan's easy access to U.S. markets. New currency exchange rates provided an immediate shock to the economy. Conflict in the Middle East destabilized world oil prices, adding additional shocks to the economy. The period of high growth could not continue forever.

Japan as Number One, 1974–1991

Economic growth slowed in the aftermath of these shocks to a manageable 4 percent per year, but the accumulated gains pushed national wealth to dizzying heights. Per capita income was the highest among major industrial nations. No longer content with mere affluence, a large segment of the Japanese population enjoyed the opulence of luxury consumer goods and international travel in a global playground. Such wealth brought corresponding influence and responsibility. The last days of the Showa period displayed Japan's struggles to accommodate itself to its new life as "number one."

While many Japanese shared in this wealth, they did not all share equally. The strengthening of femi-

nist and citizens' movements against inequality, social injustice, and pollution and the health and safety concerns of these elements exposed cracks in "number one" status. By contrast, the labor movement and opposition political parties declined. The LDP became ever more entrenched, purchasing the favor of rural voting districts through generous funding of new public-works projects. Disenchanted voters saw a party mired in scandal and machine politics, driven to preserve itself rather than serve a public interest.

No issue symbolized the struggle for international respectability more than questions over the legacy of Japan's aging emperor. Pride in postwar accomplishments encouraged Japanese to look favorably on the past and seek explanations for the nation's accomplishments in unique and innate qualities of its people. This surge of cultural nationalism seemed to many, especially in countries victimized by Japan's aggression in World War II, to be a resurgence of the nationalism of the early Showa period. The persistence of the emperor himself implied that no clean break from the past and no accounting of responsibility and war guilt had been properly undertaken. Such questions had been suppressed during the Cold War and Japan's phoenix-like rebirth. Critics pointed to the odious system of registration that reminded second- and third-generation Korean residents of their separate status. Many Koreans traced their families' appearances in Japan to prewar forced labor. This and other examples suggested that unquestioned faith in collective goals and national prosperity had concealed discrimination on the basis of minority status, gender, and race.

The Legacy of Showa

The death of the Showa emperor in 1989 intensified reflection on the long period bearing his reign name. Hundreds of books and articles on his legacy appeared in 1989 alone. A sharper sense of ending for the Showa period came in 1991. The booming Japanese economy slumped, victim of overspeculation in real estate and securities. The burst of the so-called Bubble Economy shook public confidence in government institutions, political leadership, major corporations, and ultimately pride in Showa-era accomplishments. The Showa period has been equally haunted by its past. After years of government denials of wartime sexual slavery run by the military (the women were euphemistically called "military comfort women"), former Korean sex slave Kim Haksun (1924–1997) broke fifty years of silence in 1991 by offering public testimony of these misdeeds. Scholars subsequently uncovered documentary evidence of the system, forcing a public admission from the gov-

ernment. The government has been unwilling, however, to pay compensation to former slaves.

The legacy of Showa Japan will remain contradictory. The emperor came to symbolize a postwar peace state, the remarkable advances in the material wealth of the country, and progress toward peace with its neighbors. In the early Showa period, by contrast, he was an object of mystical reverence, the justification for authoritarian thought control, social conformity, and horrific warfare that swept across Asia in his name. Whether the later Showa generation can bear responsibility for acts of that early generation persists as the enduring challenge for Showa.

Michael A. Schneider

See also: **Heisei Period; Hirohito; Taisho Period; Women in Japan; World War II**

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SHUNTO *Shunto* (spring struggle) refers to the distinctive wage-bargaining practices that play a central role in determining Japanese wage levels. Under the *shunto* system, collective bargaining occurs annually during the spring (February through May) and is generally conducted between individual enterprise unions and their respective managements. Despite this formal independence, a high degree of coordination occurs at both the industrial and national levels. Settlements in one enterprise or industry are tabulated and help set the pattern for wage hikes in other enterprises and industries in a way that makes

all bargaining in a given round part of a single inter-related system.

Shunto was originally conceived as a way to overcome some of the disadvantages of Japanese labor's enterprise-based organizational structure. Ota Kaoru of Sohyo, Japan's leading left-leaning national confederation between 1950 and 1989, felt that by simultaneously coordinating wage demands and bargaining (and striking) enterprise unions could prevent employers from playing one union off against another and so could drive a harder bargain. From an initial foothold in eight industries in 1955, *shunto* expanded to the point where the national *shunto* coordinating committee represented nearly ten million unionists by the late 1970s.

The significance of *shunto* has changed over time. Politically, the first round in 1955 was intended to circumvent Sohyo's divisive emphasis on politics in favor of more attractive economic gains. During *shunto*'s first two decades, bargaining tended to be confrontational, and unions regularly used strikes to press their demands. This confrontational quality conspicuously dissipated in the wake of the first oil crisis as the labor-management-cooperation-oriented International Metalworkers Federation—Japan Council unions seized the initiative in the *shunto* rounds. Concerned about the macroeconomic consequences of wage hikes on their industry's international competitiveness, these unions exerted a moderating influence. Since 1975, *shunto* wage hikes have closely adhered to the level of increase in the productivity of the national economy as a whole. During the late 1990s, Rengo (the current national confederation) labeled its effort the Spring Struggle for a Better Life, with the implication that *shunto* involved various policy struggles aimed at bringing about government and corporate policies that would improve the lifestyle of Japanese workers.

There is considerable debate over the degree to which *shunto* has in fact raised Japanese wages. Critics argue that even during the height of *shunto* militancy, wage increases were in line with what one would expect, given supply and demand in the labor market. Others argue that *shunto* encouraged a relative leveling of wages within and across industries and, through annual bargaining, allowed Japanese industry to adjust quickly to economic changes.

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SIBERIA Siberia is a vast region of Russia, covering some 10- million-square kilometers from the Ural Mountains in the west to the Pacific Ocean in the east and from the Arctic Ocean in the north to the borders of China, Mongolia, and Kazakhstan in the south. In 1992 it had an estimated population of 32.5 million (17 percent of the population of Russia), nearly all of whom were Russians or other peoples of European origin, save for about one million indigenous peoples.

Whether Siberia should be classified as part of Asia or Europe is the subject of debate. Geographically, Siberia forms the northeast region of Eurasia or north Asia. Culturally, it is mainly European as 98 percent of the population is Russian or of other European ancestry, Russian is the primary language, and Russian Orthodoxy the primary religion. Politically, all or part of Siberia has been part of Russia since the Russian conquest of western Siberia began in the sixteenth century.

Geography

Siberia is bordered by the Kara, Laptev, and East Siberian seas to the north; the Bering Sea and Sea of Okhotsk to the east; by China, Mongolia and Kazakhstan to the south; and the Ural mountains to the west. Major geographical features include the New Siberian Islands, the Severnaya Zemlya Archipelago, Wrangel Island, and the Taymyr Peninsula in the north; Kamchatka Peninsula and Sakhalin Island in the east; Lake Baikal (the deepest freshwater lake in the world) in south central Siberia, and the Yablonovyy, Stanovoy, Verkhoyanski, Kolyma, and Cherskiy mountain ranges and the central uplands in eastern Siberia. From west to east, Siberia is divided by its three major south-to-north flowing river systems—the Ob', Yenisey, and Lena—and their tributaries. Rivers provide the primary north-south transportation routes, while the 12,800-kilometer Trans-Siberian Railroad provides east-west transportation. The highway system is not well developed, especially beyond western Siberia, and air travel remains limited as well.

Located nearer to European Russia, southwest Siberia contains about 60% of the region's population, its largest city (Novosibirsk) and several other large cities (Omsk, Tomsk, Tobolsk, Barnaul, and Novokuz-



nets), and much of the region's industry. With a population of nearly 1.5 million, Novosibirsk is Russia's third largest city (after Moscow and St. Petersburg). It was established in 1893 and incorporated in 1903.

Eastern Siberia is sparsely populated and contains most of the region's indigenous peoples. Cold temperatures in the north and hot temperatures in the south during the summer make the climate difficult to live in and the rough terrain makes communication and transportation difficult. The major cities include Krasnoyarsk (1992 est. pop. 925,000), Irkutsk (1992 est. pop. 639,000), Yakutsk (1992 est. pop. 198,000), and Chita (1992 est. pop. 377,000).

History

The traditional view that Siberia was first inhabited about 30,000 years ago has been challenged by recent research, which suggests settlement as early as 300,000 years ago. Russian conquest began when a Cossack

force captured the city of Sibir' (the capital of the Sibir' khanate in western Siberia) in 1581 and then the Tatar khanate in 1598. The Cossacks pushed east, establishing a series of forts until they were halted by the Chinese and ceded control over the Far East in the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689.

Early Russian administration focused on exploiting the region and indigenous peoples for furs, which were traded for and collected as tribute. Colonization expanded after the fur trade declined in the early eighteenth century. The fur trade was replaced by mining for silver, lead, copper, and later gold. Russians moved to the region to work as miners, which stimulated the growth of agriculture to support the new communities. In 1861 newly emancipated peasants were allowed to settle in Siberia, although the harsh conditions led to many deaths and many failed communities.

The construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad from 1892 to 1904 stimulated settlement of the region



LAKE BAIKAL—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Lake Baikal, the oldest and deepest of the world's lakes, was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1996. The ancient Siberian lake, which contains almost 20 percent of the world's unfrozen fresh water, has evolved a unique freshwater ecosystem.

and exploitation of its natural resources. From 1906 to 1911 many Russians were urged to migrate to Siberia to relieve the population stress to the west of the Urals. Siberia was the scene of considerable political activity during the Russian Civil War (1918–1920). Forces opposed to the Bolsheviks organized there and were aided by expeditionary forces from the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan. In 1920, the government of Admiral Aleksandr Vasilievich Kolchak (1873–1920), an anti-Bolshevik who had held the Siberian city of Omsk against the Bolsheviks (1918–1919), disintegrated. Kolchak was executed, and Siberia came under Soviet rule.

The Soviets exploited the region for its mineral resources, developed industrial centers, and, in the south, agriculture. Russians and other Slavic peoples were forced or encouraged to move to Siberia, and the population expanded rapidly, with the indigenous peoples often displaced by the new settlers. Forced labor camps were established for political prisoners and many remained in use until the late 1980s. During World War II (1939–1945), industrial and scientific operations were moved to Siberia for protection from the Germans. At the same time, ethnic Germans and others accused of being disloyal to the Soviet state were forcibly relocated to the region.

After World War II, exploitation of the region accelerated with the building of new industrial centers, hydroelectric power plants, and massive agricultural development in the south. The long-term result has been massive environmental destruction.

Agitation for economic, political, and human rights began among some indigenous groups such as the Yakut in the 1980s and became more aggressive in the early 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In the post-Soviet era major issues include conflict over regional versus national political control, indigenous peoples' economic independence, the revival of shamanism and other elements

of indigenous culture, and ending environmental degradation.

Political Organization

As a part of Russia, Siberia is divided into the Sakha (Yakutia), Bashkortostan, Buryat, Khakass, and Tuva republics and the Chukchi, Koryak, Taymyr, Magadan, Kamchatka, Evenki, Krasnoyarsk, Khabarovsk, Irkutsk, Tomsk, Omsk, Sakhalin, Amur, Chita, Novosibirsk, Kemerovo, Altay, Primorskiy, Ust-Ordyn-Buryat, Yevreyskaya, and Agin-Buryat administrative districts. In the post-Soviet era, there has been a movement among some regional and local political leaders for more control over regional affairs and economic resources. An indigenous-rights movement that predates the collapse of the Soviet Union remains active and campaigns for greater autonomy for indigenous peoples, religious freedom, and the control of environmental pollution.

Economy

Siberian territory is diverse and can be divided into three zones. The north is tundra, the middle zone is a mixed-forest taiga belt, and the south is the steppe zone.

A major motivation for the Russian conquest of Siberia was exploitation of the rich natural resources of the region. Russian traders were first interested in the furs trapped by the indigenous peoples and when they gave out, mining of mineral resources became the major target. Over time, all of Siberia's resources have been exploited. In the 1990s, Siberia produced over 50 percent of Russia's oil, timber, natural gas, coal, water, and hydroelectric power. It also contains vast reserves of copper, nickel, zinc, aluminum, precious metals, mica, fluorite, black lead, asbestos, mercury, salt, and limestone.

Western Siberia is a major industrial region where natural resources such as coal, gas, and timber are processed for use. Western Siberia is also a major agricultural region with the major products being wheat and other grains, potatoes, sugar beets, and butter.

Eastern Siberia surpasses even Western Siberia in the production of fossil fuel, forest, and mineral resources; it is Russia's leading producer of these resources. Exploitation of the region's hydroelectric potential began in the mid-1950s, and there are now four major hydroelectric stations on the Angara River.

Wheat is the major farm product in the warmer south, and animal husbandry is still the primary activity of some indigenous peoples. Recreational activ-



SOLOVETSKY—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

The six islands of Solovetsky on the western edge of the White Sea were designated as a World Heritage Site by UNESCO in 1992. The islands—where evidence of life dating back to 3000 BCE has been found, along with labyrinths and megalithic structures—are the site of several important Russian Orthodox monasteries.

ities centered on Lake Baikal and the Sayan Mountains represent a recent development initiative for southern Siberia. In the north, which is still remote and not suitable for agriculture, indigenous pursuits such as reindeer herding, fishing, sealing, hunting, and fur processing remain major activities.

The centuries of exploitation have taken a toll on the land, water, and air of the region. Almost all areas of heavy human exploitation or settlement suffer from air, water, and soil pollution, often from discarded toxic wastes at industrial complexes or mining sites. The cities of Angarsk, Bratsk, Kemerovo, Krasnoyarsk, and Noril'sk, are ranked as among the most polluted in the world. With the movement for greater regional control and the indigenous-rights movement, there is a possibility that pollution might lessen and some of its effects might be reversed in the next few decades.

Peoples and Cultures

The great majority of Siberia's population is made up of Russians and other peoples of European ancestry, including Ukrainians, Belorussians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Poles, and Germans. Many of the non-Russians arrived in the 1930s and 1940s, having been exiled. There are also distinct populations of Russian members of religious minorities who fled to Siberia to avoid persecution. There are also about 500,000 Siberian Tatars (Turkic Muslims), Koreans, and Dungans (from China).

A distinct subgroup within the Siberian population are the Siberaki, generally defined as people descended from Russians (and Belorussians and Ukrainians) who arrived before the Russian Revolution of 1917 and have especially strong allegiance to Siberia. They see themselves as distinct from people who arrived later and from Russians in European Russia. Traditional Siberaki communities were rural, and the economy was based on limited farming, hunting, and fishing.

Their religion is a mix of Russian Orthodoxy and Siberian shamanism. Those who moved to the cities or became involved in industry tended to assimilate into Russian culture, although the mid-1980s marked the beginning of a revival of Siberaki ethnic consciousness.

The indigenous peoples of Siberia consist of from thirty to sixty groups, depending on the criteria used to measure cultural distinctiveness. Linguistically, these peoples can be divided into ten groups, whose populations range from a few thousand to over 400,000. The traditional economies were based on hunting, fishing, trapping, and reindeer herding and the traditional religion was shamanistic. The traditional ways of all groups were adversely impacted by Russian and Soviet rule, which disrupted their subsistence economies, forced nomadic peoples to settle in collectives, and severely repressed shamanism. Since the 1980s there has been a revival of some of the traditional cultures and some large groups, such as the Yakut and the Buryats, have campaigned for political autonomy and greater control of economic resources in their territories. In 1990 an Association of Peoples of the North was formed, with the Yakut a leading member. In 1999 the capital cities of Yakutsk (capital of Sakha, or Yakutia) and Ulan-Ude (capital of the Buryat republic, or Buryatia) signed a treaty of economic and social cooperation.

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SIBURAPHA (1904–1974), Thai writer. "Siburapha" is the pen name of Kulap Saipradit, who is regarded as one of the most important figures in the development of the novel in Thailand and a major figure in Thai intellectual history of the twentieth century. His literary reputation rests on his pioneering role as one of the first Thai novelists and, later, one of the most prominent writers of the socialist-influenced "literature for life" movement, which aimed to use fiction to highlight social injustice. His non-journalistic writings include translations from Gorky and Chekhov, and books on Marxism, Buddhism, his impressions of a yearlong study-trip to Australia, and the status of women.

After achieving fame in the late 1920s as a writer of popular romantic fiction, at a time when the Thai novel was still in its infancy, Siburapha soon moved into political journalism, where his views on social injustice and undemocratic practices frequently got him into trouble with newspaper owners and government alike. Nevertheless, his abilities were widely recognized and by the age of thirty he had edited several of Bangkok's major dailies. By the late 1940s he was one of a number of prominent writers to have absorbed Marxist literary ideas, and his fiction from this time on became primarily a means for highlighting social injustice and criticizing the government. In 1952 he was imprisoned in a government clampdown on those with left-wing sympathies, and in 1958, a year after his release, he went into exile in China rather than risk further imprisonment under the new military regime. He died in Beijing in 1974 without ever returning to his homeland. His later short stories and novels, with their uncompromising political message, were rediscovered, reprinted, and promoted during the mid-1970s by a progressive Thai youth movement and became a major influence on many young writers at the time. While radical fiction fell out of vogue with the increased political stability in the 1980s, Siburapha's reputation has continued to grow. There have been regular reprints of his earlier works and a steady stream of newspaper and magazine articles on his life; a Siburapha Foundation has been established, which awards an annual prestigious literary prize in his name; and there is now a Siburapha Road in Bangkok, the first road in Thailand to be named after a writer.

Siburapha's most famous novels are *Songkbram chiwit* (The War of Life, 1932), *Khang lang pbap* (Behind the Painting, 1937), *Chon kwa rao cha phop kan ik* (Until We Meet Again, 1950) and *Lae pai khang na* (Look Forward, 1955–1957). Of these, *Behind the Painting* and *Until We Meet Again* have been translated into English.

David Smyth

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SICHUAN (2002 est. pop. 87.4 million). Located on the upper reaches of the Chang (Yangtze) River, Sichuan (Szechwan), with a land area of 485,000 square kilometers, is one of China's most populous provinces. It has long played a key role in China's economy and relations with Tibet and other western regions. Currently, Sichuan is an important focus in the plan of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to develop the interior of the country.

Archeological discoveries at Sanxingdui in eastern Sichuan suggest that the area was inhabited as early as the eleventh century BCE by a technologically advanced people whose culture was distinct from that of the north China heartland. By 311 BCE, the kingdoms of Ba (in eastern Sichuan) and Shu (in western Sichuan) had fully developed. In that year, the armies of the Qin state from north China incorporated the territory of Ba and Shu into the Qin empire, although the two kingdoms' names are still used to refer to regions of Sichuan.

Qin engineers built the Dujiangyan waterworks on the Min River west of the provincial capital, Chengdu, which made the Chengdu Plain a productive agricultural center. However, Sichuan's geography—surrounded on all sides by mountain ranges and the Chang River gorges—kept it relatively isolated from the rest of China. The Qin built a highway from its capital near the Huang (Yellow) River southwest into Sichuan, carving ledges on the steep mountain slopes. Over the last thousand years, Sichuan has been a center of the tea and horse trade with Tibet. It also supplies rice, sugar, silk, and medicinal products to eastern China. Salt wells drilled up to 1,460 meters deep produced brine that was boiled down using local deposits of natural gas.

The name Sichuan ("four rivers") was given to the area during the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). At the end of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), the Sichuan population was devastated by a rebellion. The Qing dynasty (1644–1912) promoted resettlement of the province by immigrants from eastern China. After the fall of the Qing in 1912, Sichuan remained isolated from national politics until 1937, when it became the base of anti-Japanese resistance. In 1939 the Nationalist government created a new province, Xikang, out of parts

of western Sichuan and eastern Tibet. In 1955 the PRC government dismantled Xikang and reassigned its territory to Sichuan, with the result that today the population of western Sichuan includes many Tibetans and other national minority groups.

Sichuan is home to the Xichang satellite launching center and many scientific research institutes. Large government investments in transportation and energy networks are intended to promote the economic development of the province. The new dam in the Chang River's Three Gorges area, for example, is meant to provide electricity for much of western China, as well as create a great reservoir extending west to the city of Chongqing. Sichuan and Chongqing (which, until a 1997 administrative reorganization, was a part of Sichuan) are the focal regions of a government campaign to "Develop the West." This campaign, launched in 2000, is intended both to tap the resources of western China and to reduce the economic and cultural disparities between the interior and coastal China.

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SIDDHARTHA GAUTAMA (c. 566 BCE–486 BCE), founder of Buddhism. Siddhartha Gautama, known as the Buddha, was also titled Sakyasinha and later Sakyamuni, or Sage of the Sakyas. He was born into a princely Kshatriya-caste family in Kapilavastu, on the border between India and Nepal, in a garden



LUMBINI—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

The palatial birthplace of Siddhartha Buddha, the beauty of which led the young prince to seek a life of aesthetic suffering, can still be seen today, some 2,500 years after his birth in 623 BCE. The site has become one of the most important areas for Buddhist pilgrims, and in 1997 was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site.

identified by archaeologists in the twentieth century. His mother, Maya, died giving birth to him. His father, Suddhodhana, was of the Gautama family. At the age of sixteen the Siddhartha married Yasodhara, and they lived in his father's luxurious palace for the next thirteen years.



Buddha statue at Wat Yai Chai Mongkol, Ayutthaya, Thailand, in 2001. (MACDUFF EVERTON/CORBIS)



A TOOTH-RELIC OF THE BUDDHA

"The relic of the left eye-tooth of Gautama Buddha, here said to be enshrined, has a curious history. Rescued from his funeral pile, B.C. 543, it was preserved for eight centuries at Dantapura in South India, and bought to Ceylon A.D. 310. The Malabars afterwards captured it, and took it back to India, but the great Prakrama recovered it. The Portuguese missionaries got possession of it in the sixteenth century, carried it away to Goa, and after refusing a large ransom offered for it by the Singalese, reduced it to powder and destroyed it at Goa in the presence of witnesses. The account of this destruction of the tooth is most circumstantial in the Portuguese records. Nevertheless, the Buddhist priests at Kandy produced another tooth, which they affirmed to be the real relic, that taken by the Portuguese being a counterfeit, and they conducted this to the shrine with great pomp and ceremonial. This is the relic now treasured with such care and reverence. It is probably not a human tooth at all, being, as those who have seen it affirm, much too large (two inches long) ever to have belonged to man. Then the British got possession of it in 1815, there was great excitement, the relic being regarded as a sort of national palladium. They allowed it, however, to be restored to its shrine amid great festivities. The sanctuary in which it reposes is a small chamber, without a ray of light, in which the air is stifling, hot and heavy with the perfume of flowers, situated in the inmost recesses of the temple. The massive silver table, three feet six inches high, stands before the bell-shaped shrine, jeweled and hung around with chains, and consisting of six cases, the largest five feet high, formed of silver gilt, inlaid with rubies, the others similarly wrought, but diminishing in size gradually, until, on removing the innermost one, about one foot in height, a golden lotus is disclosed, on which reposes the sacred relic. In front of the silver altar is a table upon which worshippers deposit their gifts."

Source: Rev. William Urwick. ([1891] 2001) *India Illustrated with Pen and Pencil*. Revised and enlarged by Prof. Edward P. Thwing. New Delhi, Asian Educational Services.

Then, when only twenty-nine years old, he renounced that life, leaving his wife and newborn son behind as he went out into the world to seek enlightenment. His search began with a year of studying Indian philosophy. He then sought salvation by practicing severe austerities for five years. It was on a day when he was sitting meditating under the famous Bo tree at what would later be called Bodh Gaya that enlightenment came to him, and he was thenceforth known as the Buddha, or Enlightened One.

Beginning now a lifetime of teaching, he preached his first sermon in the Deer Park at Sarnath, near Varanasi, where five disciples joined him. For the next forty-five years he wandered the region now compris-

ing the Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, preaching the truth as he saw it, and converting both prince and peasant to his view, regardless of their caste. He organized his disciples into the great Buddhist *sangha*, the oldest religious order that is still in existence. According to one tradition he passed from this world in 486 BCE at Kusinagara, at the age of eighty.

The Buddha left behind a collection of traditions and teachings, written down in Pali by his disciples, that became the Tripitaka. Later translated into Chinese, Japanese, and Tibetan, the Tripitaka became the basic texts for hundreds of millions of Asian Buddhists.

The Buddha, whose historicity is definitely established, never made claims of divinity for himself. He

only claimed to have attained a certain knowledge that others could also attain. He was the first religious figure to found a brotherhood of monks (the *sangha*), through which he promoted an organized, widespread, and peaceful evangelization of the peasant masses.

Paul Hockings

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SIEMENS INCIDENT Allegations that high-ranking officers in Japan's Imperial Navy had received bribes from the German munitions firm Siemens Schuckert caused a political crisis that culminated in the resignation of the premier, Admiral Yamamoto Gonnohyoe (1852–1933) and his cabinet on 24 March 1914. The Siemens incident was indicative of the competition, which was especially bitter in 1905–1915, among rival factions associated with Japan's army and navy commanders as well as among rival party organizations. The subject of heated public discussion and official debate, the scandal also marked a step toward greater government accountability in the early history of parliamentary democracy in Japan.

On 23 January 1914 Japanese newspapers printed reports of the trial in Berlin of a former Siemens employee who was charged with stealing confidential company documents from files in the firm's Tokyo office. The defendant testified that he had sold the documents to a Reuters News Service reporter in order to expose a duplicitous deal between Japanese naval officers and the British firm Vickers, represented by a Japanese company, Mitsui Bussan. By accepting an offer from Vickers of regular secret "commissions" of 25 percent of the value of equipment procurement contracts placed with the firm, the naval officers contravened an agreement reached with Siemens earlier to place large orders for ammunition and communications equipment with the German firm in exchange for kickbacks of 15 percent of the value of the orders.

Admiral Yamamoto, premier since February 1913, had authorized a program of lavish expenditures on naval expansion. Critics of his generosity seized on the information released in Berlin to confirm suspicions of corruption in connection with naval spending. In a Diet session on 23 January 1914, Shimada Saburo, a leading member of the opposition Doshikai, opened a two-month period of public debate and political crisis by calling Yamamoto to account with a series of embarrassing questions about the navy's purchasing practices.

During February and March, Yamamoto succeeded in maintaining his position, partly by dismissing naval officers implicated in the allegations of corruption. But the admiral's position was irretrievably weakened by opposition within the upper house of the Diet, the army, and the public.

The Siemens incident contributed to greater instability in Japan's parliamentary politics by ousting the majority party, the Seiyukai, from the premiership and the cabinet. Yamamoto's government survived a no-confidence vote on 10 February, but failed to survive the loss of support in the upper house of the Diet, where the peers had slashed the naval expansion budget and refused to yield to the principle that only the lower house had authority over the budget. In an arrangement brokered by Yamagata Aritomo and other senior leaders, a new cabinet was installed in April 1914 with the veteran parliamentarian Okuma Shigenobu (1838–1922) as premier. Competition for budgetary appropriations between the navy and army continued to be a bone of contention within Japan's government, even at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Corruption connected to public contracts with foreign firms continued as well, although it did not precipitate another political crisis until the Lockheed scandal of 1976.

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SIERRA MADRE The Sierra Madre is the longest mountain range in the Philippines. It forms the backbone of the eastern coastline of the main island of Luzon, running from Cagayan Province up to Quezon Province. The range is approximately 500 kilometers long. The location of the Sierra Madre in the eastern part of Luzon protects the lowlands against strong typhoons during the rainy season in the middle of the year. The range is divided into the Northern Sierra Madre, which stretches from Cagayan to Isabela, and the Southern Sierra Madre, which stretches from Aurora Province to Quezon. There is a short gap dividing the two portions.

The mountains are wild and remote and not totally accessible; hence they cannot be fully developed. They are one of the remaining bastions of virgin forests and home to numerous flora and fauna, particularly the Philippine (monkey-eating) eagle. They are also rich

in mineral resources yet to be tapped. The mountain range was formed in prehistoric times when tectonic plates moved inward, pushing up landmasses.

Aaron Ronquillo

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SIHANOUK, NORODOM (b. 1922), king of Cambodia. King Norodom Sihanouk is the enduring figure of modern Cambodian politics. Born in Phnom Penh, Sihanouk was an unlikely candidate for the Cambodian throne, which he first ascended to in 1941. A student at the Lycée Chasseloup-Laubat in Saigon (Vietnam), he was selected by Cambodia's French colonial rulers to assume the throne after the death of his grandfather, Monivong. The French believed that Sihanouk would be a flexible and easily manipulated national leader. The passage of time has revealed the extent to which their judgment was wrong. Sihanouk quickly established himself as a shrewd and formidable politician, with his self-titled Royal Crusade for Independence providing the catalyst for the end of colonial rule in Cambodia.

Sihanouk's most surprising political move was his decision, in 1955, to fully immerse himself in popular politics by abdicating the Cambodian throne in favor of his father, Suramarit. He formed a political organization, the Sangkum Reastr Niyum (People's Socialist Community), which swept all before it in the 1955 national elections (and then again in 1958, 1962, and 1966). The National Assembly, whose members were all Sangkum politicians, became a rubber stamp for the prince and his policies. He tirelessly traveled throughout Cambodia, inaugurating new schools and hospitals and ingratiating himself among an adoring population.

By the late 1960s, as Cambodia became increasingly embroiled in the conflict in neighboring Vietnam, Sihanouk gradually lost his stranglehold over Cambodia's political system. In 1970, while the then prince was overseas, he was deposed by the National Assembly, which had become frustrated with the nepotism, corruption, and incompetence that characterized government in Cambodia. Sihanouk immediately aligned himself with his sworn enemies in the Khmer Rouge

(Communist) movement. For the next five years, Cambodia was at war, with Sihanouk's Communist allies enjoying the ascendancy.

After the war was won, in April 1975, Sihanouk eventually returned to Phnom Penh. No longer of any use to the Communists, he was immediately placed under house arrest in the royal palace and would likely have been executed if it weren't for the support he had from China. When the Khmer Rouge regime was ousted by Vietnamese-supported defectors in 1979, Sihanouk fled to China. He eventually formed a non-Communist resistance movement along the Thai-Cambodian border and played a significant role in negotiations that led to peace agreements in 1991. After United Nations-sponsored elections in 1993, Sihanouk resumed his place on the Cambodian throne. Increasingly frail, he alternates between the royal palace in Cambodia, and China, where he receives ongoing medical treatment. He is also involved with film making and enjoys playing jazz.

David M. Ayres

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SIKHISM Sikhism is a monotheistic religion of India founded by Guru Nanak (1469–1539) around 1500; it is marked by a rejection of idolatry and caste. It was an offshoot of the Bhakti (devotional) cult of vaishnava Hinduism, which first developed in Tamil Nadu in the eighth century and later spread throughout India in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The Bhakti tradition taught that God is the one and only reality and that the rest is *maya*, or illusion. The best way to serve God is by absolute submission to God's will, which is revealed through the guidance of a guru, or spiritual mentor. The followers of Nanak came to be known as Sikhs, from the Sanskrit word *shishya*, "disciple."

Guru Nanak and His Message

Guru Nanak was born in Talwandi, a small village in what is now part of Pakistan. His father was a Khatri, a high caste among Punjabi Hindus. He grew up in a philosophically and culturally vibrant milieu, one


in which he freely met and conversed with Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, and Jains. As a young man, Nanak went in search of his fortune to Sultanpur, where for about a decade he lived the life of an ordinary family man. However, he was constantly searching for something more valuable: the purpose of life.

During the first quarter of the sixteenth century, he undertook long journeys around the Indian subcontinent, visiting important centers of Hindu and Muslim pilgrimage. After the age of fifty-five, Nanak finally settled down at Kartarpur on the right bank of the Ravi River; there he delivered his message of salvation to all. A community of disciples grew up around him. The daily routine and moral ideals fostered in this first Sikh community constituted the core of Sikh life, whereby men and women shared equally in the Sikh institutions of *seva* (voluntary labor), *langar* (community kitchen), and *sangat* (congregation).

In the eyes of Guru Nanak, the contemporary social order had lost its legitimacy, and in his metaphors there is a direct denunciation of the Turko-Afghan rule of the time. The rulers were unjust; they discriminated against their non-Muslim subjects by levying a pilgrimage tax and *jizya* (a religious tax). The ruling class oppressed the cultivators and the ordinary people. A new religious ideology was therefore needed to form the basis of a new social order. Nanak exhorted people to turn to God, the true king. Service to God alone was true service; he who found a place with the true king did not have to look to an earthly potentate for succor. Nanak described God without reference to either Hindu or Muslim conceptions.

God, for Guru Nanak, was the eternally unchanging formless One. Nanak equated God with truth (*sachch*). God's creation is real, but not everlasting. God alone is eternal. Nanak preached that people should lodge truth in their hearts and act accordingly. Nanak made the institution of guruship the pivot of his religious system. Without the guru as a guide, no one can attain *moksha*, or salvation, and one wanders through the cycle of death and rebirth in the darkness of ignorance. Nanak, however, insisted on the separation between God and the guru. The guru is to be consulted, respected, and cherished, but not worshiped. He is a teacher, a messiah, but not an incarnation of God.

Nanak denounced caste distinctions and social differentiations. He repudiated the Hindu deities and scriptures. The protagonists of such beliefs and practices, the pundits, the ulama, and the shaikhs (although not Islam itself) naturally came in for criticism as well. He disapproved of asceticism, of penance, and of tor-



A Sikh at the Golden Temple in Amritsar, India, in 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

turing the flesh as a step toward enlightenment and instead propagated *grhastha dharma*, the religion of the householder. He refused to grant audiences to people unless they first broke bread in the community kitchen (*guru ka langar*), where the Brahman and the untouchable, the Muslim and the Hindu sat alongside one another as equals. He was just as critical of the concepts of purity and impurity that had sprung up from notions of higher and lower categories of human beings.

This emphasis on simple living, the absence of incomprehensible ritual, and, most importantly, the concern with the reordering of society on egalitarian lines had a strong appeal, and he won large followings from a diverse group of people. There were many Khatri among his followers, but there also were petty traders, shopkeepers, agents of merchants, itinerant salespeople, artisans, and cultivators, mostly of the Jat peasant community. They came from both the towns and the countryside, and they all considered themselves equal. Many belonged to the lower castes. Nanak taught using the local language, capturing the imagination, and



SIKH SEPARATISM

Although a minority in India, the Sikhs are the dominant group in the Punjab region of northwestern India. They have for their entire history resisted outside rule, first by the Mughals (Muslims) and then the Hindus and at least some elements have agitated for an independent Sikh nation. The governments of modern India have steadfastly refused Sikh independence, a policy that predates Indian independence, as indicated by this statement issued by the Working Committee of the Indian national Congress political party in 1946.

The Sikhs and the Constituent Assembly

The Working Committee have learnt with regret of the decision of the Sikhs not to seek election to the Constituent Assembly. The Committee are aware that injustice has been done to the Sikhs and they have drawn the attention of the Cabinet Delegation to it. They are, however, strongly of opinion that the Sikhs would serve their cause and the cause of the country's freedom better by participation in the Constituent Assembly than by keeping out of it. The Committee, therefore, appeal to the Sikhs to reconsider their decision and express their willingness to take part in the Constituent Assembly. The Working Committee assure the Sikhs that the Congress will give them all possible support in removing their legitimate grievances and in securing adequate safeguards for the protection of their just interests in Punjab.

Source: Jagdish Saran Sharma. (1962) *India's Struggle for Freedom: Select Documents and Sources*. Vol. I. Delhi: S. Chand, 723.

echoing the aspirations of the lowest of the low as he laid stress on cleanliness, honesty, and earning one's living through honest labor (*kirat karma*).

Evolution of the Sikh Panth

Nanak was therefore a messenger of bhakti, advocating a personal relationship between God and humans. His religion, however, survived long after the other Bhakti cults had slowly lost their earlier significance in India. Before his death at Kartarpur, Guru Nanak chose his disciple Angad (1504–1552) as his successor, setting aside the claims of his own sons. This nomination was important, as it laid the basis of the guru *parampara* (tradition), whereby the entire organization of the Sikh community revolved around the guru. It also established the idea that the positions of the guru and the disciple were interchangeable and that there was no difference between the founder and the successor.

Guru Angad's pontificate was an extension of Guru Nanak's work but with significant shifts of emphasis.

He had a thorough grasp of the compositions of Guru Nanak, and to preserve them for posterity, he adopted a new script called the Gurumukhi. Gradually, however, from the Bhakti code of surrender to a personal God, Sikhism slowly moved toward a radical reform program as it came in conflict with the Mughal state. The number of Sikhs increased considerably in the Punjab during the pontificate of the third guru, Amar Das (1479–1574). During the time of the fifth guru, Arjun (1563–1606), Sikhs spread to Kashmir, Kabul, Delhi, and Agra. Indeed, Sikhs could be found in all provinces of the Mughal empire during the rule of Emperor Akbar (1542–1605).

Guru Arjun had to appoint a number of representatives, *masands*, authorized to look after the affairs of the local *sangats* at various places. Once a year, authorized representatives brought to the guru at Ramdasapur (Amritsar) offerings that had been collected from the Sikhs under their supervision. The guru was at the center of the whole organization and was rec-

ognized as the Saccha Badshah, or the true king. He came to be seen not just as the temporal authority, but also as the human form of the true God (*niranjana*). This assumption of parallel authority by the gurus naturally earned for the Sikh brotherhood, or the Panth, the hostility of the Mughal empire. Thus, by the beginning of the seventeenth century, the socioreligious community of Guru Nanak's followers showed the tendency to form "a state within a state."

Akbar's liberalism provided some protection to the guru and his followers, but with the removal of imperial protection, a cycle of violence was unleashed against the Sikhs. The interference of the Mughal emperors Jahangir (1605–1627), Shah Jahan (1627–1658), and Aurangzeb (1658–1707) in the affairs of the Sikh Panth was an important feature of the seventeenth century. Jahangir put Guru Arjun to death for placing the saffron mark on the forehead of the rebel Prince Khusrau as a token of his blessings. State interference encouraged dissent within the Panth and accelerated disunity within it. In such a situation, the successors of Guru Arjun shifted their base to the east of the River Sutlej, and places beyond the land of the five rivers became associated with Sikhism, namely Patna in Bihar, Anandpur and Muktsar in Punjab, and Nanded in Maharashtra.

The sixth guru, Hargobind (1595–1644), was in open conflict with the Mughal administrators in the province of Lahore during the reign of Shah Jahan. The Mughal army attacked Amritsar, and Hargobind took refuge in Kartarpur. The guru's dependence on his *masands* had increased, and some of them started appointing their own deputies or agents for collecting offerings and initiating others into the Sikh faith. In the face of the Mughal onslaught, the Sikhs were forced to retreat to fastnesses in the hills of East Punjab, where they came in contact with the cult of the Mother Goddess, or Shakti worship. This cult involves the worship of power, and hence the rituals associated with it are more violent than the Bhakti rituals. This contact may have indirectly encouraged the Sikh use of violence in dealing with enemies and inspired the transition from a peaceful sect to an increasingly militant one. The Sikhs then looked upon themselves as the instrument of God, using physical force in favor of the good.

Birth of the Khalsa

Gobind Singh (1666–1708) became the tenth guru in 1675. He was determined to eliminate external influence on the Panth through the use of physical force. For this, he had to set the Panth in order and deal with the internecine quarrels plaguing the brotherhood. In 1699, at a large gathering at Anandpur, Gobind Singh inaugurated the Khalsa, the Order of the

Pure. Henceforth all Sikhs, that is, those initiated into Sikhism by the guru himself and not through the *masands*, were to be his Khalsa. This implied that dissidents were not to be considered true Sikhs. The direct link of the Khalsa with the guru was symbolized by a new baptismal ceremony introduced by Gobind Singh. After initiation, both men and women had to wear the emblems of the Khalsa, the five *k's*, namely, *kesha*, or uncut hair, denoting the way of nature; *kangha*, a comb tucked into the *kesha* to keep it tidy; *kara*, a steel bracelet worn on the right arm; *kaccha*, or short breeches; and *kirpin*, a sword symbolizing self-defense and the fight against injustice. Once initiated into the order, men were given the surname Singh (lion) and the women Kaur (princess). Their rebirth into the order represented the annihilation of family and caste lineage and the destruction of their confinement to hereditary occupations. The principles of unity and equality were therefore reintroduced into the Sikh Panth, and, with the birth of the Khalsa, the Sikhs were committed to resist oppression.

In the meantime, peasant dissatisfaction with the imperial rule increased, but in battles with the Mughals, the Sikhs were forced to retreat. Guru Gobind Singh wished to settle the issue with the Mughals but could not meet Emperor Aurangzeb, who died in 1707. Instead, he met the new emperor, Bahadur Shah (1643–1712), but there was no solution. Before his death in 1708, the tenth guru ended the line of personal gurus by passing the succession not to another person, but to the Adi Granth, the holy book of the Sikhs, which had been compiled by Guru Arjun and installed in the Harmandir, or Golden Temple, at Amritsar in 1604. Thus, leadership of the Panth came to be vested in the community. This was essential to forge the unity necessary to fight the Mughals.

The Sikh Empire

Resistance against the Mughals continued throughout the eighteenth century. Bahadur Shah successfully repressed the uprising led by Banda Bahadur (1670–1716), a follower of Guru Gobind Singh. But gradually the Mughal fortunes declined, and the later mughals faced a rapidly contracting empire. The struggle of the Sikhs against the Mughal government eventually became a people's war. Amritsar emerged as the rallying center of the Singhs (the title used by all male Sikhs, and a term interchangeable with "male Sikh"), and eventually they established their sway over Punjab. The doctrine of Guru Panth ("the guru's method" or "rule"), which provided the basis for concerted action, ensured the right of every Singh to fight, to conquer, and to rule and gave legitimacy to every

individual Sikh chief. In the eighteenth century, the region between the Jamuna and Indus Rivers came to be divided among a number of Sikh principalities that were continually involved in internecine wars.

In 1799, a process of unification was started by Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1780–1839), who occupied Lahore and established a Sikh empire extending over a large portion of the Punjab. The British, who had in the meantime established their direct or indirect political control over the greater part of the subcontinent, recognized him as the sole sovereign ruler of the Punjab by the Treaty of Amritsar in 1809.

British Annexation

Within ten years of Ranjit Singh's death, his empire was taken over by the British. Rival claimants to power approached the British for assistance, and taking advantage of the internal turmoil, the British involved themselves in the internal politics of the Sikh empire. After two Anglo-Sikh wars in 1845–1846 and 1848–1849, Punjab was annexed to the British empire. Although the army of the Khalsa was disbanded after 1849, it rendered loyal service to the British in the Indian Mutiny of 1857. After being reinstated, they attained an honored position in the Indian army and fought in nearly all the major wars of the British.

Colonial rule saw a renaissance among the Sikhs. Popularly known as the Singh Sabha movement, it was initiated by the Sikh elite and was characterized by a serious interest in Western education and science. Later, it was appropriated by radicals, who, perceiving a threat from Christian missionaries and the Arya Samaj (a Hindu reform movement started by Swami Dayanand Saraswati in Punjab in 1875), pressed for religious reform. A search for a Sikh identity distinct from the Hindus, particularly the Arya Samaj, began in earnest. The radical Sikh reformists were committed to maintaining a separate Sikh identity and to introducing and preserving distinct Sikh rituals and customs in the *gurdwaras* (Sikh temples). This was opposed by the conservative section of the Sikhs. Ultimately, in 1925, the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) was formed as managing committee of all Sikh *gurdwaras*. The SGPC opposed the partition of India in 1947, because agriculturally fertile land in West Punjab would become part of Pakistan. It sided with the Indian National Congress on this issue, but after the Congress capitulation on the partition plan, the radicals raised the cry for Khalistan, a separate homeland for the Sikhs. The transfer of power and partition of the country in 1947 resulted in large-scale migration of the Sikhs from the West to East Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and Delhi.

Post-Independence Developments

The government of independent India abolished the privileges previously extended by the British to religious minorities, including the Sikhs. Thus the proportion of Sikhs in the defense and civil services declined. The Sikh agricultural classes, who had been forced to abandon rich farmlands in Pakistan for smaller holdings in East Punjab, also nursed a sense of grievance. This gave rise to an agitation for a Punjabi-speaking province in India. The Indian government conceded, and the new state of Punjab was created in 1966 on the linguistic principle.

Increased wheat production during the 1970s brought unprecedented prosperity to Sikh farmers. This material improvement was accompanied by a growth in Sikh fundamentalism under the leadership of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwala (1947–1984). Tension between Hindus and Sikhs increased, as the predominant Sikh political party, the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD), demanded further economic and political advantages for the Sikhs. By the early 1980s, the SAD had become more militant, and the Indian government responded by arresting and imprisoning thousands of Sikhs. Armed groups under Bhindranwala's direction spread terror throughout Punjab. Finally, in 1984, when Bhindranwala and his followers entrenched themselves in the Golden Temple, the Indian army launched an attack (code-named Operation Bluestar), killing several hundred Sikhs, including Bhindranwala, and damaging the temple building. Sikh outrage at the attack on the Golden Temple was manifested through the assassination of the prime minister, Indira Gandhi (1917–1984), by her Sikh bodyguards. The new prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991), signed an accord with the Sikh leaders in 1985, hoping to restore peace in Punjab. However, militancy continued in the 1980s. Ultimately a compromise was achieved in 1996 between the Sikh leaders and the Indian government, and affairs in Punjab have remained largely peaceful since then.

Sanjukta Das Gupta

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SIKKIM (2001 est. pop. 540,000). Sikkim (in Tibetan, *Dejong*, the rice country) is a small state with a total area of 7,100 square kilometers in northeastern India, lying east of Nepal, south of the Tibetan border, immediately west of the state of Bhutan, and north of Bangladesh. Sikkim is located on the southern slopes of the Himalaya Range. On its western border lies Kanchenjunga (8,598 meters), the third-highest mountain in the world, which the Sikkimese regard as a deity; Mount Everest is also visible beyond Kanchenjunga. Several passes lead through the mountains from Sikkim into Tibet. The land rises from about 350 meters elevation in the south to 6,000 meters in the north. Sikkim has steep valleys separated by high ridges and open plateaus; about one-third of the country is forested.

The capital of Sikkim is Gangtok. The state is governed by a legislative assembly of thirty-two members. Most of the population is Nepalese (who are Hindu), with minorities of Lepcha (probably Sikkim's original inhabitants, whose religion is a combination of animism and Buddhism) and Bhutia (Buddhists who originally came from Tibet). English is the official language, but the languages of the various ethnic groups—Lepcha, Bhutia, Nepali, and Limbu—are also spoken. Crops cultivated include maize, rice, wheat, potatoes, cardamom, ginger, oranges, and tea. The country's exports are mainly fruits and small plastic, electrical, or leather goods. Some copper is produced.

The kingdom of Sikkim was established in the seventeenth century. Coming under British influence early in the nineteenth century, Sikkim became a British protectorate in 1886, but remained an independent territory ruled by its own *chogyal*, or hereditary ruler. Sikkim elected to join the Indian Union in 1952 and was created a state of India in 1975, at which time its hereditary monarchy came to an end. Palden Thondup Namgyal (1923–1982), the last *chogyal*, died

in New York. He is survived by his second wife, Hope Cooke, an American writer.

Paul Hockings

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SILK ROAD The ancient Silk Road began in the Chinese city of Changan (present-day Xi'an) and ran westward across deserts to oases and over mountain passes, through the great Central Asian trading cities of Samarqand and Bukhara in modern Uzbekistan and Merv (modern Mary) in Turkmenistan to Tyre on the Mediterranean Sea. Including all the twists and turns, it covered about 9,600 kilometers, or a quarter of the way around the globe. Scholars have considered the Silk Road one of the most significant links connecting various peoples and cultures. The term "Silk Road," which refers to the route along which silk traveled from China to the West, is modern and was coined as late as 1877 by the German geographer Ferdinand von Richtofen.

The earliest Chinese explorations of Central Asia began in the second century BCE, when a Chinese emperor sent an embassy northward to negotiate with hostile tribes on the border. The embassy was headed by Zhang Qian, who was promptly taken prisoner and who, after ten years' captivity, escaped and reported back to the emperor of the vast territories, high civilizations, and great wealth that lay beyond China.

Goods

When merchants began to travel, amber, furs, and honey came to China from northern Russia and the Baltic; pottery, coral and textiles, gold and silver, ivory, and precious stones came from Rome and elsewhere in the Mediterranean region, along with metalware from the foundries of Sidon and Tyre. In turn, China sent perfumes, silks, porcelain, tea, spices, mirrors, lacquerware, and via Samarqand the priceless gift of paper. From Central Asia came jade, cloth, and the horses of Fergana.

The Route

In reality there was no fixed road, but a series of tracks that ran through steppe and desert, branched, then converged on the many oases that offered sustenance to the traveler. The starting points in China



were the imperial capital cities of Luoyang and Changan (now Xi'an). From there the route turned northwest, splintering into three: *Bei lu*—the great North Road, leading across the Gobi Desert and passing through the oasis town of modern Turpan in western China, where Buddhist monks left their devotions in the form of painting and carvings on the walls of nearby caves; *Nan lu*—the South Road—passing through Hotan and Shache (Yarkant) in western China, skirting the dreaded Taklimakan Desert, whose name some translated as "You go in, you don't come out"; and a third road going due west, past the oasis town of Loulan. The three routes merged in western China at Kashgar, the last Chinese emporium between East and West. From here Chinese merchants set out on their journey to the lands of the barbarians across the Snowy Mountain, down the passes, to the fabled cities of Central Asia, to Persia (Iran), then to the cities of Antioch and Tyre on the Mediterranean coast, where their precious cargoes were shipped to Rome.

Regular caravans seldom traveled beyond the major trading centers, from which goods were transhipped by those coming from the other direction. Samarkand and Bukhara were the common endpoints for caravans arriving from Baghdad and Aleppo. Here they exchanged their cargoes with merchants from Kashgar and farther east. On the other hand, individual travelers—merchants and emissaries, pilgrims and missionaries—of necessity traversed the entire route.

The Silk Road cities supplied all the needs of travelers, commercial and otherwise: camels and provi-

sions, brokers to draw up contracts and guarantee delivery, banking houses to supply credit and bills of exchange, and markets to buy and sell things of every description. Even so, the journey was not easy. Travelers' accounts record the corpses of people and animals seen along the way. The ever-present danger of bandits was as great a threat as the menacing forces of nature. There are vivid descriptions of sandstorms, the desert's withering heat, and the freezing winds in the high mountain passes. Away from the oases, the need for water was always pressing.

The Rise and Fall of Empires

At the heart of the Silk Road, Central Asia linked the sedentary civilizations on its periphery—Rome, Persia, the Kushans of northern India, and China—and the fierce nomadic hordes of the steppes. From the time of Zhang Qian in the second century BCE, Chinese fortunes ebbed and flowed, checked at times by the Huns, whose dominions (in the fourth century CE) reached from Korea to the Ural Mountains, and by other nomads of the Altay Mountains and the Gobi Desert.

In the eighth century, just as the Chinese seemed about to conquer all of Central Asia, another power appeared on the scene: the Arabs, newly converted to Islam. Gradually the armies of Allah had been moving eastward, dispatching decadent rulers and spreading the word of the Prophet. The two worlds collided in Central Asia. In 751, the Arabs, along with their Turkish and Tibetan allies, defeated the Chinese at

the battle of Talas River, marking forever the limits of Chinese dominions.

In 1219, the Mongols burst out of northeastern Asia and came to rule an empire that stretched from Moscow to Beijing. Genghis Khan, a strong protector of trade and of the Silk Road between Europe and China, ensured that merchants could travel in security. Timur (Tamerlane), who presided over the last great Mongol empire, kept the route alive until the beginning of the fifteenth century.

The Demise of the Silk Road

As an increasing number of European merchants, missionaries, and adventurers traveled to the east, they returned with tales both factual and fabulous. Paradoxically, the stories of the East partly accounted for the demise of the Silk Road. Europeans who sought to gain access to the riches of the East and wanted to avoid the long and perilous land journey eventually found the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope and across the Indian Ocean. The importance of the Silk Road declined, and by the sixteenth century Central Asia began to fade from the horizon of history.

Significance of the Silk Road

Across the Silk Road East and West exchanged ideas and discoveries. The Zoroastrians of Persia may have bequeathed to the biblical religions their concept of the duality of good and evil. From the West came the early offshoots of Judaism and Christianity—the Manichaeans and Nestorians. From the east and south came Taoists and Confucians, Hindus and Buddhists, and from the north, the worldview of the shamans. And last, to overlay them all, came Islam. Today, in the ruins of long-vanished oasis settlements, Nestorian chapels stand side-by-side with Buddhist temples. Remains include wooden documents written in Kharosthi, an Indian alphabet dating back to the fifth century BCE and related to Aramaic, the language of Jesus. These artifacts are reminders that in the Silk Road oases merchants, missionaries, and other travelers exchanged their understandings of the world and shared reflections on the things beyond their understanding.

Steven Darian

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SIMLA (2002 est. pop. 145,000). Capital of Himachal Pradesh state in northern India since 1966, Simla (also known as Shimla) was the summer capital of the British government of India from 1865 to 1939. Simla is named after the Hindu goddess Shyamala, a manifestation of Kali. Situated on a ridge of the Himalayan foothills (altitude 7,200 feet), it was built by the British in 1819 on land they retained following the Gurkha War. Its cool climate and scenic setting soon made it a popular summer resort, and completion of the Kalka-Simla Railway in 1903 placed the town within a two-day ride from Delhi. Its population rose dramatically following Independence and its selection as state capital. In 1945 and 1946, Simla was the site of historic but futile efforts to resolve differences between what became India and Pakistan. It was the scene, as well, of the 1972 Simla Agreement between the two nations, which also failed to produce lasting peace.

C. Roger Davis

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SIN, JAIME (b. 1928), Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. Jaime Cardinal Sin is well known for his role in the ouster of president and dictator Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. When the minister of defense, Juan Ponce Enrile, and vice-chief of staff, Fidel Ramos (later president, 1992–1998), refused to support Marcos's attempt to manipulate the presidential election and staged a revolt, Cardinal Sin called on Filipinos throughout metropolitan Manila to support Enrile and Ramos. Thousands responded by swarming the two military camps along Epifanio de los Santos Boulevard (also known as EDSA) where Enrile and Ramos were holed up. Within days Marcos went into exile in Hawaii and Corazon Aquino was sworn in as president (1986–1992).

With the "EDSA Revolution," Sin emerged as a major moral force in Philippine politics. In 1997–1998, for example, he opposed constitutional amendments that would allow President Ramos a second term, and in 1999–2000 he supported the impeachment of President Joseph Estrada for taking millions in illegal gambling payoffs. An outspoken critic of graft and corruption in Philippine politics, Sin has worked to improve Philippine democracy and has repeatedly urged Filipinos to cast their vote based on the issues, not personalities.

Robert L. Youngblood

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SIND (2002 pop. 33 million). Sind (Sindh) is a province in southeastern Pakistan, extending over the lower Indus River valley, including the alluvial plain and river delta, between India and the Arabian Sea. Karachi is its capital and largest city. Sind is an arid region with some hilly and desert areas and depends largely on irrigation for agriculture. Its major crops are wheat, rice, millet, cotton, and sugarcane. Sheep, cattle, and poultry are raised, and fishing is important in the area along the Arabian Sea. The chief language is Sindhi, a member of the Indo-Aryan group related to Baluchi and Urdu. The province's land area is approximately 141,000 square kilometers.

Early History

Sind derives its name from the Indus River, which was traditionally called Sindhu. It was an early center of the Indus Valley civilization (c. 2500–1600 BCE); the ancient site of Mohenjo Daro is located in northwest Sind. The region was apparently settled by several waves of Indo-European-speaking peoples between 1500 and 1000 BCE (whether this settlement was peaceful is a matter of dispute among scholars). The Persians conquered Sind in the late sixth century BCE, and Alexander of Macedon invaded it in 325 BCE. Following the dissolution of Macedonian hegemony, Sind was fought over by numerous empires, including the Mauryan empire (c. 324—c. 200 BCE) of central India, the Greco-Bactrian kingdom, the Iranic Sakae and Kushans, and the Epethalites or White Huns. By the late 600s CE, Sind was composed of numerous states owing varying degrees of fealty to Sasanid (224/228–651) Persia. The majority of the inhabitants were Buddhist or Hindu.

Muslim Conquest and Rule

The Arab general Muhammad al-Thakafi invaded Sind in 711, and within three years Arab forces controlled the entire lower Indus. Sind was ruled by governors nominally loyal to the caliphs until the eleventh century, when it was partitioned between the Ghaznavids (977–1187) of Afghanistan in the north and a Rajput dynasty, the Sumeras, in the south. In the 1200s, all of Sind fell under the sway of the Ghurid



THATTA—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Thatta, designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1981, was the capital of the Sind before it was conquered by Mughal emperors and ruled from Delhi. The city and its mausoleums are a vivid reminder of the Sind civilization.

sultanate. It soon passed under the control of various local dynasties, and though the Mughals (1526–1857) briefly incorporated it into their empire in 1591, Sind remained largely independent. By the late eighteenth century, a Baluchi dynasty had established an emirate over all of Sind.

British Rule

The last emir of Sind was defeated by the British under Sir Charles Napier (1782–1853) in 1843. Under the British, Sind became part of the Bombay presidency. The area was relatively passive during the major Indian revolts against British rule, and it was made an autonomous province in 1937. When Pakistan became independent in 1947, Karachi became the national capital. Tens of thousands of Muslims displaced by the 1947 partition were resettled in Sind.

Current Issues

Ethnic violence broke out in the 1990s between Sindhi speakers and Urdu-speaking Mohajirs demanding a separate province, killing thousands. As a result, in 1998 the provincial governor was dismissed and federal rule imposed. Karachi is also a hotbed of Islamist activity and support for the al-Qaeda terrorist network is strong.

Brian M. Gottesman

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SINDHI Sindhi is the name of the community that occupies Sind (or Sindh) in Pakistan with an estimated population of 20 million people. Sind is located in the southern part of Pakistan. It shares a border with India on the east, while the province of Baluchistan is to its west and north and the Punjab is to the northeast. There are three particular geographic parts to Sind:

mountains, desert, and river. Most of the cities are situated along the Indus River. The word "Sindhi" as well as "Sind" come from another word "Sindhu," which is the old name of the Indus. The Sindhis speak a language named after themselves: Sindhi. The language is Indo-Aryan, but has elements of Persian and Arabic. Several dialects exist: Vicholi, Siraiki, Thareli, and Lari.

Most Sindhis are Muslims who belong to the Sunni sect. Their religious rituals follow those set out by the Qur'an. However, the Sindhis diverge from orthodox Islam by worshiping Muslim saints, a trait that probably developed due to the influence of Hinduism in Sindhi history. One particularly revered saint is Lal Shab haz Qalander, who was a Sufi mystic in the thirteenth century. The anniversary of his death is a major holiday that is celebrated with a festival featuring singers, musicians, and dancers.

The Sindhis have a strong cultural heritage, with a folk literature and poetry that dates back to the fourteenth century if not earlier. One famous Sindhi poet is Shah Abdul Latik, whose best-known work is *Shah Jo Risalo*, widely recited throughout the area. There are several historical sites, including Mohenjo Daro, Amri, and Kot Diji, that show the cultural legacy left by the culturally advanced Harappan civilization that flourished in Punjab and Sind in the third millennium BCE. Although there are those who do not believe there is much connection between the Harappan culture and today's Sind culture, others have shown that certain items, such as a bullock cart or a musical instrument, have not changed significantly since the days of the Harappans.

Today, agriculture is the main source of income for the Sindhis. They grow wheat, millet, maize, rice, cotton, and oilseeds. They also grow bananas, mangoes, and dates. Because there is little rain in this area, the Sindhis rely heavily on irrigation for their water. The main source of water is the Indus River, which has three irrigation dams on it. Other economic activities include herding camels, goats, and sheep in the areas away from the Indus River, and fishing catfish, shad, pomfret, and shrimp in the Indus River and on the coast of the Arabian Sea.

Industrial activity takes place mostly in Karachi. Karachi is the provincial capital of Sind and also the largest city in Pakistan. It has a population of more than 9 million people. Because Karachi is the commercial and industrial center of Pakistan, it lends considerable status to Sind. Karachi has industrial plants that manufacture cotton, sugar, cement, steel, and cars. Unfortunately, Karachi has seen the development of

squatter populations as people migrate from the rural areas, drawn by the lure of the city and the promise of the riches they believe it contains. This migration reduces the agricultural labor force, which has an adverse effect on the economy. The Sindhis suffer from the standard ills of an agricultural society within the developing countries: a low standard of living, overpopulation, and lack of education.

In addition to the economic problems the Sindhis face, they have to deal with ethnic and political concerns within Pakistan. The Sindhis perceive the Punjabis' power as threatening to their identity. Therefore, they have resisted efforts to supplant the Sindhi language with Urdu in schools. This ethnic divisiveness between Sindhis and the Urdu-speaking *mubajirs* (Muslims who fled their homeland in India and settled in the Sind following the partition of the subcontinent upon independence from Great Britain) has resulted in several violent clashes.

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SINDHIA FAMILY The Sindhia family, a prominent lineage of rulers in western India in the eighteenth century, played an important role in the ultimate transference of power to the British in much of the area that was to become the Bombay Presidency in the following century.

The founder of the dynasty, Nemaji Sindhia, invaded Malwa in central India in 1704. Ranoji Sindhia was an ordinary Maratha (inhabitant of south central India) warrior who served the *pesbwa* (the prime minister of the Maratha) so well that he was endowed with a part of Malwa as its chieftain (1726–1745); he made Gwalior, his birthplace, into his headquarters.

An illegitimate son, Mahadaji Sindhia, succeeded Ranoji Sindhia after his death. Though wounded at the third battle of Panipat (1761), where other Sindhias died, he became the leader among the Maratha chiefs. His power and influence continued to grow, until in 1771 he reestablished the emperor Shah Alam II on the shaky Mughul throne and became his protector. He then mediated between the British and the Marathas to bring the First Anglo-Maratha War (1775–1782) to an end. With the help of some European officers, he remodeled the army to create a powerful force equipped

with artillery. After defeating several Indian princes' armies (1790–1792), he gained the title of vice-regent of the empire. He died in 1794 after a short illness.

He was immediately succeeded by his grand-nephew, Daulat Rao Sindhia (1779–1827), who intrigued against the Maratha *peshwa*, Baji Rao II (d. 1852), at his court in Poona (Pune) in western India. Daulat Rao and Baji Rao II fought against Jaswant Rao Holkar, who rose in rebellion, in the battle of Poona (1802), but their forces were beaten. The *peshwa* then fled to Bassein on the west coast of India and concluded a treaty with the British, which was deeply resented by the Marathas and led to the Second Anglo-Maratha War (1803–1805). In this, Daulat Rao found himself pitted against Arthur Wellesley (later the Duke of Wellington; 1769–1852), who defeated him. Despite his involvement in the Third Anglo-Maratha War (1817–1819), Daulat Rao remained in control of his power base at Gwalior, though he was required to cede much of his territory.

Paul Hockings

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SINGAPORE—PROFILE (2001 est. pop. 4.3 million). The republic of Singapore, at the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula, is strategically located at the convergence of the world's major sea-lanes. The Chinese-dominated multiethnic country is politically stable and is a world-class business center, but it still faces the task of allaying minority groups and coping with recurring economic crises.

Geography

Dominating the Straits of Malacca, the republic of Singapore consists of the island of Singapore and sixty adjacent islets, altogether having an area of about 648 square kilometers. The country lies between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, with the Singapore Strait separating it from Indonesia to the south and the Johore Strait separating it from Malaysia to the north. The terrain is mostly lowland; the highest point of elevation is 177 meters at Bukit Timah. Keppel Harbor is the port, and Singapore City the capital and chief port. Singapore has a tropical climate with a humidity of 80 percent and average temperatures of 26°C, with rainfall throughout the year. Because most of Singapore island is urbanized, there is no difference between the

countryside and Singapore City. Except for some secondary rainforest and mangrove swamp, the island has little vegetation. Current environmental problems are caused by industrial pollution, forest fires in Indonesia, a scarcity of freshwater, and limited land resources.

People

Singapore, with about 5,855 people per square kilometer, is one of the most densely populated countries in the world. The Chinese constitute the largest ethnic group, with about 77 percent of the population; Malays represent around 14 percent, Indians 8 percent, and others 1 percent. The largest age group is that of people fifteen to sixty-four, who are 71 percent of the population, with those below fifteen years making up 22 percent. The population growth rate is around 3.5 percent according to 2001 estimates.

Free-trade opportunities meant an influx of immigrants into Singapore, and by the beginning of the twentieth century, Singapore had become a cosmopolitan country with Chinese, Peninsular Malays, Sumatrans, Javanese, Bugis, Boyanese, South Asians, Arabs, Jews, Eurasians, and Europeans. Transport and communication rapidly developed to cope with the increasing number of commercial enterprises. The well-organized Chinese immigration from the mid-nineteenth century resulted in this group's dominance in commercial life. The Malays and Indonesians from neighboring islands





SINGAPORE

Country name: Republic of Singapore
Area: 647.5 sq km
Population: 4,300,419 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 3.5% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 12.8 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 4.24 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: 26.45 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio: 0.96 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 3.62 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population: 80.17 years, male: 77.22 years, female: 83.35 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Buddhist (Chinese), Muslim (Malays), Christian, Hindu
Major languages: Mandarin Chinese (official), Malay (official and national), Tamil (official), English (official)
Literacy—total population: 93.5%, male: 97%, female: 89.8% (1999)
Government type: parliamentary republic
Capital: Singapore
Administrative divisions: none
Independence: 9 August 1965 (from Malaysia)
National holiday: Independence Day, 9 August (1965)
Suffrage: 21 years of age; universal and compulsory
GDP—real growth rate: 10.1% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita: (purchasing power parity): \$26,500 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: not applicable
Exports: \$137 billion (f.o.b., 2000)
Imports: \$127 billion (f.o.b., 2000)
Currency: Singapore dollar (SGD)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Book Factbook* 2001.
 Retrieved 5 March 2002, from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

were early immigrants who engaged in agriculture. South Indians constitute about 80 percent of the South Asian people in Singapore; others include descendants of the indentured laborers that the British brought from South Asia. Many European professionals, including the British, have also become citizens of Singapore, but the Portuguese form the bulk of Eurasians. Arabs, who came as traders, settled after marrying Malays. The arrival of foreign workers, professionals, and students in large numbers has resulted in an increasing growth rate for foreigners compared with citizens of Singapore.

Singapore's standard of living is the second highest in Asia after Japan; the per capita gross national product (GNP) is \$26,500. With a developed free-market economy, a favorable business environment, and the fifth-highest per capita gross domestic product (GDP)

in the world, Singapore is economically stable in spite of the recurring global crises.

The country does not depend on agriculture and raw material production. Manufacturing accounts for 24 percent of real GDP. The workforce is employed mainly in financial-related services (38 percent), manufacturing (22 percent), commerce (21 percent), and construction (7 percent). In 1960 a slum-clearance program was instituted, and 86 percent of the population live in public apartments constructed by the Housing and Development Board. Living conditions are good, with a life expectancy of 77.2 years for males and 83.4 for females, an infant mortality rate of 3.6 per 1,000, and 13 doctors per 10,000 people. The crime rate is low, with 1,005 cases per 100,000 population. Family planning and a strict immigration policy are intended



Downtown Singapore as seen from Mount Faber in February 1996. (KEVIN R. MORRIS/CORBIS)

to reduce population growth. The Central Provident Fund, to which both employers and employees contribute, is the country's central welfare institution. Singapore also has one of the world's highest literacy rates (93.5 percent) and has four official languages: Mandarin Chinese, Malay (national), Tamil, and English.

Society and Culture

The pluralistic society of Singapore reflects a multifaceted culture, a meeting ground for diverse cultural influences, with both traditional and contemporary aspects. The government has emphasized the unique identity of being a Singaporean with Asian values and Asian heritage. Although the core national value system is Confucian, there are many other traditions. The major religions of the nation are Buddhism (54 percent), Islam (15 percent), Christianity (13 percent), and Hinduism (about 3 percent). The Chinese are predominantly Buddhists, generally Mahayana, and Taoists, who follow the teachings of Confucius and Lao Zi and practice ancestor worship. Some Chinese temples, such as Thian Hock Keng, Siong Lim, and Hong San See, are national monuments. The Malays are generally Muslims, and there is a sizable proportion of South Asian Muslims. The supreme Islamic religious body among Singapore's Muslims is the *Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura* (Islamic Religious Council of Singapore). Sri Mariamman Temple and Sri Srinivasa Perumal Temple, built in South Indian style, are famous Hindu monuments of Singapore. There are

thirty Catholic churches and seven Gurdwaras (Sikh temples) in Singapore. All the major festivals of all these religions are celebrated throughout the year. A national holiday is Independence Day, 9 August.

Chinese opera, Chinese dance, and Malay and Indian dances are popular. The Singapore Lyric Theater presents popular music shows and operas. The Singapore Dance Theater, a professional ballet company, is noted for dance forms that fuse Eastern and Western styles. The Singapore Symphony Orchestra highlights European classical composers. The Singapore theater has been experimenting with new trends since 1988 and has produced plays of artistic excellence. The Chinese Theater Circle, Theater works, Teater Kami, and Agni Koothu are some of the major theater groups.

With features such as a disciplined workforce, high productivity, modern amenities, and strong foreign investment, Singapore's future looks bright. However, there are some discordant notes. The government's emphasis on the unique Singaporean identity and Confucian values creates suspicion and mistrust among non-Chinese groups. In addition to emphasizing the Chinese identity of Singapore, the government is bent on cementing its power through rigid control of society. As the nation moves toward a first-world economy, some experts on Singapore think that the emphasis instead should be on human development and political liberalization.

Patit Paban Misbra

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SINGAPORE—ECONOMIC SYSTEM As one of the Asian "tigers" (along with Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Korea), the resourceful but resourceless island city-state of Singapore, one of the most densely populated countries in the world, has achieved rapid economic development. Since its independence from Malaysia in 1965, it has roughly doubled its gross domestic product (GDP) every twelve years.

Singapore has succeeded in turning itself from a slum-ridden former British colony and commercial trading port centered on the Singapore River into a modern industrialized economy, producing and exporting electronic goods, chemicals, and business and financial services. It boasts the best airport in the world, the busiest seaport in terms of shipping tonnage, and a foreign exchange market with a daily turnover exceeded only by London, New York, and Tokyo.

The republic also has one of the highest standards of living in the world, according to international development agencies such as the World Bank (2001), measured in terms of access to good-quality housing and education and life expectancy at birth (seventy-five years for men and seventy-nine for women). Poverty has been virtually eliminated, the distribution of income is comparable to countries such as the United Kingdom and Australia, and Singapore probably has the world's highest proportion of shareholders.

Characteristics of the Economy

A dearth of natural resources and absence of an agricultural sector has meant that economic activity in Singapore is split into manufacturing (two-thirds) and services (one-third) and that the country is extremely reliant on international trade, with the value of exports and imports taken together accounting for more than twice its GDP. Almost all food and natural resources, including about half its water needs, are imported from abroad, and much of the value of its manufactured exports comes from processing imported components.

Foreigners also play a crucial role in the Singapore economy, both indirectly as a source of investment funds (particularly from the United States and Japan), and directly through production by multinational companies located in the republic. In 1999 about 14 percent of

those residing in the country were non-Singaporean, with foreign workers being employed in occupations as diverse as stockbrokers, construction workers, and domestic maids. This has prompted the government to take the unusual step of publishing a measure of "indigenous" national income, which excludes the contribution of foreign workers or foreign-owned firms located in Singapore. Singapore's national income is about one-third smaller when this measure is used.

These characteristics make it difficult to compare Singapore with other economies. Indeed, in many ways, a better comparison might be with other cities, such as New York, Tokyo, or Shanghai. There even are thousands of daily commuters from beyond the city's borders, from neighboring Malaysia and Indonesia, just as in any large city. This partly explains why the Singapore authorities have, so far, resisted attempts by international organizations to reclassify Singapore as a fully developed country, while other countries at a similar stage of development, such as South Korea, have recently been "graduated."

Economic Policy

Economic policy in Singapore has focused primarily on mobilizing the nation's high levels of saving and investment, promoting manufactured exports, and developing Singapore as an international financial center. The resources of the Central Provident Fund, a compulsory retirement fund to which both employees and employers contribute, are used to build an efficient infrastructure, including roads and ready-made industrial estates, to build an education and housing system, and to establish a climate of good labor relations that is attractive to foreigners. Multinational corporations, in particular, are welcomed with open arms and given tax and other incentives to locate in the republic.

The Singapore economy has largely operated in a competitive global environment, with low levels of protection against foreign competition, although import taxes are high on foreign cars, alcohol, and tobacco. However, at the same time, economic policy has been subject to strong guidance from the public sector through planning agencies such as the Economic Development Board. The National Wages Council sets guidelines on pay increases. Government-linked companies, such as the Development Bank of Singapore and Singapore Airlines (the national airline), and statutory boards, including the Public Utilities Board and Port of Singapore Authority, also account for a significant proportion of output.

Budgetary policy has been characterized by prudence, and the country has enjoyed a long history of



FIVE LARGEST COMPANIES IN SINGAPORE

According to *Asia Week* the five largest companies in Singapore are as follows:

Company	Sector	Sales (\$ in millions)	Rank in Asia
Caltex Trading	Oil Trading	27,703.5	32
Shell Eastern Trading	Oil Distributing	18,124.0	57
Felxtronics	Electronics	12,109.7	105
SK Energy Asia	Oil Trading	7,989.0	170
Hewlett-Packard	Computers	7,893.9	172

Source: "The Asia Week 1000." (2001) *Asia Week* (9 November): 115.

government budget surpluses. Those surpluses, together with a conservative monetary policy, kept the rate of consumer price inflation and unemployment during the last decades of the twentieth century low by international standards. The national currency, the Singapore dollar, has tended to increase in value over time against most foreign currencies. The balance of payments, a measure of Singapore's trading account with the rest of the world, has consistently been in overall surplus, resulting in a steady accumulation of national wealth in the form of foreign exchange reserves. Singapore has the highest per capita reserves in the world.

Challenges

A lack of indigenous resources, combined with dependence on foreigners, particularly in the manufacturing sector, has led to fears in Singapore that there might be a loss of markets in traditional manufactured goods to emerging Asian competitors, especially China. There have also been fears that foreign multinationals may choose to relocate their operations away from Singapore in countries with lower production costs.

Current policy initiatives are thus aimed at increasing the quality of the manufactured goods produced and at encouraging development in such fields as integrated circuits for computers and other electronic devices, biotechnology (including genetic engineering), and pharmaceuticals. To achieve this, educational facilities at the tertiary level are being upgraded and foreign talent is being actively recruited.

Singapore is also seeking to diversify the destination of exports away from regional markets in East and

Southeast Asia and toward new markets in Europe and Latin America. It also hopes to entice tourists to stay more than the typical two to three days in transit, and to encourage homegrown companies to venture abroad to produce and sell their products. It is hoped that the flow of profits earned by such companies will in time provide an additional source of income, a "second wing" for the Singapore economy, to balance the outflow of profits from foreign companies and the current overreliance on the income earned by government agencies investing abroad.

Another key challenge is to establish Singapore as a premier international financial center with a wider range of activities than at present, including the management of a full range of financial assets such as shares, bonds, and unit trusts. To achieve this, local financial institutions, such as the banks, are being encouraged to compete more with foreign banks in the Singapore market. In addition, some government-linked companies, such as Singapore Telecom, have been privatized, and emphasis is shifting from reliance on government initiatives toward more private-sector innovation and self-regulation in the financial sector.

The government's vision is to transform Singapore into a global hub or "intelligent island," offering a base for company headquarters, conferencing, and exhibitions. To this end, it is busy constructing a multimedia Internet computing infrastructure to which all residents, educational institutions, and companies will eventually be wired. Already in widespread use are electronic payments at the point of sale, automatic teller machines at which you not only can withdraw money but also can buy shares and pay police fines,

and stored-value cards for use on public transport. Singapore has even had a Miss Internet competition, in which the contestants are judged on intellectual as well as physical qualities.

Peter Wilson

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SINGAPORE—EDUCATION SYSTEM

Singapore's strong education system, especially its vocational and tertiary education, contributed to the country's so-called economic miracle—its rapid economic growth from the 1970s through the 1990s. The British had established a modern education system in Singapore during the colonial era, and Singapore's strong government developed it further between the 1970s and 1990s.

During the colonial era, the British established a comprehensive primary and secondary education system in Singapore, focusing on preparing a workforce for service in colonial administration and commerce. The education was conducted in four major languages—English, Chinese, Malay, and Tamil. After gaining independence in 1965, the government of Singapore emphasized the development of bilingual education, encouraging education in English and in one of the local languages. By 1968, all primary school-age Singaporean children were enrolled in public or private schools, and the literacy rate rose rapidly. By the late 1990s, the adult literacy rate reached 89.1 percent: 95 percent among males and 83 percent among females.

The Ministry of Education of Singapore is responsible for the registration of all schools in the country and for establishing national standards. According to official statistics, the government spends around 3 percent of the gross domestic product on education.

Presently, children begin a three-year preschool education program at the age of three. Kindergartens in Singapore are usually run by the private sector, communities, or religious bodies, but they must register with the Ministry of Education. At the age of six, children begin a four-year foundation program with a common government-approved curriculum, which includes English, their mother tongue, mathematics, and other subjects. At the age of ten, children enroll in a two-year orientation-education program, which includes English, their mother tongue, mathematics, science, and other subjects. On completion of the orientation program, pupils must sit for the Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE).

At the age of twelve, children enter four- or five-year secondary-education programs. On completion of secondary school, pupils sit for an exam for a Singapore-Cambridge General Certificate of Education (GCE). There are several compulsory subjects, including English, their mother tongue, mathematics, humanities, history, and geography.

According to official figures, in 2000 there were 197 primary schools with 12,287 teachers providing education for 306,000 pupils, and 159 secondary schools with 9,462 teachers providing education for approximately 176,100 students. The official statistics show that Singapore achieved nearly 95 percent enrolment of relevant age-group children at primary schools.

After completing secondary school, students may join a two-year pre-university program at a junior college or a three-year pre-university program at a centralized institute. After completing this program, students must sit for the Singapore-Cambridge General Certificate of Education "Advanced" (GCE "A") Level Examinations. Most education programs at the tertiary level are conducted in English, but some are in Chinese. Students may choose to study in Singapore, but a considerable number choose to study overseas, especially in Australia, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan.

After receiving a bachelor's degree, students may continue their education at a postgraduate level. A master's degree takes between two and four years of study. Upon completion of a master's degree, students may enter a three- or four-year doctorate program.

Official figures for 2000 listed fifteen junior colleges with 1,781 teachers providing education for 23,900 pupils, and seven higher-education institutions attended by approximately 84,000 students. Traditionally, the prestige of tertiary education is high, and competition among students is keen.

Rafis Abazov

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SINGAPORE—HISTORY Singapore, a group of islands, is situated at the tip of the Malay Peninsula at the mouth of the Strait of Malacca and separated from the peninsula by the narrow Strait of Johore. Singapore is a tiny but politically stable and economically prosperous city-state. It is a key member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well as the Asia Pacific Economic Council (APEC). Singapore's position on the sea route between India and China makes it strategically important. Robust annual economic growth of about 9 percent during the last three decades made Singapore a model for other nations. However, one-party rule, draconian laws, and alleged human rights violations mar this positive picture. Nevertheless, Singapore remains an Asian miracle thanks largely to the efforts of its first prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew (b. 1923, served 1959–1990).

Ancient History

Local legend and foreign travel accounts provide only a murky picture of Singapore's ancient history. Third-century Chinese accounts mention an island at the end of the Malay Peninsula. There is evidence of Tamil (South Indian) and Persian trading with the island since the fifth century. Some sources suggest that Italian traveler Marco Polo visited Singapore. However, although he did visit nearby Sumatra, there is no evidence that he visited Singapore. A fourteenth-century Chinese traveler recorded that piracy was the main business on Singapore's islands.

Singapore once was an outpost of the Sumatran empire of Srivijaya (flourished seventh through thirteenth centuries), which was situated on the southern coast of Sumatra along the Palembang River. At its height, Srivijaya extended its control as far as Kedah and beyond in northern Malay Peninsula. Srivijaya controlled both the Malacca and Sunda Straits. The Chola rulers of southern India, who contested Srivijaya con-

trol of the straits, proved to be a serious challenge, especially during the eleventh century. Although a Chola invasion seriously damaged the Srivijayan empire, it continued until the end of the thirteenth century.

Meanwhile, elsewhere in Southeast Asia, Chinese intervention in the civil war in Java between 1292 and 1293 enabled Prince Vijaya, the legitimate heir to Senghasari Java, to become ruler of Java in 1293 and establish a new capital at Majapahit in eastern Java; his reign marked the start of the Majapahit empire. In 1360, when Tribhuvana became queen, she appointed Gajah Mada as her chief minister. He was the real ruler of the empire from 1330 to 1364. During his rule, Majapahit controlled Bali, Macassar, Singapore (called in Javanese accounts Temasek or Tumaskik), Sumatra, and western Java. The exact nature of this control is not known. Perhaps it was limited to extracting tribute from those territories. Soon after Gajah Mada's death in 1364, Singapore fell into the hands of the Siamese kingdom of Ayutthaya. The Siamese and the Majapahits continued to vie for control of Singapore during the fourteenth century. Paramesawar, a rebel exile from Majapahit, sought asylum in Singapore, and in about 1390 he established his throne there. Eventually, the Siamese ousted him, but he went on to establish himself at Melaka, where he later embraced Islam, became Iskandar Shah, and established the Melaka sultanate, which would last for several centuries.

Portuguese capture of Melaka in 1511 drove many well-to-do people to migrate to Singapore. The sultan of Melaka set up his headquarters at Bintan Island in the Riau Archipelago of the Singapore Channel. In 1526, he lost Bintan and moved to Johor. During the seventeenth century, with the expulsion of the Portuguese from Melaka, Singapore fell into Dutch hands. Singapore, however, was not highly sought after by the Europeans for a while, and the local chieftains ruled the islands.

The British Period

The modern history of Singapore began in the nineteenth century with the arrival of the British, especially the British governor of Java, Thomas Stamford Raffles (1781–1826). During the Napoleonic wars in Europe, France occupied Holland, and the Dutch colonies in Southeast Asia fell into British hands. After Napoleon's defeat, when Java returned to Dutch hands, Raffles was transferred to Bengkulu, a pepper port of Sumatra. In 1818, Melaka was also returned to the Dutch. Dutch control of the Riau Archipelago near Singapore was nominal. Because Melaka lay in ruins and was no longer usable, Raffles had to look elsewhere for a center of trade. He decided on Singapore,



KEY EVENTS IN SINGAPORE'S HISTORY

- 5th century CE** Persians and Indians are trading with people on Singapore.
- 7th–13th centuries** Singapore is an outpost of the Srivijaya empire.
- 14th century** Singapore is ruled by Java and Siam.
- 1823** Singapore comes under British control.
- 1832** Singapore becomes the headquarters of the British Straits Settlements.
- 1867–1946** The Straits Settlements are a British Crown Colony.
- 1869** The opening of the Suez Canal in Egypt increases Singapore's importance as a trading center.
- 1946** Singapore becomes a separate crown colony.
- 1942–1946** Singapore is controlled by Japan.
- 1946** The British regain control of Singapore.
- 1959** Singapore is granted internal self-government.
- 1963** British rule ends and Singapore joins the Malaysian Federation.
- 1965** Singapore becomes an independent nation.
- 1971** The last of the British troops leave.
- 1997** Hong Kong reverts to Chinese control, increasing the importance of Singapore as an industrial and commercial center.

but it was by now controlled by the sultan of Riau-Johor, who was friendly with the Dutch. Raffles engineered the removal of the sultan and received facilities at Singapore from the sultan's replacement. The British authorities, although reluctant to approve Raffle's scheme, finally acquiesced. Soon after, Singapore became a successful center of trade.

In 1823, Raffles renewed the lease agreement on Singapore for a lump sum of \$60,000 and additional monthly payments of \$2,000 in rents. In 1824, England reached an agreement with the Dutch by which the latter agreed to exchange Bengkulu for Melaka and to relinquish all claims to Singapore and Malaya. In return, England agreed not to seek territories in Sumatra and nearby islands. The Dutch were allowed to keep the Riau Archipelago, and the British took control of Johor. Two years later, the British Parliament united Penang, Singapore, and Melaka into a single residency: the Straits Settlements. Later the Straits Settlements were placed under control of the British East India Company headquartered in Bengal, India.

In 1832, Singapore became the headquarters of the Straits Settlements. After the failed Indian revolt of 1857, known as the Sepoy, or Indian, Mutiny, the British government assumed direct control of India from the British East India Company. As a result, Indian control over the Straits Settlements ceased, but the area remained a responsibility of the British sec-

retary of state for India. In 1867 the Straits Settlements became a crown colony and it retained that status until 1946. In that year the Straits Settlements were dissolved, and Singapore was separated from Penang and Melaka. Thereafter, Singapore became a separate crown colony.

After its acquisition by the British, Singapore steadily grew in importance as the volume of trade there multiplied. The opening up of Hong Kong in 1842 did not diminish the importance of Singapore, because all goods going to China had to go through Singapore. The commissioning of the Suez Canal in 1869 greatly facilitated the transit trade through Singapore. During the twentieth century, Singapore grew in importance as the world demand for rubber and tin continually increased.

World War II and Its Aftermath

Nevertheless, the British hold on Singapore was not firm enough to keep it from falling into Japanese hands during World War II. In February 1942, Japan overran Singapore, and it remained under Japan's control until the end of the war. Japanese occupiers dealt harshly with the Singaporeans, especially those of Chinese descent. In 1946, at the end of the war, the British returned to Singapore. By 1957, Malaysia had become independent. In 1959, Singapore was given internal self-government. In the elections held that year, an

Oxford-trained lawyer, Lee Kuan Yew, became prime minister. When Singapore became free of British control in 1963, it joined the Malaysian Federation. Strong anti-Chinese sentiment, among other factors, forced Singapore (whose population is more than 75 percent Chinese) to leave the federation in 1965 and become a republic.

By 1971, the last of the British troops were gone, and Lee continued as prime minister. Under his stewardship, the nation became one of the most prosperous nations in Southeast Asia. Singapore developed close ties with Japan and the West rather than with China, despite the fact that an overwhelming majority of Singaporeans are of Chinese descent. With more than 3 million people, Singapore has a per-capita gross domestic product well above that of some Western European nations. The outlook for continued economic growth is bright. There is, however, a need for more individual freedom.

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SINGAPORE—POLITICAL SYSTEM The political system of Singapore has given it the reputation of a strong state or an authoritarian and administrative state. Certainly it has been a state with one dominant political party since its independence from British colonial rule in 1959. The birth of the political system in the city-state, which had been a colonial port, involved intense struggle during the establishment of political institutions such as the legislature, civil service, and judiciary, as well as the rules and procedures of political behavior.

Singapore's political system is the product of distinct phases of development by the People's Action Party (PAP), which has been the ruling party since 1965 and has dominated politics in Singapore since the 1960s. The initial phase of the country's political system occurred in the period before Singapore's union with Malaysia in 1963 and its subsequent break-away in 1965. After Singapore had gained autonomous rule from the British colonial government in 1959, the

political institutionalization was fairly basic, with the conventional colonial legislature, civil service, judiciary, and police force.

The People's Action Party

The People's Action Party had its origins in the struggle for independence, when it aimed to mobilize the people against British colonial rule. Formed in 1954, the PAP was an alliance between Fabian socialism and Communism. This combination of ideologies was to have a profound effect on the political conditions that Singapore faced at the time. The PAP also emphasized a multiracial, multilingual, and multicultural strategy for its proposed integration of Singapore's society. Such a political strategy for making a pluralistic society has been described as PAP's "accommodationist political credo of the day, which was one held by all serious political groups of that time" (Chan 1989: 72). This credo was essential for any political party in multiethnic Singapore, with its population mix of Chinese, Malay, and Indian as well as several other groups, including Eurasians and Arabs. Hence, the strategies that allowed the PAP's rise to dominance provided the directions and the policies that have shaped the political system in the nation. In brief, the struggle through which the PAP has come is the process that has structured Singapore's political system.

PAP's 1959 political platform promised its supporters jobs as well as basic urban amenities for the welfare of workers, mass education, emancipation for women, housing for poor people, and a good public-health system. The party's success in delivering these goods and services from the beginning of its tenure in office gave it increasing popular support and subsequently entrenchment in political power for the last four decades or so. PAP's label as a socialist party has been due to its large national programs in housing, transport, education, and health care. Such socialist moorings aside, the PAP government has consistently courted multinational corporations and foreign direct investment and has striven to integrate Singapore's economy ever more closely with that of world markets.

The PAP party stalwarts claim to have learned the skills of political action, party organization, control, and mobilization of society from the Communists who were in the party before the Communists broke away from the democratic socialists in the PAP in 1961. The Communists had been more successful in penetrating and mobilizing student societies, trade unions, farmers' associations, women's associations, and the like.

Prior to the split of the Communists from the PAP's moderate leadership, the latter faced the challenge of

a takeover of the party by the Communists, who managed to get moderate party leadership voted out of the PAP's Central Executive Committee, the governing body of the party responsible for major policy making. The day was saved for the moderate party leadership only because the government intervened with police action against subversive action by some of the Communist leaders. This allowed Lee Kuan Yew, leader of the PAP, and other moderates in the party to restructure the membership and party-election system. Since then, only full cadres in the party have been allowed to participate in elections for members of the Central Executive Committee, with the appointment to full cadreship status being determined by a board of selection over which the moderate sector has control. Such restructuring has not gone without challenge—in the late 1950s, members such as the PAP mayor challenged the leadership on the issue of intraparty democracy as well as over the rightist drift of the party's leadership. These members were expelled, and in 1961, there was a historic split when thirteen PAP assemblymen and their supporters left the party to form the Barisan Sosialis, one of several opposition parties registered in Singapore.

The formation of the Barisan Sosialis Party is believed to have removed the mass base of the PAP. Within the PAP, intraparty dissent has been discouraged since then and the formation of factions within the party deemed unacceptable. The presence of a socialist opposition party has also kept the PAP on course in its socialist programs, which combine pragmatism with the overt aims of serving national interest and legitimizing the party's grip on political power.

The Shaping of the Political System, 1959–1965

When the PAP government came into power in 1959, its leaders embarked on the tasks of nation building and managing the democratic mass politics that had begun in the 1950s with the goal of establishing a constitutional government. To make good on its promises to the voters, the PAP government forged an alliance with the civil service that has remained successful and has accounted for the efficiency with which the state has provided housing, employment, and other urban services. In 1959, the Singapore civil service was reorganized into nine ministries. This reorganization allowed the PAP to transfer local government into the hands of the central government. The centralized control of political power has quelled the internal fractiousness of the Communists and other factions within the party, which had previously challenged the leadership of the PAP. Such centralization of power later was extended so that urban and economic develop-



Opposition party leader Chee Soon Juan distributes party literature in downtown Singapore in September 2001.

ment became practically the domain of the state and its planning and development organs.

In 1960, the PAP government established the People's Association to take control of the community centers that were a legacy of the British colonial government. These centers provided the PAP with the basis for meeting the Communists' challenge in their effort at mass mobilization and allowed the prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, to rebuild grassroots support for the PAP. Mobilization of the civil service allowed the PAP to deliver public goods and services to legitimate its claim to political power, while the grassroots organizations gave it the base to socialize voters into its policies on housing and other social issues.

To quell the work stoppages and labor unrest that had kept foreign investments away in the 1950s, the PAP turned to the labor unions. These were centralized as well, with the National Trade Union Congress developing a framework that controlled the labor force in part through the demobilization and suppression of left-wing elements in the labor movement. This centralization of the unions was achieved partly because joint economic decision making gave employers, unions, and the government a say in issues related to the industrial workforce. The National Wages Council, which includes members from these three sectors, has since 1972 negotiated wage increases for the nation as a whole.

Strengthening the Administrative State, 1965–1980s

Centralization of power and bureaucratization characterized the rise of the PAP government in the early years. These trends were consolidated after the brief union of Malaysia and Singapore between 1963 and 1965. These trends also gave rise to Singapore's

label as an authoritarian state. As the bureaucracy and the political leadership have expanded their power into practically every sphere of life in Singapore, the political voice of the citizenry has been largely preempted. Political freedoms were gradually restricted with legislation that disallowed assembly in public to rally support for political or other causes. Between 1961 and 1965, political detention was used against members of the opposition Barisan Sosialis Party. In 1966, this party withdrew from parliamentary politics, leaving the PAP without any political rival that could challenge it in Parliament.

Until the 1980s and the economic recession in 1985, the administrative state in Singapore strengthened its hold on both politics and the economy. The best and the brightest were recruited into the civil service with prestigious government scholarships. Eventually, top civil servants were enlisted to run for election as PAP candidates. The administrative state was viewed as efficient because its practices were aimed at modernizing Singapore society and economy within a few decades.

If rapid economic growth was accompanied by equally rapid growth of incomes, there also was growing dissatisfaction with the PAP, which ultimately led to a decline in voter support for the party in the 1984 elections. Worse still, the opposition won two seats in the seventy-nine-seat Parliament. Already in 1981, a member of the opposition Worker's Party had won a seat, effectively ending the one-party Parliament that had been in place since the 1960s. Opposition party members in Parliament have been on the political scene since 1984.

Reorientation of the Political System since 1984

With the election of opposition party members to Parliament, the PAP began to reconsider the costs of the administrative state in terms of concentration of power with the political leadership and the bureaucracy as well as the disappearance of open politics and citizens' participation in policy making. The Feedback Unit was established in 1984 to encourage citizens to voice their opinions on public policies. Such a chance to be heard had been denied before.

Much of the effort to gain citizens' participation probably has been caused by the change in the PAP party leadership. In 1990, Lee Kuan Yew relinquished his post to a younger leader, Goh Chok Tong, who promised a more participatory approach to governance. The 1985 recession also led to a major restructuring of the planning of Singapore's economy, with the goal of allowing the private sector to participate more in economic de-

velopment. New institutions were brought into place to give the state a more inclusive image, and power became somewhat more decentralized. Town councils were introduced in 1988 to manage the public housing estates in which 86 percent of Singaporeans live. Previously these estates had been run by the government's Housing and Development Board. Parliamentary committees were convened in 1988 as watchdog bodies over key government ministries, although the committees essentially include only PAP members.

Since the 1991 elections, when opposition parties won four seats in Parliament, the political system has been somewhat liberalized. Increasingly, the leadership has been discussing the greater role that ordinary citizens can play in public life. Furthermore, since the early 1990s, members of Parliament have been nominated by the ruling party to represent sectors of society that were underrepresented in Parliament. Candidates are nominated by the public, and nine are selected by a committee of cabinet members. In addition, an opposition party that had not won an election but had secured the most votes among the losing parties could be represented by a nonconstituency member of Parliament. These and other measures appeared to convince the electorate that the PAP was serious about encouraging citizen participation in decision making, particularly in the 1997 elections, when the party won back two of the seats lost to opposition parties in the previous elections.

The Group Representation Constituency (GRC) system was introduced in 1988 by the PAP government. Three adjacent electoral constituencies were combined, and three individual members of Parliament were elected as a team, including at least one member from a minority Malay, Indian, or Eurasian community. The GRC system was further modified before the 1997 election to allow combinations of up to six constituencies. The original justification for this scheme was that because Parliament members would assume additional responsibilities for running town councils, voters would be encouraged to vote more responsibly. The opposition, however, claimed that GRCs were devised solely to "dilute opposition votes by combining constituencies with dominant opposition sympathies with neighbouring constituencies which strongly support the PAP" (Lim 1989: 184). In response, the government's defense of GRCs was that the scheme would ensure minority representation in Parliament, which in turn would curb any tendency to extremism in Singapore that might result from the predominance of Chinese communities.

Kog Yue Choong

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SINGAPORE DEMOCRATIC PARTY Established in 1980 by Chiam See Tong, the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) is the leading opposition party in Singapore. Prior to forming the party, Chiam was an independent politician and ran as an independent candidate for elections. In the 1976 and 1979 general elections, Chiam ran against prominent People's Action Party (PAP) candidates but received approximately one-third of the electoral votes. After forming the SDP, Chiam won the Single Member Constituency (SMC) at Potong Pasir in the 1984 and 1988 general elections.

The SDP was viewed as a moderate party under Chiam's leadership. In 1993, there was a split in party leadership. Chiam resigned from the Central Executive Committee and later established the Singapore People's Party (SPP). Chee Soon Juan took over the Singapore Democratic Party leadership and has since taken a more aggressive approach in dealing with the PAP. The government-controlled media, however, have portrayed him as an unreliable and dishonest person. While the SDP has made headway in international media coverage, it has made little progress in political mobilization locally.

Ho Khai Leong

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SINGH, JAI (d. 1667), military leader for Mughul rulers. Jai Singh rose to prominence during the later part of the reign of the Mughul emperor Shah Jahan (1592–1666). Jai Singh was chief of the heavily fortified city of Amber, near Jaipur in northwestern India. When Shah Jahan became terminally ill, a war of succession broke out among his sons. Jai Singh was then sent on a military expedition against Prince Shuja, whom he pursued all the way to Bengal (now encompassing parts of India and Bangladesh). Then Jai Singh was sent against Prince Dara, whom he defeated at the battle of Deorai and pursued westward into Sind (now in Pakistan).

As Shah Jahan weakened, his third son, Aurangzeb (1618–1707), continued to employ Jai Singh to conduct a campaign in the Deccan (in southern India) against the state of Bijapur. He failed to capture this city, but was more successful against the Maratha warlord Shivaji. The latter was obliged to conclude a treaty with the Mughul emperor in 1665, acknowledging his suzerainty and ceding twenty-three fortresses to him. Jai Singh also persuaded the independent-minded warlord to go to Agra and visit the Mughul court in 1666. Despite all these successes, Jai Singh's failure to capture Bijapur rankled with the future emperor Alamgir, who recalled him from his Deccan campaigns in 1667. On the way back to Delhi, Jai Singh died.

Paul Hockings

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SINGLE-CHILD PHENOMENON—CHINA

The most important of the twelve major challenges that researcher Y. Wang says China will face in the twenty-first century is the pressure of population growth. It is estimated that by 2030, the population in China will reach 1.6 billion. The situation would be worse except for the rigorous enforcement of a one-child policy. As a countermeasure to the misconceived statement that former leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976) made in the 1960s that "more hands make light work" and as a repudiation of the Confucian ideology that favored many children, China introduced this unique population-control policy in 1971. With the exception of the chaotic period of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the success of this policy is statistically reflected in that today 98 percent of urban children in kindergartens are from one-child families and that nationwide in the upper and lower primary

grades (ages six to twelve), more than 70 percent of the students are "only children."

As the one-child family movement has gained momentum in China, people have posed and debated questions regarding the sociological, psychological, and cognitive impact of the policy. Among the questions frequently posed are: Are only children in China intellectually better developed than children with siblings? What are the personality characteristics and social skills of these children?

Although numerous articles have failed to answer these questions satisfactorily, evidence suggests that China's only children demonstrate superior cognitive skills in the earlier years when compared with their peers with siblings. However, these differences become less prominent in later years. It should be stressed that the observed diminishing cognitive variation is based not so much on longitudinal but rather on cross-sectional data. It is likely, therefore, that different aggregates of samples are being dealt with. Within the current limitation, one may conclude that younger only children receive more intensive parental care and greater intellectual stimulation, have more interaction with adults, and are under greater psychological pressure to succeed than their older peers.

A second likely explanation is that schooling works to erase the differences between children of different backgrounds (in this case, the differences between children with siblings and those without siblings). As Lam (1992) observed, "unique family experiences begin to dissipate (with age) while uniform socialization process in school begins to take root." As for whether or not only children have more social skills (measured in terms of ability to make friends) than children with siblings, available data show few significant differences (Huang 1990). Variation between single children and those with siblings is tempered by such factors as educational attainment, age, and gender.

As for whether the personality of single children will deteriorate over time in a typical family structure of 4:2:1 (four grandparents, two parents, and one child), initial empirical evidence generated from a cross-sectional sample of twelve thousand Chinese children (Lam 1992) provides some useful clues. In essence, in the primary grades, single children were more creative, more focused on achievement, less independent, and more aggressive than children with siblings. In the intermediate grades, the good personality traits persisted, but new negative traits such as self-centeredness appeared, and some negative traits, such as aggressiveness, persisted, although they became less distinct after grade 4. At the junior high level, relative dependence

on others became the only outstanding features segregating single children from their peers with siblings. At the senior high level, the tendency toward greater dependence on others persisted.

The intense socialization process that begins as soon as children enter school seems to have moderating effect on single children's personality development, as schools deliberately limit the number of toys available to encourage sharing, taking turns, and negotiating with others. Chinese educational philosophy is predicated on the conviction that "learning should occur through continual, careful shaping and molding" (Gardner 1989), so that character development will be less influenced by family background.

Less is known about the situation of only children in rural areas, because most of the data analyzed come from urban areas. Researchers have yet to assess the gender imbalance in both urban and rural areas and the accompanying social problems. The question of gender balance is important, however, because male preference is still predominant among the rural and remote districts of China.

Y. L. Jack Lam

See also: Marriage and Family—China

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SINHALA Sinhala is an old Indo-Aryan language spoken by 75 percent of the population of Sri Lanka. Its early history can be traced in Brahmi inscriptions from about 200 BCE. This "Sinhalese Prakrit" is related to north Indian dialects; Sinhalese legends and linguistic evidence suggest that settlers from north India brought their dialects with them before 500 BCE. Its isolation from other Indo-Aryan languages (except Divehi in the Maldiv Islands) and long contact with Dravidian languages have given it a unique character.

History

Most early texts have been lost, but the evolution of Sinhala from Prakrit can be traced through numerous cave and rock inscriptions up to the twelfth century CE and Sinhala literature from the tenth century onward. Sinhala evolved by regular sound changes interrupted by periodic reforms and extensive borrowing from other languages. Sinhala eliminated aspirated consonants and the consonant *r*, reduced double consonants to single and diphthongs to vowels, and changed certain consonants (for example, *j* to *d*, *p* to *v*, and *s* to *b*).

Education and scholarship were in the hands of Buddhist monks, whose religious texts remained in Pali. The island had substantial scholarship in the Pali language, which encouraged borrowing. Sanskrit loan words were introduced in particular by Mahayana Buddhists and students of Sanskrit theories of poetics and rhetoric. Many Sanskrit words and idioms were added after the tenth century, and the literature of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries has a high proportion of Sanskrit words.

Tamil influence on Sinhala has always been considerable, in vocabulary, idiom, and grammatical structure. The long interaction through migration and invasion from south India has created many loan words from Tamil, including kinship terms. Tamil probably also influenced the lack of aspirated stops, the contrast between short and long" vowels, and Sinhala's "left-branching" character (a modifier precedes that which it modifies).

Portuguese and Dutch conquest of the coasts led to extensive loan words. Many administrative institutions and domestic innovations, for example, have Portuguese terms; many legal terms are derived from the Dutch, who introduced Roman-Dutch law. The revival of Buddhism in the interior of the island in the eighteenth cen-

tury was accompanied by a linguistic revival in which Buddhist monks revived classical literary forms and attempted to "purify" Sinhala. This revival persisted in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries under very different circumstances and resulted in today's literary Sinhala.

British colonial domination produced an English-speaking class of people who disparaged Sinhala (and Tamil), a situation that continued well into the postindependence period. In the nineteenth century, this meant that extensive changes in Sinhala took place with little influence from the politically and economically dominant Sinhalese leaders.

The Dutch introduced printing in Sinhala in 1737, but printed materials in Sinhala did not appear regularly until a century later, when British missionaries began publishing religious propaganda. The first Sinhalese-owned press began in about 1835. In the 1860s presses and newspapers published in Sinhala proliferated, and many old texts were reprinted. Writers struggled to decide what idiom of Sinhala to use in their works, torn between a colloquial idiom that would appeal to a wider audience and a literary idiom that would satisfy revivalists.

Education in Sinhala expanded dramatically in the nineteenth century through a system of government grants-in-aid. Most of the grants-in-aid were given to Christian missionary schools, as temple schools did not qualify under the government regulations. In addition, education in Sinhala was intended only to provide a cheap elementary education for the masses, not scholarly training. Thus Buddhist monks lost their traditional role as educators and public support for higher scholarship in Sinhala was lost.

Pamphleteers carried on acrimonious debates over language issues. Writers argued whether to use literary or colloquial forms and which literary forms to use. At one extreme, some wanted to restore Sanskrit and Pali terms used in older texts; at the other, some wanted not only to restore the so-called pure Sinhala (Elu) language from classical texts, but to apply the historical transformations to existing words to coin neologisms in pure Sinhala.

Diglossia

Written literature has diverged widely from colloquial Sinhala, producing the language situation of diglossia, in which the written and spoken languages have very different characteristics. Cornell linguist James W. Gair has argued that there are stable structural differences between literary Sinhala and spoken Sinhala, and within spoken Sinhala between formal and colloquial variants.

Literary Sinhala is characterized by such features as the distinction of masculine and feminine gender in animate nouns; person, number, and (in some tenses) gender distinctions in verbs; the agreement of verbs and subject; and the existence of a passive tense. None of these exists in colloquial Sinhala today and presumably did not in the earlier centuries. Many of these features are redundant, which makes literary Sinhala (except for the lexicon) possible to read without much training but difficult to write.

Colloquial Sinhala is the language of ordinary conversation; formal Sinhala is an intermediate form used on such occasions as public addresses, radio and television news broadcasts, university lectures, and sermons.

M. W. Sugathapala de Silva of the University of York disagreed with Gair's emphasis on the structural differences between these variants and stresses the continuity from one variety to another.

Independent Sri Lanka

English was the language of government, higher education, and the leading sectors of the economy until the Official Language Act of 1956 made Sinhala the official language. Since then there has been a progressive shift of the language of education and government to Sinhala. Many neologisms were coined in the process. These are a combination of new meanings for old words, words with Sanskritic origins, and loan words. The 1978 constitution made Tamil a national language and in 1988 an official language, but at the beginning of the new millennium, government offices increasingly required the public to transact its business in Sinhala.

There is a great deal of variation in the Sinhala one encounters in Sri Lanka today. Much of the vocabulary of literary and colloquial Sinhala is interchangeable, and individuals use varying amounts of literary vocabulary and loan words in their speech. Some words have synonyms that range from very literary to very colloquial; people seem to select their vocabulary according to the situation.

Since the outbreak of civil war in 1983, the replacement of both English-educated and Tamil-educated officials with Sinhala-educated ones has accelerated the use of literary Sinhala in government. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, there continues to be an active attempt to replace Sanskritic terms with new ones derived from Elu, perhaps influenced by the Sinhalese nationalism that has burgeoned during the civil war.

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SINHALESE The Sinhalese are a predominant ethnic group in the multicultural society of Sri Lanka, an island that is located in the Indian Ocean off the southeast coast of India. The Sinhalese constitute approximately 74 percent of Sri Lanka's 19.4 million people, followed by the Tamils, who make up approximately 18 percent of the population. Taken from a historical perspective, the ethnic structure of Sri Lanka has been largely influenced by colonialists and migrants. The term "Sinhalese" is also used to refer to Sinhala, the dominant Indo-Aryan language of Sri Lanka.

According to an old legend, the Sinhalese are descended from a lion. The literal meaning of the word *sinba* in Hindi is lion. In historical terms, the Sinhalese claim to have descended from the Aryan peoples of northern India. Under King Vijaya, the Sinhalese conquered the aboriginal people known as Vedda as early as 550 BCE. The Tamils arrived from southern India around the first century CE.

Religion

Approximately 93 percent of the entire Sinhalese population are Buddhists. Theravada Buddhism is the predominant sect. Sinhalese Buddhists fall into two categories: low-country Sinhalese and Kandyan Sinhalese. Low-country Sinhalese, constituting 60 percent of all Sinhalese, are modern in outlook and liberal in their approach. In contrast, the Kandyans are known for conservatism and are firmly committed to upholding their historical traditions and cultural values. By and large, all Buddhist Sinhalese are intent on preserving their distinct Buddhist identity.

Historically, the Sinhalese connections with India are traceable to Buddhism, which arrived in Sri Lanka in the third century BCE via India during the great



THE PATH TO SALVATION

"It is important to understand that in Sinhalese Buddhism there is only one way to salvation. All other salvation religions offer devotees several choices—usually between good works and mystical pursuits. Hindus refer to the way of mysticism or meditation (jnana yoga), the way of ritual (karma yoga), and the way of loving devotion (bhakti yoga). But all Sinhalese Buddhists maintain that the only way to obtain redemption is through systematic meditation (bhavanaya), the equivalent of the Hindu jnana yoga. The individual must eradicate mental defilements through a long process of mental self-purification. He must become satpuruṣa, a self-perfected individual. It is true that Buddhism opened salvation to all regardless of caste or sex. But its actual attainment has always been restricted to a few at any one time; it is the path for the strong in mind."

"This is a radical conception of salvation. It demands extreme virtuosity, individual achievement, and absolute renunciation of the world. The social consequences of these beliefs are therefore equally radical. For the ordinary Buddhist, salvation is considered very difficult because it demands arduous meditation; it is very distant because the necessary practice takes thousands and thousands of rebirths. It is perhaps paradoxical that although nirvanaya is the ultimate goal of the religious life, no Sinhalese is believed to have attained this goal for hundreds of years and few anticipate doing so for many centuries to come. Salvation for the Sinhalese is out of this world in more than one respect."

"The most highly venerated person in Sinhalese society is the one who leaves behind his family and retires to a forest to spend his remaining days in solitary meditation. He is striving for his own salvation, and that is precisely why he is respected."

"The ritual of meditation that hermit monks perform in their secluded forest hermitages directly emulates this world renunciation, the ascetic ideal of the noble sage. The ordinary merit-making rituals, by constantly playing on the same symbolic themes, reaffirm the same ascetic ideal. Even magic rituals, which Sinhalese claim have nothing to do with their Buddhism, refer again and again to the power and glory of Buddha."

Source: Michael M. Ames (1964) "Magical Animism and Buddhism: A Structural Analysis of the Sinhalese Religious System." *Journal of Asian Studies* 23: 25–27.

Maurya empire (c. 324–c. 200 BCE) of King Asoka (273–232 BCE). With the demise of the Maurya empire, Buddhism virtually disappeared from India, but it grew much stronger in Sri Lanka.

The influence of Buddhism on the social and cultural life of Sinhalese people is evident in their observance of such rituals as *bodhi puja*. It is believed that the special devotions that are undertaken in *bodhi puja* will cure patients suffering from incurable diseases as

well as grant the devotees peace and happiness. The faithful also perform *baliya* (a kind of traditional dance) in the hope of receiving blessings from Buddha and alleviation of misfortunes and economic sufferings.

Sinhalese literature also shows the primacy of Buddhism as a cultural influence. Buddhist chronicles originally written in Pali were later translated into Sinhala; stanzas from these chronicles are often recited by Sinhalese. Early prose works are filled with Buddhist tales.

Social Structure

At the apex of the Sinhalese social order is the *goigama*, a class of cultivators who consider themselves superior in status to other Sinhalese. Unlike in India, however, the caste system in the Sinhalese community is not institutionalized, and there is not any predominant priestly caste. *Janavamsa* (1848), a famous poem in Sinhala, describes numerous caste divisions among the Sinhalese people.

The Sinhalese Today

Low-country Sinhalese have higher incomes and a higher literacy rate than Kandyan Sinhalese, 90 percent of whom live in rural areas. The 1996–1997 literacy rate among rural people was approximately 87 percent, whereas the literacy rate among urban dwellers was approximately 92 percent. Low-country Sinhalese hold more high-status government jobs than do Kandyan Sinhalese.

There are more low-country Sinhalese than Kandyan Sinhalese in maritime areas, and fishing is one of the main occupations of low-country Sinhalese, who engage in it not at the subsistence level (except perhaps in certain villages in the deep south), but as a lucrative money-earning venture. In the deep south, many low-country Sinhalese are employed in the salt production industry. Coconut-based industries have been key to the financial success of low-country Sinhalese as a whole. The distilling of arrack (an alcoholic beverage distilled from a fermented mash of malted rice) has also led to sizeable capital accumulation and the rise of a Sinhalese bourgeoisie.

The Kandyans, who dwell inland, are largely farmers. Status among Kandyans is determined by the possession of land. During colonial times, the British held large tracts of land as plantations, leading to a shortage of land for the Kandyan peasantry. Those families that did possess large tracts of land followed the lead of the British and cultivated plantation crops.

Sinhalese life today is marred by ethnic conflict with Sri Lankan Tamils, which flared into violence in 1983. Over sixty thousand people have lost their lives in the conflict so far. Its roots lie in the discriminatory policies of the Sri Lankan government against Sri Lankan Tamils in terms of employment, language (Sinhala was made the nation's official language in the 1970s), and appointment to high administrative positions in government. As a consequence, the demand for a separate state by the Liberation Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) has gained momentum within the Tamil community. The situation took the ugliest turn in 1987, when it became virtually impossible for the government to control

widespread internal violence. There have been a number of peace initiatives, including one undertaken by the Norwegians in 2000 that was still ongoing in 2002. The lives of both the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority will be vastly improved when a lasting peace is attained.

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SINITIC LANGUAGES Sinitic languages, collectively referred to as Chinese, are spoken by over 1.3 billion people worldwide. The vast majority of Sinitic language speakers (nearly 1.3 billion) are found in the People's Republic of China and Taiwan, but approximately 60 million speakers are located in Southeast Asia, North America, Europe, and elsewhere. Although Sinitic languages are commonly known as "Chinese dialects," many linguists prefer to use the term "languages" because Chinese "dialects" are often not mutually comprehensible. The Sinitic languages have frequently been compared to the Romance languages in terms of their diversity.

Genetic Affiliation

The Sinitic languages are usually classified as belonging to the Sinitic branch of the Sino-Tibetan language family. However, some scholars have proposed that Chinese is genetically related to other language families such as Tai, Hmong-Mien, and Austronesian. Although Chinese clearly shares some vocabulary with neighboring languages, it is not clear whether the earliest strata of this vocabulary are inherited (which would be evidence for genetic relationship) or borrowed.

History

Chinese is first attested in inscriptions from around the fourteenth century BCE onward during the Shang

dynasty (1766–1045 BCE). Shang-dynasty Chinese developed into Old Chinese, the language of the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE) and of the poetic anthology *Shijing* (Book of Odes; c. sixth century BCE). The next major stage of Chinese was Middle Chinese, the language of the Sui (581–618 CE) and Tang (618–907 CE) dynasties recorded in Lu Fayan's *Qieyun* rhyme dictionary (601 CE). These early stages of Chinese exerted considerable influence on neighboring languages. Middle Chinese in particular was a source of many loanwords in Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese. The Min languages apparently split off from the rest of Chinese sometime prior to the Middle Chinese period. All other Sinitic languages with the exception of Min are frequently regarded as descendants of Middle Chinese, though the actual situation may be more complex. The last major premodern stage of Chinese is Old Mandarin, the language recorded in Zhou Deqing's *Zhongyuan yinyun* rhyme dictionary (1324 CE). With the exception of fragmentary evidence, non-Mandarin Sinitic languages have only been attested in written form during the last few centuries, largely due to the efforts of missionaries and linguists.

Languages and Dialects

The Sinitic languages can be divided into three large geographical groups. The first and most important of these is the Mandarin or northern group of dialects spoken natively by the majority of Chinese (885 million first-language speakers north of the Chang (Yangtze) river, in southwestern China, and in Taiwan). The official languages of the People's Republic of China and Taiwan are based on the Beijing dialect of Mandarin. Standard Mandarin is widely spoken as a second language in both countries.

The conservative Jin dialects (45 million speakers in Shanxi and Shaanxi and Henan Provinces) were once considered to be northwestern varieties of Mandarin but are now often classified separately.

The central languages are transitional between the northern and southern groups. Wu dialects (77 million speakers in Zhejiang Province and in Jiangsu Province south of the Chang River) such as Shanghaiese are notable for their extensive tone sandhi (changing the tone of a syllable depending on context). The Xiang (36 million speakers mostly in Hunan province) dialects are heavily influenced by Mandarin. The relatively little known Gan (20 million speakers mostly in Jiangxi Province) dialects were once classified together with Kejia but Gan-Kejia unity has fallen into disfavor among linguists.

The southern languages are often conservative due to their relative isolation from the influence of north-

ern standard languages throughout Chinese history. Yue or Cantonese (66 million speakers mostly in Guangdong and Guangxi Provinces and in Hong Kong) is the best known of these languages. Kejia (34 million speakers) dialects are spoken by the Kejia, or Hakka, a Chinese group of probable northern origin that settled in several southern provinces including Guangdong. The Min dialects (59 million speakers mostly in Fujian, eastern Guangdong, and Taiwan) are highly conservative and heterogenous. The most famous Min dialect is Taiwanese, the native language of 14 million Taiwanese. Taiwanese and other southern Min dialects, like Wu dialects, have complex tone sandhi.

Southern Sinitic languages are widely spoken outside the People's Republic of China and Taiwan. Most of these speakers are in Southeast Asia, though Sinitic speakers can be found almost anywhere in the world. The most important overseas Chinese languages are Cantonese (19 million abroad), Min (particularly the Fujian (Hokkien) and Chaozhou (Teochew) dialects; 5 million abroad), and Hakka (5 million abroad).

Some linguists consider the Bai language (900,000 speakers in Yunnan Province) to be a Sinitic language while others classify it as Tibeto-Burman. Its genetic classification remains controversial though it clearly shares much vocabulary with Chinese.

Orthography and Literacy

Chinese characters (*hanzi*) have been in continuous use since around the fourteenth century BCE. Hanzi are popularly believed to be an "ideographic" writing system comprised of pictures representing ideas. However, *hanzi* actually constitute a "morphosyllabic," rather than an ideographic, writing system. The majority of *hanzi* consist of "phonetics" indicating sounds and "radicals" hinting at meanings. Each *hanzi* represents a morpheme (a minimal unit of meaning: i.e., a root or affix) that is one syllable long. A Chinese word may consist of one or more morphemes and must be written with *hanzi* designating those specific morphemes.

Some Sinitic languages, such as Yue, have *hanzi* for words not in the standard language. Chinese is almost always written with *hanzi*; marginal exceptions utilize pinyin (a system of transliteration into the Roman alphabet) and indigenous *Zbuyin zimu* ("phonetic letters") alphabets. Official People's Republic of China data claim a literacy rate of 93 percent, though other estimates put it much lower. The literacy rate in Taiwan is approximately 92 percent.

Linguistic Sketch

The following description primarily applies to standard Mandarin, though other Sinitic languages share these traits as well.

Most Chinese morphemes are one syllable long and all syllables are pronounced with a distinctive pitch ("tone"). Syllables that differ only tonally may have completely different meanings. Standard Mandarin has four tones: *ma* means "mother" with a high level tone, "hemp" with a high rising tone, "horse" with a low rising tone, and "scold" with a high falling tone. Other Sinitic languages have many more tones, e.g., Cantonese has nine tones. New words are formed via the reduplication of syllables, the addition of suffixes (or, less frequently, prefixes), and the compounding of morphemes.

Unlike most European languages, Chinese has no articles (i.e., equivalents of "the" or "a, an"), no grammatical gender (though a gender distinction in the third person pronoun is made in the written standard language), and no noun declensions or verb conjugations. Number (singular/plural) is only obligatory for pronouns and optional for nouns referring to people. Counted nouns are accompanied by "classifiers": e.g., the classifier *ge* ("piece") in Mandarin *yi ge ren* ("one piece person"). Suffixes mark verbs (which include predicate adjectives) for aspect (completion or non-completion of a situation or action) rather than tense (past, present, or future). "Coverbs" function like prepositions but can be negated like verbs.

The basic word order patterns are topic-comment, subject-verb-object (though Mandarin also has subject-object-verb structures), and modifier-modified. Case is marked by word order and coverbs.

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SINO-FRENCH WAR France's victory in its 1884–1885 war with China over Vietnam marked a major expansion of Western imperialism in Asia. The

defeat of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) discredited the dynasty's prevailing strategy of "self-strengthening." The Sino-French War was one of several conflicts in the years from 1839 to 1911 showing the Qing court's indecisiveness in setting policy directions and its inability to enforce traditional tribute relations with surrounding states. The Qing did not take their defeat in the Sino-French War as an opportunity to undertake reform and so found itself in much deeper trouble when a conflict broke out with Japan in 1894 over a similar situation in Korea.

Origins of War

Although Vietnam's Nguyen dynasty (1802–1955) owed its rise in part to French help, once in power, the Nguyen rulers preferred conservative neo-Confucian styles of court life and governance and tried to limit additional French influence and prevent French territorial encroachment. In spite of the Nguyen emperors' increasing reliance on their Qing suzerains for diplomatic and military protection, the French steadily increased their territorial control in Vietnam. Beginning in Cochin China (in the south), the French established a protectorate over Annam (central) and outposts in Tonkin (the northern part of Vietnam) in the years between 1862 and 1880.

In the 1870s and 1880s, the Vietnamese repeatedly sought help from China on the basis of the two countries' long-standing tributary relationship. In China, a debate arose at the Qing court about how best to deal with French adventurism. The self-strengthening school, led by Viceroy Li Hongzhang (1823–1901), championed having the Qing build up its own modern technology and modern military units, but continued to fear battle with French military power. The self-strengtheners counseled a diplomatic settlement with France, while more adventurist officials such as Zhang Zhidong (1837–1909) and Zhang Peilun (1848–1903) advocated military intervention on behalf of the Nguyen dynasty. In fact, since the late 1870s, the Qing had allowed irregular military units called the Black Flags to operate in the Sino-Vietnamese border region. The Black Flag troops, which included remnants from armies of the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864) along with local brigands, began engaging French units inside Tonkin in 1882 in undeclared guerrilla-style warfare.

When the succession crisis arose in 1883, the Qing court increased its support for the Nguyen cause by permitting regular Qing dynasty troops to join the Black Flags in Vietnam. Still, the two parties at the Qing court continued to debate their respective positions. The self-strengthening advocates advised a

diplomatic settlement against what they saw as a strong Western opponent, while the war party wanted vigorous military action against what it saw as hollow threats from a weak France. Still, both parties stopped short of advocating a formal declaration of war.

The Qing court, then dominated by Empress Dowager Cixi (1835–1908), had Li Hongzhang negotiate a settlement with a French diplomat in 1883 that put Vietnam under joint French and Qing protection, but Paris rejected the arrangement. In the field, French units defeated the Black Flags, and a French assault on Qing territory appeared imminent. Hoping again to avoid a formal state of war with France, the empress dowager dismissed Prince Gong (1833–1899), the dynasty's minister of foreign affairs. She then had Li Hongzhang negotiate another settlement with a new French representative, F. E. Fournier, but it was rejected again by Paris and was sharply criticized by the war party in China.

In early 1884 renewed clashes in Tonkin produced modest Qing victories. In July 1884 the French government issued an ultimatum to the Qing. When the Qing failed to respond satisfactorily, the long-burning informal conflict became a state of war. In the first act of formal warfare, on 23 August the French took decisive military action, sinking eleven modern Chinese warships, and destroyed the foreign-built shipyard at Fuzhou on China's southeast coast, hundreds of miles from Vietnam. Thus, the war party's evaluation of French military abilities turned out to be disastrously wrong, while the self-strengtheners saw one of the Qing dynasty's most important military assets destroyed in an afternoon by the French. Hostilities continued along the Chinese-Vietnam border, but the Li-Fournier agreement was revived and accepted by both sides in its final form in June 1885. Under its terms, the Qing dynasty gave up all claims to its interests in Vietnam and French dominance over the Nguyen dynasty was accepted.

French Expansion Assured

The French victory against the Qing dynasty removed the one power that might have checked Western imperialist expansion in Southeast Asia. French dominance over Vietnam was assured. In 1887 France quickly began to establish its grand design for Southeast Asia, the so-called Indochinese Union, a combination of Cochin China, Annam, Tonkin, Cambodia, and Laos controlled from Paris. Through a combination of battlefield and diplomatic victories, the French consolidated their empire in Southeast Asia and held on to this position until 1954. Though defeated, the Vietnamese desire for independence and autonomy

never died out and burst into flame again at the end of World War II in the revolt of the Viet Minh.

David D. Buck

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SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT, SECOND

A minor clash between troops of a Chinese army and Japanese units at the Marco Polo Bridge outside Beijing on 7 July 1937 led quickly to the undeclared 1937–1945 Sino-Japanese war, referred to here as the second Sino-Japanese conflict to avoid confusion with the brief but significant Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. Ever since the Japanese victory in this first war, the Japanese government had advanced a variety of schemes to help China emerge from the deep political and social disorder into which it was falling. The Chinese vigorously rejected most of these Japanese schemes. In many ways, by the mid-1930s a second war between Japan and China seemed inevitable because Chinese public opinion was growing increasingly anti-Japanese while the Japanese had used military force to create the puppet state of Manchukuo in China's northeast and continued to press their control of other parts of China through military means.

Aggressive Phase, 1937–1939

In the initial aggressive phase of the war from July 1937 through February 1939, the Japanese armies established control over all of north China and the most important parts of east China, including the great port city of Shanghai, along with all the important cities in the Chang (Yangtze) River Valley region and along China's long coastline. In their brutal treatment of both Chinese soldiers and civilians, most infamously during the "Rape of Nanjing," also known as the Nanjing Massacre, in December 1937 through March 1938, the Japanese military acquired a reputation as war criminals that still colors Japanese relations with Chinese, Asians, and many Europeans to this day.

Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), leader of the Guomindang (Nationalist Party), lost almost all of his carefully nurtured modern armed forces in this first phase of the war but nonetheless managed to withdraw the remnants of his military and civil government, along with several million supporters, to the fastness of the Sichuan basin, where he made the city of Chongqing his wartime capital.

Attrition Phase, 1939–1944

The attrition phase of the war began in March 1939. The Chinese Nationalists had little industry and few resources other than abundant manpower with which to resist the Japanese. During this phase, the Nationalist government's territorial base was the huge province of Sichuan, most of southwestern China, and some of central Hunan and Hubei Provinces, but for most Nationalist supporters, the war was a long, dispiriting time of deprivation and hardship. The Communist movement led another effort at Chinese resistance against the Japanese from a base in the remote and poverty-stricken area around the city of Yan'an. In theory, since the end of 1936 the Communists and the Nationalists had been cooperating in the struggle against the Japanese, but in reality they operated separately with different approaches to resisting Japan and different goals for the war. The Nationalist approach emphasized building strength with American assistance beyond the reach of the Japanese forces, whereas the Communists felt they needed little or no outside assistance and could count on mobilizing the Chinese people to resist the Japanese through guerrilla warfare.

In March 1940, a disaffected Chinese Nationalist leader, Wang Jingwei (1883–1944), established a collaborationist government under Japanese control at Nanjing that ruled over Japanese-occupied China. Wang died before the end of the war, but he, his close associates, and his wife were all tried for treason following Japan's surrender.

Before 1940, Nationalist China received considerable aid from the Soviet Union, which was looking for ways to check Japanese expansionism on the Asian mainland. But in late 1940, the Japanese and the Soviets signed a nonaggression pact, and Soviet aid to the Nationalists declined quickly. The United States gave little aid to the Nationalists in 1937 when the war broke out, yet by 1940 U.S. support for Nationalist China had grown significantly. The aid involved loans and gifts or low-cost purchases of military goods. Also in 1941 the United States permitted a group of volunteer pilots under Claire Chennault to prepare to go to China. The establishment of this group, which be-

came famous in early 1942 as the Flying Tigers, marks the beginning of several years of cooperation between the United States and the Chinese Nationalists.

The long attrition phase of this war lasted five years, and many important developments occurred during this period that greatly affected both the outcome of the war and the subsequent history of Asia. Throughout this phase, Japan's armies were so thinly spread around Asia that they could not undertake serious offensives in China.

Chiang Kai-shek wanted to hold back his armies from combat and build up their strength so he could defeat the Communists when the inevitable U.S. victory came. Chiang resisted cooperation with his chief U.S. military adviser, General Joseph Stilwell, who was sent to train modern armies for use against Japan. Chiang and Stilwell disliked each other. Chiang distrusted Stilwell's motives and objected to Stilwell's use of Chinese units in Burma. Stilwell was withdrawn in October 1944. Chiang Kai-shek found it much easier to cooperate with the leadership of the U.S. air forces in China, especially General Claire Chennault, and agreed to build new bases from which U.S. bombers could attack Japan.

The small and poorly equipped Communist forces based at Yan'an followed the call of Mao Zedong (1893–1976) for armed struggle against the Japanese. The Communists had developed distinctive approaches in the early 1930s. The keys to their success were lower taxes, fair and simple administration, and programs promoting social and economic justice, all implemented through a small, well-disciplined military force totally controlled by the Communist Party. The Communists worked behind the Japanese lines, especially in northern China. They increased their influence and control by enrolling peasants in part-time militia forces and created a patchwork of small base areas.

In the face of growing Japanese aggression, Mao linked his base-area strategy to the increasingly powerful anti-Japanese nationalism among the hundreds of millions of Chinese living under Japanese occupation. Mao Zedong perfected in these years a historically important concept of protracted guerrilla war against colonialism that had exceptionally wide influence in antiforeign and anti-imperialist struggles in Asia, Latin America, and Africa during the latter half of the twentieth century.

To ensure conformity with their program, the Communist leaders headquartered at Yan'an developed new forms of ideological discipline and methods of working with the common people known as "the mass line." The whole bundle of techniques developed under

Mao's leadership became known as "the Yan'an Way" and became the guiding beacon of Communist rule of China from 1949 until Mao's death in 1976. Thus the war against Japan produced the principles on which China came to be ruled under the Communists.

Japan's Last Offensive, 1944–1945

This long second phase of attrition ended in April 1944 when the Japanese launched their last great offensive of the China war. The Japanese offensive, code-named Ichigo (Number One), aimed to destroy U.S. airbases in the Nationalist-controlled region south and west of the city of Changsha. From these airbases, U.S. long-range bombers were bombing parts of Japan, so Ichigo was defensive in nature. By early 1945, this offensive had stalled because the Japanese armies in China lacked the means to undertake an all-out campaign against the Nationalists and American airpower in Sichuan and southwestern China. In the summer of 1945 the war in China ground to a halt. After the Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945, Japanese troops remained in place all over China, often assisting the arriving Nationalist armies in establishing their authority.

In the summer of 1945, with a U.S. invasion of the Japanese home islands imminent, the Soviet Union, under U.S. urging, broke its nonaggression pact with Japan and invaded Manchuria. This offensive against inferior Japanese forces put the Russians back in control in Manchuria, marking another turn in the fifty-year struggle with Japan for dominance in this region. Once there, the Soviets looted Japanese equipment to rebuild their own war-shattered factories and withdrew by 1947, leaving the battling Nationalist and Communist armies behind.

High Cost of War

The cost of the war in China was enormous. It is estimated that more than one-third of all Japanese wartime expenditures from 1937 to 1945 were swallowed up in the conflict. Japan lost around 400,000 men in China. The Chinese losses were much greater. The Chinese Nationalist armies alone sustained 3.2 million casualties, including 1.3 million killed. No good figures exist for the millions of Communist and civilian casualties. Considerable amounts of the industry and transportation endowment of China survived the war, but the country's economic system lay essentially in tatters as a result of runaway inflation, and disorganization of the money and banking system.

At the end of the war, Chiang Kai-shek raced to establish the authority of his Nationalist government

throughout China, even in those extensive areas of the country where the Nationalists had not been in control prior to 1937. The Chinese Communists confident that their "Yan'an Way" could be turned into a nationwide revolutionary movement, prepared to challenge the Chinese Nationalists for control of China. The stage was set for a civil war.

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SINO-JAPANESE WAR The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 reflected several decades of increasing tension between China and Japan over the status of Korea, which China regarded as belonging to its sphere of influence, but which Japan saw as increasingly vital to its own imperialist interests. China continued to believe in a system of tributary relations in which Korea was a vassal state, but Japan had thrown off its feudal past and was rapidly modernizing in the aftermath of the 1868 Meiji Restoration that had returned the Japanese emperor to nominal power.

The stage was set for a clash over Korea as Koreans were caught up in the politics of the moment. Conservatives in Korea wished to continue tributary relations with China, whereas reformers in Korea looked to Japan for modernization and an "opening" of the so-called Hermit Kingdom. Amid increasing political violence, the conservative Korean government called on China for help in suppressing the Tonghak rebellion, a peasant rebellion whose participants were adherents of Tonghak ("Eastern Learning"), a religious movement that opposed both Westernization and the stratification of traditional Korean society. In early June 1894, Chinese troops began arriving.

The Japanese response was immediate and decisive. Within a week of Chinese troop movement into Korea, Japanese military units began crossing the narrow Tsushima and Korea straits to land in Korea. By mid-July, the government in Tokyo demanded that Korea make the sorts of modernizing changes Japan had made in the Meiji Restoration, and Japanese leaders hoped for a pretext for war. Korean leaders hesitated and turned to China for support.

The next step was war. Japanese forces occupied the Korean royal palace and forced the Korean king to ask for Japanese assistance against China. Then the Japanese navy sank a Chinese troop transport, and war was declared on 1 August. Japan was better organized, and its commanders were more willing to take risks. Japanese troops moved quickly up the Korean peninsula and trapped Chinese forces around Pyongyang. Other Japanese troops crossed the Yalu River and seized key positions on the Liaodong Peninsula and then moved into Weihaiwei in northern China. In September 1895, the Japanese navy forced a Chinese fleet to surrender, and the two sides looked to negotiate.

China recognized Korea's independence, ceded the Liaodong Peninsula, Taiwan, and the Pescadores to Japan, and agreed to pay a large indemnity and to extend to Japan all the benefits of the so-called unequal treaties that China had signed with European powers. Russia was concerned about Japan's interest in Korea and southern Manchuria, and with the support of France and Germany (the so-called Triple Intervention) forced Japan to return Liaodong—while demanding an even larger indemnity from China—thus helping to set the stage for the Russo-Japanese War about a decade later.

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See also: **Russo-Japanese War; Sino-Japanese Conflict, Second; Tonghak**

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SINO-TIBETAN LANGUAGES Sino-Tibetan is the largest language family in the world, in terms of the number of people who speak one of its components as their first language. It includes Chinese and its variants; Tibetan; and most of the indigenous

languages of the Himalayan region, as well as some of the more important languages of Southeast Asia.

The family is commonly divided into two groups. Whereas the sole constituents of Sinitic are the variants of Chinese (which are mostly, but quite misleadingly, referred to as the "dialects" of Chinese), the Tibeto-Burman branch numbers several hundred often poorly known languages and language groups, the proper linguistic classification of which is still largely a task for future research.

The Bodic languages (*bod*, Tibetan for "Tibet") are further subdivided into Bodish and East Himalayan. The former include Tibetan proper and its variants; Kanauri in northern India; and Newari and the Tamangic languages in Nepal (Tamang, Gurung, and Thakali). East Himalayan is formed by, among others, the Kiranti (or Rai) languages, the Kham-Magar group, and Bahing (Vayu), all spoken in central and eastern Nepal. Baric is a conventional term used for the Kamarupan languages (named after the medieval state of Kamarupa in northeastern India), made up of a large number of lesser language groups, which are further subdivided into the Abor-Miri-Dafla, the Mikir-Meithei, and the Kuki-Chin-Naga groups.

To Burmic belongs the Lolo-Burmese group, the most important language of which is literary Burmese, the state language of Myanmar (Burma); Burmic also contains sizable groups of languages in Thailand, such as Lahu and Lisu.

Karenic, sometimes viewed as a higher-level subgroup of Sino-Tibetan, taxonomically coordinates with Tibeto-Burman, rather than being one of its branches, and consists of the Karen languages Pwo and Sgaw, spoken in Myanmar and Thailand.

Kachinic (e.g., Jinghpo, or Kachin proper, in northern Myanmar) is sometimes classified as a subbranch of Baric, but some researchers group it with Burmic or treat it as a separate Tibeto-Burman branch.

Qiangic, a small family in South China, has been added to Tibeto-Burman recently; it is sometimes viewed as a separate branch of the family, sometimes included in Burmic. Some linguists set up a distinct Rung branch, composed of Qiangic, the Nung languages of northern Myanmar, and Gyarong and Primi/Pumi of Southwest China. The extinct language of the Tangut (the language of the Xi Xia empire, which flourished in Gansu and Shaanxi Provinces between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries), written in a highly unique and complicated script, is mostly viewed as Tibeto-Burman. Its place in the family is still debated, but most researchers opt for its inclusion in either the Rung subgroup or Lolo-Burmese.

The Bai (or Minjia) language of northern Yunnan Province, China, may constitute another, separate Tibeto-Burman group. This, as well as any other, classification of Sino-Tibetan or Tibeto-Burman, can only be viewed as preliminary, and numerous details, as well as some rather drastic revisions, of it are still the subject of current debates.

Another division of the Tibeto-Burman language—into indospheric and sinospheric languages—is based on cultural rather than linguistic criteria. Indospheric languages (the most typical of which are the Bodic and Baric languages) are spoken in the cultural realm of greater India, whereas the sinosphere is dominated by Chinese culture. The millennia-long influences of these dominating cultural areas are reflected in numerous loanwords (from Chinese and Indo-Aryan languages, respectively) found in the languages, as well as in some real linguistic traits. Thus, indospheric languages generally display more complicated morphological systems than languages of the sinosphere (with the Kiranti languages in eastern Nepal being morphologically the most elaborate of the Sino-Tibetan languages), whereas the latter, generally poorer in morphological devices, tend to monosyllabicity of lexemes and display intricate tone systems. However, this division is far from being unequivocal, and it does not imply that direct influence of the eponymous languages is solely responsible for these differences.

Written Sources

Some Sino-Tibetan languages are among those languages of the world with the longest continuous written attestation. First mention is due to Chinese, which has been written in its unique script at least since the fourteenth century BCE.

Tibetan writing begins in the seventh century CE; the script is an offshoot of the Indian family of scripts and continues to be used today. Newari, the language of the original inhabitants of the Kathmandu valley, was written in Devanagari script beginning in the seventeenth century (with at least one manuscript dated as early as the fourteenth century). Lepcha, the state language of Sikkim, had a script of its own, which has been in use from the eighteenth century onward but is little used today. Burmese has been written since the twelfth century in a script that is likewise a development of an Indic predecessor.

A completely different kind of script, which has been called possibly the most complicated writing system humanity has ever used, is the Tangut script, which rendered the language of the Xi Xia empire. Although considerable progress was made in Tangut

philology and linguistics during the last decades of the twentieth century, it cannot be regarded as fully deciphered.

The Naxi (or Moso) language of Yunnan Province, China, is well known for a particularly interesting kind of writing system, which mainly consists of iconic, but nevertheless conventionalized, pictographs.

Genetic Relationship

Though the genetic relationship of the Sino-Tibetan languages is no longer in doubt, the details of this relationship are still very far from having been worked out. One of the reasons for this is, quite understandably, the great number of languages in the Tibeto-Burman branch, only a small number of which have been adequately described so far. Moreover, a depressing number of these languages is at present heavily endangered, which renders the collection of reliable data for them the most urgent task of contemporary Sino-Tibetan linguistics. On the Sinitic side, the last decades of the twentieth century saw a great deal of progress in our understanding of the phonological prehistory of Chinese, though too many details are still the subject of controversies to be able to speak of a general consensus on the sound-shape of early Chinese.

Besides subclassification, the most hotly debated topics of Sino-Tibetan linguistics includes such questions as whether the highly complicated verbal concord system of, for example, the Kiranti languages is to be taken as original for Tibeto-Burman or the more isolating typology (the fact that words show only a minimal amount of morphological elements) of the Southeast Asian members of the family—and if a more isolating and tonal parent-language has to be reconstructed, how many distinctive tones should be reconstructed for the parent language, and so on.

Characteristics of Sino-Tibetan Languages

The Sino-Tibetan family shows perhaps more internal typological diversity than any other established group of related languages. Most languages show systematic tonal contrasts, some do not; the basic word order found in most Tibeto-Burman languages is subject-object-verb, but Karenic and Sinitic languages show subject-verb-object syntax (and prepositions as opposed to the postpositions common in the rest of the family). The morphological techniques employed range from mostly isolating (in Southeast Asia and Sinitic), over several degrees of agglutinativity, to high levels of polysynthesis (in Kiranti).

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SINO-VIETNAMESE CULTURE The term "Sino-Vietnamese culture" designates the part of Vietnamese culture that has been very heavily influenced by China and that uses classical Chinese as its medium of expression. Because Vietnam was part of the Chinese empire from the second century BCE until the tenth century CE, China was able to mold Vietnam in its own cultural image. China introduced methods of cultivating the land, Chinese rituals of life, the Chinese writing system, Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, Chinese administrative structures, and so on. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese people continued to speak their own language and retained their sense of national identity. Vietnam rejected Chinese political domination in the tenth century, but Chinese culture continued to exert a powerful influence on Vietnamese institutions as well as on the literature of the scholar-official elite class.

The structures and organization of the Vietnamese government were almost identical to their Chinese models. The monarchical system in Vietnam supported a ruler, called, like the Chinese emperor, the Son of Heaven. Like his Chinese counterpart, he had absolute power and the title of emperor; he was also endowed with a reign name and posthumous glorification. The central government of Vietnam was composed of six ministries. The civil service, or mandarin, had nine ranks, each divided into two steps, so that it ran from the low 9B to the high 1A. The local administration governed provinces, prefectures, and districts. At the lowest level of government were the villages, also called communes, which had their own hierarchy of notables, selected by the villagers themselves from among the inhabitants of their own locality. These notables were not considered members of the mandarin; as in China, to become a civil servant one had to pass rigorous examinations that tested applicants' ability to write official documents, compose poetry in prose and verse, comment

on Confucian texts, and analyze critically certain contemporary events. The language of the examinations was classical Chinese. Successful candidates were appointed right away to official positions according to the degrees they had earned. Usually the lowest degree holders would be appointed to ranks 7A–6B and the highest ones to 3A or 3B. The last of these examinations were held in Hue in 1917.

Vietnamese law also followed the example of China. While the code published under the Late Le dynasty (1428–1788) showed some original features appropriate to Vietnamese situations, the Gia Long Code of the Nguyen dynasty (1802–1955) was a close copy of Qing-dynasty legal codes. Even under French colonial rule, the Vietnamese court used the Gia Long Code.

How much of that Confucian influence permeated to the lower levels of Vietnamese society remains a topic of debate to this day. Some scholars maintain that Confucianism stayed within the elite scholar-official class, and that the Vietnamese common people retained their indigenous traditions. This is a difficult position to defend, given that one can find popular songs such as the following, which makes light of Confucian virtues:

You want to go but I do not let you go
 On your blouse I write three letters
 Loyalty is for our fathers and Filial Piety for our
 mothers,
 As for us, let us have Love.

In Sino-Vietnamese culture one can list countless Vietnamese works of literature that follow all the techniques and stylistic canons of Chinese literature, down to the plots of novels and the inspirational interior or exterior landscapes of poetry. Ironically, the vast body of Sino-Vietnamese literature includes a large number of anti-Chinese texts, composed to raise the morale of Vietnamese troops in their resistance against Chinese invasion or to celebrate victories over Chinese armies. Classical Chinese was still used in the pamphlets, poems, and letters of anti-French nationalists such as Phan Boi Chau (1867–1940) and Phan Chau Trinh (1872–1926) up to the 1920s.

A writing system that used Chinese characters to transcribe the sounds of Vietnamese words, called *nom*, may have been invented by the eleventh century, but Vietnamese who saw themselves as serious writers never gave it much consideration. *Nom* literature cannot, by any measure, rival Sino-Vietnamese literature as far as works of nonfiction are concerned. As for creative writing, an official 1989 almanac list of the one hundred best books in the entire history of Vietnamese literature included twenty-one written in *nom*, twenty

in Sino-Vietnamese, two in French, and fifty-seven in *quoc ngu*, the transliteration system that uses the Roman alphabet. The adoption of *quoc ngu* by the French colonial government, who proclaimed it the official writing system of Vietnam, marked the weaning of Vietnam from Chinese influence.

China was also the route by which Buddhism entered Vietnam. Although Theravada Buddhism could have come to Vietnam from the South, it happened that communication was easier from north to south and thus it was Mahayana Buddhism that came to Vietnam, through China. Buddhism was so eagerly accepted that Buddhist monks became the highest administrators in the first independent governments of Vietnam. The founder of the Ly dynasty was a Buddhist monk of sorts. The Tran dynasty (1225–1400) was also deeply devoted to Buddhism, although the progress of Confucianism pushed Buddhism out of the governing circles and into the hearts of the common people. Practically all Buddhist publications were written in classical Chinese; even certain prayers, which originally were composed in Sanskrit, had their sounds transcribed in Chinese. Vietnamese Buddhism has never actually been cut off from Buddhism in China. Up to the nineteenth century, relations between the two churches could not have been closer: Vietnam purchased incense, books, and other Buddhist necessities regularly from China. Exchanges of monks occurred on a regular basis.

Taoism in Vietnam has never been strongly tied to Taoism in China. It is the least institutionalized religion in Vietnam, with no real worries concerning orthodoxy and no books, sets of prayers, or texts of incantations that need to be exactly reproduced from an original version. In effect, Taoist superstitious beliefs and practices found in Vietnam a favorable enough environment for the faithful to nurture and develop their own conviction without any external props.

In the arts, government, law, religion, indeed, in every aspect of life, Chinese culture has left an enduring imprint on Vietnamese culture. It is a relationship Westerners can understand if they consider the relationship between the cultures of the peoples of Western Europe and ancient Greco-Roman culture.

Truong Buu Lam

See also: **China—Vietnam Relations; Chinese Influence in Southeast Asia**

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SINOP (2002 pop. 31,500). Sinop is a Turkish Black Sea coastal provincial capital. Named for the nymph Sinope and mentioned in the *Argonautica* of Apollonius, the city has two safe harbors and protective inland mountains. Earliest settlements date back to 4500 BCE. Ionians from Miletus founded a city in the eighth century BCE, where Cynic philosopher Diogenes was born in 404 BCE. For centuries the leading Black Sea port, Sinop was in turn Pontic capital, Roman colony, Byzantine port, and Comnene city after the Latin conquest of Constantinople in 1204. After Seljuk conquest in 1214, it was governed by the vizier Parvane and by Gazi Chelebi of the Seljuk dynasty in the name of the Ilkhanid Mongols. Genoese traders were active in the fourteenth century. The Ottomans originally took Sinop from the Isfendiogullari, but lost control during war with Timur (Tamerlane, 1336–1405). The Ottoman sultan Mehmet II incorporated the town in 1458. Sinop, with its mixed Muslim and Christian populations, provided ships for the Ottoman fleet. The port was attacked by Cossacks in 1614, and the Russian naval attack of 1853 started the Crimean War.

Forestry and grain agriculture have been traditional sources of revenue for Sinop, now connected to Samsun by road. In recent years it has been advertised as a tourist destination, with the natural environment and seafood restaurants the major attractions.

Sylvia Wing Önder

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SINUJU (2002 pop. 377,000). Sinuiju is the capital of North P'yongan Province and one of North Korea's centers of heavy industry. It is located in the northwestern part of the Korean Peninsula at the mouth of the Yalu (Amnok) River.

The Sinuiju railway was constructed by the Japanese in 1904 for the Russo-Japanese War. It was the last stop on the railway line connecting Pusan with

northernmost Korea. The city has a cross-border rail link with China. South and North Korea agreed in June 2000 to reconnect the Kyongui rail link—which was severed during the Korean War (1950–1953)—between Seoul and Sinuiju. It will ultimately be linked to the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Trans-China Railway in an attempt to build an "Iron Silk Road" linking Korea to Europe.

Sinuiju once enjoyed a prosperous wood industry (paper, matches), but since the construction of the Sup'ung Power Station on the Yalu River, timber production has decreased and given way to other industries, such as silk and cosmetics production. Major industries include machinery, chemicals, textiles, pharmaceuticals, footwear, clothing, food, and articles for daily use, as well as marine products (anchovies, squid, and oysters). Agriculture (rice, corn, and beans) is also important. The Sinuiju Chemical Fibre Complex produces staple fiber made from the reed grown on nearby Pidan (Silk) Island.

Ariane Perrin

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SIRAIKI The Siraiki people have historically inhabited the central parts of the classic Indus basin, the area which more or less comprises the modern state of Pakistan. The Siraiki people are considered to be of Indo-Hittite or Indo-European origin, although little is known about the ethnic origins of Siraikis before the invasion of the Indus Valley (c. 326 BCE) by Alexander of Macedon (356–323 BCE). As people of historic Sindh Desh, the Siraiki people are originally Sindhis. Sindh Desh gradually disappeared from the world map after the Arab conquest in 611 CE, and its territory was constantly amalgamated into the empires of various Central and West Asian conquerors until the creation of Pakistan in 1947.

The ethnic and sociopolitical fragmentation of traditional Sindhi society, migrations, and invading ethnocultural and religiously oriented influences over centuries have had an impact on Siraiki identity. The historians of Alexander of Macedon referred to Siraiki areas as the country of the Malloi and the Oxydaraiki, two major tribes who were, the historians said, more numerous and warlike than any of the other Indian tribes. They were located near the confluence of the Hydaspes and Akesines (Ravi and Sutlej rivers) and

their junction with the Indus. The two tribes spoke the same language and have been referred to as Hy-daraiki, Sydracae, and Syrakousi groups. Because the central Indus basin was the common route for invading armies, the Siraiki regions experienced chaos up into the nineteenth century. With the partition of India in 1947, Siraiki and southern Indus areas became a part of Pakistan. Although statistics for the exact Siraiki population are not available, Siraikis are generally considered to number around 40 million. The Pakistani province of Punjab was largely created in Indus regions with an almost two-thirds Siraiki-speaking majority.

The Siraiki language is largely derived from Sanskrit and Prakrit and influenced by Arabic and Persian, as are the other languages of the western Indian subcontinent. Siraiki is the main and central dialect of the eight distinct dialects of Sindhi that are spoken in various parts of the Indus basin. During the British colonial period, the language policy of the British Indian government contributed to serious ethno-linguistic fragmentation. Around 1850, the British decided to provide specialized scripts to some Indus basin dialects, thereby fostering a sense of individual identity for speakers of those dialects. Various dialects of Sindhi were among those standardized with different scripts.

Since the 1960s, a new wave of Siraiki nationalism has aimed at obtaining more cultural and economic autonomy. Some Siraiki nationalists even demanded a separate Siraiki province, albeit without success. Siraiki middle and upper classes however, seem to be well integrated within the political structure and it is unlikely that an anti-status-quo movement can be successful. Members of the Siraiki elite have held some of the most important positions in the federal and provincial government: one president of Pakistan, Farooq Laghari (served from 1993 to 1998), was a Siraiki, and many Siraiki feel very much integrated into Pakistan.

Aftab A. Kazi

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SISAVANGVONG UNIVERSITY Originally named after a Lao king and later renamed the National University of Laos (NUOL), Sisavangvong University was founded in 1958 as the first university of Laos and was located in the nation's capital, Vientiane. The university merged existing institutions under one administration and was modeled after the French education system. Foreign teachers composed a majority of the staff due to the lack of qualified Lao teachers, but the civil war's instability and shortage of teaching materials hindered the system. After the 1975 revolution, the socialist regime dissolved Sisavangvong University to erase any trace of both the French and the royalist regime, and Lao was reintroduced, replacing French, as the language of scholarship in Laos. The university was demoted to a teacher's college and was used to train new teachers using a Lao curriculum that was heavily imbued with communist values. Many qualified teachers either fled the country or were sent to reeducation camps after 1975. Students were sent to Vietnam, the Soviet Union, or Eastern Bloc countries for higher education.

The National University of Laos was founded in 1995 and consolidated ten existing institutions under the Ministry of Education. The National University consists of the faculties of education, sciences, agriculture and forestry, social sciences and humanities, philology, economics and management, engineering and architecture, medical sciences, and law and public administration. Students devote the first two years to foundation studies and then proceed with three or more years in professional studies to earn a middle diploma, higher diploma, or bachelor's degree.

Linda S. McIntosh

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SISTAN A lowland region lying along the Helmand River, Sistan is made up of the southwestern Afghanistan province of Nimruz (capital, Zaranj) and the Sistan district of the Iranian province of Sistan and Baluchistan (administrative center, Zabol; provincial capital, Zahedan). Spring flooding yields two harvests a year: wheat, barley, millet, and other grains in winter, and cotton and vegetables in summer.

Sistan is the legendary homeland of the hero Rostam from the eleventh-century epic *Shahnameh* of Ferdowsi. Its name is traced back to *Sakastan* or "land of

the Scythians," the Scythians having dominated the region toward the end of the first millennium BCE.

Sistan's low terrain allows easy access from Central Asia and the Iranian plateau into the heartland of Afghanistan. Since the time of the Achaemenids (559–331 BCE), it has served as a borderland of successive empires bent on eastward expansion. After the Arab conquest in 652 CE, the distant province became a refuge for rebels against later caliphal authority. From the ninth to the fifteenth centuries, the Saffarids and their successors, known as *maliks* (kings) of Nimruz, ruled the province, acknowledging the suzerainty of Samanids (864–999), Ghaznavids (977–1187), Seljuks (1038–1157), and Ghurids (c. 1000–1215). The region suffered the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century and the devastating punitive expedition of Timur (1370–1405), who destroyed its irrigation system. In Safavid times (1501–1722/1736), the province served as a base for Persian forays against Mughal India. In 1723 a *malik* of Sistan, Mohammad b. Fath 'Ali Khan, captured Khorasan from the Safavids and claimed royal prerogatives, but his bid for the throne of Persia was foiled by the future Nader Shah Afshar (1736–1747). After Nader Shah's death, the founder of Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah Durrani, established close relations with the *maliks* of Sistan, and in the nineteenth century Persia and Afghanistan came to the brink of war over possession of the region. The border between them was established in 1827 by a British commission and finalized in 1905. The present population is mostly Tajik (East Iranian) and Baluch, engaged in agriculture, pasturing, the food and textile industries, and carpet weaving.

Marta Simidchieva

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SITTANG RIVER Rising in the hills southeast of Mandalay, the Sittang (Sittoung) River flows southward between the Shan Plateau and the Pegu Yoma highland range before entering the flat paddy-field lands of the lower Pegu (Bago) Division. Here it opens

out into a wide estuary, famous for its tidal bore, before emptying into the Gulf of Martaban.

Running parallel to the Irrawaddy River, the Sittang Valley is one of the most strategic in Myanmar's history and development. For much of its 320-kilometer course, the river runs close to important road and rail links between central and south Myanmar. The former royal capital at Toungoo is situated on its banks. Other large towns in the valley include Pyu and Nyaunglebin.

Trade and transport are important in local business, but the economy of the valley remains predominantly agricultural. The Sittang Valley is the largest sugar cane-growing region in the country. Rice is also widely grown, but timber from the surrounding hills is the most valuable natural resource.

Martin Smith

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SIVAS (2002 pop. 259,000). Sivas, capital of the province of Sivas (2002 pop. 779,000), is located north-east of central Turkey, 350 kilometers east of Ankara in the valley of the Kizilirmak River. Inhabited since Hittite times, the city became historically significant under Emperor Diocletian as the Roman city of Sebaste, capital of Armenia Minor. The Armenian king Sennacherib John of Vaspurakan (Van) ceded his land to Byzantine emperor Basil II in 1021. The city was then lost to the Turkmen Danishmendid dynasty (1155–1192) after the Battle of Manzikert in 1071. In 1174, the city was captured by Rum Seljuk Kilic Arslan II and periodically served as capital of the Seljuk empire along with Konya. Under Seljuk rule, Sivas was an important center of trade and site of a citadel, along with mosques and *madrasabs* (colleges), four of which survive today and one of which houses the Sivas Museum. The city fell to the Ottoman sultan Bayezid I (1389–1402) in 1398, was lost to Timur (Tamerlane; 1336–1405) in 1400, and was recaptured by the Ottomans in 1408. Under the Ottomans, Sivas served as the administrative center of the province of Rum until about the late nineteenth century. Upon the return of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), the founder of the Turkish Republic, from Amasya, the Congress of Sivas, considered a turning point in the formation of the Turkish Republic, was held in September 1919. It was at this congress that Kemal's position as chair of

the executive committee of the national resistance was confirmed. Sivas is located on an important rail line linking the cities of Kayseri, Samsun, and Erzurum. Its economy is largely based on agriculture.

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SIXTEEN KINGDOMS The Sixteen Kingdoms is the name given to the period of Chinese history (304–440) when different tribes of non-Han Chinese, including some of nomadic origin, alternated with each other in establishing short-lived kingdoms in northern China. (See Table 1.) Chinese historians list them as the sixteen nations of the five "barbarian" tribes. The period is often called *Wubu Shiliu Guo*, meaning "Period of Five Barbarian Tribes and Sixteen Nations." The peoples were the Di, Hun, Jiehu, Xianbei, and Qiang, originating from Tibetans, Tangut, Proto-Turkic, Mongol, and Tungus tribes. Eventually the Xianbei people reunified northern China in 440.

TABLE 1

The Sixteen Nations				
	Name of the nation	Period	Location in present-day China	Ethnicity
1	Cheng Han	301–347	Sichuan	Di
2	Han (Anterior Zhao)	304–329	Shanxi, and Shaanxi	Hun
3	Anterior Liang	317–376	Gansu	Han
4	Posterior Zhao	319–351	Shandong, Hebei, Shanxi, and Shaanxi	Jiehu
5	Anterior Qin	351–394	Liaoning, Shandong, Hebei, Shanxi, Gansu, Sichuan, and Shaanxi	Di
6	Anterior Yan	337–370	Liaoning, Shandong, Hebei, and Shanxi	Xianbei
7	Posterior Yan	384–409	Liaoning, Shandong, Hebei, and Shanxi	Xianbei
8	Posterior Qin	384–417	Shaanxi	Qiang
9	Western Qin	385–431	Shaanxi	Xianbei
10	Posterior Liang	386–403	Gansu	Di
11	Southern Liang	397–414	Gansu	Xianbei
12	Northern Liang	397–439	Gansu	Hun
13	Southern Yan	398–410	Shandong	Xianbei
14	Western Liang	400–421	Gansu	Han
15	Xia	407–431	Shaanxi	Hun
16	Northern Yan	409–436	Liaoning	Han

During this period, the entire Huang River Valley became a vast battlefield for tribal kingdoms and some remnant Chinese military chieftains. The various nations fought among themselves and blood flowed freely. Although this period is often considered China's Dark Age, due to the chaos and foreign occupation of its territories, the epoch was also a time of great change, as China was transformed by the Indian religion of Buddhism.

Unryu Suganuma

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SO CHONGJU (1915–2000), Korean poet. Born in Cholla Province, South Korea, So Chongju, Korea's premier twentieth-century poet, studied the Chinese classics in a village school and subsequently attended normal school in Seoul where he was expelled for nationalist activities. In 1936 he won a poetry award from the *Tonga Ilbo*, a Korean daily newspaper, and helped found the literary magazine *Poets' Village*—two events that launched his literary career. Active in the formation of the Choson Young Writers Association, he was appointed director of arts in the post-Liberation Ministry of Education. In 1954 he was appointed a member of the Academy of Arts. He returned to his alma mater, Tongguk University, in 1959, where he had a distinguished teaching and creative career, during which he won many major Korean poetry awards, including the Asian Freedom Award (1955), the Korean Academy Award (1967), and the May 16 National Award (1987). *Flower Snake* (1941), *Cuckoo* (1948), *Selected Poems* (1956), *Shilla Notes* (1960), *Winter Sky* (1968), *Collected Poems* (1972), *Lessons of Chilmajae* (1975), *Poems of a Wanderer* (1976), and *Poems After the Crane Left* (1982) are among his best-known collections.

For So Chongju, Korea and its people were like celadon, the celebrated green porcelain. In his poems, he sought a return to a greatness as exceptional as celadon's by re-creating the spirit of Shilla, which he thought represented Korea at its best. His poems are earthy, physical, sensuous, but above all they are exquisitely Korean, informed by an all-pervading Zen awareness.

Kevin O'Rourke

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SOCIAL ASSOCIATIONS—CHINA Associations are groups of people who have organized themselves on the basis of common activities or who pursue similar interests. In the People's Republic of China (PRC), there are four different types of associations: state controlled (such as the so-called mass organizations), state supervised (such as professional and entrepreneurs' associations or hobby-based organizations), informal (organizations of fellow townspeople and clans), and illegal (secret societies, underground groups, opposition groups, or criminal organizations). While the state-controlled organizations have existed for almost the entire history of the PRC, the other three types have begun to reemerge only in the course of the reform process. The reason for this reemergence has been the development of new social strata and actors as well as increasing division of labor and specialization in the process of economic reform.

Emerging Special Interest Groups

Since the 1980s, new groups with special interests have been pushing to form efficacious professional organizations and interest associations. Along with formal groups, there are now also informal ones, and to the traditional organization forms have been added modern ones (women's and environmental groups, for example). This development started in rural areas, where it was encouraged by the return to family-based economic structures and the withdrawal of the state from the running of villages. Often, traditional organizations (such as clans, religious and temple organizations, or secret societies) reemerged. In towns, farmers began to form traditional unofficial organizations and interest groups, most often regional groupings, and gangs of beggars also emerged.

Even (illegal) trade unions of migrant workers have developed; these groups organize strikes and demonstrations. As in other developing countries, the sense of alienation felt by farmers in towns led to the spontaneous formation of groups according to local, ethnic, or professional background. In addition, business associations (for example, associations of entrepreneurs, associations of particular branches of an industry, or professional groups), hobby associations, and sport clubs developed in urban areas. Although the

nonstate organizations are, to an extent, based on traditional structures, their emergence demonstrates a growing need on the part of the population for autonomous organizations.

Social Organizations as State-Society Mediators

The role of social organizations as mediators between state and society is nothing new in China. Traditional organizations were based on shared occupation (merchants, traders, or craftspeople), intellectual camaraderie, family ties (clans), or shared regional origin (regional groups). Particularly in rural areas, secret societies or farmers' interest groups were important. Most secret organizations promised their members a heavenly state of happiness and tried to establish an egalitarian society built on the principles of morality and higher justice.

Toward the end of the Qing era (1912), numerous "modern" groups were formed in towns. These included professional organizations, groups of intellectuals, chambers of commerce, trade unions, and students', farmers', and women's groups. The weakness of the state in the late Qing era and at the beginning of the republic made these organizations increasingly autonomous. The chambers of commerce were thus able to work actively toward the creation of parliaments and the drafting of a constitution. Students', workers', and professional interest groups played an important part in the May Fourth Movement in 1919.

As central government again took control and became more stabilized after 1927, the ruling Guomindang Party enforced a policy that limited the groups' powers. In 1941 a law was passed that tied associations directly to state institutions and put them under state control. With the foundation of the PRC, most organizations were disbanded or changed into party-controlled or party-supervised institutions.

Role in Cultural History

In terms of cultural history, independent interest groups contradict the Confucian precept of the subordination of all interests to the highest authority. This was also true for the guilds that played such an important role in the European process of development. However, craftspeople and merchants never had a decisive influence on China's fate in history, and guilds hardly ever stood up for people's political and civil rights.

The guilds, which had existed for centuries, were mostly structured like families and stood for particularist interests, but they never had an impact on China's political history. They adapted themselves to

the requirements of the government bureaucracy, which controlled towns and markets, and sought to negotiate and petition their way rather than seeking confrontation. They offered their members material advantages, such as supporting them in times of need, and represented their interests in dealings with the authorities. Through a strict codex of rules, the guilds obliged their members to fulfill their duties to the state, especially since the guilds were held responsible by the authorities for their members' behavior. The guilds financed themselves primarily through self-imposed goods taxes. Every guild was headed by a paid state official, who, through his capacity as such, could personally negotiate with senior officials and was officially recognized as a representative of the organization. This corporatist structure, which was easily adaptable to the supervision and control structures of the Communist Party, is in some ways similar to the structure now used by private social organizations in the PRC.

Legalization of Associations

The foundation of academic, professional, social, arts-, sports-, or hobby-based associations has been legal again since the end of the 1980s. Hundreds of thousands of associations and organizations, covering a wide range of social interests, have been created across the country. The 1989 provisional decree offering "Directions for the Registration and Administration of Social Associations" subjected this rapidly growing trend to stronger state regulation, a move that is similar to the policy previously set by the Guomindang. A revised version of this law was passed in 1998. The rules require an official body (authority, state or party institution, or public enterprise) to make a formal application for the association to be recognized and for the official body to take on the formal patronage of the association. As patronage also includes a supervisory function—the heads of the guarantor institution can be made responsible for misconduct by the relevant association—institutions are often prepared to take on this responsibility only in return for (material or immaterial) advantages or because of personal connections.

Association-State Interlinking

It would be wrong to assume that the connection with state or party institutions means that clubs and associations function as merely quasi-state organizations and represent only the interests of party and state. Social pressure that developed following the extension of the market, political liberalization, and growing autonomy in society made the authorization

of associations acceptable to the party and the state. The connection with guarantor institutions has, however, resulted in manifold interlinking between associations and the state. Usually associations attempt to articulate and implement their interests through the guarantor institutions. This happens in many different ways, for example, by negotiations or *guanxi* (that is, creating and using connections). This aim can also be achieved by having well-known and respected functionaries as honorary members or "consultants" to gain political protection and recognition. In authoritarian societies, there is hardly any other way to assert one's interests. The close connections with state or party institutions also show that autonomous organizations are not (yet) possible. In present-day China, it is therefore not the pressure group but the *guanxi* group that solves problems and conflicts and does so by means of patronage. A continuation of this trend is the need to seek protection from a powerful guarantor institution precisely because the connection with an authority or public institution functions as protection and enhances the association's status.

In a society in which independent parallel structures are not permitted, interest representation and participation in negotiation processes between the state and interest groups would be impossible without organizations being interlinked in this way. In China today, a social group's interests are not so much asserted as indirectly negotiated, and therefore they require such interconnections. On the one hand, only in this way can social groups attain a certain degree of participation in negotiations. On the other hand, associations can influence politics through the prescribed state guarantor institution. Such half-autonomous organizations can therefore be seen as the forerunners of autonomous economic and political associations. They are two-sided in character, because they have elements of both state dominance and autonomy. The state allows these associations a certain functional autonomy as long as they do not challenge the state.

As economic reforms and social change have moved forward, interest groups have sprung up. The party is attempting, however, to bind the newly developing interest groups into existing formal structures. On the one hand, increasing economic liberalization has meant that the state is no longer able to control all social activities, but on the other hand, it does not see the necessity for this as long as the newly developing interest groups do not evolve into parallel political structures.

Unlike in democratic societies, the corporatist aspect in authoritarian societies pertains purely to the state as the only body with decision-making power; a

corporatist structure makes it possible for associations to have a voice in discussion processes. At the same time, however, state supervision prevents the emergence of parallel organizations acting independently of the state. This style of corporatism is also referred to as state or authoritarian corporatism. This kind of corporatist structure was created or strengthened in East Asia (Japan, South and North Korea, Taiwan, PRC) during the course of each nation's development. In the PRC, the historically and culturally developed authoritarian corporatism formed a synthesis with Leninist state corporatism. The continuing reduction of the role of the state in economic matters and further social differentiation will probably ascribe an increasingly important function to social organizations in the social and political processes of change.

Thomas Heberer

See also: **Guanxi**

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SOCIAL REALISM—CHINA The term "social realism" is used in a Chinese context to describe the trend prevalent in Chinese literature and cinema of the first half of the twentieth century and refers to a realistic, socially reflective, and politically engaged literary and cinematic approach. Realism was introduced into China from the West at the turn of the twentieth century. Since then various terms, including

humanitarian realism, critical realism, and social realism, have been used to characterize realism in early twentieth-century Chinese literature. Literary critics, writers, and leading intellectuals have offered various interpretations of this vague concept. Chen Duxiu (1879–1942), one of the most influential Chinese intellectuals of the period, embraced social realism by calling for a "popular social literature" and a "fresh and sincere literature of realism." The most prominent literary association in the 1920s and 1930s, the Wenxue Yenjiu Hui ("Literary Research Association"), whose literary magazine attracted major fiction writers, proclaimed a realism labeled as "art-for-life's sake." Leftist literary writers and theoreticians such as Zhou Yang (1908–1989) demanded that literature reflect the reality of social life and exercise active critique of social problems.

The embrace of realism by Chinese writers in this period was chiefly motivated by their political and cultural needs: modernizing China and rebuilding Chinese society and culture. This motive is clearly reflected in the literary realism adopted by major writers of the period, including Lu Xun (1881–1936), Mao Dun (1896–1981), Lao She (1899–1966), and Ba Jin (b. 1904). Their works portrayed a critical picture of a sick nation, a hypocritical and stale culture, social injustice and suffering, and the deprivation of human dignity and freedom.

Although strongly influenced by the Western mode of critical realism, the fictional form of Chinese social realism has its own distinct makeup and varieties. Major writers such as Mao Dun, Lao She, and Shen Congwen (1902–1988), for instance, realistically depicted their social concern through, respectively, historical, melodramatic, and lyrical narrative modes and forms of representation. Some writers, however, sacrificed literary forms and artistic integrity by being overly concerned with political content.

Social realism also refers specifically to Chinese leftist and progressive filmmakers during the Chinese civil war (1945–1949), whose "social realist" films documented the social misery of that period. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, social realism was replaced by the officially sanctioned socialist realism, which became the dominant theory in literature and arts in Mainland China during the second half of the twentieth century.

Ming Jian

See also: **Ba Jin; Civil War of 1945–1949; Lao She; Lu Xun; Shen Congwen**

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SOCIAL RELATIONS—JAPAN Japanese social relations are organized around values of interdependence and reciprocity that guide the creation and expression of human interactions. Often, these values are expressed via the establishment and reproduction of reciprocal obligations through which coworkers, family members, friends, and acquaintances build relationships over time. These interdependencies and obligations are established and expressed both in terms of individual relationships (for example, with friends, family, and coworkers) and in terms of relationships to particular groups or organizations to which one belongs (such as school, company, and community). At the core of Japanese notions about social interaction is the idea that long-term relationships are maintained through a combination of emotional bonds, practical bonds, and symbolic actions, such as gift giving, that mark and represent the continuation of the relationship. Reciprocity and interdependence are involved in both vertical relationships between subordinates and superiors and horizontal relationships among peers.

Obligation and Reciprocity

Obligations in Japan are often organized around concepts that index either an asymmetrical or symmetrical relationship between individuals. Asymmetrical obligations can exist either as a part of the innate character of a relationship, as with the parent-child bond, or from feelings of gratitude and indebtedness that arise out of the benevolent or beneficial actions of another, such as feelings of indebtedness a student has towards his or her mentor. Asymmetric obligation is usually associated with the concept of *on* (literally, "kindness," "favor," or "blessing"), which indexes a feeling of gratitude on the part of the debtor towards the donor for having received some benefit. Although *on* can come to exist in any relationship, as an innate quality it is most closely associated with the debt of gratitude a child owes to his or her parents and, by extension, ancestors for having been brought into the world and raised. The implication with *on* is that the debt incurred is asymmetrical: the debt a child owes to a parent and ancestors, or a student owes to a mentor, can never be satisfactorily repaid, because the feeling of gratitude does not normally lapse. The debtor

desires, and may be expected, to express his or her gratitude by continually making efforts to repay at least part of this endless debt. The importance of *on* for understanding social relations in Japan is that rather than being understood as a discrete instance that occurs during the course of a social relationship, *on* operates as a symbolic representation of the relationship itself and the inherent asymmetry of the benefit received.

On is a form of obligation that is closely intertwined with emotional bonds associated with love, friendship, and appreciation, and thus generally carries a positive connotation. Reciprocal obligations, on the other hand, while constituting a basis for securing social relationships, are not always perceived in a positive way. Japanese people live within webs of reciprocal obligations; some of these obligations are incurred without actually desiring to enter into a relationship—for example, through a benefit received by a family member or simply by being related to someone through common membership in family, company, school, or community. It is not unusual for an established relationship, particularly when it is not desired by one or both parties, to be described in terms of being a burden, in that each exchange requires an eventual response, and once engaged in the relationship, it is difficult to break it off without offending the other party. This sort of burdensome obligation is usually expressed as *giri* (literally, "duty," "obligation"), which refers to feelings associated with loss of autonomy that result from being indebted to another. The debtor returns the favor not out of a feeling of gratitude, but out of a desire to be rid of the debt (although, particularly if it involves family or work relationships, this may not be possible) and guilt about possibly not satisfactorily carrying out one's reciprocal obligation.

The concepts of *giri* and *on* are difficult to separate. The character of obligation in a relationship may change over time; a relationship that is initially based upon *on* may become burdensome and, thus, become understood more in terms of *giri* by one or both parties. As noted above, among the most noted areas in which individuals are viewed as having *on* is in the relationship with parents. Simply for having been brought into the world, one owes an enormous debt of gratitude to one's parents. This is responded to through the actions associated with filial piety, including heeding parental wishes and demands, caring for them in old age, and continuing to care for them after they die through rituals associated with ancestor veneration. However, it is not unusual for younger Japanese to describe this debt to one's parents in terms

of *giri* rather than *on*, indicating that the repayment is required, but does not necessarily actually involve gratitude. In many cases, a person's interpretation of the debt owed to parents (or others) involves an ambiguously defined combination of *giri* and *on* and ambivalence about how and when the debt should be repaid. This, of course, allows for considerable room in interpretation and expression by both parties as they manipulate the social and symbolic capital associated with the obligations connected with a relationship.

Interdependence

In Japan, interdependence (sometimes referred to as dependency) has been represented in scholarly literature largely in terms of the concepts of *amae*, *amaeru*, and *amayakasu*. The term *amae*, as it was made famous in the work of Japanese psychologist Takeo Doi, refers to passive dependence (or sometimes love) and is manifested through the desire to be indulged by the individual who is the object of *amae*. Typically, the term is used in describing the behavior of a child toward his or her mother, and normally this form of indulgence relationship is viewed positively (although the term *amae ko* can be used to refer to a spoiled child). Doi argues that the concept of *amae* is not limited to the mother-child bond, but is, in fact, central to how Japanese form social relationships.

Doi paints a very broad and asymmetrical—dependence oriented—picture of the *amae* relationship, one that has been refined by other scholars, such as the anthropologist Takie Lebra. Lebra points out that the seeking of indulgence (*amaeru*) is complementary; it must be enacted along with a reciprocal granting of indulgence (*amayakasu*)—which can involve both the active solicitation and passive acceptance of another's wish to be indulged. *Amaeru* and *amayakasu* thus can be understood in terms of complementary roles that people assume in the process of building and maintaining relationships with each other. As people interact, they engage and manipulate the expression of these roles, usually in terms of self-interest: a person who is good at *amaeru* is able to accept and appropriately respond to the *amayakasu* desire expressed by another, and vice versa. A person may, for example, choose to use the feelings associated with *amae* to get into his or her boss's good graces by reacting to and accepting the desire of the boss to behave in a paternal manner and nurture his or her subordinates (*amayakasu*). The *amaeru-amayakasu* relationship is interdependent and mutually beneficial, but it may be concluded when one or both parties no longer perceive the benefits of the interdependence.

The Limits of Definition

Concepts such as *amae*, *giri*, and *on* are important elements in how Japanese people establish, develop, and maintain emotive and social bonds. However, each of these concepts conveys multiple meanings and interpretations. Rather than being identifiers of Japanese social relations, they are tools that Japanese people use in creating and interpreting those relations. Each of these concepts not only describes elements of social relations in Japan, but also identifies tools that people employ and manipulate as they interact with each other.

John W. Traphagan

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SOCIAL STRATIFICATION—CHINA When the socialist government of Mao Zedong (1893–1976) came to power in 1949, one of its major goals was to reduce the stark inequalities of income and wealth that existed at that time. To this end, the government appropriated most private property, expanded public education, abolished labor markets, and instituted wage controls. By the early 1960s, inequalities of income and wealth in rural and urban areas were sharply reduced, and living standards for most Chinese were greatly improved. Ironically, however, socialism introduced new inequalities—among those who did and did not have network ties to government officials and Communist Party members and among those who did and did not work in state-owned firms. Furthermore, one of the most serious inequalities in pre-1949

China—the disparity in income and living conditions between urban and rural areas—was never eradicated under Mao. Just two years after Mao's death in 1976, many of the policies designed to abolish economic inequalities were incrementally dismantled in an effort to marketize the economy. Post-Mao market socialism could reverse many of the equalizing trends of the Maoist era.

Stratification under Mao

In the decades before 1949, China was continuously pummeled by war, acts of imperialism, and domestic turmoil. By the time Mao's government ascended to power, China had become a society in which a small proportion of well-to-do Chinese lived alongside countless impoverished people. In rural areas, where about 80 percent of the population lived, 70 percent of farmers were landless and worked for subsistence wages for a small number of landowners. In cities, unemployment was high, and begging and prostitution were rampant. Thus, the government was faced with the immediate problem of raising living standards for a mostly destitute population.

Reshaping Stratification in Cities The government sought to address economic inequalities in urban areas by appropriating wealth and abolishing labor markets. Privately owned housing was seized and subdivided into much smaller living spaces. Families could rent these apartments but never purchase them, thus eliminating a key means through which inequalities of wealth can be perpetuated from generation to generation.

By 1958, virtually all privately owned urban businesses had been appropriated and socialized as well. Furthermore, in an effort to ensure full employment, market competition for jobs in these firms was eliminated. People leaving school were assigned to jobs bureaucratically. The masses of urban unemployed were either assigned to jobs in factories or businesses or were sent to rural areas to work in agriculture. Once matched to a job, an employee could not quit voluntarily. But employees could not be fired either and thus essentially had a guarantee of lifelong employment.

Urban inequalities were further reduced through salary compression in firms. Differences in the salaries paid for high-skill, high-prestige occupations such as doctors and other professionals, and low-prestige jobs such as unskilled factory work, were much smaller than is typical in capitalist economies. Efforts were also made to increase the social prestige attached to manual labor and to downplay the social importance of white-collar work.

As a result of these economic policies, income inequalities during the Maoist era plummeted. For example, the richest 10 percent of the urban population took in only 21 percent of total urban income, a figure about ten percentage points lower than the average for other developing countries at that time. Living standards for the average urban resident improved substantially.

Furthermore, the determinants of socioeconomic status were different from those in capitalist economies. In capitalist economies, socioeconomic position is largely dictated by income, and therefore by one's educational level. The highest-paying jobs require a long period of education, and there is a big difference in pay between jobs that do and do not require extensive educational training. Mao's government expanded public education a great deal. However, salary compression in urban firms meant that the payoff in income for a lengthy education was not great.

Instead, nonmonetary employment benefits became a much more important source of stratification in urban areas, and these were determined not by what a person did on the job but by the type of work organization in which he or she did it. Though nearly all urban work organizations were government owned, they were not all administered by the same government offices. About three-fourths of urban residents were employed in state-owned work organizations, which were controlled by the central government. The rest worked in collectively owned organizations that were controlled and operated at the municipal level. State-owned firms were allocated bigger budgets and more resources and thus could afford to provide their employees with generous fringe benefits like housing, health insurance, pension plans, and consumer goods. In general, collectively owned firms could not provide such benefits and could pay employees a salary only about three-fourths of what they would have received in state-owned firms. Because housing, health insurance, and pension plans could not be acquired through markets or other government channels, placement in a state-owned firm became the goal among urban Chinese.

Important inequalities also emerged among those who did and did not have personal ties to government officials and Communist Party members. In the absence of markets, government officials and party members had monopoly control over the allocation of economic rewards. Individuals with ties to officials or party members could use these connections to maximize career opportunities or nonwage work benefits.

Maoist Policies in Rural China The socialists also attempted to reduce rural economic inequalities by

confiscating resources from the wealthy. In rural China, this wealth consisted primarily of agricultural land. Many well-to-do landlords were killed in retribution for their exploitation of tenant farmers. Starting in 1951, confiscated land was redistributed equally to all rural households, for them to farm privately. However, just a few years later, in 1953, the government began taking this land back, designating it as community property. Families were required to work larger plots of land collectively, in groups of twenty to forty households, and the harvest was split between government and the collective. Individuals were paid for their work in points, which were periodically traded in for money and grain. While average household incomes in rural areas remained low, this collective system of farming raised living standards for poor families and produced communities with much less economic stratification than before.

Gender and Socialism One subjugated social group especially targeted by rural and urban economic policies was women. Prior to 1949, Chinese women had very little social status or political and economic power. Their low social position was underpinned by a patriarchal, patrilineal family structure. Male household heads had near-absolute power in the household and held legal right to all family property. Women—especially new brides joining the family—were marginal, powerless members, who were often treated as servants. Fathers and brothers could provide no protection from abusive treatment by in-laws, since a woman lost most ties to her natal family after marriage.

One key way that Mao's government tried to rupture this family structure was by pulling women into the paid labor force. In urban areas they were incorporated into a growing industrial sector, and in rural areas they were put to work in agriculture. The idea was that women would be able to wield more power within their families if they had an independent income.

Efforts to reduce gender inequalities were somewhat successful. It became routine in both rural and urban areas for women to work, and as a result of being employed their status in the family improved. However, there was—and remains—a great deal of gender segregation in the workforce, with women usually assigned to lower paying jobs and given lowest priority for nonmonetary benefits such as housing. Especially in rural areas, Chinese families remained strongly patriarchal, because the tradition of patrilineal marriage was never challenged by the government.

The Rural-Urban Gap Though Maoist economic policies reduced inequalities within rural and urban communities, there remained a substantial gap in income and

living standards between rural and urban areas. As in all developing countries, urban residents in China prior to 1949 enjoyed much higher living standards than rural residents, because of better access to education and good-paying jobs. After both rural and urban economies were socialized, this gap began to get smaller. In 1957, for example, urban residents took in three times the income of rural residents. By 1978, urban incomes were 2.36 times greater than rural incomes. Thus the rural-urban gap was smaller, but still substantial, under Mao. Urban residents continued to have much better access to schools, medical care, and retirement pensions. Generous government investment in urban industries, and low state-set prices for agricultural goods, were factors that kept the rural-urban gap from completely disappearing. Migration laws preventing rural residents from moving to urban areas also kept urban incomes high, by limiting the supply of labor for urban industries.

Stratification after Mao

Just two years after Mao's death in 1976, the new leader, Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), began to implement economic policies designed to marketize China's economy. In urban areas, private businesses were legalized, and foreign investment was encouraged. A private sector grew quickly, so that by 1999 nearly 35 million urban residents were employed in privately owned firms, according to government estimates. In July 2001, it became legal for private business owners to join the Chinese Communist Party, a further indication of the growing acceptance of private enterprise. Likewise, reforms were instituted in publicly owned firms, requiring them to operate more like private ones. Managers were given greater autonomy in setting wages for workers and also came under greater pressure to operate in the black. Post-Mao economic policies also sought incrementally to institute labor markets in urban areas, in both public and private firms. By the late 1990s, residents of large cities were no longer assigned to jobs by the government and, once employed, could quit or be laid off from their jobs.

Post-Mao economic reforms have reintroduced substantial economic inequalities in urban communities, in part because some residents now earn very high salaries in foreign-invested firms. An equally important contributing factor is the growing unemployment problem. Pressure on public firms to be more profitable after Mao's death gave managers incentives to cut labor costs. Layoffs are becoming more and more common as a result, especially among middle-aged women. Some employers lay employees off to deal with an overstaffing problem. Others wish to replace their urban employees with cheaper recruits from rural ar-

reas, who have been allowed to migrate to urban areas and work in urban firms since 1983. By 1988 about 2 percent of the urban population was unemployed, a figure that is large compared with the Maoist era and increasing every year. Urban unemployment is publicly acknowledged as a serious and growing social problem.

Post-Mao market reforms in rural areas have also been extensive. Beginning in the late 1970s, collective farming groups were disbanded, and rural families were once again assigned land for use at their own discretion. Rural families also became free to allocate household labor to nonagricultural work. Rural families now routinely have one or more members working in industrial jobs, which bring much better pay than agriculture. Encouragement of private enterprise in rural areas has resulted in a mushrooming of industrial work opportunities in rural villages and towns.

Because of these burgeoning industrial job opportunities for rural residents, and because household agricultural production gives rural families greater profit incentives than collective agriculture, rural residents have become much more affluent, on average, than they were during the Maoist era. At the same time, economic inequalities within communities have increased, as some rural residents benefit more than others from these new opportunities.

That post-Mao economic reforms have increased inequalities in both rural and urban communities is not controversial. However, scholars disagree about whether upward economic mobility is still most advantageously pursued through personal ties to political actors. Some sociologists have argued that, as a socialist economy marketizes, political actors such as Communist Party members or government officials lose their monopoly control over economic resources. Opportunities for upward economic mobility open up among individuals who are not political actors or who lack ties to political actors, and the relative economic advantage of those with political capital declines. Individuals with education or work experience start to see greater returns for those attributes. Thus, for example, in a private, profit-driven business, someone with a college education but no political ties will be a more attractive job candidate than someone who has political connections but no college degree.

Others have argued that political actors still maintain privileged access to economic resources or are able to convert their political power into market resources easily. For example, a Communist Party member who wishes to become an entrepreneur can cut through the red tape required to establish a private business much faster than someone who is not a party member.

Changing Social Stratification

Contemporary China is a fascinating case study for social stratification. Since a socialist government was established in 1949, China has undergone an enormous amount of purposive social change in a very short time. Maoist efforts to change the stratification system demonstrate that economic policies can be an effective tool in reducing economic inequalities. In a matter of two decades or so, China went from a country with a large impoverished population in both rural and urban areas to one in which most citizens enjoyed a decent standard of living and in which the distribution of economic rewards was much more equal. Once the post-Mao government began to dismantle these economic policies, however, many of the equalizing trends of the Maoist era began to reverse.

Mao's China has also demonstrated that although reductions in inequalities can be made, it is difficult to eradicate them altogether. The concerted efforts to eliminate gender inequalities were only somewhat successful, and the rural-urban income gap never completely closed. Socialism also introduced new sources of stratification: among those who did and did not have personal ties to political actors and among those assigned to different types of work units.

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SOCIALIST SPIRITUAL CIVILIZATION—CHINA After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted economic reform and liberalization policies in

the late 1970s, many party members began to worry that if China pursued only the goals of economic development, society might advance in material terms but regress spiritually. The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) had done irrevocable damage to the Chinese moral universe. Unbridled pursuit of economic development now could lead to a society whose citizens were materially wealthy but selfish, grasping, and base. They would become psychologically alienated: suspicious and mistrustful of others and unable to cooperate either for the public or their own good. Eventually, material advancement itself would grind to a halt.

Concern mounted as Western films, television programs, and popular music surged into China in the early 1980s. Most of this popular culture would not normally be seen as seriously challenging the Chinese way of life, but older comrades, in particular, feared that in the spiritual vacuum that prevailed following the Cultural Revolution, even otherwise innocuous concepts and products could do great damage. They decided to launch a "campaign against spiritual pollution" in 1983 but had to cut it short after a few months when it started negatively affecting the economy. Clearly, in any contest between material and spiritual civilization, the CCP would favor the material. Nevertheless, the CCP did formally adopt "building a socialist spiritual civilization" as a fundamental government goal at a special CCP meeting in September 1986.

No one believes the CCP achieved this goal or even made significant progress toward it. The problem was twofold. First, there was no clearly articulated image of what a socialist spiritual civilization would look like. What should people think and do to build one? How should they change their behavior? Usually the answers were that people should "have lofty ideals," "proceed from a scientific spirit," "love genuinely beautiful things," and other vague banalities. They should also do the opposite of anything defined as bad in the present. For example, if corruption was defined as bad, they should not be corrupt; if spitting on the sidewalk was defined as bad, they should not spit.

Second, the incentive structures necessary to build material civilization frequently rewarded behaviors opposite to those necessary to build spiritual civilization. Too many "lofty ideals" and too much altruism would lead inexorably to failure in the brutally competitive economy. To get rich was undeniably glorious, but no individual could be assured that today's wealth would not be confiscated in some arbitrary way tomorrow. Self-protection took precedence over concern for the achievement of nebulous public goals. Eventually, a new antimorality took hold that stressed

the "virtues" of not being so foolish as to take building a socialist spiritual civilization seriously.

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SOIL LOSS Soil loss threatens Asia's food self-sufficiency, and is listed among the Green Revolution's deleterious effects. (The Green Revolution was a combination of land-tenure reform with research on high-yield varieties and petroleum-based fertilizers and soil additives to augment crop yields in developing countries during the post-World War II period.) The 1977 United Nations Conference on Desertification is credited with bringing attention to soil loss as a threat to sustainable agriculture in Asia. The United Nations Development Program, Food and Agricultural Organization, and Environment Program estimate that half of South Asia's arable soil suffers from degradation. A tripartite study concluded that 43 percent of the region's agricultural land was degraded, affecting Iran most severely, followed by Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Bhutan.

The leading cause of soil degradation is erosion; both water and wind detach soil particles and sediment. Hydrological processes, such as sheet and gully erosion, and rilling account for two-thirds of erosion. Soil erosion is expected to seriously compromise food production in the Himalayan foothills, Southeast Asia, and parts of southern China, where government policy prohibits cultivation on slopes steeper than 28 percent. Mass wasting and wind are responsible for the remainder of erosion. In Kazakhstan, the Institute for Soil Management estimates that due to the abandonment of areas degraded by wind erosion, available cropland will be reduced by one-fourth. Rather than representing an extreme case, this is characteristic of the post-Soviet abandonment of marginal, frequently heavily eroded land.

A secondary cause of soil degradation is compaction caused by mechanical tilling. During the Soviet period, agricultural areas of the Newly Independent States (NIS, also known as the Former Soviet Union) experienced expansion of extensive, mechanical cultivation. These areas' soils suffer from compaction due to the use of heavy agricultural machinery. Soil compaction continues to compromise Asian agricultural productivity. Soil depletion is also caused by perennial irrigation practices. Depletion of soil nutrients through repeated plantings during a given agricultural year is an identified cause of soil degradation, leading to abandonment of previously productive acreage in extreme cases. Poor water management, in particular



Soil erosion caused by logging in a rain forest in Borneo. (GALLO IMAGES/CORBIS)

inadequate drainage, is the fourth factor leading to soil degradation. Inadequate drainage leads to waterlogging, or saturation with water, and salinization, excessive saltiness hindering plant growth, which can decrease productivity. In order to mitigate salinity, cultivators in Asia Minor and the Middle East leave 60 percent of rain-fed land fallow each year.

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SOL The traditional Korean Lunar New Year's Day (Sol or Sollal) has long been one of the most festive days of the year and is still observed by many Koreans. The lunar calendar year begins on the new moon occurring in the latter part of January or in February. Sol is a family celebration beginning in the predawn hours following the end of Sottal, the last lunar month of the year. For this day, family members gather from far and near at the home of the oldest male member for ancestral rites and entertainment.

The first of two ancestral rites, *charye*, is held before sunrise in the home or sometimes in a family shrine. Tables of foods are offered to the souls of ancestors, followed by full bows. The second memorial rite, *songmyo*, is held at the ancestral tombs or burial mounds, often situated on hillsides near ancestral homes. Here, too, food offerings and solemn ceremonial bows are made.

Early in the morning before breakfast, younger family members, dressed in new or traditional clothes, greet older relatives with a ceremonial bow and wishes of good health and good fortune in the new year. The New Year's meal invariably includes rice cake soup (*ttokguk*). The white slices of rice cake symbolize the solemnity of the occasion and the desire for the new year to be free of misfortune. It is said that after eating a bowl of rice cake soup on this day, one becomes a year older, following the Korean custom of calculating age by the number of calendar years in which one has lived.

The latter part of the day turns festive with the family playing the traditional game of *yut*, a board game with four douse-like sticks that determine how quickly the players may move through the course on the board. Good fortune throughout the new year is believed to be prize for the winning side. The game of the day for young girls and women is bouncing on seesaws consisting of a plank with sheaves of straw or a rolled-up straw mat underneath. Standing on the ends of the



The traditional Korean Confucian New Year's Day celebration includes prayers and food. (NATAHN BENN/CORBIS)

plank, the participants in turn are bounced high into the air. One explanation is that the game derived from the custom of not allowing the womenfolk outside of the walls surrounding the home. By seesawing in the courtyard, young ladies would have the rare opportunity to get a glimpse of any young man who might be passing by outside the walls.

Though both the lunar New Year's Day and the solar (1 January) are official holidays in South Korea, the solar holiday has been reduced to a single day because many people prefer the traditional lunar New Year's Day for the observance of some of Korea's most traditional customs.

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See also: **Sottal**

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SOLO (1999 est. pop. 590,000). Solo (Surakarta in Indonesian; Soerakarta in Dutch) is a city on the Solo River in Central Java Province, Java, Indonesia. An important historical and cultural center in Indonesia, Solo was the capital of the powerful Surakarta principality under the Dutch, which in the eighteenth century controlled a significant part of Java.

The area of Central Java was one of the most significant political and cultural centers in the history of Javanese civilization. The history of Solo began when Sunan Paku Buwana II, the king of Mataram, gave orders that a location be found to set up a new capital city of the Mataram kingdom. In 1746, a village on the Solo River was chosen for development. The power of Mataram, however, was weakened by internal political instability and rivalry between traditional rulers. Under the Giyanti Treaty, on 13 February 1755, the Mataram kingdom was divided into two parts, Surakarta and Yogyakarta. The Dutch East India Company established control over both principalities. When in 1949 Indonesia won its independence from the Dutch, the Surakarta principality was incorporated into Central Java Province. It became a commercial center for this region, relying on agriculture and small-scale manufacturing—of goods such as batik cloth, fine metal products, woodcarvings, and traditional musical instruments—as well as tourism.

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SONG DYNASTY China's Song dynasty (960–1279) was founded by Zhao Kuangyin (temple name Taizu, reigned 960–976) during a mutiny in 960. The Song achievements are so dynamic and brilliant that some historians claim this dynasty marks the beginning of "modern" China. The Song is divided into two periods. The Northern Song (960–1126) ended when its capital city, Kaifeng, in north China, was captured by the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234). The Southern Song, whose capital city was located in the south at Linan (present-day Hangzhou), was conquered by the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) in 1279.

Political Changes

The Song dynasty was founded when Taizu, the palace army commander-in-chief of the Later Zhou dynasty (951–960), one of the dynasties that ruled part of China during the period of disunity between the Tang and Song dynasties, was supported by his rebellious troops in claiming the imperial throne. To centralize power at the court, Taizu persuaded his military officers to give up their commands in exchange for honorary titles, sinecure offices, and generous pensions. Meanwhile, he stressed the Confucian spirit of humane administration and promoted the civil service examination as the most prestigious means of government recruitment. Under the examination system, candidates for government offices went through a series of tests at three levels: prefecture, Ministry of Rites, and imperial palace. To succeed in the examinations, candidates had to memorize the Confucian classics and be able to answer questions regarding statecraft and imperial policies. Through the examination system, the Song recruited new groups of excellent scholar-officials who, though they lacked previous bureaucratic background, dominated the higher policy-making levels of government. Unlike the old aristocratic families who held power during the Tang dynasty (618–907), this new gentry ruling elite neither enjoyed guaranteed continuity of official status nor was restricted in its upward social mobility. Success in the Song was based on literary learning, examination degree, office holding, and landownership.



Under Emperor Taizong (reigned 976–997), the basic institutions of the new dynasty were adopted. The central government was divided into three major departments: Secretariat–Chancellery, Bureau of Military Affairs, and State Finance Commission, which were independent of one another but were under the emperor’s direct supervision. To maintain disciplinary surveillance over officialdom, the court established independent surveillance and remonstrance officials under the offices of the Censorate and the Remonstrance Bureau.

In local areas, the lowest unit of formal government was the district. Districts were in turn grouped in prefectures. The court also established the supervisory units—circuits—to coordinate the relations between prefectures and the central government. Song government was more autocratic than government under previous dynasties had been.

Wang Anshi’s Reforms During Emperor Shenzong’s reign (1068–1085), growing problems in finance and foreign relations led Chief Counselor Wang Anshi (1021–1086) to launch a multifaceted reform program. He created a fund for low-interest agricultural loans to farmers and small merchants, who were thereby spared the exorbitant demands of moneylenders. He had new land surveys conducted so that property taxes could be assessed more equitably, and he instituted a system that made the government an active agent in trade. Wang also established a village militia system for local policing and for the buildup of army reserves; he replaced corvée labor with a hired service system financed by a graduated tax levied on all families; he emphasized professional courses in law, medicine, and military science in the civil service examinations; and he brought government clerks under stricter supervision and provided incentives for promotion. The reform programs, while achieving some success in certain areas, were largely undermined by determined opposition from the groups that were hurt by the reform measures—large landowners, big merchants, and moneylenders. The opposition vigorously attacked the reformers and forced Wang to resign office.

Wang Anshi’s reforms and the conservative opposition to them divided the bureaucracy and weakened the dynasty. During the reign of Emperor Huizong (1101–1125), who is better remembered as an artist and patron of the arts than as an effective ruler, court extravagance weakened the dynasty’s finances, the bureaucracy continued to grow, corruption increased, and other signs of dynastic decline—including peasant rebellions—appeared.

CHINA—HISTORICAL PERIODS

Xia dynasty (2100–1766 BCE)
 Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE)
 Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE)
 Western Zhou (1045–771 BCE)
 Eastern Zhou (770–221 BCE)
 Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE)
 Warring States period (475–221 BCE)
 Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE)
 Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE)
 Three Kingdoms period (220–265 CE)
 North and South dynasties (220–589 CE)
 Sui dynasty (581–618 CE)
 Tang dynasty (618–907 CE)
 Five Dynasties period (907–960 CE)
 Song dynasty (960–1279)
 Northern Song (960–1126)
 Southern Song (1127–1279)
 Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234)
 Yuan dynasty (1279–1368)
 Ming dynasty (1368–1644)
 Qing dynasty (1644–1912)
 Republican China (1912–1927)
 People’s Republic of China (1949–present)
 Republic of China (1949–present)
 Cultural Revolution (1966–1976)

Threats from the North However, the most serious threat to the dynasty came from the northern nomadic empires. Since the founding of the dynasty, the Song had been harried by raids and invasions from neighboring regimes to the north: the Khitan Liao (907–1125), the Tangut Xi Xia (1032–1227), and the Jurchen Jin. After failed efforts to recover territories lost in northern China, the Song keyed military strategy to defense. The dynasty concluded a peace treaty with the Liao in 1005, in which the Song acknowledged loss of territory and agreed to pay the Liao a handsome annual tribute. The Song signed similar agreements with Xi Xia and the Jurchen Jin as well, all of which severely weakened the Song regime. In the early twelfth century, the Jin attacked the Song capital of Kaifeng and captured the Chinese emperor and the entire imperial house, thus ending the Northern Song.

Establishment of the Southern Song In 1127 Song loyalists put Gaozong (r. 1127–1162) on the throne and established the Southern Song in Hangzhou, south of the Chang (Yangtze) River. In his efforts to restore the ruling house, Gaozong recruited bureaucrats, secured fiscal resources, and extended centralized control. The

new ruler, however, did not want to prolong the war with the Jurchens; he valued most the security of his realm. In 1141, on the eve of concluding peace negotiations with the Jurchen Jin dynasty, Gaozong ordered the execution of one of his generals, Yue Fei (1103–1141), who had openly criticized the peace negotiations. Yue Fei later became a symbol of patriotism for refusing to give up on restoring all of China's lost territory. In the treaty of 1142, the Song accepted the Huai River as its northern boundary, agreed to make annual payments to the Jin, and recognized the Jin as its superior. In subsequent years, the Jurchens continued raiding the Southern Song until they were destroyed by the combined attacks of the Mongols and the Southern Song in 1234.

During the Southern Song period, the political system became more centralized. At first, Gaozong delegated power to a team of ministers, who, because of the crisis situation, exercised both civil and military authority. In 1139, however, the ministerial team was dispensed with, and Chief Counselor Qin Gui (1090–1155), the chief minister who was responsible for the execution of Yue Fei, exercised sole power on behalf of the emperor. This institutional change toward absolutism was to continue throughout the Southern Song. Under Emperor Ningzong (reigned 1194–1224), chief counselors Han Tuozhou (1151–1207) and Shi Miyuan (1164–1233) held power successively. The last powerful official of the Southern Song was Jia Sidao (1213–1275), who became chief counselor in 1259 and remained in office until shortly before the dynasty collapsed. Jia tried to strengthen the government by dismissing many incompetents and curbing excessive corruption. By then, however, the Mongols under Khubilai Khan (1215–1294) of the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) were across the Chang River. Hangzhou was captured without a fight in 1276; and the dynasty ended in 1279 when the last imperial heir died in Guangzhou and the Song fleet was finally destroyed.

Socioeconomic Changes

The Song represents an era of dramatic social and economic changes. The economic focus of the dynasty shifted south. For the first time in Chinese history, more people lived in the rice-growing region of the Chang River valley than in other parts of the country. In agriculture, new types of rice entered China from Champa during the eleventh century; the new varieties shortened the growing season and produced two or three crops a year in the south. Combined with technical improvements in damming methods and water pumps, farmers could grow wet-field rice, the most labor-intensive but also most productive form of agri-

culture, in a much wider range of terrains and climates than before. The increased yields provided food supplies for a population of more than 100 million. Improved tools also raised manpower efficiency.

In manufacturing, Chinese porcelain made in such towns as Jingdezhen gained international fame. Paper making and all the processes involved in book production advanced. Silk products were widely consumed in society, and shipbuilding gained new importance as maritime trade became more important to the economy. Production of gold, silver, lead, and tin also increased, and new techniques and technology made possible the production of more than 100,000 tons of pig iron and steel each year.

A commercial revolution was a remarkable feature of the Song economic transformation. To a great extent, the Song developed a market economy. With different regions specializing in the production of various commodities, a nationwide market was formed in China. Numerous market centers flourished in all cities and major towns, where shops and stalls sold products drawn from all over the country. Commercial organizations became more sophisticated. Brokers provided active services between transaction parties. Some merchants combined brokerage with the operation of storehouses and hostels. An early form of bank, called a deposit shop, was developed in many parts of the empire to facilitate the transactions. Merchants used drafts called *feiquan* ("flying money") and certificates of deposit to reduce the danger of robbery and other inconveniences. During the eleventh century, the Song became the first rulers in the world to issue paper money; its use became widespread. International trade also flourished under the Song. With well-equipped junks, Chinese sailors and merchants moved southward and linked up with merchants from Persia and Arabia.

Commercialization was greatly facilitated by improved communication networks, which made products available even in remote places. Along the government-maintained highways, private hostels and inns served busy traders. Convenient waterways reduced the cost of traveling and shipping. Aided by compasses and other instruments, Song ships navigated the high seas. The market economy had progressed to such a state that the government levied more taxes in commerce than in agriculture or industry. By 1065 the Northern Song government was taking in annual cash tax payments that were twenty times what the Tang had received in 749. The income of the Southern Song consisted of more cash revenues than grain and textile receipts (grain and textiles were also accepted as tax payments at this time).

Economic vitality stimulated the process of urbanization. China had numerous cities with over 100,000 people; the populations of several metropolitan areas approached one million. The Tang city style of strictly regulated and enclosed market blocks was replaced by open trade centers and proliferating stores. The Northern Song capital of Kaifeng, as illustrated in Zhang Zeduan's scroll *Spring Festival on the River* (c. 1186), was filled with stores, stands, restaurants, ships, trade guilds, clinics, and hostels. With a population of perhaps two million and a location near the East China Sea, the Southern Song capital of Hangzhou grew in response to market forces and mercantile necessities, serving as a port for foreign trade. For the first time in China's history, maritime trade became a significant component of the economy, and tariffs substantially contributed to government revenue.

Women were active participants in social life. They bore and reared children, advised husbands and taught sons pursuing official careers, assisted husbands in performing ancestral rites, managed household affairs, and worked by raising silkworms, making clothes, planting grain, pounding rice, selling goods, or keeping books. Women also had the right to own property and were able to inherit their families' property. Despite growing emphasis on the virtue of female chastity, women had the legal right to remarry, and many did. Many women, such as the great poet Li Qingzhao (1084–c. 1151), contributed to the cultural output of the dynasty. Song women suffered a decline in social standing with the spread of foot binding, a custom that was not abandoned until the twentieth century.

Cultural and Intellectual Changes

The most remarkable feature of the Song intellectual world was the advent of Neo-Confucianism. The Neo-Confucian upsurge that had begun in the late Tang embraced many forms, including classical scholarship, historical studies, political reforms, and moral and spiritual cultivation. During the Northern Song, a new Confucian metaphysics emerged, borrowing from Taoism, Buddhism, and classical Confucianism. Confucianists developed ideas such as "Great Ultimate" (*taiji*), "principle" (*li*), "material force" (*qi*), and "mind-and-heart" (*xin*). These ideas were later synthesized by Zhu Xi (1130–1200) into a belief system that was labeled either "Learning of Principle" (*lixue*) or "Learning of the Way" (*daoxue*). To Zhu Xi and his followers, *taiji* was the origin of the universe. Everything that existed was a combination of *li* and *qi*. Education, which consisted of mastering Confucian classics such as the Four Books, meant a deep self-cultivation of moral consciousness and apprehension of

universal principles and the true Way. A moral society constituted the only foundation for good government. To propagate his teachings, Zhu Xi developed a curriculum for both educated elite and general audiences and offered lectures at private academies. Although other forms of Neo-Confucianism also flourished at the time, it was Zhu Xi's school of thought that was later declared the state orthodoxy and guided the imperial dynasties through to the early twentieth century.

The Song saw remarkable accomplishments in arts, literature, and historical studies. Landscape painting flourished; artists incorporated cosmological meanings in pictures of natural objects. The Song style of lyric poetry (*ci*) and prose exerted long-lasting influence on later times. By the tenth century, great literary projects were completed, including the *Taiping yulan* (Imperially Reviewed Encyclopedia of the Taiping Era) and *Cefu yuangui* (Outstanding Models from the Storehouse of Literature). Song scholars wrote the first books on ancient bronze bells and tripods and coins, studies that started scientific archaeology in China.

The most famous historical work of the Song was the *Zizhi tongjian* (Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government) by Sima Guang (1019–1086). A chronicle that carries the history of China from 403 BCE to 959 CE, this masterpiece marked an important new level for its own genre as well as for general historiography. The *Tongjian jishi benmo* (Comprehensive Mirror, Topically Arranged, c. 1170), in which the chronological entries of the *Zizhi tongjian* were rearranged according to topics, became a model for the third major type of Chinese historical writing (after annals and annal-biographies).

Science and technology also made tremendous progress in the Song. One of the most significant advances was woodblock printing, which was widely used for official documents, classical scholarship, religious texts, medical manuals, calligraphy, and cartography. By the middle of the eleventh century, an artisan named Bi Sheng had invented movable characters, although the invention had little chance to replace woodblock industry at that time. Although explosive powder had been invented in the Tang, it was during the Song that the material was widely applied by the military in a variety of grenades, bombs, and rocket launchers. It was also during the Song that compasses, which had been used by the Chinese for centuries, were first employed in sea navigation. The invention of the abacus, the forerunner of the present-day calculator, facilitated transactions in commercial activities. The world's first treatise on forensic medicine for

coroners, the *Xiyuan jilu* (Manual of Forensic Medicine) by Song Ci (1186–1249), was completed in 1247.

Historians tend to characterize the Song as modern because of its breaks with earlier patterns and its new features that approximated later developments. The era saw one of the most sophisticated civilizations of the world in the domains of political institutions, thought systems, science and technology, economic activities, social life, and arts and letters. Even after the Mongol conquest, many of the trends begun under the Song continued their course in Chinese lives.

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SONG ZIWEN (1894–1971), Chinese Nationalist government official. Better known to Westerners as T. V. Soong, Song Ziwen was an official of the Chinese Nationalist government and a prominent financier. He was born in 1894 and educated at Harvard University, returning to China in 1923 to engage in private business. At the request of brother-in-law Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), he took over the role of financing the Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party) from his father. To this end, he established the Central Bank of China in 1924. The bank became the government treasury in 1928 when Song was appointed minister of finance by another brother-in-law, Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975). He was devoted to modernizing Chinese financial and fiscal systems during his tenure (1928–1931, 1932–1933). During the second Sino-Japanese conflict (1937–1945), he became minister of foreign affairs in 1942. When the war was over in 1945, he became prime minister (president of the Executive Yuan) and served in this position until 1947. Just prior to the Communist takeover of China in 1949, he moved to the United States, where he remained active in business, banking, and the China Lobby until his death in 1971.

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SONGKET *Songket* is cloth decorated with gold and silver thread and is found in the states of the east coast of western Malaysia. A simple traditional loom with treadle-operated heddles and hand-thrown shuttles is used in weaving *songket*. The Malays of coastal Sarawak also weave *songket* on a frame loom.

Songket is created from a supplementary weft of metallic threads on a background of silk. The word *songket* is related to the word *sungkit*, which means "weft wrapping." *Songket* brocade is composed by the *pilib* technique, with the supplementary weft "floating" over



A woman of the Minangkabau ethnic group in Sumatra, Indonesia, wears a *songket* in the shape of a water buffalo, an important animal in Minangkabau culture. (LINDSAY HEBBERD/CORBIS)

the wrap. *Pilib* means "to choose or pick." The weaver picks out the wrap threads to be passed over. The introduced weft passes on top of as many as five consecutive warp threads, although it is more common to have three. The introduced supplementary weft form patterns on top of the main weave. Because high-quality gold threads are used, the best *songket* is not stiff. Some examples of *songket* have a combination of cotton wrap and silk weft for a firmer foundation weave. Many types of *songket* are patterned with an interplay of geometric forms and are very ornate pieces of cloth.

Shanthi Thambiah

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SOT KURAMAROHIT (1908–1978), Thai writer. Originally from Chantaburi on Thailand's eastern border, Sot Kuramarohit studied at the prestigious Thepsirin School in Bangkok; among his contemporaries were several who were to establish themselves as major writers, including M. C. Akatdamkoeng Raphiphat, Chaem Antarasen, and Sanit Charoenrat. He received a government scholarship to study at Beijing University, and when he returned to Thailand in 1936, he was given responsibility for overseeing Chinese schools in the country at a time when they were regarded as a potential Communist threat. His most acclaimed work is *Packing: nakbon haeng khwam lang* (Beijing: City of the Past), published in 1941. Set in prerevolutionary China, the novel portrays the life of enforced poverty of a member of the Russian royal family who flees to China and ultimately kills himself rather than become a burden on his daughter. Sot's sympathy for the underdog and political idealism were continuing themes in later works, such as *Khabuankan seri chin* (The Free Chinese Movement) and the long and incomplete *Raya*.

David Smyth

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SOTTAL The twelfth and last month of the lunar calendar is traditionally known as Sottal in Korea. Sottal is a thirty-day period beginning between mid-December and the end of January and ending on the eve of lunar New Year's Day, known as Sol. This month was traditionally a time to tie up loose ends and put things in order. It was especially a time to settle outstanding accounts, as no honorable man would allow a debt of his to be carried over into the new year.

The evening of the last day of the month was by far the most important. It was the time of the year-end night watch, Suse. After the end-of-year house cleaning was finished and darkness began to set in, the house was lit inside and out with lamps and lanterns. This was to keep away evil spirits, who were believed to avoid clean and brightly lit places, so that the house would be filled with good fortune for the new year.

Troupes of musicians with drums and gongs went from house to house dancing and playing loud music to drive out any evil spirits that may have been inside. In the royal court a grand exorcising ceremony was performed by twelve masked dancing guards representing the animal signs of the year and four monster-like, spear-wielding exorcists. On this new year's eve, all were expected to stay awake keeping the night watch till cockcrow. It was believed that if one slept on this night, their eyebrows would turn white. To avoid this, games and activities of all sorts were played.

Sottal customs were actively observed until the end of the Chosun kingdom at the beginning of the twentieth century. Today, Sottal customs have all but disappeared, but it is still customary to settle one's outstanding debts before the beginning of either the lunar or solar new year.

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See also: Sol

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SOUPHANOUVONG, PRINCE (1901–1995), Lao political leader. Souphanouvong, or the "Red Prince," born in Luang Prabang in 1901, was the leader of the Pathet Lao, or Lao Nation, resistance government. He studied engineering in Paris, where

he met his politically active Vietnamese wife, Nguyen Thi Ky Nam, who encouraged Souphanouvong's political aspirations. He was foreign minister in the Lao Issara, or Free Lao, government from 1945 through 1949. As leader of the Lao Issara armed forces, he fought the French and was wounded at Thakhek in 1946. He then strengthened ties with the Viet Minh. He left the Lao Issara in 1949 due to his radical ideology and formed his own resistance government, the Pathet Lao, in 1950. Souphanouvong formed the Lao People's Party in 1956 with Kayson Phomvihane, and was a lifelong member of its central committee. He also joined all three coalition governments during the Lao civil war (1956–1975). Souphanouvong was opposed by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma (1901–1984), his half brother, and was arrested after the collapse of the first coalition government in 1959 but escaped in 1960. He became the first president of the Lao People's Democratic Republic on 2 December 1975 in the Pathet Lao's takeover. The "Red Prince" strengthened ties with Vietnam and the Soviet Union as president until his resignation in 1986.

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SOUTH ASIA—HISTORY South Asia here refers to the Indian subcontinent and the adjacent mountain fringe separating that region from the rest of Eurasia. It includes the Indo-Gangetic Plain in present-day Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh; the Himalayas and lesser mountain systems to the north, northwest, and northeast of that plain in Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, and the southern panhandle of Bangladesh; and the assemblage of hills, plateaus, basins, and coastal plains to the south of the plain, mainly in peninsular India, but also including present-day Sri Lanka.

Pre- and Ancient History

When humans first arrived in South Asia is not known. However, hominid artifacts—without accompanying fossil remains—date back several hundred thousand years, and there can be little doubt that *Homo sapiens* established societies of hunters, fishers, and

gatherers in the subcontinent tens of thousands of years ago. Pollen samples from Rajasthan in northwest India indicate the presence of grain cultivation in that region almost ten thousand years ago, while some scholars speculate that rice may have been domesticated in the eastern Indian state of Orissa even earlier. Neolithic village-based culture is traceable to the fifth millennium BCE in Kashmir, while settlements marked by Chalcolithic (Copper and Bronze Age) cultures were present over much of Pakistan and adjacent regions of present-day Afghanistan during the subsequent millennium.

By the mid-fourth millennium BCE, the northwestern Chalcolithic cultures had evolved, with apparent rapidity, into the Harappan or Indus Valley culture. This culture was remarkable in numerous respects: it gave rise to large cities, including Mohenjo Daro and Harappa (both thought to have had as many as fifty thousand inhabitants), with baked-brick structures laid out in grid patterns, with citadels, granaries, public baths, drainage systems, and occupationally segregated quarters. Because the city plan varied relatively little over time, the rulers may have been theocratic; weights and measures were standardized over a wide area; there was a simple system of writing that has yet to be deciphered; agriculture employed simple irrigation techniques and included domestic animals; and there is evidence of long-distance maritime and overland trade.

Little is known about the religion of this culture, though figurines and images on clay seals indicate the worship of a mother goddess and various proto-Hindu deities and the exaltation of cattle, especially bulls. The Indus civilization began to decline in its core region on the Indus Plain early in the third millennium BCE, while expanding on its eastern and southern peripheries. Among the reasons hypothesized for the decline are exhaustion of the resource base; climatic desiccation, earthquakes, floods, and other natural disasters; invasions and conquests by Aryans from Central Asia; or a combination of such causes. By the mid-third millennium BCE, the classic form of the civilization had ceased to exist.

Whether the Sanskrit-speaking Aryans were already in South Asia at the time of the Indus civilization—as were Dravidian- and Austroasiatic-speaking peoples—or arrived in a series of wanderings during and after the mid-second millennium BCE is hotly debated. But without a doubt that period witnessed the emergence in the northwestern part of the subcontinent of a distinctive culture known mainly from its rich collections of orally transmitted hymns, the Vedas. These hymns, set to writing many centuries later, prescribed a simple caste-based social system



KEY EVENTS IN SOUTH ASIAN HISTORY

- 5,000 BCE** People are living in Neolithic villages in Kashmir.
- 4,000 BCE** Bronze and Copper Age culture is present in Pakistan.
- c. 3,500 BCE** The Indus Valley civilization emerges in Pakistan.
- c. 2,500 BCE** The Indus Valley Civilization declines.
- c. 1,500 BCE** The Aryans enter the region and settle in the northwest region and then spread south and east.
- 6th century BCE** Magadha state in Bihar emerges as a regional power.
- c. 599–527 BCE** Vardhamana, later known as Mahavira, the founder of Jainism lives in Magadha (in present-day Bihar state).
- 566–486 BCE** Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha, lives, and shortly after his death Buddhism emerges as a religion in northern India.
- 324–200 BCE** The Maurya Empire functions as the first pan-Indian state.
- 260 BCE** Mauryan ruler Asoka converts to Buddhism.
- 78–200 CE** The Kushan dynasty in Central Asia rules northeastern India.
- c. 320–c. 500 CE** During the Gupta Empire India enjoys its golden age.
- 510–511** The Huns invade India and end Gupta rule.
- 710** Muslim Arabs conquer Sind in Pakistan and expand their control over western South Asia.
- 1186–1192** The Afghanistan-based Muslim Ghurid dynasty extends its rule across northern India.
- 1192–1526** The Delhi sultanate rules over northern and southern India.
- 14th–15th centuries** Muslim kingdoms rule in southern and eastern India.
- 1336–1672** The Hindu Vijayanagara empire is a powerful force in the south.
- c. 1500** Guru Nanak founds the Sikh religion in northwest India.
- 1526–1857** The Mughal empire conquers Delhi and expands its rule over much of the region.
- 1498** Vasco de Gama sails from Portugal to Calicut, India, opening South Asia to European colonization.
- 1757** The British defeat the French at the Battle of Plassey, leaving the British free of European rivals in India.
- c. 1850–1947** The period of the British rule in South Asia.
- 1857–1859** The Indian Mutiny is defeated but results in India coming under direct British rule, rather than control through the British East India Company.
- 1885** The Indian National Congress is founded as a political movement.
- 1906** The Muslim League is formed as a political movement.
- 1915** Mohandas K. Gandhi returns to India and leads the independence movement.
- 1940** The Muslim League sets forth the goal of a Muslim state in Muslim areas of India.
- 1947** Indian and Pakistan become independent nations.
- 1948** Burma (Myanmar) and Ceylon (Sri Lanka) become independent nations.

(greatly elaborated over the course of time) and religious practices marked largely by elaborate sacrificial rituals. Originally pastoral nomads, the Aryans rapidly spread across northern India and, in the process, cleared forests and increasingly took to agriculture. By

1000 BCE, they had reached the margins of what is now Bengal and penetrated into the Deccan Plateau. They established numerous small rival states, known as *janapadas*, some of which were monarchical and others republican or oligarchic.

Among these states, that of Magadha, in what is now Bihar, emerged as paramount in the sixth century BCE, possibly due to its access to a wide range of resources, especially iron, which came into widespread use during this period. Several increasingly expansive dynasties succeeded one another in this region, culminating in one founded by Candragupta Maurya in 324 BCE. The Mauryan empire (c. 324–c. 200 BCE), the first pan-Indian state, was a highly centralized, autocratic polity with a well-developed bureaucracy. Its governance was likely influenced by its founders' contacts with the forces led by Alexander of Macedon (356–323 BCE), which had campaigned in the northwest of the Indian subcontinent from 327 to 325 BCE. But the severity of Mauryan rule was tempered by the conversion to Buddhism (c. 260 BCE) of the emperor Asoka (d. c. 238 BCE), who sought to rule through the application of righteous law.

The Mauryan empire survived to 200 BCE; until the establishment of the Gupta dynasty (c. 320–c. 500 CE), most of India was controlled by petty states, though several empires, such as the Deccan-based Satavahanas, did briefly rule over fairly extensive areas. The period witnessed an inexorable advance of Aryan cultural influence into areas of Dravidian culture and of Brahmanical Hinduism into regions of essentially tribal culture, processes that continue to this day. It also saw the establishment of numerous Indo-Greek kingdoms along and beyond the northwestern portals of the subcontinent; movements through the northwest of peoples originating in various parts of inner Asia; and the founding and dramatic expansion of the Kushan dynasty (78–200), which probably extended, at least for a short time, from the Aral Sea to the Arabian Sea and northeastern India.

Far to the south, new centers of civilization sprang up in what are now Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Sri Lanka. These depended largely on sophisticated systems of irrigation utilizing man-made tanks (reservoirs) and were also the beneficiaries of sea trade in networks that linked them to the Roman and Chinese empires.

Under the Gupta dynasty, whose center of power lay in the eastern Gangetic Plain, Indian culture embarked on its classical or golden age, a period marked by striking achievements in the arts, architecture, letters, philosophy, and other fields. Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism all flourished. The Gupta empire was not quite as extensive as that of the Mauryas and was a relatively decentralized confederacy. Its ascendance ended with a defeat by Huns, who invaded India from Central Asia in 510 to 511.

The Medieval and Early Premodern Periods

In the ensuing centuries, numerous small, medium-sized, and occasionally large powers contended for supremacy in their respective regions of India. These powers were centered in a relatively small number of fertile core areas, generally along major corridors of movement, and were often shielded from invasion from several quarters by highlands, deserts, or other terrain barriers. Such areas have been characterized as perennial core regions. Though periodically conquered by rival states, they repeatedly threw off alien rule and gave rise to new, locally based polities. The period also witnessed growing cultural and economic contacts with the increasingly Indianized kingdoms in Southeast Asia, which adopted numerous Hindu and Buddhist religious practices.

The tide of conquest that swept out of Arabia in the wake of the death of the Prophet Muhammad reached the lower Indus Plain as early as 710, with the Arab conquest of Sind. Within the next two centuries, all of South Asia's northwestern borderlands were incorporated within the Islamic caliphate, and raids by land and sea frequently penetrated more deeply into India. Not until well after the passing of the Abbasid dynasty (749/750–1258) did the Ghurid dynasty (mid-twelfth–early thirteenth centuries), based in central Afghanistan, extend Muslim power across the length of the Gangetic Plain, during the period from 1186 to 1192.

But this had no sooner been accomplished than the Ghurid chief, Qutb-ud-Din Aybak (d. 1210), succeeded in splitting the new empire by gaining control of its Indian domains. This marked the establishment of the Delhi sultanate (1192–1526). Under five successive dynasties, the sultanate ruled over northern India and, for long periods, much of the south as well. Among those dynasties, the Khaljis and the Tughluqs achieved, even if only briefly, the status of pan-Indian powers. Recognizing the difficulty of ruling southern India from Delhi, the Tughluqs established a co-capital at Daulatabad, in the north of the Deccan. But the overextended state proved incapable of withstanding internal stress, and the period from the mid-fourteenth to the early fifteenth centuries witnessed the secession of new Muslim kingdoms in southern and eastern India.

Although Hindu power was eclipsed in northern India early in the thirteenth century, a number of significant Hindu states continued to rule over much of the south. Of these, the most important was the Vijayanagara empire, which was locked in a centuries-long struggle with its Muslim neighbors to the north: first with the Bahmani kingdom, established in 1447, and then with the four sultanates into which that kingdom

eventually split. Despite a disastrous military defeat in 1565, the Vijayanagara state lingered on until 1672.

Even after the consolidation of Muslim rule in northern India, new waves of warriors, lured by the riches of India, continued to penetrate the subcontinent via the Khyber Pass and other portals in the northwest. Among these were the Persia-based Il-Khans (1256–1353), one of the major successor states of the vast Mongol empire, who repeatedly raided the Punjab in the late fourteenth century, and later, the forces of the fearsome Turkic leader Timur (Tamerlane; 1336–1405). These invaders were precursors of the Mughals (1526–1857), of mixed Mongol and Turkic ancestry, whose leader, Babur (1483–1530), conquered Delhi in 1526 and thereby planted the seed of the mightiest Indian empire prior to that of the British.

The immediate successors of Babur included five more illustrious rulers: Humayun (1508–1556), who was temporarily expelled from India by an Afghan chief, Sher Shah of Sur (1486?–1545); Akbar (1542–1605), renowned for his religious tolerance; Jahangir (1569–1627); Shah Jahan (1592–1666), a remarkable builder; and the stern and orthodox Aurangzeb (1618–1707), under whom, in the late seventeenth century, the empire reached its territorial zenith.

The Colonial Era

The lure of India's wealth—in spices, textiles, jewels, and luxury goods—long predated Mughal rule; but direct European access to that wealth was blocked by the Ottoman Turkish possession of much of the Middle East. To circumvent the Ottoman barrier, the Portuguese, Spanish, and others sought new maritime routes to India. While Christopher Columbus (1451–1506) believed that he had found the way in 1492, it was actually the 1498 voyage of Vasco da Gama (c. 1460–1524) from Portugal around Africa to Calicut in southern India that opened a new age of European penetration of the subcontinent. During the sixteenth century the Portuguese enjoyed an undisputed monopoly on Indian foreign trade, but early in the seventeenth century the Dutch and the British, acting through chartered trading companies, gained a superior position. Somewhat later, the French, Danes, and others came onto the scene.

Initially, the European powers cared little about acquiring territorial possessions in South Asia, though the Dutch did gain control over most of the coast of Sri Lanka (then Ceylon); rather, they sought exclusive trading and warehousing privileges at particular sites known as factories, at many ports along the Indian coast. However, both the British and French became

deeply involved in political and military quarrels among Indian states and in intrigues to oust one another from the areas in which they enjoyed privileged positions. This led to a series of wars among the British and French and their respective allies. In 1757, a decisive British victory at the Battle of Plassey in north-eastern India resulted in the virtual expulsion of the French from India and in British control over the rich Mughal province of Bengal.

The loss of Bengal, combined with assertions of independence by several provincial governors and rebellions by various Hindu chiefs, greatly weakened Mughal imperial power. Foremost among the rebels were the Marathas, whose chiefs had formed a confederacy that gained control over vast tracts of India during the eighteenth century and reduced the emperor to the status of a puppet. (The precursor of the Maratha confederacy was the Maratha kingdom, carved out by the Hindu king Sivaji, 1627/30–1680, who outwitted the Mughal emperor Alamgir, 1618–1707, the son of Shah Jahan.) Despite these developments, the British East India Company long continued to recognize nominal Mughal overlordship of most of India.

Operating from Calcutta, Madras, and Mumbai (Bombay), the capitals of three major presidencies that the British East India Company established in India, British armies (manned largely by Indians) waged a series of wars against the Marathas and other indigenous Indian powers and steadily expanded the area under their control. Much of the newly acquired territory they chose to rule directly, while other areas became protectorates in which Indian princes were allowed to retain considerable powers while accepting the advice of appointed British residents. Maratha power was extirpated by 1818; by 1849, with the defeat of the Sikh kingdom in the Punjab in the second Anglo-Sikh War, the British gained control of virtually all of India. (The Sikhs, established in the late fifteenth century, were a religious group known for martial skills.) During the remainder of the century, the British rounded out their territories by annexing portions of the northern mountain ramparts of the subcontinent and adjacent regions of modern Myanmar (Burma), whose conquest was effected in three wars over the period from 1824 to 1890.

Spectacular though Britain's rise to ascendance in India was, its supremacy did not go unchallenged. In 1857, a mutiny among Indian troops of the British army in Bengal rapidly spread to army units throughout northern and central India. The rebel cause was soon joined by the nominal Mughal emperor and numerous Indian princes, chiefs, and their followers. Despite initial successes, the rebels could not match the



THE PARTITION OF INDIA

When India gained independence from Great Britain in 1947, the region was divided, creating the nations of India and Pakistan. The plan of division was set forth in the *The Indian Independence Act, 1947*.

An Act to make provision for the setting up in India of two independent Dominions, to substitute other provisions for certain provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, which apply outside those Dominions, and to provide for other matters consequential on or concerned with the setting up of those Dominions.

Be it enacted by the King's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

The New Dominions

1. As from August 15, 1947, two independent Dominions shall be set up in India, to be known respectively as India and Pakistan.
2. The said Dominions are hereafter in this Act referred to as 'the new Dominions' and the said 15th of August is hereafter in this Act referred to as 'the appointed day.'

Territories of the New Dominions

1. Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4) of this section, the territories of India shall be the territories under the sovereignty of His Majesty which, immediately before the appointed day, were included in British India except the territories which under sub-section (2) of this section are to be the territories of Pakistan.
2. Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4) of this section the territories of Pakistan shall be (a) the territories which, on the appointed day, are included in the Provinces

of East Bengal and West Punjab as constituted under the two following sections; (b) the territories which, at the date of the passing of this Act, are included in the Province of Sind and the Chief Commissioner's Province of British Baluchistan; and (c) if, whether before or after the passing of this Act but before the appointed day, the Governor-General declares that the majority of the valid votes cast in the referendum which, at the date of the passing of this Act, is being or has recently been held in that behalf under his authority in the North-West Frontier Province are in favour of representatives of that Province taking part in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, the territories which, at the date of the passing of this Act, are included in that Province.

3. Nothing in this section shall prevent any area being at any time included in or excluded from either of the new Dominions, so, however, that—(a) no area, not forming part of the territories specified in sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, sub-section (2), of this section shall be included in either Dominion without the consent of that Dominion; and (b) no area which forms part of the territories specified in the said sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the said sub-section (2), or which has after the appointed day been included in either Dominion, shall be excluded from that Dominion without the consent of that Dominion.
4. Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (3) of this section, nothing in this section, shall be construed as preventing the accession of Indian States to either of the new Dominions.

Source: Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai. (1957) *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921–47*. London: Oxford University Press, 692–693.

superior military organization of the British, and all resistance ceased in 1859.

Predictably, the Indian Mutiny had profound consequences. Among these were the termination of the East India Company's charter, the direct assumption of rule

over India by the British crown, the deposition of the Mughal emperor and of those princes who joined in the rebellion, and, in 1877, the proclamation of Queen Victoria as empress of India. Additionally, the mutiny led to an accelerated program of building railroads and tele-

graph lines for purposes of military security (as well as commerce) and to a profound deepening of the social gulf between the British rulers and their Indian subjects.

Notwithstanding the distrust of Indians to which the mutiny gave rise, as the economy of India and the concerns of government expanded, the British saw no realistic alternative to involving increasing numbers of Indians in administration at various levels and in promoting Indian higher education. The expansion of an indigenous Western-educated elite led, in due course, to political activism and demands for a greater Indian voice in their own governance. Ceylon experienced similar developments.

In 1885, the Indian National Congress was formed, with membership drawn from various religious communities and including sympathetic British as well. As more and more government responsibility was assigned to Indians, the prospect of home rule and even of independence loomed larger. However, fearing that their interests would be compromised in an independent state and in those provinces in which Hindus were in the majority, a group of Muslims formed the Muslim League in 1906. Thereafter, that group and the Congress were principal competing forces, among many, in the struggle for independence and power on the Indian political stage.

In 1915, Mohandas K. Gandhi (1869–1948) returned to India from South Africa and soon became the dominant figure in the Congress Party. His leadership stressed civil disobedience and passive resistance to British rule and was marked by repeated but ultimately abortive efforts at reconciling the political interests of India's Hindu and Muslim communities. In 1940, the Muslim League, under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), declared the goal of creating a separate Muslim state or states in the Muslim-majority areas of India. British attempts, during and after World War II, to induce the Congress Party and the Muslim League to agree on constitutional arrangements for a united, federal, independent India proved fruitless. At midnight on 14/15 August 1947, the independence of two dominions, India and Pakistan, the latter with an eastern and western wing, was declared. Burma, which was separated from India in 1937, became independent in January 1948, while Ceylon achieved its freedom the following month.

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SOUTH ASIANS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The migration of South Asians (migrants from the Indian peninsula as well as their descendants who have consciously retained a distinct ethnic and cultural identity in Southeast Asia) to Southeast Asia dates back to the emergence of regular trade routes connecting China, Southeast Asia, India, West Asia, and Europe in the trade of spices, incense, silk, and other luxury goods. Between the second century BCE and the first century CE, these trade routes were increasingly frequented. Chinese chronicles from the second century BCE reported that merchants were traveling from China across northern India to Bactria (present-day Afghanistan). From different points along this route it was possible to enter Burma and Indochina.

Ptolemy's *Geography*, composed in the second century CE, refers to many geographical names of Indian origin along the sea route connecting India with Southeast Asia. The discovery of isolated Brahmi alphabets on stones in Burma is evidence of Indian influence in this region beginning in the first century CE. Amara-vati-style Buddha images (originating in south India, present-day Andhra Pradesh) from the second and third centuries CE have been discovered in Sumatra, Java, Sulawesi, Thailand, and the Annam region of

Vietnam. Yet no Indian record has testified to an early Indian colonization of Southeast Asia.

Nevertheless, there are many references to voyages between Indian ports and Suvarnadvipa (Srivijaya, Sumatra) in ancient Indian folk stories, Buddhist *jataka* tales (tales of the previous lives of the Buddha), and other works. Since most of the heroes are merchants, these stories suggest a peaceful migration of Indian merchants to Southeast Asia. Occasionally, the *jakatas* also mention dispossessed Kshatriya chiefs trying their fortunes in Suvarnadvipa. Accounts of Indian conquest are rare and often circumstantial. Yet there is ample evidence of the influence of various Indian religions (Buddhist, Saiva, and Vaisnava sects) throughout Southeast Asia.

The Rise and Fall of Hindu Kingdoms in Southeast Asia

The Indian influence in Southeast Asia that became manifest from the first century onwards can largely be attributed to intensifying trade relations between India and emerging Southeast Asian polities, whose rulers welcomed Indian merchants and priests at their courts and ports. The earliest of these were Funan in southern Cambodia, first century CE; Kambuja in northern Cambodia, c. 800 CE; Champa in Annam, second century CE; and Lankasuka on the Malay peninsula, second/third century CE. In the seventh century, the Buddhist kingdom of Srivijaya, which had emerged in Sumatra and controlled trade passing through the Malacca and Sunda straits, was praised in Chinese sources as a flourishing center of Buddhist learning. The rulers of Srivijaya maintained close relations with the famous Buddhist university Nalanda (located in the present-day Indian state of Bihar) until the eclipse of both in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

In the tenth century, a new Southeast Asian power center emerged in eastern Java under the rule of Airlangga (991?–1049), whose inscriptions testified to trade relations with different South Asian peoples as well as with the Khmer of Angkor and the Chams of Champa. In the eleventh century, the South Indian Cholas succeeded in temporarily conquering Srivijaya. In the thirteenth century, Srivijaya became a vassal of the eastern Javanese kingdom of Singasari and its successor, Majapahit. The latter exerted wide influence in mainland Southeast Asia and entertained trade relations with Jambudvipa (India), Karnataka (South India), and China. The establishment of the Delhi sultanate in the thirteenth century and the contemporaneous eclipse of Srivijaya boosted the advance of Islam to Southeast Asian ports. By the fifteenth century, many Muslim Gujarati and Chulia ships were sailing

to Islamic ports along the Straits of Malacca. After the Portuguese conquered Melaka in 1511, the Gujaratis diverted to the Straits of Sunda to enter the northern Javanese ports of Banten, Jepara, and Gresik, which soon became thriving Muslim centers. It was the northern Javanese Muslim polities of Jepara and Demak that eventually destroyed Majapahit, the last Hindu Javanese kingdom, around 1530.

The Arrival of the Europeans

Chulia merchants frequenting the Straits of Malacca were forced to come to terms in the early 1520s with the Portuguese after the latter conquered the South Indian port of Nagapattinam, a center of Chulia shipping, and the ports of Sri Lanka, which had been the preserve of Chulia trade. Muslim Bengalis were mentioned as an important trading group in Portuguese Melaka in the *Suma Oriental*, written by the Portuguese merchant, world traveler, and writer Tome Pires between 1512 and 1515. Gujarati, Chulia, and Bengali trade continued during the initial phase of Dutch hegemony in the Malay archipelago, until the latter consolidated its trade monopoly in the seventeenth century. For twenty years Persian and Indo-Persian merchants rose to preeminence in the Thai kingdom of Ayutthaya under King Narai (reigned 1656–1688).

The Chulias proved to be the most persistent Muslim Indian merchants in Southeast Asia. After the Dutch established themselves in the archipelago, the Chulias concentrated their trade activities on the Malay peninsula, aligning themselves with the British. In 1786, when Fort Cornwallis was founded in Penang, Chulias settled there in large numbers and intermarried with the Malays; in early censuses they were the third largest community, behind the Malays and Chinese. In 1794, the British naval officer responsible for the acquisition of Penang, Francis Light, wrote that each year between 1,500 and 2,000 Chulia men came to Penang to earn a living, eventually returning to India with their savings. These men anticipated the Indian migrations to Southeast Asia that became prevalent in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

After the British Parliament abolished slavery in 1834, large numbers of Indians began to migrate as indentured laborers to various parts of the British (and Dutch) colonial empire. In Southeast Asia, it was the teak, rubber, tobacco, and oil-palm plantations of Burma, West Malaya, and North Sumatra that attracted masses of Tamil- and Telugu-speaking migrants, recruited by headmen known as *kangani*. After 1920, the *kangani* system gradually gave way to migration of individual workers. Indian traders, artisans, bankers, contractors, and clerks also turned to South-

east Asia. The Chettiers, a Tamil trading caste group, for example, became prominent money lenders, catering to peasants and workers in Burma, Singapore, and Malaya, providing a link between their illiterate clientele and the modern money economy. Although encouraged by British authorities, they occasionally became targets of indigenous public protest. Other merchant groups included the Gujaratis, who mainly handled textiles and spices, and the Sindhis, who migrated to Southeast Asia after losing their homeland in the partition of India and Pakistan. The latter became successful businessmen in the urban centers of Malaya, Singapore, and West Indonesia. Further Indian migrants included Malayees, Punjabis, Sikhs, Bengalis, and Pashtuns. After World War II, Indian migration continued to Malaya and Singapore, and, to a lesser extent, to Medan in western Indonesia. After the war many migrants adopted new citizenship, while others left Southeast Asia for good, either returning to South Asia or migrating to new regions such as Africa.

The South Indian Population of Southeast Asia Today

In Indonesia, ethnic Indian Hindus and Muslims, a small, heterogeneous minority of several thousand families, have integrated quite well into modern society. They largely work in business; only a minority still work on Sumatran plantations. In Malaysia and Singapore, citizens of Indian origin form the third largest ethnic group, after the Malays and Chinese. A large number still work on Malaysian plantations. At Singapore harbor they work side by side with short-term migrants from India and Bangladesh, the latter also forming the bulk of construction workers in both countries. A much smaller number of ethnic Indians work in business and civil service. In Singapore, citizens of Indian descent enjoy equal civil rights, and economic and educational opportunities, whereas in Malaysia, their status has been threatened by ethnic and religious discrimination. The Malaysian constitution restricts access of non-Malays to education, government, and industrial employment, as well as land, reserving special rights for the Malay majority.

Martin Ramstedt

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SOUTH ASIANS, OVERSEAS Overseas South Asians—people of South Asian descent residing outside South Asia—numbered 20 million in the year 2001, comprising about 2 percent of the population of South Asia. Over 1 million people of South Asian descent reside in just eleven nations, including the United States, Great Britain, South Africa, and Malaysia. More than twenty-two nations have a population of at least 100,000 ethnic Indians.

The Colonial Phase

South Asian emigration can be divided into two distinct phases—the nineteenth-century colonial phase and the twentieth-century postindependence phase. Some scholars also recognize an earlier wave between the seventh and fourteenth centuries, when trade links between India and East Africa and between India and the Far East were established, but the historical literature in this period is somewhat limited. The first large-scale emigration from India took place under British imperial rule and was an attempt to fill the severe labor shortage in the European plantation colonies caused by the abolition of slavery in 1834 and the subsequent emancipation of African slaves. Indians were transported as indentured labor to plantations not only in the British colonies of British Guiana (now Guyana), Trinidad and Tobago, South Africa, and Fiji but also in the former French colonies of Mauritius (ceded to the British in 1814) and Reunion, as well as in the Dutch colony of Netherlands Guiana (now Suriname). Indians were also sent to eastern and southern Africa to build railroads. Between 1834 and 1917 a total of 1.5 million indentured Indians emigrated from the northern, northeastern, and southern provinces of India, recruited by agents based in Calcutta and Madras. The conditions of indenture were

abominable, comparable to slavery, and Indians called it *narak* (hell). Although the indenture contracts promised the immigrants free or partly paid return passage to India, basic pay, food, and accommodation, in reality their wages were meager, their living conditions unsanitary, and their movements severely restricted, and they were denied basic services such as education and health care. The indenture system was terminated in 1917 after vehement protests from Indian nationalists brought its ugly practices to light. About two-thirds of the indentured immigrants stayed abroad, however, and their descendants form communities of substantial sizes. Their conditions vary greatly from country to country, though in most countries the majority are rural residents engaged in some form of agricultural production, struggling in economies plagued by overpopulation, underemployment, and racial conflict.




CHAI

Chai—a sweet, milky tea boiled in a saucepan—was once an exotic beverage available in the United States only at ethnic restaurants owned by South Asian immigrants. Of late, however, chai has become popular, so now it is served in most American coffee bars. Still, according to the author of this recipe, chai is best prepared at home.

¾ cup water
 ½ cup milk
 1 full tsp. black tea
 1 pod cardamom
 2 pea-sized chunks of fresh ginger (mulched)
 1–2 whole black peppers
 1/8–1/6 cinnamon stick

On a hard piece of paper, crush the tea and spices together. Immediately put this mix in the dish with the water and milk. Keep them on the burner for about 15 minutes, stirring continuously. Add sugar to your taste. Drain in a strainer and serve in a cup.

Source: The Enthusiast's Online Chai Resource. Retrieved 15 March 2002, from: <http://www.odie.org/chai/rec/rec101.html>.



The United Kingdom has large Pakistani and Indian populations. Here, Pakistanis protest Indian occupation of the Kashmir region outside the British Houses of Parliament in London in June 1999. (AFP/CORBIS)

Indians also emigrated under the British as middle-level functionaries to work the railways, telegraphs, steamships, rice mills, and other manufacturing industries in Burma (present-day Myanmar), Malaya (now part of Malaysia), and East Africa. A more prosperous cohort engaged in trade and commerce in the same countries where its indentured compatriots had already settled. Indian traders (*banias*) kept strictly to themselves, observing caste restrictions, practicing endogamy, and maintaining frequent contact with the homeland. In East Africa their affluence became their undoing in the 1960s, when African leaders of the newly independent countries of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, looking for scapegoats to blame for the economically subordinate position of blacks in their own countries, ordered or encouraged the mass expulsion of Indians, mostly Gujaratis.

The first significant wave of South Asian emigration to the United States and Canada took place in the first two decades of the twentieth century. About seven



CONCERN IN INDIA FOR INDIANS OVERSEAS

A significant number of Indians live in diaspora in many nations around the world. How they are treated in those nations varied and continues to vary widely. The following resolution passed by the Indian National Congress party in 1948 seeks to gain rights for the Indian community in South Africa who lived as second-class citizens, below the whites but above the indigenous Africans.

The Congress has noted with deep regret that the Government of the Union of South Africa continues to treat its Indian citizens in disregard of acknowledged human rights and of the principles laid down in the Charter of the United Nations. That Government has ignored the wishes of the General Assembly of the United Nations and even challenged the fundamental principles on which the United Nations Organization is founded. This repudiation of a vital principle, if persisted in, can only lead to the bitter and far-reaching racial conflicts and may even result in the break-up of the United Nations Organization.

The Congress expresses its full sympathy with all those who have suffered by the policy of racial discrimination of the Government of the Union of South Africa.

Source: Jagdish Saran Sharma. (1965) *India's Struggle for Freedom: Select Documents and Sources*. Vol. 2. Delhi: S. Chand, 254.

thousand Sikhs, mostly farmers from the Punjab, worked as sojourners in the lumber mills and railroad industry of the Pacific Northwest. They faced racist attacks and discriminatory laws directed against all Asians, including the Chinese and Japanese, and many returned to India. Others settled down as farmers in California, marrying Mexican women since antimiscegenation laws prevented them from marrying white women. In 1917 the Barred Zone Act, designed by the U.S. Congress specifically to cut off all immigration from India, successfully stopped any further Indian emigration.

The Postindependence Phase

After World War II, South Asian emigration picked up again, and this time the Western, white-dominated countries of Great Britain, Canada, the United States, and Australia played host. In the 1950s, Britain developed critical labor shortages in its booming industrial market, and largely unskilled workers emigrated from India and Pakistan to fill the gap. Most were Sikhs from the Punjab; entire Punjabi villages were transplanted to specific locales in England in a system of chain migration. Gujaratis also left India in large numbers. The influx of Sikh and Gujarati refugees from East Africa in the late 1960s and 1970s (the "twice mi-

grants," as they are called) added to the growth of the South Asian community in Britain. In the 1980s a hardening of anti-immigrant attitudes and violent racial strife in Britain led to a clampdown on migration from South Asia. The United States, Canada, and Australia offered much more hospitable climates for South Asians at that time, and emigrants turned increasingly to those countries in their search for economic opportunities abroad.

In 1965 major changes to the U.S. immigration law eliminated racial barriers and opened up opportunities for nonwhite peoples from Asia. South Asians from India, Pakistan, and (after 1971) Bangladesh immigrated in unprecedented numbers under an elaborate system of preferences designed to attract highly skilled professionals, such as doctors, engineers, scientists, and teachers, who could fill shortages in the American labor market. The number of Indian immigrants to the United States climbed steadily from 2,458 in 1966 to a peak of 45,064 in 1991. Under the family reunification clause of the 1965 Immigration Reform Act, the skilled immigrants were allowed to bring their lesser-skilled relatives into the United States, so by the 1990s emigration from South Asia crossed all age groups, all socioeconomic levels, and all regions of the subcontinent. The 2000 census counted 1,678,765

people of Asian-Indian origin, who formed one of the fastest-growing subgroups under the Asian-American umbrella.

Both in the United States and in Canada, South Asians have formed vibrant communities and engage in a wide range of occupations, from brain surgeons to cab drivers. They work in information-based, high-technology sectors as well as in low-skilled retail, food, motel, and other service sectors. They tend to concentrate in major metropolitan areas such as New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, where job opportunities are plentiful, but they do not cluster in ethnic enclaves, preferring instead to scatter and merge into upper-class and middle-class suburbs.

Taking full advantage of the communication and transportation revolutions, South Asian emigrants stay in close touch with their homelands and with other major emigrant South Asian communities all over the world. They have contributed to a paradigm shift, in which emigrants are no longer seen merely as exiles but as world citizens or transnationals who move between different cultures and who participate in the economies of both their home countries and their adopted lands.

Padma Rangaswamy

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SOUTH CHINA SEA The South China Sea is bordered by China to the north, Indonesia and Malaysia to the south, Taiwan and the Philippines to the east, and Vietnam and Thailand to the west and has become an increasing flash point in Southeast Asia, because each of those countries lays claim to the Spratley and Paracel Islands. Historically, China has asserted sovereignty over the South China Sea, and with its adoption in 1992 of the Law on the Territorial Wa-

ters and Contiguous Areas of the People's Republic of China, it laid claim to the Spratley and Paracel Islands. It built an airstrip and military outpost there and delineated a 12-nautical-mile zone of territorial waters and 200-nautical-mile economic zone, as allowed by international law. China also claims the right accorded to archipelago nations to extend the lines of maritime sovereignty contiguously from the edge of the territory back to the mainland, which encompasses some 800,000 square kilometers of ocean.

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SOUTH CHOLLA PROVINCE (2000 pop. 2.2 million). Located in the southwestern corner of South Korea, South Cholla Province (Cholla namdo) has an area of 11,964 square kilometers. Kwangju, site of a 1980 civilian uprising, is the provincial capital, but it is an independent and administratively autonomous city. Mokp'o, Naju, Yosu, Yoch'on, Sunch'on, and Kwangyang are other cities in the province, and there are seventeen counties (*kun*).

Only 14 percent of the nearly two thousand islands off the province's coasts are inhabited. Chindo Island, famous for the Chindo breed of dogs native to Korea, is among the best known of these islands. The coastal region accounts for South Cholla's rich marine life and strong fishing industry. The agricultural sector is also vital, with rice, grains and cereals, and potatoes produced in the southwestern and northwestern regions of the province. Mining products include gold, silver, coal, and limestone. South Cholla is in the midst of a renewed industrialization effort, with six new industrial zones planned. Kwangyang has one of the world's largest steel plants.

President Kim Dae Jung (b. 1925) is a native of South Cholla. His election in 1997 marked the end of decades of regional discrimination against the Cholla provinces.

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SOUTH CH'UNGCH'ONG PROVINCE

(1999 est. pop. 1.9 million). Located in the west central part of South Korea (Republic of Korea), South Ch'ungch'ong Province (Ch'ungch'ong namdo) has an area of 8,585 square kilometers. Present-day Ch'ungch'ong and Cholla Provinces cover the territory once controlled by Paekche (18 BCE–663 CE), one of the original Three Kingdoms subsumed by Shilla (57 BCE–935 CE) and resurrected as Later Paekche (892–936) before its surrender to Koryo (918–1392). Kongju and Puyo, former capitals of Paekche, are located in South Ch'ungch'ong and house many cultural treasures from the early kingdom.

The provincial capital is at Taejon, an autonomous administrative entity that is independent from the province. Taejon continues to grow in importance in the region and nationwide as it supplements Seoul as a second administrative capital. There are six other designated cities—Sosan, Asan, Ch'onan, Nonsan, Poryong, and Kongju—and nine counties (*kun*) in the province.

South Ch'ungch'ong is home to many heavy and light industries producing goods such as electronics, semiconductors, petrochemicals, automobiles, machinery, and apparel. Major agricultural products include rice and other grains, apples, strawberries, tomatoes, ginseng, and tobacco. Despite the province's location on the Yellow Sea, fishery production has been decreasing in recent years due to increased development along the coastline. The forests, which account for 52 percent of the province, are protected diligently through public and private efforts.

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SOUTH HAMGYONG PROVINCE (2002 est. pop. 3.3 million). South Hamgyong Province (Hamgyong namdo) is located on the central east coast of

North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK) and has a 466-kilometer coastline. The province has an area of 16,745 square kilometers. The province has been geographically restructured seven times since the 1948 establishment of the DPRK. In addition to the provincial capital of Hamhung, there are two other designated cities (Sinp'o and Tanch'on) and fifteen counties (*kun*).

South Hamgyong is mountainous and has an average elevation of 745 meters. The province also has many rivers and tributaries as well as natural lakes. South Hamgyong also claims sixty-four islands just off its coast. Although the region is not particularly agricultural, there are numerous species of indigenous trees, plants, and fruits. Staple crops such as millet, wheat, beans, and potatoes, as well as wild vegetables and fish, make up some of the key ingredients of the traditional foods of South Hamgyong. *Hamhung naengmyon*, a cold noodle dish flavored with spicy pepper sauce, is one of the region's most representative dishes.

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SOUTH HWANGHAE PROVINCE (2002 est. pop. 2.5 million). South Hwanghae Province (Hwanghae namdo) lies on the Yellow Sea in the southwest region of North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea). The province has an area of 8,294 square kilometers. Haeju is the provincial capital and the only designated city in the province. There are nineteen counties (*kun*).

The region has yielded many prehistoric artifacts. There are also many relics from the Old Choson (fourth to first century BCE), Koguryo (37 BCE–668 CE), and Koryo (918–1392) kingdoms.

The province is mostly made up of plains and hills, having an average elevation of 86 meters above sea level. The highest point is Mount Kuwol in the Kuwol mountain range, with an elevation of 954 meters. There are also numerous rivers and streams. The coastline is jagged and irregular, spanning a total of 1,242 kilometers.

South Hwanghae's cuisine features the region's most abundant agricultural products such as grains and

vegetables as well as fish and seafood. The province is famous for the Haeju style of *pibimpap* (rice mixed with vegetables), *k'alguksu* (noodle soup), buckwheat noodles, mung bean jelly, and mung bean noodles, as well as sea bream, mullet, seaweed, and vegetables.

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SOUTH KOREA—PROFILE (2001 est pop. 48 million). Two catastrophic events created the Republic of Korea (South Korea). First, from 1910 until the end of World War II in 1945, Japan ruled Korea as a colony. For the purpose of accepting the surrender of Japanese forces, the Allied forces divided the Korean Peninsula at the thirty-eighth parallel between the Soviets in the north and the United Nations in the south. Originally these were just administrative areas, but soon ideological and political conflicts led to the creation of separate states. With the support of the United States, the southern politician Syngman Rhee (1875–1965) refused a United Nations-supervised election in the entire peninsula. He declared South Korea an independent state on 15 August 1948. The Soviet-backed leader in northern Korea, Kim Il Sung, declared North Korea a state just three weeks later, on 9 September 1948. Second, these conflicts culminated in the Korean War (1950–1953). The creation of two separate hostile states at war with one another has been the greatest tragedy for the Korean people. It is estimated that 20 percent of the population in South Korea has personal ties with people and places in North Korea that have been broken for over fifty years. This situation has created a deep sense of emotional pain in the Korean population.

Geography

South Korea forms the southern half of the Korean Peninsula, which juts out from the northeast rim of Asia. South Korea is surrounded by three seas: the Yellow Sea on the west, the East China Sea on the south, and the East Sea on the east. Its area is 98,480 square kilometers. Its location between China and Japan has placed it in the vortex of political, cultural, and social movements and conflicts. Seoul, just thirty miles south of the border with North Korea, is the capital.

The climate is temperate—dry, cold winters with an average temperature of -6°C and hot, humid summers with an average temperature of 25°C .

South Korea is known for its mountains, plains, and abundant water supplies. The mountains are steep and not well endowed with minerals or ample forests. In 1997, among the more prominent agricultural products, paddy rice was the most bountiful crop, producing 7.3 million metric tons. Barley, the second-largest grain crop, attained barely a quarter of a million metric tons. Considerable harvests of apples (652,000 metric tons), grapes (393,000 metric tons), and other fruits and vegetables provide a healthy domestic diet. The plains also allow considerable livestock husbandry: 3.2 million head of cattle, 7 million pigs, 88 million chickens, and even 1 million beehives. The coastlines allow a thriving fishery industry, totaling more than 3.3 million metric tons of products annually.

Politics

By 1948 the United Nations administration of Korea had been challenged by the threat of Cold War politics in East Asia. In the northern areas, Kim Il Sung was launching a people's revolution: his policies included land reform, purges of religious and pro-Japanese lead-





SOUTH KOREA

Country name: Republic of Korea
Area: 98,480 sq km
Population: 47,904,370 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 0.89% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 14.85 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 5.93 deaths /1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: 0 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio—total population: 1.11 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 7.71 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population: 74.65 years, male: 70.97 years, female: 78.74 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Christian, Buddhist, Confucianist, Shamanist, Chondogyo (Religion of the Heavenly Way)
Major languages: Korean, English widely taught in junior high and high school
Literacy—total population: 98 %, male: 99.3 %, female: 96.7 % (1995 est.)
Government type: republic
Capital: Seoul
Administrative divisions: 9 provinces and 7 metropolitan cities
Independence: 15 August 1945 (from Japan)
National holiday: Liberation Day, 15 August (1945)
Suffrage: 20 years of age; universal
GDP—real growth rate: 9% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita (purchasing power parity): \$16,100 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: no information available
Exports: \$172.6 billion (f.o.b., 2000)
Imports: \$160.5 billion (f.o.b., 2000)
Currency: South Korean won (KRW)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Factbook* 2001.
 Retrieved 22 April 2002 from: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

ers, and socialist economic policies. In the southern areas, Syngman Rhee was empowering Korean military, police, and governmental officials who had worked with the Japanese and strengthening the landlord class. The U.N. could not mediate the conflict.

In the late summer of 1948, the Republic of Korea adopted a constitution. Syngman Rhee, a veteran Korean nationalist and longtime political exile who obtained American support during his residence in the United States, became the first president. His presidency was marked by his counterinsurgency tactics against domestic rivals, his stubborn military strategies against the Communist regime in North Korea, his repressive political policies following the Korean War, and his restructuring of the old economic and

political elite. Student protests drove him from office in 1960 and into retirement in Hawaii.

The next three rulers of South Korea were military men. In 1961 General Park Chung Hee (1917–1979) led a military coup against a short-lived civilian government. Over the next eighteen years, the general effectively suspended the constitution and established martial law. His rule was draconian. Students, workers, intellectuals, and political opponents were jailed, tortured, and even murdered or executed. His economic policies reversed the destructive rule of President Rhee by reviving the corporate conglomerates (*chaebol*), thus creating a rich and powerful business elite. In 1979 student, worker, and middle-class unrest resulted in massive demonstrations. On 26 October

1979, Park was assassinated by the head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency.

From 1978 to 1981, there was great political unrest. Lieutenant General Chun Doo Hwan (b. 1931), a commander of Korean troops who served the United States in Vietnam during the Vietnam War and was known for his brutality, led a successful military coup on 12 December 1979. Again students protested. General Chun extended martial law and rounded up political demonstrators. He arrested the popular politician Kim Dae Jung (b. 1925) and other leaders. In May 1980, the southern city of Kwangju rose up against Chun's rule. With the support of U.S. military leaders, Chun transferred troops from the border with North Korea and attacked the rebellious city, resulting in the deaths of hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians. Chun's military victory catapulted him into the presidency. His new judiciary sentenced Kim Dae Jung to death for plotting rebellion. Because of international outrage, Kim was instead jailed and later went to the United States for health reasons.

Chun Doo Hwan ruled until 1987, when he supported a military subordinate, Roh Tae Woo (b. 1932), to run for the presidency. Roh won in a plurality with 36 percent of the votes. He opened Korea to the international community by hosting the Olympics, engineering South Korea's entrance into the United Nations, and furthering the shift from an economy based on import-substitution to an economy based on electronic manufacturing and heavy and light industrial exports.

The next two presidents, Young Sam (b. 1927; served 1992–1997) and Kim Dae Jung (served from 1997), were civilian politicians who won open popular elections. These men were elected, in part, because of the democratization movements in East Asia. The Philippines and Taiwan were throwing off martial law and electing civilian reformers to office. President Young Sam brought charges of sedition and corruption against Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo. Chun received the death penalty and Roh a long prison term. However, President Kim was involved in issues of corruption, labor unrest, and student protest. His successor was the popular political hero Kim Dae Jung. Kim Dae Jung began his term by pardoning Chun and Roh. During his first year in office, Kim Dae Jung was faced with the Asian economic crisis. He ushered in economic and fiscal policies that reformed the conglomerates, supported some labor reforms, and adhered to the demands of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). His most important policies were in foreign affairs, where he initiated programs to bring



Finance Minister Jin Nyum attends the opening ceremony of the Korea Stock Exchange in Seoul on 2 January 2002. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

North and South Korea to the negotiating table. Under his presidency, the first large group of Koreans visited each other: one group going to Pyongyang in North Korea, the other to Seoul in South Korea. South Korea began to provide economic aid to North Korea, as well as negotiating some economic investments. President Kim won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000.

Economic Affairs

Until the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the South Korean economy was considered one of the economic miracles of East Asia. In 1996, the average per capita income was \$10,600; the average annual rate of growth in the early 1990s climbed to an impressive 7.2 percent. The crash in 1997 contracted the economy by 5.8 percent. Many banks went bankrupt, the large conglomerates collapsed, unemployment rose more than 7 percent, and many politicians and bureaucrats left their jobs in dishonor. The extent of the crisis can be measured by the International Monetary Fund's rescue program, which provided \$57 billion to bail out the government—the largest ever by the IMF. Kim Dae Jung reorganized the conglomerates but also restricted the powers of the labor unions. Despite protests, his government managed to rescue the Korean economy. By 1999 and 2000, South Korea's record achievements in manufacturing outputs and investment had reestablished the economy. Its trade surplus had widened to \$2.17 billion in 1999.

Culture

The negative economic effects of colonization and the Korean War prevented South Koreans from investing in cultural and artistic activities until the early

1980s. Many South Koreans are reviving the traditions that had been swept away by the Japanese and destroyed by incessant violence. Korean history has been rewritten to reclaim the glories of its civilization. Traditional music, literature, painting, and ceramics have been studied and revived through the construction of government museums, cultural centers, and artistic endeavors. The private sector has built more than two hundred museums that concentrate on many aspects of Korean creativity. The Sonje Museum of Modern Art in Kyongju reflects the great contributions that Korea has made to contemporary art. South Korean cinema has become a major competitor in international competitions. The democratization of South Korean politics has resulted in an explosion of artistic expression.

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SOUTH KOREA—ECONOMIC SYSTEM

When South Korea gained its independence in 1945, the country had no workable resources or capital except for its unemployed illiterate population. Even before the euphoria at independence had faded away, people found themselves in turmoil, followed by civil war between North and South Korea (1950–1953).

The Separation of North and South Korea

At the start of the transition period, when Korea was being divided (1945–1948), the southern part of Korea was primarily agricultural. It had an area of 98,430 square kilometers, with a population of 9.3 million. Geographically, southern Korea was blessed with relatively rich soil and a mild climate and thus was suited to agricultural activities, particularly rice production. Northern Korea had industrial prerequisites, such as rich mineral resources and a hydroelectric power supply from the Yalu River power-generation station built during the Japanese colonial era (1910–1954).

Before the division, northern Korea had 75 percent of Korea's heavy industry, while southern Korea had almost 75 percent of the light industry. Southern Korea had almost three times as large an area of irrigated rice paddies as the north. The south depended on the

chemical fertilizer produced in the north as well as the north's electrical power supply, while the north needed rice from the south. When United Nations-supervised elections were held in the south on 10 May 1948, the north shut off power transmission and other industrial supplies to the south. With the severing of north-south ties, the traditional complementarity between the two parts of Korea was suspended, and the two governments that emerged synchronically in north and south were antagonistic to each other.

North and South Korea have since followed different paths of economic development against a background of a common language, cultural history, and sense of identity. Opposing political ideologies, along with their corresponding economic systems, have created antagonistic relationships and feelings of enmity between the two halves of the country. Particularly since the Korean War (1950–1953), the two Koreas seem to have kept themselves remote from each other across 155 miles of truce line, which remains as a border of military tension between the two rival systems.

South Korea's Capitalist System

South Korea has followed the capitalist road introduced by the United States, which poured in a huge amount of economic aid intended to help the country recover from the complete destruction of its economy during the Korean War. The fundamental elements of the market economic system on which the South Korean economy is based are privately owned means of production (capital, labor, and natural resources), diversification of decision-making processes, and a built-in stabilization mechanism, which operates principally in accordance with market laws.

The general merit of a market-oriented economic system lies in its efficient allocation of resources, advancement of information and technology, and realization of consumer sovereignty and diversification of social power, which accompanies individual freedom and responsibility. However, a capitalist market has its occasional market failures, such as imperfect competition or an insufficient or unbalanced supply of public goods (for example, public education, cooperatives, and free health-care services), and may also generate a growing inequality of income and wealth distribution thanks to the vagaries of the business cycle, in which recession can follow times of economic strength. These problems inevitably necessitate the partial intervention of government into markets by means of macroeconomic planning or adjustment policies. Such policies include progressive income-tax systems and social-welfare programs.

The South Korean economy has been no exception. It has adopted economic-development plans (five-year plans) to speed up economic growth and development since 1962. These plans have been in line with a free-market system and are intended to provide broad guidelines for the macroeconomy. However, government intervention in the markets has sometimes led to corruption when politics becomes too wrapped up in economics. South Korea's economic performance might improve if the government did less and let markets move to allocate resources.

On the positive side, government-led economic planning has increased and improved the information and skills needed to make economic decisions. The government has aided the development of new industries and raised export competitiveness by providing direct assistance and incentives to private entrepreneurs.

The 1980s began to see a decline in the government's oversight of economic activity in South Korea. As the economy has become increasingly complex, and as the country's liberalization and democratization processes demand improved free-market function, the decline in government involvement is natural. It reflects the government's growing understanding of the importance of incentives and markets vis-à-vis the observed inefficiencies of government planning as the economy moves into a more highly developed phase.

The Development of the South Korean Economy

The South Korean economy has grown remarkably over the last four decades. After the civil war, the economy was characterized by cyclical poverty; that is, low incomes led to low savings, which led to low investment, which led to low production, and back to low incomes. To escape from this cycle, the government launched its ambitious First Five-Year Economic Development Plan in 1962.

In the early stage of economic development, the government fostered import-substitution industries, which produced such basic intermediate materials as cement and fertilizers. After that, from the mid-1960s, government emphasis shifted toward labor-intensive industries such as textiles and plywood, which were internationally competitive because of South Korea's low labor costs, and which were capable of absorbing unemployed and underemployed members of the population.

South Korea's greatest resource has always been its people. The South Koreans have demonstrated an awareness of the importance of education as well as a commitment to educate their next generation, even at a substantial financial cost. Thanks to that commit-

ment, it has had since the 1950s a highly motivated and educated workforce that has enabled the country to improve under a growth-oriented government. Developing human resources early, despite low per capita incomes, made it possible to lay a solid foundation for subsequent economic development.

Obligatory military service has also produced many highly disciplined and experienced young men who have returned after about three years' active service to civilian industries. Without both the belt-tightening sacrifices of the once-poor Korean parents for their children's education and the hard training in the military service, the foundations for subsequent high growth in the 1960s and 1970s would never have been laid.

The government at that time also focused on efficient mobilization and allocation of investment resources. Several specialized banks were established to finance such underdeveloped strategic sectors as small- and medium-sized enterprises and housing construction. To encourage foreign-capital inflow, the Foreign Capital Inducement Act was passed in 1966, and foreign banks were allowed to open branches from 1967. In the course of growth-oriented industrialization, the country had to encourage the investment of a large amount of foreign capital, since domestic savings were insufficient to finance the enormous investment demand.

Economic Development in the 1970s and 1980s

In the early 1970s, South Korea experienced dramatic changes and challenges both at home and abroad. Internationally, there was a new climate of protectionism, along with the worldwide stagflation caused by the first oil crisis in 1972. South Korea's labor-intensive light industries, whose competitiveness was gradually weakening as a result of rapid wage increases, faced fierce competition from other developing countries. These circumstances forced the Korean economy to modify its economic structure toward heavy and chemical industries such as shipbuilding, iron and steel, automobiles, machinery, and petrochemicals. Investments in these newly favored sectors were encouraged by tax and financial incentives. As a result, the share of heavy and chemical products in exports expanded from 13 percent in 1970 to 39 percent in 1979.

In parallel with industrial restructuring, South Korea expanded its construction and manufacturing exports to the oil-producing countries of the Middle East, whose import demand had increased due to abundant oil revenues. The construction boom in the Middle East contributed to an improvement in the Korean domestic-employment situation and served as an important source of foreign exchange.



FIVE LARGEST COMPANIES IN SOUTH KOREA

According to *Asia Week*, the five largest companies in South Korea are as follows:

Company	Sector	Sales (\$ in millions)	Rank in Asia
Samsung Electronics	Technology, Appliances	38,487.5	22
Hyundai	Trading, Investment	36,032.7	25
Samsung	Trading, Construction	35,935.5	26
Hyundai Motor	Automobiles	28,752.6	30
LG Electronics	Consumer Electronics	20,085.2	47

Source: "The Asia Week 1000." (2001) *Asia Week* (9 November): 115.

By virtue of the successful economic development plans and timely industrial structure transformation, South Korea was able to retain a strong pace of growth in the 1970s. Exports expanded rapidly at the rate of approximately 40 percent per year. The value of exports, which was below \$55 million in 1962, crossed \$658 million in 1969 and reached \$15 billion in 1979. The economy grew at a high average rate verging on 9 percent a year, and per capita gross national income (GNI) rose from \$210 in 1969 to \$1,636 in 1979. This remarkable progress allowed South Korea to emerge as one of the newly industrializing Asian economies, along with Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong.

However, in carrying out ambitious economic-development plans, the economy was handicapped by a conspicuously insufficient rate of domestic savings. This gap between investment and savings—known as the deficit current account—was typically bridged by inducing an inflow of foreign capital or by expanding the money supply, despite recognition of the importance of prudent monetary management in avoiding inflationary pressures in the process of economic development. In consequence, foreign debt kept piling up, and chronic inflation lingered on.

The second oil crisis (1979) and domestic political instability also took a heavy toll. By 1980, the nation faced many difficulties throughout the entire economy, including its first negative growth since 1962 and a huge current account deficit (−\$3.5 billion). These caused a shift in the government's policy stance to a stability-oriented growth strategy. Along with structural adjustment measures to enhance economic efficiency, the government strongly pursued the opening

up of the economy, through trade and capital market liberalization, and deregulation on a stage-by-stage basis as part of the move to encourage private initiative in economic management. Efforts at both deregulation and opening up the economy at that time unfortunately did not make great progress, owing to the immaturity of the political and economic environment. However, tight monetary and fiscal policies greatly contributed to the construction of a stable foundation for the South Korean economy, as did the renewed stability of international oil prices. The inflation rate was brought down to single-digit level in the 1980s, and the current account significantly improved to a record \$5.4 billion surplus in 1989. Annual real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate was 12.2 percent in the decade, raising the per capita GNI to \$5,185 in 1989.

The Economy in the 1990s

As South Korea moved into the 1990s, however, the structural fault lines of its high-cost, low-efficiency industrial structure grew more pronounced amid a sharp increase in competitive pressure. High costs had become endemic, and there were large wage increases as a result of the emergence of a strong labor movement amid the democratic reform of Korean politics and society, following the Seoul Olympic games in 1988. Land was expensive and interest rates were also high, mostly due to repeated waves of price instability and inflexible adherence to management strategies of both external expansion and duplicated investment on the part of firms, such as competitive investment into semi-conductor production facilities and automobile production plants. The financial and real sectors

(manufacturing, labor, capital, trade, and so forth) became markedly less efficient because market principles could not operate properly in a socioeconomic environment characterized by previous overregulation and government meddling in the financial and corporate sectors. By the mid-1990s, the Korean economy was 99 percent free of government intervention.

Efforts to improve productivity, such as introducing new technologies, were likewise inadequate. Moreover, South Korean companies faced intense competition from foreign companies in both domestic and international markets, owing to the rapid growth of recently developing countries, the launch of the World Trade Organization, and the accelerated opening of South Korea's markets in order to meet Organization For Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) criteria, such as free trade of goods and capital.

GDP grew at 7.5 percent per year on average during the period from 1990 to 1996. The current account balance, which had continued in surplus since the mid-1980s, slid into a deficit that reached \$23 billion by 1996, amounting to 4.4 percent of 1996 GDP. Total foreign debt also widened sharply from \$29.4 billion as of the end of 1989 to \$104.7 billion at the end of 1996.

From early 1997, foreign-currency liquidity conditions continued to worsen, and by November South Korea was on the brink of defaulting on its external debts. One important external signal came from the collapse of the market for semiconductors, a major South Korean export, in 1996, which caused the current account deficit to jump from 1.7 percent of GDP in 1995 to 4.4 percent in 1996. But the South Korean government did not take this drop seriously, for by mid-1997 the deficit was already back to a 2.5 percent annual rate and heading lower. Nor did the government believe that the currency could possibly be threatened, because the economic fundamentals (growth, trade, foreign exchange, and so on) were thought robust.

However, from early 1997, foreign investors began to keep a close eye on the South Korean economy, in light of the increasing weakening of its financial systems, which had accumulated huge nonperforming loans due to a string of large corporate bankruptcies. The Southeast Asian currency crisis that started in Thailand in July 1997 unsettled foreign creditors and encouraged them to withdraw their investments from South Korea as well. Leading international credit-rating agencies such as Standard and Poor's and Moody's downgraded South Korea's sovereign rating sharply in October. Then South Korea was suddenly refused a rollover for its short-term debts by foreign

banks, Japanese banks in particular. Japan, which was suffering from large nonperforming loans in its domestic markets due to the collapse of equity and land prices in 1990–1991, began to collect maturing debts from Asian countries and refused to roll over South Korea's short-term debts. Furthermore, the depreciation of the Japanese yen in 1995–1996 aggravated the trade positions of Southeast Asian countries and South Korea as well. The rising expectation of a massive depreciation of the Korean currency (the won), due mainly to the large current account deficit, also played a substantial part in the worsening of the foreign-exchange situation.

Consequently, the South Korean government turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a bailout and signed up for an IMF rescue plan amounting to \$55 billion on 3 December 1997. In exchange for these rescue funds, the IMF demanded a fundamental overhaul of the South Korean economy and a contractional macroeconomic policy of higher taxes, reduced spending, and high interest rates (with tight monetary policy). In accordance with these agreements, South Korea has been pressing ahead with structural reforms in the financial and corporate sectors and in the labor market, while accelerating liberalization of trade and capital accounts.

South Korea's Economy Today

After the currency crisis, the real economy was deeply depressed by the credit crunch and the sharp contraction of consumer and business confidence. But since early 1999, the economy has recovered and has continued to exhibit strong growth. The GDP grew at a rate of 9 percent in 2000, and consumer price inflation rose by only 1.8 percent in that year. Per capita GNI bounced back to \$9,700 in 2000, just a little short of the pre-crisis level of \$10,307 in 1997.

South Korea, though still having many problems to overcome, is now heading toward a constant reshaping of its economic systems and practices on the basis of market principles. The country pursues dynamic economic growth, converting the industrial structure into one led by high value-added industries, and accelerating both product development and quality improvement through technological innovations. The economic system is actively creating a new engine of growth by converting to knowledge-intensive industries and the information and communication sector in the twenty-first century.

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SOUTH KOREA—EDUCATION SYSTEM

Confucianism dominated education in Korea until the end of the nineteenth century, when a modern schooling system was introduced. During the Koryo dynasty (918–1392) and the Choson dynasty (1392–1910), civil officials were selected through the state examination system, which tested mainly an applicant's knowledge of Confucianism. This system made the learning of Confucian classics an educational tradition of the elite class.

In 1895, a royal decree mandating education reform established a modern education system. King Kojong (d. 1907) started to build public primary, secondary, vocational, and normal schools in the capital and in the provinces. Many private schools were also founded around the country. The modernizing of education under the Choson dynasty was interrupted, however, by the Japanese invasion of Korea in 1905. Korean education was restored in 1945, when the country was liberated from Japanese colonial rule.

Structure of the Education System

The South Korean education system consists of five parts: preschool, primary, secondary, higher, and continuing education.

Preschool education is carried out by nursery schools and kindergartens. Nursery schools and kindergartens are mostly private institutes, some of which get financial support from the government. Two-thirds of students are enrolled in private kindergartens. Fifty percent of children three to five years of age receive preschool education. Generally, parents pay substantial amounts for preschool education.

Primary education is compulsory and free from the age of six for six years. The enrollment rate for primary schooling reached 100 percent in the early 1960s. Almost all primary schools are public, enrolling 90 percent of all students.

Secondary education lasts for six years: three years in middle school and three years in high school. Students enter middle school generally at the age of twelve. Middle school education is compulsory and



Children at the Son Shin Elementary School in Seoul, South Korea, in 1989 practice the violin. (STEPHANIE MAZE/CORBIS)

free. The enrollment rate is 100 percent for children twelve to fourteen years; 23 percent are enrolled in private middle schools. Almost all graduates from middle schools advance to high school.

High schools provide two tracks: general academic and vocational. General high schools enroll 61 percent of the total number of high school students, while vocational high schools enroll 39 percent. Most high school students pay a tuition fee.

About 67 percent of high school graduates advance to higher education. Higher education includes junior colleges, four-year colleges, universities, and other institutions of higher learning, such as the Open University (which teaches via the Internet, broadcasting, and correspondence courses rather than classroom lectures), colleges in workplaces, and cyber colleges. Junior colleges provide two to three years of postsecondary education, with mostly vocational and technical programs. Colleges offer four years of courses at the undergraduate level. Universities provide graduate programs for masters' and doctors' degrees, as well as undergraduate programs for bachelors' degrees.

Higher education in South Korea depends heavily on private institutions, which enroll 81 percent of the total number of students. Students in higher education generally bear the substantial part of their educational costs, though students at the Open University and teachers' colleges pay only nominal tuition fees.

For all schools and universities, an academic year consists of two semesters. The first semester begins on 1 March and ends on 31 August. The second semester runs from 1 September through the end of February. The minimum number of school days for an academic year is established by law. Primary through high schools must provide instruction for more than

220 days. Colleges and universities must give lectures for more than thirty-two weeks per academic year. There are two vacations every year: summer vacation from mid-July through August and winter vacation from late December through February.

Administration and Curriculum Policy

The structure of educational administration includes three layers of administrative authorities: the Ministry of Education and Human Resources, the boards of education at the municipal and provincial levels, and district offices of education at the local level.

The Ministry of Education and Human Resources (the former Ministry of Education, renamed in 2001) is the central authority responsible for executing the constitutional mandates for national education. The Ministry formulates and implements national policies and plans related to education and human-resource developments. The Ministry is also authorized to control the school curriculum and textbooks.

There are sixteen boards of education at municipal and provincial levels. Members of the board are elected by the electoral college, consisting of representatives of parents, teachers, and residents. The top executive officer of the board is the superintendent of education, who is elected every four years by the school council members. At the local level, 180 district offices of education take charge of supervising primary and middle schools as well as kindergartens in a city or county, under the direction of the provincial board of education. The head of the district education office is appointed by the provincial superintendent.

Curriculum regulation prescribes the national curriculum and the criteria for textbooks for each school level. The government determines and monitors almost every detail of curriculum, so that the curriculum contents and time allocations are uniform at each school level around the nation, with only a few variations by province. The national curriculum is subject to regular revisions every five years or so. The seventh, and current, national curriculum was implemented in the year 2000.

Education Reform

The government has pursued education reform since the early 1990s. The Presidential Commission on Education Reform presented an overall reform plan to the president in May 1995. The plan stressed the following points: all education must be student oriented; school and curriculum must be diversified to provide more choices in learning experience; there

must be accountability in school management; equal opportunity and new technology must be adopted to facilitate continuing education; and the quality of education must be improved.

Currently the government emphasizes developing human resources to cope with the knowledge-based society. Every level and type of schooling has been reformed to meet the new challenges. At the same time, the government has proposed constructing an open system for lifelong learning, which provides everyone with learning opportunities at any time and place. An overall scheme for building a lifelong learning society was enacted in the Lifelong Education Act in March 2000.

Kim Shinil

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SOUTH KOREA—HUMAN RIGHTS Korea's political tradition (especially during the Choson dynasty, 1392–1910) legitimized an authoritarian regime based on a rigid class-based hierarchy of ruler and ruled, male power and female subordination, and a system of harsh penalties for crimes against the state and uncompromising demands for loyalty to social and political superiors. The state instituted a rigid system of lineage rules and village contracts that enforced social control and indoctrination. The official state ideology, Neo-Confucianism, instructed the ruler to win the affections of the people for fear that their grievances would reach to Heaven and thus invite natural disasters of flood and famine and man-made disasters of private suffering and public rebellion. Policies that promoted compassion, sympathy, or humaneness were utilized with an eye toward protecting the state. The individual did not have rights—one had duties and responsibilities to the social group and the polity.

By the end of the nineteenth century, domestic economic crisis and foreign pressures created vital changes in the perception of rights. Korean intellectuals, such as Yu Kil-chun (1856–1914), who traveled to America and Europe from 1883 to 1884, advocated for political reforms based on egalitarianism and respect for the rights to life, liberty, and property. During the twentieth century, the influence of Christianity was felt in ideas of cosmopolitanism and natural rights. Despite the harshness of Japan's colonial rule (1910–1945), many reformers argued for "Western" rights for women, labor, religion, and conscience.

Constitutional and Political Evolution

Japan's surrender of its Korean colony in August 1945 created a legal vacuum. The "peace" created a division between the north and south. American advisers, working with the United Nations command, supervised the surrender and political rebuilding of the south. However, the U.S. representatives in Korea had no knowledge of Japanese or Korean law. Furthermore, the Americans brought Syngman Rhee (1875–1965) from thirty years of exile to head the government in Seoul. He had no sympathy at all for the reformers who had fought for human rights. The new government in Seoul inherited more than 95 percent of its legal system from Japan. The 1948 Korean constitution included references to several standard political and socioeconomic rights—equality before the law; personal liberty; freedom of domicile; freedom from unlawful search; freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association; equality of men and women; and the right to elect public officials and to hold public office. However, these rights were qualified by the statement that they could be denied if they threatened the public order or the welfare of the community.

The constitution reflected Japanese and German influences in establishing a strong president, a weak assembly, and a dependent judiciary with limited jurisdiction. From 1947 to 1993, Seoul was ruled dictatorially by four presidents. The first president, Syngman Rhee, was placed in office in 1945 by the U.S. government. He authored the National Security Law (which was based on Japanese colonial laws), which made any criticism of the state illegal. The punishment for such crimes against the state included imprisonment, the death penalty, and even government-sanctioned assassination. Under President Rhee's rule, more than 250,000 Koreans lost their lives in police raids or military operations that targeted Communists or fellow travelers (Communist sympathizers). The Korean War allowed Rhee to use the army to arrest and execute his opposition. Student and

popular unrest in 1960 forced his resignation and exile to Hawaii.

On 20 August 1960, President-elect Yun Po Sun (1897–1990), a graduate of the University of Edinburgh, established the Second Republic. He crafted a new constitution that provided for greater freedoms of speech and the press. According to author Andrew Nahm, within the next year newspapers and journals increased from 600 to 1,600, and journalists numbered 160,000. There were 2,000 demonstrations totaling more than 900,000 protesters. In May 1961, General Park Chung Hee (1917–1979) reacted to the political and economic unrest by leading a military coup that put him into office for more than eighteen years.

During this time, Park created the extraconstitutional Supreme Council for National Reconstruction. This council centralized all executive, legislative, and judicial power in Park and his clique. This group manipulated state agencies to control the populace, organize economic gain for the elite, and suppress all dissent. Arrests and executions reached major proportions. Torture of political opponents became so widespread that former president Yun Po Sun categorized President Park's regime as a "government by torture" (Cohen and Baker 1999: 178). Civilian unrest grew so strong in the early 1970s that Park declared martial law in 1972. Finally, in an effort to give himself even more power, he established the Yushin (Revitalizing Reform) Constitution, which assured him of nearly total control of the economy and society. Park's rule was so onerous that his own Korean Central Intelligence Agency director, Kim Jae Kyu, shot Park during a state dinner on 26 October 1979.

Within three weeks, on 12 December 1979, Major General Chun Doo Hwan (b. 1931) seized the presidential Blue House (so-called because of its blue roof tiles) and occupied key governmental offices in central Seoul. General Chun, who was known as ruthless and uncompromising, had acquired his power by leading a division of Korean troops in Vietnam. On 17 May 1980, Chun declared extraordinary martial law to consolidate his power and to destroy the growing power of his civilian competitors, the so-called three Kims—Young sam (b. 1927), Kim Dae Jung (b. 1925), and Kim Jong Pil (b. 1926).

One day after Chun's declaration, 18 May, a pro-democracy student demonstration erupted in the historically radical city of Kwangju. General Chun, with the alleged support of U.S. military authorities, declared the protest an insurrection and moved crack troops from the border with North Korea to Kwangju. Here the troops slaughtered 400 to 2,000 protesters



Protestors in central Seoul agitate for the release of 400 political prisoners on 10 December 1998.

among a crowd of 300,000. General Chun claimed that North Korean agents had infiltrated the group of students. Because of this perceived threat, he gave himself emergency powers to suspend the freedom and rights of the people as defined by the constitution and began a national campaign to weed out all dissidents, traitors, and critics. He arrested the three Kims; in September 1980, the criminal court found Kim Dae Jung guilty of sedition and condemned him to death. After U.S. pressure, he went into exile in the United States for health treatments.

General Chun remained in office until 1987, when nationwide demonstrations broke the government's will to prevent constitutional and human-rights reform. On 16 December 1987, Roh Tae Woo (b. 1931), the prime minister and Chun's designated successor, won the election for president. His regime was marked by rapid reforms and concluded in 1993 with the first popular elections for the presidency. The next president, Young Sam, moved from military to civilian rule. In 1998, Kim Dae Jung became president and proceeded to democratize South Korea by repealing the national security laws, releasing political prisoners from incarceration, and traveling to Pyongyang to discuss measures for reconciliation with North Korea. In 2000, he received the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of his lifelong commitment to, and sacrifice for, human rights.

Protest

Japan's postwar democracy was, in part, supported and created through the institutions and collaboration of the Allied Occupation. The U.S. role in South Korea did not promote any liberalism or democracy. The Korean War (1950–1953) and its aftermath trapped Seoul in the role of a proxy in the Cold War between the United States and its Communist rivals in Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang. Although many American politicians, military leaders, and even scholars argue that Korea was not disposed to promoting and sustaining a democratic and human-rights tradition, the evidence of a strong, self-sacrificing, and intelligent prodemocratic movement in Korea belies such negative testimonials.

The strength of the human-rights movement can be expressed in terms of the attempts the Korean government made to extinguish it. To establish their rule, the military governments in Seoul were forced to create a repressive police state that attempted to control the activities and expression of all its citizens. Anyone who seemed to support human rights was faced with possible arrest, torture, and even execution. Hundreds of thousands of people, including liberal nationalists, socialists, labor organizers, women's representatives, and even satirical writers, faced daily harassment and threats. Some daring writers, like the popular and

many-times-arrested iconoclast Kim Chi-ha, criticized the bureaucracy, military, and foreign policy in scathing short stories and poetry. Hwang Suk-young's *The Shadow of Arms* harshly described the cruel and venal role of the South Korean military in the Vietnam War. His writings, coupled with his illegal trip to North Korea, resulted in a trial and jail sentence upon his return to Seoul. Others, like Ahn Jung-hyo, hid their writings until the demise of military rule and then published novels that were critical of the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

In the late 1990s, Kwangju became the site of the launch of the Asian Charter for Human Rights. Under the presidencies of Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae Jung, the Republic of Korea has been engaged, both officially and through many nongovernmental organizations, in human-rights activities domestically and abroad. In addition to democratizing the government, President Kim Dae Jung is initiating and extending human rights to cover women, children, and patients. Internationally, the Republic of Korea has appointed a human-rights ambassador to the United Nations and has been actively engaged in the Commission on Human Rights.

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SOUTH KOREA—POLITICAL SYSTEM

South Korea has a democratic form of government based on the separation of powers and checks and balances. But it took a long time until the realization of the ideal of democracy. Authoritarian rule began with

South Korea's autocratic first president, Syngman Rhee (1875–1965), and his successors and the military continued the practice, infringing on human rights and delaying the development of democratic procedures. Democratization processes began in the late 1980s.

The Creation of South Korea's Modern Political System

As soon as Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945, two groups competed to initiate the creation of a new nation-state in Korea. On the one hand, the Committee for the Preparation of an Independent State, led by Yo Un-hyong (1886–1947) and Ann Chae-hong (1881–1965), was established. The committee held a nationwide assembly in Seoul and declared the creation of the People's Republic of Korea on 6 September 1945. On the other hand, the Committee for the National Congress, composed of supporters of the exiled provisional government in Shanghai, China, refused to join the People's Republic of Korea and attempted to set up a provisional government and organize a political party in the tradition of the independence movement. On 8 September 1945, however, the U.S. armed forces proclaimed General Order No. 1, which refused to recognize both the legitimacy of the provisional government and the existence of the republic; instead, the order maintained that the U.S. military government was the only authoritative polity in Korea. The military government ruled South Korea for three years.

Under the military government, various political groups competed: Syngman Rhee and his associates, provisional government leaders, and Communists. As the military government restructured the institutional arrangement and succeeded in controlling the left-oriented social forces in Korean society, the competition among right-wing groups intensified. While Rhee and his associates favored the establishment of a separate state in the south alone, Kim Ku (1876–1949) and provisional-government leaders made desperate efforts to build a unified Korean state. The U.S. military government favored Rhee, because Kim Ku's group attempted to make an alliance with political leaders leaning toward the left. Accordingly, the emergence of two independent political systems in Korea can be attributed not only to the dissonance between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Korean problem but also to the internal dynamics of the relationship between the U.S. military government and the political groups in South Korea.

The formal launch of the Republic of Korea took place with the support of the United Nations in 1948. The general election for a National Assembly was held

on 10 May 1948, under the supervision of the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea. After the National Assembly adopted a constitution, it elected Syngman Rhee president. The Republic of Korea was inaugurated on 15 August 1948, and U.S. military rule ended.

Syngman Rhee's Autocratic Rule

From the beginning, the political system under President Rhee's leadership drifted. Not only did his alliance with the right-wing political party collapse, he also proved to be a leader with an authoritarian management style. Moreover, the Korean War (1950–1953) brought about a national crisis that threatened South Korea's existence. The political situation deteriorated further because of Rhee's desire to prolong his presidency during wartime.

In 1952, he consolidated his power base by adopting the direct presidential election, and two years later he illicitly passed a constitutional amendment permitting lifelong presidency. Based on this amended constitution, he won his third term as president in May 1956. However, when student demonstrations and civil violence followed election fraud connected with his campaign for a fourth term in 1960, he resigned and fled to Hawaii, where he lived in exile.

The fall of Rhee's rule was immediately accompanied by a constitutional revision from the presidential system to the parliamentary. Under the new constitution, Chang Myon (1899–1966) took power. To some extent, Chang's rule was seen as a democratic transition not only because of his moderate personality but because of his policies liberalizing a Korean society that had become increasingly restricted under his precursor's authoritarian rule. However, he could neither manage the exploding and massive popular demand for reforms, nor find a way to give the ruling party unity and solidarity. After nine months, he was overthrown by a military coup led by General Park Chung Hee (1917–1979) on 16 May 1961.

Park Chung Hee's Rule and After

During the period of military government between 1961 and 1963, Park consolidated his political and economic power by the introduction of a law banning the political activities of politicians and by the establishment of the Korean Intelligence Agency and the Economic Planning Board. After two and half years of military government, Park was elected president in December 1963 under the new constitution, which allowed presidents to serve two four-year terms. Even though he became president through direct popular election, his government lacked legitimacy because his

political career was rooted in a military coup. Therefore, he introduced new goals of modernization and economic development and led an industrialization drive to strengthen the weak legitimacy of his government. Although the industrial drive during the 1960s brought many social problems, it also contributed to the unprecedentedly rapid economic growth of modern South Korea. Gaining some popularity, Park was elected to his second term in 1967.

At the end of the 1960s and 1970s, however, Park had to confront a growing opposition. In 1969, he pushed to pass a constitutional amendment that gave the incumbent president the chance to run for three consecutive four-year terms. Then he became president for a third term after the 1971 election, defeating his opponent Kim Dae Jung (b. 1925). Park's ambition did not end here. He declared a state of national emergency in December 1971; in October 1972, he suspended the constitution and dissolved the National Assembly. Finally, Park introduced the notorious Yushin system (literally "revitalization"), departing far from democratic values, norms, and procedures. Unlike the official promulgation statements, the Yushin system not only seriously weakened the balancing power of the legislative body but also legalized oppressive measures like press censorship.

The Yushin system has been seen as the most authoritarian regime in modern Korean history, even though under it the country continued to achieve a high rate of economic development. The Yushin system allowed Park to rule without any restriction on the duration of his powers. The rights of opposition leaders were infringed on, and intelligence agencies and legal mechanisms were used to repress working people. Park successfully controlled the ruling camp in particular and the National Assembly in general by introducing a constitutional amendment whereby he himself chose members of the Yujonghoe (political circle of revitalization), the group loyal to him, which held one-third of the seats in the legislature.

The Yushin system collapsed after an aide assassinated Park in October 1979, following civil violence that erupted in the cities of Pusan and Masan when people denounced the Yushin system. Nevertheless, the old regime was not automatically transformed. The opposition party and political society in general were divided, and there was no alternative force to lead a democratic transition. Given this situation, the existing military rule continued, until General Chun Doo Hwan (b. 1931) staged a coup in December 1979.

Chun then masterminded the bloody repression of an uprising in Kwangju, where in May 1980 people



PREAMBLE OF THE PROVISIONAL REPUBLIC OF KOREA GOVERNMENT (SOUTH KOREA)

Adopted 17 July 1948

We the people of Korea, proud of a resplendent history and traditions dating from time immemorial, upholding the cause of the Provisional Republic of Korea Government born of the Independence Movement of 1 March 1919 and the democratic ideals of the uprising on 19 April 1960 against injustice, having assumed the mission of democratic reform and peaceful unification of our homeland and having determined to consolidate national unity with Justice, humanitarianism and brotherly love, and to destroy all social vices and injustice, and to afford equal opportunities to every person and provide for the fullest development of individual capabilities in all fields, including political, economic, social and cultural life by further strengthening the basic free and democratic order conducive to private initiative and public harmony, and to help each person discharge those duties and responsibilities concomitant to freedoms and rights, and to elevate the quality of life for all citizens and contribute to lasting world peace and the common prosperity of mankind and thereby to ensure security, liberty and happiness for ourselves and our posterity forever, do hereby amend, through national referendum following a resolution by the National Assembly, the Constitution, ordained and established on 12 July 1948, and amended eight times subsequently.

Source: International Court Network. Retrieved 8 March 2002, from: http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/ks00000_.html.

had called for the end of military intervention in politics. Chun was elected president through the rubber-stamp approval of the electoral college, under a new constitution that allowed him one seven-year term of office. But throughout his presidency, Chun confronted strong opposition not only from students but also from the middle class, because of his lack of legitimacy.

Transition to Democratic Rule

Chun handed over power to his military-academy colleague Roh Tae Woo (b. 1932). In 1987, Roh presented the June 29th Declaration, which was the beginning of a gradual democratic transition in South Korea. Roh introduced a constitutional amendment that allowed the direct election of the president, who could serve for one five-year term.

Owing to differences between the opposition leaders, Young Sam (b. 1927) and Kim Dae Jung, Roh won

the 1987 presidential election with only 35.9 percent of the vote. Although he was criticized for indecisive leadership, Roh introduced the policy of *Nordpolitik*, whereby he attempted to develop relationships with the Soviet Union and China and to circumscribe North Korea. Along with the breakdown of the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe, Roh's *Nordpolitik* succeeded in normalizing relations with the Soviet Union (1990) and China (1992) and led to the Agreement between South and North Korea on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchange, and Cooperation in December 1991. According to this agreement, South and North Korea were to recognize each other's systems; make efforts to transform the state of armistice into a solid state of peace; not use force; and enhance economic, cultural, and other exchanges.

The inauguration of President Young Sam in 1993 marked a peaceful transition from military to civilian rule and the end of three decades of mili-



DAUGHTER OF PARK CHUNG HEE ENTERS PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS

"In December 2001, Park Geun Hye, the daughter of former South Korean President Park Chung Hee who was assassinated in 1979 after eighteen years in office, announced that she would seek the nomination for president of the conservative Grand National Party. She currently represents the city of Taegu in the National Assembly. She mentioned her experience in assisting her father from 1974 to 1979 after her mother was killed by an assassin's bullet meant for her father. Her agenda includes promoting economic growth, increasing women's participation in Korean society, and moving more cautiously on reunification."

Source: Don Kirk (2001) "Candidate for President Invokes Korea of Her Father." The New York Times (19 December): A13.

tary rule. Kim enjoyed unprecedented popularity in the early stages of his presidency, when he attacked the corruption of previous governments and of private associations in the military and proposed reform policies. Kim was determined to send the two former presidents, Chun and Roh, to prison on charges of instituting a military coup and corruption. But he lost popularity when the drifting economy was faced with a financial crisis in 1997, which was solved with the help of the International Monetary Fund. Kim's declining performance finally brought about a power shift from the ruling party to the opposition party for the first time in fifty years of modern political history. The lifelong opposition leader Kim Dae Jung was elected president in 1997.

The Constitutional Prescriptions for the Political System

With the exception of Chang Myun's government between 1960 and 1961, South Korea has always been governed by a president. The present constitution prescribes a single five-year term for the president, with the intent of achieving strong and stable leadership.

The presidential system was adopted in South Korea because Koreans favor strong political leadership, particularly in the situation of national division and confrontation between south and north.

At the top of the executive branch of government, the president functions not only as head of state in domestic affairs but also represents the state in foreign relations. The president must carry out his constitutional duty to safeguard the nation's independence and work for peaceful reunification of North and South Korea. The president is the chairman of the State Council, that is, the cabinet, and has the power to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and the cabinet ministers as well as other senior officials, including heads of government agencies and ambassadors, although the National Assembly must approve his choices. The president also serves as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

The president performs executive functions through the State Council, which is made up of the president, prime minister, and heads of executive ministries. As the principal executive assistant to the president, the prime minister supervises the executive ministers under the direction of the president. Several organizations aid the president: the National Security Council, the Advisory Council on Democratic and Peaceful Unification, the Presidential Council on Science and Technology, and so on. The National Intelligence Service is authorized to collect strategic intelligence and to plan and coordinate intelligence and security activities.

Because of the presidential system, which gives the chief executive so much power, and the long history of military rule, the legislature has not always fully performed its constitutional functions. Nevertheless, legislative power is vested in the National Assembly, a unicameral body. Major functions of the National Assembly include the power to propose, deliberate on, and approve or reject legislative bills; finalize and inspect closing accounts of the national budget; consent to the conclusion and ratification of treaties; and concur in the declaration of war or the conclusion of peace. It also has the right to impeach the president and to approve his emergency orders, thereby theoretically enabling it to check any abuse of presidential prerogatives. In addition, it has the right to inspect government operations and may recommend the removal of the prime minister and executive ministers from office. The National Assembly may also review the quali-

fications of its members and take disciplinary actions against them.

Of the National Assembly's 273 members, 227 are elected by popular vote for a term of four years, and the remaining 46 legislators are distributed proportionately among the political parties. This proportional representation system is aimed at encouraging legislative participation by leading experts through the political parties. Members are not held responsible outside the National Assembly for any opinions expressed or votes cast within the legislative body.

The Supreme Court, as the highest judiciary body, examines the decisions of the appellate courts in civil and criminal cases and makes final decisions on appeals from these courts. Its decisions are final and indisputable, forming judicial precedents. The chief justice is appointed by the president to a single six-year term with the consent of the National Assembly, and the justices of the Supreme Court are appointed by the president, based on the recommendations of the chief justice. Judges in all lower courts are appointed by the chief justice, with the consent of the Supreme Court Justices Council.

Five appellate courts hear appeals of verdicts by district courts in civil and criminal cases. They hold trials and make decisions for or against lower-court verdicts. They may also decide administrative litigation filed by individuals or organizations against government decisions, orders, and actions. District courts are established in major cities and exercise jurisdiction over all civil and criminal cases filed at a lower level.

Even though the South Korean political system has accomplished significant progress toward procedural democracy, there exist some hurdles impeding its maturity of democratic culture. Not only does regionalism still prevail in elections, boss-oriented politics also sometimes stimulates severe strife in political circles. However, it seems likely that the rapidly extended freedom of press and nongovernmental organizations will play the role of balancing and checking in the process of building a healthy and sound political system in the future.

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SOUTH KOREA–EUROPEAN UNION RELATIONS Although diplomatic relations between the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) and the European Union (EU) were established in July 1963, it was not until the end of the 1980s that significant ties began to be formed. Even as European leaders were preoccupied with the challenge of implementing the Single Market (to remove physical, tax, and technical barriers to ensure the freedom of movement of people, capital, and goods among member states) by 1992, South Korea's transition to democracy, along with its increasing importance in the global economy, led EU policy makers to realize the necessity of improving relations with East Asia's third-largest economy. This aim was part of a general change of EU policy toward Asia, which sought to promote European business interests in a region perceived to be the engine of world growth. From the Korean perspective, the integration of the European market to form the world's largest single trading bloc was an opportunity to sustain South Korea's outward-oriented development strategy and reduce its excessive dependence on the U.S. market.

Economic issues, especially trade policy and market-access negotiations, have dominated bilateral relations. The export success that fueled the transformation of the ROK into a major trading country led to frequent trade frictions with the EU and the establishment of import restrictions—notably antidumping duties—on Korean products, raising the specter of "Fortress Europe," the fear that European integration would secure benefits only for member countries and that outsiders would face protectionism. South Korea responded with a surge of direct investment in European manufacturing, starting in the early 1990s. From the European standpoint, one major source of conflict has been the existence of structural barriers in the ROK, such as lax enforcement of intellectual property rights, negative sentiment against imported cars, and restrictive regulations on pharmaceuticals, which hinder access to the Korean market.

The Framework Agreement on Trade and Cooperation was signed in October 1996, was ratified by all EU member states and the ROK, and entered into force in April 2001. This agreement was a clear indication that the EU and the ROK recognized the importance of institutionalizing and deepening their relations by committing all parties to work toward improved market access and cooperation on a wide range of issues such as maritime transport, intellectual property, and standards. These trends were impacted by the Asian financial crisis of 1997, in which currency speculation in Thailand spread rapidly to other Asian economies. The contagion reached South Korea, leading to sharp declines in the value of the Korean currency (won), the

stock market, and other asset prices. In the aftermath of the crisis, the opening of the Korean market accelerated—chiefly to alleviate the capital-shortage constraint—and the EU emerged as the largest source of foreign direct investment, showing European firms' strong commitment to South Korea's potential for expansion.

Despite the continued importance accorded to economic relations, the EU has also realized the need to broaden its bilateral agenda with South Korea and support international efforts to secure stability in Northeast Asia. Political dialogue, focusing mainly on the Korean peninsula, has gradually increased since the mid-1990s. In 1997, the EU joined the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, a consortium founded by the United States, Japan, and the ROK to replace North Korea's nuclear facilities with more proliferation-resistant light-water reactors; since 1995 the EU has been a consistent donor of assistance including humanitarian aid (40 million euros of medicines, water and sanitation projects, and winter clothes), food assistance (188 million euros of food, fertilizers, and farm cooperative projects), and contributions to the KEDO project (75 million euros). As a long-standing advocate of direct dialogue between the two Koreas, the EU has been a strong supporter of the policy of the South Korean president Kim Dae-jung to seek engagement with the north, and the decision by most EU member states to establish diplomatic ties with Pyongyang (North Korea), ahead of the United States, was encouraged by Seoul to help invigorate the peace process. This European foray into intra-Korean affairs should be perceived as a complement to—not a substitute for—the leading U.S. role on the peninsula and may be a significant initiative to heighten Europe's diplomatic profile in the region.

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SOUTH KOREA–UNITED STATES RELATIONS In 1882 the United States became the first Western power to sign a treaty (the Treaty of Amity

and Commerce) with Korea. At that time, U.S. policy toward Korea was one of nonintervention. The treaty was signed to increase trade and improve the circumstances of Americans who were shipwrecked on the Korean coast on their way to and from China. The Koreans signed the treaty with the hope of enlisting the United States in Korea's efforts to offset growing Japanese power in the region. However, such a relationship did not develop, and Japan annexed Korea in 1910.

American involvement became prominent again at the end of the Japanese occupation of Korea, when Japan surrendered to the Allied forces after its World War II defeat in 1945. The United States established a military government south of the thirty-eighth parallel on the Korean Peninsula. In an attempt to establish a democratic Korea and to contain Communist expansion in Asia, the United States initiated United Nations-sponsored elections, which gave birth to the Republic of Korea (ROK) on 15 August 1948.

Security Relations

The U.S.-ROK relationship was cemented when North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950. The Korean War (1950–1953) saw U.S. and U.N. troops together with ROK forces fighting to a stalemate with the North Koreans. The signing of the 1954 U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty created a new security alliance that committed the United States to defending the ROK against external aggression. Since then, South Korea has depended on the presence of U.S. troops located in various bases around the peninsula to deter any attempted North Korean invasion.

Due to domestic difficulties in the late 1960s, the administration of President Richard Nixon (1913–1994) decided to reduce its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States removed twenty-four thousand troops from South Korea but declared it would still defend the ROK in the event of attack from North Korea. With U.S. assistance totaling \$1.5 billion, South Korea increased its defense capabilities to match those of North Korean forces by the 1970s.

In 2002, regular joint ROK-U.S. military exercises and thirty-seven thousand U.S. troops stationed in South Korea reflected America's strong commitment to the security of South Korea. To reciprocate for American support over the years, South Korea sent 300,000 ROK soldiers to fight in the Vietnam War (1954–1975) and offered assistance totaling \$500 million during the Persian Gulf War (1990–1991).

The 1990s saw the United States playing a mediating role in inter-Korean relations. South Korea and



South Korea and the United States have strong military and economic relations. Here, U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen reviews a South Korean honor guard on his arrival in Seoul on 28 July 1999. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

the United States consistently coordinated efforts to resolve threats arising from nuclear and missile issues on the Korean Peninsula. In 1993, North Korea refused to allow the International Atomic Agency (IAEA) to inspect its nuclear reactors. This triggered speculations about North Korea's capacity to produce nuclear weapons, which, if such capabilities existed, could have a tremendous impact on the security of the Korean Peninsula.

A settlement was reached with North Korea through the 1994 Agreed Framework. The United States and its allies, namely South Korea and Japan, agreed to finance and provide the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) with a pair of light-water nuclear reactors through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization. In return, North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear activities and to allow inspections by the IAEA to determine whether it had violated the Nonproliferation Treaty by using spent nuclear fuel to reprocess plutonium in order to manufacture nuclear weapons.

Subsequently, in 1997, the South Korean president Young Sam (b. 1927) and U.S. president Bill Clinton (b. 1946) jointly initiated four-party peace talks between the United States, the ROK, the DPRK, and the People's Republic of China, North Korea's ally to the north. The talks were held to build confidence, promote inter-Korean dialogue, and establish a per-

manent south-north agreement ending hostilities in the Korean Peninsula. Although these goals have not been realized, the four-party talks have provided the best opportunity to date for the United States and South Korea to discuss broader security issues with North Korea.

Economic Relations

In the aftermath of the Korean War, to reconstruct and stabilize its war-torn economy, South Korea depended heavily on U.S. aid and economic assistance. By 1973, the United States had provided a total of \$3.5 billion to rebuild South Korea's economy. The economic relationship between the two countries changed from one of client-patron to that of a mutually interdependent association when the Korean economy began to show remarkable growth in the early 1980s. For the last thirty years, the United States has figured prominently as an important source of investment, technology transfer, and foreign capital for South Korea. South Korea's dependence on exports for growth made the United States (the world's largest market) its most important trading partner. Moreover, the United States also became the principal supplier of raw materials and machinery to resource-poor South Korea.

In the late 1980s, Washington began to take exception to South Korea's trade surpluses, which became a source of friction between the two countries.

Correcting this trade imbalance became a priority. The Koreans agreed to give up their status as a "priority foreign country" in terms of trade practices with the United States and to work for appreciation of the Korean won and liberalization of Korea's import market.

The two-way trade volume between South Korea and the United States expanded from \$300 million in 1963 to \$67 billion in 2000. The United States has become the largest trading partner and investor country in South Korea. South Korea in turn is the United States's seventh-largest trading partner, sixth-largest export market, and fourth-largest market for agricultural goods.

Tensions in ROK-U.S. Relations

Although U.S.-ROK relations are strong, they are multifaceted. In recent years, anti-Americanism has begun to emerge within South Korean nationalism. The Kwangju uprising (1980) was a turning point in the Korean public's view of U.S. involvement in its internal affairs. Following the killings of demonstrators by government troops in the Kwangju uprising, many student activists blamed the United States for supporting the oppressive regime of President Chun Doo Hwan and for causing the division of the Korean Peninsula. Student demonstrations in 1980s led to the burning of the American Cultural Center in Pusan (1982), the seizure of the United States Information Service building in Seoul (1985), and attempted arson at the American Cultural Center in Kwangju (1989).

These days, public criticism of the stationing of American troops in South Korea is on the rise, due to civil and criminal incidents involving U.S. soldiers and locals, use of Korean land and facilities, and mistreatment of Korean employees by the U.S. military. Many agree that contentious issues cannot be dealt with until the one-sided Status of Forces Agreement, which gives preferential treatment to American troops in South Korea, is altered to take into account the demands of the host country. However, these bilateral frictions are outweighed by the mutual security concerns of the peninsula, which remain the cornerstone of South Korea's relations with the United States.

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SOUTH KYONGSANG PROVINCE (1998 pop. 3 million). South Kyongsang Province (Kyongsang namdo) is located in South Korea in the southeastern portion of the Korean peninsula. It contains the major metropolitan center and port of Pusan. The region is characterized by the vast basin of the Naktong River, which descends from the north, and is bounded by Mount Chiri to the west, Mount Kaya and North Kyongsang Province to the north, and the Sea of Japan (East Sea) to the south and east. Due to the rugged topography of the surrounding mountains, subareas within the region share cultural traits, such as a dialect and customs, that are quite different from those of outlying regions.

South Kyongsang Province has a large industrial agglomeration, due mainly to heavy investments in the region by the South Korean government since the 1960s. Automobile and petrochemical factories are largely concentrated along the southeast stretch of cities beginning in North Kyongsang Province and extending from Ulsan through Pusan, Ch'angwon, and Chinju. A thriving import-export zone was established in Masan Bay in the vicinity of the cities of Masan, Ch'angwon, and Chinhae.

South Kyongsang Province conserves the eighty thousand woodblocks that constitute the Korean Buddhist canon (Tripitaka Koreana) at Haein Monastery, which has been named a World Heritage Cultural Treasure by UNESCO. The blocks were carved under royal patronage during Mongolian invasions of Korea between 1236 and 1251 and are the oldest complete Buddhist canon in Chinese characters. The province also boasts several mask dance traditions, which were customarily performed on the fifteenth day of the first moon according to the lunar calendar.

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SOUTH MANCHURIA RAILWAY As the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the South Manchuria Railway originally connected the central Manchurian city of Changchun to the harbors of Lushun (Port Arthur) and Dalian (Dairen) on the Liaodong Peninsula. It was built and controlled by czarist Russia under terms of the 1898 Pavlov, or Sino-Russian, Treaty of Beijing. The railway and the Guandong (Kwantung) Leased Territory in southern Manchuria were transferred to Japanese control in 1905 under terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth at the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War. Over the next four decades, the South Manchuria Railway played a central role in Japan's exploitation of the region's natural, agricultural, and industrial resources.

To manage the railway, a unique company was established in June 1906—the South Manchuria Railway Company (Minami Manshu Tetsudo Kabushiki-gaisha, often referred to by its abbreviation, Mantetsu). The company quickly assumed the role of an auxiliary colonial government in the region, supervising not only the railway and harbors but also the great coal mine at Fushun, the steel works at Anshan, dozens of research facilities and laboratories, hospitals, schools, electrical generating plants, water facilities, and the police forces in many of the towns through which the railway ran. Under dynamic leadership, such as that of its first president, the former governor of the colony of Taiwan, Goto Shimpei, the Mantetsu hydra became a driving force in the development of the Japanese presence in Manchuria. Although it often found itself at odds with the local military establishment, the Guandong Army, the South Manchuria Railway Company was not merely a passive commercial enterprise; it was an agent that actively promoted Japanese colonial rule.

After creation of the puppet state of Manzhouguo (Manchukuo) in the early 1930s and the Japanese invasion of China in 1937, the roles played by the South Manchuria Railway Company in the governing and managing of Manchuria and its economy were diminished. A new entity, the Manchuria Heavy Industry Company, came to assume many of the administrative responsibilities and industrial assets formerly managed by Mantetsu. The South Manchuria Railway Company, however, continued to supervise the transportation network in the region, which now involved the movement of thousands of Japanese settlers to central and northern Manchuria as well as constant demands from the military for logistical support. Overall, the company's fortunes declined during World War II as inflation took a toll on its assets and financial structure.

Following Japan's surrender at the end of World War II in the Pacific, management of the original 1,128-kilometer railway was transferred to the Soviet Union and China, per terms of both the Yalta Conference and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 14 August 1945. After the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949, the railway line was transferred to sole Chinese control. During the late twentieth century, the railway lines first laid down by Russian and later Japanese colonial rulers continued to play an important role in the region's transportation infrastructure, allowing for the movement of coal, steel, and manufactured heavy machinery to the commercial port of Dalian for shipment to Chinese cities to the south as well as for export abroad.

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SOUTH P'YONGAN PROVINCE (2002 est. pop. 3.4 million). South P'yongan Province (P'yongan namdo), in North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), surrounds the capital city of P'yongyang and the city of Namp'o. Both P'yongyang and Namp'o, however, are independent administrative entities and are autonomous from the surrounding province. This province is the political, economic, and social center of North Korea. It also has historical significance as the seat of Korean civilization because the first confederacy of tribes arose in this region.

The province has an area of 12,383 square kilometers and a population of 2,853,737 (excluding the populations of P'yongyang and Namp'o). South P'yongan's five cities are P'yongsong (which is also the provincial capital), Sunch'on, Anju, Kaech'on, and Tokch'on. There are also fifteen counties (*kun*).

South P'yongan is highly industrialized, but it also has a significant agricultural sector. Heavy manufacturing sectors include coal, electricity, construction materials, machinery, automobiles, chemicals, and

mining. Foodstuffs, textiles, leather, paper, and household items are the top light manufacturing products. Wheat and corn are the key agricultural products. Livestock include cattle, sheep, and goats. The region's orchards yield apples and chestnuts. Because of the province's 400-kilometer coastline along the Yellow Sea, croakers, anchovies, and oysters are among the key seafoods produced.

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SOUTHEAST ASIA—HUMAN RIGHTS

Notions of human rights are controversial in Southeast Asia, as elsewhere, because they embrace basic values reaching to the core of personal, social, and national identity, and encompass complex moral, philosophical, and cultural issues played out simultaneously at global and local levels. The search for common values is nevertheless essential to a peaceful and stable world, as communication and cooperation will otherwise remain very difficult.

Context of Human Rights in Southeast Asia

The realization of universal human rights confronts two major obstacles. The first is the idea that culture is relative to each society. Consequently, attempts to impose universal human-rights concepts are seen as Western cultural imperialism by many non-Western countries. The second asserts national sovereignty as superior to international human-rights law. Sovereignty is precious to all countries, but especially to those that have achieved it more recently, as in post-colonial Southeast Asia.

United Nations human-rights covenants and conventions provide a primary frame of reference for this article, representing the highest level of international agreement so far achieved. These texts should not be seen as fixed or infallible "tablets of stone," but as evolving in relation to changes in technology, society, and notions of human dignity. The United Nations, based on nation-states and upholding national sovereignty, yet bound by its charter to promote human rights, appears to be the only institution capable of providing an acceptable and comprehensive framework for pursuing dialogue and dispute resolution in

this complex field. This is evidenced by increasing accession to U.N. human-rights treaties during the past decade by the ten countries of Southeast Asia constituting the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Brunei, Myanmar (Burma), Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

Human Rights: General Features

Universal understandings of human rights are held together across diverse cultural and religious contexts by a common thread of respect for human dignity, based on ideals of how human beings ought to treat each other. But controversy centers on notions of rights as inalienable entitlements to be enjoyed by all persons. Also, some rights, for example, freedom of religion, may contradict others, as when religious interpretations oppose freedom of expression or the rights of women. Protecting cultures and minority groups can allow imposition of uniform practices on all members.

It is widely agreed that rights and responsibilities go together. But whereas a liberal view would recognize responsibilities to uphold others' rights, authoritarian or totalitarian states, as well as many traditional societies, assume the right to define citizens' responsibilities and make rights conditional on their performance. The U.N. General Assembly's Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups, and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in March 1999 upheld the liberal position.

Two major streams of human rights are commonly identified: (1) civil and political; and (2) economic, social, and cultural. The former includes freedom of expression in all forms, freedom of association and organization, free and fair elections, and legal due process. The latter includes rights to food, shelter, health, education, employment, and cultural and religious expression. These rights intersect at many points, most obviously in relation to the rights of workers, women, ethnic groupings, and religious minorities. Principles of universality, indivisibility, and interdependence of all human rights are central to U.N. human-rights doctrine. In practice, each state and society accords higher priorities to some rights over others. The Cold War and rival outlooks between "developed" and "developing" countries have created many artificial divisions between the two major human rights streams.

Application of the indivisibility principle requires convergence between ideas of democracy, development, and human rights. Failure to achieve this lies at

the heart of conflicts between Western and Southeast Asian countries. Automatic equation of human rights with liberal understandings of democracy is misleading. While principles of democratic participation are upheld in all major human-rights treaties as essential to many other rights, democratic rights do not constitute the sum total of human rights. Even in Western countries, the will of democratic majorities can override the rights of minorities unless these are constitutionally and in other ways protected. Similarly, rights to minimum health, nutrition, shelter, education and literacy, equal opportunities for men and women, and sustainable and equitable management of the environment are not guaranteed by civil and political rights. Rather, they constitute necessary, if not sufficient conditions for their fulfillment.

U.N. Human Rights System

U.N. covenants and conventions constitute treaties between all participating states. Ratification of or accession to them requires states to harmonize their domestic law and practice with treaty obligations. Sovereignty is preserved through the right to declare reservations or understandings. States that invoke their domestic constitution and practices as the determinants of their treaty obligations breach Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) represents the core statement of U.N. human-rights principles. These were spelled out in two major covenants adopted in 1966—the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)—supplemented by spe-

cialized conventions, notably the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatments or Punishments (CAT); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CROC); the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Table 1 indicates the extent of ASEAN states' ratification of the above eight United Nations human-rights treaties. The United States and China, as key members of the U.N. Security Council, are included for purposes of comparison.

Ratification does not guarantee that states will implement human-rights treaties, as shown by forced child labor and alleged genocide towards toward minorities in Myanmar (Burma). By contrast, Singapore is meticulous in only ratifying treaties to the extent it is prepared to support them with domestic laws and policies. Regime changes, timing, and context help explain apparent inconsistencies in states' treaty participation. Reservations and qualifications also offer useful insights into their policies and practice. Ratification nevertheless gives opportunity and legitimacy to both domestic and international groups in advocating human-rights improvements.

Brunei participates only in the children's rights convention. All the ASEAN states except Brunei support the convention to eliminate discrimination against women. The United States accedes to neither treaty. Together with the antigenocide convention, these two treaties generate greatest support from

TABLE 1

Accession to/Ratification of U.N. Human Rights Treaties by ASEAN States, U.S., and China								
(Date Entered into Force)								
	ICCPR	ICESCR	CAT	CROC	CEDAW	CERD	Refugees	Genocide
Brunei	—	—	—	26/1/96	—	—	—	—
Cambodia	26/8/92	26/8/92	14/11/92	14/11/92	14/11/92	28/12/86	5/10/92	14/10/50
Indonesia	—	—	27/11/98	5/10/90	13/10/84	25/7/99	—	—
Laos	—	—	—	7/6/91	13/9/81	24/3/74	—	8/10/50
Malaysia	—	—	—	19/3/95	4/8/95	—	—	20/12/94
Myanmar	—	—	—	14/8/91	21/8/97	—	—	14/3/56
Philippines	23/1/87	3/1/76	26/6/87	20/9/90	4/9/81	4/1/69	22/7/81	7/7/50
Singapore	—	—	—	4/11/95	5/11/95	—	—	18/8/95
Thailand	29/1/97	5/12/99	—	26/4/92	8/9/85	—	—	—
Vietnam	24/12/82	24/12/82	—	2/9/90	19/3/82	9/7/82	—	9/6/81
China	—	—	3/11/88	1/4/92	3/9/81	28/1/82	24/9/82	18/4/83
U.S.	8/9/92	—	20/11/94	—	—	20/11/94	—	25/11/88

SOURCE: UNCHR treaty website, <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf>.

ASEAN states. But most have entered reservations based on domestic social and religious concerns. Several, including the USA and China, insist on their prior consent being sought each time torture and genocide allegations are referred to international tribunals. Together with the refugees' convention, the antitorture convention is least supported by ASEAN states.

Only five ASEAN states support the convention to eliminate racial discrimination. Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand discriminate against or are in active conflict with ethnic minorities in varying degrees. Singapore and Malaysia have developed policies aimed at protecting interethnic and religious harmony. While these policies have achieved a fair measure of success, they would not conform to the requirements of the anti-racial discrimination (CERD) convention. Indonesia ratified this convention in May 1999, indicating its intention to overcome historically strained relations with Chinese and other ethnic minorities.

The Philippines and Cambodia participate in all eight treaties. Despite authoritarian rule under President Ferdinand Marcos, the Philippines has a historically deep-rooted democratic culture, with extensive capacity for popular mobilization in both political and nongovernment spheres. By contrast, Cambodia ratified all but one of the treaties in a rush at the end of 1992 while still in a state of political, legal, and economic chaos following many years of civil war in the wake of the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge in 1979. Its actions were probably aimed at gaining international approval and assistance. Even so, rudimentary frameworks of democracy and human rights are emerging there. Vietnam has ratified six of the eight treaties, all except one in the early 1980s. But lack of freedom of association and rights to practice religion alleged by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and others undermine its human rights credentials.

Overall, Southeast Asian states remain cautious in acceding to either the ICCPR or ICESCR. Cambodia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam participate in both. Other ASEAN states participate in neither. Indonesia, which has drawn up a five-year human-rights national action plan, aims to ratify at least the ICCPR before 2003. Thailand, which instituted a new democratic constitution in 1997, ratified the ICCPR in that year and the ICESCR in December 1999. Although former Philippines President Marcos ratified the latter but not the former, other ASEAN states have shown little inclination to favor the economic and social over the civil and political rights convention, despite assertions that development must precede democracy. This is probably because the ICESCR contains many civil- and political-rights aspects, and

because it lacks a specific developing country focus. This latter aspect was addressed in the U.N. Declaration on the Right to Development (Resolution 41/128, 4 December 1986). The United States continues to oppose both this declaration and the ICESCR and heavily qualified its eventual acceptance of the ICCPR.

Asian Values

Asian values were put forward to counter intensifying pressures for democratization placed on non-Western countries following the end of the Cold War. A U.N. global and regional human-rights consultation in 1993 lent urgency to finding a common position. In their Bangkok Declaration, Asian governments asserted that while human rights are universal in nature, they must be contextualized in relation to history, institutions, culture, religions, and stage of economic development of individual states. While there are several variants, core themes affirm values of harmony, cooperation, order, respect for authority, and family over those of individualism, competition, freedom, and separation of powers. Freedom of expression, even in asserting the truth, should be tempered by consideration of the potential social impact of what is said. Hence, the Indonesian government, under President Suharto, laid down the principle of the media as "free and responsible."

One variant promotes "Asian democracy." This acknowledges the principle that sovereignty derives from the people as a whole, such that governments must ultimately rule for their benefit and be judged on the basis of performance. This entails an active government role, usually in partnership with the private sector, in promoting economic development. Alleged "gridlock" and "opposition for its own sake" associated with liberal democracy are rejected in favor of "strong government" by Confucian-style wise rulers. A more liberal version emphasizes "Asian renaissance" based on intercivilizational dialogue between equals. While emphasis on family and community remain strong, human rights are claimed as the common heritage of mankind. Asian values rhetoric should not be used as a smokescreen for corruption or to protect repressive governments.

Emphasis on culture in Asian values discourse raises questions as to who defines and interprets it. Culture is best understood as not fixed, but evolving and contested, with increasing exchange and adaptation of ideas and practices in an interconnected global world. Universality need not imply uniformity in application. Indeed, repression of cultural variety would constitute a denial of basic human-rights principles.

Asian values rhetoric concerning "community" disguises the extent to which states shape and control

communities. The Asian Forum of Non-Government Organizations strongly opposed their governments on these issues during the 1993 U.N. consultation process, affirming principles of universality and indivisibility.

While most regional countries have been content to defend their systems as appropriate to their situation, Malaysia and, at an earlier stage, Singapore have vigorously counterattacked Western systems and values as leading to economic stagnation, social disorder, and decline, with Asian values widely proposed as the key to the region's success. The East Asian economic crisis beginning in mid-1997 proved an embarrassment in this context.

The financial crisis and its aftermath represent a fundamental and continuing threat to Southeast Asia's economic and social human rights. While inflation, exchange rates, balance of payments, consumer spending, and, more gradually, employment appear to be recovering, the human costs are likely to persist into the longer term. Examples include 435 Malaysian small businesses declared bankrupt in 1997–1998; an additional 40 million Indonesians falling into poverty, plus 12 percent similarly affected in Thailand; rising unemployment, with severest impact on women and migrant workers; withdrawal of children from school; and reduced public services affecting levels of health and nutrition. The indirect costs in terms of family tensions, crime, and social disorder are less easily quantified but are already widely evident (UNDP 1999: 40).

The economic crisis has further intensified pressures for democratization. In Indonesia, it set off a chain of events that led in May 1998 to the overthrow of President Suharto, who had ruled since 1966. Indonesia's democratic transition thus coincided with major tasks of economic restructuring. Democratic elections were successfully held in June 1999, with forty-eight parties competing. The newly elected Parliament replaced President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie in October 1999 with a well-respected liberal reformist Muslim scholar, Abdurrachman Wahid. Habibie can nevertheless be credited with liberalization of political structures and of media and public life generally, and with beginning processes of judicial and constitutional reform. Wahid has continued the process, also taking steps to curb the powers of the military. However, economic recovery remains slow, with institutional weakness, mismanagement, and corruption deep-rooted.

New laws granting autonomy (devolution) to provinces and districts will be crucial to democratization. However, opinion is divided on whether devolution will protect or destroy national unity. Destructive

ethnic and religious conflict has escalated, partly encouraged by elements seeking to restore the former regime. Long-standing movements for secession have experienced vigorous revival in Aceh and Irian Jaya provinces. The separation of East Timor, following massive violence and destruction by Indonesia's military and supporting militias, has created a huge rebuilding task for the East Timorese and United Nations Temporary Administration for East Timor (U.N. TAET) before full independence in 2002 or 2003.

The Philippines and Thailand have moved strongly in a democratic direction since replacing authoritarian cum military rulers in 1986 and 1992. While the Philippines has long-established democratic institutions and culture, Thailand had only experienced a brief and turbulent period of democracy from 1972 to 1975. Consolidating democracy will entail greater respect for and commitment to constitutional processes at all levels of government, among politicians and parties, and throughout civil society. This process is more advanced



A Filipino human rights demonstrator sits inside a barbed-wire cage in Manila in 1984 to protest human rights abuses during the period of Marcos rule. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)



In Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in August 2001, three women appeal the detentions of their husbands under the Internal Security Act. They are seated before the Human Rights Commission. (AFP/CORBIS)

in urban relative to rural areas, where patronage and corruption is deep-rooted. This gap is reflected in economic disparities, particularly in chronically poor areas of northeast Thailand. However, the 1997 Constitution established a Counter Corruption Commission with strong powers. Corruption, including criminalization, is also endemic in the Philippines' political processes, despite high levels of popular awareness and participation. The country also faces problems in reconciling demands for regional autonomy in Muslim areas of Mindanao with maintaining national unity.

In Singapore, which adopted the British (Westminster) democratic model of parliamentary and cabinet government from the outset, one-party rule has been consolidated by combining restrictive controls on political and other popular mobilization with widely shared economic growth, health, and educational benefits. The government is exploring new approaches to participation but shows no signs of shifting to open forms of liberal democracy.

Malaysia has built on a similar system. Its constitution affirms basic political and personal freedoms, with due legal process. However, citizens' rights are constrained by extensive security legislation linked to major checks on judicial independence. Governments frequently use their parliamentary dominance to amend the Constitution.

Malaysian politics are dominated by issues of race and religion. The ruling coalition National Front is

based on acceptance of dominance by the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). Although the Malay vote is strongly contested by the Islamic Party (PAS), which remains outside the ruling coalition, both regard the preeminence of the Malay race, as original "sons of the soil," as a nonnegotiable fundamental of Malaysian politics. UMNO controls key cabinet positions and determines allocation of party nominations at elections. Non-Malays accept Malay constitutional privileges and seek concessions within that framework. Fear of Islamic rule, combined with relative economic prosperity, keeps most non-Malays in the government camp.

The New Economic Policy (NEP) was set in place after 1970 to promote Malays in business and education, with the reasoning that national unity would be endangered unless the nexus between ethnic, urban-rural, and occupational divisions inherited from British rule was overcome. Critics assert that affirmative action policies should be refocused toward a determined attack on poverty regardless of race.

The 1971 Sedition Amendment Act removed major areas from public discussion relating to Malay rights, the citizenship rights of other races, the status of the national language and the Islamic religion, and the rights and privileges of the king (*Yang de-Pertuan Agong*) and sultans, who act as state rulers. The uncertain and arbitrary nature of these restrictions inhibits in-depth debate concerning education, civil-service recruitment

and employment practices, rights of women, and family. Rights of Moslem women are subject to Islamic law.

Apparent evolution toward political openness was reversed by the dismissal and jailing of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in September 1998, against a background of differences with Prime Minister Datuk Seri Mahathir bin Mohamad over economic management and political reform. Ibrahim also strongly attacked governmental use of Asian values to legitimize avoidance of accountability. Trial processes and sentencing on grounds of corruption and sodomy have been widely condemned in both international and Malaysian human-rights circles.

A continuing obstacle to institutionalizing human rights in Southeast Asia is the lack of a U.N. regional arm. This has been partly offset by the establishment of national human-rights institutions (NHRIs). These institutions assist their governments in developing national human-rights plans, aimed at strengthening links with the U.N. system, while also monitoring national laws and practices. They network via the Asia-Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions (APFNHRI), which in May 2000 included Australia, Fiji, India, Indonesia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka. Malaysia, and Thailand have also established NHRIs. Definitions of human-rights goals by some states only partly conform to U.N. instruments.

The "Paris Principles," established in 1991, require independence in terms of resources, initiation and conduct of inquiries, reporting, recommendations to government, and public education. Legal autonomy of institutions is best protected, as in Thailand and the Philippines, when their establishment is incorporated in the national constitution. The NHRIs' recommendations are only advisory, and while the NHRIs' informal access and networks can often prove influential, ultimately the implementation depends on the effectiveness and integrity of political, administrative, and judicial processes.

Future Trends

Both ends and means will continue to be disputed in realizing goals of universal human rights. A priority aim at this stage should be to involve both governments and civil society groups in strengthening frameworks for dialogue, for which acceptance of the indivisibility principle is an essential prerequisite. Recent political and economic upheavals in East Asia show the urgency of integrating all streams of human rights. Adherence to U.N. human-rights treaties can provide a global framework for cooperation between Western and Asian countries, on a basis of equality

and mutual accountability, in enlarging the human rights of their diverse peoples.

Philip J. Eldridge

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SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was an alliance of Southeast Asian and Western nations. It was established on 8 September 1954, less than two months after agreements reached at the Geneva Conference had paved the way for the French withdrawal from Indochina, to provide defense and economic cooperation in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. The founding nations were Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States. Like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Southeast Asian alliance was intended to prevent the spread of Communism; but, unlike the NATO pact, the SEATO agreement did not obligate one member to assist another against a military threat. Although SEATO sanctioned the U.S. military effort in Vietnam, and although several SEATO members sent troops to fight there, SEATO itself played no direct role in the war. The organization weakened in the late 1960s with France ending active participation in 1967, followed by Pakistan's withdrawal in 1972. SEATO was unable to

intervene in the civil wars in Laos or Vietnam due to its rule requiring unanimity and the role of the organization in regional affairs was seriously questioned by 1973. With the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and the Communist victories throughout the region in 1975, SEATO became an anachronism and was disbanded on 30 June 1977.

James Chin

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SOUVANNA PHOUMA, PRINCE (1901–1984), Lao political leader. Born in Luang Prabang, Prince Souvanna Phouma was the moderate leader of Laos from the time of its struggle for independence until the Pathet Lao takeover in 1975. Souvanna Phouma was the nephew of King Sisavangvong and half brother of Prince Souphanouvong, his political adversary. He studied engineering in Hanoi and France and worked for the public works administration of Indochina. The restoration of Haw Pra Keo, once a Buddhist shrine but now the Museum of Art and Antiquities, was one of his achievements in the civil service. Souvanna Phouma joined the Lao Issara, or Free Lao, resistance government led by his brother Prince Phetsarat as minister of public works. He fled



Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma in 1969. (BETTMAN/CORBIS)

to Thailand with other members of the Lao Issara when the French regained control in 1946, but he returned to Laos when the Lao Issara disbanded in 1949. In 1951 Souvanna formed the Progressive Party and was elected prime minister of Laos in the same year. During his first administration, he negotiated Laos's independence from France at the Geneva conference in 1953. The political instability of the civil war caused the removal and reinstatement of Souvanna as premier seven additional times, including in three coalition governments. After the proclamation of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Souvanna Phouma served the government as a political adviser until his death in 1984.

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SOVIET-VIETNAMESE TFOC The relationship between Vietnam and the Soviet Union took a dramatic turn with the signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation between the two countries. Since the 1930s, relations between the two have passed through several phases. It was only after the Sino-Soviet split of the late 1950s that the Soviet Union grudgingly helped its fellow Communist government.

Until the unification of Vietnam in the mid-1970s, Hanoi judiciously maintained a balanced relationship with China and the Soviet Union. After that, the steady deterioration of relations with China turned Hanoi toward Moscow. The United States was eager for a rapprochement with China and remained cool toward Vietnamese overtures. Vietnam moved closer to the Soviet Union and became a full-fledged member of the Moscow-dominated COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) in June 1978. China then suspended its \$300 million assistance to Vietnam. Existing economic assistance from the Soviet Union was not sufficient for Hanoi's needs, and Vietnam also wanted more support for its Cambodian policy. Strategic assistance was necessary, and Vietnamese-Soviet military cooperation could help provide it.

On 3 November 1978, Vietnam signed a twenty-five-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (TFOC) with the Soviet Union. The military clause obliged both to consult each other "if one was threatened by aggression for eliminating that threat." Vietnam also allowed the Soviet Union to use naval

facilities at the Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay bases. Armed with the TOFC, Vietnam intervened in Cambodia the following month. The treaty provided more of a psychological advantage for the Vietnamese than a strategic one. However, China was not deterred from helping the Khmer Rouge, and a strong supposition existed at the time, never disproved, that the Chinese quite clearly understood that the bogging down of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia would work to China's advantage. The Soviets did not take any direct military action at the time of the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in February 1979. Apart from economic and military aid, Vietnam received primarily rhetorical support. The Vietnamese seemed satisfied with the material and diplomatic support from the Soviets. Hanoi's relations with Beijing remained strained, and it became increasingly dependent on Moscow to sustain its military support for the Cambodian government in Phnom Penh against the ousted Khmer Rouge forces. Vietnam received about \$800 million in 1978 from Moscow, which increased to \$1.4 billion the following year. National interest rather than ideological solidarity was shown to be the most important factor in relations between Communist countries, and Southeast Asia was drawn further into great-power rivalry. Vietnam also could not normalize its relations with the United States, because its troops were stationed in Cambodia. It therefore moved closer to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union also made an important contribution to Vietnam by providing fellowships for Vietnamese to pursue advanced studies in the USSR. Training in medicine, science, and math was often of high quality. This is perhaps one reason why currently Vietnam does well in the scientific olympics.

It was only after the disintegration of the Soviet Union that Vietnam's relations with both China and the United States improved considerably. However, Vietnam's historical ties with the successor state, the Russian Federation, continued, and there is currently Russian-Vietnamese collaboration in offshore oil exploration and production.

Patit Paban Mishra

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SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES—CHINA

China's late-twentieth-century process of economic

transition essentially began with the establishment of what are known as special economic zones (SEZs). SEZs are geographically insulated areas with economic openness to the outside world that are regulated by the government in a discriminatory manner in their favor, so that special and flexible economic policies and measures are adopted primarily to promote foreign investment, technology transfer, and exports. In 1979, China designated the first four SEZs—Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen—as part of its domestic economic reform. By limiting its experiment to those four SEZs, China sought to minimize the unnecessary economic, social, and political costs that are often associated with a drastic policy switch and to gain necessary experience in carrying out the transition.

Serving both as windows to the outside world and as laboratories to formulate various reform policies, the SEZs played a pivotal role in China's overall economic transition during the last two decades of the twentieth century. Numerous measures aimed at reforming the existing economic system and reaching a higher degree of economic openness were developed and tested in the SEZs. In many regards, the effect of the SEZs has far exceeded their limited geographical boundaries. It is safe to say that without the successful operation of the SEZs, China's reforms would not have gone so far and the transitional process would not have been so smooth.

China's Approach to SEZs

At the outset of the economic reform and open-door policy, the Chinese central government realized that development could not happen in all places at once (that would have been too costly) and that certain policies needed to be tested within limited areas before being implemented nationwide. It planned to take advantage of the global trend of industrial relocation to attract foreign investment to its capital-starved economy. Foreign investment would allow China to make full use of its large reserve of inexpensive surplus labor to produce labor-intensive goods for export and, ultimately, to create foreign-exchange earnings. The government also recognized the importance of advanced foreign technology for stimulating growth and for making possible technology transfer. It was hoped that inland enterprises could later learn from the experience of the SEZs.

Supported by growing local enthusiasm for such policies, particularly from Guangdong province, the SEZs functioned as a laboratory where various methods aimed at overcoming the drawbacks associated with a central-planning system could be developed.

Fourteen more cities were designated as coastal open cities in 1984; here, the entire city began to adopt policies similar to those implemented in the SEZs, such as promoting foreign investment. The following year saw the declaration of the Chang (Yangtze) River, Pearl River, and southern Fujian deltas as open economic zones. In April 1988, a fifth SEZ was established, in Hainan, after Hainan was newly designated as a province, so that the entire province functioned as a zone. In the same year, a coastal development strategy, officially called the *weixiang xing fazhan zhanlue* (Outward-Oriented Development Strategy), was launched in the coastal areas. This policy had a much larger scale and wider range, embracing twelve provinces and cities under the direct control of the central government. In April 1990, the Pudong New Area was formally established, with policies favorable for inducing rapid construction, large investments, and so on, for building a center of finance, commerce, and high technology. In the eighth five-year plan (1991–1995), the focus was placed more on the development of particular industries than of regions.

Economic Incentives and Political Considerations

In the Chinese SEZs, flexible and innovative packages were assembled that offered incentives for foreign investors. These included preferential tax rates, concessions, and exemptions from certain taxes, administrative fees, and need for high or mid-level approval. Most exported and imported items were exempted from custom duties and the industrial and commercial consolidated tax. The SEZs also introduced reform measures dealing with labor-related issues. Employment contracts with specified term limits and dismissal of unqualified employees were permitted for the first time.

There were certain political considerations in establishing the early SEZs. The zones were not selected on the basis of whether there was a strong industrial base, an adequate urban infrastructure, or a technologically innovative capacity. The SEZs had to be easily separated from the vast inland areas, because drastically different policies were to be tested in the zones, and no one could be certain that the policies would succeed. At an early stage, fences were built around them, and checkpoints were stationed to inspect traffic. Administrative procedures also were used to control population inflows to the zones. Furthermore, the SEZs were not built into major industrial centers at first, so as to avoid significant losses if the experiment should fail. Moreover, the central government intended to use these zones as intermediary or

buffer zones for the future reunification of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan with the mainland, and so they were chosen partially for their proximity to those places. Finally, the overseas Chinese community was targeted as a potential source for productive capital: the SEZs were set up along the southeast coast in Guangdong and Fujian, which were the places of origin of many overseas Chinese.

As an integral and critical component of China's gradualist approach toward economic reform and opening up, the SEZs have developed over the past two decades into self-contained mini-economies along the lines of "one country, two systems." In these SEZs, nonsocialist measures could be adopted. The SEZs have moved China much further down the path to economic transition than would have been possible with export-processing zones, because the latter may not reform the traditional socialist system but mainly process products for export. The measures that proved to be effective and successful in the SEZs have been extended, whenever feasible, to the rest of the country. This, in turn, has helped the entire economy to become more open and efficient in a step-by-step manner.

Assessment

Judged by most social and economic indicators, the performance of the SEZs has, for the most part, been extraordinary. Despite the unfavorable initial conditions, such as a lack of industrial, infrastructure, and technological support, the pace of development of the zones has not only exceeded the national average so far, but it has also narrowed the gap with some major industrial centers, such as Shanghai, that have long been considered to be the backbone of growth and trade in the Chinese economy. This happened within a short time.

Xiaobo Hu

See also: **Shanghai Pudong New Area; Shenzhen Special Economic Zone**

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SPEELMAN, CORNELIS (1628–1684), governor-general of the Dutch East India Company. Born in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, Speelman came to the

Dutch East Indies (modern-day Indonesia) in 1645 at the age of seventeen. He rose through the ranks of the Dutch East India Company, serving as governor of Coromandel, a territory on the east coast of South India, from 1663 to 1665. He learned several local languages and wrote widely on political, social, and cultural topics. In 1668, allied with Arung Palakka (1634–1696), prince of Boni, a kingdom in southern Sulawesi, he led Dutch military forces to defeat Makassar, then the most powerful state in the eastern archipelago of the Dutch East Indies and a trading center for the company's European rivals. The Treaty of Bungaya (18 November 1668) that followed granted the company a monopoly of trade in Makassar and hegemony over its former empire. As member of the Council of the Indies from 1671, Speelman argued vigorously for extending the company's territorial control in the Indies, rather than focusing simply on trade, and he led Dutch military forces in eastern Java in 1676. As governor-general (1681–1684) he ordered the conquest of Banten in the west of the island. His rule was marred by his corruption and abuse of power, and the Dutch East India Company confiscated his estate after his death.

Robert Cribb

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SPICE TRADE Spices such as salt, saffron, pepper, ginger, cardamom, nutmeg, clove, and cinnamon have, since time immemorial, been highly valued as medicine, ointment, aphrodisiacs, stimulants, antiseptics, and preservatives. Their use as seasonings for various dishes or ingredients for incenses and oils predates recorded history. The ancient recognition of the therapeutic value of salt, for instance, resonates through the etymology of the Latin words *salus* (“bliss”) and *salubritas* (“health”), which are derived from the Latin word *sal* (“salt”). In the European Middle Ages, pepper and salt were widely used as preservatives for meat. The healing and stimulating capacities of spices like ginger, nutmeg, and cardamom contributed to the fact that in various ancient cultures, such as those of early China and India, cooking was regarded as a sacred act.

Most spices are native to the tropical and subtropical regions of South and Southeast Asia. The Moluc-

cas were the spice islands par excellence because they were the home of the “holy trinity” of nutmeg, clove, and pepper. Nutmeg and clove were, in fact, native to the Moluccas and had not been transplanted to other tropical regions before the arrival of the Europeans in Southeast Asia. Pepper, on the other hand, is said to be indigenous to the Malabar Coast of India, but it had long been cultivated throughout Southeast Asia. Sumatra, for instance, became a favorite destination of European East India merchants for its wealth in pepper. Ginger is probably native to Southeast Asia, but it was already widely known in ancient India and China. Cinnamon, also already widely used in Asian antiquity, originates from Sri Lanka. Cardamom is native to the rain forests of South India. South India and Sri Lanka were the exclusive areas of its cultivation when Europeans arrived in the Indian Ocean. Saffron, for which India, especially Kashmir, and Northern China have been famous, probably originates in the Mediterranean, the Near East, and Iran. The demand for spices such as pepper, cinnamon, cardamom, ginger, turmeric, saffron, nutmeg, and clove, which were domesticated in South and Southeast Asia, was an important factor in the evolution of long-distance trade.

By 2000 BCE, different spice routes had reached the Middle East. Many references to the early Arabian trade in spices are to be found in the Bible (for example, Joseph was sold to a group of Ishmaelite spice merchants on their way to Egypt). In the fourth century BCE, the Greek historian Herodotus wrote that wild animals and steep cliffs render the spice gardens, lying somewhere in the distant East, inaccessible. His account was inspired by the stories of Arab traders, who tried to withhold the true origins of their highly prized goods.



GALLE—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

A fortified Sri Lankan city built by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century, Galle was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1988. Demonstrating the fusion of European architecture and South Asian traditions, this important link in the spice trade was conquered by the British in eighteenth century.

The Romans then succeeded in breaking the Arabian monopoly on the trade with India for more than three centuries. Yet, after the fall of Rome in the sixth century, the Arab monopoly was quickly restored. The spice routes to the East soon also functioned as conduits for the new Arab religion, Islam, propagated in the seventh century by Muhammad (c. 570–632), who had married a widow of a wealthy Arabian spice merchant.

The threshold to the European market, however, was guarded by Christian Byzantium. In 1204 it was sacked by its economic rival, Venice, which then became the Western trade center for spices until the sixteenth century. By 1500, European discoverers, seeking to evade the heavy taxes imposed by the Ottomans in the Levant and the Marmadukes in Egypt, had found the sea passage to the spice regions of India, Ceylon, Sumatra, and the Moluccas. In the following centuries, several European East India companies competed with each other in monopolizing larger or smaller segments of the spice trade in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. From 1600 onward, the most successful merchant associations were the British East India Company and its Dutch equivalent, the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie. By the late eighteenth century, however, their spice monopolies were broken due to the successful transplantation of South and Southeast Asian spice plants to other parts of the world.

Martin Ramstedt

See also: **British in Southeast Asia; Dutch East Indies; Dutch in Southeast Asia**

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SPIRIT CULTS Spirit worship is one of the oldest practices in Myanmar (Burma), preceding in many cases the practice of Buddhism. Many ethnic groups in Myanmar continue to practice in various forms what is broadly referred to as animism. The Burman spirit cults, however, are highly organized cults associated with a hierarchy of the Thirty-Seven Spirits (*nats*). These cults are unusual in the Southeast Asian region for their elaborate systematic organization. Also un-

usual is their close association with royal roles and symbolism, both in terms of historical provenance (they were often associated with royalty before meeting a violent death) and ritual roles (the mediums often adopt royal dress and language when performing and do so in "palaces"). A similar elaborate system is found among the Mon peoples.

The Thirty-Seven Nats were supposedly instituted by Anawratha (1044–1077), one of the most prominent kings of the Pagan dynasty, at the base of the Shwezigon Pagoda in the then capital Pagan in 1059. There are supposedly thirty-seven "inner" and thirty-seven "outer" spirits. Chief among them is Mahagiri, who is venerated at the center of most Burman households and is symbolized by a coconut. Anawratha, who converted to Buddhism, placed Sakka, the king of the gods in Buddhist cosmology, over and above the powerful Mahagiri *nat*, and thereby Buddhicized the pantheon. According to oral history, Anawratha is supposed to have said, "Man will not come for the sake of the new religion. Let them come for their old gods and gradually they will be won over." Thus, around the same time the kingdom was declared Buddhist, influential figures who died a violent death were placed and commemorated close to relics of the Buddha.

Anthropologists have long argued over the relative placing of the spirit cults vis-à-vis Buddhism. Are the spirit cults the fundamental religion of the Burmese, with Buddhism only a veneer? Are they in conflict at the psychological level, or do they form a continuum? What is certain is that there are fundamental differences between Buddhism and the spirit cults. Whereas the spirit cults are mostly interpreted as dealing with the mundane world, with wealth and success within it, Buddhism takes primary aim at the supramundane world. In Myanmar, attitudes to spirits vary. At one extreme are the professional preoccupations of the mediums (*natkadaw*, "wives of *nats*"), the propitiation and offering of the *nats* by their clients, and the preoccupation with *nats* by heads of state, ministers, and civil servants. Many Burmese, however, merely give their respects so that the spirits are peaceful and do no harm. Few, however, will ignore *nats* altogether in Myanmar.

Gustaaf Houtman

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SPORTS. See **Asia Games; Baseball—Japan; Buh; Buzkashi; Cockfighting; Cricket; Fish Fighting; Judo; Karate; Kendo; Kites and Kite Flying; Longboat Racing; Nu Shooting; Olympics; Sepak Takraw; Tai Chi.**

SPORTS—CHINA Chinese physical culture has always oscillated between two poles: at one extreme, violent competition; at the other, the peaceful quest for physical and spiritual harmony. Boxers, wrestlers, and other athletes embody the first extreme; devotees of tai chi, a kind of graceful gymnastic exercise, represent the second. Chinese sports, which fall by definition into the first category, have often been modified by influences from the second. For millennia, Chinese culture has had gentle sports as well as rough ones. Good form has often been prized above competitive success.

Traditional China

In ancient China, as in European antiquity, most sports were rough. Extant references to sports frequently refer to them in conjunction with military preparation. In the Zhou period (1045–256 BCE), for instance, soldiers ran, jumped, threw objects of various sorts, wrestled, and practiced their skills as archers, swordsmen, and charioteers. They seem also to have demonstrated their prowess as weight lifters. *Kangding* (tripod lifting) was popular as early as the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE).

By the time of the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), foot soldiers and mounted knights had replaced charioteers as the mainstay of the army, and the practice of *wushu* (military skills) was highly developed. Although the unarmed techniques of *wushu* were especially prized, archery too had numerous devotees, and the sport was immensely popular during the Song dynasty (960–1279). An eleventh-century district survey found 588 archery societies enrolling 31,411 members, nearly 15 percent of the local population. During the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), China's Manchu rulers preferred that their subjects not practice the martial arts. *Wushu* nonetheless experienced a surge in popularity during the nationalistic reaction to Chinese defeat in the Opium War of 1842.

Ball games, played with carefully sewn stuffed skins, with animal bladders, or with found objects as simple as gourds, chunks of wood, or rounded stones, are uni-

versal. Ball games of all sorts were quite popular among the Chinese. When they began, no one knows, but stone balls have been dated to the sixth millennium BCE. *Cuju*, which resembled modern soccer football, is mentioned in the *Shiji*, one of the oldest extant Chinese texts. The famed Han-dynasty poet Li Yu (50–130 CE) also wrote of football. Games similar to modern badminton and shuttlecock were played in the first century CE.

Through most of China's recorded history, racket games were popular among women. A Ming-dynasty (1368–1644) scroll painting, "Grove of Violets," depicts elegantly attired ladies playing *chuiwan*, a game combining elements of modern billiards and golf. According to the *Wanjing* (1282), the players took turns striking a wooden ball and sending it into holes marked with colored flags. The ethos of the game stressed fairness and harmony among the players.

Harmony seems not to have been foremost among the values of China's Mongol rulers. The martial arts flourished, and mounted archers were the backbone of the army. If Marco Polo (1254–1324) can be believed, the Mongol dynasty produced a royal heroine comparable to the Greek girl Atalanta, who raced against and defeated a number of suitors. Princess Aiyaruk was said to have owned more than ten thousand horses, winning one hundred at a time as she outwrestled a long line of doomed suitors.

Mongol emperors like Khubilai Khan (1215–1294) were passionate about the hunt, but the golden age for that sport seems to have been during the Manchu dynasty. Kangxi (1654–1722) was said to have hunted with a retinue of seventy thousand horsemen and three thousand archers, which suggests that his prey had very little chance of survival.

Throughout Chinese history, aristocrats obsessed with the quest for harmony tended to disdain sports, a tendency strengthened by the arrival of Buddhism during the Han dynasty. In the moralistic eyes of Confucian sages, playing ball games was little better than drinking, gambling, and womanizing. Yet even Confucian scholars succumbed to the seduction of archery and granted the sport a half-hearted endorsement. "There is no contention among gentlemen," wrote Confucius (551–479 BCE). "The nearest to it is perhaps archery." It was not, however, the warrior's grimly competitive archery. "Even the way they [the archers] contend is gentlemanly" (Riordan/Jones 1999: 28).

Archery was also a sport for women. It was practiced by a number of court ladies, including the Dowager Empress Chonga. For men and women who found archery too bellicose a pastime, there was *toubou*,

which required the player to toss an arrow into a vase. In time, the game was refined to the point where nine officials were required for a two-person match.

Adults as well as children flew kites, some of which were fanciful works of art in paper and wood. This form of amusement was known as early as the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) but became a national obsession during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE). In its competitive version, contestants sought to maneuver their kites so that they cut the strings of their opponents' kites. A much older sport, dragon-boat racing, elicited the same aesthetic impulse. This sport evolved from impromptu races among boats decorated with images of dragons that protected the crews from storms. Eventually, races were held to commemorate the drowned. The most famous of these races was in memory of the poet Qu Yuan, who perished in 278 BCE. By the Tang dynasty, there were fixed dates and strict rules for the races, which had become major events. Some of the boats were "manned" by female crews.

Polo, which probably had its origins on the plains of Central Asia, reached China in 627 CE. It became a passion among those wealthy enough to own horses. All sixteen emperors of the Tang Dynasty were polo players. One of them, Xizong (reigned 874–888), remarked that he would take top honors if civil-service examinations were based on polo. The army used the attractions of the game as a way to improve its men's equestrian skills. This may not have been a good idea. When the Mongols invaded, several Chinese generals were said to have been more competent at polo than at warfare. If numerous terra-cotta figures can be trusted as evidence, polo was also played by aristocratic Chinese women. The sport lost favor during the Song dynasty.

Introduction of Western Sports

Western sports came to China toward the end of the Qing dynasty. Europeans resident in China established the Canton Regatta Club in 1837. The first modern track meet was held at St. John's University, a Christian school, in 1890. Six years later, American missionaries introduced basketball at the Tianjin YMCA. YMCA workers were responsible for the first national sports festival, held in Nanjing in 1910, and for the quadrennial Far Eastern Games (1913–1934), at which Chinese athletes competed against those from Japan and the Philippines. Other Americans founded and directed educational institutions such as the Chinese Physical Training School (Shanghai, 1914).

As the Confucian scholar's disdain for the merely physical waned, Western sports increasingly influ-

enced the behavior of Chinese men, especially those of the urban middle and upper classes. In time, modern sports revolutionized the lives of middle-class and upper-class women. In the course of the twentieth century, images of the ideal female gradually changed from the delicately immobile court lady barely able to hobble on her deformed feet to the robustly active young girl racing up and down a basketball court. Female athletes became "icons of desirable sexuality" (Hong 1997: 275). From a feminist perspective, modern sports have been emancipatory.

From 1912 to 1949, modern sports were mainly an urban phenomenon. Although national sports festivals were an increasingly salient aspect of Chinese culture, the nation's athletic elite did poorly in international competition. China's National Olympic Committee was not officially recognized until 1931. At the 1932 Olympic Games, where Japanese swimmers astonished the world by winning eleven of the sixteen medals in the men's competition, sprinter Li Zhangzhun was the lone Chinese representative. He was eliminated in the heats.

The low level of elite sports (and the generally unhappy state of Chinese physical education) from the 1920s to the 1950s can be explained by the trauma of civil war and foreign invasion. Communist victory in 1949 heralded the transformation of Chinese sports as well as the rest of Chinese culture. Mao Zedong (1893–1976) had written in 1917 that physical education is "more important than intellectual and moral education" (Hong 1997: 131), but resources were scarce in 1949, and progress was slow. In 1951, the government inaugurated an inexpensive way to enhance the nation's fitness. China's masses began to perform early-morning out-of-doors gymnastic exercises in accordance with commands broadcast by state radio. The sequence of national sports festivals was resumed in 1959.

In this first decade of Communist rule, the emphasis was on national defense. The government's physical culture program included not only tai chi and conventional sports like track and field but also paramilitary training with bayonets, hand grenades, and other weapons.

Although the regime's avowed aim was to promote fitness and sports for the masses, the state-run All-China Athletic Federation recognized that athletes who broke world records and won international championships contributed to their country's prestige. Limited government support for elite sports bore early fruit in the 1950s. Chen Jingkai set a world's record in bantamweight weight lifting; Zeng Fengrong and

Rong Guotuan won world championships in high jumping and table tennis. Quarrels with the International Olympic Committee over the status of Taiwan culminated in 1958 with Chinese resignation from the committee. At the same time and for the same reason, the People's Republic of China (PRC) withdrew from the international federations for soccer and other sports. The PRC did not make its debut at the Olympic Games until 1984.

The Republic of China (Taiwan) continued to send teams to the Olympics. In the 1960 games, held in Rome, Yang Chuan-kwang barely lost the decathlon to his close friend, the American Rafer Johnson.

Unfortunately for those who dreamed of international supremacy, the "Great Cultural Revolution" (1966–1976) drastically altered the regime's approach to sports. Mao's motto was "Friendship first, competition second." Sports contacts were, however, limited to friendly nations like the People's Republic of Korea. Athletes and coaches who had had international experience were suspect. Were they truly committed to Maoism? Some of them, like Zhuang Zedong, the world champion in table tennis (1961–1966), were sent to prison. Others, like table tennis stars Rong Guotuan and Fu Jifang, committed suicide. At the elite level, Chinese sports were devastated.

During the PRC's ten years of turmoil, athletes representing the Republic of China (Taiwan) continued

to compete internationally. One of the island's most successful sprinters, Chi Cheng, was third in the eighty-meter hurdles at the 1968 Olympics in Mexico City. Two years later, competing in the United States, she set world records in the 100-yard and 200-yard sprints (10.0 and 22.7 seconds) and in the 100-meter hurdles (13.2 seconds).

The policy of the PRC veered again in the 1980s. The new motto was "Break out of Asia and advance on the world." To achieve this goal, the government invested heavily in sports infrastructure. Although physical education was required in all schools, gifted athletes received special attention. Borrowing from the model developed by the Soviet Union, the government established a network of special schools to train an athletic elite. By 1990 there were 150 such schools (while the Soviet Union had a mere 46). Large sums went to build sports facilities. Research into sports physiology and sports psychology was strongly supported at Beijing University. To maximize performance in Olympic sports, the government decided in 1997 to eliminate all traditional Chinese sports (except *wushu*) from the annual national sports festival.

Current Emphasis on International Sports

The system worked. The achievements of Chinese athletes have been spectacular. Thanks in part to substantial government investment in sports infrastructure and relatively generous subsidies to athletes, the



The Shanghai Shenhua Football Club and the A. C. Milan Club in Shanghai in May 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

Chinese began to win international championships. At the 1982 Asian Games in New Delhi, Chinese athletes won sixty-one events and ended thirty-one years of Japanese domination. Two years later, Chinese Olympians returned from Los Angeles with fifteen gold, eight silver, and nine bronze medals.

To ensure Olympic success at Seoul in 1988, the PRC spent over a quarter of a billion dollars, more than fifty million dollars for each gold medal earned. Generous rewards for individual athletes were a part of the regime's program; diver Fu Mingxia's victory brought her a bonus that was three hundred times a teacher's annual salary.

In the 1990s, female runners like Wang Junxia set new world records by astonishing margins. Wang Junxia's time over 3,000 meters was 8:06.11 minutes, an unprecedented improvement of 3.28 percent over the old record. (No previous track record had ever been lowered by more than 2.51 percent.) At the 1994 world swimming championships, Chinese women won twelve of a possible sixteen gold medals. In response to the suspicion that such performances were drug enhanced, Chinese coaches referred to hard training and the ability of peasant women to "eat bitterness." It was true that Chinese athletes trained harder than their Western counterparts, but it was also true that Chinese men had failed to achieve such stellar performances and that a large number of female athletes tested positive for anabolic steroids. Between 1972 and 1994, ten of the world's elite swimmers had failed drug tests; in 1994 alone, eleven Chinese swimmers failed.

In 1993, the desire to "break out of Asia and advance on the world" motivated the government to modify its ban on openly professional sports and launch a twenty-four-team soccer league (followed by leagues for basketball and volleyball). In keeping with the regime's new openness to capitalist development, soccer teams pay their players ten times the salary of the average Chinese worker. Transfer payments are allowed and foreign players are lured with bonuses. The money comes not only from ticket sales but also from corporate sponsors such as Hyundai, Samsung, Panasonic, and Pepsi-Cola. The sports of the People's Republic seem more and more like the sports of Europe and North America, a tendency that will doubtless be accelerated in 2008, when Beijing hosts the summer Olympic Games.

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SPORTS—INDIA The warriors of India's Vedic age (2000–1400 BCE) hunted with bows and arrows and with spears. To perfect their skills as swordsmen, they fenced. Like the warriors of other cultures, they hardened their bodies and tested their skills as runners, jumpers, and wrestlers. If the *Mahabharata* (composed 400 BCE–400 CE) and the *Ramayana* (composed 500–300 BCE) can be taken as guides, swimming, weight lifting, wrestling, archery, and sword fighting were hallmarks of the Epic age (1400–1000 BCE). In the *Mahabharata*, epic hero Arjuna successfully relies on meditation to enhance his skills in archery. Instructed by Lord Krishna, Arjuna has a commitment to ethics that sets him apart from his brother Bhima, who is merely an athlete.

Meditation and yogalike techniques to control and even to deny the reality of the body gained in importance after the Epic age. This ascetic tendency was intensified in the fifth century BCE when the spread of Buddhism challenged Hindu religious dominance of the subcontinent. For devout Buddhists, the quest for enlightenment took priority over physical fitness and military prowess. Although boxing and wrestling were popular at Nalanda, the ancient Buddhist university, the pull of contemplative pursuits was also strong. Among the students' other "sports" were hopping over diagrams marked on the ground and guessing other people's thoughts. During Muslim rule of northwestern India (1526–1857), there was renewed concern for things of this world, including horse races, polo, and archery.

Bharatiya kushti and kalarippayattu

Adherence to Hinduism or Islam was quite compatible with a passion for wrestling and the martial arts. In fact, these activities were and still are perceived by Indians as forms of the religious life. *Bharatiya kushti* (Indian wrestling) and *kalarippayattu* (exercises in an open pit) are representative examples of the Indian melding of sports and religion.

Bharatiya kushti is practiced in the north. Indians who are devoted to this sport commit themselves

wholeheartedly to the quest for a holy life. The wrestler's exercises, which include swinging eighty-kilogram "Indian clubs," are supervised by a guru whose word is law. He instructs his disciples in *pranayama* (controlled breathing) as well as in exercises familiar to Western athletes. These exercises are, however, done with a difference. When the wrestlers do their knee-bends and push-ups, they recite mantras. In accordance with the devout Hindu's unremitting struggle against pollution, the wrestlers must strictly control their diet, their sexual habits, the way they breathe, and even their urination and defecation.

Within the wrestler's world, there are, however, surprising departures from orthodox belief and behavior. Caste, which is otherwise a basic fact of Hindu life, is ignored. Some acts normally perceived as polluting are acceptable. Brahmins who have just been initiated into the practice of *bharatiya kushti* might, for instance, massage the feet of an experienced lower-caste wrestler. When wrestlers meet in actual competition, they seem to enact an unconscious inversion of "normal" Hindu life. "In a world of strict rules of body purity, wrestlers enact a ritual of physical contact saturated in sweat, mucus, and occasionally blood" (Alter 1992: 196–197).

Kalarippayattu, which has been practiced in Kerala since at least the twelfth century, is unique to the southwestern coastal region. Less obsessed with purity and pollution than *bharatiya kushti*, the sport has attracted Muslims and Christians as well as Hindus. In their search for physical health and spiritual enlightenment, the practitioners of *kalarippayattu* combine exercises reminiscent of karate with yogalike positions. As students master these exercises and positions, they are allowed to practice with weapons, advancing as they become increasingly proficient from long staves to short sticks and then to the curved *otta* (which resembles an elephant's tusk) and to daggers, swords, maces, and spears. Competition plays a more important role in *kalarippayattu* than in *bharatiya kushti*.

Western Sports

British rule introduced India to Western sports, the most important of which was certainly cricket. Seamen employed by the British East India Company played the game at Cambay (Khambhat) in 1721 and the Calcutta Cricket Club was in existence by 1792. The first cricket club for natives, the Orient, was not founded until 1848. The founders were Parsis, and for decades this religious minority produced the most ardent and successful Indian cricketers. Although traditional princely pastimes (such as pig sticking) continued to be

popular, many native rulers became world-class cricketers. Among the Indian princes who played and promoted cricket were Rajendra Singh (1872–1900), ruler of the state of Patiala, and his son, Bhupinder Singh (1891–1938). Bhupinder's son, Yadavendra Singh (1913–1974), combined an active career as a cricket player with involvement in politics. He chaired the All-India Council of Sports and founded the Asian Games Federation; he also worked with Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi (1869–1948) and Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) for the cause of Indian independence.

The most famous of India's innumerable world-class cricketers was K. S. Ranjitsinhji (1872–1933). "When he batted," wrote Neville Cardus, "a strange light was seen for the first time on English fields" (Cashman 1980: 35). Like the English language, cricket is today one of the few nongovernmental institutions uniting India's religiously and linguistically diverse population.

Cricket flourished at Mayo College and other schools for the sons of the Indian elite, but British educators such as C. E. Tyndale-Biscoe had only limited success when they attempted to force soccer and rugby football on their native pupils. One problem was that the leather balls used for these games were *jutha* (unclean). Efforts to popularize rowing and track-and-field sports were an almost total failure. The sons of the Indian elite saw no point in exhausting themselves in work that they thought was more properly done by members of the lower castes.

The example of British soldiers was apparently more persuasive than the commands of British teachers. The first Indian football clubs were for Europeans only, but the Indian Football Association (1893) decided in 1909 to allow native clubs into its annual tournament. When the Bengali team Mohan Bagan reached the finals in 1911, *The Englishman* announced in its 19 July 1911 issue, "Bengali Calcutta has gone football mad." In the final match, Mohan Bagan defeated the East Yorkshire Regiment. Soccer has been eclipsed by cricket, but Mohan Bagan continues to play the game.

Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) workers such as Henry Gray and Harry Crowe Buch were responsible for the introduction and diffusion of basketball, volleyball, and softball. Buch founded the National YMCA School of Physical Education in Madras in 1920; it was an immensely influential institution. Missionary efforts to involve Indian girls in sports were mostly in vain. After independence in 1947, the government began a series of national sports festivals for girls and women, but female athletes are still drastically underrepresented in Indian sports.

Among the more unusual governmental efforts to promote physical education and sports was the establishment of the Himalayan Mountaineering Institute of Darjeeling (1954). It was inspired by the ascent of Everest on 29 May 1953 by Edmund Hillary (b. 1919) and Tenzing Norgay (1914–1986).

Darabji Jamshedji Tata and A. G. Neohren officially inaugurated the Indian Olympic Association in 1927, a full seven years after Indian athletes made their debut at the Antwerp games. Olympic success has come mostly in the form of gold medals for field hockey. Thanks largely to the efforts of G. D. Sondhi, who served on the International Olympic Committee from 1932 to 1966, New Delhi was chosen to host the first Asian Games, which took place in 1951.

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SPORTS—ISLAMIC ASIA The sports of the Islamic peoples of Asia are a varied mix of traditional sports, many of which were played centuries before the birth of Islam, and modern sports, nearly all of which were imported from Europe and North America.

Traditional Sports

Throughout the Islamic regions from Turkey to Iran and Pakistan, hunting was "the sport of kings." Innumerable references to hunting in Persian poetry link Persian sportsmen to their distant pre-Islamic ancestors, whose passion for the hunt was chronicled by the Greek historian Xenophon (c. 431–c. 352 BCE). Hunting scenes, crowded by depictions of rulers, courtiers, attendants, and an assortment of panicky prey, are among the most common topics of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Mughal art.

Closely associated with the hunt was the sport of archery. The mounted hunters who brought down their quarry with bows and arrows honed their skills at target archery, shooting not at abstract targets but at natural objects like gourds or sacks of sand. Accu-

racy was not the only mark of a good archer. Among the Turks, "flight shooting" (for distance) was a favorite sport. Muhammad II (1431–1481) constructed an *Ok Meydan* (arrow field) north of Istanbul. Stones were placed on the field to mark the record. Composite bows made of wood and horn enabled Turkish archers to outperform their European contemporaries.

Equestrian games were also dear to the hunter's heart. Varieties of polo were popular throughout Asia. In all probability, polo evolved from *buzkashi* and other rough games played by the nomadic peoples of Central Asia. In the Afghan form that has survived into the present, *buzkashi* was characterized by a dusty melee in which hundreds of mounted tribesmen fought over the headless carcass of a goat. The winner was the hardy rider who managed to grab the animal by a leg and drag it clear of the pack.

Polo was played throughout present-day Kurdistan and as far west as Constantinople (today's Istanbul), where French crusaders came upon the game in 1204, but the game's center of gravity was in Persia and northwestern India. In the Islamic era, the game was painted by innumerable miniaturists and celebrated by poets such as Firdawsi (c. 935–c. 1020) and Hafez (1325/26–1389/90).

After the Islamic conquest of what is now Pakistan and northwest India, Mughal art frequently depicted polo players. Akbar (1542–1605), the most famous of the Mughal emperors, was renowned for his polo skills. We know that Mughal women sometimes played the game; three miniature paintings commemorate a match played by Queen Humay. In today's Pakistan, Islamic fundamentalists decry polo as an affront to the Prophet, but the Shandur Tournament is an important national event endorsed by the government, visited by throngs of tourists, and broadcast live by state-run television.

Archery was the Turkish sultans' favorite sport, but their subjects wrestled. The most skillful *pablawan* (wrestlers) were summoned to the court in Constantinople. In villages throughout the Ottoman realm, men formed wrestling guilds and frequented "houses of strength," where Allah was invoked to secure a wrestler's victory and poets were enlisted to celebrate it. Similar "houses of strength" (*zurkhaneh*) are still an important part of Iranian culture. Open only to Muslims, the *zurkhaneh* is a place of worship as well as a sports site. While the wrestlers prepare for their match, a *morshed* or ritual chanter chants and drums and reminds them of the deeds of the greatest *pablawan* of all, the fourteenth-century poet Mahmud Kharazmi.

Introduction of Western Sports

Throughout the Islamic Near East, traditional sports have been marginalized if not wholly replaced by modern sports introduced from Europe and the United States, but the process was neither swift nor easy. The government of Ottoman Turkey strongly resisted the introduction of modern sports. In 1896, when the wrestler Koc Mehmet applied to the sultan for permission to participate in the first Olympic Games of the modern era, he was sent to prison as punishment for his audacity. When a Turkish group organized a soccer team in Constantinople in 1899, nine years after British seamen and diplomats had begun to play the game at Izmir, the sultan ordered the team dissolved. Turkish citizens were allowed to watch while British residents in Constantinople played soccer, but the Turks were warned by the police not to mingle with foreign spectators. In 1905, the sultan gave reluctant permission for his subjects to form what became Turkey's most famous soccer club—Galatasary. In 1910, two years after a revolution restricted the sultan's authority, the League of Football Clubs of Constantinople was established. In the 1920s, the secular government of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938) was far more positive about Western ways. By the time of Atatürk's death, soccer had become a major sport. It remains immensely popular. In 1986, nearly half of all Turkish sports-club members played the game.

Iranian soccer began with the British officers of the South Persia Rifles. In the years from 1916 to 1921, they taught the game to native troops. A national soccer federation was established in 1919, and soccer players were soon as numerous as wrestlers.

Until the Islamic Revolution of 1978, modern sports of all sorts were promoted by the shah, Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1919–1980), and his brother Gholam Reza, head of Iran's National Olympic Committee. Throughout the shah's reign, however, there was considerable resistance to modern sports on the part of clerical leaders, who felt such activities to be an affront to Islam. Islamic fundamentalists found women's sports to be especially objectionable. The fact that state-run television broadcast sports on Friday (and showed the shah's wife as a swimmer and a water skier) contributed to the monarchy's downfall. Once the Islamic Revolution had taken place, however, the Ayatollah Khomeini (c. 1900–1989) was ready to accept most modern sports for men and even for women—if the women were properly dressed and carefully protected from the gaze of male spectators. In 1993, the First Islamic Women's Games were held in Tehran (without male coaches or male spectators).

In Olympic and other international competition, Turks and Iranians have been especially successful in weightlifting and wrestling, two sports traditionally associated with the "houses of strength."

Although Islamic fundamentalism is a force in Pakistan, modern sports have met with less resistance there than in Iran. Since its independence in 1949, Pakistan has produced some of the world's best field-hockey teams, but the nation's greatest successes have been in squash rackets. Since its recognition by the International Cricket Conference in 1952, Pakistan has also become a major power in that sport.

Relations with the International Olympic Committee

Although Turkey's Selim Sirry Bey (d. 1930) was the first Asian to join the International Olympic Committee (IOC), in 1908, the Islamic nations of Asia have had uneasy relations with that organization. For decades after the establishment of Israel, Islamic states refused to compete against what they termed the "Zionist entity." Israel was not invited to the Mediterranean Games when they were held in Beirut (1959) or to the Asian Games when they took place in Jakarta (1962). The latter exclusion had major consequences. The IOC, protesting not only the exclusion of Israel (and Taiwan) but also the rough treatment given to an IOC member, suspended Indonesia from the Olympic movement. The response of Indonesia's President Sukarno (1901–1970) was to launch the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFU). (Forty-eight nations, mostly Asian and African, sent teams to GANEFU I in 1963, after which the organization quietly disappeared.)

Indonesia was not the only Islamic state to clash with the IOC. A number of states boycotted the 1956, 1980, and 1984 games. There has also been tension over the reluctance of most Islamic nations to send female athletes to the Olympic Games.

Differences in Approach by Islamic Regions

In general, the Islamic nations of Southeast Asia have been less receptive to Western sports than their co-religionists in the Near East and South Asia.

Cricket was played in Singapore as early as 1837. The whole palette of modern sports followed. They spread rapidly among the native elites in Singapore and Penang. (An international golf tournament was held in Penang in 1888.) Missionary teachers such as Mabel Marsh and Josephine Foss saw badminton, tennis, net ball, and basketball as instruments to emancipate Asian women, but they were more successful with the peninsula's Chinese and Indian girls than with ethnic Malay girls.

The first prime minister of the independent state of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman (1903–1990), was a soccer enthusiast who had played the game at Cambridge University. Under his leadership, the government invested in a splendid new stadium, and soccer flourished, but other modern sports have had a precarious postcolonial existence.

Dutch colonists in what is now Indonesia made an effort to promote *korfball*, a Dutch version of basketball, but they failed. They had more success with *voetball* (Dutch for football, the sport known to Americans as soccer), and several soccer leagues were organized on Sumatra and Java. Basketball, volleyball, and other modern games followed. Internationally, Malaysian and Indonesian athletes have been dominant in badminton, a modern sport that probably has its origins in the ancient Chinese game of shuttlecock.

Western sports have not, however, eliminated traditional games. In Indonesia and Malaysia, traditional sports may be an endangered species, but they have managed to survive. Among them are *sepak raga* and *sepak takraw*. *Sepak raga*, the Malay version, is similar to Japanese *kemari* in that the players, using any part of the body except the forearm and the hand, strive to keep the ball in the air. This is also the goal of *sipa*, which is played by the Muslim minority in the Philippine Islands. Like many traditional Asian games, *Sepak raga* emphasizes harmony of movement, abetted by flute, gong, and drum music. Indonesian *sepak takraw*, which is one version of a game played throughout Southeast Asia, is closer to volleyball. Instead of using their hands, however, the players use their feet or their heads to propel the hollow rattan ball over the net. Competition is keen.

One reason for *sepak takraw*'s survival is that it has become, in many ways, a modern sport. To save the game from extinction, players from throughout the region organized the Asian Sepak Takraw Federation, agreed upon a common set of rules, and campaigned for the acceptance of the sport in the Asian Games, a goal achieved when the eleventh Asian Games took place in Beijing in 1990.

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SPORTS—JAPAN Japanese sports may be classified either as traditional (those sports played in Japan for centuries, before contact with the West) or modern (those sports that Japan has adopted enthusiastically from the West in the late nineteenth century and after).

Sumo

Of all Japanese sports, sumo wrestling is probably the most distinctive. According to one interpretation of the legends collected in the *Nihongi* (720 CE), the first sumo match between two mortals occurred in 23 BCE when a certain Nomi no Sukune was asked by Emperor Suinin to deal with Taima no Keyaha, a notorious bully who had boasted that he was the strongest man on earth. Nomi no Sukune engaged his boastful opponent and crushed his ribs with one kick and broke his back with another.

Better informed historians trace the origins of sumo to the annual matches performed at the imperial court in Nara. These matches, which took place on the seventh day of the seventh month of the lunar calendar, began in 734 CE. A garden adjacent to the Shishinden ("Hall for State Ceremonies") was strewn with white sand for the ceremony. Announced by drums and gongs, thirty-four wrestlers entered the garden. They were followed by officials, musicians, and dancers. One team wore paper hollyhocks in their hair; the other wore paper calabash blossoms. After each match, musicians beat their drums, struck their gongs, and performed a ritual dance. The annual event, which served as a demonstration of imperial authority, continued after the court's removal to Heian-kyo (modern Kyoto) in 794 CE.

The court had no monopoly on the sport. Sumo was performed as part of festival celebrations at temples and shrines. The most famous example is proba-



Students practice at a sumo wrestling school in Tokyo in 1995. (TEMPSPORT/CORBIS)

bly *karasu-zumo* ("crow wrestling"), which still takes place at Kyoto's Kamo Shrine. Boys representing the god Takemikazuchi wrestle against other boys representing the earthly sphere.

After the end of the Heian period in 1185, political power shifted to Kamakura and sumo was rarely performed at court. During the Tokugawa period (1600/1603–1868), sumo became an urban phenomenon. Woodblock prints of street-corner sumo show not only the massively muscled wrestlers but also the citizens of Osaka and Edo (modern Tokyo) jostling one another for a glimpse of their heroes. In the Meiji (1868–1912) and Taisho (1912–1926) periods, in the midst of Japanese modernization, sumo was "retraditionalized" in order to underline its position as a symbol of Japanese culture. Among the innovations were the referee's new clothes; he is now anachronistically attired in Heian-period kimono and headgear.

Kemari

The kimono-clad courtiers of Heian-kyo did attend sumo matches, but for exercise they chose *kemari*, a ball game they borrowed, like their written language, from China. The game was played outdoors on a square earthen court with sides about six or seven meters in length. At each of the corners was a pine, willow, cherry, or maple tree. The eight players were stationed two to a tree. The object of the game was to keep a deerskin ball aloft. Since the clogs that were normal footwear were inappropriate, players wore leather shoes. The number of times a player kicked the ball before he passed it on was not fixed, but three was considered most appropriate—one kick to receive the ball and bring it under control, one to send it high above the player's head, and one to pass it to another player. Players were not judged by the number of successful kicks but rather by the "three virtues of the ball," which were proper posture, swiftness and skill, and mastery of strategy. From the twelfth century to the nineteenth, *kemari* was a popular aristocratic pastime. It is still played by the members of the Kemari Preservation Society.

Archery

Toughened warriors of the samurai class were no more likely to spend their time at *kemari* than they were to compete in bouts of sumo against nearly naked peasants. Warriors preferred to demonstrate their physical prowess as archers and fencers. Archeologists have found obsidian arrowheads from the Stone Age, and "heavenly feathered arrows" were a token of the mythical emperor Jimmu's right to rule the Japanese

islands, but the earliest historical documents relating to archery as a sport date from late in the seventh century CE. Although the Japanese gripped the bow in the Mongolian fashion, with the thumb wrapped over the bowstring, they used the long bow derived from southeastern Asia rather than the much shorter Mongol bow. The long bow, which measures over two meters, is still used and is still gripped as it was in the Heian period, with two-thirds of the bow's length above the archer's hand.

Archery, like sumo, became incorporated into the annual calendar of ceremonies performed at the imperial court. In the *Dairishiki*, which chronicles court ceremonies from 646 to 930, archery matches far outnumbered all other ceremonies. The light bows used at court were probably more effective as symbols of authority than as weapons of war.

Jarai was typical of the many kinds of target archery performed over the centuries at the imperial court. *Jarai* matches were held at the Burakuin ("Court of Abundant Pleasures") in the middle of the first lunar month. Twenty noblemen, including imperial princes, were selected to participate. A second team was chosen from the palace guards. Standing on mats made of calfskin, aiming at deerskin targets, the nobles shot first, followed by the guards. A gong rang once to indicate that an arrow had hit the target's outer ring. The gong rang twice if the arrow lodged in the middle ring, three times if the innermost ring was struck. Heralds announced the results along with the contestant's name, rank, and office. The archer's rank influenced the prize he received. Members of the imperial family aimed their arrows at a target 20 percent larger than the one provided for the nobility.

A courtier's performance at the rather gentle sport of *jarai* was no predictor of his battlefield prowess. *Yabusame*, which required equestrian as well as archery skills, was more like the real thing. In *yabusame*, the contestants drew their bows and loosed their arrows while galloping down a straight track some 220 to 270 meters long. The archers were required to shoot in quick succession at three small targets (about 55 centimeters square) placed on meter-high poles 7 to 11 meters from the track and spaced at intervals of 72 to 90 meters.

During the relatively pacific Tokugawa era, the importance of archery as a battlefield skill declined. The samurai continued to practice with bow and arrow, but the motivation for their practice was not what it had been when the accuracy of one's aim made a life-or-death difference. Archery was simultaneously a recreation, a sport, and a form of spiritual training. Throughout the Tokugawa period, schools of archery



FUJIWARA MICHINAGA (966—1027) COMPETES AT ARCHERY

"He appeared at the Southern Palace one day while his nephew Korechika was holding an archery contest in the presence of Regent Michikane. Surprised by the visit, which he considered suspicious, Michinaga's brother Michitaka nevertheless welcomed him warmly and let him shoot before Korechika, even though his rank was inferior. Korechika lost by two hits, whereupon Michitaka and some others proposed an extension of the match. 'Shoot twice more,' they said."

" 'All right, extend it,' Michinaga said, somewhat annoyed. As he prepared to shoot again, he said, 'If Emperors and Empresses are to issue from my house, let this arrow hit the mark.' And didn't his arrow strike the heart of the target? Next Korechika prepared to shoot. He was extremely nervous, and it may be that his hands trembled. At any rate, his arrow flew off into the sky without coming near the target. Michitaka turned pale."

"Michinaga got ready again. 'If I am to serve as Regent, let this arrow find the mark,' he said. The arrow hit the very center, striking with such force that the target almost broke. Regent Michikane's cordiality vanished, and he showed his displeasure by ending the match."

Source: Adapted from *Ôkagami*. (1980) Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 197.

proliferated as *kyujutsu* (techniques of the bow) became *kyudo* (the way of the bow). When the spokesmen of the various schools codified the rules and techniques of their particular styles, they tended to express their thoughts in the religious terminology—Shinto, Buddhist, or Confucianist—that was the common currency of learned men. Zen Buddhism contributed to the idea of archery as a spiritual activity, but it was only one of several influences.

Fencing

Fencers trod the same path as archers, as *kenjutsu* (techniques of the sword) became kendo (the way of the sword). The difference was that archers had no need to transform weaponry into sports equipment. Fencers, however, had to modify their equipment to avoid the deadly damage inflicted by the Japanese sword (a much sharper instrument than its European counterpart). The wooden sports swords that had been in use since before the sixteenth century were lethal weapons in the hands of a skilled and determined swordsman. Bamboo swords, which dated from the sixteenth century, were not as dangerous, but they still caused serious pain and injury. In response to the chal-

lenge, kendo enthusiasts developed protective gear to make their sport safer: *kote* (gloves for the hands and lower arm), the *men* (a cotton helmet with a metal protector for the face), the *do* (a chest protector), and the *tare* (armor for the waist and groin). This equipment was not devised all at once but evolved over time. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the mask, gloves, and trunk padding had achieved something like their present form and were widely used for simulated combat. (The predictable lament of the traditionalists was that all these innovations distanced the sport too far from the conditions of manly combat.)

While many swordsmen proclaimed *kenzen ichinyo* ("the sword and Zen are one"), others saw their sport as a way to perfect Confucianist or Shinto discipline. Still others—a growing number in modern times—are indifferent to the religious aspects of the sport. In periods of intense nationalism, kendo has been promoted as a paramilitary discipline. During World War II, Japan's military government glorified the sport (even as it denigrated baseball). In 1945, the new Ministry of Education, under the direction of the supreme commander for the allied powers, banned all martial arts from the school curriculum, forbade them as a student

club activity, and even prohibited kendo practice on school properties. The Allied Occupation ended in 1952, and kendo returned to the schools a year later. In the kendo clubs that have proliferated in secondary schools, 40 percent of the membership is now female, a remarkable deviation from the stereotype of the frail and subservient Japanese woman.

Western Sports

During the Meiji period (1868–1912), when Japan was opened to Western influences, the whole range of modern sports was introduced to Japan. Government attempts to modernize the military led to the introduction of gymnastics. French officers taught Japanese soldiers to fence in the European way, and Austrian officers taught them to ski. British and American residents in the trading communities of Kobe and Yokohama founded clubs for their favorite sports, including cricket, soccer football, baseball, tennis, and golf. Although these Westerners established sports clubs for their own enjoyment, the Japanese with whom they interacted were quick to emulate them.

The Meiji government invited European and American educators to teach in the newly established system of secondary schools and colleges. These educators introduced Japanese students to baseball, soccer football, rowing, and track-and-field sports. Foreign missionaries, especially those associated with the YMCA, promoted basketball, volleyball, field hockey, and badminton. Japanese who had lived abroad brought back with them table tennis, handball, basketball, and volleyball. Participation in the Olympics and other international sports events introduced wrestling, weightlifting, and canoeing, and voluntary sports clubs took up activities such as yachting and mountain climbing.

Frederick W. Strange (d. 1889), an English educator, arrived in Tokyo in 1875 imbued with the Victorian conviction that sports are the proper antidote for an excess of intellectual endeavor. He summoned his students "to come out and play games." The track-and-field meet he organized on 16 June 1883 was probably Japan's first. The following year, Strange founded a boat club modeled on those at Oxford and Cambridge. In 1885, the club's team raced against the foreigners of the Yokohama Athletic Club. In 1887, the club organized intercollegiate races on the Sumida River, which flows through Tokyo.

Horace Wilson, an American teacher at what later became Tokyo University, introduced baseball in 1873. The diffusion of the game throughout the educational system was accelerated in 1896 when a team

of schoolboys defeated the Yokohama Athletic Club in a widely publicized four-game series. At the college level, Waseda, Keio, and Meiji universities formed a three-team baseball league in 1914. A year later, the Asahi newspaper started a national tournament for middle schools. Newspaper entrepreneurship was also responsible for professional baseball in Japan. In 1936 Shoriki Matsutaro, publisher of the *Yomiuri* newspaper, launched a highly successful seven-team league. The league expired during World War II, but the professional game was revived in 1950 and flourishes in the Central and the Pacific Leagues.

A professional soccer league, begun in 1993, failed to replace baseball as the nation's favorite team sport, but another sport of British origins emerged in the late twentieth century as the trademark pastime of the *sarariman* ("salary man" or white-collar employee). Although scarcity of land makes golf an extremely expensive sport, corporate executives are willing to spend a million dollars or more for membership in exclusive golf clubs.

While their fathers are at the golf club (or at one of Japan's many indoor driving ranges), Japan's adolescents head for their own sports venues. They have been quicker than young people in other parts of Asia to take up skateboarding, in-line skating, rock-climbing, hang gliding, windsurfing, and other "postmodern" sports.

Japan's participation in the Olympic Games began in 1912 when two runners were sent to Stockholm. They were accompanied by Kano Jigoro (1860–1938), who had become Japan's representative on the International Olympic Committee three years earlier. (Kano's contribution to Japanese sports included the invention of judo in 1882, a martial art that Kano envisioned as a compromise between tradition and modernity.) Except for Hitomi Kinue (1907–1931), a spectacular runner who earned a silver medal in 1928 in the first women's 800-meter race, Japanese track-and-field athletes have rarely done well at the Olympics. High points in Japan's Olympic history occurred in Los Angeles in 1932, when the men's swimming team overwhelmed its rivals, winning eleven of a possible sixteen medals; in Tokyo in 1964, when the women's volleyball team upset the favored Russians; and in Nagano in 1998, when Harada Masahiko's flawless flight secured gold for the Japanese ski-jump team. His feat was a personal vindication because he had jumped poorly at the Lillehammer games in 1994 and cost his team the gold medal. No wonder he became known as "Happy Harada."

Allen Guttman

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SPORTS—KOREA Throughout most of its history, Korea has been strongly influenced by Chinese (and to a much lesser degree) Japanese culture. Before the Koryo period (918–1392), the states of Paekche (18 BCE–663 CE), Shilla (57 BCE–935 CE), and Koguryo (37 BCE–668 CE) were engaged in nearly constant wars with China, with Japan, and with each other. Like the sports of other Asian cultures, the earliest Korean sports tended to be closely related to warfare. Mounted archery was known in prehistoric times and skill with swords and spears was highly prized. *Ssirum*, a popular traditional wrestling game, dates back to the early Koguryo kingdom. The origins of the Korean variant of the unarmed martial arts, *taekwondo* (or tae kwon do, as it is spelled in English), "the way of the foot and the hand," are unknown. The sport, which is now

closely associated with modern Korea, may have originated in the kingdom of Shilla or, like many of Korea's sports, it may have had Chinese or Japanese origins.

During the Koryo period, Buddhism flourished and the interest in sports, especially military sports, slackened. It is likely that Korea's gentler sports—such as kite flying and see-sawing, often part of seasonal festivals—flourished in this era. Notable among sports for women was a kind of swinging competition in which the contestants stood on a plank suspended from ropes. The Choson period, which lasted from 1392 until Japanese annexation in 1910, saw a renewed interest in sports, especially military sports.

Advent of Western Sports

Late in the nineteenth century, Western sports came to Korea. In 1898, a year after observing British sailors playing the game in the port of Inchon, Koreans organized their first soccer team. Missionaries from the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), mostly Americans, played a leading role in the introduction of modern sports. P. L. Gillette taught the fundamentals of baseball in 1905 and basketball in 1907. Volleyball followed in 1916. The YMCA, which had its headquarters at the royal capital of Seoul, was also behind the organization of the Choson Sports Association in 1920.



The Olympic baseball stadium in Seoul, Korea. Although not a traditional Korean sport, baseball has become a major amateur and professional sport in Korea. In the 1990s, several Korean players played in American professional baseball leagues. (JANET WISHNETSKY/CORBIS)

By that time, Japanese military men and government officials were actively promoting kendo, judo, and—less predictably—table tennis. Koreans began to participate in the Olympic Games in 1932—as members of the Japanese team. Patriotic athletes resented their role as representatives of Japan. Sohn Kee-Chung, winner of the 1936 Olympic marathon, saw himself listed as "Kitei Son" (a Japanized version of his name), and vowed never again to compete under the Japanese flag. His country honored him at the 1988 Olympics in Seoul. He lit the Olympic flame.

Sports in Divided Korea

The post-1945 division of the Korean peninsula between the Communist north and the non-Communist south led to the creation of two very different sports systems. While tae kwon do is practiced north and south (and internationally as well), the Republic of Korea (South Korea) opted for commercialized sports on the American and Japanese model. Professional baseball is the nation's most popular spectator sport. The level of play is high enough for a few Korean players, such as Pak Ch'an-ho (Chan Ho Park), to play professionally in the United States. Baseball is also popular as a recreational sport.

In recent years, South Korea has had a boom in golf. Pak Se-ri (Se Ri Pak) and Kim Mi-hyon (Mit Hyun Kim) are among the world's most successful golf professionals. Winter sports have also become popular, stimulated in part by Korean successes at the Winter Olympics.

The People's Republic (North Korea) imitated the Soviet Union's state-run system (with an emphasis on paramilitary sports). Despite its relative poverty, the north has invested heavily in its sports infrastructure. Kim Il Sung Stadium, for instance, seats 100,000 spectators. In international competition, Koreans from both sides of the thirty-eighth parallel have done well in weightlifting, boxing, wrestling, and—not surprisingly—tae kwon do.

When the International Olympic Committee (IOC) selected Seoul to host the 1988 summer games, the Pyongyang government demanded that half the events occur in the north. The IOC offered them the opportunity to host all the competitions in archery and table tennis and some of the contests in cycling and soccer football. The offer greatly displeased the Republic of Korea and failed to satisfy the People's Republic, which stayed away from Seoul, as it had from Los Angeles in 1984. The north's boycott did little to diminish the south's pride in its team, which harvested twelve gold, ten silver, and eleven bronze medals.

Allen Guttman

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SPRATLY ISLANDS DISPUTE The Spratly Islands group, whose ownership is disputed by the People's Republic of China (PRC), Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan, is located in the middle of the South China Sea, the geostrategic heart of Southeast Asia. The island group includes hundreds of uninhabitable small islands, coral atolls, reefs, and shoals scattered across the South China Sea and covering an area of approximately 180,000 square kilometers. With the possibility of abundant oil and natural gas reserves and marine life resources around the islands, the economic stakes make resolving this territorial dispute challenging.


Basis of Claims

Although the PRC claims the Spratlies have belonged to China since ancient time, all of the claimants, including Taiwan, occupied islands in the Spratly archipelago before the PRC gained a foothold. In March 1988, following a skirmish with Vietnamese forces, China wrested control of six islands in the Spratly group from Vietnam.

North Vietnam initially recognized the islands as Chinese territory, but after the unification of Vietnam in 1975, the Vietnamese government began to claim the Spratly chain and occupied several islands. In 1977, Vietnam established a 320-kilometer (200-mile) exclusive economic zone over part of the South China Sea that included the Spratly Islands.

In 1947, the Philippines claimed some of the islands that lay off its coast. This claim was based on the argument that Japan occupied these islands during World War II but abandoned the islands after the war, leaving them up for grabs. The Philippines undertook various measures, such as naval inspections, tours, and diplomatic notes, to assert its ownership. In 1974, the Philippine navy actually took control of five islands, and in 1978 a presidential decree claimed the Kalayaan Islands, as it terms the islands, as an integral part of the Philippines.

Malaysia asserted a claim to the continental shelf in 1979 and then established an exclusive economic zone adjacent to Borneo in 1980. As a result of those claims, Malaysia claims several islands in the Spratly group and occupies three atolls. Brunei claims the continental shelf off its coast, which includes the Louisa Reef;



it too bases its claims to Spratly islands on its claim to the continental shelf. In contrast, other countries base their claims upon prior occupation or discovery.

Reasons for Recent Interest

The Spratly Islands dispute has received more attention in recent years because it is a likely flash point for conflict in the region. At present, no country in the region possesses the military capacity to impose its claims. A negotiated settlement of the dispute is important in the post-Cold War era when economic cooperation is crucial for regional development. The South China Sea is a major sea lane and is important to world trade. Two hundred oil tankers pass by the Spratly Islands every day, and any disruption of trade would have a significant negative impact on the region. The necessity of regional economic cooperation has opened the door to the possibility of a negotiated settlement.

Prospects for Settlement

All claimants express a willingness to find a peaceful and mutually beneficial solution to the dispute. After maintaining a defiant position regarding its claims to the South China Sea throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the PRC signaled a new flexibility in 1990, with Beijing stating that it was willing to shelve the sovereignty question and move ahead with joint develop-

ment. This was in contrast with earlier statements asserting that China would take control of the islands by force, if necessary. Indonesia stepped forward as an honest broker and since 1990 has held several workshops on managing potential conflict in the South China Sea. The PRC has participated in the Indonesian-sponsored sessions, but the meetings have achieved no real progress toward any significant joint development efforts. China, in fact, favors bilateral negotiations because the basis for the various national claims is different and Beijing holds that dealing with these claims in a multilateral setting only complicates negotiations. Because of the many nations involved, any settlement will likely require difficult multilateral negotiations and mutual accommodation. At the second workshop, which was held in 1991, all claimants agreed to halt independent development and made a pledge to not use force to settle the disputes.

Nevertheless, Beijing's subsequent actions made clear its willingness to move unilaterally and to use force if necessary to defend its claims. In 1992, before the third workshop, China's National People's Congress promulgated a law on territorial waters that asserted China's claims of undisputed sovereignty over the islands of the South China Sea and authorized the use of military force to prevent other states from occupying the islands. China used military force to occupy three more islands in 1992, and in 1994 it dispatched two warships to the South China Sea to blockade a Vietnamese oil rig, demanding that Vietnam stop encroaching upon China's sovereignty.

China is strengthening its foothold on the islands and enhancing its ability to use force if necessary to protect its strategic interests and ensure its stake in the development of the region's resources. The PRC can now more directly challenge the claims of the other parties to the dispute and can do so more confidently. Other parties to the dispute are also being more assertive. Despite Chinese objections, the Southeast Asian states issued an official Spratly Declaration in 1992 calling for military restraint and joint development while leaving open the question of sovereignty. However, none of the Southeast Asian states show any inclination to compromise with each other on the issue of sovereignty. In 1993, the Philippines expanded its military facilities in their five Kalayaan Islands to enable civilian and military planes to use the runway.

Incentives for Settlement

It is in every country's interest to settle the territorial dispute to facilitate closer relations among the economically dynamic states in the region. The potential resources of the South China Sea would con-

tribute to China's ambitious economic development. Under the circumstances, Beijing is more likely to cooperatively pursue joint development while leaving the conundrum of sovereignty to a later date.

While historical and legal questions complicate any resolution of the Spratly Islands dispute, all parties remain interested in finding a peaceful solution. The natural resources of the Spratly Islands call for joint development, and all parties will only achieve optimum advantage through pragmatic cooperation. This requires that states in the region compromise on the sovereignty question to facilitate further cooperation on more fundamental economic and security issues.

Eric Hyer

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SPRING FESTIVAL—CHINA The Spring Festival is the most important seasonal festival in China, marking the end of an old year and the beginning of a new one. Among the most joyous and colorful Chinese seasonal festivals, it is also the longest, extending from the sixteenth day of the twelfth month to the fifteen day of the first month, affecting every aspect of life in society. On New Year's Eve, entire families are expected to gather together for an evening meal; the event is comparable in significance to the family meals held on Christmas Eve in the West.

The premodern (pre-twentieth century) Chinese calendar year followed the lunar year, and the Spring Festival was connected with this calendar. The Nationalist revolution in 1912 and the Communist revolution in 1949 not only brought about fundamental changes in political institutions, but also introduced the Western calendar as a way to "modernize" China. The official New Year's Day was moved to 1 January, and the Lunar New Year was renamed the "Spring Festival."

Businesses large and small celebrate this occasion with a year-end banquet. Bonuses of cash in red envelopes are given to employees so that they can travel home for the holiday. In China, Taiwan, Hong Kong,

and Singapore, the new lunar year also signals the beginning of the monthlong Lunar New Year holiday. Most businesses close or curtail operations throughout the festival. The twenty-fourth day of the twelfth month marks the second major ritual that involves individual families. This is the day when each family sends its residential kitchen god back to heaven; it is customary for the family to prepare sweet foods or foods made from glutinous rice as sacrifices to the kitchen god.

On New Year's Eve, all family members gather for the evening meal. By lighting incense before the meal, the head of the family symbolically invites the departed ancestors and deities to join the occasion. After the meal, children pay their respects to their parents by bowing (in China) or kowtowing (in Taiwan and Hong Kong) to them. In return, parents give their children money in red envelopes. On New Year's Day, people wearing new clothes visit their kin, friends, and neighbors. The celebration lasts until the fifteenth day of the first month, the Lantern Festival, after which all businesses resume normal operations and employees return to work.

Huang Shu-min

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SRI LANKA—PROFILE (2001 est. pop. 19.4 million). A small island nation located at the southernmost tip of the Indian subcontinent and measuring only 65,610 square kilometers, Sri Lanka has a diversified geography that includes harmoniously associated landscapes of lowlands and highlands (reaching a lofty elevation of 2,524 meters). It is richly blessed by natural beauty, and greatly benefits from its location and climatic conditions.

Climate and Agriculture

Its tropical location and the monsoons have given Sri Lanka a good environment for cultivating tropical crops, of which tea, rubber, and coconut palms are the most important. A wide variety of tropical vegetables and fruits are also grown, mostly on family farms; common crops are bananas, mangos, pineapples, avocados, and melons, as well as cashew nuts and many spices, including chili peppers, black pepper, cardamom, cinnamon, and nutmeg, which altogether flavor the traditional hot, spicy local curries. In the cold tropical



SRI LANKA

Country name: Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (formerly known as Ceylon) Area: 65,610 sq km
Population: 19,408,635 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 0.87% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 16.58 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 6.43 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: -1.43 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio—total population: 0.97 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 16.08 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population: 72.09 years, male: 69.58 years, female: 74.73 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, Islam
Major languages: Sinhala (official and national language), Tamil (national language), English
Literacy—total population: 90.2%, male: 93.4%, female: 87.2% (1995 est.)
Government Type: republic
Capital: Colombo (note: Sri Jayewardenepura Kotte is the legislative capital)
Administrative Divisions: 8 provinces
Independence: 4 February 1948 (from U.K.)
National holiday: Independence Day, 4 February (1948)
Suffrage: 18 years of age, universal
GDP—real growth rate: 5.6% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita (purchasing power parity): \$3,250 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: 22% (1997 est.)
Exports: \$5.2 billion (f.o.b., 2000)
Imports: \$6.1 billion (f.o.b., 2000)
Currency: Sri Lankan rupee (LKR)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Factbook* 2001. Retrieved 18 October 2001, from: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

environment of the highlands, even a large variety of so-called British vegetables from the middle latitudes are grown.

Sri Lanka is divided into a wet zone that occupies the southwestern quarter and the highlands, and a dry zone that covers all others quarters. The wet zone is defined by perennial rainfalls and the dry zone is characterized by a striking dry period, ranging from four to six months (from April/May until August/September).

People

The two ethnic groups that account for 92 percent of the Sri Lankan people—the Sinhalese (74 percent) and the Tamils (18 percent)—originated in India. The

Sinhalese, who are thought to be of Indo-Aryan origin, probably entered around the fifth century BCE. The larger part of the Tamils, from southern India, entered Sri Lanka at the start of the Christian era, while a smaller part came only during the British colonial period in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century for employment in the plantation industries. Subsequently, both groups established their own culture and civilization in Sri Lanka. Today, the Sinhalese community is Buddhist, whereas the Tamil community is Hindu. (Small numbers of Sri Lankans—7 percent in all—from both ethnic groups are Christians, as a result of the influence of colonial powers in Sri Lanka, particularly the Portuguese in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The 7 percent of the population who



are Muslim are descended from early Arab traders, who came mostly during the ninth and tenth centuries.) Both the Sinhalese and the Tamils speak their own languages (Sinhala and Tamil, respectively). English is also widely spoken, particularly by members of the upper and middle class. Since 1983, a civil war has been fought in north and northeastern Sri Lanka; Tamil rebels desire an independent Tamil homeland, Eelam, which is strongly opposed by the Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan government.

History

The early Sinhalese invaders settled in the semi-dry north-central, northern, and eastern lowlands, and introduced an effective system of paddy rice cultivation based on irrigation water stored in large natural reservoirs. The important Anuradhapura kingdom flourished from the fourth century BCE until the eleventh century, followed by the Polonnaruwa kingdom until the thirteenth century, when Tamil incursions from south India forced the Sinhalese reign to withdraw to a safer interior part of Sri Lanka. In the thirteenth century, with the weakening Sinhalese reign and an ascendent Tamil power over the north of Sri Lanka, the country was no longer unified, instead breaking into the three independent kingdoms of Kandy and Kotte (both Sinhalese) and Jaffna (Tamil) until the colonial period started in the early sixteenth century.

The Portuguese were the first Europeans to colonize Sri Lanka; they gained control of the coastal regions by the beginning of the seventeenth century. The Dutch, called in by the Sinhalese kingdom of Kandy to help drive out the Portuguese, stayed and colonized the island themselves from the mid-seventeenth century until the British took over in 1796. The British called the island Ceylon, the name by which it was known until 1972. While the Portuguese and Dutch were interested in the island's many spices, including the endemic cinnamon (*Cinnamomum ceylanicum*), British interests centered on the cultivation of tea and rubber after coffee and cinchona failed. Agricultural exploitation on a large scale was concentrated on the southwestern quarter, including the dense evergreen tropical forests of the highlands, which were cleared and converted into plantations. The colonists also exploited the island's wealth of gemstones (such as blue sapphire, ruby, and moonstone) and ivory.

Economy

The economic development of Sri Lanka following independence resulted in diversification of agriculture and industry, with light industry (particularly the manufacturing of garments) becoming the backbone of a liberalized and privatized economy. Sri Lanka's economic growth was also due in part to generous international aid. Sri Lanka's fishing industry is organized and practiced in traditional ways. Fishing boats are only partly mechanized and fishing occurs mostly in the coastal areas, while deep-sea fishery resources have been exploited only slightly, due to the lack of fishing vessels. Fishing catch is commonly low, though Sri Lanka has an important export trade in prawns and lobsters. Animal husbandry is not widely practiced, which leads to deficits in milk and meat. Sri Lanka offers a wide variety of traditional (called "antique") and modern handicrafts, including woodcarving, silversmithing, jewelry making, and batik textile manufacture. While the rate of unemployment is officially 10 percent, the lack of jobs that pay well has led hundreds of thousands of young Sri Lankans (mostly women) to seek work in the Middle East, commonly as housemaids.

Sri Lanka has a flourishing tourism industry, mostly for vacationers from Western Europe (in 1999, there were 450,000 arrivals). Although tourism is concentrated in sun and beach resorts along the western and southern coasts (for example, in Negombo, Kalutara, Beruwala, Bentota, and Hikkaduwa), ecotourism and health tourism have also become popular. The latter is an interesting development. As Europeans have become familiar with traditional ayurvedic medicine (the medicine of ancient India), they have traveled to Sri

Lanka to seek treatment according to this practice in ayurvedic clinics and in hotels that offer this service.

Manfred Domroes

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SRI LANKA—ECONOMIC SYSTEM Sri Lanka is a relatively poor country, although a per capita income of \$3,250 (2000 est.) makes it a lower-middle-income nation. Some 22 percent of the population lives in poverty, fewer than earlier (1985–1986: 40.6 percent). Earnings from traditional export crops (tea, rubber, coconut) accounted for about 19 percent of total export earnings (1998). Their importance sharply declined during the last three decades of the twentieth century relative to garments, textiles, and other industrial products. Creation of sufficient job opportunities for a rapidly increasing labor force and reduction of poverty are two pressing socioeconomic problems.

Sri Lanka is a famous example of a poor country with a remarkable performance in improving quality of life. On the Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Sri Lanka ranked 90th of 174 countries in 1997, twenty-two places above its ranking for per capita gross national product (GNP). This impressive performance can be attributed to the high adult literacy rate (almost 91 percent), high school enrollment ratio of both sexes, and high life expectancy (over 72 years).

Economic Policy

From its independence in 1948 until 1989, government development policy stressed making large capital-intensive investments to expand food production at the expense of plantation-based export crops; promoting industrial growth by establishing public enterprises and protecting the domestic market against

foreign competition; and increasing government use of price controls, private investment licensing, and trade restrictions.

This approach failed to generate growth (the average annual per capita rate was 2 percent between 1960 and 1977) and employment commensurate with the large fiscal resources it required. In 1977 Sri Lanka responded to the dismal economic outcome of the closed-economy era by embarking on an extensive economic liberalization program, becoming the first South Asian country to do so. The leading role in the economy was transferred to the private sector, and export-led growth was fostered, with significant trade reform and removal of restrictions on foreign investment. Financial reforms included adjusting interest rates to levels above the rate of inflation, opening the bank sector to foreign banks, and freeing credit markets to determine interest rates. New incentives for export-oriented investment were provided under an attractive free-trade zone (FTZ) scheme. The reform process lost momentum in the early 1980s, first because of a shift toward politically appealing investment projects and subsequently as a result of the onset of ethnic conflict. In a decisive move to infuse momentum into the unfinished reform process, a significant second-wave liberalization package was implemented in 1990, with a view to attaining the status of newly industrialized country (NIC) by the year 2000. The package included a sharp reduction in the budget deficit (from 12.5 percent of GDP in 1989 to 10 percent in 1990 and 8.1 percent in 1993), elimination of import licensing for most nonagricultural products, reduction of tariff rates and introduction of four tariff bands, elimination of export duties, devaluation of the Sri Lankan rupee, and reduction of income and corporate taxes (to 40 and 35 percent, respectively) to stimulate the capital market. There was a shift in investment policy away from the enclave strategy of attracting foreign private investment in export promotion zones toward a more neutral environment for all investments. As a result Sri Lanka today is one of the most open economies in the developing world.

Economic Performance

Private investors have generally been bullish in their response to market-oriented reforms (while hesitant during periods of macroeconomic instability and escalation of civil war). After the initiation of reforms in 1977, net foreign direct investment rose from a negligible level in 1978 to average over 4 percent of gross domestic investment during 1979–1982. Economic growth catapulted to 6 percent yearly, led by export growth of 13 percent. After the onset of the civil war, however, acceleration of investment halted. After the

new round of reforms and de-escalation in the civil war, private investment increased again from 11 percent of GDP (1988) to 18 percent (1993). During the 1990s macroeconomic performance in Sri Lanka remained fairly good despite internal and external problems and grew at an annual average of about 5.4 percent.

Agriculture remains the primary source of income for Sri Lanka's predominantly rural population, although its share in GDP had fallen to 21.5 percent by 1998; 38.2 percent of the labor force is employed in that sector. Agriculturally the country can traditionally be divided into an export-oriented plantation sector and a subsistence-oriented peasant sector growing food crops. About 33 percent of the total land area is cultivated, 19 percent under tea and rubber, the remainder under food crops. A growing share of export crops is produced by small holders, whereas the food-crop sector has become fully commercialized.

Government interventions in agricultural markets ever after independence included protection of domestic rice production, the staple crop; taxation of plantation crops (tea, rubber, and, to a lesser extent, coconut); food subsidies to consumers, both in the form of rice rations sold in government shops (up to 1977) and in the form of subsidies for wheat and sugar; large subsidies for rice production, primarily in the form of large public irrigation schemes; and subsidies to and rationing of agricultural inputs, such as fertilizer.

The big agricultural estates were left intact after independence; the level of direct (export, income) and indirect taxes (effects of import protection system) did however increase until owners neglected investments (or shifted them to other countries) and maintenance. Production of rubber and tea began to stagnate in the 1960s, and quality deteriorated. After losing market shares globally in 1972 through 1975, many estates owned by foreign or local individuals and companies (above 20 hectares) were nationalized and brought under the umbrella of two state corporations. Their disappointing performance slowly led to a policy reversal: in 1992 the management of state-owned estates was given to twenty-two private companies on a profit-sharing formula, and export taxes were eliminated. In 1995 the government initiated a program to privatize the estates completely.

Hectare productivity in rice production is fairly low by Asian standards, but it is higher in the dry zone, provided that adequate irrigation is provided. Ninety-four percent of the nation's paddy fields are less than five acres in size. The government tried to bring more land under cultivation with a program in which several hundred thousand acres were distributed in small

holdings to landless peasants to be operated as family farms. The biggest scheme was the Accelerated Mahaweli Development Programme (1969), implemented during the Jayawardene administration (1977) with the help of massive foreign assistance. Huge costs absorbed about 10 percent of gross national investment between 1978 and 1994. As a result of both the expansion of area under cultivation and the rise in productivity under the impact of the "green revolution," paddy cultivation has grown from 603,000 metric tons in 1952 to over 1.6 million metric tons in 1970 and to 2.69 million metric tons in 1999.

Today the country is more or less self-sufficient as regards staple food, but this result was achieved at considerable cost. Sri Lanka traditionally restricted rice imports, and local prices are therefore considerably above import parity level. This noncompetitive output is maintained not only by import restrictions, but also by massive public transfers (irrigation water without cost recovery, fertilizer, subsidized credit), amounting to nearly 5 percent of GDP.

The desire to achieve self-sufficiency also discouraged diversification and development of a functioning land market. The area under other food crops has not grown, despite higher return per acre, because widespread availability of off-farm labor in villages makes it difficult to attract laborers, which in turn makes the low labor requirements of paddy more appealing. The Land Reform Laws limited private holdings in paddy to ten hectares; in public irrigation schemes the maximum is two hectares. Government policies have also imposed restrictions on land use. Legal restraints preventing reallocation of paddy land to other crops were in force until 1991.

Industry

Sri Lanka inherited an extremely small manufacturing sector at independence, accounting for only 4 percent of GDP in 1950, two years after independence. Manufacturing was developed with the help of a heavily protected local market; state interventions in industry, trade, and finance; and the running of over one hundred state industrial corporations, newly established or taken over from private companies. Hence by 1977, the public sector accounted for 24 percent of GNP, over one-third of the nation's investment, 40 percent of employment in the formal sector (that is, in "modern" companies with more than twenty workers), and 60 percent of value-added in manufacturing. Many domestic firms developed poor management practices, hampered by heavy government interference and protection against outside competition. Privatization did

not become government policy until 1987, when a Presidential Commission on Privatization was created. After a slow start the privatization program was the most vigorously pursued area of structural reforms. Despite an unfavorable environment, the government succeeded in selling all its tea and rubber estates and its equity stake in the National Development Bank and Air Lanka, the national carrier. Private participation in infrastructure also expanded.

Manufacturing in 1998 accounted for 16.5 percent of GDP and 15.2 percent of employment. The growth of the manufacturing sector has been fairly rapid after the second round of reforms (8.4 percent per year between 1988 and 1998), especially in the textile sector; in chemicals, petroleum, rubber, and plastic products; and in food, beverage, and tobacco products. These three sectors account for 40, 20, and 22 percent of industrial output, respectively. The garment sector, which until 1977 played a very small role in the economy, profited most from liberalization. In 1998 gross garment exports exceeded U.S. \$2.4 billion and accounted for 52 percent of overall exports. Despite this remarkable growth record, 65 percent of fabrics and accessories needed as inputs are imported. Garment exports are governed by the Multifiber Arrangement, which has attracted East Asian investors to Sri Lanka.

Financial Sector

The most prominent problem in the financial sector is the high cost of finance. Real interest rates are high by international standards (since 1986 between 5 and 8 percent), impeding expansion and business diversification. High fiscal deficits, caused by domestic borrowing, an accommodating monetary policy, and inefficiencies in the financial system contributed to high real rates. The banking sector suffers from the dominance of the two state-owned banks (Bank of Ceylon and People's Bank). These banks, despite two asset clean-up operations in 1993 and 1996, continue to hold fragile portfolios. Recently the management of monetary policies has improved, and greater operational autonomy of the Central Bank is under consideration. The public banks will be placed under performance contracts, but privatization is impossible under current political circumstances.

The Central Bank of Sri Lanka, the sole bank of issue, also acts as a financial adviser to the government and administers monetary policy. In 1979 foreign banks were allowed to open branches in Sri Lanka with a view to attracting foreign investment. By the end of 1994 seventeen foreign banks had branch offices in Colombo. In the same year Foreign Currency Banking Units were established in commercial banks, as a

prelude to the development of an offshore banking center in Sri Lanka.

Public Finance

Sri Lanka has a long history of budget deficits, fueled by generous public subsidies and services, massive transfers to state enterprises, massive recruitment into the public sector, and—more recently—escalating security expenses and generous wage increases in the public sector. In 1998 Sri Lanka spent about 30 percent of its total current expenditure on interest payments, 25 percent on defense, and 10.6 percent on pensions to former civil servants. Revenue shortfalls also contributed to the budget deficit: the newly introduced goods and services tax led to smaller collections, and divestiture income suffered from the slowing down of the privatization program with the onset of the Asian financial crisis. Tax revenue amounted to 14.5 percent of GDP in 1998.

Employment is politically one of the most salient problems, with the traditionally high unemployment rate (usually around 15 percent, today under 10 percent) and the concentration of jobless among the youth and, perhaps surprisingly, those with high educational attainment. Factors contributing to high unemployment include the relatively slow rate of (capital-intensive) growth under import substitution, excessively restrictive labor legislation, poor quality of education acquired compared with labor market aspirations, and the government's tendency to hire large numbers of unemployed graduates, thus increasing incentives to stay unemployed for a while.

Human Development

Sri Lanka's early achievements in human development can be attributed to its early investments in education, to healthcare provided free of cost, and also to its extensive outreach capacity for civil administration and its well-defined delivery network of schools and hospitals. As a result Sri Lanka catapulted to developed country standards on several social indicators and even today preserves its edge over other developing countries in basic social indicators. The status of women is also generally higher than in similar countries (female enrollment at universities is 50 percent). However the performance record in health, education, and poverty reduction during the last three decades of the twentieth century did not improve in consonance with earlier achievements, especially taking into account the quality of services provided.

Estimated adult literacy is 90 percent, and gross enrollment ratios in primary and secondary schools are

105 and 74 percent, respectively (a percentage over 100 is possible because of late enrollments; enrollments are computed as a percentage of an age cohort). Despite successes of the past, today the education sector faces many problems: an unsatisfied demand for university education, low quality and relevance of education to labor market (high unemployment rates among the educated and significant underemployment of university graduates) and social needs, insufficient financing, and poor management practices. Public expenditure on education is comparatively very low, and per pupil expenditures heavily skewed toward tertiary education.

Sri Lanka has an array of programs to assist poor people. Food subsidies were once the main program, consisting of rice rations, but by the late 1970s costs of food subsidies became unsustainable (5 percent of GDP); in 1978 rice rations were restricted to the poorest half of the population. Despite retargeting of the program in 1991, leakages to nonpoor households are massive. Today the main poverty program is the Samurdhi, which provides direct income support in the form of food coupons for over 50 percent of the population and aims to promote self-reliance and rural entrepreneurship through training, credit, and savings schemes.

External Sector

One major reform area since 1989 has been the trade regime. The pace of trade reforms has been fast, including elimination of most nontariff barriers, lowering of tariffs (the maximum rate falling from 100 percent in 1989 to 35 percent in 1995), reduction of the number of tariff bands to three (35, 20, and 10 percent), and reducing discretion in the implementation of tariff rules. Despite these reforms the average tariff rate is still higher than in East Asia (20 percent as opposed to 8.5 percent). In 1977 the share of manufactures in total merchandise exports was only 5 percent. Since then manufactured exports grew rapidly (from 7 percent in the 1980s, to 9 percent from 1988 to 1998), making Sri Lanka one of the low-income countries with the fastest export growth. Today Sri Lanka exports primarily to the United States (40 percent of exports), the United Kingdom, and Germany, and imports primarily from Japan, India, South Korea, and Hong Kong.

The promotion of foreign investment has been a pivotal element of Sri Lanka's market-oriented reforms. The most important aspect of the new policy was setting up the Greater Colombo Economic Commission in 1978 with wide-ranging powers to establish and operate export-processing zones (EPZs). The first zone opened at Katunayka airport (1978), followed by two other zones in 1982 and 1991. The in-

vestment-promotion policy package included a tax holiday of up to ten years, duty exemption for the import of inputs, and industrial services at subsidized rates. A new Investment Policy Statement in 1990 abolished restrictions on the ownership structure of projects outside the EPZs and provided ETZ status to export-oriented foreign ventures in all parts of the country. Foreign direct investment played a pivotal role in expanding export of manufactured goods. The share of foreign firms in total exports of manufactured goods increased from 24 percent in 1977 to almost 80 percent in the mid-1990s.

Outlook for the Twenty-First Century

With strong social indicators and natural endowments, Sri Lanka could have achieved substantially higher growth and poverty reduction had it not been for a history of ethnic conflict and the excessive role of government in the economy until the 1980s. Since the transformation from an inward-looking socialist system to a market economy, GDP has grown at a satisfactory rate, albeit below the country's potential. The most obvious reason is the eighteen-year-long war, which has led to political stalemate (regarding a federal resolution to the conflict) and the deceleration of reforms since the late 1990s. The country remains vulnerable on the external front (still running a high current-account deficit) and fiscally (running a high budget deficit on account of military spending). The most important challenge is to resolve the ethnic conflict and launch a second wave of economic reforms, which should include further privatization and reform of public-sector institutions.

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SRI LANKA—EDUCATION SYSTEM Education in the sense of a state's obligation to provide for a tax-financed general system of primary, secondary and "high"-schools did not exist in Sri Lanka's Buddhist medieval society. Buddhist monasteries imparted sacred knowledge, the basic tenets of the Buddhist faith, and the techniques for the monks' salvation. When in Sinhalese villages there existed a local school, set up by a resident monk—which was not generally the case—then access to this school was restricted to the main cultivating caste, the Goyigamas. It was only under colonial rule—first by the Portuguese in the seventeenth century, later by the Dutch and the British—that a much more broadly based system of education was established.

The religious orders, especially the Jesuits, set up a network of missionary schools in the Sinhalese-dominated southwest and on the Jaffna peninsula in the north, settled by Tamils. These mission schools left a lasting imprint. On the Jaffna peninsula the main cultivating caste, the Vellalas, now embraced at least in outward appearance the Christian faith, monopolized access to these schools, and used this access as a means for social and economic advancement. A comparable development could be observed in the Sinhalese lowland, where besides Goyigama-caste elites, lower but ambitious elites among the fisher and cinnamon-peeler castes now increasingly embraced the Catholic faith to gain access to modern education. Under Dutch colonial rule these elites, by now embracing the Dutch Reformed faith, continued to visit and patronize the Dutch missionary schools, for which the notoriously parsimonious Dutch East India Company provided meager funds.

Education under the British

It was only with the advent of the British that a really modern and widespread system of schools and colleges was established. Three factors contributed to the emergence of a system of colonial education that was in substance secular and in quality exemplary: the competition among different Protestant denominations, the funding mechanism of "grant in aid," and the enlightened self-interest of the colonial government. Different Christian denominations were allowed to establish schools and colleges. These groups, including the Wesleyans and the American Baptists, penetrated into peripheral regions untouched by any Buddhist village schools; in their colleges these missions imparted technical skills as well as classic Western education. Members of the newly emerging "liberal professions"—lawyers, doctors, engineers, and surveyors—were trained in these schools.

The mechanism of grant in aid contributed to the spread and diversification of new schools: under grant in aid not only missionary organizations but local communities, de facto caste associations, and Hindu, Muslim, or Buddhist elites could establish their own schools and receive government funds, as long as their curricula and quality control conformed to British standards. It was due to grant in aid that the indigenous elites could avoid the farce of embracing the Protestant faith to secure a modern education. It was finally the enlightened self-interest of the British government—its perception that it was in need of well-qualified yet poorly paid (that is, native) officers—that resulted in generous funding of and the continuing interest in a decentralized and self-propagating school system, which was increasingly controlled by indigenous elites.

Education since Independence

The gentleman politicians who monopolized politics in Ceylon (as Sri Lanka was called until 1972) immediately before and after independence in 1948 were the result of this education system. It was finally the richest and the most ambitious among them, Solomon West Ridgeway Diaz Bandaranaike (1899–1959), who transformed this system for the training of civil servants into a system of primary mass education and into a medium for the propagation of Sinhalese nationalism. When Bandaranaike's party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), came to power in 1956, it initiated a massively funded program for the extension of primary and, to lesser degree, secondary education.

Already at the beginning of the 1960s more than 90 percent of primary school-age children were enrolled in schools, and some thirty years later, as a result of continuing mass enrollment in primary education, Sri Lanka attained a literacy rate of 87 percent. This was the highest literacy rate in South and Southeast Asia; neighboring India achieved only 43 percent, Pakistan 30 percent, and Singapore 86 percent. Sixty percent of the population had been in school for a minimum of five years, and 35 percent for a minimum of ten years. Yet, this spread of primary mass education coincided with the politicization, or "Sinhalization," of the school system and a deterioration of quality.

Education and "Sinhalization"

Establishing mass literacy in Sri Lanka constituted a major element in Bandaranaike's program of ethnic Sinhalese nation building. The SLFP had won the 1956 elections with the promise of establishing "Sinhalese only," the ethnic majority language as the only official and administrative language on the island, to the detri-

ment of the elites' English and the Tamil language of the minority Tamils. School enrollment served the twofold purpose of bringing literacy in the Sinhalese language to the Sinhalese majority and propagating the nationalist formula of "the unified land, the Sinhalese race, and the Buddhist faith." Children were taught in their mother languages, Tamils in Tamil and Sinhalese in Sinhalese. There was no sustained interest in providing Tamils with the capability to speak Sinhalese or in teaching English. This process of vernacularization, a de facto Sinhalization of the island's schools, administration, and politics, was paralleled by the nationalization of Sri Lanka's private schools and elite colleges. Christian and Hindu elite colleges were strictly supervised by the state, while Buddhist village and monastery schools were controlled and instrumentalized by the emerging Sinhalese state.

This not only led to a deterioration of standards (the percentage of teachers without certificates rose from 13 percent in 1950 to 30 percent in 1961) but also prepared the way for the Tamil-Sinhalese conflict and civil war, which has engulfed the island since 1983. As the island's sluggish economy was unable to provide jobs for ever more ambitious Sinhalese primary and secondary school graduates, there emerged a Maoist as well as chauvinist youth organization, the Tamil Youth League, which in 1973 threatened the government with a first major insurrection.

This radicalization of the primary school-educated Sinhalese youth was paralleled by the growing alienation and militancy of Tamil youth, who could not find employment in a Sinhalese-language-speaking and Sinhalese-dominated state administration and state economy. While the two Sinhalese mass parties attempted to satisfy the demands of the young Sinhalese for state patronage, jobs, and unrestricted access to the universities at the expense of the Tamils, young Tamils discriminated against by the employment practices of the Sinhalese state or denied access to higher education now demanded their own state. The mass education system of Sri Lanka thus contributed to an ethnic civil war, which by now has led to the decay of its institutions and a further decline of its standards. In 1998 the World Bank assisted the government of Sri Lanka in initiating reforms of the education system to improve its efficiency, to redesign its curricula, and to correct its pro-Sinhalese bias.

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SRI LANKA—HISTORY Sri Lanka is an island nation just north of the equator and southeast of India. The country's ancient civilization flourished in the north-central plains of the island, but as this civilization declined during the first millennium CE, the island's location on the sea routes of the Indian Ocean made Sri Lanka vulnerable to European colonization, which lasted from 1517 to 1948. In 1972 the country officially changed its name from Ceylon to Sri Lanka. Since 1983 Sri Lanka has been engulfed in civil war.

Sinhala, an Indo-European language spoken only on the island, is the mother tongue of three-quarters of the population. About 12 percent of the population is Sri Lankan Tamils, who speak Tamil (the dominant language on the adjacent coast of India) and, like the Sinhalese, claim descent from the island's earliest settlers. Another 6 percent of the population is Tamils descended from immigrant laborers who came from southern India in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Muslims form 7 percent of the population. The Sinhalese are mostly Buddhist, and the Tamils are primarily Hindu, although there is a sizable Christian population of both Sinhalese and Tamils dating back to the Portuguese colonization of the island in the early 1500s.

The modern economic and political center of Sri Lanka has been in the central highlands, of which the southwest is in the wet zone watered by two monsoon seasons and convectional rain throughout the year. Until the thirteenth century, however, most of the population lived in the remaining two-thirds of the island, which receives between 76 and 178 centimeters of rainfall a year, but is called the dry zone because most rain falls during only a three-month monsoon season.

Ancient Civilization

The island underwent a relatively rapid transition from a late Stone Age hunter-gatherer society to Iron Age farming by the sixth century BCE, followed by the emergence of a kingdom with its capital at Anuradhapura in the north central plains in the third century BCE. The appearance of writing in Brahmi script in around 500 BCE—the earliest appearance of the script anywhere in South Asia—throughout the island suggests that the inhabitants shared a common culture.



KEY EVENTS IN SRI LANKA HISTORY

- 6th century BCE** Peoples in Sri Lanka shift from hunting/gathering to agriculture.
- 3rd century BCE** A kingdom emerges with its capital at Anuradhapura in the north central plains.
- c. 500 BCE** Writing in the Brahmi script is in use.
- 400s CE** The *Mahavamsa* or Great Chronicle, a history of the island compiled by Buddhist monks, is written.
- 1017–1075** Anuradhapura declines and the island is ruled by the Tamil Chola empire.
- 1100s–1466** The Sinhalese kingdom revives, with its capital now at Polonnaruwa, but fades with Parakramabahu VI of Kotte, the last Sinhalese ruler of the entire island.
- 1619** The Portuguese take control of the coastal regions.
- 1658** The Dutch displace the Portuguese with the aid of local allies.
- 1796** The British East India Company replaces the Dutch.
- 1802** The British parliament makes the island the Crown Colony of Ceylon.
- 1840s** The British develop profitable coffee and later tea and rubber plantations.
- 1915** Riots and British repression create a climate leading to political reform.
- 1919** The Ceylon Nation Congress is founded.
- 1931** The Donoughmore Reforms create a State Council with substantial power in the hands of a Board of Ministers.
- 1948** On 4 February Ceylon becomes an independent nation.
- 1970s** Tamil politicians advocate separatism and violent confrontations between the Sinhalese and Tamils increase.
- 1972** The nation's name is changed from Ceylon to Sri Lanka.
- 1977–1989** Economic reforms supporting a market-oriented economy lead to income growth but do not create economic stability.
- 1983** Tamil terrorist attacks lead to massive attacks by the Sinhalese and a civil war that continues in 2002.
- 1987–1990** Some 60,000 Indian troops are on the island to help control the civil war.
- 1990s** Efforts to end the civil war fail and central government stability is hampered by a series of assassinations.

The earliest settlements were along rivers, but people soon began building reservoirs to store the monsoon rains for year-round agricultural use. The reservoirs were elaborated over the centuries into an extraordinary system of hydrological engineering and irrigated agriculture. Long, gently sloping canals extending back to the rain-drenched highlands fed massive reservoirs. Anuradhapura may not have asserted sovereignty over the entire island as it claimed, but it was the largest and most powerful city-state on the island.

Sinhalese kings sponsored the Theravada Buddhist religion, and Buddhist monastic orders in turn supported the rulers. The island became a world center

of Buddhist scholarship and remained Theravada Buddhist even when Mahayana Buddhism and then Hinduism displaced it on the mainland gradually over a long stretch from the first century BCE to the twelfth century CE (Bengal). The *Mahavamsa* or Great Chronicle, a history of the island compiled by Buddhist monks, was written in the fifth century CE when Buddhism was waning among their Tamil neighbors; the chronicle emphasizes the unity of state and religion and the Tamil threat from southern India. Its fears appeared to be justified as Anuradhapura declined and the Tamil-ruled Chola empire gained mastery over the island for about seventy-five years (1017–1075).

The Sinhalese kingdom revived for two centuries, with its capital now at Polonnaruwa, but further invasions and the appearance of malaria in the dry zone put a final end to the ancient civilization. The depopulated dry zone separated the Sinhalese regions to the south and west from the Tamil-speaking areas to the north and east. Muslim trading communities arose along the coasts from the eleventh century onwards. The strongest Sinhalese kingdom flourished at Kotte near the present site of Colombo, where the island's gems and cinnamon were attractions in the growing Indian Ocean trade. Parakramabahu VI of Kotte (reigned 1411–1466) was the last Sinhalese king to claim sovereignty over the entire island.

Colonialism

In the course of the sixteenth century the Portuguese empire extended its control of the coasts, driving the remaining Sinhalese into Kandy in the central highlands and conquering the last Tamil kingdom in 1619. From 1638 to 1658 the Dutch defeated the Portuguese with the aid of local allies. Coastal inhabitants allied themselves with the colonial rulers through language, religion, and economic interest. They served in the colonial administration and produced crops for export. Cultural differences eventually arose between the Sinhalese of the coast and the interior, and these persist today. In the Kandyan interior, for example, the Govigama caste remained dominant in relation to other castes, while along the coast intercaste relations weakened and other castes challenged Govigama predominance.

The British East India Company replaced the Dutch in 1796, and parliament made the island the Crown Colony of Ceylon in 1802. The central kingdom of Kandy was occupied in 1803 and annexed in 1815, uniting the entire island under a single government. The British created an export economy in the 1840s by developing coffee plantations cleared from highland forests; these were British owned but cultivated by laborers of Indian origin. The plantations, particularly after tea succeeded coffee and rubber was added, gave the colony a measure of prosperity unknown elsewhere in South Asia. Land taxes were abolished in 1892, and the colony had some of the best schools, health care, roads, railways, harbors, and other public services in Asia.

Prosperity came at a price as the economic and social gap between the affluent elites and the peasants and laborers increased. English missionaries provided much of the education. The elites became English-educated, Anglicized, and often Christian, monopolizing em-



POLONNARUWA—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Designated a World Heritage Site in 1982, Polonnaruwa became the second capital of Sri Lanka when Anuradhapura was destroyed in 993 CE. The historic ruins are also home to many Brahman monuments and the ruins of a thirteenth century garden-city.

ployment in government service and the professions. The Sinhalese Buddhist majority in particular felt dispossessed.

The colony had its first legislative council in 1833, but it was a weak body of officials and representatives of economic and ethnic interests. British repression of Sinhalese leaders following riots in 1915 convinced the elite of the need for political organization. The Ceylon Nation Congress was founded in 1919 with Sinhalese and Tamil cooperation. Reforms in 1920 and 1924 allowed greater participation under a restricted franchise. The results satisfied no one, and Britain sent a commission led by Lord Donoughmore to propose reforms.

In 1931 the Donoughmore Reforms created a State Council (approved by the Legislative Council over the objections of minority members) with substantial power in the hands of a Board of Ministers. As it was elected on universal adult franchise (except for people of Indian origin, whose votes were restricted), control went to whoever could win the support of the Sinhalese Buddhist majority. The State Council improved health services, education, and the extension of cultivation, but did little to change the colonial plantation economy that provided the resources for these programs.

As independence neared, tensions between ethnic groups increased. The civil rights of Tamils of Indian origin were further restricted, and Sinhalese representatives created a de facto Sinhalese government. Don Stephen Senanayake (1884–1952), a wealthy planter, and Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike (1899–1959), son of the Maha Mudaliyar (the highest-ranking Sinhalese official) competed for leadership. The British ignored minorities who feared Sinhalese domination and placed their support behind Senanayake, the more conservative of the two. He became prime minister upon independence on 4 February 1948, under a constitution prepared by the Board of Ministers with British assistance.

Independent Sri Lanka

Senanayake created the United National Party (UNP), drawing leading politicians of all ethnic groups. After his death in 1952, his son Dudley Stephen (1911–1973) and kinsman Sir John Kotelawala (1897–1980) succeeded him, in place of Bandaranaike, who founded the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). Bandaranaike, appealing to Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists, won a landslide victory in April 1956 in a coalition with minor parties called the People's United Front (Mahajana Eksat Peramuna or MEP).

The 1956 election set a pattern in which the parties alternated in power on the strength of the opposition's appeal to the majority community. The opposition tended to raise expectations of the Sinhalese Buddhists that governments were unable to satisfy. The MEP promised, for example, to make Sinhalese the official language, which to the Sinhala-



For the last quarter century, Sri Lanka has been involved in an internal ethnic conflict pitting the minority Tamils against the Sinhalese-controlled government. This sign outside the Pesalai office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees prohibits weapons. (HOWARD DAVIES/CORBIS)

educated population meant that they would inherit the jobs and status of the English-educated elites, something the latter could never allow. A Buddhist monk assassinated Bandaranaike in September 1959. Bandaranaike's widow, Sirimavo (b. 1916), took the leadership of the SLFP after his assassination and served as prime minister from 1960 to 1965 and from 1970 to 1977 (heading a United Front coalition). Dudley Senanayake was prime minister briefly in 1960 and 1965–1970.

Sri Lanka's leaders have been unable to transform the colonial economy into a successful independent one. The first UNP governments squandered foreign exchange reserves on luxury consumption and politically motivated social services with no clear strategy for growth. The SLFP introduced a wide range of inefficient state corporations that swelled budget and balance-of-payment deficits. As a result, there were not many industrial or service-sector jobs to absorb the rapidly growing population. High unemployment, declining balances of trade, and inflation followed. Over half the population depends on agriculture, primarily rice cultivation, for their livelihood. By the 1960s exports of tea, rubber, and coconuts no longer provided enough foreign exchange to pay for necessary imports, and the nation depended increasingly on foreign aid for survival.

Economics was at the heart of a Sinhalese insurrection in March 1971. The Marxist-oriented People's Liberation Front (Jatika Vimukti Peramuna or JVP) was suppressed in a few months. Sirimavo Bandaranaike then nationalized plantations and industrial enterprises while creating a vast array of state corporations, which brought the economy to a virtual halt by 1975. Under the regime of President Junius Richard Jayewardene (1906–1996) from 1977 to 1989, the UNP implemented market-oriented reforms that continue today with the daughter of the Bandaranaikes, Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga (b. 1945) as president. The economy grows at a modest 5 percent a year, but depends largely on the uncertain markets for textile and tea exports, tourism, and remissions of Sri Lankans working abroad. In the last two decades of the twentieth century economic problems were dwarfed by civil war.

The United Front passed a new constitution in 1972, which changed the nation's name from Ceylon to Sri Lanka and increased the authority of the government to act without constitutional restraints. It abolished commissions that limited patronage powers, placed public policy before civil rights, and gave a constitutional foundation to the preeminent position of the Sinhala language and Buddhist religion. The UNP

produced its own constitution after its landslide victory in 1977. It created a directly elected president as head of state and established proportional representation, in part as a means of avoiding the landslides that made constitution writing possible. Jayewardene was succeeded in January 1989 by his prime minister, Ranasinghe Premadasa (1924–1993).

Civil War

Policies enforced to redress what Sinhalese nationalists considered centuries of decline at the hands of colonial rulers provoked a reaction from minority communities, particularly the Sri Lankan Tamils. Sinhala was made the only official language of the country, and the nation's Buddhist heritage was emphasized in public affairs. The majority community had preference in colonization of land developed at public expense, university admissions, and government employment.

In the 1970s Tamil politicians advocated separatism, and violent confrontations between the Sinhalese and Tamils increased. Tamil terrorist groups increased their activities. After one such attack in July 1983, massive attacks by Sinhalese on Tamils throughout the island led to a civil war in which an estimated 75,000 people were killed by the end of the century.

Violence escalated throughout the 1980s, exacerbated by the presence of over 60,000 Indian troops from 1987 to 1990. When Indian troops fought on the island, a JVP attempt to overthrow the government was subdued only after brutal tactics on both sides led to an estimated 60,000 deaths. In the north the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran (b. 1954) crushed other separatist groups and seized control of the movement by 1986. The last years of UNP government were marked by a spate of assassinations. Premadasa was killed on 1 May 1993 by a suicide bomber and succeeded by Dingiri Banda Wijetunga (b. 1922), who appointed Ranil Wickramasinghe (b. 1951) as prime minister.

Kumaratunga's campaign promise to end the civil war helped her win a landslide victory. After efforts to call a truce with the LTTE failed, she used military superiority to force the separatists to negotiate. The military succeeded in capturing the Jaffna Peninsula in December 1995, but repeated efforts to open the road between Colombo and Jaffna were beaten back, and the struggle continues. Throughout Kumaratunga's first term the LTTE launched attacks on military bases in the north and east. The April 2000 loss of Elephant Pass, which protected the Jaffna Peninsula from the LTTE, was the largest government setback of the war.

Kumaratunga's peace proposals included constitutional changes that would grant greater autonomy to the provinces, including a Tamil province in the north and east. The proposal was supported by over one hundred organizations that joined in a National Peace Alliance, but was opposed by Sinhalese nationalists and many Buddhist monks. The UNP opposed the plan until Kumaratunga's reelection in December 1999 (during which she was injured by another suicide bomber); in the first half of 2000 the UNP's Wickramasinghe, the leader of the opposition, met to discuss a consensus that both parties could support. The government of Norway offered its services as mediators with the LTTE, who rejected the proposals.

The appalling death and destruction of the civil war continues as a war of attrition. In recent years Sri Lanka's army of 120,000 troops made slow and costly gains, which were thwarted by LTTE attacks. The losses reduced military morale and resulted in large-scale desertions. Campaigns to enlist more soldiers and grant amnesty to deserters did not meet with much success. Hundreds of thousands of Sri Lankans sought asylum abroad, and many people in the northern and eastern island survive in refugee camps.

Patrick Peebles

See also: **Buddhism—Sri Lanka; Ethnic Conflict—South Asia**

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SRI LANKA—HUMAN RIGHTS Sri Lanka is a democratic island-state with a multiparty system. After attaining independence from the British empire in 1948, Sri Lankan ruling elites retained the colonial constitution while from time to time incorporating legislative acts. A new constitution adopted in 1972

provided for a parliamentary democracy, but leaders favored the Sinhalese majority in matters of employment, official language, and recruitment criteria in educational institutions.

As a result, the Tamils felt discriminated against and in 1983 launched a movement demanding a separate homeland in the northeastern provinces for Tamil speakers. Since then, millions of Tamils have become refugees in India, and many civilians have suffered heavy casualties. Increased fighting between government security forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) resulted in extrajudicial killings and displacement of more than 150,000 persons all over the country.

Torture, rape, and harassment by the police and security forces have become common. Emergency powers have been in force since 1983. Under the emergency regulations, state authorities have the power to arrest people, restrict their movements, and ban activities of unions. During 1999 and 2000, the media were censored, and coverage of the ongoing civil war, including arbitrary detention of journalists and closing of printing presses, was banned. In June 2000, because of international pressure, the government removed restrictions on foreign media. Such violations of human rights by state agencies contributed to the erosion of democratic institutions and undermined people's faith in democracy and the rule of law.

The LTTE bombed civilian public places in the north and east of the peninsula, killing more than a hundred civilians in suicide bombings in 2000. The LTTE also recruited children younger than fifteen years of age to serve in combat operations. The National Human Rights Commission in Colombo, including nongovernment officials and international human-rights organizations, investigated cases of abuse of civil liberties by state agencies and the LTTE with little result, because of apathy, noncooperation of state agencies, and the unabated civil war. Unless an amicable political solution is found to end the ethnic war, there is little hope for improvement in the human-rights situation in Sri Lanka.

B. M. Jain

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SRI LANKA—POLITICAL SYSTEM Sri Lanka (called Ceylon until 1972) is unique among Britain's former colonial territories in that already in 1931 the island was granted a democratic constitution, which was based on full franchise, the universal and secret ballot, and de facto political control and parliamentary government by Sri Lankan political figures and parties. Unrestricted political control was eagerly embraced by the Sinhalese and Tamil political elites, who attempted without success to forestall the introduction of universal and secret voting rights. While the Tamil minority and Tamil politicians saw themselves threatened by Sinhalese majority rule, the Sinhalese politicians had to learn the idiom of democratic mass politics practically overnight and had to control the mass of Sinhalese voters. To secure this control, weaken demands for land distribution, and marginalize socialist parties, these plantation-owning politicians embraced a virulent anti-Tamil and pro-Sinhalese ethnic nationalism. This strategy, combined with the fears of the indigenous and the Indian Tamil minorities, led to the development of an ethnic party system. The Ceylon National Congress (CNC) in 1946 transformed into the United National Party (UNP) and mobilized Sinhalese voters. The Tamil Congress (TC), dominated by educated upper-caste Tamils from Jaffna, articulated the demands of the Sri Lankan Tamils. The Ceylon Indian Congress (CIC), a trade union turned into a political party, organized the Indian laborers working in the up-country "tea gardens." Based on the two-thirds Sinhalese Buddhist majority, the CNC/UNP would monopolize political control until independence.

The Soulbury Constitution of 1946

Sri Lanka entered independence in 1948 on the basis of a Westminster-type (that is, British-style) political system as set out in the Soulbury Constitution of 1946 and remained in the Commonwealth. Although the ethnic party system and the preponderance of a Sinhalese and Buddhist majority combined with a majority voting system tended to marginalize the influence of the Tamil minority—the Indian Tamils, mostly estate laborers, lost their voting rights in 1949—the Soulbury Constitution contained several safeguards for the protection of minorities. In multi-ethnic election districts, for instance in Colombo and Kandy, there existed, since 1931, so-called multiple-member constituencies. To these districts two or three parliamentary seats were allocated, and voters controlled two or three votes. Well-organized Tamil or Muslim groups in such districts were thus able to secure parliamentary representation. In cases of dis-

crimination on ethnic or religious grounds, spokesmen for the minorities could address the Privy Council in London, a special advisory committee of the British government. An ethnically balanced public employment commission also existed to ensure that employment in the expanding public administration and state economy was based on open and fair examinations and on merit.

Nonetheless, the twenty-five years of the Soulbury Constitution saw a constant deterioration of interethnic relations. A second Tamil party, the Federal Party, emerged in 1949. With the Tamil minority vote split in two, Tamils lost any hope of influencing the island's ethnic pro-Sinhalese party politics. Still more threatening was the founding of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) in 1951. This second, vastly more chauvinistic pro-Sinhalese mass party competed with the UNP for the Sinhalese electorate. After its election victory in 1956, the SLFP government not only introduced Sinhala as the sole state language, it embarked on a vast program of "Sinhalization" of the education system, public services, and state-controlled economy. In 1960 the UNP and the SLFP began to outbid each other in pro-Sinhalese "nation-building" promises, chauvinistic slogans, and government politics, which further marginalized the political and economic influence of the minorities.

The Republican Constitution of 1972

In 1951 the SLFP rejected the Soulbury Constitution as an outdated relic of colonialism. In 1970, after its third election victory, SLFP prepared a new constitution, enacted in 1972, which, according to Article 16.2, transformed Sri Lanka (Ceylon) into "a free, sovereign and independent republic," which was "pledged . . . [to] the progressive advancement towards . . . a socialist democracy."

In reality, an ethnic democracy was established. Article 2 of the constitution declared that "Sri Lanka is a unitary state." Demands for a devolution of power, as expressed by the Federal Party, were perceived as a threat to the constitution. In addition, Article 6 stated that "Sri Lanka shall give Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the state to protect and foster Buddhism." Furthermore, according to Article 8.2 "any regulation for the (enhanced) use of the Tamil language . . . shall not in any manner be interpreted as being an provision of the constitution, but shall be deemed to be subordinate legislation."

During the seven years of the SLFP-dominated United Front government, interethnic relations deteriorated further, as did economic conditions. With Sri

Lanka near bankruptcy, in 1977 the UNP returned in triumph to power with a four-fifths majority in parliament and a promise of constitutional reform. The SLFP's election defeat was so severe that the Tamil United Liberation Front—the reunited TC and FP—for the next decade would form the main opposition. Secure in his parliamentary majority, UNP leader Junius Richard Jayewardene (1906–1996) decided to prepare a new constitution and establish a de facto one-party authoritarian regime.

The Semipresidential Constitution 1978

The constitution enacted in 1978 represented a profound break with the island's fifty-year-old parliamentary tradition, transforming it into a semipresidential system along French lines. Jayewardene, the president of the new Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, as the island was renamed, not only functioned as commander in chief and influenced foreign policy, he controlled five to seven additional ministries and had complete control over the UNP's members of parliament and ministers. Thanks to his four-fifths majority in parliament, he could amend his constitution at will—and did so more than sixteen times until his resignation in 1988. With the help of such amendments, in 1982 he engineered a referendum through which he postponed parliamentary elections until 1989 and thus secured his power base.

The new constitution implemented a new voting system of proportional representation, which was supposed to avoid the distortions resulting from the "first past the post" majority voting system introduced in 1931. In 1970, for instance, the SLFP won ninety-one seats with 37 percent of the vote, while the UNP, with 38 percent, won only seventeen seats and thus lost the election. Under the new system of proportional representation, the 160 single-member constituencies were replaced by 22 electoral districts. Candidates were elected on the basis of party lists. In addition to these 196 members, 29 additional seats were apportioned as "bonus seats" in the same proportion as the proportion of the number of votes polled by each party. Through this bonus system, the two pro-Sinhalese UNP and SLFP parties (which together controlled more than two-thirds of the vote) regularly received twelve to fifteen additional seats.

It is ironic that a new semipresidential political system intended to bring stability to the island's increasingly polarized ethnic and ideological politics would provide the basis for an authoritarian UNP regime. At the same time it constituted the framework in which ethnic civil war between the Tamil Tigers (a Tamil



PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF SRI LANKA

Adopted 1948.

Whereas it is the will of the people of Sri Lanka to establish and strengthen an order—

Wherein the sovereignty of the people is assured and the exercise of authority by their freely chosen representatives is in the nature of a sacred trust;

Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, humanity, tolerance and equal opportunity shall be fully observed;

Wherein the dignity of the individual shall be upheld through the guaranteeing of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law;

Wherein the territories constituting the nation shall form one indissoluble union, the units whereof will be characterised by such boundaries and limitations on their powers and authority as may be prescribed;

Wherein the territorial integrity, independence and unity of the nation including its sovereign rights over land, sea and air shall be safeguarded;

Wherein peace and fraternity among all communities shall be secured and provision made enabling all communities to enjoy and nurture their distinct culture, practice and profess their own religion and promote their own language, thus preserving the rich cultural and ethnic diversity characteristic of a plural society:

Now, therefore, we the people of Sri Lanka having solemnly resolved to constitute Sri Lanka into a free, sovereign, united and independent Republic:

Cognisant of the sacrifices made by the people in the cause of sustaining the unity and sovereignty of the republic;

Mindful of our obligations to succeeding generations of Sri Lankans and the International Community;

Inspired by the vision of a Sri Lankan nation where all communities co-exist in equality, safety and contentment;

Conscious of the desire to achieve rapid, sustained and equitable development so that the people of Sri Lanka may prosper and attain their rightful place among the community of nations:

Do, on this (day) acting through our freely chosen representatives constituting the 10th Parliament of Sri Lanka established by us, hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves

This constitution as the supreme law of the republic of Sri Lanka.

Source: Erasmus University at Rotterdam. Retrieved 8 March 2002, from: <http://www.eur.nl/frg/iacl/armenia/constitu/constit/sry-lank/srlank-e.htm>.


independence movement) and the government and a Sinhalese terrorist insurrection against the UNP emerged. The UNP regime suffered for its failure to control the escalating civil war and its success in destroying an insurrection in 1989 led by the Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP; People's Liberation Front).

Facing Civil Unrest

In order to combat the Tamil Tigers, the UNP enacted dozens of antiterrorist laws, introduced martial law in the northern and eastern provinces, and transformed itself into a counterinsurgency regime that systematically abrogated constitutional safeguards. The JVP-led insurrection (1987–1990) was destroyed with the help of death squads and vigilante groups recruited in the constituencies of the beleaguered UNP politicians. These death squads systematically hunted, abducted, tortured, and killed suspected JVP members. After some 40,000 Sinhalese youth "disappeared" or were killed in this fashion, the insurrection collapsed in early 1990, but judicial safeguards and the rule of law also disappeared.

Against this background of massive violations of human rights and the constitution, in 1994 parliamentary and presidential elections had to be organized. A reorganized SLFP led by Chandrika Kumaratunga (b. 1945), the daughter of Sirimavo Bandaranaike (b. 1916; prime minister from 1960 to 1965 and from 1970 to 1977), confronted a fragmented and insecure UNP, which had not recovered from the assassination of its new leader, Ranasinghe Premadasa, who succeeded Jayewardene in 1989. The SLFP was aligned with two traditional leftist parties and the newly established Sri Lanka Muslim Congress in a so-called Peoples Alliance (PA). The PA promised a return to the rule of law, the eventual reversion to a parliamentary constitution, the establishment of a more benign form of capitalism, and new initiatives to end the civil war. But in a highly radicalized election campaign, the PA succeeded in winning the parliamentary (and later presidential) elections but failed to establish a strong parliamentary majority and thus government. It lacked the two-thirds majority to change the constitution and also lacked the political will to offer a genuine devolution of power to the Tamil minority and thereby bring the civil war to an end.

A political and military stalemate emerged, which continues to the present. In the 2000 parliamentary and presidential elections, a victorious PA again failed to establish a clear majority in parliament. In 2001, the PA lost its parliamentary support, and the UNP returned to power. But the UNP's return to government only strengthened the parliamentary, political, and



Sri Lankan soldiers perform on 4 February 2000 at a ceremony in Colombo to mark the 52nd anniversary of Sri Lanka's independence from Britain. (AFP/CORBIS)

military stalemate. Lacking a decisive majority in parliament, the UNP is set to govern until 2004 in "cohabitation" with a strong PA president, Mrs. Kumaratunga. It is doubtful that the UNP will jeopardize its political support among Sinhalese voters by making concessions to the Tamil minority.

Jakob Rösel

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SRINAGAR (2000 pop. 606,000). The summer capital of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, Srinagar lies between two hills, the Hari Parbat and the Shankar Acharya (also known as Takht-i-Suleiman). The original town of Srinagar was founded in the third century BCE by Emperor Ashoka (reigned 273–232 BCE) of the Maurya dynasty (c. 324–c. 200 BCE) on the site that now is occupied by the village of Pandrathan. The area now known as Srinagar was settled by King

Pravarasena in the sixth century CE. Through the ages, Srinagar developed as a center of art, culture, and learning.

The city had experienced several natural disasters. Before the nineteenth century, Srinagar had been destroyed and rebuilt six times. Two major fires, in 1892 and 1899, devastated large portions of the city. There have been eleven major earthquakes in the city since the fifteenth century.

Modern Srinagar runs for nearly two miles along the Jhelum River, which divides the city into two parts. There are several historic sites within the city, including the Hari Parbat Fort (constructed in the eighteenth century by Atta Mohammed Khan), the Shah Hamdan Mosque (one of the oldest Islamic religious structures in the city), and the Jama Masjid. Srinagar is also a city of gardens, mostly landscaped under Mughal rule.

Sanjukta Das Gupta

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SRIVIJAYA The maritime Buddhist empire of Srivijaya emerged in the seventh century CE as the first sea power to dominate the Strait of Malacca and the Sunda Strait, the key positions along the spice route connecting China, the Malay archipelago, India, and the West. The scarcity of sources—inscriptions, Buddhist statues, temple ruins, and other archaeological remains, as well as Chinese, Arab, and European reports—has caused difficulties in determining the different centers and the varying boundaries that constituted Srivijaya from the seventh to the fourteenth century. The earliest centers were probably Palembang and Jambi in Suvarnadvipa, the "gold land" in central South Sumatra.

Already in the seventh century, Srivijaya reached out to Java and the Malay peninsula, where Kedah and Perak along Malaysia's west coast, and Perlis guarding Srivijaya's trade interests on the Kra isthmus, became its most important vassals. In 686, the Chinese Buddhist pilgrim I-Ching recommended Srivijaya as a flourishing center of Buddhist learning. In 671, he had spent six months there, "in a walled city inhabited by a thousand monks," studying Sanskrit grammar while waiting for the monsoon winds that would carry his vessel to India. Having spent another, longer stint in Srivijaya on his way back to China, I-Ching also wrote

that Mahayana Buddhism was new in Srivijaya, whereas the Mulasarvastivadanikaya, the Hinayana canon in Sanskrit, was widely followed. In the first half of the eighth century, Srivijaya was visited by Vajrabodi, abbot of the famous Mahayana Buddhist cloister of Nalanda in Bihar, India, and first guru of the Yogacara sect.

Several years later the Sailendras, a Mahayana Buddhist dynasty best known for building the famous Borobudur temple, came to power in Central Java. Between 1011 and 1023, another famous Buddhist teacher, Atisa (982–1054), the reformer of Tibetan Buddhism, studied in Srivijaya. At that time the growing trade and shipping between India and China, controlled by Srivijaya, had already attracted the rivalry of both East Java and the Cholas of south India. In 1025, the Cholas attacked Srivijaya, captured its maharaja, and devastated the country. As a result Srivijaya's power waned. In 1286, its decreasing realm was temporarily conquered by Kertanagara (reigned 1268–1292), king of East-Javanese Singosari. Singosari's successor, Majapahit, regarded Srivijaya as its principal vassal. The major trade points along the Strait, however, were already held by the Muslim states of Samudra-Pasai in North Sumatra and Malacca on the Malay Peninsula.

Martin Ramstedt

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SSIRUM *Ssirum* is one of the most popular traditional games in Korea, dating back to the early Koguryo kingdom (37 BCE–668 CE). *Ssirum* is a wrestling game in which one wrestler tries to make the opponent fall to the ground. The rules of *ssirum* are that (1) the two opponents, standing in a *ssirumpan* (a circle of sand nine meters in diameter), bind their right

thighs and waists with a *satba* (a two-foot-long sash); (2) each opponent kneels facing the other, with the right hand grasping the *satba* bound around the waist and right thigh of the other; and (3) at the signal of a referee, the two opponents rise and begin to pull and push until one opponent falls to the ground. There are three basic skills: hand skill, leg skill, and lifting skill.

Ssirum matches are held not only during national holidays, including the Tano Festival day (5 May), but also during the leisure seasons. The game was handed down from the Koguryo kingdom through the Koryo kingdom (918–1392 CE) and the Choson dynasty (1392–1910 CE), becoming the most popular game among men, from the king to the common man. Today there are many professional and amateur *ssirum* wrestlers, and even women and children play the game.

Young-Il Na

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
Institute of Korean Culture. (1982) *Survey of Korean Folk Culture*. Seoul: Korea University.

STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL—MYANMAR After the 1988 uprising and protests sparked by ineffective socialist economic policies, the armed forces of Burma (Myanmar) on 18 September 1988 took control of the

notional civilian government of Maung Maung, which had succeeded that of Ne Win, and created the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). Each of the fourteen administrative areas (seven states and seven divisions) that make up Burma are further subdivided into districts, townships, and then village tracts (in rural areas) or wards (in urban areas). Law and Order Councils (LORC) operate at every level. After the takeover, all state organs, including the People's Assembly, the Council of State, and the Council of Ministers were abolished, and their duties were assumed by the SLORC. The Burma Socialist Programme Party collapsed. A Supreme Court was established as the supreme judicial authority, its members appointed by the SLORC.

The SLORC, which included army chiefs but not ministers, functioned as the highest authority in Burma and oversaw the cabinet. It embarked on "Myanmafication" when it hastily instituted the Adaptation of Expressions Law on 18 June 1989. This involved a comprehensive Burmanization of place-names. Burma was renamed Myanmar, and Rangoon became Yangon. General Saw Maung was chairman at the foundation of the SLORC, but this office was handed over on 23 April 1992 to General Than Shwe, who was also declared prime minister.

Though the SLORC held elections in May 1990, as had been promised by Ne Win in his resignation speech, in the process of electioneering in the first half



A public notice posted by the SLORC in Yangon in September 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

of 1989, the diverse ethnic groups began to meet with the National League for Democracy (NLD) to work out a national framework for sharing power. In response, the SLORC restricted the movements of politicians. After the National League for Democracy won with a landslide majority and the SLORC's favored National Unity Party failed to get a substantial vote, it reinterpreted the elections retrospectively as electing a body to draft a constitution.

Seeking to clean up its image with the international community, on 15 November 1997 the SLORC renamed itself the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) but introduced no democratic elections and no major political reforms. Though accompanied by a few changes in personnel, there was no major change in government policy, and the net effect was one of little or no difference between the SPDC and its predecessor. Like the SLORC, the SPDC includes army chiefs but not ministers and functions as the highest authority in Myanmar. Though dominated by military personnel, SPDC officials are not formally linked to the army. The chairman is Than Shwe, and the first secretary is Khin Nyunt.

Gustaaf Houtman

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STATE PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL. See State Law and Order Restoration Council—Myanmar.

STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT—JAPAN The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between Japan and the United States provides guidelines for the activities of U.S. armed forces assigned to facilities in Japan. It is typical of the more than eighty such SOFAs that have been negotiated with other allies of the United States, such as NATO na-

tions and the Republic of Korea. A separate United Nations–Japan SOFA addresses issues regarding the deployment of forces from the United Nations Command, which was formed during the Korean War.

The U.S.–Japan SOFA was negotiated in 1960 to replace earlier agreements such as the Administrative Agreement (Article III of the 1952 Security Treaty between the U.S. and Japan) and the 1954 Status of Forces Agreement. In 1960 the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed, giving the United States use of land, air, and naval facilities in Japan "for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East" (Green and Cronin 1999: 330–332). Concurrently with the signing of this treaty, the revised U.S.–Japan SOFA was agreed upon.

1960 SOFA Provisions

The 1960 SOFA sets the conditions under which U.S. military forces may operate in Japan. It also dictates how U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilian employees of the U.S. government (and their dependents) assigned to support American armed forces in Japan will be treated under Japanese law. It exempts U.S. aircraft and ships from paying tolls or operating fees to which commercial vessels would be subject, as well as exempting vehicles from toll charges and permitting travel between military facilities. The SOFA also provides U.S. military personnel use of public utilities and services that are available to Japanese ministries and agencies, and provides for acquisition of land for military facilities. In addition, it provides for local workers to be hired indirectly: local Japanese workers are actually employed by the Japanese government and work on the U.S. installations. In contrast, on U.S.-controlled facilities in the Republic of Korea local workers are hired directly by the U.S.

By mutual agreement, offensive military operations may be prohibited by the government of Japan. Because Japan's constitution renounces war, American use of military facilities to launch offensive strikes on other countries would be construed as unconstitutional. For this reason, Japanese bases were not used for direct operations during the U.S. conflict in Vietnam. This does place constraints on the U.S. military forces assigned to Japan; for example, a U.S. naval vessel or Air Force aircraft leaving from Japan cannot proceed directly to an area of conflict without violating this limitation.

The U.S.–Japan SOFA is unique in that the ministry involved is not the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The fa-

cilities provided for U.S. military forces are thus not supported by their Japanese counterparts, but by the diplomatic arm of Japan's government. This has led to conflicts within the Japanese government, because while the MOFA is concerned with the international aspects of U.S.-Japan relations, other ministries are more concerned with domestic matters. This involvement with the MOFA permits greater cooperation between U.S. armed forces and the Japanese government than might be possible with other agencies, which would likely be more supportive of domestic interests. For example, when exercise areas are needed for naval training, the MOFA is able to exert more pressure for restricting fishing operations than the JDA could.

While the U.S.-Japan SOFA frees U.S. personnel from certain obligations, such as various forms of taxation and most customs fees, it restricts them from taking part in any political activity in Japan. The legal jurisdiction for offenses considered to be security violations against Japan is retained by Japan, even if the offense is not covered by U.S. law.

One of the more controversial aspects of the U.S.-Japan SOFA is contained in Article XVII, which deals with criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel in Japan. For those Americans who are covered by this SOFA, the American government retains authority to prosecute violations of U.S. law, while Japan may prosecute violations of Japanese law. However, if an American covered by this SOFA is apprehended and detained by U.S. forces, that person may be kept in U.S. custody until he or she is formally charged by Japanese authorities. This is seen by many Japanese as a special protection for foreigners, similar to the practice of extraterritoriality which Western nations forced upon China and Japan under the unequal treaties of the mid-nineteenth century. However, extraterritoriality protected foreigners from Japanese legal prosecution, whereas the U.S.-Japan SOFA actually subjects those U.S. citizens (military stationed in Japan, their family members present in Japan, and civilians working for the military) to both U.S. and Japanese law. The SOFA does specify that anyone covered by the SOFA is entitled to the same protections of due process (the rights to prompt and speedy trial, to be informed of the specific charges, to confront witnesses, to have legal representation) guaranteed under the U.S. constitution.

The Situation in Okinawa

The U.S.-Japan SOFA is a particularly difficult issue on the island of Okinawa, where the highest concentration of U.S. military forces exists. Because of the large number of U.S. facilities on Okinawa and the

large military populations of those bases, movement of units between facilities has the appearance of a continued U.S. occupation of the island. The large military presence also increases the likelihood of conflicts with residents. Since 1972, when the United States returned control of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan, more than 4,500 military-related crimes—including twelve murders—have occurred on Okinawa. Japan's Foreign Ministry has appeared reluctant to apply the SOFA as effectively in Okinawa as it might on the main island of Honshu, leading to criticism against that ministry as well as against the United States.

One subsequent development that affects the SOFA is the establishment of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). Following widespread popular demonstrations against the U.S. presence in Okinawa in 1995, in order to preclude further demands to revise the SOFA, the Japanese and American governments agreed to establish a special committee to deal specifically with Okinawan issues. At the time the U.S. military facilities occupied approximately one-fifth of Okinawa, and one purpose of the SACO was to reduce and consolidate those facilities.

One difficulty in consolidating facilities both on Okinawa and the main islands of Japan is that in addition to the U.S.-Japan SOFA, a separate agreement exists between Japan and the United Nations for access to military facilities. Negotiated during the Korean War and based on an agreement between Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida and U.S. Secretary of State Acheson, this U.N.-Japan SOFA gives the military forces of the United Nations Command permission to use certain mainland facilities (Yokota Air Base, Camp Zama, Yokosuka Naval Base, and Sasebo Naval Base), as well as Okinawa's Kadena Air Base, Futenma Marine Corps Air Station, and White Beach Naval facility. Nations in the United Nations Command include France, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Philippines, New Zealand, Turkey, Thailand, and the United States. Although the Korean War is long past, the United Nations Command still exists and if necessary could base military operations from the facilities named above without prior approval from the government of Japan. The U.N.-Japan SOFA is based largely on the original U.S.-Japan SOFA, even including the legal protections of the U.S. constitution.

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STEEL INDUSTRY—KOREA The steel industry has been the backbone of economic development in much of the world. Both North and South Korea, since their independence in 1945 from Japan, have pursued an economic development strategy centered on heavy industrialization, including steel. There are two distinct steelmaking technologies: the larger, more expensive, integrated blast furnace-based units that use iron ore and coal and the smaller electric furnaces that melt and purify scrap to extract steel. Both technologies are found in both countries.

North Korea adopted a self-reliant (*juche*) socialist approach with central planning and a high rate of investment. The Five Year Plan of 1957–1961 radically altered the structure of the economy in favor of heavy industry. Endowed with iron ore and coal, North Korea adopted blast furnace technologies (such as the Bessemer and Open Hearth); provided by China and the Soviet Union, these were small-scale and already obsolete. North Korea's steel production was estimated to be under 7 million tons in 1995, approximately 300 kilograms per capita.

Devoid of raw materials and an industrial foundation, capitalist South Korea pursued a more open, albeit selective economic development strategy. It first pushed light industry exports, such as textiles, garments, and footwear and then pursued a strategy of heavy industrialization beginning in 1973. The government established the Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) in 1968, constructing two world-class integrated plants at Pohang (1970–1983) and Kwangyang (1982–1992). The former received Japanese technological and financial assistance, while the latter relied principally on European technologies. By the late 1990s, POSCO had become the world's largest steel company, displacing long-established Nippon Steel of Japan. Privately-owned electric furnaces contributed roughly 40 percent of South Korea's total output of 41 million tons in 1999.

While both Korean governments violated free market principles in fostering their respective industry, South Korean steel became internationally competitive. It imported inexpensive, high quality raw materials and modern technologies. Low wages, sound industrial training, and government subsidies con-

tributed to competitiveness and a per capita output of nearly 912 kilograms by 2000. Exports defrayed import costs and created the basis for technological learning in a virtuous cycle. North Korea, however, with its isolationist policy, was already stagnating in the late 1970s. It failed to take advantage of expanding global markets and modern technologies. The collapse of the Soviet Union, its ally and coal source, cut off supplies of vital raw materials.

The South Korean economy and its steel industry expanded without interruption, except during the 1970s oil crisis. Along with POSCO, private firms such as Hanbo Steel invested heavily in new technologies. However, the cozy relationship between *chaebol* (highly diversified, family-owned conglomerates) and government in South Korea had created a vast network of indebtedness. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 pushed many *chaebols*, including Hanbo, into bankruptcy. As globalization pushes national firms to become more competitive, many South Korean firms will witness reorganization, perhaps privatization, and some foreign ownership. The thawing of relations in the post-Cold War era and the economic maturity of South Korea suggests the possibility of complementing the North's market and raw materials with the South's capital and superior technologies. The proposed unification could usher in a new regional dynamic with an even more powerful, united Korean steel industry.

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STORYTELLING Stories are passed on in families, libraries, schools, and elsewhere in the United States today by parents, grandparents, teachers, and several hundred professional storytellers. Storytelling in the United States encompasses a range of traditions, from the oldest Native American tellings to more re-

cent tellings in immigrant communities. In other areas, too, of the non-Asian world, storytelling continues with a similar mix of folk and professional styles. But the widest range and the richest diversity of techniques and stories are surely found today in Asia.

Storytelling remains a part of life in much of modern Asia. Storytellers of various backgrounds help to pass on values and morals, influence voters, keep history alive, and promote rural development. Stories are told by grandparents at home, by learned tellers in South Asian temples, and by East Asian librarians and teachers. Indeed, this age-old medium remains vital today in much of Asia.

Settings and Audience

The teller and audience in various settings are mutually responsive. Older tellers often share with family members in homes during meals or at bedtime. Groups of ten to a hundred may gather to listen in Chinese tea houses, while more than a hundred might hear tellers in Japanese *yose* theaters. Although outdoor village audiences in India can be large, much telling there also occurs in smaller temples and halls. In earlier times, storytelling in Malaysia often took place in friendly, close-knit *kampong* communities.

Technology today increases the reach of Asian storytellers: their stories are now sold on cassette or videotapes, broadcast on radio or television, and found on the Internet. But the art of the live Asian storyteller depends on a close connection to the audience. One reason given for the fading of *lum pun* storytelling in Thailand is the tellers' move to the newer raised stages, farther from the audiences.

Storytelling Materials

The Asian storytelling repertoire ranges from folk tales and romances to famous epics or classics like China's *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*. Religious stories remain important: those of the Prophet and his followers are favored in Muslim Asia, while tales of Hindu gods, the Buddha, and of the land's many spirits are heard elsewhere.

True stories of wars and freedom struggles are also popular in this region, with its painful history of colonialism. Hero tales, past and present, are passed on as well, from those of the valiant Trung sisters of long-ago Vietnam to accounts of the more modern, multitalented Filipino, Jose Rizal.

Tales of tricksters and fools are favorites: clever Judge Rabbit of Cambodia, the foolish Pak Pandir in Malaysia, the quick-witted Andare of Sri Lanka, and

the comical Indonesian Si Kabayan are just a few of many. Problem stories and riddle tales help to sharpen wits, while ghost tales and stories with a range of strange creatures from the Japanese *oni* to the Nepalese *yeti* are greatly enjoyed.

Some storytellers update their traditional repertoires to adapt to changing tastes or a sponsor's interests. New themes of the Indian *patua* storytellers include stories of court cases, accidents, and political change, as well as moral tales about dowry and family planning. In the 1950s and 1960s, Lao tellers were hired by United States Information Agency to urge support for American aid projects and the royal Lao government.

Storytelling Language and Gesture

Buddhist monks in Southeast Asia use the power of chanting and recitation to share stories of the Buddha's life, including the popular *Jataka* tale (Buddhist birth story) of Prince Vessantara. The Korean *p'ansori* teller excels in verbal repetition: in "The Song of Silk," the teller rapidly lists forty-five types of silks and ninety-seven pieces of furniture as they flow from a gourd.

Japanese librarian tellers favor a very quiet telling style, with few gestures but rich language, as do a number of Asian folk tellers. Indian *ottan thullal* tellers from Kerala State, however, use an elaborate *mudra* (hand sign) language to tell their stories. Japanese *rakugo* tellers, while kneeling on the stage, create a cast of characters using largely their voices and facial expressions.

Music

Music is an integral part of many Asian telling techniques. Some stories are told entirely in ballad form. At times, the chanted voice, perhaps accompanied by a steady beat, tells a tale—a technique that was favored by tellers of the Ainu minority in Japan in the past. Korean *p'ansori* tellers train their voices for long years, sometimes even shouting under waterfalls to produce voices of incredible range and texture.

A clear floating voice is like the whooping of a crane in blue sky,

A sudden bouncing voice seems to be a peal of thunder.

A rapid changing voice is like a desolate cold wind among the bare trees.

(Bang-song 1976: 26)

Asian storytellers often use instruments: drums, bells, clay pots, and similar percussion instruments are the most popular, followed by lutes and other stringed

instruments. A musical bow provides unusual interest in the South Indian *villapattu* style, while the *xingmu*, a wood block used in China, can imitate thunder, a far-off noise, the sadness of farewell, or a sword raised in battle.

Humor

Several Asian storytelling styles are famed for their use of humor. *Xiangsheng*, a popular Chinese style performed solo or in pairs, features comic tales and characterizations satirizing human foibles and social abuses.

Japanese *rakugo* tellers, who are seen on television, in college clubs, and in *yose* (vaudeville-type theaters), are known for superb timing and clever wordplay and characterization. Many of their humorous tales are based on characters from Japan's Edo period (1600/1603–1868), although modern stories poke fun at today's world of baseball, jet travel, and noisy robots.

Improvisation

In a number of traditions, improvisation keeps classic Asian stories fresh and contemporary. Since the audience knows the story, the teller has greater scope to embroider it and to improvise. Weaving in side stories or comments—sometimes combining old and new—is a popular improvisational technique. Such material may be traditional or modern—about politics, history and legend, daily life, almost anything. This technique, skillfully used in the Indian *harikatha* style, keeps the well-known *Ramayana* relevant. One such teller, describing Sita's wedding a thousand years ago, juxtaposed past and present when he said: "Everybody prepared for the great event, but it was hard to get materials since the department stores were empty after their big discount sales."

Props

Visual storytelling props have been used for over two thousand years in busy Asian marketplaces, temples, festivals, and courtyards. Painted sets of story scenes migrated from old India to early twentieth-century Japan. There, a roving *kamishibai* (paper theater) storyteller carried large cards on his bicycle, selling food snacks before telling tales of samurai, science fiction, and comic characters. Although the traveling tellers are rare today, librarian and teachers tell stories from both published and handmade sets in Japan, Vietnam, Singapore, and Korea.

Scrolls of various sizes—both vertical, like the *patas* in northeast India, or horizontal, like the *pbad* of West India—are unrolled by wandering tellers to share long

tales. Traveling Tibetan tellers of old shared epics of the hero Gesar or Buddhist tales with the aid of *tankas*, ornate painted silk hangings.

One of the simplest props is the folding fan used in Korean *p'ansori* for dramatic emphasis, and in Japanese *rakugo* to portray a sword, a pipe, a pole, a writing brush, a bowl of noodles, and more. Elaborate costumes and makeup are less common. Although several singing styles, like the Indian *ottan thullal*, include use of colorful makeup and costume, many professional tellers favor simpler traditional robes, dresses, or wrapped cloth.

Asian storytelling is indeed varied, communicating messages both religious and secular, through amateurs and professionals of both sexes. The techniques that the Asian teller has evolved show an amazing range of complexity, appealing to audiences young and old. Asian storytelling forms may change; some will fade away since they no longer answer the needs of modern Asia. Yet other forms will survive and thrive, for the storyteller speaks from the heart with words worth hearing.

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STRAIT OF MALACCA The funnel-shaped Strait of Malacca stretches 600 nautical miles between the west coast of peninsular Malaysia and the east coast of Sumatra. Named after the ancient city of Malacca (Melaka, in Malay), it is one of the busiest and most economically important straits in the world.

Geologically, the strait is part of the extensive shallow Sunda Shelf that extends seaward from mainland Southeast Asia to a depth of 200 meters. Although largely sheltered, its waters are influenced by the monsoons. Mangroves dominate the coast, especially on the Sumatran side. Coral reefs are limited.

Historically, the strait acted as a conduit for Europeans coming east and the region's commodities moving west. Today it is an important sea route for local and international trade and shipping traffic, and for the tankers that supply three-quarters of Japan's oil imports—making it highly vulnerable to pollution from oil spills and other sources. The strait is vital to the surrounding countries, which share common interests in its use and management, and in issues concerning legal boundaries, navigation rights, traffic separation, pollution, and piracy.

The Strait of Malacca's economic significance is enhanced by two growth triangles strategically located to boost future economic cooperation and development: the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand growth triangle in the north and the Singapore-Johor-Riau growth triangle in the south.

Wong Pob Pob

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STRAITS SETTLEMENTS From 1826 to 1946, the term "Straits Settlements" was the collective name for the British colonies of Penang (former Prince of Wales Island), Singapore, and Melaka (former Malacca), today all part of Malaysia. The British East India Company had acquired these territories, situated at the strategic Straits of Malacca, at various times in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for protection of the trade route that led to China from the Indian subcontinent.

In 1786, the sultan of Kedah ceded Penang to the East India Company, and this became the first territory of the Straits Settlements. When the permanent occupation of Penang was assured, the East India Company expanded its territorial claim to Melaka, which became part of the Straits Settlements in 1826, the same year as Singapore. Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles had acquired Singapore from the sultan of Johor for the British East India Company in 1819. The sultan of Brunei transferred the island of Labuan to Britain in 1846; the island was governed by British North Borneo from 1889 to 1905 and was incorporated into the Straits Settlements in 1912. The Cocos Islands, in the Indian Ocean southwest of Java, Indonesia, were acquired by Britain in 1857 and became part of the Straits Settlements in 1886. Britain acquired Christmas Island, off western Java, in 1888, and it merged with the Straits Settlements in 1889.

In 1826, the administrative headquarters of the Straits Settlements was at George Town (now Penang city), and the Settlements were ruled by the Indian government. A governor, an advisory council, and a number of civil servants were based in Penang city. Each territory had a resident, whose responsibility was to assist the governor. In 1836, the headquarters was moved to Singapore, and in 1867, responsibility for the Straits Settlements was taken from India and the territories were made a crown colony controlled by the British.

The British shrewdly used these territories to establish their influence in the Malay Peninsula. Between 1832 and 1946, the Straits Settlements were major ports of call for ships plying between Europe and East Asia. With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, these ports became even more important for the British empire, as they formed the main sorting and

export centers of rubber. Immigrant populations of Europeans, Chinese, Malays, and Indians in the Settlements also grew substantially, attracted by the prosperity in these regions. In 1942, the Japanese invaded Singapore, and British administration of the Straits Settlements was temporarily suspended.

The Straits Settlements crown colony was dissolved in 1946. Singapore became a separate crown colony, then part of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963–1965, and finally an independent republic in 1965. Penang and Melaka were incorporated into the Federation of Malaya in 1948 and became states in Malaysia in 1963. Labuan joined North Borneo in 1946, then Malaysia in 1963, and became a federal territory of Malaysia in 1984. Christmas Island was given to Australia in 1958. The Cocos Islands were placed under Australian rule in 1955, were purchased by Australia in 1978, and became part of Australia in 1984.

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STRAITS TIMES, THE *The Straits Times* is Singapore's oldest and longest-running English-language newspaper. It was started in 1845 by Catchick Moses, a prominent Armenian merchant, and Robert Carl Woods, the newspaper's first editor. It began as an eight-page weekly, and expanded to twenty-four pages in 1928. In December 1931, *The Sunday Times* made its debut and was a great success as the newspaper made efforts to be striking in style as well as content. It was fine-tuned to include popular features as well as light-hearted articles. The newspaper ceased publication during the Japanese occupation, but it quickly reestablished itself and became the best-selling newspaper in the country. In 1956 the newspaper began to print a separate edition in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

In 1984 Singapore Press Holdings (SPH) was formed with the merger of three publicly listed publishing companies: the Straits Times Press (1975) Limited, Times Publishing Berhad, and Singapore News and Publications Limited. In October 1988, Times Publishing Berhad was separated from the group.

Singapore Press Holdings has a monopolistic grip on newspapers published in the Republic of Singapore.

The chair of the board of SPH has a close relationship with the ruling party of Singapore, giving the public the impression that the newspaper is being "guided" or "controlled." The newspaper editors, however, regard the newspaper's major mission as "responsible journalism"—in which press freedoms are subsumed under the broader and more important goals of societal stability.

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STUDENT UPRISING OF 1973—THAILAND The early 1970s saw the beginnings of Thai student political activism, with the growth in power and influence of the National Student Center of Thailand (NSTC). The concentration of many of Thailand's leading universities in one city, Bangkok, facilitated the mobilization efforts of the NSTC.

The spark that ignited the October 1973 student uprising was the arrest on 6 October of student leader Thirayudh Boonme and ten other activists for distributing leaflets urging early promulgation of a permanent constitution. The students were accused of being engaged in a plot to overthrow the government. Three days later, approximately two thousand students gathered at Thammasat University for a peaceful rally to protest the government's actions. The government in response offered to grant bail to the arrested students, but the NSTC and student demonstrators demanded the unconditional release of the students. By 13 October, the demonstrations had dramatically escalated, with approximately eighty thousand protesters completely packing Rajdamnoen Avenue (literally meaning "royal road," the major road of old Bangkok running from the old parliament building to the large park across from Thammasat University) from end to end. Much in evidence among protestors were the Thai flag and pictures of the king and queen.

Historical Background

Though Thailand was ostensibly a constitutional monarchy from 1932 to 1973, in fact the Thai military dominated in a frequently authoritarian manner for much of this period. Civilian leaders were frequently deposed in military coups. The three major

Thai political leaders during this period were Field Marshall Pibul Songgram, who served as prime minister from 1938 to 1944 and from 1948 to 1957; Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat, who served as prime minister from 1959 to 1963; and Field Marshall Thanom Kittikachorn, who served as prime minister in 1958 and from 1963 to 1973. During Thanom's rule, gatherings of more than five individuals for discussions of politics were prohibited, an edict reflective of his government's repressiveness.

In the early 1970s, perhaps as a reflection of what was happening in many parts of the world, Thai student activism emerged, stimulated by Thai intellectuals, many of whom had been educated overseas. Beginning in 1972, the NSTC became a major source of student activism, taking their issues to the general public. The government's abrogation of the constitution in November 1971 certainly contributed to the growth of student activism.

Violence Erupts

At 5:30 A.M. on Sunday, 14 October, the government announced that the student detainees were being unconditionally released and that a new constitution would be promulgated within a year. By 6:30 A.M., for reasons that are unclear, a series of tear gas explosions sparked an escalation of violent confrontation between the demonstrators and the Thai police and military, with hundreds of innocent people and demonstrators being killed. Many buses were hijacked and key buildings such as the National Lottery and the Revenue Department were burned down. This was the biggest demonstration in Thai history and the violence involved was unprecedented. The students were joined in their protests by thousands of ordinary citizens from all walks of life. Prior to this critical incident, Thailand had been famous for peaceful coups.

After a meeting with the king (who has no real political power but has great influence in granting legitimacy or withdrawing legitimacy from political leaders, as a result of his great popularity and prestige), the three military leaders (popularly known as the "three tyrants"), Field Marshall Thanom Kittikachorn, Field Marshall Praphat Charusanthien (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior), and Thanom's son Colonel Narong Kittikachorn (a high-ranking military officer and head of the Board of Inspection and Follow-up of Government Operations, which gave him considerable power to eliminate political rivals) agreed to tender the resignation of their government. The king announced that Professor Sanya Thammasakdi would be the new prime minister of an interim gov-

ernment in a transition to genuine democracy. On the next day, 15 October, it was announced that the three military leaders had gone into exile. With their departure the mood dramatically changed. People from all sectors of society volunteered to help clear away the debris left over from the uprising.

The Meaning and Implications of the October Uprising

This critical incident in October 1973 and the transition from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy in 1932 are the two most pivotal incidents in twentieth-century Thai political history. There is debate as to whether the 1973 incident should be called a student revolution. Did it fundamentally change the course of Thai politics? Certainly the immediate changes in the period 1973–1976 were dramatic in moving Thailand toward genuine democracy. These changes, however, were abruptly terminated with a successful right-wing military coup against the democratic government in October 1976. This extremely repressive regime, however, lasted for only a year and was overthrown by a popular coup on 20 October 1977.

The student leaders and those who sacrificed their lives for Thai democracy were considered to be heroes. Four special commemorative stamps were issued on 25 January 1975 by the interim government of Judge Sanya Dharmasakti to honor them and a monument was erected in Bangkok in their memory. October 14 was given the name, Wan Maha Wippasok (the Most Tragic Day). That Thailand has been significantly more democratic after 1973 than before is a tribute to the impact of the uprising.

As of the beginning of 2001, the 1973 uprising was still an issue. The Thai Ministry of Education commissioned one of Thailand's leading poets, Naowarat Pongpaiboon, to write an account of the students' revolution and its aftermath to be titled "The October 14, 1973, Incident" so that Thai students will have a chance to study this important part of their modern political history. Ironically, one of the editors for the publication turned out to be Suwit Yodmani, son-in-law of Field Marshall Thanom, who strongly objected to alleged inaccuracies and distortions in the draft of the book, delaying publication.

In reflecting on the October demonstrations there is also considerable debate as to what ignited the violence. Certainly the students were committed to non-violence in their demonstrations and Thanom claims to have ordered his generals to refrain from opening fire (a copy of his order exists). Thus there is the distinct possibility that what the Chinese call a "black

hand" or the Thais call a "third hand"—a third party who seeks political power to replace an existing regime and attempts to discredit that regime—might have played a key role in causing the violence to erupt. In a January 2001 article in the *Siam Post*, Major-General Witoon Yasawat, then 74 and ailing, admitted he acted on behalf of a third party, but did not identify it.

Despite the controversies surrounding it, the 14 October incident was a critical turning point in the maturation of modern Thai politics, and its heroes and heroines will never be forgotten.

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SUFISM—SOUTH ASIA Sufism (Arabic *tasawwuf*; from *sufi*, "man of wool") refers to the practices of religious mystics who differentiated themselves by wearing garments of coarse wool or *suf*. Arising from Islam in the seventh century and spreading throughout South Asia, adherents of Sufism were perhaps once inspired by the desire to escape earthly dilemmas and difficulties; today Sufism finds widespread expression in most Middle Eastern and South Asian nations.

By the ninth century the mystical movement emphasized the *tariqb* (the Sufi "road of life," or "path") as a way to communicate with Allah through love and devotion. A religious disciple (*murid*) might travel the *tariqb* through the teaching of a *shaiikh* or *pir* (preceptor), ultimately achieving a mystical union with God.

The *khanqah*, or abode of Sufi saints, became centers of activities like religious discourse and *sama* (musical gatherings). The saints' *dargah* (tombs) became places of pilgrimage for both Muslims and Hindus. Sufism offered a common meeting point of spiritual-

ity for both religions and provided a basis for mutual understanding between Muslims and non-Muslims.

From the fifteenth century onward, Sufism expanded. Mir (1550–1635), a noteworthy Sufi saint, propounded the doctrine of *wabadat-ul-wujud* (unity of being or "monoism"). His disciple, Mullah Shah Badakhshi, was the preceptor of Dara Shikoh (1615–1659), the son of the Turkmen ruler and Mughal emperor Shah Jahan (1592–1666). The teachings of the Sufi saints also reached the common people because preceptors taught in vernacular languages. Certain trends in Sufism, however, led to orthodoxy. Saikh Ahmed Sarhindi (1564–1624), disciple of Baqi Billah (1563–1603), opposed the doctrine of monoism and called for strict adherence to the *shari'a* (Islamic law).

It was in South Asia that Islam met Hinduism. It was not the Muslim iconoclasts but the peaceful missionaries of Sufism who converted Hindus. Sufism endeavored for Hindu-Muslim unity. It also bridged the gulf between the Muslims of foreign origin and local converts. The liberal atmosphere created by Sufism still lingers in South Asia.

The Sufis formed various orders, and today there are about one hundred, many in Iran. The Persian poet Jalal ad-Din ar-Rumi (c. 1207–1273) established an order in which dances, such as those of the whirling dervishes (still in existence, with headquarters in Turkey), were practiced. The *naqshbandi* order is popular in the Atroshi region of Bangladesh, and the former president, Hossain Mohammad Ershad (b. 1930), was a patron of this order, which formed a political party (Bangladesh Zaker Sangathan) in 1990.

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SUFISM—SOUTHWEST ASIA Sufism, or Islamic mysticism, has for centuries been integral to the religious lives of Muslims in Southwest Asia (modern Afghanistan and Pakistan). Sufism flourished in the region since its introduction from Persia and the Arab world in the eleventh century, and it remains popular today, with perhaps a majority of the people having some association with the tradition. It seems likely that its popularity even facilitated the spread of Islam there



MYSTICAL ECSTASY

The following excerpt is a recollection by ‘Ali al-Muhassin al-Tanukhi (c. 940–994 CE), a popular Iraqi writer in the late tenth century.

I saw in Baghdad a one-eyed Sufi, named Abu’l-Fath, who was chanting the Qur’an beautifully in a gathering arranged by Abu ‘Abdallah Ibn al-Buhlul. A lad read the text (Qur’an xxxv: 34): *Did we not give you length of life sufficient for a man to take warning in?* The Sufi cried out *Aye, aye* many times and fainted, remaining unconscious during the whole of the meeting. He had not recovered when the congregation dispersed, the meeting having been held in the court of a house which I inhabited. I left him where he was, and he did not come to himself till about the afternoon, when he arose. After some days I inquired about him, and learned that he had been present in Karkah when a singing-woman was performing to the lute, and heard her repeat the lines in which comes the passage

The day when each man brings his plea,
Thy blessed face shall plead for me.

This affected him so much that he shouted and beat his breast and at last fell down in a fit. When the entertainment was over they moved him and found that he was dead. He was taken away for burial and the affair got noised abroad. The verses whence this is taken are by ‘Abd al-Samad b. al-Mu‘adhhal; they were dictated by Sufi after him by a chain recorded in my records of the traditions which I have heard; they were:

Author of the ways which fascinate,
Thou art the sovereign of our fate,
A house with thee for habitant
Needeth not an illuminant.
If e’er release from my control
I crave, may God not save my soul!
The day when each man brings his plea,
They blessed face shall plead for me.


Source: William H. McNeill. (1973) *The Islamic World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 95–96.

because significant conversions to the new faith coincided with the spread of Sufism.

In general terms there are two distinct, yet frequently overlapping, forms of the Sufi tradition in Southwest Asia. The first of these has been termed "orthodox" because its followers adhere closely to the form of Sufism originally introduced by the great *pirs* (Sufi masters). This form is based upon initiation of individual disciples (singular: *murid*) into a *tariqat* (Sufi order). Members of each *tariqat* meet in small groups

with their *pir* at a *khanaqah* (Sufi lodge) to be instructed and to engage in often intensely emotional spiritual practices such as *dhikr* (reciting the names of God). Like Sufis elsewhere in the Islamic world, they seek mystical experience of God, with the ultimate aim of achieving unity with the divine power.

Many of the *tariqats* were introduced from outside the region, with the greatest flowering occurring during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Four *tariqats* became especially prominent. First, and most influential,



A devotee of Sufi saint Bari Iman attends the ceremony marking the saint's anniversary in Islamabad, Pakistan, on 9 June 2000. He wears some 115 kg of chains to show his devotion. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

is the Nakshbandiya, which was founded in Bukhara in present-day Uzbekistan by Baha'uddin Naqshband (1318–1389). This *tariqat* is found throughout the region. Second is the Qadiriya *tariqat*. It was founded in Baghdad by 'Abd al-Qadit al-Jilani (1077/1078–1166) but became established in India during the thirteenth century and from there attracted a particularly loyal following among the Pashtun tribes of eastern Afghanistan. Third, and also originating in Baghdad, is the Suhrawardiyya *tariqat*, which was founded by Abu Najib al-Suhrawardi (c. 1155–1191) and introduced to Southwest Asia during the thirteenth century. It has a strong following in Pakistan, especially in the areas of Sind and southern Punjab, but a much weaker presence in Afghanistan. Fourth is the Chishtiya, which is the only one of the major *tariqats* to have actually originated in this region. Founded in the city of Chishtiya (Herat Province) by Abu Ishaq but introduced to India by Maudud Chishti (1142–1236), this *tariqat* is now more popular in Pakistan than in Afghanistan, although many inhabitants of the area surrounding Chishtiya remain followers. The *tariqats* have traditionally found very strong support among the urban middle classes, with large cities such as Herat and Kabul becoming important spiritual centers and home to renowned Sufis, including the celebrated poets Abu Ismail Abdullah Ansari of Herat

(1005–1089) and Nur od-Din 'Abd or-Rahman ebn Ahmad Jami (1414–1492), who was born in Jam, Khorasan, but died in Herat.

Sufi Practices

Sufis are generally viewed as unorthodox or even heretical in the Muslim world in part because of their aim of achieving oneness with God, but also because they often reject orthodox practices and observance of the *shari'a* (sacred law of Islam), viewing these as obstacles to spiritual development. In contrast, members of the major *tariqats* in this region are notable for their integration with orthodox Muslim life. Members of the Chishtiya *tariqat*, for example, engage in unorthodox practices such as the use of music during worship, yet many view obedience to the *shari'a* as an essential step toward spiritual development. Also of note is the historically close relationship between Sufi *pirs* and other Muslim leaders, primarily the ulama (orthodox religious scholars, singular: *'alim*) and mullahs (clerics). Their roles, in fact, sometimes overlap, it being acceptable for a *pir* to also be an *'alim*, allowing him to fulfill the role of spiritual guide as well as instructor in the Qur'an, *shari'a*, and *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence). Similarly, the close association of many ulama with the Sufi tradition is reflected in the emphasis they place on spiritual matters (as opposed to purely theological and legal matters) in their teachings. Instead of being in conflict or competition with one another, orthodox Islam and mystical Sufism came to be viewed as complementary, with the former addressing outward or worldly concerns and the latter addressing the inward or spiritual concerns that orthodox Islam tends to neglect.

Sufism in Rural Areas

The form of Sufism just described—based on the *tariqats* and individual mystical practices—is predominant in the cities and towns. In rural areas, however, Muslims practice a popular form of Sufism that incorporates elements of pre-Islamic and Hindu traditions and that is based upon veneration of *pirs* and hereditary saints. *Barakat* (divine grace) is believed to emanate from both living *pirs* and the shrines (usually called *ziyarat*) dedicated to deceased *pirs*, giving them magical powers. *Barakat* is also thought to emanate from hereditary saints—descendants of the *pirs*, known in Pakistan as *sajjada-nishin* and in Afghanistan as *rubsmi*. For this reason they, too, are venerated despite the fact that they are usually uneducated, with no formal religious training.

Like the more orthodox *pirs* associated with the *tariqats*, the *pirs* and saints of popular Sufism have traditionally coexisted peacefully with the rural ulama and

mullahs. Unlike orthodox Sufism, however, popular Sufism places emphasis on collective as well as individual aspects of religious experience. Whole families, clans, and even entire tribes promise allegiance to a local *pir* or saint, who in return assumes responsibility for the people's spiritual well-being and gives sanction to local political leaders. His tasks include maintaining the shrine with which he is entrusted, carrying out rituals, and performing supposedly miraculous deeds such as pronouncing blessings and healing the sick. Followers (singular: *mukblis*) visit the shrines in order to give offerings of food or money, to make vows, and to seek advice, cures, and charms. However, the *pir* or saint effectively assumes the role of intermediary between his followers and God, carrying out spiritual practices such as *dhikr* on behalf of the whole community. Initiation into a *tariqat* and performance of individual spiritual practices are therefore regarded as unnecessary. Spiritual development, conformity to orthodox Islam, and consideration of theological issues are effectively less important than the alliances that sustain traditional ethnic or tribal power structures.

The belief among Sufis of this region in the importance of attending to both spiritual and worldly concerns gave rise in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to a tradition of political activism by Sufi *pirs* and saints. During this period, *pirs* in Afghanistan, often working in alliance with tribal leaders, helped lead numerous political uprisings against Afghan rulers and foreign imperialists. Farther east, Sufi leaders in the Punjab actively opposed British colonial rule and agitated for the creation of Pakistan. Certain Sufi factions also became politically influential during this time, a noteworthy example being the Mujaddidi family, whose members are descended from the Nakshbandiya reformer Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624). Such activity places these leaders in pronounced contrast to the world-renouncing Sufis known elsewhere in the Islamic world.

Opposition to Sufism

Since the nineteenth century, Muslim intellectuals and fundamentalists have been vocal in their opposition to Sufism, arguing it to be a corruption of the faith. Some, notably the Indian poet and nationalist philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), have made popular saint veneration the main target of their criticisms, viewing it as an idolatrous practice. The influence of the *pirs* and saints has also been gradually undermined as a result of repressive government policies and the incorporation of religious leadership into the modern state system. In Afghanistan, *pirs* were officially replaced by state-sponsored ulama in the 1930s.

Sufism there has also been weakened by decades of political instability. The Soviet invasion of 1979 and the rise of radical Islamic fundamentalism have been particularly damaging, forcing the *tariqats* to operate in a clandestine way. In Pakistan, official repression has been much less severe, yet still significant. In 1959 and 1961, the Pakistani government assumed administrative control over the shrines and began to actively discourage popular saint veneration, undermining the authority of the hereditary saints.

The status of Sufism as an integral part of Muslim life in this region is no longer as assured as it once was. It is difficult to predict how permanent the impact of decades of sociopolitical upheavals and government repression will be. Sufism is for now, officially at least, a less visible element of religious life. The Sufi tradition does nevertheless continue to function, and popular practices remain widespread.

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See also: **Islam—Southwest Asia**

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SUHARTO (b. 1921), Indonesia's second president. Born 8 June 1921, Suharto, like many Javanese, was given only one name. At age nineteen he joined the Dutch colonial army (KNIL). During the Japanese occupation (1942–1945), he first worked in the Keibuhō militia in Yogyakarta, later joining the Volunteer Army of the Defenders of the Fatherland (PETA). After Japanese capitulation he fought for independence from the Dutch; after independence he joined the Indonesian army.

Suharto first acquired prominence in 1961 when, as a major-general, President Sukarno appointed him operational commander under the Supreme Command for the Liberation of West New Guinea (KOTI). Suharto's ascent continued when, as commander of the army's strategic reserve (KOSTRAD),



Former president Suharto in October 1998. (AFP/CORBIS)

he crushed the supposedly Communist rebellion of 30 September 1965. Assuming command over the army—the preeminent political force in the ensuing turmoil—he led a purge of alleged Communists. By 11 March 1966, Suharto had effectively deposed Sukarno and set out to establish his New Order regime. This was implemented via the nonpartisan, nonideological system of Pancasila Democracy, which professed to foster social harmony and economic development. In March 1967 the Consultative Congress appointed Suharto acting president, and a year later, on 27 March 1968, it made him president.

In 1971 Suharto permitted general elections to confirm his rule. He achieved long-lasting stability because of his successes as "Father of Development." Encouraging oil production and Western investment, he received international awards recognizing Indonesia's successes in food production and family planning. By the late 1980s, however, Indonesia's business community was exasperated at the Suharto family's increasing control of the most lucrative areas of the economy. Moreover, liberal intellectuals were calling for more democracy, and senior military figures had begun working for Suharto's removal. With the military no longer automatically behind him, Suharto diversified his power base by courting the Muslim community. In 1990 he made his first pilgrimage to

Mecca. With the Asian economic crisis, his legitimacy collapsed, leading to his resignation on 21 May 1998.

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SUI DYNASTY The Sui (581–618 CE), a short-lived dynasty in Chinese history, was founded by Yang Jian (514–604) and ended when Yang Guang (569–618),

a son of Yang Jian and the second emperor of the dynasty, was murdered by one of his generals. The dynasty reunified China after the country had experienced three centuries of division (280–581), and it initiated or completed several important institutions adopted by later dynasties.

The personal failings of Yang Guang, the harsh conscriptions of peasants for large engineering projects and military services by the state, and the continuing rivalries within aristocratic clans eventually led to rising peasant rebellions, internal struggles between political groups, and the collapse of the dynasty.

The Reign of the Emperor Wendi, 581–604

In 581, Yang Jian (541–604), a general of the Northern Zhou dynasty (557–581), deposed the last emperor of the dynasty and founded the Sui dynasty. Yang Jian had been born into an aristocratic family and was trained in horsemanship and the arts of war at an early age. He rose to prominence as a military commander, and his marriage to a daughter of another powerful aristocratic clan also helped to establish him as a leading general and politician. In 580, he was appointed the regent for the eight-year-old Northern Zhou emperor, but, within one year, Yang Jian and his supporters had weakened the power of the imperial family and were able to establish a new dynasty. In 581, Yang Jian named himself "Wendi" ("emperor of culture") of the Sui dynasty that controlled most of northern China.



Claiming to be the legitimate heir of the great Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), Emperor Wendi had the ambition to rule all of China. In 581–583, he constructed a new capital city near Xi'an in east central China. In 582–584, Wendi sent forces north to Shanxi and Gansu, to attack Turkish nomads whose raids on the northern frontiers threatened China's security and stability. Having defeated these invaders and gained control of northern China, Wendi turned to southern China, which had long remained separated from the north. With careful planning, in 587 his military expeditions extinguished the puppet state of Later Liang (555–587) and controlled the central Chang (Yangtze) River area; in 589, his armies destroyed the corrupt state of Chen (557–589), and he incorporated the lower Chang area into the territory of the Sui. He had now reunified China.

In the following year, he crushed revolts on the lower Chang led by the former local aristocratic clans of the Chen state and consolidated the dynasty's control of the area. His armies also invaded the region of today's northern Vietnam in 602 and brought it briefly under the reign of the Sui dynasty.

During his reign, Emperor Wendi introduced a series of significant institutional arrangements to ensure stability. In 581, he reformed the government system that he had inherited from the previous dynasty. The power at the political center was restructured around three central ministries: the Department of State Affairs, the Chancellery, and the Secretariat, which supervised six boards: Civil Office, Finance, Rites, Army, Justice, and Public Works. By removing the office of prime minister, the emperor became the chief executive who exerted direct control of daily political and administrative affairs.

At the local level, the reform reduced the previous three-level system of administration—prefecture (*zhou*), district (*jun*), and county (*xian*)—to the two levels of prefecture and county. He also decided that only the Board of Civil Office had the authority to make appointments of local governors and magistrates, in contrast to the previous system in which local governors could appoint officials. These changes allowed the emperor to keep tight control over local areas and introduced a new era of centralization, undermining the influence of the powerful aristocratic clans who had previously often dominated through the appointments of local officials.

To improve the new political system, Wendi introduced a state examination system aimed at recruiting talented commoners into the administration. Nevertheless, aristocrats still provided a large number

CHINA—HISTORICAL PERIODS

Xia dynasty (2100–1766 BCE)
 Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE)
 Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE)
 Western Zhou (1045–771 BCE)
 Eastern Zhou (770–221 BCE)
 Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE)
 Warring States period (475–221 BCE)
 Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE)
 Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE)
 Three Kingdoms period (220–265 CE)
 North and South dynasties (220–589 CE)
 Sui dynasty (581–618 CE)
 Tang dynasty (618–907 CE)
 Five Dynasties period (907–960 CE)
 Song dynasty (960–1279)
 Northern Song (960–1126)
 Southern Song (1127–1279)
 Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234)
 Yuan dynasty (1279–1368)
 Ming dynasty (1368–1644)
 Qing dynasty (1644–1912)
 Republican China (1912–1927)
 People's Republic of China (1949–present)
 Republic of China (1949–present)
 Cultural Revolution (1966–1976)

of officials to the central government because of their hereditary rights to such offices.

Wendi also reformed China's military system. In the sixth century, a military system termed *fubing* (garrison soldier) had been created in north China. To defend their territories from the nomads on the northern borders, previous rulers had established garrisons in frontier regions and had appointed a dozen generals each to control a number of garrisons. The families that provided soldiers to garrisons were registered as the inherited, professional military households and were exempted from taxation and corvée (forced-labor) obligations. Most military households were non-Han minorities. A general often maneuvered the soldiers for his political gain because he controlled them and their families for life and thus had their loyalty.

In 590, Wendi, a former *fubing* general himself, decided that all military households should be registered and administered under local prefectures and counties. This reform initiated a gradual process of demilitarization, which brought military households under the control of civil officials, dissolved the concentration of

military professionals in the north, and prevented generals from contriving revolts. A by-product of this reform was a significant integration of minorities into Han Chinese society.

In economic affairs, in 582 Wendi redefined the *juntianzhi* (equal-field system) that the previous northern dynasties had created. According to his new system, at the age of twenty-one years a man was entitled to eighty *mu* (1 acre equals 6.07 *mu*) of cultivated land from the state, and a woman received half of that amount. A peasant, even if he or she did not actually own the property, had the right to pass it to his or her children and the freedom to sell it. Having received land for use, a peasant family had to pay rent (*zu*), the de facto land tax, fulfill corvée labor for twenty days per year, and pay two bolts of cotton or silk cloth. By redistributing land to farmers and collecting tax in kind, the new dynasty intended to improve agricultural production and to establish a stable revenue resource. Although the taxation depended on whether the dynasty had effective control of the rural population, the equal-field system succeeded in fulfilling its objectives. Agricultural production recovered from the wartime disruptions of the previous era, and state granaries were filled with grain and cloth, an exception in Chinese history.

Although Wendi was sometimes cruel and hot-headed, his law, the *Kaibuang* Code (emperor's new law), which was issued in 581 and amended in 583, reduced many cruel punishments in previous Chinese laws, such as the exposure of the severed head of a criminal and the dismemberment of the body. The Code's original 1,735 clauses were reduced to 500 in 583. It retained four main types of punishments, the death penalty, deportation, forced labor, and the bastinado (beating the soles of the feet with a stick). Officials who committed crimes could pay the fines from their salaries or could commute their sentence into official demotion. The succeeding Tang dynasty followed this Code as it was revised during the Sui dynasty.

The Reign of the Emperor Yangdi, 604–618

In 604, Yang Guang, the second son of Yang Jian, succeeded to the throne after his father's death and declared himself "Yangdi" ("emperor of flaming"). Before being crowned, he had helped his father with administrative affairs and thus gained experience in ruling the country. However, in Chinese history he is known as a tyrant and a corrupt ruler whose reign was extravagant, megalomaniac, and licentious.

During his reign, Yangdi continued the institutions his father had established. He introduced more categories in the state examination, to allow more officials

to be drawn from nonaristocratic classes. In 609, a census to establish the tax basis showed a total of 8.9 million registered households and a population of 46 million people.

In 605, Yangdi began to build the second Sui capital in Luoyang, several hundred kilometers to the east of Xi'an, in order to consolidate the dynasty's control of east and south China. His most important accomplishment, however, was the construction of the Grand Canal. His father had already started several canal projects, and between 605 and 610 Yangdi completed the Grand Canal that ran for two thousand kilometers between Hangzhou, an important resort city in east China, and Luoyang in the north, connecting the Chang River and the Huang (Yellow) River. Until modern railroads were laid in China, the Grand Canal was the main communication system between north and south China.

Yangdi continued employing labor forces for other projects by enforced corvée conscription. While the building of the second capital had employed 2 million laborers for ten months and the construction of the Grand Canal had required 10 million laborers working for ten years, Wendi forced 3.5 million laborers to construct roads between 607 and 608, made a quarter of a million laborers repair the Great Wall several times, and forced many workers to build traveling palaces along the Grand Canal for his use. For the fourteen years of his reign, Yangdi lived in Luoyang because it was close to south China. Nearly every year Yangdi traveled to the lower Chang, each time using thousands of boats and forcing tens of thousands of people to serve him and the local areas to pay his expenditures. One of the purposes of his travel was to collect concubines. His exhaustion of the workforce caused numerous deaths and provoked peasant resistance, but Yangdi often executed rebellious peasants when they were caught.

His worst use of military force came during his invasions of Koguryo (in modern Korea). In 598, Koguryo, a tributary kingdom of China's, had a military conflict with the Sui dynasty over the issue of south Manchuria. Using this conflict as the excuse and probably fearing a threat to China because of an alliance between the Turks and Koreans, in 612 Yangdi sent a large military force of 1.13 million to invade Koguryo. However, the expedition was not only poorly organized but also confronted strong Korean resistance; the Sui army suffered a humiliating defeat, and only 2,700 soldiers returned. Yet Yangdi seemed to have become obsessed with Koguryo and territorial expansion. In 613 and 614, he organized two more

costly invasions. The first met defeat. Because many peasant rebellions had sprung up in China, Yangdi had to withdraw the forces from Koguryo when the Koreans asked for a peaceful surrender.

By 614, a peasant rebellion in north China, which had started in 611, had grown to 100,000 people and became a powerful challenge to the Sui dynasty. In 616 and 617, two more large peasant rebellions broke out in north and central China. Although some took place in the aftermath of floods or natural catastrophes, Yangdi's endless conscription of labor forces was probably the major provocation of these revolts. While the peasants were forced to work under harsh conditions and often died of exhaustion, Yangdi lived luxuriously and avoided hearing bad news; thus he was little informed about the true extent of the resentment in the country. His officials lied to him, and one official who spoke the truth was beaten to death. Eventually, some of his high-ranking officials also organized a rebellion, and the power struggle among the aristocratic clans intensified. In 618, Yangdi was murdered in his bathhouse by a general, a descendant of the imperial family of the dynasty from whom Yangdi's father had seized power.

Impact of the Sui Dynasty

By reunifying China, the Sui dynasty accomplished a great deal. The creative imagination of Wendi and his advisers redefined China and established a series of institutions that had lasting influence. The creation of the state examination system was particularly important for building a stable, elite bureaucracy based on education and talent, which not only changed the structure and composition of the ruling class but also changed China into a society governed by civilian officials rather than by the military aristocracy.

However, the Sui rulers tried to complete too many tasks in too short a time and exhausted the country. The rule of Yangdi triggered the collapse the dynasty. Despite its short existence, the Sui dynasty's reunification of China and its institutional accomplishments paved the way for the ascendance of the Tang dynasty during which China reached a glorious moment in its imperial history.

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SUKARNO (1901–1970), nationalist leader and Indonesia's first president. Sukarno emerged as a major figure in the nationalist movement in the second half of the 1920s, both for his spellbinding oratory and for his eclectic political philosophy, which emphasized unity amongst nationalists to counter Dutch power. After studying engineering in Bandung, Sukarno founded the Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party) in 1927, and was jailed for sedition in 1929. He was released in 1932, but in 1933 he was exiled to Flores and from 1938 to Bengkulu. He was the most prominent nationalist figure to work with the Japanese occupation authorities after 1942, and he



A choir performs beneath a huge portrait of Sukarno in Blitar on 20 June 2001 to mark the 31st anniversary of his death. (AFP/CORBIS)

applied his oratory both to supporting the Japanese war effort and to spreading covert nationalist messages. As a member of the independence preparatory body Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, he formulated the Pancasila in June 1945 as a statement of the moral and philosophical principles that united the otherwise disparate nationalist movement.

As the nationalist figure with broadest national standing, he was chosen president after the declaration of independence in August 1945, but his past collaboration with the Japanese was a liability in international negotiations and he was largely excluded from executive power. During the parliamentary period (1950–1957), his role remained ceremonial but he became increasingly vocal in criticizing the parliamentary system as divisive and ineffective. From 1957 he made cabinets answer to him, rather than to Parliament, and in 1959 he restored the short-lived 1945 constitution, which gave him enormous executive power. He called his political system "Guided Democracy," and emphasized its alleged roots in traditional Indonesian practice. He particularly praised *musyawarah* (thorough consultation) and *mufakat* (consensus as expressed by community leaders) as a system preferable to majority rule. In 1963 he was declared president-for-life.

As executive president, he paid little attention to administration but focused instead on nation-building, developing a unifying national ideology (NASAKOM, nationalism-religion-communism), recovering West Irian (West New Guinea), which remained under Dutch rule, and generally combatting Western imperialism. Infrastructure and administration crumbled during the early 1960s, leading to great hardship. Tension between the army and the Communist Party over the likely successor to Sukarno became enormous by 1965, culminating in an ambiguous abortive leftist coup in October 1965, which enabled General Suharto to begin pushing Sukarno from power. Sukarno ceded his executive powers to Suharto in March 1966 and was stripped of the presidency in March 1967. He died in 1970 under house arrest.

Robert Cribb

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SUKHBAATAR, DAMDINY (1893–1923), Mongolian communist leader. Damdiny Sukhbaatar

was Mongolia's official national hero during the Communist era (1921–1991). Born into a serf family in Yost Beysiyn *bosuu*, in what is now Sukh-Batar Aimig, he began his military career in the Mongolian army during Mongolia's Autonomous Period (1911–1921), fighting on the eastern border with China. Later he worked as a typesetter and became involved in a revolutionary circle formed in response to Mongolia's helplessness in the face of Chinese and White Russian intervention. In August 1920, Sukhbaatar was among the members of a group sent to establish political contact with Soviet Russia. He remained at Irkutsk while others in the group went to Moscow. After returning to Mongolia in early 1921, Sukhbaatar helped organize partisan detachments to fight against the White Russian general Ungern-Sternberg (1885–1921), then occupying Mongolia.

Sukhbaatar subsequently became a member of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and minister of war. After the liberation of the city of Urga (now Ulaanbaatar) from the army of Ungern-Sternberg, he continued to serve as minister of war in the new Mongolian People's Republic established in October 1921, the same year of the establishment of the Mongolian People's Army. Shortly before his death, Sukhbaatar visited Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924) in Moscow and received the Order of the Red Banner for his contributions to the Mongolian Revolution. After his death, Sukhbaatar became the national hero of the new Mongolia. Today his remains lie in a mausoleum on Ulaanbaatar's central square, named in his honor and dominated by his equestrian statue.

Paul D. Buell

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SUKHOTHAI Meaning "Dawn of Happiness," Sukhothai is one of Thailand's most important cultural and historical centers. Roughly 430 kilometers (270 miles) north of Bangkok, Sukhothai was originally an outpost of the Khmer empire, before rival Thai princes united to overthrow the foreign rulers and establish their own kingdom. Founded in 1238, Sukhothai was the capital of the first Thai kingdom for over 125 years. Under King Ramkhamhaeng (reigned 1278–1318), Sukhothai expanded into a powerful empire, occupying parts of what is today Laos and Cambodia, and es-



SUKHOTHAI—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1991, Sukhothai was the capital of the first kingdom of Siam in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Many historically significant monuments can still be found among the ruins.

establishing diplomatic relations with several other states. As a political center, Sukhothai was eventually eclipsed by other Thai kingdoms. It fell under the domination of Ayutthaya in 1365, and then, by the late eighteenth century, came under the control of the new capital of Siam at Bangkok. However, Sukhothai remained the center of a uniquely Thai culture, language, and religion. Artworks, particularly sculptures, from the Sukhothai era are national treasures in Thailand and represent some of the finest Buddhist artifacts in the world. Much of the modern Thai language, including its written script, was developed during the Sukhothai period, taken in part from Khmer, Mon, and other regional language systems. Similarly, Thai reverence for the monarchy—a system that still dominates Thailand—stems from the Sukhothai era, with its establishment of centralized rule by a benevolent monarch.

Today, Sukhothai remains a focus of Thai culture. It is renowned for its many temples, ancient ruins, and the enormous Buddhist statues that stand guard around the city and local countryside. Far removed from the hustle of bigger cities, Sukhothai offers the experience of a more traditional Thailand, steeped in a rich history.

Arne Kislenko

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SUKI In various Philippine languages such as Tagalog and Bisaya, the term *suki* refers not only to a regular and familiar customer but also to a preferred seller

of fish, vegetables, or grocery. *Suki* is a relationship that exists between, for example, fishers and vendors who sell the fish at the market, between farmers and market vendors, and between vendors and their clients in the marketplace. These personal trade relationships are embedded in the Philippine value system.

The *suki* relationship is commonly understood in economic terms, but it has also far-reaching integrative social functions. In the Philippines, relationships with strangers are in general thought of as dangerous. Sorcery is only one possible danger. If people are forced to interact with others they do not know, they feel insecure. Therefore, everybody tries either to avoid such interactions or to transform the relationship into a personal, more secure bond. In the rural Philippines, the *suki* relationship is one possibility to establish relations to nonkin, to people from other islands, the hinterland, or the city. These relationships are based on mutual trust and obligation.

The sellers offer credit and discounts or special treatment concerning the quality (e.g., size, freshness) of their products to their *suki*. The buyers have the advantage of buying on credit, but they are also obliged to buy again from the same seller in the future. Both sides share a feeling of *utang na loob*, a debt of gratitude. For a client who has received credit from a seller, it would cause shame (*biya*) to buy from another vendor who offers better or cheaper products. In the long run, *suki* is a reciprocally advantageous security system for people living in poor, unstable, and therefore risky circumstances.

The mutually beneficial and personal character of the *suki* relationship should not be seen as a completely harmonious, stable system without conflicts. Conflict does occur, and alliances can change through time. The *suki* relationship does not always guarantee both sides an equality of positions in bargaining. Fish vendors, for example, are in a better position than are small-scale fishermen because the latter have no real option but to accept the price asked by the vendors.

Bettina Beer

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SULAK SIVARAKSA (b. 1933), Thai intellectual and social activist. Sulak Sivaraksa is perhaps Thailand's best-known intellectual committed to social activism and criticism. He was educated in England. Upon returning to Thailand he taught at both Chulalongkorn and Thammasat Universities. From 1963 to 1969, he was editor of the influential *Social Science Review*. He is credited by many (from both the left and right) for playing a major role in persuading Thai students to abandon their political passivity fostered by military dictatorships and to become much more politically conscious and active. These students subsequently mobilized in a massive demonstration to overthrow Thailand's military dictatorship on 14 October 1973.

Sulak's thinking has been strongly influenced by the prominent Thai politician/philosopher Pridi Banomyong; the professor/technocrat Dr. Puey Ungphakorn; Gandhi; Buddhadasa Bhikku, a prominent Thai Buddhist thinker; Thich Nhat Hanh, a prominent overseas Vietnamese Buddhist thinker; E. F. Schumacher, British author of *Small Is Beautiful*; and the Quakers. He has done extensive grassroots organizing in Thailand, founding many key nongovernmental organizations oriented toward an alternative, more humanistic, sustainable form of development. He is highly critical of Thailand's modern consumer society and prefers the traditional term "Siam" to Thailand.

Because of his radical thinking, he has on several occasions been arrested by the government for lèse-majesté and for expressing provocative views and has spent time in exile (1976–1978, 1991–1992). Ultimately, he has been acquitted of charges against him or granted amnesty. In both 1993 and 1994 Sulak was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize, and he is a recipient of the Right Livelihood Award. Sulak is a prolific writer, and several of his many publications are listed in the references below. Sulak has been a major figure over five decades in fostering Thai civil society.

Gerald W. Fry

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SULAWESI (2002 pop. 14.4 million). Sulawesi, formerly known as Celebes, is a large island in the Malay Archipelago in eastern Indonesia. It is divided into four provinces: Sulawesi Utara (North Celebes), Sulawesi Tengah (Central Celebes), Sulawesi Tenggara (Southeast Celebes), and Sulawesi Selatan (South Celebes). Manado in the north and Ujung Pandang (formerly Macassar) in the south are the largest cities. Mountainous, volcanic, and unusual in shape, Sulawesi consists of four large peninsulas covering 227,654 square kilometers.

Sulawesi lies in the transition zone between Asiatic and Australian flora and fauna and has a tropical climate with distinct rainy and dry seasons. There are extensive teak forests and many kinds of orchids; fauna include unique animals such as the *anoa* (dwarf buffalo) and *babirusa* (large wild swine) as well as tapirs and *maleo* birds. The economy is based on subsistence agriculture, especially rice, and on the export of such products as timber, spices, cacao, coconuts, fish, and minerals. Predominant indigenous groups include the Toraja, Buginese, Makassarese, and Minahasa.

Ruled by Buddhist and Hindu empires prior to the rise of Islamic states in the sixteenth century, the island was later colonized by the Dutch, who arrived in 1609. In recent times, there has been conflict between the large Christian minority and the Muslim majority in the city of Poso in central Sulawesi.

Michael Pretes

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SULAYMANIYA (2002 est. region pop. 1.5 million; 2002 est. city pop. 643,000). The region of Sulaymaniya, a *muhafaza* (governorate) in northeast Iraq and southeast Kurdistan, and the ancient city of the

same name, are rich in history. Sulaymaniya is 90 kilometers east of the city of Kirkuk and has an altitude of 838 meters. It is west of the natural mountainous frontier of Iraq and Iran and north of the Diyala River and its tributaries, the Tandjaru and Sirwan, and the Little Zab River.

Nearby is Mount Nisir, where the ship of Utnapishtim (the prototype for the biblical Noah) came to rest after a great deluge, as told in the epic of Gilgamesh, an ancient Mesopotamian hero. In 745 BCE, the Assyrian ruler Tiglath-pileser III (745–727 BCE) captured Arameans in Mazamua, near present-day Sulaymaniya. Part of the Syrian Church's diocese of Beth Garmai was located in the region around 4 BCE.

Sulaymaniya, like much of Kurdistan during the medieval Islamic period (661–1514), enjoyed virtual autonomy, although all of the major Islamic dynasties—from the Umayyad on—nominally ruled over the area. During the Ottoman empire (1453–1922), the strongest local dynasty was the Baban (1500–1850), ruled by emirs and *pirs* (chiefs). In 1850, however, the Ottomans crushed these local rulers, and political authority passed to religious sheikhs led by the Barzinja family, whose ancestor, Hadji Kaka Ahmad, is buried in Sulaymaniya city.

After a prolonged dispute between Turkey and Britain from 1923 to 1926, the region of Sulaymaniya became an official part of Iraq in June 1925. Britain controlled Sulaymaniya as part of the Mandate of Iraq until 1958. However, from 1919 to 1927, Sheikh Mahmud, a Kurdish leader demanding greater autonomy for the Kurds, controlled much of Sulaymaniya; at one time he proclaimed himself the king of Kurdistan.

From the end of British control in 1958 to the end of the twentieth century, the Sulaymaniya region was in constant conflict with the Iraq government and was the center of contention for the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq. The discord began in 1965, when Jalal Talabani (b. 1933) broke from the dominating Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by the legendary Kurdish leader Molla Mustafa Barzani (1903–1979). In 1975, Talabani created the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which was based in Sulaymaniya. The accord following the Persian Gulf War of 1991 provided a Kurdish safe haven—and air protection by the United States and Great Britain—for the region above the thirty-sixth parallel, but conflict between the KDP and PUK increased from 1992 to 2000. By 2000, the PUK was drawing closer to Iran and the KDP to Turkey and the United States; these alignments impeded the development of unity in this

region of northern Iraq and southern Kurdistan, which is controlled by the Kurds.

By 2000, nearly all of the population of the city was Kurdish. Under the control of the PUK, Sulaymaniya was becoming the cultural, medical, and educational center of Kurdistan Iraq, while sharing political power with the Kurdish Regional Government in Arbil, which was under the control of the KDP.

Robert Olson

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SULEIMENOV, OLZHAS OMAROVICH

(b. 1936), Kazakh writer and politician. Olzhas Omarovich Suleimenov contributed to the rise of Kazakh nationalism during the Soviet era by publishing his controversial book *Az i Ia* (1975), which was a historical-philosophical essay on Turkic historical destiny, the history of interaction between nomads (Turks) and settlers (Slavs), and the place of the Kazakhs in the historical development of Eurasia. Born in Almaty, Suleimenov worked as a journalist and editor before his book won him nationwide recognition and a reputation as the "opener of the difficult issues in national history." The book was condemned by Moscow policymakers as nationalistic and was banned until 1989.

With the introduction of Gorbachev's policy of glasnost, Suleimenov became increasingly active in Kazakh political life, sharply criticizing Moscow policymakers' mistakes in Kazakhstan. In February 1989, Olzhas Suleimenov, on the wave of the growing criticism of nuclear testing in Semipalatinsk, founded one of the first political movements in Kazakhstan—*Nevada-Semipalatinsk*. This movement became a prominent and influential nongovernmental organization from 1989 to 1991, preceding the rise of national parties and organizations. In 1991 he founded the People's Congress of Kazakhstan.

Suleimenov remains one of the most popular writers and politicians in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. He supports moderate nationalism, liberal reforms, and a balanced approach to the Law on Languages. He and

his supporters have contributed to moderating mainstream Kazakh nationalism by making it more liberal and compromising.

Rafis Abazov

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SULU ARCHIPELAGO Stretching northeast to southwest from Basilan Island, south of Mindanao's Zamboanga peninsula, to Sabah, Malaysia, the Sulu archipelago exceeds 320 kilometers (200 miles) in length, consists of over 500 islands, and occupies an area of 2,813 square kilometers (1,086 square miles). It is surrounded on the north and west by the Sulu and Mindanao seas and on the south and west by the Celebes Sea.

Islam was first introduced to the Philippines in the Sulu archipelago in the late thirteenth century. A majority of the population (97 percent) is Muslim. Politically the archipelago is comprised of two provinces: Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, with a combined population in 1995 of 787,000. In a 1989 plebiscite Sulu and Tawi-Tawi joined the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. Most of the inhabitants of the archipelago belong to one of three ethnic groups: Tausug, Samal, and Bajau. Commercially, numerically, and politically, the Tausug is the dominant group.

Dating back to the Spanish and American colonial periods, the Muslims of the Sulu archipelago have a

long history of resistance. In the early 1970s, Nur Misuari, a Tausug, formed the Moro National Liberation Front seeking the secession of Mindanao and Sulu from the Philippines. The ensuing guerrilla war against the Philippine army resulted in 50,000 casualties.

Robert L. Youngblood

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
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SUMATRA (2000 pop. 42.7 million). Sumatra, Indonesia's second-largest and westernmost island, is populated by a number of distinct peoples, including the Acehnese, Minangkabau, Batak, and Malay. Its earliest major states were coastal trading kingdoms; these were often situated on river mouths, where they could control the flow of goods up and down stream. From the late seventh century onwards, the state of Srivijaya was the most powerful Sumatran empire, until it was eclipsed in the fourteenth century. The first evidence of the arrival of Islam in Sumatra comes from Marco Polo, who visited the island c. 1292. The nineteenth



TUBBATAHA REEF—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Located off the Philippine coast, Tubbataha Reef Marine Park was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1993. The pristine atoll reef covers some 33,200 hectares and is home to a huge variety of marine life. The reef also features lagoons, a stunning 100-meter perpendicular wall, and two coral islands.



century witnessed profound changes: politically, Dutch colonial rule was gradually imposed throughout the entire island; and since the 1860s the introduction of plantation crops, especially tobacco and rubber, and the exploitation of oil have turned Sumatra into the archipelago's richest export area. Under the Japanese occupation (1942–1945), the island was administratively united with Malaysia, but in 1945 local nationalist leaders supported the pro-Republican cause, bringing Sumatra under Indonesian control. In 1958 a rebel government, the PRRI (Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic), was announced in Sumatra. This rebellion was crushed in 1961, consolidating the hegemony of Java over the outer islands, and the heavily Javanese army over other political forces. Since Suharto stepped down in 1998, decentralization, regional autonomy, federalism, and separatism have once again become hotly debated issues throughout Indonesia, especially in the Sumatran provinces Aceh and Riau.

Edwin Wieringa

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SUMMER PALACE Thanks to its well-documented and tragic history, the Summer Palace of Beijing is one of the most famous imperial parks worldwide. It became known in the West when Father Attiret in 1743 mailed a report on its garden that helped change the history of landscape design. The ruins of Yuanming Yuan (Garden of Perfect Brightness) and the placid waters of Yihe Yuan (Garden of Concord and Peace) form a Chinese tourist attraction that is second only to the Forbidden City. Improperly so called because the Qing (1644–1912) court used to spend summers away from Beijing in the cooler hills of Chengde, the Summer Palace is a vast complex of gardens, lakes, pavilions, temples, and hills located only 10 kilometers from the walls of Beijing. It encompasses the Yuanming Yuan residence of the Kangxi emperor (1654–1722) and the Qianlong emperor (1711–1799) and the Yihe Yuan residence that the Cixi dowager empress (1835–1908) built in 1888. A French-British military expedition destroyed the Summer Palace in 1860; only the western section was restored. Within its present limits, the Yihe Yuan



SUMMER PALACE—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

The Summer Palace in Beijing was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1998 for its superb landscape architecture that incorporates the disparate elements of temples, gardens, pavilions, temples, and palaces.

Summer Palace consists of Kunming Lake and Wanshou Hill, whose Buddhist temples dominate the site.


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SUMO. See **Sports—Japan.**

SUN BEAR An endangered species, the sun bear (*Helarctos malayanus*) has a short, sleek coat with a whitish or orange U-shaped crescent mark on its chest



The Malayan sun bear. (YOGI, INC./CORBIS)

and muzzle, which gives the animal its name. It is also known as the honey bear due to its habit of ripping into bees' nests for honey. The sun bear is the smallest member of the bear family. Its coat is a deep brown to black color. Perfectly equipped for an omnivore diet, with large jaws for cracking open hard fruits, long curved claws, naked soles, and an extraordinarily long tongue, the bear can easily tear apart trees and eat the insects found inside; it also eats small birds. A Malayan sun bear adult male can grow to be about 122 centimeters when standing on its hind legs and can weigh up to 308 kilograms. A female usually weighs about 132 kilograms. Skillful climbers, the bears spend most of their time in the trees; they are primarily nocturnal and nap and sunbathe during the day. Due to the tropical climates of the bears' habitat in Southeast Asia—Bangladesh, Borneo, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, and Sumatra—the bears are not known to hibernate.

Stacey Fox

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SUN YAT-SEN (1866–1925), Chinese revolutionary. Sun Yat-sen was born near Guangzhou (Canton) to a farming family. His personal name was Wen, his style or secondary name was Yat-sen, and his revolutionary name, by which he is better known in China, was Zhongshan (Chung-shan). Sun first attended a village school, then went to Honolulu at age thirteen with his elder brother for his secondary education, and later received a medical degree from the College for Medicine for Chinese in Hong Kong. Disgusted with the ineffectiveness of the Qing (Manchu) dynasty (1644–1912), he became a revolutionary. Travels to Hawaii, Hong Kong, and later in Britain and the United States had a profound influence on the young Sun.

In 1894, he formed the Revive China Society among overseas Chinese with the goal of expelling the Manchus and forming a republic. He later formulated a set of ideals for the republic called the Three People's Principles: nationalism, democracy, and livelihood, which are roughly analogous to Abraham Lincoln's "of the people, by the people, and for the people." Sun also envisioned the amalgamation of the best Western concepts of government with those of traditional China in a five-power constitution consisting of the executive, legislative, and judiciary plus a censorate (to check abuses by officials) and an examination system for the recruitment of a bureaucracy. In

1905, the Revive China Society was subsumed by the Tungmeng Hui (United League), with membership among Chinese students abroad, military officers of the Qing army, and overseas Chinese.

After ten abortive uprisings between 1895 and 1911, the eleventh, the Wuchang Uprising of 10 October 1911, spread like wildfire. It resulted in Sun's election as provisional president of the Republic of China and the abdication of the Manchu emperor on 12 February 1912. Sun resigned as president in favor of General Yuan Shikai on condition that the latter supported the republic.

Yuan, however, betrayed the republic by abrogating the elected parliament, which was dominated by the Nationalist Party (the Tungmeng Hui became the Nationalist Party or Guomindang in 1912), culminating in his failed attempt to become emperor. After Yuan's usurpation attempt, politics in China degenerated into civil wars between rival warlords.

Frustrated in his attempts to obtain help from Western democracies, Sun turned to the newly established Communist government in Russia for military and organizational help in 1922 and agreed to the Russian stipulation that the Nationalists accept members of the infant Chinese Communist Party into their ranks. Sun then reorganized the Nationalist Party and commissioned his lieutenant, Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), to build up an army committed to his ideology. Sun died in 1925 in Beijing during a last attempt to negotiate a peaceful unification of China.

Sun is honored as the father of the republic. The Three People's Principles are the guiding ideology of the Republic of China on Taiwan, where the people have achieved democracy and where the principle of livelihood has been realized in the high standard of living and largely equitable distribution of income among all citizens.

Jiu-Hwa Lo Upsbur

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SUN YIXIAN. See **Sun Yat-sen.**

SUNDANESE The Sundanese are one of Indonesia's main ethnic groups, inhabiting the Sunda area of the western part of Java. This area stretches from the Bogor and Sukabumi Regencies in the west, to the Kuningan and Banjar Regencies in the east, which border the Cirebon Regency of Central Java province. The area comprises mostly rugged mountains in its south and center, with a flat fertile lowland in the north that serves as Indonesia's largest rice production area.

The Sundanese form the majority in the province of West Java (population 35.5 million) and are Indonesia's second-largest ethnic group after the Javanese who inhabit the central and eastern parts of Java. While related culturally to the Javanese, they maintain a distinct culture, apparent from different language, costumes, and traditions.

Historically, the largest Sundanese kingdom was Padjadjaran, a Hindu kingdom whose seat was in the eastern part of the Sunda lands. Even at the height of the Majapahit, a Javanese kingdom whose sway encompassed much of present-day Indonesia, Padjadjaran enjoyed freedom until finally subdued in the Bubat War of 1357 CE. Because of this war, many Sundanese still remain uneasy about their relationship with the Javanese.

Unlike the Javanese kingdoms, whose historical monuments (*candi*, "temples") are scattered around their heartland, Sundanese kingdoms left few monuments. It is believed that the Sundanese did not use stone in building palaces or places of worship, instead using the wood that was abundant in their land. During the struggle for Indonesian independence, the Sundanese created their own state, Negara Pasundan, in 1947, which eventually became one of the states within the federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia. When federalism was abandoned in 1950, Pasundan disbanded, becoming the province of West Java in the unitary Republic of Indonesia. Many Sundanese have occupied important positions in the Indonesian government. The most prominent of these were Djuanda Kartawidjaja (prime minister, 1959; first minister 1959–1963) and Umar Wirahadikusumah (vice president, 1983–1988).

Irman G. Lanti

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SUNDARBHANS The Sundarbans (or Sunderbans) are the densely forested wetlands of the sea-face delta of the combined Ganges and Brahmaputra River, as they empty into the Bay of Bengal. Two-thirds of the area falls within Bangladesh, and the western third in West Bengal State, India. This area is about 200 kilometers from east to west and 50 kilometers from north to south, the much indented coast forming its southern boundary. The western boundary is the Hooghly River and the eastern the Meghna. Despite the relative closeness of Calcutta to the north, the Sundarbans were once generally inaccessible and desolate; but since 1990 the West Bengal government has been promoting the area for tourism. The Sundarbans are today the world's largest remaining tropical mangrove forest, a national park where there is a great variety of wildlife, including Bengal tigers, deer, boar, monkeys, and crocodiles. The human population is reportedly very sparse.

Paul Hockings

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SUNG DYNASTY. See **Song Dynasty.**

SURABAYA (2000 pop. 8 million). Surabaya, Indonesia's second largest city and capital of East Java, is situated at the mouth of the Brantas River opposite Madura island. Legend has it that Surabaya derived its name from a ferocious fight between a shark (*sura*) and a crocodile (*baya*) in the Mas River. According to official accounts, Surabaya was founded on 31 May 1293. Sunan Ngampel-Denta, one of the nine saints who Islamized Java, is said to have lived in Surabaya in the second half of the fifteenth century. In the sixteenth century the kingdom of Surabaya was the leading power in East Java, being a center of culture, but in

1625 it was forced to surrender to Mataram. It was seized by the Dutch East India Company in 1743. Since the second half of the nineteenth century, Surabaya has been transformed into the metropolis it is today. The area of Greater Surabaya, known as Gerbangkertosusila, "Gate to Prosperity and Decency" (an acronym: Gresik-Bangkalan-Majakerta-Surabaya-Sidoarjo-Lamongan), taking up 12 percent of the province of East Java, is nowadays inhabited by more than 8 million people. The tenth of November 1945, when Surabaya was the scene of heavy fighting between Indonesian nationalist forces and British troops, is commemorated as Heroes' Day.

Edwin Wieringa

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SURKHOB RIVER A major Central Asian river also known as the Kunduz in its lower course, the Surkhob is one of the major tributaries of the Amu Dar'ya (Oxus). The river rises in Afghanistan in the Baba Range of the Hindu Kush and flows for 420 kilometers, draining a basin of some 31,300 square kilometers. Like many other rivers in the region, its flow is heavily dependent on meltwater, with the greatest flow occurring in spring and early summer. The river's mean annual flow is 120 cubic meters per second, though this varies according to season. Within Afghanistan, the river's waters are used for electricity generation at the Pul-i Khrumri plant, supplying power to the north of the country.

The name "Surkhob" is also given to the western end of the river Vakhsh at the confluence of the Kyzylsu and the Muksu in Tajikistan; all three rivers form a single tributary of the Amu Dar'ya. Fed by meltwater and experiencing its greatest flow in July (3,120 cubic meters per second), and with an average of 660 cubic meters per second, this river of 524 kilometers and a catchment of 39,100 square kilometers has been heavily used for irrigation (the irrigation system is controlled

from the town of Vakhsh) and hydroelectric power, resulting in heavy soil salinization in the lower reaches, although these remain navigable. Qurghonteppa (Kurgan-Tyube or Kuragn-Teppe) is the main town on this river, with a railway link to the capital, Dushanbe.

Will Myer

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SUSTAINABILITY Sustainability has been variously defined, but for Asia it means not only long-term growth prospects but also the ability of the natural environment to sustain the large population and economic expansion in the region. Development, reflected in varying degrees of industrialization, urbanization, and integration with the global economy, is progressing at different rates and in different directions. Given that some 60 percent of the world's population is living in Asia, there are major challenges to development and its long-term sustainability. Among the countries that make up Asia are some with the largest populations in the world—China, India, and Indonesia.

Until the financial crisis and resultant economic downturn in Asia in 1997, countries in Southeast Asia and East Asia were experiencing among the world's fastest rates of economic growth. These rapidly industrializing economies had secured an estimated 10 percent share of the world's markets. Rapid economic growth and industrialization can be attributed to the region's relatively open policy toward foreign investment. Indeed, the Asian countries, particularly those in East and Southeast Asia, were actively competing for foreign direct investment.

The rapid pace of industrialization in Asia, particularly East and Southeast Asia, is not surprising because the region can be considered one of the richest in natural resources in the world. Raw materials range from West Asia's and Southeast Asia's oil resources to fisheries in Southeast Asia and the rain forests of Indonesia. Indeed, the region's natural resources made it the target of colonizing powers in the past. Now, not only does Asia provide most of the energy needed in the rest of the world, but it also has large shares of the world's market for shrimp and other food resources. In addition, it has a huge population base, which implies not only large markets but also a large and relatively inexpensive labor pool.

Rapid Industrialization and Economic Growth

Indicators of growth in industry and, particularly, manufacturing in the rapidly industrializing regions of Asia provide some idea of how fast development has occurred. Whereas in 1990 energy consumption in the rapidly industrializing regions of Asia, such as East and Southeast Asia, was estimated at about 1 billion metric tons, consumption had increased to 1.5 billion metric tons in 2000. Trade as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) for East Asia increased from 17 percent in 1990 to 58 percent in 1996, the year before the onset of what is now known as the Asian economic crisis. Overall the growth in gross national product (GNP) per capita between 1965 and 1996 was 5.5 percent for East Asia and 6.7 percent for China alone. South Asia lagged to some extent and registered a growth figure in GNP per capita between 1965 and 1996 of 2.2 percent.

In the economies of most Asian countries, agriculture remains important in spite of the more rapid growth of the manufacturing and services sectors. The primary industries that are focused on the processing of natural resources, such as the oil or timber industries, remain important for the revenues of Asian countries, particularly those in West Asia and some of the Southeast Asian states, such as Brunei and Indonesia. There has also been much attention paid to the tourism sector, which has been exploiting the natural environment, such as the beaches and warm water of the coastal areas, as well as heritage areas. The latter are widely distributed throughout Asia, given that some of the world's oldest civilizations—the Chinese, Indian, and Arabian—and some of the world's major religions, such as Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam, originated there. In small Southeast Asian countries like the city-state of Singapore, the tourism sector has contributed 16 percent to the GDP.

Urbanization

With industrialization has come rapid urbanization, because cities have been the foci of foreign investment in both industrial and service sectors. Many of the cities have expanded to become metropolitan regions through the extension of transport infrastructure and built-up areas. These so-called mega-urban regions have doubled in population every fifteen to twenty years, and some have population densities of more than thirty thousand people per square kilometer.

The wealth of Asia's cities has been a strong magnet for international and local labor migration, both skilled and unskilled. On intraregional and international levels, low-skilled workers have gravitated to rich countries from poorer countries in search of

higher wages, usually in domestic and blue-collar work eschewed by locals. The intraregional and international flows of workers only add to the burgeoning populations, which had already been increasing rapidly due to internal rural-urban flows of people looking for work as well as higher wages.

Environmental Impact and Sustainable Growth

Rapid economic growth based on natural resources as well as rapid industrialization has had an enormous impact on the natural environment in Asia. The fast pace of urbanization has further exacerbated the burden on the environment, so that the pollution and degradation that are evident can be described as just short of disastrous. The flip side to the rising consumption of energy is the rising volume of carbon emissions.

Environmental conditions in Asia, compared with other regions in the rest of the world and with world averages, are poor: intense pollution levels have been registered there between 1991 and 1995. For air pollution, indicators such as particulates (milligrams per cubic meter) put the level at 248, compared with 40 for Latin America, 49 for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, and 29 for Africa. The pollution level was twice the world average, which was 126. For sulfur dioxide, a toxic gas (milligrams per cubic liter), the level for Asia was 0.023, higher than Africa's 0.015 and Latin America's 0.014. The level was higher only in the OECD countries, at 0.068, and the world average, at 0.059, was only slightly higher than in Asia. Water pollution appeared equally intense, judging from the suspended solids (milligrams per liter), at a level of 638, compared with 224 in Africa and 97 in Latin America. Levels in the OECD countries and overall world average were 20 and 151, respectively. Other indicators, such as the biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) levels (milligrams per liter), were also substantially above the world average, which was 3.5. Asia's level was 4.8, higher than Africa's 4.3, Latin America's 1.6, and the OECD countries' 3.2.

A combination of rapid urban and industrial growth together with the widespread environmental strategy of growing first and cleaning up later has contributed to the environmental problems now seen in Asia. There has, therefore, been low energy efficiency within industry, natural-resource depletion, materials-intensive production, pollution of rivers and ground-water supplies, as well as unhealthy air, particularly in cities. Enforcement of environmental laws has been difficult because of limited resources, the sizes of the

countries, and the prevalence of small- and medium-sized industries in most of developing Asia. The new wealth from rapid economic growth has also led to a boom in private transportation, resulting in massive traffic congestion in many Asian cities.

The result has been poor living and working conditions for workers and their families, including slum formation and the intensive environmental degradation associated with it; air pollution from increased traffic between residences and workplaces, schools and shops; appropriation and depletion of environmental resources for urban use, such as rural reservoirs for urban water supplies; multiple-source water and land pollution; noise from traffic and construction; and loss of prime agricultural land, coastal ecologies, regional forests, and upland vegetation around (larger) cities targeted for resource extraction, industrial location, and infrastructure and housing development.

Several examples of the environmental impact of rapid industrialization and urbanization serve to illustrate the slim balance in which sustainability hangs in Asia. One instance has been the regional haze arising from forest fires in Indonesia, which were started in order to clear land for conversion of forests to plantations of oil palm. Forest fires had burned huge areas in Indonesia's old-growth tropical forests long before the major 1997–1998 fires that wiped out nearly 10 million hectares. During the dry season that is experienced in the region, the fires have become uncontrollable, and a haze has been caused because of the fires as well as the continued burning of the underground peat long after the forests have been destroyed. This haze has enveloped neighboring areas in Malaysia and Singapore as well as southern Thailand. Its regular occurrence has considerably affected tourism in the region and caused widespread health problems for people living in the affected areas.

Across Asia, per capita availability of water declined by about 50 percent between 1955 and 1990. Asia has the lowest per capita availability of freshwater in the world, with Central Asia and parts of Southeast Asia already well above the threshold of "high water-stress" conditions (when the ratio of use to availability exceeds 40 percent). Indeed, some countries in Central Asia are already using 90 percent of their available freshwater resources. Use of available freshwater resources is 25 percent in the northern portions of China and Mongolia. Many other parts of Asia will suffer the same fate during the next twenty-five years. China and India, with projected populations of 1.5 and 1.4 billion, respectively, by 2025, will encounter serious water shortage.

Future Sustainability

Not surprisingly, most countries in Asia are not rated very high in indexes of sustainability. Countries such as Japan and Singapore generally fare unfavorably in terms of sustainability compared with Scandinavia and other developed countries. Given the environmental sustainability problems, there is much cause for concern about the long-term economic development prospects of Asia. Already the Southeast Asian region and some of the East Asian economies have experienced a major financial and economic crisis in 1997. This has seen new flows of foreign direct investment go largely to China, which is undergoing a major economic boom. Yet China, too, faces the myriad economic, social, and environmental sustainability issues of other regions within Asia. Only careful and effective management of both growth and its environmental impact can help Asia maintain its course of high growth on a sustainable and long-term basis.

Ooi Giok Ling

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SUTLEJ RIVER Sutlej (or Satlaj) River is the easternmost and longest of the "five rivers" that give Punjab its name. It rises near the Manasarowar Lakes in Tibet at an elevation of about 4,630 meters. Here its Chinese name is Xiangquan He. The Sutlej River flows west through deep Himalayan valleys, entering



SUZHOU—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

As the classic example of Chinese landscape architecture, the Suzhou gardens were designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1997 and 2000. This sixteenth-century masterpiece is considered by many to be unsurpassed in its design.

India in the Kinnaur district, and passing through the plains of the Indian Punjab near Rupar, it joins with the Beas River near the Harike Barrage. The Sutlej's confluence with the Chenab River, some 480 kilometers further downstream (west of Bahawalpur in Pakistan), forms the Panjnad River (literally, "five rivers," since it carries the waters of the Beas, Sutlej, Ravi, Chenab, and Jhelum Rivers). The river joins with the Indus River near the town of Chachran, and from Kasur to its junction with the Indus, the Sutlej flows in a south-west direction through Pakistan. The division of the Sutlej waters has long been a source of tension between India and Pakistan, and still is as of 2002.

The Sutlej is altogether 1370 kilometers long. In the early nineteenth century, it formed the boundary between the Sikh states and British territory. In the twentieth century, the Sutlej was diverted to feed two irrigation systems in the Punjab, creating much new fertile land. In the late twentieth century, a huge Pakistani dam, the Sutlej Barrage (also referred to as the Islam Barrage), was constructed somewhere north of Bahawalpur. Above this point navigation is limited. Powerhouses at Bhakra, Dehar, Pong, Ganguwal, and Kotla generate electricity, which is divided between the Indian states of Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, and Himachal Pradesh, according to an agreement between the states.

Paul Hockings

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SUZHOU (2002 est. pop. 763,000). Suzhou (sometimes referred to in older publications as Soochow) is one of the most beautiful cities in China, with many canals, spectacular architecture, arching bridges, and elegant classical gardens. These gardens are popular tourist destinations, along with Lake Taihu west of the city. Much of Suzhou is surrounded by the Outer Moat, and the Grand Canal (the world's longest man-made waterway) passes through the city. The city is located in southern Jiangsu Province and was founded in the fifth century BCE. Marco Polo, according to legends, called it the "Venice of the East."

Suzhou was the capital of the kingdom of Emperor Wu (140–86 BCE), although it was not named Suzhou until the Sui dynasty (581–618 CE). The city was destroyed in the fourteenth century and again during the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864). In 1896, it became a treaty port and was opened to the West.

Silk has historically been the most famous of Suzhou's exports, and it is also noted today for its beautiful embroidery. It is located in the subtropical zone and has a mild climate and enough rain and sunshine for excellent yields in the surrounding rice paddies. The economy is diversified today with chemicals, paper, ceramics, metallurgy, cotton textiles, machine tools, and electronics.

Carole Schroeder

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SUZUKI DAISETZU TEITARO (1870–1966), Japanese Buddhist philosopher. D. T. Suzuki (called Suzuki Daisetsu in Japan) played a key role in introducing Zen Buddhism to the West. Born Suzuki Teitaro in Kanazawa, Ishikawa Prefecture, he taught English before attending university and studying Zen at Engakuji Temple in Kamakura. In 1897, he moved to La Salle, Illinois, where he worked as an editor for the Open Court Publishing Company, which published a number of his early English-language works on Buddhism. Twelve years later, he returned to Japan where he later taught at Tokyo Imperial University, Gakushuin, and Otani University.

Suzuki's English-language works, including the three-volume *Essays in Zen Buddhism* (1927–1934) and *An Introduction to Zen Buddhism* (1934), were among the first studies to introduce Zen to the West and were studied by figures as diverse as psychoanalyst Carl Jung and composer John Cage. *Zen Buddhism and Its Influence on Japanese Culture* (1938, later renamed *Zen and Japanese Culture*) was influential in promoting the view

of Zen as a cornerstone of the Japanese arts. Suzuki's English works have been reprinted countless times and have been translated into numerous languages, including Japanese. The 1999 Japanese edition of his complete works contains fourteen volumes.

Jeffrey Angles

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SWETTENHAM, FRANK (1850–1946), British administrator in the Malay States. Born outside Belper in Derbyshire, England, Frank Athelstane Swettenham was one of the most outstanding British colonial administrators of the Malay States and was instrumental in creating the political entity of British Malaya. Armed with a fluency in the Malay language and culture, diplomatic skills, and personal charm, Swettenham helped shape the destiny of the Malay Peninsula.

At age twenty-four, Swettenham participated in the drafting of the historic Pangkor Treaty and witnessed its signing in 1874, which introduced British colonial rule in the peninsular Malay States through the British Residential System. Theoretically the resident was appointed as an adviser to the Malay sultan; in practice the resident wielded executive power except on issues relating to Malay traditions and the Islamic faith. Shortly after, he became assistant British resident to the court of Sultan Abdul Samad of the western peninsular Malay State of Selangor, and then became assistant colonial secretary (Native Affairs, 1876–1882), resident to Selangor (1882–1889), and resident to the western peninsula state of Perak (1889–1895). He brought much economic progress, particularly in rail-way, mining, and commercial agriculture.

Swettenham was a prime initiator of a federated scheme aimed at centralizing the disparate political en-

ties of the Malay Peninsula to hasten economic development. In 1895, he persuaded the Malay rulers to sign a treaty that created the Federated Malay States, with himself as resident-general (1896–1900).

Swettenham retired in 1904 and assumed the chairmanship of several rubber companies. In 1909–1910, he was chairman of the Royal Commission on Mauritius. He was a prolific writer and remained concerned in Malayan affairs, publicly airing his views during the decentralization debate of the 1920s and the Malay Union controversy of 1946.

Ooi Keat Gin

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SYR DAR'YA At approximately 2,200 kilometers in length, the Syr Dar'ya (Jaxartes and Sayhun) is Central Asia's second-longest river after the Amu Dar'ya. It derives most of its waters from the melting snows and glaciers of the Tian Shan Mountains. On the modern political map, from the system's headwaters in Kyrgyzstan, the river flows through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and into the Aral Sea. Settlements existed near the river's delta during the Bronze Age, and evidence suggests that associated ecologies



were more pastoral than those along the Amu Dar'ya until the Iron Age. By the time of Alexander of Macedon's fourth-century-BCE incursions into the river's territories, settlements and associated irrigation systems were on the rise. The river's upper portions in the Ferghana Valley were especially supportive of irrigated urban centers, and the valley and the river's lower portions thus emerged as key routes of the more northern caravans traveling the Silk Road.

Russian plans to use the Syr Dar'ya as a steamboat route did not endure long in the late nineteenth century, but initial Soviet goals of adding to the river's natural wetlands to support rice cultivation began to materialize rapidly by the 1960s. Prior to this time, most canals were in the Ferghana Valley and Golodnaya Steppe. Under development schemes, however, widespread paddies were created on the lower portions

of the river. As with the Amu Dar'ya, ecological ramifications of the river's diversions have been tremendous and continue to contribute to the crisis of the wider Aral region.

Kyle Evered

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TABRIZ (2002 pop. 1.2 million). Located in a valley amid the foothills of the Sahand Mountains in Iran, Tabriz, the capital of the province of East Azerbaijan, is a city just east of Lake Orumiyeh. Hot springs in and around the city were inducements for early settlement and subsequent development. Tabriz's location has made it vulnerable to earthquakes, however, and the city has experienced some of the most destructive quakes in recorded history as measured by fatalities: the 1727 quake caused 77,000 deaths, and the 1780 quake caused 100,000. Other major quakes occurred in 858, 1042, and 1641, and slight tremors are commonplace in the daily lives of Tabriz's residents.

Tabriz owes much of its development to its central position along overland trade routes in the region over the centuries. Many sources throughout history referred to the city's ideal position for travel between the Iranian Plateau and either the Caucasus or Anatolia. Therefore, even though most sources trace the origins of the city to the Sasanid dynasty (224/228–651 CE), it is often speculated that Tabriz is only the most recent settlement on roughly the same site, an earlier manifestation possibly being the ancient Armenian city Tauris of the third century CE.

The city's accessibility for trade, however, has also made Tabriz prone to conquest, and control of the city has shifted often throughout history. In the thirteenth century, the city avoided destruction during the Mongol-Turkic invasions of Southwest Asia by surrendering; it was designated as a political capital by the invaders and thereafter began to thrive economically even more than it had previously. Between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, Tabriz thus became an important seat of power and administration for

groups like the Il Khan Mongols, the Kara Koyunlu and Ak Koyunlu Turks, and the Timurids. In 1500, Tabriz then passed to Persians under the emergent Safavid dynasty (1501–1722/1736) when it was conquered by Ismail I prior to his conquests of the rest of Persia (Iran). The city became and remained the Safavid capital until the seventeenth century, when the Ottoman Turks posed too great a risk to that location and the capital shifted to Esfahan. In 1827, Russia captured Tabriz for the first time. Although the Russians retreated when a peace was reached in 1828, this opened up Persia for increasing trade with Russia and Britain—much of it being conducted through the foreign missions thereafter established in Tabriz. Russian (and later Soviet) troops returned to Tabriz in the early twentieth century and were stationed there often, even through much of World War I, the Russian Revolution, and World War II. Although the Soviet Union attempted to establish a secessionist republic based out of Tabriz, the Soviets withdrew in 1946 because of international pressures, thus enabling Persia to reclaim the city.

Tabriz has long been a center of arts and handicrafts (especially ceramics, pottery, and tile work, Tabriz-style miniature paintings, and jewelry and silverwork), with exchange networks throughout the eastern Mediterranean and southwestern Asia. Indeed, Tabriz's Blue Mosque of 1465 is Iran's greatest example of glazed tile work, although it has been severely damaged over the years by earthquakes. However, the main handicraft and related trade of Tabriz has historically been carpet weaving. The great covered bazaar of Tabriz was built in the fifteenth century, and the city functioned as Persia's commercial capital into the twentieth century. As such, it was a nexus for globalizing trade relations



The ruins of the Blue Mosque in Tabriz, built in 1465 and later damaged by an earthquake. (ROGER WOOD/CORBIS)

between the empire and commercial centers closer to the Black, Mediterranean, and Caspian Seas. Tabriz's economic connections with the West—and especially with Russia—were further enhanced by construction of a road from Tabriz to the Russian frontier outpost of Julfa in 1906. Persia's first railway was opened along the same route in 1916. With the Russian Revolution and later with the Soviet withdrawal from Tabriz, however, the city was essentially relegated to a peripheral city in Iran. But overland trade with Turkey did continue and, in addition to Tabriz's large population, prevented the city from being entirely marginalized. Nonetheless, the city—and its Azeri Turk majority—remained highly suspect to Iranian government officials because of its Soviet connection.

As the urban center of an ethnolinguistic minority that makes up between 20 and 30 percent of the Iranian population, Tabriz is also a focal point for political issues that extend into the Caucasus and beyond. Such issues were well reflected amid discussions over the Republic of Azerbaijan's requests to open a consulate in Tabriz in the mid-1990s. Although ethnolinguistically distinct, Tabriz is like other Iranian cities in terms of its rapid population growth over the past decades.

Kyle T. Evered

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TAE KWON DO Tae kwon do is a Korean martial art that since the 1950s has become popular around the world. It is estimated that over 20 million people in 140 nations participate in the sport. The origins are unclear, and different scholars suggest Korean, Chinese, and Japanese origins. The history of tae kwon do as a modern sport begins in the twentieth century, when the Japanese banned the sport upon annexing Korea in 1910. The ban produced greater interest in the sport and caused it to be linked in the Korean mind with Korean nationalism and independence. The Korean War (1950–1953) introduced the sport to U.S. soldiers, who brought it back to the United States, initiating its emergence as a worldwide sport. In 1973 South Korea afforded the World Tae Kwon Do Federation recognition as the international governing body of the sport.

Like other Asian marital arts, tae kwon do involves offensive and defensive postures and movements classified as kicks, strikes, stances, and blocks. Advancing up through the ranks of the sport requires rigorous training that emphasizes body control, agility, balance, timing, and technique. Tae kwon do especially stresses kicking, including powerful flying kicks. This has made the sport more popular than other martial arts with women and children, who have less upper body strength than men. There are now various schools of tae kwon do, with the basic division being between those that stress competition and those that stress training and personal development.

David Levinson

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T'AEBAEK MOUNTAINS The T'aebaek Mountain range in the eastern part of the Korean peninsula is part of the geological "backbone" of the region. This range runs parallel to the coast from Kangwon Province in the north and through North Kyongsang Province to the south. Two of Korea's major rivers originate in the region of the T'aebaek Mountains: the Han River, which flows southwest through Seoul before emptying into the Yellow Sea,

and the Naktong River, which flows south to the Korea Strait. In addition, the Kum and Somjin Rivers begin in these mountains.

The T'aebaek Mountains were formed by tectonic interactions; geologically it is located on the Yongnam Massif. This region is still subject to earthquakes. This tectonic activity has given the range its steep slopes and heights exceeding 1,900 meters (6,233 feet).

The range is named for T'aebaek, one of three mountains considered sacred by Koreans. The association between T'aebaek and Korea's legendary founder, Tangun, as well as the historic sites around the mountain, make it a special place for Koreans, and it is a popular tourist site. According to legend, Korea's divine founder Hwanung descended to T'aebaek and eventually began the Korean race.

Thomas P. Dolan

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TAEDONG RIVER The Taedong River is located in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and flows southwest from the Nangnim mountain range in the northeast region of South P'yongan Province out to the Yellow Sea. With a length of 438 kilometers, it is the fifth longest river on the Korean peninsula and the second longest in North Korea.

The Taedong River, with the Samgak River as its estuary, is generally deep and carries a large volume of water, enabling substantial transportation between the river ports of Namp'o, Songnim, and Pyongyang. The Taedong is believed to have been an important seat of civilization since prehistoric times, and it has also been called Yolsu, P'aesu, P'ae[gang], and Wangsong[gang] throughout history. The river was the site of the General Sherman Incident of 1866, in which an American trading ship was destroyed by Koreans as it tried to sail up the Taedong River to Pyongyang.

Jennifer Jung-Kim

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TAEGU (2000 est. pop. 2.5 million). Taegu is the third most populous city in South Korea (Republic of Korea). The city's origins date back to the Shilla kingdom (57 BCE–935 CE), when it was called Talguh-wahyon or Talbulsong. It has been called Taegu since 757 and has been classified as a city since 1949.

Taegu is located in North Kyongsang Province about 80 kilometers inland from the eastern coastline. The city, however, is designated a metropolitan city (*kwangyokshi*) and is administratively independent of the province, although Taegu also functions as the provincial capital. Taegu has seven districts (*ku*) and one county (*kun*).

Taegu is mostly urban; its primary manufacturing industries are textiles, machinery and metals, automobile parts, and electronics. The textile industry accounts for the largest portion of the region's manufacturing, with more than 2,100 companies involved in all aspects of spinning, weaving, dyeing, and sewing.

Taegu lies in a basin, surrounded by mountains to the north and south, with the Shinch'on Stream running westward into the Kumho River, which in turn flows into the Naktong River. Recent efforts have focused on environmental and beautification issues to improve the quality of life and to increase tourism.

Jennifer Jung-Kim

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TAEJON (2000 pop. 1.4 million). Taejon, a city of 540 square kilometers, is located in South Ch'ungch'ong Province in South Korea (Republic of Korea). Taejon has been administratively autonomous since its 1995 designation as a "metropolitan city" (*chikbalsi*). It functions as a second administrative capital, housing many federal government organizations.

The city of Taejon has had many names, but its current name, meaning "big field," shows its agricultural roots. Taejon became commercialized after it became a stop on the Seoul-Pusan Railway in 1905. The Taejon-Mokp'o Railway, built in 1914, connects the city to South Cholla Province in the southwest. The city has become a hub for the nation's railroads and highways.

Taejon is growing rapidly because of its ideal location only 153 kilometers from Seoul. Taejon hosted the 1993 World Expo, bringing much attention to the

city. The city is also a center for science and technology, with its Korea Institute of Science and Technology at the forefront of scientific development.

Jennifer Jung-Kim

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TAEJONGGYO Taejonggyo (the Religion of the Divine Progenitor; sometimes spelled Daejonggyo) was founded by Na Ch'ol (1863–1916) in 1901, a time when Christian missionaries were challenging the traditional religious beliefs and practices of Korea, and Japan was threatening Korea's existence as an independent nation. Taejonggyo arose as a nationalistic response to this political and spiritual crisis. The central tenet of Taejonggyo is that Koreans need not worship any foreign gods such as Jesus or Buddha. They have a god of their own, the same god who, as the legendary ruler Tangun, ruled over a vast and powerful Korean kingdom five thousand years ago. Na taught that the worship of this Divine Progenitor had been the primary religion of the Korean people until the Mongols invaded the Korean peninsula in the thirteenth century and allowed foreign ideas and religions to penetrate and weaken indigenous Korean culture.

Taejonggyo scriptures include texts that are said to have been composed five millennia ago, when Tangun ruled Korea. Unfortunately, those texts were lost for centuries and were recovered only early in the twentieth century. They include the *Ch'onbugyong* (The Heavenly Amulet Classic), which explains the origin of the universe in only eighty-one Chinese characters. Another, the *Samil sin'go* (The Teachings of the Trinitarian God), only 360 characters long, describes the terrestrial and celestial realms and their inhabitants. According to Taejonggyo doctrine, ancient Koreans worshiped three persons in one God: God the Creator (Hanim), God the Teacher (Hanung), and God the Ruler (Tangun Hanbaegom).

Taejonggyo claims to have half a million followers. A government survey in 1995, however, found less than 10,000 Koreans who listed Taejonggyo as their religious affiliation. Nevertheless, Taejonggyo has helped shape the contours of Korean history in the twentieth century. During the thirty-five years of Japanese colonial rule, from 1910 until 1945, it en-

couraged nationalists, such as the anti-Japanese writer and activist Sin Ch'aeho (1880–1936), to assert pride in their country by claiming that Korea was once a powerful empire ruled by a divine being. After liberation from the Japanese, the Republic of Korea designated 3 October, the date on which Taejonggyo celebrates God's appearance among men as the ruler Tangun, a national holiday. The sacred texts of Taejonggyo are increasingly becoming accepted as authentic ancient historical documents even by those who do not believe Tangun is a god. Though it is a religion with relatively few adherents, Taejonggyo is nonetheless influential.

Don Baker

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
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TAEWON'GUN. See **Yi Ha-ung**.

TAGALOG. See **Philippine Languages**.

TAGORE, RABINDRANATH (1861–1941), Indian poet. One of the foremost literary figures of modern India, Tagore was born 7 May 1861 into an affluent and cultured family in north Calcutta, in Bengal, and died there on 7 August 1941. He had an aversion to formal education and never attended university. Nevertheless, his precocious talent was evident at eight, and in sheer volume and diversity his creative career is unparalleled, consisting of numerous works of poetry, plays, short stories, novels, paintings, and sketches. He set his songs (of which more than 2,500 were published) to music, and *Rabindrasangeet* (Rabindra's Music) achieved immense popularity.

He was greatly influenced by Western liberal and humanist traditions, as well as indigenous traditions and folk culture, and acknowledged Hindu, Muslim, and British influences on his creativity. Though widely traveled, he achieved international fame only after a collection of his poems, *Gitanjali* (Song Offerings), was translated into English. On the basis of this work alone he was awarded the Nobel Prize in literature in 1913, the first Indian to be so honored. However, in 1919 he renounced both the prize and a knighthood bestowed by the British (King George V) in protest over



Rabindranath Tagore in 1929. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

the massacre of Indian civilians in Amritsar, Punjab. His pride in Indian nationalism was tempered initially by his favorable response to aspects of the British connection. His perceptions of imperial rule changed, however, and during the interwar years he condemned it as inhuman and uncreative. One of his poems was adopted as the national anthem of independent India, and Mohandas K. Gandhi bestowed on him the title *gurudev* (great teacher).

Tagore's diverse works reveal the mainsprings of his thought: he divided his songs into five categories—*puja* (devotional), *prem* (love lyrics), *prakriti* (on nature), *swadeshi* (patriotic), and *bibhidha* (miscellaneous). He was a worshipper of truth and beauty (as in *Chitra*, *Urbasi*, *Gitanjali*, *Gitali*, *Naibedya*), a spiritualist with a mystical frame of reference (as in *Jiban Devata*, or Lord of Life, *Raktakarabi*, or Red Oleanders). He was a humanist and thought in terms of world peace and internationalism, giving these ideals practical form by setting up a university in Calcutta at Shantineketan (Abode of Peace) called Vishva Bharathi (World University). Yet he was aware of the social and economic problems of the common person—poverty, oppression, ignorance—and wrote against social ills such

as untouchability (as in *Chandalika*). He was also concerned with social uplift (as in *Desher Unnati*, or Prosperity of the Country, and in *Katha O Kabani*, or Tales and Stories).

Chandrika Kaul

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TAI CHI Tai chi chuan (taijiquan), sometimes referred to in English as Chinese shadow boxing, is a centuries-old martial arts system. Legend holds that tai chi chuan ("supreme ultimate boxing") was first developed by Zhang Sanfeng, a Taoist monk said to live on Wudang Mountain toward the end of the Song dynasty (960–1279). Other accounts credit Chen Wanting (1597–1664), of Wen County, Henan Province, with originating tai chi chuan in a variety now known as the Chen style. Over time, four additional varieties developed: the Yang, Sun, and two Wu styles. The 1980s also saw the emergence of a radically simplified People's Republic of China twenty-four-movement form, which exists solely for the purpose of exercise.

Theory and Practice

The essence of all tai chi chuan practice is in the principles governing the forms rather than in the forms themselves. These principles are drawn from traditional Chinese medicine, to regulate the *Qi*, or vital energy; from Yin-Yang theory, to provide balance; from the Confucian "Doctrine of the Mean," the "Book of Changes"; and from Taoist philosophy, all of which guide movement and strategy. These and other principles combine with the techniques of Chinese pugilism to form a self-defense system that promotes good health and longevity.

Forms and Styles

The most fundamental of tai chi chuan practices is the solo form, consisting of a lengthy series of conjoined postures, performed individually, at a slow and usually

constant tempo. Synchronized group practice of the solo form is commonplace as well. Some styles also practice an advanced, mixed-tempo solo form, and all styles maintain fixed-step and free-form varieties of two-person forms, as well as sword and other weapons forms.

The primary differences among the five major styles of tai chi chuan exist more in terms of the number of movements in a given form; the height and length of one's stances, or postures; and the pace or tempo of movement. However, virtually no differences exist in the basic principles governing the varied forms for any of the five major styles.

Contemporary Tai Chi Chuan

In the early 1900s, Yang Chengfu, a famous Yang-style master, began teaching the formerly secret tai chi chuan to the public. Eventually, other styles followed his lead. This esteemed martial art has since become popular worldwide as a practice that rejuvenates and promotes good health and longevity.

Charles Ettner

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TAI SHAN Tai Shan (Mount Tai) is located in central Shandong Province, China, to the north of the town of Tai'an. The main peak, Jade Emperor, is 1,545 meters (5,069 feet) above sea level. Mount Tai is a tilted fault-block mountain with extremely complex geology. Mount Tai, the most important and the most easterly of the Five Sacred Mountains of Taoism, is associated with the rising sun and birth. Its other name, Dongyue, means "Eastern Peak." Mount Tai's importance in Chinese culture, as a site of imperial pilgrimage, was solidified by the Qin emperor Shi Huangdi. More than 250 Taoist, Buddhist, and Confucian temples were built on the mountain, of which 22 remain in use. To-



TAI SHAN—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Tai Shan was designated as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1987 because of the two-thousand-year-old art stored within it. A site of imperial pilgrimage and artistic inspiration since the Han dynasty, it has immense historical value.

day, 97 ruins, 819 stone tablets, and 1,018 stone inscriptions are preserved on Mount Tai. The summit, with the temple dedicated to the Jade Emperor, the highest deity in Taoism, is reached by nearly 7,000 stone steps. On Mount Tai's slopes are many ancient trees, including the Han dynasty cypresses, planted by the Han emperor Wu Di. Mount Tai was added to UNESCO's World Heritage List in 1987.

Michael Pretes

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TAIJIQUAN. See **Tai Chi**.

TAI-KADAI LANGUAGES Tai-Kadai languages are used by more than 85 million speakers in Southeast Asia and southern China. Depending on criteria used, between forty and a hundred spoken languages can be recognized. All of these are tonal, with over two hundred different tone systems distinguished.

The two national languages of the group, Thai and Lao, sometimes called Laotian, account for well over half the total of Tai-Kadai speakers. The spelling "Thai" is used for the national language of Thailand and for some regional varieties in that country. "Tai" is used for the wider Tai subfamily of Tai-Kadai and also in the names of some specific varieties.

Branches and Subfamilies of Tai-Kadai

Thai and Lao belong to the relatively well-known Southwestern branch of the Tai subfamily. This branch is also represented in Assam in India (for example, by the Khamti language), in Yunnan in China (by Lue and Tai-Dehong), in Myanmar (by Shan and



Dehong), and in Vietnam mainly south of the Red river (by Black Tai and White Tai).

The remainder of the Tai-Kadai family extends from Vietnam mainly north of the Red River (where the Nung and Tay languages are found), into the Chinese provinces of Guangxi (the Zhuang language), Guizhou (the Bouyei, Sui, and Gelao languages), and Hunan (the Kam language), to the island of Hainan (the Hlai and Be languages). Most authorities recognize a high-level Kam-Tai subfamily including the Kam-Sui languages along with the three main branches of Tai (Northern, Central, and Southwestern).

Speculation about how the rest of the family fits together includes a so-called Kadai branch, hence the family name Tai-Kadai. This branch would comprise Gelao, Laha, and other varieties in China and Vietnam still being investigated. The exact relationship of the languages on Hainan Island to the rest of the family is also under investigation.

Sound and Writing Systems

Much basic vocabulary in Tai-Kadai languages is monosyllabic, although compounding is common. More initial consonants are distinguished than finals, usually limited to nasals, semivowels, and final stops (*p*, *t*, *k*, and glottal stop). Unlike most languages in the family, Thai and Lao distinguish pairs of short and long vowels, represented here as *i*, *ī*.

Tonal systems have been reported, from languages with three tones (Aiton, in India) to nine (Kam, in China), or even more if stopped syllables are counted separately. Some idea of tonal shapes can be given through pairs of digits on a one-to-five scale, with the first suggesting the approximate beginning pitch level and the second digit, the ending level. Many vocabulary items in Tai-Kadai languages differ only in tone. Thus *sip* means "ten" in languages of the Kam-Tai subgrouping, but with low tone (11) in Thai, mid-high (44) in Lao, low-rising (24) in Dehong, high-rising (45) in White Tai, and mid-level (33) in the Lungming dialect of Zhuang.

Tai-Kadai languages in the southern and western areas, with long cultural connections to India, have been using alphabetic Indic-based writing systems for over seven hundred years. Eight such scripts are currently in use. To the north and east, varieties in contact with Chinese once used modified character-based writing but romanizations have been recently introduced.

For Thai and Lao, some vowels are written above consonants; for example, the *i* vowel sign in *sip* (ten) is written above the *s* letter. Other vowels are written

TONAL CONTRASTS

The following examples show how tonal contrasts in Thai affect the meaning of the word.

- kha*: 33 (mid tone) "thatch grass"
- kha*: 11 (low tone) "aromatic root"
- kha*: 52 (falling tone) "value"
- kha*: 55 (high tone) "to trade"
- kha*: 24 (rising tone) "leg"

under, after, and even before their initial consonants. Tone is shown through superscript marks. Also, consonant letters are arranged in three classes affecting tonal representation differently.

Written Thai and Lao differ somewhat. Thai spelling is etymological with proliferation of consonant letters. Modern Lao is more directly phonetic.

Syntax and Semantics

Like languages nearby, Tai-Kadai varieties do not use inflectional morphology; that is, they do not use endings to show tense or number. Such distinctions are assumed from context or are optionally indicated through special words or constructions. The most basic Tai-Kadai sentence orders are subject-verb and subject-verb-object, so the Thai sentence *chan 24 rak 55 thoe*: 33 and Lao equivalent *kho':i 31 bak 33 caw 31* both mean "I love you" and here show the same basic word order as English. On the other hand, modifiers usually follow modified nouns; hence Thai *ba:n 52 + yaj 11* "house + big," or "a big house."

For counting and specifying objects, classifier constructions are used. (An example of a classifier in English is "head" in the sentence "three head of cattle.") Thus Thai *man 33 sa:m 24 hua 24* "yam three head," or "three yams"; Lao *mu: 13 ha: 31 to: 11* "pig five body," or "five pigs."

Ultimate Connections

It used to be assumed that Tai-Kadai languages, being tonal, were directly related to Chinese and indeed much Chinese-derived vocabulary is present. However, basic Tai-Kadai noun-modifier order is not Chinese and there is evidence for deep relationships with the Austronesian and Austroasiatic families as well. The ultimate connections of Tai-Kadai remain a controversial topic and will be an important area for future research.

Anthony Diller

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TAIMANOV, ISATAI (1791–1838), Kazakh rebel leader. In 1812 Isatai Taimanov became one of the elders of a *bersh* (more than 3,500 families) community migrating within the southern areas of Kazakhstan adjacent to the Caspian Sea. In 1814 his position as elder was confirmed by the governor of Orenburg. Some time later Taimanov became the governor of the whole *bersh* community. He was arrested several times (1817, 1823, 1824) by the colonial governors for resisting the khan's rule.

Taimanov protested against the oppression of the peasantry in the Bukeev Horde and became a popular hero. In February 1836, supported by Makhambet Utemisov, he was one of the instigators of a mass uprising, largely of Kazakh peasants, which included about two thousand men under arms by 1837. In October 1837 Taimanov and his supporters laid siege to the Khan Djaghir's quarters, but they were routed in a battle at Tas-Tyube later that year. This unsuccessful result is considered a decisive event in the rebellion. Taimanov then led the survivors to the Minor Zhuz (Mladshii zhuz) on the left bank of the Ural River, strengthened his forces, and joined Sultan Kaip-Galii Ishimov, who under the support of Khiva's khan was trying to wrest the Minor Zhuz from the Russian empire. In July 1838 Taimanov died at the river Ak-Bulak in battle against czarist military forces sent to suppress the rebellion, which died with him.

Islamov Bakhtor

TAINAN (1999 pop. 760,000). Located on the coastal edge of the fertile Jianan Plateau, Tainan is the

oldest Chinese settlement on Taiwan and the island's fourth largest city. Until the late nineteenth century, Tainan served as the political, cultural, and economic center of Taiwan. Tainan was a Dutch settlement and trading post from 1624 to 1662. In 1661 the Chinese rebel leader Zheng Chenggong (1624–1662), better known under the English name Koxinga, failed in an attempt to restore the Chinese Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and fled to Taiwan. His army quickly overcame the Dutch, and he established his government in Tainan. In 1684 the Manchurian Qing dynasty (1644–1912) conquered Taiwan and incorporated Taiwan as part of Fujian Province of China.

This history has left Tainan with a wealth of historic sites, including two forts built by the Dutch and a number of important temples. Tainan's more than two hundred temples, ranging from the Tainan Confucius Temple (1662) to the elaborate new Temple of Matzu (Goddess of the Sea) at Luermen, provide some of the best remaining examples of southern Chinese architecture in Taiwan.

Tainan is an important center of industry, education, culture, and tourism. Historically, the area has been important for sugar and rice cultivation, fisheries, oyster raising, and salt production. Tainan is now home to some of Taiwan's largest private industrial enterprises, including petrochemical and food processing plants. It is slated to become a high-tech center upon completion of the Tainan Science-Based Industrial Park in 2002.

Scott Simon

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TAIPEI (1998 pop. 2.6 million). Taipei is the largest city on Taiwan and, since 1949, has been the capital of the Republic of China (the Chinese state that does not recognize Beijing's sovereignty). Located at the far north of Taiwan island, in the basin of the Tamshui, Keelung, and Takokan rivers, it is a major commercial and political center, with a wide range of businesses, cultural institutions, and temples.

In 1885, the ruling Chinese Qing dynasty (1644–1912) declared Taiwan a separate province, and Taipei, a city formed from earlier Chinese and aboriginal set-



The monumental gate at the Chiang Memorial in Taipei. (MACDUFF EVERTON/CORBIS)

lements, became its capital. During the Japanese colonial rule over Taiwan (1895–1945), Japanese relationships with Taipei's Chinese population varied between repression of nationalism and accommodation to some political aspirations of the emergent middle-class elites. When Taiwan reverted to Chinese rule in 1945, tensions with the new Chinese Nationalist governor, Chen Yi, led Taipei to become a major center of the February 28th Incident of 1947, during which the city-dwellers' mass protests against the Nationalist government were put down with some brutality. After 1949, Taipei became the "temporary" capital of the administration of Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975). During this period, Taipei benefited from the economic boom in East Asia, and became a prosperous city. After Chiang's death, Taiwan democratized, and Taipei's mayoralty was held for the first time by an opposition politician, Chen Shui-bian, in 1994–1998.

Taipei's architecture reflects the city's stages of development. Little is left from the pre-1895 era, but the Japanese period has bequeathed many colonial baroque buildings, including National Taiwan University and the Presidential Office Building. From the 1950s, many undistinguished concrete buildings were hastily erected, a process aided by Taipei's lack of planning laws, but since the 1980s, greater care has been taken to build more sympathetically, with many new buildings, such as the Central Rail Station and the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial, incorporating traditional Chinese architectural themes.

Taipei's environment is marked by heavy pollution. Until the early 1980s, highly polluting soft coal was burned without effective restrictions, and Taipei's position in a basin exacerbated the resulting smog. Taipei's relative decline as a manufacturing center reduced emissions (between 1954 and 1986, the proportion of Taiwan's industrial workers based in Taipei fell by half to under 8 percent), and the city authorities have attempted to cut motor vehicle traffic by building a mass transit rail system.

Rana Mitter

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TAIPING REBELLION Led by Hong Xiuquan (1814–1864), a frustrated candidate in the civil-service examinations and a self-proclaimed Christian, the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864) seriously challenged

China's Qing dynasty (1644–1912) and was the largest rebellion in Chinese history.

The Taiping Rebellion occurred in a period of unprecedented crisis, when the Qing dynasty was plagued by an exploding population (the population tripled in two centuries to exceed 430 million by the 1850s) and challenges from Western powers that it could not meet, as evidenced in its defeat in the Opium War (1840–1842).

The Origins

From a peasant family of the Hakka group in a village close to Guangzhou (Canton), Hong Xiuquan was raised to pursue a career as a scholar-official. Having repeatedly failed to pass the provincial-level civil-service examinations, Hong was hit with a hallucinatory episode in 1837. A few years later, upon reading a set of Christian tracts, *Quanshi Liangyan* (Good Words for Exhorting the Age), which was compiled by a Chinese Christian, Hong made connections between Christian theology and his visions and was convinced that he was actually God's second son, Jesus' younger brother, and that he was sent to earth to expel devils, namely the Manchus (who ruled China during the Qing dynasty), from China.

Having baptized himself and a few friends and relatives, Hong began his evangelical mission in his hometown. Later, along with one of his converts, Feng Yunshan (1822–1852), Hong went to Guangxi Province after having lost his teaching post at the village school due to his Christian convictions. In the poverty-stricken Zijing Mountain area, Hong and Feng found enthusiastic adherents among poor peasants and charcoal burners. A religious community was formed, which began secretly preparing for an armed uprising.

The Early Stage (1851–1856)

In late 1850, Hong called for a rebellion against the Qing dynasty. He proclaimed the establishment of Taiping Tianguo (the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace) in January 1851 and declared himself the Heavenly King shortly after. The Taipings, as they become known in English, set up an elaborate military system in which men and women were segregated and submitted all their properties to a public treasury. They began to march north to the Chang (Yangtze) River valley in 1852. The Qing armies, which had not encountered such a fierce enemy for decades, failed to stop the advances of the spirited Taipings. In the spring of 1853 the Taipings, totaling 1 million or more, took Nanjing, a political and economic center

in southeastern China. Hong made Nanjing his capital and renamed it Tianjing (Heavenly Capital).

After taking Nanjing, the Taipings moved quickly to expand their military victories. A northern expedition was dispatched to take Beijing, the capital of the Qing dynasty, and a western expedition was sent to take control of the middle Chang River valley and the areas surrounding Nanjing. Although the northern expedition failed, the Taipings were successful in expanding their territories in the middle and lower Chang River valleys. Administrative apparatuses that combined military and civil functions were set up in the conquered territories. A utopian land program blueprinting equal distribution of land was promulgated. Many social and cultural reforms, such as banning opium smoking, foot binding, prostitution, and so forth, were carried out. Repudiating Confucianism as the devil's teaching, the Taipings adopted Hong's version of Christianity as their official religion and used it as the basis for their civil-service examinations, in which both men and women were encouraged to participate.

Intrigued by the Christian dimensions of the Taiping Rebellion, Britain, France, and the United States sent envoys to Nanjing to investigate the new regime. Although the Westerners were deeply disappointed by the Taiping religion, which they thought was a great distortion of Christianity, and by the rebels' lack of commitment to order and construction, the Western powers decided not to act against the Taipings immediately because they had not settled their conflicts with the Qing government. As a result, they adopted neutrality toward the rebellion for the moment.

When the Taiping Rebellion reached its apogee in 1856, fatal infighting occurred. Threatened by the swelling power of Yang Xiuqing (1820?–1856), the prime minister of the Taiping regime, Hong had him killed by another leader, Wei Changhui (1823–1856). Later, Hong also had Wei killed. Tens of thousands of Taiping followers were slain in the incident. Feeling that he was no longer trusted, Shi Dakai (1831–1863), a talented general, led his army out of Nanjing and carried on an independent campaign against the Qing.

The Late Stage (1856–1864)

The Taiping Rebellion was greatly weakened by the events of 1856 and lost much territory to the Qing armies in the wake of the incident. Meanwhile, the Qing dynasty found a powerful force in suppressing the rebellion, the Xiang (Hunan) army led by Zeng Guofan (1811–1872), a high official and famed Con-

fucian scholar. Zeng commanded strong support among the gentry class by upholding Confucian values in countering the Taipings' form of Christianity. Recruited exclusively from Zeng's hometown in Hunan Province and highly paid and well trained, the soldiers of the Xiang Army began to push the Taipings into a defensive position. Two new leaders and outstanding generals of the Taipings, Li Xiucheng (1823–1864) and Chen Yucheng (1837–1862), orchestrated a series of successful campaigns to break the impasse, advanced to eastern Jiangnan, and approached Shanghai, an important treaty port since the Opium War. Hong Xiuquan's cousin, Hong Ren'gan (1822–1864), arrived in Nanjing after having stayed in Hong Kong for years, breathing new life into the waning regime by attempting to reform the Taiping political and economic systems using Western models.

During 1856–1860, the Qing dynasty was engaged in the Arrow War with Britain and France. The conclusion of the war coincided with a change of the rulership of the Qing dynasty. The new leaders, the Empress Dowager Cixi (1853–1908) and Prince Gong Yixin (1833–1898), effected a radical turn in foreign policy, becoming cooperative with the West, which encouraged the Western powers to side with the Qing dynasty in China's civil war. In early 1862 Li Xiucheng attacked Shanghai again, triggering Western intervention. A foreign mercenary army, the "Ever-Victorious Army," headed first by Frederick Townsend Wade (1831–1862) of the United States and then by Charles George Gordon (1833–1885) of Britain, became the major agent of the Western intervention. After 1862, the Taipings retreated city by city under the joint attack of the Xiang Army and the Ever-Victorious Army. In June 1864 Hong Xiuquan died of illness. One month later, the Xiang Army captured Nanjing, which effectively ended the Taiping Rebellion, even though the remaining Taiping forces continued to fight until 1868.

About 20 million lives were lost in the extensive warfare associated with the Taiping Rebellion and other rebellions of the period. One consequence of the rebellion was that the Qing government lost much of its power to the provincial authorities. Although Taiping Christianity failed to leave any lasting impact on Chinese society, its anti-Manchu nationalism was inherited by the anti-Qing revolutionaries, and its utopian egalitarianism was echoed in the Chinese Communist revolution in the twentieth century.

Yingcong Dai

See also: **Zeng Guofan**

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TAISHO PERIOD Japan's Taisho period (1912–1926) was the period of the reign of the Taisho emperor, the son and successor of the Meiji emperor, during whose reign Japan had ended its long isolation from most of the rest of the world and began its quick modernization. The Taisho period started on a liberal note, with so-called Taisho Democracy, a national movement to protect constitutional government and to democratize not only politics but also the economy, education, and other areas of culture. The Taisho period can be divided into the pre-World War I period and the postwar period.

Prewar and Wartime Japanese Politics and Diplomacy

In 1912 the Japanese army, eager to expand the interests of Japan after the Republican Revolution in China, demanded that the cabinet establish two army divisions in Korea. When the cabinet turned down the demand because of budget restraints, the army minister resigned, an act which, due to the rules set out by the Japanese constitution of the time, forced the resignation of the rest of the cabinet. The public criticized this tyrannical behavior of the army, and there were cries for an end to the influence of the *genro* (elder statesmen who, though their role was not laid out in the constitution, manipulated politics behind the scenes) and protection of constitutional government. The movement spread over the nation quickly, and successive cabinets could not but concede to the public's criticism of the *genro* and military authorities. The *genro* stabilized the political situation by nominating Okuma Shigenobu (1838–1922), who was popular among the public, as prime minister.

Using the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as an excuse, the second Okuma cabinet declared war on Germany and



JAPAN—HISTORICAL PERIODS

Jomon period (14,500–300 BCE)
 Yayoi culture (300 BCE–300 CE)
 Yamato state (300–552 CE)
 Kofun period (300–710 CE)
 Nara period (710–794 CE)
 Heian period (794–1185)
 Kamakura period (Kamakura shogunate) (1185–1333)
 Muromachi period (1333–1573)
 Momoyama period (1573–1600)
 Tokugawa or Edo period (Tokugawa shogunate) (1600/1603–1868)
 Meiji period (1868–1912)
 Taisho period (1912–1926)
 Showa period (1926–1989)
 Allied Occupation (1945–1952)
 Heisei period (1989–present)

entered World War I in 1914. As a result, upon Germany's defeat, Japan gained Qingdao city of Shandong province, a Chinese naval base that had been leased to Germany in 1898. The Okuma cabinet also issued the Twenty-one Demands to China (demands that China recognize Japan's territorial gains in Manchuria, which China assented to, and demands that China give Japan special rights in China proper, which China successfully resisted). This action caused anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement, signed by the United States and Japan in 1917, constituted a U.S. acknowledgment of Japan's special interest in China and Japan's rights in South Manchuria. To further Japanese interests in China, the Japanese government made significant loans to the Chinese government.

Japan was involved in a military action in Siberia in 1918, along with the United States, England, and France, but sent many more troops than the Western powers and kept them there much longer. The action was very expensive and very unpopular at home; furthermore, the continued presence of Japanese troops in Siberia after troops from the other powers had withdrawn caused friction with the United States.

The Socioeconomic Impact of World War I on Japan

World War I was a boon to the Japanese economy. Increasing overseas demand enabled Japan to export much more than before the war, greatly improving its

balance of payments. During the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), Japan had been a debtor country (1.1 billion yen). Economic good times that started in 1905 led to Japan's becoming a creditor country (2.8 billion yen) by 1920. With an increase in exports and a decrease in imports, however, the imbalance between supply and demand grew, and inflation intensified. Prices more than doubled during the same period, but wages continued to fall until 1918, causing workers economic hardship.

The wartime business expansion also increased urbanization. More people worked in nonagricultural and nonforestry industries than in agricultural and forestry industries. Population decreased in cities of fewer than 10,000 residents but increased in cities of more than 100,000. Such urbanization brought about expansion of local public financing, especially in big cities. Roads, water and sewage systems, schools, and parks were improved, and private investment in such areas as railroad and housing construction expanded greatly.

Because rice was in short supply due to speculative holding back of rice by landowners and merchants during the Siberian intervention, and because there was larger demand for rice in rapidly growing urban areas, its price increased. In July 1918, housewives of a fishing village in Toyama Prefecture rioted over the price of rice, and the riot eventually expanded nationally.

Intellectuals in the First Half of the Taisho Period

Minobe Tatsukichi (1873–1948), a law professor at Tokyo Imperial University, and Yoshino Sakuzo (1878–1933), also a professor at Tokyo Imperial University, promoted theories that supported the democratic movement. Minobe believed that supreme power belonged not to the emperor but rather to national common purpose and that the emperor's power should be limited; he described the emperor as one organ of the state. Minobe supported party politics and the appointment of party members to the cabinet in a period when many still thought the cabinet should be above the political wrangling party politics brought with it. Yoshino, for his part, believed that the public's participation in government should be through a representational system instead of leaving a politics to a small elite. He did not assert the sovereignty of the people but rather democratization of politics within the limits of the Meiji constitution.

In literature, various schools emerged that advocated self-fulfillment based on individualism; they grew out of and in opposition to schools of literary naturalism, which advocated factual or realistic representation

and which had been popular at the beginning of the twentieth century. The new schools included the Shirakaba ha, or White Birch school, whose most famous authors included Mushanokoji Saneatsu (1885–1976) and Shiga Naoya (1883–1971); the Shin-Shichou (New Trend of Thoughts) school, with which the famous writer Akutagawa Ryunosuke (1892–1927) was at one time connected; and the Tanbi-Ha (Aestheticism School) of the sensual Nagai Kafu (1879–1959) and Tanizaki Jun'ichiro (1886–1965). Western-style theater, especially that which went under the name of "New Theater," became popular.

Postwar Politics and Diplomacy

The rice riots brought down the government of Terauchi Masatake (1852–1919), a military man, making it possible for Hara Takashi (1856–1921), the head of Japan's largest political party, the Seiyukai (Friends of Government Party), to become the first prime minister to have risen to power from within a political party (as opposed to through the military or by virtue of having been involved in crafting the Meiji government).

By the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I, Japan acquired a mandate to the islands in the South Pacific north of the equator and expanded its influence in East Asia as well. Chinese students in Beijing protested Japan's continuing presence on the peninsula of Shandong; China did not sign the Treaty of Versailles.

Amid external pressures, such as the Russian Revolution and formation of the League of Nations, Taisho Democracy reached its zenith in Japan. There was agitation for universal male suffrage (not attained until 1925), and labor unions quickly increased their memberships. Ichikawa Fusae (1893–1981), a feminist and politician who led the women's suffrage movement, and other women activists formed the Shin Fujin Kyokai, a women's association, and won the right of women to organize and attend political meetings. The public made gains in the freedoms of speech and association, and the socialist influence became strong. The Shakaishugi Doumei (Japanese Socialist League) was founded in 1920, and the Nihon Shakaito (Japan Communist Party) was founded in 1922.

In 1921, the Taisho emperor was declared mentally incompetent, and his son, the crown prince Hirohito, was made regent. Amid corruption in the government, Prime Minister Hara was assassinated in November 1921.

The new international order in Asia—the so-called Washington System—was formed by the Washington

Conference (1921–1922), which was held to discuss limitations on naval armament, the rules of naval war, and so on. The conference stipulated that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Lansing-Ishii Agreement be rejected and that China's Shandong peninsula be returned to China. Furthermore, Japan was to pull its forces out of Siberia at the beginning of 1922. Kato Tomosaburo (1861–1923), an admiral and naval chief of staff, formed the cabinet in 1922. Kato cut down on the number of warships in accordance with the provisions of the Washington Conference. In 1924, the establishment of an "aristocratic cabinet" under Kiyoura Keigo (1850–1942) caused the second movement for constitutional government by the Goken San Pa (Three Coalition Parties for Constitutional Government), a coalition that included the Seiyukai, the Kenseikai (Constitution Party), and Kakushin Kurabu (Reform Club). Goken San Pa won a great victory in the general election in 1924. As a result, the Kenseikai became the majority party, and Goken San Pa dominated the House of Representatives and forced the resignation of Kiyoura. After the resignation, the Goken San Pa administration was formed, with Kato Takaaki (1860–1926) as prime minister. Henceforth, the party cabinet system, in which the president of the majority party of the House of Representatives became the prime minister, became the rule.

The first national movement to protect constitutional government and the movement to obtain universal male suffrage developed to reflect the public's will in politics. The second movement to protect constitutional government developed to allow political parties to lead public opinion. During Kato's administration the Universal Manhood Suffrage Law was passed, swelling the ranks of eligible voters to 20 percent (from only 2 percent at the time of the Russo-Japanese war). The proletariat made advances in representation in Parliament, and the Rodo Nomin To (Workers' and Farmers' Party), a party organized for laborers and farmers, was formed in 1926. The Kato cabinet opened diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and decided to reduce armaments to the level of the Russo-Japanese War. On the negative side, Kato also enacted the Peace Preservation Law, which restricted freedoms of the press and of association.

Postwar Depression and the Kanto Earthquake

After World War I, Japan suffered a postwar depression. Initially, businesses had continued to grow even after the war, and people became absorbed in speculation in stocks and commodities. With the recovery of European and American exports, however,

the Japanese started importing more. Production capacity, which had increased during the war, fell because of decreased demand. Furthermore, exports grew slowly because of competition in the Asia-Africa market from the economies of Europe and the United States. The wartime boom's strong demand for capital had made the financial market tighten quickly. With the fall of the stock market in March 1920, the boom ended. The four major exchanges dealing in stocks, cotton yarn, raw silk, and rice were closed, and many banks and companies declared bankruptcy. Laborers also suffered from production cutbacks and wage cuts. The Japanese economy experienced severe recession and deflation. This deflationary environment saw the establishment of an oligopolistic economy largely controlled by four major financial conglomerates—Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda—often referred to as *zaibatsus*. With their abundant funds, those four companies established new industries, with such products as chemical fertilizer, electrical equipment, and rayon.

To make matters worse, the Kanto earthquake hit the industrial area of Tokyo and Yokohama in September 1923. The second Yamamoto cabinet declared a moratorium on the collection of loans to prevent economic turmoil. Furthermore, the government issued special notes, the so-called Earthquake Disaster Notes, to make up for the loss within the limit of the 100 million yen by which the Bank of Japan discounted the notes issued by commercial banks. The discounted notes, however, amounted to 430 million yen, and half of them fell insolvent, inducing concern over the credibility of the banks. This unsuccessful settlement of the notes resulted in severe financial disaster in the Japanese economy.

Intellectuals in the Second Half of the Taisho Period

Kawabata Yasunari (1899–1972), who in 1968 would become the first Japanese Nobel Prize winner for literature, became a leader of the school of Japanese writers that in the 1920s propounded a lyrical and impressionistic style, in opposition to the then-popular proletarian style, which portrayed the bleakness of proletarian existence in a rough, direct manner. The Tsukiji Shogekijo, a small theater in Tokyo formed by writer and director Osanai Kaoru in 1924, was influential in the further development of New Theater. The Free Educational Movement, which advocated education that respected a child's spontaneity and individuality, emerged in opposition to the uniform and controlled public education sponsored by the Ministry of Education.

From Taisho to Showa

Crown Prince Hirohito had been his father's regent from 1921; in 1926, with the death of the Taisho emperor, he became emperor, and the Showa period began. Although the Taisho period had seen the growth of a labor movement, universal male suffrage attained, and the development of party politics, the unstable economic climate and the power of the military set the stage for Japan's increasing militarism during the 1930s.

Akibiro Kawakami

See also: Meiji Period; Russo-Japanese War; Showa Period; Sino-Japanese War

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TAIWAN—PROFILE (2001 est. pop.22.4 million). Taiwan, officially known as the Republic of China (ROC), is an island about 100 miles (161 kilometers) off the southeast coast of China. It is roughly shaped like a tobacco leaf. The origin of the Chinese name Taiwan is unknown, but some scholars suggest it may be a phonetic rendering of an aboriginal name for the island. It is also known in the West as Formosa, or "beautiful island," a name given it by Portuguese explorers. Taiwan is approximately 36,000 square kilometers in size. Taipei, in the north of the island, is its largest city and capital. Taiwan is bounded to the north by the East China Sea, which separates it from Japan; to the east by the Pacific Ocean; to the south by the Bashi Channel, which separates it from the Philippines; and to the west by the Taiwan Strait, which separates it from China. In addition to the main island of Taiwan, the ROC government also has jurisdiction over Lanyu, Green Island, the Pescadores, Kinmen, Matsu, and a number of smaller, uninhabited islands.



TAIWAN

Country name: Republic of China (ROC)
Area: 35,980 sq km
Population: 22,370,461 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 0.8% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 14.31 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 6 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: -0.34 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio—total population: 1.05 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 6.93 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population: 76.54 years, male 73.81 years, female: 79.51 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: mixture of Buddhist, Confucianist, and Taoist; Christian
Major languages: Mandarin Chinese (official), Taiwanese (Min), Hakka dialects
Literacy—total population: 86%, male 93%, female 79% (1980 est.)
Government type: multiparty democratic regime headed by popularly elected president
Capital: Taipei
Administrative divisions: 16 counties
Independence: Republic Day (Anniversary of the Chinese Revolution), 10 October (1911)
Suffrage: 20 years of age; universal
GDP—real growth rate: 6.3% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita (purchasing power parity): \$17,400 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: 1% (1999 est.)
Exports: \$148.38 billion (f.o.b., 2000)
Imports: \$140.01 billion (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Currency: new Taiwan dollar (TWD)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Factbook* 2001. Retrieved 6 May 2002, from: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

History

Until the seventeenth century, Taiwan was inhabited almost exclusively by a number of aboriginal groups of Austronesian origin, although it was also visited by Chinese fishers and used as a haven for Japanese and Chinese pirates. Interested in using the island as an intermediate port between Japan and their colony in the Philippines, the Spanish established a settlement in the north of the island in 1626, which they held until evicted by the Dutch in 1642. In 1624, the Dutch established a trading post and settlement on the Southwest coast of Taiwan, near what is today the city of Tainan. The presence of Spanish and Dutch colonies on the island, and the prospect of work on new sugar plantations, brought an influx of Chinese immigrants to Taiwan.

In 1662 the Chinese rebel Zheng Chenggong (1624–1662; known in the West as Koxinga), who had hoped to restore the defunct Ming Dynasty in China, was driven out of China and fled with his armies to Taiwan. Zheng quickly defeated the Dutch and set up his own government on the island. He brought with him a new influx of Chinese immigrants. The Manchurian Qing Dynasty (1644–1912) took control of Taiwan in 1683, and it remained a part of Fujian Province until 1883, after which it was administered as a separate province. During Qing rule, Chinese colonizers took over the entire western part of the island. The original aboriginal inhabitants of the western plains largely intermarried with the Chinese. The aboriginal populations of the central mountains and east coast remained free from Chinese administrative control during the Qing period.



As a result of the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) and the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Taiwan became a Japanese colony in 1895 and was administered for the first time in history as a single political unit. At the conclusion of World War II, Japan was forced to relinquish its colonies in Asia, and Taiwan was placed under ROC control. In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party established the People's Republic of China. The Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomintang, GMT), then led by General Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), retreated to Taiwan and has governed the island ever since. Following anti-GMT riots and violent government reprisals in 1947, the island was under martial law until 1987. The GMT has continued to claim jurisdiction over the Chinese mainland, and the Communist government of the PRC also claims sovereignty over Taiwan.

Geography

Taiwan is a largely mountainous island, formed geographically by the collision zone of the Philippine Sea plate, pushing up from the southeast, and the Eurasian plate, pushing down from the northwest. The alluvial plains and terraced tablelands of the western coast constitute the principle population areas and major cities. The major ports are Keelung, on the northern tip of the island, and Kaohsiung, on the southwestern coast. The Central Mountain Range runs down the center of the island from north to south, the tallest peak being Yu Shan at 3,997 meters. The east coast of the is-

land, with the exception of a major rift valley extending from Hualien to Taidong, is largely unsuitable for agriculture and sparsely settled.

Taiwan straddles the Tropic of Cancer, giving it long, hot summers and cool winters. The tropical south remains free of frost all year, but it does snow in the higher mountain areas of the north. The mean annual precipitation is 102 inches. Rainfall is heavier in the north, where winters are cold and rainy, than in the south, which generally remains warm and sunny. Typhoon season lasts from July to September, and can bring violent storms to Taiwan.

Politics

Taiwan was under martial law from 1947 until 1987. Beginning in 1986, in response to a growing opposition movement, the GMT began to liberalize the government and martial law was abolished in 1987. When Chiang Kai-shek's son and successor Chiang Ching-kuo (1910–1988) died, he was replaced by his hand-picked successor, Vice President Lee Teng-hui (b. 1923). In 1996, Lee Teng-hui returned to office as the first democratically elected president in the history of the ROC, and in 2000 Chen Shui-bian (b. 1951) became the first non-GMT candidate to be elected president of Taiwan.

Since the lifting of martial law in 1987, Taiwan has evolved into a multiparty democracy. Although the GMT still advocates eventually reunification with mainland China, some factions have been perceived as pro-independence, especially after Lee Teng-hui declared in 1999 that China and Taiwan are de facto two independent countries. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the party of Chen Shui-bian, grew out of the opposition movement in the 1980s and controls most of the local and municipal governments. The DPP is split among pragmatic factions that focus on local governance and fundamentalist factions that advocate a formal declaration of independence from China. In 1993, the New Party emerged from among the right-wing ranks of the GMT to become the strongest advocates for unification with China. Taiwan also has a number of small parties, including a Green Party and the Taiwan Independence Party.

Economy

In 1997 Taiwan's gross national product yielded \$284.8 billion, making it the world's twentieth-largest economy. In 1997 the industrial sector accounted for 34.9 percent of gross domestic product, agriculture accounted for 2.7 percent, and the growing service sector 62.4 percent. Foreign trade has played a vital role in Tai-

wan's economic development, enabling it to amass the third-largest foreign-exchange reserves in the world.

From 1945 to about 1975, government initiatives led Taiwan from import substitution to export promotion policies. Although some state industries have since undergone privatization, the government has historically run key industries such as electricity, steel, and petroleum. The state constructs basic infrastructure (highways, railways, and waterways), oversees the financial system (including banks and the stock market), and helps develop new sectors through technology transfers and dissemination of market information.

Taiwan is best known for its dynamic private sector. Entry costs for entrepreneurs are among the lowest in the world, a fact that accounts for the proliferation of small, often short-lived, stores and enterprises around the island. In the 1970s and 1980s, Taiwanese people often preferred to go into business for themselves, saying it is better to "be the head of a chicken than the tail of an ox." Flexible, often family-run manufacturers took the lead in producing consumer goods for the export market.

With a rise in the value of the new Taiwan dollar (Taiwan's currency) and the correspondingly high cost of Taiwanese labor, Taiwan has undergone industrial restructuring, with a shift from labor-intensive to capital-intensive production. Labor-intensive manufacturing processes, such as shoes and electric goods, have shifted production to mainland China and southeast Asia, with domestic production shifting to high-tech, capital-intensive industries. The Taiwanese economy is becoming increasingly dependent on the computer and related industries. In 1997 the hardware information technology industry yielded a total production value of US\$30 billion, making it Taiwan's most important foreign exchange earner. Since 1995 Taiwan has been the world's third largest computer hardware supplier, trailing only behind the United States and Japan.

Peoples

At 601 persons per square kilometer, Taiwan is second only to Bangladesh for population density. Taiwan has an ethnically heterogeneous population. The original Austronesian aborigines, now divided into several diverse ethnic groups, live primarily in the central mountains or on the east coast, although young people often migrate to the major cities in search of work. Together, Taiwanese aborigines constitute about 2 percent of the population. In recent years, there has been a renaissance of aboriginal culture, their rights to cultural survival being enshrined in the 1997 revisions to the constitution.

The majority of the Taiwanese population are descendants from immigrants who arrived from China's Fujian and Guangdong provinces. The largest ethnic group are the Hokkien Chinese from southern Fujian Province. They speak Taiwanese, a dialect originating in the Xiamen area of Fujian Province that has evolved largely through the addition of loan words from Japanese, and is now considered on Taiwan to be a language distinct from Chinese. The Hakka, originally from Guangdong Province, also speak a distinct dialect. They live mostly in the foothills on the west coast.

The arrival of the GMT on Taiwan in the 1940s also brought with it an influx of predominantly Mandarin-speaking immigrants. These late arrivals, who come from all parts of China, are known as "mainlanders" in popular discourse, and now comprise about 15 percent of the total population. For the decades immediately following GMT takeover of Taiwan, they controlled the government and key industries, leaving the so-called "native Taiwanese" in charge of small-scale industry and petty commerce. In recent years, this ethnic division of labor has been challenged by the rise of an indigenous middle class and the increasing importance of class divisions. Due to the political dominance of the mainlanders and prohibitions against speaking Taiwanese in school or public discourse, Mandarin has become the lingua franca of Taiwan. In recent years, however, there has been a revival of interest in both the Taiwanese and Hakka languages, now frequently used in the media and in public transportation announcements.

Culture

Taiwan is home to most of the world's major religions, including Buddhism, Taoism, Protestant Christianity, Roman Catholicism, and Islam. Confucianism, with its emphasis on morality, family ethics, and academic thinking, has deeply influenced the Chinese people of Taiwan. Religion is not a divisive issue on Taiwan, however, as most Taiwanese people are eclectic in belief, practicing a combination of different faiths. In recent years, there has been a rise in so-called new religions, such as new sects of Buddhism with largely urban congregations and Yi-Guan-Dao, which combines Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism into one religion.

The family is the most important theme in Taiwanese culture. Based on the Confucian concepts of filial piety and ancestor worship, the patrilineal family has long been the foundation of Taiwanese society. In the past, the family was the main economic institution in society, providing members with savings, investment, and production functions, as well as with

social services. Those material dimensions of the family have been increasingly taken over by the state and private market in recent years, transforming the family into unit based primarily on emotional ties. Nationalist ideologies on Taiwan, however, still stress the importance of the family as a key cultural institution, which they perceive to be fundamentally different from families in other societies.

Taiwan is a rich fusion of Chinese, Japanese, aboriginal, and Western cultures. The National Palace Museum in Taipei is the repository of perhaps the world's best collection of traditional Chinese paintings, pottery, porcelain, curios, and sculptures. In addition to the visual arts, Taiwan also has a rich musical and theatrical culture that includes Chinese opera, Taiwanese opera and puppet theater, and aboriginal folk music. Performances at state-sponsored cultural centers, as well as in private venues, are frequent across the island. Architecture on the island is an eclectic mix of Qing-dynasty Chinese architecture, Japanese architecture, and the glass-and-steel architecture of pan-Asian modernity. Western influences are playfully integrated into the Meiji architecture of the Japanese period and the postmodern apartment complexes and skyscrapers of the 1990s.

The Question of National Sovereignty

The major issue currently facing Taiwan is the question of national sovereignty. The People's Republic of China sees Taiwan as a renegade province and would like to unify Taiwan into China in the next century. They have offered Taiwan high level autonomy in the context of "one country, two systems." China has increasingly isolated Taiwan diplomatically, preventing the ROC government from entering international organizations such as the World Health Organization and the United Nations. The Chinese military has also indicated preparedness to use military means to unify Taiwan and China if other strategies prove unworkable. On the Taiwanese side, President Chen Shui-bian has said that Taiwan and China are separate, sovereign states. With inflexibility on both sides, there is little hope that the issue will be resolved in the near future.

Scott Simon

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TAIWAN—EDUCATION SYSTEM Throughout Chinese history, education has been valued highly. The affirmation of this tradition is written into the law of the land. The 1946 Constitution of the Republic of China (Taiwan) establishes minimum spending thresholds for educational expenditures: not less than 15 percent of the total national budget, not less than 25 percent of the provincial budget, and not less than 35 percent of the municipal budget. The writers of the constitution displayed great foresight when they also took on the responsibility to "safeguard the livelihood of those who work in the fields of education . . . [and] increase their remuneration from time to time" (Article 165). The result of this legal affirmation is that Taiwan has developed one of the best systems of education in the world.

Total Expenditures and Enrollments

According to official government records, Taiwan's total government spending in 1999 for education, science, and culture exceeded \$17.33 billion, or about 6.5 percent of the gross national product or 15.6 percent of government expenditures, and roughly \$619 per citizen. When the Republic of China established control over Taiwan in 1945, the island's population was under 10 million people. Today the government exerts its authority over a population of 22 million.

In 1950, 17,111 students were enrolled in Taiwan's twenty-eight kindergartens. Preschooling was uncommon. In 1981 laws were passed to set basic standards. In 1998, 238,787 children attended 2,874 registered preschools, including both public (37 percent) and private (67 percent). The total preschool enrollment, in-

cluding crèches and nursery schools, is 40 percent of the age group. This is lower than the 80 to 90 percent enrolled in many developed nations.

In the 1998 school year, 2.9 million elementary and junior high school students were enrolled in Taiwan's nine-year compulsory education system, and 916,000 students were enrolled in higher education. The elementary grades contain 97.8 percent of all school-age children between the ages of six and eleven. The total enrollment rate of the population between age six and twenty-one is 80 percent, and more than one-fifth of Taiwan's total population is attending an educational institution of some type. The effect of these educational opportunities has been to drop the national illiteracy rate to 5.3 percent.

There are 137 institutions of higher education, with an undergraduate class of 916,000 and a graduate class of 54,000. In terms of percentage of the population, these totals rank the Republic of China comparatively high in the world.

Educational Policies before the 1990s

The first forty years of Taiwan's education policy were designed to accomplish academic and political purposes: the academic goals stressed science, math, engineering, and history. To achieve a productive workforce, students were channeled into academic and vocational paths early. Several difficult examinations deterred more than 70 percent of the students from entering higher educational programs. The pedagogical approach used rote learning, uniform examinations, continuous testing, and an authoritarian learning environment.

The political goals were to sinicize the Taiwanese. Mandarin Chinese was compulsory and was the only form of Chinese taught. Students and citizens were forbidden from and punished for using local Taiwanese dialects or languages in the classrooms or in public offices. An unswerving loyalty to the goals of the Republic of China was demanded. The students were required to study the biography and writings of Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), the founder of the Republic of China, and to prepare for the return to China by studying Chinese history, geography, literature, and the tenets of Confucianism. While the government of Taiwan was under martial law (1947–1987), all educational institutions were staffed with political or military officers who maintained ideological discipline. These officers had the authority to keep files on students and to have them arrested. School officials openly practiced discrimination against Taiwanese natives because of their ethnic background and culture.

In 1949, 2 million refugees from the mainland entered Taiwan, adding to the 9 million Taiwanese. These Chinese mainlanders formed about 8 percent of the total population but controlled the political, military, and educational institutions.

Reforms in the 1990s

Academically, following the 1987 abrogation of martial law, Taiwan's authorities recognized the need to develop more paths to educational fulfillment. These have included alternative educational opportunities for gifted children; for special-needs students such as the blind, deaf, and handicapped; and for non-Mandarin speakers. Educational programs have been extended to adults and now incorporate support for social and cultural centers.

Educators recognize that though Taiwanese students excel in science, they are not good problem solvers and lack a sense of curiosity and initiative. Consequently, the educators have realized that they must provide greater flexibility in course requirements and teaching approaches. Instead of separating academic and vocational education, there is now a tendency to integrate the two types of learning. Due to the economic and technological environment created by the Information Age, students who enter comprehensive high schools can participate in designing their own curriculum and can prepare independently for their career choices. Reforms in program flexibility, length of the learning time line, and the grading system reflect an awareness of the individual student's needs. These reforms have called for more compensation to teachers who have to retool and who have to spend more time in individualized teaching preparations.

The abrogation of martial law in 1987 has resulted in the liberalization of Taiwan's educational system. The most significant change has been in the teaching of Taiwan's history. Local and regional history have entered the curriculum, and the general history of China and the role of the Nationalist Party, the Guomintang (or Kuomintang, the ruling party), has been reduced. In 1998 an unsuccessful attempt to quash a standardized textbook on Taiwan's historical identity resulted in an upsurge of locally focused writings, including classes on minority languages, music, culture, and history. Newspapers, radio, television, and other media promote Taiwan's peculiar multiculturalism. The current political challenge is how to combine a local, national, and international curriculum without explosive conflict between the groups that support independence for Taiwan and those who support reunification with the mainland. Of course, Beijing's ire will

increase as Taiwan's education becomes more independent from the history of China as understood by the nationalist ideology on the mainland.

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TAIWAN—HUMAN RIGHTS Following Japan's defeat in World War II, Taiwan once again became part of China. The Nationalists' rule in Taiwan was so oppressive, however, that the Taiwanese rose up against them on 28 February 1947. In response, the government imposed martial law in Taiwan, which remained in place until 1987. Political opponents were kept imprisoned on Green Island. These prisoners consisted of Mainlanders—Chinese who fled the mainland at the time of the Communist victory—who criticized Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government, and Taiwanese who suffered from Taipei's repressive and brutal attacks on their demands for political representation and calls for independence. Martial law (*jie-yen-fa*) placed enforcement and punishment of alleged crimes against state security in the hands of the Garrison Military Command. Secret trials and torture were extensively practiced by the military, and disappearances and unexplained deaths were commonplace.

The first major public breakthrough for opponents of martial law was the trial, on charges of treason, of the Gaoxiung (Kaohsiung) Eight. In order to coincide with United Nations Human Rights Day on 10 December 1979, the defendants organized an antigovernment protest march, which resulted in violence and destruction. The trial was made public as a result of international pressure. For the first time, the mechanics of martial law were made visible to the public. The defendants received sentences ranging from twelve years to life in prison. Eventually all were released early, and several, along with their lawyers, became active in Taiwan's human rights movement. Lu Xiu-lien (b. 1944) suffered in jail but later recovered and became a leading women's rights activist and in

2000 became the vice president of the Republic of China. Chen Shui-bian (b. 1951), a young commercial lawyer who represented the Gaoxiung Eight, turned to opposition politics and eventually became the mayor of Taipei (1994) and the president of the Republic of China in 2000. He appointed human rights professionals to high government offices: Lin Feng-ching, a proponent of social activism, ecology, anti-nuclear issues, and human rights, became Taipei's director of the Bureau of Reconstruction; Chen Chu, director of the Taiwan Human Rights Association, became director of Social Affairs for Taipei City. He also activated human rights policies in all areas of life.

The end of martial law on 15 July 1987 resulted in a dramatic propagation of human rights organizations and campaigns. Green Island prison was closed. Taiwanese nationalists successfully obtained greater political representation. The indigenous people and ethnic groups such as the Hakka established newspapers, radio, and television programs. Women, environmentalists, gays, laborers, fishermen, migrant workers, artists, health providers, social workers, and even criminals joined the chorus for a culture of human dignity based on human rights laws.

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TAIWAN—POLITICAL SYSTEM In the last decade of the twentieth century, the Republic of China on Taiwan became the first full-fledged multiparty democracy in Chinese history. The ongoing process of democratization has been accompanied by a growing feeling of Taiwanese identity vis-à-vis Chinese identity and has led to increasing tensions with the People's Republic of China, which considers Taiwan to be a renegade province. Both developments—democratization and Taiwanization—have greatly influenced the process of constitutional reforms and the balance of power between different political parties. They cannot be understood correctly without knowing the historical background, that is, the constitution of 1947, that was reformed in 1989.

Constitution of 1947 Structure

The Constitution of 1947 permitted democracy, guaranteed civil liberties, and promoted political participation. It was an eclectic mixture of Chinese and



PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN)

Adopted on 25 Dec 1946.

The National Constituent Assembly of the Republic of China, by virtue of the mandate received from the whole body of citizens, in accordance with the teachings bequeathed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in founding the Republic of China, and in order to consolidate the authority of the State, safeguard the rights of the people, ensure social tranquility, and promote the welfare of the people, do hereby adopt this Constitution to be promulgated throughout the land for faithful and perpetual observance by one and all.

Source: International Court Network.
Retrieved 8 March 2002, from: http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/tw00000_.html

Western elements. It outlined a political system consisting not of three, but of five powers, called the councils (*yuan*). Two councils derived from the traditional Chinese institutions of the examination system and the censorate. The Examination Yuan fulfills the functions of a civil-service commission, while the Control Yuan (equivalent to the censorate) oversees government administration. The three other councils—the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judicial Yuan—can be compared with the three powers in Western parliamentarism, in which the chief of the cabinet (Executive Yuan) is the head of government and is responsible to the parliament (Legislative Yuan).

However, the constitution also had elements from a presidential system: the National Assembly and the president. The National Assembly elected the president and had, for example, the right to change the constitution. The president acted as the head of state and was the supreme commander of the armed forces. He also had the right to rule in times of unrest with the help of emergency powers. Although his powers exceeded those of a president in parliamentary systems, this presidency was not really an executive institution.

As a consequence of this amalgam, the 1947 constitution was neither presidential nor purely parliamentary. It was complicated by severe legal problems: not only was it marred by two competing legislative and executive blocs (the Legislative Yuan and the premier versus the National Assembly and the president), but also the relationship between those blocs was not clear. There were no functional boundaries, nor did any feasible system of checks and balances exist. No regulation, for example, existed for the instance in which the president and the premier, who is responsible to the Legislative Yuan but has to be nominated by the president, come from competing political parties.

Constitutional Practice until 1990

In practice, the constitution of 1947 was in effect only for six months. From 1948 on, and especially after the defeat of the Nationalists in the civil war and their withdrawal to Taiwan in 1949, the president of the republic and chairman of the Nationalist Party (Guomindang, GMD), Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), ruled with the help of emergency decrees and martial law. As a consequence, the bifurcated but predominantly parliamentary system of 1947 was replaced by a dictatorship dominated by the president.

Constitutional Reforms since 1990

Starting in 1986, the GMD allowed some liberalization of the Nationalist government on Taiwan. It

abolished martial law, legalized the formation of political parties, and removed restrictions on civil rights. In 1990, the GMD decided to reelect all representative institutions and to reform the constitution. In 1991 Lee Teng-hui, who succeeded Chiang Kai-shek's son Chiang Ching-kuo as president, rescinded the emergency laws. In the following years, the political system on Taiwan has been readjusted toward a presidential system of government.

The National Assembly was stripped of most of its powers and is no longer directly elected; it is now mainly responsible for constitutional changes. The president, who since 1996 has been elected directly, has gained in power. The premier has become a kind of executive agent of the president, who, albeit still with only a few clearly defined executive powers of his own, is now able to dominate the Executive Yuan. The Legislative Yuan now can propose a no-confidence vote against the premier. However, it runs the risk of being dissolved by the president if it does so. Whereas these changes are a step in the direction of a system with more checks and balances, the problem of a bifurcated political system remains unsolved. If a political party different from that of the president should dominate the Legislative Yuan, the president would have to nominate a premier from that party. Because the president and the premier are not urged to cooperate in a state council and because the legal executive

powers of the president are still very limited, a constitutional crisis could well be the consequence.

Electoral Competition between Political Parties

Parallel to the constitutional reforms, since 1990 the party system has undergone far-reaching changes, which in the end led to the landslide defeat of the GMD in the presidential elections of March 2000. In 1986, the GMD tolerated the establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which united major forces of the previous opposition against the GMD. Since the early 1970s, this opposition had fought for democratization and Taiwanization of the polity. In the years after 1986, the GMD managed to incorporate many of the opposition's demands and therefore was able to maintain the upper hand in most of the central elections. The changes of GMD policy meant that the party was increasingly troubled by inner-party struggles between Lee Teng-hui's policy of further Taiwanization and those who leaned toward the long-term goal of reunification with the mainland.

In August 1993, the first split resulted in the establishment of the New China Party, which was not able to garner more than 10 percent of the votes in the elections. In 1999, the GMD split a second time, with James Soong, the previous governor of Taiwan Province and the GMD secretary general, declaring that he would run as an independent candidate in the presidential elections. In these elections, the GMD candidate, Lien Chan, got 23.1 percent of the vote; James Soong received 36.8 percent; and the DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bian, got 39.3 percent. The conflicts within the GMD hence enabled the DPP to score a historic victory and, at the same time, led to the situation of a president who has to cope with a Legislative Yuan dominated by another party.

Results of Ten Years of Reform

After more than a decade of constant reforms and tremendous changes, the political system of the Republic of China on Taiwan today is fully democratized and is by and large characterized by a consensus that Taiwan has its own identity. A vibrant and still-changing party system has developed that makes it hard to predict future developments. As a result of the GMD split that followed the presidential elections of March 2000, James Soong established a new political party, the Peoples First Party. This party's performance will have at least as great an influence on the future political development of Taiwan as the outcome of the GMD party reforms triggered by the defeat of March 2000 and the performance of the DPP as a quasi-government party.

The constitutional situation has improved, but it still needs further adjustments in order to clarify the power relation between the president, the premier, the Legislative Yuan, and the National Assembly, so as to ensure a stable political system with a government that will be able to react quickly and with a unified voice when dealing with future internal and external challenges.

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See also: **Chen Shui-bian; Chiang Kai-shek; Lee Teng-hui**

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TAIWAN ECONOMIC MIRACLE Taiwanese economic growth in the past forty years has been phenomenal. In 1962 Taiwan had a per capita gross national product (GNP) of \$170, placing the island's economy squarely between Zaire and Congo. By 1997 Taiwan's per capita GNP, adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP), had soared to \$19,197, contributing to a Human Development Index similar to that of European countries such as Spain, Portugal, and Greece. This economic feat has been well recognized in business and scholarly communities, with Taiwan often touted as the prime example of growth with equity. In popular discourse in both Taiwan and abroad, this rapid economic growth has been called the "Taiwan economic miracle." In Taiwan this ideology is usually associated with the ruling Guomintang (Kuomintang, GMD) party and its adherents.

Most economic scholars have attributed Taiwan's economic growth to the successful implementation of neoliberal free market economic principles. Others have emphasized the role of GMD policy as leading



FIVE LARGEST COMPANIES IN TAIWAN

According to *Asia Week*, the five largest companies in Taiwan are the following:

Company	Sector	Sales (\$ millions)	Rank in Asia
Chinese Petroleum	Oil Refining	14,975.2	75
Taiwan Power	Energy	9,811.4	139
Chunghwa Telecom	Telecommunications	5,893.7	216
Taiwan Semiconductor	Technology	5,416.8	232
Mitac International	Computers	5,257.6	238

Source: "The Asia Week 1000." (2001) *Asia Week* (9 November): 116.

to a developmentalist state. Some scholars have claimed that Taiwan's economic miracle is the result of a Chinese Confucian culture that emphasizes education, family values, and an industrious work ethic. In all of its variations, the ideology of the Taiwan economic miracle has justified GMD rule of Taiwan through depiction of the island as the embodiment of capitalist productivity, bureaucratic efficiency, and Chinese tradition. This ideology links capitalistic development to nationalist sentiment, making opposition to capitalism seem non-Chinese and unpatriotic.

Ever since martial law was lifted in 1987, the ideology of the Taiwan economic miracle has come under question by both Taiwanese and Western scholars. Some scholars note that Taiwan's phenomenal economic growth actually began under Japanese occupation of the island. Some point out the influence of U.S. aid on the island, which contributed greatly to Taiwan's gross domestic product during the Cold War decades of the 1950s and 1960s and also opened up the U.S. market to Taiwanese products. These historical arguments are usually identified in Taiwan with the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party).

Some scholars look beyond the "miracle" at problems such as ethnic divisions in Taiwanese society, the evolution of economic classes, and the environmental destruction wrought by rapid industrialization. Within Taiwan, the nationalist implications of the ideology have been criticized most vocally by the labor and feminist movements. If many people believe that hard work is a Taiwanese national characteristic and a reason for the economic miracle, for example, it is difficult for unions to advocate a forty-hour workweek. The ideology, therefore, has had largely a conserva-

tive influence on society, creating greater adherence to the GMD and restraining the growth of progressive political movements on the island.

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TAIWAN—INVESTMENT IN ASIA After three decades of economic development—which included phases of import substitution, export expansion, and industrial upgrading—Taiwan fostered a special economic environment, characterized by small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and specialized industrial networks. Following rises in wages and land prices, coupled with an appreciating currency at home, Taiwanese firms embarked on a major stream of outward foreign direct investment (FDI) in the mid-1980s.

Taiwanese Investment in China

According to official records of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Taiwanese investment on the

mainland first took place in 1983. The volume of investment projects, however, did not significantly increase until 1988. In 1991, the Taiwanese government eventually legalized indirect investment in the mainland, via a third country, but the surge in the stream of FDI into the PRC took place between 1993 and 1996.

Taiwan's investment in China showed a strong trend toward certain locations. Before 1992, Guangdong and Fujian (two southeast coastal provinces of China) had accounted for 67.3 percent of the total investment amount, and 88 percent of cases. In 1999, Guangdong province continued to attract the largest percentage of Taiwan's investment dollars (29 percent), Jiangsu and Fujian attracted about 10 percent each, and the more northern reaches of Beijing and Liaoning attracted 5 percent and 2 percent of funding, respectively. It is well known that Taiwan's FDI in China has always played a pioneering role for both Western and Japanese FDI, with the adventurous SMEs playing a crucial role in these pioneering endeavors.

As to industrial distribution, in 1991, the labor-intensive industries (including electrical and electronics components, vehicles, shoemaking, plastic products, clothing, and so on) were the leading outgoing industries for Taiwanese investment in China. With the upgrading of Taiwan's industries, however, technology- and capital-intensive industries have gradually assumed a leading role in outward FDI to mainland China. In the last three years of the twentieth century, the electronics industry (including home appliances and personal computers) accounted for almost 40 percent of the total annual investment in China. The petrochemicals, basic metals, and textiles industries accounted for a further 6 to 7 percent, respectively.

Taiwanese Investment in Southeast Asia

Taiwan's investment in Southeast Asia has, however, demonstrated quite a different pattern from its investment in China. By the end of 1999, Taiwan's FDI in Southeast Asia was about equal to that in China (around 40 billion New Taiwan dollars in contracts, respectively). In terms of the number of FDI firms, however, there are only around 5,500 firms in Southeast Asia as compared to 40,000 in China. This means that the average scale of Taiwanese investment in Southeast Asia is much larger than in China. Taiwan is now the second-largest investor in both China and Vietnam, the third-largest in Malaysia and Cambodia, the fourth-largest in Thailand, and the fifth-largest in the Philippines and Indonesia. As a trading partner, Taiwan ranks between fifth and ninth in each of these countries.

Distinctive Features of Taiwan's Investment in Asia

Through FDI, Taiwanese firms are constructing a regional production network to supply a broad range of differentiated and competitive products. Among the various industries, electronics and personal computers take the leading roles in international manufacturing division of labor. There are sixteen products currently achieving the highest market share in the global market in computers and peripherals, among which switching power suppliers, keyboards, mice, desktop personal computers, sound cards, cases, and monitors all have a 70 percent or higher proportion of their products produced abroad.

Previously established national industrial networks provide the Taiwanese SMEs with their competitive edge in overseas production. Such export-oriented, subcontracting-based FDI exhibits two distinctive characteristics. First, Taiwan's FDI is trade-creating rather than trade-substituting; in order to maintain their core strength in export competition, Taiwanese firms have to rely on an intrafirm and interfirm division of labor and on network resources at home to support their offshore production operations. Second, Taiwanese FDI firms are small by international standards, typically lacking managerial and financial resources. Their subsidiaries are therefore given a high degree of autonomy in managerial decisions. This results in the rapid pace of localization.

These two distinctive characteristics of Taiwanese firms represent a unique approach to internationalization. Taiwanese firms combine domestic resources with those of Southeast Asia and China to strengthen global competitiveness. Unlike Western multinational firms, which generally undertake FDI either to explore local markets or to create export enclaves in a labor haven, Taiwanese FDI is aimed at network linkages that provide access to local resources that promote growth and technology upgrading. Taiwanese firms specialize in small niche markets, in which they strive for a leadership position. Through FDI, they construct a regional production network to supply a broad range of differentiated and competitive products. With the support of a regional production network, they can more readily respond to shifting demands from all sides.

Last but not least, at the beginning of the twenty-first century a unique phenomena emerged. Through the efforts of some domestic or international charity associations (for example, the Tzu-chi Buddhist Compassion Relief Foundation and World Vision Taiwan), Taiwanese FDI firms transformed their international industrial networks into networks of compassion and

relief for disaster-hit, poor, or needy areas. Therefore, Taiwanese overseas investment networks may lead to a diverse wave of "entrepreneurs of loving kindness" in Asia in the twenty-first century.

Lee-in Chen Chiu

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TAIWAN, MODERN (2002 est. pop. 23.3 million). Taiwan is an island situated approximately 176 kilometers east of the Chinese mainland. Han Chinese (China's dominant ethnic group) account for 98 percent of Taiwan's population; the other 2 percent are indigenous peoples whose ancestral origins lie in neolithic southern China and Austronesia. Regionally and historically, the population originated in two great migrations from the mainland: those Chinese who came to Taiwan before 1895, who originated in Fujian and Guangdong provinces, and the nearly two million who came with the Nationalist Chinese following the Communists' 1949 victory in China's civil war.

The Establishment of the Republic of China on Taiwan

When Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party (the Guomindang, GMD) arrived in Taiwan, it began a

campaign against the Taiwanese and their culture. On 28 February 1947 the Chinese military escalated a dispute into an islandwide repression that left thousands of Taiwanese dead and instituted years of "White Terror," in which many Taiwanese patriots were arrested, punished, and even executed. The Taiwanese language was banned from educational institutions and government offices, and Taiwanese membership in professional, governmental, civic, and social organizations was greatly restricted. Chiang Kai-shek established the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan and asserted that it was the legitimate government of all China.

When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, President Truman sent troops to Korea and simultaneously blocked off the Taiwan Straits from a possible Communist Chinese invasion of the Republic of China. This decision established the policy that there was just one China, and that the Republic of China was its legitimate government. In addition, the decision confirmed the belief that the Nationalist Chinese were using Taiwan only as a springboard to return to China. Officially, the national capital was still Nanjing, with Taipei the temporary capital of the exiled regime. For over thirty years, the ROC did not engage in any large infrastructure construction projects, even refraining from building public parks or recreational areas, because of that attitude.

The GMD extended its powers into the all areas of society: the military, schools, banks, industry, and secret police. Because the newly arrived mainlanders were a minority of the population, they had to make alliances with local groups. Beginning in 1950, chief executives and representative bodies under the provincial level were directly elected by the citizenry. However, these elections were carefully monitored and managed. Buying votes was common. The local leadership working in harmony with the GMD became powerful and wealthy through government contracts, real estate manipulation, and protection rackets. Because Taipei was the seat of the central government of Taiwan, it was somewhat spared the worst evils of this system.

In 1971, the Republic of China withdrew from the United Nations, and its seat was transferred to the People's Republic of China. In March 1979, the United States embassy in Taipei was formally closed, replaced by the American Institute in Taiwan. This procedure was a way to mask the reality that the United States had recognized the Communist government in Beijing as the sole government of China. The shock of these diplomatic crises spurred domestic criticism of the GMD regime.

Rebellion against the GMD

The diplomatic failures, combined with growing strength and tolerance of local elections, led to increasing calls for political reform. In 1979 the *Formosa Journal* initiated a Taiwanese reform movement that threatened the mainlanders' rule and culminated in the Kaoshiung Incident of 10 December 1979. A police attack on the Taiwanese opposition resulted in multiple injuries and the beginning of the arrests, detentions, beatings, and forced exile of thousands of Taiwanese activists. The trial of the leadership for sedition was the first internationally attended political tribunal in the history of the Republic of China. The publicity and disclosure of the government's repression consolidated and energized local and international support for a democratic and open system of government. It was not until March 1996, however, that the people of Taiwan elected a president—Lee Teng-hui (b. 1923)—by direct popular vote. He received 54 percent of the vote.

Taiwan Moves toward Independence

In terms of diplomatic affairs, Lee's tenure was challenging. Under Lee, the term "one China" was redefined as "one country and two areas separately ruled by two political entities," a definition maintained by his successor, Chen Shui-bian (b. 1951).

On 18 March 2000 Chen Shui-bian, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate, and a leader in the movement for Taiwan's independence, was elected president of the Republic of China. The GMD suffered when its vote-buying practices were revealed, and many members of the industrial Taiwanese elite feared that a GMD victory would result in further escalation of the corruption and the destruction of the Taiwanese economy. Beijing's leadership threatened Taiwan with dire consequences if Chen Shui-bian won, but those threats only increased Chen Shui-bian's support. Chen had also been respected during his tenure as mayor of Taipei (1994–1998) and was highly regarded for his leadership in Taiwan's human-rights movement.

Recent Cultural Developments

As long as the Republic of China defined itself by its anti-Communist stance, the cultural emphasis was on preserving Chinese tradition. When the claim to represent all of China was shattered, there was a dramatic growth in new cultural forms. Hakka (a Chinese minority people with a population on Taiwan), Taiwanese, and indigenous tribal music grew in popularity. At first modern art was influenced by foreign

mentors in the United States, Japan, and Europe, but gradually a Taiwanese modern art emerged with its own unique emphasis on feminism, localism, and cosmopolitanism. Art was no longer sandwiched between the slices of tradition and ideological purity. The Taipei Museum of Modern Art has become one of the key venues for new artists. Taiwanese artists appear more frequently at international art shows. In the 1990s Taiwanese films won international awards: among them *The Wedding Banquet* and *Such a Life*. Modern Taiwan can also take pride in significant accomplishments in the areas of economic development and human rights. Its national security, economic progress, social justice, and cultural creativity have become an integral part of Asia and of the world.

Richard C. Kagan

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TAIWAN STRAIT The Taiwan Strait, also known by its Portuguese name, the Formosa Strait, is the 190-kilometer-wide body of water that separates the west coast of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Fujian Province of the People's Republic of China. It also links the East Sea and the South China Sea. The Taiwan Strait is home to the Pescadores (Penghu) Archipelago, a group of sixty-four small islands covering an area of approximately 80 square kilometers off the west coast of Taiwan. The largest islands of the Pescadores Archipelago are Penghu, Yuweng (Yuneng), and Baisha (Paisha), whereas the best known are the Taiwanese-controlled islands of Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu).

Keith Leitich

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TAIWAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS

The relations between the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the United States can be divided into three historical stages. The first was the period of the civil war between China's Communists and the Nationalists; the second was the period during which the United States recognized the Nationalist government in Taipei as the legitimate government of all China; and the third, which continues today, is period that began when the United States recognized the Communist government in Beijing as the legitimate government of China.

Stage 1: The Chinese Civil War, 1945-1950

During World War II, the Nationalist Republic of China, still had control of a good portion of mainland China. It was with the Nationalists that the United States allied itself against Japan. At the Cairo Conference of December 1943, the Allies agreed that P'eng Hu (the Pescadores) and Taiwan (which had been ceded to Japan in 1895) would be returned to China following Japan's defeat. The establishment of Mao Zedong's government in Beijing and the exile of Chiang Kai-shek's government to Taipei, Taiwan, created a crisis in U.S. diplomacy. The American government was still debating whether to support Beijing's or Taipei's claims to Taiwan when the Korean War broke out in June 1950. On 27 June 1950, President Harry S. Truman ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to prevent a Communist attack on Taiwan and asked the Republic of China to cease air and sea operations against the mainland.

Stage 2: Diplomatic Recognition of Taiwan, 1950-1978

On 3 October 1949, the United States issued a statement reaffirming its support of the Nationalist Government. That same year, on 7 December, the Nationalist Government established itself on in Taipei. On 27 June 1950, in reaction to the hostilities in Korea, the United States moved the Seventh Fleet into the Straits of Taiwan to protect the island. In May 1951, the United States and Taiwan established the Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG) to aid in securing Taiwan's borders from hostile assaults. This relationship provided Taiwan's government with American military, economic, and political support. Taiwan became an important base for American military and diplomatic interests. President Chiang Kai-shek sent "advisors" to Korea; rice to Vietnam; and allowed his territory to be an operations center for U.S. Navy SEAL raids on China and electronic listening stations on communications in mainland China. The so-called China Lobby organized citizens in Taiwan and

America not only to support Taipei but also to criticize Americans suspected of being pro-Communist or anti-Chiang Kai-shek.

The alliance between Americans and Chinese on Taiwan, based on anti-Communism, laid the foundation for nearly unquestioning support of Chiang's island nation. However, between 1970 and 1972 President Nixon and his secretary of state Henry Kissinger sought relations with Beijing in order to weaken the Soviet Union, pressure the North Vietnamese to the peace table, and develop trade. Beijing demanded that the United States recognize the claim of China to the island of Taiwan. This meant that America must sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan, support China's accession to Taiwan's seat in the United Nations, and agree to withdraw American military from the island.

The Joint U.S.-China Communique (subsequently known as the Shanghai Communique), signed on 28 February 1972 between President Richard Nixon and Premier Zhou Enlai, precipitated a crisis over the Taiwan Strait. Since the United States and the People's Republic of China could not reach an agreement on the status of Taiwan, each side stated its position. The Chinese side unequivocally declared that "Taiwan is a province of China . . . the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of 'one China, one Taiwan,' 'one China, two governments,' 'two Chinas,' an 'independent Taiwan' or advocate that 'the status of Taiwan remains to be determined.'" Furthermore, the Chinese maintained the right to use military force against Taiwan.

The United States acknowledged that "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China. The United States does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves."

The public communique appeared to support a peaceful process for the resolution of the Taiwan crisis. In fact, secret discussions assured the Chinese that Taiwan was just an "irritant" and that the United States was unwilling to support Taiwan's autonomy. Nixon's own State Department officials tried ineffectually to change the wording from "all" Chinese to "some" Chinese in order to acknowledge the voice and rights of the millions of Taiwanese who did not share the view that Beijing should rule them.

Chiang Kai-shek's death in 1975, and President Jimmy Carter's normalization of relations with Beijing

eroded the Nationalist's commitment to reconquer the Chinese mainland. Taiwanese domestic reaction reflected a belief that an independent Taiwan was a possibility. A tug of war began, with Taiwanese calling for independence and China calling for the return of the island to Beijing's jurisdiction. The Taiwan Strait once again became the focus for a military crisis.

Stage 3: Looking for a Peaceful Resolution, 1978–Present

In December 1978, in accordance with the promises of the Shanghai Communique, President Jimmy Carter severed formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan and normalized relations with the People's Republic of China. When formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China were severed, the U.S. Congress reacted angrily. From January to April 1979, Congress crafted the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), and passed it with a sizable majority. This act established a shadow embassy in Taiwan (called the American Institute in Taiwan), and promised Taipei that the United States would provide military support and assistance as long as China threatened the island militarily. The TRA allowed Taiwan to establish fictive diplomatic agencies in the United States, which later became known as the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office. The Congress declared that the TRA trumped the communique because it was a legislative act and thus law, not just a statement of policy or a diplomatic document agreed upon secretly and between a few individuals. Beijing clearly resented this interference in its jurisdiction and has sought to have the TRA revoked.

In 1982, the governments of China and the United States issued a second Shanghai Communique that created much controversy. President Ronald Reagan encouraged Taiwan to unify with China but linked the reduction of U.S. arms sales to Taipei with a commitment by Beijing to seek only a peaceful settlement regarding unification. Once again, the new communique conflicted with the protections provided by the Taiwan Relations Act. The last major declaration on the Taiwan issue occurred in 1999 during President Bill Clinton's visit to Beijing and Shanghai. He reiterated the U.S. policy of neither recognizing two Chinas nor an independent Taiwan. He gave added support to Beijing's position by declaring that the United States would not support Taiwan's representatives in any international organization that gives membership to an established independent state. This meant that Clinton would prevent Taiwan from joining the United Nations.

Meanwhile, relations between Taiwan and Beijing were developing their own momentum. In the late

1980s, the Republic of China established a legal and organizational mechanism to develop relations with China. In 1991, President Lee Teng-hui terminated Taiwan's goal of reuniting with China by means of force. During the 1990s, both sides established organizations to deal with issues of trade, communication, investment, and travel. China has insisted that practical issues be discussed only after the political issue of unification is agreed upon. Taiwan's strategy is to place the goal of unification into the far future when China has democratized and has risen to the economic and political standards and levels of Taiwan.

The danger of armed conflict still remains, however. China's military exercises in 1995 and its blatant brandishing of weapons and warlike rhetoric prior to the Taiwan presidential election of 2000 alarmed Taiwan and its supporters. The election in 2000 of pro-independence presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian exacerbated the crisis in the Taiwan Strait: China's military leaders stated that Taiwan must show good faith to begin talks concerning unification or face military consequences. Some American military experts believe that China will forcefully incorporate the "renegade" province before 2010. Others believe that there is still time to negotiate and find a peaceful solution. Washington, D.C., is still undecided on what type of military support should be given to Taiwan. Is a Theater Missile Defense shield necessary? What types of defensive weapons will defend Taiwan and not create an arms race? American diplomacy has so far prevented outright war in the region. Yet, any unilateral dramatic change in the unstable cross-Strait situation will surely result in major, and perhaps dire, consequences for East Asia.

Richard C. Kagan

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TAJ MAHAL The Taj Mahal at Agra in the state of Uttar Pradesh, India, is a mausoleum built by Mughal emperor Shah Jahan (reigned 1628–1658) in memory of his favorite wife, Arjumand Banu Begum, and its name is believed to be an etymological distortion of her title Mumtaz Mahal (Chosen One of the Palace). The



The Taj Mahal in July 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

Taj Mahal took more than a decade to complete (1632–1643), and it reflects mausoleum or sepulchral architecture of the Mughal period in India, combining Central Asian architectural practices, mainly of the Timurid dynasty (flourished fifteenth–sixteenth centuries), and Mughal influences within its planning, layout, architectural style, and decoration.

An isolated structure today, the mausoleum once formed part of a larger ensemble of buildings fronting the Yamuna River that included surrounding gardens, a ceremonial tennis court, subsidiary tomb enclosures, and a commercial complex divided by two bazaar streets intersecting to form four caravansaries (inns).



TAJ MAHAL—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Considered one of the eight wonders of the world, there can be no doubt as to why the Taj Mahal was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1983. Despite the best efforts of UNESCO, the beautiful white marble tomb is threatened by pollution from local industry and excessive tourism.

By the tomb's completion, the surrounding area had developed into a township called Mumtazabad (known today as Tajganj), and an imperial command decreed that the bazaars and the caravansaries, together with thirty villages from the district of Agra, provide income toward the upkeep of the mausoleum.

While the Taj Mahal is bilaterally symmetrical, its central axis, beginning at the gatehouse and culminating at the tomb, is also emphasized. The tomb, with its four minarets, clad in white marble and flanked symmetrically by a mosque and an assembly hall, sets the main accent to the palace complex. In variation, radial symmetry dominates the layout of the gatehouse and the tomb proper, both of which follow the nine-fold plan, creating distinct points of punctuation in an ordered landscape. The Taj Mahal garden is an elaborated version of a typical Mughal riverfront garden, with a raised terrace (the plinth for the main buildings) combined with a lower *char bagh* (quadripartite garden). The Taj Mahal was designated a World Heritage Site by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1983 and is one of the primary tourist attractions in India and a symbol of India around the world.

Manu P. Sobti

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TADIKISTAN—PROFILE (2001 est. pop. 6.6 million). The Republic of Tajikistan emerged as an independent county after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, the poorest of the post-Soviet republics. It entered the twentieth century ranking 108 out of 174 countries in the Human Development Index, and with a per capita gross domestic product of only \$215.4. These low figures contrast with high adult literacy rate of 95–99 percent. Tajikistan has a total area of 143,100 square kilometers. Most of its population lives in valleys, which constitute only 7 percent of country's territory. The capital of Tajikistan is Dushanbe.

Geography

Tajikistan lies in the heart of Central Asia and is bordered on the east by China, on the north and west by Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and in the south by Afghanistan. Far from seas and oceans, Tajikistan is an alpine country, with more than half the country above 3,000 meters. Geographically, Tajikistan can be

divided roughly into four parts: north, east, center, and southwest. The northern part includes the Zeravshan and Syr Dar'ya River basins and consists of semidesert land and foothills. The east is alpine country, with the highest mountain ranges in Central Asia, the Pamirs and Tian Shan. This is the biggest yet least populated region of the country. Two main mountain passes leading north and east are closed by snow for several months of the year and separate the northern and eastern regions from Dushanbe, which is located in the central part of the country. Central Tajikistan stretches from the alpine border with Kyrgyzstan and the Pamir foothills in the east to the fertile Hisor valley and the border with Uzbekistan in the west. The fourth, southwestern region includes the Vakhsh and Panj River basins, and is crossed by relatively low mountain ranges.

Like other Central Asian countries, Tajikistan has a dry climate with little rainfall, so it depends on irrigation. The climate of Tajikistan is sharply continental, ranging from a low of -20°C in January to a high of 30°C in July, depending on altitude. Thanks to its snow, ice, and glaciers, Tajikistan has more than 60 percent of Central Asia's water resources.





TAJIKISTAN

Country name: Republic of Tajikistan
Area: 143,100 sq km
Population: 6,578,681 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 2.12% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 33.23 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 8.57 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: -3.49 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio: 0.99 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 116.09 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth— 64.18 years, male: 61.09 years, female: 67.42 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Sunni Muslim, Shi'a Muslim
Major languages: Tajik (official), Russian widely used in government and business
Literacy—total population: 98%, male: 99%, female: 97% (1989 est.)
Government type: republic
Capital: Dushanbe
Administrative divisions: 2 oblasts and one autonomous oblast
Independence: 9 September 1991 (from Soviet Union)
National holiday: Independence Day, 9 September (1991)
Suffrage: 21 years of age; universal and compulsory
GDP—real growth rate: 5.1% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita: (purchasing power parity): \$1,140 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: 80% (2000 est.)
Exports: \$ 761 million (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Imports: \$782 million (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Currency: somoni (SM)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Book Factbook 2001*. Retrieved 5 March 2002, from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

The People and Languages

Tajiks, an Aryan people, were the first to settle in Central Asia. Tajiks are Muslims, predominantly Sunnis of the Hanafi school. They speak Tajiki, a western Iranian language very close to Farsi and Dari of Iran and Afghanistan, respectively. Some 200,000 Shi'a Imami Ismaili Tajiks of Badakhshan speak eastern Iranian. There are also few thousand Yaghnobi speakers living in the central part of the country. Since independence, Tajiki (written in Cyrillic script) has been the state language, while Russian is used for international communication.

History

The first urban settlements in what is now Tajikistan appeared 2,500 years ago, founded by peoples of Iranian origin. In the sixth to fourth centuries BCE the re-

gion was a part of the Achaemenian (Persian) empire. It was conquered by Alexander of Macedon at the end of the fourth century BCE. An amalgam of local and Hellenic cultures flourished in southern Central Asia in the fourth to the third centuries BCE. In the third century CE Central Asia fell under the control of Iranian Sasanid dynasty (224/28–651 CE). During the seventh and eighth centuries Arab troops brought Islam to the urban Tajik centers of Central Asia. Modern Tajiks trace the origins of their statehood to the Samanid dynasty (864–999), the first Muslim state in Central Asia to be independent of the Arabs. In the eleventh century, dynasties of Turco-Mongolian stock were established, pushing Tajiks to the political periphery.

The profile of today's Tajikistan was defined by Anglo-Russian competition at the end of the nineteenth century. In the 1860s, Russia had conquered

the Central Asian Kokand khanate. Another Tajik-populated state, the Bukharan emirate, became a Russian vassal in 1869. The British, meanwhile, controlled what are now Pakistan and India. Afghanistan, as a buffer state with its northern edge along the Amu Dar'ya, served as a natural defensive line between the Russian and British empires.

Soviet power was established in what is now Tajikistan in 1917–1921. In 1924, central and southern Tajikistan became an autonomous republic within the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1929 Khujand (current Sogdian) province was transferred from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan and the country given the status of a separate Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic.

Tajikistan declared its independence in September 1991. Immediately, a political struggle between a coalition of Islamic groups and newborn secular democratic movements who opposed the old Soviet elite erupted. In the brutal civil war of 1992–1993, 50,000 people lost their lives and more than 650,000—a tenth of the population—fled in terror. More than 35,000 homes were destroyed, and the total damage of the war reached \$7 billion.

Politics

Talks sponsored by the United Nations in 1994–1997 led to peace and the incorporation of the United Tajik Opposition into the government. Tajikistan's constitution, adopted in 1994, declared the country to be independent, democratic, unified, and secular with separated executive, legislative, and judicial powers. Tajikistan is the only state of post-Soviet Central Asia in which an Islamic movement has opted to officially participate in the political process. The supreme legislative body is the bicameral Majlisi Oli (Supreme Council). In the November 1999 presidential elections, Emomali Rakhmonov, the leader of the People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan, won 96.91 percent of votes. His opponent from the Islamic Renaissance Party got only 2.1 percent.

Economy

After Tajikistan gained independence in 1991, its economy declined, with the gross domestic product (GDP) dropping by more than 50 percent between 1991 and 1997. In 1998, the country provided just 0.3 percent of the total GDP of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the association of former Soviet republics, putting it in last place among the former USSR states. Average monthly salary stood at \$11 in 1999. According to World Bank estimates, 85 percent of Tajikistan's population live below the poverty line.

The national economy is structured as it was in Soviet times. Agriculture, represented mostly by the cotton production, is the most important sector and employs about a half the population. It is joined by some non-ferrous metallurgy, electricity generation, and light industry. In finance, a two-level bank system was created, headed by an independent national bank. In 1997, a new tax code was adopted. Privatization began in 1992 with selling of household and small enterprises, but a lack of capital and foreign investment seriously limits economic growth.

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TADIKISTAN—ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Tajikistan's economy is affected by its topography. It is a mountainous country, situated from 300 to 7,495 meters above sea level. The territory is seismic, but without volcanic phenomena. Its location deep in the heart of Asia, far from any sea, gives it a sharply continental climate. It is dry, with a plenty of solar days (250 per year) and harsh daily and seasonal temperature fluctuations. Nine-tenths of Tajikistan is mountainous, and the mountains have a large effect on the climate, which ranges from subtropical in valleys to arctic in the East Pamirs.

Agriculture

Tajikistan is severely limited in agricultural land as 65 percent is not used for any form of agriculture, and plowed fields account for only 0.6 percent of Tajikistan's total area. Nonetheless, under the Soviet Union, agriculture was emphasized and accounted for almost one-quarter of Tajikistan's internal gross output and one-third of all its exports (in the form of cotton fiber); almost half the able-bodied population was involved in agriculture. The main product was cotton.

Other forms of agriculture—stock-raising and production of cereal crops—were limited by the lack of arable land to producing only for internal needs, and

in fact were unable to supply those needs. Today, arable lands are used for cotton growing, and irrigated fields are the basis of agricultural production. Of the new land that is suitable for bringing under cultivation, the overwhelming proportion is on hillsides and is only suitable for fruit trees.

Water Resources

The total flow of water through Tajikistan is 52.2 cubic kilometers annually, or 44 percent of the total annual average flow of all Central Asian rivers. Almost all rivers are fed by glaciers, which occupy approximately 8,000 square kilometers, or 6 percent of the country.

Tajikistan has, therefore, significant potential hydroelectric resources. The potential stocks make about 300 billion kilowatt-hours per year. Turkmenistan is second among former Soviet republics (after Russia) in hydropower resources, and is first in terms of density of hydropower resources.

During the Soviet period, the Soviet Union supported the accelerated development of hydroengineering in Tajikistan. Five hydropower stations were constructed; they produced 90 percent of the electricity generated in Tajikistan. Construction of three more stations began, but they were left uncompleted at the time of the Soviet Union's collapse.

Fossil Fuels and Mineral Resources

Coal is Tajikistan's most abundant fossil fuel. There are fifteen coal-rich areas in the country, with the estimated reserve of four billion metric tons. However, almost all the deposits are difficult to exploit because of the complicated mountainous geological structure and the remoteness of the sites (far from railroads). Of the fifteen coal deposits, only one, the Shourab brown coal layer, has been exploited and an insignificant amount of coal was also extracted from the Fan-Yagnob deposit. In spite of its reserves, Tajikistan imports 85 percent of its coal needs. Tajikistan's reserves of oil and gas are insignificant and not of high quality. Domestic output of gas covered only 13 percent of demand and gas and oil were imported.

Tajikistan is fortunate in its many mineral resources: non-ferrous, rare and precious metals, raw materials for the chemical industry, and building materials. The most plentiful mineral deposits are salt, antimony, and strontium. Tajikistan is also the leading Central Asian nation for deposits of lead, zinc, bismuth, and fluor spar; its iron ore is practically the only iron in the region with industrial value. Tajik-

istan also is home to the world's second-largest silver deposits.

Under the Soviets, Tajikistan's mining industry included enterprises for extraction of ores and manufacture of concentrates of antimony, mercury, lead, zinc, gold, silver, and a number of other nonferrous and rare metals. The manufacture of aluminum accounted for 50 percent of all industrial output. However, difficulties gaining access to these minerals and the absence of modern technologies for extraction in mountainous conditions constrained development of the listed stocks. Of four hundred mineral deposits, only a hundred have been exploited. Today, Tajikistan's largest nonferrous metallurgical enterprises are Adrasman and Anzob Mining Ore Combines, Tajik Aluminum Plant, and Isfara Hydrometallurgical Combine.

Manufacturing

While part of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan manufactured cable products, household refrigerators, power transformers, chemicals, store equipment, parts for automobiles and agricultural and textile machines, and other items. Most of the enterprises had small capacities and were not very productive. The chemical industry boasted two large plants (Yavan Chemical and Vakhsh Nitrogen Plants).

Issues Since Independence

Under the Soviet Union, the Tajik economy was not allowed to develop independently. Furthermore, economic decisions were made based on short-term needs without taking into account the economic costs of the probable environmental harm. As a result, significant damage was done to the environment. Inappropriate irrigation and intensive use of pesticides have led to salination and degradation of the soil. At present, 200,000 hectares of Tajikistan's arable lands, or 30 percent of its irrigated lands, are saline and 50,000 hectares have suffered double salination and are lost from cultivation. Major damage was also done to the country's water resources as overuse of fertilizers and pesticides means that contaminated water flows in the rivers after irrigation.

With the declaration of independence in 1991, Tajikistan began to conduct its own economic policy, stressing a gradual transition to a market economy. A program of large-scale reform was developed to correct the problems caused by the Soviet-managed economy. However, transition from a centralized planned economy to a market economy has proven to be very difficult. An economic crisis, civil war, and natural disasters have all conspired against success. The civil war

alone is estimated to have cost \$7 billion in damages. As a consequence of all these unfortunate events, there was a steady downward trend in all branches of the economy until 1996. Only in 1997 did the gross national product (GNP) finally rise—by 1.7 percent in comparison with the previous year. However, the GNP has yet to reach even 40 percent of its 1990 level.

The investment industry has suffered greatly. The physical volume of domestic investments has increased by 3.8 percent since 1991. The government is the only investor but it is severely constrained by its budget; specifically, it is burdened by its external debt. Annually, 13–14 percent of export expenditure goes to service the external debt, with serious negative consequences for economic growth.

With the signing of a peace agreement (1997) ending Tajikistan's civil war (1991–1997), attempts were made to revive the economic reform program. Privatization of state-owned enterprises and property has proceeded, promoting growth of the private sector. The private sector generates 44 percent of the GNP and by 1998, Tajikistan was relatively economically stable.

The Prospects for Sustainable Growth

Investment, a driving factor of progress, is necessary for rehabilitation of the economy and its steady development. The Tajik government is looking for external sources of investment, although the economy has simultaneously both attractive and negative features.

The appeal consists of large stocks of natural resources, cheap labor, and an investment-friendly government. However, as a whole, the investment climate in Tajikistan is seen as adverse. It is seen as politically and socially unstable, and its economic policies are also seen as being subject to change. The absence of property-rights guarantees also make foreign investors wary. So far, foreign companies have been interested only in those industries that offer short-term profits, namely, mining. Thirty-three joint ventures registered in 1998; with investors coming from Russia, Uzbekistan, Switzerland, the United States, and other nations.

Tajikistan, for its part, is interested in moving from being an exporter of raw materials to being an exporter of value-added goods; it also wishes to solve its unemployment problem and increase its revenues so that it can expand its social programs. Therefore, the government is interested in the long-term direct investments for development of such priority sectors as hydro engineering, deep processing of cotton, fuel and heating, and mining.

Development of hydropower is seen as most promising. The construction of hydropower stations in mountainous surroundings does not remove lands from agricultural use, which is a powerful factor in support of development of this sector. Cheap and ecologically pure energy can be exported to countries as far away as northern China and Pakistan.

In the absence of foreign investors, it is necessary to cultivate domestic private investors. One possibility has been to develop production of fruits and vegetables, with an eye toward marketing the produce in Siberia. Tajikistan's population is largely rural and has a propensity for agricultural work; small volumes of manufacture and the presence of the state programs to attract private entrepreneurs are expected to promote growth in the sector.

Another strategy is to use tax receipts from private enterprises and farms for long-term investment in the capital-hungry hydroengineering sector. Eventually priorities will be shifted toward the fuel and heating industry, cotton processing enterprises, and others. The country has a vast variety of energy sources—solar, geothermal, and hydroelectric, not to mention its coal deposits. If sufficient investments are directed towards this sector, Tajikistan should have the potential to meet not only internal, but also external demands. Future development of the fuel and heating industry might focus on developing nonconventional energy sources, such as solar and geothermal energy.

Finally, some consideration is being given to developing Tajikistan's tourist potential. The major potential is Tajikistan's mineral springs, including two hundred mineral springs, a third of which are also hot springs.

Munavvara Mukhidimovna Nuridinova

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TAJIKISTAN—EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

The educational system in Tajikistan has a strong Soviet/Russian influence. During the Soviet era (1918–1991) a comprehensive educational infrastructure and modern educational system provided free education emphasizing sciences, mathematics, and practical skills. By the 1930s the government eradicated mass illiteracy. According to official statistics, in 1989 more than 1.3 million students or approximately 23 percent of the population attended 3,100 schools. In addition, 41,700 students attended forty-two specialized secondary schools, and there were ten institutes of tertiary education. However, knowledge of Russian, which was a medium of instruction at most tertiary institutions, was poor; only 27 percent of Tajiks stated that they were fluent in Russian.

After independence in 1991, the educational system in Tajikistan underwent two major changes. First, there was a greater emphasis on the use of the Tajik language as the medium of instruction. Second, there was a considerable withdrawal of state funding of the educational system as a consequence of the 1992–1997 civil war (in 1998, Tajikistan spent only 2.2 percent of the GDP on education).

The constitution of Tajikistan (1994) stipulates that general education is compulsory and free and that the state guarantees access to free general, vocational, specialized, and higher education in state-controlled educational establishments. Tajik, Uzbek, and Russian are the major languages of instruction. The constitution also guarantees that all ethnic groups may use their mother tongue.

At the age of seven, children begin an eleven-year compulsory education program, composed of four years of primary school and a seven years of secondary school. According to official statistics, in 1998 more than 1.4 million students, or approximately 20 percent of the population, attended 3,522 primary and secondary schools. In addition, there were fifty specialized secondary schools and seventy-four vocational and technical schools. According to official statistics, approximately 94 percent of all those between the ages of seven and sixteen were enrolled in some kind of educational institution, although the dropout rate is high.

After completing a secondary school, students may enter a tertiary educational institution (university or institute), which usually offers a five-year program. According to official statistics, in 1999, 75,400 students attended twenty-four tertiary educational institutions. Students may complete postgraduate studies at a three-year *aspirantura* program, which combines coursework and dissertation writing. Upon comple-

tion of *aspirantura* students receive a degree of *kandidat nauk* (equivalent to a Ph.D.).

Throughout the 1990s the quality and accessibility of the educational system in Tajikistan declined due to the civil war, severe economic recession, and chronic shortage of textbooks. According to the United Nations Development Program, fewer female students entered the educational system. The government of Tajikistan is trying to reform its educational system by attracting private investment and international assistance to the educational sector.

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TAJIKISTAN—HISTORY

Tajikistan, formerly known as the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic, was one of the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union from 1929 to 1991. The independent Republic of Tajikistan emerged in 1991. The Tajiks are Iranian-speaking peoples, descendants of the group known as Aryans, who were mentioned in the Avesta, the Zoroastrian scripture (third to seventh century). The Iranians settled in the transriver region of Central Asia 2,500 years ago or even earlier, and it was probably here that the Zoroastrian religion came into being.

The Ancient and Medieval Periods

The Iranian ancestors of the Tajiks constituted the core of the populations of Khorezm, Bactria, and Sogdiana—ancient states of Central Asia lying between the Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya Rivers. The area of present-day Tajikistan has always been attractive to foreign powers because of its strategic location and its resources. Cyrus the Great (c. 585–529? BCE), ruler of the Achaemenid Persians, subjugated this region in the sixth century BCE and incorporated it into the Persian empire; Alexander of Macedon conquered it around 328 BCE. The Seleucids, heirs to Alexander's empire, continued to rule here, but the Saka, nomadic invaders



KEY EVENTS IN TAJIKISTAN HISTORY

- 6th century BCE** The region is ruled by the Persians.
- 328 BCE** Alexander of Macedon conquers the region and it comes under Seleucid rule.
- 130 BCE** The Saka displace the Seleucids.
- c. 50 BCE** The Kushans displace the Saka.
- 6th–7th centuries CE** Arabs bring Islam to the cities of Central Asia.
- 9th century** The Samanid dynasty displaces the Arab rulers.
- 13th century** The region comes under Mongol control.
- 16th century** Ties are cut with Persia and Uzbeks establish the khanate of Bukhara.
- 1869** The Russians take control of the khanate of Bukhara.
- 1876** Most Tajik regions are under Russian control.
- 1921** Under Soviet control, Tajik areas are placed within the Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.
- 1924** Southern Tajikistan is placed within the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic.
- 1991** The Republic of Tajikistan is founded.
- 1992–1993** The period of most intense fighting during the Tajik Civil War.
- 1997** United Nations peace talks end the civil war.
- 2002** Tajikistan provides some assistance to the United States during its invasion of Afghanistan.

from the eastern steppes, overran the region around 130 BCE, followed by the Kushans, also from the eastern steppes, in the mid-first century BCE.

During the seventh and eighth centuries CE, Arab armies brought Islam to the Tajik-populated urban centers of Central Asia, and the Iranians became one of the major contributors to Muslim culture. At the end of the ninth century, Arab rule began to disintegrate, and the Samanid dynasty (864–999), with its capital in the city of Bukhara, replaced it. Eventually the Mongols absorbed the Tajik lands into their empire in the thirteenth century.

Modern Tajik historiography traces the origins of Tajik statehood to the Samanid state, when Tajik culture was home to some of the finest scholars and poets of the Muslim world. Despite the various Turkic and Mongol rulers whose dynasties dominated the lands inhabited by the Tajiks, the Tajik element prevailed in the administration and culture in Mawarannahr, the Arabic name for Central Asia.

The sixteenth century marked important changes in Tajik history. First, the Safavid dynasty in present-day Iran (1501–1722/1736) declared Shi'ism its state religion and thereby cut all ties with the Tajiks, who remained Sunni Muslims. Second, Turkic Uzbek no-

mads led by Shaybani Khan overran Central Asia, establishing the khanate of Bukhara in the region inhabited by Tajiks.

The Colonial Period

The geographic and political profile of today's Central Asian states, including Tajikistan, was defined by superpowers at the end of the nineteenth century. Great Britain, after having subdued the Indian subcontinent, stopped near the Hindu Kush Mountains, a few kilometers from the Amu Dar'ya River. Russia occupied the right bank of the Amu Dar'ya and made the emirate of Bukhara a Russian protectorate in 1869. During the next several years, the other Central Asian states, the khanates of Khiva and Quqon, fell to Russia and most Tajik regions were under Russian rule by 1876. Present-day Afghanistan served as a buffer state, and the Amu Dar'ya along this country's northern edge formed a natural defensive line between the British and Russian empires.

Thus from this time onward, Tajiks have lived in different sociopolitical and economic settings, because their original lands were divided into different polities. Some Tajiks, in the Bukharan emirate (a vassal of Russia), continued to live as they had for centuries. In the Pamir Mountains, as well, notwithstanding the es-

establishment of Russian rule, there was almost no change. By contrast, northern Tajikistan, having been annexed by Russia to constitute part of the Turkistan Government-Generalship, with the capital in Tashkent, experienced rapid modernization.

The Soviet Period

After the Russian Revolution of 1917, Soviet power was established in northern Tajikistan at the end of 1917 and in the south in 1921, when the area of present-day Tajikistan became part of the Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1924, national delimitation of Central Asia granted central and southern Tajikistan the status of autonomous republic in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. Again as in 1895, the Tajiks had lost, as Stalin's mapmakers handed over major centers of Tajik culture—Samarqand, Bukhara, Khojend—to Uzbekistan. Khojend (since 1936 Leninabad) province was transferred to Tajikistan in 1929, and the country was given the rank of a separate Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic.

Notwithstanding many disadvantages and hardships associated with the Soviet imposition of power—civil war and emigration, unfair national delimitation (which created a republic whose population was less than 60 percent Tajik), Stalin's purges of the 1930s, the Soviet struggle against religion, forcible resettlement of various ethnic groups in the 1950s and later, experiments with the Tajik language—there were also great achievements in education, health care, culture, and arts. During this time, examples of unique national literature, media, and historiography were formed and preserved. A basis for the national economy was established, collectivization of primitive private farming was carried out, and relatively stable transport links between the different regions of Tajikistan and with the neighboring Soviet republics were constructed. Authority at the nation level was developed that covered the whole territory of the Tajik SSR. A modern literary language was developed, common to this day for all Tajiks. The capital city, Dushanbe, emerged as a shared administrative and cultural center. The Tajiks, cut off from their southern Muslim neighbors, communicated mostly with other peoples of the Soviet Union and with Slavs. All these factors shaped the outlines of Tajik national identity and of their state.

Soviet rule was also destructive, however. Most important was the obvious disharmony in terms of distribution of power and resources between regions, enhanced by the inequality of regional economies. In addition, Tajikistan was the poorest republic with the lowest per capita gross domestic product.

Postindependence

Tajikistan, following the examples of the other republics of the Soviet Union, adopted a declaration of state independence in September 1991. In 1990–1992, this political awakening took the form of a struggle of the Islamic opposition allied with the newborn secular nationalistic and democratic movements versus the old Soviet elites who had remained in power. This conflict was gradually overtaken by the region-based group discord that soon led to civil war.

The opposition's initial aim was to take power from the pro-Communist, northern, Leninabad (current Sogd) province that had been the center of the dominant political elite during Soviet times. Fighting broke out intermittently in Dushanbe and in central and southern Tajikistan in 1992. Paradoxically, the regions opposing the north finally achieved their aim through bloody struggle among themselves. The Kulabis (south), initially clients of the north, were supported by the Hisoris (center), and proclaiming slogans of struggle against "Islamic fundamentalism," entered into conflict with their closest neighbors, the Gharmis and Qarateginis (both center) and the Pamiris (east). In fall 1992, the Kulabis and Hisoris received the help of external powers, mostly countries of the former Soviet Union, and reestablished central control of the country. The November 1992 session of the Tajikistan parliament appointed a Kulabi, Imamali Rakhmonov, as chairman, thus putting the end to the Leninabadis' domination. Nevertheless, in south and central Tajikistan, the struggle lasted into 1993 and later, causing a massive flow of refugees into neighboring Afghanistan. During this brutal civil war of 1992–1993, as many as 50,000 people lost their lives, and more than 650,000 people—one-tenth of the population—fled in terror. More than 35,000 homes were destroyed, and the costs of damage and destruction reached \$7 billion, one of the bloodiest and costliest wars in the former Soviet Union.

United Nations-sponsored peace talks led to the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in June 1997, followed by the incorporation of the United Tajik Opposition into the government. Nevertheless, today's Tajikistan remains a country with an ailing political regime, a weak national identity, and a fragile economy. Although open warfare has ended, the Tajiki national solidarity is still undermined by subnational contests between rival, regionally based entrepreneurs for political and military dominance. Quasi-military groups formally incorporated into the national army are beyond civilian control. In spite the efforts of Russian border guards, the Tajik-Afghan border is unreliable, and there is

constant narcotic trafficking. In 2002, because of its strategic importance as a neighbor of Afghanistan, Tajikistan drew more attention from the United States, which sought and to some extent gained its cooperation in the military against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

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TAJIKISTAN—POLITICAL SYSTEM The emergence of the Republic of Tajikistan after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 is one of the most painful state-building attempts in modern Central Asian history. During the last years of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century, this country has experienced civil war, the subsequent return of opposition and Islamic fighters, and a redistribution of power as a consequence of the conflict. Born in crisis and chaos, the current political system is a product of deep-seated traditional political loyalties, Soviet-style norms and practices, and recent rationalization of the old system.

Traditional Institutions of Power

The basic unit of traditionally sedentary Tajik society and the dominant institution of power was the *avlod*—a patriarchal extended family that sometimes took the form of a patrilineal clan. The *avlod* was loyal to regional groupings and, ultimately, to the local ruler. For generations this system gave its members survival, autonomy, and adaptability, serving tradition and sustaining society, despite the fact that *avlod* loyalties sometimes challenged a monarch's power and authority. Representative government and the concept of popular sovereignty were only weakly rooted in Tajik political culture. In the Soviet era (1918–1991) the *avlod* system was considerably eroded, yet it persisted as a parallel system of power in the quasi-national government. This community-oriented identity

and clan network determined political loyalty during the civil war in 1992–1993 and after.

System of Power in Transition

Tajikistan, following the example of other Soviet republics, in September 1991 declared independence and proclaimed a presidential system of government. The presidential election of November 1991 led to a struggle of an opposition coalition of Islamic groups and newborn secular democratic movements against old Soviet elites. The struggle turned into open armed confrontation in 1992, with the antagonism to communism that had united the opposition coalition gradually eclipsed by discord among regional groups. In November 1992 a government led by Emomali Rakhmonov gained control of the state with the backing of Russia and Uzbekistan. In November 1994 Rakhmonov (by this time a chairperson of the parliament) was elected president of Tajikistan.

The current constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan was adopted on 6 November 1994 after a nationwide referendum. It replaced the Soviet constitution that had been in effect since 1978 and that had been amended after independence. According to the constitution, Tajikistan is an independent, democratic, unified, and secular state with separate executive, legislative, and judicial powers. The supreme legislative body, a parliament, is the Majlisi Oli (Supreme Council). Amendments to the constitution, adopted in a general referendum on 26 September 1999, authorized direct presidential elections for one seven-year term (instead of a maximum of two five-year terms). In the November 1999 presidential elections, Emomali Rakhmonov won 96.91 percent of the votes, while his opponent, Davlat Usmon (representing the Islamic Revival Party), received only 2.1 percent. The amendments also replaced the national unicameral parliament with a bicameral one. In March 2000, the Majlisi Oli consisted of two chambers: the Majlisi Namoyandagon (Assembly of Representatives, or lower chamber) and Majlisi Melli (National Assembly, which acts as the upper chamber, or senate). The Majlisi Namoyandagon has sixty-three members directly elected on a half-mixed basis (65 percent as single-member district candidates and 35 percent according to party lists) for a five-year term. Members of the upper house—the Majlisi Melli—are indirectly elected for a five-year term; thirty-three members are elected by local *majlises* (legislative bodies), and the remaining eight deputies of the Majlisi Melli are appointed by the president. The new election laws simultaneously guarantee pluralism and proportional representation. The lawmakers' aim was to undermine traditional patron-client networks and to

provide for a presidential system balanced by a strong legislature. However the autonomy of the legislature vis-à-vis executive power is challenged by a growing presidential authority. According to the constitution the prime minister's post is nominal, because the president is the head of both state and government. As high administrator the president has exclusive authority to appoint heads (chairpersons) of *veloyats* (provinces), *nobiyas* (regions), and cities, thus providing a strong vertical chain for the exercise of executive power. The president controls religious affairs as well, because heads of regions appoint local religious administrators. Through the Council of Justice, the president enjoys exclusive power to nominate judges and control the courts. Finally, as leader of the most powerful of the regional groupings in the country, the Kulabis, the president enjoys considerable support from the regional elite and Kulabi-dominated military forces.

Multiparty Developments

In the 1990s eleven parties (in addition to the previously existing Communist Party of Tajikistan, or CPT) were formed in the country, but by 1999 only six remained. The biggest of the current Tajik political parties is the People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT).

The PDPT was formed in December 1994, one year after the current government came to power. In March 1998 President Rakhmonov joined the PDPT and assumed its leadership. Second place is occupied by the Communist Party of Tajikistan (formed in December 1924). The Communists inherited a relatively well-developed administrative infrastructure throughout the country, as well as considerable assets, and they enjoy the support of that part of the Tajik citizenry that longs for the restoration of the USSR. From another perspective, the CPT, lacking the protection of outside patrons and the effective support of regional elites and armed forces, has all but lost mass-elite linkages and therefore any real influence on politics.

The opposition forces are represented by the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) and the Democratic Party of Tajikistan. These parties formed the Demo-Islamic bloc in 1990 to operate within the legal-framework of a secular legal and political system. The failure of this anticommunist initiative, leading to open warfare in 1992 and the cessation of the activity of these parties in June 1993, did not prevent the formation of another alliance of the same elements, the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), on the eve of the inter-Tajik peace talks in 1994. In 1994–1999 the UTO took part in these peace talks, which culminated in

June 1997 in the signing of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord.

After some debates and United Nations involvement, in November 1998 the Majlisi Oli legalized the IRPT. Thus Tajikistan is so far the only state of Central Asia where an Islamic movement, after a long period of confrontation with the government, has been permitted to participate in the political process.

All Tajik political parties generally lack institutionalized ties connecting voters, leaders, candidates, and activists. They have an elitist character, lack a mass base, and have an amorphous infrastructure. Both pro-government and opposition parties poorly articulate issue-based programs in their agendas.

Future Problems

Tajikistan's political structure has proved politically unstable in the long term. The facade of the Western-patterned legal system in Tajikistan hides a remarkable blend of secular and traditional features that can only poorly connect civil and political society or promote the interests of individuals and different solidarity groups. Quasi-democratic rule is being built on a highly fragmented society in which protection of civil liberties is promised but not practiced.

This situation has led to increasing violence and corruption in both society and government. The instability of the political system has been worsened by a severe economic crisis that has discredited the present regime. The noninclusive character of the government and the absence of free competition for leadership positions, with a resultant disproportionate distribution of power among regions, enable *avlod* loyalties to continue to hamper nation-building efforts. The position of the central government is uncertain, and its authority is disregarded in many areas. As a result, sectarian militias and foreign governments exert great influence.

The current political system of Tajikistan prevents effective political mobilization and impedes the development of a coherent party system, opening the way to the consolidation of strong authoritarian rule, but there are some grounds for positive developments in the future. During the 1990s the Tajiks gained a far richer experience in political struggle than did other Central Asian nations. It is to be hoped that this political education will yield promising strategies for the future and will indicate a way to escape from the present impasse and conflicts.

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TAJIKISTAN CIVIL WAR A civil war erupted in Tajikistan in May 1992 and lasted until December 1997, when the winning faction, called the Kulabis, succeeded, after bloody clashes, in expelling the bulk of the opposition forces, known as Gharmis, along with tens of thousands of civilians, who took refuge in Afghanistan.

When the Soviet Union collapsed at the end of August 1991, Tajikistan was the only former Soviet Muslim republic in which the Communist Party immediately lost power, although during the presidential elections of November 1991, the former head of the Communist Party, Rahman Nabiev, was elected president. His victory, however, exacerbated political factionalism. Two coalitions fought each other, with different regional identities and ideological alignments. The conservative or neo-Communist faction was composed of two regional groups: the Leninabadis, originating in the northern province of Leninabad, which had provided all the first secretaries of the Communist Party since 1949, including Nabiev; and the Kulabis, from the province of Kulab in southern Tajikistan. The opposition coalition brought together four groups: the Democratic Party, headed by Shadman Youssof; the Rastakhiz (Resurrection) Movement; the Pamiris (Ismaeli people, from the Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous region; Ismaili is a heterodox branch of Shi'a Islam); and the Islamic Renaissance Party, headed by Mohammed Sharif Himmatzade; the latter is an Islamic fundamentalist party whose constituency is almost exclusively people originating from the Gharm Valley in southern Tajikistan.

Fighting erupted in Dushambe, the capital, in early May, due to a clash between Kenjaiev, the chairman of the parliament, who was supported by the Kulabis, and Naujavanov, the minister of the interior, a Pamiri who was supported by the Gharmis. The conflict extended throughout the south of the country, with the opposing forces mainly Kulabis and Gharmis, who provided the leadership and the bulk of the fighters on each side. In May 1992, the Gharmis succeeded in

expelling the Kulabis from Dushambe. They established a coalition government, but kept Nabiev as president until his forced resignation in September. The Kulabis, entrenched in their province, undertook an offensive toward Dushambe beginning in September 1992, with the covert support of Russian troops. After months of fighting and massacres of civilians, the opposition coalition was driven out of Dushambe in December and fled to Afghanistan.

The victorious Kulabis chose Imamali Rahmanov as president. His government included some Leninabadis, but clearly expressed the Kulabi monopoly in the state. Nevertheless in 1993, a process of negotiation brought together the Kulabis, supported by Moscow, and the Gharmis, supported by Tehran, under United Nations auspices. In June 1997, a peace settlement established a coalition government, headed by Rahmanov, with one-third of cabinet appointments allocated to the Gharmis. The settlement ended the civil war and ensured the supremacy of southern Tajikistan. The civil war in Tajikistan indicates the prevailing role of regional identities in ideological commitments in the former Soviet Central Asia.

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TAJIKS Tajiks (or Tadzhihs) are the original Iranian population of Central Asia, the present-day inhabitants of the nation of Tajikistan. Various groups of Tajiks, in Tajikistan, parts of central and southern Uzbekistan, northern Afghanistan, the Uighur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang in northwestern China, northern Pakistan, as well other parts of the Central Asia, sprang from various sources at various times and places; yet they all represent disparate branches of the common Iranian world. Tajiks were the first to settle in Central Asia, in the region that was later overwhelmed by peoples of Turko-Mongolian stock.

Origin and Cultural Traits

The origin of the word "Tajik" is disputed. Most scholars of the Tajik language currently believe that the word "Tajik" is derived from *toj* (crown). Some other scholars have suggested that the word was originally the name of an Arab tribe (Taj or Tazik) that

invaded Central Asia, bringing Islam to the region in the seventh and eighth centuries. In medieval Tajiki-Farsi literature and historical chronicles the word "Tajik" was used in the general sense of "Persian," as the opposite of "Turk." In Russian usage of the sixteenth century and later, "Tajik" was applied to the urban populace of Central Asia, distinct from the ruling Uzbek nomads. Currently the term "Tajik" applies to the people of the Central Asian Trans-river, who are Europeans of Pamiro-Ferghanian type.

The Tajiks are Muslims, predominantly Sunnis of the Khanafi school; there are also 300,000 Shi'a Imami Ismailis. Tajiks today speak different Iranian languages. In addition to Western Iranian (Tajiki and Dari), Tajiks in Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and China speak Eastern Iranian (Permian and Yaghnoibi languages), using Tajiki, an Iranian tongue, as a common language.

Tajiks lived in houses constructed of mud and stones in urban centers and oases of Central Asia. They were famous gardeners, merchants, poets, and scholars. Tajik arts reached high levels, and the towns along the caravan routes linking the Near East, China, and India were centers of trade. The tenth through sixteenth centuries were a golden age for Tajiks. Their language served as a lingua franca in Central Asia and was the mother tongue of famous poets such as Rudaki (c. 859–940 or 941), Sa'di (c. 1213–1294), Hafez (c. 1325–c. 1389), Omar Khayyam (1048?–1131), and Firdawsi (c. 935–c. 1020). The celebrated medieval doctor Avicenna (Abuali Ibn Sina; 980–1037) also spoke the Tajik language.

Turko-Mongol tribes constantly migrated westward into the area inhabited by the Tajiks, pushing them to the periphery. By the early twentieth century the term "Tajik" was used to label so-called mountainous Tajiks (the population of Qarategin, Mastchah, Darvaz, and Badakhshan in modern Tajikistan), while Tajiki-speakers on the plains were called Sart.

Dispersion

As an ethnic group the Tajiks never formed a stable political unit. Until the 1920s there was no official Tajik territorial-administrative unit. In Tajikistan there are four historical areas of the Tajik population: the valleys of the northern part of the country (Fergana Valley); the foothills and mountains of central Tajikistan (Zarafshon River basin); the foothills, mountains, and narrow valleys of southern Tajikistan (Qarategin, Khatlon); and the vast alpine country of Pamir. Each of these subgroups of Tajiks is marked by distinct political and material culture, physical appearance, dialect, customs, music, and folklore.



A Tajik herdsman in traditional dress. (DEAN CONGER/CORBIS)

The valley dwellers of the north are descendants of the Sogdian culture, representatives of the rich urban civilization of Samarqand, Bukhara, Khujand, and Fergana. After Russian dominance was established in the area and according to the national delimitations drawn by the Soviets in 1924, the Tajik descendants of these cultural centers live in different states. The Tajiks of Sogd (former Leninabad) Province, known as Leninabadis, live almost exclusively in Tajikistan, while most of the Bukharan and Samarqandi Tajiks dwell in Uzbekistan. This part of the Tajik-populated area joined Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century, and these Tajiks experienced the political, cultural, and economic transformations of Communism.

The Tajiks of the central and southern regions, living in narrow valleys, foothills, and mountains, in contrast to the northern Tajiks, were almost completely independent and free of outside influence until the twentieth century. The most important of these groups were the Kulabi, Gharmi, Qarategini, and Hisari Tajiks. Their traditional communities were strongly

attached to their places of origin. Both northern and southern Tajiks speak the Tajik language, albeit with dialectical peculiarities, and are Sunni Muslims.

In Tajikistan's Gorno-Badakhshan region live other Iranian peoples known as Pamiris. Officially identified as Tajiks, they are ethnically and linguistically distinct from the previously mentioned groups of Tajiks. Pamiris are almost all Shi'a Ismailis, speaking a language unconnected to Tajik and to other nonwritten Pamirian languages. In addition to 200,000 Tajikistan Pamiris in Gorno-Badakhshan, almost 100,000 Pamiris live in the adjacent mountain regions of Afghanistan, China, and Pakistan. The number of Tajiks in Tajikistan has risen from approximately 738,000 in 1926 (approximately 72 percent of the total population) to approximately 4.2 million in 2000 (69 percent of the population).

Like the Tajiks of Tajikistan, the Tajiks of the left bank of the Amu Dar'ya River, being autochthonous and the oldest inhabitants of today's Afghanistan, have no known common place of origin, nor is it known when they appeared here. Currently compact masses of Tajik population live in central Afghanistan—in Kabul Province, areas of Charikar, Istalif, Panjsher, Gurband, Salang, and the southern and northern slopes of the Hindu Kush. Another large group of Tajiks lives in western Afghanistan—in Herat, Ghor, and partly in Nimroz and Farakh Provinces. Tajiks constitute the main population of northeastern Baghlan, Takhor, Qunduz, and Badakhshan Provinces in Afghanistan. In the northern provinces of Balkh, Juzjan, Samangan, Fariab, and Badgis, Tajiks live together with Uzbeks and Turkmen.

Estimates of the number of Tajiks in Afghanistan vary widely from 25 to 50 percent or even more of the total population of the country. According to official data, Afghanistan's total population in 1987 reached 16.1 million. Thus, on the eve of the 1989 Soviet invasion, the number of Afghani Tajiks varied between 4 and 8 million. This number equals or even exceeds the number of Tajiks in Tajikistan. In addition to the Tajiks of Tajikistan and Afghanistan, more than 1 million Tajiks live in Uzbekistan, predominantly in Samarqand, Bukhara, and Surkhandarya Provinces. This disassociation of various groups of Tajiks has always been a principal obstacle to the creation of a unified Tajik state.

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
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TAKLIMAKAN DESERT The Taklimakan Desert, the world's second largest sand desert, is located in the southern part of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in northwestern China and covers an area of 338,000 square kilometers. About 85 percent of the desert consists of shifting sand dunes, averaging 100 to 150 meters in height, while dunes in the western parts only average 5 to 25 meters in height. The desert has a temperate climate and very low precipitation of under 50 millimeters annually. It constitutes the central part of the Tarim Basin, which in the western part rises to 1,560 meters above sea level. The basin is partly surrounded by mountains reaching more than 6,000 meters in height. In the north, the desert borders on the Tian Shan and in the west and the south, it borders on the Kunlun and the Altun Mountains. Glacial streams from the mountains run far into the desert, where they disappear, and there is some growth of poplar and



tamarisk trees along the riverbeds. There are a few oasis towns along the Hotan River bed, which also constitutes the main route across the desert from south to north. Since the 1980s, large oil fields have been exploited, and in the 1990s more than 500 kilometers of roads have been constructed for the oil industry.

Bent Nielsen

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TALIBAN The Taliban (plural of *talib*, which is Arabic/Persian for "student of Islamic religious law") regime ruled Afghanistan from November 1994 to November 2001 under the leadership of mullah Muhammad Omar (b. 1959). After the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, when

more than three thousand people were killed in New York and Washington, DC, the United States believed that the Taliban regime was sheltering the al-Qaeda terrorists of Osama bin Laden, a Saudi dissident and millionaire who was suspected of having masterminded the attacks. Earlier, the United States had also accused Osama bin Laden of masterminding the bombings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 August 1998, which killed more than two hundred people, including nineteen Americans.

In spite of repeated calls from the United States and other nations, including some Muslim nations, the Taliban did not hand over Osama bin Laden to the United States for interrogation and trial. The administration of President George W. Bush (b. 1946) starting bombing Afghanistan on 7 October 2001, leading to the collapse of the Taliban regime in Kabul. The U.S.-led international community installed an interim regime, composed of anti-Taliban forces of the Northern Alliance, under the leadership of a Pashtun tribal elder, Hamid Karzai (b. 1957), who took the oath of office in Kabul on 22 December 2001.

Although most of the Taliban foot soldiers disbanded and rejoined their communities, Taliban pockets of resistance continued in eastern parts of Afghanistan, especially in Kandahar Province.



Four former Taliban soldiers on a street in Kandahar in January 2002, after general amnesty was given to Taliban fighters. (AFP/CORBIS)

The Taliban came to power in November 1994 at the end of a civil war (1992–1994) that raged between different mujahideen (holy warrior) factions. Once in power, the Taliban imposed a strictly puritanical and literal interpretation of the *shari'ah* (Islamic law). The Taliban closed female educational institutions and banned women from working outside of their homes. Women could not venture out of their homes unless a male relative accompanied them. Women were forced to wear the Afghan traditional veil (*burqa*).

Taliban authorities also banned music, television, theater, cinema, kites, cards, and other activities as useless and time wasting. They also required men to grow beards and to strictly observe Islamic rituals, including the daily five prayers. The Taliban carried out the Haddood (Islamic punishments) in public: stoning to death for adultery, fornication, or any sexual, even consensual, relations outside wedlock. They amputated hands of thieves and flogged gamblers and alcohol users.

When the Taliban regime collapsed in November 2001 as a result of the U.S. bombing of its strongholds in Afghanistan, some women in Kabul threw away their *burqas*, and some men shaved off their beards to demonstrate freedom from the Taliban.

Abdul Karim Khan

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TAMAN SISWA The Taman Siswa, or "Garden of Students," was an anticolonial educational movement in the Dutch East Indies founded by the Javanese nobleman Raden Mas Soewardi Soerjaningrat, also known as Ki Hadjar Dewantoro (1889–1959), in July 1922. Dutch-educated, Dewantoro was an active member of the nationalist movement, the founder of the Indies Party, and a member of the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association), the first political party in the Netherlands East Indies with Indonesian nationalist leanings. He propagated a course of action that would use Western methods to fight the Dutch. During his exile in the Netherlands (1913–1918), he became convinced that strengthening the cultural roots of his people through "nationalist" education would effectively counter the impact of colonialism. Influenced by the educational theories of Maria Montessori and Ra-

bindranath Tagore, Dewantoro established the Taman Siswa school system, enlisting the support of many fellow nationalists. The curriculum included lessons in Javanese ethics, traditional handicraft, dance, and music, as well as Western subjects. In the late 1930s, Taman Siswa operated 207 schools in Java, Sumatra, and Kalimantan. Following independence, Taman Siswa survived as an appendage of the state school system. Dewantoro retained leadership until his death in 1959. As minister of education, he helped to shape the educational policy of the modern Indonesian state.

Martin Ramstedt

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TAMERLANE. See **Timur**.

TAMIL LANGUAGE Tamil belongs to the South Dravidian subgroup of the Dravidian family of languages and has been spoken from prehistoric times in southern India and northeastern Sri Lanka. There are about 60 million speakers of Tamil in these two areas today; outside India and Sri Lanka, Tamil speakers are reported from Malaysia, South Africa, Singapore, Fiji, Thailand, and Mauritius. During its more than two-thousand-year uninterrupted history, three distinct stages in its development may be distinguished: Old Tamil (c. 300 BCE–ce 700), Middle Tamil (700–1600), and Modern Tamil (1600 to the present). Apart from distinct historical variations, Tamil exhibits three other dimensions: geographic (regional and local dialects), social (primarily Brahman versus non-Brahman speech), and diglossic (i.e., "high" formal variety against "low" informal varieties). The central dialect spoken by educated non-Brahmans around the cities of Tanjore, Trichy, and Madurai is considered to represent the standard.

The modern Tamil sound system has a native core and a borrowed periphery. The core inventory contains twelve vowels, the native *a*, *i*, *u*, *e*, *o*, both short and long; there are two peripheral diphthongs. There is a core of sixteen consonants in three groups: stops

k, c, ṭ, t, p; nasals *ñ, ŋ, n, m*; and liquids *y, r, l, v, r̥, z, ʃ*. The consonantal periphery, borrowed mostly from Indo-Aryan, Perso-Arabic (Persian and Arabic), and English sources, includes *b, d, ḍ, j, g, s, f, b*. The specific sounds of Tamil are primarily the retroflexes *ʃ, ŋ, ʎ, ẓ*—consonants articulated with the reversed tongue-tip against the palate—and the alveolar flap *r̥*—a consonant articulated like a "flap" with the tongue-tip behind upper teeth.

Like other South Asian languages, Tamil is written in alphasyllabic script descended from the southern variety of Asokan Brahmi (the script used in India from around 250 BCE for Buddhist inscriptions carved at the order of Emperor Asoka).

Morphology

Tamil morphology is agglutinating (words change meaning through the addition of lexical elements to a base) and suffixal (these additional elements are added on at the ends of base words rather than at the beginning or in the middle), inflections (changes in tense, number, person, and so on) are marked by suffixes attached to a lexical base (root), which may be enlarged by derivational suffixes so as to form a stem. There are two main parts of speech, nouns and verbs. So-called indeclinables indicate such categories as adjectives, adverbs, and postpositions, and these may originally have been nouns and verbs. Nouns mark grammatically gender (two basic genders, rational and nonrational, corresponding roughly to human, nonhuman; human classified further as masculine and feminine), number, and case. Tamil nouns distinguish singular and plural in eight cases: nominative, accusative, dative, sociative, genitive, instrumental, locative, and ablative. Personal pronouns in the plural distinguish between first person inclusive and exclusive.

Tamil verbs consist of a lexical stem and a set of bound suffixes. The stem consists of a base and, optionally, a set of stem-forming suffixes. Inflected verbs are finite and nonfinite. Finite verbs mark both tense and subject-verb agreement, nonfinite verbs do not. Finite verbs typically mark the end of a sentence; all other verbs must be nonfinite. For example, the sentence, "When I came home and saw him, I said, 'How are you?' and then I went to eat," would be translated into Tamil as, "Having-come home after, him having-seen, 'You-how' having-said, then I to-eat went." There are basically three tenses: past, nonpast (including future), and present (which is a later independent development). The basic order of constituents in a Tamil clause is Subject-Object-Verb. Hence the sentence structure may be described as head-final and left-branching. Head-final means that the main part of a

word or a sentence is always placed at the end (final); for example, "He came fast" would be "fast came-he" in Tamil. Left-branching indicates that the finite verb stands at the right end of a sentence, which runs from left to right. Each sentence has one finite predicate; all other predicates are nonfinite.

The lexicon of Tamil consists of a native Dravidian core and borrowings from Sanskrit (and other Indo-Aryan languages), Perso-Arabic, Portuguese, and English. At the beginning of the twentieth century a movement to remove Sanskritic elements from the Tamil vocabulary and replace them with Tamil ones was initiated and is still vigorous.

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TAMIL NADU (2001 est. pop. 62.1 million). Spread over an area of 130,058 square kilometers, the state of Tamil Nadu is located on the southeastern side of the Indian peninsula. Bounded by the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean in the east and the south respectively, the state has more than 1,000 kilometers of coastline. To its north and west lie the southern states of Karnataka, Kerala, and Andhra Pradesh. Apart from the coastal plain in the east, the state contains the range of Western Ghats, a mass of hilly regions in the north and the west averaging 1,220 meters above sea level. All the rivers in the state are rain-fed and flow eastward from the Western Ghats. The most prominent river, Kaveri (Cauvery), is 760 kilometers long.

Tamil Nadu has a 6,000-year history, predating the Aryan entry into India. The Dravidian culture associated with the state was concentrated in the south after the Aryans settled in north India in the third millennium BCE. Tamil Nadu was formerly a part of the Dravida country ruled by three significant dynasties, Chola, Pandya, and Chera from the fourth century BCE. The end of this rule in the thirteenth century saw these territories annexed by the rising Vijayanagar empire in the south. Later, the area was divided into a number of small kingdoms. The English arrived in Madras in 1639 as representatives of the East India Company. Most of south India, including Tamil

Nadu, came under British rule. After Indian independence and under the States Reorganisation Act of 1956, the erstwhile Madras province was divided into the states of Madras, Andhra Pradesh, and Kerala on the basis of language. Tamil-speaking Madras state changed its name to Tamil Nadu on 14 January 1969. The state capital changed its name from Madras to Chennai in 1996. The state legislature has one house—the Legislative Assembly—with 235 seats. Fifty-seven members from the state are elected to the national parliament—18 for the upper house (Rajya Sabha) and 29 for the lower house (Lok Sabha). The state is divided into twenty-nine administrative districts.

The backbone of Tamil Nadu's economy is agriculture. Rice and sugarcane are major crops, giving highest yields nationally. Tea and coffee plantations are a major source of revenue. The state government encourages small, medium, and large-scale industries through corporations set up for the purpose. In recent years, the state has seen a spurt in industrial investment growth, particularly in key sectors such as power and information technology. The state excels in the production of cotton, sugar, leather, and petrochemicals.

The cultural life of Tamil Nadu is a repository of rich forms and traditions. The dance style of Bharatanatyam and the practice of Carnatic music, important elements of Indian cultural ensemble, trace their origins to this state. Tamilians are great lovers of food, music, and films. Pongal, celebrated in the month of January to mark the time of harvest, is the major festival of the state.

Ram Shankar Nanda

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TAMILS The name "Tamil" denotes native speakers of the Tamil language, mainly residing since antiquity in the southernmost region of India and in northern and eastern Sri Lanka, but found today also as immigrants in Southeast Asia, Africa, Guyana and the Caribbean, the United States, Canada, and England.

The Tamil language, of the Dravidian family, appears in third-century BCE inscriptions, and Dravidian influences noted in Sanskrit suggest that an ancestor of Tamil was widely spoken in India as early as 1000 BCE. Today it is the official language of the state of Tamil Nadu in India and one of the national

languages of Sri Lanka; related languages are spoken in neighboring states.

Tamils were prominent in sea trade, and there is evidence of Tamil commerce with Greece and Rome and with Southeast Asia from around the first century BCE. Areas of the Tamil region were ruled from about the early third century BCE to the fifth century CE by the Chera, Chola, and Pandya dynasties and from about the sixth to the ninth centuries CE by the Pallava dynasty. These and other dynasties were displaced by the Vijayanagara empire at its peak (fourteenth century) and then by the Telugu-speaking Nayaka rulers (sixteenth to early eighteenth centuries CE).

The Tamil region has figured prominently in India's cultural history. Tamil literature dates from as early as around the second century BCE; it includes the Sangam (Academy) poetry and the *Tolkappiyam* (Ancient Poem), a grammar. Even in these works, there are signs of the influence of Sanskrit from the north. The gradual process of Sanskritization was driven by Brahman priests and scholars, whom local rulers settled on donated lands. Nevertheless, Tamil poetry retained a personal voice and a vivid immediacy that contrasted with the impersonal and stylized character of Sanskrit works.

From around the sixth century CE, a new Tamil literature of devotional poems began to be composed by traveling bards, who applied the conventions of the Sangam poetry to poems praising the gods of famous temples. During this period, local deities were assimilated to pan-Indian deities of the Brahmanical Sanskrit sources. This sparked a wave of vernacular religious expression throughout India over the next several centuries. Jainism and Buddhism vied with devotion to the gods Vishnu and Siva for royal patronage in the region. Meanwhile, Brahmins integrated Tamil devotional texts with their Sanskrit liturgies, creating the distinctive Saiva Siddhanta and Shri vaishnava traditions, Tamil religious movements teaching devotion to the deities Siva and Vishnu, respectively.

In postcolonial India, the linguistic and ethnic rivalry between south and north has continued. In South India, Tamil was touted as the original language and culture of India, with the carriers of Old Indo-Aryan (Sanskrit) represented as the first imperialist invaders, warlike barbarians who drove the peace-loving Tamils toward the south. An analogous situation was perceived in the dominance of North Indians in national politics and the adoption of Hindi (the language of a broad swath of North India) as the principal national language. Hence, South Indians (and Tamils in particular) have fiercely resisted using Hindi.

In Sri Lanka, where Tamils have often been treated as foreigners by the Sinhalese-speaking majority, Tamil nationalist guerrillas called the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Nation) (LTTE) seek an independent Tamil homeland in the Jaffna Peninsula in the north and along the northeast coast. Many Indian Tamils have provided support to this insurgency, and the Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991) was assassinated by an LTTE suicide bomber protesting India's intervention in Sri Lanka.

Meanwhile, regional parties claiming to represent the interests of Dravidian culture have long dominated the politics of the state of Tamil Nadu, often promoting Tamil chauvinism. During British rule and immediately after independence, Tamil-speaking regions were subsumed within Madras state, but in the 1950s Telegu-, Kannada-, and Malayalam-speaking regions were hived off as separate states, and in 1969 the Madras state's name was officially changed to Tamil Nadu (Tamil Country). Under chief minister Jayalalitha (b. 1948), Tamil Nadu in 1996 discarded the British colonial name of the capital (Madras) to adopt the older Tamil name Chennai. Yet opposition to Hindi has receded somewhat as English gets entrenched as the language of national affairs.

Timothy Lubin

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TAN SIEW SIN (1916–1988), Malaysian political figure. Tan Siew Sin was born in Malacca, Malaysia, on 21 May 1916, the only son of Tan Cheng Lock, a prominent businessman and founding member of the Malaysian Chinese Association. He was educated in Malacca and also attended Raffles College in Singapore as well as Middle Temple in London. Tan was a *baba*, a descendent of Chinese families that had migrated to Malaya before British colonization; these families adopted the local Malay customs, cultural practices, and language.

Tan Siew Sin was a major political figure in Malaya after it gained independence from the British and after the formation of Malaysia. He was elected a member of parliament in 1955. Between 1957 and 1959 he was minister of commerce and industry and in 1959

became the first minister of finance, a position he held until 1969, when he became minister with special functions (finance). In 1970 he resumed his duties as finance minister, a position he held until his retirement in 1974.

Tan Siew Sin knew the Malays well and spoke the language fluently. However, although president of the Malaysian Chinese Association—part of the Barisan Nasional coalition, the ruling political party in Malaysia since its independence from British rule—he spoke no Chinese. He, together with Malaysia's first prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, who was a close friend, oversaw the imposition of Malay as the national language and the withdrawal of government assistance for schools providing Chinese-language education. The perception among the Chinese community that he had neglected their cultural interests led to the erosion of support for the Malaysian Chinese Association during his tenure as president.

Kog Yue Choong

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TANAKA GIICHI (1863–1929), Japanese politician. Tanaka Giichi was a soldier and politician from the former feudal domain of Choshu (modern Yamaguchi Prefecture). He started his career in the Imperial Army, later becoming president of Japan's largest party, the Rikken Seiyukai, and prime minister in 1927.

Tanaka was born in 1863, the son of a samurai retainer. He attended the Army Academy and the Army War College. During the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) he served as an aide to General Kodama Gentaro (1852–1906), chief of staff of the Manchurian army. In 1906, Tanaka drafted the infamous Imperial Defense Guideline (Teikoku Kokubo Hoshin), a basic document for Japan's foreign and military policy until 1945.

In 1910, Tanaka played a leading part in founding the reservists' association (Teikoku Zaigo Gunjin-kai). He also served as army minister from 1918 until 1921, and again in 1923. Two years later, Tanaka was asked to become president of the Seiyukai party. He accepted, thus starting a new career as a party politician. As the leader of the largest party in the lower house, he was named prime minister in 1927, serving concurrently as foreign minister and minister of colonization. Unable to deal with urgent budgetary

problems or to settle Japan's China policy, the cabinet had to resign in July 1929. Tanaka died shortly afterward.

Sven Saaler

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TANCH'ONG *Tanch'ong* is the Korean technique of decorating wooden buildings. Although *tanch'ong* work dates back to at least the Three Kingdoms period (57 BCE–668 CE), the earliest extant examples date to the Koryo dynasty (918–1392). In *tanch'ong*, the eaves, ceilings, and upper column supports of buildings were painted in bright primary colors for beauty, as well as to protect the wood, hide imperfections, and emphasize the building's function. These techniques continued to be developed throughout the Choson dynasty (1392–1910).

Specially trained artisans were required for the exacting work. The ends of supporting beams or eaves of ceilings often featured a dominant motif of flowers or pomegranates. The space between the ends or eaves might depict a narrative featuring auspicious symbols such as dragons and cranes, or scenes from Buddhist sutras. Elegant designs and geometric patterns might be used elsewhere on the building, or a single flower or animal could contrast the more elaborate decorations.

The use of contrasts in design and colors was very important in *tanch'ong*. Reds were used on sun-exposed areas and provided a sharp contrast to the green-blue tones used on unexposed areas. The natural paints were composed of clay, iron, copper, or malachite pigments for their vivid colors and resistance to the elements.

Jennifer Jung-Kim

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TANG DYNASTY China's Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), which was founded by Liu Yuan (also known by his temple name Gaozu, reigned 618–626), marked one of the most glorious periods in the history of China. After the short-lived Sui dynasty (581–618 CE), the Tang ruled China for nearly three centuries, governing one of the most successful empires of the time in the world. Its government institutions, legal establishments, economic developments, cultural achievements, and territorial expansions all exerted significant impact on later Chinese dynasties and defined the identity of Chinese civilization.

Political Changes

Li Yuan, who inherited the title of the dynastic duke of Tang during the Sui dynasty, was a member of a northern aristocratic family who had intermarried with the ethnic minority Xianbei tribal aristocracy. When the Sui collapsed in 617, he seized the Sui capital Chang'an, and ascended the throne in 618, thus founding the Tang dynasty.

During Gaozu's reign, the Tang undertook the enterprises of expanding and consolidating the empire and establishing various institutions. The Gaozu's armies defeated several major rivals and completed the pacification of the country in 624. Gaozu basically continued the administrative institutions of the previous Sui dynasty. In the central government, three agencies reporting to the emperor (the Secretariat, the Chancellery, and the Department of State Affairs, which were collectively known as the Three Departments) served as the administrative core. Local administration consisted of two tiers: the inferior district and the superior prefecture. The military system of garrison militia (*fubing*) combined agricultural and military duties. Gaozu revived the civil-service examination system to recruit government officials on the basis of merit, although aristocrats continued to be influential in dynastic politics.

Like the Sui, the Tang legal system consisted of four major components: the *Code*, *Statutes*, *Regulations*, and *Ordinances*, which not only laid the foundation for later dynasties of imperial China, but also influenced the legal systems of Japan, Korea, and Vietnam.

Gaozu's second son Li Shimin (temple name Taizong, reigned 626–649) took the throne in a military coup. Taizong's reign, traditionally known as the "era of good government," was one of close personal interaction between the ruler and his Confucian advisers. Generally, Taizong developed and refined the policies of his father's reign, including revision of the law codes and expansion of the civil-service examination

system. He made particular efforts to balance the political influence of the regional aristocratic groups and uphold the pre-eminent position of his own clan, the Li. In foreign affairs, Taizong subdued the eastern Turks and began to expand Chinese power in Central Asia.

Empress Wu Taizong's ninth son, Li Zhi (temple name Gaozong, reigned 649–683) ascended the throne at the age of twenty-one. In the early years of his reign, Gaozong relied on advice from the statesmen of his father's court and continued some reform programs. Gradually, however, Gaozu's court came to be dominated by Wu Zhao (627–710, reigned 690–705), one of the most remarkable women in Chinese history. Born into a merchant family, Wu Zhao had been a low-ranking concubine of Taizong's who managed to become Gaozong's legitimate empress in 655. In 660, when Gaozong suffered a stroke, the empress took charge of the central government. Over the next twenty years, while Empress Wu continued many of the policies of the former Tang rulers, she initiated some practices to consolidate her position. For instance, she designated Luoyang as a second capital in 657 and took up permanent residence there in 683, thus removing the political center from the base area of the northwestern aristocracy. Empress Wu also encouraged lower ranks of bureaucracy by creating new posts, providing more opportunities for advancement, and increasing their salaries. In order to promote the legitimacy of the dynasty, Empress Wu revived the ancient *feng* and *shan* sacrifices on Mount Tai (Taishan), the eastern holy peak in present-day Shandong Province, and patronized Buddhism.

Under Gaozong and Empress Wu, the Chinese continued their efforts to extend and consolidate the empire. By 661, they had defeated the western Turks and established a Chinese protectorate in the western regions. But they faced serious threat from Tibet. By the early seventh century, Tibet had emerged as a unified state. Although Tibet became China's tributary state under Song-tsen Gampo (reigned 620–649), the Tibetans exerted constant pressure on present-day Qinghai and Sichuan. After Gaozong died in 683, Empress Wu, now the empress dowager, took control of the imperial succession and purged her opponents at court by means of terror and a secret police force. In 690, she ascended the throne and proclaimed a new dynasty: the Zhou. Empress Wu then formally became an "emperor," the only woman sovereign in China's history. Some senior officials at court forced her to abdicate in 705 and restored the Tang dynasty.

Li Longji (temple name Xuanzong, reigned 712–756) took the throne by means of series of political in-



CHINA—HISTORICAL PERIODS

Xia dynasty (2100–1766 BCE)
 Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE)
 Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE)
 Western Zhou (1045–771 BCE)
 Eastern Zhou (770–221 BCE)
 Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE)
 Warring States period (475–221 BCE)
 Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE)
 Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE)
 Three Kingdoms period (220–265 CE)
 North and South Dynasties (220–589 CE)
 Sui dynasty (581–618 CE)
 Tang dynasty (618–907 CE)
 Five Dynasties period (907–960 CE)
 Song dynasty (960–1279)
 Northern Song (960–1126)
 Southern Song (1127–1279)
 Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234)
 Yuan dynasty (1279–1368)
 Ming dynasty (1368–1644)
 Qing dynasty (1644–1912)
 Republican China (1912–1927)
 People's Republic of China (1949–present)
 Republic of China (1949–present)
 Cultural Revolution (1966–1976)

trigues. The early years of his reign saw the heyday of the Tang, a time of institutional progress, economic prosperity, and cultural flowering. The most important change occurred in the military. In the early Tang, troops were organized through the *fubing* militia system, under which men of agricultural households served in the army on a rotation basis. Such a system proved inadequate to defend the empire against threats from the highly mobile nomadic horsemen of the frontiers. Xuanzong's reign saw the development of professional soldiers who settled permanently in military colonies and a consequent growth of the military commanders' power. In the 740s, some non-Chinese governors were appointed to take charge of certain strategic military domains, among whom An Lushan, a professional soldier of Sogdian and Turkish ethnic background, rose to prominence. He was later to lead a rebellion.

Under Xuanzong, the aristocracy reasserted its political dominance. Although under Empress Wu and in the early years of Xuanzong's government many chief ministers obtained their positions by passing the civil-service examinations, after 720 men of aristo-

cratic origins increasingly received appointments. What complicated court politics more was that from the 740s, the emperor refused to take active interest in government affairs, being taken up by the charms of his concubine Yang Guifei, one of the most famous beauties in Chinese history. Those close to the emperor strove to become the power behind the throne; among them was An Lushan, who rebelled against the Tang in 755.

The An Lushan Rebellion The An Lushan rebellion (755–763) marked a turning point in the history of the Tang and nearly destroyed the dynasty. The rebel troops seized the Tang capitals Luoyang and Chang’an and controlled most of north China. Xuanzong fled to Sichuan. Although An Lushan was assassinated by a subordinate in 757, the rebellion continued for six more years.

Influence of Eunuchs Although the rebellion was put down, the Chinese lost their grip on many frontier areas, including the western regions. Within the Tang empire, the political authority of the central government declined. Some northern regions became virtually autonomous, and other areas fell under the control of military governors, who enjoyed enormous power in both military and civil matters. Under Xianzong (reigned 805–820), the Tang court regained a great deal of control over the powerful provinces and put down several major rebellions in Sichuan, the Chang (Yangtze) delta, Hebei, and Shandong. Xianzong’s success, however, to a great extent was based on the loyalty of his eunuchs, who controlled the dynasty’s elite palace armies and supervised the provincial administrations. Eunuchs began to play an increasing part in Tang politics under Daizong (reigned 762–779). They murdered Xianzong and determined the succession of most subsequent young emperors. Although Wuzong (reigned 841–846) temporarily revived the fortunes of the dynasty by imposing some restrictions on the eunuchs’ power, Yizong’s reign (859–873) saw a resurgence of their influence at court.

During its last several decades, the dynasty suffered serious floods and drought as well as political chaos and foreign threats. In 874, a wave of peasant rebellions broke out; their leader Huang Chao (d. 884) took Luoyang in 880 and Chang’an in 881. Although the rebel forces were finally suppressed and the Tang court returned to Chang’an, the dynasty was left powerless. Most parts of the empire was either occupied by non-Chinese forces or controlled by rival military leaders. In 907, the warlord Zhu Wen ended the Tang and established his own Liang dynasty.

Socioeconomic Changes

The Tang era witnessed economic prosperity. Under Gaozu, the government undertook a land distribution policy known as the equal-field system. This system had been used during the northern dynasties and under the Sui; it granted peasants a certain amount of land, in return for which they paid taxes in grain, cloth, and labor on public-works projects. This land and tax system remained in force until An Lushan’s rebellion. Gaozu also established mints and issued a new currency that remained standard throughout the Tang dynasty. The Grand Canal, an extensive system of waterways that were constructed during the Sui dynasty to link wealthy south China with the Yellow (Huang) River valley, facilitated the Tang economic transactions as well as political stability.

The Tang was cosmopolitan and open to foreign influences. About two million people lived in the capital Chang’an, the most populous city in the world at that time. A variety of foreign goods were displayed in the marketplaces of the major cities, where Chinese mingled with people from various Asian countries, including Japan, Korea, and India. Foreigners not only came to trade and study, but also served as grooms, entertainers, dancers, and musicians. Some foreign customs, such as playing polo, became fashionable.

The social structure in the Tang changed significantly after An Lushan’s rebellion. With the decline of the aristocracy, the ruling class obtained their political power more from education and possession of landed property than from birth alone. When the equal-field land distribution system collapsed, many peasants disposed of their lands and became tenants or hired laborers of the rich based on formal contracts. Local elites seized opportunities to establish large, landed estates that were managed by bailiffs and cultivated by tenants, hired workers, or slaves.

After mid-750s, the old taxation system ceased to function. During Dezong’s reign (779–805), the chief minister, Yang Yan, applied a new two-tax system generally to the empire. This system combined various taxes into one single tax, which was to be paid, in the summer and autumn, on the basis of the value of property instead of number of household members. This taxation method generated revenues for the Tang, and remained China’s basic tax structure until the sixteenth century.

The late Tang also saw important demographic changes. By 742, according to an official population survey, there were about 9 million households or more than 50 million registered individuals in the empire. Due to factors such as warfare and natural disasters,

the population in the north fell dramatically, and more and more people migrated to the lower Chang valley and into Zhejiang.

Despite political instability, the economy continued to grow in the late Tang. The population movements to the south promoted the agricultural expansion in the more fertile and productive lands of the country. New crops such as tea, sugar, and new varieties of grain were developed, and the double-cropping of land with rice and winter wheat produced greater quantities of foods. Silk production also increased rapidly in the Chang delta region. With regard to commerce, the merchant class enjoyed legal freedom to engage in business, and became prosperous dealing in salt, tea, banking, and overseas trade. In addition to the two great markets in Chang'an and Luoyang, large markets appeared in local areas, and the local markets facilitated the development of new urban centers. The increased volume of trade brought an increasing use of money, particularly the privately circulated silver, and various credit and banking institutions began to emerge. To facilitate commercial transactions, money drafts were invented in 811.

Cultural and Intellectual Changes

One of the most dramatic cultural achievements in the Tang was the development of Buddhism. Although the Tang court gave their preference to Taoism due to the claim that they were descended from Laozi, the legendary founder of the belief system, they also recognized the strength of Buddhism and provided it with great favor and lavish patronage through most of the period. The famous pilgrim Xuanzang (c. 596–664) went to India in 629 and returned in 645 with a large number of Buddhist sutras. It was during the Tang that Buddhist doctrine became sinicized and Chinese indigenous Buddhist schools emerged. Three were most prominent. The Celestial Terrace (Tiantai) school, named after a famous monastery, emphasized synthesis and harmony of all Buddhist teachings. The Pure Land (Jingtu) school believed that salvation, or rebirth in the Pure Land, could be attained by chanting the Buddha's name. The Meditation (Chan) school stressed intuitive enlightenment through meditation. Buddhist monasteries, free of all obligations to the state, acquired tremendous wealth by accepting gifts and conducting business. These communities, however, often encountered criticism from Confucianists and Taoists, both out of intellectual rivalry and because all these belief systems competed for economic resources from the government. In 843–845, the pro-Taoist emperor Wuzong persecuted Buddhism; during that period some 4,600 monasteries and 40,000

shrines and temples were destroyed, 260,000 monks and nuns were returned to lay status, and much monastic lands were confiscated and sold. This suppression marked the beginning of Buddhism's decline in China.

Other intellectual currents also developed in the Tang. Since Confucianism offered political theories and institutional rules to build the centralized empire, the court promoted its spread, particularly through the civil-service examinations. In the late Tang, the prominent writer Han Yu (768–824), while attacking Buddhism, emphasized the revival of the orthodox Confucianism, which influenced the development of the Neo-Confucianism during the Song dynasty (960–1279). Zoroastrianism, Islam, and Nestorian Christianity also entered China.

During the Tang, many fields of art flourished. Poetry reached its golden age. About three thousand poets are known to us today, among whom Li Bo (701–762) and Du Fu (712–770) are perhaps the most prominent. The essayists Han Yu (768–824) and Liu Zongyuan (773–819) promoted the "ancient style of prose" (*guwen*) movement to reform literature. The Tang also saw the first serious attempts to write short stories. Both Buddhist and secular sculpture flourished. Artisans created large monumental sculptures in Buddhist rock cave temples and small metal images of the Buddha and bodhisattvas. The six relief sculptures of Taizong's battle horses that guarded his tomb represented the masterpieces of the secular sculpture of the age. The frescoes at the caves of Dunhuang synthesized the cultural themes and artistic styles of China, India, and Central Asian countries. Under the Tang, woodblock printing also developed.

Legacy of the Tang

The Tang represented the golden age of China's imperial times. The early Tang epitomized the Chinese civilization achieved by then; and the late Tang initiated reforms that left long-lasting effects on later dynasties. The extensive and unified empire strengthened a political ideology of "great unity." Their achievements in political institutions and religion attracted a great number of foreign students to study, and had far reaching influences on neighboring countries. Japan, for example, learned from the Tang the imperial institutions, bureaucracy, law codes, written language, Confucianism, Buddhism, literature, art, and architecture. The economic prosperity in the Tang promoted international trade, which in turn facilitated cultural exchange between Chinese and other peoples. The technology of making paper, for instance, was transmitted to the West during the Tang. The Tang dynasty was so influential to Chinese culture that

present-day overseas Chinese call Chinatowns *Tangren jie*—the "streets of the Tang people."

Jiang Yonglin

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TANGE KENZO (b. 1913), Japanese architect. Kenzo Tange was Japan's leading postwar architect and the first Japanese architect to win the prestigious Pritzker Prize. Beginning in 1938, Tange spent four years in the office of Kunio Maekawa (1905–1986), a pioneer of modern architecture and disciple of French architect Le Corbusier (1887–1965). Upon leaving Maekawa's employ, Tange returned to his alma mater, the University of Tokyo, to further study modernist architecture's spatial organization and urban scale.



Kenzo Tange with his first sculpture, "Theme Tower," in New York City in April 1966. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

Following World War II, Tange's competition-winning proposal for the Hiroshima Peace Park brought his first commission and immediately established him in international architectural circles; he was the first of Japan's architects to receive such recognition.

Several of his subsequent works accommodated the international community, most notably his 1964 designs for the Olympics, as well as St. Mary's Cathedral (1964). Moreover, Tange established a vocabulary for postwar democracy in local government offices (Tokyo City Hall, 1957; Kagawa Prefectural Offices, 1959; and Kurashiki City Hall, 1960). Many of these buildings were unusual for their large public spaces, intended for gatherings of an unprecedented scale.

Several of Tange's most important designs, including his 1961 plan for Tokyo Bay and his 1964 proposal for the Tsukiji district, were never built, and in the 1970s, he turned his attention abroad. In the 1980s, however, Tange returned to Japan and produced a number of works that fulfilled his earlier intentions, including the New Tokyo City Hall (1991) and the United Nations University Building (1992). Tange's early work was a remarkable blending of bold, sculpted concrete forms and delicate detailing he ascribed to Yayoi traditions. In his later buildings, however, his work lost its delicacy and focused on monumentality.

Dana Buntrock

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TAN'GUN MYTH The oldest extant versions of the myth of Tan'gun, an ancient Korean myth, date to the thirteenth century, when the inhabitants of the Korean Peninsula, united by resistance to the Mongol invasions, began envisioning themselves as one people with a shared history. According to one version of this myth, in the *Samguk yusa* (Legends and History of the Three Kingdoms of Ancient Korea), Tan'gun was the product of a union between a bear-turned-woman and the son of the ruler of heaven. Tan'gun founded a state called Choson in 2333 BCE, shortly after the legendary emperor Yao assumed the throne in China. Tan'gun

ruled over much of Northeast Asia for 1,500 years. He then retired and became a mountain god.

The Tan'gun myth probably began as a foundation myth of one of the various ethnic groups that later merged to form the people known today as Koreans. However, when a national Korean cultural identity was forged during the Koryo dynasty (918–1392), the Tan'gun myth was transformed into an assertion of ancient political unity. In the early twentieth century, when ethnic identity began to be defined biologically as well as culturally, the Tan'gun myth was reinterpreted to show that Tan'gun was also the first Korean, the ancestor of all Koreans alive today.

Don Baker

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TANIZAKI JUN'ICHIRO (1886–1965), Japanese novelist. Tanizaki Jun'ichiro was born in Tokyo and moved to Osaka after the Great Tokyo Earthquake of 1923. He is one of the most widely translated of modern Japanese novelists, and his fiction is marked by urbanity, attention to style, and themes of obsessive love, the femme fatale, and masochism. His debut short story, "Shisei" (Tattoo, 1910), set the tone for later work with its emphasis on sensual romanticism, taste for the grotesque, and admiration of beautiful, sadistic women. *Tade Kuu Mushu* (1928–1929; trans. as *Some Prefer Nettles*, 1955) is a semiautobiographical novel of a failing marriage. In it, the protagonist, Kaname, discovers his preference not for his Eurasian mistress Louise but for the old-fashioned O-Hisa, and all the traditional culture associated with her. Tanizaki's move to Osaka turned his interests to the classical literature of Japan. He spent the years 1935–1941 rendering *The Tale of Genji* into modern Japanese. In *Sasameyuki* (Thin Snow, 1943–1948; trans. as *The Makioka Sisters*, 1957), his longest work, the free-form structure, like that of *Genji*, relies on in-depth characterization and evocation of a complete world. In his fiction he preferred the sensual and sensuous over the intellectual and political. A master of historical fiction, Tanizaki continued his stylistic experimentation in the diary format of *Kagi* (The Key, 1956), a psychological study of sex and old age. His last novel, *Futen ryojin nikki* (Di-

ary of a Mad Old Man, 1961–1962), pursues this theme, ending not in death but hope. Tanizaki was frequently nominated for the Nobel Prize for Literature, but he was never awarded it.

William Ridgeway

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TANO For centuries Tano was one of the four major holidays celebrated on the Korean Peninsula. Observed on the fifth day of the fifth lunar month, which usually falls in the first half of June, Tano was also celebrated in China and Japan. Tano, an auspicious day due to the double fives associated with its date, was marked by ceremonies and offerings of cartwheel-shaped rice cakes to honor the village spirits. The day was first designated a royal holiday in the Shilla kingdom (57 BCE–935 CE) and celebrated by all classes.

During the Choson dynasty (1392–1910), presents of Tano fans were made to the king and to friends and relatives. Tano became the day for women to wash their hair and bathe in sweet flag (*Acorus calamus* or, in Korean, *ch'angp'o*) water to ward off disease and guard against misfortune. Large hairpins carved from the sweet flag root and colored red were worn in the hair as an amulet to ward off evil. Swinging was also popular among women. Long ropes were strung from the tallest trees for this purpose, and stand-up swinging contests from specially constructed six- to ten-meter-high swings were held. For men, *ssirum* wrestling competitions were held as well as other contests of strength. Evening entertainment in both the king's court and the village square consisted of mask dances and theatrical presentations. The Tano tradition is marked today by televised *ssirum* matches, art exhibitions, and musical and theatrical performances.

David E. Shaffer

See also: **Ssirum**

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TANZIMAT *Tanzimat* is a Turkish word meaning "regulation" or "reorganization" that refers to a period of reforms in the Ottoman Empire between 1839 and 1876 under sultans Abdulmejid and Abdulaziz. The brilliance of the Ottoman Empire began to fade in the eighteenth century, when the imperial armies suffered a series of defeats in Europe and the gap in economic and social conditions between the Ottomans and the West widened. Starting with the Tulip Era (1718–1730) Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals started to question the situation of the empire and think of ways to revive it. Initial reform movements concentrated on military institutions, but under Selim III (1789–1807), a comprehensive reform project, including reorganization of both military and civil institutions, was implemented. A corps of regular infantry was established; the first permanent Ottoman diplomatic missions were opened in the main capitals of Europe; and modern military high schools were founded. But strong opposition, especially from the Janissaries (classical infantry troops) and conservative religious circles, stopped Selim's reforms.

Mahmud II (1808–1839) restarted his uncle Selim's reform program, but in a more determined way, and eliminated all opposition, both civil and military. With the abolishment of the Janissary troops in 1826, no serious obstacle to the reforms remained. Besides military and educational reforms, Mahmud II reorganized the Ottoman government. The Grand Vizier became Prime Minister; ministerial offices were founded, and a Council of Ministers was formed. In addition, some advisory councils such as the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances and the Deliberative Council of the Army were established in 1836; they became the forerunners of Turkey's modern parliament.

Mahmud II's son Abdulmejid gave further impetus to the reforms. His Noble Decree of the Rose Chamber on 3 November 1839 opened a new era of multi-dimensional transformation in the empire that is called the Tanzimat Period. Under the decree, the sultan yielded some of his authority to a Supreme Council of the Judicial Ordinances, which had the power to make laws, subject to the sultan's approval. It guaranteed to the sultan's subjects the security of their lives, honor, and goods; an equal length of military service for all; open and equitable legal processes; and equality of subjects whatever their religion.

During the Tanzimat Period, three prime ministers—Mustafa Reshid, Ali Pasha, and Fuad Pasha—undertook substantial reforms in the political, social, and economic fields, mostly modeled on the French experience. In 1840 the first secular penal code was

adopted and secular courts were established. In the same year the Ottoman Bank was established and the first Ottoman banknote was printed.

In 1856 an imperial decree assured equality in taxation and in certain other levies, where previously there had been discrimination between Christians and Muslims. Nor was modernization during the Tanzimat Period limited to administration. Ottoman literature, music, theater, and sports were also transformed from classical Islamic to Western forms.

The Tanzimat reforms came to a halt in the mid-1870s, during the last years of Abdulaziz's reign. When the ideas for a Turkish constitution and a parliament were rejected by Sultan Abdulhamid II, the Tanzimat Period ended.

Mustafa Aydin

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TAOISM The term *Taoism* (or, in pinyin romanization, *Daoism*) has been used to denote different philosophies, a variety of religious practices, numerous procedures of alchemy, and various approaches to traditional Chinese medicine. It is also used to connote things profound, mysterious, and sublime.

Although many Taoists believe that the teachings of Taoism were manifested by the cosmic Way (Tao) itself, its historical origins are obscure. Shamanistic practices of South China and Southeast Asia may be the source of Taoist ideas of nature and mystical union with nature. Some historians attribute the birth of Taoism to hermits such as Yang Zhu (c. late fourth century BCE), who is noted for advocating a type of individualism. Tradition usually credits its inception to Laozi (the "old master," said to have flourished in the sixth century BCE), who may or may not have been a historical person. Legend has it that Confucius met Laozi but did not understand him. A careful study of Confucian and Taoist teachings reveal a number of common values, such as humility, frugality, admitting ignorance, caution in speech, and ruling without coercion. Though Confucianism and Taoism may have sprung from a common ground, they parted company

to form complementary but opposing belief systems. An old saying has it that the Chinese were "Confucian by day and Taoist by night."

Early Taoism

The seminal text, called *Laozi* (after Laozi) or *Daodejing*, is attributed to Laozi. Its teaching of "acting by nonaction" makes the most sense in the political arena where the ruler "administers the empire by engaging in no activity" (Chan 1963: 166) while ministers handle the affairs of state. The *Laozi* advocates a type of limited anarchy or laissez-faire approach to government that is echoed in the *Analects* of Confucius. The Legalists (philosophers who took a generally negative view on human nature), especially Hanfeizi (d. 232 BCE), were attracted to passages in the *Laozi* advocating that the masses be kept ignorant and left to lead a simple existence. Some of the poems in the *Laozi* give guidance on self-cultivation and descriptive cosmology. These aspects of the text gave it a lasting quality, inspiring further philosophical speculation, meditative techniques, and religious ideals. By the time of Emperor Wu (156–87 BCE) of the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) the *Laozi* was being chanted at court.

Zhuang Zhou (c. fourth to third centuries BCE) is the second major figure in Taoism, and the text that bears his name, the *Zhuangzi*, has left its mark on Taoist philosophy and religion. We know very little about his life. He may have held a minor post; he probably declined being prime minister. Based on the first seven, or inner, chapters of the *Zhuangzi*, which are attributed to Zhuang Zhou, we can surmise that he was a man of letters and a very creative thinker and writer.

Because things are constantly changing, Zhuangzi advocated a type of contextual understanding in which things abide according to the circumstances of their existence. Part of his contextualism led to the realization that one's understanding is always limited to one's restricted perspective. Zhuangzi celebrates the world of change and transformation with the expectation that humans can transform and return to the serene unity of nature. The *Zhuangzi* is replete with meditative images and practices—being as clear as the dawn, being like dead ashes or a withered tree, fasting the heart-mind, losing the self—images that were used later in Zen Buddhism to describe meditation.

The *Zhuangzi* also contains many fanciful figures, gods, spiritual beings, and immortals. It is easy to see how some later readers understood the text to be proposing that in the process of entering the serene unity of nature one becomes an immortal. Zhuangzi's imaginative images were later taken to be literal de-

scriptions of the immortals; hence it was thought that immortals do not eat the five grains, that they live off of the mountain wind and dew, that they fly in the clouds or air and drive dragons, and so on. The outer chapters of the *Zhuangzi* discuss *shen* (spirit), *jing* (vital essence), and *qi* (vital breath, or energy), which became important concepts in later Taoist meditation, alchemy, medicine, and liturgy.

Yellow Emperor and Huanglao Taoism

Many innovations in philosophy, especially political philosophy, alchemy, and medicine from the third to the first centuries BCE were attributed to the mythical Yellow Emperor (Huangdi), who, according to legend, ruled China in the third millennium BCE. For example, the afterword of the classic *Lushi chunqiu* (Master Lu's Spring and Autumn Annals, c. 241 BCE) claims that the cosmic harmony teachings of that text were derived from his doctrines. Certainly *Huangdi neijing* (The Yellow Emperor's Classic of Internal Medicine) is the *locus classicus* of Chinese medicine.

The political philosophy of the Yellow Emperor and Laozi became closely associated during the Warring States Period (403–221 BCE), and the contraction Huanglao (Huang + Lao) was commonly used in the early Han dynasty. The Huanglao teachings entailed longevity practices, renouncing wealth, and governing without interference. The Huanglao political philosophy sought to make Taoism practicable.

While some read and interpreted the *Laozi* and *Zhuangzi* as philosophical guides in rulership, cosmology, and self-cultivation, others interpreted those texts in a spiritual manner as companions to the *Chuci* (Songs of Chu), which depict ecstatic journeys of shamans (*wu*). Out of shamanic, alchemical, and longevity techniques developed the magical and medical arts of the *fangshi*, the men of methods. The *fangshi* were also called *daoren* (people of *dao*) or *daoshi* (scholars of *dao*); in this context *dao* means "methods" or "arts" while also connoting the cosmic Way. The practice of acting by not acting and the quest for longevity and thus immortality, which were advocated independently in different sections of the *Zhuangzi*, became fused during the Han dynasty.

Later Taoism

During the latter portion of the Han dynasty, known as the Later, or Eastern, Han dynasty (25–220 CE), the country was weakened by flood and famine, and rebellion became inevitable. Two different revolutionary Taoist movements developed. In eastern and central China, a rebel group known as the Yellow Turbans,



THE TAO OF TEA

Tea is more than just a beverage as far as the Chinese are concerned. The Taoist philosophy views tea as a harmonization of earth, metal, water, wood, and fire—as the following extract demonstrates:

EARTH

WATER

rain and mist

and

FIRE

Sunshine

combine to make the tea leaves

EARTH is the source of colorful ceramics, tea's adornment.

METAL is the resource from which kettles are fashioned.

WATER, in its purest form, is 'the friend of tea'.

WOOD is the substance from which tea is born.

FIRE is the 'teacher of tea' in that it moulds tea's character during processing and again during its brewing.

Water and fire interact to release the hidden potentialities of the leaf.

Source: John Blofeld (1985) *The Chinese Art of Tea*. Boston, MA: Shambhala. (144)

who worshiped Huanglao, rose up, but they were vanquished by the Han army. Despite their demise, many of their practices persisted, especially among women and peasants. Those practices probably influenced the development in Sichuan of the Way of the Five Baskets of Rice (Wudoumi Dao), a Taoist movement of the same period that later evolved into the Way of the Celestial Masters (Tianshi Dao). Both the Yellow Turbans and the Celestial Masters advocated that the ideal Taoist sage-ruler is also a religious leader; both followed the *Taipingjing* (Classic of Great Peace), which advocated a utopian philosophy and was written before 140 CE by an unknown author, both effected cures through the written confession of one's faults and meditation retreats in solitude, reciting sacred texts, and an ecclesiastical hierarchy based on the triad of Heaven (executive administrators who communicated with the gods and received revealed texts), Earth (mid-level managers who administered the lower level), and Man (lower level managers who organized and instructed laypeople).

By the third century, the Celestial Masters had infiltrated the aristocracy. Kou Qianzhi (d. 448 CE) brought the Celestial Masters into prominence between 424 and 448 at the court of Wei, one of the small kingdoms that flourished between the collapse of the Han dynasty and China's reunification under the Sui dynasty in 581. This was the first time Taoism was officially instituted as a state religion. Although various sects developed later, the original system of organization and the hereditary descent of the Celestial Master as the head of the Taoist Church continue to this day.

Profound Studies

After the Han, while liturgical Taoism was gaining momentum, there was a renewed interest in philosophical Taoism, which is associated with the Seven Worthies of the Bamboo Grove and so-called Profound Studies (*xuanxue*). The Seven Worthies were noted for defying social conventions, drunkenness, and engaging in pure conversations. Two of the Seven Worthies wrote important commentaries on the *Laozi* and *Zhuangzi*. The commentary of Wang Bi (226–249) on the *Laozi* and the commentary of Guo Xiang (d. 312) on the *Zhuangzi* are the most noteworthy of this period. Wang and Guo advocated Taoist cosmology, but remained Confucians in their social and political thought. Wang Bi strengthened the understanding of imperceivable existence (*wu*, often rendered as "non-being") and vacuity (*xu*); he was also the first to outline the relationship between substance and function that would dominate later philosophical thought. Guo Xiang developed the concept of natural spontaneity (*ziran*), proposing an intriguing philosophy of spontaneous order.

Other Sects of Religious Taoism

Before the Celestial Masters movement had gained prominence in the south, Ge Hong (c. 280–343 CE), a Taoist alchemist, wrote *Baopuzi* (The Master Who Embraces Simplicity). Inspired by the descriptions of immortals in the *Zhuangzi*, *Songs of Chu*, and the *Biographies of Immortals*, Ge Hong sought immortality for himself. Some of his basic practices included physical and mental fasting and purification, aligning meditation and alchemy techniques with auspicious days of the calendar, ingesting vegetable and mineral drugs, increasing vital essence (*jing*, semen) symbolically in meditation or literally by sexual hygiene techniques, avoiding cereals, and using sacred texts and talismans that give the practitioner the divine assistance needed to effectively summon spirits, align macro- and micro-cosmic correlations, and attain immortality. Shortly af-

ter Ge Hong's death, the Highest Purity (Shangqing) sect developed.

Highest Purity

Founded at Mount Mao, the Highest Purity sect was the first school to be demarcated within, and subsequently to seek separation from, the Celestial Masters tradition. Between 364 and 370, Yang Xi (c. 330–386) received revealed texts at night from gods and spirits; these formed the foundation upon which the Highest Purity developed. The multitalented historian, biographer, herbalist, and Taoist theoretician Tao Hongjing (456–563) compiled and codified the texts, making an early Taoist canon. The Highest Purity teachings downplayed the physiological exercises, drug use, and legal aspects of the Celestial Masters and greatly modified their alchemical practices. The Highest Purity movement emphasized interiorization, placing special emphasis on visualization techniques in meditation.

Spiritual Treasure Liturgy

The Highest Purity school had reached its climax by the end of the fourth century. Drawing from the Highest Purity texts, Confucian moral virtues, and the rituals of Buddhism and the Celestial Masters, the Spiritual Treasure (Lingbao) liturgy took shape. Influenced by Buddhism, the Spiritual Treasure school advocated that one's personal liberation could only be had with the universal liberation of countless humans. Other influences led to the chanting of Spiritual Treasure texts, the use of mantra chants, and mudras (hand gestures).

The Spiritual Treasure liturgy developed in complexity over the next 1,600 years. The rites basically have three parts. First, the altar must be prepared with the announcement of vespers. The core of the ritual enacts the mystical union of the high priest with the Tao. The priest undertakes a symbolic cosmic journey to ascend into the heavens, seeking audience with the gods and Tao. He dances the "step of Yu," brandishing his sword to ward off demons while his thumb traces his footsteps on the joints of his fingers. This is accompanied by acolytes chanting texts; playing instruments, and burning incense. Finally, the master returns from the heavens to make the proclamation of merits. By uniting the forces of the cosmos within himself and the spirits that inhabit his body, the priest has increased his personal power and brought benefit to the community. Taoist rites came to play political and social therapeutic functions in that they were believed to restore political harmony or cure society and individuals of physical and spiritual problems.

Taoism continued to grow and transform. During the Tang dynasty (618–907) it became a state religion again. Tang dynasty Taoism was noted for its development of interiorization; the macrocosm was contained within the adept's body. In the Song dynasty (960–1279), Wang Zhe (1123–1170) established a monastic movement called the Complete Reality or Fundamental Truth (Quanzhen) school which still exists today.

After Buddhism entered China, Buddhist translators used Taoist terms to translate Buddhist concepts. Antinomian tendencies in Buddhism wedded Taoism to produce Chan (in Japanese, Zen) Buddhism in China. As noted above, religious Taoism borrowed ritual practices and philosophical ideas from Buddhism; these included funeral rites and the concepts of reincarnation and universal liberation. Zen Buddhism left a lasting impression in Korea and Japan, and Taoism's love of nature and the quest for immortality influenced Korean and Japanese arts and religious beliefs.

Taoist philosophy and religion are alive and well in China today. The 1982 constitution of the People's Republic of China reinstated freedom of religion, and Taoist monks and priests returned to the temples and monasteries. Taoist religion and philosophy are taking root in North America too, among Chinese immigrants and non-Chinese alike. Philosophical ideas and religious and meditative practices labeled "Taoism" continue to inspire and liberate the human imagination.

James D. Sellmann

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TAOISM—KOREA Taoism, along with Buddhism and Confucianism, first entered Korea during the Three Kingdoms period (c. 300–668). Unlike Buddhism and Confucianism, however, Taoism never established a significant institutional presence outside the capital. The only Taoist temples in Korea were government-sponsored temples, and the few Taoist priests performed rituals for the king and the central government only. There were no Taoist temples available to the general population.

State support of Taoist temples was sporadic. In 650 the Koguryo kingdom (37 BCE–668 CE) erected two Taoist temples in the short-lived hope of gaining a spiritual advantage over its rival Korean kingdoms. The Koryo dynasty (918–1392) funded several Taoist temples to supplement its network of Buddhist temples. One of those official Taoist temples survived into the Choson dynasty (1392–1910), and its priests continued to perform rituals on behalf of the royal family until that temple was destroyed in the Japanese invasion of the 1590s. When the last official temple disappeared, Taoism in Korea lost its separate institutional identity.

Taoism nevertheless survived in Choson Korea as a part of popular religion and as the source of longevity-enhancing practices among the neo-Confucian ruling elite. Publication of two Taoist works from China, the *Yushujing* (Classic of the Jade Pivot) and the *Qixingjing* (Classic of the Big Dipper), and their popularity among commoners in the second half of the dynasty, is evidence of the Taoist penetration of Korea's popular religion, as is the publication after 1700 of Korean

vernacular translations of Taoist manuals of life-span calculation. The inclusion of such Taoist deities as the Jade Emperor among the gods shamans worshipped is further evidence of the assimilation of elements of Taoism into popular religion.

Internal alchemy, on the other hand, was assimilated into the neo-Confucian culture of the ruling elite. Starting in the fifteenth century, scholars began reading and writing commentaries on such alchemical texts as *Hwangdingjing* (The Yellow Court Classic) and the *Cantong qi* (Triplex Unity). Renowned neo-Confucian scholars such as Yi Hwang (1501–1570) practiced Taoist breath-control techniques and physical exercises. Interest in internal alchemy techniques subsided after the seventeenth century, only to revive again in the 1970s. In the final decades of the twentieth century, there was an internal alchemy boom as centers for studying "cinnabar field breathing" and pursuing the "way of mountain immortals" began opening throughout South Korea.

Don Baker

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TARAI The Tarai is an important geographical sub-region in the north of India and the south of Nepal that is home to several national parks and the site of a regional Green Revolution in agriculture. The Tarai is a narrow strip of land running along the base of the foothills of the Himalaya Mountains. It varies from about two to fifteen miles in width and extends from the Indo-Pakistan border through Nepal and the Indian states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and West Bengal.

In the first half of the twentieth century the Tarai consisted of a series of swamps and forests famous for abundant wildlife, including elephants, tigers, and leopards. The Tarai had a small human population that included *adivasi*, or indigenous groups, such as the Tharus, Buxas, Gujjars, and Gaddis. The size of the human population was limited by the impact of the virulent malaria endemic to the area.

Beginning after 1950, the Tarai in both India and Nepal was subject to a substantial process of economic development. The swamps and forests were cleared and new agricultural technologies were introduced, which led to the initiation of the Green Revolution. As part of this process, India's first land-grant university, G. B. Pant University, was located in the Tarai

region of Uttar Pradesh. The Tarai is also home to some of the premier national parks and Project Tiger reserves in South Asia, including Corbett National Park and Dudhwa National Park in India and Royal Chitwan National Park in Nepal.

Eric Straborn

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TARIAN ASYIK *Tarian Asyik*, which means "the dance of a lover," is a classical Malay court dance that was popular in Kelantan (a state on the east coast of West Malaysia) and Patani (a state south of Thailand that was part of the Patani Malay Sultanate in the fifteenth century). *Hikayat Patani* (The Story of Patani, 1730) mentions that during the reign of Raja Kuning (a queen who ruled Patani in 1644), there were twelve *asyik* dancers at her court who gave performances during official ceremonies as well as at festivals and court marriages. The dancers were maids of the palace.

The dance was created on the instructions of a king who mourned for his favorite pet, a beautiful bird that had escaped its cage. The king went on a long search to find the bird, but he came back empty-handed. Brokenhearted, he asked that a dance be created that imitated the movements of the lost bird. Initially ten dancers enter the stage and sit gracefully. Then Puteri Asyik (Princess of Love) enters and the dance begins. The gracious and delicate movements of the dancers create a romantic atmosphere. The dancers wear long dresses made of silk and display jewelry on their bodies and waistbands. The musical instruments that accompany the dance include eleven types of *gedombak asyik* (a small drum), *gambang* (a xylophone-like instrument, usually made of slabs of wood or bronze), and *rebab* (a bowed lute). Dancers wear local flowers in their hair. Today, the dance would be performed by young girls, and it has become a dance for the common people and is usually performed at festival and cultural shows, obviously no longer a court entity.

Nor Faridah Abdul Manaf

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TARIAN PORTUGIS *Tarian Portugis*, or "Portuguese dance," is a term given to an eclectic performance repertoire associated with the Malaysian-Portuguese community. The dances are performed, often for tourists audiences, by troupes from the Portuguese Settlement in Malacca.

The *Tarian Portugis* tradition was "invented" in 1952, when a small group of upper-class Eurasians from Malacca who were preparing to entertain a visiting Portuguese dignitary learned a few dances from a book on Portuguese folk dances. The dance group remained popular after its initial performance and new dances were slowly added to the repertoire. The upper-class community faded away after Malaysian independence, and the dance group was taken over by youngsters from the lower-class fishing community who lived in Malacca's Portuguese Settlement (a reservation-like village established in 1926 by the British colonial government).

Since these performers were not able to learn new repertoire from printed sources, they composed and choreographed new dances in a similar style, using Kristang (the local Portuguese creole language) instead of Portuguese (which no one fully understood) for texts. In the mid-1970s, there was a new injection of repertoire from Portugal, though this time the dances were more "folkloric," with faster music and more complex choreography.

The only dance that can properly be described as indigenous to the community is the *branyo*, a flirtatious social dance in which couples advance and retreat without touching each other. Characterized by an alternating 3-2 rhythmic pattern, the *branyo* is similar to (and perhaps a precursor of) the national Malaysian social dance, *joget*. The most famous *branyo* tune, "Jinkly Nona," has become a national Malaysian folk song. Verses from this song are found in Portuguese communities from Sri Lanka to Macao, linking the Malacca community to a wider historical Portuguese diaspora.

Margaret Sarkissian

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TARIM BASIN The Tarim Basin encompasses the interior drainage in northwest China located between the Tian Shan and Kunlun Shan of Central Asia. The region comprises 906,500 square kilometers (530,000 square miles) of mostly shifting sands, dry lake beds, and undulating expanses of arid terrain. The Taklimakan Desert occupies the lower basin. The Tarim appellation appropriately describes a river that either flows into a lake or that meanders amid desert sands. Temperature extremes of minus 20° to plus 50°C (minus 4° to 120°F) and annual precipitation of just 50–100 millimeters (2–4 inches) define this desert climate. Vegetation is very sparse except for riparian stands of poplar and wormwood, willows, sea buckthorn, Ural licorice, and Indian hemps.

Oasis agriculture in small and far-flung settlements produces grains, cotton, fruits, wool, and silk. Khotan jades, and tourism are growing in importance. Recent oil discoveries will make this a significant source of China's energy supplies in the next century. Since the 1980s, archaeologists have unearthed well-preserved remains of bodies dating back at least 4,000 years. Nuclear tests have also been conducted here.

Stephen F. Cumba

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TARSUS (2002 est. pop.212,000). The town of Tarsus is located in southern Turkey on the Cilician Plain, just twenty kilometers from the Mediterranean Sea. Tarsus was the capital of a minor kingdom as far back as the Bronze Age (2500 BCE) and lies on a navigable river, the Tarsus Cayi, at the junction of the main coastal road and the link to the interior through the Cilician Gates.

Its strategic location made Tarsus a target of various powers' expansions; the Assyrians campaigned there around 700 BCE, and Rome absorbed the city in 67 BCE. The city was especially important during the Roman and early Byzantine empires. The Arabs conquered it in the seventh century, and other invaders—Byzantines, Crusaders, Mamluks—successively took the city until it fell to the Ottomans in the early sixteenth century.

Tarsus is famous as the meeting place of Cleopatra (69–30 BCE, who arrived by barge) and Mark Antony

after his triumph at the battle of Philippi; a Roman gate in the city is named after the Egyptian queen. Tarsus was also the birthplace of Saint Paul, who described it as no mean city.

Partly excavated ruins abound in the back streets; the town's current prosperity is based on cotton and light industry. With Tarsus American College and a university, it has remained an educational center.

Kate Clow

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TASHKENT (1997 pop. 2.5 million). The capital of Uzbekistan, Tashkent is the largest city in Central Asia. Located 440 to 480 meters above sea level, Tashkent occupies an advantageous position on the frontier between the Eurasian steppe and the oases of Transoxiana. The earliest archeological remains date from the beginning of the Common Era, and the city officially celebrated its two-thousandth anniversary in 1983. Known as Shash or Chach, the city lay astride the trade routes connecting East Asia with the Middle East and Europe. The first mention of the name "Tashkent" dates from the eleventh century.

Although always a substantial trading center, Tashkent was never politically prominent until the nineteenth century, when Russian armies conquered it in 1865 and made it the capital, in 1867, of Russian Turkestan. The consolidation of Russian rule catapulted Tashkent into preeminence in Central Asia. The Russians built a separate European quarter next to the old city, its planned layout a self-conscious advertisement for the new imperial order. Although this "new city" was not ethnically segregated, its spirit was very much that of a Russian city. It was here that revolution took place in 1917, accomplished mostly by Russian workers. The legal division between "old" and "new" Tashkent ended only in the mid-1920s, while in social fact its traces still remain.

In the Soviet period the city grew dramatically. The industrialization drive of the 1930s swelled the city's population, and substantial industrialization took place during World War II. Elements of urban planning transformed the old city, while parts of it were entirely redeveloped. From the 1950s on, Tashkent became a showpiece to the Third World of the Soviet path to development and industrialization. Thousands of stu-



The Davlat Muzeyi Museum and Mosque in Tashkent in 1997. (DAVID SAMUEL ROBBINS/CORBIS)

dents from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East attended its universities and institutes.

A massive earthquake leveled Tashkent in 1966; only the adobe houses in the old city survived intact. As a result of extensive rebuilding, Tashkent is an excellent example of Soviet city planning, but with few traces left of its antiquity. A new wave of construction in the 1990s produced several public buildings in a "neo-Timurid" style expressing the identity the post-Soviet regime has sought to forge for Uzbekistan.

Today Tashkent forms the core of the most industrialized zone in Central Asia, with light industry and agricultural machinery predominating. Tashkent boasts the busiest airport in Central Asia, four universities, the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences, and numerous vocational institutes.

Adeeb Khalid

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TATA FAMILY The Tata family, a Bombay-based family of Parsi industrialists, philanthropists, and businessmen, rose to prominence in the nineteenth century. Most prominent was Jamsetji Nasarwanji Tata (1839–1904), who had entered his father's office in 1858 after an education at Elphinstone College, Bombay, and so begun a brilliant commercial career. First he worked in establishing cotton mills in Bombay and Nagpur, and invested heavily in property, plowing the profits back into numerous educational and social welfare concerns for the benefit of the general public. Then he formed a company to exploit the iron ores of Orissa, since his elder son Dorabji Tata (1859–1932) had found the iron reserves there. A younger son, Ratanji Tata (1871–1918) helped his father form the Iron & Steel Company and its heavy engineering facilities. This enterprise culminated early in the twentieth century in the development of a new and modern industrial city, Jamshedpur, which is still the center of the Indian steel industry, located near iron ore, coal, and ready tribal labor.

Among J. N. Tata's other achievements were the introduction of a silk industry near Bangalore, on Japanese principles, and the building of the great Taj Mahal Hotel in Bombay. Among his many benefactions was the founding of a research institute at Bangalore which in time became the Indian Institute of Technology.

A grandson, Jehangir R. D. Tata (1904–1993), worked for much of his life in the Tata Iron & Steel

Company. In 1929 he became the first aircraft pilot to qualify in India, and in 1932 he started the Tata Sons Aviation Department, to provide airmail services in South Asia (initially Karachi-Bombay and Bombay-Delhi). This private airline grew to become Air India eventually. In 1938 he became the director of all the Tata companies.

Paul Hockings

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TATARS The name Tatars (also spelled Tartars) refers to several Turkic peoples and ethnic groups living in Asia and Europe, among them the Astrakhan Tatars, Budjak Tatars, Crimean Tatars, Dobrudja Tatars, Siberian Tatars, and Volga-Ural Tatars. The most populous group, the Volga-Ural Tatars, numbered approximately 6.7 million people in 1989. They are the Russian Federation's second-largest nation, and together with the Astrakhan and Siberian Tatars are usually called just Tatars.

Subgroups of the Volga-Ural Tatars include the Kasimov Tatars, Kazan Tatars, Mishars, and Kryashens. In turn, the Kazan Tatars include Central, Teptyar-Bashkir, Southeastern, Perm, Chepets, and Ichkin groups. The Mishars are further subdivided into Northern, Southern, Lyambir, and Ural groups; the Kasimov Tatars comprise the White Aimak, Black Aimak, Black Zipun, and Bastan groups; and the Kryashens include Kazan-Tatar Kryashens, Yelabuga, Nagaibek, Molki, and Chistopol groups.

The Crimean Tatars consist of three main groups: the Nogais, Tats, and Yaliboilus. All Crimean Tatars were exiled from Crimea (then part of Russia; now in Ukraine) to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in 1944 for alleged collaboration with the Germans during World War II. They regained their civil rights in 1956 and have been permitted to return to Crimea since the late 1980s. They live mostly in Crimea (250,000), Turkey (possibly 5 million, though most are assimilated) and Uzbekistan (250,000).

The Budjak Tatars live in Romania, mostly around Medgidia, Mangalia and Kostence. They number about 25,000 people. The Dobrudja Tatars live mostly in Bulgaria. According to a 1992 census, only 4,515 Bulgarians identified themselves as Tatars. These Bulgarian Tatars are scattered throughout northeastern



TATARS—THE EARLY WESTERN VIEW

The following text written by two French missionaries in the mid-nineteenth century provides a less than positive view of Muslim Mongols.

With the exception of their equestrian exercises, the Mongol Tartars pass their time in an absolute *far niente*, sleeping all day, and squatting all day in their tents, dosing, drinking tea or smoking. At intervals, however, the Tartar conceives a fancy to take a lounge abroad; and his lounge is somewhat different from that of the Parisian idler; he needs neither cane nor quizzing glass; but when fancy occurs, he takes down his whip from its place above the door, mounts his horse, always ready saddled outside the door, and dashes off into the desert no matter wither. When he sees another horseman in the distance, he rides up to him; when he sees the smoke of a tent, he rides up to that; the only object in either case being to have a chat with the new person.

Source: Huc Evariste-Regis and Joseph Gabet. ([1851] 1987) *Travels in Tartary, Thibet and China, 1844–1846*. New York: Dover Publications, 54.

Bulgaria, especially around Dobrich. Dohric, Vetovo, Rousse, Varna and Shoumen are the towns with the largest Tatar communities. The only remaining Tatar village is Onogour (in Dohrich district).

All Tatars speak related dialects, except for Polish, Lithuanian, and Belorussian Tatars, who have lost their Tatar language and speak, respectively, Polish, Lithuanian, and Belorussian.

History

The ancestors of Tatars created numerous states, such as the Hun kingdoms in Central Asia (204 BCE–216 CE) and central Europe (376–454 CE), Avarian khaganate, or kingdom (562–803), Great Bulgaria (603; en640), and Volga Bulgaria (910–1236) in Europe; and the first and second Turkic khaganates (551–742) and Khazarian khaganate (560–969) in Europe and Asia.

The term Tatar was first mentioned in the epitaph of the Turkic *khagan* (king) Bilge and his brother Kul-Tegin in the eighth century CE. Together with the

Mongols, the Tatars conquered vast territories in Asia and Europe in the thirteenth century under Genghis Khan and set up the largest land empire the world has ever known, the Mongol empire. The western part of this Empire later became known as the Golden Horde, which flourished in the fourteenth century. At that time, several Tatar cities were larger than any contemporaneous European city. Both nomadic and settled Turkic and non-Turkic peoples of the Golden Horde contributed to the melting pot known as Tatars. Kipchak, a Turkic language, became the common language for the Tatars.

In the fifteenth century, after the Golden Horde had broken up into several Tatar states, the languages and cultures of the population of those states continued developing. Different territories had different proportions of the same components (Turkic peoples of Europe and Asia) and numerous non-Turkic elements, including Finno-Ugrians (Mordva, Udmurts, Maris), Slavs (Russians, Ukrainians), Jews, and so forth. In addition, the Tatars captured many people from neighboring countries, including Latvians and Poles, and incorporated them into the Tatar states, which led to the development of particularities in the dialects and cultures of the descendants of Golden Horde Tatars.

Later all the Tatar states were subjugated by the growing Russian state. The majority of the Tatars continued to identify themselves as such, but with modifying words (for example, Crimean Tatars); others, such as the Balkars, Bashkirs, Karachays, Kazakhs, and so forth, took one of numerous tribal names. Furthermore, the presence of "Tatar" in an ethonym does not mean that the group in question is particularly close to other groups that use the word. For example, the language and culture of the Kazan Tatars are much closer to those of the Bashkirs than they are to those of Crimean Tatars.

Though many Russian noble families were of Tatar origin and Tatars had a great positive influence on Russian history, the rulers of Russia divided the Tatars into a variety of ethnic and territorial groups, declaring them separate nations and giving separate language status to their dialects. This Russian policy continues today.

The Tatars Today

Most Tatars are Sunni Muslims, though the Kryashens are Orthodox Christians. Tatars are not very devout Muslims; they never were very devout, even when they lived in their own independent states. Most Tatars go to the mosque only twice a year, during two biggest Muslim feasts. Usually during these feast days, after visiting the mosque, Tatars go home

or visit one another and drink vodka. Drinking alcohol is not compatible with being a Muslim and Arab Muslims bitterly condemn Tatars for this habit. There are also certain Tatar groups, descended from Golden Horde Tatars and now known as Karaims and Krymchaks, who are of the Jewish faith. The contemporary Tatar lifestyle does not differ significantly from that of surrounding peoples, although Tatars do have a greater inclination toward trading and entrepreneurship than do Russians and other neighboring peoples. Being Tatar is still something of which young people are proud, even if they no longer speak Tatar.

With the foundation of the Soviet Union in the 1920s, the Volga-Ural and Crimean Tatars were established in the Tatar and Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, respectively, in 1920 and 1921. The Crimean Republic was dissolved in 1945, and now Tatars have only one state in the Russian Federation: the Republic of Tatarstan. It is situated in the Volga and Kama river basin, with the City of Kazan as the capital.

Irek Bikkinin

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TATSUNO KINGO (1854–1919), first modern Japanese architect. Tatsuno Kingo was born the son of a low-ranking samurai of the Karatsu domain, in what is today Saga Prefecture. He left the province to go to Tokyo to study at the Imperial College of Engineering (forerunner of the Department of Engineering at Tokyo University) under Josiah Condor (1852–1920), a British architect who came to Japan in 1877. After Tatsuno graduated in 1879 at the top of this class, he went to London and trained under the Gothic-revival architect William Burges (1827–1881). In 1883, he returned to Japan and became a professor and dean of the School of Engineering at Tokyo Imperial University. He worked to found an architectural academy and promoted the introduction of modern architectural construction methods and materials.

His career can be divided into an early period during which he employed and introduced classic design and a later period in which he developed his free

classic style. Tatsuno helped to introduce Western-style architecture to Japan, first with the Bank of Japan Building (1896) built in Italian Renaissance style; then with the Tokyo Station Building (1914), a brick-built structure based on Amsterdam Central Station, which was the last great Meiji period (1868–1912) construction project.

Nathalie Cavasin

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TAURUS MOUNTAINS The Taurus (*Toros*) Mountains are a folded limestone range lying between the Dalaman and Seyhan Rivers in southern Turkey. The range forms a horizontal S-shape, lying parallel to the Mediterranean coast, bordered on the south by an irregular level coastal strip and on the north by the central plateau, at an altitude of 1000 meters. The Taurus range is up to 150 kilometers wide from north to south and encompasses Turkey's lake district, including the freshwater lakes of Beysehir and Egirdir and the salt lakes of Burdur, Aci, and Salda. The main subsidiary ranges are (from west to east) the jagged Beydaglar (maximum height 3,070 meters), the Sultan Daglari (maximum height 2,610 meters), the Dedegol Daglari (maximum height 2,998 meters), the Bolkarlar (maximum height 3,585 meters), and the rose-pink Aladaglar (maximum height 3,756 meters).

In Greek and Roman times the southern plain was extensively cultivated and linked to the interior by roads running north from Antalya, Perge, and Tarsus. Control of the Cilician Gates, the major pass through the Taurus, was always of vital importance to local rulers. The Seljuks made Alanya their major port, and a network of caravan roads, some still in use, with inns (*kervansaray*), linked the capital at Konya to the south coast. Present-day main roads cut the range north from Antalya, Aksu, Manavgat, Silifke, and Adana.

The sparse population inhabiting the Taurus is mainly Yoruk, an original Turkish ethnic group with a distinctive highland culture. They practice transhumance, moving in spring with their flocks of goats and sheep from the coastal strip to high summer pastures. Many have settled permanently in the lowlands, where tomatoes, cotton, and cut flowers under glass are grown, or around the lakes, where apples are grown;

mountain villages are being abandoned. The Forestry Ministry (Orman Bakanligi) owns over 50 percent of the land in the Taurus and provides employment by cultivating pines. Mineral deposits of chrome, with some iron and lead, are either worked out or uneconomic. The southern coast is a popular tourist destination; not many venture into the mountains, but the Koprulu and Goksu Rivers are seasonally used for white-water rafting; trekking is important in the Beydaglari and Aladaglari.

Kate Clow

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TAXILA Taxila was the capital of Gandhara, an ancient kingdom in northwest India east of the Khyber Pass, which flourished from the sixth century BCE to the fifth century CE. Today Taxila lies in ruins near the modern city of Islamabad in Pakistan, but in its heyday the city was a center of culture and learning. Its location on the main route through the mountains into India ensured Taxila's importance in the commerce linking India, West Asia, and the rest of the world, and its vulnerability to foreign invaders.

Enfolded into the Persian empire in the sixth century BCE by Cyrus the Great (c. 585–c. 529 BCE), Gandhara became one of the wealthiest satrapies in the empire, and Taxila absorbed Persian culture along with its Vedic traditions. Alexander of Macedon (356–323 BCE) visited the city in 326 BCE during his conquest of Gandhara, but after Alexander's death, the Maurya dynasty (c. 324–c. 200 BCE) emerged to rule India.

Taxila became a center of Buddhism after the conversion of the Mauryan ruler Asoka (d. 238 or 232 BCE) around 261 BCE. During the succeeding Kushan dynasty (78–200 CE), established by Buddhist nomadic invaders from Central Asia, Taxila maintained its importance as a Buddhist center. The Gandharan style of Buddhist art emerged in Kushan times. Mirroring the blend of foreign, particularly Hellenistic Greek, and Indian elements in the society of Taxila, Gandharan art introduced the first representations of Buddha as a human being, depicted in elegant Greek style. Through the second century CE, Gandharan art had an immense impact on Buddhist art in Central Asia, China, and Japan, as well as India.

From the second century on, however, Taxila began to decline. The city was ravaged by the armies of



TAXILA—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site since 1980, Taxila vividly displays the varied cultural influences, from Mongolian to Greek, that were incorporated into Indus architecture between the fifth century BCE to the second century CE.

the Persian Sasanid dynasty (224/228–651) in the second century and was finally destroyed by the Huns in the fifth century.

Archaeologically, the city is represented by three successive sites. The Bhir Mound (Taxila I), the earliest site, is thought to have existed for three centuries until the second century BCE. Sirkap (Taxila II) was perhaps the most important city in the early historical period in northwestern India and remained in existence until the second century CE, when the Kushan rulers shifted the capital to the nearby site called Sirsukh (Taxila III).

Sima Roy Chowdhury

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TAY HOOI KEAT (1910–1989), Malaysian painter. Active in Penang in British Malaya, Tay Hooi Keat became well-known during the 1930s for watercolor paintings depicting Malayan life and scenery. His style combined traditional Chinese brushwork with European techniques. Tay was a leader of the Nanyang Art movement of colonial Malaya, which was

characterized by a diffusion of studio techniques and ideas about painting brought to Penang and Singapore by teachers trained in modern-oriented schools in coastal China.

Chinese by descent, Tay was educated in English in Christian schools in Penang, where he also later taught. During the late 1940s, he studied painting in London on a British Council grant. In 1957, the year of Malaya's establishment as an independent nation, Tay founded the Thursday Art Group in Penang, a group of artists committed to promoting modern Malayan forms of artistic expression. In the later stages of his career, Tay painted mainly in oils.

Tay Hooi Keat is the best-known early proponent of modern Malayan artistic consciousness, and examples of his work may be seen in major galleries in Malaysia and Singapore.

Emily Hill

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TAY SON REBELLION The Tay Son Rebellion (1771–1802) was a major peasant uprising in Vietnam that united the country for a short time under one popular ruler. The rebellion, which ended the Le and Trinh dynasties, was led by three brothers from the village of Tay Son in Binh Dinh Province, Nguyen Nhac, Nguyen Lu, and Nguyen Hue. The ruling Nguyen family's taxation policy and internal corruption led to increased financial exactions from the population in the south. Besides the peasant support, the Tay Son brothers also attracted support from powerful Chinese merchants who opposed restrictive trade practices. The brothers' main slogan was to seize the property of the rich and distribute it to the poor. In 1771, they began to build an army of disaffected peasants and minorities in the An Khe Highlands near Binh Dinh. By 1773, the army of some ten thousand men attacked and seized the Nguyen fort at Qui Nhon and later took control of the provinces of Quang Ngai and Quang Nam. In each liberated village, the Tay Son forces punished oppressive landlords and scholar-officials and redistributed their property. The Tay Son forces also distributed the food from storehouses to the hungry, abolished taxes, burned the tax and land registers, and freed prisoners from local jails. Army deserters, merchants, scholars, local officials, and monks supported the rebellion as it moved forward.

In 1776, the Tay Son killed all of the Nguyen family in Gia Dinh (later Saigon), except one sixteen-year old nephew, Nguyen Anh, who escaped to the swamps of the Mekong Delta. The Trinh, who ruled northern Vietnam, had taken advantage of the Tay Son rebellion to invade Nguyen territory after a century-long truce in their civil war. The Trinh armies in southern Vietnam eventually reached accommodation with the Tay Son and withdrew from the south, giving the Tay Son effective control over the southern part of the country by 1778. The youngest brother, Nguyen Hue, a military genius, was able to defend the Tay Son south from a counterattack by Nguyen Anh (1783), and from a massive assault by the Siamese armies (1785). By 1786, the Tay Son had captured the north from the Trinh, who were embroiled in a succession struggle and whose land had been hit by typhoons and plagued by poor harvests. The three brothers had united Vietnam, with each brother ruling a part of the country. Nguyen Hue, who had proclaimed himself king and changed his name to Quang Trung in 1788, was able to defend the northern area of the country and the principle city of Thang Long (later Ha Noi) from the Chinese (especially at the Battle of Ngoc Hoi-Dong Da in 1789). As king, Quang Trung carried out effective fiscal and military reforms, redistributed land, promoted crafts and trade, and actively sought education reform. He was also eventually able to establish friendly relations with China. Quang Trung died of unknown causes in 1792, and his ten-year-old son took the throne, only to be easily ousted in 1802 by the surviving Nguyen lord, Nguyen Anh, who took power and established the Nguyen dynasty as Emperor Gia Long.

Richard B. Verrone

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TEA—CHINA The English word "tea" is derived from the southeastern Chinese pronunciation of *cha*, the name by which the beverage is known in north China and areas in contact with the north. The drink is an infusion of the leaves of the shrub *Camellia sinensis*. Before the Song dynasty (960–1279), powdered tea was preferred, but more recently tea has been consumed as dried (green tea) and often as dried and fired (sometimes fermented) leaves (black or "red" tea). Tea is accorded health-promoting qualities in China, and recent research has largely confirmed claims at least for green tea, but in categories different from those of traditional Chinese medicine.

Knowledge of the tea plant goes back as far as three thousand years ago in China. Valued at first as a medicine and a stimulant for meditation, it had by late Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) times come into more general



THE WAY OF TEA

During the Tang dynasty, the poet Jiaoren wrote the following verse, extolling the great spiritual meaning of tea.

A friend from Yeuh presented me
 With tender leaves of Yen-Hsi tea,
 For which I chose a kettle
 Of ivory mounted gold,
 A mixing bowl of snow-white teeth.
 With its clear bright froth and fragrance,
 It was like the nectar of Immortals.
 The first bowl washed the cobwebs from my
 mind—
 The whole world seemed to sparkle.
 A second cleansed my spirit
 Like purifying showers of rain.
 A third and I was one of the Immortals—
 What need have we for austerities
 To purge our human sorrows?
 Worldly people, by going in for wine,
 Sadly deceive themselves.
 For now I the Way of Tea is real.
 Who but Tan Ch'iu* could find it?

*Explained as the name of an Immortal—
 which carries the implication that one must come
 to that state in order to "know" the Way of Tea.

Source: John Blofeld (1985) *The Chinese Art of Tea*. Boston, MA: Shambala, 139.

use. Its mass popularity as a beverage dates from Song dynasty (960–1279) times, when tea cultivation in the mountainous south, particularly the Fujian highlands, became one foundation for the rapid economic expansion of the period. Once well established in Chinese cultivation, tea quickly spread to China's neighbors, including various Central Asian peoples, who took to it avidly, and to Europeans. Ultimately, it became the world's most popular drink. Although tea was not originally a primary commodity of the large-scale Chinese trade with the West that developed after the sixteenth century, it soon became one, and by the eighteenth century the Chinese tea trade was one of the driving forces of the world economy and an object of intense competition among the mercantile powers.

Today tea is found in many forms, from the mundane to teas costing small fortunes per ounce. By and large, the different forms are marked by regional variants, but cultivation, harvesting, and processing technology are also important in arriving at different varieties. China has also been known for its blended medicinal teas in which tea is combined with numerous other ingredients carefully chosen for their medicinal properties. Among the varieties, legend has it that the fermented "red" teas so preferred by the Europeans were first invented by accident when a whole shipment spoiled, only to have the tea eagerly purchased by European go-betweens. In fact, such teas were already being made in China, but it is also true that China tailored its tea production for European tastes just as it prepared special forms of porcelains and textiles for European customers.

Paul D. Buell

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TEA—SOUTH ASIA Although tea (*Camellia sinensis*) is native to China, tea production shifted from there to South Asia in the first half of the nineteenth century. Today South Asia is the most important producer and exporter of tea (in 1998 accounting for 30.3 percent and 38.8 percent, respectively). A massive

workforce, about 1.5 million people, is engaged in tea production in South Asia, and tea is responsible for a considerable, though declining, share of export earnings for the producing countries. Tea is produced in about twenty-five countries, the most important (outside South Asia) being China, Kenya, Turkey, and Indonesia. The main consumers are (in descending order of consumption) Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Egypt. Tea is produced in three main varieties: as orthodox tea (main producer is Sri Lanka), as CTC-tea (where the leaf is cut, teared and curled before firing/heating; main producers are India and Kenya) and as green tea (manufacture without firing; main producer is China). In South Asia a large and growing proportion of tea is consumed internally (in India more than two-thirds of production) as a popular and extremely cheap soft drink (often prepared on the road in "tea stalls") and sold most often in packets, very rarely in bags or as iced tea.

India

India is by far the most important tea producer in the world. In India tea production began in 1838 and slowly spread from Assam (still the most important tea-growing area) to other parts of north India and later to south India (Nilgiri Hills). First planted by individual farmers, tea quickly became a company business owned by British firms, which withdrew from the subcontinent (especially in the 1950s and 1960s) only because of declining tea prices, growing labor unrest, strict (government-imposed) social obligations (to provide employees with free housing, schooling, health care and so on), and narrow ceilings on foreign ownership.

Most Indian tea is produced on big plantations; small landholders play a role only in south India. Although India is responsible for nearly 30 percent of world tea production, it accounts for only 16 percent of world exports, as an increasing proportion is consumed locally. The government has often intervened in tea exportation by setting export quotas to protect local consumers (tea is treated as an essential commodity), by restricting plantations' land acquisition and use through land reform acts, and by imposing heavy taxes on tea companies. The Indian tea industry is in a healthy condition, apart from a few "sick gardens" taken over by the government, and productivity per hectare is very high. Nonetheless in 2001 south Indian wholesale prices of five rupees per kilogram made tea production unprofitable for small producers.

Sri Lanka and Bangladesh

In Sri Lanka tea production began in 1867. Individual planters were soon replaced by British companies,

which managed their estates by means of local agency houses. Fieldwork and picking were carried out by an immigrant workforce that arrived in large numbers from south India until the Indian colonial government called a halt to the emigrations in the 1930s. The state has supported the expansion of the plantation system by taking over land to which nobody could provide a legal title, providing infrastructure, and ensuring generous tax treatment.

Independence in 1948 led to almost immediate revolt against the plantation system, escalating export taxes, government interference, and finally (in 1972 and 1975) nationalization of the tea estates, which were brought under two state corporations. Their unsatisfactory performance slowly paved the way for privatization of management in 1992 and for full privatization after 1996. Sri Lanka has lost export market shares (1998: 21 percent) and reputation for tea quality until recently; since privatization, performance is improving.

Bangladesh is responsible for only 1.9 percent of world tea production and consumes 60 percent of its own production.

The Future

Tea was once the pillar of India's and Sri Lanka's export economy and as such an easy target of anti-colonial agitation. Since independence, tea has lost much of its former economic importance in these countries. The falling relevance of tea exports (but not consumption) for South Asia could not have been avoided, because world consumption is increasing very slowly, causing tea prices (in real terms) to stagnate or decline.

Joachim Betz

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TEA CEREMONY The Japanese tea ceremony (*chanoyu*) is a ritualized form of preparing and serving tea, usually in a carefully designed and controlled setting known as the tea room (*chashitsu*). A distinctive

feature of the ceremony is its containment entirely within this single room. The host, using a kettle and other implements, prepares tea and serves it in bowls to his guests. All participants in the ceremony, host and guests, are seated on tatami (rush mats), the traditional floor covering for Japanese rooms. The host serves his guests sweets and, depending on the formality of the ceremony, a meal, consisting of perhaps a few vegetables and a piece of fish. The host himself does not partake of either tea or food.

The tea ceremony evolved during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and reached its high point in the time of Sen no Rikyu (1521–1590), who is universally recognized as the greatest of the tea masters. In Rikyu's day, the leading tea masters stood at the apex of Japanese cultural life. They were respected not only as skilled performers of the ceremony itself, but also as men of taste in the various arts associated with the ceremony, including ceramics and lacquerware, room construction and decoration (the masters designed and decorated their own tea rooms), painting, calligraphy, and flower arrangement. Whereas the tea ceremony was performed almost exclusively by men in premodern times, from the late nineteenth century it became predominately a female pursuit.

Tea Enters Japan

Tea entered China from Southeast Asia, and by the seventh century CE it had become a popular drink throughout the country. Tea was esteemed by the Chinese for its medicinal value; it contains tannic acid, which is good for the health. In addition, it was treasured by the elite of society for its supposed spiritual quality. It was thought that by drinking tea one would be transported to a spiritual realm transcending everyday, mundane life.

Tea was transmitted to Japan in the early ninth century. The emperor and his courtiers in the capital city of Heian-kyo (Kyoto), enamored of China's higher civilization, drank and appreciated tea as an elegant beverage. At Buddhist temples, priests and monks consumed it primarily for their health. Tea drinking largely died out, however, in the late ninth and tenth centuries as the Japanese ended what had been approximately three centuries of cultural borrowing from China. The beverage was reintroduced to Japan in the late twelfth century by the Zen Buddhist priest Eisai (1141–1215), who praised tea as a medicine beneficial to the heart. Eisai also strongly recommended tea as an aid in the Buddhist practice of seated meditation. By the fourteenth century, tea had spread throughout Japan and had become a national drink.

There are three kinds of tea: black (fully fermented), oolong (partially fermented), and green (unfermented). Tea can be prepared in two ways—through infusion (dipping tea leaves into hot water) or by dissolving the leaves, after they have been ground into a powder, in the hot water. The tea ceremony uses green tea in powdered form. After placing powdered tea into a bowl several times larger than the Western tea cup, the host ladles in water and stirs tea and water into a frothy mixture with a split-bamboo whisk.

The Four Features of the Tea Ceremony

The tea ceremony, as it evolved in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, consists of four principal features: rules, setting (the tea room), personal relations (between and among host and guests), and taste (the aesthetic values governing the ceremony, its setting, and the articles used and displayed in it). Rules transform the commonplace function of drinking tea into a ceremony, which today is quite complex, with elaborate and detailed procedures governing every ritualistic aspect. The principal burden rests on the host, who must conduct himself in a highly formal manner, creating a proper and hospitable atmosphere. He or she must handle every implement in a carefully prescribed way. Whereas one can learn the rules for being a guest in a relatively short time, acquiring the true art of being a host takes years.

The tea room is a variation of a style of room that took form in the fifteenth century and became what we know today as the standard Japanese room. The room has sliding doors, either *shoji*, which consist of lattice-work frames covered with translucent rice paper, or *fusuma*, opaque cardboard-covered panels. There is an alcove, asymmetrical hanging shelves, and a low, installed desk that can be used by someone seated on the floor. The floor is covered with tatami. As a variant of the standard room, the tea room may lack features such as the asymmetrical shelves and the installed desk. Some tea rooms, however, have a unique feature of their own—the "crawling-in entrance" (*nijiriguchi*). This is a square or rectangular entryway, 45 centimeters in height from the floor, cut into one of the room's walls that obliges a person to enter by crawling on the hands and knees. The willingness to use this special entrance signifies humility and the acceptance of social equality among all the participants in a ceremony, at least for the duration of the ceremony. The *nijiriguchi* also gives guests the feeling that they are entering a unique microcosmic world.

The personal relations among the participants in a tea ceremony are traditionally imbued with the spirit of Buddhism, although the non-Japanese participant

who may not be a Buddhist is unlikely to feel that there is anything particularly religious about a tea ceremony. Among the values that people of tea emphasize are harmony (*wa*) and respect (*kei*), which presumably can be accepted by all people, whatever their religion or cultural background.

The aesthetics of the tea ceremony are many; indeed, they embrace the classical aesthetics of Japanese art and culture in general as they evolved over many centuries. Of particular importance to devotees of tea, however, is the aesthetic of *wabi*, a preference for the quiet, simple, and austere. Although not all tea ceremonies embody the aesthetic of *wabi* (some are more colorful and elaborate than others), the *wabi*-style is universally recognized as the ideal.

The Tea Ceremony in the Early 2000s

The tea ceremony is one of Japan's most enduring arts, and to learn how to handle oneself correctly at a tea ceremony is to acquire the essential features of traditional Japanese etiquette and manners. This is particularly so for young women, the principal students of the tea ceremony in modern times. Through study of the tea ceremony, young women learn how to wear kimonos correctly, how to walk and sit in a kimono, how to serve tea and food properly to guests, and how to conduct themselves with elegance and style.

Paul Varley

See also: **Tea Houses**

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TEAHOUSES Conceived as a place for aesthetic and intellectual fulfillment, the Japanese teahouse (*chabitsu*) is known for the simplicity of its design. Tea was a part of Zen monastic practice as early as the twelfth century, but it was not until the fifteenth century that the Zen priest Murata Shuko (c. 1422–1502) founded the formal tea ceremony. Shuko created the first tearoom, within the Togu-do, for the shogun



A woman performs the Japanese tea ceremony at the Yabunochi Tea School in Kyoto. (MICHAEL S. YAMASHITA/CORBIS)

Yoshimasa (1435–1490). The teahouse as a separate structure came into being in the late sixteenth century when the tea master Sen no Rikyu (1520–1591) designed a building specifically for preparing and drinking tea. The teahouse provides space not only for guests to enjoy tea but also for cleaning and storing tea utensils, along with a small anteroom for the waiting guests. While the teahouse is characterized by its restraint, this was not always the case: the shogun Hideyoshi (1536–1598) took this to the opposite extreme and used his gold-covered teahouse as a gaudy display of his power.

The teahouse itself was designed to embody a style of contrived poverty, with little interior or exterior ornamentation. Raw wood, thatched roofs, and straw tatami mats are typical of the natural materials used. This minimalism, however, is the result of careful consideration in which every detail contributes to the impression of refined simplicity. Care is reflected in both the design and construction of the teahouse: the precision and expert workmanship required here far exceed that of much more elaborate buildings, and those involved in its construction are considered to be artisans of the highest order. As important as the building itself is its garden setting. One type, the dry landscape garden, is a microcosm of the natural world in which raked sand suggests water, rocks are islands, and moss and shrubs are forests. Such gardens were designed for contemplation; strolling would disrupt the patterns in the carefully raked sand.

The teahouse is reached by a path (*roji*) of stones placed in a seemingly random pattern. This path symbolizes the initiation into the tea ceremony where the guest breaks ties with the outside world and achieves tranquility with each step along the approach. The teahouse thus serves as a haven from worldly cares; once inside, the guest is encouraged to cultivate a mood of meditative calm. The interior is small and the decor is simple: a painting and a flower arrangement set within an alcove (*tokonoma*) are typical adornments. Each item is selected so that no color or design is repeated, and asymmetry prevails. The beauty of the teahouse is appreciated only by those who are able visually to complete that which is incomplete. In the sixteenth century, the teahouse offered a refuge from politics and warfare. The tranquility and refinement of the teahouse continue to offer a refuge from the outside world.

Catherine Pagani

See also: **Tea Ceremony**

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TEDZHEN RIVER Rising in Afghanistan at an elevation of 3,000 meters, the Tedzhen (Tejen) is one of the main suppliers of water to northern Afghanistan, northeast Iran, and southern Turkmenistan. Within Afghanistan and Iran the river is known as the Hari Rud, taking the name Tedzhen only within Turkmenistan, where it waters the city and oasis of the same name.

The river is 1,150 kilometers in length and drains an area of 70,600 square kilometers. Fed by meltwater, the river's main flow is between the months of March and May, with a maximum flow of 990 cubic meters per second. The mean flow is just 30 cubic meters per second, and between the months of August and November the riverbed is usually dry. The river does not freeze.

In its upper reaches the river is no more than a mountain stream, but further downstream it provides the main source of water to the important Herat oasis in Afghanistan, where large volumes of water are diverted for irrigated agriculture. Below Herat, the Tedzhen forms the border between Afghanistan and Iran before becoming the boundary between Iran and Turkmenistan. Within Turkmenistan it flows via two

reservoirs, the Tedzhen (142 million cubic meters) and the Second Tedzhen (180 million cubic meters) into a broad valley where it splits into several channels before drying in the Kara Kum Desert. The entirety of the river's flow is here used for irrigation and the lower course has to be fed via the Kara Kum Canal.

Will Myer

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
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TEHRAN (2002 est. pop. 11 million). The city of Tehran, capital of Iran, is located in the north-central part of the country at the foothills of the Elburz Mountains. It is the second largest city in the Middle East, after Cairo, with a population of more than 10 million. According to the historical records, Tehran was first cited by a twelfth-century traveler named Yaqut. Since then, Tehran has been mentioned more regularly in the literature, demonstrating its growing importance.

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Safavid monarchs chose Tehran as a temporary resi-

dence. In 1796, Agha Mohammad Shah Qajar made Tehran his capital due to its ideal geographic location. However, city conditions were not modernized much during the reigns of Agha Mohammad or his two successors. In fact, it was not until Naser od-Din Shah's reign (1848–1896) that structural changes to the city were undertaken due to the influences of what the Qajar monarch had seen in his travels to Europe.

More substantial improvements to the city were not made again until Reza Shah Pahlavi's reign (1925–1941). During this time, the architectural landscape shifted to the neoclassical style, and many of the older buildings and features of the city were torn down, including ornate gates that were considered symbols of the "old Tehran." Moreover, summer resorts were built in the foothills of the Elburz Mountains, which became a popular retreat for the city's residents. The city underwent another architectural facelift in the early 1950s that was influenced by Iranians who had studied abroad, particularly in the United States. The 1960s and 1970s witnessed a tremendous expansion of the population of Tehran and of construction in the city, mainly because of the influx of capital from ample oil revenues. This growth brought with it the usual negative externalities associated with rapid development, such as pollution, housing shortages, crime, and even traffic jams. In the 1980s, the war with Iraq caused severe structural and economic damage to Tehran, which the government worked to restore in the 1990s.



A view of the interior of the Golestan Palace in Tehran. (BRIAN A. VIKANDER/CORBIS)

Currently, Tehran is home to several universities, including the famous University of Tehran, as well as museums such as the Archaeological and Ethnological Museums and the Golestan Palace. An international airport is located within the city's periphery to the west. Buses and taxis comprise the main public transportation system in Tehran, but a light rail system is under construction. The government is a major employer of the city's residents, and several industries are based in Tehran, including construction, financial, manufacturing, and petroleum processing. For these reasons, Tehran is considered Iran's cultural, social, political, and economic center.

Houman A. Sadri

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TELUGU Telugu are speakers of the Telugu language, a part of the Dravidian language family, which also includes Tamil, Kannada, and Malayalam. Also known as Andhras, these people mainly live in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh (population estimated at 74.0 million in 1998), but many Telugu live in adjoining states, and a significant number are found throughout the southeastern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Smaller migrant communities are located in the United States, the United Kingdom, Singapore, and South Africa. The Telugu are predominantly Hindus.

The Telugu region of India has undergone a long history of changes. Over two millennia ago, the Andhra kingdom, with its capital, Paithan, lying in the current state of Maharashtra, was a Buddhist stronghold. Successor kingdoms included the dynasties of the Pallavas, eastern Chalukyas, Kalingas, Kakatiyas, and Cholas. The Hindu Vijayanagar empire in Karnataka and the southern part of Telugu land were the last Hindu kingdoms that ruled the Telugu. The Bahmani and Golkonda kingdoms that followed much later reflected Muslim domination in central India. During the sixteenth century European traders began to arrive at the seaport city of Machilipatnam, and by the eighteenth century the British had control of much of southern India, which they governed from Madras. The British also controlled the sultanate of Golkonda, based at the city of Hyderabad, which in turn dominated much of the central regions. Following Indian

independence from the U.K. in 1947, most of the Telugu territory became the newly established state of Andhra Pradesh.

Shanti Raju

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TEMENGGONG *Temenggong* (also spelled *temenggung*) was the title of a high-ranking official, the commander of the troops and police, in the premodern Malay states. The term is undoubtedly related to the Javanese *tumenggung*. In the kingdom of Majapahit in the second half of the fourteenth century, this title was given to the commander in chief who belonged to the five top officials of the realm. In the Malay world there is general agreement that a ruler was supported by four senior officers, but there is no unanimity as to who these four were. Depicting the world of Melaka in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the *Sejarah Melayu* (Malay Annals) mentions the *bendahara* (prime minister), *penghulu bendabari* (treasurer), and *laksamana* (admiral), along with the *temenggong*. The *temenggong*'s principal concern was Melaka's security, and he was therefore in charge of the police and acted as chief magistrate. Later he became more important than the *penghulu bendabari* and was considered to be the *bendahara*-designate, equivalent to deputy prime minister in charge of internal affairs. According to the *Undang-Undang Melaka* (Laws of Melaka, i.e., the Melaka Digest), which dates from the fifteenth century, the *temenggong* was given jurisdiction over crimes committed in the country and matters such as the investigation of crime and the apprehension of criminals in the land, and was allowed to execute people he arrested without waiting for a royal order. The *Syair Sultan Maulana* (Poem of Sultan Maulana), dealing with events in the sultanate of Kedah in the beginning of the nineteenth century, shows us the *laksamana* of Kedah acting as commander of the fleet and its *temenggong* as commander of the troops.

Concerning the expressions *adat parpatih* and *adat tumenggung*, British colonial writers have erroneously translated *adat parpatih* as "law of ministers" and *adat tumenggung* as "law of the minister for war and police," which obscures the real character of the two systems. In the first place, the term *adat* has a much wider meaning than "law"; it also means "custom" and "etiquette" and extends to the legal system. Second, Parpatih and

Tumenggung were the names (or titles) of two legendary Minangkabau ancestors, Parapatih nan Sabatang and Kyai Katimanggungan, after whom the two varying *adat* were called. So *adat perpatih* designates the custom of the Minangkabau state of Negri Sembilan, and *adat temenggung* denotes "the customs instituted by our ancestor Kyai Katumanggungan"—the custom of the surrounding Malay territories.

Edwin Wieringa

See also: **Adat**

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TEMPLE OF HEAVEN Built between 1406 and 1420, the Temple of Heaven served as the prayer site for the emperors of the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties in China. Every year, on the fif-

teenth day of the first lunar month, the emperor would come to the Hall of Prayer for Good Harvest (Qi Nian Dian) to pay homage to Heaven and pray for a good harvest. He would pay homage to his ancestors as well, because he was also regarded as the Son of Heaven. In early winter, the emperor would come again to thank Heaven for the good harvest. If a drought plagued China during the summer, the emperor would also come to the temple to pray for rain.

The Hall of Prayer for Good Harvest was built with much symbolism. Of the twenty-eight pillars that support the domed structure, the four large ones represent the four seasons, the twelve inner pillars represent the months in the lunar calendar, and the twelve outer pillars represent the twelve two-hour time periods of a day. The hall, 32 meters high and 24.2 meters in diameter, is also a masterpiece of traditional Chinese architecture. The Taiji Stone—on the Circular Mound Altar—and Echo Wall are sites where Chinese architects demonstrated their mastery of acoustics. The Temple of Heaven became a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1998.

Jian-Zhong Lin

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The Hall of Prayer for Good Harvests at the Temple of Heaven in Tianan Park, Beijing. (DEAN CONGER/CORBIS)

TEMPLER, GERALD (1898–1979), High Commissioner of Malaya. Gerald Templer was born in the year 1898 and was trained at the Royal Military College in England. He replaced Henry Gurney (who was assassinated during an ambush) as the High Commissioner of Malaya in 1951. He took on this post at the time Malaya was at the height of the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), a full-scale war between the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and the Malayan government. It was an armed revolution by the Communists, who wanted to set up a Communist state. However, the British succeeded in crushing the rebellion. Templer held both the civil and military offices, but as he himself was a soldier, he concentrated more on the military front, leaving the civil office to the deputy high commissioner, Donald MacGillivray.

During his tenure, Templer expanded the Malay Regiment by bringing in troops from Britain, Fiji, East Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, making it a Commonwealth effort to bring the Emergency to an end.

He showed great enthusiasm in his work. He was usually associated with tough military policies. He also introduced the so-called white areas, which were also known as the New Villages. These were areas that were tested and found clear of Communist insurgencies. Templer traveled throughout Malaya investigating the black areas—areas under Communist control or in which people supported the insurgents and punished those found guilty of working with the Communists.

Templer left Malaya in 1954, after considerably improving the military situation there. His policies and actions undoubtedly reduced the activities of the Communists in Malaya.

Mala Selvaraju

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TEMPO *Tempo* is Indonesia's largest-circulation weekly newsmagazine. Founded in 1971 by Gunawan Mohamad, the magazine was best known for hard-hitting reportage that often got its editors in trouble with President Suharto's authoritarian New Order regime. *Tempo* was respected for standing up to censorship and to the draconian regulations that regulated Indonesia's quiescent media. *Tempo* was banned in

June 1994 for a report on Indonesia's purchase of thirty-nine East German warships and the corruption surrounding the deal. *Tempo*, along with two other magazines, was arbitrarily closed under a 1984 decree that allowed the government to revoke the license of any media organ whose coverage was not "responsible." The closure and the government's two attempts to have loyal allies of Suharto purchase the magazine, which is 60 percent owned by the workers, provoked violent demonstrations among its 400 staff, trade unions, and other supporters of press freedom. On 3 May 1995, in a surprising display of judicial independence, a court overruled the ban, stating that under Indonesia's press law, censorship and press bans were illegal. Although the court ordered the government to renew *Tempo's* license, the government refused and the Supreme Court eventually overturned the lower court's decision, effectively banning *Tempo*. Undeterred, the editors began publishing *Tempo* on the Internet. *Tempo* resumed publication following Suharto's resignation in May 1998. In 1990 it became the first publicly traded print media company in Indonesia, and it expanded rapidly. In addition to *Tempo* magazine, there is now an English edition, a daily newspaper, *Tempo Koran*, and an online edition, *Tempo Interactive* (www.tempointeractive.com). *Tempo* remains the most widely read and respected newsmagazine in the country.

Zachary Abuza

TENASSERIM DIVISION (2002 est pop. 1.3 million). Tenasserim (Tanintharyi) is a town (founded in 1373) and division of southeastern Myanmar (Burma). The name *Tenasserim* is a Western corruption of the indigenous name for the town (pronounced Ta-nin-tha-ree) and, since 1989, Tanintharyi has officially replaced the colonial version. The division of Tenasserim is located between Mon State (to the northeast), the Andaman Sea (to the west), and Thailand (to the east). The division's population is chiefly Burman, Karen, and Mon. The capital of the division is Tavoy (Dawei).

Tenasserim's premodern importance was as a portage for the carrying trade of maritime merchandise across the narrow Kra Isthmus separating the Indian Ocean from the South China Sea. The opening of British ports at Penang in the late eighteenth century and Singapore in the 1820s, however, ushered in the decline of Tenasserim's maritime economy. After the British acquired the province of Tenasserim as a result of the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826), they seriously considered giving it back to the Burmese

because of its poor economic outlook. The British were able to build a moderately prosperous colonial economy, however, through the exploitation of teak wood reserves, shipbuilding, and tin mining, largely with immigrant labor from China and India.

Michael W. Charney

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TERESA, MOTHER (1910–1997), Catholic missionary in India and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. Mother Teresa of Calcutta was born Agnes Gonxha Bojaxhiu in Skopje, Serbia (now Macedonia). In 1928 she left for India as a Catholic missionary, taking the name Teresa. At first she taught in a convent school in Calcutta, and in 1937, when she took her final vows, she became principal of the school. In 1948, however, she left this position to begin work in the vast slums of Calcutta, where she opened a school for destitute children. In 1950 she founded a sisterhood, the Missionaries of Charity, in many ways reminiscent of the much earlier Sisterhood of Charity founded by Saint Vincent de Paul in 1633. Gradually other nuns joined her, and in 1952 Mother Teresa opened the House for the Dying, an early hospice for the poor. In 1957 Mother Teresa began working with lepers, and her sisterhood ministered in many disaster areas around the world. Universally revered for her humility, Mother



Mother Teresa holds a young boy from a Catholic orphanage in Calcutta in December 1979. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

Teresa was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her relief work with the poor in 1979. Soon after her death in 1997, the Vatican began taking steps toward eventually conferring sainthood on Mother Teresa.

Paul Hockings

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TERMEZ (2002 pop. 128,000). Termez is a port city on the Amu Dar'ya River in southern Uzbekistan, near the border with Afghanistan. It serves as the administrative center of Uzbekistan's Surkhandarya oblast (province).

The ancient town of Termez, slightly north of the current city, flourished in the first century BCE and was destroyed late in the seventeenth century CE. The present city originated as a Russian fort built in 1897. The city and nearby area is home to the remains of a Buddhist monastery, ruined forts, and medieval mausoleums. Termez celebrated its 2500th anniversary in 2001.

Termez entered the international spotlight in 1991 because of its proximity to northern Afghanistan. The Friendship Bridge, built across the Amu Dar'ya River during the Soviet-Afghan war (1979–1989), is the only bridge connecting Central Asia and Afghanistan. It was closed by Uzbekistan in 1998 when Taliban forces took control of the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif. Beginning in late 2001, the United Nations and international aid agencies used the bridge and port to deliver food, blankets, and other humanitarian aid into Afghanistan, after the collapse of the Taliban government. The presence of American and other forces is controversial and the city is largely closed to visitors.

Rebecca M. Bichel

TERRACE IRRIGATION In much of Asia, a shortage of natural lowland areas suitable for food cultivation has led to extensive terracing along the edges of the uplands. This was done in order to increase the acreage of flooded fields, which are required for wet rice cultivation. From India and China, where terracing first originated, to many parts of Java and Bali in Indonesia, in North Vietnam, and in Luzon in the Philippines, terraced irrigation works extend like huge flights of steps far up along mountainsides. These terraced fields have been built since antiquity and maintained at a prodigious cost in human labor and toil.



One of the major tourist attractions of the Philippines are the stone-walled terraces in northern Luzon. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

The rice terraces provide the most spectacular agricultural landscapes in Asia. Here, permanent irrigation has allowed the conversion of slopes along uplands into rice fields and fields of other crops with which the rice crop is alternated. While much of irrigation technology on terraced land is somewhat crude, dependent on mud and brush dams and short distribution canals, some groups of farmers, such as the Balinese and the northern Vietnamese, have created complex hydraulic systems. These societies have, since an early time, developed elaborate systems for carry-

ing as well as regularizing the water supply to fields used for crop cultivation. The famous Ifugao rice terraces of northern Luzon are one example, although they contribute a relatively small proportion of the national total of rice production and are not representative of typical Filipino rice culture.

How Terraces Are Built

Terrace building and water control, reputedly the "eighth wonder of the world," is a distinctive cultural phenomenon of Asia. Terracing, as done in many parts of Asia, consists of building stone walls, often without mortar, along the slope and contours of uplands being converted into cultivated land. The walls might be given a slight batter (receding upward slope) or inward lean at the top. These walls often exceeded six meters in height and were topped with sluices for water drainage. Earth materials would then be used to fill each unit to a level just below the top of the wall. By then staggering the field units in overlapping manner at different levels, a whole mountain slope might be terraced toward the top such that it resembled a sculptured system of fields covered with rice and other types of crops. The field units may be as narrow as 2.5 meters but as long as 90 meters on steep slopes. They are, however, commonly much wider and not so long. For irrigation, water is usually introduced at the top of a terrace series or sometimes as a complementary supply at an intermediate point. The water that is sup-



RICE TERRACES OF THE PHILIPPINE CORDELLIAS—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1995, the mountain rice terraces of Ifugao have been used for over 2,000 years. The outstanding beauty of the irrigated fields and the sheer enormity of the terraces make for an extraordinary landscape.



TERRACING IN THE PHILIPPINES

Terraced fields snaking up hillsides are a spectacular sight and a major tourist attraction in Southeast Asian nations such as the Philippines and Indonesia. The following extract describing the types of terraces built by the Ifugao ethnic group of the northern Philippines indicates that terracing is more complex than it appears from a distance and a technology vital to the local economy.

Habal "swidden" (slope field, camote field, kaingin). Slope land, cultivated and often contour-ridged (and especially for sweet potatoes). Other highland dry-field crops (including taro, yams, manioc, corn, millet, mung beans, and pigeon peas, but excluding rice except at elevations below 600–700 meters (2,000 feet) above sea level) are also cultivated in small stands or in moderately intercropped swiddens. Boundaries remain discrete during a normal cultivation cycle of several years. When fallow, succession usually to a canegrass association. . . .

lattan "house terrace" (settlement, hamlet terrace, residential site). Leveled terrace land, the surface of which is packed smooth or paved but not tilled; serving primarily as house and granary yards, work space for grain drying, and so forth; discrete, often fenced or walled, and named. . . .

qilid "drained field" (drained terrace, ridged terrace). Leveled terrace land, the surface of which is tilled and ditch mounded (usually in cross-contour fashion) for cultivation and drainage of dry crops, such as sweet potatoes and legumes. Drained fields, though privately owned, are kept in this temporary state for only a minimum number of annual cycles before shifting (back) to a more permanent form of terrace use. . . .

payo "pond field" (bunded terrace, rice terrace, rice field). Leveled farmland, bunded to retain irrigation water for shallow inundation of artificial soil, and carefully worked for the cultivation of wet-field rice, taro, and other crops; privately owned discrete units with permanent stone markers; the most valued of all land forms.

Source: Harold C. Conklin. (1967–68) "Some Aspects of Ethnographic Research in Ifugao." *New York Academy of Sciences, Transactions*, ser. 2, 30: 107–108.

plied then moves through sluices in each field by gravity downward across each level of the terrace. Finally, the water empties into a stream channel at the bottom of the valley.

Water control, which is crucial in the use of terraces, consists of careful adjustment of the volume of water in the beginning and, hence, its distribution throughout the system of field units making up the terraced series. The system must therefore be able to

bring in the required volume of water at any time during the growing season. The system must also be able to divert excess water at any point at any time.

Types of Terracing

The types of terrace walls built and the materials used vary across Asia. While the Ifugao in northern Luzon build terrace walls of stone with a slight batter, the Bontoc people in the same region build stone

walls with almost no batter. By contrast, the Kallnga, also in northern Luzon, use a stone base wall and upper walls of earth with a high batter. Some groups build a few high-quality terrace walls with only a few levels, while others are known for terracing that is relatively sophisticated.

In Bali, both terracing and irrigation practices are elaborately organized through a remarkable system of aqueducts, and in some cases water is carried via tunnels through hillsides in order to distribute it from reservoirs to the cultivated fields.

Tremendous amounts of labor and toil go into the construction of the terrace walls, from the gathering of the earth fill for each field unit to the maintenance and repair that ensures the soundness of the terrace walls. Skilled water control, however, is the most important factor in maintaining good soil as well and high productivity of the field units.

With the possible exception of Java in Indonesia, all the main rice-growing areas of Southeast Asia acquired the basic method of wet-rice cultivation by cultural borrowing from India or China. The skills of some Southeast Asian wet-rice cultivators have declined rather than improved within recent times. The Thai farmers who had first learned of irrigated cultivation from the Chinese farmers of Yunnan, and who would have been familiar with the art of hillside terracing for irrigation, apparently lost this art in the course of migrating to the Menam lowlands. Similarly, in peninsular Malaysia, the Malays, who it is assumed learned their wet-farming techniques from the upland peoples of Sumatra in Indonesia—where, again, terracing was in widespread use for irrigated cultivation—also show no knowledge of the practice.

Terracing and Soil Fertility

Terracing of the fields not only served irrigation purposes but also provided a high degree of protection against the ever-present threat of soil erosion as well as loss of soil fertility. In many areas of rice and other crop cultivation using terraced irrigation and such traditional methods of farming, cultivation has continued for hundreds and even thousands of years without any serious erosion or loss of soil fertility. This has been the case particularly in areas where irrigation or floodwaters bring abundant mineral matter and where there is deposited a seasonal layer of fertile silt.

The existing area of wet-field terrace systems has grown probably because of population pressures on land as well as land scarcity in areas such as mountainous parts of Asia. Other crops apart from rice that

are cultivated in terraced fields include corn, cabbages, potatoes, beans, bananas, and even coffee trees.

Yue Choong Kog

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TET Tet marks the Vietnamese New Year, considered the most important holiday and festival of the Vietnamese lunar calendar. Falling between 19 January and 20 February, the festival is celebrated during the first week of the first month of the lunar calendar. The first night of the new moon is considered the most important. Vietnamese view the holiday as a time of renewal and integration that solidifies the family. Tet is essential to Vietnamese cultural identity. During a week of leisure and celebration, people engage in such activities as various as painting and decorating homes, feasting, buying new clothes, visiting pagodas with the family, setting off fireworks, and making offerings and paying reverence to deceased family members. The playing of drums, bells, and gongs marks Tet festivities. Tet is celebrated by Vietnamese around the world.

Richard B. Verrone

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TEXTBOOK SCANDAL (1902–1903). Thirty years after the Meiji government promulgated Japan's first compulsory education law, which called for a national school system under its authority, a protracted political and ideological debate over local versus centralized control of curriculum and textbooks would be brought to a dramatic conclusion in 1902–1903, with the so-called Textbook Scandal. The Ministry of Education, established in 1871, initially granted local governments considerable discretion over the selection of textbooks, and there was a variety to choose from. While the Ministry sponsored some publications, including translations of Western textbooks, most were produced by the private sector with little government oversight.

Beginning in the 1880s, the Ministry of Education moved to expand the central government's control over textbooks. In 1880, the post of "investigator" was created to scrutinize teaching materials used in the schools. Translations of Western works were ordered replaced, together with some works judged too liberal. The following year, the Ministry ordered schools to report which textbooks they were using, in order to weed out those banned by the Ministry. The Textbook Authorization Ordinance of 1887 required publishers who wished to sell textbooks to schools to submit them first to the Ministry for inspection and authorization. According to the Ministry, this measure was necessary to insure uniform coverage, quality, and price. However, it also heightened the specter of bureaucratic interference in local school affairs and served to expand the debate over control from the local to the national level.

One problem that the new authorization system failed to address was graft in the publishing industry. The magnitude of this problem was revealed in 1901, when newspapers began reporting on a government investigation that eventually discovered that more than twenty publishers had distributed bribes, gifts, and entertainment to local education officials, government school inspectors, and others in an effort to market their textbooks. By the end of 1902, the government had brought charges against 152 individuals, including principals, other school officials, bureaucrats, and the publishers. Eventually, 112 people were convicted in what became known as the Textbook Scandal (*kyokasho gigoku jiken*).

This incident was the principal catalyst for parliamentary action that would consolidate government control over textbooks. After first amending the laws to discourage graft, the parliament in 1903 gave the Ministry of Education exclusive authority to commission and publish all elementary school textbooks. This system remained in effect through the end of World War II.

Mark Lincicome

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TEXTILE AND CLOTHING INDUSTRY—EAST ASIA Textile production has played a key role in the initial stages of industrialization of the East Asian economies by generating manufacturing

output, employment, and exports, often with government support. As labor-intensive industries, textile and garment making are suited to developing economies with comparative advantages in low-cost labor. With experience acquired in mechanization and foreign exchange earned in textile exports, a developing economy gains in manufacturing sophistication and moves on to higher value-added and more capital-intensive industries as its labor costs rise. This strategy of industrialization was established by Japan in the late nineteenth century and was followed by other East Asian economies in their successful drives to economic modernization in the post-World War II period.

Japanese Industrialization Model

The Japanese model follows four phases in the product cycle: importation; import substitution; exportation; and reimportation. In the mid-nineteenth century, imports of Western textiles generated a new demand and created opportunities for technology transfer. An indigenous textile industry developed to meet domestic demand and to substitute for imports, with 1879 being the year when domestic production first surpassed imports, and 1910 when exports first eclipsed imports. Cotton textiles became Japan's most important export industry from the 1920s through the 1930s, when Japanese colonial domination over Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria helped to spur markets abroad.

The Textile Industry in Postwar Japan

Postwar revival restored the textiles industry as the leading export industry in the 1950s, but production and exports declined steadily from the early 1950s, as percentages of gross domestic product and total exports, respectively. Textiles and clothing's share of exports fell from 36 percent for 1950–1959 to 19 percent in 1960–1969 to 6 percent in 1970–1979. Within the sector, there was a shift to synthetic fibers and yarns, a segment that is more capital-intensive and dependent on research and development. The Japanese economy increasingly focused on other more technologically sophisticated sectors.

A turning point for Japanese competitiveness in textiles came with the Plaza Accord of 1985, an agreement between the United States, Japan, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom to drive down the price of the overpriced dollar. The result was a rising yen, making Japanese exports more expensive. Production of fabrics and spun yarns declined precipitously in the 1990s, while man-made fibers maintained output until 1997, when it began to drop. From a large exporter of textiles and clothing before the 1970s, Japan has become a net importer of clothing and a

small exporter of textiles. Japan now has the world's second-largest textiles and clothing deficit in the world after the United States.

The Textile Industry in the Newly Industrializing Economies

From the 1960s, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea took up the production of textiles, successfully penetrated export markets formerly dominated by Japan, and became world leaders in textiles and clothing. Their successful transition to industrialism prompted their collective label as the newly industrializing economies (NIEs). Hong Kong became the world's leading clothing exporter from 1973 to 1985, overtaken by Italy only in 1978–1979.

Comparative advantage in the more labor-intensive clothing segment was lost more rapidly than in textile production. The NIEs' textile exports accompanied by a shift to synthetic fibers have remained at around a



A textile worker making wool rugs in Shanghai, China, in 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)

quarter of total world trade in the 1990s, while share of clothing exports fell from around a quarter in the 1980s and early 1990s steadily to 16 percent by 1999.

China became a major player in the world textile market with the launching of market reforms from the 1980s. Output value of the textile and clothing industry grew at an annual rate of 15.6 percent from 1986 to 1995, while exports increased from \$8.5 billion to \$38 billion. China overtook Italy as the economy with the biggest trade surplus in textiles and clothing in 1991, and since surpassing Hong Kong as the world's leading clothing exporter, its lead has widened over time. In 1999, after a decade of 13 percent growth per year, China's clothing sector snared 16.2 percent of world trade, while Hong Kong had only 12 percent. In 1997 and again in 1999, China passed Germany as the world's number-one textile exporter.

The East Asian textile exporters confronted several problems that necessitated structural reform. First, world textile trade was characterized by considerable trade barriers. From 1974 to 1986, this trade was governed by four Multi-Fibre Arrangements (MFA), which allowed industrialized economies to protect their domestic industries through quotas on textile and clothing imports by bilateral agreements or unilateral action. In 1986, the MFA was to be phased out by the World Trade Organization's Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, which would remove export quotas over a ten-year period. Meanwhile China and other East Asian exporters confronted not only export quotas in the advanced economies (except Japan) but also periodic charges of dumping or illegal shipments and imposition of sanctions.

Second, as the economies of the East Asian exporters expanded, labor and production costs rose, making their textile industries vulnerable to competition by lower-cost producers. Third, the spread of preferential agreements and the formation of regional trade blocs such as the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994 and the European Union in 1993 threatened market shares in Europe and North America. Hong Kong was hit especially hard by the erosion of its American market share by Mexican and Canadian producers.

A common response is to move up the quality and technology gradient. The NIEs have shifted from being net importers to being significant exporters of synthetic fibers. Production was upgraded by automation, mechanization, and computer-aided design. More emphasis was placed on the production of upmarket and high-fashion clothing merchandise. Taiwan and Korea increasingly moved away from textiles and clothing to such

value-added production as electronics and semiconductors. In addition, the outsourcing of labor-intensive manufacturing (clothing) by the NIEs (and Japan as well) to China, Southeast Asia, and other low-cost producers released resources for higher value-added activities and also helped to sustain demand for the textile exports of NIEs. Hong Kong especially has relocated factories to China on a large scale since the 1980s, bringing the benefits of massive investments and training efforts.

As a socialist economy undergoing market reforms, China has suffered from the problem of money-losing state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which dominated the textile industry but were plagued by labor redundancy, high pension and benefit costs, and outdated equipment. Reform of these SOEs took precedence in government efforts to reform the state-owned sector in 1998: money-losing factories were closed by the hundreds, 1.16 million workers were laid off, and 9.6 million antiquated cotton spindles were taken out of production by 1999, when the state sector realized a profit of \$97 million after having sustained staggering losses over the previous six years.

Future Prospects for the East Asian Textile Industry

Despite their increasing shift to high value-added industries and recent uncertainties in the global economy, the East Asian economies will probably retain significant positions in the world textile and clothing trade. Collectively their exports were responsible for 36.9 percent of total world trade in textiles and 32.6 percent of total world trade in clothing in 1999. Japan remains a key supplier of manufacturing technology to its Asian neighbors, and recent Japanese innovations such as clothing with built-in protection against bacteria and microwave radiation, intelligent or smart textiles that respond to the environment through the embedding of microprocessors or nanotechnology (for example, to keep people warm in cold climates and cool in hot weather), and washable suits may differentiate its manufacturers from competitors and allow them to charge high prices for such unique products.

Among economies with a surplus in textile and clothing trade, South Korea may soon overtake Italy for the number-two spot, while Taiwan and Hong Kong retain respectively the number-four and -five positions. As for number-one China, even as machinery exports replaced textiles and clothing as its top export sector in the late 1990s, its competitive position in the world textile marketplace is likely to be enhanced by its entry into the World Trade Organization.

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TEXTILES—BHUTAN The weaving culture of the landlocked Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan is centuries old. Silk, wool, acrylic, metallic threads, and cotton, intricately and deftly woven on hand-hewn backstrap and treadle or shaft looms, meet a wide range of daily clothing needs, as well as religious and decorative requirements of the Bhutanese.

The rugged mountain conditions and clustered-village structure, social customs, and daily life of the Bhutanese all contribute to the need for each family to weave fabrics in their own home. The country is unique in that it is dependent on hand-weaving skills for the provision of everyday apparel. The traditional practice, which continues today, is for mothers to teach their daughters to weave. Most women over twelve years of age possess high-quality weaving skills. Men often assist with shearing, washing, carding, combing, and spinning the various local yarns.

Although past written records on weaving are sparse, the tradition of hand weaving spans several centuries, and traditional and classical motifs and designs from the past continue to be woven on a daily basis. Thus, a motif in use today may have originated several centuries ago.

Regional and cultural variations produce a vast array of unique and delightful fabric ornamentation. Although a tradition of weaving is evident among Bhutan's neighbors, weaving holds a considerably elevated position in the Bhutanese national culture.

The range of weaving output includes clothing, blankets, bedcovers, scarves, carryalls, floor and seat coverings, napkins, table covers, and decorative items for both daily use and special religious and ceremonial occasions. The indigenous resources of wool from goats, sheep, and yaks and some natural silk are supplemented by the additional use of cotton and other yarns imported through trade with neighboring countries. The limited use of silk is due to the fact that the Bhutanese are highly dependent on silk imports, as the process of destroying cocoons is contrary to Buddhist precepts adhered to by the majority of Bhutanese.

The national dress, worn daily by the inhabitants, creates a constant demand for high-quality weaving. The dress for women includes the *kira* (a wraparound garment), the *kerā* (sash/belt), *wangde* (inside or underblouse) and *teku* (outer blouse or short jacket), *koma* (clip), and *japtha* (chain jewelery). For men, the *gho* (robe or large outer coat) is the principal item of clothing and is worn with a belt and shoulder scarf. The *gho* is also known in rural areas as a *kbo* or *baku*.

Composition of the *Kira*, *Kera*, and *Gob*

The *kira* highlights Bhutanese weaving ability, imagination, sense of proportion, intricate design, and color balancing. Each *kira* is designed and woven according to size and decorative requirements and reflects family pride in their weaving and design skill. The *kira* is tightly wound around the body and belted with a woven *kerā*. Two *koma* at the shoulder hold the *kira* in place, while a joining *japtha* forms a decorative link between the *koma* and hangs at the front. This unique piece of jewelry is usually made of silver with a gold finish and is embellished with turquoise and coral.

The *kira* is composed of three loom widths of approximately 50 centimeters and is 250 centimeters in length. A complete *kira* measures about 150 by 250 centimeters, with a fringe 2.5–10 centimeters at each end. Although the *kira* is one flat piece of fabric, each differs in size both in width and length, so that it can comfortably fit the particular child or adult who will wear it. Each of the three individual loom widths consists of a continuously woven main section, two end-border panels and one central panel. The end borders contain design strips that range in number from six to fourteen and are woven according to a special and traditional sequence and always in pairs. The two strips in each pair are of similar width; however, the widths of the various pairs may vary from one to another. Designs utilized within the paired strips may be grouped as meanders, continuously repeated designs or motifs. The *kira* contains a wide range of design patterns, and may number 1,500 individual motifs on one piece. The patterns and motifs used have been strongly influenced by the Buddhist and Bonpo religions, as well as by the personal and individual expression and interpretation of craftspeople. Their inspiration is doubtless drawn from the physical structure of the country—mountains, rivers, waterfalls, clouds, mists, cascades, hills and valleys—and from the abundance of flora and fauna as well as the natural phenomena of lightning and earthquakes. The final creation is a visually pleasant and colorful garment.

During recent times the *kerā* has been reduced in width. Earlier, the belt was 30–45 centimeters in width and folded lengthwise into three sections. Currently,

the width is approximately 7.5–10 centimeters and is not folded when worn. Complex and intricate embellishments were featured extensively in the past, with designs set into complex design strips across the fabric. As many as eighty design strips have been known to be incorporated into one belt.

For males, the *gho* is made from three to four generous lengths of fabric, which allows for comfortable wrapping around the body, oversized sleeves, placement of the *kerā*, and an ample front pouch to carry personal items such as food, documents, and knives. It is woven in a striped or check design from cotton, wool, or silk or a combination of two yarns. When worn, the stripes are in a vertical position. A specially tailored white undershirt, usually of white cotton, is turned over at the cuff to form a 13-centimeter band of white. The most lavish *gho* is of silk-on-silk (raw or refined), in gold and burgundy-red stripes embellished with elaborate and ornate designs.

Other Woven Goods

Special cloths are also woven for use when dining. These are usually 208 by 90 centimeters in size. One example is the *chagsi pangkheb* (wall hanging, laptop napkin, or cloth) formed from three loom widths of woven fabric, two narrow side lengths, and one central length. The background is of white cotton with embellishments in red, dark blue, and black. The finest are of silk-on-silk, with several vibrant colors being utilized. A range of special designs is usually reserved for these pieces.

Heavy wool items such as blankets, small carpet pieces, seat and bedcovers, and outerwear for inclement weather, are also woven, generally in the central region of Bhutan. Such pieces are usually of natural and earth tones and subdued hues and adorned with bold geometric designs. A number of textiles found in the *dzongs* (monastic and administrative centers) and temples also underline the strong textile base of Bhutan's material culture. Monks' cushions, altar-pieces, and covers for religious relics are among those items where weaving skills are evident. Merit is earned when a weaver prepares a fabric as a gift to a monastery or religious person or event.

The tradition of weaving high-quality fabrics in the home continues throughout Bhutan. New designs, colors, and yarns have gradually been introduced during the past thirty to forty years. The quotidian donning of national dress and religious and other special needs ensures the continuation of traditional hand weaving in the kingdom.

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TEXTILES—LAOS Historically, Lao women of most ethnic groups weave. The resulting textiles were woven for personal use and were a representation of daily life and cultural traditions. Intricate and complex designs performed such supernatural functions as warding off evil spirits and bringing good fortune and fertility to a newly wedded couple. Textiles were produced both for wear and for ceremonial ornamentation, as well as for such domestic uses as mats and wall cloths for welcoming guests to the home for special ceremonies. Textiles used for clothing could denote a person's age and social status, or both, often through the use of color. Textile motifs may be geometric, such as the diamond or lozenge shape, or mythological, such as the *sibo* or *kosasing*, a half-elephant, half-lion figure; the *nak*, a serpent prominent in the Lao Buddhist tradition; and the *mom*, a mythical bird.

Looms and Weaving Techniques

A variety of weaving technologies is used in Laos, including both frame and body-tensioned looms. The most commonly used method is the traditional Lao floor loom with a vertical heddle. This loom consists of a wooden frame loom with a horizontal warp, the threads that are stretched to form the base and width of the woven fabric. Each thread, or warp end, is passed through a primary heddle, the mechanism that raises and lowers alternating warp threads through the use of foot peddles, or treadles, to form an opening called a shed. A secondary set of long-eyed heddles is used to create and store a supplementary design. The design is preserved with a series of pattern rods that correspond to a design the weaver wants to weave. This patterning and storage method is unique to Laos and allows for the diversity and complexity of Lao weaving.

Depending on the type of weave and patterning that is in use, the weaver passes the weft threads in between the shed with either a shuttle or manually. The warp is tensioned over a back beam and then looped back above the weaver. The warp is then tied on a beam above the weaver's head. The weaver can adjust the tension of the warp as the fabric progressed by reaching overhead and adjusting the knotted warp ends.

As the weaver weaves one row of weft, a beater, or reed, is pulled forward to beat the newly woven row into the body of the textile. The reed or comb is suspended overhead and is composed of tightly spaced bamboo teeth. Two warp ends are passed through an individual tooth of the reed that in turn keep the warp ends evenly spaced. The spacing of the teeth also determines the density, or thread count, of the fabric. Lao language has a specific term to indicate the number of threads in a warp. This measurement is known as a *lope*, a unit of 40 dents in the comb. The number of *lope* identifies the density of traditional fabrics.

Most Lao weavings are decorated using a supplementary weft, and in some cases a supplementary warp, patterning. The brocade, or pattern, is inlaid into the background of the fabric by alternating the background weave with the supplemental design. A continuous supplementary weft design is one in which the pattern and color extend across the width of the fabric. Discontinuous supplementary weft design is one in which the design and color are inlaid at various intervals across the weft line. This allows the weaver to create a wide range of complex patterns and designs in various colors.

Two other traditional methods of creating design in Lao fabrics are *mat mi*, known universally as ikat, and tapestry. With *mat mi*, the weft yarns are first dyed

a base color and then wrapped onto a rectangular frame that is sized to coordinate with the width of the fabric. The yarns are wrapped in bunches depending on the length/width of the textile. These groups of weft threads are then measured and tied to form a specific design. The bundle is then dyed a second color, the wrapping removed, and the skein placed on a skein winder. The weaver winds the dyed thread onto a bobbin that is then placed into a shuttle. As the shuttle is passed back and forth between the warp threads, the design evolves as it has been dyed into the thread. An even more complex style of weaving that is used by some Lao ethnic groups, especially the Tai Daeng and Tai Kao in the north, is *sin muk*. With *sin muk*, narrow vertical bands of *mat mi* and supplementary weft are patterned with intersecting bands of supplementary warp threads, creating an intricate checkerboard patterning.

Regional Weaving Styles

Approximately sixty-eight diverse ethnic groups live within the borders of Laos, each with its own unique style of weaving. The lowland Lao today represent an amalgamation of many of these groups. Traditionally, lowland silk skirts are tightly woven with a glossy, lightweight, and stiff texture. Skirts are often accented with gold and silver threads and employ Western dressmaking elements such as darts and metal fasteners. In southern Laos, designs are more influenced by Khmer culture, employing narrow vertical bands of alternating motifs, often in *mat mi*. Elephants, humans, and tiered structures figure prominently in their designs. The Phuan are located in the central mountains of Laos. These people tend to use a more orderly design, with horizontal bands and blocks of motifs. Color is heavily used to distinguish members within their group and to separate their designs from those of other ethnic groups.

The wild and mountainous northern terrain has isolated small bands of people, resulting in an extremely diverse region of intricate weaving styles. Various Tai groups each have their own style of patterning. The Tai Daeng of the northeast are well known for weaving intricate patterns within the body of the fabric. The Tai Lue people combine various weaving techniques with the use of tapestry weave. Many of their designs use bright colors and bold motifs. Waistbands are woven into the body of the skirt rather than attached as a separate piece. Head cloths are the most distinctive design of the Tai Dam people. Black cotton rectangles are patterned with thin lines of color and a bright rectangle. Decorative patches are woven on either end. Other northern groups, especially the

Hmong and Yao, use other patterning techniques, such as batik and embroidery.

Lao Textiles Today

Following the end of civil war in 1975, large migrations of people from the north came down to the Mekong River plain. As a result, traditions from the diverse ethnic groups intermingled. Simultaneously, heirloom textiles were sold off to raise money to survive. The combination of this mingling of styles, the exodus of old textiles, and the simplification of designs threatened the loss of ancient motifs and traditions. Synthetics and Western styles also became more and more integrated into Lao weavings. Today, silk production is growing popular in rural Laos, with farmers producing high-quality, hand-reeled silk.

Traditional Lao weaving continues to be widespread and is recognized as a unique and exquisite art. The complex designs and techniques still practiced by Lao weavers make them among the most skilled in the world. Ancient Lao weaving traditions continue to be passed on from mother to daughter, which ensures the preservation of their unique textile heritage.

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THAI The Thai people of Thailand (*Khon Thai*), numbering more than 46.4 million, form part of a much larger population of speakers of Tai languages dispersed through the neighboring countries of Laos, Vietnam, China, Myanmar (Burma), and Malaysia. With disputed origins in southwestern China, Tai peoples began migrating into northern mainland Southeast Asia well before the eleventh century, establishing chiefdoms from the twelfth century onwards. The characteristic political organization was a *muang*, or petty state, consisting of a royal class and king, free peasants, and slaves, which was established in river valleys based on the cultivation of paddy rice. However, smaller populations of tribal Tai people inhabited the mountains surrounding these valley states and practiced shifting upland agriculture. In southwestern China and Southeast Asia, Tai rulers adopted Theravada Buddhism, which became a constituent part of their social systems, while minority Tai populations practiced animism and ancestral worship.



THERAVADA BUDDHISM IN THAI LIFE

A strong adherence to Theravada Buddhism is one of the basic elements of Thai culture. The following extract of text describes the importance of the Buddhist priest and the reverence for life in the village of Bang Chan in Central Thailand.

One of those most serious concerns for a priest is that of killing any form of life. Association in any way with the taking of a human life removes the priest from the order and from the possibility of ever becoming a priest again. A priest is further committed to avoiding the killing of any form of life around him. Thai villagers consider all forms of life to be ranged roughly across a continuum of value. Taking the life of one's parents or of a priest is the most serious offense one could commit. Ranked below this would be taking the life of other human beings and then proceeding down through the animal kingdom. The head-priest said that killing a chicken would be much less serious than killing a buffalo, and that killing a snake would be less serious than killing a chicken. According to the seriousness of each moral offense, an individual receives moral punishment in the form of de-merit, or negative karma (baab).

Most Thais would expect to receive more baab from a more serious offense. It is particularly serious (therefore the source of much baab) for a priest to take any form of life. One informant explained that a priest gets the same amount of baab from killing any form of life. I did not check this point, but it is clear that priests and laymen alike consider it very serious for priests to take any visible form of life. The seriousness of this normative concern is manifest every day around the temple. I have described under daily role activities the cloth strainers on the bamboo water dippers which the priests use in order not to snuff out tiny insects as they water the temple garden or take their showers. Equally indicative is the fact that priests do not dig in the earth, because they might inadvertently kill some small creature.

When the village was rushing to complete a new residence hall in the temple before the celebration of the elevation in title of the head-priest and his assistant, large working parties frequently came and supplemented the regular workers. The priests and novices worked tirelessly into the night on the heavy construction work, but only the novices could dig the old pillars out of the ground and dig holes to set the new pillars. Priests could mix concrete, because the building sand was not thought to harbor any life, but they could not dig the soil. A priest must be attentive to the foliage when he spits or urinates.

The temple is associated in most people's minds with compassion for all living creatures. A number of stray cats, dogs, and chickens normally live at rural temples, cared for by the surplus food contributions which the priests cannot eat. Sometimes a farmer, unwilling to kill off a senile ox, asks to have him allowed to stay at the temple and graze. The farmer makes some offering the temple, and the aged draft animal ends his days grazing within earshot of the auspicious chants of the priests.

The priests do not, however, welcome pests such as mosquitoes. In the evening I often noticed smoke curling up from a little incense stick which people burn to drive away mosquitoes. The headpriest surprised me when a village asked if we had many mosquitoes in our house. Vigorously moving his arms in a spraying motion, the headpriest said that spraying was quite good. He seemed to be making a technical judgment rather than a moral one, and he was talking about our house. I never saw any priest spray around the temple. The priests in Thailand generally raise no objection to the World Health Organization spray campaigns. They probably did not actively support or oppose the campaigns.

Source: Jaspas C. Ingersoll. (1969) *The Priest and the Path: An Analysis of the Priest Role in a Central Thai Village*. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 158–160.

The Thai and Tai

Today the major areas of dense concentrations of Tai-speaking peoples are the Xishuangbanna and Dehong regions of Yunnan province of China; parts of northern Vietnam and adjacent Laos, which are inhabited by tribal White, Black and Red Tai; the Shan (Tai Yai or Tai Long) State in Myanmar; Laos proper, in which the majority population, the Lao, are Tai speakers closely related to the Thai; and Thailand, which was itself formed out of a number of smaller Tai kingdoms: Ayutthaya and Sukhothai, Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai. There is also a small Thai population in northern Malaysia.

While the great majority of the citizens of Thailand follow Theravada Buddhism, those in the southern Thai states, whose borders were negotiated between Thailand (then Siam) and British Malaysia, are Islamic. The majority population of Thailand's impoverished and dry northeast (Isan) are ethnically Lao. In Nan province, in Thailand's north, there is a population of Tai Lu who are the same as the Tai Lu of Xishuangbanna in China. The ancient kingdom of Chiang Mai and other *muang* in north Thailand have been firmly integrated into the Thai polity, and their populations of Khon Muang (people of the *muang*) and Khoen, Lue, Nong, and Yong practically assimilated into the general Thai identity radiating from the Central Thai of the Chao Phraya (Menam) River basin. There are also populations of Tai Yai (Shan) in northern Thailand.

Thai Society and Culture

The Thai people, like other lowland Tai groups, adapted culturally to a hot monsoon climate. Cultural characteristics include a particular style of teak or bamboo stilted architecture, the wearing of the sarong, a love of boats and rivers and markets in or along the waterways, the cultivation of rice in paddies combined with fishing, and the practice of Theravada Buddhism. Traditionally every village had its *wat*, or temple, and the relation between monks assigned to the local temple and village men who would become ordained as monks for a time before marriage was particularly close. Monks were invited to officiate at most major life events, including weddings, house-building, and funerals (although they did not always officiate at weddings, and they might be replaced by Taoist monks at funerals). Art forms include traditional Thai music, temple murals and wooden carvings, the dancing of the *ramwong* (traditional Thai dance), and the survival of Hindu theater epics such as the *Ramayana* (*Ramakien* in Thai) in puppet form. Monastic Buddhism has combined with traditional beliefs in the power of spirits (*phi*), astrology, and the magic of charms,

amulets and tattoos conferring invincibility into what has appeared to many to be a seamless whole. The tying of wrists with threads is still performed to "recall the soul" (*sukbwan*) at sickness or after long journeys.

Despite this appearance of homogeneity, important differences still remain between different local Tai traditions in what is today modern Thailand, such as those of the Yuan and the Lue in the north, the Phu Tai and Lao Phuan of the northeast, and the Khon Pak Tai of the south. The northern Thai (Yuan or Khon Muang), for instance, traditionally had a form of matrilineal descent associated with spirit cults in which mediums communicated with the spirits of long-dead ancestors for the purpose of curing sickness, or with the spirits of royal princes. A period of uxorilocal residence before marriage was common for many of the Tai peoples, and women customarily inherited land and the house, the youngest daughter remaining in the house, where her husband joined her, to take care of her aged parents. Over the past sixty years such practices have inevitably been modified by the impact of modernization, but they are still maintained in some areas.

Gender

Gender relations are particularly marked in Thai society. Women have traditionally enjoyed great freedom in the realms of marketing and business, though they have been restricted in access to important public domains such as the monkhood and politics. Except among the noble classes, which for some time had already shown a tendency to reckon descent patrilineally, descent was bilaterally reckoned until King Chulalongkorn (1853–1910) introduced patrilineal surnames in 1901. A man could take more than one wife, and concubinage or the taking of a "minor wife" or mistress is still quite common today.

External Influences and Social Change

The Thai society of Thailand has been marked by both Indian and Chinese influences. Hindu and Buddhist beliefs have deeply permeated Thai society and culture, and are reflected in the many terms in the Thai language derived from Pali and in the continued presence of Brahmin priests at court. More recently, the influence of Chinese settlers who have extensively intermarried with Thai has been strong. Sino-Thai families have been dominant in both business and politics, although Chinese in-marriers often lose their Chinese identities and become assimilated as Thai within two to three generations.

Modern economic relations and the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932 have transformed Thai soci-

ety. The feudal *sakdina* system, in which social ranks were differentiated by entitlement to labor, has given way to a modern agricultural peasant society with a significant degree of industrialization, in which relations of patrons with clienteles continue to be important. The hiring of agricultural labor and the advent of cash crops have transformed the traditional agricultural cycle centered on transplanting the rice and harvesting it at the end of the rainy season. Traditional forms of labor exchange have been largely destroyed as landless and impoverished migrants increasingly flock to urban centers, particularly Bangkok, where slums, industrial and vehicular pollution, and the prevalence of child labor and prostitution are causes of major international concern.

Looking Ahead

Faced with the tensions and difficulties of modern life and continuing efforts to reform the political system, the younger generation has embraced new forms of Buddhism. Meditation, never a common feature of traditional Theravada Buddhism, is increasingly popular, and charismatic monks appeal to huge audiences via video and television. In urban centers and even rural areas, the tradition of making donations to the monks and temples has eroded even as young people are showing increasing interest in nontraditional forms of Buddhism. Thai society has often been seen as uniquely flexible and adaptable to external influences. The tensions and conflicts this has brought in its wake are rarely recognized.

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THAI REVOLUTION OF 1932 On 24 June 1932, troops commanded by General Phya Bahol Balabayuha took control of Bangkok in a bloodless revolution, arresting some forty top officials and inviting King Rama VII (1893–1941), also known as Prajadhipok, the last born of King Chulalongkorn's sons, to rule under a constitution that stripped him of all authority except for the right of pardon.

Prior to the revolution, Thailand was officially an absolute monarchy, with the prime minister appointed by the king. The revolution resulted from the growing discontent felt by the populous toward the king's brothers, who dominated many positions in the government despite their incompetence, thus preventing the new educated middle class from rising to positions of responsibility. In addition, the Great Depression caused the bottom to fall out of the rice market, by 1931 resulting in an enormous budget deficit. With the king away in Europe for medical treatment, members of the cabinet clashed, and the government was in gridlock. Military officers and civil servants, whose salaries were cut, were equally discontented and unable to articulate their grievances through the channels of an absolute monarchy.

After the revolution, a constitution drafted by Chulalongkorn University law professor Dr. Pridi Panomyong came into effect on 10 December 1932. The coup leaders, many of whom adopted democratic ideals after the king sent them to study in Europe, selected members of the senate, who in turn appointed an executive council as provisional cabinet to promulgate laws and control ministers. To appease conservative opinion, the coup's military leaders did not take over the government. Phya Manopakam, respected president of the Court of the Appeal, was chosen president of the provisional executive council, though he continued policies of the past and even cracked down on dissent. The new constitution, though backpedaling somewhat on democratic reforms to gain the support of the king, nevertheless launched the country as a constitutional democratic monarchy. King Rama VII even accepted the apologies of the coup leaders for their illegal actions, recognizing that the princes, not the monarchy, were resented.

In October 1933, Prince Bovaradej led an armed counterrevolution, which failed when the king did not lend it support. However, in 1935, when the assembly tried to remove the king's power to veto cases of capital punishment, he abdicated. In the end, the bureaucracy and the military gained power at the expense of royal prerogatives, not the people.

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THAILAND—PROFILE (2001 pop. 61.8 million). Thailand lies in the heart of Southeast Asia, stretching from the Mekong River in the north to the Andaman Sea and Gulf of Thailand in the south. Known as Siam until 1939, Thailand has an ancient history and a rich, unique culture.

Geography

With an area covering 514,000 square kilometers, Thailand is the third largest country in Southeast Asia. It is slightly smaller than the state of Texas and roughly the size of France. Its population is the fourth largest in Southeast Asia, with approximately 8 million residing in the capital, Bangkok. There are four fairly distinct regions in Thailand: the north, marked by mountains and valleys; the rugged, sparsely forested northeast, which suffers from poor soil, seasonal droughts, and flooding; the fertile central region, dominated by the Chao Phraya River; and the tropical southern peninsula, extending down to the Malaysian border. Climate is dependent on monsoons, but it basically provides three seasons: hot (March–June); rainy (July–October); and cool or dry (November–February). Temperatures in the hot season often reach 40°C in many parts of Thailand, while during the cool season they drop as low as 10°C in the north. Rains are hardest and longest in the south and central regions, often causing serious flooding, while the northeast frequently suffers from drought.

Economy

Approximately 70 percent of Thailand's people work in agriculture. Major farming exports include rice, sugar, and fruit. Traditionally, fishing, textiles, rubber, mining, forestry, and tourism have also been important. Over the past two decades, multinational corporations have contributed to diversifying the Thai economy, and the presence of these corporations encourages more industry. Thailand now produces an increasing quantity of manufactured goods such as vehicles, electronics, and computers. In recent years, Thailand has endured significant economic problems as a result of the Asian recession, a reduction in foreign investment, and weaknesses in Thai industrial and

business practices. However, with the assistance of international agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Thailand's economy shows signs of recovery. For the year 2000, the gross national product of \$2,130 was again one of Southeast Asia's highest. Substantial reform in areas such as banking and the improvement of the transportation and communications infrastructure are essential for further progress.

Politics

Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia never to have been colonized. As Siam, it was ruled solely by kings until a revolution in 1932 introduced a constitutional monarchy. Attempts to establish a parliamentary democracy failed, and Siam fell under the rule of military dictators. In 1939 Siam was renamed Thailand, and a period of anti-Western nationalism





THAILAND

Country name: Kingdom of Thailand
Area: 514,000 sq km
Population: 61,797,751 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 0.91% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 16.63 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 7.54 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: 0 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio—total population: 0.97 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 30.49 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population: 68.86 years, male: 65.64 years, female: 72.24 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism
Major languages: Thai, English, ethnic and regional dialects
Literacy—total population: 93.8%, male: 96%, female: 91.6% (1995 est.)
Government type: constitutional monarchy
Capital: Bangkok
Administrative divisions: 76 provinces
Independence: 1238 (traditional founding date; never colonized)
National holiday: Birthday of King Phumiphon, 5 December (1927)
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal and compulsory
GDP—real growth rate: 4.2% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita (purchasing power parity): \$6,700 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: 12.5% (1998 est.)
Exports: \$68.2 billion (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Imports: \$61.8 billion (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Currency: baht (THB)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Factbook* 2001. Retrieved 18 October 2001, from: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

swept the country until after World War II. The military dominated Thailand until 1973, when a bloody revolt finally brought about a civilian government. However, military leaders continued to influence politics from behind the scenes, manipulating governments into the 1990s. Another popular uprising in 1992 again forced the military from power and led to the return of civilian authority.

Since that time, Thai politics have been marked by coalition governments and scandals that have undermined both the development of democracy and international confidence in Thailand. Vote buying, patronage, and strong-arm tactics are common problems in elections. Attempts in the late 1990s to reform the system, including the adoption of a new constitution (1997) and the establishment of an elections commission (1999), have yet to be effective. Moreover, al-

though curtailed in recent years, the involvement of the Thai military in government remains a significant issue, especially given recent economic problems. On the other hand, Thai politics has an important stabilizing force in the king, Bhumipol Adulyadej (b. 1927), who has ruled since 1946—the longest-reigning living monarch in the world. Although his powers are largely ceremonial, his political skill and the popularity he commands with the people give him considerable positive influence. Similarly, Thailand's economic dependence on the international community puts emphasis on the need to reform and democratize the political system.

Religion

About 95 percent of the Thai people are Buddhists. Early Theravada Buddhism came from India in the thirteenth century CE, although most Thai themselves

refer to their faith as Lankavamsa Buddhism, which came from Sri Lanka during the fourteenth century CE. Thailand has retained the most traditional practices of Buddhism. The Theravada sect is one of the oldest, and followers consider their Buddhism to be less "corrupted" than that found in the Himalayan mountains or East Asia. Every Thai male is expected to join the Buddhist brotherhood (or *sangha*), usually between finishing school and joining the workforce. Most spend several months learning scripture, discipline, and meditation as a monk, and this time is considered one of the most important in any man's life. There are more than twenty thousand Buddhist monasteries in Thailand, and approximately 200,000 monks, many of whom are ordained.

The other 5 percent of the Thai people are predominately Muslim and live mainly on the southern peninsula. About 1 percent of the Thai are Christians, Hindus, Confucianists, Taoists, or animistic. Thailand has traditionally enjoyed religious tolerance, with little conflict between minority faiths and the majority Buddhists. In fact, various religious festivals and holidays are celebrated openly throughout the country and are a significant dimension of life in Thailand. Many Thai homes and businesses have places of worship, and most have a "spirit house," a structure (like a temple) mounted on a pedestal, where spirits of the building can live. Often spirit houses are large and ornate, reflecting Thai concerns about spirituality and the afterlife.

Peoples

Nearly 80 percent of those living in Thailand are ethnic Thai. About 15 percent are Chinese, while the remainder includes Malays, Cambodians, Lao, Burmese, Vietnamese, and various hill tribes. Although there have been periods of violent suppression of these groups (particularly the Chinese), the relationship ethnic minorities have with the majority population generally has been better in Thailand than in other Southeast Asian countries. This is partly because many minorities have been absorbed into the Thai majority over time. For example, many Chinese have adopted Thai names and customs, while retaining their culture and language at home. The Lao are ethnically and linguistically related to the Thai and blend easily into the mainstream. The hill tribes inhabit the isolated north, and many Cambodian, Vietnamese, and Burmese are refugees from war in their countries and live in camps or controlled areas of Thailand.

Culture and Customs

Thailand is a culturally rich and diverse nation. Its art, architecture, literature, and dance are world

renowned. Thai cuisine, noted for its range of flavors and spices, is extremely popular in the West. Although the country is progressively influenced by Western culture, traditional Thai values remain important to everyday life. Religion, a profound reverence for the monarchy, and deep respect for family elders and ancestors are key in this regard. Thai society is male dominated, but women play a crucial role in maintaining family structure, in addition to contributing to the workforce and economy. The Thai are known for their friendliness as well as their interest in foreigner travelers. Many speak English, particularly those in business and the service industries. With everything from jungles to deserted beaches, and ancient temples to modern cities, Thailand offers tourists a great deal. All of this helps to make Thailand the most-visited country in Southeast Asia (8.7 million arrivals in 2000).

Current Issues

Although Thailand's relative stability remains a model for other Southeast Asian nations, it nevertheless confronts major issues. Extreme poverty and other social ills such as prostitution and the drug trade are significant problems. Widespread corruption and graft continue to undermine the development of democracy. Further political reform and more stable economic growth will help better Thailand's future.

Arne Kislenko

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THAILAND—ECONOMIC SYSTEM Although Thailand is the only Southeast Asian country never to have been colonized, it has had a long history of international dealings and trade with other countries that have influenced its economy. Thailand has been fortunate to have a rich supply and diversity of natural resources, as well as large stretches of fertile land and



FIVE LARGEST COMPANIES IN THAILAND

According to *Asia Week*, the five largest companies in Thailand are as follows.

Company	Sector	Sales (\$ in millions)	Rank in Asia
Petroleum Authority	Oil Refining	9,211.6	151
Electric Generating Authority	Energy	4,013.6	327
Siam Cement	Cement	3,196.0	420
Thai Airways International	Air Transport	3,034.3	449
Esso Standard Thailand	Oil Refining	2,220.3	616

Source: "The Asia Week 1000." (2001) *Asia Week* (9 November): 116.

favorable growing conditions. This base of natural resources and cultivatable soil gave Thailand a strong agrarian foundation on which it has built a complex, multifaceted economy, which is now well established in the industrial and high technology sectors.

Chinese Migration

Between the early nineteenth century and 1940, there was an in-migration of Chinese. The Thai kings encouraged this migration so long as these immigrants assimilated, that is, adopted Thai names, spoke the Thai language, and so on. Many remained in Thailand, where they excelled in business ventures. Although they became Thai, they used personal connections within families and between other Chinese families both in Thailand and in China to foster a strong business community. Through the 1940s, Thailand's business was distinctly small scale. Some families did well, but the most of the population was still dependent on agriculture, with only 2 percent of the labor force working in industry. The change in Thailand's economic climate began to occur after the Japanese occupation of World War II. Several Chinese families established banks, with the Bangkok Bank dominating trade, financing, and remittance back to China. For the next two decades, a third of the nation's savings flowed into the Bangkok Bank, while three other banks accounted for most of the remaining funds accrual.

Growth Led by Agricultural Exports

Between 1950 and 1970, the Thai government developed a strategy of growth led by agricultural exports. Agribusiness grew and thrived through a

government policy using both public and private initiatives. The government expanded the irrigation and road systems and encouraged leading banks to channel funds to agribusiness. This growth in agriculture resulted in a significant increase in exports, making Thailand the world's leader in rice exports. Thai politicians and government officials also encouraged expansion through import substitution (a push to produce domestic substitutes for imported essentials). Although the government was heavily dependent on revenue from trade tariffs, the rates were lower on capital goods and industrial inputs. As a result, a relatively small percentage of the manufactured growth was attributed to import substitution.

Business leaders in the Asian countries of the Four Tigers, (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) were being pushed (and coerced) by government officials into export-led industrialization. Thai bureaucrats, on the other hand, let business leaders take the lead. The government stayed out of the way or supported policies and strategies suggested by business leaders. This freedom for development led to a rapid rise in industrialization, but sometimes with environmental and social ramifications, as companies wholeheartedly exploited natural resources.

Modern Thai Economy

In the early 1960s, agriculture's share of the national income was about 40 percent, while manufacturing accounted for only about 13 percent. Indeed, until the 1990s, the agrarian portion of the economy continued to dominate, supporting the rest of the nation during economic slowdowns. As the economy shrank, farmers took up the economic slack by purchasing less and

receiving less money for their rice and other agricultural products.

During the 1960s, the Thai industrial and service sectors slowly began to contribute a greater share of the gross domestic product (GDP). In 1989 manufacturing commanded over 28 percent of the GDP (and nearly 60 percent of the exports), while agriculture had fallen to nearly 14 percent. These ratios continued to magnify during the 1990s. (See Table 1.)

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Thailand's economy grew at the fastest rate of any member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Of its ASEAN trade neighbors, Thailand had the greatest growth for the period through 1995.

Thailand's Economic Crisis

The economic boom carried with it greater consumer and legislative confidence than ever before. In the mid 1980s, the baht was again attached to the U.S. dollar. As the dollar value slipped against the yen, the baht grew cheaper for the Japanese, encouraging greater investment and trade with Thailand. This gave

TABLE 1

Thai Exports					
(in billion of baht)					
Export structure	1990	1996	1997	1998	1999
Agriculture	130.0	231.0	258.0	304.4	266.6
% of total exports	22.1	16.4	14.3	13.5	12.0
Agro-industries	71.0	142.0	170.0	202.6	204.6
% of total exports	12.1	10.1	9.4	9.0	9.2
Principal mfg.	359.0	994.0	1280.0	1624.7	1631.7
% of total exports	61.0	70.4	70.8	72.3	73.7
Mining and fuel	7.0	28.0	51.0	44.3	47.9
% of total exports	1.2	2.0	2.8	2.0	2.2
Others	22.0	16.0	48.0	72.1	63.4
% of total exports	3.7	1.1	2.7	3.2	2.9
Total exports	589.0	1411.0	1807.0	2248.1	2214.2

Thailand a distinct export advantage, which strongly supported its manufacturing industries. Increased trade with Japan and a general increase in its exports resulted in greater amounts of foreign investments being made in Thailand. This gave Thailand's leaders the confidence needed to liberalize its economic structure.

Although finance companies, which followed different rules from banks, came close to collapse in a 1983–1985 economic slowdown, they flourished in the late 1980s and beyond. Similarly, the Securities Exchange of Thailand (SET) had an historic high of 1753.73 in January 1994. Numerous companies floated their stock at this time.

Between 1990 and 1993, Thailand liberalized its financial market. Foreign funds flowed into Thailand as investors saw great opportunities. With so much money, financial institutions and banks approved loans for projects that only a few years earlier would have been rejected, not the least of which were property development projects. Then exports began to decline drastically. Japan's purchasing power faltered as the yen weakened due to Japan's economic recession. Furthermore, Japanese investments in Thailand also fell. Thailand no longer could boast of being the lowest-cost labor market in Asia, as other developing countries began to compete in the labor-intensive markets. Thailand's finance companies were approaching dire straits. They had escalated their asset values through leveraging, a successful strategy so long as money continued to flow inward. In June 1997 sixteen finance companies were instructed by the central bank to cease operation. In the next month, forty-two more were closed. By the end of 1997, fifty-six finance companies had been closed.

Property opportunities abounded during the early 1990s. Major landholders began a construction boom



FLOWERS IN THAI CULTURE

Before the flower industry was commercialized in rural Thailand and most flowers were grown for export, flowers were grown mainly for display in the home and sold by vendors. The following is the opening of a flower-buying repartee played as a game by children in villages in Central Thailand.

Nag: Ta-log-tog-terg

Villagers: What can I do for you?

Nag: I'd like to buy some flowers.

Villagers: What kind of flowers?

Nag: *Campii* flowers

Villagers: They haven't bloomed yet.

Nag: How about *Campaa* flowers?

Villagers: They haven't bloomed yet.

Nag: How about going to a movie with me?

Villagers: Which one?

Source: Wannu W. Anderson. (1983)

Children's Play and Games in Rural Thailand:

A Study in Enculturation and Socialization.

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unheard of in other parts of the world. A large amount of money had been borrowed abroad at interest rates lower than those obtainable in Thailand. Consequently, when the economy slowed, foreign loans had to be repaid in devalued baht currency as the baht floated from about twenty-five baht to the dollar to well over forty baht to the dollar. Few people had anticipated the risk of monetary devaluation when they considered borrowing money abroad.

Many of these financial problems exacerbated one another, leading to a financial crisis for Thailand in July 1997. Finance companies were closed. The major banks held billions of baht of nonperforming loans—those that are not being repaid in a timely manner—and numerous people were either unemployed or underemployed. In Thailand in general and in Bangkok specifically, thousands of square meters of office space, homes, and warehouses sat unoccupied and often unfinished. The SET, having hit a high in 1994, was at its lowest point on 1999, with an index of 481.92. The tentacles of the financial crisis reached every person in the Kingdom of Thailand in one way or another. Although an economic recovery was in process, the economic crisis continued to be real and evident in 2001.

Looking Forward

Thailand's economic development has differed from that of the Asian Tigers. The government encouraged business leaders to shift the nation's agrarian economy to an advanced industrial economy. This was successful until Thailand's economic and financial liberalization during the boom period of the late 1980s and early 1990s. When hit by the economic crisis in mid-1997, Thailand, together with many other Asian countries, was not capable of correcting its economic system quickly enough.

Although Thailand has corrected some of its problems, the crisis left the financial system with a large number of nonperforming loans. New bankruptcy laws have been implemented, but the bankruptcy process needs to be accelerated to resolve disputes between creditors and debtors more quickly. Growth rates will undoubtedly continue to be slower than they were before the crisis, but export levels have increased somewhat, lending a longer-term optimism.

Kenneth D. Ramsing

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THAILAND—EDUCATION SYSTEM Known as Siam until 1939 and between 1945 and 1948, Thailand has been ruled by absolute monarchs from the founding of the nation in 1238. In 1932, it became a constitutional monarchy, and it remains so today. The current ruler, H. Bhumipol Adulyadej (King Rama IX) (b. 1927), who has shown a great commitment to education, is the longest-reigning monarch in the world. The fact that Thailand was never colonized has had important implications for the evolution of its educational system, which for the most part uses the Thai language and script.

Traditional and Missionary Education

Traditionally, Thai education took place in Buddhist temples (*wat*), and monks were the learned members of the community and teachers. Even today, so-called temple schools located on temple grounds account for 20 percent of the nation's schools. Temple schools were the dominant source of organized education from the thirteenth to the mid-nineteenth century. Buddhist priests provided both moral training and the basics of a literary culture. But since only men can be ordained as monks, the system discriminated against women.

Siam generally had an open attitude toward missionaries, and they were free to establish churches, schools, and medical facilities. A few Catholic missionaries arrived in the seventeenth century, but it was not until the early nineteenth century that missionaries were allowed to enter in substantial numbers. The missionary with the most enduring influence on Siamese education was Dan Beach Bradley, who served from 1835 to 1873 and introduced a printing press to produce materials in the Siamese alphabet. Missionary schools such as Mater Dei and Wattana are among Thailand's most prestigious.

Modernization and Reform

King Chulalongkorn (1868–1910) is Thailand's most beloved monarch and was Siam's great modernizer and visionary. He was deeply committed to improving education in Siam, and also introduced fellowships to allow Siamese to study in Europe. Under his successor,



A teacher and students at a village school in rural Thailand in c. 1994. (ROBERT HOLMES/CORBIS)

King Wachirawut (Rama VI), (1911–1925), a compulsory education act was passed in 1921. By the time of the fall of the absolute monarchy in 1932, approximately 80 percent of the country had access to primary school facilities.

During the four decades that followed the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, Thai politics were dominated by the military, primarily under the leadership of the field marshals Pibul Songgram (1897–1964), Sarit Thanarat (1909–1963), and Thanom Kittikachorn (b. 1911). During this period there was a great quantitative expansion in Thai education, with the goal of pro-

viding every village with a school. Also, there was a significant expansion in secondary and higher education. Despite such expansion, the most common level of education for most Thais remained only the completion of four years of primary schooling, hardly adequate for sustaining literacy in a complex written language such as Thai. During the first part of this period, Thailand had a 4-3-3-2 structure of education, with four years of lower primary schooling, three years of upper primary, three years of lower secondary, and two years of upper secondary. The 1960 National Scheme of Education brought in a 7-3-2 system, with seven years of primary schooling, three years of lower secondary education, and two years of upper secondary.

Also during this period, there was a serious lack of unity in education. The powerful Ministry of the Interior, responsible for local government, was in control of most primary schools, while the Ministry of Education was responsible for most secondary schools, and the University Bureau (later to become the Ministry of University Affairs) was responsible for higher education. Largely as the result of a close Cold War alliance with the United States, Thailand received substantial foreign aid, which enabled many Thais, particularly in the civil service, to receive fellowships for graduate study in the United States.

The Democratic Period

Since 1973, democratic rule has mostly prevailed, with only two successful military coups (October 1976



THAILAND—EDUCATION SYSTEM

"All children from my own to the poorest should have an equal chance of education."

King Chulalongkorn (1868–1910)

Source: Keith Watson. (1980) *Educational Development in Thailand*. Hong Kong: Heinemann, 2.



EQUAL RIGHTS IN EDUCATION

"In the provision of education, all individuals shall have equal rights and opportunities to receive basic education provided by the State for the duration of at least 12 years. Such education, provided on a nationwide basis, shall be of quality and free of charge."

Source: National Education Act. (1999) Chapter 2, Section 10: 5.

and February 1991). A student revolution on 6 October 1973 led to the overthrow of the military dictatorship of Thanom and ushered in a number of political and educational reforms. Curricula were liberalized to include a diversity of ideological material, particularly from the left, that previously had been banned. There were deep concerns about excessive educational disparities, inequalities, and administrative inefficiencies resulting from a lack of unity in education.

Two major changes emerging from this period were a new National Scheme of Education (approved in 1977), which established a 6-3-3 education structure. With six instead of seven years of primary education, universal primary education was more attainable. Under the previous seven-year primary system, many rural youth were completing only four years of education. The second change, approved in 1980, was the return of the control of primary education to the Ministry of Education from the Ministry of Interior. This period saw the continued expansion of education at all levels. By 1980, Thailand had more than three hundred colleges.

The 1980s and early 1990s saw Thailand achieve rapid macroeconomic growth led by rapid export expansion and industrialization. With an abundant supply of cheap labor, Thailand became an attractive site for offshore manufacturing, particularly from Japan. However, as wages rose in the mid-1990s, Thailand's international competitiveness declined. With its workforce's relatively low average level of education, Thailand's ability to raise its productivity was limited.

The Asian Economic Crisis and Renewed Efforts at Educational Reform

Thailand's economic crisis became globally known on 2 July 1997, when the government allowed the Thai baht to devalue. Thailand subsequently went into its worst economic recession since the end of World War II. However, as an important part of the response to the crisis, major political and economic reforms have been introduced. In the education area, a new National Education Law, mandated by the new 1997 constitution and promulgated in August 1999, makes nine years of education compulsory and requires that all Thai citizens be guaranteed twelve years of free education. The law also mandates the implementation of key education reforms. Two key elements of the reform are decentralization of education to Local Education Areas and school-based management and the reform of learning to a participative learner-center approach. To the extent that these reforms can become reality, Thailand's opportunities to be internationally

competitive and improve its standard of living will be dramatically enhanced.

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THAILAND—HISTORY Scholars debate the origins of the Thai people and the beginning of their civilization. Modern Thai history also provokes controversy. Thailand's role in World War II and the Vietnam War remain contentious issues. Thai history is unique and important in understanding Southeast Asia.

Early History

Permanent settlements in Southeast Asia appeared roughly 40,000 years ago, with distinct ethnic and language groups developing about 10,000 years ago. Some anthropologists believe that the Tai people migrated from southern China, while others believe they evolved from earlier settlers in the region. During the first millennium CE, the Tai population increased, though their settlements were often absorbed by powerful empires of the Chinese, Vietnamese, Khmer, and Burmese. In the eighth century, the Tai peoples fragmented into five language subgroups: the northern Tai (Chuang) in southern China; the upland Tai in present-day Vietnam; the Lao; the western Tai (including such groups as the Shan and Lahu); and the central Tai (or Siamese), who settled in modern-day Thailand. Although scattered, most Tai-descended peoples retained a separate identity, language, and religion, which enabled the development of a unique culture.

Ancient Empires

During the thirteenth century, the balance of power in Southeast Asia changed dramatically. Mongol conquests weakened regional empires, making possible the rise of small Tai kingdoms. One, Sukhothai, was particularly successful in promoting Tai independence from Khmer and Burmese rule, dramatically expanding its influence as the larger empires declined. Sukhothai kings introduced a writing system, which subsequently became the basis for the modern Thai language. They also helped further the establishment of Theravada Buddhism throughout Tai lands. In this light, Sukhothai is widely regarded as the first truly Thai kingdom and represents a "golden age" in Thai history and culture.

Despite such achievements, Sukhothai was not without its rivals. After decades of warfare between several Tai kingdoms, one, Ayutthaya, came to dominate, forcibly annexing Sukhothai in 1376. Almost a

century of violent struggles with the Burmese and Khmer eventually led to Ayutthaya's collapse in 1569. However, a resurgence of Ayutthaya occurred in 1583, when King Naresuan (1555–1605) organized a revolt and repulsed the Burmese. Naresuan developed important trade and political links between Ayutthaya and China, which his successors expanded to include European powers new to the region. Tai influence increased in another new Asian order.

Siam Emerges

In the early sixteenth century, the Portuguese became the first Europeans to deal with the Tai, but it was not until a century later that the Dutch, and then the British and French, made real inroads. Trade was the primary motivation in any relationship between the Tai and Europeans, but other dimensions evolved. Tai rulers tried to balance independence with the economic and political benefits of European alliances. Meanwhile, in 1760, war with the Burmese erupted again. For years the Burmese advanced, gradually seizing Ayutthaya's provinces. Then, in 1767, the Burmese sacked Ayutthaya itself. Warlords took over most Tai lands. However, within a year, several old Tai kingdoms reasserted themselves. The most important was based at Thonburi, near the present-day capital of Bangkok. Led by Taksin (1747?–1782), Thonburi's armies recaptured most of Ayutthaya's lands and extended Tai control into Laos. Taksin's successor, Chaophraya Chakri, or Rama I (1737–1809), moved the capital to Bangkok, which quickly grew into a vibrant, cosmopolitan city. Rama I also reformed Tai laws, politics, and trade, establishing for the first time a unified Siamese empire and beginning the Chakri dynasty, which still rules Thailand today.

Throughout the early nineteenth century, Bangkok solidified its power. However, during the reign of Phra Nangklao, or Rama III (reigned 1824–1851), the threat from Europeans was renewed. British conquest of present-day Myanmar (Burma) eliminated Siam's mortal enemy, but new pressures emerged. Some Europeans demanded preferential trading privileges and challenged Bangkok's rule in remote provinces. Skillful negotiation by the Siamese avoided war. Siam became the largest empire in the region by outlasting its old foes and accommodating potential new ones. In this, Rama III is often seen as the champion of traditional Siamese culture in a region increasingly dominated by Westerners.

The Era of Colonization

During the nineteenth century, European powers colonized Southeast Asia. Siam's independence was



KEY EVENTS IN THAILAND'S HISTORY

- c. 40,000 BCE** Permanent settlements appear in Southeast Asia.
- c. 10,000 BCE** Distinct ethnic groups emerge in Southeast Asia.
- 13th century** Tai kingdoms emerge, including Sukhothai..
- 1376** Ayutthaya kingdom achieves dominance.
- 1569** Ayutthaya kingdom collapses under Burmese and Khmer assault.
- 1583** Ayutthaya kingdom revives and expels the Burmese.
- 1760–1767** The Burmese capture much of the Ayutthaya kingdom.
- 18th century** Late in the century and into the nineteenth, The Burmese are expelled and a Tai kingdom established at Bangkok.
- 19th century** Contact with Western nations (Britain, France, United States) intensifies and Thailand modernizes.
- 1910** Thailand has lost land to Britain and France but remains independent.
- 1917** Thailand joins World War I as an ally of the United States.
- 1932** A coup ends the absolute monarchy.
- 1939** Thailand becomes the official name.
- 1941** Japan invades Thailand.
- 1942** Thailand declares war on Britain and the United States.
- 1950s–1960s** Thailand and the United States develop a strong relationship.
- 1973** Political unrest sweeps the nation leading to to more freedom and then a return to military rule into the 1980s.
- 1990s** Politics remain unstable with conflict over military versus civilian rule.
- 1997** Thailand suffers from the Asian financial crisis.
- 1997** A more democratic constitution is enacted.
- 2001** The general election is undermined by widespread fraud.

seriously threatened, but strong leadership and artful diplomacy kept it intact. Two of Thailand's most revered kings, Mongkut, or Rama IV (1804–1868), and his son Chulalongkorn, or Rama V (1853–1910), were instrumental in this process. King Mongkut introduced political, bureaucratic, and cultural reforms designed to "civilize" and modernize Siam. He also successfully played rival Europeans off against one another. In courting the United States, Mongkut gained an important friend outside Europe and broadened Siam's international relationships. King Chulalongkorn furthered the reforms, as well as Siam's ties with the United States. However, tensions between the British and French late in the century began a period of territorial readjustment for Siam, as both impinged on its frontiers. By 1910, Siam had been forced to surrender much of Malaya and Burma to the British and Siamese Cambodia and its Lao territories to the French, losing nearly half of the territory it controlled at the height of Rama III's reign.

Nationalism and Revolution

Vajiravudh, or Rama VI (1881–1925), attempted to strengthen his kingdom by promoting the "Thai nation": a Siamese nationalism based on love of the country, the religion, and the monarchy. Although this had antiforeign overtones, in international affairs Siam remained aligned with Western powers. When World War I broke out in 1914, Siam declared neutrality, but after the United States intervened in 1917, Siam quickly followed suit. By joining the Allies, the Siamese earned a place at the Paris Peace Conference, where, with U.S. help, they negotiated an end to the special privileges that the British and French had in the kingdom.

After the war, Siam confronted a serious financial crisis, which was worsened by the worldwide Great Depression beginning in 1929. Moreover, Siam's King Prajadhipok, or Rama VII (1893–1935), was challenged by Western-educated Siamese intellectuals who demanded further reforms to modernize the kingdom. Amid these problems, a small group staged a daring coup in 1932. Prajadhipok cooperated to avoid a

bloody civil war. In doing so, he became the last absolute king of Siam.

The Military Rises

The military's participation in the coup represents a dramatic turning point in Thai history. Ideological differences between the plotters led to political instability, which worsened when Prajadhipok abdicated the throne in 1935. The new king, Ananda Mahidol (1925–1946), was just ten years old, leaving Siam effectively without a monarch. Throughout the 1930s, Siamese politics were marked by tremendous infighting. The military's influence grew considerably with the appointment of Prime Minister Plaek Khittasangkha (Luang Pibul Songgram, or Pibul; 1897–1964). He wanted to create a "new nation," renaming the country Thailand in 1939. Pibul believed the more nationalistic name would help modernize the country, rejecting Siam as an archaic "colonial" and foreign term. He also adopted a stringent economic nationalism and cultural "reforms," which banned speaking languages other than Thai and enforced traditional dress codes.

Pibul's nationalism translated into a very controversial foreign policy. He admired Japanese militarists and European dictators. Encouraged by their success and the outbreak of World War II in 1939, Pibul tried to retake the lost "provinces" of Laos and Cambodia. In a brief war with the French in 1940, Thailand regained its former territory with support from the Japanese. However, most Thais did not like the anti-Western nationalism that Japan and Pibul represented. In 1941, after being denied access en route to Malaya, the Japanese invaded Thailand. Pibul eventually allowed the Japanese transit in exchange for guarantees of Thai independence. Then, following Japanese advances against the Western powers, Pibul joined an alliance with Japan. One month later, in January 1942, Thailand declared war on Britain and the United States.

War and an Uneasy Peace

Many Thais did not support war with the West. Some formed resistance groups, most led by Pridi Banomyong, Pibul's former minister of foreign affairs and then regent, and Seni Pramoj, the Thai ambassador to the United States and leader of the so-called "Free Thai" government in exile. Others saw cooperation with Japan as in keeping with the traditional flexibility of Thai foreign policy and the only way to protect their country from what otherwise would have been a harsh Japanese occupation. Still others welcomed the Japanese over Western domination. They saw the war as an opportunity to regain territory that

had been lost to the French and British over the centuries. In fact, during World War II, Thai forces fought the British in Burma and Malaya in efforts to reestablish the old provinces.

Officially, Thailand was the only independent ally of Japan. However, Thai resistance movements worked closely with Western forces operating throughout Southeast Asia, and during the war Thai opposition to the Japanese grew. In 1944, Pibul was deposed as prime minister. A civilian government returned to power, facing the difficult task of explaining Thailand's role to the Allies. The United States was convinced that the Thai people were not truly behind Pibul and disregarded Thailand's declaration of war. Thai leaders then successfully lobbied the United States for help in negotiating with the British and French, reducing many of their reparations claims. Still, Thailand did have to pay. In addition to money and goods, the Thais surrendered to the British and French all territories temporarily gained during the war in Burma, Malaya, and Laos.

Unstable civilian governments led Thailand between 1944 and 1947. A key figure during this time was Pridi Banomyong, who became a champion of the left in Thai politics. In March 1946, he became prime minister, but rumors about his ties to Communists weakened him. In June 1946, King Ananda was mysteriously killed, and Thai conservatives linked Pridi to the incident, forcing him to resign. The military retook control. Although another civilian became prime minister, the armed forces were behind the scenes. Eliciting minimal opposition within the country and little response from the international community, the military restored Pibul to power in April 1948.

Thailand and the Cold War

Pibul's personal history was a concern, but his strong leadership was an asset during the late 1940s, when revolutions throughout Asia were gaining strength. There was concern that Thailand would be next to endure such conflict. In this context, the United States saw Pibul as an ally in containing the spread of Communism. Throughout the 1950s, the U.S.-Thai relationship flourished. U.S. economic, technical, and military assistance poured into Thailand, developing a stronger economy, but also legitimizing military rule. Many Thais were uneasy about such a strong connection to a foreign power and worried about American influence on their country. Thus, from 1955 to 1957, Pibul developed his friendship with the United States while secretly pursuing relations with China. This strategy, however, undermined confidence in Pibul. In



The historic Bridge on the River Kwai in 1998. (JOSEPH SOHM; CHROMOSOHM INC./CORBIS)

September 1957, another military coup toppled the government. Pibul fled the country, and Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1908–1963) took over.

Sarit considered himself the defender of traditional Thai institutions and introduced harsh reforms to preserve Thai culture. Sarit was also notoriously corrupt, amassing a huge fortune while in office. Nonetheless, Thailand's economic progress made Sarit popular with the people. He also gained support for restoring the prestige of the monarchy. The king, Bhumipol Adulyadej (b. 1927), was at the center of Sarit's nationalism and symbolized Thai unity. In foreign policy, Sarit cooperated closely with the United States. Thailand was a principal member of the U.S.-led Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), and became a base for U.S. covert operations in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Thailand was one of only two Southeast Asian nations to join SEATO. However, Sarit often doubted U.S. resolve to fight Communism and its commitment to his country (Bamrungsuk 1988: 118–125, 156).

The War in Vietnam

Sarit's successor, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn (reigned 1963–1973), did not share such reservations and built an even closer relationship with Washington. Thailand played a crucial role in supporting the war in Vietnam. Over 11,000 Thai soldiers served there, one of the largest contingents from

a U.S. ally. Fully 80 percent of the ordnance dropped on Vietnam came from planes based in Thailand. Thai support for the war also lent credibility to U.S. claims that it was defending Asian allies from Communism. Although the Thais were well compensated for their contributions, they were not simply mercenaries. They had legitimate security concerns related to Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. From Laos, the northeast was a potential route of Communist expansion into Thailand. Most Thais therefore supported U.S. efforts to combat Communism elsewhere in Southeast Asia, rather than wait for it to overrun their country.

There were, however, considerable problems with the U.S.-Thai relationship. Some Thais warned that their culture was threatened by such a large U.S. presence. By 1968, some 45,000 U.S. service people were stationed in Thailand, and thousands more in Vietnam rolled in on leave. Cities like Bangkok were dramatically transformed by neon lights, massage parlors, and wild bars. Many Thais thought that Americans were crude and that they did not show respect for Thai culture. They also feared that the United States was not winning the Vietnam War and that one day Thailand would be surrounded by Communist countries that would remember and resent its role in the war.

Reaction and Revolution

This scenario appeared to unfold in the early 1970s when the United States withdrew from Vietnam.

Divisions in the Thai government emerged over the direction of foreign and economic policies. There was also pressure from a new generation that wanted more democracy and an end to military rule. In 1973, growing discontent with the government led to a series of protests, culminating in mid-October with massive demonstrations by students and the population in Bangkok. When the military responded with brutal force, only personal intervention by the king prevented further widespread violence. Thanom and his associates fled the country, and major political changes swept Thailand.

Civilian governments that followed were weak, but there was an expansion of political and social freedoms. There were also changes in Thailand's foreign policy. Establishing better relations with China became a priority, especially as the United States disengaged from Southeast Asia and Communist governments came to power in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. By 1976, however, many Thais worried that the country was too radical and favored a return to military rule. Clashes between students and conservative extremists often turned violent. Once again the Thai military and police intervened, with the storming of Thammasat University and the 6 October coup, this time supporting a new but harsh civilian government. Censorship, arrests, and strict laws marked the return of repressive authoritarianism to Thailand. Although another coup toppled the government within a year and restored many freedoms, the military remained the most powerful force in Thai politics. However, conscious of past events and concerned about international opinion, the soldiers remained in the shadows. Governments into the 1980s were heavily influenced by the armed forces and were led by former Thai army generals, acting as "civilian" politicians. Nonetheless, some democratic reforms did take hold. Regular elections were held without the military's direct intervention, allowing for a relatively peaceful transition of power. Moreover, fairly diverse and viable political parties began to emerge, slowly changing the landscape of the Thai polity and paving the way for more reform.

Boom and Bust

By the late 1970s, it was clear that Thailand had avoided the revolutions that engulfed its neighbors. Despite periodic rumblings, it was also clear that many Thais favored stability and traditional institutions over democratization. Still, economic development and external relations remained problematic. In December 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia, driving thousands of refugees into Thailand and placing the Vietnamese military near the Thai border. Bangkok secured an impor-

tant, if fairly superficial, alliance with China while supporting Cambodian resistance against the Vietnamese—even the notorious Communist Khmer Rouge. In return, the Chinese stopped their support for the Communist Party of Thailand and its insurgent movement. As part of this complex foreign policy, Thailand pursued close economic relations with Japan and Southeast Asian nations, stimulating growth during much of the decade.

In the 1990s, the question of political reform resurfaced. Following a string of corrupt governments, many Thais again demanded change. The military openly seized power in February 1991, with the promise of fair elections. However, in March 1992 voting was marred by fraud, which provoked more protests. Violence exploded in May when another general, Suchinda Kraprayoon, became prime minister. Just as he had in 1973, the king intervened, criticizing the military and calling for peace. Since then, coalition governments have struggled with reforming Thailand's political structure and economy. For much of the 1990s, the country enjoyed a financial boom, joining the economic "tigers" of Asia. However, in response to a severe debt and foreign-exchange crisis in July 1997, the Thai government elected to float its currency—the baht—precipitating a disastrous economic contagion that spread to many Asian markets and eventually to Russia and Brazil. Thailand's fortunes were clearly reversed, and doubts about its long-term economic future quickly resurfaced.

Thailand Today and Tomorrow

Thailand's recovery from the crisis has been slow. So too has the process of political restructuring. Despite a new, more democratic constitution in 1997 and changes to business, finance, and electoral practices, Thailand's reform problems continue. Corruption remains a major issue affecting both the economy and government. The most recent election, in January 2001, was undermined by widespread tampering. There are serious reservations about the new government's connections to big business and the Thai military and about its commitment to genuine reform.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, Thailand remains a relatively stable nation. Reverence for the monarchy and great respect for King Bhumipol himself continue to be stabilizing factors. So do a well-defined sense of nationhood and Thailand's good foreign relations. In fact, traditional institutions and ideas have served Thailand well during some very tumultuous times in its history. The question remains how well the country will adapt to a rapidly changing future.

Arne Kislenko

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THAILAND—POLITICAL PARTIES Political parties first emerged in Thailand with the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932, when the new ruling clique established the People's Party. Nevertheless, the history of Thai political parties is not a happy one. During the first four decades following 1932, political parties were banned completely for two lengthy periods: from 1933 to 1945, and from 1958 to 1968. When parties were able to function, the great majority were established by rival factions of the political elite; forming a party was typically the response of a defeated faction following a coup d'état. In other words, party

politics was often a secondary form of politics; real power lay mainly in the hands of the military and the bureaucracy. Nor was party politics about mass politics. The People's Party has aptly been described as an "oligarchy," and few Thai parties have ever had substantial numbers of members.

Thai parties have been criticized for being unprincipled, lacking clear policies, being dominated by personalities, being undisciplined, being unstable, lacking real public support, clashing with government officials, being too numerous, being dominated by financiers, and misunderstanding their own roles. Many commentators have wanted to transform the existing parties into "real" parties, based on mass membership organizations with a more ideological basis. Legislation has been introduced in an attempt to accomplish this. The 1981 Political Parties Act, for example, set minimum numbers of members for political parties and required that parties contest a quarter of all parliamentary seats. Some political parties, such as the United Thai Peoples' Party (established by the Thanom Kittikachorn government in 1968) were established specifically as "mass" parties, designed to mobilize large memberships.

The Political Economy of Parties

In practice, such attempts have been doomed to failure. Most Thai parties are actually driven by financial rather than ideological considerations. A typical Thai party is composed of a number of factions, or cliques. Each clique is led by a boss figure, who assumes the role of patron. Often, these cliques correspond roughly to geographical areas, as politicians tend to work together in regional groupings. Faction bosses cultivate close relationships with business interests in particular regions or economic sectors. It is common for these faction leaders to work closely with local crime bosses, commonly known as *chaopho* (godfathers). Sometimes the politicians are themselves *chaopho*. Godfathers typically engage in such illegal business activities as logging, smuggling, drug dealing, gambling, and prostitution rings. To operate these businesses with impunity, they require political protection; hence their willingness to fund politicians, cliques, and parties that will cooperate, passively or actively, with their businesses.

At the same time, political economy explanations of Thai political parties are not sufficient to account fully for their activities. Thai parties seek to present a respectable image to the media and to the voting public, especially the more sophisticated Bangkok electorate. While most major parties are managed by a

secretary-general, who serves as principal fund raiser and trouble shooter, they often chose a well-educated and presentable individual to act as party leader. The party leader is the public face of the party, while the secretary-general controls the purse-strings. From 1988 to 2000, Thailand had four prime ministers who were also leaders of political parties: Chatichai Choonavan (Chart Thai), Chuan Leekpai (Democrat), Banharn Silp-archa (Chart Thai), and Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (New Aspiration). With the exception of Banharn, these men were all well-respected public figures: Chatichai was a former general and ambassador from an elite family; Chavalit was a former army commander and career military man; and Chuan was a well-educated, silver-tongued lawyer. Banharn, a provincial businessman of Chinese descent, had serious problems during his short term as prime minister. He was the former secretary-general of the Chart Thai Party, a brilliant behind-the-scenes fixer who did not gain broad public acceptance as a national leader. Thai political parties could not survive on the basis of fund raising and wheeling and dealing alone: they needed to present a serious and somewhat plausible face to the wider world. Chatichai, Chavalit, and especially Chuan were able to place an apparent distance between their own leadership, and the backstairs deal making that had put them into office.

Stasis and Change

Thai parties are constantly changing. In part, this reflects movements of politicians from one party to another, as faction leaders routinely switch parties in the run-up to elections. Yet it also reflects an eternal optimism among politicians, commentators, and the wider voting public that a new party can emerge and break the existing mold of Thai party politics. Recent examples of "new style" parties have included Palang Dharma (Moral Force), founded by Buddhist ascetic and former Bangkok governor Chamlong Srimuang in 1988; New Aspiration, set up by former army chief Chavalit Yongchaiyudh in 1990; and Thai Rak Thai (Thai loves Thai), created by telecommunications magnate Thaksin Shinawatra in 1999. New parties tend to promise higher levels of integrity, greater technocratic competence, and more substantive popular support than existing parties. They are typically led by a high-profile public figure, and initially recruit some prominent individuals to bolster the party's image. Over time, however, they demonstrate a tendency toward greater pragmatism, and gradually begin to embrace many of the features of other Thai parties that they initially disdained.

Thai governments are coalitions, generally bringing together as many as five or six parties. A typical

coalition is built around one lead party, working with a couple of medium-sized parties and a couple of rather smaller partners. Because of factional defections, a large party at one election may shrink to nothing by the next. The Samakkhi Tham Party was the single largest party in the March 1992 election, but it did not contest the September 1992 election at all. Palang Dharma was the leading party in Bangkok in July 1995, winning sixteen seats; yet in November 1996, it gained only one. During the 1995 general election, Chart Thai and the Democrats were the two main rivals. By 1996, the rivals were the New Aspiration and the Democrats. And by 2000, the key contest was between Thai Rak Thai and the Democrats. These parties present slightly different images and appeal more strongly in different parts of the country. Chart Thai is a somewhat conservative, pro-business party, with its core support in central Thailand. New Aspiration uses populist rhetoric to appeal especially to government officials and farmers, especially in the Northeast. The Democrats (Thailand's oldest party, dating back to 1946) have a slightly more liberal platform and internationalist image, with their main support in Bangkok and the South. Thai Rak Thai combines a very modern image with the use of nationalist and pro-poor rhetoric.

The 1997 constitution, widely considered one of Thailand's most liberal, included provisions intended to strengthen the party system and measures designed to prevent politicians from switching parties. The effectiveness of these changes remains to be seen. However, the January 2001 general elections—the first to be held under the new rules—did see the Thai Rak Thai Party gain an unprecedentedly large electoral mandate. The campaign was characterized by a much greater emphasis on policy issues than had previously been the case. In the aftermath of the elections, there were signs that Thai Rak Thai might absorb some of its coalition partners, with the aim of establishing a one-party-dominant system.

Coalition politics can make for unlikely bedfellows. Because his Chart Thai Party had a poor image with the residents of Bangkok, Banharn Silpa-archa's 1995–1996 administration formed an alliance with the more respectable Palang Dharma. When clean-living Chuan Leekpai began his second spell as prime minister in 1997, his coalition was based on support from the Prachakorn Thai Party's "cobra" faction, led by Vattana Assavahame, a controversial figure accused of having strong connections with *chaophu*. Any coalition requires the collaboration of respectable figures and power brokers of questionable integrity. However, these collaborations are characterized by serious ten-

sions, and consequently are unstable. Thailand's current lineup of political parties is certain to continue waxing and waning, provoking alternating moods of optimism and despair among both political analysts and ordinary voters.

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THAILAND—POLITICAL SYSTEM Thailand's political system has been in a state of near-constant flux since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932. The 1997 constitution ushered in a series of reforms designed to strengthen the integrity of the political order and to promote greater stability. The reforms reflected anxieties about a surge in vote buying and electoral abuses during the 1980s and 1990s. The political system is a difficult one to classify, because it contains both democratic and nondemocratic elements. The formal structures of representative democracy coexist with a powerful bureaucracy.

On 24 June 1932 a clique calling itself the "Peoples Party" seized power from the then king, Rama VII (Prajadhipok), in a bloodless coup. This clique was composed of members of the civilian bureaucracy and of the military, some of whom had been educated in France. The new regime abolished the absolute monarchy while retaining the monarch, calling for a democratic order. Nevertheless, the ruling clique was divided from the outset over the nature of the political system it envisaged for Siam, as Thailand was then known. While elections were held at various junctures (nine in all from 1932 to 1973) and political parties emerged, for the next forty years, the country's politics were characterized by bureaucratic dominance,

elite infighting, and strong military influence. Periods of civilian rule alternated with spells of military government, with the military frequently in the ascendant from 1947 to 1973.

Instability is a hallmark of Thai politics. Between 1932 and 2000, Thailand had sixteen constitutions, sixteen successful coups, fifty-three different cabinet administrations, and twenty-two different prime ministers. Yet, despite this near-constant change, there was considerable continuity in government policy, largely because much of the day-to-day decision making remained in the hands of civil servants. The scholar Fred Riggs famously characterized the Thai political system after 1932 as a "bureaucratic polity," in which the government officials (both civilian and uniformed) ran Thailand according to technocratic and military priorities, with little reference to the needs of either the private sector or the wider public. However, the bureaucratic polity model has been criticized by other scholars, who see it as a static, conservative interpretation that underplays the extent of political opposition and conflict.

Controversies and Conflicts

The year 1973 was a turning point for politics in Thailand. In this year, student-led mass protests in Bangkok culminated in the ouster of military-backed Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn (b.1911), who was obliged to leave the country. A period of relatively open politics followed, which was characterized by growing ideological polarization. However, on 6 October 1976 the military and rightist forces initiated a bloody showdown with the students, beginning with a dawn massacre of student activists at Thammasat University.



Protestors outside Bangkok's government building in November 1999 wear masks of senior government officials who the protestors believe are not adequately handling the national bank scandal. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)



PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THAILAND

Enacted on the 11th Day of October B.E. 2540.

Being the 52nd Year of the Present Reign.

May there be virtue. Today is the tenth day of the waxing moon in the eleventh month of the year of the Ox under the lunar calendar, being Saturday, the eleventh day of October under the solar calendar, in the 2540th year of the Buddhist Era.

Phrabat Somdet Phra Paramintharamaha Bhumibol Adulyadej Mahitalathibet Ramathibodi Chakkri Narubodin Sayammintharathirat Borommanatthabophit is graciously pleased to proclaim that whereas Constitutions have been promulgated as the principle of the democratic regime of government with the King as Head of the State in Thailand for more than sixty-five years, and there had been annulment and amendment to the Constitutions on several occasions, it is manifest that the Constitution is changeable depending upon the situation in the country. In addition, the Constitution must clearly lay down fundamental rules as the principle of the administration of the State and the guideline for the preparation of the organic laws and other laws in conformity therewith; and whereas the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2534 as amended by the Constitution Amendment (No. 6), B.E. 2539 established the Constituent Assembly, consisting of ninety-nine members elected by the National Assembly, charged with the duty to prepare a draft of a new Constitution as the fundamental of political reform and His Majesty the King graciously granted an audience to members of the Constituent Assembly for taking His Royal speeches and receiving blessings in carrying out this task, and, thereafter, the Constituent Assembly prepared the draft Constitution with the essential substance lying in additionally promoting and

protecting rights and liberties of the people, providing for public participation in the governance and inspecting the exercise of State power as well as improving a political structure to achieve more efficiency and stability, having particular regard to public opinions and observing procedures provided in the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2534 as amended by the Constitution Amendment (No. 6), B.E. 2539 (1996) in every respect;

Having carefully considered the Draft Constitution prepared by the Constituent Assembly in the light of the situation of the country, the National Assembly passed a resolution approving the presentation of the draft Constitution to the King for His Royal signature to promulgate it as the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand;

Having thoroughly examined the draft Constitution, the King deemed it expedient to grant His Royal assent in accordance with the resolution of the National Assembly;

Be it, therefore, commanded by the King that the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand be promulgated to replace, as from the date of its promulgation, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2534 promulgated on 9th December B.E. 2534.

May the Thai people unite in observing, protecting and upholding the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand in order to maintain the democratic regime of government and the sovereign power derived from the Thai people, and to bring about happiness, prosperity, and dignity to His Majesty's subjects throughout the Kingdom according to the will of His Majesty in every respect.

Source: International Constitutional Law.
Retrieved 11 April 2002, from: <http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law>.

Yet, after a brief authoritarian interlude from 1976 to 1977, Thailand embarked on a "semidemocratic" path. Elections were reinstated in 1979, and for the next twelve years, electoral politics gained increasing significance. Bureaucratic power gradually waned as profes-

sional politicians became more and more influential. During the 1980s, a wide range of interest groups and civil-society organizations gained in strength and influence, including the print media, nongovernmental associations, heterodox Buddhist sects, and environmental

movements. This expanded public sphere also challenged state power and undermined the bureaucracy.

Conflicts again emerged during the troubled period from February 1991 to May 1992, which saw the first successful military coup in fourteen years; a period of technocratic, military-backed government; the promulgation of a new constitution; and a controversial general election. Street protests against the premiership of former coup leader Suchinda Kraprayoon (b. 1933) in May 1992 culminated in the shooting of dozens of unarmed protestors by the military. The "May events" effectively destroyed the credibility of the military as a political force, leaving civilian-elected politicians firmly in the ascendant.

However, disquiet over the way in which many elected politicians abused the electoral system—and then sought to exploit ministerial office to advance their own financial and business interests—led to growing demands for reform of the political order. These demands culminated in the promulgation of the 1997 constitution, which followed an extensive process of public consultation. For all its shortcomings, this constitution was popularly hailed as one of Thailand's most liberal and democratic.

Components of the Political System

The Thai Parliament has two chambers: the House of Representatives and the Senate. The lower house, which is the more important of the two, is composed of four hundred members elected from single-seat constituencies, and one hundred elected by proportional representation using a "party list" system. MPs elected by constituencies are not entitled to become ministers (unless they resign their seats), whereas those elected on a party-list basis are free to assume ministerial positions. Politicians have been purposely divided into two groups: local representatives chosen for their electability and more respected senior figures of ministerial caliber. Members of the Senate may not be members of political parties: the Senate is supposed to be a council of elders, a nonpartisan body that stands above the fray of day-to-day politicking. In practice, however, some of those elected to the Senate are far from politically neutral. Elections are held every four years for the lower house and every six years for the Senate.

Elected Thai governments are coalitions, typically combining the strengths of five or six political parties. Thai prime ministers therefore find their power constrained by the need to mediate the demands of competing coalition partners. An unruly form of cabinet government is generally the order of the day. Historically, Parliament has been rather weak, and relatively

little legislation has been passed. Most government decisions are issued in the form of cabinet decrees. Parliamentary debates have been largely a forum for the opposition to criticize government policy, notably in the form of set-piece, knockabout, no-confidence debates that are a regular feature of the Thai political calendar.

Several new bodies were also established after 1997 to oversee and to police the political system: an independent election commission, a national anticorruption commission, a constitutional court (to resolve legal anomalies and disputes relating to the constitution), a national human-rights commission, and an administrative court (to resolve disputes between citizens and government officials). Given well-established problems of vote buying and electoral fraud, and the persistence of political corruption, these bodies face considerable challenges in performing their functions effectively.

While the monarchy has no formal role in politics, there have been explicit royal interventions at critical junctures, most recently in May 1992. King Bhumibol (b. 1927) has emerged as the ultimate arbiter in times of political crisis. Although he has performed this role with great skill, he has done so on the basis of enormous public esteem and legitimacy built up over more than half a century. It is very doubtful whether any successor could hope to emulate this feature of his rule.

Local government remains extremely weak. With the exception of the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority—which has an elected governor—Thailand's seventy-six provinces are largely administered by appointed governors dispatched from the interior ministry in Bangkok. These governors are rotated regularly. Elections take place for provincial, municipal, and subdistrict councils, but so far these bodies have gained little autonomy from the central Thai state. The result is an excessively centralized political order, where most important decisions are made in Bangkok.

Thailand has a muddled and troubled political history, yet it has emerged as one of the most open and pluralistic societies in Southeast Asia. While the political reform process of the late 1990s has brought about a variety of changes, the Thai political system still contains numerous structural problems and weaknesses, which form the subject of intense public debate.

Duncan McCargo

See also: **Chart Thai; Ekaphap; Manhattan Incident; National Peacekeeping Council—Thailand; Phalang Dharma Party; Student Uprising of 1973; Thai Revolution of 1932; Thailand—Political Parties; Thammasat University Riots (1976)**

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THAIPUSAM Thaipusam is one of three festivals celebrating aspects of the Hindu deity Lord Murugan, the others being Pankuni Uttiram (March–April) and Vaikasi Visakam (May–June). It falls on the first month of the Tamil year, Thai, on the day closest to the full moon when the constellation Pusam is in the ascendant. In one founding charter, it marks the occasion when Lord Murugan received his lance (*vel*), which symbolizes knowledge and wisdom. The mythological attributes of Lord Murugan are complex; he is variously depicted as a god-king, a warrior, an ascetic youth, a teacher, a divine lover, and a personal savior.



An attendant attaches skewers to the face and tongue of a Hindu woman celebrating Thaipusam in Singapore. (EARL & NAZIMA KOWALL/CORBIS)

In Southeast Asian countries where diaspora southern Indian communities are sizeable, Thaipusam is the most visible and spectacularly celebrated Hindu festival, attracting massive crowds of pilgrims and curious spectators alike. In Malaysia, the Batu Caves shrine complex, situated some seven miles from the Kuala Lumpur city center, is the largest and most well-known pilgrimage destination for both locals and foreigners. The celebration begins, before dawn, with a procession of a brightly decorated chariot bearing the deity through the city streets and then onward to the Batu Caves shrine. During this time, pilgrims make supplications or perform various devotional acts in fulfillment of vows or as penance. Heads are shaved, and free food and drink are distributed without discrimination. Some pilgrims carry *kavadi* ("ritual burden") for a distance, after a stipulated period of ritual preparation (e.g., fasting, abstinence, and chanting of hymns). There are various kinds of *kavadi*. Pots of milk are common with women and children; for men the typical *kavadi* consists of a metal or wooden frame decorated with an assortment of peacock feathers, flowers, colored paper, styrofoam, and other paraphernalia, which is borne on the shoulders. Additionally, many young men pierce their bodies with numerous hooks and skewers after entering a trance state.

As a complex public religious event, Thaipusam has many facets and meanings, including individual self-fulfilment, different emphases of Hindu spirituality, and as an expression of ethnic Tamil group identity in the context of religious and ethnic pluralism in countries like Malaysia and Singapore.

Yeoh, Seng-Guan

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THAKINS Members of the Dobama Asiayone Movement, also known as the Thakin Party, were

commonly referred to in the 1930s as Thakins, by the designation they put in front of their names. During the colonial times, when addressing the British, the Burmese were generally required to use the designation *thakin* ("lord" or "master"), much as "sahib" was used in India. Young Burmese began to use this designation for themselves to make a point about their own mastery over their country. The Dobama Asiayone (variously translated as "We Burmans," "We Burmese," or "Our Burma"), founded by Ba Thung in May 1930, managed to bring together traditionalist Buddhist nationalist elements with modern political ideals. Its song became Burma's national anthem. In the early 1940s and 1950s its members—including Aung San and U Nu—were later to become extremely influential in the national independence movement and in the post-independence Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) governments. During the Japanese occupation it was conjoined in 1942 with Ba Maw's Sinyetha Party to be known as Do Bama Sinyetha Asi Ayon. It lost support after its reorganization by Ba Maw into the Maha Bama Asi Ayon in 1944, when the AFPFL took over in importance.

Gustaaf Houtman

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THAKSIN SHINAWATRA (b. 1949), Thai prime minister. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Thaksin Shinawatra (pronounced "Shin-a-wat") became Thailand's twenty-third prime minister. In general elections held in January, the new political party, Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais), which he founded in 1998, won a landslide victory, the first in modern Thai political history in which a single party won a near majority (248 of 500) of all parliamentary seats. A native of Chiang Mai, Dr. Thaksin is particularly strong politically in Thailand's north.

From 1973 to 1987, Dr. Thaksin served in the Royal Thai Police Department. After resigning from the government, he went on to become a dynamic telecommunications business entrepreneur and one of the wealthiest individuals in the world. In 1994, Dr. Thaksin decided to enter Thai politics and held several different cabinet posts during the period 1994–1997. As prime minister Dr. Thaksin has advocated policies that defy typical International Monetary Fund dictates. He has, for example, implemented populist policies of providing a three-year debt relief for farm-

ers, a million-baht credit scheme for every village, universal health care with a minimal charge per hospital visit, higher interest rates to strengthen the baht, and avoidance of international loans with policy strings attached. He is deeply committed to strengthening Thailand's capabilities in information technology.

The Constitutional Court of Thailand reviewed charges that Dr. Thaksin failed to report accurately his financial assets when he became involved in Thai politics in 1997. On 3 August 2001, by a narrow vote of 8 to 7, Dr. Thaksin was found not guilty. Had he been found guilty, he would have been banned from Thai politics for five years.

At present it is somewhat premature to assess Dr. Thaksin's leadership. The key question is whether he is an old-style politician in a new guise or a genuine reformer. His alleged attempt to infringe on press freedom and his image of representing "dictatorial money politics" has certainly reduced his popularity, particularly among intellectuals, journalists, activists, and urban citizens. On a more positive note, he seems open to meet with diverse social groups with grievances. Also as of March 2002, the Thai stock market was the third best performing (in U.S. dollar terms) in the world in 2002, perhaps reflective of domestic and international investors' confidence in his leadership of the country.

Gerald W. Fry

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THAN SHWE (b. 1933), military head of state in Myanmar. Than Shwe became the first chairman of the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in Myanmar (Burma) in 1997, having succeeded General Saw Maung as chairman of the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Committee (SLORC) in April 1992. He is generally seen as holding the balance between opposite factions in the army for and against

political reform. He is also simultaneously army commander-in-chief, head of state, prime minister, and defense minister.

Than Shwe joined the army in 1953 and in 1958 was attached to the Psychological Warfare Department. He was lecturer at the Central University of Political Science in Rangoon between 1963 and 1967. In 1981 he became central committee member of the Burma Socialist Programme Party and in July 1988 he was appointed to the central executive committee and was made deputy minister of defense. Promoted to commander of the southwest region in 1983, he became vice chief of staff in 1985. He was promoted to lieutenant general in 1987 and full general in 1990. At the time of the 1988 uprising he was chairman of the Irrawaddy Division under the Burma Socialist Programme Party. He has been the patron of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) since its foundation.

Gustaaf Houtman

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THANJAVUR (2002 est. pop. 220,000). Thanjavur (or Tanjore) is an important city in the south of Tamil Nadu, India, and one of the most ancient. Located on the Vedavar River near the head of the agriculturally rich Kaveri Delta, the city first gained prominence in the tenth through twelfth centuries under the Chola dynasty.

In about 1010, the famed Brihadishvara Temple was erected, and it is still the main attraction in the city. The pyramidal stone tower rises to a height of 66 meters and is capped by a massive stone and a gold pot finial that was donated by the royal founder, Rajaraja I (reigned 985–1014). The centerpiece inside is a massive stone lingam (phallic symbol), and facing the east entrance to the shrine is a huge bull (Nandi) in black granite, which is said to have been brought from a place some 650 kilometers away. The art gallery in the former raja's palace is also worth a visit for its fine collection of Tanjore bronzes of the Chola age. Tamil University has recently been built on the outskirts of the city.

Paul Hockings

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THANOM KITTIKACHORN (b. 1911), Thai prime minister. Born August 11, 1911, Thanom Kittikachorn graduated from the royal military academy of Chula Chom Klao in 1931. He was involved in the overthrow of Pibul Songkram's government in 1957. After the inconclusive elections of December 1957, he became the caretaker prime minister until October, when Sarit Thanarat assumed power. As Sarit's deputy, Thanom became the prime minister after Sarit's death in December 1963 and became field marshal in 1964.

Thanom ruled with Field Marshal Praphat Charusathien and General Kris and continued the policies of Sarit, but without the same degree of control. The main problem was the increasing Communist insurgency. Thailand was closely aligned with the United States in the war in Vietnam. International investment and U.S. military expenditure in Thailand resulted in considerable economic growth for the country. In the February 1969 elections, Thanom's United Thai People's Party secured 75 seats out of 219 in the lower house, giving them the largest representation among the thirteen parties. However, military rule was imposed in 1971. Student unrest and mass demonstrations led to the end of Thanom's



Prime Minister Thanom Kittakachorn in Washington, D.C., in 1968. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

regime in October 1973, shortly after which Thanom and his family fled to the United States. The end of authoritarian rule by student unrest and demonstrations has remained a symbol of the democratic aspirations of the Thai people, and the government's decision to honor Thanom in 1999 for his service to the Royal Guard was dropped due to protests.

Patit Paban Mishra

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THANT, U (1909–1974), Burmese official and secretary-general of the United Nations. Educator and third secretary general of the United Nations (1961–1971), U Thant was one of the few Burmese to have held high-level international office. Educated at National High School, Pantanaw, and at the University of Rangoon, he served mostly as headmaster of National High School, Pantanaw, until 1947. He was also briefly secretary to the educational reorganization committee of the government of Japanese-occupied Burma. U Nu recruited him in various capacities, including as press director in 1947, as director of broadcasting in 1948, as secretary of the Ministry of Information in 1949 and, briefly, as Secretary to the Prime Minister in 1954.

U Thant is best remembered, however, for his services to the U.N., where he embarked on a rapid career. He began serving as Burmese delegate to the U.N. in 1952, and became permanent U.N. representative in 1957. He was appointed vice president of the U.N. General Assembly in 1959. In November 1961, after the death of U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, the United States and the Soviet Union disagreed on the successor, and U Thant was appointed in a compromise. He was elected permanent secretary-general in November 1962, and extended by a further five years in December 1966.

U Thant was a devout Buddhist and meditator, and he brought valuable qualities to the resolution of international problems. During his first term as secretary general he resolved some major international tensions, including the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba (1962). He had less success in his second term, when the U.N. moved from peacekeeping to questions of economic and social development.



Secretary-General U Thant in his United Nations office in New York on 24 November 1961. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

When he retired from the U.N., he was succeeded by Kurt Waldheim in 1971, by which time Burma had been under military rule for almost a decade. After his death from cancer in New York on 25 November 1974, his body was returned to Burma, only to become the focus for demands for democratic reforms. His remains were briefly seized by students on 5 December 1974 and buried in a makeshift mausoleum on the grounds of the Arts and Science University in Rangoon.

Gustaaf Houtman

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THAR DESERT The Thar Desert, or Great Indian Desert, is an arid region of 208,000 square kilometers in northwestern India and eastern Pakistan; it is the largest desert in South Asia. Located between the Indus and Sutlej River valleys, much of the Thar Desert consists of shifting sand dunes and stony plains, along with smaller areas of grassland. Rainfall is highly erratic, ranging between 100 and 500 millimeters per year. About 90 percent of rain falls between July and September. Mean average temperatures range between 24° and 26°C in summer and between 4° and 10°C in winter. Summer temperatures may reach 50°C, especially in May and June, the hottest months. Despite its dryness, the Thar Desert supports a diverse flora and fauna, including twenty-three species of lizards and twenty-five species of snakes. The Great Indian bustard, Indian gazelle, black buck, and caracal (wild cat) are also found. Much of the region's economy is based on pastoralism, especially sheep and goats, and on a limited amount of irrigated agriculture. The largest cities are Jodhpur and Bikaner, India. India tested its first nuclear device in the area in 1974.

Michael Pretes

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THAT LUANG The That Luang, or Phathat Luang (Great Sacred Stupa), is a Buddhist site in Laos that is said to enshrine a relic, or bone, of Buddha. Legend states that the original shrine was built in 307 BCE. King Setthathirat (reigned 1534–1571) erected the stupa in 1566 on the grounds of the shrine after he moved the capital from Luang Prabang to Vientiane. The stupa consists of three levels: a base of 41 square meters (135 square feet), a first level containing thirty miniature replicas of the central spire, and a second level consisting of the central spire on a base of blooming lotus petals. The That Luang is 45 meters (148 feet) high. King Anouvong (1767–1829) added the cloister around the That Luang during his reign. The That Luang survived the razing of Vientiane in 1828 when the Siamese attacked in retaliation for King Anouvong's unsuccessful attempt to win independence from Siam. The French restored the stupa in 1900 in a Western style after it was abandoned following the Siamese invasion. Between 1931 and 1935, using an indigenous style, the Lao renovated the That Luang to its present state. The That Luang is an ex-

cellent example of classical Lao Buddhist architecture and a symbol of the Lao nation and appears on the Lao currency. During the twelfth lunar month, the That Luang's importance is celebrated at an annual festival held on its grounds.

Linda S. McIntosh

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THAT LUANG FESTIVAL The That Luang Festival is an important Theravada Buddhist holiday for the Lao nation. The festival is held during the full moon of the twelfth lunar month, usually November, at That Luang (Phathat Luang) or the Great Sacred



An elephant marches in the White Elephant Procession during the That Luang Festival in Vientiane, Laos. (NIK WHEELER/CORBIS)

Stupa in Vientiane (pronounced Viangchan). The site of Phathat Luang is sacred, since the Lao believe the stupa enshrines a relic of Buddha. Both monks and laypeople from the various provinces of Laos congregate in the capital to celebrate the auspicious occasion with three days of religious ceremony followed by a week of festivities occurring twenty-four hours a day.

A procession of laypeople begins at Wat Si Muang in the city center to Phathat Luang to make offerings to the monks in order to accumulate merit for rebirth into a better life. The religious part concludes as laypeople, carrying incense and candles as offerings, circumambulate Phathat Luang three times in honor of Buddha, *Dhamma* (the Teachings of Buddha), and the *Sangha* (organization of Buddhist monks). Folk and popular music troupes and drama performances provide entertainment at the festival. Merrymakers can also buy goods and food at the fair.

Linda McIntosh

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THICH NHAT HANH (b. 1926), Vietnamese Buddhist master. Known to followers as Thay (spiritual teacher), Thich Nhat Hanh is a peace activist, scholar, and writer. During the Vietnam War, he lobbied in the United States and Europe against the war and advocated a negotiated settlement. Martin Luther King, Jr. nominated him for the 1967 Nobel Peace Prize. He led the Buddhist delegation to the Paris peace talks. He was exiled for his pacifist views and now lives in France.

In the early 1960s, he studied and taught in U.S. universities. In Vietnam he organized wartime relief through the School of Youth for Social Service (established 1964). He also established the Buddhist University in Saigon and a publishing house. In France he founded the Unified Buddhist Church (1969) and Plum Village as a retreat center (1982). Similar centers were established in the United States. He lectures across the globe on mindful living. He conceives of religion as action-oriented and makes religion accessible to the public by projecting it as something joyful, not solemn. His teachings are practical and not aimed exclusively at followers of a particular faith. He has written many books, including *Being Peace* (1988), *Our Appointment with Life* (1990), *The Art of Mindful Living* (1992), *Peace Is Every Step* (1992), *Living Bud-*

dha Living Christ (1995), and *The Long Road Turns to Joy* (1996).

Udai Bhanu Singh

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THIMPHU (2002 est. pop. 58,000). Thimphu has been the capital of Bhutan since 1962, when it replaced Paro. It is a small town, which was founded in 1581. A road now links the town with northern India. Thimphu is located on the Raidak River. It contains a major fortified monastery, Tashichho Dzong. It also has a small hydroelectric plant, a small airfield, and a secondary school. After considerable remodeling, the Tashichho Dzong now houses some central government offices, although the older section is still the home of the abbot and his monks. Thimphu is also the name of the surrounding district (2002 est. pop. 95,000). Here rice, wheat, maize, and timber are produced.

Paul Hockings

THIRTEEN MING TOMBS The thirteen tombs of Ming emperors are collectively known in China as the Thirteen Ming Tombs. In these mausoleums, located about fifty kilometers northwest of Beijing, rest thirteen emperors, twenty-three empresses, and many concubines of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). The construction of the mausoleums started with Changling (Perpetuity Mausoleum) in 1409 and ended with Siling (Remembrance Mausoleum) in 1644, covering an area of more than forty square kilometers.

Changling is the centerpiece of the Ming Tombs, with a ten-kilometer-long Divine Path flanked by eighteen pairs of stone sculptures and the magnificent Ling'en Hall, where living emperors came to pay respect to the deceased ones. Stone Archway, the entrance to the mausoleums, stands as part of Changling.

Excavation of Dingling (Stability Mausoleum) in 1956, the mausoleum of Emperor Wanli, who ruled from 1573 to 1620, unveiled the mystery that had shrouded the mausoleums. An all-stone underground palace lies 17 meters below the ground. It is 87.34 meters long and 47.28 meters wide, divided into five halls with a total area of 1,195 square meters. Among the more than three thousand unearthed artifacts are the

emperor's gold crown, which is woven with extremely fine gold thread, and the empress's phoenix crown, adorned with 3,500 pearls and 150 precious stones. The tomb complex was listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2000.

Jian-Zhong Lin

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THOMPSON, JIM (1906–1967?), developer of the Thai silk industry. Jim Thompson (James Harrison Wilson Thompson) is best known for developing the Thai silk industry, a major success story of post-World War II Asia, and making it world famous. He was the grandson of General James Harrison Wilson, who wrote *Travels in the Middle Kingdom* about his experiences in China and who was a friend of the

Siamese crown prince Vajiravudh, the son of King Chulalongkorn.

While serving in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) at the end of World War II, Thompson developed a deep love for Thailand and subsequently decided to remain there. He lived in a specially constructed teak home that represented the best of traditional Thai architecture and housed a magnificent collection of Buddhist and Asian art. On Easter Sunday afternoon in 1967, while on a holiday in the Cameron Highlands of Malaysia, Thompson disappeared. His death remains a mystery, with many conflicting explanations, including political intrigue. In a bizarre turn of events, Thompson's elder sister, Katherine, was found brutally murdered in her Pennsylvania home a few months later. Today the Jim Thompson Thai Silk Company continues to thrive under the direction of former employees, and Thompson's magnificent home is now a museum.

Gerald W. Fry

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JIM THOMPSON'S LEGACY

In the quote below, Jim Thompson explains his desire to leave Thailand with a legacy of great art:

I have elected to make Thailand my permanent home, and as I live here and am very interested in the artistic heritage of the country, I have tried to build up as fine a collection as I can to leave to this country. I know that the museum does not have funds to buy many of the fine pieces that turn up, and rather than see them leave the country, I have tried to buy the really exceptional ones to keep them here . . . this house and its contents will belong to the Siamese people since I have already willed it to them by way of the Siam Society.

Source: William Warren. (1993) *Jim Thompson: The Legendary American of Thailand, The Remarkable Career and Strange Disappearance of Jim Thompson*. Bangkok, Thailand: Jim Thompson Thai Silk, 118.

THOUGHT WORK—CHINA The government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) relies to an unusually high degree on what its ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) calls "thought work." In practical terms, thought work refers to the management of communication flows, the "environment of symbols" from which people derive their understandings of the world, their values, and their action strategies to pursue interests. Crucial to managing thought work is control over the mass media and telecommunications systems. Although domination of these systems cannot lead directly to government control over the entire environment of symbols, and certainly not to control over the content of all thought, domination of the media and telecommunications is the most critical component of the thought work enterprise. If the government does not dominate these systems, other groups will. That will give these groups

a strategic bastion from which to challenge the government's leadership over society.

There was never any question of other groups challenging the government for control over thought work under Mao Zedong (1893–1976). Mao certainly worried about "rightists," "counterrevolutionaries," and "revisionists" influencing thought work, and sometimes his opponents did use the media to publish veiled criticisms of his rule. But these disagreements were among people who were essentially components of the government. They were not disagreements between people inside government and outside. Moreover, the disagreements never lasted long. They would soon be eliminated, and government control would be increased. By the decade of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the government had reduced the number of media performances to which people could be exposed to eight sanitized plays, eight songs, and three film clips. There was utterly no competition for the government's own political messages, which were propagated endlessly in the CCP's newspapers and through a vast radio network that included a loudspeaker in almost every village.

After Mao died in 1976, a new generation of Chinese leaders decided that excessive control over thought work had acted as a hindrance to China's social and economic development. They began relaxing controls in the late 1970s as part of a sea change in government policy that included an opening to the outside world and transformative economic reforms. The development of a market economy fundamentally changed the incentive structures facing the managers of newspaper publishing houses, television stations, and other media units. They became much less interested in serving the government and much more interested in serving readers and audiences so that they could sell advertising. Inevitably, media content changed as a result. At the same time, technological developments such as the spread of television, telephones, and eventually the Internet also made it increasingly difficult for the government to control thought work. By the close of the twentieth century, it faced a crisis. It could still prevent the open circulation of blatantly unacceptable political messages but little else. It could not set the agenda for what people would discuss and think.

It did retain the impulse to control thought work, though—a problematic contradiction that frequently produced tensions in Chinese society. Periodically the government would launch crackdowns on undesired public communication—arresting writers and publishers, banning the sale of satellite television receivers,

and closing down Internet cafes. In this way, the government would try at least to eliminate from the thought work market such extremely pernicious items as hard-core pornography and radical social commentary. Very soon, however, people would again start producing and exchanging communications that the government did not like. They would effectively take back control of the thought work market.

The Chinese case suggests that in an era of open-market economies and expanding networks of global communication no government can control thought work. The impulse to control it lingers but should probably be seen as a legacy of centuries past that cannot survive contemporary global transformations.

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THREE AND FIVE ANTIS CAMPAIGNS

In the early years after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched two political campaigns, with the purpose of reinforcing party control over rural and urban China. Both campaigns targeted mainly urban dwellers and people working in the modern business sector.

First, the CCP initiated the Three Antis Campaign against corruption, waste, and bureaucratism. The campaign targeted cadres in government and industry, especially those who had become acquainted with China's capitalists. Second, the party launched the Five Antis Campaign against bribery, tax evasion, theft of state assets (that is, state property and economic information), cheating on government contracts, and stealing capital. This campaign targeted the Chinese capitalists themselves. Some of the blacklisted capitalists were left to function as government employees; many were simply eliminated and disappeared from the business circle.

The Five Antis Campaign also had a hidden agenda. It seized factories and capital from the blacklisted capitalists and placed them under government control. Through these efforts, the CCP expanded its influence over China's modern economic sectors. At the same time, the campaign helped the party to identify potential supporters who could be recruited into the CCP, thereby consolidating the party's grip over every aspect of Chinese society. From 1947 to 1953, the membership of the CCP increased from 2.7 million to 6.1 million.

Stephanie Chung

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THREE GORGES DAM PROJECT The three gorges dam project, located at the middle reaches of the Chang (Yangtze) River at Yichang in China's Hubei Province, is one of the largest dam projects in the world. It will be 175 meters high and 2,335 meters long. The volume of embankment will be 26.43 million cubic meters, which is twice that of what is currently the world's largest dam, in Brazil. The capacity of the spillway will be 98,800 cubic meters. It is projected to have a hydroelectricity capacity of 18.2 gigawatts and an annual generation capacity of electricity of 84.7 billion kilowatt hours.

A passage will be built in the dam to allow ships of up to 3,000 tons to pass through. The dam reservoir, at a water level of 175 meters above the sea level, can be 662.9 kilometers long and can have a water area of 1,054 square kilometers and a capacity of 39.3 billion cubic meters. Some 17.2 billion cubic meters are allocated to dead storage and 22.1 billion cubic meters to flood control. The project was started in 1993 and is expected to be completed by 2009 and will require a total investment of about \$12 billion in 1993 currency. The actual investment will be more than \$25 billion by 2009.

The three gorges dam project faces very difficult challenges. The project affects nineteen counties and cities with an area of 54,000 square kilometers and a population of 14.4 million. It will result in the submersion of 632 square kilometers of land, including 245 square kilometers of arable land, and the largest single dam-related displacement of people ever. About 1.1 million people need to be relocated. The dam may also cause other problems such as ecological changes, water pollution, and, in particular, mud deposits. In

the upper reaches of the Chang River, the estimated land degradation area will amount to 355,000 square kilometers, and it is estimated that its annual land erosion may deposit 0.48 billion metric tons of sediment in the reservoir.

Xing Quan Zhang

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THREE IMPERIAL REGALIA—JAPAN

Symbols of the emperor's right to rule, Japan's imperial regalia (*sanshu-no-shinki*), take the form of three sacred treasures—the mirror, the sword, and the jewel, all of which are believed to have been handed down from emperor to emperor throughout Japanese history. The initial stage of imperial enthronement ceremonies occurs when the regalia are passed into the possession of the new emperor, legitimizing his claim to the throne.

The regalia are thought to have been divinely bestowed and have been venerated throughout history. Their origins are described in accounts of the mythological creation of Japan. The curved jewel of increasing prosperity (*yasakani-no-magatama*) and the mirror of illuminating brightness (*yata-no-kagami*) were used to lure Amaterasu Omikami, the sun goddess, out of a cave, where she had hidden herself after a quarrel with her brother, Susanoo no Mikoto, the storm god. The sword is said to have been cut from the tail of an eight-headed serpent slain by Susanoo no Mikoto. He named it the "sword of the gathering clouds of heaven" (*ame-no-murakumo-no-tsurugi*) before presenting it to Amaterasu. She then passed the three treasures to her grandson Ninigo-no Mikoto as symbols of his authority when he descended from heaven to rule over Japan. Later the sword is said to have been used by the imperial prince Yamato-take to cut an escape route when surrounded by fire on a grassy plain, and from then on it has been known as the grass-cutter sword (*kusanagi-no-tsurugi*).

Throughout Japanese history, the regalia have been the cause of disputes and political intrigues, and copies and counterfeits have been made. The epic *Tale of the Heike* recounts how the grass-cutter sword, or perhaps a copy, was lost in the decisive twelfth-century naval battle at Dannoura, where the infant emperor Antoku perished. During the fourteenth century, the regalia

played an important role in the power struggles between the Northern and Southern imperial courts, which arose because the princes of the two imperial lines fought for the right to rule as emperor.

The mirror is now believed to be enshrined in the inner sanctum of the Grand Shrine at Ise and the sword in Nagoya's Atsuta Shrine. The jewel and replicas of the mirror and sword are in the possession of the current emperor and are enshrined in the Kashiko-dokoro Shrine on the grounds of the Tokyo Imperial Palace. Wrapped in layer on layer of silk and enclosed in boxes, the regalia have long been kept hidden from view, and their exact appearance is uncertain. They have never been exhibited or displayed, and their use in the imperial accession ceremony takes place behind closed doors. They played a crucial role, however, in the 1989 enthronement of the present emperor Akihito and continue to legitimize the Japanese imperial line.

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THREE KINGDOMS PERIOD Korea's Three Kingdoms period is generally considered to have lasted seven centuries—from the first century BCE into the seventh century CE. State institutions and autonomy, however, did not appear until the early fourth century. The three kingdoms developed out of the tribal leagues, which progressed to a stage of state-building and overpowered the Han Chinese commanderies situated on the Korean Peninsula. The combined territory of the Koguryo (37 BCE–668 CE), Paekche (18 BCE–663 CE), and Shilla (57 BCE–935 CE) kingdoms covered the entire peninsula and an even larger area to the north.

The Koguryo kingdom, by far the largest, occupied the mountainous north, including a large part of Manchuria, whereas the Paekche and Shilla kingdoms divided the southern coastal plains. In addition, a tribal league known as Kaya occupied a wedge of territory in the south but was gradually absorbed by neighboring Paekche and Shilla. The three kingdoms were fiercely competitive, and each maintained close ties with China in hopes of gaining an advantage over the other kingdoms.



CHINA—HISTORICAL PERIODS

- Xia dynasty (2100–1766 BCE)
- Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE)
- Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE)
 - Western Zhou (1045–771 BCE)
 - Eastern Zhou (770–221 BCE)
- Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE)
- Warring States period (475–221 BCE)
- Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE)
- Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE)
- Three Kingdoms period (220–265 CE)
- North and South Dynasties (220–589 CE)
- Sui dynasty (581–618 CE)
- Tang dynasty (618–907 CE)
- Five Dynasties period (907–960 CE)
- Song dynasty (960–1279)
 - Northern Song (960–1126)
 - Southern Song (1127–1279)
- Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234)
- Yuan dynasty (1279–1368)
- Ming dynasty (1368–1644)
- Qing dynasty (1644–1912)
- Republican China (1912–1927)
- People's Republic of China (1949–present)
- Republic of China (1949–present)
- Cultural Revolution (1966–1976)

The warring kingdom of Koguryo was the first to firmly establish itself by overpowering China and Puyo and the nomadic tribes of Northeast Asia. Led by a strong military aristocracy, it expanded to include all the lands north of Seoul and reached deep into Manchuria. Koguryo established a Confucian academy to educate the nobility and compiled a state history consisting of one hundred volumes before it adopted Buddhism as the royal creed in 372 CE. The Koguryo kingdom reached the height of its expansion in the fifth century during the reign of King Kwanggaet'o (reigned 391–413) and his successor, King Changsu (reigned 413–491).

The Paekche kingdom developed out of the confederated Mahan states of the southwestern part of the peninsula. Due to fighting with both Koguryo and China, many people of Puyo fled to the southwest. Being more advanced than the indigenous population, they gained control, and the kingdom evolved. Paekche also developed a highly sophisticated state organization and adopted Confucian and Buddhist hierarchical structures. Constantly bothered by Koguryo incursions into its northern territory and by Shilla in

the east, Paekche allied itself with the Japanese and the North and South dynasties of China. Through these alliances, Paekche served as a conduit of culture from China to Japan. Paekche had significant influence on the culture of the Asuka period by sending diplomats, scholars, artists, and craftsmen to Japan from the middle of the fourth century.

Growing out of a confederation of Chinhan states in the southeastern portion of the peninsula, Shilla was the last of the three kingdoms to develop. It was centered around the walled city-state of Saro, later known as Kumsong and now as Kyongju. Because its territory was situated farthest from China, it was less influenced by China and did not accept Confucianism and Buddhism until the sixth century. Because of constant pressure and attacks from the Japanese as well as Koguryo and Paekche, Shilla strengthened its military. This buildup featured the Hwarang (Flower of Youth Corps), elite young soldiers with a chivalric code of leadership, unquestioned service to the kingdom, and religious and ethical zeal. Shilla absorbed the neighboring Kaya federation in the mid-sixth century and skillfully allied itself with Tang China, Koguryo's fierce enemy. Tang aid first helped Shilla defeat Paekche and then Koguryo to unify the Korean Peninsula under Shilla rule in 668.

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THREE PAGODAS PASS Three Pagodas Pass or Phra Chedi Sam Ong is located in Thailand's Kanchanaburi Province on the Thai-Myanmar (Burma) border. It is the name of a settlement as well as the mountain pass. The name is derived from three miniature Buddhist shrines, memorials to the invasions of Thailand by the Burmese. This was the favorite Burmese invasion route during the Ayutthaya period (1350–1767). The shrines were constructed in the eighteenth century.

The area was used by the Japanese army in World War II as its point for invading Burma. It was a stop

on the infamous "Death Railway," a railroad route designed by the Japanese to link Bangkok, Thailand, and Moulmein, Burma. The "Bridge over the River Kwai" spanning the Khwae Noi River was part of this railway, which was constructed by Allied prisoners of war and "liberated" Asians. Most of this railway was destroyed after the war.

Today, area residents are Thai, Karen, and Mon. The Myanmar government has been trying to attract tourism, touting it as a hub for regional day trips. Many of those trips are to war-related sites. Journalist Micoool Brooke described the area in 1999 as "more like a demilitarized zone than a link between friendly countries."

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THREE REVOLUTIONS MOVEMENT

The Three Revolutions movement (*Samdae hyongmyong undong*; refers to the ideological, technical, and cultural revolutions of the Communist Party) was a campaign that took place in North Korea in the mid-1970s. The purpose of the movement was to boost the sagging North Korean economy by sending young students to factories and cooperative farms to stimulate economic activity. Their task was to encourage and guide factory workers and farmers to meet their production quotas. More important than classroom learning, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung (1912–1994) emphasized, was the hands-on education that the students would receive through their experiences at the actual work site. This part of the movement naturally caused friction between students and farmers, who felt it inappropriate that they be made to accept guidance from someone who knew little or nothing about the job.

A second part of the movement was efforts by Kim Il Sung to replace the old with the young in factories as a way of promoting new ideas. Many festivals were arranged to promote the value of North Korean youth. At a broader dimension, the young were to take over the revolution and pass it on to later generations. In the higher echelons of government, the movement provided the setting for Kim Il Sung to designate his son, Kim Jong Il (b. 1941), to carry out future Worker Party (the political organ of the North Korean Com-

unist Party) operations. According to University of Hawaii professor Dae-Sook Suh, the succession issue was one that few outside of Kim Il Sung's inner circle knew of. However, by placing his son at the head of the Three Revolutions movement, Kim Il Sung sought to prepare others to accept the important role that his son would play in the party, especially after the Dear Leader had passed away.

In addition to the designation of Kim Jong Il to head the Three Revolutions movement, there were other signs that suggest that this period was an important one for the younger Kim's rise to eventually succeed his father. Kim Chong-suk (1919–1949; Kim Il Sung's first wife and mother of Kim Jong Il), a figure previously not rendered important by the Communist regime, was honored as "one who served Kim Il Sung close to her body." A museum was built in her memory, as well, at this time. In Kim Il Sung's relatively early push to establish his successor can be seen the caution that he took to ensure that his regime was not usurped by reformers, as it was in the Soviet Union following the death of Joseph Stalin (1879–1953).

According to Dae-Sook Suh, in 2000 the Three Revolutions Movement was known as the Three-Revolution Work Team Movement and defined as ideology, arms, and science and technology (Suh 2001: 76).

Mark E. Caprio

See also: **Kim Il Sung**

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TIAN HAN (1898–1968), modern Chinese playwright. Tian Han, one of the founders of modern Chinese drama, was born in Hunan Province and studied science in Japan from 1916 to 1922, but his interest was in literature, drama, and movies. Beginning in the 1920s, he wrote a number of plays and became one of the most important modern Chinese playwrights.

Tian Han was a romantic dramatist. All his works were rich in poetic flavor, and his early works showed a style of both sentimentalism and aestheticism, especially *Return to the South* and *Sound of the Deep Pool*. His favorite themes were art and love. In 1929, his style changed, and he wrote his representative work, *The Noted Actor's Death*, with realism. This drama showed

the conflict between art and money and between good and evil and portrayed an actor with dignity. It has become a classic in Chinese literature. During the second Sino-Japanese conflict (1937–1945), Tian Han devoted himself to the anti-Japanese drama movement. He wrote the drama *Lugou Bridge* to reflect the war. After the war, he wrote his famous work *The Beauties*. Besides dramas, Tian Han wrote many scenarios and many song lyrics. The Chinese national anthem "March of the Warriors" was written by Tian in the 1930s.

She Xiaojie

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TIAN SHAN This great sickle-shaped arc of mountain ranges and intervening valleys stretches 2,414 kilometers (1,500 miles) east/west along the frontier between Kyrgyzstan, southeastern Kazakhstan, and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of southwestern China. The complex is 320 to 480 kilometers (200–300 miles) wide and covers 1,036,000 square kilometers (400,000 square miles). A central knot of high peaks reaches 7,439 meters (24,406 feet) on Pobeda Peak. The Pamir ranges are to the southwest, the Dzungarian and southern Kazakhstan plains fall below to the north, and the Tarim Basin lies southeast.

To early Silk Road travelers, these "Heavenly Mountains" (*tian* is Chinese for "sky" or "heaven") offered an alpine respite of steppe, forest, and glacial lakes. The interior continental location produces short, cold winters followed by long, hot summers. Winds of Mediterranean and Gulf of Arabia origin



bring moisture to the windward western and north-western slopes (up to 800 millimeters, or 32 inches, annually), while leaving the eastern and interior regions in an arid rain shadow (less than 100 millimeters, or 4 inches). Common fauna include the wolf, fox, wild boars, bears, snow leopard, mountain goat, Manchurian roe, and mountain sheep.

Kyrgyz predominate in the western Tian Shan; Uighurs form a majority on the eastern side. Ethnic Russians, Chinese, Kazakhs, Tajiks, and Tatars also settle the periphery. The economy revolves around irrigated agriculture (lowlands) and livestock herding (uplands). Oil and gas extraction, mining of nonferrous metals, and tourism are also important throughout this region.

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TIANANMEN SQUARE Tiananmen Square is located in the center of Beijing, the capital city of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and is listed first among the city's sixteen scenic spots. Originally designed and built in 1651, the square was enlarged four-fold in 1958 to cover 100 acres, making it the biggest public square in the world. It is best known in the West for the "Tiananmen Incident" of 1989.

The square is actually named for the Tiananmen Gate (Gate of Heavenly Peace), which is on the northern side of the square. Outside the gate are two marble pillars called the *huabiao*. The *huabiao* are said to date back to the sage kings of Yao and Shun in China's mythical times. Originally wooden, they served as notice boards, or "wood of direct speech" (*feibang zhimu*), which stood just outside the court for the purpose of soliciting public criticism. They were replaced during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) by stone pillars, eventually becoming elaborately sculpted columns in traditional Chinese architectural style and a common sight on the grounds of imperial palaces. However, they still symbolize people's right to speak up against official injustice.

The Presence of Mao

The posthumous presence of Mao Zedong (1893–1976) is visually and physically prominent at the



Chinese students protesting in Tiananmen Square beneath a poster of Mao Zedong in the spring of 1989. (DAVID & PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS)

square. The official portrait of the former chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has hung on Tiananmen Gate since 1949. It is flanked by two slogans: "Long Live The Unity of the Peoples of the World!" and "Long Live The People's Republic of China!" Mao is also the only permanent resident of the square: in a mausoleum on the south side, the body of Mao lies in a crypt covered in a crystalline sarcophagus surrounding by flowers. The body is retired after public viewing hours to an earthquake-proof chamber deep in the bowels of the square. An Ancestral Hall of the Revolution contains relics of other first-generation revolutionary leaders like Liu Shaoqi (1898–1974), Zhu De (1886–1976), and Zhou Enlai (1898–1976).

In the center of the square, a marble obelisk known as *Monument to the People's Heroes* commemorates those who died for change and revolution in China from 1840. Every morning at daybreak a ceremonial guard facing it hoists the five-star red flag of the PRC. To

the east, the Museum of History and the Revolution has more often than not been "closed to the public" due to the constant vacillation of party policy and the rewriting of Chinese history. Instead, it has been used for exhibiting official and avant-garde artwork, contemporary fashion shows, and so forth. To its west is the Great Hall of the People, which, with its ten thousand seats, is the annual meeting site of the National People's Congress. All major plenums of the CCP and government are held there as well.

The Tiananmen Incident

On 15 April 1989, students gathered in Tiananmen Square to mourn the death of reformist CCP general secretary Hu Yaobang. When government officials refused their petitions at the Great Hall of the People, the students clashed with police. The party mouthpiece, *People's Daily*, published an editorial on 26 April accusing a "handful of plotters" of creating "turmoil" with the object of overthrowing the regime. The next day, 200,000 students from over forty universities marched to the square in protest. Hundreds, then thousands, of Beijing University students began a hunger strike on 13 May around the *Monument to the People's Heroes*. Premier Li Peng (b. 1928) and moderate officials affiliated with General Secretary Zhao Ziyang (b. 1919), who was later dismissed, failed to defuse the situation before the arrival of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev (b. 1931) for a summit with Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), China's paramount leader. The welcoming ceremony at the square for Gorbachev was abandoned: Chinese president Yang Shangkun (b. 1907) later gave Beijing's loss of face and international prestige as one reason for the crackdown. On 20 May, martial law was declared, but for two weeks the students, now joined by workers, reporters, army personnel, and civil servants—numbering at one point over 2 million—blocked the advance of 150,000 troops toward the city. On 3–4 June, army tanks rolled in, clearing the square and killing an undisclosed number of civilians.

The term "prodemocracy" would oversimplify description of a student-led movement that made a complex set of demands, which included dialogue with the government, crackdown on official corruption, vague political reforms, greater funding for education, a freer press, and so forth. The students used the word "democracy," but they were short on specifics. They stressed the need to improve the existing system, not to overthrow it. Many acknowledged party leadership and believed that an American-type democracy was unsuitable for China. It may also be argued that they were not sufficiently versed in liberal democratic traditions to represent their interests and aspirations.

They did, however, think that by playing to the international news media (over one thousand foreign journalists had converged in Beijing for the Deng-Gorbachev summit), they could gain Western sympathy and thereby advance their cause. This partly explains why on 30 May, students unveiled the ten-meter-high *Goddess of Democracy* statue in the square. Ironically, Deng himself had been misled by Premier Li to believe that the demonstrators wanted to overthrow the party government.

Officially orchestrated mass demonstrations were common in Tiananmen Square after 1949. Mao reviewed gatherings of Red Guards there during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). In the aftermath of the 1989 incident, the CCP organized Young Pioneers parades to show that the "revolutionary successors to the Communist enterprise" had taken back the square from protestors. Tens of thousands celebrate Labor Day (1 May) and National Day (1 October) with fireworks and floats. However, traditional group calisthenics like tai chi chuan, practiced daily in the square, have to an extent replaced the mass movements today.

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TIANJIN (1997 est. pop. 5.15 million). Located near the mouth of the Hai River 137 kilometers southeast of Beijing, Tianjin (Tientsin) is one of three centrally administered cities in the People's Republic of China. In 1997, the metropolitan population of Tianjin was

9 million, while the city proper had 5.15 million residents. Aside from its importance as a major port in northeast China, Tianjin is also a major industrial center, producing textiles, light and heavy machinery, automobiles, and cement.

During the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties, Tianjin was the northern terminus of the Grand Canal and an important transfer site for the shipment of grain northward to the imperial capital at Beijing. Under the terms of the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin that concluded the Second Opium War, the city was opened to foreign trade. Over the remainder of the nineteenth century, it grew to become the second busiest port in China after Shanghai. Nine foreign nations were granted concessions in Tianjin: France, Britain, Germany, the United States, Russia, Japan, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Belgium. During the turmoil of the Boxer Uprising (1899–1900), Tianjin sustained heavy damage at the hands of the international army that was sent to rescue the besieged foreign community in Beijing. By the early twentieth century, the Japanese community in Tianjin had emerged as one of the largest foreign communities in the port. Observers in the 1920s and 1930s noted that many of the Japanese businesses and traders in Tianjin were involved in the booming opium and narcotics trade. When the Japanese army invaded China in 1937, the city was seized and remained under occupation until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. During this conflict, Tianjin played an important role in the regional transportation and communications networks, as it was not only a port, but also a key railway town with access to the Grand Canal and Huang (Yellow) River.

During the Chinese Civil War (1947–1949), the Communists targeted Tianjin as an important urban center in the revolution. After the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, Tianjin's industrial base was enhanced under the new government's state-planned economy, and hundreds of new factories and manufacturing plants were established. With the move to a market economy in the 1980s, Tianjin became one of the first Special Economic Zones to be opened to foreign investment and trade along the Chinese coast. The development of the Bohai oil fields in the Yellow Sea during the 1990s resulted in a corresponding development of the petrochemical plants and refineries.

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TIBET (2002 est. pop. 2.7 million). Traditionally, Tibet comprises the central Asian landmass between the Himalayas in the south, the Kunlun range to the north and the Karakorams to the west, while in the east it is bounded by the region of the great rivers, the Chang (Yangtze), Mekong, and Salween. With most of its territory situated above 4,500 meters and its capital city, Lhasa, located at 3,607 meters, Tibet has been popularly termed "The Roof of the World."

While the extent to which Tibet was part of China in earlier periods is in dispute, Tibet has certainly been part of China since the Communist invasion in 1950, and exists today only in the much-reduced area of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) of China. A Tibetan Government-in-exile headed by the Dalai Lama (the spiritual and temporal leader of the Tibetan peoples), has been established in India, and there are also Tibetan exile communities in Switzerland and the United States. The Tibetan government continues to campaign for Tibetan self-determination and the ongoing Sino-Tibetan dispute invests facts and figures in regard to Tibet with important political implications. Historically, however, there has been a distinction between "political" Tibet, the area ruled by the Lhasa government prior to 1950, and "ethnic" or "cultural" Tibet, that area inhabited by mainly Buddhist peoples of Tibetan origin.

Geography

"Political" Tibet had an estimated population of between 1.8 and 3 million peoples, of whom around half





TIBET–CHINA RELATIONS IN THE 1840s

Although written over 150 years ago by two French missionaries, this account of relations between the Tibetans and Chinese could in major ways characterize relations in 2002.

The Chinese you find at Lha-Ssa are for the most part soldiers or officers of the tribunal; those who fix their residence in this town are very few in number. At all times the Chinese and the Thibetans have had relations more or less important: they frequently have waged war against each other, and have tried to encroach on one another's rights. The Tartar-Mantchou dynasty, as we have already remarked upon elsewhere, saw from the commencement of their elevation the great importance of conciliating the friendship of the Tale-Lama, whose influence is all powerful over the Mongol tribes; consequently they have never failed to retain at the court of Lha-Ssa two Grand Mandarins invested with the title of *Kin-Tchai* [*Ch'in-ch'ai*], which signifies ambassador, or envoy-extraordinary. The ostensible mission of these individuals is to present, under certain fixed circumstances, the homage of the Chinese Emperor to the Tale-Lama, and to lend him the aid of China in any difficulties he may have had with his neighbours. Such, to all appearance, is the purport of this permanent embassy; but in reality they are only in attendance to flatter the religious belief of the Mongols, and to bind them to the reigning dynasty, by making them believe that the government of Peking has great veneration for the divinity of the Buddha-La.

Source: Huc Evariste-Regis and Joseph Gabet. ([1851] 1987) *Travels in Tartary, Thibet and China, 1844–1846*. New York: Dover Publications, 185.

were semi-nomadic yak herders. (Today's TAR population includes a large number of Han Chinese immigrants, who may now constitute a majority of the population in the Tibetan capital of Lhasa.) The settled urban and agricultural populations were concentrated in the river valleys, particularly in the triangle formed by the major settlements of Lhasa, Shigatse (Xigaze) and Gyantse.

While situated at a latitude similar to Algeria, the altitude and location of the Tibetan plateau produces a cold and generally dry climate, although southeastern Tibet includes areas of tropical jungle. The western Tibetan area around the Gangdise (Kailas) mountain range and Lake Mapam Yumco (Manasarowar) is the source of four great rivers: the Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra, and the Sutlej, while Mount Everest, which is situated on the Nepal-Tibet border, is, at 8,848 meters the world's highest mountain.

Sedentary agriculture is limited by the climate. Barley is the major crop and in its roasted form as *tsampa* comprises, with yak meat and tea (imported from China), the staple diet of the majority of the population.

History

The origins of the Tibetan peoples appear to be linked to Central Asian nomadic tribes such as the Qiang and Yue Zhi (Tokharians). The first unified Tibetan state was a tribal confederacy formed in the seventh century under the rule of King Songtsen Gampo (or Srong-brtsan Sgam-po; c. 608–650 CE), who established his capital at Lhasa. The introduction of a Tibetan script and Buddhist teachings are among the innovations attributed to his reign. The dynasty he founded lasted until the assassination of King Langdharma, around the year 842.

Tibet was a formidable military power during this period, constantly engaged in warfare with neighboring powers and strong enough to sack the Chinese capital of Xi'an in 763. At its height the Tibetan empire reached as far west as Samarkand. Buddhism became increasingly important, particularly in the court, and the first Tibetan monastery was established at Samye around 779. But there was considerable opposition to the new faith among aristocratic factions associated with followers of the indigenous Tibetan belief system (later identified with the Bon faith but probably at that time an unsystematized tradition that included elements of divine kingship and sacrificial practice).

Buddhism became firmly established during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, when Indian Buddhist texts were systematically translated into the Tibetan language. Of the four major sects of Tibetan Buddhism that developed on the basis of these teachings, the Gelugpa sect eventually emerged as preeminent, and from the sixteenth century onwards, Tibet was ruled by a line of incarnate Gelugpa monks with the title of dalai lama. Religious factions in Tibet tended to seek Mongol or Chinese patronage, and China became increasingly involved in events in Tibet in the eighteenth century. Thus, from 1793 until 1911–1912, China was able to exert at least nominal suzerainty over Lhasa.

In 1903–1904, the British imperial Government of India dispatched a mission to Lhasa that forced the Tibetans to accept British representatives and effectively opened the country to Western ideas and influences. But despite some modernization in the next couple of decades, Tibet remained an essentially conservative religious society, strongly resistant to change. The thirteenth Dalai Lama (1876–1933), a strong nationalist leader, led Tibet to independence after the Chinese revolution in 1911, and Tibet survived as a de facto independent state until the Communist Chinese invasion in 1950. Her independence, however, was not officially recognized by any major powers, with China continuing to claim Tibet as part of her territory.

Since 1950, the Tibetans have suffered a continuous assault on their cultural identity, with tens or even hundreds of thousands of Tibetans killed, imprisoned, and tortured as a result of Chinese colonialist policies.

Culture

Despite the continuing existence of the Bon faith and its many cultural manifestations, the outstanding feature of Tibetan culture is generally considered to

be its unique form of Buddhism, a synthesis of the Mahayana and Tantric forms of the faith. Buddhist influence permeated virtually all aspects of traditional society. An estimated 20 percent of the male population were monks, and more than six thousand monasteries were distributed throughout the Tibetan cultural world. These were important political and economic centers as well as the guardians of Tibetan cultural and artistic expression. Outside of the monasteries, pilgrimage to sacred cities and mountains was a particularly significant religious expression for all classes of people.

A small aristocratic class enjoyed considerable privilege, although in comparison to their contemporaries in neighboring states, the Tibetan peasantry were tolerably well treated. Women too, enjoyed greater than average freedom, particularly in the social and economic spheres, although they were almost entirely excluded from religious power.

There were cultural influences from both China and India, but Tibetan culture was strikingly distinct from that of its neighbors. This was particularly marked in such areas as literary traditions (in particular the lengthy *Gesar of Ling* epic), language, and art and architecture, with buildings such as Lhasa's Potala Palace and Jokhang temple, as well as the regional monasteries, being of striking originality. Much of this culture has been destroyed in the TAR, but much has been remembered or preserved in exile.

Alex McKay

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TIBET—IMAGE IN THE MODERN WEST Tibet occupies a unique place in the Western imagination. Since Marco Polo (1254–1324) and other thirteenth-century Western travelers provided the first European accounts of Tibetan exotic practices such as necromancy (sorcery), the West has imagined Tibet as a mythical place of magic and mystery, a peaceful land preserving esoteric spiritual wisdom. It is commonly described by such colorful allusions as the "roof of the world," the "forbidden land," the "land of the lamas," or Shangri-La, as if the country were otherworldly, beyond ordinary description.

The reality behind the image of mythical Tibet remains partly obscured today, because of a combination of historical circumstances and human and commercial needs. But many Tibetans consider the mythical image of their country to be detrimental to their prospects of political self-determination.

Origins of the Tibetan Image

During the nineteenth century, the British empire in India spread northward to the borders of Tibet, but the Tibetan government, fearing a threat to the Buddhist religious system, refused to allow Europeans to enter. Tibet refused even to enter into diplomatic correspondence with the British, who resorted to the use of spies to obtain information about their northern neighbor.

Tibet's policy of isolation from European influences was assisted by its forbidding mountainous geography. Ironically this remoteness only succeeded in making the country more attractive to Westerners, many of whom made clandestine journeys into "forbidden" Tibet. The nineteenth-century Western romantic landscape aesthetic furthered the perception of Tibet as a pristine and beautiful land. Travelers such as the botanist Sir Joseph Dalton Hooker (1785–1865) promoted this image to the reading public in his 1855 *Himalayan Journals*, with their descriptions of the "deep dark blue of the heavens . . . the perfect and dazzling whiteness of the earthly scene." While the more prosaic observations of British intelligence agents were restricted to official circulation, these images flourished alongside more exotic depictions of customs such as the use of skulls for drinking cups.

Because the public knew so little about Tibet, it became the repository for numerous fantasies. One image was promoted by the esoteric writings of Helena Petrovna Blavatsky (1831–1891), the founder of the Theosophical movement, which was concerned with occult practices and spiritism. Blavatsky claimed that the Mahatmas (Sanskrit "great souls"), a race of spiritual mas-

ters dwelling in Tibet, were the source of psychic revelations that led to the development of Theosophy.

The Western discovery of Tibet's unique form of Buddhism, a blend of Indian Mahayana and Tantric beliefs with indigenous Tibetan elements, did little to dispel Blavatsky's fantasies. Tibetan religious systems were then poorly understood, and Western observers tended to focus on the colorful and esoteric aspects of Tibetan religion. Tibetan Buddhism was even termed Lamaism (which is not a Tibetan noun), a title ideologically framed to represent a faith that had degenerated from what Western scholarship classified as pure, original Buddhism and that was infused with demonic elements.

Contemporary Western perceptions of Tibet were affected by political factors, particularly at the beginning of the twentieth century, when fears of Russian influence in Lhasa led to the invasion of Tibet by British Indian forces. The imperial media at that time sought to portray the Tibetan system as a form of Oriental despotism, with the Tibetan people oppressed by a parasitic and corrupt clergy. These images coalesced with those promoted by Christian missionaries, who were forbidden to enter Tibet and who naturally produced negative images of Tibetan religion.

After the British forces reached Lhasa in 1904, the mystical heart of Tibet in the Western imagination was relocated to more remote places, eventually to hidden valleys (a concept known to the Tibetans themselves). The image of a timeless and tranquil hidden valley in the Himalayas was featured in James Hilton's best-selling 1933 novel *Lost Horizon*. Its depictions of a Himalayan paradise known as Shangri-La were imagined as Tibet, firmly fixing the otherworldly image in the Western mind.

The writings of the French traveler Alexandra David-Neel (1868–1969) and the translation of the *Tibetan Book of the Dead* in the 1920s were other significant elements in the construction of a mythical Tibet. This trend culminated in the works of Lobsang Rampa, which first appeared in the 1950s. Rampa's tales of his fantastic life in Tibet remain best-sellers, even though Rampa was soon revealed to be an Englishman, Cyril Hoskings (1910–1981), who had never been to Tibet.

Commercial and Political Factors

Commercial factors have also encouraged the production of colorful images of Tibet, with publishers responding to the continuing demand for accounts of the esoteric aspects of Tibetan culture. That demand seems to spring from a human need for fantasies of



THE DALAI LAMA SEEKS HELP IN THE WEST

The text that follows is of a letter sent by the Dalai Lama to people in the United States in January 2002 as part of a packet seeking support for Tibetan independence from China.

Dear Friend,

I would like to commend the International Campaign for Tibet for the tremendous contribution it has made in gathering support for the cause of Tibet. ICT has been at the forefront of raising the Tibet issue. On behalf of the Tibetan people, I extend my heartfelt appreciation to ICT and its members and all of the people of goodwill who have helped our cause.

It is always a great pleasure for me to come to the United States. This country represents the universal concepts of liberty and justice for so many people around the world. It is here that we come to seek support for our cause. And with the help of dedicated individuals, it is here that we have found genuine support through the American people.

I have always tried to find a solution through direct and honest discussions with the Chinese. It is my sincere belief that if the concerned parties were to meet and discuss their future with an open mind and a sincere desire to find a satisfactory and just solution, a break-through could be achieved. We must all exert ourselves to be reasonable and wise, and to meet in a spirit of frankness and understanding.

With my prayers and best wishes.

place and from the sense that this imagined Tibet might possess the cure for the perceived ills of Western society.

There are also political aspects to the selection and continuing vitality of Tibet as the repository of fantasies. One scholar has noted that Tibet was fascinating because it was unknown; after Europeans had colonized a faraway land, it always became uninteresting.

But during the first half of the twentieth century, there was also a political purpose behind these images. After the Tibetans had expelled the last Chinese officials in 1912, British India became Tibet's main patron. In contrast to the images they had promoted earlier when Tibet was deemed hostile, the British now sought to promote the idea of a strong, unified Tibetan state with a distinct identity separate from that of China. Tibet's popular image helped to promote its separate and unique status and to strengthen the country, and while the British now provided more realistic

information on Tibet to the informed public, they made no attempt to counter the politically valuable mythical image.

The Consequences of the Image

There are many "Tibets" in the Western imagination today, the reality blending with the layers of romantic images. New images have emerged in recent years, with constructions of an environmentally conscious, feminist, nonviolent Tibet becoming increasingly widespread. These images are promoted by both the Tibetan refugee community and their Westerner supporters.

Today Tibet enjoys widespread recognition largely as a result of its many colorful associations, with much of its culture now within the realm of popular Western culture. But while the mythical image of Tibet helps the country retain the moral high ground in its struggle with China, the stereotypes not only deny the

historical realities of Tibet, they deny Tibetan agency and obscure the very real Tibetan struggle for political self-determination.

Alex McKay

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TIBETAN UPRISING Tibet, currently an autonomous region in southwestern China whose status has long been disputed, enjoyed de facto, if not legally recognized, independence during the 1913–1950 period. The Chinese, however, claimed Tibet as a part of their territory, and the Communist takeover in China in October 1949 was an obvious threat to Tibetan self-determination, as the Communists were openly prepared to use military force to take over Tibet. After failed attempts to arrange negotiations on neutral territory, Chinese military forces invaded Tibet in October 1950 and quickly succeeded in conquering the largely demilitarized Tibetan state.

During the 1950s, Chinese policies designed to transform traditional Tibetan society and to integrate Tibet into the Communist system were applied with increasing force. As a consequence, Tibetan resistance to the assault on their religion and culture rapidly increased, culminating in the nationalist revolt of 1959. But the Tibetans were vastly outnumbered and ill equipped for an armed struggle. Their resistance was crushed, and the fourteenth Dalai Lama (b. 1935), the spiritual and temporal leader of Tibet, was forced to flee into exile in India. Since that time, China has continued to rule Tibet through military force, while the Dalai Lama remains the head of the Tibetan government-in-exile in India.

Events in 1950–1958

In January 1950, when the Indian government formally recognized the new Communist government in

Beijing, the Chinese informed India of their intention to peacefully "liberate" Tibet. To the Communists, the Tibetans were an oppressed people at the mercy of a feudal elite, and they expected to be welcomed as liberators. When Sino-Tibetan negotiations failed, the Chinese forces launched their full-scale military invasion of Tibet on 7 October 1950. An appeal to the United Nations went unanswered due to Tibet's ambiguous status under international law. The Tibetan state maintained only a small army of around eight thousand men, and within days, Chamdo, the main Tibetan administrative center in Kham (eastern Tibet), fell to the invaders.

The province of Kham was home to the Tibetan-speaking Khampa peoples, who, while loyal to the Dalai Lama as head of their Tibetan Buddhist faith, enjoyed considerable autonomy and did not necessarily view themselves as subjects of either Lhasa or Beijing. The Khampas had a strong martial tradition, and the Kham region became the center of armed opposition to China.

After the Chinese invasion, the Tibetan National Assembly requested that the young Dalai Lama assume full secular power in Tibet, several years earlier than planned. The Chinese, meanwhile, forced a Tibetan delegation to sign the Sino-Tibetan Agreement of 1951 (known as the "Seventeen Point Agreement") by which Beijing absorbed Tibet into its empire. Guarantees of Tibetan autonomy and religious freedoms in that agreement were soon breached as China began to absorb the Tibetan administration and usurp the functions of the Tibetan government. Increasing numbers of Chinese soldiers and settlers moved into Tibet, particularly after the completion in 1954 of a drivable road to Lhasa through eastern Tibet. Many of the Chinese Communists had genuinely expected to be greeted as liberators by the people they saw as feudal masses; they were surprised by Tibetan opposition to their presence.

In 1954 the Dalai Lama traveled to Beijing, where he met the Chinese leader, Mao Zedong (1893–1976), and in 1956 he was permitted to travel to India for the 2,500th anniversary of the enlightenment of the Buddha celebrations. While there, he was advised by the Indian government to accept Chinese control of Tibet, and, with the Chinese hinting at compromise, the Dalai Lama returned to Tibet in the hope of reaching a solution through discussion with the Communist leadership.

The years 1955 and 1956 saw a rapid acceleration of the transition to communism throughout China, culminating in the disastrous "Great Leap Forward" policy in 1958. Within Tibet, there was an accelerated



Tibetans living in Darjeeling, India, mark the Tibetan Uprising in a march in 1989. They display banners calling for the re-establishment of Tibetan rule in Tibet. (ALISON WRIGHT/CORBIS)

program of collectivization, the widespread institution of "class struggle," particularly against monastic authorities, and attempts made to make the large Tibetan nomadic population sedentary.

These policies brought a strong Tibetan reaction. By 1956 an organized guerrilla movement, the Chushi Gandruk ("Four Rivers, Six Ranges") was active throughout eastern Tibet. The Dalai Lama's policy of nonviolence meant that he was unable to offer his personal support to the guerrillas, and he continued to attempt to mediate a peaceful solution to the crisis until his departure from Tibet. But many elements of the Tibetan government supported the guerrillas in their struggle, which was then primarily defending Tibetan Buddhism and the Tibetan social system rather than explicitly trying to build a nationalist movement.

Tibetan resistance to the Chinese Communists attracted the attention of the intelligence services of various countries, including the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). By 1958 significant amounts of CIA aid began to reach the guerrillas.

Uprising of 1959

By 1959 the disturbed conditions throughout eastern Tibet had led to a large influx of refugees entering Lhasa, which exacerbated food shortages caused by the large numbers of Chinese troops stationed there. By early March of that year, the population of

Lhasa was further swelled by the large crowds who gathered for the Monlam Chenmo (Tibetan New Year) celebrations; traditionally an unruly period in which the monastic powers dominated the secular structures of state.

Greatly adding to the unstable situation in the Tibetan capital was the invitation to attend a theatrical performance issued by the Chinese military commander in Lhasa to the Dalai Lama. On 9 March the Tibetan leader was instructed by the Chinese to come to the military barracks the following day without his usual armed escort. This invitation was interpreted by the Tibetan public as a Chinese attempt to seize the Dalai Lama.

A large crowd, estimated at around thirty thousand people (Lhasa's population in 1950 was around twenty thousand), gathered around the Norbu Lingka, the summer palace of the Dalai Lama. Their primary aim was to prevent their leader from taking up the Chinese invitation, but the apparently spontaneous demonstrations took on a nationalist character because the crowds also began to protest against the Chinese presence in Lhasa and to demand Tibetan independence. A showdown became inevitable.

On 17 March Chinese troops fired several artillery shells into the grounds of the Norbu Lingka, apparently in an attempt to frighten the Tibetans into submission. That night, a prearranged plan was put into

operation whereby the Dalai Lama, disguised as an ordinary Tibetan soldier, was smuggled out of the palace. His escape was kept secret for several days, and with a small group of his supporters he succeeded in making his way south through the mountains to India. An estimated eighty to a hundred thousand Tibetans joined him in India, and a Tibetan government-in-exile was established at Dharmasala in north India.

Meanwhile, in Lhasa the Chinese commenced a full-scale military crackdown. Exact figures are difficult to ascertain, but thousands of Tibetans were killed or executed in the ensuing days, with Chinese army intelligence reports admitting that their forces had "eliminated" 87,000 of their opponents in Lhasa and surrounding areas in March–October 1959 alone.

Coalescence of Resistance

A sense of Tibetan national identity was greatly stimulated by the Communist invasion of Tibet and in the eyes of the Tibetans and much of the world, the events of March 1959 were a nationalist uprising against the rule of a foreign power. Tibetan resistance subsequently coalesced around the figure of the Dalai Lama, whose insistence on nonviolent resistance has meant that the history of Tibetan armed resistance to China has been largely forgotten. But the events of 1959 remain a historical division between traditional and modern Tibet.

Alex McKay

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TIBETANS The people of Tibet inhabit the Tibetan Plateau, the highest continuous landmass in the world, which averages over 3,500 meters in height, including the Himalayas in the south, the Zangbo (or Brahmaputra) River Valley, and the northern Chang-



THE TIBETAN CAMPAIGN FOR INDEPENDENCE

The following is a statement prepared by the Dalai Lama and sent to individuals in the United States with a request that they sign it and send it to Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Affirmation of Religious Freedom to Secretary of State Colin Powell

WHEREAS . . . The people of Tibet, led by the Dalai Lama, are struggling to maintain a magnificent and ancient spiritual culture on Earth; and,

"WHEREAS . . . The Tyranny that has driven more than one hundred thousand Tibetans from their homeland and threatened the existence of Tibetan culture is an affront to all humankind; and,

"WHEREAS . . . Confronting the issue of Tibet is a basic issue of morality, a defining action for the human community.

"THEREFORE . . . I Affirm my deep commitment to religious and spiritual liberty by calling on you to take immediate and strategic action to save Tibet's religious and cultural heritage.

Signed _____

thang Desert. There are between 4 and 6 million Tibetans, of whom some 2.4 million live in the area of the present Tibet Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China. There are also substantial populations in the Chinese provinces of Yunnan, Gansu, and Sichuan and in Qinghai, formerly the Tibetan province of Amdo. Since 1959, there have also been some 100,000 Tibetan exiles in India and the southern Himalayas and small refugee populations in Western countries.

The Tibetans are basically of East Asian type, with considerable variations. The nomads of the east, the Khampas, are tall and aquiline featured, while the people of the central provinces of U and Tsang are smaller and have high cheekbones. Several dialects of one language family, the Tibeto-Burman, are spoken, with the Lhasa dialect providing the cultivated norm and classical Tibetan being used for scriptures.

The Tibetan way of life has been based on the harsh realities of geography, with nomadic animal husbandry,

particularly the yak; agriculture, with barley as a staple; and trade, frequently mixed with pilgrimage, being important. Tibetans tend to be instantly recognizable, with a traditional coat, or *chuba*, for the men and an apron in three vertical sections of colorful horizontal stripes for the women.

The consciousness of the Tibetans as a single people is based on the unity of their civilization, linked inseparably to the Buddhist religion, which pervades every aspect of everyday life. Tibetan homes have a prayer room with a scroll painting of a guardian deity with which the family is linked and statues of Buddhist saints. Tibetans are great pilgrimage goers and constantly utter sacred formulas, such as *om mani padme hum*, an invocation of Tibet's protective Buddha, Chenrezi, at their daily tasks, as well as inscribing them on prayer flags, walls, or stones.

Since Tibet's incorporation into the People's Republic of China (1951), the status of Tibetans has become controversial. China claims that Tibet has been part of China since the thirteenth century. It has attempted to control Buddhism and has launched ideological campaigns against Tibetan claims of separate nationhood, insisting that Tibetans are one of fifty-five minority nationalities in China. Tibetans in exile, led by the fourteenth Dalai Lama (b. 1935) from Dharamsala in India, affirm a distinct national identity based on separate history, ethnicity, and culture and claim that China has systematically abused the human rights of the Tibetans.

Michael Kowalewski

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TIBETO-BURMAN LANGUAGES Tibeto-Burman languages constitute one of the two branches of the large Sino-Tibetan family of languages (the other branch, the Sinitic languages, make up the dialects and varieties of Chinese languages). Languages of this family are spoken over a vast area of South and Southeast Asia, from the Karakoram mountains in the northwest to the isthmus of Malakka in the southeast. Speakers of various Tibeto-Burman languages are found in the Himalayan regions of Pakistan and India

(Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Sikkim), the Indian northeast (Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Mizoram, Tripura, Manipur, Meghalaya) and adjacent regions of Bangladesh, in Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, and China (Tibet, Qinghai, Gansu, Yunnan, Sichuan).

In terms of the number of single languages belonging to the family, the Tibeto-Burman stock is, in Asia, second only to Austronesian. Though the principal subgroups of Tibeto-Burman are largely established, a comprehensive and uncontroversial subgrouping cannot yet be elaborated, mainly because we do not possess linguistically adequate descriptions for the better part of the several hundred single languages that make up the Tibeto-Burman stock.

Overview

The following classificatory overview assumes Tibeto-Burman to consist of six primary subgroups: Bodic, Baric, Burmic, Karenic, Qiangic, and possibly Rungic. Given that the linguistic classification of Tibeto-Burman is, at the time of writing, still a matter of considerable debate and controversy, it should be borne in mind that different classifications exist, and the one adopted here does not claim to be the only scientifically adequate one. (Most controversies surround the Southeast Asian branches of Tibeto-Burman.)

Bodic Languages One way of classifying Tibeto-Burman languages is to divide them into those spoken in the indospheric area (that is, the area under the cultural influence of India) and those spoken in the sinosphere (that is, the area under the cultural influence of China). This division is independent of purely linguistically based subdivisions of the stock and does not necessarily coincide with linguistic subdivisions. Using this division, we can say that Bodic (from Tibetan *bod* = "Tibet") languages are spoken in the indospheric part of the Tibeto-Burman area. Bodic may be further subdivided into the variants of Tibetan proper, Kanauri, Tamangic, Newari (these four are often taken together as the Bodish subgroup), Kiranti (Rai), Kham-Magar, and Bahing or Vayu (the latter three are often grouped together as the East Himalayish branch of Bodic).

Tibetan dialects, the first of the subgroupings of Bodic languages, are often classified according to their respective behavior regarding the preservation or simplification of the often very complicated consonant clusters found at the beginning of words in the old written language. Thus, archaic dialects (with some or most of these clusters intact) are opposed to innovative dialects where the onset of words has been simplified, mostly to the degree of allowing not more than one

word-initial consonant. This feature corresponds largely to that of tonality, with innovative dialects showing more tonal contrasts than archaic ones, which may be marginally tonal or even completely atonal. Since archaic dialects are found mostly on the fringes of the Tibetan-speaking area, in the far west and far northeast, respectively, and archaisms generally do not allow classifying the dialects of a language (or the members of a family) in a historically meaningful way, the following enumeration of the most important Tibetan dialects—some of which would certainly justify treatment as independent languages—is mainly geographically based (the numbers of speakers are, where stated, approximate only): The Northeastern and Eastern groups of dialects are mostly referred to as Amdo (in Qinghai, and parts of Gansu) and Kham (Qinghai, Yunnan, Sichuan, eastern Tibet), respectively. Both include a large number of subdialects, which are mostly, but not invariably, rich in clusters and nontonal (i.e. "archaic"). Western Tibetan (mostly "archaic") is made up mainly of Balti (400,000 speakers in Northeastern Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir, India), Purik (120,000 speakers in Kashmir), and Ladakhi (50,000 speakers in Ladakh and Jammu and Kashmir). The dialects of Lahul and Spiti (Himachal Pradesh) are described as "transitional" with respect to the archaic-innovative dichotomy. Central Tibetan dialects include the prestige variety and lingua franca for all of Tibet, Uke, (*dBus-skad*) or Tibetan proper, the best-known variety of which is the dialect of Lhasa. Tibetan dialects in Nepal are mostly innovative but sometimes transitional, the most important ones being the varieties of Dolpo and Mustang (*gLo-skad*) in the west, and Sherpa, Jirel, and Kagate in the east. Southern Tibetan includes the dialects spoken in Sikkim and Bhutan, mostly innovative, with Dzongkha being the national lingua franca of the Kingdom of Bhutan.

Tibetan has a long tradition as a literary language, beginning in the seventh century CE. Today, it continues to be the written medium of the Tibetan community in the Tibetan Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China, as well as of the Tibetan diaspora. In Bhutan, Dzongkha is an officially written language; Ladakhi and Balti, too, are occasionally written, Ladakhi in Tibetan script, sometimes with reformed spellings. For Balti, a special script, based on the Perso-Arabic alphabet, was designed in the early twentieth century.

Kanauri (often grouped together with Tibetan into a Tibeto-Kanauri group) languages include Kanauri (25,000 speakers), Kanashi (1,000 speakers), and Bunan (2,000 speakers), spoken in Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, India.

Almoran languages are Byangsi, Chaudangsi, Darmiya, and others, all of which are spoken in western Nepal and across the border in India, by about 2,000 speakers each.

Tamangic languages are all spoken within the boundaries of Nepal: Tamang (500,000 speakers), scattered over almost all of Nepal, but centered around the Kathmandu valley; Thakali (5,000 speakers), in the valley of the river Kali-Gandaki, Chantyal, western Nepal (Myagdi district); Gurung (150,000 speakers), in western Nepal (Gorkha and Kaski districts); and the languages of the villages of Manang, Nar, and Tsuk in the Mustang district.

Newari (500,000 speakers) is spoken in the Kathmandu valley (Kathmandu, Bhaktapur, Patan), where it continues to be the most common spoken language, despite the fact that Indo-Aryan Nepali is the state language of Nepal. Newari has been written at least since the seventeenth century.

The Kiranti (or Rai) languages are located in the eastern hills of Nepal, up to the Sikkimese border. The best known languages are Bantawa, Lohorung (10,000 speakers), Limbu (200,000 speakers), Thulung (20,000 speakers), and Chamling. Some investigators include the Kham-Magar languages (Kham, 25,000 speakers in western Nepal; Magar, 500,000 speakers to the south of Thakali) and Bahing or Vayu (3,000 speakers in eastern Nepal) in Kiranti. The theory of a closer relationship between Kiranti and Newari ("Mahakiranti") is also advocated.

Baric Languages The geographic center of the Baric branch of Tibeto-Burman (also called the Kamarupan branch; not all investigators agree that the languages subsumed under either term constitute a valid first-level branch of Tibeto-Burman) is northeastern India, Myanmar, and parts of southern China. The Konyak-Bodo-Garo subgroup includes the Konyak languages (for example, Ao, 80,000 speakers in Nagaland; Konyak proper, 95,000 speakers in Assam and Nagaland; and many more languages) and the Bodo-Garo languages (Bodo, 1,000,000 speakers in Assam and West Bengal; Garo, 500,000 speakers in western Assam and 90,000 speakers in northern Bangladesh; Dimasa, 70,000 speakers in the Cachar hills, Assam). The Kuki-Chin-Naga subgroup is further subdivided into Kuki-Chin (with 700,000 speakers of a great number of Chin dialects in Myanmar, as well as in Assam, Manipur, and Nagaland), and Kuki languages such as Anal, Lushei, and possibly Lepcha, together totaling about 412,000 speakers). Of the Naga languages, which are centered in Nagaland (Konyak languages are sometimes, erroneously, also referred to as "Naga,"

obviously for purely ethnographic reasons), the better-known languages are Sema (65,000 speakers in Nagaland and Assam), Mao (60,000 speakers in Manipur and Nagaland), and Angami (40,000 speakers in Manipur and Nagaland). The Mikir-Meithei group consists of Mikir and Meithei (Mikir with more than 1,000,000 speakers in northeastern India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar; Meithei with 200,000 speakers in Assam). Abor-Miri-Dafla or Mirish languages include, among others, Adi or Miri (400,000 speakers in Assam), Lhoba (200,000 speakers in Arunachal Pradesh), and Nisi (30,000 speakers in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh). Mru (60,000 speakers in Myanmar's Arakan hills) may constitute an independent subbranch of Baric, as may Jinghpo or Kachin (600,000 speakers in Kachin State, Myanmar, and adjacent regions of China). Kachin has alternatively been classified as Burmic or as an independent first-level branch of Tibeto-Burman, Kachinic.

Burmic Languages Burmic, or Burmese-Lolo, languages are widespread in Southeast Asia, namely in Myanmar, parts of Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, and south China (Yunnan). They can be clearly subdivided into a Burmish and a Lolo subbranch. Burmish languages may be further grouped into Northern Burmish (Achang, 20,000 speakers in western Yunnan; Atsi, 80,000 speakers in Yunnan who are officially part of the Jinghpo nationality; Maru, 100,000 speakers in Kachin state, Myanmar) and Southern Burmish, which consists mainly of Burmese and its varieties. Burmese is the national language of Myanmar, spoken by more than 20,000,000 speakers, and has been a literary language since the twelfth century. The written standard is focused on the dialect of the Irrawaddy valley. The Lolo subbranch consists of Northern Lolo and Southern Lolo. Northern Lolo in turn includes Lisu (more than 600,000 speakers in Yunnan, Sichuan, and Northern Thailand), Yi (more than 3,000,000 speakers in Sichuan, Yunnan, and southeastern Tibet; this language is also referred to as Lolo, but the term is nowadays regarded as derogatory), and Naxi or Moso (250,000 speakers in Yunnan and Sichuan). Southern Lolo includes Akha (350,000 speakers in Yunnan, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam), Hani (more than 500,000 speakers in Yunnan), and Lahu (more than 500,000 speakers in Yunnan, Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos). There are also a number of clearly Loloish languages that could not be assigned to either group. One example is Tujia, spoken by 200,000 speakers in Hunan and Hubei, China.

Karenic Languages Karenic languages, sometimes viewed not as a part of Tibeto-Burman but as a higher-level grouping, coordinate with Tibeto-Burman

within Sino-Tibetan and are spoken on both sides of the Thailand-Myanmar frontier (notably in Myanmar's Karen state); the two most important varieties are Pwo Karen (1,300,000 speakers in both countries but mostly in Myanmar) and Sgaw Karen (2,000,000 speakers, of whom 300,000 live in Thailand).

Qiangic, Rungic, and Other Languages The remaining languages and small groups have not been assigned to any of the above-mentioned groups so far, and their ultimate place in the family remains open. These are Qiang(ic), with 130,000 speakers in western Sichuan; Nungish (including Rawang, with 100,000 speakers in Kachin state, Myanmar, Tibet, and Yunnan; and Nung, with 6,000 speakers in Yunnan); Primi, or Pumi, with 25,000 speakers in north-west Yunnan; and Gyarong (sometimes viewed as another Bodish language), with 100,000 speakers in Sichuan. The latter three groups have been tentatively united into a Rungish branch of Tibeto-Burman.

The Bai or Minjia language, spoken by more than 1,000,000 speakers in northern Yunnan, has resisted most attempts to classify it linguistically; it is sometimes viewed as a language isolate or as another Sinitic language, but the view that it forms an independent first-level branch of Tibeto-Burman ("Baic") is gaining ground.

Typology, Tone, and Morphology

Though the genetic unity of the family is clearly established, the different branches of Tibeto-Burman show a considerable degree of typological diversity. In terms of word order, most Tibeto-Burman languages are verb-final, with the notable exception of Karenic, where the basic order is subject-verb-object, as in Chinese.

The mainly culturally motivated division of Tibeto-Burman languages into sinospheric and indospheric languages has some linguistic corollaries, in that the former languages conform more to the linguistic type of Southeast Asian languages, or, for that matter, Chinese, in possessing few if any morphological markers attached to lexical roots (the so-called isolating typology widespread in the area), whereas some languages of the Kiranti group (in the indosphere) rank among the morphologically most complex languages of Asia.

Lexical tone is widespread in the family (a system of two register tones may be reconstructible for the protolanguage), but actual tone systems differ widely, and some of them, especially the systems found in the more central varieties of Tibetan, represent late and secondary developments from a nontonal stage. The general pat-

tern to be observed is that tonal systems tend to replace earlier contrasts of voicing of root-initial consonants (with initial voiceless consonants yielding high tone, and voiced consonants leading low tone, a phenomenon particularly observable in Bodish languages), but numerous details remain to be worked out. In Southeast Asia, some Tibeto-Burman languages are particularly rich in tonal contrasts, such as Nasu (Loloish), which has seven tones, but nontonal languages occur as well, such as Northern Qiang (the closely related Southern Qiang, by contrast, has six phonemic tones).

An important typological parameter in Tibeto-Burman morphological systems is that of person agreement of verbs. The range of possibilities exploited in Tibeto-Burman languages reaches from completely apersonal verbs, over verbal systems with subject agreement only, to systems that signal both subject and object person in the morphological verb complex.

A language like Thakali (Tamangic), for example, shows no person agreement at all, as in *nga tru-si mu* "I am sitting," *ki tru-si mu* "you are sitting," *the tru-si mu* "s/he is sitting" (*nga, ki, the* are the personal pronouns, *tru* the verbal root "to sit," *-si mu* a nonfinite, participle-like verbal form called a "converb," made final by the copula *mu*), where only the different personal pronouns serve to distinguish between subject persons. Byangsi, a language of the Almorán group, has a person-agreement system in verbs that shows, as in many European languages, the person of the subject in the verb. Thus *zage-ye* "I eat," *zage-no* "you eat," *zage-n* "she/he eats." In some Kiranti languages, transitive verbs encode the person of the object as well. For example, Chamling: *ta-tyok-u* "you saw him/her," *ta-tyok-a* "she/he saw you," *tyok-u-m-ka* "we saw him/her" (where *tyok-* is the verbal root "to see," *ta-* the marker of the second person, *-u* the third-person object, and *-m-ka* the first-person exclusive; note that third person is marked only when in object function). The actual verbal agreement paradigms of Kiranti languages are much more complicated than this fragment can illustrate and pose considerable problems of synchronic and diachronic interpretation. Opinions are still divided on whether the complex agreement patterns of the Kiranti type represent the original state of proto-Tibeto-Burman or, rather, are secondary developments of these languages, possibly under the influence of Munda (Austroasiatic) languages, which are spoken further south in India.

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TIGER The tiger (*Panthera tigris*) is one of the world's strongest and most endangered creatures. The largest member of the cat family, it inhabits the swamps, forests, and grasslands of Asia. The tiger's coat of thick fur can vary from yellow to dark orange-brown. Tigers are the only striped cats and the pattern of each tiger's dark vertical stripes is unique (like a human fingerprint), providing excellent camouflage. White tigers, with brown stripes and blue eyes, are very rare in the wild. Tigers have sharp teeth and extremely powerful jaws, neck, and limbs. They can run very fast for short periods of time and leap huge distances. They are also strong swimmers and can cross wide rivers. Tigers are generally about three meters long, including tail. An adult male tiger weighs 180 to 250 kilograms.

All tigers belong to the same species, but there are several subspecies. The best known are the Siberian (Amur) tiger (*Panthera tigris altaica*), which lives in the forests of the Russian Far East; the Bengal tiger (*Panthera tigris tigris*), which lives in the grasslands and forests of India, Myanmar (Burma), and the Himalayas;



A pair of Bengal tigers photographed in c. 1994. (DAVID A. NORTHCOTT/CORBIS)



MANAS WILDLIFE PRESERVE— WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Designated by UNESCO as both a World Heritage Site (1985) and a World Heritage Site in Danger (1992), the Manas Wildlife Preserve is still a vitally important refuge for many animals including the majestic Bengal tiger.

and the Sumatran tiger (*Panthera tigris sumatrae*), which inhabits the Indonesian island of Sumatra.

The tiger is a carnivore that usually hunts alone and at night. Its prey ranges from large mammals, such as deer and wild pigs, to monkeys, frogs, and fish. Prey is usually killed with a strong bite to the neck. Occasionally young elephants and rhinoceroses are attacked. The killing of cattle and other livestock sometimes brings tigers into conflict with people. Rarely do tigers attack and kill people.

Tigers are solitary animals and each tiger has its own territory. Male territories often overlap with female territories. Cubs are usually born in litters of two or three and stay with their mother for two years. A tiger's life span is about twenty years.

Tigers are critically endangered. Very few tigers remain in the wild, and several subspecies, such as the Javanese tiger (*Panthera tigris sondaica*), are believed to already be extinct. Tigers are illegally killed for their bones, which are used in traditional Chinese medicines, and for their coats. They also suffer from the effects of deforestation and habitat destruction. Many zoos have set up breeding programs, and India and Nepal have designated special tiger reserves.

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TIGRIS RIVER The Tigris (biblical name, Hiddekel; in Arabic, Dijlah; in Turkish, Dicle) is one of the two great rivers of Mesopotamia (present-day Iraq). Approximately 1,900 kilometers long, it rises in

southeastern Turkey at Lake Hazar in the Taurus Mountains and flows southeast for about 450 kilometers toward the city of Cizre, to form a 32-kilometer border between Turkey and Syria before entering Iraq. Unlike its twin the Euphrates River, the Tigris flows directly toward the Mesopotamian plain to join the Euphrates at the town of al-Qurnah, in southeast Iraq, whence it forms the Shatt al-Arab, 193 kilometers long, before it discharges into the Persian Gulf.

Along its upper course, the Tigris flows swiftly in well-defined channels through the gorges of east Anatolia and the Syrian and Iraqi plateaus. Numerous left-bank tributaries augment its water during its passage through Iraq. Downstream from the city of Mosul, the Tigris is joined by its two main tributaries, the Greater Zab and the Lesser Zab, originating in the eastern Zagros Mountains. Close to Samarra, the river enters the head of the Mesopotamian alluvial plain and begins to meander slowly toward the gulf. Here the Tigris receives water from other tributaries, which together with the two Zab streams provide more than 50 percent of its discharge. The flow of the Tigris, however, varies considerably, and its flow decreases rapidly along its lower course through seepage, evaporation, and intensive water use.

Losing velocity, the river deposits its silt and raises its bed level above the surrounding alluvial plain. It becomes prone to its renowned seasonal overflows and to historically altering its course. To avert the danger of inundations, in addition to expanding irrigation schemes and generating power, Iraq has constructed a system of dams and barrages on the river. Over its remaining course toward the gulf, the main stream of the river is divided into several channels 320 kilometers south of Baghdad, which irrigate the rice-growing areas and feed into the extensive marshes formed along the southern part of the plain.

Along the Tigris emerged the earliest centers of urban civilizations sustained by ancient waterworks. On its banks stood some of the great Mesopotamian cities, including the Assyrian capitals of Nineveh, Calah, and Ashur; the Hellenistic city of Seleucia; the capital of the Sasanids, Ctesiphon; and the Abbasid capitals of Baghdad and Samarra.

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
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TILE WORK—CENTRAL ASIA Glazed bricks with painted or painted-and-molded designs had been used as early as the thirteenth century BCE, as architectural decorations in the Elamite kingdom in modern Iran; Assyrian royal architecture also made use of such glazed brick decorations, although the most elaborate known examples are undoubtedly Nebuchadnezzar's (604–562 BCE) vast constructions in Babylon and the palace at Susa, the capital of the Achaemenid Persian dynasty (559–358 BCE).

Tile work became a decorative element in the architecture of Central Asia with the establishment of Islamic culture in that region, particularly on buildings of brick. The use of embellishment incorporating geometric and vegetal patterns, harmoniously balanced colors, and elaborate script decoration is an architectural achievement unique to the Islamic tradition.

In the tenth century, the Abbasid dynasty (749/750–1258) commissioned scientists to develop a white glaze that imitated the appearance of Chinese porcelain over the local brown clays. The result was tin glaze, considered very precious and used on royal dishes. This lead-based glaze was combined with the following metal oxides to produce colors: tin for white, copper for turquoise and green, cobalt for deep blue, iron for brown and yellow, manganese for purple mauve, and combined oxides for black. Tiles were incorporated into architecture in the late medieval period. In Central Asia under the Seljuks, Mongols, Timurids, and Khanates, buildings were decorated with precious glazed tiles to provide both body and soul with a soothing environment. Designs evolved from individual colored shapes as in mosaics; textured clay tiles were carved and glazed; eventually, square tiles with patterns extending beyond the individual squares were produced. Under the Abbasids, when Persian domination extended to Central Asia, tile decoration was again introduced to this area.

In Islamic architecture in Central Asia, tile decoration adorned public buildings, mausoleums, and royal residences. At first, turquoise-colored tiles were used as contrast with the terra-cotta color of the bricks; in eastern Islamic tradition, turquoise represents good luck and heaven. In time, *eyvans* (open halls around mosque courtyards), minarets (prayer towers), *minbars* (pulpits), domes, and complete walls of mausoleums, *madrassas* (religious schools), and mosques were decorated with tile work. Patterns could be created by using individual mosaic pieces of different colors to form



Detail of an Islamic tile work geometric motif from Samarqand, Uzbekistan. (GERARD DEGEORGE/CORBIS)

extremely complex geometric or floral designs that were intertwined to magnify a text or floral, astrological, or geometric themes.

Colored patterns were achieved by various methods. Mosaics were glazed pieces cut after firing; a colored pattern was arranged face down and covered with plaster, with reinforced sticks embedded into the mixture. Such panels could be lifted and attached to a façade. *Cuerda seca* (Spanish, "dry line") technique allowed the separation of color on a tile in chambers segregated by a grease line. Another method of coloring tiles was to use thick tin glaze with color additions painted on the unfired surface. Tin glaze is highly viscous, and colors stay fixed. Golds and red luster (a metallic glaze developed in Seljuk pottery) painted onto the tin-glazed fired surfaces required an additional firing to achieve a brilliant gold color. Designs could also be painted onto small tiles of various shapes. Textured patterns sometimes formed elaborate sections of columnar structures bordering doorways and accentuating the colored themes of a building.

The building process *banna'i*, developed under Timur (1336–1405) and his successors, created patterns of glazed brick ends in blue, white, or black, contrasting with the unglazed terra-cotta building material. Further color was added by using light blue, white, purple, black, green, and amber on a field of dark blue. *Thuluth* and *kufic* scripts decorated vertical and horizontal borders. The scripts often quoted from the Qur'an, sometimes passages related to the function of the particular building, or they acknowledged a donor of the building. When whole surfaces were adorned with geometric patterns that grew in algebraic complexity but had no central focus or theme, this technique reflected a philosophical aspect of Islamic design; such decoration was conducive to meditation or expressed a spiritual concept. Patterns were sometimes

based on the cycles of the moon and were amplified with subdivisions and large areas of visual unity by using color.

The best place to study architectural tiles as they were used up to the fifteenth century is at the city of Samarqand in Uzbekistan. Here one can observe every technique used in tile making: glazed terra-cotta, polychrome glazed carved tiles, *cuerta seca*, mosaic, overglaze, underglaze, and luster. During Timur's rule, when this city was his capital, large areas of architectural surfaces received decorative tile treatment with a restricted number of motifs, according to his mandates. In the mausoleum complex of the Timurid dynasty, the Sha-i Zinda, one tomb may exhibit examples of carved brick or flat tiles decorated in underglaze, glaze, overglaze, and luster techniques. On the façade of the tomb of Shirin Bika Agha (Timur's sister), every inch of surface is covered with blue, turquoise, and white patterns, creating a dazzling visual effect that encourages meditation. In contrast, stunning examples of *banna'i* on the portal and minaret of the *masjid-i jami* of Timur use bold contrast between raw terra-cotta and glazed brick ends to define the huge forms capped with a brilliant sky-blue dome. Timur's tomb retains the brilliant lustered niches that make up the interior of the dome.

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TIMBER INDUSTRY—MALAYSIA Timber as an export commodity began contributing to the Malaysian economy only toward the end of the nineteenth century. The timber industry started in today's East Malaysian state of Sabah (formerly British North Borneo) in the 1880s. Despite attempts in neighboring Sarawak (ruled by the Brooke Raj and then a British colony from 1946), it was only after World War II (1941–1945) that the industry became significant there and even overtook Sabah in both production and exports. Likewise the industry became important in peninsular Malaysia (formerly British Malaya) after

1945. In 1963, Sabah and Sarawak joined the independent Federation of Malaya (1957), which in 1963 became the Federation of Malaysia.

The timber industry of Sabah began with a chance sale of felled timber from a clearance of land near the seaport town of Sandakan for sugar planting. In February 1885, the first shipment of felled timber headed for Australia. Other shipments followed, and by the 1930s Sandakan had become one of the major timber ports of the world.

The leading market for the tropical hardwood known as *billian* was Hong Kong, where it was used for sleepers in the expanding railway network then being undertaken in China. Timber companies at that time were in European hands, namely the British North Borneo Trading and Planting Company and the British Borneo Timber Company. Timber was Sabah's major export from the 1910s onward; exports, mainly in logs, reached their peak in 1937. Before 1941, Sabah was the third-largest timber exporter in the British empire, with markets in Hong Kong, Japan, Britain, and Australia.

In Sarawak, the Borneo Company exported small quantities of *billian* to Hong Kong and Calcutta. But inexperience, difficult terrain, and fluctuating timber prices hampered large-scale operations during the pre-1941 period. A few Chinese logging companies also served the overseas market, and the European-owned VAMCO Timber Company pioneered the export of sawn timber and plywood in the 1930s.

Timber Production in Independent Malaysia

Timber production and exports from peninsular Malaysia became significant only from the late 1960s. Together with production from Sabah and Sarawak, timber became the third leading export of Malaysia after rubber and tin. The 1980s and 1990s witnessed Malaysia's becoming one of the world's largest exporters of tropical hardwood, accounting for 37 percent of world production (1998). Timber-based industries produced a wide assortment of wood products, from sawn timber, plywood, and veneer to prefabricated houses and furniture, including rattan furniture for domestic and overseas markets.

The two major organizations related to the timber industry are the Forest Research Institute of Malaysia (FRIM) and the Malaysian Timber Industry Board (MTIB). FRIM undertakes research in forest development aimed at sustainable growth and conservation of the resource base. MTIB regulates and controls the timber trade, including marketing and distribution, and promotes effective utilization of Malaysian-produced timber.

Conservation Issues

Conservation and regulation of the timber industry began in Sabah in the early 1910s, with the establishment of the Forestry Department. Forest reserves were designated, and silviculture and research were undertaken to ensure that the forest remained a sustainable resource asset. In the post-1945 period, measures to arrest the adverse consequences of logging activities and to ensure sustainable management of forest resources included the creation of the Permanent Forest Estate (PFE) and the rehabilitation of logged-over forest through different types of silvicultural treatments. The National Forestry Policy implemented since 1978 was revised in 1992 to include the conservation of biological diversity, sustainable utilization of genetic resources, and the role of local communities in forest development.

The adverse effects of logging activities on the environment have been overstated, as has the negative impact of logging on forest dwellers. Measures have been undertaken to ensure that the nomadic livelihood of the Penans in Sarawak and of some Orang Asli communities in peninsular Malaysia is not overlooked or compromised vis-à-vis the timber industry. Prudent steps adopted by the Malaysian government include setting aside vast areas (44 percent of total land area) as PFE, as well as the designation of some 2.12 million hectares as national parks and wildlife and bird sanctuaries. Malaysia has actively supported organizations such as the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) with its ITTO Year 2000 Objective, and the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). Malaysia wholly subscribed to the Statement of Principles on Forest under Agenda 21 of UNCED. Furthermore, Malaysia is undertaking bilateral-cooperation forest projects with Denmark, Germany, and Japan to enhance sustainable forest development further.

The Malaysian timber industry contributed 5.3 percent of total export earnings of some RM 17.1 billion in 1999 and steadily increasing to RM 17.7 billion in 2000.

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TIMOR SEA The Timor Sea is a small stretch of water between the island of Timor and northern Australia. As a result of the colonial division of Timor between the Netherlands (west) and Portugal (east), the western half of the island is now part of Indonesia's East Nusa Tenggara Province, while East Timor, under effective Indonesian rule from 1975 to 1999, is now an independent entity. Under the provisions of the Law of the Sea, the Timor Sea had to be demarcated, but, controversially, Australia negotiated with Indonesia to divide the sea between itself and East Timor, despite Indonesia's illegal acquisition of the former Portuguese territory.

In 1989 an agreement entitled the Treaty Between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area Between the Indonesian Province and Northern Australia, also known as the Timor Gap Treaty, was signed (and implemented in 1991). The treaty established a zone of cooperation of 61 thousand square kilometers to facilitate the exploitation of petroleum resources. The central area of the zone, known as zone A (or ZOCA), consists of 34,970 square kilometers of seabed estimated to be able to yield 7 billion barrels of oil and 50 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The Timor Gap Treaty allowed Australia to divide future revenues equally with Indonesia; both countries also were to provide to each other 10 percent of revenues derived from the zones nearest their respective shores (zones B and C). On 10 February 2000, by the Exchange of Notes between Australia and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, the parties agreed to roll over the Timor Gap Treaty, but with revenues now going to East Timor. In 2001 the United Nations renegotiated the treaty in favor of East Timor (ZOCA revenues of 90 percent), and this is expected to generate between \$150 million and \$200 million a year by around 2005.

Anthony L. Smith

TIMUR (1336–1405), emperor of the Mongol empire. Born in what is now Uzbekistan, Timur, known as Temur-i-Lenk ("Timur the Lame," or in English, Tamerlane) because his right arm and leg were paralyzed from arrow wounds, was the last of the great nomadic Mongol emperors. He carved an empire from the remnants of the Mongol territories in Central Asia and spent his life campaigning throughout the Middle East, India, and Russia. He defeated the Golden Horde (a separate wing of the Mongol empire, which flourished in Russia in the latter half of the thirteenth century) in 1387 and 1391, sacked Delhi in 1398, and



SHAKHRISYABZ—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2000, Shakhriyabz (in Uzbekistan) is a collection of monuments from the medieval empire of Timur. The important historical site, which dates back to the fifteenth century, represents the zenith of Timurid craftsmanship.

defeated Bayezid I (c.1360–1403), sultan of the Ottoman empire, in 1402. During his reign he was known as Emir (Amir) Timur.

Timur is remembered most for his conquests and cruelty. He orchestrated many massacres and left numerous towers of skulls as reminders to the conquered of his authority. Although today we remember him for his brutality, he was also noted for being very intelligent, an expert chess player, fluent in several languages—despite being illiterate—and well-versed in debate. Playwrights such as Christopher Marlowe (1564–1593) penned plays about him, inspired by his larger-than-life character. Timur died in 1404 while undertaking the conquest of Ming-dynasty China. Although his empire disintegrated after his death, his descendants established the Mughal empire in India.

Timothy May

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TIN INDUSTRY The only tin-bearing mineral of any significance is cassiterite, SnO₂. It is comparatively rare, and the bulk of the world's deposits are located in a belt running from southern China to Indonesia. The deposits are of two kinds, primary deposits in lodes underground and secondary or alluvial deposits formed through erosion. Since the alluvium is close to the surface, it is easily extracted, and the heavier particles of cassiterite are separated by washing. Asia is particularly fortunate since the bulk of its deposits are alluvial.

The low melting point of tin makes it easy to reduce the cassiterite to metal through smelting and contributes to its utility in a wide variety of products. Around 3000 BCE the inhabitants of Southwest Asia recognized the metallurgical properties of tin and added a small proportion of tin to transform copper into the much more versatile bronze. Bronze made sharper weapons and better tools than did stone, and it became an essential element in the emergence of civilization. As civilization developed, especially in China, tin was consumed in large quantities for functional objects, such as mirrors, plates, and wine cups, as well as ceremonial objects, such as bells and candlesticks for ancestral altars. Religion provided a particular stimulus, and by the eighth century CE tin was beaten into thin strips to form backing for joss paper, a sacrificial paper inscribed with prayers and burned. With the industrial revolution in Europe, entirely new uses emerged, including coating for steel in tin cans, tinfoil for wrapping food, collapsible tubes for paints and pastes, solder, and bearing metals.

The combination of utility and scarcity made tin a particularly valuable commodity, and it therefore played an important role in the development of trading networks. At first these connected Southeast Asia to China, India, and the Near East. By 1850 a global market had emerged, and Southeast Asia supplied well over half of the world demand, a position the region maintained until the 1980s. The history of the industry can be divided into phases.

The Emergence of the Chinese

From earliest times the main centers of tin production were the Ko-chiu district in Yunnan, southwest China, and the Tavoy region in Myanmar (Burma). In the sixteenth century the earliest European traders, the Portuguese, found that the main centers had moved to Phuket, Thailand, and Melaka, in present-day Malaysia. By the eighteenth century the Dutch had turned the island of Bangka, Indonesia, into the largest producer. For the following two hundred years immigrant Chinese displaced local Burmese, Malay, and Thai miners, and a few became wealthy mine owners and merchants. Mines were an important source of wealth not simply because of the richness of their deposits but also because of the opportunities for exploitation of the immigrant labor force through gambling and opium. Collapsing political authority in Malaya (now Malaysia) led to open warfare from 1862 to 1872 as rival sultans and Chinese gangs vied for control over the tin trade, forcing British intervention and the creation of the Federated Malay States in 1874. Siam (now Thailand) avoided a similar fate thanks to the role played by the

Khaw family. The founder of this extended Sino-Thai family had arrived in the tin district in the 1820s and was largely responsible for its overall economic development throughout the nineteenth century. Chinese rioting in 1876 was curbed by the Khaws and the family then became the dominant economic force in the region, with extensive mining, shipping, general commerce, and tax farming. It also became a dominant political force thanks to support from the central government in Bangkok. In the Dutch East Indies (DEI) Chinese mining was subject to direct European control, on Bangka by the Dutch government and on Belitung and Singkep by private Dutch companies.

Displacement of the Chinese

Europeans had a technical advantage in smelting tin concentrates, producing a high-quality metal better suited to the needs of American and European industry. In 1886 the Singapore smelter of the Straits Trading Company (STC) opened and began to eliminate the small, local Chinese smelters. In response the Khaw family built a modern smelter in Penang (an island in present-day Malaysia) in 1907, but the family sold out to British capitalists in 1910. The whole region then had just three important smelting complexes, Bangka, Penang, and Singapore, which treated ores from Alaska to South Africa.

Traditional Chinese mining techniques became obsolete as the quality of the deposits declined, and beginning in 1900 European technologies predominated. The gravel pump, which broke down the tin-bearing alluvium under a high-pressure jet of water, was widely adopted by Chinese miners, but the most important technical innovation was the bucket dredge, which could work low-grade and hitherto inaccessible deposits at a low cost. Dredges worked on the seabeds off Thailand and the DEI, but they also reworked deposits the Chinese considered exhausted. Dredging transformed the industry, significantly increasing production in the 1920s and drawing on fresh sources of capital, mainly from Britain and Australia. Both the capital and technical requirements of dredging led to a consolidation of the tin industry into a few corporate groups, of which the most important was the London Tin Corporation (LTC).

The LTC originated in an Anglo-German jute-trading firm in Calcutta, India, that first developed dredging in Burma in the early 1920s. The company then extended its reach throughout the world, becoming the largest producer in Malaya, Siam, and Japan. Good prices and expanded production in the 1920s generated large revenues for local governments.

The tin industry avoided the worst of the depression of the 1930s thanks to the cooperation of most of the important tin producers, members of the International Tin Committee formed through the efforts of the LTC, including Malaya, the DEI and Siam, but not including China or Burma.

China remained largely insulated from these processes of modernization. The close link between Chinese miners and local smelters blocked the sale of ores to foreign interests and perpetuated obsolete technologies. However, by 1935 the Yunnan provincial government developed a smelter that produced a metal of international standards and opened a modern mine.

Displacement of the Europeans

Much mining capacity was destroyed during the Japanese conquest of Southeast Asia in 1942, which changed the balance of power in the tin industry. The United States entered the post-World War II period determined to build a stockpile to protect against any repetition of the interruption of tin supplies, a policy confirmed by the 1949 revolution in China and the Communist insurgency in Malaya (1948–1960). By 1954 the stockpile was completed, and the world again faced the problem of chronic excess productive capacity, requiring regulation through a new form of international commodity control, the International Tin Council.

In the DEI, the industry was quickly rehabilitated thanks to good contracts for the U.S. stockpile. However, these contracts coincidentally expired as Indonesia became fully independent in 1954, and it then proceeded to take over all Dutch mining interests, which the government eventually consolidated into a fully nationalized company, PT Timah. At first the lack of fresh investment, managerial inefficiency, and attacks on the Chinese miners combined to reduce production, but investments in seagoing dredges stimulated recovery during the 1970s. Political uncertainty in Malaysia, which was established as a federated country in 1963, meant that rehabilitation drew more on local Chinese capital, which also acquired control over the STC. The New Economic Policy of the Malaysian government accelerated these trends, and in 1978 Malaysia Mining Corporation was formed, which acquired London Tin and other European dredging companies. In 1981 Malaysia Mining forged close links with the remaining STC smelter in Malaysia.

The Thais restructured their interests in LTC and other foreign dredging companies to permit majority Thai ownership. In 1965 Thailand realized its goal of establishing an important domestic smelter, though it

remained under foreign control. In both Malaysia and Thailand the balance shifted away from bucket dredging back toward small-scale techniques, such as gravel pumps on land and suction boats offshore. The LTC rebuilt its Burmese dredges, which were nationalized in the 1960s. As the new state corporation shifted production toward gravel pumps, overall output declined. Government control over all the mines of Ko-chiu, China, allowed modernization and considerable expansion in production there.


China's limited cooperation with other tin-producing countries in their attempts to control output contributed to the collapse of the International Tin Council in 1985 and to a large drop in price. Indonesia and China managed to survive the tin crisis, but production fell off sharply in both Thailand and Malaysia, bringing to an end the strategic role tin played in their economies.

John Hillman

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TIPU SULTAN (1749–1799), ruler of Mysore, a kingdom located on the southwest coast of the Indian subcontinent. Tipu Sultan is remembered for his relentless struggle against British colonial rule during his reign. The son of Hyder Ali, he was born at Devanhalli in the modern Indian state of Karnataka. Tipu joined his father in the First Mysore War (1767–1769), the first of four battles fought between the British and the rulers of Mysore, in which the British were defeated.



Gumbaz, the mausoleum of Tipu Sultan in Seringapatam, India. (SHELDAN COLLINS/CORBIS)

When he became king following the death of Hyder in 1782, Tipu inherited a powerful kingdom. The peace treaty of 1784, signed between the British and Tipu, was a temporary phenomenon that became the main obstacle to British domination in south India. Tipu had sought the help of the French and the Turks in building an alliance against the British but with little success. In the third Mysore war, Tipu was defeated by the British and ceded half of his territories to the British empire in 1792. The subsidiary alliance system (the surrender of territory by Indian rulers for the upkeep of British subsidiary troops) implemented by Richard Colley Wellesley, the new governor-general of Bengal (1797–1805), was a clever ploy to bring Indian rulers under the suzerainty of the British empire, and Tipu fiercely opposed it. His capital, Seringapatam, fell to the British army on 4 May 1799; in this final Mysore battle, Tipu died.

A Muslim himself, Tipu adopted a tolerant policy of rule; he treated Hindus well and gave grants to their religious institutions. He showed great concern for the welfare of all of his subjects. Trade and commerce

greatly improved, and he built a modern navy. Tipu's passion was driving the British out of India, and he became a martyr for that cause.

Patit Paban Mishra

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TOBOL RIVER A tributary of the Irtysh, the Tobol River rises in the southern Urals of northwest Kazakhstan not far from the Russian border and flows in a roughly northerly direction first across the Turgay Plateau and then, after crossing the border into Russia, across the West Siberian lowland. The river joins the Irtysh not far from the city and port of Tobol'sk.

With a basin of 426,000 square kilometers, the Tobol is some 1,591 kilometers long. Of this the lower 437 kilometers are navigable, the river being used among other things to float timber to the main waterway of the Irtysh. The waters are also regulated to supply industry in the cities of Rudny, Qostanay, Kurgan, and Yalutorovsk.

The river's length and the two distinct geographical areas (the high-altitude dry steppe of the Turgay Plateau and the temperate rain forest of the Siberian taiga) through which it flows give it distinct characteristics. Like other Central Asian rivers, it is fed mainly by snow. This is supplemented in Siberia by rainfall. Its upper (Kazakhstan) course freezes in November, with the melt occurring at the end of April. In this region, the river's greatest flow occurs during May and June. The lower (Siberian) course freezes in October, with the melt at the end of May. Here the greatest flow is in August. In common with other rivers of the region, the Tobol's flow is highly variable. Its average flow at the confluence with the Irtysh is 805 cubic meters per second, but the maximum August flow is 6,350 cubic meters per second.

Will Myer

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TOCHIGI (2002 est. pop. 2 million). Tochigi Prefecture is situated in the central region of Japan's island of Honshu, where it occupies an area of 6,414 square kilometers. Tochigi's primary geographical features are the Yamizo, Taishaku, and Ashio mountains which fringe a central plain irrigated by the Nakagawa and other rivers. It is bordered by Gumma, Fukushima, Ibaraki, and Saitama prefectures. Once known as Shimotsuke Province, it assumed its present name and borders in 1873.

The prefecture's capital city is Utsunomiya, base during the Kamakura (1185–1333) and Muromachi (1333–1573) periods to the Utsunomiya family, the region's military governors. In the Edo period (1600/1603–1868), it was a castle town and post station. In the early 2000s, it manufactures aircraft, farm machinery, and television sets. The prefecture's other important cities are Ashikaga, Tochigi, Sano, Kanuma, and Oyama.

Tochigi's main economic activity is agriculture: It grows rice, grains, and vegetables. Also productive are the forestry and woodworking industries, and at one time copper mining was important. Current industries include textiles, metals processing, and machine fabrication. The former post-station town of Tochigi is noted for its traditional sake brewing, wooden clogs, and lime production.

Visitors and pilgrims are drawn to Nikko National Park, site of the Tokugawa family tomb. The famed pottery town of Mashiko features the studio of Hamada Shoji (1894–1978), a leader of the folk art revival movement. Other scenic destinations are the Nasu Highland, Kegon Falls, and Lake Chuzenji.

E. L. S. Weber

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TOFU One of the great breakthroughs in human nutrition was the discovery of how to process difficult-to-digest soybeans into nutritious tofu, or *doufu*. Tofu is made by soaking soybeans overnight, grinding them finely with water, and boiling them into a slurry, filtered to produce soy milk. This can then be precipitated using various settlers, commonly magnesium salts, Japanese *okara*, and pressed into slabs. It is uncertain when tofu was first made, but the technology was well known in China by early medieval times and possibly as early as the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE).

Imitation of cheese making as practiced in the Altaic region has been cited as one possible source of the idea.

In recent times, tofu has become a mainstay of Chinese cooking and is a cheap and easily accessible source of protein. It is less well represented in early recipe books, but this may be due to its plebeian origins. Other tofu products include the "skin," *doufupi*, skimmed off and dried, and *choudoufu*, "stinking bean curd," a fermented product that is an acquired taste.

Paul D. Buell

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TOHOKU REGION Japan's Tohoku region is its northeast; the word "Tohoku" means "Northeast." Tohoku consists of the prefectures of Aomori, Iwate, Akita, Yamagata, Miyagi, and Fukushima on the main island of Honshu. The region is bordered by the Sea of Japan on the west, the Tsugaru Straits to the north and the Pacific Ocean on the east. Major cities are Sendai, Aomori and Akita, located along the coasts.

Winters are long and there is considerable snowfall along the coast of the Sea of Japan and in the central mountains, making Tohoku a favorite destination for skiers. Summers are hot, but less humid than in the southern part of Honshu.

Historically Tohoku remained out of the national political and cultural spotlight. During the eleventh and twelfth centuries a branch of the powerful Fujiwara family had their seat at Hiraizumi (in present-day Iwate Prefecture), and in the sixteenth century the warrior Date Masamune (1567–1636) established the Sendai domain and extended control over almost all of Tohoku.


Primarily an agricultural area, Tohoku's serves as Japan's rice bowl. Its long winter restricts other products to such crops as apples (in Aomori), rape (Yamagata), cherries (Yamagata), and timber (throughout the region). Tohoku is characterized by low population-density, a large number of members per household, and a high number of households with members 65 years or older. This demography reflects a lack of lo-

cal economic opportunity due to the high dependence on agriculture. With the exception of Miyagi Prefecture, which had a population increase of 1.6 percent in the period from 1995 to 2000, the prefectures of the Tohoku region saw a drop in population ranging from 0.3 percent to 2 percent.

The conservative nature of the people and remoteness from the metropolises of Tokyo and Osaka allow Tohoku to retain local traditions more than other rural areas of the country. Those traditions include the large-scale early August festivals of Kanto at Akita, Nebuta at Aomori, and Tanabata at Sendai.

James M. Vardaman, Jr.

TOJO HIDEKI (1884–1948), prime minister of Japan. Tojo Hideki was the prime minister of Japan throughout most of World War II (1941–1945). A



Former premier Tojo testifying at the War Crimes Tribunal in Tokyo on 26 December 1947. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

Tokyo-born career army officer, Tojo served as an attaché in Europe in the early 1920s and later joined the Control Faction, an influential clique within the Japanese military. In the mid-1930s, Tojo's star rose with the ascendance of the Control Faction over rival army cliques. In 1935 he was transferred to Manchuria, where he served on the staff of the Guandong (Kwantung) Army. Recalled to Tokyo in 1938, Tojo was appointed a vice-minister of the army, followed by promotion to army minister in the cabinet of Konoe Fumimaro (1891–1945) in 1940.

An ardent militarist, Tojo was a keen supporter of the alliance with Nazi Germany and the expansion of the war with China. Following the collapse of the Konoe cabinet in October 1941, Tojo was appointed prime minister in an atmosphere of escalating tensions with the United States. As Japan's material inferiority became increasingly apparent despite an earlier string of victories in the Pacific, Tojo attempted to centralize and coordinate the war effort by taking personal control of key posts in the cabinet and the army. However, this attempt aroused powerful opposition in civil and military circles, and Tojo resigned under pressure following the loss of Saipan, an island in the northern Marianas, in July 1944. After the war, he was convicted of war crimes and was hanged in Tokyo on 23 December 1948.

John M. Jennings

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TOKAIMURA NUCLEAR DISASTER Japan's latest and largest nuclear disaster—the world's worst since Chernobyl—happened in September 1999 at a nuclear fuel processing service firm in the small village of Tokaimura, 125 kilometers northeast of Tokyo in Ibaraki Prefecture. This disaster occurred when JCO Corporation workers were handling uranium and provoking the release of high levels of radiation from the plant. It was level 4 on the International Nuclear Event Scale of 0 to 7, but according to many experts it could have been rated level 5. Previously, the worst nuclear disaster in Japan was a level 3 and took place in 1997 at a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant, also in Tokaimura. The 1979 Three Mile Island accident in the United States was a level 5, and the 1986 Chernobyl accident reached level 7.

The Tokaimura disaster has raised questions about the failure of the nuclear accident system and problems in countermeasures and crisis management to deal with disasters. In June 2000, Japan's Special Measures Law for Nuclear Accidents took effect, which requires the government to conduct a comprehensive drill every year. As Japan depends more and more on nuclear power for electricity, reforms of the nuclear safety policy are being considered.

Nathalie Cavasin

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TOKUGAWA PERIOD The Tokugawa period, also referred to as the Edo period, is typically dated from 1600, the year of the military victory of Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543–1616) at Sekigahara, to the Meiji Restoration in 1868. This period saw Japan move from a country divided by civil war to a unified, stable, and mature state. Ieyasu established central authority over the country through the Tokugawa *bakufu* (shogunate) in Edo (present-day Tokyo). Regional authority was maintained by more than 250 daimyo (military chieftains) who governed their *han* (domains) with considerable autonomy. Society was divided into four distinct classes: warriors, peasants, artisans, and merchants, and the government maintained tight restrictions on all of them. Urbanization spread rapidly in the period, creating profound economic, cultural, and social changes.

Tokugawa Political and Social Control

The Tokugawa *bakufu* grew out of Tokugawa Ieyasu's experience with clan government during his time as daimyo, before his victory at Sekigahara. In 1603, after being appointed shogun by the emperor, Ieyasu began staffing the *bakufu* with his loyal retainers.

Ieyasu maintained firm control over the daimyo by redistributing land confiscated because of his victory at Sekigahara. Domains totaling about one-fourth of all land came to be ruled directly by the Tokugawa family and its vassals; the remaining territory was divided among the daimyo. The daimyo were categorized as *fudai*, longtime loyal vassals who were given strategically important lands; *shimpan*, collateral daimyo from lineages related to the Tokugawa; and



JAPAN—HISTORICAL PERIODS

Jomon period (14,500–300 BCE)
 Yayoi culture (300 BCE–300 CE)
 Yamato State (300–552 CE)
 Kofun period (300–710 CE)
 Nara period (710–794 CE)
 Heian period (794–1185)
 Kamakura period (Kamakura Shogunate) (1185–1333)
 Muromachi period (1333–1573)
 Momoyama period (1573–1600)
 Tokugawa or Edo period (Tokugawa Shogunate) (1600/1603–1868)
 Meiji period (1868–1912)
 Taisho period (1912–1926)
 Showa period (1926–1989)
 Allied Occupation (1945–1952)
 Heisei period (1989–present)

tozama, outside lords who joined Ieyasu either shortly before or after Sekigahara and who remained potential rivals.

The *bakuban* (a combination of the *bakufu* and *han*) system of government begun by Ieyasu was, for all practical purposes, completed by the time of the third shogun, Tokugawa Iemitsu (1604–1651). In the 1630s and 1640s, in order to provide an increased sense of legitimacy and bureaucratic professionalism among samurai office holders, *bakufu* offices such as the *roju* (senior councilors), *wakadoshiyori* (junior councilors), *hyojosho* (judicial council), *sojaban* (master of shogunal ceremony), *tairo* (great councilor), *ometsuke* (inspector general), *jisha bugyo* (temple and shrine commissioner), *kanjo bugyo* (finance commissioner), and *machi bugyo* (town commissioners) were established.

Bakufu control over the daimyo was also securely in place by Iemitsu's reign. While in theory the daimyo remained autonomous rulers of their domains, in practice the *bakufu* dictated general rules of conduct and placed restrictions on personal freedom of action. For example, daimyo were not allowed to marry or repair castles in their domains without shogunal permission. They could also be shifted from one domain to another or deprived of their domains entirely. The most important control measure was the *sankin kotai* (alternate attendance) system, which required that the daimyo spend alternate years in attendance at the shogunal court in Edo and leave their wives and children behind whenever they returned to their domains.

Tokugawa control over the peasantry was also strengthened under the first three shoguns. Villages inhabited primarily by *hyakusho* (small taxpaying farmers) served as the basic unit of control in the countryside. Although villagers, led by a *nanushi* or *shoya* (headman), administered their own affairs, they were required to form *gonin-gumi* (neighborhood associations) to foster mutual assistance and responsibility regarding issues such as taxation and law enforcement. Villagers were also prohibited from changing occupations or selling their land, and restrictions were placed on what they could wear and eat.

Using neo-Confucian principles borrowed from China, Tokugawa leaders saw Japanese society as divided into four classes, with the samurai on top, followed by the peasants, artisans, and merchants. In practice, there was little distinction between the last two groups, who were generally collectively referred to as townspeople. Living outside this hierarchical scheme were outcasts called *eta* and *hinin*.

The samurai lived primarily in Edo and other castle towns and were restricted to military and government service. The peasants, who made up 80 percent of the population, lived in villages at night and cultivated their fields by day. The townspeople usually resided in designated sections of urban areas and served the needs of the samurai. Over time, these social divisions became blurred, as some townspeople and rural landlords became extremely wealthy, and certain lower-level samurai and tenant farmers faced poverty, but the legal boundaries between the classes never disappeared.

Tokugawa Policies on Trade and Christianity

As the Tokugawa political and social structures were becoming formalized, the *bakufu* also developed strict control measures regarding foreign trade and Christianity, culminating in the national-seclusion policies of the 1630s. From the earliest days, Ieyasu had attempted to control the foreign trade of the Portuguese and Spanish at Nagasaki through the *shuinsen* (vermilion seal) ship policy, which officially sanctioned vessels to trade abroad, and the *itowappu* (raw-silk monopoly) system, which granted designated Japanese merchants the exclusive right to purchase, distribute, and negotiate the price of raw silk brought into Japan by Portuguese ships.

The 1600 shipwreck at Kyushu of a Dutch ship with an English pilot aboard afforded Ieyasu another opportunity to wrest control away from the Portuguese and Spanish, who had monopolized trade and tied it to the proselytizing efforts of Catholic missionaries.

Ieyasu offered both the Dutch and English an opportunity to trade in Japan. The Dutch accepted his invitation in 1609, and the English followed four years later. Both traded out of the island of Hirado, while the Portuguese and Spanish remained at Nagasaki. The nonproselytizing Dutch and English Protestant traders gave Ieyasu exactly what he desired—foreign trade without a Christian missionary presence.

With alternatives to Portuguese and Spanish foreign trade now available, Ieyasu issued a nationwide ban on Christianity in 1614. Soon thereafter, prominent Japanese and Western Christians were deported; those Western missionaries who did stay went underground with their beliefs. The second and third shoguns stepped up efforts to eradicate Christianity in Japan, first through a series of executions and later through torture-induced recantations.

In 1622, the Spanish were expelled for continued proselytizing. The following year the English departed of their own accord after a series of financial losses. This left the Dutch at Hirado and the Portuguese in Nagasaki as the only remaining Western traders in Japan.

In the 1630s, the *bakufu* promulgated a series of edicts that became the basis for what is known as Japan's *sakoku* (national seclusion) policy regarding foreign trade and Christianity. By these edicts, the *bakufu* prohibited all ships and Japanese subjects from leaving Japan for a foreign country; those Japanese already abroad could not return. In addition, the Japanese wives and children of foreigners were deported. Other measures called for payments to Japanese who turned in Christians to the government and strict inspection of foreign ships in search of Christians and Christian materials. In 1639, in the aftermath of the Shimabara Rebellion, another edict was issued banning the Portuguese from Japan.



A statue of Tokugawa Ieyasu, the first Tokugawa shogun, at Nikko National Park. (RIC ERGENBRIGHT/CORBIS)



SHRINES OF NIKKO— WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Designated as a World Heritage Site in 1999, the Nikko shrines are a vivid reminder of the incredible craftsmanship of the Tokugawa period in Japan. The shrines are perfectly blended with the breathtaking natural beauty of the area.

Over the next few years, the *bakufu* implemented additional Christian control measures, including the establishment of religious census registers, temple registration, oaths of apostasy, *fumi-e* (requiring suspects to trample on Christian images to prove they were not Christians), and the office of religious investigation. While failing to eradicate Christian beliefs completely among the Japanese populace, the *bakufu* did manage to drive the religion so far underground that it would not reappear publicly until the mid-nineteenth century.

In 1641, the Dutch were transferred from Hirado to the man-made island of Dejima in Nagasaki Harbor. From this time on, Japanese foreign trade was conducted only with the Chinese and Dutch at Nagasaki and with the Chinese and Koreans through the Ryukyus and Tsushima.

Economic and Cultural Developments

An unexpected development in the transformation of the samurai from rural warriors to civil bureaucrats living in castle towns was the rapid urbanization of Tokugawa Japan. Edo grew to a population of 1 million people, while Kyoto and Osaka had about 300,000, and even domain castle towns recorded more than 50,000 residents. Trade in silk, cotton, paper, porcelain, and sake made some merchants rich, and they, in turn, came to support a vibrant urban culture of artists and entertainers.

Urban culture flourished in the forms of literature, theater, and painting. Ihara Saikaku (1642–1693) wrote popular prose fiction about love and money among the townspeople, and the traveling poet, Matsuo Basho (1644–1694), adopted haiku as his principal medium of expression. Chikamatsu Monzaemon (1653–1724) wrote plays about townspeople and their conflicts between duty and human emotion for both the *yorui* (puppet) and Kabuki theaters. While a number of painting schools flourished in the Tokugawa period, the one that best represented the new urban culture was ukiyo-e (literally, "pictures of the floating

world"). This school of woodblock printmaking was begun by Hishikawa Moronobu (1618–c. 1694) in the seventeenth century, and it peaked in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries under Kitagawa Utamaro (1753–1806), Katsuhika Hokusai (1760–1849), and Ando Hiroshige (1797–1858).

Although the samurai enjoyed the cultural prosperity of the cities, many were unable to keep pace with the expanding urban economy, since their primary source of income was a fixed stipend tied to rural production. The *bakufu* made a number of unsuccessful attempts at neo-Confucian-inspired fiscal reform in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (the Kyōho, Kansei, and Tempo reforms), but the economic status of the samurai continued to deteriorate.

Urbanization affected the life of people in the countryside as well. The needs of urban markets turned traditionally subsistence peasants into commercial farmers, a few of whom became large landowners, while the majority fell to the status of landless laborers. Tax evasion and peasant rebellions became more and more common as the Tokugawa period evolved.

Intellectual Trends

In the Tokugawa period, the orthodox school of thought was *shushigaku* (Zhu Xi neo-Confucianism), which stressed loyalty, hierarchy, and stability. The official *bakufu*-sponsored school of neo-Confucianism was begun by Hayashi Razan (1583–1657), a trusted adviser of Tokugawa Ieyasu. A contending school of neo-Confucianism was *oyomei* (Wang Yangming), which was founded by Nakae Toju (1608–1648).

Outside neo-Confucianism were schools such as *kogaku* (Ancient Learning), which advocated returning to the original works of Confucius and his immediate disciples. Famous members of this school included Yamaga Soko (1622–1685), Ito Jinsai (1627–1705), and Ogyu Sorai (1666–1728). *Kokugaku* (National Learning) rejected Confucian ethics and searched for meaning in traditional Shinto texts. Its leading advocates were Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801) and Hirata Atsutane (1776–1843). *Rangaku* (Western Learning) explored Western science and mathematics after the shogun lifted the ban on the importation of Western books in 1720. Honda Toshiaki (1744–1821) was a leading scholar of this school.

The Downfall of the *Bakufu*

By the mid-nineteenth century, rising prices, peasant uprisings, samurai unrest, natural disasters, and famine provided formidable obstacles to effective *bakufu* rule. Exacerbating the situation was poor *bakufu*

leadership, which by this time had come to be dominated by senior councilors. Added to these troubling domestic developments was the growing threat of encroachment from the West.

In 1853 and 1854, Commodore Matthew Perry led American naval expeditions to Japan and demanded that the *bakufu* grant the United States trading and diplomatic rights in the country. The weakened bureaucracy had no choice but to agree, a fact that greatly angered some of the samurai, especially those from southern and western Japan. When *bakufu* leaders signed commercial treaties with the West in 1858, and foreign merchants, missionaries, sailors, and government officials began to pour into designated Japanese ports, the situation worsened. By the 1860s, many in Japan were demanding the dissolution of the *bakufu* and the restoration of imperial rule to unify the country and resolve the crisis. With forces from the powerful *tozama* domains of Satsuma and Choshu leading the way, the last Tokugawa shogun was overthrown in late 1867, and early the following year, in what is known as the Meiji Restoration, a new government was established.

Lane Earns

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TOKUSHIMA (2002 est. pop. 823,000). Tokushima Prefecture is situated in the eastern region of Japan's island of Shikoku, where it occupies an area of 4,146 square kilometers. Tokushima's primary geographic character is a generally mountainous terrain intersected by plains along the rivers Yoshinogawa and Nakagawa. The prefecture is bordered by the Inland Sea, the Kii Channel and the Pacific Ocean, and by Kawaga, Kochi, and Ehime prefectures. Once known as Awa Province, Tokushima assumed its present name and borders in 1880.

The prefecture's capital is Tokushima city, situated along the island's longest river, Yoshinogawa. During

the Edo period (1600/1603–1868), it was the castle town of the Hachisuka family, who completed their fortress in 1586. Under their rule, the town flourished as a port for the export of indigo dye. Following legislation enacted to promote industry in remote regions, Tokushima was declared a New Industrial City in 1964. In the early 2000s, it is the site of chemical, textile, lumber, furniture, paper, and foodstuff processing industries. The prefecture's other important cities are Naruto and Anan.

Tokushima Prefecture remains primarily a rural region. Indigo plants are still grown, and tobacco and salt are produced. The leading crops are rice, fruits, vegetables, and mulberry trees. Fishing and forestry remain important activities in the south. Visitors are drawn to Tokushima city's August dance festival (Awa Odori) and to the Naruto whirlpools and coastal scenery in the Inland Sea National Park.

E. L. S. Weber

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TOKYO (2002 est. city pop. 8.2 million). Tokyo is the capital of Japan, and the nation's commercial and industrial center. Situated on Tokyo Bay along the Pacific coast of central Honshu Island, the city proper comprises twenty-three urban wards. The wider metropolitan area (consolidated in 1943 as Tokyo-to, or Tokyo Metropolitan Prefecture) includes twenty-seven smaller cities, one county, and four island administrative units with numerous towns and villages, all occupying an area of 2,168 square kilometers. The metropolitan prefecture has an estimated population of 11.8 million (2002 estimate).

Its site has a long history of habitation, as proven by excavated artifacts from the Jomon (10,000 BCE–300 BCE), Yayoi (300 BCE–300 CE), and Kofun (300–700) periods. In the seventh century, the area was made part of Musashi Province. Its official founding date is 1457, when warlord Ota Dokan erected a castle overlooking the centuries-old fishing village of Edo (the name means "river gate"), located near the mouth of the Sumida River and bordering the fertile Kanto Plain.

In 1590, national unifier Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537–1598) sent his ally and rival Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543–1616) off to rule Edo. After Hideyoshi's death, Ieyasu completed Japan's unification and in 1603 founded the Tokugawa shogunate in Edo. On the ruins of the first castle, he constructed his own fortress;



Tokyo is known for its dense population and crowded streets, such as this street filled with shoppers in August 1991. (CATHERINE KARNOW/CORBIS)

it burned in 1647. Edo suffered more than ninety serious fires over the next centuries. The town which grew up around the castle consisted of the so-called High City (Yamanote) of samurai residences and the Low City (Shitamachi) of workshops, markets, theaters, bathhouses, and commoners's homes on the northwestern marshlands. Artisans, merchants, and peasants flooded into Shitamachi to work in an Edo swelled by the 1635 directive that the nation's some 300 feudal lords establish residences there. A city of canals and the terminus of five great highways, Edo in 1720 had a population of over a million, making it the world's most populous city at that time.

The unexpected 1853 arrival of American ships, followed by the devastating 1855 Ansei earthquake, helped to destabilize the shogunate. In 1868 Edo was renamed Tokyo (the name means "eastern capital") and the Emperor Meiji arrived from Kyoto to take up residence in Edo Castle, rebuilt as the Imperial Palace. Over the following decades Tokyo underwent rapid

modernization and intense growth. The 1923 earthquake almost completely destroyed it; by 1930 it had risen again.

The World War II bombing raids once again leveled the city; the war was followed by some seven years of Allied occupation, administered from Tokyo. The economic recovery of the 1950s and 1960s paved the way for the city to host the 1964 Olympic Games and led to a new spurt of construction. The ever-increasing land prices and housing shortages were addressed by a program to create a series of urban subcenters, contributing to the labyrinthine conglomeration of self-contained neighborhoods, retail hubs, and satellite towns that Tokyo is today. Increasing pollution forced large manufacturers to relocate to outlying districts and onto land reclaimed from Tokyo Bay.

Today Tokyo is the nation's center for air and rail travel, government offices, financial institutions, corporate headquarters, mass media, the arts, and higher education (with some 185 colleges and universities). Chief among its numerous attractions are the historic Imperial Palace grounds, Ueno Park with its zoo and many museums, and the Meiji and Yasukuni shrine complexes.

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TONGHAK Tonghak (Eastern Learning) is the oldest indigenous organized religion in Korea. Founded in 1860 by Ch'oe Che-u (1824–1864), by the end of the nineteenth century it had attracted enough followers to pose a serious threat to the Choson dynasty (1392–1910), which had ruled Korea since the late fourteenth century. In the first half of the twentieth century, under the name Ch'ondogyo (the Religion of the Heavenly Way), it was a major contributor to nationalistic resistance against Japanese colonial rule. In recent decades in South Korea, it has retreated from political activism, returning to its purely religious

roots. In North Korea, however, a Ch'ondogyo-centered political party is a nominal junior partner to the ruling Communist Workers' Party.

The Origins of Tonghak

As its name reveals, Eastern Learning appeared in Korea in response to the penetration of Western Learning, a premodern Korean term for Catholicism. Though there were only about 20,000 Catholics in Korea in the mid-nineteenth century, Ch'oe knew that China had recently suffered its second major military defeat in three decades at the hands of Europeans, whom he identified with Catholicism. This frightened him, since China was for him, as it was for most Koreans at that time, the font of those values and moral principles that defined civilized society. He therefore began preaching Eastern Learning to counter the destabilizing and immoral effects of Western Learning.

In his attempt to defend traditional beliefs and values, Ch'oe created a new form of Korean religion. Drawing on Confucianism for his ethical principles and on Korea's folk religion for his rituals, Ch'oe added two elements borrowed from the Catholicism he was fighting against: a focus on one God, and the notion that those who shared belief in that one God constituted a separate and distinct community within Korean society.

Ch'oe's monotheism alarmed the Korean government, especially since one of the terms he used for God, the Lord of Heaven, was the same term the outlawed Catholics used for God. Since Korea's small Catholic community had insisted that loyalty to their God superseded loyalty to the king, Ch'oe's use of Catholic theological terminology made him appear subversive, as did the formation, without government authorization or oversight, of a community of Tonghak believers.

That subversive potential seemed to be realized in 1862 when there were outbreaks of antigovernment violence across the southern third of the Korean peninsula. These antigovernment protests were fueled by anger at government corruption and excessive taxation and had no connection with the infant Tonghak religion. Nevertheless, the government assumed the attacks on its authority were the result of peasants becoming emboldened by Ch'oe's claim that his Lord of Heaven was superior to any king. Ch'oe was arrested and hanged in 1864 for spreading doctrines that undermined the authority of the state.

Ch'oe's death did not end the faith in his teachings. Instead, after his death, a distant relative who was also one of his earliest converts, Ch'oe Shi-hyong (1827–

1898), succeeded him as head of the Tonghak community. The second patriarch systematized Tonghak thought by collecting Ch'oe Che-u's essays and poems and publishing them as Tonghak scripture. He also organized the Tonghak community into a nationwide underground hierarchical network, linking individual believers in their villages through their district head to regional and national leaders.

As the Tonghak community grew not only larger but also more organized and more conscious of its identity as a distinct community within Korean society, it began demanding that the government recognize it as a legitimate organization, starting with a retraction of the 1864 condemnation of Ch'oe and his ideas. Tonghak demands for an end to government persecution grew louder after a treaty between Korea and France in 1886 gave Catholics, but not Tonghak followers, the freedom to practice their religion openly. Starting in November 1892, large groups of Tonghak believers began gathering near government offices in the countryside to call for the exoneration of their founder and an end to attacks by government officials on their community.

The Tonghak Peasant Rebellion

This religious protest was overshadowed by a peasant rebellion that broke out in 1894. It was led by a local Tonghak leader, Chon Pong-jun (1854–1895), who used the Tonghak underground network to mobilize peasants throughout southern Korea for attacks on local government offices. That network helped the peasant rebellion spread rapidly and become the largest peasant uprising Korea had ever seen, strong enough to seize control of Chonju, the capital of the southwestern province of Cholla, less than two months after the rebellion began.

Chon's rebellion had not been organized or even authorized by the second patriarch. In fact, Ch'oe Shi-hyong was at first opposed to the use of the Tonghak name and organization in armed rebellion. Tonghak doctrine, however, included the assertion that Korea was on the verge of a revolutionary transformation into a utopian community. This millenarian strain in Tonghak thought made many followers receptive to rebellion. Not only had Chon utilized the underground organization Tonghak had built, some Tonghak doctrines, such as Ch'oe Che-u's proclamation that humanity was on the verge of a Great Transformation, appeared on banners carried by the rebels. Thus this rebellion is often called the Tonghak Revolution.

That appellation, however inaccurate it may have been in the early stages, gained credibility in October

1894 when the second patriarch declared that the rebellion was just and that Tonghak believers should participate in it. Ch'oe Shi-hyong's decision to join forces with Chon Pong-jun was a tactical error. Chon's rebel army was annihilated by a joint Japanese-Korean force before the year was out. Chon was quickly captured and executed. Ch'oe went into hiding, but within four years he too was captured and executed.

The defeat of the Tonghak Revolution and the execution of the second patriarch did not mean the end of the Tonghak religion. Before Ch'oe was captured, he passed the torch of Tonghak leadership to Son Pyong-hui (1861–1921), revered today as the third patriarch.

From Tonghak to Ch'ondogyo

In 1905, Son, who had fled from Korea in 1901, returned when he discovered that the government had grown too preoccupied with Japanese threats to Korean sovereignty to pay much attention to him and his followers. In a successful effort to distance his followers in 1905 from the rebels of 1894, he dropped the name Tonghak and proclaimed himself leader of a new religious organization he called Ch'ondogyo. It is as the Religion of the Heavenly Way that Tonghak has survived into the twenty-first century. Under Son's guidance, the Religion of the Heavenly Way began to operate openly as a mainstream religious organization, opening worship halls and holding regular worship services. Nevertheless, it retained a revolutionary potential because of the challenge its doctrines posed to inequality in society. Ch'oe Che-u had called for men and women to serve God. Ch'oe Shi-hyong added that just as people should respect God, they should also respect their fellow human beings. Son Pyong-hui further amplified that statement with the phrase "God dwells within each and every human being," which has become a core tenet of Ch'ondogyo doctrine.

Because of their belief that all human beings deserve respect, followers of Ch'ondogyo resisted Japanese colonial rule over Korea. Son Pyong-hui was one of the chief architects of the 1 March 1919 declaration of independence from Japanese rule, which resulted in nationwide protests.

After liberation from Japanese rule in 1945, Korea was divided into a Communist zone in the north and a non-Communist zone in the south. Political activists among Ch'ondogyo members gravitated toward the north, where the Ch'ondogyo Young Friends Party was officially recognized as a junior partner within a united front dominated by the Workers' Party.

Perhaps because of the taint of collaboration with Communists in the North, Ch'ondogyo has not been able to play any significant political role in South Korea. It survives in the Republic of Korea today as a small religious organization claiming around 1 million members and slightly less than 300 worship halls.

Don Baker

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TONGIL-KYO. See **Unification Church**

TONKIN GULF The Tonkin Gulf is connected to the Pacific Ocean at the northwest arm of the South China Sea. The gulf is 500 kilometers long, 250 kilometers wide, and 70 meters deep at its deepest point. It borders northern Vietnam to the west, Hainan Island to the east, and China to the north and east, and receives the Red River out of northern Vietnam. The main ports on the gulf include Ben Thuy and Haiphong in northern Vietnam and Pei-hai (Pakhoi) in China. The gulf's main shipping route is through the Hainan Strait, between China and Hainan Island.

The Gulf of Tonkin is probably best known in recent history as the site of the so-called Gulf of Tonkin Incidents, when in August 1964, torpedo boats of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) fired on U.S. naval forces that were in the area in an intelligence-gathering operation. The incidents resulted in the U.S. Congress's adopting the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on 7 August 1964; this resolution supported an increase in American involvement in the Vietnam War. Naval activity in the gulf was heavy during the war; Soviet ships ferried supplies to the DRV, and the United States sought to interdict the activity, particularly in 1972, when the U.S. Navy mined the entrances to North Vietnamese ports.

Richard B. Verrone




Sanpans crossing the Vietnam–China border in the Tonkin Gulf off the coast of Mong Cai, Vietnam, in 1993. (ROBERT MAASS/CORBIS)

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TONLE SAP Cambodia's Tonle Sap, or "Great Lake," is one of the unique geographical wonders of the world. Southeast Asia's largest freshwater lake, Tonle Sap is located in the center of the Cambodian Basin, a low-lying area of land only 30 to 100 meters above sea level. Bounded by the Dangrek Mountains, a steep escarpment on the edge of the Khorat Plateau to the north, and the Chuor Phnom Kravanh (Cardamom range) to the south, the Tonle Sap Basin extends west to the border with Thailand.



Connected to the Mekong River by the Tonle Sap River, the lake is part of a unique hydrological phenomenon unknown in any other part of the world: during the monsoon, or rainy season, the enormous amount of rain causes the Mekong to rise so much that the Tonle Sap River can no longer empty into it. Instead, the two rivers reverse course, and the Tonle Sap River then flows north into the lake, causing it to triple in size from 27,000 hectares during the dry season to more than 150,000 hectares during the rainy season. Flooding almost one-seventh of Cambodia, the rise in water levels provides irrigation for crops and an abundance of freshwater fish (the largest source of protein for the Khmer people), while the deposition of silt created by the river's reversal enriches the agricultural soils surrounding the lake. As a result, an estimated 75 percent of the total land area surrounding Tonle Sap—approximately 100,000 hectares—is fertile lowland.

However, there are critical concerns over the increasing environmental degradation caused mainly by

human activities. Further economic development, in addition to the lack of effective policies to manage and protect the watershed, poses significant threats to the Tonle Sap ecosystem in the future. The Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve, officially recognized by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) on 28 October 1997, is the first step in addressing these issues at local, national, and international levels.

Greg Ringer

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TOTTORI (2002 est. pop. 611,000). Tottori Prefecture, situated in the western region of Japan's island of Honshu, occupies an area of 3,494 square kilometers. Its primary geographical features are the Chugoku Mountains, south of a coastal plain. Tottori is bordered by the Sea of Japan and by Hyogo, Okayama, Hiroshima, and Shimane prefectures. Once divided into Inaba and Hoki provinces, it assumed its present name and borders in 1881.

The prefecture's capital is Tottori city, which grew up as a castle town around the seventeenth-century Ikeda family fortress. Devastated by a 1943 earthquake and a 1952 fire, the city has been totally reconstructed. Today it is home to food processing, woodworking, electrical appliance, and machinery plants, as well as Tottori University. The prefecture's other important cities are Kurayoshi and Yonago.

The prefecture is archaeologically rich, with artifacts excavated from the Jomon (10,000–300 BCE) and Yayoi (300 BCE–300 CE) periods and has numerous tomb mounds from the Kofun period (300–710) scattered across the Tottori Plain. The region was controlled by a series of feudal lords through the Edo period (1600/1603–1868).

Today the region remains primarily rural, raising rice, tobacco, vegetables, livestock, and fruit, especially pears. Also important are forestry and fishing. Visitors are drawn to the Tottori Sand Dunes and to Daisen-Oki National Park.

E. L. S. Weber

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TOURISM Asia is one of the major destination areas for today's international tourists; as home to the majority of human beings alive today, Asia accommodates the largest flows of domestic or internal tourism. East and Southeast Asia, with more than 97 million international tourists in 1999, received 14.6 percent of the world's international tourists (11.1 percent more than 1998). South Asia, with almost 6 million international tourists in 1999, received about 1 percent (and 8.3 percent more than 1998). These gross figures mask regional differences and annual fluctuations. Even the definitions are problematic: various authorities subdivide the continent differently. For instance, if Iran is included in South Asia, tourism figures are much higher than if it is omitted.

Domestic Tourism

In the largest Asian countries domestic tourism outstrips international tourism. For instance Japan has over 300 million annual tourist (overnight) trips, whereas fewer than 4.5 million international tourists visit Japan yearly. Domestic tourism in the major Asian nations has long been based on pilgrimages, most of which continue today, along with conventional Western-style cultural and environmental tourism. As in Europe, it is difficult to differentiate between pilgrims and religious tourists converging on a historical site.

South Asia In India Hindus were expected to visit sacred sites, including some now in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal. There are also Buddhist, Sikh, and Muslim sites in the same region; for all Muslims the international pilgrimage to Mecca (the hajj) is a lifetime goal. Many local shrines once operated syncretistically, as foci of worship for Hindus as well as Muslims; this is rarely the case today.

During the Raj, the period of British rule over the Indian subcontinent, nontraditional appreciation for historical, cultural, and natural sites of India was encouraged by institutions such as the Archaeological Survey and the Monuments Commission, and by the development of transportation in the country. The British not only visited historical sites such as the Taj Mahal; they established seasonal resorts in cool mountainous areas such as Simla, Darjeeling, and Pune (Poona). These resorts also attracted wealthy Indians and are still favored destinations.

After independence in 1947, Indians adopted the secular tourism of British and other foreigners. Under the Raj the Indian government provided employees and their families with the LTC (Leave Travel Concession), which covered second-class train fare for internal travel every three years. Many people used the LTC to visit relatives or tourist sites, often combining the two. After 1947 the internal travel promoted by the LTC continued, and some destinations previously exclusively religious (like the Himalayan shrines of Badrinath and Kedarnath) assumed a secular dimension. Increasingly, young, well-educated Indians (and to a lesser extent natives of Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal) share the secular tourist experiences of international visitors. These include not only cultural and historical tourism but also ecotourism (travel focused on environmental concerns) and trekking as well as recreational tourism to beach and mountain resorts, major cities, and theme parks.

Southeast Asia The nations of Southeast Asia exhibit the same patterns of modern domestic tourism, interest in historical and national sites, recreational and



TOUR GUIDES IN CHINA

The Importance of Living—by Li Yutang, a popular author in pre–World War II China—aimed to give American readers a cosmopolitan glimpse at life in the Far East in the 1930s. In the extract below, Li Yutang explains the peculiar charms of Chinese tour guides.

Chinese tourists suffer like American tourists at Radio City, with the difference that Chinese guides are not professional, but are fruit-sellers, donkey drivers and peasant boys, whose information is less correct, if their personalities more lively. Visiting Huch'iu Hill at Soochow one day, I came back with a terrible confusion of historical dates and sequence, for the awe-inspiring bridge suspended fifty feet over the Sword Pond, with two round holes in the slabs of the bridge through which a sword had flown up as a dragon, and became, according to my orange-selling boy, the place where the ancient beauty Hsishih attended to her morning toilet! (Hsishih's "dressing table" was actually about ten miles away from the place.) All he wanted was to sell me some oranges. But then I had a chance at seeing how folklore was changed and modified and "metamorphosed."

Source: Lin Yutang. (1938) *The Importance of Living: A Personal Guide to Enjoyment*. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, Inc., 329.

amusement-park tourism, and, increasingly, ecotourism, as does India. Before the dominance of Islam in Java, thousands of pilgrims from as far away as mainland Asia visited great Buddhist centers such as the thousand-year-old Borobudur. These sites fell into disuse but re-emerged in the nineteenth century as targets of secular tourism for Dutch colonists and visiting Europeans. These Javanese sites were incorporated into the international panoply of UNESCO's World Heritage Sites, and Indonesians now visit them in the same secular spirit as foreigners. All over Southeast Asia modern tourism has emerged, originating in imitation of former colonists or (in the case of Thailand) other foreigners. In Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, old patterns of internal travel are combined with or superseded by secular visits to places like Angkor Wat, where pre–Vietnam War colonizers visited, and where modern Cambodian tourists are joined by the ever-increasing numbers of postwar foreign tourists. In Indonesia religious tourism is now dominated by the Islamic hajj to Mecca; most domestic travel is secular. The same is true of Malaysia; its more than 25 million domestic tourist trips a year focus on hill resorts such as Cameron Highlands, beach areas such as Penang Island, and natural and historical sites, com-

bined in the instance of the Batu caves near Kuala Lumpur.

East Asia Because of the strong shared cultural and, in part, political background between the nations of East Asia, tourism here differs somewhat from tourism in the rest of the world, and especially from the Euro-American tourist system.

Japan Contemporary Japanese domestic tourism still includes traditional group pilgrimages, for instance, around Shikoku Island or to centers such as the Eiheiji Zen temple complex, the Ise Shinto grand shrine, and the many sect headquarters in Kyoto. For decades such group tourism, using public transportation, also swamped famous cultural and historical sites, especially in big cities such as Kyoto, Tokyo, and Osaka, but also in outlying places such as Kamakura, Himeji Castle, and the ancient capital of Nara. Even in the premodern period, Japanese tourists, on foot, ostensibly for health or religious purposes, numbered in the tens of millions a year.

The last two decades of the twentieth century saw a transformation of Japanese domestic tourism, partly

because of the rise in ownership of personal automobiles and a massive road-building program of inter-city expressways, tunnels, and bridges, with other roads extending to the 70 percent of Japan that is mountainous. Increased vacation time promoted the nuclear family as the unit of recreation.

Peer-group tourism, starting as day trips for preschool students and then in the form of school, club, and sports groups, continues in the adult world of work-party, union, or farmer-group tourism. These groups visit local attractions such as hot springs, travel to Hong Kong for shopping and almost anywhere for golf, and visit other Asian destinations for disguised sex tourism.

New forms of rural recreation, such as fishing, boating, camping, golf, and skiing, attract millions from crowded cities in all seasons. The government has encouraged nostalgia for the countryside, natural hot springs, organic foods, and village life to counter the flow of urbanization. The national railways and major travel companies cooperated in a (Re-)Discover Japan campaign in the 1970s and an Exotic Japan campaign of the 1980s, signaling that many urbanites were unfamiliar with hinterland Japan and were ignorant of unique regional festivals and customs.

China Domestic tourism in China was traditionally the province of priests and literati, or educated people; most ordinary Chinese could visit only local nat-

ural or historical sites. After 1949 travel was restricted except for military and party members, and many local tourist attractions were destroyed as signs of superstition. Indeed one motivation to become a Red Guard in the 1960s was the freedom to commandeer trains and travel all over China in the name of Mao's Cultural Revolution.

The overthrow of the Gang of Four in 1978 gave Chinese people more leisure time to spend in recreation and travel. Most recreation, however, is still local, limited to short holidays and concentrated in activities and areas that rarely compete for the spaces and infrastructure required by foreign tourists.

Nevertheless powerful forces impel Chinese people to travel further. Centripetal travel, until recently opposed and controlled by the central government, is symbolically equated with power and wealth in post-Mao China. These movements flow from the hinterlands to the metropolitan centers, for both tourism (where they compete with foreign tourists) and for work. They combine business with pleasure, a feature long characteristic of Chinese (and Japanese) tourism, even for Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution.

A centrifugal motivation for modern internal tourism is not spatial but temporal, the nostalgic desire to escape the here and now for the historical, cultural, and natural past. Though Westerners may be motivated to see the traditional China of *The Last Em-*



Chinese tourists taking photographs in Leshan, Sichuan, China, in May 1996. (STEPHEN G. DONALDSON PHOTOGRAPHY)



WHY DO THEY CLIMB?

It is often not apparent to people who live in tourist destinations why tourists like to come there. This certainly seems to be the case with the Sherpas of Nepal in the Himalayas.

Sherpas are generally mystified that Westerners come to Khumbu at such great expense and in such great numbers, whether to trek or to climb. Even the most experienced *sardars* admit they cannot fathom why Europeans climb, although they make guesses. One hunch is that they climb for fame, since the books they write always include plenty of pictures of themselves. But Sherpas also know that books are bought, so a second hypothesis is that people climb to make money. One *sardar*, for example, thought this was the case with the British mountaineer Chris Bonnington since he has written (and presumably sold) so many books; but the same *sardar* believed that fame drives Reinhold Messner (the first climber to ascend all fourteen 8,000-meter peaks) to the summits. Another *sardar* wondered whether science was not the prime motivation, while still another held that climbers climb to clear their minds from the worries of office work. If he were an office worker, he said, he might well need to clear his mind too, but if so he would do it by going on a weekend picnic rather than by climbing.

Source: James F. Fisher. (1990) *Sherpas: Reflections on Change on Himalayan Nepal*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 129.

peror, the Chinese populace feels nostalgic, not for a return to a past way of life, but for experiences of the past that lend rootedness and stability to their present lives. This nostalgia encompasses local attractions in the countryside, old neighborhoods in cities, "lineage tourism," in which city dwellers visit ancestral home communities, and "heritage tourism," in which, for example, affluent urbanites of Hong Kong who could not visit their own home villages adopted the nearby Ping Shan walled community.

Urban Chinese seek out proximity to or images of nature. Of China's 1.2 billion citizens, 70 million are members of one of fifty-five minority nationalities, many of whom are concentrated in the southern province of Yunnan. The *minzu*, the people of nature, have inhabited the consciousness of the Han-Chinese majority for centuries. In some Chinese regions, the minorities are represented, as in Korea and Japan, by newly created folk culture villages, which bring together typical artifacts and crafts and demonstrate peasant performances for expectant Han tourists.

Nostalgia for Maoist socialism is another complex motivation for contemporary Chinese to travel. There are tearful reunions between rural villagers and bands of urbanites who were sent to live with them in the days of the Cultural Revolution. During Mao's lifetime Red Guards and other Mao devotees made pilgrimages to Shaoshan, Mao's home village, where a lucrative tourist trade came to flourish in later years.

International Tourism

International tourism is generally considered an economic phenomenon, planned since colonial times as an export industry to bring foreign exchange into relatively poor countries. Asian nations have put forth schemes to encourage inbound tourism. At the same time, many of them have in the past strictly controlled the outflow of tourists to save precious foreign currency. Many countries reap great economic benefits from incoming tourism, especially China, Hong Kong, Macao, Malaysia, Thailand, and Myanmar (Burma). For Nepal and the Maldives tourism is the most important

export industry. As hard currency is desired, the countries targeted by advertising are European, North American, and Australasian, and, within Asia, Singapore and East Asia. Major extravaganzas, such as Olympic Games, world's fairs, and trade shows, are planned to put a country or city "on the map."

In much of Asia, regional tourism from adjacent countries generally outstrips other forms of international tourism. International travel within Asia is sometimes almost domestic, as it is between Canada and the United States. Bhutan, India, and Nepal are a close-knit group, though none receives the majority of tourists from within the region. Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia form another near-domestic set. The ethnically related set of China, Hong Kong, and Macao exhibits levels of mutual tourism that, even with unreliable figures, surpasses any other international flows.

Generally the poorer Asian countries are recipients of tourists, and the wealthier countries are the donors. Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan all "export" less than 1 percent of their population a year; the Maldives, with a small but wealthy population, sends one in three of its population abroad. Laos and Vietnam export few travelers, whereas Singapore's affluent citizens average 1.5 overseas trips per capita. East Asia is generally more affluent than the rest of Asia. Though China (so far) allows less than 1 percent of people (still over 7 million) to travel abroad annually, nearby Hong Kong and Macao enjoy seven and twenty visits per capita, respectively. Japan, Taiwan, and, increasingly, Korea

all send 7 to 25 percent abroad annually, which allows for considerable growth by European standards.

Most international tourists to Asia travel from Europe, East Asia (mainly Japan), and North America (mainly the United States). Europeans dominate in Bhutan, India, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives, both in cultural and beach-tourism destinations. East Asian tourists dominate in Myanmar, a country whose dictatorial politics may well put off many Europeans and Americans. Southeast Asia is more evenly split, though Europe is nowhere ascendant over East Asia. Local Southeast Asian tourists are dominant in Laos and Indonesia, and East Asian tourists in most of the other countries. In East Asia every country is dominated by tourists from other East Asian countries. North America leads Europe in Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and slightly in Korea, but not in Macao and China.

South Asia International tourism to South Asia is dominated by India with 2.4 million visitors and followed surprisingly closely by Myanmar and Iran with over 1 million each. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar are all ex-British colonies. Their attractions are mostly cultural and historical and, for some, religious; India has more UNESCO Cultural World Heritage sites than any other country in the world. South Asia also attracts some of Europe's beach tourists, especially Sri Lanka, parts of India (Goa), and the Maldives.

The palaces that used to house Indian princes have increasingly become important destinations for both

TABLE 1

Tourism Flows within South Asia, 1998									
(in thousands)									
Tourism to:	Bangladesh	Bhutan	India	Myanmar	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	Iran	Maldives
From:									
Bangladesh	Dom.	0	340	0	6	7	10	2	0
Bhutan	0	Dom.	3	0	1	0	few	few	0
India	58	1.3	Dom.	4	130	67	44	13	12
Myanmar	0	0	0	Dom.	0	few	few	0	0
Nepal	5	0	38	0	Dom.	few	few	0	0
Pakistan	12	0	44	0.6	4	Dom.	10	115	1
Sri Lanka	2	0	118	0	11	2	Dom.	1	0
Iran	1	0	10	0	0	8	0	Dom.	0
S.E. Asia	12	0.1	133	256	40	9	17	4	5
E. Asia	20	1.1	129	914	11	7	22	11	47
Europe	37	3.1	925	361	165	43	248	631	305
N. America	16	1.6	328	88	44	14	18	2	5
Total inbound	172	6.3	2,482	1,381	464	429	381	1,174	396
% from S. Asia	45%	0.39%	24%	5.5%	35.6%	25%	13.4%	25%	5%
Total outbound	623	0	2396	99	118	708	381	965	11
Proportion of population outbound (per year)	1/215	0	1/423	1/425	1/185	1/200	1/50	1/42	1/3

(Dom. = Domestic)

SOURCE: Compiled from data in World Tourism Organization (2000).

TABLE 2

Tourism Flows within Southeast Asia, 1998							
(in thousands)							
Tourism to:	Laos	Indonesia	Malaysia	Philippines	Singapore	Vietnam	Thailand
From:							
Laos	Dom.	0	0	0	1	5	50
Indonesia	0	Dom.	353	15	875	4	69
Malaysia	2	515	Dom.	49	415*	20	918
Philippines	2	95	0	Dom.	151	10	78
Singapore	2	1,414	2,937*	48	Dom.	32	586
Vietnam	78	0	0	4	17	Dom.	51
Thailand	273	45	256	16	161	18	Dom.
N. America	25	197	417	537	458	51	428
N.E. Asia	32	952	3,236	816	1,834	749	2,735
S. Asia	10	62	84	31	395	6	259
Europe	53	701	1,620	311	1,162	186	1,460
Total inbound	500	4,606	9,892	2,149	6,342	1,716	7,842
% from S.E. Asia	73%	45%	27%	.3%	27%	1%	2.5%
Total outbound	56	1,710	3,870	1,670	6,547	262	6,129
Proportion of population outbound (per year)	1/250	1/126	1/6	1/47	1.5 per cap.	1/315	1/9.8

*The traffic between Singapore and Malaysia may be considered short-term, local day tripping (for example, for shopping), as between the U.S. and Canada or China and Hong Kong.
(Dom. = Domestic)

SOURCE: Compiled from data in World Tourism Organization (2000).

domestic and foreign tourists. Many impoverished royal families strike deals with multinational hotel chains to turn their palaces into luxury tourist residences. Here tourists' main motivation is a colonial nostalgia for Europeans and local Indian allies. Another

form of tourism is youth drifter tourism, characterized by low-cost and low-tech travel such as trekking.

Nepal and other Himalayan regions have benefited from mountaineering. Nepal also developed "nature tourism" in its national parks in the lowland Terai,

TABLE 3

Tourism Flows within East Asia, 1998						
(in thousands)						
Tourism to:	Japan	China	Hong Kong	Taiwan	South Korea	Macau
From:						
Japan	Dom.	1,600	945 (2,380 in 1996)	2,200	1,900	167
China	267	Dom.	2,300	few	210	1,317
Hong Kong	365	47,000*	Dom.	54	229	4,012
Taiwan	843	2,174	1,812	Dom.	108	822
South Korea	742	632	179	60	Dom.	23
Macau	few	7,100	441	few	few	Dom.
N. America	784	879	1,020	336	455	102
Europe	577	2,100	960	160	401	262
Total inbound	4,106	75,000	11,000(?)	3,298	3,600	7,100
% from East Asia	64%	95%	77%	65%	70%	94%
Total outbound	16,000	7,400	50,000*	6,100	3,100	8,000*
Proportion of population outbound (per year)	1/8	1/162	7 per cap.*	1/3.6	1/15	20 per cap.

*Figures for travel between Hong Kong, Macau, and China include many trips just across the border for shopping and tourism, comparable to Canadians visiting the United States.
(Dom. = Domestic)

SOURCE: Compiled from data in World Tourism Organization (2000).

where tourists follow yesterday's big game hunters in safari-like treks. Though encouraged by the Chinese for economic purposes, Tibetan tourism is a paradox; after the Chinese takeover in 1951, the Chinese suppressed the main attractions, Buddhist monks and their ancient establishments, and religious leaders and many other Tibetans fled abroad. While South Asian tourism is growing steadily, the cessation of hostilities in such areas as Kashmir, Assam, Myanmar, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka would give travel a major boost.

Southeast Asia Most of Southeast Asia, like South Asia, emerged from a period of European colonization (Dutch, British, French, and Japanese) after World War II, and countries made tourism a major development goal. Though Thailand was never a colony, its near-colonial status as a rest-and-recuperation destination for allied troops in the Vietnam War in the 1960s contributed to its rise as a tourist destination.

Southeast Asia has perhaps the greatest range of tourist attractions in Asia. Singapore, Saigon, and Bangkok are modern urban destinations for shopping and entertainment. Yogyakarta, Hue, and Phra Nakhon Si Ayutthaya (or Ayutthaya) are ancient former capitals with famous architectural remains; Angkor Wat and Borobudur are World Heritage sites and ancient pilgrimage and temple complexes, once lost to the jungle, rediscovered and "museumized" by European interests, and now proudly reclaimed by local peoples. Beach tourism is popular on many coasts, especially in Bali, Penang, the Philippines, and both shores of central Thailand. Gambling is promoted in the Cameron Highlands of Malaysia, and there are also golf and horse racing. Southeast Asia is notorious for sex tourism. Though rare in the Islamic parts of Malaysia and Indonesia, it is infamous in Bangkok, parts of the Philippines, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Though much of the blame has fallen on locally based American troops, the traditionally patriarchal and stratified nature of these cultures also encouraged a flourishing domestic sex industry, which attracts foreign tourists.

East Asia The countries of East Asia have followed similar strategies in encouraging foreign tourists to visit, though China's pattern is somewhat divergent.

Japan After encouraging inbound tourism as part of its successful development strategies in the 1950s, Japan capped its efforts with the Olympic Games in Tokyo 1964 and the World's Fair in Osaka 1970. Both events produced massive infrastructural investment—the Bullet Train joined the cities in 1964—and attracted huge, mainly domestic, crowds. As Japan grew wealthy, her citizens traveled abroad and enriched their Asian destinations: Hong Kong and Singapore

for shopping, Okinawa (which reverted to Japan in 1972), Guam, and later Hawaii for recreational tourism. Japanese travelers are a major force in tourism to China and important visitors to Taiwan and South Korea. In the last decade of the twentieth century, the flow became two-way. While Japanese now increasingly visit mainland North America and Europe, their young people have taken up drifter tourism in Asia and the Mediterranean region.

China During the Maoist era's "state tourism," political allies were housed in friendship hotels and shown industrial and agricultural successes; routes were restricted, and services were not widespread. After 1978, overseas tourists were encouraged. So-called compatriots came from Macao, Hong Kong (and later Taiwan), Singapore, and Malaysia, along with some Westerners and Japanese. Travel and accommodations were separated, with lower rates for Chinese. Part of the strategy was to encourage Chinese overseas to visit "home." Much of the growth of tourism (and other developments) resulted from joint ventures combining overseas Chinese capital and mainland Chinese permission and labor.

Travels from world centers to China and more interestingly from Chinese metropolises outward are equally important aspects of modern tourism. From 1978 China developed a massive foreign tourist industry. The China National Tourism Administration spent over \$50 billion on tourism in 2000, and China has opened most areas to foreign tourists, particularly in the hinterlands, where visitors can see such attractions as the archaeological army in Xi'an, colorful minorities in the south, and the Silk Road through Xingjiang Uygur to the west.

Taiwan and Korea Both Taiwan and Korea followed Japan in attracting overseas tourists while developing industries and restricting outflows for economic or military reasons. Many of their tourists have been nearby Japanese and former colonists, and sex tourism disguised as *kasaeng* (geisha) tourism in Korea flourished with official tolerance until the 1980s. Both countries increased their overseas tourism; they constitute the largest numbers of tourists to Japan. Taiwanese, understandably, send even larger numbers to Hong Kong and Macao; at the end of the twentieth century their major destination became China.

Hong Kong and Macao Hong Kong and Macao, like Singapore in Southeast Asia, are highly urbanized former colonies with many attractions for shoppers, gourmets, and gamblers. Along with Chinese visitors, they enjoy a large clientele from North America and Europe and, for Hong Kong, from Japan. The coun-



POST-9/11 TOURIST SECURITY CONCERNS IN PAKISTAN

This notice posted by the Travel and Cultural Services of Pakistan indicates the concern for tourist safety following the September 11th attack on the United States in 2001 and the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan.

SECURITY SITUATION IN PAKISTAN

Security & safety has always been questioned and people have always had wrong ideas about the situation in Pakistan. We do believe and wish to assure all tourist in Pakistan of the following things.

1. There is no threat to lives or goods of any foreign tourist in any area of Pakistan. There are no purse snatchers as in South America or Africa. Nor there are any kind of hatreds or dis-likeness to foreign tourist in Pakistan
2. Pakistan being a Muslim country has a liberal atmosphere for women. They are free to roam any where they want but as it is demand of the Muslim society we do recommend modest dress for both men & Women. A T shirt and full pants or Skirt is fine. T shirt with half sleeves is perfect.
3. There had been some troubles lately in Karachi but all that is in a part of Karachi where there is no interest of tourist nor some

one ever needs to go or pass bye. Mind Karachi is spread in the area of 2200 Sq. Kms, Secondly Government is taking very strict measures to cut this problem.

4. The Interior of Sind is culturally very rich province and has no Problems as such . When you are there in Moen Jo Daro or any other place you are well taken care of by the friendly locals and our staff.

5. Khyber pass & other tribal areas have a system of tribal jury and sometimes there are clashes among the tribes but they can not be witnessed on the main road where Tourist travel. Yet we provide proper security guards for the tours in these tribal areas.

6. The Mountainous areas of Hunza, Gilgit, Chitral, Swat, Karakorum Highway & Skardu are very safe and there is no violence or any major trouble in these areas.

Travel & Culture Services Pakistan

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Karachi Tel; 579289 - Fax: 92-21-5832632
Email : culture@tours.hypermart.net

Source: Travel and Cultural Service Pakistan.
Retrieved 3 March 2002, from:
<http://ctours.freeyellow.com/>

tries became SARs (Special Administrative Regions) of China in 1997 and 1999, respectively, with little interruption in their tourist flows.

Implications

International tourism is a fragile phenomenon. In Asia as elsewhere, tourism depends on absence of conflict. Diseases, civil strife, and physical disasters depress flows. During the past forty years of decolonization and tourist growth, events in Asia have stemmed the rising tides of tourism. Internal conflicts, civil wars, rioting, and unrest cause mass travel cancellations. Most dramatic was the televised clash between student demonstrators and the military in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1989, which reduced foreign visits to China for several years. Japanese and Western tourists reduced their numbers by nearly one million for a year

or so, and the number of Chinese compatriots visiting China dropped by seven million in one year. Hong Kong lost 38 percent of the Taiwanese tourists who normally stopped there on their way to China. Civil unrest in Sri Lanka, breaking into civil war since 1984, drastically reduced its attractiveness as a tourist destination. Interethnic clashes in Malaysia and later in Indonesia halted tourist visits for significant periods.

However, enmity and a state of war may not entirely prevent organized tourism. The South Korean Hyundai Company, which operates passenger ships, built a port in North Korea to allow nearly half a million South Koreans annually to visit Kumgang Mountain, sacred to all Koreans.

International conflicts can also bring a halt to local or national tourism, as did conflicts between India and Pakistan in Kashmir, an otherwise prime tourist

destination; between India and China at their Himalayan border; between Vietnam and Cambodia; between Thailand and Myanmar spilling over from Myanmar's civil wars; and even between China and Taiwan. Tensions in Afghanistan and Iran have sometimes halted tourism to or in these areas. China's suppression of nationalist and religious elements in Tibet at times broke into civil strife in which tourists were involved. In the last decade of the twentieth century, economic reversals in East and Southeast Asia caused a falling off in intraregional tourism. The diminished number of Japanese tourists, leaders in the region has considerably affected Hong Kong and China.

The future of outbound tourism in East Asia has growing global significance. Outbound tourism from China is expected to rise from 10 million in the year 2000 to 50 million by 2010 and 100 million by 2020, perhaps making China the leading source of tourists globally. In January 2001 China's leaders outlined a policy to encourage inbound tourism to reach 120 million by 2020 (putting China ahead of France) and to increase domestic tourism, already at 750 million annually.

At present, however, China limits outgoing tourism to fifteen approved countries, adding Taiwan in 2001; Europe and North America are not included. Only 2 percent of Chinese have passports, and there is a chronic shortage of airplanes even at present tourism levels. European analysts predict that in 2020 the countries foremost in tourism will be Germany, Japan, the United States, and China.

Nelson H. H. Graburn

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TOXIC-WASTE DISPOSAL The adoption of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal in Basel, Switzerland, on 22 March 1989 made it illegal to export toxic wastes to Antarctica. In 1994, the Basel Convention was strengthened by the "Basel ban," which made it illegal to export toxic waste from the world's richest twenty-nine countries to the world's developing nations. The Basel ban has only managed to hide and obscure toxic waste exports, however, as the demand for cheap and discreet waste disposal has exploded. Most of the 30–50 million tons of toxic waste that is shipped internationally every year is simply subcontracted out to the lowest bidder, with no questions asked about its final destination. Some 80 percent of this waste is exported from industrialized nations in East Asia, Europe, and the Americas to developing countries in Africa and Asia. Lax enforcement of local environmental law and an uneducated populace create easy dumping grounds for multinational corporations faced with rising disposal costs in their own nations.

Mislabeled or misrepresenting toxic waste is by no means an isolated incident: In March 1992 close to 1,000 metric tons of cadmium and lead-laced dust from Gaston Copper Recycling Corporation in South Carolina was sold to Stoller Chemical Company, who mixed it with fertilizer and sold to Bangladeshi farmers. The deception wasn't discovered until nearly all of the deadly mixture of carcinogenic and neurotoxic chemicals had already been used to fertilize fields.

Shipbreaking

A dramatic and very visible example of the toxic-waste trade is shipbreaking. Massive container ships from all over the world are sent to for dismantling to Gujarat, India, and to Guangzhou, China. Some rudimentary equipment and safety measures are used in China, but in India, when a decommissioned oil tanker or aged freighter is towed up onto the beach, thousands of people scramble onto the ships and rip them apart with their bare hands, with and no thought given to the deadly polyvinyl chlorides (PVCs), asbestos, and toxic marine effluents. According to Greenpeace, the incidence of cancer amongst the shipbreakers in nearly 25 percent.

In the slightly more restrained shipbreaking yards in China, analysis of sediment in the waters around the area demonstrated extremely high levels of heavy metals, hormone disrupters, dioxin-producing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and fuel oil. Chinese workers for the most part use adequate protective gear, but China's share of the world's shipbreaking is going down.

India handles nearly 70 percent of the world's shipbreaking at present, and Bangladesh and Vietnam are entering the fray in preparation for the scheduled doubling of shipping tonnage for scrap in 2005. Shipbreakers can take some comfort in that ships have been getting much safer in the past thirty years (about the average lifespan of commercial ship), so that future shipbreaking will be marginally safer. Growing awareness of the problem is also likely to initiate eventual reform, although it may take some time in India, which gets approximately 15 percent of its steel from scrapping ships.

Electronic Waste

One of the most serious toxic-waste disposal problems facing Asia is that of electronic waste—the deadly by-products of computer manufacturing and obsolescence. Some 315 million computers in the United States alone are expected to become obsolete by the year 2004, and most will end up in Asia. Computer manufacture was once considered an environmentally friendly operation, but it is gradually emerging from organizations such as California's Silicon Valley Toxic Coalition (SVTC) just how big the problem of computer waste really is.

According to the SVTC, a single cathode-ray-type monitor (the sort that looks like a television screen) is loaded with harmful elements or chemicals, including brain-damaging lead, PVCs, and brominated flame retardants that have been linked to birth defects and cancer. Unfortunately, according to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, it is ten times cheaper to send a computer monitor to China than it is to recycle it.

The computer itself also contains mercury, cadmium, and chromium—all poisonous. Regrettably, computers are also made with valuable metals, such as copper, that make them irresistible to uninformed and ill-prepared "dirty recycling" operations willing to accept them. The Computer Recyclers Association of the Philippines (CRAP) imports dioxin-laden Australian computer waste because of the copper it contained, without being aware of the hazards. Unfortunately, without effective international enforcement of the prohibitions against exporting toxic waste, toxic-waste trafficking is not likely to disappear.

James B. McGirk

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TOY INDUSTRY—CHINA The world toy industry was a \$69.5 billion business in 2000. U.S. toy imports alone totaled \$15.1 billion, of which China supplied \$10.7 billion, or 71 percent. Back in the early 1980s, Hong Kong was the world's largest toy exporter. But labor and land became more expensive with Hong Kong's development. In 1984 the nearby special economic zone of Shenzhen, China, offering a tariff-free foreign investment zone with low-cost labor and factory space, was opened. Hong Kong toy manufacturers moved more and more production across the border. By the early 1990s, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other Asian corporations, having obtained exclusive rights to produce toys according to the specifications established by the giant toy makers of the West and Japan, manufactured brand-name toys as well as toys under their own labels in joint ventures in China, concentrated in the southern province of Guangdong near Hong Kong. China became the world's largest toy manufacturer and leading exporter, reaching an export volume of \$8 billion in 1993.

But low wages; appalling safety, health, and working conditions; and prohibition on labor organizing prompted the international labor movement to call for a boycott of Chinese toys until working conditions were improved. Fatal industrial disasters in the industry were cited by American human rights and labor activists to support their call for eliminating most-favored-nation (MFN) status for China. American toy makers, with growing investment in China and dependency on Chinese exports, argued against such demands, which they claimed would lead to higher prices for American consumers and loss of jobs for American workers who packaged Chinese goods or completed the assembly of toys partially assembled in China.

Economic forces, not politics, brought about an improvement of safety standards and the increasing replacement of hazardous sweatshops by well-lit, well-ventilated modern factories employing adult workers. The product trend was swinging toward more complex, sophisticated, and interactive toys in the late 1990s. Big buyers preferred to outsource to bigger Chinese manufacturers that could meet the volume demands, handle more complex toys, and also comply with their codes of conduct regulating working conditions. The Chinese industry was consoli-

dated; many small toy factories closed shop even as the industry as a whole grew.

In the late 1990s, some six thousand toy manufacturers existed in China, more than 80 percent of which were funded by overseas capital. China and Hong Kong together accounted for some 60 percent of the world toy trade.

Robert Y. Eng

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TOYAMA (2002 est. pop. 1.1 million). Toyama Prefecture is situated in the central region of Japan's island of Honshu. It occupies an area of 4,252 square kilometers. Its geography features mountains encircling a central plain. Toyama is bordered by Toyama Bay and the Sea of Japan, and by Niigata, Nagano, Gifu, and Ishikawa prefectures. Once known as Etchu Province, it assumed its present name in 1871 and its present borders in 1883.

The prefecture's capital is the city of Toyama, growing up as a castle town around the fortress built in 1532 by the Maeda family. Today it is home to Toyama University and is the heart of the Hokuriku Industrial Region, with shipbuilding and aluminum refining as its main industries.

During the Edo period (1600/1603–1868), the region was ruled by the Maeda family as Japan's wealthiest domain. Today rice remains the primary crop, followed by pears, tea, and vegetables. Tulip bulbs are grown for export. The fisheries are active, with Toyama Bay noted for its firefly squid. Plentiful hydroelectric power fuels the machinery, chemical, metals processing, lumber, and textile industries. Visitors are drawn to the Himi coast, the Kurobe Gorge in Chubu Sangaku National Park, and the rustic steep-roofed farmhouses of the Gokayama district.

E. L. S. Weber

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TRABZON (1998 est. pop. of city 144,000). Trabzon (Trebizond), capital of Trabzon province (1998 est. pop. 850,000) in a mountainous region of north-



The Hagia Sophia Byzantine Church in Trabzon in 1990. (DAVID SAMUEL ROBBINS/CORBIS)

eastern Turkey on the Black Sea, took its name from the table-shaped plateau on which the city is located. Known as Trapezus in antiquity, the city was colonized by Greeks from Sinope, also on the southern shore of the Black Sea, west of Trabzon.

The city was occupied by the Seljuks at the end of the eleventh century and became the capital of the Greek empire of Trebizond from 1204 to 1461. Captured by the Mongols in 1240, it remained under their rule until conquered by the Ottoman sultan Mehmed II (1432–1481) in 1461. The Ottomans ordered the city's churches converted to mosques; one of these, the Aya Sofya, became a museum in 1964. Sultan Selim the Grim (1467–1520) served as governor (1490–1512) until his accession to the throne in 1512. His son Süleyman the Magnificent (1494 or 1495–1566) was born in Trabzon and raised there until he took the throne in 1520.

Trabzon's historical importance derives from its location on one of the most important routes between Europe and Central Asia and its use as a seaport. Venetian and Genoese merchants frequently visited Trabzon before the Ottoman conquest, and for centuries exports from Asia, such as silk, cotton fabrics, and wine, passed through its port.

During World War I Trabzon was attacked by the Russians in 1915 and was occupied by them in 1916. The Turks recaptured the city on 24 February 1918. The town's population consists mainly of boatmen and fishermen. Trabzon continues to be known for its tobacco, hazelnuts, and tea.

Tipi Isikozlu-E. F. Isikozlu

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TRAILOK (reigned 1448–1488), reformer of Ayutthaya (Thailand). The eldest son of King Boromaraja II (reigned 1424–1448) of Ayutthaya, Prince Ramesuen (Trailok) was appointed governor of Pistanuloke Province in 1438. He succeeded his father in 1448. He attempted to subjugate the Lan Na kingdom of King Tilokracha, but his efforts were in vain. Trailok then turned his attention toward the administrative problems faced by the expanding nation because the existing structure was not adequate.

Trailok divided Ayutthaya into provinces instead of principalities, and a prince was put in charge of each province. There was to be one royal army. Army and civilian branches of civil administration were separated. Each branch was divided into departments. In view of growing maritime commerce, a separate department was created for foreign affairs and trade. The Kot Montien Ban (Palace Law) of 1458 created a hierarchy for royalty, each rank having separate laws. For smooth succession to the throne, the position of heir apparent was created for the eldest son or full brother of the king. The grades that determined the social status of a person were set in accordance with the person's land holdings. Some of the reforms of the king violated the principle of equality before law, but they gave stability to Ayutthaya. Trailok also did much to encourage the arts and literature.

Patit Paban Mishra

See also: **Thailand—History**

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TRAN DO (b. 1922), Vietnamese general. Born 1922 in Thai Binh Province, Do joined the Indochina Communist Party in 1940. A career military officer, he rose quickly through the ranks, serving in the battle of Dien Bien Phu before being sent to South Vietnam in 1963. He served as Deputy Party Secretary of the Southern Liberation Armies, the top political officer in the Central Office for South Vietnam, the

office through which Hanoi directed the National Liberation Front and its guerrilla army, the People's Liberation Armed Force. A top military commander, he helped plan the 1968 Tet Offensive. Do was responsible for infiltrating more northern troops into the south in order to maintain Hanoi's control over the southern rebellion.

In addition to his military positions, Major General Do served on the Vietnamese Communist Party's Central Committee from 1960 to 1991, as vice-chairman of the National Assembly, and head of the Central Committee's Culture and Arts Department. In that post, Do became a staunch advocate of intellectual freedom and the abolition of ideological controls on arts and letters. He drafted key documents for the party in the mid-1980s that liberalized intellectual life, but ideological conservatives forced his retirement in October 1988. Do became a vociferous critic of the regime in the 1990s and began a letter-writing campaign attacking corruption, the lack of a free press, and the lack of political and economic reform. He was expelled from the Vietnamese Communist Party in January 1999 and remains the most prominent dissident in the country.

Zachary Abuza

TRAN VAN GIAU (b. 1911), Vietnamese revolutionary and historian. Tran Van Giau was born in Tan An, south of Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) in 1911. He received his secondary education in France and reportedly obtained a doctorate in history from the University of Toulouse. While in France he became involved in the Vietnamese revolutionary movement and joined the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). In 1931 he was recruited, with several others, to study at the Oriental School in Moscow (the Stalin School). He returned to Saigon in 1933 and headed the ICP's executive committee. He was arrested briefly on a number of occasions (1933, 1935, and 1939) and was sent to Poulo Condore prison on Con Dao Island, but he was nonetheless able to play an active role in the war against France in 1945. In 1946 the ICP removed him from his position, allegedly for his brutal repression of potential rivals. He then was sent to Thailand as a representative of the Vietminh. By 1954 Tran Van Giau was no longer an influential political figure, but he rose to prominence once again as a leading historian of Vietnam and Vietnam's communist movement. As such, he has produced a considerable body of work on contemporary Vietnamese history.

Micheline R. Lessard

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TRANS ALAI The most northerly section of the massive Pamir Mountains, the Trans Alai Range stretches east to west for 240 kilometers along the frontier between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The unbroken and somewhat rounded summits rise abruptly from all directions with only minor foothills. The fertile Alai valley of Kyrgyzstan lies north, and Tajikistan's Muksu and Markansu valleys lie south. Lenin Peak (7,134 meters, originally Mount Kaufmann) is the second highest peak in the Pamirs and was the second highest point in the former Soviet Union. In contrast to other Central Asian summits, the gentle southern slopes and ordinarily reliable summer weather attract throngs of mountaineers.

The snowbound upper elevations give way to deep canyons that shade 12,170 square kilometers (776 square miles) of "Turkestan type" glaciers, where overburden from moraines and rock falls insulates the ice from summer heat. Winter snow and spring rains nourish lush steppes and alpine pastures that Kyrgyz and Tajik herders utilize for goats, sheep, horses, and yaks from June to August. The Pamirs Highway between Osh, Kyrgyzstan, and Khorog, Tajikistan, crosses the range at Kyzalart Pass (4,280 meters). Winter snows frequently close this lone vehicle route, leaving the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast of Tajikistan isolated from the outside world. Saline Kara Kul Lake nestles south of the pass and is an important stop for migratory waterfowl.

Stephen F. Cunha

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TRANS-MONGOLIAN RAILWAY The Trans-Mongolian Railway, a prominent offshoot of the Trans-Siberian Railway, connects Mongolia with

the border of China and via the Trans-Siberian Railway with Moscow. Starting at Ulaan Ude in Russia, the rail line extends approximately 530 kilometers to Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, and a further 730 kilometers through the Gobi Desert to the border with China at Dzamiin Uud. At this point the trains must change tracks, owing to the fact that Soviets built their railways a gauge wider to prevent foreign invasions by rail. From the Chinese border, the train travels another 800 kilometers past the Great Wall to Beijing.

The rail from Ulaan Ude to Ulaanbaatar was finished in 1949 by a Mongolian-Soviet joint-stock company. Soon after, the rail extended to the border with China. The Trans-Mongolian Railway quickly became the primary mode of transportation between Mongolia and Russia and consequently increased economic and cultural relations between the two countries. In addition to providing transportation between Moscow, Ulaanbaatar, and sometimes Beijing, the line served as a main line for spurs to several important mining sites. Rail lines now run from the Trans-Mongolian Railway to mines in Choir, Erdenet, Bor Ondor, and Baganuur.

Daniel Hruschka

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TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM—CHINA

China, with its enormous and increasingly urbanized population, faces unprecedented challenges and opportunities in the way in which it transports its citizens and goods. The country's recent rapid period of economic growth is set to continue for the foreseeable future, placing increased pressure on its political leaders and urban designers to move toward more efficient and environmentally benign transportation systems for its people and products.

Roads

The main focus for upgraded transportation systems has been on China's road and vehicle network. China's light industry and agricultural sectors rely heavily on road-based transportation. Although China has more than 100 people per motor vehicle, compared with 1.3 people per motor vehicle in the United States, the number of motor vehicles in China more than tripled in the 1985–2000 period. There are more than 11 million vehicles: 6 million trucks and buses, 3.6 million cars, and 1.4 million other vehicles (mainly motorcycles).

More foreign automobile companies are entering China to meet the demand for new vehicles. Volkswagen commenced manufacturing automobiles in Shanghai in 1985. Other major companies have also commenced manufacturing for the Chinese market, including Daihatsu, Citroen, Peugeot, General Motors, and Daimler-Chrysler. Most vehicles are built in the Shanghai region and near Dalian in the northeastern province of Liaoning.

China has increased its road system such that now all towns can be reached via the highway system. Approximately 1.3 million kilometers of roads stretch across the country. In 1998 alone, 37,000 kilometers of highways were built; of those, 1,487 kilometers were expressways.

A consequence of China's growth in motor vehicles is increased use of energy (mostly oil). If China achieved U.S. levels of vehicle ownership, it would have more than 900 million vehicles—nearly 50 percent more than the total number of vehicles in the world in 2001. China would need to consume more oil than is currently produced throughout the world.

Rail

China has an extensive rail network, with Beijing being the hub for the north-south line to Shanghai and Guangzhou. Rail lines also extend to the west and connect China to Europe. New lines are being built, particularly in southern China and other industrial areas. There are nearly 60,000 kilometers of railway lines, most of which were built since 1949.

China's first subway was constructed in Beijing in 1969. Many of the densely populated cities have developed or plan to develop commuter rail transportation systems involving subways and light rail. These include the cities of Shenyang, Changchun, and Harbin in the northeast and other major cities, including Shanghai, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Shenzhen, and Chongqing.

In 2001 the length of China's light rail system was approximately 120 kilometers. By 2005 it is expected that more than 400 kilometers of rail transit systems will have been built, reflecting a construction cost of more than 130 billion yuan (\$15.7 billion) between 2001 and 2005.

Air

In the period since 1970, China has constructed and expanded numerous airports, mainly to handle increasing tourist traffic and to link remote areas. By 1999 more than 140 airports were open to civil airplanes.

Beijing is the hub of domestic air travel from which airlines reach all provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities. The other two international gateway airports are in Guangzhou and Shanghai. Around thirty Chinese airlines serve the domestic market. China has a fast-growing fleet of Western aircraft and is one of Boeing's top three customers.

Water

As China has a coastline of over 18,000 kilometers and 110,000 kilometers of navigable inland waterways, it is easy to understand why water transport has a long history in the country. Countless boats transport goods along rivers and the coast. The major inland navigable rivers are the Chang (Yangtze) (known as the "golden waterway" of China's inland river transport), Huang (Yellow), Pearl, Heilongjiang, Huai, Qiantang, Minjiang, and Huangpu, as well as the Grand Canal between Beijing and Hangzhou. The volume of passenger transportation is approximately 12 billion trips per year. There are more than five thousand berths at around seventy major inland river ports. There are twenty large ports for international shipping in China, with Shanghai Harbor being one of the largest in the world.

Transport Options

China is presented with enormous dilemmas concerning the most appropriate mode of development as the country seeks to continue its economic growth. The path it chooses will significantly affect numerous countries. China's transportation policies will increasingly influence the world energy market and trans-boundary environmental deterioration, particularly a reduction in regional air quality and an increase in greenhouse gases if there are increased emissions of gasoline-driven vehicles. China's transportation policies will also affect the health of its citizens, because the emissions from gasoline-driven vehicles are detrimental to people's health. However, China can focus on less environmentally harmful alternatives, such as vehicles powered by natural gas or batteries, as well as electric hybrids and fuel-cell vehicles powered by non-polluting and renewable hydrogen. China is relatively unhindered in developing these options because the country is not heavily dependent on oil. It has little existing petroleum vehicle-related investments, such as is common in many Western countries, and it can base its transport infrastructure on cleaner fuels. China is particularly interested in vehicles powered by natural gas because natural gas is abundant in several provinces.

China is investigating cleaner fuel technologies through institutions such as the Institute of Natural

Gas Vehicles in Beijing. Currently, China's transportation policy is focused both on the development of "cleaner" vehicles and on increasing investment in mass transportation systems in the cities. China's latest five-year plan (2001–2005) focuses on coordinating economic development among different regions and between urban and rural areas. The plan increases the priority given to environmental protection and indicates that China will attempt to pursue less environmentally harmful transportation systems than were favored by many Western countries at a similar stage of economic development.

Warwick Gullett

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TREATY OF AMITY AND CO-OPERATION OF 1976 The Treaty of Amity and Co-operation (TAC) was signed in the first Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit on 24 February 1976, in Bali, Indonesia, by the five ASEAN founding members—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The TAC fundamentally mirrors the ASEAN mode of interaction among members. The TAC signifies the group's commitment to the principles of respecting each nation's independence, national identity, the right to be free from external interference, and the noninterference in internal affairs of member countries.

In the 1992 ASEAN summit in Manila, Philippines, the decision was made to allow other Southeast Asian states to join the TAC, gaining observer status and establishing links with the ASEAN group. It paved the way for other nations to join the ASEAN family: Brunei Darussalam (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos (1997), Cambodia (1999), and Myanmar (1999). Today the ASEAN region has a total population of about 500 million with a roughly combined gross national product of \$600 billion. Against this backdrop, the TAC embodies the collective will and aspirations of all Southeast Asians.

As a political commitment, the TAC reflects one of the most important ASEAN initiatives for implementing regional order and cooperation among mem-

ber countries. With the endorsement of the United Nations General Assembly in 1992, the TAC became an important instrument in enhancing regional peace and stability. In accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the TAC is recognized as a mechanism for promoting regional relations on a broad consensual basis and settling intra-ASEAN disputes through the rule of law.

Against all odds and despite internal rivalries and territorial disputes among highly diverse member countries, the deep-seated principles of the TAC have been inspirational in the realization of ASEAN-10, which has successfully incorporated all Southeast Asian countries to be a part of ASEAN; in developing more cohesive and effective political, economic, and social relations; as well as sustaining regional peace and stability. There has been no interstate conflict or military confrontation among ASEAN members since the founding of the group. More importantly, through an agreed code of conduct, ASEAN has played a constructive role in integrating Southeast Asia into the international economy through the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC). The association has also enhanced regional and international security by promoting multilateral security dialogue with non-ASEAN members via the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which consists of twenty-two member countries.

Geetha Govindasamy

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TREATY OF GANDOMAK The Treaty of Gandomak was signed in May of 1879 between Afghanistan and Britain. The Afghan leader, Yaqub, came to power with the death of his father, Sher Ali, in February of 1879 and soon faced a crisis: Britain, enraged by Afghanistan's refusal to allow a British mis-

sion in Kabul after witnessing an unwanted Russian mission in Kabul, had sent troops into Afghanistan at the end of 1878. Before his death, Sher Ali had tried to enlist the assistance of Russia to counteract these troops but to no avail. Because the British had already occupied a large portion of the nation, Yaqub agreed to the terms of the Treaty of Gandomak in order to stop Britain from invading the rest of Afghanistan.

For all practical purposes, the Treaty of Gandomak turned Afghanistan into a British protectorate. It provided Afghanistan with British financial support and military support if Afghanistan faced foreign aggressors. In exchange, Afghanistan relinquished control of its foreign affairs to London and allowed the establishment of British missions in the capital and other major regions of the country. Moreover, London was given control over the strategic Khyber and Michni passes as well as several Afghan frontier areas. The Treaty of Gandomak, which clearly favored London, was signed by Yaqub only because of British military superiority. Following a failed Afghan military campaign against the British in October of 1879, Yaqub was forced to resign for fear of his life after having signed a treaty so disadvantageous to Afghanistan.

Houman A. Sadri

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TREATY OF GIYANTI The Treaty of Giyanti (1751) largely concluded the Third Javanese War of Succession, placed further parts of Java under Dutch control, and partitioned the Javanese kingdom of Mataram (1570s–1751) into the principalities of Surakarta and Yogyakarta. In 1746, Prince Mangkubumi of Mataram (1715?–1792) rebelled against King Pakubuwono II of Mataram (1710–1749) over the latter's extensive concessions to the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC; United East Indies Company or Dutch East India Company) on the north coast of Java. On Pakubuwono's death in 1749, Mangkubumi declared himself king, while the VOC supported Pakubuwono's son, Pakubuwono III (?–1788).

Neither side could prevail in the costly civil war, which is known as the Third Javanese War of Succession (1746–1751). In February 1755, Mangkubumi and the VOC signed a treaty, confirming the VOC's control of the north coast of Java and recognizing

Mangkubumi as ruler of approximately one-half of Mataram. He took the regal name Sultan Hamengkubuwono I and established his court at Yogyakarta, while Pakubuwono III continued to rule in Surakarta. The territories of the two principalities stretched from Cilacap in the west to Blitar in the east and were a complicated patchwork of allegiances. Only at the beginning of the nineteenth century were the two states further reduced in size and a relatively simple border drawn between them.

Robert Cribb

See also: **Dutch East India Company; Dutch in Southeast Asia**

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TRENGGANU (2002 est. pop. 927,000). The state of Trengganu lies along the eastern shore of peninsular Malaysia. It has an elongated coastline of about 250 kilometers facing the South China Sea. Until offshore oil and gas were discovered in 1978, Trengganu was one of the least developed states in the country in terms of conventional economic indicators. Mainstay activities continue to revolve around fishing and smallholding agriculture, although tourism—the state's picturesque beaches and marine life are the main attractions—and the oil boon are now bringing significant social and economic changes.

Trade links between Trengganu and China existed by the twelfth century, if not earlier, as evidenced by Chinese literary sources. The town of Kuala Berang was noted as an important trading center, and Trengganu was known by various names like Chau Chu-fei and Teng Ya-nu. An inscription dated 1303 CE uncovered in Kuala Berang indicates that an Islamic polity was also in place, predating by a century the founding of the Melaka Sultanate. However, in terms of empire building Trengganu has not been a major player. At different periods, it was a vassal state of its more powerful neighbors Melaka, Johore, and Siam before coming under British control in 1909 and subsequently becoming a constituent state of independent Malaysia in 1957.

Yeoh Seng-Guan

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TRIBES AND TRIBAL FEDERATIONS—CENTRAL ASIA

In Central and Inner Asia before modern states emerged, tribes and tribal federations were the dominant forms of political and social organization. When states arose in the region—whether imposed by an external power or emerging from the tribal organization itself—these new states bore the imprint of tribal relationships. Even today critical aspects of political and social life are rooted in earlier forms of organizations.

Varieties of Tribes and Federations

Many anthropologists no longer use the term "tribe," first, because it has become value laden; for example, expressions like "tribal warfare" imply that tribes are inherently warlike. Second, it is difficult to define "tribe" in terms of anthropological evidence, especially in relation to the once-favored evolutionary theory of human groups.

Nonetheless, there is something distinctive about social and political organizations in prestate Central and Inner Asia, and the term "tribe" serves to describe this distinctiveness. Some scholars have thought of tribes as "rural groups that have a name and distinguish between members and nonmembers, which occupy a territory, and which within that territory assume either all responsibility, or at least a significant proportion of the responsibility, for the maintenance of order" (Ahmed and Hart 1984: 1). Key to this view of a tribe is a relative political decentralization; power is normally exercised at the local level and is more diffuse than that experienced under state structures.

Traditionally, in Central and Inner Asia tribes were either sedentary or nomadic. Sedentary tribes practiced agriculture and sometimes engaged in commerce. They had a close relationship to the territory they inhabited; place-names often coincided with group identification. In the long-sedentary areas of Uzbekistan, for example, group identification with place remains common. Among sedentary populations, differences in dialect, customary practices, and mode of economy can become pronounced.

Tribal organization was different among nomads (those who migrated less predictably) and transhu-

mants (those who migrated seasonally). First, genealogy played a much stronger role in organizing nonsedentary tribes. Because they had a looser relationship to any given place, something other than physical location was needed to distinguish the members of a nomadic tribe from the nonmembers. Central and Inner Asian nomads were expected to commit to memory at least seven generations of ancestors and often more, to locate themselves in one or another tribal group.

A second distinguishing feature of nomadic tribal organization was a pattern of fissure and fusion. Groups cohered and dissolved, depending on outside threats and prevailing environmental conditions. A population, for example, that faced an outside threat might cohere as a single entity to address the threat, but after the threat diminished, the entity would probably disintegrate into smaller groups. Such fissure and fusion were understood to occur along genealogical lines; kin ties defined group boundaries, and ties of even closer kinship defined subunits.

Both sedentary and nomadic or transhumant tribes could cohere into federations. These typically began as political alliances but often evolved into something more stable. In Kazakhstan, for example, these federations (*zhuz* in Kazakh) came to be described in the genealogical terms usually limited to closer kin-based units. Each federation commanded a degree of bargaining authority with outsiders and could issue calls to arms against external foes. Especially in sedentary areas, what began as alliances or federations of different tribes evolved into stable quasi-state structures with centralized authority and mobilizable troops, if not a standing army.

Tribes and Statehood

Since it is decentralized and local, tribal organization stands in contrast to the organization of states, which typically centralize power and project it over a wide territory. Tribes may have standing political and social elites, but they lack the durable bureaucratic structures of a modern state. In Central and Inner Asia tribal organizations in many ways represented an alternative to state structures.

Tribal organization generated an alternative ideology that emphasized egalitarian values. In reality there was considerable social stratification, with aristocratic lineages enjoying positions of privilege and commercial strata enjoying the prospect of greater accumulation of wealth. Compared with nontribal contexts, however, egalitarian values were much more pervasive. The granting of hospitality to guests, widespread gift giving,

and attention to the social and economic standing of kin were all expressions of such egalitarian norms.

The tribally organized societies of Central and Inner Asia often resisted the imposition of state structures, especially in geographically remote regions where resistance could be more effective than in more accessible regions. For example, long after the Soviet Union had forcibly sedentarized the nomadic Kazakhs and had imposed bureaucratic structures on them, a spirit of resistance remained strong among the relatively remote populations on the Mangyshlak Peninsula. In parts of Soviet Central Asia, state authorities allowed local tribal elites to govern populations much as they always had, because patterns of tribal authority were difficult to undermine.

If states could be imposed on tribally organized populations, as in the Soviet Union from 1917 to 1991, tribes could also generate state structures from within. Prominent examples were the statelike structures created by Genghis Khan, which dominated much of Eurasia in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and had numerous features usually associated with states (for example, tax systems, recruitment of administrators). By creating state structures from within, Genghis Khan allowed a tribally organized core to project its power across a vast territory more effectively than had he relied on coercion alone.

Recent Transformations

What happens when states and tribally organized societies have come into contact? In Central and Inner Asia, state structures have often proved effective at governing certain populations but not others. Populations at the margins of state control have a far different relationship to the state than do populations under direct state control. Tribal populations at the margins may question the legitimacy of the ruling state elite. In Afghanistan, for example, many non-Pashtuns have felt that the ruling Taliban elite privileged Pashtuns to the detriment of non-Pashtuns. In Kyrgyzstan southern groups commonly perceive that northern elites exercise dominance illegitimately.

If urbanization and the spread of literacy accompany the imposition of state structures, a process of "detrribalization" may occur in urban areas. Given the mixing of populations and the wide array of opportunities available in cities, tribal links may weaken or even disappear. In the former Soviet Central Asia sizable populations in urban areas may know little about their tribal heritage. Any detrribalization that does occur, however, is mitigated by strong ties that many retain to the countryside, where tribal background

continues to be important. In addition, in a city, many urban dwellers use networks based on kinship or ties to place to find employment and housing. Scholars continue to debate why detribalization sometimes occurs quickly, sometimes slowly, and sometimes not at all.

Even if state structures come to govern tribes as physical entities, tribal identities continue to be vibrant and important as mental constructs with social and political significance. Thus the tribes and tribal federations of Central and Inner Asia are not merely a matter of historical or anthropological curiosity; in critical ways they remain important to the peoples themselves. Among elites, competition over scarce resources is in critical part a contest of groups based on tribal background. Moreover, much of this contest takes place behind the scenes, since elites claim to represent broad populations, not single tribal groups; they therefore often disallow public discussion of tribal backgrounds. By making such discourse difficult or even illegal, elites lend it an aura of secrecy that makes tribal background a potentially explosive issue. Not surprisingly, in genuinely democratic contexts, such as in Mongolia in 2001, tribal background and heritage are less explosive issues than in more repressive societies, but even in Mongolia they remain politically sensitive.

Edward Schatz

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TRINCOMALEE (2002 est. district pop. 356,000; est. city pop. 82,600). Since the British seized the island of Sri Lanka in 1796, Trincomalee has been the main city and center of the district of the same name. It is located in the north of the Batticaloa District of Eastern Province and to the south of the Mullaitivu District of Northern Province. From the time of the medieval South Indian Chola dynasty that ruled over northern Sri Lanka in the eleventh century, the district was overwhelmingly populated by Hindu Tamils. The city of Trincomalee was established at an extensive and nearly circular natural harbor, which the

British considered the best and most beautiful in Asia. From medieval times, the city was therefore well suited to attract long-distance trade. The Cholas established a Siva temple dedicated to Trikoneshvara on the promontory of the bay. It is from this temple, which was destroyed by the Portuguese in 1624 in order to build fortifications, that the city and district derive its name. When the Vereenigte Ostindsche Compagnie (Dutch East India Company) drove the Portuguese from the island, the Dutch erected commanding fortifications at the site, and since British times the city prospered as the island's second and most important harbor and as a trade center dominated by local Hindu Tamils and Muslim merchants. Since the 1950s, however, because of Sinhalese colonization, the nationalization of the harbor, and the establishment of industrial plants, the ethnic balance has shifted in favor of Sinhalese farmers and workers. In the early 2000s, the district population consists of 34 percent Sinhalese, 37 percent Tamils, and 29 percent Muslims.

Jakob Roesel

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TRIPURA (2001 pop. est. 3.1 million). Tripura (formerly Tipperah) is a small state in northeast India. Its area is 10,486 square kilometers. Indian territory lies to the northeast, and Tripura is bordered on all other sides by Bangladesh. The region is mostly wooded and hilly; approximately 50 percent is forested, and shifting cultivation has been a traditional practice. The highest range of hills (up to 1,000 meters) is Jampui Kang. The chief rivers—the Meghara, Titas, Gumti, and Dakatia—are navigable throughout the year.

For approximately thirteen hundred years before its accession to the Indian Union, Tripura was a Hindu princely state ("Hill Tipperah," to the British). It became a state of India in 1949, then a centrally administered Union Territory in 1957, and reverted to a state in 1972. The capital is Agartala, which is the location of Tripura University. Tripura is divided into three districts, and is governed by a sixty-member legislative assembly. The main languages spoken by the people are Bengali, Kakbarak, and Manipuri. About 24 percent of the land is cultivated. Rice, wheat, tea, oilseeds, cotton, jute, mulberry, and sugarcane are grown. The largest industries are tea cultivation and handloom production, and there are small steel and

food processing plants. Sericulture is also developing in the state.

Paul Hockings

TRIVANDRUM (2001 est. pop. 745,000). Trivandrum, or Thiruvananthapuram as it is now officially called, is the capital of the state of Kerala, India. *Thiru-Anantha-puram* means the "abode of the sacred thousand-headed serpent Anantha," who forms the couch on which reclines Lord Vishnu, the preserver. Built on seven hills, Trivandrum has grown as a major tourist destination in recent times, as it is close to many fine beaches. The city covers an area of 74 square kilometers and is located in the extreme south of Kerala on the Arabian Sea.

Historically, Trivandrum was part of the territory ruled by the Ay kings up to the tenth century CE. The rulers of Venad concentrated their power in the southern part of Kerala and by the eighteenth century their control extended over the region between Trivandrum and Cape Comorin. The name also reflects the city's best-known temple, Sri Padmanabhaswamy Temple, dedicated to Padmanabha, or Lord Vishnu. In 1750 Marthanda Varma, the ruler of Travancore, dedicated the entire state to the deity of the temple.

The modern city is known for the high literacy rate of its population, as a regional center for music and the arts, and as the locale of India's first space center, now a tourist attraction.

R. Gopinath

TRUNG SISTERS In 39 CE, a Vietnamese nobleman named Thi Sach and his wife Trung Trac led the first revolt against the Chinese who had ruled Nam Viet ("southern country of the Viet") since 111 BCE. The successful military campaign enabled the Vietnamese to free themselves from Chinese rule. Trung Trac, along with her sister Trung Nhi, established a court northwest of Hanoi at Me-linh. Vietnamese tradition states that the execution of Thi Sach by the Chinese had ignited the rebellion, while Chinese sources indicate that Thi Sach simply followed his wife's authority. The Vietnamese recognized Trung Trac as queen until the Chinese, under General Ma Yuan, invaded with an army numbering around 20,000 and eventually defeated the Vietnamese forces. At the battle of Lang Bac, some 10,000 Vietnamese surrendered, and thousands more were executed. Vietnamese tradition holds that the Trung sisters escaped the Chi-

nese and committed suicide by leaping into the Day Hat River. Chinese sources, however, claim that Trung Trac and Trung Nhi were captured and beheaded, and their heads were sent to the Han court. By late 43, Ma Yuan had regained control over the Red River Delta area, and the Chinese thus secured their rule over the Vietnamese.

The Trung Sisters (Hai Ba Trung, "the two ladies Trung"; also known as Truong Vuong or Trung Nu Vuong, "the queens Trung") are today revered by many Vietnamese as the most important heroines in Vietnamese history. The anniversary of their deaths is Vietnamese Women's Day, and the Vietnamese hold annual ceremonies honoring them on the sixth day of the seventh month of the lunar calendar. In practically every Vietnamese city, there is a street named "Hai Ba Trung" in honor of the two Vietnamese revolutionaries.

Richard B. Verrone

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TRUONG VINH KY (1837–1898), Vietnamese linguist, collaborator with the early French regime. Truong Vinh Ky (Petrus Jean-Baptiste Vinh Ky) was a Catholic-educated Vietnamese scholar who collaborated with the early French colonial regime in southern Vietnam. Ky was also a brilliant linguist who spoke more than twenty-five Asian and European languages and was a pioneer in early efforts to popularize *quoc ngu* (the romanized form of Vietnamese). Born in the Mekong Delta region of Ben Tre, Ky was educated by Catholic priests in his home village and later at missionary schools in Cambodia and Penang, Malaysia. In 1858 he returned home to become a village teacher, only to leave again in 1863 to serve as an interpreter for a Vietnamese imperial delegation to France. While there, he met Victor Hugo and Ernest Renan among other European intellectuals and became convinced of the value of European civilization and culture and the potential benefits of French colonial tutelage for his own country.

On his return from Europe, Ky resumed his role as an educator, now serving the French colonial regime. He taught at the College des Interprètes in Saigon, where he trained many early colonial officials and later gave French lessons to a future Nguyen emperor, Dong Khanh (reigned 1886–1888). Truong Vinh Ky

was also a prolific researcher and writer, producing more than one hundred books on topics ranging from grammar and linguistics to history and geography. He wrote and published the first work in romanized Vietnamese in 1866, and between 1869 and 1872 he served as editor of the earliest romanized Vietnamese newspaper, *Gia Dinh Bao*. Ky's *Cours D'histoire Annamite* (1875) was the first French-language survey of Vietnamese history, and he also produced the first French-Vietnamese dictionary.

George Dutton

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TSEDENBEL, YUMJAAGIYN (1916–1991), Mongolian premier and president. Yumjaagiyn Tsendenbel was born in the Uvs province of Mongolia and ruled Mongolia as its premier from 1952 to 1974 and then as its president from 1974 to 1984.

In 1931, he had joined the Mongolian Youth League and in 1939 the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP). From then on, his life was dedicated to politics.

In 1940, Tsendenbel became the general secretary of the MPRP and forced the introduction of the Cyrillic alphabet into Mongolia, replacing the vertical classical Mongolian script introduced by the great Mongol leader Genghis Khan (c. 1162–1227). In the 1940s and early 1950s, he served in numerous positions in the government and the MPRP, until the death of Choybalsan (1895–1952), Mongolia's prime minister at the time. In 1952, Tsendenbel became the premier of Mongolia.

In many Mongols' eyes, Tsendenbel was merely a Soviet puppet who followed the example of Leonid Brezhnev (1906–1982), the Soviet leader and general secretary of the Communist Party. Furthermore, people believed his Russian wife possessed too much influence. His detractors had reason for criticism. Tsendenbel developed a cult of personality and in 1962

purged many of Mongolia's leading academics and politicians. Although few were actually executed, many suffered in exile. Tsendenbel's rule came to an end in 1984, when Batmonkh (b. 1926) took over the post of prime minister while Tsendenbel was in Moscow. Although Tsendenbel stayed in Moscow and died there in 1991, he was buried in Ulaanbaatar, the capital of Mongolia.

Timothy M. May

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TSENG KUO-FAN. See **Zeng Guofan.**

TSUENBAL. See **Tsendenbel.**

TSUSHIMA ISLAND (1996 pop. 44,000). Tsushima Island, which is actually two main islands totaling 694 square kilometers and more than one hundred smaller ones in the strait between Japan and South Korea, belongs to Nagasaki Prefecture. Its principal industries are fishing and forestry. The island's largest city is Izuhara.

As Japan's closest landmass to the Asian continent, Tsushima traditionally served as an integral link in Japan's relations with China and Korea. The island was devastated by the Mongols during their two invasions of Japan in 1274 and 1281. In the following centuries, Tsushima became a base for Japanese pirate (*wako*) activity in the area. In an effort to halt the pirate menace, Korea sent punitive expeditions against the island in 1389 and 1419. From the fifteenth through the mid-nineteenth centuries, Korean-Japanese trade was supervised by the So daimyo family of Tsushima and restricted to walled compounds (*wakan*) in Korea.

After American commodore Matthew Perry opened Japan to the outside world in the 1850s, Tsushima also played a key role in the country's new relationship with the West. In 1861, Russia failed in an attempt to take the island. Then, in 1905, the decisive naval battle of the Russo-Japanese War was fought in the waters off

Tsushima, assuring Japan of victory over the European power.

Lane R. Earns

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TU LUC VAN DOAN Tu Luc Van Doan (Independent Literary Group) was a literary club founded in Vietnam by a group of well-known writers, following the lead of Nguyen Tuong Tam, also known as Nhat Linh. Its goal was to use literature as a means of bringing about profound literary and social changes in colonial Vietnam. Among the "Ten Commandments" of the organization were resolutions to write original works, not to translate foreign authors, and to write simply, using pure Vietnamese language while at the same time applying Western methodologies to Vietnamese literature. Other commandments expressed the group's commitment to improve society and respect individual freedom, to encourage patriotism by emphasizing the beauty and distinctive character of Vietnam in literature, and to denounce Confucianism as anachronistic.

The club published two magazines, *Phong Hoa* (Customs) and *Ngay Nay* (Today), which attracted a wide readership. It also managed a publishing house named Doi Nay (Modern Life), which produced, from 1933 to 1936, close to sixty thousand copies of novels or poetry collections. Tu Luc Van Doan exerted a tremendous influence on Vietnamese literature. It published the first modern novels in Vietnam and initiated the new poetry movement shaped by nationalist and anticolonial sentiments.

Lam Truong Buu

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TUJIA The Tujia are the eighth-largest ethnic group in China; numbering 5.7 million, they are more numerous than the better-known Mongols and Tibetans. Settlements of the Tujia are distributed over western Hunan and western Hubei provinces, as well as in several autonomous counties under the jurisdiction of Chongqing municipality.

Origins of Tujia Language and Present-Day Usage

Some linguists consider the Tujia language to be part of the Yi language branch of the Sino-Tibetan language family. According to others, however, although the Tujia language shares some characteristics with the Yi languages, those characteristics are not enough to make the Tujia a member of that branch. Nonetheless, it is beyond question that the language, like those in the Yi branch and some others, belongs to the Tibeto-Burman subfamily of the Sino-Tibetan family. The language has no written form.

Chinese is the dominant language used by the Tujia; many Tujia speak nothing but Chinese. Some are bilingual, speaking both Chinese and Tujia. A number also speak the language of the Miao (known outside of China as the Hmong), one of their immediate neighbors. Less than 200,000 Tujia still rely on the Tujia language as their major means of communication.

Tujia Names

In their own language, the Tujia call themselves *Bidzib-ka*. In history, they were called various names by their neighbors, based on perceived ethnic markers or distinguishing signs, such as their totem (the white tiger, at one time the totem of their chief), or names of rivers or places where they lived. The name "Tujia" came into being in the late seventeenth century when a large number of Han Chinese (the Chinese ethnic majority people) migrated into the Tujia area. The term, which means "aboriginal families" in Chinese, was coined to distinguish the natives from the immigrants. This name did not become official until October 1956, when the Tujia were granted the status of "unitary ethnic group" (*danyi minzu*) by the Chinese government.

Tujia History

The early history of the Tujia is a matter of dispute. Based on clues in Chinese historical literature, some scholars believe that the Tujia are descendents of the Ba, a tribe extinguished by the Qin Dynasty (221–206 BCE). Based on linguistic characteristics and some customs that are close to the Yi in Yunnan, on the other hand, some scholars think that the ancestors of the Tujia are the *wuman* or "black barbarians," who lived in southwestern China. The fact that in the 1970s two significant Neolithic sites were found in Tujia area suggests that those regions were inhabited as early as the prehistoric period.

The picture since the Later Han dynasty (25–220 CE) is much less uncertain. Located close to the great

historical powers, the Tujia have a longer history of involvement in China's national politics than many other Chinese minorities. As early as the tenth century, so-called bridled and tethered prefectures (*jimi fuzhou*), or native tributary administrations, were established in the area. The establishments were converted into a system of native chieftains (*tusi zhidu*) in the thirteenth century. Under this system, minority areas in the Chinese empire were ruled by families of native chieftains instead of officials appointed by the central government. This system lasted in the Tujia area until 1723.

Conflict was the keynote of the recorded early history of interactions between the ancestors of the Tujia and Chinese society. With the establishment of the tributary system and the subsequent system of native chieftains, the Tujia became increasingly sinicized. During the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties, a considerable number of Tujia soldiers, called different names at different times, were sent to coastal areas to fight against the Japanese and British invaders.

In the meantime, many upper-class Tujia received a Confucian education and entered the gentry-scholar rank. Some accomplished poets and scholars of the Tujia gained national reputations. When the native-chieftain system was abolished in the eighteenth century, some Tujia customs and conventions were condemned as "corrupted" or "ugly" and were reformed by force. As a result, the Tujia were further assimilated, and many of their ethnic characteristics were lost.

Tujia Culture

Love-based marriage was a tradition among the Tujia. In recent centuries until the early 1950s, however, parental approval had become a norm, and wealth and social status became decisive factors. Cross-cousin marriage (a preferential rule requiring marriage between cross-cousins—mother's father's brother or father's sister's daughter if such a person is available) and levirate (the custom whereby a man marries the widow of his deceased brother) are commonly practiced among the Tujia. In some areas, maternal parallel-cousin marriage (a convention in which one marries an opposite-sex child of one's mother's sister) is also practiced.

Seniority of age is highly venerated by the Tujia. Elderly men and women are respected and treated well while alive, and elaborate funerals are held at their death. Mortuary ritual is also held for people who die

at a younger age, but with less care and expense. No ceremony is held for the death of a child.

There is no organized religion among the Tujia. Their faith, a mixture of animism, ancestor worship, and worship of deified deceased chiefs and heroes, has apparently been influenced by the folk religion of the neighboring Han Chinese.

The Tujia have a long tradition of sophisticated folk arts. Over seventy prescribed movements are available for dancers of the popular *bai shou wu* ("hand waving dance") to depict such things as hunting, agricultural activities, battling, and feasting. Legends tell about the genesis and migration of their ancestors as well as their aspirations for and fantasies about the ideal life. Almost every Tujia is an accomplished singer of improvised or traditional ballads, which cover all aspects of daily life and feeling.

The traditional Tujia economy is diversified. Agriculture in narrow strips of terraced fields is complemented by logging, hunting, fishing, and growing or working on cash crops. The Tujia are also known for their traditional weaving, knitting, and embroidery. A variety of light and heavy industries have been developed in the Tujia area, and Jishou University was established there in 1958. In the past two decades, over 95 percent of Tujia children received at least primary education.

Chuan-kang Shib

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TUMEN RIVER The Tumen River (Tuman-gang) is the second-longest river on the Korean Peninsula. In all, it extends 520 kilometers, first flowing northeast from the slopes of Mount Paektu and then southeast through narrow gorges to the East Sea or Sea of Japan. The river is rather shallow due to the dry climate of its drainage basin, which has an area of 24,296 square kilometers. However, in its lower reaches, the Tumen is as wide as 300 meters and is navigable for 80 kilometers. The river is frozen for three to four months of the year.

The Tumen River became the permanent northern-frontier border of Korea when six garrison forts were established there during the reigns of the Choson monarchs T'aejo (1392–1398) and Sejong (1418–1450). In 1909, the river was officially recognized as the international border between China and Korea. A Sino-Russian agreement in 1860 gave Korea and Russia a 16.5-kilometer border demarcated by the Tumen River. Korea and Russia have not signed any treaty to verify this border, but it is undisputed.

The Tumen River and its tributaries have been developed into a valuable source of hydroelectric energy. Efforts are being made to transform the Tumen River area into a free-trade zone.

Brandon Palmer

TUNGABHADRA RIVER The Tungabhadra (or Tumbudra) River is a major tributary of the Kistna River, which flows eastward across peninsular India. The Tungra and the Bhadra rivers rise in the Western Ghats, join in Shimoga District, and the Tungabhadra flows 640 kilometers eastward across northern Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh states. The river falls into the Kistna River in Raichur District, becoming its chief tributary before it continues eastwards to the Bay of Bengal. The river was of great economic importance to the Hoysala and Vijayanagar kingdoms (c. 1110–1327 and 1336–1565, respectively), and the Vijayanagar capital at Hampi lay on its right bank. Here and elsewhere its waters have been used for irrigation, but because of its rapid flow and rocky channel, most reaches are only navigable by small boats. The huge Tungabhadra reservoir was constructed at Hospet in the mid-twentieth century (1945–1953). Its power generator is located at Mallapuram.

Paul Hockings

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TUNGUS LANGUAGES The Tungus (or Tungusic) languages are a group of genetically related languages spoken in eastern Siberia and northeastern China, mostly in the provinces of Heilongjiang and Liaoning, and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Re-

gion. Smaller Tungus-speaking groups are also found in Xinjiang and Mongolia. Traditionally, the family is subdivided into a Northern and a Southern branch, though this classification has occasionally been called into question.

The North Tungus languages are Evenki (formally often called simply Tungus), spoken by around 10,000 speakers in central and eastern Siberia, between the Yenisey and Amur rivers. In China, the language of the Evenki nationality, usually called Solon, has 20,000 speakers in Heilongjiang. The Oroqen (in Chinese, *Elunchun*) language, with about 4,000 speakers in Inner Mongolia, is also close to Evenki, as is Negidal, on the lower Amur (about 200 speakers). Even, formally known as Lamut and spoken exclusively in Siberia by 5,000 people, is officially written in Cyrillic script.

The South Tungus languages include Nanai (formally known as Gold), with about 5,000 speakers on the lower Amur. The 1,500 members of the Hezhen nationality in Heilongjiang, China, also speak a language close to Nanai. Ul'cha (c. 1,000 speakers) and Oroch (fewer than 100 speakers on Sakhalin island) are vanishing languages of the Nanai group. Udi (or Udihe) and Oroch, both with fewer than 500 speakers in the Amur region, form a close-knit subgroup, which is generally considered South Tungusic.

Manchu has one of the longest written traditions of the Tungus languages. The first Manchu documents, written in Mongolian script, date from the beginning of the sixteenth century. Manchu was the official language of Qing dynasty China (1644–1912). Today, very few speakers remain; most of them living in Heilongjiang. The Sibe nationality, originally a Manchu tribe relocated to Xinjiang in 1764, numbers 80,000 speakers. An early predecessor, though some scholars view it as a mere dialect, of Manchu is the Jurchen language, recorded in a unique script from the Jin dynasty (1115–1234). Some Jurchen texts were compiled in Ming times as well.

Stefan Georg

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TURA LOWLAND The Tura (or Turanian) Lowland (in Kazakh *Turan Opyty*, in Uzbek *Turan Pasttekisligi*, in Turkmen *Turan Pesligi*) is a vast plain area located east of the Ustyurt Plateau, and extending from the Kopet-Dag Mountains along the Turkmenistan-Iranian border in the southwest, to the western Siberian Plain in the north along the Russian-Kazak border. Portions of it are occupied by the republics of Turkmenistan in the south, Uzbekistan in the middle, and Kazakhstan in the north. The middle of the lowland is an internal drainage basin occupied by the Aral Sea. Once the world's fourth largest lake, the Aral Sea has been shrinking due to extensive upstream river water withdrawals from its two main water suppliers: the Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya Rivers. Beginning in the 1960s, a drastic increase in the amount of water withdrawn from the two river systems was used to irrigate more and more land to cotton. Much of the water did not reach the Aral Sea; it either drained away into lower depressions in surrounding areas or evaporated.

The Tura Lowland also contains the Kyzyl Kum (Qyzylkum) and Kara-Kum (Qorakum) deserts separated by the Amu Dar'ya River. Lying between 43° and 60° N latitude, and sitting in the rain shadow of the Tian Shan and Pamir Mountains to the south, they are the highest midlatitude deserts in the world.

David R. Smith

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TURGAY PLATEAU The Turgay Plateau is a major geographical feature of northwest Kazakhstan, extending 630 kilometers north to south and 300 kilometers east to west at an elevation of between 200 and 300 meters. Formed mostly of clay and sand and characterized by low hills, ridges, and shallow (often salt) lakes, the plateau holds deposits of magnetite, iron ore, bauxite, and coal. The plateau has a sharply continental climate. The northern region, which forms part of the steppe belt, is used for the dry farming of cereals and was incorporated into the Virgin Lands scheme initiated by Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971) in 1954, Kazakhstan being a part of the Soviet Union until the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. It now has a predominantly Russian and Ukrainian population.

The arid south, which is semidesert, is used for pastoralism, traditionally the preserve of the ethnic Kazakhs. This southern region is characterized by tablelands divided by deep depressions and ravines left by dried-up rivers.

The Turgay Plateau is crossed by the Turgay Ravine, which stretches north-south for a distance of some 800 kilometers, linking the West Siberian Lowland with the north Tura Lowland and connecting Siberia with Central Asia. With a flat bottom and heavily eroded sides, the width of the ravine varies from 20 to 75 kilometers. The Turgay River flows north and the Ubagan River south through the ravine. The groundwater is heavily mineralized and the ravine contains many salt lakes. Agriculturally, the region is used for pasture.

Will Myer

TURKEY—PROFILE (2001 est. pop. 66.5 million). Turkey, officially known as the Republic of Turkey (in Turkish, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti*), is the European gateway to Asia, one reason that the region has been home to so many cultures and civilizations since at least 6500 BCE. The country is situated in southeastern Europe and in the peninsula of Asia Minor in western Asia. The European part of Turkey is known as Thrace (*Trakya*), and the Asian part as Anatolia (*Anadolu*). Rectangular in shape, Turkey covers 780,580 square kilometers, with almost all of the land (approximately 97 percent) located in Asia. Turkey is 1,660 kilometers long from east to west and 550 kilometers wide from north to south. It is bordered by Georgia and Armenia in the northeast, the Nakhitchevan Autonomous Region of Azerbaijan and Iran in the east, Iraq and Syria in the southeast, and Greece and Bulgaria in the northwest.

Three-fourths of Turkey's boundaries are maritime, with a coastline totaling 8,372 kilometers. The Black Sea coastline is 1,695 kilometers in length; the Aegean, 2,805; and the Mediterranean, 1,577. The Marmara coastline, which links the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea, is 927 kilometers long and includes two straits: the Bosphorus, between the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles, between the Sea of Marmara and the Aegean Sea.

Hittites, Urartians, Lydians, Ionians, Romans, and Byzantines are some of the many peoples who in ancient days conquered and populated the area of modern Turkey. The Seljuk Turks settled there in the eleventh century, establishing the first Turkish empire



TURKEY

Country name: Republic of Turkey
Area: 780,580 sq km
Population: 66,493,970 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 1.24% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 18.31 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 5.95 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: -0 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio: 1.02 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 47.34 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth: 71.24 years, male: 68.89 years, female: 73.71 years (2001 est.)
Major religion: Muslim (mostly Sunni)
Major languages: Turkish (official), Kurdish, Arabic, Armenian, Greek
Literacy—total population: 85%, male: 94%, female: 77% (2000)
Government type: republican parliamentary democracy
Capital: Ankara
Administrative divisions: 80 provinces
Independence: 29 October 1923 (successor state to the Ottoman Empire)
National holiday: Independence Day, 29 October (1923)
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal
GDP—real growth rate: 6% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita (purchasing power parity): \$6,800 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: not available
Exports: \$26.9 billion (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Imports: \$55.7 billion (c.i.f., 2000 est.)
Currency: Turkish lira (TRL)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Book Factbook* 2001. Retrieved 5 March, 2002, from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>

in Asia Minor. The Ottoman Turks founded their empire in the fourteenth century.

Geography

Turkey has a rich topography, with broad plateaus in the central region, low mountain ranges in the north and south, and mountainous highlands in the east. There are three main climates with subvariations. On the western coast, from the Marmara region down to the south, the climate is mild and wet in winter and hot and dry in summer. The Mediterranean coast enjoys warmer weather. The Black Sea region is temperate and rainy year round. The interior has a semi-continental climate with hot, dry summers and cold, snowy winters. The climate is coldest in eastern Anatolia, where temperatures can fall as low as -23°

-40°C. The hottest summers occur in southeast Anatolia, where the temperature reaches as high as 40°C.

Turkey is divided into seven geographical regions: Mediterranean, Aegean Sea, Marmara, Black Sea, central Anatolia, eastern Anatolia, and southeast Anatolia. The highest mountain is the biblical Mount Ararat, with an altitude of 5,165 meters. Kackar (altitude 3,923 meters), and Erciyes (3,917 meters) are other notable mountains. The Euphrates, Kizilirmak, Sakarya, and Tigris are the country's longest rivers.

People

Turkey's population is relatively young, with a dependency ratio of 64.68 percent. In 2001 the population growth rate was estimated at 1.24 percent. Population density per square kilometer was 79. Most



of the population is concentrated in the western part of the country, with two-thirds of the population living in cities. Istanbul, with a population of more than 9 million, is one of the largest cities in the world.

The rights of non-Muslim minorities, namely, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews, were regulated by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Officially there are no ethnic minorities in the Muslim population of Turkey. While the ethnic origins of the Turks vary, they are united by their shared Turkish identity. The Kurds, the second-largest ethnic group in Turkey, were long denied an independent ethnic identity and were labeled "mountain Turks." Although the exact number of Kurds in Turkey is not known, there are estimated to be between 10 and 20 million. Other minorities include Arabs, the Laz, Tatars, Circassians, and Syrians.

Turkey is a secular state without an official religion, but more than 98 percent of the population is Muslim. Most follow the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam. There is a substantial minority of Alevi (a subdivision of the Shi'a sect). Although the exact number is not known, the Alevi population is estimated at around 10 to 15 percent of the Muslim population in Turkey. Non-Muslims, including Armenian Orthodox Christians, Greek Orthodox Christians, Roman Catholics, and Jews, constitute the remaining 2 percent of the population. The official language of the country is Turkish. Various dialects of Kurdish, Arabic, and Armenian are some of the other languages spoken in the

country. Although a ban on the use of the Kurdish language was lifted in 1991, there are still some restrictions on education and public broadcasting in Kurdish.

Political History

The Republic of Turkey was established in 29 October 1923 as a unitary state and was ruled by the single-party regime of the Republican People's Party for more than two decades. The first president of the republic was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who held the post between 1923 and 1938, followed by President İsmet İnönü (served 1938–1950). Since 1946 the country has been a multiparty parliamentary democracy, but Turkey's experiment in democracy suffered major setbacks because of interventions by Turkey's military in 1960, 1971, and 1980. The army's role in politics was institutionalized in the 1961 constitution, with the creation of the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC's role was expanded under the 1982 constitution.

The Turkish government structure is based on the principle of the separation of powers, although this principle is not always realized in practice. The executive body consists of the president, the prime minister, and the Council of Ministers. (Ahmet Necdet Sezer was elected president in 2000, the tenth president in the history of the Turkish republic.) The president is the head of state and is elected by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) for seven years; the president in turn appoints the prime minister, who

is the head of the government, and, on the recommendation of the prime minister, the Council of Ministers, or cabinet. The post of prime minister is usually offered to the leader of the majority party in parliament. According to the 1982 constitution, the legislative body, the TGNA, is unicameral and consists of 550 deputies elected for five years in a general election. The election system is based on proportional representation (that is, the number of seats a party has in parliament is proportional to the percentage of the popular vote that the party received), with a 10 percent national threshold. The voting age is 18.

The judicial system is composed of civilian courts, the constitutional court, and state security courts. Civilian courts include peace courts, criminal courts, and commercial courts. State security courts deal with crimes against the state, whereas the constitutional court decides the constitutionality of legislation. An independent court system is guaranteed under the constitution.

After the 1999 general elections political parties represented in the TGNA were the Motherland Party (ANAP), the Republican People's Party (CHP), the True Path Party, the Virtue Party, the Democratic Leftist Party (DSP), and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP). Bulent Ecevit, the leader of the DSP, is the prime minister of the fifty-seventh cabinet, formed on 4 June 1999.

Administratively, Turkey is divided into eighty provinces, each under a provincial governor appointed by the Council of Ministers. The provinces are headed by appointed junior governors. Provinces are also organized as municipalities, of which there were 3,126 in 2000.

The Turkish army is responsible for defending the republic against internal and external enemies. According to the internal service code of the armed forces, the army is the guardian of the Kemalist state. The Turkish military is one of the largest in the world, with total active personnel of 639,000 in 1998. In 1998, 11 percent of the budget was allocated for defense expenditure. Military service is obligatory for male Turkish citizens over the age of twenty; Turkey does not recognize conscientious objection.

Economy

Turkey is a free-market economy with a large public sector. The country is a customs union partner with the European Union and a member of the World Trade Organization. Although the annual growth rate is relatively high (3.9 percent in 1998), the Turkish economy is far from stable. In the 1990s it suffered from high in-

flation (99.1 percent in 1997), soaring unemployment, an expanding budgetary deficit, and an inefficient public sector, whose large deficits hamper the economy. The Turkish privatization board continues to make evaluations about privatizing the telecommunications, iron and steel, and banking sectors.

Turkey's gross domestic product (GDP), based on purchasing power parity calculations, was estimated at \$444 billion in 2000, with a GDP per capita of \$6,800. The official unemployment rate for 5.6 percent in 2000, but the unofficial estimates in the late 1990s indicated a rate as high as 30 percent, especially among urban youth. Turkey's budget deficit in 1998 was \$18.9 million, and the foreign debt at the end of 1998 reached \$79.8 million.

Although agriculture forms the largest sector of the Turkish economy, employing 46 percent of the economically active population in 1998, its contribution to the GNP was only 17.6 percent. In 1998 only 34 percent of arable land was used for agriculture. Wheat, sugar beets, barley, potatoes, fruits, corn, cotton, tea, tobacco, hazelnuts, and olives are the main agricultural products. Turkey's mineral natural resources include coal, iron ore, copper, chrome, manganese, borax, and bauxite. In 1998 the mining sector employed 0.8 percent of the economically active population and represented 1 percent of GDP.

Major industries in Turkey include textiles, food processing, iron and steel, and cement production. The industrial sector accounted for 22 percent of employment and 26 percent of GDP in 1998. The service sector made the biggest contribution to GDP, at 57 percent. The fastest-growing sector is tourism: in 1998, 9.5 million visitors came to Turkey and produced a revenue of \$7.2 million.

Turkey's principal exports include clothing and textiles, iron, steel, metals, vegetables, and fruits. In 2000 exports totaled \$26.9 million. Principal imports, including machinery, minerals, metals, and petroleum products, totaled an estimated \$55.7 million in 2000. Turkey's main trade partners are Germany, the United States, Italy, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Iran.

Turkey's total energy production is insufficient to meet anticipated requirements, which are growing by approximately 10 percent a year. The electrical energy demand for 2000 was projected at 130 billion kilowatt hours (kWh), whereas current hydroelectric potential was only 120 billion kWh. The government plans to fill the gap by encouraging private-sector investments in the power-generation and distribution sectors through a build-operate-transfer system, by which



Turks wave flags as they climb the steps of the Ataturk mausoleum in Ankara on 29 October 1998 in celebration of the 75th anniversary of the proclamation of the Turkish Republic. (AFP/CORBIS)

public services and infrastructures are financed and managed privately for a set period of time, at the end of which they are transferred to the government. Currently, energy is derived from thermal power plants using lignite, coal, and hydroelectric power.

The transportation network consists of 320,600 kilometers of provincial roads and highways (only 59,842 kilometers of which are highways). Railroads, long neglected, are operated by the State Railways, a state economic enterprise. Turkey has thirty-eight airports: the largest is Istanbul Ataturk Airport. Istanbul, Izmir, Trabzon, Mersin, and Iskenderun are major seaports.

Culture

Turkey is a land of contrasts. The country's rich historical heritage and its location as a bridge between East and West produce a unique cultural mosaic. The old and the new, secular and Islamic, modern and traditional live side-by-side and influence architecture, music, and lifestyles. Although modern Turkey is a secular, Western-oriented state, Islamic values play a significant role in people's lives. The relative strength of Islamic and secular values in daily life varies between rural and urban populations and between regions and social classes.

During the last few decades Turkey has experienced rapid social change. Population growth and migration to the big cities accompanied high inflation, unem-

ployment, and uneven distribution of wealth. As a result, social tensions have increased. Urbanization and economic necessities have changed traditionally defined gender roles and family life: large patrilineal families have been replaced by nuclear families with an average household size of four persons. Nevertheless, the family is still an important institution in Turkey. The country has one of the lowest divorce rates in the world: 0.5 percent per 1,000 population. Although serious steps have been taken to improve women's rights (polygamy was abolished in 1925; laws were amended to offer women equal rights of divorce and inheritance; women's suffrage was granted in 1934) and to promote gender equality, the emancipation of women depends on their level of education and their social class. There have been women politicians and members of parliament, cabinet members, as well as a female prime minister (Tansu Ciller, served 1993–1996). There is no gender discrimination in legal and educational systems.

Traditional cultural expressions, which had been ignored by the early republican regimes, have been revived during the last few decades, including folk dancing and singing. Turkish folk music is sung by *asiklar* (troubadours), playing traditional instruments such as the stringed *saz*. The mystical music of the whirling dervishes is another traditional music form.

Efforts to Westernize Turkish society are evident in the nation's flourishing arts, drama, and classical

and contemporary music. State-supported cultural activities encompass a national network of theaters, orchestras, opera and ballet companies, and various conservatories.

After a massive literacy program in the 1980s, the literacy rate rose to 85 percent by 2000. In 1998 elementary school enrollment was 9,581,180. Compulsory elementary education was increased to eight years to weaken the importance of religious high schools.

Turkey has colorful media: major newspapers include *Cumhuriyet*, *Hurriyet*, *Sabah*, *Milliyet*, *Star*, *Yeni Yuzyil*, *Zaman*, *Turkiye*, *Radikal*, and *Turkish Daily News*. Newspaper circulation is constantly supported by promotions. Aside from national papers, there are more than 700 local newspapers. The circulation of each national magazine varies between 10,000 and 50,000. The state monopoly on broadcasting was ended in the early 1990s, and, in addition to the TRT (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation), there are privately owned national stations such as ATV, Show TV, KanalD, Star TV, Bayrak TV, and more than one thousand private radio stations.

Current Issues

At the end of the second millennium Turkey faced serious economic, social, and political problems. Democratization and human rights abuses are among the most important issues, as are the Kurdish problem and Islamic fundamentalism. Corruption, uneven distribution of wealth, and chronic inflation plague the country's economy.

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TURKEY—ECONOMIC SYSTEM The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 as the last nation-state that emerged when the Ottoman empire disintegrated after World War I (1914–1918). World War I and the War of Independence (1919–1922) against foreign occupation of the Anatolian Peninsula

had a devastating impact on the new nation's economy. Following independence, the nationalist elites founded a single-party system (1924–1946) in which the Republican People's Party (RPP) undertook modernization of Turkey's social, political, and economic structure.

The Izmir Economic Congress of 1923 formally recognized private enterprise as an essential economic actor but gave the state the means to protect private enterprise because it was too weak to undertake massive infrastructure investments alone. In desperate need of capital, the state adopted policies to support private enterprise and encourage foreign investments. The economic environment for foreign capital investments was favorable because the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, by which Turkey was recognized as an independent state, precluded the new regime from imposing a protective customs regime until 1929.

To create the capital necessary for financing its ambitious modernization project, the state prioritized agriculture. Its policies contributed to an 87 percent increase in agricultural output between 1923 and 1926. After passage of the Law for the Encouragement of Industry in 1927, the state introduced policies to provide indirect support, such as subsidies and trade concessions to local infant industries. State banks and credit institutions were also used to raise financial support for local industries.

Although the state was partially successful in creating infant industries that accounted for 14 percent of the national product in 1929, agriculture remained the basis of the economy. Thus, the decline in agricultural product prices after the Great Depression of 1929 hurt Turkish exports and foreign currency earnings. Turkey began to experience a mounting economic crisis with the depreciation both of its lira currency and its balance of trade position. Also in 1929, the restrictive customs terms of the Treaty of Lausanne expired, and the Turkish state had the opportunity to take comprehensive protectionist measures. A new era began.

Etatism

To legitimize state intervention in the economy the RPP devised the approach known as etatism, which it interpreted as an instrumental policy to initiate a state-led industrialization effort. The etatist policies further involved the state in the economy, giving it a new role as a protector, producer, and planner. In its role as protector, the state first erected a protectionist customs regime and used the specialized state banks, such as the Agricultural Bank and the People's Bank, to generate direct credits for agriculture and commerce. As

a producer, the state founded state economic enterprises (SEEs). These giant companies, owned or controlled by the state, produced intermediate and consumer goods in sectors such as textiles, mining and extraction works, paper, chemicals, and pottery. As a planner, the state began to draw up five-year industrial plans to coordinate public and private efforts for development. The first plan was launched in 1934, but the second one (launched in 1938) became obsolete with the outbreak of World War II. Further state expansion in the economy was accelerated by the nationalization of foreign firms between 1931 and 1939. The state-led industrialization model not only restored the state as a principal actor but also instigated an increase in the private sector's contribution to the national product from 14 percent in 1929 to 19 percent in 1939 by placing the private sector under pervasive state protection. Protectionism was expanded in agriculture after 1938, when the Soil Products Office was founded to determine subsidy levels for wheat. This subsidization policy was later broadened to include other agricultural products. The legacy of the 1930s was the fact that state intervention in the economy created a mixed economy in which the public and private sectors operated as adversaries governed by different rules.

Although Turkey remained neutral when World War II broke out in 1939, wartime developments halted its industrialization attempts. The National Protection Law of 1940 tightened state control over the economy by giving the government absolute power in determining general price and production levels. The government also devised new fiscal policies to mobilize public and private resources for military objectives, causing a 5.6 percent decrease in industrial output. Agricultural output declined by 7.2 percent, causing food shortages. Deterioration of the living standards was coupled with growing income inequalities. In the prewar period (1933–1939), the share of industry and agriculture in national income had increased steadily. Wartime developments (1939–1945), however, caused a temporary stagnation in these sectors but a boom in the service sector, whose contribution to national income reached almost 50 percent. The wartime economy also generated a new problem—inflation—and the increase in the general price level posed a threat to the nation's balance-of-trade position.

From 1945 to the 1970s

The first priority of the postwar Turkish governments was to improve the competitiveness of Turkish exports, whose prices had risen above the world average. To this end, the Turkish lira (TL) was devalu-

ated by almost 54 percent in 1946. The RPP government in 1947 also launched the Economic Development Plan, which loosened etatist policies. It was trying to cope with the liberal challenge posed by the new opposition party, the Democratic Party (DP), founded in 1946.

Reacting to wartime economic constraints and the deterioration of living conditions, urban and rural classes realigned their political loyalties, and the DP won the 1950 elections. The party promised to liberalize the economy and broaden the scope of the state's support to the private sector. In conjunction with new trends in the Cold War period, Turkey began to integrate more with the Western alliance system against the Soviet Union and began to receive more foreign aid. The new DP government was able to allocate more public funds to support industry and agriculture.

The mechanization of agriculture, elimination of some taxes, and massive public investments in infrastructure coincided with favorable weather conditions and caused an annual growth rate of 11.5 percent in agriculture between 1950 and 1953. Turkey experienced an economic boom in the first half of the 1950s with an annual growth rate exceeding 10 percent. Industrial expansion was achieved mostly in the subsectors producing consumer goods and intermediate industrial goods such as cement, chemicals, construction material, and rubber and plastics.

Economic policies between 1954 and 1957 were designed on an as-needed basis to reverse inflation and solve the balance-of-payments difficulties by relying more on foreign debt. The National Protection Law was, however, reenacted to restore government control over price increases. These measures helped reduce the foreign trade deficit but failed to restore price stability and could not prevent a shortage of goods and the emergence of a black market. In 1958, the government introduced the nation's first comprehensive austerity program, which included standard stabilization measures such as devaluation, reduction of budget spending, price increases on SEE products, restraints on public spending, and rescheduling of foreign debt. The adverse effects of the deterioration of price stability and the restrictive economic program enforced by the DP since 1957—felt most severely by those groups with fixed incomes, such as the civil and military bureaucracies—paved the way for the first military takeover on 27 May 1960.

With the return to civilian rule in 1961 and a new constitution, the state introduced the policy of inward-looking, import-substitution industrialization (ISI). The aim was to create a capital-intensive industrial

base in a mixed economy through centrally planned five-year development plans. ISI was followed until 1980 with the goal of stimulating domestic-capital accumulation by protecting private or public infant industries through restrictive customs tariffs. In the first phase of ISI, which lasted through the 1960s, primary industries requiring low technologies, such as textiles, developed rapidly. In this phase, infant private and public industries took advantage of state protection in the form of incentives, import permits, and subsidies, and industry's share of GDP was 22.6 percent by the end of the decade.

During this time, economic development could be sustained as long as intermediate industrial goods and raw materials used by domestic industry could be imported. Some 95 percent of all imports were used by domestic industry. Yet, the by-product of the protectionist policies was an overvalued currency that hurt exports. By the end of the 1960s, Turkey began to re-experience the balance-of-payments difficulties that had dogged the economy since the mid-1950s. As an immediate remedy, the TL was devaluated by 66 percent in 1970.

From 1971 to the Twenty-First Century

When the military intervened on 12 March 1971, the nation was trapped in the vicious cycle of growing imbalances of payments, mounting foreign debts, and public deficits. The interim civilian governments between 1971 and 1973 imposed stabilization policies and temporarily achieved their goal by taking advantage of the stimulating impact of the 1970 devaluation on exports. Moreover, emigrant workers' remittances had become a major source for restoring the balance of payments. Turkey had exported labor to Europe, especially Germany, in the 1960s, and these workers' remittances, which amounted to only 2 percent of export earnings in the 1960s, soared to 50 percent in 1970–1971 and 90 percent in 1973. The stabilization measures and workers' remittances combined to provide a temporary solution to the balance-of-payments problems and created a surplus in current accounts in 1971 and 1972.

In the first half of the 1970s, Turkey entered the second phase of the ISI model, characterized by growth in those industrial sectors that required use of semiadvanced technology, such as chemicals, automobiles, electrics and electronics, and consumer durables. An increase in the volume of foreign investments was partially responsible for the dynamism in these sectors. The decline of the share of agriculture in national income from 36 percent in 1936 to 24 percent in 1973



Cranes at work in the Golden Horn shipyard in Istanbul in c. 1997. (DAVE BARTRUFF/CORBIS)

was an indicator of the economy's shift from agriculture to industry, a process that intensified after 1980. In 1983, agriculture accounted for only 17 percent of the national income.

With the first oil crisis in 1973–1974 the economy began to deteriorate because policymakers responded by subsidizing the rising world oil prices rather than restructuring Turkey's energy production and consumption policies. Moreover, the economic slowdown in Europe resulted in a decline in export earnings; thus, the nation's balance-of-trade position worsened, experiencing an average growth rate of 0.3 between 1977 and 1980. Declining emigrant workers' remittances complicated the economic crisis. Coupled with accelerated public deficits that boosted inflation to triple-digit levels by the end of the 1970s, declining remittances caused the economy to overheat. Public-sector deficits were financed by short-term external borrowing, which amounted to 66 percent of the nation's total foreign debts in 1977—debts on which Turkey could not repay even the interest in 1978. Then came the second oil crisis, in 1979.

On 24 January 1980, one of the most comprehensive structural adjustment programs toward the institutionalization of a market-oriented growth strategy was announced by the minority government of the Justice Party, which had been founded in 1961 as an heir to the DP. This program had four basic objectives: reduction of the external deficit and inflation, deregulation of the financial system, liberalization of the trade regime, and institutionalization of a market-oriented growth model. Like previous austerity programs, this program included standard stabilization measures such as devaluating the TL, abandoning the fixed exchange rate policy, eliminating most subsidies, freeing the prices of SEE products, reorganizing the taxation system, and encouraging foreign investments.



A girl in Izmir, Turkey, weaving a carpet c. 1997. (RICHARD T. NOWITZ/CORBIS)

On 12 September 1980, the military intervened. A new constitution was submitted to popular approval in 1982. Between 1980 and 1983, civilian-technician governments uncompromisingly imposed the stabilization program. In 1983, elections were held for the transition to civilian rule. The first civilian government was formed by the Motherland Party (MP), founded in 1983, and it further developed the export-oriented growth strategy between 1983 and 1987. These measures increased the share of manufactured goods in exports while decreasing the share of agricultural products, a trend that continued throughout the 1990s. Gradual abandonment of quantitative restrictions in the customs regime, continuous devaluations, export credits, export tax rebates, and sectoral incentives, as in the case of tourism, aimed to increase Turkey's export earnings to overcome the chronic balance-of-payments problem. The post-1983 governments also launched build-operate-transfer (BOT) schemes in the energy and infrastructure construction sectors. Under the BOT system, the government contracts out major infrastructure projects to private companies that build and operate a project for a fixed term prior to the transfer of the project to the public sector. Moreover, a program for privatization was initiated in 1986 to serve both as an alternative and a complement to the government's plan for stimulating foreign capital inflow.

The MP governments focused on deregulation of the financial sector, and the new Banking Law of 1985 transformed it into one of the most dynamically developed sectors. The opening of the Istanbul Stock Exchange Market in 1986 was another critical step for the integration of the Turkish economy with the international financial system, and it began to serve as a gateway for the inflow of international capital. Finan-

cial liberalization transformed the dynamics of the Turkish economy completely. Prior to 1980, Turkey's economic crises emerged due to foreign debt problems; after 1983, economic crises emerged due to the deflation policies that aimed to protect the competitiveness of Turkey's export sector.

In 1987, a referendum was held, and the exclusion of some political leaders, imposed after the 1980 military intervention, was ended. This was bad news for the Turkish economy because stiff political competition drove the ruling MP to adopt monetary expansion to finance growing public spending, which boosted inflation. Growing public spending on massive investments in infrastructure, transportation, and public construction works contributed to inflation rising to 55 percent in 1987 from 48.3 percent in 1984. By the end of the 1980s, economic growth had slowed, and Turkey entered a new period of recession. Restrictive monetary policies that the government tried to impose to contract domestic demand in the short run could not control inflation, which reached 70 percent in 1988. Inflationary pressure posed a real threat to the stability of an economy experiencing chronic budget deficits and suffering from foreign and domestic debt problems. To stimulate free exchange of TL for other currencies and to encourage the inflow of foreign capital, convertibility was adopted in August 1989.

The 1991 Gulf War hit the stagnant economy hard because Turkey abided by the U.N. blockade of Iraq, thereby cutting all its trade ties with that nation. In domestic politics, the adverse effects of the export-oriented growth strategy, which relied on the reallocation of national income in favor of the export sector, and the monetary policies of the MP governments, which hit fixed-income groups the hardest, worsened income distribution inequalities. Consequently, the MP lost the 1991 elections, and Turkey entered a new decade of government by coalitions. The post-1991 governments loosened the restrictive monetary policies by reactivating subsidies and price support policies in agriculture and by boosting public deficits.

These policies were designed to stimulate domestic demand but resulted in weakening the current account balance, causing a financial crisis in 1994. In response, that same year the government launched a new austerity program, the goal of which was to bring short-term stability to the financial sector. It also included standard austerity measures promising reductions in inflation and public deficits and improvements in balance payments. To these ends, the TL was devalued by 56.2 percent in April 1994, at the peak of the crisis. The austerity program required strict mon-

etary policies that political considerations made the government reluctant to impose. Still, at least temporarily, the government achieved its goals of suppressing domestic demand and reducing public expenditures at the cost of slowing down the economy. Although the program was unsuccessful in solving chronic inflation, the economy began to recover in 1995–1996, and Turkey's entrance into the Customs Union with the European Union in 1996 brought a new dynamism in some sectors—industry, trade, and communications—although its effects on the whole economy remain ambiguous.

The financial sector benefited most from the liberalization attempts in the post-1980 period. Yet, the lack of complex legal-administrative regulations further limited government control over the financial sector. The difficulties of the free-for-all game in the financial sector surfaced when the government, in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), introduced a fixed exchange rate policy within the framework of a general deflationary economic program in 1999 to control inflation and restore the balance of payments. The financial sector found it increasingly difficult to adapt to the changing rules of the game because since 1994 it had made most of its profits from the government's policy of financing public deficits from short-term loans and by manipulating the nation's high inflation and foreign exchange rate policy. The widening gap between the inflation rate and the foreign currency exchange rate and the overvalued TL made the government's policies obsolete. In November 2000 and February 2001, Turkey experienced one of its worst financial crises, losing almost one-third of its foreign currency reserve in a week when a dispute between the prime minister and the president triggered a crisis of confidence that resulted in the outflow of foreign capital. In response, the government adopted a new restructuring program. It revised its foreign currency regime and abandoned the fixed exchange rate policy (the pillar of the IMF's anti-inflationary program) in favor of a fluctuating exchange rate policy. It also received a massive amount of foreign aid from the IMF and adopted a new structural reform program requiring wide-ranging privatization in the banking, telecommunications, and energy sectors as well as a series of austerity measures for curbing government spending and reducing inflation.

Nazim Irem

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TURKEY—EDUCATION SYSTEM Education has been a consistent barometer of political and social trends in the late Ottoman empire and the Turkish Republic. Due to its importance for successive Ottoman and Republican governments, education has come to symbolize the direction in which society is intended to move. Together with the military, education has obtained an emblematic quality that ensures its central role in Turkish society. Due to this centrality, the ways in which the history of education in Turkey has been written reflect an ongoing debate about the desired blend of the secular and the religious.

Like most premodern societies, the Ottoman empire had a tradition of restricted state involvement in education. The government's provision of education extended only to training soldiers or the small number of scribes who ran the empire. In the absence of major state initiative, most education was religious: It was largely scriptural in content, usually imparted in or close to a place of worship, and taught by men of religious learning. Those who received education, always a small minority of the population and well under 10 percent until the empire's last decades, did so at the hands of the ulama (the learned men of Islam), priests, or rabbis, depending on their faith.

With the advent of Western-style military reform in the late eighteenth century, the Ottoman state embarked on a radical process of enlargement that had direct consequences for education. Fielding a standing

army based on drill and centralized command required schools for officers as well as specialized branches, such as artillery and medical units. Creating a modern army was extremely expensive and therefore necessitated finding new ways of extracting revenues from the land and its people. In short, this meant expanding the bureaucracy on a massive scale. Whereas once an estimated two thousand scribes ran the empire, over the course of the nineteenth century this number ballooned to over thirty-five thousand. Because all of these bureaucrats had to be able to read and write, educating them properly became a priority.

Tanzimat Reforms

In 1839, the first year of the Tanzimat period of reforms (1839–1876) under Sultan Mahmud II, the Ottoman government issued the first in a long series of memoranda dedicated to education reform. The thrust of these early attempts was to incorporate the existing schools, mostly the Qur'an schools, and to use them as the basis for an imperial system. The overriding objective was to train loyal and capable bureaucrats, it being understood that adopting the religious and moral approach of the Muslim schools was the only possible way forward. This piecemeal approach continued until 1869, when, under strong, centralizing French influence the empire adopted the Education Regulation, which would guide education developments for the rest of the empire's life and for many of its successor states, including the Turkish Republic.

Although decreed in the final years of the Tanzimat period, the Education Regulation was largely implemented only from the 1880s onward, during the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II (reigned 1876–1909), who strongly believed in the necessity of a modern education system that would combine the latest in European content, such as chemistry and French, with the religious and historical material suitable to Ottoman and Islamic tradition. Expanding both horizontally among the provinces and vertically from primary to higher levels, including a university in Istanbul from 1900, the new system would be altered by successive regimes, acting as a vehicle for an increasingly Turkist political agenda, first haltingly during the Young Turk period (1908–1918) and then much more forcefully in the smaller Turkish Republic (1923–present).

Ataturk's Reforms

The earlier years of the Republic demonstrated that the new government of Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938, later Ataturk, or Father of the Turks), although inheriting the core of the Ottoman system, was bent on a radical reorientation of society, toward the West and

away from its Islamic past. Among the many ruptures was the abolition of the *medrese* (Islamic seminary) system run by the ulama. But in many ways Republican education only intensified existing trends in education. Freed from the pressure of the Great Powers and with a much more homogeneous and smaller population to educate, the young Republic pursued its twin themes of tightening the restrictions on foreign schooling and making its own schools more nationalist in orientation. The Unity of Education Law of 1924 set the tone by insisting that all education institutions be regulated by the Ministry of National Education. Two years later, a regulation demanded that all teachers of such sensitive subjects as history, geography, and language be approved by the new capital in Ankara and had to be supportive of the concept of the Turkish nation. Schools were now obliged to display prominently portraits of Mustafa Kemal.

Meanwhile, Kemal was devising two highly symbolic policies that would literally reshape education in Turkey: changing the alphabet and engineering a radical reform of the Ottoman Turkish language, a rich combination of Arabic, Persian, and Turkish. The forced adoption of the Latin alphabet, and of Western numerals, in 1928 was backed by some sound linguistic arguments—the Arabic script was not well suited to render Turkish words—but was ultimately intended to sever ties with Turkey's Islamic heritage. The movement was spearheaded by Kemal himself, who now appeared around the nation, chalk in hand, as a sort of teacher in chief. The language reform, summarized by one scholar as a "catastrophic success," ensured that students in the Republic would learn a language that was increasingly unintelligible to their grandparents and, perhaps more to the point, would be cut off from the language of their elders.

The Resurgence in Religious Education

During the Single Party period (1923–1945), the government pressed ahead with its nationalist agenda in the schools while reaching out to the rural population. In order to combat high rates of illiteracy, it launched the Village Institute scheme designed to provide rural areas with teachers who would energize the literacy drive. A largely successful initiative, it was disbanded when the Democrat Party came to power in the watershed elections of 1950. In the run-up to the election, as the major parties began to court the conservative vote, the government began to offer more in the way of religious education, such as elective religious education, special training for preachers in the schools (1947), and the creation of a theological faculty at Ankara University (1949). After winning the elections

of 1950, the Democrat Party expanded religious education dramatically, thereby undermining the secularist principles of the Kemalist state. The return of the Republican People's Party, the party founded by Atatürk, to power after the military coup of 1960 produced only an increase in the attention paid to religious schools, indicating their broad support in Anatolia.

Education from the 1970s into the Twenty-First Century

During the 1970s, when Turkey entered a period of political turmoil, education was once again at the center of activity. Strikes, protest, and violence between the right and the left were often played out on university campuses, and numerous academics were fired for their views or resigned in protest of the government's policies. After the military coup of 1980, the government established the Higher Education Council, which has run university-level education in a strong-handed capacity ever since.

In recent years, the salient features of Turkish education have included the ongoing controversy over whether or not women are to be permitted to attend courses while wearing the headscarf, the question of overcrowding in schools, truancy due to child labor, and the mushrooming of private universities across the nation. Continuing a trend begun in late Ottoman times, the solutions that will emerge will doubtless reflect a struggle as much over ideology as resources.

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TURKEY—HUMAN RIGHTS Turkey is the only democratic state with a predominately Muslim population. Its political leaders have created a constitutional republic with a democratically elected Parliament and an independent judiciary. Turkey has ratified a number of international human-rights conventions, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (which includes the right of individual petition and the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights). As part of its efforts to promote human rights, the government established the

Parliamentary Human Rights Commission in 1990 and the Human Rights Ministry in 1991.

Despite these achievements, domestic and international critics have faulted Turkey's human-rights practices. Critics have alleged: (1) torture and the suspicious deaths of prisoners while in detention; (2) disappearances and extrajudicial killings of opposition politicians, human-rights activists, journalists, and Kurdish nationalists; (3) government infringements on the freedoms of speech, press, and association; (4) denial of due process to persons under the jurisdiction of state security courts and in the state-of-emergency region; (5) the destruction of Kurdish villages in the southeast by the Turkish military; and (6) suppression of Kurdish cultural expression.

Some members of the nation's political elite, bureaucracy, and military claim that Turkey is threatened from within by "reactionaries" (Islamists) and "separatists" (Kurdish nationalists) and that they are willing to curb human rights to meet these threats.

Religious and Ethnic Minorities

Turkey's 1924 constitution establishes Turkey as a secular state and provides for freedom of worship. In accordance with the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews are permitted to maintain their own schools and to teach their religion and language. These small minorities report little discrimination in daily life.

Turkey has many other ethnic minorities who are not officially recognized as such. These include Laz, Circassians, Georgians, Kurds, and Arabs. Human-rights violations have been especially inflicted on the Kurds—the largest ethnic and linguistic minority, who may now represent one-fourth of the population (roughly 15 million people). There are no legal barriers to Kurds' participation in political and economic affairs, and many members of Parliament and senior officials and professionals are Kurds. However, the government has long denied the Kurds basic cultural and linguistic rights. Kurds who publicly assert their Kurdish identity or espouse speaking Kurdish in the public domain risk harassment or prosecution. Since 1991 private spoken and printed communications in Kurdish have been legal; however, the use of minority languages in television and radio broadcasts, by political parties, and in schools is restricted by a series of laws and constitutional articles that prosecutors invoke arbitrarily.

For over fifteen years, the military has fought the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), whose goal originally was the formation of a separate state of Kurdistan in

southeastern Turkey. A state of emergency, declared in 1987, has continued in those southeastern provinces that face substantial PKK terrorism. The state-of-emergency region's governor has exercised quasi martial-law powers, imposing restrictions on the press, removing from the region persons whose activities are deemed detrimental to public order, and ordering village evacuations.

Approximately 560,000 villagers were forcibly evacuated from their homes between 1987 and 1999. A parliamentary committee concluded in 1998 that the state was partly responsible for the displacements and that it had failed to adequately compensate villagers who had lost their homes and lands. The European Court of Human Rights has ruled in favor of villagers who sued over forcible evacuations and has ordered Turkey to pay damages.

Although the constitution provides for freedom of speech and press, the government has limited these freedoms on the basis of national security. The criminal code provides penalties for those who "insult the president, the parliament, and the army." Prosecutors also rely on other provisions in various laws restricting freedom of expression.

The state-of-emergency governor, courts, police, and the body overseeing state broadcasting have denied the Kurdish population in the southeast use of their language in election campaigning, education, broadcasting, and in some cultural activities, such as weddings. Printed material in Kurdish is legal; however, the police have commonly interfered with the distribution of Kurdish newspapers. Kurdish music recordings are widely available, but bans on certain songs and singers exist. Radio and television broadcasts in Kurdish are illegal.

A total of 114 intellectuals and human-rights activists were sentenced in April 1999 to a year in prison each, on charges of "separatist propaganda," for signing a 1993 declaration calling for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish conflict. In July 1999, the European Court of Human Rights ruled on thirteen Turkish cases involving freedom of expression in which the plaintiffs were jailed or fined for books, articles, or statements that they wrote or published on Kurdish issues. These plaintiffs were convicted either of "inciting ethnic hatred" or "disseminating propaganda against the indivisibility of the state" or for "revealing the identity of officials responsible for combating terrorism." The European court found that the Turkish government violated the plaintiffs' right to freedom of expression in eleven of these thirteen cases, denied plaintiffs in nine cases the right to have their cases

heard by an independent and impartial tribunal because of the presence of military judges on the state security courts, and in one case violated the prohibition against no punishment without law. But despite government restrictions, the media criticize government leaders and policies daily. Lively debates on human rights also occur.

Torture and Other Cruel Punishment

Security forces and police have tortured, beaten, and abused persons regularly. The lack of universal and immediate access to an attorney and long detention periods for those held for political crimes are major factors in torture. Despite the government's cooperation with unscheduled foreign inspection teams and public pledges by successive governments to end the practice, torture continues to be a serious human-rights problem. The Turkish Human Rights Foundation (HRF) estimated the number of credible reports of torture at its five national treatment centers at 700 in 1999, compared with 673 in 1998. But the HRF believed that these figures underrepresented the actual number of persons tortured while in detention or prison.

Human-rights monitors say that security officials increasingly use methods that do not leave physical traces, such as beating with weighted bags instead of clubs or fists. Commonly employed methods of torture reported by the HRF's treatment centers include administering electric shocks and systematic beatings; stripping and blindfolding; exposing to extreme cold or high-pressure cold water hoses; beating the soles of the feet (*falaka*) and genitalia; hanging by the arms; depriving of food and sleep; hanging heavy weights on the body; dripping water onto the head; burning; hanging sandbags on the neck; nearly suffocating by placing bags over the head; raping with truncheons and gun barrels; squeezing and twisting testicles; and other forms of sexual abuse. Female detainees often face sexual humiliation and, less often, more severe forms of sexual torture.

Government officials admit that torture occurs but deny that it is systematic. The U.N. special reporter for torture conducted investigations at the invitation of the government in late 1998. He reported that although torture was practiced systematically and on a large scale through the mid-1990s, there had been "notable improvements" since 1997.

Human-rights monitors have reported that government forces use excessive force, sometimes resulting in deaths, during raids on criminals or alleged terrorist and militant safe houses. Police and prison guards have also been accused of extrajudicial killings,

often resulting from torture. In 1999, at least thirty trials were under way because of such charges.

Right to a Fair Public Trial

The judicial system is composed of general law courts, military courts, state security courts (SSCs), and the Constitutional Court. The High Court of Appeals hears appeals for criminal cases, including from SSCs. Military courts, with their own appeals system, hear cases involving military law, members of the armed forces, and civilians who are accused of impugning the honor of the armed forces or undermining compliance with the draft.

SSCs have posed the main problem for due-process rights. These courts sit in eight cities and try defendants accused of crimes such as committing terrorism, committing gang-related crimes, smuggling drugs, belonging to illegal organizations, and espousing or disseminating ideas that are "damaging the indivisible unity of the state." These courts may hold closed hearings and may admit testimony obtained during police interrogation in the absence of counsel. Until mid-1999, the SSCs were composed of panels of five members: two civilian judges, one military judge, and two prosecutors. A 1998 ruling by the European Court of Human Rights found that the presence of a military justice on the SSCs was inconsistent with relevant European conventions. In June 1999 the government amended the Constitution and passed legislation replacing the military judge with a civilian judge.

Attorneys defending controversial clients have been subject to spurious legal charges, such as accusations that they are couriers for clients who are alleged terrorists. The government charged twenty-five lawyers in 1993 and 1994 with aiding and abetting the PKK or belonging to a terrorist organization. Sixteen of these defendants complained of torture and mistreatment while held incommunicado after their arrests.

Human Rights for Women

Women enjoy all political and educational rights. They work in all professions. Trafficking in women and girls to Turkey from eastern Europe for the purpose of forced prostitution has been a problem since the 1990s. The government in late 1998 issued a regulation prohibiting the traditional practice of "virginity testing" of women about to be married unless requested by the women themselves.

Government Attitude toward Human Rights

Security forces and prosecutors have commonly harassed, intimidated, indicted, and imprisoned human-

rights monitors, journalists, and lawyers for ideas that they expressed in public forums. The government has closed branches of human-rights organizations in the southeast. In 1999, prosecutors had former Human Rights Association president Akin Birdal jailed on charges of inciting hatred and enmity in nonviolent statements he made about the Kurdish problem and torture.

However, the government is publicly committed to improving human-rights practices. The state minister for human rights and the minister of justice have led government efforts to implement legislative and administrative reforms. The armed forces have instituted human-rights training for officers and noncommissioned officers. Human-rights education is mandatory in primary schools and elective in high schools.

In August 1999, Parliament passed legislation increasing sentences for persons convicted of torture from a maximum of five to eight years. Government officials have been in regular dialogue with the Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) and allow unannounced prison visits by the CPT.

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TURKEY—POLITICAL SYSTEM The political life of the Republic of Turkey began with the first meeting of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) in 1920. The TGNA sprang from the conventions of the Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, held in Erzurum and Sivas in 1919.

The TGNA was a *régime d'assemblée* where all authority was vested in the assembly itself; there was no head of state. The government, known as the government of the Grand National Assembly, had no control over the assembly. The assembly elected cabinet

members by direct vote from among its members. The first assembly had two groups of representatives: 92 deputies of the last Ottoman Parliament, which had terminated its last session in protest of the Allied occupation of Istanbul in 1920, and 349 members elected from each district under an indirect two-tier system (voters elected electors, who voted for assembly members) according to procedures defined by Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk, 1881–1938).

The assembly was the result of a loose alliance of the urban middle class, the intelligentsia, army commanders, and bureaucrats, with local notables and landowners. Although the immediate aims of these groups were the same, there was an underlying conflict of interests when it came to the form and structure of the new state. One group, the supporters of Kemal, wanted to establish a secular state. Another group, created by the defenders of a constitutional monarchy, wanted to save the sultanate through reform.

To overcome the obstacles created by the assembly government system, Kemal proposed an amendment to the constitution. Under the new constitution Turkey would become a republic; the TGNA would elect the president from among its members; the president would appoint the prime minister, who would form the cabinet; and the cabinet would start work after the confidence vote of the assembly. Approval of this draft marked the victory of the first group and initiated the republican era.

The 1924 constitution established a unicameral legislature. Deputies were elected under the indirect two-tier election system. Because the candidates were defined by the party caucus; the election process was a symbolic approval of the Kemalist elite by the electorate. To be elected a deputy, candidates had to be literate and over thirty years of age. Once elected, deputies would become representatives of the nation, not of a specific district. Election districts were defined according to a ratio of one deputy to forty thousand voters. During the early years of the republic, the right to vote was limited to males over eighteen years. In 1934 the age limit was changed to twenty-two, and women were given the right to vote.

The One-Party Era

In 1923 Mustafa Kemal was elected the first president of the republic. He remained in that post until his death in 1938. Under his rule the Republican People's Party (RPP) became the official party of the country. He was not only the president of the republic but also leader of the RPP, chairperson of the party's Assembly Group Executive Committee, and chairperson

of the General Executive Committee of the party. In 1935 the RPP passed a resolution officially uniting party and state. The secretary-general of the party assumed the post of minister of interior affairs in the cabinet. Chairpersons of provincial organizations became governors of their provinces. In 1937 the six arrows of the RPP's party emblem (representing the six principles of Kemalism—republicanism, nationalism, populism, etatism, secularism, and reformism—were included in the constitution, which laid the basis for the ideological unification of the party and the state.

The death of Kemal and the election of İsmet İnönü (1884–1973) to the presidency did not change the political climate. At the party congress of 26 December 1938, İnönü was elected permanent chairperson of the party and given the title of national chief. The slogan "One party, one nation, one leader" was adopted. Although İnönü tried to create a broader consensus in the country, the policies of the World War II era increased discontent among various segments of society. Internal and external developments forced the RPP government to liberalize political life. In his speech on the opening day of the assembly in November 1945, İnönü announced the need for opposition parties for the well-being of the country and promised to achieve the necessary adjustments in the election system.

Transition to the Multiparty Period

In January 1946 a number of dissidents from the RPP formed the Democrat Party (DP). Although the programs of the two parties scarcely differed, popular discontent with the RPP provided support for the new party. The leaders of the DP emphasized the arbitrary character of a one-party state, an idea that attracted not only the bourgeoisie but the urban intelligentsia and the masses as well. As a measure against the unavoidable rise of the DP, the RPP decided to hold an early election in 1946 so that the Democrats would have little time to organize. The DP refused to take part in an election until the laws became more democratic. Consequently, the government amended the election law, replacing indirect election with direct elections. The election law went through further amendment before the 1950 election.

The new election system was a simple majority system. Ballots were cast secretly, and results were counted openly. Each province was organized as an electoral district. Under the winner-takes-all principle, the party receiving the majority of votes in a given province won all the seats in that province. The new election law made it possible for the DP to gain 83 percent of the seats (408 out of 487) with only 47 percent of the votes in the 1950 election.



THE PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

Adopted 7 November 1982

Following the operation carried out on 12 September 1980 by the Turkish Armed Forces in response to a call from the Turkish Nation, of which they form an inseparable part, at a time when the approach of a separatist, destructive and bloody civil war unprecedented in the Republican era threatened the integrity of the eternal Turkish Nation and motherland and the existence of the sacred Turkish State.

This Constitution was prepared by the Consultative Assembly, given final form by the Council of National Security, which are the legitimate representatives of the Turkish Nation, and adopted, approved and directly enacted by the Turkish Nation,

And is entrusted for safekeeping by the Turkish Nation to the patriotism of its democracy-loving sons and daughters, in order that it may be understood to embody the ideas, beliefs and resolutions set forth below and be interpreted and implemented accordingly, commanding respect for, and absolute loyalty to, its letter and spirit:

- The direction of the concept of nationalism as outlined by Ataturk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey, its immortal leader and unrivalled hero; and in line with the reforms and principles introduced by him;
- The determination to safeguard the everlasting existence, prosperity and material and spiritual well-being of the Republic of Turkey, and to ensure that it attains the standards of contemporary civilisation, as a full and honourable member of the world family of nations;
- Recognition of the absolute supremacy of the will of the nation, and of the fact that sovereignty is vested fully and unconditionally in the Turkish Nation and that no individual or body empowered to exercise it on behalf of the nation shall deviate from democracy based on freedom, as set forth in the Constitution and

the rule of law instituted according to its requirements;

- The understanding that separation of powers does not imply an order of precedence among the organs of State, but reflects a civilised division of labour and mode of cooperation restricted to the exercise of specific State powers, and that supremacy is vested solely in the Constitution and the laws;
- The determination that no protection shall be afforded to thoughts or opinions contrary to Turkish National interests, the principle of the existence of Turkey as an indivisible entity with its State and territory, Turkish historical and moral values, or the nationalism, principles, reforms and modernism of Ataturk, and that as required by the principle of secularism, there shall be no interference whatsoever of sacred religious feelings in State affairs and politics;
- The understanding that it is the birthright of every Turkish citizen to lead an honourable life and develop his material and spiritual resources under the aegis of national culture, civilisation and the rule of law, through the exercise of the fundamental rights and freedoms set forth in this Constitution, in conformity with the requirements of equality and social justice;
- The recognition that all Turkish citizens are united in national honour and pride, in national joy and grief, in their rights and duties towards their existence as a nation, in blessings and in burdens, and in every manifestation of national life, and that they have the right to demand a peaceful life based on absolute respect for one another's rights and freedoms, mutual love and fellowship, and the desire for, and belief, in "Peace at home, peace in the world."

Source: Turkish Embassy at Washington, D.C. Retrieved 8 March 2002, from: http://www.turkey.org/politics/p_consti.htm.



Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey after World War I, remains of considerable symbolic importance in contemporary Turkey. Here, a wall of the Constitutional Court is adorned with a mask depicting Ataturk. (AFP/CORBIS)

The 1950 election was critical. Voter turnout was very high: more than 90 percent of registered voters voted in the election. The election also marked the beginning of new political alignments. The DP was supported by the relatively developed western regions, whereas the RPP relied on the traditional eastern provinces for support. The 1950 election marked the beginning of the era of machine politics in Turkey, with government services being provided in return for votes.

Multiparty politics in Turkey could not function with the institutions inherited from the one-party system. In the constitutional structure of the 1950s the only effective check on the government was the assembly, but the assembly was under the control of the DP, which saw itself as the representative of the national will and tolerated no opposition. The lack of effective checks and balances paved the way for the arbitrary rule of the DP and limitation of individual rights and freedoms. In an effort to limit opposition,

the DP government amended the election law so that pre-election coalitions between opposition parties were prohibited, and election campaigns were limited to forty-five days.

The Era of Military Interventions

The arbitrary rule of the DP and its antidemocratic measures led the army to attempt to overthrow the government. The 1960 military coup was in reaction to the DP's oppression and its violation of the constitution. Following this intervention, the military junta, calling itself the Committee of National Unity (CNU), dissolved the TGNA and banned the DP. Party leaders, including the prime minister and the president, were arrested; the prime minister and two of his cabinet ministers were executed. Within the first year of the intervention, a constitutional assembly was created to prepare a new constitution and election laws. In July 1961 a referendum was held to approve the new constitution, which was accepted by 60.4 percent of the voters.

The constitution was designed to prevent the hegemony of the governing party over the assembly. The general framework of the new system was a strong bicameral legislature, a weak executive, and an autonomous judiciary. The lower chamber of the TGNA was the National Assembly, which consisted of 450 members elected every four years. Deputies were elected under a proportional system known as the d'Hondt system. According to this system, the votes cast in each constituency were divided by the number of the seats. The quotient was then used to divide the vote cast for each party list or independent candidate.

The second chamber, the Senate, consisted of 150 members elected for a term of six years by straight majority vote, with one-third retiring every two years. The senators were required to have an advanced degree and to be over forty years of age. All the members of National Security Council (NSC), the body overseeing the military were made lifetime senators, and fifteen "contingent senators" were appointed by the president. Presidents would also become senators once their terms ended. The president was elected by a two-thirds majority from among the TGNA's members and served for seven years.

Before the 1961 election, the CNU made party leaders sign a declaration promising not to discuss or criticize the military intervention and its consequences. In a further compromise, the political parties accepted a protocol to elect as president General Gemal Gursel, head of the CNU, and not to seek amnesty for imprisoned Democrats.

In 1965 an amendment of the election law gave small parties, which represented newly mobilized social and economic forces, access to the political process. The new system was called the national remainder system (NRS). Under this system, votes for parties that had failed to meet the constituency quotas would be transferred to a national pool and later used to acquire available seats on the provincial level. The 1968 amendment of the election law by the ruling Justice Party (JP) abolished the NRS to prevent small parties from gaining weight in the assembly. The Turkish Workers Party challenged that amendment in the constitutional court; that action led to the abolishment of the quota system. The simple d'Hondt system was in effect between 1969 and 1980.

During the 1960s Turkey went through a socioeconomic transformation. Adoption of an import-substitution policy accelerated the expansion of a capitalist economy and made it difficult for small merchants and artisans to compete. As a reaction, these groups withdrew their support from the JP and inclined toward small parties on the right, which promised more nationalist economic policies and protection of moral values. The Nationalist Action Party and the National Order Party (NOP) were two such parties founded to attract lower-middle-class votes.

By 1971 Turkey was in a state of turmoil. Student protests turned violent; workers' demonstrations and strikes paralyzed industry. Bombings, kidnappings, and bank robberies became daily occurrences. The Justice Party government was unable to control the situation. On 12 March 1971 the Turkish army demanded the resignation of the cabinet. During a two-year interim, Turkey was ruled by party cabinets composed mostly of civilian technocrats. Individual rights and freedoms were curtailed, and leftist organizations were suppressed.

The 1973 election ended the interim period and brought new actors into the political arena. This election was another important milestone in Turkish political life. It reflected a new realignment in the political arena. The RPP, which had adjusted its policies in the late 1960s to the left of center, now moved further to the left under the leadership of Bulent Ecevit. The support base of the RPP moved from the tradition-oriented eastern provinces to the more developed and industrialized west. The Islamist National Salvation Party, which replaced the NOP, and the Nationalist Action Party, representing small businesspeople, merchants, artisans, and newly urbanized social groups, became key parties in the assembly.

In the 1970s the fragmentation and polarization of Turkish politics reached their peak. Since no single party received sufficient votes to form a government, a series of unsuccessful coalitions, headed by either Ecevit or Suleyman Demirel, of the JP, ruled the country. Increasing anarchy and chaos brought Turkey to the brink of a civil war. Partisan attitudes and ideological polarization affected every institution. Labor strikes, inflation, and shortages caused a deteriorating economic situation. The lack of compromise between political parties created parliamentary deadlocks. Deputies switching parties for political gain led to cabinet crises and weakened the government. Finally, the assembly's failure to elect a new president led the army to intervene into politics once more.

Post-1980 Developments

Following the 1980 military coup, the NSC dissolved the parliament, banned political parties, detained their leaders, and declared martial law throughout the country. In 1981 a consultative assembly, handpicked by the NSC, was ordered to draft a new constitution, new political-party laws, and election laws. The new constitution, which was approved by referendum in November 1982, aimed to reinstate a strong executive. Excessive powers were given to the president. Because the NSC was given the role of a consultative assembly in which to express opinions and advise governments on issues related to national security, the army was guaranteed a permanent role in the political process. Political parties were forced to cut their ties with trade unions and other civilian organizations. Civil servants and students were forbidden to join political parties.

The 1983 election law is also based on the d'Hondt system. It provides a single-chamber national assembly of 550 deputies. The members are elected through a weighted party-list system of proportional representation for a five-year term. Parties must obtain 10 percent of the popular vote before they can win representation in the assembly. The party receiving a majority of the vote wins an extra bonus of seats. The system does not favor small parties, which were held responsible for the weak governments of the 1970s. The president of the republic is elected by the assembly for a seven-year term.

A new multiparty system began in 1983 with the participation of three political parties approved by the NSC. In the general election of 1983, Turgut Ozal's Motherland Party gained a surprise victory. In 1989 Ozal was elected the eighth president of the republic. He increased the powers of the president, making the

presidential office an important decision-making center. Turkey's policies during the Persian Gulf War, for example, were largely defined by the president himself, which led to the resignation of a chief army commander.

The new constitution and the election law, however, did not solve the country's problems. In 2000, the country was still ruled by coalition governments. Economic and social problems loomed larger than ever. Interparty rivalry, corruption, and the rise of Islamic forces led to the NSC issuing an army memorandum, which resulted in the resignation of the Islamist-led Welfare Party and the True Path Party cabinet in 1997. Turkey is now ruled by a three-party coalition of the Democratic Left Party, the Motherland Party, and the extreme-rightist National Action Party. Although some steps have been taken to improve personal rights and freedoms, democratization is still an important goal to reach.

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TURKEY, REPUBLIC OF The territory that is Turkey is at the crossroads of East and West, North and South, and its history up to the twentieth century is one of regional control by a succession of major empires.

Turkey is the location of Catal Huyuk, one of the world's oldest Neolithic settlements, dated to 7500 BCE. From 1900 to 1300 BCE the region was under the rule of the Hittites, and from the about 1200 to 700 BCE the Greeks established several kingdoms along the coast. In 546 BCE the Persians moved in, to be defeated in 334 by Alexander of Macedon. In 130 BCE the Romans made Anatolia (the Asian portion of present-day Turkey) a province and from 42 to 57 CE St. Paul spread Christianity across the region. With the establishment of Constantinople in the fourth century, the region became the center of the Byzantine empire. Under pressure from the Seljuk Turks in the east and the Crusaders from Europe, the Byzantine empire declined and was finally displaced by the Ottomans with the fall of Constantinople and in 1453. Following the reign (from 1520) of Suley-

man I (1494–1566), which marked its high point, the Ottoman empire declined over the centuries until what was left was dispatched in World War I.

During the twentieth century, Turkey was transformed from a pro-Islamic autocratic empire with a diverse population, inadequate defenses, and rebellious provinces in Europe into a compact, secular, and constitutional republic with a homogeneous population, massive armed forces, and a policy of integration with Europe. However, a civil society has been slow to develop. In general, the military, civil service, and politicians still do not respect or trust the common people; this is exemplified by the oppressive army, police, and bureaucracy, weak civil rights, political corruption, and inequitable wealth distribution.

End of Ottoman Turkey

In the nineteenth century, Turkey, the "sick man of Europe" (to quote Czar Nicholas I), blocked Russia's southern expansion into the Balkans and controlled its sea exit through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits to the Mediterranean. Ottoman Egypt, with its new Suez Canal, controlled the link between Britain and her colony of India. Russia invaded Turkey three times, and Britain, while providing protection, occupied Egypt and Cyprus in 1882. Following Russia's incursion to the walls of Istanbul, in 1878 Britain and France, the Great Powers, insisted that Bulgaria, Serbia, and Romania become semi-independent rather than Russian satellites. So, after fifty years of Balkan and Black Sea wars, the rebellious Christian provinces of Turkey in Europe were abandoned in favor of an Asian Islamic state.

In 1900, the Ottoman empire consisted of Anatolian Turkey, Thrace, Albania, Macedonia, Syria, Palestine, Iraq, Arabia, Yemen, and Libya, ruled through a



NEMRUT DAG—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Nemrut Dag, a mountain in Turkey, is the site of the mausoleum of Antiochus I. Designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1987, the mausoleum demonstrates the cultural blending of the Greek and Persian empires into the kingdom of Commagene.



KEY EVENTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY HISTORY

- 1908** Parliament meets and deposes the Ottoman ruler and establishes a constitutional government.
- 1913** Turkey's boundary in Europe is redrawn to the present-day line.
- 1918** The end of World War II leaves much former Ottoman territory in the hands of the British, Greeks, and French.
- 1920** Anatolia is portioned among Greece, France and Italy and Turkey reduced in size.
- 1920–1923** The period of the war of independence ends which ends with the Treaty of Lausanne and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey.
- 1924–1928** Ataturk is Turkey's first leader and institutes reforms toward secularization and ties with Europe.
- 1938** Ataturk dies.
- 1939–1945** Turkey remains officially neutral in World War II but joins the Allies in 1945.
- 1952** Turkey joins NATO.
- 1955** Most Greek residents of Istanbul flee the country.
- 1960** The military comes to power through a coup, leading to several decades of political instability and repression.
- 1978** The Kurd Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan is founded.
- 1980** The army establishes the National Security Council.
- 1982** Turgut Ozal is elected president.
- 1983** Turkey establishes an independent state in northern Cyprus.
- 1988–1999** Period of separatist conflict involving the Kurds.
- 1990–1991** Turkey supports the United States in the Persian Gulf War.
- 1995** The Islamic party does well in national elections
- 1996** The Susurluk scandal reveals political corruption
- 1997** The military intervenes to "safeguard secularism."
- 1999** Turkey is placed on the European Union candidate list.
- 2001** Turkey experiences a serious economic crisis.

network of governors and spies by the autocratic sultan Abdulhamid II (1842–1918). In reaction to Russian aggression and the self-seeking proselytizing of the Great Powers, the sultan had persecuted and then massacred thousands of his Armenian Christian subjects. Rebellious army officers in Macedonia, linked with political reformists of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in Salonika (Thessalonica) and supported by the Islamic hierarchy (ulama), demanded restoration of the 1876 constitution, which only had been implemented for a few months before Sultan Abdulhamid used the new conflict with Russia as an excuse to suspend it. After a hiatus of thirty-two years, the parliament met in December 1908; the Third Army provided support to enable the parliament and the ulama to depose Abdulhamid II on charges of tyranny.

The Ottoman empire ended in a declaration of constitutional government under a titular head of state; the three young leaders of the CUP— Ismail Enver (1881–1922), Mehmet Talat (1874–1921), and Ahmed Cemal (1872–1922)—with the army chief of staff, Sevket Pasa, wielded real power, advocating a policy of Turkish nationalism, modernization, and social reform.

The CUP triumvirate could protect the empire no better than could the sultan. Italy occupied Libya in 1911; the Balkan states used the moment to embark on a liberation crusade, their blitzkrieg tactics soon forcing an armistice. Enver, returning from Libya, rejected peace; the province of Edirne (Adrianople) was soon lost, but victorious Bulgaria turned on its allies, and in the peace, Turkey's boundary in Europe was redrawn at the present line in 1913.

When Britain refused an alliance, Enver, as minister of war, secretly signed with Germany. Winston Churchill, as first lord of the British admiralty, confiscated two battleships ordered from British shipyards by the Turks; Enver, in retaliation, opened the Straits to two German battleships, which sailed northward under Turkish flags to attack Russian ports just before the start of World War I. Enver attacked Russia overland, losing 78,000 troops from cold and disease in the Caucasus. Turkish-Armenian rebels seized the eastern city of Van and handed it to the advancing Russians, but as the Turkish army reversed the tide and the Russians retreated, the rebels faced massive deportations; between 300,000 and 1 million people, up to half the Armenian population of Anatolia, perished during forced marches to Syria.

British destroyers attempted to force open the Straits for Britain's Russian allies; a predominately Australian expeditionary force was landed at Gallipoli in 1915 to extinguish the Turkish guns; General Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk; 1881–1938) saved Istanbul at a loss of seventy thousand men. In 1917, the conquering Allies advanced from Egypt into Arabia, Palestine, and Syria, pushing back the Turkish Fourth Army until, as it reached Aleppo, the armistice of Mudros was signed in 1918. The triumvirate of Enver, the civilian Cevdet, and Talat fled, leaving the British in occupation of Istanbul and thus in control of the sultan, the Greeks in Izmir, and the French in Syria.

Independence War

In May 1919, Mustafa Kemal reached Samsun on the Black Sea and rallied war-weary nationalist groups into a fresh Turkish resistance. Linking with the Twentieth and Fifteenth Army Corps under Ali Fuat and Kazim Karabekir, he summoned local representatives to the councils of Erzurum and Sivas, where he formed a new nationalist parliament. In Istanbul, the British suppressed a newly elected assembly of the parliament and obtained the sultan's signature on the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920. That treaty partitioned Anatolia between Greece, France, and Italy; created an independent Armenia and Kurdistan; and allocated Turkey only part of the central Anatolian plateau, with no Mediterranean coastline and no capital. The Treaty of Sèvres, which still colors Turkish views of Europe, united opposition behind the nationalist government in Ankara in 1920. Nationalist forces repelled an Armenian offensive, dislodged the French from around Adana, and forced British withdrawal from Istanbul. In 1923, the Allies were forced to renegotiate terms in the Treaty of Lausanne, when Turkey, represented by Ismet Inonu (1884–1973), argued for the frontiers

as they are today, except for Hatay (returned in 1939) and the Dardanelles (which reverted to Turkish sovereignty in 1936).

Turkish forces finally drove the Greek army toward Izmir, where an Allied fleet rescued survivors of a terrible fire in 1922. The remaining Christian Greeks outside Istanbul were hastily exchanged with the Muslim population (both Greek and Turkish) of Thrace, thus aligning Turkish nationalism permanently with Islam. Since 1914, Turkey had lost 600,000 soldiers and 20 to 25 percent of its population, proportionately more than any other participant in World War I.

Ataturk's Reforms

Kemal immediately initiated reforms, including secularization of the state and abolition of the caliphate (1924), the change to Western attire (1925), a new European-style civil and penal code (1926), the change to a Latin alphabet and elimination of Arabic (1928), and a literacy campaign. Perpetuating Ottoman authoritarianism, he used a growing bureaucracy to impose these programs on conservative peasants. Trade, once the prerogative of Greeks and Armenians, had collapsed; state monopolies on basic foodstuffs (sugar, tobacco, animal feeds, and so forth)—plus nationalization of mines and shipping, intended to regenerate agricultural marketing and industry—faltered in the 1930s depression.

Mustafa Kemal, now known as Atatürk, died in 1938; his colleague, Inonu, who had become prime minister in 1923 and who was elected president upon Atatürk's death, continued with authoritarian but peaceful policies, making nonaggression treaties with Russia (1925), France and Britain (1939), and Germany (1941), accepting arms from Britain, then dealing in chrome for arms with Germany, all the time determined to remain neutral during World War II. Turkey accepted Jews fleeing Nazism but imposed a harsh, discriminatory wealth tax on Christians and small businesses in 1942. As World War II ended in 1945, Turkey joined the Allies, sent a contingent to Korea in 1952, and joined NATO's strategic southern flank also in 1952. American bases and political influence were the price of financial support and arms.

Postwar Coups

Adnan Menderes (1899–1961), a charismatic landowner, led the first opposition party, the Democratic Party, to a landslide victory in 1950. He revived Islam, borrowed abroad to invest in agriculture, and muzzled press opposition until a discontented military clique under Colonel Alp Aslan Turkes (1917–1997)

took power and imposed a liberal constitution in 1960. Menderes was tried and hanged. Unused to democracy, unstable coalitions under Suleyman Demirel (b. 1924), a goatherd turned civil engineer, and urban socialist Bulent Ecevit (b. 1925) attempted to rule, while nationalist extremists (led by Turkes) and revolutionary youth groups fought on the campuses. In 1971, the army, forcing Demirel to resign, temporarily imposed a nonpolitical technocrat government, martial law, and press restrictions, but Ecevit and Demirel resumed government alternately, spending irresponsibly in a time of rapid oil price rises. Crises with Greece over the status of the island of Cyprus and with Armenian nationalist movements in Soviet Armenia and in the diaspora over the assassination of several Turkish diplomats resulted in intercommunal violence, including fighting between Sunni and Alevi (Shi'ite) Muslims and factional street murders.

The army, with tacit American support, again intervened in 1980 and formed the National Security Council, which arrested politicians, closed trades unions, and placed universities under direct control.

A former World Bank economist, the charismatic Turgut Ozal (1927–1923), headed the center-right Motherland Party and won in the general elections in 1982, held under a new, restrictive constitution. He forced through liberalization of the economy with infrastructure development, attraction of foreign investment, convertibility of the lira, creation of a stock exchange, and international trade agreements. In contrast, education was repressively restructured, and the National Security Council maintained military control over politics. Gradually a few civil-rights restrictions were lifted; journalists tested the limits of the law but were often prosecuted.

Ozal gave asylum to 300,000 refugees fleeing repression in Bulgaria in 1989, a contrast to the poor treatment of Kurdish refugees from the Iraq-Iran War. In 1989, forcing through his own election to the presidency, which as prime minister he was able to accomplish by bending the election rules, he continued a pro-American policy, granting the Allies use of Turkish bases and airspace against Iraq's Saddam Hussein during the Persian Gulf War (1990–1991). President George H. W. Bush, visiting in 1991, failed to deliver the promised benefits to offset the cost of sanctions, loss of tourism, and refugee support.

After early elections in 1991, Demirel formed a coalition with the socialists; the Islamic Party under Necmettin Erbakan (b. 1925) also obtained record votes (17 percent). Ozal, as president, meddled in government until his death in 1993; he was succeeded by

Demirel, leaving American-sponsored Tansu Ciller (b. 1944) as Turkey's first woman prime minister. Initial optimism degenerated as corruption, inflation, and civil unrest were unchecked. In the town of Sivas, an Alevi group in conference was attacked by a fundamentalist Sunni mob; thirty-seven died. The major municipalities, now run by the Islamists, appeared progressive and graft-free, enabling Erbakan's party to obtain more votes in the 1995 elections. Ciller and Mesut Yilmaz (b. 1947, of Ozal's party) formed a minority coalition until Ciller, accused of corruption, allied with Erbakan to save herself. In 1996, an accident involving a car containing a Ciller politician, a police chief, a wanted assassin, a drug dealer, many weapons, and incriminating papers revealed political corruption and became known as the Susurluk scandal, named for the small town where the fatal accident occurred.

Controversially, the army, more worried by Islamism than corruption, demanded Erbakan's resignation and immediate implementation of eighteen measures to "safeguard secularism" in February 1997. Banned from politics, Erbakan delegated the re-formed party to Recai Kutan (b. 1928) but remained influential among Islamists. This "coup by proxy" delayed much necessary legislation and thus short-circuited Turkey's application for European Union membership.

A right-left minority coalition between Yilmaz and Ecevit was soon tainted by the Susurluk investigations and a tape recording of Yilmaz allegedly interfering in a privatization bid; government was handed to Ecevit alone. In the euphoria following the capture of Kurdish guerrilla leader Ocalan, elections in April 1999 gave Ecevit 22 percent, followed by the Nationalists at 18 percent and Islamists at 15 percent; Ciller and Yilmaz were sidelined.

Prospects for Europeanization

A coalition between Ecevit, Devlet Bahçeli (b. 1944), and Yilmaz rushed through an ambitious legislative program to deal with tax evasion, privatization, and social security, thus enabling Turkey to be added to the European Union candidate list. Economic revival was prevented by a downturn in tourism caused by threats from Kurdish nationalist guerrillas and a catastrophic earthquake, 7.0 on the Richter scale, which struck just south of Istanbul, killing eighteen thousand and damaging the industrial heartland in August 1999.

At the end of 1999, Turkey was placed on the European Union candidate list, albeit in last place. Entry depends on improvements in human rights, not

just fulfillment of economic criteria. The Turkish parliament, with much internal resistance, is implementing a program of constitutional amendments demanded by the Union as a price for membership.

Relations with Greece

During the 1950s, the Greek population of Istanbul became hostages in disputes between Turkey and Greece over the island of Cyprus, which was self-governing under the protection of Britain and which had large populations of both Greeks and Turks. Mobs in Istanbul were provoked to destroy Greek property, causing a rapid Greek exodus from that city in 1955; after incidents on Cyprus, a U.N. peacekeeping force was installed. In 1960, the island became independent. Several thousand Greek permanent residents of Turkey were summarily deported in 1963 as a result of renewed violence in Cyprus. Following a Greek attempt to annex the island in 1974, Turkey rapidly invaded and occupied the northern half, declaring it an independent republic in 1983.

Northern Cyprus remains a drain on mainland Turkish finances. Mutually threatening military maneuvers have been phased out as Greek-Turkish relations have entered a period of détente following sympathy engendered by earthquakes in Istanbul and Athens in 1999. Currently, leaders of the two communities on Cyprus are negotiating directly and urgently, as the European Union is likely to unilaterally admit Greek Cyprus if an agreement is not reached shortly.

The Kurdish Question and the Army

The Kurdish populations of Turkey, Iraq, and Iran almost achieved independence under the Treaty of Sèvres, but Atatürk subsequently denied their separate identity and culture. A Kurdish-language ban and the abolition of the caliphate led to Sheikh Said's Kurdish revolt in 1925, followed by revolts at Ararat in 1930 and Dersim (now Tunceli) in 1939; despite repression, the Kurdish tribal structure remained. In 1978, Abdullah Öcalan (b. 1953) formed the guerrilla group *Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan* (PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party), based in and funded by Syria, and commenced a violent independence campaign in 1984. The Turkish army countered with cross-border attacks on Syria, imposition of martial law in twelve provinces, and news blackouts. Between 1988 and 1999, the army and PKK depopulated villages and killed thirty thousand, forcing mass migration to Istanbul and Europe. Özal attempted an economic solution; electricity generated at huge dams on the Euphrates River revived agriculture and industry along the border. In 1999, Syria, threatened with water

shortages and invasion, expelled Öcalan and closed PKK camps; violence was confined to the extreme east and funding to drug-smuggling operations. Öcalan was kidnapped in Kenya and returned to Turkey for trial; his death sentence was appealed to the European Court in 2000. The army now insists that politicians should implement a nonmilitary solution, but moderate Kurds are still not represented in parliament.

The end of the war in the southeast, rapprochement with Greece, the cowing of Syria, the American occupation of northern Iraq, and the end of the Cold War mean that the Turkish army is almost without opponents (real or imagined). Turkish military spending is officially 9 percent of Turkey's gross national product (without defense industries); the real figure is unknown, and the treasury in 2000 attempted to restrain new equipment purchases.

The twenty-first century started in an optimistic mood, with a united government pursuing a vigorous economic program, an apparently bureaucratic but clear route to Europe, a deescalation of tension with Greece, and a new president, Ahmet Sezer (b. 1941). Of the "old guard"—Erbakan, Demirel, Türkeş, and Ecevit—only the latter retained power; Yılmaz and Çiller, defiled by corruption, commanded a rump of followers, leaving a deficit in talented leaders for the new millennium.

However, in February 2001 a dispute over the constitution between Sezer and Ecevit (leading the coalition government) resulted in a complete loss of confidence in the World Bank–devised economic program that had pegged the Turkish lira against a currency basket. Private speculation and public panic forced the government to allow the lira to float; it lost half its value overnight. Unable to meet foreign-denominated debts, twenty-three collapsing banks were taken over by the treasury, and the government borrowed heavily from the World Bank as part of a drastic restructuring program. Civil unrest was, amazingly, avoided, and Turkey has now set out on a gradual path to economic recovery. The bitter effects of this crisis may not be forgotten at the next election; a new religious party as well as HADEP, the Kurdish socialist party, wait in the wings.

Dependence on the World Bank has been one factor in Turkish cooperation with U.S. "antiterrorist" aggressive action against their coreligionists; the Turkish people worry as their troops are sent to Afghanistan and the United States plots action against their neighbor Iraq.

Kate Clow

See also: **Archaeology-Turkey; Cyprus; Kurds; Ottoman Empire**

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TURKEY–RUSSIA RELATIONS In 1453, when the Ottoman Turkish sultan Mehmet (Muhammad) II (1432–1481) conquered Byzantium (Constantinople), the historic capital of the Eastern Roman empire, the Russian grand duke Ivan, whose wife was a niece of the last Byzantine emperor, laid claim to the symbolic imperial legacy by declaring Moscow to be the third Rome (Constantinople having been the second). In ensuing years, there was constant tension and rivalry between Russia and Ottoman Turkey. This rivalry was at once ideological, symbolic, and strategic.

Nineteenth-Century Relations

Ideologically and symbolically, Russia hoisted the banner of the Christian churches against the Muslim Turks, who were perceived as infidels in a continuing holy war. In the late eighteenth century, Russia annexed the Crimea and came to dominate the Black Sea from the Caucasus on the east to the mouth of the Danube River in the west. The next goal for expanding Russian power was the imperial city of Istanbul (the Turkish name for Constantinople) and the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, connecting the Black Sea with the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. Russian attempts to achieve this goal by military conquest and diplomatic maneuvering were one of the main issues in nineteenth-century European diplomacy. Russia sought access from the Black Sea to the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas for commercial purposes and to prevent foreign navies from entering the Black Sea and attacking its southern shore.

The expansion of Russian power in Eastern and Southeastern Europe alarmed the other European powers, especially Great Britain. Among other things, the British were worried about their lines of communication and trade with their Asian colonies, especially India. These lines ran through the Mediterranean Sea and Ottoman territories to the east and south, such as Egypt. Russian expansion into this region was seen as a great danger to British interests. Consequently,

throughout the nineteenth century, the British supported Ottoman Turkish resistance against Russia.

Relations in the First Part of the Twentieth Century

By the time of World War I (1914–1918), the Ottoman empire was so weak that Russia was on the verge of achieving its historic goal of controlling the Black Sea straits and the imperial city of Istanbul. The war drastically changed this situation, however. As Russia suffered major military setbacks at the hands of Germany, the Bolshevik Revolution overthrew the czarist monarchy and effectively ended the war in that part of the world. The Bolsheviks renounced traditional Russian imperialist policies, including those pertaining to the Ottoman empire and the Black Sea straits.

The Ottoman Turks, who were aligned with Germany and Austria-Hungary, also suffered major military defeats in World War I. By the end of the war, the once mighty Ottoman empire had been reduced to the territory of Asia Minor (Anatolia) and eastern Thrace. The victorious western Allies (particularly Britain and France) planned to divide those territories among themselves and to internationalize the straits and Istanbul. However, a nationalist uprising among the Turks and other Muslims of Anatolia thwarted these plans and led to the establishment of the nationalist and secularist Republic of Turkey.

The period between the two world wars saw an unusual friendship between Turkey and Russia (by then



This undated political cartoon shows Russia as a bear and Britain as a lion—both threatening Turkey. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

the Soviet Union), as both sought to maintain independence from the West. Border disputes in the Caucasus region were resolved, and the Soviets supported Turkish control of the straits as a means of preventing foreign navies from entering the Black Sea and threatening the USSR. This newborn good will was formalized in a Treaty of Friendship.

But this amity was not to last. At the end of World War II in 1945, the Soviets, flush with victory, denounced the Friendship Treaty and reasserted the old Russian claims. At Yalta in February 1945, Joseph Stalin (1879–1953), the Soviet leader, indicated that he no longer trusted the Turks to defend Soviet interests in the Black Sea and the straits, declaring that Turkey held Russia by the throat.

A vigorous Soviet campaign of pressure and threats against Turkey followed. This was designed to force the Turks to agree to a Soviet naval base in the straits and to cede territory in the Caucasus region. The Turks feared that acquiescence would turn their country into a Soviet satellite and so sought the support of the West, particularly the United States. The United States and its allies responded positively. In 1947, President Harry S. Truman (1884–1972) proposed and Congress approved a massive program of aid to Greece and Turkey to bolster their resistance against Soviet threats; this came to be known as the Truman Doctrine.

Turkey thus became a frontline outpost in the Cold War and a close U.S. ally. In 1952, Turkey became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the major anti-Soviet alliance. The United States helped to modernize and strengthen Turkish armed forces. Turkey was one of the few countries to send combat troops to support the U.S.-led campaign against the Communist North Korean regime during the Korean War (1950–1953).

A chain of electronic observation posts was established along Turkey's Black Sea coast, by means of which the United States monitored missile launchings from Soviet bases in Central Asia. Nuclear-armed Jupiter missiles aimed at the Soviet Union were deployed on Turkish soil, as were manned U.S. fighters, bombers, and reconnaissance planes, including high-altitude U-2 spy planes, one of which the Soviets shot down in 1960.

Throughout the Cold War, Russian-Turkish relations were a mirror image of Turkey's relations with the United States: when problems arose in the Turkish-U.S. relationship, relations with Russia tended to warm up. Thus, after President Lyndon Baines Johnson (1908–1973) warned the Turkish government in June 1964 that the United States might not defend

Turkey if it was attacked by the Soviet Union, the Turkish prime minister visited Moscow, and the Soviet prime minister visited Ankara, the Turkish capital, both unprecedented events. The two governments concluded economic and cultural-exchange agreements.

Later Twentieth-Century Relations

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1991, relations between Turkey and Russia were altered once more. First, the two countries shared no common border for the first time in several centuries. The Caucasus republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, which do have common borders with Turkey, became independent. Second, other former Soviet republics in Central Asia also became independent, and Turkey faced the temptation to revive dormant pan-Turkist sentiment to form a new block of Turkic states that could become a political platform.

Thus, rivalry for political influence and power in the Caucasus and Central Asia emerged between Turkey and Russia. Russia enjoyed inherent advantages as the result of strong infrastructural ties built up during the Soviet era, but was greatly weakened by the severe economic problems that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet Union and hence was no longer a direct threat to Turkey's security.

Russia-Turkey Relations in the Twenty-First Century

As a result of these profound political changes, the relationship between Russia and Turkey at the beginning of the twenty-first century was a complex web. Trade between the two countries expanded greatly. Russia supplied natural gas to Turkey, and Turkish firms landed extensive contracts in Russia, particularly in large construction projects. Competition between Russia and Turkey developed in other areas, particularly in the planning of pipelines to carry oil from new Caspian Sea sources to world markets via Turkish ports on the Mediterranean Sea, bypassing existing pipelines through Russia.

These Russian pipelines pass near Chechnya in the Caucasus, the scene of bloody uprisings against Russian rule. The Chechens are a Muslim people, and a significant minority of ethnic Chechens live in Turkey. Thus, Turkey opposed Russian campaigns in Chechnya. However, Turkey's ability to act on its sympathy for the Chechens was hamstrung by the danger that Russia could retaliate by more actively supporting the rebellious Kurdish minority in eastern Turkey. Russia had already disconcerted Turkey by signing a deal with the Greek Cypriot regime for the supply of modern

intermediate-range ballistic missiles (known as the S-300), which could reach deep into Turkish territory from bases in Cyprus, upsetting the military balance between Turkey and Greece. In the end, the missiles were to be based on the island of Crete, far removed from Turkey. But the potential for increased tension between Russia and Turkey clearly remains and could flare up anew at any time.

Turkey and Russia found themselves on the same side of the anti-terror campaign led by the United States after the attacks on American soil on 11 September 2001. Turkey volunteered to send troops to Afghanistan to assist in the fighting against Osama bin Laden and his supporters and showed a strong interest in assisting in the formation of a new government in Afghanistan after the apparent defeat of its Taliban government. Russia was also in a cooperative mode, as were the former Soviet republics in Central Asia that border on Afghanistan and whose cooperation was important for the United States–led campaign.

Franck Tachau

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TURKEY–UNITED STATES RELATIONS

Government-to-government relations between the United States and Turkey did not assume serious proportions until World War I. Before then, the major symbols of Turkish-American relations had been a series of schools established by American Protestant missionaries

during the nineteenth century. Their main goal had been to proselytize, a fact that discouraged Muslim children from enrolling. The most prominent of these schools was Robert College, built on a commanding height overlooking the narrowest point in the Bosphorus, adjacent to the Rumeli Hisar fortress built by the Turks in 1453 to besiege the city of Byzantium. Today, this institution is known as Bosphorus University, one of the leading institutions of higher education in Turkey and now controlled by the Turkish government.

Relations after World War I

At the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919, which ended World War I, President Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) set forth his Fourteen Points, including the right of self-determination for all nations and peoples. This principle was opposed to the plans of the other Allies, who wanted to divide the remaining Ottoman territories among themselves.

Despite American sentiment against Turks, which was fanned by U.S. citizens of Greek and Armenian extraction, some Turkish nationalists were tempted by the idea of an American mandate. This would frustrate Allied plans and prevent such ethnic communities as the Kurds and Armenians from creating states that could displace the Turkish population and foreclose hopes of retaining a Turkish state. American failure to ratify the Versailles Treaty and refusal to join the League of Nations sabotaged this proposal. The successful campaign of the Turkish nationalists under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk, 1881–1938) blocked the Allied plans for division of the remainder of the Ottoman empire and snuffed out Kurdish and Armenian hopes for statehood. The reformist nationalist and secular Republic of Turkey established in 1923 forced the American schools in that country to reconsider their missions. The minority populations that had formed most of their enrollments were much reduced in size. Religious proselytism was outlawed under the republic. Those schools that remained open thus began enrolling more Turkish Muslims and secularized their curricula, giving up their original proselytizing mission. Several of them, particularly Robert College, the Tarsus Boys' School, and schools in Izmir and Uskudar (a residential suburb of Istanbul) for girls, became highly prized institutions that trained members of the new political elite, including future members of parliament and at least one prime minister.

Relations after World War II

In general, however, Turkish-American relations remained minimal until the end of World War II. During that war, Turkey again proved its strategic



Presidents Bill Clinton of the United States and Suleyman Demirel of Turkey review an honor guard during Clinton's visit to Turkey in November 1999. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

importance by remaining neutral and allowing neither Nazi Germany nor the Western Allies and the Soviet Union the advantage of running supply lines through its territory, including the Black Sea straits. The Turks also steadfastly resisted pressure from the West to declare war on Nazi Germany until February 1945, when the outcome of the conflict was certain and the danger of Turkish territory becoming a battlefield had waned.

With the end of the war, Turkish-American relations were transformed. The United States responded positively to Turkish requests for support against aggressive Soviet demands for territorial and other concessions, which would have reduced the country to the status of a Soviet satellite. In 1946, the USS *Missouri*, then the largest battleship in the world, paid a courtesy call at Istanbul; in 1947, President Harry S. Truman (1884–1972) proposed the Truman Doctrine, a massive program of economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey, meant to bolster their resistance against Soviet expansionism. In 1950, Turkey's active participation in the Korean War helped cement the relationship with the United States; two years later, Turkey became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Turkey, by now a close U.S. ally, was a frontline state in the Cold War. A chain of electronic observation posts was established along the Black Sea coast to enable the United States to monitor Soviet missile launchings in Central Asia. Nuclear-armed Jupiter

missiles aimed at the Soviet Union were deployed on Turkish soil, as were manned U.S. fighters, bombers, and reconnaissance planes, including high-altitude U-2 spy planes, one of which the Soviets shot down in 1960. Turkish policy supported America in international politics, going so far as to allow the United States to use Turkish territory as a staging area for troops bound for Lebanon during the crisis in that country in 1958.

In the 1960s, the U.S.-Turkish relationship suffered several serious setbacks. The Soviet-American crisis of 1962, provoked by the Russians placing nuclear missiles in Cuba, was the first blow. Because the Soviets demanded the removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey as a quid pro quo, it became evident that the United States could sacrifice Turkish interests without warning. In any event, the Jupiters were removed later on grounds of obsolescence, but the point hit home nonetheless.

A second and more serious problem erupted in 1964, when Turkey prepared to invade Cyprus to defend the Turkish minority on the island against the Greek majority. U.S. president Lyndon Baines Johnson (1908–1973) warned Turkey that he would not come to that country's aid if the Soviets supported Greece militarily. This letter undermined Turkish confidence in the United States and led to a major rethinking of Turkey's relations with the USSR, its neighbors, and the Third World in general. The Johnson letter also

had an explosive effect on Turkish public opinion, opening the way for widespread acceptance of leftist suspicions about the United States and turning the large-scale American military and diplomatic presence in the country into a public-relations liability. Relations hit a new low when the U.S. Congress (provoked, in Turkish eyes, by American Greek and Armenian ethnic lobbies) imposed an arms embargo in response to the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus in 1974. Use of Turkish military bases for the staging of U.S. troops in a Middle Eastern crisis, as had occurred in 1958, could no longer be taken for granted.

During the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War, for example, the chief of the Turkish general staff resigned in protest against the decision by President Turgut Ozal (1926–1993) to cooperate fully with the U.S.-led anti-Iraqi military coalition. Ozal sought to prove Turkey's continuing strategic value to the United States and the West—in the face of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War—by shutting down the Iraqi oil pipeline that crossed Turkish territory, strictly observing the UN-imposed sanctions on Iraq, and allowing heavy use of air bases on Turkish soil for bombing sorties against Iraq.

The United States was more understanding than was the European Union, which Turkey aspired to join, with regard to alleged human-rights violations against the Kurds. The Turkish government had treated the Kurdish insurrection that broke out in 1984 with harsh military repression. On the other hand, Turkey was apprehensive about U.S.-sponsored material and political support for the Kurds of Iraq, just across the border from Turkey; these Kurds had established limited autonomy from the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein (b. 1937) in the wake of the Persian Gulf War. Despite concern over Iraqi Kurdish support for the insurrection in Turkey, and despite Turkey's desire to resume trade relations with Iraq, Turkey allowed the continued use of bases on its soil for this operation, as well as for flights designed to prevent the Iraqi air force from entering the no-fly zone in northern Iraq.

Relations in the New Millennium

At the start of the twenty-first century, the United States supported Turkish efforts to finance the so-called Ceyhan project, which called for a pipeline connecting the newly developed Caspian Sea oil fields with world markets via a Turkish port on the Mediterranean. The common interest of the two governments stemmed from the political realm—the desire to by-

pass Russian pipelines. The oil industry was reluctant because of excessive costs and political instability in the Caucasus region through which the projected line would pass.

Finally, the late 1990s witnessed a change in Turkish foreign relations—a burgeoning informal alliance between Turkey and Israel, favored by the Turkish military. The initial trade-off involved access to Turkish air space for the Israeli air force (allowing Israeli planes to approach Iranian territory) in exchange for large-scale contracts with Israeli industry to modernize various Turkish weapons systems. Joint naval maneuvers were also conducted, and the military aspects of the new relationship spilled over into trade and academic exchanges. Since Turkey and Israel were major American allies in the Middle East, this development was strongly encouraged by the United States.

Frank Tachau

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Encyclopedia of
Modern Asia



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Modern Asia

Volume 6
Turkic Languages to Zuo Zongtang

A Berkshire Reference Work
David Levinson • Karen Christensen, Editors



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David Levinson and Karen Christensen, Editors

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Survey of Asia's Regions and Nations



The *Encyclopedia of Modern Asia* covers thirty-three nations in depth and also the Caucasus and Siberia. We have divided Asia into five major subregions and assigned the thirty-three nations to each.

West and Southwest Asia

The West Asian nations covered in detail here are Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. Afghanistan and Pakistan form Southwest Asia, although in some classifications they are placed in Central and South Asia, respectively. Afghanistan, on the crossroads of civilizations for thousands of years, is especially difficult to classify and displays features typical of Central, West, and South Asia.

Despite diversity in language (Persian in Iran, Arabic in Iraq, Turkish in Turkey) form of government (theocracy in Iran, dictatorship in Iraq, and unstable democracy in Turkey) and international ties (Iran to the Islamic world, Iraq to the Arab Middle East, Turkey to the West), there are several sources of unity across West Asia. Perhaps the oldest is geographical location as the site of transportation routes between Europe and Central, East, and South Asia. Since ancient times, people, goods, wealth, and ideas have flowed across the region. In 2002 the flow of oil was most important, from the wells of Iran and Iraq through the pipelines of Turkey. Another source of unity is Sunni Islam, a major feature of life since the seventh century, although Iran is mainly the minority Shi'a tradition and there have long been Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian, and Baha'i minorities in the region. Diversity is also evident in the fact that Turkey is a "secular" state while Iran is a theocracy, and in the conflict between fundamentalist and mainstream Islam in all the nations.

Another important common thread is the shared historical experience of being part of the Ottoman Empire and having to cope with British and Russian designs on their territory and, more recently, American influence. And, in the twentieth century, all three nations have sought to deal with the Kurdish minority and its demands for a Kurdish state to be established on land taken from all three nations.

Unity across Afghanistan and Pakistan is created by adherence to Sunni Islam (although there is a Shi'ite minority in Afghanistan) and the prominence of the Pash-tun ethnic group in each nation. Both nations also experienced British colonialism, although the long-term British influence is more notable in Pakistan, which had been

tied to India under British rule. West Asia is the only region in the world never colonized by Britain, although some experts argue that it did experience significant British cultural influence. In all nations resistance to external control—British, Russian, or United States—is another common historical experience.

Across the region (although less so in Afghanistan) is the stark contrast between the traditional culture and the modernity of liberation from imperial rule, still not complete across the region. This contrast is apparent in clothing styles, manners, architecture, recreation, marriage practices, and many elements of daily life.

In 2002 all the nations faced a water crisis of both too little water and water pollution. They all also faced issues of economic and social development, including reducing external debt, controlling inflation, reducing unemployment, improving education and health care, and continually reacting to the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, which exacerbates many of these problems. The governments also faced the difficult task of solving these problems while resisting Americanization and also while controlling internal political unrest. Political unrest is often tied to efforts at creating democratic governments and the persistence of elite collaboration with tyrannical governments.

Central Asia

Central Asia is known by many names, including Eurasia, Middle Asia, and Inner Asia. At its core, the region is composed of five states that became independent nations following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Scholars sometimes include Afghanistan, Mongolia and the Xinjiang province of China within the label Central Asia. For this project, Central Asia is restricted to the five former Soviet countries, while Afghanistan is classified in Southwest Asia, and Mongolia and Xinjiang as part of East Asia. These states have a shared landmass of 1.5 million square miles, about one-half the size of the United States.

The region's unity comes from a shared history and religion. Central Asia saw two cultural and economic traditions blossom and intermix along the famed Silk Road: nomadic and sedentary. Nomadic herdsman, organized into kinship groupings of clans, lived beside sedentary farmers and oasis city dwellers. Four of the countries share Turkic roots, while the Tajiks are of Indo-European descent, linguistically related to the Iranians. While still recognizable today, this shared heritage has developed into distinct ethnic communities.

The peoples of Central Asia have seen centuries of invasion, notably the legendary Mongol leader Genghis Khan in the thirteenth century, the Russians in the nineteenth and the Soviets in the twentieth century. For better or worse, each invader left behind markers of their presence: the Arabs introduced Islam in the seventh century. Today Islam is the predominant religion in the region, and most Central Asians are Sunni Muslims. The Russians brought the mixed legacy of modernism, including an educated populace, alarming infant mortality rates, strong economic and political participation by women, high agricultural development, and environmental disasters such as the shrinking of the Aral Sea. It was under Russian colonialism that distinct ethno-national boundaries were created to divide the people of the region. These divisions largely shape the contemporary Central Asian landscape.

Today the five Central Asian nations face similar challenges: building robust economies, developing stable, democratic governments, and integrating themselves into the regional and international communities as independent states. They come to these challenges with varied resources: Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have rich oil reserves; several countries have extensive mineral deposits; and the Fergana Valley is but one example of the region's rich agricultural regions.

Finally, the tragic events of September 11, 2001, cast world attention on Afghanistan's neighbors in Central Asia. The "war on terrorism" forged new alliances and offered a mix of political pressure and economic support for the nations' leaders to suppress their countries' internal fundamentalist Muslim movements.

Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia is conventionally defined as that subregion of Asia consisting of the eleven nation-states of Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Myanmar is sometimes alternatively classified as part of South Asia and Vietnam as in East Asia. The region may be subdivided into Mainland Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam) and Insular Southeast Asia (Brunei, East Timor, Indonesia, Philippines, and Singapore). Malaysia is the one nation in the region that is located both on the mainland and islands, though ethnically it is more linked to the island nations of Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines.

Perhaps the key defining features for the region and those that are most widespread are the tropical monsoon climate, rich natural resources, and a way of life in rural areas based on cooperative wet-rice agriculture that goes back several thousand years. In the past unity was also created in various places by major civilizations, including those of Funan, Angkor, Pagan, Sukhothai, Majapahit, Srivijaya, Champa, Ayutthaya, and Melaka. Monarchies continue to be significant in several nation—Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand—today. Subregional unity has also been created since ancient times by the continued use of written languages, including Vietnamese, Thai, Lao, Khmer and the rich literary traditions associated with those languages.

The region can also be defined as being located between China and India and has been influenced by both, with Indian influence generally broader, deeper, and longer lasting, especially on the mainland, except for Vietnam and Singapore, where influences from China have been more important. Islamic influence is also present in all eleven of the Southeast Asian nations. Culturally, Southeast Asia is notable for the central importance of the family, religion (mainly Buddhism and Islam), and aesthetics in daily life and national consciousness.

In the post–World War II Cold War era, there was a lack of regional unity. Some nations, such as Indonesia under Sukarno, were leaders of the nonaligned nations. Countries such as Thailand and the Philippines joined the U.S. side in the Cold War by being part of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). A move toward greater unity was achieved with the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, with the founding members being Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Subsequently other Southeast Asian nations joined ASEAN (Brunei, 1984; Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam 1997; Cambodia 1999). As of 2002, communism was still the system in Laos and Vietnam and capitalism in Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, the Philippines Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Political, economic, and cultural cooperation is fostered by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), with headquarters in Jakarta, Indonesia. Economically, all the nations have attempted to move, although at different speeds and with different results, from a reliance on agriculture to an industrial or service-based economy. All nations also suffered in the Asian economic crisis beginning in July 1997.

Alongside these sources of similarity or unity that allow us to speak of Southeast Asia as a region is also considerable diversity. In the past religion, ethnicity, and diverse colonial experience (British, Dutch, French, American) were major sources of diversity. Today, the three major sources of diversity are religion, form of government, and level of economic development. Three nations (Indonesia, Malaysia,

Brunei) are predominately Islamic, five are mainly Buddhist (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar), two are mainly Christian (Philippines and East Timor), and Singapore is religiously heterogeneous. In addition, there is religious diversity within nations, as all these nations have sizeable and visible religious minorities and indigenous religions, in both traditional and syncretic forms, also remain important.

In terms of government, there is considerable variation: communism in Vietnam and Laos; state socialism in Myanmar; absolute monarchy in Brunei; evolving democracy in the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, and Indonesia; and authoritarian democracy in Malaysia and Singapore. The economic variation that exists among the nations and also across regions within nations is reflected in different levels of urbanization and economic development, with Singapore and Malaysia at one end of the spectrum and Laos and Cambodia at the other. Myanmar is economically underdeveloped, although it is urbanized, while Brunei is one of the wealthiest nations in the world but not very urbanized.

In 2002, Southeast Asia faced major environmental, political, economic, and health issues. All Southeast Asian nations suffer from serious environmental degradation, including water pollution, soil erosion, air pollution in and around cities, traffic congestion, and species extinctions. To a significant extent all these problems are the result of rapid industrial expansion and overexploitation of natural resources for international trade. The economic crisis has hampered efforts to address these issues and has threatened the economies of some nations, making them more dependent on international loans and assistance from nations such as Japan, Australia, and China. The persisting economic disparities between the rich and the poor are actually exacerbated by rapid economic growth. Related to poverty is the AIDS epidemic, which is especially serious in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Thailand and becoming more serious in Vietnam; in all these nations it associated with the commercial sex industry.

Politically, many Southeast Asian nations faced one or more threats to their stability. Political corruption, lack of transparency, and weak civic institutions are a problem to varying degrees in all the nations but are most severe in Indonesia, which faces threats to its sovereignty. Cambodia and Thailand face problems involving monarch succession, and several nations have had difficulty finding effective leaders. Myanmar's authoritarian rulers face a continual threat from the political opposition and from ethnic and religious separatists.

In addition, several nations faced continuing religious or ethnic-based conflicts that disrupt political stability and economic growth in some provinces. The major conflicts involve Muslim separatists in the southern Philippines, Muslims and Christians in some Indonesian islands and Aceh separatists in northern Sumatra, and Muslims and the Karen and other ethnic groups against the Burman government in Myanmar. Since the economic crisis of 1997, ethnic and religion-based conflict has intensified, as wealthier ethnic or religious minorities have increasingly been attacked by members of the dominant ethnic group. A related issue is the cultural and political future of indigenous peoples, including the so-called hill tribes of the mainland and horticulturalists and former hunter-gatherers of the islands.

In looking to the future, among the region's positive features are the following. First, there is Southeast Asia's strategic location between India and China, between Japan and Europe, and between Europe and Oceania. It stands in close proximity to the world's two most populous countries, China and India. Singapore, the centrally located port in Southeast Asia, is one of two major gateways to the dynamic Pacific Basin (the other is the Panama Canal). Second, there is the region's huge population and related economic market, with a total population approaching that of one half of China's. Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous nation. Third, there is enor-

mous tourist potential in sites and recreational locales such as Angkor Wat, Bali, Borobudur, Phuket, and Ha Long Bay. Fourth, there is the region's notable eclecticism in borrowing from the outside and resiliency in transcending tragedies such as experienced by Cambodia and Vietnam. Fifth, there is the region's significant economic potential: Southeast Asia may well have the world's highest-quality labor force relative to cost. And, sixth, there is the region's openness to new technologies and ideas, an important feature in the modern global community.

South Asia

South Asia is the easiest region to demarcate, as it is bounded by the Hindu Kush and Himalayan ranges to the north and the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea to the south. It contains the nation-states of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka and the more distant island nations of the Maldives and Mauritius. Myanmar and Pakistan, which are considered part of South Asia in some schemes, are here classified in Southeast Asia and Southwest Asia, respectively.

While the region is diverse economically, culturally, linguistically, and religiously, there is unity that, in some form, has existed for several thousand years. One source of unity is the historical influence of two major civilizations (Indus and Dravidian) and three major religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam). Regionally, Sikhism and Jainism have been of great importance. There is also considerable economic unity, as the majority of people continue to live by farming, with rice and especially wet-rice the primary crop. In addition, three-quarters of the people continue to live in rural, agricultural villages, although this has now become an important source of diversity, with clear distinctions between urban and rural life. A third source of unity is the caste system, which continues to define life for most people in the three mainland nations. Another source of unity is the nature and structure of society, which was heavily influenced by the several centuries of British rule. A final source of political unity in the twentieth century—although sometimes weakened by ethnic and religious differences—has been nationalism in each nation.

South Asia is diverse linguistically, ethnically, religiously, and economically. This diversity is most obvious in India, but exists in various forms in other nations, except for the isolated Maldives, which is the home of one ethnic group, the Divehi, who are Muslims and who have an economy based largely on tourism and fishing.

The dozens of languages of South Asia fall into four major families: Indo-European, Austroasiatic, Dravidian, and Tibeto-Burman and several cannot be classified at all. Because of its linguistic diversity, India is divided into "linguistic" states with Hindi and English serving as the national languages.

Hinduism is the dominant religion in South Asia, but India is the home also to Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism. India also has over 120 million Muslims and the world's largest Zoroastrian population (known in India as Parsis) and Bangladesh is a predominately Muslim nation. India also has about twenty-five million Christians and until recently India had several small but thriving Jewish communities. Nepal is mainly Hindu with a Buddhist minority, and Bhutan the reverse. Sri Lanka is mainly Theravada Buddhist with Hindu, Muslim, and Christian minorities. Mauritius, which has no indigenous population, is about 50 percent Hindu, with a large Christian and smaller Muslim and Buddhist minorities.

Linguistic and religious diversity is more than matched by social diversity. One classification suggests that the sociocultural groups of South Asia can be divided into four general and several subcategories: (1) castes (Hindu and Muslim); (2) modern urban classes (including laborers, non-Hindus, and the Westernized elite); (3) hill tribes of at least six types; and (4) peripatetics.

Economically, there are major distinctions between the rural poor and the urban middle class and elite, and also between the urban poor and urban middle class and elite. There are also significant wealth distinctions based on caste and gender, and a sizeable and wealthy Indian diaspora. There is political diversity as well, with India and Sri Lanka being democracies, Bangladesh shifting back and forth between Islamic democracy and military rule, the Maldives being an Islamic state, and Nepal and Bhutan being constitutional monarchies.

In 2002, South Asia faced several categories of issues. Among the most serious are the ongoing ethnic and religious conflicts between Muslims and Hindus in India, the conflict between the nations of Pakistan and India; the ethnic conflict between the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils in Sri Lanka; and the conflict between the Nepalese and Bhutanese in both nations. There are also various ethnic separatist movements in the region, as involving some Sikhs in India. The most threatening to order in the region and beyond is the conflict between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir region, as both have nuclear weapons and armies gathered at their respective borders.

A second serious issue is the host of related environmental problems, including pollution; limited water resources; overexploitation of natural resources; destruction and death caused by typhoons, flooding, and earthquakes; famine (less of a problem today), and epidemics of tropical and other diseases. The Maldives faces the unique problem of disappearing into the sea as global warming melts glaciers and raises the sea level. Coastal regions of Bangladesh could also suffer from this.

There are pressing social, economic, and political issues as well. Socially, there are wide and growing gaps between the rich and middle classes and the poor, who are disproportionately women and children and rural. Tribal peoples and untouchables still do not enjoy full civil rights, and women are often discriminated against, although India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh have all had women prime ministers. Economically, all the nations continue to wrestle with the issues involved in transforming themselves from mainly rural, agricultural nations to ones with strong industrial and service sectors. Politically, all still also struggle with the task of establishing strong, central governments that can control ethnic, religious, and region variation and provide services to the entire population. Despite these difficulties, there are also positive developments. India continues to benefit from the inflow of wealth earned by Indians outside India and is emerging as a major technological center. And, in Sri Lanka, an early 2002 cease-fire has led to the prospect of a series of peace negotiations in the near future..

East Asia

East Asia is defined here as the nations of Japan, South Korea, North Korea, China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. It should be noted that Taiwan is part of China although the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) differ over whether it is a province or not. The inclusion of China in East Asia is not entirely geographically and culturally valid, as parts of southern China could be classified as Southeast Asian from a geographical and cultural standpoint, while western China could be classified as Central Asian. However, there is a long tradition of classifying China as part of East Asia, and that is the approach taken here. Likewise, Mongolia is sometimes classified in Central Asia. As noted above, Siberia can be considered as forming North and Northeast Asia.

Economic, political, ideological, and social similarity across China, Korea (North and South), and Japan is the result of several thousand years of Chinese influence (at times strong, at other times weak), which has created considerable similarity on a base of pre-existing Japanese and Korean cultures and civilizations. China's influence was

greatest before the modern period and Chinese culture thus in some ways forms the core of East Asian culture and society. At the same time, it must be stressed that Chinese cultural elements merged with existing and new Korean and Japanese ones in ways that produced the unique Japanese and Korean cultures and civilizations, which deserve consideration in their own right.

Among the major cultural elements brought from China were Buddhism and Confucianism, the written language, government bureaucracy, various techniques of rice agriculture, and a patrilineal kinship system based on male dominance and male control of family resources. All of these were shaped over the centuries to fit with existing or developing forms in Korea and Japan. For example, Buddhism coexists with Shinto in Japan. In Korea, it coexists with the indigenous shamanistic religion. In China and Korea traditional folk religion remains strong, while Japan has been the home to dozens of new indigenous religions over the past 150 years.

Diversity in the region has been largely a product of continuing efforts by the Japanese and Koreans to resist Chinese influence and develop and stress Japanese and Korean culture and civilization. In the twentieth century diversity was mainly political and economic. Japanese invasions and conquests of parts of China and all of Korea beginning in the late nineteenth century led to hostile relations that had not been completely overcome in 2002.

In the post-World War II era and after, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea have been closely allied with the United States and the West; they have all developed powerful industrial and postindustrial economies. During the same period, China became a Communist state; significant ties to the West and economic development did not begin until the late 1980s. North Korea is also a Communist state; it lags behind the other nations in economic development and in recent years has not been able to produce enough food to feed its population. In 2002 China was the emerging economic power in the region, while Taiwan and South Korea hold on and Japan shows signs of serious and long-term economic decline, although it remains the second-largest (after the United States) economy in the world. Mongolia, freed from Soviet rule, is attempting to build its economy following a capitalist model.

Politically, China remains a Communist state despite significant moves toward market capitalism, North Korea is a Communist dictatorship, Japan a democracy, and South Korea and Taiwan in 1990s seem to have become relatively stable democracies following periods of authoritarian rule. Significant contact among the nations is mainly economic, as efforts at forging closer political ties remain stalled over past grievances. For example, in 2001, people in China and South Korea protested publicly about a new Japanese high school history textbook that they believed did not fully describe Japanese atrocities committed toward Chinese and Koreans before and during World War II. Japan has refused to revise the textbook. Similarly, tension remains between Mongolia and China over Mongolian fears about Chinese designs on Mongolian territory. Inner Mongolia is a province of China.

Major issues with regional and broader implications are the reunification of Taiwan and China and North and South Korea, and threat of war should reunification efforts go awry. Other major regional issues include environmental pollution, including air pollution from China that spreads east, and pollution of the Yellow Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea. A third issue is economic development and stability, and the role of each nation, and the region as a unit, in the growing global economy. A final major issue is the emergence of China as a major world political, economic, and military power at the expense of Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, and the consequences for regional political relations and stability.

Overview


As the above survey indicates, Asia is a varied and dynamic construct. To some extent the notion of Asia, as well as regions within Asia, are artificial constructs imposed by outside observers to provide some structure to a place and subject matter that might otherwise be incomprehensible. The nations of Asia have rich and deep pasts that continue to inform and shape the present—and that play a significant role in relations with other nations and regions. The nations of Asia also face considerable issues—some unique to the region, others shared by nations around the world—as well as enormous potential for future growth and development. We expect that the next edition of this encyclopedia will portray a very different Asia than does this one, but still an Asia that is in many ways in harmony with its pasts.

David Levinson (with contributions from Virginia Aksan, Edward Beauchamp, Anthony and Rebecca Bichel, Linsun Cheng, Gerald Fry, Bruce Fulton, and Paul Hockings)

Regional Maps















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TURKIC LANGUAGES The Turkic languages are spoken across Eurasia from eastern Siberia to Iran and from China to Ukraine, but they are concentrated in Central Asia, where groups of two to twenty million are represented; the total number of speakers of Turkic languages exceeds 130 million. Turkish (approximately 57 million speakers) is the largest group. Despite their broad geographic reach, speakers of Turkic languages can usually understand each other. Turkic peoples lived in the paths of countless invasions of Eurasia, and they comprised a large part of the nominally Mongol army. This contact and mobility has rendered classification difficult.

Sound System

Most Turkic languages have eight basic vowels, which may be grouped according to backness (how far back in the mouth the tongue is when they are said), rounding (shape of the mouth), and height (how open the mouth is), such as in Kyrgyz. (See Table 1.)

Some languages have more distinctions (for example, Uighur and Azerbaijani also distinguish an open e [ɛ] and a closed e [e]), and some have fewer (for example, Uzbek and Salar. Yakut, Turkmen, and Khalaj have basic long vowels; many other languages have

long vowels in loanwords or from consonant contractions. Reduced vowels are found in Chuvash, Tatar, and Bashkir).

The combination of certain vowels with voiceless consonants have resulted in a “checked” sound (glottalization) in South Siberia (Tuva, Tofa *a*”t, meaning “horse”), and a related sound (preaspiration, or spirantization) in Inner Asia (Uighur *i*”kki, meaning “two”).

Syllables tend to have a consonant-vowel (plus optional consonant) shape, maximally CV(V)(C)(C), such as Yakut *küüs*, “force” (CVVC), or *türk*, “Turk” (CVCC, where the first consonant of CC must be a sonorant or fricative). Consonants such as *f*, *v*, *ž*, and *ts* are atypical, though they occur in many Turkic languages due to contact with other languages. Native initial nasals and liquids are not found, except for the interrogative *ne*, “what?”

The Turkic languages are also known for sound harmony: Native syllables have either all front vowels (*ä, e, i, ö, u*) and consonants (*k, g, ɣ*), or all back ones (*i, a, o, u, q*, etc.), as in *kel-*, “to come,” or *qal-*, “to remain.” There are many exceptions to this principle, however, and the Turkic languages vary widely in the extent of suffix harmony. Most suffixes match the stems in at least voicing and backness (palatal harmony). Some have roundness assimilation (labial harmony) as well, under more restricted conditions. Some languages have a weakened harmonic system, such as Uzbek, due to contact with Iranian.

Morphology and Syntax

Turkic has regular agglutinative suffixation, in which categories for person, number, tense and so on

TABLE 1

	Unrounded		Rounded	
	front	back	front	back
High	i	ĩ	ü	u
Not high	e	a	ö	o

are strung together in a strict order. For example: *Sarıg Yoghur bar-al-γe-mes-dro* is the root verb *go*, with potential-future-negative-third-person-definite endings added on to make “s/he cannot go.”

Nouns and verbs each take their own regular suffixes. Turkic nouns have neither gender nor dual number. Noun suffixes are almost uniformly ordered as follows: Uzbek *kitob-lar-im-da*, *book* plus plural-first-person-possessive-locative endings, to yield “in my books.” The plural is not marked in collective or numeral expressions. (So *horse* in the Kazakh phrase *at jaqsi* meaning “horse-good” or “Horses are good” is the same in *eki at*, meaning “two horses.”). Within the noun phrase, there is no case or number agreement between adjectives and their head nouns. Many particles have case-like functions: *üçün*, meaning “for” and *birle*, meaning “together with,” for example.

Nouns can generally function as substantives or adjectives (for example, Chuvash *śutǎ*, meaning both “brightness” and “bright”) and many suffixes can be added to both. Only adjectives have comparative forms: Tatar *yaxşı-raq*, “better.”

Personal pronouns lack a distinction between inclusive and exclusive; honorifics are often formed with plural pronouns, or with the reflexive pronoun in the third person. Demonstrative pronouns usually distinguish three kinds of distance, as with Kazakh *bul* “this (visible),” *sol* “that (invisible),” *osi* “that (further away).” Personal and demonstrative pronouns with genitive suffixes form possessives. Some demonstratives and interrogatives are formed from pronouns with suffixes.

Cardinal numerals are generally based on a decimal system; eleven to nineteen are additive: *on bir* “ten-one” yields “eleven.” Exceptions are Sarıg Yoghur and Old Turkic, in which *bir yigirmi* (“one-twenty”) yields “eleven” and *bir ohdis* (“one-thirty”) yields “twenty-one.” Normally sixty to ninety are multiplicative. Ordinals take a suffix.

Verbal expressions in Turkic comprise partly suffixing “be” verbs and regularly suffixing verbal phrases. In the third person, nonpast copulas are not usually marked (see, for example the Tuvan *ol suruqçi*, meaning “s/he is a student,” or the Kazakh *bul adam jaqsi*, meaning “this person is good,” to which can be compared *bul jaqsi adam*, meaning “This is a good person.” Negative and past copulas are always marked with particles, as in the Turkish *ben değil*, meaning “it isn’t me.”

Verbal morphology is extensive, with suffixes to express voice, mood, aspect, tense, and possibility or potentiality. Potentiality is often marked with a gram-

maticized *al-*, meaning “take” or *bil-*, meaning “know,” as in the Turkish *ver-e-bil-ir* “s/he can give.”

Verbs fall into two classes, finite and nonfinite. Finite verbs are conjugated, with markers for aspect, mood, and tense, and constitute independent utterances; nonfinite verbs do not carry such markers, and are dependant parts of a sentence (for example, they can be relative clauses). The manner in which an action is carried out is typically expressed by semantically-fused verbal phrases consisting of a nonfinite lexical verb and conjunctive followed by an auxiliary verb. Languages generally have one to two dozen of such grammaticalized combinations of tense, aspect, and modal suffixes.

One important feature of Turkic is inferentiality, which lets the speaker distinguish direct from indirect experience, as in the Uzbek *xatâ qıldım*, meaning “I made a mistake,” as opposed to *xatâ qilibman*, meaning “It seems I have made a mistake.” The indirective copulas *imiş* and *iken~eken* also exist.

Syntactic typology in Turkic is very consistent and economical. Modifiers always precede what they modify: Noun phrases precede the verb, and verbs come at sentence ends.

Diachronic Development

Before it diverged into distinct languages, a Common Turkic language unity is assumed; some scholars also posit an earlier Proto-Turkic language.

Old Turkic (the first attested) languages include East Old Turkic, Old Uighur, and Karakhanid. East Old Turkic is the oldest known Turkic, attested in runelike inscriptions on stone monuments in the Orkhon and Yenisey valleys in modern-day Mongolia from the second Turkic empire (eighth century); the language of the early Oghuz, Kipchak, and Uighur Turkic peoples was little differentiated at the time. Old Uighur flowered in the Tarim Basin Uighur dynasty under Manichaeism and Buddhism (ninth through thirteenth centuries); Karakhanid Turkic (eleventh through twelfth centuries), an Islamic literary language centered in Kashgar, was influenced lexically by Persian and Arabic and written in the Arabic script.

Middle Turkic reflects the increasing differentiation of the Turkic branches and the development of literary standards. In the east, Chagatay developed as the premier pan-Central Asian Turkic literary language, written in an Arabic script. In the west, Oghuz Turkic included Old Anatolian Turkish (from the thirteenth century onwards), its successor Ottoman Turkish, and literary Turkmen and Azerbaijani (from the

fourteenth and fifteenth centuries onwards, respectively); Kipchak Turkic is exemplified by the fourteenth-century *Codex Cumanicus*.

Modern Turkic comprises six branches, classified on the basis of both genetic and areal-typological features. Early on, Turkic languages in the west with *r* and *l* in some words (the so-called Oghur or Bulghar branch) split off from Turkic languages with *z* and *ʃ* (so-called Common Turkic). Khalaj, spoken today in Iran, represents a further early split. Common Turkic itself has four branches: Southwestern Turkic (Turkmen, Azerbaijani, Turkish, and Gagauz); Northwestern Turkic (Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Karakalpak, Noghay, Tatar, Bashkir); Northeastern (Tuvan, Khakas, Yakut), and Southeastern (Uighur, Uzbek).

Is Turkic Related to Mongolian?

A comparison of Turkic and Mongolian reveals an abundance of lexical cognates, as well as similar suffixation and phonology. Scholars disagree whether the relationship is one of genetic inheritance or borrowing. The former theory posits a common Altaic protolanguage, with three main families: Turkic, Mongolic, and Manchu-Tungusic. Altaicists pointed to regular sound correspondences, common suffixes and personal pronouns, and syntactic similarities. On the other hand, proponents of the now-dominant Turko-Mongolian hypothesis asserted that such similarities were due to borrowing, citing the lack of common numerals, and similarities between Chuvash and Mongolian. Mongolian's *r* corresponding to Old Turkic *z* may indicate that the Mongolian words were borrowed, likely very early on, from an *r*-type Turkic language like Chuvash. Altaicists call into question the claim of unidirectional borrowing from Turkic into Mongolic. Most all scholars agree that Mongolian and Turkic show evidence of heavy bidirectional copying at least since the intensive contact of the thirteenth-century Mongol empire.

The Mongolian influence was particularly strong in Yakut, Tuvan, and other Siberian Turkic languages. Other early loans include Indo-European, Uralic, and Sinitic. In addition, Yakut shows Tungusic and Samoyedic influence, and Salar, Chinese, and Tibetan elements. Uzbek, though a Southeastern Turkic language, shows the effects of contact with Tajik (Iranian) and Kipchak (Northwestern Turkic).

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TURKMEN The Turkmen are a Sunni Muslim people whose language, Turkmen, belongs to the southwestern, or Oghuz, branch of the Turkic linguistic group. In 1997, about 3.6 million Turkmen lived in the Central Asian country of Turkmenistan, with smaller numbers residing in neighboring countries. About two-thirds of the Turkmen population reside in rural settlements. With the development of Turkmenistan's economy during the post-World War II Soviet period, many non-Turkmen skilled workers and managers immigrated to the republic. The population is distributed unevenly, with few people in the Kara-Kum desert and mountain regions, but large numbers in the oases.

Origins and Early History

The origins of the Turkmen may be traced back to the Oghuz confederation of nomadic pastoral tribes that lived in present-day Mongolia and around Lake Baikal in southern Siberia. The Turkmen probably entered Central Asia in the eleventh century CE and subsequently came under the rule of the Seljuk Turks and the Mongols. Turkmen tribesmen were an integral part of the Seljuk military forces. Turkmen migrated with their families and possessions on Seljuk campaigns into Azerbaijan and Anatolia, a process that began the Turkification of these areas. During this time, Turkmen also began to settle the area of present-day Turkmenistan.

Pre-Russian Social Structure and Livelihood

For centuries the Turkmen were divided into numerous tribes, the largest being the Tekke, Ersari, and Yomut. The Turkmen traditionally lacked paramount leaders and intertribal political unity. Each tribe's elder males formed a committee that discussed matters before embarking on any significant endeavor. They chose their leaders by consensus rather than genealogy.

Prior to the Russian conquest in the late nineteenth century, most Turkmen were pastoral nomads, though during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries many had settled in the oases and become agriculturalists. The men had reputations as warriors, and many served as mounted mercenaries in various Central Asian and Persian armies. The Akhal-teke breed of horse, world renowned for its beauty and swiftness, is particular to the Turkmen.



Muslim Turkmen in traditional dress and hats praying in a mosque in 1991. (DAVID & PETER TURNLEY/CORBIS)

Prior to Soviet rule, the extended family was the basic and most important social and economic unit among the Turkmen. Small groups of Turkmen families camped together as pastoral nomads in their customary regions. Different camping groups consolidated only in times of war or special celebrations. Camping groups subsisted on their livestock and on agricultural products acquired in trade. In hard economic times, they had to raid sedentary people to survive.

Islam and Life-Cycle Rituals

Although the great majority of Turkmen readily identify themselves as Muslims and acknowledge Islam as an integral part of their cultural heritage, many are not devout practitioners. Most participate in religious traditions associated with life-cycle rituals, such as weddings, burials, and pilgrimages. Islam was spread to the Turkmen in the tenth and eleventh centuries, primarily by Sufi sheikhs rather than by strictly orthodox preachers. These sheikhs reconciled Islam with popular pre-Islamic customs. The people often adopted these Sufis as their "patron saints"—a practice contrary to strict Islam. Among the Turkmen, there developed special holy tribes, known as *ovlat*, which traced their ancestry to the Prophet Muhammad. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the *ovlat* tribes became dispersed. Their members attended and conferred blessings at important communal and life-cycle events and also acted as mediators between disputing tribes. The *ovlat* institution retains some authority today. Many of the Turkmen who are respected for their spiritual powers trace their descent from an *ovlat*, and it is not uncommon, especially in rural areas, for such individuals to grant blessings at life-cycle and other communal celebrations.

Unlike some Muslim women in the Middle East, Turkmen women never wore the veil or practiced strict seclusion. During the Soviet period, wives often

assumed what had been male responsibilities for certain Islamic rites so as to protect their husbands' careers. Many women entered the workforce out of economic necessity, a factor that disrupted some traditional family patterns. Educated urban women entered professional services and careers.

Turkmen place great value on marriage celebrations and life-cycle rituals. In rural areas especially, marriages are often arranged by special matchmakers (*sawcholar*), who seek potential spouses according to their social status, education, and other qualities. The bride's parents traditionally demanded a bride-wealth payment from the groom's family as part of the marriage contract. Turkmen rarely divorce.

Russian and Soviet Periods

In 1881, after conquering the Turkmen, the Russians created the Trans-Caspian oblast (province), which became part of the governorate-general of Turkistan in 1899. The Bolsheviks established control over the area in 1920. In October 1924, when Central Asia was divided into distinct political entities, the Transcaspian Territory and Turkmen Oblast of the Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic became the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic. Owing to forced collectivization during the first decades of Soviet rule, the Turkmen were transformed from pastoral nomads into sedentary farmers. They cultivated cotton and bred horses, camels, and karakul sheep. In the oasis strip along the middle Amu Dar'ya, they raised silkworms and grew cotton.

The Communist authorities suppressed religious expression and education. They closed most religious schools and mosques and banned religious observances. Some religious customs, such as Muslim burial and male circumcision, continued to be practiced throughout the Soviet period. Religious customs were preserved especially in rural areas.

Families continued to be close knit and often raised more than five children. It was common for married sons to remain with their parents, living together in an extended one-story clay structure with a courtyard and garden plot. In both rural and urban areas, respect for elders was great; Turkmen still consider grandparents sources of wisdom and spirituality.

The Soviet period dampened but did not suppress the expression of all Turkmen cultural traditions. Turkmen continued to produce their famous carpets; men continued to wear the high sheepskin hats, while women adorned themselves with distinctive Turkmen fabrics and jewelry. Turkmen also maintained their rich musical heritage and oral literature.

Independence

Turkmen leaders declared Turkmenistan's independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. The new government has made efforts to regain some of the cultural heritage lost under Soviet rule. It has ordered that basic Islamic principles be taught in public schools. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have financed the opening of religious schools and mosques as well as instruction in Arabic, the Qur'an, and Islamic history. Courses on *edep*, or proper moral conduct according to traditional Turkmen and Islamic values, have been introduced in the public schools, and efforts are being made to contact Turkmen living outside Turkmenistan.

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TURKMENABAT (1999 est. pop. 203,000). Turkmenabat (Chardzhou, Charjou, or Charjew before 1999) is a major river port in Central Asia, on the right bank of the lower Amu Dar'ya River, in the eastern part of the republic of Turkmenistan, a Central Asian state. It is the country's second largest city (after the capital Ashgabat) and the administrative center of Lebap Welayat (province). The city was founded in 1886 as a Russian military settlement named Novi Chardzhui (New Chardzhui), when Russia's Transcaspian Railroad, linking the Caspian Sea with the middle of Central Asia, reached the Amu Dar'ya. In 1940, the city was renamed Chardzhou and became the administrative center of the Chardzhou oblast (province) of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic, part of the Soviet Union.

After the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, the city became the center of the Lebap province of the republic of Turkmenistan. In July 1999, it was renamed Turkmenabat (Turkmen City). At present, Turkmenabat is a major rail junction and the largest port on the Amu Dar'ya in Central Asia. The city has cotton-processing, silk-weaving, and chemical industries. It is also famous for its Astrakhan fur manufacturers.

Natalya YU. Khan

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TURKMENISTAN PROFILE (2001 est. pop. 4.6 million). The Republic of Turkmenistan is located in southwest Central Asia. The nation shares an eastern border with Afghanistan, a northern border with Uzbekistan, a northwestern border with Kazakhstan, a southern border with Iran, and a western border with the Caspian Sea.

Turkmenistan was annexed by Russia in the last part of the nineteenth century. On 27 October 1924, the Turkmenistan Soviet Socialist Republic was established. It became an autonomous republic of the Soviet Union in May 1925. Turkmenistan became an independent state on 27 October 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Geography

Ninety percent of Turkmenistan's area of 488,100 square kilometers is consumed by the Kara-Kum and Kyzyl-Kum deserts, and is largely uninhabited. The Kara-Kum Canal carries water from the Amu Dar'ya westward across the desert to Mary and ultimately to Ashgabat, a distance of about 800 kilometers. The canal water permits irrigated agriculture and industry along the southern margin of the Kara-Kum desert. Temperatures tend toward extremes, with very cold winters and extremely hot, dry summers. Precipitation is low.

People

Turkmenistan had a 2001 estimated population of 4.6 million people. More than one-third of the population is under the age of fifteen. Ethnically, about 73 percent of the population is Turkmen, 9.8 percent is Russian, 9 percent are Uzbek, and 2 percent are Tatar. The population growth rate is high, about 2.1 percent in 2000. Life expectancy is about 61 years. Literacy rates are high, around 98 percent. About 89 percent of Turkmenistan's population practices Islam. Turkmen are traditionally Sunni Muslims. Another 9 percent of the population professes Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Sufi mysticism and shamanism are also visible.

In 1990 Turkmen was declared the official language. The Soviets replaced the traditional Arabic script with a Latin script in 1929, and later Cyrillic in 1940. Independent Turkmenistan has returned to a Latin script.



TURKMENISTAN

Country name: Turkmenistan
Area: 488,100 sq km
Population: 4,603,244 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 1.85% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 28.55 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 8.98 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: -1.04 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio: 0.98 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 73.25 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth: 61 years, male: 57.43 years, female: 64.76 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Muslim, Eastern Orthodox
Major languages: Turkmen, Russian, Uzbek
Literacy—total population: 98%, male: 99%, female: 97% (1989 est.)
Government type: republic
Capital: Ashgabat
Administrative divisions: 5 welayatlar
Independence: 27 October 1991 (from the Soviet Union)
National holiday: Independence Day, 27 October (1991)
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal
GDP—real growth rate: 16% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita: (purchasing power parity): \$4,300 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: 58% (1999 est.)
Exports: \$2.4 billion (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Imports: \$1.65 billion (c.i.f., 2000 est.)
Currency: Turkmen manat (TMM)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Book Factbook* 2001.
 Retrieved 5 March 2002, from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

Government

Turkmenistan is a republic with executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, and a new constitution that was adopted on 18 May 1992.

Saparmurat Niyazov, who had been chairman of the Supreme Soviet, has served as Turkmenistan's president since 1991. In 2001, he announced he would retire by 2010, and open presidential elections are not planned until his retirement. Niyazov is often called Turkmenbashi, meaning "head of the Turkmen." Niyazov is the real source of power in the Turkmenistan government. There are two parliamentary bodies, a unicameral People's Council, or Halk Maslahaty, and a unicameral Assembly or Majlis. The constitution guarantees an independent judiciary.

Turkmenistan has five administrative regions (*welayats* or *welayatlar*): Ahal, Balkan Welayaty, Dash-

howuz, Lebap, and Mary. These five are subdivided into fifty *etrap*s, or districts. Ashgabat is the country's capital.

Economy

Turkmenistan is largely desert country with intensive agriculture in irrigated oases. One-half of its irrigated land is planted in cotton, making it the world's tenth-largest producer. Desertification and water pollution pose future concerns. The country has huge gas reserves (the fifth-largest reserves in the world) as well as oil resources. Other natural resources include coal, sulfur, and salt.

Until the end of 1993, Turkmenistan had experienced less economic disruption than other former Soviet states because its economy received a boost from higher prices for oil and gas and a sharp increase in



hard-currency earnings. This changed in 1994 as the fortunes of its customers in the former Soviet Union continued to decline. The government has been cautious in initiating economic reform measures, including privatization. A regional financial crisis prompted President Niyazov to issue a decree in late 1998 restructuring the banking sector and increasing government ownership.

Turkmenistan's telephone system is poorly developed, with only 363,000 telephone lines in use in 1997. Estimates for radios and televisions in 1997 were 1.225 million and 820,000 respectively. A 2000 estimate showed 2,000 Internet users in the country. There were seventy airports in the country in that same year; thirteen of those had paved runways. In 1989, official statistics showed sixty-six newspaper titles published in Turkmenistan.

About 58 percent of the population of Turkmenistan lived below the poverty line in 1999. Future prospects are uncertain.

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TURKMENISTAN—ECONOMIC SYSTEM

The economy of Turkmenistan is dominated by agriculture and by public investment in export-oriented oil and gas. Turkmenistan's economic system is a highly administered, command-style economy, dominated by the government and the ruling political party. Structural market reforms, under way since Turkmenistan became independent upon disintegration of the USSR in October 1991, have proceeded slowly.

Background

Sandy deserts dominate Turkmenistan's terrain. Oases and river valleys have supported civilization

since ancient times, but Turkmenistan's inhospitable desert climate created barriers to the development of a modern state until the past century. The contemporary national frontiers of Turkmenistan are a product of the modern period.

Turkmenistan is a predominately Muslim nation in faith and culture. Roughly 90 percent of Turkmenistan's native population speak Turkic, and most speak an Oghuz Turkic variant that is easily understood by a modern Turkish speaker from Turkey. A small percentage of the population in the nation's four major urban areas (Ashgabat, Dashauz, Turkmenbashi, and Mary) are Soviet-era European migrants and post-Soviet-era foreign technical specialists, speaking mainly Russian and English.

Economic Activity during the Transition Period

Turkmenistan's economic activity in ancient times was restricted to oasis agriculture and animal husbandry. During the Soviet period, investment was concentrated in agricultural development and the gas and oil industries. Turkmenistan's agriculture emphasized cotton production. Given the nation's arid environment, expansion of the cotton-based agricultural economy required development of an extensive irrigation system. Diversion of the waters of the Amu Dar'ya River through Turkmenistan's Garagum (Karakum) Canal contributed to the desiccation of the Aral Sea and fueled disagreements among the Central Asian states regarding water use. The Soviet-era economy was organized on the principle of cooperative production, meaning that primary commodities such as raw cotton fiber, oil, and natural gas were transported to manufacturing centers, located primarily in the Russian areas of the USSR, for high-value secondary processing. As a consequence, Turkmenistan served as a supplier of primary commodities, while the associated processing and manufacturing took place in northern industrial centers.

Turkmenistan's Soviet-era economy depended on massive hidden subsidies. When Soviet subsidies ended, many industrial and agricultural enterprises immediately became insolvent. The government of Turkmenistan quickly sought to liberalize prices for external trade while maintaining price supports domestically. The government adopted a development strategy that stressed increasing foreign trade earnings while assuring domestic political stability under the policy of "positive neutrality." First, according to this policy, Turkmenistan sought to maintain as much distance as possible from Russia without giving up access to northern and European gas markets that, during at least the first few years of independence, would con-

tinue to be controlled by Russia by virtue of geography. Second, the policy of positive neutrality implied the expansion of trade with Turkmenistan's southern neighbors on the basis of self-interest. Third, it meant the nation would seek foreign investment to the extent possible to revitalize the gas-related industry and build a Kuwait-style emirate in Turkmenistan.

Economic Activity Today

The cornerstone of Turkmenistan's future economy is its energy wealth. With an estimated 2.7 trillion cubic meters in natural gas reserves and additional potential reserves estimated at 14 trillion cubic meters, Turkmenistan is the second-largest natural gas producer in the former Soviet Union and the fourth-largest producer in the world. Turkmenistan also has an estimated 1 billion metric tons of oil reserves and is the fourth-largest oil producer in the region.

Turkmenistan's hydrocarbon resources offer great potential for economic development but also imply certain developmental vulnerabilities. Turkmenistan was an early beneficiary of price liberalization after the disintegration of the USSR. This enabled Turkmenistan to charge world market prices for the gas it supplied to its former Soviet-era customers in Ukraine, Georgia, Russia, and other nations. On the other hand, Turkmenistan's landlocked position and limited transportation infrastructure made dependent upon customers in nations that were not in a position to pay. Accordingly, gas was supplied sporadically on credit, and a large proportion of Turkmenistan's gas sales was conducted on an inefficient barter basis. This led to serious problems of external arrears and a declining gas output. The total of arrears—mainly to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine—rose to \$1.2 billion, and the government of Turkmenistan interrupted some gas exports in 1997, greatly exacerbating political tensions in the region. Following complex negotiations involving trading partners, governments, commercial banks, and international organizations, many of the debts were rescheduled, and the government resumed gas exports.

In 1998, Turkmenistan produced 13.3 billion cubic meters of gas, down from 17.3 billion cubic meters in 1997. Turkmenistan produced 6,217 tons of oil in 1998, down from 4.4 million metric tons in 1997. Turkmenistan's gas industry is not limited by capacity. Turkmenistan can expand the output of natural gas with the turn of a valve. The constraints on production arise from the physical transport capacity. In late 1997, Turkmenistan began exporting gas to Iran through a newly completed pipeline. The government of Turkmenistan has also sought to develop new

pipelines for access to external gas markets. The government has lobbied hard for international cooperation in the construction of a gas pipeline across the Caspian, through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and through the Turkish port of Ceyhan to western consumers.

Although the oil and gas sectors account for a large proportion of foreign-currency earnings, they produce incomes that are restricted to a relatively small circle and form only a small portion of overall employment. Agriculture and animal husbandry, in contrast, account for about 20 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and more than 60 percent of overall employment. Turkmenistan is among the top ten cotton producers worldwide. The production of cotton increased in 1999 was 1.2 metric tons, up from 700,000 metric tons in 1998 and from 624,000 metric tons in 1997. In an effort to establish food self-sufficiency, Turkmenistan subsidized wheat production, leading to an increase to 1.2 million metric tons, up from 648,000 metric tons in 1997.

Despite some economic gains in recent years, much of Turkmenistan's population (48 percent by World Bank estimates) lives below the poverty level. The government has adopted populist policies to support the social safety net. Since 1992 the government has subsidized housing and related utilities (for example, electricity, water, gas, sanitation, heating, and hot water), making them virtually free, and subsidized key consumer goods (for example, bread, flour, and baby food). According to social indicators, however, the safety net is far from sound. Local gas and water supplies, although without cost to consumers, are frequently interrupted. The nation's infant mortality rate (73.25 per 1,000 live births) is among the highest in the region, and life expectancy (61 years) is among the lowest among former Soviet republics. The 2000 GDP per capita was estimated at \$4,300.

The Government and the Economy

The government of Turkmenistan has been unwilling to enact serious post-Communist structural reform by reducing the dominance of the government, liberalizing the price structure, and monetarizing the economy to allow a true private sector to emerge. A weak financial and banking infrastructure continues to hobble economic growth. The government has sought to increase direct foreign investment but has pursued this goal primarily by wooing strategic investors with concessions rather than by establishing a level playing field for economic activity. The government's credit policy has been expansionary, based on "directed credit programs" and sweetheart deals. This has led to lax budget constraints and a predictably high number

of unperforming loans as credit is extended frequently not on the basis of financial merit but on the basis of access to influence and power.

The transfer of the state's most valuable assets to the private sector—privatization—has been slow and unsuccessful. Although small-scale trading and service operations have largely been privatized, the government of Turkmenistan has delayed transfer to the private sector of medium-sized and large-scale enterprises, preferring to hold these as state-managed trusts.

The government of Turkmenistan continues to play a highly interventionist role in the economy. All decisions affecting business involve some political considerations. The fusion of political and economic decision making requires that businesspeople "facilitate" necessary decisions to avoid capricious regulatory delays by offering inducements in the forms of bribes. Rather than create greater oversight, this form of control creates opportunities for corruption.

Faced with declining tax revenues from gas exports, the government has reduced budgetary spending by curtailing some expenditures (wages, pensions, stipends, and medicines are protected) in order to achieve fiscal balance. According to official figures, state budget deficits have not been large. The reported deficit was roughly 1.5 percent of GDP from 1994 to 1996, and a slight surplus was recorded in 1997 and 1998. But these figures are misleading. Turkmenistan's true budgetary picture is hard to assess because of a large number of extrabudgetary funds. A realistic estimate would put the real overall public sector deficit at 10 percent of GDP in 1999.

Future of the Turkmenistan Economy

Turkmenistan has sought to be an attractive partner, particularly for foreign enterprises interested in participating in the development of Turkmenistan's gas, oil, and agricultural sectors. However, the foundation of economic partnership in a market economy is the establishment of fair conditions for trade and commerce, not a system of favors and special treatment for preferred parties. International financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) have sought to assist Turkmenistan in the development of its economic institutions. Although the IMF has no formal lending program in Turkmenistan, it has provided technical assistance and policy advice. The World Bank has made major institution-building investments in privatization, modernization of the financial and banking sectors, joint-venture administration, training in the energy

sector, and improvement in water quality and urban transportation. The EBRD has provided significant investment in key institutional programs.

But by and large the international development community has not been satisfied with Turkmenistan's progress toward the adoption of international standards of policy and practice. In April 2000 the EBRD took the unprecedented step of suspending its public-sector lending programs to Turkmenistan on the basis of the government's unwillingness to implement agreed-upon structural reforms. Turkmenistan's future economic development rests upon the nation's ability to break away from excessive government controls and crony capitalism toward a modern economy based upon international standards.

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TURKMENISTAN—EDUCATION SYSTEM Turkmenistan marked ten years of independence from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on 27 October 2001. From 1924 to 1991, the Ministry of Education of the USSR provided centrally planned curricula and textbooks, determined enrollments, and required teaching in Russian. Since 1991,

many reforms have taken place in the educational system of Turkmenistan.

Structure of the Education System

The educational system of Turkmenistan consists of preschools, primary and secondary schools, vocational schools, and institutions of higher education. Preschools are available to children three years of age and older. Formal compulsory education in Turkmenistan begins at the age of seven. Students attend secondary schools for nine years. All secondary schools include elementary schools (grades one through three), where all classes are taught by the same teacher, and general schools (grades four through nine), where different subjects are taught by different teachers. Secondary schools enroll about 95 percent of the seven- to sixteen-year-old age group, evenly divided between girls and boys.

After graduating from secondary school, students may enter either a vocational school or an institution of higher education. The length of study in vocational schools varies according to the type of school, but on average ranges from one to eighteen months.

There are sixteen institutions of higher education in Turkmenistan: fifteen public and one private. The only private institution is the International Turkmen-Turkish University. Most classes at this university are taught in English, and students have to pay tuition to attend. However, attendance is free for those students who receive high scores on admission tests. The public institutions of higher education include one university, eleven institutes, one academy, one college, and one conservatory. The Ministry of Education of Turkmenistan coordinates the operation of all fifteen public institutions of higher education in the country, while the Ministry of Economy and Finances governs their budgets. All the public institutions provide education free of charge. The length of study is four to six years, depending on the specialization. In recent years, Turkmen has replaced Russian as the primary language of instruction.

Policy Making

The educational system of Turkmenistan remains highly centralized. Direction is provided mainly through decrees signed by the president of the country. The Ministry of Education, which plays a leading role in policy making, includes a minister and two assistant ministers.

Challenge for the Twenty-First Century

The major issue facing students and teachers in Turkmenistan is acquiring proficiency in the Turk-

men language. Instruction in 77 percent of secondary schools is provided in Turkmen, and in the very near future, Turkmen will be the exclusive language of instruction at all levels (it is already the only language of instruction at all institutions of higher education in the country). The government is preparing for this change by training teachers to teach in Turkmen.

The available statistics on what percentage of the population speaks Turkmen as a first language is highly misleading (all numbers are too high). The new language policy divides people into two camps: the first group feels that instruction in Turkmen is the right policy because Russian was forced on them many years ago; the other group (mostly those who do not speak Turkmen as a first language) feel that this change is unnecessary and unfair.

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TURKMENISTAN-HISTORY (2000 est. pop. 4.5 million). Turkmenistan in Central Asia is home to most of the world's Turkmen, a Turkic people: hence the name, which means "land of the Turkmen," or Turkmenia in Russian. In 1924 the newly created Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic was named Turkmenistan, and this name was retained when the republic first became a sovereign country in 1991 with the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Premodern Turkmen and Oghuz

Turkmen descend from the Oghuz Turks, a political union of Turkic peoples, who in the eighth cen-

tury migrated westward from the Gok-Turk empire, located in what is today Mongolia. They organized themselves under a *yabghu* (leader), and khans and *begs* oversaw the tribes and clans. By the tenth century the Oghuz were living in the vicinity of the Aral Sea and were one of the most numerous of the Turkic peoples, possessing extensive herds of sheep, camel, and horse.

By the eleventh century, the Turkic (Seljuk) state in Khorasan, in modern Iran, was Islamic. The name "Turkmen," previously used only as a political term, may have come to distinguish those Oghuz who adopted Islam and moved southward with the Seljuks in the eleventh century. Although they were Muslims, the Turkmen retained many aspects of their pre-Muslim beliefs and practices: shamanism, Zoroastrianism, the *Gok* or sky god (Tengri) belief system. Syncretism continues today but does not limit the Turkmen sense of Islamic heritage.

The Seljuk empire (1038–1157) had developed from the Oghuz federation of tribes. Seljuk and several Oghuz tribes moved southward to seek land and pasturage; recognizing the importance of Islam in the region, they converted. The Seljuk empire expanded into the Persian, Arab, and Byzantine lands. Its dominance over the Middle East carried Turkic traditions and customs throughout the region, advancing Persian and Turkish as administrative and cultural languages and diminishing the predominance of the Arabic language in the Muslim world.

The decline of the Seljuk empire led to the rise of principalities, most of which were overwhelmed by the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century. The Mongol incursions into Turkmen regions pushed the Oghuz peoples farther westward into what is today Azerbaijan and Asia Minor (Turkey), whence the Ottoman empire partly grew.

During the next several centuries most Turkmen continued their traditional nomadic lifestyle, with some moving into Uzbek (another Turkic-speaking people)-dominated urban centers. While culturally and linguistically related to other Turks, the Turkmen saw themselves as distinct, even though they were not a united group. Although they recognized their Turkmen identity, tribal affiliation was even more pronounced and continues to be important. Khan leadership, regard for family genealogies, clan *tagma* (symbol), and oral traditions symbolized the primacy of clan and tribal membership.

Imperial Russia

Russia began military incursions into the Turkmen regions in the mid-nineteenth century. In 1879,



KEY EVENTS IN TURKMENISTAN HISTORY

- 8th century** Oguz Turks, ancestors of the modern Turkmen, migrate from Mongolia and settle in Central Asia.
- 1038** The Seljuk empire emerges in the region and Islam becomes the primary religion.
- 13th century** The region is conquered by the Mongols.
- 1881** The Russians defeat the Turkmen at the fortress of Gok-Tepe and incorporate the region into Russia.
- 1924** The region is incorporated into the Soviet Union as the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic and named Turkmenistan.
- 1928** The Soviet government represses Islam in Central Asia.
- 1954** Construction begins on the Kara-Kum Canal, which assists in the growth of agriculture but also causes long-term environmental damage.
- 1991** Turkmenistan declares political independence.
- 1992** Turkmenistan becomes a member of the United Nations.
- 1999** Saparmurad Niyazov is declared president for life.

several Turkmen tribes united to repulse the Russians, but the Russians returned in 1881 and on 12 January massacred eight thousand Turkmen at the fortress of Gok-Tepe, a battle that continues to haunt the Turkmen memory and that has been commemorated yearly since 1991. On 6 May 1881, the Turkmen region known in Russian as Transcaspia was named an "oblast" (region). By 1886 the Russian Imperial Transcaspian railroad stretched the length of the Turkmen lands, reinforcing Russian military and economic domination. In 1899 Transcaspia was incorporated into the governor-generalship of Russian Turkistan. In the Russian empire, the Turkmen were categorized as *inorodtsy* (alien) or *tuzemtsy* (native), which meant that they were exempt from military service to the czar and were allowed to preserve local custom, but these terms also belittled them for their non-Russianness.

The Soviet Era

In 1917 Turkmen regions were divided among the Khiva khanate, Bukharan emirate, and Transcaspia. Before the Bolsheviks could take control, they had to deal with the Social Revolutionary Transcaspian Provincial Government, the British in Iran to whom the Turkmen turned for assistance, and the Basmachi or Turkmen National Liberation Movement.

On 27 October 1924, the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic was created from the regions inhabited primarily by Turkmen, and Turkmen tribal identities

were subsumed under a new Soviet national identity. In the 1920s and early 1930s, efforts to bring Turkmen culture and infrastructure in line with the new Soviet society brought many reforms. Agriculture, industry, and the economy were radically reoriented toward Soviet goals, chief among which was continuing the czarist policy of using Turkmenistan as a mass producer of cotton. Turkmen resisted the Soviet program of collectivization, but the traditionally nomadic tribes were eventually forced to settle and work on collectives (*kholkhoz*) and state farms (*sovkhoz*). Women's lives began to change as educational and professional opportunities grew. In 1928 the Soviet government launched an antireligious campaign against Islam in which most mosques were destroyed and Islamic life was severely hampered. The policy of *korenizatsiia* (fostering indigenous culture) led to the creation of a standardized language and a broadly based educational and literacy campaign—all of which were designed to create a loyal Turkmen proletariat.

By the 1930s, however, Moscow's policies shifted, and *korenizatsiia* was denounced as "national chauvinism." In the 1940s, Soviet policy shifted again, this time away from ideas of internationalism and toward Russification; for example, in 1940 the Turkmen were required to adopt a Cyrillic alphabet. During the 1950s Russification increased, and supranational culture such as *dastans* (oral traditions) came under attack as a threat to Soviet culture. In 1954 construction began on the Kara-Kum Canal to bring water from the Amu Dar'ya

River to Ashgabat in Turkmenistan. The canal helped increase agricultural and cotton production, but the damage to the ecology was severe. The canal contributed to the draining of the Aral Sea and to the salinization of Turkmen lands.

Although the Soviet system deeply penetrated life in Turkmenistan, the Turkmen managed to retain many aspects of their distinct culture and values. Turkmen carpets continue to be of the highest quality and beauty. Stockbreeding remains an important sector of the economy and allows families to provide their own meat and milk products. Despite pressures, literature and poetry, especially the works of the poet Magtimguly and *dastans*, remain vital to Turkmen identity.

Post-Soviet Era

On 27 October 1991, Turkmenistan declared political independence. Saparmurad Niyazov, the former chairman of the Supreme Soviet, popularly known as *Turkmenbasy* (head of the Turkmen), became president in 1991, was re-elected in June 1992, and was declared president for life in December 1999. In March 1992 Turkmenistan became a member of the United Nations.

Today Turkmenistan is working to establish a national identity in the international sphere, to rebuild its culture, and to restore its history. After years of suppression, Islam is emerging both in private life and in the public sector. Turkmen culture continues to cultivate many aspects of its past. Mosques are being built and restored, national holidays include the old Zoroastrian springtime celebration of Navruz, and Turkmen women still wear camel-hair bracelets to ward off evil spirits.

Victoria Clement

See also: ~~Central Asia-Russian Relations; Central Asia-Early Medieval Period; Central Asia-Late Medieval and Early Modern; Central Asia-Modern; Central Asia-Prehistoric; Ethnic Conflict-Central Asia; Great Game; Perestroika; Post-Communism; Russification and Sovietization-Central Asia~~

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TURKMENISTAN-POLITICAL SYSTEM

Although nominally a republic, Turkmenistan has a highly authoritarian political structure and culture. Turkmenistan's president, Sapamurat Niyazov (b. 1940), popularly known simply as Turkmenbashi, or "head of the Turkmen," leads Turkmenistan's only political party, the Turkmenistan National Democratic Party. During the latter Soviet period (December 1985–December 1991), Niyazov served as first secretary of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan, the highest political office in the country. Niyazov was elected chairman of the Turkmenistan Supreme Soviet in January 1990 and was elected president of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Turkmenistan on 27 October 1991, during the last stages of Gorbachev-era political reform.

After Turkmenistan gained independence in October 1991, Niyazov sought to improve his political legitimacy through popular elections. He was elected president of Turkmenistan for a five-year term in elections held on 21 June 1992, running without opposition. Niyazov's term was extended for an additional five years by a national referendum held on 15 January 1994. On 28 December 1999, Turkmenistan's parliament approved an amendment to the Turkmenistan Constitution allowing the president to remain in office for an unlimited period, effectively making Niyazov president for life.

Turkmenistan has recognized its president by naming numerous institutions, including cities, irrigation canals, schools, streets, and buildings, in his honor. Even the famed Lenin Kara-Kum Canal of Turkmenistan was renamed the Niyazov Kara-Kum Canal. A new medal of Turkmenistan National Distinction was introduced to honor extraordinary service to the Turkmenistan state, and President Niyazov became the first bearer of this new distinction.

Constitutional and Legal Framework

The postindependence Turkmenistan constitution was adopted in May 1992. According to the Turkmen political system, the president is the head of state and the government's chief executive officer. The government is managed on the top-down principle that accountability and responsiveness in Turkmenistan should be maintained not through the electoral process but through the paternalism of the head of state. The cabinet is composed of deputy chairpersons of the cabinet of ministers, usually eight in number, each with responsibilities in a broadly defined area. Beneath the level of the cabinet are the ministers leading ministries defined by functional areas. While the number of ministries varies from time to time, the list includes areas familiar from Soviet-era government administration, such as foreign affairs, defense, internal affairs, justice, finance, education, energy and industry, and oil and gas.

Other high officers of government include the chairpersons of the national parliament, or Mejlis, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Supreme Economic Court, and the prosecutor-general. The cabinet members and the other officers of government serve at the president's pleasure. The president appoints judges at all levels and has the power to disband local governing bodies and the Mejlis in the event that a no-confidence vote occurs twice within the Mejlis in eighteen months.

The legislative branch consists of the Khalk Maslkhaty, or People's Council. The Khalk Maslkhaty is meant to be a public information institution rather than a true deliberative assembly. In addition to its fifty elected members, the Khalk Maslkhaty includes the president, the high officers of government (including high court justices), fifty elected members of the Mejlis, from territorially defined single-voter districts, and certain other appointed local officials. In the Mejlis elections held in December 1994, the Central Electoral Commission reported a 99 percent voter turnout. In this election, fifty new Mejlis deputies were elected in noncompetitive, single-candidate districts.

All the candidates were registered members of the Turkmenistan National Democratic Party. In parliamentary elections held on 12 December 1999, the parliamentarians were elected in the same way, and all seats went to candidates of the Turkmenistan National Democratic Party.

The Turkmenistan constitution was the first legal document in any of the Central Asian states to explicitly endorse private property, by guaranteeing citizens the right to capital, land, and other material or intellectual property. However, the constitution had no provisions about the sources from which this private land was to come, nor was a land-holding fund created. A market for land emerged during the early years of independence, but the market has been dominated by local officials who set prices and determine availability, often on the basis of nonmarket factors.

Executive-Branch Functions

The Turkmenistan president is head of state and chief executive officer of the government. There is no vice president or prime minister. While the Turkmenistan constitution pays lip service to the principle of separation of powers, in fact no system of checks and balances functions in the country. Since declaring national independence, Turkmenistan has made only minimal progress in moving toward establishing an independent judiciary, promoting a truly deliberative legislature, conducting competitive elections, promoting institutions of democratic accountability, defending civil rights, and allowing freedom of association. The public and private sectors remain as closely interdependent today as they were during the period of state Communism. This fusion of political and economic decision making in Turkmenistan creates constraints on the normal operation of business and provides a fertile ground for petty economic corruption.

Competitive Politics, Elections, Parties, and Civil Rights

Turkmenistan has not succeeded in recognizing the importance of institutional pluralism in the modern period. Opposition political parties are outlawed, and the government security services deal harshly with small, unofficial parties and opposition movements. Fundamental freedoms of speech, press, assembly, movement, and confession are routinely subordinated by the state to the prevailing definition of the national interests as determined by the president. Only Islam and Russian Orthodox Christianity are registered religions. Authorities have intimidated, arrested, and otherwise persecuted individuals and groups outside these government-supervised structures.

The Turkmenistan government maintains that the country is "not ready" for openly functioning political parties openly debating values, ideals, and policies, as in most developed democratic countries. The government prefers to avoid social tensions, conflicts, and bloodshed by outlawing democratic institutions. The elections that have been held in Turkmenistan have been instruments designed to legitimize the existing power structures rather than expressions of the popular will. Turkmenistan does not pass the "election test"; that is, the situation in the country is not one in which, as Bernard Lewis says, "the government can be changed by elections as opposed to one where elections are changed by the government" (Lewis 1996: 53).

Transition to International Standards of Governance

International human rights organizations have been highly critical of Turkmenistan's political system, accusing it of failing to make sufficient progress toward international standards of acceptable governance. The U.S. government and other major world powers have been criticized for turning a blind eye to Turkmenistan's record and instead promoting the development of Turkmenistan's fabulous gas potential.

However, Turkmenistan's negative record is not without consequences. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) suspended some of its lending programs to the Turkmenistan government in April 2000, claiming that the Turkmenistan government had failed to implement agreed-on structural reforms. The vice president of the EBRD, Charles R. Frank, noted that "the Bank has adopted a graduated approach, in which the scope of its involvement is tied to the progress these countries make in the application of universal democratic values" (Reuters 2000).

Turkmenistan's position in the international community may be determined not by its ability to make the transition to a higher standard of living but rather by its ability to offer its citizens a higher quality of life.

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TURKS—WESTERN ASIA The word "Turk" refers to the members of the great linguistic and cultural family of Turkic peoples extending from China to Europe. Today there are two main groups of Turkic peoples: the western and the eastern. The eastern group is made up of the Turkic peoples inhabiting the areas of present-day Central Asia and the Uygur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang in China. The Turks of Turkey belong to the western group, which also includes the Turks of the Balkans, Anatolia, Cyprus, northern Iraq, and northwestern Iran and Azerbaijan. Almost nine-tenths of the population of Turkey claims Turkish as their first language. In present-day Turkey, however, the word implies not only ethnic, cultural, and linguistic aspects but also designates the politico-cultural group that includes everyone living in the territory of the Turkish state. According to the Turkish Constitution, Turkey is made up of all its citizens without distinction of race or religion.

Origins of Turkic Peoples

The primary ancestors of the Turks of Turkey are the Oguz Turks, who founded an empire in Central Asia in the sixth century CE. By the eighth century, nearly all the Oguz had adopted Islam, which is still the religion of most eastern and western Turks today. Around the tenth century, the Oguz migrated westward and settled southwest of the Caspian Sea, in Iran and Iraq. There the family of Oguz tribes known as Seljuks created an empire, which by the eleventh

century extended from the Indus River west to the Mediterranean Sea. In 1071, the Seljuk sultan Alp Arslan defeated the Byzantines at the Battle of Manzikert, and thereafter several million Oguz settled in Anatolia. These Turks came to constitute the majority of the population there and made it part of the Islamic world.


Ottoman Dynasty

An Oguz tribe led by Osman Beg founded the Ottoman dynasty in 1299. The empire reached its zenith during the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent (reigned 1520–1566) and controlled vast areas from northern Africa to southern Russia and from the borders of Austria to the Bay of Basra. Turks spread westward into the Balkans, and their descendants continued to inhabit that region for five hundred years. After the collapse of the empire, most of these Turks returned to Turkey.

European expansion into the Ottoman empire and the rise of nationalism among the ethnic and racial groups of the empire resulted in the Ottoman empire's dissolution in the early twentieth century. Nationalist feelings began to spread among the Turks, and Turkish elite began to call themselves Turks rather than Ottomans and began searching for Turkic origins.

Modern Turkey

Following the partition of the six hundred-year-old Ottoman empire after World War I, Turkish nationalists under the leadership of Ataturk (1881–1938) renounced the Ottoman heritage and founded the Republic of Turkey in 1923 within the borders of the empire's Turkish core—Anatolia and eastern Thrace. To Westernize Turkey, Ataturk launched a series of reforms affecting all aspects of life, from introducing a civil code to changing the alphabet from Arabic to Latin in 1928



A Turkish man with his two daughters in Kayseri, Turkey, c. 1997. (DAVE BARTRUFF/CORBIS)

and, in the 1930s, purifying the Turkish language by removing the foreign words. Ataturk's aim was to forge the identity of the modern Turks and to make them more like Europeans. Ataturk's reforms, based on secularism, nationalism, and modernization, constitute the ideological base of modern Turkey, called Kemalism.

In the process of modernization, the Ottoman structure of social relationships was greatly transformed. Women began to take their place in the public sphere along with men; the nuclear family replaced the extended family, although in most rural areas patrilineal ties and values are still dominant in determining social and kinship relations. Nearly two-thirds of the population live in urban areas and work in industrial and service sectors. The rate of population growth declined after the 1960s due to family-planning policies. Today approximately 3.5 million Turks live in various Western European countries.

Nearly all Turks are Muslim. Thus, while the Turkish state is secular, Islam has had a deep impact on family and social life, although this influence varies according to people's social and economic status. Two dominant sects of Islam, the Sunni majority and the Alevi, divide society vertically. The Alevi originated from Shi'ite Islam, but unlike their Iranian counterparts, are heterodox and have no formal clergy.

The culture of modern Turks has both modern and traditional elements, the latter of which are based on the rich Ottoman legacy apparent in carpet weaving, ceramics, music, architectural forms, and folk arts. Thanks to Ataturk's reforms, modern literature, fine arts, and classical and contemporary music flourish in Turkey. Today, theater, a growing film industry, and book and magazine publications play an important role in Turkish culture.

Most Turkish citizens are ethnically Turk, but very few if any are "pure" ethnic Turks. After the Turkic nomads came to Anatolia in the eleventh century, some settled peoples like the Greeks and the Armenians became Muslim and Turkish. Other Turkish citizens are descendants of those who came from the Balkans and the Caucasus as refugees in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This long history of intermixing explains the difference in physical appearance between the Turks of Turkey, who are akin to European peoples, and the eastern Turks, who have an East Asian appearance.

The Turkish language spoken by Turkey's Turks belongs to the Ural-Altai linguistic family and, with Gagauz, Azerbaijani, Turkmen, and Khorasan Turkic, forms the Oguz branch of the Turkic languages. Modern Turkish is also the language of Turkish minorities

living in north Cyprus, northern Iraq, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, and Kosovo. Kurdish-speaking people, an estimated one-seventh of the population of Turkey, constitute another major linguistic group in that nation.

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TURUGART PASS Turugart (Torugart) Pass is a mountain pass in the Tian Shan mountain range of Central Asia, connecting the Republic of Kyrgyzstan with Xinjiang Province in the far northwestern region of the People's Republic of China. A major highway runs through the pass, following one of the main routes of the ancient Silk Road between Europe and China. The road winds south through the smaller At-Bashi mountain range in the central part of the Tian Shan, which is oriented northeast and southwest, forming much of the Kyrgyz and Chinese border. Reaching a height of 3,752 meters at the pass, the road descends to the Chinese city of Kashgar on the edge of the vast Taklimakan Desert. A pristine mountain landscape and high mountain lakes such as Lake Chatyr Kul, virtually untouched by human hands, make the pass an area of environmental concern for the Kyrgyz government and people.

Near the pass, within Kyrgyzstan, sits the tenth-century Tash-Rabat caravanserai, or caravan rest stop, that gave shelter to caravans traveling along the Silk Route between Europe and China. The high mountain pass is growing in importance as a major economic and trading link between Kyrgyzstan and western China. The Kyrgyz form the majority of the population on both sides of the Turugart Pass.

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TWELVE MUQAM The Twelve *Muqam* are considered the most prestigious music of the Uighur people of Xinjiang in northwest China. In terminol-

ogy, they are allied to the Arabo-Persian *maqam* system; *muqam* is the Turkic-language variant of this Arab term, and many names of individual suites are also drawn from Arabic. Musically, however, the *Muqam* are more closely related to Central Asian art-music traditions, like the Bukharan *Shashmaqam*. Unlike the Arabo-Persian traditions, which involve a degree of improvisation in performance, each of the Uighur Twelve *Muqam* is basically a tripartite suite made up of (1) *chong naghma* (great music)—a series of vocal and instrumental pieces beginning with a meditative unmetred *bash muqam* (introduction); (2) *dastan* (stories)—slower metered pieces; (3) *masbrap* (festival)—fast dance pieces.

The pieces are characterized by rhythmic formulas marked out by the hand-held *dap* (drum). Each of the Uighur Twelve *Muqam* is basically a fixed tripartite musical suite; each has a defining mood and pitch range, but modulation is so frequent that is hardly possible to link a *Muqam* to one mode, in contrast to the Arabo-Persian tradition.

The lyrics of the Twelve *Muqam* are attributed to the great Turkic and Persian poets or drawn from folk poetry; they are imbued with Sufi imagery and ideals. Said to originate in the fifteenth-century Kashgar court, their present form is more realistically traced back to the nineteenth century. *Muqam* may be performed by one singer with bowed or plucked lute (*satar* or *tanbur*) plus drum or with a small group of supporting voices and instruments. Men, women, beggars, and respected religious men may practice this tradition, for enjoyment or religious purposes. The Twelve *Muqam* hold an important place in Uighurs' affections and are often referred to in terms of spiritual necessity and moral authority.

Rachel Harris

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TWELVER SHI'ISM There are two major branches of Islam. After the death of the prophet Muhammad (c. 632 CE), Muslims who followed Abu Bakr, 'Umar, and 'Uthman as the temporal and spiritual heads of Islam came to be known as Sunni Muslims. Those following 'Ali and his descendants came to be known as Shi'ite Muslims. Among the Shi'a, those believing in the twelve imams (spiritual heads of the Muslim faith), beginning with 'Ali and ending with the twelfth imam, are known as *Ithna 'ashariyah* or Twelver Shi'ite Muslims. This also contrasts with those who only believe in seven imams—the Ismailis. In both Sunni and Shi'ite Islam, there are traditions attributed to the prophet Muhammad about the day of judgment and the coming of the Mahdi (Rightly Guided One). In the Twelver Shi'a theology, the Mahdi and the twelfth imam are one and the same. It is thought that when recognized, the Mahdi will be named after the prophet Muhammad and will be a member of the house of the prophet, one who is a direct offspring of Muhammad.

The twelfth imam is the last imam of the Twelver Shi'ite tradition. Like many of the Shi'a imams, the eleventh imam, Hasan al-Askari (d. 874), was persecuted by the Sunni rulers of his time. The Abbasid caliph Mutamid had deported Imam al-Askari from Medina to Samarra (in present-day Iraq) and kept him as a prisoner for much of his short imamate. After Imam al-Askari's death, general confusion erupted among the Shi'ite community because no apparent successor had been appointed by him, nor was he known to have had any sons. As many as twenty factions were formed among the Shi'a, with each adhering to idiosyncratic beliefs. One faction continued to believe that Imam al-Askari was not dead but in a state of occultation (waiting to reappear to humanity). Similar ideas had risen after the death of the seventh imam, Musa al-Kazim (d. 799 CE). Others claimed that Imam al-Askari was childless. Yet others claimed that he had a son, who was the anticipated Mahdi and who has gone into occultation. They claimed that the five-year-old Mahdi was seen searching for his father near his dwelling place when he entered a cavern and was not seen again.

Although the myth or reality of the twelfth imam cannot be fully determined, the Twelver Shi'ism tradition considers him to have existed, to have been named Muhammad, and to have been a son of the eleventh imam, Hasan al-Askari. It is said that even

his mother was not aware of her own pregnancy. The twelfth imam is said to have been in danger of being killed by the Abbasids, who were the rulers of his time, because the Abbasids feared that the emergence of the Mahdi would end their tyrannical rule. In order to create dissent within the Shi'a ranks, the Abbasids had even supported one of Imam al-Askari's brothers by the name of Ja'far as the claimant to the office of the imamate.

It is also held that Imam al-Askari smuggled his son, Muhammad, from Samarra to Medina in 873. During his seven-year imamate, Hasan al-Askari lived in occasional imprisonment, hiding, and dissimulation (*taqiyya*), a practice of denying of one's faith used by the Shi'ites to protect themselves from the majority Sunni.

The twelfth imam lived in hiding for sixty-nine years, communicating with and guiding the Shi'a believers through four renowned followers. This period is known as the lesser occultation (874–941 CE). The concept of the *safir* (ambassador or agent) through whom imams communicated with their followers, had been established by earlier Shi'ite imams. After the death of the fourth ambassador, no other significant leader immediately claimed to be an ambassador or direct communicator with the twelfth imam. Another tradition has it that the fourth ambassador also gave the news of the bodily death of the imam to the believers.

The period from the supposed death of the twelfth imam until the day of his resurrection is known as the greater occultation. Many of the Shi'a believe that the twelfth imam is living among humanity but is invisible and that he will choose to reveal himself and rid the world of injustice when he deems it an appropriate time.

During the nineteenth century, several prominent figures are considered to have been the twelfth imam. The most prominent were Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsa'i (1753–1826), Sayyid Kazem Rashti (d. 1844), and Mirza 'Ali Muhammad (1819–1850) of Shiraz, also known as the Bab ("the Gate"). The Bab announced his status in 1844, exactly one thousand lunar years from the lesser occultation of the twelfth imam (260 CE). Later, Mirza 'Ali Muhammad claimed to be the Mahdi and was eventually imprisoned and executed.

Unlike in the Sunni branch of Islam, in Shi'a clerics are considered more than religiously well-versed people who hold the same status as judges in secular courts. Many Shi'ite Muslims consider their religious figures to speak and deliver judgments in the name of

the twelfth imam. This has given substantial powers to Shi'ite clerics. The twelfth imam is also known as the *Muntazar* (the Expected One), the *Hujja* (the Proof), the *Qaim* (the Living), and the *Imam al-Zaman* (the Imam of Time). Today, the birth of the twelfth imam is celebrated throughout the Shi'a Muslim world.

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TWENTY-SIX MARTYRS The twenty-six martyrs were Japanese and Western Christians crucified at Nishizaka Hill in Nagasaki on 5 February 1597. The twenty-six were ordered executed by Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536/7–1598), Japan's paramount leader at the time, in response to developments surrounding the stranding of the Spanish galleon *San Felipe* the previous autumn off the island of Shikoku. Hideyoshi, who had long exhibited an erratic policy toward Christianity in Japan, had first banned the religion in 1587 but had not strictly enforced this proscription directed against the Jesuits. Originally, he also welcomed the Franciscans when they began their missionary work in the country in the 1590s, but when a pilot aboard the *San Felipe* boasted that Franciscan friars had in the past served as a vanguard of Spanish invasion forces in foreign territories, Hideyoshi moved quickly against the Franciscans in Japan.

In December 1596, six Western Franciscans from the Kyoto/Osaka area, fifteen Japanese followers of the Franciscan mission, and three Japanese Jesuits were arrested, tried, and condemned to death. The twenty-four were marched overland from Kyoto to Nagasaki for crucifixion. Two Japanese who followed the prisoners to look after their needs were also included among those executed. The deaths of the six foreign missionaries marked the first time that Westerners were executed in Japan for their faith.

The twenty-six were beatified by Pope Urban VIII in 1627 and canonized by Pope Pius IX in 1862. Three years later, to commemorate the martyrdom, French Catholic missionaries built Oura Church facing Nishizaka Hill in Nagasaki. A memorial to the martyrs was built at Nishizaka on the centennial of their canonization. In 1981 Pope John Paul II visited the memorial and paid tribute to the martyrs.

Lane R. Earns

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TYPHOONS Typhoons or cyclones are large, often destructive tropical storms similar to the western hemisphere's hurricanes. From Japan to India, millions of lives are at risk from typhoons, because of their high wind speeds, intense rainfall, and sea surges.

Since typhoons depend on heat and moisture to sustain them, these storms always form over warm oceans near the equator where sea-surface temperatures are at least 26°C. They originate in the western Pacific above the equator and follow several general tracks—westward across the central Philippines and into central and northern Vietnam, or curving northward to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, and coastal areas of China. The most deadly and damaging of these storms originate in the warm water of the Bay of Bengal, where their northward track drives them into the low-lying and densely settled areas of Bangladesh. These storms occur before (April and May) or after (October–November) the southwest monsoon season and have been accompanied by winds in excess of 145 miles per hour. Although these winds can do great damage and release large amounts of rainfall, it is the storm surge or wall of water pushed ahead of the low pressure eye of the storm as it approaches the shoreline that is most devastating and accounts for most loss of life. The average annual frequency of typhoons in East and Southeast Asia is three or more per year. In the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal, where these storms are called cyclones, there may be one or more per year.



Residents with their personal belongings wade through the flooded streets of Nagoya, Japan, in September 2000 following a typhoon. (AFP/CORBIS)

The greatest damages from typhoons or cyclones have occurred in Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Japan. About 10 percent of all tropical cyclones form in the Bay of Bengal. Poverty and overpopulation worsen the devastating effects of cyclones on Bangladesh. Twenty million people live in vulnerable rural communities in the delta at the head of the Bay of Bengal, where much of the more productive rice land is located. In May 1985, a cyclone with a storm surge nine meters high caused more than eleven thousand deaths, although much higher death tolls have been recorded. For example, the storm of 29 April 1991 had an estimated death toll of 150,000–200,000 people and directly affected 15 million residents.

In isolated island groups such as the Philippines and Japan, typhoons can inflict large amounts of property damage, flooding, and loss of life. The concentration of built-up methods and agricultural activities in flood-prone lowlands and along coastlines means that high winds and heavy rainfall can cause damage to crops and buildings and threaten human life. The low-lying and narrow landmass of these island groups tends to intensify the impact of these forces. In 1970, four major typhoons swept central and north Luzon Island in the Philippines with over fifteen hundred lives lost. Typhoon Goring caused millions of pesos in crop damage in 1989.

Japan is hit by an average of four typhoons a year, which cause millions of dollars in property damage, primarily in the southern islands of Kyushu and Fukuoka. Typhoon Vera, which struck central Honshu in 1959, left five thousand dead and over forty thousand injured.

Efforts to mitigate the adverse impact of typhoons vary. Japan has enforced typhoon-resistant building practices in many of the most vulnerable urban areas in Kyushu and southern Honshu Islands and Fukuoka Prefecture for many years. Elsewhere in Asia, evacuation programs and early warning systems are less developed, although governments and international disaster-management agencies are working on developing them.

James Hafner

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UCHIMURA KANZO (1861–1930), Japanese writer and religious figure. Uchimura Kanzo was born in Edo (present-day Tokyo) to the samurai class and educated in the English language at Sapporo Agricultural College (now Hokkaido University), where he converted to Christianity. In 1884, he traveled to the United States, studied at Amherst College and Hartford Theological Seminary, and worked at a mental hospital in Philadelphia. His spiritual autobiography, *How I Became a Christian* (1895), describes the racial prejudice, economic injustice, crime, and strident religious sectarianism he found in the United States, all of which he considered contrary to true Christianity. After returning to Japan in 1888, he became a schoolteacher, but was accused by his colleagues of showing disrespect toward the emperor. Unable to continue in education, he became a writer, editor, and religious leader, as well as a prominent pacifist. His *mukyokai* (nonchurch) doctrine sought to avoid reliance upon church buildings, professional ministers, and organizations in favor of more informal and democratic gatherings at individuals' homes. Although motivated in part by a resistance to the hegemony of Western religious institutionalism, his doctrine also emphasized Bible study in small groups, organized along the culturally familiar pattern of *sensei* (teacher or mentor) and *deshi* (student or disciple). While technically a fundamentalist, his beliefs are also seen as nationalistic in their advocacy of a Japanese-led reformation of Christianity.

Matthew Mizenko

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UIGHURS Uighurs (or Uygurs) are the largest of the Turkic groups in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China, with an estimated population in the region of 8 million in 1997. Uighurs account for 46.7 percent of the population of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, with Han Chinese accounting for 38.4 percent and members of other minority ethnicities accounting for the remaining 14.9 percent. For most of the past ten centuries, these people have lived under the control of the Mongolian peoples. The Uighurs make their living in the Tian Shan mountain range as nomads (though the nomadic population is decreasing), herding sheep, goats, cows, horses, and camels. In oases near the Taklimakan Desert, they engage in farming with the aid of irrigation canals or underground waterways to run meltwater. Wheat, corn, cotton, and fruit (grapes, watermelons, and muskmelons) are popular crops. Trading is actively carried out across borders in the southwestern cities, where people weave traditional carpets.

At present they are Sunni Muslims, but earlier in their history they inclined to Manichaeism (since the eighth century) and Buddhism (since the tenth century), and originally they adhered to shamanism and believed that Heaven (*tengri*) gave order, power, and wisdom to mankind. Fragments of many kinds of texts on Buddhism, Manichaeism, and Nestorian Christianity have been uncovered at archaeological sites in Uighur areas. Islam came to Uighur lands along the Silk Road, and almost all Uighurs had be-

come Muslims by the end of the fifteenth century. Since 1978, the Chinese government has maintained an appeasement policy with regard to religious expression, supporting the revival of religious activities, including reconstruction of mosques and religious school, as well as supporting publication of books in Uighur, in an effort to promote reform and an open-door policy. This is in an attempt to mend the damage done by the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), in which much of the culture of the pre-Communist period was destroyed. Muslims are hopeful that these policies will lead to a resurgence of ethnic and religious autonomy, but their optimism is guarded. They are quite afraid that their ethnic and cultural sovereignty will be overwhelmed by the area's growing Han Chinese population. China, for its part, is very sensitive about matters affecting its sovereignty over the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.

Early History of the Uighur people

The term Uighur originated as the name of one of the Nine Tribes (Tokuz Oghuz), a confederation of Turkic nomads that first appears in the annals of Chinese historiography in the early seventh century. A clan of the Uighur tribe, the Yaghlakar, established a state (744–840 CE) in what is now Mongolia. This state's most notable contribution was the military rescue of the Chinese Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) from the crises caused by the rebellion of the general An Lushan (703–757). In return, the Chinese emperor bequeathed the Uighur state a large monetary award annually. The Uighurs strengthened their relationship with the Sogdian merchants (Sogdians were a people who lived in Transoxiana, now Uzbekistan) who had a profitable trade of horses from the Uighur state for silk from China. In 763, the Uighurs permitted the Sogdians' Manichaeon missionary work. The city Ordubalik ("Town of the Palace"), located on the Orkhon riverside and later named Karabalghasun, enjoyed its greatest flourishing during this time. The Sogdians engaged in commerce with their colonies along the Silk Road leading to China and the Uighur state.

The Uighur ruling classes attempted to strengthen social and economic relations with the Sogdians, which caused unrest among nomadic Uighurs, who were suffering from famine and pestilence, and, in 839, from heavy snowfalls. Probably seeing the opportunity to take advantage of the situation, a large number of Kyrgyz, a Turkic tribe in the upper Yenisey valley, allied with a discontented Uighur general and invaded and burned Ordubalik, bringing down the Uighur government in 840. Both Uighur nomads and nobles of the ruling classes emigrated, eventually settling in the area

from the Tian Shan to Gansu Province in northwestern China. Immigrant Uighurs founded at least two new states, the Uighur kingdom of Ganzhou (890–1028), and the West Uighur kingdom (early tenth century–1284). Descendants of the former Ganzhou Uighurs may be the Yugu in Gansu, traditionally known as the Yellow Uighurs (with a population of approximately 39,000 people in the Autonomous Sunan Yugu Prefecture in 1997).

Rule by the Kara Khitan and the Mongols

The Uighur kingdom of Ganzhou was absorbed by the Tangut people (herdsmen from the Ordos desert area of northern China) into their Xi Xia kingdom in 1028. The West Uighur kingdom fell under the control of the Kara Khitan in the 1130s. In 1209, unable to bear the tyranny of the local Kara Khitan magistrate, the king of the Uighurs had him killed. He was no doubt emboldened by the promise of protection from a new and more powerful overlord: Genghis Khan. The king surrendered the West Uighur kingdom to Genghis Khan in the same year; it survived as a Mongol vassal state until 1284. The Uighurs were originally supposed to provide military service for the Mongol empire but ended up occupying higher positions in various areas of the government.

A succession dispute among the Mongol khans turned the Uighur lands into a battlefield at the end of the thirteenth century, and by the early fourteenth century the castle towns in the Turfan basin were devastated by war. The Uighur royal family and their subordinates took refuge in Gansu in 1284, and the Uighur lands came to be ruled by the descendants of Chagatai Khan, son of Genghis Khan. When the Kashgar Khojas, Islamic nobles, gained power in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, Islam and Islamic culture, for example, the Naqshbandiya order of Sufi Islamic mystics, spread among the Uighur people. Galdan Khan (1645–1697), leader of the Oirats of western Mongolia, occupied the land of the Uighurs for seventy years following an invasion in 1679. In the first half of the eighteenth century, under Galdan's successors, many Uighur farmers (later called Taran-chis) of southern Xinjiang were forcibly relocated to the Ili Valley on the northern border.

Rule by China

In 1760, the Uighur lands were conquered by military expeditions of the Chinese Qing dynasty (1644–1912). Approximately forty-five thousand Uighurs moved to Semirechie in Kazakhstan in 1881. The Uighur people in the oases around the Taklimakan

desert came under Chinese rule when Xinjiang Province was established there in 1884. After the Uighur rebellion of 1931–1934, the Chinese government at last granted the Uighurs the status of a minority people.

The Uighurs, together with China's Kazakh minority, founded a state (the East Turkistan Republic) in northern Xinjiang in 1944–1949, but the newly established People's Republic of China absorbed it in October of 1949. In 1955 the Chinese set up an administrative office in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China at Urumchi. About sixty thousand people, including Uighurs and Kazakhs, emigrated to Kazakhstan (1962). Today, there are more than 200,000 Uighurs who are citizens of Kazakhstan.

Juten Oda

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ULAANBAATAR (2000 est. pop. 774,000). Ulaanbaatar (also Ulan Bator, Uрга, Niislel Huree), situated at an altitude of 1,350 meters in central Mongolia, is the capital of the Mongolian People's Republic and is the country's largest city. Mountains, including the prominent Bogd Uul Ridge (2,200 meters), surround the city, which lies in a long valley of the Tuul River.

The city began in 1639 as the itinerant court of an influential Mongolian prince. Over decades it gradually became a religious and political center for the region, and in the eighteenth century the court settled permanently on the current site of Ulaanbaatar. From this place, the *bogdo-gegen*, Mongolian Buddhism's highest lama, exercised religious and political authority across large areas of modern-day Mongolia. By 1900, as many as twenty thousand lamas were conducting services at more than one hundred temples in



Ulaanbaatar in 1983, while still under Soviet rule. The high-rises on the outskirts of the city were occupied by Russians and Eastern Europeans and contrast with the more traditional architecture of buildings in the foreground of the photo. (DEAN CONGER/CORBIS)

the city. In addition the city was home to six hundred foreign firms and several thousand merchants and craftsmen and prospered from trade between Russia and China.

The first half of the twentieth century was a turbulent time for the city. In 1911, when Outer Mongolia declared independence from China, the city was renamed Niislel Huree ("national capital"). During the following decade, it was variously occupied by Chinese and White Russian troops, and in 1921 a Mongolian militia commanded by Damdiny Suhbaatar captured the city with the aid of the Soviet Red Army. In 1924 leaders of the country's Communist revolution renamed the town Ulaanbaatar, which means "red hero." With Soviet aid, the city built museums, theaters, and several institutions of higher learning, including the National University of Mongolia. To accommodate the fast-growing population, block apartments replaced the traditional Mongolian *ger* (felt tent) and public transportation replaced horses. In 2000 the city produced more than 50 percent of the country's industrial output. Its architecture is an eclectic combination of Soviet-style block apartments, neoclassical public buildings, Tibetan Buddhist temples, and traditional *gers*. The Trans-Mongolian Railway and an international airport connect the capital to both Beijing and Moscow, and it is the political, cultural, and social center of the Mongolian People's Republic.

Daniel Hruschka

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ULCHI MUNDOK (flourished 589–618), general of the Korean kingdom of Koguryo (37 BCE–668 CE). Ulchi Mundok was the hero of the Koguryo repulsion of the Sui Chinese invasion of 612. He is known, however, largely from one short passage in Kim Pu-shik's (1075–1151) *Samguk sagi* (History of the Three Kingdoms), which discusses his cunning defeat of the larger Chinese force. He lured the battle-weary Sui invaders deep into Koguryo territory by feigning defeat in several small skirmishes and sending a poem taunting the Chinese commander. He then trapped and slaughtered the Chinese troops at the Sal River (now Ch'ongch'on) and harassed them all the way back to Liaodong. Winning this great victory saved Koguryo from Chinese conquest. The poem and the Chinese version of story, from which Kim Pu-shik's account derives, are preserved in Wei Zheng's (580–643) *Sui shu* (History of the Sui).

Ulchi Mundok did not become a Korean national hero until the modern era. Traditionally, that honor was accorded to the Shilla kingdom's General Kim Yu-shin (595–673), an important figure in the unification of the Three Korean kingdoms (Koguryo, Shilla, and Paekche) in the 660s. However, nationalist historians have more recently argued that Ulchi Mundok was the real military hero of the period, because he protected Koguryo's ancient possessions in Manchuria and preserved Korea's political and cultural independence by not forming an alliance with Tang China as the Shilla leaders did. Because many present-day Koreans see Korea's historical and cultural roots in Koguryo, Ulchi Mundok has become a symbol of the Korean national spirit.

Richard D. McBride II

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UMAR, TEUKU (1854–1898), Acehese war leader. Born in Meulaboh, Aceh, on the island of Sumatra, Indonesia, Teuku Umar (Teuku Oema) first rose to prominence as a military leader on the western coast of Aceh during the long military struggle against the Netherlands's annexation of the sultanate in 1874. In 1883 he was lured away from the resistance by Dutch promises of money and weapons as part of a policy to create a coalition of pro-Dutch Acehese forces but deserted them in 1884. He rejoined the Dutch in 1893 and deserted them again in 1896, taking many of their weapons and resuming the armed struggle against them. His action strengthened those among the Dutch arguing for more forceful action in Aceh. In 1898 Colonel J. B. van Heutsz was appointed head of the Dutch civil and military forces with the task of subjugating the region. Van Heutsz's wide-ranging military operations included an ambush at Meulaboh in which Umar was killed.

Although Umar is officially regarded as a hero of the anticolonial resistance, his willingness to collaborate with the Dutch presaged their successful strategy of co-opting *uleebalang* (war leaders) as allies against more radically anticolonial Muslim leaders.

Robert Cribb

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UNGPYAKORN PUEY (1916–1999), Thai government official, economist, educator. Ungphakorn Puey was known as an honest government official, an economist and educator, a strong promoter of rural development, and an advocate for democracy in Thailand through nonviolent means. Born into a Sino-Thai family, he finished high school at Assumption College in 1933 and received his B.A. from the University of Moral and Political Sciences (Thammasat University) in 1937.

The Japanese occupation of Thailand in 1944 prompted Ungphakorn Puey to volunteer to work with the British Army Pioneer Corps. His main task was to contact leaders of the underground "Free-Thai" movement, and he risked his life by parachuting into Thailand, where he was nearly executed by the Thai police.

Puey received his Ph.D. from the London School of Economics in 1989, graduating with First Class honors, and began his career as an economist and senior government official. He held the post of governor of the Bank of Thailand from 1959 to 1971. While governor, he succeeded in keeping the bank largely free of political influence and thus enabled it to have a sound monetary policy. This allowed Thailand to avoid serious inflation and kept the Thai currency remarkably stable.

In 1964, he offered his resignation as bank governor to become dean of the Faculty of Economics at Thammasat University. A compromise was reached among bank and university officials, and he was allowed to keep both positions. His deanship at Thammasat University was from 1964 to 1972.

In 1972, continuing actions against democracy on the part of the military regime prompted Dr. Puey to write an open letter from Cambridge University, where he was a visiting fellow, to protest against the prime minister, General Kittikhachorn Thanom. The letter, together with a growing protest movement, led to the student uprising of 14 October 1973, and a brief period of freedom and democracy was instituted in Thailand from 14 October 1973 to 6 October 1976. Ungphakorn Puey returned to Thailand and was elected rector of Thammasat University in 1975.

The military regime returned to power on 6 October 1976, and Dr. Puey, because of his personal convictions, was forced into self-exile in England with his English wife, Margaret Smith. He continued with various nonviolent activities against the military regimes in Thailand until his death in London at the age of eighty-three, two years after Thailand's democratic constitution of 1997 was proclaimed.

Apichai Puntasen

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UNIFICATION CHURCH Tongil-kyo (*tongil* is the Korean word for "unification"; *kyo* is Korean for "church": thus literally "Unification Church") is the most prominent of Korea's new religions that have Christian origins. Once formally known as the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, in 1997 the full name of what is still popularly known as the Unification Church was changed to the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification in order to embrace all religions rather than focusing solely on Christianity. The Unification Church was founded in 1954 by Sun Myong Moon (b. 1920), an itinerant Christian preacher who had been imprisoned by Communist authorities in North Korea. Moon moved to South Korea when his prison was liberated during the Korean War. Soon afterwards, in 1954, he established the Unification Church in Seoul and began preaching a revision of traditional Christian theology based on revelations Moon proclaimed he had received.

According to *Divine Principle*, the record of those revelations, Adam and Eve were to be the true parents of mankind. However, Satan seduced Eve, ensuring that she and Adam would not be the sinless progenitors needed to ensure that human beings live in harmony with God's will. God later sent his only son Jesus to earth in another attempt to establish a sinless lineage and erect a heavenly kingdom on earth. However, humanity rejected Jesus, crucifying him before he could marry and father children. In the twentieth century, God allowed a man to be born without sin in order to complete the mission the savior Jesus had begun. That messiah would save the rest of humanity from Satan by marrying a woman equally sinless in order that human beings may finally have true parents who can restore them to the family of God.

In 1992, Moon and his wife Hak Ja Han, whom he had married in 1960, announced publicly that they are those true parents, and that under their stewardship humanity had left behind the New Testament age and embarked upon a new age in human history, the Completed Testament Era. Every year Unificationists celebrate the Moon's wedding anniversary as Parents Day, the date on which humanity began the return to the state of grace that prevailed before Eve's transgression with Satan.

Though the Unification Church is Korean in origin, it is no longer primarily a Korean church. Moon

moved to the United States in 1971. Even though a U.S. federal court convicted him of tax evasion in 1982, and he served thirteen months in prison on that charge, he continues to lead the Unification Church from its American headquarters in New York State. In 1999, church officials said that only 220,000 of a claimed 4.5 million members worldwide resided in Korea.

Don Baker

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UNIFIED SHILLA KINGDOM On the Korean Peninsula, the Shilla kingdom (57 BCE–935 CE), with the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) of China as its ally, was able to overpower the Paekche kingdom (18 BCE–663 CE) and then the Koguryo kingdom (37 BCE–668 CE) in the 660s. It soon became apparent, though, that Tang China had its eyes on this conquered territory for itself and did not recognize the Shilla kingdom's claim to the territory south of the Taedong River, south of Pyongyang (in present-day North Korea), until 676. This excluded much of the former Koguryo territory, and it was to this territory that many Koguryo people migrated and set up the Parhae kingdom (698–926 CE). The Shilla kingdom was thus able to unify most of the Korean Peninsula under its rule but less than half of the land ruled during the Three Kingdoms period of China (220–265 CE).



KOREAN KINGDOMS AND DYNASTIES

Koguryo kingdom (37 BCE–668 CE)
 Paekche kingdom (18 BCE –663 CE)
 Shilla kingdom (57 BCE –935 CE)
 Unified Shilla (668–935 CE)
 Koryo kingdom (dynasty) (918–1392)
 Choson dynasty or Yi dynasty (1392–1910)

The Unified Shilla kingdom (668–935 CE) reached its peak in the middle of the eighth century. With Buddhism already the state religion, the Unified Shilla kingdom attempted to establish the ideal Buddhist nation. To this end, splendid Buddhist temples and shrines were constructed. The most noted of these are the Pulguk Temple and Sokkuram Grotto, both located near the Shilla capital, present-day Kyongju. Extensive woodblock printing of Buddhist scriptures was also undertaken. These included the recently discovered imprint of the *Dharani Sutra*, probably printed in the first half of the eighth century. Overall, the arts and sciences flourished.

After unifying the peninsula, the Unified Shilla kingdom reorganized its administration after that of neighboring China and developed a complex bureaucracy. Most important, there was a growing authoritarianism in the power exercised by the king, which increased to the extent that opposition to the throne was virtually eliminated. The power of the throne was evidenced by changes in military organization. Members of the nation's ten garrisons and national army took oaths of loyalty to the throne and were under the king's direct authority. The Unified Shilla kingdom enjoyed an era of peace with Tang China. In return for being allowed to remain independent of the Tang in internal affairs, the Unified Shilla kingdom sent periodic tribute to the Tang emperor and recognized China's authority in Asian affairs.

As the nobility indulged in easy, luxurious lives, Buddhism as the state religion began to decline in the latter part of the eighth century. A new sect, Son (Zen), began to establish itself in remote mountainous areas. Corruption in the bureaucracy and factional strife in the government became rampant. Rulers became increasingly weak and immoral, and aristocrats abused their power. The situation deteriorated to one of near anarchy, leading to peasant revolts. Leaders of these revolts created rival states—the Later Paekche kingdom (892–936) and the Later Koguryo kingdom (901–918)—backed by strong armies. The Unified Shilla kingdom shrank to its preunification size. The Later Koguryo kingdom, renamed Koryo, gained control of the central part of the peninsula, and the Unified Shilla kingdom, being too weak to resist, handed over power to the Koryo kingdom. In 936, after fierce military resistance, the Koryo kingdom (918–1392) defeated the Later Paekche kingdom to reunify the Korean Peninsula.

David E. Shaffer

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UNION SOLIDARITY AND DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION-MYANMAR

In the absence of a political party popular among the masses, Myanmar's State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) founded the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) on 15 September 1993 as a mass movement to help unite Myanmar (Burma) under its sovereignty. Organized at all levels, from State and Division to village tract level, the SLORC declared the following five formal objectives: (a) non-disintegration of the union, (b) non-disintegration of the unity of the national races, (c) perpetuation of national sovereignty, (d) uplift of national prestige and patriotism, and (e) the emergence of a developed, peaceful, and modern state. Membership in the USDA affords promotion and special privileges, but also compels participation in denunciation of perceived threats, including against the National League for Democracy (NLD) and democratically elected political parties and their leaders. Though a membership in the millions is proclaimed by the authorities, the fact that it is conceived entirely as an instrument of state, and pressures people to join with intimidation, means that this organization is unlikely to play an enduring role if, and when, political reforms are initiated.

Gustaaf Houtman

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UNITED FRONT STRATEGY The United Front strategy grew from the belief of the Soviet Comintern, or international organization of Communist parties, that Communist groups in nations subject to foreign subjugation should form a united front with na-

tionals to gain their liberation before beginning their socialist revolutions. "Hostile classes," Lenin believed, "are united by a common interest in opposing foreign exploitation" (Schram 1969: 134). The strategy was first used in China and, after a successful start there, was also attempted in Korea. In the end, both attempts were unsuccessful, and the societal divisions that emerged remain in the divided Korean Peninsula and in the politically divided governments of China and Taiwan.

In China, until the Communist purge in 1927, the union of the Communists and Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party) led to the formation of a government with Communist participation; one Russian adviser even observed that members of the right-wing Guomindang were moving toward the left. This observation was premature with the brutal purge of the Communists by Chiang Kai-shek's (1887–1975) nationalist group, ending any hope of a strong united front to challenge Japanese imperialism in China.

In Korea, the United Front strategy was meant to create "a broad national revolutionary front that included handicraftsmen, the intelligentsia, and the petty and middle bourgeoisie along with the workers and peasants" (Scalapino and Lee 1972: 95). The structure for this front was the Korean National Party (KCP), formed in early 1926. This party was organized by Korean Communists in an attempt to form an alliance with Korean nationalists and thus placed Korean Communist Party members at its core. This attempt was weakened by the roundup of many KCP leaders by the Japanese after the funeral of former Emperor Sunjong in June 1926.

The formation of the Singanhoe (New Korean Society) in 1927 marked Korea's best opportunity to unify rival factions. The society, which accommodated a variety of groups ranging from the moderate to the radical, soon established a national network of 386 branches with more than seventy-five thousand members. The beginning of the end of the society came in 1929 when its leaders were rounded up by Japanese police and charged with lending support to the student riots in Kwangju in 1929. The society's subsequent move to the right caused many leftist members to quit, leading to its demise in 1931 and ending hope for a Korean united front against the Japanese.

These efforts by the Soviets to create united fronts in both China and Korea failed due to the political differences facing the leaders of the respective nationalist and conservative parties. These differences eventually erupted into civil wars in both nations, deepening divisions that persist in the twenty-first century.

Mark E. Caprio

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UNITED NATIONS Created in 1945 from the ashes of the failed League of Nations (1920–1946), the United Nations (U.N.) is an international organization dedicated to promoting world peace and cooperation. Although some Asian countries, including Afghanistan, China, India, Thailand, and Japan (until 1935), were members of the League of Nations, the league focused on European problems rather than on Asia; by contrast much work of the United Nations has centered on Asia, where most of the world's population lives.

Political Foundations

When the United Nations Charter took effect on 24 October 1945, China was a permanent member of the Security Council; the only other Asian members of the organization were India, the Philippines, and Thailand; Afghanistan joined in 1946. Japan was not allowed to join until 1956, after the peace treaty of 1951 ended the Allied Occupation.

As decolonization proceeded in Asia, most countries in the region were admitted to membership, but with some anomalies. When members of the government of the Republic of China (ROC) fled to the island of Taiwan in 1949 in the wake of the Communist revolution that established the People's Republic of China (PRC), the ROC continued to occupy the U.N.'s China seat. Upset over the establishment of Malaysia from territories contiguous with Indonesia, President Achmed Sukarno (1901–1970) withdrew his country from the U.N. in 1965, but Indonesia rejoined in 1966 when Sukarno was overthrown. In 1971, the General Assembly voted to have the PRC replace the ROC. North Korea and South Korea were not admitted until 1991. In 1992 former Soviet republics in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) became the latest Asian countries to join. East Timor is expected to be the next Asian member.

After the United Nations was instituted in 1945, the world was engulfed in two major struggles: decol-

onization and the Cold War. While the struggle for decolonization united Asian countries, the Cold War, a conflict between Western nations and Communist states allied with the Soviet Union, shattered Asian solidarity. Revolutions brought Communist regimes to power in China, North Korea, and North Vietnam, while anti-Communist Asian states forged alliances with the United States.

When the Cold War conflict became heated in 1961, U. Thant (1909–1974) of neutral Burma (now Myanmar) became the first secretary-general named to the United Nations from outside Europe; he served until 1971.

U.N. Interventions in Asia

After 1946 many countries in transition from colonialism experienced conflicts, and the U.N. often intervened to help restore stability. India and Pakistan became independent in 1947, and cross-border violence erupted. The U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan was dispatched in 1948 to investigate and mediate; when the countries agreed to a cease-fire line in Kashmir in 1949, the U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (Unmogip) was established to monitor the peace. Unmogip continues to function today.

The U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea was set up in 1947. Assigned to monitor the 1948 election in South Korea, the body continued in 1949 as the U.N. Commission on Korea. In 1950, while the Soviet Union was boycotting the U.N., war broke out between North Korea and South Korea. The Security Council authorized a U.N. Command (UNC) to help South Korea stop the aggression. The United States coordinated the UNC, with General Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964) commanding until 1951, when General Matthew B. Ridgway (1895–1993) took over. Troops from sixteen countries, including the Philippines and Thailand, fought until a cease-fire was declared in 1953; six countries, including India, sent medical units. To monitor the cease-fire, the UNC Military Armistice Commission was established. Because North Korea withdrew in 1994, only informal Commission meetings have been held.

Subsequently the U.N.'s operations in Asia have included actions involving Irian Jaya (former West New Guinea) (1962–1963), the India-Pakistan War (1965–1966), plebiscites in Sabah and Sarawak in Malaysia (1965), the war in Afghanistan (1988–1990), Cambodian refugees in Thailand (1982–1992), Cambodian elections (1991–1992), the Tajikistan civil war (1994–2000), and East Timor (1999–).



INDIA'S EARLY HOPES FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

The following resolution regarding the United Nations was passed at a session of the All-India Congress, held in Delhi, 18–19 October 1951. It outlines the hopes of India for an international organization that could serve as an effective forum for peace.

The United Nations Organization was formed to provide a common platform for all countries, even though they differed from each other in many ways, and was based on each country having freedom to develop in its own way and not interfering with another. If that basic policy of the U.N.O. is followed, the fear that grips the world today will gradually lessen and a peaceful consideration of problems will become easier. This Congress approves of the policy pursued by the Government of India in seeking friendly relations with all countries and in avoiding any entanglement in military or other alliances which tend to divide the world into rival groups and thus endanger world peace.

In particular, the Congress approved of the decision of the Government of India not to participate in the San Francisco Conference, which was held for the purpose of signing the Japanese Peace Treaty and instead to have a separate treaty with Japan. Peace in the Far East, which has been gravely disturbed by hostilities in Korea and subsequent developments, has to be based on the cooperation of the coun-

tries of the Far East and the other countries chiefly concerned. Any partial arrangement which does not include all these countries is likely to increase the tension and lessen the chances of a peaceful settlement.

This Congress hopes that the negotiations for a cease fire in Korea will meet with success and that this will be followed by a larger settlement in the Far East.

The colossal programmes of rearmament, which present-day conditions have led many countries to adopt, give rise international tension and cast a heavy burden on the people of those countries, which results in a lowering of their standards. The progress of the under-developed countries of the world is also impeded by these programmes of rearmament. If this vast expenditure on rearmament was diverted towards constructive purpose and to the advance of under-developed countries, that would be a surer guarantee of peace than preparations for war.

The Congress trusts that the United Nations Organization will devote itself to the furtherance of the aims so nobly set forth in its Charter and reorganise itself for this purpose, where this is considered necessary.

Source: Jagdish Saran Sharma. (1965) *India's Struggle for Freedom: Select Documents and Sources*. Vol. 2. Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 190.

Economic Foundations

The polarization of the Cold War diverted attention from the poorest countries of the world. Accordingly India launched a third path, which came to be known as the Nonaligned Movement, among countries that believed that a primary agenda of the U.N. was to alleviate world poverty.

India and the nonaligned countries of Asia and Africa succeeded in directing the U.N.'s attention to economic issues, and several new technical organizations took their place alongside existing specialized U.N. agencies, such as the U.N. Development Pro-

gram and the U.N. Industrial Development Organization. Nevertheless U.N. headquarters and the specialized agencies were in New York and Western Europe, far from the realities of Asia.

Regionalization

In 1947 China pressed for establishment of a regional economic commission for Asia. Western countries at first opposed the idea, but changed their minds when they realized the advantages of an economic commission for Europe. Accordingly, the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) was

established in 1947 at Shanghai, but moved in 1949 to Bangkok. Initially the ECAFE region reached from Iran on the west to the Soviet Union on the north and Australia and New Zealand in the southeast. Since 1990, the region has included the nations of Central Asia. ECAFE nations included those U.N. members in the region as well as the colonial powers of France, Britain, the Netherlands (until 1950), and the United States. In 1974 ECAFE was renamed the Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), as newly decolonized countries of the South Pacific joined the U.N. and the scope of activities grew to include social concerns.

In 1959 U. Nyun (b. 1910) of Myanmar was appointed ESCAP executive secretary. Realizing that countries outside Asia were dominating discussions in the organization and dealing with Cold War issues, he formulated the principle of the Asian way, which asked countries of the region to do most of the talking, with decisions made by consensus rather than voting. Thus the nonregional powers began to listen to the needs of developing countries and funded worthwhile projects.

ESCAP focuses on development needs in communications, energy, environment, human and natural resources, population policies, rural and urban development, social development, statistics, trade, transportation, and tourism. The mission is carried out primarily by holding conferences that bring together bureaucrats and experts from member countries to formulate regional priorities. ESCAP then promotes projects approved by member countries. In some cases the organization has established the framework for non-U.N. bodies that have subsequently operated on their own. Notable among these spin-offs are the Asian Development Bank, the Mekong River Commission, and commodity organizations focusing on coconuts, jute, natural rubber, pepper, silk, and tin.

In addition to ESCAP, other specialized agencies established regional offices in Asia: the Food and Agriculture Organization (Bangkok) and the World Health Organization (Manila and New Delhi). Other U.N. agencies, particularly the U.N. Development Program, which coordinates technical assistance projects for specialized agencies and other aid sources have field offices in many other Asian countries.

The Future

Asia has been a major focus of attention throughout the history of the U.N. Politically the U.N. has helped to keep peace, though it has not been active in mediating between the PRC and the ROC, perhaps Asia's most serious conflict situation today. The U.N.

technical agencies are expected to continue to support economic development by helping poorer nations of the region to upgrade the quality of goods produced so that these nations will be more competitive in the global marketplace.

Michael Haas

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UNITED NATIONS IN EAST TIMOR The involvement of the United Nations (U.N.) in the conflict between East Timor and Indonesia, which invaded and annexed East Timor after East Timor became independent from Portugal in 1975, has taken different forms and been of varying degrees. The adoption of two U.N. resolutions in 1975 was decisive in guaranteeing the East Timorese the right to self-determination because it gave them international legitimacy. After two decades of stalemate between Indonesia and Portugal, when the U.N. was not of much use, the fall of Indonesia's president Suharto in 1998 opened a window of opportunity in which to solve the East Timor question.

Background

During the Portuguese transition to democracy in 1974–1976, the Portuguese government decided to allow the East Timorese to exercise their right to self-determination. Indonesia, whose territory includes contiguous West Timor, opposed that decision and invaded East Timor in December 1975. Portugal immediately appealed to the U.N. for a ruling on the Indonesian invasion. On 12 December 1975, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 3485, and on 22 December 1975, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 384, both demanding Indonesia's military withdrawal from East Timor.

From 1976 until 1982, the U.N. General Assembly passed a new resolution each year reaffirming its initial demand. Confronted with the gradual loss of support in the U.N. voting sessions, Portugal ceased to submit the issue of Indonesia's invasion of East Timor to the General Assembly after 1982.

Starting in 1983, the East Timor question was instead submitted to international dispute mediation by the secretary-general. Between 1983 and 1991, the secretary-general was not able to find a solution to the

question. In part, this reflected the refusal of Indonesia and Portugal to bow to each other's demands: Portugal wanted Indonesia to allow the East Timorese to exercise their right to self-determination, while Indonesia wanted Portugal to recognize its sovereignty over East Timor. Only with the Dili Massacre in 1991, when the Indonesian military killed dozens of East Timorese during a funeral while foreign journalists filmed the event, was Jakarta compelled to accept bilateral negotiations with Portugal under the auspices of the secretary-general. Between 1992 and 1996, eight rounds of ministerial negotiations took place under the auspices of the secretary-general.

The U.N. role became more significant under the U.N.'s seventh secretary-general, Kofi Annan, who took office 1 January 1997. During the first post-Suharto ministerial meeting between Indonesia and Portugal under the secretary-general's auspices, on 4–5 August 1998, it became obvious that Indonesia was prepared to discuss granting East Timor wide-ranging autonomy that would fall short of actual independence. On 6–8 October, delegations of both nations met again and discussed U.N. proposals for autonomy. On 8–9 February 1999, Portugal and Indonesia agreed on the overall terms for the wide-ranging autonomy proposal, but they were unable to agree on how to hold a popular consultation (referendum). At last on 11 March Indonesia accepted a direct, secret, and universal ballot. The tripartite agreements were finalized on 23 April and signed on 5 May 1999. According to the agreements, the East Timorese were to accept or reject continued Indonesian rule with wide-ranging autonomy. Before and after the popular consultation, Indonesia would be responsible for maintaining peace and security in East Timor.

United Nations Mission in East Timor

On 11 June 1999, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1246 establishing the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). This mission would be responsible for organizing and conducting the popular consultation on East Timor's future status. Despite two delays in conducting the ballot and repeated episodes of violence by East Timorese militias that favored the continued tie with Indonesia, the U.N. gave the green light for the popular consultation to be held on 30 August 1999. On 3 September, Kofi Annan reported to the Security Council that 344,580 voters (78.5 percent of the votes cast) had rejected the special autonomy proposal. This overwhelming defeat triggered a scorched-earth policy by Indonesia-backed East Timorese militia groups that had supported the proposal. At least fifteen hundred East Timorese lost

their lives, and the territory's infrastructure was almost totally destroyed.

InterFET

In the days after announcement of the ballot results, it became clear that Indonesia's police and military lacked the ability and will to provide peace and security in East Timor. After several days of intense political pressure, on 12 September 1999 Indonesia accepted a proposal establishing in East Timor a multinational force under U.N. authority. On 15 September, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1264 authorizing the establishment of the multinational force under a unified command structure. Its mission was to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET, and to facilitate humanitarian operations in the territory. There was considerable concern that International Force East Timor (InterFET) would face military opposition from East Timorese militia groups. This opposition did not materialize, and InterFET easily fulfilled its goals.

United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

The next step in U.N. involvement in the East Timor question came on 25 October 1999, when the Security Council adopted Resolution 1272, which established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). UNTAET was endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice. In other words, UNTAET took responsibility for preparing East Timor for independence. This has not been a small task. Since its establishment, it has had to provide security and maintain law and order; establish an effective administration; assist in the development of civil and social services; ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, and development assistance; support capacity-building for self-government; and assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development. Bearing this in mind, since October 1999, the territory's transitional administration has introduced dozens of regulations.

On 20 May 2002, East Timor becomes an independent state. The U.N. involvement has been important not only to guarantee that the East Timorese could exercise their right of self-determination, but also to create a new sovereign state. In reaching both

goals, the U.N. has not always been as effective as it might have been.

Paulo Gorjão

See also: **Dili Massacre; East Timor—Profile**

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UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was formed following the signing of peace agreements by Cambodia's four warring factions at Paris in October 1991. UNTAC's primary function was to facilitate the creation of a neutral political environment through which "free and fair" elections could be conducted, a constituent assembly elected, a government formed, and a new constitution promulgated. At the time of its creation, UNTAC was the most ambitious peacekeeping operation ever embarked upon by the United Nations. It was composed of seven components (civil administration, civilian police, electoral, human rights, military, rehabilitation, and repatriation), the largest being the multinational military force of sixteen thousand soldiers under the command of the Australian lieutenant general John Sanderson. The UNTAC operation cost the international community more than \$2 billion.

The degree to which UNTAC succeeded continues to be debated by scholars and analysts of Cambodian and international affairs. On one side are those who claim that while it was imperfect, UNTAC delivered to the Cambodian people a democratically elected coalition government and provided the cata-

lyst to end the civil conflict that had undermined Cambodia's development for more than two decades. Critics point out that by failing to disarm the warring factions, as its mandate dictated, UNTAC failed to provide the environment for the conduct of free and fair elections. These critics point to UNTAC's slow deployment, its acquiescence to the Khmer Rouge, and its failure to deal adequately with intimidation of electoral candidates and their supporters as evidence that the United Nations mission was far from successful.

David M. Ayres

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UNITED PARTY OF MONGOLIA The United Party of Mongolia was officially founded in February 1992 by Sanjaasurengiyn Zorig, the leader of the democratic movement in Mongolia who brought down seventy years of Communist rule in 1990. The United Party (UP) developed from a merger of the Republican and Free Labor Parties and a wing of the Mongolian Democratic Party (MDP) in time to compete in the 1992 first democratic parliamentary elections. The UP was officially registered with the government on 2 April 1992. It allied itself for the June 1992 parliamentary elections with the MDP and Mongolian National Progress Party. Zorig was the only candidate who won a UP seat in that vote. In October 1992 the UP merged with three other small democratic parties to form the present Mongolian National Democratic Party (MNDP).

Alicia J. Campi

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UNITED STATES MILITARY BASES—JAPAN As part of the 1951 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and related Administrative Agreement signed on 28 February 1952, the United States was granted the right to establish military bases in post-peace treaty Japan. This right continued following the revision of the security treaty in 1960 (Article 6) and the signing of the Status of Forces Agreement regarding the use

of bases in Japan. In the early 2000s, there are ninety U.S. exclusive-use facilities in Japan, including thirty-seven in Okinawa. The main bases include Misawa, Yokota, Yokusuka, Zama, Iwakuni, Sasebo, Kadena, and Futenma.

In the 1950s, the United States began scaling down its military presence in mainland Japan due to budgetary considerations and friction, crimes, and accidents involving the bases. Several of these units were moved to Okinawa, which was under U.S. administrative control at the time and thus were not subjected to the same restrictions that existed in mainland Japan under the Security Treaty. Following Okinawa's reversion to Japan in 1972, bases (land area) were reduced some 60 percent in mainland Japan, with a 15 percent reduction in Okinawa. At present, approximately 75 percent (land area) of U.S. bases in Japan are located in Okinawa, which has led citizens in Okinawa to protest the disproportionate share of bases in their prefecture.

Robert D. Eldridge

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UNITED STATES-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY The United States-Japan Security Treaty, officially known as the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and United States of America, was signed on 19 January 1960 and went into effect on 23 June of that year. It replaced the earlier Security Treaty Between Japan and the United States, signed on 8 September 1951 in San Francisco, two hours after the signing of the Treaty of Peace with Japan. Due to the perception that the 1951 Security Treaty was no more than a continuing of the Occupation by the U.S. military and gave America rights thought to infringe on Japanese sovereignty, criticism within Japan grew and demands for its revision became increasingly strong. In 1957 the Japanese government officially requested revisions to be made, and a joint committee was established, leading to the revised treaty of 1960, which has continued without amendments or revisions since then. Made up of ten articles, the new treaty obliges the United States to defend Japan (Article 5) and Japan to provide bases to

the United States for "contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East" (Article 6). A separate Status of Forces Agreement was also signed regarding the use of facilities in Japan to replace the earlier Administrative Agreement.

Robert D. Eldridge

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UNITED WA STATE PARTY The United Wa State Party (UWSP) is the largest of the armed ethnic forces formed in 1989 during mass mutinies that led to the fall of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). A Mon-Khmer people once feared for their headhunting, the Wa inhabit the mountains along the Shan State frontier with China. Few of these areas have ever been brought under the control of any central government.

The Wa substates became a major war zone after 1968, when the CPB launched an invasion from China. In the next two decades, tens of thousands of Wa were killed. Some villagers joined the CPB's People's Army, others were forced to flee their homes, while still others enlisted in rival insurgent forces. In April 1989, resentment broke out into the open. Wa mutineers, led by Kyauk Ni Lai (b. 1938), seized control of the CPB's headquarters at Panghsang and its well-stocked arsenals. Shortly afterward, the UWSP was formed and a cease-fire agreed with the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council.

Promised a Wa autonomous region, during the 1990s the UWSP embarked on various development programs in an area designated as Shan State Special Region 2. Its twenty-thousand-strong army also fought battles with the Mong Tai Army of Khun Sa before the MTA's demise and began settling more than fifty thousand villagers along the Thai border, where it was accused of financing its activities through narcotics trafficking. Particular controversy followed the activities of the UWSP's southern leader in the Mong Yawn area, Wei Hsueh-kang (an ethnic Chinese), who was named by international antinarcotic organizations as a principal figure in the illicit opium and methamphetamine trades. In response, despite widespread international skepticism, in 2001 the UWSP

pledged to make its territories narcotics-free within five years.

Martin Smith

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UNIVERSITI BRUNEI DARUSSALAM Universiti Brunei Darussalam was established in October 1985 with an inaugural class of 176 students. It is the only university in Brunei Darussalam. Its emergence can be traced to a review of the sultanate's higher education program in 1976. Nevertheless, it was not until 1984–1985 that active planning began when Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah called for the establishment of a local university in the interest of national development and nation building.

While awaiting the completion of its permanent campus at Gadong, the university utilized a renovated building complex on the outskirts of Bandar Seri Begawan. The Ministry of Education Committee on the Establishment of the University worked in partnership with universities in Malaysia and the United Kingdom to develop the curriculum and programs for a bachelor of arts in both English- and Malay-language courses. Academic and administrative personnel were recruited from Malaysia, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. In 1989 the Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Education was added as a division, in addition to Arts and Social Sciences, Science, Management and Administrative Studies, Islamic Studies, and Academy of Brunei Studies.

Universiti Brunei Darussalam has 1,500 students and 300 faculty members and seeks to produce quality graduates who can contribute to nation building. Applied research that is consistent with the nation's interests is promoted. The university also expects that the knowledge and skills of faculty members will be utilized to serve the wider society.

Ooi Keat Gin

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UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYSIA Universiti Sains Malaysia (University of Science, Malaysia), the second-oldest university in Malaysia, received its first students (fifty-seven in number) on 9 June 1969. Since then, the student population has increased to more than 20,000, and an expanding pool of academic staff numbered more than 1,500 for the 1999–2000 academic session. The idea for another tertiary institution in Malaysia was discussed as early as the 1950s, but it was another two decades before Penang University officially came into existence. The pioneer group of students commenced studies at the Malayan Teachers' College, Gelugor, where only the Schools of Biological Sciences, Chemical Science, and Physics and Mathematics were functioning then. In May 1971, the university moved into its present premises at Minden. In line with Malaysia's emphasis on science education, Penang University became the University of Science, Malaysia (Universiti Sains Malaysia) in April 1972.

From its inception, it was organized to promote an interdisciplinary approach. Currently the university has more than twenty schools, including several in non-science-based fields like humanities, management, the arts, and education. There are also more than twenty institutes, centers, and research units covering diverse fields, from drug research to computer-aided translation. A branch campus at Kubang Kerian, Kelantan state, houses the School of Medical Sciences, while the School of Engineering is at Tronoh, Perak state. By the mid-1990s, Universiti Sains Malaysia emerged as the country's largest university in terms of academic programs, student enrollment, and infrastructure facilities.

Ooi Keat Gin

UNIVERSITY OF INDONESIA The University of Indonesia (Universitas Indonesia—UI) was established in Jakarta on 2 February 1950, shortly after Indonesia gained its independence from the

Netherlands. Notwithstanding its legacy as a colonial education institution of higher learning, the UI also fulfills the need for a national institute of higher education in a newly independent state.

Four of the university's five original campuses at Bogor, Bandung, Surabaya, and Makassar have become independent universities. The UI teachers' training and education center in Jakarta, established in 1962, became the Institute for Teachers' Training and Education (Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan), and more recently Universitas Jakarta. UI now has two campuses and prides itself on a progressive curriculum that is responsive to the needs of a developing country.

As a national university, UI is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Education. The university employs over three thousand faculty members and enrolls around 40,000 students. Its faculties include medicine, dentistry, mathematics and natural sciences, law, social sciences, political science, economics, letters, psychology, public health, computer science, and nursing. It has a graduate program and a polytechnic. Recognized as a leading Indonesian university, UI celebrated its golden anniversary in the year 2000.

Andi Faisal Bakti

UNIVERSITY OF MALAYA Situated on the southwest outskirts of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the 750-acre University of Malaya (UM) campus is the premier university in the country. The university came into being in 1949 as a result of the merger of two older educational institutions based in Singapore: King Edward VII (founded in 1905 for medicine) and Raffles College (founded in 1928 for education).

The merger had been proposed ten years earlier by the MacLean commission. With political independence from Britain imminent, and as a result of the Aitken commission, a branch of the university was set up in Kuala Lumpur. In 1962, legislative changes to the constitution saw the installation of the first Malaysian chancellor, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra al-Haj (1903–1990), also the first prime minister of the country. The Singapore branch became the National University of Singapore in 1965.

The early 1970s were tumultuous years for the university. The charged political climate saw the enactment of the Universities and University Colleges Act (Amended) in 1975, which sought to stifle student activism. The university also assumed an important role in the government's restructuring programs of the new

economic policy. A differential ethnic quota system for entry was implemented in an attempt to remedy the economic and ethnic imbalance between Malays and Chinese in the country, and the medium of instruction changed from English to Malay.

In early 1997, UM was corporatized. Currently, it has eleven faculties, two academies, an Institute of Postgraduate Studies and Research, and a University Hospital. The university motto is Ilmu Punca Kemanjuran ("Knowledge is the key to success").

Yeoh, Seng-Guan

UNTOUCHABILITY Untouchability is an Indian phenomenon based on degrees of pollution and purity probably unrelated to race. Sometime around the fifth century CE castes evolved that were ranked below the fourfold *varna* (caste) system of Brahman (priest), Kshatriya (warrior and king), Vaishya (merchant), and Sudra (laborer or craftsman). In earlier texts the term *chandala* referred to the attendants of the burning ghats, who were despised as unclean because they handled the dead. The range of castes who work with leather or rope, clean night soil, play drums, or attend death sites developed later. Specific names indicate specific, large untouchable castes. *Bhangis* or *valmikis* are scavengers; *camars* or *chamarkars* work with leather; pariahs were traditional drummers; and



An elderly "untouchable" man and children in Mysore, India, in 1929. (E. O. HOPPE/CORBIS)



RITUAL IMPURITY AND UNTOUCHABILITY

The segregation and low status experienced by untouchable castes in India is based on the notion of ritual impurity. Because they work with polluting materials and perform polluting work, they must keep apart from the higher castes, as is the case with the Nadars and other untouchable castes in South India described below.

The Nadars were defiled by their ritually impure calling as toddy-tappers. They were forbidden entry into Hindu temples, and their use of public wells was strictly prohibited. Although the Nadars, unlike the Pallan and Paraiyan untouchables, had access to the streets of the Brahmin quarter, the *agraharam*, they did share with them the prohibitions of spatial distance. As a "half-polluting" caste, in villages where they numbered only a small minority the Nadars lived in separate habitations just outside the main village, though not in so remote a site as the untouchables' *cheri*. As their middling position was spatially represented in the location of their house sites, so the Nadars were, by traditions, forbidden to approach nearer than a specified number of paces to a man of higher caste, though they might come closer than the Paraiyan or Pallan.

Source: Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. (1969) *The Nadars of Tamilnadu: The Political Culture of a Community in Change*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 22

mahars were all-around servants of the village. Approximately 12 percent of the population of India belong to one of the Scheduled Castes (former untouchables), and over four hundred such castes exist, each usually limited to one language area.

Names Denoting Untouchability

The titles of untouchables as a group indicate the history of the phenomenon. *Avarna* (without caste) was a traditional name. In a speech in 1908 the maharaja Sayajirao (1875–1939) of Broda, India, was the first to use the term "untouchable" in this context. The phrase "depressed classes" came into use when reform began in the early part of the twentieth century. Mohandas K. Gandhi (1869–1948) coined the word "harijan" (people of god) in the early 1930s to indicate his concern, but Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (1891–1956) a *mabar* and the chief organizer of untouchables, rejected that term as patronizing and unrealistic. "Scheduled Castes" came into use in 1935, when the government of India created a schedule or list to indicate which castes were eligible for benefits and for reserved places in parlia-

mentary bodies. "Dalit" (downtrodden, ground down), a proud term indicating that external oppression rather than any polluting quality is responsible for the inferior status of untouchables, has gained currency since 1970. Some cultural developments have incorporated the term, such as the Dalit Panthers, a militant group in Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu, and Dalit literature, a burgeoning field of poetry, prose, and drama. The use of the term "Dalit" usually suggests a politically awakened group of untouchables or writing by others that recognizes that awakening. "Harijan" remains in use, especially among Gandhians and some groups of rural untouchables in the south of India. The nineteenth-century word "outcaste" is inaccurate, since untouchables are within castes even though they are outside the classical Hindu *varna* system.

Discrimination and Political Activism

Restrictions on untouchables have included exclusion from Hindu temples, homes, and Brahman rituals; prohibitions against using the village well or studying in the village school; and a prohibition against

touching any Hindu or any material or food that could convey the untouchables' supposed pollution. In some areas untouchables could not own land, although in other areas some castes held some land as part of their village contract. They were generally confined to traditional occupations and agricultural labor.

The first voices of untouchables came from the bhakti (devotional religion) movement, which brought Nandanar of the Tamil Vaishnava movement into a circle of saints in the seventh century CE and Tirupan Alvar into the Shaivite legends of piety a little later. Cokhamela, of the Marathi-speaking area, and his entire family are featured in hundreds of songs performed by the devotees of the god Vithoba in Maharashtra. Their fourteenth-century voices contain notes of distress and protest as well as joyous devotion. In the fifteenth century Ravidas, who lived in the Hindi-speaking area of the north, told of his low-status leather work as well as his faith. The British brought some change in terms of servant positions in British homes, recruitment into the army, and later new kinds of work on the railways, in the mills, and on the docks. Social reform, however, did not begin until the end of the nineteenth century. When army recruitment stopped and pensioned soldiers pleaded for readmission, efforts at education and social betterment were made within the untouchable *mahar* caste itself and among such high-caste Hindu religious reform groups as the Brahmo Samaj in Bengal, the Arya Samaj in the Punjab and the United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh), and the Depressed Classes Mission in the former province of Bombay. A Buddhist movement among untouchables in Tamil Nadu in south India became an awakening force, and beginning with Ambedkar in 1956, conversion was widespread.

A number of untouchable leaders appeared in the second quarter of the twentieth century, and Ambedkar was chief among them. His voice for political representation in all government institutions, educational opportunities, and a general awakening initiated massive changes. India reserves places for Scheduled Castes in all elected bodies, in government institutions, in educational institutions, and on the teaching staffs of colleges and universities run by the government. Among the important untouchable political parties is the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP or the party of the majority) founded by Kanshi Ram (b. 1934), an untouchable Sikh from the Punjab. With Mayavati (b. 1956), a *camar* woman, as its chief voice, that party is very powerful in Uttar Pradesh. The Republican Party founded by Ambedkar just before his death in 1956 holds some power on the local level in Maharashtra

and a few state and national seats when it combines with other political parties. Tamil Nadu also has a strong political movement. As untouchables become politically and socially active, however, they frequently face violence. A report by Human Rights Watch in 1999 entitled *Broken People* indicates that acts of rape, arson, and murder committed against untouchables have increased since independence. If one Dalit oversteps what is expected, runs off with a caste Hindu girl, or challenges higher castes economically, the entire Dalit section of the village may suffer revenge. Another persistent show of anger at Dalit actions is attacking the ubiquitous statues of Ambedkar found everywhere in untouchable quarters and, in recognition of his importance, in city centers. Nevertheless, the progress among Dalits in some areas is remarkable, and because of the reservation system, a sizable literate middle class has emerged.

Eleanor Zelliot

See also: **Caste**

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UPANISHADS The Upanishads constitute the fourth and final stratum of the corpus of Vedic literature (early Hindu sacred writings), traditionally held to be *shruti*, or the revealed and eternal divine word. The Upanishads are chiefly concerned with metaphysical speculations about the nature of reality and the destiny of the human soul. The term is normally understood to mean a dozen or so esoteric and speculative texts, in prose and in verse, that are associated with the four great Vedic textual traditions or schools and are thought to date, in the main, from the sixth century BCE to perhaps the first centuries CE. These texts come chronologically at the end of the Vedic corpus and they represent, broadly speaking, the culmination of the de-

velopment of Vedic thought from a relatively straightforward ritualism to an interiorization of the ritual and speculation on the underlying principle of the cosmos. For these reasons they are sometimes referred to collectively as the Vedanta or end (*anta*) of the Veda. The term *Upanishad* is, like many words in the later Vedic texts, subject to a variety of etymological interpretations. However, scholars generally understand it to derive from a verbal root meaning "to sit down near" and to convey the sense of disciples seating themselves at the feet of a master to imbibe the esoteric doctrines that characterize these texts.

Such is the power and influence of these and other Vedic texts that (like the name Veda itself) the term *Upanishad* has been extended to a variety of post-Vedic texts such as the Sannyasa Upanishads, which lay down the rules of conduct for religious renunciants, while other important religious texts such as the *Bhagavad Gita* are sometimes also considered to be Upanishads.

The original Upanishads vary in length and are diverse in character, consisting of a variety of materials including dialogues of a spiritual or metaphysical character, genealogies of spiritual teachers and disciples, narratives involving gods, demons, men, and, in some cases talking animals, and rituals and spells for the acquisition of power, long life, wealth, sex, and progeny.

Atmavada Doctrine in the Upanishads

Deriving as they do from the various Vedic schools, each with their particular interests and preserving a broad diachronic spectrum of legendary, ritual, philosophical, theological, physiological, and psychological materials, the Upanishads do not put forward a single, consistent set of principles or doctrines.

Nonetheless, the single most dominant and most frequently articulated philosophical focus of the Upanishads is the so-called Atmavada or Brahnavada, the doctrine of the universal world Self or Soul. Simply stated, this doctrine holds that there exists only one, single, limitless, irreducible, and unchanging real entity. This is called the Atman, or Self, the Paramatman, or Supreme Self, or Brahman. This entity which is pure existence (*sat*), pure consciousness (*cit*) and pure bliss (*ananda*) is the innermost essence of all things. Indeed the apparent diversity of the universe and indeed the real existence of any of its apparent constituents is illusory and arises as a result of a kind of cosmic illusion (*maya*) and is perpetuated by our ignorance (*avidya*, *ajnana*) of the true nature of things. True knowledge (*vidya*, *jnana*) consists in the profound inner realization that all apparent individuation, in-

cluding the all but universal perception that we are separate autonomous entities, is false. This realization is in effect a profound inner understanding of the esoteric correspondences that link the Vedic ritual, the human body, and the phenomenal universe. It is to be accomplished through the cultivation of detachment from the world of the senses. In this the Atmavada is similar, although far from identical, to many of the early brahmanical and nonbrahmanical religious systems of early India.

This rigorously nondualist philosophy forms the underlying principle around which was developed the major philosophical school of Advaita (nondual) Vedanta most closely associated with its greatest exponent Sankaracarya (c. 788–820 CE), among whose most seminal works is his magisterial *Upanishadbhashya*, or collection of commentaries on the principal Upanishads. This school, although it is just one of many different religious and philosophical schools to have been developed in ancient India, has often come to be seen and represented in more modern times as the dominant and most characteristic, if not the only strand of Indian philosophy. This attitude has enhanced the prestige of the Upanishads as the foundational scripture of Hinduism.

Although the Upanishads constitute a diverse body of often obscure and highly esoteric late Vedic belief and speculation, they have come, by virtue of their promulgation of the important doctrine of the Atman and its realization as the unique path of spiritual liberation, to be canonized as one of the principal fonts of Hindu thought and practice.

Robert P. Goldman

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URALIC LANGUAGES The Uralic languages, including both the Finno-Ugrian and the Samoyedic groups, constitute a large family of languages of Europe and Northern Eurasia. Finno-Ugrian languages are spoken mostly in Europe; three of them, Finnish, Estonian, and Hungarian, are major literary and na-

tional languages of independent states. All other Finno-Ugrian languages are spoken by people in Russia. Mari (or Cheremis), Mordvin, Udmurt (or Votyak), and Komi (or Zyryene) are spoken by numerous peoples who live between the river Volga and the Ural Mountains.

The closest relatives of Hungarian, however, the Ob'-Ugrian languages, are spoken in the Asiatic part of Russia, east of the Ural Mountains, in the basin of the river Ob'. The two languages of this group are Khanty (or Ostiak) and Mansi (or Vogul). Nowadays Khanty is spoken by about 13,000 people; Mansi has approximately 3,000 speakers. Khanty and Mansi are the titular nationalities of the semiautonomous National Territory of the Khanty and Mansi, which forms part of the 'Tiumen'skaia Oblast' (province) of Western Siberia.

All Samoyedic languages are spoken by people living in Siberia. This group is commonly subdivided into a Northern and a Southern subgroup. Northern Samoyedic languages are Nganasan (Tawgy-Samoyed), spoken by around 1,000 members of the northernmost nationality of Russia, in fact of all of Asia, on the Taymyr Peninsula; Nenets (Yurak-Samoyed) has around 30,000 speakers north of the Arctic Circle to the west and east of the Ural Mountains, and the obsolescent Enets (Yenisey-Samoyed) is spoken by less than 100 people in a few villages on the bank of the river Yenisey. Southern Samoyed is today represented only by Sel'kup (Ostiak-Samoyed; 1,500 speakers); other Southern Samoyed languages, now extinct, were recorded in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as far south as the Sayan Mountains (Mator, Koibal, Kamass).

The genetic relationship of the Finno-Ugrian languages was established as early as the eighteenth century; the Samoyedic languages were added to the Uralic family by the mid-nineteenth century.

Uralic languages, especially the eastern members of the family, show a marked typological similarity to Altaic languages (e.g., verb-final word order, vowel harmony, lack of word-initial consonant clusters) in the nineteenth century this similarity gave rise to the so-called Ural-Altaic hypothesis, which tried to describe Uralic, together with Turkic, Mongolian, and Tungus, as members of one great family of languages. Because more accurate descriptions of these languages became available, and the methods of comparative linguistics were improved, specialists had largely abandoned this view during the twentieth century.

Stefan Georg

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URDANETA, ANDRES DE (1498–1568), Spanish Augustinian friar and navigator. Andres de Urdaneta was born in 1498 in the Basque region of Spain. At seventeen he became a sailor and served as a page to Garcia Jofre de Loaysa's expedition to the Moluccas. He spent eight years in Malaka (Moluccas), where he figured in several encounters with the Portuguese, Spain's rivals in colonizing Malaka, until the members of the expedition surrendered and were later repatriated to Spain via Lisbon in 1536.

In 1553 Urdaneta joined the Augustinian order in Mexico after a long, distinguished military career following his return to Spain. In 1559, King Philip II, interested in the Philippine Islands, which were named after him by the Villalobos expedition, sought out Urdaneta's services. Since his priestly status forbade him to command an expedition, Urdaneta recommended that the king appoint Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, a distinguished official in Mexico, to command the expedition. The expedition left Navidad, Mexico, in 1564 and, through Urdaneta's guidance, it reached Philippine shores in February 1565. After establishing a settlement, Legazpi sent Urdaneta back to Mexico to deliver samples of Philippine spices discovered and to find a more expedient route. Urdaneta sailed far north near Japan before turning east, where the winds were favorable. He reached Acapulco after sailing for four months. The passage he discovered was later called the Urdaneta Passage. Years later the galleons of the Manila-Acapulco trade followed this route.

When his mission was over, Urdaneta returned to his Augustinian order in Mexico. Although he expressed a desire to return to the Philippines to undertake missionary work, his superior did not grant him permission to do so due to his old age. He died on 3 June 1568 in Mexico at the age of sixty.

Aaron Ronquillo

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URDU. See **Hindu-Urdu**.

URFA (2002 est pop. of province 1.5 million). Urfa, a province and a city (1995 pop. approximately 365,000) in southeastern Turkey, was known as Edessa in antiquity; its Arabic name was al-Ruha. Under the republic of Turkey it became known as Sanliurfa ("glorious Urfa"), the capital of the province of the same name.

The city was occupied as early as 3500 BCE by the Hurrians and then successively by the Hittites, Assyrians, Seleucids, Romans, and Byzantines. In the third century the city adopted Christianity, and by the early fourth century it was a center of Syriac Christianity. The city surrendered to the Arabs in c. 639 and subsequently lost its political and religious importance. The town was attacked by the Byzantines in 959–960; by the Turks in 1065–1066 and 1066–1067, and by the Seljuk sultan Alp Arslan for 50 days in 1070. After the battle of Manzikert (1071), the city was supposed to be handed over to the Seljuks, but instead it remained under Constantinople's control until 1086–1087, when it was given to the Seljuk sultan Melikshah.

Urfa was ruled by various dynasties in the following centuries until it was conquered by Sultan Selim I, probably in 1517. In the sixteenth century it became part of the province of Diyarbakır. During this time it was located on a caravan route to Aleppo and was a transit point for goods traveling from Anatolia to Persia and Iraq. Urfa was occupied by the French in 1919–1920 and officially became part of the Turkish Republic under the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). Today Urfa is largely an agricultural city producing wheat, barley, and beans. A college of the Dicle University in Diyarbakır is located here.

Tipi Isikozlu-E. F. Isikozlu

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URGENCH Urgench was an ancient city that was an important trade center and the capital of Khwarizm

until its destruction by the Mongols in the thirteenth century. It was rebuilt only to be again destroyed by Timur in the fourteenth century; for most of the sixteenth century it was the capital of the khanate of Khiva (1511–1920). It was abandoned later in the century after the Uzbeks conquered the area. Today the town of Kunya-Urgench (or Konye-Urgench) in modern-day Turkmenistan rests on the site. Visitors can see the Kutlug Temir minaret, which is the largest minaret in Central Asia, mausoleums, and other ancient ruins.

Today, there is another Urgench, the capital city of the Khorezm oblast of Uzbekistan. It had an estimated population of 169,000 in 2002, is situated on the Amu Dar'ya River and the Shavat Canal, and houses cotton and food processing industries. Kunya-Urgench in Turkmenistan is about 140 kilometers northwest of Urgench, Uzbekistan.

Rebecca M. Bichel

USTYURT PLATEAU The Ustyurt Plateau is a 160,600-square-kilometer (62,000-square-mile) desert plateau in Central Asia between the Caspian Sea to the west and the Aral Sea to the east. It lies mostly in the southern part of Kazakhstan and the northern part of the Karakalpak Republic and Turkmenistan. The plateau's elevation ranges from 150 to 365 meters (490 to 1,200 feet), with an average elevation of 200 meters (656 feet), and it drops steeply to the Aral Sea and surrounding plains. A largely uniform desert landscape, the plateau provides little pasture for the sheep, goats, and camels raised by its small seminomadic human population. Transport networks are poor due to both natural conditions and long-term neglect.

Oil and natural gas deposits are located in the western portion of the plateau. It is estimated that there are more than 4 billion tons of hydrocarbons in the region. Exploration and production is set to continue as the region increases its contribution to the world supply of hydrocarbons. Mining activities are likely to improve air links across the Caspian Sea and stimulate further regional economic development.

Warwick Gullett and Daniel Oakman

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USUBALIEV, TURDAKUN USUBALIEVICH (b. 1919), Kyrgyz politician. Turdakun Usubalievich Usubaliev led the Kyrgyzstan Soviet Socialist Republic from 1961 to 1985 as the first secretary of the Communist Party. Born in Naryn (a remote eastern province of the republic) in 1919, he spent his entire career in the Communist Party apparatus, becoming one of the republic's most influential politicians for almost three decades in the late Soviet era. From 1955 to 1956 he worked as editor of the leading national newspaper, *Sovetnyk Kyrgyzstan*, and later held various party posts before assuming leadership in the republic. He viewed Soviet policy (reflected in his writing) as an important mode of modernization of a traditional "backward" country and measured it purely in the terms of economic development and state-led industrialization. These views largely shaped Kyrgyzstan's political and economic setting in the 1960s and 1970s.

Usubaliev belonged to the cohort of Central Asian leaders who were most loyal to the Soviet political system and to Moscow's leadership. As Kyrgyzstan's leader he contributed to the vigorous implementation of the policies of Russification and "internationalism." However, it was his success in attracting huge investment in the industrialization of the republic that won him nationwide recognition and respect.

In 1985, with the introduction of Gorbachev's policy of glasnost, Usubaliev was forced to leave his post and was charged with patronage, corruption, and mismanagement; however, these accusations have never been brought to court. Turdakun Usubaliev remains one of the most popular politicians in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan and a prolific writer (mainly memoirs). In 1992 he returned to the political arena as a member of the Jogorku Kenesh (Parliament), supporting moderate nationalism and remaining highly critical of the Westernization of Kyrgyz society.

Rafis Abazov

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UTAI *Utai* (also called *yokyoku*) is the vocal music of the Japanese classical theater form called Noh. It is monophonic music influenced by Buddhist chant, especially of the *shomyo* tradition of the Tendai and Shin-

gon esoteric sects that came to Japan from China in the Heian period (794–1185). Notation called *gomafu* or *gomaten* (literally, "sesame seed marking," from the way the notation marks look) developed from this same tradition and was consolidated in the Edo period (1600/1603–1868), with each mark having a slightly different form and a definite meaning for each of the Noh schools. Although the language and sometimes pronunciation, too, are classical and not always easily understood, the performance of *utai* is studied by amateurs of all ages as well as by professionals.

A Noh text develops through the progression of combinations of units of prose and of poetry in a 7/5-syllable meter. An actor speaks prose lines in *kotoba* (inflected speech) or chants lines solo or in exchanges with other characters. The chorus (*ji-utai*) expresses a character's speech or thoughts as well as describes a scene or narrates action during mimed sections.

Utai as chant is characterized by rhythm, pitch, and mode. The rhythm (*nori*) of Noh can be divided into *hyoshi-awazu* (incongruent) and *hyoshi-au* (congruent) chant to the drum patterns in an eight-beat system. *Hyoshi-awazu* chant may be found in short poetic sections. There are three kinds of *hyoshi-au* (congruent) chant. *Hira-nori*, the most common form, distributes the twelve syllables of the 7/5 meter over eight beats, with the syllables on the upbeat of the first, third, and fifth beats held. *Chu-nori*, also called *shura-nori* as it is often used in descriptive passages in *shura-mono* (warrior plays), distributes sixteen syllables of text over eight beats and is characterized by stress on every second beat. *O-nori* places one syllable per beat and is often used when the *taiko* (stick drum) is played for a strong or dynamic effect. Variations of syllables in lines in each of these styles create interesting syncopation. The pitch of *utai* goes through three centers: *jo* (high), *chu* (center), and *ge* (low), each a perfect fourth apart, following conventions of movement and embellishment for each section of the text. The chorus follows the pitch set by its leader, the *ji-gashira*. The two modes of *utai* express a wide range of emotions: *yowa-gin*, a weak or melodic mode for lyric passages, and *tsuyo-gin*, a strong, dynamic mode that uses microtonal pitch changes.

Ogamo Rebecca Teele

See also: **Noh-Kyogen**

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UTTAR PRADESH (2001 est. pop. 166.1 million). Uttar Pradesh is located centrally in the Indo-Gangetic Plain southeast of New Delhi. The area measures 243,286 square kilometers. It has been under one administration, at first as part of Bengal Presidency, since 1877, and in 1902 became known as the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. This became, simply, United Provinces in 1935, a name translated into Hindi as Uttar Pradesh after Independence in 1947. This state was made up of the former United Provinces and the princely states of Benares, Tehri-Garhwal, and Rampur. The capital is Lucknow (or Laknau). Not only was this area the center of the army uprising known as the Indian Mutiny (1857); Lucknow also was the focal point of the movement for an independent Pakistan. In 2000 the new state of Uttaranchal was carved out of Uttar Pradesh.

Uttar Pradesh is governed by a legislative council and a legislative assembly. The state has a mixed, mostly rural, population of Hindus and Muslims, who speak Hindi, Urdu, and English; the official language is Hindi. Traversed by several rivers and canals, especially the Ganges and Jumna, the fertile state is the largest producer of food grains in India. In addition, sugar and edible oils are important farm produce. There is considerable industrialization—among goods produced in Uttar Pradesh are paper, chemicals, glass, distilled spirits, farm implements, leather and footwear, textiles, copper, coal, limestone, bauxite, silica, phosphorite, and pyrophyllite.

Paul Hockings

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UTTARANCHAL (2001 est. pop. 8.5 million). Uttaranchal is an Indian state that was created in 2000 from the northern quarter of Uttar Pradesh. It consists of thirteen hill districts bordering on Nepal to the east, with the lower Himalayas in the north, and the states of Haryana and Himachal Pradesh to the west and northwest respectively. It has an area of 51,125 square kilometers.

Dehra Dun is the state capital, and the population of the individual districts is primarily tribal. The state is home to four of the most revered Hindu sites in India: Badrinath, Kedarnath, Gangotri, and Yamunotri. All attract thousands of pilgrims every month. In the pre-Independence period, the numerous districts of present Uttaranchal were ruled over by several petty hill princes, who owed their formal allegiance to the British. Among the prominent nationalist figures who came from this region is the Congress leader Dr. Govind Ballabh Pant (1887–1961). (The town of Pantnagar in Nainital district has been named after him.) Since the 1980s, the region has been at the forefront of the Indian environmental movement, spearheaded by the Chipko Movement of Sunderlal Bahuguna and Chandi Prasad Bhatt. There also has been vocal opposition to the proposed Tehri Dam in the district of Tehri Garhwal, a construction that threatens to wipe away entire villages.

Paul Hockings

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UZBEKISTAN PROFILE (2001 est. pop. 25.1 million). Uzbekistan is the most populous former Soviet state in Central Asia and the third most populous of all former Soviet states, after Russia and the Ukraine. It declared its independence on 1 September 1991 and is officially called the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Geography

With an area of 449,601 square kilometers, Uzbekistan is almost 42 percent desert. In North Central Uzbekistan lies the vast Kyzyl Kum desert, 297,850 square kilometers in size. Spurs of the Tian Shan and Pamir Mountains rise to the east and northeast; the highest elevation in Uzbekistan is 4,643 meters, and earthquakes are common.

Because rainfall is scarce except on the mountain sides, agriculture elsewhere in the country is possible only with irrigation. In mountainous areas live snow leopards; desert monitors, lizards that can grow longer than 1.5 meters, inhabit the desert. The two main rivers—the Amu Dar'ya (Oxus) and Syr Dar'ya (Jakartes), which flow into the Aral Sea—as well as the Zarafshon River and the Fergana Valley form the core of the relatively limited populated areas.



The country is divided into twelve *wiloyatlar* (regions), one city (Tashkent, the capital), and the Karakal Autonomous Republic, located in northwestern Uzbekistan. These entities are further divided into smaller units; at each level elected and appointed officials have constitutional responsibility, but most power rests in the central state apparatus.

Population

Almost 3 million people live in the capital city of Tashkent, which is the largest city in Central Asia and the fourth largest among former Soviet cities. The country has over one hundred nationalities, although almost 80 percent are ethnic Uzbeks, a Turkic-speaking Muslim people. Other significant ethnic groups include Russians, Tajiks, Kazakhs, Karakalpaks, Turkmen, and Tatars. The Russians are the largest minority, but their numbers decreased after independence, when many moved to Russia and other countries.

History

Uzbekistan has a rich and long history, and Uzbeks lived in the Central Asian region for many hundreds of years, but until 1925 there was no political entity

named "Uzbekistan." Known as the ancient Persian province of Sogdiana, the region was conquered by Alexander of Macedon in the fourth century BCE. Arabs conquered it in the eighth century as did the Mongol empire in the thirteenth century; Timur (Tamerlane) developed his "local" Mongol empire in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; Shaibani Khan introduced Uzbek authority to the region in the sixteenth century.

The final conquerors—the Russians—appeared only in the nineteenth century and consolidated their power by the 1860s and 1870s. In the face of stiff guerrilla resistance, the Soviets took over in the 1920s and eventually formed new political entities, parceling out the territory according to ethnic groups. The delimitation of 1925 saw Uzbekistan appear as a Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1929 the Tajik Socialist Soviet Republic was formed from a portion of Uzbekistan; the Karakalpak Autonomous Republic became part of Uzbekistan in 1936.

The Soviet period was particularly difficult; despite advances in education, health care, and treatment of women, the Uzbeks suffered during the purges and collectivization campaigns of the 1930s, and cultural



UZBEKISTAN

Country name: Republic of Uzbekistan
Area: 447,400 sq km
Population: 25,155,064 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 1.6% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 26.1 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 8 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: -2.06 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio: 0.98 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 71.92 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population: 63.81 years, male: 60.24 years, female: 67.56 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Muslim (mostly Sunnis), Eastern Orthodox
Major languages: Uzbek, Russian, Tajik
Literacy—total population: 99%, male: 99%, female: 99% (year-end 1996)
Government type: republic; effectively authoritarian presidential rule, with little power outside the executive branch
Capital: Tashkent (Toshkent)
Administrative divisions: 12 wiloyatlar, 1 autonomous republic, and 1 city
Independence: 1 September 1991 (from Soviet Union)
National holiday: Independence Day, 1 September (1991)
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal
GDP—real growth rate: 2.1% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita (purchasing power parity): \$2,400 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: not available
Exports: \$2.9 billion (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Imports: \$2.6 billion (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Currency: Uzbekistani sum (UZS)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Book Factbook* 2001. Retrieved 5 March 2002, from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

identity was often suppressed. Not until the 1980s could Uzbeks openly discuss their own non-Soviet history and Muslim identity. Ironically these issues are still problematic in post-Soviet Uzbekistan.

Politics

Islam Karimov was president even before independence, having been elected on 24 March 1990. Constitutionally he is afforded a wide range of powers and can legislate by decree. He has successfully curtailed potential rivals' efforts by constantly shuffling regional leadership and removing key individuals from office, including his former vice president, Shukhrulla Mirsaidov. Karimov was reelected in January 2000 with an overwhelming majority (even the token opposition candidate voted for Karimov).

Uzbekistan's 250-member legislature, the Oliy Majlis, is a relatively weak entity that has never challenged the presidential authority. The court system and regional governments are also fairly compliant. The country is technically multiparty, and four parties are registered. Each, especially the dominant People's Democratic Party, swears allegiance to President Karimov and acts simply as an advocate for a specific constituency in Uzbek society.

Opposition—secular and religious—is severely curtailed. Most opposition leaders have fled the country, as was the case with the leaders of the opposition movements Birlik (Unity) and Erk (Will) in the 1980s and 1990s. The religious-based opposition parties, Adolat (Justice) and the Islamic Renaissance Party, were never even allowed to register. These and other

movements have been prohibited from becoming legal entities since 1992. As a result they either remain underground or maintain a base in exile. In the summer of 1999, a relatively new movement—the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), under the leadership of Jumaboi Namangani—emerged as a threat to the Karimov regime. In that summer and in the summer of 2000, IMU units attacked positions in Kyrgyzstan and southern Uzbekistan. It is feared that in subsequent years this movement will increase its activities in Uzbekistan and could become a long-term problem for President Karimov.

Economy

Uzbekistan's economy is based largely on cotton (which was introduced in imperial Russian times despite Uzbek protests about resulting food shortages and loss of land) and on agriculture in general. Although only 31 percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) comes from agriculture, over 40 percent of all working-age Uzbekistan citizens are employed in this sector. Uzbekistan is the largest cotton exporter in the world, but because agriculture is concentrated in cotton, the country must import much of its food. The industrial and service sectors are slowly developing, with the latter now responsible for 42 percent of the country's GDP.

The major obstacles to economic growth are geography, infrastructure, and program execution. Because Uzbekistan is landlocked, it must often transit goods across international borders—a serious problem because customs duties and procedures are not consistently enforced in Central Asia. The infrastructure is in the process of moving from the Soviet-era system that was in place, although the pace of development has not kept up with the deterioration of the old infrastructure. Last, the opaque maze of regulations and the lack of openness have made it difficult for local, joint-venture, and foreign-owned businesses to establish themselves and to develop effectively. The weak currency is also a detriment to economic growth. Finally, corruption has become a deterrent to the successful creation of new companies.

Foreign Policy

Because of its geography, Uzbekistan is a key actor in the geopolitics of Central Asia. Sitting among the other Central Asian states of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, as well as Afghanistan to the south, Uzbekistan is a key transportation and communications hub. As a strategic country, it has been involved in peace processes in Tajikistan and

Afghanistan. In an effort to strengthen its position as an independent state, Uzbekistan has joined a range of associations and organizations. Ties with Russia are still important and have slowed the emergence of a free market in the country. Uzbekistan's abysmal human-rights record is often noted as a cause for U.S. concern and has been a point of contention between the two countries.

The national prospects for Uzbekistan are tied to President Islam Karimov. In his early sixties, Karimov is fit and appears poised to continue as president for the foreseeable future. The lack of a successor, of strong political actors and parties, and of a politically active population suggests that Uzbekistan's political system will not develop into a democracy any time soon. In addition to suffering from continuing economic problems, the IMU insurgency of the past two years persists unabated. While Uzbekistan has the benefits of resource wealth and an educated population, problems loom over the horizon. How Uzbekistan addresses these problems will shape the future success or failure of the country.

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UZBEKISTAN—ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Uzbekistan, the most populous and best developed of the newly independent states in Central Asia, occupies the dominant geographical, political, and cultural position in the region. It is home to Central Asia's most

productive agricultural oases, river valleys, and irrigated lowlands.

Uzbekistan is a landlocked country, and each bordering country is itself a landlocked state. The southern border with Turkmenistan is partly defined by the watercourse of the Amu Dar'ya River, one of Central Asia's most important natural resources. To the north the country's border with Kazakhstan is defined by the watercourse of the Syr Dar'ya River. In the northwest the Aral Sea, dying from overuse of the region's water resources, defines the country's border. The Fergana Valley, lying in the protected eastern part of the country between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, is one of the most productive agricultural regions in the world. The oases and river valleys of Bukhara and Samarqand have supported civilization and agriculture since ancient times.

Postindependence Economic Functioning

Uzbekistan's population is well educated and technically trained. The country is rich in a variety of natural resources, including coal, copper, gold, natural gas, oil, silver, and uranium. Primary commodities, together with cotton fiber, account for about 75 percent of merchandise exports, with cotton alone accounting for about 40 percent. Uzbekistan's 1998 gross national product was estimated at \$870 per person, placing it among lower-middle-income economies.

At the time of independence the Uzbek economy was more diversified than the economies of the other four Central Asian states and included agriculture, light and heavy industry, and important branches in primary commodities. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan's economy was insulated from much of the economic decline that afflicted other former Soviet states, due to its labor-intensive economy based on agriculture and mineral extraction. Rapid growth in 1992–1995 in oil and gas production allowed Uzbekistan to eliminate oil imports and increase gas exports. Additionally, Uzbekistan shifted some of its crop acreage from cotton to grains to boost food self-sufficiency. While these were positive outcomes, they resulted in delaying the structural reforms that Uzbekistan's neighbors, particularly Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, implemented.

Economic Policy of Stabilization

The Uzbekistan government, under the leadership of President Islam Karimov, quickly embraced the idea of market-based commercial relations. Uzbekistan announced that it was "pro-business," and the Soviet system was immediately rejected. Replacing it, however,

was an indigenous, state-controlled economy with many structural parallels to the Soviet system, except on a smaller, regional scale.

The Uzbekistan government has stressed a gradual, step-by-step approach to macroeconomic and market-oriented structural reforms. This conservative transition strategy has emphasized establishing self-sufficiency in energy and food grains, exporting primary commodities, particularly cotton and gold, and creating an internally oriented services market. In the early years of independence the government approached questions of structural reform cautiously and relied on administrative measures and controls to soften the shock of the interruption of Soviet-era commerce.

More recently the Uzbekistan government has made limited progress in implementing structural reforms in some areas, including privatization and the financial sector. In late 1998 the government announced an accelerated program for the case-by-case privatization of large strategic enterprises. At the same time it announced that restructuring and subsequent privatization of banks were to be undertaken. Yet fundamental agricultural reforms such as farm restructuring, land registration, changes in state procurement policies, and export-marketing arrangements continued to be delayed.

Reform Process and Currency Convertibility

In September 1996 in connection with a shortfall in foreign reserves, the Uzbekistan Ministry of Finance imposed a system of import contract registration. The goal of the system was to ensure that scarce foreign currency was used primarily to import capital rather than to buy consumer goods, particularly luxury goods. In practice, however, the system severely limited the availability of foreign exchange for all sectors of the economy and retarded economic activity. In subsequent years the Ministry of Finance periodically acted to make the system yet more rigorous as foreign currency reserves continued to dwindle. In 1998 the number of importers given convertibility quotas was cut by one-third of the number two years before. The remaining importers saw their quotas slashed in half.

Foreign companies in Uzbekistan reported that the currency restrictions constituted the most serious obstacle to doing business in the country. Foreign companies or foreign joint ventures importing capital goods with their own funds held outside Uzbekistan have also in effect been subject to the import registration system, although a 1998 presidential decree exempted joint ventures from the registration requirement. Nev-

ertheless foreign businesses have continued to experience bureaucratic hurdles with payments and settlements. In addition customs clearance remains a tedious and capricious bureaucratic process. Capital equipment imports for U.S.-Uzbek joint ventures have been subject to substantial processing delays and often remain in customs for months at a time. Delays can be substantial and expensive, and no procedure has been established for releasing goods under bond.

In May 2000 the government devalued the official exchange rate for government transactions by about 50 percent to bring it into line with the commercial exchange rate. But the economy remains hampered by adherence to these bureaucratic constraints.

The Future of the Uzbekistan Economy

An overvalued currency tends to channel trade into narrow and easily managed sectors and thus may appear to offer a solution to capital flight, but it is also associated with great efficiency losses. Financial transactions must be strictly regulated, which imposes a heavy burden of monitoring and sanctions. Well-connected parties with access to cheap, government-financed foreign exchange and import licenses benefit greatly from this situation. These parties can be expected to lobby to maintain the situation, despite the efficiency losses and corresponding damage to the public interest.

The bureaucratic burden of maintaining strict currency controls can be expensive and unavoidably creates an unfavorable climate for trade. A policy of overvaluation provides a rationale for extending police sanctions even to the extent of replacing the goal of public safety with that of regulating private behavior. Such a policy can produce an incentive structure in which private parties have an interest in avoiding or evading the legal framework through various forms of side payments and inducements. An overvalued currency can also lead to the depletion of foreign reserves, which, in turn, can bring about pressures for severe import restrictions and, eventually, the collapse of the free-trade policy.

Stressing economic self-sufficiency and state-sponsored welfare programs, the Uzbekistan government has resisted counsel from international organizations and economic specialists to liberalize prices, abandon government subsidies, adopt a tradable currency, and open its borders to trade. Instead Uzbekistan has maintained restrictions on trade and currency movement, closed its borders with war-torn Tajikistan, established government-controlled trading com-

panies, and developed an elaborate system of subsidies and price supports for industry and agriculture.

There are indications that Uzbekistan's foreign economic policies are changing. In June 2001, President Islam Karimov signed a decree designed to liberalize the currency market, modernize the republic's monetary system, and strengthen the banking system. The Afghanistan war drew a considerable amount of attention from foreign governments and international organizations. Faced with the potential for dramatic economic modernization spurred by international assistance, the Uzbekistan government redoubled its efforts after the beginning of the antiterror campaign in Afghanistan to bring its currency and macroeconomic policies into line with international standards.

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UZBEKISTAN-EDUCATION SYSTEM

Uzbekistan has a comprehensive system of education that embraces the entire population. Although the lands that now constitute Uzbekistan have been centers of higher learning for centuries, the system of education as it exists today has its roots in the Soviet era and thus follows the modern European model of state-based, free, compulsory, universal, and secular instruction.

Traditional Uzbek Education

Before the Soviet era, every residential neighborhood in Central Asia had a *maktab* (primary school),

where a teacher, usually the imam of the mosque, taught basic texts to neighborhood boys. The purpose of the *maktab* was to inculcate culturally accepted norms of behavior and to have students memorize certain basic texts of the area's Islamic tradition. The teacher received gifts from the parents of the boys he taught. Girls were usually taught at home. Beyond the *maktab*, education took place in practical contexts of apprenticeships or in *madrasabs* (religious schools). Those who aspired to work in the nexus of administration, justice, and religion entered the *madrasab*, where they could learn the art of textual interpretation from a recognized master in a system that had marked similarities to apprenticeship. *Madrasabs* were funded by income from endowments (*waqf*) established by various individuals. Bukhara's *madrasabs* were renowned and drew students from as far away as Tatarstan (a region on both sides of the Volga River) and India. This pattern of traditional education survived the Russian conquest of the 1860s and 1870s. A network of Russian schools emerged, but it attracted few local students.

After the turn of the twentieth century the *maktab* and the *madrasab* came under intense attack from a new group of modernist intellectuals, the Jadids, who accused them of not meeting the needs of the age. The Jadids advocated a new method of education, in which the *maktab* would focus on imparting functional literacy and a basic knowledge of arithmetic, history, geography, and hygiene. For higher education, the Jadids advocated a curriculum of technical and vocational education to equip future generations with the skills necessary for survival in the vastly new circumstances introduced by the Russian conquest. Lack of material resources and hostility from both the state and conservative elements in local society meant, however, that "new-method" schools remained few in number before the Russian Revolution of 1917.

Uzbek Education under the Soviets, 1917-1991

Real change came during the Soviet period. The Bolsheviks who took power after the Russian Revolution shared the Jadids' critique of traditional Central Asian education, although their agenda was far more radical. For the Bolsheviks, economic backwardness—in Russia as much as in Central Asia—could be overcome only through combating cultural backwardness. They therefore expended substantial energies on campaigns against illiteracy and for the establishment of a ramified system of educational institutions. Crash courses to train primary teachers and to abolish illiteracy among adults began with the advent of Soviet power. A network of Soviet primary schools offering

a basic modern education faced substantial difficulties, however, and did not become a reality until late in the 1920s. Only in 1930 did education become universal and compulsory. The Soviet commitment to universal education meant that girls were brought into the educational system. By the 1930s, coeducation was the norm in Uzbek schools.

Education was the key to the remaking of society and culture, in the Bolshevik view. One of the first Soviet decrees concerned the separation of church and school. The Soviets saw religion as an ideological cloak that prevented the full realization of human reason; religious elites were also potential political opponents. This notion was applied in Central Asia as well, although *maktab*s were tolerated for much of the 1920s until enough Soviet schools could be built. The triumph of the Soviet school spelled the end of traditional Islamic education in Uzbekistan. Soviet primary schools replaced the *maktab*, while *madrasabs* were destroyed by the early 1930s through the nationalization of their *waqf* property, which was given over to the use of new state-run schools. Traditional Islamic education was pushed underground by the mid-1930s. In 1941, a *madrasab* with a radically transformed curriculum and modern pedagogical methods was opened to train small numbers of officially sanctioned clergy; a second one followed in 1970.

Soviet policy called for provision of education in the vernacular for all nationalities. The new schools operated in the Uzbek language, with Russian taught as a second language. In the cities with substantial Russian populations, Russian-language schools were also built. These were open to non-Russians, and since a knowledge of Russian was a vital skill, many ambitious Uzbek parents sent their children to Russian schools. Higher education, especially in technical fields, operated only in Russian, and after World War II the Uzbek regime emphasized the importance of Russian as the lingua franca of the USSR. Moreover Uzbekistan's higher education was closely linked with Soviet networks, with the most prestigious institutions being those in Moscow.

Higher education evolved along parallel tracks of teaching and research. The Central Asian Communist University (called Tashkent State University since 1960), established in Tashkent in 1920, was the first institution of modern higher learning in Uzbekistan. Over time, universities were established in Samarqand, Bukhara, and Nukus. A number of specialized institutes, teacher-training colleges, and vocational schools existed alongside the universities. Research-oriented education was based in the Uzbekistan Academy of

TABLE 1

Uzbekistan's Educational Statistics, 1999			
	Institutions	Teachers	Students
Pre-Primary	n/a	96,100	1,071,400
Primary		92,400	1,905,693
Secondary	8,500	332,300	3,104,400
Teacher training	n/a	2,464	35,411
Vocational	440	7,900	214,500
Higher	53	24,787	321,682

SOURCE: UNESCO (1999).

Sciences (established 1943), with numerous affiliated institutes. Access to higher education was through university entrance examinations.

Soviet education achieved nearly universal literacy by the 1970s. In other indicators, Uzbekistan lagged behind all-Soviet levels, at least partly because of relatively low levels of urbanization. According to the last Soviet census (1989), Uzbekistan had 817 "specialists" per 10,000 population, as compared with the USSR average of 1,271. These figures are nevertheless impressive.

Uzbek Education after Independence, 1991

The basic structure of Uzbekistan's education system survived the breakup of the USSR. After nine years of compulsory education, students continue in vocational or academic streams, on the basis of their examination results. The infrastructure of primary and secondary education remains in place. Five million children study at school, and more than a million are enrolled at kindergarten level. (See Table 1.) In other ways, however, there have been drastic changes.

The end of central planning has necessitated new ways of funding education, and such resources have not always been forthcoming. Material difficulties, such as poor physical plants, shortages of textbooks and supplies, and low salaries for teachers, pose the largest threat to the system. Other problems arise from the disruption of contacts with academic institutions in the former USSR, which have not always been replaced by new ones. The government has also sought to downplay the public visibility of Russian, while emphasizing Uzbek-language education. Nevertheless Russian remains the only foreign language most people know. Russian schools continue to exist, and Russian remains a compulsory subject in non-Russian schools. Although the government would like to replace Russian with English as the means of communication with the outside world, such a switch remains

highly unlikely given the shortages of teachers. Higher education has suffered from brain drain as well as from shortages.

Another significant feature of the period since independence has been the reemergence of Islamic education. The government acknowledges Islam as part of the spiritual heritage of the nation, but it is also wary of political challenges from a religious opposition. It therefore keeps tight control over religious education. Only schools under the supervision of the Muslim Religious Board of Uzbekistan, a government department, are allowed to operate, and their curricula meet basic requirements set by the Ministry of Education. State schools remain resolutely secular, with no religious instruction whatsoever.

Adeeb Khalid

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UZBEKISTAN-HISTORY Uzbekistan is a former Soviet republic and now a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Its official name is the Republic of Uzbekistan. The history of Uzbekistan covers more than 2.5 millennia. During this period, various ancient states rose and fell in Central Asia, such as Bactria, Khorezm, Sogdiana, and Parthia.

The Ancient Period

From the sixth century to the fourth century BCE the territory belonged to the Iranian Achaemenid empire founded by Cyrus the Great (c. 585–c. 529 BCE). Alexander of Macedon (356–323 BCE) invaded Central Asia in 334 BCE and destroyed the Achaemenid empire. Inhabitants of the territory tried in vain to defeat him; a revolt under the leadership of Spitamen was one of the great battles.

After the death of Alexander in 323 BCE his empire was divided. Between the third and the second centuries BCE, the Graeco-Bactrian state, becoming independent from Alexander's empire, incorporated the



KEY EVENTS IN UZBEKISTAN'S HISTORY

- 6th–4th centuries BCE** The region is under the control of Persia.
- 3rd–2nd centuries BCE** The region is under the control of Graeco-Bactrian state.
- 1st–4th centuries CE** The region is ruled by the Kushan empire.
- 552–745** The Turks rule Central Asia.
- 7th century** Muslim Arabs conquer the region.
- 819–1001** The region is ruled by the Samanid dynasty.
- 1000** The Ghaznavid and Karakhanid dynasties begin to displace the Samanid dynasty in the region.
- 1097** The Anushtegin dynasty emerges in western Uzbekistan.
- 13th century** The Mongols conquer the region.
- 14th century** Timur displaces the Mongol rulers and establishes a capital at Samarqand.
- 16th–18th centuries** Various Uzbek dynasties compete for power in the region.
- 1860** The Russians invade and then conquer Central Asia.
- 1924** The Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan is founded.
- 1991** Uzbekistan becomes an independent nation.

greater part of present-day Uzbekistan. From the first to the fourth century CE, the territory of Uzbekistan was under the control of the Kushan empire, which also controlled present-day Afghanistan, northern India, and part of Pakistan.

The Turks ruled Central Asia between 552 and 745 CE and played a great role in consolidating nomadic tribes in the Central Asian steppes and oases. By the end of the sixth century, due to local wars their empire was divided into two parts: the Eastern and Western Kaganates.

Before Arab conquests of Central Asia, there were several small states in the territory. Then, in the seventh century CE, Arabs conquered Central Asia under the leadership of Qutaybah ibn Muslim (d. 715) and brought Islam with them. The territory between the Amu Dar'ya (Oxus) and Syr Dar'ya (Jaxartes) Rivers was named Mawaraannahr (Transoxiana) by the Arabs and included in the Arab caliphate. Under the Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad, Islamic influence became domi-

nant in the cities of Central Asia. Arab conquest played a positive role in the development of Mawaraannahr.

The Samanid and Karakhanid Dynasties

At the beginning of the ninth century, the caliphate's power began to wane, and local dynasties ruled in provinces. The Samanid dynasty ruled Mawaraannahr from 819 to 1001. This period in Central Asian history was marked by a great upsurge in economy and culture. Cities and some rural areas turned into great commercial and cultural centers. For instance, Samarqand was renowned even outside of Central Asia for the production of high-quality glass and paper. Famous scholars such as the astronomer al-Biruni (973–1048), the mathematician Khorezmi (c. 780–850), the physician Ibn Sina (Avicenna; 980–1037), and many others lived at this time.

In 999, the Karakhanid dynasty began to supplant the Samanids in Samarqand and Bukhara. The new rulers even pushed south of the Amu Dar'ya, but Mahmud of Ghazna (971–1030) stopped them, and the river became the dividing line between Khorasan and Mawaraannahr. Thus, by the end of the tenth century the territory of the Samanids was occupied by the Karakhanid and Ghaznavid dynasties.

In Khwarizm, in the western part of present-day Uzbekistan, a new Muslim dynasty was founded in 1097 CE by Qutb al-Din Muhammad bin Anushtegin. This Turkic dynasty, which was called the Anushtegins (Khorezmshahs) in historical sources, gradually attained great power and became independent from another Turkic tribe, the Seljuks, in 1127. The Anushtegins were able to control the huge territory of Central Asia. During their rule, culture, economy, and science flourished.

The Mongol Era and the Reign of Timur

Mongols conquered Central Asia between 1219 and 1221 under the leadership of Genghis Khan (c. 1162–1227), and his second son, Chagatai (d. 1241), ruled the region. Mongols destroyed many cities and killed and enslaved thousands of peasants and craftsmen. In 1238, a great revolt against the Mongols started in Bukhara under the leadership of Mahmud Tarabi. However, it was suppressed.

In the middle of the fourteenth century, a battle against the Mongol empire began in Mawaraannahr under the leadership of Timur (1336–1405), who had once fought with Chagatai. Timur created a great kingdom from India to the Volga River and from the Tian Shan Mountains to Bosporus. Timur chose

Samarqand, one of the oldest cities in Central Asia, as the capital and built many great mosques and gardens. His rule and the rule of his descendants were marked by the development of irrigation, arts and crafts, trade, literature, science, and art in Samarqand and Mawaraannahr. Timur was a cruel conqueror. He slaughtered thousands of inhabitants of the cities that rebelled against him, especially at Delhi.

The Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, nomadic Uzbeks, the Shaybanids, conquered most of Central Asia and ruled until the Ashtarkhanids, the group from the ruling house of Astrakhan (the town near of the mouth of the Volga), came to power in 1601. In 1753, the dynasty of the Mangits, an Uzbek tribe that was dominant in the central regions of Mawaraannahr, came to power in Bukhara and ruled until 1920.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Fergana became independent from Bukhara, and there the khanate of Quqon was founded. In the first quarter of the nineteenth century, it possessed Tashkent and the region of Syr Dar'ya. In 1511, the khanate of Khorezm was founded at the northwestern part of present-day Uzbekistan, and by the end of the century Khiva was chosen as its capital. Thus, there were three states in Central Asia before the Russian conquest: the Bukhara, Quqon, and Khiva khanates.

Nineteenth-Century British-Russian Rivalry

In the nineteenth century, Central Asia became an object of rivalry between Russia and Britain. Czarist Russia strove to capture Central Asia's raw materials and to prevent British penetration into the territory. In 1860, Russia invaded Central Asia and conquered it by the end of the nineteenth century. In 1876, the Russians dissolved the khanate of Quqon but allowed the khanates of Khiva and Bukhara to remain as protectorates. The Russians created the province of Turkestan, with its center at Tashkent. It was ruled by a governor-general.

On 30 April 1918, the Turkestan Autonomous Republic under the Russian federation was founded. In February 1920, Soviet power came to Khorezm, and the Khorezm People's Soviet Republic was established. In September of that year, the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic was also proclaimed.

In October 1924, following the establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan (SSRU) was founded. It included Samarqand, Syr Dar'ya, the Fergana regions,

and the territories of Bukhara and the Khorezm People's Soviet Republic. Tajikistan was a part of the SSRU until 1929, when it became an autonomous republic. In 1936, the Karakalpak Autonomous SSR was joined with Uzbekistan. In 1956 and 1963, the Mirzachul Steppes were transferred in portions from Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan. Some of the area was returned in 1971.

During the Soviet period, Russia exploited Uzbekistan for its tremendous productivity in cotton and for its other natural resources. Moscow controlled Uzbekistan's economic and political contacts with the rest of the world. The Republic of Uzbekistan became independent on 1 September 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. On 2 March 1992, Uzbekistan joined the United Nations.

Akram Khabibullaev

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UZBEKISTAN-POLITICAL SYSTEM Uzbekistan is home to the Uzbek nation, a Turkic-speaking people with a proud history and rich culture. While Uzbekistan's multinational population includes Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Turkmen, Kazakhs, Karakalpaks, Slavs, and many other groups, Uzbek national identity has undergone a significant revival since national independence in 1991. In December, 1998 Uzbekistan symbolically celebrated the re-creation of its past by awarding the country's highest honor, the Order of Emir Timur, to Uzbekistan's president, Islam Karimov (b. 1938). The award was intended to mark the country's achievements in creating a sovereign state, increasing respect for Uzbekistan around the world, strengthening civil peace and national accord, and promoting Uzbek cultural values.

Islam Karimov, while rhetorically championing democratic values and market reform, has steered a

course toward concentration of executive powers. A financial specialist and former head of the Uzbek republic's Communist Party during the Soviet period, Karimov established himself as the strongman of Central Asia in the first period of Uzbekistan's independence. In 1983, Karimov was named minister of finance. In 1986, he was named vice chairman of the Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Planning Committee. In June 1989, he was appointed first secretary of the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee. In March 1990, he was elected president of the republic by the Supreme Soviet (a legislative appointment—not a popular election). In December 1991, he was elected by popular vote. Karimov's supporters see his rule as reinforcing "Central Asian values"; critics view his leadership as reinforcing authoritarianism and despotism. Karimov justifies the severe paternalism of his government in his book *Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century*.

Constitutional and Legal Framework

The preamble of Uzbekistan's constitution (adopted 8 December 1992) states that one of the principal goals of the people of Uzbekistan is to "create a humane and democratic rule of law." The constitution guarantees the rights of freedom of speech, assembly, and religion, as well as the right to express one's national heritage.

The constitution specifies a branch system of government with a division of powers. The president directs the executive branch. The legislature is the Oliy Majlis (Supreme Council). Uzbekistan's three-tiered judiciary system is composed of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the Arbitrazh Court (Commercial Court). There are local courts as well as the municipal level.

In theory the judiciary is independent, but in practice its capacity to function as an independent branch of government is limited. While the constitution describes the legislature as the highest organ of power, in fact the country has a unitary presidential form of government. Furthermore the branches are not co-equal or balanced; the executive branch is dominant in virtually all matters. The president acts as the head of state and executive authority in the republic, and there are no meaningful lower tiers of independent authority (for instance, no federal divisions).

Executive-Branch Functions

The president's executive powers are extensive: he has the right to form a government; direct the government; appoint and dismiss the prime minister and

cabinet ministers; appoint and recall diplomats; establish and dissolve ministries; appoint and dismiss the procurator-general and his or her deputies; nominate appointees to the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, and board of the Central Bank; appoint and dismiss judges of regional, district, city, and arbitration courts; appoint and dismiss *bakims* (governors or mayors) for violations of the law; suspend or repeal acts of *bakims*; sign all laws of the Oliy Majlis or return them for reconsideration; declare a state of emergency; serve as commander-in-chief of the armed forces; declare war; award orders and medals; rule on matters of citizenship; issue amnesties and pardons; and appoint and dismiss heads of the national security service.

The president is elected by direct, secret, but not necessarily competitive, election for a term of five years. According to the constitution, a president can hold office for no more than two terms. After state service, the president becomes a lifetime member of the Constitutional Court. Islam Karimov was elected president in March 1990 by Uzbekistan's Soviet-era parliament. He was reelected in December 1991 in a popular election, running opposed and winning 86 percent of the votes. A March 1995 referendum extended the president's term of office to January 2000, matching the terms of the Oliy Majlis deputies (parliamentarians) and allowing Karimov to stand again for election. In December 2001, the Oliy Majlis adopted a resolution calling for a presidential election. If the resolution is implemented in 2002, a referendum may be held allowing Karimov to remain in office until 2007.

The three-tiered judicial system is subordinated to the Ministry of Justice. The court system is funded from the state budget. To avoid partisanship, no judge may be a member of any political party. The procurator's office represents the prosecutorial arm of the justice system and is responsible for public observance of the laws. Procurators are appointed by the president and are restricted from belonging to any political party or participating in party activity during their period of service. Local and neighborhood conflict-resolution committees—the Mahalla—are reported to function effectively on a local level in many areas, particularly rural areas.

In Uzbekistan, the parliament, the Oliy Majlis, serves as an advisory and legitimating instrument, not as a deliberative body. The core of Uzbekistan's government is not the parliament or the courts, but the system of administration that relies on the twelve *veliatlar* (former oblasts or regions) headed by *bakims*. Of

the *bakim* appointments announced in March 1994, all were ethnic Uzbeks; all had previously been oblast-level Communist Party committee secretaries, and all were members of the People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, the party headed by Karimov. The system is prefectorial. Each *bakim* administers his or her territory as representative, or prefect, of the president.

Competitive Politics, Elections, Parties, and Civil Rights

Politics is not pluralistic in Uzbekistan: the political process is carefully monitored and controlled. The Central Electoral Commission (CEC) is a fourteen-member board established by the Oliy Majlis on the advice of the president. The CEC is responsible for oversight of the nomination process and of campaigning and for the organization of the election. Campaign financing and campaign publicity are also managed by the CEC. According to an election law passed in December 1993, the right to nominate candidates is reserved to registered political parties, the *veliat* legislative councils, and the Karakalpakstan parliament in the Karakalpak Autonomous Republic in Uzbekistan. Political parties must also satisfy the additional condition of having been registered with the ministry of justice no less than six months before the election, and they must have collected fifty thousand voters' signatures supporting the party's participation in the election. These and other restrictions on the nomination process make it possible for the government to exercise a determinative influence on the preselection of candidates.

The People's Democratic Party (PDP), the successor to the Communist Party, is the dominant party and explicitly supports the president and the government. Other political parties include the Fatherland Progress Party, the Adolat Social Democratic Party, the Democratic National Rebirth Party, and the Self-Sacrificers Party (Fidoskorlar). In 1996 Karimov withdrew from the PDP, claiming that the president should be above partisan politics.

In Uzbekistan, as in many authoritarian contexts, personalities play a more significant role than do principles. When independence occurred—not as part of an organic internal development but as the outcome of a deal brokered by the disintegrating Communist Party of the Soviet Union—the existing power structures reconstituted themselves as an independent government.

A political opposition did emerge on independence, but the leading faction of the beneficiaries of the old Soviet system used their established influence to brush

the opposition aside. Uzbekistan embarked on a course of national consolidation that emphasized the state as the leading and guiding force of society. The constitution adopted in December 1992 merely institutionalized the existing political system. The government publicly emphasized the Central Asian tradition of strong but benign leadership. In private the government relied on and even refined Soviet-style techniques of manipulation and intimidation.

The Uzbekistan government's record on human rights is considered poor by most international human-rights organizations. Rights of speech, assembly, and religion routinely are circumscribed by government agencies that identify social stability and security as the principal goal. In numerous documented cases the security forces have arbitrarily arrested or detained human-rights activists, religious activists, and ethnic-group activists on false charges, by allegedly planting narcotics, weapons, or forbidden literature on them. Prison conditions are poor, and detention can be prolonged. Police routinely infringe on citizens' rights, and officials responsible for documented abuses are rarely punished. After five terrorist bombs exploded near government targets in Tashkent on 16 February 1999, Uzbekistan security forces launched a campaign of arrests and intimidation against many seen as opposing the government. Also arrested were members of the secular opposition, human rights activists, and Muslim believers.

President Karimov has argued that economic development, not European-style civil rights, is the true fruit of national independence. Uzbekistan, stressing welfare authoritarianism, has resisted counsel from international organizations to embrace democratic principles and processes.

Gregory Gleason

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UZBEKS The Uzbeks are a Central Asiatic people who speak a language belonging to the Chagatay branch of the Turkic language subfamily. In 1998, an estimated 18 million Uzbeks lived in the independent republic of Uzbekistan, located mainly between the Syr Dar'ya and Amu Dar'ya Rivers in Central Asia. Uzbekistan has an area of 447,400 square kilometers. Its estimated 1998 population was 24.1 million, of whom approximately 76 percent were Uzbek, 6 percent other Turkic, 6 percent Russian and Ukrainian, 5 percent Tajik, and 7 percent other. Smaller num-



A Uzbek grandmother holds her grandchild outside their dwelling in the desert. (BUDDY MAYS/COPRIBIS)

bers of Uzbeks also inhabit Afghanistan, other Central Asiatic Turkic republics, and Russia.

Most Uzbeks are devout Sunni Muslims. They are the least Russified of the Turkic peoples formerly under Soviet rule, and virtually all of them still claim Uzbek as their primary language. Parents typically give their children Uzbek rather than Russian names. The majority of Uzbeks live in rural areas, where extended family households are common. Only two-fifths of the population of Uzbekistan live in urban areas, and a disproportionately high number of these urbanites are Slavic peoples. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, many Russians and Jews emigrated from Uzbekistan, thereby changing the country's ethnic composition and opening up more technical and management jobs for Uzbeks.

Uzbekistan's population is youthful. Uzbeks have a high birth rate and large families. Of all the former Soviet republics, Uzbekistan has the greatest number of mothers with ten or more living children under the age of twenty years. In 2001, life expectancy at birth was estimated to be sixty-four years.

The Early Uzbeks

The Turkic-Mongol tribes known as Uzbeks originated in Siberia and entered the land of present-day Uzbekistan in the fourteenth century. They may have adopted the name "Uzbek" from the Muslim ruler of the Golden Horde, Oz Beg (Uzbek) Khan (reigned 1312–1341). The Uzbeks entered Central Asia under the leadership of Abu al-Khayr Khan, a descendant of the great Mongol leader Genghis Khan. Abu al-Khayr Khan led the Uzbek tribes southeastward to the north bank of the Syr Dar'ya.

In the late fifteenth century, the Uzbeks conquered key portions of Transoxania (the region between the Amu Dar'ya and Syr Dar'ya Rivers) and occupied the major cities of Bukhara, Khiva, Samarqand, and Khujand. Uzbek khans gained wide recognition for their Sunni religious orthodoxy and cultured patronage of the arts. They sponsored the construction of architectural monuments, such as mosques, Islamic seminaries, palaces, and bridges.

Over the centuries, the territory of what is now Uzbekistan produced great scholars, poets, and writers. In the fifteenth century, the astronomer and mathematician Ulugh Beg founded a famous observatory in Samarqand, and the scholar, poet, and writer 'Ali Shir Nava'i greatly advanced Turkic-language literature.

During the reign of 'Abd Allah Khan II (1557–1598), Uzbek rule was expanded in Balkh, Samarqand,

Tashkent, and Fergana. Uzbek hegemony extended eastward as far as Badakhshan in present-day Afghanistan and East Turkistan (roughly today's Xinjiang Uygur in northwestern China) and westward to Khorasan and Khwarizm in present-day northern Iran. Thereafter Uzbek power and influence declined, reaching a low point by the mid-1700s, with military defeats by the Iranian ruler Nadir Shah. Three Uzbek-dominated polities, known as khanates, emerged in the eighteenth century at Quqon in eastern Uzbekistan, Bukhara in southern Uzbekistan, and Khiva on the lower Amu Dar'ya.

Russian and Soviet Rule

Czarist Russian forces advanced southward, conquering Bukhara in 1868, Khiva in 1873, and Quqon in 1875. The Russians incorporated the Uzbek lands into the province of Turkistan and linked it to the rest of the empire via telegraph, telephone, and the press. Railroads reached Samarqand and Tashkent by 1905. Despite being ruled by czarist colonial administrators, the Uzbek intelligentsia and clergy of Bukhara and Khiva resisted the influence of Russian educational, religious, economic, and governmental institutions. At the same time, however, a group of reformers known as Jadids worked with the support of Russian governors to prepare a number of young urban intellectuals for change in their economy and society. The Jadid era (1900–1920) produced a number of modern poets and writers, who produced many of the first indigenous plays, stories, and novels of Central Asia.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 caused instability and conflict in Turkistan, as Muslim resistance and attempts to establish an autonomous government were defeated by the Red Army. By 1921, Communist-dominated politicians held power. In 1924–1925, they designated the region of Central Asia with an Uzbek population majority as Uzbekistan and incorporated it into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The authorities soon granted Uzbekistan the formal status of constituent republic of the USSR. Uzbeks constituted a minority in the capital city of Tashkent and were underrepresented in the Soviet bureaucracy and administration; Slavic peoples—Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians—constituted the majority.

The Communist political purges of the 1930s exacted heavy casualties, especially among Uzbekistan's relatively small class of intelligentsia and leaders. World War II brought major demographic changes, as the Soviet authorities moved thousands of Russian,

Polish, and Jewish technicians, managers, and teachers to the towns and villages of Uzbekistan.

During the 1980s, Islamic religious practice surged, transforming many aspects of Uzbek life, especially in the towns of the Fergana Valley and other concentrations of Muslim believers. This resurgence affected the republic's cultural life through the increased activities of religious schools, neighborhood mosques, religious orders, and religious publishing ventures and through the Islamic Renaissance Party.

Throughout most of the Russian and Soviet eras, the Uzbeks maintained significant portions of their cultural traditions. In athletics, wrestling, horse riding, and team competitions continued to be popular. In rural areas, both men and women continued to wear distinctive Uzbek dress. For their homes, Uzbeks continued to prefer simple, one-story structures, like those of the past, built around courtyards planted with fruit trees and gardens open to the skies but closed off from the streets.

At the same time, many Uzbeks acquired Russian as a second language, and compulsory school attendance raised the literacy rate for both males and females to above 90 percent. Until the 1980s, most Soviet Uzbek authors produced tendentious novels, plays, and verse in line with official Communist Party themes. Since the 1990s, however, younger Uzbek poets and authors have broken away from the sloganeering characteristic of Soviet Socialist Realism. Attempts are also being made to revive classical Uzbek musical forms.

Postindependence

Uzbek political leaders declared Uzbekistan's independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. However, the Uzbek Communists retained political power and prohibited opposition parties from participating in the 1991 and 1994 elections. The government's human rights record has drawn international criticism, although the government has promoted the reclamation, renovation, and reconsecration of many smaller old mosques. Communist authorities had relegated these to serve as garages, storehouses, shops, slaughterhouses, or museums. Muslim artisans have accurately reconstructed these damaged buildings as part of a comprehensive drive to recreate the Islamic life suppressed by the Communists between 1920 and 1990.

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VALIKHANOV, CHOKAN (1835–1865), nineteenth-century Kazakh explorer and scholar. Regarded by many scholars as the first Kazakh intellectual, Chokan Valikhanov was born in 1865. A grandson of Ablai Khan (1711–1781), the last great khan of the Kazakh Middle Horde, Valikhanov (also known as Mukhammed Khanafii) was initially educated at home, and in 1847 he entered the newly opened Omsk Kadet Korpus as the first Kazakh admitted to the institution. While there he studied history, geography, mathematics, and classics of Russian and Western literature. Graduating in 1853, he worked for the office of the governor-general of Western Siberia, where he became a close friend of the Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoyevsky (1821–1881), recently released from internal exile in Siberia and assigned to serve five years in a disciplinary battalion, and Petr Semonov-Tian-Shanskii (1827–1914). In 1856 he participated in an expedition to Semirechye province, where he became the first person to write down parts of the great Kirgiz oral epic *Manas*. Two years later he undertook a clandestine journey to Kashgar in Xinjiang, where he gathered economic and political information for the Russian government. His reports were published in the journal of the Russian Geographic Society and translated into German and English. Honored for his accomplishments, in 1860 he was assigned to the Asiatic department of the ministry of foreign affairs in the capital, St. Petersburg. His health weakened by the arduous journey to Kashgar, he returned to the Kazakh steppe to recuperate from complications due to tuberculosis. He died near present-day Almaty in April 1865. In 1904 an edited volume of his collected works was published by the Ethnographic Section of the Russian Geographic Society.

Steven Sabol

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VAN (2002 est. province pop. 851,000). The city of Van (estimated 2002 pop. 253,000), the capital of the province of Van, is located in eastern Turkey on the eastern shore of Lake Van; the population is now largely Kurdish. The city, with an altitude of 1750 meters, is in the valley of the Nemrut and Suphan mountains. During the thirteenth through seventh centuries BCE the Urartean empire flourished in this area, and Van was its capital in the eighth century BCE.

After Nineveh, capital of the Assyrian empire, fell in 612 BCE, the city was successively occupied by the Medes, Persians, and kings of Pontus in northeastern Asia Minor. During the first century BCE it was part of the kingdom of the Armenian king Tigranes I (c. 140–c. 55 BCE). The Romans, Sasanids, and Arabs all sought to conquer Van in the seventh century CE; it fell to the Arabs.

During the eighth century the region came under the rule of the Armenian Bagratid dynasty, and the city later became the capital of Vaspurkan, an independent Armenian state. The city of Van was occupied by the Byzantines in 1021 and then fell to the Seljuks after the battle of Manzikert (1071). The Ottoman sultan Süleyman I conquered Van in 1543, and the city remained under Ottoman control until the Russians occupied it from 1915 to 1917, during World War I. The

years 1896 and 1913 were times of terrible massacres and deportations of Armenians in this area.

Remnants of Armenian churches, Seljuk and Ottoman mosques, and the citadel still exist. North of the city lies the site of Toprakkale, an ancient Urartean city that has been excavated.

Lake Van is the largest body of water in Turkey and the second largest in the Middle East. Its natural beauty has recently begun to attract tourism. The economy of the province of Van is based on the production of fruits, vegetables, skins, and grains.

T. Isikozlu-E. F. Isikozlu

VARANASI (2001 est. pop. 1.1 million). Varanasi (also Banaras, Benares, or Kasi) is for Hindus the most sacred city in India. Located at a bend of the River Ganges, it lies on the left bank, near the eastern border of Uttar Pradesh State, and nearly 700 kilometers east-southeast of Delhi. Although the devout commonly equate its extreme sanctity with extreme antiquity, dubbing it "the oldest city on earth," archaeology shows that it had its origins during the Iron Age, in the eighth century BCE.

The biggest attraction in the city, for pilgrims and tourists alike, is the celebrated ghats, broad steps that lead down to the river and that feature a constant commerce in ritual bathing, religious teaching, cremation of the dead, or—for very poor families—launching of corpses into the river current. Of all the ghats, the Manikarnika Ghat is considered the most sacred and is consequently the one most pictured. It is one of five celebrated places of pilgrimage within the city. Buildings of note within Varanasi include hundreds of temples and shrines, preeminently the Durga Temple



Hindus bathe in the Ganges River in the holy city of Varanasi. (ALISON WRIGHT/CORBIS)

(miscalled by Europeans the Monkey Temple) and Benares Hindu University. The city has a wide range of handicrafts and is especially noted for its brasswork, silks, shawls, and embroidery. Because of the thousands of pilgrims and so many old people who come here in the expectation of dying, the city does a brisk business in cheap hotels and hospices.

Just outside the city (7 kilometers) is the site of Sarnath, where Buddha preached his first sermon in about 530 BCE. Its Deer Park is still maintained as an important archaeological site.

Paul Hockings

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VEDDA The Vedda (also Vadda, Veddah, Veddha, Vaddo) are an indigenous people of Sri Lanka. They are divided into three groups: The Bintenne Veddas, the Anuradhapura Veddas, and the Coast Veddas. The Bintenne Veddas live in an area in the southeastern region of the island, the Anuradhapura Veddas live in North Central Province, and the Coast Veddas live on the central coast. The Vedda population is small, though an accurate number has yet to be recorded. A 1970 census counted more than 6,600 Anuradhapura Veddas. Bintenne and Coast Vedda populations are probably significantly smaller.

Until recently, many Vedda maintained a way of life based on hunting and gathering and shifting agriculture. The increase in the population of Sri Lanka and the modern importance of cash cropping rather than trade and reciprocity has changed Vedda subsistence activities a great deal. The Anuradhapura Vedda, traditionally shifting agriculturists, now obtain most of their income as agricultural wage laborers outside their own villages. The Coast Veddas fish, practice some shifting agriculture, and also work as casual wage laborers. The Bintenne Veddas still maintain hunting and gathering as a way of life. In recent years, they have asked for land to be set aside on Sri Lanka as a Vedda reservation. The government has provided assistance by way of agricultural cooperatives and development societies.

Traditional villages consisted of huts of wattle and daub or plaited palm with packed earth floors. Recently, the government has begun subsidizing the con-

struction of tin-roofed brick houses with concrete floors. Within the villages, kinship provides the major social structure. Vedda caste specialization, hunting, and spirit mediumship are important in interaction with the Tamil and Sinhalese.

Vedda religious beliefs, like their language, have been strongly influenced by their Tamil and Sinhalese neighbors. Vedda groups located near the Tamil tend toward Hinduism, while those located near the Sinhalese tend toward Buddhism. All three groups use some form of religious or ritual medicine, although the state also provides free access to Western medicine.

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VEENA In classical texts on Indian music, the term veena refers to almost any string instrument, and at least forty different types of veena are listed. Today, the term refers to a particular type of stringed instrument, of which about two or three closely related variants are in existence. Like other stringed instruments in Indian classical music, the veena consists of a large round wooden base and a narrower and longer body also made of wood. On this body are attached brass or silver frets, usually enough in number to cover two octaves. There are about seven strings, of which at least three exist to create a drone. Usually, only two of the main strings are played on, by plucking. The veena is held either horizontally across the player's knees or slanting against the shoulders. While these broad features characterize a number of string instruments in India, the veena group stands out in details of construction, position of the main string, richness of sound, antiquity, and association with vocal music. Of all stringed instruments, the veena has been the closest to vocal music traditions; its repertoire has had much in common with that of vocal music, and the veena has often been played and taught by great singers themselves.

Tirthankar Roy

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VELEYET-E FAQIH *Veleyet-e faqih* literally means "the authority or governance of the jurist" in Arabic and "rule of the religious jurisprudent" ("jurisprudent" referring to one who is learned in law) in Persian. In essence, it is the belief that an ideal government is one that is run by Islamic clergy who are well versed in Islamic law, history, and theology. It is a doctrine whose origins date back to 939 CE at the beginning of the Twelfth Imam's major occultation or absence from earth. It was determined that scholars of Shi'a Islam were the most qualified to conduct government services during the Twelfth Imam's occultation, which continues to the present.

Theoretically, *veleyet-e faqih* was contemplated in the nineteenth century as a definite legal consideration, but it became a political reality in Iran only under Ayatollah Khomeini after the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The ayatollah originally began developing this concept in his first work titled *Kashf al-Asrar* in 1944 when he asserted the right and duty of Shi'a scholars to lead. During his exile in Iraq, he worked out the details more fully in lectures, which were eventually published as *Hokumat-e Eslami (Islamic Government)*. When Ayatollah Khomeini rose to power in 1979, an Assembly of Experts was assigned to take on the task of making his ideas into a viable political structure. The result was a government structure headed by the *faqih*, who would be an Islamic theologian overseeing the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of government. Ayatollah Khomeini was Iran's first *faqih*, followed by the 2000 *faqih*, Ayatollah Khameni.

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VIENTIANE (2000 pop. 233,000). The city of Vientiane (or Viangchan, in Lao) is the capital of Laos and central to the cultural, commercial, and political life of Laos. It is situated in central Laos, along the

Mekong River, and covers about 180 square kilometers. Archaeological findings in the area have included Mon artifacts related to the practice of Theravada Buddhism. The earliest known settlement near present-day Vientiane was Chandapuri (City of Sandalwood). The Mon lived in the area until about 1006. The Vientiane region became a part of Cambodia during Khmer rule (802–1431). King Xetthathirat (flourished 1540s) made the city of Vientiane the capital of Lan Xang, transferring the capital there from its previous capital, Luang Prabang, and constructed the famous shrines of Vat Phra Kaeo (1565) and That Luang (1566), the latter being the national symbol of Laos.

The city remained the capital of Lan Xang through the Lao-Siamese wars (1779 and 1826–1828). Following Siam's victory and the destruction of the city, Laotian residents were forcibly relocated to Siam, and the city became a ghost town. In March 1867, French explorers found only a few residents, including monks who were living in ruined monasteries.

The French made the city the capital of French Laos. The city is comparable to Saigon in its colonial French architecture. The French, in addition to providing their rulers and armies with accommodation, erected monasteries and restored the ancient temples. Under French rule, the population was largely Vietnamese. The Japanese briefly assumed control of the city during World War II; the French reassumed control in April 1946, and the nation was taken into the French Union.

Laos gained independence in October 1953. It soon had its own troubles, including war and civil unrest. Vientiane was, like much of Laos, bombed throughout both the war with France (French, or First, Indochina War, 1946–1954) and the Vietnam War (Second Indochina War, 1954–1975). The Pathet Lao, a Communist revolutionary group, seized power in 1975 and retained Vientiane as the capital of the Lao People's Democratic Republic.

Tourism has flourished at traditional architectural sites, such as Buddhist monasteries and monuments. These include That Luang; Patousai (1958), a monument patterned on the Arc de Triomphe; and Vat Sisaket, the only temple to survive the Siamese sacking of the city in 1828 and Laos's oldest surviving temple.

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
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VIETNAM PROFILE (2001 est. pop. 79.9 million). Vietnam occupies the eastern portion of the Indochinese peninsula, bordered on the north by China, on the west by Laos and Cambodia, and on the east by the South China Sea. The area of the country is slightly smaller (329,560 square kilometers) than the state of California, although, in terms of people, for every one Californian there are about two and a half Vietnamese.

Geography

All Vietnamese children are taught in school that their country takes the form of an elongated letter S,





VIETNAM

Country name: Socialist Republic of Vietnam
Area: 329,560 sq km
Population: 79,939,014 (July 2001 est.)
Population growth rate: 1.45% (2001 est.)
Birth rate: 21.23 births/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Death rate: 6.22 deaths/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Net migration rate: -0.49 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2001 est.)
Sex ratio: 0.97 male(s)/female (2001 est.)
Infant mortality rate: 30.24 deaths/1,000 live births (2001 est.)
Life expectancy at birth—total population: 69.56 years, male: 67.12 years, female: 72.19 years (2001 est.)
Major religions: Buddhist, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Christian (predominantly Roman Catholic, some Protestant), indigenous beliefs, Muslim
Major languages: Vietnamese (official), English (increasingly favored as a second language), some French, Chinese, and Khmer; mountain area languages (Mon-Khmer and Malayo-Polynesian)
Literacy—total population: 93.7%, male: 96.5%, female: 91.2% (1995 est.)
Government type: Communist state
Capital: Hanoi
Administrative divisions: 58 provinces and 3 municipalities
Independence: 2 September 1945 (from France)
National holiday: Independence Day, 2 September (1945)
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal
GDP—real growth rate: 5.5% (2000 est.)
GDP—per capita (purchasing power parity): \$1,950 (2000 est.)
Population below poverty line: 37% (1998 est.)
Exports: \$ 14.3 billion (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Imports: \$ 15.2 billion (f.o.b., 2000 est.)
Currency: dong (VND)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. (2001) *The World Book Factbook 2001*. Retrieved 5 March 2002, from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

its two enlarged extremities filled by the fertile deltas of the Red River in the north and the Mekong River in the south. Central Vietnam is constituted by very narrow stretches of coastal plains that are hemmed in on one side by the elongated chain of mountains called the Long Mountains (Truong Son) and on the other side by the Pacific Ocean. The stylized profile of the country as it is drawn on maps evokes the image of the long bamboo pole with two baskets suspended at both ends that is carried by peasants on their way to and from the market.

The two main rivers of Vietnam are the Red and the Mekong, which is called the Nine Dragons River. The Red River owes its name to the red dirt that it

carries over its course all the way from the southern Chinese province of Yunnan to the Gulf of Tonkin. The Mekong is a long river, linking together all five countries of mainland Southeast Asia: Myanmar (Burma), Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The soil of the two deltas is fertile from the presence of rich alluvium; in the rest of the country, principally in the highlands, the soil is rather poor, because nutrients are leached out by a combination of rushing rain water and scorching sun. Only about one-third of the Vietnamese land is good for farming.

The mountains of Vietnam are not high. In general their elevation ranges from 600 to 1,500 meters, with the exception of the Fan Si Pan, situated in the

northwest, which rises up to approximately 3,060 meters. Rain forests, shielding a great variety of species of trees, some of which are hardwood such as teak and mahogany, cover virtually the entire mountainous region. These forests fit well the definition of the word "jungle," if they are complemented with their exotic fauna: monkeys, tigers, and elephants.

Rain, more than extremes of temperature, defines the seasons, although the north sees a temperature range from the high thirties (Celsius) in the summer to about 10° or 5°C in the winter months of January and February. Elsewhere, a moist and hot 30°C plus endures pretty much the whole year round, except on the slopes of mountains and possibly during the months of December and January, when the atmosphere seems somewhat less oppressive. That discrepancy is due to the influence of seasonal winds called monsoons, which regulate the dry-cold and rainy-hot portions of the year. The northeast monsoon that brings cold and dry air from the Asian continent weakens as it reaches the Hai Van Pass in central Vietnam. Consequently, the southern half of Vietnam has a more equally distributed, fresher weather through roughly six months of the year. The other six months, from about April or May to September or October, a hot and humid wind blows from the ocean around the equator toward the peninsula, bringing with it both heat and rain.

People

Many different ethnic groups share the land of Vietnam. The official census divides them into two general categories: the "plains" people and the ethnic minorities who generally occupy the highlands (with the exception of the Cham, Chinese, and Khmer minorities). There are up to sixty different groups, speaking as many different languages. The plains people consist of the Vietnamese who, from north to south, the speak one common tongue. Vietnamese is an Austroasiatic language that does not belong to the same linguistic family as Chinese, although 70 to 80 percent of its vocabulary is derived from Chinese words.

Traditionally, the Vietnamese were essentially a small-agriculture, rural people. Villages constituted their primary social units. Usually three elements figure in every village: a communal house, a pagoda, and a pond. The communal house, called *dinh*, serves as a meeting place for all activities common to all the villagers: administration, justice, police, jail. It is also a place of worship in honor of the protecting genie, who generally was an inhabitant of that village who accomplished some illustrious feat benefiting the coun-

try: a general, a writer, an artist, a person of virtue. The presence of the pagoda testifies less to the number of Buddhist followers than to the patrons of past dynasties, who manifested their devotion by erecting shrines in almost every village of the realm. Although the majority of the villagers may claim to be Buddhists or may go to the pagoda on the first and the fifteenth of the lunar month, they all practice the cult of ancestors mixed with a tinge of Taoism and Confucianism. In the past fifty years, a fourth component surfaced in almost every village: a cemetery-memorial to bury and honor the villagers who have sacrificed their lives for the country.

Since the majority of villagers are peasants, life in the countryside centers around the agricultural cycle, which starts about a month before the first monsoonal rains and ends with the drying of the unhusked rice. In certain areas, the weather and the fertility of the land permitting, that cycle repeats itself once or even twice. Rural people can afford few days of rest. All celebrate the three days of Tet, the lunar New Year. Another two or three days' rest occurs on the birth or death day of the deity who is worshipped in the *dinh*; in celebration, games, competitions, races, and theatrical performances are organized.

Cities, such as Hanoi, the present capital, and Hue, that of the Nguyen dynasty in the nineteenth century, were rare phenomena in the past. Many of the more modern cities, like Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon), Da Nang, and Can Tho are products of the modernization process that took place during the French colonial period.

Economy

Vietnam is classified as a developing country, and the average annual income of its citizens remains among the lowest in the world (\$333 in 1998). The economic development of Vietnam suffers from three serious impediments. During the time they controlled Vietnam, the French developed only those economic sectors that brought profit to the French themselves; long wars have marred recent history; and a decade of unfortunate postwar socialist experimentation with a centralized economy has left deep scars. Since 1986 the government has adopted a new policy called *doi moi* (renovation), which replaced a planned economy with a market economy, allowed private ownership of the means of production, and encouraged private investments from all sources. Since then, Vietnam has become an exporter of rice, and the economic growth stood for many years at around 10 percent until it was drastically reduced by the Asian economic crisis of the mid-1990s.

The Future

Due to the tight control the government exercises over foreign investments, Vietnam suffered only mildly from that crisis. By 1998, the situation had remarkably improved, with an increase in the production of crude oil and some agricultural products such as rice, pepper, and coffee. A bilateral trade agreement with the United States that took effect in 2001 will facilitate the importation of Vietnamese goods into the huge American market and thereby ease the pains of a growing economy in the time of globalization.

Truong Buu Lam

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VIETNAM-ECONOMIC SYSTEM Vietnam is a poor, densely populated country, whose economy is based on agriculture—primarily wet rice cultivation. More than 80 percent of the country's 80 million people are engaged in farming. There have been numerous attempts to industrialize, but the country's infrastructure was devastated after decades of war, while aid was wasted due to poor economic planning.

Post-World War II

In 1945, Vietnam inherited an economy from the French that was poor, underdeveloped with a weak infrastructure, woefully exploited, and geared to serving the colonial regime. The French, who had colonized Vietnam from the 1860s, had changed landholding patterns, creating millions of landless peasants and day laborers who worked on French-owned plantations, and had imposed taxes and corvée duty that kept the peasantry in a cycle of indebtedness. State monopolies and limited attempts to industrialize also distorted the economy, which was then shattered by nine years of anticolonial war between 1946 and 1954.

Following the 1954 Geneva Peace Accords that saw Vietnam divided into two halves at the seventeenth parallel, the two competing regimes implemented substantially different economic policies. In North Vietnam, the Communist regime under the Lao Dong Party (LDP) began to socialize the economy rapidly. In the countryside, the LDP implemented a two-phase land reform program to radically redistribute land and abolish landlordism. The implementation of this policy was marked by mass violence as class labels were applied. After two years, massive peasant unrest caused the party to slow down the implementation of land reform. Despite an increase in the amount of collectivized land, per-capita agricultural output actually fell. The state monopolized the harvest and marketing of the rice, paying the peasantry below-market prices for their crops, so that the urban proletariat could receive subsidized food.

The urban economy of the north was also socialized through a strategy of Stalinist industrialization. Private enterprise was abolished, trade was monopolized by the state, and the north began a process of heavy industrialization with massive amounts of Chinese and Soviet aid. Between 1955 and 1965, North Vietnam received \$457 million and \$364 million in Chinese and Soviet aid, respectively. Central economic planning was adopted and the country was put on Soviet-style five-year plans. The fact that all economic resources were directed to the war against U.S.-backed South Vietnam, especially after 1963, caused terrible economic dislocations and massive shortages.

In South Vietnam, the economy was a quasi-capitalist system. Unlike North Vietnam, land in South Vietnam was inequitably distributed, which infuriated the peasants who supported the communist-backed Viet Cong National Liberation Front (NLF), which promised land reform. The South Vietnamese regime's base of support came from the landlord class, which resisted land reform, and the peasants suffered under absentee landlordism, high rates of landlessness, and high taxation.

The South Vietnamese regime was increasingly dependent on U.S. economic aid, which by 1963 amounted to more than \$1 billion. But unlike North Vietnam, South Vietnam invested little of that aid in industrialization; the economy remained overwhelmingly agrarian. As in the North, the war caused massive dislocations. The government became increasingly dependent on U.S. aid, having lost much of its own revenue. The economy was also racked by inflation and smuggling, and was dominated by an enormous black market.



Much of Vietnam's farming still relies on human labor and manual tools. In 2000, two women irrigate their rice field with water transferred from a canal with a wooden paddle irrigator. (AFP/CORBIS)

Reunification of the Two Vietnams

Following reunification under North Vietnam in 1976, Hanoi decided to socialize the southern economy rapidly: private enterprise was abolished; land was collectivized; and wholesale, retail, and foreign trade were nationalized. The ethnic Chinese, who dominated the South Vietnamese commercial sector, were persecuted and fled en masse. Additionally, radical currency reform wiped out capital holdings. There was a postwar economic malaise following the loss of Chinese aid in 1978, the imposition of an international trade embargo after Vietnam's December 1978 invasion of Cambodia, and the huge domestic expenditures (amounting to one-third of Vietnam's budget) for the Cambodian occupation.

Although Vietnam joined the Soviet-led trade block, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), in 1978 and received approximately \$1 billion in Soviet economic aid annually during the 1980s, much of the aid was wasted, and the country suffered huge trade deficits. The leadership believed that the collectivization of agriculture in the South would lead to net gains in output, but there were food shortages, as output could not keep pace with the postwar baby boom. In 1982 agriculture in the South was decollectivized, and Hanoi began to experiment with Chinese-style agricultural production contracts. In 1986 the country was wracked by triple-digit inflation and food shortages.

The sixth party congress of December 1986 adopted an economic reform program known as *doi moi*, or renovation. Agriculture was completely decollectivized, and fifteen-year contracts for individual production units were granted. As a result, Vietnam went from a net importer of rice to the world's third

largest exporter within two years, between 1986–1988. Vietnam also became the world's second largest producer of coffee robusta. Market forces were introduced and central planning was eliminated for all but essential commodities. Vietnam rejected a model of heavy industrialization in favor of sectors in which its economy had a comparative advantage: agricultural commodities (rice, coffee, rubber), natural resource (oil and natural gas) exploitation, and labor-intensive manufacturing. The labor market was freed up. Foreign investment was courted, and the government began to market the country as an offshore center for manufacturing. Currency reform eliminated the inflationary forces caused by an overvalued currency and the black market. Having withdrawn from Cambodia in 1989, Hanoi began to renew ties with the international community. Embargoes were eased, and bilateral and multilateral lending and development assistance resumed. This was essential, because Hanoi lost all Soviet aid and subsidies by 1991.

The Vietnamese economy slowed down by the mid-1990s, hampered by its half-capitalist, half-socialist system. Vietnamese authorities slowed implementation of the structural reforms needed to revitalize the economy and produce more competitive, export-driven industries. Although the government had embarked on reforming woefully inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and had pledged to shut some down, eliminate subsidies, and equitize other SOEs, it failed to implement a comprehensive solution. Although there are now only 5,300 SOEs, down from 12,000, they remain a terrible burden on the economy. Privatization of state enterprises remains bogged down in political controversy, while the country's dynamic private sector is denied both financing and access to markets. There is concern over high rates of unemployment. Complicating SOE reforms is a banking crisis, brought on by triangular debts and nonperforming loans. In addition, the revenue base remains small and tax collection sporadic.

The Asian Economic Crisis that began in August 1997 was a serious blow to the Vietnamese economy. Some 60 percent of Vietnam's exports went to Asian states, but with the sharp decline in the currencies of neighboring countries, Vietnam faced greater competition from its neighbors. Its gross domestic product (GDP), which grew by 8.5 percent in 1997, fell to 4 percent in 1998 and rose slightly to an estimated 4.8 percent in 1999.

Refusal to liberalize trade has led to smuggling and huge trade deficits. In October 2000 Vietnam signed a bilateral trade agreement with the United States that greatly liberalizes the Vietnamese trade regime, ends

state subsidies, and paves the way for Hanoi's entry into the World Trade Organization.

The initial reforms that decollectivized agriculture greatly improved the standard of living in the countryside; beginning in the late 1990s, however, there was widespread unrest as a result of corruption, inequitable distribution of land, and the many new taxes and fees. Despite the early gains of the reform program that saw a rise in agricultural production and incomes, these gains have leveled off, and the country is now confronted with a rapidly rising urban-rural income gap. As a result, there is both increased tension as well as a rapid rise in urban migration. Although the economy grew at an average 6.7 percent annually in the 1990s, Vietnam remains one of the least developed countries in the world.

Zachary Abuza

See also: **Doi Moi; Mekong Project; New Economic Zones**

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VIETNAM-EDUCATION SYSTEM Since Vietnam was occupied by China between 111 BCE and 939 CE, the Vietnamese education system was initially developed resembling the Chinese hierarchic Confucian examination system. This system mainly served for the recruitment of loyal civil servants, who were trained according to Confucian morals and ethics. The main educational content of the system was taken from the Chinese Five Classics (*Yi jing*, or Classic of Changes; *Shu jing*, or Classic of History; *Li ji*, or Book of Rites; *Shi jing*, or Classic of Poetry; and *Chunqiu*, or Spring and Autumn Annals), and the Confucian Four Books (*Da xue*, or Great Teaching; *Zhong yong*, or Doctrine of the Mean; the Analects, and *Mengzi*, or Mencius.) However, Mahayana Buddhism also had some important influence on the system.

Because the Vietnamese language originally lacked its own script, the civil-service examination system used Chinese characters as a teaching and learning medium. During the thirteenth century, Vietnamese scholars developed the first national script system (*nom*), which, while based on Chinese characters, was

built around the Vietnamese pronunciation of words. However, this script did not spread among the common population, because it demanded extensive knowledge of written Chinese. In the sixteenth century, Christian Portuguese and French missionaries arrived in Vietnam and later developed the currently used *quoc ngu* script, which uses Latin alphabet with diacritical signs. During colonial occupation, the French proclaimed Vietnamese, written in *quoc ngu*, and French the two official languages.

Education in the Colonial Period

After several changes, the colonial education system eventually comprised three years of elementary school (*certificat d'études élémentaire indigène*), three years of primary school (*certificat d'études primaires franco-indigène*), four years of complementary primary school (*diplôme d'études primaires supérieurs franco-indigène*), and three years of secondary school (*baccalauréat local*). Serving the extensive needs of the colonial government for low-paid civil servants, the colonial education system focused on practical training and on the acquisition of the French language. In addition, although the final official Confucian examinations were held in 1918, during most of the colonial period traditional Confucian instruction continued to exist, as did Buddhist education, provided for future monks.

Education in the Two Vietnams

During the separation of the country between 1954 and 1975, two different education systems developed. In the North, President Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969) launched large literacy campaigns that were highly successful. Educational reforms were aimed at establishing a socialist education system, modeled on the Soviet model. The school system was composed of nine (later ten) years of schooling in total (4-3-2, later 4-3-3). Various vocational secondary schools and training centers developed that provided personnel for lower-level careers in the state sector. Higher education was provided by highly specialized, small-enrollment universities, polytechnical universities, and colleges. Postgraduate education was mainly conducted in the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Education was organized by five- and one-year state plans and served the national demand for qualified labor. After graduation, students were directly transferred to diverse positions in the state sector.

In the South, a twelve-year system was promoted by the government. Vocational secondary schools, vocational training centers, and on-the-job training

opportunities were established to serve the labor market. Universities such as the universities of Saigon and Can Tho, as well as colleges, developed on the American model.

Education after Reunification

Vietnam was reunified in 1975, and the third education reform was initiated in 1979. Efforts were undertaken to unify the two different school systems and to establish a national education system according to the principles of free education for all, polytechnical education following the socialist model, and priority for socialist ideology and practical work in all teaching curricula. This brought about the closing of approximately 2,500 private educational establishments in the South. Higher-education students were selected according to their personal curriculum vitae and social origin, and student exchange programs were almost exclusively organized with countries from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Foreign-language teaching focused on Russian and German.

Since the official promulgation of the *doi moi* ("renovation") reform policy program in 1986 the national education system has adapted to new circumstances. Today it is composed of the following components: public kindergarten establishments, which serve children from three months to four years, public preschools for children of at least five years of age, public primary schools for children between six and ten (five years' duration), public lower secondary schools for children between eleven and fourteen (four years' duration), vocational training centers at lower secondary level (under one year's duration), upper secondary schools for students between fifteen and seventeen, secondary vocational schools at the upper secondary level (three to four years' duration), secondary technical schools at upper secondary level (three to four years' duration), and vocational training centers at upper secondary level (one to two years' duration). In addition, different opportunities for on-the-job training courses are offered by the labor market. Higher education is composed of universities (three to six years' duration) and colleges (two to four years' duration). Written and oral examinations are held to transfer pupils from one level to the next, and final examinations after grade 12 are followed by entrance examinations to universities and colleges. Postgraduate education consists of master and doctoral programs.

When the Sixth Party Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party liberalized the economy and proclaimed more market-oriented reform measures, one of the immediate consequences was a decline in education

at all levels. Income-raising opportunities forced people to decide between children's contribution to the family income or education. In addition, there were educational reform measures, which reflected the overall transition to a multisector economy. The reform measures can be grouped into five categories: the diversification of financial resources, efforts to internationalize the education system through reform of the structural organization of higher education, the withdrawal of the state-promoted plans for the decentralization of decision making in Vietnamese education, an overall increase in legal documents accompanying the transformation and culminating in the promulgation of the first national education law in 1999, and methods of encouraging the development of educational elites, which resulted in the reestablishment of schools and classes for especially gifted students.

These transformation processes were paralleled by trends among the general public. The trends include making extensive efforts and investment to gain additional instruction and preparation for their offspring to improve their chances for a future career (including sacrifices to allow their children to study overseas in other Southeast Asian nations, Australia, the United States, and Europe); educational stratification resulting from the overall differentiation of income structures, especially between urban and rural areas; reorientation of students in their choices of disciplines (preferences for English, Chinese, communication technology, computer sciences, law, economics, public administration, and so forth); a change in values and increased popularity of diplomas and certificates; and brain drain from higher education toward higher-paying jobs in the developing market economy.

Ursula Nguyen

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VIETNAM-HISTORY The creation myth of the Vietnamese people places their founding in the northern sector of the Indochinese peninsula. Lac Long Quan (the Dragon) and Au Co (the Immortal) were said to have engendered the founders of the Vietnamese nation in the form of the eighteen Hung kings of the Hong Bang dynasty, which reigned over Van Lang (Vietnam) from 2879 to 258 BCE. The rule of this dynasty stretched from the end of the Neolithic period through the civilization of Dong Son, with its famously decorated bronze drums, down to the Iron Age.

In 258 BCE, the legendary King An Duong was able to overthrow the last Hung king because he used

weapons—mainly arrowheads—made of bronze and iron. The effectiveness of these weapons was said to have been increased a thousand times by a magic claw given to King An Duong by a local deity, the Golden Turtle, and his country, now renamed Au Lac, became impregnable.

Chinese Influence

According to legend, Qin Shi Huang Di (c.259–210 BCE), the emperor who unified China, sent one of his generals, Zhao Tuo, to invade Au Lac toward the end of the third century BCE. Zhao Tuo, however, remained powerless against the magic claw held by



KEY EVENTS IN VIETNAM'S HISTORY

- 2879-258 BCE** The Hong Bang dynasty rules Van Lang Vietnam.
- 258 BCE** Legendary King An Duong overthrows the last Hung king and establishes the state of Au Lac.
- 207 BCE** The Sino-Vietnamese kingdom of Nam Viet (in Chinese, Nan Yueh) is formed in the north.
- 111 BCE** Nan Viet is annexed by the Chinese Han dynasty.
- 939 CE** Vietnam regain its independence from China.
- 13th century** Parts of Vietnam come under Mongol control, although Mongol influence is limited.
- 15th century** China annexes Vietnam.
- 1427** Le Loi expels the Chinese and founds the Le dynasty, which presides over Vietnam at least in name until 1791.
- 1771** The leaders of Tay Son (southern Vietnam) initiate a popular uprising against the north and take control of the nation.
- 1861** The French seize Saigon and by 1883 occupy all of Vietnam.
- 1941** The Communist Party and other political organizations form the Viet Minh, a guerrilla force whose aim is to expel both the French and Japanese from Vietnam.
- 1945** The Viet Minh launches the August Revolution, seizes power throughout Vietnam, and founds the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
- 1946-1954** The French Indochina War which ends with French withdrawal from the region.
- 1955** The Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) is created and Vietnam is drawn into the Cold War, with the Soviet Union supporting the north and the United States the south.
- 1960** Opponents of the Republic of Vietnam form the National Front of Liberation (NLF) of South Vietnam, whose aim is the overthrow the RVN government.
- c.1965-1973** The United States conducts the Vietnam War which ends with the withdrawal of U.S. troops.
- 1975** The Vietnam War ends in Vietnam when the south surrenders to the north and the nation is unified in 1976 as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
- 1986** The government adopts the *doi moi* (renovation) policy which establishes a market economy that welcomes foreign investments.



FRANCE TAKES CONTROL IN VIETNAM

The Treaty of Alliance and Peace of 15 March 1874 extracted below formalized French control of much of mainland Southeast Asia including Vietnam.

Article 2. His Excellency, the President of the French Republic, recognizing the sovereignty of the King of Annam and his complete independence in regard to any foreign power whatsoever, promises him aid and assistance and engages to give him, on request and freely, the support necessary to maintain order and tranquility in his States, to defend himself against all attacks, and to destroy the piracy which desolates a part of the coasts of the Kingdom.

Article 3. In acknowledgement of this protection, His Majesty the King of Annam engages to make his foreign policy conform to that of France and to change nothing in his present diplomatic relations.

This political engagement does not extend to commercial treaties. But in any case, His Majesty the King of Annam cannot make with any nation whatsoever a commercial treaty in disagreement with that concluded between France and the Kingdom of Annam, and without having informed the French government beforehand.

Article 5. His Majesty the King of Annam recognizes the full and complete sovereignty of France over all the territory currently occupied by France and including the following frontiers:

To the east, the China Sea and the Kingdom of Annam (Binh-Thuan Province);

To the west, the Gulf of Siam;

To the south, the China Sea;

To the north, the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Kingdom of Annam (Binh-Thuan Province) . . .

Source: John M. Maki, ed. (1957) *Selected Documents Far Eastern International Relations (1689–1951)*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 50.

King An Dong until he married his son to one of King An Duong's daughters. The son-in-law quickly stole the device, and Zhao Tuo easily defeated King An Duong. Zhao Tuo then combined Au Lac with his own territory to form the kingdom of Nam Viet (in Chinese, Nan Yue) in 207 BCE. Subsequently, the rulers of the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) annexed Zhao's kingdom into the Chinese empire in 111 BCE. Vietnam was not to regain its independence until 939 CE.

Throughout the thousand years of Chinese rule, there were frequent independence struggles; some were successful for short periods, others resulted in ut-

ter failure. The decisive battles against China's colonial control began in the beginning of the tenth century; they were fought by Vietnamese local officials. The struggle culminated in 938 with the naval victory on the Bach Dang River scored by Ngo Quyen over the fleet of the Nan Han Kingdom of southern China, which was the then suzerain of Vietnam. In the following year, Ngo Quyen proclaimed himself king and thereby inaugurated the monarchical tradition for a newly established kingdom that was independent from China. From then on, Vietnamese leaders endeavored to differentiate themselves from the Chinese and to nurture a culture that, although deeply influenced by

China, was Vietnamese. They wanted the Chinese authorities to renounce their conviction that Vietnam was an integral part of China's national territory.

In the eleventh century, while fighting the invading armies of the Chinese Song dynasty (960–1267), which sought to reincorporate Vietnam into the Chinese empire, a Vietnamese general of the Ly dynasty (1010–1225) fired up the emotions of his troops by reciting to them a song that, while establishing a separate destiny for Vietnam, asked also the fateful question: "How dare those foreigners come to invade our country?" In the thirteenth century, Mongol armies came to occupy parts of Vietnam. A harmonious relationship between the Tran monarchy (1225–1400), the army, and the people allowed Vietnam to successfully repel repeated attacks by the invader. In the beginning of the fifteenth century, the Chinese, now under the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), once again annexed Vietnam. In 1427, after ten years of resistance, Le Loi (d.1443) expelled all Chinese occupiers to inaugurate the Le dynasty, which presided over the destinies of Vietnam, at least in name, until 1791.

Internal Factionalism

The decline of the Le began with the sixteenth century. The Trinh and Nguyen families gained increasing ascendancy over the Le emperor, who finally became a mere puppet. The two factions soon confronted each other; weaker, the Nguyen petitioned the emperor in 1558 to be sent to govern the southern part of Vietnam. In 1627, the Trinh-*Nguyen* rivalry broke out into open warfare, and after fifty years of indecisive battles, they resigned themselves to coexistence on opposite sides of the Gianh River, approximately at the seventeenth parallel.

From the village of Tay Son, southern Vietnam, three brothers, Nguyen Nhac, Nguyen Hue and Nguyen Lu, set in motion one of the mightiest popular uprisings, starting around 1771. After overpowering the ruling *Nguyen* family faction, they turned their weapons against the *Trinh*. The Le emperor fled to China, and, on the pretext of reinstating him on his throne, the emperor of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) ordered the invasion of Vietnam. In 1789, the Tay Son army took Hanoi by surprise and routed the Chinese expeditionary corps, which it found still blithely indulging in the New Year festivities. The Tay Son reign was not to be a long dynasty, however. The sole survivor of the former *Nguyen* lords of the south regained rapid control of Vietnam, and in 1802 he founded the last dynasty and transferred his capital to Hue.

European Colonialism

The *Nguyen* came to power at a time when European colonialism was experiencing a revival of interest in Asia. In 1861, the French seized Saigon. In 1882, they took Hanoi, and from there they spread out to occupy all of Vietnam a year later.

As with the Chinese period, the French colonial times were fraught with uprisings and rebellions. The pre-1930 anti-French struggles all ended in failures. Finally, the Vietnam Nationalist Party (*Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang*, commonly referred to as the *VNQDD*), organized along the same principles as Sun Yat Sen's Nationalist Party in China and composed mainly of the new western-educated middle class, and the *Dong Duong Cong San Dang*, or Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), which counted among its members a great number of peasants and workers, discovered that they had to organize far more thoroughly before they could hope to threaten the colonial master.

During World War II, the colonial administration in Indochina managed to keep its authority while accommodating a small contingent of Japanese occupation troops in Indochina for five years. In the meantime, in 1941 the ICP led various national organizations in the formation in southern China of the *Viet Minh*, a guerrilla force whose aim was to expel both the French and Japanese from Vietnam. Two days after the Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945, the *Viet Minh* launched the August Revolution, which allowed it, less than a fortnight later, to seize power throughout Vietnam. On 2 September 1945 in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969), the leader of the ICP and of the *Viet Minh*, proclaimed the independence of his country and the founding of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)

The government set up by the *Viet Minh* was not to enjoy independence for long. The French were determined to reconquer their Indochinese colonial empire, and war broke out in December 1946, to end only in 1954 with the signing of the Geneva Accords that divided Vietnam into two temporary zones.

In violation of the Geneva Accords, elections were not held in 1956 for the reunification of the two zones, which had meanwhile become embroiled in the global Cold War between the Soviet Union, which supported the DRV, and the anti-Communist bloc led by the United States, which buttressed the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) it helped to create in 1955. The RVN quickly spawned a totalitarian, corrupt government. In December 1960, opponents of the RVN gathered together to form, with the active cooperation of the



VIETNAM HISTORY

In August 1945 the Viet Minh launched the August Revolution to free Vietnam from French and Japanese rule. That September, Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnam's independence in a formal Declaration of Independence, extracts of which are provided below.

For more than eighty years the French imperialists, abusing their "liberty, equality, and fraternity," have violated the land of our ancestors and oppressed our countrymen. Their acts are contrary to the ideals of humanity and justice.

In the political domain, they have deprived us of all our liberties. . . .

In the economic domain, they have exploited us without respite, reduced our people to the blackest misery and pitilessly looted our country. . . .

In the autumn of 1940 when the Japanese Fascists, with a view to fighting the Allies, invaded Indochina to organize new war bases, the French imperialists, on their knees, surrendered our country. . . .

For these reasons we, members of the Provisional Government, representing the entire population of Viet Nam, declare that we shall henceforth have no relations with imperialist France, that we cancel all treaties which France has signed on the subject of Viet Nam, that we abolish all the privileges which the French have arrogated to themselves in our territory. . . .

Viet Nam has the right to be free and independent and is, in fact, free and independent. All the people of Viet Nam are determined to mobilize all their spiritual and material strength, to sacrifice their lives and property, to safeguard their right to liberty and independence.

Hanoi

Signed: Ho Chi Minh, President

September 2, 1945

[Fourteen additional signatures]

Source: Harold M. Isaacs (1945) *New Cycle in Asia*, as translated from *La République*, No. 1 (1 October): 163–165.

DRV, the National Front of Liberation (NLF) of South Vietnam, whose aim was to overthrow the RVN government. The NLF soon launched armed attacks against the government, and the movement grew rapidly to present a formidable challenge. After the failure of massive economic, technical, and military aid, the United States came to the aid of the RVN with more than half a million of its own troops. The United States thereby made itself a party in what, in the view of many, had been essentially a civil war and, by the same token, gave the people who fought against

the RVN an age-old incentive, that of a struggle against foreign intervention.

Unification

The war ended in 1973 for the United States when it signed a treaty with the DRV committing itself to withdraw its troops from Vietnam. For Vietnam, the war ended only in 1975 when troops of the NLF and the DRV entered Saigon to receive the RVN's surrender from the hands of its last president. In 1976,

the National Assembly, composed of newly elected representatives, voted to unify the country, now called the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and placed under the firm control of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

The building of socialism did not succeed because the economic situation went from bad to worse, until the government decided, in 1986, to apply the policy of *doi moi* (renovation). *Doi moi* did away with the planned and supposedly self-sufficient economy in which all enterprises had been under the control of the state and established in its place a market economy that welcomed foreign investments and allowed the formation of private enterprises, with the aim of eradicating poverty and backwardness. Many problems still beset the development of the country, and today, after more than sixteen years under the renovation regime, Vietnam remains one of the poorest countries in the world.

Truong Buu Lam

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VIETNAM—INTERNAL MIGRATION

The emperors of Vietnam's Nguyen dynasty (1802–1955) used resettlement policies to secure both population and territory. The French colonial authorities, whose presence in Vietnam lasted from 1859 to 1954, tried and failed to do so. After independence (1954), the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) established a migration program, extending it to the south after the country's reunification (1975). Over four decades, 5 million inhabitants of the plains were relocated into highland and border areas. One million people moved from the cities of the south after 1975. The program has transformed the highlands and influenced the pace of urban development.

Internal Migration under the Nguyen Dynasty

The emperors of the Nguyen dynasty realized ambitious resettlement policies. Prisoners and vagabonds were exiled to the south and to Cambodia, where they joined soldiers and migrant farmers on military farms, clearing land, founding villages, and guarding the frontier. These policies predated the Nguyen rulers by many centuries: the Ly (1010–1225), Tran (1225–

1400/1414) and Le (1428–1788) emperors consolidated their conquests of Champa and Cambodia by promoting migration. The present shape of Vietnam, formed from one thousand years of southward expansion, owes much to these policies.

Internal Migration under the French

The expansion of settlement continued under the French colonial administration after 1859. Construction of canals attracted spontaneous settlers to the western Mekong Delta. Programs of organized migration provided labor for economic development. Laborers moved to build railways in the north and work plantations in the south and Cambodia. Land grants were made to settlers in the northern hills. Yet owing to competing objectives in the colonial administration, few of these initiatives enjoyed sustained success, and the independence war (1946–1954) ended them. The Geneva Agreement (1954) divided the country in two, confronting Vietnamese with the choice between residence in the north, under Communist rule, or the south, which became the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). This agreement created the largest internal migration in Vietnam's history. One million people opted to go south, and about 140,000 moved north.

There was little policy continuity between colonial and postcolonial administrations. After independence, the RVN's resettlement policy was led by the imperatives of nationalism and war, while the DRV's program was modeled on Soviet experiences of collective farming and drew from the lessons of the precolonial past.

Under the DRV, resettlement was organized in two directions. Lowlanders headed to the hills, to develop sparsely populated regions. Urban folk headed to the countryside, in implementation of the socialist model of limited urban development. Planned economic development was one purpose of the program. With the country divided, national security also became an important objective of resettlement policy. The highlands were filled with "loyal" lowlanders, while potentially turbulent cities were restricted in their growth. Both policies were extended after U.S. bombing started (1965), as the population's security depended on dispersal. The policies persisted after reunification, as the borders were attacked from Cambodia and China, and internal security was threatened by ethnic insurgency in the Central Highlands and dissatisfaction in southern cities.

Development of the Settlement Model

The settlement model evolved gradually. From 1954, plantations became state farms. These large-scale

collective enterprises were used widely in agriculture and forestry, sometimes run by the army in a model reminiscent of precolonial military farms. From 1960, lowland villagers established cooperatives in the hills. From 1968, ethnic-minority highlanders were persuaded to abandon slash-and-burn farming, which required large areas of land for extensive cultivation. The policy, known as sedentarization (*dinh canh dinh cu*), aimed to bring the minorities under closer state control while making space for the newcomers. In the 1970s, district towns became a focus for local government and economic activity. Areas in which this four-prong model were used came to be known as New Economic Zones (NEZs). An NEZ consisted of migrant cooperatives, settled minority villages, and a district town, under the leadership of a state farm or forestry enterprise. The NEZ model transformed the Central Highlands after reunification, replacing the land development and strategic hamlet policies initiated in the 1950s by the RVN and disrupted by the war.

The migrants formed two communities, by their origin and the method of their recruitment. On the one hand, mobilization teams motivated village migrants with talk of patriotism and economic progress. On the other, inhabitants of the southern cities were required, under post-reunification policy, to return to their villages or move to NEZs, with very little choice in the matter. Recruitment in both contexts was enforced by a system of household registration, whereby essential goods and services were available only in a registered place of residence. Cutting registration created an incentive for departure, but could not ensure settlement on arrival. More than 50 percent of migrants abandoned their NEZ, moving back to the village or city from which they had come, drifting elsewhere, or joining the boat people exodus of the 1980s.

Internal Migration in the Reform Era

Economic reform in the 1980s changed the dynamics of migration. The resettlement program remained, but people's economic survival no longer depended on their household registration. Free migrants headed to the cities (in search of work) and the highlands (in search of land). While registration requirements in the cities limited urban growth, there were no restrictions in the hills. Settlers planted coffee and other commercial crops, which now found markets within Vietnam and abroad. By creating networks between previous migrants and inhabitants of the plains, the resettlement program facilitated a new, uncontrolled movement of spontaneous migration, especially to the Central Highlands, where people could

take advantage of market reforms to grow and sell coffee and other cash crops.

Results of Internal Migration

Population resettlement has changed both the cities and the highlands. Vietnam's urban population remains low, and neither Hanoi nor Ho Chi Minh City may be compared with the metropolis cities of Bangkok, Manila, or Jakarta. Meanwhile, the highland population has grown rapidly. Networks of roads and towns now service a population of migrants from the plains. Forests have given way to farms. In the northern highlands, environmental stress caused by population pressure (itself caused by previous decades' resettlement programs) has provoked migration to the Central Highlands, which will experience environmental difficulties in the years to come. And the highlanders, now minorities in their own provinces, have responded by joining the national economy, retreating to remote regions, converting to Protestantism, or organizing peaceful protests against the loss of their land. All four reactions are the signs of the migration program's achievement of its long-term objectives. Intended to transform these forested havens of insurgency and underdevelopment, resettlement has brought about widespread economic, social, and landscape change in the highlands. As a result, and in spite of the strains, these outlying regions are now integrating into the Vietnamese nation.

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VIETNAM—POLITICAL SYSTEM In order to put Vietnam's current political system in perspective, it is helpful to consider briefly the political systems that were in use prior to Vietnam's reunification in 1975. The political system of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam, 1955–1975) was quite different from that of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam, 1945–1975).

Republic of Vietnam (1955–1975)

After French colonial forces were defeated in the First Indochina War (1946–1954), Vietnam was partitioned along the seventeenth parallel, the north under the control of Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969) and the Communists, the south under the U.S.-supported Ngo Dinh Diem, an intellectual Christian who was appointed president of South Vietnam in October 1955. He was considered a nationalist intent on eradicating the Communists in the North. Diem won initial respect from the public and the United States by subduing the South's various military factions and religious sects that were threatening to overthrow the government. His 1959 land reform policy was seen as inequitable, however, and he soon lost his popularity.

Furthermore, Diem's government was characterized by nepotism. His eldest brother, Ngo Dinh Thuc, was a Roman Catholic bishop, and as such wielded considerable power. Another brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, became Diem's special adviser. The youngest brother, Ngo Dinh Can, exercised political control in central Vietnam. Moreover, Nhu's wife, Le Xuan, was also involved in political and social activities. As Diem and his family used military power to suppress political and religious protests, the United States began losing interest in supporting him.

On 1 November 1963, Diem and Nhu were killed in a conspiracy led by General Duong Van Minh.

Minh was not capable of maintaining his paramount position for long, however, and was succeeded by Nguyen Khanh in January 1964. The military regime that General Minh set up was more compliant with U.S. interests, but faced protest from religious groups, interest groups, and political activists, and Minh lost control over South Vietnam in less than a year. General Nguyen Cao Ky and his comrade General Nguyen Van Thieu seized power in February 1965, and maintained military rule over the South until 1975.

Democratic Republic of Vietnam (1945)

The political situation in the North was equally chaotic. On 25 August 1945, Bao Dai (1913–1997), the last Emperor of Vietnam, reluctantly handed over the



The mausoleum of Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi. His body is preserved in a glass sarcophagus inside. (STEVE RAYMER/CORBIS)

imperial seal and symbolic golden sword to the National Liberation Committee headed by the Communists. On 2 September 1945, Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnam's independence and announced the birth of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Not many countries recognized it, however, and Ho failed to gain support from the United States and other Western countries. He was forced to fight the French, who wanted to reassert their colonial authority. Although he defeated them at the battle of Dien Bien Phu (1954), he failed to gain control of the South.

Socialist Republic of Vietnam (from 1975)

On 30 April 1975, North Vietnamese forces took control of Saigon. With reunification, the South came under the rule of the central government. Since then, Vietnam's politics have been dominated by the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), whose ideology closely follows Marxist-Leninist doctrines and Ho Chi Minh's thoughts.



PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF VIETNAM

Adopted 2 July 1976 (revised 1992)

In the course of their millennia-old history, the Vietnamese people, working diligently, creatively, and fighting courageously to build their country and defend it, have forged a tradition of unity, humanity, uprightness, perseverance and indomitableness for their nation and have created Vietnamese civilisation and culture.

Starting in 1930, under the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam formed and trained by President Ho Chi Minh, they waged a protracted revolutionary struggle full of hardships and sacrifices, resulting in the triumph of the August Revolution. On 2 September 1945, President Ho Chi Minh read the Declaration of Independence and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam came into existence. In the following decades, the people of all nationalities in our country conducted an uninterrupted struggle with the precious assistance of friends throughout the world, especially the socialist countries and the neighbouring countries, achieved resounding exploits, the most outstanding ones being the historic Dien Bien Phu and Ho Chi Minh campaigns, defeated the two wars of aggression by the colonialists and the imperialists, liberated the country, reunified the motherland, and brought to completion the people's national democratic revolution. On 2 July 1976, the National Assembly of reunified Vietnam decided to change the country's name to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam; the country entered a period of transition to socialism, strove for national construction, and unyieldingly defended its frontiers while fulfilling its internationalist duty.

In successive periods of resistance war and national construction, our country adopted the 1946, 1959, and 1980 Constitutions.

Starting in 1986, a comprehensive national renewal advocated by the 6th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam has achieved very important initial results. The National Assembly has decided to revise the 1980 Constitution in response to the requirements of the new situation and tasks.

This Constitution establishes our political regime economic system, social and cultural institutions; it deals with our national defence and security, the fundamental rights and duties of the citizen, the structure and principles regarding the organisation and activity of State organs; it institutionalises the relationship between the Party as leader, the people as master, and the State as administrator.

In the light of Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh's thought, carrying into effect the Programme of national construction in the period of transition to socialism, the Vietnamese people vow to unite millions as one, uphold the spirit of self-reliance in building the country, carry out a foreign policy of independence, sovereignty, peace, friendship and cooperation with all nations, strictly abide by the Constitution, and win ever greater successes in their effort to renovate, build and defend their motherland.

Source: Government of Vietnam. Retrieved 8 March 2002, from: <http://home.vnn.vn/english/government/constitution/preamble.html>

The new Constitution of Vietnam was issued on 15 April 1992. All people eighteen years of age or older have the right to vote, with the exception of criminals. Elections are held every five years at national, provincial, and local levels. Vietnam's government has three branches: legislative, executive, and judiciary. The Communist Party is effectively a "fourth branch," involved in all activities of the government.

Legislative Branch The unicameral National Assembly consists of 450 delegates elected in the general

election. It is the highest organ of the state and possesses both constitutional and legislative powers. It makes all decisions on domestic and foreign policies, sets socioeconomic goals, and deals with national defense and security issues.

Previously, only members of the Communist Party were qualified to stand for the election. However, since 1997 independent candidates have been eligible. In the latest election, in 1997, about 92 percent of the seats in the parliament were occupied by Communist

TABLE 1

The Cabinet in 1997	
Position	Name
Prime Minister	Phan Van Khai
First Deputy Prime Minister	Nguyen Tan Dung
Deputy Prime Minister	Nguyen Cong Tan
Deputy Prime Minister	Ngo Xuan Loc
Deputy Prime Minister	Nguyen Manh Cam
Deputy Prime Minister	Pham Gia Khiem
Other Ministers	(24 others)

Party members, with independent candidates holding the rest.

The National Assembly's Standing Committee is permanent and consists of the chairman (in 1999, Nong Duc Manh), the vice chairman, and members who are determined by the National Assembly. A member of the Standing Committee cannot occupy another position in the government.

The president of the National Assembly is elected by its members and serves a five-year term. As head of state, the president represents Vietnam both at home and in foreign countries. Tran Duc Luong was elected president on 25 September 1997. From 1992, the vice president has been Nguyen Thi Binh.

Executive Branch Vietnam has a parliamentary system in which a prime minister heads the cabinet. In actual fact, however, the general secretary of the Communist Party holds greater power, due to the nature of one-party government.

The president appoints the prime minister from among the members of the National Assembly. The prime minister then appoints the deputy prime ministers and other ministers.

Judicial Branch The legal system is based on the French civil law and consists of the Supreme People's Court, the Provincial Courts and the District People's Courts. The chief justice is nominated by the president and voted on by the National Assembly. Trinh Hong Duong has been the presiding judge since 1997. His term is for five years.

In addition, there is the Supreme People's Procuracy, which supervises and controls law enforcement at all levels of society, from the central government down to the individual citizen.

The one-party political system has been stable for a long time, though some fragmentation exists. With economic reform and Vietnam's integration into re-

gional and international organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), the political system is expected to become more open, transparent, and accountable.

Ha Huong

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VIETNAM COMMUNIST PARTY The origins of the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) date back to 1925 when Comintern official and Vietnamese nationalist leader Ho Chi Minh (1890-1969) founded the Revolutionary Youth League in southern China. Hobbled by factionalism, the group was defunct by May 1929. After uniting feuding Communist groups operating in southern China, Ho founded the Indochina Communist Party (ICP) in 1930. The group operated clandestinely, because French colonial authorities imprisoned many of its leaders. The ICP grew, however, into the preeminent anticolonial force in Indochina.

To widen the party's appeal, Ho created a broad nationalist united front, known as the Viet Minh, under the ICP's leadership in 1941. Viet Minh troops

waged a guerrilla war against the Japanese and Vichy French troops. Following Japan's surrender, Ho's Viet Minh marched into Hanoi and declared the founding of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) on 2 September 1945. To assuage fears that Communist forces would not dominate the new coalition government, Ho dissolved the ICP. With the return of French colonial forces and the breakdown of a series of negotiations in 1946, the Viet Minh began a guerrilla war, culminating in the 1954 defeat of French forces at Dien Bien Phu. Materially aided by the People's Republic of China after April 1950, the Viet Minh leadership was encouraged to restore the Communist Party. In February 1951, the Lao Dong Party (LDP) was founded.

Under Chinese, Soviet, and French pressure, the DRV accepted the temporary division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel as part of the Geneva Accords and anticipated winning nationwide elections in 1956–1957. The LDP was the sole political force in the north and began to implement a Communist political and economic system. The LDP's land reform program, implemented in two phases between 1954 and 1960, was particularly brutal and had a negative effect on production. At the advice of Chinese advisers, "people's courts" were established and "class labels" were applied to all members of society to aid identification and liquidation of the landlord class. Wide-scale violence and peasant unrest led the LDP to sack its general secretary and revise its policies. The LDP also imposed a strict system of control over its writers and artists, beginning in 1954.

In May 1959 the LDP Politburo authorized support for southern revolutionaries to defeat the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem (1901–1963). In 1963, the LDP ordered the infiltration of North Vietnamese troops into the south of the country. The LDP continued its policy to take over the south following Ho's death in 1969 and eventually negotiated peace with the United States in 1973. In 1974, the Politburo again ordered the use of force to take over the south. Formal reunification occurred in October 1976, at which point the LDP changed its name to the Vietnam Communist Party.

From 1976 to 1986, the VCP consolidated its rule but led the country into an economic malaise and diplomatic isolation, following the December 1978 intervention into Cambodia. In 1986 the party embarked on a radical course of economic reform, known as *doi moi*, or renovation, that had a positive impact on the economy. The decollectivization of agriculture caused Vietnam to go from being a net importer of rice to the world's third largest exporter of rice by 1988. Likewise, per capita GDP doubled in the first fifteen years

of the reform program. The VCP remains the sole legal party in Vietnam today. It is ruled by an 18-person Politburo and a 170-member central committee.

Zachary Abuza

See also: **Communism-Vietnam; Ho Chi Minh; Vietnam-Economic System; Vietnam-History; Vietnam-Political System**

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VIETNAM WAR From 1954 to 1975, America fought its longest and costliest war. The Vietnam War created massive disruption to Southeast Asia and massive turmoil in American society.

The Human Cost of War

The major product of war is the number of casualties: the killed, wounded, or missing in action (MIA). Although the numbers are tainted by exaggeration or error, the estimated total of military casualties from 1954 to 1975 was 1.75 million killed and at least 3 million wounded. By the end of the war, there were 10,173 captured and missing in action. Total civilian casualties for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia numbered well over 500,000. In addition, after the war thousands of Vietnamese died trying to flee Communist rule, and nearly 2 million Cambodians were killed by the Communist Khmer Rouge led by Pol Pot (c. 1925–1998).

American forces suffered 47,382 killed in action, 10,811 noncombatant deaths, 153,303 wounded in action (some 74,000 survived as amputees), and about 3,000 MIAs. (In April 1995 the U.S. Department of Defense listed 1,621 Americans missing in Vietnam and 2,207 for all of Southeast Asia.)

The greatest causes of deaths in the U.S. Army were small-arms fire (51 percent) and artillery shells, mor-

tar, and grenade fragments (35 percent). Twelve generals and eight women were killed in action. Seventy percent of all American enlisted casualties were twenty-one years of age or younger. African Americans and Hispanics suffered more casualties per enlistee than whites did.

Casualties for the Viet Minh (Communist irregulars) are undocumented. Allegedly, during the period of French control, 300,000 lost their lives in combat. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Phoenix program (1967–1972), which identified and eliminated the Viet Cong infrastructure in South Vietnam, claimed official responsibility for "neutralizing" 81,740 Communist cadres, of whom 26,369 were executed. General Vo Nguyen Giap (b. 1911), general and commander of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) from 1946 to 1972, estimated that 500,000 soldiers died in battles with Americans during the years from 1964 to 1969. The combined forces of the army of North Vietnam (the NVA) and the Viet Minh of South Vietnam in the Easter Offensive of March 1972 lost over 100,000 lives. The Americans estimated that 50,000 of these soldiers were killed by saturation bombing. Moreover, tens of thousands of Laos's Pathet Lao Communists and Cambodia's Khmer Rouge were killed in the secret bombings that began in 1969 and intensified in the joint South Vietnamese-American incursions into their territories in the early 1970s.

Background to the War

French colonization of Indochina—consisting of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos—began in 1859 with the capture of the city of Saigon, although the first French campaign (at Tourane/Danang) began in 1858. The termination of World War II introduced a worldwide period of anticolonial movements and wars. During the final months of the Pacific war, Japan occupied Indochina and turned it into a protectorate, ousting the French, who had still ruled it throughout most of the war. Upon Japan's surrender in August 1945, Indochina's independence became a geopolitical problem. On 25 September, Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969), a leader of the Indochinese independence movement, proclaimed the creation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). The United States and its allies agreed to send British troops to disarm the Japanese and obtain control of southern Vietnam and to send Chinese and French troops to administer postwar programs in the city of Hanoi. Soon the French were allowed to negotiate full control of Vietnam. In March 1946, the French declared Vietnam an independent state within the French union. In November 1946, with the French naval bombardment of

the seaport of Haiphong, the French challenged the authority of the DRV under the vague framework of the March agreement. This engagement launched the First Indochina War (1946–1954).

Ho Chi Minh and his Viet Minh troops retreated from Hanoi and launched a guerrilla war. Finally, in 1950, the anticolonial movement became integrated into the Cold War: The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China recognized Ho Chi Minh, and the United States and Britain recognized the French-sustained state of Vietnam. The United States reluctantly provided military and economic aid for the French pacification effort. President Eisenhower endorsed the Domino Theory, which predicted that the fall of one nation to Communism would result in the fall of other nations. The French made it clear that their support and participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization depended on Washington's support of France in Indochina. Consequently, France received 85 percent of its Indochinese budget from the United States.

In May 1954, the Vietnamese Communist forces decisively defeated the French at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. To resolve the issue of control over Indochina, an international conference met in Geneva in the summer of 1954. After much disagreement about the issues of French withdrawal and who was the rightful representative of the government of South Vietnam, Russia, China, France, and Hanoi signed the Geneva Agreements, which partitioned Vietnam at the seventeenth parallel pending a national referendum within two years. The agreements' legitimacy was challenged when the South Vietnamese and American representatives refused to sign.

The Communist Revolution and the Pursuit of National Independence

The leaders of the Communist revolution in Vietnam were Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Truong Chinh (1907–1988). They developed Hanoi's unique method of fighting the wars against the French and the Americans. "Uncle" Ho combined a fervid loyalty to Vietnam's independence and nationalism with a Marxist-Leninist commitment to class struggle, land reform, social revolution, and socialist economics. Depending on the political context, he could charismatically organize policies of allegiance to seemingly contradictory goals. Some scholars argue that his power and ideology were solidified with his 1941 announcement of the formation of a united front called the League for the Independence of Vietnam (Viet Minh). This front tried to unite the moderate elements of all social classes to

promote land reform and anti-imperialism—against both the French and the Japanese.

The Viet Minh organization was the predecessor of the National Liberation Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF). This term designates groups in South Vietnam who were disaffected by the rule of President Ngo Dinh Diem (1901–1963). Diem became prime minister of southern Vietnam in 1954 and, with the help of the U.S. government, established the independent state of South Vietnam and declared himself president. Diem's power base relied on Catholic refugees from northern Vietnam, wealthy and powerful landlords and merchants, and foreigners. His aloofness and familial authoritarianism estranged him from the nationalists, peasants, and Buddhists. The National Liberation Front had organized professionals such as lawyers and physicians, as well as peasants, urban workers, and Buddhists to resist Diem's rule. Mass demonstrations in the summer of 1963 fueled a coup against him. He fled from the Presidential Palace but was caught and murdered by his South Vietnamese bodyguard on 2 November 1963.

The NLF also organized a military arm, the People's Liberation Armed Forces (technically the PLAF but commonly called the Viet Cong). During the late 1950s and early 1960s, Ho Chi Minh became identified with the classical military approach to the war—conventional forces, armed confrontations, and great patriotic sacrifices. His conventional approach resulted in horrendous carnage and loss of life. After the war, many survivors suffered psychologically from this approach.

Vo Nguyen Giap, general and commander of the war, promoted the ideology of "people's war" advocated by China's Mao Zedong (1893–1976). Tactically, this ideology viewed the revolutionary war in terms of mobilization and coordination of the nation's military, psychological, diplomatic, and economic resources. The war was not to be limited to the battlefield. Giap's greatest success was the 1968 Tet Offensive. Although the offensive was a military disaster for the Communists, its psychological impact convinced the United States that the war could not be won.

Truong Chinh ranked second only to Ho Chi Minh in the political structure. An adherent of Mao's harsh revolutionary programs, he advocated vigorous policies of class struggle that ultimately led to a disastrous land reform campaign. He remained a true believer in the guerrilla strategy of people's war, even when a more conventional approach was more suitable.

The conflicting approaches of the leadership led to many bitter arguments, but by focusing primarily on the war itself and making use of multiple strategies,

they strengthened their chances of victory despite their contradictory policies. The emphasis on people's war was a costly but effective way to mobilize the Vietnamese military and civilians against the Saigon government. Neither conventional nor guerrilla warfare alone could force the United States to succumb militarily, however. After the United States withdrew its military support in 1973, Hanoi's tactics changed from a guerrilla war that stressed mobilization to a conventional war of massive troop movements that stressed destroying South Vietnam's military and seizing the government in Saigon.

U.S. "Soft" Intervention: 1954–1964

President Eisenhower manifested his support for Saigon's anti-Communist Ngo Dinh Diem by publicly praising him and providing military and economic assistance. In September 1954, Eisenhower's secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, completed the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), whose major function was to support Saigon. In October, the French military left Vietnam, and the United States took over the job of creating a strong southern government. In 1955, Diem rejected the Geneva Agreements, refused to call nationwide elections, and declared the establishment of the sovereign Republic of Vietnam.

Washington established economic support and sent military advisers to help Diem's forces train and modernize. Economic aid was so immense that Diem, no longer dependent solely on tax collection for his finances, did not need to appeal to the populace and therefore did not engage in meaningful land reforms or industrial development. His *agrovillage* (a strategic hamlet) campaign of 1959 forcibly relocated entire rural villages into fortified settlements, depleted the rural economy and destroyed the cohesiveness of peasant families and villages. The result was the beginning of vast migration to cities, where peasants increased the rolls of the unemployed.

From 1960 to 1963, Diem's rule became more dictatorial and repressive. His National Assembly Law allowed police to arrest and execute (by a portable guillotine) suspected Communists or anti-French nationalists. Intellectuals and professional groups petitioned Diem to step down or democratize his rule. An unsuccessful coup in 1960 made Diem even more repressive. At the beginning of 1963, the poor performance of the South Vietnamese army against the local Communist guerrillas at the Battle of Ap Bac revealed the incompetence and low morale of the South Vietnamese fighting forces and the need to change course. Soon after this battle, Buddhist demonstrations grew

in number and vehemence, forcing Diem to use military force to squelch them. In June, the first of seven Buddhist monks committed self-immolation to protest Diem's policies. The most vivid expression of the public's hostility to Diem's rule occurred after the protest suicide of Nguyen Tuong Tam on 7 July. Tam, born in 1906, was one of the greatest modern writers in Vietnam and an anti-Communist, nationalistic advocate of a greater Vietnam. His funeral was accompanied by the largest demonstration ever held in Saigon. Within weeks, Vietnamese military leaders plotted to end Diem's rule with the tacit approval of the U.S. government. On 2 November 1963, just weeks before John F. Kennedy's assassination, Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu were shot to death while trying to escape from Saigon.

The year 1964 was the turning point for America's commitment in Vietnam. In June, General William C. Westmoreland replaced General Paul D. Harkins (1904–1984) as commander of American armed forces in Indochina. In August, President Lyndon Johnson informed Congress that North Vietnamese patrol boats had attacked American ships in the international waters of the Gulf of Tonkin. Decades later, the reports of these incidents were revealed as having been questionable at best and shams at worst. Nevertheless, Congress was convinced that the president should be given full authority to challenge North Vietnam and to support South Vietnam by any means. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (August 1964) legitimized America's decision to engage in military activities in Indochina. The resolution served as an unofficial declaration of war. The U.S. Air Force began raids on North Vietnam's facilities, and U.S. ground troops pursued Viet Cong attacking U.S. bases.

Search and Destroy: 1965–1968

President Johnson's war quickly ratcheted the level of violence but without sufficient Vietnamese support and interaction. Relying on the managerial expertise of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the narrow military mind of General William Westmoreland, and the diplomatic arrogance of Ambassadors Henry Cabot Lodge and Ellsworth Bunker, Johnson disallowed any serious criticism of his policies. Westmoreland's strategy was to destroy the enemy, its logistical support in production and transportation areas, and its reliance on agricultural supplies and protection in local villages. After the costly battle in the Ia Drang Valley in the summer of 1965, Westmoreland announced his policies of attrition: (1) to destroy the enemy in such numbers that it could not replace or resupply sufficient men or materiel to fight the war

and (2) to establish a favorable ratio of killing—more enemy and fewer U.S. soldiers. Quantitative measures of success were provided by body counts, destroyed supply depots, destruction of protective ground cover, and removal of populations who supported enemy activity. Westmoreland knew that the South Vietnamese army could not win the war by itself or with its own equipment. His strategy called for the first use of B-52s for tactical support of U.S. troops and massive search-and-destroy missions against enemy targets. During this period, helicopters equipped with rapid-fire machine guns and rockets became key to fighting the war as well as transporting troops and picking up the wounded and stranded.

Johnson sent the first combat troops into Vietnam in March 1965. By 1968, there were over five hundred thousand troops in Vietnam, and Westmoreland was calling for more. Johnson's military strategy was hobbled by his domestic initiatives. Increased budget requests for the Great Society were dented by requests for huge amounts of money to fight the war. Johnson also was aware that tax increases to support the war would be denied or would be unpopular because his opponents would accuse him of feathering the Great Society programs at the expense of the war. To avoid a clear run into the war, Johnson implemented a strategy of "graduated response." He and his advisers believed that at some point when the price was too great, the north would relinquish its attempt to reunify the south. His refusal to use taxation to fund the war led to borrowing strategies that resulted in an increase in the Consumer Price Index, a growing international trade deficit, and eventually a high rate of inflation and unemployment.

Westmoreland, McNamara, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk predicted that the war would soon come to an end. It was thus a psychological shock to the American public when, in January 1968, the Communists initiated a nationwide uprising in South Vietnam. After months of hard fighting and tremendous destruction, General Westmoreland claimed a military victory yet asked for two hundred thousand more soldiers. The destruction of the imperial city of Hue, the burning of villages, and the slaughter of Vietnamese civilians had been seen on American television (the My Lai massacre had occurred right after the first Tet Offensive but was not publicized until November 1970). The Tet uprising had clearly been a great psychological victory for the Communists. President Johnson declared he would not run for a second term, announced the cessation of bombing of North Vietnam, appointed McNamara to direct the World Bank, and replaced Westmoreland with General Creighton Abrams.

Pacification and Vietnamization: 1969–1971

Richard Nixon was elected president in November 1968 on the promise that he had a secret plan to end the war. Nixon won election during a year of great domestic and international turmoil: in April, Martin Luther King, Jr., was assassinated; in May, while American diplomats were negotiating in Paris with Hanoi, the Communists launched a second Tet Offensive; in June, Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated, and the military outpost of Khe Sanh, the centerpiece of Westmoreland's strategy of massive destruction and attrition of enemy soldiers, was abandoned; in August, the riotous Democratic National Convention was held in Chicago while the Communists staged their third Tet Offensive. Clearly, policies in Vietnam and the United States were exacerbating military and civil unrest.

Nixon's Vietnamization of the war strategy (that is, his turning over of control of the war to the Vietnamese) installed a new core of leaders: Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, General Creighton Abrams, and William Colby guided political, military, and pacification programs. Nixon's "plan" gave full military control over to the Vietnamese army. The Americans began to withdraw troops—150,000 in 1970 and an additional 100,000 in 1971. The United States provided economic, technical, and material assistance to the government of South Vietnam but would not direct the war or engage in undue combat. Colby's pacification programs (including the notorious Phoenix program) concentrated on quietly destroying the infrastructure of the Communists and their influence in South Vietnam by rooting out Communist cadres and spies and imprisoning or executing them. American and Vietnamese civic action teams, particularly in the Mekong Delta, improved the quality of agricultural yields, health programs, and local defense.

American support missions were focused on destroying the caches of supplies that the Communists stored up for future battles and support. Nixon's illegal bombings of and incursions into Cambodia (April 1970) and Laos (January 1971) were an attempt to destroy Hanoi's ability to wage war and to give time to Saigon to build its military strength and morale.

True, the intensive training and support increased the South Vietnamese army's expertise, but the emphasis on self-reliance hindered its logistical and communication ability to engage in complex maneuvers and to coordinate its battle plans with American forces. These problems were evident during the poorly coordinated South Vietnamese attack in Laos in January 1971. This was the last time that a significant number

of American ground personnel helped the South Vietnamese army. Aware of the South's inadequacies, in March 1972, the North Vietnamese army launched a threefold attack on targets in South Vietnam. Although General Abrams credited the Vietnamese with fighting a good battle, in truth, the North Vietnamese were repelled by the massive B-52 bombing of the battlefield.

Nixon's plan to Vietnamize the war actually increased the number of American casualties. The American public was traumatized by media coverage of the death and destruction. Domestically, the antiwar movement grew to immense proportions, destabilizing American society. Moratorium antiwar protests began in early 1970 with mass demonstrations in Washington, D.C., in April. On 4 May, opposition to the Cambodian incursion caused nationwide demonstrations and resulted in four deaths and nine wounded by the Ohio National Guard at Kent State University in Ohio. The November trial of Lieutenant William Calley for the 1968 massacre at My Lai lasted five months and provided even more reason for demonstrations and antiwar activity. Congress felt the pressure and in December 1970 repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.

The year 1971 brought even greater protests. In June of that year, the *New York Times* began publishing the "Pentagon Papers," which provided an insider's account of how decisions were made to fight the war. The evidence of deception coupled with the administration's attempt to censor the account resulted in widespread antiwar sentiment. Nixon finally withdrew all U.S. ground troops in August 1972 and won reelection in November. In January 1973, the draft ended.

The year 1972 witnessed the dismal results of Nixon's strategy of Vietnamization. As the responsibility of fighting the war was turned over to the Saigon regime, the Communist troops became more confident of winning the war. As the United States continued to withdraw troops and limit direct military cooperation with the South Vietnamese army, its room to maneuver or affect the talks became more limited. A snag in the talks in the autumn of 1972 raised the level of frustration. On 18 December, unable to redeploy troops to Vietnam, Nixon ordered the most concentrated B-52 bombing campaign of the war on North Vietnam. This two-week so-called Christmas bombing forced the North Vietnamese to resume peace talks. By 23 January, a peace agreement was initialed by Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho (1910–1990), founder of the Indo-Chinese Communist Party and chief negotiator at the Paris talks, along with representatives from the Republic of Vietnam

(Saigon) and the Provisional Revolutionary (Communist) government in South Vietnam. In 1973, the Nobel Prize Committee in Sweden declared that Le Duc Tho and Kissinger should receive the Nobel Peace Prize. However, Le Duc Tho refused to accept the award because the war had not yet ended in Vietnam.

In the last years of the war, Nixon changed the war goals from rescuing South Vietnam from the Communists to ending the war honorably. This meant that the new focus was on getting American POWs back and discovering the whereabouts of MIAs. In February 1973, the Communists released 588 POWs; a month later the last U.S. military personnel left Vietnam; and in April, the last POWs were released. After the war ended, the U.S. government claimed that not all U.S. servicemen were accounted for. Hanoi was instructed to provide detailed information on MIAs and possible POWs. Without full disclosure, diplomatic recognition and normalization of relations would not be possible.

"The Decent Interval": 1971-1973

By 1971, President Nixon had realized that a victory in South Vietnam was not possible. He and Henry Kissinger devised the plan to provide Saigon with enough strength in 1973 to stand on its own against the North Vietnamese. Between the time that American troops would leave South Vietnam and the time that Saigon would fall to the North or would establish a form of accommodation, there would be a "decent interval." Saigon would bear the responsibility for its political future, and the United States would not be blamed for "losing" Vietnam, like it had been blamed for losing China.

The specific scenario for this plan was to pressure Hanoi militarily and politically to give Saigon freedom of maneuver. South Vietnam could strengthen its military forces, organize its economy, and create popular policies in rural areas—especially in the Mekong River delta south of Saigon. The "decent interval" was never achieved. Soon after America's withdrawal, North Vietnam ordered its divisions to march south in conventional military offensives, complete with tanks and artillery attacks on towns and civilians. Once American air power was halted, Saigon's army could not repel Hanoi's offensive. Furthermore, Saigon was unable to reform itself—rampant corruption, military defection, and uncontrollable dissent shattered any hopes for its continued existence against enemy threats.

Congress and public opinion choked off Nixon's strategic policies and options. Congress reduced Vietnam's economic aid package from \$2.3 billion to \$1

billion. In 1973, Congress cut off all funding for further U.S. air operations and for any further military operations in Southeast Asia. By 1974, the Pentagon could no longer authorize or budget replacement of Vietnam's military equipment. Congress belligerently overrode the president's veto of the War Powers Act, which limited the president's prerogative to declare war or to send troops abroad for more than sixty days without congressional approval.

Following Cambodia's surrender to the Khmer Rouge on 16 April 1975, Saigon surrendered to Hanoi's troops on 30 April. In the last few days of April, U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin remained publicly optimistic in order to prevent panic. Thus, there was no preparation for the evacuation of the many Vietnamese personnel who had sided with the American forces. The television news coverage showed the chaotic retreat by helicopter of American personnel from the roof of the U.S. embassy. The war was over.

Controversies Surrounding the War

The most common reason given for American commitment to South Vietnam is that the United States was obsessed with anti-Communist ideology. The aggression of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the Korean War, the successful Communist revolution in China, and the nuclear arsenal of Moscow forced the United States to conclude that the whole globe was in danger of Communist domination. The battle for Vietnam was a proxy for the war between the West and Communism—between the United States and the Soviet Union and China.

Domestically, the American public engaged in energetic efforts to cleanse the nation of Communism. On 19 June 1953, just thirteen months before the fall of Dien Bien Phu, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were executed for high treason against the United States. Their crime was providing the Soviet Union with secrets to produce an atomic bomb. Senators Joseph McCarthy and Pat McCarran held years of public hearings that denounced Communists in government, the foreign service, universities, labor unions, and Hollywood. Many of the accused lost their jobs or went into exile abroad; a few committed suicide. The disruption to American society was felt for decades.

An apologetic view of why the United States maintained the war is that the United States had entered a quagmire and could not get out. Author David Halberstam advanced this view after reporting on the Battle of Ap Bac (January 1963). Essentially, American pride, faith in technology, ignorance of Vietnamese culture, and refusal to develop a noncorrupt and com-



People travel on the Ho Ci Minh Trail in November 2000. During the Vietnam War, the trail was an important supply route for the North Vietnamese. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS)

pentent ruling force shoved U.S. forces more deeply into the morass of Vietnam.

In the 1970s, Vietnam veterans and critics of the war felt that the government had lied to them about the war. The radical left and the leaders of the antiwar movement criticized American capitalism and imperialism for profiting from the war and crushing the Third World's aspirations to, and sacrifices for, liberation and revolution. These groups aligned themselves with foreign anti-imperialist leadership. They also criticized the U.S. government for creating a national security bureaucracy and an international investment program that attacked dissent at home and impoverished farmers and workers abroad. The most authoritative criticism was voiced by the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars. Organized by graduate students and professors who specialized in Asian history, the committee's *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* provided the most thorough criticism of the war in Indochina.

Why Did Hanoi Win?

The United States lost the war mostly because politicians controlled the strategy of the war. The war could have been won if the Pentagon had been given freedom to bomb where, when, and as much as it wanted. Rather than slowly escalating the war, as Johnson did, maximum firepower should have been used immediately against North Vietnam and the Communist-held areas of South Vietnam. The devastating Christmas bombing of 1972 proved that overwhelming force could bring Hanoi to its knees. But it was too late. The final rout of South Vietnam's forces in the spring of 1975 could have been reversed if Congress had released funds for the war effort and had not

declared that all U.S. bombing and military support must end.

The rebuttal to this argument is that such tactics in the mid-1960s would have brought retaliation from China or the Soviet Union. The memory of China's entrance into the Korean War was still a vital force in the strategic decision-making process. The South Vietnamese government was too corrupt, the military too incompetent, and the populace too disloyal to expect that a military victory alone would solve the problems of Vietnam. The thorough destruction of North Vietnam would have sparked uncontrollable anger in the population and would have brought demands that the United States colonize the area with troops and administrators for an unlimited time.

In 1995, twenty years after the war, Robert S. McNamara, secretary of defense under Kennedy and Johnson, pinpointed eleven failures that led to defeat. Among them were that the United States (1) misunderstood the enemy and exaggerated the dangers of the Cold War, (2) misjudged the strengths and weaknesses of its allies, (3) relied too much on the promises of high technology, and (4) failed to organize the executive branch to deal with the political and military issues in an open and critical manner. Even in the twenty-first century, the Vietnam War is still affecting lives in the United States and in Southeast Asia.

Richard C. Kagan

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VIETNAM-UNITED STATES RELATIONS Communism, Containment, the Vietnam War, the end of the Cold War, and globalization have shaped the relations between Vietnam and the United States since 1945. Opinion within the United States

and throughout the world was sharply divided as the Vietnam War escalated in the 1960s, and the consequences of this war still linger on.

1945–1956

The Viet Minh, the organization lead by Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969) that was devoted to securing Vietnam's independence from France, controlled Hanoi and six provinces of Vietnam during the Japanese occupation and cooperated with the United States in the common fight against the Japanese. Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in September 1945, but the cause of Vietnamese independence was foiled by the Allies at Potsdam in July 1945. The French regained control of their former colony, and the First Indochina War began from 1946. The United States was alarmed by the expansion of Communism in the Cold War period, and in response, Containment became the hallmark of American policy. The United States supported the French, and by 1954 it was bearing 80 percent of the colonial war burden. In 1949 the French had set up the rival Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) under Emperor Bao Dai (1913–1997), and the United States recognized it.

With the humiliating defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu on 7 May 1954, colonial rule was over. The already-convened Geneva Conference partitioned the country at the seventeenth parallel. The question of reunification was to be decided by election two years later. South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were designated as associate states under the protective umbrella of SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), which was formed in September 1954. Within a year, U.S. advisers arrived to help President Ngo Dinh Diem (1901–1963) of South Vietnam. The administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower (served 1952–1960) blocked elections in 1956.

1956–1963

The United States mistakenly believed that Diem was a nationalist alternative to Ho Chi Minh. Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs that 80 percent of the people would have voted for Ho in 1956. Diem was becoming unpopular by alienating all major sections of the population. The Viet Cong, a Communist guerrilla force seeking to reunify the two halves of Vietnam, set up the National Liberation Front (NLF) in December 1960 from the Communist cadres of South Vietnam. From the American viewpoint, the situation was becoming alarming, and the new president, John F. Kennedy (served 1961–1963), picked up where his predecessor had left off. The U.S. administration

made an all-out effort to check Communist expansion in South Vietnam. The two countries signed a treaty resulting in arrival of American support troops, and the U.S. Military Assistance Command was set up.

American aid to South Vietnam from 1955 to 1961 had amounted to \$1.8 billion; for the 1962–1963 year alone, it was \$700 million. The United States was underwriting half of South Vietnam's government budget, including the full salary of its armed forces. U.S. military advisers numbered 17,000. The NLF increased its strength, and the situation deteriorated in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong controlled about two-thirds of the rural areas. After Diem's assassination, a succession of military generals ruled in South Vietnam. The political instability worsened. The new U.S. president, Lyndon Baines Johnson (served 1963–1968), also believed in what was known as the Domino Theory. If South Vietnam fell to Communism, the reasoning went, so would the rest of Southeast Asia.

1964–1968

The covert operation against North Vietnam, code-named Operational Plan 34A, began in February 1964 with U-2 spy plane missions and commando raids. The U.S. Congress gave sweeping powers to the president in August 1964 after a U.S. naval vessel reportedly was fired upon in the Gulf of Tonkin. North Vietnam saw the United States as the main obstacle to reunification of Vietnam. The United States began bombing North Vietnam in February 1965 in what later was to become a regular feature under Operation Rolling Thunder. U.S. fighter-bombers dropped a total of about 8 million tons of bombs, flown in about 3 million sorties, during the Vietnam War. The Ho Chi Minh Trail, the main supply route to the Viet Cong, came under severe bombing, as did Hanoi and Haiphong Harbor. By 1967 the number of U.S. troops in South Vietnam rose to half a million. The Tet Offensive of January 1968 produced a military stalemate. In March President Johnson announced that he would not be seeking reelection and ordered a partial halt to bombing over North Vietnam. The My Lai massacre of 300 Vietnamese on 16 March 1968 outraged world opinion, and the pictures of carnage from the massacre haunted generations of Americans. Domestic dissent increased in the United States, and the antiwar movement spread among students, liberal clergy, journalists, U.S. senators, and intellectuals. In October a complete bombing halt was declared. About 30,000 American soldiers had lost their lives by 1968. In spite of heavy bombing over the Ho Chi Minh Trail area, 150,000 North Vietnamese soldiers had infiltrated South Vietnam, and supply convoys went on.



HO CHI MINH'S NATIONAL DAY SPEECH

On 2 September 1957 Ho Chi Minh delivered a speech marking the twelfth anniversary of the founding of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In the speech he outlined national progress and noted the threat posed by the United States.

Dear compatriots . . .

During the past three years, our people in the north have made great efforts to overcome difficulties and to carry out production through labor. They have recorded great successes in healing the wounds of war, restoring economy, and starting the development of culture, thereby lessening difficulties in the life of the popular masses and gradually improving their living standards, in the delta regions as well as in the mountainous areas. Land reform has fundamentally been completed, the correction of errors committed and the work of developing the success obtained during that reform have been fruitfully carried out in many localities. Agriculture has visibly surpassed the prewar level. In industry, old factories have been restored and new ones built. Order and security have been ensured and national defence strengthened. On behalf of the Party and Government, I congratulate the personnel of branches at all levels for their ardour in serving the people and in building up the fatherland.

Our task for this year is to further increase production and the practice of economy, to strive to fulfill the State Plan, to restore basically North Vietnam's economy, thereby progressively improve the living conditions of our people, and prepare conditions for us to advance in 1958 toward building the north under a long-term plan.

While the north of our country is becoming stronger and stronger, in the south, the American imperialists are intensifying their intervention, increasing their military personnel, catching hold of the South Vietnam economy. Together with the southern authorities, they have been sabotaging the Geneva agreements and the peace and unity of our country. They have resorted to all means of terror and repression with the aim of quenching the patriotism and the will for reunification of our southern compatriots. However the latter, always heroic, have unceasingly broadened their solidarity and struggle for the improvement of their standard of living, for democratic liberties, and for the peaceful reunification of their fatherland. Our government has recently proposed once again to the southern authorities contacts between the two zones and the re-establishment of normal north-south relations with a view to reaching a consultative conference on general elections to reunify the country. However, the southern authorities have obdurately persisted in their refusal, thus going counter to the deep aspirations of the entire people.

Source: Vietnam Information Bulletin. (1957) Rangoon: News Service of the Vietnam Democratic Republic (25 September), no. 38.

1968–1975

Although the Paris peace talks began on 25 January 1969, the Vietnamization program of President Richard Milhous Nixon (served 1969–1974) continued to wage war, using South Vietnamese ground forces and U.S. air power without U.S. ground troops. The Vietnam War became a truly pan-Indochina war when Laos and Cambodia became involved. The publication of the Pentagon Papers in 1971 revealed the covert operation of the secret war in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The Paris talks made very slow progress, and North Vietnam began the March 1972 Easter Offensive to conquer South Vietnam. The mining of North Vietnam's harbors and the bombing of roads and bridges in May 1972 brought vehement international criticism and renewed antiwar protests in the United States.

In January 1973 the U.S. negotiator Henry Kissinger and North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho resumed stalled negotiations, and the major differences between the opposing sides were solved. On 27 January the United States, North and South Vietnam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG), representing the Viet Cong, signed the Paris Peace Accords. Major provisions of the agreement included withdrawal of American troops, a cease-fire, return of prisoners of war, and unification of the North and South. This provided a temporary respite for the corrupt and repressive regime of South Vietnam. On 30 April 1975 Saigon fell, and Vietnamese unification took place in July 1976. The casualty figures in the Vietnam War included 50,000 Americans, 400,000 South Vietnamese, and 900,000 Communists.

1975–Present

Postwar relations between Vietnam and the United States have revolved around the prisoners of war/missing in action (POW/MIA) issue, the establishment of diplomatic relations, American aid for reconstruction of Vietnam, and the refugee problem. Vietnamese premier Pham Van Dong (1906–2000) called for normalization of relations with the United States and requested payment of \$3.3 billion for reconstruction as secretly promised by President Nixon after signing the Paris agreement. The United States declined and put forth its own condition of full accounting of the MIAs. Two years later, the United States relaxed its stand to a good-faith attempt at accounting and sent a mission to Hanoi. The prospects of bilateral relations improved in 1978, when Hanoi did not put forth a precondition of economic assistance. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam complicated the matter. In 1985 Vietnam

permitted the excavation of a B-52 crash site and began to return the remains of dead American soldiers. A presidential envoy, General John W. Vessey, visited Hanoi in August 1987; Vietnam agreed to cooperate on the MIA issue, and the United States officially agreed to provide humanitarian assistance.

Vietnam's domestic and foreign policies saw a marked change in late 1980s and early 1990s, which paved the way for a better relationship with the United States. The process of economic liberalization, Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia, and Vietnam's gain of access to regional and international organizations facilitated normalization of Vietnamese-U.S. relations. POW/MIA accounting, resettlement for Vietnamese boat people, human rights, and religious freedom were key issues. In 1993 the United States supported international bodies helping Vietnam and lifted its economic embargo of the nation. A liaison office was opened in Hanoi in 1994. The United States announced establishment of diplomatic relations on 11 July 1995. Pete Peterson, a former U.S. congressman and POW, became the U.S. ambassador to Vietnam. In January 1997 Vietnam and the United States reached agreement on the resettlement of Vietnamese refugees from countries of first asylum like Thailand and Hong Kong. Bilateral trade agreement negotiations commenced in 1996. Vietnam joined the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) in 1998.

Vietnam also sought integration into the world economy and initiated sweeping economic reforms. Trade between Vietnam and the United States amounted to \$750 and \$900 million respectively in 1998 and 1999. Limited military contact was established along with a program of colonel-level exchange visits. In September 1999 the secretary of state visited Vietnam. A new phase of Vietnamese-U.S. relations was marked with a bilateral trade agreement signed on 13 July 2000. This agreement provided greater mutual market access for Vietnamese and U.S. companies, recognition of and respect for intellectual property rights, and protection of U.S. investment. The transparency clause of the agreement made Vietnamese laws in areas concerning the agreement public, and it included the right of appeal by U.S. citizens. Vietnam insisted on retaining control over telecommunications, not allowing foreign investors more than a 50 percent stake in any investment project.

The first visit by a U.S. president to Hanoi took place in November 2000 and was marked by cordiality. President William Jefferson Clinton (served 1993–2001) had discussions with Vietnamese president Tran Duc Luong (b. 1937) and prime minister Phan Van Khai (b. 1933) regarding mutual concerns. The president paid

warm tribute to the Vietnamese people and urged opening of a new era in U.S.-Vietnamese relations. The United States promised \$2 million each year over the next three years to help Vietnam implement the trade agreement of July 2000. The United States opened a consulate in Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon).

The election of the conservative Republican U.S. president George W. Bush in 2001 came without Congress having ratified the July 2000 trade pact, however. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom suggested that the trade pact be linked to human rights. Pending ratification of the July 2000 trade pact, Hanoi had waived the 50 percent surcharge on U.S. products, but it has threatened to reimpose it.

Vietnam is slowly moving away from authoritarian control, which would help it in establishing close bilateral relations with the United States. The government has made progress toward allowing religious freedom, recognizing the Vietnam Buddhist Church, the Vietnam Catholic Church, the General Council of Protestant Churches of the South, and other religious organizations. The International Labor Organization has opened an office in Hanoi, and Vietnam has ratified three labor conventions. The authorities are tolerating critical public expression, which was unheard earlier. Nong Duc Manh of the Tay ethnic minority was appointed to the top post of secretary-general of the Communist Party in April. National Assembly members are openly criticizing some of the policies of the government. Not all in the National Assembly are members of the Communist Party, and a former South Vietnamese military officer has been elected to that body.

In spite of lingering Vietnamese and American grievances, the Vietnamese Foundation Act of 2000 had attracted more Vietnamese students to study in American universities. Both countries have moved forward in the process of normalizing relations. The hard-liners in Vietnam and the United States may be skeptical of close relations, but the mutual perception is changing.

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VIETNAMESE With a population of more than 79.9 million (2001 est.), Vietnam ranks as the fourteenth most populous country in the world. In Vietnam's 1999 census, the population was found to be 23.5 percent urban and 76.5 percent rural. Many people still earn their living from agriculture. Over 10 percent of the people (and almost one-third of the urban population) live in either Ho Chi Minh City, formerly Saigon (with a population of over 5 million), or in Hanoi (with a population of almost 3 million). Over 86 percent of the population is ethnic Vietnamese, now known as Kinh.

The non-Kinh population of Vietnam was more than 10.5 million in 1999. There are officially fifty-four ethnic groups in Vietnam, including the Kinh majority. Four of these groups have over a million people: the Tay (once called the Tho), the Thai, the Muong, and the Khmer. Four other groups have well over half a million people: the Chinese (officially known as the Hoa), the Nung, the Hmong (formerly known as the Meo), and the Dao (or Dzao or Yao). Other groups are small in size. Twelve groups have populations under five thousand. Some (such as the Ro-Man, the O Du, and the Brau) number only a few hundred.

Vietnam's population is very diverse. The fifty-four ethnic groups belong to five language families: Austroasiatic, Austronesian (Malayo-Polynesian), Thai-Kadai, Sino-Tibetan, and Hmong-Dao. The Kinh majority and many other groups speak languages within the Austroasiatic family. A cluster of groups speaking Austronesian (Malayo-Polynesian) languages and having matrilineal kinship, the Ede (Rhade), Gia Lai (Jarai), Cham, Raglai, and Chu-ru (Chru), live mainly in and around the central highlands. Some small groups speaking Sino-Tibetan languages are found along the Chinese border in the northern uplands. Only four of these fifty-four groups have historically lived in the lowlands: The Khmer (mainly in the lower Mekong Delta), the Cham (mostly in the central coastal plain), the Chinese (mainly in urban areas), and the majority Kinh population.

Traditionally, ethnic Vietnamese lived in lowland areas and lived mainly by growing rice in paddy fields. Very few Vietnamese lived in the uplands. Lack of paddy fields, fear of malaria and other dangerous diseases, the presence of sometimes-unfriendly tribal groups, and the periodic appearance of bandit gangs made Vietnamese very reluctant to live in upland areas.

But with population pressure rising, modern medicine available, and the security provided by the modern nation-state, in the past fifty years over 4 (perhaps 5) million Kinh have, often under state-organized programs, moved into upland areas previously inhabited only by non-Kinh groups; many of the immigrant Kinh live in urban areas, along main highways, or in and around state farms and forest enterprises. Population movement continues, especially from rural to urban areas, from north to south, and from lowlands to uplands. There is also some spontaneous migration of non-Kinh ethnic households (that is, Nung and Tay) from portions of the northern mountain region (that is, Cao Bang) to the central highlands (especially Dak Lak and Lam Dong Provinces). The rest have traditionally lived in upland areas.

Characteristics of the Vietnamese (Kinh) Majority

The Vietnamese family has long been the most important and most stable part of Vietnamese society. Descent through the male line (patrilineal descent) is very important. Even today, some families still gather to celebrate the death anniversaries (*ngay gio*) of shared male ancestors, especially fathers and grandfathers. These are not usually sad occasions, but happy times in which people remember their shared roots and build solidarity among living family members.

Children are raised to appreciate the tremendous importance of the family as the primary and most reliable source of identity, emotional support, and help in time of need. As children learn to speak, they are taught about family relationships and the proper terms of address and self-reference that accompany them. Vietnamese have no general term equivalent to the English "you," and they rarely use the word for "I" or "me." Instead Vietnamese children address other people in the family as "mother" or "father" or "father's older brother" or "father's younger brother" or "mother's brother" or "father's sister" and so on. They refer to themselves not as "I," but as "child" or "niece" or "nephew." They call older siblings "older brother" or "older sister" and refer to themselves as "younger sibling."

As children grow up, go to school, and meet a wider range of people, they call most other people by kin terms much of the time, as if all of society were one big family. Choice of which kin term to use with which person is guided by gender, relative age and status, degree of intimacy or friendship, and the nature of the occasion. What a Vietnamese calls someone and the way he or she refers to himself or herself influences the way the two people will behave toward each other and what they can expect from each other.



A Vietnamese girl on her moped in Hanoi in 1995. (CATHERINE KARNOW/CORBIS)

This way of talking with each other is an important part of being Vietnamese. Vietnamese often seem to be less concerned about their own individual feelings and desires than many other people. But they may also be somewhat less concerned with universal principles and with people in general. What they are greatly concerned with is a very particular set of interpersonal relationships with specific people. Their identity and sense of self-worth are intimately connected to their relationships with parents, family, neighbors, teachers, classmates, colleagues, and coworkers.

Within this complex web of relationships people must perform many roles, always adjusting their behavior to fit the particular position they are in within a specific social context. Vietnamese society is hierarchical. One is expected to defer to those who are older or who have higher status, and to nurture and to instruct those younger or of lower status. These significant other people in one's life are always evaluating the way one performs one's various social roles. The acceptance, approval, and admiration of these people

are very important to most Vietnamese and many people often gladly modify their behavior to achieve this kind of social recognition.

Over the past fifty years or so a number of mass organizations have been created and many (but far from all) people belong to one or more of them. There are organizations for women, for farmers, for youth, for the elderly, for veterans. These organizations extend from the national level down to the village. They are guided and coordinated by the Fatherland Front, an umbrella organization that in turn receives guidance from the Communist Party and includes senior party officials in its leadership as well as representatives of a variety of religious and ethnic groups. To a large extent these organizations, in addition to government structures and Communist Party organization, incorporate all of Vietnam's ethnic groups and regions into one national society.

Characteristics of Non-Kinh Ethnic Groups

More than 10.5 million citizens of Vietnam, nearly 14 percent of the population, are categorized as non-Kinh persons. The official set of fifty-three ethnic categories other than Kinh seems to lump together some groups that may well be considered to be separate ethnic groups. In any case, however these groups are categorized and labeled, the reality is that there are hundreds of relatively small local groups with somewhat distinctive dialects and ways of life. Although some of these groups may have similar cultures and share a common ethnic identity, the extent to which they form a meaningful social unit is problematic.

The three non-Kinh ethnic groups who live mainly in the lowlands are distinctive. The Khmer, who lived in the Mekong Delta long before the arrival of the Kinh, number over a million and are Vietnam's fifth-largest ethnic group. Most still live in the lower half of the Mekong Delta. Most Khmer follow a form of Buddhism similar to that found in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Myanmar called Theravada or Hinayana Buddhism. This is in contrast to the Mahayana Buddhism that is predominant among Kinh Buddhists. The Buddhist pagoda is usually the center of Khmer community life, and monks often are highly influential and respected community leaders.

The Chinese (Hoa), who number about 870,000, making them Vietnam's sixth-largest ethnic population, are among Vietnam's most highly urbanized groups. They have levels of income, life expectancy, and education that are comparable to those of the Kinh majority. There is a large ethnic Chinese population in Ho Chi Minh City.

The Cham, of whom there are only a little over 130,000, live mostly in villages along the central coast, especially in Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan, although there is a Cham community in the Mekong Delta near the Cambodian border. The Cham have a matrilineal kinship system, tracing descent through the female line, and a young married couple usually lives with or near the bride's parents rather than those of the groom. Cham religion contains combinations of Hindu (Brahman) and Islamic influences that survive from earlier periods and veneration of indigenous spirits.

The remaining forty-nine ethnic non-Kinh groups in Vietnam have traditionally lived in upland areas, and the vast majority of them still do. It is difficult to generalize about them because both within and between groups there are many differences in economic levels, social organization, health status, ecological conditions, religion, and ways of life. And almost everywhere change is occurring at a rapid pace. In fact, one might say that the two most important characteristics of ethnic non-Kinh upland areas now are diversity and change.

The great majority of upland ethnic nationalities live in one of two big areas. The first is the northern mountain region, extending along the border with Laos from about Vinh and along the border with Laos and then China all the way back to the sea. The second area is usually called the central highlands in English and Tay Nguyen (Western Plateau) by the Vietnamese. It is composed of upland areas along the border with Cambodia. Between Hue and Vinh the ethnic minority population is very small because the terrain is highly broken and mountain slopes are very steep, while the flat plain is densely populated by Kinh. Fifty or sixty years ago most of the uplands were densely forested and most people lived there much as they had for centuries.

Family, kin, and community still make up the meaningful social worlds of most ethnic minorities. Most of these people traditionally lived in relatively small villages, made up of sometimes only four or five houses and rarely as many as a hundred. Most houses were built on stilts with wooden beams, bamboo walls, and thatch roofs.

The majority of upland people lived by cutting down and burning small patches of forest and then planting in the ashes, a practice often called *swidden*, or "slash and burn," agriculture. A cleared field would typically be used for two to four years and then abandoned for five to twenty years. Although sometimes erroneously called nomads, most people moved only from spot to spot within a fixed area. These upland

fields were usually planted with rice or corn, interplanted with a variety of beans as well as gourds and other crops. Pigs and chickens were commonly raised, but in small numbers. Other domesticated animals commonly found in upland areas were oxen, water buffalo, ducks, goats, and dogs. The particular mix in the way each group earned a living was determined by local conditions. Some groups who lived in valleys cultivated wet rice in paddy fields. In some places, people created terraced fields on hillsides. Farming was supplemented by hunting, fishing, and gathering wild vegetables and tubers from the forest.

The forest not only provided much of people's food, but also was a source of medicine, building materials, fuel, and water. Few if any villages were completely isolated. There was always some trade, but more were relatively self-sufficient. Life was difficult in some ways, but very satisfying in others.

Over recent decades, however, change has been taking place at an accelerating rate. These changes have disrupted familiar ways of life, causing problems and providing benefits. Access to modern medicine and other innovations (such as mosquito nets and iodized salt) has reduced infant mortality rates and increased life expectancy. Access to education has increased significantly. Many people now have electricity in their homes. Many own radios, flashlights, raincoats, kitchen utensils, and other consumer goods that make life more convenient. Quite a few have bicycles, and some have television sets, and even VCRs and motorcycles. Upland ethnic minorities are still poorer than the average Vietnamese, but they are better off in many ways than they once were.

At the same time, population density is much higher than before, because of both in-migration and natural increase in population. The forests have been reduced both in size and in quality. Biodiversity has plummeted. It is much more difficult for people to hunt and fish and gather wild food. Water and decent agricultural land are in short supply in many places. There is little room to increase wet rice paddies, and in swidden fields the yields are declining because the fragile upland soils are overworked.

The uplands contain many opportunities and many challenges. People do not always agree on how much change they want, at what rate, or how to achieve it. But it is difficult for members of an ethnic group, or even for uplanders as a whole, including Kinh, to work together to devise common solutions to shared problems. Throughout much of the uplands, but especially in the northern mountain region, ethnic groups are scattered across different districts and provinces.

Villages are grouped to form a commune, the lowest administrative unit in Vietnam, and communes are combined to form a district, which is like a county. Out of 109 districts, 59 contain 10 or more different ethnic groups, and 8 contain 15 or more ethnic groups. And in the northern mountain region 97 percent of all communes contain more than one ethnic group. Since people are scattered in villages that are within different communes and districts, even provinces, with dozens of other ethnic groups, also scattered, living around them, their meaningful social world is usually still limited to family, kin, and village. The basic model of social structure in the uplands is one of hundreds of rather tightly knit local groups, unevenly overlaid with national institutions that reach out from Hanoi.

Religion in Vietnam

It is difficult to say how many Vietnamese follow any particular religion. The religious beliefs and practices of most Vietnamese do not fit neatly into any single category. And this does not bother them. Estimates of how many people in Vietnam "follow" a particular religion vary widely, depending on how terms are defined.

The 1999 census reported that over 80 percent of the population of Vietnam had "no religion." This estimate counted only those who are formal, practicing members of an officially recognized religious organization and can be misleading. Other estimates, however, are often rather high, usually based upon a very loose definition of "religion" and without any sound empirical basis.

Buddhism is by far the largest organized religion in Vietnam. Although the 1999 census counted only a little over 7 million Buddhists, other estimates go above 20 million. Mahayana Buddhism is predominant among the Kinh, whereas over a million people (mostly in the Mekong Delta and mostly Khmer) follow Theravada Buddhism. Most Vietnamese have been influenced by Buddhist thought, however, and it is difficult to draw a line between Buddhists and non-Buddhists.

The second-largest organized religion in Vietnam is Christianity, which gained a foothold in the seventeenth century. There may be as many as 8 to 10 million Catholics in Vietnam, although the 1999 census counted only a little over 5 million. Protestantism came to Vietnam much later, but it has experienced rapid growth since the late 1980s, especially among upland ethnic minority groups. The 1999 census counted only 261,000 Protestants, but by some estimates there are as many as 2 million.

The 1999 census counted only 63,000 Muslims. Other estimates, which range up to 1 million, seem high. There seem to be few, if any, Kinh who follow Islam. Most Muslims in Vietnam are Cham, Khmer, or expatriates from Islamic countries.

Hoa Hao, a reformed Buddhist sect stressing simplicity of worship, is sometimes estimated to have as many as 2 million followers. The 1999 census counted about 1.2 million Hoa Hao. Most Hoa Hao are concentrated in the western portion of the Mekong Delta, mainly in and around the city of Long Xuyen in An Giang Province.

Cao Dai is an eclectic religion, drawing on Buddhism, Christianity, and Vietnamese tradition. It probably has 1 to 2 million followers, mainly in Tay Ninh Province and in the Mekong Delta.

Vietnamese in the Twenty-First Century

Vietnam is still a poor country. Its growing population is already stressing its environment and will continue to do so in coming decades. Under these conditions, the Vietnamese are aspiring to achieve rapid economic growth that is both equitable and sustainable and simultaneously to attain more democracy and greater rule by law. Such aspirations not only require changes in laws and policies, which are already taking place, but also ultimately will require changes in institutions, in behavior, and in ways of looking at the world.

At the same time, there is a strong desire to preserve a distinctive Vietnamese identity that retains the best elements of Vietnamese culture and tradition. This ambitious agenda will pose an immense challenge to the Vietnamese people in the twenty-first century. But they have made progress in recent years and are determined to continue to move forward.

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VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE The origins and affinities of the Vietnamese language are complex and have long been debated by scholars. The language now appears to have developed from the Mon Khmer family within the larger Austroasiatic language group. There are indications of influence from Tai languages, especially the use of tones. It also seems to exhibit some Austronesian influence, perhaps from ancient relatives of the Cham and Ede (Rhade) in prehistoric times.

In historical times there has been a very strong Chinese influence, especially in vocabulary. The word *Viet* comes from the Chinese word *yue*, which was used broadly to refer to non-Chinese ethnic groups south of the Chang (Yangtze) River. *Nam*, or *nan* in Chinese, means "south" or "southern." Some terms have been thoroughly Vietnamized and now are no longer perceived as foreign terms. Examples would include the word for "citizen," which is *cong dan*, and the word for "virtue" or "morality," which is *dao duc*. But other terms and phrases are still considered to be Sino-Vietnamese. These expressions are still heard, but not as much as they used to be.

More recently some French words have come into common use, with some of them becoming what now seem to be purely Vietnamese words. For example, the Vietnamese word for "station," *ga*, comes from the French *gare*. Similarly, the word for "doll," *búp bê* comes from the French *poupée*. The word for "pump" (*bom*) comes from *pompe*; the word for "chocolate" (*so co la*) from *chocolat*. English vocabulary has even more recently been entering the language, but to a much lesser extent than Chinese or even French words. Many English-language words have appeared quite recently and have not yet been Vietnamized. One occasionally sees in Vietnam today words like *club*, or *computer*, or *video*, even though Vietnamese already has words that mean exactly or much the same thing.

Because each syllable is written separately and usually has a meaning (as in Viet Nam), Vietnamese seems

to be, and is often called, a monosyllabic language. But compound and pseudocompound words are quite common. The words for "citizen," "virtue," and "Viet Nam" are compound words in Vietnamese. The Vietnamese word for "airplane," for example, is *may bay*. *May* means "machine" and *bay* means "to fly."

Vietnamese is also uninflected. There are no endings to distinguish tense or number or gender, subject from object, and so on. But future tense can be indicated by adding *se* in front of the verb. Thus "will fly" would be *se bay*. The past tense of "fly," "flew," would be *da bay*. Vietnamese speakers, however, use *se* and *da* sparingly, usually adding them only when necessary to avoid misunderstanding. Whether some action has already happened or will happen in the future is usually quite clear from context.

Vietnamese is also a tonal language. There are six distinct tones in the north and five in the south. In the example given above, the syllable *may*, which with a high rising tone means "to fly," would mean "eyebrow" with a low falling tone, or "lucky" with a level tone. The tone is thus an integral part of the word.

For many centuries, Vietnamese used the Chinese writing system. Classical Chinese was the official language of government and a common vehicle for literary expression. A system of writing called *Nom*, which recombined elements of Chinese characters to represent Vietnamese words, gradually evolved. By the thirteenth century it had begun to take shape as a useful system of writing and by the fifteenth century it had become a respectable and thoroughly adequate means of writing prose and poetry of the highest order. In the seventeenth century, Christian missionaries developed a phonetic, Romanized alphabet for writing Vietnamese. Early in the twentieth century this alphabet came into popular use. It soon replaced both *Nom* and Chinese characters. This writing system is now known as the "national language" (*quoc ngu*). Very few Vietnamese can now read Chinese characters and *Nom* can now be read only by a few dozen professional scholars.

In Vietnamese a person's family name (*ho*) comes first, and one's given name (what is often called the "first name" in English) comes last. Vietnamese are known mainly by their given names rather than by their family name. Let us take, for example, a Mr. Nguyen Van Ba. Nguyen would be his family name, Van his middle name, and Ba his given name. He would typically introduce himself and be addressed and referred to by others as "Mr. Ba" (*Ong Ba*). One reason for this may be that some family names (like Nguyen) are so common that most people would know many men with the family name of Nguyen but far fewer with the given name of Ba.

A final aspect of the language worth noting is the way Vietnamese address and refer to others and refer to themselves. The first person singular pronoun, "I" or "me" in English, *toi* in Vietnamese, is not often used in daily speech by native speakers of Vietnamese. There is not even a single word like the all-purpose pronoun "you" to use to address the person to whom one is speaking in Vietnamese. Instead of using somewhat neutral and impersonal pronouns like "I" or "me" or "you," Vietnamese usually use terms of kinship that express a relationship they have to the person to whom they are speaking.

In English, a child will address his or her mother as "mother." A Vietnamese child will not only do this, but will also refer to himself or herself (replacing both "I" and "me") as "child" (*con*). Even when speaking with people who are not relatives, kin terms are normally used, both for address and for self-reference. For example, older men are often addressed by one of several terms Vietnamese have for what we call "uncle." Depending on relative age, status, and degree of intimacy, a young Vietnamese may address an older man as "father's older brother" (*bac*) or "father's younger brother" (*chu*). He or she would then refer to himself or herself as *chau*, which can mean "niece" or "nephew" or "grandchild." Other common forms of address that take the place of "you" are "older brother" (*anh*), "older sister" (*chi*), and "father's sister" (*co*). The speaker would refer to himself or herself as *em* (meaning "younger sibling") or *chau*. Children are taught to make fine distinctions when using such terms with a wide variety of people as they are learning to talk.

As these examples clearly show, there are different terms for mother's relatives and father's relatives, and for older and younger siblings in the speaker's generation and his parents' generation. People also always take account of the relative age and status of the people to whom they are speaking. The Vietnamese language is thus hierarchical in nature. The English terms "I" and "you" imply a relationship of relative independence and equality, while Vietnamese speak in ways that express inequality and relationship. For some time, the Communist Party in Vietnam tried to introduce the use of the word "comrade" (*dong chi*) to reduce the sense of hierarchy in Vietnamese interpersonal relationships, but today the word is hardly ever spoken outside of party circles.

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VIETNAMESE, OVERSEAS In the early part of the twentieth century, the *Viet Kieu* (Vietnamese sojourners abroad) living in small settlements around the Indochina peninsula could be counted in thousands of families. By the century's end, they numbered 3 million in approximately seventy countries around the world.

Precolonial and Colonial *Viet Kieu*

Before French colonization (1859–1954), most *Viet Kieu* lived in Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and southern China. While short-distance moves were usually made for economic reasons, long journeys often had a political or religious dimension. Diplomats and artisans traveled to China, while many Vietnamese in Siam (now Thailand) were refugees from nineteenth-century religious persecutions. With the exception of Vietnamese Catholic villages along the Mekong River in Thailand, few traces remain of these precolonial movements. Today's Vietnamese diaspora is made up of twentieth-century migrants.

Their first community was formed as a result of French colonialism. Ocean travel opened emigration to destinations beyond the Indochina peninsula. The French transported prisoners to New Caledonia and the New Hebrides, followed in later years by plantation and mine workers. During the two World Wars, workers were sent to French factories in Europe. Between the wars, students were sent to universities in France. And a small number of Vietnamese simply traveled to France. Among these was the man later known as Ho Chi Minh (1892–1969), who learned his Communism in Paris (1910s), returned home with it (1940s), and led an independence war that ended with the French withdrawal (1954). On independence, some Vietnamese associated with the colonial power went to France. Traditions of study in Paris persisted

during the war against the United States, as some families sought to spare their children from military conscription. By the end of the war (1975), France was home to over fifty thousand *Viet Kieu*.

Prior to independence, other political dissenters also chose the route of emigration. Intellectuals joined Phan Boi Chau (1867–1940) in Japan (1905–1909). Independence activists worked in southern China and Thailand. Existing communities of Vietnamese in Thailand were later joined by fifty thousand *Viet Kieu* from Laos, who fled the French army's violent reoccupation of Laos (1946), crossing the Mekong into Thailand. However, the refugees' support for Ho Chi Minh and Thailand's alliance with the United States made their presence there increasingly awkward. Some returned to North Vietnam (1960–1964). Others were subject to restrictions on their civil rights, becoming eligible for Thai nationality only after Vietnam's 1995 entry into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Postcolonial *Viet Kieu*

A second community was formed in the wake of the Vietnam War. At the end of the war, 140,000 Vietnamese fled with the U.S. forces. They formed the nucleus of today's population of more than 1 million Vietnamese in the United States. Later refugees also went to Australia, Canada, China, France, Great Britain, and West Germany. They traveled by boat, via refugee camps in Southeast Asia, by land into China and Cambodia, and by airplane in a program designed to stem the flow of boat people. Yet the flow continued for twenty years. At first, most refugees were people associated with the old regime in South Vietnam. In the late 1970s, they were ethnic Chinese, expelled as a result of Vietnam's conflict with China (1979). By the 1980s, many boat people were northerners, tired of the failures of Communism and attracted by dreams of "paradise" in the West.

Resettlement policies varied. In China, the 300,000 refugees were sent to state farms near the border. Western countries, however, attempted to disperse them. Inhabitants of towns throughout North America, Australia, and Europe remember the arrival of a few Vietnamese families during the boat-people crisis. They also remember their departure, as they moved on to California (Orange county's Little Saigon), Sydney (the suburb of Cabramatta), and Paris (the thirteenth arrondissement). But many *Viet Kieu* are now reluctant to stay in Vietnamese suburbs. Socioeconomic success, acquired through commerce and education, is expressed in a move away and integration into a local middle class. For many, the Little Saigons have now become places to shop rather than live. They



HOI AN—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

A UNESCO World Heritage Site since 1999, the Vietnamese port city of Hoi An is a colorful demonstration of the divergent cultural influences on Vietnam between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries.



A Vietnamese grocery store in Garden Grove, California, in 1986. (JOSEPH SOHM; CHROMOSOHM INC./CORBIS)

are places, too, from where the *Viet Kieu* send remittances to their relatives in Vietnam, which since the early 1980s have had an important impact on the country's economy.

Gradual integration also characterized the political outlook of the *Viet Kieu*. On arrival, many sought to hasten their return home, forming organizations dedicated to the overthrow of the Communist government. In Vietnam, the term *Viet Kieu* became associated with anti-Communism. In the 1990s, however, many *Viet Kieu* returned to Vietnam, holding Western passports stamped with tourist or business visas issued by the Vietnamese government. Sentiments of anti-Communism are now expressions of community membership more often than strong political beliefs.

A third *Viet Kieu* community was formed beginning in 1980, through Vietnam's repayment of its national debt to the Soviet Union with the labor of 300,000 workers in the factories of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. After the collapse of European Communism, many stayed behind. Leaving the factories, they established trading businesses and played an influential role in Central Europe's underground economies. Many retain Vietnamese passports and—untainted by anti-Communism—they are not known as *Viet Kieu*. The current term *nguai Viet Nam o nuoc ngoai* ("Vietnamese living abroad") includes this "loyal" population in a broader category, distinguishing them from politicized communities.

Overseas Vietnamese in the Twenty-First Century

The overseas Vietnamese make up three communities, formed as a result of Vietnam's relations with its former colonial ruler (France) and the Cold War

superpowers (the United States, the Soviet Union, and China). These relations, of collaboration or opposition, molded the attitudes of the expatriate community toward Vietnam. But in the twenty-first century, as their socioeconomic integration proceeds and memories of the Cold War fade, the depoliticization of these communities is underway. Meanwhile, new overseas migrations are taking place, with journeys of marital union and family reunion. Contract workers travel to Taiwan, Korea, Laos, and Samoa, and prostitutes seek lucrative markets in Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong. The overseas Vietnamese used to resemble the Cubans in Florida, defined by their opposition to Communism. Vietnam's twenty-first-century emigrants may better be compared to those of other Southeast Asian countries. Most are contract workers, illegal immigrants, and businesspeople.

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VIJAYANAGARA EMPIRE Vijayanagara, the "City of Victory," the greatest of all medieval Hindu capitals, was founded in 1336 CE by Hukka and Bukka, two princes of a local family, the Sangama. This dynasty rapidly extended its control over the whole of

southern India. The power vacuum left in this region after the disruption caused by the Muslim invaders in the early years of the fourteenth century created the ideal political situation for the emergence of a new ruling house.

The Vijayanagara empire, until 1565, the year of its fall, was ruled by three dynasties, the Sangama (1336–1485), the Saluva (1485–1505), and the Tuluva (1505–1570). The most distinguished king, not only in Vijayanagara history but also in the history of medieval India, was Krishnadevaraya (1509–1529). His campaigns against both the sultans of the Deccan in the north and the Gajapati dynasty of Orissa in the east were successful. At the same time, he maintained good relations with the Portuguese on the west coast. Krishnadevaraya was an accomplished scholar and poet in Sanskrit and Telugu, and his reign saw arts, architecture, engineering, and learning flourish. He renovated and built temples throughout the empire to which he gave generous gifts; he also endowed religious institutions.

Krishnadevaraya's half-brother Achyutaraya (1529–1542) succeeded him and continued the same enlightened policy. However, in the power struggle following his death, the faction led by Ramaraya, Krishnadevaraya's son-in-law, triumphed, and Sadashiva, Krishnadevaraya's nephew, was placed on the throne with Ramaraya as regent. The regent became involved in rivalries among the Deccan sultans with fatal consequences. At the end of a long series of alliances and wars, resulting in territorial gains and increased political power for Vijayanagara, the Deccan sultans buried their differences and in a joint action defeated Ramaraya in a decisive battle at Talikota (now in northern Karnataka) in January 1565. The invading armies of the sultans occupied, sacked, and torched the capital for six months. The Vijayanagara state never fully recovered, and Vijayanagara ceased to be the capital. Two years later, tigers were reportedly roaming through the ruins.

It has often been stated that Vijayanagara was founded in an attempt to establish a new political and moral order based on traditional Hindu cultural values. Although the wars against the sultans of the Deccan were frequent, their cause was more political and economical than religious. On the one hand, the victims of Vijayanagara expansion were not always Muslim, but often were minor Hindu dynasties. On the other hand, a strong contingent of Muslim troops was crucial for the successes of the Vijayanagara army. The Vijayanagara power, however, limited the expansion of the Muslim power in the Deccan for over two cen-

turies and created the conditions for the flourishing of Hindu culture and institutions.

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VINDHYA MOUNTAINS The Vindhya Mountains, an east-west range in central India, divide the subcontinent into two major geographical zones, the Indo-Gangetic Plain to the north and the Deccan Plateau to the south. The range reaches heights of 500–1,500 meters, and forms the northern edge of the Narmada Valley. Uniting the Eastern and Western Ghats at its two extremities, the range forms one side of the triangle known as the Deccan Plateau. The Vindhyas contain some of the oldest rocks in India—granites, schists, and marbles—and are geologically the northern front of Gondwanaland where it abuts the Himalayas. The Indo-Gangetic Plain is the infilling of a trough between the two.

The Vindhyas have been of crucial importance in the historical geography of India because they were sufficiently high to dissuade most invading groups from pushing further south into the Deccan Plateau, instead deflecting invaders eastward along the Gangetic Plain. The Vindhyas are largely inhabited by such important Scheduled Tribes as the Bhils.

Paul Hockings

VISAYAN ISLANDS (2000 est. pop. 15.5 million). Surrounded by the Visayan Sea and the Philippine Sea, the Visayan Islands lie in the central part of the Philippine archipelago, between Luzon and Mindanao Islands. The group includes several major islands: Bohol (land area 3,865 square kilometers), Cebu (land area 4,422 square kilometers), Leyte (land area 7,214 square kilometers), Negros (land area 12,705 square kilometers), Panay (land area 11,515 square kilometers), Samar (land area 13,080 square kilometers), and Masbate (land area 3,269 square kilometers). There are also hundreds of small islands in the group.

The Visayas are traditionally divided into three geographic areas: the Eastern Visayas (Samar and Leyte) with a population of 3,610,355 (2000 census); the Western Visayas (Negros and Panay) with a population of 6,208,733 (2000 census); and the Central Visayas (Bohol and Cebu) with a population of 5,701,064 (2000 census).

The Eastern Visayas are the least-developed and least-populated islands in this group, due to frequent typhoons during the wet season; because they act as a buffer, the other Visayas enjoy a mild climate suitable to intensive agriculture. The population in the Eastern Visayas relies largely on fishing and agriculture (abaca or Manila hemp, a fiber from the banana leaf-stalk; coconuts; rice; and corn). Copper mining, deforestation, and industrial development have caused serious ecological problems on Samar Island.

Better developed due to the mild climate, the Western Visayas are important commercial and agricultural centers for the Philippine economy and produce sugar (both for internal consumption and for export), abaca, coconuts, corn, tobacco, minerals, and timber.

The Central Visayas are among most developed and most densely populated regions in the Philippines. Cebu, the first capital of the Philippines, is situated here. The Central Visayas host many industries, including textiles, footwear, mining (coal, copper, limestone, silver), food processing, and furniture. This area is also a major tourist attraction.

For centuries before European colonization, Malays from the Malay Peninsula and Borneo Island successfully traded with the Philippine Archipelago and often settled there. The modern history of the Visayas began on 7 April 1521, when Ferdinand Magellan (c. 1480–1521), the Portuguese explorer, landed on Cebu Island. Almost half a century later, the Spanish, led by Miguel Lopez de Legazpi (c. 1510–1572), established a settlement and a Catholic mission on Cebu Island on 27 April 1565, making Cebu City a major center for the further colonization of the archipelago.

Rafis Abazov

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VISHAKHAPATNAM (2001 est. pop. 1.1 million). Vishakhapatnam (Vizagapatam, or Vizag) is an important industrial city and seaport on the east coast of India, and the headquarters of Vishakhapatnam District in the northeast corner of Andhra Pradesh state. The city lies on a small bay 600 kilometers northeast of Madras and includes the old resort of Waltair, reputed to have the finest beach in India. The population was 752,000 in 1991, having grown eighteenfold since the beginning of the century. Vishakhapatnam has a large oil refinery and a shipbuilding industry. Mangane ore, rice, and sugar are also produced in the area.

A British factory, established in Vishakhapatnam, early in the seventeenth century, was captured by the French in 1757, but was recovered within a few months. There was a minor sepoy revolt in 1780; otherwise, the town has been remarkably peaceful and prosperous in modern times. Sixteen kilometers north of the city is the thirteenth-century sanctuary of Simhachalam, with a stupa and monastery secluded in the wooded Kailasa Hills. The monastery remains a popular site of Hindu worship.

Paul Hockings

VIVEKANANDA, SWAMI (1863–1902), Indian philosopher and religious leader. Swami Vivekananda (meaning "the bliss of spiritual discrimination") is the monastic name of Narendranath Datta. He was a major philosopher, author, social reformer, and religious and intellectual leader of India and the world. He brought back its original universalism to Hinduism, made it available to India and the world, and included service to humanity as an integral element of personal salvation.

Narendranath Datta was born in an affluent Westernized Bengali family in 1863. He received his bachelor's degree from Calcutta University in 1884. He was an accomplished classical musician and singer and knew Bengali, English, Sanskrit, Hindi, and French well. A member of the Brahmo sect, a vigorous monistic reformed version of Hinduism, Datta came in contact with Ramakrishna Paramhansa (1836–1886) in 1881. Ramakrishna was not formally learned but had an immense knowledge of all religions and accepted their validity as paths for personal salvation, though he was mainly a worshiper of the Omnipresent in the form of the goddess Kali. After much conflict, personal and with Ramakrishna, Datta finally accepted Ramakrishna as his spiritual adviser (guru) in 1885. He renounced the world, became a Sannyasi (Hindu monk), and commenced an intense study of philosophy and religion.

From 1890 to 1893, Vivekananda traversed all of India on foot and met people of all classes of society. He was moved by the poverty, ignorance, and ill health he saw. With the encouragement and support of the raja of Khettry, Vivekananda traveled to the United States to attend in September 1893 the World Parliament of Religions held in Chicago. His initial speech overwhelmed the audience. Through his many speaking engagements and his dynamic personality, he attracted many followers in the United States and later in Britain when he visited that country. Vedanta centers, or societies, were established in the West, and on his return to India, he established both a monastic order (the Ramakrishna Math) and a missionary society (Ramakrishna Mission), which manages hospitals, schools, colleges, and so forth, and which sends monks and devotees to disaster-stricken areas. Currently there are seventy such organizations in India, nineteen in the United States, and fourteen in other countries. Vivekananda's unique blend of Hindu universalism, personal salvation, and service to humanity form the philosophic backbone of these organizations.

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VO NGUYEN GIAP (b. 1911), general and commander of the People's Army of Vietnam. Vo Nguyen Giap is best known as the general and commander of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) during the Vietnamese resistance against France and the United States between 1946 and 1973. Giap is widely recognized as an expert in military science and particularly in logistics, tactics, and strategy. His personal style of conducting war, crafted from a wide array of sources and field experiences, enabled the Vietnamese armies under his command to oust both the French and U.S. military forces from his country.

Giap was born in Quan Binh Province in 1911 to a poor family that was fervently anti-French. After reading the writings of Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969), he joined the underground Communist Party in his teens and, because of his anti-French activities, was imprisoned by the French at the age of sixteen. After he was released, he entered the National University in Hanoi and earned a Bachelor of Law degree. After graduation, Giap became a public member of the Communist Party in 1937, coauthored the influential study



Retired General Vo Nguyen Giap in 1991. (VITTORIANO RASTELLI/CORBIS)

The Peasant Problem with Truong Chinh (1907–1988) in 1938, and in 1939 published *The Question of National Liberation in Indochina*, which stressed the importance of protracted warfare for defeating a foreign military adversary. He professed that revolutionary warfare passed through three stages: guerrilla warfare, strategic defensive, and counteroffensive, and worked later to follow this process against the French and the United States.

In 1940 he fled to China after the French banned the Communist Party. There he began a long relationship with Ho Chi Minh. Ho appointed Giap head of the anti-French guerrilla forces, later to be known as the Viet Minh, and ordered Giap to the mountainous region in northern Vietnam, where he successfully recruited and trained hill tribes and lowland Vietnamese for the anti-French cause. Giap's forces made their first attacks against French installations in December 1944 and later, after learning of the Japanese surrender in August 1945, marched his troops into Hanoi. The Viet Minh was able to claim control from the Red River to the Mekong Delta between 19 and 30 August, which enabled Ho to proclaim the new Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in September 1945. Giap became

the minister of the interior in the new government and later was promoted to the rank of full general and commander of all Viet Minh military forces.

During the ensuing Vietnamese-French war beginning in 1946, Giap shaped the new People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) into a strong and motivated fighting force with rigorous military training and a program of political indoctrination and education. He depicted Vietnam's war for independence as a political war first and a military one second, a people's war that involved total commitment from the population. His victory at Dien Bien Phu against the French in 1954 ensured his international recognition. After the French ouster from Indochina, Giap led the DRV forces against the Republic of Vietnam and the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. After Ho's death in 1969, Giap shared power in Hanoi with Le Duan (1908–1986) and Pham Van Dong (b. 1906). In 1972, after the failed Easter Offensive, Giap was replaced as commander of DRV forces but retained his position of minister of defense, which he held until 1980. In 1982 he lost his seat on the Politburo but remained very popular with the Vietnamese public. He spent the next years making trips to other Communist countries and in 1992 was awarded the Gold Star Order, Vietnam's highest decoration.

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VO VAN KIET (b. 1922), Vietnamese prime minister. Vo Van Kiet, considered a leading reformer, was born in 1922 in the city of Can Tho in southern Vietnam. He became involved in anticolonial and revolutionary activities in the 1940s. Following the August Revolution of 1945, Vo Van Kiet became an important member of the Vietnam Communist Party in southern Vietnam. In the early 1970s, he served as secretary of the Saigon Municipal Party Committee. After reunification in 1975, he was named chairman of

Ho Chi Minh City's People's Committee and in 1976 replaced Nguyen Van Linh as chairman of the Ho Chi Minh City Party Committee, a position he held until 1982. During this time, Vo Van Kiet established more liberal trade and commercial policies, which later became part of Vietnam's *doi moi* period. He became a member of the Politburo in 1982. He was named acting prime minister following the death of Pham Hung (1912–1988) but was defeated in an election for that post later that year. He was vice premier and chairman of the State Planning Commission in 1986 and then served as prime minister from 1992 to 1997. In 1997 he chose not to run for office and was replaced by Phan Van Khai (b. 1933).

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VOLCANOES Of the more than 1,500 potentially active volcanoes in the world, eight to ten are erupting at any given moment. On the bottom of the seabed circling the Pacific basin lies a series of volcanic arcs and oceanic trenches coinciding with the edges of one of Earth's main tectonic plates. This zone is called the Ring of Fire, because of its frequent earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. About 80 percent of these volcanoes are located in countries in Pacific Asia. The most volcanically active country in Asia is Indonesia, which has seventy-six historically active volcanoes, four-fifths of which erupted in the last century. Ten have erupted since 1990.

Volcanoes form when a break in Earth's crust allows magma (molten rock) and hot gas to reach the surface under pressure, resulting in dangerous eruptions. The main threats in the immediate area of these eruptions are high-speed, superheated toxic gases and debris (pyroclastic flows), blast effects, lava flows, volcanic earthquakes, landslides, and lahars (mudflows). Ash clouds or deposits and tsunamis (tidal waves) can be hazardous over a greater distance. Volcanoes can cause immense destruction to crops, forests, roads, and entire towns, resulting in many evacuees who must be sheltered, fed, and resettled.

While Japan's cone-shaped Mount Fuji presents an image of a volcano's majestic beauty, the volcanoes of the Philippines have earned the reputation of being the most deadly and costly in the world. On average



UJUANG KULON NATIONAL PARK-WORLD HERITAGE SITE

A UNESCO World Heritage Site since 1991, Ujung Kulon National Park is located on the southwest tip of the Indonesian island of Java. Ujung Kulon is home to a treasure trove of rare species and spectacular inland volcanoes.

over 13 percent of volcanic eruptions cause fatalities and 22 percent cause damage. The 1991 eruptions of Mount Pinatubo, for example, caused an estimated US\$260 million in damage. The series of eruptions lasted for months, producing the largest cloud of climate-modifying gases since mighty Krakatau erupted in Indonesia in 1883. Scientists estimated that Pinatubo's eruption added more aerosols (light gases and particles) than all human activity since the industrial revolution. The cooling effect of these particles on the atmosphere lasted for two years and temporarily more than offset any global-warming effect.

Many Asian countries have increased their volcano research and monitoring, to provide greater warning time of likely eruptions and to broaden natural-hazard management programs. Although these efforts help to mitigate the impacts of volcanic eruptions on humans and property, volcanic eruptions will persist as a significant natural hazard throughout countries located in Asia's Ring of Fire.

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VOLKSRAAD From the 1870s until the first half of the twentieth century, concern was expressed in the Netherlands over people's welfare in the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia). There were also calls within

the Indies itself for greater self-government. This gave rise to the Ethical Policy, whereby the Netherlands tried, among others, to bring indigenous elements into the colonial service, provide education, develop agriculture, establish health programs, and decentralize authority. This last objective saw the establishment of a Volksraad (People's Council), a single-chamber debating forum that lasted from 1918 to 1942.

Established on 18 May 1918, the Volksraad comprised both elected and appointed officials. Apart from being a place to voice ideas and criticisms, the council had no official powers, merely functioning in an advisory capacity. Dutch authorities were able to dominate the council through appointment of sympathetic elements and Dutch settlers. However, indigenous members (under 50 percent of the representatives) were able to communicate their desire for self-determination at this body, notably through insisting that Bahasa Melayu (Malay) be used alongside Dutch as a working language. In the year of the Volksraad's establishment, Dutch colonial authorities vaguely promised self-government in the "November Promise," which gave moderates hope of an evolutionary path to independence.

After its first decades, the council was strongly influenced by the political wing of Budi Utomo, an organization prepared to work within Dutch rule to achieve independence. However the failure of emergent political parties, such as Budi Utomo, to effect real change working within the Dutch administration lent greater credence to those, like Sukarno (Indonesia's founding president in 1945), who chose non-cooperation. In 1936, council member Sutardjo proposed self rule within ten years, but the proposal was obfuscated and dropped, disappointing those who favored working within the colonial administration. From then on the Volksraad was a dead letter.

The Volksraad had little impact on Dutch rule, as the Netherlands continued to solidify its grip on the archipelago, increasingly interfering in the everyday lives of the people. However the Volksraad was a factor in the emergence of a "pan-Indonesian" consciousness among the diverse peoples of the archipelago.

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WAHID, ABDURRAHMAN (b. 1940), president of Indonesia. Born in East Java in 1940, educated (although without formal degrees) in the Middle East and Europe, and heir to Muslim elite, Abdurrahman Wahid became the head of Nahdatul Ulama, Indonesia's largest Islamic organization, gained broad national respect for leadership and candor in criticizing the dictator Suharto in the 1990s, and finally established the National Awakening Party (PKB) to compete in 1999 in Indonesia's first relatively open parliamentary election in forty-four years.

Urbane, multilingual, courageous, and ecumenical, Abdurrahman Wahid (commonly called Gus Dur) was elected president of Indonesia in October 1999 by the



President Wahid at a press conference in Jakarta in November 1999. (AFP/CORBIS)

National Assembly (MPR), which also forced him from office less than two years later. Initially he was widely heralded as the perfect reformer and balm to deep national wounds from decades of autocracy, oppression, and corruption. In reality he faced crippling obstacles.

Voting irregularities and confusion in the constitutional process raised serious questions of legitimacy in Wahid's election. Military supremacy in actual governmental authority (the legacy of decades of dictatorship), pervasive institutional corruption, general economic implosion, and the marginality of his own electoral and political party base fatally constrained his presidential authority and influenced selection of his cabinet. Physical (and, reportedly, psychological) problems from recent strokes left him with sharply diminished motor coordination and energy, as well as near blindness. Soon, despite whirlwinds of international travel, jocularly effective cultivation of media and domestic publics, cheerleading about Indonesia's future, and a few reformist flourishes, Wahid proved incapable of governing. Erratic behavior, scapegoat-ism, and allegations of corruption accumulated quickly and led to his ouster by the MPR and replacement by his vice president, Megawati Sukarnoputri.

Roger Paget

WAKAYAMA (2002 est. pop. 1.2 million). Japan's Wakayama Prefecture is situated in the central part of the island of Honshu. Its 4,723 square kilometers encompass the almost completely mountainous terrain of the western Kii Peninsula. Wakayama is bordered by the Pacific Ocean, Kumano Sea, and Kii Channel,

and by Osaka, Nara, and Mie prefectures. Once known as Kii Province, it assumed its present name and borders in 1871.

The prefecture's capital is Wakayama, which grew up around a castle erected in 1585 by Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536–1598), one of Japan's three national unifiers. The prefecture has long been the home of the Koyasan Buddhist monastic complex and the Shinto Kumano Sanzan shrines. It was ruled through the Edo period (1600/1603–1868) by a branch of the Tokugawa family. The prefecture's other important cities are Tanabe, Kainan, and Singu.

The prefecture produces rice and mandarin oranges, and supports fishing and forestry. When the Hanshin Industrial Zone was extended southward from Osaka, it brought chemical, steel, and electrical equipment plants to supplement Wakayama's traditional spinning, and furniture-making and papermaking industries. Visitors are drawn to the area's coastal scenic attractions and to sacred Nachi Falls, one of the nation's highest.

E. L. S. Weber

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WAKHAN Wakhan is a high, narrow valley in the Pamir Mountains of northeastern Afghanistan, between Tajikistan and Pakistan. It is located in northeastern Badakhshan Province around the Wakhan River and extends from Ishkashim in the west to China in the east. The Great Silk Road passed through Wakhan, and Marco Polo is said to have stopped there on his way to China.

In 1896, the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission awarded this area to Afghanistan in order to create a buffer zone between British India and Russia; thereafter, the area became known as the Wakhan Corridor. Previously, it had been an autonomous region ruled by an independent emir (prince) until 1882, when it came under the administrative control of the governor of Badakhshan.

The region is known for its biodiversity. It has an alpine fauna, which provides a good habitat for the famous Marco Polo sheep, ibex, snow leopard, and brown bear. The area is also rich in lapis lazuli, the rare, bright blue semiprecious stone much prized in antiquity.

Its inhabitants are the Wakhis and Tajik, who live along the upper reaches of the Panj River and who

speak an Indo-Aryan language. The main occupations are farming (wheat, barley, and legumes), and herding (cattle, sheep, and goats). As well, there are Kyrgyz herders, who have domesticated the yak. Both the yak and the two-humped Bactrian camel are important beasts of burden in the region.

Before the Marxist coup in 1978 (known as the Saur Revolt), the Corridor attracted hunters who came for the Marco Polo sheep, as well mountain climbers. Few outsiders currently venture into the area, but this may change as the region stabilizes.

Nirmal Dass

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WALI ALLAH, SHAH (1703–1762), Indian theologian. Shah Wali Allah Dihlawi, a leading Muslim theologian and intellectual of India, was born in Delhi to an important family at the court of the Mughal emperors. An exceptional student, in 1719 Wali Allah succeeded his father as head of the religious college, Madrasah Rahimiyya, in Delhi. In 1731 he made the pilgrimage to Mecca, where he remained for fourteen months before returning to Delhi. During his stay in Arabia he studied Islamic law, hadith (narratives of Muhammad's life), and mysticism with eminent scholars who influenced his religious beliefs.

During the next thirty years he dedicated himself to teaching and writing on hadith traditions and Islamic law, in Arabic and Persian. Wali Allah is considered the father of Indian Islamic modernism and a major figure in the Islamic intellectual revival. He used a systematic historical approach to try to renovate traditional religious thought organized around the doctrine of *tatbiq* (conciliation)—a method for mitigating the conflict between Sufi mystical doctrines and theological dogmatism.

In his analyses Wali Allah underlined the importance of social and economic welfare, linking the degeneration of Islamic thought and practices to the economic and social decadence of Indian Muslims. His ideas influenced several religious and political revolutionary movements in the Indian subcontinent in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Riccardo Redaelli

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WAN AHMAD (d. 1914), ruler of the Malay state of Pahang. Wan Ahmad was the all-powerful *bendahara* (1863–1887) and first sultan (1887–1914) of the peninsular Malay state of Pahang, who for two decades resisted British influence. Born into the hereditary line of *bendahara* (prime ministers), Wan Ahmad was the son of Bendahara Tun Ali (1806–1857). He had to struggle in a bitter, devastating six-year civil war (1858–1863) against his half-brother, Tun Mutahir. He prevailed in May 1863 and having assumed the title of *bendahara*, ruled Pahang with an iron fist.

The rumored potential economic resources of Pahang and the fear that other European powers (notably France and Germany) might gain a foothold there made it imperative for the British to pressure Wan Ahmad to accept the Residential system. Through the efforts of Hugh Clifford, Wan Ahmad signed a treaty in October 1887 to accept a British Agent; the British in turn recognized him as sultan of Pahang. Although some quarters perceived Wan Ahmad to be kind and generous, others, including Clifford, saw him as ruthless.

In 1888, Wan Ahmad bowed to British pressure and agreed to receive a British Resident. Theoretically the British Resident served as an adviser to the sultan on all matters excluding those relating to Malay customs and the Islamic faith. In practice, however, the Resident exercised executive power. After 1889, Wan Ahmad, who detested the new regime, withdrew to the background, but lent his tacit support to disaffected Pahang Malay chiefs, whose dissatisfaction with the British system of governance erupted in an anti-British resistance in the 1890s.

Ooi Keat Gin

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WANDERING SOULS In Vietnam obsequies customarily have been performed to ward against the

possibility of the deceased's becoming an errant, malevolent being, or "wandering soul." The Vietnamese have traditionally believed that the souls of those who have died have influence over, and can be influenced by, actions and events in the world of the living. It is thought that when they die, the departed want and need ritual support from the living. For almost everyone, this support is provided by their family. Vietnamese understand "family" to extend across many generations, including both the living and the dead.

A series of rituals are held for the deceased. The full set, now often simplified by many people, would include rituals held immediately after death, at the funeral, at burial (sometimes reburial), at weekly intervals for seven weeks, and finally after one hundred days. Additionally, ritual celebrations are still held for departed family members on the anniversary of their death, and rituals are organized on New Year's Eve to welcome the ancestors who, it is believed, come to share in this big family celebration. Important events are reported to the ancestors.

Under ideal circumstances, the deceased remain participating members of the family—contented, happy, quiet, invisible. They are often thought to provide their descendants with advice, warning of danger, or good luck. But those unfortunate people who die without descendants, or violently, or far from home, or for any reason lack the necessary assistance of incense and offerings may become errant spirits, or wandering souls. These spirits are believed to be miserable, discontented, and sometimes dangerous to the living. Vietnamese have always had some means of guarding against these spirits and of helping them to find peace.

Well into the twentieth century, on the outskirts of many Vietnamese villages, a plot of land was set aside as a burial ground. Beside the burial ground there was often a modest building known as the "temple of wandering souls" (*am chung simb*). Such temples were simply a place to make sacrifices to wandering souls. Often, an older woman, sometimes a shaman, lived at or near the temple and made periodic offerings to wandering souls. Village groups or individual households put out rice gruel and made other ritual offerings to the souls, especially on the fifteenth day of the seventh lunar month. On this day, in various ways, individually and in groups, villages commemorated wandering souls and tried to placate them and even help them find peace. Some of these practices have become rare in recent decades, or have been greatly simplified.

Even now, on this day, exactly the middle of the lunar year, a special ceremony, usually the most important of the year, is organized in Buddhist pagodas

throughout Vietnam. Many Vietnamese associate this day and this Buddhist tradition with the tale of Mu Lien, a Buddhist monk who went into hell to plead successfully for the release of his mother. But in this case, offerings are made to plead for the salvation of all discontented spirits, including those in hell, in the Buddhist spirit of charity.

Neil Jamieson

See also: **Ancestor Worship—East Asia**

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WANG JINGWEI (1883–1944), leader of China's Nationalist Party. Wang Jingwei was an early leader of China's Nationalist Party (Guomindang), whose fierce rivalry with Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) led him to collaborate with the Japanese during World War II. Born in Guangzhou (Canton), Wang won a government scholarship to study in Japan, where he received a degree from Tokyo Law College in 1906. While in Tokyo, he joined Sun Yat-sen's (1866–1925) National Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmenghui) in 1905. Wang, who demonstrated considerable writing and speaking skills, quickly rose to a prominent position in the movement. Imprisoned for participation in a plot to assassinate the Qing regent Prince Chun in 1910, Wang was released after the fall of the Manchus, or Qing dynasty (1644–1912).

Although Wang was hailed as a hero for his revolutionary activities, he left China in 1912 after the assumption of power by the militarist Yuan Shikai (1859–1916). Returning in 1917, Wang rejoined Sun in Guangzhou, where they worked to reorganize the Nationalist Party (Guomindang, as the Tongmenghui had been renamed) and build an army with the ultimate goal of reunifying China. Sun's death in 1925 left Wang seemingly positioned to take control of the Party, but his path was blocked by a new rival, Chiang Kai-shek. Although Chiang was a relative newcomer to the Nationalists and lacked Wang's revolutionary credentials, he did control the army. This would prove decisive in the coming power struggle.

As the Nationalists and their allies (including the nascent Chinese Communist Party) embarked on the

Northern Expedition to reunify China, Wang emerged as the leader of the left wing of the Party (favoring the alliance with the Communists), while Chiang headed the right wing, which opposed the alliance. This dispute led briefly to the formation of separate Nationalist governments headed by Wang in Wuhan and Chiang in Nanjing. Wang later broke with the Communists and mended fences with Chiang in a show of unity following the Japanese invasion of 1931.

As titular head of the Nationalist government in Nanjing from 1932 to 1935, Wang was forced to appease the Japanese, while Chiang led the army in a campaign to exterminate the Communists. To recover from an assassination attempt, the disillusioned Wang resigned and left China in 1935. He returned after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and pessimistic about China's military prospects, attempted to persuade Chiang to make peace with Japan. After escaping another assassination attempt by Nationalist agents, Wang fled to occupied China, where the Japanese Army installed him as head of the puppet "Reorganized Nationalist Government" in Nanjing in March 1940. Wang's hopes of presenting himself as a credible alternative to Chiang, however, were dashed by the harsh reality of Japanese military domination. Wang died on 10 November 1944, while undergoing medical treatment in Nagoya, Japan.

John M. Jennings

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WANG KON (877–943), founder of the Koryo dynasty, Korea. Wang Kon, posthumously known as T'aejo, was born in Songak (modern Kaesong, North Korea). He came from a prominent merchant family that had built up its wealth in the China trade. At the start of the tenth century, Wang Kon became a major lieutenant to a regional lord, Kungye (d. 918). Under him, Wang Kon proved to be both an able soldier on land and a skilled commander at sea. In 918, wearied by Kungye's tyrannical acts, Wang Kon overthrew Kungye and founded a new dynasty called Koryo (918–1392).

From his capital at Songak, Wang Kon struggled to unify the Korean peninsula. In 935, the former

Shilla kingdom (57 BCE–935 CE) peacefully surrendered to Koryo, and then in 936 Wang Kon forced the other rival state, Later Paekche (18 BCE–663 CE), to submit. With the kingdom unified, Wang Kon spent the remainder of his reign stabilizing the dynasty. He married twenty-nine women from various parts of the peninsula, used both indigenous techniques and political institutions modeled on Chinese practices, and turned to Buddhism as ways to unify the country. Before he died, he issued Ten Injunctions instructing his descendants how to govern so as to ensure the success of the dynasty. These Ten Injunctions serve as an excellent political and intellectual statement of the era. Three of Wang Kon's sons succeeded him as monarchs.

Edward J. Shultz

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Wang Yiting was also a generous supporter of artists and helped to found many important art societies in Shanghai. He was proficient in painting historical figures, folk legends, birds with flowers, animals, and landscapes and was particularly renowned for his Buddhist figures and dragons. In later life, Wang became a devout Buddhist and once served as the president of the Chinese Buddhist Association.


Kuiyi Shen

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WANGCHUCK, JIGME SINGYE (b. 1955), King of Bhutan. Fourth of the Wangchuck dynasty founded by Ugyen Wangchuck in 1907, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck was born in Dechenchholing Palace, Thimphu (the capital of Bhutan), on 11 November 1955 and was educated in Bhutan and in England. He ascended the throne in 1972, following the premature death of his father, Jigme Dorje Wangchuck. He was crowned in 1974, the coronation allowing the outside world a rare glimpse of the remote Himalayan kingdom. The Wangchuck family claims descent from the most famous Bhutanese saint, Pema Lingpa (1450–1521). In 1988 the king married four sisters related, according to tradition, to an incarnation of the founder of the Bhutanese state, Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyal (1594–c. 1651). The crown prince is the king's eldest son, Jigme Khesar Namgyal (b. 1980).

The king maintains a policy of balancing modernization with tradition, called Gross National Happiness. He believes that as a small, landlocked, and undeveloped country, Bhutan must promote national unity based on the Bhutanese cultural heritage, including environmental awareness, while expanding its international role in the U.N., South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, or SAARC (which includes



King Jigme Singye Wangchuck. (ALAIN LE GARSMEUR/CORBIS)

India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Nepal), and other bodies.

Although a proactive ruler, the king has gradually yielded more power to his ministers. Since 1998 a rotating chairman of the Council of Ministers functions as head of government. The king has also reduced the powers of the civil service, privatized many state enterprises, and devolved decision making to the local level. He has also pledged to make himself personally responsible for the solution of the so-called southern problem of Bhutanese refugees in Nepal and has toured the country repeatedly requesting southern Bhutanese not to leave.

Michael Kowalewski

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WARRING STATES PERIOD-CHINA

The name "Warring States" (*Zhanguo*) refers to a period of Chinese history ending with the unification of China under the first emperor of the Qin dynasty in 221 BCE. While there is universal agreement that the Warring States period ended in 221, the date of its beginning is a matter of convention: some place it in 481, when the chronicle known as *Chunqiu* (Springs and Autumns) draws to a close; others in 453, when the state of Jin was divided into three territories; still others in 403, when each of these three new states was formally recognized by the Zhou king. For the purposes of this book, the Warring States period begins in 475 BCE, the first year of the reign of Viscount Xiang of Zhao, one of the three states that supplanted Jin. The Warring States period constitutes the second half of the Eastern Zhou dynasty (770–221 BCE), while the first half of the Eastern Zhou dynasty is known as the Spring and Autumn period (770–476) BCE, after the chronicle of the same name.

The Eastern Zhou kings were recognized as the Heaven-ordained rulers of the terrestrial world, but they were forced over the centuries to cede more and more power to the feudal lords occupying the lands around them. During this time, the most powerful of the semi-independent statelets gradually conquered and annexed their neighbors, so that by the Warring States period, only eight contenders remained: Zhou, Qin, Qi, Chu, Zhao, Wei, Han, and Yan. In 256 BCE, the last Zhou king, who was by this time nothing more than a figurehead, was finally deposed,

and the Chinese world awaited the final victory of the state of Qin.

Political Changes in Warring States Times

The political landscape of the Warring States period was determined by the intensification of several interrelated geopolitical processes that began in the Spring and Autumn period: the ongoing decline of centralized power, the rise of warlike and expansionist states with their own domestic and foreign policies, and the continual diminution in the number of autonomous states as the weakest were annihilated by the strongest. By Warring States times, these underlying historical forces had brought about pervasive political, economic, social, and intellectual changes that radically transformed the character of Chinese life.

"Agriculture and war" became a popular slogan, as states recognized the substantial benefits of a healthy economy and a mighty army. As the stakes of battle rose, the conception of war necessarily changed from a ritualized competition between educated aristocrats (as in the Spring and Autumn period) to a lawless and bloody struggle between infantry armies as large as could be mustered.

The logistical problems associated with raising, training, and supplying a massive army induced rulers to rethink their approach to governing their territories. Those rulers who could most fully exploit their resources gained a sizable advantage in the theater of war. Thus the demands of battle led to the restructuring of the state as a vast production ground of people and munitions, maintained by an efficient and organized administration and serving a single king, to whom the entire population owed unquestioning allegiance. Kinship ties, ritual obligations, and traditional practice, which had been significant considerations guiding human action in earlier times, were now subordinated to the material requirements of the "warring state." In this manner, the imperial model of Chinese statecraft was being forged even before the establishment of the empire itself. The governments of the Qin and Han dynasties were largely based on the precedents of the Warring States.

Birth of Chinese Philosophy

The Warring States period is celebrated as the foundational era of Chinese philosophy. Historians sometimes ask why such a tumultuous and perilous time provided the context for some of the most sophisticated philosophers in Chinese history, but the reasons for this intellectual burgeoning are not obscure. The competing lords valued any resource that



CHINA—HISTORICAL PERIODS

Xia dynasty (2100–1766 BCE)
 Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE)
 Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE)
 Western Zhou (1045–771 BCE)
 Eastern Zhou (770–221 BCE)
 Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE)
 Warring States period (475–221 BCE)
 Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE)
 Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE)
 Three Kingdoms period (220–265 CE)
 North and South dynasties (220–589 CE)
 Sui dynasty (581–618 CE)
 Tang dynasty (618–907 CE)
 Five Dynasties period (907–960 CE)
 Song dynasty (960–1279)
 Northern Song (960–1126)
 Southern Song (1127–1279)
 Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234)
 Yuan dynasty (1279–1368)
 Ming dynasty (1368–1644)
 Qing dynasty (1644–1912)
 Republican China (1912–1927)
 People's Republic of China (1949–present)
 Republic of China (1949–present)
 Cultural Revolution (1966–1976)

might aid them in their quest for world dominion, and so they were willing to listen to new ideas. The old ways, after all, were leading the Zhou dynasty to assured extinction. The demand for original thinkers resulted in the growth of a new profession: "wandering persuaders" (*youshui*), who traveled freely from state to state in search of landed patrons, earning their bread alongside diplomats, generals, diviners, and other educated specialists.

The two foremost philosophical schools in Warring States times were those of the Confucians and the Mohists. The former were followers of the ethical worldview laid down by Confucius (Kong Qiu, 551–479 BCE); the latter group was founded by Mozi, or Master Mo (Mo Di, c. 480–c. 390 BCE), who preached a philosophy of "universal love" (*jian'ai*). The Confucians and Mohists were irreconcilable enemies—Confucians could never accept the Mohist tenet that one should love the father of one's neighbor as one loves one's own father—but they were alike in that their doctrines did not always coincide with the desires of the lords whom they served. Confucians, for example, believed that loyal advisers should remon-

strate (*jian*) with their lord when he was in error, and their outspoken criticism often alienated their superiors. Mohists, for their part, believed that human acquisitiveness was at the root of all suffering in the world, and they actively disrupted campaigns of conquest in the hope of deterring warlords from preying on their neighbors.

Other philosophical orientations were more amenable to the aspirations of rulers. Political philosophers such as Shan Buhai (flourished 354–340 BCE), Shen Dao (b. c. 360 BCE), and Han Fei (d. 233 BCE) formulated an ideal of statecraft (often misleadingly called "legalism") that relied on standardized laws, protobureaucratic administrative systems, and unfailing adherence to the protocols of reward and punishment. The political aspect of philosophy was so important that even the *Laozi* (or *Daode jing*), a text whose primary purpose is to elucidate the benign cosmological notion of "the Way" (*dao*), takes pains to point out the political applications of its teachings.

Paul R. Goldin

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WAT XIENG KHOUAN Wat Xieng Khouan or the Buddha Park is a cement sculpture garden of religious, mythological, and secular beings located approximately 20 kilometers south of Viengchan by the Mekong River in Laos. The creator of the sculpture garden, Luang Pou Bounluea Salithat (1920?–1996), studied both Buddhism and Hinduism but never completed his ordination into Buddhist monkhood. Based on his prophetic dreams and meditation practice, he developed a religious community of Lao, Thai, and foreign laypeople.

In the late 1950s, he oversaw the creation of the images for the park—phantasmic imagery that includes the Buddha in different postures, other gods in the Hindu and Buddhist pantheons, mythological animals

such as the *naga* or serpent god, and humans who were prominent religious figures. One unique sculpture is a life-size pumpkin containing three levels. The lower level is hell; the middle level is the earth; and the upper level is heaven.

Wat Xieng Khouan was never a Buddhist temple, but received its name from all the religious images it contains. The socialist government presently runs Wat Xieng Khouan as a public park and a tourist attraction.

After the Communist takeover in 1975, Luang Pou Bounluea left Laos and went to live across the border in Nongkhai, Thailand. He then commenced to create a second sculpture park on the Mekong River bank in Thailand, opposite the original park.

Linda McIntosh

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WATER ISSUES For the people who live in Asia, daily life depends on the freshwater that reaches their fields, serves their households, and provides means of transportation. Agriculture consumes 70 percent of freshwater available around the world. Water scarcity and quality have emerged to threaten public health, economic productivity, and even food security in parts of the continent.

Water has become an increasingly critical natural resource for many Asian states' residents, technicians, and leaders. The continent's greatest challenge is to ensure sustainable access to freshwater resources. The specific water issues discussed here bear witness to the vulnerability of ecosystems to change in the domestic and international political environments.

Governance entails management of water resources at the regional, national, and local levels. Water governance refers to a range of economic, political, and administrative systems put in place to develop and manage water resources, as well as to provide water services. Water governance draws on issues in the public sphere, invoking the interventions of state and, increasingly, multilateral parastatal institutions.

Throughout the second half of the twentieth century in particular, public and multinational officials sought to promote economic and social development through intervention in water distribution for use in agriculture and industry. Interventions dedicated to the storage and seasonal management of Asia's fresh-

water—ranging from hydroelectric dams to forestry and intensive agriculture programs—are the topic of public discussions among Asian political communities. Modernist visions for quality of life include access to potable water and services as well as intensive agricultural cultivation. Considered in the light of water governance, these interventions generated water-management issues specific to Central Asia.

Urban Drinking Water, Sanitation, and Material Quality-of-Life Indicators

Water issues are central to the expansion of modern infrastructure serving Asia's residents. Officials argue the value of such interventions in raising the quality of life for Asia's residents, citing that of the 3.5 billion people living in Asia in 1995, 830 million lacked access to treated drinking water, and 2 billion had no access to sanitary waste disposal.

Demographers note that Asia's population growth is increasingly concentrated in large cities, as a result of population growth and rural-urban migration. It is projected that following the year 2020, the developing world's population growth will occur mainly in urban areas. By the middle of the twenty-first century, villages will cease to exist in many countries—including in Asia—and poverty will have been transferred to urban areas.

In Asia's modern states, water systems are centralized, depending on public investment and transfers of resources from central governments. Yet the large cities of Asia are characterized by permanent, informal settlements with restricted access to modern facilities. Consequently, residents are less likely to have access to potable water and private toilets than are people in smaller towns and even villages.

Data from many developing-states' cities suggest that the substantial progress in improving water and sanitation in recent decades is now being reversed. For this reason, analysts suggest that future water and sanitation policies and strategies be directed to urban areas, particularly to periurban areas and satellite towns where the most disadvantaged people live.

Decreasing Volume of Available Water Resources

There is a drastic decrease in the amount of water available in the Aral Sea basin, located between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan's western area, along the Syr Dar'ya River to the Aral Sea, is relatively unpopulated, with large stretches of uncultivated desert landscape; the concentration on few commodi-

ties has resulted in common water issues shared among Central Asian communities.

In 1960, the Aral Sea was the world's fourth-largest sea. Since that time, its volume has decreased by 75 percent and its surface area by 50 percent, so that it is currently ranked eighth largest. A closed hydrological system, it receives water from two tributaries (the Amu Dar'ya entering from the south and the Syr Dar'ya from the east). Until the 1960s, the Syr Dar'ya and Amu Dar'ya Rivers' combined outflow into the Aral Sea totaled about 6 cubic kilometers per year. During the next twenty years, the sea came to release more water than it received, via perennial irrigation networks, seepage, and evaporation.

In opening up new lands for cultivation, Turkmenistan's navigable Kara-Kum Canal contributed to the drying up of the Aral Sea. The canal, under construction between 1954 and 1988, diverted a significant amount of the Amu Dar'ya's waters along its 1,100-kilometer length through and into the Kara-Kum Desert in Turkmenistan and through and beyond the republic's capital of Ashkhabad. The canal's primitive design allows almost 50 percent of its water to escape via seepage and evaporation.

The amount of water available to the Aral Sea's hydrological system has decreased as a direct result of the expansion of irrigation drawing on the Aral Sea basin's freshwater resources between the 1960s and the 1980s. Increased water usage for agriculture in the Aral Sea basin caused the amount of water reaching the sea to drop by as much as 90 percent over this period. Consequently, by 1989, 28,000 square kilometers of the Aral Sea floor had dried up, exposing salt beds. At present, the sea contains less than half the amount of water that it did in 1960.

As the inland sea shrinks, salt-laden dust from the exposed seabed blows to locations more than 300 kilometers distant, ruining the soil and killing plants wherever it lands. The sea's salinity has increased to the destruction of a once-thriving local fishing industry. The drying of the Aral Sea has negatively affected well water used by residents along its shores. Also, the loss of the sea's water mass, which once moderated temperatures by absorbing heat in the summer and releasing it in the winter, has affected the local climate.

Decrease in the Quality of Water Resources

While industrial demands for single-crop cultivation increased during the second half of the twentieth century, the contamination of the Aral Sea serves Central Asian states as a negative patrimony from the Soviet Union. Agricultural-industrial monocultures took



A traditional irrigation well in a field in central Turkey in the 1990s. (CHRIS HELLIER/CORBIS)

on a qualitative transformation during the last quarter of the century, marked by the mechanical and chemical invasive forms of cultivation required by the Green Revolution, which in turn affected water quality.

Kazakhstan harvested 23.1 thousand metric tons of rice in 1967, increasing to 654 thousand metric tons by 1987. Cotton was sown on 1,450 thousand hectares of Uzbek land in 1960, which increased to 2,108 thousand hectares by 1987—making Uzbekistan the world's fifth-largest cotton producer.

In keeping with the technical requirements of modern agriculture, petroleum-based fertilizers, chemical pesticides, and artificial defoliant were poured onto cotton fields. In Uzbekistan, an average of 146.8 kilograms of chemical fertilizers was distributed over each hectare of agricultural land in 1965, increasing to 238.3 kilograms by 1975, and doubling to 305.6 kilograms in 1987.

These rates can be compared with only 122.1 kilograms per hectare for the whole Soviet Union (1987).

Central Asian cultivators applied fertilizers at much lower rates following the end of Soviet agricultural chemical subsidies in 1991 and the consequent upward spiral in the price of fertilizers and other additives. However, the earlier period of widespread use of fertilizers in cotton and rice cultivation led to an increase in traces of contaminants of fertilizer origin in irrigation water and field runoff, eventually compromising the quality of the Aral Sea's contents.

Fertilizer contaminants were not the only threat to the quality of the Central Asian water supply. Industrial pesticides and herbicides were also dumped onto Uzbekistan's cotton fields. During the late 1970s, the average hectare of Uzbekistan's cultivated land received between 30 and 35 kilograms of insecticides and defoliants. This high rate of application was unique to Central Asia and can be contrasted with the rest of the Soviet Union. While Soviet centralized planning required industrial-agricultural methods, Uzbekistan's insecticide- and defoliant-application rates were just short of thirty times higher than the average used in the rest of the Soviet Union during the same period.

Leading them was the chlorinated organic insecticide DDT, as well as the lindane insecticide benzene hexachloride. These were supplemented by the insecticides octamethyl and gamma benzene hexachloride. Pesticides included methyl mercaptans, phosphide pesticides, miticide (known under the trade name Milbex), Lenacil, Aldrin (also referred to as Aldrex, Aldrite, and Octalene), and molinate (also known as Hydram, Ordram, and Yalan). Herbicides and defoliants included butifos and the cycloate herbicide ronit (also known by the registered trade name Ro-Neet). Phosalone was used as an insecticide and acaricide, and sodium trichloroacetate was used as both pesticide and herbicide.

Contaminants originating in fertilizers, pesticides, defoliants, and insecticides entered the Aral Sea by leaching off fields into drainage canals, then emptying into the sea's tributary rivers. Thus, the closed hydrological system of the Aral Sea basin was under a double stress: at the same time as the sea's outlet was increased for monocrop irrigation, its two tributaries entered heavily laden with pollutants. The end result was to concentrate contaminants in the sea's decreasing volume.

Declining Quantity and Quality of Water Resources Threaten Residents' Health

The adverse effects of intensive monocrop cultivation were identified in the declining health of Central Asia's residents. Central Asian infant mortality became the highest among the former Soviet republics. High rates of disease prevalence were attributed to the en-

vironmental degradation caused by cotton cultivation. Those living in Kazakhstan's Qyzylorda subdivision, closest to the sea, experienced a rapid deterioration in living standards as the Aral Sea shrank. Salts and pesticides contaminated the region's water and soil and affected the health of the population.

Health professionals attest that local populations are characterized by remarkably high rates of throat and lung cancers, kidney disease, hepatitis, asthma, bronchitis, gastrointestinal ailments, infant mortality, birth defects, anemia, and tuberculosis. During the 1970s and 1980s, Kazakhstan showed a 3.29-fold rise in total morbidity due to various infectious and somatic diseases associated with the drastic worsening of the ecological situation in the Aral Sea region. At the same time, child and maternal mortality rates increased significantly.

The Aral Sea crisis has come to threaten local residents' food security, as well as their long-term health. Investigations at the Institute for Regional Nutritional Problems of the Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences showed that pesticides, mineral fertilizers, and various microorganisms and their toxic metabolites were major pollutants of food products in all regions of Kazakhstan. It is alleged that discharge of agricultural chemicals into the water environment accumulates toxins in local fish.

In addition, since early 2000, regions surrounding the Aral Sea basin, including the Karakalpak Autonomous Republic in Uzbekistan and Khorezm, a subdivision in the same country, have undergone the worst droughts in recent memory. Local authorities report substantial losses to rice, cotton, and other crops, as well as a severe impact on animal husbandry, affecting 1 million residents' access to food. Drastically decreased rains during 2000 meant that Uzbekistan farmers produced just 3 million tons of grain, against an expected harvest of 4.89 million tons.

Neighboring States Share Water Issues

A second water issue encountered in the post-Soviet Central Asian states, in addition to the degradation and diminution of freshwater resources, is a shared dependence on common sources of water. Between 1967 and 1987, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan used water resources located in Kyrgyzstan. Their mutual membership in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics exempted them from any requirement for formal remuneration. The emergence of new states after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 requires the renegotiating of preexisting water-management mechanisms.

Soviet authorities built seven large hydroelectric and irrigation facilities to serve the four republics of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. These provided access to primary water resources, such as irrigation, as well as secondary water resources, like electrical power and transport. These installations enabled the direct, perennial irrigation of 400 thousand hectares. In addition, these facilities augmented rainfall on an additional 918,000 hectares across the four then-Union republics.

While providing regional benefits, agricultural productivity through perennial and seasonal irrigation was incurred at the expense of Kyrgyzstan. Among the seven installations, the Toktogulsk hydro knot alone removed 12,000 hectares of Kyrgyz agricultural land from use, drowned under its reservoir. Likewise, industrial productivity in the surrounding republics was incurred at Kyrgyz expense. While the hydro knot's dams served local needs for electrical power, 2.4 million kilowatt-hours of energy were used outside the republic.

Political developments upset the region's means of distributing water resources. As a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, remuneration for water use emerged as an international political issue. Central Asian states had to develop new means to recompense water transactions. Kyrgyzstan demanded compensation for maintaining reservoirs on the Syr Dar'ya River complex during 2001, for the first time pressuring neighboring Kazakhstan to conclude a barter deal exchanging fuel for water.

Asia's Water Issues and Parastatal Organizations

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and similar parastatal organizations have emerged as advocates for implementation of integrated water-resources management (IWRM) in Asia. Rather than depending on technological advances or identifying new sources of freshwater supply, the IWRM approach advocates innovation in water-resources governance. According to parastatal organizations, the participation of users in water-resource management and use will result in the creation of appropriate policy frameworks to allocate and manage water among competing users.

Parastatals' policies emphasize public accountability, focusing on the political process of achieving effective water governance. In particular, parastatals call for adequate institutional capacity and accountability within regulatory and management institutions as necessary for sustainable development and management of water resources. Appropriate tariff struc-

tures for water use, in particular, will both raise the revenues necessary to provide services and will extend participation to economically unempowered countries and regions.

The UNDP, the International Council for the Environment (ICLEI), and the Global Water Partnership (GWP) particularly seek to address the politics of water management through governance dialogue. The institutionalized discussion is intended to facilitate communication between political decision makers, water technicians, and users in different nations, to highlight real processes and actual cases, and to identify the next steps culminating in the governors' meeting of the Inter-American Development Bank in South America in March 2002, the World Summit on Sustainable Development in September 2002, and the Third World Water Forum in Japan during March 2003.

Elizabeth Bishop

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WAYANG BEBER *Wayang beber* is one variety of Javanese puppet shadow play (*wayang*). Painted pictures on a long strip of leather, bark, paper, or cloth are rolled from one supporting pole to another. The size of the strip varies, but it is usually around 20 centimeters wide and 12 meters long. Each spool contains sixteen scenes.

As the storyteller unrolls the spool scene by scene, he narrates the story accompanied by Javanese traditional music orchestra or gamelan. Traditional *wayang beber* tales include *Panji* stories or a story based on the mythical Javanese Jenggala Kingdom, or the *Mababharata* and *Ramayana* epics. Gamelan orchestration is allowed only if the performance is held at the court compound. Outside the court a rebab (a kind of violin) was the traditional accompaniment. *Wayang beber* is performed very rarely because of the sacred nature of the performance. It was only performed at specific occasions following some rituals to ward off evil and epidemics. Some scholars argue that *wayang beber* is the oldest variety of *wayang* and has been performed since the early twelfth century. However, this kind of performance is rare, and the art form is near extinction. Some original scrolls are preserved at Wonosari, Yogyakarta; Mangkunagaran museum; and Pacitan. In 1986, it was reported that only two painters of *wayang beber* were still active.

Andi Achdian

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WAYANG GOLEK *Wayang golek* refers to two main genres of puppet theater in West Java, Indonesia, both of which use wooden rod puppets. One genre, *wayang golek cepak*, was created in the north coast region of Cirebon, West Java, in the late sixteenth century and is thought to have been used to convert people to Islam. *Wayang golek cepak* (also called *wayang golek menak* or *wayang bendo*) is still performed in the Cirebon Javanese language, and its repertoire includes stories about Amir Hamza (Muhammad's uncle, who brought Islam to the Arab world), the Islamic conversion of Java, and the history of legendary Javanese kingdoms.

The other genre, *wayang golek purwa*, is performed in the Sundanese language and is thought to be based on a type of *wayang kulit* (shadow-puppet play) practiced in the area of Tegal on the north coast of central Java. This *wayang golek* was brought to the Sundanese city of Bandung to entertain Sundanese aristocrats in the early to mid-nineteenth century. The main repertoire of tales is based on the *Mababharata* and the *Ramayana*. Puppets range from 15 to 30 inches in height. The head, body, and arms are carved from soft wood and painted in a wide variety of colors. The costumes are made of velvet and other colored fabrics, batik cloth, and sequins. About sixty puppets are used in a single performance. Puppets are organized into four groups, including refined aristocrats, warriors and demon-kings, clowns, and ogres.

In both types of puppetry, the main performer is the *dalang* or puppeteer, who manipulates the puppets, nar-



Wayang golek puppets in Solo, Indonesia, in the 1990s. (LINDSAY HEBBERD/CORBIS)

rates the tale, sings many of the songs, and directs a troupe of musicians who play the instruments of the gamelan (Indonesian percussion instruments). *Wayang golek* blends puppetry, narrative, dialogue, song, instrumental music, movement, and dance. Performances are all-night affairs that play a central role in Sundanese cultural and civic life. A *wayang golek* performance coincides with a *bajat*, a ritual feast in which food is served, prayers are recited, and spirits are asked to bless the feast's host. The most common *bajat* are weddings and circumcisions. Performances are also held for ritual purification ceremonies (*ruatan*). *Wayang golek* performances are opportunities for people to gather and reflect on issues that affect their everyday lives.

Andrew Weintraub

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WAYANG KULIT A *wayang kulit* performance features puppets made from parchment-like buffalo skin and horn. Such performances belong to the cultural tradition of various ethnic groups in the Indonesian archipelago. The puppeteer sits behind the cotton cloth screen, which is fixed in a wooden frame with a banana-trunk base; he or she manipulates the skillfully painted puppets that cast their shadows onto the screen in the light of an oil lamp. Most famous and sophisticated are those of the Central-Javanese courts and those on Bali, dating back to the period of the ancient Hindu-Javanese kingdoms (tenth–sixteenth centuries). They dramatize stories from the Old Javanese adaptations of the ancient Indian epics *Ramayana* and *Mababharata* and are staged mostly in a ceremonial context (especially during life-cycle rituals). In Bali, the audience sits in front of the screen; in Java, only the women watch from the front, while the men enjoy the colorful puppets and the large gamelan (Indonesian percussion instruments) orchestra directed by the puppeteer from behind. The vast aesthetic and spiritual knowledge, obtained in years of study, makes the puppeteer a highly revered member of traditional society. His advice and comments on local affairs, which are put into the mouths of the clown-servant puppets, are enjoyed as well as feared.

Martin Ramstedt



A man in Yogyakarta, Java, making a shadow puppet. (OWEN FRANKEN/CORBIS)

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WAYANG TOPENG *Wayang topeng* is a classical Javanese dance-drama genre, in which dancers use elaborately carved and painted masks to perform stories from the romantic Panji cycle. These stories, which relate the adventures of the handsome mythical prince Panji and his fiancée, Princess Candra, are thought to have occurred during the last Hindu-Javanese kingdom, the Majapahit (thirteenth to fifteenth centuries).

Tradition has it that *wayang topeng* was created in the sixteenth century by Sunan Kalijaga, one of the nine

legendary Muslim saints who converted Java to Islam by using the highly popular performing arts of the destroyed Hindu-Javanese courts to attract people to their sermons. Following the model of a *wayang kulit* (shadow-puppet play) enacting the Panji romance, Sunan Kalijaga is said to have created masks for nine dancers who were directed, as was also the case for the shadow-puppet play, by a *dalang*, or puppeteer.

Nowadays, the performers include a large number of dancers who are accompanied by a huge gamelan (Indonesian percussion instrument) orchestra. Their appearance onstage is introduced and commented on by the *dalang* in speech and song. Clowns entertain the audience with their jokes and mockeries in interludes between the acts. *Wayang topeng* has incorporated elements from other classical dance genres like the Serimpi or the Kiprah mask-dance, revered classical Javanese dances, whose origins might date to the time of the Majapahit kingdom. The Serimpi is danced by four girls, usually princesses; the Kiprah is a lively courting dance in which a male dancer impersonates a king. *Wayang topeng* has been preserved in the court tradition of Surakarta in central Java until today.

Martin Ramstedt

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WAYANG WONG *Wayang wong* is a classical dance-drama genre in Java and Bali, in which stories from the Old Javanese versions of the ancient Indian epics *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata* are performed, for entertainment as well as in ritual contexts. The earliest record of *wayang wong* occurs in a central Javanese inscription dating to 930. This ancient form either developed from or evolved at the same time as the *wayang kulit*, the shadow-puppet play, replacing the puppets with human dancers.

The contemporary Javanese *wayang wong*, however, was created in 1755 at the courts of Yogyakarta and Surakarta in Java, with the intention of continuing an ancient Javanese tradition. Stories from both the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana* are dramatized. The elaborate dance movements of the actors, who wear elaborate makeup, are accompanied by a large gamelan (Indonesian percussion instrument) orchestra.

The Balinese version of *wayang wong* was created at the end of the eighteenth century at the royal court of Klungkung on the east coast of south Bali, using ancient masks from the sacred heirlooms of the family of the Dewa Agung and drawing on the dance movements of the classical Gambuh dance drama. According to indigenous sources, the Gambuh is the oldest court dance-drama of Bali; it features stories from the Panji cycle, the adventures of the handsome mythical prince Panji and his fiancée Princess Candra, which supposedly occurred during the last Hindu-Javanese kingdom, the Majapahit (thirteenth to fifteenth centuries). Dramatizing only stories from the *Ramayana*, the Balinese *wayang wong* is accompanied by a special music ensemble, the gamelan *Batel* (probably "of warriors"), consisting of metallophones, gongs, cymbals, and drums.

Martin Ramstedt

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WAZIRI The Waziris are a tribe living on the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although they have their own tribal affiliation, the Waziris of Afghanistan are a subgroup of the larger Ghilzai (or Ghiljai in Farsi) branch of the Pashtun tribe. Their language is Pashtu, and they practice Pashtunwali or the Code of Conduct for Pashtun tribal members. The terrain in which they live is so remote that it is difficult to meet a Waziri outside of his or her home. Some Waziris live in tents along the Khyber Pass, and others live as pastoral nomads herding sheep throughout the mountains. Historically, the Waziris' homeland was referred to as Wana. However, after the British mandate to separate Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan, this area has been referred to as South Waziristan.

Because their tribe is spread out across the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Waziris also have much in common with their Pakistani neighbors.

Their tribe is much larger on the Pakistani side. Waziris are divided into two subgroups: the Darwesh Khel (Darwish Khal) and the Mahsuds (Mahsoods). In the early 1900s, it was these two groups who led the largest and most difficult resistance against British rule in Afghanistan, which was called the Third Afghan War. Many joined with the Taliban after the post-Soviet civil war in Afghanistan.

Jennifer Nichols

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WELD, FREDERICK (1823–1891), British colonial administrator. Sir Frederick Aloysius Weld was born in 1823 in England and immigrated to New Zealand in 1843, joining his cousins as a sheep farmer. Entering politics in 1848 when he joined the Wellington Settlers' Constitutional Association, he was elected in 1853 from Wairau to the House of Representatives. In 1860–1861, he served as minister for native affairs and in 1864–1865 as premier. In 1867, he returned to England, but in December 1868, he was appointed governor of Western Australia (1869–1874), after which he became governor of Tasmania (1875–1879). In 1880, he went to Singapore, where he was governor of the Straits Settlements from 1880 until his retirement in 1887. During his term of office his stated ambition was to extend British control as far as possible over the peninsula south of Siam (Thailand). His successful expansionist policy was carried out by a group of ambitious young men, the most notable of whom was Sir Frank Swettenham (1851–1946). Weld's dispatch on education in 1882 initiated the growth of a Malay vernacular educational system in the Protected Malay States. In 1883, he coined the term "British Malaya" as a geographical and political expression for the peninsular states. Weld died in England on 20 July 1891.

Edwin Wieringa

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WEST PAPUA. See **Irian Jaya**.

WESTERN GHATS The Western Ghats, (or Sahyadri in Sanskrit), are a chain of mountains forming the rim of western India, and running parallel to the coast of the Arabian Sea. Their length is about 1,600 kilometers. Their northern end is in Rajasthan, and the southern limit Cape Comorin (Kanyakumari), and in most places the Ghats are within sight of the coast. They thus form the western perimeter of the Dekkan Plateau, and average 800 to 1,000 meters in elevation. The geological formation is trap in the northern parts and gneiss in the more southern. This range is the source of nearly all the rivers in the Indian peninsula. Unlike the Eastern Ghats, the Western are a continuous chain, with only one significant break, the 40-kilometer-wide Palghat Gap, through which trains and roads connect Cochin with Coimbatore and Madras. Just to the north of this gap the Eastern Ghats fuse with the Western in the Precambrian formation of the Nilgiri Hills. Anai Mudi Peak (2,695 meters), the highest point along the Western Ghats, lies nearby, in the Cardamom Hills of Kerala. The entire range is subject to intense rainstorms during the southwesterly monsoon, June through August each year. Consequently, much of the range is still covered with dense tropical forests, which, however, are being rapidly depleted by loggers.

Paul Hockings

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WESTERNIZATION—CENTRAL ASIA

There was little evidence of Western—that is, European—cultural concepts and values penetrating into either Central Asian nomadic or sedentary societies in the aftermath of the Russian conquest in the mid- to late nineteenth century. The exception was the small handful of Central Asian intellectuals who became Russified. In some cases—Kazakh thinkers such as the writers Shokan Valikhanov and Abai Qonanbaev were a case in point—they sought closer acquaintance with Russian culture so as take from it those things that

would benefit Central Asians while preventing the destruction of their own traditional cultures.

The other means by which a degree of Westernization penetrated Central Asia was through the activities of the Jadidists, the primarily Tatar educators and journalists who sought to spread their Western-oriented educational philosophy through the Muslim regions of the Russian empire.

Westernization under the Soviet Union

The effects of pre-Soviet efforts at Westernization in the Central Asian parts of the Russian empire were largely lost through the destruction of the Central Asian intelligentsia during Stalin's purges of the 1930s. But at the same time, the Soviet regime undertook active efforts to create a "New Soviet Man" in Central Asia, through massive forced culture change. This had the effect of bringing a degree of Europeanization to the region, albeit filtered through Soviet ideology and Russian culture. Central Asians living in urban areas, particularly members of the intellectual and political elites, were under continual pressure to adopt Russian cultural values and to replace their own languages with Russian. By state policy, the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union were expected to receive world culture through the Russian language. This was in fact the case due to lack of direct contact with the outside world as well as lack of knowledge of foreign languages other than Russian.

The degree of pressure on Central Asians to become Russified varied and was particularly intense in the later years of the Brezhnev era (1964–1982). The result was an intellectual class that had assimilated a Western orientation, while developing some degree of sentiment for their own history and traditional cultural heritage. The growth of national consciousness in Central Asia was at least partly in reaction to most Russians' view of Central Asian cultures as primitive and backward.

Residents of rural settlements were much less affected by the Russification campaigns, not least of all due to a lack of resources, including an adequate supply of teachers of Russian. Some acquaintance with Western-style culture seems to have penetrated the rural parts of Central Asia more extensively with the spread of radio and television. According to Soviet sources, however, some of the remoter areas of Central Asia were unable to receive broadcasts until the late 1980s.

Postindependence Western Influences

When the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991 and the Soviet Central Asian republics became independent,

the new countries' first instinct was to turn toward Europe for recognition and assistance—somewhat to the surprise of the international community. Later the Central Asian states also sought to establish ties with the Muslim world, following the model of Turkey, which is both Muslim and Western. In the immediate postindependence period, the United States and some European countries actively urged the Turkish model on the Central Asians. Their response was to accept politely Turkish economic assistance and then to inform the Turks that the new countries had no desire to exchange one "Big Brother"—Russia—for another. But the Turkish connection was to prove fruitful for the new Central Asian states, not only as a source of economic aid and investment, but also of assistance in the development of education, military training, transport, and communications. At the same time, the Turkish connection provided—as the West had hoped—an indirect channel for Western ideas and values to reach Central Asia.

The Central Asian postindependence orientation toward Europe and North America was based partly on economic realism—these countries were seen as the most reliable sources of aid and investment. But it was also based on instincts developed during the Soviet era. Though the Soviet Union was marginal to Europe, it still belonged in the general European cultural sphere. A European commissioner was astonished to be asked in 1992 by Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbaev how his country should go about getting itself on the list for membership in the European Economic Community. It was pointed out to the commissioner that Turkey was being given serious consideration as a potential member of the European Community, and more of Kazakhstan is geographically part of Europe than is the case with Turkey.

Security was another attraction the Western world held for the new states of Central Asia. Europe and the United States were viewed as potential guarantors of the countries' independence. Initially dependent on the Russian Federation for help in creating their own military establishments and border-guard forces, most Central Asian countries eventually looked to the West as a counterbalance to the Russian desire to restore hegemony over the region. Starting with Turkmenistan, all the Central Asian states except Tajikistan joined the NATO-sponsored Partnership for Peace (PfP). Consideration of Tajikistan's membership was delayed until the civil war had been resolved, and the country was admitted to the PfP program in May 2001. Some Central Asian states, in particular Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, considered even closer security ties with the West, not only as a counterweight to Russia and China but as a source of assistance in countering

terrorist groups based in Afghanistan. In the wake of the events of 11 September 2001 in New York, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan agreed to a U.S. and European military presence in their territories, to the distress of some Russian political figures and commentators who believed that these countries were being drawn into the Western world.

Western cultural influence, which had become well established with urban young people in the last years of the Soviet era, developed even more rapidly after independence as domestic radio and television stations broadcast Western music and films, and increasing numbers of Central Asian youths had opportunities to travel and study abroad.

Central Asian membership in the primarily European Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) exposed the ruling elites and intellectuals in the region to Western political values and human-rights standards, especially after the establishment of a permanent OSCE presence in each Central Asian state. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Union's Technical Assistance to the CIS (TACIS) program, and the U.S. Agency for International Development through its network of contractors, as well as other Western assistance groups both large and small, were instrumental in promoting familiarity with and acceptance of Western political and social standards. The agencies of the United Nations sought to promote acceptance of universal human-rights standards, which were identical with Western standards. Most Central Asian leaders asserted that they aspired to achieve Western standards though they sometimes protested that they were really Asians and so needed time to assimilate European values.

The Westernization of Central Asia—in the sense of the adoption of a Western cultural orientation—may be expected to continue as the countries of the Central Asian region intensify their contacts with Europe and North America. Western tastes and attitudes adopted by the urban population are likely to spread as rural young people make their way to the cities in search of work. Western political values are likely to take longer to become rooted in the region, as is the case in most former Soviet possessions.

Bess Brown

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WESTERNIZATION—EAST ASIA Westernization in Asia has been defined as the broad interaction between Asian values and behaviors and the external influences of Western colonial or national powers, such as Great Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, the Netherlands, and the United States, that have exercised control, partial or otherwise, over Asian societies. Western influences have permanently altered practically all the societies in Asia. This process of Westernization in Asia began in the final years of the fifteenth century and continued to grow in terms of vigor and strength well into the twentieth century. The historical process of Westernization ended just after World War II with the assertion of independent nationhood by many Asian societies. Because modernization in many ways overlaps with the processes of Westernization, much of the historical influence of the West has continued with markedly expanding effects.

Western impact varied with the geographical proximity of the different Asian societies to the major areas of Western power. The nations of East Asia—China, Japan, and Korea—supposedly have had less exposure to the impact of Western influences and power than India because they are farther from Europe than is India. Two major processes have been identified through which Western power was asserted in Asia: colonization and the imposition of unequal treaties.

Colonization of Hong Kong and Macau

Early colonization by Western powers such as Portugal and Spain, who first colonized parts of India, the Philippines, Burma, and Malaya, had little impact on Asian culture because the colonizers had little contact with the indigenous people. The second wave of colonization was spurred on by rapid industrialization in the West during the early nineteenth century. British and Dutch colonial influences started, for example, in the coastal areas of India, Malaya, and Indonesia before spreading inland. A growing market for new food products, such as tea, coffee, and sugar, as well as the expanding demand for raw materials, such as rubber, tin, and oil, encouraged the Netherlands and Great Britain to extend their colonial control in Malaya, Indonesia, and Burma. The drive for raw materials and markets for Western manufactured goods stimulated Dutch and British interest in China and Japan.



The façade of a McDonald's fast food outlet in Beijing in the 1990s. (EYE UBIQUITOUS/CORBIS)

As Western colonialism spread, competition among the Western powers sometimes prevented one or another from achieving its goals, as was the case for the Germans in China. The Germans obtained a sphere of influence in the Shandong Peninsula, but their attempts to expand it were blocked by Russia, Great Britain, and the United States.

Colonial administrations in Asia favored the introduction of Western languages for instruction in educational establishments. Colonial economic policies also left permanent fixtures in the Asian landscape, including ports, highways, railroads, water-control projects, research facilities, and bridges. While often built with revenues generated in the colonies themselves and for the benefit of the colonial economy, the ports and other facilities became the infrastructure upon which the independent Asian nation-states depended in their early years of independence. Colonial social policies attempted to impose Western values on Asian societies.

An important dimension of Westernization in Asia was the education of the Asian indigenous elite in Western liberal and scientific thought. While the main colonial purpose was to train enough indigenous personnel to staff administrative and commercial positions, this elite also spread Western values and modes of behavior to broader segments of the local population. Some colonial governments, such as France in relation to Vietnam, reserved places in the universities for local people who were fluent in the Western languages of instruction and who were sympathetic to colonial rule.

Unequal Treaties

Some Asian countries, such as Japan and China, staved off actual colonialization by accepting unequal treaties that granted special concessions to Western powers. This made possible, for example, the spheres of influence different Western powers maintained in portions of Chinese territory. Western enclaves on Chinese soil were established by treaties, and their occupants remained outside the jurisdiction of the Chinese government. Each Western concession imposed its own laws on the residents living within its authorized territory.

Western norms in China were communicated by the large numbers of Western nationals in advisory positions in the Chinese government and engaged in trade and missionary activity. At the same time, Western political and legal institutions served as models for political and legal modernization. Although the Western powers did not have a unified program of Westernization, their actions were often synergistic. For example, the United States led the negotiations to open Japan to Western influence and interactions, and then Great Britain provided naval vessels for the modernization of Japan's fleet and British technicians to act as advisers in newly created Japanese industries. Similarly, France cooperated with Great Britain and the United States in reorganizing the Chinese customs services in the 1850s, and the French led the expansion of Western cultural influences in China by obtaining extraterritorial rights for foreign missionaries to work in the interior of the country.

Educational Systems

Educational systems were often vehicles of Westernization. Prior to the West's intrusion into China, indigenous Chinese higher education consisted of Confucian academies and specialized schools to train Confucian scholars. Following the arrival of the West, until the Nationalist regime established a few universities in China in the late 1920s, many Chinese youth attended the secondary schools and universities run by

Christian missionaries in China or pursued education in Europe or the United States. East Asian scholars returned from their sojourns in the West having mastered a Western language and having internalized Western values, and many of these overseas-trained elite spearheaded the nationalist movements in East Asia and led the drives to modernize their respective countries. Education in the West has continued to bring Western influences into East Asia.

Backlash

In many instances modern East Asian societies have reacted against Western behavioral norms and values. People have decried the fact that continuing exposure to stimuli from the West, with its technological superiority and its wealth, has eroded traditional ways of life and traditional virtues, such as respect for authority, a sense of familial duty, and individual sacrifice for the larger common good, whether that be the good of the family or even the nation. Nevertheless, the lure of wealth and technological advancement have continued to entice the East Asian populace, assuring the continued health of Westernization.

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WESTERNIZATION-SOUTH ASIA The term "Westernization" alludes to more than just the social effects that Western civilization has produced in non-Western societies. In the South Asian context

it also tacitly admits the hegemony of Western paradigms of thought and practice. Hence, some sensitive scholars and social thinkers in South Asia vigorously oppose Westernization. Yet opposing Westernization is an uphill task, if not an altogether futile exercise. Nirad Chaudhuri, an Indian writer in English and a self-proclaimed admirer of the British empire, dramatically highlights the tacit Indian acceptance of Western hegemony by recounting Robert Clive's victory procession in Murshidabad after he won the Battle of Plassey in 1757. He notes that if each of the gathered native onlookers had hurled a stone at the procession, Clive and his entire army would have been submerged under a mountain of stones! Anthropologists prefer to view such acquiescence as a reflection of the Indian genius for adaptation. This view glosses over the altered social and cultural framework within which such adaptation occurs. It also hides the fundamental change in the mental outlook of the people; in fact, the urge to oppose Westernizing trends is itself a Westernized response to Westernization.

In this article, the focus will be mainly on the Indian experience because the colonial penetration was deeper and more widespread in India than in the other countries of the region. The experience of other South Asian countries will be used to point to divergences from the central tendencies.

Values and Ideologies

The values and ideologies of the Western civilization have made a deep and long-lasting impression on the people of South Asia, particularly on those exposed to Western knowledge and education. These values and ideologies of liberty, individual freedom, equality, citizenship, and democracy stood in stark contrast to the holistic and hierarchical values of the South Asian cultures and triggered indigenous impulses toward social reforms. Of course, the lofty ideals that Western civilization cherished could not justify colonial rule. As Nirad Chaudhuri noted in his dedication to his book *Autobiography of an Unknown Indian*, the British denied Indians the status of British citizenship and considered them as mere British subjects. To justify such differential treatment and their rule of India they evolved the credo of the civilizing mission and of the White Man's Burden. Guided by such dual value schemes, British rule generated mixed and ambiguous responses from its subjects. The constant reminder of subjugation in everyday life tempered their admiration for Western culture.

According to French anthropologist Louis Dumont, the ideology that distinguishes Western civilization is individualism. The interests of the individual gain

priority over the interests of the group or community to which he or she belongs. The individual is free to pursue his own interests and inclinations so long as he does not abridge the interests of others in doing so. The other important ideas associated with the West, such as liberty, equality, citizenship, democracy, separation of the secular realm from that of the sacred, and rationality are all derived from the importance accorded to the individual. Individualism is the bedrock of capitalism, which has institutionalized private property and free labor.

Several Indians who acquired Western education were profoundly influenced by the works of Enlightenment thinkers. Such men as Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Jotiba Phule, Mahatma Gandhi, E. V. Ramaswamy Naicker, and Dr. B. R. Ambedkar were the more prominent Indians who launched vigorous campaigns to rid society of its superstitious practices and institutions. As is well known, the seeds of nationalist struggles and movements for the establishment of democratic regimes owe much to the lessons that the people in South Asia learned from the West.

Some scholars point out that many of the Western ideals that created social stirrings in India were not new to the country; indeed, historical evidence suggests that many profoundly liberating and universal ideals originated in India. Yet these ideals remained secondary to the ethos of hierarchy and authoritarianism. The failure of several bhakti (devotional) sects in fighting the evil of caste discrimination and hierarchy and their own subsequent conversion into castes testifies to the dominance of hierarchy in India.

It is necessary to point out that the South Asian societies have not been as favorably disposed to the ideology of individualism as they have been to the ideology of equality. Even Ambedkar, who as chairman of the drafting committee of the 1949 Indian Constitution incorporated individual liberty in the constitution's section on fundamental rights, realized the need to qualify the rights of individuals to serve the collective interests of certain oppressed castes and tribes. He believed that liberty would be meaningless to members of the oppressed castes unless their interests were protected through special constitutional provisions. Hence, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes were given special privileges in India's constitution. Individualism is looked upon with suspicion in Islam, which is after all a communitarian religion. There is the general apprehension in South Asia that the Western concept of individual freedom encourages individuals to question the authority of traditional institutions and customs and promotes a culture of decadence and hedonism. By adopting an Islamic con-

stitution, Pakistan chose to oppose individualism at the ideological level. Yet a major dilemma confronting Pakistan as well as other South Asian societies is the inability to reverse trends toward individualization that are inherent in market-oriented models of development adopted by all the countries in the region.

The ideology of equality has had profound effects on India despite the fact that British rule in actual practice strengthened authoritarian and hierarchical values and institutions in India. The credo of the civilizing mission not only helped the British to justify their rule in India but also it allowed them to slip easily into the patron-client or *mai-baap* relationship with the local population. In effect, the Westerners simply replaced the nawabs they had earlier overthrown. The new form of authoritarianism tended to take on racial overtones, as was blatantly visible in the whites-only clubs that sprouted in urban centers and hill stations in India. In the tea plantations of Bengal, and in the indigo plantations of Champaran in Bihar, the patronage system gave rise to repressive labor practices. While the British rule did promote modern industrialization to a limited extent, the colonial government favored and protected European investors in India, resulting in discrimination against local Indian entrepreneurs. Such glaring inequities fueled the nationalist movement.

British rule reinforced the consciousness of caste by generating the politics of caste. The decision to enumerate castes in the Indian censuses heightened the awareness of customs and markers of social status that differentiate castes. It also promoted a new sense of solidarity among castes sharing similar social or occupational traits, even when there was no social interaction among them. More important is the caste politics generated by caste enumeration. Castes competed with each other to be ranked as superior castes. Later, educated and politically conscious members of underprivileged castes launched movements demanding reservations in educational institutions and the government so that their members could overcome their social disabilities.

For administrative convenience, the British used certain stereotypes about castes and communities. For instance, because certain tribal communities that were displaced from their habitats due to government policies resorted to petty theft and robbery for their survival, they were categorized as criminal tribes and an officially sponsored folklore about their ruthlessness and innate criminal tendencies was constructed. The stereotype colored the attitude of the police as well as of the mainstream society, thereby further alienating and isolating the members of these unfortunate communities. Similarly, the decision to declare certain communities as martial and favor recruitment of their

members in the army resulted in the dominance of particular communities in the army. The Muslim weavers of the United Provinces belonging to the Julaha caste who lost their livelihoods because of cheap British imports of machine-made cotton cloth were administratively classified as "bigoted" because their economic vulnerability was exploited by vested interests to incite them to violence against the Hindus. A by-product of such state-sponsored stereotyping was the reinforcement of caste and community sentiments and corresponding constriction of the scope for individualism.

The work of various European scholars, missionaries, and administrators considerably shaped the self-image of South Asians, just as it kindled the Western romance with exotic India. The Orientalists learned Sanskrit and other ancient Indian languages, which tended to highlight the greatness of ancient India and its long history. Several European scholars and travelers wrote about the unique features of the Indian village and the caste system. European missionaries learned Indian languages and wrote authoritative dictionaries that gave birth to new literary trends in these languages. Orientalist scholarship nurtured by the Europeans aroused the consciousness of educated Indians about their rich cultural heritage. The translation of several rare manuscripts written in Sanskrit and Pali, archaeological discoveries at Harappa and Mohenjo Daro, and the unearthing of numerous Buddhist relics scattered all over the country deeply affected educated Indians. These discoveries provided the Indians with the raw materials to construct a new national identity. Nationalists used the Europeans' scholarly contributions to redefine Hinduism as a great and tolerant religion so that they could forge a semblance of unity across the divisions of caste, religion, ethnicity, and language. The works of European philologists who traced links between Sanskrit and European languages and speculated about the Aryan-Dravidian division in India also fueled the powerful Dravidian movement in the south, with its separatist overtones. Several revivalist and anti-Western movements were also kindled by Oriental studies initiated by Western scholars, along with the notion that reconstructing the glorious past necessitated a rejection of the Western influence that only bred inferiority complexes and sapped creative energies.

Institutions and Interactions

The British evolved a mammoth and stable administration in India that made possible the large-scale mobilization of human and material resources to collect revenue and maintain law and order. Administrative decisions became more predictable and provided greater social stability. The introduction of modern



A young woman reads a Western fashion magazine on a street in New Delhi, India, in 1990. (ARVIND GARG/CORBIS)

systems of transport and communications, the systems of modern medical care, Western education, law and justice, and the establishment of a modern bureaucracy provided benefits to the people. The system of Western medicine and health care provided cures for several diseases and stemmed epidemics that used to take a huge toll of life. The Western system of education in English unlocked the doors to knowledge of modern science, technology, Western literature, and philosophy and opened up employment opportunities for the educated. These visible benefits camouflaged the effects of colonial exploitation so well that the British rule even acquired considerable legitimacy in the eyes of numerous Indians. The "backward classes" and the depressed castes viewed British rule as delivering them from the age-old oppression of the caste system and hence were reluctant to join the freedom struggle.

After Independence

After India gained independence, the influence of Britain gradually waned while the influence of the United States and the Soviet Union increased dra-

matically. The influence of the Soviet Union was pronounced at the ideological and policy levels. The Soviet Union's experiment with socialism and with economic planning provided the template for India's development. The government of India set up the National Planning Commission to prepare five-year plans to steer the Indian economy firmly toward the socialist pattern. The socialist strategy, with its accent on equity, enlarged the bureaucracy and invested it with considerable discretionary power. One consequence of these policies was that socialist ideals and ideas of equality became firmly entrenched in the Indian political firmament. Socialism became the rhetoric of party politics, with different political parties espousing their own versions. As it evolved through the politics of India, socialism took on the idiom of caste; the theme of social justice for the socially and educationally deprived castes and communities gained prominence on the political agenda. Politics of caste reinforced caste identities, instead of diluting them as was fondly hoped by several socialist ideologues.

It could be inferred that Westernization in both the colonial and postcolonial contexts strengthened caste and community solidarities. This seeming continuity, however, hides the qualitative change that has occurred in the nature of caste society. In the colonial era, competition between castes was mainly over relative ranking in the status hierarchy. The census officials of the colonial era confronted representatives of castes who brought with them documentary evidence substantiating their claims to superior ranking vis-à-vis other proximate castes. After independence, castes competed with each other for the special privileges provided by the government to the deprived castes, ostensibly to abolish caste hierarchy itself. In contemporary India, the talk of one caste being superior to another is not part of politically appropriate speech. Notions of caste hierarchy surface mainly in private spheres and in informal conversations.

Although the Soviet Union was the officially sponsored model for independent India, the United States proved to be the popular model of Westernization. While the leading politicians and government officials in India were espousing the merits of socialist, indigenous models of self-reliant development and were even sharply critical of the policies of the United States, their children were forming long lines at the U.S. embassy and its consulates in India for visas to study or work in the United States. The preference for green-card holders (persons who are officially granted the status of resident aliens by the federal government of the United States) and NRIs (nonresident Indians) settled in the United States expressed in mat-

rimonial advertisements in prominent Indian newspapers reflect the fascination of the Indian middle class with the American way of life.

Fashion, like all other elements of culture, is also a site of controversy. In this context, it is important to note that some of the American fashion trends that have shaped the culture of the Indian youth in urban elite families are in fact derived from the African-American trends that mock and debunk the culture of the white elite in America. By adopting some of the Western dress codes, young women from urban middle classes have been able to break free of the repressive dress codes that kept their mothers secluded from public life. Western styles also made it possible for members of marginalized castes to erase humiliating markers of their low social status. Defiance is more sharply articulated in American pop songs that have influenced the tastes of urban Indian youth. In India, television channels such as MTV and VTV, which play pop music, have even developed Indian versions of pop culture that pungently and wittily expose the hypocrisy of the mainstream traditional culture.

The influence of television on the youth and the consequent weakening of indigenous traditions have triggered strong reactions from conservative sections of society. Such strong reactions have given birth to militant movements attacking the Western way of life as decadent, hedonistic, and morally repugnant. Some of these movements resort to the use of force to wipe out corrupting Western influences and conserve traditional values and practices. In recent years, beauty contests, films allegedly portraying Indian women in a negative light, and the celebration of Valentine's Day have been targeted by organizations ostensibly seeking to defend traditional Indian culture and values.

The British rule also had a liberating impact on women in India. It was during the British rule that the practice of suttee or immolation of the widow in the funeral pyre of her dead husband was abolished. Western values inspired several educated Indians to launch movements against child marriage and to actively promote widow remarriage and women's education. The constitution of independent India by adopting adult franchise and by making special provisions for the welfare of women sought to promote the idea of gender equality. Yet, during the early years of independence a woman's sphere of influence continued to be mainly within the household. Women were encouraged to go to schools and colleges and even take up jobs outside the family, but these extramural roles only complemented their main role, which was the care of their families.

The impact of postcolonial Westernization on women has been complex and uneven. While the Western ideas of feminism and gender equality have encouraged some urban middle-class women to become educated and compete with men in various professions, Indian women face new obstacles in their quest for gender equality. In urban middle-class families, young men were encouraged to pursue prestigious careers in the government bureaucracy or as high-salaried professionals in various public-sector and private-sector concerns or, better still, migrate abroad, preferably to the United States, for lucrative jobs. They were sent to prestigious English schools and professional colleges and institutes to prepare them for successful careers. Although their sisters were encouraged to study and go to English schools and convents, the main objective was to make them attractive and eligible brides for successful grooms. For women, career was only a secondary option. Further, as a family consisting of unmarried young women loses its social status, parents of young women became anxious to find grooms for their daughters as soon as they came of age. Under the circumstances, the institution of dowry—previously confined to certain upper castes—became almost universal in India. Dowry even spread to those castes that had traditionally required grooms to pay a bride-price. As the institution of dowry gained in popularity, dowry demands also started mounting. Parents of eligible young men perched in a successful career could demand huge amounts of money and other gifts from parents desperate to marry off their daughters. Reports of dowry deaths, invariably involving the avaricious groom and his parents forcibly setting the woman on fire, appeared so frequently in newspapers and magazines that the government passed an act banning the practice of dowry and changed the rules regarding the registration of evidence to ensure that the accused parties will not escape prosecution owing to procedural technicalities. Linked with the issue of dowry is the practice of female feticide and infanticide that is taking new forms. For instance, sex determination tests using ultrasound techniques are extensively used, despite a legal ban on conducting such tests, so that female fetuses can be aborted. Demographers point out that the persistence of an adverse female-male sex ratio in the Indian population even after more than five decades of attaining independence does not augur well for gender equality.

The trend of rising dowry demands compelled parents to encourage their daughters to study and become eligible for jobs so that they could help in accumulating the dowry fund. Also as "working girls" are now

preferred to "homely brides," a trend that began in the 1970s, marriage prospects for women holding jobs improve considerably. As women go out of their homes to study and work, they get opportunities to mix freely with other men and become autonomous enough to contract love marriages that violate the rules of caste endogamy. Such marriages may not be acceptable to the parents of the couple, but in urban India the popularity of commercial Hindi films that celebrate love marriage has ensured the social acceptability of such unions. Recent newspaper reports mention incidents of love marriages violating rules of caste endogamy and hierarchy from rural areas. These reports also describe the hostile reaction of caste *panchayats* (traditional institutions governing caste affairs) to such marriages. The offending couple are punished with banishment from the village, a ban on social interaction, or even a death sentence carried out without legal sanction.

The feminist movement in India that arose in the 1970s had indigenous roots, but the rise of feminist ideology in the West provided inspiration for Indian intellectuals to investigate the condition of women in India. They launched campaigns to bring to light the plight of women in India and sensitize the public about gender issues. Indian feminists viewed women's oppression as a societal problem and focused their attention on ways of overcoming the constraints imposed by patriarchal traditions by creating a general social awareness of women's problems (in marked contrast to the strategy of confrontation with men that several Western feminists advocated). Despite this strategy, the feminists have been unable to reverse the adverse trends in gender relations. For instance, despite vigorous campaigns to reserve seats for women in the Indian Parliament, and despite the express commitment of the ruling government and the leading opposition party to have the constitution amended suitably for the purpose, the Parliament has been unable to take up the relevant bill for discussion. A prominent male Member of Parliament who had vigorously supported the policy of reservations for the "backward classes" opposed the introduction of the bill on the ground that it only promoted the cause of women who had bobbed their hair—a pejorative reference to Westernized women. The statement of this Member of Parliament only reflected his antagonism to the Westernization that has encouraged Indian women to reject traditional restraints on their sexuality by adopting the liberal views of Western women. It is true that several revivalist groups and movements strongly oppose Westernization because they are convinced that it corrodes traditional morality, values, and

institutions. What is more significant is that this view is tacitly endorsed by even some of the progressive political parties and intellectuals.

Westernization Outgrown?

It is clear that it is not possible to trace linear trends of Westernization in South Asia. Considering that the Western encounter has been deeply felt for over two centuries, contradictory trends and processes generated by Westernization are bound to be encountered. Westernization has not succeeded if we assess the phenomenon in terms of English writer Thomas Macaulay's dream of converting Indians into Englishmen in tastes and habits. Western culture has been consciously resisted, and there have been several instances of sharp backlash against Westernization. Individualism has not been able to cut through the dense tangle of bonds of family and kinship, caste, religion, and language. A dissonance has emerged between the ideology of equality and its practice. In practice, measures taken to reduce social inequality have often proved to be counterproductive. This change in discourse is nevertheless radical; hierarchy that was only a few decades ago accepted as an inevitable feature of society in India has now been displaced by the principle of equality.

Some recent trends in globalization are now challenging the ideology of individualism. Western societies are increasingly attracting migrants from non-Western societies to bolster their economies. The presence of these immigrants and their growing political importance have compelled the major political parties in Western countries to pay special attention to the problem of immigrant minorities. The migrants' rights as citizens and their rights to preserve their cultural identity have now become vital political issues. Consequently, the discourse of individual rights and rights of citizenship around which law and order is structured is increasingly proving to be inadequate to guide political governance. Further, as the cultural interaction between the native Westerners and the immigrants intensify and as the ethos of multiculturalism spreads, Western culture is itself caught in the vortex of radical transformation. The usefulness of the concept of Westernization cannot any longer be taken for granted.

M. N. Panini

See also: **Marriage and Family-South Asia; Orientalism**

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WESTERNIZATION-SOUTHEAST ASIA

In reflecting on the Westernization of Southeast Asia, it is first important to define carefully the term itself. By "Westernization" is meant specific economic, sociocultural, and political influences on the region emanating from the West (that is, Europe, the United States, and Australia and New Zealand). The earliest external influences on the region (pre-sixteenth century) were not from the West, but from India, China, and the Islamic world. These influences were primarily in religion, culture, art, and political systems.

The first Western contact with Southeast Asia was through European exploration such as that by the Dutch and Portuguese. In 1511, the Portuguese captured Melaka and had arrived in the Moluccas. The explorers were followed by missionaries who were active throughout the region. These early contacts paved the way for colonization of the entire region, except for Siam (Thailand). Dutch trader Gerritt van Wuysthoff traveled up the Mekong River in 1641–1642 to the Lao capital, Vientiane. The French mistakenly anticipated that the Mekong River would be a navigational gateway to the riches of China, and this partially explained their interest in colonizing Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Among famous explorers of the region who often left detailed records of their travels and observations were Ferdinand Magellan (who died in the Philippines), Stamford Raffles (founder of Singapore), Francis Garnier (who explored the Mekong River), Joseph-Fernand Grenard, Henri Mouhot, August Pavie, and David Livingston. Among important missionaries who were active in the region were Father da Cruz, Henri Langenois, Dan Beach Bradley, Alexander de Rhodes (who developed a system, *quoc ngu*, for romanizing the Vietnamese language, 1624–1630), and Samuel McFarland. A number of Western novelists such as Joseph Conrad, Somerset Maugham, Pierre Loti, and in more recent decades Graham Greene, Eugene Burdick, Marguerite Duras, Anthony Burgess, C. J. Koch, Blanche d'Alpuget, and Robert Drewe were inspired by their experiences in the region. They left powerful Westernized and often distorted images of the region. Their literary works, however, provide rich insights into the complex nature of the Westerners' encounters with Southeast Asia.

TABLE 1

Colonization				
Nation (current name)	Former colonial name	Date colonized	Colonizing country	Date of independence
Brunei	Brunei	1888	Protectorate of the United Kingdom	1984
Cambodia	Cambodge; formerly part of French Indochina	1863 (French protectorate established)	France	1953
East Timor		1860, 1893, 1914	Portugal	1975 (from Portugal); 1999 (from Indonesia)
Indonesia	Dutch East Indies	End of seventeenth century	The Netherlands	1949*
Laos	Formerly part of French Indochina	1893	France	1949
Malaysia	Straits Settlements; Malaya	1867	United Kingdom	1957
Myanmar	Burma; also formerly part of Greater India	1885	United Kingdom	1948
The Philippines (name derives from the name of a Spanish king)	The Philippines	Late sixteenth century; 1898 (United States)	Spain and then United States	1946
Singapore	Formerly part of Straits Settlements; Malaysia	1819	United Kingdom	1963 (joined independent Malaysia); 1965 (from Malaysia)
Vietnam	Part of French Indochina	1884; French Indochina established in 1887	France	1945, 1954,* 1975*

*Independence involved violent struggle.

Western Colonization of Southeast Asia

Competition was intense among the Western colonialists for Southeast Asian territories. (See Table 1.) In mainland Southeast Asia, the primary competitors were the British coming from the west (Burma and India) and the French coming from the east (coastal Vietnam). In insular Southeast Asia, the competition was primarily among the Dutch, British, and Portuguese. The United States replaced Spain as the colonial power in the Philippines as a result of the Spanish-American War. In so doing, the United States thwarted an indigenous Filipino revolution fighting for independence.

Siam

Siam represents a fascinating case of selective Westernization without colonization. Siam was the only nation in the region not to be colonized. The Siamese kings of the nineteenth century evolved astute diplomatic strategies for avoiding colonization and playing the British and French off against each other by becoming a buffer state between the two colonial powers. In a major act of compromise, the Siamese ceded important territories in what are now Laos and Cambodia to the French. The Siamese historically were also open to outsiders, and prominent Dutch, Greeks, and

Portuguese were allowed to play important roles in the Siamese court. Later in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, various Westerners contributed to the modernization of Siam. Missionaries such as Dan Beach Bradley contributed to the development of the Siamese printing industry and modern health practices. Missionaries also contributed to the establishment of excellent schools, which are still prominent to this day. Germans were invited in to help develop a modern rail system; British advisers helped with the development of modern financial institutions. The basic strategy was to make Siam sufficiently open to Westerners that there would be no need to colonize it.

Westernization after Independence

The Asia-Pacific theater of World War II, in which the Japanese invaded and took control of much of Southeast Asia, helped awaken powerful forces of local nationalism. The Japanese demonstrated to the Southeast Asians the possibility of opposing the West successfully. Thus, within the first two decades after World War II, all the nations of Southeast Asia had received their independence, except for East Timor, a colony of Portugal that was later absorbed by Indonesia, and Brunei, which remained a protectorate of the United Kingdom until 1984.

Political Westernization Despite achieving political independence, the Southeast Asian nations continued to feel the force of Westernization in various domains. In the political arena, Southeast Asia became a battleground of the Cold War, with the USSR, China, and the United States fighting for influence among Southeast Asian nations. Communist insurgencies supported by the Marxist-Leninist USSR emerged in the Philippines, Malaya, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Indonesia at one point also had a very large communist party, the PKI. The West intervened politically in these areas to try to stop the spread of communism, ironically itself a Western influence. Communism failed in the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand, but it succeeded in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Politically, the United States continues to support actively the development of democracy and civil society in the major nations of the region.

Cultural Westernization Southeast Asian culture also continues to feel the effect of Westernization. Popular Western dress, music, film, and fast food permeate the urban areas of most parts of Southeast Asia. The powerful forces of transnational corporations and advertising have also contributed to a growing materialism. Reflective of this new value placed on material goods is the common pattern of evaluating people's status based on their possession of those goods. In the early 1960s, U.S. advisers called for Bangkok, Thailand, to become an automobile city. Many canals were replaced by highways, and the "Venice of the East" became a highly urbanized, congested, and polluted city. Possession of automobiles, and importance attached to the prestige of the type of vehicle owned, has become an integral part of the growing materialistic culture.

Throughout much of the region there is the pervasive influence of modern transnational corporations such as IBM, Coca-Cola, KFC (Kentucky Fried Chicken), McDonald's, Nike, and Philip Morris (Marlboro cigarettes, especially prominent in Cambodia, which has a large potential youth market). Nike has outsourced significant production to subcontractors in Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam, with a presence also in Cambodia and Laos. Sometimes Brunei is referred to as the Shell-fare state, given the prominence of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group in that nation.

A prominent building in old Bangkok is the headquarters of the East Asiatic Company, a major Scandinavian trading company, which has been active in the region for many decades. Thailand is becoming the "Detroit of Southeast Asia" with the major pres-

ence of Western automobile manufacturers such as General Motors.

Technological influences from the West are also pervasive, especially in modern urban areas. Personal cell phones (many Nokia or Motorola) are ubiquitous in the cities of Southeast Asia. Cable television and Internet services have dramatically expanded, especially in urban areas. Southeast Asians appear extremely open to the adoption of new Western technologies in all arenas of life.

The physical infrastructure of Southeast Asian nations shows Western influence in the buildings that survive from colonial days. Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam are all noteworthy for their colonial French architecture. In fact, the policy of Laos is the total preservation of such distinctive cream-colored architecture as an important and unique historical legacy.

The British colonies of Singapore and Malaysia also benefited from important physical and human infrastructure (modern bureaucratic structures) as a legacy of British rule. Even in Yangon (formerly Rangoon), the capital of Myanmar, there is evidence of an important physical infrastructure left behind by the British colonial masters.

The growth of the tourism industry is another by-product of Westernization. Among major attractions are Bali in Indonesia; Thailand, with its many famous beaches and excellent tourist infrastructure; and Angkor Wat temple in Cambodia, the world's largest religious monument. Vietnam also has excellent tourism potential. Tourism represents in the region a major earner of foreign exchange from the West.

Educational and Economic Westernization Two important interrelated areas of Western influence are economic aid and international education. Many Southeast Asian young people educated in the West returned to play leading roles in overturning traditional political systems. Examples of such individuals are Ho Chi Minh, Pol Pot, Pridi Banomyong, and Pibul Songkram. During the post-World War II period, many educated youth from the region have aspired to study in the West. Apart from skills learned, study in the West brings great prestige and status. Many leading intellectuals, technocrats, and some politicians in the region were educated in the West. Among prominent political leaders educated in the West are Thaksin Shinawatra, prime minister of Thailand; Corazon Aquino, former president of the Philippines; President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of the Philippines; and Lee Kuan Yew, former leader of Singapore. Universities in the West are active in

recruiting students from the region, and some are offering education in the region itself with offshore programs.

Because Southeast Asia is a region primarily of developing nations, nearly all nations (except wealthy Brunei and Singapore) have been major recipients of international development assistance from the West. Currently, transitional economies such as those of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam are also receiving significant economic assistance from the West.

These postcolonial Western influences, especially materialism, have given rise to the growth of anti-Western movements. Several key intellectuals in the region, including Sulak Sivaraksa in Thailand, Renato Constantino in the Philippines, and Syed Hussein Alatas in Malaysia, have been highly critical of the pervasive influence of Western materialism. Sulak, for example, calls for a return to core traditional Buddhist values. Despite the prolific writings and the social activism of those opposing Westernization and globalization, they have had little impact in stemming the tide of rising Western materialism and modern popular culture and their growing influence throughout the region.

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
WESTERNIZATION—WEST ASIA The nations of West Asia (Turkey, Iran, and Iraq) are considered part of the Middle East, the home of Islam, and they have a distinct history, culture, and civilization. There is a close nexus between religious authority and society. Of the three West Asian nations of the Middle East, Turkey is among the most secular and Westernized, whereas Iran and Iraq are less so, though they are almost as different from each other as they are from Turkey. Contradictions in the regime structures, political ideologies, and institutional goals of these nations have provided a fertile ground for the growth of radicalism. The state has turned out to be a most powerful institution, the final arbiter in matters of politics and societal structure.

Over the centuries, conservative and radical Arab nationalism has been a mainstream influence on state, social, and political institutions in the Middle East. By pushing people toward Islamic fundamentalism, Arab nationalism has restricted the development of a progressive outlook.

The process of Westernization in the Middle East, insofar as it has occurred, has been gradual, complex, and painful, carried out over decades to bring about transformation in patriarchal, feudal, and conservative societies. In Iran, the regime (1921–1941) of Reza Shah Pahlavi (1878–1944) in Iran began the modernization process under which he diverted major resources to expanding and strengthening the military apparatus to ensure the continuation of the absolute monarchy. To this end, he modernized military apparatus, built roads, improved the transportation system, and invested oil-based revenues in defense. The process opened up Iran's oil-based economy to Great Britain and the United States.

The inroads Reza Shah made in modernizing Iran did not extend to Westernizing it, however. In fact, his regime imposed strict censorship on the press and limited freedom of speech and expression. He deployed secret police to eliminate progressive-minded political leaders. His autocratic policies failed to create a cohesive socioeconomic base to bring about attitudinal changes among masses, and his style of autocratic regime was incompatible with liberal and democratic values.

It is paradoxical that Westernization and radical Arab nationalism have coexisted. For Middle Eastern nations, the admirable aspects of Western society are modern political concepts such as legitimacy, adult franchise, and gender equality. The Middle East's intellectuals and educated citizenry have not been so accepting what they perceive as an excessive focus on



An Iranian family drinks Coca-Cola outside a cold drink shop in Bam, Iran, in 1997. (EARL & NAZIMA KOWALL/ CORBIS)

individualism and materialism. The ruling elites in the oil-rich Middle East are also affected by the impact of science and information technology, globalization, and the opportunities presented by trade and investment. Some recognize that economic reforms, political moderation, and social change can bring economic growth, employment, and an improved standard of living for their populace.

Turkey

Turkey, with a population of 61.8 million (1997 census), is a democratic and secular country. The Turks constitute approximately 80 percent of the population; of them, 66 percent are Sunni Muslims and 33 percent are Alevi (Shi'ite) Muslims. Agriculture provides 50 percent of the nation's jobs. Early on, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938) championed Westernization. He ordered the adoption of Western clothing, replaced the Arabic alphabet with the Roman alphabet, and emphasized a secular state. By and

large, the nation has followed that path ever since, although in the 1990s Islamists came to have a stronger voice of opposition.

As a result of modernization programs launched by the government, Turkey's economy is being steadily liberalized. Transportation and communication facilities are fast expanding. Industrial growth contributes more than 30 percent of GDP, and 33 percent of employment in the labor sector. More significantly, the Turkish government has abolished Sufi orders and closed down *madrasabs* (Islamic religious schools), which are associated with radical Islam. The fast expansion of basic education has brought the country's literacy rate to more than 81 percent. Cumulatively speaking, Turkey has become an ideal model of a progressive and modern state in the Middle East, although its human-rights record still leaves much to be desired. The people of Turkey do not consider themselves Westernized in the strict liberal sense of the term, however.

Iran

The Constitutional Revolution (1906), the nationalist movement of 1951–1953, and the Islamic Revolution of 1978–1979 were Iran's three major political movements during the twentieth century. They opposed the unjust and illiberal monarchy, and granted Western-style individual freedom and rights within the framework of Islamic ideology. In March 1979, the Islamic Republic proposed by Ayatollah Khomeini (1900–1989) was overwhelmingly endorsed by the people (98.2 percent) in a referendum. But the Islamization measures undertaken under the Khomeini's regime were anti-Western, aimed at reversing liberal reforms, social progress, and women's rights. Socio-culturally and psychologically, Westernization was seen as antithetical to Islamic ideology.

In the 1990s, after the death of Khomeini, a process of political reform started. Iranian people favored individual freedom and rights. Reformists launched a political campaign to promote democratic values. Hashemi Rafsanjani (b. 1934), a champion of modernization and political reform, was elected as president in July 1989. He made efforts to revamp the economy and emphasized the necessity for liberal education in schools and colleges. The 1997 election of his successor, Muhammad Khatami (b. 1943), proved beyond doubt that the people were not in favor of conservatives and radicals. The government has demonstrated that it is not opposed to the new sources of legitimacy. In 1999, three hundred women out of a total of five thousand women candidates won local elections. Like men, women are entitled to vote at the age

of fifteen. Women continue to face discrimination in employment and the social sector, however.

The new regime in Iran today is keen to introduce secular values. Nevertheless, radical forces are still very active in Iran; these forces question the legitimacy of Western values, which they think are antithetical to Islamic ideology. In addition, there is the difficult task of blending modernity with social justice.

Iraq

Iraq has been under a long spell of the presidential dictatorship. It has suffered a lot almost on all fronts under the regime of Saddam Hussein (b. 1937), who came to power in 1968. He is opposed to Western values tooth and nail, and considers the West, especially the United States, to be the enemy of Islam. The people in Iraq have virtually no individual freedom or rights. Nor is there gender equality. The press is fully under the control of the government. All these have contributed to the reversal of the Westernization program of the 1950s and the 1960s. Economically, Iraq has suffered as a result of the Persian Gulf War (1990–1991). Unemployment is estimated at 50 percent.

When applying the yardstick of Westernization in terms of broad social and cultural outlook, expansion of education, economic development, growth of technology and mass media, and improved living and health standards, West Asia can hardly be described as Westernized. It is still hamstrung by conservatism, feudalism, and religious radicalism, which prevent people from imbibing the liberal democratic values of human freedom and dignity. Traditionally, the impact of Islamic beliefs and practices is so strong as to make it extremely difficult for people to change. There is still a long road to liberal democracy and secularism in the Middle East. Many regimes are not prepared to grant political freedom and rights. However, the acceleration of the process of economic reform and privatization, along with increased foreign investment, may make possible gradual political openness, economic development, and inter- and intrareligious tolerance.

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WHALING-JAPAN Japan has a long history (dating back to 10,000 BCE) of whaling. Whalebones have been found in ruins from the Jomon period (10,000—300 BCE). A description of whales appeared first in the *Kojiki*, the oldest Japanese written record (712 CE). Whale meat was in supply from the Muro-machi period (1333–1573).

Whaling became a prosperous endeavor in the middle of the Edo period (1600/1603–1868), and whale meat continued to be eaten. During this period, the main whaling stations were in Taiji, Koza (Wakayama Prefecture), Tsuru, Fubotsu (Kochi), Ikitsuki, Waniura, Tsushima (Nagasaki), and Awa (Chiba). Harpooning by hand was the method used. Toward the end of the seventeenth century, techniques of net whaling were developed in Taiji and continued to dominate until the end of the nineteenth century. In 1662, whaling ships were painted, and fifteen-member crews used eight sets of oars. The whales caught were grays, rights, humpbacks, fins, and probably some minke. Temples and shrines were built to commemorate the souls of whales drowned in nets.

By 1900, through Russian whaling, the Norwegian method of using a motorized fleet was introduced to Japan. This led to the development of modern coastal whaling. Whaling traditions spread from southern Japan to the northern coast of Hokkaido, and whaling took place not only along the coast but also in the open seas of the North Pacific and Antarctic. After World War II, the people of Japan became more and more dependent on whale meat because of a food crisis and the lack of other sources of protein. In 1951, Japan signed the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling of 1946. Japan gave up commercial whaling following the international moratorium in 1986 but has engaged in research, such as a whaling program to study southern ocean minke whales and the Antarctic ecosystem since 1987. The Institute of

Cetacean Research, created in 1987, is implementing this program with the Japan Whaling Association. Conservationists view this institute's activities, through its whaling research program, as a cover for commercial whalers. In 1993, Japan hosted the Forty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the International Whaling Commission (established in 1948) in Kyoto. The meeting resolved to work to alleviate distress to Japanese coastal whaling communities resulting from the moratorium. Today, there are four Japanese whaling communities, Taiji (population 3,900), Wada (population 6,000), Ayukawa (population 4,000), and Abashiri (population 44,000).

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WHITE RAJAS The White Rajas of Sarawak were British adventurers who ruled as enlightened paternal despots for more than a century, from 1841 to 1946. Three generations of the Brooke family maintained Sarawak as a multiethnic, agrarian state until they turned it over to Great Britain following World War II. The Brookes worked with the leaders from the native and immigrant populations to protect the region's traditional way of life.

The History of the White Rajas

The rule of the White Rajas began in 1841, when James Brooke (1803–1868) was granted the territory of Sarawak, then covering the Lundu, Sarawak, and Sadong River basins, by Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin II of Brunei, as a reward for putting down a revolt staged by the Malays and Bidayus (Land Dayaks) of the area.

By the time that Brooke died in London, he had extended the boundaries of Sarawak eastward to the Bintulu River (1861). His nephew, Charles (1829–1917), succeeded him, and during his long reign from 1868 until his demise in 1917, Sarawak assumed its present-day configuration through acquisitions from Brunei of the Baram (1881), the Trusan (1885), the Limbang (1890), and the Lawas (1905) Rivers. Charles, together with his son and successor, Vyner (1874–1963), molded Sarawak into a semblance of a modern state, despite its isolation.

Following World War II, it was deemed financially burdensome and beyond the means for the modestly

endowed Brooke government to undertake rehabilitation and reconstruction. Vyner decided that the practical option was the cession of Sarawak to the British government. In June 1946, Sarawak became a British Crown colony.

Characteristics of the Brookes

While James Brooke was courageous, charming, and charismatic, at ease with royalty as well as common people, his successor Charles was remote, reserved, uneasy, and lacking social graces in the company of high society. Unlike Charles, who was a consummate hands-on administrator, extremely thrifty and almost parsimonious, James Brooke had been a poor administrator and an even poorer financier. Vyner Brooke was shy and introverted; he disliked public appearances and pomp and ceremony. He was indecisive and had an aversion for day-to-day administration, but at the same time he was unable to delegate authority effectively. Vyner's younger brother, Bertram (1876–1965), who shared the rajaship in accordance with the will of Charles Brooke, was deferential and cautious about not upstaging Vyner. Bertram displayed no personal ambition and undertook his role as a matter of duty.

The Brookes' Principles of Governance

All the Brookes were steadfast to the principles of governance laid down by James Brooke, which became enshrined as the traditions of the White Rajas of Sarawak. These traditions emphasized the principles of trusteeship whereby Sarawak belonged to the indigenous peoples and the Brookes administered the territory on their behalf. The maintenance of the status quo in all spheres—political, economic, sociocultural—was emphasized. Change was discouraged, particularly radical transformation; if necessary or inevitable, the process of change was to be gradual and was not to affect adversely the way of life of the indigenous inhabitants.

Although the White Raja was an absolute monarch, he ruled through consultation with native chiefs, namely the Malay *datu* (nonroyal chieftains). This practice was institutionalized in 1855 with the establishment of the Supreme Council. If the raja consulted the *datu*, his European officers in the outstations relied on their respective native officers, drawn from the *perabangan* (sons of *datu*), for advice and discussion. Moreover officers at the district level were expected to seek advice and guidance from, and consult with, local native leaders. The advice and views given were not binding; nonetheless the act of consultation served the purpose of gaining the native perspective on is-

sues. Despite being basically a public relations exercise, the General Council (instituted in 1867), a triennial gathering of native chiefs and Brookes officers with the raja, represented the formal aspect of personal rule.

The raja also consulted with Chinese communal leaders from the various dialect groups (Hokkien, Teochew, Cantonese) on matters pertaining to the Chinese community. In the Chinese court, established in 1912, Chinese communal leaders presided as magistrates to deal with civil cases involving Chinese customs, traditions, and practices.

In the economic sphere, the development of trade and commercial activities and exploitation of natural resources were to be carried out without unduly disrupting the traditional pattern of native subsistence and way of life. The indigenous peoples were to be shielded from exploitation by outsiders—European and Chinese—particularly on the issue of land. Raja Charles Brooke equated land with *darab daging* (flesh and blood) of the natives. Under no circumstances were the natives to part with this heritage. Moreover the backbone of the economy, the Brookes insisted, was to be the tilling of the land. Agriculture was the means of improving native welfare. Ideally, as Raja Charles envisioned, family-owned and family-managed smallholdings of food crops (rice) and some commercial crops (rubber, pepper, tropical fruits) were to be established. The sago-producing coastal Melanau districts were to maintain their traditional way of life.

European capital investment and Chinese labor and entrepreneurial skills, if cautiously applied, would gradually develop the resources of Sarawak. The Chinese were allowed to engage in gold mining and in trade and commerce; subsequently they dominated the country's retail trade. The Chinese also developed commercial agriculture (pepper, gambier, rubber) on a smallholding scale. The limited number of European enterprises was confined to the extractive industries (gold, oil) and plantation agriculture (rubber).

The Brookes eliminated traditional abusive practices such as *serab dagang* (forced trade), bondage, all forms of slavery, and headhunting. Although they had mixed feelings about the effects of Western-style education on the native peoples, the Brookes provided government-sponsored Malay schools and allowed Christian missionaries to establish urban English-medium and rural vernacular schools. The Brookes were dubious about the influence of Christian missions on the indigenous peoples and forbade proselytizing among the Muslims (Malays, some Melanau, Kedayans).

After a century of White Raja rule, Sarawak was a thinly populated, tranquil, virgin country, barely touched by influences from without. The multiethnic native population remained largely in rural-based subsistence farming communities. There were also Chinese-managed commercial smallholdings of pepper, gambier, and rubber. The Chinese dominated trade and commerce. Aside from the extractive industry (oil and gold), there was a conspicuous absence of European large-scale capitalist enterprise. Equally nonexistent were native landlessness and indebtedness.

The White Rajas fostered a form of enlightened paternal despotism that jealously protected the interests of the native inhabitants and the preservation of their traditional ways of life. Consequently, economic development was sluggish, and there was no apparent significant improvement in the livelihood of the indigenous population. The provision of education and public health care barely touched the vast majority of native inhabitants. Infrastructure development was minimal.

Nonetheless, the indigenous peoples and the Chinese inhabitants revered the Brooke regime that maintained a stable administration and a peaceful country. However, heightened nationalistic feelings consequent of the brief but significant Japanese military occupation (1941–1945) of Sarawak and the changing postwar geopolitical situation made Brooke paternal rule an anachronism. When Sarawak was ceded to the British government and became a crown colony (1946–1963), a small sector of the Malay community opposed it; the majority of the population, however, viewed cession favorably. British rule brought some improvement particularly in the development of infrastructure and in the social services, such as education and public health.

Ooi Keat Gin

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WHITE TERROR "White terror" was the name given to the terror regime established by the Chinese Nationalist Party (CNP, or Guomindang) after its capture of Shanghai in 1927. The violence, which drove a permanent wedge between the Nationalists (the white party) and the Communists (the red party), was directed at the labor unions and their leaders but later turned into extortion of Shanghai's privileged classes.

Background

From the time of the collapse of China's last imperial dynasty in 1911 and the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912, China's political landscape had been fragmented; by the early 1920s Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) led the CNP from its principal base in Guangzhou (Canton), while the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded in Shanghai in 1921 by Chen Duxiu (1879–1942). In 1923 Sun Yat-sen's favorable impression of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and the communist belief that a socialist revolution would follow a nationalist revolution led to the Communists and the Nationalists forming an uneasy alliance against the local warlords who held large parts of China. Michael Borodin (originally named Mikhail Gruzenberg, 1884–1951), who was a Comintern agent in China from 1923 to 1927 and who was one of the architects of the alliance between the CCP and CNP, became one of Sun Yat-sen's special advisers. At a CNP conference in January 1924, Communist delegates accounted for fewer than 20 percent of those present, but already in January 1926, Communists and their supporters in the CNP constituted the majority of the delegates at a conference held in Guangzhou. Following the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925, Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), commander of the Whampoa Military Academy south of Guangzhou, soon emerged as the new leader of the CNP.

Although Guangzhou had become a Communist stronghold, powerful anti-Communist factions of the CNP existed all over China, and under the new CNP leadership, the pro-Soviet line was abandoned. The tensions between the CCP and the CNP surfaced in March 1926 when Chiang Kai-shek felt provoked by the presence of a gunboat commanded by a Communist and imposed martial law in Guangzhou. Soviet advisers were arrested, and workers and Communists were disarmed. After some days, martial law was lifted, and after negotiations involving Borodin, the CNP-CCP alliance continued, but with a weakened Communist position. By the end of 1926, the armies controlled by the CNP and Chiang Kai-shek had conquered most of southern China and established headquarters in Nanchang, while the CCP and its supporters were based in Wuhan.

Shanghai 1927

In the 1920s the central part of Shanghai was divided into a number of foreign settlements surrounded by Chinese neighborhoods. The foreign concessions were legislatively and administratively independent of China, and they could even overrule the legal system of the Chinese government. The city was a booming center of industry and trade, and Communist leaders had been very successful in organizing workers on the docks and in the factories in labor unions. In May 1925 strikes involving several hundreds of thousands of workers in Shanghai spread to the rest of China, and the riots were stopped only when Japanese and British troops opened fire and killed numerous Chinese workers.

In February 1927, at the same time Chiang Kai-shek was contemplating a move on Shanghai, the Communist leaders in the city, Zhou Enlai (1899–1976) and Li Lisan (1899–1967), organized a general strike that paralyzed the busy port and the industry. Again, numerous workers were arrested and executed, but in March the strike turned into an armed rebellion against the CNP and the authorities in the Chinese part of Shanghai, and police stations and other key buildings in the city were occupied. Chiang Kai-shek delayed his advance on Shanghai in the hope that foreign troops or Shanghai's local Chinese commander would crush the Communists, but when that failed to happen, the CNP armies arrived on 26 March.

White Terror

One of Chiang Kai-shek's main motives for taking over the rich city of Shanghai was to secure financial support for his campaign to conquer the northern provinces, which at that time were controlled by independent warlords. At the same time, he wanted to curb the influence of the CCP headquarters in Wuhan and the strong Communist organization in Shanghai. The city's industrial leaders, powerful businessman, foreign concessions, and underworld entrepreneurs occupied with gambling, prostitution, kidnapping, and opium trade shared Chiang's opposition to the CCP. The illegal activities in Shanghai were controlled by a secret society known as the Green Gang (Qingbang), led by Huang Jinrong, a senior officer in the French police. The nature of Chiang Kai-shek's connection with the Green Gang remains undisclosed, but it is generally agreed that an alliance was formed between the Nationalist occupying forces and the secret society to strike against labor unions and Communists.

At 4:00 A.M. on 12 April, while Chiang was away to set up his capital in Nanjing, a well-orchestrated attack on union headquarters around Shanghai was carried out

by a militia led by associates of Huang. The militia, which consisted of approximately one thousand men, was heavily armed and wore plain blue clothes and white armbands with the Chinese character for labor (*gong*). In several instances, they were assisted by Nationalist troops, and they were allowed to pass freely through the foreign settlements. Hundreds of leading labor unionists and Communists were shot or arrested and turned over to the Nationalist troops, who executed them. A few leaders, among them Zhou Enlai, narrowly escaped. The next day, the labor unions responded with huge strikes and demonstrations that were dispersed with machine guns, bayonets, and swords.

The white terror spread to other cities held by the CNP, and several Communist attempts to establish city communes were suppressed. Having put an end to Communist activities in Shanghai, Chiang Kai-shek began to collect payment from the privileged classes for his services. Assisted by criminals of the Green Gang, the CNP forced the rich to donate money or extend "loans" to finance its armies. Those who refused were imprisoned and only released in return for huge sums of money or had their property confiscated or their children kidnapped.

The white terror in Shanghai and other urban Communist strongholds had a crucial influence on the further development of Communist strategy in China. Having lost its influence in the cities, the CCP concentrated its focus on the large and richly populated rural areas and based its revolution on the peasants rather than the industrial workers.

Bent Nielsen

See also: **Guomindang**

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WIJAYA, PUTU (b. 1943), Indonesian playwright, film director, writer. Born in Bali in 1943, Putu Wijaya has developed a style that blends traditional Balinese influences with elements drawn from Antonin Artaud (1869–1948) and avant-garde Western theatre. His stage works often use a very Balinese blend of music, choreography, and dramatic action to present plots that leave a very Western impression of disturbing uncertainty. His theatrical works mostly have one word

titles, such as: *Edan* (Mad), *Aduh* (Ouch), *Awas* (Beware), *Aib* (Dishonor), and *Dor* (Bang). Putu Wijaya works mostly with his own theater company, Teater Mandiri (Independent Theater). His novels and short stories are best-sellers in Indonesia and are written to confront and shock readers and thereby grab their attention. Among his popular works are *Blok* and *Prrototes*. His plays are also performed outside Indonesia as a leading example of modern Indonesian drama.

Tim Byard-Jones

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WOMEN IN CENTRAL ASIA Central Asian women represent more than twenty different ethnic groups, speak variations of the Turkic and Tajik languages, and live in five countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, they share many common characteristics. Most Central Asian women are Muslims of the Sunni sect. They were raised under Soviet ideals of gender equality; they share high literacy rates, maintain close ties to their extended families, and are navigating the immense economic and social upheaval of the post-Soviet era.

Pre-Soviet Society

Little is recorded about Central Asian women prior to the Soviet period. Sparse descriptions in travel journals note that women of the nomadic Kazakh and Kyrgyz groups rarely were veiled. In comparison, their more sedentary agricultural neighbors, the Uzbeks, practiced female seclusion and adhered to the custom of *parandzha*, face and body veiling. Women of nomadic tribes wore male apparel since girls and women were expected to perform tasks as competently as their male counterparts, whether horseback riding, hunting, or herding. Such expectations stemmed from the seasonal cycle of nomadism, which required that men and women live separately for months at a time. While men grazed cattle on the highest pastures, women were the de facto masters of the lower-altitude camps,

performing all the duties that men performed when they were there. Since the nomadic groups of Central Asia were not Islamized until the 1800s, these women had few restrictions on their daily lives. Nevertheless, both nomadic and sedentary women had few opportunities to be educated, little freedom in choosing a mate, and few property rights.

The Soviet Period

Beginning in 1926 the Soviets initiated a campaign of female emancipation in Central Asia called (in Uzbek) *bujum* or assault. This campaign advocated that, for the good of the young Soviet nation, Muslim women become the equals of men, be allowed to work, and be educated outside the home. One of the most radical steps in the campaign was to do away with the custom of veiling. The Soviets organized large assemblies so thousands of women could "unveil" at the same time. For the Russians the veil symbolized oppression and ignorance, but for Central Asians the veil was an integral part of their lives. In urban settings it provided protection from the desert heat and dust; it also represented the definitive divide between the spaces accorded to men and women. Men were the public face of the family, and women remained secluded in their homes with their children.

Over the course of a decade Central Asians slowly shed the veil. They were given an education, and, as a first step toward employment outside the home, the Soviets established female cooperatives for textile and agricultural training. It became understood during the Soviet period that education and employment were not only their right but also their duty to their country.

In spite of Soviet norms and restrictions, many traditional customs survived. Central Asian women in many ways lived dualistic lives. They performed their duties as Soviet citizens in public while privately attending to the numerous traditions and rituals that reflected the central role of family in their society. Perhaps only in the realm of childbearing did the Soviet agenda and Central Asian traditionalism overlap. In Central Asian society children are considered a family's wealth; a woman who bears many children is regarded highly. During World War II, the Soviets encouraged reproduction, presenting medals of honor to women bearing more than five children. Central Asian women were by far the most decorated "mother heroines," even as they continued to work outside the home and boosted literacy rates to 98 percent.

Post-Soviet Dilemmas

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in August 1991, five new states emerged from the former Soviet

republics. "Democracy" and "market economy" became code words for the transition away from socialism. Instead of ushering in a new era of freedom and opportunity, as hoped, the last decade of the twentieth century was particularly arduous for women. Many of the state enterprises and collective farms, which had previously employed a large percentage of women, were privatized or eliminated. Official and unofficial unemployment have become rampant. Further, many preschools and medical supports for the aged were curtailed because of limited governmental funds. Without state provisions for child care, elder care, and other benefits, women become primary caregivers for their extended families. At the end of the twentieth century, Central Asian women also played a pivotal role in non-governmental organizations. In lieu of formal employment, they were active in the informal marketplace, especially in buying and selling goods at local bazaars.

In summary, the ethnic diversity of Central Asian women is mitigated by the fact that they share the customs of Islam. Likewise, the common experience of seventy years under Soviet rule gave women the opportunity to be educated and to work outside the home. Nevertheless, women continue to be expected to maintain family traditions. The economic woes resulting from the independence of the Central Asian countries placed an unusually heavy burden on women, since they were primarily responsible for the physical and social well-being of the family and for supplying an income.

Kathleen Kuehnast

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WOMEN IN CHINA Women figure significantly in Chinese history and had a unique status for two reasons. First, the orthodox system of Confucianism that ordered the Chinese imperium from its

earliest dynasties until the twentieth century considered the family to be the basic political unit. Women's roles as wives, household managers, and educators of the young thus served not only the family but also the state. Second, although Confucius (551–479 BCE) emphasized the hierarchical relationships between ruler and subject, father and son, and husband and wife, he also taught the reciprocal responsibilities of each. Thus, while a wife was bound to obey and serve her husband, he was equally bound to treat her with dignity and respect. Through the complex interweaving of official and private lives, Chinese women had opportunities to exercise informal power not known to women in other patriarchal societies.

Women's Roles in Early China

Confucianism ordered the lives of women from their birth to their death through three sets of principles. The earliest was penned by the great woman scholar Ban Zhao in *Lessons for Women* during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). Ban Zhao instructed women to be guided by womanly virtue, correct speech, proper deportment, and womanly work. These were known collectively as the "four womanly virtues." Also central was the concept of the "three obediences"—obeying one's father when young, one's husband when married, and one's son when widowed. Finally, there was the principle of *bie* or separateness. Men and women each had their own spheres. For elite men, this was the world of study, civil-service examinations, and official careers. For peasants, it was the field. The home was a woman's sphere whether she was rich or poor. The separate spheres of men and women in China, however, must not be confused with similar concepts in the West. Because the family was the basic political unit in the Confucian system, the state had a vested interest in the lives of women. Thus, although women led private lives, their lives were a public matter.

Although Confucian China was a patriarchal society, its moral code applied equally to men and women. One of the five basic Confucian relationships was that between husband and wife. While husbands were placed over their wives, the principle of reciprocity required that husbands treat their wives with respect if they expected to be served well in return. The principle of filial piety also elevated a woman's position. From boyhood sons were bound to their mothers through both maternal ties and the Confucian principle of filial piety, which required them to honor and serve both parents throughout their lives and after their deaths. Practical aspects of the Confucian bureaucracy also provided elite women with unusual status and power in the family. The arduous task of studying for

the examinations that led to officialdom occupied men, from their youth often through middle age. Because Chinese statesmen could not hold office in their home province, after they won official appointment they could be sent away from home for years at a time. Wives bore the responsibility of managing the household itself and often the entire family estate as well.

Because Confucianism bolstered the patriarchal state and endorsed, at least in theory, women's subservient position to the men in the household, it provided little solace for women. To find spiritual satisfaction and harmony, women turned to Buddhism and Taoism, both considered "heterodox" religions because they ran counter to the orthodox system of beliefs in Confucianism. They studied Buddhist sutras and Taoist writings and made pilgrimages to local shrines. Older women and widows might hand over control of their households to their oldest daughter-in-law and retire into seclusion to pray and meditate. The fact that women traveled on pilgrimages testifies to the hold on the public imagination of heterodox religions as well as the toleration of Confucianism. The fact that a family matriarch could withdraw from daily responsibilities and devote herself to prayer if she wished speaks to the importance of hierarchical relationships within the family and the respect given to family elders.

Certain female practices, however, lay outside the domain of the dominant Confucian culture. The custom of foot binding, the painful practice of binding a young girl's feet so that they did not grow but took on the form of a lotus flower is often offered as evidence of Chinese women's extreme subjugation. Yet while widely accepted, foot binding was not condoned in orthodox Confucian literature. A patriarchal society may have approved of the fact that women with bound feet were more easily controlled, and men may have regarded women's tiny feet as erotic, but in actuality foot binding was part of the female culture.

Foot binding began as a courtesan fashion during the Song dynasty (960–1279) and was soon imitated in court circles. The practice evolved slowly into a status marker in elite society, and a woman's beauty and desirability were judged by how tiny her feet were. Because it was the custom in China for men to marry women of lower social standing, foot binding eventually spread to peasants, where it was a means of upward mobility for daughters. Foot binding was a private female ritual: mothers bound the feet of their daughters. Young girls embroidered intricate slippers as part of their trousseau and wrote poems about their tiny feet. Bathing and rebinding feet became a lifelong part of women's daily toilet. Except for her husband, no man ever saw a woman's feet, and even he never saw his



INFORMAL SOURCES OF POWER AMONG CHINESE WOMEN

Although men have more power than do women in China, women certainly do exercise power. However, their power tends to be informal and to be most obvious in the family and in the community, as indicated by this description of women in a community in Taiwan.

The power young women wield as they build their uterine families and attempt to manipulate their husbands is of a peculiar kind. It consists in subverting and disrupting the family form that most Chinese men hold dear—the family that grows from generation to generation without interruption and without division. Sons, their wives, and their children should live in harmony under the guidance of the eldest male. The goals and desires of young married women conflict with this ideal, and it is largely their machinations that prevent its attainment. The *power* women have is their capacity to alter a family's form by adding members to it, dividing it, and disturbing male authority; the *danger* they pose is their capacity to break up what men consider the ideal family

We once asked a male friend in Peihotien just what "having face" amounted to. He replied, "When no one is talking about a family, you can say it has face." This is precisely where women wield their power. When a man behaves in a way they consider wrong, they talk about him—not only among themselves, but to their sons and husbands. No one "tells him how to mind his own business," but it becomes abundantly clear that he is losing face and by continuing in this manner may bring shame to the family of his ancestors and descendants. Few men will risk that.

Source: Emily M. Ahern. (1978) "The Power and Pollution of Chinese Women." In *Studies in Chinese Society*, edited by Arthur P. Wolf. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 276–277.

wife's feet unbound. As with other cultural rituals no longer practiced, it is difficult to unravel its meaning and importance in the lives of women, but the practice of foot binding belonged to the female sphere.

Women as Producers and Reproducers in Later China

While patriarchal systems legitimized male power over women, they also defined male and female roles in relation to what was necessary for the state and society to prosper. In China the adage "Men till, women weave" was more than a statement of gender roles. In early imperial China, taxes were paid in rice and woven cotton cloth. Because women contributed a portion of the annual tax levy, both elite and peasant

women gained status as economic producers. Reforms in the tax system and the commercialization of weaving at the beginning of the late imperial period altered women's status. From the Song to the Qing dynasties, technological advances in loom design, the introduction of silk and silk damasks, and the increasing demand for more intricately patterned cloth resulted in the decline of weaving as a cottage industry and its growth as a commercial enterprise. While domestic weaving was marginalized in the economy, culturally the adage "Men till, women weave" emphasized the importance of work over leisure, even for women in elite households.

Arguably, the downward spiral of women's social status in late imperial China, especially from the Ming

dynasty onward—which was also reflected in changes in the legal code and in the increasing cultural importance of foot binding to both men and women—started with women’s loss of economic power vis-à-vis the family and the state. This shift led women to find new, informal means of exercising power. One way was through motherhood.

Being indentured as servants, sold into slavery or prostitution, or abandoned at nunneries was a possible fate for peasant girls and even girls from elite households that were gradually descending into poverty, but most women married. Producing children, although valued in all traditional societies, had certain special implications in Chinese society. Sons were desired because they would care for their parents in their old age. In elite households sons were also prized because they could bring honor, prestige, and wealth to their families if they were successful in the civil-service examinations and fortunate in their careers.

From earliest childhood girls were groomed for their future roles as wives, mothers, and daughters-in-law. They were taught to read and write, some becoming proficient enough to write poetry. They were schooled in womanly virtues and taught all the practical aspects of household management. Marriage was a social contract, arranged between families. A bride and groom never saw each other before the wedding, and the hooded bridal gown prevented them from seeing each other even during the ceremony. A bride’s primary relationship was with her mother-in-law. Many tales of the cruelty of mothers-in-law to their daughters-in-law have come down in popular Chinese literature, much like stories of evil stepmothers in fairy tales in the West. How true these stories were is impossible to tell. What is certain, however, is that relations among the many women in an extended family compound were complicated. Hierarchy among women was dictated by age and marital status. A woman’s position was also determined by her beauty, talent, and virtue, or by her skill in compensating for the lack of such attributes. The great social novel *Dream of the Red Chamber* (*Hunglou meng*, 1792) provides the classic example of how much intrigue as well as genuine friendship there was among women in the extended Chinese family.

One complication in the Chinese household that has no direct counterpart in the West was concubinage. A concubine was a second or third wife who had no legal standing as a wife. The practice was officially condoned as long as a man’s first wife produced no male heir. Among the affluent, the practice of taking more than one concubine as a mark of wealth became

prevalent. Not only did a concubine have no legal standing as a wife, but also she could not even consider her children to be her own. Even if she was fortunate enough to produce the desired male heir, the first wife was considered the child’s mother.

Thus motherhood and the status motherhood brought with it were conferred only on the legitimate, first wife. The child owed filial obedience only to his or her socially recognized mother. The gain for some women and the loss for others in this social arrangement cannot be overstated. As the mothers of successful bureaucrats, elite women were able to reestablish a link between themselves and the state. By the Ming dynasty, no longer important as producers, they gained importance and honor as Confucian mothers.

Women’s Modern Transformation

After the Opium Wars of the mid-nineteenth century, Western powers forced themselves on China. From 1840 to 1949 China was a country in transformation, and women were caught up in it. The late nineteenth century saw the beginning of serious attempts to reform society. Every aspect of Chinese life came under challenge, including the limited social, political, and economic roles of women.

Western missionaries led the way in educating Chinese girls, one of their true contributions to Chinese society. Even before universal education was established in 1907, many gentry families had opened Western-style schools for girls or sent their daughters overseas to receive higher educations.



CHAIRMAN MAO ON WOMEN

"In order to build a great socialist society, it is of the utmost importance to arouse the broad masses of women to join in productive activity. Men and women must receive equal pay for equal work in production. Genuine equality between the sexes can only be realized in the process of the socialist transformation of society as a whole."

Source: Mao Zedong. (1976). *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tsetung*. Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 297.



With its large population a major economic resource, China has work teams that are continually building and maintaining public resources throughout the country. Here, three women working on a new water main from Miyun to Beijing take a rest. (DEAN CONGER/CORBIS)

Education was the key to women's transformation. The first generation of Chinese feminists received their higher educations abroad. With the introduction of higher education in China, first through Christian union colleges for women, founded between 1905 and 1915, and then through universities, later female leaders were more likely to have been educated entirely in China. It was not only those with advanced educations who played a pivotal role in women's struggle for a share of China's progress. Many more women with middle-school educations entered the teaching ranks than did college-educated women.

Other professions were slow to open up for women. In the 1920s women worked as doctors and educators. Gradually women entered government service. Political rights were even more elusive. Both the Nationalist and the Communist Parties were essentially patriarchal. The New Life Movement, an ideological campaign launched by General Chiang Kai-shek in the early 1930s, actually emphasized the four womanly virtues and sought to curtail women's public roles by promoting domesticity. However, in the 1930s, a civil law code was finally passed that granted women many civil rights, such as the right to divorce and hold property.

Much of the progress women made in the first half of the twentieth century affected only women in urban centers. In the rural countryside that made up most of China, life changed more slowly. Foreign wars, internal revolts, devastating famines and floods, and a spiraling population plunged the majority of Chinese women into unimaginable poverty. Infanti-

cide and the selling of little girls into various forms of bondage was prevalent. Young girls became part of the trade in labor for mills in industrializing coastal cities. Not until the Communists won the civil war in 1949 did many of these practices end.

At the time of the Communist victory, a core of women from various women's organizations formed the All-China Women's Federation (ACWF). Quasi official in nature, the ACWF provided women with their first collective voice in their own affairs and those of their country. Although ideologically bound to the Communist Party, the ACWF was and still is exclusively a women's forum that monitors women's lives, lobbies the government on their behalf, and helps enforce government policy at regional and local levels. The organization represents a step forward for women still bound in large part by patriarchal principles.

The past twenty years have brought significant changes to the lives of women in urban China, but again less so to women in rural villages. Education and economic security are still key to women's progress and, as more and more women gain both, their status and power in society should improve.

For years, all that was known about the lives of women in China came from the writings of men. Historians now realize that such writings cannot be interpreted literally because they represented only the male view of how society should function, rather than the lived experiences of women. The discovery of thousands of poems written by women finally furnished scholars with a female perspective and furthered the study of women in China.

Primary among the results of the significant new findings that have transformed the previous superficial understanding of women's lives and shattered many long-standing stereotypes is that historians and other social scientists now realize that they cannot assume that all traditional patriarchal societies are the same. Confucianism, while fundamentally patriarchal, provided certain protections for women not found in other parts of the world. The question is no longer "Who had power?" but "How did people, especially women, use the types of power available to them?" Scholars also realize that other universal categories, like motherhood, need to be carefully situated in the context of specific cultures and periods of history. When studying the lives of women, it is just as important to understand the relations between women themselves as it is to understand the relations between women and men.

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WOMEN IN JAPAN This entry focuses on the situation of women in the period from 1945. Under the political system of Imperial Japan (from 1890 to 1945) women's and men's situations were determined by their status as gendered subjects of the emperor.


Under the feudal system which was in place until the late nineteenth century, men and women's lives were primarily determined by their place in the feudal hierarchy of the imperial family, samurai, peasants, artisans, merchants and outcasts. Japanese women and men now enjoy the highest life expectancy rates in the world. High life expectancy rates and low birth rates have led to the development of distinctive life-cycle patterns in Japan's highly prosperous postwar society. Women in Japan also enjoy a legal environment that guarantees them basic political and civil rights, although they are still campaigning for social change on several fronts. The low birth rate and the steadily decreasing numbers of people of working age have been linked with problems in the delivery of care and welfare benefits to the aged.

Although women in Japan have relatively high rates of participation in the labor force, they are concentrated in part-time and casual labor rather than full-time permanent positions. Labor force participation rates show a distinctive M-shaped curve, with highest participation rates in the twenties and late forties. The curve dips in the years when women are most likely to be engaged in childbirth and childcare. In recent years, however, the M-shaped curve has been flattening.

The age of marriage for both men and women is steadily increasing. In 1975 the average age of first marriage was 24.7 for females and 27 for males. In 1998 the average age had risen to 26.7 for females and 28.6 for males. Since the postwar baby boom of 1947 (33.8 births per 1,000 population), birth rates have declined. Between 1955 and 1975, the birth rate fluctuated between 17.1 and 18.8, but has steadily declined since, reaching 11.9 in 1985. Falling birth rates and a trend toward nuclear households have resulted in a steady decline in household size, from 4.97 in 1955 to 3.17 in 1985. Later marriage and lower birth rates mean that women are spending fewer years engaged in full-time childcare.

Women have been able to vote and stand for public office since April 1946. The revised constitution of 1947 includes a clause outlawing discrimination on the grounds of sex, status, or religion, and the Civil Code was revised in 1947 in line with the new constitution. The Labor Standards Law of 1947 included the principle of equal pay for equal work. Marriage, divorce, and inheritance laws were also revised on more egalitarian lines, unlike prewar family law, which had been based on patriarchy (the rule of the father) and primogeniture (inheritance by the eldest son).

Equal-opportunity legislation was passed in 1985 and became effective in 1986, with revisions taking place in 1997. In response to Japan's ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and recognition of the Beijing Platform of Action, recent years

**GIRLS' LIVES: REAL AND IDEAL**

This poem dating to the 1930s points out the contradictions in girls' lives in Japan. Girls learned English in schools, but the only use they could make of it was to write love letters.

High-school girl, beautiful as a flower bud,
Before her parents writes a love letter in English.
The two parents, not knowing it to be a love letter,
Praise her for studying so much.

Source: John F. Embree. ([1939] 1979) *Suye Mura: A Japanese Village*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 195.



Japan's Naoko Takahashi leads the field in the women's marathon at the 2000 Summer Olympics in Sydney. Takahashi won the race with a time of 2:23:14.

have seen further legislation directed at creating a more equitable society. In 1994 the Headquarters for the Promotion of Gender Equality was organized within the prime minister's office. This developed into the Office for Gender Equality and the Council for Gender Equality. In 1996 the latter submitted a report, *Vision of Gender Equality—Creating New Values for the Twenty-first Century* to the prime minister. In June 1999 the Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society was passed by Japan's legislature, the Diet, and became effective on 23 June 1999.

Recent years have also seen important legislation concerning the conditions of working women, the harmonization of family and working life, and the provision of care for the elderly. Nevertheless, women have campaigned for over a century for improvement in their situation, and feminist campaigns have continued into the twenty-first century.

Women's Movements for Change

Feminist thought and activism in Japan dates back to the late nineteenth century. As part of a more general development of notions of human rights, women's rights (*joken*) were debated beginning in the 1880s. Socialist thinkers also debated the "woman question" (*fujin mondai*) in the first decades of the twentieth century. The feminist literary journal, *Seito* (Blue-stocking), edited first by Hiratsuka Raicho and then Ito Noe, appeared from 1911 to 1916. Until 1922, Article Five of the Public Peace Police Law prevented women from attending, holding, or speaking at political meetings or belonging to political organizations. After the modification of Article Five in 1922 it became possible for women to form organizations to lobby for suffrage. The League for the Attainment of Women's Suffrage was formed in 1924, led by Ichikawa Fusae. Bills for women's suffrage passed the lower house of the Diet in 1930 and 1931 but failed in the House of Peers. Autonomous women's organizations were gradually co-opted under the total national mobilization system during World War II.

In postwar Japan, women were initially active in such organizations as the Hahaoya Taikai (Mothers' Convention), consumer groups, pacifist organizations, and the Shufuren (Housewives' Association). In the 1970s, women's organizations took on a more explicitly feminist character. Some women participated in the New Left and student left organizations that protested the renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, and which brought universities to a standstill in 1968 and 1969. Women, however, became disillusioned with the sexism of the men in leftist organizations, and formed their own women's liberation groups in the 1970s to explore issues of sexuality, reproductive control, and identity, and to oppose moves to amend Japan's relatively liberal abortion law.

International Women's Year in 1975 and the subsequent United Nations Decade for Women provided a focus for reformist activities. After Japan's ratification of CEDAW, there was reform of the Nationality Law, so that both women and men could pass on Japanese nationality to their children. There was also enactment of legislation to promote equal employment opportunities, and reform of the education system so that there would be no subjects solely for boys or solely for girls.

Current issues involve the consideration of the relationships between men and women in Japan and men and women in other Asian countries, prompted by an interest in the situation of immigrant workers in Japan and workers in the tourism industry and multinational factories in Southeast Asia.

Women's Studies and Women's History

The current wave of women's studies in Japan can be traced to the women's liberation movements that grew out of the activism of the 1970s, and to broader reformist feminist movements. Although there are now several women's studies associations and several academic journals devoted to women's studies, most teachers in the field are on the fringes of the academy, reflecting the already marginal place of women in most colleges and universities. As in many other countries, courses on women's studies survive thanks to the dedication of groups of feminist researchers who find solidarity in networks that cross institutions and bring together academics, activists, journalists, and other professionals. In addition to women's studies based in the academy, there is also a range of community-based, grassroots women's studies activity, which often takes the form of newsletters, journals, or monographs produced on a collaborative basis. Women's history, in particular, has developed such grassroots, community-based ways of writing history, while other community-based research is tied to specific issues such as sexual harassment, domestic violence, the situation of part-time and immigrant workers, or support for claims for compensation by women forced into military prostitution during World War II. Local women's centers, established during the International Women's Decade, host adult education classes on women's studies and women's history, and provide a focus for local study groups.

Vera Mackie

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
WOMEN IN KOREA Women have enjoyed considerable freedoms throughout much of premodern Korean history. Confucianism, however, hindered women's status from the sixteenth century onward. Today, Korean women continue to be restricted by traditional mores and social structures, but they are

closer to gaining equal opportunities in education, employment, and law.

Premodern Korea

Social rank was of utmost importance in the Shilla kingdom (57 BCE–935 CE). The bone-rank system divided all people into one of the following ranks: royal hallowed bones (*songgol*), aristocratic true bones (*chim'gol*), and headranks six to one. One's hereditary social class was based on both parents' positions, with the offspring taking the lower parent's status. The hallowed-bone class declined in number due to this hereditary rigidity. As the last two members of the hallowed-bone rank, two queens (Sondok, ?–647, and Chindok, ?–654) ruled in their own right before the throne passed to true bones. Chinsong (?–897), a third *yowang* ("queen in her own right"), reigned 887–897. The strictness of the hereditary social status is cited as one of the reasons for the eventual decline of the Shilla kingdom. Married women in Shilla often lived with their natal families for some time before moving to their in-laws' homes.

In the Koryo dynasty (918–1392), as in Shilla, women generally did not have public roles, but daughters shared equally in inheritance or division of property because of siblings' collective responsibilities in



CRIMINALIZING ADULTERY IN KOREA

According to *AsiaWeek*, South Korea, along with Greece, Switzerland, Taiwan, and Austria are the only non-Muslim nations that criminalize adultery, with Criminal Law Article 241 allowing imprisonment for up to two years. In 2001, the Constitutional Court upheld the law by an 8 to 1 vote, although it did allow that the government should consider abolishing the law in view of changing Korean attitudes about sexual behavior. Those who support the law claim that it protects married women and sets a moral standard for Korean society. Opponents, including most women's groups, argue that it has little effect on sexual behavior and is an infringement on personal privacy.



SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS

The following extract from a mid-twentieth century anthropological report on Korea indicates that at that time women enjoyed few of the freedoms enjoyed by men. That situation has changed over the past fifty years, especially in cities and among educated women.

Women do not have names. It is true that most girls receive some surname by which older relatives and friends of the family designate them during childhood. But as soon as they reach the age of puberty, only their parents may use this name, and other members of the family, as well as strangers, employ paraphrases such as daughter of so-and-so, or sister of so-and-so. After marriage a woman no longer has any name. Her own parents usually designate her by the name of the district where she was married, and her husband's parents by the name of the district where she lived before she was married. Sometimes she is called simply the house of so-and-so (the husband's name). When she has sons, convention requires that one use the designation mother of so-and-so. When a woman is forced to appear before the courts, the mandarin officially imposes a name on her for the duration of the case in order to facilitate debate.

Source: Christopher Dallet. (1954) *Traditional Korea*. New Haven, CT: Human Relations Area Files, 115–116.

cares for older family members and performing ancestor rituals. Koryo women had considerable freedom, with rights to marry, divorce, and remarry at will. Married women of Koryo had close ties with their natal families, even when they lived with their in-laws.

Although early Choson society was largely similar to Koryo society, the Choson dynasty (1392–1910) is characterized by the Neo-Confucian transformation of society that began in the sixteenth century. Neo-Confucian social restructuring had a strong impact on women's status. According to Neo-Confucian social rules, a woman's identity came from her place in hierarchical and patriarchal relationships within the family. A woman was also bound by "The Three Followings"—she had to obey her father during childhood, her husband after marriage, and her son in her old age. Married women had limited ties with their natal families.

Choson women lost most of their inheritance rights and were not permitted to participate in ancestor rituals. There was also a stigma against remarried widows and their sons. Other Choson marriage restrictions included bans on endogamy (marriage between

people of the same surname and same clan seat) and marriage between matrilineal cousins.

Although the Neo-Confucian transformation seems stifling to women, it improved women's status in certain ways. With the increased stratification of the inner quarters, primary wives and mothers of sons became more powerful. Aristocratic (*yangban*) men were also duty bound to treat their wives with respect. Concubines or secondary wives, however, had a precarious position in society and were denied the rights accorded primary wives. For example, a man could acquire or discard secondary wives at will, whereas he could divorce his primary wife only in certain situations. Children born of *yangban* fathers by secondary wives were considered illegitimate and faced social discrimination for most of the Choson period. A separate social class of *chungin* ("middle people"), just below *yangban*, was formed largely of *soja* (descendants by secondary wives) and limited to specific clerical positions. Women who had public roles were at the bottom of the social status system in Choson. *Kisaeng* (courtesans) and shamans were part of the lowest social order, ranking only above slaves.

Yangban homes had separate inner quarters for women and outer quarters for men. Due to practical considerations, commoners did not have to maintain the same degree of separation between the sexes, since their houses were smaller and women had to work in the fields alongside the men.

The promulgation of the *Hunmin chongum* (hangul) writing system in 1432 enabled more *yangban* women to be literate because the new writing system was easier to learn than literary Chinese, which required years to master. Women were denied formal education, but they were indoctrinated in Confucian morality through informal, family-centered education and books for women such as *Naebun* (Inner Teachings) and *Samgang haengsilto* (The Three Followings).

Modern Korea

Formal education for women began with the arrival of Christian missionaries, who established Christian schools in the late nineteenth century. Enlightenment thinkers of the late nineteenth century, who had been influenced by Western society as well as Japanese and Chinese modernization paradigms, also advocated women's rights. The Japanese-engineered *Kabo* reforms of 1894–1895 abolished social-class distinctions and allowed sons by secondary wives to succeed their fathers.

Korean women were influenced by women's movements in Japan and the West. Both women and men saw education as an important means to modernization. But gender discrimination continued under Japanese colonialism (1910–1945). Among Koreans, women's issues were generally subjugated to the larger issue of nationalism. Korean women made a noticeable difference in anticolonial efforts, including the March First Independence Movement of 1919. Yu Kwan-sun (1904–1920), a student at Ewha Haktang ("academy"), a women's school, took part in March First demonstrations in Seoul and in her hometown in Ch'ungch'ong Province. She became a symbol of the nationalist movement when she was arrested and killed by police.

The World War II "Comfort Women" issue is one of the most controversial, unresolved aspects of Japanese colonialism. In the final years of the colonial period, some 200,000 women, most of them Korean, were "conscripted" into sexual slavery for the "Comfort Corps" (Chongsindae) to provide sexual services to the Japanese military. Korea and Japan have yet to settle issues of responsibility and reparations.

Industrialization also changed women's roles. From the early twentieth century, women entered the modern workforce by working in factories. Women educated in Korea, Japan, and the West also became



In the 1990s, several South Korean women emerged as leading players on the women's professional golf tour. Here Se Ri Pak tees off at the 1999 women's U.S. Open in West Point, Mississippi, in defense of her 1998 title. (AFP/CORBIS)

pioneers in fields such as education, medicine, and journalism during the early twentieth century.

North Korea

With the end of World War II in 1945, Korea was divided into North and South under Soviet and American occupations, respectively. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) were established in 1948.

Although women are guaranteed full equal rights under the North Korean Communist system, men still dominate society, and gender discrimination is commonplace. Women and men may compete equally for low- and middle-level jobs, but women are generally scarce in high-level jobs and politics. Women are further burdened by the triple duty of full-time work, their roles as wives and mothers, and volunteer work for the Korean Communist Party.

South Korea

In South Korea as well, women have access to higher education, but discrimination continues to



In Pyongyang, North Korea, in 1979, a female police officer controls traffic on a main thoroughfare. (BETTMANN/CORBIS)

prevail because of patriarchal practices in the family, workplace, and society.

The post-1970 economic surge opened up many new jobs for women and men, but such jobs usually entailed low wages and difficult conditions. The Equal Employment Act of 1987 and its 1989 revision protect women's equal rights in the workplace and provide penalties for violation of the law, but the law is not strictly enforced. Wage differentials, sexual harassment, and inequalities in the workplace continue to hinder women. Women are generally expected to stay at home to raise children, and women who do pursue careers receive lower pay and are the first to be laid off. In recent years, rural communities have seen an exodus of young men who go to cities in search of work. This has left women to fill the void in farming.

Long-term efforts to revise the Korean Family Law in 1992 brought about legal revisions granting women the right to sue for divorce, gain custody of children, and inherit equally. There is also considerable effort by women's nongovernmental organizations to establish hot lines and shelters for female victims of domestic and sexual violence.

Despite lingering discrimination, women have been making strides toward gender equality through legal changes, greater social awareness, and combined efforts by women's groups. Women's Studies is a growing academic discipline, and there have been recent efforts to increase pan-Asian and other international cooperation among feminists.

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WOMEN IN PAKISTAN Two perceptions describe the basic understanding of gender relations in Pakistan: Women are subordinate to men, and a man's honor resides in the actions of the women of his family. Social life in Pakistan revolves around family, and social status revolves around the honor of a family's women. As in other orthodox Muslim societies, women are responsible for adhering to respectable norms of conduct and for limiting contact between the sexes and thereby ensuring a family's honor. To ensure women's proper behavior, society limits their mobility and restricts their acceptable behavior and activities.

Space is allocated to and used differently by men and women in Pakistan. Traditionally, a woman was regarded as needing protection from the outside world, where her respectability—and therefore that of her family—was at risk. Women in many parts of the country still live under traditional constraints associated with purdah (seclusion; literally curtain), which necessitate the separation of women's activities from those of men, both physically and symbolically.

Thus male and female spheres are differentiated: most women (except for those of the urban upper classes) spend most their lives physically within their homes; they go outside only when there is a substantive purpose. Life outside the home generally revolves around the actions of men. In most parts of the country—with the exception of Islamabad, Karachi, and wealthier parts of a few other cities—people consider a woman (and by extension, her family) to be shameless when no restrictions are placed on her mobility.

Traditional Context

Purdah is practiced in various ways, depending on family traditions. The most extreme forms are found in remote parts of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan, where a woman essentially never leaves her home except at the time of her marriage and never meets with unrelated men. While gender relations are somewhat more relaxed among most people in Punjab and Sind, nowhere (traditionally) do unrelated men and women mix freely. Poor urban women in close-knit communities, such as the old

cities of Lahore and Rawalpindi, generally observe some form of purdah and wear either a *burqa* (fitted body veil) or a chador (loosely draped cotton cloth) when they leave their homes. This practice becomes less compelling in rural areas, though rural women still take care to dress modestly.

Two important factors differentiate the degree to which women's mobility is restricted: class and rural versus urban residence. Poor rural women in Punjab and Sind have traditionally enjoyed a great degree of mobility if for no other reason than sheer necessity. These women characteristically are responsible for transplanting rice seedlings and weeding crops and are often involved in activities such as raising chickens (and selling eggs) and stuffing wool or cotton into local blankets. When a family's level of prosperity rises and it begins to aspire to a higher status, often the first social change is that its women put on veils and are placed into some form of purdah.

The common perception that women are to remain confined within their homes so that neighbors do not gossip about their respectability has important implications for women's productive activities. Rural women are generally engaged in production for exchange at the subsistence level and do not earn a countable wage. In both urban and rural contexts, women's economic contributions are often included as part of the total family's labor, with government data crediting women's contributions to the male earners.

There is less of an urban-rural divide among purdah practices of wealthier classes. Rather, family traditions have more to do with whether women observe purdah and, if they do, the kind of veil they wear. In some cases, women simply observe "eye purdah," in which they tend not to mix with men, and when they do, they avert their eyes when interacting with them. Bazaars in wealthier areas of cities in Punjab differ from those in poorer areas by virtue of the greater proportion of unveiled women shopping in them. Bazaars in cities throughout NWFP, Baluchistan, and the interior of Sind are markedly devoid of women in general; when a woman does venture out into a bazaar in these areas, she always wears some sort of veil.

Political Challenges and Responses by Women

The women's movement in Pakistan has done much to raise public awareness about the conditions confronting women, as well as playing an important advocacy role in lobbying the government to change laws that discriminate against women. In Pakistan's first three decades, the most significant legal success was the 1961 Muslim Family Law, which regulated mar-

riage, divorce, and polygamy. There were marked increases in female literacy, labor-force participation, and political activities prior to the coup by Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq (1924–1988) in July 1977. Following this, however, in 1979, Zia's military regime promulgated a series of controversial laws, which, it claimed, were based on Islamic law. Women protesting against the 1979 Enforcement of *Hudood* (Islamic Laws) Ordinances focused on its lack of distinction between adultery (*zina*) and rape (*zina-bil-jabr*) and claimed that enforcing the law discriminated against women. Four years later, they protested against the promulgation of the proposed 1983 Law of Evidence, which did not give equal weight to men's and women's legal testimony. While this has been applied only to matters pertaining to economic transactions, the resultant effect is that women are not equal economic actors with men in the eyes of the law.

The issue of evidence became central to the concern for women's status, and matters such as mandatory dress codes for women and whether females can participate in international sports competitions underscored the reality that Zia's Islamization program was having a comprehensive effect on women's lives. The traditional concept of the gendered division of space continues to be perpetuated in broadcast media. Women's subservience is consistently shown on television and in films, while popular television dramas raise controversial issues such as women working, seeking divorce, or even having a say in family politics. What is often depicted, however, is the image that when a woman strays from traditional norms, she faces insurmountable problems and becomes alienated from her family. Indeed, families provide a virtually complete package of economic and social support, provided that members abide by its norms. If a man violates a social norm, it may raise some concern, but



Pakistani women carry torches during a ceremony marking Women's Day in Islamabad on 8 March 2001. (AFP/CORBIS)

if a woman violates virtually any social norm, it becomes a calamitous event for her family, with disastrous results for the woman's future.

Since the restoration of democracy in 1988, nearly all political parties in Pakistan have embraced the rhetoric of women's empowerment. While women today actively participate in the economy, less progress has occurred in the political arena. Pakistan became a state party to the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1996, yet none of the discriminatory laws promulgated under Zia's Islamization program have yet been reversed.

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WOMEN IN SOUTH ASIA In the late twentieth century, South Asian women launched a struggle for social reform against millennia of strict patriarchal control. Traditionally a woman had few rights. She was always under the control of her father, her husband, or if a widow, her sons. Even women who took Buddhist or Jain vows were subordinate to the males of the order. A growing body of evidence, however, demonstrates that the lives of women were not always severely restricted and that early civilizations on the subcontinent accorded some women social freedom and spiritual status that were curtailed at a later time.

The Early Pre-Vedic Period

Archaeological remains of the earliest urban culture of the region, the Indus Valley, or Harappan civilization (3000-1800 BCE), include numerous terra-cotta images of females, perhaps mother goddesses. Female figures wearing the horns of a water buffalo on various steatite seals have been identified as a goddess who may have been the precursor of one of the forms of the great goddess of later Hinduism. Because the

Harappan civilization was an agrarian-based culture, it seems logical that the Harappans accorded an earth goddess paramount importance. It was typical in early farming cultures that the fertility of the earth was linked with feminine fecundity. The goddess gave birth to the world, and the mystery of creation was mirrored in the creative capacity of women. Such fertility cults were concerned with sexuality, birth, and the larger realm of increase. Some historians hypothesize that the Harappan culture was matrilineal and endogamous and that women may have served a goddess as priestesses. Archaeological finds suggest that women enjoyed high status and that the culture experienced neither an imbalance between the sexes nor social stratification into distinct classes. Indus skeletons and teeth show no differences among the diets of any of the inhabitants, suggesting that food distribution did not favor any particular group.

The Vedic Period (c. 1500-600 BCE)

The Harappans were succeeded by the so-called Indo-Aryans, whose religious and social milieu was significantly different. Archaeological evidence suggests that the Aryans, a warrior people who formulated the caste system to consolidate their superior social and religious position, introduced warfare to the subcontinent. The Harappan religion of the goddess was supplanted by the patriarchal religion of the Aryan Vedas. Despite patriarchal notions, the early Vedic culture accorded women a degree of freedom and religious distinction. Some twenty female seers and authors were cited as having composed sections of the Vedas. Viewed as an integral part of a hierogamy in which marriage was a requirement for both sexes, wives and husbands were partners in religious rites. Women also participated in theological discussions. Many women were educated, and some women were teachers (*brahmavadinis*) of philosophy and theology. Gargi (c. ninth century BCE) was a particularly well-known female theologian who engaged in a pivotal debate recorded in the *Bribadaranyaka Upanishad* (c. 600 BCE). The Vedas also record that men and women of any age interacted with relative freedom.

Sometime in the middle of the first millennium BCE, however, the position of women diminished so drastically that in subsequent ages they were regarded as unfit for exposure to the sacred Vedas and equivalent in status to the lowest caste, regardless of their caste at birth. The classical law text known as *Manusmriti* (c. 200 CE) unequivocally declared the inferiority of women and the necessity for controlling their thoughts, choices, and movements. Although a woman had limited rights to property, her husband controlled

it. Discouraged from religious life, women's functions were limited to caring for her husband and his family and children. Women had no power outside of marriage. Brahman priests' concerns regarding ritual purity caused them to stigmatize women as polluting and dangerous because of their menses. Ritual taboos began to influence the secular world, and women ultimately were viewed as corrupting and debilitating.

Historians have proposed various reasons for the usurpation of women's freedom and authority in the latter part of the first millennium BCE. Developing notions of reincarnation and karma (fate) in the late Vedic age may have been a key component. Religious leaders faced mounting pressures to find a resolution for the soul enduring an endless cycle of births, deaths, and rebirths. Renunciation was viewed as a way to end the cycle, and as such it was a process of closing out and closing down, of decreasing. The ontological opposite of the indigenous fertility cults, renunciation stressed the avoidance of family ties, emotional bonds, and sexuality, all of which were associated with women. As a result women, as the agents of birth, came to be viewed as mentally, morally, hygienically, and biologically inferior.

Under Hinduism (c. First Century CE–Present)

While strong religious assertions promoted the efficacy of renunciation, by the first century CE non-Vedic indigenous cults, particularly fertility cults, reasserted themselves with vigor and merged with Vedic religion to form the pantheon of Hindu deities. A great goddess, Devi, emerged into prominence. She took various forms, including mother, warrior, and one who grants blessings, children, and enlightenment. Coeval with the emergence of the goddesses was the notion of Shakti, female power that animates all things in the universe. While the mythic model could have affected the status of women and led to increasing authority and improved status, such did not end up to be the case. For Hindu women the goddess has served mainly as a model of virtue. The most important mythical model was Sita (literally furrow), the ideal wife, who was meek, obedient, and saintly. In the *Ramayana*, the great Hindu epic (c. 300 BCE), Sita follows her husband into exile and endures a brutal kidnapping, only to have her fidelity and chastity disputed upon her release. She survives trial by fire again and again as proof of her innocence. While many literary passages extol the virtues of wives and mothers and propose that they should be regarded with honor and esteem, great discrepancies existed between the stated textual ideal and women's lot in daily life.

As is expected in a patriarchal society, female children were not welcomed as were males, who were val-



Women in Madurai, India, carrying food in baskets on their heads to workers. (ENZO & PAOLO RAGAZZINI/CORBIS)

ued as an economic asset. Caste was passed only through the male line of descent. Males also were required to perform for the father the funerary rites that guaranteed his ascent to heaven. The partiality ultimately led to female infanticide in some sectors of Hindu society, particularly from the medieval period (c. 900–1600 CE) until the nineteenth century.

Marriage in Hinduism In early times girls married around the age of fifteen or sixteen, but by the fourth century BCE the standard age for girls to marry was between six and ten. In addition to ensuring their virginity, the young age meant that the girls were too young to have formed strong personalities, opinions, or desires and thus were easily controlled by the husband and his family. The prevalence of child marriages coincided with restrictions on the remarriage of widows. Because young girls married older males, widowhood and child widows were widespread.

During the first century CE the plight of widows became severe. Shunned by society, a widow was regarded as bad luck for her husband's family. Denied the opportunity of remarriage, a widow was expected to lead an ascetic life, to remove all ornaments, to shave her head, to sleep on the floor, and to consume a restricted diet consisting of one meal per day. She spent her time in prayer and observing rituals. The only alternative to such a circumscribed existence was sati (immolation on her husband's funeral pyre). Sati was regarded as an auspicious act benefiting the family and the community, though it was practiced only

in sectors of society that considered female labor of no great value.

The dowry custom apparently was not a standardized social convention in early or classical India. The literature recommends that the bride be given suitable ornaments for her wedding, but the precise nature of the gift was left to the discretion of the father. The dowry was connected with ancient notions of gift giving, in which the bride was accompanied by a gift to the groom's family. In the medieval period the dowry system began to assume extraordinary proportions. Changes resulting from industrialization under the British particularly led to competition to obtain well-educated husbands of social standing and steady incomes. Thus the sizes of dowries escalated.

Notable Hindu Women in History Only privileged Hindu women received educations. Nonetheless, some gifted women made contributions in various fields. Among the more renowned female poets were Shila-bhattarika of Kanauj, who in the ninth century was honored as the equal of the famous classical poet Bana (flourished seventh century); Rupamati of Malwa (sixteenth century CE), who was an accomplished poet and musician; and Molla (sixteenth century CE), who wrote a moving version of the epic *Ramayana*. A number of famous female mystics were known for their profound devotional hymns. Karaikkal Ammaiyar (c. sixth century CE), Kodai Andal (c. ninth century CE), Lalla (late fourteenth century CE), and the deeply inspired Mira Bai (c. 1450–1547) were all passionate devotees of the divine. Many women were patrons of religion and art, such as the tenth-century queen Sembiyān Mahadevi, who raised countless temples throughout the southern Chola empire.

Among the accounts of heroic Hindu women, the most famous is the Rajput queen Padmini (d. 1303), who along with ten thousand female subjects endured self-immolation rather than be taken prisoner by enemy forces. Rani Lakshmi Bai (d. 1858), the famous queen of Jhansi, inspired fierce rebel fighting against British control in the Indian Mutiny of 1857. Fighting alongside her men, she finally was killed in battle.

Under Jainism

In Jainism women had more freedom than in Hinduism. Jain texts suggest that women with spiritual commitment and aptitude far outnumbered men with similar inclinations and abilities. Historically in Jainism the number of women taking vows outnumbered men by more than two to one. Jainism emphasized renunciation, and both men and women formed monastic orders. The founder of the religion, Mahavira (c. 599–527

BCE), was considered the twenty-fourth Jina or Tirthankara, an enlightened being. Mythological references point to at least two female Jains who attained enlightenment long before the time of Mahavira: Marudevi, the mother of the Tirthankara Rishabha, and the Jina Malli, the nineteenth Tirthankara.

Chandana (c. sixth century BCE) was Mahavira's first female disciple and the first head of an order of Jain nuns. Yakini Mahattara (eighth century CE) was renowned for defeating in debate the boastful Brahman scholiast Haribhadra Suri, one of the most esteemed minds of his day. Haribhadra was so impressed with Yakini's reasoning and mental skill that he eventually converted to Jainism.

While early Jainism accorded women freedom of choice and movement, nuns eventually became dependent on male authority, and regulations eventually restricted all aspects of their lives. The liberalism toward females that had characterized the early centuries was eventually influenced by the pan-Indian prejudices against women. A schism produced two sects, the Digambaras and the Svetambaras. The Svetambaras allowed the possibility of female enlightenment and endorsed the female Jina Malli. The Digambaras, on the other hand, claimed that women lacked the adamant body necessary for spiritual liberation and refuted the story of Malli altogether.

Under Buddhism

The Buddha (c. 563–483 BCE) initially did not permit the ordination of women. He accepted monks but not nuns, a surprising fact given that his first spiritual teacher was a woman: His aunt, Mahaprajapati Gotami, insisted on forming a women's order. Submitting to social pressures, the Buddha finally allowed women to renounce their earthly ties and become nuns. Generally nuns, no matter what their level of accomplishment, were expected to defer to monks of all ranks. Women of the order were enjoined to bow to all monks. Under no circumstances were nuns allowed to admonish monks, although monks were free to upbraid nuns. Nuns endured far stricter requirements than their male counterparts. The rules for nuns numbered 311, compared with only 227 for monks. Some inviolable rules applied to both sexes, such as avoidance of killing, stealing, and sexual indulgence.

Buddhist women and men received the same education on the principles of Buddhism. Buddhist women generally were literate. One remarkable literary work, the *Theragatha*, is a collection of verses composed within five hundred years of the life of the



IMPROVING THE LIVES OF SOUTH ASIAN WOMEN THROUGH POLITICAL REFORM

Mohandas Gandhi, the leader of the Indian independence movement, was a strong supporter of women's rights, and the Indian National Congress political party advocated for reforms to afford women rights and to protect women's rights. The following resolution from the sixtieth meeting of the Congress at Avadi in 1955 summarizes their position.

1. This Congress is strongly of the opinion that all social and legal disabilities as well as reactionary customs and usages to which women are at present subject and which retard their development and prevent them from taking their rightful place in the various activities of the nation should be removed and ended. The history of India contains numerous examples of women who have shown their greatness in many fields of activity. In the struggle for freedom, women took an active and effective part. It is, therefore, not only desirable but essential in the national interest that they should have full opportunities of growth and service and should also have rights of inheritance so that they might not suffer from any legal or social disability.
2. The welfare of children is of paramount importance and should be given first place in the plans for national development.
3. The Congress appreciates the efforts made by the various governments in India for the welfare of women and children and urges them to pay even greater attention to them. In particular, the Congress welcomes the Hindu Law Reform Bills at present before Parliament, and trusts that they will be enacted at an early date.

Source: The Indian National Congress. Resolutions Passed at Various Annual Sessions, A.I.C.C. and Working Committee Sessions held at various places up to 1963. Delhi.

Buddha by several nuns of the earliest order who attained nirvana. The contributions are songs stemming from the hearts of women who discovered ultimate bliss. The more liberal attitudes of the early period were abandoned eventually, and women were pushed into the background. The lack of later literature composed by Buddhist women attests to their great anonymity, and in time Buddhist theologians became equivocal on the subject of female enlightenment. It was written that being born a woman was considered a cause for special suffering; for a woman to be reborn as a man was considered the greatest merit. Occasional records document that later Buddhist women achieved enlightenment, but given their obstacles, the nuns are impressive in their demonstrations of devotion.

Under Islam

Islam, a faith imported from Arabia, brought with it severe laws regarding women set down in the seventh century by the Prophet Muhammad. The Qur'an endorses polygamy and insists on a woman's obedience to her husband. A woman's distinction was based solely on her childbearing abilities. Generally, from puberty until death, Islamic women in most parts of South Asia wore veils (*parda*) and were screened from the sight of all males except close family members. Families arranged marriages, and women spent their lives in strict confinement. Islamic law allowed a woman to have and control her own property, however, and she could inherit from her parents and her husband.



Members of the All India Democratic Women's Association protest in New Delhi for legislation that would reserve one-third of seats in parliament for women. (AFP/CORBIS)

Muslim women received little education if any. Their immobility and anonymity provided scant record of their individual lives. Women in households of the ruling class generally were literate, and a few notable women even held political influence. For example, Raziya Sultan (d. 1240), the daughter of the Slave king Iltutmish, was named by her father to succeed him. In 1236 she cast off her veil and ruled until rebels, discontented with a woman as their ruler, killed her. Gulbadan Begum (early sixteenth century CE), daughter of the first Mughal ruler, Babur (1483–1530), left a history of her father and her brother, the next emperor, Humayun, in the *Humayun-nameh* (sixteenth century CE). Nur Jahan (d. 1645), the wife of the emperor Jahangir (1569–1627), was the de facto ruler of the Mughal empire (1526–1857) for years. A more able administrator than her husband, who was primarily concerned with art and alcohol, she issued *firman*s (official orders) under her own seal. Jahan Ara Begum (seventeenth century), the daughter of Shah Jahan (1592–1666), served as an adviser to her father in his last years. One courageous female, Rokeya Sekhawat Hossain (1880–1932), a severe critic of Muslim patriarchy, spearheaded a movement at the beginning of the twentieth century for education and liberal treatment of Muslim women.

The Modern Period

The progressive leader Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi (1869–1948) was extremely critical of the traditional treatment of women and encouraged them to join the independence movement. In his book *Women and Social Injustice* (1942), he declared women superior to men and championed the abolition of child marriages, cruel treatment of widows, and prostitution. Encouraging full equal rights for women, he was in-

strumental, along with the feminist activist Sarojini Naidu (1879–1949), in developing a comprehensive plan for female advancement, and they argued for equal rights guarantees in the constitution. At the time of independence from Britain in 1947, India, West Pakistan (now Pakistan), and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) granted adult women full suffrage.

While a number of early reformers worked for constitutional equity, beginning in the 1970s women's unions and organizations coordinated at all levels of society to ensure that women were not barred from practicing their rights. Women's activism affected various sectors of the populations of India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Generally, more women began to receive some education, and a greater number of women earned professional degrees in all fields. In India and Sri Lanka large numbers of women entered the workplace, many in white-collar positions. Wider access to social contacts through the workplace encouraged more marriages of choice and fewer arranged marriages. Family planning also allowed women more freedom. Nonetheless, the prevailing attitude remained that a woman's status depends on motherhood. Islamic South Asian women in particular have been less visible in the workforce, with only a slight increase in the late twentieth century.

In addition to gaining constitutional protections, women in the late twentieth century battled the more insidious forms of control exerted by communal social pressures. For example, divorce was an option for few women because of its social stigma. In the late twentieth century, however, more women extricated themselves from abusive situations, though leaving was still difficult for them in many areas, especially Pakistan. Women of South Asia also became active in politics, and both India and Bangladesh reserve a share of the parliamentary seats for women. Six women became the political leaders of their nations in the twentieth century: Sirimavo Bandaranaike (b. 1916) of Sri Lanka was the world's first woman prime minister, and her daughter subsequently became prime minister. In addition Indira Gandhi (1917–1984) of India, Benazir Bhutto (b. 1953) of Pakistan, and Begum Khaleda Zia-ur-Rahman (b. 1945) and Sheikh Hasina Wajed (b. 1947) of Bangladesh served their nations as prime ministers.

Katherine Anne Harper

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WOMEN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA The position of women in Southeast Asia is often cited as evidence that women are not universally subjugated to men. Women's high status in the region is said to derive from their important role in agriculture; it is reflected in the bilateral kinship systems which predominate and in which male and female descent lines are equally followed in determining ancestry; the widespread phenomenon of land inheritance by women; control of household finances by women; and so on. Even amongst Chinese groups and the Vietnamese (or *kinh*), whose societies are traditionally patriarchal, women in Southeast Asia are in many ways strikingly more highly valued than women in many other parts of the world. However, in recent times, with the increased pace of urbanization and industrialization, women do not seem to be benefiting from development to the same extent as men.

Traditional Roles

The position of women in Southeast Asia in relation to men has often been described as one of complementarity: in traditional societies the roles of men and women are generally seen as equal in importance and mutually supportive. This idea reflects a symbolic dualism in the conceptualization of the world. Origin myths as well as the division of labor in such societies often demonstrate this principle. Thus creation myths often oppose textile equipment with weapons, magic, or writing, with women being defined by the former and men the latter. Among groups such as the Nagas (located in India and adjacent sections of Myanmar), in which men traditionally proved their maturity through headhunting, women may gain adult status through proving themselves as accomplished weavers.

In Buddhist societies in which maturity is achieved for a man through being a monk, motherhood and accomplishment in weaving were also the traditional ways to express a woman's maturity. This is not to say that the two spheres were always separate, and a degree of cooperation in some activities is also found, in gathering in the rice harvest, for example. Men who are for some reason without a wife may happily perform "female" tasks.

The high status held by women often derives from their symbolic importance as a source of fertility, and women often have a special role to play in relation to rice cultivation. In traditional methods of agriculture, although men may prepare the land to receive the seed, women often do the actual planting. Similarly, in many societies only women may enter the rice granary. In both mainland and maritime Southeast Asia this symbolic association of women with fertility often seems to apply also in the field of human reproduction, so that even in patrilineal societies such as the Bataks of northern Sumatra, the lineage of a bride is regarded as superior to that of the husband, since it is the woman who brings greater life force to the marriage.

In many Southeast Asian societies women have traditionally held positions of some power. Thus among the Minangkabau of West Sumatra, although legal and administrative power may be held by men, land and clan membership pass down the female line. In other societies, in which clan membership relates to male descent groups and ancestral lands are held in common following a patrilineal pattern of kinship, women's positions were in many ways less strong. In most Southeast Asian societies, however, kinship is reckoned along both male and female lines, and there is a degree of inheritance on both sides.

Postmarital residence is another factor that may affect a woman's position. Where a young bride must move in with her husband's parents, the possibility of exploitation of her labor exists; where a man traditionally lives with his parents-in-law it is he who may be subservient to his wife's family. In most but not all Southeast Asian societies, the practice is for the newly married couple to move in with the parents of the wife. When they do set up a home of their own, it is often near the wife's mother's house, and clusters of related women form strong networks in many of the villages of Southeast Asia.

In contemporary Southeast Asia many of these traditional patterns are changing, though the legacy of these perceptions often means that attitudes towards women are respectful, especially within the home, which throughout the region is regarded as the woman's

domain. Changes brought about by colonization and later through administrative arrangements under independence have often failed to recognize such traditional roles. Land that was once owned by women was in many cases registered in the names of their husbands; household censuses listed the senior male as head of the household, and in some cases village headmen were appointed in places where villages had in the past been run by councils consisting of household heads, both male and female. The declining importance of women as textile producers in the face of industrialization has also tended to diminish the status of women, though where ritual textiles are still regarded as necessary for rites of passage, this symbolic importance remains.

Religion

The introduction of world religions into the region has also affected the role of women. Where Buddhism is the main religion—in Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar—the chief way for a man to make merit and thus earn respect is through ordination as a monk. In some areas, women do serve as nuns, but they cannot achieve the same status as the monks in the Buddhist priesthood; nor do they receive the same training in the scriptures. However, outside the monastery, women are able to make a considerable contribution to Buddhist society. It is the women who prepare and present gifts of food and textiles to the monks, and they also attend services and observe the precepts. All these activities provide women with the means of making merit both for themselves as individuals and for their families. Women are also responsible for the care of tutelary spirits in the home and for other essential lay duties. The ability to make merit gives women access to a degree of social mobility.

There is a fundamental difference, however, between the spheres in which women and men make merit. Men's involvement in the priesthood removes them from the material world and from relationships with their families, and this removal from the world of desire is associated with a higher plane of religious experience. A woman's route to merit making strengthens her link with the world of material things and with her role as a mother. For her, the major act of merit making is providing a son for ordination as a monk. Women are thus more likely to be involved in trade and financial matters than men, who are more distanced from their families and from the material world.

Islam has affected the position of women in Southeast Asia to a lesser degree than is the case in some Middle Eastern countries, but where Islamic law is called on, for example in settling disputes over inheritance, women receive less equal treatment than they

enjoyed under traditional law, or *adat*, as it is known in the Indo-Malay archipelago. However, Islam as practiced in Southeast Asia does not discriminate against women in terms of their religious status or worth. Women, like men, pray five times a day, and both follow the five pillars of Islam. While men attend Friday prayers at the mosque, women may belong to a Qur'an reading group that meets at a member's house. Although men are more frequently prayer leaders than women, a woman may occasionally take on this role if she is the best qualified to do so in terms of her knowledge of the teachings of Islam. Literacy has always been an important element in Islamic societies, and although in the past boys were more likely to receive a formal education than girls, national education policies in Brunei, Malaysia, and Indonesia, the countries with the greatest percentage of Muslims in the region, have gone a long way towards their aim of giving boys and girls equal access to education.

In areas where Christianity achieved dominance, the position of women was also affected. In precolonial times, the status of men and women in the Philippines was probably for the most part equal and complementary. The male-centered Spanish regime, however, placed a great many constraints on women. This had greater consequences for women in lower socioeconomic groups than it did for those belonging to the upper classes. Among the better off, precolonial domestic patterns proved relatively resilient and many women took advantage of the opportunities presented by the economic developments of the postcolonial era. Thus they have been fairly well represented in professional, clerical, and administrative occupations.

Education

Everywhere in Southeast Asia, adult literacy levels are higher for males than for females, though the discrepancy varies from country to country. The greatest discrepancies are in Cambodia and Laos; the least discrepancy is found in the Philippines, which has a very high literacy rate.

Girls' participation in schooling in Southeast Asia is high in comparison with developing countries in other parts of the world. In Malaysia, Brunei, Myanmar, and Indonesia there is very little difference at all between participation rates for boys and girls at primary level, though the picture is less good in Cambodia and Laos. In the latter two countries female participation is lower at secondary level than at primary level, as is the case in Indonesia. In Myanmar, Malaysia, and Brunei the rate of enrollment for males and females is roughly comparable at secondary level.

In Malaysia, equal rights to education for boys and girls are written into the law, but in practice girls' education lags behind that of boys.

Politics

In recent times, a number of notable women have reached the top level of political office in Southeast Asia. However, their achievement has nearly always resulted from a family connection (that is, they have either been the wife or daughter of a prominent male politician). Men dominate the political arena everywhere, although the picture does vary from country to country. In Thailand, women have had the right to vote and to be elected to political office since 1932, but the percentage of women in the cabinet is still very low. In all other countries in Southeast Asia apart from Brunei, women gained the right to vote at or soon after independence. Only in the Philippines, however, are a substantial number of women involved in government. It was also in the Philippines that the first woman was elected to parliament, in 1941.

However, this is not to say that women do not have an important influence on political life in Southeast Asia. In Thailand and the Philippines in recent years, women from the urban elite have become increasingly active in the political arena. Furthermore, although women are much less numerous than men in formal political institutions, they are very active politically in a broader sense. There are many women's organizations in Southeast Asia that provide a vehicle for the expression of opinion, and women have become adept at organizing and finding a voice for themselves, albeit in a restricted sphere. In Indonesia, women's organizations are active in the area of welfare and income generation at the grassroots level. In the Philippines, many professional women's associations have emerged, and in Thailand women's nongovernmental organizations have been invited to participate in decision making and policy making by the government and by U.N. agencies in areas of life that are seen to relate specifically to women.

In Vietnam, women played an important role in the struggle for independence, and this seems to have led to a recognition that women have a contribution to make in the political arena. There was a steady growth in the number of women in the National Assembly between 1946 and 1975. After this date, however, both the number of women representatives and their percentage of the total fell. The fact that the decline coincided with the period of unification has led to the suggestion that the decline resulted from the relatively strong influence of feudal thinking in the South. A similar pattern occurred also at provincial, district, and

village levels. Despite this fall, women in Vietnam play an active role in political life, with 118 women deputies in the National Assembly as compared with 332 men.

Economy

Generally in Southeast Asia, motherhood and care of the family are assumed to be the first responsibility of women. However, women are not prevented from engaging in economic activity as well, and their traditional participation in agricultural work alongside men means that the division of labor is not as clear cut as in many other developing countries. Everywhere in Southeast Asia, the proportion of earned income contributed by women is lower than that contributed by men. In Cambodia the proportion earned by men and women is most closely comparable; in Brunei there is the greatest disparity. Despite these earning disparities, women occupy high-status positions throughout Southeast Asia. They compete successfully with men in entrepreneurial roles as well as in the armed forces, the ranks of the police and civil servants, and in the academic world. There are highly educated women who are professionals and who occupy executive and administrative positions in both the public and the private sector, but in all cases they are in the minority.

Women form a large proportion of migrant workers in Southeast Asia, traveling both within the region and outside it. Industrial development in the cities, particularly medium-sized or large-scale domestic or multinational operations, attracts young unmarried women and girls from the countryside, especially in Cambodia and Thailand. Few women who have worked for any length of time in the city return to the countryside, and many find husbands in the city. Out of a sense of duty and obligation towards their parents, most young women who work in the city send money home to their families, who may be unaware of or turn a blind eye to the fact that their daughters may be involved in prostitution. For girls who have found work in Bangkok, it is quite easy to find evening classes to further their education, and this is an added attraction for girls from rural areas. The trappings of modern city life are also an attraction. In Indonesia, it is chiefly Javanese girls who leave home, often to work in the domestic sphere in wealthier households within Indonesia or overseas. Philippine migrant workers also include a high proportion of women, many of them in domestic service overseas.

Although young women's wages are not high, their ability to contribute to household income in a modernizing economy has had an effect on intrahousehold relations in many cases. As they grow older and are able to find employment, unmarried daughters often

begin to expect their views to be heard, especially in relation to their own employment. The traditional pattern of deference of younger to older, woman to man in these cases is beginning to be challenged.

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WOMEN IN WEST ASIA Women in West Asia constitute a diverse population. Notwithstanding stereotypes concerning the status and roles of the predominately Muslim and Arab women of West Asia, women's social positions within and across nations vary by social class, ethnicity, age, education, and location (urban or rural). Other important factors are a nation's social structure and stage of development, as well as the nature of the nation and its economic, social, and cultural policies. These sociodemographic and structural factors shape the opportunities available to women, their legal status, and the structure of gender relations in any given society in West Asia.

Despite this diversity, however, there are some common characteristics that are particularly noticeable when comparisons are made with women in other regions. These common characteristics are relatively high (although declining) fertility rates, gender gaps in liter-

acy so that women have lower literacy rates than men, relatively limited access to paid employment (except in Israel), and underrepresentation in the political system. Moreover, women in nearly all the nations of West Asia experience second-class citizenship due to certain provisions in Muslim family law and to patriarchal cultural practices and norms. The persistence of a patriarchal system that favors men is itself partly the result of the influence of Islamist movements in recent decades. To address these problems, women in West Asia have formed a dynamic women's movement that seeks to challenge patriarchal gender arrangements; expand women's civil, political, and social rights; and empower women economically and politically.

Women constitute about half of the population of the nations in West Asia, whether in the small Persian Gulf sheikhdoms such as Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates or the large nations such as Iran



THE POET FORUGH FARROKHZAD ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS

Iranian poet Forugh Farrokhzad uses poetry to speak out for women's rights and independence. In her poem "Mechanical Doll," she describes and condemns the lives of women who enjoy the luxury provided by their wealthy husbands.

You can cry out
In a voice utterly false and strange
"I love..."
You can, in the overpowering arms of a man
Be a wholesome and beautiful female
with a body like a chamois spread
with large firm breasts
You can, in the bed of a drunk, a vagrant, a fool
defile the chastity of love.
You can be just a mechanical doll
And view your world with two glass eyes
You can sleep in a cloth-lined box for years
with a body stuffed with straw
in the folds of a net and spangles
You can cry out for no reason at all
with every lascivious squeeze of a hand:
Ah, how lucky I am.

Source: Asghar Fathi. (1985) Women and the Family in Iran. Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 58.



WOMEN AND MEN-SEPARATE LIVES

This extract of text from an ethnographic study of a farming village in central Turkey describes a pattern typical of husband-wife relations in rural West Asia, in which there is little contact except in family financial and sexual matters.

Women do not look to their husbands for companionship; still less do the men look to their wives. It is taken for granted that there is no common ground for conversation. A man must never show affection for his wife in front of anyone else. When a soldier returned to the village after years of absence, his kin and neighbours gathered round him to welcome and embrace him. The ceremony often lasted for hours, as one person after another heard the news and hastened to the guest room. His greeting for his wife was left over till bedtime—she could not even see him until all the others had finished with him. When men left Elbasi on their way to Mecca, their sisters and mothers embraced them publicly and histrionically at the boarding of the lorry—but not their wives. Within the household, before close kin, the taboo on public affection is even stronger. Nobody talks about ‘love’ except occasionally in cases of adultery and elopement. The relationship is limited to economic co-operation and to sexual intimacy. Women frequently said to my wife that they did not love their husbands—not only in specific cases, but as a general description of village life. Men spoke very little of their relationship to their wives, and when they did, it was of the common bed, of their prowess therein, and of their large families that they boasted. More than once, men remarked to me in jest: "We love our wives at night."

Source: Paul Stirling. (1965) *The Village Economy*. London: Charles Birchall, 113.

and Turkey, although in some countries the existence of an adverse sex ratio is a cause for concern. A growing number of countries in the region are now predominantly urbanized, but there remain sizable rural populations in countries such as Jordan, Turkey, and Iran. The marriage rate remains high in the region, and the fertility rate of women in West Asia tends to be higher than in other nations at similar stages of development. Fertility rates correlate with a mother's educational attainment and employment status—themselves a function of social class and location—but they also reflect the nation's stage of development and the government's family-planning policy. And in many nations, a woman's age at marriage has been rising, a result of both economic pressures and rising educational attainment. Thus fertility rates range from lows of 2.2–2.7 births per woman in Iran, Turkey, Lebanon, and Israel to highs of about 6 births per woman in

Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza)—where adolescent fertility rates are also very high.

Gains in Education

Educational attainment is growing among women in West Asia, and the gender gaps are narrowing. Although illiteracy is common among women in the older age groups, and universal schooling has yet to be achieved in some of the poorer nations (notably Yemen), enrollment rates for girls in primary and secondary schools are rising and nearly at a par with those for boys. Some nations have made tremendous progress in the past two decades. For example, in 1980 the expected number of years of schooling for girls in Oman and Saudi Arabia was only two and five years, respectively, but by 1997 it had increased to nine years, according to World Bank figures. In Iran and the

United Arab Emirates, girls can expect to complete at least eleven years of schooling. Iran has had a tremendous increase in the population of educated urban and rural females, and about half of university students are now women. In Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, the majority of university students are female. Less is known about the quality of education that women receive, although some research shows that government cutbacks have resulted in crowded classrooms, fewer qualified teachers, and poor instructional materials in the state-owned schools.

Women in the Workforce

Rising educational attainment, as well as declining household budgets after the oil boom era, has led to growing involvement by women in the formal and informal sectors of the economy, and their share of the labor force increased significantly between 1980 and 1997. This is particularly true in nations such as Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, where women's participation in the labor force was previously negligible and the economies relied on foreign contract labor. In the 1990s, women's employment increased in Turkey and Iran, largely in the teaching and health professions, to a lesser extent in sales and services. Improved methods of counting the range of women's economic activities have also yielded higher percentages of women in agriculture as well as in urban informal occupations. In Jordan, Iran, and Turkey, businesses owned by women are a grow-

ing trend. As elsewhere in the world, however, much of the work available to working-class women is irregular and ill paid, and even middle-class women in the civil service have seen the real value of their salaries deteriorate considerably. An elite corps of professional women may be found in both public and private sectors, but their numbers in the highest administrative and managerial categories are small.

Women in Politics

Women in West Asia have always been involved in political movements (for example, independence, national liberation, socialist, and feminist movements), but their involvement in formal political structures (in political parties or as elected officials) has been more recent and remains limited. In contrast to Turkey, where women were given the right to vote in 1930, other nations granted women voting rights in the 1950s (Lebanon, Syria), the 1960s (Iran), or the 1980s (Iraq). This has partly to do with the relative novelty of elections, partly with the experience of colonialism, and partly with the patriarchal gender system.

Although women are found in the rank-and-file and leadership of political parties (for example, in Turkey, which also had a woman prime minister), nowhere have they reached a critical mass (30 percent), and their appointment to party or government positions is largely a form of tokenism. Women are certainly elected to parliament, but their share of parliamentary seats in 1999



Filling a traditional women's role, women in Turkey collect water for their households. (ED KASHI/CORBIS)



Iranian women performing at the opening ceremony of Iran's women's sports championships in Tehran in August 2000. (AFP/CROBIS)

ranged from zero in Jordan to 10 percent in Syria; Israel's share of women was 12 percent. The female share of parliamentary seats in Egypt and Lebanon was 2 percent, in Turkey 4 percent, in Iran 5 percent, and in Iraq 6 percent. (By contrast, women in Vietnam and Argentina had a 27 percent share.) Women's organizations have been keen to increase women's political participation by encouraging women to run in national elections, supporting women's involvement in local elections, and insisting that more women be appointed to ministerial and subministerial positions. They hope that women politicians will be more likely to draft or support legislation that would improve the status of women in family law and labor law. But barriers to women's participation in formal politics remain formidable.

Women's Organizations

Partly because of women's underrepresentation in government and political parties, women have formed their own organizations to lobby and advocate for women; to conduct research on women, gender, and social issues; or to deliver services to poor women and their children. There has been a veritable explosion of women's organizations in West Asia; these include feminist or women's rights organizations, professional associations, nongovernmental organizations focusing on women in development, charities run by women that cater to women, institutes and research centers devoted to women's studies, and associations of women workers. These organizations have their own agendas, constituencies, and modes of operation, and their strength

or weakness varies depending on the country, but they may be said to constitute a growing women's movement throughout West Asia. The movement has many voices, but the major goals of organized women in West Asia may be summarized as follows: (1) the modernization of family law to attain gender equality in marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance; (2) nationality rights for women so that they may retain their own nationality or pass it on to their children; (3) the criminalization of violence against women, including domestic violence, so-called honor crimes (killing a female relative for a real or imagined sexual or cultural transgression), and the public harassment of women by men; and (4) an increase in women's economic opportunities and their participation in political decision making. In addition to the preceding, Muslim women are reclaiming their religion, questioning traditional (or patriarchal) interpretations of the Qur'an and hadith, and emphasizing the egalitarian or emancipatory messages of the holy texts. This is especially true of "Islamic feminists" in Iran. In Israel, women are heavily involved in the peace movement and are engaged in a feminist rereading of the Torah and of Jewish history. And in Turkey, feminists' organizations have confronted and worked against the growing influence of Islamist movements and political parties.

Women in West Asia are divided politically and ideologically as well as socially and economically. Some are more aligned with their governments and regimes, whereas others are critical; some women prefer the separation of religion from politics and the legal

framework, whereas others prefer that religion continue to have a strong presence in society. All of them would probably agree, however, that women's status and roles are in need of advancement.

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WOODWORKING-CENTRAL ASIA

A significant sector of the economies of Central Asian countries, woodworking produces a variety of products, the most important of which are round logs, lumber, wood-based panels, paper and paperboard, wood pulp, and furniture.

Forest and other wooded land in Central Asia account for 5 percent of the total land area, and constitutes less than 1 percent of the world's forest cover. Turkmenistan has the highest percentage of forest cover (8.0 percent) while Tajikistan has the lowest percentage (2.8 percent); all of the latter's forests are classified as not available for wood supply. To a great extent the demand for forest products in Central Asia is met by imports, mainly from the Russian Federation.

Kazakhstan has the biggest woodworking establishments and accounts for most of the region's production. The forest and woodworking industry plays a significant role in its industrial complex, especially in East Kazakhstan, which is rich in forests. Most of the country's woodworking plants are concentrated in the north and northeast, in Semey, Astana, Petropavl, and Aktobe; a big furniture factory is located in Ust-Kamenogorsk. In south central Kazakhstan, the most important woodworking centers are Chymkent, Almaty, and Zhambyl. In the other Central Asian countries the most important woodworking centers are Ashkhabad, Mary, and Sarakhs in Turkmenistan; Tashkent, Kokand, Andizan, Bukhara, Samarkand, and Karshi in Uzbekistan; Bishkek, Naryn, and Osh in Kyrgyzstan; and Namangan and Dushanbe in Tajikistan.

Forestry practice in Central Asia has remained relatively small-scale and less technologically advanced than

in Western Europe. This has been highly beneficial in preserving species diversity. At the same time, most of the indigenous forests in Central Asia disappeared long ago as a result of human activities. The process began during the early Middle Ages in connection with the mining industry and has continued until the present. The effects of deforestation are apparent in the intensification of erosion, higher incidence of avalanches, more arid conditions, air pollution by dust, and melting of the glaciers. In some parts of the Central Asian region, rural poverty causes wood to be used as a primary source of energy, which leads to local deforestation.

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WORKERS' PARTY-SINGAPORE

The Workers' Party is a major opposition party in Singapore, where the People's Action Party (PAP) has won every majority since 1965. The Workers' Party was formed in November 1957 by David Marshall (1908–1995), a lawyer and the first chief minister of Singapore. The party's guiding principles of *Merdeka* (independence) are democracy, socialism, and improving the conditions of workers.

Since its inception, the party has been plagued by intraparty differences, which ultimately led to Marshall's resignation in 1963. The party machinery was small and ineffective until Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam (b. 1926), a dynamic lawyer, injected life into it in 1971. Jeyaretnam broke the PAP's parliamentary monopoly by winning the 1971 Anson by-election, gaining 7,012 votes, or 51.93 percent of the total valid votes.

In the 1999 general elections, the Workers' Party's Low Thia Khiang was returned as member of parliament for Hougang for a second time. In the Cheng San Group Representative Constituency, the Workers' Party team won 45.2 percent of the valid votes, but lost to the PAP team. Since the Workers' Party candidates obtained the highest percentage of votes among all the unelected opposition candidates, they became eligible to take up the nonconstituency member-of-parliament seat. The Workers' Party team elected the party's secretary-general, J. B. Jeyaretnam, to take up the seat.

Workers' Party officeholders have been repeatedly threatened with defamation suits by the PAP government. Many observers perceive both the Workers' Party officeholders and Jeyaretnam as political victims of the PAP's vindictive course of action.

Khai Leong Ho

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WORLD BANK IN ASIA The World Bank is an internationally funded development lender, a specialized agency of the United Nations. The Bank was a product of the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, at which the imminently victorious allies—notably the United States and Great Britain—sought to lay the basis for postwar reconstruction of the world's monetary system. Since the 1960s, it has been a prime lender to the newly industrializing countries (NICs) of Asia.

Founding and Early Years of the World Bank

When discussions were under way at Bretton Woods for the creation of the World Bank, U.S. distaste for the "beggar-thy-neighbor" protectionism of the 1930s that had contributed to the worldwide economic depression and subsequent rise of totalitarianism had a large influence. The United States, possessing a flourishing and ultracompetitive industrial plant, championed free trade, monetary stability, and elimination of tariff barriers. Great Britain, the other leading western industrial power at war's end, was not as unreservedly in favor of free trade, having adopted an Imperial Preference scheme a few years earlier at the Westminster Conference in order to protect Empire and Commonwealth markets. U.S. economic predominance meant, though, that its vision would prevail.

The Bank eventually evolved into five major components, each of which had its own function in promoting international economic development. These units are the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; the International Development Association; the International Finance Corporation; the Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency; and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.

The Bank's immediate postwar task was to assist with the reconstruction of Europe. By the mid-1950s, Eu-

rope had fully recovered and the Bank turned its developmental interest elsewhere. Its interest was global, but Asia received special attention. Asian countries were just emerging from colonial status and now assumed full responsibility for their own economic development. This, naturally, prompted an urgent need for development capital and financial expertise. In addition, this same era saw the end of American occupation of Japan, and that country, already a major economic power, faced the task of full and peaceful integration into the postwar economic order. Also, the communist takeover of China prompted concern in Western capitals that the newly independent Asian countries have an alternative model for economic progress. The mission of the Bank in Asia was to act as a catalyst for economic development among the Asian NICs, many of which were newly independent. However, it differed from commercial lenders in that its goal was not simply profit but rather to help develop institutions and industries that would, in turn, further the long-term maturation of local economies. In this sense, the Bank provided "seed money" for future growth.

From Project-Oriented Policy to Structural Change

During the 1960s and into the 1970s, the Bank was essentially project-oriented. Typical ventures were a series of dams constructed in Asia. These dams were not conceived of as profit-making entities and, as such, would have held little attraction for investors looking for an immediate return. They did, however, offer the potential to control flooding and enhance agriculture, as well as generating electric power that might fuel industrial development. Such projects were well in line with the Bank's vision of investing in projects that would generate long-term wealth. Examples in Asia include the 1960s Phasom Dam Project in Thailand and the Tarbela Dam Project in Pakistan. The increase in agricultural production derived from these efforts caused a rise in rural living standards, while electrification made possible a considerable expansion of industry. Besides money, the Bank provided technical expertise and experienced personnel.

A change in the Bank's *modus operandi* occurred during the late 1970s and into the following decade as it increasingly concentrated on structural change in Asian economies. Whereas, in an earlier period, the obstacles to economic growth were seen as chiefly material—lack of electrical generation or flood control, for example—attention now focused on government policies that impeded capital formation and its effective utilization. A government that shielded inefficient industries through subsidies or tariffs, and thus impeded the more efficient

use of capital, was seen as at least as great an impediment to economic growth as a material lack. This shift occurred at a time when economic theory in Western nations moved away from Keynesian government "pump-priming," in vogue during the immediate post-war era, toward monetarist policy that emphasized profound economic reform, not individual projects underwritten by government.

The new orientation of the Bank put it in conflict with local Asian economies. For instance, from independence India had adopted a socialist economic model that stressed extensive government ownership of key industries and state-directed economic growth. Foreign investment was discouraged and import substitution was selected as a growth mechanism, which meant protective tariffs. For the favored industries, this approach produced pockets of prosperity along with stable employment. Such local stability was, however, more than offset by sluggish overall economic performance at the national level.

Bank economists became convinced that project lending was of relatively little good if financed within a national economy made stagnant by inefficient industries that were kept afloat only by wasteful government subsidies, nationalist import-substitution strategies, protective tariffs, and overvalued currencies. The emphasis of the Bank thus changed to "structural reform," by which was meant an end to statism in economic planning, the elimination of state subsidies to inefficient industries, lowering of protective tariffs, and revaluation of national currencies at realistic levels. Such restructuring might be painful in the short term but, it was believed, would open the Asian nations to broad and sustained future growth and further their integration into the world economy.

Structural Reform and Its Consequences

As part of structural reform, the Bank stressed export-oriented industrial growth, privatization of industry, curtailment of state economic planning, and currency devaluation. It was hoped that these changes would encourage exports, halt wasteful subsidizing of weak import-substitution industries, lessen bureaucratic interference, and increase international demand for local products through depreciated currencies.

This program was so in line with the economic interests of the developed countries, the United States in particular, that some charged that the Bank ignored indigenous Asian needs in favor of the creation of a world economic order that simply slotted Asian economies into western capitalism. Local effects of this restructuring, in some instances, were devastating. Currency

devaluation made essential imports hugely expensive and contributed to inflation. Local industries lost their umbrella of tariff protection, failed, and threw thousands out of jobs. The mild global slowdown of the 1980s left the new export industries without markets. One academic observer dealing with the Philippines, wrote in 1988, "Structural adjustment has also been . . . a disaster for the majority of the Third World, that is, for most workers, peasants, and small entrepreneurs producing for the domestic market" (Broad 1988: xviii).

These charges were amplified when the Asian economies were hammered during the late 1990s by the so-called Asian financial crisis. Some have noted that Malaysia's prime minister, Matahir Mohamad, refused to follow many of the Bank's prescriptions and that his nation's economy was spared some of the worst hardships.

Nevertheless, the general restructuring sought by the Bank has generally occurred. India, formerly a quasi-socialist, protectionist economy, moved toward an open-market economy with overall positive results. In the long run, it may be that the undoubted pain brought about by the Bank's change in philosophy enabled the Asian NICs to become competitive in the new global economy.

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WORLD WAR I The main theater of World War I was in Europe and no major battles were fought in Asia; nevertheless, Turkey, Japan, China, and the Asian colonies of the imperial powers were involved in the conflict, and its impact was immense in unleashing forces of nationalism and self-determination.

East Asian Region

East Asia was connected not with the immediate causes of World War I, but with such tertiary factors as militarism and nationalism. Japan saw the war as a chance to occupy the German settlements in the Pa-



JAPAN DECLARES WAR ON GERMANY

"We, by the Grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, on the throne occupied by the same Dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make the following proclamation to all Our loyal and brave subjects.

"We, hereby, declare war against Germany and We command Our Army and Navy to carry on hostilities against that Empire with all their strength, and We also command all Our competent authorities to make every effort in pursuance of their respective duties to attain the national aim within the limit of the law of nations.

"Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, the calamitous effect of which We view with grave concern, We, on our part, have entertained hopes of preserving the peace of the Far East by the maintenance of strict neutrality but the action of Germany has at length compelled Great Britain, Our Ally, to open hostilities against that country, and Germany is at Kiaochau, its leased territory in China, busy with warlike preparations, while her armed vessels, cruising the seas of Eastern Asia, are threatening Our commerce and that of Our Ally. The peace of the Far East is thus in jeopardy.

"Accordingly, Our Government, and that of His Britannic Majesty, after a full and frank communication with each other, agreed to take such measure as may be necessary for the protection of the general interests contemplated in the Agreement of Alliance, and We on Our part, being desirous to attain that object by peaceful means, commanded Our Government to offer, with sincerity, an advice to the Imperial German Government. By the last day appointed for that purpose, however, Our Government failed to receive an answer accepting their advice.

"It is with profound regret that We, in spite of Our ardent devotion to the cause of peace, are thus compelled to declare war, especially at this early period of Our reign and while we are still in mourning for Our lamented Mother.

"It is Our earnest wish, that, by the loyalty and valour of Our faithful subjects, peace may soon be restored and the glory of the Empire be enhanced."

Source: John V. A. MacMurray, ed. (1921) *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894-1919*. Vol. 3. New York: Oxford University Press, 1153.

cific and in China. The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1904 did not include any obligation that Japan join the Allied powers (Britain, France, Serbia, Russia, Japan, the United States, and China). Japan joined the war to increase its international prestige. On 23 August, Japan declared war on the Central powers (Germany, Austria-

Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey) and entered the Chinese port of Qingdao (Tsingtao). The German settlements in China were occupied, and Japan established itself on the Shandong peninsula. Japan's navy, along with the British, occupied such German islands as the Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls in the Pacific.



The city of Constantinople ablaze in 1916. (HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS)

China joined the war in 1917 and sent labor forces to France, West Asia, and Africa. China was disappointed with the results of war and refused to sign the treaty of Versailles that ended it. The Chinese government and people refused to recognize the Shangdong provisions, which granted Japan special rights on the peninsula, and large-scale demonstrations were held.

Japan had already obtained pledges from the Allied powers for its claim to Shandong and the German islands in the Pacific. Japan had hoped for parity with the Western Allies as a reward for joining the war, but its demand for a basic principle of racial equality was not included in the covenant of the League of Nations. Although the Japanese claim of racial equality among nations was not granted by the Western powers, the end of war saw a tremendous increase in Japan's power and prestige. The country benefited economically: cotton exports trebled, and the merchant-fleet tonnage doubled. Japan's trade with Asian countries also increased. Japan was able to establish hegemony in East Asia and to have its claims to special rights in Manchuria and its annexation of Korea recognized by the major powers.

West Asian Region

In West Asia, the Turkish Ottoman empire sided with Germany, and the Arabs, having been given a vague promise of freedom from colonization, were

persuaded to join the Allies. Turkey joined the war in November 1914 and posed a threat to the oil fields in the Persian Gulf region. The British landed at Gallipoli but were repulsed by Turkish troops. British Indian troops occupied Basra and marched along the Tigris River to Baghdad. The British forces surrendered in April 1916 to the Turkish troops. However, these initial Turkish victories did not save the Ottoman empire.

The Turks could not take the Suez Canal, and the British exploited the Arab dislike for the Turks to British advantage. Colonel T. H. Lawrence (known as Lawrence of Arabia) led a series of desert campaigns in Western Asia. By the end of 1917, the British had taken Baghdad and Jerusalem; Edmund Allenby, the British general, entered Jerusalem on 8 December. He was helped by reinforcements from India and by Arab revolts. After the British offensive in Palestine, Turkey concluded an armistice on 30 September 1918.

The British, along with the French, played devious diplomacy. Publicly they supported the Arabs in their drive for independence. However, as a result of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 9 May 1916, which decided the spoils of war, Britain gained control over Palestine, Transjordan (present-day Jordan), and Iraq, while the French were established in Syria and Lebanon. To gain the support of the Jews, the Balfour Declaration of November 1917, which was issued

by the British secretary of state, promised creation of a national homeland for them.

The war was over, but its impact was momentous in changing the history of West Asia. The Turkish empire was in tatters after the loss of Palestine, Arabia, Transjordan, Iraq, and Syria. The cotton plantations and oil fields were gone. Nevertheless, a national state for the Turks was emerging under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk (1881–1938). The Jews felt disillusioned, as Palestine was to be a mandated territory rather than an independent Jewish state. As for the Arabs, they found they had achieved liberation from the Turks only to come under the yoke of the British and French. Arab nationalism took a new turn, and the Arabs set out on the path to independence.

South and Southeast Asia

The military action of the war in South and Southeast Asia was confined to Madras, India, and Penang, in what was then Malaya (now Malaysia). However, it brought about a crucial change in the political life and socioeconomic condition of the colonial people of the region.

The president of the Thai foreign ministry, Prince Dewawongse, saw the end of the war as an opportune moment to further Thai interests. The motive was to prevent Anglo-French occupation (French and British colonial possessions surrounded Thailand) and to abolish German extraterritorial rights. When the tiny Thai forces returned from France after the war, they were full of new ideas and experiences.

The same was true of the 150,000 Vietnamese who had participated in the war as laborers and soldiers. Nguyen Ali Quoc (Ho Chi Minh, 1890–1969) pleaded in vain for self-determination for Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos). Vietnamese nationalism took a new turn with active resistance to French rule. The British colony of Malaya felt the impact of war economically. Rice exports had been disrupted because of wartime shipping shortages, and this led to agricultural discontent in present-day Myanmar (Burma), which was being administered as part of India.

The nationalist leaders of India had initially supported the war efforts of the British government in the mistaken belief that the colonial rulers would be grateful for their loyalty. As the war went on, however, attitudes changed. The Congress Party passed a resolution of self-government on December 1916. This was a period of Hindu-Muslim unity, and the Congress Party accepted the principle of a separate electorate for the Muslims. The entry of Turkey into the war had generated anti-British feelings in the Muslim commu-

nity, which was sympathetic to the plight of fellow Muslims. Indian politics received a new zest after Annie Besant, an English theosophist who emigrated to India, set up the Home Rule League demanding home rule. Revolutionary and terrorist activities surged.

Price rises and scarcity of agricultural products brought untold misery upon the Indian people. Meanwhile, about 120,000 men from British India were fighting in West Asia and Eastern Africa, which caused hardship for their families at home. Britain also had to depend on Indian industries to help meet its wartime needs; the jute and textile industries, in particular, flourished during this period. Britain thus felt the necessity to grant some concession to the colony, and in August 1917 the announcement was made that there would be gradual development of self-governing institutions. War brought agitation for constitutional reforms in Sri Lanka, and the Ceylon National Congress was set up.

Postwar Rise of Asian Consciousness

The end of World War I on 11 November 1918 and the defeat of the Central powers formed a watershed in Asian history. The prestige of the Western powers suffered drastically. The mutual bickering and fratricidal struggle among European powers convinced the Asian countries that the Western nations were not at all superior. A new Asian self-consciousness developed. Arabs, Jews, Indians, Vietnamese, and others felt deceived by the double-dealing of the colonial powers. With renewed zeal, they strove hard to oust the imperial powers. The Fourteen Points of the U.S. president Woodrow Wilson, particularly the principle of self-determination, had raised high hopes. However, these ideas were applied in Eastern Europe only. Another important development was the proliferation of new industries in Asia at the expense of Europe, whose economy had been directed to war purposes. A change in economic relations between Asia and Europe occurred. An exhausted Europe was losing self-confidence, and the new ideas and experiences that Asia had gained changed the course of world history in the postwar period.

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WORLD WAR II World War II in Asia was very different from the war in Europe. The Asian experience included Japanese colonial expansion into the Asian mainland, which preceded the involvement of European and North American nations, as well as the civil war in China. For some Asian nations, the worldwide aspect of the war was secondary to their own conflicts with Japan.

The war came at a time when some nations were involved either in the war in Europe or in other demographic upheavals, such as the Soviet Union's relocation of ethnic Koreans (who had fled from Japanese-occupied Korea into eastern Siberia) to Uzbekistan. In this instance, some 190,000 Koreans were moved west. Although many ethnic Russians had also been relocated to the Central Asian republics from the 1880s on as a means to counter growing Islamic influence there, such relocations were not part of Soviet wartime relocation policy.

Japanese Expansionism

The "War in the Pacific," as the conflict is known in many Asian countries, took place from 1939 to 1945. However, the military actions and colonial efforts that set the stage for this period began with the termination of World War I. At the end of that war, Japan had acquired territories in China and the Pacific formerly held by Germany. (Japan's expansionist policy had begun even before World War I, with the acquisition of Taiwan following Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and the annexation of Korea in 1910.) Japan's aim was one of strategic security, a "Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere" stretching some 1,600 kilometers from the Japanese islands, which would remove the Western powers from Asia. Western imperialism had undermined China, and by the mid-1930s, Japan had begun to remove Western influence there by dividing China through the establishment of a puppet government in Manchuria. However, open armed conflict in China escalated in 1937.

In July of that year, Japanese forces attacked Peiping (modern Beijing); they attacked Shanghai in August. At that time, Japan was fighting the forces of the Nationalist government of China; the Nationalists leaned more toward the West in matters of trade and foreign policy than did the Chinese Communists, the Nationalists' adversaries. Unable to stop the Japanese, the Nationalists retreated westward to the city of Nanking (modern Nanjing), where in December Japanese forces captured the city and massacred some 300,000 civilian residents. The "Rape of Nanking,"

more than any event, brought about international condemnation of Japan's expansion into Asia and shaped the policies of Japan's opponents.

In Southern Asia, the war came to India as a consequence of British rule there. When Great Britain declared war on Germany, the Indian viceroy did the same, but the Indian Congress did not support him. While war raged in East Asia and Europe, India was at first little more than a source of men for the African front and for the British in Singapore as well as a supply base for operations in the Middle East.

India's situation changed with the Japanese attacks in the Pacific and on the Asian mainland. Indian soldiers who had been sent to reinforce British territories in East Asia were killed or captured by the Japanese once fighting began, leading India to return to British allegiance, at least in the short term.

U.S. Entry

At this time, the United States was still formally neutral and was selling Japan steel and oil, materials Japan needed for its military expansion. America had accepted Japan's annexation of the Korean peninsula, and in the United States, ethnic Koreans were considered to be Japanese. The American focus was on the growing conflict in Europe, not Asia. While the United States provided some assistance to the Nationalist Chinese, the Soviet Union actually provided China more operational support with Soviet aircraft and pilots until 1939, when those assets were recalled to fight Germany. The major U.S. support to China after that was the effort to construct the Burma Road from Lashio, Burma (present-day Myanmar), to Kunming, China, begun in 1938 to provide a western route into China for military supplies. U.S. policy at the time was to avoid conflict in the Pacific, because conflict there would divert assets from the Atlantic. Only in 1940, in response to further Japanese expansion in China, did the United States institute an economic embargo of oil and steel against Japan. This was expanded in mid-1941 to a complete end to all trade with Japan; Japan then had to seize the sources of materials necessary for its strategic survival.

In Southeast Asia, Japan had continued its program of replacing Western influence with its own. The French colonial government in Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) capitulated to Japan in 1940, after France fell to Germany. Thailand accepted Japan's presence in the region as a means of reacquiring territory lost to Cambodia, Laos, and Malaya. The outbreak of armed conflict with Western forces in December 1941 led to the occupation of Malaya



CREATING THE AXIS POWERS

The Mutual Assistance Pact signed by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Berlin on 27 September 1940 created the so-called Axis Powers and ceded control of Asia to Japan.

The Governments of Japan, Germany, and Italy, considering it as the condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and co-operate with one another in regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and the regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote mutual prosperity and welfare of the people concerned.

Furthermore, it is the desire of the three Governments to extend co-operation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavors along lines similar to their own, in order that their ultimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realized. Accordingly, the Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy have agreed as follows:

Article I. Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

Article II. Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.

Article III. Japan, Germany and Italy agree to co-operate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese Conflict.

Article IV. With a view to implementing the present Pact, joint Technical Commissions the members of which are to be appointed by the respective Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy will meet without delay.

Article V. Japan, Germany and Italy affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three Contracting Parties and Soviet Russia.

Article VI. The present Pact shall come into effect immediately upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the date of its coming into force.

At proper time before the expiration of the said term the High Contracting Parties shall, at the request of any one of them, enter into negotiations for its renewal.

Source: Far East Year Book. (1941) Tokyo: Far East Yearbook, 93–94.

(modern Malaysia), Burma, and the Dutch East Indies (present-day Indonesia) and began the conquest of the Philippines.

While the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 is viewed by most Americans as the beginning of World War II in Asia, this event came thirty-one years after the annexation of Korea, ten years after the establishment of Japanese rule in northern China, four years after the massacre at Nanking (Nanjing), and a year after much of Southeast Asia had come under Japanese domination. To Japan, however, the initiation of armed conflict against the United States was in response to an undeclared war that the United States had initiated with its embargo of critical materials.

Early Japanese Successes

Japan's attack on Western holdings in Asia and the Pacific resulted in tremendous early successes. American military power in Hawaii was blunted, Hong Kong fell, Burma and the Philippines were taken, and at the far reaches of Japanese power, islands in Alaska's Aleutian chain, the Solomon Islands, and the Gilbert Islands were captured. The Solomon and the Gilbert Islands consolidated Japan's holdings acquired by League of Nations mandate after World War I. By mid-1942, the Western powers were close to defeat in Asia and the Pacific. However, the same technological forces that had permitted Japan's rapid military expansion began to work in favor of the Allied forces, due in part to what must be considered a stroke of luck that took place before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Change in U.S. Naval Strategy

Before December 1941, U.S. naval strategy had been based on the use of battleships in naval combat, but after Pearl Harbor, the aircraft carrier became the linchpin of U.S. naval strategy. The aircraft carrier was an untested experiment until it was used with tremendous success by the Japanese navy. At the time of the Japanese attack, the U.S. Navy's three aircraft carriers were out of port, but its battleships were at Pearl Harbor, where they were destroyed. This forced the United States to adopt a naval strategy based on the aircraft carrier for the Pacific theater of operations, because the primary focus of the war effort was still Europe and replacements for its battleships would not be available for some time. The new strategy would have to counter the advances Japan had already made in the Pacific and would rely on America's industrial capacity (once mobilized), technological advantage, and innovative tactics.

Japan's strategy, however, had been one of quick successes that would give it the advantage in establishing dominance over East Asia before the United States and the Western powers could retaliate. Japan's prime minister, General Tojo Hideki (1884–1948), had no misperceptions regarding America's capacity; even he recognized that a long conflict would work against Japan's long-term goals. As the Allied forces became able to maintain their holdings and then to advance toward the Japanese home islands, the resources available to the Allies (and denied to the Japanese), technology, and tactics swung in favor of the Allies.

Battle for China

On the Asian mainland, however, Japan was still the dominant force. In China, the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) and the Communists under Mao Zedong (1893–1976) had been at odds since 1926, and this competition at times undermined Chinese efforts to defeat the Japanese. While Chinese forces avoided complete defeat at Shanghai in 1932, Japan was able to establish a puppet government in Manchuria (called Manchuguo). Chiang spent the next five years building up his Nationalist army, while the Communists withdrew to northwest China on the Long March (1934–1935) from Jiangxi province to Shaanxi province, covering approximately 9,600 kilometers. Mao rebuilt his forces over the next year and sought a united effort of both Communists and Nationalists against the Japanese. Chiang, however, sought to defeat the Communists first, then deal with the Japanese. In late 1936, Chiang was kidnapped by one of his own generals while on a visit to Xi'an, and as a condition of his release he had to agree to work with the Communists to fight the Japanese. Subsequently, Japanese forces dramatically increased their efforts, leading to the Nanking Massacre and to victories at Wuhan and Guangzhou (Canton) in 1938.

Even as both Chinese factions worked against the Japanese, their efforts were seen as a means for each to dominate the other. Chiang believed that the Japanese would wear down the Communists so that he would be able to deal with them after the Japanese were defeated, and Mao viewed Nationalist action against the Japanese as an opportunity for his Communist forces to rest. Both sides expanded their forces in preparation for a civil war once the Japanese were defeated.

U.S. support for China began only after years of fighting by Chinese forces, but in March 1941 the Lend-Lease Program (which had been used to support European nations fighting against Hitler since 1939) was extended to China. This and other aid were sig-



JAPAN AND THE SOVIET UNION NEUTRALITY PACT

On 13 April 1941 Japan and the Soviet Union signed the Neutrality Pact between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. For the Japanese the benefit of Soviet neutrality was a reduced threat to their holdings in China and Korea.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, guided by a desire to strengthen peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, decided to conclude a pact of neutrality, for the purpose of which they appointed as their representatives:

For the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Vyacheslav Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

For His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Yosuke Matsuoka, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ju San Min, Cavalier of the Order of the Sacred Treasure, First Class; and Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Lieut. Gen., Ju San Min, Cavalier of the Order of the Rising Sun, First Class, and the Order of the Golden Kite, Fourth Class.

Who, after the exchange of their credentials, which were found in due and proper form, agreed on the following:

Article I. Both Contracting Parties undertake to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between them and mutually respect the territor-

ial integrity and inviolability of the other Contracting Party.

Article II. Should one of the Contracting Parties become the object of hostilities on the part of one or several third Powers, the other Contracting Party will observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict.

Article III. The present Pact comes into force from the day of its ratification by both Contracting Parties and remains valid for five years. In case neither of the Contracting Parties denounces the Pact one year before the expiration of the term, it will be considered automatically prolonged for the next five years.

Article IV. The present Pact is subject to ratification as soon as possible. Instruments of ratifications shall be exchanged in Tokyo as soon as possible.

In confirmation whereof the above-named representatives signed the present Pact in two copies, drawn up in the Russian and Japanese languages, and affixed thereto their seals.

Done in Moscow, April 13, 1941, which corresponds to the 13th day of the 4th month of the 16th year of Showa.

Signed by:

Molotov

Yosuke Matsuoka

Yoshitsugu Tatekawa

Source: Harold S. Quigley. (1942) *Far Eastern War: 1937-1941*. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 296.

nificantly expanded after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor eight months later.

Broadening of the War

The attack on the U.S. base in Hawaii dramatically changed the war for Japan. Despite its early successes in late 1941 and 1942, Japan lacked the resources necessary for a long war. An early attack on Tokyo made by American bombers launched from an aircraft carrier in April 1942 unnerved Japan. This raid, led by Lieu-

tenant-Colonel James Doolittle, was launched primarily for psychological reasons. For the United States, it provided some good news after a succession of defeats; for Japan, it showed that not even Tokyo was safe.

The new aircraft carrier-based U.S. strategy, instead of being oriented solely against Japanese naval forces, used "island-hopping" as a means of advancing on the Japanese home islands. After the United States defeated Japanese naval forces at the battle of Midway and at Guadalcanal in 1942, Allied forces moved



THE YALTA AGREEMENT

On 4–11 February 1945 Winston Churchill of Great Britain, Franklin Roosevelt of the United States, and Josef Stalin of the Soviet Union met at Yalta in the Crimea to discuss post–World War II Europe. They also agreed secretly that the Soviet Union would attack Japan and would regain territory taken by Japan as detailed below.

The leaders of the three Great Powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain—have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on the condition that:

1. The *status quo* in Outer Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:

(a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union.

(b) the commercial part of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR be restored.

(c) the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company, it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Mongolia;

3. The Kuril Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

Source: Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress.
(1946) Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State.

through the Gilbert Islands and New Guinea in 1943, then on to the Marianas Islands and the Philippines in 1944. By attacking Japanese strong points that might threaten Allied operations and seizing those islands necessary for operations while bypassing others, the Allied forces were able to prepare for what would have been the final assault on Japan in 1945.

Farther west, the Japanese imperial army had opened a front to invade Burma to counter American and British activities there. This expanded in mid-1944 to an effort to defeat the British and Indian forces in east India, resulting in the overextension of Japanese supply lines and the eventual destruction of the Japanese Fifteenth Army.

Also in 1944, a volunteer corps of American fliers in China, known as the "Flying Tigers," began to attack Japanese forces there. Although the Flying Tigers diverted Japanese attention away from the fight with Chinese forces, Chiang Kai-shek did not capitalize on the diversion, much to the irritation and anger of the senior American in China, Brigadier General Joseph Stillwell. The friction between Chiang and Stillwell soon caused President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945) to recall Stillwell to the United States.

By 1945, a campaign of strategic bombing of Japanese cities was being waged from island bases in the Pacific. Massed attacks by the U.S. Air Force targeted both Japanese military forces and cities and resulted in tens

of thousands of civilian casualties and massive destruction (as had the Allied attacks against German cities). The firebombing of Tokyo on the evening of 9 March 1945, for example, killed up to 120,000 Japanese. The U.S. doctrine at the time was one of "total war" against the Japanese population, in preparation for a final Allied push against Japan, which was to be a massive amphibious assault against the islands of Kyushu (Operation Olympic) in December 1945 and Honshu (Operation Coronet) in March 1946. These assaults were to use forces made available by the defeat of Germany, forces that, in many cases, already were in transit to the Pacific region. As many as 5 million soldiers, primarily American, would have been involved. The Soviet Union would also take part in the invasion of Japan.

Planning for Operation Olympic had begun in 1944 as Allied forces moved toward Japan. By early 1945 it was estimated that approximately 300,000 Japanese soldiers were on the Japanese islands; by August this estimate had risen to over a half million, including a significant number of combat units. The U.S. experience in attacking islands held by the Japanese was that Japanese soldiers and civilians would fight to the death to avoid capture, resulting in very heavy casualties inflicted on U.S. forces. Estimates for the invasion were as high as 1 million Allied casualties and possibly three times that number of Japanese. The losses for Japan would include both military and civilian personnel and might well have resulted in the end of Japan as a nation.

End of the War

Discussions regarding the Allied focus on Japan were held by the leaders of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain in February 1945 at Yalta in the Crimea. This conference resulted in an agreement that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan once Germany was defeated, and that upon Japan's defeat, those areas in China formerly held by Russia but captured by Japan in 1904 would be turned over to the Soviet Union. President Roosevelt kept the agreement secret from even Vice President Harry Truman (1884–1972) on his return from Yalta, but Roosevelt died within two months. The decision to proceed with the plans made earlier then fell on Truman.

Truman met with the British prime minister Winston Churchill (1875–1975) and the Soviet premier Joseph Stalin (1879–1953) at Potsdam, Germany, in July 1945 to discuss further the treatment and disarmament of Japan once it had been defeated. While at Potsdam, Truman learned of the successful test of a new weapon that might shorten the war. That weapon was the atomic bomb. He informed Churchill of the weapon, but not Stalin.

The atomic bomb used against Japan eliminated the need for the invasion. On 6 August 1945 a single aircraft dropped a single ten-thousand-pound bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima, resulting in an explosion equal to twenty thousand tons of conventional explosives. Hiroshima had been chosen because it was an industrial target that had not been damaged by earlier attacks, which would permit estimations of the bomb's effectiveness. The bomb instantly killed some 130,000 people, injured as many, and destroyed four-fifths of the buildings in the city. Three days later, a second atomic bomb was dropped on the Japanese city of Nagasaki. By that time, the Soviet Union had declared war on Japan and invaded Manchuria.

Although the two weapons used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki instantly killed approximately 200,000 people and thousands subsequently died from injuries and radiation poisoning, these attacks had not been as damaging as the combined earlier attacks on other major cities. For President Truman, the atomic bomb was simply a weapon of war, not an element of a greater strategy. Its use worked; on 14 August, the Japanese government accepted the guidelines of the Potsdam Declaration. The Soviets refused to accept the Japanese proposal, because it did not contain an order to the Japanese military to surrender; only the official signing of the documents on 2 September 1945 was accepted by the Soviet Union.

The War in the Pacific cost over 11 million Chinese and 2.5 million Japanese lives, plus countless others in the occupied nations of the region. Casualties among the Allied forces—the United States, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, India, and Canada—were comparatively light; approximately 200,000 were killed in Asia, the majority of whom were American.

Thomas P. Dolan

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WRAPPING CLOTHS. See Pojagi.

WU An estimated 85 million people, living predominantly in the provincial-level municipality of Shanghai as well as in the Zhejiang and Jiangsu Provinces in China, speak the various dialects of Wu. The Wu speakers in Jiangsu Province live primarily south of the Chang (Yangtze) River. A few enclaves of Wu speakers are located at the north of the mouth of this river.

The Wu region is different in a variety of ways from the other regions in which the major Sinitic sublanguages hold sway. In the Wu region, there are several culture centers, whereas in the other sublanguage groups, there is one major "local" capital. This is a population center that sets the cultural as well as linguistic pattern for the rest of the group. For example, the Yue have Guangzhou, while the Minnan of Fujian Province have Xiamen. The scattered Hakka also look to Meixian as their geographic, cultural, and linguistic center.

In comparison, the Wu people are far more diverse. Shanghai, the sublanguage's largest population center, does not really play the role of the center for the Wu people, because it is a new city, relatively speaking, and is subject to Western influences. Furthermore, the population in Shanghai has come from various Wu-speaking districts as well as from Nanjing and beyond. Centers such as Suzhou, Hangzhou, and Shaoxing have all played major roles in the history of the Wu, but none can truly be said to be its center.

The Wu people are also different from other Chinese in that they would not usually describe their subethnic identities in terms of their province of origin. This is because only the southern third of Jiangsu Province is Wu speaking. There is great diversity in

Zhejiang Province itself and the people are not all Wu speakers. So the Wu people of Zhejiang have tended to identify themselves by their native prefectures, which are subprovincial political units. Unlike the Yue, Hakka, and Min people to the south, the Wu people did not join the modern migration of Chinese abroad on any major scale, and Wu speakers have only a minor representation in the overseas Chinese population.

The Wu language had its origin in Suzhou—one of the cultural centers of the imperial period. The sociolinguistic evolution of the Wu region, however, is not well established. From the center of its origins, the language spread to regions south of the lower Chang River. It is a language that has gained importance because of the rise of Shanghai as a metropolitan center and one of the treaty ports that was ceded to the Western powers—Britain, France, and Germany.

Origins of Wu

The Chinese character for *wu* was possibly first applied to people living around the mouth of the Chang River who spoke a non-Sinitic language that was largely incomprehensible to those speaking the various Sinitic sublanguages. The other meaning given to the word *wu*, and rarely so, is "clamorous" or "yelling." This might be a reference to the rather loud and emphatic nature of the Wu people's way of speaking. To many early Han Chinese, the language might have also sounded strident. The mention of the kingdom of Wu first appeared in Chinese annals around the seventh century BCE. Historical linguists have been uncertain how to classify the ancient Wu dialect, which could not yet be considered a Sinitic sublanguage at that time. There is a widespread assumption that the language is related to the Tai languages. But the probability is that it is more of a Sino-Tibetan language. The kingdom of Wu started to adopt aspects of the evolving Chinese culture during the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE). Subsequent warfare led to the complete incorporation of the kingdom into the Sinitic political world.

Sinitic Wu culture is thought to have reached its highest point during the Southern Song period (1126–1279). This would have been the period when the Wu region was at the geographical core of what has been considered to be the most highly cultured state in China, if not in the world. The Wu-speaking people left a major legacy for human civilization. The Southern Song, with its capital at present-day Hangzhou, played an important role in transmitting Buddhism and other cultural and artistic values to neighboring countries such as Japan.

Distinguishing Features of the Wu Sublanguage

Many of the archaic features to be found in the Wu sublanguage help distinguish it sharply from modern Mandarin. Principal among these is the continuing use in the sublanguage of the series of voiced initial consonants that have been lost in other Sinitic sublanguages. Most forms of Wu will have *b*, *d*, *dz*, *g*, *p*, and *z* as initials. Another feature is a special voiced *b* (a bit like the guttural German *r*), which is contrasted in Wu with the normal, or unvoiced, *b*, according to Leo Moser.

There are fewer diphthongs in Wu than in most other Sinitic sublanguages, and the phonetics are deemed to be somewhat closer to the Old Xiang, or *Laoxianghua*, of Hunan. Wu is different from other sublanguages like the Yue, Minnan, Gan, and Hakka, particularly in the simplified endings of its syllables. While Mandarin has also simplified its endings, it has done this differently from those of Wu, with varying results. Hence, the ancient final syllables such as, *p*, *t*, and *k* appear in neither Mandarin nor Wu.

Final consonants of Wu dialects typically include only one or two nasal endings with perhaps the glottal stop. It is a pattern that more closely resembles the dialects of Minbei and some forms of Eastern Mandarin. The Wu vernaculars are characterized by complex patterns of tone sandhi in which the tone of one syllable is modified in speaking by that of the syllable that falls next to it. ("Sandhi" is a linguistic term meaning the modification of the sound of a morpheme in certain phonetic situations or contexts.) While tone sandhi in the Min-speaking areas has been deemed to be complex, it is even more so among the Wu dialects.

Wu also differs from other Sinitic sublanguages in grammatical and structural ways. In particular, the Wu dialects differ from Mandarin by putting the direct object before the indirect object when both appear in a sentence. That characteristic makes Wu similar to Cantonese, but different from the intervening Min vernacular tongues, which tend to have an ordering that resembles more that of Mandarin.

The Wu dialect tends to vary by stages over the larger region mainly as a consequence of the pluralism of standards in the sublanguage. The isoglosses (geographical boundaries that delimit the area within which a linguistic feature is found) overlap in what has been found to be a complex pattern. In spite of such variations within the region of Wu-speaking peoples, however, there is generally intercomprehensibility among the so-called Shanghai dialects, of which Suzhou Wu is one example.

One exception to the intercomprehensibility of the Wu dialects is the dialect spoken in the port city of

Wenzhou, located in the south of Zhejiang. This Wenzhou dialect and some of the dialects spoken by people living inland from the port are considered extremely different from other Wu dialects. This has led some linguists to suggest that the Wenzhou dialect should be treated and recognized as a Sinitic language that is separate from the rest of Wu.

The vernacular of Shanghai represents a fusion of various forms of Northern Wu and other dialectal influences, including even Eastern Mandarin. Other Wu speakers have traditionally treated the Shanghai vernacular somewhat contemptuously as a mixture of Suzhou and Ningbo dialects. Shanghainese have been portrayed as strategic, smart thinkers, interested in new ideas, and in new words to add to their language. Yet the Shanghainese people have long resisted the Communist government's efforts to make them speak the universally accepted Mandarin dialect.

Ooi Giok Ling

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WU CHANGSHI (1844–1927), innovative early-twentieth-century Chinese painter and calligrapher. The career of Wu Changshi represents the process of evolution from the artistic patterns of late imperial China to those of the modern era. Born into a declining scholarly family in Anji, Zhejiang, he moved to Shanghai and became a professional painter. Wu was best known for his calligraphy in the *zhuan* (seal) and *shigu* (stone drum) scripts. His calligraphy and painting were famed for their *jinsbiqui*, or antiquarian epigrapher's taste.

In his youth, Wu studied briefly with Ren Yi (1840–1895), but was mostly self-taught as a painter. Although his favorite themes were usually flowers and rocks, Wu's pictures are to be seen not as images from nature but as arrangements of plants and rocks in an

abstract space. Conventions of calligraphy and painting were brought together in his loosely brushed artwork. Thus, despite his commercial market, the ultimate ideal of literati painting—to combine poetry, calligraphy, and painting—was realized in his work.

Kuiyi Shen

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WU ZETIAN (625–705), Chinese emperor. Wu Zetian was the only woman to rule in China as an emperor in name. She entered the Chinese imperial court at the age of thirteen as a lowly ranked concubine to Emperor Taizong (reigned 626–649) of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), but when he died she became concubine and later empress to her stepson, Emperor Gaozong (reigned 650–683). When Gaozong died, she declared herself emperor after deposing her sons and attempting to found her own dynasty. She turned to the Buddhist establishment and invented about a dozen characters with a new script to legitimize her position as emperor.

Her overall rule did not result in a radical break from Tang domestic prosperity and foreign prestige. But she changed the composition of the ruling class by removing the entrenched aristocrats from the court and gradually expanding the civil service examination to recruit men of merit to serve in the government. Although she gave political clout to some women such as her capable secretary, she did not go as far as to challenge the Confucian tradition of excluding women from participating in the civil service examinations. Already in 674, she had drafted twelve policy directives ranging from encouraging agriculture to formulating social rules of conduct. She maintained a stable economy and a moderate taxation for the peasantry. Her reign witnessed a healthy growth in the population; when she died in 705 her centralized bureaucracy regulated the social life and economic well-being of the 60 million people in the empire.

Overall, Wu Zetian was a decisive, capable ruler in the roles of empress, empress dowager, and emperor. She was allegedly cruel in her personal life, murdering two sons, a daughter, and other relatives who opposed her. As a woman ruler, she challenged the

traditional patriarchal dominance of power, state, sovereignty, monarchy, and political ideology. Her experience reflected a reversal of the gender roles and restrictions that her society and government had constructed for her as appropriate to women. While surviving in the male-ruled and power-focused domain, she showed strengths usually attributed to men, including political ambition, long-range vision, talented organization, and hard work. Later historians have been hostile to her, describing her as a despotic usurper of the throne. According to these historians, the reign of Wu Zetian ended in corruption, drinking, and the elderly ruler delighting in sexual relations with young men who enjoyed all imaginable favors and honors. In 705, she was forced to abdicate, her son Zhongzong was again enthroned, and the Tang was restored.

Jennifer W. Jay

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WUDANG SHAN Wudang Shan (Mount Wudang) is located in northwest Hubei province, central eastern China, near the city of Shiyan. It is also known as Taihe Mountain. The highest peak, Tianzhu Feng (Heaven-Supporting Pillar), rises 1,612 meters above sea level, and the mountain includes seventy-two peaks, cliffs, ravines, caves, and water pools. One of



WUDANG SHAN—WORLD HERITAGE SITE

Designated by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site in 1994, Wudang is a complex of ancient palaces and temples in China. First begun in the Ming dynasty, the site demonstrates the highest artistic and architectural craft from the Ming, Yuan, and Qing dynasties.

the most sacred places in Taoism, the mountain is famous for its complex of palaces and temples, which date from the Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties. The oldest of the Taoist temples, Wulong (Five Dragon Temple), dates from the early Tang dynasty (618–907). The Ming emperor Cheng Zu, a Taoist, began the construction of thirty-three halls and monasteries in 1412. The temple complex covers more than 1.6 million square meters. Wudang is also known as the birthplace of Wudang shadow boxing, or *wudang taiyi wuxing*. This martial art, known as Tai Chi in the West, was most likely developed by the Wudang Taoist Zhang Sanfeng (1391?–1458?). The palace and temple complex on Wudang was inscribed on the World Heritage List in 1994.

Michael Pretes

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WULINGYUAN Wulingyuan, known as "China's Yellowstone," is a spectacular karst landscape near Dayong City in western Hunan Province. Its designated Scenic Area covers 265 square kilometers and incorporates China's first national park, Zhangjiajie, as well as the Tianzishan and Suoxiyu nature reserves. The impressive scenery includes more than 3,000 quartzite sandstone pillars, many over 200 meters high, as well as ravines, gorges, streams, pools, waterfalls, caves, and natural bridges. The Zhoutian Dong cavern is thought to be the largest in Asia, and the Tianqia Shengkong natural bridge, the world's highest. Wulingyuan has both subtropical and temperate vegetation and contains numerous endangered plants and animals, including dove trees (*Davidia*), Chinese giant salamanders, Chinese water deer, Asiatic black bears, Asiatic wild dogs, and clouded leopards. Wulingyuan was inscribed on the World Heritage List in 1992.

Michael Pretes

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WUSHU *Wushu* is the generic label for all indigenous martial arts in China. In the West, kung fu is often used as a synonym, although in China it refers to the time and effort given to an activity and can be applied to any activity, not just martial arts. Martial arts forms emerged in China several thousand years ago and have continued to appear and develop ever since. There are now hundreds of different martial arts in China. They are typically classified by region (Northern/Southern), religion (Buddhist/Daoist), or place of origin. Chinese martial arts have also influenced the development of martial arts in other Asian nations such as Japan, Korea, and Indonesia. In the twentieth century they have also become popular in the West. Martial arts using both body parts and weapons developed initially as forms of defense and offense. In the twentieth century, they have become more specialized and are used as forms of exercise and relaxation, in military training, in drama, and as a form of competitive sport.

Michael A. DeMarco

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WUYI, MOUNT Mount Wuyi looms at the northern end of China's Fujian Province, bordering Jiangxi Province. The magnificence of the landscape has inspired poets, painters, philosophers, and geologists for centuries. Its tree-covered granite mountains and caves of various shapes, its bustling waterfalls and tranquil mountain streams, and its abundance of plant, flower, animal, bird, and fish species caught the attention of a Chinese emperor in the eighth century CE, who ordered the area to be protected. A visitor to Mount Wuyi today can flow down the 9,500-meter-long Nine-Bend Stream on a bamboo raft, for a spiritual or therapeutic experience. Wuyi Yan Cha (Wuyi Rock Tea) has a distinctive taste of sunburned mountain rocks, which has captivated emperors and common folk alike.

Rich in cultural history, Mount Wuyi saw human activity as early as 2100 BCE. The Min Yue people built a city here 2,300 years ago. Cedar coffins of this ancient people, placed on seemingly inaccessible cliffs, still keep researchers wondering. The Neo-Confucian scholar Zhu Xi (1130–1200) lived and taught in Wuyi

for about five decades. More than 100 pieces of writing by Zhu Xi during his residency at Mount Wuyi established him as a master of Neo-Confucianism, which has had a fundamental influence on China to the pre-

sent day. Mount Wuyi was listed as both a natural and cultural UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1999.

Jian-Zhong Lin



XAYABURY (2000 pop. 333,000). The mountainous province of Xayabury, with an area of 16,389 square kilometers, is situated in the northwestern part of Laos. It shares borders with the Vientiane and Luang Prabang Provinces in the east and six provinces of Thailand in the west. Xayabury was under the empire of Lan Xang before it disintegrated into three kingdoms in 1713. Xayabury then became a part of the Luang Prabang kingdom and was handed over to the French by Thailand under the Franco-Siamese settlement of 1907. France surrendered it to Thailand in January 1941, which caused resentment in Laos.

The province's capital is Sayabouri, located on the banks of river Nam Hung. Annual rainfall is 100–150 millimeters. Rice, watermelons, cabbages, and sugarcane are produced in the fertile regions of Ban Fainamtan, Ban Nakhem, and Ban Nampoui.

Buddhist monuments such as Wat Ban Thin, Wat Ban Phapoon, and Wat Natomoy are situated in the province. A paradise for nature lovers, the province is dotted with thick forests, beautiful meadows, scenic waterfalls, and magnificent peaks. An important tourist attraction is the 1,150-square-kilometer sanctuary Nam Phoun National Biodiversity Conservation Area, which is inhabited by the Asiatic black bear, elephant, guar, gibbon, Malaya sun bear, and Sumatran rhino.

Patit Paban Mishra

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XI'AN (2002 est. pop. 2.7 million). Xi'an is the provincial capital of Shaanxi Province in central China. The city, which is the largest in the province, is situated in the central part of Shaanxi in the Wei River



The Lesser Wild Goose Pagoda in Xi'an. (KEREN SU/CORBIS)

valley north of the Qinling Range. The area around Xi'an has been inhabited for thousands of years; the remains of a stable village from around 5,000 BCE has been found at Banpo. The Xi'an area was also chosen as the capital of the first empire, the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE), as well as of the Han (206 BCE–220 CE) and the Tang dynasties (618–907 CE). The city was then known as Chang'an. The site of the famous terra-cotta soldiers of the First Emperor of the Qin (Qin Shi Huangdi) is located about thirty kilometers east of the city, and many other archaeological sites dot the area.

For hundreds of years, Xi'an was the gateway to the Silk Route to Central Asia, and during the Tang dynasty it was the largest and most cosmopolitan city in the world. The Big Goose Pagoda, which was completed in 709, still stands sixty-four meters tall, and the old part of Xi'an, with a drum tower, a bell tower, and a magnificent mosque dating to the eighteenth century, is surrounded by one of the best-preserved city walls in China. The walls date to the fourteenth century and were originally fourteen kilometers long and measured twelve meters in height and eighteen meters in width. The modern city has a major textile industry and some electrical industries, and important food processing factories are located in a rich agricultural region in the river valley. Tourism is a major source of income. Xi'an also has important universities and colleges.

Bent Nielsen

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XI'AN INCIDENT The Xi'an Incident, an important event in modern Chinese history, temporarily ended open hostility between the Communist and Nationalist movements and enabled China to present a unified opposition to Japanese aggression.

The incident emerged in 1935, in the aftermath of the Long March of 1934, when the Communists, now located in Yenan province in the northwest, urged all Chinese factions to unite to resist Japanese aggression. Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi, 1887–1975), the Nationalist leader, wanted to continue his anti-Communist campaign and to destroy that threat before dealing with the Japanese.

The Communist call for a united front appealed to many Chinese, including General Zhang Xueliang (1901?–2001) and his army, who longed to return to

their homes in Manchuria, now occupied by the Japanese. Chiang ordered Zhang and General Yang Hucheng and their armies to attack the Yenan redoubt of Mao Zedong (1893–1976), but neither the generals nor their troops showed much cooperation.

On 3 December 1936, Chiang flew to Zhang's and Yang's headquarters in Xi'an to put pressure on them to launch a military offensive. Nine days later, Zhang arrested Chiang and presented eight demands that centered on a united front against Japan and a halt to the anti-Communist campaign. The crisis worsened when Nationalist generals in Nanjing threatened to attack the two generals in Xi'an and then perhaps launch an all-out offensive against the Communists. It appeared to many that China might break down into chaos.

At this point, the Communist leader Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) offered to negotiate, for the Communists had decided that the threat of civil breakdown was worse than Chiang's continuing in power. Zhang agreed to restore Chiang to power, and Chiang nominally agreed to pursue a united front. Zhang then accompanied Chiang to Nanjing to explain the situation and perhaps to apologize for his actions, but Zhang was arrested, tried, and eventually sentenced to house arrest that lasted until 1962. Zhang later moved to the United States, where he died.

Charles Dobbs

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XIANG The term "Xiang" refers to the people and the local sublanguage used in Hunan, a province in southeast-central China; Xiang is derived from the older literary name of Hunan. It is estimated that more than 25 million Chinese (most of them living in Hunan Province) speak Xiang today. Several early leaders of the Chinese Communist Party came from Hunan, and the linguistic influence of people thinking in Xiang or in Xiang-accented Mandarin appears to have affected the forms selected to simplify the characters used in the Chinese language.

The Xiang are one of the three subgroups of Han Chinese (the other two are the Gan and the Wannan) who settled south of the Mandarin-speaking people in China but not on the coast. The sublanguage spoken

by the Xiang has not been considered as significant as the Mandarin forms spoken in the north, and the Xiang have not contributed in a major way to Chinese migration overseas. The Xiang, like the Gan and Wanan, have generally been considered to be Chinese who speak Mandarin, but pronounce it very badly.

Xiang is a complex language with numerous dialects. While it has similarities with Mandarin, it differs from other sublanguages of Han Chinese mainly because of the way the dialects and subdialects relate to each other. The dialects that have similarities with Mandarin are grouped together as the New Xiang or the Xinxianhua. Local histories suggest that the complexity of the Xiang sublanguage arose in part because most of the population now living in Hunan Province originated in other provinces. Migration has thus contributed greatly to the complex pattern of subgroups in Hunan Province.

Linguists find it easier to divide the sublanguage in terms of time into New Xiang and Old Xiang, rather than describing the geographical distribution of the various forms. Old Xiang, or Laoxianghua, has been described as a conservative form of the Xiang sublanguage and hence much closer to the Middle Chinese of the Tang dynasty (618–907) than is new Xiang. Some linguists have suggested that there are ties between Old Xiang and the Wu dialects of the region around Shanghai. It is not surprising that Old Xiang is spoken only in rural districts and some of the smaller cities of central Hunan Province. New Xiang, on the other hand, is spoken mainly in most of the larger cities and towns.

New Xiang

Linguists consider that New Xiang has evolved much further from the Middle Chinese norm than has Old Xiang. The development of New Xiang has generally paralleled that of southwestern Mandarin. Indeed, this form of Mandarin is supposed to have been the strongest influence on New Xiang, partly because southwestern Mandarin is spoken in Hubei Province, located directly to the north of Hunan Province. New Xiang is therefore phonetically much closer to Standard Mandarin than is Old Xiang. Yet both Old and New Xiang have been in use together and coexist in many towns. Complicating the geographical distribution of the speakers of Old and New Xiang are the divisions seen generationally: elderly speakers usually speak Old Xiang, and their younger family members speak New Xiang.

New Xiang that is spoken in Changsha, the capital of Hunan Province, has generally lost the voicing of the initials *b-*, *d-*, *dz-*, *dzb-*, and *gb-*, like the other sur-

TABLE 1

Corresponding Terms in English, Standard Chinese, and New Xiang (Changsha)

English	Standard Chinese	New Xiang (Changsha)
Tomorrow	<i>Mingtian</i>	<i>min-zi</i>
This year	<i>Jinnian</i>	<i>chin-nie</i>
We	<i>Women</i>	<i>ngo-men</i>
This	<i>Zhege</i>	<i>ko-ko</i>
What	<i>Shenme</i>	<i>mo-tsi</i>
Cold	<i>Leng</i>	<i>Len</i>
Person	<i>Ren</i>	<i>Zen</i>

SOURCE: Moser (1985)

rounding forms of Han Chinese. These initials have been retained in the Old Xiang spoken in the smaller city of Shuangfeng. Therefore, linguists consider Old Xiang an island of linguistic conservatism. New Xiang is expected to change Old Xiang in time, bringing it more into conformity with Standard Mandarin and Mandarin-like speech forms.

The nature of spoken New Xiang can be seen in the list of words used in the provincial capital of Changsha. In new Xiang subdialects, the personal pronouns used are similar to those used in Mandarin. Hence, him or he, *t'a*, is similarly pronounced in New Xiang and Mandarin. Similarly, you, *ni*, is pronounced in the same way in New Xiang and Mandarin. According to scholar Leo Moser, the Changsha vernacular as described in the *Hanyu Fangyan Cibui* has, compared with Standard Mandarin, first of all, no retroflex series of consonants. Second, there are no words ending in *-ng*, although some people in Changsha do use retroflex consonants as well as some syllables ending in *-ng*. Third, there are words beginning with *ng-* and *z-*. Fourth, there are six tones rather than four. Fifth, there are nasalized vowels and, sixth, there is a pattern of consonant liaison that may modify medial sounds in two-syllable phrases. Finally, there are different grammatical particles somewhat differently employed. Words in the Changsha subdialect can also start with an *b-* and an *f-*. These characteristics make the Changsha dialect different from most forms of Xiang. (See Table 1.)

In northern Hunan Province, the Yiyang subdialect is another form of New Xiang. It shares many characteristics with the Changsha subdialect but has five tones and words ending in *ng-*. The subdialect has also developed a pattern of inserting *l*-like sounds in many words.

Linguists have observed that the Xiang sublanguage differs from most other Sinitic sublanguages. Hunanese do not appear to take pride in their local dialect, since

TABLE 2

Corresponding Pronouns in English, Standard Chinese, Old and New Xiang		
English (and Standard Chinese)	Old Xiang (Shuangfeng)	New Xiang (Changsha)
I, me (<i>wo</i>)	<i>Ang</i>	<i>Ngo</i>
we, us (<i>wo-men</i>)	<i>ang-nga</i>	<i>ngo-men</i>
he, him (<i>ta</i>)	<i>To</i>	<i>Ta</i>
is not (<i>bushi</i>)	<i>pu dzih</i>	<i>pu-sih</i>
boy (<i>nanhaizi</i>)	<i>ngo-chi</i>	<i>nga-tsih</i>
skin (<i>pi</i>)	<i>Bi</i>	<i>Pi</i>
time (<i>shihou</i>)	<i>dzih-ghie</i>	<i>sih-heu</i>

SOURCE: Moser (1985)

there does not seem to be uniform pronunciation of, say, Changsha, even within the city itself.

Old Xiang

Linguists consider Shuangfeng dialect a good example of Laoxianghua, or Old Xiang. The vernacular of Shuangfeng lacks the *f*- and the initial *j*-, although there are the initial consonants *n*-, *ng*-, and the voiced *b* or *gb*-. According to Wade-Giles Standard Chinese, the word "*liang*" ("two," or "a couple") is *niang* in Shuangfeng, while *jou* (meat) becomes *niu*. The tendency to conserve old forms with voiced consonants and other ancient language habits has led to the comparison of Old Xiang and the Wu dialects.

Pronouns in Shuangfeng differ widely from Standard Chinese in both sound and formation. Several pronouns do not share the pluralizing element, *men*, of Standard Chinese. (See Table 2.)

In the far south of Hunan Province, a zone of eleven counties, the Southern Xiang, or Xiangnan, dialect is spoken. Some have assumed that this dialect was influenced by Cantonese, the sublanguage spoken south of the border, but in fact the pronunciation shows a heavy influence of southwestern Mandarin.

Ooi Giok Ling

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XINJIANG (2002 pop. 19.0 million). Located in northwestern China, the Uighur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang is bordered by Mongolia to the northeast; the Chinese provinces of Qinghai and Gansu to the east; the Tibetan Autonomous Region to the south-east; India and Afghanistan to the south and south-west; Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to the west; and Russia to the north. Xinjiang is the largest political unit in the People's Republic of China, covering an area of 1.6 million square kilometers (617,800 square miles). Despite its size, it is one of the least populated regions of China: in 1997 it had a total registered population of only 17.18 million. Xinjiang's climate and geography help explain its low population density. Much of the southern half of the region is covered by the great Taklamakan Desert, while the center is dominated by the uninhabitable Tian Shan mountain range.

Xinjiang has long served as China's gateway to Central Asia. As far back as the Han (206 BCE–220 CE) and Tang (618–907) dynasties, the oasis towns that are scattered throughout this region formed the backbone of the great Silk Road, a highway over which merchants brought luxury goods from the Chinese empire to the kingdoms of Central Asia and the Arab empires of the Middle East. Despite its strategic location, Xinjiang retained a great deal of independence for much of its history. The region's current name, which in Chinese translates as "New Frontier," can be traced to the conquest of the area by the Manchu armies of the Qing dynasty in the mid-eighteenth century. But even after 250 years of Chinese control, Xinjiang retains a lot of its traditional culture. The largest ethnic group in the region continues to be the Muslim Uighurs, while several other minority nationalities, including Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and Tajiks are also present in sizable numbers. In 1997, the "minority" population of Xinjiang was recorded to be 10.58 million, or 61.6 percent of the region's total population. This figure is all the more remarkable because, since 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party arrived to take over the governing of Xinjiang, the central authorities have followed a policy of settling large numbers of Han (ethnic Chinese) in the territory in an effort to solidify their rule.

Since the mid-1980s, this official policy, combined with arrival of hundreds of thousands of Chinese economic migrants from the eastern provinces and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia, has resulted in the development of a separatist movement among Xinjiang's Muslim. During the 1990s movement extremists launched a terrorist campaign against the local authorities in the region's capital city of

Urumqi, and against symbols of the Chinese "occupation" throughout the territory. In an effort to prevent the separatists from obtaining external support, during the late 1990s the Chinese government negotiated a number of treaties and agreements with neighboring states to jointly develop the region's natural resources and to promote trade. The authorities in Beijing hoped to curtail support for the Uighur nationalists by promising economic prosperity to the Islamic nations of Central Asia. The region is to be a central element of China's "Developing the West" program announced by Premier Jiang Zemin in 2000.

Robert John Perrins

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XIQU Shamanic and court rituals, song and dance folk forms, and entertainments such as story-telling and the presentation of simple skits have existed in China for many centuries. Various aspects of each of these activities evolved over time into the classical theater forms known as *xiqu* (Chinese opera).

The folk culture of presenting song and dance, telling stories, and enacting skits began in unknown ages in China. Certainly shamanic exorcisms and spirit-courting dances were practiced in the Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE), if not earlier. Chinese ministries to oversee song and dance performances in the courts of the Eastern Zhou dynasty (770–221 BCE) rigidly enforced the development of presentational traditions according to philosophical beliefs that performances combining music, dance, props, and costumes had a powerful influence over human behavior.

The royal courts continued to sponsor entertainments and ritual performances during the Qin (221–206 BCE) and Han (206 BCE–220 CE) dynasties, set-

ting up a *yuefu* (performance bureau) to recruit and supervise musicians and dancers for state functions. During the following centuries, music, dance, and variety-show acts from throughout China and allied regions were documented and incorporated into courtly events.

By the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE), the Li Yuan (Pear Garden Academy) was established to train musicians and dancers, and *jiaofang* (instructional institutes) were organized at central and regional courts to supervise presentations of theatrical skits and other song-dance activities, as well as to stage shamanic exorcisms. By this time, many elements that would eventually combine to produce Chinese opera were evident in song-dance forms and in ever more complex theatrical sketches involving song and dance. Also, non-court performances flourished during this period. Early monks began to preach the Buddhist religion to musical accompaniment, and thereafter the genre evolved into a source of entertainment; variety acts were popular in the marketplace and also featured in the private banquets of the wealthy.

Growth of Traditional Forms

During the Song dynasty (960–1279), urban performances of theatrical entertainments, most featuring music and dance and presented on mat-covered stages, attracted crowds in the metropolitan communities surrounding the courts. *Zaju* (assorted drama), composed primarily of plays narrated through song and accompanied by dance, comic bits, acrobatics, and a musical finale, was popular in the Northern Song (960–1126) capital.

Zaju evolved further after the Jurchen Tartars usurped control in 1126; it flowered fully under the Mongol Yuan emperors (1279–1368), when it became the preferred entertainment of the court and a popular pastime of Han (that is, ethnic Chinese) literati, who wrote increasingly complex dramas. *Nanxi* (southern theater) emerged during the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279) out of the folk songs and ballads of Zhejiang Province and declined during the Yuan dynasty. Soon after, another southern form, *chuanqi* (marvel tales), moved into the limelight. By the end of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), a form called *kunqu* (Kun opera) was attaining prominence in the south. Although *zaju* continued to develop during the Ming dynasty, it was overshadowed by southern theater forms in the final century of this dynasty, subsequently dwindled, and finally disappeared around the start of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912). *Kunqu*, however, persisted and had a significant impact on subsequent theatrical development.

Chinese Opera (*Xiqu*)

Kunqu is one of the oldest extant styles of *xiqu*. Arising when *zaju* was melded with traditional songs and music of Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, it characteristically displayed elegant movement sequences; involved plots featuring poetic dialogue and lyrics; and had a marked vocal style. Considered an art form of the elite, *kunqu* continued to be recognized as China's most popular operatic genre until Beijing opera usurped its place in the late eighteenth century.

During the Ming and Qing eras, many forms of regional *xiqu* (modeled after the Kun opera since the sixteenth century) evolved to share Yuan and Ming plays and other classical novels as repertoire. Performance features common to *xiqu* include the dividing of actor technique into the four areas of song, speech, dance-acting, and stage combat. Although drawing generally on three important musical systems, the various ways of using these systems and combining them with local tune styles serve as the primary means of differentiating the many regional forms. Common to all is the bringing together of song, musical accompaniment, dance, acting, use of costumes and props, and storytelling. Another common feature is the conventionalized use of costuming, properties, scenic items, and performer movement to impart dramatic information to spectators.

The dramas and actor role-types are usually aesthetically classified as either *wen* (civil) or *wu* (military) genres. These two basic genres were initially used to distinguish dance performance style in the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE), at first indicating the duality of ruling through diplomacy and martial means, but by the Yuan dynasty they were being used to identify both performing skills (*wen* actors specialize in song, speech, and dance-acting, whereas *wu* actors specialize in stage combat and to a lesser degree in speech and dance-acting) and dramatic style (*wen* plays are usually about romantic intrigues, whereas *wu* plays are usually about historic or legendary military heroes). Dramatic characters in *xiqu* are divided into role-types (called either *hangdang* or *jiaose*) and based on *wen* and *wu* classification; the four primary *hangdang* common to many *xiqu* forms are *sheng* (male), *dan* (woman), *jing* (warrior or deity), and *chou* (clown). Furthermore, *hangdang* are subdivided into multiple categories, each of which has even more precise requirements of performance skill; for example, the *dan* role-type, among its many subdivisions in any given regional form, might include the subcategories of *wudan* (a woman warrior specializing in combat skills) and *qingyi* (literally, "blue-green clothing," a virtuous young heroine who specializes in singing and dance-acting). The methodology of divid-

ing training and performance according to *hangdang* allows for the highly specialized display of song, speech, dance-acting, and acrobatics present in *xiqu*.

Today there are close to four hundred types of Chinese opera. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the government attempted to eradicate "feudal" aspects from *xiqu* dramas, resulting in the creation of newly arranged historical operas depicting the proletarian struggles. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), historical dramas were banned in favor of a handful of operatic plays collectively known as *yangbanxi* (model-dramas), which blended modern dress and revolutionary content with classical song and movement techniques. However, *xiqu* was reinstated in the late 1970s, and recently many of the traditional dramas have been restored, with new plays even being created around ancient Chinese legends.

Contemporary Forms

As in neighboring Asian nations, *buaju* (spoken, realistic drama) was introduced in China during the early years of the twentieth century; in China, *buaju* arrived via Chinese scholars who brought the form from Japan. By the 1920s, realistic drama had established a stronghold in urban areas, and by the 1930s the works of modern Chinese dramatists such as Cao Yu and Lao She were being staged in front of audiences who also frequented foreign plays in translation.

New forms of dance also developed during the last half of the twentieth century. The most important indigenous form has been *wuju* (dance-drama), combining Chinese folk dance, Chinese opera dance-acting, and modern ballet in classical as well as modern revolutionary story lines. Western-style ballet companies have been established in the larger cities since the 1980s, and modern dance companies were organized in the 1990s.

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XU BEIHONG (1895–1953), founding father of modern Chinese painting. Born in Yixing, Jiangsu Province, China, in 1895, Xu Beihong began drawing at an early age and by 1915 was discovered selling cheap fan paintings in Shanghai and sent by a sponsor to Japan to study art. From 1919 to 1927 Xu again studied abroad, this time in Paris and Berlin, immersing himself in European Classical and Renaissance art while disdaining the post-Impressionists. He would later argue against the influence of these art forms in China.

Xu himself excelled at figure drawing and painting, and he attempted with mixed results to meld Chinese and Western styles of art. In particular, Xu adopted the French academic mode to portray well-known Chinese historical scenes, such as in *Tian Heng and His 500 Retainers* (1928). His signature work, however, became realistic paintings of galloping horses done in Chinese brush and ink.

A lifelong educator, Xu acted as the director of the Central Art Academy in Beijing from 1946 until his death in 1953. The Xu Beihong Memorial Museum was established in Beijing in 1954 to house his extensive art collection, which his family donated to the state.

Alexa Olesen

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XU GUANGQI (1562–1633), Chinese official and scholar. Born in Shanghai, China, in 1562, Xu Guangqi was baptized by Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci in 1603 and took the name Paul. He spent the next three years collaborating with Ricci in translating Western texts on mathematics, astronomy, and geography into Chinese. Their most famous translation was Euclid's *Elements*, which exerted a great influence on Chinese mathematics. Xu also wrote original works on trigonometry and agriculture, notably the *Book of Agriculture*, which advocated the adoption of Western agricultural practices, such as surveying, mapping, and irrigation. His interest in practical subjects marked a departure from the dominance of neo-Confucian thought. After he became a high official in the Ming court, Xu sponsored the Jesuit missionaries in China.

Xu believed that Western scholarship, particularly geometry, could complement Confucianism and replace Buddhism by undermining the tendency toward vague speculation. In 1629 Xu demonstrated the use of Western science for predicting solar eclipses and other astrological events. When the Manchus invaded China in 1630, he convinced the emperor to use Western armaments to defend the capital.

Daniel Oakman

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XU ZHIMO (1897–1931), modern Chinese poet. Born in Zhejiang Province, Xu Zhimo studied law at Beijing University in 1917 before attending Columbia University in the United States and then Cambridge University in England. During his stay in England, he began to write poems under the influence of English Romantic poetry. After he came back to China in 1922, he formed a cultural organization called the Crescent Society with writer and reformist Hu Shi, scholar Zhang Junmai, and others in 1923. Their society was the origin of the Crescent poetry school, which was one of the most important literary schools of China in the twentieth century.

Deeply influenced by English Romantic poetry, Xu developed his own unique writing style. His poems are bright, graceful, and full of musicality, reflecting his love of nature with great enthusiasm. As a Romantic poet, he pursued beauty and love and dreamed of a poetic life. Xu also made a great contribution to modern Chinese poetry by developing a new poetic form. During the early decades of the twentieth century, modern Chinese poets made a persistent effort to break away from the shackles of the traditional poetic mode. In their eagerness to experiment with new forms and to achieve free expression, the new poets often disregarded meaning and formal beauty. Xu Zhimo and his colleagues corrected this. He paid much attention to the arrangement of the lines and to meter and rhyme. He and other poets of the Crescent school pursued regularity of form and harmony of rhyme. And they found the importance of poetic meter in modern Chinese poetry. Because of their effort in developing new

forms of Chinese poetry, they had a wide influence in modern Chinese literature. Xu published three collections of poetry during his lifetime: *Zhimo's Poems*, *One Night in Florence*, and *The Fierce Tiger*. Many of his poems have become classics, such as "Farewell to Cambridge Again" and "Farewell to a Japanese Girl." In 1931, Xu died in an airplane crash when he was flying from Nanjing to Beijing.

She Xiaojie

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XUNZI (c. 298–c. 230 BCE), Chinese philosopher. Although often overlooked by Western scholars, Xunzi (Hsun-tzu) was an important systematizer of pre-Qin (before 221 BCE) philosophy and considered to rank third after Confucius (Kong Qiu, 551–479 BCE) and Mencius (Mengzi, c. 371–c. 289 BCE). Commonly known as Minister Xun or Xun Qing, Xunzi was born in the state of Zhao. The traditional dates for his life may be incorrect, if evidence showing that he lived well into his nineties is accurate. He may have lived from 310 to 213 BCE.

Xunzi began his career at the Jixia academy in the state of Qi when he was fifteen years old. The syncretic approach employed at the academy left a lasting impression on him, as he mastered rhetoric, argumentation, and teachings of the various masters. In his early works, Xunzi critiqued the Jixia scholars and ideas associated with Zhuangzi, Huizi, Shen Dao, Shen Buhai, and others. After Qi was attacked in 284 BCE, Xunzi fled to Chu. There he came in contact with Mohist logic (developed by Mozi, 470?–391? BCE, who used rationalism to evaluate the truth) and sharpened his own skills.

His growing notoriety gained him invitations to other states. Xunzi was the teacher of Lisi (280?–208 BCE) and Han Feizi (d. 233 BCE). Lisi went to Qin in 247, and Han Feizi may have left Xunzi shortly thereafter. Han Feizi became the systematizer of Legalism (*fajia*), which emphasized the authority of rulers and

the state's power, while Lisi assisted the state of Qin in the unification of the empire, becoming a high minister and then chancellor under the first emperor.

Between 246 and 240 BCE, Xunzi was caught up in court intrigue and dismissed, then reappointed. When his sponsor was assassinated in 238 BCE, he was again dismissed. His disillusionment with the world is vividly expressed in his poetry. Although Xunzi continued to adhere to the Confucian approach, his later thought turned to the more practicable art of rulership, emphasizing methods and laws, fixed standards for punishments, and control of expenditures, ideas usually associated with Legalism. When Lisi came to power, he offered his aged teacher a minor post. In his wisdom, Xunzi foresaw coming disaster and refused.

Xunzi proposed that human nature is basically bad or socially deviant. Xunzi's position was a direct attack on the view of Mencius that people are basically good. Xunzi's overall position, however, may not be all that distant from Mencius's. Mencius claimed that human nature is basically good but that a "lost mind" leads people to do wrong. Xunzi, on the other hand, argued that people are basically bad but that a properly trained mind leads people to do good. Mencius emphasized the goodness of human nature, and Xunzi stressed the goodness of the human mind. Both Mencius and Xunzi emphasized the need for education and ritual action to develop moral goodness.

Xunzi is noted for his realistic, down-to-earth philosophy. He advocated naturalism and argued against supernaturalism, superstitions, and belief in spirits and demons. He used Mohist argumentative techniques to refute the Taoists and logicians of his day. His syncretic approach including Legalist ideas influenced Confucianism as it developed in the Han (206 BCE–220 CE) dynasty.

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YAK Yak (female, *nik*; *bos grunniens*) is a species of bovid native to the high Tibetan Plateau. Though vanishing in the wild, where it usually does not descend below 4,300 meters, it is much domesticated and so is widely used as a beast of burden in Tibet, Nepal, Kashmir, Ladakh, and Sikkim, in the Himalayan Mountain area, normally between 4,270 and 6,100 meters. It also served as a pack, draft, and saddle animal.

The wild yak is very dark brown all over, with some white around the muzzle; but the domesticated variety is often piebald or dun-colored. The adult bull stands 170 centimeters high at the withers, and weighs up to 545 kilograms. Both sexes grow horns that sweep upwards to a length of 75 centimeters. Because of the cold plateau climate, the body is covered in very long, silky hair, which hangs down almost to the ground. Even the tails are hairy, and are used as fly-whisks in the lamaseries. The yak is also adapted to desert conditions, being able to survive on sparse grass and thorn bushes, and eating snow when there is no water. Wild yaks live in small herds, and are very shy. They rely for protection on a strongly developed sense of smell rather than on their eyesight. The rutting season is in late autumn, with calving in April after a nine-month gestation.

The animal was domesticated in prehistoric times and, aside from some color change, it is chiefly distinguishable from the wild variety by shorter horns. The *nik's* milk and butter are crucial in the Tibetan diet; domestic yaks are used for both milk and beef. The yak's hide is made into leather, and the dried dung of the yak is the only fuel on the high plateau.

There are also smaller domestic cattle called *zbo* or *zomo*, which are a hybrid between female yaks and

domestic cattle or zebu. Like the yak, these are generally used as pack animals and so are important economically; the male *zbo* is sterile.

Paul Hockings

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YAKUSHIMA ISLAND (1994 est. pop. 14,000).

Yakushima Island is sixty kilometers south of Osumi Peninsula in Kagoshima Prefecture in southern Kyushu. The island is 500 square kilometers in size. Yakushima is characterized by a hot and humid climate and has the heaviest precipitation in Japan, with an annual rainfall of 400 centimeters in the coastal regions and 1,000 centimeters in the mountains. This rainfall has promoted the use of waterpower to produce electricity.

Yakushima Island is a mountainous island. Miyounouradake (1,935 meters) in the central part is the highest peak in Kyushu. Forestry makes up a major portion of the economy. However, 80 percent of the forests became assets of the Japanese national government at the beginning of the Meiji period (1868–1912). The Japanese cedar (*Yakusugi*) tree grows here and many of them are over one thousand years old. The variety of plants growing in any given locale on the island changes with the altitude and ranges from species indigenous to subtropical zones to those of cold temperature zones. Agricultural products are sugarcane, sweet potatoes, and Ponkan oranges (*Citrus reticulata*). One-third of the



YAKUSHIMA ISLAND— WORLD HERITAGE SITE

A UNESCO World Heritage Site since 1993, Yakushima counts exceedingly rare lichens, ancient Japanese cedar trees, and the last Japanese remnant of warm-temperate forest among its varied vegetation.

island forms the principal part of the Kirishima-Yaku National Park, which contains twenty-three volcanic peaks. In 1993 Yakushima became the first place in Japan to be designated as a World Heritage Site, and 196,500 tourists visit annually.

Nathalie Cavasin

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YAMAGATA (2002 est. pop. 1.2 million). Yamagata Prefecture is situated in the northeast of Japan's island of Honshu. Covering 9,326 square kilometers, its primary geographical features are the Ou, Dewa, and Asahi mountain ranges, with level areas located along the Mogami River (Mogamigawa). Yamagata is bordered by the Sea of Japan and by Akita, Miyagi, Fukushima, and Niigata prefectures. Once part of Dewa Province, it assumed its present name and borders in 1876.

The prefecture's capital is Yamagata city, which flourished during the Edo period (1600/1603–1868) as a castle town and post station known for producing *beni*, a precious crimson safflower dye used to color handspun silk fabric. Today the city is home to Yamagata University. The prefecture's other important cities are Yonezawa, Tsuruoka, Sakata, and Tendo.

Once the land of the aboriginal Ezo people, the region was ruled by the northern Fujiwara family beginning in the Heian period (794–1185) and then by a series of warlords who controlled smaller domains. Still comparatively rural, Yamagata is one of Japan's greatest rice producers and its many orchards grow cherries and other fruit. The main industries include sake brewing, food processing, textiles, woodworking, cast-iron goods, small machines, and chemicals. Visi-

tors are drawn to the prefecture's Zaozan skiing area, scenic mountain parks, and many hot spring resorts.

E. L. S. Weber

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YAMAGATA ARITOMO (1838–1922), Japanese soldier and politician. Yamagata Aritomo was a military man and politician from the feudal domain of Choshu (modern Yamaguchi Prefecture). He is not only considered the principal architect of Japan's modern military, but was also one of the most influential figures in Japanese politics during the Meiji (1868–1912) and Taisho (1912–1926) eras.

Yamagata was born on 14 June 1838 into a low-ranking samurai family in Hagi, the castle town of Choshu. He became one of the leaders of the radical loyalist movement to overthrow the Tokugawa shogunate and commanded the Kiheitai, a semimodern mili-



General Yamagata c. 1905. (HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS)

tia unit, in the civil wars of 1867–1868. After the Meiji Restoration of 1868 he went abroad to study European military systems. Upon his return in 1873, he assumed leadership of the Army Ministry. He became the driving force behind the introduction of conscription and the reorganization of the army along Prussian-German lines.

In the 1880s, Yamagata started an astonishing political career. He served as home minister from 1883 to 1889, during which time he reorganized the ministry, the police, and local government systems. He also served as prime minister from 1889 to 1890 and again from 1898 to 1900.

In his later years, Yamagata retired from active politics but remained a major force behind the scene as the most influential "elder statesman" (*genro*), the nominal president of the influential Privy Council, and head of a strong political faction including Katsura Taro (1848–1913), Terauchi Masatake (1852–1919), Tanaka Giichi (1863–1929), and others. Yamagata died on 1 February 1922.

Sven Saaler

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YAMAGUCHI (2002 est. pop. 1.5 million). Yamaguchi Prefecture is situated in the west of the Japanese island of Honshu. Occupying an area of 6,108 square kilometers, Yamaguchi is bordered by the Sea of Japan, the Inland Sea, and the Hibiki Sea and by Shimane and Hiroshima prefectures. The terrain is low but mountainous and is intersected by plateaus and by Japan's largest limestone tableland, Akiyoshidai, the site of one of the world's vastest limestone caverns. Yamaguchi's rugged coastline is frequently swept by typhoons. Once divided into Suo and Nagato provinces, then combined into the domain of Choshu, the prefecture assumed its present name and borders in 1871.

The prefecture's capital is Yamaguchi city, which was founded in the fourteenth century as a castle town by the territorial warlord Ouichi Hiroyo (d. 1380),

who was awarded lands in western Honshu as payment for service to the Ashikaga shogunate (military government of Japan from 1333 to 1573). It developed into a splendid provincial capital made wealthy by trade with China. During the Onin War (1467–1477), many Kyoto imperial court aristocrats took refuge there. In 1550, the Jesuit missionary Francis Xavier preached Christian doctrine in the streets of Yamaguchi. Soon after, the Ouchi overlords were overthrown, and the capital was moved to Hagi, but in 1863, Yamaguchi again became the capital. The prefecture's other important cities are Shimonoseki, Ube, Tokuyama, Iwakuni, and Hofu.

The prefecture is the site of numerous Yayoi-period (300 BCE–300 CE) burials and artifacts. In ancient times, it was among the first regions to develop, influenced by close trade ties to the Korean peninsula. The powerful Mori warrior clan ruled Choshu throughout the Edo period (1600/1603–1868). Rebellious against the Tokugawa shogunate, Choshu samurai led the movement to return power to the emperor in the Meiji Restoration (1868).

Economically, Yamaguchi relies on rice and fruit production and on heavy and chemical industries in the southern industrial zone. Visitors are drawn to the area's coastal scenery and to its hot spring resorts.

E. L. S. Weber

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YAMAMOTO ISOROKU (1884–1943), Japan's foremost World War II naval officer. Born in Niigata Prefecture, Yamamoto Isoroku graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in time to see service in the Russo-Japanese War and was severely wounded at the Battle of Tsushima in 1905. In 1919 Yamamoto was sent to the United States for graduate study, which was followed by a year of service at the Japanese embassy in Washington, D.C. He returned to the United States in 1926 for a two-year tour of duty as naval attaché in Washington.

As international tensions mounted in the 1930s, Yamamoto criticized Japan's alliance with Nazi Germany, fearing that it would lead to hostilities with the United States. Nevertheless, he was appointed commander in chief of the Combined Fleet in 1939, and in that capacity he oversaw preparations for war. With a keen appreciation of American industrial might, Yamamoto

proposed launching a surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor in an effort to avoid a protracted war. Although the attack in December of 1941 was successful, Yamamoto's hope for a quick peace settlement was in vain, and his bid for a decisive victory at Midway failed disastrously in June 1942. Yamamoto was killed in the Solomon Islands on 18 April 1943 when American fighter pilots shot down his plane.

John M. Jennings

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YAMANASHI (2002 est. pop. 898,000). Yamanashi Prefecture is situated in the central region of Japan's island of Honshu. Occupying an area of 4463 square kilometers, the prefecture has several mountain ranges, including Kanto, Misaka, and Akaishi, with Mount Fuji, the nation's highest peak, bordering Shizuoka Prefecture on the southeast. On Fuji's northern slopes are the Fuji Five Lakes: Yamanakako, Kawaguchiko, Saiko, Shojiko, and Motosuko, all created by lava flows. The rivers Fuefukigawa and Kamanashigawa form the central Kofu Basin. Yamanashi is surrounded by Tokyo, Kanagawa, Shizuoka, Nagano, and Saitama prefectures. Once known as Kai Province, it assumed its present name and borders in 1871.

The prefecture's capital city is Kofu, which grew as the castle town of the ruling Takeda family in the sixteenth century and flourished in the Edo period (1600/1603–1868). The prefecture's other important cities are Otsuki, Tsuru, and Fuji Yoshida; a smaller city named Yamanashi lies in the central area.

During feudal times, the province was ruled by a series of military families, including the Kai Minamoto, Takeda, and Asano. In the Edo period, the Tokugawa shogunate (military government) took over its administration.

Today the nation's premier grape-growing and wine-producing prefecture, Yamanashi also raises large crops of rice, vegetables, and other fruit, including peaches. Long the fabricator of crystal ware and textiles, it now also produces precision instruments, electrical goods, and machinery. Many visitors are drawn from nearby Tokyo, especially to Mount Fuji and the Five Lakes. Other attractions are the prefec-

ture's three national parks, its various hot spring resorts, and the Minobusan Buddhist temple, headquarters to the Buddhist Nichiren sect.

E. L. S. Weber

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YAMATO DAMASHII *Yamato damashii* refers to the essential and inexplicable nature of being Japanese that is at the core of beliefs in Japan's uniqueness. The term appears in several contexts, most of them of nationalistic origin, and had its greatest impact during the years of Japanese imperialism, especially in the decades leading up to and during World War II.

In premodern Japan, *wakon* (Japanese native spiritual essence) was ideally complemented by *kansai* (Chinese learning). This evolved, during the period of Japanese nationalism starting in the late eighteenth century, into an idealization of the "Japanese spirit." Japanese intellectuals have historically extolled the special nature and characteristics of Japan's inner spirit. While rarely clearly defined, the idea is prevalent in the theories of premodern intellectuals (for example, Kitabatake Chikafusa and Motoori Norinaga), as well as in the writings of twentieth-century scholars such as Suzuki Daisetz and Umesao Tadao.

Since World War II, *Yamato damashii* has often been viewed as related to the principle of *seishin* (self-cultivation), implying that it is a spiritual, internal, and subjective experience. Before and during the war, it was more closely associated with *bushido* (way of the warrior), a martial philosophy first formally expressed in the Edo period (1600/1603–1868), but elaborated upon and publicized outside Japan by Meiji-period (1868–1912) writers and ideologists. During World War II, Japanese ideologists emphasized that, notwithstanding Japan's material inferiority to the West, and particularly the United States, it could triumph by virtue of its superior *Yamato damashii*.

The nature of *Yamato damashii* is difficult to define precisely, since its expression is nonverbal and opaque to non-Japanese people, and the characterizations vary from writer to writer. The key to understanding *Yamato damashii* lies in the linguistic understanding of *Yamato kotoba*, that is, Japanese words as distinct from *gairaigo* (loanwords from Chinese and other languages) that have become part of spoken and written Japanese language. Most Japanese exponents of *Yam-*

ato damashii believe that this key is inherently inaccessible to people who are not Japanese.

Michael Ashkenazi

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YANGBAN *Yangban* were the elite of Choson Korea (1392–1910), with characteristics of a hereditary aristocracy. The term originated in the Koryo dynasty (918–1392) and indicated the two ranks of officials, civil (*tongban*) and military (*soban*). Later it came to denote officeholders and their families and, thus, to indicate social status.

Only about 10 percent of the population, *yangban* monopolized the political process, economic wealth, and Confucian learning. This learning played a central part in *yangban* culture, as did government position, but since *yangban* status was not legally defined, a clear delineation is difficult. However, basic criteria were: a clear line of descent documented through a genealogy (*chokpo*), a distinguished ancestor, a clear geographic area within which such a status was recognized, close marriage ties with other persons of reputable lineage, and a special way of life.

As *yangban* were exempted from corvée labor and military service, the late Choson period, especially the nineteenth century, saw an increase in people claiming *yangban* status. This period also saw an erosion of local *yangban* authority and a clear distinction between nationally powerful lineages (*polyol*), local lineages without government positions (*hyangban*), and ruined *yangban* (*chanban*).

Even though *yangban* today have lost their political and economic monopoly through educational and land reforms, modernization, and urbanization, in South Korea there is still a strong awareness of *yangban* ancestry, and descendants of respected families exert a strong influence, especially locally.

Anders Karlsson

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YANGGANG PROVINCE (2002 est. pop. 805,000). Yanggang (also Ryanggang) Province (Yanggangdo or Ryanggangdo), with an area of 13,888 square kilometers, is located inland along the Yalu (Amnok) and Tumen (Tuman) Rivers in North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea). The province takes its name ("both rivers") from the two rivers that form the border between North Korea and China (People's Republic of China). The province was established in October 1954 with the division of Hamgyong Province into Yanggang and North and South Hamyong Provinces. In addition to Hyesan, the province's capital and only city, there are eleven counties (*kun*).

Yanggang has been called Korea's "rooftop" because of its high mountains, ranges, and plateaus. The highest peak is Mount Paektu (2,750 meters), straddling both Yanggang province and China. Kaema Plateau, with an average elevation of 1,339 meters, is located in central and western Yanggang, northwestern South Hamgyong, and eastern Chagang provinces. Measuring 14,300 square kilometers, it is the largest plateau on the Korean peninsula. There are also numerous other rivers and tributaries.

The region has much indigenous vegetation, such as conifers and grasses, and is also amenable to agriculture, particularly potatoes, cabbage, radishes, apricots, and ginseng. The province is also abundant in minerals such as iron, copper, tungsten, and gold.

Jennifer Jung-Kim

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YANGON (2002 est. pop. 4 million). Yangon is the capital of the Union of Myanmar (Burma) and of Yangon Division (2002 est. pop. 5.7 million). Located on the Yangon River, some 30 kilometers (21 miles) from its mouth on the Gulf of Martaban, Yangon is Myanmar's largest city and principal seaport, with Mingaladon airport its main international entry point.

Yangon was originally an ancient Mon settlement known latterly as Dagon (derived from an ancient Pali

term meaning "three pots"), a name commemorated in that of Burma's famed Buddhist temple, the Shwedagon, which has stood for centuries on Singutara Hill. Dagon was renamed Yangon (meaning "end of strife") by King Alaungpaya (reigned 1752–1760), who conquered Lower Burma in 1755. Under British colonial rule, Yangon—its name anglicized to Rangoon—developed rapidly as a major seaport and cosmopolitan commercial center. In the 1850s the British constructed a new city on a grid plan on delta land, bounded to the east by the Pazundaung Creek and to the south and west by the Yangon River. By the 1890s Yangon's increasing population and commerce necessitated land reclamation work at its riverine boundaries, while prosperous residential suburbs developed to the north of the royal lakes (Kan-daw-gyi) and the Shwedagon. Colonial Yangon, with its spacious parks and lakes and mix of modern buildings and traditional wooden architecture, was known as "the garden city of the East." Before World War II, almost half of Yangon's population was Indian.

Yangon suffered heavy damage in World War II and, in the decades since Burma regained independence (1948), the city has expanded and changed in character. Satellite towns were built to create a Maha Yangon (Greater Yangon) and names of streets and parks were changed from old colonial appellations to more patriotic nationalist names. The greatest transformation occurred in the 1990s, following both the military government's adoption of an open-door market economy under strong state control and an influx of investment. Many colonial-period buildings were demolished to make way for multistory hotels, office buildings, and shopping developments, and some inner-city inhabitants relocated to new satellite towns. Major road- and bridge-building programs were undertaken, including construction of a bridge across the river to Syriam (Thanlyin) and its industrial hinterland.

The 99.4-meter-high (326-foot-high) golden Shwedagon is the city's major landmark, and the country's largest and most revered Buddhist shrine. Legend links its foundation to the time of the Buddha, and for centuries it has been the focus of state as well as private patronage and devotion. Other temples are the waterfront Botataung (destroyed in 1943, but rebuilt as an exact replica) and the octagonal Sule in the heart of Yangon. Notable twentieth-century temples include the Kaba Aye (World Peace), completed under U Nu's government in 1952; the six-story Kyauk-htat-gyi, containing a huge reclining Buddha; the Melamu; and the Maha Wizaya (Great Victory), completed in 1986. The Azani Beikman (Martyrs' Mausoleum), containing the tombs of Burma's independence hero Aung

San and six cabinet colleagues (assassinated 19 July 1947), is an important national monument.

Patricia M. Herbert

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YANGON DIVISION (2002 est. pop. 5.7 million). The Yangon Division (formerly Rangoon Division) is dominated by the national capital of Myanmar (Burma), Yangon, which is located at its center. The division measures 10,171 square kilometers in area. The Irrawaddy (Ayeyarwady) Division lies to the west, the Gulf of Martaban to the south, and the Pegu (Bago) Division to the east and north. The Pegu Yoma range slightly protrudes into the north of the Yangon Division, but most of the territory is lowland plain, watered by a number of rivers and tributaries.

The majority of the population are Burmans, but there are also more than 230,000 Karens, 50,000 Rakhines, and 500,000 inhabitants of other nationalities, including Chinese and Indians. More than half the inhabitants live in Yangon, Insein, Syriam (Thanlyin), and surrounding urban areas. Other towns include Hlegu and Twante as well as the satellite new towns of Hlaingthayar and Dagon, which the State Law and Order Restoration Council attempted to develop during the 1990s.

Reflecting its strategic position, the Yangon Division is the most developed region of Myanmar. It is Myanmar's main communications center as well as international gateway for air and sea traffic. Numerous light industries are located around the Yangon city area, which was targeted for major economic expansion in the twenty-first century. The division is also important for agriculture. Consisting of 39 townships and 1,444 wards or village tracts, it remains one of the major paddy-producing areas in Myanmar. Other important crops include jute, pulses, rubber, sugarcane, and groundnut.

Martin Smith

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YANGTZE RIVER. See **Chang River**.

YAO The Yao are a minority people living in southern and southwestern China, mostly in the mountainous regions of Guangxi, Hunan, Yunnan, Guangdong, Guizhou, and Jiangxi Provinces. The Yao total 2.1 million people (1990 census) and rank as the thirteenth most populous of China's fifty-five minority nationalities. The majority of the Yao, more than 1.2 million, live in Guangxi; fewer than 1,000 live in Jiangxi. The Yao groups are scattered in many areas; their communities, usually small in size, consist exclusively of Yao. Before the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Yao groups identified themselves by over thirty names. But in the 1950s, the central government redefined all Yao groups and named them all "Yao."

History

The origin of the Yao is debated. Most Western, Chinese, and Yao scholars believe that the Yao became an ethnic group during the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) when the term *mo yao* (not subject to corvée) was first used to refer to the upland people living in the mountains of Hunan and northern Guangdong and Guangxi. The central government allowed these people to search for arable land free from obligations—taxes and in particular corvée—to the imperial regime. After the identifier *mo* ("not") was dropped in later dynasties, the term *yao* gradually became associated more with the groups of upland people who traced their origins to an ancestral king, Pan Hu, than with a political category defining the people who were not subject to corvée.

It is conceivable that the Yao people did not become a distinct ethnic group until the Song dynasty (960–1279). During the Song and after, the central government ruled the Yao areas by *jimi* ("loose reins") policy and the *tusi* ("local chiefs") system, allowing the Yao chiefs to have autonomous power to govern their realms but requiring them to pledge loyalty to the imperial regime. By the early Ming dynasty (1368–1644), the central government replaced *jimi* and *tusi* with the policy of *gaitu guiliu* ("replacing locals with officials"), sending Han Chinese (the Chinese majority ethnicity) officials to rule the Yao areas; the Qing dynasty

(1644–1912) continued the policy. The process of replacing locals, along with policies of ethnic discrimination during the Ming and Qing dynasties (for example, prohibiting the Yao from engaging in the salt trade) inspired tenacious resistance among the Yao.

During the Song dynasty and earlier, the Yao lived mainly in communes, in which families worked together and shared equally. Apart from a small portion who moved to valleys and plains and engaged in agriculture, most of the Yao lived in the mountains, basing their life on hunting, fishing, and slash-and-burn cultivation on hillsides. To flee the Mongol invasion and encroaching Chinese immigration from the north, in the early years of the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368), the Yao began to migrate southward. By the early Ming dynasty, the majority of the Yao had settled in Guangxi, and smaller portions had settled in other provinces. The migration changed the geographic distribution of the Yao population, a distribution that remains today. The migration also changed the economic life of many Yao. A large portion of them adopted agricultural production, although those who remained in the deep mountains preserved their traditional way of life.

Modern Era

In modern times, the Yao maintained their tradition of resistance against the penetration of the Chinese central authority. Uprisings continued; many Yao people joined the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864) that originated in Guangxi. The Nationalists (Guomindang) adopted a policy of assimilation, attempting to promote Yao economy and culture. However, the Yao resisted and the assimilation attempts failed.

During the first two years after the founding of the People's Republic of China (1949), the government defined the Yao as a discrete nationality. Beginning with the establishment of the Longsheng Yao Autonomous County in Guangxi in 1951, the government in the next two decades established twelve Yao autonomous counties and over two thousand Yao autonomous towns or administrative villages. Under a policy of equality for all nationalities, the government trained many Yao cadres and extended its political administration to the Yao areas through these cadres. The Yao people in the deep mountains also began to give up slash-and-burn cultivation. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the government's minority work was halted when some Yao youths organized the Red Guards organizations to rebel against local authorities, who consisted of both Han and Yao officials; religious rituals and traditional festivals were prohibited.

In 1979, the government reassured the Yao of their rights and privileges as a minority nationality and promoted their equality more in the light of economic development. Since then Yao communities have experienced progress in agriculture, education, and health care. Reservoirs and hydroelectric power plants have been built; indigo, anise, and spices have been planted and are now important economic products; and the Yao mountainous regions have been developed for the timber industry and tourism. With more autonomous power under the government's reform policy, the Yao have also revived their traditions. But despite these developments, Yao communities are still poor in economic terms and far behind those of the Han Chinese.

Culture

Half the Yao speak the Yao language, a branch of the Sino-Tibetan language, but their dialects vary so significantly that Yao from different areas can hardly communicate with each other. The rest speak mainly Miao and Dong languages—the Sino-Tibetan languages of two other minority nationalities. Because of their long tradition of migration and association with the Han and Zhuang people in history, many Yao can also speak Han and Zhuang languages. The Yao write using Chinese characters. Although they have a long history of living with other nationalities, the Yao people usually marry only other Yao.

The Yao have a long tradition of oral literature, mostly legendary stories about their ancestors. Most of the Yao practice Taoism and ancestor worship, and the Taoist rituals and ancestor worship ceremonies, except during the Cultural Revolution, have always been practiced with great respect. The Yao also have many festivals, of which the most famous is the King Pan Festival to remember Pan Hu, celebrated by all Yao communities. The Yao are known for their unique ways of dressing, in particularly their men's turbans and women's clothes, which are very colorful. In the past, many of the Yao subgroups were actually named after their turbans and dresses, such as the "white-trouser Yao," "flowery Yao," "flat-turban Yao," and "red-turban Yao."

For most of their history, Yao economic and social development has been uneven, determined by their locations. Although the government defines them as one minority nationality, establishing a cohesive ethnic identity is still difficult, given the people's wide dispersion, the barrier of dialects, and the uneven socioeconomic development of their communities.

Yixin Chen

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YAP AH LOY (1837–1885), Chinese leader in Malaysia. Yap Ah Loy was born in Guangdong Province, China, on 14 March 1837, the son of a peasant. He arrived in Melaka, Malaysia, about 1854 and became Malaysia's most famous Kapitan Cina (a Malay word meaning "Chinese captain"). He also was head of the Hai San secret society in the state of Selangor and rose to fame by siding with Sultan Abdul Samad in the succession war in that state during the 1860s.

The title of Kapitan Cina acknowledged Yap Ah Loy and wealthy Chinese merchants like him as spokesmen or leaders of the Chinese immigrants then living in British Malaya. Through the appointment of the Kapitan Cina, the British recognized the separateness of the Chinese and their ability to govern themselves. In the first few decades of colonial rule, the British continued to rely on the Kapitan Cina–secret-society leadership system to administer revenue farms for opium, spirits, and gambling, develop the tin and plantation industries, and keep peace among the fractious Chinese dialect groups. Under Yap Ah Loy's stewardship, tin mining and other commercial activities in the Kuala Lumpur area developed rapidly. These activities transformed the previously backwater area into the nation's leading center of commerce and industry as well as the nation's capital city. He also contributed to the development of the city by supporting the building of schools, hospitals, churches, and facilities for the aged.

Kog Yue Choong

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YASUKUNI SHRINE Yasukuni Shrine is a major Shinto shrine in Japan honoring the dead of the Imperial Japanese Army from the Sino-Japanese War (1899) to World War II. Established in 1869 in Kudanshita in Tokyo, the shrine encompasses gardens, a shrine, and a museum of the Imperial Army. It is marked by a giant torii (ceremonial gate), one of the largest in

Japan. The shrine's major festival, Mitama Matsuri, is celebrated around mid-July. The shrine was initially established to commemorate and venerate the dead of the Boshin Civil War, in which the new Imperial Army defeated rebellious feudal *han* (clans) during the Meiji Restoration (1868–1912). It is controversial largely because of its association with the militaristic period of the Japanese imperial past. The shrine is not supported by public funds because of constitutional prohibitions. Many conservative Japanese feel in consequence that their war dead are not properly honored. Moreover, the clause separating state from church in the constitution can be interpreted, and has been interpreted, to mean that national political figures, such as the prime minister, are forbidden from attending rituals at Yasukuni Shrine in their official capacity. As a result, ministers have attended Yasukuni memorial rituals only in their capacity as private citizens.

Michael Ashkenazi

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YASUKUNI SHRINE CONTROVERSY

The Yasukuni Shrine has been a source of antiwar sentiment in East Asia because of its association with the Shinto *bushido* warrior code. Yasukuni has been visited routinely by members of the royal family, but civil politicians have been criticized for visiting the shrine because the remains of Japanese soldiers convicted of war crimes are placed there. Controversy began in 1978 when the remains of General Tojo Hideki were brought to Yasukuni thirty years after he was executed. The placement of his remains there deified him. Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo was the first prime minister to visit Yasukuni since 1945. In 1985, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro made an official visit to the shrine.

Japan's Supreme Court ruled in 1997 that using public funds for ritual offerings violated the constitution. Nevertheless, annual visits by politicians on the anniversary of the end of the war (August 15) continue to be a point of contention with Japan's neighbors. In 1997, the Japanese prime minister chose not to attend Yasukuni prior to visiting China. Three years later, however, China cancelled a scheduled visit of Japan's Transportation Minister, who was to have presented his bid for Japanese construction of a high-speed rail line in China, two days after he had visited Yasukuni.

Thomas P. Dolan

YAYOI PERIOD The Yayoi period (c. 300 BCE to 300 CE) saw the introduction of a full-scale agricultural economy into the islands of Japan. This economy was initially associated with immigration from the Korean Peninsula. Population growth among early Yayoi farmers then led to the rapid expansion of Yayoi culture as far as northern Honshu. By the end of the Yayoi period, chiefdom-type societies had developed in Japan, laying the foundation for Japan's first early states.

The Jomon period (c. 14,500 BCE–300 BCE) that preceded the Yayoi had seen some small-scale plant cultivation but such practices seem to have had little influence on the organization of Jomon society. In contrast, the full-scale farming of the Yayoi period marked a very different intensive and expansionary economic system. A variety of studies within biological anthropology have shown that the people of the Yayoi period were physically quite different from the Jomon peoples but very similar to the inhabitants of mainland Japan in historical times. Currently the most widely accepted interpretation of this evidence is that continental rice farmers spread to Japan from the Korean Peninsula at the beginning of the Yayoi period. It has been argued that the Japanese language also spread to the archipelago at this time.

As well as rice farming, a variety of other items and technologies were introduced from Korea in the Yayoi.



JAPAN HISTORICAL PERIODS

Jomon period (14,500–300 BCE)
 Yayoi period (300 BCE–300 CE)
 Yamato state (300–552 CE)
 Kofun period (300–710 CE)
 Nara period (710–794 CE)
 Heian period (794–1185)
 Kamakura period (Kamakura Shogunate)
 (1185–1333)
 Muromachi period (1333–1573)
 Momoyama period (1573–1600)
 Tokugawa or Edo period (Tokugawa Shogunate)
 (1600/1603–1868)
 Meiji period (1868–1912)
 Taisho period (1912–1926)
 Showa period (1926–1989)
 Allied Occupation (1945–1952)
 Heisei period (1989–present)

These include the use of bronze and iron, domesticated pigs, wooden and stone agricultural tools, megalithic burials, and certain types of pottery. The actual context of many of these finds, however, suggests close interaction between the native Jomon and immigrant Yayoi peoples, at least in the early stages of the Yayoi period.

Yayoi Cultural Expansion

During the Early Yayoi phase (c. 300–175 BCE), Yayoi culture spread rapidly through western Japan, with outlying sites in eastern Honshu as far north as Sunazawa in Aomori Prefecture. Some Yayoi pottery is known in Okinawa, but agriculture did not develop in the Ryukyu Islands until at least the eighth century CE. Hokkaido also lay outside the area of Yayoi culture, although the Epi-Jomon people of that island engaged in trade for iron and shell bracelets with their Yayoi neighbors.

The expansion of Yayoi culture is known from the excavation of over a hundred rice-paddy field sites dating to that period. Without doubt rice was an important crop during the Yayoi, but barley, millet, and other cultivated plants were also consumed in large quantities. Domesticated pigs and, more rarely, chickens are known from Yayoi contexts, but it is not clear how important these animals were as food sources. The hunting of deer and wild boar, practiced during the Jomon period, certainly continued through the Yayoi, as did river and marine fishing.

Bronze and iron appear to have been introduced simultaneously into Yayoi Japan. Iron was mainly used for agricultural and other tools, whereas ritual and ceremonial artifacts were mainly made of bronze. Some casting of bronze and iron began in Japan by about 100 BCE, but the raw materials for both metals were introduced from Korea and China. Han-dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) bronze mirrors were the most important prestige items imported from China. Bronze mirrors were also cast in Japan, as were a variety of other ritual objects unknown on the continent. Bronze weapons and bells both evolved from practical tools to ornate, ceremonial artifacts. In northern Kyushu, bronze weapons are found as grave goods in elite burials at sites such as Yoshinogari, but elsewhere weapons and bells are usually discovered as isolated hoards buried away from settlements. At Kojindani in Shimane Prefecture, 6 bells, 16 spearheads and 358 swords were found on an isolated hillside. Such hoards are often interpreted as resulting from community-based agricultural rituals.

Although written records are unknown in Japan itself until the seventh century CE, Chinese dynastic histories make some mention of the Wa people, who are

thought to be the Yayoi Japanese. The Chinese *History of the Wei Dynasty* (*Wei shu* or *Wei zhi*) was compiled in 280 CE and contains a short description of the economy and society of the Wa people and of the diplomatic relations between the Wei dynasty and the Wa polity of Yamatai and its queen, Pimiko. This text has long been a subject of great controversy. The location of Yamatai is unclear from the text itself; northern Kyushu and the Kinai region have been suggested as the two main possible locations but the *Wei shu* suggests Yamatai controlled most of western Japan in the third century CE. The archaeological record does not support such a degree of political unification until the late Kofun period (c. 300–710 CE).

Yayoi Polities

Archaeologists have proposed the existence of several chiefdom-type polities in western Japan in the Yayoi period. These were regional polities based on a large, central settlement with populations of perhaps several thousand people. Such polities may correspond to the "countries" (Chinese *guo*) described in the *Wei shu* but their political control did not extend beyond their particular basin or river valley. The site of Yoshinogari in Saga Prefecture was probably the center of one of these chiefdoms. Defensive ditches with watchtowers enclose an area of 25 hectares. The rulers of this settlement appear to have lived in a central residential precinct and to have been buried in a 40-by-26-meter burial mound.

Many of the Yayoi chiefdoms of western Japan were engaged in conflicts with neighboring groups to gain access to water and other resources and to extend their power. Such conflicts are mentioned in the *Wei shu* and are evidenced archaeologically by defended settlements, the widespread presence of weapons, and discoveries of human skeletons with war-related injuries. Over 150 Yayoi-period skeletons have been found with embedded arrowheads, cut marks, or decapitated skulls. Through warfare, trade, and alliance building, the chiefdoms of the Kinai region had considerably extended their power by the end of the Yayoi period. By the second half of the third century CE, the mound burials of the Yayoi period had developed into the huge, standardized, keyhole-shaped tombs of the Kofun period. Yoshiro Kondo has argued that the standardization of these tombs signifies not political unification but rather the creation of ties of fictitious kinship among powerful Yayoi chiefs. The Yayoi period is distinguished from the Kofun on the basis of these standardized tombs, but the underlying political processes straddle both periods.

Mark Hudson

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YELLOW SEA The Yellow Sea (Huang Hai), the shallow gulf between China and Korea, is 870 kilometers long from the south to the north and 556 kilometers wide from the east to the west and covers an area of 378,600 square kilometers. The northern part comprises the inlet of Bohai Bay in the northwest, which is almost enclosed by the Liaodong Peninsula in the northeast, the Shandong Peninsula in the south, and the Korea Bay in the northeast. The southern part of the Yellow Sea borders on the Shandong Peninsula in the north and the Chinese mainland in the west and meets the East China Sea where the Chang (Yangtze) River flows into the sea. In the east, it borders on Korea and the Korea Strait. The Yellow Sea, which has received its name from the yellowish silt deposited mainly by the Huang (Yellow) River, has a warm temperate climate. With an average depth of about forty meters, it is one of China's best fishing grounds.

The entire Yellow Sea, and especially its coastal regions, is presently being overexploited by Chinese, Vietnamese, Korean, and Japanese fishing vessels, and the environmental problems are critical. Important ports and fishing bases on the Chinese coast are Qingdao and Yantai in Shandong Province and Dalian on the Liaodong Peninsula in Liaoning Province. Bohai Bay in the northwest has been the traditional location for salt-works. Large offshore petroleum deposits have been discovered there, and a number of oil refineries have been set up.

Bent Nielsen

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YEN, Y. C. JAMES (1890–1990) Chinese reformer. Born in the mountains of China's Sichuan Province in 1890, the young Y. C. James Yen (Yan Yangchu) was sent to mission schools, where he became, in his later words, not a "Christian" (implying membership in a foreign institution) but "a follower of Christ." After studying at Hong Kong University, Yen graduated in 1918 from Yale University and worked under the International Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) with the Chinese Labor Corps in France. While there, he wrote a widely copied literacy primer that used one thousand basic Chinese characters.

Yen returned to China in 1921 to head a national mass literacy campaign under the Chinese National YMCA and to marry Alice Huie, an American-born Chinese with whom he had three sons and two daughters. He adapted the publicity and organization techniques of the YMCA's science education campaigns and combined them with the traditional village-school concepts of nonprofessionalized teachers, neighborhood classes, and flexible schedules to produce a campaign (*yundong*) model used in hundreds of localities that attracted more than five million students. In 1923, Yen and other leading intellectuals formed the National Association of Mass Education Movements (MEM).

Still, most illiterates lived in villages; nor was literacy their fundamental problem. In 1926, the MEM set up a village campaign in Ding Xian, a county some two hundred miles south of Beijing. Rejecting the radical approach, Yen saw "farmers," not "peasants," in need of education and support, not class war. In 1928, Yen received an honorary graduate degree from Yale, raised a substantial endowment in the United States, and then enlisted socially conscious specialists to develop a fourfold program in rural reconstruction. The Ting Hsien (Ding Xian) Experiment used people's schools to coordinate innovations ranging from hybrid pigs and economic cooperatives to village drama and village health workers. By 1931, these successes excited nationwide public and government interest. Yen joined Liang Shuming and other independent reformers to form a National Rural Reconstruction Movement comprising hundreds of organizations. The 1937 Japanese invasion drove MEM operations first to Hunan, then to Sichuan, but Yen spent much

of the war in Washington, D.C. After 1945, Yen found himself increasingly at odds with the Nationalist government's military preoccupation; in 1948 he persuaded the U.S. Congress to fund an independent Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, of which he became one of the commissioners. After 1949, Yen led the Philippines Rural Reconstruction Movement and founded the International Rural Reconstruction Movement, which he headed until his death in New York City in the fall of 1990.

Charles W. Hayford

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YEREVAN (2002 pop. 1.3 million). Yerevan is the capital and the largest city of Armenia, as well as its largest cultural, scientific, and industrial center (producing electronics, chemicals, textiles, and food products). The site was fortified as early as the eighth century BCE, when a ruler of the ancient kingdom of Urartu (thirteenth–seventh centuries BCE) established a fortress there in 782 BCE. In the sixth century BCE, Yerevan was the capital of Armenia when the region was under Achaemenid Persian rule.

Because of its strategic location on the trade route through the Caucasus, Armenia was overrun through the centuries by various powers, including the Romans, Parthians, Arabs, and Mongols. Between 1513 and 1735, it was repeatedly devastated by Persian and Turkish forces. The Russians conquered Yerevan in 1827; under the Treaty of Turkmanchai (1828), the city, together with east Armenia, became part of the Russian empire.

After a short-lived period of independence between 1918 and 1920, Yerevan became the capital of the Armenian Socialist Soviet Republic within the Soviet Union. Since 1991, it has been the capital of the independent Republic of Armenia.

Architectural monuments include the Katoghike Church (thirteenth century), the Church of Zoravar (1691–1705), and a sixteenth-century Ottoman fortress. In the 1930s–1950s, the city was completely redesigned in accordance with plans developed by A. I. Tamanian. Yerevan boasts a state university founded in 1919, several other institutions of higher education,

research institutions, and the Academy of Sciences. Cultural institutions include the opera house, several theaters, museums such as the National Museum of Armenia, art galleries, and the Matenadaran, a library with a large collection of Armenian manuscripts.

Pavel Dolukhanov

YESILIRMAK RIVER The Yesilirmak (from Turkish *Yesil*—green; known in antiquity as the Iris), a river in Turkey, has a course of approximately 418 kilometers. The area of its basin is around 20,000 square kilometers. The river rises in the mountains of northeast Turkey, flows northwest through narrow fertile valleys, and ends in the Black Sea, near the city of Samsun. The river's highest flow is from March to July, as snow melts in the mountains of Turkey, and its lowest flow is in November and December.

The Yesilirmak River is an important source of drinking and irrigation water for northern Turkey, and since ancient times its cities flourished along its course. The area along the river basin is known for its historical treasures and numerous architectural monuments from pre-Hellenic, ancient Greek, and Roman eras, as well as from the early Ottoman empire. This region has been inhabited since prehistoric times by various civilizations, including the Hittites (second millennium BCE) and Phrygians (early first millennium BCE), and was once part of Pontus, a kingdom bordering the Black Sea, which flourished from the fourth century BCE until it became part of the Roman empire in 63 BCE.

Several ancient cities in Asia Minor lie on the Yesilirmak River, including Amasia, the capital of Pontus, and Samsun, ancient Amisus, at the mouth of the river. Amasia was the birthplace of Strabo (64 or 63 BCE–after 23 CE), a Greek geographer who traveled over the known world and described it in his *Geographical Sketches*. Samsun, located on the Silk Road, flourished as a commercial center in medieval times.

In the modern era, the area along the Yesilirmak River has become an important agricultural and tourist region of Turkey. In 1980 Turkey built the Hasan Ugurlu dam on the river, which at the height of 175 meters was then one of the world's highest dams. The dam holds an estimated 1 billion cubic meters of water. In the 1990s, the government of Turkey became concerned about pollution, due to the overapplication of fertilizers and pesticides and the disposal of animal manure and wastes along the river's basin.

Rafis Abazov

YI The Yi people live in southwest China, in the mountainous regions of Yunnan, Sichuan, Guizhou, and Guangxi provinces. With 6.6 million people (1990 census), the Yi are the fourth largest minority nationality in China in terms of population. Yi groups in various areas described themselves with a variety of names until the 1950s, when the Chinese government redefined all Yi groups and named all of them Yi.

History

Scholars have different views about the origins of the Yi. Some believe that the Yi originated from the ancient nomadic Qiang peoples who had lived in northwestern China; others argue that the Yi people developed from the original inhabitants in Yunnan, as early as ten thousand years ago. In either case, scholars agree that starting from the early second millennium BCE, the people in central Yunnan, whether they were the original inhabitants or Qiang immigrants, migrated out of their homeland and mixed with the Han Chinese (the ethnic Chinese majority) and other minority groups. As a result, the Yi are a mixed group with diverse origins.

Their migration extended along the watersheds of the six rivers in the Sichuan-Yunnan region and the Yunnan-Guizhou plateau and divided the Yi into six branches. These six branches are the origins of the six branches of the modern Yi nationality: Southern Nisu Yi, Southeastern Sani Yi, Eastern Nasu Yi, Northern Nuosu Yi, Central Yi, and Western Yi. According to a Yi legend, the Yi people originated from an ancient ceremony of tribal division, the division of six ancestors (*liu zu*).

During the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), the ethnic minority peoples inhabiting the mountainous border region of Yunnan, Sichuan, and Guizhou were first referred to as *yi* (barbarians) in Chinese records; the Yi people were part of this group. The Han government established an administrative prefecture in the region and appointed a Yi chief to rule the region with the title King of Dian. During and after this time, large clans emerged in the Yi tribes; a caste system, which not only established various social statuses in the Yi communities but also defined a large number of common people as slaves, started to dominate the Yi societies.

From the Sui (581–618) to the Song dynasty (960–1279), the Yi people were generally referred to in the Chinese records as *wuman* (black barbarians) and *baiman* (white barbarians). While the former exclusively designated the Yi groups in central Yunnan, the latter referred to the minority groups inhabiting the border region of Yunnan, Sichuan, and Guizhou,

including some of the Yi tribes. During these centuries, two independent kingdoms, Nanzhao (739–902) and Dali (902–1253), ruled Yunnan, organized by the Yi and other minority peoples. Under the reign of these authorities, a distinct Yi culture, including music, dance, ancestral worship, and architectural, culinary, and sartorial practices, began to develop from Yi tribal traditions and from contact with the cultures of neighboring minority groups.

In 1253, the Mongols invaded southern China and destroyed the Dali kingdom. After conquering the region, the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) extended its administration to the Yi areas through a system of *tusi* (local chiefs). By pledging loyalty to the central government, the Yi local chiefs gained autonomy to govern their realms. During the Mongol period, the Yi people were referred to as *luoluo* (barbarians). Malaria and other epidemic diseases spread to the Yi areas and led to a loss of population and a setback to Yi socioeconomic development.

To consolidate its political control of Yunnan, the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) in the late fifteenth century decided to substitute for the *tusi* system a new policy whereby locals were replaced by Han Chinese officials. The process of replacing locals was not completed until the 1730s during the reign of the emperor Yongzheng of the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), and in most areas the Yi chiefs were powerful enough to maintain their rule and defy the penetration of the Chinese central government at least until the end of Republican China (1927).

The Modern Era

During the early period of the People's Republic of China (1949–), the government made efforts to redefine Yi nationality. After bringing the six branches of the Yi peoples together, the government changed their name from the barbarian term *yi* to "Yi," a different Chinese word, with connotations of respect. Beginning with the founding of the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture in 1952, the government established a total of fifteen Yi autonomous prefectures and counties. Viewing the Yi as the only existing slave society in the world, the government conducted a democratic reform of the Yi areas between 1956 and 1958 and abolished slavery. Under the policy of the equality of all nationalities, the government trained many Yi cadres and extended its political administration into the Yi areas through these cadres. However, the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) brought chaos to all the Yi communities; the traditional Yi customs and religion became the targets of political campaigns, and former local chiefs and priests were scorned or even prosecuted.

With the beginning of reform in 1979, the government reassured the Yi of their rights and privileges as a minority nationality and promoted their equality more in terms of economic development. Since then, the Yi communities have made progress in agricultural economy, education, and health care, and many of the Yi people have become modern workers employed in the tin and coal mines in Yunnan and Guizhou. Yi trade with the outside world has developed, and modern railroads, highways, and communications have been extended through the Yi areas. Despite these developments, the Yi societies, disadvantaged by their geographic locations in remote mountains, are still poor in economic terms and are far behind the Han Chinese areas.

Culture

The Yi have a long and rich cultural history. Much traditional literature is written in the distinctive script used for the Old Yi language. Folk tales, epics, and songs have also been passed down orally. Yi traditional medicine has a rich variety of resources; *baiyao*, a white medical powder with a special efficacy for treating hemorrhage, wounds, bruises, and the like, is widely used by all Chinese. Yi religion, based on ancestor worship and a belief in many gods, has been revived in recent years after its practices were prohibited in the 1960s and 1970s.

Yi people speak the Yi language, a linguistic branch of the Chinese-Tibetan language family, which has six sets of major dialects and many more local dialects which are not always mutually intelligible. One million members of the Yi nationality do not speak the Yi language at all. In 1975, the Chinese government attempted to formalize a unified Yi language by defining 819 standard Yi words, but the effort has not been as successful as hoped, as isolation and language barriers have prevented the Yi from establishing a commonly shared ethnic identity. The development of their autonomous power and the modernization of their economy and society have yet to occur.

Yixin Chen

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YI HA-UNG (1821–1898), Korean statesman. Yi Ha-ung, also known as the Taewon'gun, served as the

de facto regent of the Yi (Choson) dynasty (1392–1910) from the time his twelve-year-old son, Kojong, assumed the throne in 1864 until 1873 when he relinquished power to his son. During his tenure as regent, the Taewon'gun set about restoring the power and prestige of the Yi dynasty by inaugurating far-reaching reforms. He appointed officials to the bureaucracy on the basis of merit, regardless of clan or regional affiliation. In order to restore the financial stability of the monarchy, he closed the large, tax-exempt Confucian academies known as *sowon* and imposed taxes on *Yangban* (hereditary aristocracy) and commoners alike. The Taewon'gun succeeded in restoring financial stability, even though he undertook the rebuilding of Kyongbok Palace, destroyed two centuries earlier in the Hideyoshi Invasion.

Diplomatically, the Taewon'gun pursued a policy of isolation with regard to Japan as well as the West. He modernized the army and upgraded defensive installations along the Korean coastline, thus repelling military incursions by the French, Russians, Americans, and Chinese. Domestically, the Taewon'gun suppressed Catholicism, which he perceived as a threat. Eventually, Yi was forced to relinquish power to his son by Confucian officials and the family of Queen Min.

Keith Leitich

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YI I (1536–1584), Korean philosopher and statesman. Yi I, whose honorific is Yulgok, forms with Yi Hwang (1501–1570) the most famous pair in the intellectual history of the Choson dynasty (1392–1910). Yi I was educated in his youth by his mother, Shin Saimdang, who is as famous as her son in Korea and is regarded as the paragon of Korean motherhood. Yi became famous by placing first in the civil service examination nine times. After entering officialdom, he was engaged in a wide scope of activities, from historian to diplomat.

However, Yi is mainly remembered for his contributions to Neo-Confucian thought. He participated in what was known as "Four-Seven Debate," arguing for the position that *li* and *ki*, ("principle" and "material force"—a pair of key terms in Neo-Confucian

metaphysics) were ultimately inseparable. His position has often been interpreted as reflecting the practical character of his thinking, for Yi was also actively engaged in the effort to reform governmental institutions and strengthen the military system.

Youngmin Kim

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YI KYU-BO (1168–1241), Korean poet. Yi Kyu-bo, pen name Paegunkosa (White Cloud Hermit), lived during a very turbulent period of Korean history: Koryo was threatened to the north by barbarian tribes and from within by the struggle for power between the civil and the military factions in the bureaucracy. A child prodigy, Yi Kyu-bo had a penchant for wine, which accounts for his repeated failures in the civil service examination before finally passing in 1189. A chance meeting with General Choe Chung-hon, the most powerful figure in Koryo at the time, led to the recognition of his ability. Thereafter he had a long and distinguished public career, which culminated in his appointment as head of the Chancellery of State Affairs.

A Korean poet writing Chinese poetry attempts the equivalent of a Chinese poet writing classical Latin verse. Small wonder that many of the Korean *hanshi* poets (Korean poets writing in Chinese) did not meet a high standard; the wonder of Yi Kyu-bo is that he did. A prolific writer, he has more than two thousand poems to his credit, including the celebrated epic *The Lay of King Tongmyong*. His collected poems are in *Tongguk isangguk chonjip* (Collected works of Minister Yi of Korea). He was the greatest poet of the age and arguably the greatest poet in Korean history. His poems are vibrantly alive, rooted in the concerns of everyday life, redolent of the spirit of China's Tang (618–907 CE) and Song (960–1279) dynasties. They focus on an emotion, offering brief but brilliant illuminations of the heart. Yi Kyu-bo also left substantial prose writings.

Kevin O'Rourke

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YI MUN-YOL (b. 1948), Korean novelist. Since he made his debut in 1977 with a short story in a Daegu newspaper, Yi Mun-yol (Lee Mun-yol) has published prolifically, producing novels dealing with a wide range of subjects, from experience of military service to serious religious and philosophical questions to traditional Korean cultural heroes. In his novels—most particularly in his two masterpieces, *Yongung shidae* (1984, An Age of Heroes) and *Pyongyang* (1989, The Outskirts/Borderlands)—he reveals himself to be a sensitive witness to the twists and turns of modern Korean history. He has received numerous Korean literary prizes: his *Hwangje rul wihayo* (1985; trans. 1986, *Hail to the Emperor!*) was awarded the Republic of Korea Literary Prize, and *Saram ui adul* (1979, Son of Man) received the Today's Writer Prize.

Yi is one of the most controversial literary figures in the contemporary Korean cultural arena. His conservative stance on political and gender issues (the latter motivated by his reappraisal of traditional Confucian values) has been severely criticized by many left-leaning intellectuals and feminists. His conservative stance toward Korean politics has sometimes been interpreted as reflecting his plight as the son of a communist who defected to North Korea during the Korean War.

Youngmin Kim

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YI SONG-GYE (1335–1408), Koryo general; founder of Choson dynasty. A prominent general serving the Koryo kingdom (918–1392), Yi Song-gye (later King T'aejo) eventually founded the Choson dynasty (sometimes referred to as the Yi dynasty), which would rule Korea from 1392 to 1910. He rose to prominence as a general defending the later Koryo dynasty from increasingly potent attacks by Japanese marauders and China-based brigands.

In 1388, the king of Koryo opted to oppose Ming China's incursions in the north by launching a counterattack. Despite Yi Song-gye's strong opposition to

an anti-Ming policy, he joined in the military campaign, ostensibly as a deputy commander. Not long after setting out, however, Yi marched his army back toward the Koryo court and bloodlessly drove his rivals, including the Koryo king, from power. Yi and his supporters then set about an ambitious land reform program, and it soon became apparent that de facto power rested with Yi Song-gye rather than with the Koryo king. In 1392 he took the formal step of forcing the abdication of Koryo's last king, Kong'yang (1345–1394) and establishing himself as the first ruler of the Choson kingdom (whose name harkens back to an ancient kingdom of the peninsula), moving the capital from Kaesong to Seoul.

Daniel C. Kane

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YI T'AE-YONG (1914–1998), Korean women's rights activist. Yi T'ae-yong (Tai-Young Lee) was born in North P'yongan Province in what is the present-day Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). Although her father died when she was only a year old, Yi grew up in a loving family with strong Christian values.

After graduating from Ewha Woman's College in 1936, Yi married Dr. Chong Il-hyong (Chyung Yil-Hyung), a Methodist pastor and Korean nationalist. After the end of World War II, Chong encouraged his wife to pursue her childhood dream of becoming a lawyer. At the age of thirty-two, she became the first female student at Seoul National University (SNU) College of Law. She graduated in 1949 and passed the National Judicial Examination in 1952.

In 1956 Yi founded the Women's Legal Counseling Center, which in 1966 became the Korea Legal Aid Center for Family Relations. Yi was also dean of Ewha's College of Law and Political Science from 1963 to 1971. While dean, she earned a doctorate in law from SNU in 1969.

Yi was a famous champion of women's legal rights in Korea. For her work, she earned the Ramon Mag-saysay Award for Community Leadership, as well as

numerous other international accolades. Lee and her legal aid centers in twenty-nine Korean and twelve U.S. cities assisted countless women. Her advocacy helped effect revisions of the Korean family law in the areas of divorce, custody, and inheritance.

Jennifer Jung-Kim

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YOGA *Yoga*, or Western-style painting, emerged in Japan in 1855 as a result of efforts by the Japanese government to establish a bureau (Bansho Shirabesho) for the study of Western documents. The Western paintings that formed one part of this bureau were studied not for their aesthetic value, but rather for the insights they might yield in understanding Western technology through the study of styles and materials.

Takahashi Yuichi (1828–1894) was a central figure at this time. He entered the Bansho Shirabesho and became the first artist to consider the Western concept of objective and subjective interpretations. He later studied Western painting techniques under Charles Wirgman, of the *Illustrated London News*, and was important in founding *Kokka*, Japan's first scholarly art journal, in 1889.

The establishment of the Technical Fine Arts School (Kobu Bijutsu Gakko) in 1877 enabled the Japanese to study under Italian artists. The school was interested in providing training in drafting and cartography; however, the Westerners who taught at Kobu Bijutsu Gakko had a strong impact on the development of *yoga*. One such painter was Antonio Fontanesi (1818–1881). A follower of the Barbizon school, for whom the dominant colors were browns and golds, Fontanesi was teacher to the artists Yamamoto Hosui (1850–1906) and Asai Chu (1856–1907).

The popularity of Western-style painting declined in the 1880s in favor of Japanese-style work. As a result, the Meiji Art Society was established in 1889 to promote Western-style art through its annual exhibitions, which led, in the 1890s, to a revival of popular interest in *yoga*. However, in the first half of the 1890s, a rivalry developed between the artists trained by masters of the Barbizon school and those who had been strongly influenced by the light colors of the French Impressionists. Kuroda Seiki (1866–1924), who spent ten years in France, influenced other Japanese artists

who painted in the Western style. By 1896 the strained relationship between the two approaches led Kuroda and others to separate from the Meiji Art Society and form the White Horse Society. It was through the exhibitions of these societies that Western-style painting was promoted, creating an appreciation and interest in *yoga* that would influence later generations of artists in Japan.

Catherine Pagni

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YOGYAKARTA (2002 est. pop. 418,000). The city of Yogyakarta (pronounced "Jogjakarta")—known as the Javanese cultural heartland—is located in the Yogyakarta Special Territory (2002 est. pop. 3 million), surrounded on three sides by the province of Central Java. The city lies 27 kilometers north of the Indian Ocean and the sacred beach of Parangtritis, and a similar distance south of the active volcano Mount Merapi (2,900 meters). It is near such important ancient religious sites as Borobudur (constructed by the Sailendra kingdom between 778 and 842 CE) and Prambanan (constructed by the Mataram kingdom c. 900 CE).

The current Hamengkubuwono sultanate of Yogyakarta is descended from the Mataram kingdom of the sixteenth century. In 1755 Yogyakarta was founded when Mataram was divided into two, a related sultanate being established in nearby Surakarta (or Solo). Yogyakarta was invaded briefly by British forces in 1812 and was the center of an anti-Dutch rebellion (1825–1830) led by Prince Diponegoro. In recognition of the city's, and the royal family's, role in the Indonesian struggle for independence, Yogyakarta and its territory were granted special status as a province to allow its sultan to occupy the position of governor, a position currently held by Sultan Hamengkubuwono X. The principality of Pakualaman (founded 1812) is also situated in the city. Yogyakarta is also home to one of Indonesia's premier tertiary educational institutions, Gadjah Mada University.

Anthony L Smith

YOSHIDA SHIGERU (1878–1967), prime minister of Japan. Yoshida Shigeru served as Japan's prime minister from May 1946 to May 1947, and again from October 1948 until December 1954. After that, he continued to exercise influence as an elder statesman through his many disciples, including prime ministers Ikeda Hayato and Sato Eisaku. As prime minister, Yoshida guided Japan through the turbulent early postwar years, sometimes working with—and sometimes against—Occupation authorities to preserve Japan's *amour-propre*. His biggest accomplishments were the peace settlement signed in San Francisco in September 1951, which restored Japan's sovereignty, and the U.S.-Japan security treaty, which formed the basis of Japan's postwar foreign policy. At the same time, Yoshida resisted strong calls by the United States to rearm, forming one of the three tenets of what has been called the "Yoshida Doctrine": focus on the economy, light rearmament, and alignment with the United States and the West.

Shigeru was born in Yokosuka near Tokyo and adopted by a wealthy friend of his father, taking the family name Yoshida. In 1906, at the age of thirty-four, he entered the Foreign Ministry, and in 1909, he married Yukiko, the daughter of a prominent diplomat, Makino Nobuaki, and granddaughter of the Meiji statesman Okubo Toshimichi. Yoshida served as ambassador to Italy and England in the 1930s and foreign minister in the Shidehara Kijuro cabinet (October 1945–May 1946) before becoming premier.

Robert D. Eldridge

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YOSHIDA SHOIN (1830–1859), Japanese nationalist. Yoshida Shoin was born Yoshida Norikaka in the castle town of Hagi in Choshu. He was adopted by his uncle. At the age of eighteen he began a series of long journeys for the purpose of learning about the country and studying coastal defenses, traveling as far as Kyushu, Edo, and Mito, often without the travel documents then required by the shogunal government. Through his travels and readings of *kokugaku* (national learning), he developed strongly

pro-emperor beliefs, as expressed by the slogan *sonno joi* ("revere the emperor; expel the barbarians").

Convinced that Japan's defenses needed to be strengthened immediately to protect it from incursions by the West, and believing that to accomplish this he had to see how such defenses were built in the West, he attempted to stow away on board the U.S.S. Powhatan, flagship of Commodore Matthew Perry, in 1854. Unsuccessful, he found himself in prison for a short time before his punishment was reduced to house detention in Choshu. He eventually received special permission to accept students at his private school, the Shoka Sonjuku, where his dedication and passion greatly influenced his students, among whom were some who would become cabinet ministers of the Meiji government.

Constantly inciting his students to take direct action, he himself became involved in a plot to assassinate a high shogunal official, Manabe Akikatsu. The plot was uncovered and Shoin was executed, but his ideals lived on in his students, who helped to bring about the Meiji Restoration in 1868.

James M. Vardaman, Jr.

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YU KWAN SUN (1904–1920), Korean independence fighter. Born 29 March 1904 in Pyongch'on, a small farming village outside the city of Ch'onan, South Ch'ungch'ong Province, Yu was sent to study at Ewha Girls' School in Seoul at the age of twelve. At this time nationalist resentment against the Japanese occupation of Korea was rising, and in 1919 this would lead to widespread resistance. Yu took part in the most memorable uprising, the Samil-undong uprising, which occurred in Seoul on 1 March of that year.

With her school closed by the Japanese, Yu continued to rally Koreans in outlying areas to continue the resistance; because of her young age and fervor, she is called by many the Korean Joan of Arc. With fellow students, Yu organized a mass demonstration in her province for 1 April. The signal to begin the uprising was to be a bonfire lit on a mountain near Ch'onan. Yu lit the fire herself, but the subsequent demonstrations resulted in the death of her parents and her own imprisonment. She died in prison more than a year

later, on 12 October 1920. She is among the few women who were independence leaders in Korea.

Thomas P. Dolan

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YUAN DYNASTY The Yuan dynasty (1272–1368; as rulers of all China 1279–1368) marked the first instance in which Central Asian invaders succeeded in conquering all of China. Mongolian tribes, reorganized into military units by the famed conqueror Genghis Khan (whose name is more accurately transliterated from the Mongolian as Chinggis Khan, 1162–1227), descended upon China in repeated campaigns from the early years of the thirteenth century until the conquest process ended with the collapse of the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279) under Genghis Khan's grandson, Khubilai Khan (1215–1294). North China had been ruled by other invaders from the north (first Kitans, then Jurchens) from 916 to 1234, but the Mongols were the first outsiders to conquer and reunify all of China.

After Genghis Khan's death, his heirs carved out separate imperial domains (khanates) that, while connected by trade and diplomacy, evolved into independent geopolitical units. In addition to the Yuan dynasty in China, these units consisted of the Il-Khan dynasty in Persia, the Golden Horde in Russia, and the Chagatai khanate in Central Asia. The Yuan dynasty in China was directly ruled by a branch of Genghis Khan's descendants who were based in the Yuan capital city of Daidu (modern Beijing). As such, the Yuan dynasty was an independent polity that was governed quite differently from the other Mongolian-ruled polities in Eurasia.

The Mongols as Rulers of China

Rulers of China after the fall of the Yuan dynasty castigated the Mongols for their inattention to the welfare of the people and for their abuses of privilege. The Mongols in fact did rule China in a manner different from that of previous dynasties. As a pastoral nomadic people, they relied on their traditional emphasis on military values and hereditary transmission of office. Yet, the Mongols also adapted many preexisting Chinese institutions to facilitate their rule. The structure of the Yuan civilian bureaucracy was very much in the traditional Chinese mold, but the fact that Mongols and Western and Central Asians (Turks, Uighurs, Persians, and others) held the higher-level

positions meant that many Chinese scholars, accustomed to government service as a mark of status, felt disenfranchised.

The Yuan rulers did not allow the traditional Chinese examination system, which had determined entry into the civilian bureaucracy in previous centuries, to function until 1315; even then it was a minor source of recruitment. The Mongolian emphasis on heredity and the primacy given to the military sphere over the civilian sphere made government service less accessible and even unpalatable for many Chinese.

Yet, the Chinese viewed the Yuan dynasty as a legitimate dynasty that had won the Mandate of Heaven and reunified the empire. Khubilai Khan was largely responsible for winning Chinese acceptance of Mongolian rule. In 1272, Khubilai gave the dynasty its Chinese name, Yuan, and employed several prominent Chinese scholars as advisers at his court in Daidu. It was Khubilai also who selected the site of modern-day Beijing in 1260 as the dynasty's capital, thereby moving the symbolic center of Mongolian rule from Mongolia into China proper.

Khubilai also employed Tibetan Buddhist monks and Central Asian Muslim financiers as his court advisers. A multiethnic, multilingual entourage gave the Yuan court a cosmopolitan aura. Yet, from the point of view of contemporary Chinese observers, the Tibetans at the Yuan court were seen as arrogantly interfering with the administration of justice and claiming privileged status for themselves; Muslim financial advisers were criticized for imposing too severe a tax burden on the Chinese people and were accused of usury and embezzlement. While such criticisms may have been exacerbated by the factions at the Yuan court, it is true that the Tibetans and Central Asians rarely displayed any philosophical interest in Confucianism and its values of frugality and loyal, selfless service to one's ruler. Tensions ran high among the different ethnic groups that served the Yuan court during Khubilai's reign and in later Yuan times.

Culture and Society in the Yuan

Blocked from government service and alienated from their Mongolian rulers, some Chinese literati turned to the arts as an outlet for their untapped energies and talents. Popular drama, a genre that had existed in China for at least two centuries prior to the Mongolian invasion, benefited from elite participation in the writing of new plays. At least 160 Yuan plays are extant. The Yuan era also produced many great Chinese painters, some of whom, like Zhao Mengfu (1254–1322), served the Yuan court in official capacities.



CHINA-HISTORICAL PERIODS

Xia dynasty (2100–1766 BCE)
 Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE)
 Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE)
 Western Zhou (1045–771 BCE)
 Eastern Zhou (770–221 BCE)
 Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE)
 Warring States period (475–221 BCE)
 Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE)
 Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE)
 Three Kingdoms period (220–265 CE)
 North and South dynasties (220–589 CE)
 Sui dyansty (581–618 CE)
 Tang dynasty (618–907 CE)
 Five Dynasties period (907–960 CE)
 Song dynasty (960–1279)
 Northern Song (960–1126)
 Southern Song (1127–1279)
 Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234)
 Yuan dynasty (1279–1368)
 Ming dynasty (1368–1644)
 Qing dynasty (1644–1912)
 Republican China (1912–1927)
 People's Republic of China (1949–present)
 Republic of China (1949–present)
 Cultural Revolution (1966–1976)

While Confucianism as a philosophy and as a way of life was never directly threatened with suppression by the Mongolian rulers of China, competing ways of thought were encouraged in the Yuan period. Uighurs reintroduced Islam, Tibetans promoted Buddhism, and Central Asian monks revived Nestorian Christianity. The Mongol rulers practiced religious toleration in China as elsewhere throughout Eurasia; they exempted the clergy of all religions from taxation and from military conscription. As long as clerics did not foment or support anti-Mongolian sentiments, their churches, temples, and mosques were left untouched. In spite of the coexistence of a variety of religions in China in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, however, the Chinese elite remained bonded to their own Confucian tradition. The Chinese lack of interest in foreign cultures was testimony to the strength of Confucianism.

Trade, Transport, and the Economy

The Mongols, like other pastoral nomadic peoples of Eurasia, saw trade with neighboring sedentary peoples as an acceptable method to obtain needed goods to supplement the products of their own economy.



MONEY OF THE YUAN DYNASTY

Marco Polo, the Venetian merchant who spent twenty years in China at the court of Khubilai Khan, described in great detail the manufacture and distribution of paper money, which in the thirteenth century was unknown in Europe.

It is in this city of Khan-balik [Daidu] that the Great Khan has his mint; and it is so organized that you might well say that he has mastered the art of alchemy. I will demonstrate this to you here and now. You must know that he has money made for him by the following process, out of the bark of trees—to be precise, from mulberry trees (the same whose leaves furnish food for silkworms). The fine bast between the bark and the wood of the tree is stripped off. Then it is crumbled and pounded and flattened out with the aid of glue into sheets like sheets of cotton paper, which are all black. When made, they are cut up into rectangles of various sizes, longer than they are broad. . . . And all these papers are sealed with the seal of the Great Khan. The procedure of issue is as formal and as authoritative as if they were made of pure gold or silver.

Source: Ronald Latham, trans. (1980) *The Travels of Marco Polo*. New York: Penguin, 147.

Trade and raids coexisted in the frontier history of China and Central Asia. Genghis Khan had employed Muslim merchants in long-distance trading ventures as early as 1218 in western Central Asia. By the generation of his grandson, Khubilai, the Yuan imperial family was experienced in world trade. Investing silver in Central Asian Muslim merchant companies that financed trade caravans to distant lands and loaned funds within China at usurious rates, Khubilai and his successors reaped enormous profits. Maritime trade also flourished in Yuan times, and the government treasury was enriched by trade taxes.

Within China itself, trade and communications were facilitated by the more than 1,400 government postal stations that allowed authorized officials and merchants to cover great distances in a short span of time with fresh mounts supplied at each station. With the use of some 3 million conscripted laborers and an enormous expenditure of government funds, Khubilai Khan extended the Grand Canal so that grain from the Chang (Yangtze) River region could be shipped north to the Yuan capital at Daidu. Both land and inland waterway transport routes were improved in Yuan times.

Paper currency had been in circulation to varying degrees in China before the Yuan dynasty, but during Khubilai Khan's reign it was used more widely than

ever before. Taxes were paid in paper money, and merchants saw the advantages of the new currency. The Yuan court, however, never completely resisted the temptation to print more money when revenue demands generated by military campaigns of expansion and by fiscal mismanagement arose. Inflation was ultimately one of the economic factors contributing to the collapse of the dynasty in 1368.

Decline of the Yuan

During Khubilai's reign, the Mongols continued their campaigns outward from China, successfully subjugating Korea. They met defeat, however, in their naval attacks upon Japan in 1274 and 1281. Mongolian military expeditions into Southeast Asia in the 1270s and 1280s also met stiff resistance. After Khubilai's reign, the Yuan rulers abandoned further expansionist campaigns. The dynasty fell into decline during the course of the thirteenth century, as the once powerful military could not suppress widespread popular revolts in the 1350s–1360s. The last decades of the Yuan dynasty were marred by major floods, droughts, and epidemics, creating a confluence of natural disasters that would have undermined any dynasty, whether of foreign or Chinese origins. The Mongols fled their capital city of Daidu and returned

to Mongolia in 1368, escaping before the arrival of the armies of Zhu Yuanzhang, a rebel leader who founded the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644).

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YUAN SHIKAI (1859–1916), first president of the Chinese Republic. Yuan Shikai was born in Xi-angcheng, Henan Province, in 1859 and became an adopted son. In 1880 he joined the Qing army and was Chinese commissioner of commerce in Korea from 1885 to 1894. In 1899 he was appointed governor of Shandong Province, where he suppressed the rising tide of Boxers. He was made governor-general of Zhili Province and the high commissioner for the Northern Ocean (Beiyang Dachen) in 1901, in which position he was in charge of foreign and military affairs in North China. From 1901 to 1908 he directed various reform programs, including the establishment of a modern army, the creation of military schools, the organization of the police system, and the inauguration of modern industry.

With the outbreak of the revolution in 1911, Yuan was placed in charge of the imperial troops and negotiations with the revolutionaries. He used his immense military power to promote his own interests by clever manipulation of the negotiations. As a result, he was designated as the president of the first Chinese Republic by both the Qing court and the provisional government of the Chinese Republic in February 1912. He assumed the formal presidency in 1913, and in the next two years he outlawed the Nationalist Party, dissolved parliament, and assumed dictatorial control. Finally, in late 1915, he began preparations to assume the title of emperor. He announced that his imperial title, Hong Xian, would be used beginning 1 January 1916. Rebellion in the southern provinces against this monarchic scheme, however, forced him to revoke plans for his enthronement. He died on 6 June 1916.

Chen Shiwei

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YUE Speakers of Yue, or Cantonese, include Chinese speakers in Guangdong and Guangxi provinces and in many overseas Chinese communities. Cantonese is the most common form of the Chinese language or dialect heard in Chinatowns around the world. Hong Kong continued to use the dialect as a medium of instruction during British colonial rule. Yue is very different from Mandarin (*putonghua*; "standard" Chinese). Yuehua, or "Yue speech," is a more formal name given by linguists to the Cantonese language, particularly when they are referring to all of the many related subdialects and not just to the standard Cantonese that is centered on the cities of Guangzhou and Hong Kong. The speakers of Yuehua are among the most populous of Chinese people.

Guangdong and Guangxi are often referred to as the *liang guang*, or the "two Guangs"; as *liang yue*, the "two yue"; or as *Lingnan*, which means "south of the mountain range." Strictly speaking, the term Cantonese refers only to one subdialect of Yuehua, the vernacular spoken in the city of Guangzhou (Canton). The forms of Yuehua are actually diverse. Even in Guangzhou and the surrounding area, there are sharp subdialectal differences. Seven dialect areas have been identified in Guangdong, most of them in the Zhu (Pearl) River Delta and western Guangdong—Guangfu (the speech of Canton), Yongxun, Gaoyang, Siyi (four districts), Goulou, Wuhua, and Qinlan. These are spoken around specific geographical areas.

Origins of Yue

Sinitic people moved across the Nan Ling mountains, which run east to west, and into the Lingnan, or what subsequently became the provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi. A variety of indigenous people who were already living in the Lingnan were incorporated into new Sinicized cultural groups. The various Yue-speaking people originated in this way. The basic ideograph *yue* means "to exceed, go beyond." It has been extended to mean "frontier," or "beyond the borderland."

Being separated from the rest of China by the high Nan Ling range, the people in Guangdong and Guangxi have usually considered themselves different from other Sinitic peoples. The Yue speakers are more

likely to identify themselves as *Tong yen* (Yue) or *Tang ren* (Mandarin), that is, "Tang persons," rather than as *Han ren*, or "Han persons," which is how most Chinese identify themselves. This is mainly because it was during the Tang period (618–907 CE) that the homeland of the Yue people became part of the Chinese cultural realm. In addition, the Cantonese have traditionally spoken of classical written Chinese as *Tong man* or *Tang wen*, that is, the Tang language. Yue is closer to ancient Chinese than Mandarin is.

Characteristics of Yue

The standard Cantonese that is spoken in Guangzhou and Hong Kong demonstrates the phonetic features that set Yuehua apart from other Sinitic sublanguages. Among these phonetic features are the following: First, Yuehua retains the ancient final consonants that have been lost in the north. These include *-m*, *-p*, *-t* and *-k*. Second, the retroflex consonants that characterize Northern Mandarin are absent. Third, Yuehua has syllables that begin in *ng-*. Fourth, there are nine tones, five more than the four of standard Chinese. Fifth, Yuehua lacks any phonetic distinction between *s-* and *sh-*, *ts-* and *ch-*, and *ts'-* and *ch'-*. Finally, there is a separate series of long and short vowels.

Yue and Mandarin also differ in terms of written Chinese characters. This is in part because new characters have been added to stand for the words that are apparently exclusive to Yuehua. In some instances, characters that are no longer in use among Mandarin speakers have been used to transcribe words in Yue. This means that there can be written texts that are uniquely Cantonese, and that would be difficult for someone from northern China to read without special study of Cantonese.

Yue also differs from standard Chinese in grammar. One such difference is the ordering of the indirect and direct object in a sentence. In Mandarin the ordering is similar to that in English: the sentence "give me something" would have the same sequencing in both Mandarin and English. For standard Cantonese, the ordering is more like "give something me."

It is generally assumed that the region in which Yue is spoken has been heavily influenced by the phonetic principles of the Tai peoples who lived there before the coming of Sinitic peoples. This influence is apparent in Yue's word order and grammar. In Tai-related languages, as in Yue, the adjective follows the noun. In English and standard Chinese, by contrast, the adjective precedes the noun. This is why many two-character terms in Yuehua appear to readers of standard Chinese to have been put together in backward

sequence. The pattern is evident in subdialects of Yuehua, particularly in the southwest of Guangzhou.

Additional vowel sounds and the final consonants in standard Cantonese mean that Yuehua has practically twice the number of syllables that standard Chinese has. Because the language is so flexible, Yue has been able to absorb many foreign words, including English ones. Examples include "salad" (*sab-lud*), "bus" (*baa-see*), and "taxi" (*dik-see*).

The Yue sublanguage, unlike many of the other southern sublanguages, has little tone sandhi (modification due to context). It has none of the unaccented, toneless "neutral" syllables that form parts of compounds and other connected utterances in standard Mandarin. There is a pattern in Yue, however, in which a change in a word's tone can be used to modify it to mean a related term. One example is the word for tobacco, which is a tonal variant of the word for "smoke."

The number of tones in Yue varies from form to form. In Zhongshan County, which is located between Guangzhou and Sze-yap, there are only six tones, whereas in other counties, there are ten or even more tones. The Yue vernacular has also not borrowed as much from northern Chinese as, for instance, the Wu or Min dialects.

Yue Speakers

The best-known and most populous of the speakers of Yuehua are the Cantonese of Guangzhou and Hong Kong. The language form that these people speak is composed of many subdialects, known to linguists as the Yuehai dialect of Yuehua. The most influential subdialect is standard Cantonese. Linguistically, the Yuehai subregion is rather fragmented, but the core is the so-called Three Districts (Sam-yap in the vernacular). This would include the area around the city of Guangzhou. The districts are Namhoi, Punyu, and Shuntak.

Other well-known speakers of Yuehua are people of the Four Districts, or Sze-yap (Siyi in Mandarin). The Sze-yap dialect has many features that mark it from standard Cantonese so that speakers of the two would find it difficult to understand each other. Both the tonal pattern and vowels are different.

Guinan is the name usually given to the Yue subdialects of the interior of Guangxi. Among the Guinan subdialects are Wuzhou, Guixian, Cangwu, Guiping, and Tengxian. Many of these Guinan vernaculars include a sound shift that leads to pronunciations that are not at all characteristic of other Yuehua subdi-

alects. There are initial consonants like *b-* and *d-* that might not be found in Yuehua.

The general impression among the Chinese is that, with the exception of speakers of standard Cantonese, Yue speakers haven't played much of a role in the cultural development of China. Consequently, the Guangxi part of the Yue region has been treated more as a cultural backwater even by other Yue speakers, especially Cantonese speakers or those living around Guangzhou.

Ooi Giok Ling

See also: **Guangdong; Guangxi; Hong Kong; Mandarin; Tang Dynasty**

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YULGOK. See **Yi I.**

YUN SUN-DO (1587–1671), Korean poet. Yun Sun-do, another in the long list of Korean poet-ministers who had turbulent political careers, passed the civil-service examination at the age of twenty-six, but did not serve under the tyrant Kwanghaegun (1556–1622). In 1616 he presented a memorial to the king remonstrating against corruption in the court, for which he was exiled to Kyonwon, where he is said to have written his earliest poems. He was recalled in 1623 when Injo (1595–1649) succeeded to the throne. In 1628, he was appointed personal tutor to the two young princes, Pongnim and Inp'yong. In trouble again during the Manchu invasion of 1636 for failing to attend on the king, he was sent into exile to Yongdok but soon released. Over the next number of years his memorials to the king kept him at the center of controversy. The final embroilment occurred over the length of the mourning period that was judged appropriate for the mother of King Hyojong (1619–1659). Again Yun Sun-do's opponents carried the day, and the poet was banished to Samsu, where he remained until his release in 1668.

Yun Sun-do is regarded by most Korean commentators as the master of the *sbijo*, Korea's traditional

short lyric poetry genre. His most celebrated work, *The Fisherman's Calendar*, is a cycle of forty poems describing the four seasons in one of the poet's favorite retreats. The fisherman is a time-honored symbol of the wise man who lives simply in nature. Yun Sun-do was inspired to write his poem when reworking the earlier "Fisherman's Song" by Yi Hyon-bo, which in turn was a reworking into nine verses of an anonymous poem from Koryo. Yun Sun-do was also a considerable poet in Chinese. He died in 1671.

Kevin O'Rourke

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YUNNAN (2002 est. pop. 43.2 million). The southeastern China province of Yunnan (Yün-nan, "the cloudy south") borders in the west on Burma and Tibet, in the north on Sichuan, in the east on Guizhou and Guangxi, and in the south on Vietnam and Laos. The province covers an area of 394,000 square kilometers of mountains and plateaus. The northwestern part features the Hengduan mountain range, traversed by several big rivers and with peaks reaching over 4,000 meters. The eastern and southeastern part forms a lower plateau. The diversity of Yunnan's topography means there are three climate zones: temperate in the mountains and subtropic and tropic to the south. The rainy season between May and October accounts for about 80 percent of the annual precipitation, which averages over 1,000 millimeters.

Yunnan has a population of 43.2 million, of which about a third belong to twenty-two officially recognized minority peoples, the Yi being the largest. The Han Chinese, who constitute about 70 percent of the population, are mainly concentrated on the eastern plateau, which is also where the capital, Kunming (2002 est. pop. 871,000 million), is situated.

Yunnan was loosely incorporated into the Chinese empire during the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). It was the center of the independent Nanzhao and Dali kingdoms from the eighth to the thirteenth centuries and was reincorporated as a Chinese frontier area under the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). During the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), the Chinese government encouraged Chinese immigration into Yunnan, and

during the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), the province was repeatedly the seat of rebellion against the Manchu government. In the nineteenth century, the British and French colonial powers in Southeast Asia extended their activities into Yunnan, and the French built a railway connecting Kunming with Vietnam. During the Japanese occupation of eastern China, the Chinese Nationalist party (Guomindang) moved the government and various industries to the western provinces of Sichuan and Yunnan, and Yunnan became a stronghold against further Japanese advance.

Kunming developed into an important industrial center in the southwest, a position it still retains. Yunnan has one of the largest reserves of tin in the world, and the principal industries are tin and copper mining. Heavy industry such as iron and steel works are concentrated in the area around Kunming. The province is an important manufacturer of textiles, chemicals, processed foods, and light-industry products, and a major producer of tea, cigarettes, and sugar.

Bent Nielsen

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YURT The yurt is the traditional dwelling of nomadic Mongols and Turkic peoples in Siberia, Mongolia, China, and Central Asia. Although the yurt is no longer as common as in the past, there are still regions in Kazakhstan, western China, and Mongolia where the yurt is the primary form of dwelling, especially in summer months. In Buryiat Mongolian the word for yurt is *ger* (also *gber*), meaning "home" or "dwelling." Yurt, the more common term, is from the Russian *yurta*.

Like dwellings used by nomadic peoples around the world, the yurt is circular in shape and easy to assemble and transport. The major components are a collapsible, wooden latticework framework for the walls, wooden roof poles, a wooden tension smoke ring, large

pieces of felt (usually from sheep fleece) for the siding, tension ropes, a wooden door, and a white cloth covering. A more permanent wooden *ger* is used by more sedentary peoples in Mongolia and Siberia. These are eight-sided rather than circular. The entire yurt can be carried on one or two pack animals, a cart, or a truck.

In accord with Mongol and Turkic conceptions of the universe, the yurt is always set up with the opening facing south. The interior is divided into men's and women's areas, with a fire pit in the center over which a three-legged cooking frame is set. The north or northwest side is reserved for the family shrine, and all sacred objects are placed there. The floor is covered with felt carpets and bedding. The space opposite the door is reserved for important visitors or the male head of the household.

Yurts have become very popular in the West, and numerous companies provide modified yurt kits for home or vacation use. Why they are popular is not clear, although their association with a nomadic lifestyle and shamanism and the association of the circular shape with "symbolic circles" may be factors.

David Levinson

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YUSHIN South Korean President Park Chung Hee (1917–1979) set forth the idea of *yushin* ("revitalization" or "reform") in October 1972 when he suspended the national constitution and dissolved the national assembly. *Yushin*, as an idea, policy, and set of actions, included the inculcation of values supporting the new authoritarian regime as well as institutions designed to repress political opposition and the labor movement.

Promulgation of the *Yushin* Constitution

Park, who came to power through a military coup in 1961, enjoyed relatively high popular approval as a result of his active role in driving South Korea's rapid economic development during the 1960s. This popularity, however, made him more politically ambitious, and he attempted to revise the constitution in 1969 to extend his presidency from two to three four-year terms. After having faced a strong challenge from the prominent opposition candidate Kim Dae Jung (b. 1925) in the 1971 election, Park drafted the *Yushin* Constitution of the Fourth Republic in 1972, explain-

ing his actions as a national effort to achieve peaceful unification of the divided Korea. The Yushin Constitution was promulgated in December 1972, whereupon the Fourth Republic was inaugurated.

Through economic development, Park attempted to rationalize his past performance and his plans for the future. When he introduced *yushin*, Park restructured the industrial sectors to promote heavy and chemical industry. In this respect, the importance placed on economic development was a reflection of Park's strong commitment to strengthening industrialization and expanding national prosperity.

Consolidation of Power

To realize the values of *yushin*, Park designed formal and informal authority structures that guaranteed enormous power for the officeholders of his administration.

First, the authority structure provided Park with unprecedented power. The president as the top leader of the executive dominated not only the administration but also the legislature and the courts. According to the Yushin Constitution, the president had the right to dissolve the legislature, that is, the National Assembly, and to declare a presidential emergency measure (PEM) on internal and foreign affairs and national defense, economy, finance, and judicial affairs. Moreover, the president was not elected by the National Assembly nor the constituency but rather by a non-partisan rubber-stamp organization, the National Conference for Unification (NCU), without any limitation in the number of terms.

Second, the role of political parties was severely undermined, and even the ruling party was not an exception. Neither the ruling party nor the opposition party had any chance of obtaining a majority in the National Assembly. This was so because the Yujonghoe political group, one-third of the National Assembly members, was elected by the NCU based on the recommendation of the president. Furthermore, the political parties lost one of their major functions, that is, nomination of presidential candidates, after the NCU was established. However, it is noteworthy that the authority structure ensured that the ruling camp, composed of the Democratic Republican Party and Yujonghoe, was always able to form an absolute majority in the legislature.

Third, civil rights were extremely vulnerable to infringement under the *yushin* regime. The PEM suspended the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association, and the labor law substantially restricted labor rights. These legal arrangements were effectively used to repress the opposition and labor forces. The notorious PEM No. 9, promulgated in May 1975, forbade civil activities such as denial of the Yushin Constitution or petition for its repeal; criticism of the PEM itself; and broadcasting of news about instances of violation of the PEM. The labor law, revised in 1973 and 1974, decentralized the union structure, weakening the role of seventeen overarching industrial sector unions. The law also provided for a cushion organization, the Labor-Management Council, to minimize the impact of erupting demands for better working conditions and human rights, protecting enterprises that pursued a goal corresponding to one of the *yushin* regime's values—economic development.

Opposition to *Yushin*

Opposition by students and churches undermined the legitimacy of the *yushin* regime. From the beginning, they conducted a campaign for revision of the Yushin Constitution and denounced the values of national security and economic development. In particular, they argued that restoration of civil rights and democracy were a precondition for national security on the ground that only democratic citizens voluntarily fight for their nation. Furthermore, they encouraged and supported labor's politicization, which meant not only the expansion of the magnitude of the opposition but also a serious threat to economic development. Eventually, the alliance among student, church, and labor groups and opposition parties to confront the harsh repression under the *yushin* regime resulted in violent clashes, such as the Y. H. Incident and the Pusan-Masan Uprising in 1979, which were followed by an internal conflict in the ruling bloc and the assassination of Park on 26 October 1979.

Sung Chull Kim

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ZAGROS MOUNTAINS The Zagros Mountains, in western Iran, lie along and across the border between Iraq and Iran. Consisting of a series of ridges running parallel to the Persian Gulf and northward along portions of Iran's borders with Turkey and Iraq, the range is characterized by sheer, high cliffs and steep-walled canyons. Several of the highest peaks rise over 4,000 meters, with the highest, Zardeh Kuh, reaching 4,548 meters.

The range's rugged topography and high altitudes have made it virtually impassable, especially during winter months when heavy snows fall across the region. Throughout history, the Zagros have thus buffered the neighboring Iranian Plateau from invasions from the west. Iran's ethnic minority group, the Kurds, also found refuge in the Zagros, which form an important part of the larger but politically unrecognized Kurdistan region that occupies part of northern Iran, Iraq, and Turkey.

Archeologists estimate that the Zagros Mountains also served as one of the world's earliest cultural hearths for both plant and livestock domestication some 10,000 years ago. Today, sheep, goat, and cattle herding remain important industries, with herders seasonally moving their animals between high-altitude summer and lower-altitude winter pastures. Millennia of intensive human use, however, have led to the destruction of many of the region's native oak and juniper forests.

Ann DeVoll Brucklacher

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ZAHIR SHAH (b. 1914), king of Afghanistan. Zahir Shah was the king of Afghanistan from 1933 to 1973. Born in Kabul, he received his initial schooling at the Habibia and Istiqlal schools. Later, Zahir studied in France when his father, Mohammad Nadir Khan, moved there as a result of political pressure following a falling-out with King Amanullah. Zahir's father returned to Afghanistan soon after Amanullah was deposed and took the throne on 15 October 1929, establishing the Musahiban dynasty. One year later, Zahir returned to Kabul and enrolled in the Infantry Officers School. At a young age, Zahir held several government positions, such as assistant minister of war and minister of education, before assuming the throne on 8 November 1933 following his father's assassination. Although Zahir was king, two uncles and a cousin actually wielded power as prime ministers during much of his reign. When his cousin resigned after a disagreement, Zahir in 1963 appointed, for the first time, a non-family member as prime minister. For the next ten years, Zahir instituted an experimental program called *Demokrasi-I Now* (New Democracy), which allowed free elections and promoted democratic ideals such as a free press and freedom of association in addition to a constitution. Zahir was overthrown in 1973 by his cousin, Daud Khan, and witnessed Afghanistan's shift to communism, a Soviet invasion, and the Afghan civil war. He is currently in exile in Italy. Although some support his return to power, Zahir Shah has made no major overtures in that direction.

Houman A. Sadri

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ZAMBALES MOUNTAINS The Zambales Mountains in the Philippines stretch from the northern part of Zambales Province to the northern edge of Bataan Province. This range comprises nearly the whole province of Zambales. There are eight named mountains in the range. Its highest peak is High Peak (2,037 meters). It also includes Mount Pinatubo, which erupted in 1991.

The mountains are sparsely populated, given their rugged topography, but are home to the Negritos or Aetas, an indigenous people known for their Negroid features. They live primarily by hunting and foraging. It is rich in natural and mineral resources, particularly bauxite deposits. The Zambales Mountains were formed by the shift of tectonic plates, which pushed the land upward during prehistoric times.

Aaron Ronquillo

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ZAMBOANGA (2000 pop. 603,000). Located at the tip of the Zamboanga Peninsula in the Mindanao Island group in the Philippines, the City of Zamboanga is a chartered city independent of the province of Zamboanga del Sur in terms of funding, administration, and so on. The early Malay settlers known as Subanons ("people of the river") named the place Jambangan or Tambangan ("land of flowers"), and the city is still known for its many species of flowers, especially orchids. The Samal and Badjao ethnic groups who came to the city in their *vintas* or native boats called it Samboangan, referring to the wood poles they used to dock their boats.

The Spanish established a small garrison on the site in 1596, but they failed to hold it in the face of repeated attacks by the Moros, various Muslim ethnic groups of Malay descent who had dominated the area from the 1400s. In 1636, the Spanish reestablished themselves in what is now known as Fort Pilar, which

remained the center of Spanish rule in the southern Philippines for three hundred years. A testimony to this long Spanish presence is the use of Chavacano, the chief local dialect, which is based on Spanish.

When the Americans came in 1898, the city became the capital of Moro province, which encompassed all of Mindanao and Sulu Islands. Zamboanga City attained its cityhood status on 12 October 1936 under Commonwealth Act 9 and was formally inaugurated as the City of Zamboanga on 26 February 1937. The city became a headquarters for the Japanese during World War II but was retaken by U.S. troops in March 1945.

Today the city is a trade center and port for the southern Philippine products of copra, hemp, timber, and fish. It is also a center for Moro brass and bronze ware and a collection point for the many varieties of shells found locally. In terms of religious background, the population of Zamboanga City is 75 percent Christian and 25 percent Muslim. It is considered a Christian enclave in the heart of the Muslim region of the Philippines.

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ZEBU Zebu, or brahminy cattle (*Bos indicus*; sometimes called humped oxen or Brahman), are a species of domesticated livestock native to India. According to some, they are the same species as common cattle (*Bos taurus*), but others think that the two are separate species. Zebu are usually white or gray, with a large hump over the shoulders, a deep undulating dewlap, and hanging ears. They do not bellow but give a short grunt.

Zebu are thought to have evolved from the wild ox of Java and Borneo and to have been domesticated in South Asia as early as the ninth millennium BCE. They were depicted on seals of the Indus Valley civilization (2700–1500 BCE). Today, zebu are the preeminent

draft animals in Indian farming (though camels are used in some areas), and along with water buffalo they are used as beasts of burden in Africa as well. Some breeds of *Bos indicus* were selected for their milk-producing ability and serve as dairy animals in India. Their cooked flesh is abhorred by Hindus and Buddhists alike, but their leather forms the basis of a major industry in South Asia.

In some Hindu sects, white zebu are "sacred cows," the most sacred of all animals, because they are associated iconographically with the god Siva. Since the Kushan era (78–200 CE), they have been known as Nandi, the sacred mount or vehicle of Siva, and Siva temples have a figure of a white zebu facing the entrance to the shrine. In sacred cities like Varanasi (Benares), some zebu bulls are branded with Siva's insignia as a sign that they belong to the god, and are permitted to roam the streets. For this reason, the species has come to be known as "Brahman" outside India.

Zebu are resistant to extreme heat and to many of the insects that attack other cattle species, and thus are suited for the hot climates of their ancestral home areas. For this reason, cattle breeders in the southern United States and Latin America have imported them since the mid-nineteenth century to breed with native beef cattle and have produced hardy crosses such as the Santa Gertrudis (Brahman and Shorthorn), Charbray (Brahman and Charolais), and Brangus (Brahman and Angus).

Paul Hockings

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ZENG GUOFAN (1811–1872), Confucian scholar and official. A leading Confucian scholar and high official in the late Qing dynasty (1644–1912), Zeng Guofan was born into a peasant family in Hunan Province. Zeng received his degree and served in various positions in the central government. Typical of the scholar-official ideal, he preferred to support a foreign dynasty—the Qing—who respected Chinese norms than support an indigenous rebellion that threatened the social and political order in which he believed. When the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864) threatened the Qing dynasty, he accepted an appointment to raise an army first to regain control over Hunan and later to suppress the rebellion. He sponsored various projects of China's Self-Strengthening Movement (an effort by

the Qing dynasty to restore power to resist Western encroachments, especially after the Second Opium War) and tried to increase China's military and economic power by learning from Western nations.

Zeng was very successful. He demanded that his troops conduct themselves according to proper Confucian principles. Zeng recruited members of the local scholar-gentry class as officers who were loyal to him and then recruited troops from Hunan. They embodied such Confucian ideals as respect for superiors, concern for their fellow Chinese, and moral behavior. Zeng's very success helped pave the way for a devolution of power from the Qing government in Beijing and began the rise of regional authorities, leading, ultimately, to the period of warlordism in the 1920s and 1930s. He died in 1872.

Charles Dobbs

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ZERAFSHAN RIVER With a length of 877 kilometers and a drainage basin of 17,100 square kilometers, the Zerafshan, or "Golden," River is one of the most important of Central Asia, providing water for irrigation to some of the region's most famous cities, among them Bukhara and Samarqand. Known as the Matcha in its upper reaches, the Zerafshan has its source in the Zerafshan Glacier at an altitude of 2,800 meters in Tajikistan's Koxsu range of mountains. For its first 300 kilometers, the river flows through a narrow valley that opens out near the city of Penjikent. Below this point the river has no tributaries. Near Samarqand the river divides into two main branches known as the Akdarya (White River) to the north and the Karadarya (Black River) to the south. As it approaches the Bukhara oasis the river becomes known as the Karakul Dar'ya.

The river's flow is entirely used for irrigation, particularly of cotton, which has been grown in the region since ancient times. As a result, it dries before reaching the Amu Dar'ya, which in recent times it has attained only in 1874 and 1921. Its lower reaches are, however, fed by the Amu-Bukhara Canal, one of several major irrigation works that also include the Kattakurgan Canal. More than three-quarters of the river's flow occurs between May and September, peaking in July with

a rate of 250–690 cubic meters per second. Average flow is 162 cubic meters per second, and the lowest rate is 28–60 cubic meters per second, occurring in March.

Will Myer

ZHANG YIMOU (b. 1951), Chinese film director. Zhang Yimou is currently China's best-known film director. Born in Xi'an, Sichuan Province, he began his film career in the early 1980s as a cinematographer. A leader among China's "Fifth-Generation" of film directors, he is credited with giving modern Chinese cinema an international profile. Since winning the Golden Bear Award (Best Picture) at the 1988 Berlin Film Festival for his debut film, *Red Sorghum* (1987), Zhang has garnered many awards at prominent international film festivals, including those at Venice and Cannes, while also achieving commercial success across the globe.

His film career can be divided thematically into two periods. In such early films as *Red Sorghum*, *Ju Dou* (1990), and *Raise the Red Lantern* (1991), his work takes on the quality of the historical epic. In *The Story of Qiu Ju* (1992), *To Live* (1994), *Keep Cool* (1997), *Not One Less* (1998), and *The Road Home* (1999), he shifts his cinematic focus to the realistic depiction of modern Chinese life. Throughout his career, Zhang has been troubled by censorship in China. Outside China, his films, ironically, have often been criticized as contributing to the Chinese government's overseas public relations activities.

Doobo Shim

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ZHANG ZHIDONG (1837–1909), Chinese Confucian scholar-official. Zhang Zhidong (Chang Chih-tung), born in Nanpi, Zhili Province, was prominently associated with the "self-strengthening movement" in China. His distinguished career as an official in the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) (Manchu) imperial administration began in 1863 when he passed the highest-level civil service examination and was awarded the prestigious *jinsbi*, or "presented scholar," degree. From 1867 to 1877 he held a variety of supervisory posts related to education and the Confucian examination system in Zhejiang, Hubei, and Sichuan provinces. During this time, he achieved renown for his energetic promotion of scholarship and exemplary rectitude in administrative affairs. In 1879 Zhang was inducted into the Imperial Academy, where he earned a reputation as an astute commentator on Chinese foreign relations and political reform.

In 1882 Zhang was promoted to the governorship of Shanxi Province, the first in a long series of administrative posts that would eventually include an eighteen-year tenure as governor-general of Hunan and Hubei Provinces. During this period, he gained the reputation as a modernizer and political reformer even while retaining a conservative devotion to Confucianism and the Qing dynastic order. The abbreviated formula as-



ZHANG YIMOU FILMOGRAPHY

As Director: *Red Sorghum* (1987), *Operation Cougar* (1988), *Ju Dou* (1990), *Raise the Red Lantern* (1991), *The Story of Qiu Ju* (1992), *To Live* (1994), *Shanghai Triad* (1995), *Keep Cool* (1997), *Not One Less* (1998), *The Road Home* (1999).

As Cinematographer: *One and Eight* (1984), *Yellow Earth* (1984), *Old Well* (1986), *Big Parade* (1986).

As Actor: *Old Well* (1986), *Red Sorghum* (1987), *A Terracotta Warrior* (1989), *Keep Cool* (1997), *Turandot Project* (2000).

As Producer: *Dragon Town Story* (1997), *2046* (2001)

As Stage Director: *Turandot—At the Forbidden City of Beijing* (1999).

Compiled by Doobo Shim

sociated with Zhang's philosophy of reform is *ti/yong*, or "Chinese learning as the essence, Western learning for practical development." His active promotion of railway development and his enthusiastic sponsorship of the Han-Ye-Ping iron and steel works are among the many projects that characterized his efforts to strengthen the Chinese state and economy.

Michael C. Lazich

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ZHAO ZIYANG (b. 1919), Chinese Communist Party leader and economic reformer. Zhao Ziyang was born as Zhao Xiusheng in Huaxian County, Henan Province, in 1919. He joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1938. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Zhao served in numerous positions in Guangdong Province, where he played an instrumental role in consolidating CCP control and implementing land reform policies.

After being denounced and exiled during the Cultural Revolution, Zhao was rehabilitated by Zhou Enlai (1899–1976) and assigned as provincial first party secretary in Guangdong in 1971 and then in Sichuan in 1976. His market-oriented reforms there brought substantial progress to the economy and became a showpiece of the reforms of paramount leader Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997).

A strong supporter of Deng's economic reforms, Zhao became a member of the CCP Politburo in 1979, premier in 1980, and party secretary-general in 1987. He continued to advocate market-style reforms as well as ambitious plans to streamline the bloated PRC bureaucracy. While many of his reforms were praised, his economic liberalization program was blamed for the rising inflation of the late 1980s.

Zhao's most important moment and his political downfall came with the student protests in Tiananmen Square in May and June of 1989. Zhao openly sided with the student demonstrators and was ousted in the aftermath of the bloody crackdown on protests in Beijing. He remains a member of the CCP but has become almost completely absent from public life.

Kirk W. Larsen

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ZHEJIANG (2001 pop. 47 million). One of the most fertile and wealthiest provinces in China, Zhejiang lies on China's southeastern coast just south of the Chang (Yangtze) river delta and China's largest city, Shanghai. It is bordered on the north by Jiangsu province, on the west by Anhui and Jiangxi, and on the south by Fujian. It covers 101,800 square kilometers, including 3,061 offshore islands. About one-third of the province consists of plains, rivers, and lakes, while the other two-thirds is mountainous.

The province's capital is Hangzhou, China's capital during the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279 CE) and a city described by Marco Polo in his travels as "beyond dispute the finest and noblest city" in the world. The province has 41 counties, 23 cities, and 23 county-level towns. The total population in 2001 was about 47 million, of which 300,000 are categorized as ethnic minorities. The largest of these minorities are the She and Hui nationalities.

Historically, Zhejiang has been in the forefront of China's economic and cultural development since the early Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). Its emergence as a major producer of grain resulted in the extension of the Grand Canal to Hangzhou in the seventh century. Since the tenth century, the province has been a leading producer of grain, silk, tea, porcelain, and paper, and a center of trade and commerce. When the Southern Song dynasty established its capital in Hangzhou in 1127, Zhejiang also became China's political and cultural center. The province continues to be home to many of China's intellectual and political elite. Two of China's greatest modern writers, Lu Xun and Mao Dun, were from Zhejiang, as are nearly a fifth of the current members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. The province also produced two of China's best-known contemporary leaders: Zhou Enlai, the premier of the People's Republic of China from 1949 to 1976, and Chiang Kai-shek, president of the Republic of China on Taiwan from 1949 to 1975.

Zhejiang has been a prime beneficiary of China's present economic reforms. Since 1978 the province's economy has grown faster than the national average,

thanks in part to the rapid growth of collective and private firms. Currently the province is the fourth wealthiest in China behind such economic powerhouses as Guangdong and Shanghai. In addition to its traditional industries, the province has concentrated on the development of its machinery, electronics, chemicals, and pharmaceutical industries. Foreign trade, investment, and tourism have also flourished, especially in the coastal cities of Hangzhou, Ningbo, and Wenzhou.

Shawn Shieh

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ZHOU DYNASTY The era popularly known as the Zhou dynasty covers two time periods: the Western Zhou period (1045–771 BCE) and the Eastern Zhou period (770–221 BCE). During the Western Zhou period, the Zhou lineage ruled from the capital, Zongzhou, located near their ancestral burial grounds (near modern-day Xi'an in Shaanxi Province). In 771 BCE the Zhou elite fled east to the city of Chengzhou (located near modern-day Luoyang in Henan Province). During the Eastern Zhou period, former Zhou tribute states vied for power under the guise of upholding traditional Zhou moral authority. The Zhou royal descendants were themselves puppets of neighboring states.

Origins of Zhou

The original Zhou nation rose up in the Wei River valley in Shaanxi. Shang-dynasty (1766–1045 BCE) oracle-bone records dating from 1200 to 1000 BCE suggest that the Shang considered the Zhou group alternately as an enemy and as a tribute-paying subject. By the middle of the eleventh century BCE, the Zhou had built a coalition of partners, including former Shang subjects in northern Henan, and destroyed Shang hegemony. In texts compiled centuries later, this shift in power was attributed to the will of Heaven and called the Mandate of Heaven (*tianming*). In contemporary Zhou bronze texts, the term refers to the will of ancestral spirits, perhaps manifested as astral phenomena. By the Eastern Zhou period, however, the event was mythologized as a heroic military conquest commanded by Heaven and carried out by King Wu

(who represented "martial" reckoning against immoral leaders), the son of the founder of the Zhou nation, King Wen (who represented "humane" treatment of inferiors and a system of utopian agrarian government). By the Han period (206 BCE–220 CE), the Mandate of Heaven clearly represented shifts in a system of natural forces, much closer to the five phases system (*wuxing*) popular by the third century BCE. The Mandate of Heaven theory became a permanent part of Chinese political thought, used by later Chinese reformers to frighten recalcitrant rulers as well as by those who took up arms against the government to justify their rebellion.

After the shift of hegemony from the Shang in the east to the Zhou in the west, the Zhou rulers spent the next two centuries consolidating their power through military coercion and trade. They focused on control over resources essential to their economic system of gift giving and award, a system inherited from the Shang and intimately tied to the spread of the worship of Zhou ancestral spirits. Cowries, bronze, and jade—all valuables in Shang religion and all requiring trade links with distant regions—continued to be important to the Zhou. Although the Zhou initially worshiped the Shang spirits, by the mid-tenth century BCE, their own ancestors had clearly become national icons. Nation building became a form of ancestor worship. The Zhou rewarded subjects with sacrificial vessels, ritual clothing, wines, and agricultural lands (for food production) to further the Zhou ritual system. Gift recipients used these items to present mortuary feasts to the ancestral spirits, often including the names of their Zhou benefactors and their ancestors in the inscribed prayers. The sophistication of Zhou bronze vessels, carved jades, and musical instruments attests to control over resources and production in regions outside the Zhou homeland. At the peak of Zhou hegemony, during the late tenth to the late ninth centuries BCE, they controlled a network that reached west into Gansu Province, southwest into Sichuan Province, northeast to Beijing, east into Shandong Province, and south into Hubei Province and beyond the Chang (Yangtze) River.

Eastern Zhou Period

The Eastern Zhou period is subdivided into the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE) and the Warring States period (475–221 BCE). The names for both periods derive from chronicles of tales collected about each period that detail conflicts and alliances between former subject states of the Zhou. The entire Eastern Zhou era is characterized by larger states annexing smaller states, so that by the third century BCE,

only a few large states remained. During the Spring and Autumn period, the Zhou ruler was alternately a puppet of the states Jin, to the north; Zheng, to the south; and Qi, to the east—each of which took turns as "hegemon protectors" (*ba*). States that were on the fringes of the Zhou world earlier rose to power and challenged the exclusionary protector system.

By the time of the Warring States period, powerful new players included the states of Qin, located to the west in the old Zhou homeland; Chu, spreading south and east out of the Han River valley in modern Hubei Province; Yue, spreading north into the lower Huai River valley from the southeastern coastal region; and Yan, in the northeast near modern-day Beijing. Jin (a powerful state that rose up in southern Shanxi not far from the Zhou administrative city of Chengzhou) in the meantime divided into territories run by the large lineage groups Wei, Zhao, and Han. Zheng was taken over by Han, but other states survived simply by allying themselves strategically with different, larger groups. Examples include Lu, the birthplace of Confucius (551–479 BCE), and nearby Song, birthplace of the anti-Confucian thinker Mozi (470?–391? BCE).

The art of strategic alliances, known as the Theory of Horizontal or Vertical Alliances, was promulgated by peripatetic "guests" (*ke*), members of disenfranchised elite and artisan families who had studied under masters of military, ritual, and technical arts. By the Warring States period, literacy and text production, as well as technical or occult expertise, spread with the guest masters and their disciples from one site of patronage to another. The myriad new text types and ritual items discovered in Warring States tombs, particularly those associated with the southern state of Chu, attest to a cross-fertilization of ideas and practices over vast geographical distances. This was no doubt perpetuated not only by the roving guests, but also by the migrations of peoples, states, and armies. These guests took the cultural fabric, once identified as Zhou and rewove it, introducing new ideologies that better fit the cultural and economic realities of their far-flung patron rulers. During this time, they used tales about former Zhou-period rulers to warn and cajole regional leaders. Founder kings Wen and Wu were cast as paragons of honest humility and—most important to enhancing the precarious position of these guest advisers—the wise minister Zhou Gong (regent for Wu's son and cult founder of the state of Lu) was cast as essential to the foundation of a strong Zhou state. He took the helm while the king was weak, gave speeches about morality, quelled remnant Shang rebels, set up an administration, and politely retired when the king came of age.



CHINA—HISTORICAL PERIODS

Xia dynasty (2100–1766 BCE)
 Shang dynasty (1766–1045 BCE)
 Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE)
 Western Zhou (1045–771 BCE)
 Eastern Zhou (770–221 BCE)
 Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BCE)
 Warring States period (475–221 BCE)
 Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE)
 Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE)
 Three Kingdoms period (220–265 CE)
 North and South dynasties (220–589 CE)
 Sui dynasty (581–618 CE)
 Tang dynasty (618–907 CE)
 Five Dynasties period (907–960 CE)
 Song dynasty (960–1279)
 Northern Song (960–1126)
 Southern Song (1127–1279)
 Jurchen Jin dynasty (1125–1234)
 Yuan dynasty (1279–1368)
 Ming dynasty (1368–1644)
 Qing dynasty (1644–1912)
 Republican China (1912–1979)
 People's Republic of China (1949–present)
 Republic of China (1949–present)
 Cultural Revolution (1966–1976)

Social and Economic Changes

Comparison of the Warring States and early Western Zhou economies reveals drastic social changes. The economic network expanded by the Zhou from the eleventh through the ninth centuries BCE collapsed under its own ideological weight (a collapse that continued through the Spring and Autumn period). The rigid link to Zhou kinship through mortuary ritual and a gift-giving system was unsustainable. By contrast, the major states during the Warring States period developed their own monetary systems as well as individualized religious systems that incorporated both local practices and elements of the archaic but prestigious Zhou rhetoric. Smaller states participated in the expanded networks of larger states. Markets were commonplace in every city. The export of mass-produced trade goods and the import of exotic goods flourished. The network of interstate relationships was often multilateral, involving trade, marriage, warfare, and political covenants. Until the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) conquered the entire region and attempted unification, early China was a complex social web of competing philosophies, mingled social classes, and peoples from

different cultural backgrounds. In the face of this cultural fluidity, individual states promoted their own calendar systems, script styles, musical styles, artistic styles, and occult practices. The Warring States period represented the end of Bronze Age Zhou culture. Writers and philosophers of this and later periods would commonly use an increasingly idealized vision of Zhou ritual and government as a rhetorical foil against which to criticize the political chaos of their own times.

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ZHOU ENLAI (1898–1976), Chinese revolutionary. Zhou Enlai was one of the most important leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC, 1949–). He was born in 1898 in Jiangsu Province in a family native to Shaoxing in Zhejiang Province, with a family history typical of that locality, long noted for producing the educated aides who provided indispensable services to appointed officials in imperial times. Zhou's radical political career began with his participation in the May Fourth Movement in the city of Tianjin in 1919. This led to his arrest and imprisonment for several months, after which he traveled to Europe as a student and clandestine radical activist. Active mainly in France from 1920 to 1924, Zhou lived for shorter periods in Germany and Britain as well. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1921 and was the leading founder of the Paris-based Chinese Communist Youth Group. Returning to China in 1924, Zhou married Deng Yingchao, another former student activist with whom he had corresponded regularly for four years, and joined the work of the CCP in its new alliance with the Guomindang (Nationalist Party) of Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), then based in Guangzhou (Canton). In preparation for the "Nationalist Revolution" to reunite China, Zhou served as deputy director of the Whampoa Military Academy, where Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) was commandant. During the Northern Expedition (1926–1927),

which was undertaken to combat warlords in the north, Zhou organized labor and directed a general strike in Shanghai, facilitating the Nationalist takeover of China's most important city. Chiang's subsequent crackdown on Communism drove Zhou and his comrades into hiding. After that, Zhou organized the Nanchang uprising and became one of the founders and leaders of the Red Army. Zhou began to work closely with Mao Zedong (1893–1976) after the Communist regime in Jiangxi was destroyed by the Nationalist government. During the Long March (the Communists' flight from Jiangxi to Shaanxi), Zhou's support of Mao decisively helped Mao in his rise to dominance in the CCP. From that time on, Zhou served as Mao's right-hand man until his death. While Mao formulated doctrine, Zhou translated doctrine into practical policies. His organizational talents featured a notable ability to maintain discipline and cohesion within the CCP. During the Xian Incident of 1936, when Chiang Kai-shek's generals held Chiang captive until he would agree to postpone fighting the Communists until after the Japanese were defeated, Zhou helped to negotiate a partial rapprochement between the Communists and Nationalists and as chief liaison officer maintained relations between the two until the end of the war against Japan. During the decisive struggle against the Nationalists during the civil war of 1946–1949, Zhou directed political indoctrination programs that induced captured Nationalist soldiers to fight on the Communist side. From the inauguration of the People's Republic of China until his death, Zhou was head of state (premier of the State Council) and was a popular paternal figure among the Chinese people. Zhou also served as foreign minister from 1949 to 1958 and was respected abroad as a skilful, urbane, and dignified diplomat. One of Zhou's leadership techniques was to acknowledge personal responsibility for problems faced by the CCP. For example, following the tragic failure of the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960), Mao's attempt to industrialize at the village level, Zhou was able to diffuse responsibility for the disaster and deflect blame from Mao. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Zhou used his political influence and skills to limit the chaotic effects of the campaign and protect some of the victims of leftist excesses. Before becoming ill during the 1970s, he played an important role in the emergence of the PRC from isolation and the adoption of a program of economic reform. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) was a protégé and close associate whose Four Modernizations program announced in 1978 was a continuation of Zhou's earlier work.

Following Zhou Enlai's death on 9 January 1976, preceding Mao's by precisely nine months, the Chinese

people responded with an outpouring of grief. In April 1976, on the occasion of an annual festival honoring the dead, they gathered to mourn their loss in public. In Beijing, as crowds of citizens paying their respects to Zhou swelled tremendously in size, authorities became alarmed about their oblique expression of antigovernment sentiment and forcibly dispersed the crowds in an event known as the Tiananmen Incident of 1976.

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ZHOU SHUREN. See **Lu Xun**.

ZHU DE (1886–1976), founder of the Chinese Communist army. Zhu De (Chu Teh), founder of the Chinese Communist army, was born on 30 November 1886, the son of a poor tenant farmer. After graduating from the Yunnan Military Academy in 1911, Zhu became active in anti-Manchu activities in Yunnan and Sichuan Provinces between 1912 and 1916. In 1922, on a work-study program, he left for Europe, where he participated in Communist Party activities. In 1926, Zhu returned to China and became involved in the Nationalist Guomindang army. After the failed Nanchang Uprising (1927), Zhu led his troops to Hunan Province, where he joined up with Communist Party leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976). In Hunan they formed an effective military force that would later become the Red Army. Under Zhu's command, the Red Army defended the Jiangxi Soviet and undertook the 6,000-mile Long March to Shaanxi Province.

During the war with Japan, Zhu commanded the Red Army's northern forces. Following Japan's surrender, Zhu served as the commander of the People's Liberation Army until 1955, when he became a marshal of the People's Liberation Army. He would later become the chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee and continually was listed in many high official positions, although he was not actively involved in Chinese politics after 1954.

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ZHU RONGJI (b. 1928), Chinese premier. Following the end of Li Peng's term as premier of the Chinese Communist Party in 1998, Zhu Rongji was named premier. Zhu was born on 20 October 1928 in Changsha, Hunan Province. While an electrical engineering student at Qinghua University, Zhu joined the Chinese Communist Party and, following graduation in 1951, held a variety of posts within the State Planning Commission (SPC). While working at the SPC, Zhu was labeled as a rightist during the Hundred Flowers Movement of 1957.

Following the Cultural Revolution, Zhu became the director of the Industrial Economics Institute of the Chinese Academy of Science. He would later move to the State Economic Commission (SEC), where he was associated with the formation of economic reform policies. From there, Zhu's star began to rise. He was named a vice minister of the SEC and later a director at the China International Trust and Investment Corporation.

Zhu then became mayor of Shanghai following the elevation of Jiang Zemin to the Politburo following the June 4 Incident (when army tanks rolled into Tiananmen Square in 1989 killing civilians in their path). While the mayor of Shanghai, Zhu gained a reputation as a no-nonsense reformer who got things done. Zhu was then appointed to the post of vice premier where he worked to limit money supply while implementing fiscal and financial reforms.

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ZHU XI (1130–1200), Chinese synthesizer of neo-Confucianism. Zhu Xi (Chu Hsi) was born in Youzi in Fukien province; he is perhaps the greatest neo-Confucian philosopher. He developed and clarified the metaphysics of two earlier philosophers, Cheng Yi (1033–1107) and his brother Cheng Hao (1032–1085). According to their view, everything in the universe has two aspects, *li* (principle) and *qi*. *Li* is a structuring principle that accounts for both the way a thing is and the way it ought to be. Although the *li* is present in each and every thing, things are distinguished by having different endowments of *qi*. *Qi* is a



ZHU XI ON THE HEART

"The intelligence of the human heart never fails to have some knowledge, and the things of the world never fail to have principle (*li*). It is only due to the fact that principle is not exhausted that knowledge is not completed. Consequently, when the school of Greater Learning begins its teaching, it must direct students, in regard to all the things of the world that they encounter, to never fail to follow the principle that they already know and exhaust it, seeking to arrive at the limit. One day, after they have exerted effort for a long time, they will suddenly penetrate it, and then there will be nothing in the multitude of things—external or within, fine or coarse—that they do not reach. Then there will be nothing in the complete substance and great functioning of our heart that is not illuminated!"

Source: Zhu Xi. *Collected Commentaries on the Greater Learning*. Translated by Bryan Van Norden.

sort of self-moving ethereal substance, which has varying degrees of turbidity or clarity. Inanimate objects have the most turbid *qi*, with plants, animals, and humans having increasingly clearer *qi*.

Since the *li* is one, everything is part of a potentially harmonious whole. Consequently, a good person has concern for everything that exists. Because the *qi* differentiates things, people have greater obligations to those tied to them by particular bonds such as the five relations. The clearer one's endowment of *qi*, the easier it is to appreciate one's obligations.

Relying on one's own moral sense without education is dangerous, because selfish desires obscure the *li* within people. Instead, people should study the classic texts under a wise teacher, because the texts provide partial abstractions of the *li* from its particular embodiments in *qi*.

Prior to Zhu Xi, Confucian education emphasized the Five Classics: the Odes, the Documents, the Spring and Autumn Annals, the Record of Rites, and the Yi Jing. These works had been central to Confucian education since the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). Zhu Xi proposed a new curriculum, based on what came to be known as the Four Books. His *Collected Commentaries on the Four Books*, which gives a synthetic

interpretation of these texts in the light of neo-Confucian metaphysics, became the basis of the Chinese civil service examinations in 1315 and was committed to memory by generations of scholars until the examinations were abolished in 1905. In the early twenty-first century, the views of the majority of Confucians in East Asian communities, including the "New Confucian" philosophers, are deeply influenced by Zhu Xi's interpretations.

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ZHUANG The Zhuang are a minority people living in south and southwest China, mostly in the mountainous areas of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and the Wenshan Zhuang-Miao Autonomous Prefecture of Yunan province. A number of Zhuang communities are also scattered in Guangdong, Hunan, Guizhou, and Sichuan provinces. With 15.5 million people (1990 census), the Zhunag are the largest of all Chinese minority nationalities in terms of population.

Before 1949, Zhuang groups described themselves with more than twenty different names. In the 1950s the government redefined all Zhuang groups and in 1965 it renamed all of them Zhuang.

History

The origin of the Zhuang is debated even by the Zhuang people themselves. Scholars generally believe that the Zhuang either migrated from outside the Guangxi area, developed from the original inhabitants of the area, or evolved from intermarriage between local and outside people.

It is conceivable that the Zhuang originated partially from the ancient peoples known as Baiyue ("Hundred Yues"), who were indigenous to Lingnan, a geographic region encompassing modern Guangxi and Guangdong. With the warm weather and rich water resources of Lingnan, the Baiyue had long engaged in rice agriculture.

In 214 BCE, the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE) conquered Lingnan, moved people from the central plains to the Lingnan region, and built the Lingqu Canal to

connect the Chang (Yangtze) and Zhu (Pearl) Rivers. These policies brought together the Baiyue and immigrant populations and established political, economic, and cultural ties between Lingnan and central China. On the collapse of the Qin dynasty, a general named Zhao Tuo founded Nanyue as an independent kingdom in Lingnan. In 111 CE, the emperor Wudi of the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) destroyed Nanyue and organized an administration in Lingnan that included the eastern portion of Guangxi. It was during the Han that some native groups in Lingnan were first referred to as Zhuang.

Rulers of the Tang (618–907) and Song (960–1279) dynasties administered the Lingnan region loosely. The central government appointed Zhuang local chiefs as magistrates and allowed them to hold their positions hereditarily, but the chiefs were required to renounce independent statehood. This indirect rule permitted the Zhuang local chiefs to become autocratic on the local level, and their autonomy grew to the point that they resisted the central state. Starting in the early Ming dynasty (1368–1644), the central government decided to rule the Zhuang areas directly, but the Zhuang strongly resisted. Between 1492 and 1571, Zhuang uprisings forced the Ming government to mobilize over 140,000 troops. The Qing dynasty (1644–1912) and the Republic of China (1912–1949) maintained a policy of replacing local leaders until 1929, when the central state held overall authority.

Concurrent with increasing Chinese control was a migration of Han Chinese (the ethnic group of the majority of the Chinese population) to the Zhuang areas. During the Ming and Qing dynasties, large numbers of Han people immigrated into Guangxi and other Zhuang regions to escape the warfare and famine in northern and central China and to look for agricultural land. By the end of the nineteenth century, Han Chinese represented 50 percent of the total population of Guangxi, whereas they had represented less than 20 percent of the population in the mid-sixteenth century. The continuing arrival of Han people brought advanced agricultural technology to the Zhuang communities and formed a social base for the central government to extend its authority, but it also sometimes led to ethnic conflicts between the Han and Zhuang.

The Modern Era

In modern times, the Zhuang people increased their resistance to the central government. In 1952, the government of Communist China founded the Western Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Prefecture, the first step toward redefining all Zhuang groups and creating the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Regions in

1958. Though many Zhuang were trained and promoted to official positions, Zhuang communities suffered severely from the government's forced assimilation policy.

After China's reform in 1979, the government guaranteed the Zhuang people their rights and privileges as a minority nationality and began promoting their equality more in terms of economic development. Since then, various modern industries have begun to grow in the Zhuang areas, and the Zhuang economy has shifted from a self-sufficient agricultural base toward a more interdependent one through developments in trade, roads, and modern communication technology. Although the Zhuang economy still lags far behind that of the Han Chinese areas, it is the most advanced among the economies of China's minority nationalities.

Culture

The Zhuang have a rich cultural heritage; their traditional mountain songs and Zhuang brocade are famous. The third day of the third month of each lunar year is the most important Zhuang festival, when in each area people dance and sing before large audiences. Liu Sanjie, a Zhuang woman singer of the Tang dynasty, is considered Zhuang's music goddess (*ge xian*), known to all Chinese because of her beautiful voice and the lyrics of her songs. Zhuang brocade, originating in Tang times and woven in beautiful designs with cotton warp and dyed velour weft in five colors, is popular in China and is exported to foreign countries.

Zhuang people speak the Zhuang language, a linguistic branch of the Sino-Tibetan language family, although various distinct dialects remain in Zhuang communities. Zhuang culture has also been influenced by the Han culture because of the long interaction between the two peoples. Zhuang's old written language, the square Zhuang characters, developed from Chinese characters during the Tang dynasty, and throughout history a few Zhuang scholars passed imperial China's state examination and earned scholarly degrees.

To promote education among all the Zhuang people, the Chinese government in 1955 reformed the Zhuang language based on the Latin alphabet and then revised the alphabet system in 1982. The promotion of the Zhuang ethnic language has helped to elevate education among the Zhuang people; it has also helped to create a common Zhuang ethnic identity that was nearly nonexistent before the People's Republic.

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ZIA, KHALEDA (b. 1945), prime minister of Bangladesh. Khaleda Zia, the widow of former Bangladesh president Ziaur Rahman Zia (1936–1981), was born in Jalpaiguri (now in West Bengal, India), although her family was from the Feni district in Bangladesh. After her husband Zia's assassination in 1981, his party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), was without a leader and selected Khaleda as chairperson on 10 March 1984. As such, she was a leader of the opposition to the military regime of Hussain Muhammad Ershad along with Sheikh Hasina Wajid of the Awami League. The two frequently clashed with each other as well as with Ershad, but in late 1990 they united and brought about Ershad's fall. Following the election in February 1991, Khaleda became prime minister on 20 March 1991, an office she



Khaleda Zia appears before the media in Dhaka on 2 October 2001 when it became clear that the election would make her the next prime minister of Bangladesh. (REUTERS NEWMEDIA/CORBIS)

held until March 1996. In the June 1996 election, the BNP finished behind the Awami League and Khaleda became leader of the opposition. The enmity since 1991 between the BNP and Awami League has impeded the governance of Bangladesh. In 1999 the BNP formed an alliance with the Jatiya Party faction headed by Ershad and the Jama'at-e-Islami, an Islamic fundamentalist party, to attempt to destroy the Awami League government and prepare for the October 2001 parliamentary election. The alliance subsequently won by a substantial majority in the election.

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ZIA-UL-HAQ, MOHAMMAD (1924–1988), president of Pakistan. Zia was born on 12 August 1924 in Jalandhar in Punjab. He graduated from the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun, in 1945, and served with the British army in Southeast Asia. Upon India's independence from Britain and the partition of the Indian subcontinent, Zia chose to live in Pakistan. He became a major general in 1972 and four years afterwards was made army chief of staff by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928–1979), who was at that time prime minister. Next year Zia deposed Bhutto and became Pakistan's chief martial-law administrator.

Zia became president in 1978 and had Bhutto executed the following year, despite international appeals. Zia banned all political parties and imposed censorship of the press. Norms of *shari'a* (Islamic law) were strictly adhered to; the Islamic Ahmadiya sect, regarded as heterodox by the Islamic mainstream, was suppressed. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan strengthened his position, and he collaborated with the United States administration fully in its opposition to the Soviets. In return, he received generous financial and military assistance from the United States. Under Zia there was no sign of substantial improvement of ties with India, and Zia launched Operation Topac in Kashmir. The operation was an attempt to stir up anti-Indian sentiment with a view to ultimately wresting Kashmir from Indian control. Ghulam Ishaq Khan (b. 1915) succeeded Zia after the latter died in a plane crash near Bahawalpur on 17 August 1988.

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ZIKIR A *zikir* is a litany formula that usually follows an Islamic prayer, but which can also be practiced at other times. The Arabic word *dhikr*, which literally means "mention," "remembrance," "evocation," or "recollection," is part of the Malay-Indonesian vocabulary, sometimes written as *dzikir*. This concept and meditation tool is commonly linked with Sufi practices. Certain words or names of God are repeated as litanies after prayer, in accordance with the Prophet Muhammad's tradition, or the teachings of Sufi orders. The most common *zikir* formulas are "God is holy" (*Subhanallah*), "All praise to God" (*Al-hamdulillah*), "God is most great" (*Allahuakbar*), and "There is no god but God" (*Lailaha-illallah*), repeated in either a low or a high voice.

The purpose of this practice is to increase piety. Since in Islam God is considered unimaginable and unthinkable, the *zikir* plays an important role in bringing one closer to or into union with God. Some *zikir* formulas also involve body movement and special breathing patterns, performed while counting beads. Correct practice is achieved when the practitioner consciously feels comfortable and at peace, which is sometimes inaccurately analogized with a state of trance. To be performed effectively, the *zikir* must be learned under the guidance of a teacher who can explain, among other things, the doctrines behind the words and the difference between the nature and essence of God.

Andi Faisal Bakti

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ZODIAC SYSTEM—EAST ASIA The zodiac system popular in China, Vietnam, Korea, and Japan

has its origins in ancient East Asian cosmology, which developed during the centuries before the present era. It posits two basic complementary principles or primordial forces: yin and yang. They produce what are commonly known as the five elements: wood, earth, fire, metal, and water.

In its simplest and most familiar form, this zodiac consists of twelve signs, each represented by a different animal. The elements for which the animals serve as symbols are understood to be the twelve "earth branches." Thus, the first earth branch is symbolized by the rat (or mouse). The second is symbolized variously by the ox, the cow, or (in Vietnam) the water buffalo. The third is symbolized by the tiger. The fourth earth branch is symbolized by the rabbit in most places, but by the cat in Vietnam. The fifth earth branch is usually symbolized by the dragon, but as the system exists in Thailand the symbol is often a *naga*, a mythical aquatic beast with a more Southeast Asian ancestry. The sixth earth branch is symbolized by the snake; the seventh, by the horse; the eighth, by the goat or sheep; the ninth, by the monkey; the tenth, by the rooster; the eleventh, by the dog; and the twelfth by the pig.

A System of Symbols

But this twelve-part cycle is just one part of a larger system. These twelve earth branches operate in conjunction with ten heavenly stems. The full total cycle of twelve earth branches and ten heavenly stems provides a total of sixty units: six cycles of heavenly stems and five cycles of earth branches. (If each of the two cycles, one of ten and the other of twelve, lasts one year, the same combination [one earth branch, one heavenly stem] occurs every sixty years.)

Most people in the West think of the animals that symbolize the twelve earth branches as a means of designating years: the year of the dragon, the year of the pig, and so on. People in East Asia do this too; but they also can and do apply the entire system of categories to months, days, and even minutes for astrological and other purposes. These units are at the same time often categorized in terms of yin and yang and the five elements.

For example, all earth branches with odd numbers (represented by the rat, tiger, dragon, horse, monkey, and dog) are yang. Those with even numbers are yin. Also, the first and twelfth earth branches are associated with water; the third and fourth with wood, and so on. The five elements create and destroy each other in an eternal process. Wood produces fire, which produces earth, and so on; wood also destroys earth, which

destroys water, which destroys fire, which destroys metal. Words like "create" and "destroy" are in some sense metaphors for a wide range of relationships between "elements" that are compatible or incompatible, mutually supporting or in opposition. The five elements, like yin and yang and the signs of the zodiac themselves, are primarily systems of symbols. "Water," for example, is not necessarily and not only water. It represents a category (of actions, things, segments of time and space) that is in a predictable relationship with other similar categories that are represented by other elements or signs.

Influence in Daily Life

The earth branches and heavenly stems, coded in terms of yin and yang and the five elements, can be related to (or used to represent) stars, directions, seasons of the year, landscape features, foods, flavors, parts of the body, and many other things. The zodiac is thus linked to astrology, geomancy, health, diet, selection of a marriage partner, and the best or worst time to travel, begin building a house, or perform certain religious rituals. Thus amid all the economic growth and development of modern science and technology in East Asia, the zodiac and the ancient concepts of yin and yang are still a vital part of many people's ways of life and thought.

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ZONGULDAK (2002 est. city pop 119,000). The city of Zonguldak is the capital of the province (estimated population in 2002 of 684,000) of the same name. It is located on the Black Sea coast of northwestern Turkey in the country's main coal district. The city has been inhabited since 1200 BCE. The Lydians came into power in 6 BCE, followed by the Persians around 546 BCE. Alexander of Macedon defeated the Persians in 334 BCE. Zipoetes ruled the kingdom of Bitinia around Zonguldak from 326 BCE until the Roman conquest in 74 BCE. When the Roman empire was divided into two in 395 CE, Zonguldak fell into the eastern half. Following their victory at Manzikert, the Seljuks temporarily occupied the area, but it reverted to Byzantine rule in 1086. When the fourth Crusaders conquered Constantinople in 1204, Zonguldak became part of the Nicaean kingdom until the

Byzantines reconquered it and gave it to the Genoese. Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II (1432–1481) conquered the whole area in 1461, and Zonguldak has been under Turkish rule ever since.

The city lost its economic importance during Ottoman rule and remained a small village until the discovery of coal in the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1939 after the official openings of the steel and iron plant in Karabük and the electricity-generating plant in Çatalağzı, the province of Zonguldak regained its importance. The city of Zonguldak has one of the largest ports in Turkey and houses the Technical School of Mining.

T. Isikozlu-E. F. Isikozlu

ZOPFAN ZOPFAN, the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality, originated in a 1970 proposal by Malaysia for neutralizing Southeast Asia. The idea for such a zone has been attributed to Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra al-Haj (1903–1990), who was then a parliamentary backbencher (rank-and-file member of parliament) but later became the deputy prime minister of Malaysia. Calling for a neutrality system, the proposal had two levels of implementation. The first level specified that Southeast Asian nation-states adopt and practice nonaggression principles based on mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as finding different ways and means to ensure peace and security among themselves. For the second level of implementation, the major superpowers at the time, the United States, China, and the Soviet Union, were singled out as prospective guarantors for ensuring that the Southeast Asian region would not become an arena for conflict among these major countries. Furthermore, the superpowers were also called on to implement supervisory means to ensure the neutrality of Southeast Asia. The declaration emphasized regional cooperation in economic, social, and cultural matters, as well as support for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region to ensure peaceful and progressive national development.

The Malaysian government drove the process of gaining support for ZOPFAN by first broaching the proposal at the Non-Aligned Summit in Lusaka in September 1970. In 1971, the proposal was again raised at the Commonwealth Conference held in Singapore. The Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality Declaration, Malaysia, was signed by the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore, and by the special envoy of the National Executive Council of Thailand on 27 November 1971.

The proposal and subsequent declaration by the foreign ministers, however, received only limited support from the superpowers as well as from Malaysia's fellow member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, which in 1976 included Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, in addition to Malaysia; Brunei became part of ASEAN in 1984). Nevertheless, Malaysian officials pushed for two accords when the ASEAN member states met in Bali in 1976. These were the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation signed at Bali. The two documents fell short of neutralizing the ASEAN states and the region as a whole.

Yet the second document, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which is open to accession by other Southeast Asian states, was couched along lines that had been the basis of the proposal or plan for peace first mooted by Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra al-Haj. In the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the signatory countries agreed to be guided by the following principles in Article 2 of the treaty: mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations; the right of every state to exist free of external interference, subversion, or coercion; noninterference in one another's internal affairs; settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; renunciation of the threat or use of force; effective cooperation among themselves.

In Chapter 4 of the Treaty of Amity and Concord, there is provision for peaceful settlement of conflict through a high council of ministerial-level representatives, which would include the parties to a dispute. The treaty has been considered a significant inter-governmental effort at initiating and achieving a Southeast Asian pact on security cooperation.

ZOPFAN has not progressed very much beyond the conceptual beginnings and terms set down during the Bali meeting in 1976. ZOPFAN remains an intra-ASEAN policy, but over the years, the principles of the proposal and the subsequent Treaty of Amity and Concord have been contravened by non-ASEAN states.

In the 1990s, there has been a call for the revival and review of ZOPFAN. Such a review, according to some analysts, should recognize that while regional cooperation on security must be promoted, the emphasis on national sovereignty severely limits the realization of ZOPFAN, which needs states to submit to a supranational authority. Furthermore, the concept of ZOPFAN seems increasingly irrelevant in the post-Cold War era. ZOPFAN is extremely limited in

the contribution it can make toward the shaping or formulation of security arrangements and other such forms of regional cooperation among the member states of ASEAN.

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ZOROASTRIANISM Zoroastrianism (or Mazdaism) was born of a set of reforms attributed to the prophet Zarathushtra (in Greek, Zoroaster; traditional dates 628–551 BCE). A new ritual system gradually developed, revolving around a sacred fire, with a theology that envisions the world as an ongoing contest between good and evil. The religion originated around 1000 BCE in a pastoral society inhabiting what is now eastern Iran and Afghanistan, growing from archaic Indo-Iranian priestly ritual tradition, in which offerings of food and an invigorating plant juice (called soma in Old Indo-Iranian and Sanskrit; *haoma* in Avestan), directed to celestial divinities, were made in a ritual fire accompanied by poetic recitations. The religion survives in Iran and South Asia, with the total number of Zoroastrians worldwide at about 150,000. It is passed on mainly through family tradition; conversions are uncommon and are not sought.

Sources

Extant sources include the Avesta, compiled between the fourth and sixth centuries CE by priests, and recorded in the Avestan language by using a specially devised script based on the Aramaic script. The Old Avesta principally encompasses the *Gathas*, hymns traditionally ascribed to Zarathushtra himself and praising a supreme god, Ahura Mazda (Wise Lord; in Pahlavi, Hormazd). In language and meter they closely resemble the hymns of the Rig Veda of India, and many ideals of the Vedic religion appear in them. However in the Avesta the old Indo-Iranian gods (*daevas*) are relegated to the status of demons and are supplanted by a new class of divine entities who personify key Zoroastrian virtues. The Younger Avesta



Iranian Zoroastrian religious leader Jahangir Osheidari with Iranian president Mohammad Khatami in Tehran in October 2000. (AFP/CORBIS)

includes the *Yasbts* (hymns praising the divine entities), the *Vendidad* (a purity code), and several liturgical compilations of prayers. Only a small fraction of the original Avesta is thought to have survived.

Later but equally important are the Pahlavi texts written around the ninth and tenth centuries in the province of Fars in Persia. Notable among these are the *Zand*, a compendium of exegesis of the Avesta; the *Bundabishn*, presenting Zoroastrian cosmology and eschatology; the *Denkard* (Acts of Religion); and examples of didactic and catechistic teachings by eminent priests of the period, including the *Shkand-gumanig Vizar* (Teaching That Destroys Doubt), which demonstrates Zoroastrianism's superiority to Islam, Judaism, Christianity, and Manichaeism. In more recent centuries, collections of *Rivayat* (scholarly opinions on doctrinal, liturgical, and legal questions) have played an important role in adapting the tradition to changing times and in linking disparate communities of Zoroastrians.

The Old Persian inscriptions of the Achaemenid (sixth to fourth centuries BCE) and Sasanid (third to seventh centuries CE) dynasties provide invaluable information on the history of the tradition. Particularly important are the inscriptions of Kartir, high priest under the Sasanids, who helped establish Zoroastrianism as the state religion in the third century, and urged the vigorous suppression of other religions, such as Judaism, Nestorian Christianity, Buddhism, Manichaeism, and the Mandaean movement.

Theology and Cosmology

In the Zoroastrian religion the world is the scene of a continual struggle between truth (*asha*) and deceit (*druj*), forces personified in Spenta Mainyu (Benefi-

cent Spirit) and Angra Mainyu (Hostile Spirit; in Pahlavi, Ahriman), the children of Ahura Mazda. Alongside Spenta Mainyu are the six other Amesha Spentas (Beneficent Immortals), distinct entities embodying virtues: Vohu Manah (Good Thought), Asha Vahishta (Best Truth), Khshathra Vairya (Desirable Dominion), Spenta Armaiti (Beneficent Devotion), Haurvatat (Wholeness), and Ameretat (Immortality). Besides these, other "venerable beings" (*yazatas*) to whom *yasbts* are dedicated include Anahita, Mithra, Sraosha, and Rashnu, who sit in judgment over the soul after death; Verethraghna, who represents victory; and personifications of the sun, the moon, the star Sirius (called Tishtrya and associated with rain), and the wind.

After the soul is judged at death, it may tumble into hell, be relegated to "the region of the mixed" (limbo), or ascend via the stars, the moon, and the sun to heaven. Three days after death, the virtuous encounter their *daena*, a spiritual alter ego in the form of a girl. A final judgment is also envisioned in which a river of fire separates the good from the wicked, the world is transfigured, and the dead are revived and endowed with incorruptible bodies by means of a special offering to be performed by Saoshyant (the future savior).

Observances

Humanity, constantly faced with the choice between good and bad, true and untrue, can follow the *asha*, or truth, by adhering to the Zoroastrian purity code (canonized in the *Vendidad*) and by sponsoring performances of the fire-service (*yasna*), the central liturgy performed in the fire-temples (*atesh-gah*). The *haoma* drink, the offering itself, is prepared in the *paragra* rite. Then it is offered up while the *zot* priest recites the *yasna* chapters of the Avesta and the *raspi* priest fuels the fire.

Other important rites include the *naojot* (or *nozud*, "new birth"), the initiation of the seven- or ten-year-old child into religious responsibilities, symbolized by the putting on of a shirt (*sadre*) and waist-cord (*kusti*); *patet*, a penitential confession of sins; marriage; various purifications; and *zobr-i atash*, a funeral ceremony performed in the *dakhma* ("tower of silence"), where corpses are exposed to the elements. This latter rite involves pouring a libation of animal fat into the fire and is believed to release the soul of the deceased from the power of *druj* (implicit in bodily decay) and to send him or her along the path to heaven. The modern priestly hierarchy comprises the *mobed*, assisted by the *herbad*; major fire-temples are presided over by a *dastur*.

History

The tradition in the Younger Avesta developed under the Achaemenid empire's patronage of the priestly clan of the Magi, recorded in inscriptions of the Persian kings. In this cosmopolitan imperial setting Zoroastrianism was established more widely in Persia, in the regions of Fars and Media, and became the basis for a royal ideology, including the adoption in 441 BCE of the Zoroastrian calendar.

This period ended with Alexander of Macedon's conquest of Iran (323 BCE). In the following Seleucid period (312–246 BCE), when Alexander's generals ruled over large areas of his former empire, Hellenistic culture was an important influence in Zoroastrian circles, and Zoroastrian ideas were carried westward. They took the form of the mystery religion of Mithras in Greece and played a role in the development of dualistic Jewish and Christian doctrines. In the east Zoroastrianism interacted with Buddhism.

In the early third century CE Zoroastrianism was reestablished as the state religion of the Sasanid dynasty in Iran. After the Arab conquest of the seventh century, this period was remembered as a golden age, before Islam became the dominant religion. Despite the loss of many faithful to Islam, Zoroastrian culture remained vibrant, yielding a prolific literature in Pahlavi.

Attempts at revolt against Arab hegemony, however, led to repression, and from the tenth century, many Zoroastrians began an exodus to India, settling mainly along the western coast. These Parsis ("Persians"), as they are known in India, prospered and became the primary caretakers of the tradition. Toward the end of the fifteenth century formal contacts (in the form of *rivayat*) were forged between the Parsis and the remaining Zoroastrian communities in the regions of Yazd and Kerman in Iran.

Under British colonial rule in India the Parsis had a privileged position, and many became prosperous merchants and financiers. At the same time, the tradition was confronted with a welter of religious practices and theologies, leading to disputes between reformists and conservatives. The study of the Avesta by Western philologists beginning in the eighteenth century also gave rise to doctrinal disputes.

In 1947 with the partition of British India, the Parsis found themselves further separated into a small Pakistani community in Karachi and Lahore and the more numerous groups in India, with the largest concentration in Mumbai (Bombay). International conferences of Zoroastrians began to be held in 1960, as

the Zoroastrian community found itself becoming further dispersed internationally. Today the tradition continues its efforts to sustain the priesthood and adapt its traditions to new circumstances.

Timothy Lubin

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ZUO ZONGTANG (1812–1885), Chinese military leader and statesman. Born into a scholarly family in Hunan Province in 1812, Zuo Zongtang studied works in the fields of history, classics, geography, and agriculture in his early years. He participated in military affairs in 1852 in the campaign against the Taiping Rebellion and soon displayed his military ability and sagacity. In 1863 he was promoted to governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces and remained in this position until 1866. During this period, Zuo founded China's first modern dockyard and naval school in Fuzhou. In 1866 Zuo was appointed governor-general of Shaanxi and Gansu Provinces to suppress the Muslim rebels there. Between 1868 and 1880, Zuo suppressed Nian rebels in Shandong Province and Muslim rebels in northwestern China and consolidated China's northwestern frontier. He militarily sustained China's negotiation with Russia in recovering Yili, a Chinese territory occupied by Russia during the Muslim rebellion. He also carried out several important economic reforms, including the encouragement of the cotton industry in Xinjiang and mobilizing soldiers to farm unused land. In 1881 Zuo was appointed to serve in the Grand Council of the central government. Later, in 1884, he was once again

put in charge of all military affairs of China during the Sino-French War (1884–1885). After a settlement between China and France was reached, Zuo Zongtang died on 5 September 1885.

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